LAST UPDATE: MARCH 24TH, 2022

Theory and History of Ontology

Raul Corazzon

Theory and History of Ontology

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What's New: Last Update: March 24th, 2022.

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What's New on This Site: Recently Modified Pages

Recent updates

March 14th, 2022: Updated the Bibliography of Kit Fine (1970-2022).

March 7th, 2022: Updated the Selected Bibliography on Plato's *Sophist*.

February 24th, 2022: Updated the Selected Bibliography on Aristole's *Categories*.

February 2nd, 2022: Updated the Selected Bibliography on Bernard Bolzano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology.

November 29th, 2021: Updated the The Frege-Russell 'Is' ambiguity thesis: a bibliography.

November 4th, 2021: Updated the Annotated bibliography of the logical writings of Richard Sylvan (né Routley).

October 19th, 2021: Updated the bibliography on Being in Philosophy and Linguistics.

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Jean École:

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Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) Ontology and Semiotics. The Theory of Categories Bibliography of his writings and about his conception of semiotics and the theory of categories

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Reinhardt Grossmann (1931-2010) The Ontology of Categories

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The Ontological Realism of Panayot Butchvarov (1933) Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Iowa

The Conceptual Realism of Nino Cocchiarella (1933) Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Indiana University

Richard Sylvan [born Richard Routley] (1935-1996) Nonexistent Objects Selected bibliography with abstracts

Selected Bibliography of Richard Sylvan [*born* Richard Routley]

George Englebretsen's Contribution to the Rediscovery of Traditional Formal Logic Professor Emeritus at Bishop's University, Canada

Jon Barwise (1942-2000)

Jerzy Perzanowski (1943-2009) Modal Logics, Ontology and Ontologics Complete bibliography of the works in English with abstracts

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Kit Fine (1946) and the Ontology of Modal Actualism, Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics, New York University

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Unpublished Papers (available on line)

Kit Fine. Annotated bibliography of the studies on His Philosophy

Liliana Albertazzi (1947): Ontology and Psychology (1947) Principal Investigator at the University of Trento Centre for the Mind and Brain (CIMeC)

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Ontology: Its Role in Modern Philosophy

Introduction: A Working Definition

Ontology is the theory of objects and their ties. It provides criteria for distinguishing different types of objects (concrete and abstract, existent and nonexistent, real and ideal, independent and dependent) and their ties (relations, dependencies and predication). We can distinguish: a) *formal*, b) *descriptive* and c) *formalized* ontologies.

a) *Formal ontology* was introduced by Edmund Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* (1): according to Husserl, its object is the study of the genera of being, the leading regional concepts, i.e., the categories; its true method is the eidetic reduction coupled with the method of categorial intuition. The phenomenological ontology is divided into two: (I) Formal, and (II) Regional, or Material, Ontologies.

The former investigates the problem of truth on three basic levels: (a) Formal Apophantics, or formal logic of judgments, where the a priori conditions for the possibility of the doxic certainty of reason are to be sought, along with (b) the synthetic forms for the possibility of the axiological, and (c) "practical" truths. In other words it is divided into formal logic, formal axiology, and formal praxis.

In contemporary philosophy, formal ontology has been developed in two principal ways. The first approach has been to study formal ontology as a part of ontology, and to analyze it using the tools and approach of formal logic: from this point of view formal ontology examines the logical features of predication and of the various theories of universals. The use of the specific paradigm of the set theory applied to predication, moreover, conditions its interpretation.

This approach is best exemplified by Nino Cocchiarella; according to whom "Formal Ontology is the result of combining the intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal, mathematical method of modern symbolic logic, and ultimately of identifying them as different aspects of one and the same science. That is, where the method of ontology is the intuitive study of the fundamental properties, modes, and aspects of being, or of entities in general, and the method of modern symbolic logic is the rigorous construction of formal, axiomatic systems, formal ontology, the result of combining these two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all forms of being. As such, formal ontology is a science prior to all others in which particular forms, modes, or kinds of being are studied." (2)
The second line of development returns to its Husserlian origins and analyses the fundamental categories of *object, state of affairs, part, whole,* and so forth, as well as the relations between parts and the whole and their laws of dependence -- once all material concepts have been replaced by their correlative form concepts relative to the pure 'something'. This kind of analysis does not deal with the problem of the relationship between formal ontology and material ontology." (3).
b) *Descriptive ontology* concerns the collection of information about the list of objects that can be dependent or independent items (real or ideal).

c) *Formalized ontology* attempts to constructs a formal codification for the results descriptively acquired at the preceding levels.

Notes

(1) "To the best of my knowledge, the idea of a formal ontology makes its first literary appearance in Volume I of my *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900), [Chapter 11, *The Idea of Pure Logic*] in connexion with the attempt to explicate systematically the idea of a pure logic -- but not yet does it appear there under the name of formal ontology, which was introduced by me only later. The *Logische Untersuchungen* as a whole and, above all, the investigations in Volume II ventured to take up in a new form the old idea of an a priori ontology -- so strongly interdicted by Kantianism and empiricism -- and attempted to establish it, in respect of concretely executed portions, as an idea necessary to

philosophy." E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), English translation: The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, 27, p. 86.
(2) *Formal Ontology*, in: Barry Smith, Hans Burkhardt (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology,* Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991 p. 640.
(3) Liliana Albertazzi, *Formal and Material Ontology,* in: Roberto Poli, Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology,* Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996 p. 199 (notes omitted).

Major Ontologists

The main intellectual links from the major ontologists of Nineteenth century: Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), Franz Brentano (1838-1917), and Gottlob Frege (1848-9125) to contemporary thinkers are traced in the "Table of Ontologists":



For details see *Table of Ontologists of 19th and 20th Centuries*
Detailed information (bibliographies, abstract of relevant publications, and selections of critical judgments) for the thinkers mentioned in the *Table of Ontologists* are partly available and will be completed in the near future; I will publish also pages in French and Italian with selections of critical studies available in these languages, but not translated in English.
An important feature of this site will be the bibliographies about the history of ontology, selected authors and ontological topics that have not yet been covered in such detail; bibliographical entries will not only include the most relevant books, but also a selection of articles from about one hundred philosophical reviews; attention will be paid to the relations with logic, semantics and semiotics, in particular to the theories of predication and reference and to the relation between thought, language and the world.
The completion of this job will require some years; more than 15,000 bibliographic references are already available in the following languages, in decreasing order of frequency: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese; the Bibliographies will be constantly expanded and updated, and new abstracts of existing entries will be added.
I wish to apologize to readers of other languages, not included only because of my limited knowledge of foreign languages (my mother tongue is Italian), but I hope that students and researchers will find sufficient material for a more thorough study and will enjoy discovering many philosophical treasures, some little known, but in no way less significant.

Metaphysics and Theory of Objects

Metaphysics is the science that studies being *qua* being (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Gamma), in other words it considers reality, which is to say existent or actual objects; according to Alexius Meinong, the *theory of objects* is an a priori science which concerns the whole of what is given, existent or nonexistent. Existent objects must be distinguished from subsistent or ideal objects, such as identity, diversity, or number. Existence and subsistence are the two forms of being, whereas the 'pure object' considered in the theory of

objects is beyond being and nonbeing (*On the Theory of Objects*, 1904).
Before Meinong, the Polish philosopher Twardowski developed, according to Ingarden, in his *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation* (1894), "the first consistently constructed theory of objects manifesting a certain theoretical unity since the times of Scholasticism and the ' *Ontologia*' of Christian Wolff [1730]." (4)
"The relationship between Husserl's conception of ontology and the 'theory of objects' of Meinong has long been misunderstood. As conceived in the *Logical Investigations* [1900], the idea of ontology is not eidetic science of objects. The *mathesis universalis* is accordingly an ontology (only the word is avoided in the first edition). It is characterized as the a priori science of objects in general, and correlatively of meanings in general, i.e., of meanings which refer to objects in general. Inasmuch as that is brought out clearly in both volumes, Husserl observes that no one is justified in trying to instruct him with regard to the 'object-theoretical' character of formal logic and mathematics. Indeed, the third investigation is explicitly declared to belong to the 'a priori theory of objects as such,' and Husserl suggests that it is this passage that led to the formation of the undesirable expression ' *Gegenstandstheorie* [Theory of objects].' Ontology, or the theory of objects in the present sense, not only comprises all that relates to the field of the pure *mathesis universalis*, but includes the first volume as well as the third and fourth investigations of the second volume." (5)

Notes

(4) Roman Ingarden, *The Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski,* Studia Philosophica, 1947 pp. 23.

(5) Marvin Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943; reprint: Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006 pp. 205-206.

Formal Ontology as a Characteristica Universalis

"A system of logic can be constructed under two quite different aspects. On the one hand, it can be developed as a formal calculus and studied independently of whatever content it might be used to represent. Such a formal system in that case is only a *calculus ratiocinator*. On the other hand, a system of logic can be constructed somewhat along the lines of what Leibniz, called a *characteristica universalis*. Such a system, according to Leibniz, was to serve three main purposes. The first was that of an international auxiliary language that would enable the people of different countries to speak and communicate with one another. Apparently, because Latin was no longer a "living" language and new trade routes were opening up to lands with many different local languages, the possibility of such an international auxiliary language was widely considered and discussed in the 17th and 18th centuries. (...)
In any case notwithstanding its visionary goal, the idea of an international auxiliary language is not the purpose of a formal ontology. The second and third purposes Leibniz set for his *characteristica universalis* are what distinguish it from its precursors and give his program its formal or logistic methodology. The second purpose that the universal character is to be based upon an *ars combinatoria*, i.e. an ideography or system of symbolization, that would enable it to provide a logical analysis of all of the actual and possible concepts that might arise in science. Such an *ars combinatoria* would contain both a theory of logical form, i.e., a theory of all the possible forms that a meaningful expression might have in such a language, and a theory of definitional forms, i.e., a theory of the operations whereby one could construct new concepts on the basis of already given concepts. The third purpose was that the universal character must contain a *calculus ratiocinator*, and in particular a complete system of deduction and valid argument forms, by which, through a study of the consequences, or implications, of what was already known, it could serve as an instrument of knowledge. These two purposes are central to the notion of a formal ontology." (6).

Notes

(6) Nino Cocchiarella, *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism,* Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2007 pp. 4-5.

Different Approaches

Two definitions from philosophers of the Analytic tradition:
"Ontology is intimately related to metaphysics, the theory of ultimate categories of things. Andronicus of Rhodes coined *meta ta physica* as meaning the writings coming "after the physics" in his collation of Aristotle, but metaphysics is really the study with which those writings deal. Some might say that the categories are ultimate differentiations of being and that ontology is the study of undifferentiated being. Now insofar as metaphysics is the study of the nature and existence of broad categories of things, ontology is a branch of metaphysics by logical courtesy. It deals, paradoxically, with the nature and existence of the "category" of undifferentiated being. But strictly speaking, ontology is transcategorial. Of course, if we say, "To be is to be material," we do equate the study of being with the study of matter. But the equation is transcategorial in its very elimination of all categories other than matter. Of course, some ontologists admit different kinds or degrees of being. But even if every metaphysical category is also a kind of being and *viceversa*, so that the words "metaphysics" and " ontology" are coextensive, those words are still not synonymous. Certainly when they are used as I have explained them, they are not intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in every context of discussion.
What does the objective world include? Common-sensically, it divides into many objects: the Sun, the Moon, stars, trees, people, and so on. We also speak and think about thoughts, smiles, numbers, and many other things. There are many similarities and differences among all these things, and this makes hierarchies of classifications possible. Leo the lion and Felix the cat are both feline, and so on. Insofar as our classificatory purposes may vary, the genera of one system may be the differentia of another. Humans compared to cats are generically animal and differentially rational; humans compared to angels are generically rational and differentially animal. (...)
Any system of classifications, on pain of admitting an infinite series of classifications, will end with summa genera or ultimate classifications. This is the level of metaphysical categories. Where

change consists of something of a given kind losing old properties and acquiring new ones, nothing can conceivably change in its metaphysical category. It is conceivable that Socrates can fall asleep, learn things, or even change into a rock or tree. But it is not conceivable that Socrates can change into time or into a number. We are not able to describe such transitions because we find nothing generically underlying them to persist through or undergo the transition. Perhaps that is only because such logic-metaphysical substrata have not been found yet in any plausible classificatory system. But I suspect the reason is that our most fundamental classifications are, at least in part, correct." (7).

"The word "ontology" has four established meanings in philosophy. There are two intersecting sets of distinctions. Pure philosophical ontology is different from applied scientific ontology, and ontology in the applied scientific sense can be understood either as a discipline or a domain.

Ontology as a discipline is a method or activity of enquiry into philosophical problems about the concept or facts of existence. Ontology as a domain is the outcome or subject matter of ontology as a discipline. Applied scientific ontology construed as an existence domain can be further subdivided as the theoretical commitment to a preferred choice of existent entities, or to the real existent entities themselves, including the actual world considered as a whole, also known as the extant domain. Ontology as a theoretical domain is thus a description or inventory of the things that are supposed to exist according to a particular theory, which might but need not be true. Ontology as the extant domain, in contrast, is the actual world of all real existent entities, whatever these turn out to be, identified by a true complete applied ontological theory. As a result, we must be careful in reading philosophical works on ontology, when an author speaks of "ontology" without qualification, not to confuse the intended sense of the word with any of the alternatives." (8).

In: *A Short Glossary of Metaphysics* by Peter Simons with additional entries by Ross P. Cameron (*), the following definition is given:

"ONTOLOGY. From *onto-logos*, the science of being. A surprisingly late coinage. The Latin term *ontologia* was felicitously invented in 1613, independently, by two German philosophers, Rudolf Gockel (Goclenius) in his *Lexicon*

Philosophicum and Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), in his *Theatrum Philosophicum*, but first entered general circulation when popularized by Christian Wolff in his Latin writings, especially his *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia* of 1730. The first known English use of the term "ontology" is 1720. (1) General as distinct from special metaphysics. (2) More limitedly, the list or table of basic kinds of entities. (3) Attributively, as in "Quine's ontology," the basic kinds of entities assumed by a given philosopher. (4) In Ingarden's philosophy, the study of all possible general arrangements of the world, by comparison with metaphysics which concerns only what actually exists. (5) Recently and loosely, in computer science, a set of categories for programming and data representation which is independent of particular hardware, software or implementations."

This definition is historically inaccurate: the Latin word *ontologia* was created in 1606 by Lorhard (seven years before Gockel) and the first occurrence of "ontology" in English can be found in a work by Gideon Harvey of 1663 (see "Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant").

(*) Appendix to: *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics*. Edited by Robin Le Poidevin Robin et al. New York: Routledge 2009, pp. 590-591.

Notes

(7) Jan Dejnožka, *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and Quine*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, p. 7.

(8) Dale Jacquette, *Ontology,* Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queens's University Press, 2002, pp. 2-3.

Main Currents in Contemporary Philosophy

After Kant's rejection of the possibility of a general ontology (1), Bernard Bolzano was the first philosopher who contributed to the

new ontological turn, but is work was rediscovered only in the Twentieth century by Husserl (2).
Bolzano's work influenced both Husserl (a disciple of Franz Brentano) and Frege, that are at the origins of the main traditions of contemporary ontology: the *Phenomenological*, the *Analytical*, and the *Austro-Polish* (Brentano was also the teacher of Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School); the first work of Brentano *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862) and the *Logical Investigations* (1900) by Husserl were at the origin of the interest in philosophy of the most authoritative exponent of *Continental* ontology, Martin Heidegger (3).

Phenomenological

Bolzano and Brentano can be considered the forerunners of this School, founded by Edmund Husserl; the main exponents are Adolf Reinach, Roman Ingarden and Nicolai Hartmann.

Analytical

After C. S. Peirce and the classical works by Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein, at least Rudolf Carnap, Gustav Bergmann, Nelson Goodman and W.V.O. Quine should be mentioned.

Austro-Polish

The father of Polish philosophy was Twardowski; Kotarbinski and Lesniewski are ontologists of the first Polish generation (the Lvov-Warsaw School) and Roman Suszko and Jerzy Perzanowski of the most recent times.

Continental

After Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Deleuze and Foucault, just to mention a few names, are the most debated thinkers; other prominent ontologists are listed in the *Table of Formal and Descriptive Ontologists*.

Notes

(1) "The Transcendental Analytic accordingly has this important result: That the understanding can never accomplish *a priori* anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience

in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely principles e of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding." I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (A247/B304), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 358-359.

(2) "With such illogicality did things happen in the history of logic which we are pursuing here that this great, born logician fell prey to a fate which beats the fate of Joachim Jungius. For the latter at least was read, and read by a Leibniz; but that cannot even be said of Bolzano. Hence we cannot even maintain in his case that he was forgotten. All the greater is the merit of Edmund Husserl who discovered Bolzano." Hermes Scholz, *Concise History of Logic* (1931), English translation: New York: Philosophical Library, 1961, p. 47.

(3) "The first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle*." Martin Heidegger, Preface to: William Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. p. X.

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"Parmenides began Philosophy proper." G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I Greek Philosophy to Plato*, (1825), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1995, p. 254

"In the beginning of Western thinking, the saying of Parmenides speaks to us for the first time of what is called thinking." Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* (1954), New York: Harper & Row 1967, p. 196

INTRODUCTION

This page is dedicated to an analysis of the first section of Parmenides' Poem, the *Way of Truth,* with a selection of critical judgments by the most important commentators and critics.
In the *Annotated Bibliography* (see the links at the end of the page) I list the main critical editions (from the first printed edition of 1573 to present days) and the translations in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish, and I give a selection of recent studies on Parmenides; in future, a section will be dedicated to an examination of some critical variants of the Greek text, with particular attention to corrections to the Diels-Kranz (abbreviated DK) edition of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.
The fragments of Parmenides' Poem are cited according to Diels-Kranz numbering system as adopted in the 6th edition, Berlin 1952; the Poem is divided into three parts: the *Proem* fr. I, 1-32; the *Way of Truth* (*Alethéia*) from fr. II to VIII, 49, and the *Way of Mortal Opinion* (*Doxa*) fr. VIII, 50 to XIX, 3.
Complete references of the texts cited are given in the *Annotated Bibliography*.

THE QUESTION OF BEING IN PARMENIDES' POEM

"The problem of being was first posed in the West by the Greek Parmenides in the fifth century B.C. (...)
Parmenides flourished in Elea, a Greek colony on the west coast of Italy, south of the Gulf of Salerno. The colony had been founded about 540 B.C. by Greeks from Ionia, who evidently brought with them the Ionian interest in the origin and development of the visible universe. At any rate, some fifty years after the foundation of the colony, a philosophical poem composed by Parmenides handed down the first recorded Western attempt to account for the universe in terms of being, instead of through the Ionian way of change and growth. This poem of Parmenides had far-reaching effects on subsequent philosophic development, as is amply attested in later Greek

writings. It continued to be read for about a thousand years, and its tenets were discussed penetratingly by thinkers of the stature of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Its influence on the thought of lesser figures is apparent. By the time the last copy of the complete poem had disappeared it had been quoted so abundantly by other writers that the sections and verses copied allow the general structure of the poem to be reestablished and permit the characteristic tenets attributed in tradition to Parmenides to be studied in the fragments themselves.

The poem had three parts, which formed a unified whole. The fragments that remain show how the second part followed in express sequence upon the first, and the third in express sequence upon the second. The first part was an introduction or proem, the second dealt with being, and the third with the way things appear to men. The composition fits into a recognized literary genre of the time. Somewhat as in Hesiod's *Theogony* (1-108) the goddesses appear to the poet at the foot of their sacred mountain and impart to him the truth about the way the immortal gods came into being, so Parmenides in the proem of his work introduces himself as being borne along in a chariot guided by sun maidens who 'leaving behind the dwellings of night, sped me toward light' (Fr. 1.9-10; DK, 28 B). There Parmenides is warmly welcomed by a goddess into her home. She tells him he is to learn from her 'all things, both the unwavering heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true assurance.' (4) The two other sections of the poem go on then to show him first what the truth is, and second how things appear as they do to mortal men.

The tenses used by Parmenides in the proem indicate clearly enough that he was describing a journey made regularly, quite as a philosopher repeatedly journeys into the regions of his thought. (5) In consequence the poem is meant to describe the travel of the philosopher in his own proper world. The road traveled is characterized as "far away from the wandering of men. (6) On it Parmenides is to learn first the truth about all things, and then how the contrasted appearances are able to penetrate all in a way that makes them so readily acceptable to human cognition.(7) The contrast is clear between truth and appearance. Things are considered to appear to men in a way radically different from

what the truth about them reveals. In this framework the second section of the poem intends to explain the truth, while the third section will explain how things are able to appear to men in a way different from the truth about them. The proem envisages truth as something unwavering, something firm and stable. The way men ordinarily think is, on the contrary, wandering,' unstable. Appearance -- the ordinary thinking of mortals -- is in this manner sharply contrasted with the inspired teaching of the goddess.

The fragment accepted as second in order, listed immediately after the proem and consequently as the first statement in our record of the poem's section on being, states that only two ways of inquiry can be thought of. One is that (it) is and that (for it) not to be is impossible. This is the way that follows truth. The other is that (it) is not and that (for it) not to be is of necessity. This path offers no possibility whatever for inquiry, since non-being cannot possibly be known or expressed (Fr. 2). The fragment accepted as third then gives the reason in a rather cryptic statement that translated word for word reads "For the same thing is to think and to be" (Fr. 3).

These assertions maintain that being follows upon or accompanies truth. Truth, as envisaged in the proem, is accordingly to be given in terms of being. The stability or firmness required by the proem is here couched in the necessity involved by being. Being necessarily excludes non-being. No stronger type of stability could be found. This necessity is seen extended to everything that can be thought of or expressed. All that remains outside it is non-being, which likewise involves its own impossibility and in consequence is a path of inquiry that cannot even be entered. The basic reason given in the fragment is that non-being cannot possibly be known or expressed. If the third fragment followed immediately, it would confirm this reason with a positive statement: what is able to be known and what is able to be are the same thing.(8) That is the minimal bearing of the fragment, and seems entirely appropriate at this initial stage of the reasoning. So understood it appeals to an immediate evidence, namely, that whatever is known is known as a being. If you try to represent non-being you find it impossible.

Translated as "For thinking and being are the same," Fragment 3 gives a maximal sense that may well turn out to be in accord with Parmenides' overall thought. But can it be regarded as an immediate evidence?
Is it not rather part of a conclusion that being is a whole and is identified with all things, including thought? If that is its meaning, should not the fragment be located later in the poem, and not at the beginning of the
second section? Located immediately after Fragment 2, it should express a basic evidence that shows why the path of non-being cannot even be entered. This evidence is the immediate experience that whatever is thought of is necessarily thought of and expressed in terms of being. In consequence the alleged path of non-being cannot offer any possibility for inquiry.
However, mortals do in fact travel a path different from that of truth. It is readily observable. It seems to wander back and forth between being and non-being. It seems to assess them as the same yet not the same
(Fr. 6). Ordinary custom is regarded as urging men toward it. Yet it as well as the path of non-being is forbidden to Parmenides. Instead, he is told by the goddess to judge by reason (logos) the controversial argument
given in her words (Fr. 7). The way of being is then sketched (Fr. 8). It shows that what exists cannot be engendered or destroyed and that it cannot change or be subject to differentiation, for any of these would
require the presence of non-being. Being is accordingly whole and entire, held firmly within its limits, neither more nor less in any direction. For it all things will be a name (or, in regard to it all things are named),(9) "whatever mortals have established believing that they are true, that they come to be and perish, that they are and are not, that they change in place and vary through range of bright color" (Fr. 8.39-41).
What is the notion of being that is offered under this rather difficult phrasing? It is something that necessarily excludes non-being from its range, and on the other hand includes everything that is or exists. Any
distinction between "is" and "exists" is bound to prove futile in this context. There are only two sides to the division. One is utter

nothingness, and cannot even be thought of. All else, whether expressed in terms of being or in terms of existence, falls on the other side.

But precisely what is it that is or exists? In most cases no subject at all is expressed in the Greek. In those cases in which it is expressed, the participial or infinitive form of the verb "to be" is used. Nothing other than being seems envisaged as the subject. The question accordingly returns to the original formulation: What is the notion of being that is intended in the phrases of Parmenides? Modern views differ widely.(10) However, the text does not give any subject other than being, and usually does not feel any necessity to express even that. This indicates plainly that Parmenides is seeing no distinction in fact between being and the subject that is or exists. They are regarded by him as one and the same. He writes as though this is a matter of immediate intuition. If this analysis of the beginning of the section on being is correct, Parmenides is immediately intuiting being as something necessarily different from non-being. It is a matter of just looking and seeing. You see at once that you think in terms of being, and cannot think or express non-being. Under intense philosophical scrutiny, being seems intuited after the manner in which the ordinary mortal considers himself to be intuiting color or extension or movement.

But precisely what is this being that is so intuited? Is it something corporeal or something incorporeal, something ideal or something real? The historical background against which Parmenides did his thinking would tend to limit it to the corporeal and the real. The Ionian as well as the Pythagorean thought which Parmenides could be expected to have absorbed as he grew up could hardly have directed his attention to anything beyond the visible and extended world. It was that world that his predecessors had been striving to understand and explain. It is that world that Parmenides expressly endeavors to understand and explain in the final section of his poem. He offers, it is true, an unexpected and utterly original explanation of it. But nothing else in all the poem seems indicated as the object of his study. In the setting in which Parmenides thought and wrote, anything other than the visible and tangible universe would seem incongruous as a subject for philosophizing. In the composition of

the poem, moreover, the proem envisages Parmenides as located in a world of change and highly differentiated objects, and using them as a means to rise to light. The starting point of the philosophical journey seems in this way to be represented as a world of plurality and change, a world already known in the opinions of mortals but now to be explained from the viewpoint of truth." (pp. 17-21)

Notes

(4) Fr. 1.28-30 See Tarán, *Parmenides*, on the controversies about the meaning of these lines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) pp. 210-216.
(5) See Tarán pp. 9-13.
(6) Fr. 1.27 translated by Tarán p. 9; cfr. p. 16
(7) Fr. 1.31-32. On the problems in these two lines, see Tarán, pp. 211-15; and Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 194-219.
(8) On the translations of the fragment, see Tarán, pp. 41-44; also Mourelatos, pp. 165-80, on the parallel statement at Fr. 8.34-36.
(9) See Leonard Woodbury, "Parmenides on Names,"*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958) : 145-60; reprinted, with slight revisions, in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. John P. Anton and George L. Kustas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), pp. 145-62. Tarán's views are discussed in the revised version, p. 161, n. 29a; cf. p. ,60, n. 18a. A coverage of the topic at about the same time may be found in Mourelatos, pp. 181-91.
(10) For a survey and discussion, see Tarán, pp. 33-36; Mourelatos, pp. 269– 76; Leo Sweeney, *Infinity in the Presocratics* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 93-110. In solidarity with proem, Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides,"*Review of Metaphysics* 22 (1969) : 710, views the subject as "the knowable."

From: Joseph Owens, *Being in Early Western Tradition,* in: Mervyn Sprung (ed.), *The Question of Being*. *East-West Perspectives,* University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995.

"Parmenides of Elea, a revolutionary and enigmatic Greek philosophical poet, was the earliest defender of Eleatic metaphysics. He argued for the essential homogeneity and changelessness of being, rejecting as spurious the world's apparent variation over space and time. His one poem, whose first half largely survives, opens with the allegory of an intellectual journey by which Parmenides has succeeded in standing back from the empirical world. He learns, from the mouth of an unnamed goddess, a dramatically new perspective on being. The goddess's disquisition, which fills the remainder of the poem, is divided into two parts; the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming. The Way of Truth is the earliest known passage of sustained argument in Western philosophy. First a purportedly exhaustive choice is offered between two 'paths' - that of being, and that of not-being. Next the not-being path is closed off the predicate expression '... is not' could never be supplied with a subject, since only that-which-is can be spoken of and thought of. Nor, on pain of self-contradiction, can a third path be entertained, one which would conflate being with not-being - despite the fact that just such a path is implicit in the ordinary human acceptance of an empirical world bearing a variety of shifting predicates. All references, open or covert, to not-being must be outlawed. Only '... is' (or perhaps '... is ... ') can he coherently said of anything.

The next move is to seek the characteristics of that-which-is. The total exclusion of not-being leaves us with something radically unlike the empirical world. It must lack generation, destruction, change, distinct parts, movement and an asymmetric shape, all of which would require some not-being to occur. That-which-is must, in short, be a changeless and undifferentiated sphere.

In the second part of the poem the goddess offers a cosmology - a physical explanation of the very world which the first half of the poems has banished as incoherent. This is based on a pair of ultimate principles or elements, the one light and fiery, the other heavy and dark. It is presented as convening the 'opinions of mortals'. It is deceitful, but the goddess nevertheless recommends learning it, 'so that no opinion of mortals may outstrip you'." (p. 229)

The motive for the radical split between the two halves of the poem has been much debated in modern times. In antiquity the Way of Truth was taken by some as a challenge to the notion of change, which physics must answer, by others as the statement of a profound metaphysical truth, while the Way of Seeming was widely treated as in some sense Parmenides' own *bona fide* physical system." (Vol. VII, p. 229)

From: David Sedley, *Parmenides (early to mid 5th century B.C.)* in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* New York: Routledge 1998.

"Parmenides expressed his ideas in a poem, but his work has been irreparably lost for at least fifteen centuries. Nothing remains of Parmenides' original Poem. The work was probably written at the end of the sixth or beginning of the fifth century B.C. Without any doubt, it was copied and recopied (always by hand) over the course of many years, but all traces of it were lost in the sixth century of our era, that is, practically a millennium after it was written by Parmenides. The last concrete reference to the book appears in the neo-Platonic philosopher Simplicius (who is known to have left Athens in 526 A.D. because the Platonic Academy was closed down).
After quoting some lines from the Poem, Simplicius explains that he is taking that liberty 'because of the rarity (*dià ten spânin*) of Parmenides' book' (*Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, p. 144) From then on, nothing is known about Parmenides' work. (...) Attempts to reconstruct Parmenides' Poem began shortly after the Renaissance, but although they were very praiseworthy, there were classical texts still unknown at that time, and the quotations from Parmenides contained in them were not discovered until several centuries later. These attempts at reconstruction go from Henri Estienne (*Poesis philosophica*, 1573) to Hermann Diels (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 1903). Thanks to their work, which went on over many centuries, today we can read a good part of Parmenides' Poem. Nineteen different quotations were found (one of them translated into Latin!). These were unfortunately labeled 'fragments,' which is why, for the sake of convenience, works on Parmenides speak about 'fragment 3' or

'fragment 5'. As each fragment includes a number of lines, it is customary to write 'fr. 8.34', for example, when quoting line 34 of 'fragment' 8.
From what I have said, it can be seen that the version of Parmenides' Poem we possess is not complete. Passages that weren't quoted by anybody will remain unknown forever. Of course, the authors we use today as sources (perhaps abusively, because these authors were writing to express their own ideas, rather than to leave testimonies of other thinkers, except in the case of historians' of thought such as Theophrastus) quoted only those passages that interested them. There is nothing more subjective than a scholar's interest. A paradigmatic case is the vital Parmenides text, our present fragment 2, which postulates the existence of being, quoted for the first time by Proclus (*In Tim*. 1.345) a thousand years after it was written. Probably the discovery of the fact of being by Parmenides seemed so 'obvious' that nobody thought to quote it. Perhaps the same thing happened with other passages of the Poem; we will never know. Even so, today we possess nearly 152 lines of Parmenides, and these are an inexhaustible source of reflection. So let us take advantage of them." (pp. 12-14 notes omitted)

From: Néstor-Luis Cordero, *By Being, It Is. The Thesis of Parmenides,* Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2004.

"Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius have preserved to us the most important fragments from the poems of Parmenides; for Parmenides also propounded his philosophy as a poem.
The first long fragment in Sextus (*adv. Mat*. VII, 111) is an allegorical preface to his poem on Nature. This preface is majestic; it is written after the manner of the times, and in it all there is an energetic, impetuous soul which strives with being to grasp and to express it." (Vol. I, p. 250)
(...)
Since in this an advance into the region of the ideal is observable, Parmenides began Philosophy proper. A man now constitutes himself free from all ideas and opinions, denies their truth, and says necessity alone, Being, is the truth. This beginning is certainly still dim and indefinite, and we cannot say much of what

it involves; but to take up this position certainly is to develop Philosophy proper, which has not hitherto existed. The dialectic that the transient has no truth, is implied in it, for if the determinations are taken as they are usually understood, contradictions ensue." (Vol. I, p. 254)

From: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1968 (reprint of 1892 edition).

RELATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF PARMENIDES AND HERACLITUS

External evidence.
Most of what is needful to say on this subject has been said recently with exemplary clarity by M. Marcovich.(1) Once the workings of the mind of the Hellenistic chronological versifier Apollodorus are understood, the ancient external evidence for the date of Heraclitus is seen to be mere fabrication, with no visible foundation in fact. It follows that it cannot be used to date Heraclitus before Parmenides, any more than it can be used to date Heraclitus absolutely. The date of Heraclitus must rest purely on conjecture, and his relative chronology must rest on internal evidence, for whatever such evidence may turn out to be worth. Few oddities in the history of scholarship have so piquant an irony as the still all-too-frequent reliance on the external evidence to date Parmenides after Heraclitus.
Apollodorus dated Heraclitus in the sixty-ninth Olympiad, placing his ἀκμή at that time. Evidence for this is to be found in Diogenes Laertius, the *Suda*, and (possibly with less accuracy) in Eusebius' Canon.(2) The form it takes in the *Suda* has apparently been responsible for some unwary theorizing. The *Suda* says, after giving Heraclitus' Olympiad, that this was in the time of Darius the son of Hystaspes. So far as I can see, it is on this basis and on no other that Jacoby, discussing this part of Apollodorus, supposed the chronologer to have derived Heraclitus' date not

only from a well-known synchronism with Parmenides but also from good evidence that connected Heraclitus with this particular king of Persia. Jacoby supposed that Apollodorus for this reason fixed Heraclitus in the middle of Darius' reign. All this is baseless. No one has ever shown that any tradition of Heraclitus' connection with Darius ever existed before the forged Letters of Heraclitus or that these Letters rested on a genuine tradition of such a connection. Jacoby apparently relied upon a passage of Clement of Alexandria(3) to show the existence of such an independent tradition, but there is no reason, chronological or other, to doubt that the very learned Clement had access to the Letters or to some intermediary source. What the *Suda*'s source was, we can only guess, but there is no need to postulate one earlier than, or independent of, the Letters. The Letters themselves could easily be explained as reflecting not a tradition but a forger's romantic notion, the choice of Persian king being based on—of course, the Apollodoran chronology of Heraclitus and (doubtless) of Darius the Great. The Hellenistic age sometimes (not unnaturally) expected its philosophers to be so unworldly as to refuse royal invitations and readily projected its notions into the past; the biographies of the philosophers are full of romances of this sort.

This being so, there is no shadow of a reason for supposing Apollodorus to have been motivated in his dating of Heraclitus by anything but the above-mentioned synchronism with Parmenides. Placing Xenophanes' *floruit* at the foundation date of Elea, Apollodorus no doubt recognized not only Parmenides but also Heraclitus as pupils of Xenophanes (4) and therefore placed the birth of each in the year of their master's *floruit*, giving them a *floruit* forty years later. Heraclitus was sometimes regarded as a pupil of Xenophanes, and the interval between them is duly ten Olympiads, if the majority of our sources have the correct numbering. There is no good reason to doubt that such was Apollodorus' motivation: it would be entirely consistent with what else we know of his work.

But the majority of scholars now cast doubt, and rightly so, on the Apollodoran dating of Parmenides.(5) The evidence of Plato's Parmenides shows pretty conclusively that, in the fourth century at least, Parmenides was thought to have been born about a

generation later than Apollodorus reckoned; Kirk and Raven plausibly suggest a date of birth for Parmenides of "about 515-510."(6) The normal acceptance of this doctrine shows how little value is normally placed on the constructions of Apollodorus.
Yet it is still that same chronology of Apollodorus that is invoked to place Heraclitus before Parmenides. We are confronted with the ironic truth that a dating originally designed with the purpose of making these two philosophers contemporaries is now used to put one many years before the other. It has not been sufficiently observed that, if Apollodorus could be wrong by twenty-five years on Parmenides, he could be equally
wrong on Heraclitus. It has not been sufficiently observed that references by Heraclitus to other writers do not serve to date him exactly and certainly do not allow us to choose between. (say) 490 and (say) 485 for the composition or first dissemination of his work.(7) Nor is there any good evidence to show at what time of his life Parmenides first wrote or recited his poem.(8) For this also we cannot tell whether (say) 485 or (say) 480 is the date on which it would be safest to bet. Scholarly guessing in this particular case is worthless. So far as the external evidence goes, we do not know, and should freely admit that we do not know, whether Heraclitus wrote before Parmenides and, if he did, whether it was sufficiently before Parmenides' composition to have had any effect on him. If we are to be told these things, it will have to be on the basis of internal evidence alone. Furthermore, that internal evidence will have to be taken from the extant remains of Parmenides and Heraclitus themselves, and of them alone. The references to Heraclitus by other writers and the imitations of Parmenides by later thinkers offer us no useful dating for the philosophical activity of either. Epicharmus? If we knew the date of the plays in question, were sure that the fragments were authentic, and also knew how long it would take Heraclitus' work to become known in Sicily and Italy, we should be able to use the evidence of Epicharmus; but we are sure of none of these things, and, if we were, we should still have to show that Epicharmus' jokes were not sufficiently comprehensible without any reference to Heraclitus—a point on which the learned differ and will no doubt continue to differ.(9) All in all, it will be more profitable to discuss the actual argument of Parmenides and

see if at any point it clearly reflects a knowledge of Heraclitus' work or doctrine.(10)" (pp. 109-111)

Notes

(1) Marcovich s.v. Herakleitos, cols. 247ff.
(2) D. L. 9.1, *Suda* s.v. *Ἡράκλειτος*', Euseb. *Chron*. s. Ol. 70.1 (for variants see Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*, Berlin 1902, p. 229 n. 4).
(3) Clem. Al., *Strom*. 1.65.4 (p. 41 Stahlin-Fruchtel), see Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*, p. 228 n. 3. Jacoby himself demolishes Bernays' contentions that Epictetus referred to Heraclitus' connection with Darius at *Ench*. 21 W., that Eudemus referred to it also, and that it was probably in any case historical. Most of what Bernays said on this topic (*Die Heraklitischen Briefe*, Berlin 1869, pp. 13f) is uncharacteristically in the air. Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung,* I Teil, Leipzig, 1919-20, p. 914 n. 2), admitting that Bernays' remarks did not make the Persian invitation to Heraclitus more than a possibility, suggested that the forged letters proved the story known beforehand to their author. A clear *non sequitur*, surprisingly accepted by Kirk, *Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1954 p. 1. Heinemann at RE Suppl. 5 col. 229 plausibly suggested that the tale of Darius' invitation to Heraclitus was an imitation of the late story concerning Diogenes and Alexander the Great, for which the first extant source is Cicero (see Natorp at RE 5 col. 767)."
(4) Cf Sotion ap. D. L. 9.5. and *Suda* s.v. *Ἡράκλειτος* (cited by Jacoby).
(5) To take only English examples, see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th edition, London 1930 pp. 169f; Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* 2nd impression, Cambridge 1960 (much more cautiously) pp. 263 f.; Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge 1962, vol. II pp. If.
(6) See last note; Jacoby was prepared (*Apollodors Chronik*, p. 233) to stretch the limit for Parmenides' birth as far back as 520; I know nothing solid against this.
(7) Marcovich (s.v. *Herakleitos*, cols. 248f) remarks with justice that Ion of Chios and the vaticinium post eventum of *Letter 4*

supply termini ante quem to place Heraclitus at any rate in the first half of the fifth century. But whether Heraclitus' interest in Pythagoras and Hecataeus is sufficient to place his activity around 490 is doubtful: both these thinkers were the object of much interest later in the century, and we are in no position on this account to rule out a date for Heraclitus' writing as late as (say) 480.
(8) The suggestion (e.g., Kirk and Raven p. 268) that the goddess' address to Parmenides as κουρε dates the poem in Parmenides' youth is rash; see Taran, *Parmenides*, Princeton 1965, p. 16.
(9) For bibliography see Marcovich s.v. *Herakleitos*, col. 249.
(10) This procedure is in effect followed by Calogero, *Eraclito,* at Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 4 (1936) 195, who accepts that Heraclitus and Parmenides were contemporaries, if not coevals.

From: Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, Washington, D.C., Center for Hellenic Studies 1971.

ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS IN PARMENIDES' POEM

"If we are to examine Parmenides' reasoning profitably, an indispensable preliminary is to establish at least a provisional reading for the Greek words translated "is" or "it is" (*esti*), "what is" or "being" (*on, to on*), "to be" (*einai*). For while it is evident enough that in his poem Parmenides purports to be delivering an insight of the utmost significance concerning to *eon* (as he calls it), still the construction which he puts upon the term and its cognates, and the understanding which he expects of his listener, are not so clear and have been topics of dispute.
Especially notable, and often noted, is the fact that Parmenides' discussion of 'being' shows no sign of the conceptual distinction considered elementary nowadays, between the "is" linking subject and predicate and the "is" of existence; and in fact it needs no documentation here that this distinction was not reflected in

either ordinary or philosophical Greek idiom until, at least, a much later date than his, the word *esti* expressing both concepts. Also highly visible in the poem is the abundance of occurrences of *esti* used absolutely, unaccompanied by any predicate expression. As a result of this last, the poem can create in the contemporary reader the impression that to eon is being used to mean 'what is' in the existential sense only, to mean what there is; indeed some students of the poem conclude not only that Parmenides is unwittingly confining himself to the existential meaning, but even that his confusion on this score is responsible for his entire doctrine. (2)

Such scant basis as there is for the latter idea will be adequately treated below; (3) but it is important to understand from the outset that the notion of 'being' studied by Parmenides and by early Greek philosophy in general, is not 'confined' to either of our two distinct concepts, that of existence and that of being something-or-other in the sense of having such-and-such properties (being a man, being green); rather, these notions are impacted or *fused* in the early Greek concept of being. A result is that a Greek inquiry *ti to on*, 'what is being?', frequently must be interpreted as concerned simultaneously with the concepts of being = existence and of 'being Φ ' for variable Φ. To approach a Greek thinker, even as late as Aristotle, without keeping this in mind is to risk serious misunderstanding of his concerns.

This fusion of the ideas of existence and of being-of-a-certain-sort does not merely show itself in the early use of the word *esti*, but seems to be part of a more general situation having other manifestations also; these have such close bearings on the interpretation of Parmenides that the matter should be explored a little further. First let us recall -- what has often been pointed out -- tendency in ancient philosophy, (a) to take as the ideal or paradigm form of fact-stating assertion the ascription of a property to an object, and the further tendency (b) to take as the ideal or paradigm form of ascription of a property to an object the use of a subject-predicate sentence with subject and predicate linked by the copula. (5) In this way the predicative use of *esti* can come to be thought of as paradigmatic for asserting that anything at all is the case, or obtains. And once we see this we can discern a

considerable variety of assimilations at points where nowadays it is customary to make distinctions; thus, a running together of
1a) being-the case (*on*) with (1b) existence (*on*),
2a) facts (*pragmata, tynchanonta, etc.)* with (2b) objects (*pragmata, tynchanonta, etc.*)
3a) coming-to-be (the case) (*gigenesthai*) with (3b) coming-to-be (= coming to exist) (*gignesthai*).
Parallel to the fusion of the notions of fact and object as items of the world, is a tendency at the semantical level to run together properties of sentences with properties of singular and general terms. Here the common element is an expression's 'corresponding (or failing to correspond) to something that is' in the two senses of "is"; thus *truth* for sentences, describing what is (the case), can tend to fuse with *applying to something* for singular and general terms, denoting something that is (= exists), and conversely falsehood for sentences tends to merge with failure to apply to anything for terms. In this case the assimilation is rather conceptual than fully visible in the vocabulary; for example, terms (*onomata*) that apply to or denote something are not for this reason (6) called "true" (*alethe*); the fusion is evidenced when the notions are being explained: thus truth as 'saying, indicating in speech, that which is,' and falsehood as 'saying, indicating in speech, that which is not.' In these terms we can put the assimilation in this way:
4a) saying, indicating in speech, that which is (= stating truly) with (4b) saying, indicating in speech, that which is (designating something that exists),
5a) saying, indicating in speech, that which is not (= stating falsely) with (5b) saying, indicating in speech, that which is not (= designating something that does not exist)." (pp. 112-114, notes omitted)

From: Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology,"*Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 1968, pp. 111-132.

THE UNIQUENESS OF BEING ACCORDING TO PARMENIDES

"Having pursued Parmenides' argument to the end, we may now pause to consider the function within it of the predicate ἑν applied to Being at the opening of the argument. We have observed that it is not a predicate that is formally announced as requiring proof. The nearest Parmenides comes to putting this predicate in the programme is to say that (8.4) the subject is μουνογενής, unique of its kind, or (quite simply) unique, single. But he nowhere devotes a separate paragraph to the proof of its μουνογενής nature alone. So much there is to be said for Cornford's assertion that Parmenides does not prove his Being to be one. (115) Where Parmenides does, however, prove it is in the middle of a paragraph (8.34ff) ostensibly aimed at proving that the only thought is the thought of the subject's existence, and it is the immediate premiss from which that conclusion is deduced. The subject's singleness is proved from another predicate (οὐλον) in its turn derivable from the original decision to speak or think of nothing save one thing, namely, what is. The assertion that Being is one is for Parmenides the statement that it is alone and single. This statement he bases on the assumption that one can think of nothing else, which in turn is based on the assertion that there is nothing else there to be thought of. Parmenides recognizes that the oneness of Being in this sense is an intermediate stage in his argument when he summarizes the thought of his opening denial of becoming by saying that "it was once" and "it will be" are inapplicable, since it is now all together, one and continuous, and when he goes on to argue at 8.22ff, as a necessary supplement to the argument against becoming, that it is indivisible and continuous. That Being is single follows from the fact that it is οὐλον and συνεχες, that there is nothing else. That it will remain single and unique is the result of its being unchanging and unmoving; but it must be unchanging and unmoving because there is nothing else for it to change into and no other place for it to move to. The singleness of Being is central to the argument and depends in its turn directly on the original

disjunction ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν. It depends on the doctrine that you cannot talk or think about the non-existent and therefore cannot discourse about anything other than the existent. The only place where the impossibility of anything other than the existent is explicit is at 8.36ff, but it is nevertheless an important, indeed a cardinal, point.

Nowhere in the poem does Parmenides start from "what is one" and deduce anything about its nature; he appears to be doing so in the opening demolition of becoming and perishing, but this is illusory, in that Being's singleness is dependent in turn on the negation of nonexistence. Further, Parmenides has nothing to say about "plurality" arising from unity. He would agree (or indeed argue) that his subject is one and cannot become many, but it is not in virtue of its unity that it cannot become many. It cannot become many, he would agree, because there never will be more than one thing; and there never will be more than one thing because that would infringe the rule that only Being can be thought of, and nothing else, either now or at any other time. Even if at B8.22 the denial of divisibility were a denial that the subject can become many, the reason given is not that it is one but that it is, all in a like degree. To say this is not to state that Parmenides would have agreed that what is one can become man-- he would have excluded this or any other kind of becoming. It needs still to be said that Parmenides is concerned with becoming in general and that there is no reason in his text to suppose that the specific kind of becoming in which a unity gives rise to a plurality ever entered his head. Previous thought might have given him the idea, but his poem shows, and in logic need show, no trace of it whatever.

Nor does Parmenides show that what is one cannot be many.116 For again, if οὔλον, σννεχες, εν, μουνογενες, οὐ διαιρετον, ταὐτον, and so forth constitute a denial of plurality, as they do, it is still not in virtue of its initial unity that Parmenides' subject has these predicates hung on it but in virtue of its own existence, as being the only thing that can be talked or thought about. It is not so much that what is one cannot be many (though Parmenides would certainly have agreed, if pressed, that it cannot) as that what is must be one, single, continuous whole. Again, Parmenides does not start from unity. As long as in παν ἐστιν ὁμοιον the word

ὁμοιον was taken adjectivally, there was some sort of case for supposing that line to infer the negation of plurality from the assertion of unity. But the case even then was not strong; for, though ὁμοιον is in Aristotle a kind of ἑν, the two words are not interchangeable in Presocratic thought. Further, if ὁμοιον be adjectival and equivalent here in Parmenides' mind to ἑν, one would still have to search for the argument that led Parmenides to postulate the unity (in this sense) of his subject. Parmenides would then be found guilty of proceeding from the proposition that the subject all is (παμπαν line 11) to the statement that it is all alike. The basis for this could of course be the original κρίσις; the abolition of difference being equated with the abolition of not-Being. But this interpretation, apart from ignoring the stylistic difficulties of taking ὁμοιον adjectivally, would have the philosophical disadvantage of making Parmenides less explicit and harder to follow. And, even if one followed it, one would still, it seems, be compelled to admit that unity was not an assumption for Parmenides but something he thought he had proved. One would also have to admit that Parmenides was not specially concerned to prove that what was one in general could not be many but was rather seeking to show that his subject in particular, since it was one, could not be many. There should therefore be no more heard of the hypothesis that Parmenides proved that what was one (in the sense of being homogeneous) could not have gaps in it and thus be many. It will be observed in subsequent chapters that, if Parmenides' successors did find such a proof in his text, at any rate they ignored it.

It is important in this context to notice that Parmenides did not have to prove in particular that what was one could not become many, or that homogeneity could not give rise to a varied multiplicity, in order to invalidate cosmogonies of the type produced by his Ionian predecessors. There is no reason to suppose that he had them specially in mind; but, even if he had, his general argument refutes them along with the rest of mankind. For, to make a varied world arise from a substantially homogeneous beginning, clearly something must change, or homogeneity will be the only result. So that, quite apart from the Parmenidean wholesale rejection of the world perceived by the senses, a cosmogony of the Ionian kind was impossible. If

becoming and perishing went, this sort of cosmogony went with them. Parmenides, even if he were specially concerned with his Milesian predecessors, and even if they had enunciated the principle that one thing could be or become many things, did not have to oppose them on that particular ground." (pp. 141-143)

From: Michael Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY

"The criticism of the Eleatic unity of Being is highly instructive for the study of the method by which Aristotle built up his own doctrine of matter; and the very inclusion of the critique in the *Physics* shows that he was conscious of the logical character of the origin of his theory.

He first attacks the concept of Being from the point of view of the categories, (259) showing that, if it is substance, quality, and quantity, it is many and, if it be all quantity or quality, the axiom that only substance is separable is violated. The truth of this principle is indicated by the fact that everything is predicated of substance as subject, an example of the grammatical orientation of Aristotle's thought which determines the whole passage.

Since Melissus called Being infinite, he must have considered it to be a quantity since this is the category in which infinity occurs; (260) and, if it is both substantial and quantitative, it is two, not one; while, if it is substantial alone, it cannot be infinite or have any magnitude.

Since the notion of the unity of Being collides with the doctrine of the categories, Aristotle next examines the possible meaning of " one " as applied to Being.(261) Of the three possible interpretations of Eleatic unity-continuity, indivisibility, unity of definition or essence-the first would result in multiplicity since the continuous is infinitely divisible and would also raise the question concerning the part and the whole, for discontinuous

parts taken in themselves, if identical with the whole, would be identical with one another. If this unity be that of indivisibility, there will be no quantity or quality and Being will be neither infinite with Melissus nor finite with Parmenides. And, if the unity is unity of definition, the Eleatics will arrive at the conclusion of Heraclitus that all things are identical, and their theory will be concerned not with the unity of Being but with its non-existence and the identity of quality and quantity. (pp. 63-64)
(...)
The general critique of the Eleatics is followed by a special refutation of Melissus and Parmenides (p. 67)
(...)
At the beginning of the specific criticism of Parmenides (296) Aristotle says that the same type of argument is valid against him, a statement which confutes the notion that Aristotle supposed the " Being " of Parmenides and Melissus to have been differently conceived.(297) Parmenides falsely assumed that " Being" is an absolute concept whereas it really is ambiguous; he then argued falsely because he did not see that even an inseparable predicate is essentially different from the subject of which it is predicated. This explanation of the error of Parmenides is equivalent to the logical critique of Plato's *Sophist*; but here the language of Aristotle's correction is accommodated to his own physical terminology, and the way is prepared for a transition from the theory of predication, which is the result of the Eleatic criticism in the *Sophist*, to the doctrine of substrate and inhering accident. Aristotle implies that ignorance of the logic of predication led Parmenides to a mistaken notion of the physical world. The concept of Being as held by Parmenides is then subjected to a criticism which, by the process of showing that it will not fit into a logical proposition, is intended to prove that it cannot represent anything. If this Parmenidean Being is substantial Being and substantial Unity, it cannot be predicated of any subject since such a subject would be non-existent if " Being " were not an equivocal term; but neither can it act as subject, for, if anything else were predicated of it, the predicated attribute would have to be non-Being and non-Being would then be predicated of Being. Aristotle tacitly assumes that Parmenides would have to think of

Being as an element in a proposition; he fails to consider the possibility that Parmenides may have fallen into error just because, having envisaged the concept of transcendental Being, he denied the possibility of existence on any lower scale. Aristotle, in trying to press the Parmenidean " Being " into service in the physical world and in rejecting its possibility because it cannot fulfil such service, is guilty of the same kind of error as Parmenides was, for he too assumes that the concept of Being must be fitted to one scale only. But his conclusion is the contrary of that of Parmenides in that he holds to the exclusive reality of phenomenal Being which Parmenides completely rejected.(298) When Aristotle proceeds to the objection that substantial Being cannot have magnitude because as magnitude it would have parts which must then be essentially different from one another, he is using an argument resting finally on his doctrine of categories and considering the Eleatic Being as a spatial continuum equivalent to the substantial infinity which he attributes to the Pythagoreans and against which he uses the same argument. (299) The same doctrine derived from the categories forms the transition from the refutation of the possibility of the Eleatic Being as spatially continuous unity to that of its interpretation as essential and indivisible unity. Being, as substantial, must consist of parts which are themselves substantial, as is proved by the definition of such a thing.(300) That the elements of the definition cannot be accidental attributes rests upon the axiom that substance itself cannot be an attribute of any subject; and this axiom depends finally upon the exclusive character of the categories. The implication for the Eleatics is that, whatever is meant by their Being, it must, as a substantial existence, be defined by other substances which fact destroys its presumed unity.(301) But here again Being for Aristotle is conceivable only as phenomenal, for substance and propositional subject are treated as equivalent and exhaustive." The Eleatic argument (302) seemed cogent to some people who felt constrained thereby to admit the necessity for the existence of non-Being and to posit atomic magnitudes.(303) But, Aristotle says, even if *Being* is unequivocal, nothing prevents non-Being from existing, not as absolute non-Being but as "not being a particular thing." For

Being in and for itself is simply substantial Being which may be manifold.
There is throughout this critique an apparent confusion of logical and physical concepts which is due to the dependence of Aristotle's physics upon his logic. At one time he said that the Eleatic error was due to the ignorance of the meaning of relative or *accidental* non-Being,(304) that is of logical privation which is the essence of the negative proposition; but such a concept, which in its Platonic origin was simply logical, is at once transformed into a physical doctrine by Aristotle, so that he can say shortly thereafter that an understanding of the nature of substrate would have solved the difficulties of the Eleatics.(305) Privation is, in effect, the immediate material of generation (306) and the logical subject of privation is transmuted by means of the concomitant potentiality into the physical substrate.(307) The notion that privation of a quality requires in the substrate the potential presence of that quality is a rule of logic (308) transferred to descriptive physics. It is this connection of the matter of generation and of thought, this equivalence of the proposition of logic and the description of physical change which makes Aristotle think the Physics an appropriate place to discuss the Eleatic doctrine which on his own reckoning falls outside the sphere of physics." (pp. 72-76)

Notes

(259) *Physics* 185 A 20-B 5.
(260) Cf. page 23, note 85, 2 *supra*.
(261) *Physics* 185 B 5.186 A 3. Cf. for the different meanings of " things called one in and for themselves,"*Metaphysics* 1015 B 36-1017 A 2.
(296) *Physics* 186 A 22-B 35.
(297) Ross in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 986 B 19, Vol. I, p. 153, supposes that Aristotle made a distinction with regard to the subject-matter and treatment of Parmenides and Melissus (cf. page 67, note 273 *supra*) ; such a distinction, however, occurs only in the *Metaphysics* and for a particular purpose (cf. page 220, note 15 *infra*),

(298) It is not necessary to assume that Parmenides had clearly conceived transcendental Being in itself; Aristotle himself had an inkling that Parmenides was trying to get at something essentially different from phenomenal existence (cf. page 66, note 270 *supra*), and Plato's frequently expressed respect for the Eleatic doctrine seems to be due to his feeling that it really aimed at the static certainty of the super-phenomenal world (e.g. *Theaeteus* 183 E 3 ff.). It is enough, for fhe moment, to understand that the Eleatics were stressing the immutable reality which is manifested in thought and the objects of thought as opposed to the instability of physical phenomena, and that, in the manner of those who make a startling discovery, they reserved to the new concept the sole right to consideration. But it is not impossible that they should still have considered this transcendental Being as somehow physical, though they certainly held it to be different from anything perceptible.
(299) See pages 24-25 *supra*.
(300) Aristotle's own solution is that no universal term has substantial existence, cf. *Metaphysics* 1041 A 3-5. But the argument only proves that the Eleatic Being is indefinable and transcendent; not that there is no transcendent Being. The Eleatics might well have used Aristotle's own admission that Being " runs through all the categories" (*Metaphysics* Gamma, chap. 2) to prove that merely because the concept will not fit into any one of the categories one cannot argue that it does not exist or that it is meaningless.
(301) The origin of Aristotle's criticism is clearly Plato, *Sophist* 245 B-D; but the presumption of the doctrine of categories has restricted the application of the critique to physical existence. It is strange that Aristotle failed to see the similarity of the Eleatic Being and his own God in respect of the problems of existence. Reflection upon this similarity should have made it apparent that any attempt to apply the categories to Eleatic Being must miss the fundamental motive of the conception.
(302) *Physics* 187 A 1-10.
(303) The Greek commentators, Simplicius, Themistius, Philoponus, Alexander, understood the sentence to refer to Plato and Xenocrates, the first of whom is then charged with positing non-Being in answer to Parmenides, the second with setting up

indivisible lines. Further, the two Eleatic arguments are divided, the first being given to Parmenides, the second (by Simplicius, Themistius, Philoponus) being identified with Zeno's first paradox. But since Plato posits absolute non-Being no more than does Aristotle (cf. Plato, *Sophist* 258 A 11B 3; D 7-E 3; E 6 ff.), since Aristotle does not use ατομα μεγεθη specifically for Xenocrates' ατομοι γραμμαι, and since he represents the two Eleatic arguments as the incentives to the Atomic theory of Leucippus (cf. *De Generatione* 325 A 2 ff., especially 26-29), it seems certain that the ενιοι of the present passage are the Atomists. (For the other view see Robin, *La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, note 272, IV, pp. 300 ff.) The second Eleatic argument here mentioned, the dichotomy, was referred by Porphyry to Parmenides; since the simple term is used by Aristotle of Zeno's first paradox (*Physics* 239 B 22), it is most likely to refer to the same argument here, although it has not previously been mentioned in this passage.
In *Metaphysics* 1089 A 2-6 Aristotle refers to some who made the " indeterminate dyad" an element in the generation of things, influenced by the argument of Parmenides to prove that non-Being exists. Ross suggests that he has in mind such passages as *Sophist* 237 A, 256 E, 241 D. In that case he overlooks the limitations η θατερου φυσις, κατα τι, πη in these passages which make the sense equivalent to his own ον τι ειναι το μη ον.
(304) *Physics* 191 B 13-16.
(305) *Physics* 191 B 33-34.
(306) *Physics* 191 B 15-16. Yet 191 B 35 ff. he reproaches the Platonists for making matter " non-Being " and claims himself to differentiate privation and matter.
(307) The transformation is carried so far that στερηρεσις becomes, instead of simple negation of form, a positive reality, a kind of form itself (*Physics* 193 B 19-20). Cf. Baeumker, Problem der Materie, pp. 218-219.
(308) Cf. its use in Topics 148 A 3-9. It is a mistake to define a thing by privation of that which is not potentially predicable of it. The logical basis of the physical doctrine, as well as some of the difficulties involved in the development, is to be seen in *Metaphysics* 1055 A 33-B 29.

From: Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 1935 (reprint: New York: Octagon Books, 1964).

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Parmenides of Elea: Critical Editions and Translations

Ancient Editions (Important for the history of the reconstruction of the Poem of Parmenides)

1. Estienne, Henri (Henricus Stephanus). 1573. *Poesis Philosophica, Sed Saltem, Reliquiae Poesis Philosophicae, Empedoclis, Parmenidis, Xenophanis, Cleanthis, Timonis, Epicharmi. Adiunta Sunt Orphei Illius Carmina Qui a Suis Appellatus Fui O Theologos. Item, Heracliti Et Democriti Loci Quidam, Et Eorum Epistolae*. Genève.

   The first printed edition; see pp. 41-46, with notes of J. J. Scaliger, p. 217.
   Contains citations from texts by Sextus, Clement of Alexandria, Plutarch, Proclus and Theophrastus, with the following fragments: I, 1-30 (two times I, 29-30), II, 1-8, II, 1-4, VII, 2-6, VIII. 1-2a, VIII. 3-4, VIII, 43-45, X, 1-4, XIII, 1,. XIV, 1, XV, 1 and XVI, 1-4 (sixty-seventh fragments). (From: N. L. Cordero, *L'histoire du texte de Parménide* - in: P. Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur Parménide,* Paris, Vrin, 1987, vol. II p. 6).

2. Fülleborn, Georg Gustav. 1795. *Parmenidou Tou Eleatou Leipsana. Fragmente Des Parmenides. Gesammelt, Übersetzt Und Erläutert Von Georg Gustav Fülleborn*. Zûllichau: F. Frommann.

Greek text and German translation (102 pages).
Contains 147 verses; v. I 31-32; III, 1; V, 1-2; XI,1-4; XVII, 1; XIX, 1-3 are lacking (13 verses)
(From: N. L. Cordero, *L'histoire du texte de Parménide,* vol. II p. 13).

3. Peyron, Amedeo. 1810. *Empedoclis Et Parmenidis Fragmenta Ex Codice Taurinensis Bibliothecae Restituta Et Illustrata Ab Amedeo Peyron. Simul Agitur De Genuino Graeco Textu Commentarii Simplicii in Aristotelem De Coelo Et Mundo*. Leipzig: August Gottlieb Weigel.

   The text of Parmenides is at pp. 55-61.
   This edition contains for the first time the verses found in the *codex Taurinens* of Simplicius' Commentary on *De caelo*: I, 31-32; III, 1; V, 1-2; XI, 1-4; XVII, 1; XIX 1-3).
   (From: N. L. Cordero, *L'histoire du texte de Parménide*, vol. II p. 13).

4. Brandis, Christian August. 1813. *Commentationum Eleaticarum*. Altona: J. F. Hammerich.

   Pars prima: Xenophanis, Parmenidis, et Melisii doctrina et propria philosophorum reliquis veterumque auctorum testimoniis exposita.
   Sectio secunda: *De Parmenide* pp. 85-182
   This edition contains all the fragments with the exception of the followings: III; V, 1-2; XVII (five verses).
   (N. L. Cordero, *L'histoire du texte de Parménide,* vol. II p.14).

5. Karsten, Simon. 1835. *Parmenidis Eleatae Carminis Reliquiae. De Vita Ejus Et Studiis Disseruit, Fragmenta Explicuit, Philosophiam Illustravit Simon Karsten*. Amsterdam: J. Müller.

   Series: *Philosophorum graecorum veterum praesertim qui ante Platonem floruerunt operum reliquiae,Volumen primum, pars altera.*
   This is the first edition that contain all the 19 fragments of Parrnenides' Poem.

6. Mullach, Friedrich Wilhelm August. 1845. *Aristotelis De Melisso, Xenophane Et Gorgia Disputationes, Cum Eleaticorum Philosophorum Fragmentis Et Ocelli Lucani, Qui Fertur, De Universi Natura Libello*. Berlin: W. Besser.

   Greek text and Latin translation pp. 111-121.

7. Diels, Hans. 1879. *Doxographi Graeci*. Berlin: G. Reimer.

   This work identifies the transmitters of the philosophical opinions in Antiquity.
   Italian translation by Luigi Torraca, *I Dossografi greci,* Catania, A. Milani, 1961.

8. ———. 1882. *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores Commentaria*.

   First volume of the critical edition of Simplicius Commentary to Aristotle's *Physics,* the most important source for the text of Parmenides' Poem.
   The second volume, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros quattuor posteriores Commentaria,* was published by H. Diels in 1895 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, voll. IX and X).

9. ———. 1897. *Parmenides Lehrgedicht Mit Einem Anhang Über Griechische Thûren Und Schlöser*. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer.

   Greek text, German translation with introduction and commentary.
   Second edition with a new Preface by Walter Burkert and a revised bibliography by Daniela De Cecco, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag 2003.
   The Greek text of the Poem was reprinted in the *Fragmente der Vorsokatriker*.
   Inhalt: Vorwort im Namen der Herausgeber VII; Vorwort zur 2. Auflage, von Walter Burkert IX; Reprint 1; Einleitung durch Hermann Diels 3; Lehrgedicht 28; Kommentare 46; Über griechische Thüren und Schlösser 117; Nachtrag 152;

Sachregister 154; Vergleichung der Ausgaben 164; Revidierte Bibliographie 165; Anhang 177-178.

10. ———. 1901. *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*. Berlin: Weidmann.

    First edition of the Poet-Philosophers; will serve as a basis for Diels (1903).

11. Diels, Hans, and Walther, Kranz. 1903. *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker*. Berlin: Weidmann.

    Second edition 1906; third 1912; fourth 1922; fifth by Walther Kranz 1934; sixth 1952 (many reprints). Parmenides is the author number 28, pp. 217-246.

English Translations

1. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1939. *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides Translated, with an Introduction and a Running Commentary*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co. Ltd.

   Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
   Contents: Preface V; List of abbreviations XI; Introduction. Chapter I. The earliest Pythagorean cosmogony 1; Chapter II. Parmenides' *Way of Truth* 28; Chapter III. Zeno and Pythagorean Atomism 53; The *Parmenides* 63; Index 247.
   "This book was undertaken with the hope that a close study of the whole chain of argument [of Plato's *Parmenides*] would bring to light some method of interpretation that would give the dialogue a serious significance, worthy of its author and consistent with its position in the history of Greek thought. I could find not the faintest sign of any theological revelation. On the other hand there were innumerable features whose presence could not be accounted for in a mere parody or light-hearted polemic.

The conclusion reached was that the second part of the dialogue is an extremely subtle and masterly analysis, dealing with problems of the sort we call logical, which we know to have been much in Plato's mind in his later period. The assumptions required to yield this conclusion will be set out in the commentary introducing the dialectical exercise. As a general rule, Plato's predecessors and contemporaries (including Aristotle) throw a surer light upon his meaning than his remote successors, whose systems betray the influence of many centuries of religious and philosophical development. Accordingly, in a somewhat long introduction I have tried to fill in the historical background. The conversation in the dialogue arises out of a reading of Zeno's controversial treatise, directed against critics who had derided what seemed to them the absurd consequences of Parmenides' reasoning. It is necessary to form some picture of the position held by these critics themselves and of the nature of Zeno's counter-attack. Behind this controversy, again, lay Parmenides' own system; and this, in its turn, had involved the rejection of the Pythagorean doctrine he had learnt in his youth.
I have therefore begun with an attempt to reconstruct the earliest Pythagorean cosmogony. The second chapter gives an account of Parmenides' *Way of Truth* and of its relation to the rest of his poem. The third deals with Zeno and his opponents. All these topics are relevant to the understanding of the dialectical exercise, which not only includes a searching criticism of Eleatic dogma, but indicates the lines on which Plato would remodel the Pythagorean system." (Preface, IX-X)

2. Freeman, Kathleen. 1946. *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels 'Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker'*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

   A complete English translation of the 'B' passages (the 'fragments') from *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Fifth edition).
   Reprinted in 1983 by Cambridge University Press.

3. Tarán, Leonardo. 1965. *Parmenides. A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

   Contents: Foreword VII-IX; List of bibliographical abbreviations X-XIV; Part I: Parmenides' life 1; Fragments I-XIX: Text, translation, and commentary 7; Part I: Critical essays 173; Chapter One: Parmenides concept of Being 175; Chapter Two: *Aletheia* and *Doxa* 202; Chapter Three: The world of appearance described in the *Doxa* 231; Chapter Four: Parmenides in the ancient philosophical tradition 269; Appendix I 296; Appendix II 299; Index of Fragments of Parmenides 303; Index of passages 305; Index of proper names 309-314.
   "Parmenides' doctrine represents a turning-point in Greek philosophy, one that can truly be said to determine the course of Greek thought until the time of Aristotle. Not only Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists but also Plato and Aristotle tried to answer the dilemma put forward by Parmenides, namely, that since any difference from Being is absolute non-Being, and as such unthinkable, no account of the world of difference and change can be valid. But this doctrine not only invalidates any explanation of the sensible world, it asserts that this world insofar as it is different from Being is non-existent. Because it seems of fundamental importance for the understanding of Greek philosophy to determine exactly what Parmenides thought, I decided to study all available evidence about his work. My decision was based on the conviction that only such a study can be of value today, for Parmenides' philosophy is one in which all is in all and any interpretation of part of it risks, by not taking into consideration other aspects of his thought, being contradicted by the results of another partial study.
   I have devoted the first part of the book to a line by line commentary on the fragments. I have edited the text only to facilitate reference and to complete in part the critical apparatus given by Diels-Kranz. I have made use of the best available editions of the ancient authors who quote Parmenides' text. A fresh study of the manuscripts of

Simplicius' commentaries to Aristotle's *Physics* and *De Caelo* may still add to our knowledge, but I am convinced that even such a study would not drastically change the status of the text of Parmenides. The variant readings given in the critical apparatus and sometimes in the commentary are selective and are especially meant to illustrate the places where a variant reading may be of importance for the interpretation of the text.
The translation has no pretension to literary value and has been added as a complement to the commentary, to reduce as much as possible the number of ambiguities in the construction of the Greek. Each fragment is followed by its commentary, but in a few places discussion of the text is postponed till the second part of the book to preserve the unity of the first three chapters. These chapters deal with more general aspects of Parmenides' thought: his notion of Being, the relation of *Aletheia* to *Doxa*, and the content of the second part of the poem. The fourth chapter attempts to determine what the ancients took Parmenides' philosophy to be and what value this testimony has for the historical reconstruction of Parmenides' thought.
Since such a study as the present is by its very nature largely polemical, I wish to emphasize here my indebtedness to the scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of Parmenides and not least to those with whose interpretations I happen to disagree. In particular I would like to mention the pioneering work of H. Diels, E. Zeller, W. A. Heidel, and H. Frankel. The book, with some changes of form and content, is a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Princeton University in September 1962. But I have taken into consideration studies on Parmenides that reached me up to December 1963." (from the Preface)

4. Kirk, Geoffrey Stephen, Raven, George Earle, and Schofield, Malcolm. 1983. *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Second revised edition by M. Schofield; first edition 1957 by K. G. Kirk and J. E. Raven.
See Chapter VIII - *Parmenides of Elea* - pp. 239-262.
"This book is designed primarily for those who have more than a casual interest in the history of early Greek thought; but by translating all Greek passages, and confining some of the more detailed discussion to small-type notes at the end of paragraphs, we have also aimed to make the book useful for those students of the history of philosophy or science who have no previous acquaintance with this important and fascinating field.
Two points should be emphasized. First, we have limited our scope to the chief Presocratic `physicists' and their forerunners, whose main preoccupation was with the nature (physis) and coherence of things as a whole. More specialized scientific interests were simultaneously developing throughout the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., especially in mathematics, astronomy, geography, medicine and biology; but for lack of space, and to some extent of evidence, we have not pursued these topics beyond the interests of the chief physicists. We have also extruded the Sophists, whose positive philosophical contribution, often exaggerated, lay mainly in the fields of epistemology and semantics. Secondly, we have not set out to produce a necessarily orthodox exposition (if, indeed, such a thing is conceivable in a field where opinion is changing so rapidly), but have preferred in many places to put forward our own interpretations. At the same time we have usually mentioned other interpretations of disputed points, and have always tried to present the reader with the main materials for the formation of his own judgement.
(...)
Where the evidence is fuller and clearer - particularly where considerable fragments survive, as for example in the case of Parmenides the commentary can naturally be shorter; where the evidence is sparser and more confusing, as for example in the case of Anaximander or the Pythagoreans, our own explanations must be longer and more involved. Chapter 1 in particular, which deals with a part of the

subject which is often neglected, is perhaps more detailed in parts than its ultimate importance demands, and nonspecialists are advised to leave it until last.
Only the most important texts have been quoted, and those in an inevitably personal selection. For a nearly complete collection of fragments and testimonies the reader should turn to H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratike*r (5th and later editions, Berlin, 1934-54, edited by W. Kranz)." (from the Preface to the First edition)
"It is now more than twenty-five years since *The Presocratic Philosophers* first appeared; it has been through many printings since, with minor corrections until 1963 and subsequently without change. (...)
There are major and important changes in this new edition. M. Schofield has completely rewritten the chapters on the Eleatics and Pythagoreans, principally because of work by analytic philosophers on the former and by Walter Burkert (in particular) on the latter -- work which has called for some reassessment of the Cornford-Raven view on the interrelations between the two schools. Alcmaeon has been incorporated in these chapters." (From the Preface to the 1983 revised edition).

5. Gallop, David. 1984. *Parmenides of Elea. Fragments*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

   Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Preface IX; Abbreviations XI; Introduction 3; Glossary 41; Text and translation of the Fragments 45; Fragment contexts 95; Testimonia on Parmenides' life and teaching 104; Sources and authorities 124; Bibliographical note 133; Select bibliography 135; Index 141-144.
   "This volume contains a text and a new translation of the extant fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem. It also offers the first complete translation into English of the contexts in which the fragments have come down to us, and of the ancient *testimonia* concerning Parmenides' life and thought. All of these secondary materials are collected in the comprehensive work of Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der*

Vorsokratiker (6th edition, Berlin 1951), hereafter referred to as D-K, and all have been included here.
The purpose of the translation is to provide an English version that will be of service to modern readers who wish to explore the poem in detail. All the fragments have been translated in full, and appear in the order that has become canonical since the fifth edition of Diels-Kranz. References to the fragments are given in the conventional style derived from this order. thus, 8.50 refers to line 50 of fragment 8. As far as differences of word-order allow, the translation of the poem has been arranged in lines corresponding to those of the Greek text. This style has been adopted purely for ease of reference, and not with the aim of producing a poetic version. No attempt has been made to capture the literary qualities of Parmenides' verse or the archaism of his language.
Richard Robinson, in the introduction to his translation of Aristotle's *Politics* Ill-IV (Oxford 1962, p. XXX), has characterized a translation as 'a shameful form of book.' For by offering a translation of each sentence in his original, the translator 'implies that he knows that this is what the original sentence means. But sometimes he does not know what it means, and is only guessing as well as he can.' In publishing a fresh version of Parmenides' poem the present translator makes no claim to know what every sentence in the original means. To signal the worst uncertainties, alternative renderings have been appended for passages whose meaning is disputed, or where major questions of interpretation hinge upon the text or translation adopted. In these places the reader will find it instructive to compare alternatives. He will then quickly discover how completely he puts himself at the translator's mercy, if he relies entirely upon any single version. He may also find it useful, especially if he is wholly dependent upon translation, to consult the short glossary of terms that present special problems of translation or interpretation.
The introduction advocates one plausible, modern interpretation of Parmenides. It also tries to bring out the more important points still in dispute, and some major

philosophical questions raised by the poem. It has seemed better to write an extended essay, cross-referenced to the translation, than to provide a separate series of exegetic and critical notes. This arrangement, regrettably, has made it necessary to skate all too lightly over much significant detail. But it also avoids dispersing editorial comment too widely for convenient use; and by allowing a more continuous exposition of the poem than is possible in separate notes, it may better help the explorer to find his bearings in the Eleatic jungle.
The notes to the introduction occasionally qualify or enlarge upon points made in the text. Their main purpose, however, is to provide guidance to the secondary literature, supportive either of views adopted in the text without argument or of defensible alternatives. Almost every line of Parmenides is controversial, and it is not possible, in the space available, to discuss every problem, let alone to argue for definitive solutions. Although the present exposition is thus unavoidably 'partisan,' it attempts to air disagreements sufficiently to provide some awareness of what is at issue. Given this limited aim, the use of secondary sources is necessarily selective. Fuller treatment of the literature would have incurred the risk of producing a work impenetrable to all but specialists. And of such works Parmenides has perhaps received his due share already. Discussion has therefore been confined mainly to a small number of leading studies in English. All sources used, together with others readily accessible, have been listed in the Bibliography." (from the Preface)

6. Coxon, Allan Hartley. 1986. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction, Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

   See the new edition; Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2009.
   Contents: Preface V-VI; Introduction 1; Text and translation of the Fragments 41; The ancient Testimonia 95; Commentary 156; Appendix 257; Index 267-277.

"The text of the fragments of Parmenides was placed on a firm foundation by Diels (S *implicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros quattuor priores Cornmentaria*, 1882; *Parmenides Lehrgedicht*, 1897; *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, 1901). Since the latest editions of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* depart in several places from Diels' own text, it seemed desirable to re-examine the tradition, and the following pages were originally planned as a simple text with fuller critical apparatus than has appeared since *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta* and with epic parallels. A revised collection of testimonia was then added, incorporating the Platonic, Aristotelian and Neoplatonic discussions, mostly written with knowledge of the complete text and essential for understanding the fragments, but in the main omitted by Diels. Finally it seemed inescapable to complete the work with an introduction and commentary.
(...)
The inclusion among the testimonia of philosophical as well as of purely doxographical material necessitated the substitution of a broadly chronological order for the analytical order adopted by Diels. I have made use of the standard printed editions, but have modified the text in numerous places, particularly in Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides, where the readings are based on my own collations. Textual notes are added only where clarity demands it. In citing the text of Aetius after *Doxographi Graeci* I have included short forms of the chapter-headings, which formulate the questions which the information extracted from the original works has been adapted to answer, and apart from which it cannot be evaluated." (from the Preface)
See the Review of the book by Malcolm Schofield in *Phronesis* 32, 1987, pp. 349-359.

7. Sider, David, and Johnstone Jr., Henry. 1986. *The Fragments of Parmenides*. Bryn Mawr: Thomas Library, Bryn Mawr College.

"This Bryn Mawr Commentary differs from most in that the text has been prepared especially for this edition (by D.S.) and the commentary has had to take account of the fact that there are major disagreements among scholars over the manuscript readings, the meanings, and even the syntax of many passages crucial for an understanding of Parmenides' meaning. Hence, the number of places where we offer several possibilities (tending to put our preferred interpretation first).
The Diels-Kranz text is reprinted with the kind permission of Weidmann Verlag, Zurich." (From the Preface)

8. Henn, Martin. 2003. *Parmenides of Elea. A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

   Contents: 1. Parmenides and his Predecessors 1; 2. Translation of the Diels B-Fragments 23; 3. The Question of Being: a dialectic of alternative paths 31; 4. Fragment B3: the metaphysical unity of Thinking and Being 51; 5. Parmenides' closed-loop concept of time and the illusion of linear time-consciousness 67; 6. Necessity, possibility, and contingency 85; 7. The teachings of the Goddess 101; 8. The Diels and Kranz Greek text in the order translated 109; 9. Commentary on the Greek 115; Select bibliography 143; Index locorum: the Diels B-Fragments of Parmenides 145-147.
   "Parmenides recounts a dream voyage through the stars in a chariot drawn by swift chargers and beautiful attending maidens. Traveling through profound darkness the train arrives at the gates of the ways of Night and Day. Avenging Justice holds the keys; yet the maidens persuade her to open the gates to insure safe passage to the palace of the Goddess, who teaches Parmenides the Truth of Being.
   The Goddess instructs Parmenides on two ways of thinking inquiry: The one, that Being is, and must always be; the other, that Being is not, and cannot ever be. She then counsels him not to follow the second path, the Way of Opinion, as it represents the errant path of mortal minds,

which do not recognize the eternal Essence of all that is. But by following the Way of Truth, Thinking and Being are found to be the same; while the unlimited source of all there is is ungenerable, indestructible, systematic, and whole, subsisting in one eternally present "now" which transcends the passage of time. The circumference of the cosmos holds the clue to Being's unified simplicity. The Goddess then tells Parmenides to learn the opinions of mortals, so that he may never be outmatched in argument. Finally, the Goddess speaks of Destiny who rules sexual intercourse and painful birth. She warns that everything contained in the mortal cosmology is bound by Necessity to inevitable decay; but Being shall never cease to be.
The following translation recognizes Hermann Diels' original numbering of the B-fragments from *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (1897), which are listed on the left in parentheses. But Diels' original ordering of the B-Fragments has been modified to register a coherent flow of ideas and images." p. 23

9. Geldard, Richard G. 2007. *Parmenides and the Way of Truth*. Rhinebeck: Monkfish Book Publishing Company.

   Table of Contents: Introduction VII-XI; Chapter 1. Parmenides of Elea 1; Chapter 2. The Fragments 20; Chapter 3. Wrestling with Parmenides 52; Chapter 4. The Way of Truth 92; Chapter 5. From Being to Consciousness 109: Glossary 127; Suggested reading 128; Endnotes 129-131.
   "Parmenides wrote a long poem entitled "On Nature." We have several fragments of the poem, preserved by later historians, philosophers and commentators.
   Two-thirds, possibly more, is lost. We know a little more about the whole, fortunately, from Plato's dialogue "Parmenides," which describes a visit by the aging philosopher to Athens, where he meets with interested intellectuals, including a young Socrates. A small industry of interpretation has evolved out of the complexity of Plato's

dialogue, leading to varied conclusions about the missing sections. But, more of that below.

The "Nature" of the title is the Greek *physis* [foo-sis], a term that expresses a visionary concern for "the nature of things," not just the tangible facts of physical nature. It appears, in fact, that most Presocratic truth-seekers expressed their views in a similar way, entitling their work "On Nature" as a sign that they were not writing a poem entitled "On the Gods." *Physis* was the general topic, and each thinker made a contribution, some in more abstract language than others.

That Parmenides chose the verse form was also an accepted means of expression, following Hesiod and, to some extent, Homer. Verse was the language of revelation. The rhythm and sound of the hexameters' elevated thought above ordinary discourse. In more recent times, we have the example of Shakespeare, who employed prose in his plays only for fools and madmen. Iambic pentameter was reserved for rational (albeit sometimes brutal) discourse.

It is also useful to remember that the Greeks spoke their verse aloud. Silent reading was unknown until the Roman era. The eye followed the unbroken line of letters, the words rolled off the tongue, were caught by the ear, and only then could meaning be grasped by the understanding. Since Greek is an inflected language, word order depends on sound, how the words flow together, how vowels and consonants combine to produce a smooth, harmonic measure. As a result, the hard consonants do not bump into one another. A vowel invariably intercedes to smooth the way. Word order then, is based on auditory effect, not grammar, and meaning arises as much from this effect as from the vocabulary, making translation into English a challenge, especially from poetry to poetry. Poetic licence is required, even encouraged.

As flawed as the following transliterated verse is, it is a serious attempt to capture both the sound and sense of Parmenidean revelation, which is what his poem was meant to be. The result, hopefully, is revealed truth, arrived at in communion with divine communion, at least insofar as Parmenides experienced it. The poem emerges from the

force of Persuasion, the goddess who keeps company with Justice, whose task it is to guard the gates giving access to the realm of higher knowledge. The youth, or *kouros*, gains admittance to this realm through his desire for truth and comes from the strength of eros in his soul. It is access that anyone who is worthy and who deeply desires such communion can attain. On the basis of what is traditionally called the 'proem,' his journey into the cosmos to the goddess, we are asked to accept that Parmenides was granted admittance to a special realm and once in the presence of divinity, received the Way of 'Truth." pp. 20-21

10. Coxon, Allan Hartley. 2009. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

    Revised and expanded edition edited with new translations by Richard McKirahan and a new Preface by Malcolm Schofield.
    Contents: Preface to the revised and expanded edition by Malcolm Schofield VII; Editor's Note by Richard McKirahan XI; Preface XIII-XIV; Introduction 1; Text and translation of the Fragments 45; The ancient *Testimonia* with English translation 99; Commentary 269; Appendix 389; Concordance 400; Indexes & Glossary 403-461.
    "The book's other major contribution to scholarship is its collection of *testimonia*. Coxon's is a much fuller selection than was provided by Diels and Kranz in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. It is ordered not thematically (as in Diels-Kranz), but in chronological sequence of the writers who transmit the information: whether in their own extant texts (as with Plato or Aristotle), or -- where those texts do not survive -- as recorded in later authors (e.g. for Eudemus, in Simplicius; for Posidonius, in Strabo: though here Coxon usefully refers in the first instance to a standard modern collection of fragments and testimonia of the cited author wherever possible). To enhance the accessibility of the new edition, an English translation facing the original Greek or

(occasionally) Latin has been prepared by Richard McKirahan.
Coxon himself indicated -- in handwritten notes on two copies of the book -- where he thought revisions or corrections were needed to the first edition. In this second edition any such instance amounting to more than correction of a typographical error is pointed out in a corresponding footnote (above Richard McKirahan's initials). One extra testimonium is added: Xenocrates, T16a. Really substantial revisions are in fact few and far between. The most significant comes in the commentary on lines 34-41 of Fragment 8, where Coxon had revised his understanding of Parmenides' grammatical construction at lines 35-36, and had rethought the overall purpose of the passage. Here as elsewhere the text of the first edition is preserved in a footnote.
Richard McKirahan's translation of the *testimonia* is not the only extra help offered to the reader. There are *also* English translations of all Greek words and phrases throughout the Introduction, Commentary and Appendix, and line numbers have been inserted in the *testimonia* themselves to enhance ease of reference. Highly abbreviated forms of names of ancient authors and works have been spelled out more fully. New supplementary material includes the Greek-English Index and an English-Greek glossary to the translations of the *testimonia*. Finally, as a way of enabling the looking up of page references based on the pagination of the first edition, the original page numbers are provided here in square brackets inside the margins." pp. VIII-IX.

11. Palmer, John. 2009. *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Appendix: *The Fragments of Parmenides' Poem*. Introduction 350; Text and translation of the Fragments 362; Textual notes 376-387.
    "The notes that follow discuss those places in the fragments where any real uncertainty remains about what Parmenides wrote. Since their aim is merely to explain why the readings

printed above have been adopted (in places where this has not already been made clear in the appendix's introduction), I have tried to keep these notes as brief as possible. For the most part, readings reflecting the emergence of scholarly consensus have been printed without comment. Since, for reasons already indicated, it has not been possible to furnish an *apparatus criticus,* manuscript variants are recorded here when necessary and as reported in recent editions. Instances where the manuscripts preserve viable alternatives, or even readings genuinely useful for determining what Parmenides himself wrote, are less numerous than one might suppose." p. 376

12. Graham, Daniel W., ed. 2010. *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Translated and edited in two volumes by D. W. Graham. See Vol. I, Chapter 6 *Parmenides* pp. 203-244.

13. Mckirahan, Richard. 2011. *Philosophy before Socrates. An Introduction with Texts and Commentary*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

    Second revised edition (first edition 1994).
    See Chapter 11, *Parmenides of Elea,* pp. 145-173.
    Concluding remarks: "Parmenides' *Truth* left a lasting mark on philosophy. The present account has been generous in its assessment of this section of his poem. It would be easy to fault him for making our task more difficult than it need be. His language is frequently obscure, as is his argumentation. It is frequently an uphill battle to discern how his train of thought proceeds. There are gaps in the reasoning and extensive use both of terms that may (or may not) be intended as near-synonyms (but how near?) and of figurative, even metaphorical language that needs to be interpreted. Objections can be raised against the arrangement of the arguments, since it is not always clear where one topic leaves off and another begins. In general, it

requires a great deal of sympathy to find a way for the arguments go through. My reason for interpreting Parmenides charitably is that only in this way can we appreciate the interest, the potential, and the challenge of his ideas and arguments. Only if we make the effort to unravel his tortuous reasoning and fill in the gaps in ways congenial to his point of view can we hope to understand his enormous influence on philosophy,(57) And enormous it was. With Parmenides Greek philosophy began to become more systematic. Argument played an increasingly important role in the exposition of theories. The subsequent history of Presocratic philosophy is often seen in terms of responses to Parmenides: Zeno and Melissus developed his ideas, while Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the Atomists (to name only the most important figures) accepted that there is no generation from or perishing into nothing and composed their cosmologies on this basis, even while disagreeing on other points of Eleatic doctrine." p. 173.
(57) One of Melissus's virtues is that he presents his numerical monism in a clearer and more systematic way. See Ch. 15. [Melussus of Samo, pp. 293-302]

German Translations

1. Riezler, Kurt. 1934. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann.

   Text, translation and interpretation; second edition with a postscript by Hans Georg Gadamer 1970; third edition 2001.

2. Hölscher, Uvo. 1969. *Parmenides. Vom Wesen Des Seienden*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

   Greek text with German translation of the fragments and some *testimonia*; reprinted with a new *Nachwort* 1986.

3. Bormann, Karl. 1971. *Parmenides. Untersuchungen Zu Den Fragmenten*. Hamburg: Meiner.

   Inhalt: Vorwort VII-VIII; Kapitel I. Der Stand der Parmenides-Forschung. Ziel und Methode der Untescuchung 1; Kapitel II. Die Fragmente. Text 28; Übersetzung 29; Kapitel III: Interpretation 56; Schluss 183; Anmerkungen 185; Quellen und Literatur 253; Namenregister 260-263.

4. Heitsch, Ernst. 1974. *Parmenides. Die Anfange Der Ontologie, Logik Und Naturwissenschaft*. München: Heimeran.

   With introduction and critical studies.
   Second revised edition: *Parmenides - Fragmente: griechisch-deutsch* - München, Artemis Verlag, 1991

5. Held, Klaus. 1980. *Heraklit, Parmenides Und Der Anfang Von Philosophie Und Wissenschaft.Eine Phänomenologische Besinnung*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

6. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1981. *Parmenides. Über Das Sein. Griechisch-Deutsch*. Stuttgart: Reclam.

   Edited and translated by J. Mansfeld, with an introductory essay by Hans von Steuben.

7. Gemelli Marciano, Maria Laura, ed. 2009. *Die Vorsokratiker. Band Ii: Parmenides Zenon Empedokles. Griechisch-Lateinisch-Deutsch. Auswahl Der Fragmente Und Zeugnisse*. Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler Verlag.

   Übersetzung und Erläuterungen von M. L. Gemelli Marciano.

French Translations

1. Riaux, Francis. 1840. *Éssai Sur Parménide D'élée Suivi Du Texte Et De La Traduction Des Fragments*. Paris: Librairie De Joubert.

   Text and translation pp. 206-230.

2. Beaufret, Jean. 1955. *Le Poème De Parménide*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Reprint 1966: Table. Avertissement de l'éditeur V; Avant-propod VII-VIII; Introduction è al lecture du *Poème* de Parménide 1; Fragments 75-93.
   Avant-propos (1955) "L'origine du présent travail est une traduction du Poème de Parménide laissée par Jean-Jacques Riniéri, lorsqu'en août 1950 il quitta Paris pour le voyage en Hollande dont il ne devait pas nous revenir.
   La traduction de Riniéri, relevée par Olivier Revault d'Allones, me fut remise en 1951 par Roger Stéphane, qui me demanda d'écrire quelques pages d'introduction.
   Le projet d'introduction convenu au départ se transforma, au cours des années qui suivirent, en une méditation presque incessante et souvent découragée des difficultés de plus en plus redoutables du texte parménidien. Cette méditation m'amena à reprendre d'un bout à l'autre la traduction de Riniéri. Il semblait d'abord qu'il y avait lieu surtout de la compléter. N'étaient pas traduits en effet les Fragments IX, X, XI et XVIII. Mais la traduction des vers 30 et 35 du Fragment I et des vers 60 et 61 du Fragment VIII manquait également. Or l'interprétation de ces vers a été historiquement décisive poux l'ensemble, car c'est en eux que se concentre toute la difficulté du texte dont ils déterminent l'ajointenient. C'est ainsi qu'un travail qui voulait n'être d'abord que la mise au net d'une traduction a finalement abouti à une autre traduction, caractérisée par une situation différente de la *doxa* par rapport à l' *aletheia* et du *noein* par rapport à l' *einai*..
   Cette traduction nouvelle est une aventure qui n'aurait sana doute jamais été tentée sans l'entreprise initiale de Riniéri. Elle a été menée à son état actuel avec le concours de Michel Gourinat, Francis Olivier, André Wormser.

Plusieurs entretiens avee Martin Heidegger ont été d'une aide inestimable en ce qui concerne l'essentiel.
Jean-Jacques Riniéri avait suivi le texte que proposait Diels (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, t. I, 1912). Les Fragments sont présentés ici selon l'ordre adopté par Walther Kranz dans la récente réédition du même ouvrage (1952). Le texte grec est celui de Kranz, sauf quelques modifications (vers 7, 12, 19, 36, du Fragment VIII ; cf. notes aux passages indiqués).
Qu'il me soit permis de penser que l'interprétation proposée dans les pages qui suivent demeure fidèle à l'initiative, à la passion qui portaient Jean-Jacques Riniéri à la découverte de Parménide."

3. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 1984. *Les Deux Chemins De Parménide*. Paris: Vrin.

   Édition critique, traduction, études et bibliographie. Deuxième édition corrigée et augmentée 1997.
   Table des matières: Introduction IX-XIV; Introduction à la deuxième edition 1; Partie I: Le poème de Parménide 17; Partie II: Études critiques. Chapitre I: Analyse de la présentation des deux chemins de la recherche dans le fr. 2 45; Chapitre II: Le contenu des deux thèses du fr. 2 73; Chapitre III: Les deux chemins dans les fragments 6,7 et 8,34-78 110; Chapitre IV: L'Alétheia, la Doxa, et la portée de l'enseignement parménidien 176; AppendiceI: La significatin du verbe *einai* dans la littérature pré-prménidienne. La racine indoeuropéenne. Le Lexikon d'Ebeling. La thèse de Ch. H. Kahn. Les trois nuances d' *einai* exemplifiées par trois utilisations différentes 215; Appendice II: La tradition manuscrite du vers 6,3. Liste de manuscripts qui contiennent le vers 6,3. Les variations du texte 234; Partie III: Bibliographie parménidienne 237-272; Table thématique 273; Supplément de la bibliographie 276; Oridre chronologique du Supplément de la bibliographie 288: Ouvrages cités 289; Auteurs cités 294; Passages cités 298-300.

"Notre propos n'est pas d'embrasser la totalité de la pensée de Parménide. Les fragments de son Poème qui ont été conservés offrent un champ propice à l'orientation de la recherche dans des directions très diverses: c'est d'ailleurs ce qui fait la richesse de Parménide. La preuve la plus convaincante de la pérennité d'un système philosophique est le fait qu'il est inépuisable. Là où l'exégète a cru trouver le noyau de l'enseignement d'un penseur déterminé, une analyse effectuée dans une autre direction découvre de nouveaux éléments sur lesquels se fonderont de nouvelles théories. Dans ce sens, le cas de Parménide est particulièrement représentatif. Pour l'antiquité classique, sa place a été assurée par sa défense véhémente de l'unité de l'Être (4), grâce à laquelle le philosophe d'Élée est devenu "vénérable et redoutable" (5). Plusieurs siècles plus tard, en revanche, la philosophie idéaliste a cru trouver dans l'identification de l'être et de la pensée le noyau central de la philosophie parménidienne, et, avec lui, un antécédent illustre de son propre système. Enfin, dans les dernières années, ainsi que l'a observé Ch. H. Kahn, on préfère faire de Parménide soit "un philosophe du langage au sens de Frege ou Wittgenstein", soit "un métaphysicien de l'Être, à la manière de Hegel ou de Heidegger" (6).
Nous ne prétendons pas avoir trouvé la solution, c'est-à dire le point de vue à partir duquel la philosophie de Parménide révélera la clé de sa fertilité. L'état fragmentaire dans lequel nous est parvenu son Poème nous place en état d'infériorité par rapport aux penseurs classiques pour émettre un jugement sur la totalité de son œuvre. C'est pour cela que nous avons préféré limiter notre étude à un seul problème. Toutefois, nous avons choisi un problème qui, à notre avis, occupe une place de choix dans les fragments du Poème que nous possédons actuellement: le problème des chemins de la connaissance, des voies de la recherche. Ces *odoi dizhsios*; sont de véritables thèses que la Déesse révèle au poète (et que le poète, à savoir Parménide, révèle au lecteur-auditeur), le long desquelles la pensée peut s'acheminer pour obtenir soit une explication cohérente de la réalité, soit une "trompeuse série de paroles" (fr. 8,52). C'est dans cette

alternative, présentée sous forme de thèses contradictoires, que réside l'enseignement parménidien; et c'est précisément cet aspect dichotomique de la présentation des problèmes de la part de Parménide que nous tenterons de mettre en relief dans notre travail.
Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous proposons d'analyser certains éléments généralement admis dans la pensée de Parménide, mais qui, dans la plupart des cas, ne sont pas poursuivis jusqu'à leurs conséquences extrêmes. Dans ce sens, nous pouvons affirmer que nous allons tenter de donner une version 'extrémiste' de Parménide, même au risque de tomber sous le coup de la critique de R. Kent Sprague, pour laquelle les érudits qui étudient la philosophie éléatique sont généralement plus éléates que les philosophes en question (7). La quasi totalité des chercheurs qui se sont intéressés à la philosophie de Parménide s'accordent sur le fait que sa pensée est structurée autour du principe de la non - contradiction (8). Nous n'affirmons pas ni ne nions pour autant que Parménide ait "inventé" ce principe, ni qu'il ait eu conscience de son utilisation, mais il ne faut pas oublier que le principe du tiers exclu apparaît également chez Parménide (9) -- principe qui renforce celui de la non-contradiction et rend contradictoires toutes les oppositions que nous rencontrons tout au long de son Poème. Sur la base de cette constatation, dont nous fournirons des exemples tout au long de notre travail, nous trouvons chez Parménide un dualisme méthodologique rigoureux qui sépare, "comme d'un coup de hache", l'espace conceptuel, ainsi que l'a remarqué P.M. Schuhl à juste titre (10), en deux régions opposées. Cette dichotome, véritable transposition sur le plan philosophique de la bifurcation mystique que nous trouvons dans les récits orphiques et pythagoriciens (11), constitue, à notre avis, la structure primordiale du raisonnement parménidien. C'est à cette dichotomie qu' obéit la présentation de son enseignement sous la forme de deux thèses contradictoires: les deux chemins de la recherche.
Notre analyse cherchera à établir le contenu de ces thèses contradictoires ainsi que leur portée, c'est-à-dire le domaine

auquel elles s'appliquent et les conséquences qui dérivent de leur acceptation rigoureuse (12). Nous partirons pour cela du fr. 2, où apparaît la première énonciation des "deux seuls chemins de la recherche", et, une fois établie la valeur des deux thèses, nous étudierons leur réapparition (reliée à des problèmes différents) dans les fr. 6, 7 et 8. Ensuite, nous tenterons de découvrir quelques correspondances possibles entre ces chemins de la recherche et le récit mythique du voyage entrepris par le poète-philosophe, tel qu'il figure dans le fr. 1. Enfin, nous analyserons la nouveauté que présente le système de Parménide par rapport à la pensée de ses prédécesseurs." (pp. X-XIII).
4. Cf. Idem, Soph. 244e, Parm. 128a; Aristote, Met. A,3,984a.
5. Platon, Théet. 183e.
6. CH. H. Kahn, More on Parmenides, p. 333.
7. Cf. R. Kent Sprague, Compte rendue de Tarán, *Parmenides* (1965), [Classical Philology, 61, 1966] p. 262.
8. Cf. K. Reinhardt (1916), p. 56, et J. Mansfeld (1964), p. 57, n. 3.
9. Cf. notamment 8, 16 et 8, 36-7.
10. P.M. Scuhl, *Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque,* Paris, 1949, p. 284.
11. Cf. Idem, p. 285.
12. Parmi ces conséquences, la principale est le rejet, en tant que "chemin de recherche", du prétendu "troisième chemin" du fr. 6.

4. O'Brien, Denis. 1987. *Études Sur Parménide. Le Poème De Parménide*. Paris: Vrin.

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Essai critique: *Introduction à la lecture de Parménide: les deux Voies de l'être et du non-être*, pp. 137-302; Indices 305-310.
English summary. The Poem of Parmenides. Parmenides on existence and non-existence: an introduction to a reading of the fragments pp. 311-319.

5. Conche, Marcel. 1996. *Parménide. Le Poème: Fragments*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Table des matières: Introduction 5; Abréviations bibliographiques. Bibliographie 9; Présentation. Les deux gestes de Parménide 23; I. L'allégories 41; II. La vérité 75: III. Le mythe 187; Conclusion 269; Index des sources 273; Index des mots grecs 277; Index des padsages d'auteurs anciens 283-288.
   "Pourquoi un poème? Sens doute parce que le poème, plus que la prose, est bâti pour s'inscrire dans les mémoires et pour durer: le support de l'affirmation l'être éternel doit, autant que possible, échapper à la puissance dissolvante du temps. De ce Poème ne subsistent que des fragments, dont l'un, conservé par Sextus Empiricus, a toutefois trente vers, un autre, que l'on doit à Simplicius, plus de soixante.
   Avec eux, les deux premières parties de l'ouvrage ont été préservées, semble-t-il, pour l'essentiel: d'abord le prooemium, le prélude, à teneur allégorique; ensuite la partie *pros Alethéia*, ou la révélation, par la seule voie du discours (*logo*), de la vérité de l'être. De la troisième partie de l'ouvrage, où était exposée la genèse mythique (au sens du *Timée*) du monde sensible, ne restent que des bribes.
   Notre travail, qui tient compte des éditions essentielles de Karsten (1835) et de Diels (1897), mais aussi de nombre d'autres travaux, vise à donner une interprétation philosophique de l'ensemble. Dans le Sophiste, en 217c, Socrate déclare, disions-nous, avoir entendu Parménide "procéder par interrogations". C'est pourquoi, en 237a, Parménide est dit s'exprimer "aussi bien en prose qu'en vers: le mot prose renvoie aux discussions orales auxquelles il a été fait allusion dans ce même dialogue. Il n'a pas valeur

de témoignage quant à une œuvre écrite de Parménide autre que son Poème (même si l'auteur byzantin de la Suda, s.v. "Parmenides", a cru le contraire)." pp. 7-8

6. Cassin, Barbara. 1998. *Parménide. Sur La Nature Ou Sur L'étant. La Langue De L'être?* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

   Table: Présentation 9; Parménide, *Sur la nature ou sur l'étant*. Texte et traduction 69; Glossaire 119 Dossier 252; Bibliographie 295; Index des mots grecs 305; Index des passages cités de Parménide 313-317; Remerciements 318. "Pour nous modernes, c'est la grande philologie allemande du xixe siècle qui est le maître d' œuvre de cette restauration créatrice de Parménide, en particulier grâce à Hermann Diels. Car Diels opère à toutes les étapes requises pour bâtir. En amont : il édite les textes des principaux citateurs, essentiellement Simplicius qui, au vie siècle apr. J.-C., soit dix siècles après Parménide, a transmis dans son commentaire à la Physique d'Aristote et au Ciel dix des dix-neuf fragments du Poème, dont le plus long de tous (une séquence de 52 vers composant le fragment VIII) ; assez pour reconstruire un tout différencié, avec une première partie, sous le signe de la "vérité", qui décrit la route de l'être et sa distinction d'avec celle du non-être [fr.II à VIII, 51], et une seconde partie, sous le signe de l' "opinion", qui expose les erreurs des mortels, sous forme d'une physique, d'une cosmogonie ou d'une cosmologie [VIII, 51-XIX]. Mais Diels a d'abord plus largement, dans les Doxographes grecs, élaboré une perception d'ensemble de la doxographie, c'est-à-dire des voies de la transmission des textes et des doctrines à travers toute l'Antiquité, ayant pour but de situer les sources, d'évaluer leur fiabilité et les types de déformation auxquels s'attendre. Puis il travaille au tissage même du texte : il recense et découpe les fragments en les distinguant des témoignages, les établit en comparant d'abord les sources, puis les manuscrits et les leons, décide de leur ordre, les traduit aussi, en décidant des archaïsmes recevables. Il en produit pour finir une interprétation plus ou moins standard ou stabilisée, qui aboutit à la Bible

toujours inégalée, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, élaborée en 1903 et dont la sixième édition, améliorée par Walther Kranz en 1951-1952, n'a cessé d'être rééditée, traduite et adaptée en toutes les langues (1).
Mais toutes ces étapes constitutives, qui s'entourent d'un maximum de précautions réellement scientifiques, sont liées dans des enchaînements de procédures codouteuses et co-fictives d'une légitimité, au moins aussi, auto-proclamée. D'autant qu'elles sont, à la base même, bâties sur les pratiques doxographiques de la citation, qui travaillent le sens en ayant l'air de livrer la lettre ou le fait. C'est tout cet ensemble de pratiques et de procédures qui se trouve stratégiquement oublié et approprié dans les interprétations philosophiques ultérieures du Poème de Parménide, qui viennent ajouter leurs cartes à ce château.
Pour aborder un objet si redoutable et si construit, il me semble pourtant que la méthode est simple. Il faut aller aux points névralgiques, là où se partagent les interprétations. Et tenter d'en comprendre l'ancrage dans le texte: comprendre comment la phrase grecque de Parménide, et peut-être la langue grecque elle-même, est prise dans ce partage. Mon projet n'est pas, ou le moins possible, d'ajouter une auto-proclamation de plus: je voudrais plutôt faire percevoir sur quelques paradigmes à enjeux lourds le degré d'ouverture maximal dans la fabrication du texte et du sens. Le plus facile, le plus utile peut-être aussi, même si de très nettes évolutions se font sentir qui disqualifient ces taxinomies à la serpe, est d'instruire l'antagonisme entre interprétations dites analytiques (anglo-saxonnes, avec Owen et Barnes par exemple) et herméneutiques (plutôt allemandes, ou germano-Français es, avec Heidegger et Beaufret (2). On verra que les points de partage des interprétations reconduisent effectivement à l'idée qu'on se fait de la langue : d'abord une langue naturelle, le grec, qui se mesure à une rationalité, donc à un formalisme, d avaà la fois universels et perfectibles; ou d'abord une langue pensante, le grec, qui se mesure à l'historialité de la pensée." pp. 12-14.

(1) De H. Diels: *Doxographi Graeci* (1879), *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros quatuor priores Commentaria* (1882), *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (1897), *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta* (1901). Le Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Dublin-Zürich, Weidmann), a été traduit et "édité" très tardivement en Français , et de manière souvent fort peu satisfaisante, par J.-P. Dumont, avec la collaboration de D. Delattre et J.-L. Poirier, Paris, Gallimard, 1988. Sur la construction dielsienne, voir mon *Si Parménide*, Paris-Lille, 1980, p. 105-121.
(2) Voir en particulier, sur l'exemple du fr. III, l'entrée ANALYTIQUE/ HERMÉNEUTIQUE dans le Glossaire.

7. Bollack, Jean. 2006. *Parménide: De L'étant Au Monde*. Lagrasse: Verdier.

   Table des matières: Avant-propos 7; Introduction 11; Notice 65; De l'étant au monde 69; Bibliographie 331-339; Réperoire des Fragments discutés 340; Index thématique 341-344.
   "Ce livre-ci repose sur une lecture de ce que son auteur, Parménide, a considéré en premier lieu comme un livre, un ouvrage composé pour être déchiffré, suivant un plan d'ensemble très élaboré. Nous n'avons pas le livre, pas le tout. Une totalité mi-présente (à déchiffrer), mi-absente (à construire) se précise progressivement au cours du travail d'élucidation des phrases. La composition de l'ensemble a sa logique. La matière de cet ensemble est finalement assez étendue pour faire voir dans le détail ce qu'était le projet, et donc suffisante pour découvrir la signification de l'œuvre, pour son auteur, en son temps, dans la situation historique où elle a été conue. Elle a visiblement été travaillée pour servir à une pratique savante de la lecture, se mettant elle-même livresquement en scène comme les œuvres savent le faire partout d'elles-mêmes. Sinon, nous ne disposerions pas de ce réseau dense d'interrelations verbales, qui permet de relier un noyau à une fin, et d'arriver au bout du compte à faire parler une cohérence, malgré les lacunes.

On part de ce que nous avons, mais il faut y inclure, en dépit de sa fragmentation, l'idée que l'on se fait de ce que fut le livre quand il a été écrit; il importe de le dépouiller de tout prophétisme. Les textes que l'on lit, les fameux "fragments", cités par Plutarque (Ier-IIe siècles), Sextus (II siècle) ou Simplicius (Ve-VIe siècles), y aident. Les résumés anciens de la doctrine (la doxographie) les complètent tant bien que mal. On regrette d'autant plus ce qu'on n'a pas qu'on en souponne le contenu, sinon la faon. Nous avons les magnifiques résumés, les doxai (opinions), qui forment le corpus de ce que les spécialistes antiques et modernes appellent doxographie. Ces "opinions" répondent à une interrogation, appelée par les problèmes que l'on s'est posés sur la nature et sur l'homme, deux siècles plus tard. Théophraste, le disciple d'Aristote, les a réunies dans un ouvrage perdu, intitulé *Les Opinions des physiciens,* largement utilisé dans l'Antiquité et assez merveilleusement reconstitué sur la base de ces utilisations stratifiées par Ia science moderne. L'ouvrage de Hermann Diels, qui les a éditées, est largement à l'origine de l'intérêt accru manifesté pour les "présocratiques" au début du XXe siècle, il y a maintenant plus d'une centaine d'années (les *Doxographi Graeci* sont de 1879). Le nom d'Aétius, qui signale le recueil le plus cohérent (100 ap. J.-C.), est celui d'un compilateur obscur (choisi par Diels), utilisateur d'une autre compilation, les *Anciennes Opinions* (*Vetusta Placita*, autour de 50 ap. J.-C.). La doxographie informe; parfois elle reproduit ses sources, mais elle condense, elle aménage et elle simplifie aussi. Il faut tenir compte du point de vue de l'interrogateur. N'empêche que l'auteur du recueil, dont nous n'avons, encore une fois, que des fragments, avait, à la suite de Platon et d'Aristote, le maître de ces aperus, un sens du résumé et des systèmes, et qu'il nous aide à les approcher. Parménide y tenait une place évidente, même si elle est moins importante que celle d'Empédocle et des atomistes. "Le Monde" (à savoir la cosmologie) lui doit ici pour une bonne part sa reconstitution. Son système était différent des autres, plus éloigné et autrement orienté, pouvant servir de contrepoint. Dans le meilleur des cas, par

exemple dans celui de la genèse, les résumés reproduisent une lecture précise, un degré second qui nous ramène à l'œuvre. L'accès à la chose même, serait- il indirect, nous arrache à l'idée que, souvent inconsciemment, on prête à l'auteur.
Le texte impose une lecture neuve. Il apprend ce qui s'est dit dans l'histoire, à l'époque de Parménide, avant qu'il ne figure dans une histoire de la philosophie. L'histoire existe pour nous, mais elle existait aussi pour l'auteur. Parménide s'est situé par rapport à elle. Il s'est séparé des philosophes ioniens, prouvant en même temps qu'il s'y rattachait en profondeur. L'invective (fr. 6 et 7) prend son sens. La coupure, ou la rupture, ne se comprend que si on la pose dans ces termes. Si la lecture critique tient un rôle essentiel, c'est d'abord que le poème s'est écrit d'une certaine faon, pour être lu de cette faon-là. L'écrit répond à une attente, et la suscite. Ce n'est pas seulement la communication d'un savoir, mais une initiation poétique, qui, pour libre et éclairée qu'elle soit, reproduit, dans leur style, les pratiques religieuses dont elle s'est détachée. Mais la poésie ne retraduit aucune pensée; c'est plutôt la pensée qui se dégage de la poésie."pp. 12-15

8. Magali, Année. 2012. *Fragments Poème*. Paris: Vrin.

   Texte et traduction de Magali Année; précedé de *Énoncer le verbe être* (pp. 9-146).
   "Ce qui est proposé, dans ce bref ouvrage, est avant toute chose un commentaire linguistique du poème de Parménide. Aussi est-ce pourquoi c'est par lui qu'il commence. Comme on peut s'y attendre, c'est le fragment 8 DK qui y est le plus sollicité. Il ne fait pas, cependant, l'exclusivité.
   Le texte des fragments, que l'on trouve à la suite du commentaire, n'est pas une édition critique. Consciente de la complexité d'une tradition où les variantes peuvent être imputables non seulement à l'inadvertance de quelques copistes, mais aussi, "dans le cas de Parménide, à des manipulations tendancieuses", à l'origine de "téléscopages"

(1) bien connus des historiens de la philosophie, je me suis fiée pour l'essentiel à la dernière édition Diels-Kranz, toujours de référence, préférant cependant, comme d'autres, revenir parfois aux manuscrits.
Quant à la traduction, elle est nouvelle, comme peut l'être l'une des multiples traductions grammaticalement possibles, d'une langue poétique souvent linguistiquement ambigüe. Elle ne prétend donc à rien autre qu'à découler du commentaire, c'est-à-dire à laisser transparaître à et là les rouages linguistiques du poème, révélé par celui-ci. C'est une traduction-substrat, en quelque sorte, qui courrait en deà, sous, ou avec, les autres traductions possibles." (p. 7).
(1) Denis O'Brien, *Problèmes d'établissement du texte: la transmission du Poème dans l'Antiquité*, dans: P. Aubenque (éd.), *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, Paris, Vrin, 1987, p. 314-315 et 348.

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   Reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1976.

2. Untersteiner, Mario. 1958. *Parmenide. Testimonianze E Frammenti*. Firenze: Nuova Italia.

   Edizione, introduzione, traduzione e commento di Mario Untersteiner.
   Ristampa 1977; Nuova edizione nel volume: *Eleati. Parmenide - Zenone - Melisso*, a cura di Mario Untersteiner e Giovanni Reale, Milano, Bompiani, 2011 (pp. 19-412).

3. Trabattoni, Franco. 1985. *Parmenide. I Frammenti Con Testo Greco a Fronte*. Milano: Marcos y Marcos.

4. Reale, Giovanni, and Ruggiu, Luigi. 1991. *Parmenide. Poema Sulla Natura. I Frammenti E Le Testimonianze*

Indirette. Milano: Rusconi.

Indice generale: Un Parmenide nuovo. Presentazione di Giovanni Reale 7; L'altro Parmenide. Saggio introduttivo di Luigi Ruggiu 19; Nota editiorale 81; I Frammenti del poema di Parmenide "Sulla Natura", traduzione con testo greco a fronte e note di Giovanni Reale 83; Le testimonianze antiche sulla vita, sulla poesia e sulla dottrina di Parmenide, traduzione e note di Giovanni Reale 121; Commentario filosofico al poema di Parmenide "Sulla Natura", di Luigi Ruggiu 153; Bibliografia generale su parmenide di Giovanni Reale e Luigi Ruggiu con la collaborazione di Roberto Radice 381-423; Sommari 427-433.

"Il Poema di Parmenide, insieme ai frammenti di Eraclito, costituisce un testo base di riferimento del pensiero occidentale. In particolare, il Poema di Parmenide apre quelle vie che il pensiero greco ha seguito in tutto il suo corso: la problematica dell'Essere e anche la problematica dell'Uno, sia pure con la preminenza della prima. I filosofi pluralisti immediatamente posteriori a Parmenide dipendono strutturalmente dall'Eleatismo. Platone e Aristotele, come ho già sopra ricordato, guadagnano i punti chiave del loro pensiero proprio nel tentativo di superare le aporie di Parmenide. Le due forme di metafisica in cui si esprime il pensiero greco, ontologia e benologia, hanno in Parmenide la loro fonte.

Dunque, il Poema di Parmenide si impone, in tutti i sensi, come uno dei testi-base per eccellenza del pensiero occidentale.

La traduzione del Poema che qui presento, è stata da me fatta e rifatta più volte nel corso di un ventennio, in parte già pubblicata in altri miei scritti, ma qui per la prima volta per intero. Alcuni punti sono anche stati da me ripensati e corretti, in seguito alle discussioni fatte con Ruggiu.

Tenga presente il lettore che tradurre Parmenide è una delle operazioni più difficili. E la ragione sta nel fatto che linguaggio e concetto, immagine e pensiero, per i motivi che sopra ho già chiarito, in lui sono inscindibilmente connessi. Parmenide lo si può tradurre solo se lo si capisce, o, meglio,

la traduzione del Poema Sulla natura dipende in toto dal modo in cui se ne intende il messaggio filosofico. Il puro filologo, anche se è un conoscitore eccelso della lingua greca, non lo rende mai bene. In altri termini: nella misura in cui si approfondisce la comprensione filosofica del Poema, si riesce a tradurre anche la parola parmenidea. La traduzione dei suoi termini non può essere se non anche eo ipso la traduzione dei suol concetti.
Naturalmente, e proprio per tale motivo, avere accanto alla traduzione anche il testo greco è essenziale. E per questo lo abbiamo riprodotto a fronte della traduzione.
La temperie spirituale originaria si intende a fondo solo calandosi nel linguaggio originario.
Delle testimonianze indirette non è stato invece riportato il testo greco, perché questa necessità non si presentava."

5. Cerri, Giovanni. 1999. *Parmenide Di Elea. Poema Sulla Natura*. Milano: Rizzoli.

   Sommario: Premessa 1; Introduzione: la riscoperta del vero Parmenide 11; Pagine scelte di critica moderna 111; Bibliografia 127; Poema sulla Natura - Frammenti (testom greco e traduzione italiana) 145; Commento 163-292.
   "Pervenuto, dopo anni di studi e di ricerche, alla convinzione o alla presunzione (questo lo giudicherà il lettore) di aver compreso il senso generale del pensiero di Parmenide e, nel suo quadro, il significato preciso di quasi ogni frammento e verso, mi sono dedicato in maniera esclusiva all'illustrazione diretta di questa mia ricostruzione, documentandola punto per punto con gli argomenti necessari, di ordine sia interno che esterno, mostrandone cioè la congruenza con quanto sappiamo del poema e delle sue singole parti, della cultura e del linguaggio poetico dal cui seno il poema è nato.
   Mi sono viceversa volontariamente preclusa la strada più usuale soprattutto nel campo della filologia classica, da me stesso seguita in tante altre occasioni, consistente nel costruire il proprio discorso sull'esposizione e la disamina di quelli proposti dalla critica precedente. Nel caso specifico

ciò mi avrebbe portato a scrivere centinaia e centinaia, se non migliaia di pagine, con il bel risultato di contraddire nei fatti lo scopo che mi ero prefisso: offrire finalmente una lettura di Parmenide piana e persuasiva, perché filologicamente fondata." p. 7

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1. Gómez Lobo, Alfonso. 1985. *Parménides*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Charcas.

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   Second edition with the title: *El Poema de Parménides*, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1999

2. Calvo, Agustín García. 2001. *Lectura Presocráticas I*. Zamora: Editorial Lucina.

   3° edición con el Parménides renovado (primera edición 1981).
   Indice: Presentacion 9; Primera parte. Tentativa de redacción escrita 19; Segunda parte. Otros registros de lectura 133; Tercera parte. Edición crítica y versión rítmica de los Fragmentos de Parménides 183; Nota para le nueva edición 184; Apéndice 221-230.
   "En fin, la tercera parte es una edición crítica de todos los fragmentos del poema de Parménides, con aparato bastante numeroso, noticia en español sobre las fuentes de cada fragmento y ocasionalmente introducción de su cita por los trasmisores, y una versión rítmica en castellano. Con loable esfuerzo por parte de 'Lucina' y de los tipógrafos, se ha procurado una presentación nítida y digna, en que aparecen enfrentados en una página el texto del poema con el aparato crítico y en la otra la noticia sobre las fuentes seguida de la versión.

Para el conocimiento de la tradición del texto y su estado en la práctica editorial hasta el momento, he tenido presentes sobre todo, junto a los *Vorsokratische Denker* de Diels-Kranz (3. ed. Berlín 1964), las ediciones de M. Untersteiner, Florencia 1958, L. Tarán, Princeton 1965, y E. Heitsch, Munich 1974: de otras, como las viejas de Brandis, Karsten y Stein, o las más recientes de Covotti y Hölscher, sólo he recogido noticias indirectas. Agradezco especialmente a Aníbal González la amistosa diligencia y docto escrúpulo con que ha compulsado para mí las ediciones más autorizadas de Simplicio, Sexto, Proclo y los otros citadores principales a quienes debemos los versos conservados del poema, permitiéndome enriquecer y corregir en varios puntos la anotación crítica y aun en un par de ocasiones el texto mismo.
Este texto que ofrezco se aparta en una buena docena de sitios del recibido en el Diels-Kranz, el Kirk-Raven y las ediciones anteriores, y tengo cierta confianza en que la mayor parte de esos cambios sean para bien de la fidelidad; y así también las alteraciones en la ordenación de los fragmentos, que en tres o cuatro puntos se aparta de la seguida en las ediciones habituales. En todo caso, a la cabeza de cada fragmento, junto al número de esta edición, he colocado el correspondiente de la de Diels-Kranz.
En cuanto a la versión rítmica, que es fruto de muchas redacciones sucesivas, me he permitido esperar que, leída con igual cuidado y detenimiento, pueda dispensarme por ahora de prolijos comentarios interpretativos." pp. 15-16.

3. Solana, Dueso José. 2006. *De Logos a Physis. Estudio Sobre El Poema De Parménides*. Zaragoza: Miros Editores.

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2. Plotinus. 1951. *Enneades*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.

   I. Porphyrii vita Plotini. Enneades I-III (1951); II. Enneades IV-V. Plotiniana arabica ad codicum fidem anglice veritit Geoffrey Lewis (1951); III. Enneas VI. (1973)

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   Contents: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos: Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides 3; Joseph Owens: Knowledge and Katabasis in Parmenides 15; Karl Bormann: The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius 30; Leonardo Tarán: Perpetual Duration and Atemporai Eternity in Parmenides and Plato 43; T. M. Robinson: Parmenides on the Real in its Totality 54; David Gallop: 'Is' or 'Is Not'? 61; P. B. Manchester: Parmenides and the Need for Eternity 81-106.
2. Adluri, Vishwa. 2011. *Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy*. London: Continuum.
   Contents: Foreword by Luc Brisson XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; Introduction: Parmenides and Renewing the Beginning 1; Part I: Beginnings: *Arkhai*. Chapter 1: Radical Individuality: Time, Mortal Soul, and Journey 11; Chapter 2: Parmenides and His Importance as a Beginner 33; Part II: Parmenides. Chapter 3: The Mortal Journey: *Thumos* (The Mortal Soul) and Its Limits 45; Chapter 4: In the Realm of the Goddess: Logos and Its Limits 64; Chapter 5: At Home in the Kosmos: The Return 78; Part III: Plato the Pre-Socratic. Chapter 6: Reading Plato's Phaedrus: Socrates the Mortal 93; Part IV: Forewording. Conclusion: Returning to Parmenides 129; Appendix: Translation and Textual Notes

of Parmenides' *Peri Phuseos* 137; Section I: The Journey 137; Section II: The Goddess 139; Section III: The Kosmos 148; Notes 157; Bibliography 186; Index 205-212.
"Dr. Adluri argues for a “mortal philosophy,” that is, a philosophy that is aware of and maintains the tension between the mortal desire for transcendence, whether understood as eternity or as the timeless truths of metaphysical propositions, and the irreducibly tragic “mortal condition” which implies a return from transcendence to our finitude. In my view, Dr. Adluri holds together these opposing elements admirably in his book and, in doing so, provides a thought-provoking and brilliantly original analysis of Parmenides' poem with extensive notes, written in a fresh and lucid style. His work, which is very interesting on the level of scholarly work, provides new insight into Parmenides' poem that goes well beyond the logical analyses to which one has attempted to reduce it over the most recent decades. Above all, he proposes a description of Parmenides' approach that does not reduce him to being the philosopher of Being and of Eternity. Parmenides speaks of the universe, and confronts not only immortality, but mortality as well. The importance of argumentation in the poem is considerable, and continues to be admitted by all, but the role played in it by myth is decisive in it." (From the Foreword by Luc Brisson, XIII)

3. Altman, William Henry Furness. 2015. "Parmenides' Fragment B3 Revisited." *Hypnos (São Paulo)* no. 35:197-230.
"Abstract: The justification for placing Parmenides fr. 3 (DK 28 B3) in “Truth” is weak, and both its ambiguity and capacity to generate radically different interpretations suggest that it belongs to “Doxa.” The paper analyzes the fragment’s sources (Clement, Plotinus, and Proclus), the circumstances of its belated entry into any collection (1835), and argues that the ongoing debate between the reading of Diels and the reading of it introduced by Zeller arises from the presupposition—heretofore unquestioned—that it belongs in “Truth.”

The paper's principal purpose is not to settle this famous interpretive dilemma nor to reinterpret B3 within "Doxa," but rather to destabilize the currently unquestioned view that it belongs in "Truth," and to call into question any global interpretations of Parmenides that make B3 a central component."

4. Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. 1968. "Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 69:125-132.
   Reprinted in: *The Collected Philosophical Papers,* vol. I: *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, pp. 3-8.
   "Endeavors to elucidate Parmenides' seemingly enigmatic statements concerning the relationship between Being and thought. Formulates Parmenides' argument in terms of three propositions: (1) it is the same thing that can be thought and can be; (2) what is not cannot be; (3) therefore what is not cannot be thought. Undertakes a detailed analysis of the logical structure of the argument, and contends that it is valid if the second premiss is taken *in sensu diviso*. But it has no credibility except *in sensu composito*. The conclusion is also incredible."
   "If' we take Parmenides as simply warning us off the path of thinking there are things that do not exist, then he seems no more than good sense. But when we combine this with the idea that *being* is an object, we get his wilder results. However, we should not move slickly here: "being" might be an abstract noun, equivalent to the infinitive "to be". But Parmenides does not treat *to be* as an object, but rather *being*, i.e. something being or some being thing. It is difficult to use the participle in English in the required way, and we might get closer to the sense by saying "what is". There is a similar difficulty about Parmenides' description of the two paths for thought: "is, and cannot not be", and "is not and needs must not be". In English the lack of a subject may be found disturbing. But the Greek does not need a subject-expression. The subject - he, she, it, or they - is built into the verb, which therefore does not seem incomplete without a separate word for a subject. Therefore it is often

translated “It is”. But there is no indication in the Greek that “it” is the right subject. Therefore I would rather not give a subject word. “These are the only ways of enquiry for thought: one ‘is and cannot not be', . . . the other ‘is not, and needs must not be'.” That is: Whatever enquiry one is making, one’s thoughts can only go two ways, saying ‘is, and must be', or ‘is not, and can’t be'.
The noteworthy thing about this is not so much the ungiven subject, as the combination of “is” with “cannot not be” and of “is not” with “cannot be”. This needs argument. We have seen what the argument is: what is not is nothing, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be; and so both whatever can be must be, and what can be thought of must be; for it is the same as what can be." (from the *Introduction* to the reprint, p. X)
(...)
"It was left to the moderns to deduce what could be from what could hold of thought, as we see Hume to have done. This trend is still strong. But the ancients had the better approach, arguing only that a thought was impossible because the thing was impossible, or, as the *Tractatus* puts it. “Was man nicht denken kann, das kann man nicht denken”: an impossible thought is an impossible thought. At the present day we are often perplexed with enquiries about what makes true, or what something’s being thus or so consists in; and the answer to this is thought to be an explanation of meaning. If there is no external answer, we are apparently committed to a kind of idealism.
Whitehead’s remark about Plato might, somewhat narrowly, be applied to his great predecessor:
Subsequent philosophy is footnotes on Parmenides." (from the *Introduction* to the reprint, pp.X-XI)

5. Austin, Scott. 1983. "Genesis and Motion in Parmenides: B8.12-13." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 87:151-168.
"The emendation τοὐ for μη in Parmenides, fragment 8, line 12, proposed by Karsten, (1) has been adopted by (among others) Reinhardt, Tarán, Stokes, and, most recently, Barnes. (2) And yet, while there is no compelling reason to

make the emendation, there are several good reasons why one should not make it. I want to claim that the unemended poem already does what the emendation is supposed to allow it to do. I also should like to venture some observations on Parmenidean method and on his use of the key concepts of change and motion." (p. 151)
(1) S. Karsten, *Parmenidis Eleatae Carminis Reliquiae* (Amsterdam 1835).
(2) K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn 1916) 40 ff. Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton 1965) 95-102. Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971). Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers, I, Thales to Zeno* 188-190 (London 1979).

6. ———. 1986. *Parmenides. Being, Bounds, and Logic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX-XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. Why not "is not"? 11; Chapter 2. Terms 44; Chapter 3. Modals, the Other, and Method 96; Chapter 5. Context and contradiction 116; Chapter 6. The bounded and the unbounded 136; Appendix. Parmenides' *On Nature* 155; Notes 175; Bibliography 193; Index 199-203.
"In chapter 1, I attempt to describe what exactly the goddess requires and prohibits. One scholarly issue arises from the puzzling fact that, though the goddess prohibits discourse about what-is-not, her own discourse is full of negative words and expressions, thus seeming inconsistent. I try to arrive at an interpretation of her prohibition which does not make her rule out the language that she herself uses, which clears her of some inconsistencies by allowing her to mean what she says, negatively as well as positively. In the process I attempt to determine what Parmenides thought were the ultimate relationships among ontology, sentence structure, and logic. I also claim that Parmenides' attitude towards contextual relativity determines what is right about "Truth" and wrong about "Opinion." This claim, if correct, allows us to make connections between Parmenides, the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, connections which are taken up again

and historically amplified in chapter 5. This first chapter is the most controversial in its claims. Chapter 2, taking as its premise the goddess's use of different sorts of positive and negative language, tries to determine just how many sorts of language there are, how comprehensive the coverage of them is, and why certain sorts occur in specific places in the poem. (...)
Chapters 3 and 4 make the same claim about comprehensiveness and determinacy for Parmenides' treatment of contraries, for his proof that there is nothing besides being, and for his use of metaphorical modal language. Here the method of elimination of alternatives has the same ontological outcome: a single, non contrary necessary being is rendered determinate and, to use Parmenides' own metaphor, is bounded by being the object of a discourse which operates by systematically examining the spectrum of possibilities. In chapters 2-4, then, logic and a comprehensive method of enumeration and variation appear intimately intertwined with ontology in a combination originated by Parmenides and (as chapters 5 and 6 try to show) decisive in subsequent philosophy and in its own right. Chapter 5 attempts to trace the history, from Thales through Parmenides to Aristotle, of the Parmenidean logic of contextual variability, of the method of variation, and of the theory of negative language attributed to Parmenides in the first four chapters, thus to situate his thought in its immediate historical context while showing that later developments can be predicated retroactively in his terms. The concluding chapter meditates on the philosophical and theological significance of the views attributed here to Parmenides, especially in light of his identification of the transcendent with the determinate or bounded rather than with the unbounded, and in connection with the methodology and theory associated with that identification in earlier chapters." (pp. 7-8)

7. ———. 2002. "Parmenides, double-negation, and dialectic." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 95-100. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"I claim in this paper that Parmenides chose to negate as part of the most basic skeleton of his proof-structure: each predicate true of Being is not only proved, but also has its contradictory denied modally. And all sorts of negations (privations, denials, double-negations) have a necessary place in these proofs. Thus Parmenides' speech - a monistic speech - was already meaningfully negative, and the pluralism in philosophy that begins later on and culminates in the argument against Parmenides in the *Sophist* is unnecessary, at least on those grounds. In particular, I wish to show that Parmenides, like Plato's *Parmenides,* domesticates negation in a way that Plato and the subsequent tradition do not positively give him credit for. For Plato articulated the line of criticism which has been dominant ever since: Parmenides' discourse cannot be uttered without undercutting the goddess's own conditions for the intelligibility of meaningful speech; moreover, even if we could hear her speech and retain it for a moment, it would be useless to us. The criticism continues: a pure monism is, divorced from the needs of life, dialogue, or a path to goodness and beauty.

Parmenides' intention to speak negatively is visible from the beginning of the goddess' remarks about the canons for truth. Fragment 2 tells us that we are to say not only how or that being is, but also how it is not possible for it to be otherwise. This prescription in fragment 2 gets expanded into the list of signposts in fr. 8: 'how it is' in fr. 8.2, directly repeating the 'how it is' in fr. 2.3, is at once amplified into 'how it is ungenerable and unperishing, a whole of a single kind, unmoving, and perfect' - this amplification, along with the reading of Parmenides as an ironist, will remain one of Mourelatos' own most decisive contributions - and each signpost is then proved in fragment 8 in sequence by proving the impossibility of its contradictory in a manner I shall describe below. There is no such thing as a bare 'is' in Parmenides; the copula is always either explicitly predicational or implicitly so (Austin, 1986, pp. 11-43). It is always a mistake to isolate the `is' from the surrounding

discourse and then attempt to guess at its significance." (p. 95)

8. ———. 2007. *Parmenides and the History of Dialectic. Three Essays*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Contents: Introduction IX; Acknowledgements XIII; Essay one: Parmenidean dialectic 1; Essay two: Parmenidean metaphysics 29; Essay three: Parmenides and the history of dialectic 51; Bibliography 85; Index 91-98.
"In [the] second essay, I would like to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides in philosophical terms, not in methodological terms, as was tried in the first essay. But the philosophical issues will, I hope, be not only central, but also perennial. I shall set these out partly on the basis of the conclusions of the first essay, and partly on the basis of conclusions for which I have argued elsewhere. The attempt in this essay will, however, necessarily be incomplete, for the ramifications of Parmenides extend even into our own day. I shall attempt a study of this extension in the third essay.
I urge to begin with, as I urged in the first essay, that we abandon the attempt to figure out the motivations of Parmenides' argument by looking to fragment 2 first and then making conjectures about what the Parmenidean *esti* in that fragment means or could mean. No amount of research, amplification, or surgery is going to make this fragment specific enough. Instead, we should look to fragment 8 as an example of the discourse which fragment 2 makes both possible and necessary, and reason backwards instead of forwards. This may fail, but it is high time that it was tried." (p. 31)

9. ———. 2011. "Existence and Essence in Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 1-8. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Parmenides' absolute monism puts existence and essence into an absolutely monistic Being as it joins levels in an ontological hierarchy that other philosophers, from the Neoplatonists through Hegel, were later to separate. The result is a fusion of presentation and

representation, a fusion not teased apart until the twentieth century."

10. ———. 2014. "Some Eleatic Features of Platonic and Neoplatonic Method." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:65-74.
"I have earlier tried to show that there is a determinate sequence of positives and negatives in the 'Truh' section of Parmenides' fragment 8, that the sequence correlates with elements in the structure of the second half of Plato's *Parmenides*, and that both sequences can be called ' dialectical' in the sense demanded by *Republic* VI (Austin, [*Parmenides and the History of Dialectic. Three Essays*] 2007). I shall here investigate the use of the notions of one and many in the poem and in the dialogue, and attempt to look forward to similar uses in the Plotincan hypostases and in Proclus' commentary on the dialogue. My aim is to expand and make more precise our understanding of ancient dialectic. A cursory survey of Google will reveal dozens of results for the joint keywords 'Parmenides dialectic'. But it is never clear just what this 'dialectic' is to consist in, nor how it was interpreted by those who thought themselves to be Plato's successors in our Western tradition. Here I shall attempt to show that alternations and jugglings of one and many turn out to be as important as those of positive and negative in this tradition at its outset."

11. Barnes, Jonathan. 1979. "Parmenides and the Eleatic One." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 61:1-21.
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, *Method and Metaphysics. Essays in Ancient Philosophy I*, edited by Maddalena Bonelli, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 262-287.
" 'Exactly one thing exists'. That is the intoxicating thesis of 'real' monism. It is, of course, utterly distinct from its milksop homonym, 'material' monism, which maintains that everything is made of some single matter or stuff. As a philosophico-scientific thesis it is at best absurd and at worst unintelligible; yet beyond all doubt it was propounded by Melissus.
Almost to a man, scholars deny Melissus any monistic originality: he inherited real monism, together with most of the rest of his philosophy, from father Parmenides; and it

was the uncouth verses of the Way of Truth which placed *tò en* at the centre of Eleatic metaphysics. A few heterodox students have quarrelled with that ascription, doubting the presence - or at least questioning the importance - of The One in Parmenides' thought; but their scruples have been unconvincingly expressed, and they have failed to shake the orthodoxy. And indeed, the orthodoxy has reason for complacency: the history of fifth century thought is often seen to hinge on Parmenidean monism; a luxuriant doxography is pretty well unanimous in ascribing *tò en* to Parmenidean; and the thesis of real monism is apparently both stated and argued for in the surviving fragments of Parmenides' poem.

In this paper, I shall argue that we have in reality no reason to make Parmenides a monist. My approach is negative and serial: I shall simply consider one by one the texts and suppositions which have been or might be adduced in the quest for monism, and I shall endeavour to show that their adduction is of no avail. My aim is to prick the hide of orthodoxy: even the most sagacious elephant may benefit from the occasional gad-fly's sting." (pp. 2-3, notes omitted)

12. ———. 1979. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Two volumes; revised edition in one volume 1989.

See Chapter IX: *Parmenides and the Objects of Inquiry,* pp. 122-138 and X: *Being and Becoming,* pp. 139-157.

"Parmenides of Elea marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy: his investigations, supported and supplemented by those of his two followers [Zeno and Melissus], seemed to reveal deep logical flaws in the very foundations of earlier thought. Science, it appeared, was marred by subtle but profound contradictions; and the great enterprise undertaken by the Milesians, by Xenophanes and by Heraclitus, lacked all pith and moment. The age of innocence was ended, and when science was taken up again by the fifth-century philosophers, their first and most arduous task was to defend their discipline against the arguments of Elea. If their defense was often frail and unconvincing, and if it was Plato who first fully appreciated

the strength and complexity of Parmenides' position, it remains true that Parmenides' influence on later Presocratic thought was all-pervasive. Historically, Parmenides is a giant figure; what is more, he introduced into Presocratic thought a number of issues belonging to the very heart of philosophy. Parmenides' thoughts were divulged in a single hexameter poem (Diogenes Laertius, 1.16 = 28 A 13) which survived intact to the time of Simplicius (A 21). Observing that copies of the poem were scarce, Simplicius transcribed extensive extracts; and thanks to his efforts we possess some [B 6] lines of the work, including two substantial passages." (p. 122)

13. Barrett, James. 2004. "Struggling with Parmenides." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:267-291.
"... Parmenides' poem contains syntactical puzzles of extraordinary difficulty. (3) And yet, in spite of the fact that every student of the poem has experienced a form of vertigo in coming to terms with this remarkable text, few have pursued this disorientation as anything other than a difficulty to be surmounted.
I argue, however, that the poem reaps benefits from the opacity we all confront and that our experience of vertigo is in fact consistent with the commentary of the fragments more broadly. I do not contend that the text presents unresolvable opacity as yet one more gesture toward inescapable aporia, or that none of the possible meanings necessarily have a greater or lesser claim to validity. Rather, I suggest that the poem offers its own difficulty—particularly in the ‘Aletheia' (4) as a key part of its purpose and that the text’s strong interest in epistemological method appears not only in the substance of its commentary, but also in its mode of expression." (p. 267)
(3) By 'poem' I mean the fragments as we know them.
(4) I follow convention in dividing the poem into three sections: proem (B1); 'Aletheia' B2-8: and Doxa' B9-19. For convenience I refer to the Aletheia' as the poem's ‘first part' and to the ‘Doxa' as the 'second'. I intend no judgments either by this terminology or by these divisions.

14. Basson, Anthony Henry. 1961. "The Way of Truth." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 61:73-86.
"More generally, almost all commentators assume (1) that there is just one premiss, (2) that the poem presents a single continuous chain of argument. If this were so, a single false step would suffice to destroy the whole. In fact, analysis does not support either of these assumptions.
The object of this paper is simply logical analysis, and this means ascertaining (1) which statements in fact function as premisses, and which as conclusions, (2) whether the conclusions are in fact validly deduced from the premisses. For this purpose I use Raven's (*)excellent English rendering, referring to the Greek text only where this is essential. I shall assume that Fragments 2 and 8 contain the whole argument, the remainder being repetitious or rhetorical; and further, that propositions not proved in the extant fragments were not proved in those parts of the poem which have perished.
I first reproduce Fragments 2 and 8, arranged so as to show their logical structure. Thus Fragment 2 consists of five assertions, numbered 01-05, which form a single argument. But Fragment 8 consists of a sequence of forty-two assertions, and divides into no less than nine distinct arguments, numbered 11-13, 21-26, 31-36, 41-44, 51-55, 61-62, 71-74, 81-85, 91-97. Some preliminary observations are made on the articulation of each of these ten arguments, and their relations to one another. In Part III the principal conclusions are listed, which Parmenides seems to wish to draw. Then the various arguments for these are reconstructed, additional premisses being inserted where these are required for validity. It is found that two of these arguments (the proofs of assertions 22 and 72) are fundamental. In Part IV the argument of Fragment 2 (01-05) is examined in connexion with the proof of 22, and an interpretation of the former is offered. The outcome of this examination is that 71-74 is the fundamental argument, rather than 01-05." (pp. 74-75)
(*) [Kirk, Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 1957]

15. Beaufret, Jean. 2006. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." In *Dialogue with Heidegger*, 21-31. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
First French edition: *Botteghe oscure*, 25, 1960, pp. 31-37; revised reprint in J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973.
"If the world that is said to be pre-Socratic is rich in original historical figures, Heraclitus and Parmenides are the most radiantly central figures of this world. With Heraclitus and Parmenides the very foundation of occidental thought is accomplished. It is to them that what is still alive and vivacious at the bottom of our thinking goes back, as if to the secret of its source. It can be said that it is through them that we think, even if we do not think of them, for they are the light in which the depth of our world is originally revealed—a depth which we always and already are and which remains all the more enigmatic for us, and thus all the more concealed, in that we belong to it in the heart of the history that has come to us and that is still to come." (p. 21)
(...)
"If Parmenides is the thinker of being, we can understand now that this thinking of being overshadows change no more than a thinking of change, such as Heraclitus conceives it, destabilizes a fundamental permanence. Movement appears to Heraclitus only upon a background of permanence, and when Parmenides thinks the permanence of being against non-being, it is as an unmovable horizon of presence-absence that is the essence of all change. Far from rising from the dawn against each other like the champions of an inaugural polemic, Heraclitus and Parmenides are perhaps both, despite the difference of their words, listening to the same λόγος, to which they both lend the same ear at the origin of occidental thought. At bottom, there is perhaps no more immobilism in Parmenides' Poem than there is mobilism in the fragments of Heraclitus, or rather permanence and change are to be found to the same degree in both. In this way the two languages diverge without, however, contradicting each other. Both expose the Greek

knowledge of being, a *knowing of being* that unfolds in the element of presence without forcing or tormenting anything, without shying away or becoming strained, without compromise or excess." (pp. 30-31)

16. ———. 2006. "Reading Parmenides." In *Dialogue with Heidegger*, 32-63. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. French edition: *Lecture de Parménide*, in J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973.
"But in 1916 Karl Reinhardt, who taught at Frankfurt and whom I once had the chance to meet on the shores of Lake Maggiore just after the Second World War, dismisses the interpretations of both Diels and Wilamowitz. This is neither a polemical refutation nor a concessive hypothesis; what Parmenides explains, after having opposed truth to error, is quite simply how it would be impossible for error not to seize the minds of men from the very beginning. The power of error over men responds, as Reinhardt says, “to a sort of original sin” of pre-history. (5) The site of this error, that is, opinion or δόξα, ceases to be, therefore, a mere adventitious juxtaposition to true knowledge, ἀλήθεια, in the Poem; it becomes an integral part of a whole to whose unity it belongs as that to which true knowledge is contrasted." (p. 33)
(...)
"The argument that there is a tripartition where a bimillenary tradition has only been able to see a bipartition, is, I believe, the veritable acquisition of Reinhardt’s study. Yet whether this tripartition is exactly as Reinhardt determines it remains as questionable.
It falls to Heidegger to have raised such a question eleven years after the publication of Reinhardt’s book, on page 223 of *Sein und Zeit* (1927), that is, four pages before the incomplete French translation published in 1964 by Gallimard as a supposed first volume of the text mysteriously comes to a halt. Heidegger says in a note: “Karl Reinhardt was the first to conceptualize and solve the hackneyed problem of how the two parts of Parmenides' poem are connected, though he did not explicitly point out

the ontological foundation for the connection between ἀλήθεια and δόξα, or of the necessity of this connection." (p. 34)
(...)
"Is it a question, as Reinhardt thought, of the tripartition: truth, error, and truth of error as original sin? Is it a question of something other? But of what exactly? Can we draw it out from a simple translation? Yes, but on condition that this translation is not simply a movement of the text to us, but rather a movement on our part to Parmenides' words. Not, of course, in order to burden them with presuppositions that have come from elsewhere, but to attempt to hear in them the simplicity of what they say. And here philology, as erudite as it may be, remains insufficient. For it is above all philology that is far from being exempt from philosophical presuppositions." (p. 35)

17. Benardete, Seth. 1998. "«Night and day,...»: Parmenides." *Mètis. Anthropologie des mondes grecs anciens* no. 13:193-225.
"Three things are conspicuously absent from Parmenides' poem, and a fourth is just as surprising for its presence. The goddess never ascribes eternity (αἰεί) to being or falsehood (ψευδός) to nonbeing; nonbeing disappears as soon as the goddess turns to Opinion, even though 'to be not' is as much a mortal name as 'to be' (8. 40), and the goddess promises that Parmenides will know (εϊση, ειδήσεις [10. 1, 5]) and learn (μαθήσεαι [8.31]) mortal opinions, but she herself never uses such verbs about Truth.
Parmenides is, to be sure, fated to hear of everything (πάντα πυθέσθαι) (1.28), but only he says that he was on a road that carries the man who knows (εἰδότα φώτα) (1. 3). The goddess says that mortals know nothing εἰδότες οὐδέν) (6. 4). That the goddess never speaks of the parts that should presumably constitute the whole of being might be thought a fifth cause of astonishment, but not if 'whole' means no more than 'one', and the likeness of being to a sphere does not grant it anything more than arbitrarily sliced homogeneous sections, and the difference between the surface and center of a sphere fails to apply to being. If

being is also bereft of any magnitude, despite the equal measures the goddess assigns to it (8. 44, 49), being is no more than a point and as hypothetical as any other geometric entity. It is one thing for the goddess to speak of an articulated order (διάκοσμος) of opinions no less plausible (εἰκώς) than imagistic (εἰκώς) (8. 60); it is quite another for being to transgress its own boundaries through an image (3).
Deception (ἀπατηλὸς κόσμος) should be an exclusive property of Opinion (8. 32). Plato's Eleatic Stranger, in believing that Parmenides' whole case collapses if phantom speeches (εἴδωλα λεγάμενα) and the arts that produce them can be shown to exist, seems to be unaware that Parmenides had anticipated his counter-proof in the phantom speech his own poem was, despite the fact that the lines he himself quotes from it lodged the image within the account of being (4). The patricide he is about to commit and for which he asks Theaetetus's pardon is itself a phantoms." (p. 194)
(3) The double meaning of εἰκώς, which controls the account that Timaeus gives, first shows up in the *Odyssey*, where Nestor, in speaking of Telemachus, juxtaposes its two senses: ἠ τοι γάρ μῦθοί γε ἐοικότες, οὐδέ κε φαίης/ νεώτερον ὧδε ἐοικότα μυθήσασθαι (*Odyssey*, 3. 124-5).
(4) *Sophist*, 241 d 10-e 6; 244 e 2-7.

18. Benzi, Nicolò. 2016. "Noos and Mortal Enquiry in the Poetry of Xenophanes and Parmenides." *Methodos. Savoirs et Textes* no. 16:1-18.
Abstract: "*Noos, noein* and their derivatives are of central importance to the development of epistemological conceptions in Presocratic philosophy. Already in Homer the terms indicate a special form of cognition, resembling sense perception in its non-inferential nature, which consists in discovering the truth beyond mere appearance. In this article, I focus on the role which *noos* and *noein* play in the poetry of Xenophanes and Parmenides, whose characterizations of noetic cognition, I argue, depend on their response to the problems stemming from the contrast between humans' epistemic limitations and divine omniscience, as traditionally depicted in Archaic Greek

poetry. In particular, I consider Hesiod's poems and the implications of his claim to be able to “speak the mind (*noos*) of Zeus” (*Op*. 661), which hints at the universal truth he wants to convey through his poetry. However, Hesiod's dependence on the Muses, who can speak both false and true things (*Th*. 27-28), renders his poetry inevitably ambiguous, as he and his audience cannot know whether what they learn from the divinity is actually true. Xenophanes appropriates the motif of humans' epistemic limitedness by describing mortals as inevitably confined to opinion, and contrasting their condition with the all-powerful noetic capacities of the greatest god. However, I argue, despite mortals' belief-formation ultimately relies on divine disclosure, humans are not condemned to complete ambiguity as in the past poetic tradition, since Xenophanes' very conception of god's *noos* provides a reliable basis for mortal enquiry which guarantees the actual improvement of humans' opinions over time.
Even in Parmenides' poem human *noos* is repeatedly described as wandering astray, but error is not conceived as an ineluctable human condition. In fact, by stipulating that the correct path of enquiry which mortals' *noos* ought to follow to attain truth consists in the logical deduction of the attributes of What-Is, Parmenides allows for the actual possibility that humans achieve that universal and absolute truth to which traditionally they could not have access.
Thus, by introducing innovations to the traditional notion of divine and mortal *noos*, Xenophanes and Parmenides respectively assigned to critical enquiry and logical argumentation that essential role which they maintained in the following development of philosophy."

19. Bicknell, Peter J. 1967. "Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication." *Phronesis* no. 12:1-5.
"It is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner of atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of these being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I shall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other argument

for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theophrastus (*), our most important witness, unequivocally states that Leucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism.
Discussion is preceded by quotation of the two relevant texts." [Parmenides DK 28 B8 and Melissus DK 30 B7.7] (p. 1)
"To return to motion and the void, it seems to me most likely that Leucippus in replying to *Parmenides* made explicit τὸ κενὸν implicit in Parmenides' gaps of what is not in what is and that Melissus attempted to refute Leucippus using atomism's own physical terminology." (p. 5)
(*) [The crucial passage is the following: Simplicius Phys. 28.4ff (a virtual transcript of Theophrastus, either direct or through Alexander of Aphrodisias), (p. 4)]

20. ———. 1968. "A new arrangement of some Parmenidean verses." *Symbolae Osloensis* no. 42:44-50.
"Preface. There have been two important attempts at setting the extant fragments of Parmenides' poem in order; that by H. Diels in his 'Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta' and in the earlier editions of 'Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker'; and that by W. Kranz in the later editions of the latter work. In many respects, the sequence proposed by Diels was followed by his successor, but the respective fragments 1 and 7 differ significantly. With the important exception of C. J. de Vogel, (1) scholars appear unanimous in their approval of the Kranzian ordering. In the present paper, I intend to review the difference between Diels' and Kranz' constructions of fragments 1 and 7, and to suggest a new combination of verses which involves adding a line to fragment 1 as Diels constructed it and uniting three other fragments, namely fragment 6 (Diels and Kranz), fragment 2 (Diels) = fragment 4 (Kranz), and fragment 8 (Diels and Kranz)." (p. 44)
(1) C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, Vol. I, Leiden, 1957, pp. 37-38.

21. ———. 1979. "Parmenides DK 28 B5." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:9-11.

According to the common view, represented by Raven (1) and endorsed with little hesitation by Guthrie, (2) this fragment, whose context within Parmenides' poem is not evident from its only citation, (3) is to be interpreted in conjunction with B1.28—29. In
these lines from the prologue the goddess undertakes to reveal to the poet-seer Ἀληθειής εὔκυκλεος (4) or εὐγἰεγγέος (5) or εντεειέθος (6) τ?τορ. Accepting the reading eUKiwXeoc, Raven explains that truth is described as well-rounded because wherever you pick up the chain of Parmenides' reasoning, you can follow it round in a circle, passing through each of the links in turn back to your starting point. At B5, Raven holds, the goddess spells out this feature of her subsequent argumentation. He translates "it is all one to me where I begin, for I shall come back there again in time".
Together with others this interpretation is rightly rejected in Tarán's (7) modern doxography. It is incompatible, Tarán claims, with the structure of B8. Only a brief scrutiny of the Way of Truth is required to appreciate that this is in fact the case. Five characteristics, ἀ·γένητον, ἀνωληθρον,οὐλον μουιχτγενές, ἀτρεμές, ἀτελεστον, (8) of its subject are established in that order. (9) Only in the demonstration of the fourth, in one of its senses, (10) is the proof of others invoked. (11) None of the theorems of B8 leads back into the primary argument which occupies B2, B3 and B6 1-2. It apparently did not occur to Tarán, however, to contemplate an alternative translation for B5. Rendering "It is indifferent to me where I make a beginning; for there I come back again", he declare himself agnostic as to the reason for, if not the authenticity of, (12) the goddess' observation." (p. 9)
1. See G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1954, pp. 268-269.
2. See W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. ii, Cambridge 1965, p. 97 note 1.
3. By Proclus (*in Parm*. 1. 708. 16-17) who almost certainly found the lines, which he mistakenly referred to Being, in an anthology.
4. So Simplicius at *de caelo* 557. 27 ff.

5. So Proclus, *in Tim*. 1. 345. 15-16.
6. Thus Clement, *Strom*. 2. 336. 16-17; Diogenes Laertius 9.22; Plutarch, *adv. Colot*. 1114 d-e; and Sextus Empiricus, *adv. math*. 7. Ill and 114.
7. See L. Tarán, *Parmenides*, Princeton 1965, pp. 51-53.
8. See B8.9-11.
9. ἀγένητου together with, conversely, ἀνωλεθρον, B8. 5-21; ουλών μοννογενές, B8. 22— 25; ἀτρεμές, B8. 26-41; ἀτέλετον, B8. 42-49.1 leave elaboration for a future occasion.
10.I stand by my central contention at *Phronesis* 12 (1967) pp. 1-5 that Parmenides separately disposed of movement qua transformation, growth and diminution, and qualitative change (all ruled out proximately by the impossibility of genesis and olethros) on the one hand (B8.26-28) and qua change of position, i.e. locomotion, on the other (B8. 29-33).
11. See B8. 27-28.
12. Doubted by Jameson, for reference see note 16 below.
16. C.J. Jameson, "Well-rounded Truth" and Circular Thought in Parmenides", *Phronesis* 3 (1958), pp. 15-30.

22. Blank, David L. 1982. "Faith and Persuasion in Parmenides." *Classical Antiquity* no. 1:167-177.
"The debate between those who recognize a religious, mystical Parmenides and those who see Parmenides as a rationalist has had a long history, even when one begins its examination with Diels's shaman- and Reinhardt's logician Parmenides.(1)" (p. 167)
(...)
"This essay attempts to show not only that certain elements of the proem's imagery make sense in a religious light but that they go someway toward clarifying the purpose of the proem and its relation to the remainder of Parmenides' poem. The analysis centers on the motifs of faith and persuasion, πιστις and Πειθώ. I shall argue that these motifs are used to stress the importance of Parmenides' message to his disciples by putting forward a claim to urgency on the level of his competition, the mystery religions and Pythagorean teachings to which the disciples were

constantly exposed in southern Italy. Establishment of this claim is the ultimate goal of Parmenides' proem." (p. 168)
(...)
"If Parmenides wanted his philosophical project to be taken seriously or even to be heard at all over the confused frenzy of the pious, he was well advised to borrow some of their techniques. Thus, Parmenides begins by making his set of alternatives, Truth and Seeming, as crucially important to the audience as the alternatives of the competing groups. Once he has gained the audience's attention and has got the audience to trust him, he demonstrates the method of persuasion by argument. "ἐστί, says Parmenides, is the Way of true faith; and although he argues for this logically, he begins by using the seductive power of persuasion and implies that those who hold the true faith will be happy, while those who do not are doomed to ignorance by their απιστία." (p. 177)

23. Bodnár, István M. 1985. "Contrasting Images Notes on Parmenides B 5." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 19:52-59.
"A fragment, deprived of its context and so short as B 5 is, can pose notorious difficulties to those trying to interpret it. Tarán's verdict (which he formulates while elucidating the basic" meaning of this fragment) that "... while some of these conjectures go beyond the evidence so that there is no good reason to support one against the others, other conjectures are based on premisses that may be proved wrong" seems to suggest that we do not possess any criterion so as to choose among the interpretations which cannot be rejected: after all a certain amount of incertainty is inevitable or even inherent in this fragment.
In the following sections I will try to show that in much the same way as in the case of, for example, Parmenides B 3 we are able to contrast and rank different interpretations of this fragment. This does not lead up to pure certainty in fact, and supposing we happen to find some longer quotations from Parmenides some day embedding B 5 in a continuous context, it is clear that such a development might be disastrous for the wealth of accumulated labours of

scholastically on this fragment. But in principle this holds good in the case of the vast majority of the Presocratic authors, let alone some of the other fragments of Parmenides." (p. 52)

24. Bogaczyk-Vormayr, Małgorzata. 2016. "Parmenides' Poem: Riddle from B 5." *Ethics in Progress* no. 7:95-103.
"In my interpretation of the poem I give special attention to fragment B5." (p. 95)
(...)
"It seems plausible that the correct interpretation of Parmenides' poem should be taken from the perspective provided by the thesis of fragment B 5, so we could intuitively capture "all things" announced in a presumed whole as referring to the circular, *inner* Way of Truth.(5) It is from this way that the reliable verification of discovery begins and so also begins the reflection upon any human experience." (p. 101)
(5) Hermann Diels seems to present the interpretation which is the closest (cf. Bodnár, I. 1985. "Contrasting Image. Notes On Parmenides B5", Apeiron 19 (1985): 52-59.
25. Bollack, Jean. 2011. "From Being to the World and Vice Versa." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 9-20. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "The importance of the δόξα is accepted today by scholars; the problem is now the relation between the two parts of the poem. The most satisfactory solution is to consider the whole and to show that one part, the definition of Being, is made in reference to the other, as the projection of an organization of the world, and that both terms correspond perfectly to each other. This perspective allows us to reread the introduction as an initiation from a man who "already knows" better than anyone else, but lets himself be told everything by an honored authority: she discloses the truth of language and transmits, for the δόξα, the vision, in accord with Being, of a rigorous opposition."
26. Boodin, J. E. 1943. "The Vision of Parmenides." *The Philosophical Review* no. 52:578-589.

"The evidence is conclusive that Parmenides'contrast is that of fire and earth.That Parmenides means earth we need no more evidence than we have in the extant fragment: "The other is just opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. "That would be Anaximenes' way of characterizing the earth. But why did Parmenides choose earth to stand for the whole realm of what is not? We learn from Theophrastus that Parmenides "was the first to declare that the earth is spheroidal and situated in the middle of the universe".(19) The discovery of the spheroidal shape of the earth was capital.We find also that Parmenides observed that the moon shines with reflected light and revolves round the earth.Theophrastus does not seem to regard that observation as first "declared" by Parmenides, though it bears evidence of Parmenides being an observer and not merely a logician.If we can reconstruct Parmenides' discovery of the spheroidal shape of the earth, it would throw light upon his dualism of fire and earth.

I think that it is highly probable that Parmenides discovered the spheroidal shape of the earth from watching the shadow which the earth casts upon the heavens at twilight.

We can now conclude our argument,which we believe to be Parmenides'argument.The fire of heaven is the *It*, the truly existent, as it is also the truth of existence. At twilight we can see for ourselves how the earth darkens the sky, shuts off the fire of heaven. The earth which is the cause of the darkness -- and is in fact the darkness -- included for Parmenides, as it does for us who watch the same phenomenon, all that is part of the earth not only the solid core but water and mist. It is all the earth's shadow or darkness. We have here the key to Parmenides' dualism of fire and earth. The white, homogeneous light of heaven is It. Color and all other variety is excluded by Parmenides, because he requires the unity of It in order to think It,and unity for him must be physical continuum such as white light seems to be.

(Newton first discovered that white light is composite.)" (pp. 587-588)

(19) [Hermann Diels, *Doxographi graeci*, Berlin: G. Reimer 1879, Theophrastus] Fr. 6a, Fairbanks'translation, quoted by Nahm.
[References: Arthur Fairbanks, *The First Philosophers of Greece*, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1898; Milton Charles Nahm (ed.), *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1934.]

27. Bormann, Karl. 1979. "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius." *The Monist* no. 62:30-42.
"The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were -- as is well known -- interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.
Regarding the one being there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the *esse copulae* or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being ("Sein des Seienden"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical doxography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the first part, the αληθβια.We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately;(*) in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part." (p. 30)
"The interpretation of the Parmenidean doctrines by Simplicius has the following result: Parmenides distinguished two large regions, the sensible and the non-sensible.(133) The sensible is the region of coming-to-be and perishing.(134) The non-sensible is divided into the levels of soul, intellectual, and intelligible. The ἕν is not

discussed on the occasion of the Parmenides interpretation. The Parmenidean being is identical with the intelligible.
In view of the high esteem that Simplicius shows for Plato and Aristotle, we now have to ask how he interprets their criticism of Parmenides. The answer is: Plato and Aristotle want to prevent misunderstandings.(135)
Therefore, Plato's criticism aims at the level of the intellectual, in which a plurality of beings is found together with the otherness.(136) Aristotle, however, shows by his criticism of Parmenides that the Parmenidean being is not identical with the sensible.(137) Parmenides was not convinced — as we could read by mistake from Aristotle, *De Caelo* 298 b 21— that the sensible and only the sensible would exist.(138) With all criticism of Parmenides given by Aristotle, we always have to consider that Parmenides in Aristotle's opinion " is obviously speaking with insight." (139)." (p. 38)
(*) To this, see K. Bormann, *Parmenides*, Hamburg 1971, p. 1-22.
(133) See *In Phys*. 79, 29-80, 4.
(134) See *In Phys*. 80, 3— 4; *In De caelo* 556, 12— 14; 559, 14-27.
(135) Simplicius, *In Phys*. 148, 11-13; In *De caelo* 557, 19.
(136) Simplicius, *In Phys*. 147, 17 sqq.
(137) Ibid., 148, 7 sqq.; 86, 19 sqq.; 107, 29.
(138) Simplicius, *In De caelo* 558, 12; 559, 14.
(139) Simplicius, *In De caelo* 560, 1-4; see Aristotle, *Met*. 986 b 27.

28. Bosley, Richard. 1976. "Monistic argumentation." In *New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics*, edited by Shiner, Roger and King-Farlow, John, 23-44. Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.
"I seek to give an interpretation which is rich enough to disclose the springs of monism. I am primarily concerned to show how we may understand those arguments which leave us with the conclusion that there is only one thing to know. We may be assured at the outset that to give an argument whose conclusion is as startling as is that of monism it is necessary either to forge or to use a certain way of arguing.

Doing so, in turn, depends upon putting to philosophical or dialectical use words which were not before drawn into the service of philosophical argumentation. I shall argue that the Greek word translated as "way" is put to new service, its use making it possible to undertake an inquiry as to WHAT something is; I shall argue, in short, that Parmenides put the word “way" to the same kind of use to which Plato put “*ousia*" or“form”, a use sustained by Aristotle in his use of “genos”. These words help make it possible for a philosopher to put a What-question."
(...)
"My first task (section 1) is to give an interpretation; my second one (section 2) is to review some of what Simplicius says, my third one (section 3) is to reconstruct monistic argumentation; I do so to facilitate diagnosis and criticism. My final task (section 4) is to
comment briefly or the responses of Plato and Aristotle. In their responses we find additional tests of the adequacy of my interpretation and reconstruction." (pp. 23-24)

29. Bossi, Beatriz. 2015. "What Heraclitus and Parmenides have in common on reality and deception." *Logos (Madrid)* no. 48:21-34.
Abstract: "It is usually assumed that Heraclitus is, exclusively, the philosopher of flux, diversity and opposition while Parmenides puts the case for unity and changelessness. However, there is a significant common understanding of things (though in differing contexts), not simply an accidental similarity of understanding. Both philosophers, critically, distinguish two realms: on the one hand, there is the one, common realm, identical for all, which is grasped by the ‘logos that is common'(Heraclitus) or the steady *nous* (Parmenides) that follows a right method in order to interpret the real. On the other hand, the realm of multiplicity seen and heard by the senses, when interpreted by ‘barbarian souls', is not understood in its common unity. Analogously, when grasped by the wandering weak nous it does not comprehend the real’s basic unity. In this paper I attempt to defend the thesis that both thinkers claim that the common logos (to put it in

Heraclitean terms) or the steady intellect (to say it with Parmenides) grasp and affirm the unity of the real."

30. Bowra, Cecil. 1937. "The Proem of Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 32:97-112.
Reprinted in: C. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953 pp. 38-53.
"The origins of his method have been studied, but a knowledge of them does not explain either what he meant to say or what his contemporaries would see in his words. If we can understand what the Proem meant in the thought of his time, we may perhaps understand better how Parmenides viewed his calling as a philosopher." (p. 97)
"It may, then, be admitted that in his Proem Parmenides uses certain ideas and images which were familiar to his time, but he used them for a new purpose, and especially he narrowed their application to his own sphere of the search for knowledge. His Proem serves a purpose in making the reader feel that he is not embarking on something entirely outside his experience. But it also serves another purpose. It shows that Parmenides views his task in a religious or mystical spirit. His choice of imagery, his mention of a *daimon* and a *thea*, his use for new purposes of old elements in myths, his description of himself as an *eidota psota*, and, above all, his account of the celestial journey -- all give the impression that he writes not as a mere logician but as one who has had a very special experience like that of men who have consorted with the gods. His attitude to his subject is far from that of the *physiologos*, and we can understand why Plato, whose combination of gifts was not unlike his, held him in high reverence. Parmenides regarded the search for truth as something akin to the experience of mystics, and he wrote of it with symbols taken from religion because he felt that it was itself a religious activity." (p. 112)
31. Bredlow, Luis Andrés. 2011. "Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Parmenides' Theory of Cognition (B 16)." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 44:219-263.
Abstract: "This paper proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides B 16. After a short review of the status quaestionis (section 1), I will proceed to a detailed

examination of the context of quotation in Aristotle (section 2) and Theophrastus, whose report will be shown to disclose some new possibilities for our understanding of the fragment. I shall argue that B 16 is not a theory of sense-perception, but a fragment of a comprehensive theory of cognition (section 3). This theory is consistent with Parmenides' own claims to genuine knowledge of Being (section 4), once we recognize that neither a dualism of ontological domains ("intelligible" vs. "sensible") nor of cognitive faculties ("reason" vs. "the senses") can be consistently ascribed to Parmenides. Moreover, our discussion will provide some elements for a reappraisal of Aristotle and Theophrastus as interpreters of their predecessors."

32. ———. 2012. "Parmenides and the Grammar of Being." *Classical Philology* no. 106:283-298.
"The aim of this paper is to explore some grammatical and logical aspects of the word "is" (ἔστιν) in the fragments of Parmenides. I will argue that Parmenides' "is" is to be taken most plausibly, in its first and most immediate sense, as a copula of definitional identity, expressing the essence or nature of something. This definitional use implies both the absolute and the veridical sense of "is." This account will permit us to overcome some central difficulties inherent in other predicative interpretations of Parmenides' "is," such as those proposed by Alexander Mourelatos, Richard Ketchum, and Patricia Curd." (p. 283)
"So the two routes of inquiry of B2 ("It is, and cannot not be," and "It is not, and it is necessary for it not to be") form an exhaustive alternative, once we understand the argument as concerned with essential or definitional predication alone (where "*x* is *F*" is equivalent to "*x* is *x*"): either *x* is *x*, or *x* is not *x*, which is absurd. The other two modal forms of predication ("*x* is *F*, but can be not-*F*", and "*x* is not *F*, but can be *F*") are intentionally left aside as irrelevant to the issue of essential or definitional predication." (p. 295)
(...)
"In addition, this interpretation explains an apparent inconsistency of the goddess' wording. At B2.2 she presents

the route of “is not” as one of the routes of inquiry that can be conceived (εἰσι νοῆσαι). Later on, however, she insists that “is not” cannot be conceived (B8.8–9), and the route of “is not” is explicitly marked as “inconceivable” (B8.16). This is easily explained if “is not” stands for self-contradiction and hence logical impossibility. We cannot conceive, of course, that *x* is not *x*; but we surely can—and must—conceive the impossibility of *x* not being *x*. Evidently, the recognition that a statement is self-contradictory entails the certainty that this statement is false. Thus the route of “is not” is indeed in a certain sense a legitimate way of inquiry: in logical terms, it is the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. But it is a route that ends as soon as it begins: once it is recognized as such, there is nothing more to find out on this route. So there remains only one route to talk about, namely, that of “it is” (B8.1–2). (49)" (p. 295-296)
(49) Moreover, if this interpretation is right, another often-stated problem can be dispensed with as well: if Parmenides does not rule out negative predication as such, but only negations of definitional predications (i.e., self-contradictory statements), then there will be no need to seek for justifications for the abundance of negative predicates in his own arguments.

33. Brown, Lesley. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In *Language. Companions to Ancient Thought. Vol. 3*, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"I examine key uses of 'to be' in Parmenides, Plato (especially *Republic V* and *Sophist*) and Aristotle. I argue against imposing modern distinctions (into predicative, existential or identity uses) on to the texts, showing that while Greek uses of *einai* may be partitioned into syntactically complete and incomplete (noted by Aristotle and perhaps at *Sophist* 255cd) the distinction was neither clear-cut nor perceived as philosophically important. I examine how these authors treated the inference from 'X is F' to 'X is' (compare that from 'X teaches French' to 'X teaches') and, more problematically (as Plato *Sophist* saw,

correcting Parmenides and *Republic V*) from 'X is not F' to 'X is not'. "

34. Bryan, Jenny. 2012. *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgements VI; Abbreviations VIII; introduction 1; 1. Xenophanes' fallibilism 6; 2. Parmenides' allusive ambiguity 58; 3. Plato's *Timaeus* 114; 4. Imitation and limitation in Timaeus' *proemium* 161; Conclusion 192; Bibliography 196; Index locorum 205; General index 208.
"Many interpretations have been offered for Parmenides' εἰκω`ς .
Some see it as a qualified endorsement, others as a warning that the cosmology to follow is specious. I will offer a summary of the four main types of interpretation and argue that the best reading is that which incorporates elements of each. I will go on to present two aspects of Parmenides' use of this term that deserve closer attention than they have previously been afforded. The first is the possibility that Parmenides' vocabulary is influenced by forensic terminology. Several of Parmenides' key terms (σήματα; κρίσις; ἔλεγχος; πίστις) carry forensic connotations. I will argue that this juridical background should inform our understanding of Parmenides' εἰκω`ς. It is evidence in favour of taking one aspect of its meaning to be something like the notion of 'plausibility' widely employed in the second half of the fifth century BC. The second is the possibility that Parmenides B8.60 alludes to Xenophanes B35.
There is good evidence, in both the doxography and the verbatim fragments, that Parmenides was familiar with Xenophanes' poetry.
I will argue that B8.60 is a conscious allusion to Xenophanes and that, as with Xenophanes' allusion to Homer and Hesiod at B35, the significance of the allusion lies in the way that Parmenides alters Xenophanes' formula. Parmenides' use of εἰκω`ς can be usefully compared to his choice of the term πίστις at B1.30 and B8.28. I will argue that, when the goddess claims that her cosmology is εἰκω`ς,

she is attributing to her account a kind of persuasiveness that is subjectively convincing but ultimately false. This is in opposition to the true, objective cogency attributed to the *Aletheia* via the term πίστις.
I will conclude with some suggestions as to how such a reading can inform our understanding of the relation between the *Aletheia* and the *Doxa*. Here, my conclusions are necessarily limited by the fact that I will not be offering a detailed interpretation of either part. My interest is primarily in the characterization of the *Doxa* as εἰκω`ς and what this implies about its relation to the *Aletheia*.
The question of the precise import of, in particular, the *Aletheia* would take me far beyond the scope of this book. I will, so far as is possible, be attempting to sidestep many of the issues that have dominated recent scholarship on Parmenides. Most notably, I will not be engaging with the question whether or in what way Parmenides is a monist.' I will, of course, be looking at some of the details of the *Aletheia* and offering interpretative suggestions but, in the end, my commitments here do not, I think, go far beyond reading it as an account of 'the unmoving heart of persuasive truth' (B1.29). (pp. 61-62)

35. Burkert, Walter. 2013. "Parmenides' Proem and Pythagoras' Descent." In *Philosophy and Salvation in Greek Religion*, edited by Adluri, Vishwa, 85-116. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. English translation by Joydeep Bagchee of: "Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras", *Phronesis*, 15, 1969, pp. 1–30.
"To summarize: Parmenides' journey is neither a transition from night to light nor an ascent; it is also not a collection of heterogeneous symbols, which would only be comprehensible in relation to the theoretical content, and still less a purely literary device without deeper meaning. Parmenides travels on the path of the Daimon to the edge of the world, where at the boundary between heaven and earth a towering gateway divides this world from the beyond. The Heliades approach him from the house of Night, they accompany him through the gate into the great "open," where the Goddess receives him. Everything falls into place

as soon as one resolutely discards the path upward and the path to the light, those Platonic-Christian symbols. The journey might rather—with Morrison—be called a katabasis. More correct is to leave aside completely the vertical aspects, the above and below. The Beyond, in what is probably the oldest concept, is neither above nor below, but simply very, very far away. Odysseus too, in the Neykia, journeys neither skyward nor earthward, but simply into the distance. Something similar is true of Sumerian myth.(64)" (pp. 101-102)
(64) Cf. S. N. Kramer, “Death and Nether World according to the Sumerian Literary Texts,” Iraq 22 (1960): 67, on the myth of Enlil, Ninlil, and the Underworld: “the word ‘descent' is not used in this myth, only such words as ‘come,' ‘follow,' ‘enter.'”

36. Burnet, John. 1908. *Early Greek Philosophy*. London: A. & C. Black Ltd.
Second edition (first edition 1892).
Chapter 4: *Parmenides of Elea*, pp. 192-226.
"In the First Part of his poem, we find Parmenides chiefly interested to prove that it is; but it is not quite obvious at first sight what it is precisely that is. He says simply, What is, is. There can be no real doubt that this is what we call body. It is certainly regarded as spatially extended; for it is quite seriously spoken of as a sphere (fr. 8, 43). Moreover, Aristotle tells us that Parmenides believed in none but a sensible reality. Parmenides does not say a word about "Being" anywhere, (29) and it is remarkable that he avoids the term "god," which was so freely used by earlier and later thinkers. The assertion that it is amounts just to this, that the universe is a plenum; and that there is no such thing as empty space, either inside or outside the world. From this it follows that there can be no such thing as motion.
Instead of endowing the One with an impulse to change, as Herakleitos had done, and thus making it capable of explaining the world, Parmenides dismissed change as an illusion. He showed once for all that if you take the One seriously you are bound to deny everything else. All previous solutions of the question, therefore, had missed the point.

Anaximenes, who thought to save the unity of the primary substance by his theory of rarefaction and condensation, did not observe that, by assuming there was less of what is in one place than another, he virtually affirmed the existence of what is not (fr. 8, 45).
The Pythagorean explanation implied that empty space or air existed outside the world, and that it entered into it to separate the units (§ 53) . It, too, assumes the existence of what is not. Nor is the theory of Herakleitos any more satisfactory; for it is based on the contradiction that fire both is and is not (fr. 6)."
(29) We must not render το᾽ ἐόν by "Being," das *Sein* or l'*être*. It is "what is," das Seiende, ce qui est. As to (το᾽) εἶναι it does not occur, and hardly could occur at this date.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Calvo, Martinez Tomas. 1977. "Truth and Doxa in Parmenides." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 59:245-260.
"It has been widely held, both by ancient and by modern commentators on Parmenides, that the distinction between Truth (αλήθεια) and Opinion (δόξα) which dominates the structure of his poem, can be properly interpreted as an opposition between two forms of cognition: pure thought or conceptual knowledge, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other, where the latter is understood as including images as well as perceptions.
(...)
In the first part of this paper I will try to show that this traditional interpretation of Parmenides fundamentally misrepresents the language and intention of his poem. In the second section I will propose an alternative interpretation based upon an opposition not between two epistemic states or faculties (intellectual knowledge versus sense-perception) but between two contrasting forms of language, as represented in the poem by the contrast between λόγος and ἔπος (or ἔπεα). Finally, I will sketch some lines in the post-Parmenidean evolution of the two conceptual systems that oppose Aletheia to Doxa and Logos to Epos." (pp. 245-246)

2. ———. 2011. "Parmenides -- Scholar of Nature." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 21-58. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
   Summary: "Aristotle's influence on what we could name the philosophical historiography of pre-Aristotelian times and the one still felt up to present times is huge. We can safely argue that the work of freeing pre-Aristotelian thinkers from Aristotelian interpretation has only been developing since last century, and it is an ongoing process. I personally believe that this is the historiographic direction to be followed and that much has still to be made clear and explained in this very direction. This kind of research does not just better "historically contextualize" the thought of any pre-Aristotelian, Parmenides in our case, by setting its roots in a real world of debates, quarrels, and stand-takings on different philosophical and scientific questions, but it also better underlines its originality and speculative strengths. My paper will thus be divided into two parts. Since I just aim to discuss the special stand of Parmenides' thought in the history of scientific thought, I will try and show first of all Parmenides' complete belonging in the very lively world of scientific debates and discussions of the fifth century. Then I will try to show how Parmenides, like the other great Sicilian Magna Graecia native, Empedocles, has foreshadowed concepts and doctrines of contemporary science and physics, even if just in the shape of ingenious intuitions."
3. Cassin, Barbara. 2011. "Parmenides Lost in Translation." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 59-79. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
   Summary: "I would like to show in this text the successive difficulties to be overcome when one tries to translate Parmenides. Translation is the extreme degree of interpretation. For that purpose, one needs to triumph over the impossibility of confronting the original "venerable and awesome" as well as of confronting "historial" language such as Greek. Then, one must sort out the alternatives that make

it possible to select and fix a fragmentary text. Finally it is necessary to explore all the connections permitted by semantics and syntax. My study is focused on the play of "θυμο`ς ὁδοῖο / μῦθος ὁδοῖο," and on possible interpretations of the text traditionally retained since the 5th edition of Diels, between the heroism of being, described as Odysseus, and the storytelling of language."

4. Cerri, Giovanni. 2011. "The Astronomical Section in Parmenides' Poem." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 80-94. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. Summary: "I have collected all the data (*testimonia* and *fragmenta*), which demonstrate that in Parmenides' poem *On Nature* there was a long section concerning astronomy, where he described the heavens and also illustrated recent, astonishing discoveries accomplished by astronomical research of his time. Such a section, which is very important in the history of ancient science, could not be a mere digression, not related to his general theory of nature. Therefore, every modern interpretation of his philosophical thought based on the removal of this aspect should certainly be considered inadequate to explain the whole doctrine in its very essence."
5. Chalmers, W. R. 1960. "Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals." *Phronesis* no. 5:5-22.
"The three main parts of Parmenides' poem are apt to receive rather unequal treatment at the hands of many historians of Ancient Philosophy. From early times there has been a tendency to concentrate attention upon the Way of Truth and rather to neglect the Prologue and the Beliefs of Mortals. The Prologue is frequently explained as an interesting example of archaic imagination intruding into a philosophical work, while the last part has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some scholars have suggested that in it Parmenides is merely representing the views of other thinkers, while others believe that it does in some way describe Parmenides' own thought. There is as yet no general agreement about what the relationship is between the Beliefs of Mortals and the Way of Truth. Both are

however parts of the same poem, and it is reasonable to infer that a solution of this problem of their inter-relationship will throw light on the correct interpretation of the whole work. It is the purpose of this paper to consider in particular the last part of the poem and to try to establish what its status is in the context of the whole work." (p. 5)

6. Cherniss, Harold. 1935. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
   Volume I (only published). Reprint New York: Octagon Books, 1964.
   On Aristotle's criticism of Eleatic philosophy see in particular the First Chapter, *The Principles*, pp. 61-76.
   "The Eleatic thesis so far as the physicist is concerned is refuted by experience, and it is not the business of a treatise on any particular science to refute those who deny the principles or axioms of that science. (257) With this exposition and the remark that Parmenides and Melissus proceed from false premises to argue illogically Aristotle has really excluded a discussion of their doctrine from the *Physics*. Yet he immediately introduces a long refutation of the Eleatic thesis on the ground that, although it is not concerned with physics, it results in difficulties which are physical.(258)
   The criticism of the Eleatic unity of Being is highly instructive for the study of the method by which Aristotle built up his own doctrine of matter; and the very inclusion of the critique in the *Physics* shows that he was conscious of the logical character of the origin of his theory." (p. 62)
   (...)
   "The general critique of the Eleatics (273) is followed by a special refutation of Melissus and Parmenides." (p. 67)
   (...)
   "There is throughout this critique an apparent confusion of logical and physical concepts which is due to the dependence of Aristotle's physics upon his logic. At one time he said that the Eleatic error was due to the ignorance of the meaning of relative or *accidental* non-Being, (304) that is of logical privation which is the essence of the negative proposition; but such a concept, which in its Platonic origin

is simply logical, is at once transformed into a physical doctrine by Aristotle, so that he can say shortly thereafter that an understanding of the nature of substrate would have solved the difficulties of the Eleatics. (305) Privation is, in effect, the immediate material of generation (306) and the logical subject of privation is transmuted by means of the concomitant potentiality into the physical substrate. (307) The notion that privation of a quality requires in the substrate the potential presence of that quality is a rule of logic (308) transferred to descriptive physics. It is this connection of the matter of generation and of thought, this equivalence of the proposition of logic and the description of physical change which makes Aristotle think the *Physics* an appropriate place to discuss the Eleatic doctrine which on his own reckoning falls outside the sphere of physics." (pp. 75-76)

(257) *Physics* 184 B 25-185 A 14.

(258) *Physics* 185 A 17-20. a. *De Caelo* 298 B 14-24 where the Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, *Parmenides* 135 B-C. But cf. *Sophist* 249 B-D.

(273) Ross in his note on *Metaphysics* 986 B 19 implies that " the One as continuous and indivisible " refers to Melissus, "the One as unity of definition " refers to Parmenides. The appearance of συνεχὲς and ον διαιρετόν in Parmenides, the argument of "the part and the whole " in Plato's *Sophist* directed against Parmenides, and the express words of *Physics* 185 B 17-18, as well as the αὐτοὶς of 185 B 21 and 24 show that no division of the arguments can be made between Parmenides and Melissus.

(304) *Physics* 191 B 13-16.

(305) *Physics* 191 B 33-34.

(306) *Physics* 191 B 15-16. Yet 191 B 35 ff. he reproaches the Platonists for making matter "non-Being" and claims

himself to differentiate privation and matter.
(307) The transformation is carried so far that ατέρησις becomes, instead of simple negation of form, a positive reality, a kind of form itself (*Physics* 193 B 19-20). Cf. Clemens Baeumker, *Das problem der materie in der griechischen philosophie*, Münster, 1890, pp. 218-219.
(308) Cf. its use in *Topics* 148 A 3-9. It is a mistake to define a thing by privation of that which is not potentially predicable of it. The logical basis of the physical doctrine, as well as some of the difficulties involved in the development, is to be seen in *Metaphysics* 1055 A 33-B 29.

7. Cherubin, Rose Mathilde. 2001. "Λέγειν, Νοεῖν and Το᾽ Ἐόν in Parmenides." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 21:277-303.
"What does Parmenides tell us about το᾽ ἐόν?
Commentators have understood Parmenides' fragments as attempting to provide an account of the nature of being, or of the nature of what is.
Recently, Parmenides and his goddess (θεά, B1.22) character have been interpreted as making a variety of conflicting claims: that being or what is is one; that it is dual; that it is identical to thought or to mind or to the contents of thought; that at least some of it is independent of our thought or awareness; and that all strictly human claims about what is rest on convention or agreement. In what follows, I will attempt to show that the fragments not only fail to support such views, but actually subvert them. Rather than provide unconditional assertions about το᾽ ἐόν, I will argue, the fragments explore the conditions of the possibility of inquiry itself, conditions whose acceptance poses paradoxes." (p. 277)
(...)
"I do not assert here that all is assumption. Rather, I have argued that on the θεά's account of what is, we do not seem to be able to know whether all is assumption. I do propose that to acknowledge the conditions of inquiry includes recognizing that such an acknowledgment, like the conditions themselves, is made within the framework given us by our θέμις (literally, that which is laid down). Acknowledging the conditions of inquiry also includes

recognizing (νοεῖν) that the possibility of identification and the possibility of meaning appear to depend on contradictions or paradoxes." (p. 303)

8. ———. 2003. "Inquiry and What Is: Eleatics and Monisms." *Epoché* no. 8:1-26.
Abstract: "While Melissus argues for a numerical monism, Parmenides and Zeno undermine claims to unconditional or transcendental knowledge. Yet the work of Parmenides and Zeno is not merely critical or eristic, and does not imply that philosophical inquiry is futile. Instead it shows the importance of reflection on the way the requisites of inquiry are represented in its results, and entrains an axiological investigation to every ontological one."
"The earliest Greek philosophers sought understanding that went beyond what was given by the beliefs, customs, and ways of thinking familiar to their contemporaries. So Aristotle tells us, and since his time students of philosophy have generally agreed with this broad description.(1) But what were the earliest Greeks called philosophers trying to understand, and what kinds of understanding were they seeking? As we try to be more specific about the projects and nature of the earliest Greek philosophy, we encounter more difficulty and less agreement." (p. 1)
(...)
"The goddess in Parmenides' poem represents that which her pupil is not: she is female, and more crucially for purposes of this paper, she is immortal and as such does not need to inquire or seek. Our sense of lack, our mortality, is the spur and indeed the
substance of inquiry. We must make choices and we must seek, in order to supply our needs and desires. This is why we require consistency, in some things at least. A Greek goddess does not have such limitations; she is self-sufficient. Such a symbol of what we conceive ourselves to lack is a most appropriate vehicle to convey to us the consequences of that lack, the fundamental conflicts in our conception of what is." (p. 16)
(1) *Metaphysics* A 1-2.

9. ———. 2004. "Parmenides' Poetic Frame." *International Studies in Philosophy* no. 36:7-38.
"Two difficulties confront the beginning of an interpretation of the fragments of Parmenides: how to understand the structure of the fragments taken together, and how to deal with the apparent contradictions and incongruities in the fragments.
The first is the question of what to make of the structure of the extant parts of Parmenides' poem." (p. 7)
(...)
"The second difficulty is the problem of how to handle the many apparent contradictions and incongruities within the fragments." (p. 8)
(...)
"I propose to look at the Goddess's discussions of eon or to eon (what is, being, what is so) in the contexts in which they appear in the fragments. This means that I will first consider the significance of the fact that the remarks about what is appear within discussions of roads of inquiry (Sections I and II). In these discussions of roads of inquiry the Goddess supports her claims about the characteristics of what is (with respect to certain roads) not only with deductive reasoning but also with explanatory assertions about Dikē, Anankē, and Moira. Once we understand the basic sense of these assertions (Section III), we can turn to contemplate the meaning and the significance of the narrative frame, the tale of the journey (Section IV). The larger meaning of the fragments taken together, that which we can properly call the philosophy of Parmenides, will emerge from reflection on the juxtaposition of the narrative, mythic, and argumentative elements. By taking into due account the contexts in which the discussions of *eon* appear, we will find that both the seemingly incompatible implications of the claims about *eon* and also the mixture of narrative, mythic, and argumentative elements are philosophically meaningful and illuminating." (pp. 9-10)
10. ———. 2005. "Light, Night, and the Opinions of Mortals: Parmenides B8.51-61 and B9." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:1-23.

"Recent studies of this passage have focused largely on two issues: what the goddess or Parmenides thinks is erroneous in mortals' beliefs concerning Light and Night, and what if any merit Parmenides finds in a cosmology based on the account of Light and Night in the fragments.
My main concern will be instead with two questions that have seen less attention: First, what would be ἀπατηλός in what the κοῦρος is to learn?5 Second, what could be ἐοικώς in the Light-Night conceptual scheme that the goddess presents? Or, what would suggest that mortals do in fact find the scheme acceptable or useful?" (p. 3)

11. ———. 2009. "*Aletheia* from Poetry into Philosophy. Homer to Parmenides." In *Logos and Muthos. Philosophical Essays in Greek Literature*, edited by Wians, William, 51-72. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"The every features I have cited as Parmenides' best-known and most consequential contributions to philosophy—the central role of deductive argument and the thematic exploration of *to eon*—grow from his engagement with poetry.
Specifically, they are intimately connected to his view of *alētheia* as the orientation of a road of inquiry. Poets in and before Parmenides' time saw the apprehension and promulgation of *alētheia* as a central duty of poetry. Parmenides, I will show, significantly extended and developed the notion of *alētheia*. It is precisely this development that issues in his thematic exploration of to eon and in his use (and, conceivably, introduction) of explicit deductive inference.
Let us begin by opening the questions of the meaning and the role of *alētheia* in the fragments of Parmenides. Asking these questions is crucial not only for our understanding of Parmenides, but also for our understanding of those ways of thinking today that claim him as a predecessor, and for our understanding of the possibilities of philosophy itself. In his references to *alētheia*, might Parmenides have intended something in addition to, or instead of, what has been attributed to him so far? If so, as I will argue here, then

Parmenides will have shown us a road of inquiry to which we have been oblivious." (p. 52)

12. Clark, Raymond J. 1969. "Parmenides and Sense-perception." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 82:14-32.
Abstract: "What did Parmenides understand by the terms ἀλήθεια, ἐόν and νοεῖν, δοκοῦντα and δόξα ? After reviewing past interpretations of B 1.28-32 (Diels-Kranz), the author suggests that these lines are part of the revelation by the goddess who offers to differentiate between the levels of existence of ἐόν and δοκοῦντα and to assess the status of their resultant states of knowledge ἀλήθεια and δόξα. The conclusion, tested against other fragments, is that ἀλήθεια arises from contemplation (νόος) about being (ἐόν) : δοκοῦντα corresponds to οὐκ ἔστιν in B 8 but is « non-existent » only in the technical sense that this is not the object of thought. Δόξα is ἀπατηλο`ν only in a technical sense, and there can be right δόξα (first « false » path) which is based exclusively on sensory reality, or wrong δόξα (second « false » path) if sensory objects are confused with being.
Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge is then summarised and his cosmology is found to be consistent with it."

13. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 2004. *By Being, It Is. The Thesis of Parmenides*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Contents: Prologue IX; Acknowledgments XIII; 1. Introduction to Parmenides 3; 2. Prolegomena to Parmenides' Thesis 19; 3. Parmenides thesis and its negation 37; 4. The meaning of Parmenides's thesis (and of its negation) 59; 5. Parmenides' thesis, thinking, and speaking 83; 6. Presentation of the thesis and its negation in Fragment 6 and 7 97; 7. The negation of the thesis, "opinions" and the nonexistent third way 125; 8. The meaning of the "opinions of mortals" 151; 9. The foundation of the thesis: the Way of Truth 154; Epilogue 181; Appendix 1: Parmenides' Poem 185; Appendix 2: Note on the transliteration of the Greek alphabet 197; Bibliography 199; List of ancient authors cited 211; List of modern authors cited 213.

"Any new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, or any criticism of previous interpretations, must be based on a text that is as close as possible to the lost original. The titanic task carried out over centuries by philologists and codicologists offered us a firm starting point, but much still remained to be done. Passages of the Poem remained inexplicably obscure. (For example, why does the Goddess order withdrawal from a true way in line 6.3? How can it be said that thought is expressed in being, as line 8.35 appears to say?) For this reason, since my presence in Europe made it possible, I decided to check the manuscript tradition of citations (wrongly called "fragments") of the Poem, in order to propose a new version of it, purified of certain errors that had accumulated over the centuries. A first result of my search was presented in 1971 as a doctoral thesis. Some years later, my book, *Les deux chemins de Parménide* (1984, second edition, augmented and corrected, 1997) completed my work. New research on the manuscript sources of the first editions of the Poem, as well as a change of view in my assessment of "the two ways," allow me to present this new version of Parmenides' "thesis" today. In this work, I also take into account comments and criticism that my previous studies on Parmenides have raised, and when appropriate, (a) I defend myself, or (b) I accept and make certain corrections.
It is impossible to go into Parmenides' philosophy without being "bitten by the bug." I hope that readers of this book will feel the same." (pp. X-XI)

14. ———. 2010. "The 'Doxa of Parmenides' Dismantled." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:231-246.
"In most civilizations, fictional entities are the creations of anonymous popular imagination, or even of some special wise men. Greek civilization was not an exception: Centaurs, Sirens, Cyclops, and other such creatures can be found everywhere in Greek mythology. These imaginary creatures were put together out of elements that taken separately are real enough: human being and horse, as in the case of Centaur, woman and bird, in the case of the Siren. Philosophers, or rather, historians of philosophy, followed

this creative example, and invented imaginary notions. ‘The Doxa of Parmenides' is one of these imaginary notions.
It has never existed ‘as such': for, even though it was constructed from elements that are real, the combination of these elements was illegitimate.
These mythological examples are useful as we seek to understand the capricious mixing that took place in the assemblage of ‘Parmenides' Doxa'. It is true that the Doxa is present in Parmenides' poem, it is also true that Parmenides is a real entity and not an imaginary being; but ‘the Doxa of Parmenides', the unification of these two terms (Doxa and Parmenides), is an invention of the historians of philosophy. That Parmenides presented some ‘doxai' does not imply that these ‘opinions', which comprise the Doxa, are his ‘doxai', the ‘doxai' of Parmenides.
This article aims to expose this combination as arbitrary and false." (p. 231)

15. ———, ed. 2011. *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Proceedings of the International Symposium (Buenos Aires, October 29 - November 2, 2007).
Contents: Foreword VII; About the Contributors XIII-XVI. Part I: On Parmenides.
Scott Austin: Existence and Essence in Parmenides 1; Jean Bollack: From Being to the World and Vice Versa 9; Giovanni Casertano: Parmenides-Scholar of Nature 21; Barbara Csssin: Parmenides Lost in Translation 59; Giovanni Cerri: The Astronomical Section in Parmenides' Poem 81; Nestor-Luis Cordero: Parmenidean "Physics" is not Part of what Parmenides calls "*doxa*" 95; Patricia Curd: Thought and Body in Parmenides 115; Jean Frère: Mortals (*Brotoi*) According to Parmenides 135; Arnold Hermann: Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides 147; Alexander P. D. Mourelatos: Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism 167; Massimo Pulpito: Parmenides and the Forms 191; Chiara Robbiano: What is Parmenides' Being? 213; Fernando Santoro: *Ta Semata*: On a Genealogy of the Idea of

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"Part I of the present volume gathers together the set of papers presented at the Symposium, whose topics were divided up based on the “traditional” structure of the Poem: one section dedicated to the exposition of the way of truth, and the other to the description of the “opinions (δόξαι) of mortals.”
(...)
"Other papers went deeply into the part of the Poem concerning the “opinions of mortals.”
(...)
"The organizers of the meeting, which was open to the public, offered eight young and high-level Argentine researchers (graduate students, professors, or advanced students) the opportunity to present a short paper in front of the prestigious assembly of foreign authors. The exchange of ideas between them and their “teachers” was a very enriching experience. These eight papers are included in Part II of the present volume." (From the *Foreword* by Néstor-Luis Cordero, pp. IX-XI)

16. ———. 2011. "Parmenidean “Physics” is not Part of what Parmenides calls “δόξα”." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 95-113. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Parmenides, as were all the philosophers of his time, was certainly interested in “physical” questions, even if the response to these questions was necessarily conditioned by his big “discovery”: that there is being. But the only way to respect the value of his “physical” theories is by keeping them out of the so-called “δόξα” because, for Parmenides, opinions are deceitful and not true. The hazardous reconstruction of Parmenides' text invites the researcher to find the “δόξαι” between the end of fr. 8 and fr. 18. This prejudice, together with the anachronistic idea according to which Parmenides spoke of “appearances” (and the δόξαι would be their description), leads to the exaggerated place the δόξαι occupy in the present reconstruction of the Poem. Parmenides exposes—and criticizes—the δόξαι of “others.” There are no Parmenidean δόξαι."
17. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1933. "Parmenides' Two Ways." *Classical Quarterly* no. 1933:97-111.
"The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on 'what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.'
The poem presents two problems. First, why does the appearance of the world belie its real nature? To Parmenides himself, as to any other mortal, diversity in time and space, change and motion, seem to exist; what is the source of error here?
This is a philosophical question; and it may be doubted whether Parmenides could have given an answer that would satisfy us. The second is an historical question: Whose is the cosmogony in the second part of the poem ? Is it Parmenides' own construction or a list of errors that he rejects ? To this there must be one right answer, which

Parmenides, if we could summon him, could give us in a moment.
This is the problem I propose to discuss. The solution may throw some light on the other problem." (p. 97)

18. ———. 1935. "A New Fragment of Parmenides." *Classical Review* no. 49:122-123.
"Plato, *Theaet*. I80D: ὀλίγου δε` ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο,
οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντι` ὄνομ᾽ εἶναι
If we punctuate (with Diels at Simplicius, *Phys*. 143, 10)
οἷον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει. τῷ παντι` ὄνομ᾽ εἶναι
it can be translated: 'It is sole, immovable. The All has the name " Being." So Plato, and so Simplicius after him, must have understood it. If they found this line in Parmenides, they might well accept it as a line that Parmenides might have written. It is no odder than several verses now accepted without question. The sense is good and relevant." (p. 122)

19. ———. 1939. *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of truth and Plato's Parmenides. Translated, with an Introduction and a Running Commentary*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
Chapter II: *Parmenides Way of Truth*, pp. 28-52. ("This chapter is partly based on an article, *Parmenides' Two Ways*, Classical Quarterly, xxvii (1933), 97-111, where some of the points are discussed at greater length.").
"Parmenides' premiss states in a more abstract form the first assumption common to all his predecessors, Milesian or Pythagorean: ultimately there exists a One Being. His thought is really at work upon this abstract concept ; he considers what further attributes can, or cannot, logically belong to a being that is one.
At the same time, this One Being is not a mere abstraction; it proves to be a single continuous and homogeneous substance filling the whole of space. So far, as it seemed to him, reason will carry us, but no farther. Such a being cannot become or cease to be or change; such a unity cannot also be a plurality. There is no possible transition from the

One Being to the manifold and changing world which our senses seem to reveal. His work is accordingly divided, after the proem, into two parts. The *Way of Truth* deduces the nature of the one reality from premisses asserted as irrefragably true. It ends with a clear warning that the *Way of Seeming*, which follows, is not true or consistent with the truth.
This second part, accordingly, is not in the form of logical deduction, but gives a cosmogony in the traditional narrative manner. The starting-point is the false belief of mortals, who trust their senses and accept the appearance of two opposite powers contending in the world. Unfortunately very few fragments of the second part survive ; but it is probable that we possess nearly the whole of the *Way of Truth*, thanks to Simplicius, who copied it out in his commentary on the *Physics* because the book had become very rare.
And it is with the *Way of Truth* that we are chiefly concerned." (pp. 29-30)

20. Cosgrove, Matthew R. 1974. "The ΚΟΥΡΟΣ Motif in Parmenides: B 1.24." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:81-94.
"Why does the goddess of Parmenides' poem address her mortal guest ω κουρὲ (B 1.24)? The interpretations that have been proposed in answer to this question may be grouped generally under two opposed points of view. One finds in the goddess' address an *autobiographical* statement from the poet and a means of dating the poem's composition; the other takes it in some sense *to contrast* the humanity and/or discipleship of the κούρος *with the divinity* and/or teaching role of the goddess. Several other more recent and less widely noted suggestions have also appeared, but I think no satisfactory explanation of why the recipient of the goddess' discourse is presented as a κούρος has yet been found. The interpretation which I shall offer through an examination of previous answers to this question seeks for the goddess' address a more intrinsic meaning and coherent place within the proem and the whole of Parmenides' work." (p. 81)

21. ———. 2011. "The Unknown 'Knowing Man' : Parmenides, B1.3." *Classical Quarterly* no. 61:28-47.
"Commentators on Parmenides' poem have long read the words of B1.3, εἰδότα φῶτα, with the secure assurance that this phrase must identify and praise the recipient of the divine discourse that is shortly to come. The journeying speaker of line 1, whom the goddess will greet in B1.24 as a κοῦρος, is assumed to be the 'knowing man'; or, more precisely, it is anticipated that the goddess is about to make him so by revealing to him the heart of truth (B1.29). This 'knowing man' (so the received view goes) is the goddess's initiate,2 in contrast to whom are the 'know-nothings', the βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν (B6.4).
But I argue here that this is all a mistake, and one that undermines at every turn our ability to understand what is going on in the proem."
(...)
"I do not claim to break new ground on all or even any one of these details save by providing a consistent and coherent framework for choosing among answers to them. For I submit that only the correct identification of the φῶς εἰδώς and of the two separate journeys, as proposed here, in which the speaker of line 1 becomes involved, ties those details together, makes sense of them, and unifies the opening of the poem. In what follows I first develop this interpretation without defensive interruptions, as though it were obvious, so that readers may envision from the outset the picture of the proem I have in mind. Of course, I am aware that my interpretation is very far from being incontrovertible. Accordingly, after the initial exposition, I shall circle back into the eristic thicket." (p. 28)
22. ———. 2014. "What are 'True' *Doxai* Worth to Parmenides? Essaying a Fresh Look at his Cosmology." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 46:1-31.
"In recent years the preserved portions of Parmenides' poem traditionally labelled 'Doxa' 1 have received more nuanced attention, focusing on their content and not just on their presumed role as some kind of foil or supplement to 'Aletheia', 'Truth'. While the age-old question of the relation

between these two parts of the poem has been neither settled nor abandoned, some scholars have put this and related issues to one side and concentrated instead on assessing the sometimes startling scientific innovations introduced in the context of the Doxa." (p. 1)
(...)
"These approaches pose various problems, which this paper intends to explore.
(...)
As posed explicitly by Cordero, but bearing implicitly on Graham's, Kahn's, Mourelatos's, and Sedley's views, is the question in what sense, if any, these innovations in physical matters might be 'true', in Parmenidean terms. If they are 'true' for *brotoi*, possibly including us latter-day mortals, are they also 'true' for the goddess, but only in some 'lesser' sense, which she does not define? And what could that be? Or do they just simply and finally fail to follow her *semata* for what-is, as much as do any of the merest falsehoods of mortals' world? And if so, what are they then worth to her? And, perhaps more tantalizingly, what are they then worth to Parmenides? Could he really have been 'enthralled' by such fatally flawed 'truths'? And if so, to what end?
With this last query we are firmly back in the midst of the dilemma that has bedevilled commentators on Parmenides since antiquity, concerning not just Parmenides' own attitude towards the possibly revolutionary and astronomically accurate, or 'true', portions of the Doxa but the overall question of the philosophical relation between Truth and Doxa. These are questions not just of historical/biographical psychology but, at least as posed here, they have another import, one related to and calling for explication of Parmenides' proper philosophical concerns. In effect, as I hope to show, asking 'What are true *doxai* worth to Parmenides?' is an especially useful and revealing way of posing anew the timeworn problem of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem, and in particular that of the philosophical status of the cosmology propounded by the goddess." (p. 4, notes omitted)

23. Coxon, Allan H. 1934. "The Philosophy of Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 28:134-144.
"In the *Classical Quarterly* for April, 1933, Professor Cornford maintains that the Two Ways' of Parmenides are not meant as alternatives: "The Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming are no more parallel and alternative systems of cosmology, each complete in itself, than are Plato's accounts of the intellectual and sensible worlds. (1)
I wish here to try to support his general view, which seems to me to be indisputably correct, while differing from Professor Cornford in some important details." (p. 134)
(1) p. 102.
(...)
"The unity of the whole poem should now be clear. It opens with Parmenides realization of the difference between knowledge and belief, symbolized by his entry into the realm of Day. There he is welcomed by Justice, or Destiny, (1) who narrates to him, first the features of the world he has just entered, then the nature of the world he has left. The former narrative he has himself to test of λόγος, the possession of which has gained him admission. The latter, she warns him, is a myth.(2) True, even those to whom the door remains shut can produce such; the point is that anyone who knows that this dark world is not the real world is likely to produce a better myth about it than those who believe it to be the only reality and their myth to be truth. The thesis of this paper has been that Parmenides was, and was conscious of being, the first genuine philosopher in the Greek world. It follows that he was the founder of European philosophy; that, while his predecessors discovered the main principle of what we know as science, Parmenides was the first metaphysician. If that is true, it is a splendid achievement; and he deserves considerably more recognition than he has usually, since Plato, been given." (p. 144)
(1) On this *vide* Fränkel, [*Parmenidesstudien*, Berlin, 1930] p. 158 sq.
(2) Just as Plato's *Timaeus* is a myth.

24. ———. 1969. "The Text of Parmenides fr. 1,3." *Classical Quarterly* no. 18:69.
"In all texts of the fragments of Parmenides printed in the last fifty years he begins his poem by speaking of "the way which" (or, according to some, "the goddess who") "carries through all towns the man who knows"
(...)
"In fact ἄστη, which is alleged to be the reading of the best manuscript of Sextus' books *Adversus Dogmaticos*, has no manuscript authority at all. ἄστη first appeared in the text of the third edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* published in 1912, where it is attributed to the Ms. N (= Laur.85.19), so called by Mutschmann".
(...)
The "countless attempts at emendation" of [the readings of L and E et al., πάντα ̀ τε and πάντα τη ̀ respectively] did not include *aste*. Variants from N were first published in 1911 by A. Kochalsky in his dissertation,...but his professedly complete list of new readings from N for these books of Sextus includes no reference to Parmenides 1.3. It follows that *aste* can hardly have appeared among the variants which he says he had already communicated to Diels. The word *aste* appears, however, as the reading of N in vol. II of Mutschmann's text of Sextus, which was published in 1914. It would seem, therefore, that Diels got the reading privately from Mutschmann, who collated N in 1909 and 1911. . . . In any case, the word is a simple misreading of the manuscript, which has *pant' ate*." (p. 69)
25. ———. 1969. "The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* I-IV." *Classical Quarterly* no. 18:70-75.
Abstract: "The following discussion' of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* I-IV originated in an examination of the tradition of the fragments of Parmenides. It is therefore illustrated not only from Simplicius but particularly from the texts of Parmenides quoted by him. This will not be misleading, since, though many of these texts are quoted by Simplicius more than once, there is little or no sign in any manuscript

of interpolation from one passage to another and it is not likely that any scribe could have interpolated the text from an independent manuscript of Parmenides."

26. ———. 2003. "Parmenides on Thinking and Being." *Mnemosyne* no. 56:210-212.
"The incomplete verse which constitutes Fragment B3 of Parmenides τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι is of central importance for the interpretation of his argument. Since what may be called the traditional understanding of the phrase, as opposed to that proposed by Zeller,(2) has been recently revived in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy(*3) (*CC*) and elsewhere, it seems worthwhile to recapitulate the evidence on either side.
The sentence is cited only by Clement, Plotinus and Proclus, by all isolation from its context, and by all as asserting the identity of thinking with being. The English translation, 'For it is the same to think and be', is said to be "the only natural reading of the Greek" (CC, 120). is at least questionable, since it postulates a substantival use with no article, which would be unparalleled in the first half of the fifth century, and even later, and which its assumption by Clement and the Neoplatonists does nothing to guarantee." (p. 211)
(2) E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I, i, ed. Nestle (Leipzig 1923), 678 1).
(3) [A. A. Long ed.,] *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999).

27. ———. 2009. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. Revised and expanded edition edited with new translations by Richard McKirahan and a new Preface by Malcolm Schofield (First edition Gorcum: Van Assen 1986).
"Parmenides' poem is dominated by his conviction that human beings can attain knowledge of reality or understanding (*nóos*). This faith is expressed in the apocalyptic form of the poem, which at the same time offers an analysis of its presuppositions, and which may be regarded as an attempt to answer the questions, 'what must

reality be, if it is knowable by the human mind, and what is the nature of human experience?
The ontological part of the work comprises an account of two intellectually conceivable ways of discovering reality (*aletheín*), followed by a summary analysis of its character as revealed by pursuing the only way allowed to be genuine. The ways are defined respectively by the formulae 'is and is not for not being', and 'is not and must needs not be', and the recognition that they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive is represented (in opposition to the evidence of the senses) as itself constituting the only criterion (fr. 7, 5) for determining what is real: nothing is to be so considered, unless it either is intrinsically something, or of necessity is not anything. Since the second way is argued to be concerned with nothing and to lead nowhere, reality is to he identified by pursuing the first, i.e. by asking what can and must be made the subject of an unconditional 'is'.
Although Parmenides defines his conception of philosophy in terms of the expressions 'is' and 'is not', he gives no explicit indication of the sense which he conceives these expressions to bear. Modern exegesis has in consequence saddled him with, most generally, an existential understanding of the verb, or else with an archaic failure to distinguish between its existential and copulative uses. It is better to recognise that his approach is purely formal or dialectical, i.e. that, so far from positing any given sense of the verb, he is concerned to determine what sense attaches to it, given its essential role in 'asserting and thinking'. In the prologue and in the cosmological part of the poem he uses the verb `to be' either with an adverbial qualification or with a further predicate (e.g. frr. 1, 32; 8, 39, 57; 20, 1), but in defining 'the only ways of enquiry which can be thought' (fr. 3, 2), he isolates the expressions 'is' and 'is not' deliberately both from any determinate subject and from any further completion. In so doing he assigns to them no restricted sense but treats them as the marks of 'asserting and thinking', with the possibility and presuppositions of which he is concerned throughout (cf. fr. 3, 8n.). His aim in defining the 'genuine way of enquiry' as the expression 'is' is

to discover (I) what, if anything, can be said and thought `to be' something without the possibility of denial that it is that thing, and (ii) what this subject can further be said 'to be', i.e. what further predicates can be asserted of it. He answers these questions by converting the verb 'is' to the noun-expression 'Being' (eon) and then arguing for the nature of what this name must denote. The 'is' which constitutes the definition of the way is thus reformulated as the copula with 'Being' as its subject: 'Being is ungenerated and imperishable, complete, unique, unvarying' etc. (fr. 8, 3-5). Initially the nature and number of 'Being', like the sense of 'is', remain wholly undetermined except as what 'is and is not for not being'. Its further determination, culminating in its characterisation as non-physical, is argued in the account in fr. 8 of the many landmarks or monuments on the authentic way of enquiry, i.e. of the terms which can be asserted of the subject, and the question arises, 'how does Parmenides envisage the relation between the subject, 'Being', and the terms joined with it by the copula?' Among the landmarks on the authentic way are the unity or indivisibility of Being and its uniqueness. If what is is one and unique, Parmenides cannot well suppose that the terms which he predicates of it are the names of distinct attributes, which would have their own being and so be eonta. He must therefore regard them as alternative names of Being. This was Plato's understanding of his meaning (cf. Sections 7 and 8 below), which is confirmed by Eudemus' assertion that it was Plato himself who first introduced two senses of the verb `to be' by discriminating between its substantial and attributive uses (cf. Sect. 8). It is confirmed also by the Megarian view of predication as identification (cf. Sect. 6 ad fin.), for the Megarians were regarded as latter days (tt. 102, 132). Aristotle likewise insists (tt. 19, 21, 27) that Parmenides ascribed to 'being' only a single sense, whence he was led to suppose that what is other than Being itself has no being at all. Thus both the text and the Platonic and Peripatetic exegesis of it indicate that Parmenides' copulative use of 'is' in his account of the authentic way

signifies an identity which is the direct expression of the perfect identity of substantial Being." (pp. 19-21)

28. Crystal, Ian. 2002. "The Scope of Thought in Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 52:207-219.
"Much has been written recently about the relation between thinking and what is thought in Parmenides.(1) Long has recently argued that the relation between the cognitive act and its object is a weak form of identity in which thinking and being are coextensively related.(2) Curd in her recent study of Parmenides argued for a weaker relation in which being constituted a necessary condition for thinking.3 In this paper, I want to argue that Parmenides offers a different account of the relation between thinking and what is thought. I shall argue that Parmenides puts forth a monistic thesis which entails the strict identification of the epistemic subject and object. I am not the first to posit the strict identity of thinking and being. Vlastos and, more recently, Sedley also attribute this view to Parmenides.4 However, the argument of this paper will be that the identity relation, *pace* Vlastos and Sedley, does not emerge until Parmenides' account of qualitative homogeneity in Fragment 8. As a result, we cannot attribute this position to Parmenides prior to Fragment 8.
My argument will proceed in two main stages. First (Section I), I shall argue that Fragments 1-7 do not establish the strong identity thesis. I shall do this by canvassing two possible interpretations of how it is that thinking relates to what can be thought in Fragments 1-7. These readings I shall refer to as ‘realist' and ‘idealist' respectively. Secondly (Section II), I shall turn to the Parmenidean account of what ‘is' in Fragment 8 in order to show (Section III) how this does establish the strict identity between the thinker and that which is thought." (p. 207)
(1) To cite just a few recent examples on this subject matter, sec A. A. Long, ‘Parmenides on thinking being', in J. Cleary (ed.), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 12. (New York, 1996), 125-51; D. Sedley. 'Parmenides and Melissus'. in A. A. Long (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*

(Cambridge, 1999), 113-33; P. Curd. T*he Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton. 1998), chs. 1 and 2.
(2) Long (n. 1), 140-6. .See n. 38 below.
(38) Long (n. 1), 140-6, I think, wrongly attributes a weak identity-relation between thinking and being in which, although identical, they are coextensively related. He maintains that thinking and being do not connote the same thing or are different in semantic value just as the other attributes such as being ungenerated and everlasting are different in semantic value However, even allowing for these differences in connotation or semantic value one nonetheless cannot avoid the problem that thinking cannot be treated like the other attributes in that it requires the differentiation outlined above; the sort of differentiation which Parmenides appears to rule out when he offers his complete account of being in Fragment 8. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, it would seem that Plato picked up on this point when setting out his account of mental faculties and their objects in Republic 5. That is. in the midst of a backdrop couched in allusions to Parmenides' Proem. Plato sets out an account of thinking and its objects which is based upon the sort of differentiation that Long talks about, namely as coextensive relata. But more to the point, it would seem that Plato is setting out his account in this manner in contrast to the Parmenidean account. See I. Crystal, 'Parmenidean allusions in Republic V', *Ancient Philosophy* 16 (1996), 351-63.

29. Curd, Patricia. 1991. "Parmenidean Monism." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 36:241-264.
"Is Parmenides indeed a monist? If so, what sort of monist is he? This paper undertakes a re-thinking of these issues." (p. 242)
(...)
"I shall argue that Parmenides adopts neither material nor numerical monism; but that his arguments about the only true account of being show him to be committed to predicational monism.(10) Whatever is must be a predicational unity; but this is consistent with there being many ones. I begin by considering the *esti* and its subject in

B2, and by giving some attention to the setting and context of Parmenides' philosophical project. I next consider a number of the arguments of the *Alêtheia* section of the poem, and then turn to the relation to Parmenides of philosophers who came after him, especially the atomists and the pluralists." (p. 243)
(10) Barnes, for instance, is thus correct in denying that Parmenides adopts numerical monism (in "Eleatic One"). But because Barnes insists on an existential 'is' in Parmenides he does not give full weight to the metaphysical and methodological force of Parmenides' arguments; and so he does not see that Parmenides is indeed committed to a kind of monism. Parmenides himself speaks of the unity of being and argues that being is both *suneches* and *mounogenes*; my argument is that these claims are equivalent to predicational monism. I do not mean that Parmenides formulated a theory to which he gave the name 'predicational monism.' Rather, given that the three types of monism can be distinguished, it is crucial in understanding Parmenides to attribute this view to him.

30. ———. 1992. "Deception and Belief in Parmenides' "Doxa"." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 25:109-134.
"In this paper I examine the problem of the *Doxa*, and offer an account of it that is consistent with the claims of Aletheia and explains why Parmenides included it in the poem.(6) I shall argue that, while there is deception in the *Doxa* (though not in the goddess' account of it), nonetheless the *Doxa* does not in principle renounce all human belief. For, although Parmenides argues that the sensible world alone cannot be the source of knowledge of what is, he does not reject it completely. Moreover, I propose that, while Parmenides himself does not give such an account, a story about the sensible world that is consistent with the metaphysical and epistemological claims of Aletheia can be told. Thus, while I agree with those who argue that the particular account given in the *Doxa* fails, I also agree with those who see the *Doxa* as having something positive to say about mortal belief. But I go further, arguing that

Parmenides supposes that a trustworthy cosmology may be possible and discloses what such a theory might be like and how it would be tested. I begin by considering some of the difficulties faced by interpretations of Parmenides' *Doxa*; I then consider the problems of deception and mortal belief." (pp. 110-111, two notes omitted)
(6) For a summary of views concerning the *Doxa* held earlier in the century, see W.J. Verdenius, *Parmenides: Some Comments on his Poem* (Groningen/Batavia 1942), 45-9.

31. ———. 1998. "Eleatic Arguments." In *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Jyl, Gentzler, 1-28. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In this essay I shall limit my discussion of philosophical method to issues connected with presenting and arguing for philosophical theories or with appraising the adequacy of theories. I shall suggest that there are three stages in the development of pre-Socratic method. First, there is the mere assertion of one's theory; second, there is the giving of arguments for first principles or against other theories. Finally, in the third stage, there are the development and application of criteria for acceptable theories, combined with using these criteria to rule out whole classes of competing theories. I shall argue that the second stage appears in a rough form in Xenophanes and Heraclitus (for they reject, but do not actually argue against, the views of others), but that the full-blown philosophical method of the second and third stages together first appears in Parmenides; it is he who first uses arguments directly in support of his philosophical position (and against the positions of others) and who first stresses the criteria for the acceptability of arguments about nature. But, as I shall also argue, since in Parmenides there is also the reliance on assertion as opposed to argument that characterizes nearly all pre-Eleatic philosophy, Parmenides himself is a transitional figure. I begin with a survey of pre-Eleatic pre-Socratic theories. I then examine the various roles played by assertion, argument, and theory evaluation in Parmenides' thought. Finally, I discuss some of the argumentative

strategies in Parmenides' Eleatic followers, Zeno and Melissus." (p. 2)

32. ———. 1998. *The Legacy of Parmenides. Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Second edition with a new *Introduction to the Paperback Version* (pp. XVII-XXIX), Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004.
Contents: Preface: IX; Acknowledgments XI; A note on texts and translations XIII; Abbreviations XV; Introduction 3; I. Parmenides and the inquiry into Nature 24; II. Parmenides' Monism and the argument of B8 64; III. *Doxa* and deception 98; IV. Pluralism after Parmenides 127; V. Atoms, void, and rearrangement 180, VI. Final remarks 217; Bibliography 243; Index locorum 257; Index nominum 264; General index 269-280.
"This book offers an alternative account of the views of Parmenides and his influence on later Presocratic thought, especially Pluralism and Atomism, in the period immediately preceding Plato's Theory of Forms. It challenges what has become the standard account of the development of Pluralism (in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras) and Atomism (adopted by Leucippus and Democritus). This alternative interpretation places Parmenides firmly in the tradition of physical inquiry in Presocratic thought, arguing that Parmenides was concerned with the same problems that had occupied his predecessors (although his concern took a different form). Further, this account explains how Parmenides' metaphysical and cosmological doctrines had a positive influence on his successors, and how they were used and modified by the later Eleatics Zeno and Melissus.
In the course of this book, I shall argue against both the prevailing interpretation of Parmenides' monism and the usual explanation of the "is" in Parmenides. Instead, I shall claim that Parmenides' subject is what it is to be the genuine nature of something, thus linking Parmenides with the inquiries into nature of his philosophical predecessors. On the view for which I shall argue, the "is" that concerns

Parmenides is a predicational "is" of a particularly strong sort rather than an existential "is." I accept that Parmenides is a monist, but I deny that he is a numerical monist. Rather, I claim that Parmenides is committed to what I call predicational monism. (5)
Numerical monism asserts that there exists only one thing: a complete list of entities in the universe would have only one entry. This is the kind of monism that has traditionally been attributed to Parmenides and (rightly) to Melissus. Predicational monism is the claim that each thing that is can be only one thing; and must be that in a particularly strong way. To be a genuine entity, something that is metaphysically basic, a thing must be a predicational unity, a being of a single kind (*mounogenes*, as Parmenides says in B8.4), with a single account of what it is; but it need not be the case that there exists only one such thing. What must be the case is that the thing itself must be a unified whole. If it is, say F (whatever F turns out to be), it must be all, only, and completely F. On predicational monism, a numerical plurality of such one-beings (as we might call them) is possible. (6) The interpretation of Parmenides' "is" becomes relevant here, for I argue that to be for Parmenides is to be the nature of a thing, what a thing genuinely is, and thus metaphysically basic. The arguments of Parmenides' fragment B8 concern the criteria for what-is, that is, for being the nature of something, where such a nature is what a thing really is. Those arguments purport to show that what-is must be whole, complete, unchanging, and of a single kind. Each thing that is can have only one nature, but there may be many such things that satisfy Parmenides' criteria.' These issues are the subjects of Chapters I and II." (pp. 4-5)
(5) Mourelatos (in Route) and Barnes ("Eleatic One") have also questioned the predominant view that Parmenides is a numerical monist; Barnes denies any sort of monism to Parmenides, and Mourelatos emphasizes Parmenides' anti-dualism.
(6)Thus, the failure of later Presocratic thinkers to argue for their pluralistic theories, while working within a

Parmenidean framework and stressing the reality and predicational unity of their basic entities, is evidence for my view that it is possible for there to be a numerical plurality of entities each of which is predicationally one.
(7) In later terminology we might say that Parmenides is searching for an account of what it is to be the essence of something, although I have avoided the word essence because it is an anachronistic term in Presocratic thought. There is, however, a connection between Parmenides' search for what-is and Aristotle's accounts of ousia and *to ti en einai*; the connection runs through Plato's Theory of Forms, which itself has Parmenidean roots.

33. ———. 2006. "Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality." In *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Louise, Gill Mary and Pierre, Pellegrin, 34-55. Oxford: Blackwell.
"A helpful way to approach the question of Parmenides' importance for Greek philosophy is to examine questions of unity and plurality in pre-Socratic thought. seeing how these questions dovetail with those about the possibility of genuine knowledge and its object.(2) In this chapter, I shall argue that Parmenides' criticisms of his predecessors rest on the principle that what can be genuinely known must be a unity of a particular sort, which I call a predicational unity. On this view, anything that genuinely is (that truly can be said to be). and so can be known, must be of a single, wholly unified kind. Parmenides drew confusions from this that later philosophers took very seriously. One consequence is that what is genuinely real cannot come to be, pass away, or after, thus posing the problems of change and knowledge: How can we account for the appearance of change that we see in the world around us? And how can we have knowledge of such a changing world? An advantage of viewing Parmenides in this way is that it makes sense of the cosmological theorizing of post-Parmenidean figures such as Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. All these philosophers were (in their different ways) pluralists, holding that there is a numerical plurality of metaphysically basic entities: and yet, I shall argue, all were working in the

Parmenidean tradition because they all accepted Parmenides' criteria for what is genuinely real." (p. 34)
(2) [Stokes (1971) provides a comprehensive treatment of unity and plurality in early Greek thought in English. [M. C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, Washington, DC: The Center for Hellenic Studies 1971]

34. ———. 2011. "Thought and Body in Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 115-134. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Parmenides' fragment B16 is a puzzle: it seems to be about thought, but Theophrastus uses it in his account of Parmenides' views on perception.
Scholars have disagreed about its proper place in Parmenides' poem: does it belong to *Alētheia* or to *Doxa*? I suggest that the fragment indeed belongs to *Doxa*, and in it Parmenides claims that mortals, who fail to use *noos* correctly, mistake the passive experiences of sense perception for genuine thought about what-is, and hence fail to understand the true nature of what-is. I argue that genuine thought (the correct use of *noos*) must go beyond sense experience and grasp what is truly intelligible; in doing so I explore the question of immateriality in Presocratic thinking."

35. ———. 2015. "Thinking, Supposing, and *Physis* in Parmenides." *Études platoniciennes* no. 12.
Abstract: "What could justify the Presocratic conviction that human beings can have knowledge? The answer that I am exploring in a larger project is that most Presocratic thinkers share a commitment to the possibility of a “natural fit” between the world and human understanding. Two claims underlie this commitment: the first is the basic intelligibility of the cosmos. The second is that human beings can come to know things beyond their limited sensory experience, for in properly exercising their capacities for perception, thought, and understanding, they can come to have the knowledge that earlier Greeks thought was reserved for the gods. Here I explore a small part of one chapter of the story I want to tell: Parmenides' accounts of

what-is and of thinking and the implications of these views for the possibility of human knowledge about the world around us. The paper concentrates on Parmenides, beginning with a few comments about Heraclitus."

36. de Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1983. "Did Parmenides Reject the Sensible World?" In *Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR on the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of his Ordination*, edited by Lloyd, Gerson, 29-53. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds that, unlike the *Alêtheia* part, the *Doxa* part presents an altogether untrue account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According to the Minority, however, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two positions are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent that Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa *route(s),* but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction between two separate domains. one true and the other untrue. As any genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, *our* world and it was *that* which he wanted to truly understand." (pp. 29-30)

(...)

One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are not able to make the great decision. Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the big decision so seriously that

he left the idea of one world as approached by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's *chorismos* and find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,' (*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics." (p. 53)
(*) Joseph Owens, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* (New York 1959) p. 76.

37. DeLong, Jeremy C. 2015. "Rearranging Parmenides: B1: 31-32 and a Case for an Entirely Negative Doxa (Opinion)." *Southwest Philosophy Review* no. 31:177-186.
Abstract: "This essay explicates the primary interpretative import of B1: 31-32 in Parmenides poem (*On Nature*)—lines which have radical implications for the overall argument, and which the traditional arrangement forces into an irreconcilable dilemma. I argue that the “negative” reading of lines 31-32 is preferable, even on the traditional arrangement.
This negative reading denies that a third thing is to be taught to the reader by the goddess—a positive account of how the apparent world is to be “acceptably” understood. I then suggest that a rearrangement of the fragments would make more sense overall, while further supporting the “negative” reading as more natural and coherent. In particular, the rearrangement dispels the objection that, “if mortal opinions were not true, why would Parmenides include such a lengthy false account of the apparent world--an account which explicitly denies the conclusions of the earlier section, Truth?”
38. Dilcher, Roman. 2006. "Parmenides on the Place of Mind." In *Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, edited by King, R. A. H., 31-48. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Parmenides seems to have no place in the history of the philosophical problems that are indicated by the phrase "common to body and soul".

While in Heraclitus we do find for the very first time a concept of soul as something distinct from the body that is responsible for thought, action and feeling, there is a basic dichotomy in Parmenides' thought that also has a bearing on the question of a possible relation of "body" and "soul": on the one hand the account of Being which involves the exercise of mind; on the other hand a theory of the physical world on the basis of the two elements Light and Night. The coherence of these two parts of Parmenides' poem has been much debated in terms of the possible relation of Being to *Doxa*. Fr.16, however, provides an account of mind in relation to the two elements of the doxastic world, and so it might contribute in a different way to a better understanding of how the two parts cohere." (p. 31)

39. Dolin Jr., Edwin F. 1962. "Parmenides and Hesiod." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*:93-98.
"It should be said at once, of course, that the power and brilliance are Parmenides' own and not borrowed from anyone. To assume, as this paper does, that the tradition from which Parmenides drew was the main poetic tradition of Homer and Hesiod is not to imply that hexameter poetry by itself somehow accounts for Parmenides. Rather, the assumption is that the tradition was there, pervasively and ineluctably, in the cultural atmosphere, that Parmenides used its motifs and imagery as freely and naturally as he breathed, counting them as allies in his poetic communication with Hellas, and that he criticized this cultural *donnée* whenever he saw fit, which was not seldom, by the very manner in which he made use of what he liked of it." (p. 93)
(...)
"This article seeks to extend the comparison with the *Theogony* by suggesting a specific parallel between Parmenides' daughters of the sun and the Theogony's Muses and by commenting on the parallel between Parmenides' gates of night and day and those of the Theogony.(3)
Its hypothesis is that Parmenides was deliberately attacking the archaic thought processes represented by Hesiod and wished to present himself as the exponent of a new

intellectual approach which would be associated in its spirit with the Homeric ideal of the heroic individual." (p. 94)
(3) *Theogony* 736-57; Parmenides B. 1.11.

40. Drozdek, Adam. 2001. "Eleatic being: finite or infinite?" *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 129:306-313.
Abstract: "The extant fragments indicate that there is a fundamental agreement between the two Eleatic philosophers, Melissus and Parmenides concerning characteristics of Being. Like Parmenides Melissus asserts that Being is eternal (30B1, B2, B4), immovable (B7.7-10, B10). complete (82), and unique (B5, B6). The physical world is unreal because it is characterized by "change, multiplicity, temporal succession and imperfection" (B8). Being cannot be known through sensory perception because senses indicate that things are constantly changing, which directly contradicts the immutability of Being (B7). However, as commonly assumed, there is at least one fundamental difference between them. Melissus considers Being infinite, whereas for Parmenides Being is finite because it is held in limits (28B8.26,31,42) and is compared to a sphere (B8.42-43). Does the limited/unlimited difference signify the modification introduced by Melissus to the Eleatic philosophy?"

41. ———. 2001. "Parmenides' Theology." *Eranos.Acta Philologica Suecana* no. 99:4-15.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in: A. Drozdek, *Greek Philosophers as Theologians. The Divine* Arche, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. pp. 43-52.
Abstract: "Parmenides' system has always been an inexhaustible source of fascination because of the grandeur and, at the same time, paradoxical character of the ontological vision.
Even after centuries of interpretations, there is little agreement on the meaning of the system and its particular components. However, there seems to be a common slant in these interpretations, at least in the last hundred years, starting with the groundbreaking publication of Hermann Diels on Parmenides' poem,(1) which deemphasizes the

religious and theological components of Parmenidean ontology and epistemology. These theological components are very often glossed over – sometimes they are barely mentioned, sometimes discounted as a mere metaphor (beginning with Diels), sometimes treated as mere embellishments.(2) One reason is that Parmenides nowhere calls Being, which he discusses in particular in fr. B8, God, and the Olympian personae he mentions are discounted as a bow toward traditional mythology with very little religious significance. It seems, however, that such an approach is unjustified, that the main concern of Parmenides in his poem is with theological issues, and that the poem is an attempt to show the way of truth, which is the way of acquiring true religious knowledge about God."
(1) Hermann Diels, *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (Berlin: Reimer, 1897).
(2) It is said, for instance, that "the fact that the goddess remains anonymous shows that she represents no religious figure at all ... Parmenides could not have attributed any reality to the goddess because for him there exists only one thing, the unique and homogenous Being," Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 31.

42. English, Robert B. 1912. "Parmenides' indebtedness to the Pythagoreans." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 43:81-94.
"A close examination of all the "opinions" shows that they, even more than his statements of "truth," relate to the doctrines ascribed to the Pythagoreans. There is scarcely a tenet set forth in the " opinions" which may not be referred directly or indirectly to them as they are represented in Aristotle. Not more than ten different propositions exist in this part of his work. Of these, two deal with first principles, three deal with astronomical truths, three have an astrophysical significance, one deals with procreation, and one with the nature of thought. The six dealing with astronomical or astrophysical theories undoubtedly have reference to the Pythagoreans. Of the two referring to first principles one seems to have resemblance to Anaximander,

and the other to the dual principle of the Pythagoreans. To the theory of right and left in pro- creation corresponds indirectly the Pythagorean idea of right and left as two first principles. To the postulate that "that which thinks is the nature of mingled parts in man and the excess is thought" there is no parallel in the Pythagorean doctrine. But Parmenides' own postulate on this point that "thinking will not be found without being, in which it is expressed" corresponds in substance to the belief of the Pythagoreans that soul and mind are properties of number (being), though Parmenides makes no mention of this Pythagorean symbol." (pp. 92-93)
(...)
"It seems evident, then, from this study (1) that the " opinions" of Parmenides refer in large part to the doctrines of the early Pythagoreans; (2) that his treatise on "truth" is largely concerned with a refutation of their arguments; (3) that not only his astronomical views but also his cosmological and ontological views generally were affected by the Pythagorean system; (4) that no violence to fact is done in setting the elementary metaphysical number theory of the Pythagoreans as early in time as the ascendency of Parmenides." (p. 94)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ferreira, Fernando. 1999. "On the Parmenidean Misconception." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 2:37-49.
"This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I focus on the weaker gradation of an RTMS *[referential theory of the meaning of sentences*] and I argue that this gradation, while still unable to make sense of falsehoods, nevertheless enlarges greatly the scope of significant sentences (albeit at an ontological price) and is able to make sense of true negative predications. The relation between a weak RTMS and Plato's above mentioned double-theory is suggested in the text via what I call Plato's maneuver. However, this relation is not fully discussed in this article since I believe that a proper treatment of such an issue requires a discussion that is beyond the scope of the present paper. In my view, this discussion must include an account of the finale of the *Sophist* (after 259e), in which Plato tries to make sense of falsehoods. I plan such an undertaking at a latter date. In the third section, I discuss the first part of Parmenides' poem in light of a strong RTMS. In the course of this discussion, I propose a rather strong correlation between verses 3-4 and verses 40-41 of fragment 8 of the poem. This correlation is, to my knowledge, new in the literature. Finally, in the last section, I briefly consider an

objection to the interpretation of the poem of Parmenides proposed in this article." (pp. 38-39)

2. Finkelberg, Aryeh. 1986. "The Cosmology of Parmenides." *American Journal of Philology* no. 107:303-317.
   "Our main source of information about the cosmological component of Parmenides' doctrine of Opinion - apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 - is Aëtius' account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12.
   The reconstruction of Parmenides' cosmology is thus considered a hopeless task, for "it must inevitably be based on many conjectures."'
   I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aëtius' report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also compatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon proving our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them." (p. 303)
   "Aëtius' report reads as follows:(2)
   "Parmenides says that there are rings wound one around the other, one made of the rare, the other of the dense, and between them there are others mixed of light and darkness. What surrounds them all like a wall is solid, beneath which there is a fiery ring, and what is in the middle of all rings is <solid>: around which there is again a fiery [sc. ring]. The middlemost of the mixed rings is for them all the <origin> and <cause> of motion and coming into being which he calls steering goddess, and key-holder, and Justice, and Necessity. Air has been separated off from the earth vaporized because of the latter's stronger compression; the sun is an exhalation of fire and such is the Milky Way. The moon is a mixture of both air and fire. Aether is topmost, surrounding all; beneath it there is that fire-like part which we call sky; beneath it is what surrounds the earth." (p. 304, notes omitted)
   (2) Aët. II 1, 7 (DK 28 A 37):
3. ———. 1986. "'Like by Like' and Two Reflections of Reality in Parmenides." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische*

Philologie no. 114:405-412.
"The main problem confronting the student of Parmenides' doctrine is the nature of the relation between the two pictures of reality posited in his poem: reality as Being and reality as a mixture of the two 'forms', light and night.
To characterize the Parmenidean doctrine as ontological dualism explains nothing - the question is, what is the motivation for this dualism? Moreover, the Parmenidean teaching is epistemological rather than ontological dualism, for what is described in the Way of Seeming is not a different reality from that described in the Way of Truth, but a different knowledge of the same reality - the universe(1) - a knowledge declared inferior. On the assumption that the Parmenidean dualism is epistemological, we must therefore examine how man cognizes reality, with a view to isolating the conditions which determine the cognition of reality as Being or as a mixture of the 'forms'." (p. 405)
(1) That Parmenides conceived of Being as the unity of all things is the view of Plato (e.g. *Parm*. 128 A, 152 E), Aristotle (e.g. Met. 986b 27), and Theophrastus (e.g. ap. *Hippol*. Ref. I 11).

4. ———. 1988. "Parmenides: Between Material and Logical Monism." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 70:1-14.
"To recapitulate. The problem of the monistic conception of reality, insoluble when approached on physical terms, was solved by Parmenides by inventing the notion of Being. When translated into terms of the doctrine of Being, monism became the logical necessity to conceive Being as the only thing that exists, while pluralism, that is, the assumption of the existence of something beside Being, revealed itself as the fallacy of admitting the existence of such a thing as not-Being. However, it was not the problem of Ionian monism to which Parmenides' thought was committed: the idea of cosmic Fire underlying the notion of Being shows that it was the failure of his own vision of reality as a material unity, a vision which he shared with the Ionians, to be truly monistic, that prompted Parmenides to a thorough examination of the pattern of current monism,

resulting in a new idea of unity and a revision of the standing of cosmology in the monistic doctrine. In its genesis, the Parmenidean teaching is then a material monistic doctrine in which the material principle, Fire, is replaced by Being, while the cosmology is reinterpreted as a pluralistic misconception and demonstrated to be untenable on the application of true names as they are established in the ἀλήθεια.
However the underlying material monistic pattern still remains operative: Fire persists as a visualisation of Being, thus providing the rationale for the cosmology and determining its specific profile, while the cosmology remains - not a true but nevertheless to some degree a valid account. The Parmenidean system is thus not self-contained, for the formative conception of Fire, the vision which mediates the transition from Being to the cosmology, thus making the teaching into a coherent whole, remains outside the formally posited doctrine." (pp. 12-13)

5. ———. 1988. "Parmenides' Foundation of the Way of Truth." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:39-67.
"The problem of the subject of *estin* and *ouk estin* in B 2.3 and 5 is one of the most controversial issues in Parmenides scholarship. The usual approach is that *estin* and *ouk estin* have a subject, which, however, remains unexpressed. Now by unexpressed subject one may mean that (a) a given utterance has a logical subject which is not expressed grammatically but is supplied by the immediate context, or (b) a given utterance has a logical subject which is neither expressed by means of a grammatical subject nor supplied by the immediate context. The case (a) is an instance of an ordinary linguistic phenomenon called ellipsis; the case (b) is either grammatically nonsensical or an example of unintelligible speech." (p. 39)
(...)
"Below I argue that *einai* is the only subject that meets this requirement. Proceeding from this assumption, I argue that *einai* should be distinguished from *eon* and that the 'ways' of B 2 are not so much ontological statements as logical-

linguistic patterns whose truth and falsehood are self-evident.
These patterns serve in Parmenides as the basis of the subsequent deduction of true existential assertions about Being and not-Being, and I try to show that, if taken in this perspective, all the extant fragments preceding B 8, from B 2 to B 7, constitute a single argument whose detailed reconstruction I propose in the second section of the article. Finally, in the third section, I examine, proceeding from the conclusions arrived at, the question of truth and falsehood in Parmenides in a more general context, which helps to shed light on the respective logical standing of the two parts of Parmenides' poem, the *Aletheia* and the *Doxa*." (p. 42)

6. ———. 1997. "Xenophanes Physics Parmenides Doxa and Empedocles Theory of Cosmogonical Mixture." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 125:1-16.
Abstract: "Although the resemblances between Empedocles' and Parmenides' physical theories are commonly recognized, in speaking of the former's philosophical debt to the latter commentators usually focus on theἀλήθεια, paying much less attention, if any, to the δόξα (1). To me, this approach suggests that the role of the δόξαin fashioning Empedocles' physical doctrine is not sufficiently appreciated and calls for further discussion; consequently I propose a brief survey of Parmenides' δόξα with a view to elucidating systematic correlations between his and Empedocles' physical theories. Further, I intend to argue that Empedocles' physical doctrine is the final stage of a development which can be traced through Parmenides' δόξα back to Xenophanes' 'physics'. I believe that the novelty of Xenophanes' 'physics' has not been duly appraised and its role as a forerunner of Parmenides' δόξα largely overlooked."
(1) Thus, for example, in speaking of Parmenides' influence in the 'Conclusion' to his investigation of Empedocles' thought, D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*, Cambridge 1969, 237-249, does not even mention the δόξα; similarly, B. Inwoord, *The Poem of Empedocles*, Toronto 1992, 22-28, addresses only theἀλήθεια.

7. ———. 1999. "Being, Truth and Opinion in Parmenides." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 81:233-248.
"The traditional premise of Parmenidean scholarship is that the theory of Being renders the phenomenal world merely apparent and the account of this world in the *Doxa* fallacious. Accordingly, commentators find themselves reckoning with the tantalizing question of the rationale of Parmenides' supplementing a true theory with a false one. In what follows, I propose to consider the thesis that Parmenides' Being is consistent with material heterogeneity and that, accordingly, the two parts of the poem combine to yield an exhaustive account of reality." (p. 233)
(...)
"This construal of Parmenides' thought enables an understanding of his poem as a unified philosophical project in which the *Doxa* has its rightful place, and extricates us from the hopeless dilemma that either Parmenides' acceptance of his own conclusions was qualified for the upheld their truth unqualifiedly and was mad.(37)" (p. 248)
(37) As stated by M. Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," in A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics*, Princeton, 1993, 268; cf. C. H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," Review of Metaphysics 22, 1969, 715.
8. Floyd, Edwin. 1992. "Why Parmenides Wrote in Verse." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:251-265.
"Parmenides chose verse (instead of prose) for its many resonances highlighting deception. *Prophron* at 1.22, for example, has an apparently straightforward meaning "kindly", but in Homer it is used in contexts of divine disguise. Later on in Parmenides' poem, the focus on the immobility of Being (8.37-38) recalls Athena's fateful deception of Hektor in *Iliad*, book 22. Even more clearly, *Doxa* shows the pattern too, since the transition from *Aletheia* at 8.52 parallels a context (Solon, fr l.2, ed. West) in which feigned madness brings about the Athenians's regaining Salamis."
9. Fränkel, Hermann Ferdinand. 1962. *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. A history of Greek epic, lyric, and prose to*

the middle of the fifth century. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic.
Translated from the German *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (second revised edition 1962) by Moses Hadas and James Willis.
Chapter VII *Philosophy and Empirical Science at the end of the Archaic Period*: (c) *Parmenides*, pp. 349-370.
"The core of Parmenides' philosophy is metaphysical in its nature.
To come face to face with that reality beyond the senses which had disclosed to him, the poet had to mount in spirit beyond this world in which we live. Whenever he reflected upon his lofty ideas, he felt himself' carried away into a realm of light beyond all earthly things. In the introduction to his poem he describes this experience, and since ordinary words are incapable of conveying anything so far beyond the ordinary, he conveys it in images and symbols.(2) (pp. 350-351)
(...)
"We have now in all essential points come to the end of our information about the philosophy of Parmenides. It unites grandeur of intuition with strictness of logic. He had gazed upon Being in all its plenitude and glory, but also in all its austerity and exclusiveness.
Just as Xenophanes had chosen to believe in god as god and as nothing else, so Parmenides worked out his notion of Being as pure Being and nothing else; and he used his razor-edged dialectic to defend it against all common-sense doubts as the unique and perfect actuality, The metaphysical spirit here rules supreme.
This metaphysical spirit (cf. 1, 1 θυμός) is most completely expressed in the opening, in which the philosopher describes his own ascent into pure and inerrant reason in dramatic and vigorous images. There is a sequence of three scenes: the furious journey from night into day; the passing of a gate that opens to one man only; the gracious reception on the other side. The autobiographical 'I' at first appears quite openly; then it is latent and implied in the horses, chariot, maidens, etc.; then directly again in the address (1,

22ff.), where it is ennobled by the goddess' hand-clasp, to be replaced by 'you' on the lips of the divine speaker. This 'you' has a personal character as long as it is denoting (as in 24-32) the recipient of an exclusive favour, one who has raised himself above the fluctuations of humanity. But when the 'you' recurs later, as it sometimes does, it denotes only the audience of the lecture-in one instance Parmenides particularly (8, 61), elsewhere anyone who through his intermediacy will hear or read the poem." (p. 365)
(2) Probably this was why Parmenides chose verse: fr. 1 could not have been expressed in the Greek prose of his time.

10. ———. 1975. "Studies in Parmenides." In *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy. Vol. II: The Eleatics and Pluralists*, edited by Furley, David J. and Allen, R. E., 1-47. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Partial English translation of *Parmenidesstudien* (*Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 1930, 153-192).
"My intention in the following studies is to correct and extend certain essential aspects of our present knowledge of the system of Parmenides by criticism and interpretation of original fragments and *testimonia*. In so doing, I shall take particular care to keep dose to the wording of the original text, as is done as a matter of course in the interpretation of 'pure' literature, but is easily neglected in the case of a strictly philosophical text, where the content appears to speak for itself, quite independently of the words which happen to be used. And yet much will be radically misunderstood, and many of the best, liveliest and most characteristic features of the doctrine will be missed, if one fails to read the work as an epic poem which belongs to its own period, and to approach it as a historical document, through its language.
These studies are presented in such a way that only Diels-Kranz is required as a companion." (p. 1)
"As Parmenides himself says (B 3), his thought runs in a circle; it proves itself by itself, just as Being rests in itself: For equal to itself symmetrically on all sides, symmetrically

it meets its πείρατα (104) to translate more exactly the vivdly empirical ἐγκύρειε: 'it happens everywhere upon its final forms.' Being has reached its formation symmetrically in every direction.
So has the theory of Reality; and with these words it is concluded." (p. 36)

11. Frère, Jean. 2011. "Mortals (βροτοὶ) According to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 135-146. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "It is a common opinion that when Parmenides refers to “mortals,” he is referring to all human beings. But in fact, when he talks of “mortals,” he implies only a limited fraction of humanity: those thinkers who have elaborated clever but nevertheless insufficient or misleading theories about the origin of things and the cosmos. This can be observed in fragment 6, where the formula “mortals who know nothing,” far from implying all humanity, refers only to Heraclitus and his disciples. In the same way, in fragment 8.53–61, “mortals” who acknowledge two separate types of light and night to apprehend the structure of the cosmos are only the Pythagoreans, not all humans."
12. Frings, Manfred. 1988. "Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:15-33.
"In what follows, I wish to present a number of essentials of Heidegger's lecture, originally entitled, "Heraclitus and Parmenides," which he delivered at Freiburg University in the Winter Semester of 1942/1943. This was at a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply against the Nazi regime in Germany. Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to cross the Volga that winter. Talk of an impending "invasion" kept people in suspense. Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids. There wasn't much food left.
It is amazing that any thinker could have been able to concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time. In the lecture, there are no remarks made against the allies; nor are there any to be found that would even remotely support

the then German cause. But Communism is hit hard once by Heidegger, who says that it represents an awesome organization-mind in our time.
There are two factors that somewhat impeded my endeavor of presenting the contents of this lecture:
1. Heidegger had originally entitled the lecture "Heraclitus and Parmenides." The 1942/43 lecture was followed in 1943 and 1944 by two more lectures on Heraclitus. 2 When I read the manuscripts of the 1942/43 lecture for the first time, I was stunned that Heraclitus was mentioned just five times, and, even then, in more or less loose contexts. I decided that the title of the lecture should be reduced to just "Parmenides" in order to accommodate the initial expectations of the reader and his own thought pursuant to having read and studied it.
2. While reading the lecture-manuscripts for the first time, another troubling technicality came to my attention: long stretches of the lecture hardly even deal with Parmenides himself, and Heidegger seems to get lost in a number of areas that do, prima facie, appear to be irrelevant to Parmenides. And Heidegger was rather strongly criticized for this in the prestigious literary section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to the effect that it was suggested that I could have done even better had I given the lecture an altogether different title and omitted the name Parmenides." (p. 15, notes omitted).

13. ———. 1991. "Heidegger's Lectures on Parmenides and Heraclitus (1942-1944)." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:197-199.
"This is a discussion of the coverage of three Lectures Heidegger held on Parmenides and Heraclitus from 1942 to 1944. It is designed on the background of his personal experience during the trip he made to Greece in 1962 as recorded in his diary. The question is raised whether his 1943 arrangement of 10 Heraclitus fragments could be extended by "refitting transformations" of other fragments. The three Lectures are seen as tethered to Heidegger's 1966/67 Heraclitus Seminar. Central to his trip was the island of Delos where he seemingly experienced the free

region of Aletheia. A "fragment" in his diary is suggested as a motto for all three Lectures."

14. Fritz, Kurt von. 1945. "*Nous, noein* and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part I. From the Beginnings to Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 40:223-242.
Reprinted (with the second part) in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 23-52 (on Parmenides see pp. 43-52).
"In an earlier article (1) I tried to analyze the meaning or meanings of the words *noos* and *noein* in the Homeric poems, in preparation for an analysis of the importance of these terms in early Greek philosophy. The present article will attempt to cope with this second and somewhat more difficult problem, but to the exclusion of the *nous* of Anaxagoras, since this very complicated concept requires a separate investigation." p. 23 of the reprint.
So far it might seem as if Parmenides' concept of *noos* is still essentially the same as that of his predecessors, including his contemporary Heraclitus. In fact, however, Parmenides brings in an entirely new and heterogeneous element. It is a rather remarkable fact that Heraclitus uses the particle *gar* only where he explains the ignorance of the common crowd. There is absolutely no *gar* or any other particle of the same sense in any of the passages in which he explains his own view of the truth. He or his *noos* sees or grasps the truth and sets it forth. There is neither need nor room for arguments. Homer and Hesiod, likewise, when using the term *noos*, never imply that someone comes to a conclusion concerning a situation so that the statement could be followed up with a sentence beginning with "for" or "because." A person realizes the situation. That is all. In contrast to this, Parmenides in the central part of his poem has a *gar,* an *épei, oun, eineka, ouneka* in almost every sentence. He argues, deduces, tries to prove the truth of his statements by logical reasoning. What is the relation of this reasoning to the *noos*?

The answer is given by those passages in which the goddess tells Parmenides which "road of inquiry" he should follow with his *noos* and from which roads he must keep away his *noema*.
These roads, as the majority of the fragments clearly show, are roads or lines of discursive thinking, expressing itself in judgments, arguments, and conclusions. Since the *noos* is to follow one of the three possible roads of inquiry and to stay away from the others, there can be no doubt that discursive thinking is part of the function of the *noos*. Yet -- and this is just as important -- *noein* is not identical with a process of logical deduction pure and simple in the sense of formal logic, a process which through a syllogistic mechanism leads from any set of related premises to conclusions which follow with necessity from those premises, but also a process which in itself is completely unconcerned with, and indifferent to, the truth or untruth of the original premises. It is still the primary function of the *noos* to be in direct touch with ultimate reality. It reaches this ultimate reality not only at the end and as a result of the logical process, but in a way is in touch with it from the very beginning, since, as Parmenides again and again points out, there is no *noos* without the *eon*, in which it unfolds itself. In so far as Parmenides' difficult thought can be explained, the logical process seems to have merely the function of clarifying and confirming what, in a way, has been in the *noos* from the very beginning and of cleansing it of all foreign elements.
So for Parmenides himself, what, for lack of a better word, may be called the intuitional element in the *noos* is still most important. Yet it was not through his "vision" but through the truly or seemingly compelling force of his logical reasoning that he acquired the dominating position in the philosophy of the following century. At the same time, his work marks the most decisive turning-point in the history of the terms *noos, noein*, etc.; for he was the first consciously to include logical reasoning in the functions of the *noos*. The notion of *noos* underwent many other changes in the further history of Greek philosophy, but none as decisive as this. The intuitional element is still present in

Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of *noos* and later again in that of the Neoplatonists. But the term never returned completely to its pre-Parmenidean meaning." (pp. 51-52 notes omitted)
(1) "*Noos* and *Noein* in the Homeric Poems," Classical Philology, 38 (1943), 79-93.

15. ———. 1946. "*Nous, noein* and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part II. The Post-Parmenidean period." *Classical Philology* no. 40:12-34.
Reprinted (with the first part) in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 52-85.
16. Fronterotta, Francesco. 2007. "Some Remarks on *Noein* in Parmenides." In *Reading Ancient Texts. Volume I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, edited by Stern-Gillet, Suzanne and Corrigan, Kevin, 3-19. Leiden: Brill.
"In this paper I will confine myself to O'Brien's works on Parmenides. I refer in particular to the two volumes of *Études sur Parménide*, to which he contributed so substantially. In the first volume we find his magisterial version of Parmenides's fragments, with French and English translations and commentary, and a critical examination of the main interpretative and philosophical questions that they pose. The second volume includes two essays by him. One of these looks at a number of textual problems, and it aims to elucidate the "ideological" background which often conditions the study of texts because of a pre-existing historico-philosophical understanding of their contents.(1) O'Brien shows that many variants of the texts of frr. 1 and 8 DK reveal a Neoplatonic origin — very likely because Neoplatonic commentators felt the need to establish a convergence between the meaning and the spirit of the Parmenidean text and their own doctrinal positions. O'Brien's essay is a model of its kind, both as a reading of and commentary on the Parmenidean fragments (and on

pre-Platonic thinkers in general) and for my more modest objective here, that of reflecting upon the significance of νοεῖν.
I shall look at translations of the verb νοεῖν, and, more especially, the species of activity to which this verb, according to Parmenides, refers us." (p. 3)
(1) See P. Aubenque (ed.), vols. 1 (*Le poème de Parménid*e) and 2 (*Problèmes d'interprétation*).
The essay I am now referring to is in vol. 2: *Problèmes d'établissement du texte,* pp. 314–50.

17. Furley, David J. 1967. "Parmenides of Elea." In *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edwards, Paul, 47-51. New York: Macmillan.
Reprinted in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition,* edited by Donald M. Borchert, New York: Thomson-Gale, 2006, pp. 122-127, with an *Addendum* by Patricia Curd, pp. 127-129.
"David Furley's original entry remains an exemplary introduction to Parmenides' thought. Since its publication, philosophers have focused on the character of the routes of inquiry that the goddess lays out in the poem, suggesting different interpretations of the subjectless is (or esti), and of the nature of to eon, the subject of inquiry. In addition, scholars have continued to study the Proem (the opening lines of the poem) and the Doxa (the goddesses' statement of mortal opinion), but there is no consensus about either." (p. 127)

18. ———. 1973. "Notes on Parmenides." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:1-15.
Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos,* Assen: Van Gorcum.
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 pp. 27-37.
"There is a set of problems, much discussed in the literature, concerning the nature of the journey described in B1 of Parmenides, its destination, the revelation made to him by

the goddess, and the connection between the symbolism of B1 and the two forms, Light and Night, which are the principles of the cosmology of the Way of Doxa. Some of these problems, I believe, have now been solved. The solution, which is mainly the work of scholars writing in German, (1) has been either overlooked or rejected by the English-speaking community, (2) and it seems worthwhile drawing attention to it and developing it." (p. 27)
(1) The essential suggestion was made, without much argument, by Morrison [Parmenides and Er] (1955). For detailed arguments, see Mansfeld [Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt] (1964) 222-61, and Burkert [Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras] (1969).
(2) For example, by Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] (1965) II, Tarán [Parmenides] (1965), myself [Parmenides of Elea] (1967), Kahn [The Thesis of Parmenides] (1969), and Mourelatos [The Route of Parmenides] (1970), 15 and n. 19.

19. ———. 1989. "Truth as What survives the elenchos. An idea in Parmenides." In *The Criterion of Truth. Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd, together with a Text and Translation (With Annotations) of Ptolemy's on the Kriterion and Hegemonikon*, edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal.Stephen, 1-12. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Reprinted in D. J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989, pp. 38-46.
"My starting point in this paper is a couple of lines from Parmenides' poem. There is some reason to claim that they are the most remarkable lines in that astonishing document:
κρίνοι δε λόγφ πολύδηριν ελεγχον έξ έμεθεν ρηθεντα, μόνος δ' ετι μύθος οδοιο λειπεται ώς εατιν.
Judge by logos the hard-hitting refutation (*elenchos*) that I have uttered. Only one single account of a way is left: that it is. (DK 2SB7.5-8.2)
The paradox of Parmenides is presented in the strongest outline here.

It is a goddess who speaks these lines, revealing the way of Truth to the initiate. Instead of standing on authority or using the persuasive power of religious ritual, she tells him to take away her message and subject it to criticism: judge by logos. Moreover, the revelation itself takes the form of a criticism: what she first offers Parmenides on his arrival , when he has passed through the gates of which Justice holds the key, is described as an ἐλεγχος (*elenchos*). This is the aspect of Parmenides' vision that I want to elaborate on this occasion. I am aiming to do two things: to improve the case for thinking that ελεγχος does indeed mean 'refutation ' here, rather than 'proof'; (1) and to see what this tells us about the underlying conception of truth." (p. 1)

(1) I argued briefly for this thesis in 'Notes on Parmenides' in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty, Phronesis suppl. vol . I (Assen 1973), 1 -15. I was stimulated to more about it by some contrary arguments in a paper by Mr. James Lesher , which he was kind enough to send me in typescript.

A year or so later I was invited to present a paper at a conference on "Truth" at Brown University, and without again looking at Mr. Lesher's paper I wrote the present article. Shortly afterwards I sent it to the Editors of this volume, being very happy to have the opportunity to join in honouring my old and admired friend, George Kerferd.

Some time later, Mr. Lesher published his article ("Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: the *poluderis elenchos* of Fragment 7", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 1-30.

On re-reading it, I see that although we come to different conclusions, we cover much of the same ground. To take proper notice of Mr. Lesher's arguments now would mean rewriting my paper and expanding it quite a lot. But since we worked independently of each other, I think it best to leave the reader to make the comparisons.

20. Furth, Montgomery. 1968. "Elements of Eleatic Ontology." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*:111-132.

Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 241-270.
"The task of an interpreter of Parmenides is to find the simplest, historically most plausible, and philosophically most comprehensible set of assumptions that imply (in a suitably loose sense) the doctrine of `being' set out in Parmenides' poem.' In what follows I offer an interpretation that certainly is simple and that I think should be found comprehensible. Historically, only more cautious claims are possible, for several portions of the general view from which I 'deduce the poem' are not clearly stated in the poem itself; my explanation of this is that they are operating as *tacit* assumptions, and indeed that the poem is best thought of as an attempt to force these very assumptions to the surface for formulation and criticism-that the poem is a challenge. To be sure, there are dangers in pretending, as for dramatic purposes I shall, that ideas are definite and explicit which for Parmenides himself must have been tacit or vague-that Parmenides knew what he was doing as clearly as I represent him; I try to avoid them, but the risk must be taken. I even believe that not to take it, in the name of preserving his thought pure from anachronous contamination, actually prevents us from seeing the extent to which he, pioneer, was ahead of his time-the argument works both ways. So let me hedge my historical claim in this way: the view I shall discuss could have been an active-indeed a controlling-element of Eleaticism; to suppose that Parmenides held it not only explains the poem, but also helps explain the subsequent reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato (though there is not space to elaborate this here). In addition, it brings his thought astonishingly close to some contemporary philosophical preoccupations.
In the first of the following sections, I lay down some sketchy but necessary groundwork concerning the early Greek concept of 'being.' Then in Section 2 an interpretation is given of what I take to be the central Parmenidean

doctrine, that 'it cannot be said that anything is not.' This section is the lengthiest and most involved, but it also contains all the moves that appear to be important. Of the remaining sections, Section 3 explains the principle: 'of what is, all that can be said is: *it is,'* Section 4 deals briefly with the remaining cosmology of "The Way of Truth," and Section 5 considers the question whether Parmenides himself believed the fantastic conclusions of his argument. There is a short postscript on a point of methodology." (pp. 111-112)

21. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1998. *The Beginning of Philosophy*. New York: Continuum.
See chapter 9: *Parmenides and the Opinions of Mortals* pp. 94-106 and chapter 10: *Parmenides on Being,* pp. 107-125.
"The last line of the second fragment says that it is not possible to formulate that which is not (7) (*me eon*), for this can neither be investigated nor communicated.
It is possible that the third fragment forms the continuation of this text: *to gar auto noein estin to kai einai*. (8) In the meantime, Agostino Marsoner has convinced me that fragment 3 is not a Parmenides quotation at all but a formulation stemming from Plato himself, which I believe I have correctly interpreted and which Clement of Alexandria has ascribed to Parmenides. In order to interpret this fragment, we must confirm that *estin* does not serve here as a copula but instead means existence (9) and, in fact, not just in the sense that something is there but also in the characteristic classical Greek sense that it is possible, that it has the power to be. Here, of course, "that it is possible" includes that it is. Secondly, we must be clear about what is meant by "the same" *(to auto*). Since this expression stands at the beginning of the text, it is generally understood as the main point and therefore as the subject. On the contrary, in Parmenides "the same" is always a predicate, hence that which is stated of something. Admittedly, it can also stand as the main point of a sentence, but not in the function of the subject, about which something is stated, but in the function of the predicate that is stated of something. This something in the sentence analyzed here is the relationship

between "*estin noein*" and *"estin einai*," between "[is] perceiving/thinking" and "[is] being." These two are the same, or, better yet: the two are bound together by an indissoluble unity. (Furthermore, it should be added that the article "*to*" does not refer to "*einai*" but to "*auto*." In the sixth century, an article was not yet placed in front of a verb. In Parmenides' didactic poem, where the necessity arises of expressing what we render with the infinitive of a verb together with a preceding article, a different construction is used.

This interpretation, the one I am proposing for the third fragment, was, as I recall, the object of a dispute with Heidegger. He disagreed altogether with my view of the evident meaning of the poem. I can well understand why Heidegger wanted to hold onto the idea that Parmenides' main theme was identity (*to auto*). In Heidegger's eyes, this would have meant that Parmenides himself would have gone beyond every metaphysical way of seeing and would thereby have anticipated a thesis that is later interpreted metaphysically in Western philosophy and has only come into its own in Heidegger's philosophy. Nevertheless, in his last essays Heidegger himself realized that this was an error and that his thesis that Parmenides had to some extent anticipated his own philosophy could not be maintained." (pp. 110-111)

(7) *das Nichtseiende*.

(8) 'For the same thing exists [or, is there) for thinking and for being' (Gadamer will argue against this reading; see below); alternatively, "For thinking and being are the same."

(9) *Existenz*.

22. Galgano, Nicola Stefano. 2016. "Amēkhaníē in Parmenides DK 28 B 6.5." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* no. 10:1-12. Abstract: "The paper examines closer the notion expressed by the word *amēkhaníē* in DK 6.5. In his analysis of problematic of knowledge Parmenides alerts about *amekhaníē* of mortals, a word generally translated with 'lack of resources' or 'perplexity', a kind of problem that drives the thinking astray. Scholars point out in many passages of the poem the opposition between imperfect mortals and the

eidóta phōta of DK 1.3, the wise man. However, as much as I know, nobody noticed that, if mortals have a lack of resources, the goddess is teaching exactly how to fix it with a kind of method given through her precepts, which are an authentic *mēchané*. The paper shows that this is the genuine didactic aim of Parmenides, as he says in 1.28-30, i.e., to point out where is the error of mortals and how the wise man fixes it. Starting from a reinterpretation of 1.29 and following with the analysis of fr. 6, the paper shows that the method of fr. 2 is indeed the mēchané that can do that. Although the word is not present in the poem, it is one of its main topics. It seems (by the extant fragments) Parmenides had no clear word to call his *mēchané*, a psychological cognitive tool we call today principle of non-contradiction."

23. ———. 2017. "Parmenides as Psychologist - Part One: Fragment DK 1 and 2." *Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental* no. 19:167-205.
"The aim of this essay is to examine an aspect of Parmenides' poem which is often overlooked: the psychological grounds Parmenides uses to construct his view. While it is widely recognized by scholars that following Parmenides' view requires addressing mental activity, i.e. both the possibility of thinking the truth, as well as thinking along the wrong path that mortals follow, a closer examination of the psychological assumptions involved have, to my knowledge, not yet been attempted.
I argue that by identifying and analyzing the psychological vocabulary in his poem, it is revealed that Parmenides was a keen observer of human mental behavior. Through these psychological (perhaps “cognitivist,” following some recent categories) observations of thought processes, Parmenides gains insight into the structure of thought itself. The outcome of this inquiry reveals three notable conclusions:
First, the poem contains a remarkably extensive use of strictly psychological vocabulary.
Second, the presence of this psychological material and the lack of scholarly attention to it means there is a significant aspect of Parmenides intellectual legacy that remains unexplored — Parmenides as psychologist, keen observer of

human mental behavior. Furthermore, the recognition of this material helps shed important light on Parmenides' philosophical message.
Ultimately, I intend to provide an exhaustive treatment of Parmenides' psychological language, which requires close examination of DK B 1, 2, 6, and 7. Due to spatial constraints, I have divided the inquiry into two parts, and will only address DK 1-2 below." (pp. 167-168)

24. ———. 2017. "Parmenides as Psychologist - Part Two: Fragment DK 6 and 7." *Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental* no. 20:39-76.
For the abstract, see part One.

25. Gallop, David. 1979. "'Is or 'Is Not'?" *The Monist* no. 62:61-80.
"In this article I reopen some basic problems in the interpretation of Parmenides' 'Way of Truth' familiar to anyone who has wrestled with his poem. The hub of my discussion is fr. B2, in which the goddess formulates two 'routes of inquiry', an affirmative one — 'is', and a negative one — 'is not'. The former she commends, while the latter she rejects as 'wholly unlearnable', on the ground that 'thou couldst not know what is not, nor couldst thou point it out' (B2.7-8). What is the meaning of 'is' and 'is not' in these two routes? Is it existential, predicative, or veridical? Or should we suppose a fused notion of 'being', in which various uses of the verb εἶναι are somehow combined? These questions are clearly fundamental for determining the nature of the two routes, upon which everything else in the Way of Truth depends. The answer that I wish to defend is the classical interpretation of 'is' as existential. This reading of it, adopted by Professor G. E. L. Owen in his influential study, 'Eleatic Questions', (2) remains preferable, in my view, to various alternatives that have been canvassed before and since his article appeared. I shall therefore first review and criticize those alternatives. I shall then reconstruct the argument of B2-3 and B6.1-2, putting forward a modified version of Owen's account. Finally, I shall defend this version against its rivals by considering Parmenides' disproof of coming-to-be and perishing in B8.6-21." (p. 61)

(2) *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 10 (1960), 84-102.

26. Gemelli Marciano, Maria Laura. 2008. "Images and Experience: at the Roots of Parmenides' *Aletheia*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:21-48.

"Another argument against the thesis that the proem is to be interpreted as an ecstatic journey lies in its connection with the rest of the poem. Kingsley 2003 has recently solved this problem, too, by linking the ecstatic experience of the proem with the goddess' teaching in the central Aletheia section of the poem so as to produce a single, coherent picture (see Gemelli Marciano 2006b [Review of Kingsley 2003 in *Gnomon* 78: 657-671]). Parmenides' poem is, for Kingsley, neither a purely literary 'didactic' text nor a purely philosophical one. It is an esoteric poem that describes a mystical experience and above all aims through the power of language to induce this same experience in its listeners.

In what follows I develop this approach further and show that if Parmenides' poem is interpreted in this way his enigmatic language, his curious images, and also his so-called logical arguments take on a new meaning.(14) Parmenides' language is performative (it accomplishes what it says). 'Alienation' and 'binding, are the most powerful means to remove listeners from the ordinary, everyday dimension and way of thinking and put them into a different state of consciousness.

Images, repetitions, sequences of words and sounds, supposedly 'logical' arguments all contribute to this end and have a particular meaning and function that surpass conventional human language and ordinary syntactical and semantic relationships.

Here I will draw attention especially to the proem and to fragments 2 and 8. I refer to Kingsley 2002 and 2003 for treatment of the other fragments and the problems relating to them." (pp. 26-27; note 15 omitted)

(14) I formulated some of the observations contained in this article, concerning the divine epiphanies in the proem and the images in fr. DK 28B8, some years ago independently of Kingsley 1999 and 2003, while preparing my forthcoming edition of the Presocratics (Gemelli Marciano 2008 [*Die*

Vorsokratiker. Band II: *Parmenides, Zenon, Empedokles*. Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler.]). However, in Kingsley's books I have found the answers to questions and textual problems that have enabled me to organize my earlier unsystematic intuitions into a coherent picture.

27. Gershenson, Daniel E., and Greeberg, Daniel A. 1962. "Aristotle confronts the Eleatics: two arguments on 'the One'." *Phronesis* no. 7:137-151.
"In our review of Aristotle's two arguments against the Eleatics we have pointed out several features which mark off one from the other. The two sections are different primarily in the point of view from which each proceeds, and in the terminology each employs. Further evidence for the independence of the two passages is the following: [*Physics*] lines 186A34- 186B1 repeat in Eleatic jargon what lines 185A27-32 say in common Aristotelian parlance, namely, that if being is an attribute, then the subject will not be; lines 186B1 2-13 repeat the argument in lines 185A32-185B5, that if being is a magnitude, it will no longer be one, because all magnitudes are continua, and all continua by definition are divisible; lines 185B25-1 86A3 present a historical survey of Eleatic thought similar to that in lines 187A1-10, although the two passages accentuate different aspects of its later development. The evidence taken together makes it clear that we are dealing here with two independent written accounts of two separate Aristotelian attacks against Parmenides and the Eleatics. One need only compare the second argument, where the competence of the Eleatics as philosophers is not denied, and where, indeed, the fact that Aristotle carries on a dialogue with them lends them a certain respectability, with the first argument, where he spares the Eleatics no abuse and evinces contempt for their reputation as physicists and logicians, to see that this is so. Each account displays within itself a coherent organization and a consistent point of view. The two together make up Aristotle's main case against Eleatic philosophy." (pp. 150-151; notes omitted)
28. Giancola, Donna. 2001. "Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of Parmenides' B3." *Journal of*

Philosophical Research no. 26:635-653.
Abstract: "It is generally agreed that Parmenides' fragment B3 posits some type of relation between "thinking" and "Being." I critically examine the modern interpretations of this relation. Beginning with the ancient sources and proceeding into modern times, I try to show that the modern rationalist reading of fragment B3 conflicts with its grammatical syntax and the context of the poem as a whole. In my critique, I suggest that rather than a statement about epistemological relations, it is, as it was originally understood, a religious assertion of metaphysical identity."

29. Girle, Roderic A. 2007. "Parmenides Demythologised." *Logique et Analyse* no. 199:253-268.
"The impression is often given that the metaphysics of Parmenides is absurd.
This impression is often reinforced with a warning that if philosophers resort to an "extreme" view then they are bound to finish with an absurd view, "like Parmenides". But all this is far too swift. I will argue that there is a way of looking at Parmenides which brings his views very much into line with the views of a substantial number of modern philosophers who are not taken to be putting forward absurd views. They might be somewhat discomforted to be grouped with Parmenides, but if they are, then that in itself should give cause to pause and consider both the issue of Parmenides' alleged absurdity and to what extent they have inherited Parmenides' problems.
So let us first reprise the views of Parmenides. Then we consider some modern doctrines which have consequences of a quite Parmenidean kind.
This will lead us to considering a contrast in the Philosophy of Time of considerable interest to Prior." (p. 253)

30. Glowienka, Emerine. 1988. "Exorcising the Ghost of Parmenides." *Southwest Philosophical Studies* no. 10:37-47.
"Yet this paper is not an attempt to offer a scholarly .analysis of Parmenides' own metaphysics; rather, it is a chronology and analysis of the subsequent history of some metaphysicians in dealing with this legacy bequeathed to them by Parmenides. This legacy, which I am calling the

"ghost of Parmenides," is the confusion of our concept of "absolute being" ("abstract being") with, and/or the disengagement of this concept from, the objects of our experience. You doubtless recognize this confusion as a move from the mental to the extra-mental, which has been also named the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" according to Whitehead.(3) For to equate being with unity is really only to describe what a concept of being must be in order for it to be intelligible to human understanding; it does not describe being as found outside that concept." (p. 37)
(3) Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1967) 51.

31. Goldin, Owen. 1993. "Parmenides on Possibility and Thought." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 26:19-35.
"Given the evidence and the nature of Parmenides' writing, it seems that Mourelatos (1979,5) is right in his suggestion that it is time for a 'tolerant pluralism' in Parmenidean scholarship. But if a definitive interpretation is beyond our reach, we may yet make progress in understanding what is to be gained or lost in the depth, cogency, and clarity of our interpretation of the whole poem when we interpret a line or an argument in one manner rather than another.
For this reason, I do not here defend a complete interpretation of what remains of Parmenides' poem. In most important respects I pursue the interpretive path taken by G.E.L. Owen ([*Eleatic Questions*, reprinted in] 1987a) in his highly influential interpretation of the poem. But I take issue with Owen's claim that Parmenides' argument for the existence of any object of reference or thought rests on fallacious modal logic. I also take issue with the view of Tugwell (1964) that Parmenides' argument rests on a naive and philosophically unsatisfactory blurring of the distinction between the potential and existential uses of εἶναι. I suggest that Parmenides' argument for the being of the object of thought and speech takes a different course. On my view, Parmenides explicitly denies that there are unreal but possible things or states of affairs, on the grounds that

possible beings can be understood only as beings and hence as real. Since any object of thought or speech is a possible thing or state of affairs, any object of thought or speech is. On my view, Parmenides thus draws attention to what has come to be a perennial metaphysical problem: what status is to be given to possible beings?" (p. 19)

32. Graeser, Andreas. 2000. "Parmenides in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* no. 5:1-14.
Abstract: "This essay examines the role of Parmenides in Plato's dialogue of the same name.
Over against the widely held view that this literary figure exemplifies the philosopher par excellence of an all-encompassing systematic of Eleatic provenience, it is maintained that Parmenides represents a particular frame of mind about certain philosophical matters, namely one which regards forms in a reified manner. It is suggested that by means of the literary figure of Parmenides, Plato is addressing in his dialogue inner-Academic debates about the theory of forms, especially Speusippus' conception of Unity, which betrays a kind of naive metaphysics of things, as can be seen especially in the first three deductions of the second half of the dialogue."
33. Graham, Daniel W. 1999. "Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides." In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 159-180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"There is no question that Parmenides' poem was a watershed in the history of early Greek philosophy. No serious thinker could ignore his work. And yet it seems to pose insuperable problems for cosmology and scientific inquiry. The first generation to follow Parmenides includes thinkers who wished to continue the tradition of Ionian speculation. But how would they confront Parmenides? What would they make of him and what effect would his arguments have on their work? The first neo-Ionians(1), as they have been called, were Empedocles and Anaxagoras.(2) Despite some salient differences, the two philosophers have much in common in their approach. They

are near contemporaries,3 and as we shall see, they make similar moves in their approach to scientific speculation. Let us first examine
the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and then discuss their responses to Parmenides." (p. 159)
(1) 1 The term is from Barnes [*The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. [1st ed. 1979 in 2 vols.] (London, 1982)] ch. 15, who stresses the continuity of their project with that of early Ionian philosophers. The term aptly allows us to class philosophers of Italy and Sicily, such as Philolaus and Empedocles, with later philosophers from Ionia such as Anaxagoras.
(2) These two philosophers seem to have been active about a generation earlier than Philolaus, Archelaus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Leucippus, and perhaps a couple of generations earlier than Democritus.

34. ———. 2002. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 27-44. Aldershot: Ashgate.
"The two most philosophical Presocratics propound the two most radically different philosophies: Heraclitus the philosopher of flux and Parmenides the philosopher of changelessness. Clearly they occupy opposite extremes of the philosophical spectrum. But what is their historical relation? For systematic reasons, Hegel held that Parmenides preceded Heraclitus. But in a footnote of an article published in 1850, Jacob Bernays noticed that in the passage we now know as DK 28 B 6 Parmenides could be seen as criticizing Heraclitus.(*) Bernays' insight had already been widely recognized as the key to the historical relationship between the two philosophers when Alois Patin strongly advocated the Bernays view in a monograph published in 1899. But in 1916 Karl Reinhardt reasserted the view that Heraclitus was reacting to Parmenides. Others argued that no connection. was provable. The Reinhardt view was never popular, while the Bernays-Patin view gradually came to be widely accepted. Twenty-five years ago Michael C. Stokes (*One and many in Presocratic*

philosophy, 1971) launched a devastating attack on the view that Parmenides was replying to Heraclitus. That attack has never been answered and the Bernays-Patin thesis at present remains undefended.
In this chapter I wish to argue that the Bernays-Patin thesis is true after all. And in the process of defending it, I hope to show that accepting the thesis has some value for understanding Parmenides beyond the external question of his relation to Heraclitus. Minimally, appreciating Heraclitus' influence on Parmenides will help us understand Parmenides' argument better; but beyond that, it may help us put the whole course of early Greek philosophy in perspective. I shall first review the evidence for a connection between the philosophers (section I), then analyze the evidence for a connection (II), consider the role of historical influences in philosophical exegesis (III), and finally try to reconstruct Parmenides' dialectical opponent from his argument (IV)." (p. 27 notes omitted)
(*) In his *Kleine Schriften* (1885), vol. 1, pp. 62-3, n. 1.

35. ———. 2006. *Explaining the Cosmos. The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 6: *Parmenides' Criticism of Ionian Philosophy,* pp. 148-185.
"What connection, if any, there is between Heraclitus and Parmenides has long been disputed(1). Of the four a priori possibilities: (a) that Parmenides influenced Heraclitus, (b) that Heraclitus influenced Parmenides, (c) that the two did not know or acknowledge each other, and (d) that they are influenced by a common source, only (b) and (c) seem likely. For, contra (a), Heraclitus likes to abuse his predecessors(2), and, contra (d), he tends to radically rework the material he inherits(3). There have been, and continue to be, proponents of both (b) and (c).(4) While it seems attractive in some ways to dodge the question and thus deal only with textual certainties rather than historical contingencies, I believe that textual evidence is adequate to decide the question in favor of (b), and, moreover, to help determine the philosophical relationship between the two

most philosophical Presocratics—and the two most ideologically opposed." (p. 148)

(1) The argument in this section is drawn from a longer study (Graham 2002a). The results are disputed by Nehamas 2002.

(2) Heraclitus B40, B42, B57, B81a, B106, B129. “Dieses bleiben die Ecksteine der Geschichte der Vorsokratiker: Heraklit zitiert und bekämpft Pythagoras, Xenophanes und Hekataios, nicht Parmenides; dieser zitiert und bekämpft Heraklit” (Kranz 1916, 1174).

(3) E.g., he is at pains to deny the possibility of cosmogony at B30, the one doctrine common to all his philosophical forebears.

(4) Arguments for (a) start with Hegel 1971, 319ff., followed by Zeller, and revived by Reinhardt 1916; this view has mostly been abandoned, but see Hölscher 1968, 161–65. The argument for (b) was first made by Bernays 1885, 1: 2.62, n. 1, and defended vigorously by Patin 1899; this view was accepted by Baeumker 1890, 54; Windelband 1894, 39, n. 2; Diels 1897, 68ff.; Ueberweg 1920, 1st Part: 95, 97, 99; Kranz 1916, 1934; Burnet 1930, 179-80, 183-84; Calogero 1977, 44-45; Cherniss 1935, 382–83; Vlastos 1955a, 341, n. 11, KR (tentatively) 183, 264, 272, Guthrie 1962-1981, 2.23–24; Tarán 1965; Coxon 1986; Giannantoni 1988, 218-20, and others. Diels 1897, 68, says of Bernays: “[S]eine Ansicht is fast allgemein durchgedrungen,” noting that only Zeller has resisted the interpretation; but in his revised edition of Zeller, 1919–1920, 684, n. 1, and 687, n. 1, Nestle abandons Zeller’s view as obsolete. For (c) are Gigon 1935, 31-34; Verdenius 1942; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1959, 2.208-9; Mansfeld 1964, ch. 11; Marcovich 1965, col. 249; Stokes 1971, 111-27.

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KR = Kirk, G. S., and J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
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36. ———. 2013. *Science before Socrates: Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and the New Astronomy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 3: *Borrowed Light: The Insights of Parmenides*, pp. 85-108.
"We began by asking a series of questions about early Greek astronomy:
1. Who discovered the theories in question first?
2. What led him to this discovery?
3. Did the two philosophers (Anaxagoras and Empedocles) have good evidence for the theories?
4. Did the community of philosophers accept the theories?
5. Did they develop the theory on their own, or did they borrow it from another source (Thales, Pythagoras, the Babylonians)?

We have at present provided at least a partial answer to two of these questions. The remarkable chain of events that began theoretical astronomy as we know probably started with the recognition of heliophotism.
This theory, or insight, derives, as far as we can tell, from Parmenides of Elea, who, writing in the early fifth century, saw that the moon's phases could be explained on the basis of the moon's position relative to the sun, supposing that the sun was the moon's source of light-just as, perhaps, it is for clouds. It is plausible to suppose that Parmenides came to this insight by himself, unaided by earlier speculations on the moon, which were unhelpful, or Babylonian data and theories, which were most likely unknown to him, and which did not, in any case, derive the moon's light from the sun. The supposition that he had a Pythagorean informant seems gratuitous.
Thus in answer to question (2): Parmenides paved the way. In partial answer to question (5): Parmenides seems to be original in his contribution to the beginnings of astronomy. As to the further development of the theory of eclipses, there is no record that Parmenides had anything to say about eclipses, even if both his predecessors and his successors did. The students of astronomy and doxographers who canvassed early studies for new theories seem to have found nothing on this topic from Parmenides. We can say in answer to (1) that Parmenides (and not either Anaxagoras or Empedocles) discovered the source of the moon's light; as to the explanation of eclipses, question (1) must remain open, as well as questions (3) and (4). Moreover, we will have to see what role Parmenides' insights played in the further development of early Greek astronomy. What difference does it make to know that the moon gets its light from the sun?" (pp. 107-108)

37. Granger, Herbert. 2002. "The Cosmology of Mortals." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 101-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.
"But why could not Parmenides take up a position of the sort his successors among the pluralists adopt(49) and

introduce Light and Night as primal, eternal entities, each fully real, different and underived from one another, without their being just a denser or more rarefied version of something more fundamental? This is impossible for Parmenides and the goddess as long as they take the word 'being' to be a univocal predicate and to be what expresses the very nature of its subject. Parmenides' successors can conceive of Being as coming in a variety of forms, but not because they take 'being' to be equivocal or believe it to be something other than a qualitative term. On these points they would be in fundamental agreement with Parmenides and the goddess. Plausibly it may be argued that the pluralists who follow Parmenides are in a position to recognize the possibility of a qualitative heterogeneity within an existential homogeneity, because they take 'being' to be more like a generic than a specific term in its descriptive role, and thus they may take Being to be more like a determinable than a determinate in its nature. This would then put them in a position to maintain that Being may come in a variety of different sorts within a single conception of what it is to be.

The pathway to a cosmology of the post-Parmenidean sort is closed to the goddess and her disciple Parmenides. The goddess holds out no hope for any sort of cosmology, and she is in no position to appreciate or to anticipate the pluralism of the successors of Parmenides. The goddess should be taken, then, at her word when she warns that the order of her words on mortal opinions is deceptive. The cosmology of mortals is nothing more than a deception, which deceives by giving the appearance of reality without yielding its substance, and there is no reason to search for something more than mere deception in the deceptive words of the goddess upon the cosmos." (pp. 114-115)

(49) For example, Anaxagoras (B 5, B 17); Empedocles (B 17.27-35, B 6, B 8, B 9). On both of them, see Aristotle, *Ph.* 1.4, 187a22-b7. It is commonly held that Parmenides' successors presume a plurality without any argument. For example, Malcolm observes this of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, ["On avoiding the void", *Oxford Studies in*

Ancient Philosophy, 9, 75-94] 1991, pp. 92-3, and Curd of the atomists as well, [*Parmenidean monism*] 1991, p. 261, and Curd [*The Legacy of Parmenides*], 1998, pp. 64-5, 129-31. Curd takes their lack of an argument to indicate that none was needed because Parmenides did not deny a plurality, since he was not a 'numerical monist' who held that a single entity constitutes reality. Curd charges that Parmenides' successors would have been remiss in their philosophical duty if they had presumed a plurality in the face of any argument by Parmenides against it. Yet even if the successors of Parmenides offered no argument for plurality, this need not indicate that Parmenides did not argue against plurality and that his successors in their presumption of plurality were not philosophically responsible. Parmenides' successors may have understood their charge to be the development of a compromise between the demands of his argument and those of common sense, in which the demands of these two extremes must be satisfied as much as possible without any hope that all of them would receive satisfaction.

38. ———. 2008. "The Proem of Parmenides' Poem." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:1-20.
"The paper defends the view that the Proem of Parmenides' poem is a secular allegory. At the allegory's center is the unnamed goddess who in the body of the poem instructs the unnamed youth, through her use of a priori argumentation, about the nature of reality. The goddess provides the very symbol for a priori reason, and a central feature of Parmenides' expression of this symbolic value for the goddess is his confused presentation of her in the Proem. His presentation is intentionally vague, and it defies any definitive interpretation that clearly identifies the classification of the goddess and her circumstances within traditional or unconventional Greek religious belief. Instead, she recalls in an confusing fashion traditional revelatory goddesses, of whom the Muses and cult goddesses provide paradigm instances. Hence the youth's journey in the Proem to the unnamed goddess leads to no clearly identifiable circumstances, yet what it arrives at is

still bound up within the medium of the standard epic style. Parmenides uses the old idea of the revelatory goddess in this unexpected way to try to show how it harbors something like the exercise of a priori reason. The reflection of the a priori does not reside merely in the similarity that the Muses bestow knowledge, which lies beyond the limited powers of human observation, about past, present, and future. The similarity is stronger and more significant when the Muses grant knowledge that lies beyond their own powers of observation in the form of insights into events they could not have possibly witnessed, such as the birth of the gods. Parmenides picks his unnamed goddess for his symbol for a priori reason because he takes himself to be demythologizing the philosophical truth reflected in a distorted fashion within the tradition of divine revelation. By placing a priori reason in the garb of the revelatory goddess who appears in a puzzling form, Parmenides indicates to his audience that this use of the power of reason has its antecedents in traditional practices that did not recognize this power for its true nature. There is a value in the tradition of divine revelation, which transcends the fictions of the poets in their story-telling, but revelatory deities must now step aside for the clear expression of the power of a priori reason. Hence the goddess abdicates her authority when she demands that the youth judge her words by his logos. Parmenides' verse conforms with his symbolic use of the goddess. It helps him mark his difference from his competitors among the new intellectuals, the so-called `natural philosophers', who generally favor prose over verse. These intellectuals abandoned the Muses and their gift of verse, and they aspire to cosmologies that depend for their justification upon observation and inductive arguments that appeal to analogies and inferences to the best explanation. Verse as the medium of the Muses allows Parmenides to stress in a literary fashion how he adheres to a mode of thinking that does not rely upon the power of observation for the truth." (p. 1)

39. ———. 2010. "Parmenides of Elea: rationalist or dogmatist?" *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:15-38.

"Parmenides of Elea is often lauded as a major figure of Western philosophy because he is the first to give an extensive role in his speculation to a priori argumentation. In his poem we find for the first time in history sustained rational argumentation for the establishment of a complex metaphysical doctrine. Parmenides does not merely dictate to his audience a set of doctrines about reality, but, instead, undertakes to support his doctrines by means of logical inferences based on premises that have some claim to plausibility or self-evidence or a priori justification. This evaluation of PParmenides'accomplishment is not without its detractors, however. Kingsley has mounted a vigorous challenge to the presumption that Parmenides relies on argument for his opinions about reality, and recently Gemelli Marciano has significantly buttressed Kingsley's case by furthering his ideas in her detailed comments on Parmenides' poem. Kingsley and Gemelli Marciano maintain that Parmenides is a dogmatic mystic who depends for his dogmas entirely upon what he learns from divine revelation and that he makes no serious effort 10 defend his mystical beliefs by genuine argumentation.
In fact, reasoned argument not only cannot discover the truth, it provides an impediment that muse be transcended or suppressed." (p. 15; notes omitted)

40. Gregory, Andrew. 2014. "Parmenides, Cosmology and Sufficient Reason." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 47:16-47.
Abstract: Why Parmenides had a cosmology is a perennial puzzle, if, as the ‘truth' part of his poem appears to claim, what exists is one, undifferentiated, timeless and unchanging.1 Indeed, not only does the cosmological part of the poem tell us how the cosmos is arranged, it also tells us how the cosmos, humans and animals all came into being. Although more of the truth has survived, the cosmology originally made up some 2/3 to 3/4 of the poem. The poem claims it will give the ‘complete ordering' and Parmenides is perceived to have ‘completed all the phenomena'.3 Parmenides also seems to have made some important original contributions to cosmology. These I take to be

important facts which any explanation of the nature of this cosmology must account for. The aim of this paper is to explore a new suggestion for the status of the cosmology, that it may be equalled but not surpassed by other cosmologies which are capable of accounting for all of the phenomena. Its function, I argue, is to raise sufficient reason issues about some fundamental questions in cosmogony and cosmology. I will also argue that we can find sufficient reason considerations relating to cosmogony and cosmology in the truth part of the poem. This opens the possibility that it is at least in part issues of sufficient reason that link the two parts of the poem. Finally I will argue that by paying close attention to what Parmenides has to say about signs, σήματα, we can see how he leaves open the possibility of making positive contributions to cosmology.

I believe this gives us a richer account of Parmenides, places him more firmly in the debates of presocratic cosmology and cosmogony and gives him interesting relations to his predecessors and successors. These sufficient reason considerations may work both as a critique of contemporary cosmogony and cosmology and a challenge to any future cosmogony and cosmology. (pp. 16-17; notes omitted)

41. Groarke, Leo. 1985. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe." *Dialogue* no. 24:535-541.

"In his recent collection of Parmenides' fragments,(1) David Gallop joins a number of commentators (among them, Tarán(2) and Stokes(3)) who argue against the view that fragment 8 contains a commitment to a reality which is "timeless" or "atemporal". His arguments seem to me convincing if one adopts Owen's view(4) that timelessness is a result of indistinguishable phases of existence. Gallop's arguments could decide the issue if this was, as Tarán suggests, "the only reason to maintain that Being is a non-temporal entity".(5) There is, however, an alternative way to defend the atemporal interpretation, though it has not been elaborated in any detail.(6) If I am not mistaken, it can elude Gallop's criticisms and provide a more plausible account of Parmenides' philosophy.(7)"

(1) Parmenides of Elea, *Fragments*, a Text and Translation with an Introduction by David Gallop (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 13-16. For good reason, the book is sure to become the standard reference for years to come.
(2) Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 175-181.
(3) Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1971), 127-137.
(4) See G. E. L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", in A. P. D. Mourelatos. ed. *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1974). I cannot discuss Owen's views in detail here.
(5) Tarán, *Parmenides*. 181.
(6) For interpretations of Parmenides' similar to the one that I suggest, see the following: W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 29: Felix M. Cleve, *The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct their Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1965), 531; and Peter Geach, *Providence and Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 53-54. None of these authors develops a detailed interpretation.
(7) The question of Parmenides' view of time (exemplified by disputes over fragment 8.5) is a thorny one. In G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (2nd ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Schofield writes, for
example, that "Probably what Parmenides means to ascribe to what is is existence in an eternal present not subject to temporal distinctions of any sort. It is very unclear how he hoped to ground this conclusion in the arguments of [fragment 8]... ." If the account
I suggest is correct, this conclusion is neither surprising nor difficult to understand.

42. ———. 1987. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe, Again." *Dialogue* no. 26:549-552.

"In a recent discussion note,(1) Mohan Matthen criticizes my claim that Parmenides is committed to an atemporal reality. I shall argue that his critique misrepresents by views , misunderstands Parmenides , and is founded on a capricious view of h1stoncal interpretation."
(...)
"The key to my account is the suggestion that Parmenides rejection of what does not exist entails the rejection of the past and future, for they do not exist (because the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist). This is, I think, the most plausible interpretation of Parmenides claim that what is "neither was ... once nor will be, since it is now" (8.5, cf. my previous discussion of 8.19-20). It follows that sentences cannot meaningfully refer to the past and future, for we cannot refer to what is not (8.8)."
(1) Mohan Matthen, "A Note on Parmenides' Denial of Past and Future ", *Dialogue* 25/3 (1986), 553-557.

43. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1965. *A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
See the First Chapter: *The Eleatics. Parmenides* - pp. 1-79.
"Presocratic philosophy is divided into two halves by the name of Parmenides. His exceptional powers of reasoning brought speculation about the origin and constitution of the universe to a halt, and caused it to make a fresh start on different lines. Consequently his chronological position relative to other early philosophers is comparatively easy to determine. Whether or not he directly attacked Heraclitus, (1) had Heraclitus known of Parmenides it is incredible that he would not have denounced him along with Xenophanes and others. Even if ignorance of an Elean on the part of an Ephesian is no sure evidence of date, philosophically Heraclitus must be regarded as pre-Parmenidean, whereas Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus are equally certainly post-Parmenidean." (p. 1)
(1) See vol. 1, 408 n. 2 and pp. 23 ff., 32 below.
"The poem of Parmenides raises peculiar problems, and it will be as well to approach the text with the chief of these

already in mind. In the prologue he receives from a goddess the promise that she will reveal to him two sorts of information: first the truth about reality, then the opinions of mortals, which are unambiguously said to be false. 'Nevertheless these too shall thou learn' (fr. 1.31). In conformity with this, the first part of the poem deduces the nature of reality from premises asserted to be wholly true, and leads among other things to the conclusion that the world as perceived by the senses is unreal. At this point (fr. 8.50) the goddess solemnly declares that she ceases to speak the truth, and the remainder of the instruction will be 'deceitful'; yet she will impart it all 'that no judgment of men may outstrip thee'. Then follows the second part of the poem consisting of a cosmology on traditional lines. Starting from the assumption of a pair of opposites, 'fire' and 'night' or light and darkness, it proceeds as a narrative of an evolutionary process in time. The 'true way', on the other hand, had asserted that reality was, and must be, a unity in the strictest sense and that any change in it was impossible: there is no before or after, and the exposition unfolds as a timeless series of logical deductions.

Here is the crux. Why should Parmenides take the trouble to narrate a detailed cosmogony when he has already proved that opposites cannot exist and there can be no cosmogony because plurality and change are inadmissible conceptions? Has it in his eyes no merit or validity whatsoever, so that his purpose in composing it is only to show it up, together with all such attempts at cosmogony, for the hollow shams that they are? If so, the further question arises: what is it? Some have thought it to be based on a particular cosmic system of which he disapproved, for instance that of Heraclitus or the Pythagoreans. Others have suggested, following up the goddess's own words about the 'opinions of mortals' in general, that it is partly or wholly intended as a synthesis of what the ordinary man believed about the world; others again that it is an original production, indeed the best that Parmenides could devise, but still intended to show that even the most plausible account of the origin and nature of the sensible world is utterly false. These critics point to the

motive expressed by the goddess, 'that no judgment of mortals may outstrip (or get the better of) thee'.
An alternative is to suppose that Parmenides is doing his best for the sensible world, perhaps on practical grounds, by giving as coherent an account of it as he can, saying in effect: I have told you the truth, so that if I go on to speak about the world in which we apparently live you will know it is unreal and not be taken in. But after all, this is how it does appear to us; however misleading our senses may be, we must eat and drink and talk, avoid putting our hand in the fire or falling over a precipice, live in short as if their information were genuine. Being ourselves mortals we must come to terms with this deceitful show, and I can at least help you to understand it better than other people.
These are the most baffling problems which Parmenides presents: the nature of the 'Way of Seeming' and the relation between it and the 'Way of Truth'. Yet the essence of his remarkable achievement lies, as might be expected, within the Way of Truth itself. " (pp. 4-6)

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"Conclusions.
Parmenides seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of generation (and hence change) dilemmatically: on the one hand the notion of caused generation turns out to be incoherent, while the supposition of uncaused generation, on the other, makes it inexplicable. Neither arm of the dilemma is successful. One cannot simply invoke PSR [Principle of Sufficient Reason] in order to rule out uncaused change, since PSR is at best an empirical hypothesis and not some Leibnizian *a priori* law of thought; (53) and a suitably sophisticated analysis of the logical form of change, one which recognizes the ambiguity of 'from' in propositions such as '*x* comes to be from y,' will dispose of Parmenides' bomb. But it needed an Aristotle to disarm it.
The basic principle involved, namely:
P1 Nothing comes to be from nothing,
is not original to Parmenides (it first occurs in a fragment of the sixth-century lyric poet Alcaeus, although we do not know in what context; (54) its early history has been ably traced by Alex Mourelatos (55) but its use in destructive

argument certainly is. P1 is ambiguous between the causal principle
P1a Nothing comes to be causelessly,
and the conservation principle
P1b Nothing comes to be except from pre-existing matter;
and that ambiguity is not always patent. Indeed, distinguishing (P1a) from (P1b) is the first step towards solving the Eleatic puzzle, as Aristotle (certainly: *Ph. I.7,* 190a14-31; cf. *Metaph.* V.24; *GA* 1.18, 724a20-34) and Plato (possibly: *Phd.* 103b) realized. Moreover, as Hume was to show, neither version can be accepted as an *a priori* truth: both the causal principle and the conservation principle (at any rate crudely interpreted as asserting the conservation of matter) are rejected by the standard interpretation of quantum physics; and whatever else may be true of quantum physics, it is not logically incoherent." (p. 80)
(53) Cf. Leibniz, *Monadology* §32; on the status of the principle, see Kant, *Prolegomena* §4.
(54) Alcaeus, fr. 76 Bergk; Mourelatos 1981 [*Pre-socratics Origins of the Principle that there are No Origins of Nothing*, (*Journal of Philosophy*, 78, 1981, pp. 649-665] pp. 132-3 discusses this text.
(55) Mourelatos, 1981.

2. Havelock, Eric A. 1958. "Parmenides and Odysseus." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 63:133-143.
"It is commonly supposed that Parmenides' statement of his philosophical principles is preceded by a "proem" of an allegorical nature (the precise symbolism of the allegory being in dispute) which describes the philosopher's inspired journey from darkness to light.
(...)
The first question to ask is whether it is proper to identify such a "proem" at all, as a separate entity in the poem. Would the author himself have recognized it as such?
(...)
If, however, the motive in Sextus for first identifying and then explaining this allegory in Parmenides was itself unhistorical, modern criticism has two resources with which to correct him. It can supply a better interpretation of the

"proem"; or it can conclude that the original identification of the " proem" as such was a mistake. It is in part to this more radical view that the present article addresses itself." (p. 133)
(...)
"The foreground of Parmenides' imagination is occupied by Circe on Aeaea and the nymphs on Thrinacia all of them daughters of the sun. The latter he has converted from herdsmen into outriders, perhaps assisted therein by the common image of the sun's chariot. Both Teiresias and Circe forewarned him concerning Thrinacia, the sun's island. But Circe's warning held also a hint of promise: "You will come to the isle Thrinacia where feed many herds of the sun; and there is no birth of them nor do they pass away. Their herdsmen are nymphs . . . daughters of the sun."(56) In short, the island is involved with some implication of immortality; it holds a mystery which can be approached but not violated. The centrality of this episode in the memory of the philosopher and his audience was guaranteed by the fact that Homer had selected it from among all others for dramatization in the preface(57) to his epic as central to Odysseus' experience in the *nostos*. So Parmenides remembered how on that island coming to be and perishing had been banished. This provided his climatic poetic excuse for linking the daughters of the sun with the marvels of a mental journey which had taken the traveller into an absolute, where there is no coming to be and no passing away.(58) For the philosopher, this was where the *nostos* ended. The journey of his mind and thought had reached the mansions of home.(59)" (p. 140)
(56) *Od*. 12. 130.
(57) *Od*. 1. 7-9.
(58) *Frag*. 8. 21.
(59) The Odysseus theme may persist even into the "second part" of Parmenides' poem. The Homeric hero, so Circe had told him, while his ship "bypassed" the Sirens, was to be allowed the pleasure of hearing their song (*Od*. 12. 47 and 52; cf. also 10. 109). When they sing, they admonish him that to "bypass" without listening is impossible and that to

listen is to learn of all things that happened at Troy and of "all that is born on the earth" (12. 186-190). So Odysseus listens, while the ship "bypasses" them (12. 197). Correspondingly, Parmenides comes to the end of his "reliable discourse and thought" (*Frag*. 8, line 50, equivalent to the "true" directives of Teiresias and Circe) and then allows his listener to hear a "deceitful composition of my epic tale" (*Frag*. 8, line 52), a story of how all things " are born and end" (*Frag*. 19).
This story is told so that his audience may not be "bypassed" by any mortal type of intelligence (Frag. 8, sub fin.). Is the verb *παρέλασση* which he here uses a reminiscence of the corresponding verb which Homer had used four times? If so, the philosopher's poetic memory has transposed it in application.

3. Heidegger, Martin. 1975. "'Moira' (Parmenides, fr. 8,34-41)." In *Early Greek Thinking*, edited by Krell, David Farrell and Capuzzi, Frank A., 79-101. New York: Harper & Row.
"The topic under discussion is the relation between thinking and Being. In the first place we ought to observe that the text (VIII, 34-41) which ponders this relation more thoroughly speaks of *eon* and not -- as in Fragment III -- about *einai*. Immediately, and with some justification, one concludes from this that Fragment VIII concerns beings rather than Being. But in saying *eon* Parmenides is in no way thinking "beings in themselves," understood as the whole to which thinking, insofar as it is some kind of entity, also belongs. Just as little does *eon* mean *einai* in the sense of "Being for itself," as though it were incumbent upon the thinker to set the non sensible essential nature of Being apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather *eon*, being, is thought here in its duality as Being and beings, and is participially expressed -- although the grammatical concept has not yet come explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science. This duality is at least intimated by such nuances of phrasing as "the Being of beings" and "beings in Being." In its essence, however, what unfolds is obscured more than clarified through the "in" and the "of "

These expressions are far from thinking the duality as such, or from seriously questioning its unfolding.
"Being itself," so frequently invoked, is held to be true so long as it is experienced as Being, consistently understood as the Being of beings. Meanwhile the beginning of Western thinking was fated to catch an appropriate glimpse of what the word *einai*, to be, says -- in *Physis, Logos, En*. Since the gathering that reigns within Being unites all beings, an inevitable and continually more stubborn semblance arises from the contemplation of this gathering, namely, the illusion that Being (of beings) is not only identical with the totality of beings, but that, as identical, it is at the same time that which unifies and is even most in being [*das Seiendste*]. For representational thinking everything comes to be a being.
The duality of Being and beings, as something twofold, seems to melt away into nonexistence, albeit thinking, from its Greek beginnings onward, has moved within the unfolding of this duality, though without considering its situation or at all taking note of the unfolding of the twofold. What takes place at the beginning of Western thought is the unobserved decline of the duality. But this decline is not nothing. Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a beginning, in that the lighting of the Being of beings, as a lighting, is concealed. The hiddenness of this decline of the duality reigns in essentially the same way as that into which the duality itself falls. Into what does it fall? Into oblivion, whose lasting dominance conceals itself as *Lethe* to which *Aletheia* belongs so immediately that the former can withdraw in its favor and can relinquish to it pure disclosure in the modes of *Physis, Logos*, and *En* as though this had no need of concealment.
But the apparently futile lighting is riddled with darkness. In it the unfolding of the twofold remains as concealed as its decline for beginning thought. However, we must be alert to the duality of Being and beings in the *eon* in order to follow the discussion Parmenides devotes to the relation between thinking and Being." (pp. 86-87)

4. ———. 1992. *Parmenides (Lecture course 1942-43)*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Gesamtausgabe Vol. 54. Lecture course from the winter semester 1942-43, first published in 1982; translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz.
"We are attempting to follow the path of thought of two thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Both belong, historiographically calculated, to the early period of Western thought. With regard to this early thinking in the Occident, among the Greeks, we are distinguishing between *outset* and *beginning*. Outset refers to the coming forth of this thinking at a definite "time." Thinking does not mean here the course of psychologically represented acts of thought but the historical process in which a thinker arises, says his word, and so provides to truth a place within a historical humanity. As for time, it signifies here less the point of time calculated according to year and day than it means "age," the situation of human things and man's dwelling place therein. "Outset" has to do with the debut and the emergence of thinking. But we are using "beginning" in a quite different sense. The "beginning" is what, in his early thinking, is to be thought and what is thought. Here we are still leaving unclarified the essence of this thought. But supposing that the thinking of a thinker is distinct from the knowledge of the "sciences" and from every kind of practical cognition in all respects, shell we have to say that the relation of thinking to its thought is essentially other than the relation of ordinary "technical-practical" and "moral-practical" thinking to what it thinks. Ordinary thinking, whether scientific or prescientific or unscientific, thinks beings, and does so in every case according to their individual regions, separate strata, and circumscribed aspects. This thinking is an acquaintance with beings, a knowledge that masters and dominates beings in various ways. In distinction from the mastering of beings, the thinking of thinkers is the *thinking of Being*. Their thinking is a *retreating in face of Being*. We name what is thought in the thinking of the thinkers the beginning. Which hence now means: Being is the beginning.

Nevertheless, not every thinker, who has to think Being, thinks the beginning. Not every thinker, not even every one at the outset of Western thought, is a primordial thinker, i.e., a thinker who expressly thinks the beginning. Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are the only primordial thinkers. They are this, however, not because they open up Western thought and initiate it. Already before them there were thinkers. They are primordial thinkers because they think the beginning. The beginning is what is thought in their thinking. This sounds as if "the beginning" were something like an "object" the thinkers take up for themselves in order to think it through. But we have already said in general about the thinking of thinkers that it is a retreating in face of Being. If, within truly thoughtful thinking, the primordial thinking is the highest one, then there must occur here a retreating of a special kind. For these thinkers do not "take up" the beginning in the way a scientist "attacks" something. Neither do these thinkers come up with the beginning as a self-produced construction of thought. The beginning is not something dependent on the favor of these thinkers, where they are active in such and such a way, but, rather, the reverse: the beginning is that which begins something with these thinkers -- by laying a claim on them in such a way that from them is demanded an extreme retreating in the face of Being. The thinkers are begun by the beginning, "in-cepted" [*An-gefangenen*] by the in-ception [*An-fang*]; they are taken up by it and are gathered into it.

It is already a wrong-headed idea that leads us to speak of the "work" of these thinkers. But if for the moment, and for the lack of a better expression, we do talk that way, then we must note that their "work," even if it had been preserved for us intact, would be quite small in "bulk" compared with the "work" of Plato or Aristotle and especially in comparison with the "work" of a modern thinker. Plato and Aristotle and subsequent thinkers have thought far "more," have traversed more regions and strata of thinking, and have questioned out of a richer knowledge of things and man.

And yet all these thinkers think "less" than the primordial thinkers." (pp. 7-8)

5. ———. 2003. "Seminar in Zähringen 1973." In *Four Seminars*, 64-84. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
"In the silence that follows, Jean Beaufret notes: The text we just heard completes, as it were, the long meditation in which you have turned first towards Parmenides and then Heraclitus. One could even say that your thinking has engaged differently with Heraclitus and Parmenides. Indeed, in *Vorträge and Aufsätze*, the primacy seemed to be given to Heraclitus. Today what place would Heraclitus take with respect to Parmenides?
Heidegger: From a mere historical perspective, Heraclitus signified the first step towards dialectic. From this perspective, then, Parmenides is more profound and essential (if it is the case that dialectic, as is said in *Being and Time*, is "a genuine philosophic embarrassment") In this regard, we must thoroughly recognize that tautology is the only possibility for thinking what dialectic can only veil. However, if one is able to read Heraclitus on the basis of the Parmenidean tautology, he himself then appears in the closest vicinity to that same tautology, he himself then appears in the course of an exclusive approach presenting access to being." (p. 81)

6. ———. 2015. *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz; this is a translation of a lecture course Martin Heidegger offered in the summer semester of 1932 at the University of Freiburg. The German original appeared posthumously in 2012 as volume 35 of the philosopher's *Gesamtausgabe* ("Complete Works").
Contents: Part One: The dictum of Anaximander of Miletus, 6th–5th century 1-26; Part Two: Interposed considerations 27-77; Part Three: The "didactic poem" of Parmenides of Elea, 6th–5th century 79; §18. Introduction 79;§19. Interpretation of fragment 1. Preparation for the question of Being 81; §20. Interpretation of fragments 4 and 5 86; §21. Interpretation of fragments 6 and 7 92; §22. Interpretation

of fragment 8 103; §23. The δόξα-fragments 9, 12, 13, 10, 11, 14, 16, 19 (in the order of their interpretation) 144<
Conclusion. §24. The inceptual question of Being; the law of philosophy 152.
"We will start at once with the interpretation of Parmenides's didactic poem. What the previous endeavors at interpreting Parmenides have accomplished will be mentioned when discussing the respective issues. For the rest, however, those works will not be presented in more detail. Not because they are insignificant but because they are so unavoidable that one cannot speak about them at first. Our concern is primarily with securing a philosophical understanding of the beginning of Western philosophy and only secondarily with initiating ourselves into the procedure of appropriating an earlier philosophy, i.e., into the method of interpretation.
With respect to all previous interpretive attempts, even Hegel's, it should be said that they made their work philosophically too easy, in part by invoking as a highest explanatory principle the view that the beginning is precisely the primitive and therefore is crude and raw—the illusion of progress! (In this regard, nothing further to say about the previous attempts.)
The interpretation of Parmenides is closely coupled to the question of his relation to Heraclitus, who presupposed Parmenides and contests against him. The notion that in essentials they are in the sharpest opposition is thereby presupposed as valid. In the end, however, this presupposition is precisely an error. In the end, Parmenides and Heraclitus are in the utmost agreement—as are all actual philosophers—not because they renounce battling, but precisely on account of their own respective ultimate originality.
For nonphilosophers, who adhere only to works, opinions, schools, names, and claims, the history of philosophy and of philosophers does of course present the appearance of a madhouse. But that can quietly remain as it is." (p. 77)

7. Hermann, Arnold. 2004. *To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides, the Origins of Philosophy*. Las Vegas:

Parmenides Publishing.
Contents: Preface XIII; Acknowledgments XXI; A Note on References, Translations, Citations, Notes, Bibliography, and Some Idiosyncrasies XXV; Abbreviations XXIX; Introduction 1; I. Pythagoras15; II. The Pythagoreans 31; III. In Want of a Mathematics for the Soul 93; IV. Pythagorizing versus Philosophizing 115; V. Parmenides 127; VI. The Poem of Parmenides 151; VII. The Poem's Most Difficult Points Explained 163; VIII. Guidelines for an Evidential Account 211; IX. Methods of Proof and Disproof 225; X. Irrationals and the Perfect Premise 251; CI. Mind and Universe: Two Realms, Two Separate Approaches 267; Appendix 279; Subdivided Bibliography 297; Index Locorum 341; General Index 353-374.
"What is the Poem about? As I have indicated—and contrary to out-of-date interpretations and the cursory definitions which typify the average works of reference—the Poem is not about the universe, existence, or the oneness-of-it-all. All of these rather lofty objectives are later inventions, even if they have been repeated ad nauseam for the last 2,500 years. Yet the verses themselves bear no evidence that such matters belong to Parmenides' actual concerns. They show, rather, that Parmenides' inquiries were
less esoteric, without being less exciting, considering their fundamental ramifications for the integrity of human knowledge and communication, which indeed may also *include* our *knowledge* of the universe, existence, and so forth, and the mode we choose to explain them. Thus Parmenides focused on reasoning and speaking, and how to make both dependable, regardless of what in the end their object may be (as long as it is an expressible object). I like A. A. Long's comment on this issue: "What Parmenides says is a continuous provocation to our own thinking about thinking."(450)
There is a fine but very crucial difference to be made between the advancement of a cosmological theory and the demonstration of techniques of how to make an account reliable. Naturally, such an account may also be used to express a variety of things, including the universe and

everything in it, but it is only reliable when such matters are addressed in their capacity as objects of thought (see frs. 4 and 7.3–6), and in a form that does not lead to self-contradiction (see fr. 8). In a nutshell, Parmenides' central problem was *how to ensure the reliability of discourse*. Statements had to be defended against self-contradiction as well as against the misleading plausibility of vagueness—regardless, ultimately, of what said statements were about. For both of these vulnerabilities, Parmenides introduces examples and methods to extricate the truth." (pp. 151-152) (450) Long [‘Parmenides on Thinking Being'] expands on Heidegger’s remark about Parmenides' Poem that it “continually deserves more thought.” p. 127.

8. ———. 2008. "Negative Proof and Circular Reasoning." In *Eleatica 2006: Parmenide scienziato?*, edited by Rossetti, Livio and Marcacci, Flavia, 103-112. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
"In Cordero’s work *By Being It Is,* chapter VI, p. 123, parallels are drawn between Parmenides' Poem and Plato’s *Parmenides*. Cordero focuses on the use of 'I begin' [*arxomai*] by the Eleatic thinker - found in B5 and also B8, when the Goddess announces a new beginning before commencing with the Doxa (8.50) - comparing it to how the argumentative exercises are introduced in the second part of the *Parmenides* (137a-b). Plato, in this latter work, is having his own Parmenides - the dialogues' protagonist - also state that he will 'begin' the demonstration that will follow, the one that addresses his hypothesis ‘that one is'. Cordero speculates that this allusion is not coincidental in Plato, suggesting that Plato was not only aware of the Parmenidean principle of circularity in argumentative proving, but that he used it deliberately in the *Parmenides*. While working on the *Parmenides*, particularly on its translation, I had come to similar conclusions. The idea of returning to one’s initial premise by way of a challenge or test is at the heart of the Parmenidean method, an approach also used exhaustively by Plato in his Parmenidean dialogue. However, in Cordero’s presentation of this approach, one particular point has remained somewhat

unclear or unaddressed, namely whether the circulatory proving has to be taken as germane to the whole account, or only to specific parts. That is, must the whole account of the Goddess return to its beginning, or is this only required of the individual arguments that compose it? Personally, I hold the latter view, as this can be fairly easily demonstrated both by the Poem and the Platonic dialogue." (p. 103)

9. ———. 2009. "Parmenides versus Heraclitus?" In *Nuevos Ensayos sobre Heráclito. Actas del Segundo Symposium Heracliteum*, edited by Hülsz Piccone, Enrique, 261-284. México: U.N.A.M.
"Five years ago, at the annual Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Daniel Graham gave a first draft of a paper titled 'Heraclitus and Parmenides.' He was investigating the possibility of a Parmenidean response to the Ephesian, and he defended the idea quite vigorously. Graham's paper was a response to Michael Stokes, who, years ago, in his work *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, had debunked this theory rather convincingly. I, of course, was very much in Stokes' camp, and as an avid and sometimes excessive student of Parmenides, had strong reservations. But Graham, very graciously, entrusted me with a copy of this early draft. Years passed and although I investigated other things, Graham's paper, and in a way his challenge, was always at the back of my mind. So it is only fitting that now, after all these years, I've thought to complete the circle, in a truly Parmenidean fashion, and devote this paper to Graham's observations.
A few brief remarks about Daniel Graham's study: the paper has remained the last word on the subject of a Parmenidean response. The work is well-researched and detailed, each argument meticulously worked out; particularly the final or published version which has some substantial improvements on the original draft.(1) Graham has dug up parallels between Parmenides and Heraclitus that, to my knowledge, have remained largely unnoticed, and I have benefited greatly from this thoughtful study. All in all, Daniel has offered us an excellent defense of the "Parmenides answers to Heraclitus" theory (subsequently

acronymed to “PATH theory”). Nevertheless, I have remained unconvinced.
To establish a link between the two thinkers, certain criteria have to be met:
1. The question of chronology.
2. The textual correspondence, parallels or similarities of both works.
3. The question of an equivalent subject-matter: is there a shared object of inquiry or discourse in the teachings of both thinkers?
4. The testimonia of subsequent commentators, their criticisms, interpretations of teachings, and general opinions on Heraclitus and Parmenides.
5. And finally, if the chronological question cannot be resolved, and if no thinker mentions the other by name, and if the testimonia let us down, but if nonetheless textual agreement or parallels can be found, we must find some other means of determining who influenced whom. Perhaps, in this case, we should also consider the possibility that neither thinker influenced the other, but that they both were responding to a third party. My modest survey indicates that this may indeed be the case, a possibility that took me quite by surprise, considering that in the beginning I was aiming to show that Parmenides was an entirely original thinker, and if in fact he answered to anyone, then only to Xenophanes' epistemological challenge (B 34), (but certainly not to his theology).(2)" (pp. 261-262)
(1) Graham, “Heraclitus and Parmenides”, *Presocratic Philosophy*. Ed. Caston and Graham, Ashgate, 27–44.
(2) I am aware of the Homeric, Hesiodic and Orphic echoes in the Proem, but I dont consider this a response in the same vein as Parmenides is said to have answered to Heraclitus. It is rather a utilization of familiar or popular themes, which allowed him to evoke a mythical atmosphere.

10. ———. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato’s Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147-165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Most scholars view Plato's critique of Parmenides in the *Sophist*, particularly the observations surrounding the "parricide" remark, as quite apt and justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to recognize that "What Is Not" can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the *Sophist*, as indicating "difference." I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato's indictment of Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.
For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating "is not" predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the predicative case. Only when sought after as a "way of inquiry" does What Is Not—in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible object. After all, the "Way of What Is Not," lacks any sort of *sēmata*, or signs, that can be used to navigate it. As a "way of inquiry for thinking" (B2), it leads nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements to this effect, nor from uttering the words "What Is Not" or "Not Being." Yet this fine distinction is lost to many who have criticized Parmenides for being inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to even speak of such a "way" is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato's stature. If my arguments prove sound, then

Parmenides should be absolved of the charges leveled against him."

11. Hershbell, Jackson P. 1970. "Parmenides' Way of Truth and B16." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 4:1-23.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Vol. Two, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 41-58.
"At least three interpretations have been given to B16 of Parmenides' poem. It has been taken for a fragment of his theory of knowledge, of his doctrine of sense perception, and of his views on sensing and knowing.(1) Evidence for these interpretations is taken from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Theophrastus' *De Sensibus*. The fragment is usually assigned to the second part of the poem, the Way of Seeming or Opinion.
In this study it will be argued that B16 comes from the first part of the poem, the Way of Truth, and that it is a statement neither of a theory of knowledge nor of sense perception, but an affirmation of the close relationship between thought and Being:(2) there can be no thought without that which is, or in Parmenides' words, ". . . neither can you recognize that which is not (that is impossible) nor can you speak about it" (B2, 78).(3)" (p. 1)
(1) According to Burnet, "this fragment of the theory of knowledge which was expounded in the second part of the poem of Parmenides must be taken in connection with what we are told by Theophr*astus in the 'Fragment on Sensation.' " J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy* (reprint, New York, 1957) p. 178, note 1. Many interpreters of Parmenides' poem follow Burnet in assigning B16 to the second part. See also W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1965), p. 67; L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 253-63; J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen, 1964), p. 175 ff.; and U. Hölscher, *Anfängliches Fragen* (Göttingen, 1968), p. 112 f.; G. Vlastos, "Parmenides" Theory of Knowledge," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 77 (1949): 66-77, argued

that B 16 is part of Parmenides' doctrine of sense perception, not of his theory of knowledge.
Finally, an interpretation of this fragment as Parmenides' views on sensing and knowing has been offered by H. Fränkel, "Parmenidesstudien," *Göttinger Nachrichten* (1930): 153-92, especially 170 and 174. See also H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich, 1955): 173-79.
In *Anfängliches Fragen*, Hölscher also maintains (p. 113) that Parmenides' teaching in B16 concerns ". . . Erkenntnis im allgemeinsten Sinne . . . . , ohne zwischen Wahrnehmung und Denken, zwischen Trug und Wahrheit zu unterscheiden."
(2) This thesis is not wholly new. It is proposed, for example, by J. H. M. Loenen in *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias* (Assen, 1959). He writes (p. 58): "As to the place of fr. 16 we can by no means be sure that this really formed part of the doxa. On the contrary, there are good reasons for holding that fr. 16 belonged to the first part." My reasons for assigning B16 to the first part are, however, different. Moreover, we do not agree concerning particular details or the interpretation of Parmenides' poem as a whole.
(3) The expressions "that which is," "Being," and "existence" are used interchangeably in this study without any attempt to give them a more precise meaning. "That which is" is a translation of the substantive participle used occasionally in the fragments, e.g., B4, 2 and B8, 35. The most convincing interpretation of Parmenides' thought is that of G. E. L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," *CQ* 54 (1960): 84-102. According to him, the subject of Parmenides' poem is "what can be talked or thought about" (pp. 94-95).
I have accepted Owen's general interpretation for the purpose of this study.

12. ———. 1972. "Plutarch and Parmenides." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* no. 13:193-208.
"Although Plutarch is not a major source for interpretation of Parmenides' poem, he preserves several fragments: B1.29-30; B8.4; B13, B14 and B15, the last two of which would otherwise be lost.(1) He also makes observations on

Parmenides' style and thought, and relates one biographical incident.(2) Scholars of Plutarch and Parmenides are divided, however, on at least two problems: (I) What was the extent of Plutarch's knowledge ofParmenides, e.g. did he possess a copy of the complete poem, or was he working with second-hand sources such as compendia ?(3) (II) How reliable and worthwhile is his interpretation of Parmenides?" (p. 193)
(...)
"A summation of Plutarch's treatment of Parmenides is now in order. First, Plutarch shows interest in Parmenides' biography, relating one incident possibly derived from Speusippus' Περι φιλοσόφων.
Secondly, he shows interest in Parmenides' poem, and his observations are probably based on first-hand acquaintance with it. This seems especially so since Parmenides is mentioned with other ancient authors whom Plutarch knew well, and in his travels and study at some major cities of the ancient world, e.g. Athens, Plutarch could easily have had access to a copy of the poem. Further support for attributing to Plutarch direct knowledge of Parmenides' text is found in his discussion of B13 at *Amat*. 756E-F and his quotation of B14 and B15, not found in other sources. Thirdly, Plutarch seems familiar with both parts of Parmenides' poem. Although his discussion is Platonic in emphasis, his interpretation is not wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Parmenides does seem to have been the first thinker to make some kind of distinction between the 'sensible' and 'intelligible' worlds, even though the terminology is not his. At least the things perceived by mortals do not have the characteristics Parmenides ascribed to τό εον. Fourthly, there are no clear indications that Plutarch's quotations are inaccurate. Some difficulties, especially in connection with B8.4, can be explained by a copyist's carelessness or Plutarch's tendency to paraphrase Parmenides, possibly from memory. In any case, rather than positing a use of compendia by Plutarch (for which there is no evidence), it seems more plausible to maintain Plutarch's reliance on notebooks based on his direct acquaintance with the poem.

Last, and perhaps most important, it would be erroneous to presume that Plutarch's quotations from and references to Parmenides are wholly disinterested. Several are found in anti-Epicurean and anti-Stoic contexts, a phenomenon which suggests, if nothing more, that Plutarch considered Parmenides an ally of the Academy." (pp. 207-208)
(1) The list of quotations in W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, Plutarch's Quotations (Baltimore 1959) 53-54, is incomplete: B1.29-30 at 1114D-E and B8.4 at 1114c are not included.
(2) The *Adv. Colot.* has extended discussion of Parmenides' philosophy, and the biographical note is at 1126B. Remarks on Parmenides' style are at *Quomodo adul.* 16c-D, *De rect. rat. aud.* 45A-B, and *De Pyth. or.* 402F.
(3) Discussing the doxography on the moon in *De fac. orb. lun.* 929A-F which includes Parmenides, A. Fairbanks wrote: "it is quite possible that Plutarch was using some Stoic compendium which quoted freely from the earlier philosophers." See "On Plutarch's Quotations from the Early Greek Philosophers," *TAPA* 28 (1897) 82.

13. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1980. "Parmenides' *Cogito* Argument." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:5-16.
"Parmenides held that the only thing we can truly say in philosophy is "is" or, in a more idiomatic but also more misleading English, "it is," *éstin*. Even though this main thesis of Parmenides turns out to have more consequences and more interesting consequences than it might at first seem to promise, our first reaction to it is likely to be one of puzzlement. How can a major philosopher hold such an incredible, paradoxical view? The purpose of this paper is to make Parmenides' thesis understandable. I shall argue that, notwithstanding the paradoxical appearance of Parmenides' thesis, it is in reality an eminently natural consequence of certain assumptions which are all understandable and which can all be shown to have been actually subscribed to by Parmenides. Furthermore, Parmenides' assumptions are arguably not incorrect, either, with one exception. They are all of considerable historical and systematic interest."
(...)

"Parmenides' first and foremost assumption is easier to formulate in terms of conceptual models or paradigms than in the form of an explicit premise. This model amounts to conceiving of thinking as a goal-directed process that "comes off" or "realizes itself" in its objects.
I shall first show how this conceptual model explains Parmenides' conclusion, and only afterwards return to my grounds for ascribing it to Parmenides and also return to its background and its corollaries in his work." (p. 5)

14. Hoy, Ronald. 1994. "Parmenides' Complete Rejection of Time." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 9:573-598.
"Parmenides is often credited with discovering the category of timeless truths, and he is sometimes praised or blamed (along with Plato) for asserting that what is real can transcend time.(1)
But besides positing a timeless reality for eternal truths to be about, Parmenides finds fault with beliefs about time and argues that time is not real: if temporal thoughts are inherently contradictory then reality cannot be temporal. In claiming time to be contradictory,
Parmenides stands first in a line of philosophers (including Plato, Kant, andJ.M. McTaggart) who find something unreal about time.
(...)
In this paper, I shall suggest it is wrong to interpret Parmenides' position as hinging mainly on semantic issues centered on reference.
I shall show how commentators who do so fail to do justice to his complaints about time. Instead, I shall reconstruct Parmenides' worries in terms of the recent conflict between "tensed" and "tenseless" views of time. From this perspective, Parmenides offers an early proscription on the contradictory beliefs that dog any metaphysics based on temporal becoming. It will also become clear how complete Parmenides' rejection of time was: why, for other reasons, he could not accept even the tenseless view, and why he should be suspicious of attempts to read him as discovering a new kind of "eternity." (pp. 573-574)

(1) See, for example, G.E.L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," in A. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics*, Gaarden City: Anchor/Doubleday, (1974), pp. 271-92.

15. Husain, Martha. 1983. "The Hybris of Parmenides." *Dialogue* no. 22:451-460.
"To speak of *hybris* in the case of Parmenides seems hardly justified. He is addressed by the unnamed goddess to whose abode he journeys as Koupe, "youth" or "initiate", hardly a term of great respect in Greek usage. He is guided on his path, i.e., he has not found it by himself, and he receives a truth he never claims as his own. Could a mortal show greater awareness of his limitations? Yet, in an oddly disturbing way the distinction between the divine and the human is obliterated—the worst kind of *hybris* for Greek thought and feeling.
To charge Parmenides with *hybris* is paradoxical, to say the least, and yet perhaps illuminating. The philosopher's *hybris* has none of the traditional connotations of doing violence or injury to somebody out of wanton insolence and overreaching. On the contrary. His quest for enlightenment is sanctioned by divine power, by righteousness (θέμις) and justice δική(), and marked by almost complete self-effacement. And yet it contains features that would be clearly recognizable as hybris to traditional Greek thinking, and some of its results may well be seen as destructive. The Greek notion of *hybris*, overweening pride, connotes above all a failure of man to maintain its opposite, proper pride, i.e., to understand and occupy his proper and rightful place in the cosmos. That place is defined for man most significantly in terms of his relationship with the divine, and therefore the Greek awareness of *hybris* points to the ever-present danger of a disturbance in this relationship. To charge Parmenides with *hybris* is then to charge philosophy with being double edged, a new source of enlightenment but also a new source of danger.
Transposing this notion from traditional Greek culture to philosophy may illumine how all ways of being human are perilous." (p. 451)

16. Hussey, Edward. 1972. *The Presocratics*. London: Duckworth.
Contents: Preface VIII; 1 Introduction 1; 2The Milesians 11; 3 Heraclitus 32; 4 Pythagoras and the Greek West 60; 5 Parmenides and Zeno 78; 6 The Age of the Sophists107; 7 Cosmology from Parmenides to Democritus 127; 8 Conclusion: the Study of the Presocratics 149; Notes156; Maps: Black Sea, Aegean, Levant VI; Ionia 12; Magna Graecia 62; Index 165-168.
On Parmenides see pp. 78-99 and 128-130.
"Parmenides is the first Presocratic of whose thought we still have a nearly complete and continuos exposition in his own words. That this is so is due entirely to one man, the Neoplatonist scholar Simplicius. In his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, written early in the sixth century A.D., Simplicius quotes large extracts from the poem of Parmenides, in illustration of Aristotle's remarks on it, expressly because, as he says, the book had become scarce. It is therefore almost possible to approach Parmenides in the way intended by Parmenides himself; this chapter will follow that way as far as it can be established.
It is worth noticing that Parmenides expressed his thought in hexameter verses. This was not an odd or ridiculous thing to do, as it would be if a modem philosopher wrote in verse. Verse was still appropriate, and felt to be appropriate, for any pronouncement intended to be particularly memorable. Written books existed, and many states displayed their laws and decrees publicly in writing; yet the habit of relying on the written word was not widespread or of long standing. An educated man was one who had things by heart, and verse is more easily memorised than prose." (p. 78)
17. ———. 2006. "Parmenides on Thinking." In *Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, edited by King, R. A. H., 13-30. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Parmenides fr. 16 Diels-Kranz, notoriously, presents a tangle of textual and syntactic problems. This paper starts by by-passing these problems (though it eventually returns to them). The aim is to explore the possibility of a certain

kind of reading of Parmenides' account of "mind" and "thinking" (νοός, νόημα, φρονέειν) here.
In the rest of section 1, I consider the archaic (principally Homeric) usage of the words for "thinking" and "mind". Section 2 outlines the proposed reading of Parmenides' theory in the light of these linguistic considerations. Section 3 grapples with the greatest problem for that reading: the apparently contradictory testimony of Aristotle. Here it is necessary to use the rather different testimony of Theophrastus, and a general hypothesis about Aristotle's reading of the "materialistic" psychology of his predecessors.
Section 4 considers the earlier theories of "perception of like by like", of which Parmenides' is one. I aim to show that these can be understood as involving an "inner model". Finally, section 5 returns to Parmenides fr. 16, and shows how it may be read as an example of an "inner model" theory of mental activity." (p. 13)

18. Hyland, Drew A. 1998. "Reiner Schürmann's Parmenides: Of Unbroken Non-Hegemonies " *Research in Phenomenology* no. 28:243-258.
"Shortly before his death, Reiner Schurmann [1941-1993] brought to completion his remarkable magnum opus, *Des Hégémonies brisées*,(1) “Broken Hegemonies.”
(...)
"Because the book is only recently published, as yet only in French, and because it is almost 800 pages long, I shall take rather more time than usual in setting out as accurately as I can the fundaments of Schurmann’s interpretation of Parmenides before turning to some remarks on the philosophic issues raised by that interpretation.
Accordingly, the structure of this article will be as follows: after some introductory remarks, I shall, in part I, set out as best I can Schurmann’s interpretation of Parmenides. I shall from time to time make comments on very specific textual issues as they arise, but I shall limit my comments to the specifics of those texts. Then, in part II, I shall raise and discuss some of the broader philosophic issues raised by Schurmann’s thought-provoking interpretation.

I might best prepare the reader for the striking originality of Schurmann's interpretation of Parmenides by beginning with a word of clarification about my title. If we were to take as our standard some version of the orthodox interpretation of Parmenides (Parmenides as advocating a changeless, eternal, perfect, one Being and that alone, thereby denying all change, becoming, motion, or time; thus the father of the notion of a changeless, eternal Being of some sort), then indeed, Parmenides may have established a hegemony which has been, or perhaps still needs to be, broken. Or perhaps, Schurmann himself breaks that hegemony through his radical deconstruction of that orthodox interpretation. For in any case, the Parmenides that Schurmann reads is certainly no broken hegemony, because it is not a hegemony at all, at least not in the sense of establishing a single, exclusive, dominant and domineering law. As a final prefatory remark, let me indicate in advance how much I appreciate the originality of Schurmann's interpretation. Unorthodox interpretations of a thinker that leave that thinker far behind by straying again and again from the text or by focusing only on a few lines of the text, those that suit one's interpretation, are easy; unorthodox interpretations such as Schurmann's that are accomplished by the most faithful adherence to the text as a whole and its spirit are always the most thought-provoking and challenging." (pp. 243-244)

(1) Reiner Schurmann, *Des Hégémonies Brisées* (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1996) [English translation: *Broken Hegemonies*, Bllomington: Indiana University Press, 2003].

19. Jameson, G. 1958. "'Well-Rounded Truth' and Circular Thought in Parmenides." *Phronesis* no. 3:15-30.

"Sufficient remains of Parmenides' poem for its general pattern to be evident. It falls into four sections:

1. The Proem (DK6 28 B 1).
2. A discussion of principles, which lays down certain axioms and traces their implications (B 2, 3, 6, 7).
3. A delineation of the properties of reality, from the starting-point dictated by Section 2 and according to the principles there stated (B 8. 1 -49).

4. A cosmogony (B 8.50-61, 9 ff.).
There are two fragments whose position is uncertain: B 4 and 5. I shall be discussing frg. 5 at length in a moment. Frg. 4 has no implications disruptive of any conclusions that can be drawn from the other fragments, nor is its presence inconsistent with the general scheme of the poem. Its location is a problem, but one which, for the present, can be left on one side." (p. 15)
(...)
"It is my purpose to discuss two passages in the fragments from which conclusions are usually drawn which conflict with the general pattern of Parmenides' thought and argument. They appear in DK as:
B 1. 29: Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμε`ς ἦτορ
and B 5: Ξυνο`ν δε` μοί ἐστιν, ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γα`ρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖθις.
These passages have received various interpretations, sometimes separately, sometimes in combination. I shall suggest that frg. 5 should be treated as a doubtful fragment and that at 1.29 the correct reading is ευπειθεος not ευκυκλεως." (p. 16)

20. Johansen, Thomas Kjeller 2016. "Parmenides' likely story." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 50:1-29.
Abstract: "A reading of Parmenides fragments B1-B4 shows that Being and the Cosmos are related as model to likeness in a way that allows the Cosmos to have some degree of being and intelligibility. The cosmology that Parmenides defends reads as a precursor to the « likely story » of Plato's « Timaeus » and, indeed, Proclus in his Commentary on Plato's Parmenides had already argued for a similar reading of Parmenides' poem."

21. Jones, Barrington. 1973. "Parmenides 'The Way of Truth'." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 11:287-298.
"Recent years have produced a number of distinct interpretations of Parmenides' philosophical poem. Of these, one of the most interesting is that of Montgomery Furth's "Elements of Eleatic Ontology,"(1) and I shall use his treatment of the poem as the basis for the development of a different interpretation, an interpretation which, hopefully,

can preserve the explanatory power of Furth's exposition while avoiding certain of its difficulties.
Furth suggests that, at the start of his argument, Parmenides is concerned to show the meaninglessness of negative "is" statements, whether "is" be taken in an existential or a predicative sense. One cannot say "Unicorns do not exist" meaningfully; for, in order for the word "unicorns" to be meaningful, there must be unicorns for the word to refer to. Therefore, negative existential statements are self-defeating, because they purport to deny a necessary condition of their own meaningfulness. Parallel considerations apply to the predicative sense of "is".
If "John is tall" is meaningful only if John *is* tall, or the fact of John's being tall exists, or the like, then the statement "John is not tall" would be meaningful only if, for instance, the fact of John's being tall did not exist, but if it did not exist, then, again, there is nothing for the sentence to refer to, and therefore the sentence must be meaningless." (p. 287)
(1) *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, VI (1968), 111-132.
"To summarize the course of the discussion, then. We have seen that, if we do not take Parmenides as postulating monism, the argument proceeds with considerable force to the conclusions that Parmenides claims, and does so without involving him in any direct fallacy, such as a failure to distinguish between an 'existential' and a 'predicative' sense of "is." For just as I can think of something, so I can think of something's being the case, and the same considerations will apply. Nor does he impose impossibly stringent restrictions on meaningfulness; if anything, he is over-liberal in his admissions of existence and being. Given acceptance of the claim that what can be thought of must be, his argument has force.(26)" (p. 298)
(26) Throughout I have assumed that νόεῖν is to be taken in its customary sense of "to think." C. H. Kahn ["The Thesis of Parmenides," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XXII (1969)], (pp. 703-711), however, has maintained that it is to be taken in the stronger sense of "to know." This can hardly be so in view of the fact that Parmenides does ascribe νόος to

deluded mankind, who, he claims, are *totally* enmeshed in δόξα, opinion (B 6.6; 16.2). Furthermore, he uses the expression "wandering νόον," and, had he meant "knowledge," this would be a striking 'contradictio in adiecto' (B 6.6)."

22. Kahn, Charles H. 1966. "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being." *Foundations of Language* no. 2:245-265. Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 16-40.
"I am concerned in this paper with the philological basis for Greek ontology; that is to say, with the raw material which was provided for philosophical analysis by the ordinary use and meaning of the verb *einai*, 'to be'. Roughly stated, my question is: How were the Greek philosophers guided, or influenced, in their formulation of doctrines of Being, by the prephilosophical use of this verb which (together with its nominal derivatives *on* and *ousia*) serves to express the concept of Being in Greek?" (p. 16)
23. ———. 1969. "The Thesis of Parmenides." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:700-724.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 143-166.
"If we except Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, Parmenides is perhaps the most important and influential of all the Greek philosophers. And considered as a metaphysician, he is perhaps the most original figure in the western tradition. At any rate, if ontology is the study of Being, or what there is, and metaphysics the study of ultimate Reality, or what there is in the most fundamental way, then Parmenides may reasonably be regarded as the founder of ontology and metaphysics at once. For he is the first to have articulated the concept of Being or Reality as a distinct topic for philosophic discussion.
The poem of Parmenides is the earliest philosophic text which is preserved with sufficient completeness and continuity to permit us to follow a sustained line of argument. It is surely one of the most interesting arguments in the history of philosophy, and we are lucky to have this early text, perhaps a whole century older than the first

dialogues of Plato. But the price we must pay for our good fortune is to face up to a vipers' nest of problems, concerning details of the text and the archaic language but also concerning major questions of philosophic interpretation. These problems are so fundamental that, unless we solve them correctly, we cannot even be clear as to what Parmenides is arguing for, or why. And they are so knotted that we can scarcely unravel a single problem without finding the whole nest on our hands.
I am primarily concerned here to elucidate Parmenides' thesis: to see what he meant by the philosophic claim which is compressed into the one-word sentence "it is." I take this to be the premiss (or one of them), from which lie derives his famous denial of all change and plurality. I shall thus consider the nature of this premiss, and why he thought it plausible or self-evident. I shall also look briefly at the structure of his argument which concludes that change is impossible, in order to see a bit more clearly how such a paradoxical conclusion might also seem plausible to Parmenides, and how it could be taken seriously by his successors. Finally, I shall say a word about the Parmenidean identification of Thinking and Being." (pp. 700-701)

24. ———. 1969. "More on Parmenides. A Response to Stein and Mourelatos." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 23:333-340.
A Reply to Stein (1969) and Mourelatos (1969).
"For Burnet and for many scholars of his generation, Parmenides was essentially a critic of earlier physical theories and the author of a challenge which provoked the atomist theory of matter as a response. Commentators today are more inclined to see him either as a philosopher of language in the style of Frege or Wittgenstein or, in the Continental tradition, as a metaphysician of Being in the manner of Hegel or Heidegger. It seems to me that Burnet was closer to the truth (even if his interpretation in detail is absurdly narrow) , and that he and Meyerson were faithful to the deeper spirit of Eleatic philosophy in insisting upon a close connection between Parmenides' argument and the physical science of his day and ours. At all events, any

interpretation must. take account of the fact that his doctrine seems permanently relevant not only to speculative metaphysics and abstract ontology but also to critical reflection on the structure of natural science.

Hence I am happy that Howard Stein was willing to publish his comments on the poem, since his unusual command of modern physical theory makes it possible for him to formulate a plausible reinterpretation of Eleatic doctrine within the framework of post-Newtonian or Einsteinian physics. I fully agree with him as to the historical and philosophical value of such a reconstruction, even if it cannot square with every facet of the archaic text under discussion. Simply as a commentary on the text, however, a one-sided interpretation fully worked out will often he more illuminating than a carefully balanced synthesis of different points of view.

Once such an interpretation has been presented, it is the ungrateful task of the interlocutor to insist upon the appropriate qualifications. Stein's reconstruction gains in coherence by taking Parmenides' Being as "truth" rather than "thing," as "discernible structure in the world" or *alles, was der Fall ist*: the unique *Sachverhalt* but not the unique *Gegenstand*. But Parmenides himself is not so coherent, and part of the creative influence of his theory was due precisely to the fact that it can also he understood-and was presumably also intended-as an account of the only thing or entity or object that can be rationally understood. Hence it was that, the atomists could define the concept of indestructible solid body as their new version of Being (*on*), and empty space as the new form of Non-being (*ouk on* or *oudén*). In general, the Greek philosophers never succeeded in formulating a systematic distinction between thing and fact, between individual object and structure (although Plato's self-criticism and later development of the theory of Forms may involve a conscious shift, from one category to the, other)." (pp. 333-334)

"I am grateful to Alexander Mourelatos for having tried to formulate my interpretation more precisely, and if he has not entirely succeeded that no doubt. shows that my own

exposition was not clear enough. I confess that. 1 do not recognize my view in the complicated reduction sentences which he offers as a semi-formalization of my version of thesis and antithesis in fragment 2. I agree with him that any reading of the first and second Ways must construe them as contradictory, so that "the reason which compels rejection of the second route is the reason which enjoins strict and faithful adherence to the first route" (p. 736). I think my view can he shown to satisfy this condition, and to this end I shall indulge in a hit of rudimentary formalization." (p. 335)

25. ———. 1970. "Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt by Jaap Mansfeld (Review)." *Gnomon*:113-119.
Review of Jaap Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt*, Assen: Van Gorcum 1964.
"Mansfeld has given us one of the most penetrating and original discussions of Parmenides' poem since Frankel's *Parmenidesstudien* in 1930. The book consists of four chapters, each one of which might stand alone as an independent essay, but which together aim at a unified view of Parmenides' thought. Mansfeld develops his interpretation with a wealth of detail, a careful, nearly complete, and on the whole judicious discussion of other views, which makes his book at once a commentary on the poem and a valuable survey of earlier scholarship." (p. 113)
"Thus Maansfeld does justice to the positive side of the *Doxa*, in the analogies with Being, and also to the negative side, in the original sin of positing two forms instead of rejecting the other as the non-existent. He goes farther than other interpreters in suggesting an epistemic or pedagogic function of the Doxa as a theory which permits the initiate (i. e. the philosopher) to find his way back to the origins of the manifold of experience in the positing of two basic forms." (p. 118)

26. ———. 1973. *The Verb 'Be' in ancient Greek*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhhar (ed.), *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonims: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies,*

Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the verb *einai*.
"First of all, a word of clarification on the nature of the enterprise. My original aim was to provide a kind of grammatical prolegomenon to Greek ontology. First of all, a word of clarification on the nature of the enterprise. My original aim was to provide a kind of grammatical prolegomenon to Greek ontology.
The notion of Being, as formulated by Parmenides, seems to come from nowhere, like a philosophical meteor with no historical antecedents but profound historical consequences. It would be difficult to overstate the influence of this new conception. On the one hand, Plato's doctrine of the eternal being of the Forms as well as his struggle with Not-Being both clearly derive from Parmenides' account of to on. On the other hand, not only Aristotle's doctrine of categories as "the many ways that things are said to be" but also his definition of metaphysics as the study of "being qua being" provide deliberate alternatives to Parmenides' monolithic conception of what is." (*Introduction* (2003), p. VII)

27. ———. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." *La Parola del passato* no. 43:237-261.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 167-191.
"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of Parmenides as an influence on Plato's thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between Being and Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms. When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a visitor from Elea. Even in the *Timaeus*,

where the chief speaker is neither Socrates nor the Eleatic Stranger, the exposition takes as its starting-point the Parmenidean dichotomy. (1) From the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* to the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*, the language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides. One imagines that Plato had studied the poem of Parmenides with considerable care. He had the advantage of a complete text, an immediate knowledge of the language, and perhaps even an Eleatic tradition of oral commentary. So he was in a better position than we are to understand what Parmenides had in mind. Since Plato has given us a much fuller and more explicit statement of his own conception of Being, this conception, if used with care, may help us interpret the more lapidary and puzzling utterances of Parmenides himself."
(1) *Timaeus* 27D 5: 'The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never being?'. (p. 237)

28. ———. 2002. "Parmenides and Plato." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 81-94. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 192-206.
"This seems a happy occasion to return to Parmenides, in order both to clarify my own interpretation of Parmenidean Being and also to emphasize the affinity between what I have called the veridical reading and the account in terms of predication that Alex Mourelatos gave in his monumental *The Route of Parmenides*.) It is good to have this opportunity to acknowledge how much our views have in common, even if they do not coincide. And perhaps I may indulge here in a moment of nostalgia, since Alex and I are both old Parmenideans. My article '*The Thesis of Parmenides*' was published in 1969, just a year before Alex's book appeared. That was nearly thirty years ago, and it was not the beginning of the story for either of us. My own Eleatic obsession had taken hold even earlier, with an

unpublished Master's dissertation on Parmenides, just as Alex had begun with a doctoral dissertation on the same subject. So, for both of us, returning to Parmenides may have some of the charm of returning to the days of our youth." (p. 81)
"I want to defend Parmenides' positive account of Being as a coherent, unified vision.
And I think his refutation of coming-to-be if formally impeccable, once one accepts the premise (which Plato will deny) that *esti* and *ouk esti* are mutually exclusive, like p and not-p. And it is precisely this assimilation of the *'is* or *is-not*' dichotomy to the law of non-contradiction -- to p or not-p' - that accounts for the extraordinary effectiveness of Parmenides' argument, its acceptance by the fifth-century cosmologists, and the difficulty that Plato encountered in answering it.
However, if the rich, positive account of Being that results from Parmenides' amalgamation of the entire range of uses and meanings of *einai* turns out to be a long-term success (as the fruitful ancestor of ancient atomism, Platonic Forms, and the metaphysics of eternal Being in western theology), the corresponding negation in Not-Being is a conceptual nightmare. Depending on which function of *einai* is being denied, *to mê on* can represent either negative predication, falsehood, non-identity, non-existence, or non-entity, that is to say, nothing at all. The fallacy in Parmenides' argument lies not in the cumulation of positive attributes for Being but in the confused union of these various modes of negation in the single conception of 'what-is-not.' That is why Plato saw fit to criticize his great predecessor in respect to the notion of Not-Being, while making positive use of the Parmenidean notion of Being." (pp. 89-90)

29. ———. 2005. "Parmenides and Being." In *Frühgriechisches Denken*, edited by Rechenauer, Georg, 217-226. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
30. ———. 2009. "Postscript on Parmenides." In *Essays on Being*, 207-217. New York: Oxford University Press.
Postscript on Parmenides (2008): 1. *Parmenides and physics;* 2. *The direction of the chariot ride in the proem;* 3.

The epistemic preference for Fire.
"Parmenides was my first love in philosophy. I had once thought to write a book on Parmenides, but there always seemed to be too many unsolved problems. I conclude these essays by returning to three problems that do seem soluble, and that do not involve the concept of Being: Parmenides' relation to natural philosophy, the direction of the chariot ride in his proem, and the epistemic preference for Fire." (p. 207)

31. Kember, Owen. 1971. "Right and Left in the Sexual Theories of Parmenides." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 91:92-106.
Abstract: "G. E. R. Lloyd (1) has argued that Parmenides 'probably held that the sex of the child is determined by its place on the right or left of the mother's womb (right for males, left for females)'. It is the purpose of this paper to challenge this assertion by re-examining the primary evidence of fragments 17 and r8 of Parmenides as well as the tangled mass of testimony of the doxographers, Censorinus, Aetius and Lactantius. In so doing I shall consciously observe a sharp distinction between theories of sex differentiation and theories
of heredity since I shall argue that the confusion of the two subjects has led to distortion of Parmenides' doctrines."
(1) G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge, 1966) 17 and 50. It is interesting to note the change in wording from Lloyd's article in JHS lxxxii (1962) 60 where he uses the word 'apparently' instead of 'probably'. Other discussions on the problem of Parmenides' sexual theories within the last ten years include that of W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. ii (Cambridge, 1965) 78 ff. and L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965) 263-6.
Tarán indeed asserts (264, note 98) 'sex, according to Parmenides, was determined by the female and not by the male'. Earlier work of importance in this field has been done by E. Lesky, "Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken", *Akademie der Wissenscheften und der Literatur*, Mainz, *Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen*

Klasse, Jahrgang 1950, Nr. 19, 1272 ff.
32. Kerferd, George. 1991. "Aristotle's Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides." In *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, edited by Blumenthal, Henry and Robinson, Howard, 1-7. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In his *De caelo* (3. 1, 298bi4~24 = 28 A 25 DK) Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics." [follow the translation of the passage] (p. 1)
(...)
"What I want rather to do is to suggest a way in which we can make sense both of Aristotle's remark in the *De caelo* and of Simplicius' comments.
This can be done, I would argue, in the following way. Let us begin by assuming that all we have is the world of seeming. This, however, is seen to be defective in that it combines 'is' and 'is not', and we can know on the basis of the logical insight developed with devastating effect by Parmenides that only that which is can exist. We must accordingly proceed to a fresh analysis of the world of seeming. If we take this world at its own level, which is that of seeming, we can see that it contains, and so can be analysed into, combinations that change between two shapes or principles, light and darkness (Parmenides 28 B 8. 41, 53-9 DK). Thus, any physical object can be found both in the daytime and at night, and further it can be seen at any one time as combining what we might call reflectivity and light-absorption. We have thus the first step in a reductionist analysis. These two principles, however, can next be reduced to one—darkness is what is not light, and on the principles of Parmenidean logic what is not cannot exist. We need not ask whether the negative in 'is not light' is negating a copula or negating an existential sense of the verb 'to be'—in either case it is plausible enough to treat darkness as a negative principle. We are left then with the one principle only, that which is. This principle can be regarded as something which is itself inside or within the world of seeming. But it will be better understood, I would suggest, as being not within the world of seeming but rather in a

sense the world of seeming as such when this world is correctly understood and is stripped by the application of Parmenidean logic and cleansed of the plurality of names which mortals assign to it. For Simplicius this whole approach is to be seen as a mistake because it involves a denial of the dualism essential to Platonism, the dualism between the intelligible world and the (derived) world of appearances. But it may well have seemed to him to be a mistake which Parmenides was actually making." (pp. 6-7)

33. Ketchum, Richard. 1990. "Parmenides on What There Is." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 20:167-190.
Abstract: "There is an interpretation of Parmenides' poem which has not yet had, but deserves, a hearing. It reconciles two of the most prominent views of the meaning of the verb 'to be' ('εἶναι') as it occurs in the poem. It agrees with the spirit of those who interpret 'εἶναι' as 'existence.' It agrees with the letter of those who interpret 'εἶναι' as the copula. The basic idea is to treat relevant syntactically incomplete occurrences of the verb 'to be' as meaning 'to be something or other.(1) In section I, I will explain and clarify the interpretation. In section II, I will dialectically support the interpretation by comparing it with other major interpretations.
Weaknesses will also appear." (p. 167)
(1) To my knowledge the idea that such uses of the verb εἶναι' in Greek philosophy might be profitably interpreted in this way was introduced by G.E.L. Owen ('A Metaphysical Paradox' in Rendord Bambrough, ed., *New Essays On Plato and Aristotle* New York: Humanities Press 1965 71, n. 1). He originally suggested that for Plato to be is to be something or other but later ('Plato on Not-Being') in Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Plato, I* Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1971 266) he recants.
As for the equation "to be is to be something," the negation of "to be something" is "not to be anything" or "to be nothing," which Plato holds to be unintelligible; and then it would follow from the equation that "not to be" makes no sense. But Plato recognizes no use of the verb in which it cannot be directly negated.

The fact that Parmenides not only recognizes but demands a use of the verb 'to be' which cannot be meaningfully negated is a reason to attempt to understand his use of 'to be' as 'to be something other.'
As is well known, Owen himself interprets Parmenides' syntactically incomplete uses of 'eivai' as 'to exist?' ('Eleatic Questions',) *Classical Quarterly* 10 1960, 94).

34. ———. 1993. "A Note on Barnes' Parmenides." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:95-97.
"In *The Presocratic Philosophers* Vol. I: *Thales to Zeno* (London, 1979, pp. 155-175) Jonathan Barnes presents a formalization of an argument he finds in Fragments B2, B3 and B6 (148, 149 and 150 in Barnes' numbering). I am sympathetic to the enterprise but I think the execution is confused. After explaining the confusion, I present an alternative which I think preserves most of Barnes' interpretation." (p. 95)
35. Kingsley, Peter. 1999. *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center.
"What is to be done when the scholarly author of a book is also a believer and writes in a style that seeks to convert the reader in two different senses of that word?
Firstly, to convert the academic reader to the argument expressed, and secondly to convert the reader more generally to the belief system expressed in the book – in this case a wider mystical approach to life. Whilst doing this, Kingsley also suggests that the current point-of-view of the scholar may be nothing more than a dogmatic and faith-tinged position anyway – so how should we read all this? These questions should be at the forefront of any reader's response to *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*.
Kingsley is a lauded academic and also a self-admitted mystic and this book is framed as a journey into a new take on reality." p. 118 (Christopher Hartney, *Book Review of Peter Kingsley: In the Dark Places of Wisdom, "*Alternative Spirituality and Religion=, 9, 2018, pp. 118-121)
"And that's the purpose of this book: to awaken something we've forgotten, something we've been made to forget by the

passing of time and by those who've misunderstood or—for reasons of their own—have wanted us to forget.
It could be said that this process of awakening is profoundly healing. It is. The only trouble with saying this is that we've come to have such a superficial idea of healing. For most of us, healing is what makes us comfortable and eases the pain. It's what softens, protects us. And yet what we want to be healed of is often what will heal us if we can stand the discomfort and the pain." (p. 4)
"You might be tempted to describe the way that Parmeneides and the people close to him have been treated in the last two thousand years as a conspiracy, a conspiracy of silence. And in a very basic sense you'd be right.
But at the same time all these dramas of misrepresentation, of misuse and abuse, are nothing compared with what's been done to the central part of his teachings- or the writings of his successors. And the dramas fade away almost into insignificance compared with the extraordinary power of those teachings as they still survive: a power that's waiting to be understood again and used, not just talked about or pushed aside. This is what we ll need to explore next, and start rediscovering step by step.
So everything that's been mentioned so far Parmeneides' opening account of his journey to another world, the traditions about him, the finds at Velia—may seem a story in itself or even a story within a story. But the story is far from finished, and this book that you've come to the end of is only the beginning: the first chapter." (p. 231)

36. ———. 2003. *Reality*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center.
"The writings of Parmenides, and other people like him, survive in fragments. Scholars have played all sorts of games with them. For centuries they have experimented with distorting them and torturing them until they seem to yield a sense exactly the opposite of their original meaning. Then they argue about their significance and put them on show like exhibits in a museum.
And no one understands quite how important they are. Even though they only survive in bits and pieces, they are far less fragmentary than we are. And they are much more than

dead words. They are like the mythological treasure—the invaluable object that has been lost and misused and has to be rediscovered at all costs.
But this is not mythology, or fiction. It's reality. Fiction is like sitting on a goldmine and dreaming about gold; it's everything that happens when you forget this.
There is absolutely nothing mystical in what I am saying. It's very simple, completely down-to-earth and practical. We tend to imagine we have our feet on the ground when we are dealing with facts. And yet facts are of absolutely no significance in themselves: it's just as easy to get lost in facts as it is to get lost in fictions.
They have their value, and we have to use them—but use them to go beyond them. Facts on their own are like sitting on top of a goldmine and scratching at the dust around our feet with a little stick." (p. 21)

37. Kirk, Geoffrey S. , and Stokes, Michael C. 1960. "Parmenides' refutation of motion." *Phronesis* no. 5:1-4.
"Since Burnet at least (*Early Greek Philosophy* [third edition], 1920) pp. 179 and 181) it has been common to attribute to Parmenides the argument against motion described by Melissus in his fragment 7.
(...)
It had occurred independently to the authors of this short paper that the matter deserved further clarification, and, having discovered in conversation that their views were closely similar, they submit them jointly." (p. 1)
"Thus the fragments of Parmenides contain not the slightest hint of the physical argument that motion is impossible because it entails the existence of a void to move in. But this physical argument is stated in Melissus fr. 7 § 7, after the assertion that void, as not-being, does not exist: 'Nor does it [sc. Being] move; for it has nowhere to withdraw to, but is full. For if there had been void, it would have withdrawn into the void; but since there is no void it does not have anywhere to withdraw to'. If it had not been for Plato *Theaetetus* 180 E 3-4, the attribution of this kind of argument to Parmenides, not merely to Melissus, would presumably never have been made." (p. 2)

"This whole field of possibilities deserves further exploration, but is shut off by the unjustified interpretation of those who attribute to Parmenides an argument invented probably by Melissus." (p. 4)

38. Knight, Thomas S. 1959. "Parmenides and the Void." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*:524-528.
"Unless Parmenides' One Being is considered a corporeal unit, he cannot be said to have denied the existence of a void. And whether or not his monism can be regarded as materialistic is a matter of dispute." (p. 524)
"Descartes rejected the proposition that there can be a space in which there is no body only *after* he had demonstrated "The grounds on which the existence of material things may be known with certainty."(10) The Pythagoreans, *after* viewing their numbers as discontinuous, postulated a void to separate them."(11) Void appears then to be posterior to: some kind of phenomenalism, some kind of materialism, and some kind of pluralism.
The point here is that Parmenides' One Being excludes all of these.
It seems, therefore, purely arbitrary to say that Parmenides denied the existence of void. The only way to answer Parmenides is to find some reasonable relation between Being and non-Being. Taking body as "what is" and void as "what is not" merely rejects the more original and more fundamental problem, How can non-Being be?" (pp. 527-528)

39. Kohlschitter, Silke. 1991. "Parmenides and Empedocles in Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*." *Hermatena* no. 150:43-53.
"In a kind of history of philosophy Shahrastani(1) draws up a list of seven philosophers(2) - Empedocles among them - whom he calls the "pillars of wisdom".(3) He approaches them with an unambiguous concern regarding the creator, namely to show his unity, and clearly formulated questions with regard to the creation of the world, namely "what and how many the primary principles are, and what the ἑσκατα are and when they come to happen".(4) As Franz Altheim and Ruth Stiehl convincingly show, Shahrastani took over

the canon of the seven philosophers, as well as the problems he brings to them, from Porphyry.(5) The work that is to be considered in this context is his ¨φίλοσοφος ιστορία, of which fragments are preserved.(6)"
(...)
"Parmenides is the thinker who exclusively argues on the basis of the conditions of thinking itself." (p. 43)
"The central term in the Parmenidean philosophy of history is *Dike*.
All, by being unchangeable and motionless only as a whole, is actually unified and held together by her. One must therefore conceive of Dike as the supreme deity in Parmenides. Here the question arises, in what relationship to each other she and history, or rather eternal being and the world of seeming have to be seen." (p. 44)
(1) Muhammad B. 'Abd al-Karim Shahrastani was the principal historian in the oriental Middle Ages (1076-1153). The work that is relevant for the present paper is his *Kitab al-Mital wa'I-Nihal,* a treatise on religions and sects.
(2) Thales, Anaxagoras (= Anaximander), Anaximenes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato.
(3) Shahrastani; 253, 13.
(4) F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Porphyrios und Empedokles*, Tübingen, 1954, p. 9.
(5) Cf. Altheim/Stiehl, pp. 8-19.
(6) See *Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula tria*, recog. A. Nauck, Lipsiae 1860.
Shahrastani, *Kitab al-Mital wan Nihal*, ed. Cureton, London 1846, transl. by Haarbriicker, Halle 1850-51 (=Shahrastani). [See also the French translation: *Livre des religions et des sectes*, translated by Daniel Gimaret, Guy Monnot, Jean Jolivet, Louvain, Peeters, 1986-1993 (two volumes)]

40. Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. 2017. *The Presocratics in the Thought of Martin Heidegger*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Contents: Preface 11; Abbreviations 13; Introduction 15; Chapter One: Philosophy, History and the Presocratics 23; Chapter Two: The Anaximander Fragment 63; Chapter Three: Heraclitus: Physis and the Logos 109; Chapter Four:

Being and Thinking in Parmenides 119; Chapter Five: The Presocratics and the History of Being 219; Bibliography 247. "Chapter Four is a consideration of Parmenides' fragments 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 in Heidegger's interpretation, which comes from different works of the middle and later period of his thought. Since for Heidegger all primordial thinkers speak essentially the same, in his reading of Parmenides, I encounter the same issues with which we are already familiar from earlier chapters. He does not set up any opposition between Heraclitus and Parmenides. Nevertheless, if in the study of Heraclitus his focus was on λόγος, and φύσις, now the foremost attention is given to Αλήθεια. In Heidegger's view, ἀλήθεια is a basic character of beings, as well as the horizon within which the manifestation of what is present occurs. He claims that in the tradition of Western philosophy, the original Greek experience of ἀλήθεια has been misinterpreted and forced into oblivion. Consequently, for Heidegger, ἀλήθεια is what is most worthy of thought. Its question is, for him, inseparably bound up with the question of being. Heidegger's inquiry into ἀλήθεια in the Parmenidean poem takes us beyond the Greek experience of being, namely, to ἀλήθεια in the no longer Greek but Heideggerian sense as the openness of being. Further, since the openness of being refers to a situation with in history, the context of his interpretation of Parmenides becomes the history of being. Only in this context, I conclude, can we fully understand and appreciate the interpretation of Presocratic thinkers in his later works." (p. 21)

41. Kurfess, Christopher. 2014. "Verity's Intrepid Heart: The Variants in Parmenides, DK B 1.29 (and 8.4)." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 47:81-93. Abstract: "Abstract: This paper argues that the widespread impression of Parmenides as a poor poet has led to consequential errors in the reconstruction of his poem. A reconsideration of the sources behind two of the more disputed lines in the standard arrangement of the fragments leads to the suggestion that modern editors have mistakenly treated what were similar but separate lines in the original

poem as variants of a single verse. Seeing through that confusion allows us to see Parmenides in a better poetic light, and gives potential insight into how his manner of exposition relates to his philosophic message."

42. ———. 2016. "The Truth about Parmenides' *Doxa*." *Ancient Philosophy*:13-45.
"In a recent article in this journal, Néstor-Luis Cordero has offered an interesting account of how scholars may have been misreading Parmenides' poem for centuries, as well as some provocative suggestions on how to correct that misreading.(1)
(...)
Cordero's essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently overlooked. However, his account of the history of scholarship on the Doxa calls for correction on some points, and his own proposed rearrangement of the fragments strikes me as at least as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with him a conviction that the orthodoxy about the Doxa is incorrect, my own view of where it goes wrong is rather different. In what follows, I begin by discussing several matters raised by Cordero that, though often neglected, are necessary preliminaries for a responsible reconstruction of Parmenides' poem. As we proceed, attending more closely to the ancient sources for the fragments and venturing into what might seem like alien terrain, a different way of viewing the Doxa, including a 'new' fragment, will emerge."
(1) 'The "Doxa of Parmenides" Dismantled', hereafter 'Cordero 2010'. See also Cordero 2008, [*Eleatica 2006: Parmenide scienziato?* Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag] 78-80 and Cordero 2011b [*Parmenidean "Physics" is not Part of what Parmenides calls "δόξα"*]. References to Cordero 2010 in the main body of the text are by page number(s) alone, given in parentheses. The abbreviation 'DK' refers to Diels and Kranz 1951. Items such as 'DK 10' or

'DK 7.5' are shorthand for referring to the 'B' fragments (and line numbers, if given) in the chapter in DK on Parmenides.

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Already published in French as: "Parménide dans Théophraste", in "La Parola del passato. Rivista di studi antichi", 43, 1988, pp. 262-280.
"Under the aegis of this physicist, and pre-Empedoclean, Parmenides of the second part of the poem, I propose to analyse here the context of the quotation of fr. 16 DK in Theophrastus' *Treatise on Sensations*.(9) My aim is to show how Theophrastus, by the use which he makes of the term συμμετρία in his critical summary of Parmenides' theory of sensations, would have authorized the doxographical tradition (of which he is one of the primary sources) to rank Parmenides, no less than Empedocles and Epicurus, under the banner of a physics which respected the integrity of being, that is, in the terms of Aetius' report, of a physics of quantity and of aggregates. This demonstration analyses the way in which Theophrastus interprets fr. 16 and rereads closely the first part of Theophrastus' report, which presents itself in part as its exegesis." (p. 3-4)
(9) J. P. Hershbell, 'Parmenides' Way of Truth and B 16', *Apeiron*, 4 (1970), 1-23, has suggested that the fragment

ought rather to belong to the first part of the poem; but it is hard to see how, if it is true that the duality of the elements, which the fragment certainly presupposes (cf. the beginning of Theophrastus' report: δυοὶν οντοιν στοιχείοιν) has no place there.

2. Latona, Max J. 2008. "Reining in the Passions: the Allegorical Interpretation of Parmenides B Fragment 1." *American Journal of Philology* no. 129:199-230.
"Abstract. This article attempts to determine whether Parmenides intended the chariot imagery of his poem to be construed allegorically, as argued by Sextus Empiricus. Modern interpreters have rejected the allegorical reading, arguing that Sextus was biased by Plato, the allegory's true author. There are, however, reasons to believe that a tradition (either native or imported) of employing the chariot image allegorically preexisted Plato and Parmenides. This article argues that Parmenides was drawing upon such a tradition and did portray mind as a charioteer upon a path of knowledge, and impulse as the horses, requiring guidance in order to reach the destination." (p. 199)
3. Lebedev, Andrei V. 2017. "Parmenides, ΑΝΗΡ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΣ. Monistic Idealism (Mentalism) in Archaic Greek Metaphysics." *Indo-European Linguistics and Classical Philology* no. 21:495-536.
Proceedings of the 21st Conference in Memory of Professor Joseph M. Tronsky.
"In our view there is only one possibility to make philosophical sense of Parmenides' poem: to take seriously the ancient tradition on his Pythagorean background and to interpret his metaphysics as monistic idealism or immaterialism. The sphere of Being described in the Aletheia is not a lump of dead matter, but the divine *Sphairos* of the Western Greek philosophical theology known from Xenophanes and Empedocles, conceived as pure *Nous* (Mind) which is the only true reality. The identity of Being and Mind is explicitly stated by Parmenides in fr. B 3, Zeller's and Burnet's interpretation is grammatically impossible and never occurred to any ancient reader. «What-is», conceived as a sphere of divine light endowed

with consciousness, is also the invisible «Sun of Justice» (the Sun that «never sets»), an archaic idea known to Heraclitus and imitated by Plato in the allegory of the Sun in the Republic. Night (the symbol of body and corporeal matter) does not exist, it is an empty name resulting from a linguistic mistake of mortals who misnamed the absence of light as a separate substance. The Kouros of the Proem is not Parmenides himself, but an Apollonian image of his venerated teacher Pythagoras whose soul ascended to the celestial temple (oracle) of gods in a winged chariot and received there an oracular revelation from Aletheia herself, a great gift to humanity that liberated men from the veil of ignorance and fear of death. The first part of Parmenides' poem was not just an exercise in speculative metaphysics concerned with problems of motion and plurality, but a handbook of philosophical theology and practical psychology with ethical and political implications: the attributes of the divine absolute are paradigmatic for the personality of an ideal citizen abiding to law (Dike) and a warrior who has no fear of death and pain, since he knows that his soul is immortal and his body is just a «shadow of smoke» (σκια` καπνοῦ). The immobility of the divine Sphere is not a physical theory, but an image for meditation, a psychological paradigm of the ataraxia and tranquility (*hesychia*) of the wise who has eradicated all passions and has assimilated his psyche to god following Pythagoras'command ἔπου θεῶι." (pp. 497-498)

4. Lesher, James H. 1984. "Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: the *poludêris elenchos* of Fragment 7." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:1-30.
"It is reasonable to suppose that Parmenides' primary objective in writing his famous poem was to provide a correct account of what exists. Much of the long argument of Fragment 8 is aimed at establishing the attributes of 'the real' *(to eon),* and it is the teaching of Fragment 6 that all thinking and speaking must be about the real. Yet we should remember that the goddess who delivers Parmenides' message announces in Fragment 1 that we will learn also about 'mortal beliefs' *(brotôn doxas)* and `the things

believed' *(ta dokounta)*. The argument of Fragment 2 begins by listing the ways of enquiry that are 'available for thinking' *(noesai)*. Parmenides' poem is therefore both an enquiry into being and an enquiry into thinking, and his positive theory is both about being and about thinking. In what follows, I offer an account of Parmenides' critique of human thinking, focusing on the crucial, but largely misunderstood, idea of the*poludêris elenchos* mentioned briefly at the end of Fragment 7. I shall argue that in the motif of the *deris* Parmenides expressed a view of the human capacities for independent thinking that departed from an older and derogatory view, and that by adapting the older idea of the *elenchos* to a new, philosophical, use, he introduced an influential decision procedure into philosophical enquiry." (p. 1)

5. ———. 1994. "The Significance of κατὰ πάντ᾽ ἀ<σ>τη in Parmenides Fr. 1.3." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 14:1-20.
"Few of the problematic aspects of Parmenides' poem have proven more resistant to solution than the famous crux contained in the first sentence of his Fr. 1 (following our best MS, N= Laur. 85.19, of Sextus' adversus Mathematicos vii 111)"
(...)
"For more than fifty years, from the publication in 1912 of the third edition of DK [Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*] until 1968, it was widely supposed that N actually contained the phrase κατὰ πάντ᾽ ἄστη -- 'down to, along, on, or among all cities', but A.H. Coxon disposed of that idea when he reported that DK's ἄστη was actually a misreading of the MS, caused perhaps by a passing glance at the αστι in the πολύφραστοι in the adjacent line. Coxon' s claim that N contained ἄτη and not ἄστη was subsequently corroborated by Tarán
1977; a photocopy of Laur. 85.19. f. 124v. clearly showing the ἄτη has since been published in Coxon's 1986. (pp. 1-2)
"Nevertheless, I believe, and will proceed to argue, that a good case can be made for restoring ἄστη by emendation as the original text of Parmenides' Fr. 1.3. The case will consist of showing how, when viewed in the larger context of early

Greek poetry, κατά πάντ᾽ ἀστη can be seen to possess an entirely natural meaning and, in concert with virtually every other feature in the opening lines of Fr. 1, contribute to a single, appropriate objective for the proem as a whole. The immediate question, then, is essentially a philological matter, but to answer it we must consider how Parmenides' views, aims, and methods might have been shaped by the artistic and intellectual traditions of his time and place." (p. 2)

6. ———. 1994. "The Emergence of Philosophical Interest in Cognition." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:1-34.
   See § 4: *Parmenides' way of knowing*, pp. 24-34.
   "To the list of Parmenides' contributions to Greek philosophy we should, therefore, add what might best be described as an adaptation of a familiar 'peirastic' paradigm of knowledge for use in the context of philosophical enquiry and reflection. But, having recognized this, we might also want to view Socrates' denial of any involvement with Presocratic ideas about knowledge with some scepticism. At least when the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues sets out to discover the nature of the virtues by putting a series of rival definitions to the test-hoping to find a λόγος that will remain steadfast throughout the entire process of examination his approach represents not a repudiation of earlier views of knowledge, but rather a continuation and extension of them." (p. 34, notes omotted)
7. ———. 2002. "Parmenidean *elenchos*." In *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*, edited by Scott, Gary Alan, 19-35. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
   This paper is a revised version of Lesher 1984.
   "The present account differs from the 1984 paper in (1) omitting any discussion of the novelty of Parmenides' view of thought as subject to the control of the individual and (2) offering a different analysis of the structure of Parmenides' main argument. My view of the development of the meaning of *elenchos* from Homer to the fourth century and its meaning in Parmenides' poem remains unchanged. In the

sixteen years since to *Oxford Studies* paper appeared, the has been relatively little discussion of the meaning of *elenchos* in Parmenides' proem (and a great deal about the Socratic *elenchus*), but the view of *elenchos* as a "test" or "examination" has been endorsed in several accounts: A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1986); David J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)." (p. 19) "The upshot of the present analysis is that Parmenides' *polude¯ris elenchos* was a "controversial but forceful testing" of the possible ways of thinking and speaking about what is. By adapting the older idea of an *elenchos* or *dokimasia* of a person's qualifications or a thing's true nature to consider the merits of alternative conceptions of the nature of what is, Parmenides succeeded in mounting an effective presentation of his view in the face of competing accounts and a well-entrenched common sense." (p. 34)

8. Lewis, Frank A. 2009. "Parmenides' Modal Fallacy." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 54:1-8. Abstract: "In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not, joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not. Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be, and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not, Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete." (p. 1)
9. Lloyd, Geoffrey Ernest Richard. 1962. "Right and Left in Greek Philosophy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 82:56-66.

"The purpose of this article is to consider how the symbolic associations which right and left had for the ancient Greeks influenced various theories and explanations in Greek philosophy of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The fact that certain manifest natural oppositions (e.g. right and left, male and female, light and darkness, up and down) often acquire powerful symbolic associations, standing for religious categories such as pure and impure, blessed and accursed, is well attested by anthropologists for many present-day societies. Robert Hertz, in particular, has considered the significance of the widespread belief in the superiority of the right hand, in his essay 'La préeminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse' [*Revue Philosophique* lxviii (1909), 553 ff., recently translated into English by R. and C. Needham in *Death and the Right Hand* (London, 1960) 89 ff.).
It is, of course, well known that the ancient Greeks shared some similar beliefs, associating right and left with lucky and unlucky, respectively, and light and darkness with safety, for example, and death. Yet the survival of certain such associations in Greek philosophy has
not, I think, received the attention it deserves. I wish to document this aspect of the use of opposites in Greek philosophy in this paper, concentrating in the main upon the most interesting pair of opposites, right and left. Before I turn to the evidence in the philosophers
themselves, two introductory notes are necessary. In the first, I shall consider briefly some of the evidence in anthropology which indicates how certain pairs of opposites are associated with, and symbolise, religious categories in many present-day societies. The second
contains a general summary of the evidence for similar associations and beliefs in prephilosophical Greek thought." (p. 56)

10. ———. 1964. "The Hot and the Cold, the Dry and the Wet in Greek Philosophy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 84:92-106.
"In a previous article ([*Right and Left in Greek Philosophy*] JHS lxxxii (I 962) 56 ff.) I examined some of the theories

and explanations which appear in Greek philosophy and medicine in the period down to Aristotle, in which reference is made to right and left or certain other pairs of opposites (light and darkness, male and female, up and down, front and back), and I argued that several of these theories are influenced by the symbolic associations which these opposites possessed for the ancient Greeks. In the present paper I wish to consider the use of the two pairs of opposites which are most prominent of all in early Greek speculative thought, the hot and the cold, and the dry and the wet. My discussion is divided into two parts.
In the first I shall examine the question of the origin of the use of these opposites in Greek philosophy. How far back can we trace their use in various fields of speculative thought, and what was the significance of their introduction into cosmology in particular? And then in the second part of my paper I shall consider to what extent theories based on these opposites may have been influenced by assumptions concerning the values of the opposed terms. Are these opposites, too, like right and left, or inale and female, sometimes conceived as consisting of on the one hand a positive, or superior pole, and on the other a negative, or inferior one?· How far do we find that arbitrary correlations were made between these and other pairs of terms, that is to say correlations that correspond to preconceived notions of value, rather than to any empirically verifiable data?" (p. 92)

11. ———. 1966. *Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press.
"The aims of this study are to describe and analyse two main types of argument and methods of explanation as they are used in early Greek thought from the earliest times down to and including Aristotle, and to consider them, in particular, in relation to the larger problem of the development of logic and scientific method in this period." (p. 1)
"In Fr. 2 Parmenides puts a choice between two alternatives as if these were the only alternatives conceivable.
But even if we disregard the vagueness or ambiguity of ἐστι, the ‘propositions' which Parmenides expresses are not

contradictories (of which one must be true and the other false), but contraries, both of which it is possible to deny simultaneously, and it is clear that from the point of view of strict logic they are not exhaustive alternatives.
Fr. 8 throws more light on Parmenides' conception of the choice between ‘it is' and ‘it is not'. The addition of the word πάμπαν in Fr. 8 11 should be noted. What he means by the word ‘wholly' in the sentence 'thus it needs must be *either* that it is wholly or that it is not' becomes clear when we consider the remainder of Fr. 8 where he argues that ‘what is' is ungenerated and indestructible (vv. 6-21), immovable and unchangeable.(1) ‘What is not', conversely, is said to be inconceivable (8 f., 17, 34 ff.), and we are told that nothing can ever come to be from what is not (7 ff., 12 f.). The two alternatives between which Parmenides wishes a choice to be made might, then, be expressed, in this context, as *unalterable existence* on the one hand, and *unalterable non-existence* on the other. But if this is so, Parmenides' alternatives, stated in the form of propositions, are again a pair of contrary, not contradictory, assertions, for the contradictory of 'it exists unalterably' is 'it does not exist unalterably' *and not* 'it is unalterably non-existent' . By taking 'it is' and 'it is not' in *this* sense(2) as exhaustive alternatives in Fr. 8 11 and again in 16 (‘it is or it is not'), Parmenides *forces an issue*. Physical objects, subject to change, cannot be said to 'be' in the sense of 'exist unalterably' which Parmenides evidently demands: but since he allows no other alternative besides unalterable existence and unalterable non-existence, then, according to this argument, physical objects must be said not to exist at all, indeed to be quite inconceivable." (pp. 104-105)
(1) See ακίνητον at Fr. 8 26, and the denial of all sorts of change at 38 ff.
(2) Even if we take ἐστι in a predicative, rather than an existential, sense, Parmenides’ choice again seems to lie between a pair of contrary assertions, i.e. between 'it is wholly so-and-so' (e.g. black) and 'it is wholly not-so-and-so' (not black), rather than between contradictories ('it is wholly so-and-so' and 'it is not wholly so-and-so').

12. ———. 1972. "Parmenides' Sexual Theories. A Reply to Mr Kember." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 92:178-179.
Abstract: "In an article entitled ‘Right and left in the sexual theories of Parmenides' (*Journal of Hellenic Studies* XCI [1971] 70–79) Mr. Owen Kember challenges my statement (*Polarity and Analogy* [1966] 17) that ‘Parmenides probably held that the sex of the child is determined by its place on the right or left of the mother's womb (right for males, left for females)'. In his article Kember draws attention, usefully, to the confusions and contradictions of the doxographic tradition. He has, however, in my view, misinterpreted one crucial piece of evidence. This is the testimony of Galen, who quotes Parmenides Fragment 17 (δεξιτεροῖσιν με`ν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δε` κούρας) in the course of his commentary on [Hippocrates] *Epidemics* vi ch. 48. Kember notes, correctly, that the meaning of the fragment by itself is quite unclear: 'the only deduction which can be safely made from the actual fragment is that Parmenides thought right and left were somehow connected with sex, and even here we must rely on Galen's judgement that the passage did in fact refer to sex in the first place' (op. cit. 76)."
13. Loenen, Johannes Hubertus. 1959. *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias. A Reinterpretation of Eleatic Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Reprint New York: Humanities Press, 1961.
"Presents a comprehensive review of Eleatic philosophy as developed by Parmenides and Melissus, and as interpreted by Gorgias. identifies the ideas which are common in Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophical positions, as well as the themes (which are deemed substantial) that separate them. Observes that Gorgias' attack of Eleatic ideas must be understood from the point of view given to those ideas by Melissus. Speaks of Eleatic philosophy as a metaphysics of absolute reality, in which dualism (rather than monism) and epistemological rationalism are the fundamental ideas. Observes that Parmenides "must not be looked upon as the father either of materialism or of idealism, but that he may indeed be considered the first representative of dualistic

metaphysics and a realistic form of epistemological realism" (p. 5)." [N.]
Reviewed by: Rosamund Kent Sprague, *Classical Philology*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), pp. 267-269; M. C. Scholar, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 3, Number 2, October 1965, pp. 255-260; Jean Bollack, *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 19, 1, 1966, pp. 65-70. (in French).

14. Long, Anthony Arthur. 1963. "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:90-107.
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds.), *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatic and the Pluralists,* London,: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 82-101.
"The significance claimed by Parmenides for the cosmogony which forms the second half of his poem continues to be highly controversial. The interpretations offered by Owen and Chalmers, to name two recent criticisms, are so widely divergent that one might despair of arriving at any measure of agreement. (2) But since the significance of The Way of Truth must itself remain in some doubt until the status of the cosmogony is determined, further examinations of the evidence are justified. The purpose of this article is to discuss the passages throughout the poem which are concerned with mortal beliefs, and to suggest an interpretation of the fundamental lines 50-61 of B 8. (3) In this way the function of the cosmogony may, I believe, become clearer.
Of the solutions to the problem suggested by ancient and modern critics, four main trends can be discerned:
I. The cosmogony is not Parmenides' own but a systematized account of contemporary beliefs.
2. The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth.
3. The cosmogony has relative validity as a second-best explanation of the world.
4. Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony.
The first view, canvassed by Zeller and modified by Burnet to a 'sketch of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology', finds few adherents among modern scholars. (4) It has never

been explained, on this interpretation, why the goddess should be made to expound in detail a critique of fallacious theories. Bowra (5) has taught us to see the poem as demonstrably apocalyptic, and Parmenides needed no goddess's patronage to set forth his contemporaries' cosmological systems. Moreover, there is nothing in the later part of the poem which can be explicitly attributed to any attested philosopher. The doxographers in general, from Aristotle, assign the cosmogony to Parmenides himself.
The second and third views above have received much support. It is argued, following Aristotle, (6) that Parmenides cannot have countenanced absolute denial of phenomena. Such an explanation, however, fails entirely to account for the later activity of the Eleatics, and is quite at variance with the evidence of the poem. It belittles the achievement of Parmenides, and fails to take into account the evidence in favour of 4., even when this is equivocal. I shall argue that the cosmogony gives a totally false picture of reality; that it is the detailed exposition of the false way mentioned in The Way of Truth (B 6.4-9) and promised by the goddess in the proem (B 1. 30-32); that it takes its starting point from the premise of that false way, the admission of Not-being alongside Being, not from the introduction of two opposites, Fire and Night; and finally, that its function is entirely ancillary to the Way of Truth, in the sense of offering the exemplar, par excellence, of all erroneous systems, as a criterion for future measurement."
(2) G. E. L. Owen, '*Eleatic Questions*', Classical Quarterly NS X (1960), pp. 84-102, above, pp. 48-81; W. R. Chalmers, '*Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals*', Phronesis V (1960), pp. 5-22.
(3) All fragments of Parmenides are quoted from Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1951).
(4) J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London 1930), p. 185.
(5) C. M. Bowra, '*The Proem of Parmenides*', Classical Philology XXXII, 2 (1937), pp. 97-112.
(6) Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. A5 986 b 18.

15. ———. 1996. "Parmenides on Thinking Being." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:125-151.
With a commentary by Stanley Rosen, pp. 152-162.
Reprinted in: G. Reschnauer (ed.), *Frügriechisches Denken,* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, pp. 227-251.
"At the end of one of his studies of Parmenides Heidegger wrote: "The dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an end, not only because so much in the preserved fragments of his 'Didactic Poem' still remains obscure, but also because what is said there continually deserves more thought."(1) Heidegger's diagnosis of the reasons for "this unending dialogue" is instructive-Parmenides' obscurity, on the one hand, and secondly, the merit of his words as a provocation of thought." (p. 125)
(...)
"In this paper I want to elucidate Parmenides' project on the assumption that we should approach him as a philosopher whose primary concern was to explore the activity of veridical thinking, and to identify its subject and object." (p. 126)
(...)
"Drawing upon his own philosophy, Heidegger offered a number of suggestions—some of them challenging, others perverse— about the way Parmenides took thinking to relate to Being. If I understand Heidegger, he tried to get inside the mind at work in Parmenides' poem, with a view to showing what it is like to think Being with Parmenides. My paper, though it is totally different from Heidegger's in method and findings, has that much in common with his.(5) I propose that Parmenides' first call on us is not to think about Being but to think about thinking Being (6). In modern jargon, Parmenides' project is a second-order inquiry. He is not purely or primarily a metaphysician. He is investigating mind, from the starting point that something is there—Being or truth—for mind to think." (p. 127)
16. Loux, Michael J. 1992. "Aristotle and Parmenides: An Interpretation of *Physics* A.8." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:281-319.

With a commentary by Arthur Madigan, pp. 320-326. "Parmenides' argument for the impossibility of change so dominated Greek thinking that we can expect it to loom large in Aristotle's discussion of coming to be in *Physics* A, and we are not disappointed. After presenting his own analysis of coming to be in *Physics* A.7, Aristotle devotes all of A.8 to the argument.(1)" (p. 281)
(1) In attempting to understand Aristotle's response to the Parmenidean argument, one is struck by the fact that recent literature on A.8 seldom attempts to work through the difficult text of A.8. Those writing on the chapter typically provide inferential reconstructions of Aristotle's reply to Parmenides. As philosophically interesting as those reconstructions are, they tend to leave large chunks of the text unexplained. This paper is an attempt to identify the line of argument Aristotle actually employs in A.8. Its method is unabashedly that of extended philosophical commentary. I do not claim to have explanations of every line of the chapter, but I hope the paper goes some distance towards delineating the main contours of the argument of A.8. I make no apologies for my somewhat tedious attention to the details of Aristotle's response to Parmenides since I believe that clarity on the text of A.8 is a prerequisite to more general philosophical reflection of the sort that has typified recent literature on this chapter.

17. Mackenzie, Mary Margaret. 1982. "Parmenides' Dilemma." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 27:1-12. Abstract: "Parmenides the Eleatic wrote a treatise which intrigued, puzzled and confounded the later philosophical tradition.(2) In it, he argued for a strong monism: what there is, is eternal, complete, immoveable and unvarying, one and homogeneous (DK 28B 8.3-6).(3) All the rest, the world of perceptible things, is contradictory - or an illusion. Strong monism is frighteningly radical. So Parmenides left a series of problems in his wake, some of which have proved so recalcitrant as to be dismissed with that counsel of despair 'it's a dialectical device'.(4) This paper addresses two of those problems, and recasts the dialectical device in a mood of optimism."

(2) The secondary literature on Parmenides is extensive: cf. bibliographies in J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Vol.1 (London: 1979) (*PP*) and A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: 1970). Like many students of ancient philosophy, I have benefited most of all from the work of G.E.L. Owen; see, for example, his classic 'Eleatic Questions' (*EQ*) in R.E. Allen and D.J. Furley eds. *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*, Vol.II (London: 1975), 48-81: or 'Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present' in A.P.D. Mourelatos, ed, *The Presocratics* (New York: 1974). 271-292.
(3) All references to H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zurich: 1968) (*DK*).
(4) Cf. Owen, *EQ*, 54.

18. Makin, Stephen. 2014. "Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus." In *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Warren, James and Sheffield, Frisbee, 126-158. New York: Routledge.
Abstract: "Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus, philosophers of the fifth century BC, are often grouped together by scholars. They are sometimes referred to collectively as the Eleatics, after Elea in southern Italy, the home city of both Parmenides and Zeno (Melissus came from the Greek island of Samos). The connection between them is generally taken to turn on an opaque set of views enunciated by the earliest of the three, Parmenides. Each of the three can be taken as representative of a distinct philosophical strategy. Parmenides was an innovator, in that he offered positive arguments for a novel and provocative set of views about the nature of reality. Zeno was a defender, in that he attacked those who thought Parmenides' ideas sufficiently absurd that they could be rejected out of hand. Melissus developed Parmenides' thought by arguing, often in fresh ways, for views which, while fundamentally Parmenidean, differed in some details from those originally set out by Parmenides. I will accept this framework in what follows, although this account of the relation between Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus is not universally accepted. (See Plato's *Parmenides* 126b–129a for the source of the view of Zeno as

a defender of Parmenides; for critical discussion see Solmsen 1971, Vlastos 1975, Barnes 1982: 234–237; on Parmenides and Melissus see Palmer 2004; for a treatment of all three see Palmer 2009: Chapter 5.)" (p. 34)

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Palmer, J. (2009), Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Vlastos, G. (1975), “Plato’s Testimony Concerning Zeno of Elea”, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 95: 136–163

19. Malcolm, John. 1991. "On Avoiding the Void." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:75-94.

"Several prominent scholars have maintained that a denial of empty space, or the void, is crucial to Parmenides' rejection of plurality and locomotion.' Plurality, for example, implies divisibility but there is no *what is not* (or void) to separate one supposed portion of *what is* from another. Hence *what is* is one. Locomotion, also, might well appear to need some (empty) room for manoeuvre, but such is precluded by the proclaimed 'fullness' of *what is*. Recently, however, interpreters of Parmenides have not been convinced that an appeal to the non-existence of a void plays a role in his denial of locomotion and plurality. The void is in fact never explicitly mentioned in his poem. More importantly, to introduce the void weakens Parmenides' position, for a *plenum* may he regarded as permitting both locomotion and plurality -- a situation adopted by his successors Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Moreover, at B 8. 22 Parmenides asserts that there cannot be any distinctions within *what is* and this principle *is* strong enough to preclude *any* locomotion or plurality. This renders an appeal to the absence of the void unnecessary as well as insufficient.

Let me expand on this latter point with regard to both locomotion and plurality. In so doing I shall accept certain assumptions which shall require (and receive) subsequent identification and defence." (pp. 75-76, notes omitted)

20. ———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is'/'Teaches' Analogy." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:281-296.

"Parmenides says that 'what is not' cannot be thought of or expressed (fragments 2, 3, 6). Though there is no explicit filling after the forms of *einai*, let us not read them as 'exists', but let us see how far we can get without committing Parmenides to the view that we cannot think of, or refer in speech to, what does not exist.(10) If we understand an ellipsis and take the traditional alternative, the copula, Parmenides' dictum seems obviously true. If we cannot ascribe attributes to something, we cannot conceive of it (but see n. 7 above).

By excluding not being Parmenides (fragment 8) derives an impressive(11) series of characteristics of Being. Most of these, i.e. one, unchanging, continuous, indivisible, and homogeneous, follow directly from the denial of di·erentiation. I shall urge that this key move is best read as taking being as incomplete, not as *existence*." (p. 284)

(7) Kahn, 'Return', 386, quotes Plotinus as denying being to the One. He reads this as removing all predicative being, but not existence, from that sublime entity. It is unclear tome how this interpretation harmonizes with the view, which he champions, that the ancients did not (implicitly) distinguish existence from predication.

(10) As against e.g. D. Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* (Toronto, 1984), 8.

Brown (217–18) clearly presents the paradoxical results of limiting *esti* to 'exists'.

(11) For Brown, 'startling' (216).

Works cited:

Brown, L., 'Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry' ['Enquiry'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 4 (1986), 49–70.

‘The Verb “to be” in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks’ [‘Verb’], in S. Everson (ed.), *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–236.
Kahn, C., ‘A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being’ [‘Return’], *Ancient Philosophy*, 24 (2004), 381–405.

21. Maly, Kenneth. 1985. "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 1:5-23.
"This essay attempts to present Heidegger's reading of Parmenides, focusing on the lecture course of 1942-43, the lecture *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* (1966), and the Zahringen Seminar (1973). It shows (a) Heidegger's dealing seriously with the texts of Greek philosophy, (b) his grappling with the issue of metaphysics, (c) the new possibility for philosophical thinking that his reading of the Greeks offers, and (d) his engagement in the difficult task of dismantling the history of Western thought (i.e., metaphysics) towards a new possibility for thinking. In dismantling the philosophy of Parmenides, Heidegger's work takes Parmenides' text deeper than the simplistic issue of "static being" over against "becoming"."
22. Manchester, Peter B. 1979. "Parmenides and the Need for Eternity." *The Monist* no. 62:81-106.
"Greek ontology eventually developed a notion variously described as 'timeless', 'atemporal', or 'non-durational' eternity. In Proclus and Simplicius it is already a school-commonplace, with a stable vocabulary in which *aion* (eternity) is sharply distinguished from what is merely *aidios* (everlasting, occupying all times). Plotinus had perfected this notion beforehand, believing not only that he found it in Plato, but that Plato had developed it on Parmenidean grounds.
Until the last twenty years or so historians generally shared that view, on the ground of verbal agreement among familiar texts from Parmenides, Plato and the Neoplatonists.
(...)

But the criticism which distrusts the retrojection, via verbal agreement, of later conceptions into earlier argumentation has had this whole 'tradition' under intense scrutiny lately, and it has not held up uniformly well. It is no longer always conceded that the aion of Timaeus or the aei on of more common Platonic usage are nondurational, and there is increasingly frequent unwillingness to read an argument against duration in the Parmenides of our fragments.(1)" (P. 81)

"Parmenides contrived a discourse that had a different means of surviving verbatim than that of Heraclitan epigram, but survive it has. The proposal of this paper is that its treatment of time stabilizes it, provides the 'negative feedback' that holds the text homeostatic against millennia of emenders.

But what about eternity? Not the theological eternity, connected with divine omniscience and with theodicy, but the Greek ontological notion. Eternity, the Now of the All One, is not 'non-time' but the paradigm for the timelikeness of numbered time." (pp. 99-100)

(1) W. Kneale, "Time and Eternity in Theology," Aristotelian Society, *Proceedings* (NS) 61 (1960-61), pp. 87-108.

23. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1981. "Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi." *Vigiliae Christianae* no. 35:174-182.

"We have noticed that, in Plutarch, Parmenides' cosmogonic Eros plays an important part and that he also says that Parmenides spoke of a cosmogonic Aphrodite. This is Plutarch's name for the anonymous goddess who in Parmenides *creates Eros* (*Vorsokr*. Fr. 28B13, quoted *Amat*. 756 F29). The activities of this goddess are described in some detail in a fragment of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius only (*Vorsokr*. Fr. 28B12), and in a non-verbal quotation by the same Simplicius (*In Phys*., p. 39, 20-1, cf. *Vorsokr*. ad Fr. 28B13).

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the hymnic description of Eros in NHC 11, 5, is strikingly parallel to these Parmenidean passages:

NHC II [Nag Hammadi Codex II], 5, 109, 16ff. - Parmenides B12, 1-3; 4-5." (p. 179, notes omitted)

"Yet I am not going to argue that the author of NHC 11, 5 had read Parmenides, any more than he had read Hesiod. Above, I have suggested that the person responsible for the Gnostic treatise in the form in which it has come down to us was influenced by Greek literature
comparable as to its contents to passages in Plutarch." (p. 180)

24. ———. 1994. "The Rhetoric in the Poem of Parmenides." In *Filosofia, politica, retorica. Intersezioni possibili*, edited by Bertelli, Lucio and Donini, Pierluigi, 1-11. Milano: Franco Angeli.
"In the present paper, I wish to argue that Parmenides not only uses means we may call logical, but also avails himself of means we may call rhetorical. His logic is not a formal logic or *logica docens*, but a *logica utens*. In the same way, his rhetoric is not a *rhetorica docens* (not yet a τέχνη, as Aristotle would say) but a *rhetorica utens*. Aristotle, at the beginning of his *Rhetoric*, actually uses the concept of a *rhetorica utens*, for he points out that rhetoric and dialectic are very closely related and that all men, more or less, make use of both, either at random or from practice or acquired habit. It is this natural endowment which forms the basis of the art (1)." (p. 1)
(...)
"We may safely conclude that Parmenides wanted to convince his audience in every way possible not only by means of argument, but also by using every possible rhetorical effect. This explains why the concept of 'conviction' (and a number of words relating to this concept) occupies a key position in the poem (epanodos again); actually, the word for conviction and its relatives are even used as a means of conviction (41).
The maidens «knowingly persuade» the watcher at the Gate by using «blandishing arguments» (B1. 15-6): they know how to argue and to get their way (42). Truth is most persuasive (ευπειθεος), whereas there is no true πιστις (43) in the views of men (B1.29-30). The way of 'what there is' is the way of conviction (πετθους B2.4). It is the power of niorig which prevents something to come to be from what is

not there (B8.12 ff.). True πιστις has driven away coming to be and passing away (B8.28-9). What mortals believe (πεποιθοτες) to be true is not so (B8.39b ff., cf. B1.30). The account of truth provided by the goddess and its comprehension is πιστος (B8.50-1).

This πιστις, one should point out, is brought about by rigorous argument; it is caused by proof. True. It does make a difference whether one is convinced by rhetorical means, or is so by logical means. But, as Aristotle says, a rhetorical proof (nioTu;) is a kind of proof, and we are most fully persuaded when we assume that something has been proved (44). Often enough, the proofs in the poem involving πιστις are addressed ad hominem, that is to say are expressed in contexts containing the personal pronouns you and me (45), or verbs in the second or first person. The goddess is addressing her one-man public; the greater part of the poem is a formal logos (in verse) pronounced by her. What we would call logical proof is her most important instrument of conviction in the Way of Truth, but it is again and again presented as precisely such an instrument. In Parmenides' day, *logica* and *rhetorica* were still in their pre-technical stage of development and, in Aristotle's words, existed only as interrelated natural endowments. Parmenides of course knows what he is doing. Yet I would argue that for him the difference between rhetoric and logic was not as important as it would become in later times. Today, rhetorical and informal means of argument and of bringing about conviction have again become the object of serious study. But this is not my subject.*

(1) Arist, *Rhet*. A 1,1354a1 ff.

(41) I have learned much from A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London 1970), 136 ff., but prefer an interpretation that is a bit more superficial.

(42) Cf. my paper cited above, n. 17, 274. [Cf. J. Mansfeld, "Bad World and Demiurge: A 'gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo", in M. J. Vermaseren and Roel B. Broek (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, Leiden 1981,

repr. as Study XIV in Id., *Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism*, CS 292, London 1989), 273 n. 29.]
(43) Although I am as a rule opposed to *Wortphilologie*, I wish to remined the reader of the importance of this term in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.
(44) *Rhet*. 1.1.1355a4-6, Since it is evident that artistic method is concerned with *pisteis* and since *pistis* is a sort of demonstration [apodeixis] (*)
(45) See above, n. 27.
(*) Translation by George A. Kennedy; Mansfeld cite the Greek text.

25. ———. 2005. "Minima Parmenidea." *Mnemosyne* no. 58:554-560.
Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, *Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review*, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 177-184.
Critical and exegetical notes on on the following Fragments from Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz (eds.), *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*:
1. *A Handicap* Fr. B1.22-3a; 2. *A Subject* Fr. B2 1-5; 3. *A Way* B6.3; 4. *Changing Place and Colour* B 8.38-41.

26. ———. 2008. "A crux in Parmenides fr. B 1.3 DK." In *In pursuit of "Wissenschaft". Festschrift für William M. Calder III zum 75. Geburtstag*, edited by Heilen, Stephan [et al.], 299-301. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Jaap Mansfeld proposes to read δια` παντός in the fragment 1.3 DK instead of πάντ' ἄστη.

27. ———. 2015. "Parmenides from Right to Left." *Études platoniciennes* no. 12:1-14.
Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 185-202.
Abstract: "Parmenides devotes considerable attention to human physiology in an entirely original way, by appealing to the behaviour and effects of his two physical elements when explaining subjects such as sex differentiation in the womb, aspects of heredity, and sleep and old age. Unlike his general cosmology and account of the origin of mankind, this topos, or part of philosophy, is not anticipated in his

Presocratic predecessors. What follows is that the second part of the Poem, whatever its relation to the first part may be believed to be, is meant as a serious account of the world and man from a physicist point of view."
"The first to place the relation between the two parts of the Poem explicitly on the agenda was Aristotle, who says that Parmenides on the one hand placed himself beyond physics by postulating that there is only one immobile Being — but that, on the other hand,
constrained to follow the phenomena, he introduced two physical elements, the hot and the cold or fire and earth in order to construct the world, and in this way designed a theory of nature. A remarkable divergence, but not, it appears, a fatal one. Aristotle even provides a link between the two parts of the Poem by adding that Parmenides classified the hot as Being and the cold as non-Being.(4) That this particular link is most unlikely matters much less than that he endeavoured to find one.
(...)
In the present paper I shall be concerned with a substantial part of the history of this reception, and use it to try and draw some conclusions. Though for the sake of simplicity the evidence will not always actually be discussed from right to left, a fair amount of
backshadowing underlies most of the following inquiry." (pp. 1-2)
(4) Arist. *Met*. A.5 986b14–987a2 (= 28A24, in part). Cf. *Phys*. 1.2 184b26–185a1.

28. ———. 2018. "Parmenides on Sense Perception in Theophrastus and Elsewhere." In *Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review*, 2013-217. Leiden: Brill.
Abstract: "Theophrastus' account at *De sensibus* 3–4 shows (1) that he did not find evidence for a detailed theory of sense perception in Parmenides and (2) that he did not include our fr. 28B7 in his overview. The tradition followed by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius concluded from 28B7 that Parmenides rejected the evidence of the senses in favour of that of reason (*logos*). But *logos* in Parmenides

means 'argument', and *glôssa* is not the organ of taste but of speech. If Theophrastus had interpreted the evidence of 28B7 in the manner of Sextus and Diogenes he would have been obliged to discuss Parmenides' triad of purported senses between Plato's two and Empedocles' five."

29. Martin, Stuart B. 2016. *Parmenides' Vision: A Study of Parmenides' Poem*. Lanham: University Press of America. "Sifting through the various interpretations of Parmenides' poem from ancient times to the present-day, one might easily get the impression that there were two philosophers who went by the name "Parmenides." The first and much the older "Parmenides" was a religious seer warning about the danger of settling for a superficial reading of human experience. His visionary poem proclaims that Reality, although it may appear multiple, is as the mystics disclose, an all-comprehending One.1 This Parmenides is credited with insights into the nature and meaning of the universe beyond that which reason alone can discover. This view of Parmenides might well be called, the "religious-mystical" view. However, for many if not most 20th century Western scholars, Parmenides was a protomodern philosopher weighing in against the naive religiosity of his time with a series of brilliant but flawed arguments which perhaps led him to conclude that being is one, but whose method in later, more skillful hands, has come to underpin the scientific (and naturalistic) outlook of the modern world. In short, many modern philosophers relying primarily on analytical procedures would claim Parmenides for themselves. Their interpretation of Parmenides, for want of a better name, could be called the "rationalist" view. The "religious-mystical" interpretation is firmly grounded in the belief that Parmenides' poem is precisely what it presents itself to be in its opening verses: a vision in which God appears to Parmenides and proclaims to him the way to that one-whole Truth which lies hidden behind the veil of appearances. However, the modern student of philosophy may never encounter any serious consideration of this view, for the pervasive opinion of modern specialists, usually followed uncritically by the textbook expositors, is that

Parmenides is first and foremost a rationalist, and the opening scenario is merely a literary device." (p. 1)

30. Mason, Richard. 1988. "Parmenides and Language." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:149-166.
Abstract: "Parmenides says very little about language. Yet what he says is important, both in the interpretation of his philosophy and more widely. This paper will aim to fit together a coherent understanding and to explain why his views have a wider interest. Four themes will be considered: the nature and extent of his critique of the use of language by mortals; his alleged position as a primordial philosopher of reference; the status of the utterances he puts into the mouth of his Goddess; and his apparent identification of speaking with existing or being."

31. Matson, Wallace I. 1980. "Parmenides unbound." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 2:345-360.
Abstract: "One may doubt whether any two scholars interpret Parmenides in exactly the same way. Nevertheless on one fundamental point they divide naturally and sharply into two camps, which I shall call the Majority and the Minority.
The Majority hold that Parmenides intended the Aletheia part of his poem to be taken as expounding the absolute truth about το εὸν, in complete contrast to the Doxa part which presents an altogether untrue account of things that have no real existence. According to the Minority view, on the other hand, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity.
In this paper I shall argue in advocacy of the Minority position."

32. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:113-135.
Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second. I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has

called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it. Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics."

33. ———. 1986. "A Note on Parmenides' Denial of Past and Future." *Dialogue* no. 25:553-557.
"In a recent issue of *Dialogue*, Leo Groarke attempts to defend the claim that Parmenides was committed to an atemporal reality.(*)
He argues like this:
(1) In the Parmenidean dictum "[It] is and cannot not be" (B2.4), "is" means "exists", and is in the present tense (536).
(2) (According to Parmenides) there is nothing that fails to exist (536).
(3) It follows from (1) and (2) that "the past is not" and "the future is not" (537).
(4) If the past and future are not, then the present is not. "All three tenses go down the drain together" (538), and so reality is atemporal." (p. 553)
"The point that I have tried to make in this short discussion note is that one cannot be careless about the ontology that one attributes to Parmenides in order to make his ban on non-existence yield other results such as the ban on change, or the abolition of time. Groarke is not the only person to have done this: there are others who have thought that an ontology of facts is adequate to explaining Parmenides' denial of change.(6) Groarke, however, is in special trouble because his account demands, and does not just permit, facts." (p. 557)
(6) For example, Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology", in Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics* (New York: Anchor Press, 1974), 260.
(*) Leo Groarke, "Parmenides' Timeless Universe", Dialogue 24/3 (Autumn 1985), 535-541.

34. McKirahan, Richard. 2008. "Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8." In *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*, edited by Curd, Patricia and Graham, Daniel W., 189-229. New York: Oxford University Press.
"David Sedley recently complained (1) that despite the enormous amount of work on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have received insufficient attention. (2) It is universally recognized that Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is (3) has several attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those attributes. Some (4) hold that the proofs form a deductive chain in which the conclusion of one argument or series of arguments forms a premise of the next. Others (5) hold that the series of inferences is so tightly connected that their conclusions are logically equivalent, a feature supposedly announced in B5: "For me it is the same where I am to begin from: for that is where I will arrive back again." In act, close study of the fragments reveals that neither claim is correct. Here I offer a new translation of B8, lines 2-51, with an analysis of the arguments, their structure, their success, and their importance.(6)
I begin with a caution. Many of Parmenides' arguments are hard to make out: even on the best arrangement of the available sentences and clauses they are incomplete. Since Parmenides lived before canons of deductive inference had been formalized, he may not have thought that there is need to supply what we regard as missing premises. The interpreter's job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides' train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from premises he gives. This is a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic, depending on how we understand other arguments of his as well, and requires willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt -- up to a certain point." (p. 189)

(1) Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," 113. Sedley's complaint applies to antiquity as well.
(2) Jonathan Barnes is a notable exception to this tendency. I am indebted to his analysis in *Presocratic Philosophers*, chaps. 9-11.
(3) So far as possible, I translate to eon by "what-is"; I avoid "being." The expression denotes anything that is (see note 18 here).
(4) Notably Kirk & Raven 268
(5) Owen, "Eleatic Questions."
(6) In some places my discussion depends on interpretations of B2, B6, and B7 that are not presented here for want of space. I sketch my justification for controversial views in the notes.
(18) Parmenides argues here that the second road of investigation, "is not," cannot be pursued, on the grounds that you cannot succeed in knowing or declaring what-is-not. The minimal complete thought characteristic of the first road is *eon* (or *to eon) estin* ("what-is is"), with "what-is" being a blank subject with no definite reference: anything that is, whatever it may turn out to be and however it may be appropriate to describe it or refer to it. Likewise for the second road: the blank subject of *ouk estin* ("is not") is *to me eon* (or *mé eon)* ("what-is-not"), and the minimal complete thought characteristic of the second road is *to me eon ouk estin* ("what-is-not is not"). The argument is not a refutation of "is not" as such. Nor is it a refutation of "what-is-not is not" in the sense of proving that that claim or thought is false. Instead Parmenides undermines "what-is-not is not" as a possible claim or thought. Since what-is-not cannot be known or declared, then a fortiori no claim *about* what-is-not can be known or declared (for instance, that it is not). Therefore, not even the theoretically minimum thought or assertion about the second road is coherent; no one can manage to think (much less know) it or declare it. On Owen's view ("Eleatic Questions"), the second road is eliminated not at 2.7-8 but at 6.1-2, which establishes the subject of "is" to be not the blank subject I am proposing but whatever can be spoken and thought of. In my view, the

second part of 6.1 (*esti gar einai*: "for it is the case that it is," which Owen translates "for it is possible for it to be") repeats the content of the first road (2.3), while the first part of 6.2 (*meden d' ouk estin*: "but nothing is not," which Owen translates "but it is not possible for nothing to be") repeats the content of the second road (2.5). with the appropriate "minimal" subjects supplied. Given these premises, it follows that it is false (and therefore not right) to think that what-is-not is or that what-is is not, but true (right) to do what the first part of line 6.1 says: "it is right both to say and to think that it [namely, the subject of "is"I is what-is." The importance of 6.1-2 thus consists in the introduction of minimal subjects for "is" and "is not" together with the associated truisms that what-is is and what-is-not (namely, nothing) is not. This prepares the way for the discussion of the first road in B8, exploring the nature of what-is. (p. 222)

35. ———. 2010. "Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford's Fragment." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:1-14.
"Having established the attributes of τὸ ἐον in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that 'you cannot know what is not ... nor can you declare it' (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8.
(...)
One of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato's *Theaetetus* and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line -- a misquotation of the true version, or an allogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently." (p. 1)

36. Meijer, Pieter Ane. 1997. *Parmenides Beyond the Gates: the Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa*. Amsterdam: Gieben.

Contents: Part I: Being and Thinking; Chapter I. The relation of Being and Thinking 3; Chapter II. Being and temporality 15; Chapter III. Being and spatiality 29; Chapter IV. Being and Matter 44; Chapter V. Tensions of a spatial and material Being and of Thinking within the identity of Being and Thinking 47; Chapter IV. Fragment 4 of the identity of Being and Thinking 54; Appendix: Parmenides and the previous history of the concept of Being 85; Part II. Being and Logic; Chapter I. The logical circle:98; Chapter II. The subject of *estin 114*; Chapter III. The logical procedure again 123; Part III. Doxa and Mortals; Chapter I. Ways and 'Doxa? 144; Chapter II. Scholarly views of the 'Doxa' 166; Chapter III. The basic error of fr. 8, 53,54 190; Chapter IV. Negative qualifications of the Doxa 208; Chapter V. A plea for the existence of the Doxa 217; Part IV. A panoramic survey of results 234; Bibliography 252-257; Indices 258-274.

"Crucial will also be the discussion of the ways of inquiry Parmenides offers. Their detailed examination and delineation will appear to be of vital importance for the understanding of both Being and the Doxa. Anticipating my results, I would like to present as my view that die Doxa is not at all a way of inquiry, but that it must be seen as an optimalized description of Parmenides' view on this world. It embeds many theorems of predecessors to give an accomplished, overall and insuperable picture of this world, which is radically separated from "the world" of Being.

In Part I of this book the problems which arise from the identification of Being and thinking are examined. In Part II it is the issue of the relation of logic and Being that comes to the fore. In Part III I attempt to catalogue and assess the scholarly explanations given of the Doxa sofar in order to clarify the problems and arrive at a view of my own. Many publications in this field are lacking in confrontation with other already existing opinions. In presenting my own views I confront the views of other scholars. Therefore, a panoramic survey of my results may facilitate the reading of this book. This is the reason why I added Part IV to provide a summary of my views and conclusions."

37. Miller, Fred Dycus. 1977. "Parmenides on Mortal Belief." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 15:253-265.
"I shall argue here that we, also, ought to accept Plato's judgment as to the philosophical merit of Parmenides' work. At the core of Parmenides' logic, I believe, we find neither a crude equivocation on the Greek word " to be" nor a crude confusion between meaning and reference or between meaning and truth, nor a bundle of modal fallacies. What we do discover is an important insight concerning the nature of thought and discourse, expressed in such a subtly (but disastrously) confused way that the valuable was not completely disentangled from the nonsensical until Plato wrote the *Sophist*.
The repudiation of the beliefs of mortals at the outset of "The Way of Seeming" is founded upon the "strife-encompassed proof" which is developed in "The Way of Truth." I will endeavor to clarify his reasoning, considering Parmenides' attack on naming and the repudiation of mortals' beliefs (Section I) and later his principle or dictum that "you cannot think or say what is not" (Section lII). In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Parmenides' reasoning, I will also make use of two arguments that were intentionally directed against Eleatic teachings: Leucippus's defense of the void (Section II) and Plato's defense of falsity (Section IV)." (p. 253)
38. Miller, Mitchell H. 1979. "Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:12-35.
"The aim of this discussion is to offer an interpretation of the sense and intent of Parmenides' ἔστι. As the plethora and variety of excellent analysis attests, the problem is a perplexing one. The interpreter is faced with an intentionally fragmentary utterance - the ἔστι appears to stand alone, with its subject (and, possibly, predicate) ellipted - embedded in a collection of fragments from a lost whole poem which, in turn, is itself one of the few pieces of philosophical writing to survive from the sixth century B.C. I will argue in this essay, nonetheless, that the original

context of the ton can be recovered and that, once this context is established, its sense can be fixed.
The key to my interpretation is a close reading of the proem. As it is, this passage is generally ignored in analyses of the argumentative substance of the poem." (p. 12)
"If this interpretation is correct, then Parmenides did not regard the contraries as mere illusion. 53 It is true that he does not provide any explicit ontological characterization of their secondary status or domain. That will be the work of Plato and Aristotle.
Nonetheless, in their accounts they are not overcoming a one-sided monism but, rather, completing a task for which Parmenides has established the starting-point and direction." (p. 28, note omitted)

39. ———. 2006. "Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides' Poem." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:1-47.
"Let me begin by distinguishing an ultimate and a proximate task for these reflections. The ultimate task, a perennial one for students of Greek philosophy, is to understand just what Parmenides lays open for thinking and speaking when, in the so-called Truth section of his poem, fragments 2 through 8. 49, he isolates the 'is' (ἐστι) that is 'the steadfast heart of . . . truth' (1. 29). The proximate task is to explore the context Parmenides gives us for this ultimate task, the proem's account of the transformative journey to and through 'the gates of the paths of Night and Day' that brings the traveller into the presence of the truth-speaking goddess.' We modern-day philosophers have generally been reluctant to pursue this exploration too closely, not only because we are accustomed to draw a sharp distinction between poetry and philosophy, a distinction that, arguably, did not take hold in the Greek world until Aristotle, but also, more to the point at present, because Parmenides' proem seems riddled with ambiguity. This is not wrong; indeed, as I shall try to show, its ambiguity is both more extensive and more central than has been recognized heretofore. But I shall also try to show that it is a resource, not a liability; by the close of these reflections I

hope to have made compelling that and why bringing the ambiguity of the proem into good focus is key to a well-oriented turn to our ultimate task, understanding the 'is'." (p. 1)

40. Minar Jr, Edwin L. 1949. "Parmenides and the World of Seeming." *American Journal of Philology* no. 70:41-55.
"In summary, the legislative activity of Parmenides and his association with the politically-minded Pythagoreans show him to be capable of taking interest in practical affairs. The very fact of his writing a didactic poem, the rhetorical warmth of its style, the elaboration of the second part as a socially valuable doctrine, all show that his philosophy is not alien to this interest.
And the appropriateness of his intellectual position to his position in life and the correlation of his views with those of other thinkers, opposing and agreeing, which are sometimes expressed in social terms, make it seem not unlikely that he was influenced in their formation by his reaction to the problems of the " world of seeming."
In so far as he had an immediate aim of conviction and conversion, it is questionable how successful he can have been in it.
Certainly he attracted a number of brilliant and devoted disciples, but it was naive to expect many to follow the severe, logical development of his thoughts, and a type of theory which almost everyone must regard as absurd-or to expect many to be influenced strongly by a system frankly presented as truly false and only second-best. Yet his greatness, as was said at the outset, is as a thinker, not as a statesman, and his important influence was not upon his contemporaries but upon later philosophers." (p. 55)

41. Mogyoródi, Emese. 2006. "Xenophanes' Epistemology and Parmenides' Quest for Knowledge." In *La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell'età dei Presocratici = The construction of philosophical discourse in the age of the Presocratics*, edited by Sassi, Maria Michela, 123-160. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.
Abstract: "The purpose of this essay is to explore the role Xenophanes' theory of knowledge might have played in the

formation of Parmenides' central metaphysical concerns. It provides a detailed study of Xenophanes' epistemic tenets clarified within the context of his
theology and cosmology. It argues that although Xenophanes' epistemic ideas were formulated within the intellectual historical context of traditional 'poetic pessimism', an examination of his theology and cosmology indicates that inasmuch as he radically departed from the traditional notion of the divine and the divine-human relationship, his epistemology created an ambiguous epistemic setting chat proved provoking for the new paradigm of knowledge philosophical speculation introduced in early Greece. Parmenides responded to this crisis by a metaphysical inquiry into the rationale of 'the quest' and the nature of reality in a way by which he brought about a fundamental breakthrough toward a new methodology to attain scientific certainty.
Since Xenophanes' epistemology was essentially related to his theology, Parmenides' response necessarily entailed a new conception of the divine-human relationship."

42. Montemayor Romo de Vivar, Carlos. 2006. *Time and Necessity in Parmenides*. Long Island City NY Seabum.
43. Morgan, Kathryn. 2000. *Myth and Philosophy from Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
On Parmenides see pp. 67-86.
"A study of the fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem concerning the possible types of human enquiry provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis of one suggestive use of myth in Presocratic philosophy. We have argued that Xenophanes defined his philosophical aspirations by excluding poetic/mythological practice. Herakleitos appropriated and transformed mythological elements in order to draw attention to the failings of traditional myth as an adequate system of signification. Both philosophers are concerned with the problematic relationship of language and reality. Yet in both cases poetry and mythology, although important, even crucial targets, are not *structuring* principles in their philosophy. When

one moves to the fragments of Parmenides, one is in a different world. Although Parmenides' mythology is non-traditional, his search for knowledge is communicated to the reader through familiar motifs of quest and revelation and is attended by divine mythological beings. His wisdom is expressed in epic hexameters, which, although commonly stigmatised as clumsy and pedestrian, transport us back to the poetic and mythological realm of Homer and Hesiod. (1)

What on earth was Parmenides about?

In this section, I shall characterise the ways in which Parmenides chooses to talk about his insight into the problems of being. Treatments of Parmenides sometimes imply that the mythological framework of the poem is a veneer that can be stripped away to reveal pure philosophical argument. On the contrary, mythological elements are integrated into the argument, and interpreting their status is one of the crucial philosophical problems in the poem. Separating Parmenides' *mythos* from *logos* he speaks the same tendency we saw in the interpretation of Xenophanes' literary ethics and theology: the desire to tidy up philosophy (separate *mythos* from *logos*) so that it conforms to modern perceptions of its subject matter and method. The idea that literary presentation might have philosophical import is ignored. There is, however, no dichotomy between logic on the one hand, and metaphor and myth on the other. This is to argue in terms which would have been foreign to Parmenides. Problems of mythological style and philosophical content are not only parallel, they are expressions of the same difficulty, the relationship between thought and its expression. Here Parmenides follows in the footsteps of his predecessors as he focuses on the problems of myth as a way of symbolising the difficulties inherent in all language.

Parmenides wishes to make his audience aware of the non-referentiality of what-is-not. He does this through logical argument and by developing mythological figures of presentation that transgress the conclusions of his argument. Both argument and literary presentation problematise the status of the audience; there is a

paradoxical incoherence between the world in which we live and the uniqueness and homogeneity of what-is. These difficulties are mirrored in the uncertain relationship of the narrator of the poem (the *kouros),* Parmenides the author, and the goddess who reveals the truth. The goddess replaces the Muse, but the source of inspiration is uncertain. Let us first survey the main features of the revelation, emphasising the dose connection between thought and being, along with the key themes of narrative persuasion and conviction. We will then engage in a dose reading of the mythological framework of the proem to show how it structures and elaborates the key themes of the rest of the poem. Finally we shall consider the poem as a series of nested fictions that draw attention to problems in the relationship of language and reality, problems of which the mythological framework is paradigmatic." (pp. 67-68)
(1) Parmenides may also have included Orphic elements, which would again contribute to a sense of comfortable orientation in a tradition (Mourelatos 1970: 42). For a recent, but unconvincing, attempt to find Orphism in Parmenides, see Böhme 1986.

44. Morrison, J.S. 1955. "Parmenides and Er." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 75:59-68.
Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to explore the suggestion that Parmenides's poem, or at any rate some of it, has light to throw on the difficulties of the myth of Er in the *Republic*. Parmenides descends to the underworld as a shaman-poet in search of knowledge, Er goes there by the fortuitous circumstance of his death-like trance; but both *katabaseis* share a common setting, and in both the hero is shown a glimpse of the real shape and mechanism of the universe. In the case of Parmenides the exhibit is two-fold, both 'the unshakeable heart of rounded truth' and 'the opinions of men in which there is no true belief'. Interest has been mainly concentrated on the former, metaphysical, section, from which the greater part of our fragments derive; but the latter contained, in the system of *stephanai* (*), an account of the appearance of the universe, which is interesting, both on its own account and in view of the light it throws on the

difficulties of Er's myth. I shall consider first (I) the setting of Parmenides's poem as it appears in the opening lines, then (II) propose an interpretation of the system of *stephanai*, and (III) seek support for some of its main features in the general tradition of cosmological speculation from Homer downwards. Finally (IV), I shall proceed to examine the myth of Er and offer an interpretation of some of its difficulties which will take account of this body of earlier thought."
[(*) "Parmenides, on the other hand, in fact [proposes] a fabrication. He makes up something like a wreath—he calls it a *stephanē*-—a continuous blazing circle of light which encircles the heaven, and he calls it god." Cicero *On the Nature of the Gods* i, 11, 28 (*Dox*. 534, 14–535, 8) cited by A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Revised and Expanded Edition, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2009, *Testimonia* 54, p. 144.]

45. Mosimann, Robert. 2001. "Parmenides. An Ontological Interpretation." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 23:87-101.
"Presocratic scholarship is a rare phenomenon and even when it occurs, often commences from misguided tenets. Anglo-American philosophy has been much preoccupied by linguistic analysis and logical concerns. Regretfully these concerns of the day have been foisted upon Parmcnides as if he too were a shadow of today's illusions in philosophy.
This paper has several objectives, however, the principal one will be to provide an Ontological interpretation of Parmenides in replacement of the Logical Ones which have come to dominate Anglo American scholarship.
The second concern of this paper will be to correctly interpret "estai" and "that which is" in Parmcnides as well as to determine the existential status of the objects of everyday experience.
Finally, we will discuss Parmenides conception of time and whether "that which is" is atemporal, eternal or neither." (p. 87)

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"There are books on the pre-Socratics, and there are books on Plato.[*] Except in general histories of ancient Greek philosophy, the border that marks off Plato's philosophy of the cosmos and of nature from the thematic domain of corresponding accounts offered by the pre-Socratics is not crossed very often. Among exceptions to this pattern, one that is both well known and distinguished is Gregory Vlastos' 1975 book, *Plato's Universe*. And now Jenny Bryan's *Likeness and likelihood in the Presocratics and in Plato* is a welcome addition to the genre, and indeed a specially worthy complement to *Plato's Universe* inasmuch as Bryan deals with topics that had not been central in Vlastos' account.
The book's project is announced by Bryan ('JB' henceforth) as one of developing 'an intertextual reading of [Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Plato's] use of *eoikōs/eikōs*. Her narrative of intertextuality is engaging, and it is elegantly told in well-organized sections and sub-sections. Ir comprises careful and sensitive analyses of the target Greek texts; and ii reflects wide and searching reading of the

relevant studies in the secondary literature. She shows herself well-trained and adroit in the deployment of the twin methods her topic calls for: the conscientious philologist's scrupulous examination of words in their context and in their history; 1he analytic philosopher's probing of concepts and the dialectical canvassing of issues and of candidates for solutions. The entire narrative involves four stages. which I summarize in what immediately follows." (p. 169 notes omitted)
[* Discussion of Jenny Bryan, *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*]

2. Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. 1965. "φράζω and Its Derivatives in Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 60:261-262.
"Ever since Villoison's 1788 (*) publication of the Venetus scholia to Homer, classical philologists have been alert to the fact that φράζω may not (and usually does not) carry the meaning *dico* in early Greek poetry. It has rather a concrete sense, the core or root of which is "to point out," "to show," "to indicate with a gesture," "to appoint," "to instruct."
(...)
I would like to suggest here that the early, concrete sense of φράζω will improve the translation of 2. 6-8 and will also give us the key to the translation of that puzzling adjective πολύφραστοι applied to the horses in 1. 4." (p. 261)
[*] Jean-Baptiste-Gaspard d'Ansse de Villoison, *Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita. Scholia in eam antiquissima*, Venetiis, 1788.

3. ———. 1969. "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:735-744.
About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).
"The first of the two routes outlined by the Parmenidean goddess in fr. 2 is given this interpretive formulation in Kahn's paper: "It (whatever we can know, or whatever there is to be known) is a definite fact, an actual state of affairs." (1) Kahn explains that Parmenides intends to assert "not only the reality but the determinate being-so of the knowable object," in other words, that he posits existence both "for the subject entity" and "for the fact or situation

which characterizes this entity in a determinate way" (pp. 712-713) .
As indicated by Kahn's use of the pronoun "whatever," the thesis has the force of universality. (2) Let me condense the formulation into a single proposition:
(1) For all p, if p is known, then p is true iff (3) there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.
What should count as the denial of (1) P Presumably either:
(2) It is not the case that for all p, etc. [as in (1)];
or, more explicitly,
(3) There is a p such that: p is known, and p is true even though a certain x does not exist, or a certain F does not obtain.
If (1) is an adequate formulation of Parmenides' first route (which according to Kahn it is), then (3) ought to be the correct formulation of the second route. But Kahn's own formulation is significantly different. The first of the two "partial aspects" he distinguishes, the aspect of nonexistence of the subject, he formulates as the claim "that an object for cognition does not exist, that there is no real entity for us to know, describe, or refer to." The second aspect, nonexistence of a certain state of affairs, he expresses as the claim "that there is . . . no fact given as object for knowledge and true statement: whatever we might wish to cognize or describe is simply not the case" (p. 713). Either aspect could be condensed in either of the following formulations:
(4) There is no p such that: p is known, and p is true iff there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.
(5) For all p, if p is known, then p is true if a certain x does not exist or a certain F does not obtain.
It should be noticed immediately that (4) and (5) are alternative formulations not of the contradictory of (1) but of its contrary. If anything is clear about the argument in Parmenides' poem, it is that he intends the two routes as exclusive alternatives, the one a contradiction of the other.' Kahn's analysis thus appears to involve an imprecise formulation of the opposition between the two Parmenidean routes."

(1) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," pp. 711-712. References to the paper will hereafter be given mostly in the text and by page number only.
(2) The formulation of p. 714 has similar scope: "*esti*" claims only that something must he the case in the world for there to be any knowledge or any truth." The deflating expressions "only" and "something" should not mislead; the governing universal quantifier is in the pronoun "any."
(3) The usual abbreviation for "if and only if."
(4) But Kahn says (p. 713) that Parmenides' second route "would deny both assertions" (i.e., both the ascription of existence to x and the ascription of actuality to F). The "both" seems to be an over-statement not required by Kahn's interpretation.
(5) Kahn recognizes this (p. 706). The point I am making has nothing to do with the fact. that. the modal clauses in the two routes of fr. 2 are related as contraries. Propositions (1)-(5) are formulations of the nonmodal clauses of the routes.

4. ———. 1970. *The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos, *Names of Being in Parmenides,* Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008.
Reprint of the pages 222-263 (abridged and slightly revised) wit the title: "The Deceptive Words of Parmenides' 'Doxa' " in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 312-349.
Contents: Returning to Elea: Preface and Afterword to the revised and expanded edition (2008) XI-L; Part I. The route of Parmenides: a study of word, image, and argument in the Fragments: Use of Greek and treatment of philological and specialized topics LIII; Abbreviations used in Part I LVII-LIX; 1. Epic form 1; 2. Cognitive quest and the Route 47; 3. The vagueness of What-is-not 74; 4. Signposts 94; 5. The

bound of reality 115; 6. Persuasion and fidelity 136; 7. Mind's commitment to reality 164; 8. Doxa as acceptance 194; 9. Deceptive words 222; Appendix I. Parmenides' hexameter 264; Appendix II. Interpretations of the Subjectless *esti 269*; Appendix III. The meaning of *kré* and cognates 277; Appendix IV. Text of the Fragments 279; Supplementary list of works cited in Part I. 285; Part II. Thee supplemental essays; Abbreviations used in Part II 297; 10. Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naive metaphysics of things 299; 11. Determinacy and indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides 333; 12. Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides 350; Part III. The scope of naming: Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991) on B.38 and related issues (Essay not previously published: "Names" of being in Parmenides, by Gregory Vlastos 367; Indexes to Parts I-III 391-408.

"My own aim has been to steer a middle course, keeping three points in sight: (a) Parmenides' relation to the epic tradition; (b) the deep and central involvement of his thought in the sequence of Greek philosophy from Thales to Plato; (c) the supra-historical dimension of the concepts, problems, and arguments in the poem.

The book is not intended as a commentary on the fragments. For this one must still turn to Hermann Diels' *Parmenides' L.ehrgedicht* (Berlin, 1897) and to the two more recent commentaries: Mario Untersteiner's *Parmenide: testimonianze e frammenti* (Florence, 1958) and Leonardo Taran's *Parmenides: Λ Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays* (Princeton, 1965). The most up-to-date, comprehensive account of the various interpretations of individual lines and passages will be found in the Italian revision of Zeller's history of Greek philosophy: E. Zeller-R. Mondolfo, *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico*, Part I, 3, "Eleati," ed. G. Reale (Florence, 1967), pp. 165-335.

As the subtitle of the present study indicates, I have concentrated on the actual language of the fragments: on analyzing the meaning of key words, on articulating arguments, and on exploring the context and morphology of

images in the poem. These three aspects I see as congruent. The study of Parmenides' vocabulary reveals that the key terms are embedded in certain paradigms involving analyzable logical structures. They provide trace lines for the argumentation—the logical grammar of the words channels the course of the argument. A similar point can be made with reference to the second aspect mentioned in the subtitle. The imagery introduced in the narrative prelude (B1) is preserved, to an important extent, through verbal echoes in the rest of the poem. But the images do not function evocatively, to suggest a mood, or to point to a symbolic value. Rather, they come in certain configurations of motifs or themes, familiar from Homer (especially the Odyssey) and from Hesiod. The imagery can thus provide a sort of logical calculus for the argument, as well as paradigms or-models for the radically new concepts of knowledge and reality which Parmenides strives to formulate.

I might best summarize all this in saying that I have tried to do justice to the fact that Parmenides composed a philosophical argument in the form of an epic poem. In accordance with this approach, I have also tried to show in the concluding chapter that the poem's dramatic setting, rudimentary as it is (an all-knowing goddess in a double relation to "ignorant mortals" and to a privileged youth, who is entrusted with a revelation to be subsequently communicated to his fellow men), interacts in important ways with the rhetoric and the argument of the poem as a whole. (The comparison with Plato is, once again, apposite.)" (from the *Preface* to the first edition, 1970, pp. XIV-XV)

"In the nearly four decades that have passed since the Yale University Press edition, the volume of literature on Parmenides, both books and essays, has exploded. Accordingly, a thorough and fully updated revision is out of the question. It could only be a total re-writing of the book. Let me, then, clarify at the outset the scope of "revised and expanded." On its subject, *The Route of Parmenides* inevitably reflects the *status quaestionis* of the mid- and

late- 1960s. The revisions in the present reissue of the Yale Press book (Part I of this volume) are modest: mostly corrections of misprints; altering or adjusting some misleading formulations; editing some egregiously dated phrases, such as "X has recently argued," or "in this [twentieth] century"; and the like. All this was done with care not to change the arabic-number pagination (except for the Indexes) of the Yale Press edition; for it was my concern not only to keep costs of production low but also to ward off the emergence of inconsistencies in citations of the book in the literature.
(...)
If the revisions are delicate and unobtrusive, the expansion is substantial and obvious. Part II reprints three essays of mine, composed in the mid- and late- 1970s, in which I sought to supplement, to strengthen, and in some respects also to modify theses that were advanced in the original edition of the book (theses that are still represented here in Part I). As in the case of the text in Part I, slight adjustments and corrections have been made for the reprinting of the three essays. But the type-setting and pagination in Part II are, of course, new. Part III consists of a previously unpublished essay by Gregory Vlastos. The rationale of publishing posthumously this essay by Vlastos, as well as that of reprinting my own three previously published essays, is perhaps best given in the course of a narrative, which immediately follows here, of my engagement with the thought of Parmenides over the years. Additional comments and afterthoughts, ones that reflect my present views on crucial points of interpretation, will be presented in the course of the narrative and in the closing sections of this Preface." (from the Preface to the Revised and Expanded Edition, 2008, pp. XI-XIII)

5. ———. 1971. "Mind's Commitment to the Real: Parmenides B8 34-41." In *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, edited by Anton, John P. and L., Kustas George, 59-80. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"An expanded version of this paper appears as chapter 7 of my book, *The Route of Parmenides*" (p. 59)

"In proposing to undertake here yet another argument on the analysis of the passage, I do not aim for anything like certainty or finality of exegesis. This would be too much to hope for, when we are working at such small scale, and all the more so in the case of pre-Socratic
studies, where the evidence itself is limited and fragmentary and our controls over language and background only too imperfect. Rather it is through an analysis of this passage that I can explain most clearly and directly a certain conception of the relation of mind to reality for which I also find evidence in other texts, in some of the characteristic aspects and themes of Parmenides' poem, and which I consider philosophically and historically important. So let me proceed directly to the analysis, not pausing to review or to formulate the status quaestionis, but taking up points of controversy as they arise." (pp. 59-60)

6. ———. 1973. "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Being." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:16-48.
   Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Assen: Van Gorcum.
   Already published as chapter 10 of *The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments*.
7. ———. 1976. "Determinacy and Indeterminacy: Being and non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides." In *New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics*, edited by Shiner, Roger and King-Farlow, John, 45-60. Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.
   "The main argument in Parmenides' didactic poem begins with these remarks by the unnamed goddess who delivers the revelation (B2 in Diels-Kranz Die Fragmente dec Vorsokratiker): [follow a translation of B2-B8, here omitted]
   Modern students of Parmenides have agonized over the question as to how precisely we are to construe the first *esti* and the *einai* of the positive "route," and the *ouk esti* and *me*

einai of the negative "route". The older solution was to attempt to guess the identity of the suppressed subject from the context, and then to supply it in the translation (e.g., "Being exists . . . or “Something exists," or "Truth exists...," or "The route (*hodos*) exists...," and the like). In more recent years a certain consensus has developed, at least in English-language literature, that Parmenides' argument depends on suppressing the subject initially; that it is his intention to allow the subject to become gradually specified as one ponders the logic and implications of the two routes. Within that wider consensus, my own argument has been (2) that Parmenides' subjectless *esti* in B2 is best understood as {syntactically) a bare copula,with both its subject and its predicate complement deliberately suppressed. The route *esti* would thus represent not a proposition or premise but the mere form or frame of propositions that characterize their subject in positive terms, "___is___" or "x is *F*" r for variable *x* and *F*; the route *ouk esti*, correspondingly, would represent the form of propositions that characterize their subject in negative terms, "___is not___" or (*x* is not-*F*,” for variable *x* and *F*. Of the arguments which, I believe, justify this construction, I shall restate here only those that can be presented most briefly; I shall also present some fresh considerations and additional evidence; and, on certain points, l shall qualify or attempt to elucidate my earlier account." (pp. 46-47 some notes omitted)
(2) *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London. 1970.1. pp. 51-55. 70. 269-76; "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Meiaphysics of Things"' in *Exegeses and Argument*, pp, 40-46; "Comments on ‘The Thesis of Parmenides.' " *The Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1969>, 742-44.

8. ———. 1979. "Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides." *The Monist* no. 62:3-14.
"In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four

interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: (a) Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of *esti*, "is," or *einai,* "to be," in his statement of the two "routes" in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. (b) The negative route, *ouk esti*, "is not," or *me einai,* "not to be," is banned because sentences that adhere to it fail to refer (semantically speaking) to actual entities - the latter to be understood broadly, as will shortly be stated in thesis (d). (c) The argument does not depend on a confusion between the "is" of predication and the "is" of existence. (d) In the relevant contexts, *esti* and *einai* involve a "fused" or "veridical" use of the verb "to be"; in other words, *esti* or *einai* have the force of "is actual" or "obtains," or "is the case," envisaging a variable subject x that ranges over states-of-affairs. (1)
I formulate the four theses as abstractly and schematically as I can to do justice to the considerable variation of scholarly opinion that obtains within the consensus. It is clear, nevertheless, that the four theses concern fundamental points, and so one may even speak of the emergence of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides-let me refer to it as "SI," for short." (p. 3)
"In several respects, which correspond to the criteria of adequacy just cited, SI falls short. I detail these shortfalls in the next five paragraphs. The considerations I offer do not amount-I hasten to emphasize - to a refutation of SI. But they do provide pointers of the directions in which Feyerabendian alternatives might be sought." (p. 5)
(1) See G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," (1960), W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. II, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus,* pp. 6-57; Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," (1968) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides" (1969); Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (1971), pp. 127-148; David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides" (1973); Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics* (1972), pp. 78-99; T. M. Robinson, "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real" (1975) [references abbreviated].

My formulation both of the consensus and of alternatives fails, unfortunately, to take into account a major new interpretation of Parmenides: Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 155-230, which appeared after the present paper had already gone to print.

9. ———. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'not-Being': some literary contexts that bear to Plato." In *Arktouros. Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, edited by W., Bowersock Glen, Walter, Burkert and C.J., Putnam Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   Reprinted in: John P. Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: Plato,* Albany: State University of New York Press 1983, pp. 59-69.
   "It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (μηδέν or ουδέν). (1) Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" = "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen. (2) His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the *Sophist*, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: *meden* or *ouden* can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "'what is not anything, what not in anyway is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unindentifiable, no subject." (3) In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may—in certain contexts—work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as

negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for μὲ ον, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be."
(1) See Parmenides B 6.2, cf. B 7.1, B 8.7-13, B 9.4; Plato *Rep*. 478 B 12-C 1, *Tht*. 189 A 10, *Soph*. 237 C7-E 2. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in *Plato, I, Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 225-227.
(2) Owen, "Plato on NotBeing," pp. 241-248 and passim. For use of this assumption in interpreting Parmenides, see D. J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides," in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Phronesis, suppl. vol. 1 (Assen and New York, 1973) 12.

10. ———. 1981. "Pre-Socratic Origins of the Principle that There are No Origins from Nothing." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 78:649-665.
"Even those who might question the truth of the *ex nihilo nihil* principle would readily concede that this principle itself could not have sprung from nothing. The origins are in pre-Socratic philosophy.
(...)
But the earliest text with a recognizable version of the *ex nihilo nihil* (henceforth ENN) is Parmenides B8.7-10." (p. 649)
"This will not be a complete story of the origins of ENN, but I hope enough will be said to clear the way for renewed appreciation of the tenor of Aristotle's thesis.(*) My concern is not to vindicate Aristotle but to bring out conceptual connections and implications in pre-Socratic fragments." (p. 651)
(*) "from what-is-not nothing could have come to be, because something must be present as a substratum" (*Phys*. I.8.191a30-31).

11. ———. 1999. "Parmenides and the Pluralists." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 32:117-129.

The article discusses Patricia Curd's *The Legacy of Parmenides* (1998).
"Curd does not read Parmenides as a philosopher of the One. Her view is that Parmenides sought to establish formal criteria for what should properly count as 'what-is' or 'the real' (the physis or 'nature' of things) in a rationally constructed cosmology. Such an entity - or such entities - should indeed be unborn, imperishable, unchanging, and inherently complete." (pp. 117-118)
(,,,)
"In offering my own critical comments on the book, let me start by posing this question: Given that the basis for Curd's larger narrative is her interpretation of Parmenides, what exactly is that basis and how secure is it? Since half of the book is devoted to Parmenides, let me take up separately and at some length four salient theses in Curd's interpretation of Parmenides." (p. 120)

12. ———. 2011. "Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 167-189. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. Reprinted in Joe mcCoy (ed.), *Early Greek Philosophy. The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason*, Washington: The Catholic University Press 2013, pp. 91-112.
Summary: " “Doxa,” the second part of Parmenides' poem, is expressly disparaged by Parmenides himself as “off-track,” “deceptive,” and “lacking genuinecredence.” Nonetheless, there is good evidence that “Doxa” included some astronomical breakthroughs. The study presented here dwells on fragments B10, B14, and B15 from the “Doxa,” and especially on the term aidēla, interpreted as “causing disappearance,” in B10.3. The aim is to bring out the full astronomical import of Parmenides' realization of four related and conceptually fundamental facts: (i) that it is the sun’s reflected light on the moon that explains lunar phases; (ii) that it is the sun’s glare which, as the sun moves in its annual circuit, causes the gradual seasonal disappearance of stars and constellations, and that the absence of such glare explains their seasonal reappearance;

(iii) that it is likewise the sun's glare which causes the periodic disappearance, alternately, of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and it is the absence of such glare that allows, alternately and respectively, for the reappearance of each of these stars; and (iv), a ready inference from (iii), the realization that the latter supposedly two stars are an identical planet.
In seeking to make sense of the paradoxical antithesis of "Truth" vs. a disparaged yet scientifically informed "Doxa," the present study explores two modern analogues: Kant's doctrine of the antithesis of "things-in-themselves" (or "noumena") vs. "appearances" (*Erscheinungen* or "phaenomena"); and the twentieth-century doctrine of scientific realism, notably propounded by Wilfrid Sellars. The latter model is judged as more apt and conceptually more fruitful in providing an analogue for the relation between "Truth" and "Doxa." "

13. ———. 2012. ""The Light of Day by Night": *nukti phaos*, Said of the Moon in Parmenides B14." In *Presocratics and Plato. Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 25-58. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
"The earliest securely attested record of the discovery that the moon gets its light from the sun is in the second part of Parmenides' poem, the "Doxa": in the one-line fragments B14 and B15.(1) In an earlier study, I have used the term "heliophotism" as a succinct reference to the correct explanation of lunar light;(2) and for convenience I shall use the neologism again here. Daniel W. Graham has made a strong case in favor of the claim that the two fragments present heliophotism as a discovery made by Parmenides himself.(3)
(...)
My concern in this study is not with the issue of attribution of the discovery but quite narrowly with the correct reading of the text in B14. Nonetheless, as I hope to establish, once the correct reading is determined, the deflationary position will be decisively undercut. Moreover, the correct reading will give us a statement that is semantically more nuanced,

superior in astronomical accuracy, and rhetorically and poetically more expressive.
B15 will come up for supporting quotation later in the present essay. But the important amplification it provides for B14 needs to be kept in mind throughout." (pp. 25-27)
(1) See Daniel W. Graham, "La Lumière de la lune dans la pensée grecque archaïque," in *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique*, eds. André Laks and Claire Louguet (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002), 351–380, esp. 363–378; see also Graham's *Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 179–182.
(2) "Xenophanes' Contribution to the Explanation of the Moon's Light," *Philosophia* (Athens), 32 (2002), 47–59. In that publication, as well as in *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 2nd ed. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008), 224–225, I had uncritically accepted the emendation *nuktiphaes,* which is what I dispute in the present essay.
(3) See references to Graham in note 1 above.

14. Nehamas, Alexander. 1981. "On Parmenides Three Ways of Inquiry." *Deucalion* no. 33/34:97-111.
Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 125-137.
"We often take Parmenides to distinguish three "ways of inquiry" in his poem: the way of being, that of not being, and the way which combines being and not being; and to hold that of these only the first is to be followed.
This approach, originating in Reinhardt, (1) is now canonical (2). G.E.L. Owen, for example, writes that Parmenides aims to rule out two wrong roads which, together with the remaining right road, make up an exhaustive set of possible answers to the question *estin e ouk estin*;... The right path is an unqualified yes. The first wrong path is an equally unqualified no... There is no suggestion that anyone ever takes the first wrong road... It is the second, the blind alley described in... B6, that is followed

by 'mortals'. . To take this well-trodden path... is to say, very naturally, that the question *estin e ouk estin*; can be answered either yes or no (3).
The text of B6. 1-5 (...) can be translated as:
What is for saying and for thinking must be; (4) for it can be,
while nothing cannot; I ask you to consider this.
For, first, I hold you back from this way of inquiry,
and then again from that, on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander aimlessly, two headed...
Simplicius' manuscript, where this fragment is found, contains a lacuna after *dizesis* in line 3. Diels supplied *eirgo* and took lines 4ff. to follow directly afterwards. (5) Thus, the goddess scents to proscribe two ways of inquiring into being. This text, however, exhibits certain peculiarities which suggest that this view awes serious difficulties. The purpose of this paper is to present these peculiarities, discuss the difficulties, and to suggest, if cautiously, an alternative to the text and to the view it engenders." (pp. 97-98)
(1) Karl Reinhardt, Parmenides and die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, (reps. Frankfurt A.M., 1959) pp. 18-32.
(2) David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides", in E.M. Lee et al., *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in. Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (Assen, 1973), pp. 1 - 15; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. II (Cambridge, 1965); G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1957); A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven, 1970); G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Oiteslions", Classical Quarterly, N.S. vol. 10 (1960), pp. 85 - 102; Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., I 971.
(3) Owen, pp. 90-91.
(4) For this construction, see Furley, p. 11.
(5) See Diels' comment in his apparatus to the Prussian Academy edition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Berlin, 1882), p. 117.

15. ———. 2002. "Parmenidean Being / Heraclitean Fire." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 45-64. Aldershot: Ashgate.
"The facts are these.
Parmenides and Heraclitus lived at about the same time, at opposite ends of the Greek- speaking world. Parmenides constructed a rigorously abstract logical argument in vivid verse. Heraclitus composed a series of striking paradoxes in obscure prose. They are both difficult to understand. They are both arrogantly contemptuous of their predecessors as well as their contemporaries, to whom they usually refer as 'the many' or 'mortals.(1) They have been taken to stand at opposite philosophical extremes: Parmenides is the philosopher of unchanging stability; Heraclitus, the philosopher of unceasing change.
The rest is speculation.
That is not a criticism. Most of the speculation is not idle: it is interpretation, based partly on the texts and partly on a general sense of the development of early Greek philosophy. But interpretation it is and, as such, each of its aspects affects and is, in turn, affected by every other. One of these is the idea that, though close contemporaries, Heraclitus and Parmenides wrote successively and that whoever wrote later criticizes the other: either Heraclitus denounces Parmenides (2) or Parmenides attacks Heraclitus.(3) Testimony to the continuing influence of the ancient diadoche-writers, that assumption bears directly on the interpretation of both philosophers. In particular, if, as most people today believe, Parmenides is answering Heraclitus, we need to find in Heraclitus views that Parmenides, in turn, explicitly rejects in his poem.(4)
I want to question this assumption - not necessarily to reject it, but to show exactly how it affects our interpretation of both Parmenides and Heraclitus.(5) I would also like to outline, in barest form, an alternative understanding of their thought which takes them to write in parallel and not in reaction to one another. (6)" (pp. 45-46)

(1) Heraclitus also names some of the targets of his criticisms (for example, B 40, B 42, B 56, B 57, B 81, B 106, B 129).
(2) That is the view of Reinhardt, [*Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*] 1916.
(3) A notable exception is Stokes [*One and Many in the Presocratic Philosophy*], 1971, pp. 109-23, who believes that each can be understood quite independently of the other. For full references to the debate, see Daniel W. Graham, '*Heraclitus and Parmenides*' (in this volume, pp. 27-44). Graham offers a strong defense of Patin's thesis to the effect that Parmenides is directly concerned with criticizing Heraclitus in his poem.
(4) More cautiously, we need to assume that Heraclitus must at least have appeared to have held views which Parmenides rejects in his poem.
(5) It is an assumption that is important to two of the best recent studies of Parmenides and Heraclitus: Curd [*The Legacy of Parmenides*], 1998 and Graham [*Heraclitus' Critcism of Ionian Philosophy*], 1997, as well as to the latter's '*Heraclitus and Parmenides*.' Both, not incidentally, are as deeply indebted to A. P. D. Mourelatos as I am in my own inadequate celebration of his work, which this essay constitutes.
6 My view of the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus is similar to that of Stokes 1971, though the implication I draw from it for my interpretation of their views differ from his in many ways.

16. Northrup, Mark D. 1980. "Hesiodic personifications in Parmenides A 37." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 110:223-232.
"At *De Natura Deorum* 1.11.28 (= DK 28 A 37), Cicero's speaker Velleius first describes that deity who presides over, then identifies several other divine inhabitants of, Parmenides' World of Seeming"
(...)
"Developing an idea of Karl Reinhardt, Karl Deichgraber took these words as evidence that Parmenides populated his

world of doxa with personified abstracts arranged in antithetical pairs. (2)"
(....)
"In his book on Parmenides, Leonardo Tarán rejected this theory of contrary potencies, asserting that ultimately there was "no evidence" to support it.(7) That such evidence does, however, exist (although considered by neither Reinhardt nor Deichgraber) I hope to show in what follows. I hope to do so, moreover, in a way which will shed a measure of new light not only on Parmenides' poem but also on an important aspect of the Theogony, viz., Hesiod's use of personification. (pp. 223-225)
(7) L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965) 250. The Reinhardt-Deichgraber position is supported by H. Schwabl, "Zur Theogonie bei Parmenides und Empedokles," WS [*Wiener Studien*] 70 (1957) 278-289.

17. O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1-26. London: University College London Press.
English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur le* Sophiste *de Platon*, Napoli: Biblipolis 1991, pp. 317-364.
18. ———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In *The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk*, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.
"Plato, in writing the *Sophist*, "did not consider it beneath his dignity to return to the great Parmenides" . Any reader of Plato's dialogue must therefore do likewise. But whose Parmenides should we return to? If modern interpretations of the *Sophist* are legion, so too are the reconstructions that are currently on offer, from modern scholars, of the fragments of Parmenides.
Which one should we take on board?
Two names in particular stand out. Miss G. E. M. Anscombe was a close associate of Wittgenstein, and is generally

acknowledged as one of the leading philosophers of her day. Professor W. K. C. Guthrie was a pupil of F. M. Cornford, and is the only historian of ancient philosophy who has had both the knowledge and the ambition to undertake a history of Greek philosophy that would rival the great work of Eduard Zeller.(2) Both scholars therefore have impeccable credentials. Both have written on Parmenides.(3)
One or other or both, one might surely think, will have been able to recover from the extant fragments ideas that will make sense of the criticisms of Parmenides that loom so large in Plato's *Sophist*." (p. 19)
(2) See Guthrie (1962-1981). Sadly, Guthrie did not live to complete his majestic enterprise; the last volume takes us only as far as Aristotle. Cf. Zeller (1844) and (1919-1920). Gomperz (1896-1909) is too chatty to be a serious rival.
(3) Guthrie (1965) 1-80. Anscombe (1969), reprinted in Anscombe (1981) 3-8. Cf O'Brien (1987) 206 n. 25. Miss Anscombe goes so far as to entitle the first volume of her *Collected papers* (1981) *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*. Obviously therefore she does not consider her contribution on Parmenides to be a mere πάρπεργον."
Works cited
Anscombe, G. EM. (1969) 'Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* n.s. 69 (1968-9): 125-132.
-- (1981) *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe*, vol. I, *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein* (Minneapolis) 3-8.
Gomperz, T. (1896-1909) *Griechische Denker, Eine Geschichte der Antiken Philosophie*, 3 vols (Leipzig).
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962-1981) *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 6 vols (Cambridge).
--- (1965) A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. ii, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge).
O'Brien, D. (1987) *Études sur Parméni*de, sous la direction de Pierre Aubenque, tome I, *Le Poeme de Parménide, Texte, Traduction, Essai Critique "en collaboration avec Jean Frère pour la traduction française*" (Paris).

Zeller, E. (1844) *Die Philosophie der Griechen, Eine Untersuchung iiber Charackter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung*. (Leipzig).
-- (1919-1920) *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, ed. W. Nestle, 3 Teile, 6 Abteilungen (Leipzig).

19. ———. 2013. "Does Plato refute Parmenides?" In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 117-155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I have a couple of times ventured to suggest that in the *Sophist* Plato does not refute Parmenides.(2) The reaction has been, to say the least, hostile.(3) Hostile, with more than a touch of disapproval. You might have thought I had suggested that the Queen of England was a man.
The suggestion was not only false, but foolish. A mere eye-catcher. Absurd, and unseemly." (p. 117)
(...)
"Both Empedocles and Parmenides are understandably chary, though for different reasons, of the 'names' commonly applied to the phenomena of the visible world by those who know no better. Names commonly in use do not at all match what Empedocles believes to be the true explanation of such phenomena, the explanation inspired by his 'white-armed Muse' (cf. fr. 3.3). Still less do they match the message of Parmenides' goddess, dwelling beyond the Gates of Night and Day (fr. 1.11) and claiming to disprove the very possibility of anything whatever coming-into-being or passing-away (fr. 8.26 –28). All the many things that we mortals think to see, 'coming into being and passing away, being and not being, changing place and altering their bright colour', so Parmenides would have us believe, are 'no more than a name' (cf. fr. 8.38 –41)." (p. 155)
(2) O'Brien (*Le Non-Être, Deux études sur le 'Sophiste' de Platon*, Sankt Augustin 1995) 87 – 88, ('Parmenides and Plato on What is Not', in M. Kardaun and J.Spruyt (eds.), *The Winged Chariot, Collected essays on Plato and Platonism in honour of L. M. de Rijk*, Leiden, Boston, Köln 2000) 94-98.

(3)Monique Dixsaut, *Platon et la question de la pensée,* Paris (2000) 269 n. 2. Notomi, N., "Plato against Parmenides: *Sophist* 236D-242B", in S. Stern-Gillet and K. Corrigan (eds.), *Reading Ancient Texts*, vol. I: *Presocratics and Plato, Essays in honour of Denis O'Brien*, Leiden-Boston (2007) 167-187.

20. Osborne, Catherine. 2006. "Was there an Eleatic revolution in philosophy?" In *Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient Greece*, edited by Goldhill, Simon and Osborne, Robin, 218-245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"My concern in this chapter is with Parmenides' effect on the immediately subsequent generation of philosophers, the fifth-century Presocratics. Of course, there is no question that Parmenides was important for Plato. He figures prominently in the late dialogues, and arguably instigated, through Plato, a metaphysical trend that was indeed revolutionary, at least from the perspective of modern philosophy. But such delayed responses are not my focus here.(5) I am simply asking whether we should detect a radical change in the way cosmology was pursued and defended immediately after Parmenides' poem hit the public domain." (p. 219)
"On the orthodox story, Parmenides was targeting the group of sixth-century predecessors whom we classify as the first philosophers, particularly the Ionian cosmologists, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. Each of these, so we are told, tried to derive a plural world - the world as we know it now - from a single stuff (water for Thales, air for Anaximenes and so on). They thought that the many could be explained in terms of the one from which it was ultimately derived. By contrast, so the story goes, Parmenides was succeeded by a generation of pluralists, in particular Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). Their choice of plural principles was motivated, so we are told, by their recognition of the force of Parmenides' criticisms.
Scholars differ as to whether these so-called pluralists were attacking Parmenides' conclusions or endorsing and incorporating them. Some read them as rejecting the

Eleat.ic doctrines, both monism and the prohibition on change: hence the pluralists aimed to refute Parmenides or at least to reduce the significance of his claims, Others read the pluralists as warm towards Parmenides' outlook. On this view the 'Eleatic pluralists'6 adjusted their cosmology to meet Parmenidean criteria; they appealed to fundamental principles, atoms for instance, that were indeed indivisible and unchanging, as Parmenides' arguments had demanded. Nothing hangs on which variant we prefer, The pattern is the same: anti-cosmological motives for Parmenicles' intervention, and a subsequent attempt to rehabilitate cosmology in dialogue with Parmenidean principles. \Xlhether the later thinkers were pro- or anti- Parmenides is insignificant to the structure of this reconstruction." (p. 220)

(5) For a full treatment of Plato's reading of Parmenides see Palmer (1999).

(6) This title (originally applied to the atomists by Wardy (1988)) is adopted by Graham (1999) 176, to apply to Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Wardy challenges the reader, at page 129, to choose between ditching the traditional account of a post-Parmenidean response by the atomists, or improving on the traditional version of how atomism is a response. My chapter (unlike his) favours the former solution, though my target is not actually atomism (for which there is good evidence of a post-Parmenidean motivation).

21. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1960. "Eleatic Questions." *Classical Quarterly*:84-102.
Reprinted with additions in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatics and Pluralists,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 pp. 48-81 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 3-26.
"The following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus can be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the problem whether, as Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assume,

Parmenides wrote his poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology. The details of Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and again, but those who agree with his general assumptions take comfort from some or all of the following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which formed the last part of Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess who expounds it to have some measure of truth or reliability in its own right, and indeed the very greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Second, the earlier arguments of the goddess prepare the ground for such a cosmogony in two ways. For in the first place these arguments themselves start from assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists, and are concerned merely to work out the implications of this traditional material. And, in the second place, they end by establishing the existence of a spherical universe: the framework of the physical world can be secured by logic even if the subsequent introduction of sensible qualities or 'powers' into this world marks some decline in logical rigour.

These views seem to me demonstrably false. As long as they are allowed to stand they obscure the structure and the originality of Parmenides' argument." (p. 84)

22. ———. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present." *The Monist*:317-340.

Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays,* Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.

Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125 and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the

question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements. Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. Metaph. 1091a12-22) they confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." (pp. 317-318)

23. Owens, Joseph. 1974. "The Physical World of Parmenides." In *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, edited by O'Donnell, Reginald J., 378-395. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
24. ———. 1975. "Naming in Parmenides." In *Kephalaion. Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Offered*

to Professor C. J. de Vogel, edited by Mansfeld, Jaap and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 16-25. Assen: Van Gorcum.
"Naming for Parmenides, the texts show, is basically the conventional process by which a word or expression is established to designate a thing. Metaphorically it is extended, in one reading of Fr. B 8,38, to cover the conventional establishing of perceptible things as expressions or names for the unique immobile being. It may be either right or wrong. It is right when, either by words or by perceptible constructs it designates being, the only thing positively there to be named. Accordingly the thinking out and writing and reciting of Parmenides' poem is perfectly legitimate.
Naming, however, has always to be based on a positive characteristic or distinguishing mark. It is therefore illegitimate when conventionally applied to not-being. Not-being, having no characteristics at all, cannot be known and cannot be expressed in speech. But mortals do in fact mistakenly name not-being, on the basis of the characteristics of night, darkness, ignorance, earth, thickness, heaviness. They obtain these distinguishing marks by dividing bodily appearance -- for the corporeal is the only kind of being recognized by Parmenides -- into these characteristics and their opposites. This whole process is wrong, for there is no not-being to be named, and the characteristics assigned to it, though appearing positive, are in reality negations. But with the second basic form so named and its characteristics so established, and with equal force given to both, the differentiations and changes in the perceptible universe may be explained. To understand them and treat of them as in this way human conventions, is truth. To believe that the differentiations and changes are the true situation, is the *doxa*.
Naming is accordingly for Parmenides a conventional process throughout which being remains sole and sovereign both in the perceptible world and in human thought and speech. Every sensible thing and every human thought and word is being. To understand that, is to be on the road of the goddess while thinking and speaking. Recognized clearly as

naming the one immobile being, human thought and language and living are thoroughly legitimate. Parmenides may legitimately continue in them, even though according to *doxa* they and all perceptible things are differentiated and are engendered and perish, and "for they inert have established a name distinctive of each" (Fr. B 19,3). The important philosophical consequence is that for Parmenides perceptible things can retain all the reality and beauty they have in ordinary estimation, and still function as names for the one whole and unchangeable being." (pp. 23-24)

25. ———. 1979. "Knowledge and '*Katabasis*' in Parmenides." *The Monist* no. 62:15-29.
"The relation between imagery and philosophy in the poem of Parmenides has occasioned much discussion in recent years. One item of particular import has been the direction taken by the journey that was so inspiringly pictured in the opening section. Is the travel upwards? Or is it downwards? Or is it rather cross-country, either aloft, or on the earth's surface, or in the depths of the nether world? Further, if there is cross travel on any of these three levels, is the direction from east to west, or from west to east?
Readily acceptable is the stand that the text itself does not explicitly specify either upward or downward direction.(1)" (p. 15)
"Yet one guiding principle seems obligatory from the start. If correct historical and literary exegesis of the proem should run counter to any particular interpretation of the philosophy, the interpretation can hardly be considered acceptable. Parmenides' introduction, if even ordinary literary skill is accredited to him, has to be in harmony with what it is meant to introduce.
The effects of a *katabasis* norm in assessing Parmenides' conception of human knowledge could be especially devastating. A study of the problem in the global context of the various directions found in the proem by commentators is accordingly indicated. The reasons for the ascent, the descent, and the surface journey need to be probed from the viewpoints of their weight and their reciprocal exclusiveness. In a panoramic survey of this kind the salient

thrusts that bear upon the philosophic interpretation of the poem should become manifest." (p. 17)
(1) For critiques of alleged indications of an ascent, see infra, nn. 11-12. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Hermann Diels, *Parmenides: Lehrgedicht* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897), p. 8, had observed: [Nor does the way to God become us vividly described. We do not even hear if it goes down or up.] This warning was approved by Walter Burkert, "Das Proomium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras," *Phronesis*, 14 (1969), p. 2, n. 3, maintaining " [It is more correct, however, to omit the vertical, the top and the bottom at all]" (p.15). Burkert, however, defends a *katabasis* rather than an *Auffahrt*. A bibliography on the topic may be found in Maja E. Pellikaan-Engel, *Hesiod and Parmenides: A New View on Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides' Proem* (Amsterdam: Adolph M. Hakkert, 1974), pp. 104-109.
Note: I give the English translation of the texts by Diels and Burkert, cited in the original German by Owens.

26. Palmer, John. 2004. "Melissus and Parmenides." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:19-54.
"Detailed consideration of Plato's representations and uses of Parmenides shows that he would not have subscribed to the contemporary view of Parmenides that makes it possible to see Melissus as faithfully replicating the essential features of his thought. In fact, the view
of Parmenides as a strict monist seems to have been something of a minority interpretation in antiquity."
(...)
"... I shall try to avoid presuming at the outset any particular interpretation of Parmenides. Although I do want to argue that Melissus is more original than he has previously been taken to be, it would be improper to do so by simply adopting an understanding of Parmenides that differs from those presumed by previous assessments. Instead, I shall begin by focusing on the unquestionable adaptations of Parmenides and the equally unquestionable departures from him in Melissus' conception of what is and in his argumentation for the various attributes of what is. While

the majority of these departures have been recognized by others, I believe that the full impact of their collective weight has yet to be realized.
The differences between Parmenides' and Melissus' conceptions of what is and the structures of their argument are extensive enough to prompt reconsideration of the view that the 'overall structure' and the 'general intellectual nisus' of Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophy 'are one and the same'." (pp. 21-22)

27. ———. 2009. *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: 1. Parmnides' place in Histories of Presocratic Philosophy 1; 2. Parmenides' Three Ways 51; 3. The way of the Goddess and the Way of Mortals 106; 4. What Must Be and What Is and Is Not 137; 5. Zeno, Melissus and Parmenides 189; 6. Anassagors and Parmenides 225; 7. Empedocles' Element Theory and Parmenides 260; 8. Parmenides' Place in Presocratic Philosophy 318; Appendix: The Fragments of Parmenides' Poem 350; Bibliography 388; Index locorum 405; General index 422-428.
"Parmenides of Elea is the most brilliant and controversial of the Presocratic philosophers.
This book aims to achieve a better understanding of his thought and of his place in the history of early Greek philosophy. To this end, I here develop and defend a modal interpretation of the ways of inquiry that define Parmenides' philosophical outlook. He was, on this view, the first to have distinguished in a rigorous manner the modalities of necessary being, necessary nonbeing or impossibility, and contingent being. He himself specifies these modalities as what is and cannot not be, what is not and must not be, and what is and is not. Accompanying this fundamental ontological distinction is a set of epistemological distinctions that associates a distinct form of cognition with each mode of being. With this framework in place, Parmenides proceeds to consider what what must be will have to be like just in virtue of its mode of being and then to present an account of the origins and operation of the world's mutable population." (*Preface*, VI)

28. Papadis, Dimitris. 2005. "The Concept of Truth in Parmenides." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 23:77-96.
"In this paper I shall endeavor to define the concept of truth, which is very closely related to the βροτων δοξαι, and to the so-called δοκούντα. Truth in Parmenides manifests itself as divine revelation bestowed upon a chosen individual, namely Parmenides himself. No doubt, this revelation is no more than a poetic-mythical-religious model of teaching, which does not substantially affect the content thereof." (p. 77)
"The word ἀλήθεια occurs in three fragments, namely B 1.29, B 2.3, and B 8 .51. Its meaning is not defined in any of them. This is to say that Parmenides has not attempted a systematic theoretical approach to the problem(6)." (p. 78)
"In conclusion, we have in Parmenides a tripartite scheme, as far as the cognitive approach to things is concerned: a) *doxa*, true or false, b) *ta dokounta* = true *doxai*, mainly of universal reference, and c) *aletheia*. *Doxa* and *dokounta* refer to the perceptible aspect of the
world, whereas aletheia refers to the inner Being of the world. Access to the truth is, according to the poem, a preserve of Parmenides. Still, it is understood that this is also possible for everyone possessed of his exceptional spirituality." (p. 95)
29. Pelletier, Francis. 1990. *Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the *symploke eidon* 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94; Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name index 159; Subject index 163-166.
"As the title indicates, this is a book about Plato's response to Parmenides, as put forward in Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist*. But it would be a mistake to think that the difficulties raised by Parmenides and Plato's response are merely of antiquarian interest, for many of the same problems emerge in modern discussions of predication and

(especially) of mental representation of natural-language statements. The intricacies and difficulties involved in giving a coherent account of Plato's position will be familiar to scholars in the field of ancient Greek philosophy, as will be the general philosophic difficulty to which Plato is responding- the Parmenidean problem of not-being.
This introduction is written to show to philosophers interested more in natural-language understanding and knowledge-representation than in ancient philosophy that the issues being grappled with by Plato remain crucial to these modern enterprises, and to show classical philosophers that many of the interpretive choices they face have modern analogues in the choices that researchers in cognitive science make in giving an adequate account of the relations that must hold among language, the mind, and reality." (from the Introduction).

30. Pelliccia, Hayden. 1988. "The Text of Parmenides B 1,3 (D-K)." *American Journal of Philology* no. 109:513-522.
"With the removal (1) of all manuscript authority from ἄστη, [from the Fragment B 1.3] editors may resort to defense of the transmitted text or to conjectural restoration based upon "palaeographical likelihood." I believe they should do neither." (p. 507)
(...)
"By way of conclusion, some general remarks on το ἐον will be in order. Parmenides' use throughout the poem of the singular (το ἐον) is an innovation the purpose of which is not far to seek. In earlier writers there is found only the plural (τα ἐοντα), used, usually τα τ' εσσομενα προ τ' εοντα, to describe reality in terms of its constituent elements.(24) This tendency to use the plural to designate reality is evident in Heraclitus (whom some have thought to be a special target of Parmenides' argument (25)), both in the famous παντα ῥει and especially B7 D-K εἰ πάντα τα` ὄντα καπνο`ς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν: as clear an assertion of the enduring multiplicity of real entities as can be found anywhere. Parmenides, in denying multiplicity, would have been required, for the sake of logical consistency, to shun

the established use of the plural παντα τα` ὀντα and to adopt the singular παν το` ἐον. (26)" (p. 512)
(1) The results of Coxon's re-examination of N have been corroborated by L. Tarán, *Gnomon* 49 (1977) 656, n. 15, [review article of Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides*] who has himself inspected the Ms.
(24) In most of these passages (for example, in all the instances of the formula listed by West on Hes. *Th*. 32) the plural participles designate the objects of knowledge; this point should be of interest to those who maintain that the subject of ἐστί throughout Parmenides is "the objects of discourse or inquiry" (e .g., J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [London 1982) 163; G. E. L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," *CQ* n.s. 10 [1960] 84-102 = D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, S*tudies in Presocratic Philosophy II* [London 1975] 48-8 I). If my restoration of παν το` ἐον is accepted at B 1.3, it can be resupplied as object of εἰδότα: 'the road which bears the man who knows [all that exists] over all that exists'.
(25) See Guthrie, *Hist. Gk. Phil*. I, 408, n. 2 , and II, 23f.
(26) I wish to thank Professors A. T . Cole, R. L. Fowler, D. R. Shackleton Bailey, and R. J. Tarrant for their criticisms and suggestions.

31. Pellikaan-Engel, Maja. 1974. *Hesiod and Parmenides. A New View of Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides Proem*. Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert.
Contents: Chapter I: Why an approach to Parmenides from Hesiod 1; Chapter II: Hesiod's cosmology, *Theogony* 116-33 11; Chapter III: Hesiod, *Theogony* 736-66 19; Chapter IV: Hesiod's Truth 39; Chapter V: Some substitutions of certain Hesiodic concepts in the proem of Parmenides. The route of Parmenides 51; Chapter VI: Excursus of the other interpretations of the route of Parmenides 63; Chapter VII: Parmenides's Truth 79; Chapter VIII: Parmenides' cosmology 87; Summary 101; Bibliography 104; Curriculum vitae 110.
"Summary. Research is made into the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Points of comparison between the proem of Parmenides and Hesiod *Theogony* 736-66 lead to attach

similar meanings to the similar terms "chaos" and "house of Night" (Chapt. I). An analysis of the contents of the texts leads to the conclusion that the image in Parmenides' proem with regard to the Heliades, who have left the house of Night, taking with them the poet as a chosen person, is parallel to the alternate cyclic journey of the goddesses Day and Night c.s. from the subterranean house of Night, via the East to the region above the earth and via the West down and back again to the point of departure, as is written in Hesiod *Theogony* 746-66; in this the taking with them of the chosen person from the earth is parallel to *Theogony* 765, 6, where Death, son and companion of Night, takes with him his victims of men (Chapt. III and V).
An analysis of Hesiod's cosmological views leads to the conclusion, that Hesiod imagined the sky to be a metallic and revolving sphere, the earth at its centre (Chapt. II) and that he imagined *chaos* in its first phase to be of unbounded extension, presumably consisting of air at rest, and later on to be the region above as well as beneath the earth, limited by the spherical sky, consisting of air in motion (Chapt. IV).
The result of Chapt. V and an analysis of Parmenides' cosmological views leads to the conclusion that Parmenides imagined the earth to be a hollow sphere (Chapt. VII) and that the problem concerning what was in the midst in his cosmological system, either the goddess or the earth, can be solved by supposing the goddess to be in the midst in the absolute sense, i.e. at the centre of his cosmos and the earth to be in the midst in the relative sense, i.e. as a hollow sphere in the midst between the centre of his cosmos, viz. the goddess, and the outer limitation of his cosmos, viz. the spherical sky (Chapt. VIII)." (p. 101)

32. Perry, Bruce Millard. 1983. *Simplicius as a Source for and an Interpreter of Parmenides*, Washington University. Ph.D thesis available at ProQuest Dissertation Express, order number: 8319442.
Contents: Acknowledgments IV; Special Abbreviations V; Introduction 1; Chapter I. Plato and Parmenides 11; Chapter II. Aristotle and Parmenides 33; Chapter III. Parmenides in the Later Tradition 52; Chapter IV. Simplicius on

Parmenides 87; Conclusion 257; Bibliography 271; Appendix A. Translations 278; Appendix B. Quotations from Parmenides 409; Appendix C. Verses, Variant Readings 416; Appendix D. Index Locorum 440-442.
"A systematic study of Simplicius's interpretations of all the Presocratics is not feasible here.
(...)
I have chosen to study his interpretation of Parmenides because he is perhaps the most important, if also the most problematic, of the Presocratics. Simplicius quotes 101 out of the 154 extant Greek verses of Parmenides, and devotes considerable space in his commentary on *Physics I*, augmented by several passages from his De Caelo commentary, to interpreting Parmenides.
There is thus considerable material for study.
Because Simplicius's interpretation does not arise *ex nihilo*, some consideration must be taken of the formative influences on and the possible sources for his interpretation. More specifically, Simplicius rejects the criticisms of Parmenides by Plato in the *Sophist* and by Aristotle in the *Physics* and argues that his own interpretation silences both ciiticisms. Chapter I comprises a sketch of Parmenides's influence on Plato (Republic V 476e6-480a13), and an examination of Plato's criticism in the *Sophist* (244b6-245e2). Similarly, Chapter II considers Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides in *Metaphysics A* (986b27-987a2) and *Physics I* (184b15-187all). The other possible influences or sources are considered in Chapter III: the doxographical tradition, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and the Neoplatonists.
The large amount of material on Parmenides in Simplicius necessitates a division into manageable topics or sections. While such a division is by nature arbitrary, the nine sections I have decided upon in Chapter IV represent reasonably discrete subjects: I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The *Aletheia*; V. The *Doxa*; VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on

Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides.
Each section contains at least two parts: a detailed list of the relevant passages (A), and a summary of their contents (B). For the first five sections commentary is provided (C); particularly detailed commentary is devoted to the *Aletheia* (IV) and the Doxa (V). A summary of Simplicius' s interpretation is found at the beginning of Chapter IV, and a set of conclusions follows Chapter IV.
Appendix A contains English translations of all the passages which bear on Parmenides in Simplicius. A detailed list of Simplicius's quotations from Parmenides forms Appendix B. The verses with variant readings from CAG [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*] VII and IX are collected in Appendix C. Appendix D is a skeletal *Index Locorum*." (pp. 6-8)

33. ———. 1989. "On the Cornford-fragment (28 B 8,38)." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 71:1-9.
"In "A New Fragment of Parmenides" CR 49 (1935) 122—123, F. M. Cornford argued for the authenticity of the verse found at *Theaetetus* 180e1 and in Simplicius *in Ph*. 29.18, 143.10:
οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τφ τταντι δνομ* εἶναι.
Though editors from Diels onward have rejected the verse as a misquotation of B 8.38, Cornford has persuaded some scholars to accept it as a genuine fragment. The cogency of some of these arguments will be challenged in this article. While the fragment does not stand or fall solely with Cornford's arguments, fresh doubts as to its authenticity will be raised incidentally." (p. 1, notes omitted)
"Cornford's argument for the accuracy of Simplicius's quotation of the verse rests on the claims that he quotes the verse directly from his MS of Parmenides and that he does not explicitly mention the *Theaetetus* when he quotes it. Both claims are open to objection. Simplicius does not invariably quote Parmenides from his MS; in fact, he often quotes him from Plato. There is also good reason to believe that Simplieius has the *Theaetetus* in mind when he quotes the verse at *in Phys*. 143.10." (p. 5)

"It is reasonable to conclude that Simplicius did quote the verse from Plato, and not from his MS of Parmenides." (p. 9)

34. Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1996. "The Way of Truth." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter, 61-130. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Contents: Index 61; 1. Introduction 62; 2.Beings, the Being and Being 64; 3. Ontological connection 65; 4. Towards a theory of ontological connection 67; 5. Some classical ontological questions 73 ; 6. A linguistic intemezzo 76; 7. An outline of a Primitve Theory of Being - PTB 86; 8. Towards a Extended Theory of Being - ETB 102; 9. Parmenidean statements reconsidered and classical questions answered 122; 10. Summary 127; Acknowldgements 128; References 128-130.
"1.8 In what follows a very general theory of ontological connection is provided.
In spite of its generality this theory enables us, as we shall see, to reconsider the classical ontological claims of Parmenides and to refute an anti-ontological claim that the notion of being is syncategorematic.
Also certain ontological theorems will be proved, including: *Being is and Nonbeing is* (sic!). *A being is, whereas a nonbeing is not*. Also: *Whatever is, is* - which is shown to be equivalent to *Whatever is not, is not*.
1.9 The paper is organized as follows: I start with general remarks concerning ontology and different approaches to the notion of being. Next, several classical questions of traditional ontology are discussed. After making our problems clear, I will introduce a formalism enabling us to study them in their full generality. Finally, the results of the paper are discussed in a manner introducing perpectives for a subsequent theory of qualities." (p. 63)

35. Philip, J. A. 1958. "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge." *Phoenix.Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 12:63-66.
"But Parmenides is only incidentally concerned with any theory of knowledge. He is telling the tale of his journey, in search of both knowledge and true opinion. It takes him

away from the paths of men, beyond the gates of day and night, into the light. There the goddess reveals to him the secrets of true being which alone is the object of knowledge; but she also reveals true opinion concerning our physical world. In his poem Parmenides is passing on that revelation, but he nowhere suggests that that revelation is accessible to intellectual
effort without revelation. For that reason it seems to me that no interpretation which makes Nous a product of physical constitution can be acceptable, and that in spite of its difficulties it is preferable to understand Nous as a harmony, in the Universe and in the mind of
man." (pp. 65-66 a note omitted)

36. Phillips, E.D. 1955. "Parmenides on Thought and Being." *Philosophical Review* no. 64:546-560.
"Professor Erwin Schrödinger, in the second chapter of his recent book, *Nature and the Greeks* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954) discusses for a few pages (ibid. 24-28) the Parmenidean doctrine of Being. The whole book is of peculiar interest because it is the work, not of a professional Hellenist or even philosopher, but of a famous physicist, who has his own reasons for studying Greek thought; and this chapter has the added piquancy of presenting a view of Parmenides which was once respectable but is now widely reprobated. I propose first to examine this view, as Schrödinger puts it, and then, having necessarily reached some conclusions of my own about Parmenides, to examine the Parmenidean doctrine itself, so determined, from the point of view of modern philosophy, at any rate in the matter of logic. The precise nature of this amalgam of logical, illogical, and nonlogical thinking may then become clearer for those who are interested in the history of philosophy and the temperaments of philosophers." (p. 546)
37. Popper, Karl Raimund. 1992. "How the Moon Might Throw Some of Her Light Upon the Two Ways of Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 86:12-19.
An improved and expanded version in: K. R. Popper, *The World of Parmenides. Essays on the Presocratic*

Enlightenment, Essay 3, pp. 68-78.
"Parmenides was an important philosopher of nature (in the sense of Newton's *philosophia naturalis*). A whole series of important astronomical discoveries is credited to him: that the morning star and the evening star are one and the same; that the earth has the shape of a sphere (rather than of a column, as Anaximander thought). About equally important is his discovery that the phases of the moon are due to the changing way in which the illuminated half-sphere of the moon is seen from the earth." (p. 14)
"But a great discoverer is bound to try to generalize his discovery. Selene does not truly possess those movements that she exhibits to us. Perhaps we can generalize this?
And then came the great intellectual illumination, the revelation: in one flash Parmenides saw not only that reality was a dark sphere of dense matter (like the moon), but that he could prove it! And that movement was, indeed, impossible.
The proof was (more or less simplified):
(1) Only Being is (Only what is, is).
(2) The Nothing, the Non-Being, cannot be.
(3) The Non-Being would be Absence of Being, or Void.
(4) There can be no Void.
(5) The World is Full: a Block.
(6) Movement is impossible." (pp. 14-15)

38. ———. 1998. *The World of Parmenides. Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: Preface VIII; List of abbreviations X; Introduction: Aristotle's invention of induction and the eclipse of Presocratic cosmology 1; Essay 1. Back to the Presocratics 7; Addendum 1: A historical note on verisimilitude; Addendum 2: Some further hints on verisimilitude;
Essay 2. The unknown Xenophanes: an attempt to establish his greatness 33; Essay 3. How the Moon might shed some of her light upon the Two Ways of Parmenides (I) 68; Essay 4. How the Moon might throw some of her light upon the Two Ways of Parmenides (1989) 79; Addendum with a note on a possible emendation affecting the relation between the

two parts of Parmenides' poem; Essay 5. Can the Moon throw light on Parmenides' Ways? (1988); Essay 6. The world of Parmenides: notes on Parmenides' poem and its origin in early Greek cosmology 105; Essay 7. Beyond the search for invariants 146; Essay 8. Comments on the prehistoric discovery of the self and on the mind-body problem in ancient Greek philosophy 223; Essay 9. Plato and geometry 251; Essay 10. Concluding remarks on support and countersupport: how induction becomes counterinduction, and the *epagoge* returns to the *elenchus* 271; Appendix: Popper's late fragments on Greek philosophy 280; Index 307-328.
"When as a 16-year-old student I first read Parmenides' wonderful poem.
I learnt to look at Selene (the Moon) and Helios (the Sun) with new eyes - with eyes enlightened by his poetry, Parmenides opened my eyes to the poetic beauty of the Earth and the starry heavens, and he taught me to look at them with a new searching look: searching to determine, as does Selene herself, the position of Helios below the Earth's horizon, by following the direction of her 'eager look'. None of my friends whom I told about my rediscovery of Parmenides' discovery had looked for this before, and I hoped that some of them liked it as much as I did. It was, however, only some seventy years later that I realized the full significance of Parmenides' discovery, and this made me realize what it must have meant for him, the original discoverer. I have tried since to understand and explain the importance of this discovery for the world of Parmenides, for his Two Ways, and its great role in the history of science, and especially of epistemology and of theoretical physics." (Preface, VIII-IX)

39. Prier, Raymond. 1976. *Archaic Logic. Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles*. The Hague: Mouton & Co.
Contents: Preface VII; I The Archaic Configuration of Mind 1; II The Homeric Hymns and Hesiod 27; III Heraclitus 57; IV Parmenides 90; V Empedocles 120; VI Language, Time,

and Form 149; Bibliography 154; Index of Ancient Passages 159-163.

"The following study represents an attempt not only to explicate in some small way a mode of thought significantly different from much of our own, but also to suggest a new criterion of judgment for Classical Philology. These two purposes merge into one insofar as both come about from my own sharp disagreement with certain prevailing critical attitudes towards the so-called pre-Socratics. These essentially ungrounded attitudes are characterized, as I see them, by strong relativistic and materialistic premises which, although hidden for the most part, result in awkward misunderstandings of the pre-Platonic corpus in general and an uneven, if not castrating, criticism of specific authors in particular. These modern critical stances did not exist in the pre-Aristotelian Greek world in any predominant form, but Classical Philology in the later half of the twentieth century maintains otherwise and has, consequently, severely limited itself and very probably its future by adopting a narrow and unnecessarily rigid criterion of judgment that largely misrepresents the literary evidence at hand. Beyond the by no means unanimous acknowledgment that Aristotle revealed little of the real worth of the pre-Socratics, modern Classical Philology has not even suggested the need of a method — let alone the method itself - that might grasp the period between
Homer and the Platonic revolution. I offer this study as an attempt to supply this critical tool." (*Preface*, VII)

"Three men, Carl Jung, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Ernst Cassirer have contributed greatly to the elucidation of the mode of thought whose influences we shall trace in the ensuing pages. Each, working from a different professional point of view and actually for very different
purposes, has opened the serious investigation of the archaic configuration of mind." (p. 2)

"I substantially agree with the basic comparative approach of Reinhardt, Frankel, Mansfeld, and Mourelatos, although I should not place as much emphasis on the innovative quality of Parmenides' insight as does the last. My own

particular method, however, is symbolic and structural, and in these respects little has been done with the text of Parmenides with the partial exception of the vocabulary and motif study of Mourelatos. Tarán, for instance, denies a recourse to symbolism in Parmenides.(32) Havelock points to definite symbols in the proem of the work but does not develop their meaning *qua* symbols.(33) It was left to Jung to detect the psychological and cultural symbolism inherent in the work of Parmenides. He indicated that the στεφάνη Cicero discusses in his *De Natura Deorum* is in fact an archetypal representation of the divine.(34) Cicero's "unbroken ring of glowing lights encircling the sky which he [Parmenides] entitles god" is surely the phenomenon described in fragment 12. Jung also connects it with the "circular motion of the mind which everywhere returns into itself' (5).(35) The symbolic nature of Parmenidian thought represents an observable phenomenon that in my opinion should be examined thoroughly. It is in the proem to his work that this nature is most easily detected." (p. 95)
(32) Tarán, *op. cit*. [*Parmenides* (Princeton 1965)] p. 30.
(33) E.A. Havelock, "Parmenides and Odysseus", HSCP [*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*] 63 (1958), p. 133. Cf. fn. 49 of the present chapter.
(34) C.G. Jung, *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, p. 325-326.
(35) Ibid. p. 325.

40. Priou, Alex. 2018. "Parmenides on Reason and Revelation." *Epoché* no. 22:177-202.
Abstract: "In this paper, the author argues that the revelatory form Parmenides gives his poem poses considerable problems for the account of being contained therein. The poem moves through a series of problems, each building on the last: the problem of particularity, the cause of human wandering that the goddess would have us ascend beyond (B1); the problem of speech, whose heterogeneity evinces its tie to experience's particularity (B2–B7); the problem of justice, which motivates man's ascent from his "insecure" place in being, only ultimately to undermine it (B8.1–49); and finally the question of the good, the

necessary consequence of man's place in being as being out of place in being (B8.50–B19). What emerges is a Socratic reading of Parmenides's poem, a view that Plato appears to have shared by using Parmenides and his Eleatic stranger to frame the bulk of Socrates's philosophic activity."

41. Pulpito, Massimo. 2011. "Parmenides and the Forms." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 191-210. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Historians of Greek thought have often described the Parmenidean doctrine as a sort of philosophical exception, hostile to the prevalent naturalist interests of earlier philosophers. The structure of the Parmenidean poem itself, juxtaposing a section on Truth, concerned with an entity displaying characteristics incompatible with those of Nature, to a section on Opinion, concerned with physical theories, seems to support that interpretation. A re-examination of the relationship between these two sections, however, and their authentic internal articulation, can help to understand the Parmenidean position on physics, thus restoring him to his historical-philosophical context. The alleged tension between the two sections is contained mainly in verse B8.53. The verse is traditionally
understood as referring to the decision of mortals to name two forms (μορφάς) corresponding to Fire and Night. However, a more careful reading of the verse (as proposed by some scholars) leads us to the conclusion that the "two" are not the forms but the mortal points of view (γνώμας). So what are the forms then? A reading of verse B9.1 allows us to stipulate that, for Parmenides, the forms are all the visible things and thus the physical objects. If we identify these exterior forms with τα` δοκοῦντα from verse B1.31 (translated as "the objects of opinion") it becomes possible to recompose the poem's structure. We can recognize three sections: the first, on Truth, dedicated to existence in oneness and homogeneity; the third, on physical forms, providing a description of the world from a morphological standpoint. Between these two lies the second section,

dedicated to mortal Opinions which, like the cosmogonies, confuse the ontological status of Everything with the morphological and mereological status of particular objects. Nonetheless, in the section on correct physical theories (the third one) Parmenides attempts to recuperate the two principles recognized by mortals, accepting their δυνάμεις (most likely identified with Hot and Cold) as elements of which the cosmos consists. This reading allows us to place Parmenides inside the development of Pre-Socratic thought, connecting him to earlier thinkers and, more importantly, to the later ones. The idea that the physical world consists of forms both visible and mutable, as manifestations of a reality fundamentally invisible and immutable, perceivable only through reason, will become a cliché of natural philosophy after Parmenides; at least until Plato, who will go on to recognize in the invisible and immutable forms the paradigm of the world."

42. Pulpito, Massimo, and Spangenberg, Pilar, eds. 2019. *ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι. Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero*. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.
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43. Quarantotto, Diana. 2016. "Aristotle's way away from Parmenides' way. A case of scientific controversy and ancient humor." *Elenchos* no. 37:209-228.
Abstract: "In *Physics* A, Aristotle introduces his science of nature and devotes a substantial part of the investigation to refuting the Eleatics' theses, and to resolving their arguments, against plurality and change. In so doing, Aristotle also dusts off Parmenides' metaphor of the routes of inquiry and uses it as one of the main schemes of his book. Aristotle's goal, I argue, is to present his own physical investigation as the only correct route, and to show that Parmenides' "way of truth" is instead both wrong and a sidetrack. By revisiting Parmenides' metaphor of the route, Aristotle twists it against him, distorts it and uses this distortion as a source of fun and of some mockery of Parmenides himself. Thereby, Physics A gives us a taste of Aristotle's biting humour and of his practice of the "virtue" of wit (*eutrapelia*)."

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   "As Dr C. M. Bowra has pointed out in a paper in *Classical Philology* (XXXII [1937], p. 106), 'it is clear that this Proem is intended to have the importance and seriousness of a religious revelation'. Not only the passage from darkness into light but many minor details throughout the poem suggest that Parmenides desired, particularly in the Proem, to arm himself in advance, by stressing the religious and ethical nature of his revelation, with an answer to his potential critics. There seems no reason to doubt Dr Bowra's assumption (loc. cit. p. 108) that these potential critics were 'his fellow-Pythagoreans'.

Parmenides is indeed, in Cornford's phrase, 'a curious blend of prophet and logician'. The Proem, though its details are of no importance to our present inquiry, at least serves the useful purpose of stressing the prophetic strain. The Way of Truth, on the other hand, is an entirely unprecedented exercise of the logical faculty, and as such it is usually and naturally taken to be devoid of any emotion. In its outward form it certainly is so; but it must be remembered that the concept on which Parmenides' logic is at work is that of unity, and there is no reason to suppose that the concept of unity is incapable of arousing emotion. If two of the conclusions that I have already reached are justified, that Parmenides was a dissident Pythagorean, and that in the Pythagoreanism from which he was seceding there was a fundamental dualism between the principle of unity and goodness and another and eternally opposed principle, then is it not permissible to imagine that Parmenides, swayed perhaps by a deeper respect for the good principle than his `fellow-Pythagoreans' revealed, may have been driven along the road from darkness into light by a basically religious desire to vindicate the good principle against the bad? Such a supposition would help to explain the fervour that almost succeeds in illuminating the uninspired poetry of the Proem; and the ultimate triumph of his logical faculty over his emotion should not blind us to the possibility that an emotional impulse underlay his unemotional reasoning.
But the only convincing test of such a hypothesis must obviously be sought in the poem itself. I propose to examine the Way of Truth in considerable detail, adopting for the purpose the method employed by Cornford in his chapter on the same subject. Indeed, on occasions I shall be merely paraphrasing that chapter; but a measure of such repetition is inevitable for the sake of continuity." (pp. 23-24).
"We are now at last, therefore, in a position to counter the only apparently grave objection that might be brought against the contention that Parmenides wrote his poem with an eye especially upon the Pythagoreanism from which he had seceded. If that contention is indeed true, then why is it, it might reasonably be asked, that neither of the two ways

from which the goddess sees fit to debar Parmenides represents Pythagoreanism? Our examination of the purpose of the poem should by now have suggested a complete answer to such an apparently damaging objection. The first forbidden way, that it is NOT or NOTHING IS, is to this extent, as Parmenides claimed, ἀνόητον ανώνυμον, that at any rate nobody had attempted to tread it. It is introduced into the poem partly for the sake of logical completeness but especially because it was combined with the true way to form the way which foolish two-headed mortals tread, the way of custom. So far as we are entitled to judge, therefore, from our reading of the Way of Truth alone, the third way, namely that it is and it is not, will include any combination whatever of the true way and the way of falsehood, or in other words any known cosmology whatever. But Pythagoreanism, with its ultimate dualism and its consequent employment, not of the characteristics of Being only nor of those of Not-being only, but of the two simultaneously, is undeniably a particularly glaring example of such a combination— more glaring, indeed, than any other early system simply because, as Aristotle suggests in his own way, it admits more of those νοητά which Parmenides accepted as the only truth. It might, therefore, be not unreasonably expected, until we actually pass to it, that the Way of Seeming will at least bear a closer resemblance to the Pythagorean than to any other way. But fortunately, almost as soon as we come to the Way of Seeming, Parmenides himself gives us the explanation of why that need hot necessarily be so. The Way of Seeming presents the best cosmology that Parmenides was capable of inventing, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίξ σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσση ; and in consequence, so far from imitating the Pythagorean cosmology, it is, at some points at least, in direct conflict with it. This part of the poem too, and for much the same reason as the earlier part, is in fact especially damaging to the Pythagorean system; for that system was undeniably more guilty than any other of confusing the illusory objects of perception with the eternally existent objects of thought. To look, in short, for an explicit representation of any

known system whatever in either of the two forbidden ways is to demand that the poem should be rewritten in quite another form and with quite another object. But that is no valid argument against my contention that throughout the poem we can repeatedly detect a special (even if, as I have all along admitted, a secondary) anti-Pythagorean validity." (pp. 41-42)

2. Reilly, Thomas J. 1976. "Parmenides Fragment 8,4: a Correction." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 58:57.
   Malcolm Schofield in *Did Parmenides Discover Eternity?* read in the fragment B8.4 ἐστι γα`ρ οὐλομελές τε και`
   ἀτρεμε`ς ἠδ' ἀτάλαντον (instead of ἀτέλεστον): an emendation proposed by M. F. Bunyeat who in an unpublished paper recommends the conjecture of G. M. Hopkins (see *Notebook and Papers of* Gerald Manley Hopkins, Oxford: 1937, p. 99; Reilly notes that the emendation was already proposed by Ludwig Preller in his *Historia philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta*, (co-author Heinrich Ritter), Hamburg 1838 p. 92.
3. Reinhardt, Karl. 1974. "The Relation between the Two Parts of Parmenides' Poem." In *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Mourelatos, Alexander P. D., 293-311. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
   Partial translation of *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1916 (the following pages are translated: 18-23, 29-32, 64-71, 74-82, 88 with omissions as indicated. (Translation by Matthew E. Cosgrove with A. P. D. Mourelatos).
   "Whoever takes the trouble to understand Parmenides in all his boldness as well as in his restraint, and at the same time in terms of his historical situation, must first of all realize that the one great defect from which the "Doxa" suffers in our eyes-namely, that it is unable to take hold of the knowing subject and must turn for help to the things themselves-was not very perceptible to Parmenides, and was perhaps not perceived by him at all. He understood the proposition that like can only be known by like so literally, so close to the level of visual imagery, that he could not but

think that the organ of perception and its object were made up of the same constituents, and were even subject to the same forms and laws. Thought processes in the soul appeared to him not as corresponding with, but as exactly repeating the external world. What was a law for thought had to have unqualified validity for things also. If nature were shown contradicting the principle of non-contradiction itself, then nature was ipso facto false and precisely not existent: "For you could not come to know that which is not (for it is not feasible), nor could you declare it; for it is the same to think and to be" (B2.7-8, B3). Conversely, every character of the external world led directly to a conclusion concerning human knowledge.

No matter how hard one looks, one will not find the slightest hint of a separation between thinking and being (or representation and appearance) in the fragments. Parmenides begins the "Doxa" by relating (B8.53) that men have agreed to designate a twofold form with names, but he does not elaborate, as one would expect, on how they fashioned their world-picture from both forms. Instead, the object of their thought straightaway achieves an independent life: Dark and light unite and produce the world; and to our surprise a cosmogony springs from the epistemology. What had been no more than a name, a convention, an onoma, enters into physical combinations, and finally generates even man himself and his cognitive states. To our way of thinking, that is certainly hard to take. Our only recourse, if we are to grasp it, is to recite to ourselves once again the rule that was the lifeblood of Parmenidean conviction: "For it is the same to think and to be" (B3). Because this world is composed throughout of light and darkness, and is pervasively the same and then again not the same (B8.58, B6.8), because contradiction is the essence of all doxa, this entire world must be false, that is to say, subjective, or as the Greeks would have said, it can only exist *nomoi*, "by convention," and not *physei*, "in reality."

To be sure, this conclusion is not repeated in every sentence. Now and then it even seems as though the critic and nay-

sayer had let himself be carried along for a while on the broad stream of human opinions; indeed, as though his critique were itself the repository of discoveries in which he took pride. For since appearance by no means lacks all reason and consistency, it can actually be explored. Yet its character as appearance does not mitigate its contradicting the highest law of thought, the sole guarantee of truth. This is said twice, briefly but sharply, at decisive points: the beginning and the end of the second part. Whether between these passages there were originally additional reminders of the same fundamental idea, we do not know. The two that we do know are sufficiently complete. As though separated from the rest by a thick tallying stroke, at the conclusion of the whole stand the words that give the sum of all that has been said (B19):

And so, according to appearances (*kata doxan*) these things came to be, and now are, and later than now will come to an end, having matured; and to these things did men attach a name, a mark to each." (pp. 295-297)

4. Rickert, Thomas. 2014. "Parmenides, Ontological Enaction, and the Prehistory of Rhetoric." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* no. 47:472-493.

   Abstract: "The Presocratic thinker Parmenides is portrayed in philosophy and rhetoric as a philosopher of static monism anticipating reason's triumph over myth. Such a portrayal is narrow and ill fits the evidence. Parmenides was associated with a cult of priest-healers (*iatromantis)* of Apollo who practiced incubation, usually in caves, in order to receive wisdom and truth. Parmenides's famous poem "On Being" ("Peri Phuseōs") reflects these practices. The poem directly invokes altered states of consciousness, revelations from the gods, and an underworld descent (*katabasis*).

   Further, the poem is of strong rhetorical interest because it directly discusses rhetorical themes of persuasion, truth, and knowledge. Additionally, the poem suggests that rationality alone cannot suffice to liberate human beings from worldly illusions; rather, reason must be accompanied

by a combination of divine inspiration and *mêtis* (cunning wisdom)."

5. ———. 2017. "Parmenides: Philosopher, Rhetorician, Skywalker." In *Logos without Rhetoric. The Arts of Language before Plato*, edited by Reames, Robin, 47-62. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
"Currently, Parmenides is peripheral at best in rhetorical studies, but I claim that he merits a significant place in rhetorical history—or, better, prehistory, since he predates the group we call the sophists, and, further, it is likely that *rhētorikē* is a coinage of Plato's, and hence, not quite applicable to Parmenides.(3)" (p. 49)
"It is only recently that a different picture of Parmenides has begun to emerge that allows us to see that he does not fit the narrow frame philosophy has created for him. To see this, it is necessary to take the introductory proem seriously. While the proem has frequently been dismissed as a literary device introducing the poem's philosophical core, a variety of evidence indicates that the proem frames all that follows, performing acts of initiation and revelation in line with other ritualistic practices in the ancient Greek world. Further,
taking the proem seriously resonates with the above evidence concerning Zeno's death and Parmenides' bust. In short, Parmenides should now be understood as someone with wide-ranging interests, including teachings that involve not just cosmology but theurgy, healing, life-training, and rhetoric. Our understanding of Parmenides' use of reason should be thought within this broader scope. Instead of being a precursor to Plato's escape from the cave of ignorance to the light of reason, on the traditional philosophical read, Parmenides is engaged in *katabasis*, a descent into the cave, to receive knowledge." (p. 52)
(3) Edward Schiappa ("Did Plato Coin Rhētorikē?" *American Journal of Philology* 111 (4): 457–470, 1990, 457; *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003, 40–41) argues compellingly that the term *rhētorikē* is Plato's, or at the least a fourth-century and not

fifth-century b.c.e. usage (although the root term, in various formulations, is older). The term “sophist” is also contested, but I cannot delve into that issue here.

6. Robbiano, Chiara. 2006. *Becoming Being. On Parmenides' Transformative Philosophy*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
   Text and translation of the Poem, pp. 212-223.
   "The aim of this study is the investigation of Parmenides' method in guiding a human being towards understanding. Parmenides' words operate as a travel guide that leads the audience on a journey that will educate them, transform them, and make them philosophically mature. I will analyse various literary, rhetorical, polemical, and argumentative features of Parmenides' Poem which, I submit, bring the audience a step further towards the kind(s) of knowledge that Parmenides has in store for them.
   Many scholars have concentrated on the arguments of fragment B8,3 and on their conclusions -- that Being is without birth, undifferentiated, changeless and complete. In general, one may be inclined to think that, once a goal has been reached, the journey that brought one there is not relevant anymore. Accordingly, the student of Parmenides' Poem may be tempted to concentrate his or her interpretative energy on Being: the goal of the journey made under the guidance of the goddess of whom the Poem tells us. The scholar who is looking for the philosophical message of the Poem may try to reduce all the questions, pieces of advice and encouragements of the speech of the goddess (B1,24 onwards) to a *description* of Being: the true and knowable reality.
   But it may be asked whether this approach, which looks only for a description of Being in the fragments, does not neglect the complex journey that the mind has to make through myths, images, encouragements and warnings, before it will be able to grasp Being: the philosophical itinerary through which Parmenides guides his audience throughout the Poem. The question *how*, according to Parmenides, we can achieve insight into Being seems no less important for a better understanding of the Poem than the content of this

insight. The doubt about traditional certainties, the rejection of certain mental behaviours and the process of building new perspectives significantly *precede* the search for the characteristics of Being.
Once we resist the temptation of detaching a description of Being from the conditions for the achievement of understanding that the goddess sets out, and from the human being who attempts to understand Being, we will become sensitive to the fact that the Poem works upon its audience and helps them to achieve understanding. I will try to analyse the progress towards understanding from the very beginning. The study of this progress, which, I believe, constitutes the main subject matter of Parmenides' Poem, will turn out to be fundamental to the study of Parmenides' philosophy.
A study of a philosopher's method will have to concentrate not only on the words and phrases that the philosopher uses to *describe* the right method, but also on the words and phrases that the philosopher *uses* in order to transform his or her audience: i.e. to persuade them to adopt a new way of looking that will change them.
This will be a systematic study of the rhetorical and linguistic features of Parmenides' Poem that hopes to shed light on his philosophy. Such a study will have to pay attention to the *effect* of such features on the audience who is gradually guided towards insight. Only by looking at the transformative effect of such features of our Poem on the audience will we be able to give a *coherent* interpretation of the fragments.
We will find their coherence by studying the goal they have in common: to help the audience to acquire insight into Being.
What happens when one's journey towards Being is accomplished? Is there room for a differentiation between oneself and one's goal in a monistic reality? In order to answer these questions, we will look at the hints the goddess gives about the effects of the journey on the way of Truth, i.e. the hints about the transformation of the knowing subject when the journey has reached its goal. We will also

be able to find out more about Parmenides' monism by investigating the place of the knowing subject in a monistic reality. I will argue that there are hints throughout the Poem that it is possible for the knowing subject to leave one's status of mortal who can have only opinions, and become one with Being." (pp. 9-10, notes omitted)

7. ———. 2011. "What is Parmenides' Being?" In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 231-231. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
   Summary: "Nobody could know what ἐόν meant before listening to the Poem: even native speakers of Ancient Greek needed to acquire new mental categories and form this new concept, ἐόν, which is usually translated as "Being." Throughout his Poem, Parmenides teaches his audience to form this concept. One of the means he uses are the signs (σήματα) given by the goddess to the traveler in fr. B8. I focus here on the fourth σῆμα, where Parmenides gives hints about the special relation between Being and those who understand Being. I will show that Being is the fundamental unity of what-is (what is stable, without differences, development, needs) and what-understands. This perfect unity is what the audience is encouraged to understand. This unity is also the condition of the possibility of human understanding. Human beings can, in fact, understand this unity, directly, with an act of νοεῖν, since νοεῖν and Being are not separate but are one."
8. ———. 2016. "Parmenides' and Śankara's Nondual Being without Not-being." *Philosophy East and West* no. 66:290-327.
   "In the first section I will sketch what I call 'the fashionable Parmenides interpretations,' which regard being as the result of laws of logic or of predication. I will mention the common practice of scholars of trying to understand Parmenides' meaning of 'is' and 'being' by looking for the subject of the verb 'is,' that is, the alleged entity or object that 'is.' An alternative to this practice is to try and understand both the omission of a subject of the verb 'is' and the journey metaphors in fragment DK B2 as

suggestions that being is not a thing but rather the activity, state, or fact of being. By means of a comparison with Śaṅkara, I will use the category of nondual experience to understand being, which is not a thing. In section 2, I will present a short overview of the existing comparisons between Parmenides and Śaṅkara. I will then (section 3) look at pointers in Śaṅkara's work that might help us grasp what is meant by nondual experience, which is knowing that is not different from being (and Self/Ātman, which is reality/Brahman), which might well be regarded as the goal that both philosophers want to help their audience reach. In section 4, I will show how both philosophers express the need on the part of human beings not only to become aware of the nondual essence of reality but also to make sense of reality by means of concepts and words that help them see order in reality. However, Parmenides and Śaṅkara regard "opinions" and "lower level of knowledge," respectively, as only acceptable if they are not used as instruments to understand reality as it is. Both philosophers offer a method for testing what mortals (i.e., we) believe to be real.
In section 5, we will look at the first step of this method, taken by Parmenides in DK B2 and by Śaṅkara in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* I, 1, 1.
(...)
In section 6, I will mention the second step their methods have in common: the application of a test of what, according to common sense, are the fundamental characteristics of reality: birth, movement, differentiation, development, and relations of cause and effect. I will concentrate on the passage in DK B8 where Parmenides tests the reality of birth (which does not pass the test and is proved to be unreal). We will then look (section 7) at Śaṅkara's use of negative dialectic in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* II, 1, 18, where he refutes the reality of two distinct entities called cause and effect." (pp. 290-291)

9. ———. 2016. "Being is not an object: an interpretation of Parmenides' fragment DK B2 and a reflection on assumptions." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 36:263-301.

"Is Parmenides' *being* a thing, discovered by reason and expressible in well-formed sentences? Or is it rather the same as knowing, which is the trustworthy aspect of our experience, pointed at by Parmenides by means of coherent reasoning?
In this introduction, I make explicit the main assumptions that the majority of scholars apply to the interpretation of DK B2 and of the rest of Parmenides' poem. In sections 1 and 2, I show what role these assumptions play in the interpretation of Parmenides' poem. Then, I show what other assumptions could be used to interpret Parmenides. In section 3, I argue that Parmenides' *being* (το ἐόν, εἶναι) could be something other than a special 'object'. By 'object' I mean some entity distinct from a subject observing it. I suggest what question *being* could be an answer to and review some answers given by philosophers of various backgrounds to that question. In section 4, I look at what being could be, by focussing on the role played by the notion of trust throughout the poem. In section 5, I analyse fragment B2 and delve into the category of experience. In the conclusion, I compare the repercussions, for the interpretation of B2 and Parmenides' philosophy at large, of applying the two different sets of assumptions" (p. 263)

10. Robinson, Thomas M. 1975. "Parmenides on the Ascertainment of the Real." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 4:623-633.
"In this paper I want to suggest that, while the argued philosophical distinction between logic, epistemology and ontology is one of the many achievements of Aristotle, his predecessor Parmenides was in fact already operating with a theory of knowledge and an elementary propositional logic that are of abiding philosophical interest. As part of the thesis I shall be obliged to reject a number of interpretations of particular passages in his poem, including one or two currently fashionable ones. Since so much turns on points of translation, I note for purposes of comparison what seem to be significant alternatives to my own in any particular instance." (p. 623)

11. ———. 1979. "Parmenides on the Real in Its Totality." *The Monist* no. 62:54-60.
Reprinted in Thomas M. Robinson, *Logos and Cosmos: Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Sankt Augustin: Academa Verlag 2010, pp. 53-60.
"In the long term Parmenides' doctrine has two further major implications for logical and linguistic theory: (a) by extrapolation it can be argued that the logic of wholes and the logic of parts are different from one another whatever the philosophical topic under discussion, and knowledge of this fact will prove to be one of the greatest safeguards against two of the commonest fallacies in philosophy, namely those of Composition and Division; and (b) "what is the case" can no more be said to have a temporal mode of existence than can "what is real". In suggesting that genuine ascertainment is of what will later be called the eternally existent Parmenides has come to the very verge of the understanding that a true existential proposition is atemporally such. A hint of this, it seems to me, can be found at 8.34–36: the present tense of the participial phrase "the real (= apparently "the true": see above, note 1), like the present tense used of the phrase "the real" in the sense of "the unique entity", is the best that grammar can do to convey the notion of that which is, in Owen's phrase ([2] 271), logically tenseless. It is, as need hardly be pointed out, at best a hint and very possibly not something sensed by Parmenides himself; but with such inspired gropings does serious philosophical progress begin." (p. 59 of the reprint)
note 1: "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 4.4 (1975) 623–633.
[2] "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", in *The Pre-Socratics*, ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1974) 271–292 (= *The Monist 50* [1966] 317–340).
12. ———. 1989. "Heraclitus and Parmenides on What Can Be Known." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 7:157-167.
Reprinted in Thomas M. Robinson, *Logos and Cosmos: Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Sankt Augustin: Academa Verlag 2010, pp. 32-40.

"In this paper I wish to argue that Parmenides and Heraclitus, despite significant differences in other respects, agreed on the following fundamentals:
1) Knowledge in the strictest sense is possible, but it is always of the general or universal. As a consequence the only true object of knowledge can be the real as a whole.
2) This real-as-a-whole is co-extensive with what is normally referred to as the world, in the sense of all that exists and/or all that is the case.
3) The real as a whole is eternal (Parmenides) or everlasting (Heraclitus), and unchanging; in respect of its parts it is subject to temporal process and change.
4) What the senses can tell us about the real in respect of its parts is not always reliable; but their role can still be a valuable one.
5) Reality, knowledge and a rational account (logos) go hand in hand; this is true both for our own account of the real and for the real's account of itself.
6) The relationship between knowledge and the real, and between a number of supposedly opposing features of the real, is one of necessary interconnectedness, boldly described by both philosophers in terms of identity." (p. 32 of the reprint)

13. ———. 2010. "Parmenides on Coming-to-Know the Real." In *Logos and Cosmos*, edited by Robinson, Thomas M., 61-72. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Originally published in Japanese in *Academic Proceedings of the St. Andrew's University Press*, Osaka, 1996, pp. 27–36.
"By common consent, Parmenides is the key philosophical figure in Greece antecedent to Socrates. Yet the exact nature of his claims continues to be a matter of great dispute and puzzlement. To survey the vast literature on the matter would be the subject of a book in itself.
For the moment I shall simply offer the thoughts that I myself have had on his poem over the past two decades. Appended to the paper are set of my translations of various sections of Parmenides' poem. These I shall examine in turn. During the examination it will become clear where I

stand on what I think Parmenides is trying to say. After that I shall attempt to draw some conclusions on the effect, as I see it, of Parmenides' thought on the development of western philosophical thinking in the realms of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. (p. 61)

14. Roecklein, Robert J. 2011. *Plato versus Parmenides. The Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX-X; Introduction 1; 1. Parmenides' Argument 13; 2. Parmenides and the Milesian Philosophies: "Nothing Comes from Nothing" --- Physics or Logic? 37; 3. Parmenides' Influence of Empedocles and Anaxagoras 57; 4. Plato's Socrates and His Theory of Causation 83; 5. The *Parmenides*: Plato's Proof of Coming to Be 121; 6. The *Theaetetus*: Plato's Proof That the Objects of Knowledge Are Indivisible 159; Bibliography 187; Index 195-199.
"The estimation of Parmenides' argument has risen to such high levels in our scholarship, that Plato's very reputation as a thinker has begun to fade into somewhat of a derivative status. Plato, it is held by more than a few influential scholars, could not even have arrived at his theory of forms if he had not had the good fortune to be influenced by Parmenides' doctrine about motionless, eternal "Being." In the view of recent commentators, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that Parmenides is now often portrayed as *the* seminal thinker of classical Greek philosophy.(10) It is increasingly a standard view among commentators, that Plato's Socrates himself is overcome by the power of the Eleatic legacy, which, they say, he willingly embraces.
The most spectacular evidence of this movement in the status of Plato in our scholarship can be seen in the commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* itself. A large number of scholars are now convinced that in this dialogue, Plato has commissioned the character of Parmenides to deliver a telling, if not a fatal blow against Plato's own theory of forms.(11) We will investigate this matter in some depth in chapter *5;* for the moment, it must suffice to

indicate the following points. In fact, it is Parmenides' argument which is put to the test in the dialogue that Plato named after the great Eleatic; so far from treating Parmenides with reverence or deference, Plato actually assigns a very humbling role to Parmenides in the dialogue named for him. The role assigned to Parmenides there is nothing other than to utter the effectual refutation of his own entire argument. In the fifth chapter, a case will be made that Plato refutes Parmenides' indictment of the reality of coming-into being, and so concludes, rather than sustains, the legacy of Parmenides' argument.

We will also be challenged, in this study, to rebut a claim that has by now been very powerfully established in the scholarly literature: this claim is that Parmenides created a philosophical interpretation of the notion of Being which even Plato's Socrates has in some measure been shaped by, or come to adopt. Plato's theory of forms, as those forms are hypothesized to be eternal and ungenerated, is linked by a number of scholars to the theory of being that Parmenides developed.

This view is confused. In the first place, the forms are originally known to human beings in those very perishable objects which the Eleatics wish to wholly exclude from all evidentiary matters concerning truth of fact. Plato's Socrates, it can be noted, arrived at his famous profession of ignorance precisely as a rhetorical method for summoning forth from interlocutors a base of knowledge which all hold in common: namely recognition of the various forms in perishable bodies.

This common intelligence on display in the ordinary individual's effortless assignment of name to object is certainly not science, in Plato's view; however, the theory of scientific definition which Plato advances does indeed depend on this recognition-knowledge as the ultimate *evidence* for its own investigations. The ordinary and spontaneous ability of unphilosophic human beings to assign name to object is, in Plato's view, itself evidence of a distinct *intelligence* operative in the ordinary opinions. One

could hardly formulate a proposition more at loggerheads with the Eleatic philosophy.
That which the memory recognizes in the patterns that recur (and all of the patterns, as Plato argues throughout his work, appear innumerable times in the perishable objects), is not a knowledge that has the power of full consciousness and comprehension such as the power possessed by logos or more deliberate investigation. Yet Plato insists that these opinions are nevertheless the port from which philosophy must embark. When argument finally reaches for an intellectual comprehension in speech-as opposed to *an* inarticulate recognition of the individual forms-Plato's philosophy will attach a scientific hypothesis to the ordinary views. Yet this hypothesis itself, that the forms exist separately in nature for the sake of intellectual investigation, remains dependent on the common familiarity with the forms as they recur in the common objects. "And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects" *(Republic* 476a). Yet it is the building block upon which Plato's entire science of definition rests, and he never fails to fight for the integrity of this recognition-knowledge in his major debates with rival philosophers such as Protagoras and Parmenides." (pp. 10-11)
(10) Charles Kahn, "Being in Parmenides and Plato," *La Parola del Passato* 43 (1988): "If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between being and becoming that provided Plato with an ontological basis for his theory of forms. When he decides to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself' (237). Cf. Taran, *Parmenides,* vii; Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought* (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004), 231-32, 238.

(11) Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides," Philosophical Review* 63 (1954): 329, 342. Kenneth M. Sayre, *Parmenides' Lesson* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 60, 62, 95. Robert Turnbull, *The Parmenides and Plato 's Late Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 19, 23, 39. Kelsey Wood, *Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato's Parmenides* (Albany: SUNY, 2005), 1-2, 74, 85.

15. Rohatyn, Dennis Anthony. 1971. "A Note on Parmenides B 19." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 5:20-23.
"Hershbell (1) presents compelling evidence combined with sound reasoning for his contention that Fr. 16 does not belong in 'The Way of Opinion (or Seeming)' but rather in 'The Way of Truth' portion of Parmenides' poem. With as much justice I think it is possible to reassign Fr. 19 to the first part of the poem as well. For it is here that Parmenides introduces the concept of name (*onoma*, B19 1.3), and utilizes it to explain mortal belief (*doxa*, B19 1.1) in coming-to-be and in passing-away. (2) It seems natural to place this after the concluding words of Fr. 8, 11. 60-61, in which Parmenides advises or promises a full account (3) so that no "mortal wisdom may ever outstrip" that of the reader or initiate. It is only proper to regard Parmenides' theory of names, if it is as full-blown as all that, as belonging to his metaphysical apparatus and thus as having nothin g to do, in and of itself, with the erroneous picture of the world which it is expressly designed to account for." (p. 20)
(1) J.P. Hershbell, "Parmenides' way of Truth and B16" , *Apeiron* 4, No. 2 (August 1970), 1-23.
(2) The source is Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle, *de Caelo* 558.9-11.
(3) Of "appearances", "phenomena" and "empirical data", all *pace* Aristotle, *Metaphysica* A 986b31.

16. Romero, Gustavo E. 2012. "Parmenides Reloaded." *Foundations of Science* no. 17:291-299.
Abstract: "I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common

with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus' thought that presents no major antagonism."

17. Rosen, Stanley. 1996. "Commentary on Long [*Parmenides on Thinking Being*]." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:152-160.
"As a result of reading Long's excellent paper and reviewing some of the scholarship, it occurs to me that Parmenides is something of a Hegelian. I do not need to emphasize that Hegel would not have approved of this assertion without elaborate qualification. But that is
not decisive. To begin with, Hegel did believe that the end is somehow contained, even prefigured within, the beginning. In this connection, the spherical character of Parmenides' being is a striking prototype of the circularity of the Hegelian concept and even of Nietzsche's eternal return of the same. And Long's excellent emphasis on the fact that Parmenides is inquiring into the thinking of being, not into being as independent of thought, is also quite Hegelian. The lynch-pin of this somewhat but not entirely playful Hegelian reading is the translation and interpretation of fragment 3 offered in various contexts by Heidegger, Couloubaritsis, Long, and myself. What is "the same" that serves as the subject of the two infinitives "to think" and "to be?" It must be the same as each yet other than either. If it is not the same as each, then obviously neither will be the same as the other. But if it is not other than each, then the two will not only be "the same" but will be one and the same or a homogeneous unit. The only remaining possibility is that the two are both same and other, or as Hegel would say, that "the same" stands here for "the identity" in the expression "the identity of identity and difference."
(...)
"I do not need to emphasize too strongly that it was not my intention to present a new and comprehensive interpretation of Parmenides in a short commentary on someone else's paper. My main purpose was to signal my

partial adherence to Long's central thesis and to make one or two suggestions for strengthening it." (pp. 157-159)

18. Sanders, Kirk R. 2002. "Much Ado About 'Nothing': μηδέν and τὸ μη` ἐόν in Parmenides." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 35:87-104.
"It is, to my knowledge, a universally accepted assumption among contemporary commentators that μδεν το εν αιων, 'nothing', and 'τομ~ Μν, 'what-isnot', function as synonyms in Parmenides' poem.(1) In this paper, I focus primarily on the central role this supposed semantic equivalence plays in arguments supporting an emendation in line 12 of fragment B8.
Despite this scholarly unanimity regarding the synonymy of these two Greek terms and the popularity of the emendation, I contend that we can make the best sense of Parmenides' argument in this and the surrounding lines precisely by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the difference in meaning between 'nothing' and 'what-is-not'. This claim, of course, also has broader implications for the interpretation of Parmenides' poem generally." (p. 87)
Cf. Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (second edition) Frankfurt 1959), 39-42; Leonardo Taran, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton 1965), 95-7; Montgomery Furth, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6 (1968), 119; A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven 1970), 100-2; G.E.L. Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being', in Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays I, Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Garden City, NY 1971), 225-6; Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington 1971), 131; David Furley, 'Notes on Parmenides, in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and R.M. Rorty, eds., *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (New York 1973), 12-14; Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London 1982), 166; David Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* (Toronto 1984), 23-8; Scott Austin,

Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (New Haven 1986), 97; A.H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen 1986), 198-200; Richard J. Ketchum, 'Parmenides on What There Is', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20 (1990), 171-3 and 184-6; Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., *Philosophy Before Socrates* (Indianapolis 1994), 167; and Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought* (Princeton 1998), 76-7.

19. Santillana, Giorgio de. 1970. "Prologue to Parmenides." In *Reflections of Men and Ideas*, 82-119. Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press.
Originally published in *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, First Series 1961-1965*, Princeton Princeton University Press, 1967.
"Proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, an interpretation which is free from the misconceptions and superimpositions of ancient commentators and modern scholars, and which avoids the error of seeing in his philosophical system an ontological or metaphysical construction, or a logico-linguistic exercise. Insists on integrating the details of Parmenides' cosmology and astronomy with the principles developed in the first section of his poem. Concludes that the originality of Parmenides' thought, as well as his most significant contribution to the development of ideas, should be recognized in the fact that he "made of geometry the core of reality in an entirely different way from his predecessors" (p. 119): Parmenidean Being reveals itself as "three-dimensional extension pure and absolute" (ibid.), which was conceived as the ultimate substratum of all things." [N.]
20. Santoro, Fernando. 2011. "*Ta Sēmata*: On a Genealogy of the Idea of Ontological Categories." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 233-250. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "My hypothesis is that some figures of speech, like catalogs, present in the sapient epics of Hesiod and Homer, as well as figures emerging from a discursive field of veracity belonging to the newborn fifth century forensic

rhetoric, helped build the originality of Parmenides' categorical ontological language. Especially for the characteristics of Being, presented in fragment B8 as signals: σήματα. I would also like to add to these elements of language, the early physicists' (φυσικῶν) interest in limits (περάτων). With these genealogic views, we can speculate about some important parameters of ontological categories such as subordination, attribution, and opposition."

21. Santos, José Gabriel Trindade. 2011. "The Role of “Thought” in the Argument of Parmenides’ Poem." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 251-270. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "It is my aim in this paper to analyze the role played by “thought” in the argument of Parmenides' Poem. The relevance of the “thought” theme in Greek philosophical tradition has long been recognized. In Parmenides it implies approaching the study of reality through the experience of thought in language. As knowledge is to the known, thought is to being. Their identity dominates Parmenides' argument in the Way of Truth, persisting in later relevant conceptions as Platonic ἐπιστήμη and Aristotelian “active intellect.” "
22. Santos, José Gabriel Trindade. 2013. "For a non-predicative reading of « esti » in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." *Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:39-50.
Abstract: "The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name

which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."

23. Sattler, Barbara M. 2012. "Parmenides' System: The Logical Origins of his Monism." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:25-90.
Abstract: "This paper aims to demonstrate that it is Parmenides' criteria for philosophy in conjunction with his understanding of the available logical operators and their holistic connection that lead to what we can call a logical monism—only the one Being can be conceived and hence known. Being the first to explicate criteria for philosophy, Parmenides will be shown to establish not only consistency as a criterion for philosophy, but also what I call rational admissibility, i.e., giving an account of some x that is based on rational analysis and can thus withstand rational scrutiny. As for logical operators, Parmenides employs a basic operator for connection, identity, and one for separation, negation. His negation operator, expressing an extreme negation that negates the argument completely, corresponds to his identity operator, expressing identification with no exception. But not only are these two basic operators tailored to each other, also Parmenides' basic notion of Being is such that it fits these operators as well as his criteria for philosophy. Accordingly, a kind of holism, a systematic character, underlies Parmenides' philosophy such that that any changes in one concept would necessitate changes in the others. Given the restrictions of Parmenides' criteria for philosophy and the logical operators available to him, what can be a possible object of philosophical investigation is nothing but something absolutely simple, the one Being as the logical content of a thought."

24. Schick, Thomas. 1965. "Check and Spur: Parmenides' Concept of (What) Is." *Classical Journal*:170-173.
"So far Parmenides has told us that (what) is not does not exist, and we cannot know it: (what) is exists; and now we seek to know its characteristics, its nature.

How is (what) is described? What can we know of it? It is generally agreed that all the predicates attributed by Parmenides to (what) is are contained in Fr. 8; but how are they contained there? Are they proved there? One opinion says "yes": "It [Fr. 8) opens (like a theorem in geometry) with an enunciation of the attributes, positive and negative, that will be proved to belong to the Real. ... These attributes are then established by a series of astonishingly brief and penetrating arguments."(16) But a heavy and well-founded "no" is sounded by Loenen. [*] He argues that *de facto* many of the predicates are not proved; and he thus supports one of his main theses, that a lacuna in the text contained analytic proofs of most of the predicates.
"Fr. 8 thus contains the deduction of a small number of additional attributes, viz. those which could not be arrived at by an analytical description of the idea of being."(17) This seems most plausible; and, though I am slow to accept many of Loenen's conclusions and interpretations, I use his divisions for the following description.
I identify and explain the attributes merely mentioned; I then discuss the deduced attributes and give their arguments and proofs; and finally I discuss briefly a characteristic which is not explicity mentioned in the fragment, but which must be predicated of (what) is." (pp. 171-172)
[*] J. H. M. M. Loenen, *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias; a reinterpretation of Eleatic philosophy* (Assen 1959),
(16) F. M. Cornford, "Parmenides' two ways" *Classical quarterly* 27 (1933) 103.
(17) 17 Loenen, p. 99.

25. Schofield, Malcolm. 1970. "Did Parmenides Discover Eternity?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*:113-135.
"Mr. J. E. Raven ascribes to Parmenides the-doctrine that 'past and future are alike meaningless, the only time is a perpetual present time'(1). And this is the orthodox view(2). (...)
But in recent years a dissenting point of view has been expressed.

First Professor Hermann Fränkel (6), then Professor Taran (7) has maintained (I quote Taran's expression of the point): There is nothing in the text to substantiate the claim of those who assert that Parmenides maintains that past and future cannot be predicated of Being to which only the present 'is' truly belongs. Parmenides is only denying that Being ever perished or ever will come to be(8).
The arguments adduced by Fränkel and Taran in support of this opinion have met with vigorous opposition, deservedly so for the most part(9). But I believe that their case is a stronger one than they have been able to establish, and that the majority opinion rests on
rather flimsier supports than has yet been generally appreciated.
These claims I attempt to substantiate in this paper.
The lines of Parmenides' poem which are chiefly responsible the controversy are B 8.5-6a." (pp. 113-114, a note omitted)
(1) G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1960: corrected Impression of the first edition), p. 274.
(2) L. Taran, *Parmenides*. (Princeton, 1965), p. 175, n. 1, gives a list of some who have held this view of Parmenides. They include Diels, Calogero, Mondolfo, Cornford, Gigon, Deichgräber, Owen. One may now add the names of W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* Vol. II (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 27-31, and C. H. Kahn, in a review of Taran's book in *Gnomon* 40 (1968), pp, 127-129.
(6) H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, second edition (Munich, 1960), p. 191, n. 1.
(7) Taran, *Parmenides*, pp. 175-188.
(8) Op. cit., p. 177. Zeller, in *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. I, Pt. I, ed. by W. Nestle (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 689-692, seems to give the same Interpretation äs Fränkel and Taran in bis text, but in a note (p. 690, n. 1) he mentions what appears to him to be a possible ground for adopting the view which has become traditional.
(9) Fränkel's arguments have been effectively rebutted by G. E. L. Owen, *The Monist* 60 (1966), pp. 320-322, and Taran's by C. H. Kahn, *Gnomon* 40 (1968), pp. 127-129.

26. ———. 1987. "Coxon's Parmenides." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 32:349-359.
"A.H. Coxon has a remarkable record of publications on ancient philosophy.
In CQ [=*Classical Quarterly*]1934 there appeared the early and much respected article "The Philosophy of Parmenides". Then in CQ 1968 came a brief note reporting Coxon's shaming discovery that the puzzling ἀστη usually printed in Fr. 1, 3 has no manuscript authority, coupled with a report on his re-examination of those portions of the manuscripts of Simplicius which bear on the establishment of Parmenides' text. Now in 1986 we have a full critical edition of the fragments, with introduction, translation, a much fuller selection of the ancient testimonia than in Diels-Kranz, and a commentary(1). So far as I know these are Coxon's only published writings on our subject." (p. 349)
"Perhaps the most interesting and important general conclusion Coxon draws from his study of the manuscript tradition of Parmenides is the proposition (*contra* Diels) that Parmenides' diction is uniformly epic and Ionic." (P. 350)
(1) A.H. Coxon: *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Van Gorcum: Assen/Maastricht, 1986 (Phronesis Supplementary Volume III). Pp. viii + 277.
27. Schürmann, Reiner. 1988. "Tragic Differing: The Law of the One and the Law of Contraries in Parmenides." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* no. 13:3-20.
"There is probably no greater beginner in the history of philosophy than Parmenides. If it is true that in their compactness beginnings already contain the essential insights that the subsequent tradition only spins out in ever new threads, then coming to terms with
Parmenides is a task that has to be undertaken ever again. Most of his sayings are hapax legomena which yield clear answers only to clearly put questions. But the questions we bring to him remain ours, dictated by the preponderances of the day.
The question I put to him concerns ultimate foundations. In a sense, it is the very issue for which he has been granted the

status of fatherhood ever since antiquity. Common opinion holds that he drafted once and for all, as it were, the job description of the philosopher: namely, to secure principles —reference points on which every thinking agent can rely both in his thinking and in his acting. Husserl still echoes and accepts that assignment when he counts himself among "the functionaries of mankind". From the time Parmenides wrote that being is one, and perhaps until Wittgenstein taught that grammars are many, this public function invested in philosophers has on the whole gone unchallenged.

Their foundational expertise has made them the civil servants par excellence in as much as they felt called upon, and in many quarters still feel called upon today, to secure a ground guaranteeing knowledge its truth and life, its meaning. As professionals, philosophers must point out—not set—reliable standards. They provide evidential moorage for the sake of consoling the soul and consolidating the city: some single first law governing all regional laws, be they cognitive, practical, or even positive.

Parmenides calls that law the One (capitalized for mere conventional purposes). For an age that has grown more aware than any other of fragmentations and dispersals in the order of things, can the One as Parmenides argues it assure a non-fractured foundation? If it turned out that his originative, compact insight also contains a conceptual strategy that counters his foundational gesture from within, it might follow that in and after Parmenides philosophy has had a more humble mission to fulfill than satisfying man's quest for ultimacy. Accustomed to the Many, our century may then not amount to the mere barbarism bent on destroying the entire noble tradition devoted to the One. Philosophy may have consisted all along in the attempt to think explicitly and with some rigor about matters that everyone knows, ad though rather implicitly and poorly. And what is it that we all know firsthand, yet poorly? Of our own coming-into-being, our birth, we know only indirectly; just as we know only indirectly of our own ceasing-to-be, our death. We know, but dimly, that we stand in the double-

bind of life and its contrary. The clear knowledge of that double-bind in which the law of contraries places us is tragic knowledge." (pp. 3-4)
(1) Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, transl. David Carr (Evanston, 1970) p. 17.

28. ———. 2003. *Broken Hegemonies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French: *Des Hégémonies brisées,* Mauvenzin, Trans Europe Repress, 1996.
See Part One: *In the Name of the One. The Greek Hegemonic Fantasm*. I: *Its Institution: The One That Holds Together (Parmenides)* pp. 51-135.
"The pages that follow are meant to be read as a contribution to the age old "doctrine of principles." Philosophers have never stopped speculating about this principal Greek legacy. Today the business of principal principles seems to have been robbed of its heritage. What can be learned from its loss? May it actually represent a gain for us? These are good enough reasons to examine the operations that have been carried out on this legacy." (p. 3)
"In what way is being one? As cumulative and "re-cumulative," as constantly recurring. The one that being is, is thinkable only as the crystallization of beings (which has nothing to do with atomism), a crystallization thought not in terms of beings, but as an occurrence, hence in terms of time. The one is what occurs through an aggregation. Beings and being are articulated in the *henological difference*.
How does this difference make law? Our analysis of contraries has shown that they essentially conjoin and disjoin with one another. There fore we cannot think of being as arrival without also thinking of it as leaving. There is no centripetal aggregation without a centrifugal disaggregation. To use Heidegger's words once again: no appropriation without expropriation.(119) In the idiom of an analytic of ultimates—no universalization without singularization. In terms of the law—no legislation with out transgression immanent within it. In one fell swoop, and

necessarily, the henological difference makes the law by binding us both to the dissolution of the phenomena of the world and to their consolidation that is underway. As soon as he understands the one as a process, Parmenides has to establish both at traction and withdrawal as equally normative. This double bind is embedded in our condition as mortals. We can call it the *henological differend*." (P. 134)
(119 M. Heidegger, “Protocole,” [Martin Heidegger, “Protocole d’un séminaire,” trans. Jean Lauxerois and Claude Roël, in *Questions* IV, Paris, 1976], p. 77.

29. Sedley, David. 1999. "Parmenides and Melissus." In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 113-133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: "Parmenides and Melissus were bracketed in antiquity as the two great exponents of the Eleatic world-view which denies change and plurality. (1) In modern times their treatment has been curiously unequal.
Too much has been written on Parmenides - albeit the greater thinker of the two - too little on Melissus. Too much has been said about Parmenides' use of the verb "be," while too little has been said about his detailed arguments for the individual characteristics of what-is. However, neither these nor other anomalies should disguise the immense wealth of scholarship that has furthered the reconstruction of their Eleaticism." (p. 113)
"How, then, does the cosmology complement the Way of Truth?
Above all by showing how to bridge the gap between truth and cosmic appearance. The entire range of cosmic phenomena can be generated by allowing the intrusion of just one additional item - by starting out with two instead of one. This makes immediate sense of the frequently noticed fact that the detailed descriptions of the cosmos mimic the language of the Way of Truth. For example, in B10 the "encircling heaven" is "bound down by Necessity to hold the limits of the stars," immediately recalling the description of what-is as held motionless by Necessity in the bonds of a

limit (B8.30-31). This tends to confirm that the very same sphere is being first correctly described, then, in the cosmology, incorrectly redescribed." (p. 124)
(1) Most of the interpretations proposed in this chapter can also be found in my two articles, "Melissus" and "Parmenides," in Craig, E. General editor *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (London, 1998).

30. Sider, David. 1979. "Confirmation of Two "Conjectures" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15." *Phoenix.Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 33:67-69.
"In each of the two passages discussed below, the indisputably correct reading is given by Diels as editorial conjecture, when in fact for each there is manuscript authority." (p. 33)
[The text of Parmenides is B12.4]
31. ———. 1985. "Textual Notes on Parmenides' Poem." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 113:362-366.
Philological remarks on the following fragments: 1,10, 1,24, 1,30, 2,3f; 6,4f; 6,5-6; 8,1, 8,28, 8,38, 12,2, 12,3.
32. Siegel, Rudolph E. 1962. "Parmenides and the Void. Some Comments on the Paper of Thomas S. Knight " *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:264-266.
"In his paper, T. S. Knight came to the conclusion that Parmenides did not simply deny the existence of a void, a physical vacuum, but also questioned the existence, the reality of the sensible world.
It might be open for discussion if the poem of Parmenides can be considered as a treatise on such highly abstract thinking as discussed by T. S. Knight.(1) One may rather assume, as others have done, that Parmenides and other pre-Socratic philosophers expressed with the Greek word 'To Hen,' the 'one,' a more concrete astronomical idea, the cosmos. In a paper on 'The Paradoxes of Zeno' (2) I tried to explain that the word 'one' might express: the mathematical point, the atom, and even the cosmos.
Its respective meaning should be taken from the entire context."

(1) Thomas S. Knight, "Parmenides and the Void," *Philosophy and Phenormenological Research*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (June 1959), pp. 524-528.
(2) Rudolph E. Siegel, "The Paradoxes of Zeno; Some Similarities to Modern Thought," *Janus*, XLVIII 1-2, 1959, pp. 24-47.

33. Sisko, John E. 2014. "Anaxagoras and Empedocles in the shadow of Elea." In *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Warren, James and Sheffield, Frisbee, 49-64. New York: Routledge.
"If Anaxagoras and Empedocles advance their theories in response to Parmenides, then it is quite unlikely that they consider Parmenides to be a predicational monist.
(...)
Whether Parmenides is a numerical monist or a generous monist, his alleged monad is motionless and phenomenally homogeneous. Also, on either interpretation, it is reasonable to consider Parmenides' monad both to be either a finite sphere or an infinitely extended expanse and to be either predicationally simple or predicationally saturated.
(...)
In light of their shared supposition that the cosmos develops from Parmenides' monad, it is unlikely that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a generous monist.
(...)
It is not implausible to suppose that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a numerical monist.
(...)
Thus, it is possible that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a numerical monist, concerning the initial state of the universe, and a numerical pluralist, concerning subsequent states. This interpretation constitutes a fourth alternative for assessing Parmenides' philosophy. Nevertheless, the interpretation does not appear to be consistent with specific claims offered in the Way of Truth (as those claims are commonly understood). So, it remains credible to affirm that Parmenides is a numerical monist and both Anaxagoras and Empedocles understand him to be a numerical monist." (pp. 62-63)

34. Sisko, John E., and Weiss, Yale. 2015. "A Fourth Alternative in Interpreting Parmenides." *Phronesis* no. 60:40-59.
Abstract: "According to current interpretations of Parmenides, he either embraces a token-monism of things, or a type-monism of the nature of each kind of thing, or a generous monism, accepting a token-monism of things of a specific type, necessary being. These interpretations share a common flaw: they fail to secure commensurability between Parmenides' *alētheia* and *doxa*. We effect this by arguing that Parmenides champions a metaphysically refined form of material monism, a type-monism of things; that light and night are allomorphs of what-is (*to eon*); and that the key features of what-is are entailed by the theory of material monism."
35. Skirry, Justin. 2001. "The Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 39:403-417.
Abstract: "The doctrine of numerical monism, as it is traditionally attributed to Parmenides, is the claim that there is only one thing that is genuinely or truly real - that is, is not generated, not perishable, immutable, indivisible, whole, complete, and continuous.(1) In this paper I argue that this interpretation is mistaken because it entails a claim that Parmenides does not accept, namely that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. This paper begins with a discussion of the central thesis of the Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides (NMIP). (2) Next, I argue that any consistent version of this interpretation must also hold that Parmenides is committed to the identification of thinking with Being. In the following section, I argue that if Parmenides is committed to this identification, then he must also think that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. However, fragment B6 provides evidence for the claim that Parmenides would not accept this conclusion. Finally, these considerations provide the three main premises of an argument, which concludes that Parmenides does not accept numerical monism as traditionally attributed to him by

commentators. We now turn to a discussion of NMIP's central thesis."
(1) Other commentators use different terms to refer to what I call "numerical monism." For example, Jonathan Barnes uses "real monism" (Jonathan Barnes, "Parmenides and the Eleatic One" *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* 61 [1979]: 1-21), and Mary Margaret MacKenzie uses the term "strong monism" (Mary Margaret MacKenzie, "Parmenides' Dilemma," *Phronesis* 27 [1982]: 1-12).
(2) Numerical monism is one of at least three varieties of monism found in early Greek philosophy. The other two types are material and predicational monism. The former asserts that all reality is made of the same stuff: For example, on the traditional interpretation, Anaximenes believed that all things are really air in different stages of condensation and rarefaction. Notice that material monism does not designate a number of existents. "Predicational Monism" is the term used by Patricia Curd to describe her position. According to Curd a real thing for Parmenides is a predicational unity holding only one predicate, which indicates what it is. Notice that this does not preclude the existence of a plurality of predicates (see Patricia Curd *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press:
19980, 65-66). This paper is concerned with the attribution of numerical monism to Parmenides. Whether or not Parmenides is committed to one of these other sorts of monism is not at issue here.

36. Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla. 2003. "Of Gods, Philosophers, and Charioteers: Content and Form in Parmenides' Proem and Plato's *Phaedrus*." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 133:227-253.
Summary: "This article examines the ways in which Parmenides and Plato avail themselves of the literary motif of the charioteer's journey for philosophical discourse. I argue that the *Phaedrus*' myth of the soul as a charioteer exemplifies Plato's literary and philosophic appropriation of the charioteer allegory in Parmenides' proem and of Parmenides' concept of being, showing how the literary

study of intertexts can be applied to questions of both content and form in philosophy."
"The allegory of the charioteer's journey in Parmenides' proem and Plato's *Phaedrus* deserves the attention of both philosophers and literary critics.
Regarding content, Plato bases his concept of the immortality of the soul upon Parmenides' concept of true being: the soul is a self-moving first principle that cannot be destroyed or come into being (*Phdr*. 245c5–e1) and is therefore kindred to Parmenides' ungenerated, imperishable, whole, steadfast, and complete being (B8.3–4).1 Regarding form, Plato employs the allegory of the charioteer's journey to illustrate the immortal nature of the soul (*Phdr*. 246a6–b4), alluding thereby to Parmenides' account of the chariot journey of a young philosopher beyond sense-perceptible reality to the realm of eternal existence (B1.1–5). I shall examine the close relationship between Plato's myth of the soul as a charioteer in the Phaedrus and the charioteer's journey in Parmenides. I shall also draw attention to the literary tradition of the theme prior to Parmenides, and particularly to its presence in Homer, in order to situate the interconnection of the two philosophical texts in the context of their generic differences and similarities. The current examination entails the study of (a) Parmenides' adoption and adaptation of the Homeric theme of a charioteer's journey in the allegory of a philosopher's search for true knowledge; and (b) Plato's literary and philosophical use of Parmenides' allegory in the account of the immortality of the soul (*Phdr*. 245c5–47a2)." (p. 227)

37. Solana, José Dueso. 2011. "Parmenides: Logic and Ontology." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 271-288. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Many scholars (especially Calogero) affirm that in the age of Parmenides, a theoretical treatment of logic and ontology was not clearly differentiated. Accepting this thesis, valid as well for Plato and Aristotle to some extent, this paper provides arguments for a primarily logical and

only secondarily ontological interpretation of the ἀλήθεια of Parmenides (fr. 2–fr. 8.50). An interpretation of this type allows us to solve the arduous problem of the relationship between both parts of the poem, the ἀλήθεια and the δόξα, in a satisfactory way. Besides the internal arguments from Parmenides' own text, there are two external references that support the proposed interpretation: firstly, some data of the philosophical-poetic context, and secondly, an insistent thesis of Aristotle according to which some Presocratic philosophers (Parmenides among them) supposed that reality is confined to sensible things."

38. Solmsen, Friedrich. 1977. "Light from Aristotle's Physics on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:10-12.
"Students of Parmenides are familiar with a problem regarding his text and thought in the beginning of the passage where Being is elevated to an unheard-of grandeur and sublimity. Does Parmenides in B 8.6-15 disprove only genesis from not-Being or does his refutation dispose of genesis from Being as well as from not-Being?
(...)
Exegetes who consider a dilemmatic structure of the argument necessary have not failed to avail themselves of the strong support afforded them by Simplicius' comments on vv. 3-14
(...)
What seems to have gone unnoticed is that Aristotle too bears witness to the truth of their position. For although he does not name him, he must have Parmenides in mind at *Physics* I 8, 191 a 23-33." (pp. 10-11)
"Throughout a large part of *Physics I*, Parmenides' (and Melissus') position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality.(6) The monolithic, unchanging *on* deprives physics of the principles (*archai*) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable.
Having conquered it he constructs his own theory of *genesis*." (p. 12)

(6) See esp. I 1-3 (184 b 15 ff., 25 ff. etc.). Cf. my *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca, 1961) 74 ff.

39. Sorabji, Richard. 1983. *Time, Creation and the Continuum: theories in antiquity and the early middle ages*. London: Duckworth.
Chapter 8: Is Eternity Timelessness?; *Parmenides*, pp. 99-107.
"The concept of eternity appears very early in Western thought in one of the first Presocratic philosophers, Parmenides of Elea (born c. 515 B.C). It is taken up by Plato and the Platonists and this is the route by which it comes to influence Christian thought. Eternity is standardly contrasted with time and is said by the Christians I shall be discussing to be a characteristic of God. To the question raised in the chapter heading, whether eternity is timelessness, I shall answer with a qualified 'yes', after explaining what I mean. But the case will need arguing, for there are plenty of rival interpretations which have been ably supported." (pp. 98-99)
"In his poem The Way of Truth, Parmenides discusses an unspecified subject 'it'. I favour the suggestion that the subject is whatever can be spoken and thought of, or alternatively whatever we inquire into. (3) The crucial sentence for our purposes comes in fr. 8 DK, 1. 5 and the first half of 6:
Nor was it ever (*pot'*), nor will it be, since it now is, all together, one, continuous.
It is the denial of 'was' and 'will be' which expresses some concept of eternity - but what concept?
I shall distinguish eight main interpretations." (p. 99)
"I conclude provisionally that the 'timeless' interpretation fits Parmenides best, and I should now like to see what happened to the concept of eternity after Parmenides. To put it briefly, my suggestion will be that Plato clouded the issue by placing alongside the implications of timelessness more phrases implying everlasting duration than can conveniently be explained away. This made it necessary for Plotinus to make a decision and his decision was in favour of timelessness." (p. 108)

(3) The first is the suggestion of G.E.L. Owen, the second that of Jonathan Barnes. G.E.L. Owen, 'Eleatic questions', CQn.s.10, 1960, 84-102 (repr. in D.J. Furley and R.E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy* vol.2, London, 1975), and 'Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present', *Monist* 50, 1966, 317-40 (repr. in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.) *The Pre-Socratics,* Garden City N.Y., 1974). Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, London 1979, vol. 1, 163.

40. Spangler, G.A. 1979. "Aristotle's Criticism of Parmenides in *Physics* I." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:92-103.

"Aristotle's aim in the Physics is to discover those principles which make it possible to have systematic knowledge of nature. He does not say that this is his aim, however, but only implies that it is. The text of the Physics opens with the following remarks:

In all disciplines in which there is systematic knowledge of things with principles, causes, or elements, it arises from a grasp of those: we think we have knowledge of a thing when we have found its primary causes and principles, and followed it back to its elements. Clearly, then, systematic knowledge of nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles (184a 10-15).

These remarks put Aristotle's *Physics* squarely into the tradition of "natural philosophy," which is usually said to have originated with Thales. But just as one is rightly wary of saying that natural philosophy was originated by any one man, so it is incautious to suppose that one could easily label what Aristotle is doing in a work so complex as his Physics. His own words suggest that he is writing with a scientific interest at stake, but even so one must remember that the lover of truth was then little concerned with marking out territories on the intellectual landscape. In any event, Aristotle quickly moves on to a discussion of Parmenides and Melissus, a discussion which, as he says, offers scope for philosophy." (P. 92)

41. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1955. "Parmenides: A Suggested Rearrangement of Fragments in the "Way of Truth"." *Classical Philology* no. 50:124-126.

"The proposed alteration of Diels's ordering of the fragments of Parmenides will, I believe, eliminate from the poem two difficulties in thought which result from the present sequence.(1) The fragments with which I am concerned are the following: 6. 1-9; 7. 1-5; 8.1-2 [Greek text omitted]" (p. 123)
"My rearrangement of the fragments would be as follows: (1) I should detach the first two lines of Fragment 6, thus leaving a gap between lines 2 and 3 in the present sequence. (2) I should then place 7. 1-2 in the gap created between 6. 2 and 6. 3." (p. 124)
"The entire rearrangement may be summarized as follows: (1) 7. 1 follows 6. 2; (2) 7. 2 is dropped on the assumption that it is really another version of 6. 3; (3) 6. 3-9 are as before, but, with the removal of 7. 1-2, 7. 3 follows 6. 9. The rest of the ordering remains the same." (p. 125)
(1) All textual references are to Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1951), Vol. I.

42. Stannard, Jerry. 1960. "Parmenidean Logic." *The Philosophical Review* no. 69:526-533.
"That Parmenides introduced a significant change in the method of Greek philosophic thinking is admitted on all hands, though there is, naturally, considerable disagreement about the nature of that change as well as its significance." (p. 526)
"I am not at all convinced that the famous dictum "It is impossible that Being and Not-Being are and are not the same" (B6 D-K) is evidence that Parmenides recognized that the formal structure of his argument was a special case of the more general principle of contradiction. Exactly what method Parmenides used in cataloguing the characteristics of Being doubtless remains a problem.
My own feeling is that he was simply and intuitively following the syntactical structure of the only language known to him. Thus I would suggest that the principal criterion followed by Parmenides in this process was essentially a negative one: avoidance of any open violation of the rules of Greek syntax.(18)" (pp. 530-531)

(18) For this reason, I am inclined to agree with von Fritz (loc. cit., ["NOYZ, NOEIN, and their Derivates in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Classical Philology*, XL, 1945] p. 241) that Parmenides' method was largely an "intuitive" one. Whether or not, in addition to this, Parmenides' exposition of the Way of Truth was akin to a religious or mystical revelation, as Bowra (op. cit. [*Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford, 1953]) convincingly argues, is a matter that does not affect the present paper.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Steele, Laura D. 2002. "Mesopotamian Elements in the Proem of Parmenides? Correspondences between the Sun-Gods Helios and Shamash." *Classical Quarterly* no. 52:583-588.
"This paper will examine the striking similarities between the journey of Parmenides' narrator and that of the Babylonian sun-god Shamash (Sumerian UTU),(3) similarities that confirm previous scholarly attempts to discern attributes of Helios and/or Apollo in the proem.(4) While the metaphors of a horse-drawn chariot and 'daughters of the sun' are attested Greek associations with the sun-god Helios, three elements of Parmenides' proem are explained more readily with reference to Shamash: the downward passage(5) through gates that are described in great structural detail; the association between these gates and the figure of Justice; and the identification of Parmenides' narrator as Greek κούρος, a word that covers the semantic range of a common epithet of Shamash (and of his disciple Gilgamesh), Akkadian *etlu*.
Whether or not Parmenides invoked Babylonian antecedents intentionally, his choice of images indicates a certain degree of Babylonian influence on Greek deities and literary culture more generally." (p. 584)

(3) For general information, see 'Utu' in J. Black and A. Green, *Gods, Demons, and Symbols of Ancient Mesopotamia* (Austin, 1992), 182-4.
(4) For arguments in favour of the solar trajectory of Parmenides' journey, see W Burkert, 'Das Proomium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras', *Phronesis* 14 (1969), 1-30, following W. Kranz, 'Uber Aufbau und Bedeutung des Parmenideischen Gedichtes', *Sitzungberichte der Konig/ichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 47 (1916), 1158-76. For a semantic rebuttal of Kranz's hypothesis, see Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965), 23.
(5) Or *katabasis;* see the thorough discussions in Burkert (n. 4) and in P. Kingsley, *In the Dark Places of Wisdom* (Shaftesbury, 1999), 58ff.

2. Stein, Howard. 1969. "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:725-734.
About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).
"I want to suggest that the conclusions of your beautiful paper on the Greek verb "to be," which you apply in what seems to me a very convincing way to the analysis of Parmenides, can be exploited further than you have done, with a gain of coherence for the doctrine. I offer my suggestions diffidently: they are rather speculative, and I have no scholarship in the language and little in the period. The principal question I want to raise is that of the interpretation of what you call Parmenides' "wildly paradoxical conclusions about the impossibility of plurality and change." An argument that leads to a truly paradoxical conclusion is always open (if it escapes conviction for fallacy) to construction as a *reductio ad absurdum*. And the (meager) biographical tradition represents Parmenides - quite unlike Heraclitus, Heraclitus, for instance - as a reasonable and even practically effective man, not at all a fanatic. It therefore seems natural to ask, if he maintained a paradoxical doctrine, whether it did not possess for him (and perhaps for his successors who took him seriously) an interpretation that made some sense. Further, setting aside this not very weighty prima facie argument, I think the

search for plausible interpretations is worthwhile in any case: for (1) to make a rational assessment of the historical evidence one needs the widest possible survey of hypotheses to choose among; (2) since conclusions in such matters are always uncertain, a list of possibilities may retain a kind of permanent (not just heuristic) value, as the best we can do; and (3) readings which are even dismissed as unsound on adequate critical grounds may still be of interest, both for the understanding of historical influence - I have in mind in the present case especially Parmenides' influence on Plato- and for our own philosophical edification." (p. 725)
These remarks are a revised version of comments made in correspondence concerning an earlier redaction of Kahn's paper. It has seemed, on the whole, least stilted to retain the informality of second person address. I wish to record my gratitude to Kahn for suggesting that these comments be published with his paper.

3. Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin. 2001. "The Way of Truth. Parmenides' Seminal Reflections on Logic, Semantics and Methodology of Science." In *Audiator vox sapientiae. A Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow*, edited by Féry, Caroline and Sternefeld, Wolfgang, 450-472. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
"In the following, I try to present a new perspective on Parmenides, the father of Plato's logical semantics, or rather, on his famous and difficult poem. I do so without presenting sufficient philological arguments for the proposed reading. I just claim that the poem is a most influential text in the history of logic, semantics and methodology of science. Usually, some kind of metaphysical ontology stands in the focus of attention. I believe, instead, that later shifts of interest and understanding lost the original context and project out of sight.
Parmenides asks what truth and reliable knowledge is. He seems to be the first philosopher who did not just tell allegedly true stories about the structure of the world as, for example, the Ionians did. Parmenides begins with a metalevel reflection on method, on the right road (*hodos*) to knowledge and truth. He presents an ideal explanation of

what absolute truth and knowledge is. Only after this does he give a presentation of best possible knowledge. This main part of the poem is almost totally lost. It consisted of a collections of claims about the real causes of some phenomena. Therefore, the book had the title *On Nature* in antiquity." (p. 450)

4. ———. 2003. "Plato and Parmenides on Ideal Truth, Invariant Meaning, and Participation." In *Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato. Akten der IV. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 1-3 September 2000 in Frankfurt*, edited by Wolfgang, Detel, Becker, Alexander and Scholz, Peter, 115-132. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.
   "For Parmenides, representation 'by the mind', by memory, or 'to the mind', by words, is the basic method of overcoming the cognitive limits of sheer presence.(3) Parmenides defends the peculiar role of presence and claims that it is conceptually the same to say that something is real and that it can be known: Existing (einai) and being the object of possible knowledge (noein) are the same. But he seems to work with a double meaning of "noiein": The core meaning is to notice or to realise something in a present situation.
   Hence, there is an obvious need to 'enlarge' the concept of knowing from the narrow sense of immediate 'realisation' to general knowledge and, by the same token, of the parochial concept of actual being here to universal reality. By this move, the concept of immediate knowledge, i. e. perception, widens to possible knowledge. Truth and reality is what can be known. It is not defined by what actually is known or, even worse, what only seems to be known. But how do we conceptually proceed from what can be realised here and now to what can or could be known?" (p. 116)
   (3) It is not clear how Parmenides, fragment 4,1 must be translated, perhaps both readings are right.
5. Stewart, Donald. 1980. "Contradiction and the Ways of Truth and Seeming." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 14:1-14.
   "The central problem concerning Parmenides' poem is to provide the rationale for the relationship between the two

major parts of the poem, The Way of Truth and The Way of Seeming." (p. 1)
"Very briefly my argument is this; though the Greeks individuated objects on the basis of sensation just as we do, they had, at the time of Heraclitus, no satisfactory way of grounding this sensory individuation in ontology.
(...)
This, in turn, led Heraclitus to a belief in, if not a formulation of, what we may call the principle of contradiction, for it was evident that all things were One and yet still different things at the same time, and thus that paradox was the only true method of thought.
Parmenides, in a reference seemingly clearly to Heraclitus, (4) formulates this principle for the first time when he refers to those by whom "To be and Not To be are regarded as the same and not the same, and (for whom) in everything there is a way of opposing stress." (fr.6) It is this principle which is the key, I believe, to the relation of the Way of Seeming to the Way of Truth. If we take "To be" as a description of the One and "Not to be" as its negation then it is relatively easy to discern the relation between the two Ways. The Way of Truth gives us a description of the One from the point of view of the One while allowing, at the same time, for a description of the many, but only from the point of view of the many. Each is totally different from the other, and yet if we take Heraclitus seriously, as I think Parmenides did, they are the same as well as not the same. It is this sameness of the two opposites, the One and all the things that are the One, which provides the link between the two Ways. The Way of Seeming, though it is the Way of Truth, is that Way only from the point of view of Seeming. Similarly, the Way of Truth, though it is the Way of Seeming, is so only from the point of view of the truth, the One." (p. 2)
(4) Stokes disagrees and claims that there is no compelling reason to believe that Parmenides was aware of Heraclitus' writings at all.

6. Stokes, Michael C. 1960. "Parmenides Fr. 6." *Classical Review* no. 10:193-194.
I give the text and punctuation of Diels-Kranz for lines 3 ff.:

Πρώτης γάρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,
αὐτα`ρ ἔπειτ' ἀπο`τῆς, ἣν δη`βροτοι`εἰδότες οὐδε`ν
πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γα`ρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτο`ν νόον· οἱ δε`φοροῦνται
κωφοι`ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
οἷς το`πέλειν τε και`οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτο`ν νενόμισται
κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δε`παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.
"There has been much controversy over the question whether or not this fragment refers to the philosophy or Heraclitus; much less discussion of the construction and meaning or these singularly difficult lines. The crucial point concerns the gender of πάντων in I. 9. Kirk-Raven, p. 271, translate as if it were neuter, while admitting, p. 272 n. 1, that it is possible that it is masculine. This is fair enough; but the word 'possible' is perhaps an understatement." (p. 193)
"I suggest that the most satisfactory way out of the problem is to punctuate with a colon after κοὐ ταὐτόν, taking πάντων δε`... as syntactically parallel to οἱ δε`... in I. 6 of this fragmcnL The last clause of the fragment would then be a separate sta1atement of the goddess, introduced by an explanatory δε`.(1) It would follow. of course, that πάντων should be taken as masculine, since the *goddess* could hardly say that the way of all things was backward-turning. The conclusion is that in all probability the phrase πάντων ... κέλευθος and the path of all (mortals) is backward-tuming'. The abruptness resulting from this punctuation need arouse no suspicion; for abruptness is not uncharacteristic of Parmenides." (p. 194)
(1) See Denniston, *Greek Particles* [second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954], p. 169.

7. ———. 1971. *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies.
Reprint: Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.
Preface V-VI; Contents: I. Aristotle and the Analysis of Unity and Plurality 1; II. The Milesians 24; III. Xenophanes 66; IV. Heraclitus 86; V. Parmenides and Melissus 109; VI. Empedocles 153; VII: Zeno of Elea 175; VIII. One-Many

Problem in Atomism 218; IX. Miscellaneous Presocratic Contexts 237; X. Conclusion 249; Appendix: Parmenides *B8.7-12* 253; Abbreviations 258; Bibliography 259; Notes 267; Index of Passages 341; General Index 347-355.
"Having decided to treat of Parmenides separately from Heraclitus, we must turn to consider the role of unity, and of the one-many antithesis, in Parmenides' thought, and the kind(s) of unity and plurality that he had in mind. We must also consider whether a question of "what is one" being or becoming many arises in Parmenides' argument. It seems clear that the function of the one-many antithesis in this, the first extant European piece of consecutive metaphysical reasoning, has been greatly exaggerated in some quarters; though the exaggeration has been somewhat diminished in successive works of recent years,(65) it still remains an obstacle to the understanding and appreciation of a great philosopher and needs therefore still to be pointed out and criticized.
If any single antithesis occupied a high place in Parmenides' thought, it was that between Being and not-Being. The word "one" appears in only two extant places in Parmenides' poem, and the phrase "the one" appears in Melissus apparently for the first time, in conscious reference back to that Being which has been proved to be one; the phrase "the One Being," beloved alike of Cornford and of the Neoplatonist Simplicius, is not to be found in the extant remains of Presocratic Eleaticism. Once more the questions at issue can be decided only on the basis of close textual analysis; and again we have to deal with a thinker recognized even by the ancients as obscure. (66)" (p. 127)
(65) Untersteiner's thesis *(Parmenide*, [Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1958] passim) eliminating the One altogether from Parmenides is adequately dealt with by Schwabl, *Anzeiger fur Altertumswissenschaft* 9 (1956) 150f. F. Solmsen's important analysis, reducing the significance of unity in Eleatic thought perhaps too drastically, came into my hands as this book was going to press, too late for detailed criticism: see "The 'Eleatic One' in Melissus," *Mededelingen der koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van*

Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 32, No. 8 (1969) 221-233.
(66) See Proclus *in Tim*. 1.345.12f (Diehl) and Simpl. *in Phys*., e.g., 7.1ff, 21.16ff.

8. Stough, Charlotte. 1968. "Parmenides' "Way of Truth", B 8. 12-13." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 13:91-107.
"The consistency with which fragment 8 of the Way of Truth has occupied the attention of commentators is evidence of its importance for an understanding of Parmenides' thought. Yet the many efforts to elucidate this passage have issued in diverse and mutually incompatible conclusions, with the result that the meaning of significant portions of the text remains in doubt. Lines 12-13, in particular, have been the subject of protracted but inconclusive debate and are still interpreted variously in the context of the fragment. (2)
οὐδε᾽ ποτ' ἐκ μη᾽ ἐόντος (3) ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό.
The chief difficulty in interpreting these lines, and the source of the divergency of opinion as to their meaning, concerns the reference of αὐτό in line 13. The pronoun seems to point most naturally to μη᾽ ἐόντος in the preceding line as its grammatical antecedent. If the Greek is construed in this way, the lines can be rendered, "Nor will the force of conviction allow anything to arise out of what is not besides itself" (viz., what is not). Reading the passage accordingly, a number of scholars have translated it in some such fashion as the above.(4)" (p. 91)
"The main concern of this paper is to defend the meaningfulness of lines 12-13 as translated above and to clarify the function of that assertion in the context of Parmenides' argument. The first section deals with the claim that the lines so rendered are meaningless or inappropriate in their content; the second section concerns the structure of the argument in which the statement occurs; and the third section discusses very briefly variant interpretations of the text." (p. 92)

(2) For three different interpretations in the recent literature see Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (1963), pp. 273-275; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy,* Vol. II (1965), pp. 27-29; L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (1965), pp. 85, 95ff.
(3) Reading along with Diels and others ἐόντος for ὀντως in the MSS of Simplicius.
(49 Among them Diels (*Parmenides Lehrgedicht*, p. 37), Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 175), and most recently Guthrie (op. cit., p. 26).

9. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox. Negative Reference and Negative Existentials." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 33:727-744.
"In the beginning Parmenides sought to deny the void. But he found himself trapped by his language and his thought into admitting what he sought to deny. Wisely, he counseled others to avoid the whole region in which the problem arises, lest they too be unwarily ensnared. Plato, being less easily intimidated and grasping for the first time the urgency of the paradox, unearthed each snare in turn until he felt he had found a safe path through the forbidden terrain in a new conception of being and the derivation of its linguistic consequences in the Sophist. Aristotle evidently took Parmenides' advice; and save for a few groping scholastics, perhaps Leibniz, Brentano, and Meinong, and Frege only in passing, no one else attempted the crossing before Russell made his spectacular dash through the posted ground from the completely new direction of linguistic reference. Again the problem lay dormant for half a century until Strawson constructed a new low road through ordinary language and Quine improved Russell's high algebraic pass. Refinements of these routes have been forthcoming, especially from Searle and Kripke, until today it might appear that there are two super highways through Parmenides' forbidden country of nonbeing. In this essay I will first argue that these new linguistic highways are no more than flimsy camouflage hiding but not resolving the old paradoxes. I will then show how Plato's ontological way

out, though more difficult, is the straight and narrow path." (p. 727)

10. Tallis, Raymond. 2007. *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides. Unthinkable Thought*. New York: Continuum. Contents: Autobiographical Prelude IX; Preface: The once and future philosopher XII-XVI; Chapter 1. The strange dawn of Western thought 1; Chapter 2. The existence of What-Is-Not 27; Chapter 3. Propositional awareness encounters itself 50; Chapter 4. Why Parmenides happened 88; Chapter 5. Parmenides' footnotes: Plato and Aristotle 130; Chapter 6. Parmenides today 158; Works cited 189; Notes 195; Index 230-240.
"In Chapter 2, I shall examine Parmenides' central claim - that what-is-not is not - and discuss how what-is-not comes to have such a pervasive presence in the human world. The key to this, I shall argue, is possibility - which may or may not be actualized, as a result of which what-is exists explicitly and corresponds to `truth', and what-is-not can be individuated and be an explicit falsehood. Chapter 3 looks further into the origin of negation and possibility, finding it in the Propositional Awareness (knowledge, thought and discourse) that characterizes distinctively human consciousness. Parmenides' poem, I shall argue, is the first fully fledged encounter of Propositional Awareness with itself. Chapter 4 examines in what sense Parmenides was unique among the Presocratic thinkers and then why he and, indeed, Presocratic thought arose when they did. It is obvious that philosophy must have had non-philosophical origins. I try to dig deeper than the usual explanations and in doing so examine many factors - politics, trade, exile, the alphabet, different linguistic codes - that made seventh-century Greeks conscious of their consciousness in a way that had no precedent in the hundreds of thousands of years of human consciousness prior to this. Parmenides may be seen as the resultant of the factors that led to Presocratic thought plus his reaction to his predecessors. Chapter 5 examines the most important response to Parmenides - Plato's Parmenides - which did more than any other post-Parmenidean event to amplify Parmenides' influence kind,

at the same time, to conceal him behind the Platonic ideas he is supposed to have provoked. I examine not only Plato's response to Parmenides but also Aristotle's response to Plato.
In the final chapter, I look at the possible meaning that Parmenides might have today. His present relevance resides in the fact that we may have reached the end of the cognitive road upon which he, pre-eminent amongst the early Greek philosophers, set mankind. Parmenides dismissed ordinary wakefulness as if it were a kind of sleep, in the hope of goading us to another kind of wakefulness. While the present book cannot match that ambition, I would very much hope that, by returning to the philosophical and historical hinterland of Parmenides' cataclysmic idea, I might start the process by which we return to the place from which Parmenides set out and journey in another direction in a world unimaginably different from his." (pp. 25-26)

11. Tarán, Leonardo. 1967. "Proclus *In Parm*. 1152.33 (Cousin) and Parmenides 28 B 3 (Diels-Kranz)." *Classical Philology* no. 62:194-195.
Reprinted in L. Tarán, *Collected Papers (1962-1999),* Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 623-624.
In a recent study on Parmenides, Dr. Mansfeld takes Proclus *in Parm*. 1152. 33, ταὐτόν δ ἐστίν εκεί νοέειν τε καί είναι to be a quotation of Parmenides 28 B 3; and he maintains that, however imperfect that quotation may be, there is no justification for the failure on the part of Diels and Kranz to mention that this fragment was known to Proclus.(1)" (p. 623)
"In short, although absolute certainty is impossible, Proclus *in Parm*. 1152. 33 is more likely to be a paraphrase of 28 B 8.34 than of 28 B 3 and, whether this was the reason that decided Diels and Kranz to exclude Proclus as a source of 28 B 3 or not, Dr. Mansfeld should have considered this possibility before blaming Diels and Kranz for what he takes to be their failure to mention an important source." (p. 624)
(1) J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen 1964), pp. 69, 73, and esp. 79 f.

12. ———. 1979. "Perpetual Duration and Atemporal Eternity in Parmenides and Plato." *The Monist* no. 62:43-53. Reprinted in L. Tarán, *Collected Papers (1962-1999),* Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 204-217.
"The purpose of this paper is less ambitious than its title might suggest, since it does not deal with everything that Plato has said on time and on eternity. Rather, it attempts to clarify some issues which have arisen in the controversy as to whether Parmenides or Plato was the first Western philosopher to grasp the notion of atemporal eternity. It is particularly concerned with some publications on the subject that have appeared within the last twelve years or so. G.E.L. Owen, in a paper published in this journal, has defended his earlier interpretation that Parmenides discovered the notion of atemporal eternity. (1) J. Whittaker for his part has contended that both Parmenides and Plato failed to grasp it, and would ascribe its discovery to some later thinker. (2) Yet another scholar, G. Reale, (3) believes that there is no essential difference between the position of Parmenides as reconstructed by Owen and others and that of Melissus. For Reale maintains that Melissus' formula "it is and always was and always will be" does not exclude atemporality, that it means the same thing as the alleged tenseless "is" predicated of Parmenicles' Being.
Most scholars, however, do agree -- and rightly so, I believe -- that in the *Timaeus* Plato has clearly grasped the notion of atemporal eternity. It is therefore best to begin the discussion with him, since it will then become apparent what an ancient philosopher meant by atemporal eternity and by the tenseless "is" that expresses it." (pp. 43-44)
(1) "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," *The Monist* 50 (1966), pp. 317-40. For references to earlier scholars who have defended this interpretation cf. my *Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 175, n. 1.
(2) "The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," *Phronesis* 13, (1968), 131-44 and *God Time Being* (Oslo 1970, Symbolae Osloenses. Fasc. Supplet. 23).

(3) Melisso, *Testimonianze e frammenti* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1970), PP. 45-59, esp. 56-57 and 58-59.
(4) Cf. Melissus 30 B 2. The fragments of the presocratics are cited from H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951-52).

13. Tarrant, Harold. 1976. "Parmenides B1.3: Text, Context and Interpretation." *Antichthon* no. 10:1-7.
Abstract: "It is an almost universal principle that texts should not receive emendation until the reading of the MSS. has received careful consideration. An initial awkwardness may, after reflection, prove to be a poet's sacrifice of style to achieve some higher end – an allusion to traditional literature, a word-order reflecting the structure of his ideas, or the accurate expression of ideas which are not easily put into verse. The last reason is usually held responsible for the short-comings of Parmenides' poetry, while in his prologue, with which I am here concerned, sacrifices of the first kind may also be expected, as literary allusions have been proved plentiful and significant. In a previous publication I have also argued for a carefully contrived word-order at B8.53, hinting that this may also be the case at B1.3. If my hunch were correct, then it would involve restoring the manuscript reading in that line."
14. ———. 1983. "The Conclusion of Parmenides' Poem." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 17:73-84.
"In *Apeiron* 13 (1979) p. 115 P. J. Bicknell assigns Parmenides B4 to the closing lines of the work, following the illusory account of the physical world; he relates its references to processes of separation and combination (lines 3-4) to some kind of 'cosmic cycle' which allegedly featured in the Doxa. Since I have long supposed that the Doxa did make use of opposite, if not cyclical, cosmic processes,(1) I am attracted by Bicknell's attempt to relocate this fragment." (p. 73)
"But placing B4 at the conclusion of the poem must be dependent upon one's overall view of the conclusion. If one regards B19 as the conclusion (and Simplicius' words make

it quite clear that B19 closed the account of the physical world) (9) then B4 must be squeezed into the *Way of Truth* in spite the difficulty in finding a context for it and in spite of the fact that it refers to a cosmos (B4.3). To me it seems fairly clear that B19 did not conclude the poem, and that there was a short final section which commented further on the relation of Being to the world of phenomena. The considerations which bring me to this conclusion are independent of the attempt to place B4 there." (p. 74)
(1) See my "Parmenides and the Narrative of Not-Being", *Proceedings and Papers of AULLA XVI* (Adelaide, 1974) 90-109, particularly p. 103.

15. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1999. "Parmenides' Problem of Becoming and Its Solution." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 2:51-65.
Abstract: "Parmenides advances four arguments against becoming. Two of these are sound. Plato's and Aristotle's attempt to refute them fail. They react to Parmenides' challenge by differentiating and grading being and existence. Thus they deviate from Parmenides' strict concept of existence which is the only reasonable one. What's wrong with Parmenides' train of thought is a decisive premise: that becoming is a transition from non-existence to existence. The reality of becoming can be maintained if (and only if) this premise is given up. One has to see that becoming is a purely temporal affair not involving existence and that existence is timeless. Time and existence are independent of each other."
16. Tejera, Victorino. 1997. *Rewriting the History of Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Contents: Preface VII; 1. Aristotle versus the Peripatos: Consequences of the Conditions under Which the Aristotelian Corpus Came into Being1; 2. A New Look at the Sources19; 3. Parmenides 37; 4. The Poetic Presocratics: From Solon to the Dialogue Form 63; 5. The Academy Pythagorized: What We Can Know about the Intellectual Activities of the Pythagoreans 83; 6. What We Don't Know about Plato and Socrates 105; Selected Bibliography 121; Index 139-145.

"The interpretations of Parmenides' "Being" which have perpetuated the distinction between the objects of reason and the objects of sense as an epistemological one are just those that keep "Being" from being the appropriate subject of the cluster of predications that the Goddess makes about it in the poem. These interpretations turn the reader's problem into one of reconciling his own (or his times') notions about Being with the attributes Parmenides assigned to it. But the real problem is to find a subject to which the attributes can all be seen to attach without difficulty. The project, then, is to make coherent sense out of Parmenides' text in accordance with the kinds of sense it would have made to Parmenides' time and peers. The solution which we will come to here will also make literary sense out of the relationship between the different parts of the poem." (p. 37)

"One paradox about Parmenides' insight is that, while it is implied that discourse about "Being" must be strictly consistent when understood to be making truth-claims, the language in which he has enacted this lesson is not itself assertive or propositional, but exhibitive or poetic. But the logically two-valued strict discourse that the Goddess recommends is compelling, because it is the only guide we have to rightly conceptualizing the "All." Whether the characterization of Being that she has offered is itself strictly consistent is another matter. Is the "All," for instance, in fact one, or only because, to be spoken of at all, it must have the unity of a grammatical subject? The "All," we can agree, is certainly distributively exhaustive and innummerable. But we may ask, with Buchler, is it a unity in the sense of having a collective existential integrity? There certainly cannot be two Alls; but, in the Goddess's own terms, it could not be completely observed even if it did have such a unity. Conceptually, the "All" can be all there is, was, and will be without having any other than a nominal or grammatical unity; like Buchler's "the world," it has no collective integrity. And this is why nature philosophy must ever be an incomplete (*endeês*) and merely probable (*hôs eikós*) account, as Plato's Timaios will be willing to admit when he

rehearses for Socrates his *eikóta mûthon* in the *Timaeus*. This, in turn, reassures us that Plato -- unlike the neoplatonist forgers of the Lokrian Timaios -- has quite understood and taken to heart Parmenides' admonitions about nature-inquiry." (pp. 59-60)

17. Teloh, Henry. 1976. "Parmenides and Plato's *Parmenides* 131a-132c." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 14:125-130.
18. Thanassas, Panagiotis. 2006. "How Many *Doxai* Are There in Parmenides?" *Rhizai.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 3:199-218.
"The paucity of surviving fragments of the *Doxa* section certainly reinforces the tendency to overlook its importance. But how did it happen that, at least according to Diels (1897 [Parmenides, *Lehrgedicht,* Reimer, Berlin (2nd ed.: Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2003)], 25-26), about 9/10ths of the material on *Aletheia* has survived, but only about 1/10th of the material on *Doxa*? I would recommend viewing the scant attention paid to *Doxa* as a case of helplessness without any parallel in the history of philosophy. From Plato to Heidegger (or if one prefers, to Guthrie), the history of philosophy has consistently been confronted with the above-mentioned duality of *Doxa* and has not known how to deal with it. The loss of so much material on *Doxa* has less to do with its lack of philosophical content than with the tradition's intuitive strategy of resolving the aporia by eliminating that duality. After the detailed passages of Parmenides' cosmogony and cosmology had been lost, *Doxa* could be restricted to a region of 'lies and deception' (5) and then completely dismissed as philosophically uninteresting." (p. 200)
"We are not in a position to revoke retroactively the traditional oversight and to remedy the substantial loss of essential passages from Parmenides' cosmogony and cosmology. But we can and must set the record straight: the fact, the *factum brutum* that there really were such passages, should not remain ignored. A 'correction' of this oversight does not take its bearings by the criterion of historical fidelity; we do not 'correct' the oversight because

it discredits just a part of Parmenides' philosophy, but because it distorts what is the heart of that philosophy: Parmenidean *Aletheia*." (p. 201)
(5) 'Lug und Trug': Reinhardt (1916) [*Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Klostermann, Frankfurt (5th ed.1985)], 6.

19. ———. 2008. *Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being. A Philosophical Interpretation*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments 6; 1. The Poem and its legacy 9; 2. The Heart of Truth 23; 3. *Esti*, Being and Thinking 31; 4. The signs of Being 43; 5. *Doxa*: mixture vs. partition 61; 6. *Aletheia* and *Doxa*: the human and the divine 77; Appendix: translation of the Fragments 89; Selected bibliography 99: Index of names 107; Index of topics 109.
"Indeed, given the plurality of themes and intentions effective in the second part of the poem, the simple, unqualified use of the Doxa seems altogether misleading. In view of this, the presentation undertaken above discerned four distinctive perspectives on Doxa:
(1) Understanding the deceptive human conjectures and demonstrating their error (8.53-9).
(2) Presenting an appropriate positive Doxa that rests on a mixture of both forms instead of their separation, thus counteracting the deception (8.60 ff.).
(3) Portraying the genesis of the deceptive opinions, the divergences of which are traced back to differences in the perceptual apparatus (16).
(4) Giving (in the Aletheia) an ontological evaluation and rejecting the deceptive opinions by demonstrating their path to be the "third (non-) way" (6, 7). (pp.79-80)

20. ———. 2011. "Parmenidean Dualisms." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 289-308. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "The poem of Parmenides is systematically composed of dual structures. The part of Aletheia establishes an opposition between Being and Non-Being, but also an "identity" between Being and Thinking; the part

of Doxa attempts to give an account of the relation between the two forms of Light and Night; finally, it is the duality of the two parts of the poem themselves that poses the question of their own relation. I attempt to explore the character and role of these dualisms, and especially their impact on the traditional perception of Parmenides as a rigorous “monist.” "

21. Thom, Paul. 1986. "A Lesniewskian Reading of Ancient Ontology: Parmenides to Democritus." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 7:155-166.
Abstract: "Parmenides formulated a formal ontology, to which various additions and alternatives were proposed by Melissus, Gorgias, Leucippus and Democritus. These systems are here interpreted as modifications of a minimal Lesniewskian Ontology."
"There is a tradition of ontological theorising which commences with Parmenides and whose central arguments can can be given a purely formal interpretation. This, of course, is not their only possible interpretation. It is, nonetheless, worthy of consideration, as a means of articulating the continuities and discontinuities within that tradition, and of investigating the prehistory of logic.
The main thesis of this paper is that such a purely formal interpretation of Parmenides, his followers and critics, is best expressed in the language (or, if you wish, in some of the languages) of Leśniewski's Ontology." (p. 155)
22. ———. 1999. "The Principle of Non-Contradiction in Early Greek Philosophy." *Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 32:153-170.
Abstract: "The principle of non-contradiction received ontological formulations (in terms of 'being' and 'non-being') as well as logical formulations (in terms of affirmation and denial) in early Greek philosophy. The history of these formulations is traced in the writings of Parmenides, Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle. Gorgias noticed that the principle — in Parmenides' formulation NC: 'Not (what-is-not is)' — is inconsistent with the thesis G that what-is-not is what-is-not, given a principle P whereby we can infer from 'a is b' to 'a is'. Parmenides, Gorgias, Plato

and Aristotle all address the inconsistent triad {NC, G, P} in different ways."

23. ———. 2002. "On the Pervasiveness of Being." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 293-301. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Abstract: "The pervasiveness of Being is the doctrine that everything is. This doctrine would be false if something was not. That being is pervasive is not a trivial claim. An ontology might be motivated by the desire to quantify over non-beings in such a way that we can say that something is a flying man without implying that some being is a flying man. If such a distinction is allowed, then it might be thought that something is not, even though no being is not. Pervasiveness then would be true for beings but not for 'something's.'
This chapter explores the different positions that philosophers from Parmenides to Aristotle take on the question of the pervasiveness of Being, and traces some of the relations linking those positions to one another."
"Note the thesis's modal import. Parmenides is asserting that everything is, not just as a matter of fact, but necessarily. And this is fitting, given that the premiss of his reasoning is the modal claim that 'a is not' cannot be said.
Is Parmenides' position internally consistent? It depends. If we suppose that his philosophy is intended as a description of language in general, then it will appear to be self-refuting. He tells us that various things can not be spoken, or thought, or singled out, or consummated, at the same time forbidding us to make negative statements. Consistency can, however, be rescued by distinguishing an object-language about which Parmenides is speaking, and a meta-language in which he is speaking. We can then represent him as saying, in the meta-language, that there are no negative statements in the object-language. In this case, Parmenides' project will be a prescriptive one - to delineate the conditions that govern a certain 'higher' language that is not subject to the contradictions inherent in the language of mortals.

This is a noble conception, but not one that will be universally shared. Faced with these Parmenidean prescriptions, there will always be anarchic spirits who will dare to speak of what is alleged to be unspeakable." (p. 294)

24. Tor, Shaul. 2015. "Parmenides' Epistemology and the Two Parts of His Poem." *Phronesis* no. 60:3-39.
Abstract: "This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between *Aletheia* and *Doxa*. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides' impetus for developing and including *Doxa*, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to *Doxa*'s investigations and to those in *Aletheia*, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Alëtheia by momentarily coming to think with — or as — his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul."

25. ———. 2017. *Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology. A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface and Acknowledgements page IX; List of Abbreviations XII; Introduction 1; 1 Rationality and Irrationality, Philosophy and Religion 10; 2 Hesiodic Epistemology 61; 3 Xenophanes on Divine Disclosure and Mortal Inquiry 104; Introduction to the Chapters on Parmenides 155; 4 Why Did Parmenides Write Doxa? 163; 5 How Could Parmenides Have Written Alêtheia? 222; 6 Retrospect and Prospect 309; Appendix 347; Bibliography 360; Index Locorum 387; General Index 399-406.
"On the assumption, which I share, that the goddess represents Doxa as the best possible account of Doxastic things, she indeed implies that even the best cosmology could never constitute an account of the unshaken heart of ultimate reality. Nonetheless, the scope and nature of Parmenides' cosmological investigations undermine these dialectical responses to the aetiological question.
The goddess had concluded in Alêtheia her critical demonstrations that processes like coming-to-be and

change do not typify what-is. Both direct and indirect evidence indicates that what followed in Doxa was an extended and detailed exposition, thoroughly positive in tone, of diverse scientific theories, spanning, among other things, universal cosmology (DK28 B9, B12; A37), cosmogony (B10–11), astronomy (B10–11; B14–15; A40a), geography (A44a; B15a), theogony (B13), anthropogony (Diogenes Laertius, 9.22, A53), embryology (B18; A53–4) and human physiology and cognition (A46 = B16, A46a-b, A52)." (pp. 163-164)

26. Torgerson, Tobias Peter. 2006. "The εἴδως φώς and the traditional dichotomy of divine and mortal epistemology." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 24:25-43.
Abstract: "That Parmenides drew upon previous poets' dichotomy between divine knowledge and mortals' opinions is obvious. In his poem, the word βροτός, "mortal," always carries a connotation of ignorance or opinion. Nevertheless, Parmenides credits one type of human being - the εἰδότα φῶτα of line 1.3 - with true knowledge. This man receives a divine revelation of the truth about being, yet it seems that he possesses some knowledge even before the goddess' revelation. What sets him apart from other mortals and grants him access to divine knowledge? Homer, Hesiod, and other poets had previously spoken of the false notions of mortals, the inscrutable truth accessible only to the gods, and the conditions of revelation. By comparing and contrasting Parmenides with his predecessors, we can perceive an original element in his adaptation of the dichotomy of mortal and divine epistemology: there is a type of human being, the εἴδως φως whose mental perception νοός not only liberates him from the deceptive opinions of mortals but also renders him able to verify the words of the gods themselves."
27. Trindade Santos, José. 2013. "For a Non-Predicative Reading of *esti* in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." *Méthexis* no. 26:39-50.
Abstract: "he absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject

nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."

28. Tugwell, Simon. 1964. "The Way of Truth." *Classical Quarterly* no. 14:36-41.
"Professor G.E.L. Owen has demonstrated (C. Q. [*Classical Quarterly*]. N.s. X (1960), 84 ff.) that Parmenides' Way ef Truth is to be taken as a self-contained logical argument. The basis for this argument is a proof that whatever we may choose to think about εον. The first stage of this proof is contained in B 2.
According to Owen's reconstruction of the argument, Parmenides' method is to take the three possible answers to the question εστιν η ουκ εστιν; (i.e. an unqualified yes; an unqualified no; and a noncommittal answer that sometimes we must say yes, sometimes no) and rule out two of them. This view involves giving equal status to each of the two wrong answers; but Parmenides appears not to do this." (p. 36)
29. Verdenius, Willem Jacob. 1942. *Parmenides. Some Comments on his Poem*. Groningen: J. B. Wolters. Reprinted with a new Preface: Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1964.
Contents: Preface (to the reprint) III-IV; Introduction 1; Chapter I. The doctrine of knowing 5; Chapter II. The doctrine of being 31; Chapter I. The doctrine of opinion 45; Appendices 64; Bibliography 79; English index 81; Greek index 82; Index of quotations 83-88.

"The present study was submitted as a doctoral dissertation to the Faculty of Arts of Utrecht University in 1942. Since its publication, so many books and articles have been written on the same problems that it might seem presumptuous to reprint a comparatively old work. I do not want to suggest that everything published after my thesis has little or no value. On the other hand, a critical evaluation of these works would not affect the substance of my original comments. As the book continued to be in demand and I could not find time to carry out my intention of writing a full commentary, an unrevised reprint seemed to be the only solution.
There are three points on which I have altered my opinion. I no longer believe, as I did in my dissertation (p. 73 f.) and in *Mnemosyne* III 13 (1947), pp. 272 ff., that Περὶ φύσεως may have been the original title of Parmenides' work and of the works of a number of other Pre-Socratics. I now take the subject of εστιν in frags 2,3 and 8,2 to be Ἀληδείη in the sense of 'the true nature of things' (cf. *Mnemos*. IV 15, 1962, p. 237), and not Reality in the sense of the total of things (as suggested in my dissertation, p. 32). The μέλεα in frag. 16 I no longer take to be 'something between the two universal Forms and the parts of the human frame' (p. 7), but the human frame itself (cf. *Mnemosyne* IV 2, 1949, p. 126 n. 5fn)." (*Preface* III)
"Expounding an ancient philosophy is only possible with the aid of modern notions, which have a more limited sense than the material to which they are to be applied. Hence the difficulty of ascertaining the differences between ancient and modern abstractions and the danger of misconceiving an idea through attaching a too specific meaning to one or other particular expression. It will now be understood how in the course of time Parmenides has come to be classed with the most divergent philosophical systems. An attempt might be made to classify and analyse all these various interpretations. This would, however, not be the most expedient way to arrive at the real meaning of the poem. It stands to reason that our conclusions should be constantly reviewed and tested in the light of current opinion, but the more our considerations are bound up with the criticism of

other interpreters, the greater will be the difficulty in evolving a coherent system of interpretation.
So I will attempt to follow a more positive method by considering in detail three fundamental problems of Parmenides' philosophy, viz. 'Knowing', 'Being', and 'Opinion'. If it proves to be possible to arrive at definite conclusions in this respect, the road will probably be clear for a better understanding of the thoughts associated with these principles.
With regard to the method adopted in my interpretation I may conclude with the following remark. I have pointed out already that Parmenides stands out from his predecessors by the application of a deductive method and the building up of a coherent argument. The methodical way of reasoning characterizes his work so much that even in ancient times he was classed by some critics among the dialecticians. In fact, his syllogisms, the distinction made between the three 'ways of inquiring', and also his way of putting questions foreshadow dialectical methods. This is not surprising since the whole trend of his thought aims at valid arguments, cogent conclusions, and complete evidence'. It seems advisable, then, to give more attention to the logical form in which Parmenides exposes his views than has been done hitherto. When the goddess of Truth counsels him not to trust to the senses but to judge by reasoning, we might accept her words as a suggestion to base our interpretation on the logical context of the argument in accordance with Parmenides' own intention.
It may be objected that a criterium for such a logical context is hard to find since in a pre-Aristotelian philosopher we cannot expect a method of reasoning which may be formulated in syllogisms. From the logical point of view Parmenides' argument undeniably does not always comply with scientific standards, but this does not imply that the form of the syllogism is not applicable to his thought. This form is not an invention of Aristotle kept alive by convention, but it is at the root of all reasoning. Parmenides may not have been aware of the syllogistic form as a general mode of arguing, but he uses it, it may be unconsciously and

not always accurately, yet, generally speaking, 'guided by truth itself'.
I have undertaken the following inquiries in the belief that such a 'truth' exists, and that the principles of logic are no mere arbitrary grammatical phenomena as moderns would have us believe, but the universal foundation which underlies all science, including the science of interpretation." (pp. 3-4, notes omitted).

30. ———. 1947. "Notes on the Presocratics." *Mnemosyne* no. 13:271-289.
"The term πίστης is used in the sense of 'religious faith' in the New Testament (e.g. I Cor. 13, 13), but it has not got this meaning in early Greek literature. In the works of the Pre-Socratics πίστης means 'evidence, both in the subjective sense of confidence that one's belief is true and in the objective sense of reliable signs which justify such confidence' (15). Parmenides used it to denote the logical stringency of his argument (frag. 8, 12 and 28); his Way of Truth is at the same time Πειθοῦς κέλευθος (frag. 2, 4)." (p. 1)
(15) G. Vlastos, *Philos. Rev.* 55 (1946), 590 n. 60. ["Ethics and Physics in Democritus", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 54, No. 6 (Nov., 1945), pp. 578-592]
The text by Gregory Vlastos:
"Unlike Platonic being which, immaterial by definition, is never given in sensation, Democritean being is the material stuff of nature as we see, touch, and taste it.) The "assurance" (πίστης) (60) of its existence must, therefore, be given in the phenomenon " (p. 590, two notes omitted)
(60) πίστης in [Diels-Kranz] B. 125: φρήν gets its πίστεις from the senses. This is confirmed by Sextus (*Adv. Math.* 7.136; B. 9 in Diels-Kranz), who tells us that in his essay entitled κρατυντήρια Democritus "promised to assign to the senses the power of evidence (το κράτος της πίστεως)." This last should be compared with πίστιος ἰσχύς in Parmenides, B. 8, 12. Πίστης in the pre-socratics is not an inferior form of knowledge as in Plato, *Rep.* VI 511e, but evidence, both in the subjective sense of confidence that one's belief is true

and in the objective sense of reliable signs which justify such confidence.

31. ———. 1949. "Parmenides Conception of Light." *Mnemosyne* no. 2:116-131.
"In this paper I shall deal with a problem in the philosophy of Parmenides which has been rather neglected, because it did not seem to be a problem at all. Parmenides based his cosmology on the dualism of two primary substances, Fire or Light and Night." (p. 116)
"Perhaps another aspect of his mind may bring us nearer to the solution of our problem. In the proem of his work Parmenides describes his discovery of the truth as a journey from the realm of Darkness to the realm of Light Driving a car and guided by Sun-maidens he passes through the gates of Night and Day and is kindly welcomed by a goddess who discloses to him the principles of reality. There is much in this description that may be regarded as mere poetical imagery, but there are also many details which have a serious meaning. I shall only mention those points which have some bearing upon the present question." (p. 119)
"It may be suggested that Parmenides in a similar manner distinguished between a supreme kind of light as the cognitive aspect of Being and Truth, and an inferior kind of light restricted to the world of change and opinion. This interpretation would fit in very well with the general trend of his philosophy, which tries to attribute the various aspects of the world to a higher and a lower plane of reality. It might only be asked how Parmenides managed to get from the lower plane of empirical reality up to the higher plane of Being, or in other words: how the ordinary light which formed one of the elements of his mental constitution could pass into the divine light which enabled him to grasp the ultimate principle of reality. This criticism is justified; it could only be met by putting another question: is there anyone who has succeeded in finding a satisfactory transition from psychology to metaphysics?" (pp. 130-131, a note omitted)

32. ———. 1962. "Parmenides B2, 3." *Mnemosyne* no. 15:237.

"Much ingenuity has been spent on the question as to what is the subject of ἔστιν in Parmenides B 2,3 (and 8,2), but even the most recent attempts, such as that made by G. E. L. Owen in C.Q. 10 (1960), 95, are far from convincing.
My own suggestion (*Parmenides*, 32), that the subject is reality in the sense of the total of things, has not met with much approval. I now believe that the clue to the solution of this problem is to be found in B 8, 51 ἀμφι`ς ἀληθείης. If Truth is the subject of the goddess' discourse, it is by implication the subject of ἔστιν." (p.237)

33. ———. 1977. "Opening Doors (Parm. B 1, 17-18) " *Mnemosyne* no. 30:287-288.
"After Dike has removed the bar (5), the doors open spontaneously at the approach of the divine maidens." (pp. 287-288)
(5) Wiersma, [*Notes on Gree Philosophy*] *Mnemosyne* IV 20 (1967), 405 rightly points out that this idea has to be supplied from the context.
34. ———. 1980. "Opening Doors Again." *Mnemosyne* no. 33:175.
In my note on Parmenides B 1, 17-8 in this journal, IV 30 (1977), 287-8, I forgot to refer to K. J. McKay, *Door Magic Epiphany Hymn*, CQ [*Classical Quarterly*] 17 (1967), 184-94, who discusses Callim. *H*. 2, 6 in connection with Hom. *Epigr*. XV 3-5 and other texts." (p. 175)
35. Vick, George R. 1971. "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' 'Being'." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 8:139-150.
Reprinted in: Michael Murray (ed.), *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978 pp. 204-221.
"It is a fairly well-known fact that Martin Heidegger has defended Parmenides' account of Being, (1) but the strategy of his complex semantic and etymological arguments for the meaningfulness of Parmenides' type of discourse on Being is unknown to the great majority of philosophers in Britain and America(2) - indeed is virtually unnoted even within the phenomenological-existential school (in part, perhaps,

because of the abstruse character of both his thought and language).
Furthermore, the fact that Heidegger has corrected what is ordinarily taken as an essential part of Parmenides' theory has not, so far as I know, been pointed out, even by Heidegger.(4) Nor has anyone taken note of the way in which Heidegger's correction makes what remains of Parmenides' theory more defensible. In the following pages I shall attempt to set forth and explain Heidegger's strategy (including a reason why it has been useful for him to couch his argument in language that is so abstruse). I will then go on to show the way in which his correction of Parmenides' theory strengthens its claim to being true." (p. 139)
1 This defense is to be found primarily in the most extensive work of Heidegger's later period, his Einf*uhrung in die Metaphysik* (1953) in which his summer lectures at Freiburg in 1935 were revised and published. All page references will be to the English translation by Ralph Mannheim, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven, 1959).
(2) For this strategy, see especially ibid, ch. II and III, pp. 52-92. (p 139, a note omitted)
(4) See fn. 44.
(44) Heidegger has, indeed, distinguished his own view of the meaning of "Being" from that which he maintains has been current since antiquity (cf. Heidegger, op. cit., [*Introduction to Metaphysics*] pp. 203-204). And the view which Heidegger regards as having been current since antiquity is that in which Being is regarded as excluding our saying that becoming, appearing, thinking, and the ought are, and this is a view which is, except with respect to the third of these four factors, usually attributed to Parmenides. But, on the other hand, he has continually distinguished between the authentic pre-Socratic, or Parmenidean, view of Being, and the defective view which has come down to us since (Ibid., pp. 179-196). And he has, furthermore, given an exegesis of Parmenides in which he interprets him as allowing to thinking a certain distinction from Being (in that he interprets Parmenides as saying that thinking is one with

Being only in a "contending sense," i.e., in a unity through opposition).
Hence, it is not clear whether Heidegger identifies the teaching of Parmenides with the view of Being from which he distinguishes his own (a position with which exegesis of Parmenides' treatment of the relation between Being and thinking would make difficult), or whether he interprets Parmenides in such a way as to allow "is" to be predicated of becoming, etc., without being thereby identified with them (a position directly challenging the usual monistic interpretation of Pamenides, and challenging it in such an essential way that we should expect Heidegger to have made some explicit mention of the fact that he was correcting the usual interpretation of Parmenides on the very point which since Plato has probably been given most attention, i.e., his supposed monism.)

36. Vlastos, Gregory. 1946. "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 77:66-77.
Reprinted in: G. Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume I: The Presocratics,* edited by Daniel W. Graham, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 153-163.
Abstract: "Parmenides' frag. 16 has been taken for a general statement of his theory of knowledge. I argue that it is no more than his doctrine of sense-perception, since it views thought as a passive record of the "much-wandering" ratio of light to darkness in the frame. Theophrastus' report that Parmenides explains "better and purer" thinking by the preponderance of light must refer to the active phases of thought, memory and judgment. When these are perfect the ratio of light to darkness must be one to zero, and the knowledge of Being must represent a state of unmixed light." (p. 66)

37. ———. 2008. ""Names" of Being in Parmenides." In *The Route of Parmenides*, edited by Mourelatos, Alexander, 367-390. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Previously unpublished essay (1961).
Editing note by A.P.D. Mourelatos.: The importance and continuing value of this essay is, in my judgment, fourfold.

(1) Beyond what was already accomplished by Woodbwy's essay of 1958 [*Parmenides on Names*] Vlastos here provides the best and most sustained argument in favor of the reading *onomastai* at B8. 38. (2) There is an assumption many have made (doubtless, as Vlastos points out at n. 20, because of the influence of Diels, who first voiced it in 1887) [*] that Parmenides employs "naming" terms (*onoma, onomaztin*) only with reference to the false beliefs posited by "mortals." Vlastos' essay provides a decisive refutation of this quite unwarranted and misleading assumption. (3) Vlastos also shows that we gain a more coherent account of Parmenides' critique of the language of "mortals" if we read that critique as charging that mortals make statements that are false rather than meaningless. (4) Finally, Vlastos offers in this essay a philosophically incisive and engaging argument in support of the thesis that Parmenides' rationale for the rejection of "not-being" as a subject of thinking and speaking is quite different from that advanced by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato, *Sophist* (237B-C)." (p. 367)

[*] "Ueber die ältester Philosophenschulen der Griechen," in *Philosophische Aufsätze, Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet* [no editors listed] (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 239-60.

38. Wedin, Michael. 2011. "Parmenides' Three Ways and the Failure of the Ionian Interpretation." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 41:1-65.

"The middle part of Parmenides' great philosophical poem, the section known as the *Way of Truth (WT),* opens with the divine declaration that only two paths of enquiry present themselves to the mind—the path of what is and the path of what is not. I regard these as Parmenides' 'canonical' paths and shall refer to them as Path I and Path II, respectively. Fragment 2 emphatically warns against pursuing Path II, and fragment 6 is no less direct in advancing Path I as a necessary path of enquiry. According to some, Parmenides is merely expressing his preferences in these early fragments of *WT*. Of course he is doing so, but not just this. Rather, fragments 2 and 3 contain a deduction whose aim is

to exclude what is not as a fit target for investigation because such a thing is flatly impossible, and fragment 6 certifies Path I, again deductively, on the grounds that what it investigates is nothing less than what is necessary. Her opening declaration notwithstanding, in fragment 6 the goddess goes on to warn against a third path, the path of what is and is not. This too is excluded on the basis of a crisp, but tricky, Eleatic deduction.
This paper offers reconstructions of these three opening deductions." (p. 1)

39. ———. 2014. *Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth*. New York: Oxford University Press.
"When I examined the arguments of the leading *nouveaux* interpreters, none of the contenders lived up to expectations. Each was flawed in logically telling ways.
The results of this examination surface in the monograph in two ways. On the one hand, a contending view is sometimes discussed in the course of advancing or clarifying my own argument. On the other hand, I address them in their own right in Part III of the monograph, where the views are subjected to more systematic scrutiny. The view argued in this monograph, *outré* or not, favors an austere reading of Fr. 8's 'signs' or deductive consequences of what is." (p. 2)
"A general study of Parmenides' poem would address many issues, from the influence of the epic tradition, and the significance of the Proem with its divine invocation, to the relation between the two substantive parts of the poem—the Way of Truth (WT) and the Way of Opinion. This monograph is less ambitious.
First, I am interested almost exclusively in WT; in particular, I am interested in the logical form of Parmenides' arguments in WT. Second, I pursue this interest by offering reconstructions of WT's deductions, in their entirety, and only rarely do I introduce material that does not serve this project. Nonetheless, the reconstructions have global reach because the deductions of WT are the core of Parmenides' philosophical position." (pp. 4-5, a note omitted)

40. White, Harvey. 2005. *What is What-is? A Study of Parmenides' Poem*. New York: Peter Lang.
"The interpretation of the poem which follows takes issue with what has long been the standard view, and which, only recently, has begun to be challenged. Because my interpretation ascribes many of the fragments which have been taken as the mortal view to the goddess' position, my arrangement of the fragments differs somewhat from the standard one provided by Diels and Kranz. Thus the numbers assigned to the fragments differs from theirs." (p. 2)
"It has long been fashionable to take the ontology (and attendant epistemology) that Parmenides set forth in his poem to be characterized by "the one", or "Being", as the all encompassing single reality, which is to be distinguished from mere sensible and pluralistic being." (p. 5, notes two notes omitted)
"Against this understanding of the Poem I will argue that:
1. "is" is used predicationally rather than purely existentially, and as a result the text is best understood as being consistent with a pluralistic ontology rather than a monistic one; i.e., Parmenides did not claim that all reality is a single ideal universal and non-sensible "Being";
2. Parmenides affirms the positive role of sense perception in apprehending reality, accepting as real what appears sensibly; most of what is traditionally termed the Doxa section of the poem is an elucidation of his own position;
3. the poem's major point is that each individual object is a unity rather than a plurality constituted of opposites, even though it may come to be out of a mixture of opposites. The erroneous position held by the mortals is that an individual object is a plurality, a view that results from a confusion of what something is with the conditions out of which it is generated;
4. the poem is critically concerned with judgement rather than perception: the error of the mortals consists of misjudgements concerning perceived reality.
The overall perspective is that historically Parmenides does not present as radical and revolutionary an ontology and

epistemology as he is commonly portrayed to advocate. His importance lies within the intellectual transition occurring in the Greek world, in that his poem is an attempt to move from the past mythos (as in Homer and Hesiod) into the emerging scientific view of the world." (p. 6)

41. Whittaker, John. 1971. "God, Time, Being. Two Studies in the Transcendental Tradition in Greek Philosophy." *Symbolae Osloenses* no. 23:16-32.
First study: '*Parmenides, Fr. 8, 5*'.
Parmenides, fr. 8, 5 as quoted by Simplicius seems to proclaim the doctrine of the Eternal Now clearly and succinctly:
ουδὲ ποτ᾽ ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ παν.
Simplicius is our main authority for the surviving fragments of Parmenides and his general reliability is beyond question. Yet if we accept Parmenides as the author of the above verse and as the originator of the conception there contained, many difficulties arise, as the following considerations will indicate.
(1) The conception of non-durational eternity is not of the sort that presents itself spontaneously to the mind. Bearing in mind the abstrusity of the notion, it would seem hardly conceivable that, Stated in this bald manner, it would have been at all comprehensible to Parmenides' contemporaries. No doubt there was much in Parmenides' poem that his contemporaries found obscure. Yet it cannot have been Parmenides' aim merely to mystify. If Parmenides had really formulated the notion of non-durational eternity and was teaching it in his poem, a certain degree of elaboration would have been essential. But the relevant section of the poem contains no such elaboration.
(2) The notion in question is not accepted by Melissus; cf., e.g., fr. 1 ἀεὶ ἦν δ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. Yet there is nothing in the doxographi-cal evidence to suggest that Parmenides and Melissus were at variance on this point.
(3)The only reason Parmenides might have had for introducing the notion into the Way of Truth is that he felt that passage from past to present to future involves coming-to-be and passing-away, i.e., that duration as such entails

change. But if Parmenides had stressed this aspect of duration, then he would have raised a problem which all subsequent philosophers would have had to face. Parmenides' Presocratic successors accepted the validity of the Eleatic denial of change and were painfully aware of the predicament in which it placed them. If Parmenides had argued that duration is a process and therefore a form of change, then they would have had to tackle this problem too. Yet no post-Parmenidean Presocratic seems to have been aware that bare duration could be held to involve change. Empedocles' philosophy, for example, is a conscientious attempt to solve the difficulties raised by Parmenides. Yet there is nothing to suggest that Empedocles was acquainted with this particular problem. The same is true of other post-Parmenidean philosophers - including, as I shall argue, Plato and Aristotle.
Such considerations as these render it obvious that, in spite of fr. 8, 5 as cited by Simplicius, Parmenides cannot possibly have propounded the doctrine of non-durational eternity. Once this point has been established there are two courses open to the student of Parmenides: (a) he may search for another and more plausible interpretation of the text quoted by Simplicius, or (b) he may call into question the reliability of the text which Simplicius has preserved." (pp. 16-17)
(...)
"Because of their faith in the text presented by Simplicius, students of Parmenides have not usually considered it necessary to devote attention to a rival version of fr. 8,533 preserved by Ammonius (*In Interpr*. 136, 24 f. Busse), Asclepius' (*In Metaph*. 42, 30 f. Hayduck), Philoponus (*In Phys*. 65, 9 Vitelli), and Olympiodorus (*In Phd*. 75, 9 Norvin).
I do not believe that this alternative version is necessarily correct as it stands, but must draw attention to one fact which speaks strongly in its favour. In Simplicius' version fr. 8, 6 opens with the words ἐν, συνεχές syntactically linked to v. 5 but nevertheless left somewhat in the air, whilst Asclepius (loc. cit.) quotes the opening of v. 6 in conjunction with v. 5 as follows:

οὐ γάρ ἐην οὐκ ἔσται ὁμοῦ παν ἐστι δέ μοῦνον οὐλοφυές.
It can, in my opinion, hardly be doubted that Simplicius' ἐν, συνεχές was originally a gloss on οὐλοφυές and has supplanted that reading in Simplicius' exemplar. Since the latter term was used by Empedocles there is no reason why it should not also have been employed by Parmenides. However, it was not current in Neoplatonic terminology and might well have provoked a textual gloss." (p. 21)
(...)
"However, my own conviction is that one cannot feel assured that either version is close enough to the original text of Parmenides to permit of more than highly conjectural interpretation. We have already seen that fr. 8, 4 was universally corrupt by the time of Plutarch" (p. 24).
(...)
"I would conclude that no knowledge of the teaching of the historical Parmenides can be safely derived from the versions of fr. 8, 5 which have survived. One can, however, assert with complete conviction, as was shown at the outset, that the doctrine of non-durational eternity, which Neoplatonists associated with both versions of the line, was not taught by the historical Parmenides." (p. 24, notes omitted)

42. Wilkinson, Lisa Atwood. 2009. *Parmenides and To Eon. Reconsidering Muthos and Logos*. London: Continuum.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1 A Route to Homer 10; 2 Homeric or "Sung Speech" 27; 3 Reconsidering Xenophanes 40; 4 Reconsidering Speech 56; 5 Parmenides' Poem 69; 6 The Way It Seems . . . 104; Notes 118; Bibliography 147; Index 153-156.
"I suggest that we might be able to begin to "hear" anew the wisdom of hour first philosophical texts. Hence, I take a historical-philosophical route to Parmenides. This route begins with an analysis of the significance of "Homer" in ancient Greek culture that challenges some of our common knowledge about "Homer" and how oral poetry works (Chapter 1). These challenges are supplemented by an overview of Homeric or "sung speech" (Chapter 2) that is brought to bear on assumptions about Xenophanes'

fragments (Chapter 3) and contemporary accounts of speech (Chapter 4). Having reconsidered Homer, Xenophanes, and basic assumptions about speech, the final chapters offer an interpretation of Parmenides' poem (Chapter 5) that differs from some of our general accounts (Chapter 6)." (p. 7)

43. Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's answers to the Parmenides problem." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 65:747-764.
"The questions raised by the great pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides were perhaps the main challenge for Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest post-Socratic philosophers." (p. 747)
"No philosopher was able to accurately interpret and refute the Parmenides problem until Plato and Aristotle. Plato answered it in an important way in his dialogue the *Sophist*, and Aristotle followed this up with the complete answer in *Physics* book 1, chapter 8. My thesis is that Plato's answer would have been good enough to defeat Protagoras in extended argument, thereby remedying the political aspects of the Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle's answer is required to answer some additional philosophical and scientific aspects.
The first section of this paper will summarize the history of pre-Socratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point.
The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the *Sophist*. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (p. 748)

44. Woodbury, Leonard. 1958. "Parmenides on Names." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*:145-160. Reprinted in: J. P. Anton and George L. Kustas (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy,* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972, pp. 145-162 and in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace

(eds.), *Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, pp. 80-95.
[The essay is a discussion of the fr. B8 34-41]
"νοεῖν has been until now translated, for convenience' sake, as "mean" or "think", but these renderings will no longer suffice, since it now appears what is implied when νοεῖν is used, as by Parmenides, not of a word or a thought, but of the name of the world. The object of νοεῖν is that-in-being, and in consequencevοεῖν can here stand only for that knowledge which perceives the world as it is. Knowledge of being can be found only in the meaning of the name, "being". Parmenides' philosophy of names leads directly into his ontology. But we have no text that asserts the identity of knowledge with its object, of νοεῖν with το ἐον. The text that has so often been thought to make this assertion says in fact something quite different. It says that νοεῖν is the same as εἶναι, and this must mean that knowledge, like the right thought and meaning, can be found only in the use of the name. The only way is a μυθος ὁδοιο, ὡς ἐστίν.
Werner Jaeger has taught us to take seriously the theological significance of Parmenides' proem and to see at the heart of his philosophy a " Mystery of Being".(39) What I should venture to propose to him is that the meaning of the goddess's revelation is that the world is expressed in "being", and that Parmenides' holy mystery is the reality of a name." (p. 157)
(39) Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), 107.

45. ———. 1986. "Parmenides on Naming by Mortal Men: fr. B8.53-56." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:1-13.
Reprinted in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace (eds.), *Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, pp. 439-453.
"Concerning the text and syntax of the passage there appears to be a wide, though not a universal, agreement. But in regard to interpretation it is agreed only that severe problems proliferate and defy clear solutions." (p. 1)

"The proper choice is the one figured in the proem, the entrance upon a road that passes beyond the paths of Night and Day into light , under the guidance of the Daughters of the Sun, who quit the House of Night for this purpose, throwing back there at the veils that cover their faces.(24) The journey is one that is directed by Justice and has the effect of persuading the Necessity that controls the goings of mortal men under the direction of a bad dispensation . The choice of the road , it is plain , entails the choice of the guidance of light ." (p. 12)
(24) On the allegory of Parmenides ' journey and the vicissitudes of the sun in this world, see my "Equinox at Acragas: Pindar *Ol*. 2 . 61 - 62" TAPA [*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*] 97 (1966) 597 - 616 , especially 609 ff . and E . Robbins in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (Ed. D.E. Gerber (Chico , California 1984), note 20) 224 . "

46. Wyatt, William F.Jr. 1992. "The Root of Parmenides." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 94:113-120.
"Parmenides, in looking for the roots of things and for essence, examined and pondered as well on the roots of words and their essential meaning. In so doing he found linguistic support for his notions, or for some of them. He wrote at a time and in a style which allowed root meanings to appear clearly and which saw in nouns the verbal notion underlying them, and in verbs the nominal cognates. In this he is rather in the style of the choral poets such as Pindar and Aeschyulus who, it would seem, at times cared little for parts of speech but very much for the meanings conveyed in roots. I close with a Parmenidean example.
In 7.3 he characterizes ἔθος as πολύπειρον.(19) There can be much discussion about the precise meaning of the word, but it appears to me that it contains (for Parmenides) the meaning or meanings inherent in the verb πειρασθαι "attempt," and in the noun πειρασ "limit" with its adjective ἄπειρον.(20) It will therefore have to do with mankind's tentative and uncertain steps toward truth, steps which lead to no conclusion or end. In this man is like the ανθρωποι of Heracleitus' Fr. 1." (p. 120)

(19) For so I take it. Coxon (58 & 191) construes the adjective with τουτο. Little hinges on this, I suspect, but the Greek works better my way, which is the usual translation. 20 Parmenides seems to have played as well with prefixes, particularly the negative prefix (ἀ- and the prefix "many" (πολυ-). They correspond to the way of non-being on the one hand, and of mortal uncertainty and searching on the other. Of the three words τροπος, ἄτροπος, πολύτροπος only the first has any real existence.

47. Young, Tyler. 2006. "Perceiving Parmenides: A Reading of Parmenides of Elea's Philosophy by Way of the Proem." *Dionysius* no. 24:21-44.
Abstract: "Parmenides' poem must be read as a whole, beginning with the proem and seeing it as a basis for approaching the entirety of the work. Analysis of Homer's *Odyssey* and Hesiod's *Theogony* shows that Parmenides' poem is a masterpiece of allusion, and that the proem establishes a method and imagery by which the following two sections can be read both independently and in relation to each other. Examination of the Way of Doxa in the second part of the poem provides the opportunity for an explication of Parmenides' cosmology and theology and demonstrates that the Doxa is necessary to his philosophy. The heart of his thesis lies in the juxtaposition of the two ways. The Way of Truth in the third part stands as a succinct statement of the nature of Reality and its relation to human experience."

48. Zeller, Eduard. 1881. *A History of Greek Philosophy from the earliest Period to the time of Socrates*. London: Longman, Green and Co.
With a General Introduction (pp. 1-183),
Translated by S. F. Alleyne in two volumes from the German fourth edition of: *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1876-1882.
On Parmenides: vol. I, pp. 580-608.
"The great advance made by the Eleatic philosophy in Parmenides ultimately consists in this, that the unity of all Being, the fundamental idea of the Eleatics, was apprehended by him in a much more definite manner than

by Xenophanes, and that it was based upon the concept of Being. Xenophanes, together with the unity of the world-forming force or deity, had also maintained the unity of the world; but he had not therefore denied either the plurality or the variability of particular existences. Parmenides shows that the All in itself can only be conceived as One, because all that exists is in its essence the same. But for this reasonhe will admit nothing besides this One to be a reality. Only Being is: non-Being can as little exist as it can be expressed or conceived; and it is the greatest mistake, the most incomprehensible error, to treat Being and non-Being, in spite of their undeniable difference, as the same. This once recognised, everything else follows by simple inference." (pp. 580-585, notes omitted)

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

1. Année, Magali. 2013. "Parménide. Recommencer le verbe être." *Les Études philosophiques*:463-491.
   "« Recommencer », c'est peut-être justement le propre du verbe être parménidien.
   « Toujours recommencé », un peu comme la mer de Valéry, mais linguistiquement seulement, c'est-à-dire « énoncé » une nouvelle fois, pour reprendre le titre de l'ouvrage qu'il s'agit ici de présenter et, en quelque sorte, de continuer : *Parménide. Fragments, Poème*, précédé de *Énoncer le verbe être* (Paris, Vrin, « Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques », 2012). Les lignes qui suivent, en effet, ont ceci de particulier qu'elles ne doivent pas s'entendre autrement que comme la restitution de la présentation qui a été prononcée dans le cadre du Séminaire « présocratique » du Centre Léon Robin, le 29 juin 2013. Elles n'ont de sens, autrement dit, qu'en tant que simple explicitation, ou justification, des intentions et de l'approche qui furent les miennes au moment de la rédaction du commentaire et de la traduction qui constituent ce livre." (p. 463)
2. Aubenque, Pierre, ed. 1987. *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*. Paris: Vrin.
   Table des matières:
   Première partie: Parménide.
   Néstor Luis Cordero: L'histoire du texte de Parménide p. 3;
   Lambros Couloubaritsis: Les multiples chemins de

Parménide p. 25; Rémi Brague: La vraisemblance du faux: Parménide fr. I, 31-32 p. 44; Coloman Viola: Aux origines de la gnoséologie: réflexions sur le sens du fr. IV du Poème de Parménide p. 69; Pierre Aubenque: Syntaxe et sémantique de l'être dans le Poème de Parménide p. 102; Denis O'Brien: L'être et l'éternité p. 135; Barbara Cassin: Le chant des Sirènes dans le Poème de Parménide: quelques remarques sur le fr. VIII, 26-33 p. 163; Jürgen Wiesner: Überlegungen zu Parmenides, fr. VIII, 34 p. 170; Jean Frère: Parménide et l'ordre du monde: fr. VIII, 50-61 p. 192.
Deuxième partie: La tradition de Parménide.
Monique Dixsaut: Platon et le logos de Parménide p. 215; Guillaume Rocca-Serra: Parménide chez Diogène Laërce p. 254; Robert Muller: Euclide de Mégare et Parménide p. 274; Barbara Cassin et Michel Narcy: Parménide sophiste: la citation aristotélicienne du fr. XVI p. 277; Christian Guérard: Parménide d'Élée chez les Néoplatoniciens p. 294; Denis O'Brien: Problèmes d'établissement du texte: la transmission du Poème dans l'Antiquité p. 314.
Index. 1. Index des passages de Parménide p. 353; 2. Index des passages cités d'auteurs anciens p. 359; 3. Index des auteurs modernes p. 371.

3. ———. 1987. "Syntaxe et sémantique de l'être dans le Poème de Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 102-134. Paris: Vrin.
"On voudrait s'efforcer ici de répondre à une question simple, mais probablement décisive: de quoi s'agit-il dans le Poème de Parménide? (...)" (p. 102)
(...)
"Donc l'être, et non d'abord l'unité. Mais pourquoi l'être? Pour répondre à la question du pourquoi, on en est réduit à des conjectures, car aucun texte conservé ne justifie explicitement le choix de Parménide. Mais ne pas se poser la question serait considérer comme allant de soi un choix qui ne s'imposait pas absolument, puisque Parménide aura été pendant longtemps le seul à le faire. Il faut, si difficile que ce soit après vingt-trois siècles de métaphysique, réactiver l'étonnement devant le fait que, avec Parménide, la

philosophie se soit constituée pour la première fois comme ontologie, et non physiologie, cosmologie, théologie ou même hénologie.
De surcroît, un certain nombre d'indices convergents permettent peut- être d'apporter à la question du pourquoi un début plausible de réponse. Nous rangerons ces indices sous cinq rubriques, en mentionnant à chaque fois le très petit nombre d'interprètes qui ont pu nous précéder sur cette voie." (pp. 108-109)

4. Battistini, Yves. 1955. *Trois presocratiques: Héraclite, Parménide, Empédocle*. Paris: Gallimard.
   Deuxième édition augmentée avec le titre *Trois Présocratiques*, Paris: Gallimard, 1968.
5. Beaufret, Jean. 1971. "Héraclite et Parménide." *L'Herne* no. 15:152-161.
   Repris dans: J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger,* Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1973 pp. 38-51 (sur Parménide, pp. 45-51).
   Traduction en Anglais : *Dialogue with Heidegger,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, pp. 20-31.
   "Si le monde dit *présocratique* est riche en figures originales, Héraclite et Parménide sont les figures les plus radieusement centrales de ce monde. Car, avec Héraclite et Parménide, c'est la fondation même de la pensée occidentale qui s'accomplit. C'est à eux que remonte comme au secret de la source ce qu'il y a d'encore vivant et de toujours vivace au fond de nos pensées.
   On peut dire que c'est par eux que nous pensons, même si nous ne pensons pas à eux, car ils sont la lumière où se révèle initialement la profondeur de notre monde, profondeur que nous ne cessons d'être et qui, cependant, nous demeure d'autant plus énigmatique et ainsi d'autant mieux réservée que nous lui appartenons davantage au plus intime de notre histoire jusqu'ici advenue et encore à advenir." (p. 38)
   "Si Parménide est le penseur de l'être, comprenons maintenant que cette pensée de l'être ne porte pas plus ombrage au changement que la pensée du changement, tel que le conçoit Héraclite, n'ébranle une permanence

fondamentale. Le mouvement n'apparaît à Héraclite que sur fond de permanence, et, lorsque Parménide pense face au non-être la permanence de l'être, c'est comme horizon immuable de la présence-absence qui est l'essence de tout changement. Loin donc qu'Héraclite et Parménide surgissent l'un contre l'autre dès l'aurore comme les champions d'une polémique inaugurale, peut-être sont-ils l'un et l'autre, malgré la différence de leurs paroles, à l'écoute d'un même λόγος auquel ils prêtent l'un comme l'autre une même oreille à l'origine de la pensée occidentale. Au fond, il n'y a peut-être pas plus d'immobilisme dans le Poème de Parménide qu'il n'y a de mobilisme dans les fragments d'Héraclite, ou plutôt permanence et changement sont aussi bien des deux côtés. Ainsi les deux langages divergent sans cependant se contrarier, exposant tous les deux le savoir grec de l'être, ce savoir être qui se déploie dans l'élément de la présence sans rien forcer ni tourmenter, sans esquiver ni se crisper, sans compromis ni démesure." (p. 50).

6. ———. 1973. "Lecture de Parménide." In *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, 38-51. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
7. Bollack, Jean. 1957. "Sur deux fragments de Parménide (4 et 16)." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 70:56-71.
8. ———. 1990. "La cosmologie parménidéenne de Parménide." In *Herméneutique et Ontologie. Hommage à Pierre Aubenque*, edited by Brague, Rémi and Courtine, Jean-François, 17-53. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
9. ———. 2006. "Parménide un auteur." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 24:45-49.
10. Bollack, Jean, and Wissman, Heinz. 1974. "Le moment théorique: Parménide fr. 8,42 - 49." *Revue de Sciences Humaines* no. 39:203-212.
11. Boussoulas, Nicolas-Isidore. 1964. "La structure du mélange dans la pensée de Parménide." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:1-13.
12. Brague, Rémi. 1987. "La vraisemblance du faux (Parménide, Fr. I, 31-32)." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes*

d'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 44-68. Paris: Vrin.
Repris dans Rémi Brague, *Introduction au monde grec. Études d'histoire de la philosophie*, Chatou: Les Éditions de la Transparence 2005 (Édition revue 2008), pp. 101-142.
"Les deux derniers vers du premier fragment de Parménide, qui contient le prologue de son poème ontologique et cosmologique, comptent parmi les plus ardus et les plus âprement discutés de son oeuvre, ou de ce qui nous en est parvenu. Le fait est d'autant plus regrettable qu'ils constituent à l'évidence l'annonce par la déesse qui instruit le poète-philosophe du programme qu'il lui faudra étudier, et qu'ils sont donc comme la clef de tout le poème. Malgré les efforts de beaucoup de très bons esprits, armés d'une incontestable érudition, aucune interprétation ne semble capable de recueillir l'adhésion générale. Nous aimerions intervenir dans ce débat, non pour rivaliser avec de plus savants que nous, mais pour attirer l'attention sur un fait nouveau, résultat des travaux de ceux-ci, mais qui ne nous semble pas avoir été remarqué comme il le mériterait.
Il nous semble en effet que les efforts des philologues et des philosophes ont abouti, il y a un peu plus de dix ans, à une situation herméneutique nouvelle et simplifiée. Avant cette date, les interprétations les plus variées de ces deux vers semblaient pouvoir être admises, au moins en principe. Ce n'est, à notre avis, plus le cas. Les arguments en sont venus, nous semble-t-il, à s'annuler les uns les autres, de façon à exclure toutes les possibilités d'interprétation. Une telle situation d'aporie, si elle doit s'avérer définitive, impose un réexamen d'ensemble de la question. Nous nous proposons donc de mettre en évidence les obstacles infranchissables que rencontre toute tentative d'interprétation, avant de proposer une solution." (p. 44)

13. Bredlow, Luis André. 2011. "La théologie des passions dans le poème de Parménide (frs. 12-13 D-K)." In *Figures de la passion et de l'amour*, edited by Chateua, Dominique and Salabert, Pierre, 91-107. Paris: L'Harmattan.
14. Brisson, Luc. 1990. "Remarques sur les études parménidiennes en France." *Revue des Études Grecques* no.

103:684-692.
15. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1990. "Parménide un et indivisible." In *La philosophie et son histoire*, edited by Vuillemin, Jules, 233-263. Paris: Odile Jacob.
16. Casertano, Giovanni. 2002. "Parménide, Platon et la vérité." In *Platon source des présocratiques. Éxplorations*, edited by Dixsaut, Monique and Brancacci, Aldo, 67-92. Paris: Vrin.
"Aux origines du problème de la vérité il y a Parménide. On parle de problème car, pour claires que soient les coordonnées théorétiques dans lesquelles se situe la perspective parménidienne, il n'est pas facile, ensuite, d'en dégager la signification et les implications. Le fragment 3 (« en effet penser et être sont la même chose »), lu en dehors de tout horizon néoplatonicien ou idéaliste, nous parle seulement d'une coïncidence, ou bien d'une identité, ou bien d'une inséparabilité : mais, tandis que « penser » est facile à entendre, il est plus difficile d'entendre le champ sémantique de « être ». On sait que Parménide n'utilise pas le terme « être » pour indiquer l'objet de sa recherche mais plutôt το ἐόν, l'étant, « ce qui est ». Voilà le premier problème : l'être de B 3 est-il le même que το᾽ ἐόν, ou bien indique t-il autre chose? La question se complique parce que, à côté de « ce qui est » apparaît aussi un το᾽ μη᾽ ἐόν, un non-étant, « ce qui n'est pas », qui n'est, comme il est dit explicitement, possible ni à connaître ni à exprimer (B 2.7-8: οὔτε γνοίης ... οὔτε φράσαις), donc qui, évidemment, n'est pas pensable. Il y a donc une relation étroite entre la séquence : être / penser connaître / exprimer-dire, et, de façon spéculaire par rapport à celle-ci, l'autre séquence : ne pas être / ne pas penser-ne pas connaître / ne pas exprimer - ne pas dire." (p. 67)
17. Cassin, Barbara. 1980. *Si Parménide. Le traité anonyme De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia. Édition critique et commentaire*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
Le Parménide de Gorgias pp. 43-75.
"«Si Parménide»: il s'agit d'ontologie, de sophistique, de doxographie. «Edition commentée du traité anonyme Sur Mélissus, Xénophane et Gorgias»: il s'agit de l'établissement

d'un texte grec, de sa traduction, de leurs justifications. Du titre au sous-titre, il s'agit de philosophie et de philologie, d'un certain rapport entre elles." p. 17
"[Dans le Poème de Parménide] la déesse nomme pour qui les portes se sont ouvertes, les deux seuls chemins qui s'offrent à la recherche:
«L'un: que est et que n'est pas possible de n'être pas, l'autre: que n'est pas et qu'est besoin de n'être pas».
L'énoncé de la première thèse de Gorgias [dans le traité *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* = G.], dans la reprise introduisant à sa démonstration, est littéralement identique au nom du second chemin: «n'est pas». Il ne faut pas croire pour autant que Gorgias, désobéissant délibérément à la déesse et au père Parménide, s'engage d'emblée déjà sur le chemin interdit, impraticable et qui n'aboutit pas ; rien d'une contestation aussi immédiate, primaire, et somme toute négligeable puisqu'elle donne du sophiste l'image bien connue d'un insolent blanc-bec prêt à tout pour faire le malin. Au contraire, «n'est pas» se présente explicitement comme une conséquence et le résultat d'une double démonstration. Or ces deux démonstrations constituent en elles-mêmes une interprétation du chemin du «est» tel qu'il est tracé dans le Poème et en marquent les étapes.
C'est, tout d'abord, la différence entre les deux démonstrations proposées qui est significative. La première, celle qui est propre à Gorgias, porte sur le verbe comme tel: elle prouve que «n'est pas» parce que ni «être» ni «n'être pas» ne se soutiennent en position de verbe, parce qu'il n'y a pas de verbe pour être. La seconde, démonstration référentielle qui opère en combinant les thèses des autres Eléates, porte sur le sujet : elle prouve que «n'est pas» parce que, aucun prédicat ne convenant au sujet, il n'y a pas non plus de sujet pour être. C'est donc par deux fois qu'il faut conclure «n'est pas»: parce qu'il n'est pas vrai qu'il y ait être, et parce qu'il n'est pas vrai qu'il y ait un étant pour être. La duplication produit une structure de recul, d'ailleurs caractéristique tout au long du traité de la manière de Gorgias: il n'y a pas de verbe, et quand bien même il y aurait un verbe, ce verbe n'aurait pas de sujet. Ainsi s'interprète,

avec ses deux négations en renfort portant l'une sur le verbe et l'autre sur le sujet, l'énoncé inaugural de cette première thèse, impossible en vertu des règles françaises de la double négation à rendre par la formule littérale «n'est pas rien», et qu'on peut transcrire d'un : «(il) n'est (absolument) rien».
Si l'hypothèse texte contre texte est exacte, ce renchérissement démonstratif suppose à lui seul une certaine compréhension du Poème: à lire en deux temps ou trois mouvements, tels que de la position inaugurale du verbe «est» advienne, au moyen d'une prédication effective, la position seconde du sujet «l'étant».
Puis l'annonce faite par l'Anonyme de la démonstration propre à Gorgias pour la première thèse est elle aussi révélatrice d'une lecture de même type. Elle tient en une phrase: «(il) n'est pas (possible) ni (d')être ni (de) ne pas être» (2). Les parenthèses sont là pour servir d'alibi, c'est-à-dire conférer à la phrase un ailleurs, une ubiquité, l'équivoque caractéristique de la tournure grecque. Car le grec veut dire à la fois: «ni être ni pas être ne sont», «il n'est pas possible ni d'être ni de n'être pas», «ce n'est ni être ni ne pas être». Et la démonstration elle-même prouve qu'aucun de ces sens n'est à exclure, mais qu'au contraire ils découlent l'un de l'autre de façon réglée: si les deux verbes «être» et «ne pas être» ne sont pas, ils ne peuvent pas plus l'un que l'autre servir effectivement de verbe et donc «il n'est pas possible ni d'être ni de n'être pas», auquel cas, quel que soit le sujet qu'on veuille supposer, ni être ni ne pas être n'en seront les prédicats, si bien que «ce n'est ni être ni pas être».
Cet énoncé unique engage à explorer la prétendue tautologie parménidéenne, «l'être est», pour y lire non pas la fixité de l'identité stérile d'un «est» à jamais imposé, antihéraclitéisme caricatural, mais l'auto-mouvement en quelque sorte plus hégélien d'une identité vivante qui se développe dans la langue et en produit la logique comme syntaxe prédicative.
Reste à éprouver directement cette lecture-miroir, sa possibilité et son intérêt, au contact du texte du Poème." pp. 45-47

(1). G., 2., 1: *hoti men ouk estin*, «que (ce) n'est pas», reprend 28 B 2, 5 DK: *hè d' hôs ouk estin*: «l'autre: que n'est pas».
(2) G., 1.,1: *ouk einai... ouden* ; voir commentaire p. 432 s.
(3) G., 2., 19 s.

18. ———. 1987. "Le chant des Sirènes dans le Poème de Parménide: quelques remarques sur le fr. VIII, 26-33." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 163-169. Paris: Vrin.
"Le Poème de Parménide est une épopée philosophique: "Odyssée spirituelle", cette quête cognitive, menacée par l'errance, d'un être d'exception divinement guidé. La pertinence du lieu commun fondé sur l'analogie de certains motifs et thèmes comme sur l'identité formelle de l'hexamètre, devient plus pressante lorsque les parallèles terminologiques ne relèvent manifestement pas du seul phrasé épique. L'un de ces parallèles me paraît devoir retenir singulièrement l'attention; il superpose en effet l'immobilité d'Ulysse lié au mât par ses compagnons dans l'épisode des Sirènes [*Odyssée,* XII, 158 ss], et l'immobilité de ce qui sera la sphère, retenue par une nécessité puissante dans les liens de la limite, l'un ou l'autre 'reste ici même solidement planté dans le sol'." p. 163
"Odyssée et Poème servant tour à tour de propre et de métaphore ou d'allégorie l'un pour l'autre, le chant des Sirènes nous est ainsi apparu comme un miroir et donc une caricature de l'épopée dans l'épopée elle-même: Ulysse passe ligoté, préférant au bruit de sa gloire une identité minimale -- il sera reconnu de son chien en arrivant au pays. De façon parallèle, la *doxa* serait miroir ou caricature de l'*alétheia* au sein de l'*alétheia* elle-même, et l'étant qui lui échappe est lui aussi ligoté dans une identité minimale." p. 169
19. Cassin, Barbara, and Narcy, Michel. 1987. "Parménide sophiste: la citation aristotélicienne du fr. XVI." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 277-293. Paris: Vrin.

"Certes, il peut paraître difficile de parler d'une exégèse d'Aristote à propos du fragment XVI, étant donné que les quatre vers sont cités sans commentaire, encadrés seulement d'autres citations. Mais c'est justement dans la façon dont sont présentées, agencées, ces citations, qu'il faut essayer de saisir l'interprétation." (p. 281)

20. Castelnérac, Benoît. 2014. "Le Parménide de Platon et le Parménide de l'histoire." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 53:435-464.
21. ———. 2015. "Note exégétique sur le fragment 2 de Parménide (DK 28 B 2)." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 128:291-308.
"Cette analyse textuelle du fr. 2 de Parménide (DK 28 B2) a pour principal objectif de démontrer que le verbe νοῆσαι (l. 2) doit être lu comme un infinitif actif ayant pour complément les propositions subordonnées introduites respectivement par ὅπως à la li. 3 et ὡς à la li. 5. il est en outre suggéré que le *De arte* (ii, 1-2), du corpus hippocratique, ainsi qu'un passage du *Parménide* de Platon (136a-c) ont des points communs avec le fr. 2."
22. Charles, Sébastien. 2001. "Du Parménide à Parménide." *Les Études philosophiques* no. 59:535-552.
23. Collobert, Catherine. 1993. *L'être de Parménide, ou le refus du temps*. Paris: Kimé.
Table des matières: Préface de Marcel Conche I-VI; Avant-propos 3; Le poème de Parménide 5; Sources 7; Texte et traduction 10; Introduction 27; Première partie: La parole: dire et penser 33;
Chapitre 1: L'instauration de la parole: le chemin 35; Chapitre 2: Les chemins en question 73; Chapitre 3: L'indissolubilité du Dire et du Penser 101; Deuxième partie: Ontologie et temporalité 125; Chapitre 1: La sémantique de l'être 127; Chapitre 2: Genèse, destruction et temps 155; Chapitre 3: Les caractères et la présence permanence souveraine 197; Chapitre 4: L'étant, le non-étant et le temps 231; Conclusion 227; Bibliographie 281; Index des passages d'auteurs anciens 291; Index de noms 295-296.

"Ce travail est né de la volonté de comprendre comment, dès son origine, la pensée de l'Être s'est constituée comme refus du temps, comment "être" a cessé de signifier "devenir". Avec Parménide, le discours philosophique, le logos, s'instaure comme parole métaphysique de l'être. L'être a pour corollaire essentiel et fondamental la négation du temps ; ce qui est dans le temps, n'est pas absolument. Vivant et mourant, nous sommes dans le non-être parménidien.
La question initiale de ce travail est la suivante:
comment Parménide, en posant que tout logos est logos de l'être, c'est-à-dire aussi que tout discours vrai est discours de l'être, a-t-il fermé les portes du logos au temps?
Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons eu recours à une analyse structurelle du poème. Nous avons donc écouté la parole parménidienne par delà les vissicitudes historiques de ses différentes interprétations.
Nous avons pensé que seule l'analyse de la construction du discours parménidien nous permettait d'entrer dans ce même discours pour en saisir toutes les difficultés et toutes ses richesses et pour tenter dans la mesure du possible de lever ces difficultés.
Nous avons, par conséquent, voulu écouter Parménide et lui seul, parce que la réponse à notre question est dans sa seule pensée. Nous avons en effet, voulu comprendre de quelle manière il a réalisé le rejet du temps de la sphère de l'Être. La question du pourquoi aurait sans doute nécessité une autre méthode. Nous n'avons pas recherché les causes historiques de cette éviction du temps et de l'instauration du discours métaphysique.
Nous avons voulu comprendre comment s'est établie la dissociation de l'être et du temps dans le discours original, c'est-à- dire dans la pensée parménidienne ; comment finalement Parménide a-t-il rendu possible la métaphysique ?
Il fallait donc s'interroger sur la force et les ressorts de ce discours, qui a commandé, à certains égards, l'avenir de la philosophie. L'analyse de la logique gouvernant ce discours

nous permettait d'accéder, selon nous, à la compréhension de la dissociation de l'être et du temps.
C'est pourquoi, nous nous sommes abstenus d'expliquer Parménide à la lumière de Platon ou d'Aristote, ces derniers ne nous étant d'aucun secours pour répondre à notre question initiale. Il ne s'agissait pas, en effet, de lire Parménide au travers de sa postérité ou des problèmes qu'il a posés à cette même postérité - même si nous avons pu éclairer Parménide de certaines lumières platoniciennes ou aristotéliciennes, notamment concernant la question du temps. Mais il faut être extrêmement prudent sur les rapprochements historiques. Et cette prudence même aurait nécessité un tout autre travail." (pp. 3-4)
"La traduction qui suit n'est pas le fruit d'un travail personnel en dehors de certains vers qui nous sont apparus déterminants pour notre interprétation, et pour lesquels nous avons cru bon de proposer notre propre traduction lorsque celle de D. O'Brien et de J. Frère ne nous satisfaisait pas. Nous nous sommes largement inspirés de leur commune traduction ainsi que de celles de L. Couloubaritsis et de N.L. Cordero. Cette traduction n'a par conséquent qu'une valeur d'outil de travail et se présente à cet égard comme le reflet de notre interprétation." (p. 9)

24. Constantineau, Philippe. 1987. "La question de la vérité chez Parménide." *Phoenix.Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 41:217-240.
25. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 1977. "Analyse de l'édition Aldine du commentaire de Simplicius à la *Physique* d'Aristote." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 105:42-54.
26. ———. 1979. "Les deux chemins de Parménide dans les fragments 6 et 7." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:1-32.
27. ———. 1982. "La version de Joseph Scaliger du Poème de Parménide." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie*:391-398.
28. ———. 1982. "Le vers 1, 3 de Parménide ("la Dèesse conduit à l'égard du tout")." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*:159-179.

"Coxon, having demonstrated in 1968 that the word *aste* of the Codex *Laur. Gr. 85.19* was nothing else than *ate*, presented by the others manuscripts, only a conjecture can give any sense to the Parmenidean text. The author lists the different solutions to the problem, and on the ground of a new recension of the Codex *Par. 1964. Par. 1965, Par. Sup.133, Ves. 409, Cic. 70* and of the Codex *Par. 1963* in particular, he proposes the version (*pan t*)*ayte*(*i*). According to this version, the Parmenidean Goddess "would lead the man who knows, there, in all possible ways"."

29. ———. 1984. *Les deux chemins de Parménide*. Paris: Vrin. Édition critique, traduction, études et bibliographie. Deuxième édition corrigée et augmentée 1997.
Table des matières: Introduction IX-XIV; Introduction à la 2e édition 1; Parite I: Le Poème de Parménide. A. Sources 17; B. Texte 29; Addenda et corrigenda 34; C. Traduction 35; Partie II: Études critiques. Chapitre I: Analyse de la présentation des deux chemins de la recherche dans le fr. 2 45; Chapitre II: Le contenu des deux thèses du fr. 2 73; Chapitre III: Les deux chemins dans les fragments 6,7 et 8,34-7 110; Chapitre IV: L'Alétheia, la Doxa, et la portée de l'enseignement parménidien 176; Appendice I: La signifcation du verbe *einai* dans la littérature préparménidienne. La racine indoéuropéenne. Le Lexicon d'Ebeling. La thèse de Ch. H. Kahn. Les trois nuances d' *einai* exemplifiées par trois utilisations différentes 215; Appendice II: La tradition manuscrite du vers 6,3. List de manuscrits qui contiennent le vers 6,3. Les variations du texte 234; Parte III: Bibliographie parménidienne 237; Table analytique des matières 301-302.
"Nous ne prétendons pas avoir trouvé *la* solution, c'est-à dire le point de vue à partir duquel la philosophie de Parménide révélera la clé de sa fertilité. L'état fragmentaire dans lequel nous est parvenu son Poème nous place en état d'infériorité par rapport aux penseurs classiques pour émettre un jugement sur la totalité de son oeuvre. C'est pour cela que nous avons préféré limiter notre étude à un seul problème. Toutefois, nous avons choisi un problème qui, à notre avis, occupe une place de choix dans les fragments du

Poème que nous possédons actuellement: le problème des chemins de la connaissance, des voies de la recherche. (...)
Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous proposons d'analyser certains éléments généralement admis dans la pensée de Parménide, mais qui, dans la plupart des cas, ne sont pas poursuivis jusqu'à leurs conséquences extrêmes. (...)
La quasi totalité des chercheurs qui se sont intéressés à la philosophie de Parménide s'accordent sur le fait que sa pensée est structurée autour du principe de la non - contradiction (8). Nous n'affirmons pas ni ne nions pour autant que Parménide ait "inventé" ce principe, ni qu'il ait eu conscience de son utilisation, mais il ne faut pas oublier que le principe du tiers exclu apparaît également chez Parménide - principe qui renforce celui de la non-contradiction et rend contradictoires toutes les oppositions que nous rencontrons tout au long de son Poème. Sur la base de cette constatation, dont nous fournirons des exemples tout au long de notre travail, nous trouvons chez Parménide un dualisme méthodologique rigoureux qui sépare, "comme d'un coup de hache", l'espace conceptuel, ainsi que l'a remarqué P.M. Schuhl à juste titre (10), en deux régions opposées. Cette dichotome, véritable transposition sur le plan philosophique de la *bifurcation* mystique que nous trouvons dans les récits orphiques et pythagoriciens (11), constitue, à notre avis, la structure primordiale du raisonnement parménidien. C'est à cette dichotomie qu' obéit la présentation de son enseignement sous la forme de deux *thèses* contradictoires: les deux chemins de la recherche.
Notre analyse cherchera à établir le contenu de ces thèses contradictoires ainsi que leur portée, c'est-à-dire le domaine auquel elles s'appliquent et les conséquences qui dérivent de leur acceptation rigoureuse (12). Nous partirons pour cela du fr. 2, où apparaît la première énonciation des "deux seuls chemins de la recherche", et, une fois établie la valeur des deux thèses, nous étudierons leur réapparition (reliée à des problèmes différents) dans les fr. 6, 7 et 8. Ensuite, nous tenterons de découvrir quelques correspondances possibles entre ces chemins de la recherche et le récit mythique du

voyage entrepris par le poète-philosophe, tel qu'il figure dans le fr. 1. Enfin, nous analyserons la nouveauté que présente le système de Parménide par rapport à la pensée de ses prédécesseurs.
En ce qui concerne notre méthode, enfin, il y a deux constatations que le lecteur ne pourra pas s'empêcher de faire. La première, qui sera reçue avec un certain soulagement, concerne le fait que notre travail semble se terminer à la page 214. Cela obéit, d'une part, à notre intention de grouper dans deux *Appendices* l'analyse de certains éléments qui renforcent notre recherche, mais dont l'insertion dans les chapitres correspondants aurait, à notre avis, nui à la continuité du discours, et, d'autre part, à la présentation, dans cet ouvrage, de la Bibliographie Parménidienne.
La deuxième constatation concerne l'abondance - l'excès parfois - de questions dites "philologiques" dans un travail qui, comme le nôtre, se voudrait proche du domaine de la "philosophie". La raison en est simple: nous croyons que dans le domaine des études classiques, une collaboration étroite, voire une symbiose, entre philologie et philosophie s'impose. Nous n'hésitons pas à affirmer que, en ce qui concerne la pensée antique, *la philosophie sans philologie est aveugle,* de même que *la philologie sans philosophie est vide*. Sans son support *réel,* c'est-à-dire les mots et la science qui s'en occupe, les spéculations philosophiques ne sont que tâtonnements; mais les mots, isolés du système conceptuel dont ils sont issus, ne sont que "paroles trompeuses", comme dit Parménide lui-même."
(Introduction pp. X-XIII)
8. Cf. K. Reinhardt (1916), p. 56, et J. Mansfeld (1964), p. 57, n. 3.
9. Cf. notamment 8,16 et 8,36-7.
10. P.M. Schuhl *essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque* (1949), p. 284.
11. Cf. *Idem,* p. 285.
12. Parmi ces conséquences, la principale est le rejet, en tant que "chemin de recherche", du prétendu "troisième chemin" du fr. 6.

30. ———. 1987. "L'histoire du texte de Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 3-24. Paris: Vrin.
"L'Auteur présente les péripéties de la découverte des fragments du "Poème" de Parménide et des essais de reconstitution de son texte depuis le 5e siècle av. J.-C. jusqu'à l'édition présente Diels-Kranz. Cette dernière version, "orthodoxe", doit être modifiée en profondeur à partir d'une nouvelle analyse des sources manuscrites. L'Auteur propose quelques corrections."
Appendice A: Sur la version de Diels-Kranz du Poème de Parménide: a) L'évolution (pp. 18-19); b) Quelques erreurs (pp. 19-24); Appendice B: Les sources du texte de Parménide (pp. 22-24)
31. ———. 1990. "La Déesse de Parménide, maîtresse de philosophie." In *La naissance de la raison en Grèce. Actes du Congrès de Nice, mai 1987*, edited by Mattéi, Jean-FRançois, 207-214. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
"Un siècle et demi après Hésiode, mais presque au même temps qu'Eschyle et que Pindare, Parménide partage encore cet univers. Dans l'histoire qu'il nous raconte, il y a quelqu'un qui s'adresse à une déesse. Il ne l'invoque pas, mais il fait un voyage pour la rencontrer, et ce voyage est très certainement initiatiques. Et lorsque le voyageur arrive au domaine de la déesse, celle-ci qui, comme la *théa* du début de l'*Iliade*, est anonyme parle. Comme toutes les déesses que nous venons de mentionner, elle dit la Vérité, et exhorte son élève à écouter son *mythos*: «Eh bien : je dirai, et toi, qui écoutes, accueille mon *mythos* » (fr. 2. 1). Jusqu'ici, rien de nouveau. La Déesse parménidienne n'a rien de particulier. Mais une fois exposés (au fr. 2) les principes de sa Vérité -- c'est-à- dire les axiomes desquels découlent les affirmations qui constitueront un véritable "système" la Déesse s'engage dans une révolution copernicienne. Elle, qui est une Déesse, se sécularise, et, d'une manière inattendue, demande à son élève : "Juge avec le logos la preuve très polémique que je viens d'énoncer" (fr. 7.5-6). Etonnante formule dans la bouche d'une déesse, que cet appel à son élève afin qu'il examine son message avec le

logos! Il est probable que la philosophie, comme recherche du principe de toutes les choses, est née le 28 mai 585 (8), lorsque l'éclipse que Thalès avait prédite a eu la gentillesse de ne pas manquer au rendez-vous; mais nous n'hésitons pas à affirmer que la philosophie, en tant que critique argumentée des idées reçues, c'est-à-dire comme dialogue didactique entre la Vérité et la pensée qui l'interroge, est née en ce jour du début du Ve siècle, quand Parménide écrivit -- ou récita -- les mots que nous venons de citer. Notre affirmation peut paraître surprenante. Il est indéniable, néanmoins, que dans cette formule nous trouvons pour la première fois une invitation -- même une incitation -- adressée par un maître à son élève, afin que celui-ci joue un rôle actif dans la recherche de la vérité. Mais nous devons justifier notre enthousiasme, et le meilleur moyen est l'analyse détaillée des vers 5 et 6 du fragment 7 de Parménide." pp. 208-209
(8) W. K. C. Guthrie, *A Hislory of Greck Philosophy*, I, Cambridge, 1962, p. 6.

32. ———. 1991. "L'invention de l'école Éléatique: Platon, *Soph.* 242d." In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre and Michel, Narcy, 91-124. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
33. ———. 1994. "Parménide : la "rhétorique" de la déesse." In *La rhétorique grecque. Actes du Colloque 'Octave Navarre' : troisième Colloque international sur la pensée antique organisé par le CRHI les 17, 18 et 19 décembre 1992 à la Faculté des Lettres de Nice* edited by Galy, Jean-Michel and Thivel, Antoine, 53-62. Nice: Association des publications de la Faculté des lettres de Nice.
34. ———. 2000. "Parménide platonisé : à propos du 'Parménide' de Marcel Conche." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 18:15-24.
35. ———. 2004. "La pensée s'exprime 'grâce' à l'être: Parménide, fr. 8, 35." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 129:5-13.
36. ———. 2005. "Le *logos* comme critère chez Parménide." In *Cosmos et Psyché. Mélanges offerts à Jean Frère*, edited by Eugenie, Vegleris, 45-54. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

37. ———. 2006. "Pour en finir avec la "troisième voie" chez Parménide." *Elenchos* no. 27:5-33.
"L'idée d'une "troisième voie" d'accès à la réalité, née dans la recherche de la fin du XIXe siècle, ne se trouve pas chez Parménide, qui ne pouvait pas imaginer un compromis entre l'être et le non-être. On esquisse la genèse de cette interprétation erronée, ainsi que les traits de la philosophie parménidéenne qui obligent à la rejeter."
38. ———. 2016. "Aristote, créateur du Parménide *díkranos* que nous héritons aujourd'hui." *Anais de Filosofia Clássica* no. 10:1-25.
39. ———. 2017. "La place de la "physique" de Parménide dans une nouvelle reconstitution du *Poème*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 35:3-13.
40. Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1986. *Mythe et philosophie chez Parménide*. Bruxelles: Ousia.
Index: Préface de la deuxième édition (1990) 7; Introduction: Le mythe des multiples chemins 9; Chapitre I: Transmutation du mythe 76; Chapitre II: L'émergence de l'ontologie 165; Chapitre III: L'émergence d'une nouvelle physique 261; Conclusion: L'émergence de la philosophie 352; Appendice: Traduction du poème 368; Table de matières 381-382.
Troisième édition modifiée et augmentéè avec le titre: *La Pensée de Parménide* - Bruxelles, Ousia, 2008.
"Dans les pages qui suivent, nous allons tenter d'élucider l'instauration de la philosophie au travers de cette transmutation du mythe, grâce à laquelle se manifestent successivement une problématique de l'être et de la pensée (première partie du poème) et une nouvelle physique (seconde partie). Pour ce faire, nous commencerons par élucider le sens du proème, où le mythe parménidien pose ses fondations en vue d'édifier un nouveau type d'activité, axé exclusivement sur le savoir. Cette première étape de notre recherche nous permettra d'établir plus clairement la pratique parménidienne du mythe et d'en déceler la portée. Ensuite, nous montrerons en quoi l'émergence de l'ontologie est tributaire de la transmutation accomplie par le mythe des multiples chemins. Le traitement du texte nous

aidera à discerner comment, par une sorte de retournement, cette émergence de l'ontologie déstabilise fatalement le mythe lui-même, rendant possible l'instauration de nouveaux discours, comme le discours métaphorique et le *logos* proprement dit. Mais plus fondamentalement encore, que cette démarche parménidienne institue le penser et la pensée, ouvrant la voie à une appréhension nouvelle des choses en devenir. C'est en effet en nous appuyant sur cette problématique de la pensée que nous achèverons notre travail, en indiquant comment, à la fois la prise en considération des diverses critiques que Parménide adresse à ses prédécesseurs (117) et une certaine réorganisation des fragments (118) autorisent à établir l'émergence d'une nouvelle physique, fort différente de celle des Ioniens, non seulement parce qu'elle met en oeuvre une cosmogonie quasi-mythique, fondée sur deux entités, mais aussi et surtout parce qu'elle s'institue grâce à l'usage même de la pensée, qui seule peut accorder le devenir aux lois de l'être, lui assurant, de ce fait même, une crédibilité. Par là, le poème parménidien nous apparaîtra dans toute sa cohérence: en vue d'instaurer la philo-sophie le mythe des multiples chemins nous conduit vers la compréhension du cosmos en devenir à partir, d'une part, de l'institution de l'ontologie comme la condition même d'une pensée susceptible de le prendre comme objet possible d'un savoir et, d'autre part, de l'édification d'une physique qui suppose l'impossible ontologisation du réel en devenir." (pp. 74-75)
(117) En distinguant la critique concernant les akrita phyla de celle des "mortels" qui, au contraire, séparent le corps du réel sans chercher l'unité des deux entités qu'il établissent.
(118) En situant le fr. 4 dans la seconde partie du poème. Voir l'Appendice de cet ouvrage, où nous introduisons d'autres réaménagements de moindre importance.

41. ———. 1987. "Les multiples chemins de Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 25-43. Paris: Vrin.
"Des nombreuses difficultés qui subsistent encore dans le Poème de Parménide, les plus importantes nous paraissent

celles qui touchent aux trois éléments mêmes du texte: le sens à accorder au mythe qui l'introduit, la représentation que l'on devrait se donner de l'*eon*, y compris son rapport énigmatique à la question de la pensée, et enfin la signification de la *doxa* et son lien éventuel avec le discours sur *alétheia*. Bref, ce qui est toujours en jeu, c'est encore aujourd'hui, comme autrefois, la cohérence mémé du texte parménidien et donc son unité." (p. 25)

42. ———. 2009. *La pensée de Parménide*. Bruxelles: Ousia. Troisième édition modifiée et augmentée de *Mythe et Philosophie chez Parmenide,* Bruxelles: Ousia, 1986.
Index: Préface de la troisième édition 9; Introduction: L'avénement de la pensée 27; Chapitre I: Le mythe des multiples chemins 57; Chapitre II: Le "Proème" comme producteur de chemins 121; Chapitre III: Transmutation du mythe 197; Chapitre IV: L'émergence de l'*eon* 243; Chapitre V: Le statut de l'*eon* 297; Chapitre VI: La question de la pensée 343; Chapitre VII: Au seuil d'une nouvelle distorsion 405; Chapitre VIII: Les traces d'un univers perdu 445; Conclusion: L'émergence de la philosophie 515; Appendice: Texte et traduction 537; Auteurs cités 559; Table des matières 569-570.
"Ce livre constitue une nouvelle version, modifiée et augmentée de *Mythe et Philosophie chez Parménide* (1986, 1990 deuxième édition). Parallèlement à une réévaluation de la question du mythe qui différencie le *mythos* comme façon de parler autorisée, et le *logos* comme discours catalogique, cette nouvelle livraison refuse, pour l'*eon* parménidien, le sens anachronique d' "être" ou d' "étant", et distingue *eon / eonta* (ce qui est dans le présent / choses qui sont dans le présent) et *on / onta* (ce qui est ou étant / choses qui sont ou étants), accordant ainsi une prééminence au temps, en l'occurrence au "maintenant". Par là, l'auteur prend davantage encore ses distances par rapport aux interprétations dominantes, et propose comme centre d'analyse le *penser* et la *pensée*. Légitimée par "Ce qui est dans le présent" (*eon*) d'une façon absolue et permanente qui en est la condition "inviolable" (*asylon*), la pensée est appliquée au devenir des "choses qui ne sont pas dans le

présent" (*mè eonta*), "choses ab-sentes" (*apeonta*), et les convertit en "choses pré-sentes" *(pareonta*), sans jamais les identifier à une forme d'être. Grâce à cette promotion du présent dans le devenir, l'impossible ontologisation du réel en devenir s'accompagne néanmoins de la possible édification d'une nouvelle physique, différente de celle des premiers Ioniens, à savoir une physique du *mélange*, fondée sur l'unité de deux "formes", la lumière et l'obscurité, se référant au Feu et à la Terre, et dont le statut doxatique transforme le "nominalisme" propre au devenir des choses éphémères en une pensée de la *doxa*. Ce cheminement complexe donne une solution nouvelle au problème toujours en débat de l'*unité* du Poème, et laisse percevoir, par la transmutation du mythe archaïque, l'émergence de la philosophie comme aspiration au savoir, grâce à l'irruption de la pensée qui, en l'homme, puise sa continuité dans l'inflexibilité de "Ce qui est dans le présent", dont l'enracinement dans la flexibilité de la *physis* réussit à équilibrer et à fonder la force différenciante de la parole."

43. Cursaru, Gabriela. 2015-2016. "Imagerie mythico-poétique, philosophie et religion dans le *Proème* de Parménide." *Archæus. Studies in the History of Religions* no. 19-20:19-48.
44. ———. 2016. "Le Proème de Parménide : anabase et / ou catabase ?" *Cahiers des études anciennes* no. 53:39-63.
45. Dehon, Pierre-Jacques. 1988. "Les recommandations de la déesse. Parménide fr. 1,28-32." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 6:271-289.
46. Destrée, Pierre. 2000. "L'être et la figure du soleil: note sur Parménide, DK B 8 v. 34." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 111:304-307.
47. ———. 2000. "La communauté de l'être: Parménide fr. B5." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 18:3-13.
48. Di Giuseppe, Riccardo. 2008. "La conclusion du proème de Parménide : « constitutio textus » et histoire de la tradition." In *Filologia, papirologia, storia dei testi. Giornate di studio in onore di Antonio Carlini: Udine, 9-10 dicembre 2005*, 317-370. Pisa: Serra.
49. ———. 2011. *Le voyage de Parménide*. Paris: Orizons.

50. Dixsaut, Monique. 1987. "Platon et le logos de Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 215-253. Paris: Vrin.
"Avant d'aborder l'examen critique des doctrines de l'être, l'Étranger adresse trois prières à Théétète. Dans la première, il lui demande de se contenter «du peu qu'on pourra gagner, par quelque biais que ce soit, sur un *logos* aussi fort que celui de Parménide»; dans la deuxième, de ne point le regarder comme un parricide «s'il est contraint de mettre à l'épreuve le *logos* de son père Parménide»; dans la troisième, de ne pas l'accuser de manquer de mesure, de délirer, s'il «entreprend de réfuter ce *logos*», à supposer qu'il en soit capable (*Sophiste* 241c-242a).
Du sens que l'on accorde à cette manière d'annoncer l'entreprise comme mise à l'épreuve d'un logos fort, paternel et sacré -- et de l'importance que l'on attache (ou non) à cette manière de l'introduire, dépend toute la lecture du texte qui suit. La relecture de ce célèbre passage du *Sophiste* aura donc pour objet de déterminer sur quoi porte exactement la réfutation, comment et dans quel but elle se conduit."
51. Dubarle, Dominique. 1973. "Le poème de Parménide, doctrine du savoir et premier état d'une doctrine de l'être (première partie)." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* no. 57:3-34.
52. ———. 1973. "Le poème de Parménide, doctrine du savoir et premier état d'une doctrine de l'être (deuxième partie)." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* no. 57:397-432.
53. Dumont, Jean-Pierre. 1994. "Le modèle parménidien de l'assimilation: pensée, sensation et vie." In *Ainsi parlaient les Anciens. In honorem Jean Paul Dumont*, edited by Jerphagnon, Lucien, Lagrée, Jacqueline and Delattre, Denis, 349-371. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires de Lille.
54. Fattal, Michel. 1998. "Mythe et philosophie chez Parménide." In *Philosophes et historiens anciens face aux mythes*, edited by Bouvier, Daniel and Calame, Claude, 91-103. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

"Si Parménide n'attribue pas à l'instar de Xénophane une connotation fortement négative au discours mensonger de la tradition poétique, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'on assiste chez lui à une véritable transmutation du discours homérique et hésiodique notamment en ce qui concerne le problème complexe de la vérité, de la tromperie et de la vraisemblance. Son originalité philosophique résiderait non seulement dans l'élaboration d'un logos qui incarnera pour la première fois l'idée d'une «raison critique personnelle» capable de «juger» une réfutation énoncée par l'autorité d'une «maîtresse de vérité» et dans l'établissement d'une gnômê susceptible de faire le choix entre le plus vraisemblable et le moins vraisemblable; mais également dans le fait d'entamer, bien avant Platon et à la différence du Sophiste, une réflexion sur la vérité et l'erreur qui est commandée par la question des bons et des mauvais mélanges, des bonnes et des mauvaises séparations."

55. ———. 1998. "Le logos dans le Poème de Parménide." In *Les lieux de l'intersubjectivité. Mélanges offerts en hommage à S. Abou*, edited by Hatem, Jad. Paris / Montréal: L'Harmattan.
56. Francotte, Auguste. 1958. "Les disertes juments de Parménide." *Phronesis*:83-94.
57. Frère, Jean. 1981. "Parménide, penseur du cosmos." *Deukalion* no. 33-34:77-86.
58. ———. 1985. "Aurore, Éros et Ananké. Autour des dieux parménidiens." *Les Études Philosophiques*:460-470.
59. ———. 1987. "Parménide et l'ordre du monde: fr. VIII, 50-61." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 192-212. Paris: Vrin.
"La lecture des derniers vers du fragment VIII de Parménide (v. 50-61) pose un problème difficile. La clôture du discours cernant la Vérité est-elle ouverture sur les débordements d'opinions erronées? Ce morceau terminal ne concerne-t-il pas plutôt les étants en leur relation avec l'Être? La nouveauté de Parménide, depuis le fragment I jusqu'au fragment VIII, v.49, c'est assurément de s'arracher aux conceptions des penseurs de la *physis*; Parménide s'y

montre le premier véritable philosophe de l'Être: mais délaisse-t-il pour autant certains aspects de la *physis*? La dernière partie de l'oeuvre (fr. VIII, v. 50-61; fr. IX à fr. XIX) n'est-elle qu'une critique des opinions erronées des philosophes sur le monde? Ou ne serait- elle pas, bien plutôt, l'articulation de ce qu'il est possible et légitime d'énoncer sur le monde, en tant que les étants sont fondés dans l'Être? Ainsi une lecture approfondie des derniers vers du fragment VIII s'avère-t- elle fondamentale. Déjà les derniers vers du fragment I suggèrent que les *dokounta* sont fondés dans l'Être. Dans leur prolongement, les derniers vers du fragment VIII n'amorcent-ils pas la mise en place d'une connaissance possible du monde et d'une connaissance possible des étants par rapport à leur fondement dans l'Être?" (p. 192)

60. ———. 1991. "Platon, lecteur de Parménide dans le *Sophiste*." In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 125-143. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
61. ———. 2012. *Parménide ou le souci du vrai. Ontologie, théologie, cosmologie*. Paris: Éditions Kimé.
62. Fronterotta, Francesco. 2013. "Une école éléatique ? : Parménide, Zénon et Mélissos." In *La sagesse présocratique. ommunication des savoirs en Grèce archaïque : des lieux et des hommes* edited by Desclos, Marie-Laurence Desclos and Fronterotta, Francesco, 131-147. Paris: Armand Colin.
63. Golitsis, Pantelis. 2008. *Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Sur Parménide voir:
Deuxièe partie. Les digressions : lieux de réflexion personnelle et moyens d'innovation philosophique;
Chapitre 4. — Les digressions : esquisse dune typologie 83;
Chapitre 5. — Analyse des digressions 89;
5.1 Les digressions « concordistes » de Simplicius 89;
5.1.3 Deux digressions à propos de la doctrine de Parménide (In Phys., 86.19 – 90.22 et 142.28 – 148.24) 100-108.
Appendice
Les digressions traduites et annotées 207;

3) Simplicius, *Sur les significations de l'un chez Parménide* (*In Phys*., 86.19 – 90.22) 220;
4) Simplicius, *Sur l'Un-qui-est parménidien* (*In Phys*., 142.28 – 148.24) 225-231.
"Le présent livre se propose d'étudier l'originalité de l'éxégèse philosophique de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon, telle qu'elle se laisse appréhender par une analyse systématique de leurs Commentaires sur la *Physique* d'Aristote.
Commentant le même texte fondateur de la pensée antique, les deux exégètes, contemporains l'un de l'autre et nourris dans le même modèle philosophique, celui du néoplatonisme tardif, sont loin de nous proposer une interprétation de la *Physique* identique ou semblable, et cela dans une époque où la nouveauté, la « kainoprépeia », fut généralement dévaluée. C'est dire que la tradition – ce dont l'originalité tient à la fois sa différenciation et son identité – pesait lourd sur les épaules des derniers philosophes de l'antiquité." (p. 1)
"La présente étude est accompagnèe d'un appendice, dans lequel sont traduites et annotées les principales digressions des deux Commentaires sur la *Physique*, mis à part les excursus *contra Philoponum* de Simplicius et les quatre *Corollaria* (sur le lieu et le temps, de Simplicius, et sur le lieu et le vide, de Philopon)." (p.4)
"Les digressions que Simplicius consacre à la doctrine de Parménide visent à éclairer non seulement la critique que lui adresse Aristote, mais aussi, à l'arrière-plan du commentaire, celle de Platon. La première digression (*In Phys*., 86.19 – 90.22) suit l'explication de *Phys*., I 2, 185b 5 – 25, où Aristote réfute le monisme de l' «école » éléate en faisant apparaître les différents sens quadmet le nom d' « un ». Quand on dit que quelque chose est un, explique le Stagirite, on entend qu'elle est : 1) soit continue ; 2) soit indivisible ; 3) soit une et identique avec une autre chose en vertu de leur définition commune." (p. 100)
"La deuxième digression (*In Phys*., 142.28 – 148.24) est une sorte de récapitulation des remarques déjà formulées dans les digressions précédentes et aussi au cours du

commentaire. Somme toute, elle couronne l'exégèse de *Phys*., I 2–3, dont le contenu est pour l'essentiel une réfutation des thèses éléatiques. En voici le proème :
Mais puisque nous avons déjà atteint la fin des discours qui s'opposent àParménide, il serait bon de dépister à quel degré la doctrine de l'Un-qui-est de Parménide répond à ce dont il est question ici, et d'examiner également sur quoi portent précisément les objections." (p. 104)

64. Graham, Daniel W. 2002. "La Lumière de la lune dans la pensée grecque archaïque." In *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique*, edited by Laks, André and Louguet, Claire, 351-380. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
65. Guérard, Christian. 1987. "Parménide d'Êlée chez les Néoplatoniciens." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 294-313. Paris: Vrin.
"Dans toute son oeuvre conservée, Proclus cite abondamment les fragments orphiques, les Oracles chaldaïques et Homère surtout, mais, somme toute, peu fréquemment Parménide.
On ne trouve des citations ou des allusions certaines que dans trois seuls ouvrages:
-- l'un de jeunesse, mais probablement remanié plus tard: l'*In Timaeum*;
-- l'autre de la majorité, et pour nous le plus important: l'*In Parmenidem*;
-- le dernier de la fin: la *Théologie platonicienne* (30).
À l'évidence, l'Éléate n'est pas pour Proclus une autorité primordiale. Cela se comprend aisément dans la mesure où il ne connaissait pas l'Un avant l'être, et, dans son Poème, ne distingue pas explicitement les différents degrés de la «largeur intelligible». Toutefois, il n'est aucunement regardé comme un adversaire; nous allons le constater en étudiant toutes les citations et allusions évidentes au Poème parménidien." (pp. 300-301)
(...)
"À l'issue de cette étude, il nous semble possible de définir le néoplatonisme par rapport à sa propre perspective

historique.
Nous avons vu que les rares allusions à Parménide, chez Plotin, font place à des citations textuelles et nombreuses chez Proclus. Le Lycien a peut-être même commenté systématiquement l'Éléate, tant on a l'impression qu'il affine son exégèse à mesure qu'il lit la Voie de la Vérité. Mais ce ne sont là que différences de méthode et de personnalité.
La pensée néoplatonicienne est rigoureusement identique de Plotin à Proclus: Parménide justifie la lecture théologique du *Parménide*. C'est parce qu'il a connu l'intellect que, par son hypothèse, Platon a pu s'élever jusqu'à l'Un premier. L'Éléate s'inscrit donc parfaitement dans le mouvement de dévoilement de la Lumière." (p. 312)
(30) Signalons que nous ne rencontrons plus aucune citation de Parménide après le livre III de cet ouvrage. À part une allusion dans le livre IV, il n'est question que du personnage du dialogue pfatonicien.

66. Hoffman, Ernst. 2005. "*Logos* et *epos* chez Héraclite et Parménide." *Poésie* no. 114:111-125.
Traduit de la version italienne, *Il linguaggio e la logica arcaica*, traduit et introduit par Luca Guidetti, Spazio libri, Firenze, 1981 et présenté par Martin Rueff.
Édition originale: "Die Sprache und die archaische Logik" (*Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, 3, 1925).
67. Iribarren, Leopoldo. 2006. "Rationalisations de la croyance : la construction de la « pistis » comme philosophème chez Parménide et Empédocle." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 24:63-82.
68. Journée, Gérard. 2010. "Parménide B6, 1 et 8-9 DK. Grammaire, poésie, métaphysique." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 123:397-424.
69. ———. 2012. "Lumière et Nuit, Féminin et Masculin chez Parménide d'Elée : quelques remarques." *Phronesis* no. 57:289-318.
70. ———. 2014. " Les avatars d'une démone : à propos de Parménide fr. 28B13." *Elenchos* no. 35:5-38.
71. Kélessidou, Anna. 1986. "Dire et savoir (*legein - eidenai*) chez Xénophane et Parménide." In *Philosophie du langage*

et grammaire dans l'Antiquité, 29-46. Bruxelles: Ousia.
72. Lafrance, Yves. 1993. "Les multiples lectures du Poème de Parménide." *Dialogue* no. 32:117-127.
"Following the publication of *Études sur Parmenide*, (edited by Pierre Aubenque), this study is concerned with the analytical interpretation of the Parmenides' Poem by G. E. L. Owen as well as the conventional interpretation by P. Aubenque. In both cases, the author shows that there is a failure in the historical reconstruction of the context of the Poem. Theses interpreters haven't forgotten the cosmological context of the Presocratic thought. A longer version of this study was published in Spanish in the review *Methexis* (5, 1992)."
73. ———. 1999. "Le sujet du Poème de Parménide: l'être ou l'univers?" *Elenchos*:265-308.
74. Laks, André. 1988. "Parménide dans Théophraste." *La Parola del passato* no. 43:262-280.
Traduction anglaise: "'The More' and 'The Full': on the reconstruction of Parmenides' theory of sensation in Theophrastus' *De sensibus*, 3-4" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 8, 1990, pp. 1-18.
75. ———. 2003. " Phénomènes et références : éléments pour une réflexion sur la rationalisation de l'irrationnel." *Méthodos. Savoirs et textes* no. 3:1-22.
76. Lorite Mena, José. 1978. "Parménide : la parole entre la vérité et le soupçon." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 83:289-307.
77. Lowit, Alexandre. 1986. "Le principe de la lecture heideggerienne de Parménide." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 4:163-210.
78. Magali, Année. 2010. "Le verbe « être » de Parménide : elaboration strategique d'une entité linguistique infaillible." *Antiquorum Philosophia* no. 4:75-97.
79. ———. 2013. "Parménide. Recommencer le verbe être." *Les Études philosophiques*:463-491.
80. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1999. "Parménide et Héraclite avaient-ils une théorie de la perception?" *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 44:326-346.

81. Martineau, Emmanuel. 1986. "Le 'coeur' de l' *alétheia*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 4:33-86.
82. Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. 2014. "Le dogme de la vérité selon Parménide." In *Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan – Volume 1* edited by Reboul, Anne, 459-470. Dordrecht: Springer.
83. Muller, Robert. 1987. "Euclide de Mégare et Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 274-276. Paris: Vrin.
"Pour être bref (...) l'élement le plus propre à justifier le rapprochement avec les Éleates nous paraît être le refus mégarique de ce non-être relatif qu'est l'alterité (cfr. [*Die Megariker*] fr. 27 [ed. Döring], et par suite de la relation en général."
84. Narecki, Krzysztof 2004. "La fonction du logos dans la pensée de Parménide d'Élée." In *Logos et langage chez Plotin et avant Plotin*, edited by Fattal, Michel, 37-60. Paris: L'Harmattan.
85. O'Brien, Denis. 1980. "Temps et intemporalité chez Parménide." *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 35:257-272.
86. ———. 1987. "L'être et l'éternité." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 135-164. Paris: Vrin.
"Sommaire: I. Le problème de l'intemporalité; II. «Il n'est pas» III. «Il ne sera pas»; IV. «Il n'était pas»; V. L'inengendré; VI. L'impérissable; VII. La preuve de l'immortalité; VIII Les deux emplois du «maintenant»; IX. L'éternel (1)
LE PROBLÈME DE L'INTEMPORALITÉ
Le sens d'« éternité»
Au fr. VIII, l-2, la déesse déclare: «Il ne reste plus qu'une seule parole, celle de la voie énonçant: 'est'». Elle désigne ainsi la Voie de l'existence, annoncée au fr. II, 3. Cette Voie est «chemin de persuasion, car la persuasion accompagne la vérité» (fr. II, 4). C'est donc au fr. VIII que la déesse accomplira la promesse faite dans le prologue (fr. I, 29): le disciple s'instruira du «coeur de la vérité persuasive ...» (2).

Quelle est cette «vérité», exposée dans la Voie de l'existence?
En ouvrant cette Voie, la déesse affirme que l'objet de son discours est «inengendré» et «impérissable» (fr. VIII, 3). Elle précise, deux vers plus loin (v. 5): «II n'était pas à un moment, ni ne sera à un moment, puisqu'il est maintenant». Pour la majorité des exégètes, Parménide aurait évoqué dans ce dernier vers, pour la première fois dans l'histoire de l'Occident, le concept d'éternité. Mais de quelle «éternité» s'agit-il? En quel sens prend-on ici ce terme? Le plus souvent, les formules adoptées par les commentateurs laissent perplexe." (pp. 135-136)
(1) Le chapitre que l'on va lire repose sur les conclusions dégagées dans le premier tome de cet ouvrage (Éludes I, *Essai critique: Introduclion à la lecture de Parménide*) ainsi que sur mes recherches antérieures, que je reprends ici, en les approfondissant et en les corrigeant. Quelques précisions de terminologie s'imposent, ici comme dans mon Essai critique (cf. p. 140 n. 3): je parlerai indifféremment de «genèse» et de «naissance», de «disparition» et de «mort»; en employant ces termes «naissance» et «mort», je n'ai point voulu imposer au lecteur une représentation de l'«être» de Parménide comme d'un être animé/vivant. Dans ce que j'appelle la «preuve de l'immortalité» (voir surtout pp. 157-158 infra), la déesse vise à montrer non seulement que l'être est immortel (absence de «mort» ou de «destruction»; sur la possibiflté d'une distinction implicite entre ces deux termes, voir p.155 infra), mais encore qu'il est inengendré (absence de «genèse» ou de «naissance»).
(2) Sur l'articulation du poème, voir mon *Essai critique,* chap. XI *(Études 1*, pp. 239 sqq.)

87. ———. 1987. "Problèmes d'établissement du texte: la transmission du Poème dans l'Antiquité." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 314-350. Paris: Vrin.
Sommaire: I. L'édition des textes et l'histoire de la philosophie; II. Fr.I, 29: «vérité» et «persuasion»; III. Fr. VIII, 4: «entier en sa membrure»; IV. Immortalité et indivisibilité: la thèse de G. E. L. Owen; V. Immortalité et

immobilité: la citation de Plutarque; VI. Fr. VIII, 4: «unique» et «inengendré»; VII. Fr. VIII, 4: l'histoire de la transmission du texte; VIII Fr. VIII, 5: «il est maintenant»; IX. Fr. VIII, 6: la «continuité» du temps; X. La tradition manuscrite du poème; XI. Fr. VIII, 12: une naissance à partir de l'être; XII. Les éditeurs de la fin de l'Antiquité.
"Le texte de Parménide commenté dans un chapitre précédent de cet ouvrage (fr. VIII, l-21: la première partie du discours sur la vérité) est émaillé de variantes; je reprendrai, dans ce chapitre, celles qui touchent de près à mon analyse.
Le texte du poème, on le sait, n'est pas attesté en tradition directe; il n'est conservé que dans les manuscrits d'une trentaine d'auteurs anciens qui en ont cité des extraits. Dans ces manuscrits, comme pour tous les textes qui nous sont venus de l'Antiquité, des erreurs de copistes se sont accumulées; à l'éditeur de rectifier ces erreurs, en tirant parti de ses connaissances codicologiques ou philologiques. La science du codicologue ou du philologue risque cependant de s'avérer insuffisante, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une difficulté relevant d'un domaine qui n'est pas le sien: celui de l'histoire de la philosophie. Les fragments de Parménide, tels qu'ils ont été conservés dans les manuscrits, ne présentent pas seulement en effet des variantes imputables à l'inadvertance ou à l'ignorance des copistes; on peut aussi subodorer ici et là, sous certaines variantes, les traces de manipulations tendancieuses du poème.
À y regarder de plus près, il devient en effet évident que des copistes savants, imbus de platonisme et de néoplatonisme, ont pris à coeur de «normaliser» la pensée de Parménide, en l'intégrant, de gré ou de force, dans leur vision idéaliste de la philosophie des anciens. Pour ce faire, ils ont gommé, dans le texte du poème qui leur était transmis, les discordances, réelles ou supposées, avec les dialogues de Platon ou les Ennéades de Plotin.
Les «corrections» ainsi infligées au texte primitif du poème, si elles ont été faites avec suffisamment d'habileté, ne violentent ni la grammaire ni la métrique. Elles risqueront par conséquent de passer inaperçues tant que l'éditeur

moderne n'aura pas pris conscience des considérations proprement philosophiques qui peuvent avoir influé sur la transmission des fragments." (pp. 314-315)

88. ———. 1991. "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin." In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 317-364. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Sur Parménide, voir pp. 320-328.
89. ———. 2012. "Le Parménide historique et le Parménide de Platon." In *Lectures de Platon*, edited by Castel-Bouchouchi, Anissa, Dixsaut, Monique and Kévorkian, Gilles, 89-106. Paris: Ellipses.
90. ———. 2012. "[Chapitre] V. Parménide." In *Lire les présocratiques*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Therme, Anne-Laure, 129-148. Paris: Press universitaires de France.
91. Pasqua, Hervé. 1992. "L'unité de l'Être parménidien." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 90:143-155.
"Being exists in an absolute sense, and because it exists it cannot cease to be. In other words non-being is impossible. This is the central thesis of Parmenides' poem. The Author aims to show that this thesis can only be justified in Parmenides' view if Being is considered to be identical with the One. If this is the case, it has an important effect on the interpretation of the Poem, namely that the affirmation of Being does not depend on the denial of Non-being, as many exegetes hold. In this article two recent interpretations are discussed, namely those of N. L. Cordero and L. Couloubaritsis. The Author aims to inquire to what extent the true thought of Parmenides does not consist in making the affirmation of Being depend on that of Non-Being, but rather the contrary, by basing his argumentation on the reciprocity of Being and the One."
92. Primavesi, Oliver. 2013. "Le chemin vers la révélation : lumière et nuit dans le proème de Parménide." *Philosophia Antiqua* no. 13:37-81.
"Cet article propose une interprétation de la relation entre l'aletheia et la doxa dans le poème de Parménide sur la base d'une analyse du voyage relaté dans le proème. À partir d'un

examen précis du texte parménidien, il établit que l'hypothèse selon laquelle la citadelle de la nuit est la destination finale du voyage rend bien mieux compte de celui-ci que l'hypothèse longtemps admise selon laquelle il s'agirait de la lumière. Cette lecture du proème permet non seulement d'établir un certain nombre de parallèles avec d'autres œuvres poétiques qui décrivent le trajet du Soleil, mais surtout de mettre au jour une analogie entre le récit de voyage et la partition en deux du poème parménidien : notre monde, où alternent le jour et la nuit, représente le monde de la doxa, où être et non-être sont mêlés et qui est gouverné par deux principes correspondants, le feu et la nuit, tandis que l'unicité de la déesse de la Nuit dans l'au-delà renvoie à celle de l'être. De plus, en distinguant deux étapes dans le voyage du narrateur, celle où il atteint de lui-même le chemin de la nuit et du jour et celle où les filles d'Hélios le guident sur ce chemin, on peut expliquer l'existence même d'un discours sur les opinions des mortels : de même que le narrateur a besoin d'abord d'aller de notre monde quotidien jusqu'au chemin de la nuit et du jour pour avoir ensuite accès à la connaissance divine, de même il faut expliquer le monde de l'opinion en le faisant remonter à deux principes fondamentaux pour montrer aux mortels le chemin vers l'aletheia. L'article conclut en expliquant, à partir des fragments B14 et B15, pourquoi Parménide a recours à la déesse de la Nuit pour faire cette révélation : ce choix repose sur une critique de la lumière du soleil comme condition de la vision trompeuse."

93. Ramnoux, Clémence. 1979. *Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats*. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher.
94. Rocca-Serra, Guillaume. 1987. "Parménide chez Diogène Laërce." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 254-273. Paris: Vrin.
"Nous avons choisi d'organiser notre recherche autour de la notice consacrée à Parménide par Diogène Laèrce. Une autre méthode eût consisté dans une présentation qui aurait suivi un ordre chronologique, mais une telle procédure supposait résolu un problème qui tourmente, au moins

depuis Nietzsche, philologues et philosophes, celui des sources de Diogène Laèrce. Au contraire, partir de cet auteur et revenir en arrière nous évitait de prendre des positions trop tranchées à la fois sur ses informateurs immédiats et sur les sources de ces informateurs eux-mêmes.

L'oeuvre de Diogène constitue, on le sait, une sorte de synthèse, maladroite et parfois mal intentionnée, de ce que l'érudition hellénistique avait rassemblé sur le thème des «Vies et doctrines des philosophes célèbres». Sa méthode de travail, son esprit superficiel lui ont attiré des critiques méritées, mais il nous a conservé une masse d'informations qui font de son livre un ouvrage indispensable. Ajoutons qu'une partie des absurdités qu'on lui attribue pourrait parfaitement provenir de la maladresse des scribes médiévaux." (p. 254)

"Cet examen, bien que partiel, de la tradition biographique et doxographique nous aura persuadés, semble-t-il, d'abord, que les restes de cette tradition ne représentent qu'une infime partie d'une littérature jadis très importante. C'est ainsi que la modeste notice de Diogène nous fait entrevoir les travaux de l'école d'Aristote, de l'érudition alexandrine, de la doxographie sceptique.

Ensuite et surtout, on peut mettre en évidence la valeur de certaines des indications qu'elle nous transmet. Elle nous fournit le canevas vraisemblable de la biographie de Parménide, d'abord héritier d'une grande famille et voué probablement à une activité politique et législatrice, puis se tournant vers la philosophie, sans toutefois que la fine pointe de sa pensée soit mise en évidence, et c'est là une des lacunes de la tradition. Pourtant, bien avant K. Reinhardt 1°2, Sotion puis Diogène ont dissocié Xénophane et Parménide, pressentant ainsi l'originalité de ce dernier. La tradition, enfin, a retenu plus volontiers le monde de l'apparence que le poème. C'est surtout grâce à elle que nous reconstruisons la doxa parménidéenne, sur laquelle les parties conservées du Poème nous renseignent guère. Elle a donc sa place dans l'approche d'un Parménide dans sa totalité." (p. 273 notes omises)

95. Rossetti, Livio. 2010. "La structure du poème de Parménide." *Philosophie Antique* no. 10:187-226.
96. Ruben, Tanja. 2007. "L'être, la pensée et les liens du discours : structures et argumentation du fr. 8, 1-49 D-K de Parménide." *Métis*:163-184.
"Une analyse attentive aux liens formels et aux marques de l'énonciation du fragment 8 (1-41) D-K de Parménide montre qu'il présente une structure annulaire. Les parties corrélatives de chacun des trois anneaux se complètent et font progresser l'argumentation. Le discours de la déesse, par lequel elle cherche à convaincre le jeune homme d'emprunter le chemin de l'être, doit son efficacité et sa force persuasive à cette composition en anneaux et au récit paradigmatique qui en forme le centre. Celui-ci donne en exemple au jeune homme la divine Justice qui s'est prononcé jadis en faveur du chemin de l'être."
97. Santoro, Fernando. 2008. "Entre néréides et sirènes : Parménide et les catalogues d'Homère." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 26:25-38.
98. Sassi, Maria Michela. 2013. "La logique de l'*eoikos* et ses transfgormations : Xénophane, Parménide, Platon." *Philosophie antique*:13-35.
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Présentation, choix de textes, chronologie, bibliographie.
100. Schürmann, Reiner. 1988. "Le différend hénologique. La loi de l'Un, et la loi des contraires." *La Parola del passato* no. 43:397-419.
101. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 1996. "La question de la nature au début de la pensée occidentale. Destruction ou conservation? À propos du Poème de Parménide." *Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie* no. 18:392-396.
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104. Stevens, Annick. 1990. *Posterité de l'être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide*. Bruxelles: Ousia.

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"La plupart des fragments que nous connaissons de Parménide nous sont parvenus par l'intermédiaire de Simplicius, philosophe néoplatonicien du Vlème siècle de notre ère, grâce aux multiples citations et références étayant son commentaire à la *Physique* et au *De Caelo* d'Aristote. Or, ce commentateur ne s'est pas contenté de citer, mais a apporté bien des explications aux apories suscitées depuis vingt-cinq siècles par l'obscurité du poème parménidien. En effet, le contexte dans lequel apparaissent les citations permet souvent de situer plus exactement leur objet, et par là leur signification précise.
(...)
Par conséquent, mon travail suppose une connaissance préalable des doctrines platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la notion de l'Un dans son rapport avec l'être. Bien que j'aborde le problème au chapitre 1,B, cependant, j'évite de concentrer mon étude sur ces théories, au risque de perdre l'essentiel. Je ne fournirai pas davantage un travail exhaustif sur la pensée parménidienne, quoique, pour des raisons de clarté, j'étudierai et comparerai, sur les points les plus controversés, les explications de plusieurs interprètes modernes, en vue de proposer, quand cela est possible, mon propre point de vue. A ce propos, je voudrais signaler qu'il existe deux études récentes traitant spécifiquement de l'exégèse de Simplicius; il s'agit de "Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of Parmenides" de Bruce M. Perry, et de "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius" de Karl Bormann. On peut leur faire le reproche commun d'être davantage des paraphrases que des tentatives d'explication, et de ne pas exploiter ce nouveau champ herméneutique, cette richesse nouvelle d'interprétations possibles, que nous ouvre la lecture de Simplicius pour celle de Parménide. Néanmoins, la dissertation doctorale de Perry a le mérite d'exposer le

commentaire de façon très systématique, paragraphe par paragraphe, en l'accompagnant d'index, de remarques philologiques, d'une bonne critique des sources et des manuscrits, et de nombreuses références aux commentateurs antérieurs qui ont pu influencer Simplicius. Quant à l'article de Bormann, s'il relève certains passages où le néoplatonicien sort de l'aporie les interprétations traditionnelles sur quelques conceptions obscures de Parménide, il n'en donne aucun commentaire ni ne cherche à voir ce qui motive l'interprète, d'où s'inspire sa conception de l'Étant, et dans quelle mesure elle déforme celle de l'Éléate lui-même.
(...)
J'espère avoir montré, par ces quelques observations, qu'une étude attentive de Simplicius n'est ni superflue ni aisée.
Mon intention étant de suivre les questions posées comme essentielles par Simplicius lui-même, je n'envisagerai que les fragments transmis grâce à lui, laissant de côté une partie importante du poème. Le fait de suivre le commentaire m'oblige également à voyager constamment d'une page à l'autre en faisant bon nombre de comparaisons, d'anticipations et de rappels, ce dont le lecteur voudra bien m'excuser, puisque Simplicius, suivant lui-même l'ordre de oeuvre d'Aristote, et passant, selon le besoin, d'un Présocratique à l'autre, présente une explication tout à fait disparate et en rien systématique. Néanmoins, j'essaierai de structurer mon étude de la manière la plus claire possible, envisageant, selon la méthode classique, chacune des deux parties du poème, divisées elles-mêmes en questions principales.
Une traduction des passages de Simplicius concernant la pensée éléatique figure en appendice; j'invite le lecteur à la consulter fréquemment, car elle sert de support à tous mes développements.
Enfin, ce travail étant achevé en 1988, je n'ai pas tenu compte des études qui ont paru à partir de cette date." (pp. 5-9)

105. ———. 2011. "Parménide." In *Le Néant*, edited by Laurent, Jérôme [et al.], 29-40. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
106. Todoua, Maïa. 2007. "Sur l'improbable *douceur* du feu dans la cosmologie de Parménide (v. 57 du Fr. 8 DK)." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 120:395-413.
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109. Viola, Coloman. 1984. "Á propos d'un fragment du Poème de Parménide cité par Clément d'Alexandrie (V *Stromate* c. IX, 59, 6)." *Bulletin de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale* no. 26:90-92.
"Les *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Griechisch und Deutsch* édités par H. Diels (réédités en 1934 par W. Franz) omettent une référence incluse dans le V *Stromate* de Clément d'Alexandrie (écrivant entre 193 et 211) concernant un fragment du *Poème* de Parménide. Cette référence, que rapportera Simplicius quatre siècles plus tard, comporte des variantes importantes par rapport au texte transmis par Simplicius."
110. ———. 1987. "Aux origines de la gnoséologie: réflexion sur le sens dur fr. IV du Poème de Parménide." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 69-101. Paris: Vrin.
"Le fr. IV du Poème de Parménide est sans aucun doute un des fragments les plus difficiles à interpréter: certains commentateurs sont allés jusqu'à mettre en doute son intelligibilité. (...)
La solution ne consistera pas nécessairement en une option pure et simple pour l'une des hypothèses en excluant d'une manière absolue l'autre. Les difficultés du fragment ont amené certains à proposer des corrections du texte en supposant soit que Clément d'Alexandrie s'était trompé en le transcrivant soit que le texte de Clément lui-même nous est parvenu sous une forme corrompue. Ces problèmes

grammaticaux et textuels difficiles à résoudre doivent inspirer une grande prudence en ce qui concerne l'interprétation du fragment. Ces difficultés combinées aux difficultés d'une méthodologie en général - dont un Hölscher (2) a déjà fait état -- mettent à une sérieuse épreuve quiconque se promettrait de trouver la solution idéale du fragment.
Les cadres de cet essai ne rendent pas possible l'examen même superficiel de tous les problèmes qui ont été déjà soulevés au sujet de ce fragment. Je propose avant tout d'examiner le contexte originel dans les Stromates de Clément d'Alexandrie qui nous ont conservé le fragment pour y chercher et trouver éventuellement la solution de certains problèmes inhérents au fragment. D'autre part, pour éclaircir davantage le sens des termes, nous allons faire appel à la philologie comparée ce qui nous permettra d'esquisser quelques principes d'interprétation qui, à notre avis, devraient guider toute recherche concernant le sens du fragment." (pp. 69-70 notes omises)
(2) Cf. U. Hölscher, *Anfângliches Fragen. Studien zur frühen griechischen Philosophie*, Göttingen, p.90.

111. Wersinger-Taylor, Gabrièle. 2012. "Parménide croyait-il dans les signes de l'Etre ? Remarques sur l'énonciation et la délocution au fragment 8, vers 1-11." *Savoirs en prisme* no. 1:1-22.

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"... il punto d'arrivo del presente percorso [è] dedicato ad alcuni passaggi filosofici che hanno al centro la nozione di *pistis* intesa nel senso per cui essa definisce una relazione — la relazione di fiducia, e altresì l'affidamento (ovvero la credenza in altri), la fedeltà, l'affidabilità e la garanzia che essa comporta. Ad occuparci saranno pochi luoghi e pochi autori che individuano in tale relazione una sorta di punto-limite e di nucleo elementare capace insieme di definire e regolare i rapporti umani. Si tratta di Gorgia soprattutto, e in particolare dell'*Apologia di Palamede*, che andrà però letta in riferimento agli altri aspetti del suo pensiero. Ma si tratta ancor prima di Parmenide, il cui percorso d'indagine teoretica è all'insegna del *logos* perché questo è *pistos*, affidabile. E si tratta infine di Platone, in alcuni passi (di *Repubblica* e *Leggi*) che impongono riflessioni sulla *pistis* intesa in modo specifico nell'accezione relazionale, e lo fanno non senza connessioni con l'approccio gorgiano." (p. 9)
(...)
"Sfondo logico e contrappunto ontologico alla posizione gorgiana, padre da superare per quella platonica, è, notoriamente, il poema di Parmenide: qui *pistis* ricopre una posizione letteralmente nodale e, nonostante si presenti su un fronte dell'essere e del conoscere opposto a quello in cui la collocheranno sia Gorgia sia Platone, i significati che lì le si attribuiscono rimarranno vigenti e determinanti anche per costoro. Perciò, pur nella parzialità dell'operazione dal punto di vista strettamente storiografico, assumeremo l'Eleate come premessa per arrivare in età sofistica." (p. 23)
(...)
"Solo il *logos* che svolge la prima via è *logos pistos*: o, meglio, poiché di *logos* si parla in effetti solo in ambito di *eon* e *noein*, l'affidabilità che è propria del *logos* e del pensiero intorno alla verità (*noema*; 8, 50-51) vien meno

passando alle opinioni dei mortali, al loro cosmo di parole suscettibile d'inganno (51-52). Solo il *logos* è *pistos*: abbandonare la strada da esso tracciata è abbandonare la strada segnata da *pistis*. Così come solo la *pistis* che bandisce le *doxai* è *alêthês*: non perché sia possibile una *pistis* non *alêthês*, in quanto di *pistis* si parla solo in contrapposizione al cosmo dei mortali. E però la verità che a *pistis* si salda vien meno se si cede alle abitudini espressive e cognitive del mondo. Sicché, come il *logos* è sempre *pistos* e la *pistis* ne è una caratteristica certa, così la verità è un carattere proprio e certo di *pistis*, laddove *alêtheia* non sempre in grado altrettanto sicuro sostiene ciò di cui siamo persuasi. La verità, come correlato del dire, può essere velata dal dire stesso, che rende una parvenza: ma se il dire è *logos*, ovvero è *pistos*, l'*alêtheia* ne è correlato certo in senso pieno e non, invece, nel modo frammentato e apparente (quindi non-*alêthês*, ovvero ingannevole) del *kosmos* e della *glossa*." (p. 46)

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(Gli altri volumi previsti non sono stati pubblicati).
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"Per i Greci di età preparmenidea le varie forme di εἶναι « essere », cioè i molti tipi verbali che le seriori schematizzazioni dei grammatici avrebbero poi raggruppati e ordinati sotto l'esponente di quel « modo infinito », costituivano un complesso di strumenti significativi che essi adoperavano con la stessa spontanea libertà con cui se n'è valso e se ne varrà sempre, in ogni ambiente linguistico non privo di quel motivo semantico, il parlante idealmente preparmenideo, cioè non preoccupato delle formali difficoltà del suo uso. Chi voglia intendere la posizione di Parmenide nella sua genuina freschezza storica deve perciò riportarsi a quell'ambiente e a quell'uso: deve rifarsi Parmenide, tornare al suo primitivo ed ingenuo orizzonte mentale, presupporre i suoi soli presupposti e lasciar da parte tutti quelli di cui la sua coscienza di storico è arricchita dai ventiquattro secoli dell'evoluzione di quel problema dell'essere, che appunto in quanto nacque da Parmenide non fu la premessa di Parmenide." (p. 109)
(...)
"Ormai legittimata anche nelle sue coerenti difficoltà, la teoria della *doxa* completa dunque ed accentua, coi suoi

chiaroscuri, quella fisionomia del pensiero di Parmenide, i cui lineamenti primari risultano schietti già dalla sua concezione della realtà verace. Così nell'una come nell'altra egli resta il massimo eroe ellenico della verità parlata: il più potente traduttore di contingenze linguistiche in presunte situazioni e problemi di realtà. Nasce in un ambiente abituato a sentire su un solo piano l'infinito divergere e contrastare dei nomi e delle cose; ed ha per contemporaneo Eraclito che, persuaso di scoprir la legge del mondo in quello stesso guerreggiare delle cose nominate, era perciò condotto ad enunciarla in un linguaggio in cui il « no » disdiceva il « sì » e l'« è » era oppugnato dal « non è ». Egli invece sente l'« è» come la parola stessa della verità, e non può tollerare che sia contaminata dal « no »: deve quindi accogliere come verace solo ciò il cui « è » sia affatto immune da « no », e rifiutare come apparente anche tutto l'universo visibile, quando la multiforme sua realtà enunciabile appaia soggetta a quel contagio. Giunge così, da un lato, a proclamar reale « ciò che è », l'« ente », che solo risponde a quella suprema Necessità e Giustizia del Vero. Apre dall'altro il vasto abisso del « no », in cui precipita tutto quanto non regge al paragone del sí » dell'« è ».
Suoi epigoni sono quindi, d'allora in poi e per millenni, tutti coloro che credono che l'« ente » o l'« essere » sia una realtà o un problema, e non una maschera verbale di molte possibili realtà e problemi; coloro che vedono nell'antitesi del sì e del no, dell'affermazione e della negazione non una contingente struttura del linguaggio ma una fatale guisa della realtà, una discriminazione assoluta spezzante il cosmo in due parti, il positivo e il negativo, la luce e la tenebra dell'essere; coloro che sulla base di tale antitesi costruiscono le loro logiche e con esse l'intero quadro del mondo, e coloro che capovolgendo quelle logiche costruiscono sulla stessa base le loro dialettiche, e con esse l'intero quadro del mondo. Suoi successori sono invece coloro che, pur appartenendo ad età ancora fortemente dominate dal senso arcaico del linguaggio e quindi subendo in varia misura l'influsso di quello spontaneo atteggiamento mentale, accentuano sempre più la reazione critica nei suoi

riguardi, e riescono a volta a volta a liberarsi da talune delle sue difficoltà: coloro che non accettano quelle parole-realtà come tali, ma per intenderle le analizzano, e s'accorgono come in tale analisi si scinda e moltiplichi anche la loro presunta realtà; coloro che scoprono quante esperienze concrete possano celarsi sotto il puro « no » di Parmenide, quanti significati assumere, non solo nelle sfere dottrinali in cui vivono l'esistenza la predicazione la realtà l'identità la necessità ma anche nell'universale uso semantico, il suo astratto e solitario « è ». La storia della logica occidentale è in questo senso la storia degli sforzi, con cui il pensiero lentamente si affranca dalla servitù parmenidea." (pp. 151-153)

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    "Avvertenza. Per il testo dei frammenti parmenidei, ci siamo serviti della raccolta di H. Diels - W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Dublin-Ziirich 1968 (13 ed.); le varianti rispetto a questo testo sono state sempre indicate e discusse nel corso del commento o delle note. Della stessa raccolta ci

siamo serviti anche per le testimonianze su Parmenide, come per i frammenti e le testimonianze riguardanti gli altri presocratici. Le traduzioni italiane delle testimonianze su Parmenide e dei testi relativi agli altri presocratici che appaiono nel volume si intendono prese sempre - qualora non sia indicato diversamente - da *I presocratici. Testimonianze e frammenti*, a cura e con Introduzione di G. Giannatoni, Voll.. 2, Bari 1969 (le traduzioni sono di: M. Gigante, G. Giannantoni, R. Laurenti, A. Maddalena, P. Albertelli, V.E. Alfieri, M. Timpanaro Cardini).
L'ordine dei frammenti parmenidei da noi offerto è diverso da quello di Diels-Kranz, ma alla nostra numerazione abbiamo fatta seguire tra parentesi quella del DK per consentire un più agevole confronto con la classica edizione; per la stessa ragione, nel corso del commento e delle note, tutti i rimandi sono stati fatti conservando la numerazione tradizionale."

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"Nel presentare questo volume ci sembra utile avvertire il lettore che siamo stati indotti ad unire i nostri due studi (I. *Gli Eleati*; II. *Rapporti tra grammatica e filosofia nell'interpretazione del greco einai, on, ousia*) sotto l'unico titolo: *Attualità dell'ontologia eleatica* per la evidente connessione che é possibile rilevare tra lo studio dei frammenti dei filosofi che appartengono alla scuola di Elea e lo studio dell'essere, nonché tra lo stesso concetto dell'essere che fu da quei pensatori elaborato per la prima volta nella storia della filosofia greca e la problematica attuale su di esso, viva oggi come ieri. Che l'attualità del problema dell'essere sia sentita dagli studiosi contemporanei è prova l'abbondante messe di studi a sfondo idealistico, esistenzialistico, cristiano che sono stati recentemente pubblicati. È anzi particolare merito dello Heidegger l'aver posto e cercato di svolgere il problema dell'essere «come costitutivo essenziale della verità riportandolo al suo significato originario »: (1) è solo mediante lo studio dei Presocratici che, secondo lo Heidegger (2) si può giungere alla conoscenza dell'essere, della verità, del divino. Affermazione questa di grande importanza perché, come

risulterà dal nostro studio -- che si discosta, per altro, dalle conclusioni heideggeriane -- é partendo dalla concezione eleatica (e particolarmente parmenidea) che si può giungere alla determinazione dell'essere concepito nel senso cristiano. Con quest'affermazione, com'è ovvio, intendiamo definire sin d'ora, l'atteggiamento del nostro pensiero che é diverso dalla tesi di coloro che considerano l'essere «come elemento logico e verbale dell'affermazione» e da quella esistenzialistica. Mentre la prima poggia sul significato copulativo dell'ἐστι parmenideo e sostiene la dimostrazione della genesi dell'ontologismo parmenideo dal suo logicismo, la seconda tesi, dopo aver escluso l'interpretazione idealistica del significato dell'*è* del giudizio da ascrivere all'ἐστι parmenideo, procede all'identificazione dell'essere con l'apparire.
Un esame attento dei frammenti di Parmenide ci porterà a sostenere un valore esistenziale ontologico dell'ἐστι che si legge in essi. A sostegno della nostra interpretazione varranno alcuni rilievi filosofici, glottologici, grammaticali. Basandoci sull'accordo di tutti i filologi nell'ammettere la lezione ἐστι (e non già ἐστι) nel testo parmenideo, nonché sul rilievo grammaticale che l'uso di ἐστιστι parossitono nella lingua greca racchiude in sé un valore esistenziale, sosterremo la presenza di questo valore in Parmenide: quindi il punto di partenza della disquisizione parmenidea è per noi ontologico e non logico e siamo di fronte ad un'ontologicità dell'essere e non ad un'ontologizzazione dell'essere. Dal rilievo glottologico, poi, che è insostenibile l'accostamento semantico della radice bhu di φύω alla radice *bha* di (ραίνω, che invece vorrebbe lo Heidegger, giungeremo a negare l'identificazione dell'essere con il fenomeno per eccellenza.
Com'è ovvio, il valore esistenziale dell'ἐστι parmenideo non può avere ancora in sé nè il senso creazionistico nè quello idealistico né quello fenomenistico, ma tuttavia lascia aperta la via al primo. Così dicendo si salva la creazione e salvare la creazione vuol dire salvare il fondamento della metafisica cristiana « imperniata non più e non soltanto attorno all'οὐσία, ma attorno all'atto di essere ».(3) Trovare il

fondamento della creazione vuol dire trovare la giustificazione di quanto di più vitale è nel Cristianesimo. Questa interpretazione, poi, conserva la consistenza all'essere di fronte alle altre due tesi che tendono a svuotarlo del suo essenziale significato." (pp. V-VI)
(1) Fabro, C. *Partecipation et causalité*, Louvain, 1961, pag. 153.
(2) Heidegger, M. "Der Spruch des Anaximander", in *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a. M., 1950. pag. 296.
(3) Fabro, C. *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso*, Torino, SEI, 1949, p. 349.

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"Maintains that an epistemological approach to Parmenides' metaphysics can yield more meaningful results than a strictly semantical interpretation of the language of his poem. Explores various themes related to Parmenides' ontology: the relationship between language, thought, and reality; the eternity of Being; and the epistemological conditions which render knowledge true and genuine." [N.]
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"Il fr. 1 di Parmenide, trascurato da Zeller, ma rimesso successivamente in luce da ulteriori studi, appare meritevole di attenzione particolare in quanto sembra racchiudere in forma metaforica l'enunciazione dei principi dottrinari del sistema parmenideo. La corretta esegesi del frammento deve tuttavia scaturire da un esame preliminare riguardante la struttura secondo la quale viene allegoricamente espressa la concezione metafisica esposta nel prosieguo del poema. Una prima analisi rivela una composizione 'ad anello' che abbraccia quasi l'intero proemio." p. 127.
(...)
"A base della struttura del proemio è dunque posta una concezione triadica, che scaturisce dalla dialettica della antitesi fondamentale tra essere e non essere. Da un'indistinta molteplicità iniziale, simboleggiata nel primo anello dal numero imprecisato delle cavalle, si passa, nel secondo anello, ad un primo riconoscimento della natura dell'essere in quanto eterna extratemporalità. Il terzo anello rappresenta la sistematica classificazione delle antitesi, metodo che conduce ad una precisa definizione del non essere, tema del quarto anello. Nel quinto anello si riconosce la suprema antitesi metafisica essere-non essere, mediante la quale si giunge, nel centro, all'affermazione definitiva della realtà assoluta dell'Essere, del quale sono predicabili soltanto talune determinazioni." (p. 179 note omesse)
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"Ho iniziato le mie ricerche sulla lingua di Parmenide percorrendo la via fino a oggi più battuta negli studi, quella - fondamentale - del rapporto tra la dizione parmenidea e i suoi modelli epici. Quindi mi sono rivolto à studiare il delicato problema dei rapporti tra i dialetti e le tradizioni letterarie in un poeta attivo in un'area di intensi contatti culturali e linguistici come il mondo coloniale d'Occidente. A un certo punto, tuttavia, si è delineata ai miei occhi con contorni sempre più nitidi una questione che non ho tardato a riconoscere della massima importanza: mentre studiavo i problemi linguistici posti dai frammenti di Parmenide, mi sono infatti accorto che essi non possono essere affrontati con profitto senza che la loro trattazione venga preceduta da un'attenta disamina delle fonti che ci hanno trasmesso i vari testi. In altre parole, ho iniziato a riscontrare convergenze e divergenze significative tra fonti diverse o tra diversi gruppi di fonti; e mi sono convinto che ordinare quelle fonti in base a criteri linguistici avrebbe potuto condurre a un progresso rilevante per la nostra conoscenza della storia del testo di Parmenide.

Il mio libro riflette questo percorso di studio. La prima parte è infatti dedicata alla storia del testo di Parmenide nell'antichità, alla discussione sull'attendibilità delle fonti e ad alcuni tra i più tormentati problemi di costituzione del testo. La seconda parte si occupa del rapporto tra il dialetto ionico, la dizione parmenidea e quella dell'epica tradizionale. La terza parte, infine, studia l'influsso sul testo di Parmenide di tradizioni poetiche altre rispetto alla tradizione ionico-epica, mettendo in luce da un lato il carattere secondario di un alto numero di elementi linguistici riconducibili all'attico, dall'altro le probabili influenze esercitate su Parmenide dalla lingua della lirica." (pp. 11-12)

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"Su queste basi, il poema viene qui interpretato secondo l'ordine in cui le immagini sembrano ricorrere in un percorso che parte dal proemio, affronta il discorso su verità (l'*alêtheia*), e termina con l'analisi delle opinioni dei mortali (la *doxa*).
Il proemio, come è noto, è un racconto mitico che ha per protagonista l'autore del poema. Non sorprende, pertanto, che qui più che altrove l'Eleate faccia uso delle immagini, sfruttando al massimo la loro potenzialità evocativa. Per tale motivo a questa parte dell'opera sono dedicati ben due capitoli di questo studio. Il primo si concentra sul percorso che il giovane compie fino a giungere all'incontro con la dea che gli impartisce l'insegnamento riferito nel poema.
(...)
Il secondo capitolo si concentra, invece, sulla scena dell'incontro tra il giovane e la dea e tenta di approfondire le modalità del loro relazionarsi, a partire dalla definizione dell'identità del primo sulla base del racconto in prima persona e della presentazione che ne fa la divinità nel momento in cui lo accoglie nella sua dimora. In tal senso sarà importante considerare anche il luogo dell'incontro e il suo richiamo al paesaggio mitico dell'oltretomba.
(...)
Nella seconda parte del discorso veritiero viene poi presentata l'unica realtà ammissibile per chi sceglie di seguire la via "come è": *to eon*. Esso è subito presentato

attraverso una serie di tratti distintivi (*semata*) che permettono di assimilarlo alla nuova immagine del divino che si andava diffondendo all'epoca, ravvisabile soprattutto nell'opera di Senofane.
(...)
La parte conclusiva del poema dell'Eleate è dedicata, invece, al miglior quadro del cosmo realizzabile da chi resta nella prospettiva comunemente condivisa dagli uomini. In tale sezione, l'uso di un discorso in esametri che racconta l'origine del cosmo attiva un automatico confronto con le teogonie tradizionali, da cui, peraltro, la cosmogonia qui presentata si distanzia, sia per l'adozione di alcuni termini e concetti elaborati in seno alle ricerche fisiche e cosmologiche più recenti, sia per alcuni suoi tratti specifici. Nella prima parte dell'ultimo capitolo si tenterà dunque di capire il senso della scelta di Luce e Notte come principi fondanti questo quadro cosmico, sulla base del confronto con la funzione che le stesse entità ricoprono nelle teogonie tradizionali e nei testi dei naturalisti, in particolare nella riflessione ili Eraclito sull'unità degli opposti. Affrontando il problema in questa prospettiva potremo concludere che la cosmologia proposta nella sezione liliale dell'opera dell'Eleate, per quanto verisimile, non corrisponderà mai, in verità, proprio perché fondata su due principi che non possono in alcun modo essere ricondotti all'eon parmenideo, fondando invece le basi di una VI ione del reale attraversata da un continuo divenire.
In questo quadro, particolare attenzione sarà rivolta all'analisi del frammento 16, in cui è descritto il processo con cui l'uomo conosce in base alla corrispondenza tra Luce e Notte all'interno e al di fuori del soggetto.
(...)
Una lettura dell'opera di Parmenide concentrata sull'efficacia comunicativa delle immagini che vi ricorrono permetterà dunque di proporre un'interpretazione globale del poema dell'Eleate e della relazione tra le tre parti di cui si compone (proemio, *alëtheia* e *doxa*); e, al tempo stesso, contribuirà a stabilire in che modo il discorso poetico

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   "Argues that Parmenides' antagonism towards cosmological investigations (which, according to him, reveal only a world of opinion and appearance) was responsible for the decline of cosmology as a science among his successors."

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"Attempts to elucidate the process through which mythological and archaic thought was transformed into rigorous dialectical reasoning among the early Greek philosophers. Identifies Parmenides as the major factor in the creation of dialectics in the sense of critical thinking. Argues that Zeno's dialectics, far from being a negative exercise in eristics, was the way in which critical thinking first emerged as the tool *par excellence* in philosophical inquiry." [N.]
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Vorwort VII-VIII; Kapitel I. Der Stand der Parmenides-Forschung. Ziel und Methode der Untesuchung 1; Kapitel II. Die Fragmente. Text 28, Übersetzung 29; Kapitel III. Interpretation 56; Schluss 183; Anmerkungen 185; Quellen und Literatur 253; Namenregister 260-263.
"Schluss. Das Seiende, das Kennen des Seienden, menschliches νοεῖν und scheinbare Realität, im Zusammenhang hiermit der einzig richtige und die beiden falschen Wege der Forschung sind die großen Themen des parmenideischen Denkens. Der Weg der Wahrheit endet nicht mit der Lehre vom Seienden und den Ausführungen über das mit dem Seienden verbundene νοεῖν, sondern führt auch zur Erhellung der rein menschlichen Erkenntnis und der von ihr hervorgebrachten scheinbaren Realität. Das Seiende ist gleichmäßig ausgedehnt und kugelförmig. Wollte man aristotelische Terminologie auf es anwenden, dann ist es eine Substanz, die nur Quantität, aber keine bestimmte Quantität hat. Weder innerhalb noch außerhalb des Seienden existiert das Nichts; die räumlichen Grenzen

bilden weder den Abschluß gegen anderes Seiendes noch gegen das Nichts, sondern, in der Ganzheit des Seienden gegründet, schließen sie das Seiende ein und gewährleisten seine Ganzheit. Somit erwies die Interpretation die Richtigkeit der auf Aristoteles und Theophrast >· zurückgehenden Konzeption. In der Erkenntnislehre ist der Unterschied zwischen göttlichem und menschlichem Erkennen von größter Wichtigkeit. Das göttliche Erkennen sieht das Seiende so, wie es ist; das menschliche Erkennen erreicht das Seiende nicht, sondern entwirft die scheinbare Realität.

Durch diese Lehren sind alle denkerischen Bemühungen vor Parmenides als falsch zurückgewiesen worden. In wenigen Fällen sind einige Denker kenntlich, deren Theorien durch die parmenideische Argumentation widerlegt werden. Die Ablehnung aller früheren Deutungsversuche der Wirklichkeit besagt nicht, daß Parmenides von ihnen gänzlich unbeeinflußt geblieben ist, wenngleich solcher Einfluß selten zu entdecken ist2). Auffallend ist, daß gerade hierbei eine altpythagoreische Doktrin (Seelenwanderung) mit Wahrscheinlichkeit anzutreffen ist; das läßt erwarten, daß noch mehr Bezüge zwischen Parmenides und dem frühen Pythagoreismus sichtbar werden, wenn sich das Dunkel um diesen gelichtet hat. Die Methode des Parmenides ist dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß er der erste unter den Vorsokratikern zu sein scheint, der argumentiert. Direkte und indirekte Beweisführung werden verwendet; die Kreisförmigkeit der Argumentation3) ahmt das »wohlgerundete« Seiende nach.

Thema des zweiten Teils der Untersuchung wird die antike Parmenides-Interpretation sein. Angestrebt wird die Beantwortung von drei Fragen: 1) Was galt als Philosophie des Parmenides? 2) Stimmt die jeweilige Auffassung mit den Fragmenten überein, und welche Autoren haben Parmenides verstanden und deuten seine Lehre richtig? 3) Ist es möglich, die Lehren der Fragmente durch doxographische Berichte zu erweitern? Falls es nämlich Autoren gibt, welche den Inhalt der Fragmente richtig darstellen, darf angenommen werden, daß ihr Bericht auch

dann zuverlässig ist, wenn er durch die Fragmente nicht zu verifizieren ist, ihnen aber auch nicht widerspricht. Da die Fragmente ein zwar lückenhaftes, aber doch, was den Seinsteil und die Charakteristik der Doxa betrifft, ein klares Bild ergeben, ist von ihnen her die Doxo-graphie zu beurteilen. Notwendige Voraussetzung hierfür aber ist eine Interpretation der Fragmente; sie wurde im ersten Teil versucht." (183-184)

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From the English Summary: "The question why the poem of Parmenides includes a detailed account of the origin and the order of the world that according to his ontology is deprived of truth, cannot be answered with certainty. There are affinites between the Parmenides' cosmos and his absolute *hen*, and so the ancient idea of the unity of god and the

cosmos seems to be at the background of his philosophical system.
(...)
On the basis of this reconstruction it is possible to outline the main features of the Parmenidean cosmological system. It is a very archaic conception of the universe divided into three spheres, paralled in the Babylonian and Indian cosmography. In contrast to the systems recognizing the seven planets, in this case the fixed stars are located under the sun. In Greece, this system is recognizable in the thought of Anaximander, Metrodorus or Leucippus as a parallel to the more developed Pythagorean model. Another important feature of this system is a contraposition of two balancing cosmic principles, Fire and Earth. A dark and solid principle is represented in the very centre, while the edges are dominated by a principle that is light and thin. Between these extremes, there is a gradual transition from one principle to the other. In the process of creation of a cosmos, these two elementarily pure principles mingle and mix. Yet whenever this process is referred to as 'hateful' or 'abominable' (*stygeros*), we can assume that everything that stems from it has a negative character. In the proem, Parmenides describes a passage leading out of this world and towards knowledge of eternal and immutable truth." (pp. 48-50).

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"Mansfeld has given us one of the most penetrating and original discussions of Parmenides' poem since Fränkel's *Parmenidesstudien* in 1930. The book consists of four chapters, each one of which might stand alone as an independent essay, but which together aim at a unified view of Parmenides' thought. Mansfeld develops his interpretation with a wealth of detail, a careful, nearly complete, and on the whole judicious discussion of other views, which makes his book at once a commentary on the poem and a valuable survey of earlier scholarship.
Chapter I ('*Die Vorgeschichte des dritten Wegs*') is a brilliant study of the literary and historical background of fragment 6, designed to clarify the question whether or not Parmenides is referring to Heraclitus in his polemic against ignorant mortals (...). Mansfeld's answer to this question is, I think, the correct one: the evidence of fragment 6 and of the poem generally is *compatible* with a reference to Heraclitus but does not *require* it (pp. 41 and 204-208). The parallels are perfectly intelligible without the assumption that Parmenides has Heraclitus in mind. Since there is no relevant external evidence, we are faced with a question of historical fact which we have no historical means of deciding. What we can say is that *if* Parmenides was familiar with Heraclitus' work, he may have seen in it simply "die modernste Formulierung der archaischen Bestimmungen des Menschen" (41), and thus made use of Heraclitean terms in fr. 6 to characterize human folly *as* such. Certainly fr. 6 does not refer uniquely or primarily to the folly of Heraclitus.
(...)
Chapter II ('Die Logik des Parmenides: Disjunktion und Implikation') is a stimulating but on the whole unsatisfactory analysis of the argument in the section on Truth. Mansfeld here attempts to identify Parmenides as the originator of the Megaric-Stoic tradition of ancient propositional logic, in contrast with the Aristotelian logic of terms. Mansfeld is certainly correct in insisting upon the

careful structure of Parmenides' argument and upon the logical character of the fundamental *krisis* as an exclusive disjunction. This disjunction, *éstin mé ouk éstin*, is in fact a compressed statement of the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle at once. But Mansfeld is much less successful in his reconstruction of various syllogisms of the Stoic type in fr. 2 (pp. 56-62). And in presenting Parmenides and Zeno as 'logicians' he fails to distinguish between skill in constructing particular arguments, which the two Eleatics exhibit to a remarkable degree, and the analysis *of forms* of valid argument, which is the proper achievement of the logician and of which there is really no evidence before Aristotle, except for a few remarks in the Platonic dialogues. Mansfeld also fails to distinguish between implication understood as a conditional proposition ('If *p*, then *q')* and implication as entailment between propositions (*'p*. Therefore *q'*). (For Mansfeld's use of implication in the former sense, see e. g. pp. 100. 102 ; for the latter, confusedly, pp. 59. 68. Thus the arrow, which symbolizes inference to a conclusion on p. 59 is used to represent the propositional connective 'if ... then. . on p. 108.)"
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pointed out that Meixner's concepts of actuality and potentiality are not relevant referring to facts rather than to things. Finally, Meixner's disproof of what he calls "actualism" is refuted. "

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91. Wiesner, Jürgen. 1970. "Die Negation der Entstehung des Seienden. Studien zu Parmenides B 8,5 - 21." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 52:1-34.
92. ———. 1987. "Überlegungen zu Parmenides, fr. VIII, 34." In *Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 170-191. Paris: Vrin.
"Sur le lien dans le Fr. 8 entre "*nous* " et "*eon*", les raisons pour lesquelles l'être est accessible à la cognition."
93. ———. 1996. *Parmenides. Der Beginn der Aletheia. Untersuchungen zu B2 - B3 - B6*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort V-VI; Einleitung 1; 1, Kapitel: Antithesen 4; 2. Kapitel: Argumentation 84; Text und

Übersetzung B2 - 8,2 251; Bibliographie 255; Indizes 262-280.
"Einleitung. Die bisherige Parmenidesforschung geht im Hinblick auf den Beginn des Aletheiateils von einer prinzipiell falschen Voraussetzung aus. Die Abfolge des Textes entspricht m. E. nicht der Abfolge des Gedankenganges. B 2, mit dem die Darlegung der Seinslehre einsetzt, ist auch als inhaltlicher Ausgangspunkt interpretiert worden; doch den eigentlichen gedanklichen Beginn bildet B 6,1—2. Die Argumentation verläuft von B 6,1—2 über B3 zu B2 und nicht, wie bisher allgemein angenommen, in umgekehrter Richtung. Das Statement von Karl Deichgräber (1), Parmenides formuliere, mit der Aletheia einsetzend, sogleich ein Resultat, hat seine tiefe Berechtigung. Freilich in anderem Sinne, als der Verfasser es eigentlich meinte: der Philosoph begeht keinen logischen Kurzschluß, sondern entwickelt seinen Gedankengang, der auf die Formulierung der beiden Wege hinführt, von B 6 her in kontinuierlicher Argumentation.
Um dies aufzuzeigen, ist der Nachweis notwendig, daß die bisher als Einzelfragmente gezählten Textpartien B 2, B 3, B 6 ein fortlaufendes, lückenloses Ganzes darstellen. Hierfür gibt es einmal Indizien grammatisch-sprachlicher und gedanklicher Art: Parmenides hat seinen Text höchst sorgfältig gestaltet und verwendet durchgehend Parallelführungen und Antithesen (auf manches ist bereits hingewiesen worden). Darüber hinaus führt der Gedankenablauf, wenn man die drei Fragmente zu einer Einheit zusammenschließt, zu einer Abfolge, deren Historizität beweisbar ist. Die drei Hauptpunkte, welche sich in diesem Falle für den Gedankengang ergeben, bilden nämlich gerade das positive Pendant zu den negativen Feststellungen, die am Beginn von Gorgias' Schrift Über das Nichtseiende erscheinen: (1) Es gibt nichts. (2) Wenn es etwas gibt, ist es nicht erkennbar. (3) Wenn es erkennbar ist, kann es einem anderen nicht mitgeteilt werden. Die Reaktion des Gorgias auf Parmenides, auf die allgemein schon öfters hingewiesen worden ist, erweist sich als exakter Bezug auf den Beginn der Aletheia. Äußerungen wie

diejenige von Barbara Cassin2, der Widerlegung des Gorgias läge das Produkt einer schulmäßigen Ausformulierung parmenideischer Gedanken („Parménide scolaire“) zugrunde, verlieren damit ihre Berechtigung.
Unsere Thesen sollen nun im einzelnen erläutert und begründet werden. Das Unternehmen, über den Beginn der Aletheia zu handeln, stellt freilich jeden Parmenidesinterpreten vor immense Schwierigkeiten. Wovon soll er ausgehen? Denn in den Fragmenten 2, 3 und 6 ist nahezu alles umstritten: B 2,3 und 2,5, B 3 und B 6, la —2a werden in ihrer Syntax und ihrer Argumentationsform höchst unterschiedlich erklärt." (ss. 1-2)
(1) K. Deichgräber, Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts (Abh. Akad. Mainz 1958, Nr. 11), Wiesbaden 1959, 676.
(2) B. Cassin, Si Parménide, 44. Cassin kann der Vergleich Parmenides — Gorgias nicht gelingen, weil sie, der traditionellen Sichtweise verhaftet, für den Beginn von Gorgias von B 2 ausgeht statt von B 6.
(3) Die umfangreiche „Bibliographie parménidienne“, die Cordero seinem Buch Les deux chemins de Parmenide (1984) beigegeben hat, verzeichnet für den Zeitraum 1573 bis 1983 591 Titel (S. 240—272). Darüber hinaus ist noch eine Liste von „Ouvrages cités ne concernant pas exclusivement la pensée de Parménide“ erstellt (S. 277—281). Obwohl der Autor keinesfalls Vollständigkeit in Anspruch nimmt (siehe seine Vorbemerkung S. 239 - 240), dürften in der Bibliographie die Forschungsberichte von H. Schwabl nicht fehlen. In der zweiten Liste sollten z. B. Barnes' Presocratic Philosophers und Stokes' Buch The One and the many aufgefuhrt sein, die ausführliche Parmenideskapitel enthalten.

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BIBLIOGRAFÍA DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE PARMÉNIDES EN ESPAÑOL

Bibliografia

1. Bredlow, Luis Andrés. 2010. "Cosmología, cosmogonía y teogonía en el poema de Parménides." *Emerita* no. 78:275-297.
   Resumen: "El propósito de este artículo es ofrecer una nueva reconstrucción del sistema del mundo físico de Parménides, distinguiendo debidamente los momentos cosmológicos, cosmogónicos y teogónicos de la teoría, cuya confusión ha sido fuente principal de malentendidos en las interpretaciones anteriores.
   En particular, el sistema de coronas o anillos de B 12 y A 37 no representa el orden actual del universo, sino la estructura general de la materia, así como el estado inicial de la cosmogonía (sección 1), según puede inferirse también de la lectura de los fragmentos por Simplicio (sección 2). Esa distinción permitirá una reconstrucción tentativa de la cosmogonía (sección 3) y la cosmología de Parménides, cuyo rasgo más llamativo es la ubicación de las estrellas fijas por debajo del Sol y de la Luna, sostenida asimismo por Anaximandro y
   —como trataré de mostrar— en la cosmología del papiro órfico de Derveni (sección 4)."
2. ———. 2011. "Verdad, creencia y convención en el poema de Parménides." *Ontology Studies* no. 11:263-279.
   Resumen: "Esta intervención trata de resumir las líneas generales de una nueva interpretación del conjunto de los

fragmentos de Parménides, tomando pie de la relación entre forma poética y razonamiento lógico (I). Se sostiene, en particular, que el 'ES' de la diosa ha de entenderse en el sentido de una predicación de verdad necesaria, cuya negación ('NO ES') resulta contradictoria consigo misma (II), por lo cual 'lo-que-ES' ha de ser lo que es de modo eterno, perfecto e inmutable, mientras que las cosas de la realidad ordinaria no pueden ser lo que se supone que son más que "de nombre" (III); que el problema de la mal llamada dóxa sólo se resuelve con tal de distinguir la teoría física del poema – cuyo principio es la mezcla y unidad de los opuestos– de las engañosas creencias de los mortales en la rígida separación (lógica y física) de los términos opuestos (IV), empezando por la oposición raigal 'luz/noche', esto es, 'vida/muerte' o, para la visión cosmológica y religiosa, los dominios de Zeus y de Hades (V), si bien la teoría física misma debe partir dialécticamente de los mismos supuestos (la oposición y discontinuidad de los entes) cuya condición !cticia está denunciando (VI); lo cual, en !n, arroja alguna nueva luz también sobre el proemio como parodia irreverente de la Tartaroscopia hesiódica y sobre la unidad de razón poética y lógica en el poema (VII).

3. ———. 2011. "Platon y la invencion de la Escuela de Elea (*Sof*. 242d)." *Convivium* no. 24:25-42.
Resumen: "Los estudiosos suelen concordar actualmente en que la "escuela eleática", tal como se nos presenta por primera vez en los diálogos de Platón, tiene más de ficción que de realidad histórica. En este artículo trato de dilucidar el origen de esa ficción, empezando por examinar las hipótesis de que el comentario de Platón acerca de la "tribu eleática" iniciada por Jenófanes es una broma o bien refleja una interpretación previa debida a Hipias o a Antístenes. Argüiré que la "eleatización" de Jenófanes fue introducida – junto a la lectura
de Parménides y Zenón como filósofos monistas, a la manera de Meliso– por la escuela megárica de Euclides (lo cual me obliga a defender, contra Von Fritz y Döring, el carácter neo-eleático de la filosofía megárica), y sugeriré que una huella precisa de tal interpretación

megárica puede encontrarse en la sección dedicada a Jenófanes del tratado pseudo-aristotélico *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia*."

4. ———. 2013. "Parménides científico y las opiniones de los mortales (apuntes para una nueva interpretación)." *Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:5-22.
   Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to suggest a possible way of understanding Parmenides' so-called doxa, starting from the clear and lucid formulation of the problem which is offered to us in some recent writings of N.-L. Cordero. We agree with Cordero (and some others) on the need to distinguish between the "opinions of mortals" and Parmenides' own physical theories, usually confused under the label of the doxa or "way of opinion" (I-II); not so with his proposal to insert the 'scientific' fragments into the discourse on Truth, which seems rather incompatible with the sources (III) and ultimately grounded on the confusion –shared by most interpreters– of the ordering of the parts of the Poem, enounced at the end of fr. 1 (IV), with the "ways of inquiry" of frs. 2 and 6-7 (V). This is followed by an outline of a tentative reconstruction of Parmenides' polemics against the beliefs of mortals (VI-VIII). The guiding principle of Parmenides' physics is the mixture and interpenetration of the apparent opposites separated by mortals (VI), beginning with the antithesis 'light' / 'darkness', i. e. 'life' / 'death', the dominions of Zeus and of Hades in the traditional world vision which is refuted by the new cosmology of Parmenides (VII). But even so, the new cosmos is in its own way a "deceptive order" as well: since what-is is continuous and homogeneous, the entities postulated by the physical theory have to be necessarily fictitious or conventional; only the explicit acknowledgement of this status prevents the theory from the error of mortals, which consists in taking linguistic convention for the true being of things (VIII)."
5. Calvo, Martinez Tomas. 2000. "El lenguaje de la ontologia: de Parmenides a Meliso." *Convivium* no. 13:1-12.

Resumen: "En este trabajo se pretende analizar la relación existente entre Parménides y Meliso desde la perspectiva del lenguaje utilizado por ambos. En la primera parte el autor analiza las principales oposiciones léxicas mediante las cuales suele articularse la filosofía de
Parménides: Verdad-Opinión, Ser-No ser, Verdadero-Falso, Razón-Sentidos, Discurso Racional-Discurso narrativo. El autor descarta la pertinencia de las oposiciones Razón-Sentidos y Verdadero-Falso, insistiendo en la relevancia de la oposicion entre dos formas de discurso, el racional argumentativo (propio de la Verdad) y el narrativo (caractenstico de la opiniones relativas a la cosmogénesis). En la segunda parte del artículo el autor se vuelve a Meliso mostrando el empobrecimiento y simplificación que se produce en éste, tanto
desde el punto de vista del léxico como desde el punto de vista de la doctrina, en comparación con la compleja estructura de la filosofía de Parménides."

6. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 2002. "Acerca de la inexistencia de una tercera vía de investigación en Parménides." *Argos* no. 26:19-39.
"Volvamos al núcleo del pretendido tercer camino. El mismo mezclaría ser y no ser al decir que hay no ser y que el ser no es. ¿Para qué hipostasiar un tercer camino si, como vimos, el segundo camino dice exactamente lo mismo? Entramos así al centro del problema. Quienes aíirman que hay un tercer camino de investigación en Parménides creen que el segundo camino es "el camino del no ser". Si así fuera, ¿qué sostiene este camino? Que hay no-ser, o que el ser no es. *En ambos casos se supone que hay ser*, o sea, el contenido del primer camino, ya sea porque se otorga la calidad de "ser" al noser (y para afirmar que el no-ser, es, hay que poseer ia noción de "ser"), ya sea porque del "ser" se dice que no es. El ser está abusivamente presente y no podría ser de otra manera, ya que el ser es una evidencia primaria, necesaria y absoluta, al menos, para Parménides. La pretendida fórmula del "tercer camino" no es otra que la del segundo.

Quienes la encuentran en el fr. 6, a partir del verso 4, no tienen en cuenta que, en el conjunto que va de 6, 4 a 7, 5, Parménides presenta el segundo camino en función de sus eventuales "usuarios". No es la diosa quien lo formula; sino los "mortales que nada saben", por quienes "el ser y el no-ser son *considerados* (*nenómistai*, de "*nómos*", "costumbre") como lo mismo y no lo mismo" (fr. 6, 8-9). Parménides subraya el carácter "habitual" de esta opinión humana que se apoya sobre un "intelecto errante" (*plaktòs nóos*, 6, 6). Es la "costumbre inveterada" (*éthos polupeiron*, 7, 3) la que conduce a los hombres a "fabricar" (*pláttontai,* 6,5) un método que mezcla ser y noser y, por consiguiente, a afirmar que estos son idénticos y diferentes a la vez. La expresión que encontramos en 6, 8-9 significa simplemente que los mortales atrióuyen el ser al no-ser y el no-ser al ser. Dicho de otro modo: ellos confunden (mezclan, combinan) lo que está siendo y lo que no es." (p. 24)

7. ———. 2004. "Le logos comme critère chez Parmènide." In *Cosmos et psychè. Mélanges offerts à Jean Frère*, edited by Vegleris, Eugènie, 45-54. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
8. ———. 2005. *Siendo, se es. La tesis de Parménides*. Buenos Aires: Ciudad Biblio.
"Toda nueva interpretación de la filosofía de Parménides, o toda crítica de interpretaciones anteriores, debe apoyarse sobre un texto que se acerque lo más posible al original perdido. La titánica tarea llevada a cabo durante siglos por filólogos y codicólogos nos ofrecía un
punto de partida firme, pero mucho quedaba aún por hacer. Pasajes del Poema permanecían inexplicablemente oscuros (por ejemplo, ¿por qué la diosa ordena apartarse de un camino verdadero en el v. 6.3? ¿Cómo puede afirmarse que el pensamiento está expresado en el ser, como parece decir el v. 8.35?). Por esta razón, desde que nuestra presencia en Europa lo hizo posible, decidimos efectuar una revisión de la tradición manuscrita de las citas (mal llamadas "fragmentos") del Poema de Parménides con el objeto de proponer una nueva versión, purificada de ciertos errores que se habían acumulado a lo largo de los siglos. Un primer resultado de nuestra búsqueda fue presentado en 1971 como

tesis de doctorado, (4) y varios años después nuestro libro *Les deux chemins de Parménide* (1997) (5) completó nuestro trabajo. Nuevas investigaciones acerca de las fuentes manuscritas de las primeras ediciones del Poema, así como un cambio de perspectiva en nuestra valoración de "los dos caminos", nos permiten presentar hoy esta nueva versión de "la tesis" de Parménides. En este trabajo, además, tenemos en cuenta comentarios y críticas suscitados por nuestros estudios sobre Parménides y, cuando ello es posible, nos defendemos o hacemos, resignados, ciertas rectificaciones.
Es imposible adentrarse en la filosofía de Parménides sin contagiarse.
Esperamos que el eventual lector de este libro comparta esta idea." (p. 15)
(4) París IV, Sorbona. Director: Pierre-Maxime Schuhl.
(5) Primera edición: París-Bruselas, Vrin-Ousia, 1984. La segunda edición [1997] es corregida y aumentada.

9. ———. 2007. "En Parménides, 'tertium non datur'." *Anais de Filosofia Clássica* no. 1:1-13.
"El título de nuestra conferencia hace alusión a un principio que pertenece al ámbito de la lógica, el principio del "tercero excluido". Esta referencia a la lógica sugiere que nuestra exposición se ocupará fundamentalmente de una cuestión que hoy podríamos llamar
"metodológica". Pero para ubicar este punto en su contexto, me permitiré exponer en muy pocas palabras, apenas unos minutos, el punto central de mi interpretación de Parménides.
La filosofía nació como un intento de explicación total de la realidad. Para referirse a ese "objeto" de estudio, quizá los primeros filósofos utilizaron el término *physis*. No nos consta, al menos hasta Heráclito. El texto más antiguo que poseemos, esas inagotables tres líneas de Anaximandro, hablan de *ta onta*, en plural (en el fragmento, en dativo), o sea, directamente, las cosas, y, literalmente, "los entes". Nada sabemos de los otros filósofos de Mileto. Podemos suponer que Heráclito también habla de "las cosas" cuando dice que él explica "*hekaston*", cada cosa, según la *physis*, y

en otro texto (fr. 123) independiza la *physis*, entendida sin duda como la constitución última del conjunto de todas las cosas, *ta onta*.
Parménides, en cambio, es el primer filósofo que, para referirse a "los entes", utiliza el singular, pero ello no significa que va a ocuparse de una sola cosa. Su singular es genérico, porque se refiere a aquello que tienen en común todas las "cosas", los entes, *ta onta*. Así como el biólogo estudia *to zoon*, lo viviente, o sea, eso que caracteriza a todos los seres vivos, panta *ta zoa*, el filósofo debe ocuparse de "*to eon*", lo que es, que está presente en todas las cosas que son, que existen, en *panta ta ont*a. Ya las ciencias se ocuparán de estudiar en particular lo que corresponde a cada grupo de cosas, pero esto es posterior, ya que las cosas no existirían, si no se diese el hecho de ser. Parménides se limita a este "objeto", el hecho de ser, y su Poema es una analítica de cuanto puede decirse sobre el mismo. En resumen, la unidad parmenídea es la unidad del singular, y esto es lo que dice Platón en el *Sofista,* si se traduce bien el texto, cuando afirma que, para lo que él llama "la raza eleática", "todas las cosas (ta panta) son llamadas, nombradas (*kalouménon*) un ser único (*hen on*)" (242d). Platón no dice que para ellos "todo es uno" (frase, por lo demás, escrita por Heráclito). Dentro de esta problemática, me propongo hoy ocuparme del método puesto en práctica por Parménides para llegar a "demostrar", a su manera, las verdades que él creyó alcanzar a propósito de "*to eon*"."

10. ———. 2011. "Una consecuencia inesperada de la reconstrucción actual del Poema de Parménides." *Hypnos* no. 27:222-229.
Abstract: The modern establishment of the text of Parmenides' Poem, with its presentation of the fragments in a certain order, has induced interpreters to accept a division of its doctrine into "Truth" and "Opinion". Casting doubt on the established order of the fragments and questioning the reading of the poem in two "parts", the author seeks to free the passages about the heavenly bodies from any supposed connection with the Parmenidean doctrine of doxai."

11. ———. 2013. "El Extranjero de Elea, “compañero” de los parmenídeos... desde 1561." *Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:51-58.
Abstract: "In 1561 J. Comarius proposed his own version of some passages of Plato's *Sophist*. In this version Theodorus presents the Eleatic Stranger as "a companion (*hetairas*) of Parmenideans and Zenonians" (216a). Since then, this cliché is accepted by all translations. However, when the possibility of justifying the existence of images and appearances is considered, the Stranger himself proposes 'testing' Parmenides' thesis.
His remarks are rather those of an adversary than of a friend or companion of Parmenides. In fact, in spite of Theodorus' presentation, the Stranger, albeit citizen of Elea, does not seem to share the theses of the 'Eleatics'. These anomalies invited us to question the character of 'companion' of the 'Parmenideans' credited to the Stranger. The questioning is possible if we exploit some valuable greek manuscripts of Plato's *Sophist*, neglected by J. Bumet, like *Vindobonensis* 21 (Y). This manuscript, among others, has the lecture *heteras*, 'different', instead of *hetairon*, 'companion'. This manuscript permits to maintain the formula *tón hetairón*, transmitted by all the manuscripts after the first *hetairon*, and removed in modem editions. The translation we propose is: the Eleatic Stranger is "different (*heteras*) of the companions (*tón hetairón*) of Parmenides and Zenon".
12. ———. 2013. "Las “partes” del Poema de Parménides: un prejuicio interpretativo trágico,." In *Μαθήματα. Ecos de Filosofía Antigua*, edited by Gutiérrez, Raúl, 15-26. Lima: Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
Resumen: "Los textos conservados de los Presocráticos son reconstrucciones y en ningún caso se pretendió restaurar el texto en su orden originario. No obstante, desde hace más de dos siglos, se estudia el Poema de Parménides como si el filósofo lo hubiese escrito tal
como lo leemos: con una Introducción, una Primera Parte (Alétheia) y una Segunda Parte (Doxa). Esta estructura es peligrosa en lo que concierne la "Segunda Parte", la "Doxa".

Sólo los últimos nueve versos del fragmento 8 corresponden, según la Diosa, a las "opiniones de los mortales". No obstante, desde que el Poema tiene la forma actual, once citas textuales (=fragmentos) se agregaron a continuación, con lo cual se constituyó un dossier conocido como "la Doxa de Parménides".
La ubicación errónea de esos textos en la llamada "Doxa" obedece al prejuicio platonizante que consiste en atribuir a la noción de Doxa el valor anacrónico en tiempos de Parménides de "apariencia". Parménides pretende explicar LA realidad, y para ello expone dos métodos" posibles: uno persuasivo y verdadero (la Vía de la Verdad) y otro engañoso y no convincente: las opiniones de los mortales. La dicotomía ser-aparecer es platónica, no parmenídea."

13. ———. 2015. "La aristotelización y platonización de Parménides por Simplicio." *Argos* no. 38:32-51.
Resumen: "La dificultad de captar el pensamiento de Parménides llevó a los intérpretes ya en la Antigüedad a encarar su filosofía según esquemas de pensamiento posteriores. Fue el caso de Aristóteles, cuya interpretación fue heredada por su discípulo Teofrasto y por sus comentadores, especialmente Simplicio. Simplicio, neoplatónico y aristotélico a la vez, propuso una interpretación, fuertemente dualista (dominada por la dicotomía sensible/inteligible), que no se encuentra en las citas recuperadas. En 1789 G. G. Fülleborn, inspirándose en Simplicio, propuso una división del Poema en dos "partes", aceptada hoy en forma unánime, y que debe ser revisada y rechazada con urgencia."
14. García Bacca, Juan David. 1943. *El Poema de Parménides. Atentado de hermenéutica histórico-vital*. México: Universidad Autónoma de México.
15. Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1986. "Parmenides y la Diosa. Breve historia de la interpretación de un texto." *Ideas y Valores* no. 36:49-66.
"Como se recordará. Sexto Empíríco nos decía que Parménides iniciaba su poema con los versos que el, Sexto, transcríbiría a continuación. Ahora comprendemos por qué. La experiencia de Parménides equivale muy de cerca a la

conciencia de Homero de saberse inspirado por una musa y al encantamiento e invocación de las musas todas en Hesíodo. (38) En un sentido más distante y salvadas las diferencias culturales, hay también una equivalencia con la vocación del profeta en Israel. (39)
En cada uno de estos casos no se discierne una anticipación alegórica de lo que el poeta o profeta dirá en cumplimiento de su vocación. Se describe más bien una escena autosuficiente en que se apunta a una fuente superior de sabiduria que garantiza al auditor que lo cantado o narrado efectivamente es lo que pretende ser: una revelación profunda y arcana pero, por sobre todo, verdadera."
(...)
"Si Parménides estaba familiarizado con esas ideas cosmogónicas que la tradición posterior asoció con Orfeo, Museo y Epiménides, figuras cuya cercanía a Parménides hemos hecho notar, entonces es altamente probable que haya que interpretar el viaje de éste como conducente al origen último del cosmos, a la fuente última de todo lo que hay. Que mayor autoridad podria invocarse para la revelación de la admirable y paradójica filosofía de Elea? Este es, por último el punto al cual nos han encaminado las investigaciones modernas del misterioso proemio de Parménides, éste es el estado actual de nuestro conocimiento histórico en este campo."
(38) *Teog*. 1-115.
(39) *Isaías* 6. 1-12; *Jeremías* 1. 4-19; *Amos* 7. 14-15. El paralelismo entre este último pasaje y la vocación de Hesíodo es analizado por F.M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 99-100.

16. Gonzalez Escudero, Santiago. 1983. "Una precisión sobre el *Es* en Parmenides." *El Basilisco* no. 15:62-70.
Resumen: "Entre los muchos problemas que plantea la comprensión del poema de Parménides es sin duda el fundamental poner en claro lo que en el fragmento 2 recogido por Diels (1) se manifiesta como contenido del camino de investigación propuesto por la diosa y que ha dado lugar a las más variadas controversias dado que en él

radica lo que podríamos llamar «el discurso del ser en Parménides».
Parece pues procedente tratar de contrastar los estudios realizados desde diferentes ángulos acerca de los sentidos que pudo haber tenido en Parménides este fragmento. Estudios realizados desde la posibilidad de comprender las palabras de Parménides, de difícil sentido, dentro no sólo de los análisis filológicos más precisos sino desde las perspectivas que nos brinda la ideología conocida como propia dé Parménides y su repercusión enla filosofía griega. Pues indudablemente el problema sobre el ser que desde los versos de este fragmento comienza su andadura en el pensamiento ha constituido y constituye el núcleo del que arrancan o al que conducen todos los sistemas filosóficos, como los de Platón o Aristóteles, por ejemplo.
Las dificultades de comprensión y de traducción de la terminología en que se expresa este núcleo ideológico ha sido magistralmente analizado por García Calvo en Lecturas Presocráticas (2), si bien creemos que es preciso ahondar más en el problema para dejar en claro sobre todo las relaciones que se abren con los grandes sistemas filosóficos griegos.
Es P. Aubenque (3) el que indirectamente más ha contribuido a denunciar las consecuencias de las afirmaciones de Parménides, por cuanto ha sabido ver en Platón y sobre todo en Aristóteles la necesidad de un planteamiento de la base lingüística fundamental en lo que va a ser considerado el problema principal de la Metafísica. Desde este ángulo vamos a tratar de anaüzar en el fragmento a que nos referimos el sentido y el alcance conceptual de la definición de lo que tradicionalmente se considera el «Ser» en Parménides, sin entrar en ima pormenorización exhaustiva de sus manifestaciones lo que nos llevaría a una edición nueva de todo el poema, lo que excede los límites de un artículo."
(1) Hermán Diels-W. Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 10 ed. Berlín, 1960.
(2) A. García Calvo. *Lecturas Presocráticas*, Lucina, Madrid 1981. En donde, además de una edición crítica del poema

junto con una versión rítmica, hay dos estudios acerca de las dificultades de traducción del verbo «éstin» griego, págs. 58 y ss. y Apéndice 225-234.
(3) Fierre Aubenque. *El problema del ser en Aristóteles*, Taurus, Madrid 1981, sobre todo págs. 93-131 y 158-199. Sin embargo no estamos de acuerdo con su teoría de que los eléatas se encierran en uña ontología demasiado exigente (pág. 140), ya que así deja de lado los fundamentos de la valoración lingüística de «éstin», si bien estamos de acuerdo en que en los megáricos no aparecerían de la misma manera que en Parménides.

17. Hülsz, Enrique, and Berruecos, Bernardo. 2019. "Parménides B1.3: una nueva enmienda." In *ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero*, edited by Pulpito, Massimo and Spangenberg, Pilar, 31-60. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.
Resumen: "Este trabajo se ocupa de algunos problemas de lectura e interpretación de DK28 B1.3, un verso que nos ha llegado corrupto. A partir de una ojeada a la estructura del Proemio (que evidencia una compleja composición anular pentádica), y del examen y la discusión de las diversas conjeturas que se han propuesto hasta ahora – en particular el rechazo de la enmienda κατὰ πάντ᾽ἄστη – asumimos como lectura original la siguiente, admitiendo como suplemento una ípsilon y siguiendo el camino trazado por una conjetura antigua de G. Hermann, πάντ᾽ αὐτὴ, y dos propuestas recientes, de N. L. Cordero, πᾶν τα<ὐ>τῃ, y A. Mourelatos, κατὰ … α<ὐ>τὴ<ν>:
ΔΑΙΜΟΝΟΣΗΚΑΤΑΠΑΝΤΑΥΤΗΦΕΡΕΙΕΙΔΟΤΑΦΩΤΑ.
Nuestra conjetura, ἣ κατὰ πάντ᾽ αὖ τῇ φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα, “el cual [camino] lleva de vuelta nuevamente ahí al hombre que sabe todas las cosas”, resulta de un análisis diferente de la secuencia AYTH, interpretada como dos palabras: los adverbios αὖ y τῇ. El verso anticipa así la formulación metodológica en B5 y es una micro-imagen del Proemio entero que pone en el primer plano su carácter eminentemente poetológico. Nuestra interpretación recurre a la hipótesis de que se trata de un caso de sintaxis

discontinua: desarticulando la frase preposicional κατα` πάντα, construimos πάντα en hipérbaton como objeto directo del participio εἰδότα: el “hombre que lo sabe todo”, caracterización antitética perfecta de los βροτοι` εἰδότες οὐδε`ν, “los mortales que nada saben”, del fragmento B6, y la preposición κατα` en tmesis con el verbo φέρει, con el sentido de “llevar de vuelta”, “regresar”.

18. Lafrance, Yvon. 1992. "Las multiplas lectura del Poema de Parménides." *Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 5:5-27.
Traducido deI frances por Eduardo Andujar.
"En el transcurso de es tos ultimos diez anos, el texto y Ia interpretación deI poema de Parménides han dado lugar a numerosos trabajos de investigación."
(...)
"Los *Études sur Parménid*e (1987) (1) vienen a agregarse a esta lista ya de por si impresionante. La obra eontiene los estudios provenientes
deI *Centre de Recherches sur la Pensée Antique* o *Centre L. Robin* de la Sorbona que dirigia el profesor P. Aubenque."
(...)
"EI primer tomo de estos *Études sur Parménid*e ha sido enteramente redactado por D. O'Brien, Direetor de Investigaciones deI C. N. R. S. de Paris. EI volumen eomprende el texto deI poema (1-134) y un ensayo critico de interpretación (135-319). EI texto griego ha sido establecido a partir de las mejores ediciones modernas, dejando el autor la entera responsabilidad de la colación de manuscritos a los diversos editores (XVI n. 3). Por otra parte, O'Brien no cree, contrariamente a Cordero (*Études* II 18), que una revisión *ab ovo* de la colación de manuscritos pueda modificar, de manera significativa, el texto griego del poema de Parmenides que leernos hoy dia. Para ello, segun O'Brien, habria que esperar el descubrimiento de un nuevo documento (116)."
19. Lomba Fuentes, Joaquín. 1985. *El oraculo de Narciso: lectura del poema de Parmenides*. Zaragoza: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

20. Maestre Sanchez, Alfonso. 2010. "Síntesis transversal de la «filosofía» de Parménides (Sobre la controversia de la ἀλήθεια y del δόξα o el alborear del Λόγος)." *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* no. 27:9-47. Resumen: "Como dijimos en la Parte I, las obras de Heráclito y Parménides nos resultan desconocidas en su integridad. Sin embargo, pocos filósofos han sido tan comentados como ellos. Pero esta crítica –diversa y contradictoria– de los fragmentos heraclitanos y del Poema de Parménides, respectivamente, en vez de aclarar, ha servido para ocultar aún más sus genuinas reflexiones filosóficas, pues muchos de estos escritos se han utilizado ya sea para alabar a Heráclito o Parménides, ya sea para criticarlos y contraponerlos, o bien para justificar intereses espurios. Esta Parte II de nuestro trabajo versa sobre las interpretaciones de la doctrina de la ἀλήθεια y de la δόξα en el filósofo de Elea, advirtiendo de nuevo que siempre se planteará el problema de la duda respecto a la autenticidad o falsedad, orden y estructura de sus fragmentos como fuente."
21. Montero Moliner, Fernando. 1960. *Parménides*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos.
22. Pòrtulas, Jaume. 2014. "Παναπευθέα ἀταρπὸν (a propósito de Parménides 28 B 2 DK)." In *Ágalma : ofrenda desde la Filología Clásica a Manuel García Teijeiro*, edited by Fernández, Ángel Martínez, Ortega Villaro, Begoña, Velasco López, María del Henar and Zamora Salamanca, María del Henar, 587-592. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid. Abstract "The aim of this paper is to analyze two difficult expressions in lines 4 and 6 of Parmenides' fragment 2 DK (= 3 Coxon). In the course of this analysis, several probable Homeric hypotexts are examined. The idea underlying the paper is that the problems related to persuasion and communication have a fundamental role in Parmenides' attempt to define *aletheia*."
23. Santoro, Fernando. 2019. "A Lua, Vênus e as Estrelas de Parmênides." In *ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero*, edited by Pulpito, Massimo

and Spangenberg, Pilar, 155-166. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.
Resumen: "O século XXI começa com muitas viradas interpretativas com relação aos pensadores pré-socráticos, entre os quais Parmênides de Eleia. Nestor Cordero, tendo estudado como ninguém todos os manuscritos supérstites, desconstruiu a ortodoxia neoplatônica que, recalcitrante na filologia alemã, ao distribuir os fragmentos em duas partes, a Verdade e a Doxa, relegava todos os conteúdos cosmológicos do devir à mera aparência da opinião. Seguindo os passos abertos por Cordero, investigo como os conteúdos cosmológicos
contidos nos fragmentos do Poema podem ser integrados ao programa parmenídico de conhecimento da verdade pelo pensamento. Neste caminho vislumbram-se descobertas científicas relativas à Lua, a Vênus e às Estrelas.
Proponho ainda que uma antiga forma de integrar o conhecimento de conteúdos astronômicos ao conhecimento de conteúdos relativos à geração e ao sexo, que compõem os assuntos físicos do Poema, dá-se na forma de uma interpretação erótica do mundo, regido por Eros e por Afrodite."

24. Santoro, Fernando, Cairus, Henrique, and Ribeiro, Tatiana, eds. 2007. *Acerca do Poema de Parmênides*.
Estudos apresentados no I Simpósio Internacional OUSIA de Estudos Clássicos.
Contenido: Prefácio 5; Néstor Luis Cordero: En Parmenides, 'tertium non datur' 11; José Trindade Santos: Parménides contra Parménides 23; Emmanuel Carneiro Leão: O homem no Poema de Parmênides 43; Giovanni Casertano: Verdade e erro no Poema de Parménides 53; Chiara Robbiano: Duas fases parmenídeas ao longo da via para a Verdade: *elenkhos* e *ananke* 65; Charles H. Kahn: Algumas questões controversas na interpretação de Parmênides 79; Fernando Muniz: A Odisséia de Parmênides 91; Luis Felipe Belintani Ribeiro: Parmênides trágico 97; Gérard Émile Grimberg: Parmênides e a matemática 107; Carla Francalanci: O diálogo Sofista à sombra de Parmênides 119; Fernando Pessoa: Entre pensar e ser, Heidegger e Parmênides 127;

Gisele Amaral; A necessidade do dizer; 135; Gabriele Cornelli: A descida de Parmênides: anotações geofilosóficas às margens do prólogo 139; Izabela Bocayuva: O Poema de Parmênides e a viagem iniciática 149; Markus Figueira; O atomismo antigo e o legado de Parmênides 161; Marcus Reis Pinheiro: Plotino, exegeta de Platão e Parmênides 171; Alexandre Costa: O sentido histórico-filosófico do Poema de Parmênides 181; Marcelo Pimenta Marques: Relendo o Fragmento 4 de Parmênides 213; Bibliografia 225-235.

25. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 1978. "La relación entre el pensamiento y el ser en el poema de Parménide." *Anuario Filosófico* no. 11:197-205.
"La relación entre el pensamiento y el ser es un tema fundamental de la filosofía europea. Su primera expresión escrita se encuentra en el poema de PARMÉNIDES: «es una misma cosa el Pensar con el Ser» (1)
En esta frase los términos «pensar y ser» forman el sujeto y los términos «es una misma cosa» el predicado. Quiere decir, por lo tanto: pensar y ser son lo mismo; el pensar y el ser se relacionan en la mismidad. Sin embargo surge la pregunta, ¿qué es la misma cosa en
relación con qué? ¿es el ser en relación con el pensar o el pensar en relación con el ser? En el primer caso, la frase sería una proposición acerca del ser y afirmaría su mismidad con el pensar; en el segundo sería primariamente una proposición sobre el pensar y afirmaría su mismidad con el ser. ¿Cómo hay que entender, pues, esta frase?
En el transcurso de la historia de la filosofía la frase de PARMÉNIDES se ha interpretado de numerosas maneras, hasta en la investigación moderna acerca de PARMÉNIDES. Estas interpretaciones coinciden esencialmente en que la entienden como frase acerca del ser —por
tanto en el primer sentido: el ser es lo mismo que el pensar; el ser está determinado por el pensar; el pensar es el principio de determinación del ser. La frase de PARMÉNIDES se considera, pues, como testimonio de una concepción idealista del ser y se entiende o en el sentido de un idealismo platónico antiguo o de un idealismo moderno.

Según la interpretación idealista antigua, debe significar que el ser tiene la *naturaleza* del pensamiento, es decir es un *νοετον*, a saber, la idea suprasensible que sólo se capta con el pensamiento. Según la interpretación idealista moderna, significa que un ser sólo existe dentro de y para una consciencia." (pp. 197-198)
(1) Fragm. 3. (La traducción de este fragmento y de los demás corresponden a la versión de J. P. GARCÍA BACCA, *El poema de Parménides,* México 1962. N. d. T.).

26. Solana Dueso, José. 2001. "Lenguaje y filosofía en el poema de Parménides." *Convivium: revista de filosofía* no. 14:31-47.
Resumen: "Este artículo aborda tres cuestiones relativas al sentido y alcance que tiene en el Poema de Parménides la reflexión sobre el lenguaje. La primera pretende explicar el diferente tratamiento que merece el lenguaje en las dos partes del texto parmenídeo. La
segunda trata de señalar cómo algunos aspectos gramaticales son aprovechados como recursos formales al servicio de lo que podríamos llamar la protológica parmenídea.
Finalmente, se analizan los versos B8.34-41 para sostener que del citado pasaje no debe deducirse, como hacen muchos intérpretes, una descalificación del mundo fenoménico.
Por el contrario, el citado pasaje contiene dos tesis muy decisivas para la interpretación del conjunto del Poema: primera, que el lenguaje es un artefacto necesario e inevitable para la teona física, y segunda, que la imposición de los nombres es una actividad teórica
que debe someterse a la krisis."

27. ———. 2003. "Generación y tiempo en el Poema de Parménides." *Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 16:7-22.
"El fragmento 8 del poema de Parménides constituye un conjunto de argumentos a favor de un grupo de predicados del *éóν* que se presentan en los versos a favor de un grupo de predicados del *éóν* que se presentan en los versos B8.3-4:
ἀγένητον éóν καί ἀνώλ6θρόν ἐστιν,

οὐλον μουνογβνές re καί ἀτρεμές ἠδ’ ἀτ€λ€στόν
El objeto de este artículo será analizar cuestiones relacionadas con el primero de estos versos, el que se refiere al carácter ingénito e indestructible del *éóv*, cuya prueba se desarrolla a lo largo de B8.5-21. La estrecha asociación entre generación y tiempo queda patente al comprobar el énfasis de que son objeto los adverbios de tiempo en conjunción con el uso de los tiempos verbales." (p. 7)

28. ———. 2006. *De Logos a Physis. Estudio sobre el Poema de Parménides*. Saragoza: Mira editores.
29. ———. 2015. *La voz de los Maestros: Parménides*.
30. ———. 2019. "Mito y logos en Parménides." In *ὁδοι ̀ νοῆσαι Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero*, edited by Pulpito, Massimo and Spangenberg, Pilar, 87-99. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.
Resumen: "El artículo argumenta que la tesis de “paso del mito al logos” para explicar el nacimiento de la filosofía en Grecia no se ajusta a la realidad; antes bien, el mito siguió existiendo en el campo de la filosofía, incluida la de Parménides.
No solo eso, sino que del Poema parmenídeo se infiere que el mito es ineliminable, y además es necesario en dos dominios: el de la explicación del mundo y el de la justificación del orden social."
31. Untersteiner, Mario. 1956. "La "doxa" en la filosofía de Parménides." *Diánoia* no. 2:203-221.
Resumen: "La determinación precisa del significado de la δόξα parmenídea y de sus relaciones con la ἀλήθεια puede considerarse verdaderamente como una vexata questio hasta hoy sin solución. Mientras que en relación a otros problemas la historia de las cuestiones puede facilitarnos el hallar un hilo conducente a una solución de orden superior, en este caso, por el contrario, es más conveniente enfrentarse directamente a las palabras mismas de Parménides, sin dejar de tener presentes, en su oportunidad, para las exégesis de detalle, las precedentes soluciones parciales que puedan considerarse acertadas."

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BIBLIOGRAFIA DOS ESTUDOS SOBRE PARMÊNIDES EM PORTUGUÊS

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   Resumo: "O artigo procura mostrar que Parmênides não deve ser considerado percursor do princípio de não contradição. Não são poucos aqueles que compreendem os versos B2 do poema de Parmênides como o princípio de não contradição avant la lettre. Contudo, quando se realiza tal aproximação, perdemos de vista aquilo que parece ser próprio de cada autor. Por um lado, Parmênides defende o *Monon On*, o Ser Único, como testemunham Platão, Zenão e Melisso. Por outro lado, é preciso não assumir uma parte mais fundamental da formulação do princípio de não contradição, do contrário teríamos que sustentar um princípio do princípio mais fundamental, o que implica ter que manter o movimento e a pluralidade como itens essenciais da formulação do primeiro princípio."
2. Bernabé, Alberto. 2013. "Filosofía e mistérios: leitura do proêmio de Parmênides." *Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental* no. 10:37-58.
   Resumo: "Tem-se analisado, recorrentemente, a influência de Homero e de Hesíodo no proêmio do poema de Parmênides. As possíveis influências da poesia órfica tem sido apenas consideradas.

Todavia, diversas descobertas de textos órficos aconselham voltar a analisar os vestígios da tradição mistérica, em geral, e órfica, em particular, no poema do filósofo de Eléia, sem minimizar, com isso, as outras influências já postas em relevo.
O autor assinalou, em um trabalho anterior, algumas conexões entre Parmênides e os textos órficos; neste artigo, a análise se centra nos pontos de contato com ideias e imagens literárias dos Mistérios que se encontram no proêmio. Não se trata de determinar as crenças do filósofo, senão de situar, no âmbito da tradição, os conteúdos doutrinais e/ou poéticos expressados nesta parte fundamental do seu poema, para fazer ver o que têm de poderosamente originais e, em consequência, tratar de determinar o significado do proêmio no conjunto da obra."

3. Casertano, Giovanni. 2007. "A cidade, o verdadeiro e o falso em Parmênides." *Kriterion. Revista de Filosofia* no. 116:307-327.
   Resumo: "Parte da historiografia filosófica da segunda metade do século XIX se empenha em renovar a imagem de Parmênides de Eléia fixada pela tradição – filósofo do imobilismo, isolado, estranho e venerável – recuperando as relações estreitas que ele mantinha com as exigências da cultura de sua época. O propósito deste artigo é reconduzir Parmênides ao seu tempo, apontando o pensamento vivo de um homem que foi não apenas filósofo, mas também cientista e político de grande relevo."
4. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 2011. *Sendo, se é. A Tese de Parmênides*. São Paulo: Odysseus.
   Tradução de Eduardo Wolf.
5. de Azevedo, Cristiane A. 2017. "O discurso sobre o devir no poema de Parmênides: a presença fundamental de Éros na constituição do cosmos e do homem." *Revista Enunciação* no. 2:72-84.
   Resumo: "Este artigo pretende, primeiramente, voltar-se para a última parte do poema de Parmênides que ficou ao longo de séculos relegada ao âmbito do não-ser, da aparência ou da falta de verdade. Este discurso trata da dóxa dos mortais e apresenta os elementos que formam a

cosmologia. Nosso objetivo é pensar a dóxa de maneira positiva, constituindo-se como a maneira própria de falar daquilo que está sujeito ao devir, a saber, o sol, a lua, as estrelas, a Via Láctea, o homem. Em um segundo momento, vamos pensar não só a presença e a função de Éros no cosmos construído pelo pensamento de Parmênides mas também sua importância para o homem."

6. Galgano, Nicola Stefano. 2012. "DK 28 1.29. A verdade tem um coração intrépido?" In *Una mirada actual a la filosofía griega. Ponencias del II Congreso Internacional de Filosofía Griega de la Sociedad Ibérica de Filosofía Griega*, 189-202. Madrid-Mallorca: Ediciones de la Sociedad Ibérica de Filosofía Griega (SIFG).
"O artigo estuda uma das passagens mais famosas do Poema de Parmênides, o verso 29 do fragmento 1, Ἀληθέιης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ, que literalmente pode ser assim traduzido: «o coração intrépido da verdade bem redonda». Essas palavras são proferidas por uma deusa anônima a um discípulo e querem expor o programa de ensino da divina mestra: o discípulo tem que aprender a verdade, mas também as opiniões dos mortais. Todos os estudiosos interpretam esse verso como metáfora, onde as expressões 'coração intrépido' e 'bem redonda' formam a imagem de uma 'verdade imortal' oposta às 'opiniões dos mortais'.
O artigo questiona esta interpretação metafórica, talvez platonizante, alegando três tipos de considerações: literárias, (imagem imprópria de um coração que não bate, intrépido), históricas (pela fisiologia da época o coração é também a sede do pensamento) e filológicas (o termo para significar 'centro' é καρδία e não ἦτορ). A nova tradução proposta mostra que Parmênides queria dizer algo mais simples, isto é, 'a mente firme da verdade bem conexa', apontando para um fenômeno psicológico, a persuasão, sucessivamente retomado no fragmento 2." (p. 189)

7. ———. 2016. "Os limites da palavra: Parmênides e o indizível." *Revista Ética e Filosofía Política* no. 2:4-24.
Resumo: "A importância do papel de Parmênides na história da filosofia foi evidenciada por Hegel, quando chegou a considerá-lo o primeiro verdadeiro filósofo. No entanto, o

hegelianismo e, com ele, a moderna história da filosofia acentuaram a descoberta parmenidiana do ser, deixando de lado a complexa noção de não-ser. Mas o próprio Parmênides, ao introduzir aquelas noções, se dedica mais à explicitação e à argumentação do não-ser, mostrando algumas características peculiares que acabam tendo consequências sobre a estruturação do discurso cognitivo. Uma destas características é a indizibilidade do não ser, demonstrada por Parmênides indiretamente. Com a afirmação da indizibilidade, Parmênides estabelece, pela primeira vez na história do pensamento ocidental, um limite para o uso da linguagem e, portanto, um critério para o desenvolvimento do discurso epistêmico, uma autêntica regra metalinguística. A presente análise procura evidenciar os argumentos de Parmênides a partir do texto do poema, revelando a sutileza da reflexão do eleata, o primeiro a introduzir a problemática da linguagem epistêmica na cultura ocidental."

8. Huguenin, Rafael. 2009. "Sugestões para a interpretação do poema de Parmênides." *Síntese. Revista de Filosofia* no. 36:197-218.
Resumo:" O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer uma sugestão para uma nova interpretação do poema de Parmênides. Para isso, em um primeiro momento, (I) discutiremos algumas abordagens tradicionais das duas vias de conhecimento no fragmento 2 e suas relações com as funções do verbo grego 'ser'. Depois, (II) faremos uma exposição da tese de Charles Kahn acerca dos usos antigos do verbo 'ser', que coloca a questão em novos termos. Para concluir, (III) mostraremos como alguns aspectos da tradição oral, na qual o poema está certamente inserido, podem iluminar a interpretação dos problemas aos quais ele se dirige."
9. ———. 2013. "Parmênides e Frege: um breve estudo sobre as relações entre o poema sobre a natureza e as investigações lógicas." *Kriterion. Revista de Filosofia* no. 54:7-24.
Resumo: "O presente texto tem como objetivo estabelecer algumas relações entre o poema de Parmênides e as Investigações Lógicas, de Frege.

Mais especificamente, nosso objetivo é iluminar certos aspectos do poema de Parmênides por meio de uma comparação com certas noções utilizadas por Frege para caracterizar aspectos centrais de seu pensamento."

10. ———. 2015. "O fragmento B4 de Parmênides à luz da épica." *Prometeus - Filosofia* no. 8:218-227.
Resumo: "O propósito do presente texto é interpretar alguns termos empregados por Parmênides de Eléia em seu fragmento B4 à luz dos usos homéricos dos mesmos termos, em especial aqueles utilizados em contextos militares"

11. Kahn, Charles H. 1997. *Sobre o verbo grego ser o conceito de ser*. Rio de Janeiro: Núcleo de Estudos de Filosofia Antiga (Depto. de Filosofia da PUC-Rio).
Sumário: Editorial V; Apresentação IX; O Verbo Grego "Ser" e o Conceito de Ser 1; Sobre a Teoria do Verbo "Ser" 33; Sobre a Terminologia para Cópula e Existência 63; Por que a Existência não emerge como um Conceito distinto na Filosofia Grega ? 91; Alguns Usos Filosóficos do Verbo "Ser"em Platão 107; Retrospectiva do Verbo "Ser" e do Conceito de Ser 155; Ser em Parmênides e em Platão 197-227.
Apresentação: "No artigo "Retrospectiva sobre o Verbo 'Ser' e o Conceito de Ser", incluído nesta coletânea, Charles Kahn apresenta as razões que o levaram a investigar o verbo grego einai: seu objetivo era "fornecer uma espécie de prolegômenos gramaticais ao estudo da ontologia grega". Desconfiado de uma compreensão do verbo *einâi* que se tinha tornado cristalizada, e que lhe atribuía esquematicamente ou bem um uso copulativo ou o sentido de existência, desconfiado além disso da própria noção de existência a ele associada sem nenhuma crítica, Kahn empreendeu um estudo sobre os usos ordinários do verbo, independentes de seu uso especial pelos filósofos, a fim de "esclarecer o ponto de partida pré-teórico para as doutrinas do Ser desenvolvidas por Parmênides, Platão, Aristóteles". Kahn começou a publicar os resultados de suas pesquisas em 1966, com o artigo que abre este volume, "O Verbo Grego 'Ser' e o Conceito de Ser". A partir daí, nunca mais o verbo grego ser foi o mesmo.

As revelações de Charles Kahn sobre os usos e sentidos do verbo *einai* supreenderam os meios acadêmicos, e obrigaram a uma revisão radical de interpretações tradicionais não só sobre o sentido do verbo ser nos textos gregos, mas sobre o sentido dos próprios textos dos filósofos que forjaram o conceito de Ser, o fundamento por excelência do pensamento filosófico ocidental. O que realmente disseram Parmênides, Platão, Aristóteles, quando falaram sobre ser e o Ser? Tudo teve de ser revisto, e as polêmicas, evidentemente, não poderiam faltar. Nos debates em que se viu envolvido, Charles Kahn soube defender suas posições e soube ouvir seus opositores. Dessa escuta atenta são prova os ajustes e precisões introduzidos em suas teses ao longo do tempo. Seria redundante, na ocasião em que publicamos seus textos, apresentar, ainda que resumidamente, tanto as teses originais de Kahn quanto os ajustes e precisões a que nos referimos. Os artigos desta coletânea estão organizados cronologicamente, para que o leitor possa acompanhar essa evolução." (pp. IX-X)

12. Pereira da Silva, José Lourenço. 2010. "Sobre o conceito de *Noeîn* em Parmênides." *Dissertatio* no. 32:177-191. Resumo: "O verbo *noeîn* e sua substantivação *nóos* pertencem ao vocabulário cognitivo grego na literatura épica e pré-socrática comunicando a ideia de uma apreensão imediata da realidade ou da verdade de um objeto, isto é, um tipo de cognição análogo à percepção sensível em seu caráter intuitivo e direto. Segundo Von Fritz, esses conceitos passaram por uma evolução na qual Parmênides representa um momento decisivo. Em Parmênides, sem perder o aspecto preponderante de uma intuição da natureza das coisas – portanto de captar o ser (*tò eón*) – o nóos também opera como raciocínio lógico. Quer dizer, noeîn-nóos exerce uma dupla função: é o contato direto com a realidade última e o pensamento discursivo, que argumenta, infere e deduz. Nosso propósito aqui é mostrar como, em Parmênides, essas funções do *nóos* se encontram articuladas."
13. ———. 2014. "Sobre alguns problemas de interpretação difícil no Poema de Parmênides." *Hypnos* no. 12:108-129.

Resumo: "Parmênides de Eléia é o mais importante pensador pré-socrático.
Seu poema filosófico marca um momento decisivo na história da investigação racional no século V a.C. Os fragmentos restantes, objeto de amplo debate entre os estudiosos da filosofia antiga, apresenta problemas para a interpretação do pensamento de Parmênides. Focalizando sua 'via da Verdade', sugiro uma interpretação das lições de Parmênides sobre o ser. Examino três problemas cruciais extensamente tratados na literatura crítica sobre Parmênides: (i) sua relação com outros filósofos do seu tempo, (ii) o sujeito do verbo ser em seu poema, e (iii) o significado desse verbo no fragmento 2."

14. Santoro, Fernando. 2008. "As provas contra o ente, no tribunal de Parmênides." *O que nos faz pensar* no. 17:35-45.
Resumo: "Confluem, para a originalidade da linguagem ontológica de Parmênides, determinadas figuras de linguagem (*skhemáta léxeon*) do campo discursivo da veracidade, entre as quais destacam-se figuras da nascente retórica forense. Isto, evidentemente, já na tradição originária dos filósofos que falam da natureza, que Aristóteles chamou de físicos, fisiólogos. No fragmento 8, a Deusa do Poema de Parmênides leva o ente ao tribunal, denuncia-lhe os sinais (sémata) e por fim amarra-o nos liames da Necessidade."
15. Santoro, Fernando, Cairus, Henrique, and Ribeiro, Tatiana, eds. 2009. *Acerca do Poema de Parmênides*. Rio de Janeiro: Azougue Editorial.
Prefácio 5; Néstor Cordero: En Parmenides, 'tertium non datur' 11; José Trindade Santos: Parménides contra Parménides 23; Emmanuel Carneiro Leão: O homem no Poema de Parmênides 43; Giovanni Casertano: Verdade e erro no Poema de Parménides 53; Chiara Robbiano: Duas fases parmenídeas ao longo da via para a Verdade: elenkhos e ananke 65; Charles Kahn: Algumas questões controversas na interpretação de Parmênides 79; Fernando Muniz: A *Odisséia* de Parmênides 91; Luis Felipe Belintani Ribeiro: Parmênides trágico 97;

Gérard Émile Grimberg: Parmênides e a matemática 107; Carla Francalanci: O diálogo *Sofista* à sombra de Parmênides 119; Fernando Pessoa: Entre pensar e ser, Heidegger e Parmênides 127; Gisele Amaral: A necessidade do dizer 135; Gabriele Cornelli: A descida de Parmênides: anotações geofilosóficas às margens do prólogo 139; Izabela Bocayuva: O Poema de Parmênides e a viagem iniciática 149; Markus Figueira: O atomismo antigo e o legado de Parmênides 161; Marcus Reis Pinheiro: Plotino, exegeta de Platão e Parmênides 171;
Alexandre Costa: O sentido histórico-filosófico do Poema de Parmênides 181; Marcelo Pimenta Marques: Relendo o Fragmento 4 de Parmênides 213; Bibliografia 225-235.

16. Soares, Marcio. 2008. "Sobre ser, pensamento e discurso no poema de Parmênides." *Intuitio* no. 1:232-248.
Resumo: "Visamos tratar das relações entre ser, pensar e dizer na filosofia de Parmênides de Eléia.
Nesse sentido, procuramos demonstrar a sistemática imbricação entre essas três dimensões, na medida em que, segundo o Filósofo eleata, apenas o que realmente é (o ser) pode ser dito e pensado, como uma senda segura de investigação filosófica. Visamos, ainda, demonstrar que o nãoser acaba por figurar apenas como uma expressão lingüística puramente negativa na filosofia parmenídica, sem qualquer correspondência real (ôntica). Com isso, queremos defender que a via do não-ser e a opinião dos homens mortais são distintas e não podem ser confundidas. A partir dessa proposta interpretativa do poema de Parmênides, especulamos sobre os limites e paradoxos de sua filosofia ao pensar o não-ser como expressão negativa na linguagem, ao mesmo tempo em que o Filósofo proíbe completamente sua investigação. Também procuramos, ao final do texto, discutir o próprio conceito de discurso que resulta como conseqüência da filosofia parmenídica, especialmente em relação à opinião.
Para tanto, começamos analisando o proêmio do poema parmenídico desde a perspectiva da tradição poética grega, tentando demonstrar que nosso Filósofo reside em uma região fronteiriça entre a poesia e a filosofia nascente."

17. Trindade Santos, José. 2012. "A questao da "Existencia" no Poema de Parmenides." *Filosofi a Unisinos* no. 13:182-198.
Resumo: "O texto estuda o uso do verbo grego 'ser' por Parmênides com vista ao estabelecimento do conceito de 'ser' pelos pensadores por ele infl uenciados.
Foca a noção de 'existência' tentando avaliar a correcção do nosso uso do verbo 'existir' para traduzir o verbo grego 'einai' no Peri physeôs. Baseado em considerações de ordem cognitiva, Parmênides avança a sua tese sobre a impossibilidade de conhecer "o que não é" (B2.5-8a) visando estabelecer "o que é" como "o que há para pensar" (B2.2; B8.15-18), para permitir a identidade de "pensar" e "ser" (B3; B8.34). Se, ao longo do argumento da Via da Verdade, Parmênides lê a existência como um pressuposto de "o que é", mas nunca como um predicado separado, devem ser rejeitadas as leituras existenciais do verbo 'ser' nas traduções das expressões que nomeiam os dois caminhos (B2.3; B2.5)."
18. ———. 2012. "A leitura de "É/Enao É" a partir de Parmênides, B2." *Dissertatio* no. 36:11-31.
Resumo: "Interpreto antepredicativamente o argumento de Parmênides na "verdade" do *Da natureza*. Chamo 'antepredicativa' a uma interpretação que, explorando a ausência de sujeito e predicado em "é/não é" (B2.3,5), lê os dois caminhos como expressões autoreferenciais, negando às formas verbais usadas o valor de cópulas. Da incognoscibilidade de "que não é" (B2.6-8a) resulta a "decisão de abandonar esse 'não-nome' (anônymon: B8.17) como via de investigação" (B8.17-18a), "deixando" 'que é' (B8.2) como o único ['nome']" (B8.1b-2a) que "pode ser pensado" (B8.18b). Nesta interpretação, 'ser' não é objeto de 'pensar', nem pensar'/'pensamento' a faculdade que capta o "ser" (B3, B8.34), mas o estado cognitivo infalível em que "pensamento, pensar e pensado são" (B6.1a). A leitura antepredicativa de Parmênides deixou sinais em textos de Platão, Górgias e Protágoras, alguns anunciando a captação da antepredicatividade pela predicação, nos diálogos platônicos."

19. ———. 2015. "Parmênides e a antepredicatividade." *Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto* no. 32:9-33.
Resumo: "O texto propõe uma interpretação antepredicativa dos argumentos de Parménides na Alêtheia do seu Poema. Lida antepredicativamente, a oposição do par de esti sem sujeito em ambos os «caminhos para pensar» (B2.2) implica apenas que se um deles «é» (B2.3), então necessariamente o outro «não é» (B2.5). Esta oposição justifica a necessidade de escolher (B8.15) entre eles, abandonando «a via impensável e anónima » (B8.17-18; B2.7-8), consequentemente deixando «é» como a via autêntica (B8.18). Devido ao hábito de confiar nas sensopercepções (b7.3-5a), as «opiniões dos mortais» ignoram esta oposição (B64-9), «considerando o ser e não-ser o mesmo e o não-mesmo» (B6.8-9a; B8.40). Contudo, os homens não deviam errar (B8.54), levados pela mistura dos seus membros (B16.1-2a), «pois, o pleno é pensamento » (B16.4b; B9.1-4)."
20. Vanin, Andrei Pdro. 2017. "As 'Raizes da verdade' no proêmio do poema 'Da natureza' de Parmênides." *Gavagai* no. 4:103-120.
Resumo: "O texto procura evidenciar como algumas noções de verdade presentes, sobretudo, na *Odisseia* e na *Ilíada*, influenciaram a definição de verdade proposto no poema *Da Natureza* de Parmênides. A vasta literatura a respeito do tema, de modo geral, considera Parmênides o 'divisor de águas' entre a poesia e filosofia. Dada a importância filosófica do poema, ao enunciar pela primeira vez a identidade entre o ser e o pensar, esquece-se de ressaltar, no mais das vezes, fato não menos importante, a teoria literária subjacente ao poema, bem como as influências e semelhanças com os mitos precedentes. Sendo assim, parte-se de uma rápida caracterização do modo pelo qual a noção de verdade é apresentada em passagens específicas da *Odisseia* e da Ilíada. O segundomomento, apresenta rapidamente e de modo geral, a noção de verdade no poema de Parmênides, para após, buscar por contraste as semelhanças/dessemelhanças em relação aos poemas ditos homéricos, centrando-se a análise no proêmio do poema Da

Natureza, onde pode-se ilustrar um contexto de teoria literária arcaica específico presente em ambos os textos a serem analisados, a saber: a adequação do assunto e estilo."

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A Selection of Critical Studies on the Poem of Parmenides

FR. B1: THE PROEM

Our only source for the verses 1-28 is Sextus Empiricus, *Against the logicians*, VII, 111; verses 29-30 are also contained in Simplicius *Commentary on De Caelo (On Aristotle's 'On the heavens'*) book III, p. 557, 20 ff.; Simplicius is the only source for the verses 31-32).

Sextus gives the most ancient commentary on Parmenides' Proem (op. cit. VII, 112-114):

"(112) In these words Parmenides is saying that the "mares" that carry him are the non-rational impulses and desires of the soul, and that it is reflection in line with philosophical reason that is conveyed along "the famed road of the goddess". This reason, like a divine escort, leads the way to the knowledge of all things. His "girls" that lead him forward are the senses. And of these, he hints at the ears in saying "for it was being pressed forward by two rounded wheels," that is the round part of the ears, through which they receive sound. (113) And he calls the eyes "daughters of Night," leaving the "house of Night," "pushed into the light" because there is no use for them without light. And coming upon "much-punishing" Justice that "holds the corresponding keys" is coming upon thought, which holds safe the apprehensions of objects. (114) And she receives him and then promises to teach the following two things: "both the stable heart of persuasive Truth," which is the immovable stage of knowledge, and also "the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust" -- that is,

everything that rests on opinion, because it is insecure. And at the end he explains further the necessity of not paying attention to the senses but to reason. For he says that you must not "let habit, product of much experience, force you along this road to direct an unseeing eye and echoing ear and tongue, but judge by reason the argument, product of much experience, that is spoken by me". So he too, as is evident from what has been said, proclaimed knowledgeable reason as the standard of truth in the things that there are, and withdrew from attention to the senses." (pp. 24-25)

From: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, Translated and edited by Richard Bett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.

"The fragments of Parmenides are an important monument of Greek poetry at the end of the sixth or the beginning of the fifth century B.C. In time they cannot be far removed from Pindar's Pythian x, which was written in 498, or from his Pythians VI and XII, which were written in 490. With these flights of lyrical genius the poem has little in common, but it belongs to the same age, and it has suffered from being too often considered either in isolation as a contribution to truth or as an episode in purely philosophical poetry. But it presents questions to the literary critic which have little direct relation to its metaphysics; and particularly in the Proem Parmenides attempts a manner of writing so unusual that it is easy to dismiss it as an eccentricity of a philosopher attempting a task for which nature had not equipped him. But Parmenides was a careful and singularly exact writer, and the composition of his Proem no doubt cost him as much pains as the exposition of reality which it precedes. In it he had something to say of great importance, and he adopted a remarkable method to which Greek poetry presents hardly any parallel. The origins of his method have been studied, but a knowledge of them does not explain either what he meant to say or what his contemporaries would see in his words. If we can understand what the Proem meant in the thought of his time, we may perhaps understand better how Parmenides viewed his calling as a philosopher.(1)

Diels was surely right in assuming that behind Parmenides' Proem there lies a considerable literature which has almost entirely disappeared. There were certainly poems which described descents into hell,(2) and there may have been poems which described ascents into heaven, although the evidence for them is scanty and the story of Empedotimus, told by Servius, *ad Georg*. I. 34, cannot be pressed, since its date is not known. But even if such ascents had a poetry of their own, it seems to be quite different from that of Parmenides. For these poets surely told of such adventures as facts which they expected to be taken as literally true. When Epimenides told of his converse with nymphs in a cave, he stated what he claimed to be a fact.' It could be believed or disbelieved, but there was no question of allegory or symbolism. But Parmenides is plainly allegorizing. The allegory may of course be based on something akin to a mystical experience, but it is none the less an allegory. The transition from Night to Day is the transition from ignorance to knowledge; the Sun-maidens who accompany the poet are the powers in him which strain toward the light; the horses who know the road are his own impulses towards truth; the way on which he travels is the way of inquiry. The allegory is revealed as soon as the goddess begins to speak. For then the way with its three different branches becomes the ways of truth, of not-being, and of opinion. The allegory breaks down when the poet gets to his real task, and we may be certain that till then Parmenides is not giving the literal record of a spiritual adventure but clothing his search for truth in an allegorical dress.

Parmenides' Proem may be called allegorical because it has two meanings--the superficial meaning which tells a story and the implied meaning which gives the essential message of the poet. He tells of a chariot journey through gates to a goddess, but what he really describes is the transition from ignorance to knowledge. The use of allegory on such a scale is extremely rare in early Greek poetry. The first signs of it may be detected in Homer's account of the *Aitiai*(2) and in Hesiod's steep path which leads to *Arethé*.(3) But in neither of these is much added to the essential facts by the allegorical dress, and in both the allegory is closely related to traditional mythology." (pp. 97-99)

Notes

(1) Cf. especially H. Diels, *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (Berlin, 1897); J. Dorfier, *Die Eleaten und die Orphiker* (Prog. Freistadt, 1911); W. Kranz, *Über Aufbau und Bedeutung des Parmenideischen Gedichtes* (Berlin, 1916).
(2) The question of such poetry is discussed by E. Norden in his *Aeneis*, VI, esp. 1-10. He is primarily concerned with Orpheus in his notes on vss. 120, 264 ff., 384-416, 548- 627, and with Heracles on vss. 131 ff., 260, 309-12, 384-416, 477-93, 538-627, 666-78.
(3) I. 502 ff.

From: Cecil Bowra, "The Proem of Parmenides," Classical Philology 32, 1937, pp. 97-112. Reprinted in: C. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, pp. 38-53.

FR. B2: THE WAYS OF ENQUIRY

"Then what roads of enquiry can be thought of? [Fragment B 2] mentions two roads: Road (A) is described in line 3, and proved by line 4 to be the Way of Truth; Road (B) is the 'track beyond all tidings', delineated in line 5. [B 6]. 3-4 also mentions two roads: Road (C), described in lines 4-9, is that 'along which mortals . .. wander', and it is therefore the Way of Opinion. The 'first road' of line 3 also has pitfalls (for the goddess 'restrains' Parmenides from it); and it cannot therefore be identical with Road (A), the Way of Truth. Now lines l-2 contain the end of an argument concerned with this 'first road' ; and, as I shall show, it is plausible to find the beginning of the argument in [B 2] 7-8, which starts to recount the horrors of the 'track beyond all tidings'. If that is so, then the 'first road' of [B 6] is identical with Road (B); and in consequence Road (B), the 'track beyond all tidings', is not the Way of Opinion.
[B 2] and [B 6] show Parmenides at a crossroads, faced by three possible paths of inquiry: (A) the Way of Truth; (B) the 'track beyond all tidings' and (C) the Way of Opinion. (8) The first duty

of the goddess is to characterize those three roads in a logically perspicuous fashion. Road (A) maintains 'both that it is (*esti*) and that it is not for not being' (B2. 3) ; (9) Road (B) maintains 'both that it is not and that it is necessary for it not to be' (B2. 5); Road (C) is not explicitly described in comparable terms, but must have maintained 'both that it is and that it is not' (cf. [B 6.8]).

The three roads are thus distinguished by means of the word '*esti*', 'it is'. Both the sense of the verb and the identity of its subject are matters of high controversy. Since they are also vital to any interpretation of Parmenides' argument, we cannot burke the issue. I begin by asking what is the sense of the verb '*einai*' as Parmenides uses it here. The classification of the different 'senses', or 'uses', of the verb '*einai*' is a delicate task, abounding in linguistic and philosophical difficulties; (10) and my remarks will be crude and superficial. Nevertheless, something must be said.

We can distinguish between a complete and an incomplete use of '*einai*': sometimes a sentence of the form 'X *esti*' expresses a complete proposition; sometimes *esti* occurs in sentences of the form 'X *esti* Y' (or the form 'X *esti*' is elliptical for 'X *esti* Y'). In its complete use, '*einai*' sometimes has an existential sense: '*ho theos esti*' is the Greek for 'god exists'; '*ouk esti kentauros*' means 'Centaurs do not exist'. In its incomplete use, '*einai*' often serves as a copula, and the use is called predicative: '*Sokrates esti sophos*' is Greek for 'Socrates is wise'; '*hoi leontes ouk eisin hemeroi*' means 'Lions are not tame'. Many scholars think that Parmenides' original sin was a confusion, or fusion, of the existential with the predicative '*einai*'; and they believe that the characterization of the three roads in [B 2] catches Parmenides *in flagrante delicto*. If we ask what sense '*esti*' has in line 3, the answer is disappointing: '*esti*' attempts, hopelessly, to combine the two senses of 'exists' and 'is Y'. (11)

Now I do not wish to maintain that Parmenides was conscious of the distinction between an existential and a predicative use of '*einai*'; credit for bringing that distinction to philosophical consciousness is usually given to Plato. But I do reject the claim that [B 2] fuses or confuses the two uses of the verb. I see no reason to impute such a confusion to the characterization of the three roads; for I see no trace of a predicative 'is' in that

characterization. The point can be simply supported: Road (B) rules out 'X is not'; if we read 'is' predicatively, we must suppose Parmenides to be abjuring all negative predications. to be spurning all sentences of the form 'X is not F. Such a high-handed dismissal of negation is absurd; it is suggested by nothing in Parmenides' poem; and it is adequately outlawed by such lines as B 8.22, which show Parmenides happy to accept formulae of the form 'X is not F'. (12) ' *esti*', in the passages we are concerned with, is not a copula.

Then is '*esti*' existential? Aristotle distinguishes what has been called a 'veridical' use of '*esti*'; 'X *esti*', in this use, is complete, and ' *esti*' means . . is the case' or . . is true'. If Socrates asserts that cobblers are good at making shoes, his interlocutor may reply ' *esti tauta*', 'Those things are' or 'That's true'. It has been suggested that Parmenides' complete '*esti*' is veridical, not existential.

That suggestion can be accommodated, I think, to [B 2] and [B 6]; but the accommodation is not easy, nor (as far as I can see) does it have any philosophical merit. In any event, the suggestion breaks on the rocks of B 8: in that fragment, Parmenides sets himself to infer a number of properties of X from the premiss that X *esti*. None of those properties consists with the veridical reading of ' *esti*': the very first inference is that X is ungenerated; and if it is not, strictly speaking, impossible to take 'X' in 'X is ungenerated' to stand for the sort of propositional entity of which veridical ' *esti*' is predicable, it is grossly implausible to do so, and the implausibility mounts to giant proportions as the inferences of B 8 proceed. Since the inferences in B 8 are tied to the ' *esti*' of [B 2] and [B 6], the veridical reading of *esti* in those fragments can only be maintained at the cost of ascribing to Parmenides a confusion between veridical and non-veridical *einai*. And I see no reason for making that derogatory ascription. (13)

Existential ' *einai*' remains. The obvious and the orthodox interpretation of ' *esti*' in [B 2] and [B 6] is existential; and that interpretation is felicitous: it does not perform the impossible task of presenting Parmenides with a set of doctrines which are true, but it does give Parmenides a metaphysical outlook which is intelligible, coherent and peculiarly plausible. I shall continue to

translate Parmenides' ' *einai*' by 'be'; but I shall paraphrase it by 'exist'.
Road (A) thus says that 'it exists', *esti*. Scholars have naturally raised the question of what exists: what is Parmenides talking about? what is the logical subject of '*esti*'? Some have denied the appropriateness of the question, urging that we need no more ask after the subject of '*esti*' than we do after '*huei*', 'it is raining'. I find that suggestion perfectly incomprehensible. (14)
Nevertheless, the spirit behind it is sound: ' *esti*' need not have a logical subject. For in general, we can make sense of a sentence of the form 'it *φ*s' in either of two ways: first, we may find a determinate reference for 'it', so that 'it *φ*s' is understood as '*a φ*s'. ('How is your motor car?' -- It's working again'.) Here we do look for a logical subject and we expect to find it, explicit or implicit, in the immediate context. Second, 'it *φ*s' may be the consequent of a conditional or a relative sentence: 'If you buy a machine, look after it'; 'Whatever machine you buy, something will go wrong with it'. In ordinary discourse, the antecedent is often not expressed: 'What will you do if you catch a fish? -- Eat it'. Here there is no question of finding a logical subject for the predicate '*φ*s': 'it' does not name or refer to any particular individual.
One standard view gives '*esti*' in [B 2].3 a logical subject: that subject is 'Being'; and Road (A) asserts, bluntly, that Being exists. I am at a loss to understand that assertion; what in the world can be meant by 'Being exists'? Nevertheless, behind abstract Being there lurks a more concrete candidate for the post of logical subject: '*to eon*', 'what is': should we gloss '*esti*' as 'what is, is'? (15)
Phrases of the form 'what *φ*s' do not always serve as logical subjects: 'what *φ*s' may mean 'whatever *φ*s' ('What's done cannot be undone'); and then 'what *φ*s ψs' means 'for any x: if x *φ*s, x ψs'. Thus we might gloss Parmenides' '*esti*' by 'what is, is', and yet deny that 'what is' is a logical subject; for we might explain the phrase by '*whatever is, is*'. Road (A), on that view, maintains that whatever exists exists and cannot not exist. It has been objected to that interpretation that Parmenides attempts to prove that Road (A) is right, and Roads (B) and (C) mistaken; but that the interpretation makes (A) tautologous, and hence in no need of

proof, and (B) and (C) contradictory, and hence in no need of disproof. But the objection is doubly mistaken: first, tautologies can, and sometimes should, be proved; and contradictions can, and sometimes should, be disproved. Second, Road (A) does not turn out tautologous; since it is far from a tautology that what exists *cannot not exist*.

'What *φ*s' may mean 'the thing that *φ*s', and serve as a logical subject. Thus '*to eon*' may mean 'the thing which exists'. Then Road (A) maintains that the thing that exists -- 'the One' or 'the Whole' or 'Nature' -- exists and cannot not exist. It has been objected to that interpretation that Parmenides proceeds in B 8 to prove that the subject of his poem is One; and that he can hardly have intended to prove the tautology that 'the One is one'. Again, the objection is weak: first, Parmenides may have tried to prove a tautology; second, it is far from clear that Parmenides ever does try to prove that the subject of his poem is One; and thirdly, it is not clear that it is tautologous to say that 'the Whole' or 'Nature' or 'Reality' is one.

Nevertheless, I do not believe that '*to eon*', on either interpretation, is a likely supplement to Parmenides' *esti* . The reason is simple: nothing in the context of [B 2] could reasonably suggest to even the most careful reader that by 'it is' Parmenides meant 'what is, is'. The term 'what is' does not appear in B 1 or in [B 2]; and it is not the sort of term a reader would naturally supply for himself. (16)

A close investigation of the context of [B 2] has supplemented '*esti*' in a different way: instead of 'what is', supply 'what can be thought of or 'what can be known'. Road (A) then says that 'what can be thought of exists'; and 'Parmenides' real starting-point is . . . the possibility of rational discourse' or of thought. (17) My objection to that suggestion is a weaker version of my objection to '*to eon*': nothing in the introductory context of [B 2] suggests such a supplement for '*esti*' at line 3; reflexion on the subsequent argument may indeed lead us to 'what can be thought of', but it will also lead us to berate Parmenides for a gratuitously roundabout and allusive way of expressing himself; for the most careful reader, on this view, will only understand the crucial lines of [B 2] after he has read a quantity of later verses.

Nonetheless, the philosophical advantages of the interpretation are considerable; and we may well be loth to abandon the spectacle of a Parmenides who investigates, in Kantian fashion, the implications of rationality. We can retain the advantages and avoid the objection by modifying the interpretation slightly. I suggest the following paraphrase for lines 1-3: 'I will tell you . . . the different conceivable ways of inquiring into something -- the first assumes that it exists and cannot not exist . . .' In the paraphrase, 'it' has an explicit antecedent, and 'inquiring into' has an explicit object: viz. the word 'something'. In the Greek text there is no explicit subject for '*esti*' and no explicit object of '*dizêsios*' ('inquiry'). Subject and object must both be supplied, and nothing is easier than to make this double task one: the implicit object of '*dizêsios*' is the implicit subject of '*esti*'. 'Of the ways of inquiring [about any given object], the first assumes that [the object, whatever it may be] exists." (Chapter IX: *Parmenides and the Objects of Inquyiry*, pp. 125-128 of the 1982 edition)

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(8) The reference of *tautês* in [B6] .3 has caused some difficulty (see especially Stokes [1971], 112-15); but as far as I can see that word refers simply enough to the Road discussed in [B2] and [B6].1-2 (see Cornford [1933], 99-100).
(9) The second half of [B2].3 is syntactically ambiguous: the *esti in ouk esti me einai* may be either 'personal' or 'impersonal' ('It is not for not being' or 'It is not possible for it not to be'). Line 5 proves that the sense is: 'It cannot not be'; and I take it that either syntax will yield that sense.
(10) See especially Kahn [1973]; there is a useful table on p. 82 presenting a summary classification of the roles played by *einai*.
(11) Eudemus, fr. 43 Wehrli = A 28, says that the Eleatics ignore different uses of *einai*; but the Peripatetic and the modern accusations are quite distinct. Furth [1968] maintains that the notions of existence and of the copula are 'impacted or fused in the early Greek concept of being' (243). He cites no evidence; and he does not explain the difference between fusion and confusion. Kahn [1973], 320-3, argues that existential *einai* -- his Type VI --

was invented in the fifth century; but I cannot distinguish Type VI from the early Type I.
(12) '. . . negative judgments (*hoi apophatikoi logoi*), as Parmenides says, fit principles and limits' (Scholiast to Euclid, A 22a in Untersteiner [1958]'s edition); but the sense and reliability of the report are uncertain.
(13) The veridical use of *einai* is discussed in Kahn [1966], and applied to Parmenides in Kahn [1968]. Kahn's view is complicated by the fact that he maintains first that the veridical use of *einai* involves both the existential and the predicative uses ([Kahn 1968], 712), and second, that Parmenides' *esti* means both 'it is the case' and 'it exists' (ibid., 336). Mourelatos [1970], ch. 2 and Appendix 2, claims to follow Kahn; but he says that *esti* is the 'is' of 'speculative predication' (predication which gives insight into the identity of something or says what it is). That is not a special sense of *esti*; nor can I give any account of the three Roads in terms of it. Holscher [1969], 79 and 98, holds that *esti* is neither existential nor predicative: it means 'seiend sein', 'Bestand haben', 'wahr sein'. Jones [1973], 290-1, thinks that Parmenides is proposing a new sense of *einai*, which he explains in [B3]. None of these modern suggestions has any linguistic or interpretative plausibility; and none is worth considering unless there are grave objections to the existential construe of *esti*.
(14) Some scholars talk vaguely of an 'indefinite' subject. Loenen [1959], 12-14, emends line 3 to read: . . . *hopôs esti ti kai hôs* . . . ('that something (*ti*) is . . .). Untersteiner [1958], LXXV-XC, takes the subject of *esti* to be he *[hodos]*, 'the one [road]'; and 156.17-18 supports the suggestion. But that gives Parmenides grammar at the cost of sense.
(15) Reinhardt [1916], 60, supposes a lost line before [B2] in which Parmenides refers to *to eon*; Cornford [1939], 30, n. 2, emends line 3 to read: *Hê men hopôs eon esti* . . .
(16) Tugendhat [1970], 137, says that 'what Parmenides is dealing with is that (i.e. "the Whole") which previous philosophers had always dealt with'; so that the philosophically educated reader will grasp the subject of the poem at once (cf. Verdenius [1942], 32: Verdenius, 73-5, argues that the poem was explicitly entitled *Concerning Nature*). The Milesians had indeed described the

universe as a whole; but they had not, in any very obvious sense, made statements about 'the Whole'.
(17) See especially Owen [1960]; I quote from Stokes [1971], 119-22.

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"What is declared to exist in B 2 is simply what can be talked or thought about; for the proof of its existence is that, if it did not exist, it could not be talked or thought about. (On our version of B 6. 1-2 the subject comes into the open there: *to legein te noein t'eon*.) (50) And it needs no proving that the subject of the argument can be talked and thought about, for we are talking and thinking about it. Hence indeed the temptation to say that the éstin has no subject; for Parmenides' argument need assume nothing save that we are thinking and talking of something, and this seems to be guaranteed by our framing or following the argument at all. The subject is quite formal, until it is filled in with the attributes (beginning with existence) that are deduced for it; and because this seems to reduce to the vacuous discovery that the subject is just the subject, it is as tempting as it is certainly illogical and misleading to say that there is no subject at all.

Is this too small a mouse from the mountain? Philosophically it seems more like the giant that Parmenides' successors thought it. The comparison with Descartes' cogito is inescapable: both arguments cut free of inherited premisses, both start from an assumption whose denial is peculiarly self-refuting. This seems sufficient to establish that Parmenides does not, in the sense described, rest his argument on assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists. To me it seems sufficient to establish him as the most radical and conscious pioneer known to us among the Presocratics." (*Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, pp. 15-16)

Notes

(50) [Lest this mislead, it must be emphasized that the problem has never been to supply a *grammatical* subject for the *ἐστιν* and οὐκ ἐστιν of B 2 (save for emendators such as Cornford and Loenen), for there is sufficient evidence that, at the start of the argument at least, Parmenides is prepared to dispense with one. The problem is to decide what must be supposed true, from the start, of whatever it is that Parmenides exhibits in the course of his argument as existing without beginning or end or change or plurality. I argue that this subject must simply be what can be

spoken and thought of (told forth, picked out in speech -- (φραζειν, λέγειν, φατιζειν, cf. the contrasted ἀνωνυμον, B 8. 17; distinguished and grasped in thought -- γιγνώσκειν, νοειν). For one reviewer this still left the subject too 'definite' (Kerferd, *Classical Review* 1961, 26), and one can only ask what it would be to have a more indefinite subject than one which can merely be thought and spoken of: which of these attributes would it lack, and what nonsense would result? Another scholar, by contrast, found such an account of the subject 'rarefied and abstract' (A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route o Parmenides* (New Haven 1970), xiv) but himself proposed to translate the tatty and ouk éstin as '-- is --' and '-- is not --', 'with blanks in both the subject and the predicate place' (ibid. 55).] But those who wish to set his poem inside an orthodox cosmological tradition have one prop left to rest on: the spherical universe, whose appearance is the outcome of the whole argument."
(51) 'In the sense described': I am not of course denying that some of the ideas employed in the course of the argument may have been inherited from earlier theorists. This must be true of some of the cosmogony, and probably of at least the idea of πεῖρας in the Αλήθεια (see the third section of the paper).

From: Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen, "Eleatic Questions", *Classical Quarterly*: 1960, pp.84-102; reprinted with additions in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatics and Pluralists,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975, pp. 48-81 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,*Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986, pp. 3-26.

FR. B3: THINKING AND BEING

...το᾽ γα᾽ρ αὐτο᾽ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε και᾽ εἶναι.

"As examples of semiotic analysis I have selected classical and, as far as possible, non-problematic older texts from the tradition on

which our philosophy is founded, that is, the Greek tradition. Their clarity is a function of the non-ambiguity of translations, which is, of course, always relative since it itself is already an interpretation; in fact, variations in translation appear in our own language, as philosophical or any other dictionaries reveal (by the enumeration of synonyms and homonyms). Polysemy can be substantially reduced by investigating the context and comprehending the meaning as defined, on the whole, by the tension between context and situation -- to the extent, of course, that we are able to comprehend the situation.

For a first example I have chosen a sentence from Parmenides, fragment 3: *to gar auto noein estin to kai einai*, translated by Diels: *denn (das Seiende) denken und sein ist dasselbe*; by W. Capelle: *Denn (nur) ein und dasselbe kann gedacht werden und sein*; and by E. Cassirer: *Dasselbe ist Denken und Sein*.(3)

If we look at the syntactic side of semantic analysis, we see that everyone connects to-- *auto* and *noein* -- *einai* by means of *estin* and that the translations in general do not differ greatly, at least at first glance, with regard to the "sense," despite the fact that some translators insert words expanding the original text, and in so doing, already direct the interpretation. Let us suppose that we now choose the simplest translation, Cassirer's "it is the same to think and to be" and that we first examine without further interpretation those syntactic aspects of the texts which are important in determining the meaning. The most important is *estin*. Here logical syntax distinguishes three possibilities which could be illustrated by the following examples: (a) 1 + 1 = 2, (b) the crow is black, (c) ice is water. The first means a complete "identity" and tautology; in fact, the sentence can be reversed. The second case is an "inclusion" of a subclass; the crow is included in the class of black things. The third case represents an "identity" with regard to the third thing (the physical substance). Now, we can ask which case is applicable to the sentence: "It is the same to think and to be." The word "is" is semantically determined by the modifier "same," which would point to the first case, to a complete identity (thought = existence). Let us suppose that we accept this result; the question now is whether in such a case the "sense" is given without any ambiguity. How did Parmenides understand it and what did he mean by it? What did

he want to say through this fundamental thesis of his? Is it meant subjectively (I think = I am), or, perhaps, in an objectivist sense as with Hegel, or is it meant in another, different way? What meanings did the words "to think" and "to be" have for Parmenides in his situation? Do we understand something similar by our own words in our own situation?

Neither syntax nor simple lexical semantics helps us here. We must study the whole of the context and especially passages worded identically and probably having identical meaning or intention. Hence we reach for the nearest sentence that seems to express the same thing or to clarify the first text. In Diels we read in fragment 8, verse 34: *t'auton d'estin noein to kai houneken estin noema*,(4) which is translated by Diels: *Denken und das Gedankens Ziel ist ein und dasselbe*; by Capelle: *Dasselbe aber ist Denken und des Denkens Gegenstand*. If we now compare the first sentence (fragment 3) with the second sentence (fragment 8), we find that "being" as an object of thinking coincides with thinking about that being. The subjectivist interpretation, approximately as in Descartes, would seem to be put aside, but surely the meaning is not yet fully clear for that reason. Diels, however, does have grounds for his analysis, that is to say, for his interpretation in terms of "substance" (*einai -- to on*, *das Seiende*), which he supports by the whole text of Parmenides' poem, by Parmenides' intention to recognize what actually "is," and to assert the impossibility of knowing what "is not." But if we are to decide for a definite interpretation, then we must not only study the whole of Parmenides' poem, but also examine other texts to which, in this instance, Parmenides might directly or indirectly be tied, that is, look at the part of philosophy which could have been known to him. Moreover, we have to try to disclose Parmenides' own intuition by considering an analogous situation and, in this way, explain the proper intention of his thought. All of this will be relevant to the interpretation that we finally give to the words "thought and being are one" or "to think and to be is the same thing." Thus, the unambiguity of the meaning does not depend only on the syntax and semantics of individual words in the sentence or of the sentence as a whole, but primarily on the situation.

The question now is: what meaning did *einai* and *noein* have for Parmenides in his immediate situation? Furthermore, did he distinguish *einai* and *to on*, *noema* and *noein*, being and existence, content and object of thought? Let us assume that we know the following about his relation to predecessors or to contemporaries and followers in the Eleatic school: Parmenides responds in his poem partly to the teaching of Heraclitus on origin, partly to the teaching of Anaximander on apeiron, and simultaneously to the teaching of the Pythagoreans, who were endeavoring to demarcate, to define, the "boundless" quantitatively. He applied a more profound concept of existence or being not only as physical existence in space, but also as substance, the essence of the physical, which is not quantitatively definable, like matter, and of which it cannot be said that it appears "more" here and "less" there (since "to be" means either that [something] "is" or "is not"). This substance is definable by thought as its own object and without it nothing exists. Apparently, what is at stake is to overcome, to demonstrate if you like, the impracticality of "negation" for knowledge and to establish the basic "position" prior to any thought of particularities. Here we have a case of a confrontation with the "boundless," with the identification of existence with the world of numbers and thus with the views of Anaximander and the Pythagoreans. What is at stake is a higher reality than reality originating empirically (Heraclitus). There are many grounds for this conclusion in the context of the poem as well as in the historical reality known to us. These problems were taken up by the Eleatic school, which later, during the time of Zeno and Melissus, attempted to reconcile formally Parmenides' original intuition about thinking that attains being with the problem of the continuum of existence and the discursiveness of concepts, that is, with the logical problems of mastering the "integrity" of being as the substance of phenomena, the "immutable" being itself which "hard Necessity keeps in the shackles of bounds that hold it fast on every side." The whole intent of the antinomies and paradoxes of this school is to demonstrate the unreliability of other schools on the questions of becoming and ceasing-to-be, of being and nonbeing, of the changeability of the position, color, or shape of an object.

It is our intention here only to indicate possibilities for a definite interpretation and not to choose one it is simply a question of showing the need to approach as closely as possible the situation in which Parmenides wrote his poem, if we are to understand it. It would certainly be a great help if we were able somehow to ascertain different situational possibilities with the assurance that they had a ground in history, and at the same time to ascertain the forms of thought, or better of expression, which we have at our disposal. In this way the arbitrariness of interpretation could be limited to a certain extent, and directions could be given for the intuition of an analogous situation. For that purpose, however, a mere typology of "world views" would not be adequate, but only the elucidation or deciphering of the whole "constitution of philosophy." This is an important goal which today philosophy can no longer neglect; but it goes beyond the framework and possibilities of this article. If we were to succeed in this goal, it would be possible to establish for the first time a true philosophical history of philosophy, that is, an interpretation which would neither fragment this history into independent, isolated accidents nor impose upon it a definitive rational scheme of development in which what follows fulfills what precedes it as if the latter existed only for the sake of the former. Formal developmental connections manifest themselves above all in language, in a syntactic-semantic structure of expressive possibilities that are at the disposal of a unique act of thought, which always wants to master being anew. And precisely that tension, in turn, has an effect on the development of the vehicle of expression, that is to say, on the development of language." (pp. 93-96)

Notes

(3) John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1930): " . . . for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" (p. 173). H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1912), vol. 1; W. Capelle, *Die Vorsokratiker* (Leipzig, 1935); M. Dessoir (ed.), *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Berlin, 1925).

(4) Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy,* "The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same." (p. 137)

From: Ladislav Rieger, "The Semantic Analysis of Philosophical Texts", in: Peter Steiner (ed.), *The Prague School. Selected Writings, 1929-1946*, Translated by John Burbank, Olga Hasty, Manfred Jacobson, Bruce Kochis, and Wendry Steiner, Austin: University of Texas Press 1982, pp. 83-102. (Originally published in Czech in 1941).

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Obviously, the printed volume cannot offer all the characteristics available in the electronic edition. However, because the electronic publishing is still in a transitional phase, it was deemed appropriate to supply support facilities that are also accessible to people without access to computerised research tools, or who work in environments without a computerised workstation.
The electronic version of Lexicon is available in both on-line and off-line versions; the latter is distributed on CD-ROM with the printed volume. The two versions use the same search interface and the same technology. There are two differences: a) the on-line version allows for parallel searches within several lexicons while, with the CD-ROM version, only one lexicon can be consulted; b) the CD-ROM version allows users greater scope for personalising the text by means of notes, codes and markers."

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Plato's *Parmenides* and the Dilemma of Participation

INTRODUCTION: THE ANCIENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATOS' PARMENIDES

"Plato's *Parmenides* was probably written within the last two decades preceding the death of its author in 347 B.C. (1) Despite almost two millennia of documented commentary, however, scholars today are still struggling to make sense of the dialogue. Almost every major discussion of the *Parmenides* in this century has begun with some remark about its extraordinary difficulty; (2) and no line of interpretation has yet been offered that a majority of commentators find persuasive.
The main problem of interpretation, most agree, is what to make of Plato's treatment of the several hypotheses that constitutes the second portion of the dialogue (Stephanus 137C-166C, referred to subsequently as "*Parmenides* II"). One source of perplexity is that this latter portion fails to exhibit any obvious continuity of subject matter with the first part of the dialogue ("*Parmenides* I"), making it difficult to determine what the dialogue as a whole is about. To make matters worse, the argumentation of the second part is so extremely condensed that it sometimes gives the appearance of being incoherent. As a result, not only are individual arguments often very hard to decipher, but moreover it is far from apparent what Plato was trying to accomplish with these arguments in the first place.
(...)

Two major lines of interpretation were already established by the time of Proclus' *Parmenides Commentary* in the fifth century A.D., (3) and both have prominent followers in the present century. As Proclus notes in the first book of his commentary, (4) some readers view the dialogue as an exercise in logic. Within this group, some read *Parmenides* II as a polemical tour-de-force in which methods of argument derived from Zeno are turned against their originator, in an effort by Plato to show that Zeno's own monistic views lead to absurdities of the very sort he purports to demonstrate against the champions of pluralism. Others within this group read the second part more or less at face value, as a demonstration of a logical method that will enable Socrates to avoid the pitfalls in his theory of Forms that are exposed by Parmenides in the first part of the dialogue. In either case, readers of this persuasion view the dialogue primarily as a dialectical exercise, devoid of any positive metaphysical content. The second major line of interpretation identified by Proclus (5) assigns *Parmenides* II a definite metaphysical purpose. An early version of this approach (perhaps associated with Origen in the third century A.D. (6) identifies the topic of the dialogue as the Being of the historical Parmenides, with the consequence that the exclusively negative results of the first hypothesis come to be viewed as adding to the pluralistic list of features denied of the singular Being in Parmenides' poem. The tradition of interpretation with which Proclus himself joins forces, on the other hand, is that beginning with Plotinus and moving through Porphyry to lamblichus and Syrianus. As Proclus puts it, (7) commentators of this group take the subject of the dialogue to be "all things that get their reality from the One," which he later identifies with the Good of Plato's *Republic*. (8) Keying upon the conclusion at *Parmenides* 142A that the One can be neither expressed nor conceived, Proclus reads the results of the first hypothesis as a demonstration of the ineffable transcendence of this Supreme Principle. (9)" (pp. XI-XII)

Notes

(1) See W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 5, p. 34. The most recent attempt to assign a date to the *Parmenides* is

G. R. Ledger's *Re-Counting Plato*, which locates it between the *Republic* and the Theaetetus sometime before 369 B.C. My own view of the matter, defended in appendix B of *Plato's Late Ontology*, is that the second part of the dialogue at least was composed somewhat later, perhaps around the time of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*.
(2) Thus, for example, the opening comment of F. M. Cornford (*Plato and Parmenides*, p. V) that ancient and modern scholars alike have differed more widely about the second part of the *Parmenides* than about any of the other dialogues, that of M. Miller (*Plato's Parmenides*, p. 3) that the Parmenides is "the most enigmatic of all of Plato's dialogues," and R. S. Brumbaugh's opening remark in *Plato on the One* that no other work in the history of philosophy has retained the obscurity of this particular writing.
(3) A history of commentary on the *Parmenides* up to the time of Proclus is given in John Dillon's introduction to *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, translated in part by Glenn Morrow and completed by Dillon.
(4) Proclus' *Parmenides Commentary* 630.37-635.27.
(5) Ibid. 635.31-640.16.
(6) See Dillon in Proclus' *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, p. 8.
(7) Proclus' *Parmenides Commentary* 638.18-19.
(8) Ibid. 1097.10, passim.
(9) Ibid. 46K ff., from the Latin translation. The manner in which this reading anticipates, and to some extent inspires, the "negative theology" of the Middle Ages is noted by Cornford (*Plato and Parmenide*s, p. VI) and by R. Klibansky (*Plato's* Parmenides *in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, pp. 286, 309).

From: Kenneth M. Sayre, *Parmenides' Lesson*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1996.

STRUCTURAL OUTLINE OF PLATO'S PARMENIDES

"0. *Stage-setting* (126a-127d)
1. The *elicitation* of Socrates' theory of forms by Zeno's contradictions (127d-130a)
2. Parmenides' *refutations* of Socrates' theory (130a-134e)

1) Inquiry into the range of the forms (130b-130e)

2) The exposure of how participation appears to contradict the unity of the form (130e-133a)

(i) Against the unity (to be understood as the integrity) of the participated form, the dilemma of participation by whole or by part of the form (130e-131e)

(ii) Against the unity (to be understood as the singularity) of the participated form, the regress arguments (131e-133a)

3) The exposure of how, if the forms and their participants belong to separate domains, forms are unknowable (133a-134e)

3. Parmenides' reorienting help: the method of "gymnastic" (135a-137c)
4. Parmenides' return to Zenonian contradiction: the four pairs of apparently antithetical hypotheses (137d-166b)

(1) If the One is, it both has none of the possible characters, including being and unity, (hypothesis I, 137d-142a) and has all of the possible characters (hypothesis II, 142b-155e) and transits between them (hypothesis Ha, 155e-157b).

(2) If the One is, "the others" both participate in it and as a result have all the possible characters (hypothesis III, 157b-159b) and do not participate in it and as a result have no characters at all (hypothesis IV, 159b-160d).
(3) If the One is not, it both is, as referent of speech and knowledge, different from "the others" and participates in greatness, equality, and smallness and participates in being in some sense, transiting between being and not-being, (hypothesis V, 160b-163b) *and* -- since it does not participate in being in any sense -- cannot have any characters at all (hypothesis VI, 163b-164b).

(4) If the One is not, "the others"*both* will not "truly" have, but will "seem" and "appear" to have, all the possible characters (hypothesis VII, 164b-165e) *and* -- since they cannot participate in anything that is not -- cannot even "seem" and "appear" to have any of the possible characters (hypothesis VIII, 165e-166b)." (pp. 185-186)

From: Mitchell H. Miller, Jr., *Plato's* Parmenides. *The Conversion of the Soul*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986.

A SURVEY OF RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO'S PARMENIDES (under construction)

"The sheer magnitude of the scholarly literature on Plato makes its assessment difficult. Even if we leave aside editions and translations, the study of Plato is carried on in many languages other than the more familiar English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish and by scholars in an astonishing diversity of fields: anthropology, archeology, art history, classical philology, city planning, drama, education, geography, history, law, literature, mathematics, medicine, music, penology, philosophy, politics, psychology, religious studies, rhetoric, and sociology. At least partly for this reason, there has been no really comprehensive review of the literature recently and it is questionable whether such a thing is even possible. The problem can be reduced to more manageable proportions by distinguishing among the diverse purposes for which scholars study Plato's dialogues. For a substantial amount of the Plato literature is essentially concerned with discovering Plato's answers to the questions of concern to contemporary scholars and researchers, or, more plainly, 'the enterprise of mining Plato for the purposes of one's own philosophizing' [cited from Rudolph Weingartner]. Guthrie is correct that there is nothing intrinsically better about what he

calls, on the other hand, 'the historical approach' or 'a scholar's approach,' but the difference is often overlooked. The historical and scholarly approach has its own aims and uses, and is the concern here. Of that still substantial Plato literature which is left, there is a further distinction to be made between the study of Platonism, which involves study of the dialogues along with many other factors, texts, and influences, and the study and interpretation of the dialogues in and for themselves . That is to say, the subject of these pages is the state of the question about how to understand and interpret the dialogues of Plato, to discover their meaning in their own context, in terms of their own aims, functions, structures, and principles." (p. 309)
Gerald Press, "The State of the Question in the Study of Plato", *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 34, 1996, pp. 507-532.
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), *Plato. Critical Assessments*, Volume I: *General Issues of Interpretation*, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 309-332.

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    "The antinomies of the *Parmenides* were composed for the purpose of showing that the Eleatic dialectic of Zeno when applied to the monistic Being of Parmenides produces the same paradoxes as when used against pluralism. It is demonstrated that the second part of the dialogue is formally an elaborate parodia of the poem of Parmenides and metodically a parodia of the logic-chopping of Zeno. By this means the psychological purpose of the dialogue is elucidated, the unity of the dialogue is made evident, and its relationship to the Sophist is established."

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Semantics, Predication, Truth and Falsehood in Plato's *Sophist*

INTRODUCTION: BEING AND NON-BEING, TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD IN PLATO'S SOPHIST

"The *Sophist* seems to be concerned with two things: being and nonbeing, on the one hand, and true and false speech, on the other. If speech is either true or false speech, it seems not even plausible for being to be either being or nonbeing, since we would then be compelled to say that nonbeing is as much being as false speech is speech. If nonbeing, however, is being, then nonbeing cannot be nonbeing, for otherwise the falseness of false speech would not consist in its saying 'nonbeing.' And, in turn, if nonbeing is nonbeing, the falseness of' false speech again cannot consist in its saying 'nonbeing,' for it would then not be saying anything. If we then say that nonbeing is appearing, and appearing is not unqualified nonbeing, being is being and appearing, and we want to distinguish between the strict identity which belongs to being and the likeness of' nonbeing to the strict identity of being. We say, then, 'Here is Socrates himself' and 'Here is a likeness of Socrates.' Everything in the likeness of Socrates that is a likeness of' Socrates himself will generate a true speech of Socrates identical to another speech true of Socrates himself. Everything, how ever, in the likeness of Socrates that is not a likeness of Socrates himself yields a false speech of Socrates. Among the false speeches of Socrates would be, for example, the paint on Socrates' portrait but not the color of the paint that is

true of Socrates himself. The paint, then, without the color (*per impossibile*), is not true of Socrates, but it certainly is not a likeness of Socrates either. The paint must be together with its color in order for it to be both a likeness of Socrates and nonbeing, but it seems to be utterly mysterious how by being together it can be that and by being apart it ceases to be anything of the sort. If every thing then is just what it is and nothing else, it is impossible for there to be any speech, either true or false, for speech is impossible unless something can be put together with something else. The conditions for speech are the same as the conditions for nonbeing, and we can have speech if there is always falsehood or being if there is never truth. Parmenides must and cannot be right. If this is the gist of the sophist's argument, it is hard to see how the Eleatic stranger shows its incoherence and thereby distinguishes between sophistry and philosophy. He leads us to believe that inasmuch as logos comes to be through the weaving together of kinds, the problem of nonbeing has been solved; but he goes on to characterize logos, insofar as it can be said to be true or false, as the weaving together of verb and noun (action and actor) without ever showing how these two kinds of logos are related to one another. The stranger himself even says that he has always failed to solve the problem of nonbeing, and in the dialogue he proves that the problem of being is no less baffling. He proposes then that his own logos, even if it fails to solve either problem, will be as far as it goes adequate for both; but since he also asserts that being and nonbeing are as different as light and dark, he implies that no single logos can be adequate for both unless it is indifferent to that difference. The argument, then, that the sophist mounts against philosophy is reinforced by the stranger's own self-contradictory account. That Theaetetus believes by the end that the problem has been solved only goes to show the degree to which the stranger in tracking the sophist has become indistinguishable from the sophist." (pp. XII-XIII)

From: Seth Benardete, *Plato's Sophist*. *Part II of The Being of the Beautiful,* Chicago: Chicago University Press 1986.

"The King admired Alice for being able to see even the nothing while he himself could hardly see anything. The King's intellectual ancestry goes back more than two thousand years. The problem of seeing nothing posed philosophical questions to the Greeks, and thus it became the main topic of Plato's *Sophist*. Plato did not share the King's point of view. He wished to explain truth, falsehood, and meaning without supposing that people can see the nothing. Plato's effort goes beyond the repudiation of the King's position. Underlying the problem of seeing nothing is the issue whether believing the truth is like seeing, seeing with "the eye of the mind." If believing the truth is seeing, then believing what is false must be blindness.
But how could it be? Believing falsehoods is still believing something. It is not blindness; it is not believing nothing. Plato's dissolution of this puzzle helps us to understand better the nature of truth and falsehood. In denying that wisdom is sight and folly blindness we come to understand that truths are not objects of mental sight. What is true or false is not an object or a name. Thus Plato's explanation of truth, falsehood, and meaning has important consequences for his conception of the nature and objects of knowledge, and therefore for his theory of Forms. The results of Plato's investigation are not of mere historical interest to us. The differences between statement and name, meaning and truth, sort- and formal concepts, -- differences which Plato was pointing out -- are as lively topics of philosophical debate today as they were twenty-four hundred years ago." (pp. 22-23)

From: Julius M. E. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 14, 1962.

A SUMMARY OF THE SECTION ON NOT-BEING

"To sum up then, the discussion in the *Sophist* seems to attempt the following things: to distinguish the sense of einai in which it means 'exist' from various other senses which the word bears; to deal, as we have seen, with the Paradox of False Belief; and to deal with the (related) problems raised by negation on the assumption that a sentence which does contain, or could be re-phrased so as to contain, the copula 'is' asserts the existence of its subject and that its negation might be thought to assert its non-existence, or at least to attribute to it a measure of non-existence. I hope that this will become clear in the following account of the argument in which, as before, I shall prefix a number to paragraphs which purport to give the gist of the text and a letter to those which contain comment. [Sections with comments are omitted in this summary] (*To on* is that which is, an on is something which is; *to mê on* is that which is-not, a *mê on* is something which is-not; *einai* means 'to be').

1. The relevant section begins in 236 d, when the Stranger, having said that sophists pursue apparent rather than real wisdom, goes on to say that there has been, and still is, a serious puzzle about "appearing and yet not being, and about saying something and yet something which is not true". Arguments implying the possibility of false statement or false belief "venture to say that not-being is; for there could not otherwise be such a thing as falsity" (237 a 4).

2. The Stranger then says that Parmenides always warned his pupils not to say that not-being is, and offers as the reason for this ban the argument that 'not-being' cannot be the name of anything which is, and therefore cannot be the name of anything. But a man who says something must say some one thing; therefore the man who does not say something must say nothing, and therefore perhaps we ought to say that the man who tries to utter what is-not not only says nothing, but does not even say at all. (237 a-e).

3. It has been shown so far that not-being is a balking notion. On the one hand we often have occasion to use it; on the other hand Parmenides has good reason to forbid us to do so. The Stranger goes on to find further difficulties in the notion of not-being. That which he calls the chief of them is as follows. Something which does not exist cannot have any properties. But if one is going to speak of non-entity at all one must either use the singular or the plural ('not-being' or 'not-beings'). Not-being, therefore, cannot be spoken of nor thought of at all. Furthermore, and worse, even to say that much about it is to treat it as if it were some one existing thing. (238 a-239 c).
4. The Stranger goes on to conclude from the difficulties he has raised about not-being that it will be embarrassing to say that sophists create semblances (eikones). For the sophists will ask what an eikôn is, will refuse to accept an ostensive definition, and will force you to admit that a semblance is something which is not the genuine thing. And since the genuine thing is really a being, and the non-genuine its opposite, a semblance will have to be something which 'is not really a being, but exists in a way, though not genuinely, except that it really is a semblance', and therefore 'not really being, it really is'. And thus we shall have to say that a not-being in a way is. (239 c-240 b).
5. The Stranger then says that he is unable to see how to define sophistry without contradicting the conclusions that they have come to in their discussion so far. He wants to say that sophists make us believe what is false, but he sees that the sophists will retort that this is impossible because a false belief must be one that asserts what is contrary to what is, either by holding that not-beings are, or by holding that beings are not. Therefore if we say that there are false propositions we shall, as Theaetetus puts it, 'be forced to tack being on to not-being, which we have agreed to be impossible'. (240 c241 b).
6. The Stranger then says that they must come to terms with Parmenides, and show that not-being in a way is, and being in a way is-not. This leads him to the criticisms of various philosophical and cosmological schools which we have examined in an earlier chapter, the professed aim of these criticisms being to show that being is just as difficult a notion as not-being. He criticizes (a) those who say that to on is two or three things, such

as the warm and the cold; (b) Parmenides who says that it is to hen (which could mean either 'unity' or 'the one substance'); (c) the materialists who say that to on is what we can see and touch; and (d) the Partisans of the Forms who say that to on is utterly changeless. Showing, from this last criticism, that activity and inactivity both are (i.e. exist), and yet are not being, he concludes that it is as difficult to say what 'being' is the name of as it is to say what 'not-being' is the name of. (241 d-251 a).

7. The Stranger continues his argument by way of drawing attention to the fact that in every predication something other than the subject is predicated of it, and that this shows that kinds can share. Then follows the passage about dialectic and the discussion of the very great kinds-being, activity, inactivity, sameness and difference-in which it is demonstrated that all of these are, but that none is identical with any of the others. From this it is concluded (256-7) that activity (for instance) is not being, and that therefore 'not-being must exist with respect to activity and in accordance with all the kinds'. Since none of them is identical with being they can all be called not-beings while at the same time they are beings. 'Every kind has much being and infinite not-being' (256 a 1). Even being itself is-not everything else. (251 a-257 a).

8. The Stranger now concludes that when we speak of not-being we do not speak of the opposite of being, but only of something different from it. Negation does not 'signify the opposite'. To prefix 'not' to a word is to indicate something different from the thing that the word stands for. There are many parts of difference, or in other words many contrasts, such as that between the beautiful and that which is different from it; and the contrasted term (such as the not-beautiful) is just as much a being as the other term, since the former does not signify the opposite of the latter, but only something different from it. This, he says, deals with the problem of the sophists' teaching. Not-being is difference. It is not the opposite of being. We are not 'venturing to say' that the opposite of being exists. The question whether there is such a thing as not-being conceived of as the opposite of being, and if so whether any account can be given of it, is not one which arises in this connection. It is sufficient for the present purpose to show that the kinds can share, and that

though difference (or "not-being" in the ordinary sense of that phrase) is not being, it is a being, in which all other beings, including being itself, partake. (257 b-259 b).
9. The Stranger continues his argument by warning his hearers against the frivolous production of antinomies. The fact that logos or the making of statements involves the interweaving of different kinds means that it will always be possible to produce apparent antinomies out of innocent statements if one fails to attend to the sense of what is said. But to exploit such antinomies is to render discourse impossible. He then alarms his hearers by telling them that though the existence of not-being has been established, the sophists will still be able to contend that statements and beliefs cannot partake in it, and meets this with the analysis of a proposition into an *onoma* and a *rhema* with which we are familiar. (259 b-264 b)." (pp. 502-514)

From: Ian MacHattie Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines,* Vol. II: *Plato on Knowledge and Reality,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1963.

A SURVEY OF RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO'S SOPHIST(in progress)

"Coming back to false statement, a fantasm exists qua fantasm, and so possesses being. But qua fantasm -- qua perceived look and not qua verbal or material embodiment of that look -- it exists as not that which it shows itself to be. Therefore it cannot refer directly to what it shows itself to be or derive its existence solely from that and hence indirectly from /the pure form) being. So it looks as if the fantasm refers to, and derives its existence from, (a pure form) non-being. If, however, non-being is a pure form, then it too derives its being from combination with the pure form being.

If non-being is indeed a pure form, then 'non-being is' in the sense just explicated. This statement contains a self-contradiction because it can be unpacked into the two statements: "non-being" means "complete absence of being" and "non-being" means "presence of being" or something of the sort. Actually, the problem is even worse than this, because to deny that non-being possesses being is by the Stranger's analysis meaningful if and only if the expression 'non-being' refers to something. We can make this point sharply, if not in the Stranger's own terms, by saying that, for him, 'non' or 'not' cannot be explained entirely as a syntactical particle or function.

This leads to another preliminary remark that I think worth making here. We should not assume that it is self-evident what the Stranger means by a 'contradiction'. I want to bring this out by making use of an unpublished paper by Richard Routley. Routley distinguishes three kinds or senses of 'contradiction.' (1) One statement may cancel another. In this case, the result of 'A and not-A' is silence or nothing. (2) The collision of the statements 'A' and 'not-A' results in what Routley calls the 'explosion' of 'A' into every statement whatsoever. In other words, from a contradiction everything follows. (3) The statement 'not-A' constrains but does not totally control 'A.' Routley is thinking here of relevance logic, in which the choice between 'A' and 'not-A' can be sensibly raised if and only if 'A' and 'not-A' are each the opposite of the other. The semantical rule for evaluating relevant negation is then: 'not-A' holds in a world a if and only if 'A' holds in world a', the reverse of a. Following this third case, 'not-A' is the reverse of 'A,' and reversal is the relevance-restricted version of 'other thanness,' or what looks like the Stranger's eventual explanation of nonbeing. In sum: within relevance logic, there must be a substantive connection between 'A' and 'not-A' for any meaningful (and hence truth-functional/ connection to hold between them. To the extent that this applies to the Stranger's doctrines, we may take the connection to be semantic; since the Stranger has no doctrine of possible worlds, the connection between 'A' and 'not-A' must hold in this world. However, this world has two different aspects. Some statements refer directly to pure forms. Other statements, like 'Theaetetus flies,' do not. So 'Theaetetus flies' and 'Theaetetus sits' are contradictory, if and

only if there is someone we know named Theaetetus who is either flying or sitting.
To this extent, then, the Stranger may be called a relevance logician. The Stranger is not reduced to silence by the assertions 'nonbeing is' and 'non-being is not.' At least, this is not his intention, as his subsequent analysis makes plain. Similarly, the Stranger cannot accept the 'explosion' interpretation of contradiction. For within this interpretation, the statement 'non-being is' would continue to hold, side-by-side with 'non-being is not.' Differently stated, the Stranger's fundamental interest is ontological, not 'formal,' in the sense used in contemporary logical calculi. If the Stranger's interests were merely formal, he could easily avoid a contradiction by stipulation. This is of course an anachronistic way of looking at the actual situation, but that is precisely my point. One comes closer to the truth by saying that the Stranger is investigating the semantical basis of logical rules, and that for him 'semantics' is in the last analysis a doctrine of ontological or pure forms." (pp. 178-179)

From: Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist. The Drama of Original and Image,* New Haven: Yale University Press 1983.

"In order to understand the Stranger's position with respect to otherness, we must remember that he is on the way to a resolution of the problem of non-being. It will be part of his resolution not to hypostatize 'not'; that is, he will deny that 'being' (or being) has a contrary (or 'opposite'). In one sense, then, 'not' must be explained as a syntactical particle to which no form corresponds. But in another sense, this is impossible, since the Stranger requires forms to provide meaning. The semantic force of 'not' will thus be derived by him from otherness. Despite the assurances of some scholars to the contrary, the Stranger does have a 'complete' use of 'is,' as I have now explained at length. This use cannot be negated; at least, the Stranger never deals with this problem. He never deals with nonexistent 'things' because (to put the point somewhat awkwardly) for him, there are no such things. I am not contending that he would not understand statements like 'Socrates does not exist.' The absence of such statements follows from his primary concern with 'exists' in the

sense of 'possesses being' or 'combines with being.' But the analysis of statements like 'Socrates does not exist' would present grave problems for the Stranger. This is because he wants to explain 'not' by way of a form. The form he chooses is otherness. So 'not to be' means for him 'not to be F,' where ultimately F is a form or combination of forms (in the case of instances). But 'not to be F' must in turn mean 'to be G,' where G is ultimately a form, or formal combination, entirely distinct from F. If Socrates does not exist, then he does not participate in the form being. In this case, however, he participates in no forms at all. He is not 'other than' an instance of being. The doctrine of forms provides no basis for explaining the meaning of the statement 'Socrates does not exist.' Nor, for that matter, does the meaning of 'Socrates is dead' spring readily to the eye, given the Stranger's doctrine.

In sum: since we wish to avoid speaking of nonexistent things, or to put it positively, since anything at all combines with or participates in being, 'not' must be explained by means of the available network of pure forms. The obvious choice is otherness. 'Not to be this' is instead 'to be that.' Hence otherness must be a double look, or what would today be called a two-place relation. This conclusion gives rise in turn to a second question: What about sameness? Contrary to the contemporary procedure, the Stranger takes 'sameness' as a complete look. This is misunderstood by those who replace 'sameness' by 'identity' and explain that, in turn, as one sense of 'is'. As I have shown in detail, this destroys the distinction between the two forms being and sameness. When the Stranger says that each form is the same as itself, he is in fact denying that form F is 'related' to any other form, qua same; hence his insistence that sameness and otherness are two distinct forms. If sameness were a two-place relation, it would contain otherness in its intrinsic nature; and this would violate the separateness of the two forms. The Stranger sees no need to consider 'sameness' as a reflexive relation (for example, as 'F = F'); we may infer that this would introduce duality from his standpoint. However we might analyze it, the expression 'each of them is other' (254d13) is for the Stranger a way of saying that the form sameness is a distinct form, which provides a distinct look, and which is complete in itself. That is, 'a

is the same' is a complete expression, whereas 'a is other' is not." (pp. 271-272)

From: Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist. The Drama of Original and Image,*New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

"Before Plato is ready to attempt an integration of his accounts of becoming and of being into a coherent theory of participation, however, another important problem from the *Theaetetus* must be resolved. Although *lógos* is made possible by the weaving together of Forms (*Sophist* 259E5-6), not every case of *lógos* is a case of knowledge. It is just the difference between true and false discourse, in fact, that ultimately marks the difference between philosophy and sophistry. To complete the 'official' mission of the Sophist, which is to make the nature of the latter clear, the distinction between truth and falsity in judgment must be firmly established. To complete its account of being, in turn, which is the more substantial purpose of the dialogue, is to show how the objects of knowledge (the Forms) must be related to make the distinction between true and false judgment possible. To this end Plato develops an account of not-being (of what is not) that remains among his more impressive accomplishments of the intermediate period.
The sophist is a producer of semblance in discourse, which means that he influences our minds 'to think things that are not' (240D9). What we thus understand him as doing, however, is precisely what Parmenides had proclaimed not to be understandable at all. That it is not,' he said, 'is not to be said or thought' (Kirk and Raven, 1995, fr. 347.8-9) rather, 'all that can be thought is the thought that it is' (Ibid, fr. 352.1). Thus to complete his definition of the sophist's art, the Stranger must engage in a form of parricide (241D3), and show that 'what is not' can be thought after all." (pp. 228-229)

From: Kenneth Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology. A Riddle Resolved,*Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983. (Second edition with a new introduction and the essay, *Excess and Deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C,*Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2005).

"Plato's Sophist has held special significance in recent decades. Of all of his works it has seemed to speak most directly to philosophical interests of modern American and British philosophers. Much of the most sophisticated Platonic scholarship has been aimed at interpreting it. (...) In 1905 Russell published his article 'On Denoting'. In it he claimed to show how the notion of nonexistence could be expressed without the paradox that had often appeared to afflict it. His answer to the problem seemed to provide a lesson in how explaining a bit of language could unravel a metaphysical tangle. The problem arose because, for example, when one says 'Pegasus does not exist,' one seems to indicate that one is talking about a certain thing, Pegasus, and yet at the same time to say that it is not there to be talked about. Russell tried to show how this appearance of paradoxical conflict could be eliminated.
The Sophist mainly deals with a problem that looks much the same as Russell's. At 236ff., Plato expounds a difficulty concerning 'that which is not' (to me on). He attributes the discovery of it to the earlier philosopher Parmenides (who died probably not long after 450 B.C.). His contention was that we cannot speak or think of that which is not. Nonetheless, Plato emphasizes, certain things that we say and think do indeed seem to require us to use the phrase 'that which is not' -- including even our own effort to say that we cannot speak or think of that which is not (238d-239b). Parmenides' difficulty seems related to Russell's problem about nonexistence. For example the statement, 'That which is not cannot be spoken of,' seems paradoxical in a way that is reminiscent of 'Pegasus does not exist.' The resemblance appears especially strong if 'nonbeing' and 'nonexistence' amount to the same thing. In that case we have the two statements, 'Pegasus does not exist' and 'That which is not cannot be spoken of,' both of which look as though they single something out to talk about, but at the same time say that it is not there to be talked about. The two statements are not exactly parallel (the latter, unlike the former, tries to say explicitly that its alleged subject matter cannot be spoken of). Still, both appear to be caught up in much the same difficulty, which is

roughly that of trying to speak about something that is, by hypothesis, not there at all.
It has been disputed whether the two problems are the same (cf. *infra*, pp. XX, XXVIII), and whether 'nonbeing' really is tantamount to 'nonexistence.' Nevertheless the resemblance between them makes clear why many nonexistence twentieth-century interpreters of Plato have found the Sophist especially congenial food for philosophical and historical thought. Its problem of nonbeing, taken along with its possibly antimetaphysical and obvious linguistically oriented thinking, fits well with modern preoccupations." (pp. VII-IX)

From: Plato, *Sophist,*Translated, with introduction and notes by Nicholas P. White, Indianapolis: Hackett 1993.

"The sophist as a kind can be grasped only if falsity is possible. But the False in things and in words, that which makes them pseudo-things and pseudo-accounts (pseudos being the Greek word for "falsehood"), is shot through with Non-being: Just as imitations are not what they seem to be, so false sentences say what is not the case. Now if Non-being is unthinkable and unutterable, as Father Parmenides asserted, then we may conclude that all speech must be granted to be true for those who utter it. Perfect relativity reigns.
Parmenides' dangerous single-mindedness cannot be overthrown by the mere counter-assertion of the paradox that Non-being after all somehow is. Non-being has to be given a meaning; it has to be rendered specific and placed among the articulable kinds. The stranger helps Theaetetus to discover the great and comprehensive kind that does indeed make Non-being sayable: the Other. When Non-being is specified as otherness, it becomes a powerful principle for regulating the slippery relativity that is the sophist's refuge The Other controls relativity in two ways. First it is itself the principle of relativity which turns the swampy relativity of "everything is true for someone" into a firm source of relationality. The Other does this work by being chopped up and distributed through all beings or, in the dialogue's other metaphor, by being thoroughly interwoven with Being. Every being, every thing, is not only the same with itself but also other

than all the other beings. Each being is related to all the others by the reciprocating principle of otherness: It is the others' other without being the less itself, the less self-same.
So the Other acts as a sort of divisive bond that enables speech to mark off each kind or thing from all the others without consigning any of them to mere non-being or consigning itself to saying nothing. As the Other, Nonbeing does indeed become speakable. In fact the stranger's way of division relies continually on this power of the Other when it selects certain kinds and sets aside the other or non-selected kinds.
Non-being interpreted as the Other thus ceases to be mere nothingness and becomes instead the source of articulated diversity in things and in thought. Parmenides has been superseded.
But the sophist's relativity has not yet been completely controlled. The stranger has shown that Non-being, far from being unutterable, is in fact a necessary ingredient in thought and speech. To catch the sophist, however, another step is needed. The stranger does not just speak; he speaks falsehood, makes pseudo-arguments, offers imitation-wisdom. Though the Other is Nonbeing positively understood, it is still negative enough to help account not only for the diversity of kinds but also for differences in their dignity. An image or an imitation, because it has a share in Non-being, is not merely other than its original but also less. It is less in genuineness and may even fall further into falsity. The sophist can no longer claim that there is no intelligible discrimination between true and false.
The Other as positive Non-being thus has a double function: First it establishes a world of diversity through which the multifarious sophist ranges, with the stranger in hot pursuit. And second, the Other plays a role in establishing the hierarchy of genuineness in which the sophist is caught and marked by the stranger as one who truly deals in falsity." (pp. 11-12)

From: *Plato's Sophist. The Professor of Wisdom,* With translation, introduction and glossary by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, Eric Salem, Newburyport: Focus Publishing 1996.

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N.B. For the critical editions and translations of the Dialogue see: Plato: Bibliographical Resources on Selected Dialogues

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   Reprinted in J. L. Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, Chapter 4, pp. 72-79.
   "It is the purpose of this short essay• to consider the meaning and implications of a sentence in Plato's Sophist. At the end of the section on μέγιστα γένη (the combination

of kinds) the Eleatic visitor is made to speak as follows (259e4-6): τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστι ̀ν ἀφάνισις το ̀ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπο ̀ πάντων: δια ̀ γα ̀ρ τη ̀ν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκη ̀ν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν (the isolation of everything from everything else is the total annihilation of all statements; for it is because of the interweaving of Forms with one another that we come to have discourse). I shall be mainly concerned with the second half of this remark, and shall refer to it, for brevity, as sentence or statement S." (p. 72 of the reprint)
(...)
"I have gradually passed from talking about Forms to talking about concepts, and I have taken these to be, in effect, the meanings of general words. Correspondingly, I have implied that the task assigned in Plato's later dialogues to the dialectician or philosopher is the investigation and plotting of the relations among concepts, a task to be pursued through a patient study of language by noticing which combinations of words in sentences do, and which do not, make sense, by eliciting ambiguities and drawing distinctions, by stating explicitly facts about the interrelations of word meanings which we normally do not trouble to state, though we all have some latent knowledge of them in so far as we know how to talk correctly. To justify all this, and to add the many sober qualifications which it evidently demands, would take a volume." (p. 78 of the reprint)

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Reprinted in: R. E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1965, pp. 207-218, G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Notre Dame: Indiana University Press 1971; J. L. Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, New York: Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 80-92.
"My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M.

Cornford (in Plato's Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato's Parmenides, Class. Phil., 1942)." (Allen 1965, p. 207)
(...)
"This examination of Plato's use of some terms, though far from exhaustive, is, I think, sufficient to discredit Cornford's claim that the 'blending' metaphor is the one safe clue to Plato's meaning, and to establish that μετεχειν and its variants, μετλαμβανειν and κοννειν (with genitive), are not used by Plato as mere alternatives for μειγνυσθαι. It may be admitted that in 2.5 5d, the passage Cornford exploits, μετεχειν is used in an exceptional way; but one passage cannot be allowed to outweigh a dozen others.(1)
To sum up: I have tried to argue firstly, that the verb μετεχειν, with its variants, has a role in Plato's philosophical language corresponding to the role of the copula in ordinary language; and secondly, that by his analysis of various statements Plato brings out - and means to bring out - the difference between the copula (μετεχει . . .), the identity-sign (μετεχειν ταυτου ...) and the existential ἔστιν (μετεχειν του ὄντος)." (Allen 1965, p. 218)
(1) This is rather a cavalier dismissal of the passage on which Cornford relies so heavily. But it is not possible in the space available to attempt a full study of the perplexing argument of 255c 12-e 1, and without such a study no statement as to the exact force of μετεχειν in 25 5c 4 is worth much. My own conviction is that even in this passage μετεχειν does not stand for the symmetrical relation 'blending'; but it is certainly not used in quite the same way as in the other places where it occurs in 2 5 1-9.

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"Philosophical implications of the dialogue-form have been, for quite some time, all the buzz in Platonic studies. One need not enumerate all the advantages and productive insights that this approach has generated. One facet of Plato’s philosophical method, however, remains insufficiently explored so far: namely, Plato’s reflections on

the question of genre and form of philosophical discourse which could be gleaned from his judgments on his philosophical predecessors, the Presocratics.
What I propose to do here is to offer a close reading of a couple of Platonic passages were Plato's protagonists' engagement with the Presocratic doctrines is described or dramatised. In doingthat, I shall seek to highlight Plato's position and judgments concerning the form, or genre,(1) of Presocratic discourse, and to trace the implications of those judgments with one question in view: what is the nature, in Plato's view, of Presocratic teaching qua intellectual enterprise or 'genre'?(2)" (P. 8)
(1) The notion of 'intellectual genre' here is considerably indebted to Alasdair MacIntyre. Though he was not the first to interpret various types of philosophical enquiry in terms of their genre of discourse, each of which presupposes a certain distinct type of validity for its statements, I found MacIntyre's observations in his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry particularly rewarding.
(2) This is an aspect of larger project of reconstructing Plato's reception of the Presocratic thinkers, addressed in my doctoral thesis.

5. Aguirre, Javier. 2011. "Plato's Sophist and Aristotelian being." Czesk and Slovac Journal of Humanities no. 1:74-81. Abstract: "In the chapter M 4 of Metaphysics, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of "dialectical power". In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by "the dialecticians" imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed. There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the Platonics with the term "dialecticians", to whom he attributes the "dialectical power". Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the Sophist. In the development of his own conception of the being (to on), in the middle books of Metaphysics, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist,

such as the deficiencies of the Platonic way of understanding the being."

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7. Albury, W. H. 1971. "Hunting the Sophist." Apeiron no. 5:1-12.
   "The Stranger from Elea is asked by Socrates, at the outset of Plato's dialogue, the Sophist, to distinguish between the Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher — "not so short and easy a task," as the Stranger tells us (217 b).
   To Theaetetus, his joint inquirer, the Stranger says, "We had better, I think, begin by studying the Sophist and try to bring his nature to light in a clear formula" (218 b-c).
   But being brought to light is, of course, the very thing which the Sophist most resists, for he is a creature who "takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way" (254 a).
   Thus, the Stranger warns Theaetetus, "it is not so easy to comprehend this group we intend to examine or to say what it means to be a Sophist" (213 c). Now since the Sophist is such a "troublesome sort of creature to hunt down" (212 d) :

it seems reasonable to ask why the Stranger has decided to begin with him instead of with the Statesman or the Philosopher." (p. 1)

8. Alieva, Olga. 2010. "Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist." Hermatena no. 189:71-91.
"The well-known sixth definition of the sophist in the homonymous dialogue contains a discussion of the elenchus (230b4-e3) which is often referred to as a manifestation of the late Plato's attitude towards this method of argumentation. It is generally assumed that the definition of the sophist 'of noble lineage' given here should be applied to Socrates as represented in earlier Platonic dialogues."
(...)
"The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that the mention of the elenchus at 230b4-e3 is not merely retrospective, and to draw attention to the elenctic dimension of the whole dialogue. This, in its turn, enables us to reconsider also the method of diairesis and its methodological potential." p. 71)
9. ———. 2016. "Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in Plato's Sophist." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by de Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 143-155. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"A crucial question Plato poses in the Sophist is how it is possible to say falsehoods: it involves the assumption that non-being exists (τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι), for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence (236e–237a). Plato's solution to this problem has been explored mainly in terms of the modern philosophy of language with an emphasis on the meanings of the verb 'to be' existential/copulative/veridical),(1) types of predication (ordinary/definitional),(2) the character of false statements (affirmative/negative)(3) etc. It has been generally acknowledged that to understand the solution Plato offers to the so called "falsehood paradox" we must focus mainly on the propositional dimension of lógos, on its subject-predicate structure. In sharp contrast, Heidegger endeavours to "get rid of propositions" (GA 19, 594/411)(4)

while interpreting the Sophist,(5) and this endeavour will be our topic in what follows." (p. 143)

(1) Ackrill (1957), 1–6; Kahn (1966), 245–265, and others; a useful overview can be found in Fronterotta (2011), 35f.

(2) Crivelli (2012), 9 and passim.

(3) Owen (1978), 223f; McDowell (1982), 115f; Brown (2008), 437f, etc.

(4) 4 Hereinafter the number after the slash refers to the English translation by Rojcewicz and Schuwer (1997)

(5) There are extremely few references to Heidegger in the vast literature on Plato's Sophist. See, e.g.: Cordero (1993), 224; 227; Notomi (1999), 7. It has been repeatedly noted that Heidegger fails to do justice to the dialogical form of the writing because he reads Plato "through Aristotle". See, e.g.: Gonzalez (2009), 60; Rosen (1983), 4f.

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Rosen, Stanley. Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.

10. Allred, Ammon. 2009. "The Divine Logos: Plato, Heraclitus, and Heidegger in the Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 14:1-18.
Abstract: "In this paper, I address the way in which Plato’s Sophist rethinks his lifelong dialogue with Heraclitus. Plato uses a concept of logos in this dialogue that is much more Heraclitean than his earlier concept of the logos. I argue that he employs this concept in order to resolve those problems with his earlier theory of ideas that he had brought to light in the Parmenides. I argue that the concept of the dialectic that the Stranger develops rejects, rather than continues, the idea reached at the end of the Theaetetus that knowledge has to be grounded in a nous aneu logou (a non-logical, divine intellect) even while the Stranger appropriates the concerns that lead to his conclusion. Ultimately, I suggest that my differentiation of the later Plato’s appropriation of the tradition from Aristotle’s appropriation of that tradition is closely related to the re-thinking of the full sense of logos in the later Heidegger on Heraclitus and on Parmenides. I end by suggesting that the question that Plato and Heraclitus pose to us is to ask what such a divine logos tells about human ways of knowing."
11. Altman, William H. F. 2016. The Guardians on Trial. The Reading Order of Plato’s Dialogues from Euthyphro to Phaedo. Lanham: Lexington Books.
See Chapter 2: Plato’s Trilogy: Sophist, Statesman, and Apology of Socrates 69-169.
"In the traditional retelling of the outworn story of Plato’s Development, Parmenides marks its author’s abandonment or modification of the views of his “middle period,” especially as presented in Republic 5-7 and Phaedo. By configuring Timaeus, Philebus, Sophist-Statesman, and

Laws as “late dialogues,” that story suggests that Plato has, in some meaningful ways, outgrown Socrates; I am challenging that story on the basis of Reading Order, an alternative paradigm for ordering and reading his dialogues. Looking back to The Guardians in Action [*], the indisputable fact that Plato joined Republic to Timaeus-Critias in a dramatic sense has not been given its due, and the parallel fact guiding The Guardians on Trial is that Plato, once again indisputably, has joined Sophist-Statesman to the trial and death of Socrates, primarily by means of Euthyphro." (p. 9, a note omitted)
[*] W. H. F. Altman, The Guardians in Action. Plato the Teacher and the Post-Republic Dialogues from Timaeus to Theaetetus, Lanham: Lexington Books 2016.

12. Ambuel, David. 2005. "On What is Not: Eleatic Paradox in the Parmenides and the Sophist." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlícek, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 200-215. Prague: Oikoymenh.
"The following argument undertakes to show one positive thesis implied by the thicket of interrelated contradictions that is the Parmenides. There may well be others. In particular, it is proposed here that, as a consequence of the multiply contradictory conclusions and the methods that lead to them, any analysis of the kind of unity that we find in the world - namely, that of composites, of wholes of parts - demands that being is not a form, but form the principle of being.
To accomplish this, the following thoughts look into parallels linking the Sophist with the Parmenides. Emphasis is directed especially to the concept of not-being as it appears in the second part of Parmenides and in the Sophist, 237a-244d. Both dialogues reveal inadequacies of Parmenides’ metaphysics by employing the logic of Eleatic metaphysics to examine form - being is and is intelligible (like the ideas), not-being is its opposite, their opposition is that of simple contradictories, i.e. between being and not-being lies nothing - with the result that the real is either empty, transcendent and inaccessible, or that being, all of

reality, is reduced to the manner of existence of sensibles (i.e. having the being of wholes and parts), which, subsequently, upon analysis, leads to contradiction and unintelligibility." (p. 200)

13. ———. 2007. Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist. La Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Second edition; first edition Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991.
"The Sophist is a rather technical piece. The myth and drama are at their minimum, and Plato introduces a set of plodding definitions that evolves into a discussion of terms of highest abstraction: 'being,' 'rest,' 'motion,' 'sameness,' 'otherness.'
And yet it is not only a technical piece. This volume aims to give an interpretation of the Sophist as a whole, with sensitivity to its subtleties and implications. The philosophical commentary is followed by a translation. As R. E. Allen remarked on translating Plato, "Plato, as a writer, stands with Shakespeare, but his translators do not, so this task is all but impossible." There have been several translations of the Sophist, and I have learned from them all. The goal here is not to add one to their number, but to add clarity to the interpretation. Those familiar with other interpretations will quickly apprehend that the reading presented here sets out with an approach distinct from many. The intent is not to make a definitive statement of doctrine; where there is such philosophical richness, there is no finality. Instead, the intent is to overcome the barriers that keep us from the Sophist's philosophical depths. As the Philebus states, discussing analysis and definition by divisions, when improperly done, is the cause of impasse; properly done, it is the entry to an open path. The Sophist presented here is not an artifact of our intellectual past or a notable historical point marking the ancestry of later developments; it is living philosophy." (Preface, pp. XI-XII)
(...)
"It has been observed that "all Platonic scholars hold that in the Sophist and subsequent works the protagonist expresses Plato's own views."(2) By now, it will not have escaped the

attention of the reader familiar with the literature on the Sophist that I share neither this assumption that the Eleatic speaks straight Platonic doctrine nor other related presuppositions about the text. The reasons I find these absurd should become clear to the reader who persists. For the reader who does hold to what “all Platonic scholars” hold, and has both the kindly indulgence and diligence to persevere, let this be a dialectical exercise to discover what this dialogue might uncover, on the hypothesis that it is, after all, a work of metaphysics." (Introduction, P. XVII)
(2) Richard Robinson, Essays in Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 21.

14. ———. 2011. "The Coy Eristic: Defining the Image the Defines the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 278-310. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"The argument of this paper is informed by two observations about the Sophist’s dramatic structure: in contrast to the denial in all other Platonic depictions of the sophist, here the sophist is assumed to have an art. That assumption is never relinquished, even though the reason given elsewhere for declaring him artless is explicitly voiced when he is described as a kind of magician (233b–c). Secondly, the discussion is led, not by Socrates, but by an Eleatic philosopher, and is conducted following a process that adheres to an Eleatic ontology that admits no intermediate between being and absolute not-being. Without an ontological intermediary, every image is as real as any reality, and every practice an art." (p. 278)
15. ———. 2013. "Difference in Kind: Observations on the Distinction of the Megista Gene." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 247-268. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In short, the nominalism of an Eleatic metaphysics (or of a Heraclitean metaphysics, as they are interpreted in the Sophist and the Theaetetus) cannot state what anything “is,” which would require the means to conceive of a character that is universal, distinguishable from things that are

characterized by it, and attributable in the same or in related senses to a plurality. Consequently, what a thing “is” becomes what it is not.
The analysis of combinations furnishes the abstract, if contradictory, logic underpinning the method of division used to pursue the sophist.
The irony is that, by setting aside the ontological inquiry into the opposite of “being” and identifying “not-being” (in one sense) with “other,” the being and nature of anything as a result is constituted entirely by its difference from what it is not. Being, in effect, is nothing other than not-being." (p. 267)

16. Andic, Martin, and Brown, Malcolm. 1973. "False Statement in the "Sophist" and Theaetetus' Mathematics." Phoenix no. 27:26-34.
"The purpose of this paper is to call attention to a parallel between Plato's account of false statement in the Sophist and Theaetetus' study of incommensurables, substantially preserved for us in Euclid's Elements, Book 10." (p. 26)
(...)
The main parallel to which we are calling attention gives rise to the following question. We have emphasized that the proportions into which we analyze assertions that a given statement is true or false put the same objects on both sides of the division between statement and being: does this not collapse the true statement with the fact it states? Readers of Russell's Problems of Philosophy (London 1912), Chapter 12, are often vexed by a similar puzzle in his doctrine of false belief, which is in many ways like the doctrine of the Sophist. If and only if it is true what Othello believes, i.e., that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there exists such a complex as Desdemona's love for Cassio (or, that Desdemona loves Cassio), and this, though its actual existence is independent of Othello's mind, is composed of the very objects which also go to compose his belief. But how, one wonders, can the objects of the world be the very objects in the believer's mind? In reply, one might ask, how can they fail to be the very objects concerning which he has belief? It seems a reasonable answer to this question simply

to say that it is the same thing that can be believed and can be. More fully, the same relation which is believed to hold among objects, or holds among them in a picture, can also hold among them in reality, and does so just when the belief or picture is true to reality. Similarly, it is the same thing that one states to be the case with certain objects and which is the case when the statement is true, or not the case when it is false. Finally, a point about the Academy in the mid-fourth century. If we are right in finding a strict parallel between these philosophical and mathematical researches into "not-being in logos" at the Academy, we would have found some confirmation of the familiar Platonic thesis that mathematics prepares the way for philosophy. Nor would it be any surprise if Plato, admiring Theaetetus' work on incommensurability, should have developed his own treatment of false statement so as to run parallel to it, and accordingly had good reason for assigning to this mathematician a central role in the Sophist." (p. 34)

17. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1966. "The New Theory of the Forms." The Monist no. 50:403-420.
Reprinted in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume One: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981, pp. 21-33.
"I want to suggest that Plato arrived at a revised theory of forms in the later dialogues. Or perhaps I might rather say that he constructed a new underpinning for the theory. This can be discerned, I believe, in the Sophist, taken together with certain parts of the dialectic of the Parmenides which use the same language as the Sophist." (p. 21)
(...)
"If I am right, then the idea of some forms as having parts is of extreme importance.
In the Sophist (1158d-e) it is especially stressed that the other is divided up into many bits and parcelled out among all things in relation to one another, and we hear of the part of the other that stands over against the being of each, or, if we follow Simplicius, of each part of the other that stands over against being. I prefer the MSS reading, but on my interpretation it makes no difference to the sense. For the

language of being divided up and parcelled out occurs also in the Parmenides in relation to one and to being (144), and it seems immensely unlikely that this part of the argument there was not also part of Plato's final view. This gives us three points: (1) the being and unity of each form are parts of being and of the one respectively; (2) the one being is a whole of parts, among which are the existent unitary forms of the early theory; (3) each existent form is a whole composed of the form and its being. Thus there will be a part of the other (the bottom right hand layer in my diptych as it lies open) which is a part of being that stands over against being. This part of the other will itself be divided into pans each of which stands over against part of being, i.e. the being in one of the forms of the early theory. We may add that one will, like being, same and other, "run through" everything, and same, like being, one and other, will be "parcelled out" among all things." (p. 30)

18. Baltzly, Dirk C. 1996. ""To an Unhypothetical First Principle" in Plato's Republic." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 13:149-165.
"This paper argues that we may find examples of two unhypothetical principles in Parmenides and Sophist. But, in the Republic, Plato speaks only of an unhypothetical principle. Moreover, commentators almost universally identify the unhypothetical principle of the Republic with the Form of the Good, or some account of the Form of the Good. My unhypothetical principles-One has a share of Being, some of the kinds blend-do not look like they have much to do at all with the Form of the Good. How, then, can these passages from Sophist and Parmenides be illustrations of the method described in Book VII in the ascent to an unhypothetical starting point?" (p. 157)
19. Beere, Jonathan. 2019. "Faking Wisdom: The Expertise of Sophistic in Plato's Sophist." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 57:153-189.
"How should we understand the Sophist's definition of sophistic?
We tend to assume that the problem with sophistic is that sophists use bad arguments in the logical sense that the

arguments are either invalid or unsound. Sophistic is either some special facility in the use of fallacious forms of argument or it is a character defect, the willingness to use such arguments, or both. But the concept of a logical fallacy distorts Plato's view of sophistry, which is both stranger and more interesting, as I will argue. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting and, in its own way, puzzling aspect of the definition of sophistic has been neglected: the Eleatic Visitor defines sophistic as an expertise (τέχνη, Soph. 221 d 1–6). (1)" (p. 153)
(1) While I originally drafted this paper some time before the appearance of L. Brown, 'Definition and Division in Plato's Sophist' ['Definition'], in D. Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy [Definition] (Oxford, 2010), 151–71, the two papers are antitheses to one another. Brown claims, 'Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given a serious definition . . . there is no such genuine kind as sophistry—especially not under the genus of technē, skill, art, or expertise' (Brown, 'Definition', 153). I attempt here to vindicate the seventh and final definition of sophistic by vindicating the claim that sophistic is an expertise.

20. Benardete, Seth. 1960. "Plato Sophist 223 b1-7." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 5:129-139. "We must now ask what bearing this distinction between the hunter and the hunted has on the dialogue as a whole. Suppose all hunters were different, while all the things hunted were of the same kind. Art would then be definable exclusively in terms of its procedure. There would be no separable classes of beings in so far as they were beings, but only in so far as there were different ways of hunting them. There would be no εἴδη, Suppose, on the other hand, all the things hunted were different, while all the hunters were the same. Art would then be definable only in terms of its single subject. It would have no procedure, for an art presupposes a differentiable class of beings on all of which the same procedure can be applied; and a lack of procedure would entail no distinction between knowledge and ignorance. An

art, then, must be defined both by its objects - the art of something - and by its way to that something." (p. 131)

21. ———. 1963. "The Right, the True, and the Beautiful." Glotta no. 41:54-62.
Whenever a Platonic character says ναί in answer to a question, we know that his "yes" is the same as ours; and if he answers πῶς γάρ; or πῶς γάρ οὔ; he is confirming a negative or positive statement; but when one of them says ὀρθός, αληθή, χαλώς is not self-evident that he means the same as we do in saying "right", "true", "fine". These answers hardly look except for their greater rarity more significant than ναί." (p. 54)
(...)
"Were there a gap in our manuscripts between two questions of Socrates, we should not now be able to say which stereotyped phrase was most suitable. Was Plato equally perplexed?
Are his "rights", "trues", and "fines" as arbitrary and interchangeable as Homeric formulae, or are they, as we shall try to show, dependent on and prompted by the form the previous question takes?" (p. 54)
(...)
"To bathe the reader in enough examples and yet not drown him, I have chosen to explain καλώς (κάλλιστα), ορθώς (ὀρθότατα) and αληθή (αληθέστατα) in two dialogues only, the Sophist and Politicus.
As the "dramatic" element in them is not so prominent as elsewhere, the propriety of each word for the course of the argument appears more distinctly. The danger, however, of using them lies in the similarity of their themes, style, and speakers, which may be thought to exclude any inference about other dialogues; but these very similarities allow us to check them against one another: to see how a similar remark in each provokes the same answer. And yet to indicate that our definitions are not too parochial, further examples from other dialogues have been added, though without explanation the force of these words is easily missed." (p. 55)
(...)

"If our interpretation of these passages is correct, we should not conclude that it holds everywhere. There may be cases where it would be impossible for us to make any discrimination, and we could go no farther than the almost-empty "fine", "right", and "true"; and possibly Plato did not always keep to the same usage throughout his writings. But the consistency of our results in two dialogues and their agreement with the other passages cited (from a much larger store), put out of court the possibility of accident and randomness. They show Plato's ability even in small things to imitate and sharpen the distinctions of ordinary speech). They further suggest that every context would have to be as thoroughly analyzed before we could decide on the scope and accuracy of our tentative definitions. It is not, however, a project that can be published. Complete lists, without explanation, would be almost useless, and with them, too tedious to be valuable. They would be as long as the Platonic corpus itself. We only offer this paper as a specimen and challenge: the reader of Plato must work out the rest for himself." (p. 62)

22. ———. 1986. Plato's Sophist: Part II of 'The Being of the Beautiful'. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Contents: Introduction IX; Guide for the Reader XVII; Sophist II.1; Sophist Commentary II.69; Notes II.168; Selected Bibliography II.178-180.
"The Sophist's dialogic form presents us with another riddle: Either Socrates is just another sophist, or all philosophers prior to Socrates were sophists. The first half of the dialogue, in which the stranger traps Socrates in progressively narrower definitions until the sophist can be only Socrates, is balanced by its second half, in which the stranger proceeds to condemn all earlier philosophers for not understanding the necessity of Socrates' so-called second sailing. Inasmuch as the second sailing is inseparable from Socrates' discovery of political philosophy, the Sophist's companion dialogue, the Statesman, in which the stranger brings about a complete identity of dialogic form and argument, needs to be put together with the Sophist before the Sophist can be understood by itself. It is

because the Statesman is essentially prior to the Sophist that it follows it of necessity. The Sophist then requires a double reading. But even such a double reading does not suffice, for its problem is initiated by the Theaetetus, in which the joint failure of Socrates and Theaetetus to answer the question, What is knowledge?, prompts them to appeal to the Eleatic stranger. His answer is contained in the Sophist and the Statesman; it is not contained in either of them separately. It is therefore another question whether his twofold answer differs from the answer to be found in the Theaetetus." (p. 210)

23. ———. 1993. "On Plato's Sophist." The Review of Metaphysics no. 46:747-780.
Reprinted in: S. Benardete, The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry and Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 323-353.
"It seems at first as if the Stranger's analysis of λόγος into agent and action is designed solely for finding truth or falsity in the correct or incorrect attachment of an action to a known agent; by his restriction of imitation to impersonation, however, the agent becomes significant in himself and independent of what he does.(13) The sophist embodies virtue as it is understood in opinion, despite his suspicion that he does not know what his σχῆμα declares he knows.
Gorgias exemplifies this perfectly, but what he does is to contradict and refute the opinions about virtue the interlocutor himself maintains and believes he sees represented in the sophist. The sophist impersonates the opinions he refutes. What, then, of Socrates?
He is not an impersonator. Theodorus at any rate found him pokerfaced, and could not figure out what Socrates believed from his totally convincing presentation of a Protagorean position (Theaetetus 161a6). Socrates, however, is ironical. Does his claim to ignorance come across as knowledge in light of his capacity to show up the ignorance of others? More particularly, does the incoherence in opinion about a virtue, once Socrates has exposed it, induce the impression that Socrates himself possesses that virtue? It would seem

impossible that Socrates could display popular virtue without its inconsistencies while bringing to light its inconsistencies, but Socrates the logic-chopping moralist seems to be doing exactly that.
Λόγος as dialogue thus comes to light as the problem of Socrates the agent in his action. We can say that the Sophist ends at that point where the problem has been uncovered, and the Statesman is designed to treat Socratic agency. Socrates the agent, however, cannot show up in himself; instead, he shows up in the patient, young Socrates." (pp. 779-780)
(13) In the summary the Stranger gives of the sophist's genealogy (268c8-d4), all but one of his lines of descent can be rephrased as a verb: the difference between divine and human imitation resists such a rephrasing.

24. Benitez, Eugenio. 1996. "Characterisation and Interpretation: The Importance of Drama in Plato's Sophist." Literature & Aesthetics no. 6:27-39.
"I confess that I would not recommend the Sophist to anyone as a work of literature. But I deny that the dramatic form is ever unimportant in Plato. In my own work on Plato I have found that the drama and the philosophy are not separable.(10) to At the very least, the drama complements, supplements, and augments the philosophy. Let me cite what should be an uncontroversial example from the Sophist.
Theodorus innocently uses the word '(γένος ('kind') in his first speech: the Stranger, he says, belongs to the γένος of Elea (i.e. he is Eleatic by birth). Socrates, who has a nose for ambiguity, picks up the term in his second speech, claiming that the kind called 'philosopher' is scarcely easier to discern than the kind 'god'. The discussion then turns to a consideration of three '(γένη ('kinds') - sophist, statesman and philosopher [216c3, 217a7] - but ultimately even this topic yields to discussion of the five μέγιστα γένη ('greatest kinds'), namely being, sameness, difference, motion and rest. An innocent remark leads to the most extraordinary inquiry. This progression is the dramatic complement of the Stranger's own remark that: 'one must practise first on

small and easy things before progressing to the very greatest' [218d1-2]." (p. 28)
(10) For a discussion of the importance of the dialogue form see E. Benitez, 'Argument, Rhetoric and Philosophic Method: Plato's Protagoras', Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (1992): 222-252.

25. Berger, Fred R. 1965. "Rest and Motion in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 10:70-77.
"In a recent article,(1) Professor Julius M. E. Moravcsik has attempted an interpretation of a very difficult passage in Plato's Sophist (255 a4-b 6), in which Plato sought to prove that neither the Same nor the Other is identical with either Rest or Motion. The interpretation which Moravcsik puts forth aims at making Plato's argument sound and consistent with other points made in the dialogue. Unfortunately, Moravcsik's presentation is not always clear itself. It is one of the chief purposes of this paper to clarify Moravcsik's argument. In addition, it will be argued that his interpretation of the passage in the Sophist fails to save Plato's argument, and that it rests on a subtle logical distinction which there seems little reason to assume Plato intended to use. Indeed, it will be argued that an interpretation which Moravcsik rejects seems better suited to Plato's passage." (p. 70)
(1) Julius M. E. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the 'Sophist'," Acta Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. XIV (1962), pp. 23-78. I am indebted to Professor Jürgen Mau who first called my attention to some of the problems in Moravcsik's interpretation.

26. Berman, Brad. 2015. "The Secret Doctrine and the Gigantomachia: Interpreting Plato’s Theaetetus-Sophist." Plato Journal no. 14:53-62.
Abstract: "The Theaetetus’ ‘secret doctrine’ and the Sophist’s ‘battle between gods and giants’ have long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the passages systematically parallel one another.
Each presents two substantive positions that are advanced on behalf of two separate parties, related to one another by their comparative sophistication or refinement. Further,

those parties and their respective positions are characterized in substantially similar terms. On the basis of these sustained parallels, I argue that the two passages should be read together, with each informing and constraining an interpretation of the other."

27. Berman, Scott. 1996. "Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the Sophist." Apeiron no. 29:19-46.
"Introduction. In this paper, I will reconstruct Plato's explanation of false belief as it emerges from his Sophist and suggest why it is explanatorily better than the principal contemporary account. Since Frege, the received view in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and philosophy of language is that human cognition of the world is always mediated through some sort of intensional object.(1) Moreover, the identity conditions of such intensional objects have been assumed to be ontologically independent of their relation to the world. This theory of human cognition is worse ontologically as compared with a theory which does not require any mediary objects because the former commits itself to a larger ontology than the latter. However, the larger ontology is allegedly justified by gains in explanatory power. If that is the case, then the postulation of such further entities is justified. On the other hand, if the alleged gain in explanatory power is, as I shall suggest, illusory, then Plato's theory of human cognition, which makes no reference to intensional objects which are ontologically independent of their relation to the world, will be a better explanation insofar as it will commit itself to a smaller ontology in that explanation and further, will actually explain something we want explained." (p. 19)
(1) I owe a great debt, both here and elsewhere, to Penner, Terry. (1988). Plato and the Philosophers of Language. Unpublished manuscript.

28. Bernabé, Alberto. 2013. "The Sixth Definition (Sophist 226a-231c) : Transposition of religious language." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 42-56. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Plato defines the sophist, in the sixth definition of the dialogue of the same name (226a – 231c), as one who

purifies the soul of wrong opinions through the technique of refutation. In so doing, however, he ends up in an awkward position: the result of applying the method of diairesis seems to result rather in a definition of the philosopher Socrates (1), or, what is worse, a definition valid for both the sophist and the philosopher, and likely to produce confusion between them. So the sixth definition looks a little bizarre, and is difficult to understand.
My aim is to make a contribution to the solution of the problem from the point of view of a philologist. I shall be looking at the use of certain words which in Plato's time were as pertinent to the religious sphere as they were to the philosophical. I shall pay particular attention to those that had been used by him in dialogues antecedent to the Sophist.
This analysis will allow me to introduce a number of facts into the discussion from a point of view which is different from the usual, and to open up new possibilities for the understanding of this section of the dialogue." (p. 41)
(...)
"The art of the sophist, like the practices of Orpheus and his followers, is deceptive, false, and lies in the realm of δόξα. The philosopher alone is a true educator, physician and purifier, who effects a genuine liberation. And philosophy alone can be placed on the level of genuine religion." (p. 56)
(1) Cf. N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato's 'Sophist'. Between the Sophist and the Philosopher, Cambridge 1999, 65 n. 72, for those who take it that it is Socrates who is represented here.

29. Berrettoni, Pierangiolo. 2008. "A Metamathematical Model in Plato's Definition of Logos." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 30:7-19.
Abstract: "The definition of logos given by Plato in the Sophist is investigated together with its (meta) mathematical background.
Terminological resonances found in philosophical and mathematical authors are pointed out in order to show the generalization of an epistemic model based on the concept of generation."

"In a recent article (Berrettoni, forthcoming) I observed that Plato's definition of logos, noun and verb in the Sophist makes use of a set of terms and of a phraseology which had a wide range of use in mathematical sciences, in many cases acquiring the status of technical terms; this might lead us to the hypothesis that the definition had a (meta)mathematical background. By this I understand a conceptual frame and mental map ultimately derived from mathematical sciences, which gave Plato the model and the form for his definition of logos, according to the apt expression with which Starobinski (1966), in his study on the history of the concept of "nostalgy", characterizes the cultural hegemony of a discipline inside a particular historical epistēme, as in the case of the generalization of an epistemic model derived from psychoanalysis in the culture of the 20th century.
I am fully aware that this hypothesis is very strong and difficult to demonstrate on a strictly textual and philological basis. I am not claiming that Plato was consciously and deliberately applying mathematical concepts to the definition of logos, but simply that he was conditioned by his view of knowledge as based on a hierarchy of sciences, where the central role was attributed to mathematics." (p. 7)
References
Berrettoni, Pierangiolo (forthcoming). « Un modello matematico nella definizione platonica di nome e verbo », Atti del XXXI Convegno della Società Italiana di Glottologia, Categorie del verbo. Diacronia, teoria, tipologia (26 - 28 ottobre 2006, Scuola Normale Superiore) [2008, pp. 31-51].
Starobinski, Jean (1966). « The Idea of Nostalgia », Diogenes 54, 81-103.

30. Berry, John M. 1986. "A Deconstruction of Plato's "Battle of Gods and Giants"." Southwest Philosophy Review no. 3:28-39.
"The Eleatic Stranger's extremely problematic refutation of materialism in Plato's "battle of gods and giants" (Soph. 246-48) is an instance of what Heidegger terms an 'ontology,' a 'theoretical inquiry explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities' - in this case, living things, souls, wisdom, justice, and the like. Every such explicit inquiry

into beings, Heidegger claims, "has its foundation" in the implicitly presupposed "pre-ontological understanding of being" that characterizes the inquirers themselves - in this case, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus (as a surrogate materialist). For all inquirers into being "fall prey to the tradition"
from which they have "more or less explicitly" received their "pre-ontology." The Stranger's and Theaetetus's pre-ontology, that is, dictates the direction and scope of their inquiry without their being aware of it. To understand the Sophist inquiry, then, "this hardened tradition must be loosened up and the concealments ... dissolved." My thesis is that, to a point, Heidegger is correct: The Eleatic Stranger's and Theaetetus's ontology, their explicit inquiry into being, is controlled ('mastered") by their traditional "pre-ontological" understanding of being. To understand them we must "destroy [i.e., unstructure or deconstruct their] ancient ontology' to reveal what it conceals." (p. 28)

31. ———. 1988. "Plato's Forms. A text that self-destructs to shed its light." Southwest Philosophy Review no. 4:111-119.
"Heidegger would call Plato's problematic revision of his theory of forms in "the Battle of Gods and Giants" (Soph. 246-48) an "ontology," a "theoretical inquiry explicitly devoted 10 the meaning of entities."
(...)
"On its surface, then, the text is incoherent. It can be coherent only if beneath its surface the Stranger's charge of inconsistency is somehow on target, and his move to conform the theory to his own ontology is somehow relevant.
I will show that the attack is on target and the revision relevant. For though the Stranger and the friend of forms cannot know it, their startling conclusion that being is nothing but power turns out to be the Heideggerian "preontology" that has controlled their inquiry from the outset, the subsurface upon which the theory of fom1s itself rests. Real being is "power either to affect anything else or to be affected," the Stranger concludes, "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but

power" (247de). This explicit ontology is the surfacing of the implicit "pre-ontology" which underlies and supports this text and the theory of forms wherever it is found. When on the surface the Stranger irrelevantly forces the theory of forms to conform to his apparently alien ontology, beneath the surface he is in fact forcing it to conform to its own presupposition. The text. that is, and the theory of forms which it attacks both make sense only if understood as presupposing the text's conclusion. The argument turns a perfect Heideggerian circle: its surface anomalies are the barely decipherable indications that within its depths its presupposition is twisting itself into position to surface disguised as the argument's conclusion." (p. 111)

32. Bestor, Thomas Wheaton. 1978. "Plato on Language and Falsehood " The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy no. 9:23-37.
"In a recent article in this journal entitled "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language,"(1) William B. Bondeson makes several acute points about Plato's philosophy of language, particularly as it relates to the so-called "paradox of false judgment." On one point he is almost certainly right, and importantly right. On another, however, he is almost certainly wrong, and importantly wrong. Both points deserve a certain amount of amplification, I believe, and that is what I want to give them here. The details provide us with a much clearer perspective on Plato's basic picture of how language works. They also provide a rather nice illustration of the relevance of analytic philosophy to Platonic scholarship today." (p. 23)
(1) Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975): 29-41.
33. Blondell, Ruby. 2002. The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface IX; 1. Drama and dialogue 1; 2. The imitation of character 53; 3. The elenctic Sokrates at work: Hippias Minor 113; 4. A changing cast of characters: Republic 165; 5. Reproducing Sokrates: Theaetetus 251; 6. Putting Sokrates in his place: Sophist and Statesman 314; Bibliography 397; General index 428; Index of passages cited 438-452.

"My first two chapters are devoted to clarifying certain preliminary matters that underlie this way of approaching Plato. I begin, in this chapter, with some general questions about “dramatic” form and literary” interpretation, which will help to clarify my methodology.
Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding literary and philosophical notions of character and its interpretation in ancient texts generally, and in Plato in particular, with special attention to the figure of Sokrates.
Subsequent chapters offer readings of a select number of individual dialogues: Hippias Minor, Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. These works were chosen in part to exemplify a broad range of Platonic styles and methods, and in part because most of them have received relatively limited “literary” study, but also because their discursive content connects with my particular concerns, especially in their focus on the representation and use of literary character." (p. 3)
(...)
"The last chapter was concerned with Theaetetus on its own terms. But it is also the first of a triad of dialogues, completed by Sophist and Statesman, which are linked by a variety of thematic and structural connections.(1)
These three works are also bound together by formal features, in a way that is unparalleled among Plato’s works. These features include dramatic sequencing, explicit cross-references, and an overlapping cast of characters. At the end of Theaetetus Sokrates looks forward to continuing his conversation with Theaitetos and Theodoros the next day (210d); at the beginning of Sophist Theodoros alludes to “yesterday’s agreement” to continue (216a); and in Statesman, Sokrates refers back explicitly to his first meeting with Theaitetos and the previous day’s discussion (257a, 258a).
The explicitness and the dramatic character of these links distinguish them from other forms of Platonic intertextuality, and invite us to read these three works together, in a certain sequence, and in each other’s light." (p. 314)

34. Bluck, Richard Stanley. 1957. "False Statement in the "Sophist"." Journal of Hellenic Studies no. 77:181-186.
"Various attempts have been made to find a satisfactory alternative to Cornford's explanation of what the Sophist has to say about false statement, and in particular to his interpretation of the passage in which the statements 'Theaetetus is sitting' and 'Theaetetus is flying' are discussed. The difficulty with Cornford's view is that he wants to find the explanation of truth and falsity entirely in the 'blending' or incompatibility of Forms, but that in the examples Socrates chooses, while Sitting and Flying may be Forms, Theaetetus cannot be. Hence Cornford has to say, 'It is not meant that Forms are the only elements in all discourse. We can also make statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must contain at least one Form'. Unfortunately, when talking about the εἴδων συμπλοκή at 259e, the Stranger seems clearly to envisage a blending of εἴδη with each other:. How can this be reconciled with an 'example' in which only one term stands for a Form?
I do not propose to discuss in detail the various solutions that have been offered, but to set forth my own interpretation of the whole passage. This may be regarded as to some extent a 'blending' of what has been said by Professor Hackforth and Mr. Hamlyn, but a number of points arise which deserve further discussion, and it may perhaps be hoped that such a σύνθεσις as this may prove to be ." (p. 181)
35. ———. 1975. Plato's Sophist: A Commentary. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Edited by Gordon Neal.
"The problems raised by the Parmenides being extremely complicated, and the date of the Timaeus being a matter of dispute, studying the Sophist is perhaps the most promising way of trying to discover whether, and if so in what manner, Plato's philosophy—and in particular his theory of Forms—developed or changed after the writing of the Republic.
(...)

No doubt the dialogue is capable, and is meant to be capable, of being interpreted without reference to Platonic Forms. The arguments of the unconverted sophist against the possibility of saying or thinking what is false must be controverted with arguments that he will accept as valid. Yet at the same time it is most unlikely that Plato would repeatedly use the term εἶδη; without bearing in mind that readers acquainted with his earlier works would at once think of his Forms; and it is therefore highly probable that what is said is meant to be capable of being interpreted in terms of Forms. This is all the more likely, as a great deal is said about one Kind (λέγως) or Form (εἶδος) partaking of another, and the question was raised in the Parmenides, clearly with reference to the theory of Forms, whether one εἶδος could partake of another. It is therefore a reasonable working hypothesis that the arguments are intended to be interpreted in terms of Platonic Forms by those acquainted with Platonic doctrine, while at the same time being capable of being interpreted without special reference to such doctrine by those who rejected it or had no knowledge of it. The aim in what follows is to try to determine the most natural significance of each argument from the Platonist's point of view, taking the γένη or εἶδος; as Forms, and to see whether these arguments and the dialogue as a whole will, after all, make good sense when so interpreted. A positive answer to this question will emerge as the book proceeds. The reader must judge whether the case is proved.
Those who have never doubted that the Kinds can be taken as Forms may consider such an enquiry unnecessary. But there are many passages, as has already been mentioned, where difficulties raised have never been satisfactorily met, and the precise nature of the Platonic doctrine implied is still far from clear. New interpretations are here offered, for example, of the arguments for the separateness of the Kinds (chapter VII), of what is meant by a vowel Form (chapter VI), and of the argument against the monists (chapter III)" (pp. 1-2).

36. Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." The Review of Metaphysics no. 29:66-95.

Reprinted in: N. D. Smith (ed.), Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. II: Plato's Middle Period: Metaphysics and Epistemology, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 116-141.
"The guiding questions to which I refer are familiar ones. First: What is the fate of the theory of paradigm forms of the Phaedo and Republic in view of the apparent criticism of the theory found in the Parmenides? And second: What is the fate of the distinction of the Phaedo and Republic between being (οὐσία) and becoming (γένεσις) in view of the apparent criticism of the adequacy of that distinction found in the Theaetetus and Sophist? Lately, the first of these two questions has received the greater share of the attention of philosophers and scholars. I want here to redirect attention to the equally important and equally intriguing second question." (p. 66, note omitted)
(...)
"The conclusion of our investigation is that Plato's theory of reality was neither subject to as much or to as little flux as some have believed. There were important modifications in his view of becoming and also in his view of being. In each case the changes were based on important philosophical developments. But Plato retained a version of the being-becoming distinction strong enough to sustain his theory of degrees of reality and of sufficient conceptual power to make that theory intelligible.
In the light of the history of Platonic scholarship it would be foolish to claim that no other theory of the development of Plato's views on being and becoming could be defended. All that is here claimed is that the theory which is here offered is the one which best accommodates all the available evidence. It accounts for Aristotle's testimony, for the explicit statements of the Phaedo and Republic and the argument of Republic V, for the explicit changes in Plato's way of characterizing being and becoming after the Theaetetus, and for the changes in Plato's view of the epistemic status of becoming. On this account none of these matters need be explained away or given any interpretation other than the most straightforward one. That constitutes the strongest argument in favor of this account." (p. 95)

37. Bondeson, William. 1972. "Plato's "Sophist": Falsehoods and Images." Apeiron no. 6:1-6.
"The chief arguments of the Sophist occur in what is sometimes called its "inner core". The core is that large section which begins after the dichotomies employed to catch the sophist come to an impasse about "nonbeing" and falsehoods, and which ends with the return to dichotomous division after the account of "logos" in the sense of "statement" has been given. This inner core runs from 232B to 263E. The relations between shell and core depend upon how seriously Plato is thought to have regarded the method of "division" (διαίρεσις). Such problems are not relevant to the questions discussed here, nor does Plato's attempt to catch the sophist appear to be entirely serious.
Rather, I want to discuss the puzzles about falsehood and how these puzzles are connected with the hunt for the sophist." (p. 1)
38. ———. 1973. "Non-Being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's "Sophist" and "Parmenides"." Apeiron no. 7:13-21.
"The purpose of this paper is to point out some similarities between a part of Plato's treatment of non-being in the Sophist and two hypotheses of the Parmenides. I shall first discuss a small section of the Sophist and try to show what Plato means by the phrase το μηδαμως ὀν. I shall then, by an analysis of the first and sixth hypotheses of the Parmenides, try to show that Plato wants to make virtually the same points as he made in the Sophist.
The conclusions reached here should be helpful for a more comprehensive interpretation of these two dialogues." (p. 13)
See the reply by Paul D. Eisenberg, "More ou'uon-being and the one". Apeiron, 10, 1976, pp. 6-14.
39. ———. 1974. "Plato's Sophist and the Significance and Truth-Value of Statements." Apeiron:41-48.
"The greater portion of Plato's Sophist deals with a number of issues in what might be called the philosophy of language. It also deals with a series of metaphysical and ontological views and attempts to show how language and reality are

related. Thus one way of organizing the views of Plato in the Sophist is to view much of the material up to and including 260E as concerned with topics centring around the question: how is discourse possible? Thus Plato talks about Being, Non-being, Sameness and Otherness and makes the claim that it is the των ειδών συμπλοκή which makes discourse possible (259E). The interpretation of this important passage and what precedes it in the dialogue must be left aside for the purposes of this paper because it is concerned with what follows 260E rather than with what precedes it.
(...)
In this paper I want to do four things. First, it will be necessary to discuss and evaluate Plato's answer to the "nature" question about statements and their parts. Second, I want to determine the relation between statements and truth or falsehood, and to determine how statements can be true or false.
Third, I want to determine whether Plato has adequately discussed and answered the Sophist's difficulties and confusions about falsehoods (these will be also discussed as the topics in the first two parts are developed), and fourth, to point out the propositional character of belief which will indicate some important connections between the Sophist and the Theaetetus." (p. 41)

40. ———. 1975. "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language." The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy no. 6:29-41.
"Whatever Plato's philosophy of language and his logical theory might be, they are backed by a metaphysics and an ontology. Or, to put the claim more strongly, Plato's philosophy of logic and language implies a metaphysics and an ontology, and the elaboration of these is his primary goal, even in those dialogues, i.e., the later ones, where linguistic considerations might seem to be predominant. Or, as one recent interpreter of Plato, Julius Moravcsik, has put it, Plato constructs an elaborate metaphysics and ontology in order to make our ordinary ways of thinking, talking, and knowing intelligible.(14)

Thus, in this paper, the concern shall be with a variety of topics in Plato's philosophy of logic and language, but there is not the space here for developing many of the metaphysical implications of those views.
Probably the most fundamental question in interpreting Plato, and in terms of which most questions concerning Plato's views are settled, is the question of whether, and to what extent, the views in the dialogues are cut from the same cloth and form a single philosophic whole. Most analytic interpreters do not hold such a view; rather, they maintain that there are important differences in the doctrines of the various dialogues. Other interpreters have maintained that there are differences in the angle of approach to a problem or that there are differences in topic without real change in the overall doctrine. It will be shown that this will not work for at least some of the logical and linguistic problems with which I am concerned." (p. 30)
(...)
"Many distinctions and clarifications need to be made before the"object" view and its resultant paradoxes can be laid to rest; senses of "is" and "is not" need to be distinguished, negation and negative predication need to be understood, and how the forms and their interrelations make discourse possible needs to be shown. But all of these problems can be solved only if there is a clear awareness of the nature and function of statements in accounts of stating, believing, and knowing.
It seems to me that Plato realized that the "object" view is confused and contradictory and that in the Theaetetus, and even more so in the Sophist, he attempts to dispel it. Thus, the concept of a λόγος is the fundamental notion which ties the Theaetetus and the Sophist together." (p. 39)
(14) Being and Meaning in the Sophist, Acta Philosophica Fennica, fasc. 14 (1962).

41. ———. 1976. "Some Problems about Being and Predication in Plato's Sophist 242-249." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:1-10.
"One of the central tasks which Plato sets for himself in the Sophist is to say what being (το` ὄν) is. In doing this he

makes a variety of philosophical moves. The first is to show that non-being in a very restricted sense of the term (το` μηδαμῶς ὄν) is an impossible and self-contradictory concept. (1) This occupies the first part (237A ff.) of the central section of the Sophist. After discussing some puzzles concerning deceptive appearances (240 B) and falsehoods (240 D), Plato turns to a discussion of being at 242B. In this section of the dialogue Plato claims to show that the attempts of previous philosophers to define being have failed and he makes his own first attempt in the dialogue to define being (cf. 242C and 247E). 2 In this paper I am concerned only with this section of the Sophist (242-249), and I want to show first that Plato's notion of being here is ambiguous, the term το` ὄν shifting between "being" and "what has being," between the form and those things which participate in it. Second, I want to show that the definitions of being at 248C and 249D are not only compatible with one another but also that, when properly understood, they make sense of Plato's use of motion and rest in the Sophist. And finally, I want to show that Plato is caught in the snares of self-predication when he talks about being and other Forms of the same ontological level. This is due to the way in which he formulates the difference between statements of identity and predication in the argument against Parmenides in this section of the Sophist." (p. 1)

(1) Cf. my "Non-being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's Sophist and Parmenides," forthcoming in Apeiron [1973]. My view is somewhat different from that of G. E. L. Owen's "Plato on Not-Being" in Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1971), vol. I.

(2) Cf. Owen, ibid. p. 229, n. 14. Owen presents a convincing case that Plato is giving a definition (as opposed to a mark or sign) of being. However, Owen also seems to take the view, for example against Moravcsik in Being and Meaning in the Sophist (Acta Philosophica Fennica, XIV [1962]), that little of philosophical significance happens in 242-249. I hope to show in this paper that this is not the case.

42. Booth, N. B. 1956. "Plato, Sophist 231 a, etc." The Classical Quarterly no. 6:89-90.
"Mr G. B. Kerferd , in Classical Quarterly XLVIII (1954), 84 ff. writes of 'Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry'. He suggests that Plato thought there was a 'Noble Art' of sophistry, other than philosophy itself; and he seeks to find this Art in the better and worse arguments of Protagoras. This suggestion is, unfortunately, based on a mistranslation of Plato, Sophist 231 a (...). Mr. Kerferd supposes that this can mean: 'For I do not think there will be dispute about distinctions which are of little importance when men are sufficiently on guard in the case of resemblances.'
(...)
But further, what are these distinctions which, if we accept Mr. Kerferd's view, are 'of little importance'? They are distinctions on the one hand between tame and fierce, and on the other hand between the cathartic process of dialectic and sophistry. The 'tame' and 'fierce' distinction is not between tame and fierce merely; it is a distinction between the very tamest and the very fiercest of animals (Plato uses superlatives at the beginning of 231 a). How Plato could have in the same paragraph stressed the vastness of the difference by means of superlatives and then spoken of 'small distinctions', is more than I can see. I also fail to see how Plato could ever have thought the distinction between sophistry and healing dialectic to be a small one; that would be saying that there was little to choose between Socrates and Thrasymachus. No: Plato is saying here that there is a certain superficial resemblance between healing dialectic and sophistry, but we must beware of that resemblance; in fact the one is a tame watch-dog, the other a ravening wolf, and 'we shall find in the course of our discussion, once we take adequate precautions, that there is no small distinction between the two'." (p. 89)
43. Bossi, Beatriz. 2013. "Back to the Point: Plato and Parmenides – Genuine Parricide?" In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 157-173. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Famous scholars in the XXth century (1) understood that Plato really does refute Parmenides' absolute condemnation of not-being as unthinkable and inutterable by his demonstration that 'not-being' 'is' in the sense of 'is different from'. Though this goal is made explicit and is almost claimed to have been achieved by the Stranger in the Sophist, Plato offers certain clues that show there is enough evidence for a different reading that admits of some nuances. The Stranger begs Theaetetus not to suppose that he is turning into some kind of parricide (241d3). Yet Plato does toy with a potential parricide, which the Stranger claims he will never commit. The attitude might be regarded as a literary trope inserted for dramatic purposes, but in the context it could be merely rhetorical.

In my view, the person the Stranger really fights and kills is, not Parmenides himself but the ghost of a ridiculous Parmenides character dreamed up by the sophist, who will shelter his own 'relativistic' view beneath his cloak by denying the possibility of falsehood." (p. 158)

(1) Guthrie (1978) 151; Diès (1909) 7; Taylor (1960) 389; Ross (1966) 115; Cornford (1970) 289 –294 quoted by O'Brien (1995) 43 n.1. Also Notomi: 'The two extreme philosophical positions of Parmenides and Protagoras converge on the denial of the possibility of falsehood' (1999) 182.

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"The papers included fall into three broad categories: a) those dealing directly with the ostensible aim of the dialogue, the definition of a sophist; b) a number which tackle a specific question that is raised in the dialogue, namely how Plato relates to Heraclitus and to Parmenides in the matter of his understanding of being and non-being; and c) those discussing various other broad issues brought to the fore in the dialogue, such as the ‘greatest kinds’, true and false statement, difference and mimesis." (Preface, p. V)

45. Bostock, David. 1984. "Plato on 'Is Not' (Sophist, 254-9)." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 2:89-119.
"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the Greek verb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and those that are incomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement of some kind (which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there is no complement, and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to be true' or something of the kind. What role the complete uses of the verb have to play in the Sophist as a whole is a vexed question, and one that I shall not discuss. For I think it will be generally agreed, at least since Owen's important article of 1971, (1) that in our central section of the Sophist it is the incomplete uses that are the centre of Plato's attention. Anyway, I shall confine my own attention to these uses, and accordingly my project is to elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where the 'is' is incomplete. I might also add here that, for the purposes of the Sophist as a whole, I am in agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be crucial was the account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes, merely ancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has already done so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As we shall see, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about 'not' without first considering his views on the incomplete 'is'.

Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means the same as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign of predication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased. The vast majority of commentators on the Sophist seem agreed that Plato means to distinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the verb.(2) This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see the distinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity that he fails to see, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central section of the Sophist is therefore one grand logical mistake." (pp. 89-90)

(1) Plato on Not-Being in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 223-267.

(2) One may note P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), 298; J. L. Ackrill, 'Plato and the Copula', Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXVII (1957), 1-6 esp. 2; J. M. E. Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist', Acta Philosophica Fennica, XIV (1962), 23-64 esp. 51; W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962), 89; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. II (London, 1963), 449; R. S. Bluck, Plato's Sophist (Manchester, 1975), 151; J. Malcolm, 'Plato's Analysis of to on and to me on in the Sophist', Phronesis, XII (1967), 130-46 esp. 145; Owen, above n. 1, 256; G. Vlastos, 'An Ambiguity in the Sophist' in his Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 287; and I would add J. McDowell, 'Falsehood and not-being in Plato's Sophist' in Language and Logos, ed M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), 115-34 (discussed below). But the older commentators do not always agree, e.g. F. M. Comford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), 296, and A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman (London, 1961), 82. More recently J. C. B. Gosling, Plato (London, 1973), 216-20, has put the case for scepticism, and F. A. Lewis, 'Did Plato discover the estin of identity?', California Studies in

Classical Antiquity, VIII (1975), 113-43, has argued it at length.

46. Brisson, Luc. 2011. "Does Dialectic Always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the Sophist 254d5-e1." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 156-172. Praha: Oikoymenh.
47. Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:49-70.
    Reprinted with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 455–478.
    "Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the Sophist the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.
    Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai, 'to be'. This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of 'to be', which has usually been associated with the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is, the copula." (p. 49)
    (1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59 (1957), both reprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.
48. ———. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In Companions to Ancient Thought: Language,

edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The existence of at least these three distinct uses of 'is' was taken for granted by commentators and assumed to apply, by and large, to ancient Greek, though with some salient differences. These include the fact that Greek can and regularly does omit esti in the present tense, though not in other tenses, and that the complete 'is' is still very much a going concern, though more or less defunct in modern English. The fact that the esti of the copula can be omitted means that a predicative use of esti can convey a nuance over and above that of the mere copula (for instance connoting what really is F rather than merely appearing F, or what is enduringly F).
And the fact that current English has more or less abandoned the use of the complete 'is' to mean 'exist' (as in Hamlet's 'To be or not to be), while in Greek it is very much a going concern, may lead us to question whether the complete esti really shares the features of the 'is' which means (or used to mean) 'exist'." (p. 215)
(...)
"I cannot offer here a full account of what I take to be the results of the Sophist, far less a defence of such an account, but confine myself to a few points. To the question whether the dialogue distinguishes an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of predication, I have indicated my answer: that it does not, but it does draw an important distinction between identity-sentences and predications (see section I and n. 2 above). Here I focus on the question whether and if so how it distinguishes complete from incomplete uses. I shall suggest that Plato developed a better theory about the negative 'is not' than his argumentation in the Republic suggests, while continuing to treat the relation between the complete use (X is) and the incomplete (X is F) in the way I have described in section IV, that is, by analogy with the relation between 'X teaches' and 'X teaches singing'." (p. 229)

49. ———. 2001. "Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist 245-249." In Method in Ancient

Philosophy, edited by Gentzler, Jyl, 181-207. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In Greek mythology, Zeus and the other Olympian deities were challenged in a mighty battle by the race of giants, a battle which, with the help of Herakles, the gods won. Unlike the earlier battle of the Titans, in which Zeus' party defeated and supplanted their own forebears, the Titans, the Gigantomachia ended with the preservation of the old order in the face of the newcomers' challenge.
(...)
Here I focus on the section of the Sophist whose high point is represented by Plato, through his chief speaker, the Stranger, as a Gigantomachia, a debate about being between materialists and immaterialists, or so-called Friends of the Forms. The materialists, cast in the role of 'giants', hold that only the material (what is or has a body) is or exists.
Their opponent the 'gods', labelled 'Friends of the Forms', take the opposite view; they accord the title 'being' only to the immaterial, to 'certain intelligible Forms', and relegate to the status of genesis (coming to be) those material, changing things the giants champion. In this section, in which the Stranger takes on each party in turn and aims at a rapprochement between them, Plato takes what may be thought of as first steps in ontology. in reflective discussion and argument about what there is and about how one should approach the question of what there is. There is considerable disagreement over the upshot of the whole debate, and especially over whether the discussion of the Friends of the Forms' views concludes with the Stranger advocating a radical departure from the treatment of Forms in the middle dialogues: both Owen and Moravcsik advocate a reading whereby the immutability of the Forms is abandoned.(1) Here I re-examine the Gigantomachia, asking what philosophical moves and results it contains. In doing so, I consider what use Plato makes of two innovations in approach which can be detected in the later dialogues, and in particular in the Sophist." (pp. 181-182)

50. ———. 2008. "The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood." In The Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by

Fine, Gail, 383-410. New York: Oxford University Press.
"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part: the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false statement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic troublemaking; and how the Eleatic Stranger offers a definitive solution to both. As I said above, the Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues I've selected." (p. 438)

51. ———. 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist." In Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In Plato's late dialogues Sophist and Politicus (Statesman), we find the chief speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, pursuing the task of definition with the help of the so-called method of division.
(...)
However, there are major and well-known problems in evaluating the method as practised in the two dialogues, but especially so in the Sophist.
(...)
I investigate below some of the many scholarly responses to this bewildering display of the much-vaunted method of division. I divide scholars into a 'no-faction', those who hold that we should not try to discern, in any or all of the dialogue's definitions, a positive outcome to the investigation into what sophistry is (Ryle, Cherniss), and a 'yes-faction': those who think an outcome is to be found (Moravcsik, Cornford, and others).(2) I shall conclude that in spite of the appearance of many answers (Moravcsik) or one answer (Cornford, Notomi), the reader is not to think that any of the definitions give the (or a) correct account of what sophistry is. But while I side with the no-faction, my reasons differ from those of Kyle and Cherniss, who, in their different ways, located the failure in the nature of the method of division. In my view the failure lies not, or not

primarily, in the method of division itself; but in the object chosen for discussion and definition. Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given, a serious definition, for the simple reason that a sophist is not a genuine kind that possesses an essence to be discerned.(3) If we try to carve nature at the joints, we cannot hope to find that part of reality which is sophistry, for there is no such genuine kind as sophistry-especially not under the genus of techne, art, skill, or expertise." (pp. 151-153).
(2) The views of Moravcsik, Cornford, and Notomi are discussed in the text of section III; those of the 'no-faction' in note 17.
(3) I use 'genuine kind' to indicate something with a wider extension than that of 'natural kind' familiar from Locke, Putnam, etc. I use it to mean the kind of entity which Plato would allow to have an ousia (essence) or phusis (nature) of its own (cf. Tht. 172b). Virtues, senses like hearing and sight, and crafts like angling would be recognized as genuine kinds in the intended sense."

52. ———. 2012. "Negation and Non-Being: Dark Matter in the Sophist." In Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 233-254. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
"My aim is to try to understand what I regard as the most difficult stretch of the Sophist, 257–259. In responding to a particularly impenetrable claim made by the Eleatic Stranger (ES), Theaetetus announces at 258b7 that they have found το` μη` ὄν (not being), which they have been searching for on account of the sophist. He is thinking, of course, of what sparked the long excursus into not being and being: the sophist's imagined challenge to the inquirers' defining his expertise as involving images and falsehood. Here's that challenge: speaking of images and falsehood requires speaking of what is not, and combining it with being, but to do so risks contradiction and infringes a dictum of Parmenides. This heralds the puzzles of not being, and of being, which are followed by the positive investigations of the Sophist's Middle Part. So Theaetetus'

eureka moment ought to signal some satisfying clarification and closure to the discussions. But in fact the stretch it is embedded in is singularly baffling, and the subject of continuing debate among commentators.(2) There is little agreement about what issues Plato is discussing in this section, let alone about any supposed solutions.
My strategy is to try to read the passage without preconceived ideas about what it ought to contain." (pp. 233-234)
(2) I list here and in the next two notes some of the major discussions. I have learned from them all, and from many others not mentioned: M. Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Hypomnemata 18 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). G. E. L. Owen, “Plato on Not-being,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays 1, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971), 223–267. Owen’s essay is reprinted in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). E. N. Lee, “Plato on Negation and Not-being in the Sophist,” The Philosophical Review 81.3 (1972): 267–304. D. Bostock, “Plato on ‘Is Not’,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), 89–119. M. Ferejohn, “Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (1989), 257–282. M. Frede, “Plato’s Sophist on False Statements,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 397–424.
(3) J. van Eck, “Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e–263d,” Phronesis 40 (1995), 20–47 (...).
(4) J. Kostman, “False Logos and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist,” in Patterns in Plato’s Thought, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973) (...).

53. ———. 2018. "Aporia in Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist." In The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis, 91-111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: "The chief aim of this essay is to examine the development of Plato’s use of philosophical puzzles to guide

his enquiries. Labelled aporiai, they are prominent in Sophist, but already found in Theaetetus. Section 2 identifies common features in such puzzles, and explores how in Theaetetus they are presented but left unsolved. In both dialogues the young Theaetetus is characterised as an ideal interlocutor, quick to appreciate a philosophical puzzle, and to respond appropriately. By these means Plato links the otherwise very disparate dialogues: Theaetetus, a formally aporetic attempt to define knowledge conducted by Socrates, and Sophist, whose new protagonist, the Stranger from Elea, confidently announces results both in the Outer Part's search for the sophist and in solving the problems of the Middle Part.(1) Section 3 traces how the Sophist's Middle Part is explicitly structured around a series of philosophical puzzles, and notes the plentiful terminology of aporia that signposts this. Plato shows his readers the philosophical payoffs of a serious attempt to diagnose the source of a given aporia: herein (I suggest) lies the real difference between the sophist and the philosopher.
But first Section I explores the famous image in Theaetetus of Socrates as a midwife, where Plato offers what I read as a new approach to the respondent's subjective aporia."
(1) I follow Szaif's classification of a formally aporetic dialogue, Chapter 2 [same volume], Section 2. Like other formally aporetic dialogues, This has been the subject of many doctrinal readings, cf. Sedley 2004.
References
Jan Szaif, "Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement", G. Karamanolis, V.Politis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, 2018.
David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

54. Brumbaugh, Robert S. 1983. "Diction and dialectic. The language of Plato's Stranger from Elea." In Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, edited by Robb, Kevin, 266-276. LaSalle: Open Court.
Reprinted in R. S. Brumbaugh, Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Form, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock, Albany:

State University Press, 1989, pp. 103-111.
"An interesting effect of Eric Havelock's discussion has been the constant reminder of the location of Plato at the end of a dominant oral tradition, without which there might be the temptation to take Platonic dialogue as a discontinuous leap into literacy, thus leading a modem reader to misread the texts. For example, we easily assume, because we have not thought about it, that reading was done silently in Plato's time; that there were equivalents of our copyrights and publishers; even -in some cases- an axiom that "mature" thought must be expressed in clear, monochrome treatise. All of this helps misunderstand
the dialogue form.
(...)
The purpose of my present comments is to relate this framework to the interpretation of Plato's Sophist, with a passing glance at the Statesman. In particular, I want to follow up a suggestion I made earlier, that the principal speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, is an imported bounty-hunter, brought in to shoot the Sophist down (or, more exactly in the absence of the rifle, to catch him in a net). The "weapons" are, perhaps, new (or old) techniques of method and language. (For this simile, compare Socrates' remark in the Philebus that he will now require "weapons of a different kind" to resolve a shifted point under debate.)(2)" (p. 103)
(2) Philebus 23B5

55. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology." In Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, 92-157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
English translation by Janet Lloyd of La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne (1988).
"The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine [the doctrine of the τί as the supreme genus]. In part II, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I shall be

analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been played by the reading of Plato's Sophist (III) and that possibly played by critical reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (IV) in the elaboration of the TSG doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics to fix their ontological status (V). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (VI)." (pp. 95-96)

56. Bruseker, George. 2018. "The Metaphor of Hunting and the Method of Division in the Sophist." In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy Volume 2, Section II: Classical Greek Philosophy, edited by Boudouris, Kostantinos, 55-60. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society. Abstract: "This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato's dialogue, the Sophist. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the 'angler' given at the start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of division introduced for coming to definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student's understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a non-linear,

iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or separative arts (as they are classified within the dialogue)."

57. Buckels, Christopher. 2015. "Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 35:317-327.
"The blending of the greatest kinds (γένη) or forms (εἴδη) is one of the central topics of Plato's Sophist. These greatest kinds, or megista gene, which seem to be either Platonic Forms or very similar to Platonic Forms, are Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, and Otherness; I take them to be properties that are predicated of other things, for reasons we will examine. Why these five kinds are greatest is not made explicit, but immediately before taking up his investigation, the Eleatic Visitor, the main speaker of the dialogue, says that some kinds are 'all-pervading', such that nothing prohibits them from blending with every other kind, i.e., from being predicated of every other kind (254b10-c1). One might think, then, that these five are examples of all-pervading kinds. Almost immediately, however, the Visitor and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, agree that Motion and Rest do not blend with each other, which seems to cut off this explanation of their greatness (252d9-11). For this reason, many commentators suggest that Motion and Rest are simply convenient examples of kinds, garnered from discussions earlier in the text, and only Being, Sameness, and Otherness are special, all-pervading kinds. On this reading. Hot and Cold, which are also examples from earlier in the text (243d6-244b4), would seem to do the job just as well as Motion and Rest, since both pairs are opposites that do not blend with each other but which are (by blending with Being), are self-identical (by blending with Sameness), and are distinct (by blending with Otherness).
I think this reading is incorrect; Motion and Rest are carefully selected as megista gene, greatest kinds, and are not just convenient examples (Reeve [Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the Sophist] 1985, 57 holds a similar position).

In fact, I think the kinds are greatest because they are all-pervading; the Visitor intends us to question the agreement that Motion and Rest do not blend, as is suggested when Theaetetus agrees, later, that if Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about saying that Motion is at rest (255b6-8). Thus, I argue, Motion and Rest can blend, i.e., they can be jointly predicated of one subject and can be predicated of each other, just as Sameness and Otherness can. While Sameness and Otherness are opposites, a single subject may be the same in one respect, namely, the same as itself, and other in another respect, namely, other than other things. Thus they can be predicated of a single subject, and they can be predicated of each other, as well, since Sameness is other than other things and Otherness is the same as itself." (p. 317)

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Abstract: "This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato's use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of "agonistic" argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato's qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive

philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations."
2. Candiotto, Laura. 2011. "The Children's Prayer: saving the Phenomena in Plato's Sophist." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 5:77-85.
Abstract: "Plato builds an ontology capable of saving the Phenomena in the Sophist. By doing so, he distances himself from Parmenides. This article analyses the children's prayer (Soph. 249 d 5) in order to sustain this thesis and evaluate the platonic proposal, along with the role of the negation and the heteron in the communication of the Kinds."
3. ———. 2016. "Negation as Relation: Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's Sophist 257 b3-259 d1." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 75-94. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The aim of the present chapter is to discuss and evaluate chapters 78 and 79 of Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist, which deal with Sph. 257b3-259dl. To this purpose, I will compare these chapters with the more established interpretations concerning the role played by the heteron in Plato's dialogue. Providing my own reading, my main claim is that negation is understood by Heidegger as the foremost shape of relationality. Moreover, negation as relation is not a dialectical tool but the disclosive power able to show the "things themselves". My argument will proceed by: 1) providing a short introduction of the major themes within the Sophist; 2) presenting Heidegger's thesis; 3) analyzing the main threads within the Platonic text by referring to the more established interpretations; 4) evaluating Heidegger's interpretation with a special emphasis on where it has to be situated with regard to the text and to other interpretations, thus pointing out the innovative elements proposed by Heidegger." (p. 75)
4. ———. 2018. "Purification through emotions: The role of shame in Plato's Sophist 230b4–e5." Educational

Philosophy and Theory no. 50:576-585.
Abstract: "This article proposes an analysis of Plato's Sophist (230b4–e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical practice. The use of emotions characterizing the 'elenctic' method described by Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social image by concealing his shame at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato's literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the Platonic dialogs the tools for the constitution of a new paideia."

5. Caplan, Jerrold R. 1995. "The Coherence of Plato's Ontology." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 65:171-189.
"In light of the so-called theory of Forms presented in earlier dialogues and the communion of the greatest kinds in the later dialogues, it has been argued that Plato abandoned his earlier ontology in favor of the more sophisticated scheme of his later period. The criticism is then made that the so-called later ontology is inconsistent with the earlier one and that the two accounts do not cohere.
I argue, to the contrary, that Plato's presentation has been consistent throughout. One might say that the discussion in the Sophist (236-259) is a revision or a refinement or expansion of the theory as found, for example, in the Phaedo (78-9). Although this may suggest that there has been some sort of development in the treatment of the Forms from early to late, it by no means implies any wholesale abandonment of the first formulations nor any inherent inconsistency. The fact that Plato himself raises questions about the Forms indicates the need for a clearer articulation of the relationship between thought and being,

which is precisely what is undertaken in the later dialogues." (p. 171)

6. Casadesús Bordoy, Francesc. 2013. "Why Is It so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl. Sph. 218d3 and 261a5." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 15-27. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   "Suffice it, therefore, in conclusion to this presentation, to return to the passage from the Republic in which the lines of the Odyssey which begin the Sophist are commented on in negative terms, and to ask once again the question Socrates poses in justification of his criticism of the lines of Homer: 'Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another...?'
   In order to answer this question in the negative, Plato has to undertake the writing of the Sophist, in an attempt to expose one who, due to his protean and mimetic character, adopts all kinds of forms, even the most divine. Equipped with his philosophical hunting weapon, the dialectical method and diaresis, he attempts, like Menelaus, to catch the sophist.
   Nonetheless, the possibility of success remains in doubt, given Socrates' disturbing observation that the hard-working hunter, the Stranger from Elea himself, could be yet another of the multiple and polymorphous manifestations of the Sophist ..." (p. 27)
7. Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third One and Many Problem in Plato?" Apeiron no. 11:20-26.
   "In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two."(2) The first problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing (Philebus, 14D-15A); it is " the problem of how the same thing can have many characteristics."(3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things which come into being (

Philebus, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy", the second serious and difficult.
Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However, when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't have the structure of (I) at all."
Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out (III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the Philebus, Parmenides, and Sophist. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)
(1) 1M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.
(2) Ibid., p. 149.
(3) Ibid. In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from Sophist, 251A-B. In the Philebus and at the opening of the Parmenides (127E; 129A-E), the problem concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.

8. Cassin, Barbara. 2017. "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the Pseudos." In Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, edited by Greenstine, Abraham Jacob and Johnson, Ryan J., 13-29. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
"Barbara Cassin's "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the 'Pseudos"' (1991; translated by Samuel Galson), investigates Plato's attempt in the Sophist to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. Cassin pinpoints the slippery operation of the pseudos through the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Yet Parmenides' rejection of not-being allows the sophist to claim infallibility. Plato's Eleatic Stranger shows that Parmenides' rejection of notbeing is self-refuting (thus the Stranger's famous

parricide is just as much Parmenides' suicide). Further, although the Stranger ultimately fails to find a criterion for truth or falsity, he nevertheless establishes a place for the pseudos in the distinction between logos tinos (speech of something) and logos peri tinos (speech about something). Ultimately, Cassin argues that reality of pseudos is a condition for the possibility of language, and indeed involves the very materiality and breath of language." (p. 5)

9. Cataldo, Peter J. 1984. "Plato, Aristotle and προς εν equivocity." The Modern Schoolman no. 61:237-247.
"One of the brilliant features of Father Joseph Owens' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics [*] is the way that be traces the integration of the προς εvequivocity of being in Aristotle's work. But Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is not linked with his predecessor Plato in this classic commentary.
The aim of this essay is lo indicate such a link, and one in which Plato 's contribution is more than just an anticipation; for, it will be argued that all of the elements which constitute προς εν equivocity per se are also present in Plato's doctrine of being found in the Sophist.
The nature of this project requires that several texts be presented from both thinkers, but this in no way presumes to be a comprehensive analysis of the texts. I on! y wish to show that Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is traceable to Plato in some definite ways, all the while assuming, of course, that their doctrines of being are essentially opposed." (p. 237)
[*] The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A. Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951, Third revised edition 1978.

10. Chan, Han-liang. 2012. "Plato and Peirce on Likeness and Semblance." Biosemiotics no. 5:301-312.
Abstract: "In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been

questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford's English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato's, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists' profession, the mysterious 'stranger', who is most likely Socrates persona, makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b).
For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircian scholar identified it.(1) There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to phantasma is eikastikhn (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikhn (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: 'But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.' (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by indexisation.
Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircian example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircian iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension."

11. Chappell, T. D. J. 2011. "Making Sense of the Sophist. Ten Answers to Ten Questions." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 344-375. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"One notable feature of the method of division is this: every determination in a well-performed division is a positive determination.

See Statesman, 262c9–d7, on an attempted definition by division of barbaros:
“[Our division went wrong because we did] the same sort of thing as those who are trying to make a twofold division of the human race, and do what most of those do who live here: they distinguish on one side the race of Greeks as separate from all others, and then give the single name ‘barbarians’ to all the other races, though these are countless in number and share no kinship of blood or language.
Then because they have a single term, they suppose they also have a single kind.”
A good division will not divide Greeks from non-Greeks, but Greeks from Romans, Britons, Gauls, Teutons, Slavonic tribes, Hyperboreans, islanders of the utmost west, etc. etc. etc. To put it another way, every step of a well-performed division will use “other than” and not “is not”. More about this in due course." (pp. 344-345)
(...)
"In all these ways making sense of the Sophist, and (come to that) making sense of the sophist, is very literally a matter of watching Plato making sense: creating a theory of how, alongside the changeless world of the Forms, there can and must be a changing world of interweavings of those Forms. Not only the gods’ interweavings, which constitute the world, but also our interweavings, which constitute logoi about – representations of – that world: either misleading and false images of it, like the sophist’s, or faithful and accurate images, like those created by the person whom above all the sophist aspires to imitate: the philosopher." (p. 375)

12. Charlton, William. 1995. "Plato's Later Platonism." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 13:113-133.
"And although on some interpretations the analyses of negation and false statement in the Sophist call precisely for quantification over abstract objects, those passages have also been interpreted as requiring quantification over concrete objects like Theaetetus.
(...)

"But the passages themselves are brief and the issues clear. In what follows I first explain (Section I) why I prefer a Platonizing interpretation, and (Section II) question whether Plato is willing to quantify over concrete objects at all. I then (Section III) consider how he would wish us to understand existential claims to the effect that 'there is' something or that something 'shares in being'. Next (Section IV) I show how, using quantification over abstract but not over concrete objects, and also using the five Greatest Kinds mentioned in the Sophist, Plato could analyse various kinds of statement. He did not, of course, have the concept of quantification logicians have today. But he had strong logical instincts, and the suggestions he throws out lend themselves to development with the aid of quantifiers in a perspicuous and intriguing way. Finally (Section V), I suggest that his analysis of negation in terms of otherness reveals a sort of Platonism that is itself other than that defined by Quine: he believes that the difference between being and not being is independent of our thought in a way it would not be on an analysis similar to that proposed for change in Section IV." (pp. 113-114)

13. Cherubin, Rose. 1993. "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger?" In Plato's Dialogues: New studies and Interpretations, edited by Press, Gerald A., 215-235. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
"In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why is there an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist? What if anything does this character say or imply or do that only a "companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno" (216a) would?
I would also like to propose that central to these concerns is the question of how Plato read Parmenides' poem. Did Plato take the daimon's speech as a direct and literal statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue could be instructive in our considerations of how we might best read Parmenides.
The Stranger's speeches and behavior include much that seems sophistic, as well as a number of reasons to suspect that he is not, or not only, a sophist. We are led, then, to ask

what if any the differences are between Eleatic and sophist, and especially what if any differences between them appear in Plato. (For the latter I will focus on the Sophist.) What would account for the differences, or the lack thereof? And if there are differences, into which group-Eleatic or sophist-does the Stranger fall?" (p. 215)

14. Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana. 2010. "Heraclitus and Xenophanes in Plato's Sophist: The Hidden Harmony." Ariadne. The Journal of the School of Philosophy of the University of Crete no. 16:75-98.
"The principal aim of the present article is to shed light on Heraclitus' intellectual kinship with Xenophanes. Although the overlap of fundamental patterns and themes in both thinkers' worldview could be partly due to the osmosis of ideas in the archaic
era, the intertextual a!nity between them, as transmitted by the history of reception, cannot be regarded as a mere accident of cultural diffusion. Our primary intention is to focus on the common grounds of their criticism against the authority of the epic poets on the theological education of the Greeks and more particularly on its platonic appropriation." (p. 75)
(...)
"In conclusion, Plato in the Sophist uses Xenophanes' and Heraclitus' theological a!nity as a trait d'union between the latter and Parmenides, inasmuch as Plato's ontology is presented as a response to Parmenides' account on being." (p. 85)

15. ———. 2018. "Xenophanes in Plato's Sophist and the first philosophical genealogy." Trends in Classics no. 10:324-337.
Abstract: "In this article I intend to show that Plato in the Sophist provides us with the earliest doxographic material on pre-Platonic thinkers. In his account on his predecessors, Xenophanes emerges as the founder of the Eleatic tribe as opposed to the pluralists, while Heraclitus and Empedocles are presented as the Ioanian and the Italian Muses respectively. This prima facie genealogical approach, where Plato's predecessors become the representatives of schools of different origins paves the way for Plato's project in the

Sophist. In other words the monistic account Xenophanes introduces, prepares for the synthesis between the one and the many set forth by Heraclitus and Empedocles, which is thus presented as a further step towards the 'interweaving of forms' (συμπλοκὴν εἰδῶν) Plato proposes in the Sophist."

16. Clanton, J. Caleb. 2007. "From Indeterminacy to Rebirth: Making Sense of Socratic Silence in Plato's Sophist." The Pluralist no. 2:37-56.
"I argue here that, in the Sophist, Plato opens up possibilities for philosophy that lie beyond Socrates's style of discourse. Plato does so by introducing indeterminacy as a way of salvaging determinate discourse itself. In the first section of this article, I explore what the problem of the Sophist seems to be. It appears that in order to preserve discourse, the characters within the dialogue must try to make sense of non-being, which clearly is a problematic undertaking. In the second section, I follow the characters as they try to
resolve this issue of not-being. Third, I argue that in saving determinate discourse through resolving the issue of not-being, the characters in the dialogue incorporate indeterminacy into the very enterprise of philosophy. With this reading of the Sophist in mind, I try to make sense of a crucial element that Plato adds -- namely, Socrates's absence in che dialogue. In doing so, I mean to stay closely attuned to the dramatic features of the dialogue as they generate the questions I focus on. Finally, in light of this reading of the Sophist,
I suggest a way to rethink what it means to do philosophy, following Plato's lead in carrying out a philosophical project that is often deemed foreign to Plato." (p. 37)

17. Clarke, Patricia. 1994. "The Interweaving of the Forms with One Another: Sophist 259e." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 12:35-62.
"At Sophist 259 E the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus agree that 'The loosening of each thing from everything [else] is the complete wiping out of all λόγοι for it is because of the interweaving of the forms with one another that we come to have λόγος. My chief aim in this paper is to air a possible

solution to the problem of how this remark might apply to such statements as 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies', (1) in each of which only one form is referred to. The solution turns on the claim that neither statement could be true unless forms could mix with one another in the sense of being instantiated together in Theaetetus. I do not positively endorse it. I wonder whether there is any definite solution to the problem; Plato does not seem to give sufficiently clear indication of how he is thinking. However, I wish to argue that a solution along the lines indicated cannot be dismissed as easily as has sometimes been supposed. In the first part of my paper I give some general consideration to the remark at 259 E, and examine briefly some alternative solutions to the problem of its application to 'Theaetetus sits' and other such statements." (p. 35)

(1) I use these translations, rather than the more idiomatic 'Theaetetus is sitting', 'Theaetetus is flying', to reflect the fact that in the original at 263 A each example is expressed by means of a two-word sentence composed of proper name and verb. However, even for a statement of the form 'Theaetetus is F', expressed with copula and predicate, a problem arises if for Theaetetus to be F is simply for Theaetetus to partake directly of F, for then again only one form might seem to be involved."

18. Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2013. "The relativization of ”separation" (khorismos) in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 187-201. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"It is a commonplace among historians of ancient thought to refer to the “separation” (khorismos) which characterizes Platonic philosophy, and which Aristotle criticized severely. It is true that, like any commonplace, this separation, which is at base a type of dualism, can be the subject of very different understandings, including that of being minimized." (p. 187)

(...)

"All aporiai stem from separation. So, one has to try to suppress it, or at any rate relativize it, and that is going to be the task the Sophist sets itself.

Why the Sophist? Because, as we saw, khorismos separated two modes of being, and the Sophist is a dialogue about being. Steering clear of interpretation, the dialogue's subtitle is peri tou ontos. And it is normal, if he is going to undertake an in-depth analysis of the figure of the sophist, that he should see himself as obliged, for the first time on his philosophical voyage, now that he is over seventy, to confront his father Parmenides, the venerable and fearsome monopolizer of being, and the confrontation concerns sophistry. This is not the time to expatiate on the "amitiés particulières" that Plato establishes between Parmenides and sophistry. In criticizing the great master all things are allowed, including taking literally images in the poem which are didactic, such as the sphere, and in particular characterizing him as a fellow traveller of sophistry, which is, all in all, a joke in poor taste. But it is undeniable that his changing of porte-parole, in which he replaces Socrates with the Stranger, allows Plato to take certain liberties, and to face problems that his Socrates had never faced, among them precisely the necessity of refuting Parmenides." (p. 191)

19. Corey, David D. 2015. The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chapter Eight: Plato's Critique of the Sophist?
"In this chapter, I consider four such accounts of the sophists: those of Anytus speaking to Socrates in the Meno, Socrates speaking to Adeimantus in the Republic, Socrates speaking to Polus in the Gorgias, and the Eleatic Stranger speaking to Theaetetus in the Sophist. Although all these appear to stand as general critiques of the sophists, none is successful as such, nor, I argue, does Plato mean for us to accept them as such. These accounts are obviously defective both in their own terms and in light of what we know of the sophists from other dialogues. At the same time, however, I want to argue that these passages of general criticism have a broader scope than merely attempting to criticize the sophists. They also call into question the very lines of demarcation

between such categories as “sophistry,” “philosophy,” and “good citizenship,” thus leading inevitably to the possibility of self-reflection, whether one understands oneself to be a philosopher or merely a citizen.
In other words, what is usually taken rather facilely to be “Plato’s critique of the sophists” in fact cuts more deeply into common thinking and doing than readers may like to admit. Widely accepted and even cherished political, philosophical, and pedagogical practices are implicated in these accounts. " (pp. 202-203)

20. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1935. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Contents: The Theaetetus, pp. 15-163; The Sophist pp. 165-332.
"My object was to make accessible to students of philosophy who cannot easily read the Greek text, two masterpieces of Plato's later period, concerned with questions that still hold a living interest. A study of existing translations and editions has encouraged also the hope that scholars already familiar with the dialogues may find a fresh interpretation not unwelcome. A commentary has been added because, in the more difficult places, a bare translation is almost certain, if understood at all, to be misunderstood.
This danger may be illustrated by a quotation from a living philosopher of the first rank: It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion "and I hold that the definition of being is simply power". This suggestion is the charter of the doctrine of Immanent Law.'(1)
Dr. Whitehead is quoting Jowett's translation. If the reader will refer to the passage (p. 234 below), he will see that the words are rendered: 'I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they be nothing but power.'(2) A mark of real things may not be a 'definition of being'. This mark, moreover, is offered by the Eleatic Stranger to the materialist as an improvement on his own mark of real things, tangibility. The materialist accepts it, 'having for the moment no better suggestion of his own to offer'. The

Stranger add that Theaetetus and he may perhaps change their minds on this matter later on. Plato has certainly not committed himself here to a 'definition of being'. So much could be discovered from an accurate translation; but the word 'power ' still needs to be explained. It has been rendered by 'potency', 'force', 'Möglichkeit', 'puissance de relation'. Without some account of the history of the word dynamis in Plato's time and earlier, the student accustomed to the terms of modem philosophy may well carry away a false impression.

To meet difficulties such as this, I have interpolated, after each compact section of the text, a commentary which aims at discovering what Plato really means and how that part of the argument is related to the rest. There are objections to dissecting the living body of a Platonic dialogue. No other writer has approached Plato's skill in concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reasoning beneath the flowing lines of a conversation in which the suggestion of each thought as it arises seems to be followed to an unpremeditated conclusion. In these later dialogues the bones show more clearly through the skin; and it is likely that Plato would rather have us penetrate his meaning than stand back with folded hands to admire his art. An interpolated commentary, giving the reader the information he needs when and where he needs it, may be preferred to the usual plan of stowing away such information in an introduction at the beginning and notes at the end. It is not clear why we should be forced to read a book in three places at once. This book, at any rate, is designed to be read straight through." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (1933), p, 165. I am not suggesting that Dr. Whitehead fundamentally misunderstands the master who has deeply influenced his own philosophy, but only pointing out how a profound thinker may be misled by a translation.

(2) This rendering is itself doubtful, the construction of the words, as they stand in the MSS, being obscure and difficult.

21. Cresswell, M. J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?" The Philosophical Quarterly

no. 22:149-154.
"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is described in the Philebus (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that "almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument". And in the Sophist (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for "late learners of old men" who are "poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom".
What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem of how one thing can be many? In the Philebus (15a) Socrates says that the trivial problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)

22. Crivelli, Paolo. 1993. "Plato's Sophist and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 75:71-74.
"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn [*] proposed to apply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's Sophist a methodological principle which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation': given the close relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in particular circumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret obscure or vague Platonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's application of the 'principle of joint explanation' to the Sophist and his interpretation of Plato's analysis of negation and of its philosophical aims."

[*] Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation.

23. ———. 2012. Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works X; Note on the text XI; Introduction 1; 1. The sophist defined 13; 2. Puzzles about non-being 28; 3. Puzzles about being 71; 4. The communion of kinds 102; 5. Negation and not-being 177; 6. Sentences, false sentences, and false belief 221; Appendix: The Sophist on true and false sentences: formal presentation 261; References 275; Index of names 290; Index of subjects 294; index of passages cited 296-309.
"In the Sophist Plato presents his mature views on sentences, falsehood, and not-being. These views have given an important contribution to the birth and growth of the subjects now identified as ontology and philosophy of language. I have two main objectives: to offer a precise reconstruction of the arguments and the theses concerning sentences, falsehood, and not-being presented in the Sophist and to gain a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I offer an overview of the main problems addressed in i he Sophist and their solutions and then discuss the methodology whereby I pursue my primary goals." (Introduction, p. 1)
"Almost a commentary. The close interconnection of themes and concepts invited by the dialogue-form makes it difficult to address a Platonic dialogue by examining some of its themes and concepts in isolation from the others: if an operation of this sort is attempted, the impression arises that some factor essential for the understanding of the issues under consideration is ignored. Mainly for this reason I decided to have my examination of the Sophist unfolding in parallel with the development of the dialogue. So the present study covers most of the dialogue and follows its progression, almost as a running commentary. Nevertheless, my examination of the Sophist is selective: not all the themes and concepts emerging from the dialogue are discussed with the same care or depth. The approach I have

privileged is that of philosophy of language (in the comprehensive sense in which it addresses also ontological matters). In particular, I ask Plato some of the questions that a modern philosopher of language would regard as important and I consider what answers Plato is committed to offering. Establishing what answers Plato is committed to offering requires an accurate historical reconstruction of what he actually does say: modern questions, Plato's answers. The present study therefore combines exegetical and philological considerations with a philosophically minded attitude." (p. 11)

24. Crombie, Ian M. 1962. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Vol. 2: Plato on Knowledge and Reality; Chapter 3: Metaphysical Analysis. § V: The Sophist, pp. 388-421; Chapter 4: Logic and Language § III: The Paradox of False Belief pp. 486-497; § IV: Some Further Problems arising out of the Sophist: the Copula and Existence, etc., pp. 498-516.
"The doctrine of the Sophist is continuous with that which we have been examining. The fact that I have relegated the Sophist to a section of its own must not be allowed to give a contrary impression.
I have given the Sophist a section on its own partly because it is very difficult, and partly because it adds something to the doctrine sketched in the Cratylus and common to the Phaedrus, Statesman and Philebus. There are two parts to this additional material. One of these parts deals with matters which are perhaps more properly called logical than metaphysical, namely the meaning of the verb einai or "to be", and the nature of negation. The discussion of these topics is entangled with that of the others and can only be separated by violence. I shall use violence, however, and postpone the detailed consideration of these topics to the next chapter. The other part of the additional material can perhaps be described as follows. So far the "kinds" whose "sharing" we have been considering have been, on the whole, material or limiting properties. I call, for example, animality a limiting property, because there are certain

limits which cannot be transgressed by anything which is to have the property.
We recall however that the discussion in the Parmenides was concerned with the formal or non-limiting property unity—non-limiting in the sense that to be told that X is one is to be told nothing whatever about the nature of X. It is clear that the relation of non-limiting to limiting properties was an important question in Plato's latest phase, and it is in the Sophist that this is first discussed in connection with the sharing of kinds. This is the special material with which this section will be primarily concerned. I may add that it will be impossible in a discussion of this—perhaps of any—length to justify an interpretation of the Sophist." (p. 388)

25. Curd, Patricia Kenig. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:307-320.
"Does the Parmenides hold clues to a proper understanding of the Sophist? It seems to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the Parmenides can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the Sophist.
Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the Parmenides exhibit this confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the Sophist that Plato sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that dialogue.(1)
In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II of the Parmenides are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion. Further, I shall argue that in the second part of the Parmenides Plato explores and investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of Not-Being in the Sophist (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and predicative "senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"). (2) I shall

begin with some preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning to the Parmenides and the Sophist." (p. 307)
(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in "Notes on Ryle's Plato," in Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on Not-Being," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The Antinomies of Plato's Parmenides," Classical Quarterly, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139-158). See also M. Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Gottingen, 1967).
(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the Sophist suggested by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the Sophist," History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say here about the Sophist is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.

26. Dancy, Russell M. 1999. "The Categories of Being in Plato's Sophist 255c-e." Ancient Philosophy no. 19:45-72.
"Sophist 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather than a distinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication; this emerges from an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The resulting division is the same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition among the so-called "unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories are attached to the One and the Indefinite Dyad." (p. 45)
(...)
"Conclusion. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like Aristotle. But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato and Aristotle, if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be believed. We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between beings and others can be put by saying that while beings partake of both the Forms Standalone and Relative, others partake only of the Form Relative. The partition of beings into Standalone ones and Relative ones, as I have

construed it, is a categorial scheme: the scheme of Old Academic Categories adverted to in the introductory section of this article. Hermodorus (or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'of the beings, some are by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something'; that much we have the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives us examples, where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue of themselves; large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack these examples, we presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue of himself; it is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is not because of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact that Bucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce other, relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size goes. This then leads to categorizations of the terms man and horse under the heading Standalone and large, small, good, and bad under the heading Relative. And it seems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking of 'terms', Plato would speak of 'forms': the division is a division of forms, if that is right.

But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other texts, (1) would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone and Relative in two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious entities known as the One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary Forms derived as numbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that is a large undertaking, not to be entered on here." (pp. 69-70)

(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the rather strange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos X 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras and his circle'.

27. De Brasi, Diego, and Fuchs, Marko J., eds. 2016. Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

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"This volume offers a selection of papers presented at the international Symposium "Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924–25)" held at the University of Marburg in April 2013. At
that meeting young classicists and philosophers discussed the possibility of a re-evaluation of Heidegger's hermeneutics of the Sophist, and argued for a more nuanced reconstruction of his relationship with Plato." (p. VII)

28. ———. 2016. "Introduction. Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist and their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 1-26. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"This introductory essay hence focuses on four aspects. First of all, it will offer an overview on the current state of research. Second, it will argue for a relativization of Heidegger's alleged misunderstanding of Plato. This will be achieved by arguing against some of the criticism expressed by Werner Beierwaltes [*] towards Heidegger's reading of Plato. Third, it briefly examines the "Transition" in the 1924 Marburg Lectures between Heidegger's analysis of the

Nicomachean Ethics and the interpretation of Plato's Sophist, the "Preliminary Remarks" and the "Introduction" to the actual interpretation of the dialogue, describing Heidegger as a somehow unconscious 'forerunner' of the modern dialogical approach. Finally, it will present an overview of the contributions in the volume and suggest further possible research developments." (p. 2)
[*] Beierwaltes, Werner. "EPEKEINA. A Remark on Heidegger's Reception of Plato." Trans. Marcus Brainard, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 17, no. 1-2 (1994): 83–99 (orig.: "EPEKEINA. Eine Anmerkung zu Heideggers Platon-Rezeption." In Transzendenz: zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik. Festschrift für Klaus Kremer, edited by Ludger Honnefelder and Werner Schüßler, 39–55. Paderborn: Schöning, 1992).
—. "Heideggers Rückgang zu den Griechen." Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Jg. 1995, Heft 1 (Munich: Beck).
—. "Heideggers Gelassenheit." In Amicus Plato magis amica veritas. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Rainer Enskat, 1–35. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998.
The three essays are reprinted in:
Beierwaltes, Werner. Fußnoten zu Platon. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2011.

29. De Garay, Jesús. 2013. "Difference and Negation: Plato's Sophist in Proclus." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 225-245. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"We do not have a specific commentary on the Sophist, and it is doubtful whether he ever wrote one. What we do have is the Commentary on the Parmenides, from which some have hypothesized that he also wrote one on the Sophist. Whatever the case, the explicit references to this dialogue are many, and they affect crucial issues in Proclus' thought. In particular, The Elements of Theology aside (which, because of its axiomatic treatment does not include textual references of any kind), allusions to the Sophist are very

frequent in his three most relevant systematic works: the Commentary on the Parmenides, the Platonic Theology, and the Commentary on the Timaeus (9)." (p. 227)
(...)
"However, as has been pointed out by Annick Charles-Saget, to understand Proclus' interpretation of the Sophist we cannot pay attention solely to explicit quotations from the dialogue; but we must also consider his silences and significance shifts. In other words, on the one hand there are important questions in the dialogue which Proclus hardly adverts to: for example, the sophist as deceiver, and purveyor of falsehood in general; on the other hand, there are matters which Proclus presents in a different way, such as the vindication of poetic production in light of the definition of the sophist. Also significant is the way in which a number of very short passages from the Sophist are adduced over and over and again in support of his thesis." (p. 228)
(9) An exhaustive documentation of references to the Sophist can be found in Guérard (1991). My own exposition will focus strictly on the Commentary on the Parmenides and Platonic Theology.
References
Charles-Saget, A., "Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste", in P. Aubenque (éd.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon (1991), 475 – 494 = Charles-Saget (1991).
Guérard, Ch., "Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus", in P. Aubenque (éd.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, 1991, 495 – 508 = Guérard (1991).

30. de Harven, Vanessa. 2021. "The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism." Apeiron:1-27.
Abstract: "The Stoics are famously committed to the thesis that only bodies are, and for this reason they are rightly called "corporealists." They are also famously compared to Plato's earthborn Giants in the Sophist, and rightly so given their steadfast commitment to body as being. But the Stoics also notoriously turn the tables on Plato and coopt his "dunamis proposal" that being is whatever can act or be acted upon, to underwrite their commitment to body rather

than shrink from it as the Giants do. The substance of Stoic corporealism, however, has not been fully appreciated. This paper argues that Stoic corporealism goes beyond the dunamis proposal, which is simply an ontological criterion for being, to the metaphysics of body. This involves, first, an account of body as metaphysically simple and hence fundamental; second, an account of body as malleable and continuous, hence fit for blending (krasis di' holou) and composition. In addition, the metaphysics of body involves a distinction between this composition relation seen in the cosmology, and the constitution relation by which the four-fold schema called the Stoic Categories proceeds, e.g. the relation between a statue and its clay, or a fist and its underlying hand. It has not been appreciated that the cosmology and the Categories are distinct — and complementary — explanatory enterprises, the one accounting for generation and unity, the other taking those individuals once generated, and giving a mereological analysis of their identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities. The result is an elegant division of Plato's labor from the Battle of Gods and Giants. On the one hand, the Stoics rehabilitate the crude cosmology of the Presocratics to deliver generation and unity in completely corporeal terms, and that work is found in their Physics. On the other hand, they reform the Giants and "dare to corporealize," delivering all manner of predication (from identity to the virtues), and that work is found in Stoic Logic. Recognizing the distinctness of these explanatory enterprises helps dissolve scholarly puzzles, and harmonizes the Stoics with themselves."

31. de Vries, Willem. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:385-394.
"At Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though

superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious.
Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being." This distinction, which has been misinterpreted in the literature, is then applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness. Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish being and identity.
As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as other commentators have held.
The first section will discuss the first argument of our text, along with a recent interpretation of it. In the second section I shall introduce the argument to distinguish being and otherness and argue against Owen's interpretation.
The third section contains my interpretation of this argument, and is followed by a summary fourth section." (p. 385)

32. Delcomminette, Sylvain. 2014. "Odysseus and the Home of the Stranger from Elea." Classical Quarterly no. 64:533-541.
"Not very long ago, Plato's Sophist was often presented as a dialogue devoted to the problem of being and not-being, entangled with limited success in an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Thanks to the renewal of interest in the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues, recent works have shown that this entanglement is far from ill conceived or anecdotal.(1) However, the inquiry into the sophist is itself introduced by another question, concerning the nature of

the Stranger from Elea himself. I would like to show that this question and the way in which it is raised in the prologue may themselves shed light on the relations between the many threads which run across this very complex dialogue."
(1) See especially N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato's Sophist (Cambridge, 1999).

33. Denyer, Nicholas. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy. London: Routledge.
"How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing?
Since, for example, all men are mortal, how can one either say or think that some man is immortal? For since it is not the case that some man is immortal, how can there be any such thing for one to say or think? That, in a nutshell, is the problem of falsehood. It, and some of its many ramifications in ancient philosophy, will be the topic of this book." (p. 14)
(...)
"In the Sophist Plato sorts out, once and for all, the problems about falsehood that still lingered in the Theaetetus. His strategy is one of unite and conquer. What has made falsehood so problematic hitherto is, he suggests, the fact that it has been treated in isolation. We have thought that not being was uniquely difficult to understand, not realising how wrong we are to think that we understand being (243 b 7 - c 5, 245 e 8 - 246 a 2). Once however we realise that both being and not being should by rights be found equally difficult, we will be able to make progress (250 e 5 - 251 a 3). Plato thus examines all the many and diverse questions and answers about being that were bequeathed him by his philosophical predecessors. How many things are there? Just one? Just two? Or more? What sorts of things are there? Only changing and tangible things? Only changeless and intangible ones? Or are there things of both sorts? If we are to speak and think at all, argues Plato, we must acknowledge the existence of many things, both tangible and intangible.
Above all, we must acknowledge the existence of the five Greatest Kinds: Change, Rest, Being, Same and Other. By

the end of Sophist 255 those kinds have been isolated and distinguished from one another. Plato thereupon puts them to work. He starts to explore some of the connections between them, and in so doing solves the problem of how we can speak of that which is not." (Chapter 8, p. 147)
(...)
"Plato has explained how we can negate both predications and identifications. He has explained how both those ways of speaking about what is not are perfectly legitimate and free from paradox. His explanations seemed plausible enough, so far as they went. But did they go far enough? In particular, did they go far enough to solve our problem about falsehood? Plato thought not. By Sophist 258 b 7 he has legitimated talk of what is not. It is not however until Sophist 263 d 4 that he takes himself to have legitimated talk of falsehood. In the meantime, much other work is done; and even though the problem of falsehood was that to charge someone with falsehood requires talk of what is not, nevertheless the eventual solution to that problem is not a simple application of the earlier result that talk of what is not can make perfectly good sense. Why does Plato proceed in this way? Why does he not declare the problem of falsehood solved the moment he has given his account of negation?" (Chapter 9, p. 166)

34. Desmond, William. 1979. "Plato's Philosophical Art and the Identification of the Sophist." Filosofia oggi no. 2:393-403. Summary: "The author starts from an interpretation of continuity in the dramatic character of Plato's dialogue (a trait to be found in the Sophist as well, also in account of those images helpful to outline the nature of the philosopher), thus bringing forward a reading of the dialogue based on the statement that Plato's philosophical purpose cannot be either dried up or fulfilled on the range of logical analysis."
35. Diggle, James. 2020. "Two Conjectures in Plato (Laches 183e, Sophist 261a)." Hermes. Zeischrift für Klassische Philologie no. 148:381-382.
36. Dinan, Matthew. 2013. "On Wolves and Dogs. The Eleatic Stranger's Socratic Turn in the Sophist." In Socratic

Philosophy and Its Others, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise. Lanham: Lexington Books.
" I argue that in adopting a kind of Socratic “virtuosity,” the shortcomings of the Eleatic alternative to Socrates are put in dramatic relief. Not only does the Stranger’s appropriation of Socratic elenchos ultimately fail to produce clarity with respect to the sophist, but the drama of the dialogue suggests that the Stranger is critically lacking in self-knowledge. We see this most clearly in the Stranger’s philosophical parricide of “Father” Parmenides; certainly, it is through this parricide that the Stranger is able to produce an internally consistent account of being and logos, but the Stranger’s consistency only serves to attenuate his abstraction from a satisfactory account of the human things. At the end of the dialogue the Stranger thus produces a conclusion no more satisfying than the Athenian jury of the Apology—that Socrates looks awfully similar to a sophist. The specific ways in which Plato problematizes the Stranger’s investigation and conclusions, however, provide us with some insights into why Plato made Socrates the philosophical hero of the dialogues, particularly insofar as the Stranger seems lacking in Socrates’ characteristic self-knowledge. In the last analysis, while Plato opens the Sophist by dividing philosophy like from like, he closes it by dividing it better from worse, vindicating Socrates." (p. 117)

37. Dominick, Yancy Hughes. 2018. "The Image of the Noble Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 22:203-220.
Abstract: "In this paper, I begin with an account of the initial distinction between likenesses and appearances, a distinction which may resemble the difference between sophists and philosophers. That distinction first arises immediately after the puzzling appearance of the noble sophist, who seems to occupy an odd space in between sophist and philosopher. In the second section, I look more closely at the noble sophist, and on what that figure might tell us about images and the use of images. I also attempt to use the insights provided by the noble sophist in an investigation of the kind of images that Plato the author

produces. This raises the question of the general notion of image as it appears in the Sophist, and especially of the dual nature of all images, which in turn invites reflection on certain features of the examination of being and non-being late in the dialogue. Finally, I return to the deception inherent in images, and I argue that this dialogue does not present the possibility of completely honest images. Nevertheless, I hope to show that some uses of deceptions and images are better than others."

38. Dorter, Kenneth. 1990. "Diairesis and the Tripartite Soul in the Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 10:41-61.
"It has not generally been observed that there are remarkable differences between the way that the Eleatic stranger defines the sophist in the dialogue of that name, and the way that Socrates had characterized him in the earlier dialogues. These differences entail some serious consequences, and by paying attention to these we will be able to notice important implications of the Sophist's treatment of its theme. More generally, it will help us evaluate the claim that the dialogue represents a fundamental departure from Plato's earlier thinking." (p. 41)
39. ———. 1994. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press.
"The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns. Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in book-length studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (from the Preface, p. IX)
(...)

"In the middle dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic, Plato defines reality with reference to the criterion of rationality. Reason apprehends what is universal and unchanging, but not what is particular and in flux. The senses apprehend what is particular and in flux, but not what is universal and unchanging. Since reason is a more trustworthy guide to truth than are the changeable and deceptive senses, true reality is to be identified with "being" (the universal and unchanging) rather than "becoming" (the particular and fluid). This is the dichotomy represented later in the Sophist by the gods (friends of the forms) and giants (materialists), respectively. The former maintain against the materialists that "through the body we have intercourse with becoming by means of the senses, and by means of reason through the soul we have intercourse with real being, which always remains the same in the same respects, whereas becoming is different at different times" (248a). The leader of this dialogue is not Socrates but an unnamed stranger from Elea, who apparently is proposing to give up this dichotomy by neutralizing the difference between the gods and giants—in which case he would destroy the theory of forms in one of its most fundamental features.

Consequently it is more important in the case of the Sophist than with most other dialogues to consider its standpoint in relation to that of its predecessors. There are in fact notable differences between the way sophistry—the defining focus of the present dialogue—is portrayed here and in the Socratic dialogues." (pp. 121-122)

40. ———. 2013. "The Method of Division in the Sophist: Plato's Second deuteros plous." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 87-99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"I have suggested that the trilogy [Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist], like the Phaedo, approaches the good indirectly, by a deuteros plous. The reason the good cannot be presented directly is indicated in the final definition. The visitor concedes that it is difficult to know in which of the two species of images – distorted "semblances" or accurate

“likenesses” – the sophist’s products belong (Sophist 236c – d). He goes on to locate that difficulty in the problem that to say what is false is to attribute existence to “what is not”, and although at first he raises this point with regard to semblances rather than likenesses (236e– 239e), he proceeds to broaden the problem: since any image (ειδωλον) differs from the true thing (ἀληθινον) that it imitates, it must be not true (μή ἀληθινον), which means it really is not (οὐκ ὀντος). When Theaetetus points out that it “really is a likeness (εικόν),” the visitor replies, “Without really being, then, it really is what we call a likeness (εικόνα)?” (239d – 240b). Although the passage began as if only semblances were problematic, the problem was eventually extended to images in general, and by the end even likenesses were expressly included." (p. 97)

41. Driscoll, John. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:253-269.
"In this paper I will not examine the three-sided relationship between the Receptacle, primary substance, and primary matter. Such an examination would afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's theory of substance from the Categories to the Metaphysics, but it would raise many difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one important consequence of the link thereby established between Timaeus 49-52 and Categories V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold Cherniss over the dating of the Timaeus must be decided in favor of Owen, at least with respect to the relative dating of the Timaeus and the Sophist. I propose to show, in other words, that Categories V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not only of Aristotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later philosophy." (pp. 253-254)

42. Duerlinger, James. 1988. "The ontology of Plato's Sophist: I. The problems of falsehood, non-being and being." The Modern Schoolman no. 65:151-184.
Second part: The Modern Schoolman, LXV, March, 1988, 170-184.
"This is the first part of a two-part article in which Plato's discussion of the problems of falsehood, non-being and being, as presented in his Sophist, 236D9-25908, is explained from an ontological perspective. A new, unifying account of Plato's discussion is introduced that place it squarely within the framework of his theory of forms as it was understood by Aristotle and the ancient Platonists instead of the linguistic frameworks in which it has been placed by modern scholars. Because these linguistic frameworks have dominated both the modern translations and interpretations of Plato's text, readers will need to take special care not to presuppose the correctness of one or another of them when assessing this explanation. In particular to understand what is said here readers must free themselves of the habit of assuming that we are concerned with interpretations of " is" in positive statements of existence, predication, or identity, or with interpretations of "is not" in negative statements of existence, predication, or identity. The result of their effort, I believe, will be a clearer understanding of the novelty of my account, and consequently, a better understanding of the place of Plato's discussion within the history of ancient Greek ontology.
In the first part of this article I shall explain Plato's presentations of the problems of falsehood, non-being, and being, and in the second I shall explain his solutions to these problems in the context of his reply to those who deny that something can be both one and many. As Plato presents the problems of falsehood and non-being, I claim, he intends that we should realize that they rely on the assumption that because non-being is the contrary of being nothing can be both a being and a non-being. For this reason his solution to these problems is to argue, first of all, that non-being is not the contrary of being, but instead the form of otherness than another being, and secondly, that

because every being, including being itself, partakes of this form, something can be both a being and a non-being." (p. 151)

43. Duncombe, Matthew. 2012. "Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:77-86.
"Beginning at Sophist 255c9 the Eleatic Stranger attempts a proof that 'being' (το` ὄν) and 'other' (το` θάτερον) are different very great kinds. The key step in this proof is to group beings (τῶν ὄντων) into those that are themselves in themselves (αὐτα` καθ' αὐτά) and those that are in relation to other things (προ`ς ἄλλα). Much effort has been made to understand this distinction between αὐτα` καθ' αὐτά and προ`ς ἄλλα. The prevailing approach takes the former to name the class of 'absolute' terms and the latter to name the class of 'relative' terms, categories described in Diogenes Laertius' Life of Plato. Some, however, have argued that this category approach fails because it cannot say into which class some terms, such as 'sameness', fit. This represents a longstanding interpretive impasse. In this paper I show that an alternative manuscript reading can preserve the general category approach, whilst allowing 'sameness' to fit into the scheme, and thereby end the interpretive deadlock. I then defend my alternative reading against the possible objection that certain terms do not fit into the new scheme by appealing to a range of texts where Plato discusses relative terms." (p. 77, notes omitted)
"For a good overview of the literature on this distinction, see John Malcolm, "A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13", Ancient Philosophy 26: 275-289. 2006, p. 276."

44. Eisenberg, Paul D. 1976. "More on non-being and the one." Apeiron no. 10:6-14.
"In a recent issue of this journal, Prof. William Bondeson has argued(1) that previous translations of το μηδαμῶς ου will not do (or, in some cases, are even seriously misleading); and he proposes to translate that phrase by 'that which has no characteristics at all'. In the second section of his paper, he seeks to show that there is "a close resemblance" (p.17) — indeed, "a direct parallel" (p. 18)—

between the Sophist's το μηδαμώς ὀν and the ostensible subject of the first and sixth hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides. Although, to be sure, he raises a number of other points as well—and although I am inclined to agree with much else that he says or suggests in his paper—what I have just indicated seem to me to be the principal theses in his paper. In any case, in this paper I shall deal almost exclusively with them—and I shall take issue with both of them. Or, more exactly, I shall argue that Bondeson's proposal for a new translation is quite untenable; and, while agreeing that there is indeed a "direct parallel" between the materials in the two dialogues that he considers, I shall question what seems to be his interpretation of the significance of those materials or arguments." (p. 13)
(1) "Non-Being and the One." Apeiron, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1973). 13-21.

45. El Murr, Dimitri. 2006. "Paradigm and Diairesis: A Response To M.L. Gill's 'Models In Plato's Sophist and Statesman'." Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society no. 6:1-9.
"In her interesting and stimulating paper, Mary-Louise Gill addresses one of the central issues in Plato's Sophist and Statesman: what is a model (paradeigma) and how does one become useful in a dialectical inquiry? Gill's main thesis is clear: a paradeigma becomes truly useful when not only the sameness between the example and the target but also their difference are recognized ("the inquirers need to recognize, not only the feature that is the same in the example and the target, but also the difference between the two embodiments and the procedural difference those different embodiments entail")." (p. 1)
46. El_Bizri, Nader. 2004. "On και κώρα. Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 4:73-98.
Abstract: "In attempting to address the heideggerian Seinsfrage, by way of situating it between the platonic conception of ὀν in the Sophist and of χώρα in the Timaeus, this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened up in terms of rethinking space. Asserting the

intrinsic connection between the question of being and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as phenomenology would not unfold in its furthermost potential unless the being of space gets clarified. This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting ontological task to found a theory of space that contributes to an explication of the question of being beyond its associated temporocentric determinations. Consequently, our line of inquiry endeavors herein to constitute a prolegmenon to the elucidation of the question of the being of space as “ontokhorology.”

47. Ellis, John. 1995. "Δύναμις and Being: Heidegger on Plato's Sophist 247d8-e4." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 3:43-78.
"This definition of being is proposed by the Stranger in the course of his discussion of the "gigantic battle."
One side maintains that only tangible, visible bodies have being (οὐσία), while the other claims that being is limited to only incorporeal, invisible Forms, the bodies of the opponents being relegated to the realm of becoming (δύναμις)." (p. 43)
(...)
"There is hardly a line in the above summary of the setting for 247d-e that is uncontroversial. The crux of the controversy is of course whether Plato is offering a definition of being as δύναμις;. Should we take this seriously, or is it merely a mark of being, used to refute the corporealists? After all, it looks as if the Stranger merely suggests that the known is changed by the knower-it is in fact one of three options mentioned so
the friends of the Forms may not be forced to accept it. And if we do take the definition seriously, this surely entails that Plato has radically altered his view on the nature of the Forms.
The issue still divides scholars. Heidegger's interpretation of this passage in his lecture course on the Sophist is one that takes the definition seriously.
(...)
What is most interesting, however, is his relation to an unnamed interpreter, whom, as we shall see, Heidegger no

doubt wants to take issue with, but who also fundamentally shaped Heidegger's own reading. This
kind of problematic relationship is even more so because he remains unnamed. He is none other than Paul Natorp, whose name explicitly occurs only one other time in the course of the lecture (with the obvious exception of the eulogy at the very beginning), and that is with respect to his article on Antisthenes [*]." (p. 44)
(...)
"The essay is divided into three subsequent sections. I will give a review of Natorp's interpretation in section II. In section III, we shall turn to Heidegger's reading in the Sophist lecture, pointing out, along the way, influences of, and divergences from, Natorp. And in section IV, we will briefly consider the issue of destruction." (p. 45)
References
[*] Natorp, Antisthenes, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft I 2, (1894), 1538-1545.
Natorp, Paul. Platos ldeenlehre. 1903. Reprint of the 2nd (1921) edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961

48. Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2009. "The Ontological Ground of Syntax: An Analysis of Plato's Sophist, 262c2-5. A Reply to Bruno Centrone." Les Études Platoniciennes no. 6.
"In his most recent translation of the dialogue, B. Centrone(1) argues that the expressions οὐσία ὄντος and οὐσία μὴ ὄντος can be interpreted in different ways, according to how we interpret the noun οὐσία, either as an indication of what a thing is or as an indication of the fact that it is.
Therefore, Centrone remarks that the meaningful λόγος can assert (a) that a thing which is, or a thing which is not, are (the horse is; the chimera is); (b) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what it is not (the horse is a quadruped, it isn't a biped); (c) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what a thing which is not (doesn't exist) is (a swallow is winged; a chimera is winged); or (d) that a particular nature is or is not.
Centrone suggests that the first is the right interpretation. Nevertheless I am not sure that he really gives a complete

range of choices. I don't believe that the expression οὐσία μὴ ὄντος could refer to a non-existing entity like "a chimera", for the simple reason that Plato had previously excluded not being as an entity: "not being" is rather an expression which means the idea of Difference, in relation to a subject. I will therefore try to demonstrate that the expressions ὄντος and οὐσία μὴ ὄντος aren't equivalent and that the first refers to a particular entity, while the second has a completely different function." (p. 178)
(1) Platone, Sofista, Translation of B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi, 2008, note 146 p. 223.

49. Esses, Daniel. 2019. "Philosophic appearance and sophistic essence in Plato's Sophist. A New Reading of the Definitions." Ancient Philosophy no. 39:295-317.
"Why does the Eleatic Visitor present so many definitions of sophistry in Plato's Sophist? Is the final definition complete, or should it be qualified and supplemented with further research'! These arc long-standing questions in scholarship on Plato·s Sophist, and they have been the subject of lively debate.(1) I develop a new reading of the dialogue's definitions and provide fresh answers to these questions. The distinguishing features of my reading are the following. First, I read the Sophist as a drama, paying special attention to how the dialogue's participants are portrayed and its place in a trilogy that also includes the Theaetetus and the Statesman. Second, rather than simply casting aside the first six definitions of sophistry as erroneous and irrelevant due to the success of the seventh definition, I examine what they each contribute to !he search for the sophist. The multiple definitions not only help highlight the sophist's deceptiveness and manifold appearances, but they also though subtly and gradually turn our attention to the challenge of distinguishing Socrates and sophists. Last, I strike, middle course in my assessment of the Visitor's final definition. I accept it as an adequate disclosure of the sophist's essence, but I also grapple with the possibility that it fails to provide adequate guidance for differentiating between Socratic philosophizing and sophistry." (p. 295)

(1) See Rickless 2010 for a recent intervention in this debate. Brown 2010 and Gill 2010 are also notable for their focus on the dialogue's divisions and definitions. Though studies focusing on this particular aspect of the dialogue are relatively recent, interpretations of the dialogue as a whole generally address the status and significance of the definitions, with varying conclusions.

References

Brown, Lesley 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist ." In Definition in Greek Philosophy , edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gill, Mary Louis. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist and Statesman ." In Definition in Greek Philosophy , edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy no. 30:289-298.

50. Ferejohn, Michael T. 1989. "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 71:257-282.

"This paper opened with the proposal of a somewhat unorthodox approach to reading the Sophist (as a close companion to certain Aristotelian texts), to which can now be added a further methodological prescription which needs no apology whatsoever. Simply put, it is that the Sophist should be read as a single and continuous whole. This may not seem to need saying, but in fact it is all too tempting (and has been too common) to think of the dialogue almost as if it were two separate works: an "outer shell" (216 — 36 and 264 — 8) in which Plato is concerned primarily to show off his method of division (and secondarily to continue his sustained invective against the sophists), and a more philosophical "inner core" (237 — 64) where the aim is to vindicate the possibility of false thought and speech against Eleatic attack. This bifurcation is an excessive reaction to an unexceptionable fact.

For one can quite readily agree that there is a vast difference in philosophical content between the two parts of this alleged division without committing the correlative errors of

regarding the "inner" section as self-contained, and dismissing the "outer" sections as so much optional reading when trying to puzzle out the discussion of negation, falsity, and related topics which occurs at 237 — 64.
Besides the general point that this false partition denies justice to Plato both as a philosopher and as a master of the dramatic craft, there are very powerful reasons pertaining to the specific issues involved for suspecting that the parts in question must be more connected than the explicit transitions at 236,7 and 264 make it seem.
Chief among these is the fact that whereas the particular application of the method of division to the very special case of the sophist might depend on the intelligibility of false statement, Plato's very conception of the method itself presupposes the coherence of negative predication." (pp. 264-265)

51. Ferg, Stephen. 1976. "Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being, and Not-Being in the Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:336-342.
"Recently Plato's account of not-Being in the Sophist has received considerable attention, notably in papers by David Wiggins, (1) G. E. L. Owen, (2) and Edward N. Lee. (3)
Lee's discussion is especially important because it emphasizes (in my opinion, correctly) the analogy of the partitioning of Knowledge at 257c-d. Nevertheless even Lee seems to me to fail to give a correct explanation of the Sophist's discussion of this matter." (p. 336)
(1) David Wiggins, "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being," in Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 268-303.
(2) G. E. L Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," also in Vlastos, pp. 223-267. (Henceforth referred to as "Owen.')
(3) Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," Philosophical Review, LXXXI, 3 (July, 1972), 267-304. (Henceforth referred to as "Lee.")

52. Ferreira, Fernando. 2001. "A Two-Worlds, Two-Semantics Interpretation of Plato's Sophist." In Greek Philosophy and

Epistemology. Vol. II, edited by Boudouris, Costantin, 61-68. Athens: Ionia Publications.
"The avowed purpose of Plato's Sophist is to characterize the sophist. In the first part of his book, Plato employs the method of divisions to obtain this characterization, and eventually arrives at the conclusion that the sophist is an imitator and that "there is an art, concerned with speeches, by which it is possible to beguile the young" (234c). From here it is short shrift to arrive at the problem of falsity. This problem is, I claim, the philosophical leitmotiv that drives the discussions in the second part of Plato's Sophist (after 236d). One should be clear about what exactly this problem consists of. In the Sophist, Plato is not concerned with the problem of the meaningfulness of false statements concerning some high-minded realm of objects (e.g., forms) - quite to the contrary (see the epilogue). Plato is concerned with falsity in ordinary statements. This is worth emphasizing: Plato's main problem in the Sophist is to account for the meaningfulness of such simple and prosaic (false) statements as 'Theaetetus is flying' (263a)." (p. 61)

53. Figal, Gunter. 2000. "Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato in the Sophist Lectures (1924/25)." In, edited by Scott, Charles E. and Sallis, John, 95-109. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"We should begin with a general characterization of the Sophist and Heidegger's reading of the dialogue. The aim of the long and extremely difficult discussion between the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetos is to find out how something like sophistry is possible. To find an answer to this question is equivalent to investigating the human way of being in the world. In this way Plato's dialogue is a contribution to ontology. Nearly needless to say that it is an ontology of a very special kind and that the ontological investigation also turns out to be very special because of the nature of its subject. As Heidegger puts it, from the attempt to hold up a mirror "to the sophist's concrete Dasein within Greek life" (GA, 19:189) soon arises the suspicion, that sophists are connected with "deception and fraud," and so the investigation has to determine the status of deception

and fraud. A quite simple reflection makes clear that every deception makes a pretense of being something that it is not, it passes off "non-being for being." Accordingly, the question of the being of the sophist's form of life is the question of the being of non-being. And, as Heidegger stresses, this means "a revolution in the previous way of thinking, even in the previous way in which Plato himself put forward the meaning of being"; the demonstration of non-being in being "is nothing less than the more radical conception of the meaning of being itself' (GA, 19: 192)." (pp. 96-97)

References

GA 19 = Martin Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, edited by Ingeborg Schüßler, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

54. Fine, Gail. 1977. "Plato on Naming." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 27:289-301.

"Plato is sometimes criticized for having failed to distinguish names and sentences, and naming and stating, until the Sophist, and this failure is thought to underlie both his supposed perplexity about false belief in the Cratylus, Theaetetus, and elsewhere, and his claim, in the Cratylus, that names can be true and false" (p. 289)

(...)

"This does not imply that Plato is clear about the differences between names and sentences; but we shall at least find that there is no evidence committing him to any confusion here. Nor, as we shall see, does Plato conflate stating and naming, in either of the alleged ways. Finally, we shall see that neither his account of true names nor his account of false belief in the Cratylus rests on the crude views ascribed to him. The account of true names says no more than that names are true or false of things, and that correct assignments of names depend upon the descriptive content of names. The account of false belief, so far from depending on the atomist "hit or miss" model, in fact matches the Sophist's later, supposedly more mature, account." (pp. 290-291)

55. Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb To Be." Apeiron no. 14:87-95.

"When it comes to Plato, the question which Aristotle tells us has plagued philosophers from the beginning — namely, "What is being?" (1) — has been reduced by certain contemporary commentators to the question, "How many syntactically distinct uses of the verb "to be" can be discerned in Plato's Sophist.(2) Over this latter question there has arisen something of a controversy of interpretation between two camps, so to speak. The first camp, from which I have chosen as representative, J.L. Ackrill (3), claims to have discerned three distinct uses: the "is" of identity, the "is" of the copula, and the "is" of existence. The second camp, represented here by G.E.L. Owen,(4) claims that there are only two uses of the verb "to be" in the Sophist: the "is" of identity and the "is" of the copula. To quote Professor Owen,

"The Sophist will turn out to be primarily an essay in problems of reference and predication and in the incomplete uses of the verb associated with these. The argument neither contains nor compels any isolation of an existential verb."(5)

I should like to argue in this paper that both camps are mistaken. There is only one use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist — namely, the "is" of participation — and it is this and this use alone that constitutes Plato's answer to Aristotle's question.

Being, for Plato of the Sophist, is participation or, perhaps better, the "power of participating". Thus, while Owen is, I shall argue, quite correct when he inveighs against discerning a substantive, existential use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist, his own account (and the arguments he offers in favor of it) warrants, shall we say, a "friendly amendment".

Whether one has adopted Ackrill's position or been persuaded by Owen, the evidence in question is minimally two-fold. Either interpretation must account for, first, the various passages wherein Plato either employs or seems to imply the expression, "participates in being" and, second,

the passage from 255b7 to 255e where the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes Being from the Same and the Other."
(1) Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z 1.7, 1028b3-8.
(2) While this is not the time to argue about the advisability of such a "reduction". I must admit to the suspicion that the approach to Plato inherent in such a reduction does generate certain confusions; if only because it fails to preserve the issue of the initial question.
(3) J.L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259", Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, 1971), pp. 210-222. For further representatives of AckrilPs position see P.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), p. 296; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p.298; M.K. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv (1962), pp. 23-78; I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1962), vol. II, pp. 498-499.
(4) G.E.L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", Vlastos, pp. 223-267. See also Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", New Essays on Plato and Aristotle ed. R. Bambrough (London, 1965), pp. 69-95. For others who tend to share Owen's position see J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of το v and το μη δν in the Sophist", Phronesis xii (1967), pp. 130-146; M. Frede, "Pradikation und Existenzaussage" Hympomnemata xviii (1967), pp. 1-99; W.O. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962), ch, iii; C. Kahn, "The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Concept of Being", Foundations of Language ii (1966), p. 261.
(5) Owen, op. cit., p. 225.

56. ———. 1984. "The number of being." The Modern Schoolman no. 62:1-26.
"It is to my mind no accident that the primary interlocutor of both the Theaetetus and the Sophist, is the young mathematician, Theaetetus. In the former dialogue Theaetetus· in-roads into a theory of proportion that would include incommensurables constitute the model in terms of which Plato would have us understand the "fluid" logic of "maieutic" inquiry. I should here like to argue that the

"object" of Theaetetus' own mathematical studies - namely incommensurables - offer Plato, if not the literal truth with regard to Being, at least a revealing metaphor in terms of which the nature and logic of Being can be articulated." (p. 1)

57. Foshay, Raphael. 2017. "Plato at the Foundation of Disciplines: Method and the Metaxu in the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Symposium." IAFOR Journal of Arts & Humanities no. 4:15-23.
Abstract: "This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to establish Plato's metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it manifests in Derrida's reading of Plato's Phaedrus. I then give two examples of the transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond, respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied in Plato's dialogues."
References
Desmond, W. (1979). Plato's philosophical art and the identification of the sophist. Filosofia Oggi, 11, 393–403.
Zuckert, C. H. (2009). Plato's philosophers: The coherence of the dialogues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

58. Fossheim, Hallvard J. 2013. "Development and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:318-327.
Abstract: "Plato's dialogue the Sophist seems to contribute to two separate projects that are not easily reconciled: on the one hand, defining the sophist, and, on the other hand, developing a theory of being and process. In this article, it is argued that the two undertakings come together in what is a

main focus for the dialogue's interlocutors and a major issue in Plato's writings overall, namely, education or development. This is an issue which in the Sophist finds expression in two separate but intimately interconnected questions, concerning the "who" and "how," respectively, of the educational process."

59. Foster, Bennett. 2018. "Platonic Agonism: A Dialogical Addendum to Plato's Sophist." Sophia and Philosophia no. 1:1-28.
"The following addendum to Plato's Sophist was fabricated as a kind of experimental answer to a specific contextual question: What is the relation of Plato's conception of philosophy to the practice of the agōn in Ancient Greece? For the "contest-system,"(1) to adopt Gouldner's phrase, has long been recognized as one of the salient features of Greek culture in the centuries leading up to Plato's time.(2)" (p. 1)
(...)
(1) By "contest-system," Gouldner means to convey the sense that the agōn is a systematic cultural entity, almost on the level of a formal institution. By agōn there is certainly meant more here than the sum of the various types of contests in Ancient Greece, let alone a particular type or instance of contest. Alvin Gouldner, "The Greek Contest System," in Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), 41-77.
(2) Jacob Burkhardt is credited with popularizing the notion of the "Agonal Age" of Greek history, during which the agōn was a "motive power ... capable of working on the will and potentialities of each individual .... and indeed became the paramount feature of life." While the agōn was on the wane in Plato's time, its influence was formative and lasting, and it was still a live issue whether traditional values such as the agōn represented should be retained. [Jacob Burkhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, trans. by Sheila Stern, ed. by Oswyn Murray (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 162, 166.]

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2. Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's Sophist on False Statements." In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"...I want in what follows to focus on the discussion of false statements. Hence I will, only very briefly, comment on the remarks about being, and, in somewhat more detail, consider the remarks about what it is to be not being, to the extent that this seems necessary to understand Plato's resolution of the difficulty concerning false statements." (p. 399)
(...)
"Conclusion. In fact one thing that is striking about the Sophist, in comparison to the earlier dialogues, is its "dogmatic" and systematic character. It sets out carefully constructing a series of puzzles, aporiai. In this respect its first half resembles the early dialogues or even its immediate predecessor, the Theaetetus. But then it turns toward a resolution of these aporiai. In this regard the procedure of the dialogue reminds one of the methodological principle Aristotle sometimes refers to and follows, the principle that on a given subject matter we first of all have to see clearly the aporiai involved before we can

proceed to an adequate account of the matter, which proves its adequacy in part by its ability both to account for and to resolve the aporiai (cf. De An. I, 2, 403b20-21; Met. B1, 995a27 ff.). And the Sophist proceeds to resolve these difficulties in a very systematic and almost technical way. By careful analysis it tries to isolate and to settle an issue definitively. In this regard it does stand out among all of Plato's dialogues. And because of this it also is more readily accessible to interpretation. If, nevertheless, we do have difficulties with this text, it is in good part because in his day Plato was dealing with almost entirely unexplored issues for whose discussion even the most rudimentary concepts were missing. Seen in this light, Plato's solution of the difficulty presented by false statements is a singular achievement." (p. 423)

3. ———. 1996. "The Literary Form of the Sophist." In Form and Argument in Late Plato, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 135-152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
"If one considers the literary form of the Sophist, one is primarily interested in what is characteristic of, or distinctive about, the literary form of this particular dialogue, as opposed to other Platonic dialogues. But this should not make us overlook the fact that the Sophist, first of all, is a dialogue, and that, in the case of the Sophist, there is something particularly puzzling about this. So I will first consider the question why Plato wrote the Sophist as a dialogue, and then turn to two other literary features of the text.
The puzzle is this. If we look at the early aporetic dialogues, we have a number of readily available explanations why Plato wrote them as dialogues. But, as we proceed to the middle and then the late dialogues, these explanations become less and less plausible. And they seem to be particularly implausible in the case of the Sophist. For the Sophist, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues. And it might seem that Plato could as well have written at least the central part of this dialogue as a treatise on falsehood." (p. 135)

4. Friedländer, Paul. 1969. Plato. Vol. III: The Dialogues, Second and Third Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958) Chapter XXVI: Sophist, pp. 243-279.
   Translated from the German Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswirklichkeit, 3 vols. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff.
   Publisher's note: "The first volume of this work, Plato: An Introduction (1958), contains seventeen chapters, each an independent study of an aspect of Plato's thought, his creative work, and his relation to modern thinkers, and a chapter on Plato as jurist by Huntington Cairns. A new edition is in preparation, with revisions and additional annotation.
   The second volume, Plato: The Dialogues, First Period (1964), contains Chapters I-XIX, which interpret the works of Plato's early creative period, the "ascent."
   The third volume, Plato: The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods, contains Chapters XX-XXXI. These take up the central and late dialogues, the works of Plato's major creative periods. At the end of this final volume, there is an Afterword, "On the Order of the Dialogues."
   "We know that the task of clarifying the meaning of pseudos — falsehood, deception, and lie—occupied Plato from his beginnings as a philosopher. It did not grow out of a special interest in a difficult logical problem. It occupied him because (to speak in the concrete imagery of the Sophist) both sophistic and eristic hide in this darkness and confusion—everything, in other words, that is hostile to philosophy and that, because of its dangerously similar appearance, jeopardizes the reputation of philosophy and the life of the philosopher. Even one of the earliest of Plato's works, the Hippias Minor, deals with the problem of deception, involuntary and voluntary, sophistic and Socratic deception. Then, with the Cratylus, language becomes the instrument of positive enlightenment. There (Cratylus 431bc; cf. 385bc) discourse is explained as the "juxtaposition" of noun and verb. In the Sophist, it is the

"combination" of the two, and this change is more than a mere difference in expression. In the Cratylus, we are shown that just as the elements of a sentence, the "names," may be used wrongly, so may the juxtaposition of these elements. The Sophist derives discourse not simply from "naming"; discourse has a new and autonomous structure. As a unique kind of being it has the structure of being itself, characterized by "communion." In the Cratylus, the "names" have the function of revealing (δήλωμα, 433b et seq.}; in the Sophist, it is the statement that has this function. Hence, the Cratylus seeks to discover falsehood in the elements of language; the Sophist seeks it more deeply, in the structure of language."

5. Fronterotta, Francesco. 2011. "Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 35-62. Praha: Oikoymenh. Abstract: "In this paper I examine the question of the different senses of the verb "to be" and the notion of "being" in Plato's Sophist, discussing the relevant passages and bibliography."
6. ———. 2013. "Theaetetus sits - Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and truth in Plato's Sophist (263a-d)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 205-223. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "After solving the problem of "what is not" (259a–b) by elucidating the relations between the γένη that give rise to their reciprocal κοινωνία (259d-e), the next step, before getting back to hunting the sophist, is to clarify whether this also helps disentangle the difficulty connected with the possibility of falsehood in λόγοι, as the examination of what is not was introduced for precisely this purpose: once the logical aporia of falsehood has emerged from the ontological paradox of what is not, solving the latter would also solve the former. So, if what is not, whose form the Stranger has succeeded in identifying, "blends with thinking and discourse" (δοξη και λογω μειγνυται), there will be no contradiction in allowing falsehood in λόγοι, thus making approachable the dark place of images and appearances that

are only similar to the truth, where the sophist has taken refuge; but if this were not the case, any λόγος would always have to be considered necessarily true and the inaccessibility of falsehood would make the sophist's refuge safe from any threat (260d –261b). The section of the dialogue that opens in this way contains some of the fundamental premises of what can fairly be seen as Plato's philosophy of language (259e –264b)." (p. 205)

7. Gacea, Alexandru-Ovidiu. 2019. "Plato and the "Internal Dialogue": An Ancient Answer for a New Model of the Self." In Psychology and Ontology in Plato, edited by Pitteloud, Luca and Keeling, Evan, 33-54. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
"The theme of the dialogic relationship that the ψυχή entertains with itself appears explicitly in the Theaetetus and the Sophist.(10) Naturally, one could argue that "dialogicity" represents one of Plato's main concerns throughout the dialogues.
However, I prefer to isolate the way the issue is treated in these two dialogues, because stating explicitly that thought is the "dialogue of the soul with itself" appears to be indicative of a particular Platonic outlook on thought and selfhood. I claim that Plato is subtly moving away from a descriptive perspective, the way thought has always been conceived in Greek culture, toward a prescriptive one, the philosophical appropriation and reinterpretation of this cultural trait. I thus propose not to treat this notion as being self-explanatory." (p. 35, a note omitted)
(...)
"In the Sophist, the description is couched in different terms, making the distinctions more explicit and adding some other elements: "Thought (διάνοια) and speech (λόγος), says the Visitor, are the same, except that what we call thought (διάνοια) is dialogue (διάλογος) that occurs without the voice (διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς), inside the soul (ἐντο`ς τῆς ψυχῆς) in conversation with itself. [...] And the stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech (λόγος)" (263e3-8). We find out that dialogic thought and speech are not identical but of the

same kind, namely, λόγος. Διάλογος is a type of λόγος but not in the same way uttered speech is λόγος, i.e., doxic λόγος. The dialogue “placed inside the soul” occurs “without sound or voice,” but speech is always uttered, it is something that is “breathed out.”
Not all speech is thought or dialogue, but all thought can become speech when it is accompanied with sound or when it is exteriorized. Furthermore, the λόγος that is exteriorized, “breathed out,” is not the dialogue but its “conclusion,” i.e., the δόξα.
The belief marks the cessation of the conversation, the moment when the soul doesn't doubt anymore." (p. 40)
(10) There is a third passage about the “internal dialogue” in the Philebus (38c-e), but this is more of an example than a description of dialogic thought.

8. Galligan, Edward M. 1983. "Logos in the Theaetetus and the Sophist." In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Volume Two, edited by Anthon, John P. and Preus, Anthony, 264-278. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"In this paper I am concerned with the Theaetetus' dreamed theory [(201d-206b)] and its refutation in that dialogue. From the vantage point of the Sophist, I ask (1) whether and how Plato changed the theory's view of logos and (2) whether and how he might have been able to loosen the dilemma that refutes the theory." (p. 265)
(...)
"The dreamed theory and the Sophist differ about logos in rather much the way they differ about syllables. Though the Theaetetus contains a distinction of letters into kinds, not much was made of these distinctions. But according to the Sophist, vowels make non-vowels pronounceable. The latter dialogue claims part-part asymmetry for syllables. As for logos, the dreamed theory does not clearly have any part-part asymmetry, whereas the Sophist articulates just such a distinction. On the other hand, concerning the whole-part aspect of logoi, the dreamed theory and the Sophist are closer. According to the dreamed theory, by means of a statement we can express our knowledge of complexes, but what we can only name, elements, we can neither know nor

state. According to the Sophist, we can name beings by means of a name or a verb, but in doing so we do not state anything of anything.
The Sophist's view of both statement and syllable seems to be that they are wholes that come to be when their parts are put together and that the wholes have a character that their parts do not have. This suggests that syllables and statements are open to whatever force there is in the second horn of the dilemma brought against the dreamed theory." (p. 270)

9. Gerson, Lloyd. 1986. "A Distinction in Plato's Sophist." The Modern Schoolman no. 63:251-266.
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments Vol. IV: Plato's Later Works, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 125-141.
10. ———. 2006. "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation of Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:291-304.
"There is a famous passage in Plato's Sophist which serves-as well as any, I believe-to indicate perhaps one of the most fundamental divides among Plato scholars. The division is between those who do and those who do not take seriously the ancient Platonic tradition's interpretations of Plato. The passage is the Eleatic Stranger's response to the claim of the 'Friends of the Forms' that 'real being' (τη`ν ὄντως οὐσίαν, 248a11) is immovable."
(...)
"The argument leading up to this rhetorical question is this: if knowing is a case of 'acting' (ποιεὶν) on something, then being known is a case of 'being acted upon' (παρχειν). Since the Friends of the Forms agree that real being is known, they would seem to be forced to admit that the Forms, insofar as they are known, are acted upon. But that which is acted upon is 'in motion' (κινεισθαι). So, the Forms would seem to be in motion insofar as they are acted upon. But the Friends have maintained that Forms are not in motion; on the contrary, they are completely immovable. So, the Friends are faced with an apparent dilemma: either Forms

are not known or else their claim that real being is immovable must be abandoned." (p. 291)
(...)
"In sum, the Platonic interpretation of Sophist maintains that the Friends of the Forms - both ancient and modern - do not grasp full-blown Platonism. Perhaps Plato himself at one time in his career did not grasp its nature either. Platonism is, among other things, the view that οὐσία must never be supposed to have its own separate reality. It is always and necessarily understood as embedded in the matrix Demiurge-οὐσία-Idea of the Good. From the Platonists' perspective, Aristotle wrongly collapsed or telescoped this matrix into the Prime Unmoved Mover, thereby making it unsuitable to be the absolutely simple first principle of all. The inseparability of ontologically primary thinking and being is a doctrine shared by Plato and Aristotle." (p. 302)

11. Giannopoulou, Zina. 2001. ""The Sophistry of Noble Lineage" Revisited: Plato's Sophist 226 b1 - 231 b8." Illinois Classical Studies no. 26:101-124.
"This paper deals exclusively with the sixth logos of sophistry, which depicts the sophistic art as "noble" and its practitioner, the sophist, as a teacher with apparently similar educational characteristics as those possessed by Socrates, the greatest enemy of sophistic practices. My aim is to shed some new light on the identity of the "sophist of noble lineage." Some of the methodological questions which will shape my argumentation are the following: is "noble sophistry" a suitable characterization of Socrates' elenctic method? If the answer to this question is positive, then how can one explain the fact that the Socratic method seems to be reflected in otherwise straightforward definitions of the sophists which condemn and repudiate their practices? If, on the other hand, the sixth definition does not intend to present Socrates as a "noble sophist" but simply reveals a more positive aspect of the σοφιστική τέχνη which could be seen as Socratic, what are the distinctive boundaries that clearly separate the elenchos from even the noblest eristic? In order to conduct my examination, I have divided this

paper into three parts. In Part I, I attempt a close reading of the method used by the Eleatic Stranger and demonstrate its limitations; it is, I suggest, the nature of these limitations which contributes significantly to the ambiguity of the logos provided in the sixth definition. In Part II, I explore the main methodological tool of the definition, namely the "body and soul" analogy, and assess its impact on the quality of the logos provided. Finally, in Part III, I offer my own interpretation; its novelty lies in the fact that it contextualizes this part of the Sophist in the broader frame of the dialectical quest conducted by the Stranger and attempts to account for its intentional definitional ambiguity." (pp. 101-102)

12. Gibson, Twyla. 2009. "The Code of Ethics in Medicine: Intertextuality and Meaning in Plato's Sophist and Hippocrates' Oath." In Critical Interventions in the Ethics of Healthcare: Challenging the Principle of Autonomy in Bioethics, edited by Holmes, David and Murray, Stuart J., 183-198. London: Routledge.
"I develop a set of criteria for identifying connections between Hippocrates and Plato by drawing upon media and information theory to adapt the principles devised by researchers working on intertextuality in other ancient Greek collections. Next, I turn to
Plato's Sophist, a dialogue that explains the procedure for distinguishing multiple sequences of classifications that make up the different branches of the definition of art or technique (techne). I delineate the topics in the definition of the Merchant of Learning, and then use this Platonic sequence as a template for comparing the organization of topics and ideas in the Oath. I show that the sequential order of topics in the Oath corresponds point by point to the serial order of the topics in the various classifications of the definition explained in Plato's Sophist. The presence in the Oath of the same sequence described in Plato makes it possible to line up the classifications in the two works and to cross-reference and compare information in corresponding categories. Cross-referencing of topics and ideas allows us to bring information presented in Plato to bear on the

interpretation of the Oath. This new information provides the· resources for dealing with issues of interpretation that have gone unresolved due to lack of evidence concerning the meaning and context of words and ideas. The discovery of connections between Plato and Hippocrates adds to our understanding of the meanings communicated in the Oath by linking the Greek medical tradition to the wider context of ancient thought and expression.
This broadened context sheds new light on the foundations of Western medical ethics and provides the evidence and insights needed to reconstruct and reassess the history of our ethical tradition. It is my argument that the expanded horizons of meaning gained though the study of intertextual connections among Hippocratic and Platonic texts and traditions provides a rich resource for reevaluating the history of Western medical ethics, and for defending and critiquing the possibilities entailed by biomedical technologies today." (p. 184)

13. ———. 2010. "The Fisher: Repetition and Sequence in Plato's Sophist, Statesman, and Ion." The McNeese Review no. 48:84-112.
"In this study, I address the question of a coherent philosophical system in Plato's collected dialogues as well as the problem concerning the meaning and function of Plato's method. Is there evidence of a consistent set of principles in Plato's dialogues that pertain to all the disparate discourses in the collection?
What is the purpose of the method of division and of the sequences of topics and ideas that make up the classifications spelled out by the characters in Plato's Sophist and Statesman? This study proposes new answers to these questions." (pp. 86-87)
(...)
"Comparing passages from several important dialogues in light of one definition suggests that the Sophist does offer a technical explanation and demonstration of Plato's method. Tracing the definition of the fisher across three books highlights a number of consistencies that point to the presence of a system, and shows how repetition and

sequencing are principles that may be applied to different texts in the collection. Moreover, finding the definition in four works makes it possible to transfer findings from the case studies to Plato's dialogues more generally. Generalizing from the examples to the dialogues as a whole suggests that the "Forms" are the system of rules and conventions that govern the order, shape, and organization of all of Plato's dialogues." (pp. 108-109)

14. ———. 2011. "The Philosopher's Art: Ring Composition and Classification in Plato's Sophist and Hipparchus." In Orality and Literacy: Reflections across Disciplines, edited by Carlson, Keith Thor, Fagan, Kristina and Khanenko-Friesen, Natalia, 73-109. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
"With Plato, argued media theorist Marshall McLuhan, the Greeks 'flipped out of the old Homeric world of the bards into this new, rational ... civilized world.'(1) McLuhan and other scholars associated with the foundations of media studies cite Plato's writings as evidence for dating the shift from primary orality to literacy in ancient Greek culture. Further research has demonstrated that the 'great divide' of orality versus literacy is untenable; traditional oral modes of communication persist alongside and into written texts. This study re-examines Plato's dialogues in light of recent research concerning ring composition, an oral formulaic technique found in Homer. Comparative analysis of two exemplary dialogues - Plato's Sophist and Hipparchus - shows that these works manifest the ring pattern associated with oral traditional modes of communication. This comparative evidence suggests that the dialogues are transitional compositions, and that Plato's writings represented not a break with the oral tradition but rather its transposition to written texts. I explain the implications of these findings for the interpretation of the history and philosophy communicated in Plato's dialogues, in other ancient oral derived works, and for the study of oral histories and traditions today." (p. 73)
(1) Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Me: Lectures and Interviews, ed. Stephanie McLuhan and David Staines (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003), 227.

15. Gili, Luca. 2017. "Plato, Soph. 216 a3–4." Méthexis no. 29:171-173.
"N.-L. Cordero has persuasively argued that there is no reason to delete ἑταίρων (l. 4) if one were to choose the reading ἕτερον (l. 3), that all manuscripts preserve, instead of ἑταῖρον.(2)" (p. 171)
(...)
"My reading turns the reference to the followers of the Eleatics as a piece of Platonic irony – they are philosophers, but definitely not as good as the stranger – Plato's alter ego? – nor, we can suppose, as their masters Parmenides and Zeno." (p. 173)
(2) Cf. N.-L. Cordero, El Extranjero de Elea, 'compañero' de los Parmenídeos...desde 1561, Méthexis xxiii (2013), 51–58. Cordero, however, seems to be unaware of the fact that Y, the earliest source for ἕτερον, does not have a primary status. On this issue see A. D'Acunto, "Su un'edizione platonica di Niceforo Moscopulo e Massimo Planude: il Vindobonensis Phil. Gr. 21 (Y)," Studi classici e orientali 45 (1996), 261–279. Accordingly, Cordero's intervention, whose rationale I fully endorsed, should not be understood as an emendation ope codicum, but rather as an emendation ope ingenii that at least one Byzantine reader already suggested. The text that Cordero and I defend is not an ancient variant.
16. Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. "Models in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." Journal of the International Plato Society no. 6:1-9.
"Plato's Sophist and Statesman use a notion of a model (paradeigma) quite different from the one with which we are familiar from dialogues like the Phaedo, Parmenides, and Timaeus. In those dialogues a paradeigma is a separate Form, an abstract perfect particular, whose nature is exhausted by its own character. Its participants are conceived as likenesses or images of it: they share with the Form the same character, but they also fall short of it because they exemplify not only that character but also its opposite. Mundane beautiful objects are plagued by various sorts of relativity—Helen is beautiful compared to other

women, but not beautiful compared to a goddess; she is beautiful in her physical appearance, but not in her soul or her actions; she is beautiful in your eyes, but not in mine, and so on. The Form of the Beautiful, which is supposed to explain her beauty, is simply and unqualifiedly beautiful (Symp. 210e5-211d1).
In the Sophist and Statesman a model involves a mundane example whose definition is relevant to the definition of some more difficult concept under investigation, the target. The steps taken to define the example also reveal a useful procedure to be transferred to the more difficult case. This much should be fairly uncontroversial. In my view it is important to recognize that a paradeigma is not merely an example (or paradigmatic example) of some general concept." (p. 1)

17. ———. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." In Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In this paper I will argue that dichotomous division yields a good definition of a target kind only in the simplest and most uncontroversial cases. Plato also uses division in defining more complex kinds, but then it serves as a preliminary strategy, which undertakes to expose some puzzle about the kind under investigation, which the enquirers must resolve in some other way, or at least in conjunction with some other method.
We have trouble catching the sophist, because we find him, not at the end of a single branch, but at many different termini, allowing multiple definitions. We find the statesman at a single terminus, but he has many rivals there, who claim to share his expertise; the definition of the statesman reached by dichotomous division, though very detailed, turns out to be much too general. These disappointing results serve a purpose. Plato wants us to see that something about the sophist explains why he turns up all over the map, and that something about the statesman explains why he has company at the terminus. In each dialogue, reflection on the peculiar outcome of division enables the enquirers to recognize something about the kind

in question which helps to explain the peculiarity. The enquirers aim to discover a real definition that applies to all and only instances that fall under a kind, and which specifies its essence -- the feature or complex of features that explains why in the case of the sophist he turns up in too many places, and why in the case of the statesman he is not alone at the terminus." (p. 173)

18. ———. 2012. Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Introduction 1; 1. Forms in Question 18; 2. A Philosophical Exercise 45; 3. The Contest between Heraclitus and Parmenides 76; 4. Knowledge as Expertise 101; 5. Appearances of the Sophist 138; 6. Refining the Statesman 177; 7. The Philosopher's Object 202; Works Cited 245; Index Locorum 263; Index of Names 274; General Index 278-290.
"The only thing that does not exist is something indescribable, something with no features at all: nothing—or to use Owen's colorful phrase, "a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable."(12) I take it that not-being, so understood, is the focus of the first three puzzles about not-being in the Sophist and of the sixth deduction in the Parmenides, so it could be that Plato restricts non-existence to an unidentifiable non-thing: Plato's notion of existence need not correspond to our own. Even so, he talks about fictional entities in several dialogues (centaurs and other mythical creatures), and the Sophist itself begins and ends with a discussion of production, defined by the Stranger as bringing into being something that previously was not (219b4–6, 265b8–10).(13) Furthermore, the Battle of the Gods and Giants at the center of the dialogue treats two distinct views about what is real (tangible things or immaterial forms), a dispute that surely concerns actual being or existence (a monadic property), what things have it and what things do not. The items rejected on each side are describable, even as the opponents on the other side (Gods or Giants) deny their being. The Stranger tries to settle the feud with his definition of being as dunamis (the capacity to act on or to be affected by

something else). Moreover, this same monadic being—the nature of being (250c6–7)—is the property that becomes mysterious in the Aporia about Being (249d9–250d4) directly following the Battle of the Gods and Giants.14 Plato is clearly interested in monadic being in the Sophist — what things have this feature, and what things, though describable, do not. In Chapter 5 I take the first steps toward an alternative interpretation of being, one indebted to Lesley Brown and Michael Frede, which aims to preserve the virtues of their different proposals without the shortcomings." (p. 176)
(12) Owen (1971: 247).
(13) Cf. E. N. Lee (1972: 300) and Heinaman (1983: 12).
14 Discussed below in Chapter 7 secs. 7.2 and 7.6.
References
Heinaman, R. 1983. “Being in the Sophist.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65: 1–17.
Lee, E. N. 1972. “Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist.” Philosophical Review 81: 267–304.
Owen, G. E. L. 1971. “Plato on Not-Being.” In G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Garden City: Doubleday. 223–67. Repr. in G. E. L. Owen, 1986. 104–137.
Owen, G. E. L. 1986. Logic, Science and Dialectic. M. C. Nussbaum (ed.). London: Duckworth/Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

19. ———. 2021. "Images of Wisdom in the Prologue of Plato’s Sophist." The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies no. 60:137-152.
Abstract: "This paper examines the prologue of Plato’s Sophist in light of interpretive claims by Proclus, and revived by Myles Burnyeat,[*] that Plato imaged in the opening scene of his dialogues the main philosophical themes of the work.
This paper applies that insight to the prologue of the Sophist and argues that Proclus is right but that the work in which this prologue is embedded is much larger than the dialogue it introduces. A close reading of the Sophist’s prologue reveals it to image, in a literary way, the whole series of dialogues—Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and missing

Philosopher—of which the Sophist is a member. At the end of the Sophist, the sophist is identified as imitator of the wise man. The paper explores the sophist in relation to the kinds it imitates, including two sorts of wise men, the philosopher and the statesman, and asks whether there is a wide kind covering all of them, both genuine experts and their benign and dangerous imitators. If there is such a kind, what is its status as a kind? The paper considers a genealogical family, descended from a common ancestor (intelligence or cleverness) with derivative kinds differentiated from one another by their object and their aims, either beneficial or harmful."
[*] Burnyeat, M. F., 1997, “First Words,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 43, 1-20. (reprinted as Chapter 16 in F. M. Burnyeat, Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge Univerist Press 2012, p. 305-326.

20. Giovannetti, Lorrenzo. 2021. "Between Truth and Meaning. A Novel Interpretation of the Symploke in Plato’s Sophist." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 42:261-290.
Abstract: "In this paper, I provide an interpretation of the symploke ton eidon at Soph. 259e. My goal is to show that the specific metaphysical view expressed by the interweaving of forms best accounts for Plato’s explanation of truth and falsehood.
In the first section, I introduce the fundamentals of the interpretation of the greatest kinds and their functions. After that, I propose an interpretation of the assertion at 259e, the upshot of which is that the interweaving of forms only deals with extra-linguistic items, that it is related to both truth and meaning of linguistic items, in a very complex way which I aim to explain throughout the paper, and that it never involves sensible particulars. In the second section, I put forward my reading of the Stranger’s description of how logoi are structured and how they work. I pay particular attention to the view that words reveal being when they intertwine to form a statement. In the third section, I interpret the statements concerning Theaetetus.

My goal is to advance a new reading of the specific role that kinds and their interweaving play with regard to the truth and falsehood of the statements concerning Theaetetus. The result is the very specific view that the kinds, which are the separated ontological cause of what happens in space and time, are the grounds of both the truth and the meaning of statements."

21. Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1977. "Plato's Description of Dialectic in the Sophist 253d1-e2." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 22:29-47.
"In the Sophist there is an obscure and much disputed passage (253 d 1-e 2) which professes to say something about what is proper to the science of Dialectic (... μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ; 253 d 2-3). The communis opinio is that we are offered there a description of the Method of Division. The facts that the passage is introduced by the expression το` κατα` γένη διαιρεῖσθαι , that it appears in a late dialogue and moreover in a dialogue where that method is explicitly practiced (218 b 5-236 c 8 and 264 b 9-268 d 5) seem to be very strong reasons for suspecting that here Plato must have in mind the Diaeretic Method. This conviction seems to be almost unavoidable when one takes the lines as an "ausführliche Definition des Dialektikers" (Stenzel). (2) If it is such an exhaustive definition, how could Division be missing from it? I would like to challenge the generally accepted view and show that another quite different interpretation gives a better sense to the text and solves some problems which otherwise must remain puzzling. Since nearly all recent interpretations depend on Stenzel's, I shall discuss it first (I). Then (II) I shall put forward the main theses of my interpretation and lastly (III) I shall paraphrase the whole text." (p. 29)
(...)
"Summary: Soph. 253 d 1-e 2 does not describe Division, it anticipates the comparison Being and Not-Being with other Forms which will ultimately provide Plato's answer to the dilemma of Parmenides." (p. 47)
(2) Julius Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles, 2. Auf.,

Leipzig, 1931 (reprint Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961), English translation by D. J. Allan, Plato's Method of Dialectic, Oxford, 1940. Quotations or my own translations from the German original will be identified by 'orig.' Quotations from Allan's translation are identified by 'trans.' Occasionally Allan's version is inaccurate; in such cases I have referred to the original German text.

22. ———. 1981. "Dialectic in the Sophist: a reply to Waletzki." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 26:80-83. Reply to Waletzki (1979).
"In "Platons ldeenlehre und Dialektik im Sophistes 253d" (Phronesis 24 (1979) 241-252) Wolfgang Waletzki has criticized an earlier article of mine on that passage (Phronesis 22 (1977) 29-47). Although I have benefitted from a number of his observations, I am not in a position to accept his interpretation as a whole. Instead of arguing piecemeal against each of his claims, I would here like to embark first on a task which I believe to be more rewarding: the working out of criteria which would have to be satisfied by a correct interpretation of the disputed passage. In the light of these criteria I hope to show that Waletzki's approach is unsatisfactory, thus vitiating his specific claims." (p. 80)

23. Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1997. "On the Way to Sophia: Heidegger on Plato's Dialectic, Ethics, and Sophist." Research in Phenomenology no. 27:16-60.
"The great lacuna in the Heideggerian Gesamtausgabe has been a detailed interpretation of an entire Platonic dialogue. This situation has changed with the publication of the lecture course on Plato's Sophist (1924/25) .(1) This text does not disappoint for lack of thoroughness or scope: Heidegger takes the task of interpreting this major Platonic dialogue so seriously that he devotes over two hundred pages to preparing his interpretation and almost four hundred pages to detailed, almost line by line exegesis of the text, from the dramatic prologue to the explanation of the possibility of falsehood. With this course, therefore, we are finally in a position to assess the extent to which Heidegger succeeded in coming to terms with Plato's thought.

In this paper I argue that, despite some important insights, this attempted "philosophical appropriation of Plato"(2) fails. I also suggest that this failure exposes certain limitations of Heidegger's thought,
specifically with regard to the relation between ethics and ontology." (p. 16)
(1) Platon: Sophistes, vol. 19 of Gesamtausgabe, ed. Ingeborg Schussler am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, hereafter GA 19.
(2) To use Heidegger's own characterization of what Friedrich Schleiermacher failed to achieve: "die philosophische Aneignung Plato" (GA 19: 313). All translations of Heidegger and Plato in this paper are my own.

24. ———. 2000. "The Eleatic Stranger: His Master's Voice? ." In Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity, edited by Press, Gerald A., 161-181. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
"Interpreters of the Sophist and the Statesman almost universally assume that the Eleatic Stranger speaks for Plato. This is surprising, given how little speaks in favor of this assumption and even how intuitively implausible it is." (p. 161)
(...)
"Yet, interpreters are apparently willing to live with some implausibility here because they consider it even more implausible that the Stranger should not speak for Plato. Their argument, insofar as it can be reconstructed, assumes that the only positive assertions made in the two dialogues are the Strangers and that therefore one could, without losing anything essential, eliminate the dialogue form by putting what the Stranger says into the form of a treatise authored by Plato. The aim of the present chapter is to refute this specific assumption and therefore the interpretation that depends on it. Socrates does speak in both dialogues, and what he says is of extraordinary importance; furthermore, a major, perhaps the major event of Socrates' life, namely, his trial, forms the dramatic context. These words and deeds of Socrates are not

peripheral curiosities added to relieve the tedium of an otherwise highly abstract discussion. Instead, as I will show, what Socrates says and who he is, even his silence in the dialogue, expose serious problems in what the Stranger says. If Plato in this way uses Socrates against the Stranger, the assumption that the Stranger speaks for Plato, already implausible on the surface, is rendered untenable. On the other hand, we are not thereby required to conclude that Plato rejects everything the Stranger says and chooses Socrates instead as his mouthpiece. What we have here, as elsewhere, is not a disguised author expounding doctrines in a disguised treatise, but rather a drama in which two opposed and limited perspectives confront each other and in that confrontation leave us with a problem." (pp. 161-162, notes omitted)

25. ———. 2003. "Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato's Sophist." In Platon und Aristoteles - sub ratione veritatis. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum 70. Geburstag, edited by Damschen, Gregor, Enskat, Rainer and Vigo, Alejandro G., 102-133. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
"In his WS 1924-25 lecture course on Plato's Sophist, Heidegger charges that, because in this dialogue the method of separation and division is applied not only to objects in the world, such as the angler, but also to Being itself and its structures, Plato recognized no distinction between the way of dealing with beings (Behandlungsart des Seienden) and the way of dealing with Being (Behandlungsart des Seins). What underlies this charge is Heidegger's conviction, which he seeks to support in the present course, that to address Being by way of λόγος and its structure, which is what the method of διαίρεσις does, is inevitably to collapse the distinction between Being and beings. Heidegger further suggests that Plato's Ideas or Forms are a product of this approach to Being and the confusion it produces (287). The goal of this paper is to defend Plato against this charge by arguing the following: 1) Plato fully recognizes both the ontological difference itself and the inability of λόγος, and any λόγος-centered approach, to preserve and do justice to

this difference; 2) Plato's response to this "weakness" of λόγος is, in the Sophist, to distance himself from the λόγος of Being (and non-being) presented there by means of various strategies, most generally the dialogue form itself; 3) though the εἰδη are unavoidably objectified in discourse, Plato did not understand the εἰδη as objectively present things: indeed, it was precisely in order to avoid objectifying the εἰδη that Plato refrained from offering a "theory of Forms"; 4) Heidegger's attempt to reduce the dialogue's characterization of Being as δύναμις to a characterization of Being as presence is unacceptable; 5) despite Heidegger's insistence to the contrary, even the account of Being as δύναμις is presented in the dialogue not as final, but as aporetic and necessarily so. In pursuing this goal it is neither my intention nor even possible in the present context to give a detailed, step-by-step exposition of Heidegger's course, much less of the Sophist itself. Instead. I will assume some acquaintance with both in focusing on only those moments where Heidegger explicitly sets himself apart from Plato, with the aim of encouraging us to set ourselves apart from Heidegger's reading of Plato." (pp. 102-103, notes omitted)

26. ———. 2011. "Being as Power in Plato's Sophist and Beyond." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 63-95. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"In the literature on Plato's metaphysics one finds much discussion of what kinds of beings exist for Plato, what makes one class of beings 'more real' than another, what relation exists between these different levels of beings, and what ultimate principles or causes can be invoked to explain the nature of these beings. What is much harder to find is reflection on what this word 'being' actually means for Plato. If both sensible objects and the Forms can be said to be, if the latter must nevertheless be said to be more truly, or 'more beingly', than the former, then what exactly is meant by this word 'be'? If this fundamental question has been neglected in the literature, the reason is not that Plato fails to address it In the Sophist this question is not only

addressed, but given an answer. Since the passage in question (247d8-e4) is the only place in the Platonic corpus where this question is directly raised and answered - and this in a context that stresses the great importance and indispensability of the question - one would expect it to be the subject of a voluminous literature. Strangely, the exact opposite is the case. Not only the literature on Plato's ontology, but even the literature devoted specifically to the Sophist, displays little interest in the definition of being this dialogue offers. Those scholars who have discussed the definition at all have tended to dismiss it as purely provisional, ad hominem, and in the end unPlatonic. Other scholars, particularly in more recent works on the Sophist, quickly pass over the definition with little or no comment.' What explains this neglect? The first set of scholars presumably have interpretative grounds for denying that the definition is Plato's, but many devote little effort to making this case and all fail to suggest what might be a better definition in Plato's eyes.

The second set of scholars, in simply passing over the definition with no comment, perhaps have deeper philosophical reasons for just not being interested in the question, though these reasons are left unarticulated. Ironically, many scholars writing on the Sophist today are in this way like those tellers of muthoi or those figures of muthos (the Giants and Gods) which the Eleatic Visitor criticizes for only talking about the number and kinds of beings without addressing the more fundamental question of what it means for any of these things to be.

My object in the present paper is to go against this trend by showing that the definition of being, far from being merely provisional and negligible, is absolutely indispensable not only to the argument of the Sophist, but to a proper understanding of Plato's metaphysics in both this and other dialogues. Specifically I wish to show that the characterization of being as "nothing other than dunamis" is incompatible with attributing to Plato a conception of the "really real" as static and immutable." (pp. 63-65, notes omitted)

27. Gooch, Paul W. 1971. ""Vice is ignorance": The interpretation of Sophist 226a-231b." Phoenix no. 25:124-133.
"It is often held by Plato's commentators that the famous Socratic paradox "Virtue is Knowledge" has as its complement the doctrine that vice is ignorance. While Plato's readers never find such an aphorism as "Vice is Ignorance" stated categorically in the texts, it is interpreted to mean that in Plato's view moral evil is the result of ignorance. And from this it is an easy step to the "intellectualist" Plato, who thought that knowledge of the right thing to do was a sufficient condition of virtue." (p. 124, notes omitted)
(...)
"My own reading of this section [Sophist 226a-231b] is that Plato, not popular opinion, is responsible for the division of evils into two branches, and that the division therefore cannot be considered unimportant for his ethics. Yet I cannot feel as sure as Dodds that the classification places ignorance and vice into two watertight compartments; there are indications that at least one kind of ignorance is a vice, and that its treatment cannot leave the irrational parts of the soul untouched. This in turn means that while Hackforth is probably right to say that Plato's real belief was that wrongdoing always involves ignorance, I hope to provide some evidence that this belief is not as obscured by the Sophist passage as Hackforth seems to think. With these claims in mind we may now turn to an analysis of the passage. After purification has been introduced as a negative art whose function is to throw out the evil and undesirable, the discussion develops various divisions within the art until the following schema becomes evident." (p. 126)
References
E. R. Dodds says that Plato "no longer makes ignorance the sole cause of wrongdoing, or increased knowledge its sole cure" ("Plato and the Irrational," Journal of Hellenic Studies 65 [1945] 18).

R. Hackforth claims that for Plato all moral evil involves ignorance ("Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics," Classical Quarterly 40 [1946] 118.

28. Grams, Laura W. 2012. "The Eleatic Visitor's Method of Division." Apeiron no. 45:130-156.
"The method of division (diairesis) employed by the Visitor from Elea in Plato's Sophist and Statesman is often interpreted as a hierarchical classification, in which each cut divides a kind (genos) into smaller parts that are fully contained within it and each subsequent kind entails all of the previous kinds in the sequence. On this view, division begins with one large class and continues separating it into successively smaller portions, until no further cuts can be made and an infima species is reached. I argue that a strictly hierarchical interpretation of diairesis cannot adequately explain the Visitor's method for several reasons. First, division often produces kinds that are neither determined by nor fully contained within the intension or extension of the previous kinds, and division occasionally separates pairs of kinds that overlap in scope. In addition, division does not always move from general to more particular kinds, so the order in which a series of divisions is made often has no effect on the outcome. The same kinds may be divided in different ways in different contexts, which means that multiple paths may lead from a given starting point to the destination." (p. 130, note omitted)

29. Granieri, Roberto. 2019. "Xenocrates and the Two-Category Scheme." Apeiron:1-25.
Abstract: "Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τα᾽ καθ᾽αὑτά and τα᾽ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates' per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the primacy of

Plato's binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4, over Aristotle's list of the categories."

30. Greenstine, Abraham Jacob. 2019. "Accounting for Images in the Sophist." In Plato and the Moving Image, edited by Biderman, Shai and Weinman, Michael, 19-36. Leiden - Boston: Brill Rodopi.
Abstract: "Plato's Sophist is a critical dialogue for the question of images, for here the interlocutors divide images into two kinds – likenesses and apparitions – in their hunt for an account of sophistry. Yet much of the recent scholarship on the Sophist does not make much of this division. This chapter defends the continuing significance of the distinction between likeness and apparition. It argues for its importance in Plato's analysis of images, in his theory of accounts, and in his endeavor to differentiate philosophy from sophistry. It further contends that one can only distinguish likenesses from apparitions by establishing a correct perspective on both the image and the original. Thus, the Sophist exhorts us differentiate likenesses from apparitions, even as we struggle to consistently find the right perspective for this task. Living in the cinematic age only intensifies the need to distinguish likeness from apparition. Over the course of this chapter, we consider two films that advance our questions about perspectives, images, and falsity: Carol Reed's The Third Man (1949) and Orson Welles' F for Fake (1974). Like the Sophist, both films reveal a world of apparitions, where names are confused, lies are constant, and the truth is elusive."

31. Griswold, Charles. 1977. "Logic and Metaphysics in Plato's Sophist." Giornale di Metafisica no. 6:555-570.
Abstract: "In part one of this essay I defend the thesis that the "greatest genera" of the "Sophist" are not the metaphysical ideas of the earlier dialogues, and that the "participation" of these genera in each other is to be understood from a linguistic or logical, rather than metaphysical, perspective. The genera are like concepts, not essences. In part two I argue that the Stranger's doctrine of the genera means that they cannot be unified, self-predicative, separable, and stable; the doctrine deteriorates

for reasons internal to itself. I suggest throughout that the Stranger's philosophical orientation is more "subjectivistic" than that of (Plato's) Socrates; unlike the ideas, the genera are subject to the soul's intellectual motion and productive capacity. finally, I suggest that there is no convincing reason for holding that the Stranger's views are superior to those of Socrates."

32. Grönroos, Gösta. 2013. "Two Kinds of Belief in Plato." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 51:1-19.
"In the Sophist (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief.
On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs "according to thinking" (κατα` διάνοιαν), being "the completion of thinking" (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind is called 'doxa.' On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs "through sense perception" (δι αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called 'phantasia,' perhaps best rendered as "appearing." The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction between these two different kinds of belief." (p. 1)
(...)
"The failure to recognize this distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato, despite the enormous scholarly effort devoted to the Theaetetus and the Sophist, is probably due to the fact that we do not operate with such a distinction any longer.
We may admit that beliefs are more or less justified, but this observation suggests that beliefs differ in degree (of justification), rather than in kind. Moreover, if we embrace the view that the formation of any belief requires the possession of concepts and the capacity for propositional thought, and that these capacities are the hallmarks of thinking and rationality at large, then it is difficult to escape the conclusion that even a phantasia is formed through thinking, and that it is a disposition of reason in precisely that sense. But attributing such an anachronistic starting point to Plato overshadows a more specific notion of thinking, and a different way of accounting for the role of thinking in belief formation. As Plato's unfolding of the

disguise of the sophist shows, this kind of thinking, giving rise to a qualified kind of belief, may well be worth serious consideration." (p. 18)

33. Gulley, Norman. 1962. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. London: Metheuen & Co.
Chapter III: Knowledge and Belief; § 4: The Sophist's Account of Statement and Belief, pp. 148-168.

34. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1978. A History of Greek Philosophy V: The later Plato and the Academy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
On the Sophist: Chapter II, 3, pp. 122-163.

35. Hackforth, Reginald. 1945. "False Statement in Plato's Sophist." The Classical Quarterly no. 39:56-58.
"Plato's examination of False Statement (Sophist 259 D-263 D) is, like many of his discussions in the later dialogues, a mixture of complete lucidity with extreme obscurity. Any English student who seeks to understand it will of course turn first to Professor Cornford's translation and commentary(1); and if he next reads what M. Diès has to say in the Introduction to his Budé edition of the Sophist he will, I think, have sufficient acquaintance with the views of modern Platonic scholars on the subject. For myself, at least, I have not gained any further understanding from other writers than these two." (p. 56)
(...)
(1) Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 298-317.

36. Hamlyn, David W. 1955. "The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato's Logic." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 5:289-302.
"The impression given by many accounts of Plato's philosophy is that the doctrine of the communion of forms (or kinds) which is introduced in the Sophist is new and revolutionary. It may well be true that the use to which Plato puts this doctrine is revolutionary, but there are unmistakable hints of it much earlier. In the Republic 476a we are told of the communion of forms with actions, bodies, and one another, and, as Ross points out,(1) the doctrine is implicit in the account of the theory of forms given in the

Phaedo 102b ff., in the sense that we are told that certain forms exclude each other." (p. 289)
(...)
"The doctrine of the communion of forms is an attempt to do two things at once - to characterise predicates as names referring to a kind of particular, and also to relate such names to those occurring as the subjects of assertions by means other than that of identity and difference. Consequently the assertion that Plato looked on proper names as disguised descriptions should be qualified by saying that for him descriptions were only another kind of name-names of forms rather than names of sensible particulars. Hence the doctrine of ' communion ' is still vitiated by the fault from which Plato was trying to free himself. That it was an important advance nevertheless is clear." (p. 302)

37. Harte, Verity. 2002. Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents: 1. The Problem of Composition 1; 2. Composition as Identity in the Parmenides and the Sophist 48; 3. A New Model of Composition 117; 4. Composition and Structure 158; 5. Plato's Metaphysics of Structure 267; References 293; General Index 300; Index of Names 300; Index Locorum 304-311.
"In my view—a view for which the book as a whole constitutes a defence—Plato's discussions of part and whole in the works I shall consider may be divided into two distinct groups: those in which Plato explores a model of composition which he does not endorse; and those which work towards building an alternative to the rejected model. This book is organized around discussion of these two groups. §1.6 to Chapter 2 examine the discussions of the first group, Chapters 3 and 4 those of the second.
The division between these two groups does not coincide with the division between different works. To the first group—those which focus on the model which Plato does not endorse—belong passages of the Parmenides, the Theaetetus, and a passage of the Sophist. To the second group—those which develop an alternative to the rejected

model—belong other passages of the Parmenides and of the Sophist, and passages of the Philebus and Timaeus. The Parmenides as a whole enacts the contrast between the two groups and provides an illustration of the framework I propose for understanding their relation. Over the course of the Parmenides arguments involving the rejected model of composition are used to expose the problems that arise from its adoption; problems to which the alternative model of composition is framed as a solution." (pp. 2-3)

38. Havlíček, Aleš, and Karfík, Filip, eds. 2011. Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense. Praha: Oikoymenh.
Contents: Preface 7; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Die Aufgabe des Gastes aus Elea Zur Bedeutung der Eingangsszene des Sophistes (216a–218a) 11; Francesco Fronterotta: Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the Sophist 35; Francisco J. Gonzalez: Being as Power in Plato's Sophist and Beyond 63; Walter Mesch, Die Bewegung des Seienden in Platons Sophistes 96; Filip Karfík: Pantelôs on and megista genê (Plato, Soph. 242C–259b) 120; Noburo Notomi: Dialectic as Ars Combinatoria: Plato's Notion of Philosophy in the Sophist 146; Luc Brisson: Does Dialectic always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the Sophist (253d5–e1) 156; Aleš Havlíček: Die Aufgabe der Dialektik für die Auslegung des Seins des Nichtseienden 173; Nestor-Luis Cordero: Une conséquence inattendue de l'assimilation du non-être à « l'Autre » dans le Sophiste 188; Denis O'Brien, The Stranger's "Farewell" (258e6–259a1) 199; Štěpán Špinka: Das Sein des Nicht-Seins. Einige Thesen zur strukturellen Ontologie im Dialog Sophistes 221; Christoph Ziermann: La négativité de l'être chez Platon 240; David Ambuel: The Coy Eristic: Defining the Image that Defines the Sophist 278; Francisco Lisi: Ποιητικη τέχνη in Platons Sophistes 311; Jakub Jinek: Die Verschiedenheit der Menschentypen in Platons Sophistes 328; T. D. J. Chappell: Making Sense of the Sophist: Ten Answers to Ten Questions 344; Index locorum 377.
39. Heidegger, Martin. 1997. Plato's Sophist. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in the Winter Semester of 1924-25.
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.
Original German edition: Platon, Sophistes, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992, edited by Ingeborg Schüssler (Gesamtausgabe, II, 19).

40. Heinaman, Robert E. 1981. "Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:1-17.
"There is an influential view, developed during the last fifteen years, concerning the relationship between the concept of existence and the notion of Being in Plato's Sophist. (a)
Three distinguishable claims are involved in this account:
(1) Plato does not wish to isolate the existential use of 'to be' from its other uses.
(2) Plato's discussion of being concerns syntactically incomplete uses of 'to be,' not syntactically complete uses of the verb. (b)
(3) The concept of existence plays no role in the philosophical problems discussed or their solutions. Plato operates with a "scheme of concepts which lacks or ignores an expression for 'exist.' (c)
I have no quarrel with (1). But (1) must be clearly distinguished from (3) since Plato may have failed to mark out the existential use of 'to be' while nevertheless using the word to mean existence with this latter concept playing an important role in the argument. In this paper I will try to show that there are no good reasons to accept (2) or (3). Although I shall deal with points raised by John Malcolm and Michael Frede, the focus will be on Professor Owen's paper. The first section will argue that Owen's interpretation of the Sophist is untenable and the second section will show that his arguments for (2) and (3) are unsuccessful. Finally, the third section explains how the position I defend is compatible with Plato's employment of negative existentials. The position I defend is that the concept of existence does not monopolize but is part of the notion of Being in the Sophist." (pp. 1-2)

(a) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67; Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò ón and tò me ón in the Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. Also cf. W. Bondeson, "Some Problems about Being and Predication in the Sophist," Journal of the History of Philosophy (1976), p.7, n. 15; A. P. D. Mourelatos, " 'Nothing' as 'Not-Being'," in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M. Putnam (eds.) Arktouros (New York, 1979), pp. 319-29.
(b) Owen, pp. 225, 236, 240-41. Frede makes the still stronger claim that every use of 'to be' in the Sophist is incomplete (Frede, pp. 37, 40, 51). I discuss Frede's interpretation in an appendix.
(c) Owen, p. 263.

41. ———. 1981. "Self-Predication in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 26:55-66.
"A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist.(1)" (p. 55)
(...)
"It has often been said that 250c confuses identity and predication. But since 255 establishes Plato's commitment to self-predication, it is preferable to see the mistake as occurring a few lines later (250c 12-d3) where the Stranger concludes that, since Being does not rest or move according to its own nature, it does not rest or move at all (cf. Parm. 139c6-d1). It is plausible to suppose that Plato believes that this error is corrected by the doctrine of the communion of Forms (cf. 252b8-10, 255e4-6, 258b9-c3)." (p. 63)
(1) The claim that the Sophist is committed to self-predication has been made before. W. F. Hicken, "Knowledge and Forms in Plato's 'Theaetetus'," in R. E. Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), p. 192; R. S. Bluck, "False Statement in the Sophist, " Journal of Hellenic Studies (1957), p. 186, n. 2; G. Striker, Peras und

Apeiron (Gottingen, 1970), p. 37; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy V (Cambridge, 1978), p. 43, n. 1. Cf. W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge. 1962), pp. 80,95, 102; R. Marten, Der Logos der Dialektik (Berlin, 1965), p. 214, n. 134.

42. ———. 1983. "Communion of Forms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 83:175-190.
"At Sophist 259e5-6 Plato says: 'Logos exists for us on account of the interweaving of Forms'. It appears to be an important claim, and various suggestions have been made as to why Plato believed logos depends on the communion of Forms. It has often been thought that the communion of Forms referred to in 259e5-6 lays down conditions for meaning, not truth. Thus, in a well known paper Professor Ackrill has suggested that the communion of Forms covers relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and presumably other relations which determine the meaning of words. (1) I believe that such an interpretation is too optimistic and that Plato's view is less sophisticated than scholars would like to admit. I will argue that the communion of Forms does not provide an explanation of meaning but of an entity's being characterized by a property. It is simply the relation of participation which in earlier dialogues related individuals to Forms. (But I make no claims about resemblance.)
259e5-6 occurs in a context (259d9-260a3) where the Eleatic Stranger refers back to an earlier argument for the conclusion that some Forms combine and some do not (25 1d5-252e8). And that earlier passage had been followed by a discussion where five 'Great Kinds' had been distinguished (254d4-255e1) and some relations of communion had been pointed out (255e8-257a12; cf. 254c4-5). If we want to determine what Plato means by 'communion of Forms' we must examine 251d-252e where Plato presents his arguments in support of the claim that some Forms combine and some do not.
One preliminary problem is the question of how to translate 'logos' in the statement that logos has come to be on account of the communion of Forms. The answer is provided by the context. 'Logos' also occurs in 260a5 and 260a7 where it

possesses the same sense as 'logos' in 259e6. 260a7 says that we must determine what logos is, and when the explanation of logos is finally given (261d-262e) an explanation of statements is provided. So 259e5-6 is saying that statements exist because of the communion of Forms." (pp. 175-176)

(1) J. L. Ackrill, 'XYMJI-AOKHE IAQN', in G. Viastos (ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 201-9. Also cf. his 'In Defense of Platonic Division', in 0. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.) Ryle (London, 1971), pp. 376, 391-92.

43. ———. 1986. "Once More: Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 68:121-125.

"According to what I will call the 'new' interpretation, the meaning of 'being' which plays an important role in the philosophical argument of the Sophist is not 'existence' but 'being such and such,' what is expressed by syntactically incomplete uses of 'to be. (a) In an earlier paper I claimed, to the contrary, that 'being' is used to mean existence in the Sophist's argument, although its meaning corresponds to the other uses of the verb as well. (b) Against the new interpretation I argued as follows:

(1) The aporiai of 237-41 are solved in 251-59 by rejecting 237-41's assumption that 'not-being' means 'contrary to being' and claiming that 'not-being' instead means 'different from being.'

(2) On the new interpretation, 'the contrary of being' means 'what is (predicatively) nothing.'

(3) The aporia of 240c-241b cannot be given a coherent interpretation if 'not-being', as there used, is understood to mean 'what is (predicatively) nothing.'

(4) Hence the meaning of 'not-being' required by the new interpretation is unacceptable, and the new interpretation should be rejected.

In a recent note John Malcolm has replied to this argument and raised some other objections to my paper. (c) Here, I will limit myself to explaining why Malcolm's objections have no force, and why his reply to my argument. simply exchanges one absurdity for others." (p. 121)

(a) Its main proponents are G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67); Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò on and tò mé on in the Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46.
(b) "Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1983), pp. 1-17.
(c) "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1985), pp. 162-65. Ensuing references to Malcolm will be to this paper.

44. Hermann, Arnold. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides." In Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e), edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147-165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Most scholars view Plato's critique of Parmenides in the Sophist, particularly the observations surrounding the "parricide" remark, as quite apt and justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to recognize that "What Is Not" can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the Sophist, as indicating "difference." I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato's indictment of Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.
For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating "is not" predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the predicative case. Only when sought after as a "way of inquiry" does What Is Not—in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible object. After all, the "Way of What Is Not," lacks any sort of sēmata, or signs, that can be used to navigate it.

As a “way of inquiry for thinking” (B2), it leads nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements to this effect, nor from uttering the words “What Is Not” or “Not Being.” Yet this fine distinction is lost to many who have criticized Parmenides for being inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to even speak of such a “way” is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato’s stature. If my arguments prove sound, then Parmenides should be absolved of the charges leveled against him."

45. Hermann, Fritz Gregor. 1998. "On Plato's 'Sophist' 226b-231b " Hermes no. 126:109-117.
"The sixth attempt to show what it is to be a sophist (226 b-231 b) marks a fresh starting point in the discussion by Theodorus' guest-friend from Elea and Theodorus' young pupil Theaetetus. The first five attempts were closely modelled on the exemplary search for the angler (218 e-221 c), and started from the division, διαίρεσις, of all the arts and crafts into acquisitive, κτητική, and productive, ποιητική. Unlike the previous sections whose divisions were arrived at by abstract consideration, the passage commencing at 226 b starts with the enumeration of concrete examples of household activities. Adduced by the Elean, they serve as illustrations of the art of separation, διακριτική (1)." (p. 109)
(1) Cf. e.g. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1935, p. 177f
46. Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 41:1-24.
" Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a

nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's Sophist. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the Sophist. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's Metaphysics -- a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in the Sophist." (pp. 1-2)

47. ———. 2016. Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments page IX; Note on the text XII; List of abbreviations XIII; 1 Introduction 1; Part I Stability 17; 2 Strong Platonism, restricted Platonism, and stability 19; 3 Concerns about stability in the Cratylus 39; 4 Flux and language in the Theaetetus 57; 5 The foundation exposed: Parmenides 135bc 84; Part II Combination 105; 6 Being as capacity and combination: a challenge for the Friends of the Forms 107; 7 The problem of predication: the challenge of

the Late-Learners 144; Part III Truth 181; 8 Predication, meaning, and truth in the Sophist 183; 9 Plato's conception of truth 209; 10 Truth as being and a substantive property 234; Bibliography 243; Index locorum 259; General index 265.
"My project is motivated by my interest in understanding the following two passages from Plato's Sophist. In the first passage, the so-called Stranger from Elea presents Theaetetus with an account of true and false statement.
In the second, he relates that account to thought and judgment, although my project concerns only that aspect of it that is an extension of the first.(2) He describes thought as "discourse without voice" (dialogos aneu phônês) and judgment as the end result of thought. Statement and judgment involve doing something with words and thoughts, respectively, namely asserting or denying, and assertions and denials are either true or false:
I [Sophist (263b4–12)]
II [Sophist (263e3–264b4)]
"Together these passages stand as what I consider to be the quintessential expression of Plato's account of truth and falsehood, yet they do not by themselves constitute a complete account of his conception of truth. I am interested in that conception and its relation to Plato's semantics and metaphysics.
This project aims to fill several gaps in the current scholarship on ancient Greek conceptions of truth, meaning, and language. What is missing is a detailed investigation into how the development of Plato's understanding of the metaphysical foundation of meaning plays an integral role in his conception of truth in the Sophist. The two aforementioned passages follow on the heels of a discussion of language and signification that emerges, I argue, from a systematic approach to semantics that Plato commences in the Cratylus and continues through the Parmenides and Theaetetus, each of which is commonly taken to precede the Sophist. The Sophist supplies something of an explanation of how being grounds meaning and truth. However, more needs to be said about the mechanism of being, its relation

to meaning and truth, the relation between the latter two, and what sort of conception of truth emerges from all this. It is also the case that more could be said about how this conception of truth complements the account of truth as being in “middle-period” dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic. Moreover, there has not been a detailed treatment of the striking parallels between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of meaning and truth. This book contributes to the developing scholarship in these areas. (pp. 2-3)
(2) So, for example, I will not be discussing Plato’s account of concept acquisition and cognition.

48. Hopkins, Burt C. 2013. "The Génos of Lógos and the Investigation of the Greatest Genê in Plato’s Sophist." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:353-362.
Abstract: "It is argued that once the negative criterion for distinguishing eikones from phantasmata in lógos about the originals in the intelligible realm appears in the Sophist, the Stranger’s claim in the final divisions that “we now indisputably count off the kind of image-making as two” (266e), i.e., likeness making and semblance making, becomes problematical.
Specifically, what becomes a problem is whether the distinction in question is a mathesis (learning matter) and therefore something capable of becoming epistême. Consequent this, it is also argued that the eidetic-arithmoí that appear in the dialectical investigation of the greatest kinds rule out precisely the power of lógos to make the kind of clean cut the Stranger proposes regarding the sophist and philosopher belonging to different gene, given the incomparable nature of the gené and eidê being divided."
49. Horan, David. 2019. "Plato’s Parmenides in Plato’s Sophist." Etudes platoniciennes no. 15:1-23.
Abstract: "I wish to argue in this article that Plato, in considering the position of the monists in the Sophist, relies heavily upon arguments carried forward from the Parmenides. Accordingly, I argue, he invokes, in turn, three understandings of what one means, imported from the Parmenides, and finds that all of them fall short, and

generate aporiai, when they are used in the Sophist as the basis for an account, not of the one, as in the Parmenides, but of being, or “what is”. In fact I shall argue in this paper that an entirely coherent reading of the overall challenge to the monists in the Sophist, beginning with the naming argument, or names’ argument, through to the argument about the whole, only emerges if we take account of the arguments of the Parmenides, and three conceptions of what “one” is, taken from that dialogue."

50. Hoseup, Rhee. 2021. "The Division of Images and the Deception of the Sophist." The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies no. 60:153-167.
Abstract: "This article discusses the division of images (eidōla) presented in Sophist, and explores how the sophist’s verbal deception is made based on this division. In Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two types of images: likenesses (eikones) and apparitions (phantasmata). If the likeness is an image that actually resembles the original, the apparition is an image that does not actually resemble the original but appears to resemble it. How exactly should this distinction be understood? Cornford’s argument that the distinction between likenesses and apparitions is made according to the ‘degree of reality’ leads to the conclusion that Plato uses the concept of ‘image’ inconsistently. Bluck criticizes Cornford on the grounds that likenesses and apparitions are both related to falsehood as branches of images.
This criticism is reasonable but does not help us to understand the distinction.
According to Notomi, given the metaphysical distinction between reality and appearance, if the likeness is a correct image that truly resembles the original and represents its appearance, then the apparition is an incorrect image that only appears to resemble it by points of view. I basically agree with Notomi’s view, but his interpretation does not accurately reveal the falsehood particular to the apparition, nor does it accurately account for the deception of sophists, other than painters. It is because, according to Notomi’s interpretation, apparitions will appear as likenesses, i.e.,

they will represent the same appearance as likenesses even in the 'unbeautiful point of view.' This, contrary to Notomi's assertion that the apparition is an incorrect image, seems to allow for the possibility that it can represents 'true appearances.'

Moreover, unlike painters, the deception of sophists occurs when the original is not well known, and therefore it is difficult for the observer to determine which is a likeness, that is, when he does not know which image represents true appearances. For this reason, I argue that the falsehood particular to the apparition arise on the one hand by accidental resemblance irrelevant of the essence of the original and, on the other hand, by aesthetic and emotional effect. Thus, the sophist's verbal deception can be achieved by stimulating the emotions of the audience with flashy rhetoric unrelated to the truth, and by imitating the appearance of a wise person in terms of performing discourses. Furthermore, the deception of the sophist can be discriminated into two types, according to the view on the relation between language and Forms."

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Cornford, F. M., 1935, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London: Routledge and K. Paul.

Notomi, N., 1999, The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

51. Hülsz, Enrique. 2013. "Plato's Ionian Muses: Sophist 242d-e." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 103-115. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "The focus of this short paper will be a couple of very famous lines at Sophist 242d–e, which constitute one of the precious few certain references to Heraclitus within the Platonic corpus. It will be well to recall from the outset that there are virtually no full quotations of Heraclitus in Plato's works, with the possible exception of two consecutive passages in Hippias Maior (289a – b) usually counted as sources for Heraclitus fragments (DK22) B82 and (DK22) B83, which do not qualify as verbatim quotations but are at best mere paraphrases. What looks like the dominant trend

in current scholarship concerning Plato's views on Heraclitus is largely based on the Cratylus and the Theaetetus, which seem to provide a basic sketch for the official image of the Ephesian as the main representative of the Universal flux theory (the famous but apocryphal dictum, πάντα ῥεῖ). In spite of the popularity of this view, surely also based on Aristotle's authority, if Universal flux is what allegedly defines Heracliteanism, Heraclitus was no Heraclitean." (p. 103, notes omitted)

52. Ionescu, Cristina. 2013. "Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: Division and the Communion of Kinds " Arethusa no. 46:41-64.
Abstract: "This paper explores the Eleatic Stranger's use of the method of division in the Sophist and attempts to reveal it to be a dialectical method of discovery, not of demonstration, that proceeds tentatively while it ultimately aims to ground its discoveries in the communion of the very great kinds. To illuminate this view, I argue for three main theses: first, that the method of division is a method of discovery, not of demonstration; secondly, that the much discussed passage at Sophist 253d-e is about both the method of division and the communion of kinds; and thirdly, that the method cannot succeed to discover natural articulations of reality as long as it ignores considerations of value."

53. ———. 2020. "Images and Paradigms in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." Ancient Philosophy no. 40:1-22.
"At the heart of two Platonic dialogues, one of which is the sequel of the other, the Eleatic Stranger draws two distinctions: one between two types of images (εἴδωλα): εἴκασια (likenesses) and φαντάσματα (appearances), Sophist 234a-236d, and the other between two kinds of paradigms (παραδείγματα): perceptible and verbal paradigms, Statesman 277a-c, 285d-286b. My present aim is to examine the relevance of each of these distinctions in its respective context, and to suggest a way to understand the relation between them." (p. 1)

54. Isenberg, Meyer W. 1951. "Plato's Sophist and the Five Stages of Knowing." Classical Philology no. 46:201-211.

"in a well known passage in the Seventh Epistle (342 A ff.) Plato describes the five stages (1) which one traverses on the road to the knowledge of what is real. If this epistle was written about 353 B.C., its explanation of Plato's method, whether it is primarily directed to the beginner or the advanced student, (2) should have an intimate connection with the method pursued not only in the early and middle dialogues, but especially in the works of Plato's old age. Since the Sophist is one of the latest dialogues and has been generally considered one of the most difficult it may not be too far from the mark to inquire whether a right understanding of Plato's five stages of knowing in the Seventh Epistle may not be of use in the interpretation of that dialogue. In this way, perhaps, some difficulties which that work has raised may be solved and a more intimate acquaintance made with Plato's dialectical method.
It is, then, the purpose of the present paper to show that the movement of thought in the Sophist follows closely the description of method in the passage of the Seventh Epistle referred to above. All descriptions of method, however, tend to be more simple and more rigid than the actual application of the method itself." (p. 201)
(1) Plato does not use the word "stages." δι' ὃν (342 A 7) should be translated "instruments." But only "name," "discourse," and "image" are instruments.
The term "stages" in the present paper is used in a loose sense to indicate the unfolding of the dialectic.
It has no ontological significance. Various "stages" can only become definite in the context of the Sophist and its interpretation. It is important to note, then, that the various stages listed in this passage do not have even the apparent fixity of the levels of the divided line in the Republic, but are rather extremely fluid terms which flow into one another as the dialectic twists and turns. Note the term διαγωνή (343 E 1).
(2) Harward in his excellent edition of the Epistles states that Plato is "quoting material from some discourse addressed to a single learner, apparently a beginner in philosophy, who has already had a grounding in

mathematics" (The Platonic Epistles [Cambridge, 1932], p. 213, n. 95). This may well be the case, but many an advanced student may be benefited by an elementary exposition. The importance of the passage on either count is not diminished.

55. Jeng, I-Kai. 2017. "Plato's Sophist on the Goodness of Truth." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 21:335-349.
Abstract: " "Late" Platonic dialogues are usually characterized as proposing a "scientific" understanding of philosophy, where "neutrality" is seen favorably, and being concerned with the honor of things and/or their utility for humans is considered an attitude that should be overcome through dialectical training. One dialogue that speaks strongly in favor of this reading is the Sophist, in which the stance of neutrality is explicitly endorsed in 227b-c. This paper will propose a reading of the Sophist showing that this common view of late Plato is misleading. It will argue for three things. First, 227b-c, when contextually understood, actually shows the limitation of being neutral. Second, that limitation compels the interlocutors in the rest of the conversation to pursue a non-neutral way of philosophizing about the sophist, contrary to the advice put forward in 227b-c. Finally, the non-neutral definition of the sophist that concludes the dialogue does not signal Plato's preference for a non-neutral conception of philosophical knowledge either. A careful consideration of the dramatic ending suggests that he has reservations about it no less than he does about a neutral conception. The fact that both these conceptions had limitations perhaps explains why Plato, even in his late years, did not turn to the treatise format but remained within the dialogue: only in this form is it possible to retain both in philosophical logos."

56. ———. 2019. "On the Final Definition of the Sophist: Sophist 265A10–268D5." The Review of Metaphysics no. 72:661-684.
Abstract: "This paper defends the closing definition of the sophist in Plato's Sophist as a modest success. It first argues that it consistently articulates the sophist's class structure as

someone who resembles someone wise without being in the same class as that being. Then it explains why this structuring principle satisfies the demands of a successful definition as stated in the Sophist 232a1-6, and how the earlier definitions, despite being informative, nevertheless are failures. Since a number of scholars consider the final definition to fail no less than the earlier ones, the paper then turns to address four common objections in the literature. The conclusion briefly discusses how this reading affects our understanding of the method of division (diaeresis) in Plato."

57. Johnson, Patricia Ann. 1978. "Keyt on ἕτερον in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:151-157.
"In his article, "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,"' David Keyt introduces a crucial question for understanding the definition of false statement given by Plato in the Sophist: What is the relation of flying to Theaetetus (or, to the attributes which belong to Theaetetus)? The response given to this question will amount to an interpretation of the key line, 263B11-13. Keyt mentions five interpretations and argues briefly against each, but the major argument of his paper is devoted to showing that the definition of falsity is vague and therefore defies specific translation. I shall not discuss all of these possible interpretations because my concern here is in defending what Keyt calls the Oxford interpretation. He argues directly against this view as raising serious epistemological problems, but he also challenges it as an interpretation by presenting counter arguments to the two most persuasive reasons for choosing this interpretation over the others. I shall try to respond to the more significant of these challenges." (p. 151)

58. Jordan, Robert William. 1984. "Plato's Task in the Sophist." The Classical Quarterly no. 34:113-129.
"I shall argue that it is clear that Plato would himself characterize his task in the Sophist as showing τα᾽ μη᾽ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν (258d 5) - that what is notbeing is being.(3) Problems arise only in the interpretation of Plato's task. We must be guided in our interpretation by the solution Plato

offers to his problems. This solution turns firstly on his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and secondly on his distinction between otherness and opposition. The conclusion Plato draws from his discussion of Communion of Kinds has sometimes been thought to lend support to the view that Plato's task here is that of distinguishing different senses of einai. I shall argue that this view of the passage presents serious problems for the commentator. And this view of Plato's task in the Sophist receives no support at all from Plato's contrast between otherness and opposition. That contrast, however, equally fails to support the other commonly held view of the problems Plato is facing in the Sophist, that Plato is keen to distinguish between the medamos on and the me on. In particular, the analogy Plato draws between 'being' and 'big' presents a major difficulty for this view.

Finally, I shall introduce a new interpretation of Plato's task, via a consideration of his stated intention to commit patricide and refute Parmenides' criticism of the road of enquiry followed by mortals. Once we have seen that Plato promises to refute Parmenides, but does not accomplish this task by distinguishing between different senses or uses of einai, nor yet by a distinction between being in no way and simply not being, only one possibility remains: Plato thinks the refutation of Parmenides achieved if he can show that being (F) is not opposed to notbeing (G). This interpretation of Plato's task is then shown to fit well, both with the puzzles that introduce the central section of the Sophist, and with Plato's resolution of those puzzles by way of his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and his distinction between otherness and opposition. It is compatible with what Plato says and does in Sophist 241-56; and it accounts well for the nature of Plato's discussion of negation and falsity in the dialogue. (pp. 113-114)

(3) We normally translate to mega as 'what is big'. I consequently translate to on as 'what is being' and to me on as 'what is notbeing', to preserve the parallel in the Greek.

59. Julia, Pfefferkorn, and Spinelli, Antonino, eds. 2021. Platonic Mimesis Revisited. Sankt Augustin: Academia

Verlag.
Contents: 1; Julia Pfefferkorn, Antonino Spinelli: Revisiting Mimesis in Plato: An Introduction 7; Stephen Halliwell: The Shifting Problems of Mimesis in Plato 27; Michael Erler: Performanz und Analyse. Mimesis als Nachmachen – ein Element traditioneller Paideia in Platons früheren Dialogen und seine Analyse in den Nomoi 47; Andrea Capra: Imitatio Socratis from the Theatre of Dionysus to Plato's Academy 63; Anna Pavani: The Essential Imitation of Names: On Cratylean Mimesis 81; Laura Candiotto: Mimesis and Recollection 103; Elenio Cicchini: Der mimische Charakter. Mimus und Mimesis in der Philosophie Platons 123; Justin Vlasits: Plato on Poetic and Musical Representation 147; Irmgard Männlein-Robert: Mit Blick auf das Göttliche oder Mimesis für Philosophen in Politeia und Nomoi 167; Lidia Palumbo: Mimêsis teorizzata e mimêsis realizzata nel Sofista platonico 193; Michele Abbate: Der Sophist als mimêtês tôn ontôn (Sph. 235a1 f.). Ontologische Implikationen 211; Alexandra V. Alván León: Wolf im Hundepelz: Mimesis als Täuschung in der Kunst des Sophisten 225; Benedikt Strobel: Bild und falsche Meinung in Platons Sophistes 249; Francesco Fronterotta: Generation as μίμησις and κόσμος as μίμημα: Cosmological Model, Productive Function and the Arrangement of the χώρα in Plato's Timaeus 275; Antonino Spinelli: Mimoumenoi tas tou theou periphoras. Die Mimesis des Kosmos als menschliche Aufgabe im Timaios 291; José Antonio Giménez: Gesetz und Mimesis im Politikos 313; Julia Pfefferkorn: Plato's Dancing City: Why is Mimetic Choral Dance so Prominent in the Laws? 335; Index Locorum 359–376.

60. Kahn, Charles H. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." La Parola del Passato no. 43:237-261.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 167-191.
"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of Parmenides as an influence on Plato's thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that

made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between Being and Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms.
When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a visitor from Elea. Even in the Timaeus, where the chief speaker is neither Socrates nor the Eleatic Stranger, the exposition takes as its starting point the Parmenidean dichotomy.(1) From the Symposium and Phaedo to the Sophist and Timaeus, the language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides." (p. 237)
(...)
"My aim here has not been to analyze Plato's use of to be in the formulation of his own ontology, but only to demonstrate how faithfully Parmenidean he is in his progression from an initial, quasi idiomatic use of ἐστι for truth and reality to more philosophically loaded, 'ontological' uses of the verb in which existential and predicative functions are combined with connotations of truth, stability, and permanence." (p. 257)
(...)
"In the Sophist veridical being is carefully analyzed as 'saying of what is that it is concerning a subject' (236b), whereas the problematic concept of not-being is dissolved into distinct negations for falsehood, identity, and predication. A long and laborious effort of analysis was required to bring to light the confusions hidden in Parmenides' argument. But these confusions infect only the negative concept of what is not. The positive conception of Being emerges unscathed, to dominate the metaphysical tradition of the West for many centuries to come." (p. 258)
(1) Timaeus 27d5: 'The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never being?'.

61. ———. 2007. "Why is the Sophist a sequel to the Theaetetus?" Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 52:33-57.
Abstract: The Theaetetus and the Sophist both stand in the shadow of the Parmenides, to which they refer. I propose to interpret these two dialogues as Plato's first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in the Parmenides and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the Philebus as well as in the Timaeus. The most important change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of Being to include the nature of things that change.
This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the Theaetetus and Sophist by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new account of Forms as a network of mutual connections and exclusions. The division of labor between the two dialogues is symbolized by the role of Heraclitus in the former and that of Parmenides in the latter. Theaetetus asks for a discussion of Parmenides as well, but Socrates will not undertake it. For that we need the visitor from Elea. Hence the Theaetetus deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is reserved for Eleatic treatment in the Sophist. But the problems of falsity and Not-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without the considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why there must be a sequel to the Theaetetus."
62. ———. 2013. Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 3. Being and Not-Being in the Sophist, pp. 94-130.
"In the Theaetetus Socrates insisted on avoiding the discussion (which Theaetetus had requested) of Parmenides' doctrine of Being. As the promised sequel to the Theaetetus, the Sophist is designed to fill that gap. A significant change in style suggests that a considerable lapse

of time may have occurred between the composition of these two dialogues.
Nevertheless, the reappearance of Theaetetus as interlocutor in the Sophist is a clear reminder of continuity in this project.
It was presumably with these Parmenidean issues in view that Plato chose to replace Socrates as chief speaker with a visitor from Elea. One of Plato's principal tasks in this dialogue will be to correct Parmenides' account of Not-Being. The choice of a spokesman from Parmenides' own school will serve to guarantee an atmosphere of intellectual sympathy for the doctrine to be criticized." (p. 94)

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"As Cornford has formulated it,(5) “the class of ‘images’ (εἴδωλα) we are concerned with—semblances—imply two relations between image and original.
The image is more or less like the original, though not wholly like it, not a reproduction. But it is also conceived as possessing in some sense a lower grade of reality, as illusory, phantom-like” (author’s emphasis). Thus it is not unusual to find Plato being accused of abandoning the world of concrete sensible reality in favor of a nebulous region of intangible presumed “prototypes” of the items encountered by our everyday experience, of assuming as properly real what—to every sober minded naturalist—seem to be no more than abstractions from things or features existing in the world of our common, and commonly shared, experience.
In what follows, I wish to challenge certain aspects of this interpretation of the analogy of the image and to suggest that Plato did not intend to question the reality of sensible existence, but only to deny that we can be confident about the truth of any statements we make in reference to it. In my

view, in interpreting the image analogy we have to take seriously into account the extended analysis Plato offers with respect to the various kinds of imaging in the Sophist, where a great amount of energy is given to an ex professo examination of this, at first glance, rather inconsequential or, at best, marginal topic." (pp. 392-393)
(5) See F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1935), 199.

2. Karanasiou, Argyri G. 2016. "The Term symplokē in Symposium 202b1 and in Sophist 240c1ff, 259d-261c: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of "Interconnection" in Platonic Thought " In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 113-130. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The pivotal question raised in this study is, whether Socrates's presentation of Eros in the Symposium could serve as an allegory of the concept of symploke(2) of Forms anticipating the exclusive and exhaustive distinction of a thing, its polar contrary, and its different (the tertium quid or third alternative) as presented in the relevant discussion of the Sophist (240c1; 259e5f; 260a1-6; d5).(3) Heidegger (GA 19, 572) argues that although Plato has seen the heteron early (in the Symposium), he only conceived the difference between heteron and enantiosis (mere negation) later referring to symploke as a logical possibility of something 'being' and 'not-being' at the same time; existing, even if it is other than itself (GA 19, 431-32; 569-75; 580). Relating to this topic in his Lectures on the Sophist Heidegger refers to a passage (Smp. 202b1) where the idea of otherness (heteron) is probably defined as signifying not necessarily opposition (enantion, GA 19, 572).4 Both the discovery of the heteron as a category in the Symposium and the resolution of the problem of negation through the notion of interconnection (symploke) in the Sophist laid the foundation of dialectical logic (cf. Sph. 253d; 259c4ff)." (pp. 113-114)

(2) The term is rendered either as 'combination', 'dependency' or 'interrelation'. The verb sympleko means in general 'plait together' and it is usually used with the verb syndeo which at Rsp. 309b means 'bind together' or 'unite'. Both verbs occur at Sph. 268c5-6 when a reverse recapitulation of the definition (toúnoma) of the sophist is concisely mentioned (beginning at the end and closing at the opening of the dialogue).
(3) Cf. Seligman (1974), 18-9.
(4) Patt (1997), 23 7.
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GA = Heidegger Gesamtausgabe
Patt, Walter. Formen des Anti-Platonismus bei Kant, Nietzsche und Heidegger. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1997.
Seligman, Paul. Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato's Sophist. Dordrecht: Springer, 1974.

3. Karfík, Filip. 2011. "Pantelôs on and megista genê (Plato, Soph. 242C–259b) " In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 120-145. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"About the middle of Plato's Sophist a perplexity (ἀπορία) emerges out of a lengthy discussion as to how to catch the "tribe" of sophists with a definition. It turns out that to define a sophist as somebody who has to do with falsehood implies the existence of not-being.(1)
Such a hypothesis clearly infringes the ban placed on not-being by Parmenides in his celebrated poem.(2)"
(...)
"The inquiry into this question, which eventually leads to a solution of the question about not-being, fills out the rest of the central part of the dialogue.7 Both these questions having been solved, the interlocutors take up the interrupted job of defining the sophist and bring it to a successful conclusion. The Sophist, unlike the Theaetetus, thus ends up with a positive answer to the question it has initially raised, namely: "What is a Sophist?"8 But the way to get there is anything but straightforward and raises more

questions than it solves. Formally, both subordinated questions, about not-being and about being, receive due answers, the first one via the second one.
But especially the answer to the question “What does it mean ‘to be’” is itself far from being clear. Modern interpreters do not agree about its general meaning and there are several more particular points in Plato’s presentation which are in dispute. In this paper I would like to enquire once again into these vexed issues in order to get clearer about the general meaning of Plato’s answer to the question: “What is being?” (pp. 120-121)
(1) Cf. Plato, Soph. 236d8–237a4.
(2) Cf. ibid., 237a4–b1, line a8–9 = Parmenides, fr. 7 Diels – Kranz

4. Keane, Niall. 2010. "Interpreting Plato Phenomenologically: Relationality and Being in Heidegger's Sophist." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 41:170-192.
"... this paper sets out to examine the phenomenological import of Heidegger’s subsequent interpretation and appropriation of relationality (pros ti) and logos in his analyses of the megista gene in the Sophist. This paper addresses some of the more philosophically salient points of Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological interpretation’ and addresses what were, according to him, both the philosophical merits and limitations of Plato’s ‘late ontology’. To this end, I will attempt to explicate the phenomenological issues that inevitably remained unthematized in Plato’s Sophist. In this respect, I shall largely focus on Heidegger’s early interpretation of Plato’s analysis of ‘movedness’ (kinesis), ‘otherness’ (heterotes) and ‘relationality’ (pros ti); each of which will then be considered with respect to the role of the logos.
The ancillary aim of this article will be to disentangle these specific issues from the perspective of the limits and ground of the pros ti and it will subsequently examine how Heidegger’s early reading of ‘relational movedness’ in the Sophist inspired his later Being and Time analysis of the disclosive negativity of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein). By way of conclusion, I argue, against what I

consider to be a renewed case of ‘Platonic apologetics’, that Heidegger’s reading of Plato is best understood when approached from a purely ‘phenomenological perspective’. I contend that it is only by approaching Heidegger’s ‘deconstructive’ interpretation of Plato’s highest kinds from the standpoint of his nascent existential-ontology of Dasein, that one can both meaningfully defend and contextualise his interpretation of the Sophist against the above reproach. In contrast to what I have called a ‘Platonic apologetics’, I would like to argue that Heidegger’s compelling interpretation of the Sophist offers us an unconventional (yet nonetheless valid) way of responding to Plato’s thought, a response which is thoroughly evinced in the 1924/25 interpretation which I shall now pursue." (p. 170)

5. Kerferd, George B. 1954. "Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry (Sophist 226a-231b)." The Classical Quarterly no. 4:84-90.
"Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, (1) or more probably different aspects of the sophistic art.(2) The sixth division (226 a-231 b) is very different. To quote Cornford's words, 'satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent.' (3)
(...)
"It is the purpose of this paper to argue that the natural meaning of the passage is the right one the persons referred to are sophists and Plato was aware that one aspect of their activities was not only extremely valuable but was a necessary preliminary to his own philosophy." (p. 84)
(...)
"There is thus ample evidence of the practice by sophists of a method which could be described in the terms which Plato uses in the Sixth Definition, a method which if used in the right way could prepare the ground for a true understanding

of reality based on the Forms. It is in this sense that Plato could speak of 'the art of sophistry which is of noble lineage'." (p. 90)
(1) Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 173.
(2) Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work, 379. There is nothing to support Jackson's view (Journal of Philosophy, XIV (1885), 176-82) that Plato is describing successive stages in the history of the sophistic movement. Soph. 232 a shows that Plato held there was a single common element underlying the name 'sophist' and it is for this that he is searching.
(3) Op. cit. 177.

6. Ketchum, Richard J. 1978. "Participation and Predication in the Sophist 251-260." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:42-62.
"While a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in bringing to light the philosophical sense of the Sophist one problem, or cluster of problems, has resisted analysis.(1) The problem is that Plato seems to use a particular form of sentence ambiguously; the fact that he does so seems to reveal a fundamental confusion on Plato's part."
(...)
"Now it is argued that Plato uses sentences of the form "the F (is) ... sometimes to express a Form-predication and sometimes to say something about the nature of the F or perhaps about the nature of particular F 's. The fact Plato vacillates between these two types of predication not only obscures whatever philosophical point he may be making but also shows that Plato was confused about the nature of Forms.
I think, however, that there is a plausible reading of the Sophist which shows Plato to be in no way confused as to the meaning of such sentences.
None of the first-order sentences of the Sophist, I will argue, are Form predications.
After arguing that the text forces this conclusion on us (Part I), I will try to make the conclusion plausible (Part II) by describing a type of predication, different from Form-

predication, in terms of which all of the first-order sentences of the Sophist can be consistently understood. A consequence of my interpretation is the rather surprising thesis that nowhere in the Sophist with the exception of those passages in which the friends of the Forms are discussed, does Plato mention the Forms of the middle dialogues. I will conclude (Part III) by explaining how I think those passages which seem to mention Forms are to be understood." (p. 42-43)
(1) The problem has been discussed by R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd Edition (Oxford, 1953), 250-264; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrine: II, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (London, 1963), 401-410; M. Frede, "'Pradikationu nd Existenzaussage," Hypomnemata, Heft 18, (1967) 9-99; and G. Vlastos, "On Ambiguity in the Sophist" in Platonic Studies, (Princeton, 1973), 270-322, among others, while it is alluded to by G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being" in Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, G. Vlastos, ed., (Garden City, 1971), 233, note 20.

7. Keyt, David. 1969. "Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 19:1-14. "One of the great questions that Plato considers in the Sophist is that of the number and nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the dialogue, an Eleatic stranger, raises problems for both the pluralist (243D6-244B5) and the monist (244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns to the battle of gods and giants, the battle between those who hold that "body and being are the same" (246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain intelligible and bodiless Forms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical contrary, not the contradictory, of what the other holds; so it is possible that they are both wrong. This seems in fact to be the Eleatic's conclusion (249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to the friends of the Forms the property under examination has shifted from corporeality to mutability. The Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with an interesting paradox (248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold that real being " is always invariable and constant " (248A11-12).

But being is known (248D2). And on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, that which is known is acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to be changed (248E3-4). Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). But this conclusion contradicts their original contention." (p. 1)
(...)
"My conclusions are that he is not deeply committed to the proposition that Forms undergo change, but that he ought to be, and that he is deeply committed to the proposition that Forms are completely changeless, but for insufficient reasons. A Platonist really ought to hold that Forms are changeless in some respects but not in others. In what respects? This is my third question. Aristotle, in commenting on Plato's theory of Forms, provides a basis for answering it." (p. 2)

8. ———. 1973. "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263b." In Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, edited by Lee, Edward N., Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 285-305. Assen: Van Gorcum.
9. Klein, Jacon. 1977. Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
"There can be no doubt that the Platonic dialogues entitled Theaetetus, The Sophist, and The Statesman belong together --- in that order and are meant to be a "trilogy," regardless of when they were written. It is important to note that these three conversations are supposed to take place not during three days but two, shortly before the trial and the conviction of Socrates. (3) The conversation in the Theaetetus is followed on the next day by two conversations, by that in the Sophist and that in the Statesman. There is almost certainly no pause between the latter two. (4)" (p. 3)
(...)
"Independently of the time sequence within the dialogues, something is dealt with in the Sophist which happens to be the fundamental premise in the Theaetetus, namely, that the roots, the ultimate sources of everything, the "ruling beginnings" (the αρχαί), arc these two: the 'Same' and the

'Other'. We shall, therefore, begin witl1 the Sophist, continue with the Theaetetus, and end with the Statesman. How shall we convey what is either said or not said explicitly but only implied in the dialogues? We shall watch the text carefully, always remaining aware of the playfulness --- the sister of seriousness which persists in the dialogues and determines the way they proceed. We shall watch how the spoken words produce the dramatic content presented to us. We shall participate in the discussions: the paraphrase of the text of the dialogues will be interwoven with what occurs in us as listeners." (p. 5)
(3) Theaet. 210d 1-3.
(4) Cf. Diès, Platon: Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 8, pt. 3, Le Sophiste. Paris, 1963.

10. Kohnke, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1957. "Plato's Conception of το` οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:32.40.
"In the neo-Platonic philosophy of the fifth century A.D. the hypostases of being are found in connection with a four-level scale of being and non-being." (p. 32)
(...)
"Plato seems to have formulated the concept of οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν for the first time in the Sophistes." (p. 38)
(...)
"We are now in a position to recognise its roots: The neo-Platonists derived a terminology for their fourfold system of being from Plato's Parmenides, the dialogue which they honoured as the revelation of metaphysical truth, and combined this with their system of hypostases of the cosmos." (p. 40)
11. Kostman, James. 1973. "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Patterns in Plato's Thought. Papers Arising Out of the 1971 West Coast Greek Philosophy Conference, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 192-212. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"In the Sophist, Plato argues that false statements are possible, defending this common-sense view against the claims of a notorious sophistic puzzle: if there are false λόγοι, according to the puzzle, then not-Being is (237a3-4);

but, as Parmenides had testified, what is-not cannot be (237a4-b2).
After introducing this puzzle, Plato goes on to magnify the difficulties it raises (237b7-239c3), and he asserts that, in order to refute Parmenides, we must show both that what is-not is and that what is is-not (239c4-242b5). Plato then takes up several traditional theories about Being (242b6-251a4), and finds that this subject too is full of perplexity. So he attempts to resolve the whole cluster of problems he has raised, starting with the question of how one and the same thing can be called by many names (251a5-c7). This leads to the topic of the communion of Kinds (251c7-257aI2). But, as we shall see, it is only at 257b1 that Plato begins
his direct reply to the original sophistic puzzle." (p. 192)

12. ———. 1989. "The Ambiguity of 'Partaking' in Plato's Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 27:343-363.
"In the central section of the Sophist (250-259), as Gregory Vlastos has shown,(1) statements about Forms or Kinds are subject to a certain structural ambiguity: 'The F is G' may be either an 'ordinary' or a 'Pauline' predication, in Vlastos' terminology; that is, it may either attribute being G to the F itself or assert that necessarily whatever is F is G. For example, 'Being is at rest' may assert either that the Form Being itself is at rest, in which case it is an ordinary predication, or that necessarily whatever is is at rest, in which case it is a Pauline predication." A few scholars have quibbled with Vlastos' interpretations of some of the passages on which he bases the claim that the ambiguity exists, but I find it surprising that, in the decade and a half since its publication, Vlastos' central thesis---that Plato was "utterly unaware" of the ambiguity--has never been directly challenged. After summarizing the evidence for the existence of the ambiguity in section 1 of this paper, I shall show in section 2 that the argument by which Vlastos concludes that there is "positive evidence" for his thesis is fundamentally incoherent.
In the rest of this paper, I offer an argument, based on my analysis of two important passages (255c-e and 250a-e) and

the relationship between them, that there is additional circumstantial evidence that Plato was not only aware of the ambiguity but allowed it to play a significant, though indirect, role in the overall argument of Soph. 250-259." (p. 343)
(1) Gregory Vlastos, "An Ambiguity in the Sophist," in his Platonic Studies, 270-322. This article will be referred to as 'AS'; all references to it and other papers in Platonic Studies are to the first edition.

13. Lacey, Alan Robert. 1959. "Plato's Sophist and the Forms." The Classical Quarterly no. 9:43-52.
"The Sophist is on the face of it concerned to charge the sophist with being a mere maker of images, and to defend this charge by showing that images, though they 'are not' what they are images of, yet in some sense 'are'. This leads to the analysis of Not-being as being other than, but Plato makes it quite clear that the general problem concerns Being as much as Not-being (250 e); the difficulty is that Being is neither Rest nor Motion, and so can neither rest nor move of its own nature, but surely it must do one of these (250 c, d). In other words Being is in danger of not being able to have attributes except by being identical with them. The ensuing discussion seems to point out that this is not so, and that Forms, like other things, do have some attributes and not others, without being identical with them. But such an interpretation will only hold if the Megista Gene are in fact all Forms. This is denied by Dr. A. L. Peck, who argues (Classical Quarterly. 1952; cf. 1953, 1954) (2) that the whole point of the discussion is to show that Being, Not-being, Same, and Other are not Forms, but merely empty names, and so φάντασματα rather than the εἰκώνες which are the names of real things; the sophist raises paradoxes by relying on linguistic habits (Dr. Peck (S p. 52) points to the frequency of verbs of saying in the Sophist) to pervert the theory of Forms into positing absurd Forms." (p. 43)
14. Lanigan, Richard L. 1982. "Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato's Sophist." Semiotica no. 41:221-246.
Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.), Frontiers in Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986, pp. 199-216.

"My essay attempts to explicate the main features of the Platonic argument in order to establish that the model of discourse analysis is semiotic in nature and phenomenological in function. I am using the term model in its technical theory construction sense as an 'exemplar' (combined 'paradigm' and 'prototype') in a theory."
(...)
"My essay does not represent an effort to claim that Plato is either a semiologist or a phenomenologist. Rather, I argue that the dialogue Sophist offers a long neglected textual model of binary analogue thinking that is foundational to many of the issues current in the study of the philosophy of communication where semiology and phenomenology intersect in the problematic of analysis. Indeed, many of the basic elements in the Platonic investigation are being unnecessarily reinvented by contemporary theorists. By addressing the fundamental problem of the Being of Not-Being, Plato provides a semiotic phenomenology of discourse in which he demonstrates the acceptability of analytic proofs as the concrete analysis of empirical communication acts. Thus, the dialogue Sophist represents a critical, but often ignored, theoretical foundation for an empirical examination of the sign relationship between the ontology of the speaking subject and the epistemology of the discourse system." (pp. 221-222, note omitted)

15. Larsen, Jens Kristian. 2007. "The Soul of Sophistry: Plato's "Sophist" 226a9–231b9 revisited." Filosofiske Studier no. 102:1-14.
"It is a widespread opinion that the first part of the Sophist (216a – 237b) is primarily concerned with the problem of finding an adequate definition of the sophist. Within this passage six different definitions
are given, each unsatisfactory, until a seventh description leads to the main problems of the dialogue, namely the questions concerning non-being, being, the intertwining of forms and the problem concerning false statements. Whereas the first five definitions are relatively unproblematic, the sixth is known to be troublesome – it

has a peculiar resemblance to the Socrates-figure of the elenctic dialogues.
In the following I shall argue that the so-called sixth definition is not a definition of the sophist at all, but a methodological reflection which plays a central role in the overall composition of the dialogue. I shall further argue that this methodological reflection shows that Plato did not change his basic notion of philosophy in the late dialogues towards a more 'technical' concept, as is often maintained, but in a fundamental way stayed true to the Socratic, 'existential' impulse." (p. 1)

16. ———. 2013. "The Virtue of Power." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:306-317.
Abstract: "The "battle" between corporealists and idealists described in Plato's Sophist 245e6–249d5 is of significance for understanding the philosophical function of the dramatic exchange between the Eleatic guest and Theaetetus, the dialogue's main interlocutors.
Various features of this exchange indicate that the Eleatic guest introduces and discusses the dispute between corporealists and idealists in order to educate Theaetetus in ontological matters. By reading the discussion between Theaetetus and the Eleatic guest in the light of these features, one comes to see that the primary audience for the proposal advanced by the Eleatic guest in this passage, namely that being is power, is not any of the participants in the "battle," as has been commonly assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation of the passage."
17. ———. 2016. "Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 27-60. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The present chapter investigates Heidegger's early understanding of Platonic dialectic in its contrast to sophistry as this comes to expression in his Lectures on Plato's Sophist." (p. 27)

(...)
"To investigate Heidegger's early understanding of sophistry is thus a challenging task, since this understanding cannot be isolated from his broader interpretation of Plato's understanding of philosophy or from his own understanding of philosophy, developed in discussion with the philosophical tradition. Moreover, as Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is primarily based on a reading of the Sophist, a text that may not be typical of Plato, we need to look at the Sophist itself if we wish to evaluate Heidegger's engagement with Plato. Accordingly, the chapter will have two main parts. The first part will focus on Plato's Sophist, in particular on the connection between arete, virtue, and the inquiry into sophistry in the dialogue. Here a now common reading of the Sophist will be examined critically. The second part will focus on Heidegger's interpretation of philosophy and sophistry in the light of the Sophist and will ask what role, if any, arete plays in this interpretation." (pp. 28-29)

18. ———. 2019. "Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical Inquiry, and Estimations of Worth in Plato's Parmenides, Sophist and Statesman." Etudes platoniciennes no. 15:1-17.
Abstract: "The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato's conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well.
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the

Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato's Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers."

19. ———. 2020. "Differentiating Philosopher from Statesman according to Work and Worth." Polis. The Journal for Amcient Greek and Roman Political Thought no. 37:550-566.
Abstract: "Plato's Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a ti esti question about a single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist, statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to addressed these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to as the method of collection and division. Some scholars have argued that this so-called method is value neutral and therefore unable to address the question how philosophy differs from sophistry and statesmanship according to worth. This article contends that the procedures of collection and division does not preclude the visitor from taking considerations of worth into account, but rather helps establish an objective basis for settling the main questions of the dialogue."
20. Lee, Edward N. 1966. "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist." The Philosophical Review no. 81:267-304.
"On pages 257c-258c of the Sophist, Plato introduces a notion which he calls the "Parts of the nature of Otherness." He then writes explicitly - in fact, he writes it twice - that that Part of Otherness, and not merely Otherness by itself, defines the genuine non-Being that is needed to conclude his inquiry and to trap the Sophist.(2) But why does he say so? Just what difference is there between the not-Being explicated by means of the Parts of Otherness and the not-

Being explicated through Otherness by itself? I am convinced that none of the existing interpretations of the Parts doctrine adequately answer that question or accurately analyze Plato's own meaning. My aim will be to do both. To begin (I), we will work through the details of the difficult passage in which Plato spells out his doctrine of the Parts of Otherness; then we shall try to clarify the philosophical role that the doctrine plays-first (II) in Plato's analysis of negation (particularly his account of the sense of negative predication statements), and then (III), though more briefly, in connection with one of the wider metaphysical issues raised in the Sophist." (p. 267)
(...)
"If the account in Sections I and II above is sound, then the logical force of Plato's theories in the Sophist proves to be much greater than the commentators have appreciated. Not only can he analyze the sense of negative identity statements, but he can analyze the sense of negative predication statements as well. To an extent much greater than had earlier been recognized, he did succeed in dealing with the problem of negation. Yet we have noted that his aims in the Sophist were not narrowly logical or "analytical" in nature, and we need also to ask what other substantive issues he may have hoped to illuminate by means of these analytic achievements." (p. 299)

21. Lee, SangWon. 2016. "The Dynamic Association of Being and Non-Being: Heidegger's Thoughts on Plato's Sophist Beyond Platonism." Human Studies no. 39:385-403.
Abstract: "This article examines Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's Sophist, focusing on his attempts to grasp Plato's original thinking of being and non-being. Some contemporary thinkers and commentators argue that Heidegger's view of Plato is simply based on his criticism against the traditional metaphysics of Platonism and its language. But a close reading of his lecture on the Sophist reveals that his view of Plato is grounded in Plato's questioning struggle with the ambiguous nature of human speech or language (logos). For Heidegger, Plato's way of philosophizing is deeper than the metaphysical

understanding of Platonism which sees only fixed ideas of being. In the Sophist, dialectical thinking of Plato constantly confronts the questionable force of the logos which betrays the natural possibility of non-being based on the tension between movement and rest. Thus, from Plato's original insight Heidegger uncovers the dynamic association (koinōnia) of being and non-being as a natural ground of everyday living with others. However, although Heidegger's understanding of the Sophist powerfully demonstrates the lively possibility (dunamis) of being beyond the customary perspective of Platonic metaphysics, his interpretation fails to further disclose Plato's political question of being emerging in the Sophist, which seeks the true associative ground of human beings."

22. Leigh, Fiona. 2008. "The Copula and Semantic Continuity in Plato's Sophist." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 34:105-121.
"Lesley Brown first made a radical claim about uses of the Greek verb 'to be' (einai) in Plato's Sophist some twenty years ago (1986).(1)
(...)
"In brief, Brown's innovation is as follows: The verb 'to be' in Greek, unlike its counterpart in modern English, permits a complete and an incomplete use. Sometimes it does not take a complement, though it could, and at other times context demands a complement (whether elided or not). In the former case, the verb exhibits what Brown calls a 'C2' complete use, and in the second, an incomplete use. Brown's view is that the verb is not being used merely homonymously in these cases, but, like 'to teach' in English, exhibits a certain continuity of meaning across uses. The mistake has been to take complete uses of estin as C1 complete uses, i.e. as uses that will not bear further completion.
The first critical discussion (to my knowledge) of Brown's reading has recently appeared in print.(6) In it John Malcolm advances several arguments against Brown's reading. I shall argue, however, that Malcolm's textual considerations are less than decisive. More significantly, I

shall suggest that his conceptual arguments miss their mark in two ways: one objection relies on a less than charitable reading of Brown, while another involves the questionable attribution of an assumption to the author of the Sophist. But despite my defence of Brown's view, I do not endorse it. On the contrary, I hope to show that Brown's central thesis —that there is a semantic continuity between complete and incomplete uses of einai—lacks the textual support it requires from the Sophist. Moreover, a central argument of that dialogue tells against it. (pp. 105-106)
(...)
"I have argued that Malcolm's arguments against Brown's reading of einai in the Sophist are ultimately unconvincing. None the less, I hope to have shown that Brown's reading receives insufficient support from the relevant passages, and is even rendered doubtful by a central argument of that work. If this is right, the contention that einai has a C2 complete use in the Sophist—a use referred to in the kath' hauta/pros alla distinction at 255 c 14—will turn out to be at best improbable, and at worst defeated." (p. 120)
(1) L. Brown, 'Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry' ['Being'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1986), 49–70; repr. with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1:Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford, 1999), 455–78 (all references are to the later publication).
(6) J. Malcolm, 'Some Cautionary Remarks on the "is"/"teaches" Analogy' ['Remarks'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 31 (2006), 281–96.

23. ———. 2009. "Plato on Art, Perspective, and Beauty in the Sophist." Literature & Aesthetics no. 19:183-214.
"With only a few exceptions, readers of Plato's later dialogue, the Sophist, have not usually associated it with Platonic aesthetics. But this is to overlook two important features of the dialogue. First, the unfavourable contrast, built up throughout the dialogue, between the practice of sophistry – likened to the practice of the mimetic arts (235c-236e)–and the practice of philosophy. Only the latter, the Stranger implies, affords the possibility of what we might call an aesthetic experience, i. e., the experience of beauty in

the soul, while the former results in ugliness (230d-e). Second, it overlooks the argument at 235d-236c, offered by the main speaker in the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger, for the claim that certain artworks, such as monuments and large paintings, are necessarily illusory."
(...)
"I mentioned above that the conception of a beautiful soul figures in the Stranger's remarks on the benefits of knowledge, as contrasted with the deleterious effects of submitting oneself to the teaching of sophists.
However, the conception of beauty at work here, and its relation to truth and knowledge, is not argued for or defended in our dialogue, but instead appears to be presupposed: there is nothing in the Sophist that counts as an advance in Plato's thought on the conception of beauty. Nonetheless, as a preliminary, I want first to review this conception in the corpus, and its connection to truth, knowledge, and virtue, in order to provide a broader context within which to situate the importance accorded to a beautiful soul in the Sophist. We will see that the experience of beauty generally, and coming to have a beautiful soul in particular, is desirable because it has moral value. We will also see, however, that aesthetic value is not thereby reduced to moral value, since it will emerge that the soul's beauty is for Plato a constituent of the good life, of eudaimonia, and not simply a means towards that end." (pp. 183-184, notes omitted)

24. ———. 2010. "Being and Power in Plato's Sophist." Apeiron no. 43:63-85.
"What should we make of the passage in the Sophist at 247d-e, in which the Eleatic Stranger declares that being is whatever has the power (dunamis) to act or be affected, even if only once, in the smallest way? Does this proposal about being — the 'dunamis proposal' (2) — express the view of the Stranger's interlocutors, the giants, or is the Stranger speaking in his own voice and so representing Plato's view? (3) If the latter, how could the proposal be seen to survive the encounter with the 'friends of the Forms', and be applicable to immutable Forms? Is the

employment of 'horos' and 'horizein' at 247e3 meant to indicate that a mere mark of being is offered in the proposal, or the very definition of being? How these questions are answered determines what role, if any, one takes the dunamis proposal about being to play in the later constructive part of the dialogue, in which the Form, Being, takes centre stage."
(...)
"I shall argue that in the Sophist Plato has the Stranger forge the definition — that whatever has the power to act or be affected is a being — by distinguishing relations of causation (or poiesis) from relations of change." (p. 63-64)
(2) L. Brown, 'Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants', In J. Gentzler, ed., Method in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 1998), 181-207, at 184ff.
(3) Although it has been recently challenged, the orthodox position, that provided one proceeds with care one can read off Plato's position — however partial and provisionary — from the views expressed by the main character of a dialogue, remains, and I shall assume it here. (For the case pro, see D. Sedley, Plato's Cratylus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 1-2; M. Frede, "The Literary Form of the Sophist', In M. L. Gill and M. M. McCabe, eds., Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 135-151. 142,150-1. For the case contra, see e.g., R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 18-21.)

25. ———. 2012. "Modes of Being at Sophist 255c-e." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 57:1-28.
Abstract: "I argue for a new interpretation of the argument for the non-identity of Being and Difference at Sophist 255c-e, which turns on a distinction between modes of being a property. Though indebted to Frede [Prädikation und Existenzaussage] (1967), the distinction differs from his in an important respect: What distinguishes the modes is not the subject’s relation to itself or to something numerically distinct, but whether it constitutes or conforms to the specification of some property. Thus my view, but not his, allows self-participation for Forms. Against Frede and the

more traditional interpretation, I maintain that the distinction is not introduced by way of the pros alla/kath' hauta distinction, or by way of uses or senses of the verb 'to be', but is established prior to the argument and is deployed in its frame. Moreover, since I read the argument's scope as restricted to properties in what I shall call the attribute mode, my interpretation can explain, as its rivals cannot, why the criterion of difference at 255d6-7 does not apply to the Form, Difference, itself."

26. ———. 2012. "Restless Forms and Changeless Causes." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 112.
Abstract: "It is widely held that in Plato's Sophist, Forms rest or change or both. The received opinion is, however, false-or so I will argue. There is no direct support for it in the text and several passages tell against it. I will further argue that, contrary to the view of some scholars, Plato did not in this dialogue advocate a kind of change recognizable as 'Cambridge change', as applicable to his Forms. The reason that Forms neither change nor rest is that they are purely intelligible entities, not susceptible to changing or being at rest. Since Plato continues in the Sophist to treat Forms as causes, it follows that Forms are changeless causes. I ask what conception of cause might allow for this view, and reject the suggestion that Plato was some kind of proto-dispositionalist about causation. Instead I suggest that he understood causation to incorporate a notion of structuring, such that Forms can be seen to structure their participants and so cause them to possess the attributes they possess."

27. Lentz, William. 1997. "The Problem of Motion in the Sophist." Apeiron no. 30:89-108.
"In the Sophist, Plato seems to introduce κίνησις, motion or change, into the unchanging and eternal realm of being. On the face of it, this looks like an outright contradiction; i.e., motion or change is introduced into a realm of unchanging and perfect actualities. The introduction of motion occurs in two ways: Plato suggests that when the soul knows its object it affects that object (248e2-4), and he claims that motion

and rest define reality (249d3-4). Neither of these claims is very clear; both require some interpretative work.
After a brief examination of previous attempts to explain Plato's introduction of motion into being, I suggest that a solution to these problems begins with Plato's claim that being is defined by power. The concept of power is then filled out by reference to the genera of motion, rest, sameness, and difference. I oppose the tendency in the literature to reject motion and rest as essential genera. Instead I argue that these two genera are required in order for there to be relations in being — relations that are manifest between forms but do not affect the nature of the forms themselves. I also reject the tendency to explain the interweaving of forms as a function of discourse. Instead I argue that the interweaving of forms is referred to a metaphysical state that in turn makes knowledge and discourse possible." (p. 89)

28. Lewis, Frank A. 1976. "Did Plato Discover the "Estin" of Identity?" California Studies in Classical Antiquity no. 8:113-143.
Summary: "(I) The notion of an is of identity in English. Some passages from Plato suggesting the existence of the comparable notion of a special estin of identity in Greek. (II) What in particular would lead Plato to recognize such a special sense of estin? Forms, participation, and predication. In the account of ordinary singular predications, a predicate 'Y' is true of a subject X just in case X participates in the form the Y associated with. (III) Self-participation. If nothing can participate in itself, then for any forms X and Y, X participates in Y and so is Y only if X is not Y. Even if self-participation is allowed, still in the majority of cases a subject is not what it participates in. The difficulty for all theories of predication which wish to explain how a thing can be something which it also is not. (IV) The is of identity re-examined. Some fallacies which might support the notion, and some arguments against it. (V) Sophist 255e11-256d10. Plato does not explicitly recognize an estin of identity. Four competing, "equally best" accounts of the grammatical theory he may implicitly

be invoking: (i) the estin of identity; (ii) relational terms; (iii) the definite article; (iv) the not of nonidentity. (VI) Conclusion. The notion of a special estin of identity has little basis in Plato's text."

29. ———. 1976. "Plato on "Not"." California Studies in Classical Antiquity no. 9:89-115.
"Plato's account of not being can be seen as a treatment of issues connected with the analysis of negation. It is generally agreed that his account covers at least one set of negative assertions. We are explicitly told how to analyze such sentences as "Motion is not rest," "Motion is not the same," which the context shows are intended to assert the nonidentity of motion and assorted other forms. For Plato, such assertions form a special class of sentences, which he analyzes by reference to the form "otherness." What is less clear is whether Plato successfully distinguishes negative sentences of this sort from negative sentences for which, on his terms, a different pattern of analysis is appropriate: "Socrates is not beautiful," "Helen is not wise." I shall call these sentences of negative predication proper ("NP" hereafter).(1) I argue that Plato does recognize this second sort of sentence, and that he does in the Sophist offer a theory to say how such sentences get their meaning. At the same time, his theory is in many respects unlike the kind of theory we should demand for the task at hand. These differences may help explain why the details of his account have so often seemed so elusive.
I offer first (I) a general account of the context within which Plato's treatment of negation takes place. I then turn (II) to a detailed examination of the passage at 25 7b3-c3, where I shall argue that we find our best evidence for what Plato regards as the chief desiderata in an account of NP. I end (III) with some brief comments on the aims and limits of Plato's inquiry." (pp. 89-90)
(1) By "NP," accordingly, I mean to confine my attention to simple, singular, negative sentences other than sentences that are denials of identity. I follow Plato in ignoring the use of negation in combination with general sentences.

30. Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio, and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, eds. 2011. Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Abstract: "The three dialogues, which are the object of the collected papers included in this volume, are a unicum in the Platonic corpus. No other existing trilogy is connected dramatically so clearly as they are.
From the formal point of view, in these texts Plato shows his brilliant literary ability in all its facets in order to deploy all the grades of the philosophical inquiry, always related to education: maieutikos elenchus, dialectical dihairesis and everything entangled with allegory and myth. In the first dialogue of the trilogy Socrates searches in Theatetus' soul for the definition of episteme, not knowledge in general, but the specific wisdom proper of the true philosophers. In the following Sophist and Statesman, on the other hand, a new character, the guest from Elea, offers the science they had looked for as a gift, the diairesis. The exercises in it serve also for distinguishing the true philosopher-statesman from his fake: the sophist and all the historical politicians acting in the scene. Actually these dialogues develop the subject of the excurse, which stands at the centre of the Theaetetus (172c3-177c5): the opposition between true and false philosopher."
Essays on the Sophist:
Milena Bontempi: Opinione e legge: l'anima e la città nella trilogia, Teeteto, Sofista, Politico, pp. 47-58; Elisabetta Cattanei: Arithmos nel Teeteto, nel Sofista et nel Politico di Platone, pp. 59-71; Francesco Fronterotta: Dialettica et diaíresis nel Sofista platonico, pp.151-167; Beatriz Bossi: ¿Por qué Platón no refuta Parménides en el Sofista?, pp. 180-192; Noburu Notomi: Where is the Philosopher? A single project of the Sophist and the Statesman, pp. 216-236.
31. Lloyd, A. C. 1953. "Falsehood and Significance According to Plato." In Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 12, 68-70. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

32. Losev, Alexandre. 2020. "Plato's Quincunxes." Philosophia: E-Journal for Philosophy and Culture no. 26:200-209.
Abstract. The Five Greatest Kinds discussed in Plato‘s Sophist are taken to be just one instance of a fivefold structure found in various related texts. Contemporary linguistic theories are a source for ideas about its functioning."
33. Lott, Micah. 2012. "Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist’s Error in Plato’s Sophist." Phoenix no. 66:36-56.
"In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–231e, has received less attention." (p. 36, note omitted)
(...)
"I begin with a brief overview of the dialogue and a summary of the argument leading to the sixth definition. I then address some of the ambiguities in that argument and spell out some of the argument’s implications, paying particular attention to the notions of ignorance and shame. I then show how ideas from the sixth definition illuminate the final definition of the sophist. Although my focus in this paper is the Sophist, in my discussion of the sophist’s condition I also touch on some relevant cases of learning and shame from other Platonic dialogues, including the Apology, Charmides, and the Republic. Two key assumptions that affect my interpretation but which remain mostly unargued for are: 1) that the sixth definition describes some kind of expertise, even if it does not accurately describe the sophist, and 2) that the final definition of the sophist is, at least within the context of the dialogue, an adequate definition of the sophist." (p. 37)
34. Luce, J. V. 1969. "Plato on Truth and Falsity in Names." The Classical Quarterly no. 19:222-232.
"Further discussion of the logical points at issue between Lorenz-Mittelstrass [*] and Robinson [**] would involve a

critique of the modern reference-theory of names. I propose to confine myself to Platonic exegesis, and to ask which of their theories better fits the facts of Plato's thought about names, not only as it appears in the Cratylus, but as stated or implied in other dialogues. My general conclusion will be that Plato in practice regards names as functioning in the sort of way required by the Lorenz-Mittelstrass theory, though I would not be prepared to ascribe to Plato a theory of the proposition as sophisticated as that implied in their symbolism (p. 6). In section II of the paper I aim at showing in detail that the concept of 'stating a name', i.e. applying a name as a predicate to its nominate, is fully accepted and used by Plato throughout the Cratylus, that this implies that names may be vehicles of truth or falsity, and that there is no reason to suppose that Plato was unhappy or suspicious about the logical validity of the concept of truth/falsity in names. In section III I shall argue that Plato treated names as descriptive predicates in earlier dialogues, and continued to do so in late dialogues, notably in the Sophist and Politicus, and that this is not incompatible with the fact that a doctrine of propositional truth is developed in one section of the Sophist (261 d-263 d). In section IV I shall consider briefly how a doctrine of truth-names and lie-names fits into Plato's general conception of the relations between language, truth, and reality." (p. 223)

References

[*] KUno Lorenz, Jürgen Mittelstrass, "On Rational Philosophy of Language: the Programme in Plato's Cratylus Reconsidered", Mind LXXVI (1967), 6.

[**] Richard Robinson, "The Theory of Names in Plato's Cratylus", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XXXII, 1955, 1-16.

35. Mahoney, Timothy A. 2015. "Commentary on Planinc." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:218-225.

Commentary on Z. Planinc, Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato’s Critique of ‘Platonism’ in the Sophist and Statesman.

Abstract: "Zdravko Planinc’s Odyssean reading of the Sophist and Statesman presents a radical critique of claims

that these dialogues present developments of Plato's thought. His claim that Plato intends us to see the Stranger as no more than an outrageous sophist, however, is undermined by the quality of at least some of Stranger's arguments and insights."

36. Malabed, Rizalino Noble. 2016. "The Sophist of Many Faces: Difference (and Identity) in Theaetetus and the Sophist." Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy no. 17:141-154.
Abstract: "One can argue that the problem posed by difference/identity in contemporary philosophy has its roots in the persistent epistemological imperative to be certain about what we know. We find this demand in Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist. But beyond this demand, there is a sense in the earlier dialogue that difference is not a passive feature waiting to be identified. "Difference" points towards an active differentiating. In the Sophist, difference appears in the method of dividing and gathering deployed to hunt for the elusive "sophist." Difference is also one of the great kinds that weaves together other kinds. Practically, difference enables the sophist's expertise of appearance-making as he knowingly confuses things with words. This paper then quizzes the concept of difference in all these guises in the two dialogues."

37. Malcolm, John. 1967. "Plato's Analysis of το` ὄν and το` μή ὄν in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:130-146.
"The main thesis I shall present is that in the Sophist Plato does not distinguish the existential sense of εἶναι from the predicative and identifying senses. It is regarded as a commonplace that he did so, (1) but I shall try to show that it is advisable to translate το` ὄν and εἶναι in a more general way, as "being" and "to be" respectively. This is sufficient not only to bring out the force of the paradoxes in 236e-250e, but also to explain Plato's use of the expression μἐτἑροιν τοὔ ὄντος in 251 a-259 e and his account of το` ὄν as a vowel form in the same section." (p. 130)
(...)

"In short, I am suggesting that neither in Sophist 251-259 nor in 236e-250e do we need to take το` ὄν to be existential. Insofar as it need not be so taken, and in certain places it must not be so taken, it ought to be translated as 'being' rather than as 'existence'." (p. 131)
(...)
"Although I have denied that Plato distinguishes an existential sense of εἶναι, I would agree that he does distinguish positive predication from positive identity. He makes the latter a sub-division of the former.
To say "XpY" is to predicate Y of X. 'X is identical with Y' is written 'XpSrY.' To identify is to predicate sameness.
Plato, however, does not distinguish negative predication from negative identity. At 256e το` μή ὄν is limited to non-identity (as opposed to predication which is here το` ὄν), but at 263b, a parallel phrasing, το` μή ὄν must include predication (e.g. the flying of Theaetetus).
Plato's account of negation holds only for negative identity. He gives no account of negative predication as such.(30) (p. 145)
(1) Pro Taylor pp. 60, 81; Cornford p. 296; Ackrill p. 1; Moravcsik pp. 42, 51.
Crombie, though he has reservations as to the success of Plato's undertaking, maintains (p. 502) that it was a prime purpose of his to distinguish the existential sense of εἶναι in the Sophist. Contra Runciman p. 84.
(30) See Taylor pp. 64-65, also Runciman pp. 98, 101, Crombie p. 500, n. 1. For a dissenting opinion, see Moravcsik pp. 68-75.
Bibliography
Ackrill, J. L., 'Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259,' Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 77 (1957), pp. 1-6.
Cornford, F. M., Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935).
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. 2, (London, 1963).
Moravcsik, J. M. E., 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist,' Acta Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. 14, (1962), pp. 23-78.

Peck, A. L., 'Plato and the ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ of the Sophist: a Reinterpretation,' Classical Quarterly, n.s. vol. 2, (1952), pp. 32-56.
Runciman, W. G., Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962).
Taylor, A. E., Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman (ed. Klibansky and Anscombe, London, 1961).
Addendum
I note with some satisfaction that my major thesis is consistent with the results attained by Michael Frede in his thorough study Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen, 1967.

38. ———. 1983. "Does Plato Revise his Ontology in Sophist 246c-249d?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:115-127.
"At Sophist 248 e—249 a, while examining the doctrine of the Friends of the Forms to the effect that real being or true reality (ἡ ὀντως ουσία) is always unchanging and is attained by thought alone (248 a), the Eleatic Stranger forcefully poses the rhetorical question whether we can easily be convinced that change, life, soul and intellect are not present to true reality: is that which completely is (το παντελώς δν), devoid of mind and changeless? Theaetetus readily agrees that we cannot exclude mind and change from the real. The Stranger concludes (249 b) that both change and that which is changed qualify as "beings" (οντά), and later (at 249d), that being (reality) is both the unchanging and the changed." (p. 115)
(...)
"Although I am persuaded that the Friends of the Forms include Plato himself, I shall not try to establish this or, indeed, to say definitively how the supposed emendation might apply in detail to Forms, souls and sense-objects. I shall suggest, rather, that the best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at the expense of his earlier views or otherwise. On the contrary, given that we have here a part of a section which aims at showing confusion in the use of the term "being," we

cannot plausibly regard it as a source of any new commitments on his part as to the nature of the real." (p. 116)

39. ———. 1985. "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 67:162-165.
"In this journal, Band 65, Heft 1, pp. 1-17, Robert Heinaman has launched an attack on those (1) who have claimed that Plato's solution to the alleged paradox of false statement (Sophist 236-264) restricts itself to an incomplete use of "being" (identity and predication) and is not concerned with questions of existence. It is my contention that Heinaman 's assault miscarries in that he has totally misjudged the position he purports to oppose."
(1) I consider pages 1-13 of Heinaman 's "Being in the Sophist". These are directed at G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being, in: G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato I, New York 1971, pp. 223-267 and J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of το` ὅν and το` μὴ ὅν in the Sophist", Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. An appendix, pp. 13-17, treats of M. Frede's Prädikation und Existenzaussage, Gottingen 1967 and is beyond the scope of this paper.

40. ———. 1985. "On 'What is Not in any Way' in the Sophist." The Classical Quarterly no. 35:520-523.
"To ensnare the sophist of the Sophist in a definition disclosing him as a purveyor of images and falsehoods Plato must block the sophistical defence that image and falsehood are self-contradictory in concept, for they both embody the proposition proscribed by Parmenides - 'What is not, is'. It has been assumed that Plato regards this defence as depending on a reading of' what is not' (to me on) in its very strongest sense, where it is equivalent to 'what is not in any way' (to medamos on) or 'nothing'.
Likewise, the initial paradoxes of not-being (237b-239c) are seen as requiring that to me on be understood in this way, that later designated by Plato (257b, 258e-259a) as the opposite of to on or 'being'. On this interpretation, Plato's counter-strategy is to recognise a use of to me on which is

not opposed in this strict sense to being, but is indeed a part of it and is 'being other than'.
In a stimulating article,(1) R. W. Jordan challenges this account.(2) I shall briefly attempt to show that his objections are not decisive and that his own interpretation is open to question." (p. 520)
(1) R. W. Jordan, 'Plato's Task in the Sophist',Classical Quarterly 34 (1984), 113-29.
(2) Referred to by Jordan as' Malcolm's view'. Though flattered by the appellation, I can claim to be but an adherent and not the initiator (see Jordan, p. 120, notes 14 and 15.

41. ———. 2006. "A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:275-289.
"At Sophist 255c8 the Eleatic Stranger asks whether Difference is to be distinguished from Being. As evidence that these are two distinct items he introduces at c12-13 two ways in which beings can be: (1) in themselves or αυτά καθ' αυτά (hereafter, KH) and (2) with reference to others or προς αλλα (hereafter, PA).(1)
At 255d1-7 it is then shown that Difference, unlike Being, only shares in the second way of being, since what is different is always different in relation to something else.
Now this may be read in a straightforward and unproblematic manner since there are many ways in which something can be said to be without this something being said, in the surface grammar, to be in relation to something else.
Compare, for example, ‘Socrates exists’ or ‘Socrates is a man’ with ‘Socrates is wiser than Miletus’.
Yet some of the most distinguished and deservedly influential commentators differ radically from such a ‘naïve’ reading and see the KH/PA contrast here as germane to such issues as replying to the late-learners, dealing with self-predication, contrasting statements of identity with those of predication, involving different uses of ‘is’, and discussing the so-called ‘two-level’ paradoxes.(2) There is no doubt that these approaches have been philosophically most instructive and inspiring, but, I shall maintain, they should

not intrude into the exegesis of this particular passage. The naïve reading is to be preferred."
(1) Line references to Plato are from Burnet 1900. The title's passage is at lines 13-14 (mislabeled 15!) in Duke et al. 1995. The Budé edition, Diès 1925, agrees with Burnet.
(2) For this last item see Vlastos 1973, 323ff. The most discussed example is that where Motion, qua its nature as motion, moves, but, qua Form is at rest.
References
Burnet, John. 1900. Platonis Opera. vol. 1. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Diès, Auguste. 1925. Platon: le Sophiste. Édition 'Les Belles Lettres'. Paris: Budé.
Duke, E.A. et al. 1995. Platonis Opera. vol. 1. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1973. Platonic Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

42. ———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is' / 'Teaches' Analogy." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:281-296.
"Ancient Greek thinkers, notably Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, are regarded by some as having been led into error through a failure to recognize the difference between two uses of (their equivalent of) the verb 'to be': the incomplete or copula, and the complete or existential.(1) They allegedly acted as if 'X is F' entailed 'X is', i.e. 'exists'.
Not everyone is convinced by this. I shall consider two responses.
The one I favour is to grant that a rigid existence/copula distinction is a legitimate tool for the interpretation of these philosophers.
Furthermore, I suggest that their reasoning may be understood in a way that does not leave them as vulnerable to the charge of this confusion as is sometimes supposed.
The other reaction takes a more subtle approach. It maintains that, with respect to 'being', the complete/incomplete distinction is a modern contrivance, (2) hence it is anachronistic to employ it in addressing the ancients. In the use of the Greek equivalent of 'to be' the

copula had some ‘built-in’ existential import. Since writers in that language did not have two completely different uses to confuse, it is unfair to look at them from this perspective. Two leading proponents of this latter doctrine are Charles Kahn and Lesley Brown. Although it was introduced some time ago, this view continues to enjoy current endorsement(3) and I believe it is not inappropriate to examine the reasoning offered in its support in the work of Brown, especially that of 1994.(4)" (pp. 281-282, note 1 abbreviated)

(1) The charge is found in J. S.Mill, A System of Logic (London, 1843), 1. iv. i, who mentions Plato and Aristotle and implies that they were open to this error. He refers us to the Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols. (1829; new edn. London, 1869), by his father James Mill.

(2) See e.g. C. Kahn, ‘A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being’ [‘Return’], Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2004), 381–405 at 385, who allows that we should use ‘such modern distinctions’ in our ‘hermeneutical metalanguage’, but that are (i.e. exist).’ My aim will be to help him avoid this precarious position as far as is possible.

(3) Let me give two items from 2003: B.Hestir, ‘A “Conception” of Truth in Plato’s Sophist’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41 (2003), 1–24 at 6 n. 16 ; J. Szaif, Der Sinn von ‘sein’ (Freiburg and Munich, 2003), 19 n. 13. To these may be added two from 2002: J. van Eck, ‘Not-Being and Difference: On Plato’s Sophist 256 d 5–258 e 3’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 23 (2002), 63–84 at 70–1; A. Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence (Princeton, 2002), 145 n. 17, 150 n. 21.

(4) The article in question is L. Brown, ‘The Verb “to be” in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks’ [‘Verb’], in S. Everson (ed.), Language (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–36. (Any ‘bare’ page references in my article will be to this item.) Kahn, ‘Return’, 383, accepts Brown’s contribution unreservedly. He writes, ‘She shows [emphasis added] that the relation between the verb einai in sentences of the form X is and X is Y is like that between the

verb teaches in Jane teaches and Jane teaches French'. See also his 385.

43. Marback, Richard C. 1994. "Rethinking Plato's Legacy: Neoplatonic Readings of Plato's Sophist." Rhetoric Review no. 13:30-49.
"In what follows I will historicize the reception of the terms Platonist and sophist by briefly exploring neo-Platonic discussions of sophistry and sophistic. As late Roman and early Christian exegetes of the Platonic texts, the neo-Platonists might at first seem unflinching adversaries of sophistry. While it might be unrealistic for us to expect any sympathetic treatment of Gorgias from scholars so invested in the authority of classical authors like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, we should not be surprised to find these same scholars promoting sophistry-the contingency of meaning in the context of expression -- in the name of Plato." (p. 31)
(...)
"To recognize that Plotinus and Proclus and Augustine discerned and grappled with issues of sophistry raised by Plato in the Sophist is, I think, to recognize their creative influence over the subsequent reception and impact of classical rhetoric.
(...)
Along these lines I have attempted to show how the Sophist, as one instance, was used and can be used to fashion sophistic or antisophistic perspectives, how readings of it by rhetoricians, logicians, and ethicists, or by Augustine, Plotinus, and Proclus, reiterate or reject an antagonism to sophistry. Reading Plato in this way, I think we benefit from finding that along with the sophist whose language skills eluded easy capture in the Stranger's philosophical net, the neo-Platonist similarly eludes well-defined historical categories. Adding the Sophist to our Plato makes more elusive, more sophistical, the contingent and contextual elements by which we fashion our rhetorical terms as historical, genealogical categories. This approach also raises questions about the kinds of textual strategies that led to the dialogue's exclusion from Plato's rhetorical canon. Discussions of why the primary rhetoric texts in the Platonic

corpus have come to be the Phaedrus and Gorgias can and should inform discussions of what sophistry has meant throughout the years people have been forming this canon. Such selectivity presupposes reading and writing and talking about the dialogues in particular ways, employing strategies and making choices influenced by an inheritance of possible issues and conflicts as well as settled ways of reading and representing that reading that may or may not be identified as "sophistic." Attention to the neo-Platonists and their readings of Plato's Sophist thus points not only, as Quandahl says, to the rhetorical elements of Plato (347), such attention points as well to the contextual and contingent rhetorical strategies constantly at work in the shaping of philosophy's, rhetoric's, and sophistry's intertwined histories." (p. 47)

References

Quandahl, Ellen. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's Sophist", Rhetoric Review 7 (1989): 338-51.

44. Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela Elena. 2016. "Plato's Argumentative Strategies in Theaetetus and Sophist." In Plato's Styles and Characters. Between Literature and Philosophy, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 77-87. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"In Theaetetus and Sophist, Plato accomplishes a construction operation of his adversaries which leads him to associate doctrines regularly attributed to Heracliteans or Eleatic thinkers with different sophistical positions. However, his primary purpose is not to refute historical positions, but to assert fundamental theses and principles of his own philosophy. So I am not interested here in evaluating the legitimacy of such associations, or "dialectical combinations", as Cornford (1935, p. 36) calls them. I will focus instead on the peculiar kind of argument he employs for the refutation of both kinds of opponents. This is a sort of peculiar argumentation, as I will try to show, which does not appeal to the existence of the Forms but to the conditions of the possibility of language." (p. 77)

(...)

"To conclude, I would like to emphasize once more that the resource to the conditions of possibility of language rather than to the thesis of the existence of the Forms is not a defect of the argumentative strategy displayed in the passages of Theaetetus and Sophist analyzed here. On the contrary, such resource gives rise to a special type of argument that tries to persuade every language user and not only those who defend the Forms. Despite this, Plato's reader will inevitably find veiled references to these realities in almost all of them." (p. 86)

45. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 28:113-135.
Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second.
I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it. Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics."
(...)
"I have argued in this essay for the recognition of a sort of entity that is not familiar in modem ontologies. I have argued on the basis of a syntactic and semantic analysis of certain uses of 'is', and found textual support for the analysis in certain texts of Aristotle. In addition, the recognition of predicative complexes enables us to give a unified treatment of a number of puzzling features of Greek ontology.
It is possible that the Greeks may have regarded predicative complexes not in the way I have presented them, namely as

constructed entitles derivative from more basic types, but as the entities given in perception, and so epistemically and even ontologically prior. If so, we may find that in positing the Forms, Plato was making a break with an ontology of predicative complexes, not, as is usually thought, with an ontology of individual substances. Similarly, it is possible that Aristotle posited individual substances against the background of an ontology composed of predicative complexes and Platonic Forms. These possibilities offer the prospect of a richer appreciation of the development of Greek ontology than is now customary." (pp. 130-131)

46. Mazur, Zeke. 2013. "The Platonizing Sethian Gnostic Interpretation of Plato's Sophist." In Practicing Gnosis: Ritual, Magic, Theurgy and Liturgy in Nag Hammadi, Manichaean and Other Ancient Literature. Essays in Honor of Birger A. Pearson, edited by DeConick, April D. , Shaw, Gregory and Turner, John D. , 469-493. Leiden: Brill.
"This essay constitutes the second part of a larger investigation into the evidence of a tacit debate between Plotinus and the Gnostics over the interpretation of Plato. In a previous part of this study, I made the case that Zostrianos drew on a number of specific passages describing the cyclical reincarnation of souls especially in the Phaedrus, but also in the Phaedo and Republic, and that Plotinus and Porphyry had tacitly responded in several locations throughout their writings.(4) Here I would like to present a similar case for the Gnostic use of the Sophist. The specific thesis of this essay is that the Platonizing Sethians drew at least in part upon the text of Plato's Sophist for central aspects of their metaphysics, and—in relation to the topic of the present volume—they even went so far as to reconceptualize the dialectical methods described in the Sophist in terms of their praxis of visionary ascent." (pp. 469-470)
(4) Mazur, Zeke. 2016. Traces of the Competition Between the Platonizing Sethian Gnostics and Plotinus' Circle: the Case of Zostrianos 44–46. In Estratégias anti-gnósticas nos escritos de Plotino. Actas do colóquio internacional realizado em São Paulo em 18–19 de março 2012, M.P.

Marsola and L. Ferroni, eds. São Paulo: Rosari et Paulus, pp. 125-211.
47. McCoy, Marina. 2008. Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; 1 Introduction 1; 02 Elements of Gorgianic Rhetoric and the Forensic Genre in Plato's Apology 23; 3 The Rhetoric of Socratic Questioning in the Protagoras 56; 4 The Competition between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Gorgias 85; 5 The Dialectical Development of the Philosopher and Sophist in the Republic 111; 6 Philosophers, Sophists, and Strangers in the Sophist 138; 7 Love and Rhetoric in Plato's Phaedrus 167; Bibliography 197; Index 209-212.
"In this chapter, I argue that part of Plato's purpose in the Sophist and Theaetetus is to offer two different accounts of the nature of philosophy.
Plato engages his audience in a reflection upon the nature of philosophy through the contrast between Socrates' and the Stranger's ways of speaking. I focus on two main questions about the Sophist. First, how is the Stranger's character and way of speaking distinct from Socrates' character and speech in the Theaetetus? Second, how do the divisions and collections of the Sophist illuminate some of the differences between Socrates and the Stranger? I argue that the Eleatic Stranger is deliberately presented as an enigmatic figure who may alternately be identified as either a sophist or a philosopher. While the Stranger defines sophistry in such a way that he would separate his own activity from that of the sophists, the drama of the dialogue suggests that Socrates would not consider the Stranger to be a philosopher. That is, the dialogues function to draw us into the philosophical question of what philosophy is. The Sophist and Theaetetus as a pair demonstrate that the philosopher–sophist contrast is relative to the way in which one constructs a positive understanding of philosophy.
I argue that the Stranger's understanding of himself as a philosopher is inadequate from Socrates' standpoint, although the Stranger seems to identify himself as a philosopher. While the Stranger identifies philosophy with a

method of division and collection, and especially with applying that method to metaphysical questions, Socrates emphasizes self-knowledge and knowledge of the human soul and its moral good as central to philosophical practice.4 Both Socrates and the Stranger are interested in persuasion, but Socrates' rhetoric is to be found in the role of a midwife who is helping others to give birth to ideas and to grow in self-knowledge, while the Stranger's rhetoric is oriented toward making his interlocutor more compliant and dispassionate." (pp. 139-140, notes omitted)

48. McDowell, John. 1982. "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 115-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the Sophist (§§5 and 6 below) -it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can and should be made even sharper." (p. 115)
49. McPherran, Mark L. 1986. "Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument of the Parmenides: Sophist 248a-249d." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 68:233-252.

"In a previous paper I have argued that the theory of relations Hector-Neri Castañeda has discovered in the Phaedo is clarified and extended in the Parmenides. In particular, the paper contains an Interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument (Parm. 133a —135a), an argument purporting to establish that human knowledge of the Forms is impossible. My Interpretation showed the argument to utilize the extended theory of relations in its premises. I also showed, contrary to previous interpretations, how Plato's argument was logically valid.

One consideration in favor of the Interpretation I offered is that it allows the argument at last to live up to its description as the most formidable challenge to the early theory of Forms (in a long series of tough arguments), requiring a "long and remote train of argument" by "a man of wide experience and natural ability" for its unsoundness to be exposed (Parm. 133b4 —c1).

Unfortunately, the Parmenides does not contain such a reply, even though the text at 133b seems to hint that Plato had already formulated one. Did he ever entertain and record a reply, and if so, could that reply rescue some version of the theory of Forms from the devastating consequences of the 'worst difficulty'? In the following, I present my previous reconstruction of that argument and the most plausible lines of response open to a defender of a theory of Forms. In the second section I argue that Plato gives clear recognition to one of those replies in the Sophist, and I show how that reply would save the theory of Forms. Finally, I will contend that this reply is Plato's best line of response, and I will discuss the problem of actually attributing the adoption of this solution to him." (pp. 233-234, some notes omitted)

(1) Mark McPherran, "Plato's Parmenides Theory of Relations," in F. J. Pelletier and J. King-Farlow (eds.), New Essays on Plato, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume IX (1983): 149 — 164 (hereafter, "Plato's Parmenides Theory").

(2) My Interpretation dealt explicitly only with the first half of the argument (133a11 — 134c3). The second half (134c4—

135a3) attempts to establish that just as men cannot know Forms, so the gods cannot be knowers of particulars (e. g., men), but only Forms.
References to Hector-Neri Castañeda:
"Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations," Journal of Philosophical Logic I (1972): 467—480.
"Plato's Relations, Not Essences or Accidents, at Phaedo 102b — d2," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1978): 39 — 53.
"Leibniz and Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations and Predication," M. Hooker (ed.). Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Minneapolis, 1982): 124—159.

50. Mesquita, Antonio Pedro. 2013. "Plato's Eleaticism in the Sophist. The Doctrine of Non-Being." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 175-186. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The aporia experienced by the interlocutors in the Sophist on the notion of non-being is, essentially, the following:
1. That which absolutely is not cannot be thought of or spoken of (238c).
2. However, every assertion concerning that which is not, even if negative in content, requires the mediation of an "is" in order to be expressed.
3. In effect, when we say that non-being is not thinkable or utterable, we are, in actual fact, uttering it and, necessarily, uttering it as being, namely, as being unutterable (239a).
4. Therefore, due not to linguistic ambiguity but to ontological requirement, to say that non-being is not utterable is the same as asserting that it is unutterable and, in general, to say that non-being is not is to say that non-being is non-being, which certainly collides with what those assertions were intended to demonstrate in the first place, that is, the absolute unutterability and the absolute non-being of non-being.
5. In fact, each of those assertions tacitly affirms the opposite of what it declares, namely, that non-being is utterable (precisely as being unutterable) and, therefore, that non-being is (precisely as being nonbeing).

The most immediate interpretation of this section would be as follows: the Eleatic notion of non-being, here patently challenged, must be superseded; and the Platonic notion of "other" (ἑτέρων), introduced through the novel doctrine of the κοινωνίᾱ των ειδων, is exactly what supersedes it.
Such an interpretation has, however, the disadvantage of being external to the argument, replacing analysis of its internal progress with the abstract assumption of the two extreme moments that structure it, namely, the two different notions of non-being. As an act of supersession, it excludes the Eleatic notion of non-being to the benefit of the Platonic one, without realizing that every act of supersession is never simply one of negation, but also one of incorporation.
Now, this is precisely what happens with the question of non-being in the Sophist.
The Eleatic notion is not dissolved; it is, rather, interpreted in the light of another conception of non-being which, in absorbing it, refashions it into a different shape.
The peremptory interdiction of Parmenides, according to which non-being is not,(1) is never actually refuted: it is taken as possessing its own truth, although such truth is understood as limited, and confined within new boundaries." (pp. 175-176)
(1) In summary form, for the exact statement never appears as such. See DK B 2.5 – 8, B 6. 2, B 7. 1, etc.

51. Michaelides, C. P. 1975. "The concept of not-being in Plato." Diotima.Review of Philosophical Research no. 3:19-26.
52. Mié, Fabian. 2011. "Plato's Sophist on Negation and Not-Being." In Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e), edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 363-372. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "This brief paper develops an interpretation of Plato's theory of negation understood as an answer to Parmenides' paradoxes concerning not-being. First, I consider some aspects that result from an analysis of Sophist 257b–259d, formulating some general theses which I then go on to unfold in more detail in the following section. Finally, I show what exactly Plato's so-called

overcoming of the Eleatic problem related to negation and falsehood is; and I outline some of the main semantic and metaphysical consequences that are entailed by this overcoming."

53. Migliori, Maurizio. 2007. Plato's Sophist: Value and Limitation on Ontology. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani, Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto. Original Italian edition: Il Sofista di Platone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia, Brescia: Morcelliana 2006.
Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato's Writings and Dialectical Dialogues p. 11; Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato's Writings and Dialectical Dialogues p. 11; Second Lecture – The Sophist's Manifold Nature p. 29; Third Lecture – The driving force of Plato's Philosophy p. 51; Fourth Lecture – Ontology and Meta-ideas p. 69; Fifth Lecture – The relative importance of the Sophist p. 93; Appendix I – The Whole-Part relation in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus p. 103; Appendix II – The Doing-Suffering Pair p. 121; Appendix III – The Dialectics of Being in the Parmenides (161 E - 162 B) p. 125; Exchanges with the Author 127-206.
"The Philosophical Contents of the Sophist.
First of all, one should establish as closely as possible the meaning of the dialogue in its Author's mind. With Plato this task is far from easy, for it is one of the issues that arouses the liveliest debate among critics. As elsewhere, I suggest following the classification put forward by Szlezák (1) in an attempt to single out three elements in the dialogue:
a) The overriding issue, the aggregating force that breathes life into the text and which Plato never lets his readers forget about;
b) The thematic hub of the writing, the philosophically crucial question which assesses the worth of the overriding issue and/or confers it legitimate meaning;
c) The foremost problem which the argumentative development must grapple with.

This model has always appeared to me as capable of yielding some kind of clarifying effect. It is especially helpful in showing how the various facets of the discourse are not set alongside one another but necessarily recall each other. The aim is to identify three elements, strongly-linked yet not mutually coinciding, among the wealth of opinions in Plato's text. Weaving them into one another will provide us with the thread that can guide us through the dialogue." (pp. 93-94)
(1) T. A. Szlezák, Come leggere Platone, Rusconi, Milano 1991, pp. 126-127. [in English: Thomas A. Szlezák, Reading Plato, Translated by Graham Zanker, New York: Routledge 2003].

54. ———. 2021. "The Use and Meaning of the Past in Plato." Plato Journal no. 21:43-58.
Abstract: "This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of writing proposed by Plato in Phaedrus and especially the conception of philosophical writing as a maieutic game.
The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy.
On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between Plato and "the facts".
1) If we compare the Apology of Socrates with other sources, we discover a series of important "games" that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes.
2) The famous passage of Phd. 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics.
3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of their contribution is overall negative.
4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the Sophist, there is a "sophist of noble stock", an educator who can only be Socrates.
5) Plato in the Sophist shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals,

before the Philebus and the Timaeus, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his philosophy
In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex reality."

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Bibliography

1. Miller, Dana. 2004. "Fast and Loose about Being: Criticism of Competing Ontologies in Plato's Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 24:339-363.
"In the Sophist, in the context of an argument designed to demonstrate that being (το` ὄν) is as puzzling as non-being, the Eleatic Visitor embarks on a discussion of competing views about being. It is generally thought that this discussion (242b6-250e4) establishes a number of significant claims that are made in the course of the Visitor's argument. The argument proceeds on two levels: (i) a general argument that focuses on what the Visitor regards to be a muddle about being and the consequences of this muddle, and (ii) specific argun1ents against specific views, where these arguments seek both (a) to refute these views and (b) to shed light on the muddle and consequences that are the concern of (i). Scholarship has been largely concerned with the claims made under (iia), as for example, the claim made in the argument against the Friends of the Forms that the objects of knowledge are somehow moved or changed by their being known. My intent, however, is chiefly to set out (i), the general argument, and then to examine the particular arguments from the perspective of (iib), that is, how these arguments relate to the general argument. Yet to get at (iib). it is necessary to examine the Visitor's arguments in some detail and this requires

approaching them from the perspective of (iia). Because the claims made in the discussion should be understood with reference to their context, I begin by situating the general argument within the larger argument of the Sophist and explain the dialectical purpose that the discussion is meant to serve. Then, in brief, l argue that the puzzle about being derives from muddled thinking about the notion of being and that this muddled thinking lies at the base of the various earlier views about being that the Visitor undertakes to refute. To show how this is the case, I examine the argument against these views." (p. 339)

2. Miller, Mitchell. 2016. "What the Dialectician Discerns: a new reading of Sophist 253d-e." Ancient Philosophy no. 36:321-352.
"At Sophist 253d-e the Eleatic Visitor offers a notoriously obscure schematic description of the kinds of eidetic field that the philosopher practicing dialectic 'adequately discerns' (ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, 253d7). My aim is to propose a fresh reading of that obscure passage. For all of their impressive thoughtfulness and ingenuity, the major lines of interpretation pursued so far have missed, I will argue, the full context of the passage. As a consequence, the proponents of these lines Statesman of interpretation have failed to avail themselves of resources that would have freed them from otherwise unavoidable moments of force or neglect in their readings. The key is to recognize the place of the Sophist within the trilogy of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and, accordingly, to expand the context of Sophist 253d-e to include the Theaetetus and the Statesman. In his schematic description at Sophist 253d-e, the Visitor refers to the eidetic fields traced by two distinct modes of logos. At the end of the Theaetetus, Socrates offers anticipatory sketches of each of these modes; but in the body of the Sophist the Visitor restricts his practice of dialectic to just one of the two —only in the second half of the Statesman does he take up the other mode. As a consequence, only a reader who is oriented by the close of the Theaetetus and who lets this orientation guide her in a reading of the Sophist and the Statesman together is well positioned to recognize the

referents of the Visitor's remarks at Sophist 253d-e." (p. 321)

3. Mohr, Richard D. 1982. "The Relation of Reason to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology: "Sophist" 248e-249c." Apeiron no. 16:21-26.
   Reprinted as Chapter X in R. D. Mohr, The Platonic Cosmology, Leiden: Brill, 1985, pp. 178-183.
   "Since Cherniss' Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I, there has been nearly universal agreement among critics that Plato's God or divine Demiurge is a soul. (1) Yet the prima facie evidence is that the Demiurge is not. In all three of Plato's major cosmological works the Timaeus, the Statesman myth, and the Philebus (28c-30e), the Demiurge is fairly extensively described and yet not once is he described as a soul. Rather souls, and especially the World-Soul, and what rationality souls have are viewed as products of the Demiurge (Timaeus 35a, 36d-e, Philebus 30c-d, Statesman 269c-d). Nonetheless, the overwhelming critical opinion is that since the demiurgic God of these works is described as rational, this entails that God is a soul. Three texts are adduced to prove this, Timaeus 30b3, Philebus 30c9-10, and Sophist 249a. These texts are taken as claiming A) that if a thing is rational, then it is a soul. Proclus saw that at least the Timaeus passage can mean only B) that when reason is in something else, what it is in must be an ensouled thing. The rhetoric of the Timaeus sentence strongly suggests that reading B is correct and the argumentative context of the Philebus sentence (properly understood) requires sense B. This leaves (as Cherniss is willing to admit, ACPA, p. 606) the Sophist passage alone as bearing the whole weight of Plato's alleged commitment to the view A) that everything that is rational is a soul. I wish to give a new, tentative interpretation to this passage which shows that it is, like the Timaeus and Philebus, committed only to the weaker claim B) that when reason is in something, it is so along with soul. This leaves the Demiurge who is not in anything free to be rational without being a soul and to serve rather as a maker of souls." (p. 21, notes omitted)

(1) H.F. Cherniss, ACPA l (Baltimore, 1944), appendix XI, which is in part an attack on Hackforth's "Plato's Theism" (1936) rpt. in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), pp. 439-447.

4. Mojsisch, Burkhard. 1998. "Logos and Episteme. The Constitutive Role of Language in Plato's Theory of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 3:19-28.
   Abstract: "This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term logos as it appears in Plato's dialogues Theaetetus and The Sophist. These are: the colloque of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination of knowledge (episteme) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -- conclude the essay."
5. Monserrat Molas, Josep, and Sandoval Villarroel, Pablo. 2013. "Plato's Enquiry Concerning the Sophist as a Way Towards "Defining" Philosophy." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 29-39. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   "The Sophist discloses the urgency of the question concerning being, and it is only in pondering this question that the essence of philosophising comes to light and is realised. In other words, the dialogue does not deal with the question of being simply because the problem of the sophist requires that it do so, but rather it deals and has to deal with the question concerning being in that its fundamental concern, its σκοπός, which consists in moving towards the essence of philosophy, not by way of a formal, abstract "definition", but rather through the consummation of philosophising.

For this reason the Stranger of Elea later on poses the question: και᾽ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες το᾽ν σοφιστη᾽ν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι το᾽ν φιλόσοφον [253c8 – 9], “and have we unwittingly found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?”. Who, then, is the philosopher? He is that human being who has devoted himself fully, through thinking, to enquiring again and again into the essence of being: ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀει᾽ δια᾽ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ [254a8 – 9]." (pp. 38-39, note omitted)

6. Moravcsik, Julius M. E. 1958. "Mr. Xenakis on Truth and Meaning." Mind no. 67:533-537.
"In a somewhat breathless article Mr. J. Xenakis has presented us with a new interpretation of Plato's theory of truth and meaning in Sophist, pp. 260-263.(1) In this brief note I shall show that the theory which Xenakis champions is objectionable, and toward the end I shall suggest that Plato need not be burdened with it. Xenakis claims that all statements must satisfy four rules. According to the third of these, all statements - if they are to be statements - must be about something.(2) Little can be found in the article that pertains to the status of the four rules. We are told, however, that two of them are formation rules, and two are truth-conditions. Since Xenakis insists that all statements must satisfy the truth-conditions, one can assume that he excludes the possibility of there being statements which are neither true nor false. I am not sure whether he would go on to say that any utterance which does not satisfy one of the truth-conditions is meaningless. It may be that he would restrict himself to maintaining that if any utterance does not meet one of the truth-conditions, then meaningful as it may be, it cannot be true or false - and hence it cannot be a statement. In order to be on the safe side, I shall examine rule [3] first as a criterion of meaningfulness, and then as a mere truth-condition." (p. 533)
(1) Mind (April 1957), pp. 165-172.
(2) Ibid. pp. 168-169.
7. ———. 1960. "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ and the Genesis of ΛΟΓΟΣ." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 42:117-

129.
"Διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another. (Translation added)] (Sophist 259e5—6)*. In these lines Plato states that rational discourse is made possible by the interwovenness of the Forms. The task of the Interpreter is to discover what the nature of this interwovenness is, and to ascertain the exact nature of the relationship between the interwovenness of the Forms and the structure of rational discourse. At present there is considerable disagreement concerning these issues. In this paper the main difficulties of 259e5—6 will be outlined, and some recent attempts to overcome these difficulties will be surveyed. It will be indicated where and why I dissent from the positions taken by several contemporary authors, and a new Interpretation will be presented which attempts to show that a plurality of Forms, woven into a pattern, underlies each meaningful sentence, and that the interwovenness can be explained by reference to formal concepts. The importance which — in my opinion — Plato attaches to formal concepts in the Sophist has implications for the Interpretation of the theory of Forms as found in the later dialogues." (p. 117)
(...)
"In conclusion let me sum up the most important implications of what Plato says in 259e5—6. Plato believes that the changing dynamic combination of words, yielding meaningful discourse, is based on the static interwovenness of the Forms. For discourse is changing, man-made; and the language of 262d2—6 shows that Plato regards it s such. But he also believes that one of the essential tasks of meaningful discourse is to convey Information. Fundamental to the conveying of Information is the ability to order the elements of reality according to concepts (23). What makes this ordering possible, according to Plato, is the general fact that the elements of reality are identifiable and describable." (p. 129)
(*) Burnet's numbering of lines is followed throughout the paper.

8. ———. 1962. "Being and Meaning in the Sophist." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 14:23-78.
From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the Sophist. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two are not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of the Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallels 260-262. A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between the discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together. This interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing in this period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working out the whole passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are interdependent. This justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.
Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight or blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as self-sufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The paradigm-case of how not to read Plato therefore is: "each element in the statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1) The notion of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of the Forms as functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments in order really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be like functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of thought beyond the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that what Plato says leads to construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are truths and falsehoods, and these are complexes which contain Forms. The constituents of these complexes are not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some sort. In order to understand them we have to know into what complexes they fit. We do not grasp them prior to all completions.
It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much progress with it. They

approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection, genus-species' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is said to be the method of division they identify all of Plato's methodology with this notion, and seek to explain the middle part of the Sophist within this framework. But these are the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen in proper light, the suggestions of the Sophist present themselves as topics the further exploration of which is one of the more important philosophical tasks today." (p. 77-78)
(1) F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary, p. 315.

9. Morgan, Michael L. 1993. ""Philosophy" in Plato's Sophist." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 9:83-111.
"In this paper I want to use a different approach to understand Plato's primary task in the Sophist. I want to ask a rather large set of questions about the dialogue. These questions arise out of the dialogue when it is viewed in terms of its relation to the Theaetetus and Politicus, to issues Plato discusses in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus, and to a consideration of Plato's place in fourth century Athenian culture. Once I have stated these questions and clarified them, I shall consider how the Sophist might be taken to answer them. All of this will be somewhat programmatic and provisional. The Sophist is a puzzling, demanding, complex text, and to make my case regarding the issues I have in mind would require much more evidence, interpretation, and argument than I can provide here. This is a beginning, with a promissory note for future development.
The questions that I want to ask about the Sophist are these: where, in the dialogue, do we find what Plato would think of as philosophy? Where - if anywhere - does he engage in it? Where does he refer to it or describe it, either directly or indirectly?
Who is a philosopher in the Sophist-Socrates, the visitor from Elea, Plato, all or none of these? And why does Plato

here seek to articulate what sophistry is and how it differs from philosophy?" (p. 84)
(...)
"Philosophy, then, differs from sophistry in purpose—as well as in method and object, for philosophy is essential to the best human life. It is a form of intellectual and religious transcendence that is divine because its objects are divine and hence because its cognitive goal is pure, permanent, and comprehensive.
As the philosopher's understanding of the map of the world of Forms increases, so does the clarity, purity, and stability of the soul.
To Isocrates Parmenides is a sophist; to Plato he is a philosopher and divine, epithets that transfer to his followers, one a visitor to Athens, another Plato himself. Eleatic in spirit, the visitor advocates views that are Platonic in letter, for Plato is himself an Athenian with Eleatic convictions, and like the visitor a parricide and disciple all at once." (p. 110)

10. Morgenstern, Amy S. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'To Be' Behind: An Alternative Reading of Plato's Sophist." Dionysius no. 19:27-50.
"Equating the terms esti, to on, and ta onta with the verb "to be", understood existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign, cannot serve as a basis of an illuminating approach to the Eleatic Stranger's investigation in Plato's Sophist. An alternative reading of esti at 256 A 1, Esti de ghe dia to methexein tou ontos, allows a more comprehensive analysis of the limitations and accomplishments of this investigation. Here esti should be interpreted as rhema, i.e. a name that, in this instance, says something about kinesis, the implied subject."
11. Mourelatos, Alexander. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': Some Literary Contexts that Bear on Plato." In Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday, edited by Bowersock, Glen, Burkert, Walter and Putnam, Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy, Volume Two, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 59-69.
"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (to me ón) to "nothing" (medén or oudén).' Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" ---- "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen [Plato on Not-being, 1971]. His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the Sophist, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: medén or oudén can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "what is not anything, what not-in-any-way is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable, no subject." In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may-in certain contexts-work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for me on, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be"." (p. 59 of the reprint)
(...)
"Observations made in this paper can be read as providing support, in yet a different way, for a thesis advanced by Charles H. Kahn (22) and others. In a formulation I prefer,

the thesis is that the dialectic of Being in classical Greek speculation focuses not on "What there is" but on "What it is" or "How it is"; not on existence but on physis, constitution, or form. (23)" (p. 67 of the reprint)
(22) See "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. 58 (1976): 323-34; cf. Kahn, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, Foundations of Language, suppl. ser., 16 (Dordrecht and Boston, 1973): 394-419.

12. Mouzala, Melina. 2019. "Logos as "weaving together or communion of indications about ousia" in Plato' s Sophist." Platonic Investigations no. 10:35-75.
Abstract: "In this paper, we set out to show that in the Sophist the interweaving of Forms (sumplokē tōn eidōn) is the substantial presupposition of the existence of logos, because what we do when we think and produce vocal speech is understanding by our dianoia the way in which the Forms are interwoven, and what we weave together in our speech are indications about ousia (peri tēn ousian delōmata). Dianoia conceives of the relations between the Forms, and these relations are reflected in our thought and its natural image, vocal speech. We support the idea that we cannot interpret the Platonic conception of the relationship between language and reality through the Aristotelian semiotic triangle, because according to it the relation between pragmata or onta and logos becomes real through the medium of thought (noēmata). On the contrary, logos in Plato has an unmediated relation with reality and is itself reckoned among beings.
In parallel, we set out to show the difference between the Platonic conception of logos and the Gorgianic approach to it, as well as the approaches of other Sophists and Antisthenes.
Logos itself in Plato is a weaving which reflects the interweaving of Forms, while vocal speech is a natural image of thought. Logos in its dual meaning, dianoia and vocal speech, is illustrated in Dialectic, because as vocal speech is a mirror to dianoia, so Dialectic is a means which clearly reflects the thinking procedures of dianoia."

13. Muckelbauer, John. 2001. "Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum through Plato's The Sophist." Philosophy and Rhetoric no. 34:225-244.
"A single question marks our departure, a question that, while apparently straightforward, has assumed so many shapes and disguises that it would not be unjust to claim it has infected all of Western history. In its current manifestation, however, we will take our cue from Plato in phrasing it thus: What is a Sophist? When Plato first formulated the question in these terms, he well understood that its self-evident simplicity could be deceptive and that its effects might proliferate uncontrollably. As Jacques Derrida comments, “The question of what the Sophists really were is an enormous question” (Olson 17). In Plato’s case, attempting to “hunt down” the Sophist led from a disturbing journey through the world of images to an unsettling encounter with the existence of nonbeing." (p. 225)
References
Olson, Gary. 1990. “Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation,” Journal of Advanced Composition, 10.1: 1–21.
14. Muniz, Fernando, and Rudebusch, George. 2018. "Dividing Plato’s Kinds." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 63:392-407.
Abstract: "A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger’s method of dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman. The dilemma assumes that the kinds are either extensions (like sets) or intensions (like Platonic Forms). Now kinds
divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a kind as like an animal body—the Stranger’s simile for division—possessing both an extension
(in its members) and an intension (in its form). We find textual support in the Stranger’s paradigmatic four steps for collecting a subkind."

15. Naas, Michael. 2003. "For the Name's Sake." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 7:199-221.
Abstract: "In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the Sophist, there is a general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (onoma) in philosophy. No longer understood rather vaguely as one of potentially dangerous and deceptive elements of everyday language or of poetic language, the world onoma is recast in the Sophist and related dialogues into one of the essential elements of a philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the way things are. Onoma, now understood as name, is thus coupled with rhema, or verb, to form the two essential elements of any logos, that is, any claim, statements, or proposition.
This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name from early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role Plato fashions for language in these later works."
16. Narcy, Michel. 2013. "Remarks on the First Five Definitions of the Sophist (Soph. 221c-235a)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 57-70. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The Sophist is explicitly dedicated to the question of getting to know what constitutes a sophist. It is, however, far from being the only dialogue where one finds a definition of one. This is natural enough, given that, from the Apology to the Theaetetus, a good part of Plato's work is devoted to pointing out the difference between Socrates and the sophists who were his contemporaries, considered less for who they were as individuals or for the particular positions they adopted than as representatives of a manner of thinking which Plato himself calls 'sophistry'.(2) So it is normal that, as part of the enterprise, Plato would have been led to clarify just what the manner of thinking is which he condemns through the character Socrates. The question one ought rather to answer, however, is: Why, after so many repeated condemnations of sophistry, does Plato feel the need to devote a dialogue to it? After the Theaetetus, and the antithesis there – which takes up the central part of the

dialogue – between the frequenter of the law courts and the philosopher,(3) is it still necessary to ask the question whether the sophist and the philosopher are or are not the same thing?" (p. 57)
(2) Cf. Gorg. 463b6, 465c2, 520b2; the Protagoras (316d3 – 4) talks of the σοφιστική τέχνη. (I naturally leave aside from the calculation the occurrences of the word in the Sophist).
(3) Theaetet. 172c3 –177b7.

17. Nehamas, Alexander. 1982. "Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought." The Review of Metaphysics no. 36:343-374.
Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, pp. 196-223.
"One of the central characteristics of Plato's later metaphysics is his view that Forms can participate in other Forms. At least part of what the Sophist demonstrates is that though not every Form participates in every other (252d2-11), every Form participates in some Forms (252d12-253a2), and that there are some Forms in which all Forms participate (253cl-2, 256a7-8). This paper considers some of the reasons for this development, and some of the issues raised by it." (p. 343)
(...)
"Having many properties is not being many subjects. Beauty is many things in virtue of participating in them, in virtue of bearing to them that relation which Plato had earlier introduced in order to account for the claim of some things which are not beautiful to be called "beautiful" nonetheless. But Plato came to see that the phrase "are not" is illegitimate in this context.
(...)
In arriving at this realization and in extending the ability to have many names, that is, to bear predicates, to Forms as well as to their participants, Plato finally left behind the tradition from which he had emerged. This tradition, he realized, was common to thinkers ranging from the sophists to the sage he most venerated and who was, astonishingly, discovered in the many-headed sophist's hiding place-a

place which, even more astonishingly, he had himself supplied. In the Sophist Plato liberated himself from that tradition and showed that to have a characteristic is not an imperfect way of being that characteristic. In this, I think, he offered us the first solid understanding of the metaphysics of predication in western philosophy." (p. 374)

18. Noriega-Olmos, Simon. 2012. "Plato's Sophist 259E4-6." Journal of Ancient Philosophy no. 6.
Abstract: "There are at least seven different well-known interpretations of Sophist 259E4-6. In this paper I show them to be either misleading, in conflict with the context, or at odds with Plato's project in the dialogue. I argue that 259E4-6 tells us that in view of the fact that statements consist in the weaving of different linguistic terms that stand for different extra-linguistic items, if there is to be statements, then reality must consist in a plurality of items some of which mix with some and some of which do not mix with some according to certain ontological rules. My argument for this construal of Sophist 259E4-6 involves an analysis of the passage as well as an assessment of how that text fits into its context."

19. ———. 2018-2019. "'Not-Being', 'Nothing', and Contradiction in Plato's "Sophist" 236D–239C." Archiv für Begriffgeschichte no. 60-61:7-46.
Abstract: "At 236D-239C, Sophist presents three arguments to the conclusions, that the expression 'not-being' does not say or express anything, that we cannot even conceive of the alleged entity of not- being and that we contradict ourselves when claiming that not-being is not and that the expression 'not-being' does not express anything at all. I intend to answer five questions concerning these arguments: (Question 1) What does Plato mean when he says that the expression 'not-being' does not say any- thing at all? (Q2) What sort of semantic relation does he think the expression 'not-being' involves? (Q3) How could he possibly explain that 'not-being' is, after all, an expression? (Q4) What does he think we are to learn about the contradictions ensued by our talk of not-being? (Q5) And what does he think is the ontological status of not- being? My motivation for

considering these questions is that the arguments against not-being in Sophist 236D-239C have not been charitably discussed and therefore have not been fully explored."

20. Notomi, Noburu. 1999. The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The aim of this work is to clarify the topic with which the Sophist is mainly concerned, and I do not discuss other hotly debated topics, such as the senses of the verb 'to be', and the dialogue's relation to the theory of Forms." (p. XIV)
"About the philosopher only a few passing reflections are offered in the Middle Part, as we saw in Chapter 7. It is a philosopher's attitude to value intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge (249cro-d5), and it was also philosophical to admit the proper combination of kinds, since it saved discourse, and therefore philosophy (26oar-7). The more important passage is in the midst of the Middle Part (253c6-254b6), where knowledge of dialectic is said to be rightly ascribed to the philosopher. In that digression, the Eleatic visitor wonders whether the inquirers, in searching for the sophist, may by chance have stumbled on the philosopher (Passage 38: 253c6-9; cf. e4-6). Yet clearly the description of dialectic in that digression (Passage 39) is not decisive, but rather, proleptic, and the mention of the philosopher is just an anticipation which needs further investigation. In this way, the question of what the philosopher is is not explicitly discussed in the Sophist. However, this does not imply that Plato intended another dialogue, the Philosopher, to give a fuller account and definition of the philosopher. On the contrary, the whole project of the Sophist has already shown the philosopher in three ways." (p. 297)
"The Sophist says little about the philosopher, but the dialogue as a whole shows something of what the philosopher really is. The inquirers try to be philosophers in defining the sophist, by performing dialectic. Apart from this way, there does not seem to be any other proper way of revealing the essence of the philosopher; for it is by our

confronting the sophist within ourselves that philosophy can be secured and established." (p. 299)

21. ———. 2007. "Plato on What Is Not." In Maieusis. Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 254-275. New York: Oxford University Press.
"What is not (το` μη` ὄν) was scarcely discussed in ancient philosophy before Plato.
Although this phrase, or concept, made occasional appearances in philosophical arguments, it did not figure as their primary subject." (p. 254)
(...)
"Modern philosophers often assume that Plato treats what is not merely as the privation of being and that he dismisses the idea of absolute nothingness from the inquiry altogether, although the latter always remains a real philosophical problem. Pointing to the way in which Plato in the Sophist describes what is not as 'different from what is', these philosophers fault him for reducing the problem of absolute nothingness to that of something lacking particular properties. Against this interpretation, which at first sight seems to give an adequate account of the argument of the dialogue, I suggest that Plato tackles a more profound problem.
What is not is no more trivial or easy to deal with than its counterpart, what is. It is perhaps a more perplexing concept, since it seems to prevent any discussion (λόγος). This feature takes us to the heart of the problem that Plato faces in the Sophist. There he works out a new strategy to overcome the difficulty: what is not can only be clarified together with what is. The purpose of my paper is to clarify the implication of this strategy." (pp. 255-256)

22. ———. 2008. "Plato Against Parmenides: Sophist 236d-242b." In Reading Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien, edited by Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 167-187. Leiden: Brill.
"Parmenides, one of the greatest and most influential Greek thinkers, is not mentioned in Plato's earlier dialogues. His

name appears only n four dialogues: Symposium, Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist. This peculiar fact by no means implies that Parmenides had little influence on Plato's earlier thinking. On the contrary, it is generally agreed that Republic V bases the theory of forms on the Parmenidean scheme of what is and what is not. Nevertheless, that passage contains no reference to its source. (p. 167)
(...)
"It is noteworthy that Parmenides is never mentioned again after the Sophist." (p. 168)
(...)
"In presenting his own view, O'Brien criticises my reading of the Sophist on philological and philosophical grounds.(8)" (p. 169)
(...)
"Our disagreement concerns how we view Plato's attitude toward Parmenides.
O'Brien suggests that Plato introduces a new distinction between two 'kinds' of what is not, which is unknown to Parmenides. Consequently, according to him, Plato's response is oblique. From one point of view, Plato can agree with Parmenides, while from another he is in disagreement; but from the standpoint of Parmenides himself, Plato's criticism is irrelevant or unanswerable. By contrast, my reading is straightforward: Plato tackles the same philosophical difficulty that Parmenides faces, and criticises him so forcefully in order to secure the possibility of logos and philosophy.
In this paper, I present my arguments against O'Brien's criticisms, first by focusing on the key text, secondly by reconsidering Plato's strategy, and finally in respect of philosophical interpretation.(9)" (p. 170)
(8) O'Brien (2000), 56, 68–75, 79, 84, 93–94, 96, takes up and criticises my 1999 (esp. pp. 173–179).
(9) I have also discussed Plato's argument on what is not, in Notomi (forthcoming).
References

Notomi, N. (1999), The Unity of Plato's Sophist: between the sophist and the philosopher, Cambridge.
Notomi, N. (forthcoming), 'Plato on what is not', D. Scott ed., Maieusis: Festschrift for Myles Burnyeat, Oxford.
[2007]
O'Brien D. (2000), 'Parmenides and Plato on what is not', M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt eds., The Winged Chariot, Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, Leiden: 19–104.

23. ———. 2011. "Where is the Philosopher? A single project of the Sophist and the Statesman." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 216-236. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
24. ———. 2011. "Dialectic as Ars combinatoria: Plato's Notion of Philosophy in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 146-195. Praha: Oikoymenh.
25. ———. 2011. "Image-Making in Republic X and the Sophist. Plato's Criticism of the Poet and the Sophist." In Plato and the Poets, edited by Destrée, Pierre and Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 299-326. Leiden: Brill.
"The famous phrase, 'the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry' (Rep. X, 607b), represents Plato's critical attitude towards poetry. However, this phrase might mislead us, the modern readers, in multiple ways.
I believe it as yet a matter in need of clarification what the real target of Plato's criticism is and how he deals with it. To re-examine his treatment of poetry reveals how Plato conceptualizes his own pursuit, namely philosophy, in contrast to its rivals." (p. 299)
(...)
"The Sophist is the later dialogue which finally defines the sophist as 'the imitator (mimêtês) of the wise' (Soph. 268c). While this dialogue does not deal with a poet or poetry in a direct way, it nevertheless examines the foundation of Plato's earlier criticism of poetry in Republic X: namely the

ontological basis of the art of image-making. Plato's implicit intention can be seen in remarkable correspondences between the two dialogues."
(...)
"Republic X presents the ontological argument to criticise the poet; poetry is treated as a special kind of making, i.e. image-making or imitation.
In a parallel way, the Sophist defines the sophist as a specific kind of making, i.e. image-making and apparition-making in particular. Finally we should consider some differences between the two treatments of image-making. First of all, while, as we saw in the previous section, the Sophist confronts the difficult challenge concerning the problematic notions of 'image' and 'making', the Republic does not seem to worry about such a metaphysical danger. Whereas the Sophist clarifies the concept of image in the course of defining the sophist, the Republic simply uses it." (p. 324, notes omitted)

26. ———. 2017. "Reconsidering the Relations between the Statesman, the Philosopher, and the Sophist." In Plato's Statesman: Dialectic, Myth, and Politics, edited by Sallis, John, 183-195. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"In the opening conversation of the Sophist, Socrates (just before the trial in 399 BC) raises a crucial problem about the philosopher: how to distinguish between three kinds of people, a philosopher, a sophist, and a statesman." (p. 184)
(...)
"From this initial problem, the Sophist first engages in definition of the sophist and finally clarifies what the sophist is. The Statesman next discusses and defines the statesman." (p. 184)
(...)
"In the Sophist, the philosopher surprisingly appears in the middle of the inquiry. When the art of discerning combinations and separations of kinds is discussed, the Eleatic Visitor abruptly suggests that they may have come across the philosopher before finding the sophist (253c), and he gives a description of the art of dialectic, which belongs to philosophy. However, when he says that they will

see the philosopher more clearly if they wish (254b), this is far from clear indication of a plan for another dialogue. Rather, it is more important that the inquirers may have encountered the philosopher already in search for the sophist; for they are like two sides of one coin, or, more precisely, the original and its image." (p. 185)
The Sophist does not present the definition of the philosopher, but it finally shows the philosopher through definition of the sophist in three ways (11):
(1) First, since each feature of the sophist illuminates its opposite characteristic, the definitions of the sophist show what the philosopher should be. In addition to the contrast between apparition making (φανταστική) and likeness making (εἰκαστική), which we shall see, the sophist is characterized as "ironical" in consciously concealing his ignorance (267e–268a), while the philosopher sincerely admits it.
(2) Second, the inquiry into the sophist discusses dialectic (διαλεκτική), the art of the philosopher, in the middle part of the dialogue. The inquirers actually practice and demonstrate dialectical arguments, and thereby show what philosophers should do.
(3) Third, the project of the whole dialogue, namely, to define the sophist and thereby to show the philosopher, is itself a pre-eminent task of the philosopher. In this way, the Sophist represents the philosopher in stark contrast to the sophist. As for the problematic sixth definition, the "sophist of noble lineage" eventually turns out to represent more Socrates than the sophist." (pp. 185, 186 a note omitted)
(11) Cf. Notomi, The Unity of Plato's Sophist, 296–301.

27. O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1-26. London: University College London Press.
English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991, pp. 317-364.

"Negation and contrariety. In the Sophist, a Stranger from Elea sets out to refute Parmenides. Or so at least he does in most modern studies of that deceptively simple dialogue. But because Parmenides has been misunderstood, so too, inevitably, has been the Eleatic Stranger's criticism of Parmenides. For although the Eleatic Stranger does warn of the dangers of parricide (he may have to murder Parmenides, the father of Greek philosophy), in fact he starts off by agreeing with Parmenides, and that agreement, contrary to what most modern scholars will tell you, is never withdrawn or cancelled in the course of the argument.
Let me explain. The Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two uses of the negation in the expression to me on, "what is not".
The negation may be used to mean "what is not in any way at all" (to medamos on, 237b7-8). "What is not in any way at all" is what would be, impossibly, the contrary of being (d. 258e6-7).
Impossibly: for there is no contrary of being, since there is nothing entirely without participation in being. What is entirely without participation in being is what you might expect it to be - just plain nothing. There isn't any." (p. 5)

28. ———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.
"Understanding of Plato's Sophist cannot therefore be dissociated from our understanding of the poem of Parmenides, and vice versa.
To understand the poem of Parmenides we need to appreciate that the goddess is working with a single conception of non-being, an appreciation which we can best arrive at by seizing the distinction between the two uses of non-being that are established in Plato's Sophist and yet, at the same time, refusing to read back that distinction into the poem of Parmenides.
Understanding the Sophist requires us, on the contrary, to appreciate that the Stranger arrives at his new definition of 'what is not' by consciously distancing himself from the way

in which Parmenides had thought of nonbeing, nearly one hundred years before.
The distinction between the two 'kinds' of non-being is, in both cases, the same. But where the Stranger consciously and deliberately marshals his arguments in the light of that distinction, Parmenides, on the contrary, produces the arguments he does because the Stranger's distinction forms no part of his conscious self. (298)" (p. 90)
(298) Some of the implications of this style of conclusion for how I understand the history of philosophy are spelt out in O'Brien (1993).
References
O'Brien, D. (1993) 'Non-being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: A Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy', in Modem Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers, The Stanley Victor Keeling Memorial Lectures at University College London, 1981-1991, ed. R. W. Sharples (London) 1-26.

29. ———. 2011. "The Stranger's "Farewell" (Sophist 258e6-259a1)." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 199-220. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"‘Don’t let anyone try and tell us that we dare say of the contrary of being that it is. We have long ago said farewell to any contrary of being, to the question of whether it is or of whether it isn’t…’ Those are the first words spoken by the Stranger after Theaetetus’ enthusiastic reaction (258 E 4-5: ‘absolutely so’, ‘most true’) to the Stranger’s declaration (258 D 5-E 3) that he and Theaetetus have ‘dared’ speak of ‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’.
A ‘contrary of being’. A ‘form that there turns out to be, of what is not’. The meaning of those two expressions, together with their difference of meaning, lies at the very heart of Plato’s dialogue, of what the Sophist is all about. If the meaning, with the difference in meaning, of those two expressions has not been understood, then the dialogue itself has not been understood." (p. 199)

30. ———. 2013. "A Form that 'Is' of What 'Is Not' . Existential Einai in Plato's Sophist " In The Platonic Art of Philosophy,

edited by Boys-Stones, George, El Murr, Dimitri and Gill, Christopher, 221-248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Motivated by an otherwise very understandable desire to study ancient philosophical texts philosophically, recent commentators have taken to weeding out from Plato's dialogues any existential use of the verb einai, seemingly in deference to the supposedly philosophical principle that existence cannot be a predicate. The result is disastrous. This is not only because Plato very clearly does use the verb as a predicate complete in itself, with a meaning that can properly be described as 'existential', notably in his account of being and non-being in the Sophist, but also because the principle itself is not what it is all too often thought to be." (p. 221)

(...)

"Veer to one side or another of that narrow line and you end up in one or other of the errors portrayed in the concluding pages of this essay. Identify the form of non-being with a straightforward negation of the existential meaning of the verb, and the Stranger will end up asserting, of 'what is not in any way at all', that it 'is' (Notomi's error). Identify the form of non-being with a negation of the copulative use of the verb joined to any and every complement, so that 'non-being' is so because it is 'other than' and therefore 'is not' any one of all the vast variety of different forms that participate in being, and you will end up asserting, of 'being itself ', that it is 'non-being' (Owen's error). Start from Plato's own assumption that an existential use of einai has to be subjected to the same analysis as 'is the same' or 'is beautiful', with one specific part of otherness, and only one, opposed to 'being', whether to the form or to the instantiation of the form, while at the same time taking into account the different extension of forms that are, and forms that are not, participated universally, and you will, if you pay close attention to both syntax and argument, avoid both errors. You may even come within shouting distance of the essentials of Plato's reply to Parmenides." (p. 248)

31. ———. 2013. "Does Plato refute Parmenides?" In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 117-155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I have a couple of times ventured to suggest that in the Sophist Plato does not refute Parmenides.(2) The reaction has been, to say the least, hostile.(3) Hostile, with more than a touch of disapproval. You might have thought I had suggested that the Queen of England was a man. The suggestion was not only false, but foolish. A mere eye-catcher. Absurd, and unseemly." (p. 117)
(...)
"Not only is it obvious why Plato should want to refute Parmenides; it also seems clear enough, to many readers of Plato's Sophist, that he no less obviously claims to do so. When the Stranger of Plato's dialogue introduces Parmenides (237a3 – b3), he quotes a pair of verses giving voice to what are called elsewhere in the poem the 'opinions of mortals' (fr. 1.30 and 8.51 –52), summarised in the pithy sentence 'things that are not, are' (237a8 = fr. 7.1: εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα)." (p. 119)
(...)
"Pinned down to their context, the places where the Stranger supposedly speaks of successfully 'refuting' Parmenides vanish like the morning dew on a summer's day. But if the Stranger doesn't claim to have 'refuted' Parmenides, does he then leave it to be understood that he therefore agrees with him?
Not at all. But at the crucial moment when he prepares to trumpet his discovery of 'the form that there turns out to be, of what is not', the language he uses is not the language of 'refutation'.
The Stranger: 'So do you think we've been unfaithful to Parmenides, in taking up a position too far removed from his prohibition?' (258c6 – 7: οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν) Theaetetus: 'What do you mean?' (258c8: τί δή;)
The Stranger: 'By pushing on ahead with the search, what we've shown him goes beyond the point where he told us to

stop looking' (cf. 258c9 –10: πλεῖον ἢ 'κεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.). Just so. The metaphor of distance, of uncharted and forbidden territories, hits off the situation very neatly. The Stranger and Theaetetus have entered a new world, far removed from the world of Parmenides, and have survived to tell the tale. But that does not mean that they claim to have 'refuted' him in any simple sense. How could they have done?

Refutation implies contradiction. No-one in his right mind would think to contradict Parmenides' denial that 'things that are not, are', in so far as those words are taken as meaning, or even as implying, that 'things that do not exist, do exist'." (pp. 151-152, note omitted)

(2) O'Brien (1995) 87 – 88, (2000) 94 –98.

(3) Dixsaut (2000) 269 n. 2. Notomi (2007) 167 – 187.

References

Dixsaut, M., Platon et la question de la pensée, Paris 2000 = Dixsaut (2000).

Notomi, N., 'Plato against Parmenides: Sophist 236D-242B', in S. Stern-Gillet and K.Corrigan (eds.), Reading Ancient Texts, vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien, Leiden-Boston 2007, 167 – 187 = Notomi (2007).

O'Brien, D., Le Non-être. Deux études sur le 'Sophiste' de Platon, Sankt Augustin 1995 = O'Brien (1995).

O'Brien, D., 'Parmenides and Plato on What is Not', in M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt (eds.), The Winged Chariot. Collected essays on Plato and Platonism in honour of L. M. de Rijk, Leiden, Boston, Köln 2000, 19 – 104 = O'Brien (2000).

32. ———. 2019. "To Be and Not To Be in Plato's Sophist." In Passionate Mind. Essays in Honor of John M. Rist, edited by David, Barry, 93-136. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

"Surely you can no more say of something that it both is and is not (as do Parmenides' mortals) than you can say of it that, at one and the same time, it is non-being and being (as does the Stranger of Plato's Sophist)?

3. Words and their meaning

The solution to the puzzle, if there is one, will have to depend on the precise meaning of the words in Greek. Dictionaries and grammars will take you only so far. The ultimate test has to be Plato's use of the common idiom of his time, modified, when necessary, by the context—by the meaning, however idiosyncratic, that he has given his words in the course of an argument.
Those are the two criteria adopted in the course of this article. To steer your way through the Greek text of the Sophist, you will need to recognise a distinction that Plato has taken over from the common parlance of the day, while at the same time adapting it to his own purposes.
The distinction lies between two uses of einai, its common-or-garden use as a copula, joining a subject to an attribute, the verb and its attribute making up the predicate (x 'is so-and-so'), and a less common, but still well authenticated, use as a predicate complete in itself (x 'is'), traditionally called, for convenience, an 'existential' use of the verb, simply because such a use may easily lend itself, in modern English, to translation by 'exist'." (p. 3 a note omitted)

33. O'Leary-Hawthorne, Diane. 1996. "Not-Being and Linguistic Deception." Apeiron no. 29:165-198.
"Though it is certainly clear that Plato spends a great deal of time in this dialogue [the Sophist] grappling with problems that we now place squarely in the domain of philosophy of language, we should think carefully about the context of these pursuits. As Owen,
Wiggins, Pelletier and countless others would have it, Plato is concerned with the nature of language, with the structure of sentences, with negation, with truth and with falsity simply because these problems are important and Plato was aware of their importance. Reluctant as I am to place any obstacles in the way of Plato's unstable popularity, I submit that we must think again about the relevance that these problems had for Plato." (p. 167)
(...)
"At the very least, even if we are skeptical about attributing a mistrust of language to Plato, there are certainly grounds here for caution. If indeed Plato has devoted himself in the

Sophist to repairing 'the naive semantics of natural language' or some similar project, it is
unlikely that he will have done so without some hint as to how these issues might fit into his broad scheme of philosophical knowledge. At best Plato is concerned with linguistic matters in the Sophist precisely because he wants to examine and explain what underlies the linguistic skepticism that runs through the dialogues. In what follows I shall argue that beneath the glistening surface of debate about reference and truth in the Sophist there does lie a beautifully simple, though highly rigorous, account of the disparity between language and the world it purports to represent. Embedded within the Stranger's most technical linguistic pursuits is something we should have been missing in the Platonic corpus, that is, an explanation of Plato's persistent suggestion that language is not a good place to turn for philosophical insight." (p. 168)

34. O'Rourke, Fran. 2003. "Plato's Approach to Being in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and Heidegger's Attribution of Aristotelian Influence." Diotima.Revue de recherche philosophique no. 31:47-58.
"Olympiodorus reports the last dream of Plato: «Shortly before he died, Plato dreamt that he had become a swan which flew from tree to tree, thereby causing the utmost trouble to the archers who wanted to shoot him down. Simmias the Socratic interpreted the dream as meaning that Plato would elude all the pains of his interpreters. For to archers may be likened those interpreters who try to hunt out the hidden meanings of the ancients, but Plato is elusive because his writings, like those of Homer, must be understood in many senses, both physically, and ethically, and theologically, and literally»(1)" (p. 47)
"It is significant to note that in the three dialogues we have examined, the Phaedrus, Theaetetus and Sophist, Plato brings the reciprocal, dynamic, distinction and relation «to act and act upon» to bear in his reflections, respectively, on φύσις, κίνησις, and εἶναι: these themes are inseparable; they refer to the intrinsic principles of every reality in its constitution, operation and foundation. The distinction and

relation are clearly for Plato of central and lasting importance. In further support of Plato's own discovery of δύναμις it is worth noting that for Plato in the Republic, the Good which is the principle of all things, the source of their Being and intelligibility, is not itself Being, but «lies beyond Being, surpassing it in dignity and power» (509 b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ και᾽ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.). This is to place power at the heart of being, suggesting that for Plato the dignity or value of being is its power to act or be acted upon! Επέκεινα is indeed an unresolved dilemma.
Despite the criticisms offered earlier, we must conclude that Plato contributed immeasurably to the early development of the philosophy of being. His self-reproach, that the discussion in the Sophist concerning nonbeing was lengthy and irrelevant, is not only harsh but untrue. To quote Solon, as he does himself: χ.χαλεπα᾽ τα᾽ καλά [beautiful/goods things are difficult]. The Sophist is a worthy contribution to this most difficult and rewarding of questions. It offers rich insights and distinctive signposts on a path of far reaching discovery. To refer again to Olympiodorus (32): whereas Aristotle wrote that all men seek wisdom, he suggests that all philosophers seek Plato as a source which overflows with wisdom and inspiration. Plato deserves our praise and, in words which he placed in the mouth of Socrates, in Athens it is easy to praise an Athenian." (pp. 57-58)
(1) Olympiodorus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, ed. L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1956, p. 6.
(32) Loc. cit., cf. supra and n. 1.

35. Oberhammer, Arnold. 2021. "Dialectic in Plato's Sophist and Derrida's 'Law of the Supplement of Copula' " In Platonism: Ficino to Foucault, edited by Rees, Valery, Corrias, Anna, Crasta, Francesca M., Follesa, Laura and Giglioni, Guido, 314-324. Leiden: Brill.
"Derrida [*] refers to Sophist 253d, where the Eleatic Stranger determines being to be the ability (δύναμις) to connect. He sees being (ὄν), in addition to motion and rest, as the third 'in the soul' (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).(12) The progress of the Eleatic Stranger, as opposed to the older aporetic

ontologies where either motion or rest were considered to be, is based on the concept of 'otherness', ἕτερον. Being is different (ἕτερον) to motion and rest with the result that, 'according to its own nature' (κατα᾽ τη᾽ν αὑτοῦ φύσιν), it is neither one nor the other.(13) Plato's definition of being as disposition (δύναμις) or commonality (κοινωνία) takes place with reference to 'the most general classes' (μεγίστα γένη), which are connected because they are different to each other. In line with the critique of some 'old men who came by learning late in life,' it is impossible for one to be many.
Here the relationship between λόγος and ὄν takes centre stage.(14)" (pp. 316-317)
(12) Plato, Sophist, 250b7–10: 'τρίτον ἄρα τι παρα᾽ ταῦτα το᾽ ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὡς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν και᾽ τη᾽ν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβω᾽ν και᾽ ἁπιδω᾽ν αὐτῶν προ᾽ς τη᾽ν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφότερα.'
(13) 13 Ibid., c3–7: 'οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις και᾽ στάσις ἐστι᾽ συναμφότερον το᾽ ὂν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον δή τι τούτων. [...] κατα᾽ τη᾽ν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα το᾽ ὂν οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.'
(14) Ibid., 251b6: 'τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι.'
[*] Derrida, Jacques. 'Le supplément de copule: La philosophie devant la linguistique,' in
J. Derrida, Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Les Éditiones de Minuit, 1972, 209–46.

36. Oscanyan, Frederick S. 1973. "On Six definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221c-231e." Philosophical Forum no. 4:241-259.
Abstract: "The paper shows that the definitions of the Sophist on 221c-231e refer to specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the Platonic corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically describe the sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes Thrasymachus and Socrates, it is shown

why Plato viewed the method of divisions as inadequate for obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic definition must have ostensive truth as well as essential validity."

37. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present." Monist:317-340.
Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.
"In sum, it is part of the originality of Plato to have grasped, or half-grasped, an important fact about certain kinds of statement, namely that they are tenseless whereas others are tensed. But he tries to bring this contrast under his familiar distinction between the changeless and the changing. So he saddles the familiar distinction with a piece of conceptual apparatus taken from Parmenides, a tense-form which retains enough of a present sense to be coupled with expressions for permanence and stability, yet which has severed its links with the future and the past. Armed with this device Plato is able to turn the distinction between tensed and tenseless statements into a more congenial distinction between timebound and timeless, changing and immutable, objects.
But at a price. The concept of stability has been stretched so that stability is no longer a function of time. And the interesting propositions, so far from staying tenseless, are restated in an artificial and degenerate tense-form. The theory for which we are asked to tolerate these anomalies will need to hold firm against scrutiny. But on scrutiny there seems to be something wrong at its roots.
What is wrong, I think, can be put very shortly. It is that to be tensed or tenseless is a property of statements and not of things, and that paradoxes come from confusing this distinction; just as they come from trying to manufacture necessary beings out of the logical necessity that attaches to certain statements. But how is the distinction to be recognized? One way, a good way, is to notice that tenseless

statements are not proprietary to one sort of subject and tensed statements to another. And there seems to be evidence in another work of Plato that he did notice this, and brought the point home by a valid argument.
I want to end by discussing that evidence. It occurs in the Sophist, in the criticism that the chief speaker brings against the so-called "friends of the Forms.(15)" (pp. 335-336)
(15) My account of this argument lies close to that given by J. M. E. Moravcsik [Being and Meaning in the Sophist] in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 14 (1962), 35-40, which should be consulted for its criticism of alternative views.

38. ———. 1971. "Plato on Not-Being." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 104-137. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 104-137 and in: Gail Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 416-454.
"Platonists who doubt that they are Spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge that they are investigators of the verb 'to be'. Their investigations make them familiar with certain commonplaces of the subject for which, among Plato's dialogues, the Sophist is held to contain the chief evidence. But the evidence is not there, and the attempt to find it has obstructed the interpretation of that hard and powerful dialogue. The commonplaces that I mean are these: In Greek, but only vestigially in English, the verb 'to be' has two syntactically distinct uses, a complete or substantive use in which it determines a one-place predicate ('X is', 'X is not Y') and an incomplete use in which it determines a two-place predicate ('X is Y' , 'X is not Y'). To this difference there answers a semantic distinction. The verb in its first use signifies 'to exist' (for which Greek in Plato's day had no separate word) or else, in Greek but only in translators' English, 'to be real' or 'to be the case' or 'to be true', these senses being all reducible to the notion of the existence of some object or state of affairs; while in its

second use it is demoted to a subject-predicate copula (under which we can here include the verbal auxiliary) or to an identity sign. Plato's major explorations of being and not-being are exercises in the complete or 'existential' use of the verb. And, lest his arguments should seem liable to confusion by this versatile word, in the Sophist he marks off the first use from the verb's other use or uses and draws a corresponding distinction within the negative constructions represented by to me on, 'not-being' or 'what is not'. For the problems which dominate the central argument of the Sophist are existence problems, so disentangling the different functions of the verb 'to be' is a proper step to identifying and resolving them." (pp. 104-105, notes omitted)

39. ———. 1973. "Plato on the Undepictable." In Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, edited by Lee, Edward N., Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 349-361. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 138-147.

40. Pacitti, Domenico. 1991. The Nature of the Negative. Towards an Understanding of Negation and Negativity. Pisa: Giardini editori.
Contents: Preface IX-X; On the nature of the Negative 1; Epilogue 77; Notes 79; Bibliographical references 103; Index nominum 115-118.
On Plato's Sophist see in particular pp. 63-75.
"The immensity of the 'tours de force' necessary in the Parmenides and Sophist for the admission of nonbeing on a par with being reflects the enormous hold that Parmenides must have exerted over the Greeks. His writing in verse, like the monotheist Xenophanes, reflects divine inspiration and the transcendent powers of thought. Thus it is not he but the goddess who speaks throughout.
The style of Parmenides fr. B8, 12-21 is strikingly reminiscent of the Vedic hymn and may easily be read as a solution to the anonymous poet's riddle. But his answer that

there is only 'is' and no 'is not' cannot, I think, be understood as meaning that Parmenides wished to reject negative predication out, as Anscombe (Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction, 1969) would have in the first place, Parmenides himself consistently uses negatives, which would be highly implausible if that was what he wished to outlaw, and secondly, his position on the illusory nature of 'opinion' and the nonexistence of what is not is quite compatible with the use of the negative.
For in Parmenides (fr. B2, B6, 1-2, & B8 34-36) thought and reality are probably even more closely bound together than in Plato, in that reality - or at least true reality - can be thought, and if 'opinion' is part of what is not, then the result of thinking that is what he calls a non-thought, which must be taken to mean something that is not a true or authentic thought. We find Aristotle (Posterior Analytics 89a) still pondering over this problem of how true knowledge and mere opinion could have the same object of reference.
Similarly, Parmenides' convincing rebuttal (fr. 3) of what is having been produced out of what is not, which would then mean what is being in some sense what is not, led Aristotle (De Anima 417a and Metaphysics 1051b) to his theory of potentiality in order to bridge the gap somehow between nonbeing and being.
And this is a radical challenge to the common concept of time: the unreality of past and future which are illusory, the present which is all there is, timeless and eternal.
For Parmenides, then, reason, namely the correct use of thought in contact with reality - not the world of appearance but the real world - will alone lead to truth." (pp. 73-74)

41. Painter, Corinne. 2014. "The Stranger as a Socratic Philosopher: The Socratic Nature of the Stranger's Investigation of the Sophist." The St. John's Review no. 56:65-73.
"Much of the secondary literature on Plato's Sophist considers the Stranger to be a non-Socratic philosopher, and regards his appearance in the dialogues as a sign that Plato had moved on from his fascination with Socrates to

develop a more “mature” way of philosophizing.(2) This essay will argue, on the contrary, that the investigation led by the Stranger in the Sophist demonstrates an essentially Socratic philosophical stance. In order to do this, I will consider carefully some dramatic evidence in the Sophist that allows us to notice a philosophical “transformation” in the Stranger.

My consideration focuses upon the Stranger’s rejection of the Parmenidean way of philosophizing followed by his acceptance of the Socratic way of practicing philosophy. This is revealed most decisively by the Stranger’s willingness to pursue truth and justice at the expense of overturning the practices of his philosophical training, and, secondarily, by his genuine concern with showing that Socrates is not guilty of sophistry."

(2) There are far too many accounts to list here; but see, for example, Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999). Just as Rosen argues in his text, most of the accounts in the literature that treat this issue view the Stranger as non-Socratic and advance the position that he represents at least a change, or perhaps even a progression, in Plato’s thinking away from, for instance, emphasis on the Socratic elenchus, to a more developed, mature philosophical practice that emphasizes dialectic."

42. Painter, Corinne Michelle. 2005. "In Defense of Socrates: The Stranger's Role in Plato's Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 9:317-333.

Abstract: "In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the Philosopher and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger's task in the Sophist, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially - of political and ethical significance."

43. Palmer, John. 1999. Plato's Reception of Parmenides. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"The Gorgianic perspective on Parmenides' philosophy also figures crucially in the First Deduction of the subsequent exercise in which Parmenides undertakes an examination of his own theory. Plato has Parmenides reject this reductive perspective, thereby providing us with a crucially important instance of how Plato is concerned with combating certain sophistic appropriations of Parmenides so as to recover him for the uses he himself wants to make. This dynamic of reappropriation becomes increasingly important as we continue to examine Plato's later period reception.
This theme in fact guides my discussion of the complex representation of Parmenides in the Sophist, where I argue that Plato's efforts to define the Sophist so as to discriminate between this figure and the Philosopher are accompanied by an attempt to recover Parmenides from sophistic appropriations that challenge certain of the key distinctions of Plato's middle period metaphysics. I therefore take
issue with the common view that Plato in the Sophist is determined to 'refute' Parmenides. The Sophist's denial of the viability of the distinctions between truth and falsehood and between reality and
appearance employ the logic of Parmenides in ways Plato himself finds unacceptable. Plato's own view of Parmenides in this dialogue emerges in the ontological doxography in which Parmenides is significantly associated with Xenophanes and in the subsequent interrogation of this doxography's first two groups. The interrogation of the Eleatics in particular has important connections with various deductions in the Parmenides's dialectical exercise. These connections make it possible to see where in each dialogue Plato is concerned with sophistic appropriations of Parmenides and where he is engaging with him in ways that reflect his own understanding. This understanding is reflected to some extent in portions of the Timaeus but most directly and importantly in the Parmenides's Second Deduction. I therefore conclude this study by describing

how Plato will have understood Parmenides' account of the attributes of Being in B8 and the relation of this account to the cosmology he presented alongside
it, and I explain how this understanding is reflected in the Second Deduction." (p. 16)

44. Palumbo, Lidia. 2013. "Mimesis in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 269-278. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Mimesis is the production of images (Soph. 265b1 – 3). These cover a very wide semantic field, including the meanings of “opinion” and “viewpoint”. A false image is a wrong opinion that says the things that are not: in believing, we imagine; in thinking, we represent what we think. The false belief is therefore a mental scene, an image that possesses neither a corresponding reality nor a model, although it is perceived as a real scene. The virtue of an image (the arete eikonos) lies in its being similar to what is true, whereas the similarity between false and true can produce a deception similar to that caused by a dream or by poetry.
The aim of this paper is to show that in the Sophist falsity is closely linked to mimesis. This is not because every mimesis is false, but because all falsity is mimetic. That not every mimesis is false is shown at 235c – 236c. The crucial distinction between eikastike and phantastike must be understood as the distinction between true and false mimesis. That every falsity is mimetic is a far more complex issue, which I shall be discussing in this paper. I shall claim that falsity does not consist in confusing something for something else, but, more specifically, in confusing an image for its model." (p. 269)

45. Panagiotou, Spiro. 1981. "The 'Parmenides' and the 'Communion of Kinds' in the 'Sophist'." Hermes no. 109:167-171.
"The section on the Communion of Kinds in the 'Sophist' is prefaced with an outline of the view that in calling the same thing by many names we make it 'many', and are thus guilty of contradiction: we make what is 'one' to be 'many' and vice versa (251 A - C). The language here leaves no doubt that

this aspect of the 'one and many' problem ought to be regarded as specious (cf. 251 B 5 - 6; C 4), although the Stranger does not explain why it should be so regarded. After making some derogatory remarks on those who are impressed by this aspect of the problem, the Stranger abruptly turns to the section on the Communion of Kinds. Though we are not told so, we may be certain that the two sections are related and that the Communion of Kinds has something to do with problems of the 'one and many' variety. We may, furthermore, fill in some of the missing details by considering what Plato has to say on the same topic in the 'Philebus'." (p. 168)

46. Pappas, Nickolas. 2013. "Introduction." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy:277-282.
Abstract: "Plato's Sophist is part of the most striking change that occurs within the chronology of his dialogues. Their dramatic presentation changes, the main speaker Socrates replaced by the Eleatic stranger. The dialogues still seek to define terms, but now use the method of division and collection and succeed where earlier attempts used to fail. They transform Platonic metaphysics to include the great kind heteron "other," which points the way to a new enterprise of understanding the reality of appearance rather than opposing appearance to reality. The seven papers collected in this part explore metaphysical, methodological, and pedagogical topics explored in or arising from the Sophist. Their subjects include the other, number (arithmos), power (dunamis), mixture, appearance, and myth."
47. ———. 2013. "The Story that Philosophers Will Be Telling of the Sophist." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:338-352.
Abstract: "Plato's stranger exemplifies the impulse to move beyond myth into logos, anticipating the later author Palaephatus. The stranger wishes earlier philosophers had not mythologized being to their students; he works to define the sophist so as to escape myths about that figure. Yet reading the Sophist alongside Palaephatus illuminates how

far myth continues to permeate this work. The sophist's moneymaking is mythologized into his wildness. The stranger's closing words about announcing the meaning of the sophist hark back to a dense mythic passage from the Iliad. If philosophy begins by bidding good-bye to myth, it has not left home yet."

48. Partenie, Catalin. 2004. "Imprint: Heidegger Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in the Sophist lectures (1924-25)." In Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 42-71. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"My essay will follow one episode of this Platonico-Heideggerian interplay. The episode has at its core four theses centered upon the Platonic dialectic that Heidegger advances in his lectures on Plato's Sophist. I shall argue that these theses, although they reveal a biased reading of Plato, manage to draw our attention to a genuine and important Platonic distinction, usually overlooked, between authentic and inauthentic human existence, and that this distinction also lies at the core of the fundamental ontology expounded in Being and Time. At the close of the essay I shall address, but only in a preliminary way, the question of why Heidegger did not acknowledge this Platonic imprint on his Being and Time.
The lectures on Plato's Sophist were delivered at the University of Marburg during the winter semester 1924–25. They contain a running commentary of the Sophist completed by extensive analyses of book Z of the Nicomachean Ethics, book A (chapters 1 and 2) of the Metaphysics, and the Phaedrus.
Of the many theses Heidegger advances in these lectures (whose published text counts 653 pages), I shall focus here on four, centered upon the Platonic dialectic." (pp. 42-43)

49. ———. 2016. "Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 61-74. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist are a long and complex affair. In their opening section, entitled "Preliminary Considerations", Heidegger claims that a double preparation is required for an interpretation of Plato's late dialogues: one philosophical-phenomenological, the other historiographical-hermeneutical." (p. 61)
(...)
"Usually, scholars go "from Socrates and the Presocratics to Plato"; Heidegger, however, will go from "Aristotle back to Plato" (11). Why? Because "what Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (11-12)." (p. 62)
(...)
"So, we know how to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in Plato: through Aristotle. But how are we to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in Aristotle? In other words, if Aristotle is going to be the guiding line for our interpretation of Plato, what will be our guiding line for the interpretation of Aristotle? Who said more radically, and developed more scientifically, what Aristotle placed at our disposal? Nobody, Heidegger claims. Aristotle "was not followed by anyone greater", so "we are forced to leap into his own philosophical work in order to gain an orientation" (12), or guiding line. In what follows I shall argue that Heidegger's actual guiding line throughout the lectures was not Aristotle, but his own thinking at the time, which he brought to its fullest development in the fundamental ontology of Being and Time." (p. 62)

50. Peck, Arthur Leslie. 1952. "Plato and the ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ of the Sophist. A Reinterpretation." The Classical Quarterly no. 2:32-56.
"It is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part of the Sophist (232 b-264 d) is one which arises from the use of certain Greek phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics (although the solution of it which Plato offers has an important bearing on the defence of his own metaphysical theory against one particular kind of attack).

We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as 'Being', 'Reality', 'Existence', etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which the Greek terms ὅν and μή ὅν and other such terms are used by the 'sophists' which gives rise to the problem." (32)
(...)
"It is not easy to suppose that Plato thought the business of the true philosopher, as described at Sophist 253 d-e, consisted in spending his time on such verbal futilities as saying that Rest is not Motion, Motion is the same as itself, Motion is other than Being, etc. (Indeed, even in the discussion in the Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus require no 'high art' to see that Rest and Motion cannot 'mix'.) The difficulties caused by sophistic verbal conjuring must, of course, be overcome by the philosopher; but once they are overcome, the philosopher can go forward with his own proper work. It is indeed surprising that the view has ever been entertained that the business of the true philosopher, as described in Sophist 253 d-e, is illustrated by the argument about the μέγιστα γένη. The philosopher's work, as epitomized in the phrases κατα` γένη διαιρεῖσθαι (253 d) and διακρίνειν κατα` γένος ἐπίστασθαι (253 e), is surely much more closely represented by the making of 'Divisions', of which semi-serious examples are given in the earlier part of the dialogue, than by the discussion about the μέγιστα γένη. It is, of course, true that any such work of Division would be blocked at the outset so long as the τό μη όν ουκ έστιν objection held the field; but once that objection is cleared away the course is open for the true dialectical philosopher to proceed with his work." (p. 56)

51. ———. 1962. "Plato's "Sophist": The συμπλοκη` τῶν εἰδῶν." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 7:46-66.
In Plato's Sophist, at 259 E 4 ff., we read the following sentence:
τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστι`ν ἀφάνισις το` διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπο` πάντων: δια` γα`ρ τη`ν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκη`ν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [The complete separation

of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another (translation added)].
A few pages later, at 263 A2 and 8, we find these examples of λόγος:
‘Θεαίτητος κάθηται, [Theaetetus sits] Θεαίτητος πέτεται [Theaetetus flies].
The difficulty which seems to present itself is that these examples of λόγος do not illustrate what is said in the second part of the sentence quoted." (p. 46)
(...)
"The amount of effort expended by Plato in combating the activities of 'sophists' and αντιλογικοι is itself an indication of the prevalence and (as he felt it) the danger to philosophy of the kind of talk which was in vogue. The danger of this attitude, as Plato saw it, was its superficiality, its undue preoccupation with words instead of realities."
(...)
"Plato's attack, then, is against those who confine their attention to terminology, who fail to consider whether their terminology is a correct representation of the facts, or who believe it is a reliable index to truth and reality - or think they can floor Plato by specious verbal manipulations.
It will, I believe, be found that μετέχειν and all the various verbs and nouns used to denote 'combining' and 'mixing' in the Sophist imply no more than that two terms can be used together in the same sentence without self-contradiction." (p. 66)

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Annotated bibliography on Plato's *Sophist*. Sixth Part: Pel - Sam

Bibliography

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"I want to consider a much-disputed reading of a certain critical area of Plato's Sophist. It is widely agreed by most commentators that in this text, between 255E and 259E there occurs a refutation of Parmenides' dictum that "one cannot say that which is not", and that this is followed by an application of the foregoing discussion to the problems of sentential falsity. (For a partial list of commentators, see bibliography.) It is also generally agreed that Plato uses the Form, The Different, for this purpose. What is not generally agreed upon is how Plato uses The Different." (p. 143)
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"We have witnessed," says Mourelatos (1979: p. 3), "in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus." This interpretation is so agreed upon that "one may even speak of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides." One of the presentations counted by Mourelatos as standard, indeed one of the paradigms, is that of Furth (1968). According to this interpretation, Parmenides' infamous ontological views follow as corollaries from his implicit views about language and meaning. I will briefly present this Parmenidean view about language, but I will not here try to justify the attribution (for these sorts of arguments see Furth, 1968; Mourelatos, 1979; and Pelletier, forthcoming [1990]).
In this paper, I am interested in the Platonic response to Parmenides, especially the response that occurs in the middle portion of the Sophist (249-265). Since I am going to evaluate this as a response to the "standard interpretation" of Parmenides, it is clear that I owe a justification for my belief that Plato understood his opponent to be our "standard Parmenides." This issue, too, I will avoid here (further discussion can be found in Pelletier [1990], which

discusses the "Parmenidean" arguments of Sophist 237-241, Theaetetus, 188-189, and Cratylus 429-430, with an eye toward showing that Plato was aware of these types of argument.)" (p. 35)
"It seems that one way to clarify the details of the interpretation of Parmenides is to investigate the symplokê eidôn of the Sophist. Unfortunately, Plato's position is also open to a variety of interpretations and cannot be convincingly elucidated in the absence of a precise account of what Parmenides' argument was. One, therefore, wishes to set up all the possible interpretations of Parmenides and all the interpretations of the symplokê eidôn and then to inspect these lists to discover which pairs of Parmenidean/Platonic interpretations mesh the best. This, it seems to me, would provide the best evidence possible that one had finally gotten both Plato and Parmenides right. I will not attempt that Herculean task. Rather, I will state one interpretation of Parmenides, Furth 's, and ask which of the many ways to understand Plato's position best accords with that interpretation of Parmenides. (p. 36)
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Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the symploke eidon 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94, Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name Index 159; Subject index 163-166.
4. Peramatzis, Michail. 2020. "Conceptions of Truth in Plato’s Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 102:333-378.

Abstract: "The paper seeks to specify how, according to Plato's Sophist, true statements achieve their being about objects and their saying that 'what is about such objects is'. Drawing on the 6th definition of the sophist, I argue for a normative-teleological conception of truth in which the best condition of our soul –in its making statements or having mental states– consists in its seeking to attain the telos of truth. Further, on the basis of Plato's discussion of original and image, his distinction between correct and incorrect image, and the 7th definition, I argue that achieving the telos of truth involves preserving the original's proportions and appropriate features. The view that Plato's conception of truth takes statements or mental states to be certain types of image is not ground-breaking. The important contribution of my argument is that it offers a plausible way to understand two recalcitrant claims made by Plato: first, that falsity obtains not only in the region of incorrect images (appearances) but also within correct images (likenesses); second, that some incorrect images are based on knowledge and so could be true."

5. Perl, Eric D. 2014. "The Motion of Intellect On the Neoplatonic Reading of Sophist 248e-249d." The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition no. 8:138-160.
   Abstract: "This paper defends Plotinus' reading of Sophist 248e-249d as an expression of the togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being. Throughout the dialogues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness of knower and known, expressing this through the myth of recollection and through metaphors of grasping, eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible paradigm is in the thought that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as extrinsic "objects" but as the contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading of Sophist 248e-249d shows that the "motion" attributed to intelligible being is not temporal change but the activity of intellectual apprehension. Aristotle's doctrines of knowledge as identity of intellect and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as thinking itself, are therefore in continuity with

Plato, and Plotinus' doctrine of intellect and being is continuous with both Plato and Aristotle."

6. Petterson, Olof. 2018. "The Science of Philosophy: Discourse and Deception in Plato's Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 22:221-237.
   Abstract: "At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato's Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor explains why philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor's science is either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics, or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic deception. By showing how the Visitor's account of the science of philosophy is just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry identified at the dialogue's outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. "
7. Philip, James Allenby. 1961. "Mimesis in the Sophistes of Plato." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 92:453-468.
   "If a generalized use of mimesis was current in Plato's time, it was current as an extension of a more specific use. We shall find in Plato instances of both the specific and the generalized use and instances in which, because Plato allowed them to co-exist, the meaning and connotations of the one overlap those of the other, and ambiguities arise. Already in the Republic these two senses of mimesis, the specific or dramatic sense and the generalized or metaphysical sense, are both present. They are exhibited again in the final division of the Sophistes as two classes related to one another as genus to species. When we have delimited the two senses in the Republic we will consider their relation in the Sophistes and its implications." (pp. 453-454)
   (...)
   "We must then ask ourselves: What enables us to know? and by what process of knowing do we make ourselves like the object of our knowledge?

(...)
So we affirm that in the wide spectrum of meaning given to mimesis in the Platonic dialogues we can distinguish two principal senses: a restricted or dramatic sense of making oneself like another, and a wider sense describing the creative processes in all the productive crafts; and further that in the final division of the Sophistes we find the latter related to the former as genus to species." (p. 468)

8. ———. 1968. "False Statement in the Sophistes." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 99:315-327.
"I shall limit myself to showing what are the moves he makes, and how he reaches the conclusion he does reach. The question whether Plato's doctrine is tenable, in whole or in part, in terms of modern logic is beyond the scope of this study.
The discussion of false statement falls into five parts, each part corresponding to a move in the development of the thesis. It will be convenient to conduct our discussion conforming to these divisions:
1. 256D11-258C7: Not-being and its two kinds.
2. 258C7-260A1: Summing up against Parmenides.
3. 260A1-261C6: The problem of statement (logos).
4. 261C7-263A1: Basic doctrine of meaning and statement.
5. 263A1-263D5 : Test case : "Theaetetus flies" etc.
It must be remembered throughout that Plato is single-mindedly pursuing his purpose, which is to show that false statement as το` μη` ὄν λέγειν is possible; and further that this phrase means: (a) in the Parmenidean sense, (if anything) nothing relevant to our inquiry, (b) in a modified sense, to say what is not as what is other than (or different from) X, and (c) to make a false statement. This last sense is for Plato's purpose the important one. He will use it to differentiate between the activities of the sophist and the philosopher, and to justify his relegating the sophist to the class of purveyors of false statement.
It must also be remembered that, here as elsewhere, Plato for all his frequent prolixity excludes from his argument what he does not consider essential to it. In the present

instance he attempts no general logical doctrine." (pp. 315-316)

9. ———. 1968. "The apographa of Plato's Sophistes." Phoenix no. 22:289-298.
   Since Burnet's edition of Plato it has been recognized that B, T, and W are primary sources for the first half of the Platonic corpus, and for most of those dialogues, including the Sophistes, the only primary sources. (In the Budé Sophistes, edited by Diès, Y is cited in the apparatus as a primary source; though this has been shown to be the case for other parts of Y it is not the case for the Sophistes, as will appear below.) All other manuscripts are conceded to be apographa of these, and their mutual relations have been in part explored. They have not been examined systematically, on the basis of collations, to discover precisely how they depend on one another and whether any of the manuscripts other than the principal three can be primary sources for our tradition in whole or in part." (p. 289)
   Codices referred to by sigla are as follows: B = Clarkianus 39 of the Bodleian Library, Oxford; T = Ven.app.cl. 4.1 (542 in the new numbering of Mioni's catalogue) of the Marciana Library, Venice; W = Vind.supp.phil.gr.7, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna; Y = Vind.phil.gr.21, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna. All other codices are referred to by the abbreviation of their library designations; a list is given in Post [L. A. Post, The Vatican Plato and its Relations (Middletown 1934)];. I shall discuss the primary source manuscripts, B, T, and W, in a separate study.

10. ———. 1969. "The Megista Gene of the Sophistes." Phoenix no. 23:89-103.
    "Five common concepts or megista gene -- being, identity, difference, motion and rest-play a key role in the Sophistes. (1) They are not an innovation. Allusion is made to them, and to similar concepts, in earlier dialogues. Already in the Phaedo (103E-105C) certain ideas having a mathematical character-equality, oddness, evenness-are recognized not as a special category but as functioning in special ways and having peculiar problems. It is in the Parmenides that we

first encounter them as a grouping.(2) There Parmenides introduces them as similar ideas specially suited to the training of neophytes in dialectic. The ideas mentioned are (136A-B): unity/plurality, similarity/dissimilarity, motion/rest, being/non-being, coming-to-be/passing away. To these are later added identity/difference (139B) and equality/inequality (140B)." (pp. 89-90, note 1 partly omitted)
(...)
"Let us now turn to the Sophistes. If we are to understand the role of the megista gene we must observe how and in what context they are introduced. The critical issue of the whole dialogue is approached by an episode to which Plato has given the name Gigantomachia, or Battle of the Giants. In this episode idealists and empiricists are pitted against one another in bitter conflict. Their ideological quarrel is about οὐσία.
The giants maintain that only what has physical body and is perceptible to touch or contact may be said to be real, or to exist. The idealists maintain that the only genuine reality/substance is to be found in incorporeal, intelligible kinds or ideas, physical body being merely genesis or change and process.
In the thesis of the idealists we have in its most uncompromising form Plato's chorismos of intelligibles and sensibles. But we find Plato not, as we might expect, championing the cause of the Friends of the Ideas, as he calls his idealists. Instead he attempts to mediate. Let us observe how he does so, remembering always that he develops only such aspects of his metaphysical assumptions as seems to him necessary for the theme he is treating." (p. 92)
(1) I use for megista gene "common concepts." That equivalent is suggested by Tht. 185c 4, and Ryle has pointed out in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London 1965) 146 that it is used also by Aristotle. So it may have had some currency in the Academy. To translate by "greatest," "highest," "very important," is to suggest that they occupy a place in some hierarchy of concepts or ideas,

whereas their importance derives from the fact that they are topic-neutral and of almost universal application. Their logical importance has been pointed out by Ryle, loc. cit., and in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London 1965) 64-65. My debt to those discussions will be obvious.
(2) By "first" I mean first in the order Plato assigned to the dialogues -- Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus. I shall treat the Timaeus as subsequent to these. I shall not attempt to discuss again the actual date of writing of any dialogue or part of a dialogue. Relative dating does not affect my thesis here. It ceases to be of major importance if we accept even in part the Krämer/Gaiser theory of agrapha dogmata.

11. Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and Not-Being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Plato's Sophist." Kant Studien no. 70:179-196.
"The origins of our contemporary fascination with language are, of course, quite complex and go to the very heart of that persistent twentieth-century attempt to see philosophy as a "critique of language". But, in investigating those origins, it does no one an injustice to insist upon the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially his little book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in bringing the issue to the prominence it enjoys today."
(...)
"In fact, [Wittgenstein] seems to return quite explicitly to Plato's account of language as an eidolon in a dialogue like the Sophist. In a certain sense, one could claim that the central problem of dialogues like the Theaetetus and the Sophist was Wittgenstein's major concern in his early work."
(...)
"Further, in the opinion of some commentators, the Eleatic Stranger and Wittgenstein not only begin with very similar problems, they seem to arrive at very similar solutions.
The picture theory's representational model of language's relation to the world, the ontology taken by some to be supported by the picture theory (Wittgenstein's infamous

"simples"), the doctrines of logical space and the "form" of objects, and perhaps more than any other issue, Wittgenstein's "derivative" explanation of negation (the claim that any not-X depends on X for its intension and the claim that it has no negative extension, that there are no negative facts), all count as evidence for Platonic shadows stretching across the Tractatus. This seems especially true when we consider that Wittgenstein regarded as a major consequence of the picture theory its ability to account for meaningful, false propositions, that it could explain how "Thought can be of what is not the case".
Plato's discussion of images is clearly and directly concerned with much the same problem in "capturing" the elusive sophist.
In the following, I will consider two such comparable issues- the general theory of language involved in both accounts, and their specific solution to the problem of negation and false propositions. What I hope to accomplish by this contrast is to illuminate two very different kinds of analyses appropriate to the topic of "not-being", differences one could roughly characterize as "semantic" versus "ontological". Further, this difference in orientation and in emphasis will involve differences within each mode; specifically it will involve a "picture" versus an "image" theory of language, and atomistic versus nonatomistic ontologies." (pp. 179-180, notes omitted)

12. Pirocacos, Elly. 1998. False Belief and the Meno Paradox. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Abstract: "The Sophist is a dialogue that may be addressed as a sequel to the Theaetetus. It also finds Socrates suspended of his capacity as director of inquiry, and replaced by an Eleatic Stranger. The difficulty of the task is located in the form of refutative argumentation adopted by each, and therefore involves the evaluation of the justifying epistemological systems supporting each. The stage setting of the Sophist is even more involved than the three phased report of the dialogue in the Theaetetus. The philosophical persuasion of the Stranger deserves special attention, especially given that he has been assigned the role to

designate the criteria of philosophical inquiry by way of establishing the true relations between the tripartite subjects of inquiry. Both Theaetetus and the Eleatic Stranger are agreed that being and not-being are equally puzzling terms; but Theaetetus seems to have understood the objective of the present dialogue in a slightly different way."

13. Pitteloud, Luca. 2014. "Is the Sensible an Illusion? The Revisited Ontology of the Sophist." Aufklärung no. 1:33-57.
"I want to argue in this paper that, in the Sophist, behind the discussion about the nature of non-being, Plato provides the reader some elements about a revision of his ontology. First, the analysis of the notion of image gives some indications concerning the nature of the sensible, which is usually described as an image of the intelligible (Republic 509a9 and 509e1-2, Timaeus 52c).
Second, since the dialogue seems to assume that not only Forms are part of the realm of being, but what is in motion too, it will appear that sensible objects must somehow belong to being. The focus of this paper is the revision of the nature of the sensible." (p. 33)
(...)
"Conclusion: A new realm of being
The Friends of the Forms have to admit that Forms are acted upon but not that they change. In this way, they could easily defend the idea that for a Form, to be known, does not imply any alteration or change. Nevertheless, they seem to accept another different thesis, namely that some objects that are in motion belong to the realm of being. The Eleatic Stranger asks the question of the pantelôs on (248e7): this does not refer to what is really being (ontôs on), but to the total family of being. To this realm of being belong motion (κίνησις), life (ψυχὴν) and intelligence (φρόνησιν). In this way, the Sophist does not only assert that an image cannot be reduced to non-being, but also that what is in motion is part of the realm of being. Those two elements seem to plead for a revaluation of the nature of the sensible, which has to be part of the set of being. We face an ontology with two degrees of being: the intelligible and its image, namely

the sensible. The sensible is not reducible to an illusion or to falsehood (and nothingness), but is somehow a being. As the Timaeus will explain it, it is the image of the intelligible appearing into a milieu (the Receptacle), which guaranties to it some degree of existence (Timaeus, 52b3-d1)." (pp. 52.53)

14. Planinc, Zdravko. 2015. "Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato's Critique of 'Platonism' in the Sophist and Statesman." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:159-217.
    Abstract: "The Eleatic Stranger plays a central role in all reconstructions of Plato's "Platonism."
    This paper is a study of the literary form of the Sophist and Statesman and its significance for interpreting the Eleatic's account of the nature of philosophy. I argue that the Eleatic dialogues are best understood through a comparison with the source-texts in the Odyssey that Plato used in their composition. I show that the literary form of the Sophist is a straightforward reworking of the encounter of Odysseus and his crewmen with Polyphemus the Cyclops; and that the form of the Statesman is a somewhat more complex reworking of the narrative in which Odysseus and those loyal to him oppose Antinoös, leader of the Ithacan suitors. The comparison reveals that the Eleatic Stranger is no way Plato's spokesman. On the contrary: by casting the Stranger in the role of Polyphemus and the Cyclopean Antinoös, Plato intends the Sophist and Statesman to be read as an explicit critique of the metaphysical and political doctrines that have since come to be identified as Platonism. In Plato's characterization, the Eleatic Stranger is neither a philosopher nor a sophist. He is an intellectual—the sort of person who professes to be a philosopher and is often mistaken for one."
15. Politis, Vasilis. 2006. "The Argument for the Reality of Change and Changelessness in Plato's Sophist (248e7-249d5)." In New Essays on Plato: Language and Thought in Fourth-Century Greek Philosophy, edited by Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 149-175. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

"Plato's metaphysics, from beginning to end, is tiered rather than tier-less.(1) This is because Plato's general account of reality is characterized by a fundamental distinction between certain things, especially the changeless forms, which he argues are perfect beings,(2) and certain other things, the changing objects of sense-perception, which he argues are something, as opposed to being nothing at all, only in virtue of being appropriately related to and dependent on those perfect beings.(3) However, in a dialogue addressed to the very question, 'What is there?' – and to the related question, 'What is being?' – he defends an answer which, so it appears, makes no reference to two tiers of reality and indicates rather a tier-insensitive ontology. This is the argument in the Sophist (248e7–249d5) which, together with the arguments that precede it in the dialogue, is summed up in the conclusion that any changing thing (κινούμενον), and likewise any changeless thing (ἀκίνητον, στάσιμον), is something that is.(4) There can be no doubt that this conclusion is about any changing thing and any changeless thing, and there is no suggestion, moreover, that the things referred to must occupy one or the other of two tiers of reality.

Following Julius Moravcsik and Gwil Owen, Lesley Brown has recently defended a tier-insensitive interpretation of this argument, such that the 'upshot is an all-inclusive ontology'.(5) On the other hand, a number of critics, including David Ross, Harold Cherniss, and Michael Frede, have defended a tiered interpretation.(6) It seems to me, however, that the choice between these two interpretations – which evidently is of central importance for the understanding of Plato – has not been properly characterized, much less settled. My aim in this paper is to show, first, that the choice between these two fundamentally different and opposed interpretations of this argument, the tier-insensitive and the tiered interpretation, depends on how we read the single phrase, το` παντελῶς ὄν, at 248e8–249a1; and second, that the correct reading of this phrase commits us to a tiered interpretation beyond reasonable doubt, and that Plato's formulation of the conclusion

(249c10–d4), which sums up both this and the previous arguments in the dialogue, does not state a commitment to a tier-insensitive ontology." (pp. 149-150)

(1) See for example Phaedo 74 (esp. 74d5–8), 78–9 (esp. 79a6–7), 100b1–e7; Republic 475e9 ff.; Symposium 210e6–211b5; Timaeus 27d6–28a4, 51d3–52a7 (I am assuming that the Timaeus is a late dialogue); Philebus 58e4–59a9, 61d10–e3.

(2) παντελῶς ὄντα (Republic 477a3 and Sophist 248e8–249a1; see below). Also εἰλικρινῶς ὄντα (e.g. Republic 477a7, 478d6), ἀληθινη` οὐσία (e.g. Sophist 246b8), ὄντως ὄν / οὐσία (e.g. Timaeus 28a3–4, 52c5 and Sophist 248a11), and sometimes simply οὐσία (e.g. Phaedo 78d1 and Sophist 246c2). Plato's terminology is not fixed, indeed reconciling, or otherwise, his terms is an inquiry of long standing.

(3) i.e. the relation of one-way dependence which Plato sometimes refers to as 'participation' and 'communion' (μέθεξις, κοινωνία).

(4) The conclusion is stated at 249c10–d4. It is important to observe (as we will see in section 6) that this conclusion sums up not only the immediately preceding argument (248e7–249c9), i.e. the argument against the friends of the forms (which is our present concern), but also the earlier argument against the materialists (246e5–247c8, which is not our main concern at present).

(5) Brown 1998, 204. Moravcsik (1962, 31 and 35–41) argues that Plato defends an 'all-inclusive' and 'tier-insensitive' answer to the question 'What exists?' So too Owen 1986b [originally 1966], 41–4 [336–40]. A tier-insensitive interpretation is also defended by Teloh 1981, 194–5 and Bordt 1991, 514, 520, 528.

(6) see Ross 1951, 110–11; Cherniss 1965, 352; Frank 1986; Frede, 1996, 196; and Silverman 2002.

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Teloh, H. 1981 The Development of Plato’s Metaphysics, Pennsylvania.

16. Prior, William J. 1980. "Plato's Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 18:199-211.
"In this paper I offer an account of Plato’s analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist. This account differs from those current in several important respects. First, although I take it that Plato distinguishes in the Sophist among existential statements, statements that are predicative in grammatical structure, and statements of identity, I do not believe that he distinguishes corresponding senses or uses of the verb “to be.” Second, I do not take Plato’s analysis to be linguistic or logical in nature, but rather metaphysical or ontological. In my view, the Greek verb “esti” is analyzed in terms of a metaphysical theory, the Theory of Forms, and specifically in terms of the metaphysical concept of participation. This indicates a third difference between my view and that of commentators who believe that Plato’s late dialogues show a trend away from transcendent metaphysics and toward a more neutral sort of conceptual

analysis. As I shall hold that the genuine conceptual breakthrough of the Sophist is made with metaphysical apparatus not much changed from the Phaedo, I deny that this passage, at least, can be taken as evidence for such a trend.
The passage in which Plato makes his analysis is Soph. 251a-257c. I shall examine briefly the entire passage, but concentrate on 255e-256e, from which I draw the bulk of the material for my account." (p. 199)

17. ———. 1985. Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. London: Croom Helm.
Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the Parmenides 51; 3. The response of the Timaeus 87; 4. The Sophist 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the Timaeus 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.

18. Priou, Alex. 2013. "The Philosopher in Plato's Sophist." Hermathena no. 195:5-29.
"The above observations suggest that only by situating the arc of the Sophist between the Theaetetus and Statesman does the larger significance of its issues emerge. Obvious though this may sound, scholars who treat the Sophist's place in the trilogy as a whole don't approach it from the perspective of Socrates' failure to define false opinion in the Theaetetus. As we have seen, Plato presents the Stranger's inquiry into being and non-being as a response to Socrates' shortcomings in the Theaetetus; and, as I hope to show, his response anticipates the specific inquiry taken up in the Statesman. Toward this end, I will walk the arc of the Sophist's argument from the Theaetetus to the Statesman as follows. First, I will consider how the initial definitions of the sophist frame the dialogue's famous digression on images, being, and non-being (Section II). I will then consider how this frame necessitates the distinction of 'spoken images' (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα) into φαντάσματα and εἰκόνες, i.e. those that respectively distort and preserve the proportions of the beings, the very distinction that

eventually allows the Stranger to distinguish between true and false opinions (Section III).
Thereafter, I will discuss how this distinction in spoken images necessitates the acquisition of a 'dialectical science' (διαλεκτική ἐπιστήμη), which very acquisition appears intractably problematic (Section IV). I will then conclude with some general reflections on the stance of the dialogue as a whole, the possibility of defining false opinion, and how the interpretation advanced informs the search for the statesman in the Statesman (Section V). My basic aim throughout will be to show that, in so situating the Sophist between its prequel Theaetetus and sequel Statesman, we come to see the place of the philosopher in Plato's Sophist." (pp. 7-8, noted omitted)

19. Przelecki, Marian. 1981. "On What there Is Not." Dialectics and Humanism no. 8:123-129.
"It is my contention (which I shall try to defend in what follows) that the text of the dialogue contains thoughts and ideas that closely correspond to those characteristic of modern logical semantics. The difficulties which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him find their explicit counterparts in the discussions of contemporary logicians and semanticists.
This statement, however, needs some qualification. The text of the dialogue is comprehensive and indefinite enough to allow for different readings and interpretations. It is only some interpretation of some of its fragments that may be said to yield that version of its problems which is suggested below. I would, however, contend that the interpretation advanced is a warranted one and the fragments so interpreted essential for the author's standpoint. One more point should be explicitly stated beforehand. Referring to what I call modern logical semantics, I mean by this a definite semantic theory: model theoretic semantics in its standard version, which might be regarded as a "classical" form of contemporary logical semantics. Some deviations from this use will be indicated in what follows.
The most important philosophical content of the dialogue is contained in its second part (esp. in the paragraphs 237-

264). The main problem concerns the semantic characteristic of falsehood and, involved in it, notion of not-being." (p. 123)

20. Quandahl, Ellen. 1989. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's Sophist." Rhetoric Review no. 7:338-348. "In this essay I will suggest that when rhetoricians consider the Sophist, they will find the opposition of Plato to Sophists disturbed. My argument is not particularly new; for several decades scholars like E. A. Havelock, Mario Untersteiner, and G. B. Kerferd have been reevaluating, and indeed revaluing, Sophistic thought, and noticing similarities, rather than contradictions, between the Sophists and Plato's Socrates. And yet I think that for many rhetoricians "Plato" means Phaedrus, Gorgias and perhaps portions of the Republic and Symposium, dialogues that are all striking in their "literary" qualities and in their discussion of the "Forms," Plato's version of the "foundations" around which the recurrent foundational/antifoundational debate centers. But the Sophist, rather than disproving sophistic relativism, provides philosophical underpinnings for the view that meaning is contextual and not absolute. At the level of inference—and the Sophist has often been seen as prototypically "logical"—we see in this dialogue how logical categories are in fact metaphorical. And if we read it with "literary" or "rhetorical" eyes, although it lacks the "poetic" quality of other dialogues, we find an extended illustration of ways in which words are allusive, replete with covert histories which, fully as much as "logical" inference, contribute to conclusions." (pp. 338-339)
(...)
"Whether Plato abandoned the theory of Forms or loyalty to his character Socrates in the late dialogues is not, at last, my concern. Rather, I want to question ways in which Plato has been appropriated and summarized, and the tradition in which the Plato of rhetoricians did not write the same texts as did the Plato of, say, logicians or ethicists. When rhetoricians add the Sophist to their Plato, Plato is no longer "Platonic," but a writer whose text acknowledges, both

theoretically and by example, the power of contextual and contingent elements in rhetoric." (p. 347)

21. Ray, A. Chadwick. 1984. For Images. An Interpretation of Plato's Sophist. Lanham: University Press of America. "Our dialogue is apparently an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Theaetetus and Theodorus have kept their appointment with Socrates from the day before, when the Theaetetus is supposed to have transpired, (1) and after which Socrates was to go to the portico of the King Archon to meet the indictment of Meletus against him. (Theaet. 210d) Socrates, the lover of wisdom, has been indicted by Meletus on charges of "criminal meddling," inquiring into natural phenomena, making the weaker argument defeat the stronger, (Apol. 19b-c) and embracing atheism (Apol. 26c). The philosopher seems to have been mistaken in the popular mind for a sophist. His defense, the Apology, may be read largely as an attempt, adumbrated from the first sentence, to distinguish between appearance and reality; Socrates is not what his accusers make him appear to be. After Socrates has met the King Archon, it should not be surprising in the dramatic context if he shows a keen interest in the difference between the Philosopher and the Sophist. Thus the nature of the Sophist is to be today's topic. A further reason for Socrates to bring the discussion to the nature of the Sophist is that Theodorus and Theaetetus have brought with them a guest from Elea, a student of the school of Parmenides and Zeno. Briefly, the "Eleatic School", as will become clearer, affirms the reality of being and denies the reality of any non-being, the upshot being (so the Stranger will suggest) that there could be no such thing as mere appearance or any falsehood, such as might seem to be real without being so. If the Apology presents a personal defense against false images propagated about Socrates, the Sophist can be seen in large part as a philosophical defense of the logical possibility of images at all. In fact, this will be the perspective of the present interpretation. As Socrates at the end of his life must give an account of himself to answer his critics, so perhaps must Plato toward the end of his career answer some of his most astute critics.

The concept of an image is central to Plato's metaphysics because he explains how many things may be called by one name by appeal to that concept. Where a number of individuals are all called F, this is possible because of F-ness itself, a Form which is different from the individuals but of which these are called images. The Form is said to make the many things F (Phaedo 100d) as these come to mirror that Form, to resemble it to one degree or another. The relationship of "the many" to the Form, which accounts for their somehow having its character, is called participation or sharing, but the nature of this relationship is somewhat problematic. Plato's diffidence on the subject is evident in the middle dialogues both in his refusal to let any explanatory terms harden into technical vocabulary and from his own explicit tentativeness, as Socrates expresses it at Phaedo 100d. That the uncertainty remains in Plato's later thought, including the Sophist, will be evident in the present discussion. But the reality of images cannot be open to question.

Now Plato in the Sophist will identify certain Eleatically inspired challenges to his theory of participation and images, challenges which he will be able to answer in part from the resources of his own "classical theory" as developed in middle dialogues like the Phaedo and the Republic. To the extent that those resources are sufficient, the Sophist is essentially a "conservative" dialogue upholding the adequacy of the classical theory to handle particular objections. On the other hand, new developments in Plato's thought are apparent in the dialogue, (the upgraded status of sensible objects, for instance), developments for which Plato probably would have found no need had he not taken seriously the problems of deceptive appearance and falsehood." (pp. 1-2)

(1) Clearly Plato is using these details as a literary device. The historical Socrates never addressed the issues treated here.

22. Reagan, James T. 1965. "Being and nonbeing in Plato's Sophist." The Modern Schoolman no. 42:305-314.

"I take it that the principal problem of the dialogue concerns the ontological status of the Forms, or true being: to discern a real differentiated plurality in being which will at once ground a true dialectic or science and repudiate the false dialectic of the Sophist. Plato is wholly lacking in any conception of what will later be called metaphysical analogy, which might permit an essentially differentiated plurality of being. The famous Hypotheses of the latter part of the Parmenides have established the controlling limits within which Plato must solve the problem of the metaphysical status of the Forms. In fact, he concludes to a plurality which is differentiated not in terms of essence but in terms of relations which remain outside the essence of the Forms. This in turn will require that he posit a new metaphysical factor, relative nonbeing. Finally, he will accept as the epitome of science or true knowledge the true but nonessential dialectic which this view of being will support." (p. 305)

23. Reeve, C. D. C. . 1985. "Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 67:47-64.
"If discourse is to be possible at all, some Kinds (γενε) (1) must blend (μετέχειν) with one another (251d5ff.).(2) To follow the 'late learners' (251b5-6) in refusing to allow one thing to share in another is 'to make short work of all theories' (252a5-6). But nor can it be that all Kinds blend (252d2ff.), otherwise Motion itself would rest, and Rest itself would move, and both are impossible (252d6-11).(3) We need some science then 'to be our guide on the voyage of discourse' (253d10) and to tell us 'which Kinds are consonant, which incompatible' (253b10-c1). The science in question is dialectic (253d1-3).
My present topic is one rather stormy section of that voyage, namely the Eleatic Stranger's dialectical remarks about Rest and Motion and their proper interpretation. However what I have to say bears directly on the larger issues of Dialectic and the Theory of Forms." (p. 47)
(...)
Conclusion

If the foregoing discussion is cogent, the Sophist contains a cleverly constructed trap, and many of the Eleatic Stranger's remarks about Rest and Motion cozen us into it. If we take his bait, and fail to learn the lessons he teaches us in his discussion of Not-being, the Sophist presents us with paradoxes and contradictions of the sort I have been addressing. These lead us to believe that Plato was himself confused and urge us to import solutions from elsewhere. (49) If, on the other hand, we detect the trap, and learn the lesson the Stranger has to teach, we solve his puzzles about Being and being known, and the paradoxes and contradictions disappear.

Of course no analytic philosopher would play tricks of this sort - we like our philosophy transparent not tricky. Thus we tend to mistrust, often rightly, readings of the great philosophers which exhibit them as other than plain. We all know, of course, that Plato was a great literary artist and a great teacher as well as a great thinker. And we know that art is artful and that teachers often leave dangling puzzles to test their pupils' acumen. But we often read Plato as if his art and pedagogical purposes were extraneous to his thought. The result is that we often get the thought wrong." (p. 62)

(1) 1 The Eleatic Stranger calls the five μεγιστα γενε, Being, Rest, Motion, Identity, and Difference, both γενε (254d4) and ειδε (255c5). He applies both appellations to λόγος and δόξα (260a5, 260d7-8). At 255c12-d7 το᾽ καθ᾽ αὑτό ανδ το᾽ προς ἄλλο αρε ψαλλεδ ειδε. 'The question is thus unavoidably raised, Are all of these to be reckoned as Platonic Forms?', Peck (1962: 62). To postpone it for treatment on another occasion I adopt the following convention: I call all the items referred to either as γενε or as ειδε 'Kinds', and I leave open the question of whether or not Kinds are Forms.

(2) 2 Line references are to Burnet (1900). References are fully explained in the Bibliography.

(3) I have followed Vlastos (1970: 272n5) in using 'Motion' and 'Rest' as dummies for the Greek words κινεσις and στασις (and their cognates). I remind you that κινεσις

covers all kinds of variation and that στασις stands for invariance in its most general sense.

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Vlastos (1973). Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973).

24. Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy no. 30:289-298.

Abstract: "Plato's Sophist is puzzling inasmuch as it presents us with seven completely different definitions of sophistry. Though not all seven definitions could be accurate, Plato never explicitly indicates which of the definitions is mistaken. Recently, Kenneth Sayre and Mary Louise Gill have proposed a clever solution to this puzzle. In this paper I explain why the Sayre-Gill solution is mistaken, and suggest a better solution."

"There is something about the Sophist that has always bothered me. Why are there so many definitions of sophistry in the dialogue? Here is the problem: either all the definitions are right, or all of them are wrong, or some of them are right and some of them are wrong. But it can't be that all the definitions are right, because, after all, they are all different.

(...)

In this paper, I want to consider one influential answer to what we might call "the puzzle of the many definitions", criticize it, and then provide an answer of my own. The answer I am going to criticize appears most clearly in the work of Kenneth Sayre, and also perhaps in the work of Mary Louise Gill. It is, I think, a very clever and compelling answer, but, as I will argue, it is mistaken." (p. 289)

References

Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. "Models in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." Journal of the International Plato Society 6.

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25. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1981. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part V. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Second part)." Vivarium no. 19:81-125.
"In concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that Aristotle's Categories may be viewed as dealing with the several ways in which an individual man can be named without destroying his concrete unity. A well-known passage of Plato's Sophist (251 A 8ff.) was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change (presently called Kinds) can also have several attributes (attributive names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the 'Communion' of Kinds. But it is obvious at the same time that in this shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming, asserting and predication. So Plato's Sophist unavoidably has to be part of our discussion. A further argument for taking the Sophist into consideration may be found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's De interpretatione. He remarks {ad 17 a 26ff. : Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV 5, p. 83, 8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis of the apophantikos logos as given by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over Plato's Sophist (261 Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed with Being (peri tou synkekramenou toi onti mê ontos). For that matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione the Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in Plato's later dialogues, especially the Sophist. I hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the views found in the Categories and De interpretatione are most profitably compared with what Plato argues in the related discussions of the Sophist." (p. 81)
[* Parts (1), (2), (3) and(4) are found in this Journal 15 (1977), 81-110; 16 (1978), 81-107, 18 (1980), 1-62; 19 (1981), 1-46.]

26. ———. 1982. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part VI. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Third part)." Vivarium no. 20:97-127.
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may be concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?
The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the 'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his Parmenides onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually

found it in the Sophist in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being shared in, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operable' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradeigmatic standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can partake of that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.
Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, 'What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.
(...)
In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than before their presence in matter and their activities as immanent forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." (pp. 125-127)

27. ———. 1986. Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical Commentary. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered? 11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter

5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.

"The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249C-D) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless and what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?

Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unraveling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the 'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.

The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical problems,

an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').
The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned nominatim: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.
I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him." (from the Preface)

28. Ringbom, Sixten. 1965. "Plato on Images." Theoria no. 31:86-109.
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss Plato's use of the concept of picture in three different contexts. First, his use of the picture as a metaphysical model; secondly, the picture-object relation as a semantic explanation; and, thirdly this same relation as an argument of value.
(...)
In his metaphysical model Plato regards the objects of our experience as pictures of the Ideas (1). But he also discusses the relationship between the visible things and the pictures of these things-for instance, the relation between a bed and a painting of a bed, or the name "bed".
(...)
The obvious procedure in approaching Plato's theory of pictures is to discuss each aspect in turn. But this must not mean that we isolate the three functions from each other; the purpose of the following discussion is, on the contrary, to show that Plato's line of thought in all three cases adheres to the same pattern, and that it is actually based on an analogy between the three aspects." (pp. 86-87)
(1) D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1953, p. 12 f.

29. Roberts, Jean. 1986. "The Problem about Being in the Sophist." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 3:229-243. Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. IV: Plato's Later Works, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 142-157.
"It is by now a matter of firmly entrenched orthodoxy that Plato's discussion of being in the Sophist serves to distinguish different meanings or uses of "esti." This claim has taken different forms in different hands.
Nevertheless, almost everyone seems agreed that a large part of what Plato needs (and gets) in order to rescue negation and falsity from sophistic attacks is either a distinction between the existential "is" and one or more incomplete uses of "is," a distinction between the so-called "is" of identity and the copula, or some more subtle distinction between incomplete uses of the word which amounts to a distinction in kinds of predication.
I shall argue that what Plato says about being in the Sophist is in no useful way described as a distinguishing of different senses or uses of the word "is."(1) The Eleatic puzzles Plato is out to solve here are solved, in large part, by demonstrating that being is something distinct from any or all of the things that might normally be described as being." (p. 229)
(...)
"There is, moreover, reason for suspicion of any interpretation which reduces the discussions of being and not-being to discussions of positive and negative statement in general. The commentators have failed to notice how careful Plato is to separate questions about the nature of being and not-being and the bearing of alternative answers on the status of negative and false statement. When he first sets out the problem he begins by describing the Eleatic position on not-being (237b10-239a12) and then showing, in a separate argument (240c7-241b3), that this makes false statement and negative statement impossible. The pattern is repeated later. After he has shown that not-being is he goes on (260a5-264b8) to explain how statements in general are put together and how false statement is to be explicated.

That the blending of not-being and logos is still taken as, at least in principle, an open question after the discussion of not-being is completed suggests that that discussion could not have been intended as an account of negative statement. Nor is there any reason to take the previous account of being as an account of positive statement. They are, just what they claim to be, and all that they need to be, purely metaphysical accounts of being and not-being." (p. 239)
(1) I do not mean to deny that there is something to be learned from looking at Plato's use of esti, only that this is not his own object in the Sophist. For the record, I think that there is a complete use of "is" to be found in the Sophist for reasons I will not go into here. Much of what I would say in defense of this has been said by Robert Heinaman in "Being in the Sophist," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 65 (1983), pp. 1-17.

30. Robinson, David B. 1999. "Textual notes on Plato's « Sophist »." The Classical Quarterly no. 49:139-160.
"In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT [Oxford Classical Texts] vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford, 1995), there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W."
(...)
"A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We (myself aided in the earlier sections by Nicoll) have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet.

What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures (including readings from secondary mss.) on something like 87 occasions (12 from secondary mss., 75 from modern conjectures from Stephanus onwards), so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places." (p. 139)

31. ———. 2001. "The Phantom of the Sophist: το ουκ οντως ουκ ον (240a–c)." The Classical Quarterly no. 51:435-457.
"A spurious phantom, Platonistic but non-Platonic, a non-entity by the name of ουκ ὀντως ουκ ον, made spectral appearances in manuscripts and printed texts of Plato's Sophist over a long period. It perhaps first manifested itself a little earlier than Proclus and Damascius; but there seems to be no evidence of its appearing to Plotinus. It was rather strongly present in the primary MSS (give or take a little blurring). It still appeared in the Teubner edition by Hermann in 1852. But it was attacked by Bonitz in 1864, and on most views was successfully exorcized when Badham's conjecture of 1865 was added to an earlier conjecture of Baiter's, each removing an unwanted ουκ. Campbell's edition of 1867 shows no awareness of Badham's conjecture, but on an overall view, since then it might seem that the phantom had been left for dead by most interpreters. Apelt in 1897 said 'locus . . . sanitati suae est redditus'. Burnet, as we have seen, banished the phantom from his 1900–5 OCT." (p. 436)
(...)
"The cruel deception practised by both phantoms turns upon readers making the erroneous assumption that we have exposition of doctrine in this passage, where in fact we have what is at least primarily intended as a reductio ad absurdum. This is not a situation where the Visitor is stating a Platonic view of ειδωλα; what is happening is that the supposed Sophist attempts to reduce the concept of ειδωλον to absurdity.

The passage does not set out to show that Plato or his Visitor, or even his Sophist, thought that ειδωλα have some degree of phantom being, but that an enterprising Sophist could argue that they have no being at all. Plato will later refute his own imaginary Sophist (not by introducing intermediates); but here the Sophist must be allowed to make his challenging manoeuvre." (p. 437)

32. Robinson, Jim. 1993. "A Change in Plato's Conception of the Good." Journal of Philosophical Research no. 18:231-241.
Abstract: "One of the most interesting passages in the Republic is the comparison of the Form of the Good with the Sun. Although this depiction of the Good was never repeated, many hold that the Good retained its privileged place in Plato's metaphysics. I shall argue that there are good reasons for thinking that Plato, when writing the Sophist, no longer held his earlier view of the Good. Specifically, I shall contend that he ceased to believe that as the Sun makes its objects visible, so the Good makes the Forms knowable. This being the case, it cannot also be said to illuminate either the Forms or the order they exhibit. My procedure will be first to consider briefly how, in the Republic, the Good can be said to iIluminate the Forms. I shall then determine the extent to which, in the Sophist, this function can still be credited to the Good. "

33. Robinson, Thomas M. 2013. "Protagoras and the Definition of 'Sophist' in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 3-13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I should like to begin by setting out as clearly as I can what seem to be the main things that can be said about Protagoras, and offer an evaluation of them. This will be in large part without reference to the final definition of 'sophist' in the Sophist. I shall then turn to the definition, and see where if anywhere it appears to fit into the picture, and what can be said about the definition as a definition." (p. 3)
(...)
"As the dialogue draws to a close an intense, and uncompromisingly negative definition of the sophist is

finally offered, and this one undoubtedly excludes what had earlier been called the sophist of noble lineage.
The sophist (268c) is now described as a mimetes who operates on the basis of belief not knowledge, by contrast with mimetai who operate on the basis of knowledge not belief. More precisely the mimesis characterizing a sophist is said to be a) mimesis of that which is 'insincere', of that which is productive of 'contradictions', and of that which is non-knowing; b) mimesis of that specific form of copy–making that constitutes appearance-making; and c) mimesis of that species of production which is marked off as human not divine." (pp. 10-11)

34. Rodriguez, Evan. 2020. "'Pushing Through' in Plato's Sophist: A New Reading of the Parity Assumption." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 102:159-188.
Abstract: "At a crucial juncture in Plato's Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor's seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor's hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of 'exploring both sides' that lends insight into Plato's aporetic method."

35. Rosen, Stanley. 1983. Plato's Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image. New Haven: Yale University Press.
"I said previously that I prefer the dramatic to the ontological approach to the Sophist. It should now be clear that this does not require a suppression of the narrowly technical themes in the dialogue.
On the contrary, it requires their meticulous analysis, both in themselves and as elements in a comprehensive dramatic structure.
In this section, I should like to clarify this view from a somewhat different angle and to introduce a term to describe my reading of the Sophist. The term in question is dramatic phenomenology.

Whereas a dialogue is not a "drama" in the sense of a poetic play written to be performed in the theater, it has a manifestly dramatic form. A dialogue is a poetic production in which mortals speak neither to gods nor to heroes, but to each other. At the same time, there is a hierarchy of mortals within a Platonic dialogue that is rooted, not in the contingencies of birth but in the natures of diverse human souls. Similarly, a dialogue is not a phenomenological description, but an interpretation of human life. As a poetic production, it so orders its scenes of human life as to provide an indirect commentary on the significance of the speeches delivered within those scenes.
Adapting a distinction of the Stranger's to our own purposes, we may say that a dialogue is centrally concerned with the better and the worse, the noble and the base." (p. 12)

36. Roupa, Vichy. 2020. Articulations of Nature and Politics in Plato and Hegel. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3: Producing the Categories of Being: The Sophist
"The Cratylus's aporetic ending inevitably raises the question whether this is Plato's last word on names or whether the issue is explored further in another dialogue where a more positive outcome is reached. The aim of this chapter is to show that the dialogue where Plato carries forward the programme of the Cratylus is the Sophist.(1) Although it is sometimes argued that the Sophist breaks new ground completely unanticipated in the Cratylus, there is an area of shared concern between the two dialogues that warrants, I believe, reading the Sophist as a development of the Cratylus.(2) This area is marked, in the first instance, by the methodological approach adopted; the two interlocutors—it is set down early on in the dialogue—will strive to reach agreement not only as regards the name but, first and foremost, as regards the thing itself. Thus, the Eleatic Visitor, who leads the discussion in the Sophist, claims in 218c to have only the name ('sophist') in common with his discussant Theaetetus at this stage, but this is not enough because 'in every case' they 'always' need to be in agreement 'about the thing itself [pragma auto] by means of verbal

explanation [dia logoñ], rather than doing without any such explanation [choris logou] and merely agreeing about the name [tounoma]'. So, the aim of the dialogue is to achieve an understanding of the sophist that goes beyond the un-stated assumptions that each of the discussants has about the sophist. (p. 43)
(1) I thus follow the interpretative approach of Fine and Barney both of whom reject a sharp distinction between the analysis of the Cratylus (which is aimed at the level of the name) and that of the Sophist (which is aimed at the level of the statement or sentence). See Gail Fine, 'Plato on Naming', The Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 109 (1977): 289–294; Rachel Barney, Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus (London: Routledge, 2001), 170–172. This view is reinforced by Kahn: 'The contents of the Cratylus on the theory of naming, the problems of flux, Protagorean relativism and the paradox of false statement, all point ahead to discussion of these topics in the Theaetetus and Sophist'. Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 364. See also R.M. van den Berg, Proclus' Commentary on the Cratylus in Context: Ancient Theories of Language and Naming (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 8–13.
(2) The proponents of this view see in the Sophist a radical break in Plato's thinking because in it Plato offers an account of language at the level of the sentence or statement rather than that of the name. The distinction between name and statement is not made in the Cratylus, nor is there any recognition in the earlier dialogue of the importance of syntax for the truth value of a proposition. See Barney's summary of this view (which she calls the 'syntactical reading of the Sophist') in Barney, Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus, 170.

37. Rowe, Christopher J. 1983. "Plato on the sophists as teachers of virtue." History of Political Thought no. 4:409-427.
Abstract: "When he came to try to find a formal definition of the sophist, Plato found him an elusive creature; and with

good reason. But there are two features which regularly recur in his references to them: the sophist is a professional teacher, and what he professes to teach is ἀρετή. Sophists are people who claim παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;(1) they set themselves up as παιδεύσεως και` ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον (2) The only apparent exception is Gorgias, who though classified as a sophist in other dialogues, is represented in the Meno as laughing at other sophists for claiming to teach ἀρετή;(3) and it may well be that Plato regarded this disclaimer as disingenuous. (4) But there is a difficulty here, in that on the face of it different sophists claimed to teach different things under the title of ἀρετή. Hippias, for example, is portrayed in the Hippias Major as professing to encourage a 'devotion to honourable and beautiful practices', (5) whereas in the Euthydemus the ἀρετή which the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus claim to impart is apparently coextensive with skill in eristic debate.(6) In that case, 'teacher of ἀρετή appears to be a highly ambiguous description, and therefore incapable of serving, even informally, to define the class. In general, historians of philosophy tend to suggest that behind the apparent differences between individual sophists in this respect lies a single shared purpose: the teaching of 'the art of success'."

(1) Gorgias, 519e7.

(2) Protagoras, 349a2. Cf. also Meno, 95b; Apology, 20b; Euthydemus, 273d; Hippias Major,
283c ff.

(3) Meno, 95c.

(4) cf. E.L. Harrison, 'Was Gorgias a Sophist?', Phoenix, 18 (1964) (hereafter Harrison),
pp. 183-92.

5) Hippias Major, 286a f.

(6) See below, pp. 423-6; and Harrison, p. 189, note 34.

38. ———. 2015. "Plato, Socrates, and the genei gennaia sophistike of Sophist 231b." In Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, edited by Nails, Debra and Tarrant, Harold, 149-167. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.

39. ———. 2015. "Plato versus Protagoras: The Statesman, the Theaetetus, and the Sophist." Diálogos no. 98:143-165.
Abstract: "The Statesman is nowadays generally read either on its own, or with Republic and Laws. But more attention needs to be given to the fact that it is designed as part of a trilogy, alongside Theaetetus and Sophist. Reinstating the dialogue in this context gives a fuller perspective on its purposes. The Statesman (1) identifies existing so-called «statesmen», for whom the Protagoras of Theaetetus is chief apologist, as the greatest exemplars of sophistry as defined in Sophist: mere «imitators» and dealers in falsehood; (2) offers the Platonic alternative to the Protagorean vision of human life and organization sketched in the first part of Theaetetus; and (3), in common with Sophist, illustrates – after the apparent failures of Theaetetus– both what knowledge is and how it can be acquired. Finally, and controversially, the Statesman emerges, along with Theaetetus and Sophist, as part of one and the same project as the Republic."
40. Rudebusch, George. 1990. "Does Plato Think False Speech is Speech?" Noûs no. 24:599-609.
"Before Plato came along, there was no satisfactory account of the nature of false speech. This is not to say that no one had yet figured out how to tell a lie; the Greeks were notorious, even in their own literature, as skillful liars. What I mean is that there was a pair of puzzles floating around unanswered. These puzzles were expressed as arguments that false speech was impossible. One puzzle went like this: to say what is false is to say what does not exist, but to say what does not exist is to say nothing at all, and to say nothing at all is not to speak. Thus there can be no such thing as false speech. The other puzzle went like this: to say what is false is to say what is other than the things that are. Nonetheless (in view of the first puzzle), to say what is other is to say something that is. But to say what is is to speak the truth. Thus there can be no such thing as false speech.(1)" (p. 599)
(...)

"In what follows, I shall look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. It will then be clear (IV) what sort of reconciliation is ruled out and what sort remains to be investigated, if we are to avoid paradox." (p. 600)
(1) The distinction between these two puzzles is not always recognized. But the puzzles are two, and Plato presents them as a pair: Eud. 283e7-284a8 and 284bl-b7; Crat. 429d4-6 and 429e3-9; and Tht. 167a7-8 and 167a8-b1.

41. ———. 1991. "Sophist 237-239." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 29:521-531.
"The text of the Sophist at 237-239 is aporetic: it leads any talk of non-being into perplexity. This passage shares with many other of Plato's dialogues the following structure. A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached and accepted by the interlocutor. Then the interlocutor is examined further, his assent to that answer is undermined, and the interchange ends. After giving the details of this passage (in section I), I shall argue (section 11) that the Stranger does not share Theaetetus's perplexity and continues to hold the rejected answer. Such an interpretation needs an explanation: why should the Stranger behave this way? Sufficient reasons can be found in the Stranger's pedagogy. What those pedagogical reasons are, and how good they are, I consider in section 111." (p. 521)
42. Runciman, Walter. 1962. Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127; Selected bibliography 134; Index 137.
43. Ryle, Gilbert. 1939. "Plato's Parmenides." Mind no. 48:129-151.
Second part: Mind, 48, PP. 302-325.
Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 97-147; G. Ryle,

Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), Essay I pp. 1-44.
On The Sophist see in particular pp. 42-46.
"However, there is a pair of concepts which are forced upon our notice in the course of the operations which turn out to require a very different sort of elucidation, namely those of non-existence and existence. For a Sophist is a pretender who either thinks or says that what is not so is so.
The puzzle which arose in the Theaetetus arises again here. How can what does not exist be named, described or thought of? And if it cannot, how can we or Sophists talk or think of it, falsely, as existing? So the question is squarely put: What does it mean to assert or deny existence of something?
(...)
"Now the interesting thing is that it is true that existence and nonexistence are what we should call 'formal concepts', and further that if modern logicians were asked to describe the way in which formal concepts differ from proper or material or content-concepts, their method of exhibiting the role of formal concepts would be similar to that adopted here by Plato. But we need not go further than to say that Plato was becoming aware of some important differences of type between concepts.
There is no evidence of his anticipating Aristotle's enquiry into the principles of inference, which enquiry it is which first renders the antithesis of formal and other concepts the dominant consideration.
There is, consequently, in Plato, no essay at abstracting the formal from the contentual features of propositions, and so no code-symbolisation for the formal in abstraction from the material features of propositions." (pp. 44-46 of the reprint)

44. ———. 1960. "Letters and Syllables in Plato." The Philosophical Review no. 69:431-451.
Reprinted in G. Ryle, Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), Essay III pp. 57-75.

"In his later dialogues Plato makes a lot of use of the notions of letters of the alphabet and the spelling of syllables out of these letters. He frequently uses these notions for the sake of analogies which help him to expound some more abstract matters.
There is one of his uses of the letter-syllable model which is not of special interest to me, namely, for the exposition of some merely chemical theories about the combinations of a few material elements into multifarious compounds.
Plato employs this model in this way in the Timaeus (48B–C), though he says that the analogy is not a good one. Here he is stating what is essentially an Empedoclean theory. Sextus Empiricus says that stoicheion, used thus to denote an ultimate material element, was a Pythagorean term.
My interest is in Plato's use of the alphabet model in expounding his logical or semantic views, namely his views about the composition of the thoughts, that is, the truths and falsehoods that we express or can express in sentences (logoi)." (p. 57 of the reprint)
(...)
"Conclusion. Plato in his late dialogues was concerned with some of the same cardinal problems as those which exercised Frege and the young Russell, problems, namely, about the relations between naming and saying; between the meanings of words and the sense of sentences; about the composition of truths and falsehoods; about the role of 'not'; about the difference between contradictories and opposites; and in the end, I think, about what is expressed by 'if ' and 'therefore'. His admirable model, which Frege lacked, of the phonetic elements in syllables enabled Plato to explain more lucidly than Frege the notion of the independent-variability-without separability of the meanings of the parts of sentences. On the other hand, lacking the apparatus of algebra, he was nowhere near abreast of Frege's and Russell's symbolisation of substitution-places. Plato could not extract implications from their particular contexts or therefore codify implication patterns. A blackboard would have been of no use to him.

Plato says nothing about the bearings of the alphabet model on the Theory of Forms, or of the Theory of Forms on the alphabet model. So I shall not say much. If the Theory of Forms had maintained or entailed that Forms are just subject-terms of a superior sort, that is, just eminent namables, then this theory could contribute nothing to Plato's new question, What does a sentence convey besides what its subject name mentions?
But if the theory of Forms had been meant or half-meant to explain the contributions of live predicates, including tensed verbs, to truths and falsehoods about mentioned subjects, then in his operations with the model of letters and syllables, Plato has raised to maturity things which, in his Theory of Forms, had been only embryonic. To his terminal questions about the composition of logoi and, therewith, about the roles of live, tensed verbs, the Theory of Forms was either quite irrelevant or else quite inadequate." (pp. 74-75 of the reprint)

45. Saati, Alireza. 2015. "Plato's Theory of the Intercommunion of Forms (Συμπλοκὴ Εἰδῶν): the Sophist 259, e4-6." Philosophy Study no. 5:35-43.
"Plato's lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of believing that nothing (το μη᾽ ὂν) does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher after facing the foe and having the last laugh simmers down. In this paper after giving an interpretation of what Parmenides says, I shall present an analysis of Plato's drastic answer to him (Sophist, 259 e4-6) to see how Plato opens the impasse way created by the Eleatic philosopher. Here the intercommunion of Forms is regarded as the final answer by which Plato devastates Parmenides infamous thesis. Since hitherto no in-depth analysis is given by the scholars who are puzzled with the subject, I have tried to analyze the intercommunion of Forms philosophically. Plato's Eleatic challenge has always been crucial in Plato himself and philosophical development after him. As while as Parmenides thesis (Sph., 238 a8-9) provides the sophists opportunity to reject the falsehood, Plato's theory of Forms in contrast in order to cross off the

extremely sly sophists tries to make Parmenides come down. In my opinion, the intercommunion of Forms, as the last step of the theory of Forms, basically determines Plato's late ontology tightly knitted with logic. Vindicating this proposal depends on true understanding of the intercommunion of Forms. Since Plato's late ontology, in my opinion, is closed to Frege's ontology and discussion of language, we are armed to interpret the intercommunion of Forms with recent recent logico-philosophicus achievements, I think.
In this respect, this is what I have done in my paper: analyzing sentence from Plato's logico-metaphysical point of view. Ultimately, I have tried to show how the aim of the intercommunion of Forms, which Plato himself states, is demonstrating the possibility of dialogue and discourse. This statement explicitly sets forward that the discussion is bound up with several logical approaches, according to which finally full bright light is shed on different implications of the subject such as universals." (p. 35)

46. Sabrier, Pauline. 2019. "Parts, Forms, and Participation in the Parmenides and Sophist: A Comparison." Etudes platoniciennes no. 15:1-9.
Abstract: "This paper addresses the vexed question of the outcome of the second horn of the dilemma of participation in Plato's Parmenides bringing in Sophist 257c7-d5 where the Eleatic Stranger accepts what he seems to reject in the Parmenides, namely that a Form can have parts and nevertheless remain one. Comparing Plato's treatment of parts of Forms in both passages, and in particular the relation among Being, Change and Rest at Sophist 250a8-c8, I argue that unlike in the Parmenides, in the Sophist, parts and wholes are seen as offering a structure that can explain how things that may, at first, appear unrelated nevertheless belong together."
47. ———. 2020. "Plato's Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the Sophist: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)." Apeiron:1-20.

Abstract: "In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the Gigantomachia passage of Plato's Sophist (249b5–249c9), according to which it is an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that on the former, Plato's argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption, whereas on the latter, Plato's argument is free from any such commitments. If the argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also invites us to reconsider Plato's approach to the question of being in the Sophist."

48. Sallis, John. 1975. Being and Logos. The Way of Platonic Dialogue. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.
Second edition with a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: Being and Logos. Reading the Platonic dialogues, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Chapter VI. The Way of Logos: Sophist, pp. 456-532.
49. ———. 2013. "Plato's Sophist: A Different Look." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:283-291.
Reprinted in: Hallvard Fossheim, Vigdis Songe-Møller, Knut Ågotnes, Knut (eds.), Philosophy as Drama: Plato's Thinking through Dialogue, New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2019, pp. 231-240.
Abstract: "This paper deals with the question of difference in the Sophist. It begins with the difference that sets this dialogue apart from its dramatic predecessor, the Theaetetus, and with the task posed at the outset of determining the difference between the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. An account is then given of

the critical engagements through which the question of being and of its intertwining with nonbeing is taken up. Outlining the discussion of the five kinds, it concludes with a close examination of the genos difference as “chopped into bits” and hence as a different “look”."

50. Sampson, Kristin. 2013. "A Third Possibility: Mixture and Musicality." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:328-338.
Abstract: "This paper considers two small textual places within Plato’s Sophist, namely 252d–253c and 259d–260b. First it turns to what is called a third possibility and looks at how this is described by examples related to the letters of the alphabet and the notes of music. Three words that are used to describe the mixing that these two examples display are συμμίγνυμι, κοινωνία, and μίξις. What is common for these three words is that they are shrouded in a similar kind of ambiguity of meaning, related to sexuality.
This paper argues the relevance of taking this ambiguity seriously, something which has not, to my knowledge, previously been done. Next it considers how the exposition of this third possibility results in the emergence of the philosopher. At this point also a view of language and thinking (logos) related to the philosopher is developed, and used in order to distinguish between the philosopher and the sophist. At the end of the paper, in the last textual fragment mentioned (259d–260b), it is indicated how this is a place where an echo of the musical and the philosophical resound, where these two elements are linked to each other, to logos, and to the necessity of mixture."

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Annotated bibliography on Plato's *Sophist*. Seventh Part: Say - Zuc

Bibliography

1. Sayre, Kenneth M. 1970. "Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist." Noûs no. 4:81-91.
"The Sophist is one of Plato's most constructive dialogues, and one of the most cleverly constructed. Feigning pursuit of the essential sophist, Plato analyzes in turn (a) δύναμις as the mark of what is, (b) collection and division as the source of "the free man's knowledge," (c) the modes of combination among the forms, (d) Difference as the nature of "that which is not" and, in culmination, (e) the distinction between false and true judgment which separates the sophist from the philosopher. These results surpass in their solidity any positive contribution of the Phaedo or the Republic.
Yet they are achieved with a more austere conception of the forms than any found in these earlier dialogues. The structure of this more mature conception, I believe, is best illustrated in Plato's analysis of true and false discourse. My purpose in this paper is (1) to recapitulate what I take to be Plato's analysis of truth and falsehood in the Sophist, (2) to contrast the theory of forms presupposed by this analysis with the theory of the Phaedo and the Republic, and (3) to sketch against this background the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in the Sophist and other late dialogues. My contention, in preview, is that a form in this later context is a kind definable in terms of criteria for membership, and that participation is the relationship by

which individuals qualify for membership in a kind." (pp. 81-82)

2. ———. 1976. "Sophist 263b Revisited." Mind no. 85:581-586.
"This passage [Sophist 263b: "Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies'] has posed problems for sympathetic commentators. One is the problem of mere intelligibility. (1) A more basic problem has been that of reconstructing from the passage a credible account of true and false judgment. In Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago, 1969) I offered an interpretation which, although I believe accurately directed, is potentially flawed in an important respect.(2) The difficulty with this interpretation stems from a mistaken assumption, which most commentators share, about the nature of not-Being in the Sophist account. Correcting this mistake yields an interpretation which is more fully Platonic both in content and elegance, and which is considerably more faithful to the text of the dialogue."
(1) A sensitive discussion of syntactical ambiguities in these sentences may be found in David Keyt's 'Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,' in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (Humanities Press, New York: 1973), to which I am indebted in the translation above.
Robert Vacca also is to be thanked for advice on Plato's use of ὄν ἔστι ̆ν .
(2) I say 'potentially flawed' because, although the interpretation in the book is literally compatible with what I now believe to be the correct account, its further elucidation in my 'Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist,' Noûs, iv (1970), 81-91, brought the flaw to the surface. I am indebted to Alvin Plantinga for drawing the problem to my attention.
This interpretation was developed originally in response to difficulties with other accounts of false judgment in the Sophist, which need not be reviewed for present purposes.

3. ———. 1983. Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the essay "Excess and Deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C".
4. ———. 1992. "A maieutic view of five late dialogues. Methods of interpreting Plato." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. Supplementary volume:221-243.
"There are five dialogues of Plato's late period, each consisting of a conversation with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the case of the Theaetetus, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues, notably the Phaedo and book 6 of the Republic. In each of the remaining four, however, the method is expounded and applied within the same conversation-by the Stranger from Elea in the Sophist and the Statesman, by Parmenides himself in his namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late Philebus. I shall refer to these five as the methodological dialogues." (p. 221)
(...)
"I have made two claims concerning the methodological dialogues.
The first is that the conversational format of these dialogues is intended to serve the maieutic function described by Socrates in the Theaetetus, and characterized in the Seventh Letter as the only path to the flame-like revelation of philosophic knowledge. The second is that the respective methods of these conversations provide the structure by which they are enabled to lead the reader to that state of fulfilment.
The first claim is supported by the texts involved, the second by the experience of the attentive reader. Neither claim by itself, perhaps, is particularly adventuresome. I have suggested further, however, that together these claims answer the question posed at the beginning of this discussion: namely, how the conversational format of these five late dialogues relates to the methods they severally illustrate. The answer, in summary, is that the method in each case provides the discipline by which the reader is

enabled to follow the path of the conversation, to the state of wisdom that can be found at its end." (p. 243)

5. ———. 2006. Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Chapter 2. Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist 36; Chapter 3. Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist 52-72.
   "The Statesman is third in a sequence of dialogues employing the method of dialectical division. In both the Phaedrus and the Sophist, division is paired with a companion procedure of collection. To evaluate the absence of collection in the Statesman, it is helpful to look carefully at how it functions in these two previous dialogues. This is the purpose of Chapter 2. Also discussed in this chapter is the language of collection that appears in the Philebus, despite the absence of the corresponding methodological procedure.
   In similar fashion, Chapter 3 addresses the use of division in those two earlier dialogues. A notable feature of division in the Phaedrus is its use of nondichotomous distinctions, a feature which is absent in the Sophist but reappears in the Statesman. The Sophist contains eight fully developed lines of division in all, each of which is examined in the course of this chapter." (p. 5)
6. ———. 2008. "Dialectic by Negation in Three Late Dialogues." In Reading Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien, edited by Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 189-212. Leiden: Brill.
   "While little is beyond dispute in Platonic commentary, it seems clear that there are three distinct methods of dialectical inquiry to be found in the middle and late dialogues. One is the method of hypothesis featured in the final arguments of the Phaedo and implicated in the Divided Line of the Republic. Another is the method of collection and division, introduced in the Phaedrus and employed extensively in the Sophist before collection is phased out in the course of the Statesman. And third is the method introduced by Parmenides in his namesake dialogue and meticulously illustrated in the ensuing arguments on Unity.

(1) I shall refer to this latter as “Parmenides’ method.” (p. 189)
(...)
But what are we to say in this regard about Parmenides’ method?
Unlike the other two, the dialectical procedure employed by Parmenides is confined to a single dialogue. On initial consideration, at least, it appears that we lack evidence for earlier versions in Plato’s thought.(4)
While the dialectical approach in question is said (at Parmenides 135D) to be essential for achieving the truth, and while it produces some of the most substantial results in the entire Platonic corpus, (5) we encounter it here in full-blown form with no indication of prior development. Or so at least it appears.
The purpose of the present paper is to dispel this appearance. Parmenides’ method is distinguished from the other two primarily by its use of negative hypotheses. As we shall see, there are sections of both the Sophist and the Statesman where negation figures in the explication of important topics. While these passages are familiar in their own right, I am not aware of any previous attempt to connect them with the distinctive method of the Parmenides. If the attempt of the present paper is successful, we will have reason to believe that Parmenides’ method was anticipated in dialectical manoeuvers employed (appropriately enough) by the Eleatic Stranger." (p. 190)
(1) While any of these three methods might be accompanied by elenchus in a particular rhetorical setting, it should be noted that Socratic refutation by itself is not a dialectical method.
(4) Although one part of the procedure is said at 135D8 to trace back to Zeno, there is no reason to think that the method overall is not due to Plato himself.
(5) This claim is supported in K. Sayre, Parmenides’ Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato’s Parmenides (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

7. Schipper, Edith Watson. 1964. "The Meaning of Existence in Plato's Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient

Philosophy no. 9:38-44.
"In this paper, I should like to give arguments for the following points: (1) that, for the later Plato, what exists must be defined by forms interrelated in logos; (2) that the particular things of experience exist, and also are defined by the interrelated forms. Their existence is not that of substantial subjects beyond their predicative forms, but is comprised by the forms, which formulate them and bring them out of the matrix of experience. Thus, Plato is sketching a profoundly original approach to the perennial problems of philosophy." (p. 38)

8. ———. 1965. "Souls, Forms, and False Statements in the Sophist." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 15:240-242.
"In a provocative and ingeniously worked out article, Robert Turnbull has presented his view of the Sophist's account of false statements.(1) I should like to bring out some passages which raise questions about his position, and briefly suggest an alternative view to which I think they point.
The argument, as I understand it, rests upon Mr. Turnbull's interpretation of the Platonic ontology as consisting of " forms, souls, and immanent characters "(2) Immanent characters or actions, " the stuff of Becoming ", exist in the souls, and participate in the forms for which the souls strive. A false statement about a soul ascribes to it a possible action participating in a form which is not (is different from or contrary to) the form for which the soul strives. For " the contrariety of forms is reflected in references to actions "(3) Thus, a false statement rests on the difference of some forms from others, though it is about the possible actions which illustrate the contrary forms and are somehow in the souls." (p. 240)
(1) "The Argument of the Sophist", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, Jan. 1964, pp. 23-34.
(2) op. cit., p. 24.
(3) op. cit., p. 34.

9. ———. 1965. Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Chapter IV: Forms in the Sophist, pp. 31-42.

"This little book is concerned with one problem, that of whether and in what respects Plato continued to hold his earlier theory of forms of the Phaedo and Republic in his later dialogues. The earlier theory is first considered; since those who deny that Plato continued to hold his theory base their contention on an interpretation of it which is inadequate to explain even the arguments of the earlier dialogues. The later dialogues are then examined, in an attempt to show that the earlier theory is continually assumed, in all its essentials; although it is developed and modified to make it more consistent and adequate to experience.
Special attention is given to Plato's treatment of the problem of the relation of the forms to the perceived things, left unexplained in the earlier dialogues, but clearly recognized and wrestled with in the later ones. This problem is the perennial one of how the objects of intellectual argument and explanation are related to the things of experience. A solution to that problem is brought out in Plato's reconsideration of his theory of forms." (Preface, P. VII)
"The Sophist by common consensus, is placed sometime after the Parmenides and Theaetetus, and before the Politicus. Its place in the dialogues is thought to follow their literary order; and it starts with an appointment made at the end of the Theaetetus, while the Politicus refers to the immediately preceding discussion of the Sophist.
The Sophist could be subtitled: On Being and Not Being. Ostensibly, it is a laboriously worked out definition of the sophist by means of diaeresis, carried on by the Eleatic Stranger. Again, Theaetetus responds. Yet the defining of the sophist seems to serve primarily as a means of introducing discussions of the nature of existence and as an illustration of the interconnecting of the forms, the συμπλοκη ειδων, the central conception of the dialogue and the most important addition to Plato's later metaphysics." (p. 31)

10. Schoener, Abraham. 2000. "Not the Sophist." In Retracing the Platonic Text, edited by Russon, John Edward and

Sallis, John, 41-54. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"We must pause for a moment to recall just what Penelope is weaving. It is a burial shroud for Laertes, the father of Odysseus-the father of the image of the philosopher-who is not yet dead. This is a sign that, for Plato, the writing of the dialogues is not a supplement or marker for the dead, defunct Philosopher, but that the writing precedes and even announces his death. Plato's Socratic dialogues are Socrates' Penelopean burial shroud, tolling the death of conversational, "living," philosophy.
This brings us to our last question. This is a very vexed one and seems to be addressed with the greatest seriousness in all of the literature on the Sophist. The question is: Who is the (real) Philosopher?
Our answer must now be "Nobody in particular." Stop worrying about the question. It is a question left over from the pretextual era of philosophy. Once philosophy becomes and recognizes itself to be textual, the question for now and all time is: What is being? This displacement is the deepest form of the patricide of Socrates by Plato." (p. 53)

11. Sedley, David. 2019. "Etymology in Plato's Sophist." Hyperboreus. Studia Classica no. 25:290-301.
Abstract: "The etymological method displayed at considerable length in the Cratylus is widely assumed to be intended by Plato as an object of ridicule. In my 2003 monograph Plato's Cratylus I resisted this assumption. In the present paper I seek to strengthen my case by arguing that in Plato's major work on philosophical logic, the Sophist, the same method is re-employed twice, at 221 a–c and 228 b–e, for entirely serious purposes."
12. Seligman, Paul. 1974. Being and Not-Being. An Introduction to Plato's Sophist. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
"The present study has been undertaken with the ontological perspective in mind. In addition the historical roots of Plato's thinking will be emphasized. His struggle with the Eleatic legacy permeates this dialogue in a deeper sense and to a greater degree than has generally been admitted. On the other hand, the value of logically and

linguistically oriented exegeses of the Sophist, such as have appeared during the last thirty years, is readily acknowledged. Still, they have not given us the whole story; they have neglected a significant dimension of Plato's thinking, and therefore need supplementing, and it only speaks for the richness of his work that it can be approached in more than one way.

My discussion will concentrate on the middle sections of the dialogue and follow the order of its argument, which develops organically and with greater cohesion than its dramatic form and artistic presentation might suggest. There can be no doubt about the seriousness of Plato's concern (contra Peck, 1952, cp. Runciman, 1962, p. 59), but there is also present a tinge of poetic playfulness which can have a baffling effect on readers seeking straightforward, unequivocal answers. At times it looks as though Plato lived up to the Heraclitean word that nature likes to conceal itself. It seems though that on some issues raised in the Sophist Plato himself was wavering, that there are others on which he had not made up his mind. In any case, he was never prone to produce a closed and final system, and each dialogue right to the end of his life meant a fresh start. But certain positions he never surrendered, and some of these permeate the Sophist as well. One of them is his belief in a rational and intrinsically knowable order of reality. That order is apprehended by the intuitive intellect and capable of being set out, indeed needing to be set out, in reasoned discourse; i.e., it is apprehended by noesis, accompanied by logoi. As Plato matured, the emphasis shifted from the former to the latter mode. And while the latter takes the stage in the Sophist, there is no evidence that the former was abandoned by him even then." (pp. 2-3)

References

Peck, A. L. (1962). "Plato's Sophist: The Symploke ton Eidon," Phronesis, VII, I.

Runciman, W. G. (1962). Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge, U.P.

13. Sellars, John. 2010. "Stoic Ontology and Plato’s Sophist." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies:185-203.

"It has been suggested that Stoic ontology should be conceived as a reaction against Platonism thus understood. It has also been suggested that Stoic ontology be conceived as a 'reversal' of Platonism,(4) inverting the order of priority between bodies and incorporeals, or particulars and universals, depending how one views it. The most significant attempt to analyse the relationship between Stoic ontology and the work of Plato, however, must be Jacques Brunschwig's article 'The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology" in which he argues that Stoic ontology was in effect a philosophical response to material the early Stoics found in Plato's Sophist.(5) It was through reading Plato, Brunschwig claims, that the early Stoics developed their own distinctive position.
The aim of what follows is to assess this claim and to ask whether Stoic ontology can be read as the product of a critical engagement with Plato's Sophist. I shall begin in the first section with a brief overview of Stoic ontology along with a closer look at some of the differences between the principal recent interpretations. I shall focus my attention not only on Brunschwig's account of Stoic ontology but also those of David Sedley (which came before) and Victor Caston (which came after).(6) In the second section I shall move on to consider the Sophist, giving a brief overview of those sections of the dialogue that Brunschwig claims already contain the central features of Stoic ontology. In the third and final section I shall consider to what extent, if any, Stoic ontology can be said to be the product of a critical reading of the Sophist." (pp. 183-184)
(4) This is a claim made by G. Deleuze, Logique du sens (Paris 1969), where he says that the Stoics were the first to reverse Platonism. However he doesn't specify how he thinks they achieved this and his account of Stoic ontology is eccentric to say the least (on which see J. Sellars, 'Aiôn and Chronos: Deleuze and the Stoic theory of time', Collapse 3 (2007) 177-205 (178 n. 4)). Elsewhere, in Différence et répétition (Paris 1968), he claims that Plato himself was the first to reverse Platonism.

(5) First published as J. Brunschwig, ‘La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l’ontologie platonicienne’, in Matter and metaphysics, ed. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (Naples 1988) 19-127 and translated in Brunschwig’s Papers in Hellenistic philosophy (Cambridge 1994) 92-157. All subsequent references are to the English version.
(6) It goes without saying that I have learned an enormous amount from the work of each of these authors and what I offer here is merely by way of a footnote to their contributions to our understanding of Stoic ontology. I shall not discuss directly earlier accounts of Stoic ontology as they are dealt with and taken into consideration in the works I shall consider, but I note the earlier discussion in J. M. Rist, Stoic philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 152-72.

14. Shorey, Paul. 1930. "Plato Sophist 255c and το δισσόν." Classical Philology no. 88:80.
15. ———. 1931. "Plato Sophist 236 C and Laws 668 A ff." Classical Philology no. 81:323-324.
"To sum up the common sense of the matter, in the Sophist and in order to disparage the sophist, Plato says that we may distinguish two kinds of imitation in all the mimetic arts, that which produces a likeness and that which produces an illusion. He employs a similar if not precisely identical distinction in Republic 380 D for another purpose. Elsewhere, when he has no such purpose in mind and is merely speaking of the general theory of art, he amplifies "imitation" by the addition of the virtual synonym "representation," and says art is imitation and representation. This, as the passage of Aristotle quoted shows [*], is a perfectly natural mode of expression, and it is the height of hypercriticism to read into it a contradiction or withdrawal of the special point that there are tricky arts for which illusion is a better name than representation or the production of an objective likeness." (p. 324)
[*] Aristotle, Poetics, 11447 a 19: πολλα` μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες.
16. Shukhoshvili, Maia. 2016. "Tékhnē in Plato's Sophist (Discussing Heidegger's Opinion)." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25),

edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 131-142. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The aim of this chapter is a discussion of the concept of tékhnē in Plato's Sophist, since this dialogue distinguishes and defines many different tékhnai. But what is tékhnē for Plato? Very often tékhnē is translated by 'art', but this is not the case for Plato and especially not in the Sophist.
The chapter is divided into four main parts. First of all I would like to propose Heidegger's definition and interpretation of tékhnē. Then I will examine the etymology and precise meaning of tékhnē in Ancient Greek.
The third part is concerned with the meaning and use of tékhnē in Plato's dialogues, and finally, in the last part of the chapter I will try to reach the meaning of tékhnē in Plato's Sophist." (p. 131)

17. Silverman, Allan. 2002. The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato's Metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. See in particular Chapter Five: Forms and Language, pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six: Not-Beings, pp. 182-217.
18. Smith, Colin C. 2019. "Dialectical Methods and the Stoicheia Paradigm in Plato's Trilogy and Philebus." Plato Journal no. 19:7-23.
Abstract. "Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman exhibit several related dialectical methods relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in Theaetetus, bifurcatory division in Sophist and Statesman, and non-bifurcatory division in Statesman, related to the 'god-given' method in Philebus. I consider the nature of each method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον) paradigm, used to reflect on each method. At issue are the element's appearances in given contexts, its fitness for communing with other elements like it in kind, and its own nature defined through its relations to others. These represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic student inquiring into the sources of knowledge."
19. ———. 2020. "Diairesis and Koinonia in Sophist 253d1-e3." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 378:1-20.
Abstract: "Here I interpret a central passage in Plato's Sophist by focusing on understudied elements that provide

insight into the fit of the dialogue's parts and of the Sophist–Statesman diptych as a whole. I argue that the Eleatic Stranger's account of what the dialectician "adequately views" at Sophist 253d1–e3 involves both division and the communion of ontological kinds—not just one or the other as has usually been argued. I also consider other key passages and the turn throughout the dialogue from imagistic opining toward noetic understanding."

20. ———. 2021. "The Method of Bifurcatory Division in Plato's Sophist." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 42:229-260.
Abstract: "The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato's Sophist begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of mental gymnastics that will stretch us properly in preparation for further, more challenging dialectical work. Considering several interpretive issues, I argue that bifurcatory division is a process of collective inquiry into the common through which an account, both definitional and taxonomical, is discovered. Depending on the level of understanding exhibited by the inquirers, this account may or may not allow for noetic understanding of the object in the deepest sense."
21. Solana, José. 2013. "Socrates and «Noble» Sophistry (Sophist 226b-231c)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 71-85. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The sixth division of the Sophist has caused and continues to cause notable perplexity for several reasons.
1. It is introduced into the dialogue in an anomalous way. The Stranger speaks about two kinds of art: acquisitive (κτητική) and productive (ποιντική). However, later on he introduces a third kind: separative (διακριτική) art, whose relationship with the earlier types remains unexplained.

2. The role of this new art in relation to the overall objective of the dialogue, which is to reach a strict definition of the nature of the sophist, is also not explained.
3. Apart from not contributing to the main objective, it creates great difficulties, since, on the one hand, the Stranger speaks of a “noble Sophistry” and, on the other hand, the sophist is defined as a negative figure: one who is in possession of a knowledge which is merely apparent (233c10). Thus the paradox occurs that noble Sophistry is entrusted with the task of destroying the apparent knowledge (231b5) produced by Sophistry.
In view of these difficulties, it is relevant to question, with Cornford ([1935)] 182), why in that case this division stands here." (pp. 71-72, notes omitted)
(...)
"So Plato would have faced two options: either to discard the αντιλογική τεκνηέ which would have seriously affected the ἔλεγχος, or to preserve it in the form of γενναια σοφιστική. This second option, chosen by Plato in the Sophist, is proof that Plato’s position against the sophists has to do with axiological and normative postulates rather than with theoretical questions and arguments." (p. 85)

22. Speliotis, Evantha. 2013. "Sophist and Philosopher in Plato's Sophist." In Socratic Philosophy and Its Others, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise, 197-215. Lanham: Lexington Books.
"Having completed the search for the sophist and having identified the nature of his activity (see 218b-c), we may now reflect back and "calculate before ourselves" (dialogisometha, 231d) how he has appeared and what we have learned. From the beginning, the sophist has been particularly associated with appearances, and he may be said to dwell in, even to be a master of, appearances.
(...)
And yet the philosopher, too, appears. Just as the sophist faces a threat because of his overweening attention to the appearances and, the Stranger has argued, insufficient attention to knowledge, being, and truth; the philosophr also faces a challenge and a threat if, in his devotion to and

pursuit of knowledge and truth, he does not care sufficiently for the appearances.
(...)
The Stranger, therefore, concludes the Sophist with both an affirmation and a criticism of Socrates. Socrates is in his being, his intention, and his activity a philosopher. But Socrates is also, in a sense "poor in speeches" (phaulos en logois). As masterful as he is at phantastic imitation, he is not masterful enough. For all his knowledge and his skill, his devotion to truth and being to the exclusion of appearance is a weakness, not a strength. The philosopher need not be a victim of others' opinions. Being masterful as he is at phantastike, he should also give some care and attention not only to what he does, but how he appears to others when he does it. As Plato seems to suggest also in the Phaedrus, the philosopher must embrace, not eschew, the true art of rhetoric, the art of making both true and beautiful speeches (see Phaedrus 277b-d)." (pp. 212-213)

23. Starr, David E. 1974. "The Sixth Sophist: Comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's "On Six Definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221e-231e"." Philosophical Forum no. 5:486-492.
24. Stenzel, Julius. 1940. Plato's Method of Dialectic. Oxfordf: Clarendon Press.
Translated and edited by D. J. Allan.
25. Stough, Charlotte. 1990. "Two Kinds of Naming in the Sophist." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 20:355-381.
"Those who hold the view that Plato is committed to self-predication by his theory of Forms are forced to consider whether he ever came to terms with the problem and, if he did not, why he did not, in view of the apparently damaging effects of the Third Man Argument. Their opponents in the tradition, on the other hand, insist that Plato would not have agreed that a Form can be predicated of itself and that his theory does not imply it. But they in turn have been hard put to explain the import of the Third Man Argument, which appears to trade so heavily on that assumption, as well as the unmistakably self-predicative language of the dialogues. I believe that this line of thinking focuses too narrowly on what we have come to understand as the 'problem of self-

predication'. To begin with, no winner in the debate is anywhere in view. Plato's language, overtly self-predicative though it is, gives no purchase to either party in the dispute, and the textual evidence on both sides is notoriously inconclusive. Much of the debate has centered on several controversial passages in the Sophist. In this paper I shall argue that the Sophist offers no unambiguous interpretation of grammatically self-predicative statements because it does not, either by design or in effect, distinguish between predication and identity. Instead of attacking certain troublesome puzzles connected with Being by directly analyzing that concept (esti), Plato offers a solution to those problems by distinguishing between two kinds of names." (pp. 355-356)

26. Strawser, Bradley Jay. 2012. "Those Frightening Men: A New Interpretation of Plato's Battle of Gods and Giants." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 16:217-232.
    Abstract: "In Plato's Sophist (245e–247e) an argument against metaphysical materialism in the "battle of gods and giants" is presented which is oft the cause of consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the materialist position. Attempts to explain it usually resort to restructuring the argument while others rearrange the Sophist entirely to rebuild the argument in a more satisfying form. I propose a different account of the argument that does not rely on a disservice to the materialist nor restructuring Plato's argument. I contend, instead, that the argument is enthymematic in nature, allowing the definitions employed to flow out of the reasoning as originally presented. Moreover, it suggests that Plato's idealism was so deeply ingrained that modern defenses of materialism were not even live options."
27. Sweeney, Leo. 1988. "Participation in Plato's dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Timaeus." The New Scholasticism no. 62:125-149.
    "Having witnessed Plato's upgrading intelligence (and thereupon the efficient causality it exercises) and his disclosing the efficient causality it exercises) and his

disclosing the extent and nature of divine artistry, let us now, before moving to the Timaeus. bring the Sophist into focus with the Phaedo and Parmenides." (p. 125)
(...)
"In order to succeed, the three-factor theory of the Phaedo (the Form itself, the participated perfections, participants) needed further causes to explain how the participated perfections themselves were produced in the participants without the Form itself being changed, multiplied, divided. His answer can be found in the Parmenides and Sophist, where he joined participation explicitly with exemplarity and efficiency. More adequately, then, participation consists in things being made-as-images of the Forms (Parm. 132D3-4), which thereby are present in their participants through the participated perfections they cause by paradigmatically directing the artistic activity of cognitive agents (Sophist. 248E sgg. and 264 sgg.).
The advantages of this more adequate conception are obvious. By their activity agents are genuine causes that sensible existents are what they are. By their indirect presence through participated perfections the Forms are genuine causes of what things are. Yet they are not divided or multiplied or changed or lessened by their causality. Simply by being what it is, a Form can constantly direct as model whatever artistic activity the cognitive agent wishes to engage in. Sensible existents themselves are actually produced and yet they remain imperfect: they are only images of the Forms, upon which they depend constantly for being what they are.
Plato's procedure in formulating his philosophy was, then, to start with participation and end with efficient and exemplary causalities. But these latter do not replace the former: they complement and enrich it. à thing's participation in Forms results from the divine agent producing it while acting under their paradigmatic guidance." (p. 134)

28. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox: Negative Reference and Negative Existentials." The Review of Metaphysics no. 33:727-744.

"In this section I hope to show that Plato offers in the Sophist an alternative conception of being and irreferential language which avoids commitment to forms without instances.
Although I believe the Sophist contains a general semantics of reference, including the germ of a solution to the paradoxes of intensionality, I will confine myself here to Plato's solution of Parmenides' Paradox. Whereas the modern accounts I have been discussing begin with language and take some settled ontology for granted, Plato insists that a real solution requires a reconsideration of being itself. Only when we understand the nature of being can we begin to fathom reference to nonbeings.
There are at least three statements by the Eleatic Stranger defining being. At 238a he says, "To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is. . . . But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?" (24) An object exists if and only if it is possible for it to possess some real property besides existence. This principle is said to be violated in all attempts to refer to or describe what does not exist. At 247a, in refutation of materialists, the Stranger, alluding to virtues and vices, says, "But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists." If it is possible for anything to possess or not to possess some property, then that property exists. These two principles give us existential conditions for objects and properties.
(...)
"Being" means "possible relatedness"; being is exactly identical to possibility (dunamis); being is the possible possession of properties. At Plato's hands Parmenides' ontology falls prey to his own logic. They agree that nonbeings can have no properties, but Plato adds that beings must have properties besides their being. There can be no simple, either Parmenidean or Russellian." (p. 738)
(24) All passages from the Sophist are in H. N. Fowler's translation, Theaetetus and Sophist (New York: Loeb, 1921)

29. Tabak, Mehmet. 2015. Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4: Parmenides in Theaetetus and Sophist: Introduction 127; Plato's Critique of Protagoras in Theaetetus 128; Parmenides and Parmenides in Sophist 141; Conclusion 163-165.
"The eight arguments of the Parmenides are governed by eight hypotheses, or "suppositions" (henceforth, H1, H2, H3, etc.)." (p. 59)
(...)
"There is a noteworthy suggestion in Sophist to the effect that Parmenides's principle is self-contradictory. On the one hand, (1) Parmenides claims that only the one is (as in H1) or that it is not many in any way. On the other hand, (2) his description of the one suggests that it has being and thus is a whole with parts (as in H2). What we have here is akin to setting argument 2 against argument 1. Relatedly, Sophist does not take up (1) directly as an object of refutation except when the Stranger mentions briefly, but critically, that Parmenides denies any combination and any conception of the real as a plurality.
However, the Stranger's refutation of (2) makes it rather evident that H2 is attributable to the historical Parmenides and that Plato thinks it creates a "measureless perplexity" for Parmenides's doctrine.
Sophist also briefly, but strongly, suggests that Plato supports H3.
This is implied in the Stranger's definition of Unity itself." (p. 163)

30. Tegos, Michalis. 2019. "How does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? Or, Why the One is not among the Megista Gene." Platonic Investigations no. 10:42-73.
Abstract: "This paper explores the relation of the Sophist to the Parmenides: in what ways the Sophist responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the Parmenides. It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories used in the second part of the Parmenides, relate to the solutions proposed in the Sophist. The Parmenides has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in impossibility.

It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also, as an impossible map sketching how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its purpose, a parody, or training, a pedagogic exercise necessary for the proper way to truth.
Not, however, in order to discard forms, but, on the contrary, to affirm their necessity and to refine them, lest we end up abandoning forms and, with them, the possibility of dialectic and Philosophy. Throughout the Parmenides, the Theaetetus and the Sophist, we are led through a complex argumentative and dramatic strategy to the refutation of the Eleatic doctrine and the mature ontology of the Timaeus. We shall seek to show that the sections on dunamis, the megista gene and the community of forms that follow the Gigantomachia episode about ousia in the Sophist, propose a way out of the aporias of participation and the 'greatest difficulty' of the Parmenides, a way to salvage the theory of forms, and, with them, the possibility of knowledge, logos and Philosophy altogether."

31. Thomas, Christine Jan. 2008. "Speaking of Something: Plato's Sophist and Plato's Beard." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 38:631-668.
"After close examination of the Eleatic Visitor's arguments, I shall defend the view that Plato intends the something requirement articulated in the Sophist to be a metaphysical condition on significant discourse and contentful thought. For Plato, whatever is something is some one thing that is. In other words, whatever is something exists as a well-individuated, countable entity. Being and number 'belong to' whatever is something. Moreover, whatever is something is self-identical (by sharing in sameness) and different from everything else (by sharing in difference).
One of the central aims of the Sophist is to articulate and to develop Plato's metaphysics of somethings. We learn in the dialogue that, strictly speaking, speech and thought must be of existing, countable beings that are self-identical and different from everything else.
Some qualifications are, of course, in order. There is reason to believe that not simply any apparently contentful piece of

speech commits Plato to the somethinghood and existence of the purported subject. For example, the apparent meaningfulness of the sentences 'Pegasus does not exist' and 'Pegasus is winged' does not commit Plato to the somethinghood or existence or being of Pegasus. Or so I argue. (pp. 632-633 a note omitted)

32. Thorp, John. 1984. "Forms, Concepts and TO MH ON." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 2:77-92.
Note 1: "This paper is a reply to Y. Lafrance "Sur une lecture analytique du Sophiste 237 b 10 - 239 a 12" [Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, 2, 1984, pp. 41-76]. His paper and my reply continue a discussion which began when we gave a seminar together in 1982 - 83 at the University of Ottawa on 'The analytic and continental traditions in the exegesis of Plato's Sophist'. I wish to thank him both for his vigorous curiosity and also his friendly tolerance throughout the seminar and since." (p. 77)
(...)
"Conclusion
In conclusion let me simply restate the principal thesis which I have argued. Plato's Forms and analysts' concepts are fundamentally the same things. Once we see this a good deal of Plato's philosophical work becomes remarkably alive.
And given that Plato is thus sufficiently on our wavelength that we can take him out of the museum and treat him seriously as a philosopher, why should we not do so? I am sure it is what he would have wanted." (p. 92)

33. Tilgham, B. R. 1969. "Parmenides, Plato and logical atomism." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 7:151-160.
"In the Sophist Plato does not give us a theory of proper names although there is no reason to suppose he is not committed to thinking of names as meaning their bearers and likely enough he thinks of the names of the forms as logically proper names. Whether he would consider the name of a sensible object, e.g., “Theaetetus,” as a logically proper name, there is no evidence to suggest. At any rate, it doesn't make any difference. Whatever he takes to be logically proper names, it would, I think, be easy enough to

impose the theory of descriptions upon him to take care of the other words that we use to refer and, besides, what is important and original is not a theory of names, but a theory of sentence meaning." (p. 157)

34. Trevaskis, J.R. 1955. "The Sophistry of Noble Lineage (Plato, Sophistes 230a5-232b9)." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:36-49.
"This passage has recently been examined by Mr G. B. Kerferd in the Classical Quarterly.(1) He reaches interesting and novel conclusions.
The following article questions the results of his investigations and attempts to support the usual view of the passage.
It may be best to begin with a recapitulation of the dialogue up to 231 e6. An Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus attempt to define the sophist.
Five divisions are pursued under the generic starting-point κτητική. The sixth is preceded by a Collection which yields the term διαλεκτική. The τέχνη διαλεκτική is successively divided until a cathartic method of education is isolated. The question is then raised whether its practitioners are sophists. The Eleatic is doubtful about this, but is prepared to accept the qualified title." (p. 36)
(...)
"The reason for the sixth division appearing where it does in the Sophist must surely be that the method of Socrates portrayed in it was often confused with sophistry. After five divisions which characterize sophistry as Plato saw it and are plainly hostile, the sixth is "serious and sympathetic; towards the close it becomes eloquent.(2)" (p. 48)
(1) N.S. IV I, 2 (Jan.-Apr. 1954) pp. 84-90.
(2) i.e. Plato to his reader: "Continue to call it sophistry, if you insist; but if you do you are talking of a 'sophistry' of a very different order."

35. ———. 1966. "The μέγιστα γένη and the Vowel Analogy of Plato, Sophist 253." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 11:99-116.
"I wish to discuss the μέγιστα γένη section of the Sophist (251a5-259d8) and in particular some difficulties in the

passage 253a1-c3.
Let us begin by considering a couple of general points about the Sophist: 1. What is the Sophist about? Answers commonly given are that it is concerned with the relations of Ideas to one another, or with the elucidation of significant negative and of false statement, or with a development in Plato's ontology, or with the practical illustration of the method of Collection and Division, or with a number of these topics.
Even on the assumption (which I do not share) that all these topics are to be found treated in the dialogue, it does not seem to me that their treatment is other than incidental to a more fundamental theme: philosophy. The dialogue is an exercise in doing philosophy, which is distinct from its counterfeit, sophistry or casuistry. Of course all the dialogues are in a sense exercises in doing philosophy: the reader's mind is exercised by them in philosophical questions. But the Sophist is a dialogue which is itself pre-eminently a demonstration of philosophy in action. The passages concerned with significant negative and with false statement, for instance, are practical examples of casuistical positions refuted. No-one strongly interested in philosophy is likely to find the dialogue dry or technical. These adjectives may be applied to it by those more interested in literature than philosophy.
2. The discussion is led by a visitor from Elea' who, it is emphasized at the beginning of the dialogue and elsewhere, is a philosopher and no mere logic-chopper. He is, in fact, indistinguishable from Plato's Socrates in some traits: for example, his use of the aporematic method, and his penchant for the method of diaeresis.
The dialogue, then, shows us philosophy in action, and is conducted by a serious philosopher." (p. 99)
(1) I call him an 'Elean' rather than an 'Eleatic' since, although he is described at the opening of the dialogue as ἑταῖρον... τῶν ἀμφι` Παρμενίδην και` Ζήνωνα, it becomes clear in the course of the dialogue that he does not adopt the Eleatic position.

36. ———. 1967. "Division and its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:118-129.
"The formal divisional exercises which we meet above all in the Sophist may strike the reader as tedious. Yet it is usually said that Plato lays great store by Division as a method of philosophy, one, moreover, to which he gives the title of 'dialectic' and which reveals the real structure of Ideas.
I wish to discuss how far the method is to be identified with dialectic, what relation, if any, it bears to Plato's ontology, and what Plato hopes for from it. I shall be mainly concerned with Phaedrus, Sophist and Statesman, having discussed the Philebus on a previous occasion (Phronesis 5,1 [1960], 39-44)." (p. 118)
37. Trindade Santos, José. 2013. "For a Non-Predicative Reading of esti in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." Méthexis no. 26:39-50.
Abstract: "The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."
38. ———. 2016. "Reading Plato's Sophist." In Plato's Styles and Characters. Between Literature and Philosophy, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 89-99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Plato's Sophist explores a cluster of philosophical interconnected problems, namely those of truth/falsity and being/not-being. Highlighting some key passages in Plato's

dialogues in which these problems are approached I come to the Sophist where they are brought together and solved." (p. 89)
(...)
"The greatest innovation contained in this conception of dialectics consists in the previous separation and subsequent combination of the ontological and epistemological perspectives on reality(14). While the three first Greatest Kinds – Being, Movement and Rest – refer to what exists, the Same and the Other provide the dialectician with the ability to relate them using different kinds of statements: existential, identitative and predicative ones (this last one exploring the participation of Forms in one another: 255a–b, 256a).
Plato's theory of Being shows how this kind includes all the others granting them 'existence' (Being is everything that is, seen in itself). In his conception of Not-Being he starts by making manifest the function played by the Other as 'difference' (Not-Being is Being seen from the perspective of any other kind: 255d, 256d–e). He then proceeds to condense in the idea of 'contraposition' (257d–258c) the role played by Not-Being in the generation of ontological hierarchies.
In these each grade is what it is, in contraposition to all the others it is not, but in relation to which it is and is said by discourse (258d–259b)." (p. 97)
(14) In the Phaedo or the Republic Epistemology and Ontology are tied together, for each one of the two cognitive competences "is related to" its own content – "being" or "opinion" – and "effects" its product: "knowledge" or "belief" (R. [Republic] V 477d ff.).

39. Turnbull, Robert G. 1964. "The Argument of the Sophist." Philosophical Quarterly no. 14:23-34.
"The aim of this paper is to present and defend an explanation of the connections between the most noteworthy parts of Sophist. That explanation ties together the battle of gods and giants, the section on non-being and the section on speaking and thinking falsely. As always in Platonic interpretation, however, my explanation accords

with a more comprehensive interpretation of Platonic ontology and has ramifications for the explanation of other dialogues.

Baldly stated, my claim is as follows. In the battle of gods and giants section the Stranger insists that both forms and souls are, both being dynameis (powers). In the section on non-being a distinction is drawn between forms which, as it were, run through all the other forms as principles of their division and contrariety and forms which might be called " illustrable " forms (cf. the " illustrability " of mathematical forms in Republic in that the mathematician may draw diagrams). The former are Being, Same, and Different, the latter, Motion and Rest. Motion and Rest are among the " most important ", for every other illustrable form may be regarded as a kind (or sub-kind) of one of them. They are, moreover, contraries, that is, they mingle with Different with respect to each other. The section on speaking and thinking falsely requires that souls are, for " names " refer always to souls. It also requires contrariety, for " verbs " refer to immanent characters (i.e., to what, strictly, participate in forms) or, better, to " possible " immanent characters. And immanent characters, sharing contrariety with the forms in which they participate, provide the possibility of speaking or thinking what is not. To speak or think what is not (i.e., to make a false " statement ") is to refer to a soul and a " possible " immanent character, the " possibility " of which is assured by the diversity and contrariety of " illustrable " forms. The " discourse " principle which parallels the contrariety principle among the forms is : No soul may have in it at the same time (and in the same respect) contrary immanent characters.

And discourse here, of course, consists of juxtaposition of " names " and " verbs ".

In what follows, Part I will develop the intellectual considerations upon which my interpretation rests, providing a more general framework for it.

Part II will deal directly and briefly with the text of Sophist." (p. 23)

40. Turner, E. G. 1955. "A Ptolemaic scrap of Plato, Sophistes." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 98:97-98.
"Shortly before the publication in May 1955 of The Hibeh Papyri Part II, I identified the contents of two small scraps printed therein as No. 228 as from Plato, Sophistes. I had time to insert a slip stating the identification, but not to revise or assess the value of the text, and I attempt that revision and evaluation here." (p. 97)
41. Van Eck, Job. 1995. "Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e-263d." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 40:20-47.
"The dramatic aim of the Sophistes is to characterise the sophist and capture him in a definition. He is to be described as an illusionist who creates false beliefs. Therefore, an analysis of falsity is needed, which is provided in 263.
Now, three of the main problems the Sophistes has raised among interpreters are: 'What is the preparation Plato made before he could arrive at his analysis of falsehood?', 'What is the nature of the problem about falsity Plato gets to grips with?' and 'What account of negative predication, if any, can we derive from the dialogue?' In the following I want to deal with these questions." (p. 20)
(...)
"To conclude: there is no treatment of what we usually call negative predication (that is, nonpredication) in 255e-258e, nor any reference to it, nor any use made of it in 258e-263d; further, the analysis of a sentence of the type 'x is not F' we can derive from 240e-241a and 263b-d, shows that it does not imply negative predication in the strict meaning of the phrase, viz. that a negative predicate is attributed to x. Thus, in a double sense we can say that there is no negative predication in the Sophistes. What we do find is falsity without negative predication. In consequence, it is wrong to speak of the 'crucial inadequacy of [the] Sophist account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement (50); the Platonic account of negation we can derive from the Sophist is an immediate result of the theory of false

judgement we find there, and an adequate one indeed." (p. 40)
(50) Wiggins (1971), 268.

References

G. Vlastos ed. 1971. Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York.

Wiggins, D. 1971. 'Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being'. 268-303 in G. Vlastos ed. 1971.

42. ———. 1997. "A Note on Sophist 257b9-c3." Mnemosyne no. 50:75-77.
"In the literature we find two kinds of translations of Sophist 25 7b9-c3, but, strange enough, no discussion among the commentators of the point of difference at issue. In my opinion, both versions are unsatisfactory. I will try to prove this claim and offer an alternative. The question behind the difference between the translations is: on what part of the sentence do the genitives τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων (c1-2) and τῶν πραγμάτων (c2) depend?" (p. 75)
43. ———. 1999. "Plato's Analysis of Falsity. A Landmark in the History of Logical Analysis." In JFAK — Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of his 50th Birthday, edited by Gerbrandy, Jelle, Maarten, Marx., de Rijk, Maarten and Venema, Yde. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Abstract: "Plato's theory of falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in Sophistes 254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms: it is said to be fundamentally flawed in several respects. Yet it appears that the main origin of this view is an incorrect reading of the section on negation, which precedes the analysis of falsity. This section is interpreted as treating negative predication; in fact it treats higher order (non-)identity propositions (F is [not] G). And it is on the basis of these (non)identity propositions that the falsity of atomic first order sentences is explained. The resulting analysis turns out to be impeccable and fully adequate to the problems at issue."
44. ———. 2000. "Plato's logical insights: On Sophist 254d-257a." Ancient Philosophy no. 20:53-79.

"Plato has often been censured for a serious lack of important logical insights.
Especially his theory of not being and falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in the middle part of the Sophist, particularly 254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms." (p. 53)
(...)
"I shall discuss those parts of the text that have given rise to these criticisms, which I show to be all mistaken: Plato is not guilty of any of the fallacies or failures mentioned. On all points at issue here Plato's logical insights are perfectly sound." (p. 54)
(...)
"On the basis of the criticisms dealt with above, the section 254d-263d of the Sophist, containing Plato's theory of not-being and falsity, has been called 'one great logical mistake' (Bostock 1984, 90). Now that we have seen all these criticisms are false, how should we evaluate the theory? We found that it is not faultless either, as it contains the idea that (a) rest does not participate of movement and movement not of rest, because (b) this would turn their-opposite-natures into each other. Actually, only the first part of (a) is true and the reason given for it is not sound. In fact, this makes the system inconsistent: it follows from the text
that every form is at rest (contra a), and also that resting is not part of the physis of any form (except for rest, of course), and so will not interfere with the form of movement either (contra b). How serious is this and what is the position of the inconsistency within the theory as a whole?" (p. 77)
(...)
"Thus, within the theory as a whole the idea that movement would not partake of rest and vice versa because this would turn their natures into each other, is merely a marginal slip. In fact it is the only fault in an otherwise impeccable series of arguments, leading, as our outline in the introduction can only adumbrate, to a highly adequate analysis of not being and falsity. Far from being the logical mess the criticisms

would make us believe it is, the theory of falsity and negation we find in the Sophist is a masterpiece of logical analysis, to be reckoned among the great achievements in the history of the discipline." (p.78)

References

Bostock, D. 1984. 'Plato on "Is not' " Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 89-119.

45. ———. 2002. "Non-Being and Difference: on Plato's Sophist 256d5-258e3." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 23:63-84.

"Plato's analysis of falsity at Sophist 263 is given in terms of notbeing and difference. 'Theaetetus flies' is false because what is different is stated as the same, and what is not as what is, θάτερα ὡς τα᾽ αὐτα᾽ και᾽ μη᾽ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, (263 D 1-2), things that are different from what is the case concerning him (viz. flying) are described as the same (as what is the case about him). That there are indeed many μη᾽ ὄντα, 'not-beings' in the sense of things different from the things that are, the Eleatic Stranger (ES) and Theaetetus remarked some lines above, 'for we said there are many things that are with regard to each thing and many things that are not' (263 B 11-12), referring to 256 E 6-7, 'so, with regard to each of the forms, being is many and not-being is indefinite in quantity' . In this way they had been disobedient to Parmenides, who had stated, 'Never shall it force itself on us that things that are-not are [εἶναι μη ἐόντα].' But they had gone even further in their disobedience: 'but we have not merely shown that the things that are-not are, but also brought to light the form not-being happens to have' (258 o 5-7).

The context of both points has caused commentators a lot of problems. The main question is, how is it that something (i.e. a form) is called an ουκ ὀν in 256 o 8-257 A 6? Is it because it is different from the form of being; or is it because it is different from any thing (i.e. any form) it is not identical with? And on which of the two lines is the form of not-being defined as it is introduced in the section that follows, in 258 A 11-B 8 and 258 D 7-E 3? Only a few commentators have tackled the problems systematically,

and as far as I know no interpretation has been reached that is both coherent and sound. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is possible, as I shall argue in the following. I shall discuss the passages at issue, criticize commentaries that have been given, and present the interpretation intended." (pp. 63-64)

46. ———. 2008. "Self-predication and Being the Aitia of Things." Ancient Philosophy no. 28:105-124.
"In recent times sentences of self-predication in Plato, that is, sentences in which it is said that a certain form F-ness, is itself F. have been explained by referring to the causal role of forms. The form F-ness is F because it is the aitia of any particular x being F. This is taken in different senses. Some commentators are of the opinion that to say that F-ness, also called ' the F'. is itself F is to say that it is the ultimate source (explanation) of why anything is F (Fine 1992, 26 and 2003, 36, 314-315). For others, sometimes the form of F is itself F because as a cause of other things' being F, it must itself have the quality F (Malcolm 1991, 154-158 and Devereux 2003, 79).
I examine the evidence put forward for these interpretations and look at some passages pertinent to the issue of self-predication from the Phaedo and the Sophist. The Sophist features a context in which there is no question of the role of forms as aitiai; the Phaedo passage is explicitly about the causal role of the forms concerned. From both dialogues we can learn why a form F-ness cannot be not F, and what it means that it is F, without referring to the F as the aitia of F-things being F. Yet there is a very interesting connection between the causal role of the forms and a certain type of self-predication. Surprisingly. however, it is not self-predication of forms that is at issue, but self-predication with relation to the F-ness 'in us'." (p. 105)
References
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his Dialogues. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume.
Fine, G. 2003. Plato on Knovledge and Forms, Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malcolm, J. 1991. Plato on the Self-Predication of Forms. Early and Middle Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University.

47. ———. 2014. "Plato's Theory of Negation and Falsity in Sophist 257 and 263: A New Defense of the Oxford Interpretation." Ancient Philosophy no. 34:275-288.
"There are two main rival interpretations of the text, the so-called Oxford interpretation and the incompatibility range interpretation.(1) On the Oxford interpretation, the sentence 'Theaetetus flies' is false, because flying is different from everything that applies to Theaetetus. So it reads a universal quantifier implied in the text: 'other things than all the things that are'. The incompatibility range interpretation, however, says that 'Theaetetus flies' is false, because flying is different from something taken from the range of attributes incompatible with flying (viz., sitting) that applies to Theaetetus. Thus it reads an existential quantifier in the text: 'other things than some things that are'. This reading finds its inspiration in an earlier passage, 257b1-c3, on negative expressions, where the idea of a range of incompatible attributes is introduced indeed, and where it is said that 'the prefixed "not" indicates some of the other things than… the things the words uttered after the negative stand for'. On this interpretation 'not big', for instance, would signify middle-sized, or small, because it means 'something other than big'.
What is at issue here, namely, to which interpretation we should subscribe, concerns an important point: whether the Sophist offers an adequate theory of falsity or not. On the Oxford interpretation it does, on the incompatibility range interpretation it does not.
Now, the incompatibility range interpretation is winning more and more support.2 Brown 2008, 453-458 argues against the Oxford interpretation. As her criticisms are incisive and forceful indeed, adherers to this interpretation cannot ignore them. In the following, I will oppose the

incompatibility range interpretation and point out that it involves a remarkable inconsistency in the treatment of negative terms in 256-257. Then I will show that a natural reading of 263 justifies the Oxford interpretation." (pp. 275-276)

(1) The name 'Oxford interpretation' was introduced by Keyt 1973.

(2) Szaif 2004; Brown 2008; Gill 2009. Crivelli 2012 adheres to the Oxford interpretation.

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Szaif, J. 2004. Platons Begriff der Wahrheit. Munich: Alber.

48. van Fraassen, Bas C. 1969. "Logical Structure in Plato's Sophist." The Review of Metaphysics no. 22:482-498.

"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the Sophist in which Plato discusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate to examine this passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There is indeed already one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent the relations among the forms within the framework of classes in Principia Mathematica. Since we consider some of these relations to be modal in character, we cannot accept the adequacy of this framework for this purpose.

In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among the forms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section 2) , the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section

3), and finally the formal representation of the described logical structures (section 4). The main point which emerges is that the problems discussed by Plato are closely related to difficult problems in current logical theory." (p. 482)
(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The megista genê and the vowel analogy of Plato, Sophist 253," Phronesis 11 (1966), pp. 99-116, and the references therein.
(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges Sophistes," Museum Helveticum 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.

49. Vázquez, Daniel. 2018. "Argumentation and Reflection in Plato's Gigantomachia (Sophist 245e6–249d5)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 100:241-285.
Abstract: "This paper argues that Plato's gigantomachia is simultaneously concerned with first-order arguments about metaphysics and epistemology and with second-order arguments that reflect on the impact of ethical components, argumentative strategies and theoretical assumptions in the conversation. This complex argumentative structure reveals, I suggest, an organic and systematic conception of philosophy where all the elements are interdependent. This interpretation has four consequences, two at the second-order level, and two concerning the first-order arguments. First, it shows that there are methodological and ethical requirements without which philosophy is impossible. Second, it shows that the text does not refute materialism but tries to reflect the necessary conditions to consider possible the existence of incorporeal beings. Third, it argues that the text assumes a conception of knowledge where knowing something is a complex activity composed of two causal relations. Finally, it offers a new interpretation of the overall conclusion of the passage."

50. Vigdis, Songe-Møller. 2013. "Socrates, the Stranger, and Parmenides in Plato's Sophist: Two Troubled Relationships." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:292-305.
Abstract: "Who is the xenos, the Eleatic stranger, in the Sophist? Or rather: who is he not? In this paper, I try to shed light on this (latter) question by discussing Socrates'

relationship toward the stranger as well as the stranger's relationship toward Parmenides. I argue that in the opening of the dialogue, Socrates creates an aura of disinterest, distance, and alienation toward the visitor and thus indicates that the stranger is a philosopher of another kind than himself. Through an analysis of the stranger's treatment of Parmenides' notions of non-being and being I come to the conclusion that the stranger also diverges from his spiritual father Parmenides: while both Socrates and Parmenides never lose the divine ideal out of sight, the stranger confines himself to a purely human perspective, in total isolation from the divine ideal."

51. Vlasits, Justin. 2021. "The Puzzle of the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie:1-29.
Published first online.
Abstract: "The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato's Sophist have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue's main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is.
It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato's method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences."

52. Vlastos, Gregory. 1969. "Self-predication and self-participation in Plato's later period." The Philosophical Review no. 78:74-78.
Reprinted in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, Princeton. Princeton University Press 1973, pp. 335-341.
53. ———. 1973. "An Ambiguity in the Sophist." In Platonic Studies, 270-322. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Appendix I: On the interpretation of Sph. 248D4E4 pp. 309-317; Appendix II: More on Pauline predication in Plato pp. 318-322
54. Webb, David. 2000. "Continuity and Difference in Heidegger's Sophist." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 38:145-169.
"My argument in this paper comprises four claims. First, Heidegger's interpretation of nous and logos can only be fully understood in conjunction with his reading of phronesis and sophia. Second, the way in which the two pairs of terms bear upon each other turns at a series of levels on the question of relation. Third, for Heidegger the question of relation is articulated in terms of movement, and moreover Heidegger wishes movement, and thereby relation, to show itself as itself without being reduced either to a thing or to a subsequent relation between preexisting things. Fourth, while Heidegger's reception of the Aristotelian conception of movement as "continuous" (squelches) assists in holding open the possibility of a more fundamentally ontological discourse than is possible within the dialectical form of inquiry as presented in Plato's Sophist, it is paradoxically Heidegger's deployment of continuity that leads to the movement by which philosophy relates to truth being revealed as aporetic and even discontinuous. As a result, we shall see that Heidegger's attempt to secure a more "fundamental" philosophical relation to truth in fact draws philosophy back into the concreteness of human existence." (p. 146)
55. Wedin, Michael V. 1981. "Plato on What "Being" is Not." Philosophia no. 10-11:265-295.
"Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make claims about the number of things that

are. I argue that they are preliminary to and reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that it is a mistake to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so support the thesis that for Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."

56. Wiggins, David. 1971. "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 268-303. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.
Synopsis: "I. An analysis of Sophist 236E ff. The sentential variant of the problem of non-being in dialogues earlier than Theaetetus and Sophist. II. The display theory of sentence meaning as an escape from Plato's problem of false judgement. The theory's inability to accommodate negation. III. Plato's analytical approach to the problem of sentence-sense in Sophist, and anticipations of this in Cratylus and Theaetetus. IV. Relevant points from the discussion of Being in Sophist. V. The Sophist explanation of negation. Preliminary criticism and a suggested amendment of the explanation. VI. The analysis of true and false judgement at Sophist 263B4 ff. and Plato's return from negation to falsity. VII. Crucial inadequacy of Sophist account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement. VIII. Positive achievements of the analysis."
"For these reasons I do not myself believe that Plato came near to solving the problem of negation, or that he reached any satisfactory understanding of what problem this problem really is. The little clarity we now have about the nature of the problem of negation does not lead me to think that Plato's notion of the notion of Other is of fundamental importance in solving it. A theory of speech acts is a more likely focus for a satisfying answer. On the other hand we are not in a position to condescend to him on the subject. As J. L. Austin complained, we ourselves are all too apt to define negation in terms of falsehood and falsehood in terms of negation, and to fend off the charge of circularity by keeping the occasions of such interdefinition apart

(rather than by getting really clear about what exactly is to be expected from an analysis of negation).
As for falsity, Plato's objective was as much to find room for falsity as to define it by means of his account of negation; and in the former project I believe he has more success. Admittedly he mistakes the gravity of some of the obstacles which he thinks he sees in the way of admitting the existence of falsity, and he does not always take the best or the shortest way round them. As a result his eventual theory is a more primitive theory than it otherwise might have been. But in the course of it he puts logic and philosophy onto the subject of parts of speech and the asymmetrical roles of names and other parts in the completed sentence." (p. 302)

57. Wiitala, Michael. 2015. "Non-Being and the Structure of Privative Forms in Plato's Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 19:277-286.
Abstract: "In Plato's Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger explains that the division of all human beings into Greek and barbarian is mistaken in that it fails to divide reality into genuine classes or forms (eide). The division fails because "barbarian" names a privative form, that is, a form properly indicated via negation: non-Greek. This paper examines how the Stranger characterizes privative forms in the Sophist. I argue that although the Stranger is careful to define privative forms as fully determinate, he nevertheless characterizes them as having a structure unlike that of their non-privative counterparts. A privative form, in contrast to a non-privative form, is indifferent to the specificity of its members."

58. ———. 2018. "The Argument against the Friends of the Forms Revisited: Sophist 248a4-249d5." Apeiron no. 51:171-200.
Abstract: "There are only two places in which Plato explicitly offers a critique of the sort of theory of forms presented in the Phaedo and Republic: at the beginning of the Parmenides and in the argument against the Friends of the Forms in the Sophist. An accurate account of the argument against the Friends, therefore, is crucial to a

proper understanding of Plato's metaphysics. How the argument against the Friends ought to be construed and what it aims to accomplish, however, are matters of considerable controversy. My aim in this article is twofold. First, I show that the two readings of the argument against the Friends that dominate the contemporary literature – the "Cambridge Change" reading and the "Becoming-is-Being" reading – lack sufficient textual support.
Second, I offer an alternative reading of the argument against the Friends that better explains both the text of 248a4-249d5 and the role the argument plays within the Stranger's wider project of demonstrating that non-being is. My thesis is that the Stranger's argument against the Friends seeks to demonstrate that the forms must be both at rest and moved, where "moved" (kineisthai) has the sense of "affected." To participate in a form is to be affected by that form. I argue that since, according to the Stranger, every form participates in some other forms (see 251d5-253a2), every form is "moved" in the sense that it is affected by the forms in which it participates. Likewise, I argue that every form is at rest in the sense that its unique nature remains unaffected by the other forms in which it participates."

59. Wiles, Anne M. 1999. "Forms and Predication in the Later Dialogies." In Plato and Platonism, edited by van Ophuijsen, Johannes M., 179-197. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
60. Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's Answers to the Parmenides Problem." The Review of Metaphysics no. 65:747-764.
"The question raised by the great pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides were perhaps the main challenge for Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest post-Socratic philosophers. To summarize the challenge briefly: Parmenides denied that there was any change in the world.
(...)
If Parmenides' argument seems tricky, it ought to. It has seemed tricky to all thinkers who have followed Parmenides. There were even a few unscrupulous thinkers who took advantage of this trickiness and used it as a justification for

moral relativism. These thinkers were the sophists, and the most brilliant of them was Protagoras.
Protagoras claimed that each individual man was "the measure of all things," so the same thing that was good for one man might not be good for another based on perspective.(1) Ultimately, Protagoras claimed there was no measure of goodness based on human nature because human nature as a separate individual form did not exist. Only being exists, as Parmenides argued; Protagoras said the rest of what we take to be reality is an illusion and subjective. Protagoras' argument is a stronger version of the sophist arguments about convention and nature (nomos and phusis). As Plato and Aristotle both recognized, the Parmenides problem had implications for politics as well as for philosophy.
No philosopher was able to accurately interpret and refute the Parmenides problem until Plato and Aristotle. Plato answered it in an important way in his dialogue the Sophist, and Aristotle followed this up with the complete answer in Physics book 1, chapter 8. My thesis is that Plato's answer would have been good enough to defeat Protagoras in extended argument, thereby remedying the political aspects of the Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle's answer is required to answer some additional philosophical and scientific aspects.
The first section of this paper will summarize the history of presocratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point.
The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the Sophist. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (pp. 747-748)
(1) See Joe Sachs' footnote 10 on page 214 in his translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002).

61. Wood, James L. 2009. "Is There an "Archê Kakou" in Plato?" The Review of Metaphysics no. 63:349-384.
"Does Plato admit an archê kakou, a source or principle of evil? One or more than one? If he does, is the principle of evil matter, soul, a god or gods, some combination of these, or something else entirely? Or, is evil merely a human phenomenon? Just what does Plato understand by evil anyway? These questions have been repeatedly addressed by Plato's commentators, but by no means has a consensus been reached on any of them. (p. 349)
(...)
"In what follows I intend to defend this stance by an analysis of key metaphysical passages in several Platonic dialogues, and in the process I will address the central disputes in the scholarship on the present topic. I begin with the idea of the good in the Republic in order to elicit, by contrast, the concept of an arche kakou, and the negativity of this notion will be developed through the discussion of me on (nonbeing) and thateron (difference) in the Sophist. I turn then to the Philebus, where negativity is conceived as the unlimited or indeterminate (apeiron), and evil is realized in the embrace of the unlimited in hedonism, the pursuit of pleasure, and particularly the pleasure of the body. In the next section I show with reference to key passages in the Statesman and Timaeus that what seems to be a competing principle of evil, the bodily element (to somatoeides), in fact is a metaphysically derivative notion referring back to the generative cosmic order and specifically to the relative negativity, thateron, that makes genesis possible. Finally, I consider the possibility of psychic evil on the cosmic level in the discussion of an evil cosmic soul in the Laws. Throughout I will show that positive evil lies only in the defection of the intellect from its responsibility to generate our being as good." (p. 350)
62. Xenakis, Jason. 1957. "Plato on Statement and Truth-Value." Mind no. 66:165-172.
"Plato discusses the notions of false, true and statement in a number of places, but Sophist 261e-3b stands out. I propose to analyse, and not merely to reproduce in other words, this

passage because I expect to make it evident that it has been unduly if not regretfully neglected by those who concern themselves with such matters. I am almost tempted to retrodict, for example, that the Theory of Descriptions would not have been born had this passage been paid the attention it deserves. In any case, 'the present King of France is bald' would not have perplexed anybody because it would not have been even seriously considered, let alone chosen as a legitimate specimen of a false statement, or indeed of a statement." (p. 165)
(...)
"That Plato's analysis applies to 'there is '-statements of the form 'there is (isn't) a mouse in here 'is evident from what has already transpired before the preceding paragraph; the subject (in the by now familiar sense of 'subject') of this statement is not of course 'a mouse'—a substance expression —but 'in here', a place expression. Relational statements too can be accommodated in Plato's analysis, only that the elucidation of the truth-value of these is, perhaps, more complicated.
I am not necessarily maintaining, with Russell and others, that the higher-order use or elucidation of 'to exist' is the only one; nor that Plato did successfully cope with existential, as against attributive, statements, but rather that his present analysis can accommodate the former without postulating a Meinongian Realm of Being. If so, Quine's 'Plato's beard' need not be Plato's." (p. 172)

63. ———. 1959. "Plato's Sophist: A Defense of Negative Expressions and a Doctrine of Sense and of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 4:29-43.
"The Sophist anyhow may be said to surmount the difficulty about knowledge and logos appearing toward the end of the Theaetetus: logos, not being a name, can after all enter into the definition of knowledge; and it can do so, of course, as true not as false logos. You have knowledge not because you are "apprehending" an object if an ethereal one - for apprehension according to the Sophist is not thought and hence knowledge - but because you have a true logos.

This does not conflict with the Theaetetus thesis that perception is not knowledge; on the contrary it agrees with it, since perception is a form of apprehension - I should say the only form, but let that be as it may.
Nor would it conflict with that dialogue had Plato maintained in it, as perhaps he at bottom at does, that knowledge is not of particulars but of principles; for principles demand logoi.(1) However, the Theaetetus is not my present concern. In fact, I am rather uneasy over the way certain concepts are managed in the "commons" passage (185a ff.), some of which might correspond to some of the "highest concepts" of the Sophist: they seem to be treated as though they were first-order or attributive concepts, like "red" and "sound," only not perceptual. Perhaps this is a slip. Anyhow Plato's stand against perceptionism does not require anything of the kind. Indeed, that passage could be said to amount to the following valid argument: Knowledge entails reality or truth (right: "illusory or false knowledge" is a contradiction in terms); neither truth nor reality is a perceptual concept (right; cf. " 'existence' is not a predicate"); therefore knowledge cannot be identical with perception." (pp. 42-43)
(1) It is worth adding that the Wax Tablet metaphor in the Theaetetus goes against 'innate ideas" of course, but also against the "Theory of Recollection" and, to that extent, against Formism.

64. Zaks, Nicolas. 2016. "Is the 'In-Itself' Relational? Heidegger and Contemporary Scholarship on Plato's Sophist 255c–e." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 95-112. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"For some scholars, the proof offered by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist 255c9-e2 of the fact that otherness and being are not two names for one kind is "probably the most crucial text in the dialogue", since "it contains two lines (255c13-14) that seem to speak directly about being and how the form being is spoken of'." (p 95, a note omitted)
(...)

"I will proceed as follows. After presenting the difficult text, accompanied by preliminary remarks making explicit how Heidegger's interpretation both aligns with and yet remains very different from contemporary scholarship, I start with two versions of what one might call the 'standard reading' of the proof. I claim that Heidegger would have endorsed this standard reading. But Heidegger goes further by adding a sharp remark concerning the relational character of the 'in-itself. To clarify his argument, I dig into the conception of 'understanding' and temporality developed in Being and Time. Then, I argue that Heidegger's remark concerning the relational character of the 'in-itself in some sense foresees Michael Frede's objection to the standard reading.(3) Finally, I present and discuss two different kinds of reactions to this objection. The first kind is a defence of the standard reading; the second regards the 'in-itself as relative. In my conclusion, I argue that even if the standard reading is right concerning the proof of 255c9-e2, the fact remains that Plato, at strategic points of the Sophist, speaks of forms relatively to themselves." (p. 96)

(3) Frede (1967), 17; 19, and 22. Cited and described by Heinaman (1983), 14-15.

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Heinaman, Robert. "Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65, no. 1 (1983): 1-17.

65. ———. 2018. "Socratic Elenchus in the Sophist." Apeiron no. 51:371-390.

Abstract: "This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of

reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4-251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato's methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed."

66. ———. 2020. " Διακριτικη` as a ποιητικη` τέχνη in the Sophist." The Classical Quarterly:1-3.
Abstract: "The διακριτικη` τέχνη (the art of separating or discriminating), from which the sixth definition of the Sophist starts (226b1–231b9), is puzzling. Prima facie the art of separating does not fit the initial division of art between ποιητικη` τέχνη (production) and κτητικη` τέχνη (acquisition) at 219a8–c9. Therefore, scholars generally agree that, although mutually exclusive, ποιητική and κτητική are not exhaustive and leave room for a third species of art, διακριτικη` τέχνη, on a par with ποιητική and κτητική. However, I argue that textual evidence suggests otherwise."

67. Zistakis, Alexandar H. 2006. "Difference, συμπλοκή and the hierarchy of ideas in Plato's Sophist." Phronimon no. 7:29-45.
Abstract: "Starting from the dialectic of intertwinement, the weaving together (συμπλοκή) of ideas in the Sophist, this paper tries to determine the place, function and significance of Difference and Hierarchy among platonic ideas. To that effect, it is first established that and how the notion of difference becomes the fundamental and even substantial structural principle of the dialectic of being and non-being, motion and rest, and finally of the notions of unity and identity themselves. In the second instance, the question of the hierarchy among ideas is interpreted and understood as the question of liberty. Namely, that very hierarchy is understood as an intrinsic and an innate one, i.e. as the set of dialectical relationships between ideas that follow from their own essence and being, which therefore is not nor cannot be externally imposed or forced upon them. Such a character of hierarchy is, then, recognized and exemplified in the case of the individual and the collective, where it turns out not only that there exists a clear idea of

individuality in Plato, but also that every individual necessarily belongs to some collective and indeed seeks to unite with the collective in the same way and for the same reasons everything or idea tends towards its form, or its own proper good."

68. Zucchetti, Nicholas. 2020. "An unexplained overlap between Sophist 232b1 236d4 and Republic X. The case of the sophist as a painter." Archai no. 30:1-27.
Abstract: "Although most scholars agree that the lexicon of Sophist 232b1-236d4 is similar to that of Republic X, they leave undetermined whether they are theoretically compatible. Notably, both dialogues elucidate the art of imitation through the metaphor of the painter who deceives his pupils through φαντάσματα. I argue that Plato's conception of imitation of the Republic is not only consistent with that presented in the Sophist, but also importantly integrates it."
69. Zuckert, Catherine H. 2000. "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger v. Socrates." The Review of Metaphysics no. 54:65-97.
"Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of Plato's philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the Stranger presents in the Sophist appear to be better than those Socrates articulates in earlier dialogues. (1) In particular, in the Sophist Plato shows the Stranger answering two questions Socrates proved unable to resolve in two of his conversations the day before. In the Theaetetus Socrates admitted that he had long been perplexed by the fact of false opinion; he was not able to explain how it was possible. Likewise, in the Cratylus Socrates and his interlocutors were not able to determine satisfactorily the relation between names and the things to which they refer. Through his teaching about the idea of the other, the Stranger shows not only how false opinion is possible but also why names do not always correspond to the kinds or ideas of things. More generally, in the course of his account of previous thought the Stranger presents a fundamental critique of the teaching of "friends of the forms" like Socrates. When we examine the definition of the

sophist to which the Stranger comes at the end of the dialogue, however, we find reasons to question the adequacy of his teaching and, consequently, his superiority to Socrates.
If philosophy consists in knowledge - of the whole or merely of self - we are forced to conclude, neither the Stranger nor Socrates is a philosopher.
Each or even both might appear, therefore, to be a pretender - or sophist. If, on the other hand, philosophy consists in the search for knowledge by means of a dialectical sorting of things according to kinds, Socrates and the Stranger represent two different, although related types." (pp. 65-66, a note omitted)
(1) For example, Paul Friedlaender, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958-69); Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Statesman, trans. Joseph Bright Skemp (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 96 n. 48.

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1. Aubenque, Pierre. 1991. "Une occasion manquée: la genèse avortée de la distinction entre l' "étant" et le "quelque chose"." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 365-387. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans: P. Aubenque, Problèmes aristotéliciens. Philosophie théorique, Paris: Vrin 2009, pp. 307-320.
"Platon, dans le Sophiste, ne consent pas à remettre en cause le primat de l'ontologie, remise en cause qui lui aurait peut-être permis de réfléchir sur le statut infra-ontologique de la temporalité et de la fausseté, mais peut-être aussi sur le statut supra-ontologique du premier principe, qui, selon Resp. VI 509 B, "n'est pas une essence", puisqu'il est "au-delà de l'essence".
P. Hadot, dans une analyse célèbre, a émis l'hypothèse que le Dieu transcendant de Porphyre, «non-étant au-dessus de l'étant (μή ὀν υπέρ το ὀν)», venait remplir la place éminente qu'occupe le "quelque chose" dans le schéma stoïcien.(22) Mais, en réalité, c'est l'Un, et non le "quelque chose", qui désigne le plus constamment pour les Néoplatoniciens le terme premier par rapport à quoi l'ontologie se trouve rabaissée à la seconde place, et il ne me paraît pas que le néoplatonisme ait été conscient de l'affinité structurale profonde qui existe entre son hénologie et la "tinologie" stoïcienne. J'ai moi-même souligné l'«aveuglement de Plotin à l'égard d'une doctrine qui pourrait passer à bon

droit pour l'une des sources du dépassement néoplatonicien de l'ontologie» (23), rappelant notamment l'analyse très critique où Plotin, se référant à l'aristotélisme le plus orthodoxe, qualifie d' «incompréhensible et irrationnelle» la notion stoïcienne d'un "quelque chose" qui ne serait pas nécessairement un étant (24). La tradition néoplatonicienne n'a retenu expressément que le refus platonicien de la "tinologie", et par là de l'occasion, que saisira le stoïcisme, d'un dépassement de l'ontologie surdéterminée du substantialisme au profit d'une doctrine plus englobante du "quelque chose", c'est-à-dire de la détermination en général (25). L'occasion restera à jamais manquée pour la tradition platonicienne, qui dépassera certes l'ontologie, dans sa phase néoplatonicienne, mais par d'autres voies. Il reste que le problème, doublement posé par le Sophiste, du statut du discours faux et de celui de la non-présence "incorporelle" représente un premier et décisif ébranlement de l'ontologisme parménidien. C'est là un aspect trop méconnu du "parricide" : le discours sur l'être ne retrouvera jamais plus, après le Sophiste, son innocence perdue, celle d'une prééminence qui lui reviendrait en quelque manière de droit." (pp. 384-385)
(22) P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, t. I, Paris, 1968, p. 175 sq.
(23) P. Aubenque, Plotin et le dépassement de l'ontologie grecque classique, in Le néoplatonisme (Actes du Congrès de Royaumont, 9-13 juin 1969), Paris 1971, p. 106.
(24) Cfr. le premier des traités plotiniens Sur les genres de l'être, VI 1 (42), 25 s.
(25) On serait tenté de dire: la déterminité en général.

2. ———, ed. 1991. Études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Les textes de ce volume ont été recueillis par Michel Narcy.
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"Le Centre de Recherches sur la Pensée antique (Centre Léon Robin) de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), formation associée au C.N.R.S. (U.A. 107), s'est attaché ces dernières années à l'étude des fondements grecs d'une théorie de l'être, de ce que les Modernes ont appelé

"ontologie". Deux ouvrages déjà parus portent témoignage de ces recherches(1).
Après le Poème de Parménide, il était naturel que notre attention se portât - ce fut le cas des séminaires tenus entre 1984 et 1986 - sur le dialogue platonicien où la compréhension parménidienne de l'être se trouve contestée, mais aussi d'une certaine manière assumée, en même temps que transformée.
L'occasion de cette crise, que Platon dramatise au point de la voir culminer dans l'exigence d'un "parricide" pourtant impossible, avait été suscitée par l'existence du mouvement sophistique, dont la pratique "polymorphe" visait en fait à donner !'apparaître - donc une certaine forme d'être - au non-être, contrevenant par là à l'interdiction de Parménide de dire étant le non-être. On connaît la solution platonicienne : l'introduction dans l'être d'un certain non-être sous la forme de l'altérité." (p. 13)
(...)
"Replacer l'onto-logie dans les circonstances historiques de son surgissement, c'est, croyons-nous, redonner vie et d'abord sens à ce qui ne devrait plus apparaître dès lors comme le simple complément, général et abstrait, d'études philosophiques plus particulières, dont le platonisme nous fournit par ailleurs maints exemples, mais comme le fondement même et le garant de leur possibilité. En ce sens, le Sophiste est bien, dans toute l'acception du terme, un texte central, pour le platonisme comme pour l'histoire de la philosophie." (p. 14)
(1) Concepts et catégories dans la Pensée antique, Paris 1981; Etudes sur Parménide, Paris 1987, 2 voll.

3. Audouard, Xavier. 1966. "Le simulacre." Cahiers pour l'Analyse no. 3.
"Qui sait donc ? Celui qui commence ou celui qui parvient ? le sujet dont on part ou le sujet auquel on arrive? Qu'est ce sujet supposé savoir, sinon le sage lui-même? Savoir quoi? qu'il a toujours su précisément ce qu'il fallait savoir. Le sophiste, lui, prétend que savoir et ne pas savoir reviennent au même, parce qu'il n'y a pas de vérité du simulacre, parce que l'écart qui crée le simulacre le différencie autant de la

copie de la réalité que de la réalité même, que de la réalité même, que le simulacre seul institue le sujet en l'incorporant comme cet écart même. Que le sujet n'est pas et ne peut pas être référence, sinon en mettant en lumière, à chaque instant, du procès dichotomique, qu'il est l'écart nouveau pris par rapport à toute référence, que jamais ce sujet-là ne survolera comme "sujet de connaissance", l'ensemble des écarts où, il s'est institué, que le sujet à connaftre est un simulacre, un fantasme enfin, car il ne peut être connu que du point de vue particulier du sujet auquel il se révèle." (p. 71)

4. Ballériaux, Omer. 2001. "Platon. Aporía, euporía et les mots étymologiquement apparentés : Sophiste." In Aporia dans la philosophie grecque, des origines à Aristote, edited by Motte, André and Rutten, Christian, 81-128. Louvain: Peeters.
"La fréquence relative des mots de la famille d'ἄπορι ̆ ́ ᾱ y est [dans le Sophiste], en effet, la plus élevée de tous les dialogues, à savoir 0,149 alors que la moyenne générale est de 0,044 (1) Les occurrences des mots à connotation positive, εὔπορος et εὐπορέω y sont très peu nombreuses et n'offrent guère d'intérét. Trois d'entre elles sont, on le verrà plus loin, prises dans l'acception physique ou socio-économique. Et la quatrième, la seule qui fasse référence à un stade atteint dans la connaissance, dépeint une réussite qui est en réalité illusoire.
Εὐπορεῖν φαμεν (2433 c3) : nous nous berçons d'illusion lorsque nous prétendons êtree sorti d'incertitude." (p. 81)
(...)
"Mais l'examen le plus révelateur est incontestablement celui qui porte sur l'inégale répartition des occurrences dans les diverses parties du dialogue. L'introduction (section A [216a 1-218b 5] ne retiendra guère notre attention. Elle ne comporte qu'une seule occurrence, d'ailleurs peu significative. Socrate ayant manifesté son intention d'interroger l'Étranger d'Élée sur le sophiste, le politique, le philosophe, Théodore constate, en passant, que Socrate a donc été jeté dans l'embarras à propos de ces trois personnages,περι ̀ αὐτῶν διαπορηθει ̀ς (217 a 4-5). Nous

négligerons également les deux occurrences (267 c 7 et 10) qui, dans la conclusion (section I [264b 10-268 d5]), font référence à l'embarras éprouvé à un moment antérieur de la discussion. Restent 23 occurrences, fort inégalement réparties au sein du reste du dialogue, où nous distinguerons trois parties, la première (les divisions) correspondant aux sections B [218b 6-231 a 5] , C [231 a 6-232 b 3], D [232 b 3-236 c 8], la seconde regroupant les sections E [236 c 9-241 c 3], F [241 c 4-242 b 5], G [242 b 6-251 a 4] (examen des opinions des philosophes), la troisième enfin (section H [251 a 5-264 b 9]) étant celle où l'Éléate expose la doctrine des genres." (pp. 87-88)
(1) Pour un relevé complet des occurrences présentes dans chaque dialogue, voir le début du §6. Conclusions.

5. Boutot, Alain. 1991. "L'interprétation heideggerienne du Sophiste de Platon." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 537-559. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"De toutes les interprétations modernes du Sophiste de Platon celle qu'en a donnée Heidegger dans un cours professé à Marbourg pendant le semestre d'hiver 1924-25, mais non encore publié à l'heure [*] compte probablement parmi les plus originales."
"L'exégèse heideggerienne du Sophiste, telle qu'elle s'exprime à travers les textes de la première période de Heidegger, reste, on le voit, très lacunaire. Elle n'est probablement que l'écho affaibli de l'interprétation développée dans le cours de Marbourg. Elle montre très clairement cependant que Platon n'était pas encore pour Heidegger, à cette époque, ce penseur charnière qu'il sera plus tard, en tant qu'initiateur de la tradition métaphysique, mais n'était qu'une étape, une étape essentielle certes, mais une étape seulement dans le développement de la pensée grecque qui va de Parménide à Aristote. Cette présentation, somme toute assez classique, de la place de Platon au sein de la philosophie grecque, a pu être suggérée à Heidegger par la problématique du Sophiste elle-même, puisque dans ce Dialogue Platon s'efforce précisément de dépasser l'ontologie parménidienne et ouvre la voie, du même coup, à l'ontologie aristotélicienne et à la doctrine des significations

multiples de l'être. Le fait que Heidegger soit resté fidèle à cette présentation, qui apparaît déjà dans le cours de 1925/26 : Logik (56), jusque dans le cours sur Aristote de 1930/31 (57), tout comme les évocations, assez rares, mais persistantes, du Sophiste pourraient laisser supposer que c'est essentiellement à travers ce Dialogue que Heidegger appréhendait Platon ou plus précisément l'ontologie platonicienne pendant la première partie de son œuvre. Heidegger trouvait dans le Sophiste une anticipation de ses propres vues aussi bien sur le problème de l'être, que sur celui du λόγος. Ensuite, on le sait, Heidegger privilégiera, dans son analyse de la pensée de Platon, les textes où s'affirme l'idéalisme platonicien sous sa formulation la plus "traditionnelle", comme ceux de la République, et s'efforcera de montrer que, dans et par cet idéalisme, l'être en tant qu'être sombre dans l'oubli." (pp. 557-558)
[*] Platon: Sophistes, GA Bd. 19 (2002); traduction française: Platon : «Le Sophiste», Paris : Gallimard 2001.
(56) Cfr. [Gesamtausgabe] GA Bd. 21, p. 168-9.
(57) Cfr. GA Bd. 33, p. 27-8.

6. Brague, Rémi. 1991. "La cosmologie finale du Sophiste (263b4-e6)." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 269-288. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans Rémi Brague, Introduction au monde grec. Études d'histoire de la philosophie, Chatou: Les Éditions de la Transparence 2005 (Édition revue 2008), pp. 195-218.
"Le but de la note qui suit est simplement d'attirer l'attention sur un passage du Sophiste de Platon: les pages 265 B 4 à E 6, qui forment la première moitié (hormis les quatre premières lignes) du paragraphe 49 du découpage traditionnel. Ce morceau se trouve communément négligé par les commentateurs, à ma connaissance (et à celle des répertoires spécialisés, comme par exemple celui de la revue «Lustrum») depuis une bonne trentaine d'années. On peut comprendre les raisons de cette omission : les philosophes, le plus souvent, et avant tout ceux de la tendance que l'on étiquette aussi commodément que caricaturalement comme «analytique», ne lisent du Sophiste que quelques pages qu'ils considèrent comme cruciales, et qui portent sur les

cinq genres, la négation, le sens du verbe "être", etc. - problèmes avec lesquels notre passage n'a, à première vue, rien à voir. Par ailleurs, ceux, et ils ne sont pas si nombreux, qui se donnent la peine de fournir de tout le Sophiste un commentaire suivi, semblent curieusement pressés d'en finir, et passent rapidement sur les dernières répliques - non d'ailleurs sans imiter en cela les protagonistes mêmes du dialogue. Il me semble que l'on passe de la sorte à côté d'un texte fort intéressant et, en particulier, lourd d'implications pour la signification de tout ce que Platon dit ailleurs à propos de l'univers physique. Je ne puis ici que donner quelques rapides indications, me réservant de revenir plus en détail sur le contexte de ce qui reste ici programmatique." (pp. 269-270 notes omises)

7. Brisson, Luc. 1991. "De quelle façon Plotin interprète-t-il les cinq genres du Sophiste ? (Ennéades, VI 2 [43] 8)." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 451-474. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Il arrive souvent que le scholar contemporain qui essaie de comprendre un dialogue de Platon tombe sur une interprétation qui, de prime abord, le déconcerte, tout en excitant chez lui un grand intérêt, en raison de la profonde originalité qui s'en dégage. Or, il n'est pas rare qu'une recherche des sources de cette interprétation mène à Plotin. C'est le cas notamment en ce qui concerne les cinq genres du Sophiste. Voyons donc ce qu'il en est dans le détail, en prenant pour texte de référence Enn. VI 2 [43] 8, chapitre qui, après avoir été replacé dans son contexte théorique et historique, sera traduit et commenté." (p. 451)
(...)
"Pour Plotin donc, le problème est moins d'expliquer comment communiquent entre elles les formes intelligibles, qui représentent l'être par excellence, que de décrire l'intellect, lieu de l'intelligible et donc de l'être. Ce décalage entrâine des conséquences importantes. Alors que, dans le Sophiste, l'être, le même et l'autre, déduits d'une analyse du couple de contraires : repos/mouvement, constituent les genres véritablement suprêmes qui régissent la communauté des formes intelligibles, en Enn. VI 2. 8, l'être,

le mouvement, le repos, et surtout le même et l'autre, ne sont que des aspects de l'intellect (νοῦς). Ils perdent ainsi leur autonomie ontologique, pour devenir, comme le veut d'ailleurs Plotin, des catégories du monde intelligible, c'est-à dire des instruments permettant la description de la seconde hypostase." (p. 472)

8. ———. 2008. "La définition de l'être par la puissance. Un commentaire de Sophiste 247 b - 249 d." In Dunamis. Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, edited by Crubellier, Michel, Jaulin, Annick, Lefebvre, David and Morel, Pierre-Marie, 173-196. Louvain-La-Neuve: Peeters.
"Lorsque, dans le Sophiste, il définit l'être par la puissance, Platon modifie-t- il sa position sur les formes intelligibles en les soumettant au changement ? Telle est la question à laquelle je voudrais tenter de répondre ici." (p. 173)
(...)
"Comme il est difficile d'admettre qu'il s'est contredit, on a fait l'hypothèse que Platon avait changé d'idée sur les Formes, qui, à partir du Sophiste, ne seraient plus totalement dépourvues de changement.
Depuis la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, deux types d'interprétation inspirés tous les deux par la philosophie allemande ont été développés, l'une dans le cadre de la philosophie analytique, et l'autre par Francesco Fronterotta récemment.
Les commentateurs analytiques suivent Gilbert Ryle(23), qui prétendait que Platon avait abandonné la doctrine des Formes dans la seconde partie du Parménide. Et ils estiment donc que le Sophiste est le témoin de ce changement. Les Formes ne sont plus des réalités séparées, des modelés, mais des concepts, susceptibles de changement comme le prétendent Julius Moravsick(24), G.E.L. Owen(25) et I. M. Crombie(26) entre autres.
L'interprétation analytique, où se fait sentir une très forte influence aristotélicienne(27), est en fait un avatar des grandes interprétations néo-kantiennes, celles de Ritter(28) et de Natorp(29).
Pour sa part, Francesco Fronterotta(30) propose une interprétation qui s'apparente à celle de Zeller(31), lequel

était sous l'influence de Hegel. Francesco Fronterotta attribue aux Formes une activité causale qui est non pas seulement d'ordre paradigmatique, mais aussi d'ordre efficient.
(...)
À la suite de F.M. Cornford(34), de H. Chemiss(35) et de Gr. Vlastos(36), j'estime que Platon n'a pas modifié sa position sur le sujet. Relisons Sophiste 247b-249d. Force est d'admettre qu'il y a bien une définition de l'être par la puissance en Sophiste 247d-e. Mais des divergences apparaissent, lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer à qui fait référence Sophiste 248d-e, et quel sens il faut donner au pantelôs ôn de 248e." (pp. 179-180)

(23) Ryle [1965] «Plato's Parmenides» (1939[1]), dans Allen (ed.) [1965]. Studies in Plato's metaphysics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
(24) Moravcsik [1962] «Being and meaning in the Sophist», Acta Philoso-phica Fennica, fase. XIV, p. 37 sq.
(25) Owen [1986] Logic, Science and Dialectic, collected papers in Greek philosophy, ed. by Martha Nussbaum, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), pp. 27-44.
(26) Crombie [1963] Examination of Plato's doctrines, vol. II: «Plato on knowledge and reality», Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 396 sq.
(27) Notamment chez Keyt [1969] «Plato's paradox that the immutable is unknowable», Philos. Quarterly, 19, p. 1 sq. Keyt essaie de tenir les deux bouts de la chaîne en renvoyant à Aristote : «The Eleatic Stranger, in Sophist 248d 1-e 5, présents the friends of the forms with the paradox that the immutable is unknowable. Plato does not indicate in the Sophist how his own theory of forms avoids the paradox. He is not deeply committed lo the proposition that the forms undergo change, but ought to be; he is deeply committed lo the proposition that the forms are changeless, but for insufficient reasons. Aristotle, in Topics 137b3-13, distinguishes two respects in which a form may have an attribute, which suggests that a Platonist ought to hold that the forms are changeless in some respects, but not in others».

(28) Ritter [1976] «Eidos, idèa und verwandte Wörter in den Schriften Platons mit genauem Nachweis der Stellen» (1910[1)] Neue Untersuchungen über Platon (1910), Amo Press, New York, pp. 228-236.
(29) Natorp [2004] Plato's theory of ideas. An introduction do idealism (1903[1], 1921[2]), ed. by Valitis Politis, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin..
(30) Fronterotta [2001] Methexis. La teoria Platonica delle idee et la partecipazione delle cose empiriche. Dai dialoghi giovanili al Parmenide, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, pp. 348-356.
(31) Zeller, Mondolfo [1974] La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico (1922[5]), trad, par Ervino Pocar, parte seconda, vol. III 1 et 2: «Platone e l'Accademia antica», a cura di Margherita Isnardi Parente, La Nuova Italia, Firenze.
(32) Fronterotta [2001: 343-348].
(33) Fronterotta [2001: 354-356]
(34) En m'inspirant des notes et des commentaires faits par Cornford [1964[2]| Plato's theory of knowledge (1935[1]), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
(35) Cherniss [1993] The riddle of the Academy; traduction française par L. Bou-lakia, Vrin, Paris.
(36) C'est la position soutenue par Vlastos [1981[2]] «On the interpretation of Soph. 148d4-e4», dans Platonic Studies (1973[1]), pp. 309-317.

9. ———. 2010. "L'âme ou l'intelligible ? Comment interpréter Sophiste 253d5-e2 ?" In Aglaïa. Autour de Platon : Mélanges offerts a Monique Dixsaut, edited by Brancacci, Aldo, El Murr, Dimitri and Taormina, Patrizia, 387-395. Paris: Vrin.
10. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1988. "La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne." In Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Jonathan, Barnes and Mignucci, Mario, 19-127. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Traduction anglaise : "The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology", in J. Brunschwig, Papers in

Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press:1994, pp. 92-157.

11. Cassin, Barbara. 1991. "Les Muses et la philosophie. Élements pour une histoire du pseudos." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 293-316. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Le philosophe, chien de garde de la vérité et du désir de vérité, est commis à l' aletheia. Le sophiste, ce loup depuis qu'il y a des philosophes, est commis au pseudos. Or pseudos nomme dès l'origine et indissolublement le "faux" et le "mensonge" : la "fausseté" donc de celui qui trompe et/ou se trompe; c'est le concept éthico-logique par excellence. Le Sophiste de Platon marque expressément ce double lien qui rattache sophistique et pseudos aux yeux de la philosophie : le sophiste est une imitation, une contrefaçon sauvage du philosophe (Soph. 231 A), parce qu'il élit pour domaine le faux, le semblant, le phénomène, l'opinion, en un mot, tout ce qui n'est pas. Philosophie des apparences et apparence de la philosophie : sophiste simulateur-dissimulateur.
Je voudrais tenter de localiser le pseudos, essentiellement à travers Parménide et Hésiode, pour déterminer la manière dont la sophistique s'y loge, afin de comprendre, à travers Platon, comment la philosophie à ses débuts domestique l'idée même de pseudos, et aménage la place de la sophistique. Place de l'alter ego dans la structure : d'une part le pseudos, la possibilité de choisir le pseudos, est une condition de possibilité de l'existence même du langage; autrement dit : tous ne sont pas sophistes, mais, pour parler, il faut qu'il y ait des sophistes.
D'autre part, l'interprétation du pseudos en termes de mimesis bloque toute assignation de critère et brouille l'imputation : «Sage ou sophiste?» se demande l'Etranger jusqu'au bout." (pp. 293-294)
12. Caujolle-Zaslawsky. 1991. "Note sur l'ἐπαγωγή dans le Sophiste. A propos de Diogène Laërce, III 53-55." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 511-534. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Examinons donc, pour commencer, l'emploi effectif du terme ἐπαγωγή dans l'œuvre de Platon. Il se trouve que Platon a employé ἐπαγωγή en un sens correspondant à l'un des emplois courants du terme, celui de "charme", de sortilège, de mauvais sort, d'influence magique, ou encore d' "induction", mais dans l'acception aujourd'hui désuète de séduction, emprise. Il a utilisé, également, le terme ἐπαγωγός, en un sens que semblent retrouver de nos jours la médecine et la biologie contemporaines avec le néologisme '"inducteur": une cause "inductrice" déclenche un phénomène avec un certain retard par rapport au moment où elle intervient. Platon parlait d'un «inducteur de sommeil» : c'est la description qu'on pourrait donner, aujourd'hui, d'un somnifère.
Il est évident que l'usage platonicien d'ἐπαγωγή est simplement, ici, l'usage courant et n'a rien de technique ni de particulier. Surtout, cette sorte-là d'ἐπαγωγή n'a rien à voir avec celle qui lui est attribuée chez Diogène Laërce [III, 53-55], et que nous allons examiner maintenant." (pp. 520-521, notes omises)
(...)
"Si nous tentons ici de récapituler les notices et les thèmes qui semblent liés à l'enseignement "épagogïque" selon Platon, nous observons successivement : le procédé est lié à l'analyse de cas particuliers, concrets, que la perception et l'évidence sensible y jouent le premier rôle, qu'il ne s'applique qu'à des choses présentant une similitude : (les lettres, par exemple). Car la place tenue dans cette méthode par la notion de το` ὅμοιον exige une homogénéité de cas." (p. 534, note omise)

13. Charles-Saget, Annick. 1991. "Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste (avec un appendice par Christian Guérard : Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus)." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 451-474. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Nous ne connaissons pas de commentaire de Proclus au Sophiste de Platon. Quelques indices textuels permettent de supposer qu'il y eut, sinon un commentaire continu, du moins quelques "explications" ou exégèses de passages

considérés comme essentiels. Mais pour le lecteur philosophe d'aujourd'hui, il ne reste qu'une série de citations sur laquelle faire fond, citations ou simples références qui représentent ici le matériau de notre travail. Au premier examen, nous remarquons combien la densité des renvois varie avec les oeuvres, ce qui est bien naturel et correspond à la diversité des thèmes, mais ne saurait à soi seul être significatif. L'In Parmenidem viendrait en premier (plus de 50 renvois), puis la Théologie Platonicienne (31 références pour les tomes I à V), l'In Timaeum (21), l'In rempublicam (9), les Trois Opuscules (7), enfin l'In Alcibiadem (2), l'In Cratylum (1). Même si le nombre des occurrences ne permet pas de préjuger de la résonance proprement philosophique du texte, il reste que les lieux de citation dessinent dejà une certaine lecture du Sophiste, au moins en ce que certains passages sont absents. Et même si la prudence est de rigueur, on est ici particulièrement tenté de donner au non-dit "un certain être".
Quant au dit, il faut en entendre les accents. Ceux que Proclus marque lui-même par les amplifications qui sont l'effet de son système ne peuvent, pour nous, se confondre avec les accents du texte de Platon. Car nous lisons aussi des éclaircissements, sans doute, mais souvent des déplacements (de sens ou d'accents), qui sont de l'ordre du détournement. Tout le néoplatonisme est de cette veine, dira-t-on. Sans doute, et c'est pourquoi nous allons proposer à notre tour un mode de lecture de la lecture que fit Proclus de certains passages du Sophiste de Platon." (pp. 477-478, notes omises)

14. Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 1985. "Révélation et rationalité aux origines de la pensée grecque. L'héritage parménidien dans le Sophiste de Platon." École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire no. 94:409-416. "Cette année nous avons étudié l'héritage du parménidisme, ainsi que son « dépassement », dans le Sophiste de Platon. Nous avons donc voulu nous pencher tant sur la naissance que sur la « mort » de Parménide, car Platon, par la bouche de l'Étranger d'Élée, a bien voulu « tuer » le Philosophe de l'Être. D'où l'une des inconnues qui nous a amenés à

entamer notre enquête : le crime, a-t-il vraiment eu lieu ?" (p. 409)
(...)
"En effet, ce qui déclenchera le mécanisme qui aboutira à la nouvelle conception du non-être est le paradoxe qui fera dire à Théétète que tout cela est « très bizarre » (mala atopon) (242c 2). Le paradoxe consiste à admettre que, malgré son inexistence, l'image existe réellement (ontôs) en tant qu'image. Cela va de soi que si l'image avait déjà eu une certaine forme d'existence, le fait de dire maintenant qu'elle existe pleinement ne constituerait pas un paradoxe. Il a fallu d'abord nier absolument (ontôs) l'existence de l'image pour pouvoir ensuite susciter le plus grand étonnement lorsqu'on affirmera que pourtant elle existe absolument (ontôs).
Une nouvelle conception de l'être (et, par conséquent, du non-être) est en train de naître. Selon l'ancienne conception, tout ce qui n'est pas vrai, n'existe pas ; dans la nouvelle conception, l'identité est la garantie de l'existence. Et comme chaque individu est identique à lui-même et différent des autres, identité et différence définissent son être. On ne peut pas nier que le Sophiste est un dialogue étrange : si Parménide est (peut-être) tué, Aristote est certainement né." (p. 415)

15. ———. 1985. "L'héritage parménidien dans le Sophiste de Platon." École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire no. 94:409-416.
Le sujet des conférences portant sur la période octobre 1985 - janvier1986 a été la suite presque évidente de celui de l'année précédente. En effet, les conférences sur « Révélation et rationalité aux origines de la pensée grecque » avaient abouti à la naissance du premier essai de constitution d'une démarche rationnelle à partir de (ou en rapport avec) un univers chargé encore d'éléments mythiques et religieux, démarche que nous avions située chez Parménide. Cette année nous avons étudié l'héritage du parménidisme, ainsi que son « dépassement », dans le Sophiste de Platon. Nous avons donc voulu nous pencher tant sur la

naissance que sur la « mort » de Parménide, car Platon, par la bouche de l'Étranger d'Élée, a bien voulu « tuer » le Philosophe de l'Être. D'où l'une des inconnues qui nous a amenés à entamer notre enquête : le
crime, a-t-il vraiment eu lieu ?" (p. 409)

16. ———. 1987. "Le non-être absolu dans le Sophiste de Platon." Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études – Vème Section no. 95:282-285.
Analyse de Sophiste 237b-239c.

17. ———. 1991. "L'invention de l'école éléatique: Platon, Sophiste, 242D." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 91-124. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans N.-L. Cordero, Parmenidea. Venti scritti sull'Eleate e i suoi"eredi", Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag 2019, pp. 194-213.
"Elée était une colonie fondée par le Phocéens vers 540 pour remplacer une ancienne enclave grecque située au nord du promontoire de Palinure, en Lucanie (Grande Grèce).
C'est là que naquirent Parménide et Zénon, à une date difficile à préciser (dans le cas de Parménide, presque simultanément avec la fondation de la colonie, selon la chronologie d'Apollodore qu'adopte Diogène Laërce IX 23; vers l'année 515, selon la chronologie que l'on peut déduire des témoignages de Platon, Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217 C, Parm. 127 B. Dans le cas de Zénon, entre 508 et 490, selon les mêmes sources). Plus d'un siècle après, entre 368 et 361, date probable de l'écriture du Sophiste, Platon fait état d'un ethnos éléatique (242 D) dans une liste des mouvements philosophiques qui l'ont précédé. La "philosophie éléatique" est devenue ensuite l'un des clichés dont les commentateurs dans un premier temps, et les historiens de la philosophie après, n'ont pas pu se passer. Nous voudrions analyser dans ce travail le rapport qui pourrait s'établir entre les deux philosophes nés à Elée ("éléates", donc) et le "système éléatique" tel qu'il a été canonisé par Platon dans le Sophiste." (pp. 93-94, notes omises)
(...)
"Il ne reste qu'à répondre à deux questions: (a) Platon a-t-il été le premier à regrouper les quatre philosophes

[Xénophane, Parménide, Zénon, Melisse] pour inventer ex nihilo l' ethnos éléatique? (b) Pourquoi cette mise en scène a-t-elle lieu dans le Sophiste? A la première question on peut répondre oui et non. J. Mansfeld a démontré dans une étude récente et très exhaustive (89) que des systématisations thématiques étaient pratiquées au moins depuis la Sophistique, et il analyse le cas de !'Anthologie d'Hippias. Selon Mansfeld, dans le passage qui nous occupe, Platon aurait hérité une séquence intégrée par Musée, Orphée (les mystérieux initiateurs de l'école), Xénophane et Parménide (90) dans un schéma contenant des réponses sur la "quantité" des êtres. C'est très probable. Mais Mansfeld admet que Platon effectue aussi des «additions personnelles aux schémas préalables» (91). Il a raison en ce qui concerne le sujet de la liste platonicienne: il s'agit de réponses à la question «combien y a-t-il d'êtres (τα ὀντα [...] πόσα) (Soph. 242 c). Mais c'est Platon qui ajoute les noms de Zénon et de Mélissos à cette liste, qui expose les fondements conceptuels du groupe, qui justifie doctrinalement - mais à tort - l'appartenance de Parménide à l'équipe, et surtout qui caractérise comme "issus d'Elée" ces "monistes"; il "invente" ainsi l'école éléatique.

La réponse à notre deuxième question a été avancée tout au long de notre travail. Dans le Sophiste, Platon doit se libérer d'une certaine conception de l'être: celle qu'il avait affirmée jusqu'aux dialogues de la période des "critiques". Le Parménide règle les comptes avec la théorie des Formes, mais surtout en ce qui concerne le rapport entre celles-ci et les individus. Dans le Sophiste, c'est la structure même de l'univers des Formes, ainsi que la constitution de chaque Forme, qui est en question. Jusqu'au Sophiste, l'héritage du père Parménide était la source de l'univers des Formes. La nouvelle conception du παντελως ὄν, en revanche, exige le parricide." (pp. 123-124)

(89) J. Mansfeld, Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronography, in G. Cambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, Torino 1986, pp. 1-59.

(90) J. Mansfeld, op. cit. (note préc.), p. 27.

(91) Loc. cit., p. 28. Isocrate fera lui aussi des «additions évidentes» au «catalogue original» (loc. cit., p. 34).

18. ———. 1991. "Des circonstances atténuantes dans le parricide du Sophiste de Platon." In Platonisme et néoplatonisme. Antiquité et temps modernes, 29-33. Athène: Cahiers de la Villa Kérylos.
"On cherchera en vain, dans le Sophiste, un rapprochement quelconque entre l'Étranger et la philosophie éléatique. C'est un philosophe, mais différent des compagnons de Parménide et de Zenon. C'est un bon connaisseur de la philosophie qui est née à Élée et qui s'est répandue, évidemment très modifiée (mais ceci est un autre problème) dans tout le monde grec. A la demande de son amphitryon, il entreprend de définir le métier de sophiste, et sa logique impitoyable l'amène à réfuter le système du père de l'éléatisme — il dit «le père Parménide» (241 d) et non pas «mon père Parménide» — , ce personnage qu'il a écouté dans son enfance et qui avait été aussi le créateur des lois d'Élée. Si nous tenons compte de ces éléments, force nous est d'avouer que le crime, malgré son importance, a des véritables circonstances atténuantes." (p. 33)

19. ———. 1992. "Le procès de Parménide dans le Sophiste de Platon." École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire no. 101:249-252.
"Nous pouvons affirmer avec certitude que nous ne trouvons pas chez Parménide ce que Platon lui critique : a) l'assimilation du faux au non-être (237a) ; b) une conception de l' être-Un (242d) associée littéralement à quelque chose de « spatial », voire à une sphère (244e). Ces deux affirmations découlent d'une perspective sur la réalité étrangère à celle de Parménide et que Platon résume comme une recherche sur « la quantité et la qualité des êtres » (242c), question qui n'est pas pertinente par rapport à Parménide, dont les intérêts sont préalables à cette classification. Regardons maintenant les deux chefs d'accusation." (p. 250)

20. ———. 2000. "La participation comme être de la forme dans le Sophiste de Platon." In Ontologie et dialogue. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Aubenque avec sa collaboration à

l'occasion de son 70e anniversaire, edited by Cordero, Nestor-Luis, 33-46. Paris: Vrin.
"Le sujet de ce travail m'a été suggéré par une remarque de Pierre Aubenque à propos d'un passage du Sophiste de Platon. En effet dans le volume collectif Études sur le Sophiste de Platon (2)publié sous la direction de Pierre Aubenque, l'éditeur lui-même a écrit un article remarquable dans lequel il faisait état d'une sorte d'échec. Le titre du travail en témoigne : "Une occasion manquée. La genèse avortée de la distinction entre l'étant et le quelque chose». (p. 33)
(...)
"Je voudrais tout simplement réfléchir sur une affirmation qui fait partie de la conclusion de P. Aubenque. Il dit que Platon,l dans le Sophiste, n'accepte pas de remettre en cause le primat de l'ontologie : et c'est dommage. car la remise en cause de ce primat lui aurait permis de réfléchir sur le statut infra-ontologique de la temporalité et de la fausseté, mais peut-être aussi su le statut supra-ontologique du premier principe, qui, selon la République, n'est pas unee ssence (ousía), puisqu'il est au-delà de l'essence (Rép. 509b) (op. cit. 384).
Je n'ai rien à dire sur la première partie de la conclusion de P. Aubenque en ce qui concerne le statut infra-ontologique de certaines réalités telles que le temps et la fausseté, ou ce que les Stoïciens appelleront les incorporels : et je n'ai rien à dire parce que ce que P. Aubenque a dit me semble tout à fait convaincant. En revanche, je m'interroge sur la pertinence de la deuxième partie de sa conclusion, car il me semble - et je ferai de mon mieux pour justifier mon point de vue - que Platon a bel et bien réfléchi, je n'ose pas dire sur un premier principe, mais sur la question d'une sorte d'être qui n'est pas assimilé à des ousiai. c'est-à-dire, dans son système, à des Formes et il me semble que non seulement il s'est posé la question, mais qu'il a aussi trouvé la réponse. Je voudrais montrer que Platon se demande, à une certaine étape de sa démarche philosophique, quel est le statut d'un être qui n'est pas ceci ou cela. S'agit-il de la

question de l'être en tant qu'être, attribuée depuis toujours, pour la première fois à Aristotle?
Pourquoi pas? En tout cas, ce n'est pas la réponse platonicienne qui pourrait être retenue, mais la question. S 'il en est ainsi, Aristote - qui, lui non plus (et P. Aubenque l'a bien démontré) n'a jamais répondu à la
question - ne fera que suivre l'exemple de son maître." (pp. 33-34)
(2) Essais publiés sous la direction de Pierre Aubenque, Naples, Bibliopolis. 1991.

21. ———. 2005. "Du non-être à l'autre. La découverte de l'altérité dans le Sophiste de Platon." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger no. 195:175-189.
"Le titre de ce travail suggère que nous avons l'intention de parcourir un chemin qui mène d'une notion (celle du non-être) à une autre (celle de « l'autre »). Mais il faut dire d'ores et déjà que la notion de « chemin » n'engage, dans notre cas, que l'interprète (donc, nous-mêmes), et que les auteurs étudiés ici (notamment, Platon) seraient très surpris d'apprendre qu'ils ont « découvert » quelque chose qui est, pour nous, une sorte d'aboutissement d'une longue marche. En effet, il arrive souvent aux philosophes de partager l'expérience que l'on constate aussi chez les grands écrivains : la signification la plus profonde de leurs oeuvres leur échappe." (p. 175)
(...)
"Lorsque Parménide parle de « ce qui est » (to on), il fait allusion au « fait d'être ». C'est d'ores et déjà une notion « dynamique », et c'est pour cette raison que, lorsqu'il présente pour la première fois dans son Poème la notion de « ce qui est », il utilise le verbe « être » à la troisième personne, isolé : esti (fr. 2. 3). « On est » (esti, sans sujet) ; donc, il y a de l'être, dirait Parménide. Cette notion d'être, présente dans tout ce qui est, est très voisine, et même plus, de la Forme de l'être présentée par Platon dans le Sophiste. Platon lui-même dit qu'il ne s'est pas occupé de la question d'un non-être qui serait l'opposé de l'être, et, nous croyons, pour cause : parce que Parménide avait déjà dit ce qu'il fallait dire : qu'il faut être, ou ne pas être du tout (fr. 8. 11).

Platon accepte le défi, et trouve des nuances (avant Aristote) dans le sens du mot « être » ; quoi qu'il en soit, en tant que Forme, il donne de l'être, même au non-être, représenté par l'altérité. On pourrait donc dire que Platon confirme et élargit ce que Parménide disait : il y a de l'être, et il y a aussi du non-être, qui, en tant que Forme (celle de l'Autre), occupe une place éminente. Maintenant tout est, même le non-être...
Mais cette Forme de l'être que Platon découvre n'admet pas une négation, et c'est pour cette raison que les Formes les plus importantes ne sont que cinq : repos-mouvement, identité-altérité, être.
La Forme de l'être ne peut pas admettre une Forme contraire...
L'être que Platon propose a le même caractère absolu et nécessaire que l'être parménidien." (pp. 188-189)

22. ———. 2007. "Il faut rétablir la version originale de Sophiste 240b 7-9." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 28 (403):413.
"Si tout ouvrage écrit avant l'invention de l'imprimerie est devenu un "livre", c'est grâce à l'aide de toute une série de collaborateurs que les auteurs anciens ont eu la chance de rencontrer à titre posthume: les "éditeurs", des érudits qui ont mis de l'ordre à l'intérieur de la tradition manuscrite de ses ouvrages, qui ont établi des textes "bons à tirer", et qui dans la plupart des cas ont offert aux érudits modernes des possibilités de lecture non retenues, mais valables, dans les apparats critiques.
(...)
"Cependant, dans quelques occasions – les cas son heureusement très peu nombreux – quelques éditeurs se sont laissés emporter par leur imagination, et des collègues plus respectueux du texte original ont du faire des efforts titanesques afin que la voix authentique de l'auteur puisse s'écouter à nouveau, ou, simplement, pour rétablir un silence salutaire là où des conjectures malheureuses avaient détourné le sens d'un passage.
(...)

"Un cas beaucoup plus grave, car il s'agit de la transformation volontaire d'un texte clair et distinct transmis d'une manière unanime par la tradition manuscrite, est celui d'un passage décisif du Sophiste de Platon (240 B 7-10)." (pp- 403-404)
(...)
"L'étonnement sera le résultat d'un véritable paradoxe: l'admission de l'existence réelle de quelque chose qui n'existe pas. Pour sortir de l'impasse il faudra admettre, malgré ce que l'on croit d'habitude, que le non-être existe d'une certaine manière (πως). Et, pour que l'étonnement soit authentique, c'est Théétète lui-même qui sera obligé de tirer cette conclusion à partir de la définition de l'image (εικών) que lui-même a proposé: une sorte de double d'un modèle mais qui, à la différence de celui-ci, «n'est pas du tout vrai» (οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν, 240 B 2). Comme Théétète lui-même admet que ce qui est vrai est ce qui existe réellement (ὄντως ὂν, B 3) – qui est le contraire (ἐναντίον, B 5) de ce qui n'est pas vrai – l'Étranger tire la seule conclusion qui s'impose: «tu dis donc que ce qui est semblable (το` οικο`ς n'existe pas, car tu affirmes qu'il n'est pas vrai». Mais comme Théétète a déjà admis que ce qui ressemble est «semblable» (ἀλλ᾽ οικο`ς, B 2), l'Étranger, dans la même phrase, ajoute: «Mais il existe» (B 8). Voilà le texte authentique de Platon." (p. 405)
(...)
"Toutes les éditions actuelles du Sophiste, en revanche, reproduisent la deuxième modification, aussi injustifiée que la précédente mais beaucoup plus grave, car nous n'hésitons pas à affirmer que la séquence de l'argumentation platonicienne a été tergiversé, et l'effet dramatique annulé. Le responsable a été C.F. Hermann, et la preuve du délit se trouve à la page 375 du volume premier de son édition (sans traduction) des dialogues de Platon (Teubner, Leipzig 1851)."(p. 407)
(...)
"Voici son texte, que l'on trouve, d'ailleurs, dans toutes les éditions et traductions actuelles du Sophiste 240 B:

7-8 – ÉTR. Tu dis donc que ce qui est semblable est un non-être [non]9 réel, si tu affirmes qu'il n'est pas vrai.
9 – THÉÉT. Mais il existe d'une certaine manière (πως).
10 – ÉTR. Non véritablement, tu dis.
Nous avons déjà dit que le texte que l'on trouve dans la totalité de la tradition manuscrite du passage (nous croyons avoir fait l'"autopsie" de tous les codices existants aujourd'hui), ainsi que dans les éditions antérieures à celle de 1851 (à l'exception de Schleiermacher) est celui que nous avons présenté plus haut. Les petites divergences (sur lesquelles nous reviendrons) concernent des adverbes ou des négations fournis par des sources manuscrites diverses, mais jamais un changement des répliques ni du statut de l'adverbe πως. La modification de Hermann, par conséquent, ne se justifie pas; mais il donne cependant des arguments." (p. 408)

23. ———. 2011. "Une conséquence inattendue de l'assimilation du non-être à l'Autre dans le Sophiste." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 188-198. Praha: Oikoymenh.
24. Cornea, Andrei. 2009. "Le Sophiste de Platon: cinq ou six «genres suprêmes» ? ." Semitica et Classica:43-49.
Résumé : "Il existe une ancienne interprétation (qu'on retrouve déjà chez Plotin) selon laquelle, dans le Sophiste, Platon aurait pris en considération seulement cinq «genres suprêmes»: le mouvement, le repos, l'être, le même et l'autre. Or, Platon admet aussi une certaine existence du non-être (à l'encontre du «père Parménide») qu'il définit comme «autre que l'être». Il s'ensuit, selon cette même interprétation, que Platon aurait identifié l'autre et le non-être. Cet article s'interroge sur le bien-fondé de cette interprétation et cherche à montrer que Platon distingue l'autre du non-être, de sorte que le nombre des genres suprêmes dans le Sophiste serait six et non pas cinq. La thèse est étayée de plusieurs sortes d'arguments. Premièrement, Platon ne dit jamais que le nombre définitif des genres suprêmes est seulement cinq; au contraire, il laisse entendre que ce nombre est plus important.

Deuxièmement, il y a des raisons logiques qui s'opposent à ce que non-être et autre (celui-ci défini comme «autre que l'être») soient identiques. Par exemple, cela amènerait à confondre «l'autre que l'être» avec «l'autre», c'est-à-dire à confondre un sujet avec une relation.
Troisièmement, il s'ensuit une conséquence inévitable de la distinction entre l'autre et le non-être, étant donné que la théorie des Formes veut que tout sujet auquel on attribue une certaine propriété, participe de la Forme correspondante: cette conséquence est la «Forme des négations», distincte de la «Forme des relations». Or, cette «Forme des négations» est mentionnée par Aristote dans deux passages de la Métaphysique, à côté de la «Forme des relations», lorsqu'il évoque les objections contre la théorie des Formes que l'on formulait au sein de l'Académie.
L'article soutient qu'il est vraisemblable que, après le Sophiste, Platon ait abandonné la théorie des six genres suprêmes, tout en explorant des solutions alternatives dans le Philèbe, le Timée et la «doctrine non écrite»."

25. de Vogel, Cornelia. 1953. "Platon a-t-il ou n'a-t-il pas introduit le mouvement dans son monde intelligible?" In Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 12, 61-67. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Reprinted in: C. de Vogel, Philosophia. Vol. I: Studies in Greek Philosophy, Assen: Van Gorcum 1970, pp. 176-183.
26. Diés, Auguste. 1909. La définition de l'Être et la nature des Idées dans le Sophiste de Platon. Paris: Félix Alcan. Nouvelle édition Paris: Vrin 1963.
"Notre étude comprend donc cinq chapitres :
I. — Le rôle du concept de mouvement dans le Sophiste.
II. — La définition de TÊtre par la δύναμις.
III. — Le mouvement de l'οὐσία.
— Le παντελῶς ον.
V. — Le Communauté des Genres.
Enfin, dans notre Conclusion, nous résumerons brièvement les résultats de notre étude." (p. VI)
(...)
"Lors même que les Amis des Idées seraient des Platoniciens ou Platon lui-même, il n'en resterait pas moins

que le Sophiste ne met pas, dans l'οὐσία, autre chose que le mouvement passif qui résulte, pour elle, du fait d'être connue; il serait vrai encore que le παντελῶς ον, en qui sont affirmés le mouvement, l'âme, la vie et la pensée, est le monde sensible et non pas l'idée platonicienne; il serait démontré, autant que nous avons pu le faire, que la définition de l'Être par le pouvoir de pâtir et d'agir n'est pas la proclamation solennelle d'une théorie énergétique de l'Être et que l'essentielle nouveauté du Sophiste, la Communauté des Genres, n'est pas la conséquence de ce dynamisme. La théorie des Idées resterait tout aussi exempte de transformation que si la thèse combattue dans les Amis des Idées eût été celle des Mégariques.
Seulement il deviendrait étrange de voir Platon, auteur du Phèdre et du Phédon, lire et combattre rétrospectivement en ces dialogues une théorie de la réalité exclusive de l'ousia et de l'éternelle immobilité du Tout. La preuve d'une transformation de la théorie des Idées dans le Sophiste serait une présomption en faveur de l'identification des Amis des Idées aux Platoniciens classiques : si Platon a mis, dans les Idées, à partir du Sophiste, le mouvement et la vie consciente, il a pu, il a peut-être dû, de ce nouveau point de vue, traiter sa doctrine antérieure comme une doctrine d'immobilité.
Nous avons essayé de prouver que cette transformation n'est pas opérée dans le Sophiste. Nous savons, d'ailleurs, que bien des traits différencient le platonisme classique de la théorie soutenue par les Amis des Idées. Si d'autres sont forcés d'identifier ces Néo-Eléates et presque obligés par leur thèse à y comprendre Platon lui-même, nous avons, nous, le droit de confesser provisoirement notre ignorance et de maintenir seulement ces simples propositions : le Sophiste ne combat pas la théorie classique des Idées, le Sophiste ne transforme pas la théorie classique des Idées; le Sophiste ne combat pas, ne transforme pas Platon." (p. 133)

27. Dixsaut, Monique. 1987. "Platon et le Logos de Parménide (Sophiste, 241d-245e)." In Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 215-253. Paris: Vrin.

Repris dans M. Dixsaut, Platon et la question de la pensée: études platoniciennes I, Paris: Vrin 2015, Chapitre VI.
"Avant d'aborder l'examen critique des doctrines de l'être, l'Étranger adresse trois prières à Théétète. Dans la première, il lui demande de se contenter «du peu qu'on pourra gagner, par quelque biais (πη) que ce soit, sur un logos aussi fort que celui de Parménide»; dans la deuxième, de ne point le regarder comme un parricide «s'il est contraint de mettre à l'épreuve le logos de son père Parménide»; dans la troisième, de ne pas l'accuser de manquer de mesure, de délirer, s'il «entreprend de réfuter ce logos», à supposer qu'il en soit capable (Soph. 241c-242a).
Du sens que l'on accorde à cette manière d'annoncer l'entreprise comme mise à l'épreuve d'un logos fort, paternel et sacré — et de l'importance que l'on attache (ou non) à cette manière de l'introduire, dépend toute la lecture du texte qui suit. La relecture de ce célèbre passage du Sophiste aura donc pour objet de déterminer sur quoi porte exactement la réfutation, comment et dans quel but elle se conduit." (p. 215)

28. ———. 1991. "La négation, le non-être et l'autre dans le Sophiste." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 165-213. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans M. Dixsaut, Platon et la question de la pensée: études platoniciennes I, Paris: Vrin 2015, Chapitre VII.
"L'analyse de la négation suit l'examen, par l'Etranger, de ceux qu'on dit être les plus grands parmi les genres; elle aboutit à la définition du non-être comme Forme assurée de son être et de son unité, possédant sa nature propre. La finalité de toute cette partie du dialogue est explicite : ne pas être un homme sans culture et sans philosophie, donc tenir le λογος pour l'un des genres qui sont. Pour cela, il a fallu établir, contre les opsimathes, la communication des genres; elle suppose que, d'une certaine manière, l'être n'est pas. La manière qu'a l'être de ne pas être, c'est de ne pas être les autres : «autant de fois les autres sont, autant de fois il n'est pas» (257 A 4-5), d'être autre que tous ses autres.
L'articulation des genres entre eux garantit la possibilité du

logos. Réciproquement, affirmer que le non-être, sous un certain rapport, existe, et qu'il est comme l'être une Forme une, εἶδος εν, va permettre d'affirmer la réalité du logos, d'affirmer que, tout en n'étant pas l'être, il en participe, il est. La réalité du discours a partie liée avec la différence de l'être et avec l'affirmation de l'être de cette différence.
De la pluralité et de la communauté des genres découle la nécessité d'attribuer le non-être et l'affirmation d'une pluralité infinie de non-étants (256 D-257 A 6). Cette attribution est !'œuvre de la nature de l'autre: l'existence de la différence, en différenciant les genres, les rend du même coup autres que l'être, donc, sous ce rapport, non étants. Ainsi, attribuer le non-être, c'est attribuer l'autre relativement à l'être. La réduction de la négation à l'altérité est-elle propre à ce seul terme, "non-être", ou ne fait-il que suivre la règle commune à toute expression et à toute attribution négative? C'est là l'objet d'un passage de transition, qui conclut le développement sur les cinq grands genres et introduit le morcellement de l'autre en "petites parties" [257 B 1-257 C 3]." (pp. 167-168)

29. ———. 1992. "La dernière définition du Sophiste (Sophiste 265b-268d)." In Sophies maietores = Chercheurs de sagesse : hommage à Jean Pépin, edited by Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile , Madec, Goulven and O'Brien, Denis, 45-75. Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes.
Repris dans M. Dixsaut, Platon et la question de la pensée : études platoniciennes I, Paris: Vrin 2015, Chapitre VIII.

30. ———. 2000. "Images du philosophe." Kléos no. 4:191-248.
"Le sophiste est un être difficile à capturer, mais le philosophe ne l’est pas moins; cependant, “en ce qui le concerne la difficulté est d’un autre ordre qu’en ce qui concerne le sophiste”(1). Si, pour ce dernier, elle tient à l’obscurité du lieu où il s’est réfugié (le non-être), le philosophe “au contraire est difficile à voir en raison de l’éclatante lumière de la région” où il réside. Les objets sur lesquelles il réfléchit portent tous la “marque” (idea) de l’être, cesont des réalités véritablement existantes et pleinement intelligibles. “Or les yeux de l’âme de la plupart sont incapables d’avoir la force de regarder vers ce qui est

divin”(2). La plupart des hommes, donc, ont une âme impuissante à voir et à comprendre ce qui est. Pour eux, l’éclat divin propre à l’intelligible est indiscernable de l’obscurité de l’inintelligible, ils sont semblablement aveuglés
par l’excès de lumière et par son absence. C’est donc leur incapacité à saisir la nature des réalités dont s’occupe le philosophe qui entraîne leur méconnaissance de ce qu’est réellement un philosophe."
(1) Platon, Sophiste, 254 a 1-2: ἐναργῶς και᾽ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μη᾽ν τρόπον ἥ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἥ τε τούτου.
(2) Platon, Sophiste, 254

31. Dorion, Louis André. 2001. "Le destin ambivalent de la sixième définition du Sophiste : l’exemple d’Aristote et de Clément d’Alexandrie." In Une philosophie dans l’histoire : hommage à Raymond Klibansky, edited by Melkevik, Bjarne and Narbonne, Jean-Marc, 47-63. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.
"La sixième définition du Sophiste comporte donc à la fois un volet logique et un volet moral, la dimension logique étant toutefois clairement subordonnée à la dimension morale. Ce double aspect de l'elenchos ne sera pas nécessairement conservé par les auteurs qui s' inspireront de ce texte du Sophiste. Les dimensions logique et éthique, que Platon s'efforce de concilier et d'articuler en subordonnant la première à la seconde, peuvent être indépendantes l'une de l'autre, si bien que l'on peut souscrire uniquement à l'une ou l'autre. C'est précisément cette dissociation des aspects logique et éthique que j'aimerais mettre en lumière chez deux auteurs, Aristote et Clément d'Alexandrie s'inspirent l'un et l'autre, à des fins différentes, de la description de l'elenchos en Sophiste 230b-e. Comme je m'efforcerai de le démontrer, Aristote ne retient de cette description que le volet logique en faisant l'impasse sur la perspective pédagogique qui confère pourtant sa finalité à la réfutation dialectique. Quant à Clément d'Alexandrie, il semble ignorer la structure logique de l'elenchos, au point même que son elenchos ne se présente plus comme une réfutation dialectique, mais il

demeure néanmoins fidèle à l'autre aspect de l'elenchos, puisqu'il en fait un instrument pédagogique au service d'une finalité morale, qui n'est toutefois pas identique, en dépit des apparences, à celle visée par Platon." (pp. 49-50)
Références
L-A. Dorion. Les Réfutations sophistiques d'Aristote : introduction, traduction et commentaire. Paris. Vrin (coll. «Histoire des doctrines de l'Antiqui1é classique», 18), 1995.
Clément d'Alexandrie. Le Pédagogue, Livre I, introduction, texte, traduction et notes de M. Harl. H.-I. Marrou, Paris, Cerf (coll. «Sources Chrétiennes 70), 1960.

32. Fattal, Michel. 1991. "Le Sophiste : logos de la synthèse ou logos de la division?" In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 145-163. Napoli: Bibliopolis. Repris dans: M. Fattal, Logos. Pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque, Paris: l'Harmattan 2001, pp. 161-180. Trad. it. "Ricerche sul logos da Omero a Plotino", Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2005, pp. 104-115.
"C'est en remontant aux origines de la pensée grecque, représentée par la poésie d'Homère d'une part et par la philosophie d'Héraclite et de Parménide d'autre part, que l'on se propose de comprendre l'originalité de la pensée platonicienne du logos telle qu'elle a été élaborée dans le Sophiste. Ce retour aux origines revêt une importance capitale pour la compréhension du logos platonicien. En fait, il s'agit de montrer que l'utilisation platonicienne du logos n'est pas sans se référer indirectement au fonctionnement simultanément synthétique et analytique du verbe legein tel qu'il apparaît pour la première fois chez Homère. La notion de dialectique représente, selon nous, la thématisation des deux fonctions synthétique et analytique déjà contenues dans le legein homérique. Platon se serait laissé guider par l'étymologie du verbe legein pour élaborer sa théorie philosophique et linguistique du logos et de la dialectique.
Compte tenu de cela, le logos du Sophiste ne serait pas non plus sans présenter certaines similitudes structurelles avec le logos d'Héraclite, qui semble pour sa part mettre l'accent sur l'idée de synthèse, et avec le logos de Parménide qui

paraît fondé sur celle de l'analyse. Notre but étant de montrer, que malgré la valorisation des deux fonctions de la dialectique (Soph. 253 B-E), Platon finit par privilégier le langage de la division en se rangeant plutôt du côté de Parménide." (p. 147)

33. ———. 2009. Le langage chez Platon. Autour du Sophiste. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Sommaire : Avertissement 11; Introduction 13; Chapitre I: Le Cratyle 15; Chapitre Il: Le Phèdre 25; Chapitre III: Le Sophiste 39; 1. Le problème de la prédication (251 a - 259 d) : une difficulté linguistique, logique et philosophique 45; 2. Les conditions de possibilité du discours vrai et du discours faux (259 d - 264 b) 65; Conclusion 81; Annexe : Une mise en perspective du logos platonicien 85; Bibliographie sélective 103-114.
"Le Sophiste représente un des sommets de la philosophie en général et de la pensée grecque et platonicienne en particulier. C'est dans le Sophiste que Platon élabore une théorie philosophique du langage qui est complète et achevée. Le présent ouvrage, destiné à un large public et qui est également susceptible d'alimenter la réflexion des spécialistes, se propose de montrer toute l'originalité de la pensée platonicienne en matière de langage. Il entend ainsi décrire l'itinéraire intellectuel et philosophique qui a conduit progressivement Platon à élaborer sa théorie de la proposition, et à réfléchir sur les conditions de possibilité du vrai et du faux dans les discours." (p. 13)

34. Frère, Jean. 1991. "Platon, lecteur de Parménide dans le Sophiste." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 125-143. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Bien que souvent négligé, le témoignage de Platon sur Parménide est sans aucun doute capital. Comment Platon lit-il Parménide avant de le discuter ?
Platon, certes, lorsqu'il a parlé de Parménide, quand il a mis en scène Parménide, n'a pas toujours été fidèle à Parménide. Dans le dialogue intitulé Parménide, ce que Parménide. est censé envisager quant aux hypothèses sur l'Un (l'Un est un, l'Un est, etc.) constitue analyse platonicienne, non parménidienne. Quand, dans le

Théétète, Platon évoque Parménide, c'est à propos d'un thème parménidien, non d'un vers précis du Poème que se fait la discussion (180 D).
Dans le Sophiste, au contraire, Platon cite Parménide; ceci par trois fois: 237 A, 244 E, 258 D." (p. 127, note omise)
(...)
"Ainsi selon Platon dans le Sophiste y avait-il chez Parménide énoncés vrais, énoncés erronés, quant à l'Etant et quant aux étants. C'est le problème du bien-fondé de tels énoncés qui allait amener Platon à contourner Parménide énonçant de l'Etant son caractère d'inengendré et indestructible Englobant. «Il nous faudra nécessairement, pour nous défendre, mettre à la question la thèse de notre père Parménide» (Soph. 241 D). Au dialecticien rationaliste usant de mythes rationnels Platon, Parménide apparaissait, tels les autres Présocratiques, comme un abusif "conteur de mythes". «Ils m'ont tout l'air de nous conter des mythes, comme on ferait à des enfants» (Soph. 242 C)31• Mais, même si Parménide a intégré à son œuvre des figures mythiques, Parménide selon Platon n'a point vraiment "conté de mythes". Des pensées désormais incontournables ont été énoncées par Parménide.
Platon le sait et l'a écrit. Or Platon ne nous montre pas seulement en Parménide un penseur de l'Etre un, mais aussi un penseur de l'Etre-sphère et de l'Etant dont se peuvent énoncer avec certitude bien des qualifications et bien des négations essentielles." (p. 143)

35. Fronterotta, Francesco. 1995. "L'être et la participation de l'autre, une nouvelle ontologie dans le Sophiste." Les Études Philosophiques:311-353.
"Mais sur quelle base repose l'interdit de Parménide, selon l'analyse de l'Eléate ? Quels sont les paradoxes et les difficultés du non-être ?
C'est sur ce point que porte l'enquête menée dans la section qui suit (3)." (p. 312)
(...)
"Pour sortir de telles difficultés, il est nécessaire d'examiner le raisonnement de Parménide, pour vérifier s'il est possible de réfuter le caractère péremptoire de sa négation du non-

être : c'est seulement démontrant que, sous certains aspects, le non-être est, et que par conséquent il peut être objet d'analyse et de discours, que l'on pourra éclairer l' « endroit d'accès difficile » où s'est réfugié le sophiste; en effet, si l'on songeait à discuter les paradoxes de la fausse opinion et des imitations, ou des arts qui les touchent, avant d'avoir analysé en profondeur la question du non-être, qui est à la base de ces paradoxes, on tomberait immédiatement en contradiction avec soi-même (4). C'est un point important, parce qu'il met en relation le problème de l'être et du non-être avec celui du discours vrai ou faux, opérant ainsi un renvoi du plan logique au plan ontologique, et établissant une connexion nécessaire et indiscutable." (p. 313)
(...)
"La discussion sur la nature de l'être et du non-être est introduite par l'analyse des doctrines philosophiques antérieures où ce problème est pris en compte. L'Eléate dresse d'abord la liste des différentes positions et des philosophes qui les ont défendues; mais leur interprétation est tellement difficile qu'il doit suggérer une autre approche : il vaudra mieux classer ces doctrines par groupes, en examinant la théorie de l'être qu'elles présupposent (1)." (pp. 317-318)
(3) Soph. 237 b7 - 241 e 5.
(4) Ibid., 241 e1-5.
(1) Soph., 242 b6-243 b 9.

36. ———. 2008. "La notion de δύναμις dans le Sophiste de Platon : koinônia entre les formes et methexis du sensible à l'intelligible." In Dunamis. Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, edited by Crubellier, Michel, Jaulin, Annick, Lefebvre, David and Morel, Pierre-Marie, 187-224. Louvain-La-Neuve: Peeters.
"Prémisse. Le Parménide transmet aux dialogues qui le suivent deux problèmes fondamentaux dans la réflexion tardive de Platon, 1° celui de la κοινωνία των γενῶν, évoqué d'une manière allusive en Parménide 129b-130a (qui annonce un programme de travail qui consiste en l'explication du τέρας extraordinaire de la distinction et de la conjonction des formes)(1) 2° celui de la μέθεξις du

sensible à l'intelligible, tellement discuté qu'il représente la question essentielle examinée dans le Parménide. Ce dernier, cependant, ne lui donne pas de réponse définitive: si aucune des formes «ne se trouve chez nous», dans le sensible (μηδεμίαν αυτών εἶναι ἐν ἡμϊν), «les choses sensibles n'ont pas plus d'efficace sur les humes que les formes n'en ont sur les choses sensibles. Au contraire, je lr répète, c'est sur elles-mêmes que les formes ont de l'efficace et c'est en relation avec elles-mêmes qu'elles existent; et pareillement les choses sensibles n'existent qu'en relation avec elles-mêmes» (<τά εϊδη> αυτά ου ιών καί προς αυτά ἐκεϊνά τέ ἐστι ... τα παρ'ἡμϊν ωσαύτως προς αύτά)(2). Mais les formes dans leur ensemble sont en même temps ce à quoi participent les choses sensibles, ce qui fait que ces dernières tirent justement de cette participation leur réalité propre, leurs qualités et leurs dénominations, d'où le problème de savoir si la participation entre les formes et les choses sensibles est compatible avec leur séparation réciproque, le fait de «se trouver chez nous» étant, pour les formes, contradictoire(3).

Une fois ces deux questions soulevées, si on admet que le Parménide précède de quelques années la composition du Sophiste, il est opportun de vérifier si le Sophiste se propose de leur donner une réponse. C'est précisément ce que je vais essayer de faire dans les deux parties qui composent cette étude." (pp. 187-188)

(1) Je parlerai dans cet article de formes (εϊδη) ou de genres (γένη) intelligibles, car le Sophiste emploie ces deux termes sans poser entre eux aucune distinction véritable. Sur l'interprétation de ce passage du Parménide, voir mon article Fronterotta [2001 a].

Avant ce passage du Parménide, il n'y a que très peu de références à la question de la participation des formes entre elles dans les dialogues de Platon (Cratyle 438e 5-10; République V 476a 4-7; Phédon 104b 6-105a 5).

(2) Voir Parménide 133a -e. La traduction du Parménide est celle, légèrement modifiée, de Brisson [1999²] Platon. Parménide, GF-Flammarion, Paris.

(3) Concernant le «dilemme» de la participation des choses sensibles aux formes intelligibles, voir récemment Brisson [2005] «Come rendere conto della partecipazione del sensibile all'intellegibile in Platone», in Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, éds. F. Fronterotta, W. Leszl, Sankt Augustin, pp. 25-36, et mes études Fronterotta [2001 b| ΜΕΘΕΞΙΣ. La teoria platonica delle idee e la partecipazione delle cose empiriche. Dai dialoghi giovanili al Parmenide, Pisa. pp. 115 57; 195-222; 271-314, et [2000] «Que feras-tu, Socrate, de la philosophie? L'un et les plusieurs dans l'exercice dialectique du Parménide de Platon», Revue de Métaphysique et d Morale, pp. 273-99.

37. ———. 2019. "Platon sur ΟΝΟΜΑ, ΡΗΜΑ et ΛΟΓΟΣ : théories du ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ en Sophiste 261d-262e." Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 19:1-20.
Résumé : "Dans cet article, j'examine la conception platonicienne du λόγος, en Sophiste 261d-262e, en tant que succession (συνέχεια) « signifiante » de ὄνομα et ῥῆμα, par un commentaire du passage cité du dialogue. Je discute particulièrement les points suivants : 1. Pourquoi « les termes prononcés », dans les cas d'une succession de noms ou d'une succession de verbes, n'indiquent aucune action ni aucune inaction (οὐδεμίαν ... πρᾶξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν), aucune réalité qui est ni aucune réalité qui n'est pas (οὐδε᾽ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδε᾽ μη᾽ ὄντος, 262c2-4) ? 2. Quelle est la différence entre « nommer » (ὀνομάζειν) et « dire» (λέγειν), en 262d4-6 ? 3. Quelle est la différence des constructions : λόγος περι᾽ + génitif et λόγος + génitif, en 262e-263a ? 4. Plus généralement : est-ce que le critère de vérité du discours établi en 263b-d est valide, rétrospectivement, pour toute forme de σημαίνειν, y compris le ὀνομάζειν ?"

38. ———. 2020. "Être, présence et vérité : Platon chez Heidegger (et à rebours)." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 20:167-189.
Abstract: "In this article, I wish to present and discuss some Heideggerian theses concerning the notions of "being," "presence" and "truth" in Plato's dialogues, taking as a point of departure Heidegger's course on Plato's Sophist given in Marburg in 1924–1925. My aim is to show that the

fundamental philosophical link that unites them makes it possible to better understand seemingly obscure aspects of the Platonic conception of being and knowledge as it is presented in particular in the concluding pages of Republic V, to which this article is therefore essentially devoted."

39. Gaudron, Edmond. 1960. "Sur l'objet du Sophiste." Laval théologique et philosophique no. 16:70-93.
"L'étude des derniers dialogues platoniciens, depuis une soixantaine d'années, est généralement marquée des mêmes préoccupations : montrer que la théorie des idées, a subi, ou non, une transformation, — que Platon a finalement conçu, ou non, les idées comme des activités intellectuelles, des idées forces et même des esprits, — ou bien encore que de pareilles façons de concevoir les idées se retrouvent d'une certaine manière dans les dialogues écrits avant ceux qui ne laisseraient plus de doute sur la pensée de Platon.
(...)
Toutes les discussions qui se sont élevées autour de ce problème, ont cependant retenu l'attention des exégètes à ce point qu'il est permis de se demander si, pour édifier ou démolir une thèse ou même une hypothèse, on n'aurait pas fait passer au second plan des préoccupations auxquelles Platon lui-même donnait la première place. C'est ce que prêtent à penser les analyses dont le Sophiste, par exemple, a été l'objet.
On a bien insisté sur l'objet de ce dialogue : essayer de penser le non-être et en déduire que Parménide avait tort de dire : « Jamais tu ne feras que le non-être soit ». Il y a du non-être, autrement l'erreur est impossible, puisque se tromper c'est prendre une chose pour une autre, c'est dire qu'une chose est alors qu'elle n'est pas.
Mais il n'est pas facile de réfuter directement la thèse de Parménide.
Platon montre bien que le non-être échappe d'abord à toute définition et c'est ce qui le conduit à cette conclusion : peut-être ne savons-nous pas ce qu'est le non-être, parce que nous ignorons d'abord ce qu'est l'être lui-même. Et nous arrivons à ce long passage du dialogue (2) où Platon fait une

revue sommaire des idées que se sont fait de l'être les présocratiques et les amis des idées."(p. 70)
(2) 2426-2546.

40. Gavray, Marc-Antoine. 2006. "La dunamis dans le Sophiste." Philosophie Antique. Problèmes, Renaissance, Usages no. 6:29-57.
Résumé : "En Sophiste, 247d8-e4, l'Étranger d'Élée pose un horos de l'étant comme « puissance d'agir et de subir (dynamis tou poiein kai tou pathein) ». L'objectif que se fixe cet article est d'envisager quel sens donner à cet horos et quelle valeur accorder à la dunamis dans ce dialogue. D'une comparaison avec d'autres occurrences dans le corpus platonicien (Phèdre et Théétète), il ressort que le Sophiste amène un double déplacement : d'une part il fait passer la question de la dunamis sur le champ de l'Etre d'une manière inédite, d'autre part son protagoniste n'attribue plus la formule à Hippocrate ou à Protagoras, mais il la présente comme le moyen, qu'il s'apprête à défendre, de sortir d'une impasse. Par une lecture des arguments qui annoncent et qui suivent cet horos, il apparaît que celui-ci possède une grande efficacité pour la compréhension de la structure du dialogue et de l'évolution de son argumentation. En même temps qu'il sert à définir l'Etre, il permet d'expliquer le fonctionnement de la koinonia des Genres et de jeter les bases de la théorie du non-être. En définitive, il se révèle être un truchement opérant pour dépasser définitivement la sophistique en lui substituant une véritable ontologie philosophique.".

41. ———. 2007. Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste. Contribution à l'étude de l'exégèse néoplatonicienne tardive. Paris: Klincksieck.
Table des matières: Introduction 9; Chapitre : L'hèritage néoplatonicien (Plotin, Proclus, Damascius) 13; Chapitre II: Les citations du Sophiste 35; Chapitre III: Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste 55; Conclusion 91; Traductions 95; Commentaire sur les Catégories 97; Commentaire sur la Physique 113; Commentaire sur le Traité de l'Âme 193; Annexe: Construction du Sophiste 203; Bibliographie 207;

Index locorum 215; Index nominum 223; Index rerum 225-228.
"Pour les commentateurs contemporains, le Sophiste constitue un dialogue clé au sein de l'œuvre de Platon. La complexité de sa doctrine et son rôle dans l'ensemble, la rigueur de sa méthode et l'enjeu de ses réfutations, l'identité de ses personnages et le rapport à Parménide : autant de questions qui ne cessent d'alimenter les débats. Or, au lieu de les aborder frontalement, il est possible d'adopter un autre point de vue, consistant à interroger le rapport qu'entretenaient les Anciens avec le texte, en particulier les Néoplatoniciens. Et si Plotin et Proclus, les grands noms du néoplatonisme, ont fait l'objet de quelques études récentes, personne n'a encore abordé cette question à propos de Simplicius - bien qu'il se présente comme un lecteur assidu du Sophiste. Une telle entreprise enrichirait pourtant nos connaissances de l'histoire de l'interprétation et de l'étude de ce dialogue." (p. 9)
(...)
"Par sa méthode exégétique et par sa perspective de commentateur d'Aristote, Simplicius se démarque de ses prédécesseurs néoplatoniciens. Dès lors, nous commencerons par analyser leurs grilles de lecture respectives, car en décryptant leur approche du Sophiste et en cherchant l'objectif qu'ils se fixent, nous espérons dégager les traits propres à chacune. De cette manière, nous espérons rendre compte du fait que Plotin met en œuvre la dialectique qu'il définit dans ses Ennéades, afin d'aboutir à une déduction des Genres de l'Être; que Proclus systématise les Dialogues de Platon et les rassemble dans une structure théologique où le Sophiste se voit accorder une place de choix par rapport au Parménide, malgré les apparences ; enfin, que Damascius, en raison de sa formation de rhéteur, retourne au texte original, mais que son regard varie si l'on observe son œuvre de philosophe ou bien celle de commentateur." (p. 10)

42. Grasso, Elsa. 2008. "Socrate dans le Sophiste : Platon, le juge et le prétendant." In Socratica 2005: Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle Giornate di studio

di Senigallia, edited by Rossetti, Livio and Stavru, Alessandro, 305-325. Bari: Levante.

43. ———. 2021. "L'ousia dans le Théétète et le Sophiste." Chôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales no. 18-19:41-71.

Abstract: "The Theætetus and the Sophist present in succession two "battles" regarding ousia. In so doing, ousia is placed at the heart of what is essential to both dialogues: in fact, ousia interconnects with the conditions of possibility, both physical and metaphysical, of logos and epistèmè.

However, each dialogue brings differing conceptions of discourse and science into play, and both articulate a different train of thought regarding being.

Ousia appears differently in the two dialogues and it is not the same thing as the notion of ousia, usually considered to be truly Platonic, presented in the central books of the Republic, which neither the Socrates of the Theætetus nor the Stranger of the Sophist put forward.

Both present ways out of the battles, each has its own middle course. Against the thesis of the non-immutability of ousia, the Theætetus establishes that there is not only motion. And, unlike the doctrine that reduces ousia to Forms excluding all motion, the Sophist shows that while there is not only motion, there is not only rest either. Such different orientations in the treatment of ousia, just below and just above doctrinal Platonism as it were, adjust to distinctions in the epistemological stakes: even if the Theætetus emphasizes that science proceeds from an activity of the soul bringing together "commons", it is not yet a question, as it will be the following day, of systematically getting epistèmè to intellectually grasp a set of eidetic relationships, nor of making

logos itself the elaboration of relationships. One needs to have left the field where those in favour of motion are challenged on their own ground, and in an albeit transformed field marked out by the partisans of eide which is not the field hierarchical metaphysics either, it will become possible to analyse the discourse itself as a

relational framework that is consistent with the framework of ousia."

44. Guérard, Christian. 1991. "Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 495-508. Napoli: Bibliopolis. "Liste complète pour les Tria Opuscula, !'In Alcibiadem, !'In Parmenidem, les cinq premiers livres de la Théologie platonicienne et l'In Cratylum" (p. 495)
45. Hoekstra, Marieke, and Scheppers, Frank. 2003. "Ὄνομα, ῥῆμα et λόγος dans le Cratyle et le Sophiste de Platon : analyse du lexique et analyse du discours." L'antiquité Classique no. 72:55-73.
"Cette étude concerne (i) les valeurs sémantiques des mots Ὄνομα, ῥῆμα et λόγος en grec classique (paragraphe 1), et (ii) la façon dont ces valeurs sont mises en œuvre dans le développement thématique de quelques passages chez Platon (Cra. 424e-425a et Soph. 261c-262e), passages qui sont important du point de vue de l'histoire de la linguistique (paragraphes 2 et 3). À ce propos, nous essaierons de décrire le fonctionnement de ces mots dans ces passages à partir de l'hypothèse que le vocabulaire de Platon n'est pas encore une terminologie spécialisée, mais puise dans les ressources du lexique commun de l'époque. Le champ sémantique de la parole dans le lexique grec « commun» (non spécialisé) de l'époque classique est assez différent des champs lexicaux comparables dans les langues modernes; ainsi, il n'y a pas d'équivalents (sauf très approximatifs) en grec classique pour des termes fondamentaux comme 'mot' ou 'phrase'; de plus, ce champ a connu une évolution diachronique importante entre les époques homérique et classique (évolution qui continue d'ailleurs ensuite). D'autre part, il y a eu une mutation profonde dans la conceptualité philosophique ou scientifique qui a donné lieu - après Platon - à des concepts tels que sujet, attribut, référence, etc., concepts qui n'existent pas encore à l'époque de Platon, mais qui déterminent la tradition grammaticale occidentale." (p. 55, notes omises)

46. Husson, Suzanne. 2018. "Autarcie du Bien et dépendance de l'être? De la République au Sophiste." Chôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales no. 15-16:45-66.
Abstract: "Even thought Parmenides doesn't use αὐτάρκης and any noun derived from this root, the Being is conceived by him as self-sufficient (v. 8,33). Plato, for its part, never uses this term concerning the intelligible reality; however, in the Sophist, he allusively challenges Parmenides self-sufficiency of Being and outlines an ontology that is conflicting with it. On the other hand self-sufficiency is explicitly ascribed by Plato to the human good (Philebus, 20d, 67a), to the divine world (Timaeus, 33d), and also to the virtuous man (Republic, 387d). This paper aims to demonstrate that these facets (theological or anthropological) of self-sufficiency are consistent with the supremacy of the idea of the Good in the Republic, which can be understood as a structural kind of self-sufficiency."
47. Ildefonse, Frédérique. 2021. "Quelques différences entre le Cratyle et le Sophiste." In Plato's Cratylus. Proceedings from the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Mikes, Vladimir. Leiden: Brill.
A paraître.
Abstract : "In this contribution, I seek to propose an approach to certain aspects of Cratylus by combining two paths : an approach to Cratylus by the Sophist and an approach, enlightened by stoicism, of what both of the dialogues develop. I do not propose to consider what the Cratylus would anticipate from the Sophist in terms of language study, but rather what the Sophist will shift from the investigation of the name, specific to the Cratylus. By reading the Cratylus closely, one can better see what operations the Stranger carries out in the Sophist : on truth, on the relationship between legein and logos, on logos and its parts, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the distinction between legein and logos, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the relationship between logos and its parts. I also propose, for some of their aspects, to read the Cratylus and the Sophist in the light of Stoicism, which, for these dialogues as

for others, gives a particular light to the Platonic issues, but also allows us to understand the genesis of the Stoic concepts coming, for many of them, from a certain reading of Platonism."

48. Jaulin, Annick. 2011. "Rupture et continuité : les divisions du Sophiste de Platon." In Figures de la rupture, figures de la continuité chez les anciens, edited by Desclos, Marie Laurence, 82-179. Paris: Vrin.
49. Kapantaïs, Doukas. 2003. "Deux exemples du 'paradoxe du non-être' dans la littérature philosophique grecque." Skepsis no. 13-14:193-201.
50. ———. 2004. "La dunamis du Sophiste et la critique aristotélicienne dans les Topiques." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 22:3-18.
"Parmi les érudits il y a pas mal de disputes concernant l'importance du passage sur la définition de l'être en tant que puissance d'agir ou de pâtir en 247e du Sophiste. Mais, même si cette définition ne possède pas une place centrale dans le dialogue, Aristote semble lui en attribuer une.
Il y a de fortes raisons exégétiques pour soutenir qu'Aristote non seulement prend au sérieux cette définition, mais que, en plus, il consacre une partie considérable des Topiques à sa réfutation. Nous argumenterons dans cet article en faveur de la thèse selon laquelle la réfutation d'Aristote est basée sur une ambiguïté du domaine des variables p et q dans des formules générales qui peuvent obtenir la paraphrase formelle suivante: "a est (soit p, soit q)" (1)." (p. 3)
(1) "a" est une variable d'objet général (d'un καθόλου). Ce n'est que par la suite que nous allons voir si la disjonction est exclusive ou inclusive, ainsi que quelle sorte de variables sont "p" et "q".
51. ———. 2013. "Le paradoxe de Russell et l'idée de l'autre dans le Sophiste de Platon." In Plato, Poet and Philosopher: in memory of Ioannis N. Theodoracopoulos : proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Philosophy : Magoula-Sparta, 26-29 may 2011 259-273. Athens: Academy of Athens, Research Centre of Greek Philosophy.
52. Kévorkian, Gilles. 2013. "L' « invention de la proposition » dans le Sophiste de Platon : une projection des paradigmes

aristotéliciens et frégéens de la prédication." In Le langage, edited by Kévorkian, Gilles. Paris: Vrin.
53. Kucharski, Paul. 1949. Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
54. Lafrance, Yvon. 1984. "Sur une lecture analytique des arguments concernant le non-être (Sophiste 237b10 - 239a12)." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 2:41-76.
"Dans son étude sur le Sophiste de Platon [*], Moravcsik nous propose de comprendre l'expression το῾ μη῾ ὂν αὐτο῾ καθ᾽ αὐτό (238c10) comme signifiant le concept de Non-Existence qu'il identifie par ailleurs à une Forme platonicienne (3) Il analyse ensuite les trois arguments du Sophiste (237b10 -239a12) à l'aide de cette Forme-concept. Nous appellerons donc logique ou conceptualiste cette lecture de Moravcsik.
Par ailleurs, d'autres traductions ont été proposées et qui ne se recommandent pas de cette Forme-concept. Bluck traduit notre expression par: "that which is not all by itself, without any properties" (4), Cornford: "that which just simply is not" (5), Seligman: "that which is in no way whatever" (6), Diès: "le non-être en lui-même" (7), et D. Ross: "that which is not" (8). Nous appellerons ontologiques ces dernières lectures parce qu'elles invitent à comprendre les trois arguments sur le non-être en considérant celui-ci non pas comme un concept, mais comme le fait négativement contingent d'une "chose qui n'est pas". Nous pensons que la lecture conceptualiste de Moravcsik impose au texte platonicien la notion analytique de "public concept" ou de "conceptual reality", et que cette notion est incompatible avec la conception platonicienne de la réalité, du langage et de la vérité." (pp. 41-43)
[*] Nous nous référons ici à l'étude de Moravcsik intitulée: "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", Acta Philos. Fennica, 14, 1962, pp. 23 - 78.
Le commentaire du Sophiste (237b - 239a) se trouve aux pages 26 - 29 de cette étude.
(3) J. M. E. Moravcsik, art. cit., p. 24, n. 2 et p. 26, n. l.
Toutes nos références aux textes de Platon sont prises dans

l'édition de l'Association G. Budé, publiée par les Belles Lettres de Paris.
4. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Sophist, Univ. Press. Manchester, 1975, p. 63.
5. F.M. Cornford, Plato's theory of knowledge, Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1964, p. 206.
6. P. Seligman, Being and Not-Being, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974,
p. 15. Seligman propose aussi de traduire par "not-being qua se", c'est à-dire "without any determination".
7. A. Diès, Le Sophiste, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1963, p. 238.
8. D. Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 115.

55. ———. 2014. La théorie platonicienne de la doxa. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Deuxième édition ajournée 2014 (première édition 1981).
Sur le Sophiste voir chapitre 7.

56. Lassègue, Monique. 1991. "L'imitation dans le Sophiste de Platon." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 249-265. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Etudier l'imitation dans le Sophiste, c'est, semble-t-il, la condamner d'avance, puisqu'en ce dialogue le sophiste est celui qui imite et qu'il est aussi l'opposé du philosophe.
Les rares commentateurs qui ont étudié l'imitation dans ce dialogue ont souligné le caractère négatif du contexte dans lequel cette notion apparaît. Il faut se garder de prendre trop au sérieux, pensent-ils, la distinction entre la "copie" (eikon), fidèle à l'objet qu'elle imite et le "simulacre" (phantasma) qui ne ressemble pas au modèle. Cette distinction faite par l'Etranger en 236 A-B, n'empêche pas en 241 E d'affirmer: «on ne pourra guère parler de discours faux, ni d'opinions fausses, ni d'images, ni de copies, ni d'imitations, ni de simulacres», tant qu'on n'aura pas réfuté Parménide et rejeté son interdiction de poser le non-être de quelque façon que ce soit. Ainsi, qu'il s'agisse de "copie" ou de "simulacre", il semble bien que l'imitation tout entière rentre dans une classe unique et que tout y soit de la même

façon marqué de fausseté. Comment alors ne pas condamner l'imitation?" (p. 249)
(...)
"Si on admet ces analyses, on sera conduit à conclure que la doctrine de l'imitation qui apparaît dans le Sophiste n'est pas une nouveauté platonicienne, et qu'elle permet d'écarter un certain nombre d'ambiguïtés présentes dans d'autres dialogues.
Le sophiste n'est pas l'imitateur par excellence, car ses modèles, comme ceux du peintre, sont des objets ou des êtres sensibles qui ne peuvent servir à produire de belles images. Le modèle n'est d'ailleurs pas seul en cause. Le sophiste n'a pas de bons modèles parce que ses intentions sont perverses, il veut séduire, donner à croire qu'il est savant alors qu'il sait ne l'être pas. Pour mener à bien son projet, il a besoin de l'imitateur véritable, celui en qui nous avons reconnu le philosophe.
Le philosophe se fait aussi ressemblant au modèle que possible et, passant du faire au dire, il tient un discours véridique, qui sans doute n'est pas identique à l'essence, mais lui demeure fidèle. Si, en cherchant le sophiste, on trouve d'abord le philosophe, il ne faut pas s'en étonner : on ne saurait trouver d'image s'il n'y a pas de modèle. Le sophiste parodie le philosophe, ce n'est qu'un imitateur de pacotille, mais la vanité des images qu'il produit peut révéler pourtant, à sa façon, la valeur de l'image qui imite l'essence." (pp. 264-265)

57. Ledesma, Felipe. 2009. "Le logos du Sophiste : image et parole dans le Sophiste de Platon." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 30:207-254.
Abstract : "The logos' question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato' s Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides' logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos' complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological

conditions that make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist's one; finally, the identity between the power to produce "spoken images" and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces." (pp. 207-208)

58. ———. 2009. "Le sophiste et les exemples : sur le problème de la ressemblance dans le Sophiste de Platon." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 27:3-39.
"Gráce á ce jeu de ressemblance et de dissemblance qui d'entrée leur semblait impossible á dire, non seulement parce que ceci est ce que le père Parménide a dit, mais aussi parce que le logos même le montrait en résistant fermement á dire que ce qui n'est pas toutefois est (85), Théététe et l'Étranger arrivent á rendre dicible qu'il y a des exemples, des images et des apparences sans renoncer á étre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, c'est-á-dire sans étre en désaccord á l'égard de ce qu'eux-mémes disent (86). Cependant, ils n'arrivent aucunement á dire ce qu'est finalement la ressemblance ni la dissemblance ; ils n'arrivent pas à dire ce qu'est finalement un exemple. Cela il faut le montrer.
Il faut d'ailleurs en donner des exemples. Ce qu'ils font en effet le jour suivant, l'Étranger et le jeune Socrate, quand ils nous proposent I'exemple d'exemple, mais sans avoir jamais renoncé á son emploi, sans s'étre jamais passés des comparaisons, des ressemblances et de l'exercice. Il est vraiment difficile pour le logos d'en faire l'économie. Bien plus qu'arriver á rendre dicible sans désaccord qu'il y a des exemples, des ressemblances et de l'exercice." (p. 37)
(85) Cf. 237 a-239 b.
(86) En 240 c 8. lc verbc employé est en effet σθμφωρεἰν.

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Bibliographie

1. Malverne, Lucien. 1958. "Remarques sur le « Sophiste »." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 63:149-166. "Comme tous les systèmes, la philosophie platonico-aristotélicienne du concept s'est posée en s'opposant. Elle avait à surmonter les difficultés inspirées aux Sophistes par la méditation des Présocratiques, et presqu'aucune de ses thèses ne fut forgée autrement qu'à l'occasion d'une polémique engagée contre la Sophistique ou l'Eristique issues des Eléates ou d'Héraclite. Dans le débat ainsi ouvert devant l'histoire, la philosophie occidentale à peu près tout entière s'est prononcée contre les Sophistes ou les Mégariques, en faveur de Socrate, Platon et Aristote. Devons-nous considérer cette cause comme entendue ? D'un précédent travail consacré aux réfutations de Zenon par Aristote (2), au contraire, nous avions cru pouvoir conclure qu'en ce qui concerne au moins le débat entre adversaires et partisans du changement, le choix demeurait libre. Nous nous proposons aujourd'hui de reconsidérer la réfutation qu'opposa Platon aux néo-éléates de Mégare, selon lesquels l'impossibilité ontologique d'exprimer le non-être eût permis de nier l'erreur. Cette réfutation habite l'œuvre entière de Platon ; il n'est guère de dialogue qui n'en livre un aspect. Mais les seuls textes où Platon l'ait méthodiquement exposée sont la sixième hypothèse du Parménide, et surtout le Sophiste. Outre que le cadre du

présent article nous l'interdirait, nous ne pouvons songer à isoler ici du Parménide le contenu de la sixième hypothèse, trop profondément mêlé au reste du dialogue, et encore relativement extérieur à notre sujet : cette hypothèse constitue, en effet, moins une réfutation de l'éléatisme qu'une étude méthodologique de la δόξα comme statut ontologique du non-être. Nous nous bornerons donc à l'examen du Sophiste, ne pouvant d'ailleurs en retenir ici que ce qui concerne immédiatement le problème de la réalité du non-être." (pp. 149-150, notes omises)
(2) Lucien Malverne : « Aristote et les apories de Zenon » (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, janvier-juin 1953).

2. Mansion, Suzanne. 1969. "Dialectique platonicienne et dialectique plotinienne (Sophiste 254b-256d; Enneade VI, 2, 6-8),." In La Dialectique. Actes du XlVe Congres des Societés de Philosophie de Langue francaise. Nice, 1-4 sept. 1969. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Reprins dans S. Mansion, Etudes aristotéliciennes, Louvain-la-Neuve : Editions de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1984, pp. 499-502.
3. Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela Elena. 1994. "Négation, fausseté et non-être dans le Sophiste." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 12:153-170.
"Certes, la doctrine du non-être comme altérité ou différence est la clef de la solution platonicienne au problème de la fausseté.
C'est pourquoi, lorsque Platon conteste l'argument des sophistes grâce aux célèbres lógoi sur Théétète, il n'hésite pas à caractériser l'énoncé faux comme celui qui dit "des choses autres que celles qui sont" ((ἑτερα των δντων), Soph. 263b7).
Cette formule, comme on le sait, fait l'objet de nombreuses discussions. Dans ce travail nous tenterons d'en faire un éclaircissement à l'aide du Sophiste 257b-c, le passage où Platon, avant d'exposer la doctrine des "parties de la nature de l'autre", trace la distinction entre le non-être comme contrariété et comme altérité ou différence. Nous examinerons tout d'abord ce passage platonicien afin d'éclairer cette distinction signalée dans la plupart des

études consacrées au Sophiste, mais dont la vraie signification demeure cependant obscure. Ensuite, dans la seconde partie de notre travail, nous appliquerons le résultat de notre examen à l'interprétation de "Théétète, avec qui maintenant je dialogue, vole", l'exemple bien connu d'énoncé faux que Platon offre vers la fin du dialogue. Les deux passages correspondent, à notre avis, aux deux modalités de 'dire ce qui n'est pas', celle de la négation (Soph. 257b-c) et celle de la fausseté (Ibid. 263b-d).
Or, au-délà des différences entre ces deux textes, une lecture attentive montrerait quelle est l'exigence fondamentale que selon Platon tout énoncé doit remplir. D'après notre interprétation, il s'agit d'indiquer, d'exprimer ou de signaler ce dont on parle,
exigence qui concerne aussi bien la négation que l'affirmation, l'énoncé faux non moins que l'énoncé vrai. Cette condition remplie - c'est l'enseignement du Sophiste - il est possible de dire le non-être." (p. 154)

4. ———. 2005. "Platon, son « père Parménide » et l'héritage sophistique." In La philosophie de Platon. Tome 2, edited by Fattal, Michel, 237-268. Paris: L'Harmattan.
"La bataille que livre Platon contre le sophiste dans le dialogue qui porte son nom est en même temps une bataille contre l'ontologie de Parménide, dans laquelle s'enracine la thèse sophistique qui nie la possibilité de l'erreur et que notre philosophe se propose de réfuter.
En vertu de ce double affrontement, Platon se trouve contraint d'adopter des stratégies complexes d'argumentation qui, comme nous tenterons de le montrer, l'associent à l'ennemi et l'en rapprochent beaucoup plus que l'on ne pourrait le supposer. Pour ce qui est de sa polémique avec Parménide, une fois établie la réalité du non-être à titre d'altérité ou de différence, Platon proclame avoir réfuté le dictum paternel qui nie le non-être. Néanmoins, dans la mesure où son objectif ultime est de démasquer certains arguments sophistiques fallacieux qui dénaturent l'esprit de la philosophie de Parménide, sa recherche ne l'éloigne pas mais le rapproche plutôt des arguments présentés par celui-ci. Quant à sa polémique avec la sophistique, cible directe de

l'attaque du Sophiste, l'hostilité mutuelle n'empêche pas Platon de reconnaître que les occupations du philosophe et du sophiste se rejoignent sur certains points. Nous pourrions même dire qu'en vue de trouver une solution au problème du discours faux, Platon n'hésite pas à élaborer une conception du discours qui le rapproche dangereusement du rang de l'ennemi.
Nous examinerons dans ce travail quelques aspects de la polémique que notre philosophe entretient avec les deux courants, et au travers de laquelle ont certainement vu le jour nombre des doctrines positives que nous transmettent ses dialogues. Tous ces affrontements n'ont certes pas la même valeur, car dans une cas, il s'agit d'un prédécesseur illustre que Platon traite avec respect, et dans l'autre cas, d'un courant de pensée auquel sa philosophie est ouvertement hostile. Toutefois, un examen attentif de certains passages du Sophiste met en évidence que dans les deux cas, derrière les critiques ouvertes de Platon, il existe également des appropriations, des héritages cachés permettant de détecter d'intéressants points de contact entre la philosophie platonicienne, celle de son « père Parménide » et certaines positions sophistiques. Ce que nous voudrions éclaircir ce n'est pas tant l'attitude de Platon envers d'autres courants de pensée que la possible incidence de ceux-ci sur sa propre philosophie, qui a dû en grande partie être le produit du rapprochement et du «dialogue» avec ses prédécesseurs et ses contemporains." (pp. 237-238)

5. Mattéi, Jean-François. 1983. L'Étranger et le simulacre. Essai sur la fondation de l'ontologie platonicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
"Notre dessein naquit d'une première et déjà ancienne rencontre avec le Sophiste de Platon, dont une particularité de composition nous avait frappé, et dont nous sentions confusément qu'elle n'était pas étrangère à la chasse au faiseur de simulacres comme au détour ontologique par la communauté des cinq genres de l'être. Nous soupçonnions même que la forme du texte, ou plutôt la figure des personnages, pour parler avec Pascal, portait« absence et présence », et constituait le lien voilé qui rapproche, en leur

perpétuel déchirement, Philosophie et Sophistique. Nous ne pensions pas, alors, découvrir que cette figure avait été faite sur un chiffre, en son double sens que l'on ne réduira pas seulement au clair et au caché, et exprimait la vérité ontologique de l'acte de fondation. Il fallait donc lever le sceau et reconnaître chez Platon, chez d'autres penseurs aussi sans doute, cette reprise continue d'une parole à l'écoute de sa propre origine et qui se tourne vers l'être, au croisement du temps et de l'éternité. Nous fascinaient en effet la répétition du voyage du philosophe, à la recherche du royaume perdu, et sa volonté tranquille de sauver de l'anéantissement, face aux écueils symétriques d'un Parménide et d'un Gorgias - le langage, voué aux mirages de la Mimésis, tant qu'il n'a pas restauré sa droite filiation ; - l'être, dont le visage menace de se figer dans la paralysie éléatique ou de se dissoudre dans les convulsions sophistiques ; - le pouvoir enfin, qui conquiert sa légitimité en s'ancrant dans la parole du Maître, seul à dire l'être. Et certes, l'enjeu ultime de l'Odyssée du philosophe - la Maîtrise - semblera peu conforme au goût d'une époque qui a cru bon d'assujettir la pensée au désir de Rebellion, malgré çà et là quelques résurgences incertaines, à l'écho de Nietzsche, et qui ne partagent l'intempestivité du penseur de l' Aurore que pour mieux atténuer l'éclat de la lumière platonicienne." (p. 5)

6. ———. 1985. "La symphonie de l'être dans le Sophiste de Platon." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review no. 24:237-256.
   Repris dans J.-F. Mattéi, L'ordre du monde. Platon - Nietzsche - Heidegger, Paris. Presses universitaires de France, pp. 25-47.
   "La pensée platonicienne du Sophiste, comme celle des autres dialogues, revele ainsi ce que j'appellerai, sur le modèle de l'onto-theologie heideggerienne, sa dimension onto-theo-cosmo-mytho-logique; elle unit en un même tout ces cinq déterminations majeures: (1) ONTO-: car la parole du philosophe est toujours en quête de l'« être »;(2) THEO-: comme l'être est assimilé au « divin » (254a8-9; 254b1), la formation du Tout est due a « une science divine emanèe de

Dieu » (265c9); (3) COSMO-: l'être et le Tout (249d4) sont identifiés à l'Ousia au centre du Monde; (4) MYTHO-: le Monde et les Dieux relevent du muthos et non du logos, comme en témoigne la verité du mythe du Timée (26d-e); (5) LOGIQUE: enfin le logos trouve sa racine dans l'être dont nous sommes partis, et qui conduit en silence nos pas." (p. 255)

7. ———. 1989. "Feu et lieu : Platon et la modernité." In L'ordre du monde. Platon - Nietzsche - Heidegger, 119-141. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
"Le principe de l'argumentation platonicienne, après que !'Etranger d'Elée a rappelé les doctrines de ses prédécesseurs relatives au nombre des êtres et à leur nature (242b6-249d5), consiste à emprunter à la tradition un couple de contraires irréductibles l'un à l'autre, puis à établir que cette dualité exige, pour être posée, la présence d'un troisième terme qui distingue les précédents tout en se distinguant d'eux. La
même argumentation va se reproduire à propos d'un second couple, appelé par le premier, dont on montrera la différence interne des éléments qui le composent et la différence externe avec le couple antérieur. L'articulation des deux couples à l'aide de leur élément commun - l'être - qui se trouve toujours en tiers parmi eux, permet d'affermir la Communauté des cinq genres de l'être (κοινωνία) en laquelle nombre d'interprètes ont pu voir « la clef de voûte de tout le système platonicien »(232)" (p. 130)
(232) V. Brochard, Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris, 1912, p. 142.
8. ———. 2005. "L'origine platonicienne de la métaphysique : la communauté des genres de l'être." In Y a-t-il une histoire de la métaphysique?, edited by Zarka, Yves Charles and Pinchard, Bruno, 27-44. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
9. ———. 2005. "Les genres de l'être chez Platon et le système aristotélicien des quatre causes." In Cosmos et psychè. Mélanges offerts à Jean Frère, edited by Vegleris, Eugénie, 183-202. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

10. Mazzara, Giuseppe. 1991. "Quelques remarques sur Gorgias et les Gorgiens dans le Sophiste." Argumentation no. 5:233-241.
Résumé : "Le Sophiste de Platon est une oeuvre qui - comme on le sait - du moins à en croire son titre, n'est pas la première du genre: le Peri tn Sophiston d'Alcidamas et le Katai tôn Sophistón d'Isocrate tout autant que la partie introductive (§§ 1-13) de son Eloge d'Hélène avaient déjà ouvert la voie.
A propos du sophiste : un doxomimète fallacieux qui invite le philosophe come imitateur "historique". Tout comme l'allusion que fait Platon la definition isocratienne du δημολγιχός comme imitateur ειρονιχός. L'auteur s'engage a démontrer ici, outre le developpement du concept d' fπιστήμη chez Platon et Gorgias, une influence possible d'Alcidamas et d'Isocrate sur la definition platonicienne du sophiste."
11. Milner, Jean Claude. 1966. "Le point du signifiant. Sur Platon: à propos du Sophiste." Cahiers pour l'Analyse no. 3:73-82.
"Qu'il y ait eu entre l'être et une computation un lien hérité, la doxographie antique suffirait à le manifester, qui, rapportant les opinions sur l'être, ne sait les énoncer que comme des dénombrements, et ne peut, pour en dresser la liste, que se conformer à la suite des nombres: "pour l'un (des anciens sophistes), relate par exemple Isocrate, il y a une infinité d'êtres; pour Empédocle, quatre ; pour Ion, seulement trois; pour Alcméon, rien que deux; pour Parménide, un ; pour Gorgias, absolument aucun". (Isocrate, Or. XV, 268 ; cité à la page 345 de l'édition Diès). Ce lien, que l'anecdote ici décrit, cerne bien cependant l'hypothèse qui supporte le mouvement de Platon, désireux dans le Sophiste d'établir ce qu'il en est du non-être: se plaçant dans la succession des opinions, puisqu'il entend la clore, - entre le "un" de Parménide, qui résume tous les comptes positifs, et l' "absolument aucun" de Gorgias, qui les efface tous, il ne peut faire qu'énumérer le non-être, en susciter l'émergence par une computation." (p. 73)

12. Miura, Kaname. 2015. "Quelques notes sur les critiques du pluralisme et du monisme dans le Sophiste de Platon." Kanazawa Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology no. 6:69-84.
    Il semble que la thèse selon laquelle le changement majeure de la métaphysique à la logique s'est accompli dans le Sophiste de Platon soit assez fondée.(1) Certains y ont vu une transformation ou un abandon même de la théorie des Idées exposée par Platon dans les dialogues dits de transition(2) En effet, ce dialogue a attiré l'attention d'un nombre considérable de chercheurs voulant y trouver les «anticipations logiques» de Platon.
    (...)
    Platon est-il vraiment obligé à réviser sa théorie dans le Sophiste? Les arguments qu'il énonce dans ce dialogue sont-ils à ranger uniquement dans le domaine de la logique? Il n'en est rien. Au contraire, nous pouvons dire que le Sophiste occupe une position cruciale dans toute la théorie des Idées au point de vue de son développement ontologique et épistémologique. Il faut alors que l'on remette à plat le rôle que jouent les critiques du monisme et du pluralisme 242C-245E dans ce développement aussi bien que dans le plan général du Sophiste, en dépit du diagnostic d'un «détour» par Dièes(4)." (p. 69)
    (1) Cf. Soulez (1991), pp.222-227.
    (2) Diès (1969), p.286, n.1.
    (4) Diès (1969), p.274.
    Réferences
    A. Diès, (1969), Le Sophiste, OEuvres complètes de Platon, Torne VIII, 3e partie (Collection des universités de France), Paris.
    A. Soulez (1991), "Le travail de la négation. L'interprétation du Sophiste par Gilbert Ryle", dans P. Aubenque (ed.), Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, Napoli, pp.215-246.
13. Motte, André. 1987. "Ἅγιος chez Platon." In Stemmata. Mélanges de philologie, d'histoire et d'archéologie grecques offerts à Jules Labarbe, edited by Servais, J., Hackens, T. and Servais-Soyez, B., 135-152. Liège/Louvain-la-Neuve: L'Antiquité classique.

14. Mouze, Létitia. 2020. Chasse à l'homme et faux-semblants dans le Sophiste de Platon. Paris: Classiques Garnier.
15. Muralt, André de. 1957. "De la participation dans le Sophiste de Platon." Studia Philosophica no. 17:101-120.
16. ———. 1975. "Dialectique de l'idée et analogie de l'être. Comparaison structureIle du Sophiste de Platon et des Métaphysiques d'Aristote." Diotima.Review of Philosophical Research no. 3:43-59.
17. Narcy, Michel. 1991. "La lecture aristotélicienne du Sophiste et ses effets." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 419-448. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"En deux passages de la Métaphysique, Aristote s'exprime au sujet du Sophiste de Platon. La première fois (E 2. 1026 b 14-15) il nomme Platon, et c'est pour l'approuver: «Platon, d'une certaine façon, n'a pas eu tort d'assigner la sophistique au non-être».
Une telle assignation, c'est bien la tâche à laquelle s'évertue !'Etranger d'Elée tout au long du Sophiste; ou du moins c'est celle à laquelle il se voit condamné à partir du moment où sa pratique des divisions l'a conduit à situer le sophiste dans l'art de produire des simulacres (Soph. 235 A-236 c). Or, le second passage de la Métaphysique dont nous aurons à nous occuper est une rigoureuse condamnation de la façon dont]'Etranger arrive à ses fins: en se croyant confronté à la «nécessité de montrer que le non-être est» (Metaph. N 2. 1089 a 5). C'était là, juge Aristote, se laisser prendre à une difficulté archaïque (ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς, 1089 a 1-2).
On voudrait montrer ici que non seulement ces deux passages trouvent leur cohérence dans une conception du non-être (et de l'être) fondamentalement différente, chez Aristote, de celle de Platon (1), mais que dans cette façon qu'a Aristote d'approuver d'un côté, de condamner de l'autre, est impliquée une façon de lire le Sophiste, allons jusqu'à dire une stratégie de lecture, qui pèsera pour longtemps sur la compréhension de ce dialogue: Plotin en sera ici l'exemple." (p. 419)
(1) Cfr. E. Berti, Quelques remarques sur la conception aristotélicienne du non-être, «Revue de Philosophie Ancienne», I (1983) pp. 115-42.

18. Nercam, Nathalie. 2012. "«Topos» en question dans l'introduction du Sophiste (216a1-217a1)." Plato Journal:1-18.
Résumé : "Au début du Sophiste, Socrate demande au visiteur éléate ce qu'ont pensé des genres philosophe, sophiste et politique, « ceux qui sont de ce lieu-là ». L'article a pour but d'éclairer cette dernière expression et en particulier son mot clef « topos ». Il est montré que les significations de ce terme, dans son contexte, sont multiples et que cette diversité, loin d'apporter la confusion, permet au contraire et précisément d'ouvrir les diverses perspectives du dialogue."
"« Topos », mot crucial du problème posé par Socrate dans l'introduction du Sophiste (216a1-217a1) peut donc être interprété de façon plurielle. Il peut désigner : premièrement, une adresse géographique (le pays d'Elée), deuxièmement, une école philosophique (« l'école éléatique ») troisièmement, un classement rhétorique (la « classe » des spécialistes de la définition des genres) ou quatrièmement, un niveau d'intelligibilité (le seuil maximal d'une pensée discursive).
(...)
La polysémie de « topos » invite ainsi le lecteur à relativiser les propos de l'étranger de trois façons :
- En les considérant dans le cadre de l'action pédagogique conduite qui peut être caractérisée en comparaison avec celle de Parménide dans le dialogue éponyme et avec celle de Socrate dans le Théétète.
- En les rapportant à l'ensemble des discours rhétoriques ou sophistiques tenus sur le même sujet pour mesurer sur ce point les continuités et les ruptures proposées par le visiteur éléate.
- En les examinant enfin selon les critères socratiques du Phèdre, pour déterminer le sens accordé à « topos » au cours de l'exposé afin d'apprécier son degré relatif d'intelligibilité et de déterminer ses limites.
Socrate reformule immédiatement sa première question et réduit alors considérablement le problème (217a2-4). Mais il attend toujours une réponse de la part de « ceux qui sont

et/ou s'occupent de ce lieu-là ». « Topos » reste donc un critère d'appréciation pertinent. Cet article n'avait pas pour prétention de l'éclairer complètement et définitivement, mais avait pour but de montrer que son étude permet d'ouvrir des perspectives interprétatives qui viennent compléter les exégèses plus classiques du dialogue." (pp. 17-18)

19. Nevsky, Alexandre. 2011. Voir le monde comme une image: Le schème de l'image mimétique dans la philosophie de Platon (Cratyle, Sophiste, Timée). Bern: Peter Lang.
Table des matières: Introduction 1; Partie I. Analyses; I. Le Cratyle: le schème de l'image dans la constitution du langage 33; Le déploiement du schème de l'image dans le Cratyle 39; Apories de l'interprétation 130; II. Le Sophiste: le schème de l'image dans la constitution du discours 159; III. Le Timée: le schème de l'image dans la constitution du monde 297; Partie II. Conclusions; I. Conclusions des dialogues 435; II. La conception de l'image chez Platon 473; Epilogue. Voir le monde comme une image selon Platon 503; Bibliographie 507; Index des noms 519; Index des textes anciens 523.
"Que veut nous dire Platon quand il nous invite à voir le monde comme une image ? De quoi est-il l'image et existe-t-il plusieurs images possibles de la même réalité ? A quel degré d'engagement ontologique exposons-nous quand nous acceptons, avec Platon, de redéfinir comme étant image le langage, le discours, le monde matériel et même le matériau de celui-ci ?
Ce travail propose une analyse approfondie de la conception de l'image de Platon dans ses trois dialogues clés. Il essaie de nous montrer que cette conception n'est pas une simple conséquence de la théorie des Idées, mais une solution philosophique originale au paradoxe de l'apparence archaïque et une étape préalable à la dialectique platonicienne.
Cette étude nous invite ainsi à revoir les fondements de la métaphysique occidentale, au moment où se produit la naissance conceptuelle de la notion d'image, en mettant en

évidence son originalité et son importance pour l'enquête philosophique sur la réalité."

20. O'Brien, Denis. 1991. "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 317-364. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans: D. O'Brien, Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon, pp. 3-39.
Sommaire: I INTRODUCTION: LA PHILOSOPHIE ET L'HISTOIRE; II PARMÉNIDE. 1. L'être et la vérité 2. Le non-être et l'erreur des mortels; III PLATON. 1. Les deux sens du non-être 2. Le non-être et l'altérité; IV PLOTIN. 1. Les trois sens du non-être
2. Le non-être et la matière; V PARMÉNIDE ET PLATON. 1. L'existence des non-êtres 2. La question du parricide; VI PLATON ET PLOTIN. 1. "Réellement non-étant" 2. Le non-être et le contraire VII CONCLUSION : L'HISTOIRE ET LA PHILOSOPHIE.
"Cette étude du non-être permettra, je l'espère, de résumer en quelque sorte les recherches que nous avons menées en commun depuis plusieurs années sous l'intitulé général: Recherches sur le vocabulaire de l'être dans !'Antiquité. Comme le dit Hegel, comme le dit Heidegger, comme l'a dit aussi Platon : comment étudier l'être sans le non-être?" (pp. 119-120)
(...)
"Résumons, le plus simplement possible, les différents sens du non-être que nous avons repérés en examinant ces quelques textes de Parménide, de Platon, de Plotin.
- Parménide a parlé d'un non-être impensable et incommunicable.
- Platon a distingué le non-être qui serait comme le contraire de l'être et le non-être qui serait "autre" que l'être,
- Plotin a distingué: premièrement, le non-être absolu; deuxièmement, l'altérité du mouvement et du repos; enfin, troisièmement, la "forme" du non-être qui est la matière.
Voilà la philosophie; où se trouve son histoire? A moins que l'on ne se pose la question inverse: voilà l'histoire, où se trouve la philosophie?" (pp. 349-350)

21. ———. 1991. "Platon et Plotin sur la doctrine des parties de l'autre." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger no. 116:501-512.
Résumé : "La matière est-elle identique à l'alterité ? » Plotin se pose cette question au commencement du dernier chapitre de son traité Sur la matière (Enn., II 4 [12] 16). « Plutôt non », répond-il. « Elle est en revanche identique à cette partie de l'altérité qui s'oppose aux êtres proprement dits. » En s'exprimant de la sorte, Plotin fait allusion à un passage du Sophiste (258 E 2-3). Son allusion suppose pourtant l'existence d'un texte qui n'est pas attesté dans les manuscrits. Cette différence textuelle implique un changement fondamental de doctrine, dont les éditeurs modernes ne se sont pas avisés."
22. ———. 1995. Le non-être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Sommaire: Avertissement XI-XII; Étude I: Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin 3; Étude II: Le non-être et l'altérité dans le Sophiste de Platon 43; Notes complementaires 91; Index: I. Auteurs anciens 133; II. Auteurs modernes 139; III. Supplément bibliographique 151; English summaries: I. Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus 169; II. Non-Being and otherness in Plato's Sophist 176-181.
23. ———. 1996. "Á propos du Sophiste de Platon." Les Études Philosophiques:375-380.
Dans une étude sur le Sophiste de Platon, parue récemment dans Les Études philosophiques, F. Fronterotta me reproche d'avoir mal interprété la doctrine des parties de l'autre, telle que la présente l'Étranger d'Élée dans sa critique de Parménide (Soph. 257 c5-258 c10) (1)" (p. 375)
(...)
"A la différence de la forme de l'être, à la différence de la forme du non-être, la forme de l'autre ne sera donc qu'unité « en quelque sorte» (cf. 257 c10: που).
Cette différence est essentielle pour qui veut comprendre la différence qui sépare le non-être et l'autre. La science est divisée en une multiplicité de sciences, possédant chacune son nom propre. Il en va de même de la nature de l'autre

qui, elle aussi, est divisée en une multiplicité de parties, dont chacune possède une appellation (appellation négative) qui lui est propre («non beau», « non grand», « non juste»). Mais il n'en va pas de même, ni de l'être, ni du non-être." (p. 379)
(...)
"Ainsi s'expliquerait l'erreur dans la thèse de Fronterotta. Cet exégète n'a pas en effet compris qu'en participant d'une « partie» (la forme du non-être), les autres parties de l'autre ne deviennent pas, de ce fait, les parties d'une partie. Il n'a donc pas compris que la forme du non-être ne peut pas être définie à la fois comme une partie de l'autre (258 a 11 -b 4) et comme «chaque partie de l'autre» (cf. 258e2-3). La doctrine de !'Étranger n'est pas à ce point contradictoire." (p. 380)
(1) 1. F. Fronterotta, L'être et la participation de l'autre, une nouvelle ontologie dans le Sophiste,Les Études philosophiques, 1995, p. 311-353. Voir surtout p. 350-353, Annexe:
« L'interprétation de D. O'Brien». Pout la thèse incriminée, Fronterotta renvoie à D. O'Brien, Il non essere e la diversità nel Sofista di Platone, Atti dell'Acccademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli, vol. 102, 1992, p. 271-328. Voir aussi maintenant Le non-être, deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon, dans la collection « International Plato Studies, published under the auspices of the International Plato Society», n° 6, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 1995. Pour la thèse de Fronterotta, voir surtout p. 159-166.

24. ———. 1999. "Théories de la proposition dans le Sophiste de Platon." In Théories de la phrase et de la proposition. De Platon à Averroès, edited by Büttgen, Philippe, Diebler.Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 21-41. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.
"Commençons par le Sophiste de Platon. Deux théories de la proposition s'y opposent : celle de l'Etranger d'Elée, porte-parole de PIaton, et celle du sophiste. Pour étayer sa thèse, le sophiste se réclame de Parménide. S'opposeraient donc ici, par personnes interposées, Platon et Parménide. Or voilà, d'emblée, l'une des raisons pour lesquelles les

exégètes se trompent dans leur interprétation du dialogue. S'ils ne - comprennent pas le Sophiste, c'est parce qu'ils comprennent mal le poème de Parménide. Et s'ils comprennent mal le poème de Parménide, c'est parce que, cherchant dans les fragments du poème une proposition - proposition qui sera reprise par le sophiste de Platon —, ils gauchissent, sans le savoir, le point de départ du raisonnement parménidien.
Je m'explique. Toute proposition permet de distinguer ce dont on parle de ce qu'on en dit. Cette distinction, fondamentale, ne s'applique pourtant pas aux deux énoncés formulés par la déesse au début de son discours : ἔστιν ("est", fr. 2.3), οὐκ ἔστιν ("n'est pas", fr. 2.5). Aucun de ces deux verbes, prononcés sans sujet ni complément dans le contexte immédiat du poème, ne permet de distinguer ce dont on parle de ce qu'on en dit(1)." (p. 21)
(...)
"L'Etranger rétablit de la sorte une contrariété du vrai et du faux, sans pourtant revenir sur son refus d'une contrariété de l'être et du non être(4). D'où l'ambivalence dont fait preuve la déclaration "des non êtres sont" au cours de son raisonnement. Dans un premier temps, cette formule établit l'existence des objets, des nombreux objets, dont on parle, renversant de la sorte la thèse moniste de Parménide. Dans un deuxième temps, la même formule, revêtue d'un sens nouveau et différent, rétablit la vérité ou la fausseté de ce qu'on en dit, autorisant, enfin, la définition du sophiste comme pourvoyeur d'erreurs et de mensonges." (p. 41)
(1) I "Il faut que tu sois instruit de toutes choses, à la fois du cœur de la vérité persuasive [..: ainsi la déesse à Parménide (fr 1.28), quand ce dernier aura franchi les portes du Jour et de la Nuit. Pour apprendre à son disciple la vérité, la déesse commence par distinguer deux "voies de recherche, les seules que l'on puisse concevoir" (fr. 2.2). Ces deux voies sont les deux énoncés cités ci-dessus ("est", fr. 23 , "n'est pas", fr. 2.5)
(4) "Le vrai serait le contraire du faux : cf. Sophiste, 240 b 5 ; 240 d 6-7. Le non-être, tel que le définit l'Etranger, ne

serait pourtant pas le contraire de l'être : cf. Sophiste, 258 e 6-259 a 1.".
25. Pasqua, Hervé. 1996. "L'Être comme πολλά chez Platon. Les enseignements du «Parménide» et du «Sophiste»." Revue Philosophique De Louvain no. 94:7-18.
Résumé : "L'Être est l'Un. Tel est l'héritage que Platon reçoit de Parménide. Non pas l'Être est un, mais : l'Être est l'Un. Autrement dit, l'Un n'est pas prédicat ni accident de l'Être, il en constitue l'essence. Quand l'Éléate affirme : l'Être est, le non-Être n'est pas, Platon comprend : l'Un est, le non-Un n'est pas. Dès lors, le sens du parricide que va commettre l'Étranger dans le Sophiste sera non pas, comme on l'entend traditionnellement : l'Être n'est pas, le non-Être est, mais l'Un n'est pas, le non-Un est. En refusant l'identification parménidienne de l'Être à l'Un, Platon révèle son véritable dessein, à savoir, montrer que l'Être, le réellement réel, le ontôs on, c'est le Plusieurs (les Idées)."
26. Pellegrin, Pierre. 1991. "Le Sophiste ou de la division. Aristote-Platon-Aristote." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 391-416. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Depuis quelques années notre approche de la critique par Aristote de la méthode platonicienne de division a été profondément renouvelée, notamment par une relecture du versant biologique de cette critique. Le premier effet qu'on en peut signaler n'est anodin qu'en apparence : la diairesis qui est critiquée dans les textes logico-métaphysiques d'une part et biologiques d'autre part du corpus aristotélicien semble bien être la même." (p. 391)
(...)
"Comme les grands dialogues de la période antérieure, le Sophiste et le Politique sont eux aussi consacrés à la dialectique platonicienne, mais c'est la dialectique qui a changé.
Ainsi se résolvent certaines des difficultés de la diairesis. Comme la relation d'altérité, par exemple, n'est pas une simple relation d'exclusion, on comprend ce que signifie la règle qui prescrit de couper un genre en deux parties à peu près égales : tous les oiseaux sauf les grues ne forment pas

"l'Autre des grues". L'hypothèse de la contemporanéité de la méthode diérétique et du Sophiste se trouve ainsi singulièrement renforcée.
Il ressort de tout cela l'image contrastée d'une diairesis à la fois fondamentale et invalide. Car même le dévoilement du fondement ontologique de la diérétique platonicienne ne la guérit pas de son essentielle impuissance. Quand l'objet à définir, comme dans le cas du pêcheur à ligne, ne subit pas la concurrence de rivaux suspects, la diairesis va droit au but.
Mais quand surgissent les questions «grosses d'embarras, aujourd'hui comme hier et comme toujours» du «paraître et sembler sans être» (Soph. 236 E), on s'aperçoit que la nouvelle dialectique platonicienne n'a pas à elle seule les moyens de lever une difficulté qui a été un des prétextes originaires de l'entreprise philosophique de Platon." (p. 412)

27. Rizzerio, Laura. 1999. "Dialectique et art dans la République et le Sophiste de Platon." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 97:231-252.
Résumé : "Cet article étudie le rapport que Platon établit entre la beauté, la mesure, et la production artistique aux fins de prouver que le philosophe athénien n'est pas un véritable «ennemi» des arts, à tout le moins qu'il ne peut être considéré comme un ennemi de la beauté des œuvres «sensibles», qu'elles soient naturelles ou produites par l'homme. Grâce à l'analyse de quelques extraits du Sophiste et de la République, cette étude veut montrer que la distinction de l'art d'imitation en deux «sections» différentes, «art de la copie» et «art de l'illusion», proposée par Platon dans le Sophiste, n'est pas simplement un expédient auquel le philosophe athénien a recours pour parfaire ses diaireseis et «capturer» la définition tant recherchée. Cette distinction trouve sa justification dans le rôle important que Platon confie à la «mesure» là où il s'agit de la saisie du beau. C'est par cette notion de «mesure» qu'il en vient effectivement à rejeter un type d'art d'imitation, «l'art d'illusion», et à en accepter un autre, «l'art de la copie», en comparant ce dernier au travail du dialecticien. Or, il est fort probable que Platon prononce son jugement

sur l'art d'imitation en ayant présente à l'esprit la production artistique de son temps. Soumis à condamnation serait alors l'art basé sur les techniques de l'illusion et du trompe-l'oeil, un art qui en était venu à s'imposer à son époque grâce à l'utilisation d'une proportionnalité capable de reproduire la réalité d'une manière vraisemblable, mais qui ne fabriquait qu'illusion, était loin de la vérité et se révélait incapable de saisir le beau. La production artistique reconnue comme respectable, voire utile à l'acquisition de la science, serait au contraire l'art qui s'était développé autour du canon de Polyclète dont les productions étaient fondées sur le respect absolu d'une «mesure» objective et d'une proportionnalité rigoureuse, mathématiquement représentables."

28. Rougier, Louis. 1914. "La correspondance des genres du Sophiste, du Philèbe et du Timée." Archiv für Geschichte de Philosophie no. 27:205-334.
"La correspondance des genres du Sophiste, du Philebe et du Timée est un des problèmes fondamentaux de la philosophie de Platon. Suivant les conceptions qu'ön s'en fait, cette philosophie prête aux interprétations les plus divergentes. Dans une première partie, nous exposerons la thèse que nous adoptons; dans une seconde, noüs en vérifierons les details par l'examen critique des théories opposées les plus representatives: celles de M. Lachelier, Zeller, Rodier, Brochard. Sans pretendre apporter une solution définitive de cette redoutable question, nous en fournirons, peut-etre, une approximation plus exacte." (p. 305)
Réferences
Victor Brochard, "La morale de Platon", Année philosophique 1909, p. 29, note 1; "Le Dévenir dans la philosophie de Platon". Bibliothèque du Congrés International de philosophie 1902, IV, p. 103-127.
Jules Lachelier, "Note sur le Philèbe de Platon", Revue de métaphysique et de morale, mars 1902; reproduit dans: Études sur le syllogisme, suivies de l'observation de Platner et d'une note sur le Philèbe, Paris, Alcan, 1907, p. 151-163.

Georges Rodier, "Remarques sur le Philèbe", Revue des études anciennes, avril-mai 1900; "L'évolution de la Dialectique de Platon", Année philosophique 1909.
Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1880, vol. II, 1 p. 169 sq.

29. Rousset, Emmanuelle. 2009. Les intermittences de l'être. Lecture du Sophiste de Platon. Lagrasse: Verdier.
30. Santa Cruz, Maria Isabel. 1997. "L'exégèse plotinienne des μεγιστα γενε du Sophiste de Platon." In The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, edited by Cleary, John J., 105-118. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
"Dans une étude précédant (3) j'ai examiné quelques aspects fondamentaux de la critique de Plotin à la doctrine aristotélicienne sur les catégories. Je voudrais aborder maintenant quelques points concernant la conception plotinienne des genres de l'intelligible exposée en VI 2, traité qui peut être lu presque comme un commentaire (4) des passages du Sophiste où Platon présente la doctrine des μεγιστα γενε, que Plotin va situer au niveau de la deuxième hypostase, l'intelligence. J'essayerai seulement de tracer les grandes lignes de la doctrine plotinienne des genres de l'intelligible et de signaler les principaux points de divergence avec la conception platonicienne des μεγιστα γενε. Malgré sa prétention de fidélité à Platon, Plotin n'adopte pas d'une façon stricte les genres du Sophiste pour les situer dans l'intelligence, mais il les interprète du point de vue de son propre système et en fait un libre emploi pour développer sa propre théorie. L'exégèse de Plotin n'est pas une reprise de l'analyse conceptuelle du Sophiste et de son enplacement dans le domaine de l'intelligence. Lorsqu'il caractérise la nature et la fonction des genres, Plotin s'écarte des affirmations et même des suggestions de Platon.
Etant donné que chez Plotin le monde intelligible est une réalité de deuxième ordre et dérivée, dont la source, l'Un, est au-delà de l'être et de la pensée, les genres de l'intelligible ne peuvent avoir du point de vue ontologique ainsi que du point de vue de la prédication ni la même portée ni la même importance que chez Platon, pour qui ils

appartiennent à la région plus élevée de la réalité. L'interprétation du Sophiste sur les cinq genres ne prend sens qu'à l'intérieur d'un système métaphysique donné, celui de Plotin" (pp. 105-106, deux notes omises)
(3) "Aspectes de la critica de Plorino a las categorias de Aristoteles", Elenchos. Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico XI (1994) 1, 25-41.
4. Evangeliou, Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry, Leiden: Brill, 1988, pp. 131-133, offre un résumé des points qu'il considère comme les thèses principales dans VI 2.

31. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 1996. "Le Sophiste de Platon dans l'interprétation de Heidegger." In Heidegger 1919-1929. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 91-111. Paris: Vrin. Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-François Marquet (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994).
Repris dans: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (éd.), Images de Platon et lectures de ses oeuvres: les interprétations de Platon à travers les siècles, Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1997, pp. 395-415.
32. Serra, Mauro. 2004. "Lectures du Sophiste entre analytiques et continentaux." In Actualité des anciens sur la théorie du langage, edited by Petrilli, Raffaella and Gambarara, Daniele, 97-109. Münster: Nodus Publikationen.
33. Soulez, Antonia. 1987. "Aux sources grecques de la tradition sémantique : le thème platonicien des "liaisons premières"." Archives de Philosophie no. 50:371-401.
Résumé : "Il s'agit dans cet article de retracer la filiation sémantique qui permet d'enraciner la tradition de la « proposition en soi » à partir de Bolzano dans les anticipations « logiques » que représentent les premiers efforts de certains philosophes de l'antiquité grecque pour penser les conditions de l'unité de la composition d'un sens. Pour cela il fallait remonter, au-delà de ceux que Bolzano lui-même cite comme ses propres sources, jusqu'au Sophiste de Platon. De quelle façon Platon s'est-il posé la question de l'unité sémantique de l'énoncé, et quelle réponse il a apportée à cette question ? Tels sont les points sur lesquels

la démonstration cruciale de l'existence du discours faux dans le Sophiste apporte la lumière, en révélant le nerf verbal de l'articulation des parties d'énoncé en une « liaison » douée de sens, qu'elle soit vraie ou fausse. L'examen de la signification des phrases fausses découvre par là-même le rôle d'opérateur que joue la négation sans la fonction assertive de laquelle l'unité des complexes de parties ne saurait être mise à jour. La négation s'offre ici pour expliquer une sorte de mystère à la fois syntaxique et sémantique qu'Aristote devra à son tour considérer. Toutefois, ce sera plutôt à renoncer à le percer qu'Aristote invitera en proposant d'axer la solution sur l'unité de la chose signifiée par une interprétation ontologique de la référence. La conséquence de ce nouveau traitement du problème est l'obscurcissement du motif originaire des « liaisons premières » chez Platon, et son recouvrement par le thème prédicationniste de l'énoncé de l'être. Ce qui s'observe dès lors est un véritable glissement de l'intérêt logique de ce qui constitue le socle de l'inférence à l'étude formelle de ses lois."

34. ———. 1991. La grammaire philosophique chez Platon. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
"Axé sur la confrontation de la méthode dite de nos jours « analytique » avec l'histoire de la philosophie, ce travail donne une large place à une lecture qui a été menée, il y a une trentaine d'années outre-manche,
sur un grand dialogue de Platon : le Sophiste, par un philosophe à la fois connaisseur de la pensée grecque ancienne et logicien professionnel. Il s'agit d'une lecture « logique » originale entr'autres d'une partie du Sophiste consacrée aux genres dits « suprêmes » et à leur mélangeainsi qu'à la définition du logos(1). L'intérêt de ces passages est parfois discuté parce que à cet endroit du dialogue il semblerait qu'il y ait plutôt une pause qu'un développement vraiment central. L'auteur de cette lecture est Gilbert Ryle(2), philosophe logicien d'Oxford" (p. 6)
(...)
"En plus d'articles spécialisés dans ce domaine, dont certains seront mentionnés dans ce travail, il est pourtant

l'auteur d'un livre : Plato's Progress (1967) et d'une contribution importante sur Platon dans la fameuse Encyclopedia of Philosophy éditée par Paul Edwards (1967)." (p.6)
(...)
"En dehors du plaisir que j'ai personnellement ressenti à lire le philosophe Ryle, dont le style est à la mesure d'une pensée frondeuse et volontiers démarquée, j'ai trouvé un double intérêt à son interprétation des dialogues de Platon, en particulier les dialogues qu'il appelle « logiques » tels le Parménide ou le Sophiste. D'abord, Ryle a vraiment cherché à dégager chez Platon ce qu'il vaudrait mieux appeler une « sémantique catégoriale » pour des raisons que j'explicite plus bas, qu'une « philosophie du langage », et une « sémantique » qui, bien qu'articulée à la doctrine des Idées, nous parle à nous, aujourd'hui. Cependant, il ne s'est pas contenté de déterrer une approche séduisante pour le contemporain. Sa lecture engage un choix méthodologique. C'est ce choix qui m'a paru, non pas le plus plausible, mais le plus important en raison des conséquences qui en résultent pour l'exercice de la philosophie et sa conception." (pp. 8-9)
(1) Il s'agit des passages 251 a - 264 a du Sophiste (coll. Budé).
(2) Cf. « Letters and syllables in Plato », Ph. Rev., vol. LXIX, 1960. [repris dans G. Ryle, Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays, London: Hutchinson 1971, Essay III pp. 57-75.]

35. ———. 1991. "Le travail de la négation: l'interprétation du Sophiste par Gilbert Ryle." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 215-246. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Tout porte à croire, dans ce qu'on peut appeler le "détour sémantique" du Sophiste consacré de 260 A 5 à 264 B 8 à la définition du logos, que le non-être dont l'Etranger avec Théétète a découvert qu'il était un «genre déterminé parmi les autres genres» (260 B) (1), a décidément une "forme" (eidos) (2) vraiment exceptionnelle. C'est ce que la chasse au genre du sophiste a permis de découvrir non sans mal.

Cependant, arrivés à ce point où le non-être se révèle fractionné le long de la série des êtres (ibid.), !'Etranger et Théétète n'ont parcouru que la moitié du chemin." (p. 217)
(...)
"Le Parménide, dialogue donc à la fois auto-critique et marqué par des préoccupations formelles, s'inscrit dans l'histoire des recherches logiques s'il ne l'inaugure pas. D'après Ryle, le Parménide est une discussion d'un problème de logique, comme le sont une partie du Théétète et la majeure partie du Sophiste:
«Non que Platon dise: "détournons-nous de l'Ethique, de la Métaphysique, de l'Epistémologie et de la Physique pour considérer quelques questions qui sont du ressort de la Logique"»
car, dit Ryle, «ces titres n'existaient pas. Cependant les questions et les arguments qu'il énonce dans ce dialogue, nous devrions les ranger dans le même domaine que celui auquel appartiennent par exemple la théorie aristotélicienne des catégories, la séparation kantienne des concepts formels et non-formels, la théorie russellienne des types et les théories de la syntax logique de Wittgenstein et Carnap» (8).
(1) Dans la traduction de Diès adoptée ici sauf mention contraire. Cfr. plus haut dans le dialogue le passage 258 B 10 où le non-être est dit «posséder sa nature propre (τη`ν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον), et, dans les lignes qui suivent, la façon dont sa nature d' "autre" permet de comprendre comment son ezdos (258 D 6) se distribue sur toute la chaîne des êtres dans leurs relations mutuelles.
(2) Cfr. ci-dessus.
(8) G. Ryle, Plato's 'Parmenides', «Mind», XLVIII (1939), repris dans Collected Papers, London 1971, I, pp. 35-6.

36. Steel, Carlos. 1992. "Le Sophiste comme texte théologique dans l'interprétation de Proclus." In On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Bos, Egbert B. and Meijer, Pieter Ane, 51-64. Leiden: Brill.
"Dans cette communication, je voudrais examiner comment Proclus a interpreté cet autre dialogue dans lequel on trouve un exposé scientifique de la théologie, le Sophiste. S'il est

loin d'avoir !'importance du Parménide, Ia doctrine qui y est developpee constitue neanmoins, selon les mots memes de Proclus, "une preparation (προτέλεια) aux mysteres du Parménide.(4)" (p. 51)
(...)
"Ce qui l'intéressait dans le Sophiste, ce n'etait pas sa théorie de l'être, son ontologie, mais la doctrine de l'Un qu'on trouve dans la discussion des thèses pluralistes et unitaires (242 c - 245 e). C'est par cette discussion hénologique que le Sophiste a pour lui une signification théologique.
Je me limiterai done ci-dessous a présenter !'interprétation proclienne de cette seule section du dialogue, sans oublier pour autant que le Sophiste était également important pour la théorie de la dialectique et pour le statut de la negation (question capitale dans la théologie negative).(10) Dans mon exposé, je distinguerai trois parties. D'abord je présenterai !'interprétation que Proclus donne de la section 242 c -245 e, pour autant qu'on puisse la reconstruire en s'appuyant sur des informations dispersées dans son œuvre . (En effet, on n'a pas gardé de commentaire sur le Sophiste, et il est même probable que Proclus n' en a jamais composé). Ensuite, j' examinerai l'apport du Sophiste à l'interprétation du Parménide. Enfin, je relirai le Sophiste à la lumière du Parménide, ce qui nous fera decouvrir d'autres doctrines théologiques." (p. 52, note omise)
(4) Cf Theol. plat. III 21, p. 73, 10- 12 [For the conceptions of the Elean guest are the proteleia of the mysteries of the Parmenides. (translation by Thomas Taylor]
(10) Sur la dialectique dans le Sophiste, voir In Parm. 622, 22- 24; 634, 30- 33; 637, 9-12; 649, 36- 651,9 (texte important); 653, 32- 654, 14; 654, 34- 655, 12; 656, 2- 14; 989, 14- 17. Sur le statut du non-etre et de la negation, voir In Parm. 1072, 19- 1074, 21; Theol. plat. II 5, p. 38, 13- 39, 5 et l'importante note complementaire de Saffrey-Westerink a la p. 39, 1 (o. 99- 100).

37. Strycker, Émile de. 1979. "Notes sur les relations entre la problématique du Sophiste de Platon et celle de la Métaphysique d'Aristote." In Études sur la Métaphysique

d'Aristote. Actes du VI Symposium aristotelicum, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 49-67. Paris: Vrin.
"L'objet de la Métaphysique aristotélicienne est la recherche et la construction de la science la première et la plus universelle. Nous voudrions, dans la présente communication, préciser quelques-unes des relations que ce traité entretient avec le Sophiste de Platon. Pourquoi ce seul dialogue, et non tel ou tel autre? D'abord parce qu'il faut se limiter, ensuite parce que les sujets qui y sont débattus s'apparentent d'assez près à certains thèmes centraux de la Métaphysique et que certaines formulations dont Platon s'y sert paraissent avoir directement influencé divers passages d'Aristote. Nous n'avons évidemment pas l'intention de présenter ici une confrontation générale des philosophies spéculatives d'Aristote et de Platon ni de nous demander si l'une est supérieure à l'autre. Notre but est beaucoup plus modeste et s'inspire directement du programme du présent Symposium. Nous voudrions seulement, en partant du Sophiste, contribuer à mieux délimiter, sur quelques points, ce qu'Aristote a voulu réaliser dans sa Métaphysique. Assurément, le plan et la méthode de ce traité sont profondément originaux et il peut sembler que les rencontres avec Platon soient peu nombreuses et d'un intérêt médiocre. Peut-être, néanmoins, notre exposé réussira-t-il à montrer que les rapports sont plus étroits qu'il n'y paraît à première vue. S'ils ne se manifestent pas d'emblée, c'est parce qu'Aristote a si radicalement repensé les problèmes qu'ils prennent chez lui une tout autre figure que chez son maître. C'est moins le cas dans les livres M et N, consacrés à la polémique contre les doctrines de l'Académie, que dans ceux ou Aristote poursuit son propre projet, c'est-à-dire AB T EZH0I. Nous ne ferons mention qu'une seule fois du livre A, dont la problématique et la méthode, du moins dans les chapitres 6-10, sont en un sens plus proches de celles de Platon, mais qui semble avoir été rédigé sans relation littéraire directe avec le groupe des livres centraux.
Les re

38. Sun, Yu-Jung. 2018. "À quoi sert la discussion sur l'opinion fausse dans le Théétète de Platon ?" Philosorbonne:61-76.
"L'interprétation défendue ici est la suivante : dans le Théétète, surtout dans le passage sur l'opinion fausse, ainsi que dans le Sophiste, Platon cherche à mettre au jour l'importance d'un savoir d'intermédiaire oud'une science d'intermédiaire, alors que, sans ce savoir d'intermédiaire, il est impossible d'interroger l'essence du savoir et la nature de la fausseté sans tomber dans l'aporie. Dans le Théétète, Platon montre la conséquence d'une interrogation de la nature du savoir sans prise en compte du rôle des relations dans la connaissance. C'est pourquoi le Théétète ne présente que des arguments qui, en définitive, échouent. Le Sophiste fait suite à ce questionnement du Théétète et apporte une solution à l'aporie partagée par ces deux dialogues, en expliquant ce qui est nécessaire mais absent dans les arguments sur l'opinion fausse du Théétète." (p. 62)
39. Swiggers, Pierre. 1984. "Théorie grammaticale et définition du discours dans le Sophiste de Platon." Les Études Classiques no. 52:15-17.
40. Teisserenc, Fulcran. 2007. "Consonnes et voyelles: les fonctions de l'Être et de l'Autre dans le Sophiste de Platon (251a-259e)." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review no. 46:231-264.
Résumé : "Le but de cet article est de comprendre les fonctions que dans le Sophiste l'Étranger attribue à la forme de l'Être et à celle de l'Autre. À la différence d'une interprétation de type linguistique, qui vise à déceler dans le texte une distinction entre les emplois du verbe «être», nous mettons en évidence le rôle ontologique assigné aux très grands genres dans l'entrelacement des formes. Exploitant l'analogie des voyelles, nous montrons que l'Être est un connecteur, qui rend actuelles les participations entre formes, tandis que l'Autre est un séparateur, qui rend actuelles leurs différences. Cette analyse permet d'éclairer les procédés dialectiques décrits dans le dialogue en termes très abstraits et de résoudre le problème controversé de l'auto-prédication sans avoir besoin de recourir à l'auto-participation."

41. ———. 2008. "Platon a-t-il distingué différents emplois du verbe « être » ? : note sur un passage controversé du Sophiste 255c-d." Philosophie Antique.Problèmes, Renaissance, Usages no. 8:153-188.
Résumé : "Contrairement à ce que présupposent certaines lectures contemporaines du Sophiste, l'Étranger ne cherche pas à conférer au verbe « être » des sens différents selon le type d'énoncé dans lequel il figure, qu'il s'agisse d'un énoncé d'identité, prédicatif, ou encore existentiel. L'analyse précise d'un passage fréquemment sollicité à cet effet (255c-d), analyse qui tient compte également de l'ensemble de la partie centrale du dialogue, fait apparaître que l'Étranger n'a pas un besoin crucial d'une telle distinction et qu'elle n'est pas non plus implicitement présente dans ses autres arguments. Quant au texte litigieux de 255c-d, il se lit bien mieux comme opérant une séparation quasi catégorielle entre termes absolus et termes relatifs. Cette dernière distinction, attestée par l'Ancienne Académie comme authentiquement platonicienne, se trouve enrichir le tableau des relations entre genres que l'Étranger esquisse dans son exploration partielle de la συμπλοκη τον ειδον."
42. ———. 2008. "Puissance, activité et passivité dans le Sophiste." Philosophie no. 96:25-45.
"Quand l'Étranger d'Élée passe en revue dans le Sophiste les diverses théories de l'être que la philosophie de son temps a pu produire, la gigantomachie qui met aux prises les Fils de la Terre et les Amis des Idées retient particulièrement son attention. Dans ce combat, les premiers accordent spontanément le monopole de l'être aux réalités corporelles (et accessoirement tangibles) tandis que les seconds n'admettent pour véritables οὐσίαι que les réalités intelligibles et incorporelles. Entre « matérialistes » et « idéalistes », l'Étranger recherche une sorte de dénominateur commun qui puisse les mettre d'accord. Il propose alors de caractériser l'être par la puissance (247 d-e)." (p. 25)
(...)
"Nous nous proposons de reprendre ces deux questions : après avoir rappelé les textes concernés, nous mettrons en lumière certains aspects de l'argument développé en 248 c-e

qui laissent à penser que l'Étranger engage délibérément le débat sur une fausse piste, dont le bénéfice attendu est indirect. Piste qu'il abandonne d'ailleurs juste après pour revenir à des considérations plus familières sous la plume de Platon.
Quant à l'importance et la signification du « critère » de la puissance, elles dépendent en grande partie du mode et de la mesure selon lesquels il est utilisé dans la suite du dialogue. S'il se trouve en effet, comme l'a relevé F. Fronterotta, [*] sollicité dans les analyses centrales sur les très grands genres, c'est toutefois, verrons-nous, moyennant des aménagements conceptuels considérables qui confèrent à l'Être comme genre voyelle un rôle charnière de premier plan que ne pouvait laisser entrevoir le seul passage de 247 e." (p. 27)
[*] Francesco Fronterotta, « L'être et la participation de l'autre. Une nouvelle ontologie dans le Sophiste », Les Études philosophiques, no 3/1995, 311-353.

43. ———. 2012. Le Sophiste de Platon. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
"Le présent travail est un commentaire suivi du Sophiste. J'ai profité pour sa rédaction de certains de mes travaux antérieurs qui portaient déjà sur ce Dialogue, mais n'en abordaient que des parties ou des aspects singuliers. Ce livre s'en distingue par le souci de restituer au parcours dans lequel l'Étranger entraîne le jeune Théétète toute sa complexité et sa cohérence. La tradition du commentaire est en France peu pratiquée, du moins dans les études platoniciennes, alors qu'elle est florissante outre-Manche. Nos spécialistes ont préféré pour la plupart fournir des Dialogues des traductions amples et informées, nanties de substantielles préfaces, ou bien se consacrer à éclairer tel point du texte, tel concept ou tel élément de doctrine. Mais l'analyse pas à pas du texte, de son argumentation, et de ses silences comme de ses équivoques, est un exercice qui a pratiquement disparu du paysage académique français.(1) Je souhaite proposer une lecture attentive d'une œuvre pourtant déjà surchargée d'interprétations, mais qui pour la plupart ne portent que sur certains passages, toujours les

mêmes. On sait pourtant qu'avec un auteur aussi intelligemment retors que Platon, il n'est possible d'offrir quelque clarté supplémentaire sur un texte si saturé et raturé qu'en le mettant en mouvement, ce qui veut dire : le situer dans une progression qui n'est pas nécessairement progrès, le rapprocher d'autres textes dont les perspectives peuvent être différentes tout en étant consonantes, le faire entendre enfin dans ses variations de ton et de visée." (p. 7)
(1) Exception faite du remarquable ouvrage de Sylvain Delcomminette consacré au Philèbe (Le Philèbe de Platon. Introduction à l'agathologie platonicienne, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2006) qui, à lui tout seul, en a renouvelé le genre.

44. Thornton, Anna Maria. 1986. "λόγος-phrase et λόγος-texte chez Platon et Aristote." In Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l'Antiquité, 165-179. Bruxelles: Ousia.
45. Vanohutte, M. 1948. "Note sur la communauté des genres dans le « Sophiste »." Revue philosophique de Louvain no. 46:177-187.
Sommaire : "Le passage du Sophiste (253d5-253e2), où l'on a cru que Platon devait décrire soit les deux opérations de la dialectique, συναγωγή et διαίρεσις, soit la seule συναγωγή, soit toutes autres relations de concepts, ne peut nullement être interprété dans ce sens. Il semble, dans le cadre même du dialogue, qu'il s'agisse plutôt de quatre conceptions différentes de la communauté des genres, qui résument succinctement les positions historiques adoptées par Platon lui-même, les Pluralistes, les Amis des Formes et Parménide."
46. Vasiliu, Anca. 2001. "Dire l'image ou la parole visible chez Platon (sur le Sophiste, 216a-241e)." Dionysius no. 19:75-111.
"Le Sophiste introduit dans le discours philosophique un riche vocabulaire qui désigne des copies et des ressemblances de toutes sortes, des simulacres, des apparitions et des phantasmes qui ouvrent une brèche entre être et non-être, un écart à travers lequel s'insinue dans le discours de l'Étranger la multiplicité d'expressions et de définitions possibles de l'image - alors que le philosophe (mais est-ce bien le point de vue de Platon ?) ne visait pas le

rôle de l'image dans la connaissance, mais la distinction tranchée entre le vrai et le faux, à travers la complémentarité des définitions de l'être et du non-être." (p. 75)
(...)
"L'analyse que nous proposons part du déploiement lexical à travers lequel l'Étranger tente de nommer et donc de circonscrire par/dans la langue l'image « ontique », instrument favori du sophiste. Mais dès l'abord le rapport entre l'image et la parole s'avère ici conflictuel, et il demeurera d'ailleurs sous le signe d'une impossibilité de la rencontre parfaite, voire sous le signe d'une inadéquation ou d'une inappropriation du discours à l'égard du visible : l'image glisse, fugace et furtive comme des reflets sur l'eau, à peine saisis par la rétine, et le langage n'arrive pas à la contenir, ou bien elle se laisse définir, s'adapte même à la définition (tantôt ceci, tantôt cela), et lui échappe aussitôt que l'on croit pouvoir arrêter la « chasse ». De fait, l'image ne peut se dire que par un dédoublement à l'intérieur même de la langue, dédoublement qui reprend, calque la nature même de l'image, sa nature double, sa réflexivité. Le moyen le plus adéquat de l'exprimer serait peut-être celui de la tautologie ou de la « double négation » - en un mot, l'astuce, la mechanè d'une sorte de miroir placé dans un interstice choisi de la langue, une brèche réfléchissante opérée dans son intimité. D'où le recours ardu et néanmoins révélateur au non-être, et par-delà le non-être, au mouvement et au temps, notions étrangères de prime abord à l'image, impropres en apparence à en définir la nature." (pp. 2-3)

47. ———. 2008. Dire et voir. La parole visible du Sophiste. Paris: Vrin.
"Au lecteur inquiet de savoir à l'avance ce qu'il aurait à gagner en parcourant ces pages, nous lui livrons un raccourci : ce livre cherche dans la lecture d'un texte particulier de la philosophie grecque classique réponse à l'étonnement suscité par ce manque de précision apparente de la part de l'expérience la plus commune et la plus souvent évoquée de toutes les expériences diurnes. Il s'adresse, par conséquent, à ceux qui voudraient apprendre à regarder le

visible à la manière dont les Anciens en parlent, c'est-à-dire dans la patience d'une vision qui traverse la parole et s'enrichit de l'épaisseur des mots. Mais, si l'objet d'étude de ce travail est un texte historiquement déterminé, le Sophiste de Platon en l'occurrence, notons tout de suite que le regard au sujet duquel est formulée la question de départ, est, lui, un acte indéterminé historiquement. On pourrait définir ce regard, simplement, comme l'acte de recevoir de manière réfléchie le visible en tant que visible. Précisons donc, d'emblée, que cette définition basique du regard est notre définition, tout autant que la lecture du texte platonicien est notre lecture, sans autre but que de répondre à la question du régard et à la nécessité de définir le statut du visible pour la pensée." (pp. 7-8)

48. ———. 2014. "Le Même et l'Autre et les images. Une lecture de la division des genres dans le Sophiste." Philosophia no. 44:95-136.
49. Vieillard Baron, Jean-Louis. 2008. "Le même et l'autre, du Sophiste de Platon à la Logique de Hegel." Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg:37-51.
50. Villela-Petit, Maria. 1991. "La question de l'image artistique dans le Sophiste." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 55-90. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"Si, avec Stanley Rosen, nous admettons que dans le Sophiste Platon met en scène «le drame de l'original et de l'image»(1), nous devons aussitôt constater qu'il y fait jouer à l'image artistique un rôle clef. De quelle expérience du monde grec et de son art un tel "rôle" porte-t-il la trace? Comment se fait-il, en effet, que Platon choisisse tantôt l'art du peintre, tantôt l'art du sculpteur (et nous verrons que cette différence n'est pas insignifiante) comme l'analogon le mieux à même de faire saisir non seulement le sophiste et son activité mais aussi la distinction entre le sophiste et le philosophe ?
Pour déployer ce genre de questionnement nous sommes certes redevables à la tradition déjà longue constituée par ceux qui, frappés par l'abondance d'allusions à l'art dans les dialogues, ont essayé d'éclairer, à partir d'une confrontation entre le corpus et les autres documents disponibles, le

rapport de Platon à l'art, ou plutôt aux arts, en particulier à la peinture et à la sculpture." (p. 55)
(1) S. Rosen, Plato's 'Sophist': the drama of original and image, New Haven & London, 1983.

51. Wolff, Francis. 1991. "Le chasseur chassé. Les définitions du sophiste." In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 19-52. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"On se propose d'analyser ici la structure et l'objet des "définitions" initiales du Sophiste dans le dialogue homonyme (222 A-232 a). Quelle est leur fonction dans l'économie du dialogue, voire dans celle de la trilogie inachevée (Sophiste, Politique, Philosophe) ? Qui définissent-elles et comment ? Sont-elles des définitions et pourquoi ? En revanche les problèmes liés à la méthode de la division (son principe et son but, son rapport avec les autres "méthodes" platoniciennes, sa place dans l'évolution de la dialectique, dans "l'histoire de la logique" etc...) seront largement laissés de côté: ce sont eux qui ont généralement retenu l'attention des rares commentateurs du Sophiste qui se soient arrêtés à ce texte." (p. 19)
(...)
"Nous revoilà face à nos trois genres suprêmes et leurs gardiens: le Sophiste du Non-Etre, c'est-à-dire de l'Autre, le Politique du Même, le Philosophe de l'Etre. Leur compétence universelle leur est aussi mutuellement nécessaire que celle des trois genres maximes - qui se mêlent à tous les autres - est nécessaire à tout "dire". Concernant le Politique et le Philosophe, rappelons seulement que le Philosophe est dit explicitement avoir l'Etre pour résidence (254 A); et que dans le Politique, mais surtout dans la République, le rôle architectonique du Politique, par rapport à toutes les autres pratiques, consiste dans le fait qu'il est le garant de l'identité du tout par la pureté des parties. Quant au Sophiste, on sait qu'il habite le Non-Etre (254 A), et on ne manque pas de nous rappeler (258 B) que c'est à cause de lui qu'on cherche ce Non-Etre. Mais d'une manière plus générale, n'est-ce pas la leçon de tout le dialogue de montrer que le Non-Etre est possible d'une part, qu'il est nécessaire d'autre part : il est possible

comme Autre, genre suprême, il est nécessaire pour que le “contredire”, et donc aussi le “dire”, soient possibles. De la même façon, de toute compétence, si générale soit-elle, s’origine une pratique sophistique. Derrière tout politique ou tout philosophe, il y a sans doute un sophiste. Car le Sophiste est le genre même qui redouble tous les autres et son être (comme celui du Non-Etre) n’est rien d’autre que d’être l’Autre de tous les autres. Qui sait même si l’intention de la trilogie n’était pas de montrer cette nécessité où se trouvent le Politique comme le Philosophe de leur Autre, le Sophiste, pour que chacun d’eux soit ce qu’il est, c’est-à-dire pour que chacun soit, tout court." (pp. 51-52)

52. Zaks, Nicolas. 2014. "Être et non-être dans la République (livre V) et dans le Sophiste " Zetesis - Ζήτησις : Actualités scientifiques en philosophie ancienne et sciences de l'Antiquité no. 4:1-16.
Résumé : "À la fin du livre V de la République, Socrate démontre patiemment à Glaucon, porte-parole désigné des amateurs de spectacles, que seuls les objets de la connaissance sont pleinement, alors que ceux de la doxa participent à l’être et au non-être. Dans le Sophiste, l’Étranger, pour capturer le sophiste, se voit dans l’obligation, contre Parménide, de reconnaître l’être, d’une certaine manière, du non-être, dans la mesure où chaque Forme, étant autre que n’importe quelle Forme, n’est pas cette Forme. Les analyses du Sophiste viennent-elles bouleverser la conception de l’être établie dans la République ? Après avoir présenté une interprétation du texte difficile et controversé de la République, interprétation dégageant du texte les critères de détermination et d’identité à soi comme caractérisant les objets de la connaissance, on démontre la compatibilité de ces enseignements avec les analyses ontologiques menées dans le Sophiste : la participation à l’Autre et au non-être ne nuit pas à la pleine détermination d’une Forme, mais au contraire y contribue, et elle ne trouble pas l’identité à soi de cette Forme, car elle implique une altérité non pas par rapport à soi-même mais par rapport aux autres."

53. ———. 2016. "À quel logos correspond la συμπλοκη` τῶν εἰδῶν du Sophiste ?" Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 34:37-59.
Résumé : "Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l'entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκη` τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu'aucune de ces solutions n'est pleinement satisfaisante.
Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκη` τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l'œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion."
54. ———. 2017. "Science de l'entrelacement des formes, science suprême, science des hommes libres : la dialectique dans le Sophiste 253b-254b." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 38:61-81.
Abstract: "Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato's description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the "vowel-kinds" are necessary (but not individually sufficient) conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the "cause of divisions" mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of "meta-divison" as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the

supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men."
55. Ziermann, Christoph. 2011. "La négativité de l'être chez Platon." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 240-277. Praha: Oikoymenh.

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2. Alván León, Alexandra V. 2021. "Wolf im Hundepelz: Mimesis als Täuschung in der Kunst des Sophisten." In Platonic Mimesis Revisited, edited by Julia, Pfefferkorn and Spinelli, Antonino, 225-248. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
3. Apelt, Otto. 1895. "Platons Sophistes in geschichtlicher Belenchtung." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 50:394-452.
   "Unsere Abhandlung verweilte etwas lange bei trockenen logischen Fragen. Aber vielleicht trägt sie doch etwas bei zu der Erkenntniss, wie innig diese logischen Quisquilien - als welche sie manchen erscheinen dürften - mit den höchsten Problemen des Denkens zueammenhängen, wie wichtig und entseheidend also für den ganzen Verlauf der Geschichte der Philosophie sie sind.
   Aristoteles lässt sich nicht ungestraft umgehen: die Gesetze des Reflexionsvermögens haften unserer Erkenntniss als unbequem Mitgaben au und lassen sich durch keine intellectuelle Anschauung oder vermeintliche höhere Logik bei Seite schieben. Die Rückkehr von aristotelischer zu platonischer Abstractionsweise war ein Anachronismus. Wir halten fest an der selbständigen Geisteswelt Platons in

Gestalt des Kantischen transcendentalen Idealismus. Darin sah Platon viel weiter als Aristoteles. Dafür sah dieser weit schärfer in der Nähe. Seinen Belehrungen in Sachen der Logik müssen wir treu bleiben, wenn wir die Grundlagen gesunden Denkens nicht aufgeben wollen." (s. 452)

4. Bechtle, Gerald. 2002. "Dihairesis, Definition, Analysis, Synthesis: Betrachtungen zu Jamblichs Skopos-Lehre und zur Interpretation des platonischen Sophistes (253d1 - e5)." Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie und Patristik no. 115:175-218.
   "Es mag manchem gewagt erscheinen, einen Aufsatz zu Jamblich und seinem Verhältnis zu dem platonischen Dialog Sophistes verfassen zu wollen. Diese Zweifel sind zunächst deshalb berechtigt, weil uns die Spät antike insgesamt nur sehr spärliche und indirekte Zeugnisse der Interpreta tion des platonischen Sophistes hinterlassen hat. Die Bedeutung dieses Dialogs scheint somit - vor allem von der Überlieferungslage her gesehen - hinter der solch zentraler Dialoge wie Parmenides, Timaeus oder auch Philebus zu verblassen, zu welchen wir ja direkte und wesentlich reichhal tigere Zeugnisse und oft sogar noch ganze Kommentare besitzen." (s. 175)
   (...)
   "Damit sind zwei der weiteren, über die Teilrekonstruktion der Philoso phie Jamblichs hinausreichenden Ziele dieses Beitrags bereits umrissen. Zum einen geht es um die Ergänzung eines historischen Bausteins im not wendigerweise stark lückenhaften Gebäude der Geschichte der Sophistes Interpretation, zum anderen um einen eher systematischen Baustein im Bereich der weniger erforschten spätplatonischen Methodologie/Logik und Methodenphilosophie. Die meisten bisherigen Arbeiten zum Einfluß Sophistes in der spätantiken Philosophie verfolgten andere Schwerpunkte, wenn auch klar sein muß, daß die angesprochenen Probleme immer teil weise miteinander verknüpft sind. Dies gilt umso mehr, als man nie die Tatsache aus den Augen verlieren darf, daß gerade für die späten Plato Interpreten immer der gesamte Dialog - also sogar mit den heute oft philo sophisch irrelevant

erscheinenden Teilen - relevant war und vom σκοπός erfaßt wurde bzw. auf ihn bezogen werden konnte." (ss. 176-177)

5. Bordt, Michael. 1991. "Der Seinsbegriff in Platons Sophistes: eine Untersuchung zu 242b6-249d5." Theologie und Philosophie no. 66:493-529.
   Abstract: "The article provides, first, a survey of the scholarly debate about the meaning of 'to be' in Plato's Sophist, starting from Cornford, centering on Michael Frede and Owen, and leading up to the present day discussion. Then, Plato's criticism of dualism, monism, idealism, materialism (Soph. 242b6-249d5) is given detailed analysis. The scope of this analysis is to substantiate the hypothesis that Plato distinguishes two types of propositions in Sophist, i.e., those of predication and a particular kind of identity. Each type uses 'is' differently. However, even when criticizing traditional ontologies, Plato does not use 'is' to mean 'exists'."
6. Brach, Markus Joachim. 1996. Heidegger-Platon. Vom Neukantismus zur existentiellen Interpretation des "Sophistes". Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.
7. Brzoska, Andreas. 1992. Absolutes Sein. Parmenides' Lehrgedicht und seine Spiegelung im Sophistes. Münster: Lit.
8. Buchheim, Thomas. 2013. "Megista genê und Weisen der Gemeinschaft in Platons Sophistes 249d-259e." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 67:538-565.
   "Noch immer gibt es in der Forschung keine allgemein akzeptierte und hinreichend präzise Auffassung darüber, was Platon mit dem Lehrstück über, größte Gattungen' (μέγιστα γένη) im Herzen des Dialogs Sophistes genau genommen hat ausrichten wollen." (s. 538)
   (...)
   "Meine Argumentation stützt sich vor allem auf zwei bisher wenig in Erwägung gezogene Punkte des Textes: Zum einen wurde kaum beachtet, was Platon selbst als über Parmenides hinausgehenden Gewinn an logischer Befähigung nennt, der sich ergibt, wenn man die betreffenden Gattungen unterscheidet (259c – d). Zum anderen ist der innere Zusammenhang der Lehre von den

fünf Gattungen mit dem wie eine Abschweifung wirkenden Passus über Philosophie als dialektische Wissenschaft in der Mitte des Abschnitts (253b – 254b) nicht genügend erkannt und für die Klärung des Gedankengangs herangezogen worden. (s. 539)

9. Colloud-Streit, Marlis. 2004. "Warum gibt es keinen Mythos im Sophistes?" Plato Journal no. 4:1-17.
"Der vorliegende Beitrag möchte zeigen, dass das Fehlen respektive das Vorhandensein eines Mythos mit Platons Verständnis von Dialektik zu tun hat. In einem ersten Schritt wird versucht, die Bedeutung von Dialektik im Politikos respektive im Sophistes zu beleuchten. Dann werden in einem zweiten Schritt die Figuren Theaitetos und Jung-Sokrates vorgestellt, und es wird eine Antwort auf die Frage gewagt, weshalb der Eleat nur einem von beiden einen Mythos erzählt.
Zweck dieses Artikels ist, eine Antwort vorzuschlagen, welche die Anwesenheit des Mythos im Politikos beziehungsweise dessen Abwesenheit im Sophistes erklärt. Die folgenden Überlegungen sind bei weitem nicht abgeschlossen und der Artikel ist als Anregung für eine vertiefte Forschung gedacht." (p- 2)
10. Detel, Wolfgang. 1972. Platons Beschreibung des falschen Satzes im Theätet und Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
11. Dürr, Karl. 1945. "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges Sophistes." Museum Helveticum no. 2:166-194.
"§ 1. Der platonische Dialog "Sophistes" erscheint uns heute in manchen seiner Teile merkwürdig spröde, während andere Stellen des Werkes durch eine Fülle von Sätzen, die zu tieferer Forschung anregen, ausgezeichnet sind.
§ 2. Friedrich Schleiermacher war wohl der erste, derdaraufaufmerksammachte, daß innerhalb des Dialoges zwei wesentlich verschiedene Teile, ein äußerer und ein innerer, zu unterscheiden sind (vgl .SchP Bd. lI,2, S. 13lff.). An dieser Grundauffassung ist späterhin von denen, welche eine Analyse des Dialoges gegeben haben, stets festgehalten worden; und gerne bezeichnete man von nun an den

äußeren Teil als die Schale, den inneren als den Kern des Ganzen. Doch kommt in dieser Bezeichnungsweise eine Wertung zum Ausdruck, die Schleiermacher selbst nicht gebilligt hätte; denn er hebt ausdrücklich hervor, daß in dem Dialog nichts ist, was als bloße Schale wegzuwerfen wäre (ibid. S. 134, Z. 20-21)."
SchP = Platons Werke von F. Schleiermacher. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. 1817-1824

12. Ebert, Theodor. 1998. "Wer sind die Ideenfreunde in Platons Sophistes?" In Amicus Plato magis amica veritas. Festschrift Wolfgang Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Enskat, Reiner, 82-100. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In der Diskussion philosophischer Lehren, die Platon im Sophistes durch den Mund des Besuchers aus Elea im Gespräch mit dem jungen Theaitetos vortragen läßt, kommt es an einer Stelle (246 a ff.) zur Schilderung eines „Gigantenkampfes" zwischen zwei entgegengesetzten und sich bekämpfenden Lagern. Ihr Streit geht um die ουσία, um das Sein, genauer um die Frage, wem eigentlich überhaupt der Charakter des Seins zukommt. Auf der einen Seite stehen, etwas vereinfacht gesagt, die „Materialisten", von denen es heißt, daß sie alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herunterziehen (246 a 8 —9), daß sie, wie der eleatische Besucher sagt, mit ihren Händen Steine und Bäume umklammern. Nach ihnen gilt als seiend nur das, was körperlich ist (246 b l -2). Ihnen gegen ber stehen die Ideenfreunde (οἱ των ειδών φίλοι 248 a 4 —5), die sich, wie es heißt, „von oben herab aus dem Unsichtbaren" verteidigen (vgl. 246 b 7). Sie lassen als das wahre Sein nur die „denkbaren und unkörperlichen Eide" zu (νοητά ἀττα και ασώματα είδη 246 b 7 —8). Beide Positionen werden von dem Besucher aus Elea einer kritischen Prüfung unterzogen." (s. 82)

13. Eckl, Andreas. 2011. Sprache und Logik bei Platon: Zweiter Teil: Ideenlogik und Logik der grammatischen Form im Sophistes. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
"Mit dem Dialog „Sophistes“ liegt nicht nur die späteste Fassung der Platonischen Ideenlehre vor, sondern auch die refl ektierteste. Am Beispiel der Bestimmung des Begriffs

des „Sophisten“ lässt Platon darin seine Gesprächspartner verschiedene Varianten von Begriffs- und Ideentheorien durchgehen und entwickelt kritisch-selbstkritisch eine Theorie der Grundlegung des Logos allen Seins. Die Argumentation zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie überall auf das Faktum und die Notwendigkeit des sprachlich-logischen Ausdrucks der Begriffe oder Ideen rekurriert. Die Ideenlogik wird insofern in den Zusammenhang einer Theorie eingebettet, die Sprache und Logik umfasst, in Beziehung zueinander setzt, und die Platon von der sprachphilosophischen Seite her schon im Dialog „Kratylos“ behandelt hat. Die Begründung des Logos im Dialog „Sophistes“ kann deshalb aber doch nicht sprachanalytisch, sondern muss logisch-begrifflich erfolgen: in einer refl ektierten, selbstbegründenden Theorie der Synthesis der Logoi. Diese Theorie führt am Ende zu einem „Gefl echt“ „wichtigster Begriffe“, die alle den Status von Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Logos beanspruchen. In Form von Gegenbegriffen treten sie auseinander und bestimmen so jeweils verschiedene Dimensionen ihrer möglichen Verbindung oder wechselseitigen Durchdringung. Für die systematische Theorie der Gegenwart ist dieses Modell von besonderem Interesse, weil es seine eigene dynamische Veränderung rechtfertigt. Das Buch setzt den vorliegenden ersten Band „Sprache und Logik bei Platon I“ fort und schließt die Arbeit am Zusammenhang von „Sprache und Logik bei Platon“ ab."

14. Frede, Michael. 1962. "Bemerkungen zum Text der Aporienpassage in Platons Sophistes." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 7:132-136.
15. ———. 1967. Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Platons Gebrauch von '...ist' und '...ist nicht...' in Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
16. ———. 1996. "Die Frage nach dem Seienden: Sophistes." In Platon. Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschungen, edited by Kobusch, Theo and Mojsisch, Burkhard, 181-199. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
17. Friedländer, Paul. 1975. Platon. Band III: Die Platonischen Schriften: Zweite und Drite Periode. Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter.
Kapitel 26. Sophistes, ss. 224-259.
18. Gardeya, Peter. 1988. Platons Sophistes. Interpretation und Bibliographie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
19. Gauss, Hermann. 1960. Die Spätdialoge Theätet, Parmenides, Sophist und Politicus. Bern: Peter Lang. Dritte Band, Erste Hälfte.
20. Glasmeyer, Christian. 2003. Platons Sophistes: zur Überwindung der Sophistik. Heidelberg: Winter.
21. Havlíček, Aleš. 2011. "Die Aufgabe der Dialektik für die Auslegung des Seins der Nichtseienden." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 173-197. Praha: Oikoymenh.
22. Iber, Christian. 2007. Platon, Sophistes. Kommentar. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
23. Jinek, Jakub. 2011. "Die Verschiedenheit der Menschentypen in Platons Sophistes." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 328-343. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"Der vorliegende Text möchte die Topographie der Menschentypen im Sophistes vervollständigen und dadurch mit Sinn erfüllen. Dabei soll a) bekräftigt werden, dass die Topographie sich auf die Seinsordnung
stützt, und dass sie sich deswegen nicht nur auf die Sprache oder Prädikation bezieht, sondern auf Erkenntnis- und Seinsobjekte.
b) Diese Objekte sind dabei hierarchisch abgestuft. Die Hierarchie der Objekte erschließt die Existenz c) mehrerer Kontexte der philosophischen Tätigkeit und d) einer hierarchisch abgestuften Menschenskala,
die normativ ist und den Verfassungskatalog aus dem Politikos vorweg nimmt." (S. 3)
24. Kamlah, Wilhelm. 1963. Platons Selbstkritik im Sophistes. München: C. H. Beck.
25. ———. 1966. "Zu Platons Selbstkritik im Sophistes." Hermes no. 94:243-245.

"Ich habe Verständnis dafür, daß mancher auf meine 'Sophistes'-Interpretation zunächst mit Abwehr reagiert. Wir bemühen uns nicht allein aus guten Gründen darum, das Eine und Wichtige zu fassen, das Platon uns zu sagen hat, sondem in der Verehrung fur den großen Mann lassen wir es gelten, daß er seine Lehre in den langen Jahren seines Lebens mehr und mehr 'entfaltet' hat, nicht dagegen, daß er ein eigenes Lehrstück eines Tages zugunsten einer besseren Einsicht fallen gelassen hat. Gerade dies aber zeigt, wie mir scheint, der 'Sophistes' demjenigen, der sich auf eine subtil unterscheidende Interpretation einzulassen
gewillt ist, die alle Teile des Dialogs miteinander in Beziehung setzt. Sieht man Platon so, dann wird er kein unfehlbarer Kirchenvater mehr sein, sondem ein menschlicher' Denker, der im Dialog mit anderen um seine Probleme gerungen hat wie wir und dabei nicht immer nur geradeaus gegangen ist. Sieht man ihn so, dann wird man zwar nicht den 'Entwicklungsgedanken' und das bloß historische Interesse für das 'Werden der Personlichkeit' wieder ausgraben, man wird aber auf historische Differenzierungen nicht mehr gar zu allergisch reagieren, vielmehr historische Forschung und systematisches Denken zu vereinigen trachten, wie es doch auch sonst das Geschaft des Philosophen ist.
Meine prinzipielle These zur Platonforschung lautet also: Wir sollten nicht allein den Entwicklungsgedanken, sondern auch das - diesem Gedanken verwandte - Entfaltungsdogma verabschieden." (S. 244)

26. Koch, Anton Friedrich. 2010. "Was meint ihr eigentlich, wenn ihr 'seiend' sagt? Überlegungen zu Piatons Sophistes." Philosophical Inquiry no. 32:69-83.
"Die Kunst des Sophisten ist eine hervorbringende, menschliche, bildnerische, trugbildnerische, nachahmende, mei-nungsnachahmende, ironisch sich verstellende und in kurzen Reden sich artikulierende Kunst.
Unter den vielen philosophischen Errungenschaften, die dieser Dihairesis zugrunde liegen, seien zwei zum Schluß noch einmal eigens hervorgehoben. (1°) Piaton hat gegen den eleatischen Monismus ein Verfahren der

Ausdifferenzierung des Seienden entwickelt, das theoretisch anspruchsvoller ist als die entsprechende anti-eleatische These seines Schülers Aristoteles, daß das Seiende keine Gattung sei, sondern auf unhintergehbar viele Weisen ausgesagt werde. (2°) Piaton hat das Sein, das mit dem Logos ausgesagt bzw. beansprucht wird, als ein propositional gegliedertes Der-Fall-Sein erkannt und ipso facto gegen das Sein dessen profiliert, was der Noesis zugänglich ist, also das Sein der Ideen. Auf diesem Weg ist Aristoteles." (S. 83)

27. ———. 2012. "Prädikate von und Relationen zwischen Ideen in Platons Parmenides und Sophistes." In Platons Hermeneutik und Prinzipiendenken im Licht der Dialoge und des antiken Tradition. Festschrift für Thomas Alexander Szlezák zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by Bruchmüller, Ulrike, 345-362. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
28. Kolb, Peter. 1992. "Die Dihairesen in Platons Sophistes." Perspektiven der Philosophie no. 18:329-346.
"Im Folgenden will ich die Aufmerksamkeit auf ein Detailproblem aus dem Kosmos des platonischen Spätdialoges Sophistes lenken, auf die Frage, welche genuin philosophische Bedeutung der Gruppe der ersten fünf Dihairesen zugedacht werden muß, die das Wesen des Sophisten erfoiglos zu bestimmen versuchen.
Trotz der thematischen Eingrenzung scheint es nötig zu sein, vorweg auf die Fülle der Interpretationsprobleme des Gesamtdialoges, die typologisch sehr verschiedenartig sind, wenigstens aufmerksam zu machen, ganz einfach, weil all diese Probleme - gut platonisch - so ineinander verschlungen sind, daß die Erörterung eines einzigen von ihnen sich unvermeidlich im Kontext aller bewegt." (S. 329)
29. ———. 1997. Platons Sophistes: Theorie des Logos und Dialektik. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
"Die vorliegende Studie ist dem Vorhaben verpflichtet, den Sophistes systematisch und argumentativ zu rekonstruieren. Dies soll durch einen fortlaufenden philosophischen Kommentar erreicht werden. Damit das Untemehmen auf solidem Boden steht, muß der Gang des Dialogs Schritt für Schritt nachvollzogen werden. Um die

Gefahr zu vermeiden, daß die historische Distanz zum Text unreflektiert übersprungen und das Auszulegende einer sprachlichen und sachlichen Überformung unterworfen wird, werden zentrale Termini sowohl im griechischen Original als auch in deutscher Übersetzung wiedergegeben. Der Leser soll die Möglichkteit des Vergleichs und der Kontrolle haben. Auch wenn es unvermeidlich ist, daß die Elegnz der Darstellung unter den Textreferaten leiden wird, so erscheint es doch mit Blick auf die außerordentlichen Schwierigkeiten des Sophistes geboten, diese Vorsicht walten zu lassen. Die ausführliche Wurdigung der Forschung findet in einem abgetrennten Literaturanhang statt, um von der ruhigen Entfaltung des epochemachenden platonischen Gedankens nicht ständig durch Hinweise auf die Kontroversen in der Forschung ablenken zu müssen. Dort weiden auch die Hauptthesen zu jedem Abschrutt in bündiger Form wiederholt.
Zu welchem Ergebnis eine Rekonstruktion führt, hingt trivialerwise von dem philosophischen Standpunkt des Interpreten ab, der sie durchführt. Die Vielfalt der Deutungen, die der Sophistes erfahren hat, liefert den besten Beweis dafür, bis zu welchem Grad das jeweilige Verständnis von den mitgebrachten systematischen Positionen präformiert ist. Deshalb weiden wir uns bemühen, den Verstehenshorizont, der hinter der vorliegenden Interpretation steht, in seinen Grundzügen jeweils zu explizieren und dem Leser verfügbar zu machen. Dadurch läßt sich zwar das Risiko einer Fehlinterpretation nicht veringem, aber immerhin die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöben, daß unausgesprochen wirksame Interpretationsvoraussetzungen aus der unmittelbaren Auslegung ausgeschlossen bleiben." (S. 18)

30. Königshausen, Johann-Heinrich. 1992. "Parallelen zwischen Platons Sophistes und Aristoteles' Met Γ." Perspektiven der Philosophie no. 18:347-368.
31. Krohs, Ulrich. 1998. "Platons Dialektik im Sophistes vor dem Hintergrund des Parmenides." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 52:237-256.

"Um im Sophistes kein Flickwerk sehen zu müssen, sollte jedoch die Einheit hinter Inhalt und Struktur des Dialogs gesucht werden.
Zunächst möchte ich anhand einer Analyse beider Methoden zeigen, daß sie für Platon erst zusammengenommen hinreichend für die Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen den Gattungen (Ideen) und damit adäquates Werkzeug des Dialektikers sind (Kapitel I und II dieses Aufsatzes).
Im Anschluß daran werde ich die These entwickeln, daß in der Aufspaltung des Sophistes in Mittelteil und Eckteile - mit jeweils unterschiedlicher Problemstellung und Untersuchungsweise - eine Differenzierung der Dialektik gegenüber derjenigen des Parmenides strukturell abgebildet wird. Die Methode war dort noch einheitlich, führte jedoch bei der Untersuchung der Ideen in Aporien (Kapitel III). Die sehr interessante nicht-aporetische Lesart Meinwalds[*] erweist sich nach kritischer Diskussion als nicht haltbar (Kapitel IILa). Erst im Sophistes löst Platon die Aporien des Parmenides. Die Verknüpfung beider Methoden über den gemein" (S. 237)
[*] Meinwald, C. C. (1991): Plato's Parmenides, New York.

32. Künne, Wolfgang. 2004. "Die "Gigantomachie" in Platons Sophistes: Versuch einer analytischen Rekonstruktion." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 86:307-321.
Abstract: "Prima facie there is a tension between a principle upheld by the Friends of Forms, 'Whatever is real is omnitemporally stable', and a conclusion into which they are driven, 'Some things are real, and yet they change in becoming the objects of cognition'. The paper argues that we should stop looking for a faulty premiss in the argument that leads to this conclusion but rather seek a way of reconciling principle
and conclusion. Frege and Russell can help us to see that the principle only disallows intrinsic change and that the conclusion only requires extrinsic change. There is some evidence that Plato himself was very well aware of this option."

33. Lisi, Francesco Leonardo. 2011. "Ποιητική τέχνη in Platons Sophistes." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 311-327. Praha: Oikoymenh.
34. Lorenz, Kuno, and Mittelstrass, Jürgen. 1966. "Theaitetos fliegt: Zur Theorie wahre und falscher Sätze bei Platon (Soph. 251d— 263d)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 48:113-151.
"Wir haben es hier mit einer Untersuchung zu tun, die in Platons Werk ganz einzigartig dasteht und die mit Recht auch heute als ein unerläßlicher Bestandteil der Prolegomena zur Logik angesehen werden darf. Kein Wunder also, daß diese Untersuchung gerade in neuerer Zeit, in der sich Probleme der Logik wieder größerer Aufmerksamkeit erfreuen, das Interesse vieler Interpreten gefunden hat, wenngleich deren Darstellung den logisch entscheidenden Partien bei Platon meist nur unvollkommen gerecht wurde. Diesem Mangel hoffen wir mit einem neuen Vorschlag zur Interpretation der fraglichen Textstellen abzuhelfen.
Es soll gezeigt werden, daß Platon — allerdings in der Sprache der Ideenlehre — über wahr und falsch im wesentlichen nicht anders denkt, als man es heute tut. (S. 113)
(...)
"Die vorliegende Arbeit gliedert sich in zwei Teile: der erste behandelt kritisch die wichtigsten Interpretationen der letzten Jahre, der zweite bietet und begr ndet die von uns vorgeschlagene Interpretation." (s. 114)
35. Manasse, E. M. 2009. Platons Sophistes und Politikos. Das Problem der Wahrheit. Berlin-Schöneberg: Siegfried Scholem.
36. Marten, Rainer. 1965. Der Logos der Dialektik: eine Theorie zu Platon Sophistes. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
37. Mayer, Rupert. 2008. "Heidegger und Platon: Die Dialektik der wahren Aussage im "Sophistes"." Phänomenologische Forschungen:147-167.
Abstract: "In his reading of the Sophist, Heidegger unfolds Plato's late thought concerning the dialectics of the

correctness of statements. This dialectics is described as gathering into one genus and dividing of the same genus, as dialectics of the community of ideas, and as the being-able-to-be-with-one-another of mind and idea. Hence, Plato's solution of the question of truth is dialectical. He looks at the ideas through statements and conforms his mind to the ideas through the same statements. Thus the question arises: If one and the same statement represents both the manifestness of an idea and the conforming of the mind to this idea, how are we able to judge, whether our statement conforms to the idea? Plato answers: If the idea of sameness is present in a judgment, then a thing is said as it is, i.e. it is judged to be the same with itself. This solution is both richer and poorer than the description of truth in the parable of the sun in the Republic: It is poorer, because it leads further away from unconcealedness or the truth of things; it is richer, because it unfolds truth as a relation to the whole truth in the community of ideas, not as a relation to this or that singular idea."

38. Meinhardt, Helmut. 1968. Teilhabe bei Platon. Ein Beitrag zum verständnis platonischen Prinzipiendenkens ünter besönderer Berucksichtigung des Sophistes. München: Alber.
39. Meissner, David. 2015. "Überlegungen zum platonischen Seinsbegriff." Philosophisches Jahrbuch no. 122:3-23. Abstract: "In Plato's Sophist (247e), the Eleatic Stranger seems to propose to define being by means of the notion of dynamis. Although some recent papers have claimed that his dynamis-proposal should be taken seriously (at least as an explication of Plato's concept of being, if not as a definition in the strict sense) it is still far from clear what this claim amounts to – especially in the case of the being of the forms.
This paper shows that, regarding forms, a modal and a formal interpretation of the dynamis-proposal is possible. While the latter interpretation is preferable on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds, it seems to conflict with the principle that a form is a being by participating in the form of being. By distinguishing between direct and indirect

participation in the form of being, the paper resolves this conflict, concluding that the formal interpretation of the dynamis-proposal can indeed be read as a philosophically attractive holistic explication of Plato's concept of the being of forms."

40. ———. 2015. "Der Dynamis-Vorschlag im 'Sophistes'. Überlegungen zum platonischen Seinsbegriff." Philosophisches Jahrbuch no. 122:3-23.
41. Mesch, Walter. 2011. "Die Bewegung des Seienden in Platons Sophistes." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 96-120. Praha: Oikoymenh.
42. Mojsisch, Burkhard. 1986. "Platons Sprachphilosophie im 'Sophistes'." In Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter. Bochumer Kolloquium, 2-4 Juni 1982, edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard, 35-62. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
"Nicht nur die Authentizität, sondern auch die eminente Bedeutung des Dialogs 'Sophistes' für das platonische Denken ist heute nahezu unbestritten(1) , wenngleich bisweilen immer noch Stimmen laut werden, die diesem Dialog als Episode(2) im Sinne einer transeunten Verirrung nur eine untergeordnete Rolle zuerkennen, um nicht an den Fundamenten eines sonst harmonischen Platonbildes rühren zu müssen.
Abgesehen davon, daß selbst eine Episode stets ein integratives Moment eines Denkens bilden und somit für dieses Denken - in welcher Hinsicht auch immer - konstitutiv sein dürfte, erlaubt gerade der 'Sophistes', ihn als grundlegendes Werk Platons zu betrachten. Damit verkehren sich die Vorzeichen: Ein als bloße Episode deklarierter Dialog gewinnt prädominierende Relevanz - eine umwertende Aufwertung, die nach Rechtfertigung verlangt, dies um so mehr, als der Dissens selbst zwischen denen, die sich der Bedeutung dieses Dialogs gewiß sind, nicht größer sein könnte.
Worin seine Bedeutung aber besteht, läßt sich aus einer Betrachtung der immer noch Probleme aufwerfenden platonischen Sprachphilosophie ermitteln. Der 'Sophistes' ist insofern Platons wichtigster Dialog zur Theorie der

Sprache, als nach Hinweisen auf die Hypothesis im 'Phaedon'(3), nach der Wörterlehre im 'Kratylos' und aporetisch endenden Reflexionen über den Satz im 'Theaetet'(4) der Logos selbst(5) thematisiert wird. Im Folgenden soll diese Thematisierung selbst thematisiert, sollen die spätplatonischen Einsichten zum Logos, zur Sprache in ihrer Differenziertheit, analysiert und zugleich weiterweisende Grenzen dieser Sprachtheorie bedacht werden." (S. 35-36)
(1) Vgl. Platon, Der Sophist, Auf der Grundlage der Übers, von O. Apelt (2. Aufl. 1922) neu bearb. u. eingel., mit Anm., Literaturübers. u. Regist. vers, von R. Wiehl, (PhB 265) Hamburg 1967, VII f.
(2) Vgl. H. Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos, 3. Teil/1. Hälfte: Die Spätdialoge. Theätet, Parmenides, Sophist und Politicus, Bern 1960, 221-223.
(3) Vgl. Phaed. 100 a 3-7.
(4) Vgl. Theaet. 206 c 1 - 210 b 3.

43. ———. 1996. ""Dialektik" und "Dialog": Politeia, Theaitetos, Sophistes." In Platon. Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschungen, edited by Kobusch, Theo and Mojsisch, Burkhard, 167-180. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
44. ———. 1999. "Der Dialog als sechste wichtigste Gattung in Platons Sophistes." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 4:41-48.
Abstract: "In his late dialogue The Sophist, Plato intends to show that the universal contents <motion>, <rest>, <being>, <identity> and <difference> differ from and yet intermingle with each other. Plato develops this theory using the universal content <motion> as an example, whereas the present essay concentrates on <dialogue> as a further universal content linked with all the other contents. It thereby aims to deepen the understanding of Plato's late theory of ideas, arriving at the conclusion that for Plato the possibility of philosophy is due to the possibility of the relational community of the universal contents. Plato, however, does not investigate the possibility of possibility

itself - an issue which can indeed be seen as the principle of the very possibility of universal contents and their relation."

45. ———. 2001. "Das Verschiedene als Nicht-Seiendes in Platons Sophistes." In Umbrüche: Historische Wendepunkte der Philosophie von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit, edited by Kahnert, Klaus and Mojsisch, Burkhard, 1-9. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
Abstract: "Plato's dialogue The Sophist highlights the commonality of the most important genera: rest, being, identity, difference and dialogical thinking are necessarily implicated in movement. This essay explores how difference combines as not-being with these other genera.
It concludes that not-being makes possible the commonality of the genera in the first place, that dialogical thinking alone justifies the thought of motive not-being and, finally, that not-being allows of conceiving the idea of being as also not-being, as in motion and as mediated through language. In sum: In Plato's late philosophy, not-being is the most important of the most important genera."

46. Mouroutsou, Georgia. 2010. Die Metapher der Mischung in den platonischen Dialogen Sophistes und Philebos. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Zusammenfassung: "Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des Wahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der Unbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet (Teil I). Daraufhin wird ihr Wesen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches (Teil II). Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: Warum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform der Teilhabe in den

ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet (Teile III–IV). Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen (Phil. 23–27)
wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem N icht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend (Resp. 479d), sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend (Teile V–VII)."

47. Peron, Barbara. 2008. Mit Aristoteles zu Platon. Heideggers ontologische Ausdeutung der Dialektik im "Sophistes". Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
48. Prauss, Gerold. 1966. Platon und der logische Eleatismus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
49. Ritter, Costantin. 1898. "Bemerkungen zum Sophisten." Archiv für Geschichte de Philosophie no. 11:18-57.
50. Römpp, G. 1988. "Dogmatismus und Reflexivität in Platons Sophistes." Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie no. 20:153-177.
51. Seeck, Gustav Adolf. 2011. Platons Sophistes: Ein Kritischer Komment. München: C. H. Beck.
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"In einem kürzlich in dieser Zeitschrift erschienenen Aufsatz(1) hat A. Gómez-Lobo es dankenswerter Weise unternommen, die Stenzelsche(2) Deutung dieser Stelle als unhaltbar zu erweisen und durch eine neue zu ersetzen. Zwar ist Stenzel das Verdienst des Bahnbrechers in dem schwierigen Gelände der spätplatonischen Dialektik nicht abzusprechen, aber nachdem seine Interpretation 60 Jahre lang beherrschend war, ist es an der Zeit, ihre Einseitigkeiten und Fehler zu erkennen und sie durch eine bessere abzulösen. Nach der Interpretation von Gómez-Lobo sind die Dunkelheit und Lückenhaftigkeit des Textes nicht zufällig, sondern von Platon beabsichtigt; er habe Ergebnisse, die er erst später erarbeitet, vorwegnehmen wollen; er verschlüssele, was er wirklich meine(3).
Gegen diese Deutung möchte ich Widerspruch anmelden. Es wäre befremdlich, Platon hier in den Noten eines schlechten Regisseurs zu sehen, der zu Tricks greifen muß; allerdings wird man vielleicht diese Interpretation annehmenm müssen, wenn sich keine besseref inden läßt. Die Frage stellt sich so: Ist die seit Stenzel an unserer Stelle

festgestellte Dunkelheit nur aus der verschlüsselten Vorwegnahme des folgenden zu erklären?
Ich bin andrer Meinung; Gómez-Lobo hat sich nicht ganzlich vom Einfluß tenzels freimachen können, in einigen wesentlichen Punkten hat er sich von ihm auf eine falsche Bahn locken lassen, so daß er eine reichlich unwahrscheinliche Lösung versuchen mußte, ohne doch zu voller Klarheit gelangen zu können, wie er selbst zugibt(4). Ich mochte meinen, wenn eine Stelle dunkel ist, soll man nicht diese Dunkelheit für gewollt erklaren, sondern sie möglichst aufhellen. Das halte ich für moglich, und ich mochte es hier versuchen, ohne die Schwere der Beweislast zu verkennen, die ich damit übernehme." (S. 241)
(1) "Plato's Description of Dialectic in the Sophist 253d 1 - e2", Phronesis 22 (1977) 29ff.
(2) Julius Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles, [3]Darmstadt 1961.
(3) S. 36.
(4) S. 29

59. Wieland, Wolfgang. 1976. "Platon und der Nutzen der Idee. Zur Funktion der Idee des Guten." Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie no. 1:19-33.
60. Ziermann, Christoph. 2004. Platons negative Dialektik. Eine Untersuchung der Dialoge "Sophistes" und "Parmenides". Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

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3. Belardi, Walter. 1997. "Dal "non essere" parmenideo all' "alterità" platonica: un caso di paralogismo verbale." Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.Rendiconti Classe di Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche no. 8:633-647. Abstract: "Plato, in his dialogue The Sophist, tried to disprove the thesis of Parmenides, according to which the contrary of the eivαi would be the nonexistent μη εφναι. Plato maintained instead that μη εφνα is not the contrary of εγναι but its otherness (το ετερον). Plato's argument has seemed impeccable and constructive, and has had notable resonance and a sound approval through the history of the philosophy. Really, the deep structure of Parmenides' nominalized μη εγναι was a predicate. Plato replaced the universal notion of «being (eivαi) with an εφναι assumed as a determined «thing. Besides he transformed the negative meaning of μη into the arithmetic meaning of less». So that μη slum → - eivαi», and the wholeness of the «things», from

which εφναι was subtracted, became the wholeness less to be, viz. the. Such an argument is actually a paralogism, according to Aristotle who says exactly: «it is not the same thing to affirm not to be absolutely and to affirm not to be in a determinated sense and about a determined thing (Soph. elench. I67 a 4). Then, Plato simply committed the well known paralogism which consists in changing a statement «a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid»."

4. Berti, Enrico. 2004. "Elementi di ontologia nel Parmenide e nel Sofista." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 15-22. Milano: Albo Versorio.
   "È possibile ricavare degli elementi di ontologia da entrambi i dialoghi e credo di aver trovato un passo del Sofista (c. XXXII, 244 b-245 e) in cui, a proposito di tematiche ontologiche, sembrano essere contenuti riferimenti al Parmenide. Mi rendo conto che questa affermazione è molto audace e azzardata." (p. 15)
   (...)
   "Ebbene, il passo del Sofista che ho preso in considerazione contiene, a mio giudizio, alcuni riferimenti a quelle che tradizionalmente sono chiamate le prime due ipotesi del Parmenide." (p. 15)
   (..-)
   "In conclusione mi sembra che, in questo passo del Sofista, si trovi una conferma di ciò che è detto nel Parmenide. Ciò significa che il Parmenide non è un dialogo aporetico, come molti affermano, ma è un dialogo costruttivo, sia pure in senso dialettico, cioè come confutazione dell'eleatismo. Credo che sia aporetica, effettivamente, la prima parte del Parmenide, cioè tutta la discussione sulle idee. Quanto alla seconda parte, non credo che essa sia un mero esercizio dialettico, ma penso che essa contenga un nucleo di ontologia, il quale, tuttavia, non emerge con chiarezza nel Parmenide, ma emerge, invece, nel Sofista, se è vero che il Sofista contiene questo riferimento alle prime due ipotesi del Parmenide." (P. 22)
5. Bianchetti, Matteo, and Storace, Erasmo, eds. 2004. Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista. Milano: Albo

Versorio.
Indice: Matteo Bianchetti, Erasmo Silvio Storace: Presentazione 9; Prima parte. Enrico Berti: Elementi di ontologia nel Parmenide e nel Sofista 15; Giovanni Casertano: Il falso: un'esistenza che non esiste tra cose esistenti 23; Francesco Fronterotta: Pensare la differenza. Statuto dell'essere e definizione del diverso nel Sofista di Platone 39; Maurizio Migliori: Non è l'ontologia il vero cuore del Parmenide e del Sofista 65; Mario Vegetti: Struttura e funzioni della dicotomia nel Sofista 95; Seconda parte. Vincenzo Vitiello: Incontro sul Parmenide e il Sofista 107; Carlo Sini: Il significato politico dell'ontologia di Platone 115; Nota bio-bibliografica 121-123.
"Questo volume raccoglie le riflessioni di autorevoli studiosi, che si sono espressi e confrontati sulla questione dell'ontologia in Platone e a partire da Platone, nonché sulla stessa possibilità di parlare di ontologia
in riferimento ad un autore vissuto circa duemila anni prima che tale termine fosse coniato.
La scelta di questi due dialoghi non è stata casuale, ma guidata dalla volontà di approfondire, all'interno della ricchezza di temi e spunti dell'intera produzione platonica, proprio quel che, interpretato forse attraverso la lente deformante della posterità, appare più. interessante per comprendere lo spazio e la possibilità in cui situare il dire filosofico in generale e la problematica ontologica in particolare." (p. 9)

6. Bianchi Bandinelli, Ranuccio. 1955. "Osservazioni storico-artistiche a un passo del Sofista di Platone." In Studi in onore di U. E. Paoli, 81-96. Firenze: Le Monnier. Ristampatio in R. Bianchi Bandinelli, Archeologia e cultura, Roma: 1979, pp. 146-163.
7. Bontempi, Milena. 2011. "Opinione e legge: l'anima e la città nella trilogia, Teeteto, Sofista, Politico." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 47-58. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

"Il nesso fra legge e opinione è posto esplicitamente nella prima parte del Teeteto, che affronta la dottrina protagorea." (p. 47)
(...)
"Il seguito del Teeteto e il Sofista si concentrano sull'opinione nell'anima individuale. Valido però il parallelismo singolo-città, la ricerca sulla doxa dovrebbe servirci anche per la polis e la sua legge. Dato questo particolare punto prospettico, la nostra indagine sull'opinione, tema che nella trilogia è di fatto onnipresente, si concentrerà specificamente sulla dimensione psicologica della doxa, ovvero sulla sua posizione e sul suo ruolo rispetto alla natura dell'anima nel suo complesso. Per capire infine come l'intreccio doxa-legge sia ripreso e rielaborato nelle ultime pagine del Politico, consentendovi di impostare la questione del rapporto e dell'interazione fra la città tutta e le sue componenti, anche singolari." (pp. 48-49)

8. Botter, Barbara. 2016. "Enti inesistenti: phantasmata in Platone." Archai no. 18:113-149.
Estratto: "Una delle questioni problematiche attorno alle quali ruota il dialogo Sofista di Platone è la distinzione fra originale e immagine, più precisamente, la distinzione fra originale, immagini vere e immagini false. È per giustificare questa classificazione che il filosofo si impegna nella dimostrazione del non-essere e gioca, sin dalle prime battute del dialogo, con il dualismo realtà-apparenza. Scopo del presente articolo è di intrecciare le nozioni di non-essere e apparenza, tali quali sono definite nel Sofista, per giustificare l'esistenza di enti che sono, pur non essendo reali né veri, i phantasmata, i quali si distinguono da altre forme di immagine per il fatto di essere, per natura, ingannevoli."
9. Brancacci, Aldo. 1999. "Eutidemo e Dionisodoro, gli ὀψιμαθεῖς deI Sofista e un passo dell'Eutidemo." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 20:381-396.
"È singolare, ma anche rivelativo, come, tra i non molti passi platonici i quali presentano serie possibilità di riferirsi

allusivamente o polemicamente ad Antistene, il solo, forse, il cui riferimento al Socratico
sia stato accettato pressoché unanimemente da una tradizione storiografica antica(1), e dura a morire, sia un luogo del Sofista platonico, che, invece, alle dottrine e alla persona di Antistene non può in alcun modo fare riferimento." (p. 381)
(...)
"Il passo, celebre, del Sofista, che già in quella sede [*] osservai non potersi riferire ad Antistene, perché il suo contenuto, anziché concordanze, rivela opposizioni e contraddizioni gravissime con le dottrine logiche del Socratico, è 251 B-C" (p. 382)
(...)
"Ma chi sono allora, una volta escluso il Socratico, gli ὀψιμαθεῖς [qualcuno che impara tardi nella vita] di cui parla Platone? A mio parere si tratta di Eutidemo e Dionisodoro, a noi noti dal dialogo che Platone ha intitolato al primo dei due, ove la fisionomia dei due sofisti è delineata con una serie di tratti che il passo del Sofista riecheggia con precisione." (p. 386)
(1) Una lista dei principali studiosi che hanno sostenuto questo riferimento è in G. Giannatoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (" Elenchos ", XVIII), Napoli 1990, I, pp. 369-70.
[*] A. Brancacci, 'Oikeios logos'. La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene ("Elenchos", XX), Napoli 1990.

10. Cambiano, Giuseppe. 1986. "Tecniche dossografiche in Platone." In Storiografia e dossografia neUa filosofia antica, edited by Cambiano, Giuseppe, 61-85. Torino: Tirrenia Stampatori.
11. Capra, Andrea. 2008. "La carne e il fantasma: il Sofista di Platone e l'ombra del filosofo." OT / Orbis Tertius. Ricerche sull'immaginario contemporaneo:39-46.
12. Carchia, Gianni. 1997. La favola dell'essere. Commento al Sofista. Maceratаa: Quodlibet.
Con il Sofista di Platone nella traduzione di Ermidio Martini.

Presentazione "Problemi e motivi de Il Sofista platonico sono all'origine di innumerevoli ricerche della filosofia contemporanea. Basti pensare, per rammentare il caso più celebre, all'esergo di Essere e tempo di Martin Heidegger. Spesso, però, quest'incontro si è realizzato attraverso una forzata attualizzazione del testo platonico, come provano soprattutto i trattamenti cui esso è stato sottoposto nelle indagini delle scuole filosofiche d'ispirazione analitica. Diversa è l'intenzione del presente commento. Esso non si propone, infatti, di interrogare e sollecitare Il Sofista, per rinchiuderlo nell'orizzonte dei problemi attuali della filosofia. Al contrario, esso vuole rimettersi all'ascolto del testo platonico, per prolungare innanzi tutto le sue stesse domande. In questa lettura, insomma, è Platone a interrogare la nostra attualità, mentre l'esegesi si pone come l'onda di risonanza del testo, ovvero, in termini figurativi, come una sua "icona". Il commento vorrebbe così rendere giustizia all'idea di filosofo che nutre il dialogo platonico, ponendo la sua differenza dal sofista. Per quest'idea, la filosofia è musica, pura voce accordata sull'essere, mero tramite del suo risuonare."

13. Casertano, Giovanni. 1999. "Il "veramente falso" in Platone." Atti dell'Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Nazionale di Scienze, Lettere e Arti in Napoli no. 90:33-47.
14. ———. 2004. "Il falso: un'esistenza che non esiste tra cose esistenti." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 23-38. Milano: Albo Versorio.
"Quello che qui vorrei mostrare è che (...) Platone costruisce il suo discorso sul difficile crinale della differenza tra una duplice discendenza da Parmenide: da un lato i sofisti, che su Parmenide fondano, sempre nell'interpretazione platonica, la loro negazione del falso basandosi sulla negazione del non essere; dall'altro Platone stesso, che, a sua volta "interpretando", su Parmenide fonda la netta distinzione tra verità e falsità, concedendo una realtà al non essere. Questa operazione, che esaminerò per quanto detto nel Sofista, è comunque condotta con la piena coscienza

della sua problematicità, che traluce anche nella stessa impostazione stilistica e linguistica del dialogo." (p. 25)
(...)
"Concludendo, l'orizzonte parmenideo, nella sua tesi centrale della coincidenza tra realtà e verità, qui nel Sofista, viene riaffermato ma non dimostrato, perché la differenza tra discorso vero e discorso falso non è
questione di differenza logica, od ontologica, ma etica, o politica. E Platone lo sa bene, ed anche in questo dialogo ci sono tutti gli indizi di questa sua consapevolezza: ma è discorso che qui non posso affrontare.
Ma quella che resta comunque, sempre, anche in questo dialogo, e non sullo sfondo, bensì rivendicata esplicitamente, è la centralità del logos e della dialettica, del discorso in quanto costitutivo della filosofia (260a) e dell'unica "scienza degli uomini liberi" (253c-d): la quale, se è vero che appartiene non genericamente al filosofo, ma "a colui che filosofa con purezza e giustizia" (253e), non può però procedere se non confutando, essendo la confutazione la massima delle purificazioni, tanto che chi non è stato mai confutato, fosse pure il Gran Re, non essendo purificato nelle cose più importanti, è privo di educazione e brutto nell'anima (230d-e)." (p. 37)

15. ———. 2009. "Verità e realtà nel Sofista e nel Parmenide platonici." In Gli Antichi e noi. Scritti in onore di Antonio Mario Battegazzore, edited by Lapini, Walter, Maluza, Luciano and Letterio, Mauro, 31-44. Genova: Glauco Brigati.
16. ———. 2019. "ΠΙΣΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ ed ΑΠΑΤΗΛΟΣ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΕΠΕΩΝ in Parmenide di Elea." In Venticinque studi sui preplatonici, 205-216. Pistoia: Petite plaisance.
17. ———. 2019. "Astrazione ed esperienza: Parmenide (e Protagora)." In Venticinque studi sui preplatonici, 217-236. Pistoia: Petite plaisance.
18. ———. 2019. "Noterelle parmenidee." In Venticinque studi sui preplatonici, 237-248. Pistoia: Petite plaisance.
19. ———. 2019. "Aristotele critico di Parmenide." In Venticinque studi sui preplatonici, 249-265. Pistoia: Petite plaisance.

20. Castelli, Laura Maria. 2007. "Note sulla nozione di δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν και πάσχειν in Soph. 247 D-E: alcuni spunti aristotelici " Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 28:415-434.
"In un discusso passo del Sofista (247 D-E) Platone fornisce una caratterizzazione di ciò che è in termini di δύναμις ποιεῖν και πάσχειν. Tale caratterizzazione sarà destinata (nonostante la sua oscurità
per gli interpreti del testo platonico) ad una straordinaria fortuna nella storia della filosofia attraverso l'idea che l'efficacia causale possa costituire un criterio di esistenza.(1) Le note qui proposte sulle espressioni che compaiono nella formulazione dello ὅρος di Soph. 247 D-E (δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν και πάσχεινna:crxnv) hanno lo scopo di riesaminare tale caratterizzazione nel suo
complesso, cercando di valutarne la possibile portata qualora la si intenda, se non come una conclusiva definizione dell'essere, per lo meno come espressione di un nucleo teorico non meramente provvisorio.
Alcuni passi dei Topici di Aristotele sembrano fornire materiale utile per la discussione." (p. 415)
(1) Cfr.J. Cargile, On "Alexander's dictum", «Topoi», XXII (2003) pp. 143-9.
21. Cattanei, Elisabetta. 2011. "Arithmos nel Teeteto, nel Sofista et nel Politico di Platone." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 59-71. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
22. Charles-Saget, Annick. 1988. "Un esempio di ermeneutica neoplatonica. Il Sofista-Demiurgo." In Questioni neoplatoniche, edited by Romano, Francesco and Tiné, Antonino, 27-44. Catania: CUECM.
23. Chiereghin, Franco. 1969. "La metodologia della storiografia filosofica di Platone nel Sofista." Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche. Rendiconti no. 24:205-223.
24. Chiurazzi, Gaetano. 2015. "Salvare le differenze. Sulla necessità del non-essere nel Sofista di Platone." Verifiche

no. 44:29-46.
Abstract: "La tesi centrale dell'articolo è che ci sia una relazione tra la definizione dell'essere come dynamis nel Sofista di Platone e la discussione coeva sulle grandezze incommensurabili, mostrando come alcuni degli argomenti che Platone usa per affermare l'insostenibilità della definizione quantitativa dell'essere (Uno, molti) sono riconducibili all'argomento sulla decomposizione del pari e del dispari con cui si dimostra l'irrazionalità della diagonale del quadrato. Come conseguenza, l'articolo cerca di mostrare che la definizione dell'essere come dynamis è necessaria al fine di "salvare le differenze", ovvero far sì che l'uno non sia uguale al due, come accade secondo Platone nelle tesi dei monisti e dei pluralisti, un collasso logico e ontologico che sarebbe anche conseguenza della negazione dell'irrazionalità della diagonale."

25. Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2002. "Aristotele critico spietato ma erede furtivo del Sofista di Platone." In Gigantomachia. Convergenze e divergenze tra Platone e Aristotele, edited by Migliori, Maurizio, 205-219. Brescia: Morcelliana.
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27. Crivelli, Paolo. 1990. "Il 'Sofista' di Platone. Non essere, negazione e falsità." Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria" no. 55:11-104.
"Introduzione. Dopo sei tentativi insoddisfacenti di definire il sofista con il metodo diairetico, nella settima classificazione dicotomica Platone lo descrive come 'produttore di immagini'. Tale caratterizzazione si scontra con le difficoltà sollevate dal 'paradosso del falso', l'argomentazione che cerca di provare l'inesistenza del falso. L'ampio excursus centrale del Sofista (236d5-264d9) affronta e risolve una delle versioni del paradosso del falso. Platone riconduce la fallacia dell'argomentazione a un'errata valutazione dei rapporti tra negazione ed esistenza, e corregge lo sbaglio mediante una minuziosa analisi del significato della particella 'non'.

La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista può essere presentata, a meno di qualche inessenziale semplificazione, come un'argomentazione che esclude la falsità degli enunciati singolari affermativi: perché un enunciato singolare affermativo sia falso, bisogna che ciò che non è P sia detto essere P ('P' termine generale arbitrario), e quindi bisogna parlare di ciò che non esiste; ma è impossibile parlare di ciò che non esiste; di conseguenza, un enunciato singolare affermativo non può essere falso. Il passaggio critico di questa argomentazione si fonda sull'assunzione che la negazione predicativa implichi l'inesistenza: se x non è P, allora x non esiste.
Platone ritiene (giustamente) che tale assunzione sia errata, e adotta la strategia di svelare, e quindi confutare, il ragionamento sofistico che sta a fondamento di essa. A suo avviso, tale ragionamento muove dal presupposto che la particella 'non' indichi contrarietà: dato che la copula ha portata esistenziale, la verità di un predicato nominale 'è P' rispetto a un oggetto x richiede (tra l'altro) l'esistenza di x; se il 'non' indica contrarietà, la verità rispetto a x del predicato nominale negativo 'non è P' richiede la soddisfazione di condizioni contrarie (ossia antitetiche, il più possibile lontane) rispetto a quelle che garantiscono la verità di 'è P', e quindi richiede (tra l'altro) l'inesistenza di x. Pertanto 'non è P' è vero solo di ciò che non esiste, e la negazione predicativa implica l'inesistenza.
Platone demolisce tale ragionamento attaccandone il presupposto: il 'non' non indica contrarietà, ma solo diversità. Più precisamente: la verità del predicato nominale negativo 'non è P' rispetto a un oggetto x richiede 'solo' che x sia diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti dei quali è vero il predicato nominale 'è P', ossia (poiché la predicazione ha portata esistenziale) che x sia diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti che esistono e partecipano della proprietà significata dal termine generale 'P'.
Ora, però, niente vieta che tra gli oggetti diversi da tutti quelli che esistono e partecipano della proprietà significata da 'P' ve ne siano di esistenti. Pertanto 'non è P' può essere vero anche di ciò che esiste, e la negazione predicativa non

implica l'inesistenza. L'assunzione sulla quale si fonda il paradosso del falso è confutata.
Platone non si limita a demolire il paradosso del falso, ma propone anche un'analisi della falsità degli enunciati singolari nella quale mette a frutto i risultati dello studio della negazione: 's è P' è falso quando s (l'oggetto del quale 's è P' parla) non è P, ossia quando s è diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti che esistono e partecipano della proprietà significata dal termine generale P.
La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista non dipende da uno scambio tra gli usi 'esistenziale' e 'predicativo' del verbo 'einai' ('essere'), ma da un errore nel modo d'intendere il 'non'. Ciò spiega perché la soluzione suggerita da Platone non si concentri sulla distinzione tra gli usi 'esistenziale' e 'predicativo' di 'einai' (un fatto, questo, che mette in crisi varie accreditate interpretazioni del dialogo): la distinzione tra gli usi di 'einai' non avrebbe colpito l'errore che sta alla radice del paradosso esaminato da Platone. Il problema logico più profondo studiato dal Sofista non riguarda i sensi o usi di 'einai', ma i rapporti fra negazione ed esistenza." (pp. 11-12)

28. D'Angelo, Antonello. 1993. "Sul Sofista di Platone." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 14:83-89.
29. De Cecco, Daniela. 1998. "Simile, uguale, identico. Brevi annotazioni intorno all'uso Platonico in Fedone, Parmenide e Sofista." Esercizi filosofici:211-221.
30. De Petris, Alfonso. 2005. Del vero e del falso nel Sofista di Platone. Con un saggio sul Cratilo. Firenze: Olschki.
"In aderenza al testo, si rivisita la speculazione platonica sul vero e sul falso.
Nel Cratilo, contro chi nega che il falso sia in quanto dice il non-essere, Socrate – posta la corrispondenza tra originale e copia, categorizzato che suoni e colori rinviano alle cose reali, essendo linguaggio e pittura imitazioni – correla il discorso all’essere delle cose, che in sé hanno sostanza, di per sé sono.
La scoperta dell’oggettività degli enti è anche alla base del Sofista: non più sul piano logico-glottologico ma su quello ontologico, nella ricerca di una dialettica risolutiva delle

aporie di una diairesi ad ambito formale. Superata la negazione parmenidea del non-essere,presupposta l'inoppugnabilità del non-essere, «in qualche modo» il falso è, perché partecipa del non-essere relativo. Platone estende al logos umano questa acquisizione teorica.
Postulato che ragionamento e opinione partecipano del non-essere relativo, dimostra che vero e falso ricorrono anche nel discorso: vero, se dice l'essere com'è; falso, se predica il diverso dall'essere. Si pongono i fondamenti dell'analisi logica quale intesa fino all'Ottocento. Si evidenzia la rilevanza filosofico-linguistica di un epocale studio scientifico della compiuta articolazione del discorso umano. Si delinea la figura del sofista: opinimitatore, che non sa, nella categoria della parvenza. In seconda rappresentazione, dalla copia egli riproduce ciò che «pare»."

31. Di Iulio, Erminia. 2020. "Á rebours: Dal Sofista a Parmenide. Platone tra «corrispondenza» e «identità»." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 112:111-125.
Abstract. "This paper aims to develop an answer to a twofold question: in the Sophist, what does the aporetic notion of falsehood amount to, from a theoretical point of view? And, consequently, how can be theoretically defined the concept of truth Plato is rejecting in order to provide a new account of truth (and falsehood)? The two questions are, in fact, deeply related. Thus, the strategy will be as follows: firstly, the Plato's «not-being as difference» account employed to solve the «ontological falsehood» puzzle will be recalled and its consequences examined; secondly, an analysis of the correspondence theory of truth Plato seems to endorse in the Sophist will be provided; finally, a suggestion concerning the theoretical nature of Eleatic account of truth – i.e. the account Plato is questioning – will be made."
32. Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2008. "Analisi nominale e analisi verbale nel Sofista di Platone." Giornale Critico di Filosofia Italiana no. 87:240-254.
33. Ferrari, Franco. 2011. "L'anima dell'essere. Sofista 248e-249a e Timeo 30c-31a." In Logon didonai. La filosofia come esercizio del rendere ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni

Casertano, edited by Palumbo, Lidia, 601-613. Napoli: Loffredo.
34. ———. 2019. "« Homologia » e dialettica in Platone." Antiquorum Philosophia no. 13:23-44.
Abstract: "According to the Republic (books VI and VII) and che Cratylus, homologia, in neither of its meanings - i.e. agreement on the one hand, and formal coherence and consistency on the other, - can be identified with philosophical knowledge (episteme), that is, with dialectic. The reason is that homologia represents a hypothetical procedure unable to reach an anhypothetical principle, and therefore to acquire certainty and truth. However, in Plato's dialogues there are numerous examples of homologia within philosophical and dialectical sections: in some cases it is fallacious homologia, which leads to unacceptable consequences (Parmenides); in other cases, instead, Plato seems to admit the existence of dialectical homologia, that its, of an agreement on a nonhypothetical principle (Sophist). Moreover, dialectic seems to display a degree of coherence superior to that of the other disciplines (i.e. mathematical sciences). The conclusion is that homologia (agreement and coherence) cannot be considered foreign to dialectic."
35. Ferro, Antonio. 2011. Il problema della predicazione tra antichi e moderni. Il Sofista platonico e la sua fortuna nella filosofia contemporanea. Bologna: CLUEB.
"In questa prima parte, la trattazione sarà prevalentemente diretta a una preparazione preliminare sullo state of the art nella letteratura contemporanea sul problema [della predicazione], che possa metterci in grado di valutare più accuratamente le ragioni dell'attacco davidsoniano all'autore del Sofista – il fatto che si tratti del caratteristico «uomo di paglia» non toglie che un esame della strategia di Davidson possa rivelarsi assai istruttivo." (p. 32)
(...)
"L'utilità di queste (lunghe) considerazioni preliminari dovrebbe risultare con chiarezza nel terzo capitolo, ragione per cui la lettura degli ultimi due capitoli, dotati di una certa autonomia, e senz'altro di maggiore interesse per gli

antichisti, può essere fatta precedere a quella del primo, in cui, a partire da una disamina delle posizioni di logici e filosofi del linguaggio contemporanei si cerca di sistematizzare i diversi requisiti per una buona teoria della predicazione.
Sono proprio questi requisiti a spiegare alcuni scrupoli teorici che informano la trattazione offerta nei capitoli finali: sulla scorta di un principio di carità interpretativa minimale, abbiamo preferito non attribuire a Platone tesi filosofiche sulla predicazione banalmente false, assurde, non sufficientemente generali, o particolarmente controverse agli occhi di un filosofo contemporaneo.
Questo non significa ovviamente che abbiamo proceduto a retrodatare al IV sec. a.C. sofisticate teorie contemporanee della predicazione: piuttosto, all'unico scopo di raggiungere il massimo grado di chiarezza, ci è parso legittimo e sensato proiettare sul dialogo – in particolare, su quei passi "linguistici" dell'opera che solleciterebbero l'attenzione anche di un filosofo moderno – requisiti di adeguatezza basilari e preoccupazioni teoriche anche più tarde, ferma restando la priorità assoluta per lo storico (cioè, per chi scrive) di leggere il dialogo privilegiando temi e problemi che sembrano suscitare l'interesse di Platone." (p. 32)

36. Franchi, Leonardo. 2020. "Considerazioni sulla presenza di Parmenide nel Sofista di Platone (Soph. 236 D-241 B)." La Cultura no. 58:177-195.
37. Friedländer, Paul. 2004. Platone. Milano: Bompiani. lntroduzione di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione, note e apparati di Andrea Le Moli.
Libro secondo, Capitolo XXVI: Sofista, pp. 975-1014.
"Sappiamo che il compito di chiarire il significato dello pseudos (la falsità, l'inganno, la menzogna) impegnò Platone sin dai suoi esordi come filosofo. Tale compito non è un interesse particolare derivato da un problema logico di difficile soluzione. Esso lo occupò perché (per parlare nel linguaggio concreto del Sofista) in questa oscurità e confusione si nasconde ogni sofistica e ogni eristica - tutto ciò, in altre parole, che è ostile alla filosofia e che, a causa della sua pericolosa somiglianza con quella, minaccia la

reputazione della filosofia e la vita del filosofo. Persino una delle prime opere platoniche, l'Ippia minore, si rivolge al problema dell'inganno, volontario e involontario, sofistico e socratico. In seguito, con il Cratilo, il linguaggio diviene strumento dell'illuminazione positiva. Già lì (Cratilo, 431 BC; cfr. 385 BC) il discorso è descritto come «composizione» [Zusammenstellung] di nome e verbo. Nel Sofista esso è !'«intreccio » dei due e questo cambiamento è più di una semplice differenza di espressione. (p.1012)

38. Fronterotta, Francesco. 1995. "L'essere e la partecipazione dei diversi nel Sofista di Platone." La Cultura no. 33:117-157.
39. ———. 2004. "Pensare la differenza. Statuto dell'essere e definizione del diverso nel Sofista di Platone." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 39-64. Milano: Albo Versorio. "È certamente vero che il Sofista affronta per la prima volta nel suo insieme il problema della partecipazione o della comunicazione fra i generi ideali, per fornirgli una soluzione che Platone sembra considerare in qualche modo definitiva. Abitualmente, si tende a dire che la soluzione del problema consiste nell'elaborazione del genere del diverso, come pure nell'elaborazione del genere del diverso consisterebbe la soluzione dell'altra grande aporia che il Sofista si propone di risolvere, quella relativa al non essere, alla sua pensabilità e alla sua dicibilità. In realtà, le cose non stanno propriamente così. Di per sé, l'elaborazione del genere del diverso, il diverso come tale, non risponde affatto né al problema della κοινωνία dei generi né al problemadel non essere, perché, di per sé, il diverso non coincide con il non essere (e non lo rende perciò pensabile e dicibile) né si pone come l'esclusiva chiave di volta per la comprensione della struttura e della composizione della κοινωνία dei generi. Non a caso, la lettura del testo indica chiaramente che la soluzione di questi due problemi risiede piuttosto in quella che lo Straniero di Elea, che conduce la discussione, individua come la totale "compenetrazione" di essere e diverso, per tre volte a breve distanza ribadita." (pp. 39-40 due note omesse)
(...)

"Ciò significa senza dubbio, a mio avviso, che una corretta comprensione dei fondamentali problemi affrontati nel Sofista, con la loro eventuale soluzione, dipende precisamente dai due termini, essere e diverso, di cui il dialogo afferma, argomenta e dimostra ripetutamente l'unione e la mescolanza.
Cercherò in quanto segue di presentare alcune riflessioni intorno allo statuto e alla definizione di questi due termini, lasciando invece da parte - se non per servirinene come occasionale punto di partenza dell'esame i delicati problemi del non essere e della κοινωνία dei generi cui essi sono chiamati a dare risposta nel Sofista." (p. 41)

40. ———. 2011. "Dialettica et διαίρεσις nel Sofista platonico." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 151-167. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
"Ci si deve forse rassegnare a riconoscere la complessità irriducibile del metodo e l'assenza di un obiettivo univoco e ben definito, perché, se la dialettica fornisce nella sua applicazione (1) la mappa, parziale o totale, delle relazioni fra i generi ideali, con il fine di far emergere quali generi comunichino e quali non comunichino con quali altri, disegnando così (2) la rete di significati di cui sono intessuti il pensiero e il discorso, e perciò in generale il sapere e il giudizio, potremo anche ricavare per questa via (3) il Λόγος definitorio relativo a ciascun genere e l'insieme di tali λόγοι avrà (4) un tratto indubbiamente classificatorio." (p. 167)

41. ———. 2015. "Il non essere e la strategia dello Straniero di Elea. Deduzione o rimozione." Rivista di Storia della Filosofia no. 70:143-162.
Abstract: "In this paper the Author examines the problem of not-being in Plato's Sophist. "Notbeing" is closely connected in Plato's Sophist with the notion of the "other" or "difference" since not-being can be understood as "not-being something", that is, as "different from" something. In fact, what "is not" beautiful, for example, is not only what is "contrary" to beautiful but also what is "different" from beautiful. Thus, the "other" introduces and explains the

notion of a relative “not-being” as “different” from what it is. The Author puts this idea at the center of the analysis in an attempt to verify its coherence and legitimacy and establish some connections with two contemporary thinkers, Meinong and Frege, who clearly depend on Plato’s reflections on this point."

42. ———. 2018. "“Movimento, vita, anima e intelligenza”, la σεμνότης del παντελῶς ὄν nel Sofista platonico. Nota a margine di P.-M. Morel, L’argomento delle “venerabilità dell’essere” e la sua fortuna." Antiquorum Philosophia no. 12:27-36.
Abstract: "In this note I discuss Pierre-Marie Morel's article L'argomento della 'venerabilità dell'essere' e la sua fortuna published in this same volume (see pp. 11-16) on Soph. 248e-249a, trying to develop his interpretation of this passage and the conception of being it implies. I also examine Morel's reconstruction of some steps of the exegetical history and reception of this passage in the history of Ancient Platonism, with reference to Aristotle and Plotinus."
43. ———. 2020. "Panteles zōion e pantelōs on: Vita, anima e movimento intellegibile nel Timeo (e nel Sofista)." In Plato’s Timaeus: Proceedings of the Tenth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Jorgenson, Chad, Karfík, Filip and Špinka, Štěpán, 49-69. Leiden: Birll.
Abstract. "In this article, I try to propose some reflections about the nature and status of the intelligible in the Timaeus, particularly with respect to its features of a properly being and above all vital reality. The attribution of “life” and “vitality” to the intelligible certainly has an analogical character, that is, it depends on the consideration of the sensible: since the cosmos is a sensible living being and is a copy of an intelligible model, then the intelligible model must be configured as an intelligible living being. Now, to be “living”, for a sensible reality, means to have a soul that animates a body, that is a soul which is embodied; but this seems to apply only in the case of the sensible. What does it mean, then, and what does it entail, to be “living” for an intelligible reality? Some interpretative hypotheses on

this point are examined here and a possible overall explanation is suggested."

44. Grimaudo, Sabrina. 2012. ""Un conflitto intestino e una malattia dell'anima" ΝΟΣΟΣ Ε ΣΤΑΣΙΣ nel Sofista di Platone (Soph. 228 A 7–8)." Philologus no. 156:3-16.
Abstract: "In Sophist 228a7–8 the reading of Plato's manuscripts διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν is defended on the basis of a reconsideration of the Galenic passages of De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (V 2, p. 302, 18–19 and V 3, p. 310, 26 De Lacy) usually advanced in order to maintain that it is corrupt and is to be changed into in διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν. The analysis of several other passages of the Platonic corpus concerning στάσις and νόσος, and the comparison with Plutarch's De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1041b, which shows a textual history very similar to the considered passage of Plato's Sophist, further support the reading in the manuscripts."

45. Grondona, Mauro. 1956. "La dialettica nel Sofista di Platone." Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino. 2, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche no. 91:261-319.

46. Guglielminetti, Enrico. 2012. "Gemelli diversi: Sulla 'piccola differenza' tra il sofista e il filosofo." Spazio Filosofico:115-124.
Abstract: "A little mystery is contained in the prologue to the Sophist. It is not completely clear why Plato mentions Homer. The Homeric quotations that are employed appear rather poorly chosen given that, while attempting to grasp the essence of the philosopher, to which they refer, they seem to bring it to a disquieting proximity with the essence of the sophist. More specifically, in the Republic Plato sharply criticizes Homer: "Then let no poet ... say that 'The gods, in the likeness of strangers from foreign lands,/ Adopt every sort of shape and visit our cities'" (Rep. 381d1-4). The same quotation, which comes from Odyssey 17, 485-486, is used in the prologue to the Sophist to define philosophers—not faked philosophers, but rather authentic ones. What has happened meanwhile? Has Plato changed his mind? Or is it the case of a different use of the same quotation? And, in

this hypothesis, why could the very same quotation apply equally well to the sophist (or the poet) as well as to the philosopher?"

47. Le Moli, Andrea. 2002. "Platone e l'essere in comune. Figure della relazione dal Sofista alle Leggi." Studium Philosophicum no. 1:89-106.
48. Lettieri, Gaetano. 1993. "L'esegesi neoplatonica dei generi sommi del Sofista: Plotino e Mario Vittorino." Annali di storia dell'esegesi no. 10:451-493.
49. Li Volsi, Rocco. 2002. "Il Sofista di Platone." Giornale di Metafisica no. 24:177-234.
50. Licata, Gaetano. 2002. "Il vero e il falso in Platone." Studium Philosophicum no. 1:107-128.
"Nel Cratilo, aprendo la confutazione del convenzionalismo proposto da Ermogene, Socrate domanda al proprio interlocutore: "Chiami qualcosa dire il vero e dire il falso (ἀληθῆ λἐγειν και` ψευδῆ)?" (385b 2) (1); esiste qualcosa il cui nome è "dire il vero" e qualcosa il cui nome è "dire il falso"?
Naturalmente il senso effettivo della domanda riguarda la differenza: in cosa consiste la differenza fra il discorso vero e il discorso falso? Risponde Ermogene: "il discorso vero è quello che dice le cose come stanno, il discorso falso è quello che dice le cose come non stanno" (385b 2-8) (2) La risposta platonica lega la verità dell'espressione linguistica alla relazione con la realtà, ma il modo in cui debba attuarsi tale relazione, come vedremo, è problema di non facile soluzione. In questa ricerca tenteremo di chiarire i rapporti fra le due diverse soluzioni - l'una nel Cratilo, l'altra nel Sofista - che Platone appronta per questo problema, al fine di determinare meglio il concetto platonico di Àoyor,, e per confrontare due atteggiamenti teorici nei confronti del problema della rappresentazione linguistica della realtà che ancora oggi si mescolano e si oppongono in semantica e in filosofia del linguaggio." (p. 107)
(1) L'edizione critica di riferimento utilizzata per i dialoghi di Platone è Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit J. Burnet, Oxford, 5 voll., 1900-1907.

Secondo Schofield l'argomento del vero e del falso (385 b2-d1) non può essere la confutazione della tesi di Ermogene, per cui andrebbe spostato e posto fra 387c 5 e 387c 6; M. Schofield, The Dénouement of the Cratylus, in Language and Logos: Studies Presented to G.E.L. Owen, edited by M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum, Cambridge 1982: PP· 61-81.
(2) A. Soulez rinviene nell'argomento del vero e del falso il punto iniziale dell'analisi platonica della contrapposizione fra i sostenitori della stabilità dell'essenza e quanti pensano al divenire come ad un flusso continuo che non permette né una
conoscenza stabile né una nominazione vera e propria: "L'important était de mettre d'abord en lumière que la distinction entre le vrai et le faux, sur laquelle sans le savoir Hermogène s appuie lorsqu'il prétend 'avoir raison' en matière de Justesse, présuppose que la dénomination est ontologiquement garantie. 'Dire vrai' est une chose et 'dire faux' en est une autre parce que le logos s'applique à de l'être stable." A. Soulez, La grammaire philosophique chez Platon, Paris 1991, pp. 52-3.

51. ———. 2002. "Nome e conoscenza in Platone." Studium Philosophicum no. 1:9-22.
"1. Nome e idea
In che modo, a parere di Platone, i nomi si riferiscono alle cose? In che modo, problema per Platone molto più importante, i nomi ci fanno, o ci farebbero conoscere le cose? La risposta a questi interrogativi, a nostro modo di vedere, è da ricercare nel Cratilo - nella sterminata confutazione di Ermogene e nella prima sezione della confutazione di Cratilo (384c 9-433 b 7) - , ma anche nella teoria della definizione delineata nel Sofista. I diversi punti di vista espressi da Platone sul concetto di nome devono essere sottoposti ad una considerazione che tenga conto dell'esigenza di dare unità e coerenza alla spiccata complessità concettuale dell'idea platonica di òνομα; questo perché, all'epoca in cui scrisse le Leggi, quasi sicuramente l'ultimo fra i dialoghi(1), il filosofo aveva in mente un concetto sufficientemente determinato, e sufficientemente unitario, di nome. Il nostro tentativo, è bene puntualizzarlo

fin d'ora, non ci darà, pronta per l'uso, l'essenza del nome: la ricerca dell'essenza infatti non ha termine. Dal momento però che è stata nominata diciamo subito che, in Platone, la ricerca dell'essenza è molto vicina alla ricerca del nome: il nome e l'essenza, nella loro vicinanza, rimandano ad una irraggiungibilità che è stata intesa come segretezza; come se il nome rivelasse l'essenza con lo stesso movimento col quale la mantiene segreta." (p. 9, una nota omessa)
(1) Cfr. L. Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues, Cambridge 1990.

52. Lo Casto, Claudia. 2019. L'essere come dynamis. Heidegger interprete del Sofista di Platone attraverso Aristotele. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.
53. Maggi, Claudia. 2017. "Il 'qualcosa' in Soph. 237c e in Enn. VI 6." In Platone nel pensiero moderno e contemporaneo, edited by Muni, Andrea, 17-28.
"IL TI E L' ΌN IN SOPH. 237C. Obiettivo di questa nota sarà, a partire da una proposta di lettura relativa a una breve sezione del Sofista, sondare la ridefinizione semantica del τι e dell'ὅν nel trattato plotiniano Sui numeri. La mia indagine esula, ovviamente, da una più vasta considerazione del dominio dei due termini nella riflessione dei due filosofi; intendo, più semplicemente, provare a verificare come la costellazione lessicale che gravita attorno all'ὅν possa mutare nel momento in cui si ammetta, con Plotino, che la sua natura intrinsecamente molteplice rinvia a una unità originaria che la fonda e la precede metaontologicamente." (p. 17)
54. Magri, Elisa. 2015. "Holon e Heteron. Osservazioni per un collegamento fra il Teeteto e il Sofista." Journal of Ancient Philosophy no. 9:34-66.
Abstract "It is noteworthy that both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist Plato aporetically introduces the notion of holon. The author argues that it is possible to outline a connection between the two dialogues by focusing on the methodological relevance of holon and heteron. Several hints contained in the Theaetetus suggest that Plato conceives of holon as a method of dialectical thinking, underlying the process of soul's reasoning. The Theaetetus

presents this notion ex negativo due to the lack of distinction between difference (heteron) and negation (not being). By contrast, the Sophist shows that heteron is the read thread guiding the dialectics of forms as well as the communication between the soul and the eidetic sphere. Accordingly, the Sophist entails that the process of soul's reasoning is correlative to the eidetic horizon in so far as they both rely on a holistic methodology that is activated by the quest for the difference."

55. Marrucci, Elia. 2020. "Filiera tessile e dialettica conoscenza tecnica ed impieghi analogici nella seconda tetralogia platonica." Dialogues d' histoire ancienne no. 46:105-121. Abstract: "Nel presente contributo ho intenzione di mostrare la continuità tra l'impiego paradigmatico della filiera tessile nel Sofista e nel Cratilo e l'impiego che Platone ne fa nel Politico. Nella prima parte di questo contributo evidenzierò la perfetta conoscenza da parte di Platone delle singole procedure in cui si articola la filiera e la sua diffusa presenza all'interno del corpus. Nella seconda parte, attraverso l'analisi e l'intreccio di passi provenienti da Cratilo, Teeteto, Sofista e Politico, tenterò di dimostrare l'esistenza nella seconda tetralogia di un filo rosso legato all'impiego paradigmatico della filiera tessile e necessario all'illustrazione della natura e dei campi applicazione dell'arte dialettica. In conclusione di contributo tenterò di dimostrare come la scelta della filiera tessile come paradigma del metodo dialettico da parte di Platone dipenda dalla cosciente ripresa da parte del filosofo di un arcaico paradigma tecnico-artigianale della produzione poetica, in linea con le intenzioni didascaliche della sua riflessione filosofico-politica."
56. Meo, Oscar. 2016. "Lo statuto ontologico dell'immagine in Platone." In In cammino verso la casa della sapienza, edited by Ross, Paolo Aldo and Li Vigni, Ida, 161-191. Aicurzio: Gruppo Editoriale Castel Negrino.
"L'indagine di Platone intorno allo statuto ontologico dell'immagine è poliprospettica. Nei testi fondamentali per lo studio della questione, la prima parte del Libro X della Repubblica (ma, come si vedrà, un rilievo non marginale lo

hanno anche la fine del Libro VI e l'inizio del VII) e il Sofista1, alcune fra le maggiori difficoltà si incontrano sul piano dell'approccio semasiologico, giacché egli utilizza per designare l'immagine diversi termini, che si alternano e si sovrappongono semanticamente nella prima opera, mentre – sia pure con qualche oscillazione – appaiono abbastanza differenziati nella seconda: eikón, eídolon e phántasma." (p. 161, a nota omessa)

57. Migliori, Maurizio. 1999. "Verso il Filosofo: dialettica e ontologia nel Sofista Platone." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 91:171-204.
"Dovendo affrontare un tema così vasto e un dialogo tanto complesso, vorremmo limitarci a svolgere la nostra analisi sulla base di tre domande:
a) perché proprio nel Sofista troviamo questa specifica trattazione sull'essere?
b) ci sono altre trattazioni analoghe a questa?
c) che cosa Platone pensava dell'essere?
A tali domande cercheremo di rispondere sulla base di tre riflessioni:
1. il senso della collocazione del Sofista; crediamo infatti che l'Autore ci abbia offerto una vera e propria indicazione di lettura, che brilla per la sua 'unicità'; seguendola, è possibile comprendere meglio la specificatrattazione del dialogo e la stessa struttura dell'opera;
2. l'indicazione dialettica che in questo quadro emerge; infatti, non solo lo stesso inserimento del dialogo nel contesto delle altre opere obbedisce a uno schema diairetico, ma la dialettica è, a un tempo, un tema da sviluppare e lo strumento per chiarire gli argomenti affrontati in questo blocco di dialoghi;
3. la metafisica che emerge dalla trattazione centrale dell'opera; crediamo infatti che occorra mostrare il peso, in verità molto relativo, che Platone attribuisce alla tematica dell'essere e del non essere. (pp. 171-172, note omesse)

58. ———. 2004. "Non è l'ontologia il vero cuore del Parmenide e del Sofista." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 65-94. Milano: Albo Versorio.

"Premetto subito due chiarimenti: a) uso il termine "ontologia" nel suo senso pregnante, come teoria dell'essere; b) questo articolo, come indica il titolo, indaga il "cuore teoretico" dei due dialoghi, cioè la questione centrale sul piano della concezione della filosofia e della visione del reale che Platone propone." (p. 65)
(...)
"La domanda che propongo è quindi se ci sia in Platone, e in particolare in questi due dialoghi, una centralità dell'ontologia o se questo appaia in tanta letteratura secondaria come frutto di una sorta di fenomeno proiettivo. Per tentare di dimostrare tale assunto, devo necessariamente cercare di rispondere in modo adeguato a due domande:
Quali sono i passi di Platone che giustificano la mia affermazione?
Qual è allora il centro teoretico dei due dialoghi in questione?" (p. 65)

59. ———. 2007. Il Sofista di Platone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia. Brescia: Morcelliana.
"Due sono stati negli ultimi decenni i modelli interpretativi della filosofia platonica: un modello, ispirato a Schleiermacher, ha privilegiato l'interpretazione cronologica dei dialoghi, l'altro, proprio delle scuole di Tubinga e Milano, ha reinterpretato tutto Platone alla luce delle «dottrine non scritte». Come per sottrarsi a unilateralità ermeneutiche, l'autore di questo volume legge «il corpus platonico come un vero e proprio "protrettico" che propone filosofia per costringere il lettore a trovare soluzioni sulla base di poche indicazioni, il che implica la proposta di difficoltà crescenti che via via nello svolgimento delle opere selezionano i "veri filosofi". Platone appare convinto socraticamente che la filosofia è lavoro comune e scoperta. Ciò dà luogo a un insegnamento che, sempre, ma soprattutto nella forma scritta, avvicina al vero senza rivelarlo, comunica informazioni vere che non sono tout court la verità, ma che richiedono la partecipazione, l'elaborazione e lo sviluppo da parte del lettore». Un modello messo qui alla prova nella disamina del Sofista: ad

assumere inaspettati significati sono i suoi punti più controversi (la dialettica come esercizio diairetico, il parricidio di Parmenide, la scoperta del non-essere in quanto "diverso")."

60. Mignucci, Mario. 1989. "Esistenza e verità nel Sofista di Platone." Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli no. 100:267-281.
61. Morel, Pierre Marie. 2018. "L'argomento delle "venerabilità dell' essere" e la sua fortuna (Aristotele e Plotino, eredi di Platone, Sofista, 248c-249a)." Antiquorum Philosophia no. 12:11-26.
Abstract: "In a famous passage of Plato's Sophist (248e-249a), The Stranger addresses the question of the activity of the perfect being: is it deprived from change, life, soul and understanding? Does it stand immutable, holy and solemn (semnos), devoid of intellect? There is an issue about whether this text is to be taken seriously. The present article analyses how this passage (and especially the word semnos) has been read after Plato, mainly by Plotinus but also by Aristotle (and hypothetically by Epicurus). In particular, it is argued that, despite is obscurity, the idea of solemnity plays a major role in Plotinus, but with different purposes, depending on the context, and in an ambiguous way. Generally speaking, the legacy of Plato's passage is much more a question (is it possible to deprive that which is perfectly real from activity?) or even an aporia than a positive claim regarding the properties of being. This is probably the best way to read the passage, and to take it seriously."
62. Movia, Giancarlo. 1985. "il Sofista di Platone: dal problema dell'essere al principio teologico." In Sapienza antica: studi in onore di Domenico Pesce 192-216. Milano: Franco Angeli.
63. ———. 1988. "La diairesi nel Sofista." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 80:501-548.
64. ———. 1991. Apparenze essere e verità: commentario storico-filosofico al Sofista di Platone. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
"L'adesione convinta al nuovo paradigma ermeneutico degli scritti di Platone [*] non mi è servita da comoda scorciatoia

per evitare la serie infinita di problemi che, come tutti sanno, un qualunque dialogo platonico suscita (specialmente se si tratta di un dialogo "sistematico" o, se preferiamo dir così, "critico-dialettico"). Piuttosto, il nuovo paradigma mi ha offerto un quadro unitario di riferimento entro cui collocare le varie dimensioni teoriche che percorrono il testo. In realtà, è il testo stesso, almeno in un punto davvero cruciale, che subordina la dottrina metafisico-ontologica dei generi sommi alla dottrina metafisico-protologica dei principi. Né l'Essere né l'Identico sono l'Uno, ma partecipano dell'Uno, e, analogamente (si dovrebbe dire), né il Non-Essere né il Diverso sono essi stessi la Diade indefinita, il principio di molteplicità, ma rappresentano soltanto alcune delle sue prime "concretizzazioni" ideali.
In questa visuale interpretativa, la lettura del Sofista richiede, per così dire, un'attenzione e un impegno bivalente: uno negativo ed uno positivo. Per un verso, bisogna rinunciare a privilegiare il nostro dialogo, e in particolare l'excursus ontologico sui generi sommi, quasi fosse il depositario della dialettica globale e della verità filosofica integrale di Platone.
(Per parte sua, come sappiamo, Hegel, probabilmente anche a motivo di un "incidente" filologico, [**] giungerà a porre il Sofista, col Filebo, addirittura al di sopra del Parmenide, nella misura in cui, come egli crede, il nostro dialogo tematizza esplicitamente l'unità dialettica degli opposti). Per un altro verso, bisogna minuziosamente esplorarlo in ogni sua piega più riposta, per evidenziare tutti i suoi (notevolissimi) contributi teorici.
In ogni caso, la lettura qui proposta àncora saldamente allo spessore metafisico della dottrina delle idee (e dei principi) i vari tipi di approccio al testo che sono stati effettuati e ai quali ho cercato di prestare la massima attenzione critica possibile. Mi riferisco, in particolare, all'approccio dialettico-epistemologico, incentrato sul problema della diairesi e delle tecniche e sulla componente etico-politico-retorica del dialogo, nonché all'approccio logico-linguistico, con le connesse interpretazioni intensionali ed estensionali

della dottrina delle idee da un lato, e le analisi della funzione sintattica e del contenuto semantico dei "nomi" associati ai sommi generi dall'altro." (pp. 31-32)
[* Il "nuovo paradigma ermeneutico" è quello della scuola di Tubinga-Milano (Krämer, Gaiser, Reale, Szlezák)]
[** Berti documenta anche che il tentativo di Hegel (cfr. Lezioni di Storia della filosofia, trad. di E. Codignola e G. Sanna, II, Firenze 1964, pp. 220 ss.) di ridurre l'elenchos platonico alla contraddizione dialettica dipende da un errore di traduzione di 259 D I s. (rilevato, peraltro, già da Campbell, L. Campbell, [in The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a Revised Text and English Notes by L. C., Oxford 1867 (rist. 1973)], pp. LXXXIX e 166) e risalente a Marsilio Ficino.] (p. 421)
Il riferimento ad Enrico Berti è: "Hegel la ritrova [la dialettica] nel Sofista, dove non ci sono più le complicazioni del Parmenide, cioè lo sviluppo di ipotesi opposte, ma c'è anzi, secondo Hegel, l'affermazione diretta dell'identità di essere e non essere, anzi addirittura di identico e diverso. Naturalmente questa interpretazione è possibile solo al prezzo di ignorare le reiterate affermazioni, da parte di Platone, del p.d.n.c. [principio di non-contraddizione], ed al prezzo di un almeno apparente errore di traduzione, dovuto probabilmente all'influenza del neoplatonico Marsilio Ficino, grazie al quale si fa dire a Platone che ciascuna cosa è insieme identica e diversa « sotto il medesimo riguardo», mentre Platone dice esattamente l'opposto.(80)"
(80) G. W. F. Hegel, Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, trad. di E. Codignola e G. Sona, Firenze 1964 2 edizione, II, pp. 220-223. Su ciò abbiamo già richiamato l'attenzione nel capitolo su Platone (v. sopra, p. 98). Va detto, in ogni caso, che il testo di Michelet [delle Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia] su cui si basa la traduzione non è attendibile, perciò non si può imputare l'errore senz'altro a Hegel.

65. ———. 1991. Il "Sofista" e le dottrine non scritte di Platone. Napoli: Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa.
Ristampato in: Giovanni Reale (a cura di), Verso una nuova immagine di Platone, Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1994, pp. 225-249.

66. Napolitano, Linda M. 1979. "Caratteri e significato della dialettica nel Sofista platonico." Verifiche no. 8:365-394.
67. ———. 2011. "Teodoro, Teeteto, Socrate il Giovane. I matematici deuteragonisti nei Teeteto, Sofista e Politico." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 72-83. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Abstract: "Sono note le figure storiche dei matematici – appunto Teodoro, Teeteto e Socrate il Giovane - deuteragonisti nei dialoghi indicati: si può perciò, per tale aspetto, riferirsi alla letteratura classica relativa (fra gli altri E. Sachs, Th. Heath). Accogliendo però la recente ipotesi ermeneutica di E. Ostenfeld, che tutti i personaggi dei dialoghi in qualche modo e misura "parlino per Platone", è interessante e utile esaminare il ruolo filosofico problematico ivi svolto da tali matematici. Va chiarita anzitutto la ragione per cui proprio costoro siano, volta a volta e in modo certo disomogeneo, interlocutori adeguati rispettivamente di Socrate e dello Straniero per il problema centrale discusso nelle tre opere e se tale ragione resti poi costante, per ognuno di tali personaggi, da una all'altra di esse. Vanno approfondite in particolare le ragioni del lusinghiero giudizio pronunciato – nel Teeteto e nel Sofista - sul giovane matematico ateniese (che farebbe, seppur nella bruttezza, da "specchio" allo stesso Socrate e che è simile, per alcune doti ascrittegli, perfino al filosofo-re della Repubblica); va chiarito il senso filosofico del suo allenamento a "raccogliere in uno" e a "bipartire" poi i materiali aritmetico-geometrici, procedura che lo avvicina alle pratiche dialettiche della sunagoghè e della diàiresis; va discusso il motivo per cui, nel primo dialogo, proprio lui discuta con Socrate una teoria dell'àisthesis di stampo protagoreo più adeguata forse, storicamente, al suo maestro, il cireneo Teodoro. Va delineato il compito specifico anche di tale autorevole figura nel Teeteto (capacità di giudicare la virtù e saggezza delle anime) e nel Sofista e quello di Socrate il Giovane, solo citato nei primi due dialoghi e chiamato invece, nel Politico, a sostituire

Teeteto quale deuteragonista. Sempre tenendo presente ed evitando di banalizzare e forzare gli specifici contesti drammatici dei tre testi, va indagato infine se siano i loro contenuti filosofici complessi (la conoscenza e i limiti del relativismo, il falso e il non essere, la figura del politico) o piuttosto il metodo dialettico ormai maturo in essi impiegato a legittimare o forse perfino ad esigere dei matematici quali interlocutori di un Socrate ormai vecchio, al quale però già nel secondo dialogo subentra, quale protagonista, un significativo e non meno problematico Straniero di Elea."

68. Napolitano Valditara, Linda M. 2007. Platone e le 'ragioni' dell'immagine. Percorsi filosofici e deviazioni tra metafore e miti. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
    Capitolo 4: pp. 137-211.
69. O'Brien, Denis. 1992. "Il non-essere e la diversità nel Sofista di Platone." Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli no. 102:271-328.
    Versione francese in: D. O'Brien: Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon, pp. 43-165.
    "Platone [nel Sofista] non intende confutare Parmenide: questa tesi sembrerà, sulle prime, paradossale ed anche un po' assurda. All'inizio della sua analisi del non essere (237 A), lo Straniero di Elea non ha forse citato dei versi in cui Parmenide condanna il non essere (nostro fr. 7 .1-2), e alla fine della sua analisi (258 D) non ha forse citato una seconda volta gli stessi versi, e affermato al tempo stesso (258 C6-10) di essersi « molto allontanato » dalla condanna pronunciata da Parmenide? Come dunque, esprimendosi in questo modo, egli non avrebbe confutato l'insegnamento espresso nei versi citati?
    Notiamo tuttavia che nelle due pagine che seguono la prima citazione di Parmenide (237 B7-239 C8), Teeteto e lo Straniero convengono sul fatto che, conformemente alla dottrina enunciata nei versi appena citati, non si può concepire « ciò che non è in nessun modo » (το᾽ μηδαμῶς ὂν , 237 B7-8), il « non essere in se stesso » (το᾽μη᾽ὂν αὑτο᾽ καθαὑτό, 238 C9). Se lo Straniero ritenesse di aver « confutato » Parmenide, ci si dovrebbe aspettare di trovare in

qualche luogo, nello svolgersi del dialogo (239 C9 sgg.), una ritrattazione - da parte dello Straniero e di Teeteto - della condanna di questo non essere per così dire « assoluto ». Ora, una simile ritrattazione non si trova in nessuna parte del dialogo; tutt'al più si troverà, nelle linee che seguono la seconda citazione dal poema parmenideo, una distinzione: lo Straniero afferma di aver dimostrato l'esistenza di una « forma» del non essere (258 D5-E3), ma afferma anche, nella stessa pagina (258 E6-259 Al), che non « osa» minimamente parlare di un non essere che sarebbe il contrario dell'essere.
Ci si domanda allora: di questi due « non esseri » qual è quello condannato da Parmenide? È quello che lo Straniero chiamerà la « forma » del non essere? O quello che chiamerà il contrario dell'essere?" (p. 272)

70. ———. 2005. "La forma del non essere nel Sofista di Platone." In Eidos - Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, edited by Fronterotta, Francesco and Leszl, Walter, 115-159. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
"«Una forma che è, di ciò che non è». La definizione platonica del non essere (Soph. 258d6-7) è volutamente paradossale. Ma ciò che si trova nella maggior parte delle storie della filosofia greca non è un paradosso, ma un pasticcio che rasenta la sciocchezza. E questo perché la presentazione che gli storici moderni forniscono della forma platonica del non essere è basata su una serie di errori.
H lungo e complesso argomento che conduce alla definizione di una forma del non essere nel Sofista platonico si conclude, nella maggior parte delle edizioni moderne del dialogo (258e2-3), con una sequenza di parole che non si trova in nessuno dei nostri manoscritti. Anche nel primo volume rivisto delle opere di Platone, recentemente pubblicato presso Clarendon Press a Oxford, si trova stampato, al posto delle parole unanimemente riportate dai nostri tre migliori e più antichi manoscritti, una lezione che è data soltanto da Simplicio nella seconda di due citazioni di questa parte del Sofista contenute nel suo commento alla Fìsica di Aristotele. La definizione di una forma del non essere, così come appare nella seconda delle due citazioni di

Simplicio, non è di per sé priva di senso, ma appare completamente fuori luogo nel contesto del dialogo platonico. E questo perché la sequenza di parole che Simplicio riporta qui come tratte dal Sofista è stata chiaramente adattata in modo tale da rendere la definizione platonica del non essere compatibile con la ben diversa concezione del non essere avanzata da Plotino nelle Enneadi (1).

Ma questo è soltanto uno degli errori. Il portavoce nel dialogo di Platone è uno Straniero di Elea. Quando si propone inizialmente di indagare la natura di 'ciò che non è', lo Straniero deve confrontarsi con la spiegazione del non essere fornita oltre cento anni prima in un poema in cui Parmenide, anch'egli di Elea, affermava di riportare le parole di una dea situata oltre le porte della Notte e del Giorno. Al principio della sua analisi del non essere, lo Straniero di Platone cita dal poema di Parmenide le parole: «le cose che non sono, sono» (237a8). Grazie a lunghe citazioni di Simplicio dal poema originale di Parmenide, sappiamo che, nel loro contesto (fr. 7.1), quelle parole intendevano fornire il contraddittorio resoconto di ciò che la dea afferma essere il mondo illusorio del movimento e della pluralità che noi 'mortali' crediamo di vedere e di sentire intorno a noi. Lo Straniero del dialogo platonico ci dice che quelle stesse parole, soltanto al singolare (237a3-4: «ciò che non è, è»), costituiscono «ciò che Parmenide ἀπεμαρτύρατο». Se si cerca il verbo ἀπεμαρτύρομαι nel Greek English Lexicon, pubblicato a Oxford in successive edizioni per ben oltre un secolo e mezzo, si trova che il significato indicato, con specifico riferimento al nostro passo del Sofista, è 'asserire risolutamente'(2)

L'affermazione dello Straniero, allora, deve essere che Parmenide «asseriva risolutamente» che «ciò che non è, è». Ma nel contesto del poema parmenideo il senso che il termine deve avere è esattamente l'opposto. La dea del poema parmenideo nega che le cose che non sono, siano. Il senso del verbo nel dialogo di Platone non è dunque 'asserire risolutamente', ma 'negare recisamente'.

Gli errori che caratterizzano la lettura del dialogo platonico sono piuttosto seri. Ancor più disastrosi sono gli errori che insidiano la moderna comprensione di ciò che Parmenide intendeva nel poema che Platone ha posto come punto di partenza della propria analisi. I commentatori attribuiscono comunemente alla dea di Parmenide, al principio del suo argomento (fr. 2), due proposizioni: 'l'essere è' e 'l'essere non è'. Talvolta, essi modificano la seconda proposizione, in modo che a essere negato è il soggetto e non il verbo. Le due proposizioni sono in tal caso: 'l'essere è' e 'il non essere è'(3). La variazione è abbastanza straordinaria. Come è possibile che studiosi diversi diano due significati così differenti ('l'essere non è', 'il non essere è') alle stesse parole greche? Ma ciò che appare ancor più straordinario è che entrambe le traduzioni sono false. La dea, al principio del suo argomento, non dice che 'l'essere non è' (∃~x, dove x è l'essere) né che 'il non essere è' (∃~x) e neanche dice che 'l'essere è' (∃x). Ognuna di queste traduzioni è falsa. Peggio ancora, queste false traduzioni impediscono di comprendere come lo Straniero di Elea, nel Sofista di Platone, possa trovarsi sia in accordo sia in disaccordo con Parmenide. Esse impediscono dunque di comprendere come lo Straniero giunga infine alla definizione paradossale di una «forma che è, di ciò che non è»." (pp. 115-116)
(1) Si veda in proposito infra, § 5.
(2) Cf. Liddell & Scott, 1996, s.v. (p. 209). La prima edizione di questa opera fu pubblicata a Oxford (University Press) nel 1843.
(3) Per gli opportuni riferimenti si veda infra § 1.

71. Palumbo, Lidia. 1990. "Sulla nozione di phántasma nel Sofista platonico." Atti della Accademi a di Scienze morali e politiche della Società nazionale di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti di Napoli no. 101:23-42.
72. ———. 1994. Il non essere e l'apparenza. Sul Sofista di Platone. Napoli: Loffredo Editore.
"In questa prospettiva tenteremo di dimostrare che la " questione tecnica", intorno alla quale ruota l'intera opera, è la distinzione tra originale e immagine, che su questa distinzione vengono per così dire ricalcate le distinzioni tra

essere e non essere, tra realtà e apparenza, tra discorso vero e discorso falso, dunque tra filosofo e sofista. Proveremo a mostrare come, guardando all'intero dialogo come al "luogo " platonico ove si affronta il problema della definizione dell'apparenza, tutti i passi dell'opera si rivelino profondamente collegati in un'unica tensione speculativa che attraversa orizzontalmente il testo dal principio alla fine e ne costituisce la dialettica interna.
Il punto chiave della nostra lettura del Sofista, che ci permetterà di interpretare alcuni passi del dialogo, non ultimo quello del famoso "parricidio", in una nuova luce, è proprio la nozione di μη` ὄν, che la critica è orientata ad identificare con ον ἑτερον. Noi non accettiamo questa identificazione tra il «non essere» ·e il «diverso», perché riteniamo che in 258d5-e3 Platone stabilisca tra il genos ἑτερον e l' eidos μη` ὄν un rapporto di tutto a parte: la natura del non essere non si identifica con la natura del diverso, ma con «quella parte di essa che è contrapposta all'essere di ciascun ente».
Non si tratta, come vedremo, di una questione marginale: la comprensione del tipo di relazione che intercorre tra la natura del non essere e la natura del diverso - per cui il non essere è una parte del diverso, e precisamente quella parte che è contrapposta all'essere di ogni ente - è di fondamentale importanza per la comprensione della definizione platonica dell'apparenza che, come dicevamo sopra, impegna il filosofo per l'intero dialogo.
Noi tenteremo di dimostrare che il non essere rappresenta per Platone proprio tale dimensione dell'apparire, che il discorso falso, per la sua "comunicazione" con il non essere, è propriamente un discorso apparente, esattamente nello stesso senso in cui il sofista, a causa del suo "commercio" con το` μη` ὄν, è un non filosofo, una falsa immagine di filosofo, un filosofo soltanto in apparenza.
Il "luogo testuale" in cui, a nostro avviso, Platone pone le basi ontologiche della identificazione tra l'idea del non essere e la specie dell'apparire, è propriamente quello della discussione sulla κοινοια τῶν γενῶν , ma noi tenteremo di dimostrare che i termini del problema - che troverà una

soluzione appunto solo in quella discussione - vengono posti fin dalle prime pagine del dialogo e si ritrovano nelle ultime battute dell'opera, quando viene data la settima definizione del sofista, cosicché esso appare essere non uno tra gli argomenti dibattuti, ma l'argomento dell'intero lavoro, quello alla cui corretta impostazione e soluzione concorrono tutti gli altri." (pp. 21-22, note omesse).

73. ———. 1994. "Su alcuni problemi (e alcune soluzioni) relativi al Sofista di Platone." Bollettino della Società Filosofica Italiana no. 152:5-14.

74. ———. 1995. "Realtà ed apparenza nel Sofista e nel Politico." In Reading the Statesman, Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum, edited by Rowe, Christopher J., 175-183. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
"Quanto ci proponiamo di dimostrare, facendo perno su alcuni passi del Sofista e del Politico (come è noto questi due dialoghi nella finzione drammatica presentano lo sviluppo di una discussione che è cominciata nel Teeteto), è che uno dei problemi di fondo della speculazione platonica di questo periodo, quello di individuare i fondamenti ontologici del falso; viene affrontato dal filosofo passando attraverso la questione del non essere inteso non come semplice differenza, ma come apparenza.
Proprio all'inizio della sezione aporetica del Sofista, quando, dopo alcuni tentativi di definire l'oggetto della ricerca - appunto il sofista - ci si è imbattuti nell'ipotesi che questi altro non sia che 'una specie di stregone, un imitatore delle cose che sono (ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστί τις, μιμητη`ς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, 235 a 1), 'un rappresentante del genere degli illusionisti' (235 b 5), nell'ipotesi che la più corretta denominazione dell'arte sofistica sia quella che la presenta come τέχνη φανταστική, 'arte di produzione delle apparenze' (cfr. 236 c 4), lo Straniero ha annunciato a Teeteto: 'Beato ragazzo, è realmente un ambito di ricerca estremamente difficile quello in cui siamo. Infatti, che una cosa appaia e sembri, ma non sia il dire qualcosa, ma che non sia vero, tutto ciò è pieno di difficoltà sempre, tanto in passato quanto ora. In che modo si debba parlare per dire di opinare che il falso è realmente, e senza che questa

asserzione comporti una contraddizione, è una cosa assolutamente difficile da mostrare' (236 d 9 - e 6).
La difficoltà dell'indagine - chiarisce lo Straniero in questo luogo del Sofista - è tutta nella 'audacia di porre come ipotesi che il non essere sia; in nessun altro modo, infatti, il falso potrebbe venire ad essere' (237 a 3-4)." (p. 175)

75. ———. 2002. "Hegel interprete del Sofista nelle Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia." In Hegel e Platone, edited by Movia, Giancarlo, 225-249. Cagliari: Edizioni AV.
76. ———. 2018. "La nozione di immagine in Platone, Soph. 240." In ὁδοι` νοῆσαι – Ways to think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero, edited by Spangengerg, Pilar and Pulpito, Massimo, 395-402. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.
Abstract: "Questo contributo è un commentario della lettura di Cordero di Platone, Sofista 240. Nel dialogo lo Straniero si meraviglia dell'esistenza del non essere.
La parola chiave dell'argomento è eidolon (immagine). L'esistenza dell'immagine, infatti, comporta l'esistenza del non essere, perché l'immagine è μη` ἀληθινο`ν, ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς (240b5). L'immagine è qualcosa di non vero, di contrario del vero. L'immagine dovrebbe non esistere, eppure essa esiste.
Questa sezione del dialogo è molto aporetica: sebbene molti studiosi ne hanno modificato il testo, Cordero difende la lettura dei manoscritti."
77. ———. 2021. "Mimêsis teorizzata e mimêsis realizzata nel Sofista platonico." In Platonic Mimesis Revisited, edited by Julia, Pfefferkorn and Spinelli, Antonino, 193-210. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Abstract: ""This paper aims at discussing Platonic examples of mimesis in the Sophist, by trying to identify the mimetic figures that show to the reader, in a vivid way, what the characters of the dialogue abstractly theorize. All Platonic dialogues are mirnetic, but the Sophist is a privileged point of observation of their "mimeticity" because in the Sophist one of the characters explains what mimesis is, how it works. In addition. such a character does not simply explain this abstractly, but puts mimetic figures in front of the eyes of his interlocutor, just as Plato does with his reader. The

question of difference is linked to that of mimesis and plays a crucial role in the Sophist. This question. too, is not only discussed at length but is also presented in front of the eyes of the reader !hanks to the figure of the Eleatic Stranger who embodies the difference and makes it visible, just as the Sophist makes visible the misleading nature of not-being. This dialogue, with the aporiai of diairesis, stages the difficulty of drawing the figure of the sophist, who is never staged as a character, but always faced as a problem."

78. Palumbo, Lidia, and Casertano, Giovanni. 1994. "Discorso e realtà nel Sofista platonico." Atti dell'Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche - Napoli no. 105:281-296.
"Possiamo guardare al Sofista come al supremo sforzo di Platone di concettualizzare la possibilità stessa del discorso e della scienza, nella consapevolezza di tutte le difficoltà che comporta la teoria delle idee (quindi nel tentativo di raffinarla, correggendola e dialettizzandola, esplicitandone tutte le potenzialità e le complicazioni), ma ancora nella profonda convinzione che soltanto essa conserva la possibilità di costruire un «discorso migliore» sulla realtà; non solo, alla maniera di Protagora, da un punto di vista etico e politico, ma anche, alla maniera di Aristotele, da un punto di vista logico e gnoseologico. In questa direzione lo sforzo massimo di Platone è appunto quello di definire il più correttamente possibile: 1) il rapporto che lega il nostro discorso sulla realtà alla realtà che nel nostro discorso viene "rispecchiata"; 2) il significato profondo, e nello stesso tempo le modalità, del nostro «costruire» il discorso: non solo cioè stabilire in generale che cosa è un λόγος, quando possiamo parlare correttamente dell'esistenza di un λόγος, ma anche le regole del λόγος corretto senza le quali il "τί" che costituisce l'oggetto del nostro discorso rimane, nonostante tutte le parole che usiamo e che sprechiamo, estraneo alla nostra comprensione ed alla nostra comunicazione (ed è chiaro che questo è il tentativo platonico di superare le difficoltà sollevate da Gorgia); 3) i diversi livelli ai quali dobbiamo porci per capire, e quindi per fissare, le norme per una corretta comunicazione del discorso (e questo era necessario appunto dopo il περὶ του

μη ὀντος. di Gorgia), per fissare che cosa sono «l'essere» ed «il non essere» (τό ὀν e τό μη ὀν). Questo terzo aspetto nel Sofista è quanto mai importante, non solo perché comporta una riflessione ulteriore sulla teoria delle idee elaborata dal Fedone e dalla Repubblica fino al Parmenide, ma anche perché esprime il più alto e consapevole sforzo di Platone di utilizzare, incorporandole nel vivo del suo pensiero, le riflessioni di un Parmenide, di un Eraclito, di un Protagora, di un Gorgia. Questi autori, infatti, implicitamente od esplicitamente, sono presenti, in tutta l'importanza e la complessità delle loro proposte, nel nostro dialogo." (pp. 281-282, note omesse)

79. Perazzoli, Giovanni. 1999. "Il Nulla e la Chimera. Il Sofista di Platone e la distinzione tra essere della copula e essere dell'esistenza." Novecento.
"Il rilevamento della presenza o dell'assenza di una chiara delineazione della distinzione tra l'essere come mera «congiunzione» e come «predicato», è stato, soprattutto in ambito neopositivista, l'obiettivo della gran parte dei commentatori del Sofista platonico. L'assunto fondamentale di queste interpretazioni è che la «confusione» logico semantica dei sensi della predicazione, oltre ad essere all'origine dell'aporia centrale del Sofista, l'aporia del nulla, sia in realtà l'errore costitutivo delle indagini filosofiche sull'essere.(1) Le pagine dedicate da Platone alla delineazione dell'aporia del nulla in forza anche della drammatica e disorientante sospensione del rapporto del linguaggio con la logica che vi si realizza, hanno costituito, perciò, un problema molto attraente per tutte quelle concezioni, che attribuiscono ai miraggi del linguaggio i «paradossi» e, in generale, gli stessi problemi della filosofia speculativa." (p. 2)
(...)
"L'indagine, dunque, è rivolta ad esaminare, nella teoria della distinzione dei sensi dell'essere, il senso e la possibilità della distinzione tra il senso dell'«essere» come semplice «copula» e quello dell'«essere» come «predicato». Al contempo, si tratterà di esaminare, in particolari occorrenze testuali, le posizioni di quegli interpreti, ma soprattutto di

quei filosofi, che, incontrando in modo più o meno opportuno e felice il problema platonico del «nulla», hanno ritenuto di avere in mano la soluzione del bimillenario «guazzabuglio mentale intorno all'‘esistenza’»(3) (secondo la definizione di Russell). L'indistinzione tra l'«essere copulativo» e l'«essere esistenziale» è stata considerata, con varie differenze, come la conseguenza dell'indistinzione «arcaica» tra parola e cosa, tra piano logico e piano ontologico.
In realtà, benché dotata di un'apparente irrefragabile evidenza e di un'enorme fortuna, la distinzione della predicazione copulativa ed esistenziale risulta coinvolta, ben più di quanto immediatamente non appaia, in difficoltà e paradossi ed è ben lungi dal risolvere il problema posto da Platone; e non risolvendolo entra in crisi essa stessa nella sua ambizione di costituirsi come prospettiva ontologica." (p. 3)
(1) Un esempio di questa tesi si può trarre da Jon Stuart Mill, il quale scrive nel System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation (London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 18728, I, p. 86): «many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations concerning the nature of Being, [...] which have arisen from overlooking this double meaning of the word to be; from supposing that when it signifies to exist, and when it signifies to be some specified thing, as to be a man, to be Socrates, to be seen or spoken of, to be a phantom, even to be a nonentity, it must still, at bottom, answer to the same idea; and that a meaning must be found for it which shall suit all these cases. The fog which rose from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over the whole surface of metaphysics».
(3) B. Russell, Storia della filosofia occidentale e dei suoi rapporti con le vicende politiche e sociali dall'antichità ad oggi, 4 voll., Milano, Longanesi, 1967, IV (Da Rousseau ad oggi), p. 1101.

80. Perriello, Ricardo Lucio. 2010. "La metafisica del Sofista nell'orizzonte della protologia (prima parte)." Salesianum

no. 72:423-444.
Abstract: "In this article I propose to afford an interpretation of the metaphysic of the five genus of the platonic Sophist, on the base of the last hermeneutic paradigm, concerning the studies of the school of Tubinga-Milano. The last hermeneutic paradigm of the platonic thought concentrates the attention on the "unwritten doctrines" and on their metaphysic nucleus, the prothology, doctrine of the supreme principles of the One and the Diades. The One, principle of unity and the Diades, principle of multiplicity, found the being, understood as synthesis of unity and multiplicity. On the base of this general statement of platonic thought and of the articulated metaphysic system, which is founded on this interpretation, I try to interpret the five great genus of Sophist: the being, the same, the different, the movement and the quiet, searching to prove the transcendence of the being, of the same and of the different on other two genus and their deep valence about the platonic System and about a renovated metaphysic proposal in the actual age."

81. ———. 2010. "La metafisica del Sofista nell'orizzonte della protologia (seconda parte)." Salesianum no. 72:629-654.
82. Raschini, Maria Adelaide. 1961. "La dialettica del Sofista." Giornale di Metafisica no. 16:693-730.
Ristampato in M. A. Raschini, Saggi su Platone e Plotino, a cura di Pier Paolo Ottonello, Venezia: Marsilio, 2000, pp. 23-60.
83. Rezzani, Maria. 1952. "I problemi fondamentali del Sofista di Platone." Sophia:298-309.
84. Riccardo, Amalia. 2004. "Tra ἔλεγχος e ἀπόδειξις: strategie di analisi di un testo parmenideo (DK 28 B7. 1-2) nel Sofista di Platone." In L'ultima parola: l'analisi dei testi. Teorie e pratichenell'antichità greca e latina: atti del terzo colloquio italo-francese, edited by Abbamonte, Giancarlo, Conti Bizzarro, Ferruccio and Spina, Luigi. Napoli: Arte Tipografica.
85. Roggerone, Giuseppe Agostino. 1983. La crisi del platonismo nel Sofista e nel Politico. Lecce: Milella.

86. ———. 1990. I dialoghi platonici del Forestiero di Elea: Sofista e Politico. Settimo Milanese: Marzorati.
87. Rossetti, Livio. 2019. "Il Parmenide phusikos e il meccanismo di Antikitera: Risposta alle osservazioni di N. L. Cordero (Archai 25, 2019)." Archai no. 27:1-7.
88. Rossitto, Cristina. 1995. "La dialettica platonica nel Sofista: elenchos o diairesis?" In Platone e la dialettica, edited by Di Giovanni, Piero, 39-57. Bari: Laterza.
Ristampato in: C. Rossitto, Studi sulla dialettica in Aristotele, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2000, pp. 327-346.
89. Russo, Nicola. 2011. "Nichilismo del lógos. Il "veramente falso" nel Sofista di Platone." In Logon didonai. La filosofia come esercizio del rendere ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano, edited by Palumbo, Lidia, 615-627. Napoli: Loffredo.
"... le brevi considerazioni che seguono non hanno lo scopo di “difendere” Platone dall’accusa di nichilismo, ammesso e non concesso che di un’accusa possa trattarsi, né di emendare quelle vulgate, la cui inconsistenza è stata già più volte dimostrata. Il ritorno al testo platonico, invece, risponde a esigenze teoriche, a quelle esigenze suscitate proprio dalla riflessione intorno alla questione del nichilismo.
Una questione che nasce essenzialmente dal problema della verità, decisivo in Nietzsche come in Platone, e che si sviluppa verso l’ontologia in maniera consequenziale, poiché il luogo della verità è proprio il nesso ontologico, l’unità di λόγος e ὅν riconosciuta fin dai suoi primi inizi dalla filosofia greca, quell’equazione parmenidea intorno a cui Platone non si è mai stancato di interrogarsi e che nelle pagine centrali del Sofista considera proprio in riferimento al vero e al falso, all’ente e al non ente. Pagine in cui mostra di avere una consapevolezza molto lucida di quanto andava maneggiando teoricamente e di cosa vi fosse in gioco, tanto che non è infondato il sospetto, che almeno a lui «l’essenza del nichilismo» non fosse affatto «occulta». È allora tramite una breve lettura di alcuni passi di quel dialogo acrobatico – in senso greco –, che cercheremo di saggiare la sostanza del “nichilismo platonico”. (p. 614)

90. Sasso, Gennaro. 1991. L'essere e le differenze. Sul Sofista di Platone. Bologna: Il Mulino.
"Poiché, oltre che storiografica, questo libro ha natura teoretica, e anzi proprio quest'ultima apparirà a qualcuno come la sua più autentica, desidero dichiararne subito, o specificarne, l'intento e la tesi. Ho scritto questo libro per far vedere che, malgrado la sua importanza, e lo straordinario acume con il quale l'analisi dell'eleatismo e, in particolare, di Parmenide, vi è stata condotta fino alle estreme conseguenze, il Sofista culmina nella dichiarazione, non però nell'autentica dimostrazione, della «differenza». Ho scritto questo libro perché, convinto come sono che da nessuno la questione della differenza sia stata posta e discussa con altrettanta lucidità, ritengo tuttavia che, pur dopo il tentativo platonico di risolverla, questa resti, per la filosofia, aperta. Ho scritto questo libro, non per risolverla, tale questione; ma piuttosto per mostrare, in forma implicita (e, qualche volta, esplicita), perché quella tracciata da Platone sia una via che, dopo essere stata seguita fino in fondo, deve tuttavia, con decisione, essere abbandonata. L'ho scritto, infine, per far vedere quante difficoltà la consapevolezza del «fallimento» platonico riveli nel fondo della questione, e quanto lungo, aspro e disagevole sia il cammino che resta, o resterebbe, da percorrere."
(Prefazione, 7)
91. Sini, Carlo. 2004. "Il significato politico dell'ontologia di Platone." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 115-120. Milano: Albo Versorio.
" "Ontologia di Platone" è un'espressione impropria. Essa sembra suggerire che esista una "storia dell'ontologia" in qualche modo presupposta e in sé entro la quale sia possibile e legittimo collocare Platone, come poi Tommaso, Spinoza, Hegel e così via. Penso invece che il Sofista e il Parmenide, cioè i dialoghi ai quali si fa qui espresso riferimento, costituiscano, caso mai, la soglia e la premessa a partire dalla quale qualcosa come l'ontologia si mette in movimento e si rende intelligibile e disponibile nella storia della tradizione filosofica. Non esiste, come se fosse cosa

ovvia, una scienza dell'ente, della quale Platone rappresenterebbe un capitolo; al contrario, è con Platone che si inaugura un nuovo senso di ciò che si dice "realtà" e un nuovo senso dell'"essere reale"; è a partire dal gesto inaugurale di Platone che la riflessione filosofica comincia a immaginare e, per così dire, a "sognare" qualcosa come un'ontologia: invenzione di Platone che anche noi moderni non smettiamo di perseguire e di sognare." (p. 115)

92. Sirianni, Filippo. 2020. "ΣΤΑΣΙΣ e ΔΙΑΦΘΟΡΑ. Nota a Sofista 228a7-8." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 41:141-155.
Abstract: "Passage 228a7-8 of Plato's Sophist has been the object of a broad debate by reason of a number of subtle interpretative problems. The present work attempts to take stock of this passage and to put forward a satisfying solution from both a philological and an exegetic perspective. I seek to show that the reading cited by Galen and adopted in the editions of the Sophist (τη`ν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν) cannot be preferred to the variant found in the manuscripts of the dialogue (τη`ν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν). As for the interpretation, both readings stand out as problematic. I propose to reconsider the interpretation of the syntagma τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς and to translate it as "the natural kinship" rather than as "what is naturally kindred".
The paper continues with an analysis of the role played by kinship in Plato's philosophy, showing how its sundering can be identified with stasis.

93. Valle, Manuela. 2016. Un'antica discordia. Platone e la poesia: Ione, Simposio, Repubblica e Sofista. Napoli: Paolo Loffredo iniziative editoriali.
""Vi è un'antica discordia tra filosofia e poesia": così si esprime Socrate nel X libro della Repubblica e possiamo convenire che tale controversia certamente antica sia, almeno per Platone. Lungo l'intero arco della sua vita da filosofo e da scrittore filosofico, Platone si pose il problema del confronto con la poesia e i poeti. Ione, Simposio, Repubblica, Sofista costituiscono quattro momenti fondamentali in cui tale confronto si è articolato ed è ad una

loro analisi, insieme contenutistica e formale, che questo libro è dedicato. Più che ad una discordia, l'impressione è che si assista ad una ripetuta insoddisfazione rispetto ai risultati raggiunti nelle indagini sulla poesia, ancora una volta sfuggente. La diaphora è allora, in fondo, una "distanza", oltre che antica, salutare, perché è là che si origina l'esigenza di una nuova ricerca."

94. van Eck, Job. 2007. "L'analisi platonica del falso. Una vetta nella storia dell'analisi logica." Rivista di Storia della Filosofia no. 62:635-646.
Traduzione dall'inglese di Mauro Bonazzi.
"Eppure rimangono dei testi non ancora adeguatamente compresi. Un esempio significativo è la parte centrale del Sofista (237-264), dove Platone affronta il problema del falso. L'obiettivo di fondo del dialogo è descrivere il sofista imbrigliandolo in una definizione. I due personaggi principali, Teeteto e uno 'Straniero di Elea', intendono presentare il sofista come un illusionista che crea false opinioni. Ma il sofista non cade facilmente nella rete replicando che il concetto di falso è problematico. Chi ha una falsa opinione o pronuncia una falsa asserzione crede o dice qualcosa che non è. Ora, ciò che non è non esiste.
Ma come possono un'opinione o un'asserzione rappresentare qualcosa che non è, vale a dire qualcosa di cui non si può dare una rappresentazione? Come possono un'opinione o un'asserzione essere false? Di questo problema si discuteva nella seconda metà del V sec. a.C. in un contesto segnato dallo scetticismo e dal relativismo tipici del movimento sofistico del tempo. L'idea che nessuno possa pronunciare una falsa asserzione e che contraddire sia impossibile è attribuita a Protagora (490-420 a.C.), l'esponente di spicco della sofistica, e ben si adatta al soggettivismo da lui professato: non c'è una realtà oggettiva, esiste soltanto il mondo dell'esperienza soggettiva di cui non si danno affermazioni con validità oggettiva. Tutto ciò che appare ad ognuno, ogni percezione e ogni opinione possiedono la stessa validità soggettiva. Le opinioni di ciascuno sono per ciascuno vere: 'L'uomo è la misura di tutte le cose'. Il problema del falso e l'idea che non si possa

distinguere tra asserzioni false e vere era alla radice di una diffidenza generale circa la possibilità della conoscenza scientifica, cioè oggettiva; questo problema aggiungeva benzina al fuoco dello scetticismo circa la possibilità che il pensiero e le argomentazioni funzionassero come mezzo per arrivare a dei giudizi in grado di pretendere validità oggettiva.
Ecco perché risolvere questo problema era importante non soltanto da un punto di vista logico." (p. 636)

95. Vegetti, Mario. 2004. "Struttura e funzioni della dicotomia nel Sofista." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 95-104. Milano: Albo Versorio.
Ristampato in: Gastaldi, Silvia, Calabi, Francesca, Campese, Silvia and Ferrari, Franco (a cura di), Dialoghi con gli Antichi, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2007, pp. 123-131.
"Per avvicinarci a una comprensione in positivo della natura e del senso della dialettica dicotomica, è bene considerare il modo con cui essa viene delineata nel disegno dialogico del Sofista. Si tratta, come è ben noto, di dare la caccia al personaggio omonimo, che a sua volta è un cacciatore, di seguirne le tracce (ichne), di afferrarlo e chiuderlo in una rete: come ha osservato Bernadete, il linguaggio della caccia - che comporta una valenza euristica - appare dominante nel dialogo. Ma come condurre questa caccia a una figura di cui è noto soltanto il nome?
Il primo aspetto saliente del dialogo è che il procedimento che verrà seguito risulta introdotto senza formulare alcuna regola metodica, per la quale occorre attendere il riepilogo - a cose fatte - delineato alla fine del dialogo (264d-e). Poiché nella finzione dialogica il Sofista precede il Politico, e non è lecito d'altra parte presumere che lo Straniero di Elea avesse assistito alla conversazione fra Socrate e Fedro sulle rive dell'Ilisso (su cui dovremo tornare), nel contesto del dialogo viene presentato un esperimento privo sia di regole sia di precedenti, e come tale esso andrà qui rapidamente riconsiderato." (p. 97)

96. Vitiello, Vincenzo. 2004. "Incontro sul Parmenide e il Sofista." In Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista, edited by Bianchetti, Matteo and Storace, Erasmo, 107-114. Milano: Albo Versorio.
"Mi fermerò in particolare sul Parmenide che costituisce da sempre - e ancora - un problema aperto." (p. 107)
(...)
"Qualche parola ancora sul Sofista - solo a smentire la falsa convinzione che con questo dialogo Platone scioglie le "contraddizioni" del Parmenide, trasforma l'aporia in euporia, la via bloccata in strada di passaggio.
Fermiamoci sulla koinonia ton genon. Bene, cosa dice questa comunione di generi? Che essere non è diverso, ma si partecipa del diverso - fosse il medesimo che diverso, non potremmo dire che l'identico "è". E lo stesso va ripetuto per moto e quiete. Ma ... , ma per parteciparsi a moto e quiete, a identico e diverso, moto e quiete, identico e diverso in qualche modo debbono già "essere". Come, se già non fossero, essere potrebbe ad essi parteciparsi?
E non si dica che solo perché essere si partecipa ad essi, identico e diverso, quiete e moto sono. Perché se identico è solo dopo che essere gli si partecipa, allora essere conferisce ad identico con l'essere l'identità, e così al diverso, alla quiete e al moto. In entrambi i casi all'essere che è diverso dagli altri quattro generi s'aggiunge altro essere che è - in qualche modo - tutti i generi, non essendoli. In qualche modo: in quale? In quello che Platone ci ha detto nel Parmenide. Al modo dell'essere non essendo, del disdire disdicentesi." (p. 112)
97. Zadro, Attilio. 1961. Ricerche sul linguaggio e sulla logica del Sofista. Padova: Antenore.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Platón: Sofista. Bibliografía comentada de estudios en Español

Bibliografía

1. Aguirre, Javier. 2010. "El Sofista de Platón y la concepción aristotélica del ser." Revista aguna:53-62.
   Resumen: "En el capítulo M4 de la Metafísica, Aristóteles critica la dialéctica practicada por Sócrates achacándole su falta de «vigor dialéctico». Asimismo, en N2, Aristóteles critica la dialéctica practicada por «los dialécticos» imputándoles el modo arcaico en que se plantean el problema del ser. Hay numerosos indicios que apuntan que con el término «dialécticos» Aristóteles se está refiriendo a Platón y a los platónicos, y de que es a ellos a quienes atribuye el «vigor dialéctico». Aristóteles es consciente, por consiguiente, de los méritos y de las deficiencias de la dialéctica platónica, y más concretamente la practicada por Platón en el Sofista. En el desarrollo de su propia concepción del ser (to on) en los libros centrales de la Metafísica, Aristóteles tiene presente el contenido de este diálogo y trata de superar tanto las dificultades planteadas por los eléatas como las propias deficiencias en el modo platónico de entender el ser."
2. Aguirre Sala, Jorge Francisco. 1994. "La falsedad en el pensamiento y en el discurso. Comentarios al Sofista 259b al 265e." Revista de Filosofía (México) no. 27:432-434.
   "En el presenta artículo nos proponemos elaborar una digresión sobre uno de los temas más controversiales en Filosofía: las relaciones entre el ser y la falsedad. Queremos

asimismo tomar lo más directamente posible el texto de Platón porque no queremos perder a nuestro autor entre sus miles de comentaristas." (p. 432)

3. ———. 2001. "La ontologìa platonica de los géneros supremos I." Analogía (Filosófica) Revista de filosófia, México no. 15:121-156.
   Segunda parte: Analogía (Filosófica) Revista de filosófia, México, 15, 2001, pp. 123-137.
   "Con Platón y acompañado de sus múltiples comentadores e intérpretes se nos ofrece, al menos, dos modos de abordar el mundo; tarea que todo humano debería hacer de vez en cuando, pero si por oficio se es filósofo, nunca debe despreciarse ni tomar demasiado aprisa tan atractivo ofrecimiento. Uno de estos modos parte desde los arquetipos -esas instancias inventadas por Platón para explicarse, precisamente, el mundo- y tiende hacia las cosas, el mundo físico tal y cual lo percibimos en nuestra experiencia cotidiana. Este camino podríamos denominarlo como la "vía deductiva" . El otro derrotero, en el mismo sentido y propósito, pero en dirección contraria, va desde las cosas hacia sus arquetipos, esas instancias pretendidamente justificadoras, fundadoras que nos hacen inteligible el mundo. A esta vía podríamos denominarla el "camino fenomenológico", en el sentido de que lo primero que nos aparece es un "acontecer", es "lo que sucede", lo que la cosa "manifiesta" en el plano inmediato." (p. 121)
4. Álvarez, Lucas. 2008. "El Sofista como pseudorgós: sus posibles sentidos." Circe de clásicos y modernos no. 12.
   Resumen: "En Sofista, Platón alcanza simultáneamente la definición más acabada y la crítica más severa a propósito de la figura del sofista.
   Éste aparece allí como un pseudourgós. Mediante el uso de eídola legómena los sofistas pretenden demostrar que pueden producirlo todo para así engañar a jóvenes desorientados.
   Hasta aquí la letra platónica pero, ¿qué otro sentido se puede pensar respecto de este título de 'hacedor de falsedades'? Teniendo en cuenta la concepción del lenguaje propia de la sofística es posible entender ese mote como un

indicador del estatuto propio no sólo del lógos demiúrgico sino también de la pólis hecha por y para sus palabras."

5. ———. 2014. "Las figuras del justo y del injusto en República II como antecedentes del sofista y del filósofo en Sofista de Platón." Nova Tellus no. 32:9-43.
Resumen: "Teniendo en cuenta la construcción de personajes o figuras realizada por los interlocutores de los diálogos platónicos, aquí nos ocuparemos de estudiar la de los sujetos justo e injusto (efectuada por Glaucón y Adimanto en República II)y la del sofista (consumada por el Extranjero de Elea y Teeteto en el diálogo Sofista), sin perder de vista la singular presentación que se hace del filósofo en este último diálogo. Establecidas esas cuatro figuras, buscaremos explicitar las relaciones que hacen de las primeras antecedentes de las últimas. Finalmente, destacaremos las consecuencias que se derivan de dichas relaciones para la comprensión de la interpretación platónica del filósofo y de su principal adversario, el sofista."
6. ———. 2016. "La función propedéutica del sofista y la emergencia del filósofo. División, dialéctica y paradigmas en el diálogo Sofista." Areté no. 28:337-366.
Resumen: "El propósito de este trabajo es examinar la cuestión de los objetivos planteados por Platón en el diálogo Sofista. En primer lugar, procuramos echar luz sobre el objetivo general que se estaría trazando en el prólogo de la obra, allí donde el Extranjero de Elea comienza a demostrar su estatus filosófico. En segundo lugar, nos ocupamos de ubicar la caracterización del sofista en el marco de ese objetivo, interpretando el resultado de dicha caracterización como un παράδειγμα implícito que prepara la ejecución de la dialéctica y anticipa los rasgos de un objeto clave de esa ciencia."
7. ———. 2017. "El no-ser como diferencia y el sofista como diferencia: hallazgos ontológicos y estrategias refutativas en el diálogo Sofista." Hypnos no. 39:238-257.
Resumen: "En este trabajo, nos ocuparemos de dos cuestiones vinculadas al concepto de lo diferente, el gran hallazgo del diálogo Sofista. En primer lugar, intentaremos aclarar el estatus específico que adquiere el no-ser relativo,

en la medida en que es posible leer dicho no-ser como la diferencia tout court o como una parte de esa diferencia, debido a una aparente oscilación del texto platónico. En segundo lugar, iluminaremos la particular caracterización del sofista que, al ser entendido como lo diferente del sabio, termina funcionando como un modelo a pequeña escala que anticipa de forma proléptica aquel no-ser relativo."

8. ———. 2019. Platón frente al sofista. Buenos Aires: Teseopress.
Índice: Comité editorial de la colección Pensamiento Antiguo 9; Introducción 11;
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1. La caracterización del sofista 19; 2. Los planteos de República como antecedentes del diálogo Sofista 63; 3. El sofista como μιμητής 105; 4. Recapitulación: filósofo vs. sofista 185;
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5. Los objetivos del diálogo Sofista 195; 6. El filósofo platónico: su método y sus objetos 225;
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"Blanco preferido de los ataques platónicos contra dichas formas de sabiduría (o, en realidad, de pretendida sabiduría) es el sofista quien resulta severamente cuestionado a lo largo de todo el corpus platonicum. En este trabajo, nos ocuparemos del punto culminante de ese cuestionamiento alcanzado en el diálogo Sofista. Según intentaremos mostrar, en esa obra de su etapa tardía, Platón logra articular su crítica más aguda contra ese adversario con la postulación de una renovada ontología, y todo ello a través de la noción de alteridad.
Nuestro estudio, de hecho, gira en torno a esa noción; gira, más precisamente, en torno a dos modalidades específicas de la alteridad. Hablamos, en principio, de la doble alteridad que comporta el propio sofista a los ojos de los interlocutores, pues siendo lo otro del filósofo, es, en simultáneo, aquel que hace siempre de otro, pero además de la alteridad que implica el no-ser equiparado, en el marco de una novedosa propuesta ontológica, a la Forma de la Diferencia." (p. 11)

9. Álvarez, Lucas M. 2014. "Platón: el filósofo y el sofista a la luz del paradigma teatral." In El filósofo y sus adversarios en los escritos de Platón y Aristóteles, edited by Marcos, Graciela Elena and Díaz, María Elena 50-69. Buenos Aires: Editorial Rhesis.
10. Anchepe, Ignacio Miguel. 2017. "¿Existen los fantasmas? Sobre imagen (eidolon) y conocimiento en el Sofista de Platon." Praxis Filosófica no. 44:37-58.
Resumen: "En el Sofista, Platón revé algunos puntos clave de su teoría del conocimiento, tales como la teoría de las Formas y la noción de imagen (eídolon). Según algunos intérpretes (Ringbom, Palumbo, Deleuze, Audouard), este diálogo contendría la decisiva novedad de que entre conocimiento verdadero y conocimiento falso hay una notable paridad: ambos recurren a imágenes, el verdadero al eikón y el falso al eídolon (según diálogos anteriores, la imagen está reservada a las formas inferiores de conocimiento, lindantes con lo apariencial y lo falso). En este trabajo me propongo discutir estas interpretaciones. No hay duda de que el Sofista revisa el estatuto de las imágenes falsas, no obstante creo que no llega a establecer la aludida equiparación entre ambos tipos de conocimiento. Incluso en este diálogo —argumentaré— el conocimiento verdadero continúa funcionando de un modo cualitativamente distinto respecto del falso, sin recurrir a imágenes o haciéndolo lo menos posible."
11. Bossi, Beatriz. 2011. "¿Por qué Platón no refuta Parménides en el Sofista?" In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 180-192. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
12. Carrasco Campos, Ángel. 2007. "Reinterpretación del proyecto filosófico de Platón: una lectura del Sofista." Revista Bajo Palabra no. 2:43-55.
Resumen: "En este ensayo nos proponemos analizar las figuras del sofista y del filósofo a partir de una lectura del Sofista de Platón. Para ello haremos uso del concepto de sabiduría de Giorgio Colli, con el fin de ver el clásico debate entre filósofos y sofistas como una lucha, con auténticas

implicaciones filosóficas y sociales, por la herencia del rol del sabio arcaico en el nuevo contexto de la polis griega."

13. Casadesús Bordoy, Francesc. 2010. "La terminología filosófica en el Sofista y el Político: dificultades de traducción." Estudios Clásicos. Organo de la Sociedad española de estudios clásicos:83-94.
14. Casnati, María Gabriela. 2004. "Una lectura unitaria del Sofista de Platón." In Diálogo con los griegos. Estudios sobre Platón, Aristóteles y Plotino, edited by Santa Cruz, María Isabela, E., Marcos. Graciela and Di Camillao, Silvana G., 111-130. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad.
"En lo que sigue, me concentraré en analizar los nexos que muestran que el diálogo es una unidad en su conjunto y que no es correcto -como tradicionalmente se sostuvo(3)- leer la parte central como una digresión. Al mismo tiempo, relevaré los cambios que aparecen en el Sofista respecto del planteo ontológico tradicional, para mostrar que Platón nunca "olvida" sus doctrínas anteriores, sino que la, completa y asimismo refina la caracterización ontológica de lo que son apariencias(phantásmata) y copias (eikónes). fundamentales a la hora de caracterizar al sofista." pp. 111-112)
(3) Cordero, N. L (Platón, Diálogos, Madrid, Gredos, 1988) señala en la introducción a su traducción. pp. 322·323, esta actitud tradicional y confies él mismo no encontrar ninguna unidad en la obra. Ver también Notomi. N., The Unity of Plato's 'Sophist'. Between the Sophist and the Philosopher, Cambridge, 1999, p. 7.
15. Castro Caeiro, António de. 2011. "Compreender o eînai e alethè dokeîn e a semântica estruturante do poieîn (Sofista 234a - 240c)." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 168-179. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
16. Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2013. "El extranjero de Elea, ”compañero“ de los parmenídeos ... desde 1561." Méthexis no. 26:51-58.
Abstract: "From 228d of the Sophist Plato deals with diseases of the soul, and argues that the most serious is

ignorance (agnoía). And in a completely unusual way, he presents the sophist as someone who would be able to purify the soul and cure it of ignorance. The method used by the sophist seems even in its most precise details the activity of the “Platonic Socrates”. Since the context of the Sophist is exclusively ontological (the subtitle of the dialogue is About Being), as Socrates was not interested of “Being” (as nor the sophists), not should wonder that Plato assimilate Socrates to them, even if he is considered a sophist “of noble lineage”.

17. ———. 2016. Platón contra Platón. La autocrítica del Parménides y la ontología del Sofista. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.
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"Ha llegado el momento de hacer lugar a nuestro tema en esta presentación: la autocrítica que (¿quizá?, ¿seguramente?) encontraremos en cierto momento en la producción de Platón. Para que la noción de autocrítica pueda aplicarse a un filósofo de la Antigüedad, deben tenerse en cuenta circunstancias materiales y conceptuales. Desde el punto de vista concreto, el autor en cuestión tiene que haber escrito más de un trabajo (6) y debe conocerse, con un margen mínimo de error, el orden cronológico de la

escritura de sus obras.(7) Platón cumple con ambos requisitos.(8)
Las circunstancias conceptuales que permitirían aplicar la noción de autocrítica dependen de la manera o del tipo de filosofar del autor. Utilizamos la fórmula “tipo de filosofar” en vez de la esperada categoría de “filosofía” porque, en el caso de Platón, el hecho de evitar expresarse mediante tratados(9) nos invita a privilegiar la actividad filosófica que resulta del diálogo, con idas, venidas, juego de caracteres, incluso rasgos de humor, en desmedro de un eventual “sistema” que, a nuestro juicio, no existe en Platón. Y bien: este tipo de filosofar, propio de Platón, ¿admite la autocrítica? Evidentemente. Que la autocrítica se lleve a cabo, es otro problema (y, si el lector persiste y llega hasta la conclusión de este trabajo, se convencerá de que realmente se produjo). (pp. 15-16)
(6) Los partidarios de la existencia en Platón de “doctrinas no escritas” encuentran natural que en sus escritos se critique. Es el caso de Maurizio Migliori (1990: 155), quien escribió:“No nos extraña [...] La presentación escrita de la mayor parte de la filosofía de Platón es sustancialmente insuficiente”.
(7) Esta condición, ausente en el caso de Aristóteles, explica la interminable discusión respecto de la evolución (o no) de su pensamiento. Un caso ideal, en cambio, es el de Plotino, cuyo discípulo Porfirio ordenó sus tratados por orden a la vez temático y cronológico.
(8) La cronología generalmente aceptada en la actualidad se basa en el estudio estilométrico del filólogo polaco Wincenty Lutoslawski (1897: passim). Otro especialista de la cuestión, Leonard Brandwood (1990: 2), no duda en afirmar que el “greater consensus” que existe hoy respecto de la cronología se debe al éxito del método estilométrico.
(9) Las conocidas críticas de Platón a la escritura son más bien críticas a los tratados filosóficos: véase Fedro 275d y Carta VII 344c.
Referencias
Brandwood, L. (1990), The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues, Cambridge University Press.

Lutoslawski,W (1897), The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic. With an account of Plato's style and of the chronology of his writings, Londres.
Migliori, M. (1990), Dialettica e Veritá. Commentario filosofico al Parmenide di Platone, Milán, Vita e Pensiero.
18. ———. 2017. "El extraño purificador del alma del Sofista de Platón (228d-231b)." Nova Tellus no. 35:83-95.
Resumen: "A partir de 228d del Sofista, Platón se ocupa de las enfermedades del alma y sostiene que la más grave es la ignorancia (agnoía). De manera totalmente inusual, presenta al sofista como alguien que sería capaz de purificar el alma y de curarla de la ignorancia. El método utilizado por el sofista reproduce hasta en sus detalles más precisos la actividad del "Sócrates platónico".
Dado que el contexto es exclusivamente ontológico (se subtitula Sobre el ser), como Sócrates no se ocupó "del ser" (ni los sofistas), no debe extrañar que Platón lo asimile a ellos, si bien se trata de un sofista "de buen linaje".
19. ———. 2019. "El extraño no-ser descubierto por Platón en el Sofista." In Nunc est Bacchandum. Homenaje a Alberto Bernabé, edited by Piquero, Juan, de Paz, Pablo and Planchas, Soraya, 223-230. Madrid: Guillermo Escolar Editor.
"No caben dudas de que la frase principal del Sofista es la siguiente: "Cuando hablamos de lo que no es, no hablamos de algo contrario a lo que es, sino sólo de algo diferente (héteron)" (257b)."
(...)
"La lectura que ya propusimos hace años en nuestras traducciones al español y al francés, héteron, se encontraba sin duda en el ejemplar griego que poseía Marsilio Ficino, quien, en 1482, tradujo "Eleatem quidem natione, longe vero alterum ac dissimilem a Parmenide et Zenone suis aequalibus", y otro tanto puede decirse de la fuente utilizada en 1552, en Lovaina, por Petreio Tiara, un médico frisio, en su traducción latina: "itemque alterum quendam Parmenidis Zenonisque familia". Por último, podemos recurrir a la autoridad de H. Estienne, en cuya edición de 1578 se lee también la lectura héteron. Inexplicablemente,

estos códices que yo cito en apoyo de héteron, que ya habían sido utilizados por A. Diès en 1925, no fueron tenidos en cuenta en la nueva edición de Oxford de 1995, a cargo de D.B. Robinson.
(...).
En nuestra comunicación nos vamos a ocupar de esta noción de héteron, central en el Sofista, la cual le permite a Platón justificar la existencia del no-ser, en realidad de "cierto" no-ser, un no-ser un tanto extraño que, como intentaré demostrar, influyó, con su intrusión en el ámbito de las Ideas, nada menos que a la noción de ser, esa también extraña idéa tou óntos que Platón presenta en la página 254a8." (pp. 223-224)

20. ———. 2020. "Parménides y la concepción ante-predicativa de la verdad." Archai. As origens do pensamento ocidental no. 30:1-21.
Resumen: "Platón sostiene que, para confirmar que el sofista es un fabricante de ilusiones (Sph.262d8), hay que refutar la tesis de Parménides que afirma que sólo existe – según Platón lo interpreta – el ser absoluto. Muy probablemente un eco de esta tesis se encuentre en Antístenes, a quien Platón parece aludir en el Sofista, para quien “lo que es, es verdadero”. Esta concepción de la verdad se conoce como “ante-predicativa” u ontológica, y, según Heidegger, sería originaria. No es así. Desde Homero y hasta Parménides, la verdad (o falsedad) fue siempre atribuida a un discurso o a un pensamiento, jamás a un ente. La concepción “ante-predicativa” de la verdad fue una creación de la filosofía, que probablemente comenzó con Parménides y continuó con Antístenes. Cuando Platón la refuta, en la segunda parte del Sofista, no hace sino regresar al pasado, pues hace del discurso el “lugar” de la verdad."
21. ———. 2021. "Acerca del Sofista de Platón." Parerga. La Revista de la SFPA no. 3:7-49.
"1. El lugar del Sofista en la trayectoria filosófica de Platón. El conjunto de soluciones que ha propuesto cada pensador como respuesta a las cuestiones filosóficas fundamentales, y que la posteridad denomina, a veces abusivamente, su “sistema”, es, en la mayoría de los casos, el resultado de un

largo camino, incluso de una cierta “evolución”. La cumbre de esta evolución coincide, en algunos filósofos, con sus últimas obras; en otros casos, se alcanza durante cierta etapa de su carrera filosófica, y sus posteriores obras son sólo aclaraciones o retoques de lo que ya expuso; finalmente, estamos ante el caso de los autores que, después de haberlo dicho todo, encuentran fisuras en los sólidos cimientos que habían construido y que no dudan en analizar el origen de esas flaquezas y en emprender nuevos enfoques. Este es el caso de Platón." (p. 7)

22. ———. 2021. "Segun Platon los 'mortales' de Parmenides son los antepasados de los sofistas." Eidos no. 36:397-419.
Resmen: "¿Por qué cuando Platón quiere justificar su definición del sofista como un «fabricante de imágenes» (Sofista, 236c), se apoya sobre dos versos auténticos de Parménides (fr. 7.1-2) que aluden, sin duda alguna, al camino recorrido por los «mortales que nada saben» (fr. 6.4)? ¿Quiere acaso sugerir que esos «mortales», que son en realidad «fabricantes de opiniones» (doxaí), son un antecedente de los sofistas, que son «fabricantes de imágenes»?"
23. Costa Pinto Francalanci, Carla 2009. "O diálogo Sofista à sombra de Parmênides. Acerca do poema de Parmênides." In Acerca do poema de Parmênides: estudos apresentados no I Simpósio Internacional OUSIA de Estudos Clássicos, edited by Tatiana, Ribeiro, 123-129. Rio de Janeiro: Azougue.
24. Deaño, Alfredo. 1970. "El Sofista de Platón y la prehistoria de la lógica formal." Emerita no. 38:131-147.
25. Di Camillo, Silvana Gabriela. 2007. "El problema del lógos falso en el Eutidemo y su solución en el Sofista." Hypnos no. 13:1-15.
Resumen: "El problema del discurso falso en Platón se plantea en el diálogo Eutidemo pero encuentra su máxima elaboración en el Sofista. En este trabajo intentaremos mostrar que Platón no podía, a la altura del Eutidemo, resolver el problema del discurso falso, puesto que la solución implicaba operar un cambio profundo en su ontología, que se haría efectivo recién en el Sofista. Allí él

concibe al lógos como combinación de nombres que se corresponde, pero no se identifica con la combinación que se da en la realidad. La distinción entre lógos y prâgma constituye una de las claves para que el problema del discurso falso reciba una solución definitiva."

26. Echauri, Raúl. 1996. "Ser y no ser en el Sofista de Platón." Sapientia no. 51:327-334.
"El ser y lo diferente penetran todos los géneros, y éstos son en la medida en que participan del ser, pero no son cuando participan de lo diferente, ya que, al hacerlo, resultan distintos del ser y, debido a ello, no son. En tal sentido, las cosas «en muchos casos son, y, en muchos otros, no son»(26).
El no ser se mezcla también con el juicio y con el discurso (X6yoQ). Si no fuera así, no habría juicios, ni discursos falsos, los cuales expresan lo que no es. Pero «nadie piensa —argumenta el sofista— ni dice lo que no es: pues el no ser no participa en modo alguno de la realidad (οὐσία)»(27.
Por su parte, la realidad (οὐσία) resulta expresada por dos tipos de sonidos: el verbo, que indica las acciones, y el nombre, que señala el sujeto que las ejecuta. En el discurso verdadero, ambos se combinarán a fin de expresar algo acerca de lo que los seres son, y en el falso, manifestarán cosas diferentes de las que son. Aunque no sea quizás el objetivo principal del diálogo, éste tiene como «fin confesado —escribe Diés al respecto— resolver el problema del error; para establecer la posibilidad del error, se trata de demostrar la existencia del no-ser»"(28). (p. 333)
(26) Sofista 259b.
(27) Sofista 260d.
(28) A. Diés, La définition de l'étre et la nature des idées dans le Sophiste de Platon, Vrin, Paris 1932 p. 1.

27. Flórez, Alfonso. 2012. "Entre la semejanza y la apariencia. La reflexión sobre la imagen y la captura del sofista en el Sofista de Platon." Pensamiento no. 68:357-371.
Resumen: "En el diálogo el Sofista de Platón el tema de la imagen ocupa un lugar central. En efecto, la captura del sofista que se proponen los interlocutores puede llevarse a cabo sólo en la medida en que el sofista, hábil constructor de

imágenes, pueda ser apresado en una de las clases de la imagen.
Para ello en el diálogo se recurre a diversas imágenes habladas que deben entenderse según las propias determinaciones del diálogo sobre la imagen, por lo que el resultado del diálogo puede alcanzarse sólo gracias a la reflexión de él sobre sí mismo en el ámbito de la imagen."

28. Forciniti, Martín. 2014. "Erótica de las estatuas y retórica de los fantasmas. Una contraposición entre las producciones miméticas del filósofo y el sofista en Platón." Hypnos no. 33:259-282.
Resumen: "En este trabajo comparo el vínculo erótico entre el filósofo y su joven amado, tal como es descripto en Fedro 249b-256b, con la relación retórica que el sofista establece con el pueblo, según Sofista 232b-236d y 265a-268d. Postulo que se trata de dos casos estructuralmente análogos de producciones miméticas. El primero da como resultado un ágalma, ("estatua sagrada"), mientras que el segundo genera un phántasma ("simulacro"). Identifico las semejanzas y diferencias entre los elementos que participan de cada producción, para concluir poniendo en cuestión la pretendida inocuidad de la erótica filosófica, así como la supuesta nocividad de la retórica sofística."
29. Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1979. "Platón, Sofista 256 e 5-6." Critíca no. 11:3-13.
"En este trabajo me propongo contribuir a dilucidar el sentido de dos líneas del Sofista de Platón.(1) En la primera parte presento una sumaria interpretación del contexto en que se encuentran. En la segunda, las cito en el original y examino críticamente la interpretación de G. E. L. Owen procediendo luego a proponer una interpretación diferente." (P. 3)
(1) He utilizado el texto del Sofista establecido por J. Burnet, Platonis Opera, Vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. Este trabajo presupone la pequeña revolución copemicana en la interpretación de este diálogo que tuvo lugar hacia fines de la década del 60. La linea interpretativa desplazada es la de F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 1935 (hay traducción al castellano de N. L.

Cordero y M. Ligatto, Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968). La línea interpretativa que ha terminado por imponerse entre un número creciente de estudiosos es la introducida por M. Frede, en Prádikation und Existenzaussage, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1967 y por J. Malcolm, "Plato's analysis of to on and to me on in the Sophist", Phronesis 12 (1967) 118-129.

30. ———. 1979. "Platón Sofista 244 b 6 - d 12." Dialógo no. 10:131-137.
"En un valioso artículo publicado por Diálogos, Año VII, 19 (1970) 73-82 el profesor O. N. Guariglia interpreta un pasaje del Sofista de Platón (244 b 6- 245 e 2) en que se formulan dos argumentos contra la tesis eleática de que sólo lo uno existe. El artículo, invirtiendo el orden del texto, trata primero el segundo argumento que, como nos muestra muy claramente Guariglia, se basa en la ley de la transitividad de la identidad, sin mencionarla.
Me veo obligado a disentir en cambio respecto a la interpretación de la primera argumentación (244 b 6 · d 12, expuesta en las pp. 75-82 del artículo)." (p.131)
(...)
"Mis objeciones apuntan básicamente a lo siguiente: (a) Platón no posee una teoría de la predicación lo suficientemente desarrollada como para que sea razonable pensar que dentro de un mismo argumento opere conscientemente con ella y luego pase a su semántica habitual de '"denominación".
En esto me parece que puedo contar con el consenso del Prof. Guariglia (p. 78, 4° aparte), (b) Interpretando de una y la misma manera la relación palabra-objeto se puede dar un buen sentido a ambas partes del texto; y (e) Parménides 142 b 5. e 5 no posee la misma estructura que el argumento en discusión." (p. 132)

31. González Ruiz, Oscar Leandro. 2016. "Más allá de presupuestos ontológicos: la posibilidad de la falsedad en el Sofista de Platón." Saga: Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía no. 17:52-63.
Resumen: "Es un lugar común de la interpretación de la teoría platónica del conocimiento, el verla como sostenida

bajo la presuposición de dos ‘órdenes ontológicos’ distintos: el mundo de las apariencias y el mundo de las ideas. A dichos ‘mundos’ corresponden distintas características que, a su vez, determinan dos posibilidades del conocimiento. Así, en el llamado ‘mundo aparente’, solo sería posible la opinión (doxa); en efecto, al estar referida a los objetos de un mundo de apariencias en constante devenir, la doxa se hace intrínsecamente pasible de falsedad. Este ensayo no tiene como propósito entrar a discutir directamente si la distinción platónica, entre doxa y episteme, efectivamente tiene como fundamento dicho dualismo. Más bien, indagaré las razones por las cuales se considera que la doxa es pasible de falsedad en el Sofista, con el objetivo de mostrar que –contrario a la interpretación precedente– Platón no vincula necesariamente dicha falsedad al hecho de que la doxa esté circunscrita a un
supuesto ‘mundo aparente’ esencialmente falso. Con ello, tendremos elementos de juicio para poner en cuestión, de manera preliminar, la tesis según la cual a distintas formas de conocimiento (episteme y doxa), se debe hacer corresponder distintos órdenes ontológicos (mundo de las ideas y aparente, respectivamente)."

32. Guariglia, Osvaldo. 1970. "Platón, Sofista 244b6-245e2: la refutación de la tesis eleatica." Diàlogos no. 7:73-82.
"Dentro de la revisión sumaria de las antiguas teorías sobre el ser (242c - 251a), que sirve de conclusión a la primera parte del Sofista y al mismo tiempo de transición al próximo tema -a saber: el problema de la predicación y el de las proposiciones negativas (251a - 259d), donde el diálogo alcanzará uno de sus puntos culminantes, filosóficamente hablando , Platón nos ofrece una breve discusión de la teoría eleática, que consta de dos argumentaciones, una que comienza en 244b6 y termina en 244d13 y una segunda que comienza inmediatamente a continuación (244d14) y terminará en 245d11." (p. 73)
(...)
"Se advertirá de inmediato que en este planteo hay de hecho dos cuestiones envueltas : (1) ¿a qué llaman ser los eleatas?

y (2) ¿qué están realmente afirmando cuando dicen que 'el Todo es uno'?" (p. 74)

33. Iglesias, Mercedes. 1994. "La alteridad en el Sofista de Platón." Revista de Filosofía (Venezuela) no. 19:1-19.
Resumen: "Él présente trabajo trata del concepto de participación en El Sofista de Platón.
El propósito fundamental del texto es epistemológico; pero, sin embargo, toca la dimensión ontológica.
Haytres tipos de participación: 1) Participación de las Ideas entresí, 2) Participación del alma a las Ideas y 3) Participación dé los elementos sensibles a las Ideas. La participación es posible por cuanto el Ser noes más Absoluto. El Ser es y no es; el no-ser no es y es. El No-Ser o Diversidad será otra forma de ser del no-ser.
Identidad y Diversidad participarán con todas las demás formas."

34. Julià, Victoria E. 1977. "Algunas cuestiones sobre el significado de ser y no ser en el Sofista." Cuadernos de Filosofía no. 17:35-41.

35. Königshausen, Johann-Heinrich. 1993. "¿Paralelismos entre el Sofista de Platón y el libro Gamma de la Metafisica de Aristóteles?" Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía no. 10:157-171.
"Procederé de la siguiente manera: Empezaré por hacer unas breves consideraciones introductorias acerca de ambos escritos. Luego, en vez de intentar hacer una comparación entre tales o cuales problemas o conceptos, buscaré probarque existe una íntima conexión entre ambos, que se revela en su estructura argumentativa altamente compleja, y no sólo en lo que respecta a los elementos y a las funciones de la argumentación, sino incluso en ciertos matices de lenguaje, todo lo cual, más que un mero hecho, pone de manifiesto el tema central propio de ambos escritos." (p. 158)

36. Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela Elena. 1991. "Aporias del no-ser y aporias de lo falso en "Sofista" 237b-239c." Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofia no. 17:259-274.
Abstract: "In Sophist 237b-239c Plato presents three puzzles designed to show that nothing can be thought or

said about the not-being: what is not in any way ("to medamos on") cannot even be unthinkable or unsayable. This paper argues that these puzzles involving the not-being are parallel to those raised with respect to falsehood, which are exploited by Plato in order to prove that false statement is possible. While "what is not in any way" cannot be denied, because this negation forces us precisely to what we are trying to deny-the being of not-being, in denying the falsehood, the Sophist is bound to accept that the false in some respect is ("einai pos")."

37. ———. 1993. "Συμπλοκή en el Sofista de Platôn. Su posibilidad y alcance." Cuadernos de Filosofía no. 24:55-71.
"What Plato means by «combination» in the Sophist is extremely difficult to establish. In this paper, I try to elucidate the point by considering the concept of συμπλοκή in the light of the Platonic argument in support of the c1aim that there must be a combination. Firstly, I examine the several verbs used to express the notion of combination in the dialogue. Secondly, I analyse the arguments by which Plato proves that there is a συμπλοκή (251e-252e), to show that the denial of combination is rejected on linguistic and specifically ontological grounds. The conclusion brings out useful consequences concerning Plato' s theory of συμπλοκή των ειδων."

38. ———. 1995. Platón ante el problema del error: la formulación del Teeteto y la solución del Sofista. Buenos Aires: Fundec.
Prefacio de Nestor-Luis Cordero.

39. ———. 1997. "Discurso y no ser en Platón (Sofista 260a-263d)." Synthesis no. 4:61-83.
"El problema de la falsedad enfrentó a Platón con los sofistas de su época e indirectamente con el "padre Parménides", de cuya ontología derivaba la tesis sofística de la imposibilidad de lo falso. Si no hay no ser y es imposible pensarlo o decirlo -argüía el sofista apelando, hábilmente, a la autoridad del fundador del eleatismo- es imposible pensar o decir algo falso, ya que la falsedad no es otra cosa que pensar o decir "lo que no es" (το` μη` ὄν). A combatir este argumento se consagraron los esfuerzos de Platón en el

Sofista, uno de cuyos principales logros es brindar una solución definitiva al problema. Al cabo de una ardua investigación que ocupa buena parte del diálogo, Platón consigue por fin demostrar que el discurso (λόγος) no es forzosamente verdadero sino que puede, en ocasiones, ser falso, al consistir en una combinación de nombres por cuyo medio nos es dado reproducir lo que es tal como es, pero también como no es." (p. 61)

40. ———. 2000. "Las falacias en torno a la falsedad: una lectura de Eutidemo 283e-286b a la luz de la solución del Sofista." In Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides. Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum, edited by Robinson, Thomas M. and Brisson, Luc, 144-153. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
41. ———. 2001. "Platón, el sofista y el "padre Parménides". Sobre la legitimidad del parricidio." Congreso Nacional de Filosofía no. 10:151-153.
42. ———. 2004. " Filosofía versus sofística en el Sofista de Platón." In Diálogo con los griegos. Estudios sobre Platón, Aristóteles y Plotino, edited by Santa Cruz, María Isabela, Marcos, Graciela E. and Di Camillao, Silvana G., 77-92. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad.
"En lo que sigue, teniendo en cuenta que filósofo y sofista plantean una dificultad similar, aunque por razones bien distintas, y que cuando uno de los dos se muestre, presumiblemente, "el otro se mostrará de la misma manera" (4) me serviré de la definición platónica del sofista como productor de imágenes habladas, fabricante de apariencias en el dominio de los discursos, para echar alguna luz sobre la actuación del filósofo en ese mismo terreno. Cuando se sirve del lenguaje para comunicar verdades, el filósofo construido por Platón se acerca peligrosamente a las filas enemigas." (p. 78)
(4) Cf. Sof. 250e 8-251 a 1. La afirmación del Extranjero se refiere en rigor al ser y al no-ser, que según 253e 7-254b 1 son dominios respectivos del filósofo y del sofista, por lo que resulta aplicable a estos últimos. En cuanto a la dificultad de percibir con claridad tanto al filósofo como al sofista, en un

caso se debe a la luminosidad, en el otro caso a la oscuridad del ámbito en que se actúa.

43. ———. 2006. "La crítica platónica a oradores, poetas y sofistas. Hitos en la conceptualización de la mímesis." Estudios de Filosofía no. 9:34-28.
Resumen: "Este trabajo se ocupa de la crítica de Platón a oradores, poetas y sofistas. Su propósito es mostrar que independientemente de las características que singularizan una batalla de vasto alcance librada por el filósofo en tres frentes distintos, la noción de imitación (mímesis) proporciona un hilo conductor que permite vincular esos diferentes enfrentamientos y arrojar luz sobre la reacción de Platón ante quienes identifica, peyorativamente, como imitadores. La práctica adulatoria del orador en Gorgias, no menos que el quehacer del poeta puesto en tela de juicio en República y el del sofista en el diálogo homónimo tendrían, en efecto, una naturaleza mimética. Esto no impide reconocer, junto a los puntos de continuidad, diferencias significativas en los tratamientos de la mímesis que ofrecen los tres diálogos aquí considerados."
44. ———. 2013. "Platón vs. Gorgias. El itinerario del Sofista a la luz de la sección gnoseológica del tratado Sobre el no ser." In El filósofo griego frente a la sociedad de su tiempo, edited by Cordero, Nestor-Luis, 152-167. Buenos Aires: Editorial Rhesis.
45. Marino López, Antonio. 1997. "Argumento, silencio y acción en la distinción de filósofo y sofista." Tópicos.Revista de Filosofia no. 12:19-41.
Abstract: "A detailed analysis of the dialogue Sophist shows that the distinction between philosopher and sophist sketched there by Plato is possible by tracing a distinction between dialogue and argument, in which the difference between the recourse to appeararice arid the demand of objectivity plays an important role.
This distinction, on the other hand, is supported by' some main ideas of later Plato's ontology."
46. Martin, José Pablo. 1991. "El Sofista de Platón y el platonismo de Filón de Alejandría." Méthexis no. 4:81-99.

Resumo: "El marco general de 'esta investigación es el de la historia del platnismo. Esta historia comienza de una manera problemática, en cuanto no tenemos noticias coincidentes sobre la primera recepción de la enseñanza platónica, ni sabemos cómo se iniciaron los primeros desplazamientos que habrían de conducir dicha historia hasta Plotino o hasta Agustín de Hipona. En tales desplazamientos actúan decenas de autores de varios tiempos y lugares, cuya documentación ha quedado oscurecida, en b mayoría de los casos, por los repliegues del tiempo. En algunos casos, aunque gocemos de un conocimiento aceptable de los textos de un autor, no se ha logrado todavía darle una ubicación mayoritariamente aceptada por los historiadores del platonismo. Uno de estos casos es Filón de Alejandría"

47. Másmela, Carlos. 1997. "Copia y simulacro en el Sofista de Platón." Tópicos.Revista de Filosofia:163-173.
Abstract: "Within the Sophist, Plato establishes a clear distinction between two types of mimetic art: the copy and the simulacrum.
Such a distinction avoids reducing the image to the faithful reproduction of a sensitive model. The present article aims at making visible the fact that the phantasma (simulacrum), and not the copy, constitutes the starting point of artistic creation."

48. ———. 2006. Dialéctica de la imagen: una interpretación del "Sofista" de Platón. Rubí: Anthropos.
"El libro destaca la concepción dialéctica de la imagen en contraste con las interpretaciones esquemática (Kant), fenomenológica (Husserl) y hermenéutica (Gadamer), así como con la actualidad de la pregunta por la imagen (Gottfried Boehm). Intenta confrontar estas interpretaciones con base en la exposición platónica de la imagen en el Sofista, específicamente en la esencial distinción entre la imagen icónica y la imagen fantasmal. La mayoría de comentaristas de Platón resaltan la prioridad del icono sobre el fantasma. El libro, por el contrario, muestra que una comprensión icónica de la imagen sólo puede comprenderse a partir de la técnica de una imagen

fantasmal. Cuestión que se aborda en las tres partes de la obra: en la primera, se expone el significado de los dos tipos de imagen; en la segunda, se presenta un análisis pormenorizado del concepto de dialéctica en el Sofista; y en la tercera, se elabora una dialéctica del fantasma con base en la otredad."

49. Mié, Fabian. 2004. Dialéctica, predicación y metafísica en Platón. Investigaciones sobre el Sofista y los diálogos tardíos. Cordoba: Ediciones del Copista.
"A las investigaciones sobre la filosofía platónica tardía está reservado actualmente un amplio espectro de legítimos objetivos, intereses y metodologías conforme a las perspectivas filosóficas privilegiadas. A un estudio como éste, que persigue examinar la validez de la versión ofrecida por el "platonismo" contenido en la "metafísica de los dos mundos", que está asociada a una restringida interpretación de la teoría de las ideas, se ofrece hoy una amplia gama de aportes críticos como herramienta de trabajo. Las siguientes investigaciones pretenden identificar componentes fundamentales de la filosofía de los diálogos platónicos tardíos sobre cuya determinación no está permitido pactar nada de antemano a fin de poner en cuestión esa base de preconceptos que, a lo largo de la inmensa historia de la recepción de la filosofía platónica, operan como peligrosos "sobreentendidos" especulativos." (Introducción, p. I)

50. Monserrat Molas, Josep. 2013. "Figuras de la filosofía en el Teeteto y en El sofista de Platón." La Torre del Virrey: revista de estudios culturales no. 14:53-56.
"En esta escena inicial de El sofista se define el papel del filósofo como parecido al de la divinidad: mirar (observar) elmundo desde las alturas. La referencia socrática a la comedia aristofánica Las nubes parece plausible. De algún modo, la filosofía es algo que presenta este aspecto de estar en las nubes. En la Apología, el acusador más antiguo que Sócrates trae a colación es, sin ninguna duda, Aristófanes; recordemos además cómo aparece ridiculizada la figura del filósofo en el centro del Teeteto.
A la luz de las escenas iniciales del relato de Teeteto y de El sofista, vemos, pues, que la escena inicial de El político

retoma la voluntad socrática de examinar a los jóvenes discípulos atenienses del extranjero Teodoro, que este examen es un intento de corrección de la sabiduría aparente que el maestro de geometría enseña a sus discípulos, y que los caracteres de los jóvenes están dibujados con ciertas aptitudes y ciertas deficiencias para el ejercicio al que Sócrates les quiere someter. Pero Sócrates cede su posición al Extranjero." (p. 55)

51. Mouján, Raimundo Fernández. 2020. "No existe la separación. Algunas continuidades entre el poema de Parmenides y el Sofista de Platón." Signos Filosóficos no. 22:8-33.
Resumen: "En varios pasajes de su poema, Parménides identifica al no ser con la separación: “No podrás obligar a lo que es a separarse de lo que es”. No es posible no ser significa así que no existe corte o franja al interior de lo que es por la que pase el no ser. No existe separación ontológica. Platón apoya esta idea: en el Sofista dice que la separación es a-filosófica, y consecuentemente define al ser como capacidad de relación. ¿No hay acaso una suerte de “deducción” a seguir, una que va del es parmenídeo a la dúnamis koinonías platónica, pasando justamente por la imposibilidad de la separación ontológica como dato central? ¿Y no podemos identificar gracias a esta continuidad una prevención fundamental contra todo sustancialismo, contra toda concepción según la cual el mundo estaría hecho de sustancias separadas entre sí? Me propongo pensar esa continuidad para analizar cómo la lectura conjunta del poema de Parménides y el Sofista de Platón permite hablar de un rechazo fundamental de toda filosofía sustancialista."
52. Muriete, Matías. 2020. "A pesar de existir realmente: sobre la reivindicación del arte en Sofista y su inexorable destino en Leyes." In Simposio AAFA IV - Educación, arte y política en la filosofía antigua. Actas del IVº Simposio Nacional de la Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua-AAFA, edited by Suñol, Viviana and Berrón, Manuel, 377-384. Santa Fe: Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua.

Resumen: "En el presente trabajo se analizará cómo la redefinición ontológica de Sofista 247d8 afecta directamente al esquema político del arte que Platón plantea en República II y X y lo conduce al que se ve en Leyes II. En estos últimos dos diálogos, la intención es establecer una serie de lineamientos que guíen el rol social y político del arte. Dado que entre ambos se sitúa el Sofista y, en particular, el pasaje 247d8,
veremos en este trabajo cómo en Leyes no hay una argumentación de tipo onto-gnoseológica basada en la cadena imitativa desde la verdadera realidad hacia la obra de arte para justificar la censura de ciertos artistas. Es precisamente a causa de que se ha reestructurado la noción de "ser" (tò ón) y el andamiaje ontológico que los lineamientos políticos y morales hacia el arte en Leyes tienen la posibilidad de cobrar
aún más vigor, aún más sentido, y estar aún más justificados que antes."

53. Nova, Ana Bertha. 1992. "Ciertas cuestiones sobre el εἴδωλον." Tópicos.Revista de Filosofia no. 2:139-152.
"Los diversos problemas suscitados por el εἴδωλον en la filosofía de Platón no nos habían parecido tan importantes. Sin embargo, cuando se analiza qué papel tiene en su gnoseología vemos que nos remite a cuestiones fundamentales, que requieren una explicación. Por una parte, se le ve como un intermedio entre el mundo sensible y la realidad a que pretende remitimos y, por otra, tiene peculiaridades que hay que reconocer para acercamos a su naturaleza y las consecuencias que implica. Esta es la diferencia más obvia que hay en el nivel inmediato de su comprensión, pero parece que la manera como está en el Sofista se encamina a mostrar la implicación de problemas más complejos." (p. 139)
54. Palazzo, Ana Julia Fernández. 2020. "Una relectura a partir del curso sobre el Sofista de la crítica de Heidegger al pensamiento de Platón en torno a la cuestión del ser." Hybris. Revista de Filosofía no. 11:175-185.
Resumen: "En el presente trabajo nos proponemos analizar la crítica de Heidegger al pensamiento de Platón en torno a

la cuestión del ser con el objetivo de mostrar que, si bien esta varía a lo largo de los años en sus puntos de vista, las objeciones son las mismas que ya aparecen en el curso sobre el Sofista. A su vez intentaremos definir la naturaleza de la relación entre ambos pensadores, es decir, si lo planteado por Platón en torno a la cuestión del ser estaba, dada la valoración general eminentemente negativa que Heidegger realiza de su filosofía, efectivamente alejado de la postura del autor de Ser y Tiempo o si, por el contrario, Heidegger pudo haber encontrado en él una fuente de inspiración gracias a la cual habría desarrollado los conceptos fundamentales de su propia filosofía."

55. Pascual, Fernando. 2015. "Educación y comunicación en el Sofista de Platón." Alpha Omega no. 18:23-60.
"Introducción
Estudiar a Platón permite profundizar numerosos temas de gran importancia para la filosofía y para tantos otros ámbitos de la vida humana, especialmente aquellos que se refieren al mundo educativo.
En la línea de una serie de artículos publicados en los años pasados, el presente estudio quiere recoger y sintetizar ideas y reflexiones sobre la educación y la comunicación que podemos encontrar a través de una lectura analítica del Sofista de Platón. El esquema adoptado es el siguiente: tras una sección dedicada a la presentación de los datos esenciales de este diálogo platónico, se analizan aquellos contenidos que más tienen que ver con nuestro argumento, para luego ofrecer algunas reflexiones conclusivas sobre la teoría dialógica que podemos encontrar en este texto." (p. 23)
56. Pedrero, Rosa. 1995. "Comentario a Platón, Sofista 261 d ss." In De Homero a Libanio: estudios actuales sobre textos griegos, edited by López Férez, Juan Antonio, 273-280. Madrid: Ed. Clásicas.
57. Pino Posada, Juan Pablo. 2006. "La caza del filósofo: Comentarios al Sofista de Platón." Estudios de Filosofia no. 33:123-141.
Resumen: "El siguiente pasaje del Sofista ilustra el asunto de este ensayo: "¿O ocaso inadvertidamente hemos caído,

por Zeus, en la ciencia de los hombres libres, y, buscando al sofista, corremos el riesgo de haber encontrado primero al filósofo?" (253c5-10). Que el extranjero de Elea se tope sorpresivamente con el filósofo en una conversación que pretende ofrecer una definición del sofista, insinúa lo poco inadvertida que resultaba para Platón la cercanía entre el "hombre libre" y su imitador. En el Sofista, el interés platónico se centra en poner de manifiesto esta cercanía y a la vez definir sus límites haciendo que el primero cace al segundo. El presente artículo explora el sentido de la caza atendiendo a las singularidades de 1) el procedimiento formal que sigue; 2) la pregunta que la gula; 3) la cualidad de espíritu que demanda; 4) las palabras con que los interlocutores la nombran; y 5) la "noble" presa que termina encontrando. "

58. Ramírez Vidal, Gerardo. 2008. "El Sofista y el filósofo en Platón." Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica no. 46:49-59.
Resumen: "En sus orígenes el término σοφιστής se empleó como el sustantivo del adjetivo σοφός o como sinónimo de ó σοφός. Asimismo, en el siglo V. aquel sustantivo se empleó, en general, para designar a grandes pensadores anteriores y contemporáneos indistintamente, pero también se utilizó, sobre todo en Aristófanes, de manera irónica, para ridiculizar a maestros como Sócrates, que era un 'sofista' en el sentido que entonces se daba a esa palabra. A su vez, φι˘λόσοφος se empleaba como sinónimo de σοφιστής. Platón modificó el sentido y las relaciones estructurales de los tres términos. Es decir, llevó a cabo operaciones de resignificacián y de disociación: reformuló los sentidos de los términos φι˘λόσοφος y σοφιστής haciéndolos antitéticos. Como puede observarse en los diálogos, la resignificación se realizó de manera paulatina, y la oposición entre los términos no fue completa sino vacilante. Platón prefirió llamarse a sí mismo φι˘λόσοφος y σοφισταί a sus adversarios. Fue así como se crearon los nuevos conceptos y nació la filosofía."
59. Segura, carmen. 1994. "Analitica dei logicismo platónico." Anuario filosófico no. 27:461-481.

Abstract: "Is Plato a logicist? A comparative study between The Republic and The Sophist shows at one side how Plato maintains the transcendence of Good over the rest of the Ideas conserving it in this manner not just like a form but as that which made possible the Ideas and the intelligibility of all that is. On the other hand one notice in The Sophist that being which Plato is talking about is surely the being (and not being) of propositions. Being is for Plato like an Idea, but this doesn't imply logicism because in his thought there's a place for a Foundation, a Principle -the Good- which transcends all the forms: which made possible also "the seen" and seeing itself."

60. Soares, Lucas. 2002/2003. "Sobre el epigrafe de Ser y tiempo." Espaciod de critica y producción no. 29:58-64.
"Hay una parte del Ser y tiempo que suele pasarse de largo. Me refiero puntualmente al epígrafe que enmarca esta obra. Allí Heidegger cita un breve pasaje del Sofista de Platón [244a] como antecedente del hilo conductor que recorre todo su tratado: la
pregunta que interroga por el sentido del ser.
(...)
"Este epígrafe al comienro de Ser y tiempo nos abre un horizonte de interrogantes:¿cuál es el tema del Sofista? ¿Qué afinidades guarda este diálogo tardío de Platón con la problemática fundamental que atraviesa Ser y tiempo? En una palabra: ¿cuál es el propósito de Heidegger al iniciar su tratado con dicho epígrafe?" (pp. 58-59)

61. ———. 2013. "Los paradigmas politicos de República a la luz de las técnicas miméticas del Sofista." Méthexis no. 26:59-82.
Abstract: "Of all the themes running through the Sophist, in this paper I am interested in focusing on the definitions, particularly on the seventh of these, as in its attempt to hunt the sophist and distinguish his own particular activity, Plato may therein make important references to the "technique of producing images" (eidolopoiike techne). It is in the context of this seventh definition of the sophist as a 'wizard' (goes) and 'imitator' (mimetes), belonging to the "genre of the illusionists" who perform illusions in their discourses,

where Plato mentions the examination of such a productive human technique of an imitative nature (mimetike) and, what interests me, the explanation of its potential divisions (eikastike and phantastike) in order to include the sophist in one of these. The drama of the original and the image that the Sophist stages, and whose inclusion leads to a new reworking in the domain of mimetics, will allow us, in making it extensive in the specific case of poetic mimesis, to corroborate from another perspective the counterpoint between poetic paradigms (traditional and platonic) which can be deduced from books II, III and X of The Republic."

62. Sonna, Valeria. 2017. "Ouk éstin antilégein: Antístenes tras la máscara de Parménides en el Sofista de Platón." Eidos no. 27:15-38.
Resumen: "El tema principal de este trabajo es la posición que suele atribuirse a Antístenes de que es imposible contradecir (ouk éstin antilégein) o decir falsedades (pseúdesthai) y su vinculación con el problema metafísico central del Sofista, el del No Ser. La imposibilidad de contradecir es presentada como la posición opuesta a la de la sofística entendida como contradictor (antilogikós) en Sof., 232b y ss., cuyo relativismo es asociado con la figura de Protágoras, más específicamente con su tesis de que sobre cualquier cuestión hay dos argumentos opuestos entre sí. Nos proponemos argumentar a favor de la hipótesis de que esta posición que en el diálogo es atribuida a Parménides es la de Antístenes, discípulo de Sócrates y rival teórico de Platón."
63. Spangenberg, Pilar. 2004. "Acerca de la relación entre ser y lógos en el Sofista." In Diálogo con los griegos. Estudios sobre Platón, Aristóteles y Plotino, edited by Santa Cruz, María Isabela, E., Marcos. Graciela and Di Camillao, Silvana G., 93-110. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad.
"A fin de comprender el planteo conlra el cual Platón elabora su prueba de la falsedad en el Sofista, en la sección I me referiré a los argumentos presentados en el Eutidemo, a través de los cuales el sofista negaba la posibilidad del discurso falso. Tales argumentos, a mi entender, representan la postulación más clara y mas completa de la

paradoja de lo falso, y por eso contribuyen a esclarecer la formulación del problema en el Sofista. En la sección II analizaré brevemente la concepción del discurso de Sofista 261d 1-263a 11, pasaje en el cual Platón introduce la distinción entre nombre y verbo de la que se servirá con el objetivo de dar cuenta de la posibilidad de lo lo falso. Un análisis del tratamiento de la falsedad en la sección III permitirá un examen de la relación que establece Platón entre ser y lógos. Una vez aclarada tal relación a partir de la consideración del enunciado falso, en IV me referiré a otro aspecto de la relación entre ser y lógos, enfocando esta vez no el enunciado, sino el nombre en su relación con el ser. Asimismo, me referiré allí a las interpretaciones que consideran que Platón se hizo eco sin más de la adhesión sofistica entre ser y nombre, interpretaciones que serán discutidas en la sección V a partir del análisis de un nuevo sentido de "ser" introducido por Platón. Tal sentido permitiría dar razón de ojetos que no cuentan con una existencia efectiva al margen del discurso, pero que sin embargo son. Finalmente, ofreceré algunas conclusiones." (pp. 93-94)

64. ———. 2018. "Lenguaje y acceso al ser en el Sofista." In ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι – Ways to think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero, edited by Spangengerg, Pilar and Pulpito, Massimo, 385-394. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia. Resumo: "El trabajo analiza las razones que pudieron conducir a Platón a equiparar el algo (ti) y el ente (on) en el marco del Sofista e intenta exhibir que es la primacía conferida al lenguaje como vía privilegiada de acceso al ser una de las razones fundamentales de tal equiparación. Sirviéndose de algunas tesis de Cordero en relación con la concepción del ser como forma relacional, muestra la emergencia de una concepción de ser de alcance universal en el Sofista: el acento, según se intenta mostrar, no está puesto en este diálogo en una consideración vertical del ser atada a una fundamentación, sino en una horizontalidad plena determinada por el lenguaje."

65. ———. 2020. "Dialéctica y refutación en el Sofista de Platón." Plato Journal no. 20:7-20.

Abstract: "The dialectic exhibited in Plato's dialogues assumes different characters throughout the corpus. Nevertheless, it remains always linked to refutation. In this way, like dialectic, refutation assumes different characteristics. The aim of this work is to show how refutation takes a key role in the Sophist, even with unique features: far from facing an opponent of flesh and blood as in Socratic dialogues, the Eleatic Stranger faces hypotheses, and instead of examining consistence within the opponent's beliefs, he draws upon a radical mechanism that focuses in the conditions of possibility of the (opponent's) discourse."

66. Spangengerg, Pilar. 2017. "Antecedentes de algunos lineamientos de la estrategia de Aristóteles frente al negador del principio de no contradicción en el Sofista de Platón." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 38:83-105.
Abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to show that in the Sophist Plato develops a dialectical strategy that appeals to necessary conditions of language as a fundamental step toward establishing some principles of his ontology. This strategy constitutes a clear antecedent of the elenctic refutation offered by Aristotle in Metaphysics Gamma 4 against the denier of the principle of noncontradiction and could be described as transcendental because it refers to conditions without which there wouldn't be any speech. The paper aims to show that such a strategy is used both by Plato and Aristotle to deal with radical adversaries whose refutation allows the establishment of basic theses of their own philosophies."
67. Spinassi, Miguel Angel. 2014. "El extranjero de Elea y la « Sofística de noble linaje » (Platón, Sofista 230 E5-231 B8)." Exemplaria Classica no. 18:29-46.
Resumen: "El siguiente artículo tiene que ver con el famoso pasaje de Sofista 230e5-231b8.
Mi hipótesis fundamental sostiene que no sería el sofista quien aparece en la sexta definición como practicante del élenkhos, sino el verdadero filósofo, representado en el diálogo por la figura del Extranjero de Elea."
68. Tonti, Silvia Liliana. 1999. "La crítica del « Gorgias » a la retórica sofística y su relación con la primera definición de

sofista en el diálogo homónimo." Synthesis:115-135.
"Tratar de dilucidar cuál es el objetivo que persigue la retórica, es uno de los problemas que ha preocupado a Platón en el Gorgias." (p. 115)
(...)
"Con tal propósito, examinaré la crítica a la retórica sofística que procura el Gorgias al tiempo que procuraré establecer una conexión con la primera definición de sofista que Platón brinda en el diálogo homónimo." (p. 116)
(...)
"En el caso del Sofista, exhibiré aquellos aspectos metodológicos, particularmente aquellas cuestiones que tienen que ver con el procedimiento definicional por divisiones dicotómicas. Sugeriré, a propósito de la cuestión, que en el Gorgias pueden rastrearse los indicios del procedimiento por división dicotómica desarrollado en diálogos posteriores, dado que hay un intento por establecer -aunque prematuramente- aquellos requisitos necesarios que debe satisfacer una definición, a través de la clasificación sistemática de los significados involucrados en el término que se busca definir." (p. 116)

69. ———. 2001. "La alteridad y el problema del status de los mégista géne en el Sofista de
Platon: principales con Enéada III 6 y VI 2,." Congreso Nacional de Filosofía no. 10:174-176.

70. ———. 2002. "La doble función de la alteridad, su aporte y su relevancia en el terreno metodológico del Sofista de Platón." Revista de Filosof´ıa y Teor´ıa Pol´ıtica, no. 34:337-349.
En este trabajo me ocupo de la doble función de la alteridad en el terrenometodológico del Sofista de Platón. Este examen supone precisar, por una parte, (I) cómo juega el no ser así entendido en el procedimiento de división dicotómica (Sof. 218 b-231 e5), que pone en práctica la búsqueda de la definición. Dicho mecanismo definicional es novedoso con relación a los diálogos tempranos y de madurez. En este caso, si bien Platón apela a este procedimiento sin haber demostrado aún la existencia del no ser como alteridad, esta concepción parece estar en

germen. En este contexto, intentaré mostrar, se exhibe una función “diferenciadora” de la alteridad en el terreno metodológico.
Por otra parte, (II) advierto igualmente de manera anticipada otro rol decisivo de la alteridad en la caracterización platónica de la dialéctica, como ciencia de la combinación de los géneros-formas inteligibles (Sof. 253 d4-e2). En este caso, mostraré que una función “combinativa” de la alteridad permite inferir indirectamente -ya que toda combinación reposa sobre la base de la diferenciación- cuál es la capacidad de relación mutua entre los géneros-formas.
Finalmente, si se acepta mi interpretación, las conclusiones destacarán un papel decisivo de la alteridad en el terreno metodológico. Pero, además, doble sería la función que cumple el no ser así entendido en el terreno mencionado." (pp. 337-338, notas omitidas)

71. Villar, Francisco. 2020. "No-ser, falsedad y contradicción: la segunda demostración erística del Eutidemo y el problema de lo falso en el Sofista." Revista de Filosofía no. 58:11-37.
Resumen: "Este trabajo lleva a cabo una lectura de Eutidemo 283c-288b a la luz del problema de la falsedad en el Sofista. Mi hipótesis será que la segunda demostración erística del Eutidemo puede ser interpretada como una representación de Sofista 236d-239b: mientras que allí es el Extranjero el que evoca lo que el sofista diría para defenderse de la séptima definición, donde se le acusa de producir falsedades, en el Eutidemo son dos sofistas quienes emplean las nociones de no-ser y falsedad para refutar dicha acusación. La exposición tendrá tres partes. En la primera analizaré Sofista 236d-239b y lo contextualizaré en el marco de la séptima definición. En la segunda me concentraré en la caracterización de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro en tanto sofistas.
En la tercera analizaré los tres argumentos que organizan la segunda demostración del Eutidemo, intentando dar cuenta de su estructura y su rol en la economía dramática del diálogo."

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Bibliografia

1. Alves, Alexandre. 2021. "Método e discurso filosófico no diálogo O Sofista de Platão." Princípios: Revista de Filosofia no. 28:131-142.
   Resumo: "Por sua discussão da questão do não-ser e por sua intenção de fundamentar o discurso filosófico, o diálogo Sofista ocupa uma posição central na história da filosofia. O objetivo deste artigo é relacionar o método de definição empregado por Platão no diálogo Sofista (a diérese) com sua concepção do discurso filosófico. As diferentes definições para o sofista propostas no diálogo não são somente parte da polêmica de Platão contra a sofística, mas fundamentam a própria concepção platônica do filósofo e do discurso filosófico. Enquanto a dialética seria o método empregado pelo filósofo para chegar ao conhecimento e à sabedoria, a sofística seria apenas imitação do verdadeiro conhecimento e da verdadeira sabedoria."
2. Arêas, James Bastos. 2013. "O estatuto ontológico da imagem no Sofista de Platão." Tríade: Revista de Comunicação, Cultura e Mídia no. 2:399-411.
   Resumo: "A análise da mimesis, no Sofista de Platão, nos conduz, como em um círculo, da linguagem à imagem, da “linguagem imagem” à imitação; da possibilidade da imitação à afirmação do “ser” do não-ser e à realidade do falso. O exame do estatuto ontológico da imagem requer, portanto, a análise desses três principais problemas que a

imitação pressupõe. A imagem traz consigo, por sua índole, um turbilhão de questões; desdobra, em sua fulguração, intermináveis impasses."

3. Barbosa Dias, José Ricardo. 2010. "O Ser no "Sofista" de Platáo." Kalagatos: Revista de Filosofia no. 7:58-75.
   Resumo: "Platão, no “Sofista”, busca melhor determinar os gêneros do ser e a relação entre eles a fim de capturar o não-ser como sendo. Em nosso artigo visamos, em meio a essa busca de Platão, a sua tese sobre o ser.
   Com isso enfatizamos a relação de entrelaçamento do ser com o não-ser como “lugar” no qual essa tese se dá. Para tanto, nos mantemos num triplo movimento como constituindo o todo do diálogo platônico em questão: O Sofista e o não-ser; Platão e Parmênides; e Ser e discurso. Somente então apontamos para o que consideramos essencial na tese em questão: o caráter de ambigüidade e primazia do ser."
4. Bocayuva, Izabela. 2014. "Entre o Parmênides e o Sofista de Platâo." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 16:62-72.
   Resumo: "A teoria platônica das ideias sofreu uma crítica contundente, em primeiro lugar, pelo próprio Platão. Isso fica mais do que claro no diálogo Parmênides, onde uma personagem homônima evidencia as aporias inevitáveis de uma suposta dicotomização da realidade e da proposta da participação como uma saída para o relacionamento entre os dois polos criados pela metafísica platônica. No âmbito da primeira aporia que vem à tona na primeira parte do Parmênides, encontra-se a questão da possibilidade, ou não, da ideia de coisas desprezíveis tais como cabelo, lama e sujeira, questão essa que nos incomoda e exige investigação. Arriscamos a hipótese de que na segunda parte do diálogo Parmênides e ainda na inaugural proposta ontológica contida no Sofista podemos perceber uma saída para esse passo aporético."
5. Borges de Araújo Junior, Anastácio. 2007. "Heidegger e o Sofista de Platão." Revista de Estudos Filosóficos e Históricos da Antiguidade no. 22/23:31-45.
   Resumo: "Entre os vários pensadores que, no panorama filosófico atual, retomaram a Antigüidade, Martin

Heidegger, seguramente, ocupa uma posição de destaque. Ainda que muitas de suas interpretações acerca do pensamento antigo sejam controversas entre os especialistas, parecem incontornáveis muitas de suas lições e seminários. Nosso trabalho tomará como tema as lições de Heidegger, ocorridas durante o semestre de inverno [1924 – 1925], acerca do diálogo Sofista de Platão. O Mestre de Fribourg deixa explícito na sua exegese do diálogo Sofista, e isto parece aplicar-se a suas interpretações dos textos da tradição filosófica em geral, que ele não tem uma intenção histórica, na medida em que ele parece não se preocupar em reconstituir o pensamento platônico, mas antes, seguir o trabalho do pensamento, desobstruir suas tendências imanentes, pensar ao lado do texto e assim tentar elucidá-lo. Nosso trabalho procurará caracterizar a exegese heideggeriana acerca do Sofista de Platão, a partir de uma dupla perspectiva: por um
lado, mostrar que suas interpretações acerca do pensamento antigo parecem, do ponto de vista daquilo que estudamos e investigamos na história da filosofia, discutíveis, para não dizer inaceitáveis, e, por outro lado, essas mesmas interpretações, do ponto de vista filosófico, parecem revigorar os textos antigos ao atualizar seus conceitos."

6. Braga da Silva, André Luiz. 2011. "Dificuldade e beleza em um parricídio que não há (Platão, Sofistam 236e-237a)." Hypnos no. 26:146-159.
   Resumo: "Trata-se de investigar acerca da relação do Estrangeiro de Eléia, personagem do Sofista, com o filósofo Parmênides de Eléia, a quem ele chama de “pai”. O foco desta análise é a idéia de refutação ou “parricídio” do último nas mãos do primeiro. Tal refutação diria respeito ao reconhecimento que faz o Estrangeiro de certa realidade do não ser, a qual havia sido totalmente interdita pelo mestre eleata. O estudo defenderá a idéia de inexistência de refutação, ou parricídio do filósofo eleata, por parte de seu discípulo."
7. Cavalcante Brígido, Anúzia Gabrielle. 2016. "O cão versus o lobo ou qual a diferença entre Platão e Górgias?" Phaine.

Revista de Estudos Filosóficos e Históricos da Antiguidade no. 1:17-23.
Resumo: "Não raras vezes os chamados “sofistas” são interpretados a partir da caracterização presente nos diálogos de Platão e esta mesma caracterização não é de todo abandonada, ainda quando essas interpretações se propõem a partir diretamente dos textos dos "sofistas" - estabelecidos em séculos bem mais próximos de nós que deles - na tentativa de reabilitar suas imagens ou discordar de Platão. Parece-nos que, a despeito disso ou exatamente por isso, existe um certo consenso em torno do conceito de “sofista” ser uma criação platônica e de não podermos nos fiar em sua caracterização se quisermos chegar a uma compreensão mais adequada do pensamento de determinado “sofista”. Partindo disso, o presente trabalho pretende esboçar alguns questionamentos sobre o significado dessa caracterização e caça ao “sofista” efetuadas por Platão. Mais especificamente, usaremos a imagem de Górgias criada por Platão para sugerir que Platão parece não só não estar interessado simplesmente em interpretar e criticar as teses "sofísticas" em nome de um saber pretensamente desinteressado, como muitas vezes se utiliza das mesmas estratégias discursivas dos "sofistas"."

8. da Silva, José Lourenço Pereira. 2001. "A definição da imagem no Sofista de Platão." Cadernos de Atas da ANPOF (Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia):71-78.
"A noção de imagem, no Sofista, guarda as mais desconcertantes dificuldades." (p. 71)
(...)
"Tudo isso implica a fundamental distinção entre o ser e o não-ser pros ti, que faz com que o ser em um certo sentido não seja (ser uma certa determinação equivale a não ser uma outra) e o não-ser de algum modo seja (não ser uma certa determinação equivale a ser uma outra). Atinando, assim, à polisse-mia do ser, antes mesmo de Aristóteles, Platão pôs as condições de possibilida-de do não-ser e, por conseqüência, da falsidade. Não porém do não-ser como contrário do ser, o medamos on, que foi abandonado já no

começo da discus-são, mas do não-ser como diferente (do ser), de sorte que falar o falso, embora seja enunciar o que não é, não consiste na absurda enunciação de nada, mas simplesmente na afirmação de um fato, estado ou ação que não é o caso pre-sente, mas outro." (p. 77-78)

9. ———. 2019. "O problema do um multiplo ou de como Platão se liberta das injunçoes eleaticas no Sofista." Revista de estudos FilosóFicos e Históricos da antiguidade no. 34:23-35.
Resumo: "Neste artigo, procuro mostrar como a colocação do problema do um e do múltiplo e a hipótese da participação mútua das Formas para respondê-lo no Sofista significam um decisivo afastamento por parte de Platão da ontologia e lógica eleática. Rejeitando a noção do ser absoluto e o princípio de identidade intransigente de Parmênides, que não permitiam afirmar senão tautologias, o Estrangeiro trata do problema do um e do múltiplo no plano do inteligível para mostrar que a concomitância do um e do múltiplo que nossos discursos expressam se apoia no fato de que as próprias Formas, que na ontologia do Banquete, República e Fédon foram concebidas tal como o ser de Parmênides, mantêm relações mútuas que torna cada qual, ao mesmo tempo, una e múltipla. O reconhecimento do fenômeno da relação como inerente à constituição dos verdadeiros seres só foi possível mediante o rompimento com a lógica e a ontologia eleática e sua crença no ser absoluto que a tudo pretendia imobilizar na sua unidade e auto-identidade. O Estrangeiro libertou o ser das amarras que impossibilitavam o contato com o Outro. Reconhecendo o modo de ser em relação (pros allo), compatível com o modo de ser em si (kath auto), o diálogo Sofista não só superou as injunções parmenideana, mas também refinou a ontologia das Formas que Sócrates havia defendido."

10. da Silva, José Wilson. 2021. "Elenchos e educação moral no Sofista de Platão." Argumentos. Revista de Filosofia no. 13:43-53.
Resumo: "Uma das características marcantes de Sócrates é o seu modo de examinar. Através da investigação apoiada em

uma série de perguntas intercaladas por respostas de um interlocutor, Sócrates segue um caminho de negação das teses que lhes são apresentadas até chegar a um total impasse nesta busca. Sócrates chama de elenchos (refutação) ao seu procedimento habitual e ficou bem conhecido pelo o que nos é apresentado nos primeiros diálogos de Platão. Por outro lado, há no diálogo Sofista, na sexta definição, a associação do elenchos à atividade sofística e, ainda, é apresentado como um método educacional. Estes dois casos são matéria de debate entre os estudiosos, que consideram que o elenchos nesta passagem do Sofista não é o mesmo método dos primeiros diálogos de Platão, principalmente, por ser considerado um método educacional; já o elenchos dos primeiros diálogos serviria apenas para mostrar que o interlocutor sustenta opiniões conflitantes sobre os assuntos morais. Pretendemos, portanto, mostrar que Platão não está apresentando uma nova compreensão do elenchos e, ainda, que já era pensado como um método educacional em diálogos anteriores."

11. ———. 2021. "Sobre valor moral e correçao intellectual no Sofista de Platão." Trans/Form/Ação no. 4:149-176.
Resumo: "Platão, no diálogo Sofista, argumenta que a vergonha tem a capacidade de fazer que umindivíduo mude sua opinião. Além disso, a vergonha não opera apenas uma mudança qualquer, mas o abandono de uma opinião falsa, retirando-a do caminho que leva ao conhecimento. Contudo, é argumentado que o erro intelectual é corrigido pelo ensino e não por um valor moral. Pretendese explicar como a vergonha pode ter essa função de uma positiva mutação mental, contribuindo desta forma para a obtenção do conhecimento. A interação entre valor moral e capacidade cognitiva é possibilitada pelo conceito de imagem e fealdade."
12. de Aguiar Menezes Neto, Nelson. 2013. "Uma leitura do prólogo do Sofista de Platão." Calíope Presença Clássica no. 30:48-62.
Resumo "O Sofista é um diálogo dramático. De modo semelhante a outros diálogos platônicos, a obra começa com

a cena em ação, em discurso direto, dispensando o papel de um narrador e o uso de terceira pessoa.
Provavelmente por conta de seu estilo, os passos iniciais da obra (216a a 218b) são comumente tomados como "prólogo", sendo entendidos como uma introdução ao diálogo como um todo, cuja investigação filosófica propriamente dita se iniciaria apenas a partir do passo 218b, com a busca pela definição do sofista através do método das dicotomias. Fazendo referência às noções de "prólogo" e de "proêmio", buscamos conferir aos passos iniciais do Sofista um sentido e uma função para além de uma mera introdução. Neles, não se apresenta apenas o projeto de enquadramento do sofista, como também se pode encontrar, de algum modo já esboçado, a sua própria definição. A proposta deste trabalho é desvencilhar-se de uma leitura en passant dos passos iniciais do Sofista, pretendendo uma interpretação que evidencie o seu caráter ao mesmo tempo literário e filosófico."

13. de Souza, Eliane Christina. 1997. " Sobre a teoria da participaçao da Formas no Sofista de Platão." Hypnos no. 2:81-88.
"O objetivo desta apresentação é fazer algumas observações sobre a teoria da participação das formas exposta no Sofista de Platão, abordando especificamente como esta teoria procura resolver o problema da predicação. Neste diálogo, a possibilidade do discurso predicativo é ameaçada por um argumento conhecido como "argumento de Antístenes", segundo o qual é impossível predicar, já que a predicação implica na identificação de duas coisas diferentes. Esta ameaça ao discurso predicativo é, na verdade, uma ameaça à própria possibilidade do discurso filosófico, visto que ela representa um dos pólos de um confronto entre filosofia e sofística com relação ao uso do discurso." (p. 81)
14. ———. 1998. "Platão e Parmênides: notas sobre o « parricídio »." Letras Clássicas no. 2:27-38.
Resumo: ": O "parricídio" que Platão apresenta no Sofista não pretende ser uma negação completa da ontologia de Parmênides, mas a crítica do princípio de não-contradição postulado por Parmênides em seu

Poema, que interdita a união entre ser e não-ser. Após a exposição das dificuldades discursivas a que esta interdição conduz, Platão admite uma ontologia que associa ser e não-ser do mesmo modo como eles estão associados no plano discursivo."

15. ———. 2009. Discurso e Ontologia em Platão. Um Estudo Sobre o Sofista. São Paulo: Unijui.
Resumo: "Este livro apresenta um exame das condições de possibilidade do discurso informativo sobre o ser esboçadas no Sofista de Platão e da reformulação ontológica sugerida no diálogo para satisfazer estas condições. Ao entender a concepção sofística de discurso como uma ameaça ao caráter informativo da linguagem, o Estrangeiro de Eléia se vê obrigado a reconhecer Parmênides como um forte aliado do sofista contra sua própria compreensão de discurso filosófico: um dizer o que as coisas são. A tarefa do Estrangeiro de Eléia será, então, preservar o caráter objetivista da concepção de discurso de Parmênides e reformular as noções de ser e não-ser e a relação entre ser e discurso, de modo a garantir que a ontologia forneça o fundamento para que o discurso diga o ser."
16. ———. 2010. "Negação e diferença em Platão." Trans/Form/Acao.Revista de Filosofia no. 33:1-18.
Resumo: "Platão, ao tratar da negação no diálogo Sofista, afirma que sempre que enunciamos o que não é, não enunciamos algo contrário ao que é, mas algo diferente. A negação significa cada parte da natureza da diferença em antítese ao que é. Tal tratamento da negação resulta da necessidade de resolver alguns problemas colocados pelo eleatismo. Propõe-se indicar esses problemas e examinar o tratamento que Platão dá ao nãoser como diferença."
17. Engler, M. R. 2021. "Comentário a "Pressuposto ético da alteridade na hermenêutica filosófica a luz do Sofista de Platão": platonismo militante." Trans/Form/Ação no. 44:277-286.
"No artigo de Rohden e Kussler (2021), a associação entre Gadamer e Platão pressupõe o raro e admirável reconhecimento do elemento antitirânico do platonismo, contra todo o ranço conservador com o qual Platão ainda é

lido, em especial no Brasil. Isso faz com que a história de Quíon nos venha inevitavelmente à mente. Os dados que os autores usam para mostrar esse fato são outros, todavia, sua conclusão é a mesma, a saber, que o platonismo implica profundo respeito à diferença, e que tal respeito pode ter sido absorvido na hermenêutica de Gadamer através de um processo de transformação dos princípios do Sofista em noções como alteridade e identidade. No fim, talvez devamos dizer: "Sob o signo de Platão, mas não pelo militarismo prussiano, caro Herr Moellendorff, e sim contra toda a tirania, do passado e do presente!" (pp. 283-284)
(8) Trata-se de famosa afirmação de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920, Nachwort, tradução nossa), no prefácio à sua obra sobre Platão: "Combaterei, sob o signo de Platão, enquanto respirar". Como a análise de Vegetti (2010, p. 114) demonstra, porém, essa luta era em prol de uma versão bastante militarizada da Prússia da época.

18. Flaksman, Ana. 2015. "Notas sobre Heráclito no Teeteto, Banquete e Sofista." Archai no. 15:87-95.
Resumo: "Este artigo, partindo da leitura da primeira parte do Teeteto e de passagens do Banquete e do Sofista, busca examinar de que forma Platão interpretou e transpôs o pensamento de Heráclito. O texto sustenta que Platão não transmitiu de Heráclito a imagem de um mobilista radical, nem dissociou a tese do fluxo de outras teses do Efésio, como a tese da unidade dos opostos, mas, ao contrário, distinguiu as teses de Heráclito das opiniões extremadasde seus adeptos e apresentou uma imagem bastante rica, complexa e multifacetada de seu pensamento."
19. Floriano, Rodrigo César , Franco, José Henrique Fonseca, and Oliveira, Richard Romeiro. 2020. "O problema do erro (pseûdos), a possibilidade do discurso predicativo e a questão ontológica no Sofista de Platão." Investigação Filosófica no. 11:27-38.
Resumo: "O presente artigo analisa as relações entre discurso e ser, estabelecidas de maneira dialética por Platão em seu diálogo tardio Sofista. Como se sabe, os sofistas defendiam a impossibilidade de provar a falsidade ou verdade de qualquer discurso. Tais pensadores basearam-se

no interdito ontológico de Parmênides de Eleia, que asseverava a existência de uma correspondência estrita entre dizer e ser, de modo que seria, portanto, impossível dizer algo que não é, isto é, um não-ser. Contrariamente a essa perspectiva e fazendo uso do método da "diaíresis" - no qual os seres são caracterizados por suas diferenças mais fundamentais -, o Sofista se desdobra revisitando e pondo à prova as teorias ontológicas de seu tempo, a fim de explorar uma nova maneira de pensar a relação entre os seres. Com isso, Platão garante a possibilidade de análise qualitativa do discurso predicativo e, consequentemente, define o erro (pseûdos) como desarmonia entre dizer e ser. No intuito de levar a cabo tal empreendimento, o filósofo explica como ocorre o entrelaçamento entre ser e não ser em suas relações básicas, as quais são mediadas pelas seguintes categorias fundamentais: Ser, Mesmo, Outro, Movimento e Repouso. A partir disso, a dialética é finalmente constituída como a técnica correta de diferenciação dos predicados em suas possibilidades de comunicação com cada sujeito. Graças aos resultados filosóficos alcançados por meio desses procedimentos, desenvolveram-se novas reflexões que levaram Aristóteles a instrumentalizar a análise da linguagem."

20. Huguenin, Rafael. 2008. "Sobre alguns empregos do verbo grego ser no Sofista de Platão." O que nos faz pensar no. 24:47-58.
Resumo: "O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer uma breve análise de algumas ocorrências do verbo grego ‘ser’ no Sofista de Platão. Em um primeiro momento, (I) discutiremos algumas abordagens tradicionais de algumas ocorrências do verbo na parte central do Sofista. Depois, (II) faremos uma breve exposição da tese de Jaakko Hintikka acerca da suposta ambiguidade do verbo. Para concluir, (III) mostraremos como o texto pode ser interpretado sem atribuir tais ambiguidades às ocorrências do verbo."
Referências
Hintikka, Jaakko. “Existence and Predication from Aristotle to Frege”. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIII, N. 2, 2006, pp. 359-377.

21. Iglesias, Maura. 2003. "A relaçao necessaria entre a primeira parte e a parte central do Sofista de Platão." Boletim do CPA no. 15:143-156.
"A importância capital das discussões realizadas na segunda parte; sua posição central, literalmente encravada no desenvolvimento do tema explícito do diálogo; a nítida quebra temática entre as duas partes, apesar da continuidade formalmente bem construída entre elas, tudo isso levou Th. Gomperz a uma célebre comparação: a primeira parte seria a casca, a segunda o fruto (citado por Diès na Notice da ed. do Sofista da Collection Budé, Belles Lettres)." (p. 144)
(,...)
"Quando, na primeira parte do diálogo, o Estrangeiro acusou o sofista de ser produtor de imagens no discurso, a sugestão parecia ser que haveria um discurso que não seria imagem. Mas o desenvolvimento das questões levantadas pelo não ser acaba revelando o próprio discurso verdadeiro como imagem, i.e., algo cujo ser consiste em não ser aquilo a que ele se refere, mas que ele faz aparecer por uma relação natural de semelhança entre a tessitura que ele estabelece entre onoma e rhema com a tessitura da coisa de que ele fala, e que ele próprio não é. Diferente do caso das figuras geométricas, o discurso jamais poderia ser entendido como uma imagem de um modelo que seria produto de abstração, uma vez que a coisa dita necessariamente pre-existe ao discurso, sendo um tipo de ser que é intuitivamente reconhecido como independente do discurso que a diz. Assim, fixando o ser do discurso como essencialmente imagem –algo que não é aquilo que faz aparecer– Platão consegue não só provar que há imagens –o que é essencial para sua ontologia, que afirma o sensível como imagem do inteligível–, mas torna o discurso verdadeiro um instrumento de investigação da tessitura do real." (p. 155-156)
22. Machado, Alexandre N. 1999. "Enunciado Falso e Não-Ser no Sofista de Platão." Barbarói no. 11:81-109.
"O presente artigo consiste numa breve reconstrução do problema sofista a respeito da possibilidade de enunciados

falsos e da solução que Platão pretende ter dado a este problema. A solução de Platão é dependente de considerações sobre o ser e o não-ser, dada a sua definição de enunciado falso como aquele que enuncia o não-ser (aquilo que não é). Devido a isso, as considerações de Platão sobre o ser e o não-ser, que são relevantes para a solução do problema do nãoser, também são apresentadas sumariamente. A abordagem dos temas procura seguir a ordem expositiva de Platão." (pp. 82-83)

23. Marques, Aurelio Oliveira. 2019. "A noção de opinião falsa à luz de uma interpretação do não-ser: um problema entre o Teeteto e o Sofista de Platão." Griot: Revista de Filosofía no. 19:122-134.
Resumo: "Embora o Teeteto nos coloque num cenário interpretativo completamente à parte da teoria das Formas, não nos é permitido admitir seu total esquecimento. Conceitos como 'racionalidade' contraposto à percepção sensível, e a 'imprescindibilidade do logos' enquanto discurso que perfaz o conhecimento verdadeiro, são extremamente caros ao Teeteto. Desconsiderar a pertinência e a similaridade do significado destes conceitos desde a maturidade até à velhice, colocar-nos-ia em situação de grande dificuldade explicativa acerca do conhecimento. Assim, é importante destacar que optamos por uma perspectiva intermediária, que por um lado reconhece a ausência de uma argumentação calcada na clássica teoria das Ideias, mas que compreende a obra platônica sob a tutela de uma interpretação sistemática e holística, segundo a qual Platão não abandona os pressupostos metafísicos das Formas inteligíveis. Longe de uma ruptura com o que foi dito anteriormente na maturidade, o Teeteto serve como complementação teórica acerca da ontologia e da epistemologia, embora no Teeteto não haja uma menção direta às noções presentes nos diálogos anteriores e boa parte do tema se apresente por meio de estilo de escrita e vocabulário inusitados. Por fim, mas não menos importante, será feita uma breve análise de alguns trechos dos momentos finais do Sofista com o objetivo de compreender em que medida o aspecto epistemológico, proposto por

Platão no Teeteto, pode ser lido à luz de questões relacionadas ao Ser e ao Não-ser, já que a pergunta pelo 'o que é conhecimento' nos remete também a uma discussão ontológica."

24. Marques Kussler, Leonardo. 2018. "Alteridade no Sofista: ecos platônicos oculto sna proposta ricoeuriana." Problemata. International Journal of Philosophy no. 9:61-69.
Resumo: "No Sofista, Platão já desenvolve princípios argumentativos acerca dos conceitos de identidade e reconhecimento, mesmidade e alteridade. Ao traçar limites entre o que se caracteriza por ser, não ser e a possibilidade de estas grandezas relacionarem-se, Platão explicita, pela voz do estrangeiro, o mesmo e o outro, modos de compreender os entes. Ricoeur, por sua vez, elabora uma teoria tangente ao reconhecimento e à alteridade, do si-mesmo como um outro, uma vez que insiste na necessidade de um outro para a formação e o reconhecimento da identidade. O objetivo, aqui, é remontar alguns aspectos da filosofia ricoeuriana à teoria anteriormente proposta por Platão, enfatizando e defendendo que a) a ideia de alteridade mostra-se presente já no Sofista, dependendo do modo como se interpreta o conceito de ἕτερος [héteros] e b) quais as principais distinções da proposta de Ricoeur com relação à tese platônica, não referenciada diretamente em sua obra. Assim, abriremos o diálogo entre as tradições supracitadas com o fito de alimentar a discussão sobre a possibilidade de defender traços de alteridade ao identificar as definições platônicas e em que medida elas ecoam na proposta hermenêutica e literária de Ricoeur."
25. Marques, Marcelo Pimenta. 2000. "O Sofista: uma fabricação Platônica?" Kriterion no. 41:66-88.
26. ———. 2001. "Imagem e aporia no Sofista de Platão." Classica, Sao Paulo no. 13-14:189-204.
Resumo: "É no contexto da série de aporias relativas à possibilidade de dizer o não-ser, numa perspectiva eleata, aporias derivadas da posicão inicial do problema da produção de imagens, que o Estrangeiro e Teeteto formulam uma definição da imagem que, por sua vez, se apresenta

como uma aporia do não-ser. Meu propósito é compreender o problema da imagem no Sofista articulando-o aos temas da produção (dimensão antropológica) e da aporia (dimensão lógico-ontológica)."

27. ———. 2005. "Phantasia em Platão." Tòpicos no. 28:57-82.
Resum: "Neste artigo, interrogo a noção de phantasia (aparição, representação imagética, simulacro), a partir das ocorrencias do termo no corpus platônico: uma na República, duas no Teeteto, quatro no Sofista e uma no Timeu. De um modo geral, me interessam como objeto de pesquisa as modalidades do "aparecer" nos diálogos de Platão, na medida mesma em que questiono preconceitos e lugares comuns com relação a aparência e o aparecer. Como introdução, me limitarei a alguns comentários a proposito de um clássico."

28. ———. 2006. Platão, pensador da diferença: uma leitura do Sofista. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG.
"Que conclusões tirar quanto ao que concerne aos objetivos, do Sofistá? O desafio proposto no Parmênides é o de demonstrar o entrelaçamento das formas entre si, entrelaçamento que torna possivél a unidade de sua multiplicidade, evitando e superando as ameaças de contradição. A partir do Teeteto, deve-se pensar na busca de uma ciência que ultrapasse os dados de la percepçao sensível e da opinião, levando em conta a diferença entre os seres.
A reflexão epístemológica aporética exige que se aprofunde na compreensão do que é o lógos propriamente dito: como pensá-lo para que ele possa ser tanto verdadeiro, quainto verdadeiramente falso. O Político indica o coração aporético do Sofista, que é a impossibilidaide e a inevitabilidade de se pensar o ser da imagem, justamente aquele ser que é o que não é; sua posiçao exige que se possa estableer o ser do não-ser." (p. 21)
(...)
"Obtenho, assim, os elementos que estruturam meu percurso de leitura do Sofista, em três planos - antropológico. lógico-epistemológico e ontológico: os cidadãos em suas relaçoes (açoes e produções) na cidade,

seus discursos e argumentos enquanto modos de agir e os gêneros maiores ou as formas mteligíveis como objectos de conhecimento que determinam decisivamente seus discursos e açoes. A diferença entre os seres humanos e, em particular, a diferença entre o sofista e o filósofo; a diferença essencial com relaçao ao ser do lógos às contraposiçóes entre lógoi; e, finalmente, a diferença enquanto parte da alteridade inteligível, condição para o entrelaçamento das formas que determina a significaçao dos discursos, sua verdade e sua falsidade.
Posso, assim, dizer que a diferença se revela como a pe3dra de toque da dialéctica, tal como ela é visada non Sofista: uma ciência humana (dos homens livres), da diferenciaçao e da divisâo (nos discursos) dos seres, seguendo os gêneros (as formas)." (p. 22)

29. McCoy, Marina. 2010. Platão e a retórica de filosófs e sofistas. São Paulo: Madras.
Tradução de Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists.
30. Mesti, Diogo Norberto. 2020. "Marques ilustrando as imagens do Sofista de Platão." Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia no. 11:134-149.
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é retomar a leitura de Marcelo Marques do conceito de imagem do Sofista de Platão, tendo como recorte o capítulo sobre a “Aporía” do livro Platão, pensador da diferença. Além de retomar essa leitura, pretende-se reconstruir as pontes sugeridas pelas epígrafes que o comentador retirou de Faulkner e de Guimarães Rosa para ilustrar o estatuto paradoxal das imagens, que são definidas no diálogo platônico como um tipo de ser que é, mas que não é aquilo que é. Com isso, pretende-se avaliar algumas imagens literárias utilizadas para falar de imagens na teoria filosófica de Platão."
31. Oliveira, Claudio. 1999. "Um outro « lógos », um outro sofista: variações em torno de Platão." Kléos no. 2-3:73-83.
"Trata-se, em Platão, de distinguir o sofista do filósofo? Ou talvez, melhor, de distinguir o filósofo do sofista? A diferença é sutil, mas importa.

Qual dos dois, na verdade? Platão não deixa dúvida e ainda menos toda tradição filosófica que segue seus passos: trata-se, muito mais, do segundo caso. O caso: um filósofo atormentado, às voltas e em busca de um princípio que possa distingui-lo do sofista." (p. 73)

32. Oliveira, Lethicia Ouro de. 2014. "A εἰκαστική no Sofista de Platão." Archai: The Origins of Western Thought no. 13:53-60.
Resumo: "No diálogo Sofista de Platão, os personagens Estrangeiro e Teeteto estão à caça da definição do sofista. Ambos concordam em que o sofista produz imitações, ficções.
Seguindo o método dialético, será preciso responder: que tipo de imitação é produzido pela sofística? Para isso, o Estrangeiro divide a mimética em εἰκαστική e φανταστική. Essa divisão, feita sem grandes explicações, gerou, contudo, bastante controvérsia na tradição comentarista. Nesse texto analisaremos a leitura de diferentes comentadores sobre o sentido de um desses gêneros miméticos, a εἰκαστική. Esta análise permitirnos- á posicionarmo-nos entre as vertentes interpretativas e compreender o texto do Sofista com maior acuidade. Por fim, novos direcionamentos serão abertos para apreender o que é a própria filosofia tal como realizada nos diálogos platônicos."

33. ———. 2018. Da Mímesis Divina à Humana: um breve estudo sobre as noções de pintura e escultura nos diálogos Sofista, Timeu e Leis de Platão. Rio de Janeiro: Casa da Editora PUC-Rio.
"Finalizamos assim a expressão de nossa percepção sobre as noções de pintura e escultura nos diálogos Sofista, Timeu e Leis. Nosso intuito foi de construir uma imagem fidedigna, um discurso icástico, mas sempre corremos o risco de nos deixarmos enganar por uma ou outra simulação, artimanha ou brincadeira com palavras e imagens tão do gosto de Platão. Como uma pintura, este estudo é também inacabado e cumprirá seu fim ao despertar o desejo por mais pesquisas e investigações sobre o que são pinturas, esculturas e quais seus poderes na filosofia platônica. E se estas são exemplos claros do que são imagens em geral, uma investigação, por

fim, sobre si mesma, dado o caráter imagético do discurso, pelo qual nos arriscamos a conhecer e divulgar o real no perigo de nos percebermos sofistas e/ou filósofos, dadas todas as variáveis históricas e políticas de ambas as posições." (p. 208)

34. Paviani, Jayme. 1997. "Tópicos para uma leitura de O Sofista." Veritas (Porto Alegre) no. 42:937-943.
Sìntese: "Indicação de tópicos do prólogo de o Sofista considerados relevantes, sob o ponto de vista propedêutico, para o estudo do diálogo na perspectiva do processo diairético. Observações sobre as implicações entre o método, os temas e a estrutura do diálogo."
35. Pereira, Viviane Magalhãe. 2013. "Uma concepção hermenêutica de Filosofia: pensar com o Sofista de Platão e a Metafísica de Aristóteles." XII Semana Acadêmica do PPG em Filosofia da PUCRS:3-10.
Resumo: "Quem trabalha com Filosofia em algum momento se deparou com a dificuldade de defini-la. Mesmo ante as indicações daqueles elementos que caracterizariam a unidade da Filosofia, vemos que a nossa concepção pormenorizada do que ela seja depende da teoria filosófica na qual apoiamos nossas teses. Para defender isso, utilizaremos neste artigo o exemplo de dois textos clássicos que nos influenciam até hoje, a saber, o Sofista de Platão e a Metafísica de Aristóteles. Mostraremos como estes escritos apresentam o exemplo da unidade da Filosofia e da multiplicidade de suas teorias. O que está por trás desses argumentos, no entanto, é uma concepção hermenêutica de Filosofia, segundo a qual principalmente as questões filosóficas são dependentes da linguagem daqueles que com ela estão envolvidos."
36. Rocha, Thomas. 2016. "Saussure: leitor de Platão." Letrônica. Revista Digital do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras da PUCRS no. 9:126-143.
Resumo: "Neste trabalho, propomo-nos a fazer um estudo que coloca em relação a teoria da alteridade, elaborada por Platão no diálogo Sofista, e a teoria do valor linguístico apresentada no Curso de linguística geral (CLG) de Ferdinand de Saussure. Partimos da hipótese levantada por

Oswald Ducrot de que, ao desenvolver a noção de valor linguístico, Saussure aplica ao estudo da linguagem o que Platão disse sobre as Ideias. Profundo conhecedor da filosofia clássica, Ducrot encontrou, na teoria do valor linguístico, a fundamentação que o lançou na pesquisa linguística e que hoje conhecemos pelo nome de Semântica Argumentativa. Segundo Ducrot, na teoria da alteridade concebida por Platão encontramos a origem filosófica da teoria saussuriana do valor. Nossa intenção é, partindo de um estudo minucioso do diálogo Sofista e do CLG, circunscrever a concepção de diferentes conceitos que, por sua vez, pertencem a diferentes campos do conhecimento: a filosofia e a linguística. Dessa forma, é de uma perspectiva epistemológica que nos colocamos. Foi através desses textos que Ducrot pode relacionar a ideia de alteridade com a noção de valor, ao encontrar, em ambas, a ideia de "oposição" como constitutiva das entidades a serem analisadas. De modo que, ao investigar e aprofundar a noção de valor, tentamos explicitar as influências filosóficas que fundamentaram o conceito desenvolvido pelo linguista genebrino."

37. Rodrigues Pimenta, Danilo. 2013. "Ontologia, linguagem e techné no Sofista de Platão." Plêthos no. 3:8-16.
Resumo: "O presente texto pretende discorrer sobre a ontologia e a linguagem no Sofista de Platão. Seguiremos os passos do diálogo entre o Estrangeiro de Eléia e Teeteto, a fim de melhor compreender a questão proposta. Portanto, nosso objetivo é acompanhar os passos do Sofista com a finalidade de investigar a real problemática do diálogo, o problema do discurso falso."
38. Rohden, Luiz, and Kussler, Leonardo Marques. 2021. "Pressuposto ético da alteridade na hermenêutica filosófica a luz do Sofista de Platão." Trans/Form/Ação no. 44:257-276.
Resumo: "A teoria filosófica de Gadamer comporta a proposta da hermenêutica filosófica enquanto um projeto ético. Embora o autor não tenha focalizado essa relação, de forma sistemática, almejase, aqui, explicitar e aprofundar a noção de alteridade como pressuposto ético fundamental da

hermenêutica gadameriana, à luz do Sofista de Platão. Para tanto, na primeira seção, abordam-se a estrutura e as formas de interação do conceito de outro, tal como apresentado por Platão, no Sofista, que trata de aspectos da identidade, da diferença, da coexistência do eu e do outro enquanto princípios metafísicos. Em um segundo momento, propõe-se uma percepção possível da apropriação de Gadamer relativamente aos conceitos platônicos os quais dialogam entre si, por meio da dialética, a partir da subjetividade moderna. Dessa maneira, justifica-se que os traços fundamentais da ética hermenêutica têm base em princípios não autoexcludentes, visto que não se exige o assujeitamento do outro como condição da formação e da manutenção identitária de si. Por fim, reconduz-se a hipótese de que o outro hermeneuticus é tão importante quanto o eu hermeneuticus para a compreensão de si e do mundo, em uma relação copartícipe, a qual não nega diferentes modos de ser para se afirmar com significativas implicações pessoais e sociopolíticas."

39. Salles, Lucio Lauro Barrozo Massafferri. 2016. "As faces do Sofista de Eleia." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 10:1-22.
Resumo: "Apresento aqui a hipótese de que Platão pode ter usado aspectos da filosofia e do estilo de Alcidamante na composição poética dos personagens Estrangeiro de Eleia e Palamedes Eleático. Para compartilhar essa hipótese, farei uma leitura onde examino e comparo determinadas passagens do Sobre os Sofistas, de Alcidamante, com o Sofista e com o Fedro, de Platão."
40. Santos, Barbara Helena de Oliveira. 2021. "Unidade e Multiplicidade no método diairético de Platão no Sofista." Archai no. 31:1-27.
Resumo: "Ao colocar a diairesis em comunhão com a dialética, Platão rompe com a estrutura dicotômica-unívoca parmenídica; no Fragmento 2 do Poema Da Natureza, a deusa estabelece que há apenas dois caminhos para a verdade, um que é e outro que não é. Desses dois caminhos, Parmênides nega o segundo, afirmando que é impossível conhecer o que não é: para o filósofo préssocrático conhecer algo está relacionado ao é, logo, para ele, é impossível

conhecer o que não é. De maneira que há, em Parmênides, uma cisão entre “ser” e “não-ser”. O desafio, ao qual nos propomos neste artigo, é explorar as implicações, para a diairesis no Sofista de Platão, quanto à afirmação parmenídica sobre a impossibilidade cognoscível a respeito do não-ser."

41. Santos Lima, Jorge dos. 2008. "A dialética presente na estrutura textual d'O Sofista de Platâo." Saberes, Natal – RN no. 1:71-83.
Resumo: "O objetivo deste artigo é resolver uma simples pergunta: como é possível apresentar a trama filosófica que se desenvolve no Diálogo O Sofista de Platão sem subtrair a dialética, mobilidade e fluidade dinâmica de seu texto? Com esse intuito, pressupõe-se de imediato que há uma trama filosófica no Diálogo e que é dialética. Assim, optou-se por seguir seis passos que, metodologicamente, estruturam este estudo e resumem, ao mesmo tempo, esse escrito de Platão: o primeiro é a introdução responsável pela delimitação deste estudo; depois se descreve em conjunto, a introdução que Platão faz à obra e as primeiras tentativas de definição do sofista; em seguida mostra-se como Platão interpreta as discussões existentes na história acerca do ser e não-ser e os resultados dessa interpretação; logo adiante, enfatiza-se a retomada de Platão do debate sobre ser e não-ser que culmina na afirmação do não ser como alteridade no contexto da linguagem; depois, expõe-se as conclusões que Platão escreve sobre o autêntico sofista para, por fim, assinalar algumas considerações sobre o caráter dialético e móbil da trama ou idéias principais desse Diálogo."
42. Santos, Maria Carolina Alves dos. 2001. "A demarcação platônica de novas fronteiras epistêmicas para o discurso filosófico um estudo sobre o Sofista." Trans/Form/Ação no. 24:273-299.
Resumo: "No Sofista, mediante os circuitos do procedimento ontológico-binário das divisões dialéticas, Platão busca não somente chegar à verdade das coisas em si, mas, também, a sua correta expressão. A superação das aporias relativas à natureza da linguagem por um tratamento metódico rigoroso, que minimiza suas

limitações e inadvertências e a instala numa dimensão transcendente, entre os gêneros do Ser, assegura-lhe o estatuto de discurso filosófico, capaz de dizer aquilo que é como ele é."

43. Severo Buarque de Holanda, Luisa. 2014. "A parte e o todo: atomismo e linguagem no Sofista." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 16:49-61.
Resumo: "O atomismo de Leucipo e Demócrito é utilizado implicitamente, em não poucos diálogos de Platão, como um importante paradigma científico a ser problematizado, criticado ou reempregado. Interessa-me, aqui, analisar a contribuição do atomismo para a Filosofia da Linguagem platônica presente no Sofista. A hipótese a ser desenvolvida é que o cerne das reflexões linguísticas encontradas em tal diálogo se inicia com uma importante crítica à doutrina do atomismo."
44. Trindade Santos, José. 1998. "Do Crátilo ao Sofista: a descoberta da linguagem." Atti della Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche della Società nazionale di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti di Napoli no. 109:55-67.
45. ———. 2011. "Notas sobre o estatuto do não-ser no Sofista." In Logon didonai. La filosofia come esercizio del rendere ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano, edited by Palumbo, Lidia, 591-600. Napoli: Loffredo.
46. ———. 2018. "Metamorfoses do logos: do não predicativo ao predicativo." Archai no. 24:179-206.
Resumo: Este texto aborda alguns usos filosóficos de logos em Platão, em especial os associados a contextos lógico-epistemológicos contrastantes. Contraposta a vagas concepções 'não-predicativas', a teoria 'predicativa' do enunciado (Sofista 261-264) culmina a pesquisa sobre o logos, desenvolvida nos diálogos. Da obra "socrática", retira o pedido de resposta à pergunta "O que é?" por meio de um logos, correspondida, no Fédon e na República, pela exigência de logon didonai como prova do saber. Noutro plano, exemplificando usos sofísticos do logos, são expostas três" concepções infalibilistas e não-referencialistas de logos, avançadas no Eutidemo, no Teeteto e no Crátilo. Depois de analisar três casos de logos não-predicativo, o

texto defende que, com a teoria predicativa do logos, Platão visa a habilitar do discurso para o conhecimento de “o que é”."

47. Veloso, Cláudio William. 2001. "Dicotomia e imitação no Sofista de Platão." Cadernos de Atas da ANPOF (Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia) no. 1:121-126.
"Tempos atrás, eu decidira nunca mais me ocupar de Platão. Eu achava impossível —pelo menos para mim— dizer algo de sensato —e, ao mesmo tem-po, de não óbvio— acerca desse autor. Como ouvi dizer de Luc Brisson uma vez, Platão é perverso. E diante de um perverso só consigo constatar a sua perversi-dade, onde por perversidade entendo o fato de se afirmar algo e se negar esse algo ao mesmo tempo. Levado, porém, pelo entusiasmo de uma discussão com Monique Dixsaut e Marcelo Pimenta no III Simpósio Nacional de Filosofia Antiga (Itatiaia (RJ), Abril de 2000), deixei-me convencer a apresentar um trabalho neste encontro. Na verdade, logo me arrependi. Platão não é, como se costuma dizer, minha especialidade. Embora leitor interessado dos diálogos, confesso que sou muito ignorante da bibliografia crítica. Mesmo assim, atrevo-me a expor-lhes algumas minhas reflexões." (p. 121

48. Wolff, Francis. 1996. "Dois destinos possíveis da ontologia a via categorial e a via física." Analytica no. 1:179-225.
"Os gregos são tidos como tendo falado do Ser. Falar do Ser, certamente, mas o que dizer do Ser? Que ele é, mas isso não diz nada. Para instituir a possibilidade de um discurso sobre o ser, é preciso começar pensando e dizendo também que ele não é. Um discurso é então possível, mas é ainda sobre o ser? Pode ser que, ao invés de nos ter mostrado como o discurso sobre o ser é possível ou necessário, o pensamento grego tenha esboçado, de uma vez por todas, três figuras de sua impossibilidade.
Três figuras, as únicas possíveis, nas quais se abisma necessariamente toda “ontologia”: aquém do discurso “ontológico”, há a tautologia vazia; além, há uma física ou há uma lógica." (p. 179)
(...)

"A ontologia institui-se, dizíamos, no curto momento que separa Parmênides de Aristóteles ou de Epicuro. Antes, ela não é ainda possível, por não pensar o não-ser; depois, não é mais possível, o ser não devendo mais ser pensado como tal. Ela institui-se também na estreita via que separa a lógica da física e abisma-se necessariamente em uma ou em outra se quiser verdadeiramente pensar o discurso
ou o movimento. Tudo isso é natural. Pois querer uma ciência universal do ser obriga o pensamento a escolher. Em que pensa ela? Neste mundo em que evidentemente nos encontramos, ao qual temos uma relação imediata (aisthesis), este mundo que vemos e tocamos e no qual nos movemos não menos evidentemente?
O mundo-visto? Ou neste mundo no qual a linguagem (logos) nos joga, mediante a qual temos uma relação possível com todos os seres que falam e no qual falamos infinitamente das coisas e aos outros? A linguagem-mundo?" (p. 225)

Related pages

Selected Bibliography on Plato's *Sophist* in English:

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (A - Buc)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Can - Fos)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Fra - Kah)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Kal - Mig)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Mil - Pec)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Pel - San)

Plato's *Sophist*. Annotated Bibliography (Say - Zuc)

Bibliographies on Plato's *Sophist* in other languages:

Platon: *Sophiste*. Bibliographie des études en Français (A - L)

Platon: *Sophiste*. Bibliographie des études en Français (M - Z)

Platon: *Sophistes*. Ausgewählte Studien in Deutsch

Platone: *Sofista*. Bibliografia degli studi in Italiano

Platón: *Sofista*. Bibliografía de estudios en Español

Platão: *Sofista*. Bibliografía dos estudos em Portugués

Plato: Bibliographical Resources

Plato's *Parmenides* and the Dilemma of Participation

Semantics, Predication, Truth and Falsehood in Plato's *Sophist*

Plato's *Cratylus* and the Problem of the "Correctness of Names" (under construction)

Theory and History of Ontology

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Aristotle: Bibliographical Resources on His Logical and Metaphysical Works

LEXICON

Readers with Greek will find indispensable:

> Hermann Bonitz, *Index aristotelicum*, First edition Berlin, 1870, reprinted by Walter de Gruyter, 1961.
>
> A new Greek Lexicon of Aristotle's works is now available:
>
> *Aristotle*. Edited by Roberto Radice, Electronic edition by Roberto Bombacigno, Milano: Biblia, 2005.

Readers without knowledge of Greek can see:

> Wilson Organ Troy, *An Index to Aristotle in English Translation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949 (reprinted in 1966, New York: Gordian Press).

From the Preface: "It is well-known that the Corpus Aristotelicum contains many passages which throw light on one another, but there has been no method by which the student of Aristotle can easily discover this interrelationship. Bonitz' word index is of great help to advanced students of Aristotle in locating terms, but it is of little value to those who are interested in attaining a well-rounded view of Aristotle's analysis of a particular subject. Students of Plato find Abbott's index to Jowett's translations of the dialogues invaluable; but students of Aristotle, who are in

much greater need of a synoptic apparatus, have no such work to which they may refer. Consequently, Aristotle is often studied as a biologist, or an orator, or a metaphysician, or an art critic, or a political and moral philosopher without due attention being given to the light thrown upon a particular view by his other works. When approached in this manner Aristotle is open to unnecessary misinterpretations; for example, he has been unduly Christianized by those who have attempted to comment upon the Politics or the Poetics without appreciating the relevance of his Ethics and Metaphysics. The intricacies of his terminology and the variety of extant translations add to the difficulty. This English topical index should aid not only the philosopher, but also the student of letters, politics, ethics, or psychology who seeks to evaluate Aristotle's contribution in a specific field.
In the preparation of this index the eleven volume English translation edited by W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith and published by the Oxford University Press (1908-1931) was used. The page numbering is that of the Berlin Academy edition of the Greek text (1831-1870) edited by Immanuel Bekker. This pagination is listed in the margins of the Oxford translations and is likewise indicated in most translations of Aristotle's works. In this pagination, 184 b 32, for example, refers to line 32 of the second column on page 1284 of the text."

CRITICAL EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S Categories

Critical Editions of the Greek Text

1. Aristotle. 1844. *Aristotelis Organon Graece*. Lipsiae: Sumtibus Hahnianis.

   Novis codicum auxiliis adiutus recognovit, scholiis ineditis et commentario instruxit Theodorus Waitz.

Pars prior 1844: *Categoriae, Hermeneutica, Analytica priora*. pp. XXXII, 540; Pars posterior 1846: *Analytica posteriora, Topica*. pp. X, 599.
Reprinted Aalen, Scientia Verlag 1965 and Dubuque, Iowa : Wm. C. Brown Reprint Library 1962 (?).
Index of the *Categories*: *De codicibus graecis Organi,* pp. 1-29; *Scholia ad Categoria,* pp. 30-38; *Commentarius,* pp. 265-322.

2. ———. 1949. *Aristotelis Categoriae Et Liber De Interpretatione*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

   Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Lorenzo Minio-Paluello.

3. ———. 2001. *[Catégories]*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

   Texte établi et traduit par Richard Bodéüs (Élements de bibliographie: pp. CXCI-CCXV).

English Translations

1. ———. 1963. *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

   Translated with notes and glossary by John Lloyd Ackrill.

2. ———. 1980. *Aristotle's Categories and Propositions (De Interpretatione)*. Grinnell: Peripatetic Press.

   Translated with commentaries and glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle.

French Translations

1. ———. 1983. *Les Attributions (Catégories). Le Texte Aristotélicien Et Les Prolegomènes D'ammonios D'hermeias*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

   Présentées, traduits et annotées par Yvan Pelletier.

2. ———. 2002. *Catégories*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

   Présentation, traduction du Grec et commentaires par Frédérique Ildefonse et Jean Lallot.

3. ———. 2001. *[Catégories]*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

   Texte établi et traduit par Richard Bodéüs (Élements de bibliographie: pp. CXCI-CCXV).

4. ———. 2007. *Catégories*. *Sur L'interprétation*. *Organon I-Ii*. Paris: GF Flammarion.

   Introduction géenérale à l' *Organon* par Pierre Pellegrin.
   Introduction, traduction, notes et index des *Catégories* par Peirre Pellegrin et Michel Crubellier.
   Introduction, traduction, notes et index de *Sur l'interprétation* par Catherine Dalimier.

Italian Translations

1. ———. 1955. *Organon*. Torino: Einaudi.

   Introduzione, traduzione e note di Giorgio Colli.
   Ristampa in tre volumi: Bari, Laterza, 1970.

2. ———. 1989. *Categorie*. Milano: Rizzoli.

   Introduzione, traduzione e commento di Marcello Zanatta (Bibliografia: pp. 271-298).

German Translations

1. ———. 1984. *Kategorien*. Berlin: Akademie-Varlag.

   Übersetzt und erläutert von Klaus Oehler (Bibliographie: pp. 120-151).

2. ———. 1998. *Kategorien*. *Hermeneutik, Oder Vom Spraclichen Ausdruck (De Interpretatione)*. Hamburg: Meiner.

Herausgegeben, ubersetzt, mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen versehen von Hans Gunter Zekl.

Spanish Translations

1. ———. 1988. *Tratados De Lógica: Órganon*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos.

   Vol. 1: Categorías; Tópicos; Sobre las refutaciones sofísticas; Vol.2: Sobre la interpretación; Analíticos primeros; Analíticos segundos.
   Introducciones, traducciones y notas per Manuel Candel Sanmartín.

2. ———. 1999. *Categorías. De Interpretatione. Porfirio: Isagoge*. Madrid: Tecnos.

   Introducción, traducción y notas de A. García Suárez, L. M. Valdés Villanueva y J. Velarde Lombraña.

Portuguese Translations

1. ———. 2004. *Categorias*. Goiânia (Brasil): Editora Alternativa.

   Traduao do grego clássico, introduao e notas feitas por José Veríssimo Teixeira da Mata.

CRITICAL EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S De interpretatione

(In preparation)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES ON ARISTOTLE'S Metaphysics

On Aristotle's *Metaphysics* the most complete bibliography is:

Roberto Radice e vari collaboratori, *La 'Metafisica' di Aristotle nel XX secolo. Bibliografia ragionata e sistematica*, Seconda edizione riveduta, corretta e ampliata, Presentazione di Giovanni Reale, Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1997.
English translation: Roberto Radice and Richard Davies, *Aristotle's Metaphysics. Annotated Bibliography of the Twentieth-Century Literature*, Leiden: Brill 1997.
From the Foreword by Giovanni Reale: "The historiography of philosophy, especially today, with the huge and unpredictable growth in publication, has need of annotated bibliography. Aiming to avoid the Scylla of partialness and the Charybdis of mere cataloguing, the present volume aims not merely to collect most, but to describe much, of the astonishing amount of work that Aristotle's Metaphysics has stimulated and continues to stimulate in our century.Roberto Radice undertook the labour of putting this bibliography together more than five years ago, and has worked at it tirelessly and with great efficiency ever since, producing the first Italian edition in 1996. This sold out in less than a year, and the second, up-dated, edition appeared in 1997. It is on this latter that Richard Davies has based his translation. My hope is that the reader will appreciate not only their vision of the importance of the instrument they have made available, but also the commitment and passion that they and the other collaborators have brought to this undertaking.
The result of the editors' collaboration with the team of more than forty scholars world wide is a work that will surely be indispensable to anyone seeking to investigate the Metaphysics with an open mind and without the blinkers of methodological or theoretical preconceptions. I am confident, therefore, that Aristotle's masterpiece will be more fruitfully exploited and more clearly seen for what it is-one of the great and abiding legacies of ancient Greece."

CRITICAL EDITIONS OF THE BOOK GAMMA OF ARISTOTLE'S Metaphysics

1. Ross, William David. 1924. *Aristotle's Metaphysics a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. Jaeger, Werner. 1957. *Aristotelis Metaphysica*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Cassin, Barbara, and Narcy, Michel, eds. 1989. *La Decision Du Sens. Le Livre "Gamma" De La "Métaphysique" D'Aristote*. Paris: Vrin.

   Introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire.
   Traduzione italiana: *La decisione di significare. Il libro* Gamma *delle* Metafisica, edizione italiana a cura di Stefano Maso, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1997.

4. Hecquet-Devienne, Myriam. 2008. *Aristote. Métaphysique Gamma. Édition, Traduction, Études*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters.

   Introduction, texte grec et traduction par M. Hecquet-Devienne.
   Onze études réunies par Annick Stevens.

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Aristotle and the Science of Being *qua* Being. Ancient and Modern Interpretations

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle gives four definitions of what is now called metaphysics: wisdom, first philosophy, theology and science of being *qua* being.
The purpose of this page is to present some of the most important interpretations, ancient and contemporary, of the definition of a science of being *qua* being.

The main points that will be developed are the following:

A panorama of current interpretations;
A discussion of the authenticity of the Book K (XI) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics;*
Citations from the most important Greek and Latin Commentators about Aristotle's definition of a science of Being qua Being;
A brief presentation of the theory of reduplication (qua-theory):
An annotated bibliography of contemporary research.

Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between 'theory of being' and 'theory of being *qua* being'? In brief, the problem is deciding whether the two expressions 'the theory of being' and 'the theory of being *qua* being' are equivalent. If they are, the functor ' *qua*' does not seem to play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different -- that is to say, if there is a difference between the theory of being (*simpliciter*) and the

theory of being *qua* being -- we should study the role played by the functor of reduplication ' *qua*'.

For an introduction to the problem of reduplication see Roberto Poli, "*Qua*-theories", in Liliana Albertazzi, (ed.), *Shapes of Forms*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998, pp. 245-256.
It should be noted that the functor of reduplication is massively used by Aristotle in his theory of mathematics (see in particular *Met*., books XIII and XIV). Reduplication is the tool Aristotle uses for avoiding the pitfalls of Platonism.

ARISTOTLE'S TEXTS ON BEING QUA BEING

The sentence ὄν ᾗ ὀν (Being *qua* Being) is used only in the books IV, VI and XI of the *Metaphysics*.

References are made to: Aristotle, *Metaphysics*. *Text and Commentary*, Edited and translated by William David Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1924, corrected edition 1953.

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS IN A NUTSHELL

"What were Aristotle's metaphysical contentions, and what is Aristotle's Metaphysics? The latter question is the easier. The work, as . we now have it, divides into fourteen books of unequal length and complexity. Book Alpha is introductory: it articulates the notion of a science of the first principles or causes of things, and it offers a partial history of the subject. The second book, known as "Little Alpha," is a second introduction, largely

methodological in content. Book Beta is a long sequence of puzzles or *aporiai*: possible answers are lightly sketched, but the book is programmatic rather than definitive. Book Gamma appears to start on the subject itself: it characterizes something which it calls "the science of being qua being" -- and it then engages in a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction. Next, in book Delta, comes Aristotle's "philosophical lexicon": some forty philosophical terms are explained and their different senses shortly set out and illustrated. Book Epsilon is brief: it returns to the science of being qua being, and also passes some remarks on truth. Books Zeta, Eta and Theta hang together, and together they form the core of the Metaphysics. Their general topic is substance: its identification, its relation to matter and form, to actuality and to potentiality, to change and generation. The argument is tortuous in the extreme, and it is far from clear what Aristotle's final views on the subject are -- if indeed he had any final views. The following book, Iota, concerns itself with the notions of unity ('oneness') and identity. Book Kappa consists of a resumé of Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon and of parts of the Physics. In book Lambda, we return to the study of beings and of first principles: the book contains Aristotle's theology, his account of the 'unmoved movers', which are in some sense the supreme entities in his universe. Finally, Books XIII and XIV turn to the philosophy of mathematics, discussing in particular the ontological status of numbers." (pp. 66-67)

From: Jonathan Barnes (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995. Chapter 3: *Metaphysics*, by Jonathan Barnes.

"Aristotle can fairly be said to be the founder of metaphysics as a separate discipline, as well as one of the most influential theorists of metaphysics. (...) Aristotle was not the first philosopher to concern himself with metaphysical issues, but he was the first to study metaphysics systematically and to lay out a rigorous account of ontology. (...) In the Metaphysics Aristotle subjects to scrutiny his own metaphysical principles. Our word 'metaphysics' itself derives form the expedient of early editors of Aristotle who, not knowing what to call his books on first principles, called them

META TA PHYSIKA, the material after the physical enquiries. Whether the fourteenth books of the Metaphysics are a unity or a collection of disparate treatises is a matter of serious debate. Aristotle clearly recognizes a special study corresponding to metaphysics which he calls variously wisdom, first philosophy, and theology.
But the books of the Metaphysics seem to present different conception of what metaphysics is. In Book I Aristotle identifies wisdom with knowledge of the ultimate causes and principles, which he identifies as the four causes. Book IV makes metaphysics an enquiry into the causes of being qua being, an enquiry made possible by the fact that all senses of being are related to a single central notion, the notion of substance. Book VI argues that the highest science must study the highest genus of substance, which is the divine, and hence this science must be theology. Of course, it is not surprising that metaphysics should take in studies of causation, of ontology (the study of the basic entities in the world), and what was later called special metaphysics (the study of special kinds of beings, e.g. God and the soul); but precisely how these enquiries were related in Aristotle's mind remain obscure." (vol. I, pp. 50-52)

From: Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, München: Philosophia Verlag 1991, entry *Aristotle*, by Daniel W. Graham.

AN HYPOTHESIS ABOUT THE TITLE METAPHYSICS

In an essay published in 1954 (1), Hans Reiner proposed a new interpretation of the origins of the title of Aristotle's book.

His hypothesis is summarized by Takatura Ando in: *Metaphysics. A Critical Survey of Its Meaning*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963, pp. 4-5.

"According to Reiner, it would have been a quite arbitrary procedure to christen the science, which Aristotle himself called the first philosophy, and Theophrastus the first theology, with a name derived by chance from the mere editorial sequence of the work. The interpretations of this book by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Asclepius, on which modern scholars like Brandis, Zeller, and Bonitz base the above mentioned hypothesis [that the title is due to Andronicus of Rhodes], tell us in reality that the book was called *ta meta ta fisika,* because it came after the physical sciences. Rather then mentioning anything about its origin from Andronicus' arbitrary arrangement, Alexander and Asclepius said that the order was taxix proz hmaz. Anyone who has learned a little about Aristotle's philosophy must know that prox emax usteron is the contradictory opposite of prox emax proteron, which on its side, is the contrary of fusei proteron. Metaphysics is posterior to physical sciences in the order in which we learn things, and this is consistent with calling metaphysics *prote filosofia*, first philosophy, i.e. prior in the order of being. (...) The name metaphysica, Rainer proceeds, cannot be found even in Diogenes Laertius, the oldest catalogue of Aristotle's works. The first person to use this title if Nicolaus of Damascus, who lived in the latter half of the first century B.C. In a commentary on Theophrastus metaphysics -- this book had also originally another name -- we find that Nicolaus of Damascus wrote a book on Aristotle's *meta ta fusica*. (...) Though as we have already said we cannot find it [metaphysics] in the list of Diogenes Laertius, it seems very probable that it was included in an earlier list -- that of Hermippus (ca. 200 B.C.) -- and was by some chance dropped from the list of Diogenes. According to Howald, Ariston of Ceus who was master of the Peripatetic school fro 228-5 B.C. made a list of philosophical works before Hermippus and Diogenes presumably used this when he made his list. The origin of the name metaphysics, thus traced back to one century after Aristotle's death, might be safely conjectured to reflect the sequence which Aristotle himself followed. (...) Eudemus, Aristotle's immediate disciple, the author of the History of Theology, and the first editor of his teacher's works, is supposed by Reiner to have invented the name *ta meta ta fusica*."

N.B. The bibliographical references of the works cited can be found in the Selected Bibliography

Notes

Reiner, Hans. 1954. "Die Entstehung Und Usprüngliche Bedeutung Des Names Metaphysik." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 8: 210-237.

Reprinted in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.), *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1969 pp. 139-174; translated as: "The Emergence and Original Meaning of the Name "Metaphysics"," in: *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 13, 2, 1990 pp. 23-53.

THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF ARISTOTLE'S THOUGHT

"For most of this century, Aristotelian scholarship was dominated by a single question: how might Aristotle's intellectual development be used to shed light on his philosophical doctrines? Opinions differed widely as to how this growth might be charted; eventually, a reaction to the whole enterprise set in. The past thirty years have seen the question lose its prominence as scholars returned to studying the corpus without Aristotle's development as a primary concern.
Recently, the question of the Aristotle's philosophical development has been reopened. Two books in particular, Daniel Graham's Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford, 1987) and John Rist's The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophic Growth (Toronto, 1989), have advanced comprehensive developmental accounts of the whole of Aristotle's thought. Together they may signal a renewed interest in developmentalism, and offer philosophers an opportunity to assess the problems and prospects facing any such revival. (...) For fifty years after it was first raised, to little notice by Oxford professor Thomas Case (Case 1910), then resoundingly by Werner Jaeger in a groundbreaking study two years later

(Jaeger 1912), scholars devoted themselves to the question of Aristotle's growth as a thinker. Jaeger's 1912 study concentrated on the development of Aristotle's Metaphysics; in 1923, he furnished a comprehensive account of the whole of Aristotle's growth, which revolutionized the study of the philosopher (Jaeger 1923; all references are to the 1948 second English edition except as noted). The main points of his thesis are familiar (though perhaps no longer familiar enough: see Code 1996). Aristotle began his philosophical career as a follower of Plato and only later, after a long transitional period, emerged into philosophical maturity as the opponent of Platonic forms and the investigator of empirical nature and living things. Much of Jaeger's evidence for the early Aristotle came from fragments of the literary remains, many of which had been regarded as spurious before his work. He then turned to works often regarded as assemblages of independent lectures or smaller pieces (the Metaphysics and Politics in particular) and to the three ethical treatises that have come down to us under Aristotle's name. Using these works he constructed a picture of Aristotle's development in which Aristotle moved toward an increasing independence from Plato. He then sought parallels with doctrines in other works not held to be internally inconsistent. So, for instance, his contention that Aristotle's empiricism came late in his career led to his assigning the biological works to the Lyceum period.

Almost immediately, the genetic question came to dominate Aristotelian scholarship (see Chroust 1963, also A. Mansion 1927). (...) Cherniss (1944) argued forcefully that, given Aristotle's constant revision of his lectures until the end of his life and the clear programmatic connections between many of them, interpreters are compelled to take his doctrines as a unified whole. Others sought to dismiss Jaeger's approach as being simply the product of positivist or historicist dogmas popular in Germany at the turn of the century.

Gradually, Jaeger found himself with fewer and fewer supporters for his version of the developmental thesis. Probably the decisive challenges came in the work of Düring and Owen. During (1956, 1966a, 1966b) argued that Aristotle was from the beginning opposed to Plato and his transcendental view of reality. His growing interest in natural science developed, in turn, under the

influence of Aristotle's own gifted pupil and eventual successor, Theophrastus. Owen's analysis (1960, 1965) was yet more influential. Owen argued that early in his career Aristotle issued an uncompromising rejection of Platonic metaphysics and the corresponding master science of dialectic. Later, a pivotal insight into how we refer to one thing by means of another -- the now famous doctrine of 'pros hen equivocity" of 'focal meaning' -- prompted him to make room for a universal science of Being after all. In effect 'the Platonism of Aristotle' was more complex that Jaeger had pictured it (and perhaps more so than Owen thought -- see Code 1996)." (*Introduction* by William Wians, pp. IX-XI.)

From: William Wians (ed.), *Aristotle's Philosophical Development: Problems and Prospects*, Lanham: Rowman Littelfield Publishers 1996.

"Turning to Aristotle's own works, we immediately light upon a surprise: Aristotle began his extant scientific works during Plato's lifetime. By a curious coincidence, in two different works he mentions two different events as contemporary with the time of writing, one in 357 and the other in 356. In the Politics (V 10, 1312b10), he mentions as now (nun) Dion's expedition to Sicily, which occurred in 357. In the Meteorologica (III 1, 371a30), he mentions as now (nun) the burning of the temple at Ephesus, which occurred in 356. To save his hypothesis of late composition, Zeller resorts to the vagueness of the word "now" (nun). But Aristotle is graphically describing isolated events and could hardly speak of events of 357 and 356 as happening "now" in or near 335. Moreover, these two works contain further proofs that they were both begun earlier than this date. The Politics (II 20) mentions as having happened lately (*neosti*) the expedition of Phalaecus to Crete, which occurred towards the end of the Sacred War in 346. The Meteorologica (III 7) mentions the comet of 341. It is true that the Politics also mentions much later events, e.g., the assassination of Philip, which took place in 336 (V 10, 1311b1-3). Indeed, the whole truth about this great work is that it remained unfinished at Aristotle's death. But what of that? The logical conclusion is that Aristotle began writing it as early as 357, and continued writing it in 346, in 336, and so on till he died.

Similarly, he began the Meteorologica as early as 356 and was still writing it in 341. Both books were commenced some years before Plato's death; both were works of many years; both were destined to form parts of the Aristotelian system of philosophy. It follows that Aristotle, from early manhood, not only wrote dialogues and didactic works, surviving only in fragments, but also began some of the philosophical works that are still parts of his extant writings. He continued these and no doubt began others during the prime of his life. Having thus slowly matured his separate writings, he was the better able to combine them more and more into a system, in his last years. No doubt, however, he went on writing and rewriting well into the last period of his life; for example, the recently discovered Athenaion Politeia mentions on the one hand (c. 54) the archonship of Cephisophon (329-328), on the other hand (c. 46) triremes and quadriremes but without quinqueremes, which first appeared at Athens in 325-324; and as it mentions nothing later it probably received its final touches between 329 and 324. But it may have been begun long before and received additions and changes. However early Aristotle began a book, so long as he kept the manuscript, he could always change it. Finally, he died without completing some of his works, such as the Politics, and notably that work of his whole philosophic career and foundation of his whole philosophy -- the Metaphysics -- which, projected in his early criticism of Plato's philosophy of universal forms, gradually developed into his positive philosophy of individual substances, but remained unfinished after all.

On the whole, then, Aristotle was writing his extant works very gradually for some thirty-five years (357-322), like Herodotus (IV 30) contemplated additions, continued writing them more or less together, not so much successively as simultaneously, and had not finished writing at his death.

There is a curious characteristic connected with this gradual composition. An Aristotelian treatise frequently has the appearance of being a collection of smaller discourses (logoi), as, for example, K. L. Michelet has remarked.

This is obvious enough in the Metaphysics: it has two openings (Books A and α); then comes a nearly consecutive theory of being (B, Γ, E, Z, H, Θ), but interrupted by a philosophical lexicon Δ;

afterwards follows a theory of unity (I); then a summary of previous books and of doctrines from the Physics (K); next a new beginning about being and, what is wanted to complete the system, a theory of God in relation to the world (Λ); finally, a criticism of mathematical metaphysics (M, N), in which the argument against Plato (A 9) is repeated almost word for word (M 4-5). The Metaphysics is clearly a compilation formed from essays or discourses; and it illustrates another characteristic of Aristotle's gradual method of composition. It refers back to passages "in the first discourses" (*en tois protois logois*) -- an expression not uncommon in Aristotelian writings. Sometimes the reference is to the beginning of the whole treatise; e.g., Metaph. B 2, 997b3-5, referring back to A 6 and 9 about Platonic forms. Sometimes, on the other hand, the reference only goes back to a previous part of a given topic, e.g., Metaph. Θ 1, 1045b27-32, referring back to Z 1, or at the earliest to Γ 2. On either alternative, however, 'the first discourses' mentioned may have originally been a separate discourse; for Book Γ begins quite fresh with the definition of the science of being, long afterwards called 'Metaphysics,' and Book Z begins Aristotle's fundamental doctrine of substance." (vol. 2 p. 506-507)

From: Thomas Case, *Aristotle*, Encyclopedia Britannica (1910). Reprinted In William Wians (ed.), *Aristotle's Philosophical Development: Problems and Prospects*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 1-40.

"This book, being at once treatise and monograph, demands a brief word of explanation.
It does not seek to give a systematic account, but to analyse Aristotle's writings so as to discover in them the half obliterated traces of his mental progress. Its biographical framework is intended merely to make more palpable the fact that his previously undifferentiated mass of compositions falls into three distinct periods of evolution. Owing to the meagerness of the material the picture that we thus obtain is of course fragmentary; yet its outlines constitute a distinctly clearer view of Aristotle's intellectual nature and of the forces that inspired his thinking. Primarily, this is a gain to the history of philosophical problems

and origins. The author's intention is, however, not to make a contribution to systematic philosophy, but to throw light on the portion of the history of the Greek mind that is designated by the name of Aristotle.
Since 1916 I have repeatedly given the results of these researches as lectures at the universities of Kiel and Berlin; even the literary form, with the exception of the conclusion, was established in essentials at that time. The literature that has since appeared is not very important for Aristotle himself anyhow, and I have noticed it only so far as I have learnt something from it or am obliged to contradict it. The reader will look in vain for the results even of earlier researches so far as they concern merely unimportant changes of opinion or of form; such matters have nothing to do with development. Still less has my purpose been to analyse all Aristotle's writings for their own sake and to complete a microscopic examination of all their stages. The aim was solely to elucidate in its concrete significance, by means of evident examples, the phenomenon of his intellectual development as such." (Preface to the German edition (1923)

From: Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1948.

"It can be shown, however, that even the earlier version of the introduction (K 1-8) is not the original form of the Metaphysics. We have seen that in K 1-8 metaphysics is described as the science of that which is unmoved and eternal and transcendent. We also find there, however, the definition of it as the science of being as such (ὂν ᾗ ὀν), though not developed, as it is in the later version, into a science of the manifold meanings of being including the perceptible being of movable nature. This combination of the two definitions in K 1-8 is a serious difficulty, and becomes only too painfully obvious in the later version of E, which in its present revised form is meant to introduce the science of the manifold meanings of being. Since the earlier and the later versions do not differ in this respect, but only in the extension that they assign to the notion of being, we shall not fall into error if we use them both together in what follows.

In E 1 (= K 7) Aristotle explains what he understands by a science of being as such. All sciences inquire into certain causes and principles of things. As examples he mentions medicine and gymnastics, and-to take one with a more developed method mathematics, i.e. the examples usual in Plato's theory of science and method. Each of these sciences marks off systematically a definite sphere of reality and a definite genus and studies the resulting limited complex of facts. None of them discusses the being of its object; they all either presuppose it on the ground of experience, as do natural science and medicine; or, like mathematics with its axioms, they start from particular definitions. Their demonstrations, which differ from each other only in degree of accuracy, deal solely with the properties and functions following from these definitions or from facts evident to sense. The metaphysician, on the other hand, inquires about being precisely as being. He examines the presuppositions of these sciences, of which they themselves are neither willing nor able to give an account.
Aristotle supplements this explanation at the beginning of Book E 1 (= K 3), where he brings out even more fully and clearly the distinction between first philosophy as universal science and the special sciences, between being as such and its particular realms. Here he treats being not as a sort of object separate and distinct from others, but as the common point of reference for all states, properties, and relations, that are connected with the problem of reality. As the mathematician, according to him, looks at all things solely from the point of view of quantity, so the philosopher studies everything that belongs to being as such, whereas the physicist, for example, considers it only as in motion. Many things 'are' only because they are the affection or the state or the motion or the relation of some one being they derive from something that ' is' simply. (...) To Plato dialectic was as such ontology. To Aristotle it was rather a practical and historical question whether this whole logic of being was under all circumstances to be included in first philosophy. His original metaphysics was theology, the doctrine of the most perfect being; it was hard to combine abstract dialectic with this once the Ideas were gone. But he tried to link them up by means of their common relation to being as such." (pp. 214-216)

From: Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1948.

"According to Werner Jaeger, the ὂν ᾗ ὀν has two different meanings, depending on whether it is considered as found in the more ancient books or in parts which would have been added to the collection of the Stagirite's Metaphysics in the last-period.
In 'the last' stage the theory of the ὂν ᾗ ὀν, according to Jaeger, would signify a sort of 'ontological phenomenology,' that is, 'an enumeration and description of the various meanings of being' in which a place would be found for all the forms of being, while transcendent being will not hence forward be the center of interest itself. Thus understood, the ὂν ᾗ ὀν permits Aristotle to unify the two preceding conceptions of Book K Λ E 1; one in which the predominant interest concerns the supersensible and transcendent substance, the other, Books Z Θ, in which the interest in sensible substance and immanent entelechy or immanent form predominates. In fact the ὂν ᾗ ὀν comprehends both the pure energeia of divine thought and the αἰσθητη ουσια of the physical world which is subject to generation and corruption insofar as both are 'being.'.
This conception of the ὂν ᾗ ὀν, as we said, would be contained only in the last additions, insertions, and articulations, chiefly in the second, the third, and the fourth chapters of Book E. In Book K, where according to Jaeger the object of first philosophy is indicated in 'a clear way and without exception' as being the immobile and eternal realities, the ὂν ᾗ ὀν also appears close to this perspective, but here the ὂν ᾗ ὀν *is not developed yet*, as it is in the later version, *into a science of the manifold meanings of being*, including the perceptible being of movable nature. The same ought to be said of the meaning of ὂν ᾗ ὀν in Books Γ and E 1, which, on this account, are not even distinguished from Book K by means of 'the different scope with which it treats the concept of being. 'By excluding the doctrine of ὂν ᾗ ὀν from K, Γ, and E 1 as having the meaning of an ontological phenomenology, as it will, on the contrary, be present in E 2-4, Jaeger only explains rather vaguely what it does signify in that first group of writings. With respect to Book Γ he writes: 'Here he treats being not as a

sort of object separate and distinct from others, but as the common point of reference for all states, properties, and relations that are connected with the problem of reality. It would seem, therefore, that Jaeger considers it as a kind of general ontology, in the sense of a universal theory of being.' (Jaeger, - Aristoteles - p. 289, Robinson trans. p. 215)". (pp. 138-139 notes omitted)

From: Giovanni Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the* Metaphysics *of Aristotle*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1980.

CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS: METAPHYSICS AS GENERAL ONTOLOGY

The general science of causes is general ontology.
Gamma 1 begins with the assertion that there is a science that studies 'that which is' qua 'thing which is' and what belongs to 'that which is' intrinsically, or per se. (1) By virtue of its generality this science is contrasted with the departmental sciences that cut off merely some part of 'that which is' and study the properties that are unique to that part. To study 'that which is' qua 'thing that is' is not to study some special object called 'that which is qua thing that is'. The 'qua' locution is here used to indicate the respect in which this science studies its subject matter, and indicates that it deals with those ubiquitous truths that apply to each 'thing that is'. The metaphysician must both state the general (propositional) principles that apply to 'that which is' as such and treat of their properties or features. An example of a metaphysical principle that belongs to beings as such is the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). To study what belongs to 'that which is' per se also involves a study of the terms that apply to 'things that are' as such (for instance, 'same' and 'one'), and to investigate truths about them.
This concept of general ontology is further clarified by the way in which Aristotle proceeds to deal with issues raised by four puzzles stated in B 1 about the nature of the metaphysical enterprise

itself. These are four of the first five items on the list, and they concern the characterization of the universal science that deals in the most general way possible with the causes and starting points of all things. The second puzzle (995b6-10), for instance, assumes that this science will at the very least deal with the principles of substance, and inquires whether it will also deal with the common axioms those principles 'from which everybody makes proofs'. Does it, for instance, study the PNC? I 3 solves this puzzle by showing that the science of substance is the science that studies the common axioms. Gamma also provides answers to at least portions of the other puzzles, though without explicitly referring back to them. For instance, after Book B has queried whether the science of substance also studies the per se accidents of substances, it goes on to ask whether it will study in addition to these accidents such terms as 'same', 'other', 'similar', 'dissimilar', 'contrariety', 'prior' and 'posterior', and then concludes by asking whether it will also study even the per se accidents of these last mentioned items. This is to ask whether in addition to investigating the definitions of the per se accidents of substance, it will also study such issues as whether each contrary has a single contrary. Gamma 2 is in part devoted to answering these last two questions in the affirmative." (pp. 57-58).

Notes

(1) 'That which is qua thing that is' translates '*to on hêi on*', an expression often rendered as 'being qua being'.

From: Alan Code, "Aristotle's Logic and Metaphysics", in: C. C. W. Taylor (ed.), *Routledge History of Philosophy. From the beginning to Plato*, Vol. I, London/New York: Routledge, 1997.

"One of the most difficult problems of interpretation set by the Metaphysics lies in the fact that in book IV the 'sought-for science' is characterized very precisely as the science of 'being qua being' (ὂν ᾗ ὀν).(1) Unlike the particular sciences, it does not deal with a particular area of being, but rather investigates everything that is, in its most general structural elements and principles. This description fulfils the expectations the reader has derived

from books I and III, which repeatedly aim at insights of the highest generality. But, on the other hand, and startlingly, we also discover that in Metaphysics VI 1 - only a few pages further on, if we exclude book V as not part of the collection Aristotle seems first to accept this opinion and then, immediately afterwards, to embrace its exact opposite. For in VI 1 we again find an analysis of the sciences designed to establish the proper place of 'first philosophy'. Here, however, Aristotle does not, as he did in book IV, distinguish the 'sought-for science' from all other sciences by its greater generality. First he divides philosophy into three parts: theoretical, practical, and productive; and then he splits theoretical philosophy into three disciplines. To each of these disciplines he entrusts well-defined areas as objects of research. The 'sought-for science', referred to in IV as the 'science of being qua being', he now calls 'first philosophy', and defines it as the science of what is 'changeless and self-subsistent (*akinêton kai chôriston*)'. He explicitly gives it the title of 'theology'. Physics and mathematics stand beside it as the two neighboring disciplines in the field of theoretical philosophy.

Such an unexpected conclusion to so extended an introduction to 'first philosophy' must seem strange to the reader. It is understandable that an author should see the fundamental philosophical science as universal ontology. We can also accept that a philosopher should elevate theology above all other sciences because of the importance of its object. But that Aristotle should attempt to undertake both enterprises in a single work surely violates 'the greatest duty of a philosopher', which, according to Kant, consists in 'being consistent'.(2)That Aristotle here contradicts himself has been the dominant view in textbooks and commentaries since the middle of the last century. When faced by such difficulties of interpretation, it is customary to seek help from philology. It seemed necessary to saddle Aristotle with an internal inconsistency; and yet scholars were unwilling to credit him with one. Might not philology show that Aristotle's text did not, after all, contain such an inconsistency? In this way, the problem has submitted to what might be called therapeutic surgery at the hands first of Paul Natorp [1887] and then, more recently, of Werner Jaeger ([1948], pp. 214-21). Natorp resorted to the classical remedy of the nineteenth century, the obelus.

Jaeger replaced this by its modern and more lenient counterpart, stratification. The two attempts are, curiously, almost mirror images of each other: Natorp saw the 'theologising tendency' of VI 1 as the result of interpolations by a later hand into Aristotle's text. By making excisions in the text and by giving a somewhat violent interpretation to what was left, he attempted to obliterate this tendency. Jaeger, on the other hand, regards the problematical line of thought which culminates in the description of 'first philosophy' as theology not as the amateurish addition of anonymous epigoni but as the remains of an earlier theologising stage in Aristotle's own development.

The following discussion attempts to prove three points:

I. Both Natorp's and Jaeger's solutions,(3) which may be seen as the two end points of a whole spectrum of related solutions,' are contradicted by the text of the Metaphysics itself.

II. As opposed to these radical solutions, we find that a conservative treatment, based on a detailed analysis of the text is possible.

III. This interpretation, which defuses the supposed contradiction, reveals a characteristically Aristotelian mode of thought and argument -- a mode which can be discovered in other parts of the corpus too, and which merits the attention of anyone concerned to give an accurate portrayal of Aristotle's intellectual 'development'."

(1) Met. IV 1, 1003a21; 24; 31.

(2) Critique of Practical Reason (1787), p. 44.

(3) Thus Reidemeister in his important article 'Das System des Aristotele's' (now in K. Reiderneister, Das exakte Denken der Griechen, 1949, pp. 67-87) speaks of a certain 'refractoriness' which 'appears in Aristotle's thought as a double inclination that he could not overcome but is explicitly aware of' (p. 70). Reidemeister rejects, on good grounds, both the separate ascription of these inclinations to Aristotle's youth and to his maturity, and the early dating of books I-VI. And he has informed me by word of mouth that he does not regard the 'refractoriness' as a contradiction.

From: Günther Patzig, "Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", in: Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield. Richard Sorabji (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. 3: *Metaphysics*, London: Duckworth 1979 (Originally published in German in: *Kant-Studien*, 52, 1960/61 pp. 185-205. (Translated by Jennifer and Jonathan Barnes).

A NOTE ON THE NUMBERING OF THE BOOK OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

The books of Aristotle's Metaphysics are standardly referred to by their Greek numbering, i.e. by the letters of the Greek alphabet, because of the anomaly that after book 'I' there comes a short book labeled, as it were, not 'II' but 'i'. Translators have often called this 'book II', so that the following book is then called 'book III' in English, though in the Greek it is unambiguously entitled 'B', which means 'II'. This creates confusion, which is avoided by using the Greek numbering throughout. For those unfamiliar with the Greek alphabet, here are the relevant letters, and the confusing 'translation' of them into Roman numerals, which is found in translations of the Metaphysics but nowhere else:

A = I

α = II

B = III

Γ = IV

Δ = V

E = VI

Z = VII

H = VIII

Θ = IX

I = X

K = XI

Λ = XII

M = XIII

N = XIV

This peculiar numbering reflects a more important fact about the books themselves, namely that they do not form a single and well organized whole, and one should not think of them as intended for publication as they stand. Aristotle clearly did mean there to be a connected series of books which we could call his 'Metaphysics' but the writings that have come down to us under that title contain much that would have been either abandoned or re-formed in a final version. For example, book a, which is an alternative introduction, would surely have found no place at all; book A would certainly have been pruned of the material in the first half of chapter 9 (which reappears almost unchanged in chapters 4-5 of book M), and probably of other material in consequence. There is no book of the existing Metaphysics of which one can confidently say that it would have figured in the final version just as it now is."

From: *Aristotle Metaphysics. Books Z and H*, Translated with a commentary by David Bostock, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994 p. IX.

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Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Concept of Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

For the critical editions and translations of the Book *Gamma* of the *Metaphysics* see: Aristotle: Bibliographical Resources on His Logical and Metaphysical Works

An extended and well organized bibliography is available in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* edited by Jonathan Barnes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995, pp. 295-384.
From page 295: "The thing is meant for Anglophone philosophers. Hence it this bibliography lists relatively few studies which are exclusively historical or philological in character (and offers relatively thin coverage of Aristotle's own scientific and antiquarian researches); and it is powerfully biased in favor of books and articles in English. In addition we have tended to favor more recent items (which are generally more accessible), and we have concentrated on work done in what is sometimes called the 'analytical' tradition in philosophy.
Even within these limits the list is far from comprehensive. We hope that we have missed little of the very first rank (and that we have included little of the very last rank). But we have surely omitted, for one reason or another, many worthy pieces; and other scholars would doubtless have com forward with other selections."

I will try to add the most important references in French, German and Italian languages.

CRITICAL EDITION OF THE BOOK GAMMA

Aristote. *Métaphysique livre Gamma*. Leuven: Peeters 2008.

Introduction, édition, traduction et notes par Myriam Hecquet-Devienne. Suivie de onze études réunies par A. Stevens.
"Grâce à une nouvelle collation rigoureuse et complète des trois plus anciens témoins de la tradition manuscrite : J, E et Ab, l'édition par Myriam Hecquet-Devienne de Métaphysique Gamma corrige la vulgate imprimée. Le témoignage des lemmes et citations du commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise est également rectifié sur la base des manuscrits L et A. Après avoir exposé les principes méthodologiques suivis, analysé la tradition imprimée de la Métaphysique, donné une description codicologique et paléographique précise des manuscrits retenus, et examiné le rapport entre les témoins manuscrits, et entre les lemmes et citations d'Alexandre et la tradition directe d'Aristote, la traductrice propose une analyse de l'argumentation développée par Aristote dans le livre Gamma. La traduction qui accompagne ce texte grec fondamentalement révisé le suit de près, sans en gommer les aspérités, afin de le livrer dans toutes ses potentialités aux lecteurs. Des notes éclairent les passages trop abrupts, certains choix interprétatifs, ou les choix éditoriaux inédits.
Les études qui accompagnent cette édition ont pour origine un colloque organisé à l'Université de Liège, dont l'objectif était de profiter de la nouvelle traduction de Myriam Hecquet pour renouveler également l'interprétation de ce texte aussi difficile que fondateur. Il s'agissait en particulier d'examiner si de nouveaux éléments étaient venus modifier les grandes propositions interprétatives publiées ces dernières décennies."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aiken, Wyatt D. 1991. "Essence and Existence, Transcendentalism and Phenomenalism: Aristotle's Answers to the Questions of Ontology." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 45:29-55.

2. Ambühl, Hans. 1994. "Metaphysik Und Ontologie Bei Aristoteles." *Freibürger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* no. 41:223-228.

   "This is a review of five articles on Aristotelian metaphysics ("Revue Philosophique de Louvain", 90, November 1992). Main results are: 1) there is no conflict between ontology and theology, because in its object the latter also comprises the causes of the being qua being. 2) in the formula "being qua being" the "qua being" does not stand for a specific reality, but for a formal point of view directing the investigation. 3) the train of thought in book Z leads to the establishment of the fundamental structure of being, i.e., the "being in itself". 4) ontology and henology (theory of the one) complement each other; the former relates to reality, the latter provides the corresponding methodical structure. 5) the application of stylometric methods and an in-depth analysis of book K show certain traditional interpretations in a new light."

3. Anton, John P. 1972. "On Aristotle' Principle of Contradiction: Its Ontological Foundations and Platonic Antecedents." *Philosophia*:266-280.

4. Aubenque, Pierre. 1961. "Aristoteles Und Das Problem Der Metaphysik." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 15:321-333.

5. ———. 1962. *Le Problème De L'être Chez Aristote. Éssai Sur La Problématique Aristotélicienne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

6. ———. 1964. "Sens Et Structure De La *Métaphysique* Aristotélicienne." *Bulletin de la Société Français e de Philosophie* no. 58:1-50.

   Repris dans: P. Aubenque - *Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique* - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 131-170

7. ———. 1983. "Sur L'inauthenticité Du Livre K De La *Métaphysique*." In *Zweifelhaftes Im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien Zum Einigen Dubia. Akten Des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16. September 1981*, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 318-344. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

   Repris dans: P. Aubenque - *Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique* - Partis, Vrin 2009 pp. 171-196

8. Bäck, Allan. 2004. "What Is Being Qua Being?" In *Idealization Xi: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization.*, edited by Coniglione, Francesco, Poli, Roberto and Rollinger, Robin, 37-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

   Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities - Vol. 82.
   "I offer truth conditions for propositions about being *qua* being in Aristotle's philosophy. I show that in general Aristotle views expressions of the form "qua *S*" in " *S* qua *S* is *P*" (or " *S* is *P* qua *S*") as making a claim not about the subject "S", but about the predication of "P" of "S". I develop necessary and sufficient truth conditions for propositions of the form " *S* qua *S* is *P*". Finally, I show how this analysis satisfactorily covers what Aristotle says about being *qua* being in the *Metaphysics* ."

9. Balmes, Marc. 2000. "Ontologie Formelle De L'objet, Catégories Et Philosophie Première." *Revue Thomiste* no. 108:259-268.

10. Bastit, Michel. 2002. *Les Quatre Causes De L'être Selon La Philosophie Première D'Aristote*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters.

"... le présent ouvrage se devra de préserver l'originalité de la pensée d'Aristote et, pourrait-on dire, toute sa verdeur. Il devra donc entre autre se garder des lectures platoniciennes de la *Métaphysique* très fréquentes depuis celles de nombreux commentateurs grecs, jusqu'à certains aspects de celles qui sont inspirées aujourd'hui par Heidegger. Sans aucun doute, le texte d'Aristote n'est pas lui-même univoque, il suffit de rappeler la multiplicité des interprétations auxquelles il a donné lieu pour en être persuadé. Néanmoins, notre intention n'est nullement de tenter de projeter, en recourant à telle ou telle philosophie, un sens sur un texte qui par lui-même en serait dépourvu. Nous chercherons plutôt l'originalité génuine de ce texte. Cela implique de penser qu'il peut encore nous éclairer sur les questions que nous avons évoquées. Mais cet espoir n'est pas infondé, dans la mesure où les problèmes que nous rencontrons aujourd'hui pour utiliser les causes dans le cadre d'une philosophie de l'être et d'une philosophie première sont issus d'une remise en cause et d'un oubli progressif de la pensée aristotélicienne. Nous demanderons à Aristote de nous aider à philosopher sur une réalité commune; peut-être est-ce là ce que les doctrines contemporaines de l'interprétation appellent une fusion d'horizon (1).

Notre propos se déroulera selon le plan suivant. Après avoir examiné quelques-unes des interprétations des causes aristotéliciennes les plus autorisées, nous commencerons par marquer nos réserves à l'égard de la présentation habituelle de la causalité aristotélicienne, ou tout au moins nous en ferons ressortir les limites. Nous devrons constater également que celle qui lui a été préférée par Richard Sorabji n'est pas non plus entièrement satisfaisante. Ceci constituera un premier chapitre, à la suite duquel nous nous tournerons vers l'usage des causes tel qu'il est mis en œuvre dans la Métaphysique. Là nous montrerons que la recherche des causes les plus élevées, leur dénombrement et leurs relations constituent l'un des caractères originaux de la pensée d'Aristote.

Notre projet consistera donc d'abord à examiner la conception aristotélicienne de la causalité là où elle se déploie avec le plus d'intelligibilité pour nous, à savoir en physique et en logique. Cela nous conduira à concevoir la causalité comme une relation de dépendance dans l'ordre de l'intelligibilité ou du devenir. En même temps nous serons conduit à reconnaître l'originalité de l'exercice de chaque genre de causes et le lien de celles-ci avec la cause formelle. Nous devrions donc parvenir à une conception de la causalité beaucoup plus diversifiée que celle qui réduit les causes à la cause matérielle ou efficiente, voire à la cause formelle si on néglige la distinction qui suit. En effet ceci ne sera possible qu'en recourant à la distinction des causes en acte et des causes en puissance qui fait cruellement défaut dans la plupart des interprétations aristotéliciennes, alors qu'elle recouvre pourtant tous les genres de causes. Probablement cette distinction peut-elle faire saisir à la fois l'unité des causes et leur rattachement à la cause formelle. Muni de ces préalables, nous devrons alors constater que la philosophie première aristotélicienne se donne bien comme une analyse de l'être à la lumière des causes et des principes les plus élevés. Si la quête de ces causes et principes exige une méthode dialectique, celle-ci par sa fécondité même entraîne une connaissance des causes et une science analogique de cet objet analogique qu'est l'être dans la diversité des étants. Nous entreprendrons alors d'examiner l'usage des diverses causes dans la philosophie première. Ce qui nous montrera d'une part la fidélité d'Aristote au programme initial du livre Alpha et d'autre part la spécificité irremplaable de chacune d'elles pour parvenir à une connaissance satisfaisante de l'être. Mais la connaissance des causes et des principes ne peut en rester à celle des causes universelles et en puissance.
Elle doit, pour parvenir à son terme, à savoir les causes en acte, parvenir jusqu'au principe de cette actualité, lequel ne peut lui-même être que l'être où les causes sont perpétuellement actuelles. L'analyse des causes de l'être devra donc, pour être complète, déboucher sur une théologie. Pour ce faire, nous prendrons en compte

essentiellement les textes de la Métaphysique, mais aussi ceux de la Physique et de l'Organon, principalement dans les Analytiques, sans nous interdire les incursions et rapprochements avec d'autres textes du corpus aristotélicien, tels qu'ils ont été lus dans la tradition antique et médiévale et jusqu'aux modernes."
Introduction pp. 5-7.
Cf. Berti (E.), «Les stratégies contemporaines d'interprétation d'Aristote», Rue Descartes, n° 1-2, 1991, p. 33-55.

11. Bell, Ian. 2004. *Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

12. Bolton, Robert. 1994. "Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics as a Science." In *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, edited by Scaltsas, Theodore, David, Charles and Gill, Mary Louise, 321-354. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

13. Brague, Rémi. 2001. *Aristote Et La Question Du Monde. Essai Sur Le Contexte Cosmologique Et Anthropologique De L'ontologie*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

14. Brentano, Franz. 1862. *Von Der Mannigfachen Bedeutung Des Seienden Nach Aristoteles*. Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder.

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    Translated in English as: On the several senses of being in Aristotle - Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.
    Translated in Italian as: Sui molteplici significati dell'essere secondo Aristotele - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995.
    Translated in French as: Aristote. Les significations de l'être - Paris, Vrin, 2000.

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16. Buchanan, Emerson. 1962. *Aristotle's Theory of Being*. Cambridge: University of Mississippi.

17. Cassin, Barbara. 1992. "Aristote Et Le *Linguistic Turn*." In *Nos Greecs Et Leurs Modernes. Les Stratégies Contemporaines D'appropriation De L'antiquité*, edited by Cassin, Barbara, 432-452. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

"Les raisons de lire Gamma plutôt ainsi qu'autrement: pour une histoire sophistique de la philosophie.
La question à laquelle Terence Irwin et moi-même avons accepté d'être confrontés, sinon de répondre, est une application du principe de raison leibnizien, sans doute constitutive de l'herméneutique elle-même: quelles sont les raisons de lire un texte plutôt ainsi qu'autrement? Et, s'il y en a, rendez-les-nous, si vous pouvez!
Elle suppose d'abord, qu'il y a plusieurs lectures, plusieurs mondes, possibles; ensuite que ces lectures, ces mondes, sont hiérarchisables selon un classement comparatif auquel préside encore le principe de raison, cette fois sous forme de principe d'économie: maximum d'effet pour un minimum de dépense. Reste à décider ce qu'est un "effet" et ce qu'est une "dépense" en herméneutique: mettons, maximum d'intelligibilité, c'est-à-dire d'oscillation entre fidélité et philosophicité (comme la boiterie du centaure philologue-philosophe que décrit Nietzsche), pour un minimum d'hypothèses, d'anomalies et de déchets.
Tout le problème est de savoir s'il n'y a que des comparatifs, ou bien si l'on peut, si l'on doit, passer au superlatif.
(...)
Ce type de chemin faisant, il me semble qu'on tente de sortir du sillon ontologique de l'herméneutique, pour s'essayer à quelque chose comme: une histoire sophistique de la philosophie.
Je propose d'appeler "histoire sophistique de la philosophie" celle qui rapporte les positions, non pas à l'unicité de la vérité, qu'elle soit éternelle ou progressivement constituée en mode hégélien (la vérité comme *telos*, dans un temps orienté, ou "comme si" orienté), mais celle qui les rapporte

aux instantanés du *kairos*, occasion, opportunité, grâce à des *mékhanai*, procédés, ruses, machines, permettant de happer le kairos par son toupet. Et l'agôn est par excellence l'une de ces procédures, vieilles comme le monde.
(...)
Bref, dans l'histoire sophistique de la philosophie, il serait explicite que le meilleur, la performance, est la mesure du vrai.
Le premier intérêt de ce type de série comparative, par différence avec la clôture du superlatif, même réfléchissant, c'est qu'elle n'est, en droit, jamais finie. (...) Le challenge du "encore mieux" (passer à l'étage au-dessus) fait place à la possibilité de l' "autrement mieux" (traverser la cour). Et même, à en croire Deleuze et Lindon, c'est autrement mieux tout simplement déjà parce que c'est autrement. Il ne s'agit plus dans ce cas des "raisons de lire Gamma plutôt ainsi qu'autrement", mais bel et bien des "raisons de lire *Gamma* autrement".".

18. Cheng, Chung-Hwan. 1976. *Sophia: The Science Aristotle Sought*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

19. Claix, René. 1982. "L'objet De La Métaphysique Selon Aristote." *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* no. 44:454-472.

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21. ———. 1997. "Aristotle's Metaphysics as a Science of Principles." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 51:357-378.

22. Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1983. "L'être Et L'un Chez Aristote (Première Partie)." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 1:49-98.

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28. ———. 1990. "Le Titre De La *Métaphysique*." In *Herméneutique Et Ontologie. Mélanges En Hommage À Pierre Aubenque*, edited by Brague, Rémi and Courtine, Jean-Franois, 121-126. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

29. Desanti, Jean-Toussaint. 1988. "Remarques Sur L'ontologie Aristotélicienne." In *Aristote Aujourd'hui*, edited by Sinaceur, Mohammed Allal, 27-43. Paris: Éditions érès.

30. Destrée, Pierre. 1992. "'Physique' Et 'Métaphysique' Chez Aristote. Á Propos De L'expression *on Me On*." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 90:422-444.

31. Dhondt, Urbain. 1961. "Science Suprême Et Ontologie Chez Aristotle." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 59:5-30.

32. Dillens, Anne-Marie. 1982. *Á La Naissance Du Discours Ontologique. Étude De La Notion De Kath'hauto Dans L'œuvre D'Aristote*. Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia.

33. Dumoulin, Bertrand. 1986. *Analyse Génétique De La Métaphysique D'Aristote*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

34. Elders, Leo. 1962. "Aristote Et L'objet De La Métaphysique." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 60:165-183.

35. Ferejohn, Michael T. 1980. "Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:117-128.

    In chapter Two of book IV of the "Metaphysics", Aristotle alludes to an argument that the Platonic vision of constructing a science of being "qua" being is made possible by the fact that the verb "to be", while categorially ambiguous, also exhibits a special sort of ambiguity to which he gives the name "focal meaning." This paper contains a reconstruction of the focal meaning analysis of "to be", from which are extracted principles which are shown to form the structure of Aristotle's argument for the science of being "qua" being.

36. Follon, Jacques. 1992. "Le Concept De Philosophie Première Dans La 'Metaphysique' D'Aristote." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 90:387-421.

    "In this article the author inquires into the meaning of "First Philosophy" in Aristotle's "Metaphysics". In his view, attentive examination of the passages in which the nature of this discipline is mentioned (essentially "Alpha" 1-2, "Gamma" 1-3 and "Epsilon" 1) shows rather clearly that the Stagirite meant by "First Philosophy" the science of first causes and hence necessarily of divine substances, which are causes of this kind. In other words, First Philosophy, being

the supreme aitiology, was theology for him, as the traditional interpretation always held. But, being the science of first causes, it was equally the science of being "qua" being in his eyes, as first causes are precisely those of being "qua" being. The author thus concludes, contrary to the hermeneutic deriving from Suarez, that it is inappropriate to maintain a duality of inspiration and of subject-matter in the "Metaphysics", and that there is no "onto-theological" ambiguity in Aristotle's view of first philosophy."

37. ———. 1993. "Le Concept De Philosophie Première Chez Aristote: Note Complémentaire." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 91:5-13.

38. Fraser, Kyle A. 2002. " *Aristoteles Ex Aristotele*: A Response to the Analytic Reconstruction of Aristotelian Ontology." *Dyonisius* no. 20:51-69.

39. ———. 2002. "Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being *Qua* Being." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:43-82.

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42. Gomez Nogales, Salvador. 1972. "The Meaning of 'Being' in Aristotle." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 12:317-333.

43. Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1976. "Sobre "Lo Que Es En Cuanto Es" En Aristoteles." *Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofía* no. 2:19-26.

44. Hahn, Robert. 1979. "Aristotle as Ontologist or Theologian? Or, Aristotelian Form in the Context of the Conflicting Doctrines of Being in the *Metaphysics*." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* no. 10:79-88.

"Scholars have believed that there are two apparently conflicting doctrines of being in the "metaphysics" -- one which treats being qua being as the concept of the most general object, comprehending both sensible and supersensible being alike, traditionally identified as the "ens commune"; the other which treats being qua being as the concept of the separate and divine entities, traditionally identified as the "ens perfectissimum". Following Owen, the conflicting positions of the tradition of Greek commentators are contrasted with those Aristotelianizing christians of the middle ages; scholarship, in the last century, on this problem of the conflicting doctrines of being in the "Metaphysics" is considered. Next, it is argued that primary being for Aristotle is understood as formal cause, the meaning of which is considered in terms of the separate and divine entities, the "ens perfectissimum". Finally, an attempt is made to explain the inclusion of the supposedly conflicting doctrine of the "ens commune", as a means of clarifying the nature of primary being as formal cause."

45. Halper, Edward C. 1987. ""Being Qua Being" in *Metaphysics Gamma*." *Elenchos*:43-62.

46. ———. 2005. *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Central Books*. La Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

First edition Columbus : Ohio State University Press, 1989.

47. ———. 2009. *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Book Alpha - Delta*. La Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

48. Harré, Rom. 1997. "Forward to Aristotle: The Case for a Hybrid Ontology." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* no. 27:173-191.

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50. Husain, Martha. 1981. "The Multiplicity in Unity of Being ' *Qua*' Being in Aristotle's ' *Pros Hen*' Equivocity." *New Scholasticism* no. 55:208-218.

" *Pros hen* equivocity unquestionably plays a central role in Aristotle's philosophy, both as a linguistic and as an ontological structure. This paper attempts to answer both G.E.L. Owen's charge that the secondary senses of being are reducible to the primary and D. W. Hamlyn's charge that the dependence of secondary on primary being cannot be understood concretely. It shows that Aristotle carries out the program of "Metaphysics" vii, 1 in the "Physics" where the dependence of secondary on primary being can be understood concretely in terms of characteristic ranges within which all processes of quantitative and qualitative change occur. Thus he is able to preserve both the irreducible multiplicity of the categorial senses of being and their unity, and so *pros hen* equivocity."

51. Irwin, Terence. 1977. "Aristotle's Discovery of Metaphysics." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 31:210-229.

52. ———. 1987. "Ways to First Principles: Aristotle's Methods of Discovery." *Philosophical Topics* no. 2:109-134.

53. ———. 1988. *Aristotle's First Principles*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

54. ———. 1992. "Quelques Apories De La Science De L'être." In *Nos Greecs Et Leurs Modernes. Les Stratégies Contemporaines D'appropriation De L'antiquité*, edited by Cassin, Barbara, 417-431. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

"Le quatrième livre de la *Métaphysique* est divisé en deux sections principales. La première section (chapitres 1-3) est programmatique; Aristote introduit la science de l'être en tant qu'être (ou: de l'étant en tant qu'étant), et décrit les

tâches de cette science nouvelle. La deuxième section (chapitres 4 et suivants) est en même temps polémique et constructive; Aristote présente une défense du principe de non-contradiction (PNC), et il combat le subjectivisme de Protagoras. Quel est le lien entre les deux sections du livre? En particulier, Aristote se borne-t-il à décrire la science proposée, ou achève-t-il son programme? Autrement dit: la section polémique de *Gamma* nous offre-t-elle des raisonnements propres à la science de l'être, ou faut-il conclure qu'ils ne sont que préliminaires à cette science ?
Je voudrais discuter principalement la section programmatique, pour mieux comprendre la tâche et le but qu'impose Aristote à la science de l'être. Ensuite, je vais suggérer que la section polémique de *Gamma* fait vraiment partie intégrante de la science de l'être ; c'est-à-dire que, après avoir annoncé le programme de la science nouvelle, Aristote commence à le remplir'.
L'interprétation de Gamma que je vais esquisser n'est certainement pas la seule possible; et je voudrais la développer en comparaison avec une interprétation alternative qui a souvent paru être bien fondée. Selon cette interprétation, que j'appellerai "propédeutique", le livre *Gamma* n'achève aucun raisonnement propre à la science de l'être; bien sûr, la section polémique discute de questions qui sont propres à la science de l'être, mais elle ne présente aucun raisonnement scientifique; au contraire, les raisonnements sont tout à fait préliminaires à la science de l'être (2)
L'interprétation propédeutique peut paraître bien fondée, si nous tenons compte de la conception aristotélicienne de la science (*epistêmê*). On peut raisonner comme suit :
(I) Aristote exige une forme démonstrative pour chaque vraie science, selon les règles des Seconds Anatytiques; mais
(II) les raisonnements du livre *Gamma* sont évidemment dialectiques, plutôt que démonstratifs ; donc
(III) ces raisonnements ne peuvent pas appartenir à une science (3).
La première prémisse est hors de contestation, si l'on applique les règles des *Anatytiques* à la *Métaphysique*. La

deuxième prémisse est hors de contestation, si l'on considère les raisonnements de *Gamma* en les comparant avec la conception aristotélicienne normale de la dialectique. Donc, si l'on accepte les conceptions de la science et de la dialectique qui sont exposées dans l' *Organon,* on conclura que les raisonnements de *Gamma* ne sont point scientifiques.

Cette conclusion laisse, pourtant, un rôle légitime aux raisonnements de *Gamma*. Car Aristote assigne à la dialectique un rôle sur la route "vers les principes" des sciences démonstratives (*Topiques,* 101 a 36 - b 4). On ne peut pas saisir les principes par les raisonnements propres à la science elle-même; donc il faut les saisir par l'intuition (*nous*). La dialectique elle-même n'atteint pas l'intuition des principes, mais elle accomplit une tâche propédeutique qui nous aide à atteindre cette intuition.

On voit alors que l'interprétation propédeutique prétend révéler une certaine unité et stabilité dans la pensée d'Aristote. Selon cette interprétation, il n'y aurait aucune fracture entre l' *Organon* et la *Métaphysique* sur la question des rapports entre la science et la dialectique. Il ne faut donc pas rejeter l'interprétation propédeutique, à moins de trouver des objections fortes; et telles sont les objections que je cherche. J'espère montrer comment remplacer l'interprétation propédeutique par une interprétation (pour ainsi dire) "scientifique", selon laquelle les raisonnements de *Gamma* font partie intégrante de la science de l'être."

(1) Dans les sections I-II, je présente des questions que j'ai plus largement discutées dans *Aristotle's First Principles*, Oxford, 1988; voir surtout les chapitres 7-9 (avec des renseignements bibliographiques). Dans les sections III-VI je propose des corrections et des développements. Après avoir écrit *Aristotle's First Principles*, j'ai lu la discussion très provocante de *Gamma* par Barbara Cassin et Michel Narcy, *La Décision du sens*, Paris, 1988; mais, pour la circonstance présente, je ne réponds pas aux thèses principales de ce livre (qui portent surtout sur la section VI, infra).

(2) Pour une défense de l'interprétation propédeutique, voir, par exemple, W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924, p. 252; M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 1987, p. 94.
(3) Cette objection est soutenue par P. Aubenque, *Le Problème de l'être chez Aristote*, Paris, 1962, p. 299: "L'opposition de la dialectique et de la philosophie serait donc justifiée si la philosophie parvenait à se constituer comme science selon le type défini dans les *Analytiques*."

55. Jaeger, Werner. 1923. *Aristoteles: Grundlegung Einer Geschichte Seiner Entwicklung*. Berlin: Weidmann.

English translation by R. Robinson, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.

56. Kamlah, Wilhelm. 1967. "Aristoteles Wissenschaft Vom Seienden Als Seienden Und Die Gegenwartige Ontologie." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 49:269-297.

"Methodische Vorbemerkung
Die folgende Untersuchung ist entstanden in Anknüpfung an die von Paul Lorenzen und mir soeben veröffentlichte *Logische Propädeutik* (LP) . Es soll gezeigt werden, wie mit den sprachlichen Mitteln dieser Logik ein bedeutsamer Text unserer philosophischen Tradition interpretiert werden kann (Buch Gamma der *Metaphysik* des Aristoteles), und zwar unter sparsamem Einsatz dieser Mittel und unter radikalem Verzicht auf die entartete Terminologie unserer traditionellen Bildungssprache. (Weitere hermeneutische Hinweise im Text selbst und LP V, 5 Ende.)
Übersicht:
1. Die heutige Ontologie
2. Die 'erste' Wissenschaft
3. Das Seiende und das Eine, die Gegensätze
4. Der Grundsatz vom Widerspruch, Sein als Wahrsein
5. Das Einzelding als das vorrangig Seiende
6. Ist die antike Ontologie heute wiederholbar?" p. 269

57. Ketchum, Richard. 1998. "Being and Existence in Greek Ontology." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 80 (3):321-332.

58. Leszl, Walter. 1970. *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle*. Padova: Antenore.

59. ———. 1975. *Aristotle's Conception of Ontology*. Padova: Antenore.

60. Louis, Pierre. 1956. "Observations Sur Le Vocabulaire Technique D'Aristote." In *Mélanges De Philosophie Grecque Offerts a Mgr Diés Par Ses Élèves, Ses Collègues, Ses Amis*, 141-150. Paris: Vrin.

61. Ludwig, Walter D. 1989. "Aristotle's Conception of the Science of Being." *New Scholasticism* no. 63:379-404.

62. Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias. 1990. "Die Frage Nach Dem Gegenstand Der Metaphysik Bei Aristoteles. Ontologie Und Theologie." In *Beiträge Zum Problem Der Metaphysik Bei Aristoteles Und Thomas Von Aquin*, edited by Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias, 9-35. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

63. Madison, Ryan Douglas. 2008. *First Philosophy*. *Aristotle's Concept of Metaphysics*.

    Unpublished h.D. Dissertation.

64. Mansion, Augustin. 1956. "L'objet De La Science Philosophique Suprème D'aprés Aristote, *Metaphysique,* E 1." In *Mélanges De Philosophie Grecque Offerts a Mgr Diés Par Ses Élèves, Ses Collègues, Ses Amis*, 151-168. Paris: Vrin.

65. ———. 1958. "Philosophie Première, Philosophie Seconde Et Métaphysique Chez Aristote." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 56:165-221.

66. Marion, Jean-Luc. 1999. "La Science Toujours Recherchée Et Toujours Manquante." In *La Métaphysique. Son Histoire, Sa Critique, Ses Enjeux*, edited by Narbonne, Jean-Marc and Langlois, Luc, 13-36. Paris: Vrin.

67. Marx, Werner. 1954. *The Meaning of Aristotle's 'Ontology'*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

"This study forms part of a wider investigation which will inquire into the relationship of Ontology and Anthropology. Since the meaning of the term 'ontology' is far from clear, the immediate task is to ask the 'father of ontology' what he might have understood it to mean.
The introductory chapter emphasizes the fact that Aristotle himself never used the term 'ontology.' It should be stressed at once that, even had be used it, he could not very well have employed it to denote the discipline of ontology. For it was only during the era of the schoolmen that the vast and rich body of the *prose philosophia* carne to be disciplined into classifications; these classifications reflected the Christian, - not the pagan Greek view of all-that-is. The *metaphysica specialis* dealing with God (theology), his creatures (psychology), and the created universe (cosmology), was differentiated from the *metaphysica generalis,* dealing with being-in-general *(ens commune)*. This latter discipline amounted to the 'discipline of ontology' (1).
We are not concerned with the meaning of the *metaphysica generalis*. We wish to approach our problem with an open mind and want to hear directly from Aristotle - on the basis of the text of the *prole philosophia* alone - which body of thought he might have called his 'ontology' and what its meaning might have been.
Yet however carefully we may attempt to 'bracket' all preconceived notions, it stili remains true that it is an audacious undertaking to pose a definite question to Aristotle. More than two millenia of changing human thought cannot be eliminated, and we know very well that our question, as such, shapes and compels the answer in a definite direction which might easily be adjudged too

'modem'. Moreover, in concentrating on just one motif out of the many variegated and rich themes of the *corpus aristotelicum,* we are certain to overstress this one motif at the expense of others." (frm the Preface, P. VII)
(1) cf. M. Heidegger, *Kant* und *das Problem der Metaphysik,* p. 18.

68. ———. 1977. *Introduction to Aristotle's Theory of Being as Being*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    English translation by Robert S. Schine of: *Einführung in Aristoteles' Theorie vom Seienden*, Freiburg: Rombach, 1972.

69. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:113-135.

70. Merlan, Philip. 1957. "Metaphysik: Name Und Gegenstand." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 77:87-92.

    Reprinted in: Philip Merlan - Kleine Philosophische Schriften - Herausgegeben von Franciszka Merlan mit einem begeitwort von Hans Wagner - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1976 pp. 189-194.

71. ———. 1960. *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Second revised edition (First edition 1953).
    See Chapter VII: *Metaphysica generalis in Aristotle?* pp. 160-220.

72. ———. 1968. "On the Terms 'Metaphysics' and 'Being Qua Being'." *Monist* no. 52:174-194.

    Reprinted in: Philip Merlan - *Kleine Philosophische Schriften* - Herausgegeben von Franciszka Merlan mit einem begeitwort von Hans Wagner - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1976 pp. 238-258.

73. Modrak, Deborah. 1995. "Theories of Meaning and Ontology in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." In *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics*, edited by Sim, May, 221-234. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

74. Moreau, Joseph. 1977. "Remarques Sur L'ontologie Aristotelicienne." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 75:577-611.

    "The science of being "qua" being dwells on dialectic and from the examination of the conditions of speaking draws the priority of substance towards other categories. Then the analysis of sensible substance exhibits an "aporia" which, through the distinction of act and potency, leads to the concept of immaterial substance or pure act. Theology is connected with ontology by means of "ousiology", and the consideration of hierarchised substances, according with degrees of act and potency, is a way for understanding the role of cognition within realistic ontology."

75. Muralt, André de. 1963. "La Genèse De La *Métaphysique*. La Primauté De L'être En Perspective Aristotélicienne." *Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie* no. 13:185-204.

76. Narbonne, Jean-Marc. 1995. "Ontologie Et Hénologie; Divergence Ou Convergence?" *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* no. 51:541-549.

77. Natorp, Paul. 1887. "Thema Und Disposition Der Aristotelischen Metaphysik." *Philosophische Monatschefte* no. 24:37-65;-540-574.

    Translated in Italian as: Tema e disposizione della "Metafisica" di Aristotele. Con in appendice il saggio sulla inautenticità del libro K della "Metafisica" -Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995

78. ———. 1888. "Über Aristotele's Metaphysik K 1-8." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 1:178-193.

Translated in Italian as: Sull'inautenticità di *Metafisica*, K 1-8, 1065 a 26 (Appendix to: Tema e disposizione della "Metafisica" di Aristotele - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995

79. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1960. "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle." In *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957*, edited by Düring, Ingemar and Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane, 163-190. Göteborg: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia.

    Reprinted in: Jonathan Barnes et al. - *Articles on Aristotle* - vol. 3 - Metaphysics - London, Duckworth, 1979 pp. 13-32. Reprinted also in: G. E. L. Owen - *Logic, science and dialectic. Collected papers in ancient Greek philosophy* - Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1986 pp. 180-199.

80. ———. 1965. "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology." In *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, edited by Bambrough, Renford, 69-95. New York: Humanities Press.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Ancient Greek Philosophy,* - Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986 pp. 259-278.

81. Owens, Joseph. 1951. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A Study of the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

    Third revised edition 1978

82. ———. 1982. "The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* - Revisited." In *Philosophies of Existence. Ancient and Medieval*, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 33-59. New York: Fordham University Press.

83. ———. 1986. "Is There Any Ontology in Aristotle?" *Dialogue* no. 25:697-707.

84. ———. 2007. *Aristotle's Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z*. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press.

Edited with a preface by Lloyd P. Gerson

85. Patzig, Günther. 1979. "Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." In *Articles on Aristotle. Vol. 3: Metaphysics*, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield, Martin and Sorabji, Richard, 33-49. London: Duckworth.

Originally published as: *Theologie und Ontologie in der "Metaphysik" des Aristoteles* - Kant-Studien, 52, 1960/61 pp. 185-205.

86. Poli, Roberto. 1994. "Formal Aspects of Reduplication." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 2:87-102.

"Aristotle's presentation of ontology advanced at the beginning of the fourth book of *Metaphysics* is universally known: "there is a science which studies being qua being. . . ". Needless to say, this is a familiar sentence: unfortunately, it is also quite an odd one. Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between 'theory of being' and 'theory of being qua being'?
In brief, the problem is to decide whether the two expressions 'the study of being' and 'the study of being qua being' are equivalent. If they are, the 'qua' does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different, that is to say, if there is a difference between the study of being (*simpliciter*) and the study of being qua being, we should study the role played by the (operator) 'qua'.
Let us remember that 'qua' is a technical term. The word is the Latin translation of the Greek 'he' in the expression 'on he on' which, in the 17th century, gave origin to the term ontology'.
I shall call 'reduplicative' the expressions containing some instance of the functor 'qua'. Theories of reduplicative expressions will also be labelled as qua-theories." (*)

(*) The term 'reduplication' (anadiplosis) is to be found in Aristotle. For a general presentation of reduplication see Roberto Poli, "", (PDF) in Liliana Albertazzi, (ed.), Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1998, pp. 245-256).

87. ———. 1999. " *Qua*-Theories." In *Shapes of Forms. From Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenology to Ontology and Mathematics*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, 245-256. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"Reduplicative expressions: some introductory notes.
I shall call a theory of the functor *'qua'* a 'qua-theory'. This functor is used in expressions like 'A *qua* B is C'. Some synonymous expressions are 'as', 'insofar as', 'in virtue of, 'with respect to'.
'Qua' is a technical term. The word is the Latin translation of the Greek *'he'* in the expression *'on he on'* which in the seventeenth century gave origin to the term 'ontology'. That is to say, a qua-theory is an ontology, and ontology is the heart of philosophy.
The definition of ontology that Aristotle advanced itself involves the functor *'qua'*. His definition of ontology at the beginning of the fourth book of *Metaphysics* is universally known: "there is a science which studies being *qua* being [...]". My problem is this: why does Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between 'theory of being' and 'theory of being *qua* being'?
In brief, the problem is deciding whether the two expressions 'the theory of being' and 'the theory of being *qua* being' are equivalent. If they are, the *'qua'* does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different - that is to say, if there is a difference between the theory of being *(simpliciter)* and the theory of being *qua* being - we should study the role played by the (operator) *'qua'*.
The main reason for distinguishing between theory of being and theory of being *qua* being rests on Aristotle's opinion that the analysis of being *simpliciter* cannot be developed in

a scientific fashion. Aristotle's intention to submit being to scientific analysis was the principal reason for his adoption of a reduplicative kind of analysis. His position derived from the thesis that being is not a genus.
It is well known that Aristotle believed that scientific analysis can be developed only if there is a common genus for the entities under examination. If being does not have a common genus, the study of being cannot be a science.
From this arises a fundamental difference between study of being and study of being *qua* being. If ontology is a science, we must admit that there is a common genus for the entities studied by ontology: the main role of *'qua'* is precisely that of assigning a surrogate for the lacking common genus to beings by making explicit the *context* of the being referred to.
Qua-theories will be collectively referred to as reduplicative-theories or as theories of reduplication." pp. 245-246.

88. Reale, Giovanni. 1994. *Il Concetto Di 'Filosofia Prima' E L'unità Della Metafisica Di Aristotele. Con Due Saggi Sui Concetti Di Potenza-Atto E Di Essere*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

    Sixth edition; (First edition: 1961).
    The third edition is translated in English as: The concept of philosophy and the unity of Metaphysics of Aristotle

89. Reiner, Hans. 1954. "Die Entstehung Und Usprüngliche Bedeutung Des Names Metaphysik." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 8:210-237.

    Reprinted in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.) - Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969 pp. 139-174; translated as: *The Emergence and Original Meaning of the Name "Metaphysics"* in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13, 2, 1990 pp. 23-53

90. Routila, Lauri. 1969. *Die Aristotelische Idee Der Ersten Philosophie. Untersuchungen Zur onto-Theologischen*

Verfassung Der Metaphysik Des Aristoteles. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

91. Rutten, Christian. 1992. "La Stylometrie Et La Question De 'Métaphysique' K." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 90:486-496.

    "Stylometric methods can provide considerable information in regard to the relative chronology of the parts of the *Metaphysics* and their authenticity. In this article some suggestions are made on the problems raised by book K on the basis of the 'analysis of the materials'. The passage K7, 1064A28 - 1064B14, in which the science of being as being is assimilated to the science of the divine being, is closer, from a stylometric point of view, to the *Metaphysics* of Theophrastus than to that of Aristotle. The same holds for K10. On the other hand, the classification based on stylometrics corresponds for the other chapters to the evolution which Aristotle's thought underwent in various regards."

92. ———. 2001. "Science De L'être Et Théologie Dans La *Métaphysique* D'Aristote. Essay D'analyse Génétique." *Kernos* no. 11:227-235.

    Vol. Suppl. 11: *Képoi*. De la religion à la philosophie. Mèlanges offerts à André Motte, edités par Édouard Delruelle et Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge.

93. Seddon Jr., Frederick A. 1981. "The Principle of Contradiction in *Metaphysics*, *Gamma*." *New Scholasticism* no. 55:191-207.

    "The purpose of my paper is an historical-critical examination of the principle of contradiction as it appears in Aristotle, specifically but not exclusively as it appears in "Metaphysics, Book Gamma". to achieve this goal, I have chosen to subject Jan Łukasiewicz's article on this topic in the march 1971 number of "The Review of Metaphysics" to critical exposition and, as it turns out, refutation. Should the essay achieve its intended result, it will have shown that the

principle of contradiction to be "...true of being qua being..." rather than, as Łukasiewicz would have us believe, a mere assumption having only a practical-ethical value."

94. Skousgaard, Stephen. 1976. "Wisdom and Being in Aristotle's First Philosophy." *Thomist* no. 40:444-474.

    "The thesis of this article is that Aristotle's notion of wisdom is determined by his ontology. Starting with the fact that people do think, and think about being, the argument of the article traces the development of Aristotle's notion of being "qua" being, then decides that the tension between being-itself and the many-ways-of-being structures wisdom as dynamic rather than dogmatic."

95. Stevens, Annick. 2000. *L'ontologie D'Aristote Au Carrefour Du Logique Et Du Réel*. Paris: Vrin.

96. Stevenson, J.G. 1875. "Being "Qua" Being." *Apeiron* no. 9:42-50.

    "It is shown that in the opening chapter of the Fourth Book of the "Metaphysics" (Book Gamma), Aristotle conceives of metaphysics as a very general study, encompassing all being. This is shown by means of a close study of the meaning of the phrase "being "qua" being" which Aristotle uses here. This result is important because it contradicts the claims of Joseph Owens and Philip Merlan, who have argued that there is nothing in Aristotle's "metaphysics" to contradict a conception of metaphysics as theology."

97. Upton, Thomas. 1988. "Aristotle on Existence: Escaping the Snares of Ontology?" *New Scholasticism* no. 62:373-399.

98. Verbeke, Gérard. 1952. "La Doctrine De L'être Dans La *Métaphysique* D'Aristote." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*:471-478.

99. ———. 1983. "L'objet De La Métaphysique D'Aristote Selon Des Études Récentes." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no.

1:5-30.

100. Wedin, Michael. 2009. "The Science and Axioms of Being." In *A Companion to Aristotle*, edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 125-143. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

"Aristotle's first editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, placed the fourteen books now known as the *Metaphysics* after the *Physics,* whence comes the word "metaphysics," which literally means "after the physics." Some have used this fact to buttress the claim that the work as a whole has no focused subject, but rather is a collection of loosely linked essays. There is some warrant for this skeptical assessment. The first chapter of the first Book, Book *A*, (1) announces that "we" are seeking a certain kind of theoretical knowledge, something Aristotle calls "wisdom" *(sophia).* Because wisdom is knowledge of first causes and principles, the task is to investigate what sorts of causes and principles are suited to play this role. The reader might expect Aristotle to then proceed on just such a course of inquiry. After *A*, however, the term "wisdom" effectively disappears from the treatise.(2) In *B*'s set of puzzles we get instead the "science of substance," in *G* we are introduced to the "science of being *qua* being," and in Book *E* preference appears to be given to "first philosophy" and "theology." Are these the same or different enterprises and, if different, are they independent or related, and, if related, how? These questions can be addressed by seeing how Aristotle's treatment of wisdom follows a coherent, if complicated, path through much of the *Metaphysics,* beginning with the science of being *qua* being." p. 125
(1) It is customary to indicate books of the Metaphysics by uppercase Greek letters, with the exception of the diminutive second book, which is denoted by lower case *Alpha* (*a*).
(2) The term occurs in *B.2* but only by way of referring back to *A.2*'s marks of wisdom. It also reappears in *K*. But *K* is just a precis of Books **B**, *G,* and *E* (with, in its second half,

material from the *Physics*); plus, some doubt that *K* was even written by Aristotle.

101. Weil, Eric. 1967. "Quelques Remarques Sur Le Sens Et L'intention De La *Métaphysique* D'Aristote." *Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia e Letteratura* no. 41:831-852.

102. Yu, Jiyuan. 2003. *The Structure of Being in Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Related pages

Aristotle and the Science of Being *qua* Being. Ancient and Modern Interpretations

Theory and History of Ontology

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The Rediscovery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the Birth of Aristotelianism

THE EDITION OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS BY ANDRONICUS OF RHODES

"We know that Aristotle's death in 322 B.C. left in the hands of his immediate disciples an impressive series of texts unedited and without determinate classification.(1) As F. Wehrli has suggested, (2) the very nature of the texts (joined to the difficulty of the message which they contain) was perhaps the principal cause of what one must call the decadence of the *Peripatos* during the Hellenistic period. Still the fact remains that the rebirth of Aristotelianism in the first century before our era coincides with the labors of Andronicus of Rhodes, who obtained a first-rate edition of the principal so-called "acroamatic" texts [writings thought to have served as the basis for oral presentations] of Aristotle, of which Andronicus drew up a new catalog.(3) Its arrangement supposes an organizing principle about which we should inquire.(4) The historian who desires to measure the originality of Andronicus' contribution is forced to study the early lists of Aristotle's works preserved by Diogenes Laertius and the anonymous author of the *Vita Menagiana*, which permit us to ascertain the condition of the *Corpus* a good century at least before the catalogs of Andronicus were drawn up.(5) But the comparison of these earlier materials with the catalogs of Andronicus is not without difficulties. For no Greek text has preserved the latter for us. Perfectly known in Plutarch's time (6)

and probably still used by Porphyry and the Neoplatonists,(7) these catalogs, if one believes the tradition, were integrated (in an abridged form?) into a general work on Aristotle's life and writings composed by a certain Ptolemy.(8) Thanks to Ptolemy, at first translated into Syriac,(9) they then penetrated the Arab world and it is there that we can make our acquaintance with them in the parallel editions of Ibn al Qifti (twelfth-thirteenth centuries) and Ibn Abi Usaibi'a (thirteenth century).(10) A section of the lists which these authors offer us has every chance of reproducing the work of Andronicus; it indexes the principal titles of the modern *Corpus* as it is edited, for example, by I. Bekker.(11) It is a section which has no parallels in the earlier lists and thus constitutes an exceptional document." (pp. 111-112)

Notes

(1) Cf. Düring, *Aristoteles. Darstellung und interpretation des Denkens*, Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1966, 35 ff.
(2) F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Text und Kommentar*, Bâle, 1959, 96. On this subject see my remarks in Bodéüs, "En marge de la théologie aristotélicienne", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 73, 1975, 5-33.
(3) Cf. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Berlin, 1973, 58-94.
(4) Cf. Littig *Andronikos von Rodhos: I. Das Leben des Andronikos und seine Anordnung der Aristotelischen Schriften* München, 1890, 34ff., and Diels "Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik"*Berichte der Berliner Akademie der Wlssenschaften* 1882, 1-42. pp. 2-3. "It was actually Andronicus' edition which laid the basis for the view that Aristotle was striving for a closed philosophical system" (Düring 1966, 42).
(5) Diogenes Laertius V 22-27 (cf. Düring *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm, 1957, 41-51, 67-69) and *Vita Menagiana = Vita Hesychii*, published in Düring 1957, 83-89. As P. Moraux notes (1973, 60 n. 5), the hypothesis that the lists go back to Andronicus himself (V. Rose, J. Bernays, H. Diels, A. Gerke, ...) is today explicitly contradicted by what we know about the Rhodian.

(6) Plutarch, *Life of Sulla* 26 (Düring 1957, 414 [74 b]): του`ς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας.
(7) Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 24 (Düring 1957, 414 [75 g]). Cf.H.-R. Schwyzer "Plotinos" In *Paulys Realencyclopedie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* XXI, 1, 1951, col. 486-87.
(8) On this individual, see: Dihle "Dei Platoniker Ptolemaios", *Hermes* 85:314-25, 1957, 314-25; Moraux 1973, 60 n. 6 (with discussion and bibliography); and Düring 1957 20B-210.
(9) Probabilities established in Lippert *Studien auf dem Gebiete der Griechisch-Arabischen Übersetzungsliteratur* Braunschweig 1894; cf. Littig 1890, 22-23.
(10) A. Müller "Das arabische Verzeichniss der Aristotelischen Schriften", In *Morgenländische Forschungen. Festschrift H. L. Fleischer*, 1-32. Leipzig, 1875, no. 34-35. With this scholar, the Arabic text is preceded (pp. 18-22) by a reconstruction of Ptolemy's Greek πίναξ; a similar attempt working from Ibn Abi Usaibi'a is found in Düring 1957, 221-31. Cf. Moraux *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951, 289ff. and less recently: Baumstark, *Syrisch-arabische Biographien des Aristotele* Leipzig, 1898, 61-70; Plezia *De Andronici Rhodii studii aristotelicis* Krekow, 1946, 26ff., and Littig 1890, 38-42. A Latin translation by M. Steinschnelder is found in *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*, t. V {Berlin, 1870), 1469 (cf. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* 2).

From: Richard Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics*, translated by Jan Edward Garrett, Albany: State University of New York Press 1993.

THE DECADENCE OF THE PERIPATOS AFTER THEOPHRASTUS AND THE STORY OF ARISTOTLE'S LIBRARY

"In 307 the Peripatos met with a decisive catastrophe. Demetrius Poliorcetes captured Athens nearly without striking a blow.

Demetrius of Phaleron escaped to Thebes and from there to Alexandria. The Athenians who had constantly been hostile towards the pro-Macedonian Peripatos, were easily enticed into adopting a decree, compelling all non-Athenian philosophers to leave Athens. Ptolemy Soter now tried to persuade Theophrastus to move Aristotle's school to Alexandria. He declined, but Strato and Demetrius accepted the invitation. Strato became tutor of the young Philadelphus: thus pursuing the tradition of Aristotle, and Demetrius advised Soter in planning for the Mouseion and the library. Soter was obviously very anxious to uphold the traditional relations with Aristotle's school. He was particularly interested in acquiring for his new library as many of the written works of Aristotle he could lay hand on. So it happened that Alexandria rapidly became a seat of learning, marked by the scientific tradition from the Peripatos. But whereas Aristotle as ὁ νους τής διατριβής had been able to lead and unite all branches of study, specialization, often in rather narrow tracks, became the rule in Alexandria. After the catastrophe of 307 Eudemus returned to his home in Rhodes. It is more than probable that he brought with him copies of the Aristotelian school literature, and I have already mentioned his correspondence with Theophrastus on this matter. Praxiphanes, one of Theophrastus' disciples, was also from Rhodes. Among later Rhodians whose writings betray intimate knowledge of Aristotle’s writings may be mentioned Hieronymus, Panaetius and Posidonius. From Rhodes came also Andronicus, of whom I shall speak presently. Hieronymus played an important rôle in popularizing Aristotelian doctrines. He was highly appreciated and utilized by Cicero and Plutarch. What Panaetius and Posidonius did as intermediaries of Aristotle’s doctrines', and philosophy can hardly be overrated.
Cicero’s knowledge of Aristotle came this way. When he was in Rhodes and listened to Posidonius, he certainly did not miss the opportunity to visit its rich library. In 287 Theophrastus died, and was succeeded by Strato. He bequeathed his and Aristotle’s library, which was the private possession of the *σχολάρχης*, to his kinsman Neleus (*τά βιβλία πάντα Νηλεϊ* Diog. V 52). Up to this point the tradition is undisputed. As to whatl happened with the library after Neleus had taken possession of it, there is complete disagreement. I limit myself to stating briefly how I interpret the

evidence.(1) We know from the testaments of Strato and Lyco that a distinction was made between *τα βιβλία ἀνεγτωομνένα* and *τά ἀίνέκδοτα* or *ἀ αυτοί γεγράφαμεν*,(2) i.e. between copies of published books and the author's own un-edited manuscripts. Neleus sold to Philadelphus Aristotle's and Theophrastus' library of published books, including works of both philosophers, but kept Aristotle's manuscripts and brought them with him to his home in Skepsis.
In his eagerness to obtain a collection as complete as possible of Aristotle's writings, Philadelphus bought books from all quarters. We are thus told that the library possessed no less than 40 copies of Aristotle's Analytics, only four of which were regarded as representing the pure Aristotelian version. We have hardly any right to doubt, that a complete collection of Aristotle's writings, both the dialogues and the school literature, belonged to the original stock of the Brucheion. The *πίναχες* contained a *πίναξ των φιλοσόφων*, fr. 438 Pfeiffer, and we are told that "Ερμιππος δ ἐν τοῖς Θεοφράστου μαθηταϊς καταλέγει which is a strong support for the view that Hermippus ± 200 B. C. composed the catalogue of the works of Theophrastus. This catalogue is alphabetical, whereas the arrangement of the catalogue of Aristotle's writings is more or less systematic.(3) It is probably older, and I suppose that Hermippus incorporated it in his biography of Aristotle, without essentially changing its character." (pp. 59-61)

Notes

(1) Strab. XIII 608, Plut. *Sulla* 26, Luk. *Adv. ind.* 4, Athen. 3 ab aqns 214d, Suda s.v. Συλλας.
(2) Diogenes Laert. V 62 and 73.

From: Ingemar Düring, "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings", *Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis* 1950, pp. 37-70. (Reprinted as second study in: *Aristotle and His Influence: Two Studies*, New York: Garland 1987.)

"As it is recounted both in ancient sources and by modern scholars, the history of the Peripatetic School after Aristotle and Theophrastus may be summed up in one word: decline. Some accounts, with special pleading or a begrudging tone, may admit that Theophrastus' immediate successor, Straton of Lampsakos, was a somewhat worthy heir of the school (cf. Diogenes Laertius V, 64; Cicero, *De Finibus* V, 5.13); but otherwise ancient (1) and modern (2) authorities agree that the Peripatos declined drastically during the Hellenistic Period. Wilamowitz stated the prevailing view in its most extreme form, when he spoke — in a remark which is often quoted with approval — of "the death-sleep of Aristotelian Philosophy" beginning with Straton's successor Lykon.(3) Despite the unanimity of opinion, one might nevertheless be tempted to question whether or not the Athenian Peripatos did decline so much. For there is an enormous variety of work produced in the Hellenistic Period which goes under the name "Peripatetic": "Peripatetic biography," "Peripatetic literary criticism," "Peripatetic art criticism," and "Peripatetic historiography." Most of this activity, however, did not in fact go on in the school at Athens. The essential distinction to be made about the label "Peripatetic" in the Hellenistic Period is stated very precisely by K. O. Brink:

The name *Peripatetikos*, which by the middle of the third century denoted a member of the Peripatetic School in Athens, changed its significance about that time. With the wider influence of Peripatetic studies it is not only used for the Athenian School but can also denote any writer of biography or literary history connected with Alexandria. The two non-Peripatetics to whom the name appears to have been applied first are two pupils of Callimachus, Hermippos and Satyros.(4)

Since the Peripatos under Aristotle established the systematic treatise, particularly in biography and literary history, as a new form of writing, any Alexandrian author of such a work might claim the title *Peripatetikos* — whether or not he had studied in the Athenian Peripatos and whether or not he composed his treatise along lines which appear to be in some sense "Aristotelian." As Brink has shown, much of the so-called "Peripatetic" work done at Alexandria was in fact anti-Aristotelian in intention.(5) Not only did these "Neo-Peripatetics"

reject Aristotelian principles in their biographies and literary treatises but they also claimed to be doing better what Aristotle and his school had inaugurated. Polemical opposition rather than descendance is what the use of the title *Peripatetikos* signifies among the Alexandrians. Far from being an Alexandrian extension indicating the vitality of the Athenian Peripatos in the third and second centuries B.C., the “Peripatetic” works of Hermippos, Satyros, Sotion, Herakleides Lembos, and other Alexandrians represent an attempt to usurp and to surpass the traditions inherited by Aristotle’s school in Athens." (pp. 135-137)

Notes

(1) In Cicero's *De Finibus* (V, 4-5) a survey of the Peripatetic School is put into the mouth of Piso, whose contention is that after Aristotle and Theophrastus the Peripatetics “declined so much that they seem to have been born of themselves.” Strabo, who had studied Peripatetic philosophy with Boethos of Sidon at Rome (XVI, 2.24), says that “the earlier men from the Peripatos, after Theophrastus, were unable to study philosophy effectively but instead managed only to spout tedious commonplaces” (XIII, 1.54). Diogenes Laertius reveals that a number of schemes for treating the history of Greek philosophy ended the Peripatetic tradition with Theophrastus (I, 14-15). The Roman editor of Aristotle, Andronicus of Rhodes, also had a very low opinion of the Athenian Peripatetics after Theophrastus. For a reconstruction of Andronicus' critique of the school, see M. Plezia, *De Andronicii Rhodii studiis aristotelicis* (Krakow, 1946) pp. 10-15.
(2) According to I. Düring, “it is not merely exaggeration, when Cicero says [of the later Peripatetics] *ita degenerapt ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur*; their teaching consisted of endless repetition of their master's words, just as in the school of Ammonios seven hundred years later” (*Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (1957), p. 394). The Peripatetic's are often dismissed with little or no comment even in general works on Hellenistic philosophy and literature; cf. F. A. Wright, *A History of Later Greek Literature* (New York, 1932) p. 128: “Of the Peripatetics little need be said; after the death of Theophrastus they

abandoned pure philosophy for the collection of historical and scientific facts, and by the middle of the third century their work was over." E. Zeller had a slightly higher opinion of the Hellenistic Peripatos, but only slightly; cf. *History of Greek Philosophy* VI, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, vol. 2, p. 500.
(3) "Der Totenschlaf der aristotelischen Philosophie," Wilamowitz, *Antigónos von Karystos*, p. 83; cf. F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit* I (Leipzig, 1891) p. 147.
(4) K. O. Brink "Callimachus and Aristotle: An Inquiry into Callimachus' *Pros Praxiphanen*" *Classical Quarterly* 40 (1946) p. 11; cf. art. "Peripatos" in Pauly-Wissowa (Suppl. band 7) col. 905. The distinction between "Peripatetics" and Alexandrian "Neo-Peripatetics" is usefully observed in the article by A. Podlecki, "The Peripatetics as Literary Critics," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) pp. 114-137.

From: John Patrick Lynch, *Aristotle's School. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1972.

"Reasons for the decline in the Peripatos have often been suggested. Some scholars are content with attributing the decline to a general "failure of nerve" characteristic of the Hellenistic Period.(19) But the difficulty with this kind of explanation is quite obvious. Theophrastus' directorship of the school came in the Hellenistic Period, and two of the schools -- the Stoa and the Garden -- were founded and flourished at the beginning of the age. Not long after the Peripatos declined never to rise again, the Stoa and the Academy were bolstered by their "second founders," Chrysippos and Arkesilaos. The "failure of nerve" thesis fails to account for the fact that the later history of the Peripatos was so different.
The most recent and perhaps most authoritative solution to the problem has been offered by F. Wehrli in his "Rückblick der Peripatos in vorchristlicher Zeit" (*Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft 10 (Basel, 1959; 2nd ed., 1969 pp. 95-128). Although Wehrli's treatment of the question is very brief, his views are based on an

elaborate re-edition, with commentary, of all the fragmentary *Peripatetikoi* in the pre-Christian era. Wehrli's sketch of the process of decline in the school convincingly demonstrates the prevailing view of the Hellenistic Peripatos after Theophrastus; his explanation for the phenomenon is not, however, equally persuasive.

It is Wehrli's contention that since Aristotle's philosophical outlook changed considerably over the time between his earlier dialogues and his later systematic treatises, the Peripatos failed to develop an orthodoxy which subsequent members of the school could follow. Because it was difficult, Wehrli argues, for the Peripatetics of the third century B.C. to reconcile the teaching of Aristotle's esoteric treatises with that of the exoteric dialogues, the school ended up in confusion and, in an eclectic spirit, turned to sources of clarification outside the confines of the Lyceum. And these sources proved to be influences of the worst sort, such as those tendencies of the age which emphasized the marvelous over the logical. As far as the apparent split between the earlier and later Aristotle was concerned, all later Peripatetics chose one to the exclusion of the other. Most opted for the direction suggested by Aristotle's exoteric writings and addressed themselves to subjects of popular appeal; those who followed the lead of the esoteric writings failed to recognize the importance of keeping larger systems in mind and as a result ended up pursuing a banal empiricism. The result of all these developments was the decline, or -- to use Wehrli's stronger word -- the "disintegration," of the Peripatos until its revival in the time of Andronicus of Rhodes.

Wehrli's interpretation seeks to explain the decline of the school purely on the literary level. That is to say, Wehrli tried only to isolate tendencies in the writings of Aristotle and his successors which, in his opinion, led to disintegration; he did not consider other modes of explanation which might help to account for the phenomenon and which might, in addition, suggest causes for the literary tendencies themselves. In brief, the features which Wehrli points out in the writings of the later Peripatetics seem more symptomatic of degeneration than causal. Furthermore -- and equally important -- the problem of decline in the Peripatetic School is more than a literary problem, just as the school itself was more than a literary phenomenon.

(...)
Several events in the early history of the Peripatos as an institution suggest much less subtle and more convincing reasons why Aristotle's school at Athens declined in the third century B.C. An important factor was undoubtedly the loss of the school library, which after Theophrastus' death was taken by Neleus of Skepsis from Athens to the Troad. (20)
Strabo in fact argues that this was the reason why the Peripatos became so insignificant in the period after Theophrastus:

The effect of this [the loss of the library] was that the earlier men from the Peripatos after Theophrastus had no books at all, with few exceptions, mostly exoteric works; hence, instead of studying philosophy effectively, they were able only to spout tedious commonplaces. (Strabo, XIII, 1.54; cf. Plutarch, Sulla 26)

Modern scholarship, however, has shown that Strabo's view of Peripatetic decline is simplistic for a number of reasons. Later Peripatetics at Athens, although only fragments of their works survive, show knowledge of most esoteric works, as do some other Athenian *philosophers* in the Hellenistic Period.(21) Despite the implications of Strabo's statement, it is not reasonable to suppose that the library of Neleus contained the only copies of the *pragmateiai* written under Aristotle and Theophrastus. Other members of the school doubtless had copies of esoteric works which interested them and could have gotten copies of others if they had some incentive to do so. It is known, for example, that when Eudemos left the Peripatos in the time of Theophrastus and went to Rhodes, he had in his possession a copy of Aristotle's *Physics*, some readings in which he asked Theophrastus by letter to check in the school text (fr. 6, Wehrli); it is probable that Eudemos also had a copy of the *Ethics*, a version of which he worked up into a different form, and copies of other treatises as well.(22) Straton, who took over the Peripatos after Neleus' departure, was able to build up and pass on to his successor a library which probably contained personal copies of some of the school literature (cf. Straton's will in *Diogenes Laertius V, 62*).

P. Moraux has made a brilliant and plausible case that the catalogue of Aristotle's writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius (V, 22-27) is a copy of the works available in the library of the Peripatos during the time of Ariston of Keos, the second-century B.C. scholar who, Moraux argues, was responsible for drawing up the list as part of his biography of Aristotle.(23) And Diogenes Laertius' catalogue, though full of Aristotle's dialogues and rhetorical works and deficient in the works on natural science, does include a large number of the esoteric treatises.(24) It appears that by the third century B.C. multiple copies of books were increasingly available, and it became common for cities and private individuals like Eratosthenes (Strabo II, 1.5) to amass considerable libraries of their own.(25) In building up the Alexandrian Library, Ptolemy II Philadelphos reportedly was able to buy from Neleus a complete set of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus (Athenaeus I, 3a-b) (26)

Why were the members of the Peripatos content to do without works which they did not have? And why did they not build upon those which they are known to have had? The loss of the library was undoubtedly a serious inconvenience and could not help setting back somewhat the workings of a school which aimed to systematize the whole of human knowledge. But that loss alone cannot, as Strabo would have it, completely explain the decline of the Peripatos. A vital philosophical community could have done more than the Peripatetics after Theophrastus did to offset the loss of the systematic collection which Theophrastus willed to Neleus."

See the full analysis of the contents of Diogenes Laertius' list given by P. Moraux 1951 (above, n. 21) pp. 27-153.

On city libraries in the third century B.C., see E. A. Parsons, The Alexandrian Library (New York, 1952.) pp. 19-50. The testimonia to private and city libraries are gathered by J. Platthy, Sources on the Earliest Greek Libraries (Amsterdam, 1968). The proliferation of libraries in the third century B.C. implies the existence of multiple copies of books.

Athenaeus' statement is supported by Elias, In Cat. p. 107.11 = T 75p, p. 419, Miring; Philoponos, In Cat. pr. p. 7.16 = T 77c, p. 456, Dining. On the esoteric works available in the Alexandrian Library during the Hellenistic Period, see the article of E.

Howald, "Die Schriftenverzeichnisse des Aristoteles and des Theophrast," Hermes 55 (1920) pp. 204-221, which also must be modified by the work of Moraux." (pp. 144-149)"

Notes

(19) This influential view of the Hellenistic Period was first developed by G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion* (New York, 1912); cf. Murray's third edition, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (New York, 1951) pp. 119-165.
(20) The story of Aristotle's library has often been recounted and includes many controversial details. The most detailed and readable study is perhaps that of J. Bidez, *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'antiquité* (Bruxelles, 1943). The ancient evidence is assembled and discussed by Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957, pp. 337-338, 382-384, 392-395, 412-425; E. Zeller V, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics,* vol. 1, pp. 137-160; and F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit* II, pp. 296301; cf. also A.-H. Chroust, "The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the Corpus Aristotelicum," Classica et Mediaevalia 23 (1962) pp. 50-67 and R. Shute, *On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at their Present Form* (Oxford, 1888), an excellent essay bringing together and sifting the results of research done in the nineteenth century. For a very illuminating overview of the complicated process by which Aristotle's writings were transmitted to the West, see I. Düring, "Von Aristoteles bis Leibnitz,"*Antike and Abendland* 4 (1954) 118-154 (reprinted in P. Moraux, ed., *Aristoteles in der neueren Forschung* [Darmstadt, 1968] pp. 250-313).
(21) E. Zeller (above, n. 20) reexamined the question of knowledge of the esoteric writings during the Hellenistic Period and argued that most of the Aristotelian Corpus must have been available at Athens and Alexandria after Theophrastus' death: "We may sum up the case by saying that of the genuine portions of the extant *Corpus*, there are only the works on the *Parts, Genesis*, and *Movement of Animals*, and the minor anthropological tracts, as to which we cannot show either express

proof or high probability that they were in use after the disappearance of Theophrastus' library from Athens. Even as to these we have no reason to doubt it -- only we cannot positively prove it; and that, when we remember the fragmentary character of our knowledge of the philosophic literature of the period in question, is nothing strange' (p. 152). Zeller's discussion and conclusions must be modified somewhat by the work of P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951) especially pp. 312-321 (conclusions). But Moraux's work serves to confirm the general view that despite Strabo's statement to the contrary, a large number of esoteric works were available in the Hellenistic Period (see further below, n. 23 for the Aristotelian works in the library of Ariston of Keos). The esoteric works do not appear to have been studied or used very much, even in the Peripatos; but that is a different problem -- one directly connected with the decline of the school.

(22) It is commonly held that the *Eudemian Ethics* was so-called because it was a compilation of Aristotle's lectures on ethics by Eudemos, while the Nicomachean Ethics was a version compiled by Nikomachos. For a discussion of various theories about the relation between the two works, see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 228-258 and I. Düring, art. "Aristoteles" in Pauly-Wissowa (Suppl. band 11, 1968) cols. 282-287.

(23) P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, pp. 237-247. I. Düring has attempted to refute Moraux's thesis in favor of the traditional view that Diogenes Laertius' list reflects the one drawn up by Hermippos and contains the holdings of the second-century B.C. Alexandrian Library ("Ariston or Hermippos?"*Classica et Mediaevalia* 17 [1956] pp. 11-21). But Moraux's objections to Hermippos as author seem to me to be persuasive (pp. 221-233). Moraux's thesis has been strongly supported against Düring's objections by J. J. Keaney, "Two Notes on the Tradition of Aristotle's Writings,"*American Journal of Philology* 84 (1963) pp. 52-63.

From: John Patrick Lynch, *Aristotle's School. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1972.

THE REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS AND THEIR PUBLICATION

"The difficulty of piercing the screen, sometimes very opaque, which is the Aristotelianism of so many centuries, based substantially on the thinking of a thousand and one more or less faithful "disciples," is doubled by a difficulty probably unique in its kind: the impossibility of always being able to determine exactly the sort of things the writings of the authentic Aristotelian *Corpus* are. For we suspect that scholars often have to deal with texts whose definitive form owes something to the work of Aristotle's disciples. We remain, on the other hand, powerless to determine always with precision the extent to which the products of their work continue to conform to the master's thinking or proceed, on the contrary, from a new idea. At least I can state very generally that the organization of the *Corpus Aristotelicum,* such as scholars after Andronicus of Rhodes have understood it, depends for them on the firmer and firmer conviction that Aristotle elaborated a philosophical system whose constituent parts are reflected in the arrangement of the different preserved treatises, as if their author had effectively "programmed" them from the perspective of systematic expression. Now, this is the one intention that we may hardly attribute to our philosopher. The project of expounding a genuine system is in fact, as I. Düring has written,(4) "typically Hellenistic but very un-Aristotelian." Such a claim will perhaps seem today the unavoidable result of Jaeger's explicit attempt to combat "scholastic idolatry,"(5) which regarded the work of the "master of those who know" as a genuine "summa," firmly articulated. But, independently of Jaeger, K. Praechter, for example, assures us that "a secure division of the philosophical disciplines according to a determinate principle does not occur in Aristotle"! (6) And it is obvious that Aristotle was not as concerned as his disciples were to propose a rigid system of sciences and to organize his writings systematically according to it.

This indeterminateness is obviously quite irksome for the interpreter who asks about the occasion for the project of Aristotle to which the texts catalogued under the titles *Ethics* and *Politics* correspond, and who finds himself dealing with a *Corpus* established by people who indeed thought that they could abolish such indeterminateness by recourse to the hypothesis that the philosopher conceived his project as formally expounding a genuine system. Moreover -- and this is a prime consideration whose significance I shall examine at great length -- the originality of Aristotle's project risks being masked by the interpretation or the importance given since antiquity to certain interpretive categories (human philosophy, practical science, ethics, etc.) in accounting for the approach of a series of texts integrated in the *Corpus,* itself conceived as a philosophical summa. The danger will appear considerable especially as these categories make reference to Aristotelian vocabulary.
To restore to the philosopher that which properly belongs to him is thus an extremely perilous task. Without hiding from ourselves either the difficulty of the undertaking or the limits beyond which everything is no more than a tissue of gratuitous hypotheses, it is important to state in the clearest way the particulars of the problem." (pp. 9-10, some notes omitted)

Notes

(4) Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957.
(5) Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1948.

From: Richard Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics*, translated by Jan Edward Garrett, Albany: State University of New York Press 1993.

"Strabo is the main source. There are supplementary texts, the most important of which is in Plutarch.(1) Here, first, are Strabo and Plutarch.

From Scepsis came the Socratics, Erastus and Coriscus, and also Coriscus' son, Neleus, a man who attended the lectures both of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and who took over Theophrastus' library, which included Aristotle's. For Aristotle left his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also entrusted the school. (Aristotle was the first man we know to have collected books, and he taught the kings of Egypt how to put a library together). Theophrastus left it to Neleus, who took it to Scepsis and left it to his successors. They were not philosophers and kept the books locked away and carelessly stored. When they heard that the Attalid kings, by whom their city was ruled, were eagerly searching for books in order to set up the library at Pergamum, they hid them underground in a sort of tunnel, where they were damaged by mildew and worms. Some time later the family sold the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for a large sum to Apellicon of Teos. Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher. That is why he tried to repair the worm-damage by transferring the writings to new manuscripts but did not complete them satisfactorily; and he published the books full of errors.

Thus it was that the older Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus did not possess the books at all -- except for a few, and in particular the exoteric works -- and so were not able to do any serious philosophy but merely declaimed generalities. Their successors -- once these books became available -- were better philosophers and better Aristotelians; yet they were obliged for the most part to speak at haphazard because of the number of mistakes.

Rome too had a considerable hand in this. For immediately after Apellicon's death Sulla, who had captured Athens, took his library and brought it here, where the scholar Tyrannio, who was an amateur of Aristotle, put his hand to it, having buttered up the librarian. And certain booksellers made use of bad scribes and did not check the copies -- something which happens with other books which are copied for sale, both here and at Alexandria. But enough of this. Strabo, [*Geography*] 13-1. 54 (608-9).

Sulla reserved for himself the library of Apellicon of Teos, which included most of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus (which were then not yet familiar to most people). It is said that after the

library had been taken to Rome the scholar Tyrannio prepared most of it and that Andronicus of Rhodes obtained copies from him, made them public and drew up the catalogues which are now in circulation. The older Peripatetics were themselves evidently accomplished and scholarly men; but the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus which they had come across were neither numerous nor accurately written because the estate of Neleus of Scepsis (to whom Theophrastus had left his books) was passed on to men who were unambitious and not philosophers. (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26 (468 BC)

Strabo does not cite any authority for his story. Elsewhere he says that he heard Tyrannio lecturing (12. 3. 16 (548)), and also that he 'studied Aristotelian philosophy together with Boethus' of Sidon (16. 2. 24 (757)). He might well have heard the story from Tyrannio or from his Aristotelian lecturer.'(10) Plutarch cites no authority either; but his text is strikingly close to Strabo's, and it is tempting to suppose that either Plutarch copied from Strabo or else the two men drew from a common source.(11) If the two men drew from a common source, then Strabo-whatever he may have heard from his cronies-knew the story in a written form." (pp. 2-3, some notes omitted)

Notes

(1) The texts are conveniently found in Düring [1966], Gigon [1987], and in Fortenbaugh et al. [*Theophrastus* 1992] I. 90-4. Of recent discussions the fullest are Düring, [1966] 46-54; id. [1968] cols. 190-203; Moraux [1973] I. 3-94; Blum [1977] 109-34; Gottschalk [1990] 1083-97; Richardson [1994] 7-28; Irigoin [1994] 50-3. Of the older literature, I mention Stahr [1830] 117-34; id. [115] 23-32. The romantic will read L. Canfora, *La biblioteca scomparsa* (Palermo, 1986), 34-7, 59-66, 181-90.[See the Bibliography on the Rediscovery of *Corpus Aristotelicum* below for the complete references]

(...)

(10) Together with Andronicus and Boethus he [i.e. Strabo] heard Tyrannio, and through Andronicus he became interested in Aristotle's works': Düring [132] 413 -- a garbled invention.(11) See Moraux [76] I. 21-4; below, pp. 9, 19-20.

From: Jonathan Barnes, *Roman Aristotle* in: Jonathan Barnes and Miriam Griffin (eds.), *Philosophia togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 1-69.

"The external evidence for the transmission of Aristotle's writings before the edition of Andronicus is meagre. There is also a great difference in opinion as to the essential question. Silently and without entering upon the problem many scholars seem to presuppose that Aristotle's writings, in the form they are handed down to us in the Corpus Aristotelicum, were widely circulated during the Hellenistic era and that the edition of Andronicus was nothing but a stage in an otherwise uninterrupted tradition. Other scholars maintain that the scientific *pragmateiai* known to us through the *Corpus Aristotelicum* on the whole were unknown during the time from the death of Theophrastus to the age of Sulla, when, through Apellicon's famous find, they began to be known again. This opinion is energetically and with great skill defended by Bignone and the Italian school.(1) It is a well-known fact that the Peripatetic School mismanaged their inheritance from Aristotle. It was outside the Peripatos that Aristotle's philosophic tenets, his scientific method, his achievements is various branches of 'science, in brief, his life's work gained most importance. How could this be possible, if we are not to assume widespread and intimate knowledge of his writings, the dialogues as well as the treatises, in the Hellenistic era? More concretely the question might be put thus: which works of Aristotle were known for example to Polybius, Posidonius or Cicero? The crucial point in an inquiry into this problem is that direct and definable quotations from Aristotle are exceedingly rare, particularly quotations which agree with a text known to us in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. As to quotations from Plato it is, as everybody knows, quite the other way. They are generally in perfect accord with our text. It is not unusual to come upon a statement like this: here we find the earliest quotation from the Metaphysics. A close examination of the passage in question, however, often makes us disappointed. As a rule it turns out that there is a general agreement between the two passages in factual content, but this is not enough." pp. 37-38

(1) A. Bignone. *L'Aristotele perduto*, Firenze 1936, Vol. I p. 33. He often stresses that "l'Aristotele che pubblicamente si leggeva e che solo, o quasi solo, si poté conoscere, sopratutto fuori della scuola, particolarmente nel periodo fra la morte di Teofrasto e l'età di Silla ... era l'Aristotele dei dialoghi e degli scritti esoterici, i soli da lui pubblicati."

(...)
In 47 B. C. the main part of the books belonging to the Alexandrian library were destroyed. Caesar intended to bring the books to Rome and had them transported down to the harbour. In the course of the riots they caught fire. (...) This fire did not of course mean that Aristotle's writings were lost to the world: there existed, as I have said, copies in other libraries. But when the commentators began their work in the first and second century they were obliged to resort to the Andronicean edition and such books as they happened to encounter in one library or another. Apart from the Andronicean edition, there existed no more a complete collection of the writings of Aristotle like that which had existed in Alexandria. We shall now briefly trace the history of this edition. Athens was, in the beginning of the first century B. C., the stage of events which became decisive for the history of the Peripatos and for later Aristotelianism. In these happenings Apellicon played an important rôle. Apellicon was, according to Strabo, ψιλόβίβλος μάλλον ἡ φιλόσοφος. His wealth enabled him to buy large collection of books during his travels in Asia Minor. He happened to run into the family of Neleus, who still treasured Aristotle's manuscripts, once inherited from Theophrastus. He bought the whole collection and brought it to Athens, where he, as Strabo says, »attempted to restore the parts which had been eaten and corroded by worms, made alterations in the original text and introduced them into new copies; he moreover supplied the defective parts unskilfully, and published the books full of errors». This last statement is, of course, impossible to control, and we can believe it or not. (...) When, during the first Mithridatic war, the Athenians sided with the oriental despot against the Romans, Apellicon was elected στρατηγός bii των δπλων. In 86 [B.C.] Sulla besieged Athens. The Roman soldiers cut down the grove of Academus and used the trees for their

entrenchments. The Peripatos was evacuated, and what eventually was left of books landed in Apellicon's library. When, early next year, Sulla stormed Athens, Apellicon was slain. His library was subsequently sent to Rome.
Another famous Roman also brought books to Rome, namely Lucullus (2) and among them also copies of Aristotle's works. He was a great philhellene, and when at Amisos he captured the learned Tyrannio, he treated him well, after some quarrel with his legate Murena. Tyrannio went with him to Rome in 67 and there became an important person. He took charge of the books taken as war-booty. At the same time as he acted as adviser to Roman noblemen, he gathered a library of his own, comprising 30.000 volumes. It is probable that he acted as counsellor to Atticus in his publishing-house. He was still alive in 26. Cicero mentions his name often, the first time in 59 (3) as literary authority. In 56 he rearranged Cicero's library and fixed appropriate titles on his rolls, *offendes designationem Tyrannionis mirificam in librorum miorum bibliotheca;* and in another letter from the same year *postea vero quam Tyrannio mihi libros disposuit, mens addita videtur meis aedibus*. (4) The last time he is mentioned by Cicero is in a letter of 46.(5) It was probably through Tyrannio Cicero for the first time had access to other woks of Aristotle than the dialogues. In earlier work he had spoken of the *flumen aureum* of Aristotle's style. Aristotle, Theophrastus and Carneades were *eloquentes et in dicendo soaves atque ornati*.(6) In 45 he writes in his *Hortensius* (*apud Nonium* p. 264.15): *magna etiam animi contentio adhibenda est explicando Aristoteli si legas,* and a year later, in his *Topica* he confesses that Aristotle *ignoratur ab ipsis philosophis praeter paucos*. He seems to have accustomed himself to his style, which now is characterized as *dicendi incredibilis copia, tum etias suavitas,* words that arouse some suspicion in everybody who know Aristotles' *Topica*.
We must, however remember, that he writes this from memory during a voyage. His judgment is superficial as so often. In Sulla's library Cicero must have had ample opportunities to browse. Sulla's son was killed in Caesar's camp 46, and after this time the library was entirely in Tyrannio's charge. Already in 55 Cicero writes to Atticus (IV 10): *ego hic pastor bibliotheca Fausti*.

Tyrannnio seems to have advised Atticus to publish works of Aristotle after the manuscripts, bought to Rome by Sulla and Lucullus.
Since we have no exact information about these editions, it can hardly have been more than occasional copies. That Atticus admired Aristotle particularly, is shown by the fact that Cicero mentions a statue of Aristotle in a niche in Atticus' office. (7) Tyrannio left the task of preparing an edition of Aristotle's works to Andronicus of Rhodes. And here we leave the story to Plutarch, Sulla 26 [see the text cited above] .
From the context in which this notice occurs, (8) it is pretty obvious that it is taken from Strabo's lost work *Hypomnemata historika*. It is Strabo too, who In his geographical work provides information concerning Apellicon's find and how his library was brought to Rome by Sulla.(9) We can also see the reason why Strabo was so well informed in this matter. He mentions that he together with Boëthos of Sidon listened to lectures in Aristotelian philosophy.(9) Boëthos was the foremost disciple of Andronicus and pursued his work. It is not improbable that Strabo sat together with Boëthos in Rome before Andronicus' professorial chair, or perhaps all together heard Tyrannio.(10) This must have happened circa 30 B.C. Strabo's *Hypomnemata historika* related events which occurred in 27 and must consequently have been finished some time after this date. His Geography was not finished before 18 B.C. and is probably later.
If the chronology which I have followed here is right, it is impossible to date the beginning of Andronicus activity as editor of Aristotle's works earlier than 40. It would probably be safes to say: between 40 and 20 A. C. This means that Andronicus' edition did not appear until many years after Cicero's death.
Here I am entirely at issue with the general opinion. It is generally believed that Andronicus was scholarch in Athens in the seventies and published his edition there. Practically all information in this matter in current handbooks is based on F. Littig's dissertations. (11) Even K. O. Brink follows Littig in his article *Peripatos*, (12) although he expresses his doubts. In my opinion Littig's argumentation don not stand confrontation with the ancient evidence. His chief argument is, in fact, his strong

belief in his own theory, and this is, as all of us know, a *communs malum* in our field of study.
To the positive arguments I have set forth in support of my theory, I should like to add a very strong negative argument. Cicero was very interested in the works of Aristotle, particularly during his last years when he wrote his philosophical works. He mentions Lucullus' two companions, Antiochus of Ascalon and Tyrannio, he often speaks of Diodotus, but he never mentions Andronicus. When he was in Athens 78, he heard Philo, the leading Peripatetic, and when, in 45, he sent his son to Athens, he mentioned Cratippus as the foremost Peripatetic. Is it really possible that he could have escaped noticing a man of Andronicus' qualities, and much less, a new edition of Aristotle's works?
Andronicus introduced his edition with a work in five books, containing a biography and catalogue of Aristotle's writings. A comparison between Hermippus' catalogue in Diogenes and Andronicus' (which is handed down to us in Arabic versions) raises a number of problems which cannot be discussed here. I just wish to touch two essential questions. Firstly, is it a catalogue of the writings of Aristotle, known to Andronicus, or a catalogue of his edition? For my part I find the first alternative more probable. It is not very likely that he made new editions of works already known and widely circulated, such as the dialogues, Protrepticus, the polities. It is more probable that our present *Corpus Aristotelicum* on the whole corresponds to his edition. He is responsible for the editing of the existing treatises. Thus he added the *peri lexeos* as a third book to the Rhetoric, the independent first book of the *Parts of Animals* to the existing edition, the likewise independent fourth book to the existing edition of the *Meteorologica* etc. In his catalogue and in quotations after his time we meet with the title *Meta ta phusikà,* reflecting the order in which he arranged the treatises. The earliest quotation I have found, which is undoubtedly taken from Andronicus' edition, is Dionysius de compos. c' 25, 198 and ep. ad Arm. 8 *en te tite bublo ton technon*. These works were written after the year 30 B. C.
Andronicus was also responsible for introducing the distinction between exoteric and esoteric works. The notion in itself is early

(13) but we find no signs of this distinction applied to Aristotle's works until after the edition of Andronicus. Andronicus obviously interpreted Aristotle's of *oi exoterikoi logoi* in a way, which suited the taste of his time. Thus he inspired the creation of the myth of .the two Aristotles, ridiculed in Lucian's *Vitarum auctio* 566.
The second interesting question is this: did Andronicus use the manuscripts, bought by Apellicon from the family of Neleus in Skepsis, as a basis for his edition? This is not the place for a full discussion of this problem, but I should like to add a few remarks. I think the part played by the manuscripts from Skepsis has been both underrated (14) and overrated.(15) As I have shown, there was in Rome, from the sixties onwards, a continuous influx of books to private libraries. The first public library in Rome was founded in 39 by Asinius Pollio after his triumph over the Parthians. Andronicus must have had to his disposal s comparatively rich collection of Aristotelian works, although certainly not nearly so rich as that in Alexandria.
Sulla brought from Athens not only the manuscripts from Skepsis, but also other books taken from Apellicon's library. An attempt to define more precisely the contents of the collection from Skepsis can only be a mere guess. Thus I do not find it improbable that Metaphysics α, the *peri lexeos, the* first book of the present *Parts of Animals*, the fourth book of the *Meteorologica* and a collection of Aristotle's letters came to Andronicus exclusively through the find in Skepsis. In his catalogue of Aristotle's writings, handed down to us in the Arabic translation of Ptolemaios Chennos, we read under n. 86: " the books found in the library of Apellicon", and under n. 90: "other letters, found by Andronicus ". We shall probably never know, exactly how important the find from Skepsis was for the formation of Andronicus' edition, but it is certain that this edition saved Aristotle's works from the fate that befell the works of Democritus." (pp. 64-70)

Notes

(1) Isid. *or*. VI, 5.1 *librorum copiam advexit Lucullus a Pontica praeda*. (...)

(2) *Ad Att*. II 6.
(3) *Ad Att*. IV 4 a and IV 8. See further Usener Kleine Schriften III 153.
(4) *Ad Att*. XII 2, cf. *ad Qu*. fr. II 4.
(5) *De or*. I 12, 49.
(6) *Ad Att*. IV 10 from the year 55.
(7) He quotes Strabo for a notice concerning Sulla in the same chapter.
(8) Lucian knew the story, probably from Andronicus' own work on Aristotle. *ad. ind* 4.
(9) XVI 2,24.
(10) Strabo XII 3,16.
(11) Friedrich Littig *Andronikos von Rhodos* I, Munchen 1890, II, Progr. Erlangen 1894, III, Progr. Erlangen 1895.
(12) *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft Suppl. 7*, 1940.
(13) See Usener, *Epicurea* p. XLII.
(14) E.g. by E. Howald, *Die Schriftenverzeichnisse des Aristoteles und des Theophrast* Hermes, 55, 1920, pp. 204-221.
(15) E.g. by J. Bidez, *Un singulier Naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité*, Bruxelles 1943.

From: Ingemar Düring, "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings", *Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis* 1950, pp. 37-70. (Reprinted as second study in: *Aristotle and His Influence: Two Studies*, New York: Garland 1987.)

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES AND THE ROMAN EDITION OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

"Most information on Andronicus in current handbook is based on F. Littig's dissertation *Andronicus von Rhodos. I. Das Leben des Andronikos and seine Anordnung der aristotelischen*

Schriften, München 1890, followed by two additional parts, Erlangen 1894-95. K. O. Brink, in: *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft Suppl. 7, s. v.* Peripatos, expresses some doubt as to the validity of Littig's conclusions. As I said in my "Notes on the history of the transmission of Aristotle's writings", Littig's argumentation does not stand confrontation with the ancient evidence. Very useful is M. Plezia, "De Andronici Rhodii studiis Aristotelicis", *Polska Ak. Archiwum filologiczne*, N. 20, Kraków 1946. Although I do not agree with some of his conclusions, his treatment of the subject has considerably advanced our knowledge.

There is no ancient evidence that Andronicus ever was head of the Peripatetic school in Athens, apart from T 75 p [Elias *In Cat. CIAG (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca)* XVIII, 1, p. 113-117)], which I regard as entirely untrustworthy. Cratippus is mentioned as scholarch in 46 by Cicero; when Cicero was in Athens in 78, he met no Peripatetic philosopher of importance except Antiochus, *germanissimus Stoicus*, as he mockingly calls him, seeing that he was in fact more of a Stoic than Aristotelian. Neither before nor after Cratippus is there any room for Andronicus as scholarch. To Littig the solution was simple: "Wahrscheinlich dass Andronikos in aller Stille Vorstand der Schule geworden war."

In our evidence there is universal agreement on one point: Andronicus was highly respected as a conscientious scholar. He was educated in Rhodes, an old centre of Aristotelian studies, and it is not unlikely that he preserved the traditions of Eudemus and his school, see T 75 m [Simplicius *In Phys. CIAG* X, p. 923-927] and Diels in: *Abhandlungen Akademie Berlin*, 1882, p. 40. It was one of those rare and happy coincidences of history that this scholar, educated in a good Aristotelian tradition, happened to find in Rome a library rich in manuscripts of Aristotle's writings. The find from Scepsis was probably not unimportant, but of much greater importance was the large-scale influx of books to the private libraries in Rome after about 60 B. C. Lucullus, the great philhellene, brought with him from Asia Minor not only Tyrannion and other learned scholars, but books in great quantities, too, bought or taken from old Hellenistic libraries. We are told that Tyrannion collected a library of his own, comprising

30,000 rolls; from Cicero's correspondence we may conclude that he acted as literary adviser to Atticus. Sulla's son was killed in 46, and after this time his library was in Tyrannion's charge. In the circle of men of letters that we get to know through Cicero's correspondence, Aristotle was admired as one of the greatest minds of the past. Atticus had a bust of him in his library, and Orsini believed that the replica he had bought actually was that same bust (see Studniczka *Das Bildnis des Aristoteles* (1908) p. 17). It is against this background of a general awakening of interest in Aristotle that we should see Andronicus' achievement. Cicero knows nothing about Andronicus or his edition. The evidence, especially T 66 c [Strabon XIII 1, 54, p. 608], 74 d [Strabon XII, 3,16 p. 548] and 75 b [Strabon XVI 2, 24, p. 757], suggests that Andronicus was younger than Tyrannion and that he came to Rome some time between 50 and 40 B. C. In my "Notes on the history of the transmission of Aristotle's writings" I suggested that his work on Aristotle's writings and his edition of the *Organon* and the other pragmaties were accomplished between 40 and 20 B. C. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De compos.* c. 25, 198 and *Ep. ad Amm.* 8 εν τη τρίτη βυβλώ τών τεχνών are the earliest references to Andronicus' edition known to me. These works were written after 30 B. C. When speaking of his "edition", εκδοσίς, we should take care not to think in modern terms. Horace's poems and literary works of the same kind might have been produced commercially, although we should be on our guard against too exaggerated accounts of ancient book-production. A scholarly work like Andronicus' edition, was produced only for use in the school, anıd certainly only a few copies were made for his collaborators and disciples.
The only work of Andronicus which concerns us in this connexion is his book on Aristotle's writings. We do not know the title, but we know that it served as an introduction to his edition of the scholarly writings of Aristotle; we are entitled to conclude that his work had a somewhat propagandistic tendency. Like all innovators he was full of enthusiasm for his great enterprise, and rightly so. Porphyry mentions his book as Διαίρεσις τών 'Αριστοτελικών συψψραμματων Simplicius as '(Περί) Αριστοτέλονς βιβλίων, Gellius merely says *Liber Andronici philosophi.* Ptolemy mentions Andronicus' book in title 97,

retranslated by Baumstark εν πεμπτω 'Ανδρονίκον Περί πίνακος τών 'Αριστοτέλους σνγγραμμάτων. If we stick to this information, the title of his book must have been *On Aristotle's writings*, but the exact Greek title cannot be ascertained. It was a work in at least five books; in the third book Andronicus dealt with the physical treatises.

We have three fairly extensive fragments of the text, T 75 m [Simplicius *In Phys. CIAG* X p. 923-927] and o [Philoponus *In de an. CIAG* XV, p. 27.21, T 76 f [Aulus Gellius *Noct. att.* XX 5], and several short indications of the contents, as in T 75 g, j, n and q [Porphyrius *Vita Plotini,* c. 24; Ammonius *In l. De interpr. pr., CIAG* IV 5, p. 5.24 -- Schola Brandis, p. 97a 13-20; Philoponus *In Cat. pr., CIAG* XIII 1, p. 5.16; Boethius *In Aristotelis De interpr.* II p. 11.16]. According to VM 43 it included the text of Aristotle's Will. We have no evidence whatever that his book contained a biography of Aristotle. The story presented by Gellius T 76 f is an extract from a chapter in which Andronicus developed his ideas about the difference between "exoteric" and "acroatic" writings.

Littig, Baumstark and Plezia take for granted that Andronicus' work contained a biography of Aristotle. Baumstark's and Plezia's reconstruction of the work is interesting. Plezia thinks that the first book was devoted to the biography, including the Will; the second dealt with the dialogues, the third (cited by Simplicius) with the σύταγματικα, the fourth with the ὑπομνήματα, the fifth finally with the ψπευδεπίγραφα (this he infers from the note in Ptolemy's catalogue). He then reconstructs Andronicus' biography by picking out from the *Vita Marciana* and the Arabic tradition all objective information on Aristotle and excluding all those small details which are so characteristic of Ptolemy's *Vita*. The result is, as he himself says, "rigida atque ieiuna de vita philosophi narratio."

Quite consistently he concludes that such a biography is entirely different from the anecdotic *Vita* of Hermippus and the neoplatonic eulogy of Ptolemy, and consequently must have been written by a scholar who seriously tried to apply the principles stated by Dionysius, *De Dinarcho* 2. This is all very attractive, but Plezia has finally to admit that not a single fragment of this Life of Aristotle has reached us; no ancient writer mentions the name of Andronicus in connexion with a single biographic detail, apart

from the Will. With this the whole structure falls to the ground. Until new evidence is produced, I think we must rest content with what we really know, namely that Ptolemy relied on Andronicus for his *Index librorum* and for the text of the Will.

In his work on Aristotle's writings Andronicus was inspired by some typically Hellenistic but very un-aristotelian ideas. He believed that Aristotle had written his scholarly treatises as part of a philosophic system; he tried to arrange the writings according to this idea. The arrangement was based on his ideas of the subject-matter treated; rather artificially he created a department of knowledge which he called "metaphysics", corresponding to Aristotle's Πρώτη φιλοσοφία. The chemical treatise was collocated as the fourth book of the *Meteorology*, the treatise *On diction and style* as the third book of the *Rhetoric*. He paid no respect to the chronology of the various treatises; the whole corpus was to him a closed system of knowledge. He accepted and developed further the idea that Aristotle had expounded certain advanced doctrines in his lectures and pragmaties which differed from the opinions set forth in the dialogues and other popular writings. He identified "exoteric" with the popular writings, and held that the "acroatic" writings were more important and in reality the only true expression of Aristotle's philosophy. His third idea is perhaps not entirely un-aristotelian, but mentioned only in passing by Aristotle, namely that logic and dialectics are the instruments of philosophy. Andronicus was so impressed by this idea that he built a system on it and arranged all the logical writings in a corpus to which he gave the title *Organon*. Finally, he had a high opinion of himself: as a result of his work on Aristotle and his investigations, he arrived at the conviction (which certainly was true), that he and the circle of scholars around him were fellow actors in a great revival of Aristotelian studies. He believed that he was following up the great tradition from Theophrastus and Eudemus, whereas the Peripatetics of the third and second century had degenerated (see T 66 b, 66 d and 76 b [Strabon XIII 1, 54 p. 609; Boethius *De divisione,* Migne 64, p. 892 b; Cicero *De fin.* V 4.10 (45 B.C.)]). His book as a whole was a vigorous plea for a new approach to Aristotelian studies.

None of his basic ideas was in itself new; no doubt Antiochus of Ascalon has a great share in propagating them (T 76 b [Cicero *De fin*. V 4.10 (45 B.C.)]). But it was Andronicus who fused these ideas into a kind of philosophy and soon became celebrated as the man who had given new impetus to Aristotelian studies. He gave rise to a school of commentators whose main activity aimed at making the learned writings of Aristotle more intelligible by means of paraphrases and commentaries: among them may be mentioned his contemporary Ariston of Alexandria, disciple of Antiochus; his own collaborator Boethus of Sidon; Eudorus, Xenarchus, Athenodorus and, most famous of these early commentators, Nicolaus of Damascus.

Plezia believed that the first book of his work contained a biography of Aristotle; I am more inclined to believe that it was a general introduction, developing the ideas which I have outlined here. It is understandable that his introduction should have aimed at arousing great interest in his edition; the extract preserved by Gellius is a good example of his style in this introduction. It is interesting to see that he did not abstain from using spurious letters as evidence; I have offered a possible explanation in my note on T 76 f. [Aulus Gellius *Noct. att*. XX 5]

From Ptolemy's catalogue we can gather that he included Artemon's collection of letters in his "catalogue raisonné" and that he himself had collected no less than twenty books of letters. His interest in this kind of literature is thus well attested. In his introduction he also made as much as he could of the find from Scepsis.

The Will is a special problem. To Littig, Baumstark and Plezia the solution was simple: it formed part of his biography. But if he did not include a biography, why did he find it appropriate to present the text of the Will, which was well known through Hermippus? In my notes on Ptolemy, p. 239, I have offered a possible explanation. He might have found in the papers from Scepsis a better text than that given by Hermippus and added it as an appendix to his Index librorum.

His catalogue was a thoroughly revised edition of the old Alexandrian Πίναξ, transmitted by Hermippus; in this he included his own rearrangement of the scholarly treatises. In Ptolemy's catalogue we possess a transcript of his index which

gives us a fairly good idea of the original. The reconstructions made by Littig, Baumstark and Plezia are interesting but seem to me too sophisticated and speculative. We have not the slightest evidence that Andronicus divided the dialogues in tetralogies. Much more interesting is that we know a good deal about his methods in discussing the titles; the extract in T 75 m [Simplicius *In Phys. CIAG* X, p. 923-927] is especially valuable. Plezia rightly says: "Ex hoc fragmento facile colligi potest Andronicum imprimis Aristotelis ipsius testimoniis colligendis operam dedisse, quibus usus scripta eius in ordinem quendam redigeret, qui ipsius auctoris consiliis ei respondere videretur. Quibus ut hunc ad modum uti liceat, probandum est Arius Aristotelem omnia opera sua uno eodemque examinato consilio conscripsisse; nobis id parum probabile videtur, sed Andronicus rem ita se habere certe persuasum habuit." -- "At in solis locis non acquievit, qui in ipsis Aristotelis scriptis haererent, sed etiam extrinsecus testimonia quaerebat.
" His methods were thus in principle the same as those followed by modern scholars before W. Jaeger. His systematic discussion was a "catalogue raisonné" in which he applied the leading ideas which I have outlined; scraps of the discussion concerning the composition, arrangement and authenticity of individual writings are found in great number in Simplicius (see Plezia, pp. 7-10) and other commentators; in this connexion he also made observations on philosophic questions. He had an open mind and did not hesitate to criticize Aristotle. Owing to the immense influence of his edition and its leading idea that all the writings contained in it are parts of a closed philosophic system he has been called "the first school-man", but this is quite inappropriate. He was a fine scholar and in certain respects an innovator; a good example of Hellenistic erudition and scholarship, with the imperfections and merits of his age." (pp. 420-425)

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957.

THE ROLE OF DEMETRIUS OF PHALERUM

Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 350 - c. 280 B.C.) was a disciple of Theophrastus (the successor of Aristotle at the head of Peripatos).

Demetrius and the Alexandrian Library

Fragment 58A: "This Ptolemy Philadelphus brought together from all over the world every book, so to speak, through the exertions of Demetrius of Phalerum, third lawgiver of the Athenians, a man of great importance amongst the Greeks. Included were also the writings of the Hebrews, as mentioned above.(1) Thus he established the library in Alexandria in the 132rd Olympiad,(2) but while it was being stocked he died.(3) There were, according to some, 100,000 books." (p. 111)

From: Georgius Syncellus, *Chronographical Selection*, Karl Wilhelm Dindorf (ed.), *Corpus scriptorum historiæ byzantinæ* (CSHB), Bonn 1829, vol. 22, p. 518 (Alden A. Mosshammer (ed.), *Georgii Syncelli Ecloga chronographica*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1984, pp. 329, 3-8)

Notes

(1) Part of this paragraph on Ptolemy II Philadelphus is quoted in Fragment 64.

(2) I.e., 252/1-249/8. According to Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.8.11 (citing Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.21.2; cp. 61.3-4), it was founded by Ptolemy I Soter.
(3) In 246.

Fragment 58B: "For the said king Ptolemy, (1) a truly most philosophic and divine spirit, was a confirmed lover of everything beautiful to sight and in deed and in word. Thus he collected through the services of Demetrius of Phalerum and other elderly men the books from all over the world in Alexandria, defraying expenses out of the royal funds, and deposited them in two

libraries. Of these two the one outside numbered 42,800 books, the one inside the royal palace(2) 400,000 books of a composite nature and 90,000 books of a simple and non-composite nature... (3)"

From: Joannes Tzetzes, *Introduction to Greek Comedy*, Proem II (Willem John Wolff Koster & Douwe Holwerda (eds.), *Scholia in Aristophanem*, Groningen: J. B. Wolters, Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1960-1964, XIa II, 1.1A.32.2-11)

Notes

(1)i.e., Ptolemy II Philadelphus, mentioned by Tzetzes in the preceding sentence.
(2) The one outside was the Serapeum, the one inside the Museum.
(3) Tzetzes adds that these figures were computed later on by Callimachus in his *pinakes*

Fragments cited from: William W. Fortenbaugh, Eckart Schütrumpf (eds.), *Demetrius of Phalerum. Text, Translation and Discussion*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2000.

Demetrius and the History of Aristotle's Works

"His influence on later letters may in fact have been far more profound than is usually suspected and than I have thus far suggested. (I am aware that I am entering onto very slippery ground, but proceed anyway.) The account in the letter of Aristeas that made Demetrius head of the library charged with collecting all the books in the world, even with translating books from the Hebrew,(58) is certainly late -- ca. 100 B.C. -- and fundamentally wrong on some important points.(59) To take but the most obvious -- however much the first Ptolemy may have laid the groundwork for it, the library as an actual institution did not apparently come into being until the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphos. By then Demetrius was out of favor at court; he could not, therefore, have been head of the library. Surely, however, Demetrius was active in some way in the efforts of the first Ptolemy to create a collection. The letter could well,

therefore, preserve in exaggerated form a real memory of Demetrius' activities. He no doubt put together at least part of the collection that later became the great library.(60) And he certainly saw to it that his own books and his own scholarly work found a place in the new collection. More importantly, it is *prima facie* extremely probable that he acquired ca. 295 B.C. or earlier copies of many of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastos. As a distinguished member of the Peripatos, he was unusually well-positioned to do exactly this.

If this is correct (and it must remain an hypothesis), the early history of Aristotle's works must be seen in a different light than heretofore. Previous discussion has tended to focus on the activities of one Neleus of Skepsis to whom Theophrastos left all his books at his death ca. 287 B.C.(61) It is reported, I assume correctly, that the books of Aristotle were among Theophrastos' books.(62) The ancient sources preserve two conflicting accounts about Neleus' handling of his legacy. One was that he took the books to Skepsis where after his death they lay moldering in a cellar until Apellikon of Teos brought them back to Athens early in the first century B.C.(63) The other was that he sold them to Ptolemy II Philadelphos for the library at Alexandria.(64) Whatever Neleus' exact role was, (65) it is significantly diminished in importance if we believe that, thanks to the activities of Demetrius of Phalerum, copies of many of the major Aristotelian treatises were already in Alexandria before the death of Theophrastos.(66) They were thus well-known in the Hellenistic period and some of them formed the basis for the work of the scholars of the library.

In conclusion, Demetrius surely deserves a better press than he has received -- first, for his enlightened rule of Athens where he accomplished much that was positive and did the best he could for his fellow citizens in the difficult circumstances he faced; second, for his very important scholarly contributions, particularly his efforts to further, as well as preserve, the work of the Peripatos; finally, for his creation of the collection that formed the basis of the library at Alexandria." (pp. 343-345)

Notes

(58) The letter of Aristeas to Philokrates (Felix Jacoby's *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* 1954, 228 T6e).
(59) Beginning with this sentence most of this paragraph and the next have been taken with slight alterations from my *Athenian Democracy in Transition*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1995 50-51.
(60) P. M. Fraser *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972), 314-15.
(61) D.L. 5.52. Theophrastos died either in the year 288/7 or 287/6.
(62) The report occurs in Athenaios 1.3A-B and in Strabo 13.1.54. The will of Aristotle preserved in Diogenes Laertios (5.11-17) makes no provision for his books. There are two possible reasons: either the will is incomplete or the books had already been entrusted to Theophrastos.
(63) Strabo 13.1.54, Plutarch Sulla 26.1-2.
(64) Athenaios 1.3A-B.
(65) On Neleus' activities, see H. B. Gottschalk, "Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs," Hermes 100 (1972) 335-42 and C. Lord, "On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus,"*American Journal of Philology* 107 (1986) 137-61, esp. 138-45.
(66) Indeed, their presence may have acted as a catalyst to spur the agents of Ptolemy II to assemble in the library at Alexandria as complete a collection as possible of the works of Aristotle. Neleus may indeed have been approached by them and sold to them much of what he had. Thus it is quite possible that the very efforts of Demetrius to preserve the writings of his great master and his school brought it about that they were concentrated in the library at the time of the great fire and thus many works, including his own, were lost to posterity.

From: Stephen V. Tracy, *Demetrius of Phalerum: who was He and who was He not?*, in: William W. Fortenbaugh, Eckart Schütrumpf (eds.), *Demetrius of Phalerum. Text, Translation and Discussion*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2000, pp. 331-345.

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Bibliography on the Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Writings and the Rediscovery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*

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7. Dorandi, Tiziano. 2006. "La *Vita Hesychii* D'Aristote." *Studi Classici e Orientali* no. 52:87-106.

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   "La *Vita Hesychii* ou *Vita Menagiana* d'Aristote (= *VH),* faisait partie de l *'Onomatologos e pinax ton en paideia onomaston* d'Hésychius de Milet (VI s.), histoire de la littérature limitée, à ce qu'il semble, aux auteurs païens, et perdue dans son intégralité.
   Je voudrais proposer une nouvelle édition de ce court texte, dont l'importance pour la reconstruction de la biographie d'Aristote et de la liste de ses œuvres est indéniable. J'ai commencé à travailler sur la *VH* en marge de mon édition du texte grec des *Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres* de Diogène Laërce (en particulier de la *Vie d'Aristote* au livre V 1-35), et en prévision d'un volume consacré à la tradition biographique antique d'Aristote dans lequel je rééditerai, entre autre, les *Vies* anciennes (grecques et latines) du Stagirite accompagnées d'apparats, d'une traduction et de notes de commentaire." p. 87

Édition critique du text grec pp. 98-103.

C) The Catalogue attributed to Ptolemy el-Garib (I century) and transmitted in two Arabic version by Ibn al-Qifti (ca. 1172-1248) and Ibn Abi Usaibia (1203-1270).

1. An-Nadim, Ibn. 1871. *Kitab Al-Fihrist, Mit Anmerkungen*. Leipzig: F.C.W. Vogel.

   Two volumes: I edited by Gustav Flügel (1871); II: edited by Johannes Rödiger, August Müller (1872); written in the 10th century.
   On Ptolemy el-Garib see vol. I pp. 246-252.
   "We learn from the writer's own words that he has before him the Vita of Ptolemy-el-Garib; he gives us the title of it and says in (14) that his own notes are a brief epitome. Our conclusion is that before 950 there was in circulation in Baghdad an Arabic summary of Ptolemy's *Vita*, including a full translation of the Will. Since an-Nadim presents his classification of Aristotle's writings in roughly the same form as al-Yaqubi (...), Baumstark concluded that he had not seen the Arabic translation of Ptolemy's catalogue. But this is a weak argument, for he might have found Ptolemy's catalogue too detailed and technical and have preferred the classification based on the traditional prolegomena. Moreover we observe that, unlike al-Kindi and al-Yaqubi, an-Nadim regarded the *De anima* as one of the physical treatises." Düring, 1957 cit., p. 195.
   (14) About him [Aristotle] numerous stories are circulated of which we only have mentioned the essentials.

2. Müller, August. 1875. "Das Arabische Verzeichniss Der Aristotelischen Schriften." In *Morgenländische Forschungen. Festschrift Herrn Professor Dr. H. L. Fleischer*, 1-32. Leipzig: Brockhaus.

   Verzeichniss der Aristotelischen Schriften aus dem Buche des Ptolomaeus an Gallus (first edition of Ptolemy's Catalog) pp. 19-22.

3. Usaibi'a, Ibn Abi. 1884. *Uyun Al-Anba Fi Tabaqat Al-Atibba (Lives of the Physicians)*. Königsberg.

   Vol. I pp. 54-69 (contains the *Vita Aristotelis* by Usaibi'a and the Catalogue by Ptolemy el-Garib) written 1245-1246. "Comments on Ptolemy's Catalogue. P. Moraux's valuable book, *Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951, deals at length with Ptolemy's catalogue and gives full references to the earlier literature. I have learnt much from his discussion of the complicated problems, but I do not always agree with his conclusions; see my paper "Ariston or Hermippus?", in: Classica et mediaevalia, 17, 1956, pp. 11-21. M. Plezia *De Andronici Rhodii studii aristotelicis* closely follows Baumstark but contributes many good observations. My translation of the catalogue is based on Usaibia, but I have added al-Qifti's readings (...)
   A full critical apparatus is found in Steinschneider's edition, in the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle, tom. V, pp. 1469-73. (...) Baumstark *Syrisch-arabische Biographieen des Aristoteles* gives a complete translation of the two versions of the catalogue, pp. 61-70, profuse comments and a bold reconstruction of the original catalogue of Andronicus, built on Littig's book on Andronicus. I am sceptical of these airy constructions. In my edition I have added ten sub-titles (Published works, etc.) to distinguish the sections of the catalogue." Düring, 1957 cit., pp. 241-242.

4. Baumstark, Anton. 1900. *Syrisch-Arabische Biographieen Des Aristoteles. Syrische Kommentare Zur Eisagoge Des Porphyrios*. Leipzig: Teubner.

   Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom V. - VIII. Jahrhundert
   Syrische texte herausgegeben, übersetzt und untersucht von Dr. A. Baumstark. Erster Band.
   Reprint: Aachen, Scientia Verlag, 1975.
   German translation of the two versions of Ptolemy's Catalogue (by IBN al-Qifti and by Ibn Abi Usaibi'a) pp. 61-70).

5. Gamaladdin, Al-Qifti. 1903. *Tabaqat Al-Hukama (Schools of Wise Men)*. Leipzig.

   Contains the Catalogue by Ptolemy el-Garib; Latin translation of the Catalogue by Moritz Steinschneider in: Aristotelis, *Opera Omnia* vol. V, Berlin, 1870, p. 1469.
   " *s. v. Ptolemy-el-Garib:*
   'This scholar was during his lifetime a philosopher in the country of the Greeks, and he is not identical with the author of the *Almagest*. He was a friend of Aristotle whom he loved and defended from his enemies, and he transmitted his doctrines to everybody who was eager to acquire knowledge about them from him. On account of this he was a highly reputed and honoured scholar during his lifetime.
   Many kings and scholars are known under the name of Ptolemy. They distinguished them from one another by adding a special name, so that we can know them under this name.
   In order to show his solicitude concerning Aristotle this scholar wrote a book *On the life of Aristotle, his death, and the classification of his books*.
   Comment: The *Fihrist* says (19): "Ptolemy-el-Garib who was an adherent of Aristotle and spread knowledge about his merits; he is the author of a book *On ... books*". - Usaibia, in the introduction to his biography, says: "Thus speaks Ptolemy in his book to Gallus on the life and history of Aristotle, his Will and the list of his famous writings."
   Apart from the fact that his name is mentioned several times in the biographies, this is all information we have on Ptolemy in Arabic sources. Almost identical is the title given by Elias, *In Cat*. CIAG XVIII 1 p. 3.
   Al-Qifti's work is a biographic handbook with about one hundred articles on Greek authors, arranged in alphabetical order, written between 1230 and 1235. The original, now lost, was used by Usaibia, Abu-l-Farag, and Abu-l-Fida; what is left is an epitome and several extracts.
   Steinschneider, Lippert and Baumstark characterize the work as a compilation of earlier works, partly lost, partly

extant. Steinschneider *Al-Farabi. Des arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften* (1869), pp. 187-191 gives a general survey of his biographical article on Aristotle; some additional notes by Baumstark S *yrisch-arabische Biographieen des Aristoteles* p. 15, and by Lippert *Studien auf dem Gebiete der greich-arab. Übersetzungslitteratur*, Braunschweig, 1894, in his comments on Mubashir. Latin translation of the catalogue by Steinschneider, in: Aristotelis *Opera Omnia*, V, Berlin 1870, p. 1469.
On the special problem of identifying our Ptolemy a great many scholars have expressed opinions; a good survey of the literature in P. Moraux, *Listes anciennes des ouvrages d' Aristote*, pp. 289-294. It was W. Christ and J. Lippert who simultaneously suggested that our Ptolemy is identical with the rather obscure Ptolemaios Chennos, writing in the last half of the first century A. D.
It is important to realize that the presentation of Ptolemy in our three sources is nothing but an elaboration of the title of his book. Everything in this note is obviously based on the book itself as the only source. Lippert interpreted the sentence "They distinguished - under this name" as implying: "and this is why Ptolemy-el-Garib also has a special name, given to him by the Greeks". Susemihl, in his review of Lippert, op. cit. (Berl. Phil. Wochenschrift 15, 15, p. 1130) added the following remark: "dass diese Bezeichnung "der Fremde" nicht erst von den Arabern herriihrt, erhellt aus der nachdrucklichen Angabe von Qifti". Unfortunately this is not so; Usaibia's statement is not at all so definite and unambiguous." Düring, 1957 cit., pp. 208-209

6. Düring, Ingemar. 1957. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

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   Contains the English translation, by Bernhard Lewin, of the dedicatory letter to Gallus found in an Arabic manuscript (codex *Ayasofya 4833*, Istanbul, folios 10a-18a) of the *Vita Aristotelis* by Ptolemy el-Garib.

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EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF THE FRAGMENTS OF THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

The fragments of the successors of Aristotle and Theophrastus have been edited in ten volumes by Fritz Wehrli; the fragments of some Peripatetics are now available, with English translation, in the Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities (RUSCH), founded in 1979 by William Fortenbaugh.
For Theophrastus see Selected Bibliography on the Philosophical Works of Theophrastus.

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William W. Fortenbaugh: Eudemus' work *On Expression* 59; 5. Pamela M. Huby: Did Aristotle reply to Eudemus and Theophrastus on some logical Issues? 85; 6. Robert W. Sharples: Eudemus' physics: change, place and time 107; 7. Han Baltussen: Wehrli's edition of Eudemus of Rhodes: the physical fragments from Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Physics* 127; 8. Sylvia Berryman: Continuity and coherence in early Peripatetic texts 157; 9. István Bodnár: Eudemus' Unmoved Movers: fragments 121-123b Wehrli 171; 10.Deborah K. W. Modrak: *Phantasia*, thought and science in Eudemus 191; 11. Stephen A. White: Eudemus the naturalist 207; 12. Jørgen Mejer: Eudemus and the history of science 243; 13: Leonid Zhmud: Eudemus' history of mathematics 263; 14. Alan C. Bowen: Eudemus' history of early Greek astronomy: two hypotheses 307; 15. Dmitri Panchenko: Eudemus fr. 145 Wehrli and the ancient theories of lunar light 323; 16. Gábor Betegh: On Eudemus fr. 150 (Wehrli) 337; Index of ancients sources 359-383.

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   Reprint: Aachen, Scientia Verlag, 1975.
   Inhalt: Vorrede V-XIV. Syrisch-arabische Biographieen des Aristoteles 1; 1. Ptolemaios Chennos 13; A. Die Lebensgeschichte und das Testament 15; B. Das Schriftenverzeichnis 53; 2. Der Anonymus des Ishaq ibn Hunain 105; 3. Der Anonymus des al-Räzi 126; Syrische Commentare zur *Eisagogé* des Porphyrios 133. 1. Der Commentar des Pröbä 139; 1. Der Commentar des Ioannes

Philoponos 156; A. Die Fragmente des cod. *Vat. Syr. 158* 171; B. Stephanos von Alexandreia in den Dialogen des Severus bar Sakkü 181; C. Der *liber deftnitionum* des Bäzüd 210; 3. Der Commentar des Anonymus Vaticanus 223; Syrische Texte (68 Seiten).

2. Dietze-Mager, Gertrud. 2015. "Die "Pinakes" Des Andronikos Im Licht Der Vorrede in Der Aristoteles-Schrift Des Ptolemaios." *Aevum. Rassegna di Scienze storiche linguistiche e filologiche* no. 89:93-123.

   English summary: "According to Plutarch, Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century B.C.) drew up Pinakes of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the basis of books from their personal library which had been hidden away in Skepsis, centuries later brought to Rome by Sulla, where finally copies made by Tyrannio came into the hands of Andronicus. Andronicus' Pinakes are lost. Our sources only provide scant information about them. Interestingly they are mentioned in a treatise on Aristotle written by a certain Ptolemy, the Greek original of which is also lost, but which is preserved in several Arabic sources. Most importantly, this treatise contains a catalogue of Aristotle's writings, and additionally in one source manuscript (Ayasofya 4833) Ptolemy's introduction to his treatise in which he explains its content and structure. Ptolemy's Aristotelian Pinax is one of the three extant ancient lists of Aristotle's writings, its structure and titels closely resembling Aristotle's corpus as it is currently known. Because Ptolemy mentions Andronicus' Pinakes in his list, the general assumption was and still is that Ptolemy more or less copied his list from Andronicus, and that therefore Andronicus' lost work on Aristotle can be reconstructed directly from Ptolemy. However, Ptolemy's introduction – contained only in Ayasofya 4833 – (which, although discovered around the middle of the last century, still is rarely taken into account) clearly excludes this hypothesis, as in it Ptolemy informs us about fundamental differences between Andronicus' approach and his own. Currently there are three widely

diverging translations of this introduction which – specifically in four passages – have important consequences concerning the relationship between Ptolemy and Andronicus. This article aims to offer a new interpretation of the relevant passages on the basis of a translation from a new transcript of the Arabic original text by E. Wakelnig." Appendix: Abschrift des arabischen Texts der Vorrede an Gallus auf der Grundlage eines Mikrofilmabzugs der HS Ayasofya 4833, 10b-11a, (Christel Hein, *Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie*, 416, 418).
Übersetzung der Vorrede an Gallus, (C. Hein, *cit.,* 417, 419); English translation, pp. 120-123.

3. Dihle, Albrecht. 1957. "Der Platoniker Ptolemaios." *Hermes* no. 85:314-325.

   Nachdruck: A. Dihle, *Antike und Orient. Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Hrsg. von Viktor Pöschl und Hubert Petersmann, Heidelberg: C. Winter Universitätsverlag, 1984, pp. 9-20. "In den philosophischen Texten der späten Kaiserzeit stößt man zuweilen auf den Namen Ptolemaios, ohne daß dabei an einen Lagiden oder an den berühmten Astronomen zu denken wäre. Wie jene Zitate auf einen oder mehrere Träger dieses Namens zu verteilen seien, war eine einst viel diskutierte Frage, die dann allerdings im Anschluß an eine Vermutung W. v. Christs durch das Buch von A. Chatzis (Der Philosoph und Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos I = Stud, z Gesch. u. Kult. d. Altert. VII 2, Paderborn 1914) endgültig dahin beantwortet schien, es handele sich bei all diesen Ptolemaioi immer weder um Ptolemaios Chennos aus der Zeit um 100 n. Chr., der uns durch den Auszug des Photios aus seiner *καινή Ιστορία* (cod. 190) recht gut bekannt ist. Diese Frage soll hier einer erneuten Prüfung unterzogen werden."

4. Düring, Ingemar. 1966. *Aristoteles. Darstellung Und Interpretation Seines Denkens*. Heidelberg: Winter.

   Translated in Italian by Pierluigi Donini as: *Aristotele,* Milano: Mursia, 1976.

5. ———. 1968. "Aristoteles." In *Paulys Realencyclopädie Der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Suppl. Xi*, 159-336. München: Druckenmüller.

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7. Gigon, Olof. 1958. "Interpretationen Zu Den Antiken Aristoteles-Viten." *Museum Helveticum* no. 15:147-193.

8. Hein, Christel. 1985. *Definition Und Einteilung Der Philosophie. Von Der Spätantiken Einleitungsliteratur Zur Arabischen Enzyklopädie*. New York: Peter Lang.

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10. Littig, Friedrich. 1890. *Andronikos Von Rodhos: I. Das Leben Des Andronikos Und Seine Anordnung Der Aristotelischen Schriften*. München: Buchdruckerei von F. Straub.

    Inhalt: Das Leben des Andronikos 1; Die Andronikosausgabe der aristotelischen Schriften 8; Anhang I: Das Verzeichnis der aristotelischen Schriften nach Ptolemäos Chennos 37; Anhang II: Die Disposition der aristotelischen Schriften nach den griechischen Erklärern des V. Jahrhunderts 43-58.

Vol. II: Erlangen, 1894; Vol. III. ERlangen 1895.

11. Moraux, Paul. 1973. *Der Aristotelismus Bei Den Griechen. Von Andronikos Bis Alexander Von Aphrodisias*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Vol. I: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh.v. Chr. (1973)
    Vol. II: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh.n. Chr. (1984)
    Vol. III: Alexander von Aphrodisias (2001) - Edited by Jürgen Wiesner, with a chapter on Ethics by Robert W. Sharples.
    See the Chapter "Das Schicksal der Bibliothek des Aristoteles" in the first volume, pp. 3-94.
    The first two volumes are translated in Italian as: *L'Aristotelismo presso I Greci*. Vol. I: *La rinascita dell'Aristotelismo nel I secolo a. C.*; vol. II/1: *Gli Aristotelici nei secoli I e II d.C.*; vol. II/2: *L'Aristotelismo nei non-Aristotelici nei secoli I e II d.C.*, Milano: Vita e pensiero, 2000.
    "This is the first volume of a work which will comprise three. In that work Moraux proposes to study the history of the Aristotelian tradition from Andronicus of Rhodes (first cent. B.C.) to Alexander of Aphrodisias (latter part of the second cent. A.D.). The book under review covers the first cent. B.C. It contains five parts: The first is devoted to the fate of Aristotle's scholarly treatises up to and including Andronicus' edition and catalogue. The second deals with the earliest Aristotelian commentators, Andronicus himself, the Peripatetic Boethus of Sidon, and Ariston of Alexandria. The third is concerned with Xenarchus of Seleuceia, a Peripatetic who criticized some of Aristotle's central doctrines. The fourth discusses Staseas of Naples and Cratippus of Pergarnum, two authors Moraux characterizes as offshoots of Hellenistic Aristotelianism. The fifth and final part is devoted to complete expositions and summaries of Aristotelian and/or Peripatetic philosophy. The two authors discussed are Arius Didymus and Nicolaus of Damascus. The main purpose of Moraux's work is to

investigate that part of the Aristotelian tradition whose main concern was the study and interpretation of Aristotle's works and doctrines, especially of his scholarly treatises. Therefore, his decision to include both authors who perhaps cannot be regarded as "orthodox" Peripatetics, e.g. Xenarchus, and Stoics such as Arius Didymus seems to be justified." (from the article-review by Leonardo Tarán, *Aristotelianism in the First century* B.C., *Gnomon,* 1981, 53, pp. 721-750)

12. Moraux, Paul, and Wiesner, Jürgen, eds. 1983. *Zweifelhaftes Im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien Zu Einigen Dubia*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

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et Latini (praeter Aristotelem) 383; Index nominum et rerum 388; Corrigenda 402.

13. Müller, August. 1875. "Das Arabische Verzeichnis Der Aristotelischen Schriften." In *Morgenländische Forschungen, Festschrift H.L. Fleischer Gewidmet Von Seinen Schülern*, 1-32. Leipzig: Brockhaus.

    Contains an annotated edition of the article on Ptolemy's list of Aristotle's books in Ibn al-Qifti, Ta'rikh al-hukama' (= ed. J. Lippcrt, Leipzig 1903, 42-48). [Note by Hans Daiber].

14. Primavesi, Oliver. 2007. "Ein Blick in Den Stollen Von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel Zur Frühen Überlieferung Des *Corpus Aristotelicum*." *Philologus* no. 151:51-77.

    "The purpose of the paper is to defend a modified Version of the report given by Strabo about the transmission of the writings of Aristotle during the Hellenistic period. The basic dilemma was pointed out by Dom Jean Liron in 1717: The existence of our *Corpus Aristotelicum* entails that Strabo must be exaggerating either in assuming that the manuscripts brought by Neleus to Scepsis were the only manuscripts of the Aristotelian and Theophrastean writings, or in asserting that these manuscripts were severely damaged. Many writings of our *Corpus* are missing in the Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle's works while they are listed in the later catalogue of Ptolemy al-Gharlb; furthermore, the single books of the transmitted treatises are labelled by means of the pre-Hellenistic System of 24 letter labeis, whereas in the Hellenistic catalogue the single books are numbered by means of the Hellenistic System of 27 alphabetic numerals. This suggests that the treatises missing in the Hellenistic catalogue formed part of a collection which was inaccessible in Hellenistic times and which, therefore, preserved the pre-Hellenistic System of book-labelling. After the rediscovery of the collection (ca. 100 BC) its System of book-labelling was maintained by the editors who laid the foundations of our *Corpus*. The same

criterion reveals the *Eudemian Ethics* in eight books to be a later compilation."

15. Reiner, Hans. 1954. "Die Entstehung Und Usprüngliche Bedeutung Des Names Metaphysik." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 8:210-237.

    Nachdruck: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.), *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969 pp. 139-174.
    English translation: *The Emergence and Original Meaning of the Name "Metaphysics"* in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13, 2, 1990 pp. 23-53.

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18. Steinschneider, Moritz. 1869. "Al-Farabi (Alpharabius). Des Arabischen Philosophen Leben Und Schriften." *Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St.Pétersbourg.VII Série* no. 8.

    Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte der griechischen Wissenschaft unter den Arabern, nebst Anhängen Joh. Philoponus bei den Arabern, Leben und Testament des Aristoteles von Ptolemaeus, darstellung der Philosophie Plato's, Grösstentheils nach handschriftlichen Quellen.

Nachdruck Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1966.

19. Wehrli, Fritz. 1944. *Die Schule Des Aristoteles. Texte Und Kommentar*. Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe.

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    I. Dikaiarchos (1944); II. Aristoxenos (1945); III. Klearchos (1948); IV. Demetrios von Phaleron (1949); V. Straton von Lampsakos (1950); VI. Lykon und Ariston von Keos (1952); VII: Herakleides Pontikos (1953); VIII. Eudemos von Rhodos (1955); IX. Phainias von Eresos, Chamaileon, Praxiphanes (1957); X. Hieronymos von Rhodos, Kritolaos und seine Schuler, Rückblick: Der Peripatos in vorchlisticher Zeit, Register (1959); Supplementband I: Hermippos der Kallimacheer (1974); Supplementband II: Sotio (1978).

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2. Bodéüs, Richard. 1973. "Contribution À L'histoire Des œuvres Morales D'aristote: Les *Testimonia*." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 71:451-467.

3. ———. 1982. *Le Philosophe Et La Cité. Recherches Sur Les Rapports Entre Morale Et Politique Dans La Pensée D'aristote*. Paris: Publications de la Faculté de Philosophie de l'Université de Liège.

   Chapitre premier. *À la recherche du projet aristotélicien*.

4. Dorandi, Tiziano. 2007. "Diogène Laërce "Lecteur" D'aristote." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 28:435-446.

"Présente une nouvelle édition du passage que Diogène Laërce consacre à la doctrine d'Aristote (*Vies* V, 27-34), accompagnée d'un apparat et de quelques notes de lecture destinées à justifer les choix textuels."

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   Voir aussi les notices sur:
   Andronicus de Rhodes (Richard Goulet) I, 200-2002; Apellicon de Téos (Richard Goulet) I, pp. 266-267; Hermippe de Smyrne (Jean-Pierre Schneider) III, pp. 655-658; Néleus de Scepsis (Jean-Pierre Schneider) IV, pp. 617-620.
   Dans le volume *Supplément*, voir: II. Aristote de Stagire, pp. 109-471; III. Aristote de Stagire. *Dubia et Spuria*, pp. 475-654.

6. Hecquet-Devienne, Myriam. 2000. "Les Mains Du *Parisinus Graecus 1853*. Une Nouvelle Collation Des Quatre Premiers Livres De La *Métaphysique* D'aristote (Folios 225v-247v)." *Scrittura e Civiltà* no. 24:103-171.

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Dans Les œuvres Antiques. Actes Du Colloque International De Chantilly 13-15 Décembre 1994, edited by Fredouille, Jean-Claude, Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, Hoffmann, Philippe and Petitmengin, Pierre, 75-103. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.

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10. Mansion, Auguste. 1958. "Compte-Rendu De Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 56:624-629.

11. Moraux, Paul. 1949. "L'exposé De La Philosophie D'aristote Chez Diogène Laërce (V, 28-34)." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 47:5-43.

    "Diogène n'a pas lu lui-même les ouvrages du Stagirite. Dieu sait par combien d'intermédiaires son information lui est parvenue!
    S'il est difficile de mettre un nom sur les sources du compilateur, peut-être une critique sagace pourra-t-elle en déterminer l'époque, les tendances, la valeur.
    La question des sources revêt d'ailleurs ici un intérêt tout particulier. Strabon et Plutarque rapportent une étrange histoire sur les traités aristotéliciens: la bibliothèque d'Aristote passa, par héritage, à Théophraste, puis à Nélée; les successeurs de Nélée, gens ignorants, enfouirent ce legs dans une cave, à Skepsis, pour le dissimuler à l'ardeur bibliophile des Attales; les précieux ouvrages n'en sortirent, gâtés par les vers et l'humidité, que deux siècles plus tard, dans la première moitié du premier siècle avant J. C. et c'est vers le milieu du même siècle qu'ils commencèrent à circuler dans le monde savant (1). Le déclin du Lycée après Straton doit, selon nos deux auteurs, s'expliquer par là: ne possédant plus les ouvrages techniques d'Aristote, les péripatéticiens furent incapables de philosopher sérieusement. En fait, il semble bien que le Lycée et les

autres écoles n'aient, entre 250 et 50, connu, ou, du moins, utilisé que les écrits exotériques d'Aristote, ceux que leur style et leur contenu rendaient plus accessibles à un public moyennement cultivé,
les dialogues. Même si l'on n'ajoute qu'une foi médiocre à l'histoire rapportée plus haut, il reste que cette histoire veut expliquer un fait, l'abandon quasi complet des ouvrages scolaires d'Aristote pendant deux siècles: les traités qui nous sont familiers n'entrent guère dans le monde philosophique qu'avec Andronikos, le père du commentarisme (milieu du premier siècle avant J. C.). A l'époque où vivait Diogène Laërce (on a de bonnes raisons de croire que c'était au troisième siècle après J. C.), ils étaient de longue date en circulation.
Reste à savoir si l'information de Diogène se fonde sur des ouvrages « modernes », je veux dire postandroniciens, où les traités étaient largement utilisés, ou si, au contraire, elle remonte à une époque où l'on connaissait fort mal les traités scolaires. Dans la biographie
d'Aristote, Diogène nous livre un document fort archaïque, la liste des ouvrages du philosophe; il est manifeste que cette liste est antérieure aux travaux par lesquels Andronikos donna au *corpus aristotelicum* sa physionomie actuelle; on est, aujourd'hui, bien
d'accord sur ce point, encore que l'attribution à Hermippos, généralement admise, se heurte à de très grosses difficultés (2). L'adoption de cette liste préandronicienne à une époque où les πίναχες d'Andronikos étaient aisément accessibles (3) semble indiquer que le compilateur a voulu interroger les témoins les plus anciens de préférence aux autres. A-t-il obéi à la même tendance à propos de la notice sur la philosophie d'Aristote? Nous tenterons de répondre à cette question au cours de la présente étude." pp. 5-6
(1) Strab., XIII, 608; Plut., Sylla, 26.
(2) Nous les signalerons dans un ouvrage qui attend la publication, *Les catalogues aristotéliciens. Recherches sur la diffusion des traités d'Aristote avant l'époque des premiers commentateurs*. [cfr. Moraux 1951]
(3) Plut., *l.l.*

12. ———. 1951. *Les Listes Anciennes Des Ouvrages D'aristote*. Louvain: Éditions universitaires de Louvain.

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de Ptolémée 289. § 1. L'auteur du catalogue 289; § 2. Contenu du catalogue 294; § 3. Ordonnance du catalogue 299; § 4. Modèles et sources de Ptolémée 306; Chapitre VII. Premières conclusions sur le sort des ouvrages scolaires d'Aristote 311; Les traités connus à Athènes vers 200 avant J.-C. 312; Le cas de la *Métaphysique* 314; Appartenance de certains traités omis par Ariston à la dernière période de l'activité d 'Aristote 315; Les catalogues, témoins du groupement progressif d'études apparentés, mais primitivement indépendantes, 320.Appendice. Notes sur la chronologie de quelques ouvrages d'Aristote 323;Bibliographie 347; Index 361; I. Aristote, ouvrages conservés 361; II. Aristote, ouvrages perdus et titres 368; III. Commentateurs d'Aristote 371; IV. Autres auteurs 374; V. Noms et matières 376; Errata et Addenda 385.

13. ———. 1955. "La Composition De La Vie D'aristote Chez Diogène Laerce." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 53:124-163.

"Bien des inepties déparent les biographies dues à Diogène Laërce. Comme le révèle l'analyse de la Vie d'Aristote, une grande partie d'entre elles s'expliquent par l'application maladroite d'un procédé de composition assez singulier: d'un thème normalement amené par la marche du récit chronologique, l'auteur passe volontiers, par associations d'idées, à un thème voisin; de celui-ci, il saute à un autre, et ainsi de suite. Des digressions en cascades se mêlent donc à la narration biostraphique. On peut retrouver, cependant, la charpente originelle de la biographie: il suffit d'isoler les digressions et de ne considérer que les morceaux qui les ont déclenchées. Or ce démontage de la Vie d'Aristote révèle un fait d'une importance primordiale: le canevas, sur lequel a brodé Diogène est identique à celui qu'on retrouve chez le grand Apollodore, l'un et l'autre découlent d'une source commune, qui est probablement le péripatéticien Ariston de Céos. Diogène a fait de son mieux pour étoffer ce donné primitif en y insérant une foule de renseignements complémentaires; il a rédigé lui-même une partie de ces

digressions et a laissé à l'état brut les matériaux qu'il destinait aux autres. Son manuscrit, à demi achevé et bourré de notes additionnelles non encore incorporées au texte, a été confié à un éditeur, qui a transcrit le tout en un texte continu, non sans commettre une foule de bévues et d'erreurs. La stupidité d'un rédacteur incapable est ainsi venue s'ajouter à l'insigne naïveté de Diogène."

14. ———. 1967. "Le Parisinus Graecus 1853 (Ms. E) D'aristote." *Scriptorium* no. 21:17-41.

    "De tous les manuscrits d Aristote, le Parisinus gr. 1853 est sans contredit l'un des plus importants. Il compte parmi les plus anciens, puisqu'il remonte, dans sa plus grande partie, au milieu du Xe siècle. L'abondance des scholies marginales et des notes interlinéaires dont il est pourvu et dont l'exécution s'étale sur plusieurs siècles montre qu'il a servi d'exemplaire de travail à de nombreux spécialistes. Mais ce qui lui confère un intérêt tout particulier, c'est le fait que le texte d'un bon nombre des traités qu'il renferme s'écarte sensiblement de celui de la tradition courante et remonte peut-être à une translittération différente de celle d'où sont issus la plupart des autres manuscrits. Aussi n'est-il pas surprenant qu'il ait été collationné à maintes reprises et que les éditeurs en aient toujours fait grand cas. Cependant, plusieurs de scs particularités semblent bien avoir échappé totalement à l'attention des philologues qui l'ont eu en mains. Dans les pages qui suivent, je partirai de quelques observations d'ordre codicologique pour tenter de préciser plusieurs points de l'histoire du manuscrit. On verra que, comme dans une enquête policière, des détails apparement dépourvus d'importance peuvent constituer autant d'indices révélateurs et mener à des conclusions insouponnées." (p. 17)

15. ———. 1970. "Les Manuscrits D'aristote." In *D'aristote À Bessarion: Trois Exposés Sur L'histoire Et La Transmission De L'aristotélisme Grec*, 67-94. Quebec: Les presses de l'Universite Laval.

"Nous diviserons en trois parties l'histoire du texte grec d'Aristote:
1. Période antérieure à la renaissance byzantine du IXe siècle.
2. Aristote dans le monde byzantin, du IXe siècle à la prise de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453.
3. L'arrivée du texte grec d'Aristote en Europe occidentale et sa diffusion.
Ensuite, nous examinerons quelques aspects du travail historique et philologique que rendent indispensable les circonstances de la transmission de ce texte." (pp. 68-69)

16. ———. 1986. "Les Débuts De La Philologie Aristotélicienne." In *Storiografia E Dossografia Nella Filosofia Antica*, edited by Cambiano, Giuseppe, 127-147. Torino: Tirrenia.

"Il est temps de résumer rapidement nos observations. Bien avant la renaissance des études aristotéliciennes au premier siècle avant J.-C., plusieurs savants se sont efforcés, en partie avec un succès indéniable, de préciser la chronologie de la vie d'Aristote et de laver le philosophe des calomnies dont l'avaient accablé ses détracteurs. - Il est possible, mais non certain, que la plus ancienne liste conservée des ouvrages d'Aristote ait été élaborée par un savant alexandrin; si tel est bien le cas, celui-ci devait se fonder en partie sur un classement, d'origine péripatéticienne, des écrits du philosophe. - L'édition et les pinakes d'Andronicus de Rhodes marquent un tournant dans l'étude de l'aristotélisme. - Avec Andronicus commence l'époque des commentaires; ceux-ci ne sont pas, en tant que tels, des créations ex nihilo; ils ont comme modèles lointains les commentaires à divers auteurs, dont Homère, conus et réalisés par les grands philologues alexandrins. - Les méthodes proprement philologiques, également créées par l'érudition alexandrine, ont été appliquées par les commentateurs au texte d'Aristote. Dès avant Alexandre d'Aphrodise, ceux-ci pratiquaient ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui la critique des textes; ils mentionnaient et interprétaient les leons de plusieurs manuscrits; le cas

échéant, ils s'efforaient d'améliorer, par des conjectures diverses, un énoncé qu'ils trouvaient fautif ou peu satisfaisant. - Enfin, la critique dite supérieure a laissé des traces assez nombreuses dans l'œuvre des commentateurs. Nous apprenons ainsi que l'authenticité de plusieurs livres avait été contestée, surtout en raison de prétendues divergences doctrinales avec l'aristotélisme authentique. L'hypothèse a aussi été avancée que tel livre ne serait pas à sa place là où nous le trouvons, qu'il n'aurait pas été terminé par Aristote ou nous serait arrivé incomplet. Dans leur ensemble, les commentateurs que nous lisons se montrent très conservateurs et rejettent unanimement ces vues souvent hypercritiques. Parfois, ils se fondent sur des points de doctrine assez précis pour montrer qu'une athétèse était sans fondement. Il leur arrive aussi, à l'occasion, d'exploiter les renvois d'un livre à un autre. Mais la plupart du temps, ils se contentent de constatations générales assez subjectives et dépourvues de preuves concrètes: la teneur d'un livre et son style en montreraient bien l'origine aristotélicienne. Sans aucun doute, l'œuvre d'Aristote leur était familière, et leur intuition ne les trompait pas. Il n'empêche que nous aurions aimé qu'ils nous fournissent plus de précisions sur ce que, par exemple, ils tenaient pour caractéristique du style aristotélicien. A cet égard, nous restons sur notre faim, et c'est assez dommage." (pp. 143-144)

17. ———. 1986. "Diogène Laërce Et Le *Peripatos*." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:245-294.

"Un mot encore des livres et de la bibliothèque. L'école disposait à coup sûr d'une bibliothèque; il semble bien que celle-ci ait partagé purement et simplement le sort de l'école. Aristote n'en dit rien dans son propre testament. La brève indication du testament de Théophraste est assez ambiguë. Après avoir légué à Callinos le morceau de terrain qu'il possédait à Stagire, Théophraste lègue τα [...] βιβλία πάντα Νηλεϊ9. S'agit-il de la bibliothèque de l'école ou de la bibliothèque privée de Théophraste ou encore des livres

sortis de sa plume? Quoi qu'il en soit, cette indication évoque l'histoire assez rocambolesque qu'on connaît par Strabon et Plutarque: Nélée aurait transporté à Skepsis de Troade les livres d'Aristote et de Théophraste; ils y seraient restés cachés pendant très longtemps et n'auraient été retrouvés qu'au début du premier siècle avant notre ère (10). Pourtant, sous Straton, l'école devait encore disposer d'une bibliothèque. Dans son testament, en effet, Straton lègue la διατριβή à Lycon, puis il ajoute: « Je lui lègue également tous les livres, sauf ceux que j'ai écrits moi-même » (11).
Après cela sont mentionnés le mobilier et la vaisselle servant aux repas en commun (κατά το συσσίτιον). Les livres, eux aussi, devaient donc être ceux de l'école. Lycon, en revanche, ne mentionne dans son testament que les livres dont il est l'auteur; ceux qui ont déjà fait l'objet d'une lecture publique iront à Charès; les inédits sont légués à Callinos, pour qu'il en assure une publication soignée (12). Parmi les autres documents très précieux que nous devons à Diogène, il faut mentionner les "catalogues" des ouvrages d'Aristote (13), Théophraste (14), Straton (15), Démétrius de Phalère (16) et Héraclide Pontique (17)." (pp. 247-249)
(...)
"Ce rapide coup d'œil sur les renvois à Aristote que l'on trouve en dehors du bios lui-même confirme tout à fait les conclusions auxquelles nous ont amenés les analyses consacrées au V livre. Diogène et ses sources ignorent à peu près tout des traités scolaires d'Aristote. Leur Aristote, c'est avant tout celui des ouvrages perdus: celui des écrits dits exotériques, qu'on lisait beaucoup avant qu'Andronicus ne tirât les ouvrages scolaires de l'oubli à peu près complet dans lequel ils étaient tombés. C'est aussi celui des grandes collections documentaires, qui étaient bien faites pour retenir l'attention des savants de l'époque hellénistique. Dans l'ensemble, on peut dire que l'image de l'aristotélisme que nous livre Diogène, c'est celle qu'on s'en faisait trois ou quatre siècles auparavant, à une époque où les traités scolaires n'avaient pas encore fait l'objet d'une étude approfondie. Si, d'aventure, quelques indications qu'il nous

donne mentionnent des ouvrages scolaires ou en évoquent des échos, elles ne représentent, en fait, que les informations assez générales et assez vagues dont on disposait avant Andronicus." (p. 294)
(10) Cette histoire, et, d'une manière plus générale, celle de la bibliothèque d'Aristote ont déjà fait couler beaucoup d'encre. Parmi les études récentes, je citerai H. B. Gottschalk, *Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholars*, (*) pp. 335-42. P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodtsias. I. Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh. v. Chr.*, Berlin-New York 1973; II. *Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr.*, Berlin-New York 1984 (*Peripatoi*, 5-6), I, pp. 5-31; R. Blum, *Kallimachos und die Literaturverzeichnung bei den Griechen. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Biobibliographie*, (Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens, xviii 1-2) Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 109-33.
(*) "Hermes", (1972) pp. 314-342.
(11) V 62.
(12) V 73.
(13) V 22-27.
(14) V 42-50.
(15) V 59-60.
(16) V 80-81.
(17) V 86-88.

18. Plezia, Marian. 1986. "Encore Sur La Vie D'aristote De Ptolemée." *Études Classiques* no. 54:383-385.

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English abstract: "Parisinus gr. 1853, a key witness to the Corpus Aristotelicum, is usually believed to be the medieval copy of an ancient corpus. Nevertheless, the analysis of its codicological, paleographic and textual features strongly suggests that it is built up out of smaller items, probably copied in different milieux from different exemplars, and

combined in a single manuscript by an unknown scholar in tenth century Constantinople."
"Le Paris gr. 1853 est un livre de grand format qui contient, dans son état actuel, les textes suivants:
f. 1 r - 2 v - *De Anima* II (*partim*)
f. 3 r - 67 v - *Physica*
f. 67 v - *Anth. Pal.* IX. 577
f. 68 r - Κεφάλαια τοῦ Θ (48 propositions tirées du livre Θ de la *Physique*)
f. 68 v - Annotations philosophiques et grammaticales
f. 69 r -106 v - *De Caelo*
f. 106 v -129 r - *De Generatione et corruptione*
f. 129 r - 175 v - *Meteorologica*
f. 175 v - 202 v - *De Anima*
f. 203 r - 210 r - *De Sensu et sensibilibus*
f. 210r-212v - *De Memoria et reminiscentia*
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f. 225 v - 308 r - *Metaphysica*
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f. 309 r - Συλλογή περί νομίμου
f. 309 r - 312 r - Théophraste, *Metaphysica*
f. 312v-318r - ([ps.-] Aristot.), *De Coloribus*
f. 318 r - 351 r - *De Partibus animalium*
f. 352 r - 393 r - *De Generatione animalium*
f. 393 r - *De Incessu animalium* (*partim*)
f. 393 r - 437 v - *Ethica ad Nicomachum*
f. 437 v - 453 r - *Magna Moralia*" (p. 203, notes omises).

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treatises (in particular, Aristotle's *Categories, Rhetoric, Topics and De caelo*). The Academic Eudorus of Alexandria was a partial exception, since he was probably acquainted with parts of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Aristotle's exoteric dialogues remained a majour source for those interested in Aristotle well into the 2nd century AD. Finally, late-hellenistic compendia and handbooks provided second-hand information on Aristotle's philosophy. It is only between the 2nd and the 3rd centuries that the Peripatetic commentators developed a systematic reading of the whole corpus of Aristotle's acroamatic treatises. Their work culminated with Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose exegesis laid the basis for the subsequent incorporation of Aristotle within Neoplatonism accomplished by Plotinus and Porphyry."

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    Appendice: 1) Il Liceo: ambiente fisico 145; 2) Filosofi e teatro 146; 3) La legge di Sofocle di Sunio 149; 4) La scuola di Aristotele. Alcuni dati 152; Aristotele e la sua biblioteca 152; Iscrizioni onorifiche per Aristotele 154; Notizie sull'organizzazione della scuola dopo Aristotele 154; 5) Le polemiche contro Aristotele 157; 6) Brani dalle opere di Aristotele 163-169.

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   "When Theophrastus died, his library, which included the library of Aristotle, was carried off to the Troad. His successors found nothing much to read; the Lyceum sank into a decline; and Peripatetic ideas had little influence on the course of Hellenistic philosophy. It was only with the rediscovery of the library that Aristotelianism revived — and it revived in Italy. For the library went from the Troad to Athens — and thence, as part of Sulla's war-booty, to Rome.

There Andronicus of Rhodes produced the ‘Roman edition’ of the corpus Aristotelicum. It was the first complete and systematic version of Aristotle’s works, the first publication in their full form of the technical treatises, the first genuinely critical edition of the text. Andronicus’ Roman edition caused a sensation. It revitalized the languishing Peripatetics. It set off an explosion of Aristotelian studies. It laid the foundation for all subsequent editions of Aristotle’s works, including our modern texts. When we read Aristotle we should pour a libation to Andronicus — and to Sulla. That story is the main subject of the following pages. It is familiar enough; and although my argument will be long and laborious, I have nothing new to say, and my general conclusions are dispiritingly sceptical. But recent scholarship on the topic has taken to the bottle of phantasy and stumbled drunkenly from one dogmatism to the next. Another look at the pertinent texts may be forgiven — and in any event the story is a peach.
My concern (let me stress at the start) is the way in which Aristotle’s texts reached Rome — and us. I am not concerned with the general influence of Peripatetic ideas on the Roman intelligentsia — that is a vast and a complex question; nor am I concerned with the specific influence of Aristotle’s ideas on the Roman intelligentsia — that is a different question, less vast and more complex. Indeed, I deal neither with the history of ideas nor with the history of philosophy: my subject is an episode in the history of books and the book-trade. " (J. Barnes, *Mantissa*, p. 407)

2. Benoit, William L. 1981. "A Guide to Line Numbers in the Aristotelian Corpus." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* no. 11:42-44.

   "Those who work with several of Aristotle's works at once, as is often necessary, are frequently confronted with the minor difficulty of determining which work contains the passage indicated by the line numbers from Bekker's edition of *Aristotle's Opera* (Berlin, 1870). This is especially true when using the index of Hermann Bonitz *Index*

Aristotelicus, Graz, 1955 or of Troy Organ *An Index to Aristotle in English Translation,* Princeton, NJ, 1949. As a tool for the Aristotelian scholar, then, this guide may be of some modest assistance. In an attempt to make the work as helpful as possible, both English and the Greek titles are included, as well as the names of the Oxford and Loeb Translators and the Oxford volume number for each work (these being the two most complete sets)."

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   "This work deals with the beginnings of bibliography. Kallimachos of Kyrene, a Hellenistic scholar and a famous poet, created about 260 B.C. a fundamental list of Greek authors with biographical and bibliographical data, the first national author bibliography, based on the holdings of the Alexandrian library. But what he, his predecessors, and successors achieved in the field of bibliography, that staging area for the history of literature, is almost unknown outside the circle of experts. In addition, there are some important related issues which are still in need of clarification.
   The investigations which I have undertaken for this purpose pertain to questions in the history of ancient scholarship and librarianship. But I endeavored to write in such a manner that not only students of Classical Antiquity will be able to follow me. Therefore, I inserted explanations of issues pertaining to Antiquity wherever I deemed them to be appropriate. Greek quotations are rendered in translation. Greek titles of books, typical Greek expressions, and shorter sayings of Greek scholars are always transliterated. Some passages in the footnotes are also given in the original Greek.

Bibliographic works of the Romans and those of Christians in Antiquity have been omitted because I am treating these, together with those of the Middle Ages and the early modern period, in another work.(*)" (*Preface*, IX)
(*) Rudolf Blum. *Die Literaturverzeichnung im Altertum und Mittelalter. Versuch einer Geschichte der Biobibliographie von den Anfängen bis zum Beginn der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Buchhändler-Vereinigung, 1983)
On Aristotle see Chapter 2: *Forerunners: Aristotle, His Predecessors and Pupils*, pp. 14-94 (in particular 2.6 *The Library of Aristotle* pp. 52-94) and Chapter 5: *Later lists of Greek Writers and Their Works*, pp. 182-225 (in particular 5.4 *The List of Aristotle's Writings by Andronikos of Rhodos*, pp. 194-195 and 5.6 *The Work of Diogenes Laertios on the Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers*, pp. 199-201).

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   See Chapter I. *In Search of Aristotle's Project* pp. 9-46.
   "Conceived at first for the sake of the citizens of the Greek city of the fourth century B.C., the part of Aristotle's teaching traditionally associated with human philosophy sought somehow to be useful. How can one make sense of this aim historically, this desire to contribute concretely to the perfection of human becoming? This is the question which has guided my research from the beginning.
   It has led me to scrutinize the unity of purpose which clearly governs the elaboration of the two *Ethics* and of the *Politics*. This issue is not sufficiently clarified if one limits oneself to saying that the two series of texts are written from the same theoretical perspective, a perspective appropriate for explaining human affairs, and that the one series describes

mies of an ethical code for individuals, the other series principles for the organization of communities.
On this point it is necessary to challenge a very long tradition of misunderstandings.
To make this clear is my task in the first chapter. This chapter also brings to light support for the belief that the works of Aristotle with which we are concerned were the object of a political teaching which the philosopher aimed primarily at the “lawgiver" (νομοθέτης). Aristotle designates by this term not the well-known magistrate of Athenian institutions (19) but, like the French word *législateur*, with its collective sense, the individuals to whom political communities entrust the ultimate task of defining coercive norms relating to the good and who potentially include all the adult citizens in the city which corresponds "to the wishes" of the philosopher." (p. 3)
(19) Cf. Demosthenes, *Olynth*. III, 10, “Although they are not mentioned by Aristotle in the *Constitution of Athens*, their existence is not in doubt." (P. Lavedan, *Dictionnnaire illustré de la mythologie et des antiquités grecques et romaines*, Paris: Hachette, 1964, s.v.).

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   See Appendix 1. *Translations of selected Testimonia and the biographical fragments* pp. 189-226, and 3. *Hermippos and the authorship of Diogenes Laertios' Catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22-27)*, pp. 233-243.
   Abbreviations: F = Fragment, T = Testimonia.
   "A problem that cannot be left undiscussed in the present study is Hermippos’ presumed authorship of the catalogue of Aristotle’s writings as found in Diogenes Laertios, even though strictly speaking we have no nominatim F or even an indirect testimony connecting the Callimachean with that catalogue, let alone that the ancient sources speak of such a list ever having been composed by Hermippos in the first place. However, since we have sound proof that he drew up (or at least transmitted) a similar *pinax* for Theophrastos

(1), it is a reasonable assumption that the Callimachean may also have edited (or published) one for Aristode (as well as for others: cf. F 9, 44, 89). To be sure, this is still a far cry from asserting that Diogenes' list goes back to the Callimachean. As it is, along with the provenance of the other catalogues of leading Peripatetics preserved in Diogenes' Book 5 (Theophrastos: 5,42-50; Straton: 5,59-60; Demetrios of Phaleron: 5,80-81; Herakleides of Pontos: 5,86-88), the origin of the Laertian *pinax* of Aristotle is one of the most oft-discussed points with regard to the history of the transmission of the early Peripatetic corpus of writings. In spite of the great number of participants in the debate, definitive results of this quest are still wanting."
(1) See the discussion of T 20 and F 37 above, p. 164-177.

6. Bos, Abraham P. 1987. "The Relation between Aristotle's Lost Writings and the Surviving *Corpus Aristotelicum*." *Philosophia Reformata* no. 52:24-40.

   Reprinted as Chapter X in A. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues*, Leiden: Brill, 1989, pp. 97-112.
   "Something else is relevant at this point. Historians of philosophy concerned to trace Aristotle's influence are faced by the remarkable fact that in the first centuries following Aristotle's death his school shows a clear and continual decline in both quality and productivity. Not until the first century BC is it possible to speak of a 'renaissance'. Only then does the Peripatetic school awaken 'aus ihrer langen Lethargie'.(43) No satisfactory explanation for this highly remarkable state of affairs has yet been suggested. We must begin by realizing that the decline of the Peripatos took place during the period in which the dialogues, composed, ordered, and produced in a highly polished form by Aristotle himself, were in circulation, while the writings of the Corpus were not available as they are to us.
   The revival of interest in Aristotle's philosophy, on the other hand, is strictly connected with the discovery of the unpublished treatises in the first century BC. Here too we

should prefer a *philosophical* explanation. We suggest that Aristotle's philosophy, in the period when he was known on the basis of his published work only, fell into disrepute because the notion of 'genuine, serious scholarly philosophy' underwent a change at the hands of the professional philosophers, who no longer accepted an appeal to any experience other than common human experience. And to this shift in the idea of 'scientific philosophy' Aristotle's own activities within the school no doubt pointed the way." (pp. 110-111 of the reprint)
(43) Cf. P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, l, xiv.

7. ———. 1989. " *Exoterikoi Logo*i and *Enkyklioi Logoi* in the Corpus Aristotelicum and the Origin of the Idea of the *Enkyklios Paideia*." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 50:179-198.

   Reprinted as Chapter XI in: A. P. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues*, Leiden: Brill, 1989, pp. 113-152.
   "We would now like to show how various elements from the tradition can be combined in an entirely new interpretation. Since the explanations of the term "exoteric" do not appear until after Andronicus's edition, it is legitimate to assume that they were attempts to solve the problem of the references in the Corpus with no more information than is now available to us. On the basis of the subjects dealt with in the *exoterikoi logoi,* which, as we shall see more clearly in the next section, included Plato's doctrine of Ideas and the debate over the Idea of the Good, we seem justified in consideringthat "exoteric" was understood by Aristotle as "pertaining to the realities lying outside *Physis*. " That is to say, in these works Aristotle discussed the subjects which, according to his own philosophy of science, were not susceptible to treatment in a discursive, conclusive argumentation. For argumentation or proof is possible only on the basis of acceptance of the starting-points (*archai*)." (p. 186)

(...)
"I should like to advance the hypothesis, therefore, that the notion of the *enkyklios paideia* is a product of philosophical reflection, as laid down in the lost writings of Aristotle, on kinds of knowledge in relation to kinds of objects of knowledge.The introduction of this notion may well have been linked with Aristotle's distinction between *enkyklioi logoi* and *exoterikoi logoi* in such a way that the *enkyklioi logoi* comprised all sciences concerning the natural reality "surrounding" us and whatever is derived from it through abstraction. And the *exoterikoi logoi* dealt with the matters related to *ta exo* and with those themes which Plato reserved for dialectic and Aristotle for an "earlier, higher, and more logical science than physics, "a science which deals with the *archai*, the principia, and
which cannot therefore be deductive and demonstrative.(72) This distinction was no doubt linked to a difference in the level of difficulty, seen from the viewpoint of man who stands at the beginning of the road to knowledge. Aristotle regarded the study of experiential reality in all its aspects as a necessary preliminary training for insight into metaphysical reality.
The elements discussed above are best integrated, therefore, if we assume that in his lost writings Aristotle described the process of man's striving for knowledge in metaphors of "liberation," "purification," "initiation," "ascent,"and "enlightenment," following and transforming whatPlato had said about this process in his dialogues the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and the Republic.
Aristotle saw man in his everyday existence as a "natural" being, a being belonging to and enclosed by Physis and endowed with a "natural" rational faculty. As such, man is occupied by, bound to, and oriented toward the "surrounding" reality of ordinary, everyday experience. But as such, man is also in many respects "unfree"(73) and "is as susceptible to those things which are by nature most evident as the eyes of bats to daylight."(74) The way to liberation indicated by Aristotle is a road involving various stages." (pp. 197-198).

(73) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *A* 2 982b29.
(74) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *Alpha minor* 1 993b9.

8. Chroust, Anton-Hermann. 1962. "The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 23:50-67.

9. ———. 1964. "A Brief Account of the Traditional *Vitae Aristotelis*." *Revue d'Études Grecques* no. 77:50-69.

10. ———. 1965. "The *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus." *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae* no. 13:369-377.

Reprinted in A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 16-24.
"In his *Vita Aristotelis* (or *Chronologia Vitae Aristotelis*), which because of its brevity and alleged unimportance has been sadly neglected, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes: ‘Aristotle was the son of Nicomachus, who traced his ancestry and his profession to Machaon, the son of Asclepius. His mother, Phaestis, descended from one of the colonists who led the [Greek] settlers from Chalcis to Stagira. Aristotle was bom in the 99th Olympiad, when Diotrephes was archon in Athens [384-83 B.C.]. Hence, he was three years older than Demosthenes. During the archonship of Polyzelus [367-66 B.C.], and after his father had died, he went to Athens, being then eighteen years of age. Having been introduced to the company of Plato, he spent a period of twenty years with the latter. On the death of Plato, during the archonship of Theophilus [348-47 B.C.], he went to Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus. After spending three years with Hermias, during the archonship of Eubulus [345-44 B.C.], he repaired to Mytilene. From there he went to the court of Philip [of Macedonia] during the archonship of Pythodorus [343-42 B.C.], and spent eight years there as the tutor of Alexander. After the death of Philip [in 336 B.C.], during the archonship of Evaenetus [335-34 B.C.], he returned to Athens, where he taught in the Lyceum for a

space of twelve years. In the thirteenth year [of his second stay in Athens], after the death of Alexander [in 323 B.C.] and during the archonship of Cephisodorus [323-22 B.C.], he retreated to Chalcis where he fell ill and died at the age of sixty-three.' (1)" (p. 369)

(1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I Epistola ad Ammaeum 5. See also F. Jacoby, *Frag. Hist. Grace*. 244, F. 38.

"The brief and not very informative *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, it must be borne in mind, is primarily a 'chronology' rather than a detailed biography of Aristotle, compiled to disprove the allegation that Demosthenes owed his rhetorical prowess to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Hence, like Apollodorus in his *Chronicle* (DL V, 9-10), Dionysius was of the opinion that he could restrict himself to citing some of the essential dates in the life of Aristotle. Aside from this rather scanty bit of information, the *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius contains practically nothing that might shed additional light on the life and work of the Stagirite. The only novel piece of information furnished by Dionysius is the report that Aristotle's mother Phaestis was a descendant from the original colonists who led the Chalcidian settlers from Chalcis on the island of Euboea to Stagira. Of great importance and much assistance to us is also his effort to date, though in all likelihood not always accurately, certain key events in the life of Aristotle by referring to the respective archonships during which these events took place.

Despite its brevity, the *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus appears to be based on extensive research and what seems to be a fairly accurate grasp of the most relevant facts and dates in the life of the Stagirite. It was motivated by the desire to check and disprove the claims of certain Peripatetics who exalted and exaggerated beyond reason and historical fact the importance and influence of Aristotle upon the history of rhetoric in general and on the rhetoric of Demosthenes in particular. In so doing, Dionysius, like so many apologists, occasionally overstates his case and becomes guilty of some minor inaccuracies. What he did not know, and probably could not know, is that

certain parts of the Aristotelian Rhetoric—the (Urrhetorik9 according to W. Jaeger—may date back to the years 360-55 B.C., and that during the fifties of the fourth century B.C., Aristotle probably composed, two works on rhetoric as well as taught a course of lectures on rhetoric.49 Moreover, his manner of dating Aristotle's arrival in Athens in the year 367 B.C., that is, his insistence that Aristotle went there during the archonship of Polyzelus (367-66 B.C.), when he was eighteen years old (in his eighteenth year), is open to debate.50 Most likely, Aristotle went to Athens during the latter part of Nausigenes' archonship (368-67 B.C., or the first year of the 103rd Olympiad), that is, in the late spring of 367 B.C. (after Plato had departed for Syracuse), when he was seventeen years old (in his seventeenth year), rather than in the summer or early fall of 367. Dionysius also seems to imply that Aristotle died during the archonship of Cephisodorus (323-22 B.C.), that is, during the first half of the year 322, rather than during the early part of Philocles' archonship (322-21 B.C.), that is, between July and October of 322 B.C.51"

11. ———. 1965. "A Brief Analysis of the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laërtius (Dl V 1-16) " *L'Antiquité Classique* no. 34:97-129.

    Revised and expanded in A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 25-53.
    "Book V, sections 1-16, of Diogenes Laërtius' The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, also called *The Lives of the Philosophers* (Photius) or *The Lives of the Sophists* (Eusthatius),(1) contains a rather important, though at times confused (and confusing), account of the life of Aristotle.(2) In his *Vita*, which to a large extent relies rather heavily on a biography of Aristotle by Hermippus of Smyrna, Diogenes Laërtius also employs a number of other divergent sources. Some of these sources are cited by name, others can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty, while others cannot readily be identified. What is

perhaps the most striking characteristic of Diogenes' biography, however, is that he constantly alternates his use of two distinct types of sources or biographical tendencies: the decidedly sympathetic, favorable and even encomiastic tradition; and the clearly unsympathetic, unfavorable and even hostile trend.(3) In this, Diogenes Laërtius and his *Vita Aristotelis* differs from the majority of the extant biographies of Aristotle. The following is a tentative analysis of Diogenes' rather bewildering account in terms of these two types of sources or tendencies." (p. 25)

(1) Diogenes Laërtius, in the main, has remained an obscure author. There exists no certainty even about his correct name. Eustathius (*Comment. in Iliadem M 153*, vol. IΠ, p. 103, ed. G. Stallbaum) calls him Laertes, while some authors (Stephanus of Byzantium and Photius, for instance) refer to him as Laërtius Diogenes. The approximate date of his *Vitae* has been fixed provisionally in the first decade or decades of the third century A.D., that is, shortly after the year A.D. 200, although some scholars would prefer to place the *Vitae* closer to the year A.D. 300. The latest philosopher whom Diogenes cites in his work is Saturninus (DL IX. 116), an otherwise unknown disciple of Sextus Empiricus (*floruit* towards the end of the second century A.D.). If our assumption should be correct, namely, that Diogenes Laërtius wrote shortly after 200 A.D., then he was the younger contemporary of Clement of Alexandria, Galen and Philostratus. See, in general, E. Schwartz, 'Diogenes Laërtius,' in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. V (Stuttgart, 1905), pp. 738-63.

(2) See P. Moraux, 'La Composition de la Vie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce,' *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. 68 (1955), pp. 124-63; I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. 63, no. 2, Göteborg, 1957, pp. 29-79, et passim; O. Gigon, 'Interpretationen zu den Antiken Aristoteles-Viten,' *Museum Helveticum*, vol. 15 (1958), pp. 147-93. I. Düring, op. cit., pp. 25-6, aptly calls the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laërtius 'a compilation of literary sources ranging over a

period of about 500 years. It lacks stylistic unity. It is probable that the author went on making insertions and adding marginal notes until he partly spoiled his original arrangement. It is probable, too, that some of these additions were rather carelessly inserted in the text... This makes Diogenes' work appear more disorderly, not to say sloppier, than it really is. It is habitual to sneer at Diogenes as an insipid and stupid author... The texts which he excerpted were of course not without textual errors, and we must expect that he inherited many of these ancient errors.... The assumption that he was stupid is mainly based on the epigrams with which he adorned his work: they beat the record in bathos and bad taste. But this manifestation of insipidity does not give us the right to dismiss him once and for all as an ignorant ass... [H]e has undoubtedly collected for us a material without which our knowledge of the history of ancient philosophy would be much poorer; he has traced and used some excellent sources; and he has put his material in a tolerably good order.'
(3) Whenever and wherever the situation demands it, some of the sympathetic sources or biographies turn at times into outright, though fanciful, apologies, while some of the unsympathetic or hostile sources or biographies, though by no means all of them, lapse into invective and slander. Naturally, there are also those sources which, on the whole, seem to be fairly 'neutral' and objective.

12. ———. 1965. "A Brief Summary of the Syriac and Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis*." *Acta Orientalia* no. 29:23-47.

Revised version in A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 54-72.
"It is commonly held that the two surviving Syriac and the four extant Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis* are ultimately based on the biographical tradition represented or inaugurated by Ptolemy (-el-Garib) and his (lost) *Vita Aristotelis*.(1) Probably in the course of the fifth or sixth century A.D., a Syriac translation was made of Ptolemy's *Vita* or, more

likely, of an epitome of this *Vita*. Of this original translation, only two rather scanty abridgements by some Syriac biographers survive, namely, *I Vita Aristotelis Syriaca* and *II Vita Aristotelis Syriaca*, which might also be called short *résumés* of an older and more comprehensive Syriac translation of Ptolemy's original Greek *Vita Aristotelis* or of an epitome of this *Vita*.

The Syriac translation of either Ptolemy's *Vita* or that of an epitome of this *Vita*, together with some additional (probably Neo-Platonic) materials transmitted through several intermediary sources, ultimately became the foundation of the four Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis*. It has been surmised that towards the end of the ninth century A.D., Ishaq Ibn Hunayn translated into Arabic a Syriac rendition of Ptolemy's *Vita* or, rather, of a Syriac translation of an epitome of this *Vita*. In any event, the Arabic biographers, without exception, ultimately derived their information and materials, through the intermediary of Syriac translators, from Ptolemy, although they seem to have included in their *Vitae* not only some elements that were probably added (or invented) by the Syriac translators (or by the Arabic biographers themselves), but also bits of information gleaned from some other (Neo-Platonic?) reports or accounts. There exists no evidence, however, that the later Arabic biographers made direct use of Greek or Syriac sources. It might be correct to maintain, therefore, that the Syriac and Arabic biographers, like the Neo-Platonic School of Ammonius, derived most of their information concerning the life of Aristotle from Ptolemy (-el-Garib) and his *Vita Aristotelis*.(2)

The four major Arabic biographers of Aristotlee are: Al-Mubassir (or Al-Mubashir, subsequently cited as *II VA*), who wrote during the latter part of the eleventh century;(3) Ibn Abi Usaibia (subsequently cited as *IV VA*), who wrote during the latter part of the thirteenth century;(4) Ibn an-Nadim (subsequently cited as *I VA*), who wrote near the end of the tenth century;(5) and Al-Qifti Gamaladdin (subsequently cited as *III VA*), who wrote during the first half of the thirteenth century.(6) A cursory examination of

the Arabic (and Syriac) *Vitae Aristotelis* might indicate that especially *I VA, II VA* and *IV VA*, which are based on a single main source, are quite similar in content. Closer analysis reveals, however, that there exist quite a few significant differences in the facts selected and discussed by the different Arabic biographers. It is also obvious that some of the later Arabic biographers simply copied from some earlier Arabic author. Thus, Usaibia, for instance, occasionally seems to quote from Mubashir without, however, acknowledging his source." (pp. 54-55)

(1) See A.-H. Chroust, 'A brief account of the traditional Vitae Aristotelis,' *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. 77, nos 364-5 (1964), pp. 50-69, especially, pp. 60-9, and Chapter I. The title of Ptolemy's *Vita Aristotelis* probably was something like ' *On the Life of Aristotle, His Last Will and Testament, and a List of His Writings*.' See Elias (*olim* David), *Commentaria in Porphyrii Isagogen et in Aristotelis Categorias*, *CIAG*, vol. XVIII, part 1 (ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1900), p. 107, line 7, where we are told that Ptolemy wrote about Aristotle's 'list of writings, about his life, and about his last will and testament.' I VA 19 (An-Nadim) reports that 'Ptolemy-el-Garib ... is the author of a book "On the Life of Aristotle, His Death, and the Classification of his Writings."' See also *IV VA* (Usaibia), at the beginning.

(2) For the Syriac and Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis*, see, in general, F. A. Müller, 'Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung,' *Festschrift der Fränkischen Stiftungen fur Professor Bernhardy* (Halle, 1873) ; F. A. Müller, 'Das Arabische Verzeichnis der Aristotelischen Schriften,' *Morgenländische Forschungen: Festschrift für H. L. Fischer* (Leipzig, 1875); M. Steinschneider, 'Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen,' *Centralblatt für Bibl.-Wesen*, Beiheft no. Π, part 3 (Leipzig, 1890-1), and Beiheft no. IV, part 12 (Leipzig, 1893); J. Lippert, *Studien auf dem Gebiete der Griechisch-Arabischen Übersetzungsliteratur* (Braunschweig, 1894); A. Baumstark, 'Lucubrationes Syrio-Graecae,' *Jahrbuch für Klassische Philologie*, Supplement, vol. 21 (Leipzig, 1894),

pp. 333-524; A. Baumstark, *Syrisch-Arabische Biographien des Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1900); J. Lippert, *Ibn al-Qiftis Tarih al-Hukama* (Leipzig, 15)03). For additional and detailed information about the literature on our subject, see M. Guidi and R. Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi I: un scritto introduttivo alio studio di Aristotele,' *Memorie della Reale Academia Nazionale dei Lincei*. Classe di Scienze Morali, series VI, vol. VI, fasc. 5 (Rome, 1940), pp. 375-419; R. Walzer, 'New light on the Arabic translations of Aristotle,' *Oriens*, vol. VI (1953), pp. 91-142; I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. LXIII, no. 2 (Göteborg, 1957), pp· 183-92, 193-246.
(3) His full name is Abu-(e)l-Wafa al-Mubashir (or Mubassir) Ibn Fatik. He authored the *Kitab Mukhtar al-Hikam wa-Mahasin al-Kihm* (*The Book of Selections of Wisdom and Wonderful Sayings*). For simplicity's sake the accents on the Arabic words have been omitted. See also Chapter I, note 17.
*(4) He authored the Kitab uyun al-Anba fi Tabaqat al-Atibba (*The Book of Sources for Information Concerning the School of Physicians). Usaibia, who died in 1270, was a physician. See also Chapter I, note 19.
(5) His full name is Ibn Abi Yaqub an-Nadim. He authored the *Kitab al-Fihrist*, which was written before the year 987. This work, like that of Al-Qifti (see note 6), is more in the nature of a ' biographical encyclopedia.' See also Chapter I, note 16.
(6) His full name is Al-Qifti Gamaladdin al-Qadi al-Akram. He authored the *Tabaqat al-Hukama* (*The School of Wise Men*). He died in 1248. See note 5 and Chapter I, note 18. Neither the work of An-Nadim nor that of Al-Qifti will be used extensively.

13. ———. 1970. "Estate Planning in Hellenic Antiquity: Aristotle's Last Will and Testament." *Notre Dame Law Review* no. 45:629-662.

Reprinted in A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 183-220.
"The text of Aristotle's last will and testament is preserved in the writings of Diogenes Laërtius, (1) Ibn An-Nadim, (2) AI-Qifti Gamaladdin, and Ibn Abi Usaibi'a.(4) Without question, this instrument is wholly authentic. Although in the course of its transmission it may have been somewhat mutilated or abridged, it remains the most revealing, as well as the most extensive, source of information among the few surviving original documents related to the life of Aristotle. It is safe to assume that the ancient biographers of Aristotle derived or inferred much of their information and data from this will. Concomitantly, this document supplies the modem historian with details that in many instances have been obscured, altered, or simply omitted in the traditional (and preserved) biographies of Aristotle.
The testaments of the early Peripatetic scholarchs, including Aristotle's, were carefully preserved and finally collated by Ariston of Ceos in his Collection [of the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs].(6)" (p. 629)
(1) Diogenes Laërtius, βίων [καὶ ·γνώμων] των ἰν φίλοσοφίαιεὔδοκιμησάντων των els δέκα (On the Lives [and Opinions] of Eminent Philosophers in Ten [Books]), bk. 5, paras. 11-16 [hereinafter cited as Diogenes Laërtius].
(2) Ibn Abi Ya'qub An-Nadim Kitab al-Fihrist [hereinafter cited as I Vita Aristotelis Arabica].
(3) Al-Qifti Gamaladdin al-Qadi al Akram, Tabaqat al-Hukama' (Schools of Wise Men) [hereinafter cited as III Vita Aristotelis Arabica].
(4) Ibn Abi Usaibi'a, Kitab 'Uyun al-Anba' fi Tabaqat al-Atibba' (Book of Sources of Information about the Schools of Doctors) [hereinafter cited as IV Vita Aristotelis Arabica]. The text transmitted by An-Nadim is almost identical to that of Usaibi'a. It is fair to assume that Usaibi'a used the text of An-Nadim.
(5) Diogenes Laërtius, bk. 5, para. 64; see Strabo, "Στράβωνος γεωγραφικών (Geography), bk. 13, ch. 1, para. 54.

(6) In the preserved will of Theophrastus we read: "And the whole library [of the school] I bequeath to Neleus." Diogenes Laërtius, bk. 5, para. 52; see Strabo, supra note 5, bk. 13, ch. 1, para. 54; Athenaeus, Αθηναίου Ναυχρατίτου δειπνοσοφίστων (Deipnosophists), bk. 1, para. 3A [hereinafter cited as Athenaeus]. Theophrastus, it must be borne in mind, expected that Neleus of Scepsis would succeed him in the scholarchate of the Peripatus. When Neleus failed to be "elected" scholarch, he went back to Scepsis, in the Troad, taking with him the library containing the intramural compositions or treatises of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other early Peripatetics. This incident also explains why the doctrinal treatises of Aristotle and others became lost for some time. See Chroust, *The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the Corpus Aristotelicum*, 23 Classica et Mediaevalia 50 (1962). This also justifies doubts as to the authenticity of parts of the extant *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

14. ———. 1973. *Aristotle. New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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"This book, which consists of two distinct volumes, essentially is a collection of papers which I wrote between 1963 and 1968, when I became interested in the historical Aristotle -- the Aristotle revealed not merely in the highly problematic *Corpus Aristotelicum,* but also in the ancient biographical tradition and in the 'lost works' of the young Stagirite. Some of the papers collected and edited here owe

their origin to classroom discussions and lectures which I offered while on leave from the Notre Dame Law School. They have previously been published in various journals, both in the United States and elsewhere. When re-editing these papers for this book, I made some far-reaching alterations, important additions, incisive corrections and, it is hoped, some worthwhile improvements." (Vol. I, from the *Preface*, IX)

"Aside from a more general and rather sweeping discussion of the several *Vitae Aristotelis* in Chapter I, only the *Vita* (or *Chronologia) Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the *Vita* of Diogenes Laërtius And the *Vitae* of the Syriac and Arabic biographers are treated in this book with any detail. The *Vita Aristotelis Marciana,* which was recently edited by O. Gigon, the *Vita Hesychii (Vita Menagii* or *Vita Menagiana), the Vita Vulgata,* the *Vita Latina* and the brief biographical sketches found in the Neo-Platonic commentaries to the works of Aristotle, on the other hand, have not received special treatment, although frequent reference is made to them. Chapter I also makes an attempt to reconstruct the essential content of the lost *Vita Aristotelis* of Hermippus of Smyrna as well as that of the likewise lost *Vita Aristotelis* of Ptolemy (-el-Garib). These two *Vitae,* it is claimed, constitute the most important sources or intermediary authorities for the majority of the subsequent *Vitae*. Chapter II, which discusses the *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, indicates that this *Vita* is actually a brief chronology which offers little detailed information, except some valuable and apparently accurate biographical data. The *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laërtius, which is analyzed in Chapter III, poses many vexing problems, some of which are almost impossible to resolve. Especially difficult to determine are the sources used by Diogenes Laërtius. There can be little doubt, however, that this *Vita,* as we shall see in Chapter I, draws heavily on the *Vita* of Hermippus. Chapter IV, again, presents a general survey and discussion of the Syriac and Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis* without entering into a detailed analysis of each individual *Vita*. This particular chapter is primarily an

attempt to illustrate the peculiar biographical trend introduced (?) by the Neo-Platonic biographers and by Ptolemy (-el-Garib) in particular. Of necessity no less than by design, the expository and analytical discussions of all these *Vitae Aristotelis* are at times repetitious in that certain statements found in one *Vita* are referred to or restated again and again.
(...)
The somewhat arbitrary selection of these biographical sources was made on the basis of the following considerations: The lost *Vita Aristotelis* of Hermippus and the lost *Vita Aristotelis* of Ptolemy (-el-Garib), it is widely and probably correctly held, constitute what appear to be the two main biographical trends. The *Vita* of Diogenes Laërtius, in particular, to a fairly large extent, though not exclusively, relies on the *Vita* of Hermippus (as does the *Vita Aristotelis* of Hesychius) and, hence, at least in part, may be considered an 'epitome' or 'derivative' of the latter. The Syriac and Arabic *Vitae,* in turn, are primarily based on the *Vita* of Ptolemy (-el Garib) -- as are the *Vita Marciana,* the *Vita Vulgata* and the *Vita Latina* -- and *,* hence, may be called 'epitomes' or 'derivatives' of Ptolemy's biography. The *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which is largely based on what appear to be independent investigations, seems to follow a course of inquiry all its own." (Vol. I, *Introduction*, pp. XIX-XX, notes omitted).

15. Dix, T. Keith. 2004. "Aristotle's 'Peripatetic' Library." In *Lost Libraries. The Destrucion of Great Book Collections since Antiquity*, edited by Raven, James, 58-74. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    "The details in Strabo's account are subject to question and interpretation; and the truth of the Scepsis episode in particular must remain an open question. Three elements in Strabo's story do ring true to the history of libraries in the Hellenistic age. First, there is the rise of institutional libraries, beginning with the library of the Peripatetic school.

At least four of the Macedonian dynasts established libraries in their capitals, a practice which spread to other rulers on the fringe of the Mediterranean world who aspired to Hellenic culture; and a number of Greek cities established libraries in their city gymnasia, presumably for the education of their young men. Second is the bibliomania of rival Hellenistic kings, especially the Ptolemies in Alexandria and the Attalids in Pergamum. Indeed, the entire Scepsis episode may reflect wrangling between Alexandria and Pergamum over who had the better texts of Aristotle. Third is the confiscation of the cultural treasures of Greek civilisation, including libraries, by victorious Roman generals: Sulla was not the first nor would he be the last to acquire a library as spoils of war. One element is unusual: Strabo's assertion that the decline of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastus was due to the 'disappearance' of Aristotle's library. In no other ancient account of lost libraries do we find any assessment of the consequences of loss. Other ancient accounts and modern scholarship do not seem to bear out Strabo's assertion; nevertheless, for his ability to conceive that the loss of a library might have practical and intellectual consequences, Strabo can take his place in this collective history of lost libraries. (pp. 69-70)

16. Drossart, Lulofs Henrik Joan. 1999. "Neleus of Scepsis and the Fate of the Library of the Peripatos." In *Tradition Et Traduction. Les Textes Philosophiques Et Scientifiques Grecs Au Moyen Age Latin. Hommage À Fernand Bossier*, edited by Beyers, Rita, Brams, Jozef, Sacré, Dirk and Verrycken, Koenraad, 9-24. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

    Text prepared for publication and completed after the death of author by A. M. I. van Oppenraay.
    "Roughly speaking, Posidonius (135-51 BC) and Apellicon (d. 87) were contemporaries, while Strabo was only 13 years old when Posidonius died. So this (*) is the earliest mention of Apellicon's purchase of Aristotle's library which has come

down to us. When and where he acquired it is not explicitly stated, but it may have been in his student days — thirty or forty years before, perhaps with Athenion, who after a career as sophist in Messene and at Larissa, in Thessaly, amassed a considerable fortune and returned to Athens. (31) Messene, Larissa and Athens are quite distant from Scepsis. Since Posidonius does not refer to Neleus at all, it is clear that he follows a different tradition. Even so it is noteworthy that the two authors (Posidonius and Strabo) agree as to the main point: that Apellicon was the owner of the library of Aristotle (so Athenaeus; Strabo more correctly adds Theophrastus).

The implications in § 4 are downright impossible. For it is improbable that this rascal, at best an amateur, was able to restore heavily damaged manuscripts of extremely difficult texts. Apart from that, even if he had been an accomplished philosopher and a trained expert in textual criticism, he might have corrected only a very small part of the 676.078 lines of the literary remains of Aristotle and Theophrastus (32).

There is, however, an independent witness: the annotated catalogue of Andronicus is lost, but we still have a summary (in Arabic), made by a certain Ptolemy. Towards the end of the Arabic translation of the catalogue of Ptolemy, called the Foreigner (al-garïb), in which a miscellany of personal papers, letters etc. is listed, there is a reference to "Books that were found in the library of a man called Ablikun" (Ablikun is the regular transcription of Apellicon). Now, it is known that he was interested in Aristotle's marriage to Pythias (I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, p. 267, T. 10; p. 375, T. 58 / and the commentary, on p. 392), and it may be that he bought some personal papers concerned with Aristotle's private life, because such texts appealed to him, and he was able to read and to emend them. Boastful and vainglorious as he was, he may have grossly exaggerated his acquisition.

According to § 7, after his death Apellicon's books were carried away by Sulla and included in his private library at Rome (or Cumae? see Cicero, *ad Att*. IV. 10, 1). If it really

had contained all the books of the Peripatos, the hundreds of volumes in large chests would immediately have caught the eye. But Cicero, who was privileged to visit Sulla's library, failed to notice anything of the sort, so that we may safely conclude that the famous library of the Peripatos was not among the belongings of Apellicon captured by Sulla. Presumably, Apellicon had actually acquired some Aristotelica, which may easily have escaped Cicero's attention. On the other hand Cicero came across several *Commentarii*, that is to say esoteric works, of Aristotle in the library of Lucullus, another general, who had collected manuscripts during his expeditions in the East (see Cicero, *Fin*. III. 10 and Moraux *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* 1973, pp. 39ff.). This is extremely interesting, for the same Lucullus brought Tyrannio of Amisia as a prisoner to Rome, where he was freed and honoured as a scholar. Apparently, even in remote Pontus it was possible to acquire Aristotelian MSS. In this connection it should be stressed once more that, contrary to the impression given by Strabo's account (in § 5), MSS of Aristotelian *esoterica* were available outside the school in various countries. This stands to reason, because the school was known all over the world. And this was exactly what Strabo's informant ignored: apart from Athens and Rome there existed intellectual centres in many parts of the ancient world (like the Troad, for instance, see note 25.

My conclusions are that Strabo's account ought to be dated early, that it may have had a place in Strabo's own *Historical Sketches*, and that later on it may have been inserted in his *Geography*. It consists mainly of misinterpreted facts." (pp. 23-24)

(*) [Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae,* V. 214 de].

(25) Note that Straton is nowhere referred to in the account, and Strabo himself seems to have ignored that he was a Peripatetic. He quotes him (in 1.3, 4-5) on the authority of Eratosthenes with his usual nickname Straton the Physicist. The account in *Geogr*. XIII. 1.45 may suggest that Scepsis was an insignificant one-horse town, but that is far from the truth. In the next chapter of the 13th book Strabo repeatedly

quotes Demetrius of Scepsis (*Geogr*. XIII.1.45, 55, al.), a famous historian who spent his life in his native town, where he must have been able to collect the material for his thirty books of commentary on a little more than sixty lines of Homer, that is on the *Catalogue of the Trojans* (ibid. XIII.1.45), a work of stupendous erudition. In fact, Strabo's reports on the Troad reveal that it was one of the centres of intellectual activity. From Assos, where Aristotle had taught, came Cleanthes, the Stoic (ibid. XIII. 1.57). With Lampsacus and Parium many great names are connected. See ibid. XIII.1.19 : "Now Neoptolemus, called the Glossographer [and author of a Poetic, heavily drawn upon by Horace for his *Ars poetica*], a notable man, was from Parium; and Charon the historian and Adeimantus and Anaximenes the rhetorician, and Metrodorus the comrade of Epicurus were from Lampsacus; and Epicurus himself was in a sense a Lampsacenian, having lived in Lampsacus and having been on intimate terms with the ablest men of that city, Idomeneus and Leonteus and their followers" (transi. Jones). Here again, Strabo omits mention of Straton — a Lampsacenian too — and of Lycon, the son of the Trojan Astyanax, who was Straton's successor. Evidently he was poorly informed about the Peripatos.
(31) See R. Goulet, in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, I, Paris, 1989, p. 649.
(32) For this number see the catalogues of Diogenes Laërtius V. 27 and V. 50.

17. Düring, Ingemar. 1950. "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings." *Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis*:37-70.

    Reprinted as second study in: *Aristotle and His Influence: Two Studies,* New York: Garland, 1987 (First study: Hans Kurfess: Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der aristotelischen Lehre vom sog. *Nous poietikos* und *pathetikos* (1911).

18. ———. 1956. "Ariston or Hermippus? A Note on the Catalogue of Aristotle's Writings, Diog. L. V 22." *Classica et*

Mediaevalia no. 17:11-21.

"The catalogue of Aristotle's writings preserved to us by Diogenes Laërtius is a valuable document, supplementing our knowledge of Aristotle's literary production. Provided that we can solve the problem of its origin, it will enable us to draw important conclusions as to the extent to which Aristotle's books were known during the centuries immediately following his death. In his book on this and the other catalogues, preserved by Hesychius and Ptolemy-el-Garib, Moraux (1) has well summarized the results of earlier research, and his own contributions to the interpretation and clarification of details in these catalogues are very important. With his predecessors Littig and Baum-stark, however, he shares a tendency towards highly conjectural construction. Owing to the conditions under which the catalogues are handed down to us, they pose for us a series of complicated problems. If we are going to draw any profit from the information they contain, we must be careful not to transcend what is really knowable. These problems cannot be solved by substituting still more problematic reconstructions, however ingenious these may be. Moraux has advanced and vigorously defended the thesis that the catalogue preserved by Diogenes is a list of Aristotle's works in the library of the Peripatos, composed by Ariston of Ceos who succeeded Lycon as head of the School, about 226/5 B.C. If this thesis can be proved, it will have important consequences for the history of the Peripatos and Hellenistic philosophy in general, and Moraux has not shrunk from drawing such far-reaching conclusions. The object of this paper is to examine Moraux's thesis and match it with the traditional opinion that this catalogue is an inventory of Aristotle's books in the possession of the Alexandrian library." (pp. 11-12)

(1) P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d' Aristote,* Louvain 1951. To the exhaustive bibliography can be added: O. Regenbogen s. v. *Pinax*, RE XX 2, 1950.

19. ———. 1957. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Reprint New York, Garland, 1987.
Contents: Preface 7; Part I. Editions of the Ancient Vitae Aristotelis. 1. Diogenes Laërtius 13; 2. Hesychius 80; 3. Vita Marciana 94; 4. Vita vulgata 120; 5. Vita Lascaris 140, 6. Vita Latina 142, 7. Medieval Vitae Aristotelis 164; Part: II. The Syriac and Arabic tradition on Aristotle's life and writings 183; Part III. Fragments of the ancient biographical tradition. I. Chronology of Aristotle's life 249; II. Descent and family 263; III. Hermias of Atarneus 272; IV. Relationship with Philip and Alexander 284; V. Aristoteles and Isocrates 299; VI. Aristotle and Plato 315; VII. Aristotle's library 337; VIII. Aristotle honoured by the Delphic Amphyctions 339; IX. Aristotle's dicta on leaving Athens 341; X. Aristotle's apology 343; XI. Aristotle's death 345; XII. Appearance and personal qualities 349; XIII. Some ancient verdicts 353; XIV. Indirect evidence from Aristotle's own writings 366; XV. Early invectives against Aristotle 373; Comments on ch. XV 374; XVI. Characteristic sayings. Bon-mots. Anedoctes 396; XVII: The words *peripatos, peripatein, peripatetikos* 404; XVIII. The Roman edition of Aristotle's works 412; XIX. *Exoterichoi logoi* 426; XX. The neoplatonic introductions to the study of Aristotle 444; Part IV. From Hermippus to Ptolemy. A brief summary of results and conclusions 459; *Index testimoniorum* 479-490.
"This book has a long history. It was begun as an investigation of the passages in which Plutarch speaks of Aristotle. Detached from their context some of these passages lent themselves to different interpretations and I found too that they were used as evidence for quite different opinions. It soon became apparent that the scattered fragments of the biographical tradition could not be fully understood and properly interpreted unless on the basis of an examination of all the material. The aim of this book is to present this material and the result of my examination of it

and to trace the development of the biographical tradition concerning Aristotle's life and writings.

Part I contains critical editions of all ancient Vitae Aristotelis, based on fresh collations of all manuscripts known to me. To the very last I hoped to find another manuscript of the *Vita Marciana*, now preserved only in *Marcianus 257*, which is today almost indecipherable, but my hope failed. The editions of the *Vitae* pose problems which I have set forth in the introductions. To each text I have added *testimonia*, a running commentary, and a short chapter with a general evaluation. In this part of the book I have also included a brief survey of some of the late medieval *Vitae*.

Part II contains a survey of the Syriac and Arabic tradition. My chief object has been to present readable translations of the most important *Vitae Aristotelis* and to discuss the problems raised by these texts. This material has been hard to deal with for a non-orientalist, and it would have been impossible for me to give an account of it, had I not received kind and generous assistance from my orientalist colleagues, Professors Oscar Löfgren and Bernhard Lewin, Göteborg University, and Dr. Richard Walzer, Oxford University. I wish to emphasize, however, that I am alone responsible for all shortcomings in this chapter.

Part III contains about four hundred passages from ancient and medieval writers, selected from a large collection of excerpts and arranged according to subject-matter. I have experimented with several types of arrangement and finally decided upon the one chosen here. This arrangement of the material inevitably leads to certain repetitions for which I ask the reader's indulgence. I hope that the frequent cross-references and the Index testimoniorum will help the reader to find what he wants to find.

In most cases each passage or cluster of passages is provided with a commentary. In my comments and interpretations I have followed the simple method applied in every critical treatment of sources and authorities. Each statement has first been examined separately, with due consideration given to textual problems, language, context,

mode of transmission, the writer's personality (if known), time and tendency, and so forth. It has then been compared with related texts and further analysed and interpreted with the ultimate aim of finding out as much as possible about trends and tendency in that branch of the biographical tradition to which the passage belongs. Certain facts recorded in the biographical tradition are of such a nature that we can never prove whether they are true or not. But we may advance a step nearer the truth if we can prove that the author (or his source) is biassed and find out something about his prejudices or tendency. In most cases it is possible to evince that he follows a certain tradition whose general character we are able to determine. However, everybody familiar with the ancient biographical tradition knows that the material is fragile and often open to different interpretations. I have honestly tried to make a clear distinction between facts and hypotheses and left many questions open with a *non liquet*. But I am fully aware how complicated and difficult the problems are and how evasive the truth is. The reader will find that my conclusions are often qualified by an additional "probably" or subject to other reservations.

It is my hope that the editions of the *Vitae Aristotelis* together with the large collection of testimonia will prove useful as a source book for the purpose of reference, quite irrespective of the appended comments.

Part IV contains a brief outline of the development of the biographical tradition from Hermippus to Ptolemy-el-Garib. I have of course had a great mass of material to draw upon in the works of the many scholars who have written on the life of Aristotle: Brandis, Stahr, Blakesley, Zeller, Bywater, Shute, Busse, Baumstark, Praechter, Jaeger, Mulvany, Wormell, Hubbell, Moraux, and many others cited or referred to in my notes and comments. My separate debts to predecessors I have tried to acknowledge in all cases where they were contracted; I may sometimes have put down, from ignorance or forgetfulness, as my own, what ought to have been credited to another. Let me say, however, that without the diligent and careful work done by generations of

scholars towards clarifying obscure passages and hidden rapports in the biographical tradition, this presentation and, if I may be allowed to say so, this tidying-up of the entire material, could not have been achieved." (from the Preface, pp. 7-9)

20. ———. 1971. "Ptolemy's *Vita Aristotelis* Rediscovered." In *Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan*, edited by Palmer, Robert B. and Hamerton, Kelly, 264-269. La Haye: Nijhoff.

    "In a discussion at the Fondation Hardt (1) Professor Richard Walzer reminded classical scholars and historians of philosophy that they largely ignore the fact that Arabic translations of hitherto unknown Greek texts are becoming known in steadily increasing numbers, either through editions of the Arabic texts or, more often, because more detailed information about existing manuscripts is now available. The following example well illustrates his point." (p. 264)
    (1) *Porphyre*, Entretiens Fondation Hardt XII, 1965 (Geneva, 1966), p. 275.

21. Earl, Donald. 1972. "Prologue-Form in Ancient Historiography." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. I. 2*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang and Temporini, Hildegard, 842-856. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    On Aristotle see pp. 850-856.

22. Falcon, Andrea, ed. 2016. *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*. Leiden: Brill.

23. Gottschalk, Hans B. 1972. "Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs." *Hermes* no. 100:314-342.

    "Among the more important documents preserved by Diogenes Laërtius are the wills of six leading philosophers, Plato (3, 41—3), Epicurus (10, 16—21), and the first four heads of the Aristotelian school, Aristotle himself (5, 11—16), Theophrastus (5, 51—7), Strato (5, 61—4 = fr. 10 Wehrli)

and Lyco (5, 69 to 74 = fr. 15 Wehrli); Aristotle's will has also been preserved in two Arabic versions containing some variant readings (1). While those of Plato and Aristotle are purely personal, the remaining wills contain more or less detailed provisions for the continuation and endowment of the Epicurean and Peripatetic schools, which throw a good deal of light on their organisation and the conditions in which they operated. The Peripatetic wills are particularly instructive, forming as they do a continuous series dating from 322 to 228/5 BC. Yet there has been no comprehensive study of these documents since the eighties of the last century, and the discussions published then concentrated mainly on their legal aspects (2). The aim of this paper is rather to extract as much historical information as possible about the Peripatos and its members. I shall press the evidence hard and some of my conclusions are more speculative than I like. But none of my results conflict with any reliable ancient testimony, and I hope at least to succeed in dispelling some misconceptions and in clarifying the nature of our sources and the limits of our knowledge." (p. 314)

(1) See below, p. 315 ff.

(2) C. G. Bruns, "Die Testamente der gr. Philosophen", *Ztschr. d. Savigny-Stiftun*g, Romanistische Abtlg. I, 1880, 1-52; A. Hug, "Zu den Test. d. gr. Philos.", Festschr. zur Begrüßung der Vers. deutscher Philologen u. Schulmänner, Zürich 1887, 1-22. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos v. Karystos,* Berlin 1881, 263ff., deals with the historical problems. Aristotle's will has come in for a great deal of individual attention. An English translation of the Arabic version of Usaibia is printed by I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition*, Göteborg 1957, p. 219f., and both the Arabic and the Greek text are discussed on pp. 61 ff. and 238 ff. ; this work will be referred to as *AB*. Another edition of the Greek text, with the chief Arabic variants (in a Latin translation) given in an apparatus, is in M. Plezia, *Arist. Epistulae cum Testamento*, Warsaw 1961. Discussions by A. Grant, *Aristotle*, London 1877, 26ff. ; G. Grote, *Aristotle*, London (2nd edition) 1880, 17ff. ; E. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr*. II 23, 1879, 41

ff.; W. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles,* Berlin 1923 etc., 34ff.; C. M. Mulvany, "Notes on the Legend of Ar.", *Class. Quart*. 20, 1926, 157ff. ; M. Plezia, in *Meander* 2, 1947, 215ff. (in Polish ; not available to the present writer); A.-H. Chroust, "Ar.'s Last Will and Testament", *Wien. Stud*. 80, 1967, 90 ff. includes English translations of the Greek and Arabic versions in parallel columns. Düring, Plezia and Chroust break the text up into short numbered sections; in this paper references will be given to Diogenes' paragraphs and sections in the numeration of Düring and Plezia, e.g. *Diog*. 5. 15, § 2e D.-P. Chroust's numeration differs from that of the other editors and will not be given here.

24. ———. 1987. "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century Ad." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. Ii. Teilband: Philosophie (Platonismus, [Forts.]; Aristotelismus)*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 1079-1174. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Partial reprint in: R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence,* London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 55-81.

25. Grayeff, Felix. 1956. "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text." *Phronesis* no. 1:105-122.

    "If the *Corpus Aristotelicum* consists of such varied material it is necessary, as Brink says ("Peripatos" in Pauly-Wissowa suppl. VII 1.1. p. 925), to investigate separately in each case in what manner the individual books, or μέθοδοι, of the Corpus were first edited. But perhaps the most immediate task of Aristotelian students is, to search for characteristics of the three (or more) main sources on which, I think, Tyrannion and Andronicus drew, i.e. to attempt to assign parts of the Corpus to the Rhodian, the Athenian, the Alexandrian branches of tradition. Only if we succeed in distinguishing between such branches, if we discover trends prevalent in each of them, and understand the principles of

editing and lecturing used in the different peripatetic centres, can we hope to find a way to Aristotle himself."

26. ———. 1974. *Aristotle and His School: An Inquiry into the History of the Peripatos with a Commentary on Metaphysics Z, H, Λ and Θ*. London: Duckworth.

Contents: Preface 7; List of Abbreviations 8; Introduction 9; Part One: 1. Life of Aristotle 13; 2. The Peripatos after Aristotle's Death 49; 3. The Emergence of New Philosophical Schools during the Fourth and Third Centuries B.C. 57; 4. The Library of the Peripatos and its History 69; Part Two: 5. The Structure of Metaphysics Z; 6. Peripatetic Ontology according to Metaphysics H 127; 7. Peripatetic Ontology according to Metaphysics Λ 143; Excursus: The Theory of the Proper Place 183; 8. A Volume on Potentiality and Actuality: Metaphysics Θ 187; Select Bibliography 213; Index of Passages Quoted in Text 219; General Index 225-230.
"This book on Aristotle and the Peripatos aims at elucidating the origin and growth of the Aristotelian treatises and it poses the question whether the treatises are the work of Aristotle himself, or of some of the outstanding members of his school." (p. 9)
(...)
"In making this new attempt at explaining the Aristotelian contradictions I intend to analyse the structure of Metaphysics Z, H, Θ and Λ — a task greatly facilitated by W. D. Ross's commentary on Aristotle's works. The analysis, which forms the main part of this book, is preceded by an introductory section on Aristotle's life and the history of the Peripatos after Aristotle's death, and on the history of the school library, especially after the closure of the school. Both sections of the book are designed to throw light on the genesis of the treatises, which must not be read as though they had been composed in a void, but as lectures delivered before often critical audiences of students, in the consciousness of changing trends of thought." (p. 10)

27. Gutas, Dimitri. 1986. "The Spurious and the Authentic in the Arabic Lives of Aristotle." In *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: The Theology and Other Texts*, edited by Ryan, William Francis, Kraye, Jill and Schmitt, Charles Bernard, 15-36. London: Warburg Institute. University of London.

    Reprinted as Chapter VI in D. Gutas, *Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
    "The study of the Arabic lives of Aristotle is an old and tired subject; it can fairly lay claim to the distinction of being the first area of sustained scholarly concentration in Graeco-Arabic studies. I would not undertake an extensive treatment anew in a volume on Pseudo-Aristotle were it not for the fact that, despite considerable discussion for more than a century now, much light can still be shed on the scope and nature of this material from the vantage point of an examination of the spurious and the authentic in it, and for the rather ironic state of affairs that the secondary literature has itself generated its own share of the spurious. A review of the whole subject, then, that would list in detail the sources and remark on the ways of analysing them, remove the incrustations of outdated or misguided scholarship, and put the tasks of future research in perspective would seem to be in order.
    For the purposes of the present discussion, all the Arabic biographical material on Aristotle can be conveniently categorized under the following six headings:
    1) Reports in Arabic biographies of scholars;
    2) Information in Arabic histories and chronographies, in so far as it does not derive from No. 1;
    3) The story of young Aristotle, the precocious orphan, in Hunayn's *Nawâdir al-falasifa* ('Anecdotes of the Philosophers');
    4) The story of Aristotle's death in *The Book of the Apple;*
    5) Various scattered reports, the Aristotelian *adespota;*
    6) The voluminous material on Aristotle in his relation with Alexander: anecdotes, stories, correspondence, the 'legend' of Aristotle.

In this paper I shall concentrate mainly on No. 1, deal very briefly with Nos. 2 to 5, and omit altogether No. 6 which, in addition to being biographical only peripherally, clearly requires a volume -- if not volumes -- of its own."

28. ———. 2012. "The Letter before the Spirit: Still Editing Aristotle after 2300 Years." In *The Letter before the Spirit: The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle*, edited by van Oppenraai, Aafke M. I., 11-36. Leiden: Brill.

    "Survey of the methods and practices used to edit the texts of Aristotle from the time of Aristotle himself to the present. Special attention is paid to the significance of the translations of Aristotelian texts, in particular into Arabic, for the establishment of their critical editions, as well as to the relative value of the vet-eres and recentiores Greek codices. Attention is also paid to some of the shortcomings of modem research and the challenges it faces."

29. Hatzimichali, Myrto. 2013. "The Texts of Plato and Aristotle in the First Century Bc." In *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century Bc*, edited by Schofiled, Malcolm, 1-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

30. Hecquet-Devienne, Myriam. 2004. "A Legacy from the Library of the Lyceum? Inquiry into the Joint Transmission of Theophrastus' and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Based on Evidence Provided by Manuscripts *E* and *J*." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 102:171-189.

    "A *scholium* in Paris, BNF, gr. 1853, fol. 312r, provides evidence for the tradition of the Aristotelian corpus. The scholium reveals that Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* was not on early lists of Theophrastus' works. It also reveals that Nicolaus of Damascus in his study of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*) identified the author of the work as Theophrastus. The transmission of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* is thus closely linked to that of the Aristotelian

corpus. Conclusions are: that both Book *L* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* were written before the central books of Aristotle's treatise as it is known to us; and that Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* could have provoked, in response, Aristotle' writing of *De partibus animalium* and *De generatione animalium*."
(*) *Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy of Aristotle, e*dited by H. J. Drossart Lulofs, Leiden: Brill, 1965 (reprint with additions and corrections 1969).

31. Huby, Pamela M. 1969. "The Transmission of Aristotle's Writings and the Places Where Copies of His Works Existed." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 30:241-257.

    "This is an attempt to trace the history of the Aristotelian tradition, (1) mainly by means of a study of the evidence about the whereabouts of the manuscripts of his esoteric writings in ancient times. In this particular case the task is a relatively easy one, because these works are too difficult to have had a wide circulation. A few important centres of learning probably had good copies of all of them, and some works like the *Organon*, may have been much more widely known at certain periods, but most of the material that once existed must have been destroyed, and we can often say where and when such destruction is likely to have happened. We can distinguish four main centres of tradition, by which I mean places where manuscripts were kept, studied and copied over a long period — Athens, Alexandria, Rome and Constantinople. (2) Of these the Roman tradition is completely lost, except in some Latin translations; the large collection at Athens probably slowly decayed, though some manuscripts may have gone to Constantinople; the perhaps even larger collection at Alexandria was scattered, but its tradition survived in Antioch and other parts of the Arab dominions, and is probably at the base of the Arabic translations. Even in Constantinople much was lost through fire or neglect, but a certain amount survived till the revival of interest in the

ninth century, when our earliest extant Greek manuscripts were made." (p. 241)
(1) The following books are frequently referred to by an abbreviated title:
Düring, ABT = I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, (Göteborg, 1957)
Lulofs = H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, ed. & trans: *Nicolaus Damascenus, On the Philosophy of Aristotle* (Leiden, 1965).
2) Too much must not, however, be made of the idea of a separate tradition in each place. For long periods there was close contact between two or more of these centres, and men, and their private libraries, might move from one to another. But it has some value.

32. Jaeger, Werner. 1948. *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    English translation by Richard Robinson of: *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, Berlin: Weidemann, 1923.

33. Keaney, John J. 1963. "Two Notes on the Tradition of Aristotle's Writings." *American Journal of Philology* no. 84:52-63.

    "In recent years, scholars have taken up anew the problem of the knowledge of Aristotle's works, most particularly his school treatises, in the period from Theophrastus to Andronicus, and the question of the sources of the catalogues of Aristotle's writings, especially of that preserved by Diogenes Laërtius (V, 22-7). The names of Paul Moraux and Ingemar Düring have been prominent in this activity.(1) In the present paper, I propose to deal with two of the many points raised by these scholars." p. 52
    (1) P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951); I. Düring, "Notes on the history of the transmission of Aristotle's writings," *Goteborgs Hogskolas Araskrift,* LVI (1950), pp. 35-70.

34. Leyra, Irene Pajón. 2013. "The "Aristotelian Corpus" and the Rhodian Tradition: New Light from Posidonius on the Transmission of Aristotle's Works." *Classical Quarterly* no. 63:723-733.

"According to information provided by Strabo 13, 1, 54 and Plutarch, *Sull*. 26, the texts produced by the Peripatetic school were lost for a period of more than two hundred years from the time of Neleus, the heir of Theophrastus's library, until Sulla's victory in Athens in 86 B.C. Sulla, these sources maintain, recovered the esoteric writings of Aristotle, and this prepared the ground for the work of Andronicus of Rhodes, said to have been the author of the "editio princeps" of the Aristotelian corpus. Although it is true that knowledge about Aristotelian thought and science weakened until the renaissance of Peripatetic studies in the 1st cent. B.C., the tales of the total loss of the corpus until the time of Sulla seem hard to accept. Clear pieces of evidence point at least to the existence of copies of several Aristotelian works preserved in Hellenistic cultural centers. In this context, the fragments of the works of Posidonius of Apamea offer useful information. They demonstrate that the author had access to some treatises during the time when they were supposed to be lost; and show how Posidonius's reading of Aristotle can shed light on the tradition of Peripatetic studies developed in Rhodes and on its role in developing the version of the corpus as we know it today."

35. Lindsay, Hugh. 1997. "Strabo on Apellicon's Library." *Rheinische Museum* no. 140:290-298.

"A remarkable tale, full of fabulous elements, appears in Strabo's *Geography* in the course of his discussion of notable figures from Scepsis (2). It relates to the history of the text of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The passage has been taken to contain an important discussion of the chain of events surrounding the fate of Aristotle’s personal library between the time of Aristotle and Cicero. It certainly purports to deal with this topic, but there are good reasons for believing that it exaggerates the extent to which

Aristotelian texts were unavailable in the interim (3). This has frequently been noticed, but in this paper I shall suggest that Strabo had motives related to his own career for wishing to add to the mystique over the history of Aristotle's text, and for dismissing the value of earlier editions of Aristotle. It may be that Apellicon before him had started the process of making excessive claims over the importance of the documents that passed through his hands." (pp. 290-291)
(2) Strabo 13.1.54 p.608-9. For a summary of the vast literature on this passage see H. B. Gottschalk, *Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs*, Hermes 100 (1972) 335 n. 2, and further in "Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD", ANRW II.36.2, 1079-1174, partially reprinted as "The earliest Aristotelian commentators", in: *Aristotle Transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence*, ed. R. Sorabji (London 1990) 55-81 (henceforth Gottschalk 1990).
(3) As emphasized by A.H. Chroust, The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the Corpus Aristotelicum, C&M 23 (1962) 50-67; D.C. Earl, Prologue form in Ancient Historiography, ANRW I.2, 851.

36. Lord, Carnes. 1986. "On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus." *American Journal of Philology* no. 107:137-161.

"The manner in which the collection of Aristotelian writings now extant was originally constituted remains very much a mystery. The curious and in many respects implausible story of the disappearance and subsequent recovery of the library of Theophrastus is the best known element in this puzzle. But the most detailed evidence concerning the early condition of the Aristotelian corpus is that provided by three lists of books ascribed to Aristotle which have been preserved in ancient biographies of him. These catalogues are the chief source of external evidence touching on both the condition of Aristotle's writings in the period immediately following his death and the alterations they

appear to have undergone in the edition of Aristotelian works prepared by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C. Because of the many problematic features of the catalogues, their evidence has often been ignored or dismissed, or used only in selective and unsystematic fashion.

The extensive studies devoted to the catalogues in recent years by Paul Moraux and Ingemar During have rectified this situation to some degree, and have secured general agreement as to their authority and importance.(1) At the same time, however, the problem of the catalogues, and of the early history of the Aristotelian corpus as a whole, can hardly be said to have been satisfactorily resolved. Disagreements persist over such questions as the identity of the original source of the earliest catalogues and the circumstances and precise nature of Andronicus' editorial activity. Moreover, even when liberal recourse is had to textual emendation, no fully convincing account has yet been given of the exact relationship of the three catalogues to one another, to the edition of Andronicus, and to the corpus as presently constituted.(2) In the state of our knowledge, many uncertainties must remain concerning matters such as the status of book titles and the meaning of the numbering of books of larger treatises. Still, it has to be acknowledged that much information in the lists appears to be transmitted with great fidelity, and under these circumstances it seems legitimate to wonder whether there are not alternative hypotheses concerning the catalogues which remain to be explored.

In what follows, an attempt will be made to establish the plausibility of such a hypothesis and to examine some of its implications with respect to the composition and early history of Aristotle's writings." (pp. 137-138).

(1) Paul Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951); Ingemar During, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957); Düring, art. "Aristoteles," RE Suppl. XI (1968) cols. 184-90.

(2) Consider the negative judgment on Moraux' undertaking expressed by R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (Munich 1972)

160-64.

37. Lynch, John Patrick. 1972. *Aristotle's School. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

See Chapter V. *The Athenian Peripatos and Its Decline Among the Successors of Aristotle and Theophrastus*, in particular pp. 146-154.
"The research presented here does not make great claims for its utility in understanding Greek philosophy as a speculative phe nomenon. Pure philosophers will not find in these pages much even about the educational theory of Aristotle and his successors. My inquiry originates from a concern with what Aristotle and other Greek philosophers actually did as teachers, not what they said should be done. Such a concern is, I believe, both proper and desirable. For Greek philosophy as it developed in the Athenian schools of the fourth century B.C. was more than a general name for various kinds of theories and systems, and that "more" — philosophia as higher education among the Greeks — can be legitimately isolated and subjected to analysis on its own. Much con fusion results from not clearly distinguishing between theory and practice. Histories of ancient education almost always conflate the two with misleading results, and interpretations of Greek phil osophical texts often lapse into concrete formulations such as "Plato's University," "Scholarch of the Stoa," or "chair in the Per ipatos" without considering concrete facts which such language implies.
To those scholars who are interested in ancient educational practice and the external history of the Athenian philosophical schools, the modifications in traditional views which have been suggested above may seem too drastic. Because of the vastness of the area concerned, this may well prove in some measure to be the case. But if these six chapters serve to stimulate some debate in a virtually unexplored field, the purpose of this investigation will be fulfilled." (pp. 7-8)

38. Menn, Stephen. 1995. "The Editors of the *Metaphysics*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:202-208.

39. Natali, Carlo. 2013. *Aristotle: His Life and School*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Translated and edited by D.S. Hutchinson from Italian *Bios theoretikos. La vita di Aristotele e l'organizzazione della sua scuola*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991.

40. Pajón Leyra, Irene. 2013. "The Aristotelian Corpus and the Rhodian Tradition: New Light from Posidonius on the Transmission of Aristotle's Works." *Classical Quarterly* no. 63:723-733.

    "There are clear pieces of evidence (6) that point, if not to a broad circulation of the Corpus' treatises, at least to the existence of copies of several Aristotelian works, preserved in the various culture centres of the Hellenistic period associated with the Peripatos. Though it is most unlikely that the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus were at that time widely known and available, the idea that they were preserved in single copies can hardly be sustained, so that the problem now is not to determine if there was a total loss of the Corpus, but when and where the different treatises were known, and what their relation is to the version of the Corpus that we know today.
    In this context, the preserved fragments of the works of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius of Apamea might offer useful information. The aim of this paper is, then, to examine how they demonstrate that the author had access to some Aristotelian treatises during the time when they were supposed to be lost, and how Posidonius' reading of Aristotle can shed light on the tradition of Peripatetic studies developed in Rhodes, and on its role in developing the final version of the Aristotelian *Corpus* as we know it today." (pp. 724-725)
    (6) Particularly important is the information provided by Philodemus and Simplicius. See Phld. *Cont.: P.Herc. 1005*,

fr. 111 Angeli; W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Philosophen und Literaturgeschichte* (Amsterdam, 1965 = 1874), 174, on the existence of copies of the Aristotelian *Analytics* and *Physics*. See F. Grayeff, *Aristotle and his School. An Inquiry into the History of the Peripatos. With a Commentary on Metaphysics Z, H, Λ and Θ* (London, 1974), 70 n. 2. Simpl. *In Phys*. 923.9 ff., on the letters exchanged between Theophrastus and Eudemus, regarding a mistake of the scribe on the copy of the *Physics* available in Rhodes. See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Zweiter Teil, zweite Abteilung: Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker* (Hildesheim, 1963 = 1921 4th edition = 1878) 149 n. 2; J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship. Vol. 1: from the Sixth Century B. C. to the End of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1921), 85.

41. Plezia, Marian. 1961. "Supplementary Remarks on Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition." *Eos.Commentarii Societatis Philologue Polonorum* no. 51:241-249.

    "Ingemar Düring's excellent book *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957) represents an important step forward in the development of research on Aristotle, in so far it manages to present an almost complete collection of biographical material available to us and relating to the philosopher of Stagira, not only in the form of his proper biographies in Greek, Latin, Syrian and Arabic, but also in the shape of a rich collection of loose references to him (some taken from valuable sources) which can be found scattered in the whole of the ancient and parts of medieval literature. At the end of the book the author makes an attempt to draw some conclusions, of a broadest nature, from the collected texts, which are all very clearly annotated.
    However, like all human works, Düring's valuable book shows some shortcomings and defects, which are unavoidable at such first attempts; we thought it therefore

both necessary and useful to present here a handful of supplementary remarks, based on our research on the same subject, carried out between the years 1943 to 1957, in the belief, that they may prove useful to those interested in Aristotle's biography and how it took shape in the course of centuries. Our remarks are divided, in conformity with the way During handles his material, into three parts: (a) those dealing with full biographies of the philosopher of Stagira; (b) those dealing with loose references to him, contained in sources pertaining to various epochs; and finally (c) certain amendments relating to the question of how the ancient tradition about Aristotle has developed." p. 241

42. Richardson, Nicholas J. 1994. "Aristotle and Hellenistic Scholarship." In *La Philologie Grecque À L'époque Hellénistique Et Romaine. Sept Exposés Suivis De Discussions*, edited by Montanari, Franco, 7-28. Genève: Fondation Hardt.

43. Rist, John M. 1964. "Demetrius the Stylist and Artemon the Compiler." *Phoenix* no. 18:2-8.

    "The appearance of G. M. A. Grube's book (1) on Demetrius the Stylist has revived interest in the date of his work. Grube dates it at about 270 B.C. whereas G. P. Goold holds (2) that it was written in the Augustan Age. Such a discrepancy is disturbing; two hundred and fifty to three hundred years is a wide margin of error. This note therefore is intended to reduce the gap by an investigation of the Artemon who is described by Demetrius (223) as the editor of Aristotle's Letters. It seems that some progress may be possible here, although the matter has been quickly passed over by both Grube (3) and Goold. (4) More in fact can be discovered about the date of Artemon than either of these scholars has indicated. To attain such knowledge, it is necessary to examine the traditional accounts of the contents of the Aristotelian corpus." (p. 2)
    (1) G. M. A. Grube, A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto 1961).

(2) G. P. Goold, "A Greek Professorial Circle at Rome," TAPA 92 (1961) 168-192.
(3) Grube (note 1), who on p. 111 writes that nothing is known of the Artemon who edited Aristotle's letters, mentions on p. 42 the suggestion of H. Koskenniemi, "Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes," Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae B.102 (Helsinki 1956), that the Artemon mentioned by Demetrius may have been a contemporary of Theophrastus.
(4) Goold (note 2) 181.

44. Sharples, Robert W. 2007. "Aristotle's Exoteric and Esoteric Works: Summaries and Commentaries." In *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 Bc - 200 Ad. Vol. Ii*, edited by Sharples, Robert W. and Sorabji, Richard, 505-512. London: Institute of Classical Studies.

45. Shute, Richard. 1888. *On the History of the Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form*.

Reprint: New York, Arno Press, 1976.
Table of Contents: I. The problem 1; II. From Aristotle to the time of Cicero and the Latin Renaissance 19; III. Cicero and the Latin Renaissance 46; IV. From Cicero to Alexander Aphrodisiensis 66; V. Of titles and references 96; VI. Of repetitions and second and third texts, illustrated especially from the *Physics, Metaphysics,* and *De anima* 117, VII. Of the *Nichomachean ethics* 141; VIII. The *Politics* and evidence from the avoidance of hiatus 164; General summary 176; Index of references 183.
"General Summary.
I have in this essay attempted to prove, first, that of the great bulk of the Aristotelian works as we now have them, there was no kind of publication during the lifetime of the master, nor probably for a considerable period after his death. Secondly, that as to this portion of the Aristotelian whole, we cannot assert with certainty that we have ever got

throughout a treatise in the exact words of Aristotle, though we may be pretty clear that we have a fair representation of his thought. The unity of style observable may belong quite as well to the school and the method as to the individual. We have certainly got a most precious Aristotelian literature ; we have not certainly got Aristotle in the strongest and most literal sense. Thirdly, I have tried to prove that the works which are preserved to us come chiefly, if not entirely, from the tradition of Andronicus, and stand in no very definite relation to the list of Diogenes, and consequently we have a very considerable proportion, and not a merely insignificant fraction of the reputed works of Aristotle known to Latin antiquity. Fourthly, I have laid down that the majority of the titles, and probably all the definite references, are post-Aristotelian, and that therefore no safe argument can be drawn from the latter as to the authenticity or original order of the Aristotelian works, though other very valuable inferences as to the subsequent history of these works result from their careful consideration. Fifthly, I have attempted to trace the double texts and repeated passages each to several original sources, and not to a single point of origin. I have applied the doctrines arrived at to the consideration of those Aristotelian treatises which have given rise to most controversy, and seem to myself to have found some solutions at least, through the method I have followed. Incidentally I have been led to investigate the question of another class of works which bear Aristotle's name, of which we can say with certainty that the portions which we have of them are precisely as the final author wrote them; but cannot with equal certainty assert that that author was Aristotle. We can safely assume, however, that these works, and works like these, were those best known to our earliest authorities on the subject, Cicero and his predecessors, and that on them all the praise of Aristotle's style is founded.

If there be any value in these conclusions, the practical lesson to be drawn from them will be, that the present duty of scholarship is to determine as far as possible the course of the Aristotelian argument, by bracketing superfluous and

repeated passages. In some cases there will be internal or external evidence for bracketing the one of two passages rather than the other. In other cases, and I believe they will be the majority, there will be no trustworthy evidence which shall lead us to reject one of such passages more than the other. We shall not follow such assumptions as that of Torstrik in the *De Anima*, that the former of two like passages is always the preferable; nor shall we rashly assume that the one is more strictly Aristotelian than the other. When we have pointed out such reduplications to the student we shall leave him to choose which of them he prefers, showing him only that both cannot be wanted in the text. If we bracket at all, it will not be that we assert the one passage rather than the other to be spurious (except in those rare cases where we have definite proof). It will merely be in order that he may see what is the general line and connection of the argument. We shall be cautious in many cases in assuming even reduplication ; for an author or lecturer may deliberately repeat himself. But this caution will not be necessary in the case of repeated and almost identical passages which follow immediately after each other.

In a word, we shall try to get as near as we can to the earliest form of the teachings of the master, but shall not vainly and pedantically hope to restore his actual words; nor shall we rashly reject this or that passage or phrase as being clearly un-Aristotelian, since we shall know well that the Aristotle we have can in no case be freed from the suspicion (or rather almost certainty) of filtration through other minds, and expression through other voices. Criticism of Aristotle must in truth always be of thought rather than of phrase, of sentence rather than of word." (pp. 176-177).

46. Sollenberger, Michael George. 1992. "The Lives of the Peripatetics: An Analysis of the Contents and Structure of Diogenes Laërtius' *Vitae Philosophorum* Book 5." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband:*

Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.]), edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 3793-3879. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

On the Catalogue of Aristotles' writings see § 2. Writings pp. 3849-3855.

"Accounts of the lives of six early Peripatetic philosophers are contained in the fifth book of Diogenes Laërtius' 'Vitae philosophorum': the lives of the first four leaders of the sect -- Aristotle, Theophrastus, Strato, and Lyco -- and those of two outstanding members -- Demetrius of Phalerum and Heraclides of Pontus. Our knowledge of the history of two rival schools, the Academy and the Stoa, is aided not only by the lives of several members of these two schools in Books Four and Seven of Diogenes' work, but also by accounts in the `Index Academicorum' and the 'Index Stoicorum' which have been preserved for us among the several papyri from Herculaneum.(1) But for the Peripatos there is no such second source of information. There are, to be sure, numerous bits and pieces of evidence which concern the school and its members scattered throughout ancient and medieval literature, many of which have been made readily accessible by F. Wehrli in his well-known series 'Die Schule des Aristoteles'.(2) Moreover, in addition to Diogenes' version, several other lives of Aristotle have come down to us and have been collected and analyzed in detail by I. Düring in his 'Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition'.(3) But for the lives and careers of other Peripatetics, Diogenes' accounts are the only ones available to us.

All of the many aspects of these six lives cannot be discussed here with comprehensive thoroughness. Rather, relying on the studies and findings of past scholars, sometimes heavily, I shall offer a compilation of those findings in a systematic manner. Although oversimplification is inevitable in view of the many complex problems encountered in these lives, consideration will be given to general matters of content, structure, organization, and arrangement of material in Book Five as a whole, to the different categories of information in the individual lives, and to the two most

striking features of this book which set it apart from other books: the wills of the first four scholarchs and the extensive catalogues of writings included by Diogenes for five of the six philosophers." pp. 3793-3794
(1) P. Herc. 1021 (and 164) and 1018 respectively, edited by S. Mekler, *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis* (Berlin, 1902), which should be read in conjunction with W. Crõnert, *Die Ueberlieferung des Index Academicorum*, Hermes 38 (1903) p. 357-405, and A. Traversa, *Index Stoicorum Herculanensis*. Istituto di filologia classica 1 (Genoa, 1952).
(2) F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentare*, 2nd ed. vol. 1 - 2 (Basel, 1967), vol. 3 --10 (Basel, 1969), suppl. vol. I (Basel, 1974), and suppl. vol. 2 (Basel, 1978). The fragments of Theophrastus, not included by Wehrli are being prepared by a team of scholars headed by W. Fortenbaugh in a series of volumes which is scheduled to appear soon. [Theophrastus of Eresus. *Sources for his life, writings, thought and influence*. Edited by Fortenbaugh William W. et al. Leiden: Brill 1992, two volumes].
(3) Ingemar Düring Ingemar. Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensis 5 (Göteborg, 1957).

47. Tanner, R.Godfrey. 2009. "Aristotle's Works: The Possible Origins of the Alexandria Collection." In *The Library of Alexandria. Centre of Learning in the Ancient World*, edited by MacLeod, Roy, 79-91. London: I. B. Tauris.

    "Some of the most puzzling issues surrounding the Alexandria Library involve the source and content of the Library's holdings of Aristotle's works. The history of these works bears a close and intriguing relationship to the history of the library. The argument of this paper is that there are two sources for the transmission of Aristotle's work from the ancient to modern world. The first - what we may call the traditional view - holds that Aristotle's corpus was inherited entirely by Theophrastus, and subsequently

buried, sold, and edited in Rome. Thence, in Roman times, copies made their way to the library. The second, the more controversial, but possibly more interesting view, argues that there is a,collection of Aristotle's works which was derived from the works prepared at Mieza for the education of Alexander; and that these were either given by Alexander to Alexandria, or were subsequently stolen for the library by Ptolemy Soter.
These two, parallel accounts, present us with Aristotle's thought at two different stages in its chronological development. One phase we can describe as the 'educational stage', dealing with works intended for the education of Alexander, and embracing Aristotle's four so-called `non-scientific' works on poetry, ethics, politics and rhetoric; the other can be described in terms of Aristotle's larger philosophical corpus." p. 79

48. Tarán, Leonardo. 1981. "Aristotelianism in the First Century B.C." *Gnomon* no. 53:721-750.

    Review-article of Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*. Vol. I: *Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh.v. Chr.* (1973).
    Reprinted in: L. Tarán, *Collected papers (1962-1999),* Leiden: Brill, 2001 pp. 479-524.
    On the Aristotelian Corpus see in particular pp. 481-511.

49. Tarán, Leonardo, and Gutas, Dimitri, eds. 2012. *Aristotle Poetics. Editio Maior of the Greek Text with Historical Introductions and Philological Commentaries*. Leiden: Brill.

    See the *Introduction* by Leonard Tarán, Chapter One, *History of the Text of the Poetics*: 1. *The Poetics and Its Place among Aristotle's Works. The Availability of Aristotle's Scholarly Treatises during His Lifetime and those of Theophrastus and Eudemus*, pp. 11-25; 2. *From the Deaths of Theophrastus and Eudemus until the End of the*

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Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: First Part

Diogenes Laërtius Lives V, 22-27

Second Part: Hesychius and Ptolemy al-Garib

THE VITAE ARISTOTELIS AND THE ANCIENT CATALOGUES OF ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

"The following pages are an attempt to give a brief account or compressed overview of what may be called the 'traditional' *Vitae Aristotelis*, namely, the lost *Vita* authored by the Peripatetic Hermippus of Smyrna, and the lost *Vita* composed by the Neo-Platonist Ptolemy, whom the Arabic biographers call Ptolemy-el-Garib. These two *Vitae*, which have been compiled in antiquity, survive in one form or another only through their respective 'derivatives' or epitomes of which we still possess a fair number. The more important biographies of Aristotle, (6) which have been handed down to us from antiquity, are:
Diogenes Laërtius, *The Lives And Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* V. 1-35; (7)
the *Vita Aristotelis Hesychii*; (8)
the *Pseudo-Hesychius*; (9)
the *Vita Aristotelis Marciana*; (10)
the *Vita Aristotelis Vulgata*; (11)

the *Vita Lascaris*; (12)
the *Vita Aristotelis Latina*; (13)
the *Vita Aristotelis Syriaca I* (anonymous); (14)
the *Vita Aristotelis Syriaca II* (anonymous); (15)
the *Vita Aristotelis Arabica I* (by An-Nadim); (16)
the *Vita Aristotelis Arabica II* (by Al-Mubashir or Mubassir); (17)
the *Vita Aristotelis Arabica III* (by Al-Qifti); (18)
and the *Vita Aristotelis Arabica IV* (by Usaibi'a). (19)
All these *Vitae* in some ways are related to, or are more or less accurate abridgments of, either the *Vita Aristotelis* of Hermippus or the *Vita Aristotelis* of Ptolemy-el-Garib. An attempt shall be made here to reconstruct the essential content or outline of these two basic *Vitae* with the help of their surviving 'derivatives' or epitomes. Such an undertaking, however, is a purely tentative effort based on much conjecture and many hypotheses.
According to C. A. Brandis, E. Zeller, F. Susemihl, E. Heitz, W. Christ, F. Littich, W. Jaeger, W. D. Ross, L. Robin, I. Düring and others,(20) Hermippus -- the Peripatetic, the disciple of Callimachus and the justly famed librarian at Alexandria (towards the end of the third century B.C.) -- must be considered the main, though by no means the sole, source for the biographical notes found in Diogenes Laërtius. It has been claimed by some scholars that as a librarian at the Alexandrian Museum this Hermippus had at his disposal ample biographical materials about Aristotle. In the year 306 B.C., when all 'alien' or 'subversive' philosophers were threatened with banishment from Athens by the decree of Demetrius Poliorcetes,(21) Ptolemy Soter, the King of Egypt, invited Theophrastus to come to Egypt and also to transfer the Peripatetic School together with its library to Alexandria. Although Theophrastus declined this invitation, two of his disciples or colleagues in the Peripatus, Straton of Lampsacus and Demetrius of Phaleron, for a short period of time actually went to Egypt.(22) Undoubtedly, these two men brought to Alexandria some of the writings of the Peripatetics, including probably some of Aristotle's compositions or, at least, notes and excerpts from his works. It is also known that at the time of his death (288-87 or 287-86 B.C.) Theophrastus bequeathed the library of the Peripatus, including the writings of Aristotle, to Neleus of Scepsis.(23) Neleus (or his heirs) subsequently might

have sold parts of this library or 'collection' to Ptolemy Philadelphus, the successor of Ptolemy Soter.(24)
All this would indicate that in the course of the third century B.C., Alexandria had become one of the great centers of Aristotelian and Peripatetic scholarship as well as the repository for many Aristotelian and Peripatetic works. Such a situation, in turn, enabled Hermippus to draw much reliable information concerning the life and works of Aristotle from the materials which had accumulated in Alexandria. Moreover, Hermippus himself was considered a painstakingly objective and conscientious scholar whose statements could unquestionably be taken at face value.
This highly idealized picture, which, among other matters, is based on the entirely unsupported presumption that many of Aristotle's writings had reached Alexandria and that Hermippus was a dispassionate as well as objective reporter, was shattered by I. Düring. On the strength of his detailed and searching studies, Düring, in opposition to many scholars, reached the well-founded conclusion that Hermippus' biographical reports were uncritical accounts, heavily slanted in favor of Aristotle.(25) In keeping with the general literary tendencies of the time (which were concerned primarily with entertaining and amusing one's readers), Hermippus, according to Düring, concocted a strange *mélange* of fact and fiction, history and anecdote, truth and gossip, praise and slander. To be sure, Hermippus' biography contains many items which are correct, or almost correct. In accord with a widespread Hellenistic trend, however, it is also replete with many fanciful stories devoid of all foundations in fact. Moreover, it is by no means certain that any of the intramural, 'esoteric' or doctrinal late writings of Aristotle, provided they were actually and in toto authored by the Stagirite, ever reached Alexandria during the fourth and third centuries B.C., although it will have to be admitted that some of his 'exoteric' early compositions were known there. According to tradition, after the death of Theophrastus (c. 286 B.C.) the 'esoteric' works were carried to Scepsis by Neleus of Scepsis, where they were gradually lost. Düring believes that Hermippus' most important contribution (and, perhaps, least credible addition) to the biographical tradition concerning Aristotle was his determined effort to

present Aristotle as the true and sole founder of the Peripatetic school. Among the many and, in all likelihood, fanciful stories he invented, probably the most conspicuous was the legend, subsequently widely accepted (and widely exploited), that Aristotle seceded from the Academy and from Plato's basic teachings while Plato was still alive. (...)
When attempting to recast some of the main features of Hermippus' *Vita Aristotelis*, we must always bear in mind, however, that with the exception of the very complex *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laërtius and some parts of the *Vita Hesychii*, all surviving *Vitae Aristotelis*, in the main, go back to Ptolemy (-el-Garib) rather than to Hermippus. It is more than likely, however, that Ptolemy (or his sources) to some extent is also influenced by Hermippus' *Vita*, although the degree of this influence can no longer be determined. Hence, it would appear that any attempt to reconstruct the basic contents of Hermippus' *Vita Aristotelis* will have to rely almost exclusively on Diogenes Laërtius . Düring has suggested a tentative and conjectural sketch of the main features that were characteristic of the likely contents of Hermippus' original biography of Aristotle.(28) Implementing Düring's suggestions, it may be assumed, as some of the other *Vitae* of Diogenes Laërtius indicate, that ancient biographies of philosophers seem to have followed a general pattern. They recite, (i) the name of the philosopher; (ii) the name of his father, but rarely that of his mother; (iii) sometimes the 'social position' and occupation of the father; (iv) the place of birth of the philosopher; (v) the time of his birth; (vi) sometimes the more remote ancestry of the father and occasionally that of the mother; (vii) the philosopher's schooling and his teacher or teachers; (viii) his 'intellectual qualities' ; (ix) his physical appearance and physical peculiarities; (x) his travels; (xi) his 'social connections'; (xii) sometimes his 'family status'; (xiii) his public or political activities; (xiv) his scholarly activities and achievements; (xv) bits of general information; (xvi) some particular events in his life; (xvii) some particular honors bestowed upon him or some unusual misfortunes that befell him; (xviii) sometimes his last will and testament or his last sayings; (xix) his death; (xx) a list of the works he wrote; (xxi) his most distinguished pupils; and (xxii) a summary of his philosophic teachings. Naturally, not every

ancient biography follows this pattern, mentions all the fact we have indicated or observes the order suggested above."

Notes

(6) Except for the purpose of shedding some additional light on the several *Vitae Aristotelis*, no attention will be paid here to occasional biographical references to Aristotle by a host of ancient authors, historians, grammarians, critics and commentators. For an exhaustive treatment of our subject, see also I. Düring *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. 63, no. 2 (Goteborg, 1957), passim [this work contains a critical edition of all the *Vitae Aristotelis*. *Added by R. Corazzon*]; O. Gigon, 'Interpretationen zu den Antiken Aristotelesviten,' *Museum Helveticum*, vol. 15 (1958), pp. 147-93. Also, no mention is made here of the 'abridgment' or 'chronology' found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *I Epistola ad Ammaeum* 3-5. This epitome, it will be noted, is based on several *Vitae Aristotelis* that were in circulation during the latter part of the first century B.C. See A.-H. Chroust, 'The Vita Aristotelis of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I Epistola ad Ammaeum 5)' *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, vol. 13 (1965), pp. 369-77, and Chapter II.

(7) See O. Gigon (see note 6); I. Düring, *cit*., pp. 29-56; P. Moraux, 'La composition de la "Vie d'Aristote" chez Diogène Laerce,' *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. 68 (1955), pp. 124-63; A.-H. Chroust, 'A Brief Analysis of the Vita Aristotelis of Diogenes Laërtius (DL V. I-16)'; *Antiquité Classique*, vol. 34, fasc. I (1965), pp. 97-129, and Chapter III.

(8) This *Vita*, which contains an important 'list of Aristotle's writings,' is also known as the *Vita Menagiana* or *Vita Menagii*. It is reprinted in V. Rose, *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886), pp. 9-18; I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 82-9.

(9) This relatively unimportant *Vita* is a brief compilation from Diogenes Laërtius and from the *Vita Hesychii*. See I Düring (see note 6), pp. 92-3.

(10) This important *Vita* was first edited by L. Robbe, *Vita Aristotelis ex Codice Marciano Graece* (Leiden, 1861); V. Rose (see note 8), pp. 426-36. See also A. Busse, 'Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Aristoteles,' *Hermes*, vol. 28 (1893), pp. 252-73; I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 96-106; O. Gigon, *Vita Aristotelis Marciana: Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen and Übungen*, Heft no. 81 (Berlin, 1962). The *Vita Marciana*, in the main, is dependent on an abridgment of Ptolemy's lost *Vita Aristotelis*.
(11) This *Vita*, which is also called *Vita Pseudo-Ammoniana* or *Pseudo-Elias*, is probably an abridgment of Ptolemy's *Vita Aristotelis* or is based on such an abridgment. It contains some additions which can also be found in an anonymous commentary to Porphyry's *Isagoge*. See A. Busse, *Die Neuplatonischen Ausleger der Isagoge des Porphyrios* (Berlin, 1892), passim; V. Rose (see note 8), pp. 437-41; I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 131-6.
(12) This *Vita* is an unimportant abridgment of the *Vita Marciana*. See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 140-1; A. Továr, 'Para la formation de la Vita Marciana de Aristoteles,' *Emerita*, vol. 11 (1943), pp. 180-200; V. Labate, 'Per la biografia di C. Lascaris,' *Archivo Storico Siciliano* (1901), pp. 222-40; L. Alfonsi, 'Su una Vita di Aristotele scritta da C. Lascaris,' *Giornale di Metafisica*, vol. 4 (1949), pp. 381 ff.
(13) This *Vita*, which can be found in V. Rose (see note 8), pp. 442-50, is a rather 'liberal' thirteenth-century Latin translation of a Greek epitome of Ptolemy's *Vita* or of the *Vita Marciana* (which likewise is based on such an epitome), with some minor additions from the *Vita Vulgata* (?). See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 142-63.
(14) This brief *Vita*, which might be called a Syriac version of the Greek *Vita Vulgata* (see note 11), ultimately goes back to Ptolemy's *Vita* (or to an abridgment of this *Vita*), which probably was brought to Nisibis when Emperor Zeno closed down the Neo-Platonic school in Edessa. It was edited and translated by A. Baumstark, *Syrisch-Arabische Biographien des Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1900), appendix to p. 130, and *ibid*., p. 38. See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 185-6.
(15) This very short and relatively unimportant *Vita*, which is likewise based on Ptolemy's *Vita*, was translated by A. Baumstark (see note 14), p. 116. See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 187-8.

(16) This *Vita*, which follows the *Vita* of Ptolemy, was translated by A. Baumstark (see note 14), pp. 39 ff. See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 193-5.
(17) This *Vita*, which shows the influence of Ptolemy's *Vita*, the *Vita Syriaca I* and *II*, and of the *Vita Arabica I*, was translated by A. Baumstark (see note 14), pp. 39-51 and 120-4; and by J. Lippert, *Studien auf dem Gebiete der Griechisch-Arabischen Übersetzungsliteratur* (Braunschweig, 1894), pp. 4-19. See I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 197-201.
(18) This *Vita*, which is a sort of 'article' on Aristotle, to a large extent is based on the *Vita* of Ptolemy as excerpted by several Arabic authors. See J. Lippert, *Ibn al-Qifti's Tarih-al-Hukama* (Leipzig, 1903); M. Steinschneider, *Al-Farabi: Des Arabischen Philosophen Leben and Schriften* (St Petersburg, 1869), pp. 187-91; I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 211-12.
(19) This *Vita*, which likewise follows Ptolemy's *Vita*, contains a 'catalogue' of Aristotle's writings which ultimately goes back to Ptolemy-el-Garib. See P. Moraux, *Les Listes Anciennes des d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951), *passim*; I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 211-31. The important and influential Greek *Vita Aristotelis* of Ptolemy, which underlies the Syriac and Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis* (and the *Vita Marciana*, the *Vita Vulgata* and the *Vita Latina*), has come down to us only in the garbled, mutilated and abridged form of these *Vitae*. See below. A discussion of the *Vitae* mentioned in notes 9-19 can also be found in I. Düring (see note 6), passim; the *Vitae* mentioned in notes 14-19 are analysed in A.-H. Chroust, 'A brief summary of the Syriac and Arabic Vitae Aristotelis,' *Acta Orientalia*, vol. 29, nos 1-2 (1965), pp. 23-47, and Chapter IV.
(20) These scholars were opposed by V. Rose, J. Bernays, H. Diels, A. Gercke and others, who insisted that the primary source of information used by Diogenes Laërtius was Adronicus of Rhodes, the alleged 'restorer' of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* around the middle of the first century B.C. This thesis, which sees in Andronicus the original source of Diogenes Laërtius, by now has been mostly abandoned.
(21) See Demochares' *Oration Against the Philosophers* in support of Sophocles' motion to have all 'subversive' philosophers expelled from Athens (in 306 B.C.). D.L. V. 38; Athenaeus,

Deipnosophistae XIII. 610EF, and XI. 509B; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vita Decem Oratorum* (*Moralia* 850B ff.); Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XV. 2. 6; Pollux IX. 42. Demochares denounced Aristotle in particular (whom he charged with having committed many acts detrimental to Athenian political interests) as well as the philosophers in general.
(22) Straton of Lampsacus probably went to Egypt because he was an 'undesirable alien' in Athens as well as a Peripatetic. Demetrius of Phaleron left because, aside from his association with the Peripatus, he was in political difficulties. See note 21.
(23) D.L. V. 52. See also A.-H. Chroust, 'The miraculous disappearance and recovery of the Corpus Aristotelicum,' *Classica et Mediaevalia*, vol. 23, fasc. 1-2 (1962), pp. 50-67.
(24) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* L 3AB. See also I. Düring, *Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings* (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. 56, Goteborg, 1950), pp. 59-60.
(25) I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 464-7. See also M. Plezia, 'De Hermippi Vita Aristotelis,' *Charisteria Th. Sinko Quinquaginta abhinc Annos Amplissimis in Philosoph. Honor. Ornato ab Amicis Collegis Discipulis Oblata* (Warsaw, 1951), pp. 271-67; P. Moraux (see note 19), pp. 243-5.
(28) I. Düring (see note 6), pp. 465-7.

From: Anton-Hermann Chroust, *Aristotle. New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works. Vol. I. Some Novel Interpretations of the Man and His Life*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 1-4.

The following Vitae contain catalogues of the writings of Aristotle:

a) Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* - Book V. *The Peripatetics* 22-27 (III century);
b) The anonymous *Vita Menagiana* or *Vita Hesychii*, attributed to Hesychius of Miletus (V century);
c) The catalogue attributed to Ptolemy el-Garib, surviving in two Arabic version by Ibn al-Qifti (ca. 1172-1248) and Ibn Abi Usaibi'a (1203-1270) (IV century?).

The Works of the Peripatetics on Philology, Literary History and Biography until the Middle of the Third Century B.C.

"Many of Aristotle's pupils and their own pupils shared his interest in philology and literary history. In some of them these interests were even more pronounced than they were in Aristotle himself. This pertains to the following scholars of the last third of the fourth and the first third of the third century BC.:
1) Herakleides Pontikos, that respected pupil of Plato, had also heard Aristotle in the Academy but he had returned to his hometown Herakleia on the Pontos when Aristotle reappeared in Athens (335 B.C.). Although he may be counted among Aristotle's pupils, he does not belong to the Peripatetics, but is generally dealt with together with them. His works, which cannot be dated, belong however more to the pre- and exo-peripatetic researches in fields that were also investigated by the Peripatetics.
2) Theophrastos of Eresos on Lesbos, Aristotle's versatile successor, who was, however, more interested in other disciplines. We have already made his acquaintance as a doxographer of natural philosophy.
3) Phainias of Eresos, a fellow countryman of Theophrastos and of about the same age as he, who had heard Aristotle when he taught in Mytilene on Lesbos (345-343 RC.) and remained there.
4) Aristoxenos of Tarentum, nicknamed "the musician", a rival of Theophrastos, who had hoped to become Aristotle's successor.

Even today he is highly regarded as a theoretician of music, and we met him already as a doxographcr of musicology.
5) Dikaiarchos of Messene (Messina).
6) Chamaileon of Herakleia on the Pontos, a somewhat younger fellow oountryman of Herakleides, who apparently returned to his home town after studying in the Peripatos.
7) Demetrius of Phaleron, a pupil of Theophrastos, who switched from science to politics, ruled Athens under Macedonian sovereignty from 317 till 307, had to flee, and lived since 297 in Alexandria at the court of Ptolemaios I.
8) Praxiphanes of Mytilene on Lesbos, also a pupil of Theophrastos. He taught on Rhodos. Eudemos, a pupil of Aristotle who hailed from the island, and had worked meritoriously on mathematical and astronomical doxography, taught also there during the last period of his life. It is said that Praxiphanes, purportedly the teacher of Kallimachos, was the first to be named a grammarian in the later A1exandrian sense. (181)
9) Hieronymos of Rhodos, probably a pupil of Praxiphanes.(182) The relevant writings of these scholars are lost, but we know the titles of many of their works, and we also know a little more about some of them because they were used by later authors. Thus, it is possible to indicate at least approximately which subjects were dealt with by the pupils of Aristotle and by their own pupils. It is much more difficult to say what they did not deal with, because so little has come down to us."

Notes

(181) See note 23 above [note 23: Alfred Hilgard (ed.) *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam* Leipzig, 1901. (*Grammatici Graeci* I,3) pp. 164, 26-28 and 488, 12-14; Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: frm the beginning to the end of the Hellenistic age*, Oxford, 1968, p. 158.] ; see also Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar* (1967) Heft 9, fragment 8010 and 16-17, with commentary.

(182) On the cited scholars and their works see the relevant fascicles (Hefte) of Wehrli's collection *cit*. (2. Auf. 1967-69), also

his summary in Heft 10, pp. 95-128. Wehrli excluded Theophrastos, which is understandable because what has been preserved of his works would have been beyond the scope of the collection. Only five of the Peripatetics of the 4th and 3rd century B.C. dealt with by Wehrli did not pursue studies in the history of literature: Eudemos (except for the doxography), Klearchos, Straton, Lykon, and Ariston. It is remarkable that except for Demetrios, who had to leave the city, Herakleides, Phainias, Chamaileon, Praxiphanes, and Hieronymos did not live in Athens for the better part of their lives, but this fact is not quite clear. In addition to the Peripatetics dealt with by Wehrli there were of course at that time also others who were active in literature, e.g. the "Homer scholar" Megakleides named by Tatianos (see above, note 23) and Menon, the founder of medical doxography.

From: Rudolf Blum, *Kallimachos. The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, pp. 47-48.

THE LIBRARY OF ARISTOTLE

We have four *testimonia* on the destiny of the Library of Aristotle (that included his own works) after his death:

1. Strabo, *Geographia*, XIII, 1, 54-55;
2. Plutarch, *Sulla*, XXVI, 468 A-B;
3. Athenaneus, *Deipnosophistae*, I, 3A-B;
4. Athenaneus, *Deipnosophistae*, V, 214D - 215A;

I give the texts in an Appendix to this page.

"The library of Aristotle which is mentioned by several ancient authors must have been a very plentiful collection of Greek literature, and it was also at the disposal of his pupils. The works of Aristotle and his pupils, especially those mentioned above, show a comprehensive knowledge of literature and could not have

been written at all without such a library. Public libraries, where scholars could study works of interest to them or where they could even borrow them, did not exist at that time, neither in Athens nor anywhere else. But Aristotle had the necessary means to acquire the books which he needed from booksellers or other people. Thus, after the death of Speusippos, Plato's successor, he bought his books (library?) (there were only a few of them) for the sum of three talents (18,000 drachmas).(210) The geographer Strabo (d. AD. 20) claims in a passage that Aristotle had been the first man, so far as known, to collect books; that, to be sure, is an exaggeration. because Euripides (485-406 B.C), for example, already had a library. But if that statement is limited to the systematic organization of a research library, then it is correct.

The nickname *anagnostis* (reader) which Aristotle acquired in Plato's Academy, seems to indicate that he had a library already at that time. He was also a new type of philosopher in that he, unlike those of an earlier period and quite like those of a modern scholar, perused the literature and made excerpts.(211) During this lifetime, this became the custom of all scholars, largely thanks to his own example, but in his youth, immediately before this change, it still made him the butt of jokes on the part of his school mates who were listeners rather than readers. Euripides, a reader and collector of books, had also been ridiculed by his contemporaries, especially by Aristophanes.(212) Plato himself declared in the Phaedrus that written notes served not for the communication of knowledge but only as memory aids for the knowledgeable.(213) Basically, Aristotle shared this opinion. During his time in the Academy he, like his teacher, published works (mostly in the form of dialogs) that were intended for a larger public, but as head of a school he acted through talks, lectures and didactic writings which grew out of his lectures and were intended only for the school itself.(214) Nevertheless, he thought it indispensable to complement the oral transmission of knowledge by the study of literature. His method demanded to begin every inquiry with the collection of material. This included also the perusal and evaluation of the relevant Iiterature.(215) The fate of Aristotle's library is a very remarkable chapter of ancient library history, and it is also important for our present

investigation. His collection contained three parts: 1. the copies of works by other authors which he had bought, that is, his library proper; 2. the personal copies of his own works, written by himself or by others, both those that were intended for a larger public, the more polished 'exoteric' works, and those that were aimed only at his pupils, the "acroamatic" works which resulted from his lecture notes (literally: only intended to be heard); 3. his written legacy (in the archival sense), consisting of notes (*hypomnemata*) of all kinds (annotations, excerpts, lecture notes and the Iike),(216) letters and personal papers. Well-known scholars of Antiquity as well as modem researchers identified, however, Aristotle's works which formed part of his library with that library itself, as if it had contained only his works and his literary legacy. The term *ta Aristotelus biblia* (Aristotle's books) which occurs in addition to *hē Aristotelus bibliothēkē* (Aristotle's library), is admittedly ambiguous: it means both the books acquired by Aristotle and those written by him. Even those researchers who distinguished between these kinds of books did generally not consider that the books written by Aristotle himself constituted, despite their large number, only a very small part of his library; strictly speaking, they were even no more than an annex to that collection of books which surpassed all earlier ones in scope and importance. This is so because researchers devoted to Aristotle tried to elucidate the fate of the philosopher's library with regard to the history of transmission of his works. Gottschalk and Moraux treated the problem also from that point of view.(217) .217 Since I cannot agree with them on some important points, I must here deal with the fate of Aristotle's library, limiting myself to questions that are relevant for my investigations."

Notes

(210) Gellius III 17, 3 and Diogenes Laertios IV 5. According to Carl Wendel "Das griechisch-römische Altertum." Erganzt von Willi Göber. (In: *Handbuch der Bibliothekwissenschaft*, 2. Auf. 3. Bd. *Gechichte der Bibliotheken*, Wiesbaden, 1955. pp. 51-145.) p. 60, note 3, Aristotle bought only the writings of Speusippos, according to Eckart Mensching *Favorin von Arelate. Der erste*

Teil der Fragmente. Berlin, 1963 p. 75, he bought all books that had been in his possession.
(211) Ingemar Düring *Aristoteles. DarStellung und Interpretation seine Denken*, Heideiberg, 1966, p. 607, note 125.
(212) Georg Rohde "Über das Lesen im Altertum." (In: *Ansprachen und Reden zur Feier der Uebergabe der Spende der Ford Foundation* Berlin, 1951, pp. 16-28) Also in his *Studien un Interpretationen zur Antiken Literatur, Religion und Geschichte* p. 20; Wendel-Göber (1955) p. 56.
(213) Plato, *Phaedrus* 274 C-277 A, especially the myth of Theuth. Plato argues that only knowledge taught orally by the teacher reaches exclusively those for whom it is intended, and that it can be further explained, if necessary, when pupils ask questions."
(214) Karl Oskar Brink "Peripatos." *RE Suppl.* VII (1940): 899-949, column 907 f.
(215) Similarly Wendel-Göber (1955) p. 59 f.
(216) On these *hypomnēmata* see Paul Moraux *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1951 pp. 153-166; HOmer (1952) pp. 216-221.
(217) Hans B. Gottschalk "Notes on the wills of the Peripatetic scbolars." *Hermes* 100 (1972): 314-342, pp. 335-342; Paul Moraux *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen: Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*. Berlin, 1973, pp. 3-31 with many references to works by earlier scholars, among which I mention only Brink (1940), especially column 939 f., Otto Regenbogen "Theophrastos." *RE Suppl. VII* (1940): 1354-1562, column 1375-77, and Düring (1966) pp. 38-43 and "Aristoteles." *RE Suppl. XI* (1968): 159-336, and (1968) column 184-200.

From: Rudolf Blum, *Kallimachos. The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, pp. 52-53.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE BY DIOGENES LAERTIUS (Vitae, Book V)

"The Catalogue of Aristotle's writings has been thoroughly examined and discussed by P. Moraux, *Listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951. I refer to his bibliography and his copious and careful references to the earlier literature. I have refuted his thesis concerning the origin of the catalogue in my paper "Ariston or Hermippus?", in: *Classica et mediaevalia* 17, 1956, pp. 11-21, but this hypothesis is a rather unimportant detail in his valuable book. His main contribution is the interpretation and discussion of the individual titles. I have limited myself to very brief notes, appended to each individual title in the testimonia under the text; for further information I refer to Moraux.

As I have said in my paper, mentioned above (which I am now summarizing), our evidence favours the traditional opinion that the catalogue is a list of manuscripts of Aristotle's works in the possession of the Alexandrian library. To be more precise, I would say that it is an inventory of the manuscripts acquired fairly soon after the library was established. Apart from the *History of Animals* and the *Anatomai*, the important biologic works and the *Meteorology* are missing, but these works are expressly mentioned and quoted by third century writers; it is inconceivable that the Alexandrian library should not have possessed copies of these works. Their absence from our catalogue is best explained, if we assume that it is an old inventory made before the collection was complete. The disposition of the inventory is this:

1) Nos. 1-19. The works most widely known by the general public in Hellenistic times.

2) Nos. 20-24. Here we recognize Aristotle's synopses of Plato's dialogues and oral teaching, later quoted under the collective title

ta Platoniká. We do not know anything certain about 23-24; they might be doxographic hypomnemata of the kind mentioned by Aristotle *Top*. I 14, 105 b 12.
3) Nos. 25-73. Logical and dialectical writings. Some of the titles are known to us as titles of separate parts of the pragmaties, other titles seem to be entirely out of place. In many instances Moraux's interpretations of individual titles are convincing. More than any other part of the catalogue, this section gives the impression of being an inventory of manuscripts in the possession of a library. It is likely that Nos. 42, 43 and 62 were different manuscripts of the same work, and the same can be said about Nos. 48, 56 and 57. (...)
4) Nos. 74-75. Political writings, very meagre indeed. We should have expected to find the ethical treatises here (it is almost certain that Epicurus knew and used the *Nicomachean Ethics*), and the omission is difficult to explain. Nos. 78 - 79. Works on rhetoric and on style. Nos. 90-110 (109 - 110 may be late interpolations). Works pertaining to natural philosophy and biology. Nos. 111 - 116. Mathematical works, including optics and musical theory. In this section we can see that the author has attempted to arrange the books according to their subject-matter.
5) Nos. 117-127 (128). *Aporemata* and *Problemata*. It is possible that 128 is a collective title referring to the following section.
6) Nos. 129-144. Collectanea. Here Nos. 141 -142 are certainly misplaced, probably interpolated in the course of transmission.
7) Letters and poetry.

I can find no philosophy behind this arrangement, no idea that Aristotle's writings should be arranged according to some principle inherent in his philosophy; it is purely matter-of-fact. Any librarian endowed with common sense could have made this list, starting with the more well-known, popular works, proceeding with the bulk of the scholarly works roughly arranged according to their subject-matter, then the so-called hypomnematic works and the collectanea, and finishing the catalogue with the personal documents, letters and poetry.

Hermippus worked in the Alexandrian library and had access to its inventories and catalogues. He hit upon an old inventory of

Aristotle's writings and incorporated it in his biography, without essentially (or perhaps at all) changing its character. Perhaps he realized that it would have involved him in a laborious work, entirely outside his competence, to investigate these four hundred-odd rolls, many of which had more or less identical titles or no titles at all."

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957, pp. 67-69.

"The catalogues are arranged according to different principles and, overall, there is a great lack of uniformity among them, which would seem to point to different sources. All of the lists, moreover, are unsatisfactory or imperfect for several reasons: for each of the philosophers we can point to titles of works cited by other trustworthy ancient sources which do not appear in Diogenes' lists, many titles are repeated or duplicated in a single catalogue, there are variant titles for the same work listed separately, instances of melding and blending the other lists and later supplements, the separate listing of individual books of larger, collective works as well as the listing of the collective work, restorations, clear misattributions, and other contaminations and corruptions.(292) All of the lists present almost insurmountable difficulties for interpretation and analysis and the final conclusive word on them has yet to be spoken and may never be. Even if there were space and time to do so, I cannot discuss each item in each list here, but shall limit discussion to a presentation of some of the general characteristics of each list.
The catalogues of Aristotle (5.21-7) and Strato (5.59-60) are most like one another, which is evidence that they derive from the same source. They are ordered along similar lines in a sensible, matter-of-fact manner. Dialogues or exoteric works appear first, listed according to the diminishing number of books included for individual titles. Esoteric works take up the next section, within which various scientific treatises are grouped according to subject matter. Next, collections of different sorts are found, e.g. *aporemata* and *ipomnemata*, and each list concludes with personal papers and letters.(293) Of course in both lists there are titles which are found in each of the sections which do not fit

them, but overall one can see this general pattern of arrangement.” (p. 3850)

Notes

(292) Diogenes does not seem to have been totally oblivious to problems of trustworthiness in the book lists which he transmits. At the end of his entry for Aristotle, he writes: "For Aristotle was in all things !oust industrious and most inventive, as is obvious front the writings listed before, which come near in number to 400, at least all those that are undisputed" (5.34).

(293) See I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition,* pp. 67-69 and P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote* p. 27 ff. and 246-7 .

From: Michael George Sollenberger, The Lives of the Peripatetics: An analysis of the contents and structure of Diogenes Laërtius ' *Vitae philosophorum*' Book 5. In Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,* vol. 36.6, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1992, pp. 3793-3879.

“At the conclusion of three of these catalogues, those of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Strato, Diogenes appends a stichometric notice. This is meant to be an indication of the total length of all the writings in each catalogue. One *stichoi*, a verse or line, was regarded as a line of prose or poetry equivalent in length to one hexameter verse, approximately sixteen syllables or 34-38 letters. (300) Counting the number of *stichoi* in a given work seems to have been a customary way of measuring its length, and such notices were a common bibliographic practice in Alexandria in the third century B.C., a point to which I shall soon return. The total given for Aristotle is 445,270 verses, for Theophrastus 232,850, and for Strato 332,440.(301) But these numbers are certainly corrupted. If they are supposed to represent the number of lines contained in all the works in each catalogue, there is some great disproportion. There are 146 titles in Aristotle's list which comprise over 550 individual books. His total number of *stichoi* is almost twice that of Theophrastus, and yet the latter is credited

with more titles (224) and almost as many individual books (495). Further, Strato's catalogue has only 47 titles (302) which comprise only 58 individual books, yet his number of *stichoi* is nearly half again as many as the number given for Theophrastus. If some rough calculations are made and the number of *stichoi* is divided by the number of individual books, we arrive at some surprising average lengths of individual books. For Strato the average length of a book is 5,732 verses, for Aristotle 809, and for Theophrastus 470. These figures are so incommensurate that, unless we want to assume that Strato composed tremendously long books, over twelve times as long as those written by Theophrastus, we will have to reject them as accurate measurements of the total length of the works listed in Diogenes' catalogues.(303)

Diogenes nowhere names his source(s) for the catalogues of Peripatetic writings, but the stichometric notices in the first three, although their accuracy is to be rejected, may provide some clue about the provenance of the lists. Such a reckoning system points, as mentioned earlier, to an Alexandrian source.(304) Book catalogues were compiled in Alexandria during the third century B. C., most notably by Callimachus, whose 130-volume *Pinakes* (305) appears to have been a listing of works available in the library at Alexandria in his day. (306) It is generally thought that Callimachus arranged the works in large groups according to type or genre, e. g., medical treatises, epic, tragic and lyric poetry, philosophy, political works, etc. Within each of these classes the various authors were listed in alphabetical order. For each author some brief biographical material seems to have been included. Next, the works of each author were apparently listed in alphabetical order, with the *incipit* and number of verses in each being given.(307) But, as already remarked, there are three different types of catalogues among the Peripatetics in Book Five of Diogenes' work: 1) systematic (Aristotle's and Strato's), 2) alphabetical (Theophrastus'), and 3) thematic (Demetrius' and Heraclides'). Surely these must derive from three different sources, which may be Alexandrian in origin. The only one which comes close to fitting the previous outline of Callimachus' cataloguing method is that of Theophrastus. While no one has ever suggested that Callimachus himself compiled Theophrastus'

catalogue, and no such claim is made here, most scholars tend to accept the conclusion of H. Usener that Theophrastus' catalogue is derived fundamentally from the work of Hermippus of Smyrna, a follower of Callimachus.(308) Hermippus, in fact, has been put forth by a number of scholars as the source not only of Theophrastus' catalogue, but also of the other four lists of Peripatetic writings. This can hardly be the case, unless one assumes that the same man compiled Bibliographies according to three different systems. It seems more likely that if Hermippus was Diogenes' ultimate source for Theophrastus' list of writings, there is a different source behind his lists of Aristotle and Strato, and probably yet another one for the lists of Demetrius and Heraclides. Besides Hermippus, the source of Aristotle's list has been thought to be Andronicus of Rhodes, the famous arranger and editor of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus.(309)
On the other hand, others have maintained that Diogenes' ultimate source of Aristotle's list as well as Strato's was Ariston of Ceos, who is considered to have been the successor to the leadership of the Peripatos after Lyco.(310) Further, it has been claimed that these lists pre-date the bibliographic activities in Alexandria and derive from a library list in the Lyceum itself.(311) For the lists of Demetrius and Heraclides, besides Hermippus, Sotion has often been suggested as Diogenes' ultimate source.(312) In addition to all these contending claims concerning the source(s) of these lists there is the matter of the tale of the fate of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus, their alleged disappearance and general unavailability during the two centuries after Theophrastus' death and their rediscovery in the first century B.C. This complicated tale begins with Theophrastus' bequest of 'all the books to Neleus' in his will (5.52). This topic is extremely controversial and complex and requires more space than can be allotted here. It has little relevance to the lives and wills of the Peripatetics, but is of major importance for the influence of Aristotle and Theophrastus and the availability and use of their writings during the succeeding centuries.(313)" pp. 3852-3855

Notes

(300) Galen, De placita Hippocratis et Platonis. 8.2 (vol. 5, p. 655 - 6 Kühn); see T. Birt, Das antike Buchwesen in seinem Verhältniss zur Literatur. Mit Beiträgen zur Textgeschichte des Theokrit, Catull, Properz und anderer Autoren (Berlin, 1882) p. 204-5, 214, and 286, K. Ohly, Stichometrische Untersuchungen. Zbl. fiir Bibliothekswesen, Beiheft 61 (Leipzig, 1928) p. 4-22, and R. Blum, Kallimachos und die Literaturverzeichnung bei den Griechen: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Biobibliographie. Archiv fiir Geschichte des Buchwesens 18 (Frankfurt a. M., 1977) p. 124 n. 291 and 238 ff.

(301) D. L. 5.27, 5.50, and 5.60 respectively.
(302) In all three cases the number of titles could be greater or fewer, since in some instances what is listed as one title may in fact be two. One example of this should suffice: 5.59 *Peri ton metallikon mekanematon* may be two titles *Peri to metallikon* and *Mekanematon*.
(303) I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, p. 77, writes: "Moraux counted 550 books; a simple calculation (sc. *Listes anciennes* p. 192) shows that his figure tallies well with the number of lines at the end of the catalogue. Taking as standard an average page of a Greek text in the Loeb library with 30 lines of 40 letters in each line, Aristotle's literary output according to Hermippus' catalogue, in which most of the great pragmaties are missing, would correspond to about 12,000 printed pages." The calculations for Aristotle are not disproportionate as far as I. Düring and P. Moraux are concerned, but since Strato's numbers are so incommensurate, perhaps all such numbers should be suspected of error. It is also interesting to note that Demetrius of Phalerum is reported to have surpassed all Peripatetics in the number of lines written (5.80). However, Demetrius' total is not given by Diogenes; his list of works is nowhere near as long as Theophrastus' or Aristotle's.
(304) In addition to the studies of T. Bity, R. Blum, and K. Ohly (note 300 above), see F. Ritschl, Die Stichometrie der Alten, in: ID., Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken unter den ersten Ptolemäern und die Sammlung der Homerischen Gedichte durch Pisistratus (Breslau, 1838, Reprint: Amsterdam, 1970) p. 91 and 103 ff. = ID., Opuscula Philologica vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1886) p. 74 and

84 ff., E. Howald, Die Schriftenverzeichnisse des Aristoteles und des Theophrast, Hermes 55 (1920) p. 204, F. Schmidt, Die Pinakes des Kallimachos. Klassisch-Philologische Studien 1 (Berlin, 1922) p. 68 ff., W. Weinberger, Stichometrie, RE 3A,2 (1929) col. 2487 - 8, P. Moraux, Listes anciennes, p. 214 n. 17 and 246, I. Düring, Ariston or Hermippus?, Classica et Mediaevalia 17 (1956) p. 19, and L. Daly, Contributions to the History of Alphabetization. Coll. Latomus 90 (Brussels, 1967) p. 92. While stichometric notices are given for the sum of the writings of both Speusippus (4.5) and Xenocrates (4.14), elsewhere totals are given in *epe*, e. g., 1.34, 9.20 and 9.111. Totals for individual writings are also given, e. g., 1.61, 68, 79, 85, 89, 97, 101, and 8.77. Several different purposes were achieved by stichometric notices. They served to indicate the extent of a work or corpus of works, to determine the pay of the copyist, to determine the price or value of a work or corpus of works, to ascertain the integrity of a work or corpus as well as its authenticity. Moreover, stichometry facilitated the citation of individual passages in a work, for just as line numbers are often used in modern books, consecutive numbers of verses were often placed at regular intervals in the margins of a work. See the citations of line numbers by Diogenes at 7.33 and 7.187-8 and the remarks of M. Sschanz, Zur Stichometrie, Hermes 16 (1881) p. 309-14, K. Wachsmuth, Stichometrie and kein Ende, Rheinische Museum 34 (1879) p. 481-4, and K. Ohly, op. cit. (note 300) p. 74 f.

(305) The full title of the work is recorded as [*Pinakes (or Tables) of those who were eminent in every branch of learning, and what they wrote, in 120 volumes*] in the Suda, s. v. *Kallimachos* (no. 227, part 3, p. 19.27-9 Adler).

(306) See O. Regenbogen, *Pinax*, RE 20.2 (1950) col. 1419-20, and R. Blum, op. cit. (note 300) p. 224 ff., for much of the older literature on Callimachus' bibliographical work.

(307) On the reconstruction of Callimachus' work see R. Pfeiffer, Callimachus, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1965), fr. 429, 435, 438, and 452-3, R. Blum, op. cit. (note 300) p. 231, and F. Sschmidt, op. cit. (note 304) p. 58 ff.

(308) H. Usener, Analecta Theophrastea (Diss. Bonn; Leipzig, 1858) p. 22-4, reprint. in: Idem, Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Rademacher, Vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1912). For a succinct summary of

Usener's argument, see O. Regenbogen, Theophrastos col. 1366-9.
(309) For a review of the scholarly battles on the sources of these lists and the various proponents see P. Moraux, *Listes* p. 15-21, 211-16, and 221-37, and Idem, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias I. Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr., *Peripatoi* 5 (Berlin-New York, 1973) p. 4 n. 2, and C. Lord, The Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus, Amer. Journal of Philology 107 (1986) p. 137-61.
(310) P. Moraux, *Listes* p. 243 ff., and more recently with a bit of hesitation, Idem, Diogène Laerce et le Peripatos p. 251-2. That Ariston was Diogenes' source was first suggested by A. Gercke, Ariston no. 52, RE 2.1 (1896) col. 953 ff.
(311) J. Keaney, Two Notes on the Tradition of Aristotle's Writings, American Journal of Philology 84 (1963) p. 58-63.
(312) P. Moraux, *Listes* p. 220-1 and 246-7, F. Wehrli, *Schule Aristoteles* vol. 7, p. 64-5, and H. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Ponto* (Oxford, 1980) p. 6 n. 20.
(313) The most recent treatment of this problem is that of C. Lord, op. cit. (note 309) where much of the relevant secondary literature will be found listed.

From: Michael George Sollenberger, The Lives of the Peripatetics: An analysis of the contents and structure of Diogenes Laërtius ' *Vitae philosophorum*' Book 5. In Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,* vol. 36.6, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1992, pp. 3793-3879.

(*) See my page in French, *Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote : Diogène Laërce.*

Who is the source of Diogenes' Catalogue: Aristo of Ceo, Hermippus of Smyrna or an Anonymous author?

The Traditional Thesis: Hermippus of Smyrna

"Hermippus refers by name to the following writers: Eumelus, Bryon (from whom he quotes Theocritus of Chios), Timaeus, Timotheus, Lycon, Timon. It is a well-known fact that many ancient writers like to quote their subsidiary sources but keep silent about their principal sources. Hermippus worked in the library of Alexandria and was a diligent compilator. It is reasonable to assume that he had access to a rich material, not only of books published in the usual manner, but also of records and other unpublished material which had reached the library from the archives of the Peripatos. The Catalogue of Aristotle's writings which he included in his biography is best explained as an inventory of the books in the possession of the Alexandrian library.

The Hellenistic biographic literature in the two centuries after Hermippus was very rich, but in most cases only the titles of these works are known. It is likely that a small standard biography of Aristotle crystallized in what we use to call the *koiné historia*, corresponding to our encyclopaedias. Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers in general words to the *koiné historia* and to "those who have written about the life of Aristotle". No certain fragments of these biographies are known.
Some fragments of other Hellenistic literature give us glimpses of what we have lost. A valuable fragment of Apollodorus' *Chronica* on the chronology of Aristotle's life is preserved by Dionysius and Diogenes. Aristocles tells us that Apellicon wrote a book on Aristotle's relations with Hermias. It is tempting to assume that Artemon used some of the letters which Apellicon had bought from Aristotle's heirs in Scepsis in his collection of Aristotle's correspondence (in no less than eight books). But most of the letters in his collection were probably faked, which did not prevent later writers from quoting them as genuine. Philodemus is generally held to be the author of the *Index Academicorum philosophorum Herculanensis*, containing precious information from old reliable sources. In his *Volumina Rhetoric*a, written about 75 B.C., he deals at length with the Epicurean attacks on Aristotle.

At about this time Cicero was in Athens, listening to lectures held by Antiochus of Ascalon and other reputed professors. Cicero's letters and philosophic treatises testify to his great interest in Aristotle, and I do not doubt that it was Antiochus who stimulated this interest. With Antiochus begins the revival of Aristotle; according to him the Peripatos after Straton had degenerated; it was his ambition to resuscitate the old Peripatetic tradition. The final result of this revival is Andronicus' edition of Aristotle's scholarly works.
As an introduction to his edition Andronicus wrote a book *On Aristotle's writings* which I have characterized as a "catalogue raisonné". It is superfluous to repeat here what I have said in the chapter on the Roman edition of Aristotle's works about the ideas which inspired Andronicus. It is nowhere attested that his book contained a biography of Aristotle. Hermippus' Life of Aristotle remained the standard work."

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957, pp. 466-467.

APPENDIX: THE ANCIENT TESTIMONIA ON THE LIBRARY OF ARISTOTLE IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The texts are collected in:

1. Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Part III. *Fragments of the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Chapter VII. *Aristotle's Library*, pp. 337-338; see also Chapter XVIII. *The Roman edition of Aristotle's works*, pp. 412-425.
2. Olof Gigon, *Aristotelis opera III: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987;
3. William Fortenbaugh et al. (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus*, Part One, Leiden Brill 1992, *Writings. Preservation and*

Publication [Fragments] 37-41, pp. 90-94 (with English tranaslation).

These are the more relevant texts:

"[1] From Scepsis [a town in the Troad] were the Socratics Erastos and Coriscus, and Coriscus' son Neleus, a man who studied under Aristotle and Theophrastus. He received the library of Theophrastus, which contained also Aristotle's library. For indeed Aristotle gave his own library to Theophrastus, and also left his school to him.

[2] Aristotle was the first man we know to have collected books, and he taught the kings in Egypt how to organize a library.

[3] Theophrastus gave (the library) to Neleus. But Neleus brought it to Scepsis and gave it to his heirs, ordinary men who kept the books shut up and carelessly stored. And when they learned that the Attalid kings, to whom their city was subject, were eagerly searching for books for the provision of the library in Pergamum, they hid them in a place dug in the ground.

[4]After some length of time their descendants sold the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus, which were damaged by dampness and moths, to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money. But Apellicon was more a bibliophile than a philosopher. For this reason, though he attempted to correct parts that had been eaten through, he transferred what was written to new copies, making restorations that were not good, and published the books full of errors.

[5] Since the ancient members of the Peripatos after Theophrastus were entirely without books, except a few, and these were mostly the exoteric writings, it happened that they were unable to do philosophy in a systematic way, but could (only) hollowly declaim theses.

[6] Those who came later, after these books (re)appeared, were better able than they to philosophize and to expound Aristotle. Nevertheless they were forced in many cases to state what was probable, due to the great number of errors.

[7] ome also added much to this (situation). For immediately after Apellicon's death, Sulla, who had taken Athens, seized Apellicon's library, and after it had been brought here (to Rome), Tyrannio, the grammarian, a lover of Aristotle, got his hands on it

by playing up to the person in charge of the library, [8] and some booksellers, employing poor scribes and not comparing (manuscripts) — which also happens in the case of books copied for sale, both here and in Alexandria. But enough about these matters.”

From: Strabo (64/63 B.C.-25 A.D.), *Geographia*, XIII, 1, 54-55.

"Having put out from Ephesus with all his ships, (Sulla) anchored on the third day in Piraeus. And after being initiated into the mysteries, he carried off for himself the library of Apellicon of Teos, in which were most of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus, at that time not yet clearly known to many. When it (the library) was brought to Rome, Tyranrdon the grammarian is said to have prepared many (of the books) and the Rhodian Andronicus, obtaining the use of copies from him, published them and drew up the lists now in circulation. In themselves the elder Peripatetics appear to have been elegant and fond of learning, but neither to have read many of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus nor (to have done so) with care, since the estate of Neleus of Scepsis, to whom Theophrastus left his books, passed to men who lacked aspiration and were ordinary."

From: Plutarch (ca. 45–120 A.D.), *Sulla*, 26.1-3.

"He (Athenaeus) says that he (Larensis) possessed such a great number of ancient Greek books that he outdid all those who have been admired for their collections: Polycrates the Samian and Peisistratus, who was tyrant of the Athenians, and Euclid, who was also an Athenian, and Nikocrates the Cypriot and, moreover, the kings of Pergamum and Euripides the poet and Aristotle the philosopher (and Theophrastus), and Neleus, who preserved their books. From him, he says, Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, the king of our country, purchased all of them and transferred them along with those from Athens and Rhodes to beautiful Alexandria."

From: Athenaneus (? - after 192 A.D.), *Deipnosophistae*, 1.4, 3A-B: Livius Laurensis, a rich Roman, is the host of the symposium

(this first book is extant only in a byzantine epitome of unknwon date).

"And he [Athenion] seized not merely the property of citizens [of Athens], but presently he took the goods of foreigners as well, reaching out his hands even for the property of the god at Delos. At any rate, he sent to the island Apellicon of Teos, who had been made an Athenian citizen and had run a chequered and novelty-seeking career.
When, for example, he professed the Peripatetic philosophy, he bought up Aristotle's library and many other books (for he was very rich), and began surreptitiously to acquire the original copies of the ancient decrees in the Metroön, as well as anything else in other cities which was old and rare. Detected in these acts at Athens, he would have forfeited his life if he had not absconded. But after a short while he returned to Athens again, having won over the favour of many persons; he then enlisted in the cause of Athenion, as one who belonged to the same philosophic sect. Athenion, meanwhile, had forgotten the precepts of the Peripatetic school, and was rationing out a quart of barley every four days to the silly Athenians, giving them food fit for cocks, not human beings. And Apellicon, though he had set out with a military force to Delos, behaved as if he were attending a festival rather than as a true soldier, and, on the side toward the town of Delos, set a guard which was too negligent; as for the regions behind the island, he left them completely unguarded, and went to bed without even throwing up a palisade. When this came to the knowledge of Orbius, who was the Roman praetor in charge of Delos, he waited for a night when there was no moon; he then led out his troops and attacked the Athenians when they were asleep or carousing, and slaughtered them and their companions in arms like sheep, to the number of six hundred; he also took about four hundred prisoners. And this noble general Apellicon made off from Delos in secret flight. When Orbius observed many others fleeing together for refuge in farm-houses, he burned them up, houses and all, as well as all their appliances for a siege, including the siege-engine which Apellicon had constructed when he came to Delos..."

From: Athenaneus, *Deipnosophistae*, 5, 214D - 215A.

Related pages

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PAGES EN Français SUR LES LISTES ANCIENNES DES OUVRAGES D'ARISTOTE:

Diogène Laërce, Vies, V 22-27

Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib

Theory and History of Ontology

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Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: Second Part

Hesychius and Ptolemy al-Garib

First Part: Diogenes Laërtius Lives V, 22-27

THE ANONYMOUS VITA MENAGIANA OR VITA HESYCHII

"The Vita is known in the literature under the name of *Vita Menagiana*, because it was first edited by Gilles Ménage in the London edition of Diogenes, 1663. His *Animadversiones*, extended and considerably improved, were then published in the beautiful folio edition, Amsterdam 1693, printed by H. Wetstenius, together with the notes of H. Stephanus, Casaubonus father and son, and others; a veritable treasure-house from which all later commentators have borrowed material.
V. Rose reprinted the Index Hesychii in his *Aristoteles pseudepigraphus*, pp. 18-20, reporting that Tischendorf had seen a manuscript of the Vita Hesychii ("cum edito plane conspirantem") in St. John's monastery in Patmos. The Index is reprinted in the Berlin edition of Aristotle, vol. 5, p. 1466, and then in Rose's *Aristotelis fragmenta*, 1886, together with the Vita. It was also reprinted by Buhle in the first volu *me* of his edition, by Westermann in his *Vitarum scriptores*, and by Flach in his *Hesychii Milesii Onomatologi quae supersunt*. P. Moraux in his *Listes anciennes des d'Aristote* deals at length with problems connected with the Index librorum."

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957, p. 81.

"If we count the books listed in the first part of the catalogue (1-139), accepting the transmitted numbers of books and assuming, when no figure is given, that the title represents one book, we get 403 books plus the 158 books of the Polities. Moraux counted in the original list of Hermippus (or as he believed, Ariston) 551 books (*Listes anciennes*, p. 192). The number of *stikoi*, according to Hermippus' catalogue was 445.270, corresponding roughly to 550 papyrus-rolls of about 800 lines each.

(...)
Hesychius' Catalogue of Aristotle's writings has been dealt with at length by P. Moraux, *Listes anciennes*, pp. 195-271. Plezia has a note on the catalogue in *De Andronici Rhodii studiis*, p. 51.
On the first part of the catalogue, titles 1-139, there is general agreement. As appears from the following survey, it is essentially the same *Pinax* as that transmitted by Hermippus.

Nos. 1-24. The works most widely known to the general public in Hellenistic times; the list agrees pretty well with Hermippus.

Nos. 25-68. Logical and dialectical writings; a few titles misplaced, but the general agreement with Hermippus is obvious. It is interesting to see that both lists preserve an old error: *ethikon* (title 38 in Diogenes Laërtius, 39 in Hesychius).
Nos. 69-70, and title 64, misplaced; the same three "political" writings as in Hermippus.
Nos. 81-98, eighteen writings on natural philosophy and biology; as in Hermippus, the list ends up with two interpolated titles, 97-98, another old error which both lists have preserved.
Nos. 99-104, the same six mathematical and astronomical writings as in Hermippus.
Nos. 105-119, hypomnematic writings; No. 111 must be a late addition, perhaps by Hesychius himself.
Nos. 120-131, collectanea; No. 121 is perhaps the general title. No. 123 has preserved an ancient gloss, probably an annotation by the

librarian who made up the original *Pinax*. "This is the book by which he defeated the corresponding book of Menaechmus."
Nos. 132-133, added in the same way as Hermippus 141-142. Nos. 135-139, the same as Hermippus.
Both catalogues, then, are transcribed from the same original. According to Heitz, DL is more reliable, according to Howald the list of Hesychius is a deteriorated copy of the list in DL. Like Moraux I am more inclined to believe that Diogenes and Hesychius independently used the same original, and that in some small and rather unimportant details Hesychius has preserved the original better than Diogenes. At least two additions are very late and may be ascribed to Hesychius himself: title 96 (this work was not divided into two books until the second century A. D.), and title 111.
The *appendix Hesychiana*, titles 140-197, raises problems which can never be answered satisfactorily. Moraux's hypotheses are very ingenious, but I doubt whether he can persuade anybody to believe in them. And what has Porphyry to do with this list? As far as I know, his *Philosophos historia* did not include a biography of Aristotle, let alone a Catalogue of his writings, genuine or spurious.
The *appendix* consists of four different parts.
Nos. 140-147 belong to the class of *aporemata* or *problemata*, possibly with one exception, No. 140.
Nos. 148-158, a selection of the well-known pragmaties, as edited by Andronicus.
Nos. 159-187, a list of various writings, inviting wild conjectures as to the original arrangement. Christ, and later Plezia, suggested that this is an inventory of a Hellenistic library, e.g. in Rhodes or Pergamon, an attractive and simple hypothesis which, however, as Plezia rightly says, "aequo iure affirmari ac negari potest".
Nos. 188-197, a list of pseudepigrapha. Such a list was probably included in Andronicus' work; at least he discussed the titles of spurious works. Diogenes merely says that he knows that some books, circulated under Aristotle's name, are *anaepsilekta*.
Moraux's reconstruction of 1 he original alphabetical order in this list, p. 271, is attractive but does not carry us any further.
Hesychius, a diligent collector of facts, must have compiled this appendix from different sources. The first and the third section

are probably pre-Andronicean. The second list, 148-158, is certainly made after Andronicus, but equally certain is that the titles are quite arbitrarily ranged. If Hesychius had known Andronicus' work, he would hardly have presented such a disordered list of the pragmaties. It is therefore more likely that this section, too, is an inventory of a library. It is futile to make any conjectures concerning the fourth section.
As to the individual titles, I refer to Moraux's careful and valuable comments. A characteristic feature of this catalogue is that so many of the titles are in the accusative. The history of the transmission of this list is entirely unknown; it may, or may not have been interfered with during this process.
It is generally assumed that the Vita Hesychii is an epitome of the original *Onomatologon* of Hesychius, and the language in ([Vita Hesychii] 4) would lend some support to this hypothesis.
Concerning the relationship with Diogenes we can only say that Hesychius used the same biographical sources, but the mixture is his own, and on two or three points he transmits information which is plainly wrong and not found anywhere else. The catalogue proves that he had access to post-Andronicean sources.
The Suda contains an excerpt of our Vita under No. 3929 Adler. The text is identical with that of Ambros. 490 with a few minor variants, annotated in the critical apparatus."

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957, pp. 90-92.

PTOLEMY EL-GARIB (OR AL-GHARIB)

"It is commonly held that the two surviving Syriac and the four extant Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis* are ultimately based on the biographical tradition represented or inaugurated by Ptolemy (-el-Garib) and his (lost) *Vita Aristotelis*.(1) Probably in the course of the fifth or sixth century A.D., a Syriac translation was made of Ptolemy's *Vita* or, more likely, of an epitome of this *Vita*. Of this original translation, only two rather scanty abridgements by some

Syriac biographers survive, namely, *I Vita Aristotelis Syriaca* and *II Vita Aristotelis Syriaca*, which might also be called short resumes of an older and more comprehensive Syriac translation of Ptolemy's original Greek *Vita Aristotelis* or of an epitome of this *Vita*.

The Syriac translation of either Ptolemy's *Vita* or that of an epitome of this *Vita*, together with some additional (probably Neo-Platonic) materials transmitted through several intermediary sources, ultimately became the foundation of the four Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis*. It has been surmised that towards the end of the ninth century A.D., Ishaq Ibn Hunayn translated into Arabic a Syriac rendition of Ptolemy's *Vita* or, rather, of a Syriac translation of an epitome of this *Vita*. In any event, the Arabic biographers, without exception, ultimately derived their information and materials, through the intermediary of Syriac translators, from Ptolemy, although they seem to have included in their *Vitae* not only some elements that were probably added (or invented) by the Syriac translators (or by the Arabic biographers themselves), but also bits of information gleaned from some other (Neo-Platonic?) reports or accounts. There exists no evidence, however, that the later Arabic biographers made direct use of Greek or Syriac sources. It might be correct to maintain, therefore, that the Syriac and Arabic biographers, like the Neo-Platonic School of Ammonius, derived most of their information concerning the life of Aristotle from Ptolemy (-el-Garib) and his Vita Aristotelis.(2)

The four major Arabic biographers of Aristotle are: Al-Mubassir (or Al-Mubashir, subsequently cited as *II VA*), who wrote during the latter part of the eleventh century; (3) Ibn Abi Usaibia (subsequently cited as *IV VA*), who wrote during the latter part of the thirteenth century; (4) Ibn an-Nadim (subsequently cited as *I VA*), who wrote near the end of the tenth century; (5) and Al-Qifti Gamaladdin (subsequently cited as *III VA*), who wrote during the first half of the thirteenth century.(6) A cursory examination of the Arabic (and Syriac) *Vitae Aristotelis* might indicate that especially *I VA, II VA* and *IV VA*, which are based on a single main source, are quite similar in content. Closer analysis reveals, however, that there exist quite a few significant differences in the facts selected and discussed by the different Arabic biographers.

It is also obvious that some of the later Arabic biographers simply copied from some earlier Arabic author. Thus, Usaibia, for instance, occasionally seems to quote from Mubashir without, however, acknowledging his source." pp. 54-55
(...)
"A long list of Aristotle's writings is preserved by Usaibia. This list or catalogue, which includes a number of pseudepigrapha, ultimately goes back to the list compiled by Ptolemy (-el-Garib). (104) A brief classification of Aristotle's works can also be found in An-Nadim (*I VA* 18). Mubashir (*II VA* 35), who maintains that Aristotle 'wrote many books, about one hundred, and that it is said that apart from these one hundred books he wrote others too,' (105) enumerates only twenty works which he claims to have seen, namely, 'eight books on logic; eight (actually seven) books on physics; (106) one book on ethics; one book on constitutions; one large book called *Metaphysics*, also known by the title of *Theology*, that is, *Divine Discourse*; one book on mathematics; and one book on mechanics.' (107)
A comparison of the Syriac and Arabic *Vitae Aristotelis* with other *Vitae* -- Diogenes Laërtius V. 1-16,(108) *Vita Aristotelis Marciana*, *Vita Aristotelis Vulgata*, *Vita Aristotelis Latina* and *Vita Aristotelis Hesychii* (*Vita Menagiana* or *Vita Menagii*) -- indicates that the Syriac and Arabic biographies supplement and implement, and must be implemented by, these other Vitae." pp. 68-69

(1) See A.-H. Chroust, 'A brief account of the traditional Vitae Aristotelis,' *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, vol. 77, nos. 364-5 (1964), pp. 50-69, especially, pp. 60-9, and Chapter I. The title of Ptolemy's *Vita Aristotelis* probably was something like 'On the Life of Aristotle, His Last Will and Testament, and a List of His Writings.' See Elias (olim David), *Commentaria in Porphyrii Isagogen et in Aristotelis Categorias*, CIAG, vol. XVIII, part I (ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1900), p. 107, line 7, where we are told that Ptolemy wrote about Aristotle's 'list of writings, about his life, and about his last will and testament.' *I VA* 19 (An-Nadim) reports that 'Ptolemy-el-Garib . . . is the author of a book "On the Life of Aristotle, His Death, and the Classification of his Writings."' See also *IV VA* (Usaibia), at the beginning. For the Syriac and Arabic

Vitae Aristotelis, see, in general, F. A. Muller, 'Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung,' *Festschrift der Frankischen Stiftungen für Professor Bernhardy* (Halle, 1873); F. A. Muller, 'Das Arabische Verzeichnis der Aristotelischen Schriften,' *Morgenländische Forschungen: Festschrift für H. L. Fischer*[=Fleischer] (Leipzig, 1875); M. Steinschneider, 'Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen,' *Centralblatt für Bibl.-Wesen*, Beiheft no. II, part 5 (Leipzig, 1890-1), and Beiheft no. IV, part 12 (Leipzig, 1893); J. Lippert, *Studien auf dem Gebiete der GriechischArabischen Übersetzungsliteratur* (Braunschweig, 1894); A. Baumstark, 'Lucubrationes Syrio-Graecae,' *Jahrbuch fur Klassische Philologie*, Supplement, vol. 21 (Leipzig, 1894), pp. 333-524; A. Baumstark, *Syrisch-Arabische Biographieen des Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1900); J. Lippert, *Ibn al-Qiftis Tarih al-Hukama* (Leipzig, 1903). For additional and detailed information about the literature on our subject, see M. Guidi and R. Walzer, 'Studi su al-Kindi I: un scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele,' *Memorie della Reale Academia Nazionale dei Licei. Classe di Scienze Morali*, series VI, vol. VI, fasc. 5 (Rome, 1940), pp. 375-419; R. Walzer, 'New light on the Arabic translations of Aristotle,' *Oriens*, vol. VI (1953), pp. 91-142; I. During, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. LXIII, no. 2 (Goteborg, 1957), pp. 183-92, 193-246.

Notes

(3) His full name is Abu-(e)l-Wafa al-Mubashir (or Mubassir) Ibn Fatik. He authored the *Kitab Mukhtar al-Hikam wa-Mahasin al-Kilam* (The Book of Selections of Wisdom and Wonderful Sayings). For simplicity's sake the accents on the Arabic words have been omitted.
(4) He authored the *Kitab uyun al-Anba fi Tabaqat al-Atibba* (The Book of Sources for Information Concerning the School of Physicians). Usaibia, who died in 1270, was a physician.
(5) His full name is Ibn Abi Yaqub an-Nadim. He authored the *Kitab al-Fihrist*, which was written before the year 987. This work, like that of Al-Qifti (see note 6), is more in the nature of a 'biographical encyclopedia.'

(6) His full name is Al-Qifti Gamaladdin al-Qadi al-Akram. He authored the *Tabaqat al-Hukama* (The School of Wise Men). He died in 1248. See note 5.
Neither the work of An-Nadim nor that of AlQifti will be used extensively.

(104) Usaibia also contains a short survey of Aristotle's writings. This survey is based upon, or taken from, Ibn Said Al-Qordubi.

(105) The number 'one hundred' is probably a mistranslation or misreading of the Greek *chilioi* (one thousand), which can be found in *Vita Marciana* 45 and *Vita Lascaris* 48.
(106) Like An-Nadim (*I VA* 18), Mubashir (*II VA* 35) actually recites only seven titles on 'physics.'
(107) Mubashir (*II VA* 36) also mentions the 'public' and private letters of Aristotle. These 'public' letters might well contain the 'official reports' which Aristotle sent to Macedonia and to Antipater in particular. In his *Oration Against the Philosophers* of 306 B.C., Demochares implies that Aristotle 'conspired' with Macedonia against Athens.(...)
(108) A.-H. Chroust, 'A Brief Analysis of the Vita Aristotelis of Diogenes Laërtius (DL V. 11-16),' pp. 97-129, and Chapter III.

From: Anton-Hermann Chroust, *Aristotle. New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works. Vol. I. Some Novel Interpretations of the Man and His Life*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 54-55; 68-69

"The *Kitab al-Fihrist* by Ibn An-Nadim: "Ptolemy-el-Garib who was an adherent of Aristotle and spread knowledge about his merits; he is the author of a book *On the life of Aristotle, his death, and the classification of his writings*. -- Usaibia, in the introduction to his biography, says: "Thus speaks Ptolemy in his book to Gallus on the life and history of Aristotle, his Will and the list of his famous writings." -- Apart from the fact that his name is mentioned several times in the biographies, this is all information we have on Ptolemy in Arabic sources." I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, cit. p. 195

"The *Life of Aristotle* current in the neoplatonic schools was written by a certain Ptolemy. The identification of this Ptolemy, the character and scope of his biography, the relationship of the numerous late epitomes to the original work: all this is very problematic.

We possess three neoplatonic epitomes, all from the fifth century, Vita Marciana, Vita vulgata, and Vita Latina; the two Syriac Vitae are probably from the same period; the Arabic tradition is represented by an-Nadim's *Fihrist*, transcribed by al-Qifti, and by the extracts in al-Mubashir and Usaibia; there are also some scattered fragments of other writers; the entire Arabic tradition goes back to a translation (or epitome) of Ptolemy's Life of Aristotle, presumably made by Ishaq ibn Hunayn towards the end of the ninth century.

All the material handed down to us in these nine Vitae is very uniform in its general character, in spite of differences in details. But sometimes, even in small details, their agreement is complete, as I have shown in my comments. I do not for a moment doubt that these nine Vitae ultimately are derived from the same common source, Ptolemy's Life of Aristotle. I have found no vestiges of any other independent source. This conclusion is confirmed by the neoplatonic prolegomena. The biographical material in these prolegomena (and incidentally in the commentaries) shows such close relationship with the Vitae and with Ptolemy's Catalogue of Aristotle's writings that there is no room for doubt.

The examination of the three Greek and Latin Vitae has led to the result that they are three independent versions of the same original epitome. This epitome was used as the basis of oral instruction in the school of Ammonius Hermeiu and by his disciples Olympiodorus, David and Elias. It was also used by Philoponus and Simplicius, and after the time of Elias and David by the anonymous professor called Pseudo-Elias: thus by three generations of students from about 480 A. D. until the middle of the following century.

The Syriac Vitae are very meagre in content and not derived directly from any of the existing epitomes; they too must be regarded as independent versions of the same original. They may

have been current in the school of Ibas of Edessa, but it is also possible that they are products of the seventh century used in the schools of Bishop Sebocht of Qennesrin or Jacob of Edessa.
The Arabic tradition is rich in facts which are not found at all in the Greek and Syriac Vitae, and in many cases when the Greek Vitae merely contain a hint or a simple fact, we find a more elaborate account in the Arabic tradition. The Arabic tradition has been unduly neglected; as I have shown in my comments, it contains much valuable material of undoubtedly Greek origin; the Arabic elaborations, distortions and embellishments stand out clearly, and in most cases we can easily detach them. The Arabic text of Aristotle's Will affords an excellent criterion, since we can directly compare the Greek and the Arabic text paragraph by paragraph. The result is that there is a remarkable agreement between Diogenes' text (derived from Hermippus, probably via Phavorinus), and the Arabic text (derived from Andronicus, via Ptolemy, via Ishaq's translation and other possible intermediate sources). As a matter of fact, the Arabic text of the Will is in certain respects superior to that given by Diogenes. This should warn us not to be too suspicious of the Arabic tradition. The criteria that I have used in my scrutiny of the Arabic sources are these: agreement in substance with Greek sources, agreement in language of such a kind that it is possible to recognize typically Greek idioms behind the Arabic text, and finally, agreement in tendency.
Ptolemy's biography has a clear tendency: it is a glorification of Aristotle, based on some typically neoplatonic conceptions. Aristotle is *dios Aristoteles*. He was entrusted to Plato in compliance with an oracle of the God in Delphi. He made an extraordinary impression on Plato, and when Plato went on his second visit to Sicily, he deputized as head of the school. He was held in great honour by Philip and Alexander and was very influential in political affairs, "using philosophy as an instrument". He dissuaded Alexander from attacking Persia, telling him that the omina were unfavourable. He was great as a benefactor, both towards individuals and cities. The inhabitants of Stagira honoured him in many ways after his death. They believed that "their coming to the place where Aristotle's remains were buried would purify their minds". It is said that a swarm of

bees was found around the urn containing his ashes. And so forth.
It is further characteristic of Ptolemy's biography that he frequently refers to Aristotle's correspondence as evidence. It is probable that he used Artemon's collection of letters and the additional collection made by Andronicus as principal sources. The section on chronology is probably taken from Hermippus; the fact that Aristotle was not elected head of the Academy after Plato's death is explained in exactly the same way as by Hermippus: "Aristotle was on a mission to Macedonia". Other facts are of such a nature that it is impossible to determine whether he has taken them from Hermippus or from the *koiné historia*. Although his tendency to glorify Aristotle forbids us to speak of critical scholarship, it cannot be denied that his biography is a scholarly work, based on extensive investigations and a thorough knowledge of the biographical tradition. He wanted to find material likely to extol Aristotle and present him as an almost divine personality, and he found it. If suitable for his purpose, he transferred to Aristotle qualities, honours, and actions originally ascribed to other persons. Philip, Alexander and Antipater were honoured by the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea with statues on the Acropolis and the status of *proxenoi* -- Ptolemy felt no scruples in transferring this to Aristotle, perhaps using faked letters as evidence; other examples of similar transfers are cited in my comments. The habit as such is old; a short time after Aristotle's death the historian Eumelus is already describing Aristotle as a second Socrates. Ptolemy is really critical only when he refutes stories which, if believed, could damage the memory of his idol." Düring, *cit*., p. 469-471

"Who was this Ptolemy and when did he live? The identification with Ptolemaios Chennos should in my opinion be discarded. The general character of the Vita tells us that the author was a neoplatonist, writing after Porphyry's time. A neoplatonist named Ptolemy is mentioned as disciple of Porphyry and Iamblichus, Stobaeus I 378 Wachsmuth; he might well be our Ptolemy. But the name was indeed very common, especially in Alexandria. A curious detail in *Fihrist* 15 is the dating of Aristotle's death to "the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy, son of Lagos". An Arabic writer

can hardly have invented this; it must be derived from Ptolemy; it would be natural for an Alexandrian scholar to use the Alexandrian List of Kings instead of or parallel with the Athenian List of Archons. This is admittedly a weak argument, but it points to Alexandria. So does the scholarly character of the biography. My conclusion, then, is that Ptolemy was a member of Porphyry's and Iamblichus' school and that he wrote his Life of Aristotle in the first half of the fourth century. I base this conclusion mainly on the general tendency of the biography.

Two problems, in themselves of little importance, must be left open: the alleged dedication of the biography to a certain Gallus, and the name Ptolemy-el-Garib. The simplest solution is to accept both facts as true. Dedications of books to Roman noblemen was a common habit; Porphyry is a good example. It is possible to translate el-Garib with "the unknown", and explain it as a surname given to him by Ishaq to distinguish him from the well-known Ptolemy, the author of Al-Magest. Other possible explanations are discussed in my comments on al-Qifti.
With this my brief survey comes to an end. After Ptolemy no ancient writer is known who has made an independent or original contribution to the biographical tradition.
The biographical tradition on Aristotle is interesting from two quite different points of view. Part of this material is important because it is true and gives us knowledge about the historical Aristotle, about the events of his life and about his personality. His Will is one of the most precious documents that antiquity has preserved to us. Another part of the fragments and the biographies is interesting because it provides us with material for a history of Aristotelianism. But it is not my object in this book, either to write a Life of Aristotle or a history of the changes in the conception of his personality and importance as a philosopher and scholar, but rather to provide a source-book for such work."

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, cit., pp. 475-476.

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Diogène Laërce, Vies, V 22-27

Deuxième partie : Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib

INTRODUCTION

L'Antiquité nous a laissé trois catalogues des d'Aristote :

Diogène Laërce, *Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres*, Livre V. *Les Péripatétiques* 22-27 (III siècle) ;

La *Vita Menagiana* (anonyme), connue aussi comme *Vita Hesychii*, attribuée à Hesychius de Milet (V siècle) ;

Le catalogue attribué à Ptolémée el-Garib, existant en deux versions arabes de Ibn al-Qifti (ca. 1172-1248) et de Ibn Abi Usaibia (1203-1270) (IV siècle ?).

LES ÉTUDES DE PAUL MORAUX

1) Le livre *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires, 1951.

"M. Paul Moraux a publié, en 1942, une fort bonne monographie consacrée à Alexandre d'Aphrodise, exégète de la noétique d'Aristote. On sait que l'activité d'Alexandre, aux environs de l'an 200 de notre ère, marque l'une des étapes les plus importantes dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme et que ses vues sur les conditions de la pensée humaine ont alimenté pendant des siècles les controverses sur le sens véritable de la doctrine aristotélicienne de l'intelligence. Depuis ce premier travail plein de promesses, M. Moraux a poursuivi en sens inverse, en remontant vers la source, ses études sur le péripatétisme ancien ; mais nul n'ignore que la longue période qui s'étend de Théophraste à Alexandre nous est connue seulement par des témoignages fragmentaires et trop peu nombreux, permettant à peine de tracer une image bien pâle des prestations de l'École péripatéticienne à cette époque.
Devant cette pénurie de documents, M. Moraux n'a pas craint de s'attaquer à ceux d'entre eux dont la nature même ne semblait guère autoriser l'espoir d'en tirer des renseignements quelque peu substantiels sur la vie de l'École et l'activité concrète du maître : les sèches énumérations de titres d' que constituent les listes anciennes des écrits du Stagirite. L'étude historique qu'il en a entreprise répond sans doute aux vœux des spécialistes que ne pouvaient plus satisfaire les travaux actuellement vieillis sur cette matière aride. Mais par la manière dont il a su traiter le sujet, il rejoint des problèmes d'un intérêt plus étendu et de portée plus grande. On ne songe plus, de nos jours, à contester l'importance des recherches sur l'origine et la formation des écrits d'Aristote. Elles éclairent autant le philosophe qui s'attache à la doctrine du maître du Lycée pour en approfondir le sens, que l'historien qui a souci de retracer l'évolution de sa pensée et de suivre les répercussions qu'elle a eues après lui dans son école. Toute contribution nouvelle à l'étude de ces questions mérite, dès lors, notre attention sympathique.
C'est précisément à ce titre que nous avons été heureux d'accueillir dans la collection consacrée à l'œuvre philosophique d'Aristote l'ouvrage de M. Moraux sur les listes anciennes des

écrits du Stagirite. Car cet ouvrage nous apporte beaucoup plus que son titre ne permet de le soupçonner. Sans doute y trouvera-t-on un examen patient et consciencieux du contenu et de l'origine de ces listes. Mais pour découvrir ce qui se cache sous ces longues énumérations de titres dont la grosse part ne révèle quasiment rien au premier abord, il était nécessaire de replacer dans leur cadre aussi bien les listes elles-mêmes que chacun des écrits qui y sont relevés. M. Moraux s'y est employé avec un succès remarquable. Il s'est imposé la tâche ardue de rassembler les données innombrables propres à éclaircir le mystère de chacun des titres de ces listes. Il ne s'est pas contenté toutefois des renseignements épars, fournis par les auteurs de l'antiquité, sur l'activité d'Aristote ou des philosophes postérieurs ; il a su tirer des lumières inattendues de l'étude des traités conservés du Stagirite : en en scrutant le contenu, la structure, les procédés de composition, les expressions caractéristiques, il est parvenu à déceler, avec une sûreté de coup d'œil peu commune, le sens vrai de tel titre d'apparence anodine, ne suggérant de façon précise aucune œuvre nettement déterminée.

Il nous amène ainsi à reconnaître, sans contestation possible, que tels livres parfaitement connus d'un de nos traités, -- des Topiques, par exemple, -- figurent dans les listes sous des dénominations inattendues. Et par ce biais on apprend aussi de quelle indépendance relative ont joui, aux premiers temps de l'École, certaines parties -- livres ou groupes de livres -- des traités aristotéliciens considérés depuis des siècles comme formant une unité.

Par ces brèves indications, données à titre d'échantillon, nous espérons faire entrevoir en quelque mesure ce que l'on peut attendre du travail de M. Moraux. La manière même dont il a abordé son sujet l'a mené bien au-delà de l'interprétation immédiate des documents squelettiques qui font l'objet direct de son étude. Pour une bonne part, les écrits qui y sont simplement énumérés ont pu être replacés dans leur ambiance vivante et dans les circonstances concrètes où ils ont vu le jour. Par voie de conséquence, certaines dates ont pu être précisées de façon heureuse, ou du moins proposées avec une sérieuse probabilité. On est mis en présence d'Aristote en pleine activité au sein de son école, rassemblant avec ses disciples des documents de toute

sorte, constituant avec eux des collections de problèmes et d'exercices relatifs aux domaines les plus variés, mais composant aussi, de façon progressive, ses fameux traités qui devaient le rendre si célèbre plus tard.
A côté de cela, on nous montre, avec preuves à l'appui, le rétrécissement de plus en plus accentué du champ sur lequel s'est porté l'intérêt des représentants de l'École après les successeurs immédiats du maître. Ces disciples tardifs se cantonnent dans certains domaines, — logique et dialectique, entre autres, — rappelés par une profusion de titres dans les listes les plus anciennes. Ils semblent plier sous le poids d'un héritage trop lourd pour leurs faibles épaules et négligent, malgré leur importance, une série de traités de philosophie naturelle caractéristiques de la manière et des préoccupations du fondateur du Lycée.
C'est à la fin du Me siècle avant J.-C. que nous reportent en fait les documents envisagés. En étudiant de façon minutieuse les procédés de la catalographie alexandrine, M. Moraux a su montrer que les listes les plus anciennes d' d'Aristote (Diogène Laërce, Hésychius) n'appartiennent pas au milieu alexandrin, mais ont leur origine dans l'école péripatéticienne elle-même, vers la fin du IIIe siècle, un peu plus de cent ans après la mort du Stagirite. Elles proviennent d'un catalogue dressé à cette époque et dont l'auteur ne serait autre qu'Ariston de Céos, chef de l'École après Lycon. -- En même temps, les listes en question nous fournissent un précieux témoignage touchant la diffusion des traités aristotéliciens après Théophraste et avant l'édition d'Andronicus de Rhodes. Il en résulte une fois de plus qu'on ne peut ni refuser tout crédit, ni s'en tenir de façon exclusive à la tradition qui veut que tous les traités ou à peu près seraient restés enfouis durant plus de deux siècles dans une cave à Skepsis.
Cet aperçu, tout incomplet qu'il soit, ne laisse pas, croyons-nous, de mettre en lumière la richesse de contenu de l'ouvrage de M. Moraux et l'apport considérable qu'il représente pour notre connaissance de l'œuvre d'Aristote, de la formation et de l'origine de maints écrits qui y figurent, et du sort qui leur fut fait aux temps qui suivirent la mort du maître. Nous osons espérer que cette étude sera le point de départ de bien d'autres, visant à approfondir la genèse et la signification de bon nombre de ces

écrits qui n'ont pas encore livré à l'histoire tout le secret de leur origine, ni dévoilé à l'analyse toute la portée philosophique de leur contenu." (pp. V-VIII)

Préface de Augustin Mansion à Paul Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires 1951.

Oubli des scolaires d'Aristote dans le premier Peripatos

"Près de trois siècles s'écoulèrent entre le moment où furent écrits les scolaires d'Aristote et celui où l'activité des commentateurs en assura la diffusion dans le monde philosophique. Durant cette longue période, l'histoire des traités d'Aristote reste fort obscure. Strabon rapporte, à ce propos, une singulière histoire. La bibliothèque de Théophraste, qui contenait celle d'Aristote, fut transmise à Nélée par voie d'héritage. Nélée la fit transporter à Skepsis en Troade. Ses successeurs, des gens ignorants, l'enfouirent dans une cave pour la dissimuler à l'ardeur bibliophile des Attales. Longtemps après (au commencement du ter siècle avant J.-C.), les livres furent achetés par Apellicon ; celui-ci les publia en réparant maladroitement les dégâts faits par les vers et par l'humidité. La bibliothèque fut ensuite transportée par Sylla d'Athènes à Rome. Là, elle “passa par les mains” du grammairien Tyrannion, qui goûtait beaucoup Aristote. Les libraires se servirent souvent de copies fautives qu'ils ne collationnaient pas, ce qui arrive encore tous les jours, dit Strabon, aussi bien à Rome qu'à Alexandrie (1). Dans la *Vie de Sylla*, Plutarque raconte la même histoire ; il ajoute cependant qu'Andronicus de Rhodes acquit de Tyrannion des copies qu'il "publia et qu'il écrivit les tables (*pinakés*) qui circulaient encore à l'époque de Plutarque (2). Les deux auteurs signalent que les anciens Péripatéticiens, successeurs de Théophraste, n'avaient point les livres d'Aristote, si ce n'est en très petit nombre, et que, par conséquent, ils ne pouvaient pas philosopher sérieusement.

Dans ces récits, le mélange d'histoire et de légende est bien difficile à débrouiller. Strabon, le plus ancien auteur qui narre le sort des d'Aristote, n'écrivait guère qu'un demi-siècle après la découverte d 'Apellicon ; il était disciple de Tyrannion (3), avait étudié la philosophie aristotélicienne avec Boéthus de Sidon (4) et puisait souvent son information chez le stoïcien Posidonius, lequel témoignait un vif intérêt aux choses de l'aristotélisme (5). Toutes ces circonstances confèrent un certain poids à son témoignage.

D'ailleurs, l'école péripatéticienne elle-même semble avoir ignoré longtemps les scolaires d'Aristote. Straton fut sans doute le dernier à les utiliser, pour les combattre ; peut-être même ne les lisait-il plus et n'en connaissait-il les théories que par l'enseignement de Théophraste. Après Straton, le Lycée décline. Lycon n'est qu'un beau parleur ; l'éloquence l'intéresse plus que la philosophie. Ariston passe aussi pour un orateur plein d'élégance et pour un philosophe sans profondeur. Hiéronymus et Diodore, les moralistes de l'école, cherchent leur inspiration chez les Cyrénaïques, les Épicuriens et les Stoïciens. Critolaus, le seul Péripatéticien de l'époque qui ait quelque importance comme philosophe, utilise visiblement les dialogues d'Aristote et non ses ésotériques.

En dehors de l'école, on ne connaît pas davantage les traités scolaires du Stagirite. L 'adversaire le plus acharné de l'aristotélisme, Épicure, dirige ses attaques contre les dialogues. L' *Eudème*, le *Protreptique*, le *De Philosophia*, le *Banquet* et d'autres exotériques font l'objet de ses critiques. Il ne tient compte ni du *De Anima*, ni de l' *Éthique*, ni de la *Métaphysique*, ni des autres traités dont les théories différaient, sur bien des points, de celles des dialogues (6). Cependant, Épicure fut l'hôte d'Athènes dès 323, année où Aristote prit sa retraite à Chalcis en Eubée. Il était alors âgé de dix-huit ans et s'occupait de philosophie depuis plusieurs années. Quand il revint à Athènes et y ouvrit une école, après avoir enseigné à Mytilène et à Lampsaque, Aristote était mort depuis quinze ans. Dans ces conditions, les traités ésotériques ne lui auraient pas échappé, s'ils avaient joui d'une certaine diffusion à Athènes.

Dans leur polémique contre l'école péripatéticienne, Colotès et Diogène d'Œnoanda se contentent de reproduire les arguments

d'Épicure. D 'autre part, les Épicuriens associent dans leurs attaques l'Académie et le Lycée, comme si l'enseignement des deux écoles était le même ; pareille confusion n'aurait pas été commise si l'on avait connu les traités ésotériques, où Aristote établissait sa position antiplatonicienne. La thèse syncrétiste d'un Antiochus d'Ascalon, affirmant l'unité foncière des doctrines de l'Académie, du Lycée et du Portique, ne se justifie pas autrement. Il semble d'ailleurs que Cicéron, le disciple d'Antiochus, ne connaisse d'Aristote que les publiés, les dialogues.
Pendant près de trois cents ans, les traités du Stagirite sont donc demeurés inconnus de la plupart des philosophes. Ce fait confirme, dans une certaine mesure, le récit de Strabon et de Plutarque. Cependant, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que nous connaissons mal l'histoire philosophique des siècles pendant lesquels, selon Strabon, les écrits d'Aristote demeurèrent cachés à Skepsis. Les penseurs de cette époque n'ont laissé aucune grande œuvre qui nous soit parvenue : nous n'avons que des fragments transmis par des auteurs parfois très tardifs (7). Dans ces conditions, il est bien téméraire d'affirmer qu'un philosophe ou qu'une école de ce temps ignorait tel ou tel ouvrage d'Aristote. Peut-être les traités du Stagirite étaient-ils connus, mais peu prisés ; il n'est pas nécessaire d'en admettre la disparition pour expliquer l'oubli dans lequel ils tombèrent (8)." (pp. 1-3)

Notes

(1) Strabon, XIII, 608-609.
(2) Plutarque, *Sylla*, 26.
(3) Strabon, XII, 548.
(4) Strabon, XVI, 757.
(5) Strabon, II, 104. Cfr R. Zimmermann, *Posidonius und Strabo*, dans *Hermes*, XXIII, 1888, pp. 103-130.
(6) Sur la connaissance qu'il a pu avoir des *Analytique*s et des de physique, cfr infra, p. 4 et n. 9.
(7) M. F. Wehrli a commencé à réunir les fragmenta des Péripatéticiens sous le titre *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar*, B. Schwabe, Basel. Sont parus jusqu'ici : I, *Dikaiarchos* (1944) ; II, *Aristoxenos* (1945) ; III, Klearchos (1948) ; IV, Demetrios von Phaleron (1949).

(8) L'étude des traités scolaires n'a peut-être pas été absolument négligée : un assez long morceau de l'ouvrage d 'Ocellus (§ 20-35) présente d'incontestables analogies avec le *De generatione et corruptione* ; à cause de cette circonstance, Diels (*Doxographi Graeci*, p. 187 ss.) croit qu'Ocellus a vécu après Andronicus. Mais le bien-fondé de cette déduction est contesté par Harder, dont voici la thèse : Ocellus n'a pas utilisé directement Aristote ; il s'est contenté de reproduire un commentaire, fort imprécis et de maigre valeur, au deuxième livre du D *e gen. et corr.* ; ce commentaire n'est probablement rien autre qu'un cours provenant d'Athènes ; il est si médiocre que l'on ne peut le croire postérieur à la renaissance de l'aristotélisme ; les arguments qui tendent à démontrer qu'Ocellus a vécu avant Andronicus restent donc valables. Cfr. : Richard Harder, *Ocellus Lucanus*, Berlin, 1926, pp. 97 et 110-111 (= *Neue philologische Untersuchungen*, I).

Extrait de : Paul Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires 1951.

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2) Les écrits successifs de Paul Moraux sur Diogène Laërce

"Parmi les autres documents très précieux que nous devons à Diogène, il faut mentionner les "catalogues" des d'Aristote (13), Théophraste (14), Straton (15), Démétrius de Phalère (16) et Héraclide Pontique (17). Celui d'Aristote, que j'ai étudié en détail il y a quelque 35 ans (18), mérite de retenir particulièrement notre attention. Il s'agit manifestement d'un document très ancien, antérieur à la mise en ordre du corpus par Andronicus de Rhodes. Plusieurs grands traités scolaires, et des plus importants, n'y sont pas mentionnés. Pour d'autres, comme les *Topiques*, chaque livre figure encore isolément, sous un titre particulier. En revanche, on y trouve à peu près au complet les dialogues et autres exotériques, qui ne devaient pas tarder à disparaître après la diffusion des scolaires. La liste mentionne aussi une foule de travaux et recueils destinés aux exercices de l'école, et qu'on n'a pas reproduits dans la suite. Elle contient une série de grandes collections documentaires telles que les Constitutions, les Didascalies, les Listes de vainqueurs, etc. Tout cela montre bien que celui qui a dressé la liste ne disposait pas encore des travaux

d'Andronicus, mais avait connaissance d' que le Rhodien n'a probablement pas repris dans son édition. Par ailleurs, les d'Aristote y sont groupés dans un ordre encore perceptible, en dépit d'accidents mineurs et de l'incertitude de l'une ou l'autre identification. On trouve en tête les exoterica, suivis d'extraits de Platon et d' consacrés au platonisme. Vient alors une longue série d' proprement scientifiques, classés par disciplines : de logique, consacrés aux disciplines pratiques et poétiques et aux sciences théorétiques. On trouve ensuite des aide-mémoires en tout genre (les écrits dits hypomnématiques), puis des collections et finalement des documents d'ordre privé, les lettres et les poèmes. Si nous nous tournons vers la liste de Straton, nous constatons que l'ordre dans lequel sont énumérés les est assez semblable à celui qu'offre la liste d'Aristote. À l'une ou l'autre exception près, les premiers titres ont trait à l'éthique et à la politique. Vient ensuite une série de 25 titres environ consacrée, en gros, à la philosophie naturelle. Une troisième section, d'une dizaine de titres, groupe des ayant manifestement trait à la logique. De même que le pinacographe d'Aristote avait groupé à part les collections, les hypomnemata et les lettres, celui de Straton mentionne en fin de liste un catalogue d'inventions, des hypomnemata d'authenticité douteuse et enfin les lettres de notre philosophe (19).

Le *pinax* de Théophraste se présente, lui, sous un aspect très différent. Comme Usener l'a bien montré dans sa dissertation doctorale (20), il est fait en réalité de quatre parties distinctes : a) une liste alphabétique de 108 titres ; b) une seconde liste alphabétique, de 65 titres ; elle énumère sans doute les nouvelles acquisitions faites par la bibliothèque à laquelle appartenaient les mentionnés dans le premier tronçon du catalogue ; c) une série de 29 titres cités pêle-mêle ; il s'agit sans doute d'acquisitions qui n'ont pas encore été mises en ordre, et dont on n'a pas supprimé les titres faisant double emploi avec ceux d'autres parties de la liste : d) enfin, une nouvelle liste alphabétique de 22 titres, dont l'ordre a été quelque peu troublé par l'insertion intempestive de quatre titres en fin de liste.

Que peut-on conclure de la comparaison de ces listes ? D'une part, nous savons qu'Hermippos, élève et successeur de Callimaque, s'était intéressé à l'authenticité des de Théophraste et

avait dressé une *anagraphé* de ceux-ci. Il y a donc de bonnes chances que le catalogue reproduit par Diogène soit l'œuvre d'Hermippos et ait été rédigé à partir du catalogue de la grande bibliothèque d'Alexandrie. L'ordre alphabétique, du reste, est particulièrement commode pour grouper, dans un catalogue de bibliothèque, les d'un seul et même auteur (21). Mais alors, les catalogues d'Aristote et de Straton remonteraient-ils aussi à Hermippos, comme on l'admet assez couramment ? Le même bibliothécaire-pinacographe aurait-il soigneusement classé les d'Aristote et de Straton en respectant à la fois les grandes articulations de la philosophie et certaines pratiques habituelles dans la confection des catalogues systématiques, mais adopté pour Théophraste le principe du classement alphabétique ? Une telle hypothèse semble difficile à admettre, et on est tenté de dire que si le catalogue de Théophraste est bien d'Hermippos, ceux d'Aristote et de Straton ne peuvent être de lui (22). En partant de ces considérations, j'ai suggéré, dans mes *Listes anciennes*, que le catalogue d'Aristote devait avoir été rédigé dans l'école péripatéticienne elle-même et était probablement tiré de l'ouvrage d'Ariston de Céos sur les scolarques ses prédécesseurs. Cette thèse a, on le sait, été approuvée par les uns et rejetée par les autres (23). Aujourd'hui, j'hésite à me prononcer. Ce sont surtout les lacunes très importantes de la liste qui me paraissent militer contre la thèse de son origine péripatéticienne ; il est en effet peu probable, en principe, que le Lycée, même en pleine décadence, n'ait pas conservé au moins un exemplaire de pragmaties aussi importantes que le *De caelo*, le *De generatione et corruptione*, les *Météorologiques*, le *De anima* et l' *Éthique à Nicomaque*. Dans une étude récente, R. Blum soutient la thèse que la bibliothèque de Nélée, qui contenait les livres d'Aristote et de Théophraste, aurait été acquise par la grande bibliothèque d'Alexandrie, où auraient été dressées les listes conservées par Diogène. Il n'ignore pas, bien sûr, la différence fondamentale entre le catalogue "alphabétique" de Théophraste et le catalogue "systématique" d'Aristote, mais il se débarrasse assez cavalièrement de la difficulté : d'après lui, la liste de Théophraste représenterait une exception, un essai d'Hermippos pour classer alphabétiquement les d'un même auteur ; cet essai n'aurait pas eu de succès et serait resté sans lendemain (24).“ pp. 249-252

Notes

(13) V 73
(14) V 22-27
(15) V 42-50
(16) V 59-60
(17) V 86-88
(18) P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951
(19) Sur le catalogue de Straton, voir, en dernier lieu, M. Gatzemeier, *Die Naturphilosophie des Straton von Lampsakos*, Meisenheim am Glan 1970, pp. 38-43.
(20) H. Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea*, diss. Bonn, Leipzig 1858, pp. 1-24.
(21) Sur le catalogue de Théophraste, voir la bonne mise au point d'O. Regenbogen, s.v. *Theophrastos* (n. 3), in RE Supplbd. VII (1940) coll. 1363-70 : le catalogue doit être d'Hermippos ; il donne les en possession de la bibliothèque d'Alexandrie.
(22) Dans le même sens, F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar*, Basel 1944-1959, IV, pp. 56-7 : les catalogues d'Aristote et de Straton, dont l'origine reste mystérieuse, ne présentent aucune trace d'ordre alphabétique. “Hermipp als Urheber [...] kommt nicht in Betracht, wenn auf diesen das alphabetische Theophrastregister bei Diogenes Laertios V 42 ff. zurückgeht”. (23) *Status quaestionis* dans P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, I, p. 4 note 2.
(24) R. Blum, *Kallimachos und die Literaturverzeichnung bei den Griechen. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Biobibliographie*, (Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens, XVIII 1-2) Frankfurt am Main 1977 p. 125.
Extrait de : Paul Moraux, "Diogène Laërce et le *Peripatos*", *Elenchos*, 7, 1986, pp. 245-294.

VOIR AUSSI

Listes Anciennes des Oeuvres d'Aristote: Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Les Listes Anciennes des d'Aristote : Deuxième Partie

Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib

Première Partie : Diogène Laërce, Vies, V 22-27

A) La Vita Menagiana (Anonymus Menagii) attribuée à Hésychius de Milet

LES ÉTUDES DE PAUL MORAUX

1) Le livre *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires, 1951

"La *Vita Menagiana* d'Aristote (1) se termine par une liste d' dont la première partie ressemble fort à la liste de Diogène. Même si cette vie anonyme n'est autre que l'article ' *Aristoteles*' de l' *Onomatologue* d'Hésychius de Milet (2), son origine demeure obscure, car les sources d'Hésychius n'ont pas encore été identifiées avec certitude (3). Il est donc impossible d'en déterminer a priori les rapports avec Diogène Laërce.
La liste anonyme se divise en trois parties. La première compte cent trente-neuf titres (4) et correspond à peu près à la liste de Diogène ; la seconde, plus courte, se compose de quarante-six titres, dont certains figurent déjà dans la première partie, tandis

que d'autres sont nouveaux ; la troisième est faite de dix titres d' donnés comme pseudépigraphes." pp. 195-196
(...)
"Vingt-cinq titres de la liste anonyme occupent une place différente de celle qu'ils ont chez Diogène ; ils ne sont cependant jamais fort éloignés de la place qu'ils devraient occuper si l'ordre des deux listes était identique.
L'ordonnance primitive de la liste a été conservée plus fidèlement par Diogène que par l'Anonyme. (...)
Un examen attentif de la liste anonyme permet d'affirmer que les déplacements de titres ne sont pas dus à une volonté formelle d'améliorer la liste ou d'y introduire un nouveau principe d'ordre. De toute évidence, les modifications ont été exécutées sans but ; elles sont bien plus le produit d'un hasard aveugle que l'œuvre d'une intelligence ordonnatrice. Elles doivent, à notre avis, s'expliquer en grande partie par des accidents survenus au cours des copies successives de la liste. L'auteur de la *Vita* avait sous les yeux un catalogue qui s'était déjà altéré au cours des siècles, et les copistes qui nous transmirent la *Vit*a ne manquèrent point d'ajouter encore aux fautes existantes. Il suffit, en effet, d'une légère distraction pour que l'on oublie plusieurs titres en transcrivant de semblables listes. Les copistes commettent souvent des omissions de ce genre ; ils tentent bien de réparer leurs bévues, en ajoutant en marge ou entre les lignes les titres oubliés. Mais ceux qui transcrivent un texte ainsi surchargé ne savent pas toujours où il faut insérer les additions : la porte est ouverte aux bouleversements de l'ordre primitif.
(...)
L'étude comparative des deux listes nous a permis d'arriver aux conclusions suivantes : la liste anonyme n'a pas été copiée directement sur celle de Diogène ; elle conserve en effet des vestiges d'un texte meilleur ou plus complet (6) ; la présence de ceux-ci serait incompréhensible si l'Anonyme ou sa source n'avait eu sous les yeux que le texte de Diogène. En outre, la liste anonyme contient cinq titres absents de celle de Diogène, ceux de la *Métaphysique* et de quatre écrits hypomnématiques ; or, le texte de Diogène présente justement une lacune de cinq titres dans la quatrième colonne, où devaient se trouver la *Métaphysique* et les hypomnemata : alors que les trois premières

colonnes comptent trente-cinq titres, la quatrième n'en compte que trente. La conclusion s'impose : les cinq titres propres à l'Anonyme sont ceux qu'a perdus Diogène ; la liste anonyme ne peut donc pas dériver du texte lacuneux de Diogène. Heitz et Howald ont vu juste : les deux listes remontent à une source commune ; celle-ci est postérieure à la transcription du pinax en cinq colonnes, au déplacement du *peri pathon*, et de l' *Éthique* et à l'interpolation des *Physiognomiques,* des *Iatrika*, des *Catégories* et du *De interpretatione* ; elle présentait un certain nombre de fautes qui ont passé dans les deux listes, notamment des mauvaises coupes de titres (7) et des erreurs de lecture (...)
Le texte de Diogène demeure assez proche de sa source ; il en conserve fidèlement l'ordre ; de ci, de là, il laisse bien tomber l'un ou l'autre morceau de titre, mais ces suppressions n'ont, d'ordinaire, aucune gravité (11) ; son principal défaut est l'omission de cinq titres, dont celui de la *Métaphysique*.
Le texte de l'Anonyme présente des altérations de loin plus graves et plus nombreuses. Il n'est pas impossible d'établir en partie dans quel ordre celles-ci se sont succédé.
Certaines confusions de chiffres, notamment celles de 'α' avec 'γ' et de 'γ' avec 'δ' n'ont pu se produire que dans l'ancienne onciale ; elles sont antérieures à l'ère chrétienne (12). Or, ces fautes sont propres à la liste anonyme ; elles n'apparaissent pas chez Diogène. La source commune de l'Anonyme et de Diogène (le catalogue déjà fautif dérivant du *pinax* en cinq colonnes interpolé) ne les connaissait pas ; elle est donc nécessairement antérieure à l'ère chrétienne.
Les chiffres de quelques livres ont été corrigés intentionnellement, pour mettre la liste d'accord avec les éditions d'une époque donnée ; ces corrections doivent avoir été opérées après le premier tiers du second siècle de notre ère (13). La suppression des doublets et les corrections savantes de certains titres remontent vraisemblablement au personnage qui a jugé bon de rectifier les chiffres. D'autre part, la suppression des doublets est antérieure à l'addition de l'appendice : dans le cas contraire, le correcteur aurait supprimé les nombreux titres qui y font double emploi avec ceux de la première partie (tels sont : 145, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 161, 163, 167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176 ?, 177, 181, 182).
Les rectifications de chiffres sont, elles aussi, antérieures à

l'addition de l'appendice ; autrement, un correcteur s'intéressant au nombre des *volumina* n'aurait pas toléré que plus de la moitié des titres de l'appendice manquent de cette indication bibliographique ; si son modèle avait laissé à désirer à ce point de vue, il l'aurait complété, du moins en partie, d'après les matériaux dont il disposait. L'addition de l'appendice fut faite après l'intervention du premier correcteur ; elle est donc postérieure au premier tiers du second siècle après J.-C.
Les modifications apportées à la forme des titres (addition de *perí*, de *biblion*, etc.) remontent à un autre correcteur ; celui-ci ne connaît guère le contenu des dont il lit les titres et son intervention est parfois malheureuse : il fait précéder d'un *perí*, comme s'il s'agissait de traités théoriques, des listes de divisions ou des didascalies (...).
Quant aux bouleversements apportés à l'ordre primitif dans la liste anonyme, ils ne peuvent être datés ; il en va de même des fautes accidentelles affectant l'énoncé de certains titres.
Les transformations successives du catalogue sont représentées par le tableau suivant, que nous préciserons plus loin, quand nous aurons analysé l' *appendix hesychiana*." (pp. 204-209)



Notes

(*) *Observationes et emendationes in Diogenem Laertium* Paris 1663 (réimprimé à Londres 1664) : *Observationibus ad librum V Diogenis Laertii,* p. 202 ss. [Note de R. Corazzon]
(1) Cette vie anonyme fut éditée pour la première fois par Égide [Gilles]Ménage, en appendice à son édition de Diogène Laërce (*). Elle avait été communiquée à Ménage par un avocat d'Angers, Philippe Loyauté, qui ne dit point d'où il la tenait (cfr. [Aemilius] Heitz, *Aristotelis Fragmenta* [1869], p. 5) ; on la retrouve dans un manuscrit de Patmos, décrit par Tischendorf (*Wiener Jahrbücher*, 110, *Anz. Bl.*, p. 17), et dans le Codex Ambrosianus R 117. Les plus récentes éditions sont, à notre connaissance, celles de Flach dans *Hesychii Milesii Onomatologi quae supersunt*, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 245-249, et de Rose dans *Aristotelis q. f. librorum fragmenta,* Leipzig, 1886, pp. 9-18. [Voir la Bibliographie pour les éditions plus récentes].
(2) Rose a, le premier, défendu cette thèse dans son *De Arist. libror. ord. et auctoritate*, Berlin, 1854, pp. 48-50. La *Vie* anonyme et celle de Suidas se correspondent textuellement, à cette différence près, que Suidas ne donne pas la liste des œuvres. Or, on sait que la source principale de Suidas est, pour les parties biographiques de l'ouvrage, l' *Épitomé* de l' *Onomatologue* d'Hésychius (cfr. Suidas, s. v. *Hesuchios*, et A. Adler, dans *RE*, s. v. *Suidas*, col. 706-707). La *Vie* anonyme est donc tirée de l' *Onomatologue* non encore abrégé. Cette thèse est admise entre autres par Susemihl, *Aristoteles Politik*, p. XLIII ; Schneider, *Callimachea*, II, p. 26 ; Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, p. 15 et *Aristotelis, Fragmenta*, p. 5 ; Nietzsche, dans Rheinische Museum, XXIV, 1869, p. 216 ; Maass, *De biographis graecis*, pp. 81 et 119 ; G. Wentzel, *Hesychiana*, dans Hermes, XXXIII, 1898, p. 276, et H. Schultz, dans *RE*, s. v, *Hesychios* 10. Elle est rejetée par Flach, *Untersuchungen zu Suidas und Eudokia*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 93, que nous n'avons pas pu consulter, et *Hesych. Mil. Onomat.*, p XIX, note 1, où l'auteur ne donne aucun argument.
(3) L'état de la question est résumé par H. Schultz, *l.l.*, qui conclut qu'aucun résultat certain n'est acquis.

(4) l'édition de Ménage, don Heitz, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, pp. 5-9 reproduit la liste, est fautive et lacuneuse ; Rose, *Aristotelis g. f. librorum fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1886, l'a considérablement amendée.
(7) Dans *Aristot. Opera*, V, p. 1467, app. crit. ad 107.
(11) Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 2 p. 103, n. 1, *sub fine*.
12) Cfr *supra*, p. 202, n. 20.
Cfr *supra*, p. 203. Il ne faut pas s'étonner que le correcteur n'ait pas amendé les erreurs de chiffres résultant de confusions paléographiques : celles-ci affectaient, pour la plupart, des qui n'étaient plus guère en circulation au second siècle après J.-C

Extrait de : Paul Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires 1951.

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2) Les écrits successifs de Paul Moraux sur la *Vita Menagiana*

(en préparation)

B) La liste de Ptolémée el Garib (en préparation)

"La liste de Ptolémée diffère, par plus d'un aspect, des documents étudiés jusqu'ici. Nous en connaissons l'auteur, du moins de nom. Nous savons aussi qu'elle est relativement récente : elle est postérieure aux classiques travaux d'Andronicus et date d'une époque où le corpus aristotélicien avait, à peu de chose près, pris la forme qu'il a conservée jusqu'aujourd'hui. Enfin, les témoins qui nous l'ont transmise sont très tardifs ; ce sont deux Arabes du début du treizième siècle ; comme bien on pense, les intermédiaires, et notamment les traducteurs, n'ont pas été sans faire subir au document plus d'une transformation.
Par bonheur, cette liste a, bien plus que les précédentes, retenu l'attention des érudits : les témoins arabes ont été traduits à plus

d'une reprise et la liste elle-même a fait l'objet de bonnes monographies, au premier rang desquelles il convient de signaler celle de Baumstark. Notre tâche sera donc assez simple : nous résumerons à grands traits les résultats acquis ; nous redresserons, à l'occasion, l'une ou l'autre erreur de détail et surtout nous tâcherons de faire la lumière sur certaines questions qui n'ont pas intéressé nos devanciers. Étant donné la date de sa composition, la liste de Ptolémée ne présente d'ailleurs pour nous qu'un intérêt secondaire : elle nous servira de jalon pour montrer le chemin parcouru depuis Ariston, et, en outre, elle nous permettra de constater la longue survivance des principes d'ordre adoptés par ce pinacographe ; en revanche, comme elle est indubitablement postérieure à Andronicus, elle ne peut pas nous apprendre grand 'chose sur l'état du corpus avant l'activité de ce savant." (p. 289)

Extrait de : Paul Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des d'Aristote*, Louvain : Éditions universitaires 1951.

VOIR AUSSI

Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote: Diogène Laërce, *Vies*, V 22-27

PAGES EN ANGLAIS

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The Rediscovery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the Beginning of the Commentary Tradition

Bibliography on the Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle and the *Corpus Aristotelicum*

Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives*, V 22-27

Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: Hesychius and Ptolemy al-Garib

Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laërtius. A Bibliography

Theory and History of Ontology

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The Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

THE GREEK COMMENTARY TRADITION

"More than any other philosophical current of the Imperial period, Aristotelianism operated as a commentary tradition. Based on the texts of the Master -- on their precise wording and terminology -- Aristotelian philosophy found in the commentary format not only a means of transmission, but also a preferred tool for the development of doctrine. A closed system, but not a static one, it evolved in two main directions: internal consistency and external competitiveness. Thus, the basic aim was, on the one hand, systematic coherence and didactical proficiency; on the other, fuller responsiveness to the various issues that emerged in the long span of time between Aristotle and the last traces of an Aristotelian school.
In a broad sense, one can see a development of this sort starting from the early Peripatos, among Aristotle's immediate successors, Eudemus and Theophrastus. But a major part of the process -- namely, work on the texts of Aristotle -- probably came to a halt in the next generation. We are told that the libraries of Aristotle and Theophrastus were dispersed, while the dialogues and the more popular texts remained in circulation (the so-called exoteric works, i.e. those written for publication outside the school). As a matter of fact, the Aristotelian legacy among masters and teachers of the Hellenistic period was often elementary and non-specialized, open to various influences from other contemporary schools, especially Stoicism.

The development of Aristotelianism into a commentary tradition was not completed until the first centuries of the Christian era. This development presupposes, above all, the accessibility of the treatises or *pragmateiai* written by Aristotle for his own school (the so-called 'esoteric' works). Here, according to the commonly held view, a decisive role was played by the editorial activity of Andronicus, a Peripatetic scholarch who arranged them and made them accessible during the first century BC. Toward the end of the century, these treatises were available again, or became available for the first time (as seems to have been the case with the *Metaphysics* as a whole, although some of its individual books were already listed among Aristotle's works). The Aristotelian corpus was largely accessible to the 'early commentators', in particular to Boethus of Sidon, a pupil of Andronicus, and to Nicolaus of Damascus. The latter's compendium of Aristotelian philosophy implies the circulation of a *Metaphysics* not too far in content and shape from the one we do have, with the same title, *Meta to physika*.
A major qualitative change took place in the course of the second century AD, when the commentary tradition adopted the specific aims of a period of archaizing and of a return to the classics. Literary Atticism is one of the best-known expressions of this archaizing tendency, which saw in the ancients both a timeless model for stylistic imitation and, in the context of philosophy, a legacy of truth that could be neither extended nor surpassed. This is why the commentary gained such a central position in Aristotelian literature. Still, it was conceived as something to be used, rather than as a product with a cultural value of its own. For this reason, the successive stages of the commentary tradition tend to obliterate one another. A new commentary on a given work of Aristotle thus appropriated, not without criticism and selection, the interpretative legacy of the preceding commentary. At this point the earlier commentary could cease to be consulted and transmitted and so often came to be lost. In the new commentary, both recent and earlier components co-exist in successive layers, often without distinction, so that it is difficult to determine what the most recent commentator has himself contributed and what he has inherited from his predecessors. For both reasons, therefore, commentaries tend to be an impersonal

product: both because of their original purpose -- to help the reader of a text written by someone else -- and because of the peculiar dynamics of their use and transmission. Within the Peripatetic tradition, the personality of the commentator is overshadowed not only by the authority of the Master, but also by the collective authority of the school.

We are now in a position to understand the first basic difficulty that the history of philosophy faces in attempting to give an account of the work of commentators and, hence, in evaluating the Aristotelianism of late antiquity. The evidence is plentiful, but it does not sufficiently explain the activity of individuals. This difficulty is further increased by another factor: the theoretical foundations of nineteenth-century history of philosophy, which inevitably persist in categorizations and evaluations that still have an influence, especially in areas that are not yet fully explored. This approach concentrated, on the one hand, on important individuals, and, on the other, on the reconstruction, through 'successions' or *diadochai*, of a progressive development of ideas that, from imperfect and embryonic beginnings, came to be displayed in all their fullness and power. In both respects, the historical approach has been opposite to the emphases and aims of the commentary tradition itself, which tends to play down the intermediary contributions while looking backward to the past in order to search for (or to reconstruct) a timeless truth, held to be definitively contained in the foundational texts of the school.

Such historiographical difficulties have led to negative judgements on the culture of commentaries. Hence its summary treatment -- if not complete neglect -- in many scholastic manuals, where the commentary seems to be just a dry and long-winded repetition of what is already contained in the texts of the great masters. Nor has the commentary tradition been judged any less critically where it has been possible to point out differences between Aristotle's and a commentator's Aristotelianism: this kind of instances have led to harsh accusations, both of deliberate betrayal, and of incompetence and misunderstanding of the original text.

The rediscovery of the work of the commentators as a living tradition of re-workings of Aristotle's philosophy, and not just of its transmission (or distortion), has taken place only in our own

day. And even now, this does not mean that the relevant problems mentioned have been resolved in a single way, nor that methodological principles of inquiry have been firmly and generally agreed on. Rather, specific interests and contexts have prompted the different, particular direction that research on individual topics has followed (...). But it is precisely this plurality of complementary approaches that is producing now one of the richest, most lively and dynamic fields of research in ancient philosophy." (pp. 3-8) (notes omitted)

From: Silvia Fazzo, *Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition*, in: P. Adamson, F. Baltussen and M. W. F. Stone (eds.), *Philosophy, Sscience and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, London; Institute of Classical Studies 2004, Vol. One, pp. 1-19.

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overview of the tradition of commenting on Aristotle, and of the study of this tradition in the modern era. It concludes with an up-to-date bibliography of scholarship devoted to the commentators. Volume Two deals with commentaries in Arabic, including a paper on the reception of Arabic interpretations of Aristotle's *De anima* in Latin during the Renaissance." (From the Preface)

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"In the first century BCE Aristotle was subject to an intense textual study. This study eventually led to the appropriation of the conceptual apparatus developed in his writings. In the case of Xenarchus, the relevant apparatus was Aristotle's theory of motion, with an emphasis on the concepts of natural place and natural motion. Xenarchus reworked Aristotle's theory of motion so as to make the celestial simple body expendable. While I do not deny that some of his views are best understood in light of the debates of late Hellenestic philosophy, I contend that his textual engagement presupposes the distance from Aristotle that is characteristic of Post-Hellenistic philosophy."

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Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Notes on Contributors X; Andrea Falcon: Introduction 1;
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"The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle *Categories*, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch and Porphyry, the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the *Categories* and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure treatise. But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also discussed the *Categories* and played an important role in crafting its interpretation during the first centuries of our era. For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the *Categories*' value as a treatment of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic. These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the shape of subsequent philosophy and philosophical education within and beyond the Aristotelian tradition ."

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"Le présent article décrit les différents types de schémas introductifs contenus dans les commentaires des néoplatoniciens tardifs sur les ceuvres d'Aristote et de Platon, en essayant de déterminer leur signification exégétique ainsi que l'origine de plusieurs d'entre eux. Il apparaît que les deux schémas en dix points qui introduisent respectivement à la philosophie d'Aristote et à celle de Platon ont de toute vraisemblance été codifiés par Proclus au V siècle de notre ère, tandis que certains points des schémas en six points introduisant aux différents traités

d'Aristote ou aux divers dialogues de Platon apparaissent déjà au III siècle chez Origène qui a dû s'inspirer des commentaires platoniciens de son temps." p. 99

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"[The essay] lucidly presents continuous commentaries on philosophical works focusing on their *Sitz im Leben* in the instruction of a circle of students with a specific level of knowledge. She briefly discusses formal aspects, and then focuses on the syncretistic tendencies regarding the philosophical schools, the educational function of the introductions to single treatises, the gradually increasing level of difficulty as challenge for the developing student, and the act of interpretation as religious deed." Frm the review by Daniel Stökl Ben Ezra (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2004.03.46).
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"Neoplatonic thought at the end of antiquity -- like that of most of the schools of the Hellenistic and Roman period -- has an essentially exegetical and scholastic dimension. Beginning with the classical and Hellenistic period, philosophy in Greece is inseparable from the existence of schools (private or public), often organized as places of communal life *(sunousia),* in which the explication of the texts of the school's founders came to be one of the main activities.(1) The practice of exegesis of written texts supplanted the ancient practice of dialogue. It was sustained through its application to canonical texts, and was put to everyday use in the framework of courses in the explication of texts. The social reality of the school as an institution, with its hierarchy, its *diadochos* (i.e., the successor to the school's founder), its structure as a conventicle in which communal life was practiced, its library, its regulation of time, and its programs organized around the reading of canonical texts, constitutes a concrete context into which we should reinsert the practice of exegesis, which is the heart of philosophical pedagogy and the matrix of doctrinal and dogmatic works." p. 597
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"Le présent volume constitue les Actes du colloque "Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive", qui a eu lieu à l'Université de Genève du 29 septembre au 1er octobre 2006.
Il s'agit du premier colloque international de philosophie antique à avoir été consacré intégralement au philosophe Syrianus (Ve siècle après J.-C.), maître de Proclus et diadoque de l'École platonicienne d'Athènes. Syrianus est un philosophe important pour la force de sa pensée et pour la grande influence qu'il a eue dans la tradition platonicienne de l'Antiquité tardive Malgré cela, il reste encore trop peu connu et étudié. Son Commentaire sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, dans lequel il développe une défense rigoureuse des réalités intelligibles et de leur connaissance scientifique, en réaction contre Aristote et la tradition péripatéticienne, est particulièrement important. En effet, il est l'un des rares platoniciens de l'époque à ne pas vouloir réaliser à tout prix une conciliation entre les doctrines de Platon et celles d'Aristote, et à critiquer de faon âpre ce dernier en matière de métaphysique, tout en gardant les apports aristotéliciens en matière de logique.
Cette initiative s'inscrit dans un projet scientifique plus large (commencé en avril 2004) concernant l'étude systématique de la notion de dialectique et son emploi dans

les Écoles platoniciennes d'Athènes et d'Alexandrie du Ve au vie siècle après J.-C. Ce projet, dont j'assure la coordination, est soutenu par le Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique.
Les contributions des spécialistes de la tradition platonicienne, réunis à cette occasion, ont traité des différents aspects du projet philosophique de Syrianus ainsi que de son savoir littéraire et rhétorique, sans négliger la question de l'état de la tradition manuscrite de ses ouvrages. Les multiples articles du présent volume ont été rassemblés en deux parties selon les thèmes suivants: la première partie, après un aperu général et un bilan critique concernant l'apport des différents manuscrits du Commentaire sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote (dont certains sont pris en compte pour la première fois), traite de l'astronomie, de la matière et des nombres, de l'âme et du monde intelligible; dans la deuxième partie il est question de l'éventuelle harmonisation entre Platon et Aristote, de la logique, de la conception de la science, ainsi que du mythe et du savoir rhétorique. En outre, deux contributions qui n'ont pas fait l'objet d'une présentation orale lors du Colloque ont été ajoutées au volume, car elles apportent des approfondissements complémentaires sur la théologie et la logique de Syrianus." pp. 15-16

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Supplementary volume 17 to the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.
"The neo-Platonism of Aristotle's Greek Commentators leaves them unable to take with full seriousness the Categories doctrine that individual organisms like this human being or that horse are the primary realities. Yet

these Commentators stand with Michael Frede and G. E. L. Owen against john Ackrill in reading 1a24-5 in such a way that Aristotle can really mean what he says when he maintains that all other things besides primary substances are either said of them, or in them, as subjects. not only are this grey and this color in the old grey mare, grey and color are there, too."

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    In the third volume see the Fourth Chapter: *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik,* pp. 423-510.
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    "In this paper I shall be considering the emergence, or rather re-emergence, of Platonic commentary around the

end of the Hellenistic age. That is the period which forms the essential background to our chief surviving specimens of the genre, the great fifth-century Platonic commentaries of Proclus. Specifically, I intend to examine why Platonic philosophy came to such a large extent to take the form of commentary, and how the resources of the commentary format were deployed for the task of establishing, preserving, and exploiting Plato's philosophical authority. I have explored this theme, mainly with reference to the Epicureans, in [226] 97-119. The present paper tries to take the same discussion further, with occasional modifications to what I said there.

For three reasons, Rome provides a peculiarly apt vantage-point from which to observe the process. First, the philosophical centre of gravity having shifted away from Athens, Rome had now become more of a magnet to philosophers than at any previous time. Both Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, who fought for Plato's mantle in the Academy's dying phase, were known at Rome, and each had close links with a network of influential Roman figures. Second, by far our most voluminous and eloquent witness to that battle is a Roman, Cicero. And third, the Romans had one unusual advantage over the Greeks. They had the right word: *auctoritas*. As the Greeks themselves admitted, *auctoritas* was a concept inexpressible in their own language Yet it is this Latin word which, by combining the notions of leadership, ownership, prestige, and validation, most informatively conveys the commanding status that the founder (the *auctor)* of a Greek philosophical system held in the eyes of its subsequent adherents. Such a linguistic advantage, along with his lifetime adhesion to the Academy, makes Cicero a uniquely valuable witness to, and commentator on, the refurbishment of Plato's *auctoritas* among first-century BC Academics. (Just because the Greek language could not express the notion of *auctoritas,* it does not follow that the phenomenon which it describes was absent from Greek philosophical schools.) And without an understanding of that background, there is no hope of

seeing how and why, in the immediate aftermath, Platonists turned to the writing of commentaries.
To illuminate the renaissance of Platonic commentary, I can make no use of the numerous indirect reports of Middle Platonist commentators. Nor can I do much with our considerable evidence for the interpretations of Plato which held the field from the late first century BC to the late second century AD. Most of it comes from epitomes, treatises, and indirect reports which do not directly display the process of textual exegesis, even though this undoubtedly lies just below their surface. It is only when we have the actual words of the commentators in front of us that we can examine their exegetical techniques in adequate depth." pp. 110-111

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"The story of the ancient commentators on Aristotle has not previously been told at book length. Here it is assembled for the first time by drawing both on some of the classic articles translated into English or revised and on the very latest research. Some of the chapters will be making revisionary suggestions unfamiliar even to specialists in the field. The philosophical interest of the commentators has been illustrated elsewhere. (1) The aim here is not so much to do this again as to set out the background of the commentary tradition against which further philosophical discussion and discussions of other kinds can take place.

The importance of the commentators lies partly in their representing the thought and classroom teaching of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonist schools, partly in the panorama they provide of the 1100 years of Ancient Greek philosophy, preserving as they do many original quotations from lost philosophical works. Still more significant is their profound influence, uncovered in some of the chapters below, on subsequent philosophy, Islamic and European. This was due partly to their preserving anti-Aristotelian material which helped to inspire medieval and Renaissance science, but still more to their presenting an Aristotle

transformed in ways which happened to make him acceptable to the Christian Church. It is not just Aristotle, but this Aristotle transformed and embedded in the philosophy of the commentators, that lies behind the views of later thinkers.
Many of the commentaries are being translated in the series 'The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle', published by Duckworth and Cornell University Press from 1987 onwards (general editor: Richard Sorabji). The present book will also serve as an introduction to them.
(Chapters 1, 4, 10, 11, 19 and 20 are new; 2, 6, 8 and 12 are translated; 5, 9, 14, 15 and 18 are substantially revised. Others are revised in more minor ways; Greek and Latin passages are translated throughout." (from the Preface)

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"The aim and organization of this book.
The main objective of this book is to offer a philosophically focused introduction to the ancient commentators.
(...)
There is a wealth of material in the commentaries themselves but no general introduction comparable to this one exists. During the past twenty years, more and more texts by the commentators have become available to English-speaking students and scholars in the translation series led by Sorabji. Sorabji has also edited a sourcebook

(2004) that contains a selection of translated texts with brief introductions. Scholars working in continental Europe (such as Hadot's group at the National Centre for Scientific Research [CNRS] in France) have produced considerable research, as well as new editions, on the commentaries. All these works make the commentaries much more accessible than they used to be. However, none of these works serves exactly as an *introduction* to the topic.
In order to introduce the commentators as philosophers, some restrictions have been necessary. Anything like a complete overview of the commentators' thought would be unimaginable. The text material is simply too large, not to mention the fact that the group that could justifiably be called "ancient commentators" would include many more than the authors studied in this volume. The selection of material concentrates on themes that have been found philosophically inspiring during most periods of the history of Western philosophy. They also are themes that were central in the commentaries themselves. Methodologically speaking, the discussions in this book start from generally recognized philosophical problems or themes (such as the nature and possibility of knowledge, explanatory principles of nature, the nature of reality, the content of a good human life and so forth) and ask how the commentators formulated questions related to these themes and how they answered them. The most important reason for choosing this approach is that it helps integrate the commentators into the continuum of thinkers who work in different historical periods, employ different methods and follow divergent meta-philosophical guidelines." (pp. 14-16)

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   On résumera d'abord les résultats qui ont été acquis par les diverses recherches jusqu'à présent pour déterminer les problèmes qui se posent. Ensuite, on examinera en détail quelques questions concernant les trois plus anciennes traductions, en particulier le problème de la *Metaphysica Vetus* et de ses relations aux deux autres traductions. Dans une annexe, on donnera, outre un tableau des mss, certaines informations concernant les exemplaires grecs de la *Metaphysica Vetustissima* et de la *Metaphysica Vetus*." p. 7

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    "La discussion sur l'authenticité du deuxième livre de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote (Petit Alpha), qui dure depuis un millénaire, a pour origine une scholie qui se trouve dans le *Parisinus* gr. 1853 (Xe siècle) à la jonction du premier et du deuxième livre. Or, cette scholie a été copiée par la même main que celle qui a ajouté une scholie d'un contenu comparable à la fin de la Métaphysique de Théophraste. Ce fait était passé inaperu, parce que ce scribe a utilisé différentes écritures: droite ou penchée, calligraphique ou cursive. L'ensemble des témoignages et indices déjà examinés par Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, d'une part, et par Enrico Berti, d'autre part, est analysé et réinterprété à la lumière de cette nouvelle information, qui permet d'établir que c'est le premier livre de la Métaphysique, et non le deuxième, qui était attribué par certains à Pasiclès de Rhodes, comme en témoignait déjà Asclépios.

Le contenu et la formulation très proches des deux scholies permettent de penser qu'elles viennent d'un même érudit: à l'aide, notamment, des commentaires d'Alexandre et d'Asclépios à la Métaphysique d'Aristote, de l'étude de Nicolas de Damas ou des catalogues d'Hermippe et d'Andronicos, il a préparé une 'édition' d'Aristote destinée à devenir un modèle de référence.
Dans la tradition latine, Grand Alpha a été accidentellement attribué à Théophraste à cause de la seconde scholie. Mais la discussion dont témoigne la première scholie a pu également être provoquée dès l'origine par celle que rapporte la seconde scholie: la *Métaphysique* de Théophraste avait probablement été transmise comme un traité aristotélicien, jusqu'à ce que Nicolas de Damas en restitue la paternité à Théophraste; par suite, l'authenticité d' autres livres du corpus aristotélicen a pu également être mise en doute, mais parce qu'ils posaient des problémes d' ordre éditorial, il y a deux millénaires déjá."

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    Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université Laval dans le cadre du programme de maîtrise en philosophie pour l'obtention du grade de maître es arts (M. A.).
    "Bien que plusieurs études aient été consacrées à Asclépius de Tralles (Vie siècle), disciple du néoplatonicien Ammonius à Alexandrie, on ne dispose à ce jour d'aucune traduction de son commentaire aux livres A-Z de la *Métaphysique*

d'Aristote. Puisqu'il constitue l'un des plus précieux témoignages de la réception des doctrines métaphysiques du Stagirite au sein de l'école néoplatonicienne, nous avons jugé bon d'entreprendre la première traduction en langue moderne de cet ouvrage. Comme la pleine compréhension de l'exégèse d'Asclépius n'est possible qu'à la lumière de son contexte historico-philosophique, nous avons d'abord présenté la tradition des commentaires grecs à la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote. Nous avons ensuite offert une traduction annotée des premières pages du commentaire d'Asclépius, à savoir de son prologue et des deux premiers chapitres du livre Alpha. Enfin, nous avons rédigé une étude doctrinale concernant les principaux enjeux philosophiques de la section traduite du commentaire: la division du prologue exégétique en questions capitales, le concept d'appréhension simple et les rapports entre les intelligibles, Dieu et le Bien."

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Theophrastus "On First Principles" (known as his *Metaphysics*): A Debate with Aristotle

INTRODUCTION: THE OBLIVION OF METAPHYSICS IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

"It would not be quite accurate to claim that Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, like Hume's *Treatise*, "fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." First, there was no press. Second, the *Metaphysics* would not have been published as a book had there been a press. And finally, the *Metaphysics* was not completely ignored by Aristotle's school. Still, if one peruses Fritz Wehrli's monumental *Die Schule des Aristoteles* and notes the few scattered and desultory references to ontological or theological topics, one cannot resist forming the impression that the *Metaphysics* is pretty largely an academic failure. Even Aristotle's formidable disciple and colleague Theophrastus, who himself actually composed a treatise on metaphysics, seems to write with a remarkably limited understanding of the work of his predecessor in this area.
(1) Apart from a few references to book twelve, there is almost total silence regarding the central features of Aristotle's work as they are recognized today. There is nothing about the identification of first philosophy with wisdom and theology and a science of causes; nothing of the *aporiai* facing the construction of such a science; nothing of the doctrine of *pros en* equivocity or

of the conclusion that being in the primary sense is separate form. Nor is there a word about the dialectical treatment of sensible substance in the central books of the *Metaphysics*, which has so exercised contemporary scholars. The list of the disappearing doctrines could easily he expanded and reconfirmed by considering other philosophers both inside and outside the Lyceum. We must not be tempted to account for this extraordinary state of affairs by supposing that Aristotle's successors regarded his metaphysical doctrines as too sublime for comment, for both Theophrastus and Strato, the first and second heads of the Lyceum after Aristotle, appear actually to have rejected the argument for the existence of an unmoved mover.' Strato's argument amounts to the claim that nature alone is sufficient to account for motion, a claim that must have been intended to recall Aristotle's own admission that if separate substance does not exist, then there is no special science of substance apart from physics (cf. Met. 6.1.1026a27-29). Since Aristotle adds that the putative science of separate substance is first philosophy and the science of being qua being, Strato's denial of the need for the hypothesis of an unmoved mover is nothing short of a rejection of the entire enterprise of the *Metaphysics*. And this from within the Peripatos!

If we look beyond the Lyceum to the tradition of Aristotelian commentaries, beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias, we do indeed find something more like reverence for the words of the founder, but hardly any awareness at all of the problematic and crucial connection between the specific theological arguments in the *Metaphysics* and the science of being qua being. Though the extant corpus of Aristotelian commentaries includes four works on the *Metaphysics*, there exists not a single commentary by one hand on the entire work as preserved and edited by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C. Alexander's commentary ends at book five and is completed by an anonymous continuator; Themistius has a commentary, or more accurately a paraphrase, of book twelve alone; Syrianus comments on books three, four, thirteen, and fourteen; Asclepius halts his commentary at book seven.

In the face of this modest harvest, one might well conceive the notion that the *Metaphysics* was doomed from the beginning to

bear meager fruit. (3) The dominance of Stoicism throughout the Hellenistic period explains in part the near oblivion into which metaphysics in general and Aristotle's work in particular were cast. A central principle of Stoic theoretical philosophy is the refusal -- perhaps for methodological reasons as much as anything else -- to countenance the existence of immaterial entities. Accordingly, physics becomes Stoic first philosophy, and theology becomes a branch of physics (cf. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.42; cited hereafter as SVF). Within such a system there is little conceptual space for isolating being as a subject for investigation, and, especially, for raising Aristotelian *aporiai* regarding its nature. The evidence for this claim is to be found in the corpus of Stoic fragments, where a science of being *qua* being makes no appearance at all, not even as a dragon to be slain. It is as if it had never existed. (4) Considering that Stoics, and to a lesser extent Epicureans and Academic Skeptics, were the primary purveyors of theoretical philosophy throughout the Hellenistic period, it is hardly surprising that the doctrines of the *Metaphysics* simply lay dormant. (5)" (pp. 3-5)

Notes

(1) Theophrastus did not of course title his work *meta ta physika*, but he does describe it as dealing with first principles (Theo., *Met*. 4a 1-2) and as distinct from physics (ibid., 2-4) and mathematics (ibid., 4b6-8). The first principles are apparently reducible to a unique first principle, i.e., god (ibid., 4615). As Giovanni Reale, "The Historical Importance of the *Metaphysics* of Theophrastus in Comparison with the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle," appendix to *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 364-91, shows, Theophrastus closely follows *Metaphysics* 12 in many respects. But apart from these and some less convincing parallels from *Metaphysics* 2, there is little awareness shown by Theophrastus of any connection between theology and a science of being *qua* being.
(2) For Theophrastus's criticism, see his *Metaphysics* 563-10, and for Strato, see the testimony contained in Cicero, *Academica*

2.38.
(3) See Gerard Verbeke's "Aristotle's Metaphysics Viewed by the Ancient Greek Commentators," in D. J. O'Meara, ed., Studies in Aristotle (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981 114ff., for a useful summary of some of the basic interpretations in the commentators. Verbeke concludes that there is a consistent interpretation among the commentaries that may be aptly termed "Neoplatonic." We should distinguish, however, a Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle from a Neoplatonic refutation of Aristotle, as is to be found in Plotinus.
(4) Zeno, Chrysippus, and Antipater are all reported to have written books titled *Perí Ousías*. Of course, these Stoics all identify *ousía* with matter. The few scattered references to *tò on*, which identify it with body and make it a species of the genus *tò ti*, betray little more than a lingering memory of some Aristotelian terminology stripped of its argumentative context. The Stoic position was perhaps taken to follow immediately from the principle that immaterial entities cannot exist; hence, argument indicating the contrary can be safely ignored. F. H. Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), has argued the revisionary case that, for the Stoics, Aristotle was not rejected but largely unknown. But the lack of hard evidence, rightly insisted upon by Sandbach, is also explicable by the hypothesis that Aristotelian arguments, in metaphysics at least, were rendered irrelevant on the above principle.
(5) Cf. Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Text and Kommentar* (Basel/Stuttgart: Benno Schwabe & Co., 1959), 10:95-128, who suggests in a *Ruckblick* over the material he has collected that the disintegration of the Peripatetic school was owing to its undogmatic and aporetic character as compared to its Academic, Epicurean, and Stoic rivals. He also suggests that conflict in doctrine between the *Metaphysics* and the early dialogues of Aristotle might account for diffidence or confusion on the part of his disciples: "der Zerfall der Schule hatte seine tiefste Ursache im Werke des Meisters selbst" (ibid., 96). Undoubtedly, there is much in what Wehrli has to say. One may also add the instability of the Peripatetic foundation owing to political reasons.

From: Lloyd P. Gerson, "Plotinus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Metaphysics", in: Lawrence P. Schrenk (ed.), *Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, Washington: Catholic University Press 1994, pp. 3-21.

SUMMARY OF On First Principles,KNOWN AS Theophrastus' Metaphysics

"Chapter I. The nature of the relation between the first principles and sensible things; II. Problems about the impulse of sensible things towards the first principle; III. The importance of deducing the observed facts from the first principles; IV. Are the first principles definite or indefinite?; V. The supposed immobility of the first principles; VI. Matter and form; VII: Good and evil; VIII: The multiplicity of being and of knowledge; IX; The limits of teleological explanation."

From: *Theophrastus Metaphysics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1929. With translation, commentary and introduction by William David Ross and Francis Howard Fobes. Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms 1967.

“What are first things? They are different from the world of nature, and are the objects of reason, not sense. (Here he adopts Aristotle's standard distinction, derived from Plato.) But how are these two related, and what are the objects of reason? They must either be in mathematical objects, or be something prior to these. If the latter, how many are they? He continues in an Aristotelian vein to say that they/it are the cause of motion, but themselves unmoved. They are objects of desire, and cause the rotation of the heavens. But if the prime mover is one, why do heavenly bodies move differently? If there are more than one, how is their influence harmonized? And why does love of the unmoved cause an imitation which is movement? After an interlude about the Platonists, he continues: anyhow the heavenly bodies, having

desire, must also have soul, and the movement of soul, which is thought, is better than rotary movement. And what about the inferior parts of nature? And is rotation essential to the existence of heavenly bodies?

He then criticizes Plato, and some of his followers, including Speusippus (died 339 BO, for not carrying through their accounts to the end, but considers a possible reply, that metaphysics is only concerned with first principles. So are first principles definite, or indefinite, in the sense of shapeless and merely potential? At this point it is difficult to be sure whether he is talking of first things in the sense in which the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry may be seen as first things, or about the fundamental principles (laws) which govern what exists. So when he asks if they are moving or motionless, it could be that the former are in motion but the latter, being abstract, are motionless. In any case, the universe is complex.

Among particular first things are form and matter, one of Aristotle's basic dichotomies.

What is the status of matter? This problem was developed in his De Anima, in which he pointed out the similarities between prime matter and potential intellect, both being merely potential, and probably explained their differences in terms of how each is related to forms. Other pairs then occupy him, especially good and evil -- Why is there so much evil in the world? -- and he mentions the void as the contrary of being. But there are different types of being, and knowledge is of similarity in difference at various levels. (Here again he adopts Aristotle's distinctions.) There are different methods of knowledge for different subject. One must stop somewhere in searching for causes. It is often difficult to assign final causes, as with floods, male breasts, the shapes of inanimate objects, and many other things. Perhaps these result automatically from the rotation of the heavens. Alternatively there is a limit to purposiveness, and the desire for what is good.

Though wide ranging, this is largely a criticism of many of the assumptions on which Aristotle's system is based, and some people believe that it was so devastating that interest in metaphysics ceased in the Peripatos. Theophrastus's successor, Strato (died 269 BC), concentrated on natural science." (p. 894)

From: Pamela M. Huby, "Theophrastus", in: Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Munchen: Philosophia Verlag 1991, vol. II.

THE METAPHYSICS BY THEOPHRASTUS

"Theophrastus recognized the need to justify the assumption that natural science involves principles, causes, and elements. He also warned against inquiring into the cause of everything. Nevertheless, his physics is in large measure an attempt to trace observed phenomena back to principles of order and determination. He believed in the divinity of the heavens and the eternity of the universe and held that the heavenly bodies possess regularity in the highest degree. However, he denied a clean break between the heavenly and sublunary spheres, holding that the universe is a single system in which the same physical laws apply to all its parts. Theophrastus considered the possibility that the sun might be a form of fire, but the discussion is aporetic and not proof that Theophrastus rejected Aristotle's fifth element, aether, as Strato did. Theophrastus does, however, appear to depart from Aristotle by analyzing place in terms of arrangement and position with reference to the whole universe.
Academic discussion and Aristotle's postulation of an unmoved mover form the background to Theophrastus's treatise on metaphysics. Many of the views discussed are considered plausible, but often we do not know what Theophrastus accepted as part of his own theory. It is probable that Theophrastus rejected Aristotle's unmoved mover and laid greater emphasis on the limits of teleological explanation. Like both Plato and Aristotle, he held that the study of first principles is more definite and ordered than the study of nature. Intelligible and physical entities are related as prior and posterior, but further specification of the relationship is not clearly provided. Most likely Theophrastus posited an unbroken causal series, for he requires continual explanation of all phenomena." (p. 553)

From: "Theophrastus" by William W. Fortenbaugh and Josip Talanga, in: Donald J. Zeyl (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, London; Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers,

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“The historical importance of this brief treatise on first philosophy by Theophrastus has not escaped some scholars who have been concerned with it. It is the most significant metaphysical text that we possess between the time of Aristotle and the flowering of the new philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period. The treatise has two different dimensions, one refers to Aristotle, the other, in a certain way, refers to Stoicism. A careful examination of the precise links which one aspect has to the other as well as in comparison with Aristotle and Stoicism has come only recently and is susceptible of further precisions as well as corrections and modifications.
The historical relations existing between the treatise of Theophrastus and Aristotle's Metaphysics has been recently studied by Jaeger, in connection with his well-known thesis on the genesis and development of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine, as well as on the basis of his special interpretation of the development of theology and the doctrine of the immobile Mover.(1)
The other dimension of the treatise, which refers to Stoicism, has been investigated chiefly by Grumach.(2)
We intend to limit ourselves to a reexamination of the first point. To review the second point, it would be necessary to reexamine many problems concerning Stoicism, which would take us outside the limits of our subject.” (pp. 364, notes omitted)

Notes

(1) Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, translated by Richard Robinson, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1948, pp. 349, 354-357.
(2) Ernst Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin: Weidmann 1932

From: Giovanni Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Albany: State University of

New York Press 1980, Appendix A. *The Historical Importance of the* Metaphysics *of Theophrastus in Comparison with the* Metaphysics *of Aristotle*.

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THEOPHRASTUS ERESUS

Abbreviations:

FR = Fragments

FHS&G = *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his life, writings, thought and influence.* Edited by Fortenbaugh William W. et al. Leiden: Brill 1992 (two volumes)

RUSCH = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*

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1. Fortenbaugh, William W., Gutas, Dimitri, Huby, Pamela, and Sharples, Robert W., eds. 1992. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. I. Life, Writings, Various Reports, Logic,*

Physics, Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Preface VII-VIII; Introduction 1; Abbreviations 15; Texts. Life (FR 1-36) 20; Writings (FR 37-55) 90; Various reports (FR 56-67) 104; Logic (FR 68-136) 114; Physics (FR 137-245) 276; Metaphysics (FR 246-250) 436; Theology (FR 251-263) 442; Mathematics (FR 264) 456; Appendix Nos. 1-4 460.

"These two volumes represent the first fruits of an international project to produce a new collection - text, translation and commentary - of the fragments and testimonia relating to Theophrastus (c. 370-288/5 B.C.), Aristotle's pupil and successor as head of the Lyceum. The need for a new collection was apparent: the standard collection, by Wimmer, is already 120 years old, whereas we now have far better texts of many of the ancient authors in which fragments and testimonia of Theophrastus occur. Whilst classicists have devoted the past hundred years to bringing into the light the work of the major post-Aristotelian schools, the contribution of Theophrastus has remained obscure. The second printing contains corrections to the first.

This first stage of the project presents the texts, critical apparatus and English translation of the fragments and testimonia. It contains a long methodological introduction, an index of Theophrastean texts and concordances with other collections (Scheider, Wimmer and the several recent partial editions).

The second stage of the project, which Brill will also publish, will consist of 9 commentary volumes, planned at present as follows:

1. Life, Writings, various reports (M. Sollenberger, Mt. St. Mary's College)
2. Logic (P.M. Huby, Liverpool University)
3. Physics (R.W. Sharples, University College London)
4. Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics, Psychology (P.M. Huby, Liverpool University)

5. Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany (R.W. Sharples, University of London)
6. Ethics, Religion (W.W. Fortenbaugh, Rutgers University)
7. Politics (J. Mirhady)
8. Rhetoric, Poetics (W.W. Fortenbaugh, Rutgers University)
9. Music, Miscellaneous Items and Index of proper names, subject index, selective index of Greek, Latin and Arabic terms (several authors/editors).

Most of the nine commentary volumes will include significant discussion of Arabic texts, with contributions by Dimitri Gutas (Yale University) and Hans Daiber (Free University of Amsterdam).

2. ———, eds. 1992. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Ii. Psychology, Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany, Ethics, Religion, Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics, Music, Miscellanea*. Leiden: Brill.

   Contents: Texts. Psychology (FR 264-327) 2; Human physiology (FR 328-349) 106; Living creatures (FR 350-383) 134; Botany (FR 384-435) 188; Ethics (FR 436-579) 254; Religion (FR 580-588) 400; Politics (FR 589-665) 438; Rhetoric and Poetics (FR 666-713) 508; Music (FR 714-726) 560; Miscellneous items (FR 727-741) 584; Appendix Nos. 5-9 600; Concordances 619; Index of Theophrastean texts 629.

3. Huby, Pamela M., ed. 2007. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 2: Logic. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. Leiden: Brill.

   "This volume contains commentary on the sections concerned with logic (texts 68-136) of the collection of texts published in 1992 *(Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Lift, Writings, Thought and Influence,* edited and translated by William W. Fortenbaugh, Pamela M. Huby, Robert W. Sharples (Greek and Latin) and Dimitri Gutas (Arabic) and five others, 2 vols., Leiden: Brill, 1992). It was comparatively

easy to isolate those texts connected with logic, though in a few cases there was uncertainty about whether an item was to be assigned to rhetoric rather than logic. There was also little difficulty with problems of texts where the attribution to Theophrastus is doubtful.
The texts on which we are commenting are nearly all ones that contain the name of Theophrastus, along with a few in which only "the colleagues of Aristotle" are mentioned in a context where it is clear that Theophrastus is intended, usually with Eudemus. They are evidence for works now lost, even in translation. We have taken account, either by actual quotation or by giving references in the upper apparatus, of all such passages up to the cut-off date of 1450. Two items printed in the appendix are without attribution, and are included only as possibly by Theophrastus. To facilitate access to contexts we have added references to English translations of some passages quoted or referred to, and have given short accounts of most of the items mentioned in the upper apparatus.
Within the commentary in some cases several items are grouped together for a general discussion, but then individual items are also treated separately. Lists of relevant literature are given either under the heading of a group or with individual items. We have transliterated short items of Greek, but quoted longer ones in the original script.
(...)
It was only after the bulk of this work had been written that I became aware of the important study of De Rijk, entitled *Aristotle Semantics and Ontology,* which in fact contains a great deal of valuable work on Aristotle's logic. I have however been able to incorporate many references to it, either in the text or in footnotes." (from the Preface).

4. Sharples, Robert W., ed. 1998. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 3.1: Sources on Physics (Texts 137-223)*. Leiden: Brill.

   This volume contains commentary to the section concerned with physics (texts 137-223) of the collection of texts

relating to Theophrastus compiled and edited under the leadership of W.W. Fortenbaugh and published in 1992 *(Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*) . The collection of texts was arranged by subject matter, rather than by the known or conjectured relation of testimonia to particular Theophrastean works (cf. the Introduction to the collection of texts, vol.1 pp. 7-8), and the arrangement of topics was broadly that familiar from the ordering of Aristotle's writings in Bekker's edition. The subject matter of the present commentary might thus be loosely described as the Theophrastean counterpart to the Baker pages of Aristotle 184-390 *(Physics, On Heaven, On Coming-to-Be and Passing Away* and *Meteorology)*. Commentary by Han Baltussen on the texts relating to physical doxography (224-245) will appear in a separate volume, 8.2, along with that by Pamela Huby on texts on metaphysics, theology and mathematics (246-264).
It should be emphasised at the outset that our collection of texts is confined, with a very few exceptions, to those passages where Theophrastus is actually named, and that it is explicitly concerned with material that does not survive in Theophrastean works transmitted in MSS. We are concerned, in other words, with reports of Theophrastus' views -- sometimes quotations, but more often paraphrases -- in other authors." (from the Preface).

5. Huby, Pamela M., ed. 1999. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 4: Psychology (Texts 265-327)*. Leiden: Brill.

   "This will eventually be the fourth of nine volumes of commentary by various authors, each relating to a part of the collection of texts relating to Theophrastus compiled and edited under the leadership of W.W.Fortenbaugh and published in 1992 *(Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*). This volume covers texts 265-327, which relate to psychology and epistemology.

This commentary is designed to be used in conjunction with the volume of texts and translations; that includes both an apparatus of parallels for each text and an apparatus of textual variations and emendations. In the commentary isolated words or phrases of Greek have been given in transliteration, with longer passages being given in Greek script. The titles of ancient works have generally been given in the same English versions as used in the text and translation volume.
The procedure adopted in writing the commentary varies according to the nature of the passage involved. At the start of each passage there is usually a short list of pieces of modem literature; for references to such works the reader should consult first that list and then the general bibliography at the end of this volume." (from the Preface).

6. Sharples, Robert W., ed. 1994. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 5: Sources on Biology (Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany: Texts 328-435)*. Leiden: Brill.

   "This is the first to appear of a projected nine volumes of commentary by various authors, each relating to a different part of the collection of texts relating to Theophrastus compiled and edited under the leadership of W.W. Fortenbaugh and published in 1992 *(Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and lnfluence*). The present volume of commentary, no. 5 in the eventual series, cover texts 328-435 in the second volume of that collection, relating to human physiology, zoology and botany. The collection of texts was arranged by subject matter rather than by the known or conjectured relation of testimonia to particular Theophrastean works (cf. the Introduction to the collection of texts, vol. 1 pp. 7-8), and the arrangement of topics was broadly that familiar from the ordering of Aristotle's writings in Bekker's edition. The subject matter of the present commentary might thus be loosely described as the Theophrastean counterpart to the Bekker pages of Aristotle 436-789 (i.e. starting with the

Parva Naturalia; Theophrastus' writings on general psychology will be dealt with in volume 4 of the commentary).
It should be emphasised at the outset that our collection of texts is confined, with a very few exceptions, to those passages where Theophrastus is actually named, and that it is explicitly concerned with material that does not survive in Theophrastean works transmitted in MSS. We are concerned, in other words, with reports of Theophrastus' views, sometimes quotations but more often paraphrases, in other authors."

7. Fortenbaugh, William W., ed. 2011. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 6.1: Sources on Ethics*. Leiden: Brill.

   With contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas.

8. ———, ed. 2016. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 7: Politics*. Leiden: Brill.

   Not yet published.

9. ———, ed. 2005. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 8: Sources on Rhetoric and Poetics (Texts 666-713)*. Leiden: Brill.

   "The present volume (...) concerns the rhetorical and poetic fragments that are found in the second of the two text-translation volumes.
   The central sections of the commentary, i.e., III and IV, are ordered in accordance with the material presented in the second text-translation volume. Section III covers the twenty-four titles that have their primary listing in the section on the "Titles of Books." That section carries the number 666. It also includes discussion of nine titles that have their primary listing elsewhere (under logic, mathematics, physics, ethics, religion and miscellaneous items) but for one reason or another have or might be thought to have a connection with rhetoric and poetics. Each of these related titles is referred to in 666 and appears in this commentary in the same position in which it is found

in 666. For example, the mathematical title *In Reply to Aeschylus* (137 no. 42) appears both in the source volume and in this commentary after the second work *On the An of Poetry* (666 no. 21) and before *On Comedy* (666 no. 22). Section IV on "The Texts" is also ordered in accordance with the second text-translation volume: i.e., the discussion of texts 667-713 proceeds in numerical order. There are, however, occasional interruptions, ten in all, when texts whose primary listing occurs elsewhere (under life, logic and ethics, among the miscellaneous items and in the appendix to the second text-translation volume) are discussed. In each case, the text is referred to in the second text-translation volume within the section on rhetoric and poetics, and discussion occurs in accordance with the position of the reference. For example, a logical text from Alexander of Aphrodisias (135) is referred to after one from Cicero (672) and before one from the codex Parisinus Graecus 3032 (673A), and discussion of the text occupies a similar position in this commentary.
I have created a separate section on the ancient sources - Demetrius Rhetor, Philodemus, Cicero, etc. - and placed it at the beginning of the commentary proper, i.e., as Section II. An alternative would have been to reserve discussion on any given source until a text taken from that source is commented upon. Were that procedure adopted, Cicero *qua* source would be discussed at the very outset, for the first text among the rhetorical and poetic texts is taken from Cicero (667). In contrast, discussion of Philodemus, Cicero's contemporary, would occur much later (689A). "

10. ———, ed. 2016. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 9.1: On Music*. Leiden: Brill.

    Not yet published.

11. ———, ed. 2014. *Theophrastus of Eresus. Commentary Volume 9.2: Sources on Discoveries and Beginnings, Proverbs Et Al. (Texts 727-741)*. Leiden: Brill.

    With contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas.

12. Ross, Wiiliam David, and Fobes, Francis Howard, eds. 1929. *Theophrastus. Metaphysics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    With translation, commentary and introduction by W. D. Ross and F. H. Fobes.
    Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1967.
    Contents: Preface VIII; Introduction IX; Sigla XXXIII; Text and translation 2; Commentary 41; Index verborum 77; Index to the Introductiona and Commentary 84-87.
    "The text as here given, the English translation, the greater part of the Introduction, and all the Commentary are the work of Mr. Ross; for that part of the Introduction which deals with the MSS., for the *apparatus criticus,* and for the Indexes Mr. Fobes is responsible." (from the Preface)
    "All the Greek manuscripts of this work assign it to Theophrastus. A scholion at the end adds that it was unknown to Hermippus *(c.* 200 B.C.) and to Andronicus *(c.* 85 B.C.) and does not occur in their lists of Theophrastus' writings, but that Nicolaus (i.e. Nicolaus of Damascus) ascribed it to Theophrastus. Thus the tradition that Theophrastus was its author goes back to about 25 B.C. (...) The title *ta meta ta phusika* must have been imposed on the work at some time after Andronicus' edition of Aristotle's works, from which the phrase took its origin; and may have been imposed by Nicolaus, who was the first, so far as we know, to refer to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by that name. (..:) The essay is printed in the *editio princeps* of Aristotle (Aldus, 1498); in the edition of Theophrastus published at Basel in 1541 by Hieronymus Gemusaeus or Oporinus (a reprint of the Aldine), and in a reprint of this (bearing the same date) in which Priscian's *Metaphrasis* is added; in the Camotian Aristotle (Venice, 1552), and in the Sylburg Aristotle (Frankfurt, 1585). It is omitted in the edition of Theophrastus' shorter works by H. Stephanus (Paris, 1557), in the editions of Theophrastus by Furlanus and Turnebus (Hanover, 1605), by Daniel Heinsius (Leyden, 1613), and by J. G. Schneider (Leipzig, 1818-21), but was printed by Brandis (1) with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Berlin, 1823), and in Wimmer's two editions of Theophrastus (Leipzig, 1862,

and Paris, 1866), and finally has been edited separately by H. Usener (Bonn, 1890). It is the subject of a Greek commentary by Camotius (Venice, 1551)." (from the Introduction)
(1) Who summarizes and discusses its contents in his *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie* (1835-1866).

13. van Raalte, Marlein ed. 1993. *Theophrastus. Metaphysics*. Leiden: Brill.

    With an introduction, translation and commentary by M. van Raalte.
    Contents: Preface XI; Abbreviations XV; Introduction 1; Text and translation 35; Commentary 67; Chapter One (4 a 2 - 5 a 13) 69; Chapter Two (4 a 14 - 6 a 15) 164; Chapter Three (6 a 15 - 6 b 22) 250; Chapter Four (6 b 23 - 7 b 8) 285; Chapter Five (7 b 9 - 8 a 7) 330; Chapter Six (8 a 8 - 8 a 20) 362; Chapter Seven (8 a 21 - 8 b 9) 277; Chapter Eight (8 b 10 - 10 a 21) 393; Chapter Nine (10 a 22 - 12 a 2) 485; References and author index 588; Index of passages cited 598; Index of Theophrastus *Metaphysics* 628; General Index: English 659; Greek 668-657.
    "The history of this book is like that of the best of relationships in that it was started lightheartedly and lasted much longer than foreseen.
    Initially serving mainly as a counterbalance to the study of Greek stichic verse, the project was meant to be completed in 1983-1985, during which years the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research granted me a post-graduate scholarship for that purpose. In the course of time it became increasingly clear that Theophrastus' argument, in spite of the deceptive familiarity of its idiom, defies any easy access to a consistent interpretation-even allowing for its obviously dialectical nature. This made the commentary grow to its present size, my extensively quoting of parallel passages testifying to the experience that without a careful study both of the idiom

and of the kind of reasoning involved the purport of the argument remains elusive.
The opportunity offered by Project Theophrastus to present a paper at its 1985 conference at the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London triggered a choice of focus which is at the base of the present interpretation of the treatise. As if infected by Theophrastus' way of proceeding I have made an attempt to expose each and every question that is posed by the text, and to detect the reasons for preferring one interpretation rather than another-my prevailing criterion being the internal consistency of the argument.
A side-effect of the somewhat unusual set-up of this book might be that it could be used as a kind of sourcebook for Peripatetic idiom; in order to help those who may want to explore this way of making a virtue out of necessity full indices have been provided.
During all these years I had the opportunity to profit from the wisdom and erudition, and certainly did profit front the assistance and support of many people.
First of all I have to acknowledge my indebtedness to the authors of the forthcoming Budé-cdition of the *Metaphysics,* and especially to Professor Andre Laks for generously sending me a copy of their completed manuscript in 1990 (and of a revised version of it in 1992), and for allowing me to make use of their *apparatus criticus* and to incorporate references to their interpretation of the text; in this way we have tried to minimize the drawbacks of our simultaneously working on a treatise which had been waiting for attention for so long. It will he clear that the present work heavily relies on Laks & Most's study especially where the manuscript tradition is concerned." (from the Preface).

14. Gutas, Dimitri, ed. 2010. *Theophrastus on First Principles (Known as His Metaphysics)*. Leiden: Brill.

    Greek Text and Medieval Arabic Translation, edited and translated with introduction, commentaries and glossaries,

as well as the medieval Latin translation (by Bartholomew of Messina), and with an Excursus on Graeco-Arabic editorial technique by D. Gutas.
Contents: Preface XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; Abbreviations and Reference Works XXI; Abbreviations of Works by Aristotle and Theophrastus XXIII; Part I. Introduction to the Texts. Chapter One. Introduction to the Essay 3; Chapter Two. The Greek Text: Manuscripts, Translations, Stemma Codicum 45; Chapter Three. The Arabic Text: Manuscripts, Transmission, Editions 75; Part II. The Texts and Translations 105; Part III. Commentary Introduction 247; Aporia 1-25 248-395; Scholium 395; Appendix. "Known by Being Unknown" (9a18-23) 401; Word Indices and Glossaries 409; Bibliography 481; Index Nominum 491; Index Locorum 499.

Français

1. Tricot, Jules, ed. 1948. *Théophraste. La Métaphysique*. Paris: Vrin.

   Traduction et notes par J. Tricot.

2. Laks, André, and Most, Glenn W., eds. 1993. *Théophraste. Métaphysique*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

   Table des matières: Avant-propos VII; Notice IX ; I. La question du titre et du caractère fragmentaire de l'opuscule IX; II. Caractères généraux de l'opuscule XVIII; III. Sommaire de l'argument de l'opuscule XXVII; IV: La transmission de l'opuscule XL; Bibliographie LXXXI; Sigla LXXXIX-XC; Texte et traduction 1; Notes complémentaires 25; Index nominum 91-101.
   Texte édité, traduit et annoté par A. Laks et G. W. Most avec la collaboration de Charles Larmore et Enno Rudolph et pour la traduction arabe de Michel Crubellier.
   "Le travail que nous présentons ici a débuté, en décembre 1983, par un séminaire sur la Métaphysique de Théophraste

réunissant André Laks (Centre de recherche philologique de l'Université Charles de Gaulle-Lille III/Princeton University, Grec), Charles Larmore (Columbia University, Philosophie), Glenn W. Most (Université de Heidelberg, Philologie classique), Enno Rudolph (Forschungsslâtte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft et Université de Heidelberg, Théologie). Pendant quatre ans, ce séminaire s'est réuni à intervalles variés, à Heidelberg, Florence ou Paris, pour approfondir le travail d'interprétation. En 1987, Michel Crubellier (Centre de recherche philologique) s'est adjoint au groupe de travail, quand nous nous sommes rendu compte de l'importance de la version arabe conservée à la bibliothèque de Téhéran. Les discussions intensives qui se sont prolongées pendant celte période fournissent la base de ce travail. Si deux auteurs signent finalement le livre, c'est qu'ils se sont chargés de l'établissement du texte grec et de la rédaction de cette édition. G. W. Most a relu les manuscrits grecs et latins et établi le texte avec l'apparat. Il a préparé les parties de l'introduction relatives à l'histoire de la transmission du texte (I et IV), à l'exception de la partie arabe, due à M. Crubellier (qui a aussi collationné les manuscrits arabes), et élaboré un premier état du sommaire (III). Une première version de la traduction, des notes, et de la section II de l'Introduction, rédigée par A. Laks (qui a également révisé l'Index des mots figurant dans l'édition Ross-Fobes), a été soumise à la critique des membres du séminaire. La mise en forme finale de l'ensemble, qui résulte du travail commun des signataires, a tiré profit des remarques de tous." (Extrait de l'Avant-propos)
(...)
(*) En janvier 1993, Marlein van Raalte a mis à notre disposition le manuscrit du volumineux commentaire de l'opuscule qu'elle publie chez Brill, et qui se réfère au manuscrit de la présente édition. Nous n'avons pu comparer et utiliser les résultats obtenus que dans un cas (cf. p. 69, n. 41). Elle n'a pu, de son côté, tenir compte des dernières modifications apportées à notre propre travail (cf. *e.g*. notre texte en 11a19-20, notre interprétation de 10b25 ou notre note 37, p. 57).

ITALIANO

1. Reale, Giovanni. 1964. "Traduzione Integrale Con Commento De "La Metafisica" Di Teofrasto." In *Teofrasto E La Sua Aporetica Metafisica*, 165-207. Brescia: La Scuola.

   English translation by John Catan of Reale's translation of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* in: G. Reale, *The concept of first philosophy and the unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle,* Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980, pp. 392-423.

2. Romani, Silvia, ed. 1994. *Teofrasto. La Metafisica*. Milano: La vita Felice.

   Testo greco a fronte, introduzione, traduzione e note a cura di S. Romani.

3. Repici, Luciana, ed. 2013. *Teofrasto. Metafisica*. Roma: Carocci.

   Testo greco a fronte. Introduzione, traduzione e commento di L. Repici.

4. ———. 1977. "Teofrasto. Testimonianze E Frammenti." In *La Logica Di Teofrasto. Studio Critico E Raccolta Dei Frammenti E Delle Testimonianze*, 193-223. Bologna: Il Mulino.

   A cura di Luciana Repici (testi greci e latini di 77 frammenti).

DEUTSCH

1. Henrich, Jörn, ed. 2000. *Die Metaphysik Theophrasts. Edition, Kommentar, Interpretation*. München: K. G. Saur.

" *Die Metaphysik Theophrasts* is the first German translation of the short (fragmentary?) work by Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastus. It is a strange destiny for the scholars of classical German philology: the main edition of the original - *Metaphysica*, herausgegeben von Hermann Usener, Bonn 1890 - is due to their care, but only now they arrive at a translation in modern language, after W.D. Ross and F.H. Fobes (Oxford 1929, in English); J. Tricot (Paris 1948, in French); G. Reale (Brescia 1964, in Italian); A. Laks and G.W. Most (Paris 1993, in French); M. van Raalte (Leiden-New York-Köln, 1993, in English); S. Romani (Milan, 1994, in Italian).
Certainly Henrich uses the previous works with intelligence, particularly, Laks-Most and Van Raalte's critical enquiry and commentaries, but his purpose is to be exhaustive in every point of view: philological, historical-philosophical, theoretical-interpretative. The introduction (I) which defines the *status quaestionis* of research on this work of Theophrastus, about the fixing of the text, about its character and structure, it is followed by (II) the German translation with a critically revised Greek text (III) grammatical-syntactical comment to every single chapter, a (IV) precise philosophical commentary that seeks to define both the method and the theory of Theophrastus' knowledge (pp. 164-223), and also his *Weltanschauung* (pp. 223-287). Then we find (V) an appendix concerning fragments and testimonies of ancient authors that are extrapolated from the text of *Metaphysics*. Finally there is a bibliography and an analytical index of Greek terms."
From the Review by Stefano Maso in: *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 2001, November 11.

2. Theophrast. 2012. *Metaphysik*. Hamburg: Meiner.

   Griechisch-deutsch. Übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Gregor Damschen, Dominic Kaegi und Enno Rudolph. Mit einer Einleitung von Gregor Damschen und Enno Rudolph. Griechischer Text nach der Edition

"Théophraste: Métaphysique" von André Laks und Glenn W. Most.

3. Graeser, Andreas, ed. 1973. *Die Logischen Fragmente Des Theophrast*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

4. Fortenbaugh, William W., ed. 1984. *Quellen Zur Ethik Theophrasts*. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THEOPHRASTUS' PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

1. Alon, Ilai. 1985. "The Arabic Version of Theophrastus' *Metaphysica*." *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* no. 6:163-217.

2. Anton, John P. 1998. "The Concept of Causality in Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*." *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* no. 7:1-31.

3. Baltussen, Han. 1992. "Peripatetic Dialectic in the *De Sensibus* in Theophrastus." In *Theophrastus. His Psychological. Doxographical, and Scientific Writings*, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Gutas, Dimitri, 1-19. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

   "The nature and purpose of the *De sensibus* have remained unstudied ever since the text was printed as a fragment of the lost (so-called) *Physikon doxai* in Hermann Diels's D *oxographi graeci* (1879). In this paper its general structure and argument are studied from a Peripatetic point of view by using recent insights in Aristotle's use of dialectic. This procedure provides tools for testing reputable views' (*endoxa*), which may then serve as a starting-point for a

systematic exposition. It is shown that Theophrastus also makes use of dialectical moves to examine the theories on perception."

4. ———. 2000. *Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De Sensibus*. Leiden: Brill.

5. ———. 2002. "Theophrastean Echoes? The *De Sensibus* in the Platonic and Aristotelian Tradition." In *On the Opuscula of Theophrastus*, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Wöhrle, Georg, 39-58. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

6. Barbotin, Edmond. 1954. *La Théorie Aristotélicienne De L'intellect D'aprés Théophraste*. Louvain: Publications de l'Université de Louvain.

7. Battegazzore, Antonio. 1989. "La Posizione Di Teofrasto Tra Metafisica E Fisica." *Epistemologia* no. 12:49-72.

   "L'interprétation moderne fait apparaître de plus en plus clairement les divergences de Théophraste par rapport à Aristote. Sa critique est avant tout dirigée contre ce qui, dans Aristote, porte la marque de l'esprit platonicien, et en particulier contre la doctrine du moteur immobile. Homme de science, aveugle à l'esprit ontologique, Théophraste est rétif à tout système abstrait et global et incapable d'admettre l'idée d'une science au-dessus de toutes les autres sciences. Il représente le triomphe du pragmatisme et de l'empirisme et inaugure la séparation entre philosophie et science. Cette optique caractérise aussi sa recherche physique."

8. Cronin, Patrick. 1992. "The Authorship and Sources of the *Peri Semeion* Ascribed to Theophrastus." In *Theophrastus. His Psychological. Doxographical, and Scientific Writings*, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Gutas, Dimitri, 307-345. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

   "The purpose of this paper is to establish through an analysis of the language of the text and the arrangement of

its contents whether or not the *Peri Semeion* is a genuine work of Theophrastus. The author concludes that it is the work of an anonymous Peripatetic, probably a pupil of Theophrastus, who had recourse to (a) two written sources, (b) oral weather lore, and (c) his own experience, and that it was probably composed c. 300 BC."

9. Crubellier, Michel. 1992. "La Version Arabe De La *Métaphysique* De Théophraste Et L'établissement Du Texte Grec." *Revue d'Histoire des Texts* no. 22:19-45.

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    "In Theophrastus's treatise, *Metaphysics*, we find a critique of Aristotle's metaphysical theories, but the critique strangely relies exclusively on book Lambda for the views it addresses. This fact poses a problem for both Jaeger's hypothesis that Lambda is early (why, then, would Theophrastus treat it as "the" authoritative source for Aristotle's views?), and the unitarian hypothesis that it is late (why is there "no" discussion of the views of the central books?). In the paper I try to show, on the basis of a

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"To sum up, the layout of the text pages would be as follows:
1. The text, each fragment introduced by a reference to the primary source; it would use two sizes of print, one for the fragments themselves and the other for the context, but only one fount each for Greek, Roman and Italic.
2. Three, or less ideally two, *apparatus,* of references to earlier publications, of secondary attestations, and *apparatus criticus*.
This gives all the information needed for a first reading of the fragments: the actual quotations, enough of the context to make them intelligible, and the basic facts about the constitution of the texts and their *fortuna* up to the present. But it would not answer all the questions a reader may legitimately ask, and so a commentary would be unavoidable. It will have to deal with several kinds of questions:

1. Textual problems, involving choices between the readings of different manuscripts and also, where the same fragment has been transmitted independently by several intermediaries, between the versions they present.
2. The accuracy and extent of the quotation. This may involve some discussion of the intermediate author's motive for quoting Theophrastus and the distortions or adaptations, particularly of terminology, he may have imported.
3. The relationship of each fragment to the others, especially those belonging to the same work or subject-group. This will necessitate some consideration of the form and subject-matter of the book from which each fragment was originally taken, and where there is sufficient evidence, its arrangement and method of treatment. But in view of the available evidence, this will in most cases fall far short of anything that could be called a "reconstruction".
4. The meaning of the fragment and its historical context, i.e. what Theophrastus is trying to say and what place his ideas have in the history of philosophy." pp. 554-55

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nombres (l'âme, le ciel, le temps, tout ce qui a en soi un principe d'ordre mathématique) et celle des êtres qui dependent de la Dyade indefinie, qui n'ont en soi aucune forme, ordre ou determination."

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but also his own suggestions for a different kind of explanation, in which the cosmos is conceived as a hierarchically structured whole bound by the natural coherence of its parts. Theophrastus's final rejection of Platonic formism -- which takes to its logical conclusion the course taken by Aristotle himself -- accounts for his affinity with both Heraclitean and Stoic thought."

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"A complete and systematic analysis is offered of the relations between Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Theophrastus book of the same title. The author has two aims. One is to clarify the historical and philosophical significance of the latter work. The other is to find external (and therefore particularly compelling) evidence in favour of Reale's unitary account of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The aporetic nature of Theophrastus' writing begs a comparison with the aporetic book in Aristotle, even though Theophrastus' *aporiai* are almost all internal to Aristotelian thought. Convergences between Theophrastus and the book *Lambda* help Reale to establish the genuineness of this book. But the main attention is on the relation between Theophrastus and Aristotle. From comparative analysis it emerges that the break Jaeger thought he detected between, on the one hand, 8 and, on the other, 1 - 7 and 9- 10 is non-existent, and hence that, following the traditional sequence, the book is thematically and philosophically a unit. As to the philosophical position of Theophrastus, Reale shows that his *Metaphysics* represents a serious break with Aristotle, in the sense that, by reducing metaphysics to cosmology, he almost completely loses any sense of the ontological and ousiologial dimension of Aristotle's thought."

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   "A considerable number of our testimonies about the Stoic doctrine of determinism are concerned with modality. In particular the concepts of possibility and necessity were central to some parts of its discussion. It seems that Hellenistic philosophers generally agreed that an action or, in general, activity does not depend on us and is not in our power, if it (or a corresponding proposition) is necessary or impossible; or, put differently, that a prerequisite for something's depending on us is that it is both possible and non-necessary. This fact is invoked both by the Stoics in defence of their theory and in the criticism of their opponents. But in the debate over fate and determinism, modalities played a role in a number of different contexts. They are dealt with separately in the following sections:
   - Chrysippus rejected Diodorus' modal theory, because of its built-in necessitarian consequences (3.1.2).
   - Chrysippus developed his own set of modal notions, which, in themselves, do not lead to necessitarianism and which secure a necessary condition for that which depends on us (3.1.3-5).
   - Some critics of Chrysippus and the Stoics developed arguments to show that there is a conflict between

Chrysippus' modal notions and the Stoic theory of fate (3.2).
- Some later Stoics replied to this type of objection by giving an epistemic interpretation of Chrysippus' modal notions (3.3).
- Critics of the Stoics objected that fate, *qua* Necessity, renders all events necessary; but this objection is not justified in Chrysippus' philosophy (3.4)." p. 97

5. ———. 2005. "Early Stoic Determinism." *Revue de Mètaphysique et de Morale*:489-516.

   "Although from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd AD the problems of determinism were discussed almost exclusively under the heading of fate, early Stoic determinism, as introduced by Zeno and elaborated by Chrysippus, was developed largely in Stoic writings on physics, independently of any specific theory of fate". Stoic determinism was firmly grounded in Stoic cosmology, and the Stoic notions of causes, as corporeal and responsible for both sustenance and change, and of effects as incorporeal and as predicates, are indispensable for a full understanding of the theory. Stoic determinism was originally not presented as causal determinism, but with a strong teleological element, in the context of a theory of natural motions, which makes use of a distinction between a global and an inner-worldly perspective on events. However, Chrysippus also employed his conception of causality in order to explicate his determinism, and can be shown to have maintained a universal causal determinism in the modern sense of the term. The teleological and mechanical elements of early Stoic determinism were brought together in Chrysippus' conception of fate, which places elements of rationality in every cause."

6. Boeri, Marcelo. 2001. "The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 54:723-752.

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   Repris dans: J. Brunschwig, *Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
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    Repris dans: J. Brunschwig, *Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
    Translated in English by Janet Lloyd as: *On a Stoic Way of Not Being,* in: J. Brunschwig, *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 158-169.

11. ———. 1997. "Les Stoiciens." In *Philosophie Grecque*, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique, 511-562. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

12. ———. 2003. "Stoic Metaphysics." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, edited by Inwood, Brad, 206-232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13. Caston, Victor. 1999. "Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 17:145-213.

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    Second edition with a Foreword and Afterword by Sten Ebbesen and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013.

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"For the Stoics, the *lekton* is as an intermediary between the thought and the object. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not create them. Due to this status, they guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are incorporeals that do not exist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God guarantees their permanent subsistence. The *lekta* are semantico-syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua used as a tool for automated translation of languages."

20. Epp, Ronald H., ed. 1985. *Recovering the Stoics*. Memphis: Memphis University Press.

    Spindel Conference 1984 published in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary volume 23.
    Contents: Ronald H. Epp: Editor's Introduction; John M. Rist: Stoicism: some reflections on the state of the art 1; Anthony A. Long: The Stoics on world-conflagration and everlasting recurrence 13; David E. Hahm: The Stoic theory of change 39: Nicholas P. White: The role of physics in Stoic ethics 57; Brad Inwood: The Stoics on the grammar of action 75; Davide Sedley: The Stoic theory of universals 87; Peter Barker: Jean Pena and Stoic physics in the 16th century 93; B. J. T. Dobbs: Newton and Stoicism 109; Ronald H. Epp: Stocism bibliography 125-171.

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    Deuxième édition 1969; troisième édition 1977; quatrième édition 1979.

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24. Goulet, Richard. 2005. "Les Principes Stoïciens Sont'ils Des Corps Ou Sont-Ils Incorporels?" In *Agonistes. Essays in Honour of Denis O'brien*, edited by Dillon, John and Dixsaut, Monique, 157-176. Aldershot: Ashgate.

25. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2005. "La Disparition Et La Reconstitution Du Stoïcisme: Éléments Pour Une Histoire." In *Les Stoiciens*, edited by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 13-28. Paris: Vrin.

26. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, and Barnes, Jonathan, eds. 2009. *Lire Les Stoïciens*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Table des matières: Avant-propos 1; Abréviations 3; Jonathan Barnes et Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Introduction 5; Première partie: L'école stoïcienne à l'époque hellénistique. I. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Épistémologie, rhétorique et grammaire 23; II. Paolo Crivelli: La dialectique 41; III. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Le monde 63; IV. David Sedley: Les dieux et les hommes 79; V. Thomas Bénatouil: La vertu, le bonheur et la nature 99; VI. Suzanne Husson: Le convenable, les passions, le sage et la cité 115; Seconde partie: Le stoïcisme impérial. VII. Jonathan Barnes: Grammaire, rhétorique, épistémologie et dialectique 135; VIII. Keimpe Algra: Cosmologie et théologie 151; IX. Anthony A. Long: L'éthique: continuité et innovations 171; X. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: La sagesse et les exercices philosophiques 193; XI. Christelle Veillard: L'empreinte du stoïcisme sur la politique romaine 201; Chronologie 211; Bibliographie 215; Index des passages cités 225-234

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"Das Wort exsistentia erscheint erstmalig im Lateinischen- in den theologischen Werken des Marius Victorinus, in denen es fast immer zur Übersetzung von hyparxis; dient, im Gegensatz zu dem Wort substantia das ousia übersetzt, und zu subsistentia, das hypostasis wiedergibt. (1)
Exsistentia ist abgeleitet von exsistere, das in der philosophischen Sprache oft für esse eintrat, zumal in der Form des Partizips.(2) Exsistere seinerseits wurde auch zur Übersetzung von hyparkein verwendet, wie aus der Timaios-Übersetzung des Calcidius ersichtlich.(3)
Für das Verständnis der Vorgeschichte des Begriffes Existenz ist es daher unerläßlich, sorgfältig die Bedeutung zu präzisieren, die das Wort hyparkein innerhalb des technischen Wortschatzes der griechischen Philosophie aufweist, und die vorliegende Studie möchte einen Beitrag zu einer derartigen Untersuchung liefern. Zunächst soll zu zeigen versucht werden, daß das Wort hyparkein innerhalb der Stoa eine Seinsweise bezeichnet, die dem Geschehen, dem Akzidenz, dem Prädikat zukommt und der Seinsweise des Subjektes gegenübergestellt wird. Danach soll diese Bedeutung des hyparkein einerseits mit dem aristotelischen, andererseits mit dem neuplatonischen, Gebrauch dieses Wortes verglichen werden." p. 115
(1) Marius Victorinus Adversus Arium, III, 7, 9, Henry-Hadot (Sources Chrétiennes, Paris, 1960); deutsche Übersetzung, Bibliothek der alten Welt, Artemis Verlag, S. 244-245, Hadot-Brenke); Adversus Arium, II, 4, 48-57 (S. 221, Hadot-Brenke); Candidi Arriani (= Marii Victorini) ad Marium Victorinum rhetorem, I, 2, 18 (S. 74, Hadot-Brenke).
(2) CICERO, De officiis, I, 30, 107: "Ut in corporibus magnae diaim;litudines suns, sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam uarietates " Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium, I, 33, 7: "In potentia exsistens ad id quod est esse."

(3) Calcidius, Timaeus, 50, 23, Wasznik: "In reputatione quidem et consideratlone, uere existentis uereque peruigilis naturae." Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 B.

30. ———. 1991. "Philosophie, Discours Philosophiques Et Divisions De La Philosophie Chez Les Stoiciens." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 45:205-219.

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32. ———. 1992. "Diogenes Laërtius Vii: On the Stoics." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4076-4182. Berlin: de Gruyter.

    Indices pp. 4404-4411.
    "In this study I propose to reexamine Diogenes' composition of the seventh book of his 'Lives' in the light of what is now known about ancient methods of composition of informational works. By carefully picking through the text for evidence on its construction I hope to clarify the nature and identity of most of the sources that he used in this book. This analysis will also bring into clearer focus his historiographical and literary objectives to the extent that they are manifested in this book. It is my hope that these

results will, in combination with studies of other parts of his work, also advance our understanding and appreciation of Diogenes as an author and historian of philosophy in the early third century A. D."

33. Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 1993. "The Stoic Division of Philosophy." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:57-74.

    "In introductions to Stoicism, Stoic philosophy customarily is discussed under the headings of "logic", "physics", and "ethics"; the evidence, however, shows that the Stoics' own view on the tripartition was more complex. The paper focusses on a passage in Diogenes Laërtius (VII 39-41) and deals with the following four points the passage raises: first, according to most Stoics, it is not philosophy, but philosophical discourse, which is divided into three parts. Second, different Stoics used different terms when referring to the three parts. Third, Stoics were not unanimous as to the order of the three parts. Fourth, different similes were used by the Stoics to describe the interrelation of the three parts. It is only by close analysis of these points that we see in what sense Stoic philosophers divided philosophy, and how they understood the unity of the philosophical disciplines underlying their division."

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36. Inwood, Brad. 1999. "Stoicism." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Ii: From Aristotle to Augustine*, edited by Furley, David, 222-252. New York: Routledge.

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    Contents: Contributors VII-IX; Brad Inwood: Introduction: Stoicism, an intellectual Odyssey 1; 1. David Sedley: The School from Zeno to Arius Didymus 7; 2. Christopher Gill: The School in the Roman Imperial period 33; 3. R. Jim Hankinson: Stoic epistemology 59; 4. Susanne Bobzien: Logic 85; Michael J. White: Stoic natural philosophy (physics and cosmology) 124; 6. Keimpe Algra: Stoic theology 153; 7. Dorothea Frede: Stoic determinism 179; 8. Jacques Brunschwig: Stoic metaphysics 206; 9. Malcolm Schofield: Stoic ethics 233; 10. Tad Brennan: Stoic moral psychology 257; 11. R. Jim Hankinson: Stoicism and medicine 395; 12. David Blank and Catherine Atherton: The Stoic contribution to traditional grammar 310; 13. The Stoics and the astronomical sciences 328; 14. Terence H. Irwin: Stoic naturalism and his critics 345; 15. Anthony A. Long: Stoicism in the philosophical tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler 365; Bibliography 393; List of primary works 417; General index 423; Passages index 433-438.

38. Irwin, Terence H. 1997. "Aristotelian Substances and Stoic Subjects." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 51:397-

415.

39. Isnardi-Parente, Margherita. 2005. "La Notion D'incorporel Chez Les Stoiciens." In *Les Stoïciens*, edited by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 175-185. Paris: Vrin.

40. Layrand, Valéry. 2002. *Le Vocabulaire Des Stoiciens*. Paris: Ellipses Marketing.

    Réédition in Jean Pierre Zarader (ed.), *Le vocabulaire des philosophes*, Vol. I. *De l'Antiquité à la Renaissance*, Paris, Ellipses, 2002, pp. 219-268

41. Lewis, Eric. 1995. "The Stoics on Identity and Individuation." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:89-108.

42. Lloyd, Anthony C. 1970. "Activity and Description in Aristotle and the Stoa." *Proceedings of the British Academy* no. 56:227-240.

43. ———. 1971. "Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa." In *Problems in Stoicism*, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 58-74. London: Athlone Press.

    "The Stoics thought language to be natural and not conventional, but they failed to separate the theory of meaning from the theory of etymology. Aristotle's categories underlay his logic and metaphysics, which belonged to a doctrine of terms. The Stoic categories, however, depended upon traditional grammar."

44. Long, Anthony Arthur, ed. 1971. *Problems in Stoicism*. London: Athlone Press.

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Categories and their uses 38; IV. Arthur C. Lloyd: Grammar and metaphysics in the Stoa 58; V. Anthony A. Long: Language and thought in Stoicism 75; VI. E. G. Pembroke *Oikeiosis* 114; VII. Ian G. Kidd: Stoic intermediates and the end for man 150; VIII. Anthony A. Long: Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action 173; IX. Ian G. Kidd: Posidonius on emotions 200; X. Gerard Watson: The natural law and Stoicism 216; Select bibliography 239; Indexes 242-257.

"This book brings together a set of papers by different hands on problems in Stoicism. Most of the material is published here for the first time, and it deals with problems of Stoic epistemology, logic, metaphysics and ethics. In more than one sense this book is a statement of work in progress. Several of its topics take up questions already treated in recent literature, and further publications on Stoicism by most of its authors are current or forthcoming. More particularly, half the chapters of the book were presented at a series of seminars in the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, and we are deeply grateful to its Director, Professor E. W. Handley, for offering us such a congenial forum for discussion and for suggesting publication in this form.

The problems in Stoicism are vast, and they vary greatly in type over a long period of time. This book makes no claim to treat more than some of them, much less to give a comprehensive account of Stoicism. But its collection of papers does cover topics of considerable philosophical and historical importance, and through the treatment of these much of the coherence and significance of Stoicism as a whole can be seen. Because we are concerned here with a school of Greek philosophy, and its Roman inheritance, part, sometimes a large part, of the discussion turns on matters of philology. But with the help of translation and transliteration it is hoped that the book will be found intelligible and interesting to those who have no knowledge of Greek and Latin. A short bibliography gives full details of most of the works on Stoicism cited in the notes and often referred to there by abbreviated titles." (From the Preface)

45. ———. 1974. *Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Second edition 1986 with a *Bibliographical Postscript 1985* pp. 257-268.
See Chapter 4: *Stoicism* § III: *Stoic logic* pp. 121-146.

46. Lossky, Nikolay. 1929. "The Metaphysics of the Stoics." *Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 4:481-489.

"The metaphysical doctrine of the Stoics is a remarkable instance of a theory that appears to be materialism, but is in truth a form of unconscious ideal-realism. It is worth while to give an exposition of it in order to show that this is really the case, and, incidentally, to explain why a materialistic philosophy seems so attractive to many minds. I will refer chiefly to the teaching of the ancient Stoics, i.e. of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, and also to the later doctrine of Posidonius."

47. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1986. "Diogenes Laërtius on Stoic Philosophy." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:295-382.

48. Mansfeld, Jaap. 2003. "Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 48:116-131.

49. Papazian, Michael. 1999. "Stoic Ontology and the Reality of Time." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:105-119.

"Aristotle starts his discussion of time in Physics iv by presenting a couple of paradoxical arguments that appear to show that time does not exist at all or that it exists only 'scarcely or dimly' (217b29).(1) The first paradox begins with the assertion that both infinite time and also any period of time are composed of a part that is past and a part that is future. The past has been but is not now. The future will be but it is not yet. It follows that no part of time just is. Since nothing which consists entirely of non-existing parts can exist, time does not exist.

One may argue on behalf of the reality of time that at least one part of time, namely the present, is. Aristotle replies that the present or the 'now' is not a part. A whole must be made up of parts, but the whole of time is not thought to be made up of 'nows'. Aristotle does not state exactly why the whole of time is not thought to be made up of nows. The argument may be that if there is a present, it either has a duration or it does not. If it has duration or temporal extension, then it is not really present but consists of a part that is past and future (cf. 234a9-19). But if it lacks extension, it cannot be a part of time because 'parts must measure, and the whole must be composed of parts' (218a6-7). A durationless point of time cannot be used to measure time nor can the whole of time consist of durationless points.

Aristotle does not provide a refutation of the paradoxical arguments against the reality of time in his subsequent discussion. (2) The question of the reality of time remained an issue in Hellenistic philosophy and, in particular, for the Stoics. The purpose of this article is to examine the Stoic ontology of time. Did the Stoics believe that time is real? How did they understand the relation between the past, present, and future? These are important questions not only because Stoic views on time are interesting in their own right but also because they can shed much needed light on the philosophy of time in late antiquity. The Stoic views appear to have had considerable influence on late Neoplatonic theories of time and on Augustine's speculations on time."

(1) Translations of the Physics are from Hussey Aristotle Physics Books III and IV Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.

(2) Most commentators, though, claim that Aristotle's discussion of time provides the requisite philosophical apparatus to refute the arguments. See, e.k., Sorabji Time, Creation and the Continuum, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, 7ff.

50. Pohlenz, Max. 1948. *Die Stoa. Geschichte Einer Geistigen Bewegung*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Two volumes: I (1948), II (1949).
See: Vol. I - Die Logik. Der Logos als Träger unserer geistigen Existenz pp. 37-62.
Traduzione italiana: *La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale* - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1967.

51. Rieth, Otto. 1933. *Grundbegriffe Der Stoischen Ethik. Eine Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

52. Rist, John M. 1969. *Stoic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

53. ———, ed. 1978. *The Stoics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations VIII; 1. Ian Mueller: An introduction to Stoic logic 1; Michael Frede: Principles of Stoic grammar 27; Andreas Graeser: The Stoic theory of meaning 77; Anthony A. Long: Dialectic and the Stoic sage 101; George B. Kerferd: What does the wise man know? 125; 6. Robert B. Todd: Monism and immanence: the foundations of Stoic physics 137; Michael Lapidge: Stoic cosmology 161; 8. Margaret E. Reesor: Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy 187; 9. Charlotte Stough: Stoic determinism and moral responsibility 203; 10. Arthur C. Lloyd: Emotion and decision in Stoic psychology 233; 11. Ian G. Kidd: Moral actions and rules in Stoic Ethics 247; 12. John M. Rist: The Stoic concept of detachment 259; 13. F. E. Sparshott: Zeno on art: anatomy of a definition 273; Bibliography 291-295.

54. Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert, and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, eds. 2005. *Les Stoïciens*. Paris: Vrin.

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de la connaissance; Aldo B. Brancacci: Antisthène et le stoïcisme: la logique 55; David Sedley: La définition stoïcienne de la *phantasia katalêptiké* 75; Richard Goulet: La méthode allégorique des stoïciens 93; Anna Maria Ioppolo: Poétique et théorie de la perception chez Ariston 121; Stéphane Toulouse: Les sciences et l'âme chez Posidonius. Remarques sur une définition de l'âme conservée dans Plutarque et sur le statut de l'astronomie et des mathématiques dans sa philosophie 153; Deuxième partie: La physique stoïcienne. La nature et les dieux; Margherita Isnardi-Parente: La notion d'incorporel chez les stoïciens 175; Lambros Couloubartsis: Les structures hénologiques dans le stoïcisme ancien 187; Michael Frede: Sur la théologie stoïcienne 213; Clara Auvray-Assayas: Deux types d'exposé stoïcien sur la providence dans le *De natura deorum* de Cicéron 233; Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Prédiction du futur et action humaines dans le traité de Chrysippe *Sur Ie destin* 247; Troisième partie: L'homme et l'éthique; Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey: La naissance de la subjectivité chez les stoïciens 277; Maximilian Forschner: Le Portique et le concept de personne 293; Mary-Anne Zagdoun: Problèmes concernant l' *oikeiôsis* stoïcienne 319; Cristina Viano: L'Epitomê de l'éthique stoïcienne d'Arius Didyme (Stobée, *Eclog*. II, 7, 57, 13-116, 18) 335; Jacques Brunschwig: Sur deux notions de l'éthique stoïcienne. De la "réserve" au "renversement" 357; Maria Daraki: Les deux races d'hommes dans le stoïcisme d'Athènes 381; Anthony A. Long: L'empreinte socratique dans la philosophie d'Épictète 403; Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot: La parabole de l'escale dans le *Manuel* d'Épictète et son commentaire par Simplicius 427; Quatrième partie: Postérités du Stoïcisme ; Jean-Joël Duhot: Métamorphoses du logos. Du stoïcisme au Nouveau Testament 453; Agnès Pigler: Les éléments stoïciens de la doctrine plotinienne de la connaissance (*Traité* 29) 467; Philippe Hoffmann: La définition stoïcienne du temps dans le miroir du néoplatonisme (Plotin, Jamblique) 487; Michel Gourinat: Hegel et le stoïcisme 523; Bibliographie d'orientation par Jean-Baptiste Gourinat 545; Index des textes cités 573;

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55. Samb, Djibril. 2009. *Étude Du Lexique Des Stoiciens*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

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57. Sandbach, Francis Henry. 1985. *Aristotle and the Stoics*. Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society.

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    "This essay maintains that the extent of influence exerted by Aristotle on the Stoics has often been exaggerated by modern scholars. A collection of all references to him by authors other than Peripatetics, whether contemporary or belonging to the following century, shows that his importance as a philosopher was not then recognised and reveals a lack of evidence that his school-works were known. Professor Sandbach argues that it is a mistake to proceed on the assumption that the Stoics must have known his work, or even an outline of it, and been stimulated whether to agreement or to modification. If the supposed evidence for Aristotelian influence is examined without this presumption, much is found to be flimsy and some can be

confidently rejected. A residue remains of varying degrees of probability, which it is hard to estimate owing to our insufficient information, particularly about Zeno, about the Academy of his time, about Aristotle's exoteric works, and about memory of him in oral tradition." (Abstract, p. 89)

58. Sedley, David. 1982. "The Stoic Criterion of Identity." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 27:255-275.

    "The growing argument, a sceptical puzzle favoured by the Hellenistic Academy, maintained that every material reconstitution, however slight, entails a change of identity. The Stoics responded to this challenge by denying the identity of a "qualified individual" with his material substrate. This was achieved in particular by Chrysippus' paradox about Dion and Theon (ancient forerunners of Geach's Tibbles and Tib), Best interpreted as a dialectical refutation of the growing argument's assumption that matter is the sole principle of individuation. Chrysippus thereby licensed his theory of the four levels of existence (conventionally called the Stoic theory of "categories"). The notion of enduring "qualified individual" provides a criterion of identity central not only to this theory but also to a quite separate epistemological thesis, that of the possibility of infallible recognition."

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61. ———. 2008. "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome." In *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought. Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, edited by Salles, Ricardo, 117-142. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Overview.
In this essay my main concern has been to illustrate the Roman Stoics' attitude to metaphysics. It is an area of philosophical discourse in which Seneca grants the Platonists and Aristotelians greater territorial rights than in any other. For his excursions into it he offers a fundamentally Platonist justification, and as regards ontological kinds, at least, he sees Platonism as superior to the legacy of his own school.
What we have seen to be Seneca's reservations about Stoic metaphysics, I can now add, fit comfortably with Letter 117, where he finds severe ethical disadvantages in the Stoics' too rigid distinction between corporeals and incorporeals, and Letter 113, where he is painfully embarrassed by the Stoic paradox which treats virtues as living beings. But its most typical manifestation is in the counting games which Seneca and other Stoics play with their Platonic-Aristotelian colleagues. Sometimes the Stoics are the winners at these games-notably when arguing more directly against Aristotle, the inventor and chief proponent of such games-sometimes, on Seneca's own confession, the losers. It is this residue of open-mindedness that most clearly characterizes the syncretism which we have been witnessing.
Seneca's readiness to jump ship shows up with regard to metaphysical questions far more prominently and explicitly than in other philosophical areas.(59) I have tried to sketch in a background which makes it plausible that, far from being Seneca's own quirk, this attitude was characteristic of Roman Stoicism in his day. It is hard to know whether it is anything more than accidental that both the main figures who have emerged as Seneca's fellow-participants in the discussions-Severus and Cornutus have Roman names. But Cornutus at least, like Seneca himself, worked in Italy; and Sergius Plautus has emerged as yet another Roman Stoic of

the era who wrote about both Stoic and Aristotelian metaphysics. In the light of this pronounced pattern, I do not see why we should not assume Italy to be the primary scene of those discussions, as indeed Seneca may be taken to imply when he presents them in narrative guise as recent conversations with his friends. My main point, however, is that Seneca is almost certainly not alone among Stoics in his constructively conciliatory attitude to Platonist metaphysics. If it had merely been a question of Seneca's personal distaste for abstruse areas of Stoic metaphysics, it would have been easy for him to remain silent, as lie does for the most part about Stoic epistemology and logic. But instead of thus staying aloof, he cooperates in what I have presented as a pooling of resources between Stoic and Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics.(60) If I have been even half right, his way of conducting these negotiations can teach us something about what it meant to be a Stoic in an age when the Platonic worldview was rapidly regaining its old ascendancy.(61)" pp. 140-141

(59) Seneca's psychology is often taken to be infused with Platonic rational-irrational dualism. For a measured response to this assessment, see Brad Inwood, 'Seneca and Psychological Dualism', in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), *Passions and Perceptions* (Cambridge, 1993), 150-83. The Platonizing tendency in Letters 58 and 65 seems much stronger and more explicit than that in any of the psychological cases discussed by Inwood.

(60) For evidence of the degree of syncretism that had developed by Plotinus' day, cf. Porphyry, *Vit. Plot*. 17.3, on Trypho 'the Stoic and Platonist'.

(61) Ancestors of this essay have benefited from discussion with audiences at Chicago, Gargnano (Italy), Mexico City, London, and Cambridge. My thanks to all who were kind enough to supply comments, especially Brad Inwood, Victor Caston, Ricardo Salles, Stephen Menn, and Myles Burnyeat, although responsibility for the views expressed is entirely my own.

It is a special pleasure to be contributing, with this essay, to a collaborative celebration of Richard Sorabji and his work.

No one has done more than he has to show the philosophical vitality of the debates conducted in the Roman imperial era.

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    "The XIIIth meeting of the Symposium Aristotelicum, which took place in 1993 on the *De Interpretatione*, had a very strange and very sad history. True enough, it took place in the enchanting decor of the Certosa di Pontignano, near Siena; and, as usual, it offered contributions and discussions of the highest order. But this time the publication of the

papers met with insurmountable obstacles. It had been initially entrusted to Mario Mignucci and Michael Frede, two of the most faithful and devoted participants in the Symposium. Most infortunately, however, they were both wrenched from our admiration and affection, Mario Mignucci in 2004, after a protracted and merciless disease, Michael Frede in 2007, owing to an unpredictable, sudden accident. The inevitable ensuing delay for the publication of the XIIIth Symposium has not been caught up with so far and those members of the Organization Committee whom I have been able to contact told me that, in their opinion, it ran a strong risk of never being caught up at all, alas." p. 35. Jacques Brunschwig, *Le chapitre 1 du 'De Interpretatione'. Aristote, Ammonius et nous*, Laval Philosophique et Théologique, 64, 2008, pp. 35-87.

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    Contents: A.M. Ioppolo and D. N. Sedley: Introduction 9; J.-L. Ferrary: Les philosophes grecs à Rome (155-86 A V. J.-C.) 17; D. E. Hahm: Critolaus and Late Hellenistic Peripatetic Philosophy 47; T. Tieleman: Panaetius' Place in the History of Stoicism with Special Reference to His Moral Psychology 103; F. Alesse: Il concetto di *ousia* nel pensiero metafisico e cosmologico di Posidonio: alcune considerazioni su F 92 e 96 EK (= 267 e 268 Th.) 143; J. Annas: Carneades' Classification of Ethical Theories 187; A.M. Ioppolo: L'assenso nella filosofia di Clitomaco: un problema di linguaggio? 225; M. Schofield: Aenesidemus: Pyrrhonist

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    M = *Adversus Mathematicos*.
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Theory and History of Ontology

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Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laërtius. A Bibliography

SELECTED STUDIES ON DIOGENES LAËRTIUS

ENGLISH

1. Barnes, Jonathan. 1986. "Nietzsche and Diogenes Laërtius." *Nietzsche Studien* no. 15:16-40.

   Reprinted in: J. Barnes, *Mantissa: Essays in Ancient Philosophy IV*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015, pp. 584-611.

2. ———. 1992. "Diogenes Laërtius Ix 61-116: The Philosophy of Pyrrhonism." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6: Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4241-4301. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

3. Bollansée, Jan. 2001. "Animadversiones in Diogenem Laertium." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* no. 144:64-106.

   "The present article is concerned with three passus which cause one to ponder all the afore-mentioned matters; the unifying element are the recurring references to Hermippos of Smyrna, the Hellenistic biographer who was active in late

third-century Alexandria and whose writings Diogenes eagerly mined for biographical information on his subjects." (p. 66)

4. Chroust, Anton-Hermann. 1965. "A Brief Analysis of the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laërtius (V, 1-16)." *Antiquité Classique* no. 34:97-129.

   Revised reprint as Chapter III in: A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle. New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, Vol. I pp. 25-53.

5. Düring, Ingemar. 1956. "Ariston or Hermippus? A Note on the Catalogue of Aristotle's Writings." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 17:11-21.

   According to P. Moraux the catalogue by Diogenes Laërtius is based on the Peripatetic philosopher Aristo of Ceos; according to I. Düring on Hermippus of Smyrna.

6. Finkelberg, Aryeh. 1998. "Diogenes Laërtius on the Stoic Definitions of *Kosmos*." *Scripta Classica Israelica* no. 17:21-26.

7. ———. 2000. "Diogenes Laërtius on the Stoic Definitions of *Kosmos* Again." *Scripta Classica Israelica* no. 19:271-280.

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9. Haake, Matthias. 2004. "Documentary Evidence, Literary Forgery, or Manipulation of Historical Documents?: Diogenes Laërtius and an Athenian Honorary Decree for Zeno of Citium." *Classical Quarterly* no. 54:570-483.

   "The Athenian decree honoring Zeno of Citium is considered to be a source for the social status of philosophers in Hellenistic Athens. A remarkable aspect of this source is that the text has not come to us as an inscription, but is quoted by Diogenes Laërtius in his « Life of Zeno » (7, 10-12). In spite of the convincing form of the

decree, the possibility of a forgery or - most likely - the manipulation of an historical document should not be ruled out. Analysis of the motivation clause shows elements that do not fit the pattern of, or are incompatible with the nature of, honorary inscriptions. It is not possible to decide whether Apollonius of Tyre, Diogenes' source, himself copied the decree or consulted a collection."

10. Hahm, David E. 1992. "Diogenes Laërtius Vii: On the Stoics." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4076-4182. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Indices pp. 4404-4411.
    "In this study I propose to reexamine Diogenes' composition of the seventh book of his 'Lives' in the light of what is now known about ancient methods of composition of informational works. By carefully picking through the text for evidence on its construction I hope to clarify the nature and identity of most of the sources that he used in this book. This analysis will also bring into clearer focus his historiographical and literary objectives to the extent that they are manifested in this book. It is my hope that these results will, in combination with studies of other parts of his work, also advance our understanding and appreciation of Diogenes as an author and historian of philosophy in the early third century A. D." (p. 4078)

11. Hope, Richard. 1930. *The Book of Diogenes Laërtius. Its Spirit and Its Method*. New York: Columbia University Press.

12. Kindstrand, Jan Frederik. 1986. "Diogenes Laërtius and the *Chreia* Tradition." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:217-243.

13. Long, Anthony A. 1986. "Diogenes Laërtius, *Life of Arcesilaus*." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:429-449.

14. Mann, Wolfgang-Rainer. 1996. "The Life of Aristippus." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 78:97-119.

15. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1986. "Diogenes Laërtius on Stoic Philosophy." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:295-382.

    " *Quellenforschung*, just as psycho-analysis, is an heirloom of 19th century positivism; it was believed that something is understood if one knows its origins, or what it is composed of. One could even argue the remote influence, or actio very much in distans, of Presocratic arche-speculation. But we have since learned also to take the author and his public into account. Consequently, I have attempted to display less interest in Diogenes Laërtius as a person than as an author, and although one knows little about the sort of early third-century provincial public he wrote for, one may at least account for the fact that the traditions used by him reflect the feudings among and the discussions internal to the philosophical schools, as well as the various ways of teaching philosophy or addressing the general public, that evolved in the Hellenistic period and later. The way Diogenes Laërtius handles his materials may reveal certain preferences, but it would be jejune to hold him responsible for the information at his disposal." (p. 299)

16. ———. 1988. "Number Nine (Diog. Laert. Ix, 87)." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 5:235-248.

17. ———. 1999. "Sources." In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Long, Anthony A., 22-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "Diogenes Laërtius' work, though for the most part a treatment of the sects, is structured according to lines of succession, the Ionian in books II-VII and the Italian in books VIII-X. Hence, we find the early Greek philosophers who are Ionians starting with Anaximander (said to be the pupil of Thales and so linked to book I) at the beginning of book II, and the Italians-cum-Eleatics together with

Heraclitus and Xenophanes (who are counted as "random") in books VIII and IX. 1-49. Protagoras is added at IX. 50-6 because he was purportedly a pupil of Democritus, and Diogenes of Apollonia at IX. 5 7 for no visible reason.(36) Diogenes' treatment is very uneven. The early Ionians get only brief chapters, and the sections about the early Eleatics are also relatively short. Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism are treated on an extraordinarily large scale, though not yet in the mystagogical way of a Porphyry, or an Iamblichus; Empedocles (included among the Pythagoreans), Heraclitus, and Democritus are presented in fairly long sections.(37)
(...)
The doxographies in Diogenes Laërtius that are concerned with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Democritus are preceded by fairly extensive biographies, whereas biographical information about the other early Greek philosophers is thin, or even, as in Leucippus' case, absent (though he is part of the succession). This too shows that Diogenes Laërtius, or the traditions he is following, attached a special importance to these figures. The biography of Heraclitus is perhaps the most interesting. Factually, little was known, so stories about his character, his behaviour, and his death were fabricated from the utterances in his book - an interesting example of the idea, prominent in Diogenes Laërtius but also quite common in a variety of other authors, that a philosopher's life and his work should agree with each other.(41) The study of the life, activities, and sayings of a philosopher was in fact regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the study of his writings and doctrines. In the cases where no books were available, the philosopher's "life" itself, including acts, apophthegms, and so on had to suffice. Conversely, if biographical data were unavailable, they were made up from what a person wrote, or from what others were believed to have written about him. These practices gave ancient biography, or at least part of it, its bad name.(42) " (pp. 33-34)

18. ———. 2000. "Diogenes Laërtius 7.83." *Mnemosyne* no. 53:592-597.

19. Mejer, Jørgen. 1978. *Diogenes Laërtius and His Hellenistic Background*. Wiesbaden: Steiner.

    Contents: Preface IX; Part I: Diogenes Laërtius 1; The intentions of Diogenes' book 2; The question of sources 7; The technique of excerpting 16; A specimen of source analysis 29; Diogenes' personality 46; Part II: Hellenistic historiography of philosophy 60; *Diadokai* 62; History of a single School 74; *Peri aireseon* 75; Doxography 81; Biographies of philosophers 90; Concluding remarks 94; Bibliography 96; Index locorum 102; Index nominum 105-108.
    "The original motivation for this book was a wish to sort out the many ways in which Presocratic philosophy was transmitted in Antiquity. Only later did I realize that such a study demanded far more knowledge and skill than I possessed, and that any attempt to discuss the question of historiography of philosophy in Antiquity had to be based on a fresh analysis of Diogenes Laërtius. This book is offered as a contribution to Laertian scholarship but its value, if any, is to be decided by the extent to which it will be followed up by further research on Hellenistic scholarship, concerning history of philosophy and biographies of philosophers, and on the transmission of early Greek philosophy in Antiquity. Ultimately, a History of Historiography of Philosophy in Antiquity is to be hoped for." (from the Preface)

20. ———. 1992. "Diogenes Laërtius and the Transmission of Greek Philosophy." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 5. Teilband: Philosophie (Einzelne Autoren, Doxographica)*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 3556-3602. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    "It should be clear by now that Diogenes did not mindlessly copy out his sources for his doxographical sections. He must

have made an effort to find what he considered the best sources for each philosophical school, and he definitely had his own ideas as to the content of each doxography even if he did not always understand the more complicated philosophical arguments. Most of his doxographies show some affinity to the presentations of earlier Greek philosophy, which we find in other texts from the IInd and IIIrd centuries A. D., though in some cases he seems to have turned to older sources (e. g. for Aristotle and Epicurus). There is no sign of any mechanical use of sources, not even in the case of the Presocratics where he undoubtedly drew upon a source belonging to the doxographical tradition going back to Theophrastus. His information sometimes differs from that in Aetius and Hippolytus. In the few longer excerpts on the Presocratics he seems to reproduce his source(s) fairly closely but he is not averse to changing, or even adding to, the text he found in his source. We may not always be happy with him as a source of information on earlier Greek philosophy, but he is neither incompetent nor consciously misleading; there is little doubt that he can be taken to represent what an individual interested in philosophy, (161) living somewhere in the provinces of the Roman empire in the IInd or IIIrd centuries A. D., could do, provided he worked hard collecting and excerpting the sources which he could find. Diogenes may not be a great writer, and there were obviously better philosophical minds writing in his period, but he is not to be vilified, and he has preserved much information that would have been lost to us, had it not been for his enthusiasm and industry." pp. 3599-3600.

(161) Diogenes is usually compared to sources like Plutarch, Galen, Sextus, and Hippolytus. They were, however, in some sense all 'professionals' and placed in important positions with access to good libraries in major cities. If we measure Diogenes with another stick, e. g. the philosophical knowledge implied in Lucian's `Vitarum Auctio', his effort becomes much more respectable.

21. ———. 2007. "Biography and Doxography. Four Crucial Questions Raised by Diogenes Laërtius." In *Die Griechische Biographie in Hellenistischer Zeit. Akten Des Internationalen Kongresses Vom 26.-29. Juli 2006 in Würzburg*, edited by Erler, Michael and Schorn, Stefan, 431-442. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Diogenes' text is divided into 10 'books' (...)
This structure is important since it seems to indicate that Diogenes' work belongs to a type of ancient literature in which the lives of philosophers were arranged as two or three series of biographies so that teacher and student followed one another within each major philosophical school. This type of literature had the title *Successions of Philosophers*, (5) though there are also other books with different titles that seem to belong in this category, not least Philodemus' two surveys of the Platonic and the Stoic schools.(6)
Some of Diogenes' biographies, however, seem to have been composed later than the Hellenistic period (Xenophon, Democritus), and some of his reports on philosophical systems show features that are similar to texts from the second century AD (Plato, Skeptics). Therefore, we must ask:
To which extent is Diogenes representative of the *Successions* type -- and in general of the Hellenistic tradition of biography and historiography of philosophy?
Diogenes' biographical sections are composed of a number of items like birth, parents, name, appearance, relationship to other philosophers, travels, life style and circumstances of death; there is no particular order in which these items are presented, and though many details also were found in Hellenistic sources, they cannot have come from one particular source. In any case, we must ask:
Is the biographical information we get, trustworthy?
The dominating element in all the biographies is Diogenes' use of anecdotes; sometimes the same anecdote is told about more than one philosopher, hence it is hard to believe that Diogenes himself was convinced of them being literally

true. Since it is commonly assumed that anecdotes are fictitious, we must ask a third question:
What is the biographical value of anecdotes?
Many, but not all, of Diogenes' Lives include a section on the philosophical ideas, if not of an individual philosopher, then at least of a philosophical school. In the case of the Post-Socratic schools (the Cyrenaics, Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, the Stoics, the Skeptics and Epicurus) there is no uniform way of presenting their philosophy: Plato is presented in the light of second century AD Platonism, while Aristotle's philosophy seems to represent a fairly early way of doing Peripatetic philosophy; the Stoic philosophy is described with references to many Stoics of different periods while Epicurus' philosophy is represented by four texts going back to Epicurus himself. The survey of the Skeptic tropes (9,79-105) is shorter than in Sextus Empiricus but otherwise comparable.(7)
The philosophy of the Presocratics is, however, for the most part described by means of fairly short systematic surveys similar to what we find in Hippolytus' *Refutatio omnium haeresium* Book One, and -- in content, if not in form -- to Pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* and to sections of Stobaeus. These surveys have since Diels' pioneering work *Doxographi Graeci* (1879) been called doxographical, though the term 'doxographical' unfortunately has been extended to mean any text reporting the views of previous philosophers.
Considering this variety of philosophical information, we must ask a fourth important question:
To which extent can we assume that Diogenes just copied his predecessors, or to put the question in another way: are we justified in assuming that most of the Hellenistic biographies of philosophers contained separate sections on the philosophers' views?
I would like to discuss these four crucial questions (8) by examining Diogenes' *Life of Democritus* (9,34-49) and draw some more general conclusions on that basis." (pp. 432-433)

(5) Cf. Mejer *Uberlieferung der Philosophie im Altertum. Eine Einführung* (Kobenhaven, 2000). Fragments in Rosa Giannattasio Andria *I frammenti delle Successioni dei Filosofi*, (Napoli, 1989).

22. Sluiter, Ineke. 2005. "Communicating Cynicism: Diogenes' Gangsta Rap." In *Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad, 139-163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

23. Sollenberger, Michael George. 1985. "Diogenes Laërtius 5.36-57. The *Vita Theophrasti*." In *Theophrastus of Eresus. On His Life and Work*, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W., Huby, Pamela M. and Long, Anthony A., 1-62. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

24. ———. 1987. "A Note on the Lives of Theophrastus and Strato in Diogenes Laërtius 5.57-58." *Classical Philology* no. 82:228-230.

25. ———. 1992. "The Lives of the Peripatetics: An Analysis of the Contents and Structure of Diogenes Laërtius' *Vitae Philosophorum* Book 5." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 3793-3879. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    "Accounts of the lives of six early Peripatetic philosophers are contained in the fifth book of Diogenes Laërtius' 'Vitae philosophorum': the lives of the first four leaders of the sect -- Aristotle, Theophrastus, Strato, and Lyco -- and those of two outstanding members -- Demetrius of Phalerum and Heraclides of Pontus. Our knowledge of the history of two rival schools, the Academy and the Stoa, is aided not only by the lives of several members of these two schools in Books Four and Seven of Diogenes' work, but also by accounts in the `Index Academicorum' and the 'Index Stoicorum' which have been preserved for us among the several papyri from

Herculaneum.(1) But for the Peripatos there is no such second source of information. There are, to be sure, numerous bits and pieces of evidence which concern the school and its members scattered throughout ancient and medieval literature, many of which have been made readily accessible by F. Wehrli in his well-known series 'Die Schule des Aristoteles'.(2) Moreover, in addition to Diogenes' version, several other lives of Aristotle have come down to us and have been collected and analyzed in detail by I. Düring in his 'Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition'.(3) But for the lives and careers of other Peripatetics, Diogenes' accounts are the only ones available to us.

All of the many aspects of these six lives cannot be discussed here with comprehensive thoroughness. Rather, relying on the studies and findings of past scholars, sometimes heavily, I shall offer a compilation of those findings in a systematic manner. Although oversimplification is inevitable in view of the many complex problems encountered in these lives, consideration will be given to general matters of content, structure, organization, and arrangement of material in Book Five as a whole, to the different categories of information in the individual lives, and to the two most striking features of this book which set it apart from other books: the wills of the first four scholarchs and the extensive catalogues of writings included by Diogenes for five of the six philosophers." (pp. 3793-3794)

(1) P. Herc. 1021 (and 164) and 1018 respectively, edited by S. Mekler, *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis* (Berlin, 1902), which should be read in conjunction with W. Crõnert, *Die Ueberlieferung des Index Academicorum*, Hermes 38 (1903) p. 357-405, and A. Traversa, *Index Stoicorum Herculanensis*. Istituto di filologia classica 1 (Genoa, 1952).

(2) F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentare*, 2nd ed. vol. 1 - 2 (Basel, 1967), vol. 3 --10 (Basel, 1969), suppl. vol. I (Basel, 1974), and suppl. vol. 2 (Basel, 1978). The fragments of Theophrastus, not included by Wehrli are being prepared by a team of scholars headed

by W. Fortenbaugh in a series of volumes which is scheduled to appear soon. [Theophrastus of Eresus. *Sources for his life, writings, thought and influence*. Edited by Fortenbaugh William W. et al. Leiden: Brill 1992, two volumes].
(3) Ingemar Düring Ingemar. Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensis 5 (Göteborg, 1957).

26. Warren, James. 2007. "Diogenes Laërtius, Biographer of Philosophy." In *Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire*, edited by König, Jason, König, Jason and Whitmarsh, Tim, 133-149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "Diogenes' approach to writing about philosophical history in terms of biography is also an attempt to construct a life-story of philosophy. Evidence includes Diogenes Laërtius 1, 13-18; 2, 47; and 4, 28-29".

Français

1. Algra, Keimpe A. 1994. "Gassendi Et Le Texte De Diogène Laërce." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 15:79-103.

   "L'étude des objectifs et de la méthode de Gassendi, ainsi que du matériel dont il disposait pour la rédaction de ses *Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laërtii* (Lyon 1649), permet d'affirmer que le jugement très négatif que la plupart des savants du XIX et XX siècle ont porté sur cet ouvrage n'est pas justifié. Même si les compétences philologiques de Gassendi n'égalaient pas ses qualités de philosophe, il a donné une impulsion non négligeable à l'établissement du texte de Diogène grâce à sa connaissance de l'épicurisme et à sa maîtrise du grec."

2. Bidez, Joseph. 1894. *La Biographie D'empédocle*. Gand: Université de Gand.

Table des matières: La vie d'Empédocle par Diogène Laërce; Histoire de la tradition; Biographie d'Empédocle.
Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1973; Charleston, BiblioLife 2009.

3. Bodéüs, Richard. 1995. "L'aristotélisme Stoïcien." *Cahiers des Études Anciennes* no. 29:7-32.

   "The text of Diogenes Laërtius' testimony to Aristotle's philosophy is in fact a Stoic construction the principle elements of which, established in the Hellenistic era, have influenced for centuries our understanding of Aristotle's thought."

4. Brisson, Luc. 1992. "Diogène Laërce, 'Vies Et Doctrines Des Philosophes Illustres', Livre Iii: Structure Et Contenu." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 5. Teilband: Philosophie (Einzelne Autoren, Doxographica)*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 3619-3760. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

   Indices pp. 2* - 25*.
   " *Conclusion*. Le livre III, qui, comme on peut le constater, suit un plan assez rigoureux, présente donc un intérêt tout particulier, dans la mesure où la dédicace qui s'y trouve insérée permet de se faire une idée du public auquel s'adressait Diogène Laërce: il s'agissait non de spécialistes intéressés par les doctrines philosophiques, mais d'amateurs éclairés friands de littérature. Ce point précisé, on comprend mieux de quelle manière procède Diogène Laërce, lorsqu'il décrit la vie de Platon, et lorsqu'il évoque ses œuvres et ses doctrines.
   Pour fabriquer la vie de Platon, qui, pour l'essentiel, répond à des intentions bien précises, notamment celle d'illustrer ou d'exemplifier des points de doctrine par référence à des éléments biographiques, un certain nombre de recettes ont été appliquées. Or, cette recherche systématique d'un accord entre la vie de Platon et ses doctrines ne laisse pas de prêter à cette partie du livre III l'allure d'un "roman".

En revanche, les informations que recèle la partie du livre III sur les œuvres et les doctrines de Platon présentent un caractère plus positif. Diogène Laërce y donne des renseignements de première importance sur la transmission du texte de Platon et sur sa présentation matérielle à son époque. En outre, la doxographie que, par la suite, propose Diogène Laërce nous permet de nous faire une idée de l'interprétation à laquelle furent soumises les doctrines de Platon dans les tout premiers siècles de l'Empire, période que nous connaissons mal par ailleurs.
Cela dit, on ne peut, à la suite de cette lecture "savante", manquer de se poser cette question. Si le corpus platonicien avait été perdu, s'il n'en restait plus que des fragments, serions-nous en mesure de relativiser l'image que l'on pouvait se faire de Platon et de son œuvre dans certains milieux durant la première moitié du IIIème siècle apr. J.-C., pour retrouver une image de Platon plus authentique, celle qu'essaie de reconstituer un historien contemporain de la philosophie, à partir d'une lecture systématique et assidue du corpus platonicien? Cette question présente d'autant plus de pertinence que les œuvres de la plupart des philosophes qu'évoque Diogène Laërce ont été perdues en tout ou en partie." pp. 3759-3760

5. Caujolle-Zaslawsky, Franoise. 1991. "Note Sur L' *Epagogé* Dans Le *Sophiste*. A Propos De Diogène Laërce Iii 53-55." In *Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 509-534. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

6. Delatte, Armand. 1922. *La Vie De Pythagore De Diogène Laërce*. Bruxelles: Lamertin.

   Introduction, pp. 5-100.
   Reprint: New York, Arno Press, 1979; Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1988; Genève, Slatkine, 2002.

7. Delebecque, Édouard. 1957. *Essai Sur La Vie De Xénophon*. Paris: Klincksieck.

8. Desbordes, Bernadette Anne. 1990. *Introduction À Diogène Laërce. Exposition De L'altertumswissenschaft Servant De Préliminaires Critiques À Une Lecture De L'œuvre*, Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht.

   Deux volumes.

9. Dorandi, Tiziano. 2007. "Diogène Laërce "Lecteur" D'aristote." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 28:435-446.

   "Présente une nouvelle édition du passage que Diogène Laërce consacre à la doctrine d'Aristote (*Vies* V, 27-34), accompagnée d'un apparat et de quelques notes de lecture destinées à justifer les choix textuels."

10. ———. 2008. "Notes Critiques Et Éxégetiques Aux Livres Iii Et V Des *Vies Des Philosophes* De Diogène Laërce." *Eikasmos.Quaderni Bolognesi di Filologia Classica* no. 19:241-262.

11. Dumont, Jean Paul. 1987. "Les Modèles De Conversion À La Philosophie Chez Diogène Laërce." *Augustinus* no. 32:79-97.

    "Les quelques modèles de conversion à la philosophie que présente Diogène établissent un ordre de filiation entre l'Académie, l'école cynique et le Portique. Radicales, ces conversions n'obéissent pas tant aux raisons de l'intelligence (*protreptique*) qu'à une intervention incompréhensible et gratuite de la Fortune, c'est-à-dire de Dieu. Ainsi, de spéculative la philosophie devient existentielle, préparant le terrain à la conversion chrétienne."

12. ———. 1993. "La Physique De Zénon D'élée: Diogène Laërce, Vies 9, 29." *Helmantica* no. 44:73-90.

    "Étude visant à montrer la cohérence de la physique zénonienne, sur la base de l'examen des *kephalaia* d'un ouvrage de Zénon sur la physique conservés et cités par Diogène Laërce 9, 29."

13. Frede, Michael. 1992. "Doxographie, Historiographie Philosophique Et Historiographie Historique De La Philosophie." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 97:311-325.

14. Goulet, Richard. 1992. "Des Sages Parmi Les Philosophes: Le Premier Livre Des Vies Des Philosophes De Diogène Laërce." In *Sophiés Maiètores. Chercheurs De Sagesse, Mélanges Jean Pépin*, edited by Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, Madec, Goulven and O'Brien, Denis, 167-178. Paris: Institut d'études Augustiniennes.

    Reprins dans: R. Goulet, *Études sur les vies de philosophes dans l'antiquité tardive. Diogène Laërce, Porphyre de Tyr, Eunape de Sardes,* Paris, Vrin, 2001.

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16. ———. 2001. *Études Sur Les Vies De Philosophes Dans L'antiquité Tardive. Diogène Laërce, Porphyre De Tyr, Eunape De Sardes*. Paris: Vrin.

    Recueil de 19 études parues entre 1977 et 2001.

17. ———. 2007. "La Conservation Et La Transmission Des Textes Philosophiques Grecs." In *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, edited by D'Ancona, Cristina, 29-61. Brill: Leiden.

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19. ———. 1986. *L'ascèse Cynique. Un Commentaire De Diogène Laërce Vi, 70-71*. Paris: Vrin.

20. ———. 1986. "Une Liste De Disciples De Cratès Le Cynique En Diogène Laërce 6, 95." *Hermes* no. 114:247-252.

21. ———. 1992. "Le Livre Vi De Diogène Laërce: Analyse De Sa Structure Et Réflexions Méthodologiques." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 3880-4048. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    "Le lecteur des 'Vies' de Diogène Laëree en général et du livre VI en particulier a le sentiment de pénétrer dans une sorte de labyrinthe où il manque de points de repère. Le texte offre peu de prises, il résiste, parce que les 'Vies' sont le témoignage résiduel d'une vaste littérature en partie disparue. Comment alors échapper à une lecture naïve, à une lecture de surface, et découvrir les problématiques sous-jacentes aux différents matériaux qui, juxtaposés, constituent le livre VI?
    D'emblée nous proposons de dégager la structure du livre VI, telle qu'elle peut apparaître au cours d'une première lecture, afin de susciter une confrontation immédiate avec la complexité du texte." (p. 3880).

22. ———. 1997. "Les Titres Des Œuvres D'eschine Chez Diogène Laërce." In *Titres Et Articulations Du Texte Dans Les œuvres Antiques. Actes Du Colloque Nternational De Chantilly, 13-15 Décembre 1994*, edited by Fredouille, Jean-Claude, Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, Hoffmann, Philippe and Petitmengin, Pierre, 167-190. Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes.

23. Gugliermina, Isabelle. 2005. "Les Écrits De Cratès De Thèbes Selon Diogène Laërce: (*Vies Et Doctrines Des Philosophes Illustres*, Ii, 118, 26; Vi, 85-98)." *Philosophie Antique* no. 5:3-196.

24. ———. 2006. *Diogène Laërce Et Le Cynisme*. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

25. Masson, Olivier. 1995. "La Patrie De Diogène Laërce Est-Elle Inconnue?" *Museum Helveticum* no. 52:225-230.

26. Mejer, Jørgen. 1994. "Diogène Laërce." In *Dictionnaire Des Philosophes Antiques. Vol. Ii*, edited by Goulet, Richard, 824-833. Paris: CNRS Éditions.

    "Caractère général de l'œuvre. Si le titre «Vies, doctrines et sentences des philosophes illustres» semble bien connu, cela résulte de la popularité de l'œuvre de Diogène Laërce, car en fait ce titre, qui caractérise de faon exacte l'œuvre de Diogène Laërce, est unique dans l'historiographie philosophique de l'Antiquité. Néanmoins, si l'on prend en considération la structure de l'ouvrage et les sources citées par Diogène, il faut rattacher le livre au genre historiographique des "Successions". Après une introduction consacrée à l'origine et au nom de la philosophie, ainsi qu'aux différentes classifications de la philosophie et des philosophes (I 1-21, cf. 30 O. Gigon, «Das Prooemium des Diogenes Laertios : Strüktur und Problème», dans Freundesgabe fur W. Wili, Bern 1960, p. 37-64), Diogène présente deux séries de philosophes, une qui conduit des sept Sages aux stoïciens à travers Socrate et les socratiques, Platon et les péripatéticiens (livres I-VII), l'autre de Pythagore aux sceptiques et à Épicure à travers Héraclite, les Éléates et les atomistes (livres VIII-X). L'histoire de l'Académie est conduite jusqu'à Clitomaque, celle de l'école aristotélicienne jusqu'à Lycon, celle de la Stoa seulement jusqu'à Chrysippe dans l'état actuel de l'ouvrage, mais atteignait originellement Cornutus au Ier siècle de notre ère (cf. l'apparat critique à la fin du livre VII de l'édition d'Oxford; on ne peut savoir de faon certaine si Diogène donnait ces noms dans le cadre d'une simple liste ou s'il leur avait consacré des biographies indépendantes). Diogène nomme les épicuriens les plus célèbres jusqu'à Zénon de Sidon, Démétrios Lacon, Diogène de Tarse et

Orion, par conséquent jusqu'au premier siècle av. J.-C. Seule la succession sceptique est conduite jusque vers 200 ap. J.-C. Cette progression historique est exclusivement biographique: à l'exception des stoïciens, Diogène décrit toujours les opinions philosophiques du fondateur, mais non celles des successeurs." (p. 827)

27. Moraux, Paul. 1949. "L'exposé De La Philosophie D'aristote Chez Diogène Laerce 5.28-34." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 47:5-43.

"Dans la *Vie d'Aristote* de Diogène Laërce, c'est surtout la notice biographique qu'ont exploitée les modernes; l'exposé doctrinal les a moins intéressés; pour connaître la pensée du philosophe, ils disposaient des propres traités de celui-ci et jugeaient ces témoins bien
plus précieux que le médiocre résumé d'un obscur compilateur!
Pourtant, les quelques lignes dans lesquelles Diogène croit condenser la doctrine d'Aristote soulèvent bien des problèmes.
Diogène n'a pas lu lui-même les ouvrages du Stagirite. Dieu sait par combien d'intermédiaires son information lui est parvenue!
S'il est difficile de mettre un nom sur les sources du compilateur, peut-être une critique sagace pourra-t-elle en déterminer l'époque, les tendances, la valeur." (p. 5)
(...)
"Comme le catalogue, l'exposé doctrinal fut donc ajouté au fonds primitif par Diogène lui-même. Il reste à savoir si Diogène l'a emprunté en bloc à un autre auteur, ou s'il en a lui-même rassemblé, tant bien que mal, les éléments.
Plusieurs constatations nous inclinent
vers la seconde hypothèse. Laisser aller, incohérence et manque d'esprit critique sont, certes, défauts communs aux compilations de l'époque impériale, et l'on comprendrait que Diogène ait pu les tenir de sa source; mais pourtant, ces travers ne déparent que certains genres littéraires, tels que biographies, recueils d'anecdotes, histoires merveilleuses,

etc. Nous tournons-nous vers la littérature philosophique de certaines écoles, nous sommes frappés par le sérieux, la méthode, la discipline que l'on s'est efforcé d'y faire régner; nous
n'en voulons pour preuve que les travaux scolaires, aide-mémoire, fragments de dialogues et commentaires réunis sous le titre d' *Apories* et attribués à Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Dès lors, il est à peu près sûr que, si Diogène avait emprunté son exposé doctrinal à un ouvrage spécialisé ou même à un manuel sans prétention, nous n'y découvririons pas la disparate que nous avons constatée. En fait, chaque tronon diffère de l'autre par l'âge, la valeur et le but visé; la forme grammaticale elle-même laisse deviner qu'il s'agit de morceaux étrangers l'un à l'autre; le résumé de la logique est, par exemple, en discours direct, mais la division de la philosophie, qui le précède, est en style indirect dépendant de βούλεται; le commentaire est également en discours direct, tandis que les *placita* sont faits de propositions infinitives introduites, de temps à autre, par un ἔφη ou ἀπεφαινε.
Le compilateur s'est peu soucié d'unifier les documents qu'il a résumés et mis bout à bout; il les a cependant marqués involontairement de son empreinte: on remarque, dans l'exposé doctrinal, plusieurs des relâchements caractéristiques du style des Biographies:
ainsi, une proposition sur l'immobilité divine coupe en deux la doctrine de la Providence; or, des insertions malencontreuses du même genre se rencontrent dans les autres livres diogéniens; le commentaire sur la définition de l'âme est défiguré par un déplacement de
texte, faute qui n'est pas non plus sans exemple dans les Biographies; c'est la preuve que l'exposé doctrinal n'a point été simplement copié sur un ou plusieurs manuels, mais qu'il a été retravaillé par la main à qui nous devons la rédaction de l'œuvre tout entière." (pp. 42-43)

28. ———. 1951. *Les Listes Anciennes Des Ouvrages D'aristote*. Louvain: Éditions universitaires de Louvain.

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29. ———. 1955. "La Composition De La Vie D'aristote Chez Diogène Laerce." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 53:124-163.

"Bien des inepties déparent les biographies dues à Diogène Laërce. Comme le révèle l'analyse de la *Vie d'Aristote*, une grande partie d'entre elles s'expliquent par l'application maladroite d'un procédé de composition assez singulier: d'un thème normalement amené par la marche du récit chronologique, l'auteur passe volontiers, par associations d'idées, à un thème voisin; de celui-ci, il saute à un autre, et ainsi de suite. Des digressions en cascades se mêlent donc à la narration biographique. On peut retrouver, cependant, la charpente originelle de la biographie: il suffit d'isoler les digressions et de ne considérer que les morceaux qui les ont déclenchées. Or ce démontage de la *Vie d'Aristote* révèle un fait d'une importance primordiale: le canevas, sur lequel a brodé Diogène est identique à celui qu'on retrouve chez le grand Apollodore, l'un et l'autre découlent d'une source commune, qui est probablement le péripatéticien Ariston de Céos. Diogène a fait de son mieux pour étoffer ce donné primitif en y insérant une foule de renseignements complémentaires; il a rédigé lui-même une partie de ces digressions et a laissé à l'état brut les matériaux qu'il destinait aux autres. Son manuscrit, à demi achevé et bourré de notes additionnelles non encore incorporées au texte, a

été confié à un éditeur, qui a transcrit le tout en un texte continu, non sans commettre une foule de bévues et d'erreurs. La stupidité d'un rédacteur incapable est ainsi venue s'ajouter à l'insigne naïveté de Diogène."

30. ———. 1986. "Diogène Laërce Et Le *Peripatos*." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:245-294.

31. Mouraviev, Serge. 1987. "La *Vie D'héraclite* De Diogène Laërce (Analyse Stratigraphique; Le Texte De Base; Un Nouveau Fragment D'ariston De Céos?)." *Phronesis* no. 32:1-33.

    "L'analyse permet de distinguer 1) un texte de base, 2) des compléments (doxographie, lettres, épigrammes, etc.) et 3) des additions postérieures. Le texte de base se subdivise en une étude caractérologique, attribuable à Ariston de Céos d'après Diogène Laërce II, 22, du fr. 13-I Wehrli d'Ariston, et d'un pinax bibliographique. Dans une apostille est reconstituée l'histoire du texte de la Vie et la technique de citation de Diogène."

32. Rocca-Serra, Guillaume. 1987. "Parménide Chez Diogène Laërce." In *Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 254-273. Paris: Vrin.

    "Nous avons choisi d'organiser notre recherche autour de la notice consacrée à Parménide par Diogène Laèrce. Une autre méthode eût consisté dans une présentation qui aurait suivi un ordre chronologique, mais une telle procédure supposait résolu un problème qui tourmente, au moins depuis Nietzsche, philologues et philosophes, celui des sources de Diogène Laèrce. Au contraire, partir de cet auteur et revenir en arrière nous évitait de prendre des positions trop tranchées à la fois sur ses informateurs immédiats et sur les sources de ces informateurs eux-mêmes.
    L'œuvre de Diogène constitue, on le sait, une sorte de synthèse, maladroite et parfois mal intentionnée, de ce que

l'érudition hellénistique avait rassemblé sur le thème des «Vies et doctrines des philosophes célèbres». Sa méthode de travail, son esprit superficiel lui ont attiré des critiques méritées, mais il nous a conservé une masse d'informations qui font de son livre un ouvrage indispensable. Ajoutons qu'une partie des absurdités qu'on lui attribue pourrait parfaitement provenir de la maladresse des scribes médiévaux." p. 254
"Cet examen, bien que partiel, de la tradition biographique et doxographique nous aura persuadés, semble-t-il, d'abord, que les restes de cette tradition ne représentent qu'une infime partie d'une littérature jadis très importante. C'est ainsi que la modeste notice de Diogène nous fait entrevoir les travaux de l'école d'Aristote, de l'érudition alexandrine, de la doxographie sceptique.
Ensuite et surtout, on peut mettre en évidence la valeur de certaines des indications qu'elle nous transmet. Elle nous fournit le canevas vraisemblable de la biographie de Parménide, d'abord héritier d'une grande famille et voué probablement à une activité politique et législatrice, puis se tournant vers la philosophie, sans toutefois que la fine pointe de sa pensée soit mise en évidence, et c'est là une des lacunes de la tradition. Pourtant, bien avant K. Reinhardt 1°2, Sotion puis Diogène ont dissocié Xénophane et Parménide, pressentant ainsi l'originalité de ce dernier. La tradition, enfin, a retenu plus volontiers le monde de l'apparence que le poème. C'est surtout grâce à elle que nous reconstruisons la doxa parménidéenne, sur laquelle les parties conservées du Poème nous renseignent guère. Elle a donc sa place dans l'approche d'un Parménide dans sa totalité." p. 273 (notes omises)

33. Verbeke, Gerard. 1986. "Panétius Et Posidonius Chez Diogène Laërce." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:103-131.

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1. Gigante, Marcello. 1992. "Das Zehnte Buch Des Diogenes Laertios: Epikur Und Der Epikureismus." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6: Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4302-4307. Berlin: de Gruyter.

2. Gigon, Olof. 1960. "Das Prooemium Des Diogenes Laertios. Struktur Und Probleme." In *Horizonte Der Humanitas. Eine Freundesgabe Für Walter Wili Zu Seinem 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Luck, Georg, 37-64. Bern: Haupt.

3. ———. 1986. "Das Dritte Buch Des Diogenes Laertios." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:133-182.

4. Janácek, Karel. 2008. *Studien Zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laërtius Und Zur Pyrrhonischen Skepsis*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

   Herausgegeben von Jan Janda und Filip Karfík.

5. Kienle, Walter von. 1961. *Die Berichte Über Die Sukzessionen Der Philosophen in Der Hellenistischen Und Spätantiken Literatur*, Freien Universität, Berlin.

6. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1868. "De Laertii Diogenis Fontibus I - Ii." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* no. 23:632-653.

   I. De Diocle Magnete; II. De Favorino Aretalensi. Nachdruck: F. W. Nietzsche, *Philologische Schriften (1867-1873)*, hrsg. von Fritz Bornmann and Mario Carpitella, (*Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, vol. II, 1 Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982 ss. 75-167.

7. ———. 1869. "De Laertii Diogenis Fontibus Iii - Vi." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* no. 24:181-228.

   III. De Demetrio Magnete; IV. De Demetrio Dioclis fonte; V. De ceteris Dioclis fontibus; VI. De Laertio et Hesychio.

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8. ———. 1870. "Analecta Laertiana." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* no. 25:217-231.

   Nachdruck: F. W. Nietzsche, *Philologische Schriften (1867-1873),* hrsg. von Fritz Bornmann and Mario Carpitella (*Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, vol. II, 1 Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982, ss. 169-190.

9. ———. 1870. *Beiträge Zur Quellenkunde Und Kritik Des Diogenes Laërtius*. Basel: Carl Schultz.

   1. Laërtius Diogenes als Epigrammendichter 193; 2. Diokles als Hauptquelle des Laërtius Diogenes 201; 3. Favorinus als Nebenquelle des Laërtius Diogenes 207; 4. Ueberreste platonischer Schriftenverzeichnisse 211; 5. Eine angebliche Schrift des Pythagoras 214; 6. Der codex Burbonicus des Laërtius Diogenes 216; 7. Diokles über Demokrit's Leben 218; 8. Das Zeugniss Timons über Demokrit 222; 9. Thrasylls Verzeichniss der demokritischen Schriften 224; 10. Hermippus oder Menippus 231; 11. Der Cyniker Menippus 233; Namenregister zu den Laertianischen Quellenstudien 241.
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ITALIANO

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   Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Napoli ed Amalfi, 30 settembre - 3 ottobre 1985.
   Sommario: Avvertenza 5; Marcello Gigante: Biografia e dossografia in Diogene Laerzio 7; Gerard Verbeke: Panétius et Posidonius chez Diogène Laërce 103; Olof Gigon: Das dritte Buch des Diogenes Laertios 133; Gabriele Giannantoni: Socrate e i Socratici in Diogene Laerzio 183; Jan Frederik Kindstrand: Diogenes Laërtius and the *Chreia* tradition 217; Paul Moraux: Diogène Laërce et le *Péripatos* 245; Jaap Mansfeld: Diogenes Laërtius on Stoic philosophy 295; Jonathan Barnes: Diogene Laerzio e il Pirronismo 383; Anthony A. Long: Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Arcesilaus 429-449; Indici 451.

2. Ambaglio, Delfino. 1983. "Diogene Laerzio E La Storiografia Greca Frammentaria." *Athenaeum* no. 61:269-272.

3. Aronadio, Francesco. 1990. "Due Fonti Laerziane: Sozione E Demetrio Di Magnesia." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 11:203-255.

4. Barnes, Jonathan. 1986. "Diogene Laerzio E Il Pirronismo." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 7:383-427.

5. Brancacci, Aldo. 1992. "I *Koiné Aréskonta* Dei Cinici E La *Koinonia* Tra Cinismo E Stoicismo Nel Libro Vi (103-105) Delle 'Vite' Di Diogene Laerzio." In *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie (Doxographica [Forts.])*, edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4049-4075. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

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    "L'VIII libro di Diogene Laerzio e dedicato a Pitagora, capostipite del ramo italico della filosofia e primo a chiamarsi filosofo e a usare il termine *philosophia* (1), nonché ai pitagorici famosi; di questi solo Telauge, figlio di Pitagora, figura nel proemio, ma non ha una vita autonoma a lui dedicata. Il programma descritto nel § 50 e il bilancio tratto nel § 91 lasciano presumere che Diogene abbia condotto a termine il piano previsto e che dunque l'ottavo libro possa considerarsi ultimato (2): dopo aver trattato Pitagora, Diogene annuncia (§ 50) di voler trattare dei pitagorici più famosi, c subito dopo dei cosiddetti 'sporadici', poi di continuare la successione sino a Epicuro. Le scarne notizie fornite su Teano e Telauge nel corso della vita di Pitagora (§§ 42 -43) valgono ai suoi occhi come una trattazione esaurita; quanto egli dichiara al termine del libro (§ 91), di aver trattato i pitagorici più famosi, non contrasta pertanto con la concisione dei capitoli dedicati ad alcuni di questi (Epicarmo, lppaso, Alcmeone, Filolao) c può ritenersi definitivo."

(1) Questa notizia compare nel Proemio delle 'Vite* (I 12), mentre nelI'VIII libro la medesima storia (Sosicrate-Eradide) è narrata senza la menzione del primato. Nel proemio (I 41) Pitagora figura tra i sette saggi. Su Pitagora inventore del termine cfr. W. Burkert, *Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes 'Philosophie'*, Hermes 88, 1960, 159-177; H. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus*, Oxford 1980, stt. 23 - 36, con letteratura critica.
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    "Sebbene singoli 'Bioi' siano stati analiticamente studiati nella varietà dei loro problemi, in particolare quelli di Speusippo, Senocrate (Isnardi Parente / Tarán) e Arcesilao (Long), né sia stata trascurata una indagine sui rapporti di Diogene Laerzio con la 'Academicorum historia' di Filodemo (Gaiser, Gigante, Dorandi), manca, per il quarto libro, una trattazione complessiva unitaria. Tale non possono esser considerati infatti né la rapida rassegna del Leo, (11) né il profilo biografico di Antigono del Wilamowitz, (12) interessati entrambi a enucleare piuttosto la struttura, le fonti e la genesi formativa della compilazione diogeniana.
    Il presente contributo, che ricalca idealmente le pagine della mia Introduzione all'edizione della 'Academicorum historia'

filodemea, (13) dedicate a Filodemo quale storico dell'Academia, si propone di colmare, almeno in parte, questa lacuna, ma anche di delineare e definire le caratteristiche salienti del contributo di Diogene Laerzio e porre così i presupposti essenziali di una progetta indagine complessiva sulla tradizione antica dell'Academia da Speusippo Antioco." (pp. 3762-3763)

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    Sommario: Premessa XI-XIII; I. Dai codici alle edizioni delle *Vite dei filosofi* 1; II. Ricerche sulla più antica tradizione delle *Vite dei filosofi* 49; III. Lettori bizantini delle *Vite dei filosofi* ovvero del buon uso della tradizione 'indiretta' 125; IV. Verso uno *stemma codicum* dei più antichi testimoni 195; V. Le *Vite dei filosofi* tra Medioevo e Rinascimento latino 201; VI. Appendice. Peter von der Mühll editore di Diogene Laerzio 229; VII. Bibliografia 247; VIII. Indici 256-276.
    "Le sei sezioni che compongono questo volume, costituiscono altrettanti capitoli sulla tradizione manoscritta e sulla storia del testo delle *Vite* laerziane. Nel primo capitolo (Dai codici alle edizioni delle *Vite dei filosofi*) sono catalogati tutti i manoscritti che contengono l'insieme delle *Vite* o una scelta di libri o di estratti nonché le edizioni dell'opera dall' *editio princeps* Frobeniana (1533) a quella di M. Marcovich (1999). Il secondo capitolo (Ricerche sulla più antica tradizione delle *Vite dei filosofi*) si compone di una serie di studi sui principali manoscritti integri e sulla tradizione degli *excerpta* Vaticana; vi è discussa la questione dell'esistenza o meno di una tradizione italo-greca delle *Vite* e proposta una ricostruzione di Ω, il capostipite dei codices integri *antiquiores*, e di X, il modello tardo-antico da cui derivò tutta la tradizione medievale. L'ultima parte del capitolo è riservata alla vulgata e alla sua formazione, da

collocare in un'epoca relativamente antica. Con il terzo capitolo (Lettori bizantini delle *Vite dei filosofi*, ovvero del buon uso della tradizione 'indiretta') intendo presentare una storia del testo delle *Vite* nel mondo bizantino attraverso uno studio delle testimonianze degli autori che le hanno lette e utilizzate, dalla fine dell'Antichità alla caduta di Costantinopoli, e oltre. Alla ricostruzione (per molti aspetti ancora incerta) delle vicende delle *Vite* prima della loro sistemazione nel perduto codice X e allo stemma dei testimoni più antichi è consacrato il capitolo quarto (Verso uno stemma codicum dei più antichi testimoni). Il capitolo quinto (*Le Vite dei filosofi* tra Medioevo e Rinascimento latino) indaga le due traduzioni latine delle *Vite*, quella (perduta) di Enrico Aristippo e quella (ancora conservata) di Ambrogio Traversari. L'Appendice (capitolo sesto) contiene una descrizione dell'inedito *Nachlaß* di Peter Von der Mühll, da me per la prima volta utilizzato nella sua integralità, per l'edizione delle *Vite* laerziane." (pp. XI-XII)

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"La struttura del secondo libro delle 'Vite' di Diogene Laerzio è presto detta. Rifacendosi al criterio delle 'successioni' fissato nel 'Proemio', ribadito in questo stesso libro (II 19) e sul quale dovremo tornare, Diogene Laerzio inizia con il *bios* di Anassimandro (II 1 - 2), che - a rigore - se si prescinde dalla indicazione cronologica fornita sulla base di Apollodoro, non è un vero e proprio *bios* quanto piuttosto un compendio dossografico. Ad esso segue il *bios* di Anassimene (II 3 - 5), con la solita indicazione cronologica desunta da Apollodoro e quasi interamente occupato dal testo di due lettere - certamente non autentiche - di Anassimene a Pitagora. Inverosimile, per ragioni cronologiche, è la notizia, desunta da fonti anonime, di un suo discepolato presso Parmenide.
A questi *bioi* seguono quelli di Anassagora (II 6 - 15) e di Archela (II 16 - 17); il seguito del libro è interamente occupato dai *bioi* di Socrate e dei Socratici, ad eccezione di Platone (trattato nel libro III) e di Antistene (trattato nel libro VI): su questa parte ci soffermeremo con particolare attenzione, dopo aver detto qualcosa sui *bioi* di Anassagora ed Archelao." pp. 3603-3604

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Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: Hesychius and Ptolemy al-Garib

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Boethius' Metaphysics of Being and Goodness

Introduction: An Overview of the Work of Boethius

"By writing the *Consolation of Philosophy* Boethius provided all educated people of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance with one of their principal classics, a work of both intellectual profundity and literary delight to be read not only in Latin by clerks in their study but also by laymen at leisure, and therefore often in the vernacular.
(...)
"His world is the old world of antiquity with an intellectual framework dominated by Ptolemaic ideas about the world, by Aristotle's doctrines of substance and accidents, by a Platonic metaphysic setting asunder mind and matter, by Pythagorean ideas of mathematics and of musical proportion as the key to the structure of the cosmos."
(...)
"Boethius was by temperament a man who liked to strike out on his own. In all the fields that he touched he had some Latin predecessors. Apuleius anticipated him in writing a short guide to Aristotle's difficult treatise on *Interpretation*. It is likely that Boethius knew Apuleius' work, but he never mentions it by name. Apuleius also anticipated him in making an adaptation of the *Arithmetic* of Nicomachus of Gerasa, but Boethius sets about his own version of Nicomachus as if he had no predecessor. Marius Victorinus, the African rhetor of the mid-fourth century whose conversion to Christianity astonished high Roman society about

355, directly covered some of the ground that Boethius was to claim as his own. He made a translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* or introduction (Porphyry did not explain what he was introducing, but in the sixth century it was assumed to be an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*; a version, with eight books of commentary, of Aristotle's *Categories*; a version of Aristotle *on Interpretation*; a tract on the hypothetical syllogism; and a commentary on Cicero's *Topics*. Boethius acknowledges that Victorinus was the most eminent orator of his time, but loses no opportunity of drawing attention to Victorinus' blunders either in logic or in translation from the Greek. Nevertheless, it can hardly be accidental that the portion of Boethius' dialectical work which became most widely known covers much the same area as that laid down as the standard curriculum by Victorinus in the fourth century. Although Boethius succeeded in making careful translations, which were then given a further meticulous revision, of both *Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistic Refutations*, the transmission of these last treatises is a thin line. Until the twelfth century they were little known or not at all. Neither in his dialectical studies nor in his works on mathematics did Boethius claim to be original. For arithmetic he closely follows his Greek model in the Pythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa. This study is intended as a preparation for the introduction to music, a much longer work dependent on Nicomachus and on Ptolemy. The *Institutio Musica* is transmitted incomplete in the manuscript tradition, which breaks off in the middle of a sentence half way through the fifth book. Originally the work must have run to six or seven books.
(...)
"In his logical treatises there stands one monograph which had special interest for him, namely, that on the hypothetical syllogism of the conditional form: 'if A, then B; but A, therefore B', or 'if A, then B ; but not B, therefore not A.' The school of Aristotle had begun the investigation of the logic of conditional statements of this kind. The Stoics had taken the matter considerably further, treating the variables AB as symbols not (as in Aristotle) for terms but for entire propositions. Cicero took some notice of this Stoic logic, so that it was not bringing out matter of which the Latin world knew nothing. But Boethius'

monograph is the most careful and detailed study in logic to come from his pen, and without it our knowledge of ancient propositional logic would be thin. To medieval logicians this treatise was not perhaps of the greatest interest. John of Salisbury regarded it without enthusiasm, but conceded that it was at least clearer than anything that Aristotle would have written on the subject, had he done so. In recent times modern logicians have shown a more benevolent interest in Boethius' work in this complex field. John of Salisbury felt that some of Boethius' logical studies were too abstract to be of any use. There is no doubt that his expositions of Aristotle are academic and detached, but written with the conviction that they train the mind to detect fallacies. In his second commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* he utters the warning: 'Those who reject logic are bound to make mistakes. Unless reason shows the right path, the incorrupt truth of reality cannot be found'. In the commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* he writes in pain of the threat to the survival of culture in his own time, and speaks of the imminent collapse of liberal studies unless drastic action is taken to preserve the values of the classical past. Knowledge is not only gained in the process of historical change; it is even more easily lost. Human culture can suffer impoverishment more readily than it can achieve enrichment. Hence Boethius' sweat and toil in his study to make available to the Latin world those works which the best philosophers of his age regarded as the proper ladder of true education. They were Neoplatonists and set action far below contemplation. Their educational ideal was relatively little concerned with politics or economics or even ethics (though Boethius' contemporary Simplicius wrote a commentary on the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus which must be reckoned a treatise on the moral life), but was directed towards what they called 'theoria', rendered by Boethius 'speculatio'. Under the heading of speculative philosophy they wrote of physics, i.e. the scientific study of the natural order; or of mathematics; or of metaphysics and 'theology'."

From: Henry Chadwick, *Introduction* to Margaret Gibson (ed.), *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981, pp. 1-5.

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2. Arlig, Andrew W. 2005. *A Study in Early Medieval Mereology: Boethius, Abelard, and Pseudo-Joscelin*, Ohio State University.
   Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (available on line).
   Chapter 3: *Boethius and the Early Mereological Tradition*, pp. 62-140.
   "In what follows I will examine the mereological tradition founded by Aristotle and presented to the early medieval

West by Boethius. Given the paucity of what was available from Aristotle's extensive opera, it is no surprise that some important concepts are not carried over to the early medieval period, or if they do appear, they often do so in a distorted form. Sometimes this omission and distortion is attributable to Boethius. Boethius' logical works are almost without exception introductory treatises. As one would expect from introductory textbooks, Boethius' treatment of mereology often glides over complexities, which a more advanced work would stop to address. Hence, Boethius' remarks about parts and wholes are often general and devoid of nuance.

It is by no means clear that Boethius actually has a theory of parts and wholes. He might, as some of his contemporary interpreters have urged, be merely parroting remarks he finds in elementary, (probably) neoplatonic textbooks without worrying whether these remarks are consistent. (49) I will not assume that this is the case from the start. Rather, I will attempt as best as I can to reconstruct Boethius' metaphysics of mereology. This reconstruction will require that I piece together stray remarks, think through the specific examples that he gives, and generally extrapolate from an admittedly sparse collection of rules, examples and hints. My method carries the risk of yielding not Boethius' theory of parts and wholes, but rather a Boethian theory. But this is the same risk that Abelard, Pseudo-Joscelin, and all the thinkers of the early medieval period took when attempting to piece Boethius' remarks into a coherent metaphysics of mereology." (pp. 64-65).

(49) Some have argued that Boethius' *De divisione* is derived from Porphyry's lost commentary on the *Sophist*. Andrew Smith reprints the entire *De Div*. as 169F in his edition of Porphyry's fragments. On his reasons for inclusion consult his introduction (Frag. x-xii). Others suggest that Boethius had two sources, one being Porphyry's commentary and the second being a treatise on division by Andronicus of Rhodes.

Magee concludes that Porphyry's prolegomena to his *Sophist* commentary is the direct source of Boethius' *De*

divisione. However, he does not discount the possibility that Andronicus is an indirect source, nor does he discount the possibility that some of the material in *De divisione* is original to Boethius (1998, lv-lvii).
One of the reasons that scholars suspect that Boethius borrows from more than one source is that there are problems with Boethius' presentation of the modes of division (Zachhuber 2000, 88-89).
References:
Zachhuber, J. 2000. *Human nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical background and theological significance*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, no. 46. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

3. ———. 2009. "The Metaphysics of Individuals in the *Opuscula sacra*." In *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, edited by Marenbon, John, 129-154. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Three of the five treatises that comprise the *Opuscula sacra* [= OS] contain interesting philosophical material. (1) All three treatises attempt to make aspects of God intelligible using Greek philosophical concepts.
The treatise *Quomodo substantiae* (OS III) discusses how something can be essentially predicated of both God and His creatures. *On the Trinity* (OS I) and *Against Eutyches and Nestorius* (OS V) are concerned with the individuality and unity of, respectively, God and Christ. Along the way to formulating his solution to his chosen puzzles, Boethius presents some of the elements of a general theory of individuals.
In this chapter we will concentrate on the general theory of individuals that can be reconstructed from Boethius' Opuscula. (2) The theological treatises are not the only places that he discusses individuals, and at times we will make use of Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry to flesh out some of his remarks. (3)
Nonetheless, we will focus on the account of individuals that can be reconstructed from the theological treatises for two reasons. First, this account has exerted a tremendous influence on subsequent generations. Second, Boethius

admits that his main role in the logical commentaries is to present a sympathetic elucidation of Aristotle's or Porphyry's views. (4) The doctrines in the *Opuscula* presumably are Boethius' own.
After we have examined and reconstructed Boethius' general treatment of individuals, we will finish this chapter by asking whether this general account of individuals can illuminate the nature of the Incarnation and the Trinity." (p. 129)
(...)
"Conclusion.
In his *Opuscula sacra*, Boethius presents some of the elements of a metaphysical theory of individuals. He does not flesh out his theory.
But what he does tell us is tantalizing. It is little wonder that Boethius' brief and incomplete treatments of individuals captured the imagination of numerous medieval philosophers. (29) The elements of the theory of individuals that he presents in the *Opuscula* are marshaled in order to make the Incarnation and Trinity intelligible in so far as these Divine truths can be made intelligible to the unaided human intellect. Our assessment has been that Boethius comes up short. But then again, Boethius admits that his task is doomed to fail.
These inadequacies, however, should not detract from the importance of Boethius' *Opuscula*. The student of medieval metaphysics should begin with Boethius. Boethius defines the problems that will inspire generations of philosophers, and he gestures toward many of the solutions that subsequent philosophers will offer." (p. 151)
(1) All references are to the Latin edition by Claudio Moreschini (Boethius 2000), in the format of number of the opusculum, followed by its section and the line of the edition. As an aid to students who do not have much Latin, citations of passages from the *Opuscula* will include a reference to the corresponding English passage in the Loeb edition (Boethius 1973).
The Loeb edition is still the only volume that contains a complete English translation of the *Opuscula*. For a good,

recent English translation of *Quomodo substantiae* see MacDonald 1991b. A good, recent translation of *On the Trinity* is Kenyon 2004. There is a new French translation of *Quomodo substantiae* with commentary in Galonnier 2007. Galonnier's translations of *On the Trinity* and *Against Eutyches* are to appear in a future volume [*Opuscola sacra II*, Louvain: Peeters, 2013].

(2) For this reason, we will not be able to touch upon many of the interesting and puzzling aspects of the *Quomodo substantiae*. The third theological treatise is an extremely difficult one, and there is significant disagreement over its structure and meaning. For introductions to *Quomodo substantiae* see Marenbon 2003a, 87–94 and Chadwick 1981, 203–11.

For detailed studies see De Rijk 1988; MacDonald 1988; and McInerny 1990, 161–98. There are book-length studies by Schrimpf (1966)) and Siobhan Nash-Marshall (2000), and a detailed commentary by Galonnier (2007). Pierre Hadot's interpretation of Boethius has been extremely influential. See, in particular, Hadot 1963 and 1970. Recently there has been a lot of work on Boethius' metaphysical *Opuscula* in Italian. For example, see Maioli 1978; Micaelli 1988 and 1995.

(3) For a survey of Boethius' remarks on individuals and individuation that carefully considers not only the *Opuscula sacra*, but also the logical commentaries, see Gracia 1984, Chapter 2, 65–121.

(4) For example, in his famous discussion of universals Boethius announces that he has provided an Aristotelian solution to the problem because he is commenting on an Aristotelian treatise, not because it is the best solution (2IS [Second Commentary on *Isagoge*] 167.17–20; English translation in Spade 1994, 25).

(29) On Boethius' influence in general see the next chapter. [Christophe Erismann, *The medieval fortunes of the* Opuscola sacra, pp. 155-177] For Boethius' influence on medieval ruminations on the metaphysics of individuals, start by consulting Gracia 1984; Spade 1985 I, Chapter 23; and King 2000.

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4. Bark, William. 1946. "Boethius' Fourth Tractate, the So-Called *De Fide Catholica*." *Harvard Theological Review* no. 39:55-69.
"The exact status of the fourth tractate included among the *Opuscula Sacra* of Boethius is still uncertain, though the other theological works are now almost universally accepted as genuine. Boethian scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally inclined to reject Tractate IV. (1)" (p. 55)
(...)
"Another possibility, more prosaic, corresponds better with what we know about the treatise. Tr. IV is simple and brief, but it is not incomplete. It is so written, with energy, with conviction, and with sensitiveness, as to be exceedingly impressive. There are, in addition, definite indications of a didactic motive on the part of the author. (46) Because of these considerations, I wonder if it is not more likely that Boethius meant it to be a guide for the layman. We know that the doctrinal questions of Boethius' day, especially those of Oriental origin, were very confusing to ordinary Western Christians, who were interested in them but for obvious reasons could not always distinguish between the orthodox and the heretical. We know also that there were attempts both by the Scythians and by their opponents in Rome to win public support. (47) It has already been shown that Boethius' theology was very close to the Scythian; whether their alliance was openly avowed or not, we do not yet know. Boethius unquestionably understood the Eastern doctrines then being discussed so widely in Rome better than any of his countrymen. Perhaps he and his friends thought it advisable for him to turn from his highly specialized theological works to edify, to protect, and if possible, to win over the Romans. That would accord with the strange weaving together of Trinitarian doctrine and a compact narrative of Christian history. In that fabric nothing is clearer than the importance the writer put upon his Trinitarian teaching, which he proclaimed one of the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic

faith." (pp. 68-69)
(1) Viktor Schurr lists some of those for and against in *Die Trinitiitslehre des Boethius im Lichte der "skythischen Kontroversen"* (Paderborn, 1935), 8, n. 40. He mistakenly cites August Hildebrand as supporting the authenticity of the document.
(46) Lines 94-96 and 247-253. Note Schurr's comment, 8-9, n. 46.
(47) For that reason an unknown Scythian compiled the *Collectio Palatina* and in it appealed to the definitions of Nestorianism and Eutychianism patriot, John, bishop of Tomi, who was presumably John Maxentius. Dionysius Exiguus made his translations of theological documents for the same reason. Pope Hormisdas vigorously defended his rather hostile treatment of the Scythians and Maxentius replied. A senator, Faustus by name, asked the presbyter Trifolius to explain the Scythian formula and Trifolius gave an unfriendly interpretation of the Theopaschite position. Both sides energetically tried to win the support of senate and people.

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Contents: Preface VII; Chapter I. Introductory 1; II. Western Europe in the Fifth Century a.d. 9; III. Theodoric the Ostrogoth 18; IV. Boethius the Scholar 33; V. Boethius and Theodoric 44; VI. The Fall of Boethius 57; VII. The *Consolation of Philosophy* 75; VIII. The Philosophical Background of the *Consolation* 102; IX. Eternal Life 123; X. The Theological Writings 139; XI. Boethius and Christianity 153; XII. Conclusion 164; Bibliography 170; Index 173.
"In writing about Boethius and his work I have had in mind the general reader who is not equipped with any special knowledge of the Classics or of Philosophy; I have therefore given translations of all passages quoted from Greek and Latin authors. Though I am aware that footnotes are a cause of irritation to some readers, I have employed them for the double purpose of acknowledging my own indebtedness

where it is due and of indicating the sources of fuller information.
But in addition to the references I make in the course of the book, I wish to express here my special sense of obligation to two writers, Dr H. F. Stewart and Dr E. K. Rand; to Dr Stewart for his valuable *Boethius, An Essay* (1891), a book now out of print, to Dr Rand for the chapter he devotes to Boethius in his *Founders of the Middle Ages* and for his article " On the Composition of Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiae " in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. xv, and to Dr Stewart and Dr Rand jointly for giving in that volume of the Loeb Classical Library Series for which they are responsible the text and translation of Boethius's theological writings. This is the only English translation so far as I know of these tractates. My indebtedness to these two writers is great in spite of the fact that on a number of points I have reached conclusions that are different from theirs." (Preface, VII-VIII)

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kann 171; Fabio Troncarelli: Boethius from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 213; John Marenbon: Boethius's Unparadigmatic Originality and its Implications for Medieval Philosophy 231; Elisabeth Schneider: *Naturae rationalis individua substantia*. Eine theologische oder juristische Definition der Person? 245-269.

8. Bradshaw, David. 2009. "The *Opuscula sacra*: Boethius and theology." In *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, edited by Marenbon, John, 105-128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The *Opuscula sacra* are a collection of brief but dense and highly influential theological treatises. Their unquestioning commitment to Catholic orthodoxy, not to mention their concern over issues of dogma, has seemed to many to be at odds with the philosophical
detachment of Boethius' other works. For a time in the nineteenth century scholars almost unanimously denied their authenticity, but this situation was reversed in 1877 with the publication of a fragment from a hitherto unknown work by Cassiodorus. The fragment states that Boethius "wrote a book concerning the Holy Trinity and certain dogmatic chapters and a book against Nestorius."(1) This description corresponds nicely to the first, fourth, and fifth of the treatises that have come down to us. Although the others are not mentioned, since they are included in all the manuscripts, and all save the fourth are explicitly attributed to Boethius, there seems little reason to doubt them as well. Our concern here will be the relevance of the treatises for revealed theology, as distinct from their relevance for metaphysics (to be discussed in the next chapter [*Andrew Arlig, The metaphysics of individuals in the Opuscula sacra*]). Accordingly we will set aside the third treatise, the so-called *Quomodo substantiae* or *De hebdomadibus*, and focus upon the others." (p. 105)
(...)
"Conclusion.
I have observed that each of the four treatises discussed here is problematic. The problems derive in part from Boethius' desire to treat theological issues using a purely

philosophical method, and in part from his exclusive reliance on Augustine as a theological authority. In addition, there is a certain tendency to exaggerate the role of authority itself within theology, as if theology's sole task were to make authoritative pronouncements which it is then the job of philosophy to render rationally coherent. This is not a very fruitful way to think of the relationship between the two disciplines. Despite such problems, however, the treatises remain a remarkable achievement.
Boethius almost single-handedly made philosophy into theology's indispensable handmaiden, in the process raising theology to a new level of sophistication. (54) Anyone who finds his views unsatisfactory would do well to consider the challenge posed at the end of the *Utrum Pater*: "if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully what has been said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason" [37)]." (pp. 124-125)
(54) As B. E. Daley ['Boethius's Theological Tracts and early Byzantine Scholasticism', *Mediaeval Studies* 46, 1984, pp. 158–191] observes, this process occurred almost simultaneously with a similar movement in the Greek-speaking East, so that scholasticism had two more or less independent births.

9. Casey, Gerard. 1987. "An Explication of the *De Hebdomadibus* of Boethius in the Light of St. Thomas Commentary." *Thomist* no. 51:419-434.
"Introduction
The writings of Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius exercised a powerful influence on the nature and development of mediaeval philosophy. The extent of his influence was such that I think it fair to say that anyone seeking more than a superficial grasp of mediaeval philosophy must acquire some first-hand knowledge of his work. The trouble is, however, that while *The Consolation of Philosophy* is well-known and much commented upon, Boethius's other works are relatively neglected. (1) Included in this latter group are the five theological tractates, one of which has this imposing title: *Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quod Sint Bonae Sint Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona*.

This tractate also has the more manageable title *De Hebdomadibus* and it is as such that I shall refer to it throughout this article. (2) I have chosen to give an explication of the *De Hebdomadibus* for three reasons. First the problem with which it deals (the nature of the relation between goodness and substance) is intrinsically interesting and Boethius's solution to the problem is a model of philosophical analysis. Second, in addition to the fact that the philosophical status of the nine axioms listed in the tractate is a matter of some scholarly controversy, the answer to the obvious question of how these axioms function in the tractate as a whole is not at all clear. And third, this tractate is philosophically significant to those philosophers who take St. Thomas as their inspiration since it appears that St. Thomas's existence/essence distinction is adumbrated here. I shall begin my explication by giving a brief overview of the main lines of the tractate. Then I shall lay out the arguments contained in the statement and resolution of the dilemma which Boethius constructs, indicating (by means of Roman numerals in parentheses) where I think particular axioms are meant to apply. Finally, I shall display the axioms as perspicuously as possible and comment on them." (pp. 419-420)

(1) I am obliged to Professor Ralph Mclnerny for awakening my interest in Boethius and for his suggestion that the *De Hebdomadibus* would repay careful study.

(2) All references are to the H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand edition of *The Theological Tractates* and *The Consolation of Philosophy*, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973)

10. Caster, Kevin J. 1996. "The Distinction between Being and Essence according to Boethius, Avicenna, and William of Auvergne." *Modern Schoolman* no. 73:309-332.

"A close analysis of William of Auvergne's metaphysics reveals a distinction between being and essence that more closely approximates the celebrated real distinction of St. Thomas than has generally been recognized. Like St. Thomas, William maintained both a real distinction and a real composition between being and essence in the

metaphysical structure of the concrete thing. Since William's position thus represented a marked development in the history of philosophy with respect to this topic, it is obviously valuable to look at William's sources, namely, Boethius and Avicenna. Of course, I am in no sense suggesting that the study of Boethius and Avicenna is valuable only for the insights it might lend to one's perspective of William's position. On the contrary, such study is eminently valuable in itself.

1. Boethius's Contribution to the Doctrine of the Real Distinction

In his *Opuscula Sacra*, Boethius distinguishes between being (*esse*) and that which is (*id quod est*). Because William, who borrowed Boethius's terminology for his own position, was especially influenced by the *De hebdomadibus*, one needs to look at this work in order to reach a more complete understanding of William. While the scholarly opinion on Boethius's distinction is quite divergent, Pierre Hadot's work — in my opinion — represents the best of the scholarly interpretations regarding this topic. Hadot not only seems best to capture Boethius's doctrine, but his perspective of Boethius also highlights what William seemed to find in him.

In "La distinction de l'êtr *e et de l'étant dans le De Hebdomadibus de Boèce*," Hadot summarizes the differences between being (esse) and that which is (id quod est) as they appear in the axioms found in the De hebdomadibus. The characteristics of being (esse) and that which is (id quod est) may be translated as follows. Being: 1) "is not yet," 2) "in no way participates in anything," and 3) "has nothing besides itself added on." That which is: 1) "has received the form of being," 2) "has received being," 3) "participates in that which is being," 4) "is and exists," 5) "is able to participate in something," and 6) "is able to have something besides the fact that it is." (1)

(1) See Pierre Hadot, "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le *De hebdomadibus de Boèce*," *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter*, Miscellanea Mediavalia, 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), p. 147. The characteristics of *esse*: 1) "nondum est,"

2) “nullo modo aliquo participat,” and 3) “nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.” The characteristics of *id quod est*: 1) “accepit formam essendi,” 2) “suscipit esse,” 3) “participat eo quod est esse,” 4) “est atque consistit,” 5) “participare aliquo potest,” and 6) “potest habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est.”

11. Chadwick, Henry. 1980. "The authenticity of Boethius's fourth tractate, *De fide catholica*." *Journal of Theological Studies* no. 31:368-377.
12. ———. 1981. *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Contents: Abbreviations IX; Chronological Table X; Introduction XI; I Romans and Goths 1; II Liberal Arts in the Collapse of Culture 69; III Logic Part of Philosophy or a Tool of all Philosohy? 108; IV Christian Theology and the Philosophers 174; V Evil, Freedom, and Providence 223; Preservation and Transmission 254; Editions 258; Bibliography 261; Notes 285; Index 307-313.
"Born fifteen hundred years ago (within a reasonable approximation), Boethius wrote one of the dazzling masterpieces of European literature. But he has been seldom studied as a whole, and has been seen more through the eyes of those whom he influenced than in relation to the writers whom he had read and who influenced him.
The purpose of this book is to see the man in the setting of his own turbulent and tormented age, not to trace his large posterity in thought and literature. Moreover, the latter concern predominates in the collection of studies on Boethius by various authors, including myself, edited by Dr Margaret Gibson ([*Boethius*] Blackwell, 1981). Much is also said of that in the studies of Boethius by Pierre Courcelle ([*La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire: antécedents et posterité de Boèce*. Paris,] 1967). Modern reappraisal of Boethius, especially since the work of Klingner ([*De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae*. Philologische Untersuchungen, 27. Berlin,]1921) and Courcelle ([*Les lettres grecques en occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore*. 2nd edn. Paris,] 1948. [Eng. tr. by H.E. Wedeck, *Late Latin Writers and their Greek sources*. Harvard,

1969.]), has concentrated on his debt to the late Platonists of Athens and especially of Alexandria. The present book continues that line, and adds fresh Neoplatonist evidence for the interpretation of the five tractates on Christian theology. On the other side, I have also found more affinity with Augustine than has been generally recognized, and therefore conclude with a portrait of Boethius simultaneously more deeply Neoplatonic and more deeply Augustinian than has been acknowledged. I have also tried to integrate the various constituent elements in his intellectual achievement. The substructure of the *Consolation of Philosophy* is only clear when one has also seen something of his arithmetic, music, and logic, the last being the grand obsession of his mind. It is then possible to make a fresh attack on the question of his religious allegiance, debated since the tenth century when Bovo of Corvey asked how the evidently Christian author of the theological tractates could write a work of so exclusively non Christian inspiration as the *Consolation*. The examination in the first chapter of the political tangle between the Gothic kingdom of Theoderic the Great and the Byzantine ambitions of Justinian leads me to conclude that it is quite wrong to exclude religion from the causes of his tragic arrest and execution." (*Preface*, p. V)

13. Collins, James. 1945. "Progress and Problems in the Reassessment of Boethius." *Modern Schoolman* no. 23:1-23.
14. Cooper, Lane, ed. 1928. *A Concordance of Boethius. The Five Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America.
15. Corrigan, Kevin. 1990. "A New Source for the Distinction between *id quod est* and *esse* in Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus*." *Studia Patristica* no. 18:133-138.
"In his treatise on how substances are good in virtue of their existence without being substantial goods (1) Boethius draws a distinction between the existing object (*id quod est*), composed of a subject and the forms it receives, and pure Being (*esse*), simple in itself. All things are good in their own substantial existence only because their *ipsum esse* derives from the First Good, whereas the First Good is

good simply and solely in the fact that it exists. In several articles (2) Pierre Hadot has traced the roots of this distinction to two principal sources: (I) the distinction between absolute Being and determinate Being (respectively Being-infinitive, To εἶναι, and being — participle, Tò ov) found in the anonymous *Commentary on the Parmenides* (ascribed to Porphyry) and in Marius Victorinus (3). And (II) the late Neoplatonic distinction (of Proclus, Damascius (4) and Victorinus) between *hyparxis* (preexistence) and *ousia* (substance), i.e., between pure Being in its simplicity prior to all things and Substance, as the determinate subject taken together with all its accidents. I think Hadot is correct in his assessment of these sources, but what I shall do here is attempt to show firstly, that an earlier source is Plotinus himself and secondly, that the distinction is ultimately based upon something more general, but well-founded, in Graeco-Roman thought."

(1) In the middle ages this treatise was mistakenly entitled *De hebdomadibus*. On this and on the treatise in general see H. Chadwick, *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1981) pp. 203-211.

(2) P. Hadot, “La distinction de l’être et de l’étant dans le *De hebdomadibus* de Boèce”, in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, ed. P. Wilpert, 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 147-153; Id., “Forma essendi: interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d’une formule de Boèce”, *Les Études Classiques*, 38 (1970), pp. 143-156; Id., “L’être et l’étant dans le Néoplatonisme”; *Revue de Théologie et Philosophie* (1973), pp. 101-113.

(3) P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1968). See Vol. 2: pp. 98-112. Marius Victorinus, *Adversus Arium*, Sources Chrétiennes, ed. P. Henry and P. Hadot (Paris, 1960), IV: 19,4ff.

(4) Damascius, *Dubitationes et Solutiones*, ed. C.E. Ruelle (Paris, 1889), Vol. 1, 120, p. 312, 11-121, p. 312,29. Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: 1933), props. 8-10.

16. Coster, Charles Henry. 1952. "The fall of Boethius: His character." *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire*

Orientales et Slaves no. 4:45-81.
Mélanges Henri Grégoire.
Reprinted in C. H. Coster, *Late Roman Studies*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1968, pp. 54-96 (cited from the reprint).
It is at most a pardonable exaggeration to say that the fall of Boethius as been almost asmuch discusses as the falla of Adam. Not that there has been any doubt that the fall of Boethius did in fact take place, but that exactly when it took place, and exactly why, have been less clear. Some have thought Boethius was a martyr, (1) some have doubted that he was a Christian, (2) most have thought that he was the innocent victim of enemies who accused him falsely, (3) William Bark has maintained that he did actually attempt to overthrow Theodoric. (4) The character of Boethius has generally been thought one of the noblest of that antique world which was about to expire; (5) Bark, on the other hand, feels unable to "avoid the conclusion that Boethius could be harsh, selfish and arrogant, and that he well knew how to consult his own interests ..." that he "lacked the steadfastness of Cassiodorus, being apparently unaware of the inconsistency of accepting gifts of power and prestige from Theodoric while working for the King's overthrow." (6)" (pp. 54-55)
(...)
"As to chronology, rereading my paper after many years, I am inclined to accept the conventional dates (arrest of Boethius in 523, his execution in 524), not as a certainty, but as a probability. It is difficult in the extreme, as many have pointed out and as Bieler implies, to believe that Marius Aventicensis, who made use of the lost chronicles of Ravenna, should have been mistaken. Further, I took *Cons. Phil.* 3.4.4 Bieler ("Tu quoque num tandem tot periculis adduci potuisti ut cum Decorato gerere magistratum putares, cum in eo mentem nequissimi scurrae delatorisque respiceres?") to mean that Boethius had thought of holding office in the same administration as Decoratus but (prevented by the death of Decoratus) had not done so. (This would have made Boethius magister in 525 instead of

523.) Such an interpretation of the passage, though, now seems to me perhaps to place too great a strain upon the Latin. (94)

Coming to the question of the guilt or innocence of Boethius, it may be that Bieler slightly simplifies the issue. There can be no doubt that Theodoric thought Boethius guilty: the king would not antagonize the Roman aristocracy, the Catholic church, and the emperor for the mere pleasure of doing so. There is no doubt either — or at least, I have no doubt, and have given my reasons above — that Boethius was not guilty of magic or of conspiring against the king." (pp. 98-99).

(1)For the authorities on this question, see William Bark, "The Legend of Boethius' Martyrdom," in *Speculum* 21 (1946) 312 n. 1. Cf. "The Beginnings of the Legend of Boethius," by Howard R. Patch, in *Speculum* 22 (1947) 443-45; also, Charles Henry Coster and Howard R. Patch, "Procopius and Boethius," in *Speculum* 23 (1948) 284-87, reprinted in chap. 3 above [pp. 46-53]. The essence of the difference of opinion between Patch and me seems to be that the former accepts a broader definition of martyrdom than I do.

(2) For the authorities maintaining this point of view, see Giovanni Semeria, "II cristianesimo di Severino Boezio rivendicato," in *Studi e Documenti di Storia e Diritto* 21 (Rome 1900) 68-178, cited by Bark in note 4 of the article just referred to, and other authorities citcd by Bark in the same note.

(3) See, among many, Procopius, *History of the Wars* 5.1.33-34; Viktor Schurr, *Die Trinitätslehre des Boethius im Uchte der "skytischen Kontroversen"* (Paderborn 1935) 201 n. 316; E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass. 1929) 159. Stein believes that Theodoric sincerely thought Boethius guilty but that Boethius sincerely thought himself innocent (Stein II 257 [*Histoire du Bas-Empire: De la disparition de l'Empire d'Occident à la mort de Justinien (476–565 n. Chr.)*. Edited by Jean-Rémy Palanque. Brüssel/Paris 1949]. I still hold to my view that Boethius was guilty of acts (trying to prevent the charges

against Albinus from coming to the notice of Theodoric and trying to minimize the matter when it was brought before the King) that he knew would amount to treason in the eyes of Theodoric, acts which Boethius himself thought justified because his first loyalty was to Romanism and Catholicism. Cf. *lud. Quinq*. 62 f.
(4) William Bark, "Theodoric vs. Boethius: Vindication and Apology," in *American Historical Review* 49 (1944) 410-26. M. L . W . Laistner seems to support this position. See his review of Pierre Courcelle, *Histoire littéraire des grandes invasions germaniques* in *Speculum* 24 (1949) 257 f. Bark's article is also cited by Vasiliev. See A. A. Vasiliev, *Justin the First* (Harvard University Press, 1950) 328 n. 19.
(5) Among many, see Procopius (above, n. 3); Rand (above, n. 3) 135 f., 157 f., 180.
(6) Bark (above, n. 4) 425 n. 66 and 426. See also his " The Legend of Boethius' Martyrdom" (above, n. 1) 317 n. 18. One should add that Bark, elsewhere in the interesting and stimulating articles cited, fully recognizes that in spite of the defects which he finds in the character of Boethius, the latter was "one of the greatest men of the sixth century; his brilliant reputation has no need of spurious honors" ("The Legend" 312). He also says ("Theodoric vs. Boethius" 426), " At the end at least he was loyal to what he believed in and risked everything for it." For another very severe criticism of the character of Boethius, see Thomas Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, III (2nd ed., Oxford 1896) 479, 493, 498. For a milder criticism, see *lud. Quinq*. 50f.
(94) Cf. Boezio *Philosophiae Consolatio*, Testo con Introduzione e Traduzione, di Emanuele Rapisarda (Catania 1961) 81, and the Loeb edition, 241.

17. Courcelle, Pierre. 1969. *Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
English translation by Harry E. Wedeck of *Les lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore*; on Boethius see Part III pp. 273-330.
Contents: Part I. The mainstream of Hellenism at the death of Theodosius.

Pagan Hellenism: Macrobius; Christian Hellenism: St. Jerome;
Part II. Attempts at confrontation and the decline of Hellenism in the fifth century.
Greek studies in Italy; St. Augustine and Hellenism in Africa; Greek culture in Gaul;
Part III. The renaissance of Hellenism under the Ostrogoths.
The East to the rescue of Pagan culture: Boethius.
Introduction; Boethius's scientific works; Boethius' works on logic; The neoplatonism of the 'De consolatione philosophiae'; Boethius' Christianity; Symmachus' course of studies and his failure;
Hellenism in the service of monastic culture: Cassiodorus;
The monks in the service of Hellenism: Vivarium and the Lateran;
Conclusion.

18. Cross, Richard. 2012. "Form and Universal in Boethius." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 20:439-458.
Abstract: "Contrary to the claims of recent commentators, I argue that Boethius holds a modified version of the Ammonian three-fold universal (transcendent, immanent, and conceptual). He probably identifies transcendent universals as divine ideas, and accepts too forms immanent in corporeal particulars, most likely construing these along the Aphrodisian lines that he hints at in a well-known passage from his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge. Boethius never states the theory of the three-fold form outright, but I attempt to show that this theory nevertheless underlies and gives structure to what Boethius has to say on the topic."
19. Curley III, Thomas F. 198. "The *Consolation of Philosophy* as a Work of Literature " *American Journal of Philology* no. 108:343-367.
"Much, in fact most of the scholarship devoted to Boethius' *Consolatio* has dealt with the work as a philosophical treatise. (1) And this it certainly is. The author is almost ostentatiously conversant with Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic,

Epicurean, and neo-Platonic thought; what is more, he weaves these various strands into an organic whole. But in addition to philosophy the *Consolatio* is also literature. Formally, it is an example of an ancient literary genre, the Menippean Satire, a medley of alternating verse and prose, which had served the very different purposes of Petronius, the author of the *Apocolocyntosis*, Martianus Capella, and the mythological allegorist, Fulgentius. But even those critics who do treat the *Consolatio* as a work of literature too often limit themselves to tracing Boethius' sources and to indicating his influence on subsequent authors, Dante and Chaucer being the most renowned. (2) What I should like to do, and the present paper is merely a premier essai in this direction, is to determine Boethius' literary purposes and to suggest what implications the literary aspects of the work may have on its philosophical content. More specifically, I shall try to explain how Menippean Satire functions in the *Consolatio* and why Boethius chose this medium for a philosophical treatise." (p. 343)
(1) For bibliography see:
a. Beiler, L. (ed.), *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Philosophiae Consolatio* (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 94) (Brepols, Turnholt. 1957) 16-17.
b. Gruber, J. *Kommentar Zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Walter De Gruyer (Berlin 1978)417-27.
(2) The most important literary critics and those to whom I am most indebted are [Luigi] Alfonsi. [Friedrich] Klinger, and [Kurt] Reichenberger.

20. Daley, Brian E. 1984. "Boethius' Theological Tracts and Early Byzantine Scholasticism." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 46:158-191.
For biographical as well as literary and philosophical reasons, then, the riddle of the depth and orientation of Boethius' Christianity remains important. I do not propose to solve it completely here, when so many others have failed. But I do think it helps us towards a solution to look more carefully at his theological writings, not just by themselves but in the context of the kind of theology being done in the first two decades of the sixth century, especially in the

Greek-speaking East. The main point I want to make is simply that Boethius' theological work ‘fits’, far better than many modern students have supposed: fits organically into his own life and program of work, into his intellectual profile, precisely because it fits into a general pattern of philosophical and theological thinking that was just then beginning to emerge among Greek Christian writers, especially in Alexandria and Palestine. As a result, I believe Boethius deserves to be taken more seriously than he often is as a Christian thinker, and possibly even as an ecclesiastical politician." (p. 163)
(...)
"The point I have been making throughout this article - the closeness of Boethius' theological tracts, in method, style and content, to contemporary Greek 'scholastic' theology- leaves some central riddles still unsolved. What, for instance, was the 'home' of this new style of theological writing in the East? Where would Boethius or his informants have made its acquaintance? In what kind of 'school' was it originally done? Were there lecture halls, similar to that of Ammonius, where Christians carried on their theological debates and taught others how to take this dialectical approach to revelation and tradition?" (p. 185)
(...)
("That Boethius could find Lady Philosophy consoling in her own right during his final days should not surprise us, or cause us to doubt in the least the sincerity of his Christian faith. It should simply remind us of the respect he felt he owed her, and of the thoroughness with which he had made the Greek cultural tradition which nurtured her his own." (p. 191)

21. Dane, Joseph A. 1979. "Potestas / Potentia: Note on Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophiae*." *Vivarium* no. 17:81-89.
"Boethius's treatment of the two words *potestas* and *potentia* in the *Consolatio* is based on a hierarchical model, a model which finds both political and philosophical expression. In classical and medieval usage, *potestas* implies a legitimate realm of power, and is often the title of

a particular office. *Potentia,* on the other hand, implies the exercise of power; its military applications further suggest the notion of external resistance. (5)" (p. 82)
(...)
"In Boethius's commentaries on Aristotle, a similar distinction appears in a philosophical context. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (*Editio secunda*, ed. Meiser II, 459.19-464.4) *potestas* is used in conjunction with *actus* to express the abstract relation between potential and act. *Potentia*, however, appears to have a more concrete application. In Book III of *In Categorias Aristotelis*, *potentia* is used in the dichotomy *potentia/ impotentia* in relation to a physical ability to run or fight: *quae ex quadam naturali potentia impotentia que proveniat* (244C). The political distinction between "legitimate domain" or "office" (*potestas*) and "exercise of physical power" (*potentia*) clearly influences this latter usage. Both the political and philosophical contexts suggest an individual "potens" as intermediary. His legitimate power expressed in the epithet *potensis* derived from a realm (*potestas*) and is expressed concretely as physical power (*potentia*)." (p. 83)
(...)
"What has taken place, then, is a redefining and refining of a verbal pair centering on the concept of power in such a way that the once *vana nomina* with their cumbersome worldly referents can participate in the final union asserted in Book V. Throughout the *Consolatio*, Boethius rigorously maintains the relation of *potestas* to *potentia* - a relation which in both political and philosophical contexts implies subordination of the second term. Once the connection of *potentia* with s *ummum bonum* is established, *potestas* cannot retain its specifically worldly connotations without denying the linguistic subordination of a now highly elevated *potentia*. When *potestas* does reenter the dialectic with a positive connotation, it relates to the psychological dimension on which the definitions of *potentia* and *summum bonum* itself depend.

Reversal or confusion of this proper relation is inevitable whenever notions of power are referred to various levels within a worldly hierarchy (*potentia* of kings or *potestas* of mice). Reorientation toward the spiritual leads to reestablishment of proper linguistic relations." (pp. 88-89)
(5) See v.Lübtow, "Potestas", *Paulys Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Band 22, I, Stuttgart 1953, cols.1040-46 and J.H. Heinr. Schmidt, H *andbuch der lateinischen und griechischen Synonymik*, 1889; (rpt. Amsterdam 1968), 351-68. See also Charles du Cange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, Vol. VI, (ed. 1883-87; rpt. Graz-Austria [1954]), 438-41 and Carlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, Oxford 1879, s.v.
References below to the *Consolatio* and *Opuscula Sacra* are to Boethius: *Tractates, De Consolatione Philosophiae*, ed. H. F. Stewart et al., *The Loeb Classical Library*, Cambridge, Mass. 1973. In the passages cited, no significant textual variants are listed in the editions of R. Pieper, Leipzig 1871 or L. Bieler, *Corpus Christianorum*, *Series Latina*, 94, Turnholt 957.
References to Boethius 's commentaries are to columns in *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, *Series Latina*, vol. 64, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1847.

22. De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1988. "On Boethius' Notion of Being. A Chapter of Boethian Semantics." In *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*. *Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 1-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Reprinted as chapter I in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality*. *Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, edited by E. P. Bos, Northampton: Variourum Reprints, 1989.
"From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just applying and adapting what was handed down to them. No

student of medieval speculative thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental progress was made, it was theological problems which initiated the development. This applies to St Augustine and Boethius, and to the great medieval masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature (Being).

It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises, especially *De hebdomadibus*.

(...)

My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is most clearly seen in the main argument of *De hebdomadibus* where they may be actually seen at work.

As is well known, the proper aim of *De hebdomadibus* is to point out the formal difference between *esse* and *esse bonum,* or in Boethius's words: 'the manner in which substances *are good* in virtue of their *being,* while not yet being substantially good' (38.2-4). Its method consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:

(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole and *id quod est* = the constitutive element which causes the object's actually' being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.

(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being *(forma essendi,* or *ipsum esse)* and the object's actuality as such (*id quod est* or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.

(c) The distinction between *esse* as 'pure being' (= *nihil aliud praeter se habens admixtum),* which belongs to any form, whether substantial or incidental, and *id quod est* admitting of some admixture (lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in fact implies the distinction between *esse simpliciter* and *esse aliquid.*

(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', *tantum esse aliquid,* and ' *being* something *qua* mode of *being'*. It is made in Axiom V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further distinction made within the notion of *id quod est*. It points out the differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of being *some* thing and that caused by the main constituent *(forma essendi)* which causes an object's *being simpliciter*.
(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one effecting an object's *being subsistent,* the other its being *some* thing, where the ' *some* thing' (*aliquid*) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.
The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a solution to the main problem: although the objects (*ea quae sunt,* plural of *id quod est*) *are* (*are good*) through their own constitutive element, *being* (*being good*), nevertheless they are not identical with their constitutive element nor (*a fortiori*) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation." (pp. 1 and 22-23).

23. ———. 2003. "Boethius on *De interpretatione* (ch. 3): is he a reliable guide?" In *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs*, edited by Galonnier, Alain, 207-227. Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters.
"There can be no doubt whatsoever about Boethius's exceptional merits for transmitting Aristotle's logic to us. But while 'Aristotelian' logic is in many respects synonymous with 'Aristotelico-Boethian' logic, the question can be raised whether Aristotle himself was an 'Aristotelian'. To give just one example: from Łukasiewicz onwards there has been much debate among scholars about the telling differences between traditional syllogistic and that of the *Prior Analytics*. (1)
In this paper I intend to deal with two specimens of Boethius's way of commenting upon Aristotle's text. They are found in his discussion of *De interpretatione*, chapters 2 and 3, which present Aristotle's views of *ónoma* and *rhema*. (2) One concerns the semantics of indefinite names, the other that of isolated names and verbs." (p. 227)

(1) Jan Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, Oxford, 1951. G. Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism. A Logico-Philological Study of Book A of the Prior Analytics*, Dordrecht, 1969.
(2) *Rhema* properly stands for 'what is said of', including not only our 'verb' but also adjectives, when used in attributive position. One should realise, however, that 'verb' refers to a word class, rather than a semantic or syntactical category, as *rhema* does.
(...)
"Conclusion.
Returning now to Boethius' manner of commenting upon Aristotle's texts, the following points can be made:
[1] In the wake of Ammonius, (3) Boethius explains [De int.] 16b22-25 on the apophantic level, i.e. in terms of statement-making, instead of framing significative concepts, i.e. on the onomastic level.
[2] Whereas in Ammonius' report of the predecessors, Alexander and Porphyry, as well as his own exposition of the issue, there are many clues to the previous alternative reading and interpretation on the onomastic level, Boethius does not even refrain from cleansing the text (including his 'quotations'), by changing, at any occurrence, ' *ens*' into ' *est*'.
[3] In doing so, Boethius decisively influenced the commentary tradition on account of the purport of De int. 3, 16b19-25. He effectively contributed to the common verdict on this paragraph in terms of 'a curious medley'.
[4] As far as the semantics of the indefinite verb (3, 16b14-15) is concerned, Boethius' apparently adhering to the so-called 'Ammonii recensio' was far less desastrous for the common understanding of Aristotle on this score, and, in effect, merely provided us with some stimulating Medieval discussions of the semantics of term infinitation.
[5] Finally by way of speculative surmise, it might be suggested that both the fact that Boethius dealt with the 'Ammonii recognise' without reading it in his lemma of 16b14-15, as well as his rather ruthlessly interfering in the

quotations of the pre-Ammonian sources, should make it more plausible that Boethius had extensive, but incomplete marginal notes to his Greek text of Aristotle at his disposal, rather than a full copy of Ammonius' commentary (or those of other Greek commentators).
To comment upon Aristotle's work naturally includes developing his lore. But nothing can ever guarantee that this will happen *ad mentem auctoris*. (4)"
(3) It is unmistakably plain that in *De int*. ch. 3, Boethius is strongly influenced by what he read in Ammonius (or in marginal notes on Ammonius' view).
(4) Cf. the interesting paper on this subject by Frans A.J. de Haas, "Survival of the Fittest? Mutations of Aristotle's Method of Inquiry in Late Antiquity" (forthcoming). [Conference: *The Dynamics of Natural Philosophy in the Aristotelian Tradition (and beyond)*, Nijmegen, 16-20 August 1999.]

24. De Vogel, Cornelia J. 1971. "Boethiana." *Vivarium* no. 9:49-66.
".A highly controversial problem is: whence did Boethius derive his Greek culture, from Athens, from Alexandria, - or have we to imagine that he simply worked in his library in Rome?
[Follow an examination of the opinions of Courcelle, Minio-Paluello, Shiel and de Rijk: Courcelle thinks that Boethius studied at Athens, the other authors are of the contrary opinion.]" (p. 49)
(...)
Summing up the result of this part of my inquiry I think I can make the following modest statements.
(1) On the basis of contemporary evidence it must be accepted as certain that Boethius spent his school years in Athens, say from the age of 9 or 10 up to about 17 or 18.
(2) It is very probable that immediately after that period he was Ammonius' student at Alexandria, from the age of 17 or 18 till about 20.
(3) Taking into the account that he was extremely precocious it is probable that he returned to Rome as early as the year 500 or a little later. There and about that date he

composed the first of his mathematical treatises,the *Institutio arithmetica* and followed it up by the other three. To these three points I add a fourth, concerning the period in which Boethius' other works were written. In the preceding pages I did not discuss the important article of C. H. Coster on *The fall of Boethius*, (34) which did not touch on my subject. However, the present account of Boethius' younger years which brings us up to the beginning of his own works may be duly concluded by a correction of the traditionally accepted final term of his life and work. I think that Coster's above-cited paper offers the grounds for such a correction. By a careful analysis of the contemporary sources the author comes to the conclusion that the execution of Boethius and Symmachus must have taken place in the summer of 526, shortly before Theodoric's death. If that is correct- and I think Coster's arguments are solid -, the framework into which the list of Boethius'works is to be fitted will be enlarged by two years. Since a few years ago Dr. De Rijk drew up such a list in the pages of the present Journal, (35) it may not be out of place to mention the result of Coster's research at the end of this study.

What I have not done in these pages but wish to do in the next number of this Journal, is to reconsider Boethius' argument in the *Consolatio* more closely from the point of view of what does and what does not correspond to his own convictions." (pp. 65-66)

(34) C.H.Coster, *The fall of Boethius: His character*, in: Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales et slaves, XII, (1952), pp. 45-81, (*Mélanges H. Grégoire*) Bruxelles 1953.

I dealt with this paper in section II of my contribution to the German work Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Band III,prepared atTübingen for1972.

(35) Vivarium II2,J964,p.i£9ff.

25. ———. 1972. "Boethiana II." *Vivarium* no. 10:1-40.

"So to Boethius, as it had been to St. Augustine, true philosophy and Christian faith tended in the same direction.

To Augustine Christian faith had been the fulfilment of that which philosophy had promised.
He did not identify them. Did Boethius?" (p. 2)
(...)
"In fact, Courcelle thinks that Boethius tried to give a kind of synthesis of the Alexandrian Neoplatonism of Ammonius and Christianity, in the same way as later St. Thomas Aquinas proposed a synthesis of Aristotle's philosophy and Christian theology without mixing up the fields of reason and faith.Thus, we can understand that such an expression as the "prima divinitas", even on the lips of Philosophia, appears a lapsus to Courcelle. On the whole, again, I think his view of Boethius is right: in fact, the "last of Romans", who was a Christian, spent his life in the Neoplatonic philosophy of his age, and he did so rather technically. Even in his theological treatises he tackled the problems as a philosopher, applying the distinctions of Aristotle's logic to the terms used in theology.
Was it so strange then, that to him, when in prison, philosophy appeared to have a word to speak, a word which must have appealed to him the more since its tendency was in agreement with what he believed as a Christian.
No doubt this is the main-point. But there are a few unsettled problems. I wish to dispose them under the following three points.
1. Are there any clearly Christian features in the *Consolatio*? And if so, where and which are they?
2. What about the *loci sacrae Scripturae*, gathered by Fortescue and mentioned as parallels in Bieler' s new edition of the *Consolatio*? Are all of them either vague parallels or just a matter of coincidence, or will there be found one or two cases in which a very peculiar biblical thought or expression occurs in the *Consolatio* in precisely the same form? This would be an interesting thing to us. I think it has to be carefully checked.
3. In which form do the"pagan", non-Christian elements present themselves in the *Consolatio*? Are they confined to the part in which Philosophia is speaking, or do they sometimes occur in our Christian-philosopher's own part as

well? Another question might be raised in this context: is it necessary to believe that Boethius accepted every word spoken by his Mistress without any reservation, or can he be supposed to have had some reservations with regard to certain details of her teaching?" (p. 3)

26. ———. 1973. "The Problem of Philosophy and Christian Faith in Boethius' *Consolatio*." In *Romanitas et christianitas. Studia Iano Henrico Waszink A.D. VI Kal. Nov. A. MCMLXXIII XIII lustra complenti oblata*, edited by den Boer, Willem, 357-370. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
27. Dod, Bernard G. 1982. " *Aristoteles Latinus*." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Jenny, Anthony P. and Pinborg, Jan, 46-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"All of Aristotle's works were translated into Latin in the Middle Ages and nearly all were intensely studied. The exceptions are the *Eudemian Ethics*, of which no complete translation survives, and the *Poetics*, which, although translated by William of Moerbeke, remained unknown. Most of the works were translated more than once, and two of them, the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, were translated or revised no fewer than five times. The translations we are concerned with spanned a period of about 150 years; some were made from the Arabic, but the majority directly from the Greek. Some translations became popular and remained so; some became popular but were then superseded by other translations; others barely circulated at all." (p. 45)
(...)
"At the beginning of our period only two of Aristotle's logical works, the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, were known in Latin, in Boethius' translation; these two works, which together with Porphyry's *Isagoge* became known as the 'logica vetus', had already become standard school texts in logic. One of the results of the quickening interest in logic in the early twelfth century was the recovery, from about 1120 onwards, of the rest of Boethius' translations of the logic: the *Prior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistici elenchi*. How and

where these translations, made some six centuries earlier, were found is not known. The logical corpus was completed by James of Venice's translation (from the Greek) of the *Posterior Analytics*; in 1159 John of Salisbury in his *Metalogicon* shows a familiarity with all these works. (He also quotes from a second translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, that of Ioannes, which otherwise remained virtually unknown.)" (p. 46)

28. Donato, Antonio. 2012. "Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* and the Greco-Roman Consolatory Tradition." *Traditio* no. 67:1-42.
"The aim of this study is to show that an adequate assessment of the literary genre of the *Consolatio* requires (i) a thorough analysis of features (*topoi*, themes, and methods) considered typical of the consolatory genre and (ii) a consideration of the goal of Greco-Roman consolations. (11)
It is only by following this approach that we can gain the knowledge and insights necessary to determine accurately the ways in which Boethius's text resembles and differs from Greco-Roman consolations. (12)
The significance of an investigation into whether the *Consolatio* is a consolatory text is not only that of assessing its literary genre, but has further exegetical importance. Typically, an author's choice of employing a specific literary genre — particularly in the case of ancient and medieval authors — is a telling sign of the purpose of the text, the way the content of the text is to be considered, and the author's motivation to write it. (13) Thus, the exegetical importance of assessing the literary genre of the *Consolatio* is that, among other things, it crucially affects the way we interpret the text's goal and its philosophical arguments. If we consider the *Consolatio* to be a consolatory text, then it is appropriate to focus on its overt meaning and consider its philosophical arguments as designed to offer consolation. On the other hand, if we think that the *Consolatio* is, for example, a "Menippean satire" we cannot stop at the overt meaning of the text but have to read between the lines in order to identify the text's underlying agenda. (14)

This paper will be divided into seven parts. After a brief discussion of the origin of the Greco-Roman consolatory tradition, we shall examine, one by one, those features of the *Consolatio* which can be traced back to Greco-Roman consolations (sections 2–5) and those which seem to distinguish it from these texts (sections 6–7)." (pp. 3-4)
(11) Means and Phillips offer very persuasive arguments in support of the interpretation that the *Consolatio* is a consolation; yet they give no consideration to Boethius's relation to Greco-Roman consolations (M. Means, *The Consolatio Genre in Medieval English Literature* [Gainesville, 1972], 18; P. Phillips, "Boethius's De Consolatione Philosophiae and the Lamentatio/Consolatio Tradition," *Medieval English Studies* 9 [2001]: 5–27).
(12) The very significant number of consolatory texts composed before and immediately after the *Consolatio* makes it impossible to study, within the limited scope of a paper, the relation between the *Consolatio* and ancient as well as medieval consolatory texts. Thus, we shall limit our study to the investigation of the relation between the *Consolatio* and some well-known Greco-Roman consolations. Greco-Roman consolatory texts present several advantages for our study: 1) scholars such as Gruber (*Kommentar zu Boethius*) have persuasively demonstrated that Boethius knew these texts; 2) many of the consolatory strategies contained in these texts are very clearly spelled out and easy to recognize; 3) these texts are amongst the earlier examples of consolations and hence it is reasonable to start from them when investigating the place of the *Consolatio* within the consolatory tradition.
(13) R. B. Rutherford, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study* (Oxford, 1989); P. Hadot, "Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy," *Critical Inquiry* 16 (1990): 483–505.
(14) The scholars who consider the Consolatio to be a "Menippean satire" believe that the goal of its philosophical arguments is not really to convey philosophical ideas, but to present flawed arguments that are supposed to illustrate the limitations (Marenbon) or failures (Payne, Relihan) of the

discipline of philosophy. See Marenbon, *Boethius*; Payne, *Chaucer and Menippean Satire*; Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy*.

29. ———. 2013. *Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy as a Product of Late Antiquity*. New York: Bloomsbury.
Contents: Acknowldgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. Boethius and the Ideology of the Roman Senatorial Aristocracy 7; 2. The Hillness and the Healer 57; 3. How does *Philosophy* Convey her Therapy? 101; 4. Christiantity and the *Consolation* 163; Concluding Remarks 197; Bibliography 199; Index 217-221.
"In the last 50 years the field of Late Antiquity has advanced significantly. Today we have a picture of this period that is more precise and accurate than ever before. Nonetheless, the study of one of the most significant texts of this age, i.e. Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy (henceforth *Consolation*), did not sufficiently benefit from these advancements in the scholarship. This book aims to fill this gap by investigating how the study of the *Consolation* can profit from the knowledge of Boethius' cultural, philosophical and social background that is available today. The goal of this enterprise, however, is not simply that of placing the *Consolation* in its historical and cultural background, but to unlock its exegetical difficulties by employing an approach hitherto mostly unexplored. In this text, I show that some of the *Consolation*'s long-standing exegetical issues can be more adequately addressed by going beyond the text and investigating the extent to which the cultural, philosophical and social context of Late Antiquity informs Boethius' last work.
In this book I explore the hypothesis that the *Consolation* is not simply influenced by the context of Late Antiquity, but is a 'product' of Late Antiquity. A text may be regarded as the 'product' of its age when (i) it does not simply contain individual views and features that are common to intellectuals of a particular age, but also (ii) presents elements that are specific to the mindset of the time in which it was written. The view that the *Consolation* is a product of Late Antiquity, however, does not imply that the

text lacks originality and can be reduced to its background. On the contrary, it is by examining how Boethius receives, refashions and expresses literary, philosophical and cultural elements that are typical of his age that it is possible to fully appreciate the *Consolation*'s originality." (From the *Introduction*)

30. ———. 2013. "Forgetfulness and Misology in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 21:463-485.
Abstract: "In book one of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius is portrayed as a man who suffers because he forgot philosophy. Scholars have underestimated the significance of this portrayal and considered it a literary device the goal of which is simply to introduce the discussion that follows. In this paper, I show that this view is mistaken since it overlooks that this portrayal of Boethius is the key for the understanding of the whole text. The philosophical therapy that constitutes the core of the 'Consolation' can in fact be properly evaluated only if we recognize the condition it is designed to cure. Through the portrayal of Boethius's forgetfulness, the 'Consolation' illustrates that it is the very nature of philosophical knowledge that makes it susceptible to being forgotten. Philosophical knowledge can (i) turn into misology, when it appears unable to solve certain problems, and (ii) be overrun by strong emotions. The therapy offered in the 'Consolation' is designed to make Boethius aware of the 'fragility' of philosophical knowledge and show him how to 'strengthen' it. He is taught how to more fully embody philosophy's precepts and that philosophy's inability to solve certain problems reveals not its failures but its limits."
31. D'Onofrio, Giulio. 1986. "Dialectic and Theology. Boethius' *Opuscula sacra* and Their Early Medieval Readers." *Studi Medievali* no. 27:45-67.
32. Dougherty, M. V. 2004. "The Problem of *Humana natura* in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* of Boethius." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:273-292.
"In Boethius's *Consolatio Philosophiae* one finds a rather unusual argument contending that human beings can lose

their natures as the result of immoral or virtuous activity. A number of texts in the work argue that the polarities of beast and god serve as options for those who lead highly immoral or highly virtuous lives. This argument is examined in detail in light of its philosophical ancestry. The paper argues that those who think the Boethian doctrine is Platonic in origin tend to read the texts about the loss of human nature as metaphorical. The paper then suggests that if one places the argument in an Aristotelian context one is able to see it as a metaphysical argument, and more particularly, as part of Boethian psychology. This paper thus provides a new context for approaching Boethius's contention that human beings can lose their natures."

33. Ebbesen, Sten. 2003. "Boethius on the Metaphysics of Words." In *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs*, edited by Galonnier, Alain, 257-275. Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters. Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, *Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen Volume 1,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 115-128.
"Boethius distinguished himself from most panegyrical orators by having pursued the study of the words he lived by beyond ordinary grammar and rhetoric school. He may not have delved deeply into the theory of grammar, but his works on topics demonstrate a live interest in the borderland between rhetoric and logic, and he spent much time on Aristotelian logic. He saw logic as fundamentally a language science: logic and grammar study the same matter, he says; but though logic gives a deeper understanding of language than grammar, it cannot replace grammar, for they study the subject from different points of view.
We might expect Boethius to have thought about the question “What is a word” and the related questions “What is a phrase?” and “What is a sentence?” (pp. 257-258, note omitted)
(...)
"Boethius’ discussion of molecular propositions is revealing of his way of thinking. A conjunction of propositions is semantically several propositions, but a conditional is somehow one proposition: ‘If it is day there is light’ does not

signify several things, but rather one “following”, one consequently as he says, translating the Greek ακολουθία. In other words: it takes two facts to make two conjoined propositions true, but only one to make a conditional true. A fact that can be described in a conditional is at least as good a fact as one describable in a categorical proposition.
One might think Boethius should have distinguished between assertion and signification; he could have held that the conditional signifies whatever the antecedent signifies and whatever the consequent signifies, whereas it asserts that one follows from the other. Boethius actually had the necessary tools for so doing. The verb “proponere”, which does occur in the context, would do nicely for “assert”.
I doubt, though, that he would have embraced the recommendation with alacrity. If I am not mistaken, his intuition was that words signify real things, and things are more real the more they are understood as unit-seeds capable of unfolding in multiplicity. Consequents of true conditionals really are contained in their antecedents in the sense that what the whole conditional signifies is one thing the richness of which may be gauged by seeing it unfold in a conditional. (34) (pp. 272-273, notes omitted)
(34) For the unity of conditionals and the antecedent-consequent relationship, see Boethius, *Top. Cic*. IV. 1124-1126.

34. Erismann, Christophe. 2009. "The Medieval Fortunes of the *Opuscula Sacra*." In *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, edited by Marenbon, John, 155-177. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The history of the medieval reception of the *Opuscula sacra* shows that, like late ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy was often a question of exegesis. Early medieval philosophy is characterised by its frequent reliance on ancient, late ancient and Patristic texts, as a basis for speculation. Commenting on an authority was often the occasion of expressing original thought, as noted by John Marenbon: ‘It is in commentaries that much of the most important philosophical work of the ninth to twelfth centuries was accomplished.’ (6)

Despite its particular rules, the practice of commentary did not restrain philosophical thought; on the contrary, it often stimulated it. Gilbert of Poitiers and Thomas Aquinas are good examples of this phenomenon.
I shall proceed in three stages: first, I shall give an historical overview of the medieval reception of the *Opuscula sacra*; I shall then consider the methodological and lexical influence of Boethius, and conclude with a presentation of some of the philosophical discussions
which Boethius initiated in the Middle Ages." (pp. 156-157)
(6) John Marenbon ('Making Sense of the de Trinitate: Boethius and Some of His Medieval Interpreters', in *Studia Patristica* 18, ed. E. A. Livingstone, Kalamazoo and Leuven: Cistercian Publications and Peeters, 446–52 1982) 446.

35. Evans, Jonathan R. 2001. *The Boethian Solution to the Problem of Future Contingents and its Unorthodox Rivals*, University of Nebraska.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis available at ProQuest, reference number 3034374.
Abstract: "One concern bothering ancient and medieval philosophers is the logical worry discussed in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 9, that if future contingent propositions are true, then they are settled in a way that is incompatible with freedom. Another is if we grant God foreknowledge of future contingent events then God's foreknowledge will determine those events in a way precluding freedom.
I begin by discussing the standard compatibilist solution to these problems as represented in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* and then examine theories that allegedly deviate from the Boethian solution. Boethius's solution to these separate problems involves showing that both problems operate on an ambiguity in the scope of the modal operator 'necessarily' present in the articulation of the problem. Once the ambiguity is removed we see that both disambiguations fail to offer a sound argument against the compatibility of free action with either God's omniscience or future contingent proposition's being true. The only difference between the solutions is that before executing the scope distinction strategy in the theological problem, Boethius

reminds us that God knows future contingents rather than foreknowing them, since God is timeless.
The rest of my discussion examines positions that allegedly deviate from the Boethian solution: positions held by Peter de Rivo, William Ockham and Plotinus. I argue that Ockham doesn't in fact deviate from the Boethian solution to the theological problem as is commonly held. Instead of offering a compatibilist position where God's omniscience includes foreknowledge, Ockham denies that God foreknows the future advocating instead a more sophisticated Boethian position. The other two philosophers, Rivo and Plotinus, deviate from Boethius, but unfortunately neither position appears philosophically plausible. Rivo's incompatibilist solution to the logical problem is inconsistent with his retention of the Boethian solution to the theological problem and is probably implausible on its own. Plotinus's compatibilist account fails not because it claims that necessity and freedom are compatible, but because the account of moral responsibility Plotinus offers to justify the compatibility fails."

36. ———. 2004. "Boethius on Modality and Future Contingents." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:247-271.
"In *The Consolation of Philosophy* Boethius addresses two main problems posed by the problem of future contingents that shed important light on his conception of necessity and possibility: (1) a logical problem that alleges that if propositions about the future are true now then they are necessarily true, and (2) a theological problem that centers on a supposed incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and a contingent future. In contrast to established readings from the Consolation, this paper argues that a proper understanding of book 5 requires understanding the modal concepts employed there in atemporal terms. This interpretation requires revising the traditional understanding of the two problems present in the Consolation text, particularly in seeing how timeless knowledge or truth could be conceived as a threat to human freedom. It also stresses the importance of a strategy used

by Boethius to disambiguate the scope of modal operators used in his opponent's arguments and how that strategy unifies his discussion in book 5."

37. Ford, Lewis S. 1968. "Boethius and Whitehead on Time and Eternity." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 8:38-67.
38. Fortin, John R. 2004. "The Nature of Consolation in the *Consolation of Philosophy*." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:293-308.
"Does *The Consolation of Philosophy* console? Is Philosophy able to bring the prisoner not simply to an acceptance of and reconciliation with his situation, but further to move him beyond this to ultimate peace through philosophical activity? The *Consolation* does offer some consolation but only ironically and not in the way intended by the character Philosophy. Philosophy is attempting to bring the prisoner to a philosophical experience in which he will contemplate and enjoy eternal truths, and thereby be consoled. Nevertheless the prisoner will in the end reject this project which takes him away from what he perceives to be his life's work. Philosophy's failure to console the prisoner is disconsoling in part to herself because the prisoner ultimately rejects her invitation to become a martyr for her sake. It is disconsoling in part to the prisoner who seeks a consolation that would support his firmly held desire to remain engaged in public life."
39. Frakes, Jerold C. 1984. "The ancient concept of casus and its early medieval interpretations." *Vivarium* no. 22:1-34.
"Even after the Prisoner has accepted Philosophia's specific arguments concerning fortuna, however, he is not yet prepared to accept the abstract principle necessitated by this analysis: i.e. that the all-encompassing divine ordo precludes the existence of any and all random events.
Thus Boethius presents in *Cons*. V, pr. 1 a brief analysis of the abstract concept of *casus*. This treatment is heavily dependent on the Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian analyses, but Boethius omits much of the traditional material and incorporates subtle alterations into his argument, especially in changing the emphases of the

Aristotelian presentation, resulting to a certain degree in a new definition of chance. The concept naturally undergoes further modifications in the post-Boethian tradition. The first attempts to assimilate the *system* of the *Consolatio* in the vernacular were the translations by Alfred the Great in the ninth century into Old English and by Notker Labeo at the turn of the eleventh century into Old High German. They further modify the tradition derived from antiquity, not only by translating the text of the *Consolatio*, their principle source for that tradition, but also by attempting to translate Boethius' system of thought in such a fashion as to render it accessible to their own cultures. The present study investigates the concept of casus as it is developed by Boethius, Alfred and Notker in the context of the tradition. The analysis must then begin by establishing this context, and thus Aristotle's discussion of the topic must be briefly treated, since his was the first full examination of the problem, which then through Boethius' adaptation became the basis for medieval analyses." (pp. 1-2)
(...)
"Boethius transforms the Aristotelian concept through his 'metaphysical' perspective; Alfred treats Boethius' transformation with the reverence which he deemed appropriate for an ancient work of Christian philosophy, but in doing so transforms the concept again; and Notker presents an annotated translation/edition. One sees in the three texts three quite distinct methods and products, and thus three different stages in the interpretation and reception of the ancient philosophical concept of chance." (p. 33)

40. Gersh, Stephen. 1986. *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Volume II, Part II, *Neoplatonism*, Chapter 9: *Boethius*, pp. 647-718.
"That Boethius should be considered primarily as part of the Platonic tradition follows from a consideration of both his aims and his achievements. On the one hand, we have his projected but never completed program of translating with

commentary all of Aristotle's writings on logic, ethics, and physics; of translating with commentary all of Plato's dialogues; and of demonstrating that the two philosophers are in agreement on the most fundamental questions. (2) This program should be understood in terms of the Alexandrian Neoplatonic one, in which Aristotle's works were studied not for their own sake but as introductions to Plato's philosophy. (3) On the other hand, we ave the extant work *De Consolatione Philosophiae* which includes not only frequent allusions to passages in Plato's *Gorgias, Meno, Republic,* and *Timaeus* (4) but also references to Plato as a profound philosophical authority. (5) This should be contrasted with the same work's relatively limited appeal to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and *Physics*. (6) But Boethius was also a Christian, and this immediately leads to the question: how did he reconcile Platonism and Christianity? Here the influence of Augustine, who is explicitly cited on one occasion as a source, (7) is perhaps the crucial factor. Indeed, Boethius seems to have fashioned the synthesis along his redecessor's lines, realizing clearly that this involved both a responsibility and an opportunity.

In the first place, only those aspects of Platonism consistent with the Christian teaching could be adopted. (8) Thus, Boethius made no place in his theory for the order of henads postulated by Proclus; he combined the first and second hypostases of the Neoplatonists: the One and Intellect, in order to remove a subordination element from the divinity; and he found little use for the Platonic doctrine of the world soul . (9) In requiring these modifications of the doctrine derived from contemporary philosophical schools, Christianity played an indirect role in determining the character of the system which finally emerged.

In the second place, it was possible to pursue Platonism independently of Christian teaching from a methodological viewpoint. (10) This was demonstrated when Boethius employed philosophical theories as additional support for dogmatic positions in *De Trinitate* and *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*. (11) and in detachment from theological dogma in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. (12) In permitting such

elaborate discussion of philosophical questions to take place, Christianity assumed a subordinate role at least in the presentation of material.
That he is primarily a Platonist and that Christianity often plays merely an indirect or subordinate role in his arguments are two facts which make it imperative to include Boethius in our survey of the pagan philosophical tradition in late antiquity. In describing his teaching, we shall therefore take our starting point from its relation to the philosophical tenets of the pagan schools, although sometimes it will be necessary also to take account of peculiarly Christian transformations of the material." (pp. 651-654)
(2) Boethius: *In De Interpr*. ed II. 2, 3, 79, 1-80, 17.
(3) See for example Elias: *In Categ*. pr. 123, 7-11.
(4) See Boethius: *De Consol. Philos*. IV, pr. 2. 1 ff. (to Plato: *Gorg*. 466 a ff. on the respective powers of the good and the wicked); ibid. I. pr. 2, 13-14 (to Plato: *Meno* 81 c ff . on learning as recollection); ibid. I. pr. t, 18-21 (to Plato: *Rep. V*. i 7.3c-d on the need for philosopher-kings); ibid. III. pr. 9. 99-101 (to Plato: *Tim*. 27b on the need to pray for divine assistance); ibid. 111. pr. 12. 110-112 (to Plato: *Tim*. 29h on language and reality); and ibid. V, pr. 6, 31 ff. (to Plato: *Tim*. 37d on the perpetuity of the cosmos). On the passages in this work influenced by Plato see P. Courcelle: *Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*, translated by H . E. Wedeck (Cambridge, MA, 1969), pp. 296-297 and J. Gruber: *Kommentar zu Boethius De consolatione philosophiae* (Texte undi Commentate 9) (Berlin/New York, 1978), p. 36.
(5) In the passages mentioned above Philosophy refers to our Plato' (*Plato noster*), to Plato's decree' (*Platone sanciente*). and so on.
(6) See Boethius: *De Consol. Philos*. III, pr. 8, 23 together with lamblichus: *Protr*. 8. 47, 13 (to Aristotle: *Protr*. on the eyes of Lynceus); ibid. V, pr. 1, 33 ff. (to Aristotle: *Phys*. II, 4, 195b 31 ff. on the relation between causation and chance); and ibid. V. pr . 6, 18-22 (to Aristotle: *De Caelo* II, 1. 283b26-31 on the world's eternity). On the passages in this work influenced by Aristotle see Courcelle: *La Consolation*

de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire. Antecedents et posterité de Boece, pp. 25-26 and 124-125; and Gruber: op. cit., pp. 36-37.
(7) At *De Trin*. pr. 31 -.32 Boethius asks the addressee: ' You should however examine whether the seeds of argument from Saint Augustine's works have borne any fruit in my writing' (*Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos venientia fructus extulerint*).
(8) Cf . Augustine: *De Vera Relig*. 4, 7 (CCSL 32, 192-193) where it is stated that the Platonists could become Christians by changing a few words and opinions. The kinds of modification required are described in texts like *Conf*. VII, 9 (CSEL 33/1, 154-157); *Civ. Dei*. X, 30 (CCSL 47. 307-308); etc.
(9) These doctrines will be discussed in detail below.
(10). Cf. Augustine: *De Ord*. II, 5, 16 (CCSL 29, 115-116) where two separate methodological routes to the doctrine of the Trinity are postulated: that of reason and that of faith. That the first method is prior in reality and the latter prior in time is stated at ibid. II, 9, 26 (CCSL 29. 121- 1 22).
(11) In accordance with this approach, certain chapters like Boethius: *De trin*. 2 and 4; *Contra Eutych. et Nest*. 1-3 are free of explicitly Christian content.
(12) In accordance with this approach, the only indisputable scriptural citation is that of *Sap*. 8: 1 at Boethius: *De Consol. Philos*. III, pr. 12. 63-64.

41. ———. 1998. "Dialectical and Rhetorical Space: The Boethian Theory of Topics and its Influence During the Early Middle Ages." In *Raum und Raumvorstellungen in Mittelalter*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas, 391-401. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"According to L. Obertello's chronology, Boethius' writings on topics: the commentary on Cicero's 'Topica' and the 'De Topicis Differentiis' date from the last few years of his life (ca. 518 — 524) (1). They do indeed reveal the maturity of reflection characteristic of a thinker who has translated and commented upon Aristotle's *Organon* and is perhaps on the threshold of elaborating the Platonic synthesis of which 'De

Consolatione Philosophiae' stands as a poignant reminder. In this paper I hope to show how the notion of 'place' (*locus*) developed in Boethius' topical writings lies at the heart of important issues not only in rhetoric and dialectic but also in metaphysics." (p. 391)
(...)
"Boethius develops in response to Cicero two definitions of 'topic': a. A topic is the seat or foundation of an argument (24); and b. A topic is that from which one draws an argument (25). These formulations are of considerable interest because of the connection established with the notion of 'argument'.
Since for Boethius, an argument is a rather complicated phenomenon — on the surface it is simply a reason producing belief regarding something which is in doubt (26), yet on a deeper level it embraces the complementary aspects of being 1a. something expressed verbally (27) and 1b. something thought conceptually (28); and 2a. a connected set of propositions (29) and 2b. that through which propositions are connected (30) — then we must allow that this complexity arises from the topic as the argument's source. Thus, it may be that a topic is implicitly both verbal and conceptual, both connected and connecting (31)." (p. 395)
(1) See L. Obertello, *Severino Boezio* I, Genova 1974, 342. Cf. L. M. de Rijk, 'On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic II', in: *Vivarium* 2 (1964), 159-161.
(26) *De top. diff.*. I, 1180 C; *In Cic. Top*. I, 1048 B.
(27) *In Cic. Top*. I, 1050 B *oratione prolatum*. Strictly speaking, Boethius distinguishes I. 'argumentation' (*argumentatio*) which is verbal and II. 'argument' (*argumentum*) which is conceptual. See *In Cic. Top*. I, 1050B. However, the distinction having been made quickly breaks down in practice. See *In Cic. Top*. I, 1053 B.
(28) *De top. diff*. I, 1180 C *ratio*.
(29) *In Cic. Top*. I, 1050 B *propositionum contexione dispositum*.
(30) *In Cic. Top*. I, 1051 *A medietatis inventio*. The mediating function of a topic is an important matter which

cannot be pursued here. In brief, it operates in an argument by supplying either a middle term or a second premiss for a syllogism. See Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis*, 183-204 for detailed discussion. Cf. O. Bird, 'The Formalizing of the Topics in Mediaeval Logic', in: *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 1 (1960), 138-149; id., 'The Tradition of Logical Topics. Aristotle to Ockham', in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), 307-323; J. Pinborg, 'Topik und Syllogistik im Mittelalter', in: *Sapienter Ordinare. Festgabe für E. Kleineidam*, Leipzig 1969, 157-178; id., *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick*, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 1972, 21 sqq., 69 sqq.
(31) That the topic cannot be totally separated from its argument follows from the dynamic nature of both. See below.

42. ———. 2012. "The First Principles of Latin Neoplatonism: Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius." *Vivarium* no. 50:113-138. Abstract: "This essay attempts to provide more evidence for the notions that there actually is a Latin (as opposed to a Greek) Neoplatonic tradition in late antiquity, that this tradition includes a systematic theory of first principles, and that this tradition and theory are influential in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. The method of the essay is intended to be novel in that, instead of examining authors or works in a chronological sequence and attempting to isolate doctrines in the traditional manner, it proceeds by identifying certain philosophemes (a concept borrowed from structuralist and post-structuralist thought and here signifying certain minimal units from which philosophical “systems“ can be constructed), and then studying the combination and re-combination of these philosophemes consciously and unconsciously by a selection of important medieval writers. These philosophemes occur in Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*; Augustine, *De Trinitate*; Augustine, *De Vera Religione*; Augustine, *De Musica*; Macrobius, *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis*; and Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. The sampling of medieval authors who use these philosophemes includes Eriugena,

William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and Nicholas of Cusa."

43. Gibson, Margaret, ed. 1981. *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Table of Contents: Henry Chadwick: Introduction 1; John Matthews: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius 15; Helen Kirkby: The scholar and his public 44; Jonathan Barnes: Boethius and the study of logic 73; Patrick Osmund Lewry: Boethian logic in the medieval West 90; John Caldwell: The *De institutione arithmetica* and the *De institutione musica* 135; David Pingree: Boethius' geometry and astronomy 155; Alison White: Boethius in the medieval quadrivium 162; John R. S. Mair: The text of the *Opuscula sacra* 206; Margaret Templeton Gibson: The *Opuscula sacra* in the Middle Ages 214; Anna M. Crabbe: Literary design in the *De consolatione philosophiae* 237; David Ganz: A tenth-century drawing of Philosophy visiting Boethius 275; Jacqueline Beaumont: The Latin tradition of the *De consolatione philosophiae* 278; Christopher Page: The Boethian metrum *Bella bis quinis*: a new song from Saxon Canterbury 306; Alastair J. Minnis: Aspects of the medieval French and English traditions of the *De consolatione philosophiae* 312; Nigel F. Palmer: Latin and vernacular in the northern European tradition of the *De consolatione philosophiae* 362; Anthony Grafton; Epilogue: Boethius in the Renaissance 410; Malcolm R. Godden: King Alfred's Boethius 419; Malcolm Beckwith Parkes: A Note on MS Vatican, Bibl. Apost., lat. 3363 425; Diane K. Bolton: Illustrations in manuscripts of Boethius' works 428-437.

44. ———. 1981. "The *Opuscola Sacra* in the Middle Ages." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 214-234. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Ergo, domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. St Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 1078 (2)
Over five centuries earlier Boethius had made the same point: we cannot extend our thought and language to describe God. 'Ten categories can be predicated of all things: substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, condition,

position, being active or passive . . . But if you apply them to God, everything in the case is changed5. (3) For both the acknowledged master was Augustine. ‘When we think of God the Trinity, (5) he had written ‘our very thought itself is aware of how far it falls short of its object; it does not grasp God as he is, but through a glass darkly. (4) Yet Augustine persevered. Throughout the fifteen books of the *De Trinitate* he defined his linguistic tools and applied them to the nature of God. Within his own terms it is virtually complete: Boethius and Anselm say nothing that is not said in greater detail in the *De Trinitate*. Augustine was the catalyst, and the quarry of material, bold explorer of the divine and at the same time a sheltering authority. (5)

Given the dominance of the *De Trinitate*, we may well ask why the *Opuscula Sacra* had any future beyond the remote political infighting of the early sixth century. Boethius' prose has a hard clarity of expression that may seem more objective than Augustine’s, and here at least he is brief. Such qualities — and no doubt others which I have not discerned — commended the *Opuscula* as teaching texts, and it was principally in the schoolroom that they were to survive: as useful lo the electic scholars of the ninth century as to the sophisticated professionals of twelfth-century Paris and fifteenth-century Cracow." (pp. 214-215)

(2) *Proslogion*, cap. 15: *Anseimi Opera*, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946), I. 112.

(3) *Op. Sac.* I. iv. 1-9.

(4) Augustine, *De Trinitate* V. i, ed. W. J. Mountain (Turnhout, 1968: CCSL 1), p. 206, quoting *1 Cor*. 13. 12.

(5) Ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum ... in nos uenientia (*Op. Sac.* I praef. 31-3) ; Quapropter si cui uidebitur, quod in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis nouum sit aut a ueritate dissentiat: rogo, ne statim me aut praesumptorem nouitatum aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati doctoris Augustini *De trinitate* diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum meum diiudicet (*Monologion* prol. : *Anselmi Opera*, ed. cit. [note 2 above], I. 8).

45. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 1981. "Boethius and the Problem of Individuation in the *Commentaries* on the *Isagoge*." In *Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980): atti*, edited by Obertello, Luca, 169-182. Roma: Editrice Herder.
"The paper I am going to read here consists of a section from a much longer study on which I am presently working. This longer study deals with the problem of individuation not only in relation to Boethius, but also discusses the views of other early medieval figures, such as John Eriugena, Gilbert of Poitiers and Abailard. Unfortunately, due to time constraints I cannot engage here in a presentation of the views of so many authors. My efforts, therefore, will be directed only to the presentation of Boethius' views on the stated topic and to the defense of my interpretation of those views. (1) Moreover, again for reasons of time, I shall have to restrict my remarks to Boethius' views as presented in the two editions of his Commentary on Porphyry's « Isagoge » (2)." (p. 169)
(1) I would like to express my appreciation to Eleonore Stump for reading an early draft of this paper and for bringing to my attention a number of ambiguities and infelicities present in the text.
(2) *In « Isagogen » Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda*, ed. Samuel Brandt, in *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, vol. XXXXVIII (Vienna: Tempsky, 1906; rep. N.Y.: Johnson Rep. Corp., 1966), p. 135; PL 64, 71.
46. Hall, Douglas C. 1992. *The Trinity: An Analysis of St Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius*. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: I. Introduction 1; II. Boethius: The *Theological Tractates* 16; III. Aquinas: The *Expositio* of the *De Trinitate* 38; IV. Conclusion 112; Bibliography 124; Index of Authors 130-131.
"In the entire history of Western Trinitarian theology, one of the most bold attempts to logically and philosophically penetrate the *De Trinitate* of Augustine was, precisely, the *Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii* (*The Trinity is One God*

and not Three Gods) - also known as the *De Trinitate* - of Boethius; and the greatest medieval analysis of this theological tractate of Boethius was that of Thomas Aquinas. The purpose of the present study is to disclose the theological methodologies and the contents of this Boethian tractate and the *Expositio* of Aquinas." (p. 2)

47. Harding, Brian. 2005. "Metaphysical Speculation and its Applicability to a Mode of Living: The Case of Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter* no. 9:81-92.
Abstract: "This paper argues that Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae* presents theoretical metaphysical speculation as having a direct bearing on the life of the metaphysician. Boethius accomplishes this through his depiction of Lady Philosophy's 'therapy' wherein complex metaphysical arguments are utilized to pull Boethius out of his depression, returning him to what she calls his true self. I begin the paper by contextualizing this discussion in terms of the debate as to whether or not the 'philosophic life' of pagan antiquity is present in medieval thought. I then turn to a discussion of the therapeutic metaphysical arguments of Lady Philosophy and their effects on Boethius' mental and emotional state. I conclude the essay by listing some questions raised and directions for further study."
48. Helm, Paul. 2009. "Eternity and Vision in Boethius." *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* no. 1:77 - 97.
Abstract: "Boethius and Augustine of Hippo and are two of the fountainheads from which the long tradition of regarding God's existence as timelessly eternal has flowed, a tradition which has influenced not only Christianity, but Judaism and Islam too. But though the two have divine eternality in common, I shall argue that in other respects, in certain crucial respects, they differ significantly over how they articulate that notion."

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2. ———, eds. 2012. *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*. Leiden: Brill.
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3. Kijewska, Agnieszka. 2003. "Boethius' conception of the supreme good." In *Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism: Being or Good?*, edited by Kijewska, Agnieszka, 307-317. Lublin: Wydaw. KUL.
"Yet this reasoning, based on the dialectic of Platonic and Aristotelian tradition will remain paradoxical and difficult to accept from the standpoint of common-sense thinking. It is also hard to imagine such paradoxical dialectic bringing any real consolation to someone who is in plight like that of Boethius the prisoner. What, then, should we make of the encounter of Dame Philosophy and Boethius?
4. Suggestion of a solution
It is my opinion - and in this I am in full agreement with John Marenbon - that in trying to interpret the *Consolation* it is worthwhile to realize the importance of the literary genre in which this work was written, namely the Menippean satire. The cynical philosopher Menippus in his lost writings upheld stoical ideals and derided human vices and weaknesses. He made fun of philosophical theories by introducing personifications of abstract concepts and parodies of mythological and literary characters (32).
It seems, by the way, that element of comedy is not totally absent form the *Consolation*, as in the scene of chasing the Muses from Boethius' bedside, though it is overshadowed by the pathos of Boethius' fate. Now Dame Philosophy is a typical allegorical character personifying the Platonic and Aristotelian ideal of wisdom. Yet, impressive as she is, it seems she is not the principal character of the work. The focus seems to be rather on Boethius the prisoner, it is he that is the dynamic character of the piece, as he undergoes a radical metamorphosis.
We know of him that he received excellent education in philosophical schools of late antiquity, to which Dame

Philosophy clearly testifies by saying that he had been nourished with Eleatic and Academic teachings (33). It is no longer doubtful that, like other Roman aristocrats, Boethius was a Christian and a Catholic, and that he took special interest in theological discussions. He put to good use his philosophical skills and experience in explaining and clarifying theological notions and in perfecting theological methods. Why, at the end of his life, faced with a violent death, should he look for consolation to philosophy rather than religion?

It may be the case that Boethius, in choosing this precise literary genre and in constructing his dialogue the way he did, wanted to call into doubt sufficiency of human reason alone, or human reason deprived of assistant from living, painful experience, in discovering the Supreme Good, that would give man his happiness. Philosophy demonstrates that there exists the Supreme Good that is both God and Providence, yet this supreme goodness is constantly found to be incommensurable with the expectations of the humans and thus philosophical reasoning and everyday thinking part company. As Karl Jaspers wrote: *Philosophizing has, as it were, two wings, one that moves in the medium of communicable thinking, common theory, the other, whose medium is the individual existence. Only these two wings together are able to effect flight*. And a number of lines above he affirms: *Every essential philosophical idea points beyond itself to reality, without which it is not possible that the meaning of philosophizing be fulfilled*. (35). Thus it is life experience coupled with philosophical reasoning that can provide a proof there existing a reality that, though not apparent, yet can be discovered by the philosopher, who may bear witness to this discovery even by a sacrifice of his own life; for this hidden reality is no other than the Supreme Truth and the Supreme Good. *Consolation* - writes von Albrecht - *is merged in the comersion to God*. His work is a προτρεπτικός εἰς θεόν rather than a *consolatio*, (36) Boethius came close to that reality under the guidance of the Dame Philosophy, yet he had to testify to the truth of his knowledge by laying down his life. As we know he was

eventually executed in 524 or 525, some sources say that he had to undergo torture before his death. King Theoderic allegedly ordered his body to be cleared away in order to prevent spreading of the martyr's cult, so claims in his *History of the Wars* (37) Procopius of Caesarea. Yet his scheme came to naught and Boethius has ever since been venerated as a martyr, his feast day being the 23 October, formally approved on the 15 December 1883." (pp. 316-317)
(32) Cf. Marenbon, *Boethius*, [2003] p. 160-161.
(33) Cf. Boethius, *The Consolation* I, 1, p. 133.
(34) In that way Bovo of Corvey read the text; Cf. Huygens, 'Mittelalterliche Kommentare zum *O qui perpetua'*, [*Sacris erudiri,* VI (1954) pp. 373-427] p. 384.
(35) K. Jaspers, *Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung*, München 1963, p. 471-472.
(36) M. von Albrecht, *A History of Roman Literature,* vol. II Leiden-New York-Köln 1999, p. 1715.
(37) Cf. Procopius of Caesarea, *History of the Wars* I, 1, 34, tr. By H. B. Dewing, Cambridge Mass., London 1953, p. 13: *Symmachus and his son-in-law Boetius were men of noble and ancient lineage, and both had been leading men in the Roman senate and had been consuls. But because they practised philosophy and were mindful of justice in a manner surpassed by no other men (...) they attained great fame and thus led men of the basest sort to envy them. Now such persons slandered them to Theoderic, and he, believing their slanders, put these two men to death, on the ground that they were setting about a revolution, and made their property confiscate to the public treasury*.

4. ———. 2014. "Divine Logos in the Heart of Boethius's Path Toward *Summum Bonum*." *Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval* no. 21:39-52.
Abstract: "This paper presents an outline of the way Boethius conceived the human path to the Supreme Good (*Summum bonum*). In order to achieve this goal one has first to specify the way he construed this Supreme Good, and this discussion is naturally related to the much-discussed problem concerning the Christian identity of Boethius: was he indeed a Christian? does his *Consolation*, from which

any overt allusions to Christian faith are absent, provide us with any clue as to whether the Supreme Good of Boethius can be identified with the God of the Gospel? In the course of the analysis we propound a hypothesis that the message that Boethius puts forward through the means of his *Consolation* and the utterances he puts in the mouth of his dame Philosophy are not far removed from the advice offered by Fulgentius to Proba.
She, too, was encouraged to acknowledge her own weakness and lack of sufficiency, to be contrite, and to have humble trust in wisdom and guidance of God, who is the best of all doctors. Is dame Philosophy's message not very similar? did not Alcuin, who regarded himself as a faithful «disciple» of Boethius, share a conception of philosophy as being the «teacher of virtues» and wisdom, as the one who leads man along the path of wisdom towards the divine light?"

5. King, Peter. 2007. "Boethius: First of the Scholastics." *Carmina Philosophiae* no. 16:23-50.
"Boethius was the first of the scholastics in much more than paraphrases and his word-for-word commentaries, Boethius also provided the mediæval world with an object lesson in how to think about it. His theological treatises set the style for later scholastic investigations of dogma: concise, tightly-reasoned chains of argument applied to matters of faith, rich enough to be commented on in their own right. His intellectual influence was so pervasive in the Middle Ages that we might be tempted to paraphrase Whitehead's famous dictum (1) and declare mediæval philosophy to consist in a series of glosses on Boethius.
One work, however, has been left out of this accounting. While the influence and impact in the Middle Ages of Boethius's translations, paraphrases, commentaries, and theological treatises has long been studied and is well known, the same cannot be said for his masterpiece, the *Consolation of Philosophy*. Yet it too received its 'series of glosses' in the Middle Ages. In what follows I propose to look into this neglected history, focusing primarily on the reception of the *Consolation* as a philosophical text by later mediæval thinkers.

Putting aside its literary qualities, then, we can ask: What did later scholastics make of the *Consolation* as a philosophical treatise? What philosophical problem did they take it to address, and how did they take it to solve that problem?
I'll proceed as follows. In §1, I'll describe the tradition of philosophical commentary on the *Consolation*, as far as it can be made out at present. In § 2, I'll discuss the interpretation of the logical structure of the *Consolation* in the commentary tradition. In § 3, we'll look at the particular question of how the issues and arguments given in Book 5 are related to the rest of the work, a question that has consequences for the unity of the *Consolation* as a whole. In § 4, the medicinal metaphors Boethius uses to present the 'therapeutic' arguments will be looked at in detail as an example of how the commentary tradition can illuminate the logical structure of the text." (p. 23)
(1) Alfred Whitehead [*Process and Reality*. New York: Macmillan, 1929] 63: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists in a series of footnotes to Plato."

6. ———. 2011. "Boethius' Anti-Realist Arguments." *Oxford Studes in Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:381-401.
"Boethius opens his discussion of the problem of universals, in his second commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, with a destructive dilemma: genera and species either exist or are concepts; but they can neither exist nor be soundly conceived; therefore the enquiry into them should be abandoned (*In Isag*. *maior* 1.10). Boethius' strategy to get around this dilemma is well known. He follows the lead of Alexander of Aphrodisias, distinguishing several ways in which genera and species can be conceived, and he argues that at least one way involves no falsity. Hence it is possible to conceive genera and species soundly, and Porphyry's enquiry into them is therefore not futile after all (1.11). Boethius thus resolves the second horn of his opening dilemma.
Yet he allows the first horn of the dilemma, the claim that genera and species cannot exist, to stand. The implication is

that he takes his arguments for this claim to be sound. If so, this would be a philosophically exciting and significant result, well worth exploring in its own right.
Yet there is no consensus, either medieval or modern, on precisely what Boethius' arguments are, or even how many arguments he offers, much less on their soundness. (1) One reason for the lack of consensus is that Boethius' arguments need to be understood in the light of their ancient philosophical sources — particularly his difficult regress argument, which can be reconstructed only in this light — and this is rarely done. (2) In what follows I shall try to establish Boethius' dependence on his sources, and to show that Boethius offers three arguments as part of a unified dialectical strategy to establish that genera and species cannot be things (in some suitably robust sense of 'things')." (pp. 381-382)
(1) The secondary literature is sparse. Boethius' arguments do not rate even a single mention in J. Marenbon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius* [*Companion*] (Cambridge, 2009). There is an analysis of Boethius' entire discussion in M. Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals* [Abailard] (Amsterdam, 1976), and of these arguments in P. Spade, 'Boethius against Universals' [*Boethius*], which takes into account unpublished work by Spade and King. The brief treatment in A. de Libera, *La Querelle des universaux de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* [*Querelle*] (Paris, 1996), 128-30, is expanded in id., *L'Art des généralités: théories de l'abstraction* [*L'Art*] (Paris, 1999), 175-214. Some relevant material can be found in J. Barnes, *Porphyry: Introduction* [*Introduction*] (Oxford, 2003), 37-9. For Boethius' works in general see J. Magee and J. Marenbon, 'Boethius' Works', in Marenbon (ed.), *Companion*, 303-10, and the references given there.
(2) There is still controversy over Boethius' relation to his ancient sources: see J. Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence*. (London, 1990), 349-72, and S. Ebbesen, 'Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator', ibid. 373-91.

For the most recent overview of the debate see S. Ebbesen, ‘The Aristotelian Commentator’, in Marenbon (ed.), *Companion*, 34-55.

7. Koterski, Joseph W. 2004. "Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:203-224.
"Boethius's famous definition of "person" as *naturae rationabilis individual substantia* (an individual substance of a rational nature) is frequently cited without reference to the specific theological purpose of his formulation (an attempt to provide some clarification about the mysteries of Christ and the Trinity). This article elucidates some of the theological issues that required philosophical progress on the nature of "personhood." It also considers some of the residual difficulties with the application of this definition to divine persons that have been raised by subsequent theologians such as Thomas Aquinas who are otherwise sympathetic to Boethius's definition of person when applied to human beings."
8. Kretzmann, Norman. 1985. " *Nos Ipsi Principia Sumus*: Boethius and the Basis of Contingency." In *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*, edited by Rudavsky, Tamar, 23-50. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"Introduction. Boethius's two commentaries on Aristotle's *De interpretatione* contain an account of the metaphysical foundations of contingency in their discussions of Chapter 9. (1) For the countless medieval discussions of future contingents only *De interpretatione* 9 itself is of greater historical importance than Boethius's discussions of it. In this chapter, however, my concern is with the content of Boethius's theory of contingency and not with its historical sources or influences. In order to give his theory the kind of consideration I think it deserves, I need to extract it from the other material in the commentaries and expound it in its own right; I also want to examine some of its consequences. Because those tasks are the only ones I can undertake in this paper, I am not now concerned with what the later medievals thought about Boethius or with what Boethius

thought about Aristotle or with what Aristotle thought about contingency, but only (or as nearly as possible only) with what Boethius thought about contingency in his two commentaries on *De interpretatione*. (2)" (p. 23)
(1) The Latin texts of the commentaries are published in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 64, cols. 329-342 and 487-518; and in the critical edition by C. Meiser, Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis II EPI EPMHNIA Σ, Leipzig: Teubner, 1877-1880 (2 vols.), Vol. I, pp. 103-126, and Vol. 11, pp. 185-250. All my references to and quotations from Boethius's commentaries in the notes will be taken from Meiser's edition. For the definitive edition of Boethius's translation of Aristotle see L. Minio Paluello (ed.), *Aristoteles Latinus II 1-2: De Interpretatione vel Periermenias*, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges 1965.
(2) See also Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy in Boethius. The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy*, H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (eds.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass 1968, Bk V, esp. Prose 1 and 2; and *In Ciceronis Topica*
in *Ciceronis Opera*, J. C. Orelli and G. Baiterus (eds.), Zurich 1833, Bk V, chs, 15.60-17.64. lowe the latter reference to Eleonore Stump.

9. ———. 1987. "Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow's Sea Battle." In *Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans*, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 63-97. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Reprinted in: D. Blank, N. Kretzmann (eds.), *Ammonius on Aristotle* On Interpretation *9 with Boethius on Aristotle* On Interpretation *9*, London: Duckworth, 1998, pp. 24-52 (cited from the reprint).
"Łukasiewicz's interpretation of Aristotle's response to determinism in *Int*. 9 has stood, in one version or another, at the center of the modem controversy that has its source in his 1930 article. (*)
(...)
"Recent commentators on *Int*. 9, whether they accept or reject the oldest interpretation, have tended to follow

Hintikka's lead in designating it 'the traditional interpretation'. (5)" (p. 25)
(...)
"My concern here is with the principal ancient rival to the so-called traditional interpretation, a rival whose subsequent medieval career was so long and so eminent that it provides another reason for feeling uneasy about calling the simple denial of universal bivalence'the traditional interpretation'. Since the one I am focusing on is the second-oldest on record, I will refer to it simply as the second-oldest interpretation and continue referring to the denial of universal bivalence as the oldest. I will also continue to refer to both of them as interpretations even when I am primarily interested in them as responses to logical determinism, regardless of their accuracy as interpretations of Aristotle. The second-oldest interpretation's claim to preserve bivalence while rejecting determinism is what essentially distinguishes it from the oldest interpretation. Its details will emerge gradually." (p. 25)
(...)
"Boethius' version of the second-oldest interpretation is based on his thoroughgoing Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth: 'the nature of predicative [i.e. categorical] propositions is acquired from the truth and falsity of things, events, or states of affairs; for however they are, so will the propositions that signify them be'. (28) For that reason propositions 'about past and present things, events, or states of affairs are, indeed, like those things themselves, stable and definite; ... [and], for that reason, of that which has happened it is true to say definitely that it has happened ... And concerning the present as well: whatever is happening has a definite nature in that it is happening. It is necessary to have definite truth and falsity in the propositions, too; for of whatever is happening it is definitely true to say that it is happening, [*definitely*] false that it is not happening.' (29)" (p. 29)
(*) [J. Łukasiewicz,'Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalküls', Comptes

Rendus des Séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, Classe III, vol. 23 (1930) pp. 51-77, translated by H. Weber as 'Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic' in Storrs Mc Call (ed.), *Polish Logic 1920-1939*, Oxford 1967, pp. 40-65.]
(5) R. Gaskin, *The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future*, Berlin 1995. Chapter 12 is dedicated to the interpretation of the ancient commentators, especially Boethius and Ammonius.
(28) II 188,14-17: 'praedicativarum autem propositionum natura ex rerum veritate et falsitate colligitur. quemadmodum enim sese res habent, ita sese propositiones habebunt, quae res significant.'
(29) II 189,5-7, 9-10, 13-18: 'de praeteritis quidem et de praesentibus, ut res ipsae, stabiles sunt et definitae.... idcirco de eo quod factum est verum est dicere definite, quoniam factum est ... et de praesenti quoque: quod fit definitam habet naturam in eo quod fit, definitam quoque in propositionibus veritatem falsitatemque habere necesse est. nam quod fit definite verum est dicere quoniam fit, falsum quoniam non fit.'

10. LaChance, Paul Joseph. 2004. "Boethius on Human Freedom." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:309-327.
"It is commonly asserted that Boethius defined free will as the judgment of the will or a rational choice. Accordingly, sin or evil is identified with ignorance or vice of the intellect, which prevents or distorts rational deliberation. However, Boethius adopted a more complex understanding of the self-motion of the soul and, consequently, articulated a more nuanced account of sin and the healing effects of Providence. Boethius treated human freedom as a complex including a natural motion, identified as the desire for happiness, the determination of reason following the judgment of deliberation, and the sovereignty of the will over its own acts and, to some extent, over other acts of the soul. Sin, therefore, involves mistaken ideas about reality but also deformations in the affective orientation of the will

to the world and in the exercise of the will's control over the soul."

11. ———. 2011. "Transcendental Prediction in Boethius' Signification Theory: *De hebdomadibus* in the Context of the Commentaries on *Peri hermeneias*." In *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, edited by Emery, Kent jr., Friedman, Russell L. and Speer, Andreas, 248-274. Leiden: Brill.
"In this essay I shall set out the basic terms and relations for an explanatory account of the central meaning of Boethius' *De hebdomadibus*. The basic terms and relations include *bonum, esse* and *id quod est* as well as the principle that terms which refer to objects that share a particular meaning but that subsist differently are analogically predicated. I shall argue that Boethius distinguished between the meaning of predicates and the mode or manner in which their referents are said to subsist.
Boethius offered only very brief and often tantalizing explanations of these concepts, leaving much room for interpretation as to their exact meaning. I will approach my interpretive task from two directions.
First, I shall investigate Boethius' logical commentaries and treatises, in which he discusses foundational questions of human knowing and the manner in which the content of one's predications may be brought closer to the meaning that one intends to communicate. Second, I shall adopt a hypothesis that locates Boethius' third tractate in the context of trinitarian theology. What I have to offer with respect to the meaning of *De hebdomadibus* will not verify the hypothesis, but I think that the hypothesis sheds light on the possible intention and meaning of the tractate. Thus, the linking of the hypothesis and the data of the text will yield an advance in 'understanding'. (1) (p. 248)
(1) Boethius commented on the importance of the task of understanding prior to judgment, noting that Aristotle treated the two parts of logic, understanding and judgment, whereas the Stoics neglected understanding. Cf. *Commentaria In Topica Ciceronis,* Lib. I–IV, PL 64, col. 1039–1174; english trans. by E. Stump, Ithaca 1988. Despite

the fact that in this context judgment appears to be a logical activity concerned with the forms of arguments, evidence from the *De divisione liber* (cf. infra, n. 18) suggests that Boethius recognized the importance of a range of activities in the articulation of a definition. If we consider that predication involves not simply the synthesis of meanings but also the positing of a particular mode of subsistence (substantial, accidental, relational) or manner of occurrence (necessary, contingent, or free), then the discussion of contingency in the commentaries on Peri hermeneias takes on a greater importance in the articulation of Boethius' epistemology.

12. Lazella, Andrew. 2008. "Creation, *Esse*, and *Id Quod Est* in Boethius's *Opuscula Sacra*." *Carmina Philosophiae* no. 17:35-56.
13. Lewftow, Brian. 1990. "Boethius on Eternity." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 7:123-142.
"The concept of eternity was prominent in medieval discussions of divine foreknowledge and human freedom and of God's relation to the world. Perhaps most importantly, the medievals took it to express the distinctive quality of God's life, experience and mode of being. For such writers as Boethius and Aquinas, the claim that God is eternal, properly understood, says most of what we can know about what it is like to be God. So an examination of the concept of eternity promises to repay our efforts with a better understanding of the history of philosophical theology and with insight into the concept of God.
Some thinkers see eternity as everlasting duration through time. Others liken it to a static, durationless instant, a timeless *nunc stans*. Language appropriate to both views occurs in such authors as Plato, Plotinus and Boethius, leading some scholars to conclude that these men wrote misleadingly, wavered between different views of eternity or were just inconsistent. (1) In a well-known article, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann suggest another possibility. (2) On their view, when Boethius *et al*. seem to waffle between talk of a durationless now and talk of everlasting duration, they are actually trying to communicate a single

thesis, that eternity is “atemporal duration." This paper will argue that at least as regards Boethius, Stump and Kretzmann are correct, though not for the reasons they give. Stump and Kretzmann have recently tried to defend the concept of atemporal duration against an attack by Paul Fitzgerald. (3) I will suggest that their defense is inadequate, then offer a different defense and a different view of atemporal duration." (p. 123)
(1) Thus Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 108-13.
(2) Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 78 (1981), pp. 429-58.
(3) Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Atemporal Duration,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 84 (1987), pp. 214-19. They are responding to Paul Fitzgerald, "Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 82 (1985), pp. 260-69.

14. MacDonald, Scott. 1988. "Boethius’s Claim that all Substances are Good." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 70:245-279.
Appendix: Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* (How Can Substances Be Good in Virtue of the Fact That They Have Being When They Are Not Substantial Goods?), translated by Scott MacDonald, pp. 274-279.
"Boethius's short treatise *Quomodo substantiae*, known in the Middle Ages as *De hebdomadibus* (DH), has been oddly neglected. (1) It deserves close attention for at least two reasons. First, in it Boethius presents a philosophically sophisticated defense of a provocative metaphysical position, viz., that all substances are good in virtue of the fact that they have being. Moreover, in the course of defending this position he lays out and attempts to resolve a deep philosophical problem the resolution of which appears to be necessary for *any* account of the nature of goodness, not just his own.
Second, DH deserves attention because of its historical significance.

The extant *De hebdomadibus* commentaries from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the number of references to DH in the works of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, for example, testify to the use made of it by later medieval philosophers.(2) In addition, the subject matter of the treatise places it in a long and distinguished philosophical tradition: Bocthius's thesis that all substances are good in virtue of the fact that they have being is clearly a near relative of the Augustinian view that everything which exists is good insofar as it exists and of Aquinas's claim that 'being' and 'good' have precisely the same referents although they differ in sense. (3) The fact that the account underlying Boethius's thesis is significantly different from either Augustine's or Aquinas's makes DH's
position in the philosophical tradition all the more interesting. In this paper I will offer a detailed analysis of DH in order to evaluate the support Boethius offers for his counter-intuitive thesis and identify the historical context into which his account of the nature of goodness fits." (pp. 245-246)

(1) I have provided a translation of *De hebdomadibus* in an appendix. All references to DH are to line numbers of this translation.

(2) The medieval commentaries on DH which have been edited are the ninth century glosses edited by E. K. Rand in *Commentaria in Boethium, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters* (München, 1906), the twelfth-century commentaries by Gilbert of Poitiers, Thierry of Chartres, and Clarenbald of Arras, all edited by Nikolaus M. Haering in (respectively) *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966), *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971), and *Life and Works of CIarembald of Arras* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. 1965), and the commentary of Thomas Aquinas edited by Fr. M. Calcaterra in the Marietti edition of Aquinas's works, *Opuscula theologica* II (Rome, 1954).

For Albert's use of DH, see his *Summa de bono*, vol. 28 in *Opera omnia* (Cologne edition), edited by Henricus Kuehle (Cologne, 1931), especially the first seven articles of the first question. For Aquinas's use of DH outside of his commentary, see especially *Summa theologiae* Ia.5 —6 and *De veritate* I and XXI.
(3) For a statement of Augustine's thesis, see, e. g., *Confessiones* VII. For Aquinas's claim, see *Summa theologiae* Ia.5.1—3.

15. Magee, John. 2007. "Boethius, Last of the Romans." *Carmina Philosophiae* no. 16:1-22.
16. ———. 2010. "Boethius." In *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, edited by Gerson, Lloyd, 788-812. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"It is difficult to determine how much of the corpus [*of Boethian works*] has disappeared. There may have been a translation, possibly with draft commentary, of the *Physics*. (15)
Boethius was acquainted with the *Posterior Analytics*, although it is uncertain whether he translated or commented on it; he certainly had access to Themistius' paraphrases of both *Analytics* and to Praetextatus' translation thereof (*In Perih*. 2.3.7–4.3; *Div*. 885d; *In top. Cic*. 1051b). A bucolic poem has evidently vanished, but the *Liber de definitionibus* transmitted under his name belongs to Victorinus (*In top. Cic*. 1098a; 1100b). Certain works are mentioned in such a way as to make it impossible to say whether they were merely planned, partially drafted, or actually completed. A treatise *De ordine Peripateticae disciplinae* was evidently written some time between the second *Peri Hermeneias* commentary and *De divisione*; another on the harmony of Plato and Aristotle was planned but may not have been written, and the same holds for a planned compendium of the *Peri Hermeneias* (*In Perih*. 2.80.1–6; 2.251.8–16; Div. 877b). Boethius obviously planned numerous projects in advance and must have worked on more than one at a time, and although some of his cross-references furnish reliable evidence for establishing relative chronology, others, having been

penned with an eye only to his readers' presumed order of study, carry no implication as to the order of composition. Boethius' failure to mention a work, or his mentioning it in such a way as to suggest borrowing from a source, does not amount to proof that he had no direct knowledge of the same. For example, certain hints of *De generatione et corruptione* in the commentaries may well reflect mere borrowing from a source (e.g., *In Cat*. 262a (cf. *Porph., In Cat*. 141.14)), but the *Consolatio*, which draws from many sources but is a copy of none, suggests direct acquaintance with the treatise (cf. below, p. 802)." (p. 796)

17. ———. 2014. "Boethius's *Consolatio* and Plato's *Gorgias*." In *Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought*, edited by Kirchner, Andreas, Jürgasch, Thomas and Böhm, Thomas, 13-29. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Our understanding of Boethius the Platonist is remarkably less clear than that of Boethius the Peripatetic, owing to the fact that the precise range of Boethius's later Platonic sources is difficult to ascertain from his extant writings, which include no translation of or commentary on a Platonic dialogue. (1) Although there has been much discussion of his interpretation of the *Timaeus*, especially as evidenced in Consolatio III,m9 (2), and although numerous allusions to other Platonic dialogues have been teased out of various Boethian works, the evidence is generally rather piecemeal. For example, does Boethius's reference to Plato on the rule of philosopher-kings (3) indicate a direct knowledge of the *Republic* or is it merely echoing a commonplace? (4) And if the former, then how much of the *Republic* are we entitled to read into our interpretation of the *Consolatio* or of Boethius's Platonism generally? The most notable exceptions to this rather sparsely populated terrain are perhaps Consolatio IV,2 and IV,4, prose sections which since Klingner have been taken to reflect direct engagement with Plato's *Gorgias*. (5) The contrast between Boethius's use of the *Timaeus* and his use of the *Gorgias* seems particularly striking. For if the *Timaeus* serves in the context of the *Consolatio* to affirm the essential goodness of creation and to foster hope for the mind's ascent to the

ordered serenity of the heavens, the *Gorgias*, with its pessimistic sense of a philosophical life desperately wagered (6) on hopes for improved conditions here on earth, is suggestive of much darker undercurrents within Boethius's dialogue.

It seems worth reconsidering the case of the *Gorgias*, and in what follows I hope to shed some light on Boethius's understanding of that great dialogue. Did he merely copy from it, or did he form an original interpretation? If the latter, then is it necessary to suppose that he had a copy of the *Gorgias* to hand when he wrote the *Consolatio*, or did he work from memory? And did he work exclusively from Plato, or did he consult a later intermediary?" (pp. 13-14)

(1) Cf. John Magee: "Boethius", in: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 798–810. I would like to thank my hosts in Freiburg, especially Dr. Thomas Jürgasch, for their hospitality and the invitation to present the paper on which the present essay is based.

(2) Cf. Friedrich Klingner: *De Boethii consolatione philosophiae*, (= Philologische Untersuchungen; 27), Berlin 1921, 38–67; Pierre Courcelle: *La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire. Antécédents et postérité de Boèce*, Paris 1967, 163–165; Pierre Courcelle: *Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*, transl. by Harry E. Wedeck, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, 302–303; Helga Scheible: *Die Gedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius*, (= Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften; 2/n. F. 46), Heidelberg 1972, 101–112; Henry Chadwick: *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*, Oxford 1981, 233–235; Béatrice Bakhouche: "Boèce et le Timée", in: Alain Galonnier (Ed.): *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs: Actes du colloque international de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris, 8–12 juin 1999*, (= Philosophes médiévaux; 44), Louvain/Paris 2003, 5–22; Joachim Gruber: *Kommentar zu Boethius, ‚De consolatione philosophiae'*, (= Texte und Kommentare; 9), Berlin/New York 22006, 275–288.

(3) Cf. Cons. I,4,5. All citations of the Consolatio are from Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica, ed. C. Moreschini, (= Bibliotheca Teubneriana), München/Leipzig 22005. Internal divisions indicate prose passages unless marked by the letter “m” (e.g. III,9,3; III,m9,3). Plato’s *Gorgias* is cited according to the traditional Stephanus numbers.
(4) Cf. (e.g.) Pierre Courcelle: *La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire*, 60–62.
(5) Friedrich Klingner: *De Boethii consolatione philosophiae*, 84–88.

18. Mair, John. 1981. "The Text of the *Opuscola Sacra*." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 206-213. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Today, the Tractates are again generally accepted as Boethian. The turning point was the publication in 1877 of a fragment of Cassiodorus discovered by Alfred Holder in a Reichenau manuscript and edited by Hermann Usener. In this fragment, called the *Anecdoton Holderi*, (2) Cassiodorus remarks that Boethius wrote a book on the Holy Trinity, some chapters on dogma, and a book against Nestorius. (3) This list seemed to accord well with the topics covered by the works themselves. Specifically, the 'book on the Holy Trinity’ corresponded with Tractate I, and that 'against Nestorius’ with Tractate V. The 'chapters on dogma’ were taken as references to Tractates II and III, which deal respectively with the questions whether Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be predicated of God as substances; and how substances can be good simply by existing. The genuineness of Tractate IV, 'On the Catholic faith’, remained in doubt. E. K. Rand wrote a doctoral thesis to disprove its genuineness, (4) hut some years later ‘deemed it expedient to recant' and concluded that the work was after all by Boethius. (5) It now seems clear that it is to this tractate that the term ‘chapters on dogma’ most aptly applies; and it may therefore be reasonable to treat Tractates I, II and III as together constituting the ‘book on the Holy Trinity’. (6)
At all events, even if perhaps not yet irrefragable, (7) the authenticity of the *Opuscula Sacra* seems beyond

reasonable doubt, and is assumed in what follows." (pp. 206-207)

(1) The text of the Tractates, with English translation, is most conveniently available in the Loeb Library revised edition by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass./London, 1973), pp. 1-129. The Latin text in this edition is based upon Rand's collations of all the important manuscripts (Introduction, p. VII), and is substantially the same as that printed in the first Loeb Library edition in 1918. See further below, p.211.

(2) H. Usener, *Anecdoton Holderi, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgothischer Zeit* [Festschrift zur Begrüssung der 32. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner zu Wiesbaden] (Bonn, 1877). The text of the Anecdoton is now conveniently available in Cassiodori. . . Opera I, ed. A. J. Fridh and J. W. Halporn (Turnhout, 1973: CCSL XCVI), pp. V-VI.

(3) Scripsit [Boethius] librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et librum contra Nestorium: op. cit., p.V.

(4) E. K. Rand, 'Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat *de fide catholica*' *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*: Supplement-band XXVI (1901), 401-61.

(5) *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 156-7, 315, η. 28; cf. the Loeb edition (note i above), p. 52, note a, and M. Cappuyns' excellent article, 'Boèce', in DHGE [*Dictionnaire d'Histoire et Géographie Ecclesiastique*] I (Paris, 1937), 358-61; 371-2. Tractate IV is further discussed, and its authenticity affirmed, by Henry Chadwick in JTS [*Journal of Theological Studies*] XXXI (1980), 551-6.

(6) Cappuyns, op. cit., 371.

(7) For the view that excessive reliance may have been placed upon the *Anecdoton Holderi* see H. F. Stewart, *Boethius* (Edinburgh/London, 1891), pp. 11—14. A. Hildebrand, *Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentume* (Regensburg, 1885), pp. 148-314, argued from internal evidence for the authenticity of the Tractates.

19. Malcolm, John. 1986. "Some Consolation for Boethius." *New Scholasticism* no. 60:35-45.
"I should like to address myself to the contention of several contemporary commentators to the effect that there is a critical inconsistency between Boethius's rejection of realism and his own solution to the " problem of universals." I shall propose an interpretation which will charge the time-honored transmitter with terminological laxity rather than basic conceptual confusion.
In his second commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (1) Boethius takes as his starting point Porphyry's question as to whether genera and species are extramental entities (subsistant) or are only concepts or mental entities. On pp. 161-163 he rejects the first option and concludes (p. 163) that the genus, or any other universal (which would, under Porphyry's classification, be a species, differentia, property or accident), cannot be an entity existing in re. A realist theory of universale requires that one and the same thing exist in many at the same time as a whole, but Boethius adduces considerations which, he believes, show this to be impossible. The genus, for example, if present as a whole at the same time in several species, will lose its unity and fail to be as " one over many ." (p. 35)
(1) All references to this work are to *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, ed. Schlepse and Brandt, CSEL, 48 (Vienna, 1900).
20. Marenbon, John. 1982. "Making Sense of the *De Trinitate*: Boethius and Some of His Medieval Interpreters." *Studia Patristica* no. 17:446-452.
21. ———. 1998. "Boethius: From Antiquity to the Middle Ages." In *Routledge History of Philosophy*. *Volume III: Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Marenbon, John, 11-28. New York: Routledge.
"Boethius is a difficult figure to place in the history of philosophy.
Considered just in himself, he clearly belongs to the world of late antiquity. Born in 480, at a time when Italy was ruled by the Ostrogoths under their king, Theoderic, Boethius was adopted into one of the most distinguished patrician

families of Rome and benefited from an education which made him at home not only in classical Latin culture but also in Greek literature and philosophy. Although most historians doubt that Boethius actually went to Alexandria or Athens to study, he certainly knew the work of Greek neoplatonists of the immediate past: Proclus, Porphyry and probably Ammonius. Although a Christian, writing in Latin, he therefore falls into a tradition stretching back directly to Plotinus and, ultimately, to Aristotle and Plato. Yet considered as a late antique philosopher, his importance is limited. Most of Boethius' ideas and arguments derive from his Greek sources; his own contribution lay more in choosing, arranging and presenting views than in original thinking.

By contrast, from the perspective of medieval philosophy, Boethius looms large. Only Aristotle himself, and perhaps Augustine, were more important and wide-ranging in their influence. Besides providing scholars in the Middle Ages with two of their most widely-read textbooks on arithmetic and music,(1) through his translations, commentaries and monographs Boethius provided the basis for medieval logic. His short theological treatises helped to shape the way in which logical and philosophical techniques were used in discussing Christian doctrine.

His *Consolation of Philosophy*, read and studied from the eighth century through to the Renaissance, and translated into almost every medieval vernacular, was a major source for ancient philosophy in the early Middle Ages and its treatment of goodness, free will and eternity continued to influence thirteenth- and fourteenth-century thinkers. In short, it would be hard to understand the development of philosophy in the medieval Latin West without looking carefully at Boethius' work — and it is for this reason that, although he falls outside its chronological limits, a chapter on his work (with glances forward at its medieval influence) begins the present volume." (pp. 11-12)

(1) For these works (and possible works on geometry and astronomy), which fall outside the scope of this discussion,

see Chadwick [1.12] 69–107 and the articles in Gibson [1.16] by Caldwell, Pingree and White.
References
1.12 Chadwick, H. *Boethius: the Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy*, Oxford, 1981.
1.16 Gibson, M. (ed.) *Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence*, Oxford, 1981.

22. ———. 2003. *Boethius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Abbreviations of Boethius's Works XV; 1 Introduction 3; 2 Life, Intellectual Milieu, and Works 7; 3 Boethius's Project: The Logical Translations and Commentaries 17; 4 The Logical Textbooks and Topical Reasoning: Types of Argument 43; 5 The *Opuscula Sacra*: Metaphysics, Theology, and Logical Method 66; 6 The *Consolation*: The Argument of Books I-V.2 96; 7 The *Consolation*, V.3-6: Divine Prescience, Contingency, Eternity 125; 8 Interpreting the *Consolation* 146; 9 Boethius's Influence in the Middle Ages 164; Notes 183; Bibliography 219; Index Locorum 237; General Index 243-252.
"I shall argue that, in his theological treatises (*Opuscula sacra*) and in the *Consolation*, Boethius is an original and important thinker — one who fully deserves to have been treated by medieval readers as a great author. His individual arguments are often far more careful, sophisticated, and, in their own terms, successful than has usually been recognized, although it is certainly true that Boethius often bases himself on ideas taken from others. But Boethius's especial distinction as a thinker lies in how he uses, combines, and comments on philosophical arguments. The *Opuscula* are innovative in their very approach to theology. The *Consolation* is, as its complex literary structure should immediately suggest, a work not just of but about philosophy: a subtle text which can be understood on various levels. The remaining writings — treatises on music and arithmetic, logical translations, commentaries — that make up Boethius's œuvre are not usually innovative, but they are at the least very competent examples of genres where originality was not sought. The logical monographs

offer an insight into two branches of logic, hypothetical syllogistic and the theory of topical inferences, about which there are no other extensive treatises from late antiquity. The logical commentaries are remarkable for the way they continue the project of the first great Neoplatonic logician, Porphyry, rather than follow the more usual approach of Boethius's contemporaries." (pp. 4-5)

23. ———. 2004. "Boethius and the Problem of Paganism." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:329-348. "The "problem of paganism" is my name for the set of questions raised for medieval thinkers and writers, and discussed by some of them (Abelard, Dante, and Langland are eminent examples), by the fact that many people--especially philosophers--from antiquity were, they believed, monotheists, wise and virtuous and yet pagans. This paper argues that Boethius, though a Christian, was himself too much part of the world of classical antiquity to pose the problem of paganism, but that his *Consolation of Philosophy* was an essential element in the way medieval writers saw and resolved this problem. In particular, because it was a text by an author known to be Christian which discusses philosophy without any explicitly Christian references, it opened up the way to treating texts by ancient pagan philosophers as containing hidden Christian doctrine."

24. ———, ed. 2009. *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: List of contributors XI; List of abbreviations of Boethius' works XIV; List of abbreviations XV; John Marenbon: Introduction: Reading Boethius whole 1;
Part I. Before the *Consolation* 11;
1. John Moorhead: Boethius' life and the world of late antique philosophy 13; 2. Sten Ebbesen: The Aristotelian commentator 34; 3. Christopher J. Martin: The logical textbooks and their influence 56; 4. Margaret Cameron: Boethius on utterances, understanding and reality 85; 5. David Bradshaw: The *Opuscula sacra*: Boethius and theology 105; 6. Andrew Arlig: The metaphysics of individuals in the *Opuscula sacra* 129; 7. Christophe

Erismann: The medieval fortunes of the *Opuscula sacra* 155;
Part II The *Consolation* 179;
8. John Magee: The Good and morality: *Consolatio* 2-4 181; 9. Robert Sharples: Fate, prescience and free will 207; 10. Danuta Shanzer: Interpreting the *Consolation* 228; 11. Lodi Nauta: The *Consolation*: the Latin commentary tradition, 800-1700 255; 12. Winthrop Wetherbee: The *Consolation* and medieval literature 279;
Appendix. John Magee and John Marenbon: *Boethius' works* 303; Bibliography: 311; Index: References to Boethius' works 340; General index 343-356.

25. ———. 2013. "Divine Prescience and Contingency in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*." *Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia* no. 1:9-21.
Abstract: "This article discusses Boethius's argument in *Consolation* V.3-6 that divine omniscience of even the future is compatible with some things happening contingently. Section 1 argues that, according to Boethius, the kernel of the problem is not that God's beliefs about the future are true, but that they must be incapable of turning out false – something which seems incompatible with the unfixedness of contingent events. Section 2 looks at the Modes of Cognition Principle (everything that is cognized is cognized, not according to its own power, but rather according to the capacity of those who are cognizing), one of the building blocks of Boethius's solution, and contends that it is far bolder than anything Boethius may have found in his sources, putting forward as it does a limited relativism about knowledge. Section 3 argues that the other important building block, the view that all things, past, present and future, are present to God, should be understood epistemically (he knows them as if they were in his present) rather than metaphysically (God's present is co-extensive with worldly past, present and future)."
26. ———. 2014. "Boethius's Unparadigmatic Originality and its Implications for Medieval Philosophy." In *Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought*, edited by Böhm,

Thomas, Jürgasch, Thomas and Kirchner, Andreas, 231-244. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The title of this article needs an apology and an explanation. Not only is it unwieldy.
It also presents itself as a discordant rejection of the line of thinking about Boethius on which this volume, and the conference which gave rise to it, are based. But 'paradigm' is, in my view, a strange word to use in connection with Boethius. Rather than acting as a paradigm, he is a writer who seems to resist being fitted into any of the apparently appropriate existing paradigms. This exceptionality emerges even when trying to answer some of the simplest questions about him. Was he a Church Father (like, for instance, Jerome or Gregory of Nyssa) or an ancient philosopher (like his near contemporary Ammonius)? The answer is obviously neither — and both. Does he belong to the Middle Ages — his birth coincided with the deposition of the last Western Roman Emperor — or to antiquity, with which his cultural ties were so much closer than those of Augustine, a century earlier? Again, it would be wrong to choose either alternative, and the same would be true even if it were asked, simply, whether he fits best into Greek or into Latin culture." (p. 231)

27. Marshall, David J. 2002. "The Argument of *De hebdomadibus*." In *Die Normativität des Wirklichen*, edited by Buchheim, Thomas, Schönberger, Rolf and Schweidler, Walter, 35-73. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
28. Marshall, Mary Hatch. 1950. "Boethius' Definition of Persona and Mediaeval Understanding of the Roman Theater." *Speculum* no. 25:471-482.
"In this paper, I wish to draw attention to a rather explicit source of information on ancient representation of formal comedy and tragedy, widely known in the Middle Ages, which has hitherto been ignored in histories of mediaeval drama — Boethius' definition of *persona* in his fifth theological tract, *De Duabus Naturis et Una Persona Jesu Christi, contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, c.3. Cloetta mentioned the passage, but only to show that Boethius himself knew the old dramas, since he alluded familiarly to

rôles in plays by Euripides and Seneca, Plautus and Terence. (10) This tract, longest and most interesting of Boethius' *Opuscula Sacra*, was of fundamental importance to post-Augustinian conceptions of the Trinity; and the definition of *persona*, widely accepted but often contested or modified, was a crux of the Trinitarian controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. (11)

One conservative monk of the eleventh century, Otloh of St Emmeram, in the preface of his *Dialogus de Tribus Quaestionibus* objected vehemently to dialecticians who put more credence in Boethius than in Holy Scriptures for some things, and who reproved him if he used *persona* in any but the Boethian theological sense. (12) Although criticized by conservatives, Boethius' theological authority was second only to Augustine's in the early scholastic period. Because Boethius' definition of the important theological concept of 'person' refers to the ancient theatrical masks called *personae* and their uses, many men of learning with theological interests incidentally derived from it a reasonable idea of the representation of Roman plays by masked actors using voice and gesture. In the evidence to be presented here from Boethius and his mediaeval commentators and interpreters, it is clear that some understanding of the Roman theater was a great deal more common than we have thought, particularly in the twelfth century in France." (p. 472)

(10) W. Cloetta, *Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (2 vols. in one, Halle, 1890-1892), I: *Komodie und Tragodie im Mittelalter*, 16-17.

(11) On the concept of *persona* in Boethius and in the Middle Ages, see A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, VII (Paris, 1922), cols. 369-437, s.v. *Hypostase* (A. Michel); M. Buchberger, *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (Freiburg i/B., 1936), cols. 97-98, s.v. *Person* (A. Stohr); M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, (2 vols., Freiburg i/B., 1909-1911), I, 173-175; K. Bruder, *Die philosophischen Elemente in den Opuscula Sacra des Boethius* (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 64, 67-72; J. de Ghellinck, 'L'Histoire de " persona" et d' " hypostasis"

dans un ecrit anonyme porretain du xiie siècle,' in *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie*, xxxvi (1934), Hommage à M. deWulf, pp. 111-127; M.Bergeron, 'La Structure du concept latin de personne . . . :Commentaire historique de Ia Pars, q. 29, a.4,' in *Etudes d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIIIe siècle* (Ottawa, 1932), pp. 121-161. The major recent semantic study is by H. Rheinfelder, *Das Wort " Persona" ; Geschichte seiner Bedeutungen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des franzosischen und italienischen Mittelalters* (*Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fur romanische Philologie*, LXXVII, Halle, 1928). I owe this reference to the kindness of Professor Robert J. Menner. See also the historical discussion by Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1937), pp. 25-36.
(12) Migne, *PL*, CXLVI, col. 60. B. Smalley, *The History of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1941), p. 30.

29. McInerny, Ralph. 1990. *Boethius and Aquinas*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
Contents: Preface IX-XIV; Introduction: Two Italian Scholars 1; Part One. The Art of the Commentary. 1. Commenting on Aristotle 33; 2. *Altissimum negotium*: Universals 61; Parto Two: *De trinitate*. 3. Thomas Comments on Boethius 97; 4. *Tres speculativae partes* 121; 5. Metaphysics and Existence 148; Part Three. *De hebdomadibus*. 6. Survey of Interpretations 161; 7. The Exposition of St. Thomas 199; 8. More on the Good 232; Epilogue: *Sine Thoma Boethius Mutus Esset* 249; Appendix: Chronologies of Boethius and St. Thomas 255; Bibliography 259; Index 265-268.
"This volume has been a long time emerging from well over a decade of research aimed at writing "a book about Boethius," a project I had the temerity to announce in an article devoted to Boethius and Saint Thomas which appeared in the 1974 commemorative volume of *Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica*. Originally I thought of presenting the thought of Boethius in all its scope to English readers, by which I mean of course readers of English. J. K. Sikes's book on Abelard and Gilson's on Augustine and Scotus

suggested models of what I might do. A chapter on Boethius in Volume 2 of the *History of Western Philosophy* I undertook with my late colleague A. Robert Caponigri was the first fruits of my labors. The work I wrote on Thomas for the Twayne series on world authors dwelt on the role Boethius had played in the formation of Thomas's thought. And various papers, notably several read at the spring gatherings of medievalists in Kalamazoo at Western Michigan University, formed if only in my own mind pieces of the larger thing.
By 1974, I had made enough progress to permit me to refer in a footnote to a "work in progress, devoted to the thought of Boethius in its full scope." However, that same year appeared the imposing two volumes of Luca Obertello's *Severino Boezio*. Boethian studies would never be the same again. Here was a massive survey of the Boethian corpus along with the secondary literature on it accompanied by a full volume of bibliography. I will not say that my thunder had been stolen, since that would suggest that I could, then or now, achieve what Obertello had. But I did feel a bit deflated. My hopes began to revive when I considered that there are many who do not read Italian. And, after all, the book I planned was not at all like the one Obertello had written. And then in 1981 came the publication of Henry Chadwick's masterful book on Boethius.
Chadwick's book did, so much better than I ever could, what I had dreamt of doing that it forced a rethinking of my whole project. I leafed through the chapters I had written on Boethius's Quadrivial Pursuits and acknowledged that the world would not be a poorer place if they were never published. But it was not until 1985, after I resigned as Director of the Medieval Institute, that I saw my way clear. The book I would write would be a focused monograph on the relation between Boethius and Thomas Aquinas." (pp. XII-XIII).

30. McKinlay, Arthur Patch. 1907. "Stylistic tests and the chronology of the works of Boethius." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 18:123-156.

"Whoever undertakes to treat of Boethius finds himself in illustrious company. Potentates, churchmen, scholastics, and philosophers have busied themselves with this " last of the Romans."
It would appear that but little remains to be said on such a well worn subject. Much less does it seem fitting in a beginner to essay that little. Yet, as the recent researches of Usener and Brandt and the acute suggestions of Rand have marked an epoch in *Boethiana*, one may hope to gain still further insight into the character and mode of thought of the author of the *Consolatio*. With this purpose in view, by the help of the so-called stylistic method, I intend to examine the writings of Boethius, in case it may be possible more accurately to place works the dates of which are not yet certain. To be explicit, I hope to show that the *De Arithmetica* and the *De Musica* should be placed neither first nor together; more definitely to place certain other works; to throw light on the authenticity of the D *e Geometria* and the *De Fide Catholica*, and incidentally to test the value of the so-called stylistic method in determining the relative chronology of an author's writings. For a definition of the meaning of stylistic method, and an illustration of its application, I may refer to the well-known work of Lutoslawski, entitled *The origin and growth of Plato' s logic with an account of Plato's style and of the chronology of his writings*, 1897." (p. 123)
(...)
"In the beginning of my paper I implied that any such study as I have undertaken, to be of value, must serve to give us a deeper insight into the character of our author. What have the present results contributed to this end? One thing at least. If the *De Arithmetica* and *De Musica* were not written first of Boethius's works nor together, we must place a new estimate on our author's temperament and habits." (pp. 154-155)
(...)
"For all must concede that before he had carried out his plan of translating and perhaps of commenting on all the works of Aristotle and Plato, he had begun to work on Cicero. In

the same way, he may have undertaken the *De Musica* as a parergon." (p. 156)

31. McMahon, Robert. 1995. "The structural articulation of Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*." *Medievalia et Humanistica* no. 21:55-72.
32. Mezel, Balasz M. 2009. "Boethius and the Unity of Human Persons." In *Europäische Menschenbilder*, edited by Gerl-Falkovitz, Hanna-Barbara, Gottlober, Susan, Kaufmann, René and Sepp, Hans Rainer, 277-286. Dresden: Thelem.
33. Micaelli, Claudio. 2004. "Boethian Reflections on God: Between Logic and Metaphysics." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:181-202.
"This paper systematically reconstructs Boethius's reflections on God, attempting to find the common element to which all of the variations in these reflections can be retraced. This common element is constituted by the continuous tension between kataphatic and apophatic theology. Boethius apparently both kataphatically defines God in his logical works, and maintains that God can only be defined apophatically in his theological works. This tension can, at times, cause some incoherence as one moves from one level of discourse to another: that is, from the logico-linguistic to the metaphysical-ontological level of discourse. Boethius's thought manifests this incoherence. This incoherence is in part common to Neoplatonic thought and its sources, but would also seem to be dictated by the nature of the very operation of reflecting upon God."
34. Mignucci, Mario. 1989. "Truth and Modality in Late Antiquity: Boethius on future Contingent Propositions." In *Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Le teorie della modalità*, edited by Corsi, Giovanna, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 47-78. Bologna: CLUEB.
"As is well known, Aristotle's analysis of future contingents in *De interpretatione,* Chapter 9 has generated since ancient times a lot of discussion (1), which ranges from the interpretation of his own words to the philosophical meaning and adequacy of the solution proposed by him. Unfortunately, the former question is entailed by the latter and there is no agreement between scholars about the kind

of answer that Aristotle gives to the question of determinism, despite the astonishing quantity of works dedicated to it. I would by no way like to be involved in the problem of Aristotle's interpretation. My task here is to illustrate the meaning and relevance of Boethius' analysis of future contingents, and I will consider his commentary on the *De interpretatione* for its own sake. In other words, I do not feel myself committed to evaluate the adequacy of Boethius' proposal with respect to Aristotle, even if, of course, he believed that his interpretation was faithful to the pages of the *De interpretatione*. Nor will I try to compare Boethius' solution with other solutions which have been proposed by ancient and modern interpreters who have tried to explain Aristotle's text. I will just consider one view different from that of Boethius, because Boethius himself discusses it, and his discussion is relevant to the understanding of his position." (p. 47)
(1) A bibliographical survey of the relevant books and papers until the year 1973 can be found in V. Celluprica, *II capitolo 9 del De interpretatione di Aristotele. Rassegna di studi: 1930-1973,* Bologna 1977. Further references are in D. Frede, "The-Sea Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,* 3 (1985), pp. 84-87 and J. Talanga, *Zukunftsurteile und Fatum. Eine Untersuchung Über Aristoteles' De interpretatione 9 und Ciceros De fato mit einem Überblick Ober die spãtantiken Reimarmene-Lehre,* Bonn 1986, pp. 169-185. The recent article of C. Kirwan, "Aristotle on the Necessity of the Present", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,* 4 (1986), pp. 167-187 must be added.

35. Moreschini, Claudio. 2014. *A Christian in Toga. Boethius: Interpreter of Antiquity and Christian Theologian*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
Contents: Foreword 7; 1. Boethius' great cultural project 9; 2. Philosophy and Theology in Boethius' *Opuscula Theologica* 35; 3. The *Consolatio Philosophiae* 92; 4. 4. Boethius' Christianity 132; Bibliography 145; Selected Sources 145; Works Cited 146; Index nominum 153-155.

"The core of this book has its origin in the lectures I delivered at the University of Bremen in October 2011 during the annual graduate seminar " Christentum als antike Religion" organized by Christoph Auffarth, Marvin Doebler, and Hinca Tanaseanu-Doebler.
(...)
As it may be inferred from it, this book is neither an introduction, nor a general study on Boethius, but is meant to investigate the question of Boethius' Christianity, secular and at the same time theologically profound. Secular, because Boethius was a layman, who did not belong to the Church, and because he used almost exclusively the heritage of Greek (and partly Latin) Neo-Platonism together with those rational tools typical of a philosophical system. On the other hand, he was thoroughly interested in the issues of contemporary Christianity, starting from Augustine, whose legacy is perceivable even when not overtly mentioned. " The last of the Romans" (as Martin Grabman called Boethius, a designation that has generally become accepted) was therefore able to produce a synthesis, the validity of which was acknowledged throughout the Middle Ages until the rediscovery of Aristotle." (p. 7)

36. ———. 2014. "Subsistentia according to Boethius." In *Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought*, edited by Kirchner, Andreas, Jürgasch, Thomas and Böhm, Thomas, 83-99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* (CEN), as is well known, Boethius offers a definition of persona and hypostasis. This definition is influenced by the dispute between the Western Christian tradition, which since Tertullian and the Arian debate normally employed *persona* for the persons of the Trinity, and the Greek tradition which used 'hypostasis'. The debate was provoked by a misunderstanding, which is testified, for instance, by Gregory of Nazianzus (*On The Great Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria* 21, 35, delivered on 379 AD):
„We use in an orthodox sense the terms one Essence and three Hypostases, the one to denote the nature of the Godhead, the other the properties (ἰδιότητες) of the Three;

the Italians (1) mean the same, but, owing to the scantiness of their vocabulary, and its poverty of terms, they are unable to distinguish between Essence and Hypostases, and therefore introduce the term Persons, to avoid being understood to assert three Essences. The result, were it not piteous, would be laughable. This slight difference of sound was taken to indicate a difference of faith. Then, Sabellianism was suspected in the doctrine of Three Persons, Arianism in that of Three Hypostases, both being the offspring of a contentious spirit.“ (2)
This was a momentous dispute between Oriental and Western Christianity. Boethius, thanks to his philosophical education, perceived much more than other Christian writers in the West the imprecision of the word persona: in CEN, since he is discussing the nestorian and Monophysitic Christology, he is compelled (so to say) by the Western tradition to employ persona, but he considers ‘hypostasis’ much more exact.
Introducing, therefore, persona in philosophical or theological vocabulary is, in his opinion, not without inconveniences, which he tries to avoid. Yet just for these reasons he has to face other difficulties." (p. 83)
(1) That is, the Western theologians when discussing Trinitarian problems.
(2) *A Select Library of the Christian Church. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2. series: vol. 7: Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzen, ed. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Peabody 1894, 279.

37. Nash-Marshall, Siobhan. 2000. *Participation and the Good. A Study in Boethian Metaphysics*. New York: Crossroad. Contents: Foreword IX; Preface XIII-XIV; Part One: The Boethian Doctrine of Participation: The Problem 1; 1. Participation in the *Quomodo Substantiae* 5; 2. Participation in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* 10; 3. A Survey of Possible Methodologies 18; 4. The Direct Theoretical Approach: The Good 31; Part Two: The Good 39; 5. The Definitions of the Good 41; 6. The Two Definitions of the Good and Their Paradoxes 69; 7. The Foundations of a Solution 73; 8. The Elements of a Solution 98; 9. Outline of

the Solution 108; 10. Conclusion 114; Part Three: Boethius and the Good: The *Quomodo Substantiae* and *Consolatio Philosophiae* 117; 11. The *Exitus*: The *Quomodo Substantiae* 119; 12. The *Consolatio Philosophiae* 186; Part Four: Participation 223; 13. The *Quomodo Substantiae* 225; 14. The *Consolatio Philosophiae* 274; Part Five: Conclusion 291; Bibliography 299; Index 305-306.

"What Siobhan Nash-Marshall offers in this volume is a study in Hoethian metaphysics by focusing on participation and the good. Neither doctrine is unambiguous in the texts of Boethius — in fact, the prima facie claims seem contradictory and relatively obvious problems appear to go unresolved. Boethius never explicitly employs any of his axioms (let alone those that mention participation) in his explanation, of the ontological goodness of composite beings. Yet, he envisions participation as crucial for the resolution of the problem of how things can be good by virtue of their essences without thereby being substantial goodness (that is, God). The variety of definitions offered for the good in the Consolation of Philosophy sometimes invoke the notion of participation, for instance, in the claim that the human good re-stiles in one's participation in the prime good, and yet the inclusion of such language seems directly at odds with other definitions, including the notion that the human good consists in the self-possession of one's own being, for this cannot involve participation in anything other than one's own nature.

By engaging in the thoughtful reconstruction of both of these key Boethian doctrines — participation and the good — Nash-Marshall proposes a credible and sustained case for better understanding the inner logic of Boethius. But in doing so she also offers an exceptional insight into the very problems that drew Boethius to begin to articulate his own views — whether so tersely in the succinct deductions of the Quomodo or so tantalizingly unreconciled a set of affirmations that undergird the conversations of the Consolation.

Central to her re-thinking of the issues is the assumption of the dialectic of exitus and reditus that Neoplatonists are

always traversing, but to which they consciously advert as seldom as travelers do to the road itself when their minds are fixed on getting to their destination or getting back home. Yet, this simple distinction enables both the philosopher and the historian of philosophy to make better sense of the fragmentary comments in Boethius's texts about participation. From this distinction too one gains a stance by which to reconcile the apparently contradictory claims Boethius makes about the substantive and teleological definitions of the good for composite beings. On the basis of the difference between exitus and reditus, Boethius needs to assign analogous meanings to participation which in turn help us to grasp why composite beings must already be good in their essence and yet still need to acquire the perfections appropriate to their existence by their participation in God and in their own essences.

To grasp the inner logic of Boethius's reasoning on these issues entails a readiness to complete the articulation of a synthesis Boethius envisioned but was unable to provide. While some scholars have thought the project impossible, Nash-Marshall ventures a thoughtful reconstruction of the connections intrinsic to his positions." (from the *Foreword* by Joseph W. Koterski, pp. Xi-XII)

38. ———. 2004. "God, Simplicity, and the *Consolatio Philosophiae*." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 78:225-246.

"One of the primary concerns of the *Consolatio* is to draw out many of the paradoxical conclusions concerning the relation between creation and God that stem from the premises of classical creationist metaphysics, and attempt to solve them. Once one accepts that God does exist, is omnipotent, omniscient, and simple, it becomes viciously difficult to explain: (1) how anything contrary to God's will--evil--can exist; (2) how any cause can act independently of God's will--human freedom; and (3) how "independent causes" can relate to God through their own agency--human prayer. This naturally begs the question: why should we accept the premises of classical creationist metaphysics?

This paper addresses this question by analyzing and defending two of the central premises of Boethius's version of classical creationist metaphysics as they are addressed in Consolatio 3,10: (a) that God exists, and (b) that God is simple."

39. ———. 2008. "Boethius, Scholarship, and the *Hebdomadibus*'s Axioms." *Carmina Philosophiae* no. 17:1-34.
40. ———. 2012. "Boethius's Influence on Theology and Metaphysics to c. 1500." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 163-191. Leiden: Brill.
"My two general points here are meant not just to give an account of the current state of Boethian affairs. They are also a caveat of sorts: no article written at the present time can hope to give an exhaustive overview of Boethius's influence on medieval metaphysical and theological thought. There is simply too much basic work left to be done to hope for a comprehensive overview. (22) It is also true that Boethius's influence on medieval thought is so pervasive that no article would begin to do it justice.
In what follows, I will attempt merely to sketch a partial picture of that influence, based both on current manuscript work and, above all, on an impartial recognition of Boethius's originality as a thinker. The sketch will be divided into two primary parts. In the first part, it will outline and broadly discuss the characteristics of Boethius's thought and their significance with respect to the development of medieval thought. In the second, it will briefly present the history of the process through which medievals came to appropriate Boethian texts and thought. The second part will itself be divided into two sections, which will deal with the logical and the "theological" texts respectively." (p. 171)
(22) This is one of Troncarelli's complaints with respect to the status of studies of medieval manuscripts of the *Consolatio*. See, on this point, Fabio Troncarelli, *Cogitatio Mentis. L'eredità di Boezio nell'alto Medioevo* (Naples, 2005), p. 9: "Se esaminiamo, ad esempio, le edizioni critiche

della *Consolatio*, ci rendiamo conto che un uso poco coerente dei manoscritti ha generato una condizione di confusione, in conseguenza della quale è assai difficile stabilire se alcune questioni siano irrisolvibili o, piuttosto, non siano state ancora risolte"... (If, for example, we examine the critical editions of the *Consolatio*, we will realize that the hardly coherent use of the manuscripts has generated a condition of confusion, the consequence of which mas made it very difficult to establish if certain questions are unrcsolvablc, or, on the other hand, have as yet to be resolved.. .]

41. Obertello, Luca. 1981. "Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius on Divine Knowledge." *Dionysius* no. 5:127-164.
"Whoever undertakes to treat of Boethius finds himself in illustrious company. Potentates, churchmen, scholastics, and philosophers have busied themselves with this " last of the Romans."
It would appear that but little remains to be said on such a well worn subject. Much less does it seem fitting in a beginner to essay that little. Yet, as the recent researches of Usener and Brandt and the acute suggestions of Rand have marked an epoch in Boethiana, one may hope to gain still further insight into the character and mode of thought of the author of the Consolatio. With this purpose in view, by the help of the so-called stylistic method, I intend to examine the writings of Boethius, in case it may be possible more accurately to place works the dates of which are not yet certain."
(...)
"For a definition of the meaning of stylistic method, and an illustration of its application, I may refer to the well-known work of Lutoslawski, entitled *The origin and growth of Plato' s logic with an account of Plato's style and of the chronology of his writings*, 1897." (p. 127)
(...)
"Bearing in mind the foregoing facts, we are now ready to take up our chronological study of the writings of Boethius. Any such research must be based on the painstaking and masterly investigation (1) of Samuel Brandt. Utilizing all the

references made by Boethius to his own writings, he has fixed beyond all question the chronology of most of the works.
He has made out an almost complete framework, leaving now and then a gap of more or less uncertainty which, I hope, may be at least partly supplied by my investigations." (p. 130)
(...)
"Having thus traversed the whole series of Boethius's extant writings, I may briefly recapitulate the results of this examination. The so-called stylistic method is a recognized form of investigation, applied notably in the case of Plato. In any stylistic study of Boethius two traits must be taken into account. There is, first, the influence of translation on his style. Translation tends to explain new phenomena in style. It tends to unification of vocabulary. Its influence is more transient than one might anticipate. The second trait is Boethius's marked desire for variety.
Bearing these influences in mind and basing my study on Professor Brandt's researches as a framework, I have shown that works of a given period agree and works of a different period disagree. Then I classified them stylistically, giving up Professor Brandt's classification, based on subject matter. I have shown that my criteria fit in exactly with all the arguments, inductive and deductive, that Professor Brandt has formulated." (p. 153)
(1) [Samuel Brandt,] 'Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius', *Philologus*, LXII, [1903] pp. 141-154; 234-279. See also his edition of the Commentaries of Boethius on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, 1906, pp. XXVI ff., LXXIX ff., and cf. below, p. 155.

42. O'Daly, Gerard. 1991. *The Poetry of Boethius*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
"To label the poetry of the *Consolation* 'didactic' is too simplistic a response to its many functions, unless we are aware of the importance and value of moral and metaphysical reflection and instruction in Greek and Roman cultural life, and in literature as well as philosophy. This book has explored several of the traditions of which the

Consolation is a beneficiary, and to which it contributes. It has attempted to show that a responsive reading of Boethius' work depends upon a realization of the many kinds of allusiveness in that work. Virgil, Ovid, and Senecan tragedy, no less than Plato and the Neoplatonists, Cicero's philosophical writings, and Epictetus, form the imaginative and intellectual world of the *Consolation*. In this world the art of poetry has its privileged place. We cannot know what sense Boethius may have had of writing at the end of a long tradition: it is unlikely that he saw with the clarity which historical hindsight has given us that he was, in Gibbon's words, 'the last of the Romans whom Cato or Tully could have acknowledged for their countryman'. The *Consolation of Philosophy* has often been regarded as the final chapter of ancient philosophy. This book has endeavoured to show that its cultural importance is much wider: when Boethius sought consolation in his captivity, he was also consoled by the idioms and images of Latin poetry, and his own poetry is a late and subtle flowering of that art form." (pp. 236-237)

43. Patch, Howard Rollin. 1929. "Fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonists." *Speculum* no. 4:62-72.
"The great figure of the orb of destiny in the Fourth Book of the *Consolatio Philosophiae* is the means used by Boethius to present his unusual conception of a mutable Fate. The stability of the centre is occupied by Providence; all else controlled by the turning sphere is subject to Fate, who, however, by this very fact is also subservient to God. The whole idea, justly famous and well known to later writers, immediately suggested to many the corresponding idea that Fate's more customarily fickle sister, Fortune, is also subject to God, and thus helped to give us the Christian conception of Fortune.' Brief study will show, nevertheless, that the mutability of Fate is probably not original with Boethius; and the whole passage has been traced, with apparent satisfaction among scholars, to the works of Proclus. It is my intention here to offer a different explanation, and to suggest that more important problems are involved than have so far been appreciated." (p. 62)

44. ———. 1935. *The Tradition of Boethius. A Study of His Importance in Medieval Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
45. ———. 1935. "Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists." *Speculum* no. 10:393-404.
" Necessity, one had always supposed, admits of no conditions. Release for man in this fashion is startling, and at first sight the solution may appear like a verbal device to escape from a logical dilemma. But it has a more dignified basis in reasoning than that. As a brief review of its history will show, Boethius did not invent the conception. His originality consisted rather in the way in which he adapted it to his purpose.
A study of the force of necessity in the scheme of things, as he saw it, will show that in his references to the frame of nature and the power of fate he is loyal to most of its implications and shows no willingness to ignore them. (3) For his sufferings in prison the idea would have afforded him a natural consolation. But his courage was too great and his moral integrity too vigorous to let the question rest there, and he pressed his search further until he found justification for a belief in some degree of human freedom although that also implies moral responsibility. In fact he obviously strove to justify such responsibility together with its appropriate reward of pleasure or pain. In his debate he was guided partly by the treatise De Prouidentia et Fato of Proclus; I have elsewhere pointed out hints for the plan of his discussion that were available to him there.1 But he added material from other sources, and Proclus did not give him his present solution. The process by which his theory of conditional necessity was first thought of and then elaborated may be possible to discover. In following something of the distinguished history of the phrase we may actually have the opportunity of seeing Boethius at work, and, although the centuries that intervene since his day must make anyone cautious about jumping at conclusions, some light may be thrown on his method in composing the book." (pp. 393-394)

(3) Cf. *Contra Eutychen et Nest*., i, 45 ff. (Boethius, etc. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, London, 1918, Loeb Libr., p. 80), and *Cons. Philos*., v, pr. iii.

46. Pessin, Sarah. 1999. "Hebdomads: Boethius Meets the Neopythagoreans." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 37:29-48.
"The thesis of this article si three-fold. First, I suggest, uncontroversially, that Boethius was in many ways influenced by Neopythagorean ideas. Second, I recommend that in light of our appreciation of his Neopythagorean inclinations in at least some of his writings, we understand his esoteric reference to the " hebdomads" — at the outset of his treatise often called by that name — as a reference to something Neopythagorean. This I suggest in light of the fact that, as I will discuss, the " hebdomad" plays an important role within the Neopythagorean literature of Nicomachus of Gerasa, an author with whose writings Boethius was intimately familiar. Lastly, I suggest— following Dillon's analysis of the Triad and the Hebdomad within Nicomachus' works [*] — an interpretation of the 'hebdomad' within the Neopythagorean corpus which, if correct, would make appropriate Boethius' reference to it at the outset of a treatise on the nature of God and creation." (p. 29)
[* John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (New York: Cornell, 1977).]

47. ———. 2001. "Boethius and the Neoplatonic Good: Hebdomads and the Nature of God in the *Quomodo Substantiae*." *Carmina Philosophiae* no. 10:57-72.

48. Rand, Edward Kennard. 1904. "On the Composition of Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 15:1-28.
"Hermann Usener whose justly admired interpretation of the *Anecdoton Holderi* (*) has done more than any single publication toward restoring Boethius to his rightful place among the Christian theologians, suggests in this work a theory with regard to the composition of the *Consolatio*, to which nobody hitherto has devoted the consideration it deserves." (p. 1)

(...)
"The object of the present paper is not to attempt an ultimate determination of the various writings from which Boethius drew inspiration, but merely, as a precursor to such a study, to discuss Usener's theory regarding the composition of the *Consolatio*, Naturally we may best approach our subject by examining in turn the four elements into which Usener analyzes this work— the poetry, the prose introduction, the chapters from Aristotle's *Protreptikos*, and the Neoplatonic section." (pp. 3-4)
(...)
"The *Consolatio* does not, like the *Opuscula Sacra*, deal directly with problems of Christian theology, but it is the work of a Christian theologian who holds fast the distinction between *fides* and *ratio*. There are naturally no traces of Christian doctrine in the *Consolatio*, for the reason that Philosophy speaks and not Faith. Boethius is trying by the unaided effort of the reason to establish a theodicy for which revelation has its own proofs, and for this reason, inevitably, recurs to the utterances of the schools and not the councils. But, be it noted, the solution at which he arrives, though expressed consistently in terms of Philosophy, is at one with the conclusion of Theology: reason could not prove something contradictory of faith. (1) Sometimes we meet a doctrine that would not have
been accredited by St. Thomas (that of the world's perpetuity, for instance), because it had not been definitely excluded from orthodoxy when Boethius wrote. (2) Sometimes Boethius includes what would doubtless have been dangerous in contemporary theology, as, for instance, the Neoplatonic imagery in 5, pr. 2. But these are matters of detail. The general scheme of the *Consolatio* is in harmony with Christian theology.
Nor need we ponder why Boethius chose a philosophical rather than a theological consolation in his last hours. Schrockh remarks, (3) " Unwiirdig waren sie (i. e. philosophische Trostgriinde) doch eines christlichen Gelehrten nicht. Es sind sehr nahe mit seiner Religion verwandte Grtinde; es ist der letzte und edelste Erfolg seiner

vieljahrigen philosophischen Untersuchungen.” The fundamental aim of the work is to make the language of philosophy approach as closely as possible to the meaning of faith; for Boethius was neither a Pagan, nor a cold eclectic, nor a dilettante reviser of others’ texts, but the first of the scholastics." (pp. 27-28)
(*) *Anecdoton Holderi, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgothischer Zeit*, Bonn (Leipzig, Teubner), 1877 [A new edition of this text is available: Alain Galonnier, ' *Anecdoton Holderi* ou *Ordo generis Cassiodororum*, Introduction, édition, traduction et commentaire', *Antiquité tardive*, 4, 1996, pp. 299-312.]
(1) This point is clearly expressed in an admirable discussion of this matter by Schrockh, *Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, 1792, Theil 16, p. 99 ff., a work quoted by Nitzsch, *Das System des Boethius*, Berlin, i860, p. 33, and Dräseke, ['Ueber die theologischen Schriften des Boethius',] *Jahrbuch für Protestantische Theologie*, XII, 1886, p. 327, and deserving still wider recognition by students of Boethius.
(2) See *Jahrbuch für Protestantische Theologie, Supplement*. XXVI, p. 427.
(3) Op. cit., p. 118.

49. ———. 1928. *Founders of the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reprinted New York: Dover Piblications, 1957; see Chapter 5, pp. 135-180.
50. Reiss, Edmund. 1982. *Boethius*. Boston: Twayne.
51. Relihan, Joel C. 2007. *The Prisoner's Philosophy. Life and Death in Boethius's "Consolation"*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Preface IX; Texts, Translations, Terminology, *Dramatis Personae* XIII; Chapter One. The Ironic *Consolation* and Its Reception 1; Chapter Two. Two Digressions and a Pointed Conclusion 15; Chapter Three. Universality and Particularity 34; Chapter Four. *Consolation* and the Genre of Consolation 47; Chapter Five. Death and Meditation 59; Chapter Six. The Odyssey of *Consolation* 75; Chapter Seven. Models and Rewritings 93; Chapter Eight. The Menippcan Boethius in

the Personification Allegories of the Middle Ages, bv William E. Heise 111; Chapter Nine. The Wisdom of Boethius 127; Appendix I. Latin Texts: *Consolation 4.1; 5.1; 5.6.44-48* 137; Appendix 2. Boethius, *In de interpretatione2 3.9, 221.27-227.12 Meiser* 141; Appendix 3. Maximian, *Elegy 3* 147; Appendix 4.
Agathias Scholasticus, *Greek Anthology. 11.354* 155; Notes 158; References 206; Index 217.
"Both response and resistance to a dozen years of scholarly activity have proved fruitful. A number of works appeared immediately after the publication of *Ancient Menippean Satire* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993]"
(...)
"Classicists and medievalists may be surprised to discover how popular the term Menippean satire has become in discussions of modern literature, and how many works have been claimed to fall under its influence, among them Tristram Shandy, Moby Dick, and Gravity's Rainbow. Such contemporary critical approaches to the genre offer welcome insight into the intellectual enterprise of *Consolation*, but Boethius rarely finds a place in them."
(...)
"Granted, *Consolation* is awkwardly poised between the usual traditions and divisions of Western literature, but the fundamental problem is the general lack of recognition that *Consolation* is critical of the intellectual synthesis that it both presents and undermines, that it is both philosophical and ironic. I wish to place *Consolation* in the genre's vital center, which I understand more in terms of the parody of encyclopedic knowledge than in the exaltation of polyphony; my debts to Northrop Frye's anatomy are ultimately greater than those to Bakhtin. The questions that need to be raised and answered about *Consolation* have to do with plot and intertextuality, with irony and the presentation of wisdom, with literary history and a many-branched reception. Modernists must be called to take Boethius into account; classicists must be urged not to allow their knowledge of late antiquity and its philosophical and religious traditions to determine the interpretation of the text, but to let an

understanding of the Menippean Consolation modify their understanding of late antique culture."
(...)
"I used to rake the Christian presence in *Consolation* more as a latent thing, as the path not taken, as the wav out of Philosophy's labyrinth that is hinted at but never achieved. But, emboldened by the work of others, I now see it much more actively at work—the prayer advocated at the end is not the philosophical path to God that Philosophy had earlier intended the prisoner to travel, but a different, Christian path that the prisoner chooses, offered grudgingly by a Philosophy forced to admit that her intended approach docs not quite satisfy or console this particular patient, a Philosophy who wanted to lead but who ultimately only can point him to his true home. Boethius is truer to Plato by not being as optimistic as Augustine: there is no logical path, and certainly no trivial or quadrivial path, that leads from the world of human logic and perception to the divine realm. What is most remarkable about *Consolation*, in its relation to Platonic and Christian worlds, is that the author tries so hard to resist apocalypse, and that the narrator is neither an Er nor a Scipio nor a St. John nor a Plotinus. After all of its intellectual heavy weather, *Consolation* is about humble access to God through prayer, not revelation." (from the *Preface*, IX-XI).

52. Rogers, Katherin. 2011. "Defending Boethius: Two Case Studies in Charitable Interpretation." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 51:241-257.
Abstract: "Among those who study medieval philosophy there is a divide between historians and philosophers. Sometimes the historians chide the philosophers for failing to appreciate the historical factors at work in understanding a text, a philosopher, a school, or a system. But sometimes the philosopher may justly criticize the historian for failing to engage the past philosopher adequately as a philosopher. Here I defend a philosophically charitable methodology and offer two examples, taken from John Marenbon's book Boethius, as instances where exercising more philosophical charity would likely have resulted in more adequate or

complete interpretations. The examples are taken from Marenbon's analyses of the conclusion of Boethius's discussion of freedom and divine foreknowledge and of Boethius's argument against Euthyche's understanding of the Incarnation."

53. Scarry, Elaine. 1980. "The Well-Rounded Sphere: The Metaphysical Structure of *The Consolation of Philosophy*." In *Essays in the Numerical Criticism of Medieval Literature*, edited by Echardt, Caroline D., 91-140. Lewisburg: Bucnell University Press.
"The specific aesthetic structure of the *Consolation* has until recently been ignored. Earlier commentary on its structure tended to stress the generic influence of such classical forms as "consolation literature" (Cicero, Seneca), "incentives to philosophy" (Aristotle, Cicero), and "Menippean satire." Emphasis on these genres has inevitably carried with it the implication that a hard center of thought and feeling must be made palatable by presentation in a leisurely style. Even E. K. Rand's admiring consideration of the *Consolation* occasionally threatens to slip into the diminutive: "To vary the presentation, to break the flow of dialogue, a number of little poems are interspersed —thirty-nine in all—which now sum up the argument of the preceding prose section, and now themselves carry it on."(1) While the leisurely element of the work should be recognized, the words of Boethius in *Quomodo Substantia* should be remembered: "[I] would rather bury my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is made amusing." The "leisure" of the *Consolation* might be more accurately described as the grace with which Boethius presents a rigorously premeditated structure. It is in part by understanding the logic of that structure, its aesthetic integrity, that the passion of the author's conviction and the power of his *Consolation* are made accessible to the contemporary reader.
As this essay will show, the structure of the work reflects and sustains the idea of the work. The circular relation of form and content is immediately suggested by the title

“consolation of philosophy”: Philosophy originally consoles Boethius (book 1) so that he will be receptive to philosophy, by means of which he may eventually attain philosophy and so be consoled (book 5). Philosophy is the cause of its own consummation; philosophy is the cause of the consummation of consolation; consolation is the cause of its own consummation; consolation is the cause of the consummation of philosophy. Knowledge and happiness are one in the co-incidence of form (cause) and idea (end). The consistency with which form recapitulates idea will be shown after first suggesting Boethius’s attitude toward this circularity." (pp. 92-93, notes omitted).

54. Simpson, Peter. 1988. "The Definition of Person: Boethius Revisited." *New Scholasticism* no. 62:210-220.
" *Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*. So runs the classic definition of Boethius. (1) But is it a definition that is still of value? Or, to put it another way, is this the sort of definition that will serve for a philosophy of persons?
Certainly it is not Boethius’s definition that is operative in contemporary discussions about persons. (2)" p. 210
(...)
"In conclusion then, I think it may be said that Boethius’s definition is by no means an obvious non-starter for the philosophy of person. In fact in many respects it may be the best one. In which case a philosophy of person grounded on that definition is going to be
more accurate and more compelling than others. It will also direct attention back to key ideas such as nature, reason and substance, that are in particular need of close analysis, and which may yield more fruitful results than even the term ‘person’ by itself, or any of the moral and other features mentioned earlier. Such a philosophy of person may prove to be a better way to sort out the problems of person than any current alternative." (p. 220)
(1) “A person is an individual substance of a rational nature.” The definition is given in Boethius’s *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, ch. 3.

(2) It is notable that the most recent article on persons in *The New Scholasticism* rather summarily dismisses Boethius: D. O Dahlstrom, “Personal Pleasure”, *The New Scholasticism*, LX, 1986, pp. 276- 277. I respond to this article later.

55. Sommaggio, Paolo. 2005. "Boethius’ Definition of Persona: A fundamental Principle of Modern Legal Thought." In *Epistemology and Ontology. IVR-Symposium Lund 2003*, edited by Bankowski, Zenon, 163-170. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
"The definition is set out in the *Opuscula Sacra*, which with all probability date back to 512. Amid the conflicts that followed the Council of Calcedon. and therefore in a period dense with intricate political and religious events, Boethius wrote these *Opuscula*. As he did so, he addressed the problem of giving rigorous definition to the concept of person.
The first of the *Opuscula* was *De Trinitate*, the second *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus substantialiter praedicentur*, the third *De hebdomadibus* (*Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae...*); the fourth *De fide catholica*, and the fifth the *Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, thereafter known more simply as *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*.
The most interesting of the *Opuscula* for my purposes here is the last of them, because it contains the definition of person that made Boethius famous in his own lifetime (5). The Council of Calcedon had laid down the celebrated formula that in Christ there are two natures and one person. In the introduction to his Treatise. Boethius points out that the premises established by the Council lead only to four possible conclusions: 1. that in Christ there are two natures and two persons, as Nestorius maintained: 2. that there is one nature and one person, as Eutychus claimed; 3. that there are two natures and one person, as the Catholic faith affirmed; 4. that there is one nature and two persons - though this conclusion, Boethius wrote, was so nonsensical that no heresy affirmed it. Boethius' main concern was to structure his work with clear and unambiguous language.

According to Boethius, it is entirely legitimate to enquire as to the unitary definition of the term person, in that the philosophy and theology of ancient Christianity had failed to give it a precise definition. In order to understand what was meant by the word, he analysed the concept of nature which, in fact, has a broader meaning than person and to some extent is its *genus proximus*." (p. 166)
(5) Boezio, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, PL 64 1343, Caput III, 1-6. 'Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationibus, substantiaque omnis natura est, nec in universalibus sed in individuabilibus sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est igitur definitio: persona est naturae rationa(bi)lis individua substantia'. See also Marshall, 'Boethius' Definition of Persona and Medieval Understanding of The Roman Theatre, in *Speculum*. Camb. (Mass.), vol. XXV (1950). pp. Q71-482."

56. Spade, Vincent. *Boethius against Universals: Arguments in the Second Commentary on Porphyry* 1996.
Available on-line at pvspade.com/Logic/docs/boethius.pdf
"Apart from his *Consolation of Philosophy*, perhaps the most well known text of Boethius is his discussion of universals in the *Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge*. In that passage, he first reviews the arguments for and against the existence of universal entities, and then offers a theory he attributes to Alexander of Aphrodisias, a kind of theory called in recent times "moderate realism," according to which there are no universal entities in the ontology of the world, but nevertheless there is an objective, non-arbitrary basis for the formation of our universal or general concepts about that world. At the very end of the passage, Boethius adds the intriguing comment that he has presented this view not necessarily because it is his own, but because it is the one that fits Aristotle's doctrine the best, and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, the work Boethius is commenting on, is intended after all as an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*. (2)
There are many interesting things about this passage, not the least of which is that it is an early example of a form that would later be codified in the scholastic *quaestio*: a yes/no

question is stated (or in general some question expressed in terms of an exclusive dichotomy), then arguments are presented on both sides, pro and con, the author gives his own answer to the question, and finally (although this part of what would become the classic form is missing from Boethius' discussion) the arguments for the losing side of the question are answered.
I do not intend to discuss the whole of Boethius' passage in this paper, and in fact will not even be saying very much about Boethius' own theory of universals in the passage — if indeed it contains his own theory. What I want to focus on instead is just one part of the discussion's quaestio structure: the preliminary statement of the case against universals." (pp. 1-2, note 1 omitted)
(2) See ibid., p. 25, § (37).

57. Speer, Andreas. 2011. "The Division of Metaphysical Discourses: Boethius, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart." In *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: a tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, edited by Emery, Kent jr., Friedman, Russell L. and Speer, Andreas, 91-116. Leiden: Brill.
"When one considers the history of metaphysics in the Latin West, there is at least one important forerunner, Boethius, who not only had provided the Latin speaking community up to the middle of the twelfth century with its only Latin translations of Aristotelian writings, namely of the *Organon* with the exception of the *Posterior Analytics*. Moreover, in his 'theological treatises', especially in the second chapter of his *Liber quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii* (or *De sancta Trinitate*), he displays the division of the three theoretical sciences according to Book *E* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. (3) In the twelfth century especially this *divisio philosophiae* became the point of reference for the epistemological enterprise, notably in the 'Chartrian' and 'Porretanean' schools, to establish a *scientia naturalis* based on reason and argument alone, and to establish theology as a deductive science, which proceeds more geometrico in a strong axiomatical order and provides the highest and most

common principles (*maximae* or *rationes communes*) for the other sciences." (p. 93)
(...)
"According to McInerny, Boethius fits with Thomas' endeavour to reconcile the thought of Aristotle and Christian faith; in fact, according to McInerny, "Boethius taught what Thomas said he taught." Therefore, as McInerny concludes, "the Thomistic commentaries on Boethius are without question the best commentaries ever written on the tractates". (6) This completely a-historical construction, which finds its expression in the dictum "sine Thoma Boethius mutus esset" (coined after Pico's famous dictum "sine Thoma mutus esset Aristoteles" (7)), not only ignores the important commentary-tradition of the twelfth century but also overlooks the fact that Thomas, who surprisingly enough composed the only thirteenth-century commentaries on two of Boethius' theological treatises (*De hebdomadibus* and *De Trinitate*, unfinished), (8) fundamentally dismissed the underlying idea of Boethius' metaphysics. Here we come face-to-face with a division of metaphysical discourses. According to one 'progressive' narrative of the history of metaphysics, it would appear that at this dividing of the ways Thomas had successfully relegated Boethius' conception to "the dust-bin of history", as it were. But the story does not end here and has an unexpected sequel, when at the very beginning of the fourteenth century Meister Eckhart, in explaining his understanding of the first of the Aristotelian theoretical sciences, resumes the Boethian intuition and once more equates metaphysics and theology." (p. 94)
(3) For the theological Tractates, cf. the new edition of C. Moreschini, in: Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae—Opuscula Theologica* [henceforth: DCPOT], Leipzig 2000 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp. 163–241 (here esp. pp. 168 sq.), which we cite instead of the former standard edition of H. F. Stewart / E. K. Rand / S. J. Tester, *Boethius*, new ed., London 1973 (The Loeb Classical Library 74).
(6) R. McInerny, *Boethius and Aquinas*, Washington 1990, p. xiv.

(7) Cf. the title-heading of McInerny's Epilogue to his book on *Boethius and Aquinas* (cf. n. 6), p. 249.
(8) Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium de Trinitate* and *Expositio libri Boetii de ebdomadibus* (ed. Leonina), vol. 50.

58. Sulowski, Jan. 1961. "The sources of Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae*." *Sophia* no. 29:67-94.
59. Suto, Taki. 2015. "From Analysis of Words to Metaphysical Appreciation of the World. The Platonism of Boethius " *Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics* no. 15:321-331.
Abstract: "Anicius Manlius Seuerinus Boethius has been regarded one of the major sources of Platonism in the Middle Ages, and the influence of different Platonists on his thought has been widely discussed. In his Aristotelian commentaries, however, Boethius rejects Platonists' opinions while saying that Aristotle and Plato essentially agree. Boethius may have intended to show the agreement he saw, but did not provide any explanation in his works. In this article, I consider how Boethius could have seen such an agreement. While reexamining past remarks about Platonism in Boethius, I conclude that he adopts Porphyry's view that Aristotelian logic functions as a step toward the metaphysical appreciation of the universe, which Platonists consider to be the most essential form of philosophy. However, Boethius follows Iamblichus in holding that the highest level of metaphysical appreciation involves mathematization."
60. Sweeney, Leo. 1989. "Boethius on the "individual": Platonist or Aristotelian." In *Daidalikon. Studies in Memory of Raymond V. Schoder*, edited by Sutton Jr., Robert F., 361-373. Wauconda (Ill.): Bolchazy-Carducci.
61. Troncarelli, Fabio. 2014. "Boethius from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages." In *Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought*, edited by Kirchner, Andreas, Jürgasch, Thomas and Böhm, Thomas, 213-229. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Boethius, the Roman Boethius, the philosopher Boethius, invented himself as a theologian and invented, as well, Scholastic theology, as St. Thomas recognised in his

commentary on the first Boethian theological treatise. Quoting Father Marie-Dominique Chenu, we can say that after Boethius: Theology is a science. The best medicine against Augustine and the poison of his deep pessimism.
1. Boethius inventing Boethius
But Boethius invented himself in another way, becoming, for the second time, the best antidote against Augustine, because he invented his death. The execution of an innocent was more than a crime: it was a murder, the murder of the "Civilization", the murder of the last philosopher of Antiquity as well as the last of the Romans." (p. 218)

62. Walz, Matthew D. 2016. "Boethius and Stoicism." In *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition*, edited by Sellars, John, 70-84. New York: Routledge.
"The Stoics mistake a small part of Philosophy's garment for the whole of her. Instead of possessing the fullness of philosophy, as did Plato and Aristode, the Stoics possess only a portion of its appearance.
Stoicism is philosophically superficial and incomplete. (2) This severe take on Stoicism must be qualified, however, in light of a subsequent passage in Book 1, [of *Consolation of Philosophy*] in which Philosophy relates how not only Greek philosophers suffered for her sake, but Roman ones as well. The three Romans she names - Canius, Seneca, and Soranus - were all Stoics (*Cons*. 1.3, 31-7). The pieces of her garment that they snatched sufficed for facing adversity under tyranny in an exemplary fashion. (3) Something about Stoicism, then, is able to fortify human beings in times of distress.
This mixed review makes sense in the *Consolation*; for there Stoicism is presented as a necessary stage within the Prisoner's philosophical development. Though it be superficial and incomplete, it is also indispensable. This dual characterization, moreover, illuminates
Boethius's criticism of Stoicism in earlier works; (4) for it helps us see what those critiques are ultimately driving at, namely, the philosophical superficiality and incompleteness of Stoicism, which compares poorly with the

multidimensional, expansive thinking Boethius finds in Plato and Aristotle.
In what follows we explore Boethius's works chronologically in order to elucidate his twofold judgment of Stoicism. Beginning with references to the Stoics in his logical works (5) and then turning to the *Consolation*, we delineate the intelligible contours of Stoicism as
Boethius sees it, including the positive impetus Stoicism provides toward a philosophical apprehension of reality as well as its innate inadequacy for attaining the full measure of wisdom available to us through philosophical inquiry." (pp. 71-72, note 4 and 5 omitted)
(2) Indeed, in light of these passages, we can see why one might arrive at the judgment that in Boethius's eyes " the Stoics . . . in general are considered to be pseudo-philosophers" (Marenbon [*Boethius*] 2003: 154).
(3) Each of these Romans, like Boethius, suffered under the reigning authority: Canius was executed by Caligula; Seneca was forced to commit suicide by Nero; and Soranus was condemned to death by Nero and committed suicide. Canius is mentioned again at 1.4, 9; Seneca, at 3.5, 28-36. Soranus is not mentioned again.

63. Wiitala, Michael. 2010. "It Depends on What One Means by "Eternal". Why Boethius is not an Eternalist." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* no. 84:253-261.
Abstract: "Objections to the traditional view that God knows all of time eternally stand or fall on what one means by "eternally." The widely held supposition, shared by both eternalists and those who oppose them, such as Open Theists, is that to say God knows all of time eternally entails that he cannot know all of time from a temporal perspective. In this paper I show that Boethius's characterization of God's eternal knowledge employs a different meaning of "eternal," which is incompatible with this supposition. I argue that Boethius's claim that "the most excellent knowledge is that which by its own nature knows not only its own proper object but also the objects of all lower kinds of knowledge" entails that God is not limited by perspective

and so eternally and simultaneously knows every temporal event from a temporal as well as a timeless perspective."

64. Wiltshire, Susan Ford. 1972. "Boethius and the *Summum Bonum*." *The Classical Journal* no. 67:216-220.
"The definition of the *summum bonum* itself comes in the tenth prose section of book 3 [of *The Consolation of Philosophy*]. The main steps of Boethius' argument are as follows:
1. Human beings agree that God, the ruler of all things, is good-and further, that he is perfectly good (3.pr.10.7).
2. But the perfect good is true happiness (sed perfectum bonum veram esse beatitudine» (3) constituimus (3.pr.10.10).
3. There cannot be two perfect, highest goods, because if one lacked anything of the other, it would not be perfect (3.pr.10.19).
4. Therefore true happiness and God, being both the same thing, arc both the *summum bonum*, and the supreme good is identical with supreme divinity (Atqui el beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa divinitas: 3pr.10.20). Later Boethius adds that a person becomes *beatus* by attaining divinity and that, while by nature there is only one God, there can be many by participation. (4)
Boethius' identification here of the *summum bonum* with God is explicit." (p. 217)
(...)
"Boethius offers just such a preethical vision, a concept of the ideal good. True, it is one that leaves the hard questions of justice, morality, and mercy unsolved; but it does demand an ultimate framework within which the answers to penultimate questions are sought. His creation of this concept of the summum bonum, argued through dialogue, illustrated and enlarged through poetry, and presented with the powerful effect of drama throughout, suggests to us that in bis own life Boethius did achieve in the end some sense of the unity and goodness he sought." (p. 220)

(3) Boethius uses the terms *beatitudo, felicitas*, verum or *perfectum bonum*, and on one occasion (3.pr. 10.38) even *bonitas* all interchangeably with *summum bonum*.
(4) Cf. *John* 10:34: also 2 *Peter* 1:4.

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2. Bower, Calvin M. 1978. "Boethius and Nichomachus: An Essay Concerning the Sources of *De institutione musica*." *Vivarium* no. 16:1-45.
   "I begin this inquiry with two underlying assumptions. First, Boethius was principally a translator when putting together the *De institutione musica*. The treatise seems to follow the *De institutione arithmetica* in the chronology of Boethius' works, and the arithmetical treatise is recognized to be a translation of Nicomachus of Gerasa εισαγωγή ἀριθμητική.
   (...)
   Boethius' method of composing in his early works is that of compiling through translation with some commentary; the arithmetical treatise and the logical works clearly demonstrate this point. Thus ininquiring into Boethius' sources I am trying to determine which Greek treatise Boethius was translating when he compiled his musical treatise.
   My second assumption is that Boethius was a conscientious and competent translator." (pp. 1-2)
   (...)

"Since this essay is somewhat expository in nature, its organization must largely follow that of Boethius' treatise. Seven principal sections will be designated as follows:
I. Pattern of citation in the mathematical works
II. Books I and II
III. Book III
IV. Book IV
V. Unity of Books I-IV
VI. Nicomachus and Ptolemy
VII. Book V and the original scope of *De institutione musica*
In that my conclusions concerning the first three books are similar to those of Pizzani (*) and other writers, these sections may be brief and concise. Since my treatment of Book IV stands in sharp contrast to previous scholarship, that section must be the most detailed and extended." (pp. 3-4 notes omitted)
(*) Ubaldo Pizzani 'Studi sulle fonti del " De Institutione Musica" di Boezio', Sacris erudiri, 16 (1965), 5-164.

3. ———. 1981. "The Role of Boethius' *De Institutione Musica* in the Speculative Tradition of Western Muiscal Thought." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 157-174. Bern: Peter Lang.
"An attempt to define the role of Boethius' *De institutione musica* in the speculative tradition of Western musical thought may appear to be an awesome and even pretentious task, especially in context of a study as brief as the present one. My limitations may seem even more severe in that I will confine my discussion to musical writings before the year 1100. The centuries immediately prior to 1100 saw the birth of that sphere of study which has come to be called musical theory; the nature of the thought which has grown and developed within this sphere was largely shaped during the years between about 500, when Boethius compiled his *De institutione musica*, and the year 1000, when the first full flowering of medieval musical theory was completed in the works of such theorists as Guido of Arezzo and Herman of Reichenau.
If my temporal and spatial boundaries for this study seem small, I would like my consideration of the word

"speculative" to seem large. By "speculative tradition" I do not mean what Boethius would term *musica mundana* or even *musica humana*; I mean rather man's verbal reflections and meditations concerning an art so universal yet so difficult to grasp intellectually and articulate verbally. If my study has any basic thesis, it is that Boethius' *De institutione musica* played a highly significant and clearly definable role in shaping the language and concepts with which Western man sought to understand and articulate music. One might begin to prove this thesis by compiling an index of the places in musical theory where Boethius has been quoted or cited, or those relatively few places where he has been both quoted and cited. But such an approach seems too discursive; moreover, it has been basically accomplished in several other studies. (1) The mere quoting of an author does not prove that his thought is crucial in shaping the ideas of the writer quoting, especially during the Middle Ages. My approach will be to examine Boethius' basic position and attitude toward music, both in itself and in comparison with other theorists. Thereafter I will trace the history of Boethius' text and of reflections concerning music in subsequent centuries. Finally, I will show how Boethius' attitude essentially shaped the understanding of and articulation concerning music in the ninth through the eleventh centuries.

In discussing the nature of Boethius' treatise I do so with the understanding that it is basically a translation of Greek sources and not an original work. (2) But for the sake of ease in discourse, as well as the fact that medieval man viewed the work as the creation of Boethius, I shall speak of the basic contents of the work as words and thoughts of Boethius." (p. 157)

(1) W. Brambach, *Die Musiklitteratur des Mittelalters bis zur Blüthe der Reichenauer Sängerschule* (Karlsruhe, 1883). Gerhard Pietzsch, *Die Klassifikation der Musik von Boetius bis Ugolino von Orvieto* (Halle, 1929).

(2) Ubaldo Pizzani, "Studi sulle fonti del *De Institutione Musica* di Boezio," *Sacris Erudiri* XVI (1965), 5-160; C.M. Bower, "Boethius and Nicomachus: An Essay Concerning

The Sources of *De institutione musica*," *Vivarium* XVI (1978), 1-45.

4. ———. 2002. "The Transmission of Ancient Music Theory into the Middle Ages." In *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Christyensen, Thomas, 136-167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Boethius, following Pythagorean and neo-Platonic authors before him, held that quantity was divided into two basic genera: discrete quantity – or multitude; and continuous quantity – or magnitude. The *monad*, or unity, was the source of discrete quantity, and this genus could increase into infinite multitude; yet its basic element, unity, remained indivisible. Magnitude, or continuous quantity, might be represented by the line or a shape, which was delimited with respect to increasing and growth, but could be infinitely divided. The two basic genera of quantity were, in turn, subdivided into two species: multitude is best represented by number, and every number can be considered in and of itself (even, odd, perfect, square, cube, etc), or it can be considered in relation to another (in ratios and proportions – e.g., 2:1, 3:2, or 6:4:2); magnitude is best represented by shapes, and some shapes are fixed and immobile (e.g., a line, a triangle, a cube), while others are in motion (e.g., the sun, the moon, the heavenly spheres). Four areas of study were thus defined by the very nature of quantity: *arithmetic* pursued number in and of itself; *music* examined number in ratios and proportions; *geometry* considered immobile magnitudes; *astronomy* investigated magnitudes in motion. Boethius described these four disciplines as the *quadrivium*, the fourfold path by which the soul was led from the slavery of sensual knowledge to the mastery of knowing immutable essences. *Musica* thus became a necessary prerequisite to the study of philosophy. (19)" (pp. 141-142)
(19) See *De institutione arithmetica* I.1; *De institutione musica* II.3
5. Caldwell, John. 1981. "The *De Institutione Arithmetica* and the *De Institutione Musica*." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought*

and Influence, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 135-154. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Boethius stands at the very end of a long tradition of mathematical philosophy that had extended for nearly a thousand years. (1) His work on music is much the more original of the two treatises to be considered in this chapter, and it is to that that the greater part of our attention will be devoted; but Boethius also wrote on arithmetic at least of the other mathematical arts, and his contribution must be considered in the light of a tendency in antiquity to isolate the four speculative mathematical subjects — arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy — and to group them together as a unit which Boethius was apparently the first to call the 'quadrivium' or 'quadruvium'. (2) Opposed to this of course was the trivium of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic, the whole forming the group of sevenu liberal arts' which combined with the 'three philosophies' made up the staple diet of the medieval university curriculum. With these larger units we are not here concerned. But the development of the quadrivium, and the contribution of Boethius to it, demands a closer look." (p. 135)
(1) In the East, however, writers such as Michael Psellus, Bryennios and Pachymeres reproduced ancient musical theory in their treatises of the Byzantine middle ages, just as Boethian philosophy is reproduced in the works of Hucbald, Regino of Prüm, Johannes de Mûris and innumerable others of the West. But even if Boethius himself were proved to be a wholly unoriginal thinker in music, his work would still belong to the very end of the long cultural tradition to which it relates, and from which the works of Cassiodorus and Isidore already mark a significant break.
(2) *Arith*. I. i: pp. 7. 25, 9. 28.

6. Chamberlain, David S. 1970. "Philosophy of Music in the *Consolatio* of Boethius." *Speculum* no. 45:80-97. Reprinted in: Manfred Fuhrmann, Joachim Gruber (Hrsg.), *Boethius*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984, pp. 377–404.
7. Dehnert, Edmund John. 1969. "Music as Liberal in Augustine and Boethius." In *Arts Libéraux et Philosophie*

Au Moyen Âge. Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, 987-991. Paris: Vrin.

8. Edmiston, Jean. 1974. "Boethius on Pythagorean Music." *Music Review* no. 35:179-184.
9. Erickson, Raymond. 1992. "Eriugena, Boethius, and the Neoplatonism of *Musica* and *Scolica Enchiriadis*." In *Musical Humanism and Its Legacy: Essays in Honor of Claude V. Palisca*, edited by Kovaleff Baker, Nancy and Russano Hanning, Barbara, 53-78. Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon Press.
   "Because Eriugena's writings include discussions of the liberal arts and music, they have attracted the interest of music historians. And because Eriugena uses certain terms that are found in the *Enchiriadis* treatises, scholars for the past 150 years have argued for, or at least accepted the likelihood of, links between Eriugena and the treatises. Indeed, no less eminent a scholar than Jacques Handschin was certain that Eriugena knew *Musica enchiriadis*. (8) Furthermore, none of today's leading authorities on Carolingian theory — even when a proposed point of contact has been disputed — has argued against such links altogether. (9) It is the intention here, however, to do just that: to assert that there is no likely connection between Eriugena and the *Enchiriadis* treatises and to demonstrate that the concepts and vocabulary of the *Enchiriadis* treatises that have been attributed to Eriugena (and indirectly to Greek Neoplatonism) are all explainable in terms of the earlier Latin tradition, and Boethius in particular, to that end, we will undertake a brief review of previous scholarship on this question and a more detailed critique of new, as yet unevaluated claims for Eriugenian influence." (pp. 56-57)
   (8) "Die Musikanschauung des Johannes Scotus (Erigena)," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte V (1927) 339.
   (9) For example, Michel Huglo, "Bibliographie des éditions et études relatives â la théorie musicale du Moyen Age," Acta musicologica LX (1988) 261, refers to the author of *Musica enchiriadis* as "disciple de Jean Scot"."

10. Evans, Gillian R. 1978. "Introductions to Boethius's “Arithmetica” of the Tenth to the Fourteenth Century." *History of Science* no. 16:22-41.
"The much-neglected introductions to arithmetical texts — especially Boethius’s *Arithmetica* — which are to be found in a number of manuscripts of the tenth to the fourteenth century, are essentially teaching-aids. Even if they were not necessarily used on every occasion in the actual presence of a master, they preserved his spoken comments for the use of the student reading alone. In whatever way they were employed, their purpose is primarily instructional; they complement the text to be studied, and they seem to have no pretensions to stand as works of literature in their own right. It is striking that the authors of many of these introductions, commentaries and glosses have often found it convenient to explain arithmetic by means of notions drawn from grammar, logic or rhetoric. Grammar and logic in particular were subjects undergoing active development during these centuries." (p. 22)
11. ———. 1981. "Boethius’ *Geometry* and the four Ways." *Centaurus* no. 25:161-165.
"It is evident on the most cursory reading that neither of the *Geometries* which have survived under Boethius’ name are, as they stand, authentic works. They contain material which places them, at the earliest, in the tenth century; they are disorderly and repetitious. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that Boethius wrote a *Geometria*, and it is not, on the face of it, impossible that some fragments of the original may survive, embedded in these fraudulent treatises. Some work has been done upon the Euclidean translations which are found in both versions, but little attempt has been made to answer the question: what should we expect the *Geometria* to have contained? Boethius himself provides some evidence on this point which has been largely overlooked." (p. 161)
12. Folkerts, Menso. 1981. "The Importance of the Pseudo-Boethian *Geometria* during the Middle Age." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 187-209. Bern: Peter Lang.

"Compared to the other writings of Boethius on the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*, his *Geometria* takes a special place. We do not have this work in its original form, but only in two later adaptations: both contain only part of the original but on the other hand they are enlarged through a variety of insertions. Therefore any study of the importance of Boethius' *Geometria* in the Middle Ages should not only try to show the influence of geometrical writings which were transmitted under the name of Boethius, but also should try to understand the origin of such compilations. From these two demands, then, arises the organization of my essay: the first section will be concerned with the scanty evidence known about the authentic *Geometria* as well as with the contents and origins of both extant compilations. In the second part of my essay I will attempt to show the dissemination and impact of both writings during the Middle Ages. For this purpose I will make use of entries of the *Geometria* in medieval library catalogues and of allusions to it in other medieval writings. A broader understanding of the importance of these two writings and of their comprehension in this period can be gained from an analysis of the scholia to one of these compilations which have been neglected up to now. Such a study should make it possible to indicate the value of these treatises in comparison with the other two, authentic, works of the Boethian quadrivium - the *Arithmetica* and *Musica*." (p. 187)

13. Fournier, Michael. 2008. "Boethius and the consolation of the *quadrivium*." *Mediaevalia et Humanistica* no. 34:1-21. "Conclusion. The books of the *Consolation* form a step-by-step ascent from the lower part of the soul to the higher. For Boethius, the ascent passes from sense (book 1) and imagination (book 2) to reason (books 3–4), but it ends with a glimpse of what is beyond reason (book 5). Intellect and not reason characterizes the divine life and is its mode of knowing all the lower modes in a simple way. Boethius moves the reader from the lower modes of knowing to the higher by showing the limits of each mode. At the end of each book there is an opposition or a contradiction that

cannot be resolved by the mode and points to the need to adopt a higher mode of knowing.
The *Consolation* not only advances from lower modes of knowing to higher, but also presents an ascent through the levels of being. When Philosophy appears to the Prisoner her height is ambiguous (*Consolation* 1,1,1), and she appears at one moment to “confine herself to the ordinary measure of man” (*Consolation* 1,1,2), while at another moment it appears that “the crown of her head touched the heavens” (*Consolation* 1,1,2) and at yet another she appears to have “penetrated the heavens themselves” (*Consolation* 1,1,2) and passed beyond the reach of human vision. The three heights of Lady Philosophy represent the terrestrial world of process, the spheres of the heavens that circumscribe the natural world, and the transcendent divinity. For Boethius, consolation requires an ascent from the lower, human perspective to the highest, divine perspective, even if this divine perspective is only intimated or adumbrated." (p. 19)

14. Guillaumin, Jean-Yves. 2012. "Boethius's *De institutione arithmetica* and its Influence on Posterity." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 135-161. Leiden: Brill.
Abstract: "The first systematic and well-developed treatise on the mathematical subject in the Roman world, the *De institutione arithmetica* should be considered as the first fruits of the intellectual activity of the young Boethius. It is from the pen of Boethius in the *De institutione arithmetica* that we find the first use of the word *quadriuium* to designate the meeting of the four mathematical sciences: arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Boethius was intrigued at least as much by the philosophical aspect of the study of arithmetic as by its strictly technical and scientific aspects in the modern sense of the term. Without a doubt, what Boethius and Nicomachus understood by arithmetic would be much better expressed today by the term arithmology. The arithmetic treatise of Boethius profoundly marked the intellectual evolution of the West during the

High Middle Ages and up to the beginning of the Renaissance."

15. Huglo, Michael. 1990. "The Study of Ancient Sources of Music Theory in the Medieval Universities." In *Music Theory and Its Sources: Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbera, André, 150-172. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
16. Jeserich, Philipp. 2013. *Musica Naturalis: Speculative Music Theory and Poetics, from Saint Augustine to the Late Middle Ages in France*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
    Translated from the German *Musica naturalis*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008 by Michael J. Curley and Steven Rendall.
17. Kárpáti, András. 1987. "Translation or Compilation? Contributions to the Analysis of Sources of Boethius' *De institutione musica*." *Studia Musicologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* no. 29:5-33.
    I. To understand the *De institutione musica*, first we have to see clearly the intentions of the writer. Boethius has few Latin antecedants. Both Cassiodorus and he himself mention the work of the 4th century Albinus. (9) Albinus wrote a geometry and probably a dialectics, too. (10) Cassiodorus esteemed high of Gaudentius' work *Introductio harmonica* (11) and wrote that it was translated to Latin by his friend, Mutianus.12 It is not clear whether Boethius could know this or not. Besides these, all the musicological works written in Latin are a few Vitruvius-excursions, (13) the 9th book of Martianus Capella's illustrious *De nuptiis* and some chapters of *De die natali* by Censorinus. (14) Augustinus' *De musica* deals only with rhythmics and metrics, and we also know about Apuleius' work on music, (15) though it is lost. So Boethius was right in thinking that there was no comprehensive work in Latin which could contain high-level theoretical matter and from which Greek music — theory could be thoroughly learnt. Especially the interpretation of the Pythagorean theory was missing, which used mathematical means, for Censorinus and Martianus Capella borrowed a lot from Aristeides Quintilianus' work,

who belonged to Aristoxenus' school. So Boethius' intentions were clearly to supply this basic lack." (pp. 6-7)
(9) Cf. Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 5, 10, p. 19. (Gerbert).
(10) " Albinus quoque de eisdem rebus scripsisse perhibetur, cuius ego geometricos quidem libros editos scio, de dialectica vero diu multumque quaesitos reperire non valui." (*De interpretatione ed. secunda* I. PL 64, 394 A).
(11) " Habetis hie (sc. in Bibliotheca Romae) Gaudentium Mutiani Latinum, quem si sollicita intentione relegitis, huius scientiae (sc. musicae) vobis atria patefacit." (Cass.: *Inst*. 5, 10.)
(12) Cf. Cassiodorus Ib.
(13) Vitruvius, *De architectura* 5, 5, 3.
(14) Censorinus, *De die natali* 10; 12; 13.
(15) Cf. Cassiodorus I. c. 1b

18. Kibre, Pearl. 1981. "The Boethian *De Institutione Arithmetica* and the Quadrivium in the Thirteenth Century University Milieu at Paris." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 67-80. Bern: Peter Lang.
"In another essay of this collection, Professor Ubaldo Pizzani has made a study of the Boethian *De Musica* and how it was disseminated throughout Europe until the High Middle Ages. He has made clear that the history of the *De Music*a was closely tied with the spread of the *De Arithmetica* which seems to have been intended - or at least to have served in the medieval schools - as an introduction to the music theory. It is my intention in this chapter of the collection to extend Professor Pizzani's survey to the late history of the *De Arithmetica*. Wc should be able to see that the history of the Boethian mathematics underwent several interesting developments, most of these quite apart from its connection with the music theory. First and most significantly it must be noted that the Boethian arithmetic did not lose its importance after the influx of Arabic mathematics and the re-introduction of Greek number theory. If we are to judge from the number of extant manuscripts which contain the *De Arithmetica*, by the frequency of citations in other treatises (with or without the

mention of Boethius' name) and by the number of early printed editions through the 16th century (at least 25), (1) we must conclude that the Boethian mathematics enjoyed an extraordinary increase in popularity and influence between 1200 and 1600.

That Boethius' mathematics should have become so widely used may seem surprising since the superior texts of Euclid, Nicomachus (Boethius' source) and Archimedes were available, could be read by many scholars, and were being translated. Moreover, as all students of the period are aware, the nature of mathematics was undergoing thorough and wide reaching changes at this time. The needs of a growing merchant trade which demanded efficient bookkeeping were responded to by an increasingly more sophisticated computational mathematics couched in the recently adapted Arabic number system. Though the new mathematical technique were initially slow to grow in European soil, by the 15th century hundreds of computational works (2) were available for those who wanted to learn. The ascendency of the Boethian mathematics in this context indicates a far more interesting aspect about the development of mathematics in the Middle Ages than that it was simply evolving into modem algebra and trigonometry. An examination of the various texts dealing with mathematics shows that this discipline was becoming highly diversified in nature by the late Middle Ages.

Until the late Middle Ages, a large portion of the mathematics studied in the schools and universités was a carry-over of earlier number theory, unoriginal and impractical. It was a mathematics which oriented the student to philosophical study and was imbued with the terminology of logic. As a preparation for higher philosophical study, it had once served its purpose well, but it had long since ceased to grow by the 15th century. But practical and computational mathematics slowly broke with the old number theory and began a new strain of mathematics. This break occurred outside the universities and probably began very early in the Middle Ages. It was a

new strain of mathematics that lived in the counting rooms of merchants and its greatest exponent was Fibonacci, the son of a trader. Certainly much of the computational mathematics was as servile to the merchant as the older number theory was to the philosopher. Some few thinkers, subtle and perceptive in their study of both Greek and Arabic numbers, such as Bradwardine, Nicholas of Oresme and Fibonacci, achieved a scope of mathematical vision not fully appreciated until recent times.

By the late Middle Ages the *De Arithmetica* had become moribund, and the widespread popularity of Boethius served, perhaps, to slow down the progress of mathematical innovation. The text of the *De Arithmetica* was inherited by the universities as a scrap from that vast learning of Greek thinkers and had become fossilized as part of the Liberal Arts curriculum, a once vital program of studies. But, for a small number of original thinkers (whose proportion among mathematicians has perhaps remained a constant even to our own times) Boethian definitions of numbers, the classification of number and ratio, and the definitions of the types of proportionalities were the starting points for new understandings.

I have accordingly divided my study into two parts. Initially I will survey the evidence which makes the Boethian treatise the best known mathematical work of the Middle Ages. Without attempting to evaluate the works cited, I will review a few treatises which show the way in which Boethius was adapted. When the *De Arithmetica* was not used directly as a text, it appeared in shortened form (an epitome) or merely excerpted to reduce its length. In the second part of the essay I will attempt to demonstrate how Boethian ideas provided seeds for more original thought in the works of a small number of innovative mathematicians. The most important of these are Thomas Bradwardine, Albert of Saxony (whom he influenced), Roger Bacon and Nicholas of Oresme." (pp. 81-82)

(1) In the introduction to my translation of the *De Arithmetica* (to be published soon by Rodopi, Amsterdam [1983]), I have listed almost 200 manuscripts of the *De*

Arithmetica extant. A list of printed editions may be found in David Eugene Smith, *Rara Arithmetica* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908), p. 27.
(2) Descriptions of many such works may be found in Smith's *Rara Arithmetica*.

19. Kijewska, Agnieszka. 2003. "Mathematics as a Preparation for Theology: Boethius, Eriugena, Thierry of Chartres." In *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs*, edited by Galonnier, Alain, 625-648. Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters.
20. Kirby, Helen. 1981. "The Scholar and his Public." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 44-69. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Boethius' motives in embarking upon his intellectual projects were not as grandiose as has sometimes been argued: from the evidence which remains he cannot be regarded as having conceived a 'Hellenist Renaissance' on a significant scale. He saw his role as one of enriching the Latin intellectual tradition with the transfusion of Greek material, in the mould of many Latin intellectuals before him. He believed that he had an audience, interested in Greek culture if not skilled in the Greek language, and the opposition to such an enterprise (if indeed contemporaries recognised his intellectual activities as having the coherence this word implies) should not be overemphasised. Boethius' intention in his philosophical programme was, and this cannot be overstressed, a highly technical one, that of reconciling the philosophical schemes of Plato and Aristotle, and he himself makes no claim for it to have any greater significance than this." (p. 59)
21. Masi, Michael. 1974. "Boethius and the Iconography of the Liberal Arts." *Latomus* no. 73:57-75.
"To anyone who reads the texts of the quadrivium, it is obvious that for Boethius proper order was very important. (...)
Each discipline is logically prior to the following and each is dependent on the previous for its principles of procedure. The four arts of the quadrivium must be studied in the given order and they ultimately serve as preparation for a study of philosophy; the conclusion of their study is an approach to

the wisdom of the *Consolation of Philosophy*. Indeed, without the study of the quadrivium, true wisdom is not available to the student.
(...)
"The second point in my exposition, while extending the scope of the discussion, at the same time involves it in a simple but important philosophical consideration. Basic to the nature of the quadrivium is an understanding of the purpose of the arrangement of the disciplines. It is the matter of the nature, arrangement, and purpose of the disciplines where we see the increasing schematization of the allegories of the liberal arts during the late Middle Ages." (pp. 58-59 note momitted)
(...)
"At this point it is important to review the conceptual binding force within the quadrivium which enables its disciplines to be extended universally to all the arts and to the diverse modes of thought beyond them. The logical principles of the disciplines in the quadrivium are drawn from number theory, which is explained in considerable detail and with some application by Boethius in the *De Arithmetica*.
(...)
The proportional definitions of the *De Arithmetica* are extended to the relationships between sounds in the *De Musica*, second discipline of the quadrivium.
(...)
From the *De Musica*, the student of the liberal arts proceeded to the *De Geometria*. The science of geometry applies the concepts of proportion and order to the dimensions of planes and to the shapes of figures extended into solids. To these geometrical figures are applied the rules of harmonic proportion as outlined in the *De Arithmetica* and realized in sounds by the *De Musica*.
(...)
In the study of astronomy, the principles of order and proportion, the metaphor of harmony, and the ideals of the proper arrangement of parts receive their broadest extensions. Man was thought to embark on the highest

order of learning when he undertook a survey of the heavens. In the context of the liberal arts, we find this larger meaning in the arrangement of celestial spheres in Dante's *Paradiso*." (pp. 65-66)

22. ———. 1981. "Boethius' *De Institutione Arithmetica* in the Context of Medieval Mathematics." In *Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980): atti*, edited by Obertello, Luca, 263-272. Roma: Editrice Herder.
"During the last three or four centuries, the name of Boethius has been linked almost exclusively with the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. However, as it has been recently recognized among Boethian scholars more generally, Boethius was recognized during the Middle Ages as the author of a variety of important works on logic, music, theology and mathematics (1). Some of these works became standard texts for the curriculum of the seven liberal arts. In recent years there has been considerable research into the writings and texts of Boethius as seen in the context of medieval culture (2). These more recent studies and re-evaluations of Boethius' work have been important because they demonstrate the complexity of Boethius' influence - notably that of his mathematics. His *De Arithmetica* had an influence not only on writers of mathematics but also on those who were concerned with the principles of music, literature, ethics, and architecture. In this essay I would like to examine the Boethian relationship with other medieval mathematical writing, and in so doing hopefully I might demonstrate his authoritative standing among writers of such texts. But, as well, in order to show the full scope of his work I would like to touch briefly on works outside the field of mathematics, although it will be possible to do so in only the most sketchy manner." (p. 263)
(1) See, for example, the entry under "Boezio", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani,* vol. 11 (1969), 142-165.
(2) See Pearl Kibre, « The Quadrivium In Thirteenth Century Universities (with special reference to Paris) », in *Arts Libéraux au moyen-âge* (Montreal, Canada: 1969), pp. 175-191.

23. ———, ed. 1981. *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Contents: Introduction 1; Myra L. Uhlfelder: The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio* 17; Eleonore Stump: Boethius and Peter of Spain on the *Topics* 35; Fannie J. Lemoine: The Precious Style as Heuristic Device: The Function of Introductions to the Arts in Martianus Capella and Boethius 51; Pearl Kibre: The Boethian *De Institutione Arithmetica* and the *Quadrivium* in the Thirteenth Century University Milieu at Paris 67; Michael Masi: The Influence of Boethius *De Arithmetica* on Late Medieval Mathematics 81; Ubaldo Pizzani: The Influence of the *De institutione musica* of Boethius up to Gerbert D'Aurillac 97; Calvin M. Bower: The Role of Boethius's *De institutione musica* in the Speculative Tradition of Western Musical Thought 157; Julia Bolton Holloway: "The "Asse to the Harpe": Boethian Music in Chaucer 175; Menso Folkerts: The Importance of the Pseudo-Boethian *Geometria* during the Middle Age 187; Pierre Courcelle: Boethius, Lady Philosophy, and the Representations of the Muses 211-218.
24. ———. 1981. "The Influence of Boethius *De Arithmetica* on Late Medieval Mathematics." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 81-95. Bern: Peter Lang.
"In another essay of this collection, Professor Ubaldo Pizzani has made a study of the Boethian *De Musica* and how it was disseminated throughout Europe until the High Middle Ages. He has made clear that the history of the *De Music*a was closely tied with the spread of the *De Arithmetica* which seems to have been intended - or at least to have served in the medieval schools - as an introduction to the music theory. It is my intention in this chapter of the collection to extend Professor Pizzani's survey to the late history of the *De Arithmetica*. Wc should be able to see that the history of the Boethian mathematics underwent several interesting developments, most of these quite apart from its connection with the music theory. First and most significantly it must be noted that the Boethian arithmetic did not lose its importance after the influx of Arabic

mathematics and the re-introduction of Greek number theory. If we are to judge from the number of extant manuscripts which contain the *De Arithmetica*, by the frequency of citations in other treatises (with or without the mention of Boethius' name) and by the number of early printed editions through the 16th century (at least 25), (1) we must conclude that the Boethian mathematics enjoyed an extraordinary increase in popularity and influence between 1200 and 1600.

That Boethius' mathematics should have become so widely used may seem surprising since the superior texts of Euclid, Nicomachus (Boethius' source) and Archimedes were available, could be read by many scholars, and were being translated. Moreover, as all students of the period are aware, the nature of mathematics was undergoing thorough and wide reaching changes at this time. The needs of a growing merchant trade which demanded efficient bookkeeping were responded to by an increasingly more sophisticated computational mathematics couched in the recently adapted Arabic number system. Though the new mathematical technique were initially slow to grow in European soil, by the 15th century hundreds of computational works (2) were available for those who wanted to learn. The ascendency of the Boethian mathematics in this context indicates a far more interesting aspect about the development of mathematics in the Middle Ages than that it was simply evolving into modem algebra and trigonometry. An examination of the various texts dealing with mathematics shows that this discipline was becoming highly diversified in nature by the late Middle Ages.

Until the late Middle Ages, a large portion of the mathematics studied in the schools and universités was a carry-over of earlier number theory, unoriginal and impractical. It was a mathematics which oriented the student to philosophical study and was imbued with the terminology of logic. As a preparation for higher philosophical study, it had once served its purpose well, but it had long since ceased to grow by the 15th century. But

practical and computational mathematics slowly broke with the old number theory and began a new strain of mathematics. This break occurred outside the universities and probably began very early in the Middle Ages. It was a new strain of mathematics that lived in the counting rooms of merchants and its greatest exponent was Fibonacci, the son of a trader. Certainly much of the computational mathematics was as servile to the merchant as the older number theory was to the philosopher. Some few thinkers, subtle and perceptive in their study of both Greek and Arabic numbers, such as Bradwardine, Nicholas of Oresme and Fibonacci, achieved a scope of mathematical vision not fully appreciated until recent times.

By the late Middle Ages the *De Arithmetica* had become moribund, and the widespread popularity of Boethius served, perhaps, to slow down the progress of mathematical innovation. The text of the *De Arithmetica* was inherited by the universities as a scrap from that vast learning of Greek thinkers and had become fossilized as part of the Liberal Arts curriculum, a once vital program of studies. But, for a small number of original thinkers (whose proportion among mathematicians has perhaps remained a constant even to our own times) Boethian definitions of numbers, the classification of number and ratio, and the definitions of the types of proportionalities were the starting points for new understandings.

I have accordingly divided my study into two parts. Initially I will survey the evidence which makes the Boethian treatise the best known mathematical work of the Middle Ages. Without attempting to evaluate the works cited, I will review a few treatises which show the way in which Boethius was adapted. When the *De Arithmetica* was not used directly as a text, it appeared in shortened form (an epitome) or merely excerpted to reduce its length. In the second part of the essay I will attempt to demonstrate how Boethian ideas provided seeds for more original thought in the works of a small number of innovative mathematicians. The most important of these are Thomas Bradwardine, Albert of

Saxony (whom he influenced), Roger Bacon and Nicholas of Oresme." (pp. 81-82)
(1) In the introduction to my translation of the *De Arithmetica* (to be published soon by Rodopi, Amsterdam [1983]), I have listed almost 200 manuscripts of the *De Arithmetica* extant. A list of printed editions may be found in David Eugene Smith, *Rara Arithmetica* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908), p. 27.
(2) Descriptions of many such works may be found in Smith's *Rara Arithmetica*.

25. McCluskey, Stephen C. 2012. "Boethius's Astronomy and Cosmology." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 47-73. Leiden: Brill.
26. Moyer, Ann E. 2012. "The Quadrivium and the Decline of Boethian Influence." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 479-517. Leiden: Brill.
27. Palisca, Claude V. 1990. "Boethius in the Renaissance." In *Music Theory and its Sources. Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbera, André, 259-280. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Reprinted in: C. V. Palisca, *Studies in the History of Italian Music and Music Theory*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 168-188.
28. Pingree, David. 1981. "Boethius' Geometry and Astronomy." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 155-161. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Cassiodorus in a letter he wrote to Boethius on behalf of Theoderic in about 507, (1) attributes to his young correspondent translations of Pythagoras on music, of Ptolemy on astronomy (for which see below), of Nicomachus on arithmetic, and of Euclid on geometry; later on, in the Institutiones (2), he refers again to Boethius' translation of Euclid." (p. 155)
(...)
"It has been argued that only Boethius could and did translate Euclid from the Greek before the twelfth century. However, this cannot be stated with certainty, for it is clear

from the Praeceptum Canonis Ptolemei discussed below that reasonably competent Latin translations of Greek works on the exact sciences were still being made in the sixth century, after Boethius' death. There survive, in fact, two fragments of quite different translations of Euclid that cannot be demonstrated to have anything to do with either Boethius or with M, though one is connected with Luxeuil, the other with Corbie." (p. 156)
(...)
"Cassiodorus in his letter to Boethius, as we have seen, attributes to the latter a translation of Ptolemy on astronomy. In the Institutiones (29) he gives a description of the contents of Ptolemy's *Canones* which corresponds quite well with the *Praeceptum Canonis Ptolemei* which survives in some eight manuscripts copied between the late tenth and early thirteenth centuries. (30) Naturally, these references by Cassiodorus raise the possibility that the *Praeceptum* is the translation made by Boethius. This, however, cannot be the case. For the *Praeceptum*, which comprises two reasonably competent translations of instructions for the use of the Ptolemaic *Handy Tables*, mentions the year 535 as current. (31) It was, perhaps, intended for use in the Christian school that Cassiodorus and Pope Agapetus hoped to establish in Rome in just that year or the next. (32) Its existence proves that Boethius was not the only translator of Greek texts belonging to the quadrivium in the late fifth and early sixth centuries — a conclusion toward which the Verona fragments of Euclid seem also to point. Thereby the argument that M most probably represents Boethius' translation because we know of no other translator (33) loses some of its force, though Boethius certainly remains the chief suspect." (p. 159)
(1) *Variae* I. xlv. 4, ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1894: *MGH* [*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*] Auct. Ant. xii), p. 40. On the translations of Euclid's *Elements* see J. Murdoch in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (New York, 1971), iv. 437-59.
(2) *Institutiones* II. vi. 3, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937), p. 152.

(30) An edition is being prepared by N. Swerdlow and the present writer.
(31) *Praeceptum* II. 1: a Diocletiano usque nunc anni sunt CCLI; cf. II. 11. In *Praeceptum* I. 23 is mentioned Augustus 383=ad 354.
(32) *Inst*. I praef. 1, ed. cit. (note 2 above), p. 3. Agapetus was pope from 13 May 535 till 22 April 536.
(33) Folkerts, [*Boethius' Geometrie II. Ein mathematisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters*, Wiesbaden, 1970] p. 72.

29. Pizzani, Ubaldo. 1981. "The Influence of the *De Institutione Musica* of Boethius up to Gerbert D'Aurillac: A Tentative Contribution." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 97-156. Bern: Peter Lang.
"Among those writings of Boethius which transmitted to the Middle Ages so much of the ancient culture, the *De Institutione Musica* must certainly occupy a place of special prominence. The second treatise of the quadrivium, according to the outline apparently sketched by Boethius himself in the first chapter of the *De Institutione Arithmetica* (1) its fame is attested not only by the great number of manuscripts in which it has reached us, (2) but also (and above all) by the imposing mass of scholia - largely unpublished (3) -preserved in those manuscripts, as well as by the flourishing medieval musicological production that found inspiration in Boethius as the most learned and reliable authority on the ancient musical culture. (4)
It is mainly to this last aspect that scholars as a rule have directed their attention, (5) owing partly to the fact that Boethius, with his approximations and misunderstandings, did not always have a positive and stimulating effect on the musical theories of the Middle Ages. (6) But there is another factor, no less important, in the continuous good fortune of this treatise: its influence, together with that of the *De Institutione Arithmetica*, and the lost treatises *De Institutione Geometrica* and *De Institutione Astronomica*, (7) on the didactic applications of the quadrivium. Here the medieval schools did not have in Boethius their exclusive and unchallenged master, but turned, as well, to the great

syntheses of such teachers as Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidor of Seville, not to mention the *De Musica* of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Boethian corpus, with its greater amplitude, and with the prestige conferred upon its author by his logical and theological works, played a decisive and preeminent role. This is true especially in the Carolingian (8) and post-Carolingian periods, whence derive most of the codices bearing the treatises in question. (9) It is more difficult to determine the role they played in the nearly three centuries intervening between their composition and the Renaissance prompted by Charlemagne.

The fact is that the influence of Boethius on the authors of that period - particularly Cassiodorus and Isidor of Seville, who both dealt with the artes of the quadrivium - is not conclusively demonstrable, particularly as far as music is concerned. An exceptional case is that of the Venerable Bede, under whose name we have a *Musica Theorica* that is definitely linked to Boethius, but which, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (10) and will illustrate later in this essay, came into being under very particular circumstances that do not allow us to attribute it to the Monk of Jarrow *sic et simpliciter*. An investigation into this matter, culminating, as we shall see, in a proposal for a new form of edition for that unique work, will give us an opportunity to survey the mass of scholia relating to the *De Institutione Musica* (for, indeed, the *disiecta membra* of the so-called *Musica Theorica* are nothing more than scholia); to examine some of the complex problems attending the preparation of such an edition and the identification of sources; and lastly, to ascertain the potential role of these scholia in clarifying in what forms and ways the Boethian text was used in medieval scholastic activity. At that point, with a brief survey of the coeval musicological production, we shall bring our investigation to a close. Our purpose is not so much to obtain definitive solutions to individual problems as to define their terms and to establish the areas of research and the methodological criteria while trying to trace an outline - however tentative and problematical - of

the fortune of the *De Institutione Musica* from Boethius to the scholiastic activity of Gerbert d'Aurillac. In the absence of a thorough documentation, it is the history up to the 9th century, at least, that will prove hard to grasp in even its most essential stages. But the problems that it poses, whether in philology, strictly speaking, or in the history of culture, cannot be evaded by anyone who wishes to understand through what adventures the *De Institutione Musica* passed so decisively into the scholastic and musicological traditions of the Middle Ages - after a period, as it would appear, of total eclipse." (pp. 97-98)

Note: the editor is grateful to Mr. Peter Gimpel who translated this essay from the Italian, working in close collaboration with the author.

(1) *De Institutione Arithmetica* I, 1. All citations from the Boethian treatises on arithmetic and music are taken from the edition of G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867; reprinted, 1966) and cited hereafter as DIA and DIM.

(2) A nearly complete list has been furnished recently by M. Masi, "Manuscripts Containing the *De Musica* of Boethius," *Manuscripta*, 15 (1971), 89-95 and "A Newberry Diagram of the Liberal Arts," *Gesta*, XI/2 (1973), 56.

(3) As far as I know, the only scholia to have yet been published are two by Gerbert d'Aurillac (N. Bubnov, *Gerberti Opera Mathematica* [Berolini, 1899] pp. 28-31), one on the harmony of the spheres (R. Bragard, "L'harmonie des sphères selon Boèce," *Speculum*, 4 [1929], pp. 206-13, and some others in my article, "Uno pseudo-trattato dello pseudo-Beda," (*Maia*, I [1957], 36-48). It should be noted, however, that a substantial mass of scholia has been packed into this so-called treatise attributed to the Venerable Bede, as we shall see in the course of this study.

(4) The texts are assembled in good part in the fundamental though somewhat obsolete collections of M. Gerbert, *Scriptores Ecclesiastici de Musica Sacra Potissimum* (Typis San Blasianis, 1784; reprinted, 1931) and E. Coussemaker, *Scriptores de Musica Medii Aevi,* 4 vols. (Paris, 1864-76). More up-to-date on the critical and textual level is the

Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, but the latter is still far from completion.
(5) See the ample bibliography after the article on Boethius by R. Wagner in the great German encyclopedia, *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Band II (Kassel und Basel, 1952), col. 49-57.
(6) See for the bibliographical references the above-cited article by R. Wagner, coll. 54-55; see also my observations in "Studi sulle fonti del De Institutione Musica di Boezio," *Sacris Erudiri*, 16 (1965), 87, 128 ff.
(7) That Boethius completed the entire cycle of the quadrivium is deducted from incontestable evidence. (See the article, "Severino Boezio" in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 11 [Roma, 1969], 142-65.)
(8) Our most ancient voice, in that sense, is perhaps that of Aurélien de Moutier-St. Jean (Aurelianus Reomensis), who lived in the first half of the 9th century and was the author of a *Musica Disciplina,* largely inspired by Boethius, whom he cites and exalts as *vir doctissimus* (p. 41, Gerbert) and *eruditissimus* (Gerbert, p. 32).
(9) None of the extant manuscripts of the *De Institutione Musica* dates from before the 9th century.
(19) U. Pizzani, "Uno pseudo-trattato."

30. Rimpler, Mark T. 2012. "The Enduring Legacy of Boethian Harmony." In *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 447-478. Leiden: Brill.
31. Schrade, Leo. 1947. "Music in the Philosophy of Boethius." *The Musical Quarterly* no. 33:188-200.
"In the doctrine of music that Boethius formulated in his youth two elements, both of ethical nature, converge, and in this conjunction the ethical value of music surpasses that of any other discipline in the Quadrivium. For music as the art of sound exerts in all
events and by its very nature an influence upon the moral state of man, or, in the words of Boethius himself, music is capable of “ improving or degrading the morals of men” . In addition to this, however, music as part of mathematics shares in those educational

ethics that are inherent in the disciplines of the Quadrivium. It contributes to the training of the intellect, which in the end must be totally free from all bodily impediments. This is the meaning of the education in which music assists in liberating the human mind. The music Boethius described at the beginning of his literary activity is of Platonic-Pythagorean origin. It has no direct contact with the Aristotelian system of philosophy. Music stands before philosophy; and the student of music is driven by the ethical impulse to learn how to benefit intellectually from the instrument that holds the key to the " purer reason of the mind" in philosophy. With the assumption of a pre-philosophic position of music, with the thesis of its ethical function in the process of education, and finally with the denial that music as a " science" could be part of philosophy proper, Boethius gives evidence that he wrote his works on the Quadrivium essentially as a Platonist. In it he had no intention — and no need— of reconciling the Aristotelian and Platonic schools of thought with each other.
(...)
It may be puzzling to find that an incomplete book on music, written by a man of only twenty, exercised the most extraordinary influence upon centuries to come. It is less puzzling when we take into account both the ethical function and the position music was given in relation to philosophy. And it seems to be very characteristic of this school of thought that many a later philosopher actually did what Boethius had done, that is to say, started any work in philosophy with a treatise on music as a primary necessity, without ever returning to music again. This procedure is by no means accidental; it bears all the marks of the situation in which Boethius' work on music originated. The significance of this fact has been completely overlooked. Let us think of Augustine, to name only one author of the Latin world of humanities. The first work Augustine wrote is his treatise on music which, however, he did not complete in his youth. Though in later years he returned to the subject of music— in his commentaries on the Psalms— he did so merely for reasons of a religious nature which had nothing

to do with the Musica as a discipline of the Quadrivium. When investigating the work of philosophers through the centuries we are surprised how often we find music opening the course of philosophical studies. Even Descartes, in 1618, still begins with an *Essay on Algebra* and the *Compendium of Music*. The theorists of music proper, also, in antiquity, the Middle Ages, through the 16th century (e.g., Glareanus) often first presented an " introduction" to music. But the reason for this would require a special discussion." (pp. 193-194)

32. Stone-Davis, Férdia J. 2011. *Musical Beauty. Negotiating the Boundary between Subject and Object*. Eugene (OR): Cascad Books.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XVII; 1. The Bocthian Understanding of the World, the Role of Beauty, and the Value of Music 1; 2. Inhabiting Harmony — The World as a Series of Relations: An Examination of the *Fundamentals of Music* 12; 3. Know Thyself — The Place of Humankind within Created Beauty: An Examination of the *Consolation of Philosophy* 34; 4 The Kantian Understanding of the World, the Role of Beauty, and the Value of Music 79; 5. The Play of Harmony — The Subjective Powers in Relation: An Examination of the *Critique of Judgment* 90; 6. Creating Beauty: Genius and the Work of Art 119; 7. Musical Beauty: An Enchanted Mode of Attention 158; Conclusion 191; Bibliography 195; Index 207.
"The nature of musical meaning, considered through its physicality, is also often clouded by frameworks built upon aesthetic categories and principles. These provide a lens through which the arts in general arc viewed. Such broad-sweep approaches tend towards a certain homogenization across their range and thereby result in distortion within accounts of individual arts. The uniqueness of the arts is not fully attended to. The specific category that will provide the focus for the task at hand is beauty. Beauty features within current aesthetic and theological discussion (standing more peripherally within the domain of philosophical aesthetics). Historically, however, it has been a dominant concept, acting as a cipher for underlying presuppositions that

themselves comprise broader frameworks, both philosophical and theological.
It is on this basis that the two central figures of our narrative present themselves: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c.480-c.525) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)." (p. XIV)
(...)
"Initially, then, we will start with Boethius for whom the world is knowable and for whom, as a result, the physical world is of value. Here, within an integrally theological framework, beauty is understood as harmony and as such is constitutive of the world: it is the principle by which the world coheres as a whole and a property of the material world. I will show how granting beauty this objectivity allows it a cosmic meaning or "resonance" which extends both between and beyond subjects. I will then demonstrate how the Bocthian account of music illustrates his understanding of the material world and beauty. Considering beauty as the principle of harmony grants music significance in relation to both the intellectual and the material for, as physical sensation, music offers knowledge of the world. However, I shall show that ultimately Boethius stresses the intellectual to the detriment of the material, using the physical experience of music as merely a stepping-stone to intellectual perception through form (with form finding its ideal location in God). By virtue of the satisfaction and pleasure imparted by musics physicality, Boethius' attention is re-invigorated and he is encouraged to re-focus on the world and, specifically, himself as part of the world. Ultimately, however, musical indeterminacy gives way to and is surpassed by the conceptual truths of reason." (p. XVI)

33. Uhlfelder, Myra L. 1981. "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*." In *Boethius and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays*, edited by Masi, Michael, 17-34. Bern: Peter Lang.
"At the close of the Consolatio, God is looking down upon the cosmos while the newly liberated and restored Boethius, with the recovery of *mens* at the end of his philosophical

return, is looking up as far as possible toward the Divine Light, who judges His well-ordered world and perceives everything though He Himself is beyond understanding. The whole situation is now the diametrical opposite of what it had been when Boethius, at the beginning, was indulging his grief with his elegiac Muses.
The preceding example is interwoven with the important judicial metaphor in the *Consolatio*. In passing judgment on God, Boethius had been influenced at the beginning by his personal experience of suffering shameful injustice at the hands if men, experience of which the autobiographical material in Book 1 provides ample evidence. By the end, however, Boethius has ascended beyond the limits of reason to accept on faith the goodness of the Divine Judge whom, even in his affliction, he had continued to recognize as Creator and Ruler (I. P.6. 4).
lu bringing about the changes so dramatically portrayed in these opening and closing scenes, the Liberal Arts make a contribution which it is the main purpose of this paper to examine." (p. 19)

34. White, Alison. 1981. "Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium." In *Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence*, edited by Gibson, Margaret, 162-204. Oxford: Blackwell.
"The quadrivium' designated the mathematical arts of arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. (2) Boethius appears to have been the first writer to use the term to delineate these areas of knowledge existing in the timeless world of being. For these arts were seen not merely as isolated sources of skills and information, but as an indispensable path to abstract knowledge. The created world, Boethius says, appears to have been formed according to number, 'for this was the principal design in the mind of the Creator'. (3) So the arts which consider number in its pure or solid form, static or mobile, provide paths through the creation to its source in the incorporeal world wherein lies true wisdom. This was the direction of Christian contemplation as much as Neoplatonic. It found a classic source in the verse 'Thou hast ordered all things in number, measure and weight' (*Wisd*. 11:21). Knowledge of

the rational, numerical structure of the universe would lead to knowledge of the divine nature and to apprehension of God himself. (4)
Although Boethius set his mathematical works in the framework of Neoplatonic and Christian concepts of true wisdom, his immediate aim was severely practical: to make available to the Latin world the treasures of Greek learning. His *De Arithmetica* is chiefly a translation of a treatise by Nicomachus of Gerasa (2nd cent a.d.); his music draws on several Greek sources. (5) It seems likely too that Boethius made a translation of part of Euclid's *Elements* which was incorporated into medieval works bearing Boethius' name. (6) But the complex history of its transmission is largely independent of that of the *De Arithmetica* and *De Musica*, and it cannot be considered a definable, independent Boethian quadrivial text. It therefore lies outside the scope of this study. There is no surviving work by Boethius on astronomy; some scholars have pointed to possible traces of such a treatise, but the evidence is at best inconclusive. (7) Boethius' approach to arithmetic and music was speculative and mathematical. 'Arithmetica' was the science of number, not calculation; 'musica' was harmonic theory based on Pythagorean mathematics of proportion, not music-making. This fact was firmly pointed out in the eleventh century by Guido of Arezzo, who declared that Boethius' *De Musica* was useful not to musicians, but only to philosophers. (8) But this is one of the cardinal reasons for the durability of his treatises: the science of number and proportion could serve as the foundation of diverse practical applications as long as the fundamental assumptions on which they were based were not challenged. Throughout the Middle Ages, Boethius' *De Arithmetica* and *De Musica* remained standard texts for these two arts of the quadrivium, sometimes supplemented by other medieval works, but never ousted from the canon." (pp. 162-163)
(2) On the liberal arts, see: ed. J. Koch, *'Artes Liberales' von der Antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mittelalters* (Leiden, 1959), but see review by C. Leonardi in *Studi Medievali*, 3 ser., II (1961), 268-75; H. Marrou, *Histoire de*

l'éducation dans l'antiquité 6 edn (Paris, 1965) ; idem, 'Les arts libéraux dans l'antiquité classique', *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age, Actes du IVe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale* (Montreal/ Paris, 1969), pp. 5-27. On the quadrivium, see: M. F. Bukofskcr, 'Speculative thinking in mediaeval music', *Speculum* XVII (1942), 165 180; ' *Artes Liberales*', ed. Koch (1959), pp. 1-31 ; 107-23; E. A. Lippmann, 'The place of music in the liberal arts', *Aspects of Mediaeval and Renaissance Music, A Birthday Offering to G. Reese*, ed. J. La Rue (London, 1967), pp. 545-59; W. H. Stahl, *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts* (New York, 1971), I. 3-70; 125-227; L. Obertello, 'Boezio, le scienze del quadrivio e la cultura medievale', *Atti dell'Acad. Ligure di sc. e lett*. xxviii (1971), 152-70; G. Beaujouan, 'L'enseignement du "Quadrivium" ', *Settimane di Studio* XIX. ii (Spoleto, 1972), 639-67; I have not yet seen B. Münxelhaus, *Pythagoras Musicus: Zur Reception der Pythagoreischen Musiktheorie als quadrivialer Wissenschaft im lateinischen Mittelalter* (Bonn/Bad Godesberg, 1976).
(3) Boethius, *De Arithmetica* I. 2: ed. cit., [Friedlein] p. 12, lines 14-17.
(4) Cf. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* II. xvi-xvii. 41-6; L. Schrade, 'Die Stellung der Musik in der Philosophie des Boethius als Grundlage der ontologischer Musikerziehung', *AGP [Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*] XLI. iii (1932), 368-400.
(5) H. Potiron, *Boèce, théoricien de la musique grecque* (Paris, 1961) ; J. Caldwell, pp. 135-54 above [The *De Institutione Arithmetica* and the *De Institutione Musica*].
(6) Ps-Boethius, *Geometria* (ed. Friedlein [1867]) pp. 372-428; ed. M. Folkerts, *'Boethius' Geometrie II* (Wiesbaden, 1970); H. Weissenborn 'Die Boethius-Frage', *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Mathematik* ii (1879), 187-240; C. Thulin, 'Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Corpus Agrimensorum', *Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-saml*. xiv (1911), 3-68; B. L. Ullman, 'Geometry in the mediaeval quadrivium', *Studi di Bibliografia e di storia . . . Tammaro di Marinis* (Verona, 1964), iv. 263-85; D.

Pingree, pp. 155-61 above [Boethius' Geometry and Astronomy].
(7) W. H. Stahl (op. cit., note 2 above, p. 173 and n. 6) and B. L. Ullman (art. cit. note 6 above, 278) suggested that it might be found in Naples, Bibi. Naz., V. A. 13 (s. x), but the Naples catalogue (Naples, 1827), p. 258, and N. Bubnov, *Gerberti Opera Mathematica* (Berlin, 1899), pp. 478-9, ascribe the material to Isidore, Cassiodorus and Bede. The Bobbio catalogue of the tenth century includes 'Libros Boetii III de aritmetica' (nos 384-6) 'et alterum de astronomia' (no. 387) ; the twelfth-century catalogue of St Bertin mentions 'Boetius de geometria et astronomia'. See G. Becker, *Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui* (Bonn, 1885), pp. 69 and 182. But the 'astronomiae' are not explicitly identified as Boethius' works.

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TRADUCTIONS

1. Guilaumin, Jean-Yves, ed. 1995. *Boèce. Institution arithmétique*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
   Texte établi et traduit par Jean-Yves Guillaumin.
   "Table des matières: Introduction VII; Vie de Boèce, VII; L'œuvre de Boèce: la Consolation, XIV; L'œuvre de Boèce: les traités théologiques, XIX; L'influence de l'école d'Alexandrie, XXII; L'œuvre scientifique de Boèce, XXV; La géométrie, XXV; Un traité d'astronomie?, XXVIII; La musique, XXIX; L'arithmétique de Nicomaque, XXXI; Boèce et Nicomaque, XXXIX; Les buts de l'étude, XLIV; Les quatre sciences, XLVI; Arithmétique et logistique, L; Le *quadriuium*, LII; La destinée du traité, LVI; Le texte, LXI; Les manuscrits, LXV; Les éditions, XCII; Avertissement XCIV; Conspectus siglorum XCVII; Institution arithmétique. Livre I 1; Livre II 78; Notes complémentaires. Livre I 179; Livre II 207; Index verborvm et nominvm 227; Index graecvs 252.
   "L'œuvre scientifique de Boèce.
   Moins connue certainement que son œuvre philosophique et que la *Consolation*, l'œuvre scientifique de Boèce est de toute première importance par l'influence qu'elle a exercée au Moyen Age, même si elle nous est parvenue fort mutilée. Nous avons perdu l'Astronomie qu'il pouvait avoir rédigée comme quatrième ensemble de son travail sur le q *uadriuium*; nous n'avons plus sous sa forme authentique sa

Géométrie; mais il nous reste les deux autres traités mathématiques de Boèce, l' *Institution Musicale* (éd. Friedlein, Leipzig, 1867) et l' *Institution Arithmétique* dont la lecture devait précéder celle du traité sur la musique. Tous deux doivent l'essentiel de leur substance (l'intégralité, peut-on même dire, pour l' *Institution Arithmétique*) à l'œuvre arithmétique de Nicomaque de Gérasa. Bien que l'ordre pythagoricien auquel s'est conformé Boèce (cf. *Inst. ar*. 1,1) soit le suivant: arithmétique, musique, géométrie, astronomie, nous laisserons l'arithmétique pour la fin et considérerons d'abord les traités portant sur les trois autres sciences."
(...)
"Les buts de l'étude.
En définitive, le parti-pris de fidélité au texte de Nicomaque est évident chez Boèce, dont les compétences mathématiques, du reste, n'étaient sans doute pas assez développées au moment de la rédaction de l' *Institution Arithmétique* pour qu'il pût se permettre une véritable originalité. Il faut alors se demander pour quelles raisons l'auteur, encore si jeune, avait décidé de s'attaquer à ce difficile exercice. Les motivations, sans doute, ne lui manquaient pas. Malgré la véritable difficulté du contenu, le texte de Nicomaque était d'une grande valeur pédagogique, clairement structuré comme le montrent *a contrario* les quelques longueurs ajoutées par Boèce et, à ce titre, parfait pour une initiation. Une progression soigneusement réglée devait permettre au débutant de suivre l'exposé sans se décourager et sans lâcher prise. Au demeurant, l'intérêt de l'ouvrage de Nicomaque dépassait le domaine mathématique *stricto sensu*. Il permettait également une initiation commode à la philosophie de Platon, pour le contenu, et d'Aristote, pour les systèmes de classification. Il avait d'ailleurs toujours joué ce rôle avant Boèce et, comme on l'a souligné, il était devenu matière classique d'enseignement à Alexandrie. Aussi était-il investi d'une importance culturelle particulière."
(...)

L' *Institution Arithmétique* est donc la première pierre posée par Boèce pour la réalisation du grand dessein dont il partage la conception avec son beau-père. Dans la lettre de dédicace à Symmaque qui précède le traité, il affirme avec netteté sa volonté de rendre accessibles aux lecteurs latins les trésors de la culture grecque. En ce qui concerne la partie scientifique du programme, il était évident que la primauté traditionnellement reconnue à l'arithmétique, dans la classification pythagoricienne des mathématiques qui avait traversé le cours des temps, imposait de commencer par l'étude de cette science un cursus sérieux. Boèce fait lui-même cette expérience: c'est évidemment un tout jeune homme qui dédie ce traité, avec une piété filiale, à son beau-père dont il sollicite à la fois l'indulgence (ce travail lui a coûté tant de peines, tant de nuits de veille!) et la sévérité: il n'est pas question de publier un texte qui ne serait pas satisfaisant, et Symmaque est instamment prié d'user de l'encre rouge pour amender et émonder le travail de son beau-fils. C'est avec l'espoir d'une lecture sans complaisance que Boèce ose offrir à l'helléniste érudit ces prémices de son esprit." (pp. XLIV-XLVI)
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dieux 137; Si le Père, le Fils et le Saint-Esprit sont prédiqués substantiellement de la divinité 169; De la foi catholique

175; Notes 195; Annexes 247; Bibliographie 251; Chronologie 257-259.

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"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos du problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et la plus féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son opuscule *Quomodo substantiae* l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-être). Il est évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être obtient une importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien. Aussi la solution du problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa métaphysique de l'être.
L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est, c'est une seule et même chose *d'être* et *d'être bon*. Mais si les choses sont *substantiellement* bonnes, en quoi diffèrent-elles du Bien en soi, qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du *Sophiste* de Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans cette dialogue Platon a essayé de résoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses périssables par une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (*tauton*) et «Autre» (*heteron*).
Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il commence (dans *De hebdomadibus* = *Quomodo substantiae* etc.; voir l'édition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion de l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le moyen âge: *diversum est esse et quit quod est* (II 28-30: «il y a diversité entre "être" et "ce qui est"»). Cette formule, qui est valable pour tout être composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément constitutif, ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose elle-même, ou le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son être à l'élément constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans

laquelle il n'est pas du tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être résolue en désignant cette forme. (...)
Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des commentateurs médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question du point de vue sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion de *qualitas* chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses idées sur le rôle (logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la signification exacte de sa notion de l'être (*esse*) sera discutée (6) et éclaircie en mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité *Quomodo substantiae* (7)." pp. 141-142 (Notes omises).

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"Cette première traduction Français e d'une portion significative de l' *In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda*, en regard d'un texte latin reponctué en conséquence et accompagné d'annotations critiques, est précédée d'une présentation historico-doctrinale mettant en relief le rôle — à la fois central et problématique — de

l'abstraction dans la solution boécienne, ouvertement rattachée à Alexandre d'Aphrodise (dont le traité *De l'âme* est ici examiné), du statut des genres et des espèces dans ce texte qui, à travers l'exégèse du célèbre questionnaire porphyrien, a fait connaître le problème des universaux à l'Occident latin et en est demeuré l'expression la plus achevée jusqu'au XIIe siècle, où Abélard en a donné un méta-commentaire particulièrement brillant dans sa *Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium*, éditée, traduite et étudiée ci-après dans ce numéro thématique.

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"En nous fondant sur les témoignages de Boèce et d'Ammonius, nous nous proposons d'enquêter sur le sens de la question d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, rapportée par Boèce, à propos de l'interprétation des premiers chapitres du *Peri hermeneias*. Nous suivrons d'abord le commentaire

majeur de Boèce, pour tenter de comprendre le contexte dans lequel cette question apparaît. Nous examinerons ensuite la question elle-même, en précisant sa raison d'être à partir du commentaire d'Ammonius. Nous passerons ensuite à l'évaluation de sa pertinence pour une théorie du discours. Enfin, en guise de conclusion, nous essayerons de dégager/quelques remarques générales." (p. 241)
(...)
"À suivre Boèce, Porphyre développe une analyse générative du discours pour justifier l'idée que l'assertion simple se compose d'expressions simples (37), c'est-à-dire du nom et du verbe, qui sont les parties nécessaires et suffisantes de l'assertion simple (38). L'affirmation et la négation sont ainsi les deux éléments constitutifs du genre de l'assertion simple. Cette analyse conduit à associer à l'assertion simple une sémantique de l'inhérence (ὑπαρχειν). Porphyre « projette », en quelque sorte, la structure syntaxique de l'assertion simple sur la structure ontologique de l'inhérence: l'affirmation signifie l'inhérence de quelque chose dans quelque chose, la négation, sa non-inhérence. Il a donc développé son analyse de la construction syntaxique complète en lien avec sa sémantique de l'inhérence empruntée aux *Catégories*. Cette construction syntaxique, Boèce l'appelle « assertion simple » ou « assertion catégorique » (39). On comprend alors que s'il se concentre sur l'assertion simple dans les premiers chapitres de son commentaire, c'est parce qu'il vise en fait la notion de complétude. Dès lors que l'assertion simple exprime l'inhérence ou la non-inhérence, Boèce enchaîne, après la question de la structure de l'assertion (ch. 4-6 du *Peri hermeneias*), sur le thème des universaux (ch. 7) (40), car la théorie de l'inhérence présuppose toujours la division des étants en particuliers et en universels (41). La deuxième partie du chapitre *De oratione* de Boèce, qui correspond au commentaire des chapitres 4-8 du *Peri hermeneias*, achève par conséquent l'exposé sur l'assertion simple (ou assertion catégorique) en traitant de Γ inhérence et de la non-inhérence." (pp. 254-255)

(37) Voir « Simplices quiddem idcirco quod quaelibet simplex parvissimaque oratio nomine et verbo coniungitur, quae sunt simplices dictiones » (84, 27-30).
(38) « In simplicibus enim orationibus huiusmodi partes sunt » (82, 23-5).
(39) « [S]ic in simplicibus propositionibus praedicatio vim obtinet, unde et Graece quoque tales propositiones κατηγορικαί, id est praedicativae, dicuntur, scilicet quae sunt simplices, quod in totam propositionem obtineat praedicatio » (Migne, PL 64, 447 B). « Igitur quoniam supra dixerat simplicem propositionem, quam κατηγορικαί Graeci dicunt, *nos praedicativam interpretari possumus*, semper verbi praedicatione constitui, non autem semper nomine subjecto, quod aliquoties quiddem vel infinitum nomen, vet casus nominis, vel verba subjecta sunt» 112, 10-16). C'est nous qui soulignons.
(40) « Necesse est autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid aut non, aliquoties quidem eorum alicui quae sunt universalia, aliquoties autem eorum quae sunt singularia, hujusmodi est tanquam si diceret: omnis quidem adfirmatio et negatio inesse aut non inesse demonstrat et quidquid enuntiatur, aut de eo quod est esse proponitur... aut de eo quod est, non inesse » (140, 22-141, 1).
(41) « Ergo quoniam necesse est, aut aliquid alicui inesse dicere, aut aliquid alicui non inesse, illud quoque necesse est ut intelligamus cui inesse aliquid dicimus, aut universale esse... aut certe particulare ac singulare » (141, 3-8).

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TRADUZIONI

1. Boezio. 1969. *Trattato sulla divisione*. Padova: Liviana. Testo latino e traduzione italiana con commento di Lorenzo Pozzi.
   Indice: Avvertenza V; Introduzione 1; Nota bibliografica 17, Trattato sulla divisione 19; Appendice: Anitii Manlii Severini Boethi - *De Divisione* 105; Indice analitico 131-136.
   "La traduzione è stata condotta sull'edizione di Venezia (sull'esemplare appartenente alla Biblioteca Palatina di Parma), che viene riportata in Appendice nel testo latino diviso in paragrafi per comodità di lettura e di commento. Un controllo eseguito sul Manoscritto conservato nella Biblioteca Antoniana di Padova (Scaff. XXII, 553, ff. 55r-68v) ha permesso di convalidare l'opinione corrente circa la superiorità dell'edizione di Venezia su quella di Basilea riprodotta dal Migne. Le poche varianti tratte dal manoscritto che miglioravano la stampa dell'incunabolo veneziano sono state direttamente introdotte nel testo, dandosene notizia in nota." (Avvertenza)
   "La divisione, già fin dai tempi di Cicerone, era considerata una parte essenziale della logica, infatti nel *De finibus bonorum et malorum* (7) viene criticato Epicuro per non avere una logica: *Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi oc disserendi, quae* λογική *dicitur, iste vester piane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet; non,*

quomodo efficiatur concludatur que ratio, tradii; non, qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur, ostendit.
Dal che si vede che vengono elencate queste quattro parti della logica e cioè la definizione, la divisione, il sillogismo o ragionamento, il sofisma o falso ragionamento.
Boezio, per quel che concerne la divisione, conosceva tre concezioni e cioè la platonica, l'aristotelica e la stoica, per cui è necessario accennare brevemente a tutte e tre.
Per Platone la divisione è il metodo che permette di costruire una corretta definizione ed è il secondo momento della dialettica. Il primo momento consiste nel ricondurre ciò che si deve definire ad un'idea, che, per la sua estensione, sia capace di includerlo totalmente.
(...)
Aristotele, negli *Analitici Primi* (14), critica la divisione platonica, che è per lui «un sillogismo impotente», in quanto a) chiede che sia concesso ciò che deve dimostrare e b) conclude sempre con un predicato superiore a ciò che deve essere provato. Aristotele considera il sillogismo nella sua funzione dimostrativa e perciò richiede che in esso il termine medio debba avere un'estensione minore dell'estremo maggiore ed un'estensione maggiore dell'estremo minore. Si considera evidentemente un sillogismo che concluda universalmente ed affermativamente, cioè della prima figura in cui il termine medio è il soggetto della premessa maggiore ed il predicato della premessa minore.
(...)
Nella dottrina stoica abbiamo una rivalutazione della divisione, rivalutazione che segue quella della dialettica. Gli Stoici definiscono la dialettica «la scienza di discutere rettamente su argomenti, per domanda e risposta» (18). Per questo si può affermare una certa dipendenza della concezione stoica dalla dottrina aristotelica, infatti anche per gli Stoici la dialettica si riferisce al dialogo e, punto essenziale, non ha riferimento all'essere, di cui non può produrre scienza.
(...)

Il trattato di Boezio è un'originale sintesi delle tre concezioni sopra esposte. (...)
Il trattato ha come punto di partenza lo stesso nome « divisione » e l'elenco delle diverse cose da esso significate. Scopo del trattato è infatti quello di indicare le proprietà di ciascuna divisione e le reciproche differenze. Egli innanzitutto distingue le divisioni *secundum se* da quelle *secundum accidens*: mentre nelle prime sono sostanze sia il dividendo che i divisi, nelle seconde o il dividendo o i divisi o entrambi sono accidenti. Sono divisioni *secundum se* quelle del genere nelle specie, del tutto nelle parti, e della voce nelle significazioni. Sono divisioni *secundum accidens* quelle del soggetto negli accidenti, dell'accidente nei soggetti e dell'accidente negli accidenti. Queste distinzioni hanno la funzione di evidenziare la divisione del genere nelle specie, che è la vera divisione logica, quella che permette di giungere alla definizione essenziale: motivo conduttore di tutto il trattato è la continua preoccupazione di distinguere la divisione del genere nelle specie dalle altre divisioni." (pp. 5-10)
(7) Libro I, cap. VII (22).
(14) *An. Pr.* I 46a 31 ss.
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   Sommario: 1. Il progetto boeziano e il commento di Tommaso al *De hebdomadibus*. 2. La questione dell'essere boeziano e tommasiano. 3. La partecipazione. 4. Ci può essere partecipazione con o senza Idee platoniche. 5. L'essere stesso partecipa ad una causa. 6. L'essere non si partecipa come un genere e comunque inerisce alle cose. 7. L'essere si partecipa secondo le categorie e l'essere *simpliciter* è l'essere sostanziale. 8. L'essere partecipato appartiene per sè. 9. Conclusione.
   Abstract: Several features of St Thomas's commentary on the *De hebdomadibus* suggest that he was taking quite seriously Boethius's view concerning the fundamental harmony between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

The paper focuses on the commentary's treatment of the doctrine of participation in being (esse). There are several places where St Thomas seems to be working quietly to bring the doctrine in line with Aristotelian ontology. These have a bearing on the much disputed question of the relation between St. Thomas and Boethius on the distinction between *esse* and *id quod est*.

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"Lungi dal purismo classicista della Consolatio, la traduzione di Boezio è caratterizzata dalla frantumazione della compattezza dell'ordine classico delle parole mediante la frequente introduzione di moduli espressivi estranei alla tradizione latina, dal conio di calchi linguistici e semantici e dall'accetttazione di sintagmi propri del latino tardo. In questo modo Boezio cerca di risolvere i molti problemi di ordine esegetico, sintattico, di interpretazione ed espressione lessicale presenti nell'Organon aristotelico e spera di contribuire al progresso della letteratura latina."
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"L'opuscolo teologico dal titolo *Quomodo substantiae bonae sint in eo quod sint, cum non sint substantialia bona*, comunemente indicato con il titolo abbreviate *De hebdomadibus*, è stato spesso oggetto di studio soprattutto in relazione al grande influsso ehe esso ha esercitato sul pensiero medievale, al punto che Gangolf Schrimpf ha potuto definire questo trattato, non a torto, come 'Lehrbuch des Mittelalters'. (1)" (p. 33)
(...)
"...ma il più importante tentativo di inquadrare l'opuscolo teologico nell'ambito della tradizione filosofica tardo-antica è stato, senza dubbio, quello intrapreso da P. Hadot, il quale, concentrando la propria attenzione sulla celeberrima formula forma essendi, ha ipotizzato delle affinità tra la concezione boeziana dell'essere e quella di Porfirio, estendendo così i confini di un rapporto fino a quel momento delimitato agli scritti di logica. (5) Del contributo di Hadot vogliamo riprendere, allargandolo ad una prospettiva più ampia, il metodo di indagine, basato sulla ricerca di un equilibrio tra 'interprétation philologique' e 'interprétation philosophique', per esprimerci con le parole dello studioso: non partiremo, dunque, dall'esame di una singola affermazione, ma cercheremo di individuare i nuclei

concettuali che costituiscono, per così dire, l'impalcatura di tutta l'opera. Le direttrici fondamentali della nostra ricerca saranno, pertanto, le seguenti : 1) la dottrina boeziana circa l'essere; 2) i concetti di somiglianza e partecipazione; 3) l'identità tra essere e agire di Dio. Nell'approfondimento di queste tematiche cercheremo anche di mettere in luce gli eventuali rapporti del *De hebdomadibus* con problemi di ordine non solo filosofico, ma concernenti anche aspetti del dogma cristiano." (pp. 33-34)
(...)
"A conclusione di questa nostra disamina, necessariamente breve ma, nel contempo, aperta ad una molteplicità di problematiche, abbiamo ancora una volta chiara, davanti ai nostri occhi, quella che ci pare una delle caratteristiche principali del filosofo romano, vale a dire una originalità di pensiero che non esclude l'apporto delle più varie tradizioni, dalle quali Boezio sa ricavare, con acume e senso critico, ciò che più si adatta alla soluzione dei problemi da lui affrontati: ciò che ne risulta non è un disomogeneo eclettismo, ma una costruzione speculativa che, pur con i limiti e le aporie da noi messi in luce, è dotata di una sua intrinseca coerenza. Si farebbe un torto a Boezio analizzando il suo pensiero con la pretesa di 'quantificare' le percentuali di platonismo e di aristotelismo in esso presenti: il *De hebdomadibus* è da ritenersi, a buon diritto, un trattato teologico, anche se non vi compaiono espliciti riferimenti a tematiche cristiane, perché nell'orizzonte culturale di Boezio, come abbiamo avuto modo di ribadire in altri nostri contributi, non esistono rigide separazioni tra la filosofia e la teologia, accomunate, per così dire, dal fatto di avere, come supremo oggetto della conoscenza, Dio e la sua relazione con il mondo. Di questa relazione l'opuscolo teologico indaga il fondamento ontologico, chiedendosi in quale modo le cose, pur non essendo Dio, abbiano la bontà come caratteristica costitutiva del proprio essere. Speriamo di aver contribuito, almeno in parte, ad una più precisa collocazione di quest'opera nel panorama filosofico del tardo-antico.£ (pp. 52-53)

(1) Cf. G. Schrimpf, *Die Axiomenschrift des Boethius (De hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters*, Leiden, 1966. Il termine *Axiomenschrift,* impiegato dallo studioso, è indicativo di un'altra diffusa tendenza esegetica, per la quale l'attenzione degli interpreti si è spesso soffermata sui singoli enunciati assiomatici ehe costituiscono la premessa del trattato, senza considerarli nel contesto generale dell'opera.
(5) Cf. P. Hadot, "La distinction de Tètre et de Tétant dans le De Hebdomadibus de Boèce", in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, vol. II, p. 147-153, Berlin 1963; "Forma essendi: interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d'une formule de Boèce", *Les Études Classiques,* 38, 1970, p. 143-156.

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Eriugena: Dialectic and Ontology in the *Periphyseon*

INTRODUCTION: THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF JOHN SCOTTUS ERIUGENA

"Philosophy properly speaking begin in the ninth century with John Scottus Erigena." (p. 42)

G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6. Volume III: Medieval and Modern Philosophy*, Revised Edition, Translated and edited by George F. Brown, New York: Oxford University Press 2009.

"It is anachronistic to separate philosophy and theology in Eriugena. 'Speculation' would be a less misleading description of his thought than 'teaching'. But we must use words in any case. Although Augustine is the major source of Eriugena's doctrine, its characteristic features do not derive from the teaching of Augustine.
(...)
Platonism and Neoplatonism, that is to say the revival of Platonism especially by Plotinus in the third century A.D., were, on the other hand, freely embraced by the Eastern Fathers, by those precisely from whom Eriugena derived his distinctive thought, St Gregory Nazianzen, the brothers Saints Basil and Gregory of Nyssa and the great Origen. Here Eriugena found Christian authority for his negative theology ('one knows God

best by not knowing Him'), for creation as being co-eternal with God, and for the final restoration of all things in the end. Curiously enough, as I have indicated elsewhere, Eriugena derives some Greek ideas from St Ambrose of Milan - but in fact this fits in with the new (but not, of course, on that account necessarily correct) view of St Ambrose presented by a number of our contemporaries and notably Courcelle.

The corpus of Eriugena's work is considerable commentaries, translations and original works, all making up one ponderous volume (number 122) of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*. The centerpiece of his achievement is the *Division of Nature*, written about 867, running to five books and a quarter of a million words. It deals ostensibly with the Creator, the first or primordial Causes, the created universe, and finally God as End. It considers five different and unrelated modes of being: things may be said to be according as we perceive them, according to their place in a hierarchy, according as they become actualized, according to the faculty by which they are perceived (sense or intellect for example), and fifthly according to their realization of God's image. These are truly unrelated, and illustrate the easy overlapping of what we optimistically call philosophy and theology. In the system of Eriugena the most important of these modes of being is the second, i.e. that according to a thing's place in a hierarchy.

Eriugena and his Greek predecessors, pagan and Christian, are essentially concerned with the greatest problem - or perhaps the second greatest problem - of all: assuming a Creator, how can He create? If He begins to create, He changes, is completed and has been imperfect - which imperfect - which is unacceptable. If He always has been creating, His creatures are as eternal and as infinite as Himself: they are Himself - which is pantheism. The contrast between Augustine and Eriugena is nowhere greater or more visible than in this. Augustine wrote the sixth to the tenth books of his imposing work, the *City of God*, on the problem of how, taking account of Neoplatonism, the creature can be united with the Creator, which is another version of the problem just mentioned. Characteristically, however practically, he looks at the matter from the point of view of man, the creature. He differs from the Neoplatonist Porphyry by accepting Christ as the great

Mediator between God and man, but follows him in much consideration of mediation in general and a hierarchy of mediating demons, angels and heroes as well. It is only fair to say that he does not always take so practical a view of the problem. But how different, how more Plotinian, is Eriugena, who fixes his gaze on the Creator, scrutinizing His revelations of Himself, his 'theophanies' or 'appearances' as Eriugena calls them, for any clue; and searches the ineffable, incomprehensible and inaccessible clarity of the divine goodness for understanding, at least of what God is not. Almost the only images employed are air and light and fire, and these are used in contexts suggesting rarefaction and incandescence. The whole of the *Division of Nature* is essentially an exercise in trying to follow the descent, or possibility of descent, of creatures from the One, and their return to the One up the hierarchy of being. The return of all is the conversion of bodies to souls, of souls to causes (such as Goodness), and of causes to God.

One may ask if, after all, Eriugena is not a pantheist? Certainly he himself was aware that he might be thought so, but denied explicitly that he was. 'God', he says, 'is all in all. All things that are in God, even are God, are eternal.' 'We should not understand God', he writes, 'and the creatures as two things removed from one another, but as one and the same thing. For the creature subsists in God, and God is created in the creature in a wonderful and ineffable way, making himself manifest, invisible making himself visible.' But the divine nature, he finally insists, because it is above being, is different from what it create within itself. Eriugena circles around the object of his thought insistently, patiently, lovingly. He can sustain prolonged concentration on the Creator, on that darkness, as he calls it, of incomprehensible and inaccessible light. One thinks of the nearly contemporary work of the great Irish metal-workers, sculptors and especially illuminators of manuscripts; the abstraction, the subtlety, the incredible detail. In the end Eriugena knows only that God is, not at all what He is. Of the creature he chooses to investigate for the most part only how he can be - for he refuses, under one aspect, to deny that the Creator and the creature are one thing. He cannot have truck with lower things. One might as well ask for practical considerations Teilhard de Chardin. He is sublime, he is

subtle, but in a curious way his very openness, his lack of word-bound assertion may very well help us in our evolutionary age to approach an understanding of reality. Certainly he ennobles man, but still leaves him less than God.
These few words have been intended to convey something of Eriugena's characteristic thought. Circumstances have worked against his recognition in the area of the world in which he lived and wrote - the Latin world dominated by Augustine and Aquinas Even so he is the greatest philosopher in the ages that separate these two. Copleston writes of his system as 'standing out like a lofty rock in the midst of a plain'. Another of his biographers has described him as 'one of the greatest metaphysicians of all time'. Be that as it may, he is certainly an outstanding figure in the history of thought, a favourite of the mystics and one who may provide for the future a Christian synthesis, at once purified of anthropomorphism and capable of bringing ideas of evolution, the continuum and the relative to the focus of Infinite Being: this after all is what Eriugena attempts to do." (pp. XI-XIII)

From: John J. O'Meara, *Introduction* to: John J. O'Meara and Ludwig Bieler (eds.), *The Mind of Eriugena*, Dublin: Irish University Press 1973.

"The Western philosophical tradition has been characterised, in a somewhat misleading and over generalised manner, as centring on the concept of being from the time of the earliest Greek thinkers. Eriugena, inspired by Dionysius, departs from this tradition and regards non-being as equally as important as being in the study of the nature of reality as a whole. For Eriugena ontology is not the most fundamental or universal discipline; in fact, he develops a negative dialectic which counterbalances ontological affirmations and constructions with a radical meontology, giving the most detailed analysis of non-being since Plato's *Sophist* and *Parmenides*.
But Eriugena goes farther and anticipates many of the features of the modernist turn in philosophy begun by Descartes (1596-1650). Eriugena begins with a typical Carolingian psychology but is stimulated by Saint Augustine to develop an understanding of the cogito and a deep appreciation of inwardness, which was

enriched by his encounter with the anthropology of the Greeks, especially Gregory of Nyssa. He does not stop there, however, but goes on to articulate, in his own terms, what might be called a philosophy of subjectivity. Eriugena sees the human subject as essentially mind. Everything is a product of mind -- material reality, spatiotemporal existence, the body itself. In this sense, Eriugena is a thoroughgoing idealist. Matter is a commingling of incorporeal qualities which the mind mistakenly takes to be corporeal; spatiotemporal reality is a consequence of the seduction of the mind by the senses, which is the true Fall of Adam; the body itself is an externalisation of the secret desires of the mind. But more than that, the true being of all things is their being in the mind. Eriugena takes this to be a consequence of the scriptural revelation that the human mind is an image of the divine mind, and that the divine mind contains in itself the ideal exemplars of all things.

Eriugena inserts this radical view of the human mind and of human nature into his account of the cosmos, his fourfold division of nature. The whole of nature, which includes God, proceeds or externalises itself in its multifarious forms through the operation of the human mind, which is pursuing its own course of intellectual development or enlightenment. In the four divisions of nature, we have not only a typical mediaeval cosmology of a hierarchy of being but also a dynamic process of subjectivity becoming objective, of the infinite becoming finite, the drama of God's and of human self-externalisation in the world, which anticipates the idealist systems of Schelling and Hegel." (*Preface*, pp. XIII-XIV)

(...)

How are we to interpret Eriugena's philosophy?

He made use of the logical and dialectical material available to the ninth century in his metaphysical discussions of the nature of essence, substance, accident, and the categories, but he stands above his contemporaries in offering a unique metaphysical system -- the four divisions of nature -- which introduced to the West not only a new cosmology but also the first important meontology, or study of non-being -- *me on* (με ον)." (p. 81)

From: Dermot Moran, *The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989.

"While one may well attempt to write about the works of Eriugena, one can hardly as yet essay with any confidence to describe his life, so much in connection with him is legend or slender hypothesis. We can say that he was born in Ireland around the first quarter of the ninth century, and that he lived and worked for most of the third quarter of that century at the court of Charles the Bald in the general area of Laon, north-east of Paris. He would appear to have been a teacher who became a philosopher.

His greatest work, written in Latin, was the *Periphyseon*, known also as *De divisione naturae*, a comprehensive investigation into all things that are and all things that are not. Here the philosophical doctrines of Augustine in his understanding of Revelation (already significantly, if not consistently, indebted to Neoplatonism) are as far as possible brought into relation with the more direct and prevailing Neoplatonism of the Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and the Greek Fathers. The result is a synthesis of what we might now call philosophy and theology where the influence of the Neoplatonists dominates. To theologians he is too philosophical; to philosophers, too theological. But as long as Plato is counted a philosopher, then Eriugena must be reckoned a philosopher too. His message is essentially optimistic, and it is conveyed in language that is subtle, often warm, and always distinguished.

Eriugena had more influence in western Christendom than is generally recognized, even if the spirit of the times, guilt by association, and finally a flood of Aristotelianism told against him. The mystics listened carefully to what he had to pass on from the Pseudo-Dionysius, and nineteenth-century German Idealists discovered in him a spirit and a thinking akin to their own." (*Preface*, p. VII)

From: John J. O'Meara, *Eriugena,* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988.

THE NAME OF THE PHILOSOPHER

"The subject of this study was named by Archbishop Ussher in his *Veterum epistolarum hibernicarum sylloge* (Dublin, 1632) 'Scotus Erigena'. This is a pleonasm since, in the lifetime of the man in question and up to the eleventh or twelfth century, Scotus or Scottus meant 'Irish' and Erigena or Eriugena (1) meant 'of Irish birth'. Since he called himself Johannes, that is, John, the name John Scotus Erigena became fairly common after Ussher's time. This had the grave inconvenience of causing confusion between our Irish philosopher of the ninth century and John Duns Scotus, the better-known Scottish (in the present meaning of that term) Franciscan philosopher of the thirteenth.
Scholars nowadays, to avoid both pleonasm and confusion, have a tendency to call him Eriugena. This is the name that appears at the head of his translation of Dionysius the Areopagite: 'incipiunt libri sancti Dionysii Areopagitae, quos Ioannes Eriugena transtulit de graeco in latinum': 'Here begin the books of the holy Dionysius Areopagiticus which John Eriugena translated from Greek into Latin.' (2) Eriugena, not Erigena, is attested by the oldest manuscripts of this work. (3) But he was known to his contemporaries and in later times as Johannes Scottus, (4) where 'Scottus' refers to his origins rather than being used as a surname. He refers to himself usually and is also referred to by some of his contemporaries as simply Johannes. (5) We shall call him Eriugena." (p. 1)

Notes

(1) Formed on the model of *Graiugena* (Virgil, *Aeneid*, 3. 550), 'of Grecian birth'.
(2) *Patrologiae Latinae* 122, 1035 A-6 A.
(3) See M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Érigène sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 1933 p. 5 n. 10.
(4) Ibid. 3. 'Scotus' is also used.
(5) Ibid. p. 5 and n. 4.

From: John J. O'Meara, *Eriugena,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

THE TITLE OF HIS MAIN WORK

I

"In the development of Eriugena's *De divisione naturae* or *Periphyseon* (if you will allow me to introduce the alternative title right away) it is possible to distinguish a series of stages:

1. An essay in dialectic, possibly abandoned before completion, concerning the division of the genus Nature (defined as "all things that are and all things that are not") into four species: the Nature that creates but is not created, the nature that is created and creates, the nature that is created but does not create, and the Nature that neither is created nor creates. From this the work as we now have it derives its generally accepted title, *De divisions naturae*; and for convenience I shall refer to this primitive version as *De divisione naturae A*. Here Eriugena's sources may all have been Latin: chiefly, St. Augustine, Boethius, and Martianus Capella.

2. The next stage, the first of which there is MS evidence, already contains the substance of the full *Periphyseon*, but in a somewhat shorter form. It is found in the earliest extant MS, Rheims 875, which I shall call R. Whatever may have been the case with the *De divisione naturae A*, we have here already the great work running to five books(1), and already, from the end of Book I (which may not differ greatly from the primitive version) dependence on Greek sources predominates. It bears (or seems to bear) the Greek title περι` φύσεως μερισμοῦ, and I shall refer to it as *De divisions naturae B*. But although the Four Divisions of Nature still remain as a framework for the whole, this scheme is of secondary importance to the Platonic notion of the Descent of the Soul from God and her Return, seen through the eyes of St. Gregory of Nyssa, the pseudo-Dionysius and St. Maximus the Confessor.

3. The next stage first appears on the margins of R in the form of extensive enlargements to the text which were incorporated in a copy perhaps made at Rheims, of which the first part (containing

Books I—III) survives as MS Bamberg Ph. 2/1, which I shall call B.

4. Finally, similar marginalia, and in the same hand as the principal ones of R, but fewer, shorter, and less important, were added to B, and thus constitute a fourth stage in the development of the text. These in turn were incorporated, together with a small quantity of additional matter (none of which is undeniably authentic, while some of it is clearly unacceptable), in a group of Paris MSS which derive from B. They may be referred to collectively as P. In B and P the title is περι` φύσεων.

II

All these MSS are of the 9th century, and could have been written during the author's life-time. Fifty years ago Traube made the interesting suggestion(2) that the hand responsible for most of the marginal enlargements in R and all in B was Eriugena's own. It cannot be said that this has been finally established, but it seems very likely. But whose-ever the hand that wrote them there can be little doubt that the matter is Eriugena's, even when, in R, the hand is not the "Eriugena" hand. Although they do not as a rule affect the main argument, being for the most part qualifications of assertions made in the test, or similes to illustrate the meaning, all bear the stamp of authority. To say that they were not by Eriugena would be to make the Periphyseon a work of collaboration.

III

It follows that everything in the "Eriugena" hand in B is authoritative. This will include not only the enlargements similar to those of R, but the very full set of lemmata, which here appear for the first time, and the new Greek title: περι` φύσεων. Clearly, then, this was the title by which the author wished his work, in its final form, to be known. But the evidence does not rest on this one MS: he himself refers to his work by this name elsewhere; by this name it was known to his friends and his enemies, and generally, with a single vacillating exception, throughout the middle ages; and under this name it was eventually condemned. In his *Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy* Eriugena refers three times to this work, each time as περι` φύσεων.(3) On a blank leaf of a MS of his translation of the *Ambigua* of St. Maximus, a 9th century hand has written out a list of the books

belonging to Wulfad, the friend to whom he dedicated the *Periphyseon*. The list contains, among other works of Eriugena, the item: *Libri perifision*. I. I.(4)
(...)
Yet the fact remains that the oldest extant MS is headedπερι` φύσεως μερισμοῦ, and the work is generally known today as *De divisions naturae*. There can, of course, be no doubt that Eriugena made use of that title — at one time: but it belongs to the earlier stages of the development of the text, and is perhaps an accidental survival from the earliest — that which I have called *De divisione naturae A*.
(...)
Gale chose the title *De divisions naturae* for his edition; reasonably enough, for he found this given as the Latin equivalent for *peri fiseon merismou* at the beginning of his MS. In doing so he established a precedent for his successors(5), and so it has come about that the title which Eriugena may have first adopted but certainly discarded subsequently, and which, after R, is only found in MSS of secondary importance (and even these do not speak with a certain voice) has been universally substituted for that which is found in MSS of the highest authority, and by which the work was known to all, including the, author himself, from the 9th to the 12th century.
IV
De divisione naturae is not only less well authenticated, it is less appropriate to the text in its developed from, in which the theme of the "division of nature" is largely overshadowed by speculations which reach beyond it. Indeed, a reading of Book I, where much of the primitive stage of the text seems to survive, suggests that the word *divisio* is used in the technical sense of substantial division of genus into species and that *de divisione naturae A* was a treatise on dialectic. In its final stage, however, it is very much more than this, comprising a whole philosophical system which embraces cosmology, metaphysics and theology. One can well understand why Eriugena seized the opportunity afforded by the re-copying of the text (MS B) to change its title, and why the name he chose should be of the kind traditionally given to books in which philosophical systems were expounded.
(5)

Notes

(1) R itself is incomplete, ending in the middle of Book IV, but there are marginal references to a fifth book, and this book is found in MSS copied from R.
(2) *Paläographische Forschungen V. Autographa des Johannes Scottus*, aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von E. K. Rand, Abhandlungen der kgl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse 26, I, München 1912.
(3) II 6 (PL 122, 168A); IV 4 (MS Douai 202f. 37 v.); H. Dondaine, "Les Expositiones super ierarchiam celestem" de Jean Scot Erigène, *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire de Moyen-âge* 18, 1950-1951; XI 2 (PL 122, 230 B).
(4) Paris Mazarine 561, f. 219.
(5) περι` φύσεων, de rerum natura: cf. the works attributed to Heracleitus (Diog. Laert. IX 5, Simpl., *Phys*. CLI 20 sq.), Xenophanes, and Diogenes of Apollonias; and the *de rerum natura* of Lucretius. See also Plato *Phaedo* 90 A 7, and Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophers*, ed. 3, London 1920, 10 n. 2; 115 n. 5.

From: I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "The Title of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*", *Studia Patristica* 3, 1961, pp. 297-302 [Sheldon-Williams thesis that *Periphyseon* Book One had emerged from an earlier ‘essay in dialectic’ is undemonstrated and had no followers]

ANALYSIS OF BOOK FIRST OF PERIPHYSEON

"Introduction: Definition of φύσις-Natura (441A 1-441B 4).
Chapter I: περι` φύσεως μερισμοῦ (441B 5-450B 2).
1. The four species of Nature (441B 5-10).
2. Classification of the species into pairs of opposites (441B 10-442A 12).
3. The need to discuss each species separately (442A 12-B 9).
4. Amplification of the Introduction, in which Nature was defined as comprising that which is and that which is not. This can be understood-in five different ways (442B 10-446A 3):
(i) That which is sensible or comprehensible is: that which is insensible or incomprehensible is not (443A 9-D 3).
(ii) In a hierarchy, if the superior order is said to be, the lower is said not to be, and vice versa (443D 4-444C 12).
(iii) The manifested effect is: the unmanifested cause is not (444C 13-445B 10).
(iv) That which is is: that which becomes and passes away is not (445B 11-C 2).
(v) Man in a state of grace is: man who has fallen from grace is not (445C 3-446A 3).
5. An objection to 4 (i): angels contemplate the primordial causes, and men may contemplate God in the Beatific Vision; therefore that which by this definition is not is yet comprehensible.
Answer: these comprehend not the nature of what they contemplate, but theophanies of it (446A 3-451C 10). The section includes a digression on theophanies (449A 1-450B 2).
Chapter II: *De natura creante et non creata* (451C 11-462D 8).
1. God is φύσις and therefore *non-creatus*; and is the First Cause and therefore *creans* (451C 11-452A 7).
2. If God is said to be created, this is because He pervades all things and thus becomes manifest in all things, and so comes to being in them. If He did not they would have no being at all (452A 8-455A 6).

3. Therefore, although we cannot know God, we know three things about Him:
(i) that He exists, from the fact that His creatures exist; (ii) that He is wise, from the fact that they are rationally ordered; (iii) that He lives, from the fact that they are in constant motion. These three things are substantial to Him, and therefore we know that He is a Trinity consisting of Being, Wisdom, and Life, i.e. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (455A 6-D 3). 4. How the One God can be Three. His Unity does not exclude multiplicity, and therefore contains within itself the Unbegotten Substance, the Begotten Substance, the Proceeding Substance. The relation of the first to the second is the Father; that of the second to the first is the Son; that of the third to the first and second is the Holy Spirit (455D 3-457D 5).
5. There are two theologies: the Apophatic, which declares that nothing of God's creation can be predicated of Him literally; and the Cataphatic, which declares that all things can be predicated of Him metaphorically. The two are reconciled by adding to every predicate the prefix 'More-than-' (457D 6-462D 8).
Appendix (462D 8-524B 12).
(This appendix applies the principle of the two theologies to each of the ten Categories. It provides the opportunity for a little treatise on the Categories for which an appropriate title would be that which Hugh of St. Victor gave to the whole Book:(1) *On the Ten Categories in relation to God*. The new topic is really broached at 457D 6, where Alumnus breaks into the discussion on the Trinity with the irrelevant words: 'Nosse tamen aperte et breuiter per to uelim utrum omnes categoriae, cum sint numero decem, de summa diuinae bonitatis . . . essentia . . . possint praedicari.' [*] Nutritor insists on dealing with the two theologies first, and then deals with Alumnus' question at 462D 8. Within this appendix there is a long digression which deals with the first eight Categories in greater detail. So as not to obscure the structure of the dialogue, this digression will be analysed separately at the end.)
1. Introduction (462D 8-464A 10).
2. The Ten Categories (464A 10-524B 11)
(i) *essentia* (464A 10-13).
(ii) *quantitas* (464A 13-B 15).

(iii) *qualitas* (464B 15-C 7).
(iv) *relatio* (464C 8-465C 6).
(v) *situs* (465C 7-466A 1).
(vi) *habitus* (466A 2-468B 12).
(vii and viii) *locus, tempus* (468B 13-469A 4).
(Here follows the digression on the first eight Categories, 469A 4-504A 4.)
(ix and x) *agere, pati* (504A 5-524B 11).
Conclusion of Book I (524B 11-12).
Treatise on the First Eight Categories (469A 4-504A 4).
1. Introduction: Alumnus remarks that the nature of the Categories and their application to God have been sufficiently covered (although in fact only eight Categories have so far been dealt with) (469A 4-9).
2. The reduction of the ten Categories to the two higher Categories of status and motus, and of these to the universal genus, φύσις (469A I0-B I 1).
3. Doubts about *habitus* and *relatio*. They have been allocated to *motus*, but seem to be in *status*. Answer: That which subsists in another subject is in motion; *habitus* and *relatio* subsist in another subject; therefore they are in motion (469B 12-470B 3).
4. But this argument would equally apply to *locus, quantitas*, and *situs*, which have been allocated to *status*. Answer: *locus, quantitas*, and *situs* are not in the subject, but rather each is a subject in which other things are. Therefore they are at rest (470B 5-D 3).
5. But *locus, quantitas*, and *situs* s are accidents of *essentia*, and therefore cannot be self-sufficient subjects. Answer: there are two kinds of accidents, περισχαί and συμβάματα. The former enclose the subject and are its limits, and therefore are at rest. *Locus, quantitas*, and *situ* are always this kind of accident, and therefore at rest (470D 3-472B 10).
6. In the course of this discussion the Categories have been shown to be so closely interrelated that Alumnus is compelled to ask for their properties to be clearly distinguished (472B 11-C 3).
7. The properties of the Categories (472C 4-504A 4).
(i) *essentia* (472C 4-15).
(ii) *quantitas* (472C 15-D 9).
(iii) *qualitas* (472B 9-473B 1).

(iv) *relatio* (473B 2-C 8).
(v) *situs* (473C 9-474A 5)-
(vi) *habitus* (474A 6-B 5).
(vii and viii) *locus, tempus* (474B 6-504A 4). With this long section on *locus* and *tempus* the interpolated treatise comes to an end, for the passage on *agere* and *pati* which follows is concerned with the question whether these two Categories may be predicated of God, and therefore belongs to the main body of the Appendix." (pp. 28-22)

Notes

(1) *Eruditionis didascalicon*, iii, PL clxxvi. 765 *De decem categoriis in Deum*; cf. Cappuyns, [*Jean Scot Érigène sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 1933] p. 71, n. 2.
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From: I. P. Sheldon-Williams, *Introduction to Books I-III*, in: Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae *Periphyseon* (De Diuisione Naturae). Liber Primus, Dublin: The Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies 1968.

THE FOUR DIVISION OF NATURA IN THE PERIPHYSEON

The *Periphyseon* begins by setting out a fourfold division of universal nature (...) into: 1) that which is not created and creates, 2) that which is created and creates, 3) that which is created and does not create, and 4) that which is not created and does not create. God, as creator, constitutes 1); the primordial causes -- which are both like Platonic Ideas and the Stoic seminal reasons Eriugena learnt about in Augustine's *Literal Commentary on Genesis* -- make up 2); 3) is the created world of men, animals and things and 4), like 1), is identified with God, but God as the

Final Cause to which all things return. The underlying course of universal history, seen as the progress from 1) to 4), is described in the five books of the work, which takes the form of a dialogue between master and pupil. Book I is mainly devoted to showing that God does not belong to any of Aristotle's ten categories. Drawing on pseudo-Dionysius' negative theology, Eriugena argues that God does not even belong to the first category, that of *ousia* (substance or essence) as Augustine had held. The remaining four books are structured round an exegesis of the story of creation and fall in Genesis, in which Eriugena discovers not only an account of divisions 2) and 3) but also that of the return of all things at the end of time to the uncreated and creating God of 4)." (pp. 120-121)"

From: John Marenbon, "Introduction" to: *John Scottus Eriugena and Anselm of Canterbury,* by Stephen Gersh, in: J. Marenbon (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy*, Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Chapter 6, New York: Routledge 1998.

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Notes

(1) *Eruditionis didascalicon*, iii, PL clxxvi. 765 *De decem categoriis in Deum*; cf. Cappuyns, [*Jean Scot Érigène sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 1933] p. 71, n. 2.
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From: I. P. Sheldon-Williams, *Introduction to Books I-III*, in: Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae *Periphyseon* (De Diuisione Naturae). Liber Primus, Dublin, The Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968, pp. 28-32.

ONTOLOGY AND SEMIOTICS IN THE PERIPHYSEON

"In some respects, Western medieval philosophy can be viewed as beginning with the brilliant and controversial ninth-century thinker John Scottus Eriugena. (1) Marenbon values him for his ability to reason abstractly yet criticizes his tendency to system building. However, it is Eriugena's notion of structure which perhaps makes him closer to modern writers than to other medieval ones.
Few would deny that a particular concept of 'structure' is one of the intellectual paradigms of our era. This involves a priority of

relation to related terms, such relations being either of opposite to opposite where one opposite exists through or is understood through the other, or else of whole to part where the whole exists through or is understood through the part, or vice versa. (...) Although avoiding the term 'structure' itself, Eriugena builds his metaphysical system with identical components. Priority of relation is underlined by his discussion of the Aristotelian categorical doctrine in *Periphyseon* I where the category of 'relation' (*relatio, ad aliquid*) or of 'condition' (*habitus*) is found to be present in all the other categories. (2) Contrast of opposite with opposite is a recurrent theme of Eriugena's writing, as instanced by the negative and affirmative predicates applied to God (I. 458A-462D, II. 599B-600A, III. 684D-685A, etc.) and the five dichotomies constituting nature (II. 529C-545B); contrast of whole with parts is only slightly less frequent, an instance being God's status with regard to created things of which man's is the microcosmic reflection (IV. 759A-B. Cf. II. 523D-524D). Strict relatedness is clearly the writer's underlying assumption in such cases, since each binary term is said to be dependent ontologically and epistemologically on its counterpart (V. 953C-954A, V. 965A-B).

Eriugena exploits the notion of structure in developing his own variant of the classical Platonic Theory of Forms. The expression of this doctrine, acquired through intermediary Greek and Latin patristic sources, combines ontological and semiotic criteria. From the ontological viewpoint, (3) there exists a set of transcendent i.e. atemporal and non-spatial principles. These are termed 'reasons' (*rationes*) in Latin, and 'Ideas' (*ideai*), 'prototypes' *(prototypa*), 'pre- destinations' (*proorismata*), or 'divine volitions' (*theia thelêmata*) in Greek. (4) They possess a metaphysically intermediate status since they depend upon a prior cause: God (the technical term for such dependence being 'participation' (*participatio*), while subsequent terms, created objects, depend on them. (5) According to Eriugenian textual exegesis, when the Bible describes God as making heaven and earth 'in the beginning', it means that the first principle establishes the reasons or Ideas of intellectual or sensible creatures within its Word. (6) Examples of the transcendent principles are Goodness, Being, Life, Wisdom, Truth, Intellect,

Reason, Power, Justice, Salvation, Magnitude, Omnipotence, Eternity, and Peace (II. 616C-617A).
From the semiotic viewpoint, (7) Eriugena proposes an analysis of the term 'nature' (*natura*) using a combination of traditional logical principles like the square of opposition (8) and the division of genus into species versus the partition of whole into parts. (9) Within nature, four 'differences' (*differentiae*) are posited: creating (A), not created (D), created (B), and not creating (C), these combining to form four 'species' (*species*): creating and not created (1), both created and creating (2), created and not creating (3), and neither creating nor created (4). (10) The relations between 1 and 3 and between 2 and 4 are described as 'opposition' (*oppositio*), those between A2 and Al, between B3 and B2, between C3 and C4, and between D4 and D1 as 'similarity' (*similitudo*), and those between B2 and D1, between C3 and A2, between B3 and D4, and between C4 and Al as 'dissimilarity' (*dissimilitudo*) (I. 441A-442A, II. 523D-528B). This semiotic analysis is applied to metaphysics when species 1 is identified with God as the beginning of the cosmic process, species 2 with the reasons or Ideas, species 3 with the effects of the reasons or Ideas, and species 4 with God as end of the cosmic process (11)." (pp. 125-126, some notes omitted).

Notes

(1) The most useful books providing a general introduction to Eriugena's life and works are Cappuyns [1933] and Moran [1988]. See O'Meara and Bieler [1973], Allard [1986], Beierwaltes [1987] and [1990], Jeauneau [1987], for essays on specific aspects of his thought. [*for the complete references see the* Annotated Bibliography]
(2) Eriugena, *Periphyseon* I. 466A-467C. References to Eriugena's work give the column numbers of Floss's edition [6.1] which are reproduced in the modern editions and translations and so provide a standard form of reference. Because of his interpretation of pseudo-Augustine: *The Ten Categories*, Eriugena allows the separate Aristotelian categories of relation and condition to coalesce. On Eriugena's theory see Flasch [1971].

(3) In discussing both Eriugena's and Anselm's notions of structure, I shall distinguish 'ontological' and 'semiotic' components. By the former is meant any aspects of the metaphysical system stated in the texts, by the latter those aspects corresponding to elements in the notion of structure described earlier. Of course, neither Eriugena nor Anselm could have made such a distinction.
(4) II. 529A--C. Elsewhere, Eriugena calls these 'primordial causes' (*causae primordiales*). See III. 622Bff
(5) II. 616B. 'And they are said to be the principles of all things since all things whatsoever that are sensed or understood either in the visible or invisible creation subsist by participation in them, while they themselves are participations in the one cause of all things: that is, the most high and holy Trinity'. Cf. III. 630A--C, III. 644A--B, III. 646B--C, III. 682B--C.
(6) II. 546A--B. 'But on considering the interpretations of many exegetes, nothing strikes me as more probable or likely than that in the aforesaid words of Holy Scripture -- that is, within the meaning of "heaven" and "earth" -- we should understand the primordial causes of the entire creature which the Father had created before the foundation of all other things in his only begotten Son who is designated by the term "beginning", and that by the word "heaven" we should hold the primal causes of intelligible things and celestial essences to have been signified, but by the word "earth" those of the sensible things in which the entire corporeal world is completed'.
(7) That Eriugena was aware of the linguistic even if not semiotic starting point of his analysis is suggested by his reference to nature as a 'generic term' (general nomen) rather than as a generic entity. See Cristiani, [1981].
(8) The square of opposition was a classificatory schema applied by Greek writers of late antiquity to (a) substance and accident and (b) the numbers 1-10. Thus, in (a) four terms: of a subject (A), not in a subject (D), in a subject (B), not of a subject (C) are grouped into four combined terms: of a subject but not in a subject 1), both in a subject and of a subject 2), in a subject but not of a subject 3), neither of a subject nor in a subject 4) where 1 = universal substance, 2 = universal accident, 3 = particular accident, 4 = particular substance. See Porphyry, *On the*

Categories 78, 25ff. In (b) four terms: generating (A), not generated (D), generated (B), not generating (C) are grouped into four combined terms: generating but not generated 1), both generated and generating 2), generated but not generating 3), neither generating nor generated 4) where 1 = the numbers one, two, three, and five, 2 = the number four, 3 = the numbers six, eight, and nine, 4 = the number seven. See Theo of Smyrna, *Exposition of Mathematical Matters* 103. 1-16. Such schemata were repeated in Latin texts and thereby transmitted to Eriugena and others: see Marius Victorinus, *To Candidus* 8. 1-21, Macrobius' commentary on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio* I. 5. 16, Martianus Capella, *On the Marriage of Mercury and Philology*VII. 738, Boethius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* I. 169Bff. The square of opposition in antiquity has been discussed by P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, Paris, 1968 148ff., Libera, A. de, ' *La sémiotique d'Aristote*', in *Structures élémentaires de la signification*, ed. F. Nef, Brussels, 1976, pp. 28-55. The square of opposition in Eriugena has been examined most recently by D'Onofrio [1990] and Beierwaltes [1990] 17-38. An analogous schema applied to propositions was also traditional and certainly known to Eriugena; see Martianus Capella, *On the Marriage of Mercury and Philology* IV. 400-1.
(9) See Martianus Capella, *On the Marriage of Mercury and Philology* IV. 352-4.
(10) I. 441A-442B. Eriugena himself seems to envisage a diagram in the form:



The notation A, B ... 1, 2 ... is not provided by Eriugena.
(11) I. 442A--B, II. 525A, II. 526C-527A, II. 527C. The fourfold schema is repeated later in *Periphyseon* but with no additions to the basic doctrine. Cf. III. 688C-689A, IV. 743B--C, V. 1019A--B.

From: Stephen Gersh, *Structure, Sign, and Ontology from Johannes Scottus Eriugena to Anselm of Canterbury. A reply to Marenbon,* in: *Reading Plato, Tracing Plato. From Ancient Commentary to Medieval Reception,* Aldershot, Ashgate 2005, Essay XIII.

Related pages

The Works of Eriugena: Editions and Translations

Eriugena, *Periphyseon* Book I: Aristotelian Logic and Categories

Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Eriugena:

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Édouard Jeauneau sur la Philosophie Médiévale. Bibliographie Choisie (complete list of his essays on Eriugena)

Index of the Pages on Medieval Philosophy from Boethius to ca. 1400

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The Works of Eriugena: Editions and Translations

EXTANT WORKS OF ERIUGENA (ca. 800/815 - ca. 877) IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

An updated and detailed examination of the manuscripts and editions can be found in the following essay (in Italian): Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi. *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena*. In *La trasmissione dei testi latini del medioevo / Mediaeval Latin Texts and their Transmission*. Edited by Chiesa Paolo and Castaldi Lucia. Firenze: SISMEL - Edizioni del Galluzzo 2005, pp. 186-264.

1. *De diuinae praedestinatione* (On divine predestination) (ca. 850-851)
2. *In Priscianum* [also known as *Glosa Prisciani*] (ca. 850)
3. *Annotationes in Marcianum* (ca. 840-850)
4. *Glosae Martiani* (ca. 840-850)
5. *Glossae divinae historiae* (850-860)
6. *Versio operum sancti Dionysii Areopagitae* (translation of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite) (before 860-864); revised (864-866)
7. *Versio sancti Gregorii Nisseni Sermonis de imagine* (translation of Gregory of Nyssa's *On the Image of Man*) (862-864)

8. *Versio sancti Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad lohannem* (translation of Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua to John*) (862-864)
9. *Versio sancti Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium* (translation of Maximus the Confessor's *Questions to Thalassius*) (864-866)
10. *Periphyseon* (Concerning Nature) (862-866)
11. *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem* (Exposition on the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite) (864-870)
12. *Vox spiritualis aquilae* (Homily on the Prologue to St. John's Gospel) (870-872)
13. *Commentarius in Iohannem* (Commentary on St. John's Gospel) (875-877)
14. *Carmina* (Poems) (850-877)
15. *Epistola "Domine Winiberte..."*

WORKS OF UNCERTAIN ATTRIBUTION

1. *Tractatus in Matheum*: Gustavo Piemonte attributed to Eriugena two sections of this lost work that are found in the *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, a commentary on the Gospel of Matthew attributed to John Chrysostom
2. *Versio Prisciani Lydii Solutiones ad Chosroem regem*
3. *Defloratio de libro Ambrosii Macrobii Theodosii De differentiis et societatibus graeci latinique verbi*

LOST WORKS

1. Translation of the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius of Salamis
2. *Tractatus de uisione Dei*

MODERN EDITIONS OF THE WORKS OF ERIUGENA

1. Johannis, Scoti. 1853. *Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*. Paris.

   Jacques Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia Latina,* vol. 122, coll. 439-1022; reprint: Turnhout, Brepols, 1999.
   The only complete edition, but superseded by the most recent critical editions.

2. Iohanni, Scotti. 1978. *De Divina Praedestinatione*, *Corpus Christianorum*. *Continuatio Mediaevalis; 50*. Turnhout: Brepols.

   Introduction and notes in French.

3. Johannis, Scoti. 1982. *De Diuina Praedestinatone, Enumeratio Formarum*. Turnhout: Brepols.

   Corpus Christianorum. Instrumenta Lexicologica Latina, 4.

4. Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. "In Priscianum." *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* no. 71:115-188.

   Early Medieval Commentary on Priscian's *Institutione grammaticae*.

5. Iohannis, Scotti Eriugenae. 1939. *Annotationes in Marcianum*. Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America.

   Version ot the Commentary on the *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercuri* of Martianus Capella, based on the manuscript Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris *, fonds lat., MS 12960* folios

47r - 115v (known as *Corbiensis*), discovered by Jean-Barthélemy Hauréau: 'Commentaire de Jean Scot Erigene sur Martianus Capella,' *Notices et Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothéque Impériale, XX*, 2, 1862, pp. 1-39. Reprinted 2012.

6. Jeauneau, Edouard. 1978. "Le Commentaire Érigénien Sur Martianus Capella (*De Nuptiis*, Lib. I) D'aprés Le Manuscrit D'Oxford (Bod. Libr. Auct. T.2.19 Fol. 1-31)." In *Quatre Thèmes Érigéniens*, 101-186. Paris: Vrin.

   Conférence Albert-le-Grand 1974.
   Version of the *Annotationes in Marcianum* based on the manuscript *Oxford Bodleian Library Auct T.2.19*, discovered by Lotte Labowsky, *A New Version of Scotus Eriugena's Commentary on Martianus Capella*, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, 1, 1941-1943, pp. 187-193.

7. John, Scottus Eriugena. 1997. *Glossae Divinae Historiae. The Biblical Glosses of John Scottus Eriugena*. Tavarnuzze - Firenze: Edizioni del Galluzzo.

8. Joannis, Scoti Erigenae. 1681. *De Divisione Naturae Libri Quinque Diu Desiderati; Accedit Appendix Ex Ambiguis S. Maximi Graece Et Latine*. Oxford: Theatro Sheldoniano.

   First printed edition; photographic reproduction, Minerva, Frankfurt, 1964.

9. Erigenae, Johannis Scoti. 1838. *De Divisione Naturae Libri Quinque*. Monasterii Guestphalorum: Librariae Aschendorffianae.

   Editio recognita et emendata accedunt tredecim auctoris ad Carolum Calvum ex palinsestis Angeli Maii.

10. Johannis, Scoti. 1853. *De Divisione Naturae Libri Quinque*. Paris.

    Jacques Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia Latina,* vol. 122, coll. 439-1022.

11. Eriugenae, Iohannis Scotti. 1968. *Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae)*, *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*. Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies.

    Book First: *Nature which creates and is not created* (1968); Book Second: *Nature which is created and creates* (1972); Book Third: *Nature which is created and does not create* (1981).
    Latin text established with the collaboration of Ludwig Bieler and English translation by Inglis Patrick Sheldon-Williams.
    Book Fourth: *On the man* (1995) Latin text edited by Édouard A. Jeauneau with the assistance of Mark A. Zier; English translation by John O'Meara and I. P. Sheldon-Williams.
    Book Five: *Nature which neither is created nor creates* (not published; see the critical edition by E. Jeauneau).
    The edition of the Latin text by Sheldon-Williams has been criticized: see the reviews by P. Lucentini (1976), J. Marenbon (1982), A. Breen (1991), in the *Annotated Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Eriugena*.

12. Johannis, Scotti seu Eriugenae. 1996. *Periphyseon*, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*. Turnhout: Brepols.

    Critical edition of the Latin text in five volumes, with introduction in French to every volume.
    Liber primus: *Natura quae creat et non creatur* (1996); Liber secundus: *Natura quae creatur et creat* (1997); Liber tertius: *Natura quae creatur et non creat* (1999); Liber quartus: *De homine* (2000); Liber quintus: *Natura quae nec creat nec creatur* (2003).
    Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, voll. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165.

13. Allard, Guy-H., ed. 1983. *Periphyseon. Indices Generales*. Paris: Vrin.

14. Johannes, Scottus Eriugena. 2007. *Iohannes Scottus Seu Eriugena, Periphyseon / Curante Ctlo, Centre "Traditio Litterarum Occidentalium"*, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*. Turnhout: Brepols.

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    Reprinted, with additions and corrections 1999.
    New edition of the Latin text: Turnhout, Brepols, 2008.

19. Eriugenae, Iohannis Scotti. 2008. *Johannis Scotti Seu Eriugenae Homilia Super "in Principio Erat Verbum"; Et Commentarius in Evangelium Iohannis*. Turnhout: Brepols.

    Critical edition by E. Jeauneau and Andrew J. Hicks with Introductions in French.

20. Johannes, Scoti. 1896. "Carmina." In *Monumenta Germanie Historica, Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini, Iii*, edited by Traube, Ludwig, 518-556. Berlin: Weidmann.

    This edition is superseded by that of M. W. Herren (1993).

21. Iohannis, Scotti. 1993. *Carmina*. Dublin: School of Celtic Studies, Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies.

    Latin and Greek text with English translation.

22. Eriugenae, Iohannis Scotti. 1972. "Epistola "Domine Winiberte..."." *Le Moyen Âge.Revue d'Histoire et de Philologie* no. 1:5-39.

    In: John J. Contreni, *A propos de quelques manuscrits de l'école de Laon au IXe siècle: découvertes et problèmes*, pp. 9-14.
    "The three mss in question are related to the study of Virgil and of Martianus Capella. MS Laon Bibl. Municipale 24 contains on fol. 1r a letter to a certain Winibertus, probably abbot of Schüttern in connection with the correction of a copy of the *De nuptiis*. The letter is in an Irish hand, possibly that of Eriugena. Winibertus (Wenebertus) was known for his scholarly activities which are documented in a poem by Walafrid Strabo. The author of this study emphasises the links between contemporary Irish scholarship in the Rhineland and at Laon. A second Laon ms, MS 468, is a handbook for the study of Virgil and of the liberal arts, from which the text of a poetic *vita* of Virgil is here transcribed (pp. 17-21), part of it identifiable as the *Vita Ternensie,* the remainder probably from Donatus. This manuscript had belonged to Martinus Scottus. Marginal notes in an Irish hand indicate knowledge of Isidore of Seville. The removal of manuscripts of classical texts from Laon in the 16th and 17th century renaissance resulted in discoveries in other libraries of texts related to e.g. MS Laon 444. The author discusses one Vatican manuscript of such probable origin (cf. C. Leonardi, 'Nuove voci poetiche tra secolo IX e XI', *Studi medievali*, 3a serie, II, 1961, 139-168)

the authorship of which might be traced to Auxerre in the late 9th or early 10th century, and probably to Remigius." (B.).

MODERN EDITIONS OF ERIUGENA'S LATIN TRANSLATIONS FROM GREEK

1. Johannis, Scoti. 1853. "Ioannis Scoti Versio Operum S. Dioniysii Areopagitae." In *Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*, edited by Floss, Heinrich Joseph. Paris.

   Patrologia Latina vol. 122, coll. 1023-1194.

2. Chevallier, Philippe, ed. 1937. *Dionysiaca I-Ii*. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer.

   Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aéropage.
   Contains the Latin translation by Eriugena of the works of Pseudo-Dyonisius the Areopagite in two volumes I (1937); II (1950).

3. *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook of Mystical Theology at the University of Paris*. 2004. Leuven: Peeters Publishers.

   The *Mystical Theology* of Dionysius the Areopagite in Eriugena's Latin translation, with the scholia translated by Anastasius the Librarian, and excerpts from Eriugena's Periphyseon.
   Edition, translation, and introduction by L. Michael Harrington.

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Greek text and Latin translation on opposite pages; editorial matter in French.
Vol. I. Quaestiones I-LV; Vol. II. Quaestiones LVI-LXV.

5. Jeauneau, Édouard, ed. 1988. *Maximi Confessoris. Ambigua Ad Iohannem, Iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae Latinam Interpretationem*. Turnhout: Brepols.

   Latin text with commentary in French.

6. Cappuyns, Maïeul. 1965. "Le *De Imagine* De Grégoire De Nysse Traduit Par Jean Scot Érigène." *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* no. 32:205-262.

   Publication of the Latin translation (made ca. 862-864) by John Scottus of the *De hominis opificio XVI* by Grégory of Nissa (P. L. 122, coll. 793C-797C), based on ms. Bamberg B. IV. 13.

MODERN EDITIONS OF THE WORKS OF UNCERTAIN ATTRIBUTION

1. Pseudo-Ioannes, Chrysostomus. 1862. "Opus Imperfectum Im Matthaeum." In *Patrologia Graeca. Vol. 56*, edited by Migne, Jacques Paul, 611-946. Paris.

   English translation: *Incomplete Commentary on Matthew (Opus imperfectum)* with an introduction and notes by James A. Kellerman, edited by Thomas C. Oden; Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010, two volumes.
   The work is probably a compilation of different writings; two groups of homilies: (C1 = 24-31, Migne: 756-798 and C2 = 46b-54, Migne: 897-946) were attributed by Gustavo Piemonte (1996, 2002) to a lost work of Eriugena, the *Tractatus in Matheum* (a commentary on the Gospel of Matthew).

This attribution was accepted by Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi (2005), but has been challenged by Peter Dronke in his *Introduction* to the Italian translation of the first book of the *Periphyseon* (Giovanni Scoto, *Sulle nature dell'universo. Libro I*, Milano, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla - Arnoldo Modadori, 2012, pp. XXXI-XXXII.
See also Jean-Paul Bouhot, *Adapatations latines de l'Homèlie de Jean Chrysostome sur Pierre et Elie (CPG 4513)*, Revue bénédictine, 112, 2002, pp. 201-235: according to the Author the part of the homilies corresponding to C1 and C2 was written in the Carolingian period.
Sigebert of Gembloux (c. 1030 - 1112) in his *Catalogus Sigeberti Gemblacensis monachi de viris illustribus,* Chapter LXV, wrote:
"Joannes Scotus, in exponendis divinis et humanis scripturis satis idoneus, fecit tractatus in Matthaeum. Scripsit librum De officiis humanis et alia quae ab aliis habentur." (John Scotus, in explaining the divine and human Scriptures, made a *tractatus in Mattheum*. He wrote the book of the human duties and other things which others have." (critical edition by Robert Witte, Bern, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1974, p. 71; old edition in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, 56, with the title *Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis*, coll. 547-592).
For completeness, I give also the traditional view on the authorship of this work:
"The *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum* is a set of fifty-four Latin homilies on the first gospel which throughout the Middle Ages were believed to be translations of Greek homilies by John Chrysostom. In reality, they are probably the work of an unidentified Arian bishop or priest writing in Latin in the fifth or sixth century. The great range of dates, authors, and places of origin that have been proposed for these homilies (up through the 1960s) is usefully summarized by Gauthier (1972 pp. 50-54). Dekkers (CPL 707) captures a dominant trend in the scholarship in advocating a date of composition in the mid-sixth century; however, Joop van Banning, the senior editor of a new edition in progress, believes the *Opus* was composed in the

second or third quarter of the fifth century (CCSL 87B.v). Schlatter's (1988) suggestion that the author was Anianus of Celeda is deemed "attractive" yet "problematic" by Cooper (1993), who cautions against accepting this hypothesis without further evidence." (Thomas N. Hall).
Forthcoming in: Thomas N. Hall (ed.), *Sources of Anglo-Saxon Literary Culture. Volume 5: Julius Caesar to Pseudo-Cyril of Alexandria*, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications.
References:
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- Cooper, Kate. 1993. "An(n)ianus of Celeda and the Latin Readers of John Chrysostom." *Studia Patristica* 27: 249-55.
- Dekkers Eligius, 1995. *Clavis patrum latinorum: qua in corpus christianorum edendum optimas quasque scriptorum recensiones a Tertulliano ad Bedam*, Third edtion, Turnhout, Brepols.
- Gauthier, Roland. 1972. *La Vierge Marie d'après l''Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum'*. in: De cultu mariano saeculis VI-XI: Acta Congressus Mariologici-Mariani Internationalis in Croatia anno 1971 celebrati, ed. Joseph Lécuyer et al., vol 3. pp. 49-66. 5 vols. Rome.
- Schlatter, Frederick W. 1988. "The Author of the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum". *Vigiliae Christianae* 42: 364-75.
(See my *Annotated Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Eriugena* for the complete references).

2. Priscianus, Lydus. 1853. "Solution Des Problèmes Proposés Par Chosroes: Traité Inédit De Priscien Le Philosophe." *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* no. 4:248-263.

3. Johannis, Scoti. 1868. "Defloratio De Macrobii Libro De Differentiis Et Societatibus Graeci Latinique Verbi Quam Iohannes (Scilicet Scotus Eriugena) Carpserat (Excerpta Parisina)." In *Grammatici Latini Vol. 5*, edited by Keil, Heinrich, 599-630. Lipsia: B. G. Teubner.

This edition is supersed by that of P. De Paolis (1990).

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   Edizione critica a cura di Paolo De Paolis.

TRANSLATIONS

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1. John, Scottus Eriugena. 1998. *Treatise on Divine Predestination*. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.

   Translated by Mary Brennan; with an introduction by Avital Wohlman.

2. Johannes, Scotus Erigena. 1976. *Periphyseon. On the Division of Nature*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

   Translation of nearly half of *Periphyseon* by Myra Uhlfelder, with introduction and summaries by Jean A. Potter.
   Reprint: Wipf & Stock Publishers, Eugene (Oregon), 2011.
   Contents: Translator's Preface VII-VIII; Introduction IX-XLI; Selected Bibliography XLIII; Book I 1; Book II 107; Book III 123; Book IV 207; Book V 271-362.
   "This work is an attempt to present Eriugena's *Periphyseon: On the Division of Nature* in a fuller translation than is now readily available in English. Where the text has not been translated, summaries have been inserted to give a precise and reasonably detailed idea of the content of passages deleted. The procedure ranges from a complete translation of Book 1 to a treatment of Book 2 almost entirely by summary except for the inclusion of a few brief excerpts. Books 3, 4, and 5 include fairly lengthy passages in translation joined by summaries.

The basic Latin text followed is Floss's edition, printed in volume 122 of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*. Sheldon-Williams's recent edition of Books 1 and 2 is based on earlier manuscripts and would have to be adopted by anyone concerned primarily with paleographical and textual problems. In several passages as noted, Sheldon-Williams's readings are helpful in establishing a controversial reading or correcting a faulty one. On the whole, however, it is encouraging to see how reliable the older text is. The future availability of a complete modern edition, desirable for a number of reasons, will fortunately not invalidate scholarship based on the earlier edition. For a translator who still needs the Floss text for the later books of the *Periphyseon,* this essential soundness of the Floss text is both important and heartening." (from the Translator's Preface).

3. John, Scottus Eriugena. 1987. *Periphyseon. (the Division of Nature)*. Montréal: Bellarmin.

   Translation by I. P. Sheldon-Williams. Revised by John J. O'Meara.
   "About this translation.
   The first three books of this translation are a reproduction, with the minimum necessary adjustments, of that by Dr. I.P. Sheldon-Williams in the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies' edition of the *Periphyseon,* still in course of completion, for which due gratitude to the Institute is hereby expressed. To this has been added the publication of a draft translation of the remaining two books of the work, exactly as edited by H.J. Floss in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* 122, prepared by Sheldon-Williams and considerably revised by me - not however, for reasons of desirable continuity, to the extent of eliminating unusual elements of style and structure that indicate Sheldon-Williams' close and conscious affinity with Eriugena. The *marginalia* for books 4 and 5 are taken from MS Bamberg H.J.IV 6, as reproduced by M. Cappuyns in *Jean Scot Erigene* 207-13. The numbers and letters in the margins refer to the columns

and sections of *P.L.* 122; the numbers (only) refer to the sequence of chapters there. The terms (N)utritor and (A)lumnus correspond to Master and Disciple. For all references, including Biblical, notes, and some help with the use of brackets (especially in the early books) the reader is referred, when it is available, to the Dublin Institute's edition." John J. O'Meara.

4. O'Meara, John J. 1988. "Homily of John Scot, the Translator of the Hierarchy of Dionysius." In *Eriugena*, 158-176. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

   First English translation of the *Homily on the Prologue to St John's Gospel*.

5. Johannes, Scotus Erigena. 1990. *The Voice of the Eagle. Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John*.

   Translation of *Homilia in prologum Sancti Evangelii secundum Joannem,* with an introduction and reflections by Christopher Bamford.

6. Rorem, Paul. 2005. *Eriugena's Commentary on the Dionysian Celestial Hierarchy*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

   Translations of major sections of the *Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem* are appended (pp. 180-226), as well as John's prologue to his earlier translation of the Dionysian corpus (pp. 174-179).
   "The book is a comprehensive study of John Scotus Eriugena's commentary (*Expositiones*) on the Pseudo-Dionysian *Celestial Hierarchy*, with special attention given to its literary form and theological content.
   The order for introducing various aspects of the *Expositiones* follows the format of the work itself: first in John's own order comes the Dionysian text in translation, followed by a paraphrase or two and then by Eriugena's own comments, sometimes on particular sources, more often on the points of doctrine he wants to expound. Thus this book

starts with the author, that is, John's perspective on Dionysius himself (Chapter I: "Dionysian Biographies"). For Eriugena, Dionysius was the Athenian Areopagite, but was he also the Parisian martyr Saint Denis? Turning to the text of *The Celestial Hierarchy,* the particular Greek codex John was working with contained its own variants and challenges (Chapter II: "The Greek Manuscript and Its Problems"). Next comes a study of John's "Patterns of Translation and Paraphrase" (Chapter III). After his multiple paraphrases, Eriugena often adds his own expository remarks, sometimes invoking other sources, especially the remaining works of the Dionysian corpus (Chapter IV).
Those interested primarily in John's philosophical theology could turn directly to the last three chapters, spanning the arc of "procession and return" so characteristic of the *Periphyseon*. The *Expositiones* show a particular interest in creation (Chapter V), anthropology (Chapter VI) and "Christ and Salvation" (Chapter VII). Eriugena's treatment of the doctrine of creation includes a particularly innovative understanding of *creatio ex nihilo*. His anthropology turns on the question of humanity's relationship to the divine, whether immediate (unmediated) or mediated or somehow both. The discussion of Christ includes skillful expansions of the biblical and Dionysian images for Christ, and a presentation of salvation as "theosis" or deification. Translations of major sections of the *Expositiones* are appended, as well as John's prologue to his earlier translation of the Dionysian corpus. The book also contains a bibliography, an index of premodern and modern names, a scriptural index, and an index to the works of Eriugena."

7. *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook of Mystical Theology at the University of Paris*. 2004. Leuven: Peeters Publishers.

   The *Mystical Theology* of Dionysius the Areopagite in Eriugena's Latin translation, with the scholia translated by Anastasius the Librarian, and excerpts from Eriugena's *Periphyseon*.

Edition, translation, and introduction by L. Michael Harrington.

8. Iohannis, Scotti Eriugenae. 1993. *Carmina*. Dublin: School of Celtic Studies, Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies.

   Latin and Greek text with English translation.

FRENCH

1. Érigène, Jean Scot. 1995. *De La Division De La Nature. Periphyseon. Livre I. La Nature Créatrice Incréée. Livre Ii. La Nature Créatrice Créée*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Introduction, traduction et notes par Francis Bertin.

2. ———. 1995. *De La Division De La Nature. Periphyseon. Livre Iii. La Nature Créée Incréatrice*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Introduction, traduction et notes par Francis Bertin.

3. ———. 2000. *De La Division De La Nature. Periphyseon. Livre Iv. La Nature Créée Incréatrice*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Introduction, traduction notes par Francis Bertin.

4. ———. 2009. *De La Division De La Nature. Periphyseon. Livre V. La Nature Incréatrice Et Incréée*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

   Introduction, traduction notes par Francis Bertin.

5. ———. 1969. *Jean Scot. Homélie Sur Le Prologue De Jean, Sources Chrétiennes; 151*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

   Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes de Édouard Jeauneau.

Introduction, critical text, French translation and notes by Édouard Jeauneau (Sources chrétiennes, 151).
New edition of the Latin text: Turnhout, Brepols, 2008 [se the section on the Editions].

6. Jean, Scot. 1972. *Commentaire Sur L'évangile De Jean, Sources Chrétiennes; 180*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

   Introduction, critical text, French translation and notes by Édouard Jeauneau (Sources chrétiennes, 180).
   Reprinted, with additions and corrections 1999.
   New edition of the Latin text: Turnhout, Brepols, 2008 [see the section on the Editions].

ITALIAN

1. Giovanni, Scoto. 2003. *De Praedestinatione Liber. Dialettica E Teologia All'apogeo Della Rinascenza Carolingia*. Firenze: Edizioni del Galluzzo.

   Edizione critica, saggio introduttivo, traduzione e indici lessicali cura di Ernesto Sergio N. Mainoldi.

2. ———. 2012. *Sulle Nature Dell'universo. Libro I (Periphyseon)*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

   Testo latino a fronte, basato sulla Versione II dell'edizione di Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhot, Brepols, 1996-2003), traduzione di Michela Pereira, introduzione e commento di Peter Dronke.

3. ———. 2013. *Sulle Nature Dell'universo. Libro II (Periphyseon)*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

   Testo latino a fronte, basato sulla Versione II dell'edizione di Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhot, Brepols, 1996-2003), traduzione di Michela Pereira, introduzione e commento di Peter Dronke.

4. ———. 2014. *Sulle Nature Dell'universo. Libro III (Periphyseon)*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

   Testo latino a fronte, basato sulla Versione II dell'edizione di Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhot, Brepols, 1996-2003), traduzione di Michela Pereira, introduzione e commento di Peter Dronke.

5. ———. 2016. *Sulle Nature Dell'universo. Libro IV (Periphyseon)*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

   Testo latino a fronte, basato sulla Versione II dell'edizione di Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhot, Brepols, 1996-2003), traduzione di Michela Pereira, introduzione e commento di Peter Dronke.

6. ———. 2017. *Sulle Nature Dell'universo. Libro V (Periphyseon)*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

   Testo latino a fronte, basato sulla Versione II dell'edizione di Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhot, Brepols, 1996-2003), traduzione di Michela Pereira, introduzione e commento di Peter Dronke.

7. Giovanni, Scoto Eriugena. 2013. *Divisione Della Natura*. Milano: Bompiani.

   Testo latino dell'edizione Jeauneau a fronte. Presentazione di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione. introduzione, note e saggio integrativo a cura di Nicola Gorlani.

8. Scoto, Eriugena. 2011. *Il Cammino Di Ritorno a Dio. Il Periphyseon*. Milano: Mimesis.

   Antologia del V libro a cura di Vittorio Chieti.

9. Giovanni, Scoto. 1987. *Omelia Sul Prologo Di Giovanni*. Milano: Mondadori - Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Introduzione e traduzione di Marta Cristiani, testo latino dell'edizione di Jeauneau (con alcune varianti).

10. Scoto, Eriugena, Remigio, di Auxerre, Bernardo, Silvestre, and Anonimi. 2006. *Tutti I Commenti a Marziano Capella*. Milano: Bompiani.

    Testo latino con traduzione italiana a fronte a cura di Ilaria Ramelli; presentazione di Giovanni Reale.

11. Scoto, Eriugena. 2014. *Carmi*. Milano: Jaca Book.

    Prefazione di Giulio D'Onofrio.
    Introduzione, traduzione con testo a fronte e note di Filippo Colnago.

GERMAN

1. Johannes, Scotus Erigena. 1984. *Über Die Einteilung Der Natur*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

   I. Erste Abteilung (Vorwort der Übersetzers und Übersetzung von Ludwig Noack des ersten, zweiten und dritten Buchs) Berlin, 1870; II. Zweite Abteilung (Buch vier bis Schluss des Werkes), Berlin, 1874.
   Nachdruck mit einer Vorbemerkung und neuer Bibliographie von Werner Beierwaltes.

2. ———. 1988. *Denken in Gespräch Mit Dem Engel*. Stuttgart: Verlag Freies Geisteleben.

   Translation of the Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John.

3. ———. 2000. *Die Stimme Des Adlers. Homilie Zum Prolog Des Johannesevangeliums*. Zürich: Chalice Verlag.

   Übertragen und kommentiert von Christopher Bamford.

SPANISH

1. Juan, Escoto Eriúgena. 2007. *Sobre Las Naturalezas (Periphyseon)*. Pamplona: Eunsa.

   Introducción y notas de Lorenzo Velázquez; traducción de Lorenzo Velázquez y Pedro Arias.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES ABOUT JOHN SCOTTUS ERIUGENA

1. Brennan, Mary. 1977. "A Bibliography of Publications in the Field of Eriugenian Studies, 1800-1975." *Studi Medievali* no. 18:401-447.

   Preface by Werner Beierwaltes.
   Introductory note: "The bibliography which follows was initially compiled for the use of members of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies established in 1970. While drawing attention to my major bibliographical sources, indicated in Section I. a., I wish to acknowledge my particular indebtedness to the following members of that Society: W. Beierwaltes, L. Bieler, J. J. Contreni, J. Garcia, E. Jeauneau, H. Liebeschütz and G. Schrimpf. Most particularly I would wish to acknowledge my great debt of gratitude to the late I. P. Sheldon-Williams for his guidance at the early stages of this work.
   I should like also to express my thanks to the former librarian of University College, Dublin, Miss Ellen Power, as well as to assistant librarians R. Brennan and M. Dennigan Brown for much practical help. Finally, I want sincerely to thank Professor John O'Meara of University College under whose direction the work was undertaken and with whose encouragement it is now being published, as also the editor of *Studi Medievali,* Professor Claudio Leonardi, who has made publication possibile.
   The bibliography attempts to cover a limited field. It has been necessary to make judgments in the matter of

inclusion or exclusion of items of related interest. For any shortcomings in this regard I take sole responsibility."
The bibliography contains 520 titles plus 66 Addenda, Index of Authors pp. 443-447.

2. ———. 1989. *Guide Des Études Érigéniennes. Bibliographie Commentée Des Publications 1930-1987 - a Guide to Eriugenian Studies. A Survey of Publications 1930-1987.* Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

   Summaries of 523 publications.
   From the Introduction: "A short section of this survey (I (b): 14-19) draws attention to progress in Eriugenian studies and, in an attempt to illustrate such progress, the individual sections are ordered chronologically from 1930 to 1987 (alphabetically within each year). The year 1930 has been chosen as an appropriate starting point, barely introducing, as it does, the publication in 1933 of *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* by Dom Maïeul Cappuyns (Louvain/Paris 1933; reprint Brussels 1964). That volume was a major contribution to Eriugenian studies in this century. If it does not figure in the body of this survey or in the indices this is because the present writer regards it as meriting a separate survey. One may repeat the judgement of G. Mathon (*) that it dispenses us for the most part from reading the literature that pre-dates it. Hence it seems advisable that any student of Eriugena should begin with Cappuyns. The volume is provided with important bibliography, effective indices and a wealth of analytic treatment within the text itself. It could be assigned to all sections of the present survey, apart from III, (b) *Editions*, and (c) *Instrumenta Lexicologica*. On the other hand, acknowledgement is also due to Migne, *Patrologia Latina* CXXII (Paris 1853) whose publication date lies outside the scope of this survey but which for over a century provided the sole printed edition of most of the works of Eriugena. The present survey is intended as a guide for students and others who may be approaching the study of Eriugena from a great variety of perspectives. The compiler has striven to

present summaries of the material read and not to pass judgement. Titles of books or articles are not always informative and the summaries, even when they may appear to run to some length, are intended only to indicate to the reader the main direction of the publication in question. In the case of books, published reviews have been listed or longer review articles summarised. Unpublished theses have not been included, with the single exception of the study of Greek sources by L. Vietorisz (**). Published *Acta* of conferences are listed both under the editor's name and the names of individual authors of papers. In only two cases is a publication by a single author listed twice, where two quite separate studies appeared in one volume. Where a publication that could be assigned to more than one section has been assigned to only one, the Indices which follow the survey are intended to expand on the information implied by the section headings and titles."
(*) Gérard Mathon, *Jean Scot Erigène,* in: G. Jacquemet (ed.), Catholicisme hier, aujourd'hui, demain, VI (1967) cols. 626-631.
(**) Lenke Vietorisz, *Greek Sources in the 'Periphyseon' of John Scotus, called Eriugena*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1966.
The volume contains 523 titles.

3. Riel, Gerd van. 1996. "A Bibliographical Survey of Eriugenian Studies 1987-1995." In *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena: The Bible and Hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies Held at Leuven and Louvain-La-Neuve, June 7-10, 1995*, edited by Riel, Gerd van, Steel, Carlos and McEnvoy, James, 367-400. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

   "This bibliography is intended to complement the extensive bibliographical study of Mary Brennan [*Guide to Erigenian studies*], whose work covers the period from 1930 to 1987. Among the sources we used, the most important are *Medioevo Latino. Bollettino bibliografico della cultura*

europea dal secolo VI al XIII, a cura di C. Leonardi, Spoleto (Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo); the *Répertoire Bibliographique de la Philosophie - Bibliografisch Repertorium van de Wijsbegeerte,* Louvain-la-Neuve (Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie) Leuven; and the *Bibliography* which Prof. J. McEvoy periodically published *in Eriugena. The Annual Bulletin of SPES* (1992 -).
Contrary to M. Brennan's practice, we did not arrange the references by subject item. Instead, we used larger subdivisions: 1) Bibliographical Surveys, 2) Editions, 3) Translations, 4) Proceedings and *Festschriften,* 5) Collected Papers, 6) Monographs, and 7) Articles. All papers included in the volumes mentioned under the heading "Proceedings and *Festschriften"* figure also as separate articles in the corresponding section.
Summaries are given only when the reference to Eriugena is not clearly stated in the title. Reviews are listed under the sign 'I'. Items marked with an asterisk (*) refer to publications earlier than 1987, not present in the survey of M. Brennan.
I am deeply indebted to all the contributors to this volume (particularly to Prof. J. Contreni and É. Jeauneau), to Prof. W. Beierwaltes and D. Moran, for their willingness to revise the first draft of this survey, and for the additions they suggested. I also want to express my profound gratitude to Prof. C. Steel, for his support and sympathy. *Magistro discipulus opusculum dedico*."
List of 302 titles.

4. ———. 2002. "Eriugenian Studies 1995-2000." In *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time. Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies - Maynooth and Dublin August 16-20, 2000*, edited by McEnvoy, James and Dunne, Michael, 611-636. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"The work of John Scottus Eriugena continues to interest modern scholars. The last lustrum saw the publication of a large amount of articles and books devoted to this early medieval thinker. The most important event in the field of Eriugenian studies was the textual edition, by Edouard Jeauneau, of the *Periphyseon (de divisione naturae),* which will soon be fully achieved. One can expect that this critical edition of Eriugena's major work will give an extra stimulus to the ever growing stream of publications on the Irish master.
This survey of Eriugenian studies completes the "Bibliographical Survey of Eriugenian Studies 1987-1995" [referred to as Van Riel 1996], which was published in the proceedings of the Ninth Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies *(lohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and Hermeneutics,* ed. G. Van Riel, C. Steel, and J. McEvoy, Leuven, 1996, p.367-400). We have adopted the same subdivisions here (editions, translations, monographs, and articles).
The survey also contains an index (authors, topics, and manuscripts), which covers not only the present list of works, but also the "Bibliographical Survey 1987-1995" [the numbers 1-302 refer to items listed there]. This provides the reader with a complete and indexed survey of the period from 1987 to 2000."
List of 134 titles.

5. Sheldon Williams, Inglis Patrick. 1959. "A Bibliography of the Works of Johannes Scottus Eriugena." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* no. 10:198-224.

   "This bibliography is part of the preparation of an edition of Eriugena's *Periphyseon (De diuisione naturae)* for the series, *Scriptores latini Hiberniae*, published by the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies.
   It supplements the shorter one contained in J. F. Kenney's *Sources for the Early History of Ireland,* I: *Ecclesiastical* (New York 1929), and, except in the lists of MSS., does not repeat what is contained there. The letter K against a MS.

indicates that it is mentioned by Kenney. Dom Maieul Cappuyns's study, [*Jean Scot Erigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*] published in 1933, would have afforded a broader and sounder foundation to build upon, but its bibliographical material, though ample, is not systematically arranged. Kenney supplies the form, Cappuyns the greater part of the matter, the rest of which derives from researches carried out since he wrote.

In the light of these researches Eriugena is shown to be the author of the following:

1. *De Praedestinatione* (851) .
2. A commentary on the *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* of Martianus Capella (859/860).
3. A commentary on Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* III, met. 9 (between 859 and 862).
4. A translation of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite (between 860 and 862).
5. A translation of the *Ambigua* of Maximus the Confessor (between 862 and 864).
6. A translation of the *De hominis opificio* of Gregory of Nyssa (De Imagine) (between 862 and 864).
7. A translation of the *De fide* of Epiphanius.
8. *Periphyseon (De diuisione naturae)* (between 864 and 866).
9. Expositiones super Ierarchiam caelestem (between 865 and 870).
10. A revised version of the translation of Dionysius (between 865 and 875).
11. A homily on the Prologue to St. John's Gospel.
12. A commentary on St. John's Gospel.
13. *Tractatus de uisione Dei*.
14. Poems.

Of these fourteen works eight are included in Floss's edition in P.L., CXXII: De Praedestinatione, the translation of Dionysius (the earlier version, emended to some extent from the later), the translation of Maximus (incomplete), Periphyseon, Expositiones (incomplete), the homily and three of the four extant fragments of the commentary on the Fourth Gospel, and the poems (incomplete). A new and

complete edition of the poems was published by Traube in 1896, and in recent years editions have appeared of the Boethius commentary, the missing portion of the Expositiones, and a commentary on Martianus Capella in which parts, at least, of Eriugena's work are included. The MSS. of the De Imagine and the rest of the translation of the Ambigua have been identified by Cappuyns (as, with less certainty, a fourth fragment of the commentary on St. John) but have not been published. The translation of Epiphanius and the Tractatus have not been discovered."

6. ———. 1965. "A List of the Works Doubtfully or Wrongly Attributed to Johannes Scottus Eriugena." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* no. 15:76-98.

   "Eriugena made a name for himself both by his outstanding scholarship and by the boldness, not to say the heterodoxy, of his opinions. As a natural consequence of this, there has been since the Middle Ages a tendency to attribute to him works displaying these characteristics for which no more likely author could be found. My 'Bibliography' of Eriugena (*) was an attempt to give an account of his genuine writings purged of these accretions, and I made no reference to them in it. As, however, many of them have been published under his name in Migne's *Patrologia* and elsewhere, and as the literature in which their genuineness is questioned or refuted is not always easily accessible, it seemed that a supplement to the 'Bibliography' containing a list of the works that were excluded from it with, where possible, the reasons for their exclusion might be useful. This supplement breaks no new ground: particularly, my debt to Dom Maïeul Cappuyns is greater than in the 'Bibliography' for, whereas more Eriugena material has come to light since he wrote, I know of no work excluded by him from the Eriugena *corpus* which has since been proved to be genuine. Such value as this note has is that of convenience.
   It cannot in all respects follow the shape of the 'Bibliography', in which I gave a catalogue of Eriugena's writings, as fully documented as possible and (except for the

Poems) in chronological order. Pseudepigrapha do not require such documentation and do not lend themselves to chronological arrangement. But, since some sort of order must be adopted, I have tried to align them as far as possible with the stages of Eriugena's development as revealed in his genuine extant works, in which he shows himself first (in the *De praedestinatione*) as a controversialist, then (in the commentaries on Martianus Capella and Boethius) as a grammarian and logician, and finally, after reading the Greek Fathers, as a Christian Platonist philosopher. Among the works doubtfully or falsely attributed to him, apologetics are represented by a treatise on the eucharist, grammar and logic by works on Aristotle, Porphyry, the two Priscians, Macrobius, which, if they ever existed, would probably belong to this group; and philosophy by works related to, or influenced by, the translations of the ps.-Dionysius. As in the 'Bibliography' I have left poetical works to the end."
(*) *Journal of Ecclesiastical History,* X (1959), 198-224.

For the current research on Eriugena see: *Medioevo latino. Bollettino bibliografico della cultura europea da Boezio a Erasmo (secoli VI-XV) / Medioevo latino. A Bibliographical Bulletin of European Culture from Boethius to Erasmus (VIth to XVth century).*

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF ERIUGENAN STUDIES (SPES)

1. O'Meara, John J., and Bieler, Ludwig, eds. 1973. *The Mind of Eriugena*. Dublin: Irish University Press.
Papers of a Colloquium, Dublin, 14-18 July 1970.
Contents (every essay os followed by a Discussion): John J. O'Meara; Introduction VII; 1. I. P. Sheldon-Williams: Eriugena's Greek Sources 1; 2. Jean Pépin: *Mysteria* et

Symbola dans le commentaire de Jean Scot sur l'evangile de Saint Jean 16; 3. Robert Russell: Some Augustinian Influences in Eriugena's *De diuisione naturae* 31; 4. Marta Cristiani: Le problème du lieu et du temps dans le livre Ier du 'Periphyseon' 41; 5. Hans Liebeschütz: The Place of the Martianus *Glossae* in the Development of Eriugena's Thought 49;
6. René Roques: Traduction ou interpretation? Brèves remarques sur Jean Scot traducteur de Denys 59; 7. Paul Meyvaert: Eriugena's Translation of the *Ad Thalassium* of Maximus: Preliminaries to an Edition of this Work 78; 8. Jeanne Barbet: La tradition du texte latin de la Hiérarchie céleste dans les manuscrits des *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* 89; 9. Jean Trouillard: Erigène et la théophanie creatrice 98; 10. Edouard Jeauneau: Influences érigénionnes dans une homélie d'Héric d'Auxerre 114; 11. Gangolf Schrimpf: Zur Frage der Authentizität unserer Texte von Johannes Scottus' 'Annotationes in Martianum' 125; 12. Ludwig Bieler: Remarks on Eriugena's Original Latin Prose 140; 13. Guy-H. Allard: La structure litteraire de la composition du *De diuisione naturae* 147; 14. Nikolaus M. Haring: John Scottus in Twelfth Century Angelology 158; 15. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny: Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Erigène et d'Avicenne. Notes sur le *De causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui consequitur eas* 170; 16. Yves Christe: Quelques portails romans et l'idee de théophanie selon Jean Scot Erigène 182; 17. Werner Beierwaltes: The Revaluation of John Scottus Eriugena in German Idealism 190-199.

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   A collection of papers originally delivered at an international conference organized in Dublin in March 2002 by the University of Notre Dame and Trinity College Dublin.
   Contents: Stephen Gersh and Dermot Moran: Introduction 1; Chapter 1: Vasilis Politis: Non-subjective idealism in Plato (*Sophist* 248e-249d) 14; Chapter 2: John Dillon: The platonic forms as *Gesetze*: could Paul Natorp have been right? 39; Chapter 3: Vittorio Hösle: Platonism and its interpretations: the three paradigms and their place in the history of hermeneutics 54; Chapter 4: Gretchen Reydams-Schils: The Roman Stoics on divine thinking and human knowledge 81; Chapter 5: Andrew Smith: The object of perception in Plotinus 95; Chapter 6:Jean Pépin: Saint Augustine and the indwelling of the ideas in God 105; Chapter 7: Dermot Moran: *Spiritualis incrassatio*: Eriugena's intellectualist immaterialism: is it an idealism? 123; Chapter 8: Stephen Gersh: Eriugena's fourfold contemplation: idealism and arithmetic 151; Chapter 9: Agnieszka Kijewska: Eriugena's idealist interpretation of paradise 168; Chapter 10: Peter Adamson: Immanence and transcendence: intellect and forms in al-Kindi and the *Liber de causis* 187; Chapter 11: Bertil Belfrage: The scientific

background of George Berkeley's idealism 202; Chapter 12: Timo Airaksinen: The chain and the animal: idealism in Berkeley's Siris 224; Chapter 13: Karl Ameriks: Idealism from Kant to Berkeley 244; Chapter 14: Walter Jaeschke: Idealism and realism in classical German philosophy 269; Bibliography 285; Index 301-318.

4. "Erigène." 2013. *Les Études philosophiques* no. 104:3-141.

   Edité par Willemien Otten.
   Table des matières: Willemien Otten: Avant-propos 3; Bernard McGinn: Jean Scot Érigène. Une introduction 7; Édouard Jeauneau: Le *Periphyseon*: son titre, son plan, ses remaniements 13; Dermot Moran: Jean Scot Érigène, la connaissance de soi et la tradition idéaliste 29; Stephen Gersh: L' *ordo naturalis* des causes primordiales. La transformation érigénienne de la doctrine dionysienne de noms divins 57; Adrian Guiu: Le *Periphyseon* d'Érigène comme une extrapolation de l' *Ambiguum* de Maxime le Confesseur 79; Elizabeth Kendig; La forme dialogique dans le *Periphyseon*: recréer l'esprit 101; Willemien Otten: Le langage de l'union mystique: le désir et le corps dans l'œuvre de Jean Scot Érigène et de Meister Eckhart 121-141.

5. Allard, Guy-H. 1973. "La Structure Littéraire De La Composition Du *De Diuisione Naturae*." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 147-157. Dublin: Irish University Press.

6. ———. 1977. "Quelques Rémarques Sur La " *Disputationis Series*" Du *De Divisione Naturae*." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 211-224. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

   "This author fids that Eriugena in the *Periphyseon* does fulfil his promise of an internal order and coherence in the progress of his reasoning. But the order may be difficult to discern. The author proposes to survey the *Periphyseon* on three levels - logical, pedagogical and epistemological. The

work is a vast logical definition of the *phusis,* entirely centred on the *universitas*. The ten categories are not merely the objects of Eriugena's discourse but the conditions thereof (p. 213). This author considers Eriugena's four divisions of nature and five modes of being in the light of that remark: even in these basic analyses there is a logical order of anteriority and posteriority. At the pedagogical level the *Periphyseon* is a debate and between the two participants in the dialogue there is the mediatory figure of Reason. The device of *repetitio* far from manifesting mere prolixity is a time-honoured element of rhetoric: it represents the gradual adaptation of the eye to the light (p. 218) and clarifies any obscurities remaining over from earlier exposition of a theme; the dialogue takes on the allure of a symphony. In Book I the discussion of the Categories is a propaedeutic to the principal theme. At the epistemological level the discussion moves from the deep obscurity of being/non-being to 'the less obscure and to epiphanies. This author emphasises the framework of the *trivium* to be discerned in the structure of the *Periphyseon*. The metaphor of a knot which is to be untied is recurrent; reasoning is a weave and God a weaver." (B. p. 233)

7. ———. 1981. "The Primacy of Existence in the Thought of Eriugena." In *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 89-96. Albany: State University of New York Press.

8. ———. 1989. "Un Analyseur Syntaxique Du *Periphyseon*." In *Giovanni Scoto Nel Suo Tempo. L'organizzazione Del Sapere in Età Carolingia*, edited by Leonardi, Claudio, 457-467. Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo.

9. ———. 1990. ""Medietas" Chez Jean Scot." In *Begriff Und Metapher. Sprachform Des Denkens Bei Eriugena*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 95-107. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

10. ———. 1991. "Jean Scot Et L'ordinateur: Le Traitement Syntaxique Du "Periphyseon"." In *From Augustine to*

Eriugena. Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'meara, edited by Martin, Francis X. and Richmond, John A., 1-11. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

11. ———. 1992. "Jean Scot Et La Logique Des Propositions Contraires." In *From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau*, edited by Westra, Haijo Jan, 181-193. Leiden: Brill.

12. Alverny, Marie-Thérèse d'. 1977. "Les "Solutiones Ad Chosroem" De Priscianus Lydus Et Jean Scot." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 145-160. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

    Repris dans: M.-T. d'Alverny, *La transmission des textes philosophiques et scientifiques au Moyen Age*, Aldershot, Variorum, 1994.

13. Ansorge, Dirk. 1996. *Johannes Scottus Eriugena: Wahrheit Als Prozess. Eine Theologische Interpretation Von "Periphyseon"*. Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag.

14. Armando, Bisogno. 2002. "Essentia, Voluntas, Et Scientia': Esiti Escatologici Della Gnoseologia Del *De Praedestinatione Liber*." In *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time*, edited by McEvoy, James and Dunne, Michael, 283-302. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

15. Armstrong, Arthur Hilary. 1980. "Philosophy, Theology and Interpretation: The Interpretation of Interpreters." In *Eriugena. Studien Zu Seinen Quellen*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 7-14. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

16. ———. 1991. "Apophatic-Kataphatic Tensions in Religious Thought from the Third to the Sixth Century A.D.: A Background for Augustine and Eriugena." In *From*

Augustine to Eriugena. Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'meara, edited by Martin, Francis X. and Richmond, John A., 12-21. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

17. Arruzza, Cinzia. 2003. "Ordo E Mediazione Gerarchica Nelle *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem* Di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena." *Studi medievali* no. 44:117-145.

18. ———. 2013. "The Authority of Reason: On John Scottus Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, I.508c-513c." *Glossator* no. 7:137-150.

19. Athanasopoulos, Constantinos. 2004. "The Influence of Dionysius the Areopagite on Ioannes Scotus Eriugena and St. Gregorios Palamas: Goodness as Transcendence of Metaphysics." In *Being or Good? Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism*, edited by Kijewska, Agnieszka, 319-341. Lublin: Wydaw Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski.

    "Studies the Platonist and Neoplatonist project of uniting metaphysics and ethics, as reflected in the interpretations of Pseudo-Dionysius by Ioannes Scotus Eriugena and Gregory Palamas"

20. Barbet, Jeanne. 1973. "La Tradition Du Texte Latin De La Hiérarchie Céleste Dans Les Manuscrits Des *Expositiones in Hierarchiam Caelestem*." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 89-96. Dublin: Irish University Press.

21. ———. 1977. "Le Traitement Des "Expositiones in Ierarchiam Caelestem" De Jean Scot Par Le Compilateur Du *Corpus* Dionysien Du Xiiie Siècle." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 125-134. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

22. Beierwaltes, Werner. 1973. "The Revaluation of John Scottus Eriugena in German Idealism." In *The Mind of*

Eriugena, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 190-198. Dublin: Irish University Press.

23. ———. 1977. ""Negati Affirmatio": Welt Als Metapher. Zu Grundlegung Einer Milltelaterlichen Aesthetik." In *Jean Scot Érigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 263-276. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

24. ———. 1986. "Language and Object. Reflexions on Eriugena's Valuation of the Function and Capacities of Language." In *Jean Scot Écrivain*, edited by Allard, Guy-H., 209-228. Paris: Vrin.

    Translated from German by Dominic J. O'Meara.
    "This author confronts the question of the extent to which Eriugena shows trust or distrust concerning the nature, capacity and function of language. Philosophers and theologians are faced with the problem of expressing in words the ineffability of that which they recognise to be ineffable and inexpressible. The author takes Eriugena's thought as a paradigm for the evaluation of the relationship between thought and words, language and its object, and considers it under certain headings. I: Thought does not lose but retains its spirituality in being expressed in words (pp. 524 ff.): the spoken word is an exteriorising of an already 'sensualised' *sensus interior* which, together with *intellectus* and *ratio,* form in man's thought a structure analogous to the Holy Trinity. JSE (p. 527B) comes close to extreme 'idealism' in seeming to identify the notion of a thing with the thing itself: the substance is the concept. Newertheless we cannot fully know *what* they are. (Hence how can we hope to know *what* God is.) The author proceeds to comment on JSE's analysis of the relationship between man's thought, understanding and word, which depends ultimately on God's 'enlightenment' of man.
    II. The author deals with a particular aspect of God's ineffability and JSE's dissatisfaction in an approach to the topic metaphorically *(translative),* and his preference for

the negative approach *(nihil per excellentiam, per infinitatem)*. The only difference between the first and fourth divisions of Nature is in *our* concept and description of them.
III. The author chooses two terms, *dialectica* and *transitus,* with which to exemplify JSE's own application of his theories on language. (i) *Dialectica:* the dialectical functions of division and resolution (particular/general correspond with the philosophical notions of *descendere* and *ascendere,* the many/the One). Dialectic, according to JSE, is not a mere human device but established within existence itself. The existence of God himself is dialectically structured, negatively and affirmatively, in nothingness and super-essence. The author elaborates this point with many references to the text of the *Periphyseon*. (ii) *Transitus:* this term, according to the author, has a very wide reference in respect of JSE's use of it. It has more than a dialectical verbal connotation: it implies the entire process of creation and return; e.g. God's creation of Himself from nothingness is a 'crossing-over'. The theme of *transitus* occurs also in JSE's poetry, e.g. *Carmina* II, III (ed. Traube), and the author adverts to possible Irish echoes here."

25. ———. 1987. "Eriugena Und Cusanus." In *Eriugena Redivivus. Zur Wirkungeschichte Seines Denkens Im Mittelalter Und Im Übergang Zur Neuzeit*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 311-343. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Revised edition in: *Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens*, pp. 266-312.
English translation: *Cusanus and Eriugena*, Dionysius, 13, 1989, pp. 115-152.

26. ———. 1990. ""Duplex Theoria". Zu Einer Denkform Eriugenas." In *Begriff Und Metapher. Sprachform Des Denkens Bei Eriugena*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 39-64. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Revised edition in: *Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens*, pp. 82-114.

27. ———. 1990. "Unity and Trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena." *Hermathena* no. 157:1-20.

28. ———. 1991. "Eriugenas Faszination." *...Ut Sua Osculabuntur*" (' *Periphyseon*', V 40)." In *From Augustine to Eriugena. Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'meara*, edited by Martin, Francis X. and Richmond, John A., 22-41. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

    Revised version in: Revised edition in: *Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens*, pp. 13-31.

29. ———. 1992. "Eriugena's Platonism." *Hermathena* no. 149:53-72.

30. ———. 1994. "Unity and Trinity in East and West." In *Eriugena East and West*, edited by McGinn, Bernard and Otten, Willemien, 209-231. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

31. ———. 1994. *Eriugena. Grundzüge Seines Denkens*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

    Translated in Italian as: *Eriugena. I fondamenti del suo pensiero*, traduzione di Enrico Peroli, Presentazione di Giovanni Reale, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1998.

32. Bertin, Francis. 1977. "Les Origines De L'homme Chez Jean Scot." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 307-314. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

33. Bieler, Ludwig. 1973. "Remarks on Eriugena's Original Latin Prose." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 140-146. Dublin: Irish University Press.

34. Bischoff, Bernhard. 1977. "Ein Neuer Text Aus Der Gedankenwelt Des Johannes Scottus." In *Jean Scot Erigène*

Et L'histoire De La Philosophie, edited by Roques, René, 109-116. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

35. Bishop, Terence Alan Martyn. 1977. "Autographa of John the Scot." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 89-94. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

36. ———. 1980. " *Periphyseon*:An Episode in the Tradition." *Transactions of Cambridge Bibliographical Society* no. 7:411-426.

37. ———. 1982. "Periphyseon: The Descent of the Uncompleted Copy." In *Ireland in Early Mediaeval Europe. Studies in Memory of Kathleen Hughes*, edited by Whitelock, Dorothy, McKitterick, Rosamond and Dumville, David, 281-304. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

38. Bonfiglioli, Stefania, and Marmo, Costantino. 2007. "Symbolism and Linguistic Semantics. Some Questions (and Confusions) from Late Antique Neoplatonism up to Eriugena." *Vivarium* no. 45:238-252.

39. Breen, Aidan. 1991. "Iohannes Scottus, "Periphyseon": The Problems of an Edition." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy.Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* no. 91C:21-40.

    "The complex recensional history of "Periphyseon" poses especial difficulties for an editor, particularly in Books I-III. An outline of the ramifications of the problem is given here with respect to the palaeographical characteristics of the primary MSS, RB, the various recensions of the text represented in those MSS, the shortcomings in the text and apparatus of the printed edition (a sample list of errors from parts of Books I and III only), as well as other technical difficulties in the edition. A sample edition of a small portion of Bk IV is presented as an illustration of one solution to these problems.

I. Palaeography
The complex palaeographical problems relating to the earliest MSS of *Periphyseon* were very inadequately treated in the introduction to the edition of Book I (Sheldon-Williams 1968) and have not otherwise been fully analysed since then. Our understanding of the development of the various strata of the text, laid down by a succession of amending scribes over several years, is consequently still unclear. The present contribution will outline the ramifications of the problem and propose a few solutions. A sample edition of Book IV, up to the end of the third lemma in Recension II, is given for comparison with the published edition of Books I-III (Sheldon-Williams 1968; 1972; 1981). But what has been done cannot be undone: it was singularly unfortunate that the editor should have been permitted, without rigorous supervision, to continue with a project that was flawed at its basis and could only aggravate the burden of its errors with each succeeding publication." p. 21

40. Brennan, Mary. 1986. "Materials for the Biography of Johannes Scottus Eriugena." *Studi Medievali* no. 27:413-460.

"Below are close on forty testimonia dating from the ninth to the seventeenth century, of which the first fourteen, of the ninth and tenth century, could be said to have been original evidence and have been so considered; the remainder appear (with the exception of that of John Bale who introduced new exotic information in the sixteenth century) to be largely an elaboration of the notable twelfth century accounts of William of Malmesbury. On the other hand, intimations of the Malmesbury version can already be found in tenth and eleventh century material (e.g. Testimonia 14, 15, 16) possibly originating with Asser, bishop of Sherborne, who died in 910 - thus almost 'contemporary' - but the subject of which « Johannes » cannot clearly be identified as Eriugena. This identification was, for a variety of reasons favoured by James Ussher, Lord Archbishop of Armagh in *A Discourse of the Religion*

anciently professed by the Irish and British, first printed in 1631 (Ussher, *The Whole Works*, ed. C. R. Elrington, Dublin, 1847, IV, p. 285). Ussher is also credited with being the first to combine the surnames « Scottus » and « Eriugena » (*Veterum epistolarum Hibernicarum sylloge*, Dublin, 1632, p. 57), a nomenclature subsequently to be established by Thomas Gale in the first printed edition of the *Periphyseon* published at Oxford in 1681.
Unhappily, one is far from being able to proclaim the undoubted authenticity of those first fourteen contemporary or near-contemporary *testimonia*. The first four, contemporary, illuminating and interrelated, adduced by recent scholarship, are ultimately circumstantial pieces of evidence. The rebuke supposedly administered to Eriugena by Pope Nicholas I (*Testimonium* 10), accepted as authentic by William of Malmesbury and later writers, has been critically shown to have its origins no earlier than in the twelfth century. Hence there remains only the matter of eight testimonia (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14: 12 is of doubtful significance) to add little to what might be inferred from Eriugena's own writings - that he came from Ireland, that he was not only learned but holy, that he impressed many by his exceptional erudition, and particularly by his knowledge of Greek, but that his preference for the Greek view offended not a few of his western contemporaries. Eriugenian scholarship is nowadays more concerned, and rightly so, with the sources of his erudition and, as we shall see in the first four *testimonia*, with the many facets of this erudition and, whereas the slightest detail about his early life could contribute to the discovery of his sources, one cannot but continue to be intrigued by the question of where and when, rather than how he ended his days." (pp. 414-415).
Testimonia 1-37 with Latin text and English translation: pp. 416-457; Index of Topics and Authors: 457-460.

41. Breton, Stanislas. 1977. "Langage Spatial, Langage Métaphysique Dans Le Néo-Platonisme Érigénien." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by

Roques, René, 357-366. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

42. Brueren, Rainier. 1990. "Die Schrift Als Paradigma Der Wahrheit. Gedanken Zum Vorbegriff Der Metaphysik Bei Johannes Scotus Eriugena." In *Begriff Und Metapher. Sprachform Des Denkens Bei Eriugena*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 187-201. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

43. Cappuyns, Maïeul. 1933. *Jean Scot Erigène Sa Vie, Son œuvre, Sa Pensée*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.

    Réimpression anastatique: Bruxelles, Culture et Civilisation, 1964.

44. ———. 1964. "Jean Scot Érigène Et Les *Scoliae* De Maxime Le Confesseur." *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* no. 31:122-124.

    Ce que Jean Scot appelle *Scoliae,* ce sont les *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*.

45. Carabine, Deirdre. 1990. " *Apophasis* and Metaphysics in the *Periphyseon* of John Scottus Eriugena." *Philosophical Studies (Dublin)* no. 32:63-82.

46. ———. 1994. "Eriugena's Use of the Symbolism of Light, Cloud, Aand Darkness in the *Periphyseon*." In *Eriugena East and West*, edited by McGinn, Bernard and Otten, Willemien, 141-152. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

47. ———. 1996. *The Unknown God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena*. Louvain: Peeters Publishers.

48. ———. 2000. *John Scottus Eriugena*. New York: Oxford University Press.

49. Chiesa, Paolo. 1989. "Traduzioni E Traduttori Dal Greco Nel Ix Secolo: Sviluppi Di Una Tecnica." In *Giovanni Scoto Nel Suo Tempo. L'organizzazione Del Sapere in Età Carolingia*, 171-200. Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo.

50. Coallier, Christine. 1986. "Le Vocabulaire Des Arts Libéraux Dans Le "Periphyseon"." In *Jean Scot Écrivain*, edited by Allard, Guy-H., 343-360. Paris: Vrin.

    "The sted purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between Eriugena's theory and *praxis* of the arts. Making use of the computer programmes devised principally at the Université de Montréal this author has been able to establish that close to three quarters of the significant vocabulary in the *Periphyseon* is related to one or other of the *artes*. The study is extended further to discover in which of the seven disciplines Eriugena most often, assumes the role of *magister* and it is found that the *trivium* receives far greater attention than does the *quadrivium*. The author points out the originality of Eriugena's elaboration of expressions in the field of *dialectica* in the course of the five books. She, particularises, with the aid of tables, on the distribution of the other disciplines throughout the books, noting that *musica* has a global aspect within the *quadrivium* transcending its mere specific reference. The author pursued her computer investigation further to include an analysis of the occurrences of the *decem categoriae* within the *Periphyseon:* her findings suggest that it is simplistic -- in view of the uneven distribution of their occurrences -- to regard Book I as a concealed gloss on Aristotle's work (p. 356). Coupled with Eriugena's discourse on the four elements these physical references i.e. to *natura* (in Books III and V) create a balance. within the ambit of the *quadrivium* to match the major emphasis of *dialectica* in Book II, with an even emphasis from both groups in Books I and IV." (B. pp. 121-122).

51. Colish, Marcia L. 1990. "Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot's Conception of "Nihil"." In *Knowledge and the*

Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.) Helsinki 24-29 August 1987, edited by Knuuttila, Simo, Asztalos, Monika, Tyorinoja, Reijno and Ebbesen, Sten, 385-404. Helsinki.

Voume II.

52. Colnago, Filippo. 2009. *Poesia E Teologia in Giovanni Scoto L'eriugena*. Roma: Herder.

53. Courtine, Jean-Franois. 1980. "La Dimension Spatio-Temporelle Dans La Problématique Catégoriale Du *De Divisione Naturae* De Jean Scot Érigène." *Études Philosophiques*:343-367.

    "After a brief critique of some recent scholarly interpretations of the *Periphyseon,* including the views of I. P. Sheldon-Williams, this author confines his considerations to Book I. Themes treated include *universitas,* incognoscibility, the significance of the section on the *categoriae decem* within Book I. The author regards as crucial for Eriugena the passages on time and space, representing, he believes, the *circumstantiae,* to be distinguished from *essentia,* and he links the distinction with that of apophatic and kataphatic expression. The second half of the article concentrates on the categories of space and time. The author recognises Eriugena's debt to Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus in his treatment of those themes. Their equivalencies of *status* and *motus* are also traced to ancient secular sources. The author concludes, as he had begun, by remarking that the 'digression' on the categories in *Periphyseon* I should not be so regarded: on the contrary it is central to Eriugena's views on creation." (B. p. 247)

54. ———. 2003. "Les Catégories Dans Le *De Divisione Naturae* De Jean Scot Érigène." In *Les Catégories De L'être. Études De Philosophie Ancienne Et Médiévale*, 129-166. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

55. Cristiani, Marta. 1973. "Le Problème Du Lieu Et Du Temps Dans Le Livre Ier Du "Periphyseon"." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 41-48. Dublin: Irish University Press.

    "The very limitations of space and time allow us mentally to grasp the unattainable unity within the Causes by individualised beings *(Periphyseon* I, 25: *PL* 122, 471B-C). Whereas Eriugena's byzantine patristic sources had considered this problem and declared the human mind inadequate, his optimistic view included this process within the *divisio* of nature, from unity to multiplicity. For Eriugena full knowledge implies definition, limitation, hence God's knowledge of *quid sit* would delimit that *quid*. The positive theology of psDionysius as expressed in such delimiting terminology, is often translated by Eriugena with the prefix *circum-*. The ten categories are the instruments of definition and delimitation, particularly that of *locus,* which following Maximus is inseparable from that of *tempus (Periphyseon* I, 39: *PL* 122, 481 B-C). Nevertheless, as this author is quick to point out, there is a reversal of emphasis on Eriugena's part and while she suggests possible neoplatonist sources she equally quickly rejects them (pp. 45-6).
    The discussion following the paper cented to some degree on Augustinian influences as well as (from W. Beierwaltes) the view that there was an aristotelian influence received through Maximus." (B. pp. 221-222).

56. ———. 1973. "Lo Spazio E Il Tempo Nell'opera Dell'eriugena." *Studi Medievali*:39-136.

    "The author of this study suggests at the outset that she intends the term 'spazio' to be construed rather as 'place' *(locus)* and proposes to deal with her theme in the context of *Periphyseon* Books I and V, that is in relation first to *processio* - in which Eriugena makes a coherent case -- and then to *reditus* -- where the clear-cut arguments cannot apply.

Section I (pp. 40-116) explores the question in relation to *processio* under the following headings: (1) the incognoscibility of Essence: Eriugena's (mis) translation of the ps-Dionysian dictum is adduced: *Cognitio... eorum quae sunt, ea, quae sunt, est*. In the formulation of his system his debt to Maximus Confessor and consequently to Gregory is emphasised. (2) *"Terminus naturae"*: *locus* is one of the categories which though in describing a being necessarily delimits it yet renders it less unknowable; likewise the category *tempus* enjoys equal privilege. (3) The Unity of the Categories and the problem of *"locus"*: the question of *locus* is discussed within the tradition of Plato and Porphyry as well as of the skeptic, Sextus Empiricus, all responding to the *Categoriae* of Aristotle. (4) The notion of place as a function of the intellect: Eriugena did not adhere to the strict hierarchical structure of the ps-Dionysius. The distinction between knowledge of *quia est* and *quid est* and the problem of the divine intellect as *locus sui* are discussed. The variety of his sources has complicated the problem. (5) Spatio-temporal unity: on the question of time Eriugena has a clearer view. Again sources are discussed, going back to the Stoics, with Maximus Confessor providing the principal inspiration. Knowledge must be expressed in terms of space and time *(Periphyseon* I, 39, col. 481BC). (6) Space and time, primordial conditions of the real: this heading indicates Eriugena's divergence from the views of Maximus. Eriugena held a more dynamic view of creation. The question of other sources is looked into, particularly concerning the interpretation of the biblical *principium (arché)* (7)' Conclusion: Space and Time perform the function of determining and circumscribing and stabilising the frontiers of being; they precede created nature; they are a function of the intellect in the cognitive act.
Section II (pp. 116-134) considers space and time in the perspective of the *reditus*. This author suggests that the imprecision of language on this question may seem to involve a paradox in Eriugena's exposition (Book V) but it does contain its own internal logic. The Pauline phrase *tempora aetema* is adduced in relation to the Primordial

Causes. Eriugena has recourse to Augustinian texts to help him reconcile seemingly impossible contradictions. The author believes that even if Eriugena does seem to express views that are superficially negative, the *recapitulatio* profoundly demonstrates the ontological necessity of the incarnation of the Word *(Periphyseon* V, 29, col. 912 B). Eriugena's originality would seem to have been his characterisation of space and time as intellectual, not material categories." (B. pp. 220-221)

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    Contents: Preface VII; Acknowledgments XI; Introduction. I. Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scottus Eriugena, Nicholas of Cusa: An Approach to the Hermeneutic of the Divine Names 3; Part I: *John Scottus Eriugena*. II. Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Scottus Eriugena 23; III. Nature as Speech and Book in John Scottus Eriugena 41; IV. Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's *Periphyseon* 49; V. Isaiah Meets the Seraph: Breaking Ranks in Dionysius and Eriugena? 67; VI. Denial or Promise of the Tree of Life?: - Eriugena, Augustine, and Genesis 3:22b 85; VII: Virgins in Paradise: Deification and Exegesis in *Periphyseon V* (co-authored with Paul A. Dietrich) 101; VIII. Hell and Damnation in Eriugena (co-authored with Paul A. Dietrich) 121-138.

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    This essay is about the discovery of a commentary *In Priscianum*, to be attributed to Eriugena. An appenidx contains the edition of the *accessus* to the commentary.

87. Erismann, Christophe. 2002. " *Generalis Essentia*. La Théorie Érigénienne De L' *Ousia* Et Le Problème Des Universaux." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Age* no. 69:7-37.

    "La problématique philosophique d'Erigène - catégories, universaux, individuation - se noue autour de la notion d'ousia, comprise soit comme l'essence générale, genre suprême unique, soit comme substance particulière. En opposition aux Catégories, Jean Scot défend un réalisme radical, concevant l'individuation comme accidentelle et le particulier comme un rassemblement de propriétés universelles. Guillaume de Champeaux reprendra cette position dans sa théorie réaliste dite de l'essence matérielle."

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90. ———. 2004. " *Processio Id Est Multiplicatio*. L'influence Latine De L'ontologie De Porphyre: Le Cas De Jean Scot Érigène." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* no. 88:401-460.

"Porphyre fait subir dans l' *lsagoge* une inflexion platonicienne au système ontologique des *Catégories* d'Aristote et investit les catégories d'une signification métaphysique. Plusieurs penseurs du haut Moyen âge - les réalistes - ont amplifié et explicité cette métaphysique. La lecture et l'usage ontologiques de l' *Isagoge* par Jean Scot Erigène, dans son *Periphyseon*, est à ce titre un cas d'école. Influencé par le néoplatonisme tardif de Proclus, Jean Scot se sert des outils conceptuels de l' *Isagoge* pour élaborer son système philosophique."

91. ———. 2005. "Alain De Lille, La Métaphysique Érigénienne Et La Pluralité Des Formes." In *Alain De Lille, Le Docteur Universel. Philosophie, Théologie Et Littérature Au Xiie Siècle. Actes Du Xie Colloque International De La Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale, Paris, 23-25 Octobre 2003*, edited by Solère, Jean-Luc, Vasiliu, Anca and Galonnier, Alain, 19-46. Turnhout: Brepols.

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Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, vol. II.

93. ———. 2007. "The Logic of Being: Eriugena's Dialectical Ontology." *Vivarium* no. 45:203-218.

"In his major work, the *Periphyseon*, the ninth century Latin philosopher John Scottus Eriugena gives, with the help of what he calls "dialectic", a rational analysis of reality. According to him, dialectic is a science which pertains both to language and reality. Eriugena grounds this position in a realist ontological exegesis of the Aristotelian categories, which are conceived as categories of being. His interpretation tends to transform logical patterns, such as Porphyry's Tree or the doctrine of the categories, into a structure which is both ontological and logical, and to use them as tools for the analysis of the sensible world. The combination of dialectic interpreted as a science of being, capable of expressing truths about the sensible world as well as about discourse, with an ontological interpretation of logical concepts allows Eriugena to develop his metaphysical theory, a strong realism. Eriugena not only supports a theological realism (of divine ideas), but also, and principally, an ontological realism, the assertion of the immanent existence of forms. Eriugena claims that genera and species really subsist in the individuals: they are completely and simultaneously present in each of the entities which belong to them."

94. ———. 2011. *L'homme Commun. La Genèse Du Réalisme Ontologique Durant Le Haut Moyen Âge*. Paris: Vrin.

"Le présent livre propose l'étude de la constitution, durant le haut Moyen Âge latin, d'une position philosophique: le réalisme de l'immanence à propos des universaux. Cette

position est fondée sur la conviction qu'il existe, dans le monde qui nous entoure, certes des individus particuliers -- ce tilleul, cette tortue --, mais aussi des entités universelles. Ces entités n'existent pas séparées des individus, mais intégralement réalisées en eux, sans variation ni degré. Cet engagement philosophique résulte d'une exégèse des *Catégories* d'Aristote, réinterprétées selon des philosophèmes issus de la pensée de Porphyre. La généalogie de cette position est ici retracée en abordant successivement ses sources tant grecques que latines et ses ancêtres patristiques (avant tout Grégoire de Nysse), puis son élaboration conceptuelle durant les premiers siècles du Moyen Âge latin jusqu'à la critique qu'en donnera Pierre Abélard, et ce, par l'analyse de l'ontologie des quatre philosophes qui l'ont soutenue: Jean Scot Érigène, Anselme de Canterbury, Odon de Cambrai et Guillaume de Champeaux. Ce parcours permet de dessiner les contours d'un projet philosophique: comprendre, analyser et décrire le monde sensible au moyen des concepts issus de la logique aristotélicienne."

95. Eswein, Karl. 1930. "Die Wesenheit Bei Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Begriff, Bedeutung Und Charakter Der "Essentia" Oder "Ousía" Bei Demselben." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 43:189-206.

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"At the beginning of his *Periphyseon*, Eriugena makes the first and fundamental division of nature that between the

things that are and the things that are not. On account of its real and apparent obscurity, Eriugena's "primordial discretive *differentia* of all things requires certain modes of interpretation." (Moran) Five modes are adduced, and it is the logic of the relation between these with which this paper is concerned. I argue that these modes (which Eriugena states are not exhaustive of the possibilities of dividing being and non-being) are not five disparate interpretations connected only by analogy, but are another series of divisions, each beginning with one side of the previous division. Thus, while Moran sees these modes as independent and opposable, I argue that their apparent oppositions must be understood within a hierarchical order of the divisions which extend from the first and highest to the last, lowest parts of nature."

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101. Gersh, Stephen. 1977. ""Per Se Ipsum": The Problem of Immediate and Mediate Causation in Eriugena and His Neoplatonic Predecessors." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 367-376. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

    Reprinted in: S. Gersh, *Reading Plato, Tracing Plato. From Ancient Commentary to Medieval Reception,* Aldershot, Ashgate, Essay IX.

102. ———. 1978. *From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*. Leiden: Brill.

Italian translation: *Da Giamblico a Eriugena. Origini e sviluppi della tradizione pseudo-dionisiana,* Edizione italiana a cura di Marialucrezia Leone e Christoph Helmig, Bari, Edizioni di Pagina, 2009, with a new Preface by S. Gersh (pp. VII-IX) and a Supplement to the Bibliography (2008) pp. 424-457.

103. ———. 1980. "Omnipresence in Eriugena. Some Reflections on Augustino-Maximian Elements in *Periphyseon*." In *Eriugena. Studien Zu Seinen Quellen*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 55-74. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

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104. ———. 1987. "Honorius Augustodunensis and Eriugena. Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis Physicae*." In *Eriugena Redivivus. Zur Wirkungeschichte Seines Denkens Im Mittelalter Und Im Übergang Zur Neuzeit*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 162-173. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Reprinted in: S. Gersh, *Reading Plato, Tracing Plato. From Ancient Commentary to Medieval Reception,* Aldershot, Ashgate, Essay XV.

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Reprinted in: S. Gersh - *Reading Plato, tracing Plato. From ancient commentary to medieval reception* - Aldershot, Ashgate, Essay II.

111. ———. 2013. "L' *ordo Naturalis* Des Causes Primordiales. La Transformation Érigénienne De La Doctrine Dionysienne Des Noms Divins." *Les Études philosophiques*:57-78.

"In books I and II of *Periphyseon*, Eriugena mentions the «primordial cause » (corresponding to the second species of Natura) without specifying any order of priority among them. In response to a question about this on the part of the Alumnus, this omission is rectified near the beginning of

book III. Initially, Eriugena follows the authority of Dionysius and argues that, since the divine names in Dionysius' *De Divinis Nominibus* correspond to his own primordial causes, the order given in Dionysius' treatise may be adopted. However, Eriugena quickly shifts to rational demonstration. Here, he first establishes certain general principles governing the ordering of the primordial causes. This section of the argument makes extensive use of the analogy of a geometrical sphere in order to argue for the striking conclusion that there is a perceptible order neither at the beginning nor at the end of the causes' procession into created things. Such a conclusion is possible because of what one might term the idealistic, non discursive, and theophanic aspects of Eriugena's theory. Secondly, Eriugena explains a specific case of the ordering of the primordial causes, and argues that the primordial cause of Goodness is prior to the primordial cause of Being. The Alumnus expresses satisfaction with his teacher's explanation and summarizes what he has learned, although certain features of his summary suggest that he has not grasped some of the theory's most subtle features. A postscript to this essay briefly considers the question whether reminiscences of Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae have influenced Eriugena's discussion of this question."

112. Gierer, Alfred. 1999. "Eriugena, Al-Kindi, Nikolaus Von Kues - Protagonisten Einer Wissenschaftsfreundlichen Wende Im Philosophischen Und Theologischen Denken." *Acta Historica Leopoldina* no. 29:7-60.

    With summarizing English version: *Eriugena, Al-Kindi, Nicholaus of Cusa - Protagonists of pro-scientific change in philosophical and theological thought*.
    "Ancient Greek philosophers were the first to postulate the possibility of explaining nature in theoretical terms and to initiate attempts at this. With the rise of monotheistic religions of revelation claiming supremacy over human reason and envisaging a new world to come, studies of the natural order of the transient world were widely considered

undesirable. Later, in the Middle Ages, the desire for human understanding of nature in terms of reason was revived. This article is concerned with the fundamental reversal of attitudes, from "undesirable" to "desirable", that eventually led into the foundations of modern science. One of the earliest, most ingenious and most interesting personalities involved was Eriugena, a theologian at the Court of Charles the Bald in the 9th century. Though understanding what we call nature is only one of the several aspects of his philosophical work, his line of thought implies a turn into a pro-scientific direction: the natural order is to be understood in abstract terms of "primordial causes"; understanding nature is considered to be the will of God; man encompasses the whole of creation in a physical as well as a mental sense. Basically similar ideas on the reconciliation of scientific rationality and monotheistic religions of revelation were conceived, independently and nearly simultaneously, by the Arab philosopher al-Kindi in Bagdad. Eriugena was more outspoken in his claim that reason is superior to authority. This claim is implicit in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa with his emphasis on human mental creativity as the image of God's creativity; and it is the keynote of Galileo's "Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina" some 800 years later, the manifesto expressing basic attitudes of modern science."

113. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 2007. "Ontological Characterization of the Relation between Man and Created Nature in Eriugena." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 16:155-166.

114. Graff, Eric. 2002. "A Primitive Text of *Periphyseon V* Rediscovered. The Witness of Honorius Augustoduniensis in *Clavis Physicae*." *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* no. 69:271-295.

"Book V of Eriugena's Periphyseon presents new critical problems because of the lack of the Rheims manuscript, which contains the author's own revisions. The text which has been called Versio Prima in the first four books of

Jeauneau's new edition is lacking for the fnal volume. Working from a transcription of the second portion of the Clauis Physicae, the epitome of the Periphyseon by Honorius Augustodunensis, the author reports that the unpublished Clauis II contains a text of Periphyseon V that is analogous to Versio Prima. This article first compares the transcription from Clauis II to Lucentini's notes on Honorius' work, then it analyses the difference between Clauis II and Versio Secunda in Periphyseon V. The relationship is found to be the same as that between the primitive text (Versio Prima) of Periphyseon in books I-IV and Eriugena's revised version (Versio Secunda). Consequently, Clauis II should be recognized as an essential witness to the early text of Periphyseon V."

115. Gregory, Tullio. 1963. *Giovanni Scoto Eriugena. Tre Studi*. Firenze: Le Monnier.

I. Dall'Uno al Molteplice 1-26; II. Mediazione e incarnazione nella filosofia dell'Eriugena 27-57; III. 58-82.

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"Eriugena's *Periphyseon* as an Extrapolation of Maximus Confessor's *Ambiguum* 41.
This essay looks at the way John Scottus Eriugena appropriates and constructively employs Maximus Confessor's anthropology. It claims that the fivefold division of being, appropriated from Maximus Confessor's *Ambiguum* 41, constitutes the framework of the Periphyseon. In my understanding, Maximus Confessor's understanding of the human being as the «workshop of creation», as the synthesis of all aspects of creation, as the agent of unification, provides the anthropological premise for Eriugena's own dialectical division of the genus of nature. It is within the framework of Maximus's ontology centered on «man as the workshop of creation», that Eriugena has recourse to the tradition of the liberal arts.

Therefore, the division of the genus of nature, as an exercise of dialectic, has to be understood within the framework of Eriugena's appropriation of Maximus Confessor's fivefold division of being and its corollary, the anthropology of the *officina omnium*. The project of the *Periphyseon* is driven by the possibility that through the application of the arts man could become the *officina omnium* in spite of the fall; if intellectual knowledge of creation can be achieved, then the return of all creation to the unity of the intelligible human being and ultimately to God will be warranted."

117. Hankey, Wayne J. 1998. "The Postmodern Retrieval of Neoplatonism in Jean-Luc Marion and John Milbank and the Origins of Western Dubjectivity in Augustine and Eriugena." *Hermathena* no. 165:9-70.

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    Reprinted as Essay IV in M. Herren, *Latin Letters in Early Christian Ireland*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1996.
    "In the present paper I would like to try to shed some new light on the old problem of what John may have read in Ireland and what kinds of literary skills he may have acquired there, including such items as Greek grammar, Latin metrics, and Latin vocabulary. As it is generally believed that John came to the continent at some point in his adult life, it would seem likely that he did not acquire all the erudition that he displays from continental scholars (2). Of course, we have no way of proving what John did learn at home ; we are, however, in a reasonably good position to show what was available to the Irish - always bearing in mind that it is not easy to establish what aspects of Irish learning were available at home only, what in Irish centres on the continent only, and what in both places.
    The so-called *Annotationes in Marcianum* obviously provide one of the best means of assessing John's reading

and learning, since Martianus' encyclopedia embraces nearly all the areas of knowledge available to the ninth century. Moreover, the *Annotationes* frequently cite sources by name, and individual notes reveal a great deal about the technical learning of the author in such matters as astronomy, music, arithmetic, Greek grammar, and metrics. However, before we can undertake an assessment of John's learning in relation to this Irish background, it will be necessary to address the problem of the authenticity of the *Annotationes* - a problem that has puzzled students of Eriugena since their discovery and has become more complex with the discovery of more Carolingian commentaries or sets of scholia to Martianus." pp. 265-266. (2) For the little that is known of John's life, see the first two chapters of M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Brussels 1933).

119. ———. 1987. "Eriugena's *Aulae Siderae*, the 'Codex Aureus', and the Palatine Church of St. Mary at Compiègne." *Studi Medievali* no. 28:593-608.

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123. Hibbs, Darren. 2011. "John Scottus Eriugena on the Composition of Material Bodies." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 19:385-393.

"This paper examines John Scottus Eriugena's account of material bodies. Some scholars have argued that Eriugena's account prefigures Berkeleyan idealism. The interpretation offered in the paper rejects the Berkeleyan interpretation on the grounds that Eriugena, unlike Berkeley, did not propose a thoroughly immaterialist view of reality."

124. Hochschild, Paige E. 2007. " *Ousia* in the *Categoriae Decem* and the *Periphyseon* of John Scottus Eriugena." In *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought. Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse*, edited by Treschow, Michael, Otten, Willemien and Hannam, Walter, 213-222. Leiden: Brill.

"In this article I will show how Eriugena exploits the *Categoriae decem,* expanding the several notions of *ousia* contained therein and fitting them into a larger metaphysical framework. We shall see that Eriugena's understanding of *ousia* does not create confusion from what is obvious, as Marenbon suggests, but rather develops out of a legitimate reflection upon the philosophical content of the Latin paraphrase. While in no way diminishing the significance of more prominent influences on Eriugena's thought, the *Categoriae decem* may be the most important source for explaining Eriugena's notion of *ousia,* in its full, epistemological and potentially theological richness.(2) It is, however, a difficult and often merely suggestive source, as its varied and controversial history of interpretation indicates.

To this end, I will argue that what Eriugena finds in the *Categoriae decem* in the way of a doctrine of *ousia* is clearly that of Aristotle's *Categories* -- not I think, a radical claim. Moreover, Eriugena shows himself able to comprehend the limits of and distinctions between the several notions of *ousia* found in the *Categoriae decem*.(3)He is quite clear that the primary *ousia* of the *Categoriae decem* is not identical with the full philosophical content of *the ousia* of, for example, Augustine's *De Trinitate* or Gregory's *De hominis officio*. They are distinct but surely connected. Our task is to show how these several notions of *ousia* are connected for Eriugena and by what specific paths he arrives at their connection." (pp. 213-214)

(2) *Anonymi Paraphasis Themistiana (Pseudo-Augustini Categoriae decem)*, in *Aristoteles Latinus 1.1-5, Categoriae vel Predicamenta,* ed. L Minio-Paluello (Bruges, 1961), pp. 133-175.

Citations will be from this edition and reference shall be made to paragraph, page, and line numbers respectively. Translations are my own. By an 'important' source we certainly do not mean an exhaustive one. By this means we simply limit the scope of our investigation.

(3) The assumption here is that the *Categoriae decem* is *a* faithful report of the content of Aristotle's *Categories,* though one which suggests directions of interpretation not explicit in Aristotle's text. Hence we occasionally use the term 'Aristotelian' loosely; as including a rich tradition of interpretation of which the *Categoriae decem* is a part.

Related pages

Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Eriugena: (Second Part: K - Z)

Eriugena: Dialectic and Ontology in the *Periphyseon*

Eriugena, *Periphyseon* Book I: Aristotelian Logic and Categories

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N.B. Summaries cited from: Mary Brennan, *A Guide to Eriugenian Studies. A Survey of Publications 1930-1987*, are indicated with: (B.) and page number.

1. Kabaj, Józef. 1977. "Homme Et Nature Dans La Cosmologie De Jean Scot Erigena." *Studia Mediewistyczne* no. 18:3-50.

   "This article begins by tracing the history of the *term phusis/natura* from the earliest Greek philosophers onwards. The author finds the sources of Eriugena's four divisions in Augustine, Origen and Philo of Alexandria (p. 8) as also in Marius Victorinus. Another (tripartite) variation is to be found in Claudianus Mamertus or in Boethius. The author then analyses (pp. 12 ff.) Eriugena's synthesis of patristic and platonic views while finding Aristotelian elements within his exposition. At the outset this author has declared for a Marxist interpretation of Eriugena and much of section (3) Nature as seen by Eriugen is concerned with a review of mainly 20th century scholars' judgments of his work as either dualist i.e. orthodox in christian terms, or

monist/pantheist i.e. unorthodox, which would be this author's own view: thus the major themes of the *Periphyseon* are discussed, his dialectic leading, inevitably, to monism and pantheistic emanationism. Two sections (4 and 5) 'Human nature in Eriugena' and 'Man and his Existence' treat of man as microcosm, again going back to Heraclitus to trace the reception of this theory: according to Eriugena man participates in both the second and third divisions of nature. The supposed ontological dualism of Eriugena is in fact pancosmic spiritualist monism. In section (6) 'Man's cosmic consciousness' the factor of 'vital motion' is discussed. The author holds (p. 38) that Eriugena needed a fifth 'complementary' book for his *Periphyseon* because the first four did not suffice to resolve the theory of his four divisions. In a final section (7) entitled 'Dialectic of human knowledge' the problem of man's ignorance of *quid sit* and of the relation between gnoseology and ontology are discussed; self-knowledge *(quia sit) is* existence." (B. pp. 232-233)

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"The Aristotelian categories are a fundamental element in Eriugena's philosophical system on account of his realist view of dialectic. He received his texts concerning the categories from Boethius and the *De decem categoriis,* but key ideas in his treatment of them -- namely, the metaphysical importance of dialectic, the unknowability of essence, and the origin of being in place and time, ideas fundamentally rooted in Byzantine developments of the Christology of Chalcedon -- are taken from Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena's work on the categories represents an attempt, much misunderstood, to assimilate the richness of the Eastern tradition to Western philosophical and theological method. This paper examines the synthesis of Maximus's ideas with Ciceronian and Boethian elements in Eriugena's striking treatment of the Aristotelian Categories."

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   "The form of the dialogue, in this case the interchange between the Nutritor and the Alumnus, is the most obvious feature of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, but it is curiously taken for granted in most discussions of the work. This essay observes the nature and function of the two personae of the dialogue, and the relationship between them, with the suggestion that the dialogue of the *Periphyseon* might actually be a bifurcated interior monologue. Examination of internal evidence from Books IV and V illustrates the ways that the Alumnus functions as a rhetorical vehicle that provides the impetus for the upward spiral of the discussion. In addition to serving as a model of the ideal intended audience of the Periphyseon, the character of the

Alumnus provides an opportunity for the Nutritor, ostensibly the superior voice in the dialectic, to develop his arguments and fully convince himself, thus bringing the discussion to a higher level. In the process, the characters of the Alumnus and the Nutritor together become an embodied example of one of the key points of Eriugena's idealist philosophy: in a dialogue between participants, when one understands what the other understands, he is indescribably created in the other, and they are made one understanding."

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Ratramnus, the pupil of the Irish teacher Macarius, had supported a view subsequently espoused by Eriugena (pp. 67-70). The author (Chapter 4) examines Eriugena's account of the categories first in Book I and what he calls its ramifications (p. 82) in the later books, giving special attention to Essence, and discerns an inconsistency in his metaphysical system. Chapter 5 devotes a section (pp. 89-96) to the status quaestionis of the scribal hands referred to as i1and i2 which occur in various manuscripts connected with the Eriugenian circle.
In section II the investigation of manuscripts is extended to suggest the existence of a veritable writing circle, glossing and revising under the eye of the master: named manuscripts are discussed as reflecting various stages of revision or, in some cases, gratuitous unauthorised glossing sometimes from Eriugena's own later writings -- the wider 'circle' encompassing also Laon, Auxerre and Corbie for some decades at the end of the ninth and beginning of the tenth century. The variety of Eriugena's readership may be inferred from the range and content of the codices.
In section III the author addresses the question of Eriugena's links with his contemporaries, in turn raising doubt of any connection with Sedulius (as suggested by MS Bern 363), suggesting that Laon 444 implies some influence on Martinus Scottus, confirming from the Periphyseon itself and from Wulfad's library list the collaboration of Wulfad at S. Médard of Soissons, where Heiric of Auxerre is likely to have come under his influence." (B. p. 51)

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"In this article I wish to re-examine the vexed issue of the possibility of idealism in ancient and medieval philosophy with particular reference to the case of Johannes Scottus Eriugena (c. 800-c. 877), the Irish Neoplatonic Christian philosopher. Both Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have argued that idealism never emerged (and for Burnyeat, could not have emerged) as a genuine philosophical position in antiquity, a claim that has had wide currency in recent years, and now constitutes something of an orthodoxy. (1) Richard Sorabji (instancing Gregory of Nyssa) and Werner Beierwaltes (citing Proclus and Eriugena), and Eyjólfur

Kjalar Emilsson (discussing Plotinus), on the other hand, have all argued that idealism is to be found in the Neoplatonic tradition, a tradition neglected by Burnyeat. (2) Similarly, in a 1989 study, I argued not only that idealism was a genuine possibility in late classical and in medieval philosophy, but that that the ninth-century Carolingian philosopher Johannes Eriugena presents a striking example of an extremely radical, almost fantastical, idealism. (3) Of course, the whole discussion depends entirely on what is meant by 'idealism'. Burnyeat uses Berkeley's immaterialism as his standard for idealism, and it is this decision, coupled with his failure to acknowledge the legacy of German idealism, which prevents him from seeing the classical and medieval roots of idealism more broadly understood."

(1) Myles Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3-40, reprinted in Godfrey Vesey, ed., Idealism -- Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 19-50.

(2) Richard Sorabji, "Gregory of Nyssa: The Origins of Idealism," in Time, Creation and Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 1983), pp. 287-96; Werner Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie and ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985). See also Beierwaltes, "Die Wiederentdeckung des Eriugena im Deutschen Idealismus," in Platonismus und Idealismus (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), pp. 188-201, and his "Zur Wirkungsgeschichte Eriugenas im Deutschen Idealismus und danach. Eine kurze, unsystematische Nachlese," in Eriugena. Grundzüge seines Denkens (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), pp. 313-330. Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, "Cognition and its Object," in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996), pp. 217-49, esp. pp. 245-49. But see, Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 227, n. 3, who maintains that Plotinus is not an idealist.

(3) Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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    "In this essay, I explore Eriugena's idealism in his own terms, attempting to capture the specific nature of his theological, metaphysical and epistemological application of the relation between non being and being. I suggest that the German Idealists are justified in embracing Eriugena for his recognition of the universe as a product of the process of self-articulation and self-understanding of the divine mind. Eriugena's account of the nature of all existence as essentially immaterial, his ontological ranking of the apparently physical, material, and sensible world below the level of mind and, in a specific sense, dependent on mind, and his understanding of all things as contained in the divine mind (and by extension in the human mind as *imago dei*), must be evaluated not only as constituting an original philosophical system in its own right, but also as a dynamic

and intellectualist idealism. Eriugena's infinite nature involves the dialectical interplay of hiddenness and manifestation, nothingness and being, mind unknown to itself coming to self-knowledge in an infinite knowing and unknowing."

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    "In this article I shall attempt (I) to isolate as far as possible what Eriugena means by his concept of *natura*, by reviewing both the sources he was inspired by and his use of these sources in the elaboration of this concept. I shall then seek (II) to determine the bearing of this concept on the general inquiry conducted in the *De divisione naturae* by examining its relationship to conceptions presented immediately after it, i.e. the well-known fourfold division of nature and the fivefold classification of modes of being and non-being.

Finally (III), the philosophical implications of Eriugena's conception of a study of natura (*physiologia*) will be discussed briefly insofar as this study is suggestive of an unusual metaphysical project."

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    Essays on Eriugena: XX. L'Investigation et les investigateurs dans le *De divisione naturae* de Jean Scot Erigene; XXI. The Concept of *Natura* in John Scottus Eriugena (*De divisione naturae* Book I); XXII. The Problem of Speaking about God in John Scottus Eriugena; XXIII. The Metaphysical Use of Mathematical Concepts in Eriugena; XXIV. Eriugena and Aquinas on the Beatific Vision.

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in His Teaching on the Soul-Body Relationship 255; 20. Eriugena's Use of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* in the *Periphyseon* 269-285.

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"To analyze the tradition of negative theology, the article goes back to its prime architect, Pseudo-Dionysius. By comparing him to an author who preceded him, viz. Augustine, and one who followed him, viz. Eriugena, the article aims at giving a 'thicker' description of his position by framing it historically. In doing so it draws two conclusions. It first shows that the connection between negative theology and negative anthropology is indeed Dionysian; as such it is rightfully pointed to in postmodern thought. In contradistinction to postmodern applications, however, Dionysius' interest in negativity is shown to reflect before all a desire to wrestle with the overpowering presence of the divine instead of concluding to its absence."

105. ———. 2002. "Realized Eschatology of Philosophical Idealism: The Case of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*." In *Ende Und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven Im Mittelalter*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Pickavé, Martin, 373-387. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

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110. Piemonte, Gustavo. 1968. "Notas Sobre La Creatio De Nihilo En Juan Escoto Eriúgena." *Sapientia* no. 23:37-58; 115-132.

111. ———. 1986. "L'expression " *Quae Sunt Et Quae Non Sunt*": Jean Scot Et Marius Victorinus." In *Jean Scot Écrivain*, edited by Allard, Guy-H., 81-113. Paris: Vrin.

"L'expression double «quae sunt et quae non sunt», dont les membres antithétiques veulent embrasser la totalité du réel, revient souvent, comme on sait, dans les écrits de Jean Scot. Elle est présente, tout d'abord, dans le *Periphyseon*, et dès ses premières pages, consacrées à l'explication bien connue des manières d'entendre la distinction entre les «choses qui sont» et les «choses qui ne sont pas». Mais elle paraît aussi dans les autres ouvrages érigéniens ; on la trouve déjà — avec une signification qui ne coïncide qu'en partie avec celle que lui donneront les textes postérieurs — dans le *De divina praedestinatione*; on la rencontre également dans les *Expositiones in ierarchiam coelestem* et dans le *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, et même dans des pièces d'un genre littéraire très différent, moins techniques et destinées à un public plus large, comme l' *Homélie* sur le prologue de ce même évangile, ou les poèmes. C'est justement la première occurrence de cette expression dans

la *Vox spiritualis*, au chapitre I, lignes 6 et 8-12, avec les problèmes textuels qu'elle a soulevés, qui m'a amené à l'étudier dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Jean Scot, et à me poser la question des origines possibles d'une locution si typiquement érigénienne. Elle n'était probablement pas courante au temps de notre auteur, puisqu'il se donne plusieurs fois la peine de l'expliquer à ses lecteurs. Où Jean Scot avait-il trouvé l'inspiration pour cette formule d'apparence paradoxale, qui occupait souvent ses méditations et sur laquelle il exerait toutes les forces de son intelligence («saepe mihi cogitanti diligentiusque quantum uires suppetunt inquirenti... ») ? Chez Denys et Maxime le Confesseur, oui, sans doute; l'Érigène le dit lui-même (4), et d'ailleurs il n'est pas difficile de retrouver, derrière les mots latins, les vocables grecs respectifs (*tà ônta, tà me ônta*) ; il s'agit bien d'un cas de traduction, et cela n'a rien d'extraordinaire. Mais on peut toujours se demander si notre auteur n'aurait pas suivi consciemment l'exemple de quelque prédécesseur dans son adaptation au latin de ces éléments de la terminologie philosophique grecque. Après avoir fait quelques recherches personnelles, je crois que l'opinion qu'expriment à cet égard, un peu en passant, certains historiens est juste, et que la réponse à la question posée doit être affirmative. Il me semble par ailleurs que l'influence du prédécesseur en question — je parle de Marius Victorinus — n'est pas limitée à ce seul point: elle s'étend aussi à d'autres thèmes, et la faon dont l'Érigène l'a assimilée pourrait nous dire quelque chose sur ses procédés de composition littéraire et en même temps éclaircir certains aspects de sa pensée. (pp. 81-83)
(4). Cf. *Homéelie sur le prologue de Jean (1969)*, p. 204, n. 1.

112. ———. 1986. ""Vita in Omnia Pervenit". El Vitalismo Eriugeniano Y La Influencia De Mario Victorino." *Patristica et Mediaevalia* no. 7:3-48.

113. ———. 1987. "Les *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem* De Jean Scot Et Un Opuscule Hébreu Pseudépigraphique Du

Xiiie Siècle." In *Eriugena Redivivus. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte Seines Denkens Im Mittelalter Und Im Übergang Zur Neuzeit*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 279-310. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

114. ———. 1990. "Image Et Contenu Intelligible Dans La Conception Érigénienne De La 'Diffusio Dei'." In *Begriff Und Metapher. Sprachform Des Denkens Bei Eriugena*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 80-94. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

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116. ———. 1996. "Recherches Sur Les "Tractatus in Matheum" Attribués À Jean Scot." In *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and Hermeneutics*, edited by Riel, Gerd van, Steel, Carlos and McEvoy, James. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

117. ———. 2002. "Some Distinctive Theses of Eriugena's Eschatology in His Exegesis of the Gospel According to St. Matthew." In *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time*, edited by McEvoy, James and Dunne, Michael, 227-242. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

118. Pinzani, Roberto. 2012. "Alle Origini Del Realismo. Appunti Sull'ontologia Di Scoto Eriugena." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 23:107-142.

"I would like to discuss in this article some issues concerning Scotus Eriugena's ontology. I will focus on the *De Divisione naturae* and, in particular, on the concepts of 'nature', 'essence/substance', 'matter', 'form', 'species' and 'genus'. I will also pay attention to the way in which Scotus deals with some traditional logic themes, like that of individuation and universals. The underlying assumption is that (realist) philosophers of the 'twelfth Century

renaissance' take into some consideration elements of Scotus' ontology when discussing the problem of universals. I tried to read Scotus language in a 'neutral' way, by translating it literally, disregarding historical metaphysical interpretations (which are considered anyway in the footnotes), and by rendering metaphors and literary texts in a comprehensible way, as far as possible."

119. Préaux, Jean. 1977. "Jean Scot Et Martin De Laon En Face Du *De Nuptiis* De Martianus Capella." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 161-170. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

120. Puxley, David. "The Role of the Human in the Procession and Return of the Cosmos from Plotinus to Eriugena." *Dionysius* no. 24:175-208.

"The first two parts of this study examine the formulations of Plotinus and Porphyry (Part 1) and of Iamblichus and Proclus (Part 2) with respect to the median and mediating nature of the human self in terms of its capacity for *anagogé* and *énosis*. Part 3 examines the early reception and transformation of the Iamblicho-Procline formulation. In Part 4 we see that in the « *Periphyseon*» of Eriugena an early and profound synthesis is to be found, with the result that in Eriugena the human soul or self is the agent of creation and thus central to the «exitus» and «reditus» of the cosmos."

121. Ramelli, Ilaria. 2012. "Eriugena's Commentary on Martianus in the Framework of His Thought and the Philosophical Debate of His Time." In *Carolingian Scholarship and Martianus Capella. Ninth-Century Commentary Traditions on 'De Nuptiis' in Context*, edited by O'Sullivan, Sinead and Teeuwen, Mariken, 245-272. Turnhout: Brepols.

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Leiden: Brill.

On Eriugena see in particular: *Shift to the West but on Geek Patristic Grounds: John the Scot Eriugena and Apokatastasis as* Reditus, pp. 773-815.

123. Rand, Edward Kennard. 1920. "The Supposed Autographa of John the Scot." *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* no. 5:135-141.

124. ———. 1940. "How Much of the Annotationes in Marcianum Is the Work of John the Scot?" *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 71:501-523.

125. Roques, René. 1973. "Traduction Ou Interprétation? Brèves Remarques Sur Jean Scot Traducteur De Denis." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 59-75. Dublin: Irish University Press.

126. ———. 1975. *Libres Sentiers Vers L'érigénisme*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

127. Rorem, Paul. 2008. "The Early Latin Dyonisius: Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor." *Modern Theology* no. 24:601-614.

"This essay sketches how Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor interpreted the Areopagite, emphasizing key passages for each. Eriugena's translation of the *Corpus Dyonisianum* and his *Expositiones on The Celestial Hierarchy* exerted a tremendous influence on subsequent Latin readers, including Hugh, and even survived the condemnation of his masterwork, the *Periphyseon*. The Victorine, whose own Augustinian inclinations were largely untouched by his encounter with the Areopagite, nevertheless exerted a distinctive influence by (falsely) attributing to Dionysius the view that in our pursuit of God, "love surpasses knowledge." Together, despite their stark differences, they bequeathed a lively Dionysian tradition to the high medieval authors, scholastics and mystics alike."

128. Rosemann, Philipp W. 1996. *Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile. A "Repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"Chapter IV, "Eriugena -- Causality as Concealing Revelation" follows the great Irish philosopher in his reflections upon causality as a manifestation of the cause in and through its effect, a manifestation, however, which by its very nature cannot but conceal the cause at the same time as it discloses it. For the Christian thinker that is Eriugena, the Trinity constitutes the paradigm of this "concealing revelation". God, who is beyond being and, therefore, strictly speaking "no-thing", enters the domain of being -- "creates himself", as Eriugena puts it in daring terms -- in and through the Trinity, and then, derivatively, through the natural world. We can know God -- and, indeed, God can only come to "know" himself -- only through his effects; yet as in these effects God "alienates" himself from his "true" nature, which is "nothing", creation is as much an obstacle as an aid in our quest for God. Moreover, this ambiguity is not only a theoretical one, having as it does repercussions upon the moral quality of creation, which, as "revelation", serves as a signpost on the road to God, while as "concealment" it presents dangerous temptations, and the occasion of sin." p. 27.

129. Rudnick, Ulrich. 1990. *Das System Des Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Eine Theologisch-Philosophische Studie Zu Seinem Werk*. Bern: Peter Lang.

130. Russell, Robert. 1973. "Some Augustinian Influences in Eriugena's *De Diuisione Naturae*." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 31-40. Dublin: Irish University Press.

131. Schrimpf, Gangolf. 1973. "Zur Frage Der Authentizität Unserer Texte Von Johannes Scottus' 'Annotationes in Marcianum'." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 125-137. Dublin: Irish University Press.

132. ———. 1977. "Wertung Und Rezeption Antker Logik Im Karolingerreich." In *Logik, Ethik, Theorie Der Geisteswissenschaften.*, edited by Patzig, Günther, Scheibe, Erhard and Wieland, Wolfgang, 451-456. Hamburg: Meiner.

XI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Göttingen, 5 - 9 Oktober 1975.
"In the years preceding the mid-9th-century Predestination controversy, the doctrine of the Church was defended, and taught, by means of the *catena*, that is by a survey of the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. In the middle of the 9th century a new method was resorted to by Eriugena, viz. the use of Logic. The author seeks to identify JSE's probable sources in ancient and late antique literature: these he lists, together with the provenance of the manuscripts to which JSE could have had access. He discerns three crucial stages in the dissemination of the relevant literature, viz. Charlemagne's circle and in particular Alcuin, the monastery of Fulda under Rhabanus Maurus, and the cathedral school at Laon in the period of Martinus Scottus and JSE - about 840-860. At the first stage Logic remained a theoretical school subject: at Fulda syllogistic argument began to be appreciated; in Eriugena's writings it became part of the very fabric, reflecting the inherent negative and positive aspects that he sought to express. This bries article is enriched by two valuable pages of footnotes." (B.)

133. ———. 1982. *Das Werk Des Johannes Scottus Eriugena Im Rahmen Des Wissenschaftsverständnisses Seiner Zeit. Eine Hinführung Zu Periphyseon*. Münster: Aschendorff.

134. ———. 1989. "Die Systematische Bedeutung Der Beiden Logischen Einteilungen (*Divisiones*) Zu Beginn Von *Periphyseon*." In *Giovanni Scoto Nel Suo Tempo. L'organizzazione Del Sapere in Età Carolingia*, 113-151. Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi dull'Alto Medieoevo.

135. ———. 1990. "Der Begriff Des Elements in *Periphyseon* Iii." In *Begriff Und Metapher. Sprachform Des Denkens Bei*

Eriugena, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 65-79. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

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137. ———. 2007. "Eine Wissenschaftstheoretische Anwendung Der "Dialectica" Bei Johannes Scottus Eriugena." In *Dialektik Und Rhetorik Im Früheren Und Hohen Mittelalter. Rezeption, Überlieferung Und Gesellschaftliche Wirkung Antiker Gelehrsamkeit Vornehmlich Im 9. Und 12. Jahrhundert*, edited by Fried, Johannes, 51-72. München: R. Oldenbourg.

138. Sheldon-Williams, Inglis Patrick. 1961. "The Title of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*." *Studia Patristica* no. 3:297-302.

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139. ———. 1967. "The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena." In *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Armstrong, Arthur Hilary, 425-536. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

140. ———. 1973. "Eriugena's Greek Sources." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 1-15. Dublin: Irish University Press.

141. Silvestre, Hubert. 1952. "Le Commentaire Inédit De Jean Scot Érigène Au Mètre Ix Du Livre Iii Du *De Consolatione Philosophiae* De Boèce." *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* no. 47:44-122.

142. ———. 1956. "Le Commentaire Sur Prudence Du *Paris. Lat. 13953* Et Du *Pal. Lat. 235* Est À Attribuer À Scot Érigène." *Scriptorium* no. 10:90-92.

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144. ———. 1992. "Yet More on the Autograph of John the Scot: Ms Bamberg Ph. 2/2 and Its Place in *Periphyseon* Tradition." In *From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau*, edited by Westra, Haijo Jan, 47-70. Leiden: Brill.

145. Stock, Brian. 1967. "The Philosophical Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena." *Studi Medievali* no. 8:1-57.

146. ———. 1967. "Observations on the Use of Augustine by Johannes Scottus Eriugena." *Harvard Theological Review* no. 60:213-220.

"The ninth-century metaphysician, John the Scot, who came very probably from Ireland to write both polemics and philosophy at the court of Charles the Bald, is known to have read a number of Augustine's writings, and to have cited them in his major work, *De Divisione Naturae* or *Periphyseon,*(1) *at* times without showing much regard for the context of his quotations. He composed *Periphyseon* around 860 A.D., (2) in a period which was noted for the dissemination of traditional theological ideas to a large, poorly educated public, rather than for its innovations.(3) The influence of Greek ideas on John's mind, unusual in his day, but not quite so unusual as we used to believe, (4) gradually gave rise to the position, now commonly held by historians, that his thought was more or less dominated by Greek ideas to the exclusion of the Latins. This position has had to be modified, however, in the light of closer examination of his use of figures like the

Pseudo-Dionysius."
(1) A list of citations from Augustine in *Periphyseon* and other works is compiled by Dom M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Brussels, 1964 [reprint]), 388f.
(2) I. P. Sheldon-Williams, A Bibliography of Johannes Scottus Eriugena, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* X' (1959), 198f.
(3) B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1952), 371.
(4) On the use of Greek in the theological literature of the period, see A. Siegemund, *Die Überlieferung der griechischen christlichen Literatur in der lateinischen Kirche bis zum XII. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1949), and the occasional remarks of B. Bischoff in Wendepunkte in der Geschichte der lateinischen Exegese in] Frühmittelalter, *Sacris Erudiri* VI (1954), 189-281; on Eriugena's study of Greek, Cappuyns, *op. cit.,* 128-46.

147. ———. 1977. ""Intelligo Me Esse": Eriugena's "Cogito"." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 327-336. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

148. ———. 1980. "In Search of Eriugena's Augustine." In *Eriugena. Studien Zu Seinen Quellen*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 85-104. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

149. Théry, Gabriel. 1931. "Scot Erigène Traducteur De Denys." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Age*:185-278.

"Pour sa traduction des écrits du Pseudo-Denys, Scot Erigène dispose déjà de la version d'Hilduin. D'ailleurs il y a tout lieu de croire que, dès 851, il compte parmi les hellénistes de son temps. Importance du vocabulaire de la version de Scot Erigène pour la connaissance du langage philosophique et théologique qui se crée en Occident au IX siècle. Les idées nouvelles introduites par Denys vont déterminer une langue nouvelle."

150. ———. 1933. "Scot Erigène Introducteur De Denys." *New Scholasticism* no. 7:91-108.

151. Touchette, Gilles. 1986. "L'affixation Dans Le "Periphyseon". Analyse Générale Et Èétude D'un Cas Type." In *Jean Scot Écrivain*, edited by Allard, Guy-H., 327-341. Paris: Vrin.

152. Traube, Ludwig. 1912. *Autographa Des Iohannes Scottus. Aus Dem Nachlass Hrsg. Von Edward Kennard Rand. Mit 12 Tafeln. Vorgelegt Am 13. Januar, 1912*. München: Verlag der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

    Extracted from *Palaeographische Forschungen*, V.

153. Trego, Kristell. 2008. "La Subsistence Des Existants. La Contribution De Jean Scot Erigène À La Constitution D'un Vocabulaire Latin De L'être." *Chora: Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales* no. 6:143-180.

    "S'il reprend des thèmes chers à la patristique, Erigène adapte ces notions théologiques afin de penser non plus tant l'être divin, que l'être créé, en sa condition même de créature. Ainsi Erigène reconnaît-il aux êtres créés, qu'il nomme «existants» (*existentia*), une subsistence qui, si elle se fonde dans l'essence divine, s'en distingue toutefois. Quoi qu'il en soit du contexte néoplatonicien dans lequel intervient le terme subsistence (utilisé notamment pour traduire l' *huparxis* du Pseudo-Denys ou de Maxime le Confesseur), l'on ne saurait le réduire à la nomination de la venue à l'être (c'est l'existence qui évoque cette idée). Réinvestissant la notion de subsistence qui s'est construite chez ses prédécesseurs latins, notre auteur s'en sert pour faire signe vers l'idée d'une permanence de ce qui est au-delà de la procession qui lui a permis d'accéder à l'être."

154. Trouillard, Jean. 1973. "Érigène Et La Théophanie Créatrice." In *The Mind of Eriugena*, edited by O'Meara, John Joseph and Bieler, Ludwig, 98-113. Dublin: Irish University Press.

155. ———. 1977. "La Notion D' "Analyse" Chez Érigène." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 349-356. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

156. ———. 1983. "Erigène Et La Naissance Du Sens." In *Platonismus Und Christentum. Festschrift Für Heinrich Dörrie*, edited by Blume, Horst-Dieter and Mann, Friedhelm, 267-276. Münster: Aschendoff.

"L'Auteur part de la distinction entre "Dieu" et la Déité chez Eckhart ("Dieu" nous cache la Déité), et montre que l'origine s'en trouve chez Erigène. Il présente ainsi le problème du "sens", c'est-à-dire de l'émergence de "Dieu", à partir du "non-sens originel" de la Déité, chez l'Erigène reconstruisant sa théorie des théophanies, sa théorie de la lumière et du néant, sa doctrine des mouvements de l'âme. Il conclut en inscrivant J. Scot dans le courant général du néoplatonisme. L'incarnation du verbe est le point d'articulation du non-sens originel avec le déploiement de la nature."

157. Vernet, André. 1977. "Fragment D'un Manuscrit Du "Periphyseon" De Jean Scot (Xie Siècle)." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 101-108. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

158. Vezin, Jean. 1977. "A Propos Des Manuscrits De Jean Scot: Quelques Remarques Sur Les Manuscrits Autographes Du Haut Moyen Åge." In *Jean Scot Erigène Et L'histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Roques, René, 95-100. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

159. Weiner, Sebastian Florian. 2007. *Eriugenas Negative Ontologie*. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

"Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in the work *Periphyseon* of the early medieval philosopher John Scot Eriugena. Previous research has classified the book either as

a piece of Neoplatonic philosophy or as part of the Latin dialectic tradition, which has led to one-sided interpretations. The present publication focuses instead on the philosophical claims defended in the Periphyseon itself, examines its originality and discusses the soundness of its argumentation. As a result, a hitherto unnoticed basic thought of the work has been uncovered, namely the concept of a negative ontology, according to which all substance is completely incomprehensible. This notion constitutes the greatest innovation of Eriugena's thought. In keeping with his negative ontology, Eriugena downgrades the fourfold division of nature that he had presented at the beginning of his work. A critical survey of the current readings of Eriugena as a Neoplatonist and idealist completes this book."

160. ———. 2008. "Eriugena's Innovation." *Vivarium* no. 46:1-23.

"John Scot Eriugena's work *Periphyseon* is commonly regarded as having introduced Neoplatonism into early medieval thinking. Eriugena's theory of the reunification of the Creator and his creation is then viewed as being based on the Neoplatonic scheme of procession and reversion. However, this interpretation falls short of Eriugena's intentions. Above all, he denies any ontological difference between Creator and creation without taking recourse to the Neoplatonic considerations of procession and reversion. Surprisingly, according to Eriugena's explanation, God is not only the Creator but he is also created. He is created insofar as he alone, possessing all being, is the essence of all created things. Moreover, the fourfold division of nature, presented at the beginning of the work, is not Eriugena's own innovation, but a common Carolingian concept. It is rather his aim to show that from an ontological point of view this division has to be resolved."

161. Wilband, Marie Michelle. 2008. *Ingenium Veterum Mirabile Laudet. Eriugena's Reception of the Aristotelian*

Categories and Their Role in the Periphyseon.

Unpublished MA Thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Available at ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
"Eriugena's discussion of the Aristotelian categories in Book One of the *Periphyseon* has the appearance of a mere digression in the context of the work as a whole. Moreover, it is often seen as an incoherent interpretation of Aristotle's original doctrine put forward in the *Categories*. This thesis proposes to correct these views by reading Eriugena's treatment of the categories in the context of the Neoplatonic commentary tradition, as well as in Eriugena's own historical context. Eriugena's interpretation of the categories becomes coherent when read as a Carolingian development of the Late Antique commentators, Iamblichus in particular. The fruit of that development, namely Eriugena's unusual approach to the categories as generative intellectual realities, makes his treatment of them integral to his system, and the appropriate starting point for the *Periphyseon* as a whole."
Contents: Abstract VI; Acknowledgments VII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Th Early Tradition of the *Categories* from Aristotle to Ammonius 6; 3. Eriugena's Direct Sources - The *Categories* from Augustine to Alcuin 29; 4. Eriugena's Reception and Treatment of the Categories 48; 5. Cnclusion 92; Bibliography 97-107.

162. Wohlmann, Avital. 1983. "L'homme Et Le Sensible Dans La Pensée De Jean Scot Erigène." *Revue Thomiste* no. 83:243-273.

163. ———. 1983. "L'ontologie Du Sensible Dans La Philosophie De Scot Erigène." *Revue Thomiste* no. 83:558-582.

164. Zier, Mark A. 1989. "The Shape of the Critical Edition of *Perhyseon* Iv." In *Giovanni Scoto Nel Suo Tempo. L'organizzazione Del Sapere in Età Carolingia*, edited by Leonardi, Claudio, 487-498. Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'Alto Medioevo.

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Related pages

Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Eriugena: (First Part: A - J)

Eriugena: Dialectic and Ontology in the *Periphyseon*

Eriugena, *Periphyseon* Book I: Aristotelian Logic and Categories

The Works of Eriugena: Editions and Translations

Bibliographie des écrits d'Édouard Jeauneau sur la Philosophie Médiévale (complete list of his essays on Eriugena)

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Avicenna (Ibn-Sina) on the Subject and the Object of Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

"Ibn Sina (Arabic), also known as Avicenna (Latin) and Abu Ali Sina (Persian) was the most original and systematic Muslim philosopher. In this light he is mentioned by two celebrated historians of medieval western philosophy: A. Maurer states, "...his [ibn Sina's] philosophy is a highly personal achievement, ranking among the greatest in the history of philosophy;" and F. Copleston holds, "The greatest Muslim philosopher of the eastern group without doubt is Avicenna or ibn Sina (980-1037), the real creator of a scholastic system in the Islamic world." (1) Y. Mahdavi lists 244 texts attributed to him and G. A. Anawati lists 270. (2) These works envelop a multiplicity of topics such as metaphysics, poetics, animal physiology, minerals, rhetoric, mechanics of solids, Arabic syntax, meteorology, mystical treatises, and a medical treatise, and are translated into more than nineteen languages. The crown of his philosophical corpus is a set of encyclopedic collections of treatises, especially al-Shifa, al-Najàt, al-Isharatwa al-Tanbihàt and the Danish Nameh; each collection contains elaborate philosophical treatises on metaphysics, physics, psychology, and logic. A standard edition of the logical texts of al-Shifa' alone comprises more than one sixteen hundred double size (1600) pages.(3) (pp. 1-2)

Contemporary philosophies of logical syntax of a language distinguish between two types of primitives-one, designative types of sign, the other, rules for transformation, designation, and

interpretation, and these distinctions can be applied to ibn Sina's system.

Ibn Sina's two primordial notions of the soul are 'being' (hasti, wujûd) and the modalities [of necessity (wajib), contingency (mumkin) and impossibility (mumtani)]. The notion of being is the core of his system, while the modalities specify the subset of beings that are existents. The notion of 'being' concatenated with 'necessity' point to 'the necessary being;' using the second version of the ontological argument, 'necessary being' results in 'the Necessary Existent.' The notion of 'being' concatenated with 'contingency' has two possible results: (a) if there is a cause for the case in question, then the contingency is an actual existent-for example, in the case of 'being a human,' persons are existents because they have parents; (b) in the case of absence of the cause, the results are non-actual contingencies such as unicorns. 'Impossibility' and 'being' lead to no existent, as illustrated by 'round squares,' and 'the largest number.' The key notions of ibn Sina's system are very clear: 'Being-qua-being' (hasti, wujûd) corresponds to Aristotle's notion of 'being-qua-being' in Metaphysica 1002a 20 (ὂν ᾗ ὀν) and E. Moody's reading of Ockham's use of 'ens' in Summa Totius Logicae. (4) It signifies the most determinable concept. 'Non-being' is meaningless. We should note that all mental concepts (actual or not actual) signify a being. For this reason 'being' is different from 'existent'. 'Existent' (mawjûd) signifies actual entities, Aristotle's notion of first substance (πρώτη φιλοσοφία). There are no impossible existents. For ibn Sina there is only one Necessary existent, which is the ultimate cause of generation of other existents. 'Existence' itself is not an existent, but signifies those entities which are neither uncaused 'contingent beings' nor 'impossible entities."Essence,' (mahyya) is used by ibn Sina in the sense of "ti esti" and in the secondary sense of "ousia" employed by Aristotle. (5) An existent partakes of an essence; for example, the feature of a basket-hall can be discussed in terms of the formal properties of a sphere. An unrealized entity such as a unicorn may have an essence but no existence." (pp. 20-21)

Notes

(1) A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, New York, 1962, p. 94; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, New York, 1962, vol. II pt. 1 p. 215.
(2) Y. Mahdavi, *Bibliographie d'ibn Sin*a, Tehran, 1954; G. C. Anawati, *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne*, Cairo, 1950 [these Bibliographies are in Arabic]
(3) *Al-Shifa'Al-Mantiq*, ed. I. Madkour, et al. 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960).
(4) See A. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, New York, 1965 p. 137
(5) See P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sina)*, London, 1973 p. 313.

From: Parviz Morewedge, *The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna*, Binghamton, Global Publications, 2001.

THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS ACCORDING AVICENNA

"The inspection of the *llahiyyat* reveals not only the importance of Metaph. α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10, but also the particular way in which Avicenna reproduces these two loci of the *Metaphysics* in his work: first, the doctrines of α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10 are somehow interconnected in the final section of the *Ilahiyyat*, the one dealing with philosophical theology (VIII, 1–X, 3); second, within this section the doctrine of α, 1-2 is placed before that of Λ, 6-10, and constitutes a sort of introduction to philosophical theology. It is possible that Avicenna read α, 1-2 and *Λ* 6-10 during his secondary education according to this same pattern. (...)
In sum, Avicenna's approach to the Metaphysics at the time of his secondary instruction had three main features: (i) it was not an extensive reading of this work in its entirety, but only of the essential parts of it, namely--on the basis of the evidence at our disposal--α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10; (ii) these two loci were read in connection with one another, as elements of the theological part of the Metaphysics, in disregard of the ontological part of it; (iii) a

was read as an introduction to Λ, 6-10 whereas books A, B-K of Aristotle's work were probably neglected." (pp. 57-58)
"The first specific endeavour of clarifying the relationship between ontology and theology within the [Aristotle's] *Metaphysics* took place, as far as we know, in Arabic philosophy. In post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy, this relationship was not perceived as problematic: it appears as a crucial issue neither in an independent "aporetic" treatise on metaphysics like Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, nor in a reworking of the Metaphysics such as parts II and III of Nicholas of Damascus' *Philosophy of Aristotle* (at least judging from the extant portions of this latter work), nor in the commentaries on the Metaphysics by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Syrianus and Ammonius/Asclepius. In Arabic philosophy the problem was determined by the "theologizing" interpretation of the *Metaphysics* offered by philosophers like al-Kindi, which derives proximately from the classifications of sciences of Late Antiquity and depends ultimately on Aristotle's perspective (iii) taken in isolation from the others. (*) Al-Farabi's reacted to al-Kindi's one-sided view of the *Metaphysics*: connecting himself with the commentatorial tradition of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Ammonius/Asclepius, he had a broader view of the Metaphysics and in the *Fi Agrad* he clarified that Aristotle's work contains not only a theology, but also an ontology. (**) The background of the entire discussion is the relationship of *falsafa* and Islam: whereas al-Kindi emphasizes the theological part of the *Metaphysics* in order to assimilate Aristotelian metaphysics (and Greek metaphysics in general) and Islamic theology, al-Farabi stresses the distinction of metaphysics and philosophical theology and assigns a broader scope (and, implicitly, a higher rank) to the former with regard to the latter. Avicenna further develops al-Farabi's point of view, somehow incorporating in it al-Kindi's perspective, and presents the fullest and most articulated account of the relationship of ontology and theology within metaphysics in the history of Medieval philosophy. Avicenna regards as very important to determine the subject-matter of metaphysics: he starts the *Ilahiyyat* addressing this issue and adding the "subject-matter" (*mawud*), as we will see in Chapter 5, to the preliminary questions traditionally discussed by

Aristotelian commentators at the beginning of their exegesis of Aristotle's works. He appears to be the first in the history of philosophy to have devoted to this issue a separate and articulated treatment, and his contribution in the first two chapters of *Ilahiyyat* (I, 1-2) has rightly attracted the attention of scholars. (***) In Avicenna's powerful synthesis, Aristotle's different perspectives on the issue are elucidated and harmonized. As we are going to see in the first part of the present chapter, the main elements of Avicenna's discourse are five. First, he starts with a notion of metaphysics that gathers points (iii) and (i), namely the idea that metaphysics deals with immaterial things and with the first causes and the absolute Prime Cause, i.e. God. Second, he adds point (ii) to point (i) by means of the distinction between the "subject-matter" of metaphysics and the "things searched" in it: according to Avicenna, "existent qua existent", rather than God or the first causes, is the subject-matter of metaphysics. God and the first causes are things searched in metaphysics, and can be taken into account by this discipline just because they are not its subject-matter, for the subject-matter of a discipline is something that is common to all the things searched by the discipline in question, without being itself one of them. Third, he brings to unity perspective (iii) and perspective (ii) by means of a peculiar notion of "existent", according to which this concept is immaterial in as much as it is not restricted to the sphere of material things. Conceived as immaterial, "existent" can be common to all the objects of research of metaphysics. Fourth, he reaches a synthesis between perspective (i) and perspective (ii) by stressing that the first causes and God are a part of "existent" and the principles of the "existent" that is caused. Fifth, he stresses that the first causes and God, despite not being the subject-matter of metaphysics, have nonetheless a fundamental function within this discipline: among the things searched by metaphysics, they are its "goal", namely the things whose knowledge is ultimately pursued." (pp. 113-114)

Notes

(*) See Chapter 2, 6-7.

(**) See Chapter 3, 2.
(***) See Fakhry [1984]; Davidson [1987], pp. 284-288; Hasnawi [1991]; Roccaro [1994]; Ramon Guerrero [1996]; Bertolacci [2001b] pp. 230-232, 259-261.

From: Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitab al-Sifa'. A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*. Leiden: Brill 2006.

"Martin Heidegger claims that the history of metaphysics is a history of the oblivion of being while propounding that his "fundamental ontology" presents a "genuine" account of the question of being that attempts to overcome metaphysics and its oblivion of being. Yet, it is perhaps doubtful that, for more than two thousand years (from Aristotle to Edmund Husserl), no philosopher was able to come up with a "genuine" approach to the question of being, and that no philosopher attempted to overcome the metaphysical history of the oblivion of being. This issue becomes more polemical and problematic, given that it is unlikely the case that in the global intellectual history of Chinese, Jewish, or Islamic philosophy, no philosopher or philosophical tradition has successfully attempted to overcome the history of the oblivion of being. In the case of Islamic philosophy, it is well documented that the Near Eastern Muslim world of the Middle ages has had an impact on the intellectual history of Western science and metaphysics. However, it is not yet well documented that the same Near Eastern Islamic philosophical tradition does indeed testify to the development of a phenomenological philosophical tradition that took the question of being to be the most central question of philosophical investigations. Considering the particular case of the physician, philosopher, and poet: Avicenna ([Ibn Sina] 980-1037), it is known that his influential *al-Qanun fi al-tib* (Book on medicine) was translated into Latin (*Liber Canonis*) and many other languages, and was in currency since the late Middle ages and early Renaissance in Europe. It is also known that Avicenna's philosophical works have had a strong impact on Thomism and on the works of Maimonides among others. Moreover, Avicenna's philosophical contributions constituted the milestones of a phenomenological

mode of investigation in ontology that impacted subsequent philosophical developments in the Near East, up to the recent modem times, and some investigators have already depicted some of the phenomenological dimensions that characterize his views." (pp. XIII-XIV)

From: Nader El-Bizri, *The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger*, Binghamton: Global Publications 2000.

AVICENNA'S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS AS THE "SCIENCE OF BEING QUA BEING"

"For Ibn Sina, metaphysics is basically the study of "being qua being", but he immediately adds that its most noble, although not its first object is God, the Necessary Being by virtue of itself. (3) All this implies that the existence of God is not self-evident, but has to be proven. In order to do so, Ibn Sina develops his theory of the essence/existence distinction. In God, His essence is His existence, while in all other Beings one has to sharply distinguish their existence from their essence. (4) In the latter case, he qualifies the existence as being not identical with, but "accidental" to essence. Ibn Rushd saw in it a simple affirmation of the pure accidentality of existence, and therefore vehemently criticized Ibn Sina on this point. (5) Till recent times, this latter interpretation remained the standard one in the West. F. Rahman seems to have been the first contemporary commentator to have seriously put into question such an understanding of Ibn Sina's affirmation. (6) However, it deserves to be stated that already Henry of Ghent, in the late thirteenth century, was aware of the fact that the restricted Aristotelian notion of "accidentality" was surely not involved here, but a larger one. (7)
Among the vast majority of the Latin scholastics who followed Ibn Rushd's line of interpretation, was Thomas Aquinas.

However, he accepted as most valid Ibn Sina's distinction between essence and existence, (8) a fact already evident from the very title of his famous early work *De ente et essentia*. Thomas Aquinas uses Ibn Sina's theory in order to explain the composite nature of all creatures, especially the immaterial ones, i.e., the angels. He obviously rejects any kind of hylemorphic composition in them. Although he does not mention the Avicennian vocabulary of "necessary in virtue of itself', "necessary in virtue of another", and "possible", he clearly derived his view from Ibn Sina, and not from Aristotle, Boethius, or the *Liber de Causis* as he suggests. (9) But, on the other hand, Thomas wants to distance himself from what he considers to be Ibn Sina's "essentialism". For him, there is not only identity in God between essence and existence, but God is above all "*esse subsistens*", which clearly means that the priority is on the side of the existence. Thomas certainly believed that he thus was radically opposing Ibn Sina's view. Even if he misunderstood the accidentality of existence in the latter's thought, he was right in his opinion that Ibn Sina had not fully appreciated existence as a part of the integral ontological dimension of Beings. (pp. 1-2)

I have already stressed that for Ibn Sina, metaphysics was essentially the study of being qua being, i.e., an ontology, but that its most noble object of investigation is God, in other words it also includes theodicy. One may add that for Ibn Sina metaphysics is moreover the science that has to demonstrate the principles of the other sciences, which means that it also deals with the "archaeology" of the sciences. Although Aristotle's metaphysics entails elements of all three of these views, it never linked them together within a substantial unity. Based on the important preparatory work of his predecessor al-Farabi, for the first time in the history of philosophy Ibn Sina had worked out a metaphysical "system" as "system". In this respect this latter rightly deserves to be qualified as a kind of onto-theology even if it does not completely match Heidegger's – inspired by Duns Scotus – conception. In view of all this, metaphysics is certainly the highest and most valuable of all sciences, a fact particularly underlined by Ibn Sina when he discusses, in his *Danesh-Nameh,* metaphysics immediately after the "instrumental" science of

logic, but before "physics", and such contrary to the customary habit, a habit he himself respects in his Arabic encyclopaedias, of presenting it as the latest of all sciences. While it is commonly designated as "meta-physics", i.e., the science of what comes after physics, an appellation sometimes used by Ibn Sina as well, he does not hesitate to call it *Ilahiyyat*, i.e. "(science) of the Divine Things" as well, and indeed prefers to do so." (pp. 6-7)

Notes

(3) This is a common doctrine in his writings, clearly expressed in his major writing *al-Shifa*, *al-Ilahiyyat*, vol. I, eds. G.C. Anawati and S. Zayed, Cairo, OGIG, 1960, book I, chapters 1-2. This text is also available in a mediaeval Latin translation, see S. Van Riet (ed.), *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I–IV, Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1977, Tractatus primus, capitula 1-2.
(4)This idea is omnipresent in Ibn Sina's metaphysical works too. Again, I refer only to *al-Shifa*, *al-Ilahiyyat*, but now vol. II, eds. M.Y. Musa, S. Dunya and S. Zayed, Cairo, OGIG, 1960, book VIII, chapter 4; for the Latin translation, see S. Van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latinus. *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* V-X, Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1980, Tractatus octavos, capitulum 4.
(5) See e.g., Ibn Rushd, *Tafsir ma ba'd al-Tabia*, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1938. Repr. Tehran, Int. Hikma, 1377 H.S., vol. I, commentary on book Gamma, C 3, p. 313; there exists a medieval Latin translation, see Averroes, *Opera omnia,* Venetiis, Junta, 1562, vol. VIII, f. 67 B.
(6) F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna", Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), pp. 1-14; see also ID., "Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina. The Myth and the Reality", Hamdard Islamicus 41 (1981), pp. 3-14.
(7) See P. Porro, "Possibility ed esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand", in W. Vanhamel (ed.), *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Ser. I, vol. XV), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1996, pp. 211-53, especially p. 215.

(8) There exists ample literature on this subject. For references, see my *An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina (1970-1989)* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Ser. I, vol. XIII), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1991, pp. 244-250 and my *An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina. First Supplement (1990-1994)* (FIDEM, Textes et études du moyen age, 12). Louvain-la-Neuve, FIDEM, 1999, pp. 137-161.
(9) See Thomas d'Aquin. Dietrich de Freiberg, *L'être et l'essence. Le vocabulaire médiéval de l'ontologie*. Traduction et commentaires par A. de Libera et C. Michon (Points. Essais, 339), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1996, pp. 27-36.

From: Jules Janssens, *Ibn Sina and His Influence on the Arabic and Latin World,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

"...it behooves us to commence making known the ides of metaphysics. (...)
The philosophical sciences, as has been pointed out elsewhere in [our] books, are divided into the theoretical and the practical. The difference between the two has [also] been indicated. It has been mentioned that the theoretical are those wherein we seek the perfecting of the theoretical faculty of the soul through the attainment of the intellect in act -- this by the attainment of conceptual and verifiable knowledge through things that are [the things] they are, without [reference to their] being our [own] actions and states. Thus, the aim in these [things] is to attain an opinion and belief which is not an opinion and belief pertaining to the manner of an action, or to the manner of a principle of an action inasmuch as it is a principle of action. And [it has also been stated] that practical [philosophy] is that wherein one first seeks the perfection of the theoretical faculty by attaining conceptual and verifiable knowledge involving things that are [the things] they are in being our own actions -- thereby attaining, secondly, the perfection of the practical faculty through morals.

It was stated that theoretical knowledge is confined to three divisions -- namely, the natural, the mathematical, and the divine.
[It was also stated] that the subject matter of the natural is bodies, with respect to their being in motion and at rest, and [that] its investigation pertains to the occurrences that happen to them essentially in this respect.
[It was also stated] that the subject matter of mathematics is either that which is quantity essentially abstracted from matter, or that which has quantity -- the thing investigated therein being states that occur to quantity inasmuch as it is quantity and where one includes in its definition neither a species of matter nor a motive power.
[Finally, it was stated] that the divine science investigates the things that are separable from matter in subsistence and definition.
You have also heard that the divine science is the one in which the first causes of natural and mathematical existence and what relates to them are investigated; and [so also is] the Cause of Causes and Principle of Principles -- namely, God, exalted be His greatness.
This much is what you would have come to know from the books that have previously come to you. But from this it would not have become evident to you what the subject matter of metaphysics really is (except for a remark in the *Book of Demonstration*, if you remember it). This is because in the other sciences you would have something which is a subject; things that are searched after; and principles, [universally] admitted, from which demonstrations are constructed. But now you still have not truly ascertained what is the subject matter of this science -- whether it is the essence of the First Cause, so that what one seeks here is knowledge of His attributes and acts, or whether the subject matter is some other notion." pp. 2-3 (Book One, Chapter One).

"Hence, we must inescapably indicate the subject matter of this science so that the purpose that lies in this science becomes evident for us. (p. 7)

"Moreover, [the subject matter of metaphysics] cannot be specifically confined to any one category, nor can it be the attributes of any one thing except the existent inasmuch as it is an existent.

It is thus clear to you from this totality [of what has been said] that the existent inasmuch as it is an existent is something common to all these things and that it must be made the subject matter of this are for the reasons we have stated. And, moreover, because it is above the need either for its quiddity to be learned or for itself to be established so as to require another science to undertake to clarify [such] a state of affairs therein ([this] because of the impossibility of establishing the subject matter of a science and ascertaining its quiddity in the very science that has that subject), [it thus needs] only the admission of its existences and quiddity. The primary subject matter of this science is, hence, the existent inasmuch as it is an existent; and the things sought after in [this science] are those that accompany [the existent,] inasmuch as it is an existent, unconditionally." (pp. 9-10, Book One, Chapter Two).

From: Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*. A Parallel English-Arabic Text Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Michael E. Marmura, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press 2005.

THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

"What adheres necessarily to this science [therefore] is that it is necessarily divided into parts. Some of these will investigate the ultimate causes, for these are the causes of every caused existent with respect to its existence. [This science] will [also] investigate the First Cause, from which emanates every caused existent inasmuch as it is a caused existent, not only inasmuch as it is an existent in motion or [only inasmuch as it is] quantified. Some [of the parts of this science] will investigate the accidental occurrences to the existent, and some [will investigate] the

principles of the particular sciences. And because the principles of each science that is more particular are things searched after in the higher science -- as, for example, the principles of medicine [found] in natural [science] and of surveying [found] in geometry -- it will so occur in this science that the principles of the particular sciences that investigate the states of the particular existents are clarified therein.

Thus, this science investigates the states of the existent -- and the things that belong to it that are akin [to being] divisions and species -- until it arrives at a specialization with which the subject of natural science begins, relinquishing to it this specialty; [and at a] specialization with which the subject matter of mathematics begins, relinquishing to it this specialty; and so on with the others. And [this science] investigates and determines the state of that which, prior to such specialization, is akin to a principle.

Thus, [some of] the things sought after in this science are the causes of the existent inasmuch as it is a caused existent; some [of the things sought after] pertain to the accidental occurrences to the existent; and some [pertain] to the principles of the particular sciences.

This, then, is the science sought after in this art. It is first philosophy, because it is knowledge of the first thing in existence (namely, the First Cause) and the first thing in generality (namely, existence and unity).

It is also wisdom, which is the best knowledge of the best thing known. For, it is the best knowledge (that is, [knowledge that yields] certainty) of the best thing known (that is, God, exalted be He, and the causes after Him). It is also knowledge of the ultimate causes of the whole [of caused things]. Moreover, it is knowledge of God and has the definition of divine science, which consists of a knowledge of the things that are separable from matter in definition and existence. For, as has become clear, the existent inasmuch as it is an existent, and its principles and the accidental occurrences [it undergoes] are all prior in existence to matter, and none of them is dependent for its existence on [matter's] existence." (pp. 11-12, Book One, Chapter Two).

From: Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*. A Parallel English-Arabic Text Translated, Introduced and Annotated by

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"En muchas de las obras traducidas se encontró Gundisalvo con la palabra *al-qiwam*. Vamos a recorrerlas transcribiendo los pasajes más representativos para darnos a entender su significado. (p. 381)
(...)
Después de haber señalado así la mayoría de los pasajes en que Gundisalvo, tanto en las traducciones como en sus propias obras emplea la palabra 'existentia' para traducir *al-qiwam,* y despues de haber visto que Gundisalvo quiere asi

significar et 'esse' o 'quo est' como contradistinto de 'quod est', debemos preguntarnos ¿qué es lo que et propio Avicena entiende por *al-qiwam*? Desde luego tratamos del sentido correspondiente inmediato entre el concepto y la cosa significada, no de un sentido implicito o de un sentido consecuente al modo como al decir 'casa' significamos 'el techo' y significamos 'las paredes', y al designar et 'individuo' designamos su 'esencia especifica'.
Primeramente observemos que hoy por *al-qiwam* todo el mundo entiende la 'subsistentia' (traducción que tambien Gundisalvo aceptó, como hemos visto). Por esto dice A.-M. Goichon: «599. -'Qiwâm', *subsistence*, sens donné par Lane art. *qiwam* et *rukn*, mais qui n'est presque jamais rendu exactement par les traductions, pourtant des plus diverses». No podían traducir al-qiwam por 'subsistentia', porque el latin corriente de entonces carecía de esa palabra. No se encontrará vocabulario del rabe ni arabista entendido que haya visto en Avicena el uso de *al-qiwam* en el sentido de 'existencia' contrapuesta a la 'esencia' corno *principia quibus* de las cosas, ni Gundisalvo lo vió, ya que la 'existencia' para él no significa lo que en tiempos posteriores a los suyos vino a significar. Contra los que quieren ver en el *al-qiwam* de Avicena o en la `existentia' de Gundisalvo ese significado de tiempos posteriores, ya es bastante decir que nadie, conocedor del árabe, haya encontrado tal significado en dicho *al-qiwam* aviceniano.
En segundo lugar, la existencia en ese sentido posterior a los tiempos de Gundisalvo es algo simple en sí el acto último que entra en la composición de las cosas. Es, como veremos, algo del orden de la *al-anniyya* de Avicena. En cambio, el *al-qiwam* aviceniano es algo compuesto de 'acto' y `potencia', mas o menos simples (cada uno de por sí), o bien mas o menos determinados. (pp. 392-393).
(...)
Que ese 'acto' y esa 'potencia' pueden recibir (según la dottrina de Avicena) determinaciones, hasta convertirse en lo que Santo Tomas llamó 'materia' y `forma', es manifiesto por et mismo pasaje a que aludimos, ya que a continuación prueba Avicena que ese acro de *al qiwam* es en las plantas *y*

animales ' et alma` *y* esa potencia del mismo *al-qiwam* es 'el cuerpo' . De aquí que ese *al-qiwam* sea ciertamente la 'constitucion' de la cosa, o sea su esencia específica, su *mahiyya,* como por otro nombre lo nombra el mismo Avicena, según luego vamos a ver. He ahí por que Gundisalvo, en la traduction de la *Isagoge* de Avicena equiparo el 'esse' (o 'quo est') de Boecio a la *rnahiyya* aviceniana, y la traduce cerca de cien veces por 'esse', y este 'esse', según el, se define: «Esse est existentia formae in materia». Esta existencia, pues, es la esencia específica o simplemente 'la esencia', dicha en abstracto, solo que latinistas posteriores a Gundisalvo cambiaron los conceptos que implicaban esas palabras.
De aquí que tengamos en Avicena pasajes que contradistinguen entre sí *al-qiwam y '* existencia' (*al-wuyud*) en cuanto se suele contraponer a 'la esencia'. (p. 394).
(...)
En otro artículo seguiremosn: con el estudio de *al anniyya* en las obras de Avicena. El hecho de que una palabra se apoderó del significado de la otra, al par que et confusionismo que de eso se siguió y aun vemos seguir, relacionó de un modo inconveniente los terminos *al-qiwam y al-anniyya* y sus mismos conceptos. Pero quizá con lo dicho y con lo que diremos después encontremos alguna mayor claridad en ese boscaje de traducciones e interpretaciones." (p. 405).

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some commentaries thereupon. The parts of the Metaphysics that Avicenna read in this earlier stage were books Alpha Elatton and Lambda, as constituting the natural theology of Aristotle's work. He neglected, on the contrary, the books corresponding to its ontological part. The special attention to Alpha Elatton and Lambda and the close connection between these two books in a theological context were peculiar traits of al-Kindi's approach to Aristotle's Metaphysics. Therefore, the evolving approach to Aristotle's Metaphysics that Avicenna's autobiography witnesses can properly be described as a passage from the Kindian to the Farabian way of interpretation."

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"Avicenna has been interpreted as having held the real distinction between 'esse' and 'essence'; Averroes as having criticized him on this point: "Avicenna made a big mistake here." A closer reading, however, will, I believe, reveal that Avicenna was talking about two intelligible notes, 'intentiones' or 'dispositiones', in the comprehension of a concept, whereas Averroes was pushing two different modes of understanding that same content. St. Thomas thought that Averroes "was closer to the truth." No Arabic scholar today would, so far as I can make out, read that real distinction into this context. Avicenna has also been accused of holding an independent order of possibles, just as Averroes was accused of holding a double truth theory. Both charges were libels."
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"Taking as a starting point the knowledge that the Arab world had of the neo-Platonic texts ascribed to Aristotle, such as the *Pseudo-Theology* and the *Liber de Causis*, the author of this study investigates the possible knowledge that Avicenna had of this under book, well-known in the Arab world under the title of *Kalamfi mahd al-hayr*. In order to demonstrate this, she provides an analysis of four passages that belong to the *Metaphysics* of the great philosophical encyclopaedia *Al-Sifa'* ("The cure")""

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"The first philosopher known to use the concept of necessary existence in order to construct a proof of the existence of God was Avicenna. Avicenna's proof, it will appear, neither is, nor inevitably reduces itself to, an ontological proof. It is rather a certain kind of cosmological proof.
The concept of necessary existence is used by Avicenna to prove the existence of God in two works, at length in the Najat, briefly and somewhat obscurely in the Isharat. The concept is also discussed fully in two other works, the Shifa and Danesh Namesh, but there Avicenna employs it only to define the nature of God, not, as far as I can see, to establish His existence."
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"Aborder les thèmes de l'être et de la création chez Avicenne c'est, en principe, risquer une recherche immense à travers les concepts qui structurent trois dès domaines où les spéculations du grand philosophe sont les plus remarquables et aussi les plus difficiles: l'ontologie et la cosmologie, avec leur jointure. Les prendre tels qu'ils s'offrent dans le travail des traducteurs tolédans du 12e siècle, c'est tenter d'en saisir le fil tel qu'il pouvait apparaître à travers un ensemble lexical différent de celui de leur

origine, constitué dans une langue d'un type différent et, *a priori,* moins riche; et d'autant moins que le fonds spécial dont disposaient ces traducteurs, leur vocabulaire technique, s'était constitué à partir de textes qui avaient assez peu à voir avec ceux que pratiquait Avicenne: c'étaient ceux de la philosophie latine, des Pères et de Boèce, quelque peu de Platon et de la logique d'Aristote, transposés en latin. D' autant plus remarquable, notons-le, est que les premiers lecteurs de ce corpus avicennien devenu accessible aient su en faire l'usage que l'on sait. On voudrait ici proposer seulement quelques remarques sur une partie du lexique ainsi constitué, en noter quelques correspondances plus ou moins réussies avec celui d'Avicenne, y accrocher quelques observations. Nous disposons pour cela d'un instrument de travail inestimable: les trois tomes de la *Philosophia prima* publiés par la regrettée Simone Van Riet et dont le troisième offre un double lexique: arabe-latin et latin-arabe, où est donc recueillie toute la matière de notre examen (1)." p. 35
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Annotated Bibliography on Avicenna's Logic and Metaphysics: L - Z

First Part: A - K

1. Lagerlund, Henrik. 2009. "Avicenna and Tusi on Modal Logic." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 30:227-239. "In this article, the author studies some central concepts in Avicenna's and Tusi's modal logics as presented in Avicenna's *Al-Isharat* (*Pointers and Reminders*) and in Tusi's commentary. In this work, Avicenna introduces some remarkable distinctions in order to interpret Aristotle's modal syllogistic in the *Prior Analytics*. The author outlines a new interpretation of absolute sentences as temporally indefinite sentences and argues on the basis of this that Avicenna seems to subscribe to the Principle of Plenitude. He also shows that he has no valid proof of the modal conversion rules and that he uses some rather ad hoc distinctions to show that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is correct. The author also notes some interesting differences between Avicenna's and Tusi's approaches to modal logic."
2. Langermann, Y.Tzvi, ed. 2010. *Avicenna and his Legacy. A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy*. Turnhout: Brepols.
3. Libera, Alain de. 1994. "D'Avicenne à Averroès et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la théorie scolastique de l'Un transcendental." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* no. 4:141-179.
4. ———. 1999. *L'art des généralités: théories de l'abstraction*. Paris: Aubier.
   Chapter IV: *Avicenne,* pp. 499-636.

5. Lizzini, Olga. 2003. " *Wugud-Mawgud /* Existence-Existent in Avicenna. A key ontological notion in Arabic philosophy." *Quaestio.The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 3:111-138.
6. ———. 2005. "Utility and gratuitousness of metaphysics: Avicenna, *Ilahiyyat* I, 3." *Quaestio.The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 5:287-305.
7. ———. 2012. *Avicenna*. Roma: Carocci.
8. Madkour, Ibrahim. 1958. "Le traité des categories du Shifa'." *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales (MIDEO)* no. 5:153-178.
9. ———. 1961. "Introduction à la *Métaphysique du Shifa'*." *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales (MIDEO)* no. 6:281-308.
10. ———. 1966. "La théorie du syllogisme chez Avicenne." *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales (MIDEO)* no. 8:131-144.
11. Marmura, Michael E. 1962. "Some aspects of Avicenna's theory of God's knowledge of particulars." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 82:299-312.
12. ———. 1963. "Avicenna *Healing-Metaphysics* X." In *Medieval Political Philosophy*. *A Sourcebook*, edited by Lerner, Ralph and Mahdi, Muhsin, 98-111. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
13. ———. 1975. "Avicenna's Chapter "On the relative" in the *Metaphysics* of his *Shifa*." In *Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science*, edited by Hourani, George Fadlo, 83-99. Albany: State University of New York Press.
14. ———. 1979. "Avicenna's Chapter on Universals in the *Isagoge* of his *Shifa*." In *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge*, edited by Welch, Alford T. and Cachia, Pierre, 34-56. Albany: State University of New York Press.
15. ———. 1980. "Avicenna's Proof from Contingency for God's Existence in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifa'*." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 62:337-352.
16. ———. 1980. "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the *Isagoge* of his *Shifa'*." *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* no. 4:239-251.

17. ———. 1984. "Avicenna on primary concepts in the *Metaphysics* of his *al-Shifa*." In *Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens*, edited by Savory, Roger and Agius, Dionisius, 219-239. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
18. ———. 1987. "Avicenna: Metaphysics." In *Encyclopaedia Iranica. Vol. III*, edited by Yarshater, Ehrsan, 73-79. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
19. ———. 1992. "Quiddity and universality in Avicenna." In *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 77-88. Albany: State University of New York Press.
20. ———. 2004. *Probing in Islamic Philosophy. Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, al Ghazali and Other Major Muslims Thinkers*. Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing.
"Part I is devoted to Ibn Sina (Avicenna), noted for his refining the distinction between essence and existence, which constitutes the basis for his proof of God's existence and for his significant theory of the universals. The second part is devotes to Avicenna's theologian critic, Ghazali, noted for his argument that a necessary causal connection between natural events can be proved neither logically nor empirically. The third part pertains to various central themes in Islamic philosophy and includes discussions of the thought of such philosophers as Kindi, Razi, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). It concludes with a discussion of on the issues that divided the Islamic theologians, namely whether the value of the moral act is intrinsic to it or whether it is solely derived from the religious law."
Contents:
I. Avicennan studies
Preface VII; Avicenna's *Division of the Sciences* in the *Isagoge* of his *Shifa* 1; Avicenna's metaphysics (from Encyclopedia Iranica) 15; Avicenna's *Chapter on Universals* in the *Isagoge* of his *Shifa'* 31; Quiddity and universality in Avicenna 57; Some aspects of Avicenna's theory of God's knowledge of particulars 67; Avicenna and the Kalam 91; Avicenna's proof from contingency for God's existence in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifa'* 123; Avicenna on primary

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21. ———. 2006. "Avicenna's critique of Platonists in Book VII, Chapter 2 of the *Metaphysics* of his *Healing*." In *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, edited by Montgomery, James E., 355-369. Leuven: Peeters.
22. Maróth, Miklós. 1989. *Ibn Sind und die Peripatetische Aussagenlogik*. Leiden: Brill.
Translated from the Hungarian by Johanna Till.
23. Martin, Richard Milton. 1964. "On connotation and attribute." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:711-723.
"This article is a historical-philosophical discussion of two works by n Rescher on the history of Arabic logic. The most interesting essays in the former work are Al-FArabi's discussions of future contingencies and of existence as a predicate, Avicenna's analysis of conditional propositions, and Averroes' extensional analysis of modal propositions. In the first of these essays, Al-FArabi rejects the Stoic interpretation of Aristotle's "De interpretatione IX", which restricts the principle of the excluded middle; and in the

second essay, Al-FArabi tries to harmonize a number of apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle's logic and metaphysics. The essays on Avicenna and Averroes are interesting for their discussion of temporal quantification. The translation of Al-Farabi's commentary also contains useful historical information. The most interesting part of the commentary is Al-Farabi's treatment of inductive arguments."

24. McGinnis, Jon. 1999. "Ibn Sina on the Now (A new translation with commentary of a section of Avicenna's *Physics*)." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 73:73-106.
"Ibn Sina's *Treatise on the Now* is philosophically deep analysis of Aristotle's temporal theory.
The text is translated and discussed, with particular attention to both its un-Aristotelian and uniquely Avicennian aspects. Among the former is his conception of time as the flow of the now, a view found among Aristotle's later commentators, but absent from Aristotle himself. Ibn Sina's originality emerges most vividly in his solution to Aristotle's paradox against a "flowing" or changing now ("Physics" iv 10, 218a8-21). Ibn Sina's answer conceives of the now analogously to our contemporary mathematical notion of a limit."
25. ———, ed. 2004. *Interpreting Avicenna. Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam*. Leiden: Brill.
Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group.
26. ———. 2006. "A penetrating question in the history of ideas: space, dimensionality and impenetrability in the thought of Avicenna." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* no. 16:47-69.
"Avicenna's discussion of space is found in his comments on Aristotle's account of place. Aristotle identified four candidates for place: a body's matter, form, the occupied space, or the limits of the containing body, and opted for the last. Neoplatonic commentators argued *contra* Aristotle that a thing's place is the space it occupied. Space for these Neoplatonists is something ossessing dimensions and distinct from any body that occupies it, even if never devoid

of body. Avicenna argues that this Neoplatonic notion of space is untenable on the basis of three arguments. In general he maintains that bodies' impenetrability is explained by reverence to dimensionality. Avicenna argues that the method used to arrive at the possibility of space is illicit, and so Neoplatonist cannot show that space is even possible. Thus, concludes Avicenna, Aristotle's initial account must be correct. The paper outlines the historical context of this debate and then treats Avicenna's arguments against space in detail."

27. ———. 2010. *Avicenna*. New York: Oxford University Press. "Nearly three hundred works have been attributed to Avicenna. Moreover, even if one limits oneself to Avicenna's philosophical encyclopedias, he wrote no less than three (extant) s *ummas,* whose content, organization, and presentation can at times differ significantly. Additionally, recent scholarship has begun making a case that Avicenna's thought underwent an evolution, and so the problems of dating leis works (even the encyclopedias) and determining what are his "mature" views arise. In order partly to address this last issue, I decided to focus primarily on Avicenna's philosophical system as it appears in his most extensive and well-known encyclopedic work, the *Cure (ash-Shifa),* albeit in places drawing significantly on his other extant encyclopedias-particularly the *Salvation (an-Najat),* and to a lesser extent *Pointers and Reminders (al-Isharat wa-t-tanbihat)* as well as his *Canon of Medicine (Qanun fit-tibb).* Unfortunately, this meant that I gave rather short shrift to Avicenna's shorter specialized treatises as well as his *Discussions (Mubahathat)* and *Glosses (Ta'liqat),* even though I recognize that these works frequently have a more fully developed presentation of certain technical and tricky points. Also because of this self-imposed limit, I have thought it prudent not to take up the issue of intellectual development, not because I deny that it occurred or that it is not important, but because in the end I think that presenting a roughly unified Avicennan system of thought as it is appears predominantly in the *Cure* will be more useful for those readers who are interested primarily in

getting some initial sense of Avicenna's overall philosophy as well as providing a starting point for scholars who want to explore systematic developments in his thought.
Even limiting myself to the *Cure,* however, presented problems, for what one quickly discovers is that Avicenna is indeed a systematic thinker, weaving and interlacing a few very basic concepts, ideas, and arguments throughout a legion of diverse philosophical topics and problems. Consequently, in order to appreciate some move he makes, for example, in metaphysics, one must first understand the problem that he is addressing, which might have arisen initially in physics or medicine. Similarly, the value of some Avicennan notion, which might seem peculiar or even gratuitous-such as his doctrine of the Giver of Forms, which is virtually unique to his system-can be fully grasped only by seeing how it provides him with a single solution to a score of seemingly diverse philosophical problems that in fact Avicenna reveals to have a common ailment and so require a common cure. Moreover, often one cannot properly appraise Avicenna's philosophical contribution without first understanding the historical context and problematic to which he is responding. In short, what I had hoped to be a relatively concise presentation of Avicenna's philosophical system quickly grew into a somewhat lengthy tome as I tried to provide the necessary pieces needed to get some sense of the beautiful and, were it possible, almost seamless mosaic that is his system. I can only hope that the present work does justice to the systematic nature of Avicenna's unique philosophical mind." (From the Preface, XI-XII)

28. Mertz, Donald W. 1993. "Instance Ontology and Avicenna's Arguments." *Modern Schoolman* no. 70:189-199.
29. Mondin, Battista. 1999. "La metafisica di Avicenna." *Sapienza* no. 52:257-279.
"Avicenna is not only the greatest metaphysicians of Arabic philosophy, but through his excellent paraphrasis of Aristotle's "Metaphysics", he contributed to the knowledge of metaphysics among the Christian scholastics; and his influence on William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus was quite strong. The

present article analyzes the object and properties of metaphysics according to Avicenna; then it explains the structure of metaphysics, the four causes, the real distinction between essence and existence, and between the necessary and the possible, the proof of God's existence the attributes of God and the meaning of divine names, the origin of the world through emanation, divine providence and the problem of evil. The study is mainly based on the *Kitab al-Shifa*."

30. Morewedge, Parviz. 1972. "Ibn Sina's Concept of the Self." *Philosophical Forum* no. 4:49-73.
31. ———. 1972. "Philosophical analysis and Ibn Sina's "essence-existence" distinction." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 92:425-435.
Reprinted in: Parviz Morewedge, *The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna,* Binghamton: Global Publications, 2001 pp. 33-55.
32. ———. 2001. *The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna*. Binghamton: Global Publications, Binghamton University.
Contents: A introduction to Ibsn Sins's ontology 1; 1. Philosophical analysis and Ibn sina's essence-existence distinction 33; 2. The logic of Emanationism and Sufism in the philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 57; 3. A third version of the ontological argument int eh Ibn Sinian *Metaphysics* 117; 4. The analysis of "Substance" un Tusi's *Logic* and in the Ibn Sinian tradition 165; 5. two senses of mysticism in the Neoplatonic and Sufic tradition 207-239.
"Summary: The enclosed collection of essays focuses on the ontology of the most important medieval Muslim philosopher, ibn Sina (980-1037), proffering the theses that: (a) his ontology is incompatible with monotheistic theologies; (b) his cosmogony is not derivable from either Aristotelian or Neoplatonic systems; and finally (c) the mystical dimension of his system is in accord with monistic "nature mysticism," as classified by R. C. Zaehner*. In contrast to the views of majority of contemporary scholars that ibn Sina's philosophy essentially follows monotheistic or Greek philosophical systems, this collection emphasizes his original contributions to ontology and meta-mysticism."

* [Robert Charles Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane. An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.]

33. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1989. "Existence ('wujud') and Quiddity ('mahiyyah') in Islamic philosophy." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 29:409-428.
"This paper deals with the meaning of "wujud" and "mahiyyah" in various schools of Islamic thought. It begins by turning attention to the significance of this subject for Islamic philosophy as well as theology and even certain schools of sufism. It traces the history of the subject from Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina to Suhrawardi, Fakhr al-din Al-Razi and later Islamic philosophers such as Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra. The essay then deals with the basic distinctions made by Ibn Sina between necessity, contingency and impossibility which forms the basis of the ontology of Islamic philosophers."
34. Owens, Joseph. 1992. "The relevance of Avicennean Neoplatonism." In *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 41-50. Albany: State University of New York Press.
35. Porro, Pasquale. 2002. "Universaux et *esse essentiae*: Avicenne, Henri de Gand et le "Troisième Reich"." *Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Université de Caen* no. 38-39:9-51.
36. ———. 2004. "Tommaso d'Aquino, Avicenna e la struttura della metafisica." In *Tommaso d'Aquino e l'oggetto della metafisica*, edited by Brock, Stephen, 65-87. Roma: Armando.
37. ———. 2004. "Duns Scot et le point de rupture avec Avicenne." In *Duns Scot à Paris 1302-2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002*, edited by Boulnois, Olivier, Karger, Elizabeth, Solère, Jean-Luc and Sondag, Gérard, 195-218. Turnhout: Brepols.
38. Rahman, Fazlur. 1958. "Essence and existence in Avicenna." *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* no. 4:1-16.
39. ———. 1963. "Chapter XXV. Ibn Sina." In *A History of Muslim Philosophy. Vol. One*, edited by Sharif, M. M., 480-506. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

40. ———. 1981. "Essence and existence in Ibn Sina. The myth and the reality." *Hamdard Islamicus* no. 4:3-14.
41. Ramón, Rafael Guerrero. 1996. "Sobre el objecto de la metafisica según Avicena." *Cuadernos de Pensamiento* no. 10:59-75.
42. Rashed, Marwan. 2004. "Ibn 'Adi et Avicenne: sur les types d'existants." In *Aristotele e I suoi esegeti neoplatonici. Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe. Atti del Convegno internazionale Roma 19-20 ottobre 2001*, edited by Celluprica, Vincenza and D'Ancona Costa, Cristina, 107-171. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
43. Reisman, David C. 2002. *The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sina's al-Mubahatat (The Discussions)*. Leiden: Brill.
44. ———. 2002. "A New Standard for Avicenna Studies." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 122:562-577. This is a review article of: *Ibn Sina, lettre au vizir Abu Sa'd: Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa,* traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique, by Yahya Michot. Sagesses musulmanes 4. Beirut: Éditions al-Boraq. 2000. "Yahya Michot's recent contribution marks an important advance in the study of Avicenna's life and thought, not only because it offers a critical edition, translation, and commentary of a relatively unknown letter by Avicenna (the *Letter to the Vizier*), but also because it emphasizes the importance of historiographical and philological methods. However, many of Michot's conclusions concerning the historical context of a number of Avicenna's works, as well as his decision to publish preliminary editions and translations of these works, are open to serious criticism. Many of these historical questions are addressed here, along with manuscript and recension studies of Avicenna's *usul ilm wa-hikma* and *al-Ahd*."
45. ———. 2009. "Avicenna's Enthymeme: A Pointer." *Arabica* no. 56:529-542.
"In reaction to earlier scholarship on the role of Aristotelian political theory among medieval Arabic-writing intellectuals, this paper argues that another approach of those intellectuals might more profitably be followed: that

of the role of rhetorical speech. That political speech is investigated in Aristotle's Rhetoric makes it a suitable candidate for such a pursuit. However, what the present investigation concludes is that even this aspect of political theory by way of the Rhetoric also was not perceived to warrant investigation among medieval Arabic-writing intellectuals. In a review of all constituents of Greek political theory as it is now understood, this paper finds that there was one aspect of rhetorical speech that captivated the attention of these writers: the use of the enthymeme in speech patterns. Drawing on the writings of Avicenna, the author concludes that, instead of the application of the enthymemic construction of political rhetoric, Avicenna perceived yet another arena for its applicability: the training of philosophy students."

46. Reisman, David C., and Al-Rahim, Ahmed H., eds. 2003. *Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*. Leiden: Brill.
47. Rescher, Nicholas. 1963. "Avicenna on the logic of 'conditional' propositions." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 4:48-58.
48. ———. 1963. *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
"In the ten essays brought together in this volume, the author discusses different aspects and problems related to the intellectual history of Islam and centered around logical and philosophical issues. the guiding line is that Arabic logic is entirely western and has nothing to do with "oriental philosophy." Six of the essays have appeared in different journals. The first essay, written especially for this volume, gives a brief account of the history of Arabic logic. The other essays deal with particular texts and problems related to the writings of such thinkers as Al-FArabi, Al-Kindi, Avicenna, Abu 'l-Salt of Denia, Averroes. The book contains extensive bibliographical references, documentary and critical notes."
49. ———. 1964. *The Development of Arabic Logic*.
"The book begins with a chapter on the "First century" of Arabic logic which is understood to be a period of

transmission, translation and assimilation of mainly Alexandrian Aristotelianism.
The author relates how toward the end of the development of Arabic logic the initial relationship which logic bore to medicine, mathematics and astronomy was replaced by a new kinship with the Islamic "sciences" of theology, law, philology and rhetoric."

50. ———. 1966. *Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

51. ———. 1967. "Avicenna on the Logic of Questions." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 49:1-6.
"In the past few years the Logic of Questions has come into its own as a branch of logical theory which has generated widespread interest and has been extensively cultivated (1). It is thus germane to call attention to the (relatively brief) treatment of the theory of questions by the famous Persian-Arabic philosopher Avicenna (980-1037) (2).
In several of his logical treatises, Avicenna takes up the task of providing an analysis and a systematic classification of questions (3)." p. 1
(1) A pioneer work of the recent discussions is M. and A. Prior, "Erotetic Logic", *The Philosophical Review,* vol. 64 (1955) pp. 43-59 . Three important monographs are: D. Harrah, *Communication: A Logical Model,* Cambridge Mass. 1963; N . D. Belnap, Jr., *An Analysis of Questions: Preliminary Report,* Santa Monica 1963; L. Aqvist, *A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Interrogatives,* Pt. I, Uppsala 1965.
(2) On Avicenna as a logician see N. Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic,* Pittsburgh 1964, especially pp. 149-155.
(3) Our principal sources are: (1) *Danesh-name,* anonymously edited in Teheran in 1331 A. H. (= 1912); tr. by M. Achena and M. Massi, *Avicenne: Le Livre de Science,* vol. I, *S*ections on logic and metaphysics; Paris 1955, pp. 84-85; (2) *Kitab al-isharat wa-' l-tanbihat,* ed. J. Forget, Leiden 1892; ed. with the commentary of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (b. 1201) by S. Dunya, Cairo 1960; tr. A. M. Goichon, *Livre des Directives et Remarques,* Paris 1951; see pp. 85-

86 of the Forget text and pp. *234-238* of the translation; (3) *Kitab al-najat,* et. M. Kurdi, Cairo 1938; The material on questions is extracted and translated in a series of footnotes on pp. 235-237 of A. M. Goichon, *op. cit.*

52. ———. 1968. *Studies in Arabic Philosophy*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
53. Rizvi, Sajjad. 2000. "Roots of an aporia in later Islamic philosophy. The existence-essence distinction in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Suhrawardi." *Studia Iranica* no. 29:61-108.
"The distinction between existence and essence in contingent beings is one of the foundational doctrines of medieval philosophy. Building upon the Aristotelian logical distinction between a thing and its existence, Avicenna posited the distinction as a proof for the radical contingency of creation. However, one Islamic philosopher, who had an enormous influence on the development of philosophical discourse in Iran, subverted the traditional Peripatetic vision of reality and disputed the ontological nature of existence. Through a critique of the Peripatetic notion of existence, Suhrawardi denied that the term had 'reference' and demonstrated the irrelevance of the distinction for metaphysical inquiry, which should, instead, rely upon an eidetic vision of the 'hierarchy of lights'. The synthesis of these two views led to the crystallisation of Mullâ Sadrâ Shirâzi's famous doctrine of the 'primacy and systematically graded nature of being'. "
54. ———. 2003. "Process metaphysics in Islam? Avicenna and Mulla Sadra on intensification in Being." In *Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, edited by Reisman, David C., 233-248. Leiden: Brill.
55. Roccaro, Giuseppe. 1994. "Il soggetto della scienza prima. Ibn Sina, *As-sifa'. Al-ilahiyyat,* I.1-2." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 16:45-69.
In appendice: Traduzione italiana di *Al-ilahiyyat,* I.1-2 (pp. 69-82).
56. Sabra, Abdelhamid I. 1980. "Avicenna on the subject matter of logic." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 77:757-764.

Reprinted in: A. I. Sabra, *Optics, Astronomy, and Logic. Studies in Arabic Science and Philosophy,* Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 1994 (Essay XVII).
"Analysis of Avicenna's views on the subject matter of logic as presented in the introduction to the logical section of his "Kitab al-Shifa" -- the only part of this section that was translated into Latin in the Middle Ages. Attempts to clarify the distinctive character of Avicenna's account and point out Avicenna's emphasis on the intimate connection between logic and language. A brief historical introduction places Avicenna's view of the nature of logic in the context of Islamic."

57. Sebti, Meryem. 2000. *Avicenne. L'âme humaine*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
58. ———. 2005. "Le statut ontologique de l'image dans la doctrine avicennienne de la perception." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* no. 15:109-140.
"Our goal in this article is to show that the analysis of Avicenna's doctrine of perception enables the isolation of two distinct concepts of the image. In the first part, we examine the passages in which Ibn Sina characterizes the image, in agreement with the ancient conception, as the material replica of a concrete reality formed in the faculty-organs by reification. We then undertake to read his doctrine of perception in the light of the discussion of the essence or common nature, which in itself is indifferent to unity and plurality. This reading enables us to show that for Ibn Sina, the common element of the various representations--sensible, imaginative, and intellective--is the quiddity as it is in itself. Each of these representations adds to the quiddity an intention of universality or of particularity."
59. Sezgin, Fuat, ed. 1999. *Ibn Sina in the Western Tradition. Texts and Studies. Collected and Reprinted*. Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the history of Arabic-Islamic science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University.
Contents of Vol. I. (pp. 338):
A. Jourdain (Ed., transl.): Dhikr-i shamma-i ahwâl-i Abû 'Alî Sînâ / Biographie abrégée d'Abou Aly Synâ ... (1813)

J. Forget: Un chapître inédit de la philosophie d'Avicenne. (1894)
A.F. Mehren: La philosophie d'Avicenne (Ibn-Sina) exposée d'après des documents inédits. (1882)
A.F. Mehren: Les rapports de la philosophie d'Avicenne avec l'Islam considéré comme religion révélée ... (1883)
A.F. Mehren: Vues d'Avicenne sur l'astrologie et sur le rapport de la responsabilité humaine avec le destin. (1884-85)
A.F. Mehren: Vues théosophiques d'Avicenne. (1885-86)
B. Carra de Vaux: La kaîda d'Avicenne sur l'âme. (1899)
L. Cheikho (Ed.): Risâlatâ at-tayr li r-ra'îs Ibn Sînâ wa-li sh-shaykh al-imâm al-Ghazâlî. (1901)
L. Cheikho (Ed.): Athar majhûl li-Ibn Sînâ. (1906)
C. Prantl: Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande. Einfluss der Araber. (1927)
Contents of Vol. II. (pp. 354):
C.A. Nallino: Filosofia "orientale" od "illuminativa" d'Avicenna? (1923-25)
F. Gabrieli: Estetica e poesia araba nell'interpretazione della poetica aristotelica presso Avicenna e Averroè. (1929-30)
G. Furlani: Avicenna e il Cogito, ergo sum di Cartesio. (1927)
G. Furlani: Avicenna, Barhebreo, Cartesio. (1927)
G. Furlani: La versione siriaca del Kitâb al-Isârât wat-tanbîhât di Avicenna. (1946)
M. Waliur-Rahman: The psychology of Ibn-i-Sînâ. (1935)
M. Amid: Essai sur la psychologie d'Avicenne. (1940)
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S. Afnan: The commentary of Avicenna on Aristotle's Poetics. (1947)
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"Avicenna refers on a number of occasions in his *Book of the Syllogism* to "the eminent later scholar" (*al-fadil min al-muta'ahhirin*). At least three recent studies have argued or

assumed that this eminent later scholar is Alexander of Aphrodisias.
It is argued in this article that Avicenna is in fact referring to Alfarabi. This has consequences for reconstructing the lost first part of Alfarabi's *Great Commentary on the Prior Analytics*, for highlighting certain aspects of Alfarabi's logical doctrines, and for understanding more about the relation between Avicenna and Alfarabi in matters logical."

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"This study presents an outline of Avicenna's categorical syllogistic with divided modal premises. It is hoped that this will encourage further analysis of the system and, ultimately, the production of a formal semantics for it. The study also takes note of some of the problems in Avicenna's system which motivated the later logicians to introduce modifications into it. Finally, the study proposes translations for a number of the Arabic terms of art."
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"The article deals with the principles according to which the first critical edition of the Latin medieval translation of Avicenna's De anima IV-V has been prepared by Simone van Riet (University of Louvain, Belgium). The main topics are: the 'double readings', the choice of the basic manuscripts, the two critical apparatus and the two comparative vocabularies.
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"During the last years a critical edition of two important works of Avicenna according to their Latin medieval translation has been published: "De anima" and "De philosophia prima". This translation dates back to the 12th century: as far as the "De anima" is concerned the translation was made wih the help of a Jewish philosopher, Ibn Daoud, who was probably assisted by Dominicus Gundisalvi. Both translations were very influential in the Latin West: the doctrines expressed in them were widely accepted (with some restrictions) and were never censured by the Church."
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72. Wickens, G.M., ed. 1952. *Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher. A Millenary Symposium*. London: Luzac & Company.
73. Winovsky, Robert. 2000. "Notes on Avicenna's concept of thingness (*Say'iyya*)." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* no. 10:181-221.
"Avicenna's appeals to thingness occur most densely in passages devoted to analyzing the relationship between efficient and final causes, an entirely Aristotelian topic. A philological question arises: should these passages be

emended to real causality (*sababiyya*) in place of thingness (*say'iyya*)? I argue that the balance of evidence compels us to retain thingness. For Avicenna, thingness is the respect in which the final cause is prior to the efficient cause (as well as to the formal and material causes); existence, by contrast, is the respect in which the efficient cause is prior to the final cause. In fact, over the course of Avicenna's career a progression from the *kalam* problematic of *say'* v. *mawgud* to his own problematic of *mahiyya* v. *wugud* can be detected in his discussions of efficient and final causation."

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Edited by Robert Winovsky.
Contents: Acknowledgments; A note on transliteration and citation; Preface; Dimitri Gutas: Intuition and thinking: the evolving structure of Avicenna's epistemology 1; Dag Nikolaus Hasse: Avicenna on abstraction 39; Abraham D. Stone: Simplicius and Avicenna on the essential corporeity of material substance 73; David C. Reisman: Avicenna at the ARCE 131-182.
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77. ———. 2005. "Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition." In *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, edited by Adamson, Peter and Taylor, Richard, 92-136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"My aim in this book is to present a history of the metaphysics of Abú `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abdallah ibn Sinâ, known in the West by his Latinized name Avicenna.
Since 1937, when Amélie-Marie Goichon published *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sinâ (Avicenne),* no serious book-length study specifically devoted to Avicenna's metaphysics has appeared. This is surprising enough given how influential Avicenna's

metaphysical ideas were, but what makes it astonishing is that tremendous advances have taken place since Goichon's time in fields relevant to this topic. Those fields include - from the ultimate to the proximate, to use Avicenna's terms - the study of late antique Greek philosophy and the study of classical Islamic doctrinal theology, or *kalâm;* the study of the Greco-Arabic philosophical translations and the study of the philosophy of al-Farabi; and the study of Avicenna's metaphysics and the study of his intellectual biography."

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"Both Aquinas and Siger were familiar with a fundamental disagreement within the earlier philosophical tradition concerning the subject of metaphysics: is it being as being, or is it divine being? if Avicenna represented one approach to this issue, and Averroes another, both Thomas and Siger were closer to Avicenna than to Averroes in their respective solutions. Nonetheless, each resolved the issue in a distinct way."
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Metaphysics or Ontology? The Debate about the Subject-Matter of First Philosophy

INTRODUCTION

"As it now exists, the subject of metaphysics can be described by a distinction that became standard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (*) According to this distinction, metaphysics has two principal divisions: general metaphysics and special metaphysics. *General metaphysics* includes ontology and most of what has been called universal science; it is concerned, on the whole, with the general nature of reality: with problems about abstract and concrete being, the nature of particulars, the distinction between appearance and reality, and the universal principles holding true of what has fundamental being. *Special metaphysics* is concerned with certain problems about particular kinds or aspects of being. These special problems are associated with the distinction between the mental and the physical, the possibility of human freedom, the nature of personal identity, the possibility of survival after death, and the existence of God. The traditional subject of what is real as opposed to what is mere appearance is treated in both general and special metaphysics, for some of the issues relevant to it are more general or fundamental than others." (p.11)

Notes

(*) See, for example, Baruch Spinoza, "Thoughts on Metaphysics," in *Earlier Philosophical Writings*, trans. Frank A. Hayes (Indianapolis, 1963), pp. 107-61. See also the note on "Pneumatology" in G. W. von Leibniz, *New Essays on Human*

Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge, Eng., 1981), p. LXIV.

From: Bruce Aune, *Metaphysics. The Elements*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986.

"The term 'metaphysics' as the name of the discipline is taken from the title of one of Aristotle's treatises. Aristotle himself never called the treatise by that name; the name was conferred by later thinkers. Aristotle called the discipline at work in the treatise first philosophy or theology and the knowledge that is the aim of the discipline, wisdom. Nonetheless, the subsequent use of the title Metaphysics makes it reasonable to suppose that what we call metaphysics is the sort of thing done in that treatise. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not give us a single account of what he is up to there. In some contexts, he tells us that what he is after in the treatise is a knowledge of first causes. This suggests that metaphysics is one of the departmental disciplines, a discipline with a subject matter distinct from that considered by any other discipline. What subject matter is identified by the expression 'first causes'? Perhaps, a number of different things; but central here is God or the Unmoved Mover. So what subsequently came to be called metaphysics is a discipline concerned with God, and Aristotle tells us a good bit about the discipline. He tells us that it is a theoretical discipline. (...)
But Aristotle is not satisfied to describe metaphysics as the investigation of first causes. He also tells us that it is the science that studies being *qua* being. As this characterization gets fleshed out, metaphysics turns out to be not another departmental discipline with a special subject matter of its own. It is rather a universal science, one that considers all the objects that there are. On this characterization, then, metaphysics examines the items that constitute the subject matter for the other sciences. What is distinctive about metaphysics is the way in which it examines those objects; it examines them from a particular perspective, from the perspective of their being beings or things that exist. So metaphysics considers things as beings or as existents and attempts to specify the properties or features they exhibit just insofar as they are beings or existents. Accordingly, it seeks to

understand not merely the concept of being, but also very general concepts like unity or identity, difference, similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to everything that there is. And central to metaphysics understood as a universal science is the delineation of what Aristotle calls categories. These are the highest or most general kinds under which things fall. What the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify those highest kinds, to specify the features peculiar to each category, and to identify the relations that tie the different categories together; and by doing this, the metaphysician supposedly provides us with a map of the structure of all that there is.(...)

In the medieval Aristotelian tradition, we continue to meet with this dual characterization of metaphysics; and like Aristotle, the medievals believed that the two conceptions of metaphysics are realized in a single discipline, one that aims both to delineate the categorial structure of reality and to establish the existence and nature of the Divine Substance. But when we reach the metaphysical writings of the Continental rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we meet with a conception of metaphysics that expands the scope of the metaphysical enterprise.

Someone schooled in the Aristotelian tradition would be puzzled by this new use of the term 'metaphysics' and would likely charge that, in the hands of the rationalists, what is supposed to be a single discipline with a single subject matter turns out to be the examination of a hodgepodge of unrelated topics. Evidently, rationalists were sensitive to this sort of charge, and they sought to provide a rationale for their redrawing of disciplinary boundaries within philosophy. What ultimately emerged is a general map of the metaphysical terrain. (5) The claim was that there is a single subject matter for metaphysics; it is being. So the metaphysician seeks to provide an account of the nature of being; but there is a variety of different perspectives from which one can provide such an account, and corresponding to these different perspectives are different subdisciplines within metaphysics. First, one can examine being from the perspective of its being just that -- being. Since this represents the most general perspective from which one can consider being, the branch of metaphysics that considers being from this perspective was dubbed *general*

metaphysics. But the rationalists insisted that we can also examine being from a variety of more specialized perspectives. When we do, we are pursuing this or that branch of what the rationalists called *special metaphysics*. Thus, we can consider being as it is found in changeable things; we can, that is, consider being from the perspective of its being changeable. To do so is to engage in cosmology. We can, as well, consider being as it is found in rational beings like ourselves. To consider being from this perspective is to pursue that branch of special metaphysics the rationalists called rational psychology. Finally, we can examine being as it is exhibited in the Divine case, and to examine being in this light is to engage in natural theology. Pretty clearly, the rationalist notions of general metaphysics and natural theology correspond to the Aristotelian conceptions of metaphysics as a thoroughly universal science that studies being qua being and as a departmental discipline concerned with first causes; whereas the claim that metaphysics incorporates cosmology and rational psychology as branches expresses the new and broader scope associated with metaphysics in the rationalist scheme." (pp. 2-5)

From: Michael J. Loux, *Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction*, third edition, New York: Routledge 2006.

HISTORICAL DIVISIONS OF METAPHYSICS IN A NUTSHELL

"*Metaphysics* (*ta meta ta phusika*) names a discipline practiced, from the 2nd cent. C.E. on, by the 'Peripatetic and Platonic schools, and also names two "classic" early Peripatetic texts, a long treatise by Aristotle and a short one by Theophrastus. The phrase *ta meta ta phusika* is first attested, as a title for both treatises, in Nicolaus of Damascus (1st cent. C.E.), but is probably earlier as a title for Aristotle's work. While the title comes from the arrangement of this treatise after Aristotle's physical works, this arrangement is determined by the perceived logical order of

the subjects of Aristotle's different treatises and the recommended order for instruction; there is no basis for the modern legend that the title originates in a library catalogue. (The systematic arrangement of Aristotle's works is often credited to Andronicus of Rhodes [1st cent. B.C.E.], but the texts had clearly been given some systematic and pedagogical order before Andronicus' edition; it is controversial how far Aristotle himself intended this order.) The Phrase "*ta meta ta phusika*" is intended as equivalent to Aristotle's " wisdom," "first philosophy," and "*theologikê*." Its advantage over these ether names is that it is more specific. Thus the Stoics use "*theologikê*" to name the discipline that studies gods or divine things; but since these gods are themselves natural bodies, t *theologikê* is a part of physics, although it may be the final, crowning part of physics, and although Cleanthes distinguished it from physics in a stricter sense (D.L. 7.41). The title "*ta meta ta phusika*," for a discipline occupying the same place as Stoic *theologikê*, makes it clear that the divine objects to be studied (unlike the divine objects studied in Aristotle's *De Caelo*) are beyond the physical world.
Although Aristotle uses "wisdom" and "first philosophy" for the same discipline, these names are not interchangeable and are used in different contexts. "Wisdom" (discussed mostly in ethical contexts) designates a certain intellectual virtue, namely, whatever knowledge is most desirable for its own sake and not for any practical consequences. "First philosophy" specifies the object of this knowledge and contrasts it with other disciplines: If there were only physical substances, then "physics would be the first science" (Met. 1026a27-9), but if (as Aristotle thinks) there are eternal unchanging substances separate from matter, then first philosophy can be *contrasted* with physics as the science of the best and divine kind of substance. Aristotle thinks that none of the existing sciences will do as first philosophy. In the early *Topics* (105b19-29) Aristotle recognizes the tripartition of logic," "physics," and "ethics" elsewhere credited to his Academic contemporary Xenocrates, in which all *theoretical* philosophy (knowledge pursued only for its own sake) would fall under physics. But now Aristotle seeks a further theoretical discipline. One candidate would be Platonic dialectic, which, beyond examining hypotheses by question and answer, also classifies and

defines and so seeks to grasp the eternal Forms of the definienda. Aristotle admires the practice of dialectic and the ideal of a universal presuppositionless science, but rejects Plato's exaggerated claims for dialectic. Aristotle contrasts dialectic (which aims at defending or refuting, before a general audience, the claim that S is P) with the specialized causal investigations (seeking the real reason why S is P), which alone can produce scientific knowledge. The knowledge (and the scientific definitions) of the forms of natural things can be grasped only by physics, not by dialectic; and the forms reached in this way are not separate eternal stances but depend for their existence on matter. If separate eternal substances do exist, then they can be known (if at all) only by another causal inquiry, which, unlike physics, would lead us from manifest sensible effects to a cause separate from sensible things." (pp. 335-336)

From: Stephen P. Menn, "Metaphysical thought, Classical", in: Donald J. Zeyl (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1997.

"Aquinas divided *sapientia* into *metaphysica* (being as being), *prima philosophia* (first principles), and *theologia*. This scheme remained intact until early modern times. It was replaced by Christian Wolff, who divided metaphysics into general and special, calling general metaphysics, the science of being as being, by the name ' *ontologia*' (...)
Special metaphysics was now divided into the three branches of rational theology, rational psychology, and rational cosmology, namely the (rational) sciences of God, souls and bodies respectively, which in fact correspond in subject matter to the divisions of Aristotle's second philosophy. Kant's 'metaphysics of nature', subordinated to epistemology, was divided similarly into a general part, ontology, opposed to the physiology of reason, itself divided into two 'transcendent' parts (rational theology, rational cosmology) and two 'immanent' parts (rational psychology and rational physics). Husserl gave the discipline of being the name of ontology, but divided it into formal ontology and several material or regional ontologies. Formal ontology deals with formal ontological concepts, those concerned with

objects in general, as distinct from formal logical concepts, those concerned with truth and inference. Regional ontologies study the most general concepts and principles of the principal regions of being, including physical nature, consciousness, mathematics and the divine. Husserl himself spent much of his time on methodological issues and his regional ontologies were only sketched. Husserl's student Ingarden divided ontology into existential, formal and material. Existential ontology is concerned with what he called moments of existence, like forms of dependence, modality and temporality, which are combined into modes of being. Formal ontology studies different objects according to their form (thing, property, event, process, relation, state of affairs, system), material ontology according to their kind (spatio-temporal, psychological, divine'. For Ingarden 'metaphysics' denotes among all possible ontologies the one that is actual." (p. 312)

From: Peter Simons, "Metaphysics: definitions and divisions", in: Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (eds.), *A Companion to Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell 1995.

Metaphysics or Ontology? The Debate about the Subject-Matter of First Philosophy in German Renaissance Philosophy

"The earliest German textbook on metaphysics was published by the Wittenberg professor Daniel Cramer in 1594, two years before Taurellus' *Synopsis*. Cramer's *Isagoge in Metaphysicam* is a very modest attempt to present the contents of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but the work is important because its basic structure was retained in other early German textbooks. After a preface on the subject-matter of metaphysics, he reversed the order of the two central sections of Aristotle's work, dealing in his book I with the properties of being (act and potency, *ens per se*

and *ens per accidens*, the transcendentals), in his book II with its principles (the categories and the principles of natural substance) and finally in his book III with its species (the intelligences). Cramer's work was not strictly a commentary on the *Metaphysics*, but rather a textbook written in the form of questions and answers on points of metaphysical doctrine. The treatises of his successors were also independent of Aristotle's text and sought to apply and develop his thought. (...)
Decisive for the development of German metaphysics as the science of being was the publication of Suárez' *Disputationes metaphysicae* at Mainz in 1605, eight years after its first publication at Salamanca. Suárez' work was well suited to the purposes of the Lutheran thinkers. (...)
The influence of Suárez' approach may be observed as early as the works of Cornelius and Jakob Martini and most clearly in the *Opus metaphysicum* (1617) and *Epitome metaphysica* (1618) of Christoph Scheibler, professor of logic and metaphysics at Giessen.
In spite of such efforts to maintain the integral character of metaphysics, Lutheran writers came increasingly to regard an independent natural theology as a necessity. They distinguished between traditional metaphysics, as a discipline which had the task of explaining certain generally valid terms and principles, and a discipline which was often called *pneumatologia* because it dealt with the nature, properties and activities of spiritual being. (...)
Scheibler himself contributed to the distinction of the two subjects by publishing a separate textbook on T *heologia naturalis* (1621). In the preface to this work he gave a practical reason for treating the subject separately -- to limit the extent of his general treatment of metaphysics -- but the division was in fact a natural consequence of his own distinction between a *metaphysica generalis* and a *metaphysica specialis*. Also contributory to the separation of the two sciences was the publication at Cologne in 1595 of the *De communibus onmium rerum naturalum principiis* of the Jesuit Benito Pereira. The Wittenberg professor Johannes Scharf referred in the preface to his *Pneumatica* (1629) to Pereira's distinction between first

philosophy as the science of being and metaphysics as the science of God, and maintained that it was well founded. (...)
The publication at Basle in 1594 of Jacopo Zabarella's *Opera logica* played an important role in this development. Whereas the theoretical sciences employ a synthetic method in the presentation of doctrine, drawing conclusions from first principles, the practical sciences make use of an analytic method -- described by Zabarella -- which takes as its point of departure the end or purpose of an action and seeks to discover the means and principles by which this end might be attained. (...)
Consequently, whereas Lutheran writers on metaphysics sought to maintain the unity of Aristotle's science and only reluctantly admitted the necessity of an independent natural theology, Calvinist authors tended to distinguish clearly between two sciences, a science of God to the extent that he is accessible to human reason and a science of being understood as a universal science which supplies the principles for all the particular sciences.
For the formulation of the distinction they turned to the Jesuit Benito Pereira. In the preface to his *Isagoge in primam philosophiam* (1598) the Marburg professor Rudolphus Goclenius spoke of two separate sciences, a universal science called 'first philosophy' and a particular science called 'metaphysics'. First philosophy deals with being, its properties and its principles; metaphysics studies the various types of immaterial being: God, the intelligences and the human soul. Goclenius composed no treatise on metaphysics as the science of God, but his *Isagoge* is an introduction to first philosophy as the science of being. The work has two parts, the second of which deals with individual questions in the form of disputations. The first part, entitled *Praecepta metaphysica*, contains his complete treatment of the science. The first chapter deals with the definition of first philosophy and the notion of being, chapter 2-15 take up the simple and conjunct properties of being and the last three chapters treat substance and accident as its principles. Goclenius seems to have been aware of the difficulties involved in restricting the term 'metaphysics' to the science of God while speaking of the science of being as 'first philosophy'. In his *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613) he made a new and important

addition to philosophical terminology. In the article on abstraction he divided the speculative sciences according to the types of abstraction from matter that characterise them; that employed in physics he described as 'physical', that made use of in the science of God and the intelligences as 'transnatural' and that used in the science of being and the transcendentals as 'ontological'.' (pp. 13-19) The term occurs here in its adjectival form, but it soon appeared as a noun. The term 'ontology' made it possible to recognise the claim of the science of being to be metaphysics just as much as the science of God. It was in this way that the term 'metaphysics' came to designate both the universal science of 'first philosophy' or 'ontology' and the particular or special science of 'natural theology'." (pp. 626-632, notes omitted).

From: Charles H. Lohr, "Metaphysics", in: Charles B. Schmitt (ed.), *The Cambridge history in Renaissance philosophy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 537-638.

"Lutheran Aristotelianism

(...) (31)

By appealing to the philosophical idea of God, Lutheran theologians were to be able to respond to the threat to Orthodoxy which came from some extremist theologians, who maintained not only that the doctrines of faith could not be proved, but also that they are contrary to reason. Distinguishing clearly between that which belongs to reason and that which belongs to revelation, Calixt (*) maintained that reason in its own sphere cannot contradict revelation. The philosophical idea of God which man is able to attain is not such that we can say that it conflicts with the revealed idea. This approach may be observed in the works of Cornelius and Jakob Martini and most clearly in the *Opus metaphysicum* (1617) and *Epitome metaphysica* (1618) of Christoph Scheibler, professor of logic and metaphysics at Giessen.(32)
In this way a new understanding in Lutheran Orthodoxy of the nature and method of revealed theology brought about a

distinction between metaphysics as the science of being and metaphysics as natural theology. Lutheran writers came increasingly to regard an independent natural theology as a necessity. They distinguished between traditional metaphysics as a discipline which had the task of explaining certain generally valid terms and principles, and a discipline which was often called *pneumatologia* because it dealt with the nature, properties and activities of spiritual being. Scheibler contributed to the distinction of the two subjects by publishing a separate textbook on Theologia naturalis (1621).
This understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology opened the way for the free development in Lutheranism of natural theology as a theoretical science -- using the synthetic method -- distinct from the practical science of revealed theology -- using the analytic method.

Calvinist Aristotelianism

The analytic method had little success in those German territories -- like the Palatinate, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel and several smaller principalities – which leaned towards Calvinism. In accordance with the architectonic spirit of Calvinist Scholasticism; (33) Reformed theologians at the universities of Heidelberg and Marburg and later at Herborn and Burgsteinfurt regarded their science as essentially speculative and followed the synthetic method in the presentation of doctrine. Rejecting the Lutheran transposition of the tracts on salvation and soteriology in systematic works on theology, they took the glory of God and predestination as their point of departure.
Reformed dogmatics began with God as the first cause and final goal of all things, and treated his eternal decrees of providence and predestination before taking up his government of the world in time. In this conception natural theology formed an integral part of the cognitio Dei perfecta at which theology aimed. Consequently, whereas Lutheran writers on metaphysics only reluctantly admitted the necessity of an independent natural theology, Calvinist authors tended to distinguish clearly between two sciences, a science of God (to the extent that he is accessible to human reason) and a science of being (understood as a

universal science which supplies the principles for all the particular sciences).
Thus the Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius (34) in the preface to his *Isagoge in primam philosophiam* (1598), spoke of two separate sciences, a universal science called 'first philosophy' and a particular science called 'metaphysics'. First philosophy deals with being, its properties and its principles; metaphysics studies the various types of immaterial being: God, the intelligences and the human soul.
Goclenius seems to have been aware of the difficulties involved in restricting the term 'metaphysics' to the science of God while speaking of the science of being as 'first philosophy'. In his *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613) he made a new and important addition to philosophical terminology. In the article on abstraction he divided the speculative sciences according to the types of abstraction from matter that characterize them; that employed in physics he described as 'physical', that made use of in the science of God and the Intelligences as 'transnatural' and that used in the science of being and the transcendentals as 'ontological'. The term 'ontology' made it possible to recognize the claim of the science of being to be metaphysics just as much as the science of God. It was in this way that the term 'metaphysics' came to designate both the universal science of 'first philosophy' or 'ontology', and the particular or special science of 'natural theology'." (pp. 290-291)"

Notes

(*) [Georg Calixt (1586 – 1656), author of the *Epitome theologiae* (1619)]
(31) Concerning the Aristotelianism of Lutheran Orthodoxy, see Troeltsch (1891); Weber (1907), (1908); Petersen (1921); Wundt (1939), (1945); Dreitzel (1970); Sparn (1976); Leinsle (1985); Lohr (1988b), pp. 620-31; Wollgast (1993), pp. 128-220; Kusukawa (1995).
The influence of Spanish-Jesuit Aristotelianism on German Protestant philosophy is discussed by Eschweiler (1928); Lewalter (1935).

(32) Concerning these authors, see Lohr (1988a), pp. 247 (C. Martini), 247-248 (J. Martini), Petersen (1921), pp. 306-8; Wundt (1939), pp. 119-23 (Scheibler).
(33) Concerning Calvinist Scholasticism, see Althaus (1914); Lohr (1988b), pp. 631-638; Wollgast (1993), pp. 128-220.
(34) Concerning Goclenius, see Lohr (1988a), pp. 169-170.

[For the complete references see the *Selected Bibliography on the Subject Matter of First Philosophy*]

From: Charles H. Lohr, "Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy as Sciences: the Catholic and the Protestant Views in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in: Constance Blackwell, Sachiko Kusukawa (eds.) *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle*, Aldershot: Ashgate 1999, pp. 280-295.

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   "In Aristotelian "first philosophy" *(prote philosophia),* wisdom is defined as 'the search for first causes and first principles.' (1) Thus, first philosophy is defined as the highest, governing science, even before its object has been determined, i.e. before knowing the precise number and the nature of these first principles, whether nature (*phusis*), being (*to on*), God, or, as Aristotle himself is inclined to think in *Metaphysics* VII (Z), *ousia*.
   The very claim that God is first principle -- if such a principle exists -- emerged in the field of philosophy. Before Aristotle, Anaxagoras had already characterized the *nous* as divine. Further, as we have seen, the question of the nature and existence of a first principle is a crucial one for determining the status of the "highest science" for which Aristotle was looking in the *Metaphysics*. In a situation like this, a confrontation with the doctrine of the great revealed religions was unavoidable. This began in the period of the Alexandrian commentaries, continued in the Arabo-islamic world, and the Latin Middle Ages inherited this rich and complex tradition. In fact, for a long time, medieval Latin thinkers believed that Aristotle had written a theology, supposedly the continuation of Book XII of the *Metaphysics*. They thought that this was to be found in the small text derived from Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and entitled *Liber de causis*.

Does the investigation of the natural world allow us to conclude the existence of a first principle? Following natural reason, what might prompt us to call this principle 'God'? In the highest part of philosophy, what functions does God as first principle play? Are we talking about the same God as the God of the Bible, or is this pure homonymy?
In the first part of this paper I sketch the thirteenth and fourteenth century debate concerning the object of metaphysics, which raised the question of whether God, insofar as he is first principle, is the object of this science. Then I investigate how the first principle can be apprehended and conceived as an integral part of a discipline that proceeds according to human reason. I consequently touch on how the question of the knowability of the first principle serves simultaneously to assign the limits of metaphysics and to determine fully the extent of its validity. Finally I show that Early Modern metaphysics, specifically René Descartes, while completely abandoning the peripatetic conception of knowledge prevalent in the Middle Ages, nevertheless retains certain aspects of the medieval tradition through the use that Descartes made of a philosophical conception of God that provided a foundation for the order of nature and guaranteed our knowledge." (pp. 75-76)
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"The history of modern metaphysics is essentially marked by its splitting up into a metaphysica generalis and a metaphysica specialis, a well-known distinction especially within Christian Wolff's systematic conception of

metaphysics. This study investigates the actual origins of this significant development, which can be already found at the beginning of the 14th century. On the basis of a fundamentally revised doctrine of transcendentals the Franciscan theologian Francis of Marchia (~1290-1344) introduces for the first time a dissociation of the primum cognitum of the human intellect from the subject of metaphysics, according to which metaphysics is no longer one science in the sense of a scientia transcendens, as most of his predecessors claimed in the 13th century, but rather twofold: ontology and theology."

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"Concluding remarks. We have to come to a close. The study of the history of metaphysics has been addressed from the perspective of the postmetaphysical era. We shied from reproducing the claims to self-evidence that the various metaphysical projects convey and, seeking for safer, more objective ground, rather investigated into the structures that underlie this self-evidence and induce its very production. This line of questioning brought us to consider a connection which is characteristic of the foundation of metaphysics in the Middle Ages, the one between the first object of thought and the *subiectum* of first philosophy. Without reducing the speculation on the first object of thought to the modern

concept of subjectivity - both parties would resist their insertion in such a history of continuity -, the medieval discussion on the first object of thought proved to have an important feature in common with the later philosophy of subjectivity, insofar as an investigation into the horizon of knowledge settles the possibility of a homogeneous field and, therewith, of metaphysics. Yet these same structures which establish the homogeneous field of metaphysics are, in the 14th century, involved in its dispersion. This event, the dispersion of metaphysics at the beginning of the 14th century, was verified by four examples and clarified by the image of the scattered field: the collision of the homogeneous field of metaphysics with the object of knowledge made it disperse in a scattered field. Still, because of its foundation in an established distribution of subjectivity, the medieval dispersion of metaphysics remained entirely unproblematic. Only the explicit turn to the subject for the unfurling of the homogeneous field of metaphysics after the Middle Ages allowed a refreshed dispersion of subjectivity to damage the confidence in metaphysics and herald the postmetaphysical era.

Perhaps the question arises whether, in this way, metaphysics itself has indeed become impossible. Is it not rather a certain episode of its history that has come to a close, an episode in which this foundational scheme of subjectivity grew to full stature and then faded away? But it would be quite ahistorical to think that one could escape from this development and once more try, free now from the rise and fall of subjectivity, to establish a homogeneous field of metaphysics. This reality of which we are not the most creative part, is constituted, on a theoretical level, by structures of which we cannot dispose, structures that, historically determined, are imposed upon us and do not allow us - thus the diagnostics of our postmetaphysical era - to describe reality, like metaphysics intends to do, in terms of a homogeneous field.

This transition from the era of the philosophy of subjectivity to the post- metaphysical era was symbolized by the succession of those both catchwords `subjectivity' and

'structure'. Structural reflection on subjectivity reveals its constitutive vigor to be embedded in or even derived, not to say borrowed from more fundamental structures in the ordering of knowing, structures that propose and indeed define both the subject-positions to be occupied and the object-domains of metaphysics allegedly constituted by mutually irreducible instances of subjectivity.
Turning things round, a conclusion is reached to which we - rather on the sly, as must be admitted - were tacitly leading all this time. For if, by accepting the perspective of the postmetaphysical era and receiving the self-evidence of metaphysical projects not as something given, but as constituted by analyzable structures, we reached insight into tendencies of dispersion in the history of metaphysics, then, finally, also the self-evidence to which the *postmetaphysical* era appeals reveals itself to be produced and analyzable as to its constitutive structures -- with this analysis, thus we may conclude, we have made a beginning here." (pp. 63-64)

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"The subject-matter of metaphysics has been debated since the time when Aristotle first conceived the idea of the science. He himself speaks of 'the science we are seeking' and describes it differently in different places. In *Metaphysics* IV 1003a 21-6)) he speaks of a science which studies being as being and contrasts this science with the special sciences, like the mathematical disciplines, which investigate the attributes of a part of being. Two chapters later, IV.3 (1005b2), Aristotle speaks of a science which he calls 'first philosophy' because it grounds the first principles or axioms of the special sciences. But in book VI.1 (1026a18-1 9) he distinguishes three types of speculative science, physics, mathematics and 'divine science', so that one must ask how he understood the relationship between the general science of being, first philosophy and divine science. It is clear that divine science studies objects that are separate from matter and not subject to change. But Aristotle seems to have wanted to identify this science both with the investigation of being and with the science of the principles of the sciences, on the ground that divine science concerns itself with the highest principle of being in general

and can for this reason preside over the special sciences. At the same time, each of these definitions of metaphysics must be understood in accordance with Aristotle's own idea of what science is. In his conception, scientific knowledge is attained by way of the definition of the essential natures of things and the demonstration of the attributes which necessarily belong to them. Basically, Aristotle understood reality as an ordered structure. Even where his definitions are definitions of events, these are understood not in their variability as a process, but rather as reified. His science of metaphysics deals therefore with all reality according to its fixed essences and their necessary attributes and has consequently a static character, like the ancient society which it reflected.

In the course of history it was Aristotle's conception of metaphysics as divine science that gave rise to the most difficulties. The encounter of his idea of God as first substance with divergent religious traditions often forced later thinkers to modify the conception of metaphysics as the science of being. In late antiquity those philosophers who came to the defense of the pagan gods tended to interpret metaphysics as the science of intelligible reality, arranged in hierarchical degrees, separate from matter, but mediating between the divine and the material worlds. In Islam the doctrine of God's oneness compelled philosophers and theologians to emphasise the great gulf which separates the necessary being of the creator from the radically contingent being of the created world. Medieval Latin Christianity learnt of both of these approaches through Avicenna and Pseudo-Dionysius. The notions of a necessary first substance and a hierarchy of intelligences readily found a place in the contemplative and ordered society of the Middle Ages. The Christian notion of a God active in himself as triune and active in the world as incarnate as the fundamental articles of a faith thought to be even more certain than scientific knowledge would seem to have demanded a new definition of science and a new definition of the reality which metaphysics studies. But, paradoxically, it was only with the revolutionary social changes that

marked the period under consideration in this volume [the Renaissance] -- a period in which the medieval faith was breaking down - that a vision of reality as dynamic process and a new understanding of science emerged.
This new conception of reality appeared in various guises, as a new mathematics, as the idea of a magical control over nature, as a conflict between Plato and Aristotle, or in connection with the doctrine of God. It was resisted by scholastic authors, who sought for apologetical reasons to maintain Aristotle's static notion of being. But as more and more new sciences -- sciences connected with this new vision of reality and often undreamt of in antiquity -- carne to maturity, even thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition were forced to reopen the question of the definition of metaphysics and its relationship to the individual sciences. Since each of these problems -- the problem of God and the problem of the science of being -- had its own history, I shall treat them separately." (pp. 537-538)

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"In the fourteenth century, a new version of the first solution makes its appearance. Unlike its thirteenth century predecessor, this version of the solution is aware of the notion of the formal object uniting the various discourses comprising a science, yet it rejects such a notion. This deconstruction of the problematic surrounding the subject of metaphysics may be seen most clearly in the writings of Ockham and Buridan. With this development, the medieval history of the problematic of the subject of metaphysics may be said to reach its apogee by returning to its origins. The notion of a formal unity in a science, a unity that transcends the merely logical unity of a particular demonstrative syllogism, is once again missing from the discussion.
In this, the second edition of his classic study, Albert Zimmermann has once again provided scholars with a remarkable collection of otherwise unavailable texts along with penetrating studies on that perennial metaphysical

question: what is the subject of metaphysics. As indicated by the title, Zimmermann's treatment of the medieval discussion on the object of metaphysical knowledge ranges over the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, covering authors from the generation of Richard Rufus and Roger Bacon up to John Buridan. The new edition takes account of most of the considerable literature that has appeared since the original publication in 1965. (...)

Zimmermann's volume divides into two parts. The first presents texts drawn from medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in which the subject of metaphysics is discussed. The second part is subdivided into three chapters: the first sketches out the primary sources for the medieval discussion -- found chiefly in the writings of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes; the second describes the advent of the three basic solutions proposed by medieval authors for the solution to the problem; and the final chapter shows the subsequent development of these three solutions. The study closes with reflections upon the medieval treatment of the problem and what impact the medieval discussion had upon the development of early modern philosophy as well as contemporary European thought.

Given the ambiguity of Aristotle's various statements on the subject of metaphysics, Avicenna and Averroes attempted to work out systematic accounts of the subject of metaphysics. Applying rigorously the model of scientific knowledge expressed in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, Avicenna concluded that being as being, understood as common to substance and accident, had to be the subject of metaphysics since God's existence was sought in metaphysics and no science proves the existence of its subject. Agreeing with many of the basic assumptions of Avicenna, Averroes came to the opposite conclusion: metaphysics has as its subject God since the existence of God is already shown in natural philosophy and thus may be assumed for the purposes of metaphysical investigation.

The medieval philosophers worked out three alternative solutions to the problem presented to them by the texts

newly received at the outset of the thirteenth century. The first solution, clearly evidenced in the writings of Roger Bacon, proposed that there are various subjects for the science of metaphysics and thus diffused the disagreement between Avicenna and Averroes. In the case of Bacon, the three subjects are being as being, substance, and God, subjects that are treated successively in the sequence of books in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*. As Zimmermann notes, this solution is not only too facile but indicates that its proponents had not developed the notion of a single, formal subject that unites all the features treated within the scope of a science; Bacon is an especially clear case in this regard since he located the unity of metaphysical knowledge in the reducibility of all metaphysical objects to the First Cause and not in any formal unity of the subject matter.

The second solution Zimmermann finds most fully expressed in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, though he sees adumbrations of it in the commentaries of Albert the Great and Richard Rufus. Unlike the defenders of the first solution, those advancing the second solution are distinctive in having a refined notion of the formal object of the science and positing the unity of the science to be derived from the formal object. According to this solution, being as being or being in general (*ens in communi*) is limited to the range of creaturely being, a notion of which we attain through our acquaintance with sensible substances. The existence of God is not presupposed for metaphysical science though some judgment (*separatio*) that being is separate in notion and reality from merely sensible things is required. Instead, God relates to metaphysical knowledge as the cause and the principle of the subject of the science or ens commune; hence, God's existence may be known in and through metaphysics, but the names derived from the concept of being that constitutes the object of the science can tell us little about His nature.

The final solution developed by medieval philosophers was also the one most commonly adopted by them. Positing being as being as the subject in the widest possible sense, these thinkers claimed that God falls under the subject of

metaphysics in that sense, albeit they often qualified that claim by stating that the sense of being that applies to God and creature is only analogously the same. One of the earliest adherents of this view was the great Dominican theologian Robert Kilwardby, but the most famous of those subsequently defending the view were Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. In many ways, as Zimmermann notes (p. 329), Scotus's systematic presentation of this view marked the culmination of its development and led to the form that the medieval discussion would have thereafter, connecting the discussion of the subject of metaphysics to distinctively Scotistic theses such as the univocity of being."
Timothy Noone, Review of the volume in: *The Review of Metaphysics*, 54, 2000, pp. 183-185.

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Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant

INTRODUCTION

"To begin with we want to state that ontology should be seen only as an interdiscipline involving both philosophy and science. It is a discipline which points out the problems of the foundations of the sciences as well as the borderline questions, and which further attempts to solve these problems and questions. Ontology is not a discipline which exists separately and independently from all the other scientific disciplines and also from other branches of philosophy. Rather, ontology derives the general structure of the world; it obtains the structure of the world as it really is from knowledge embodied in other disciplines. If one examines the history of philosophy one sees that ontology has never solved or attempted to solve the questions about the structures of our world independently, apart from the other philosophical disciplines or apart from the sciences. As is expressed by this symposium's topic, "Language and Ontology", ontology has derived the world's structure from other disciplines which describe reality, and has thus relied upon the languages of other disciplines. A common belief is that this derivation of the world's most general structures from the knowledge of other disciplines is ontology's only task. But now the belief is that in doing ontology one always selects the most important and most general laws from among all the laws which the various disciplines have to offer at any given time. Further, the ontologist interprets and generalizes those laws and must endeavor to establish certain of them as the most fundamental and general structures of our world.

If ontology is a discipline which uses knowledge from various other disciplines then it is obvious that, in the course of the history of philosophy, ontology must have developed in a most dramatic fashion. If we look at the actual history of ontology we find confirmation of our claim. Ontology mirrors, so to speak, the level of our knowledge of the world at any given time. For instance, Plato and the Platonists have assumed that one could derive our world's most general empirical structures from an ideal world of Platonic Forms. Of this world of Forms it is said that one can experience it intuitively and that its existence has to be presupposed a priori. For this derivation, one needs only two relations, *methexis* and *parousia*. "Methexis" means "participation" or what we would call "representation" "parousia" means "manifestation" (of the ideas in the world) or what we would call "interpretation". These ontological procedures are explained in Plato's Parmenides.

For Aristotle, the main task of philosophy was not to perceive the world of ideas, but to experience the empirical world and acquire knowledge about it (Metaphysics, Chapter 9). He created the first system of ontology in the form of an ontology of substances. Aristotle's search for the world's true structures is interestingly opposed to Plato's. For Aristotle the general properties of things, that is, those properties of things which constitute their invariant form, have to be found through a cognitive process. These general properties of things are universal structures or patterns. These universal patterns are to be defined and axiomatized. For this task one calls on logic for help. The end result is that universals become generally comprehensible.

Here one may ask as Porphyry did what universals really are. The answers that have been proposed are numerous. They include: Platonic ideas, substances residing in things, concepts or representations in the human mind (conceptualism), terms or predicates contained in our language (nominalism), and mathematical-theoretical constructs in the languages of present day theories. The question about the very nature of universals (general structures) has occupied philosophy and the sciences up to the present day as one can see in reading Heisenberg's dialogues with Schrödinger where this question is discussed at length.

In the Middle Ages the concern with universals continued. Various elaborate systems evolved, including, importantly, varieties of conceptualism and nominalism. A decisive turn in the history of

ontology is connected with the writings of Goclenius, Wolff, and Leibniz. Goclenius needs to be mentioned for he is credited with the first use of the term 'ontology'. Like all ontologies, so also Wolff's, has to be made dependent upon the level of knowledge existing at his time. Knowledge for Wolff is logical knowledge. He established the interdisciplinary character of his ontology by deriving the most general laws of nature and of all things from the principles of a logic derived from Leibniz. According to Wolff, it is one of the basic ontological structures of everything that exists, that the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason are valid in all merely possible worlds in addition to the real world.
Kant rejected Wolff's logic as metaphysical and Platonistic. Therefore Kant rejected also Wolff's ontology. Instead of traditional logic, Kant introduced his own transcendental logic. This transcendental logic may be seen as a cognitively oriented method which is founded on concepts. If one wants to gain knowledge, then, according to Kant, only those categories (or most general concepts) may be used which fulfill certain spatio-temporal conditions when they are applied. These categories are of subjective origin, that is, created by the human mind. It is a scientific theory, namely, Newton's physics, which furnishes the natural laws which are the basis of Kant's ontology. In his epistemology (an "auxiliary discipline" of his ontology which is contained in the Critique of Pure Reason), Kant methodologically explains Newton's physics. Leibniz's logic stands in the same relationship to Wolff's ontology, as the natural laws of Newton's physics and Kant's own epistemology stands to Kant's ontology. But for Kant it is not the world of things-in-themselves which determines his ontology but the spatio-temporal categorial system of relations of the phenomena. It is important that here ontology can be clearly separated from epistemology. Kant's epistemology is a metatheory of the cognitive presuppositions and methods of classical physics. Kant's categorial ontology derives from natural laws which are supported and confirmed by empirical evidence of the general structures of the world-the classical physical world, as we would say today. With this, ontology became an interdiscipline, since it is here that for the first time in the history of philosophy and science that scientific results were thoroughly (philosophically) generalized. This is also an important point in the development of the ontology of the sciences. The ontology of the sciences has progressed enormously in

the twentieth century, since many scientific theories with their specialized, cognitively oriented languages and with their specialized mathematical methods did not originate before the twentieth century. Up to now, the ontology of the sciences is the last chapter of the history of ontology.
After Kant, ontology developed in several directions. Ontology of the sciences evolved in Neo-Kantianism, Positivism and Neo-positivism, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, and in contemporary philosophy of science. On the other side stands phenomenological ontology. Phenomenological ontology expanded Kant's phenomenological "reduction" of the world. Its climax is Husserl's phenomenology in which the world itself becomes the (world) phenomenon. The world's basic structures exist exactly in that way in which they are experienced (phenomenologically) by human beings. The construction and the structure of the world "happen" in man's pure intentional consciousness vis-à-vis reality. According to Husserl, mathematics and logic also participate in the constitution of the world out of the phenomena. This constitution has a semantical character but happens, nevertheless, without language. Heidegger's fundamental ontology, on the other hand, speaks of an anti-logical and anti-scientific basic experience, which is said to be paramount to all scientific knowledge.
The next decisive step in the development of ontology was the result of another development, which had reached its climax in the twentieth century, the development of formal logic. Formal logic, and, in union with it, analytic philosophy, often show the tendency to dissolve epistemology into syntax and semantics, and even pragmatics. The syntactical semantic functions, the reference relation, etc., could, in turn, be based upon the respective functions of language, be it ordinary language or the language of the sciences. Wittgenstein's reduction of thinking to the linguistic medium became an object of a philosophical position whose task was to explain and clarify language. As a result, the ontology of the sciences acquires features which are best characterized by "regional linguistic ontology". An important result of Wittgenstein's reduction of thinking to language was the dissolution of conceptualistic ontology." (*Preface by the Editors,* pp. 18-20)

From: Werner Leinfellner, Eric Kraemer and Jeffrey Schank (eds.), *Language and Ontology. Proceedings of the Sixth International*

Wittgenstein Symposium. 23th to 30th August 1981 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria), Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1982.

THE ORIGIN OF A NEW TERM: "ONTOLOGIA"

Until 2003 the first appearance of the Latin word "ontologia" was known in two works published in 1613:

> Rudolf Göckel (1547-1628) Latin Rudolf Goclenius, Professor of Logic in the University of Marburg: in his *Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, informatum opera et studio Rodolphi Goclenii*, Frankfurt (reprinted by Georg Olms, second edition 1980) XII, 1143 pages) on the left margin of *abstractio* (the term is written in Greek);
>
> Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609) Latin Jacobo Lorhardo or Jacobus Lorhardus, Professor at the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland) in his *Theatrum philosophicum*, Basilea, SECOND edition.

Göckel's work was well known, but Lorhard's *Theatrum philosophicum* was first discovered by Joseph S. Freedman in the second edition of his *Deutsche Schulphilosophie im Reformationszeitalter (1500-1650): ein Handbuch für den Hochschulunterricht*, Münster, MAKS, 1985, and cited by Jean-François Courtine in his masterpiece *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, p. 410 n. 6.
Lorhard was an unknown author and the only reference I found to him is in the *Syllabus auctorum*, Vol. 9 of the *Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus . Repertorium generale systematicum operum philosophicorum usque ad annum MDCCC typis impressorum* by Wilhelm Risse, Zürich - New York, Georg Olms, 1998:
"*Lorhardus, Jacobus* (fl. 1597), praeceptor Durlaci, rector S. Galli"

Wilhelm Risse 's outstanding work contains a bibliography of the published titles on philosophy up to 1800 (about 18.000 titles!); I tried to find the FIRST edition of Lorhard's work, which was unknown.
In Vol. II, - "*Logica*" of Risse's work, Jacobus Lorhardus is cited twice: year 1597 and year 1606 (references are to the year of publication).
1597: *Liber de adeptione veri necessarii, seu apodictici*..., Tubingae, 1598, (p. 217)
1606: *Ogdoas scholastica, continens diagraphen typicam artium grammatices, logices, rethorices*... Sangalli, 1606, (p. 232)
The title of the second work puzzled me: *Ogdoas* means "composed of eight elements" and the title cited only three disciplines.

May 16, 2003, I discovered that this work was the first edition of the *Theatrum philosophicum* and that the word "*ontologiae*" appeared in the complete title:

Jacobo Lorhardo: *Ogdoas Scholastica continens Diagraphen Typicam artium: Grammatices (Latinae, Graecae), Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae*.

The frontispiece of the book *Ogdoas Scholastica* and of the *Metaphysicae su Ontologiae Diagraphe*.

"The first occurence of "ontology" (in German: *Ontologie*) in a dictionary of philosophy can be found in the first philosophical dictionary published in a modern language, the *Philosophisches Lexicon* by Johann Georg Walch (1693-1775): the first edition was published in 1726 (the second improved edition of 1733 has been reprinted in three volumes by Thoemmes in 2001).

July 15, 2005: I received new information about Jacob Lorhard from Peter Øhrstrøm, Institut for Kommunikation, Aalborg Universitet:

"Jacob Lorhard was born in 1561 in Münsingen in South Germany. In 1603 he became "Rektor des Gymnasiums" in the protestant city of St. Gallen. In 1606 he published his book Ogdoas scholastica, on the frontispiece of which the word "ontologia" appears - probably

for the first time ever in a book. "Ontologia" is used synonymously with "Metaphysica". In 1607, i.e., the year after the publication of Ogdoas scholastica, Lorhard received a calling from Landgraf Mortiz von Hessen to become professor of theology in Marburg. At that time Rudolph Göckel (1547-1628) was also professor in Marburg in logic, ethics, and mathematics. It seems to be a likely assumption that Lorhard and Göckel met one or several times during 1607 and that they shared some of their findings with each other. In this way the sources suggest that Göckel during 1607 may have learned about Lorhard's new term "ontologia" not only from reading Ogdoas scholastica but also from personal conversations with Lorhard. For some reason, however, his stay in Marburg became very short and after less than a year he returned to his former position in St. Gallen. Lorhard died on 19 May, 1609. Later, in 1613, Lorhard's book was printed in a second edition under the title Theatrum philosophicum. However, in this new edition the word "ontologia" has disappeared from the front cover but has been maintained inside the book. In 1613, however, the term is also found in Rudolph Göckel's *Lexicon philosophicum*. Here the word "ontologia" is only mentioned briefly as follows: "ontologia, philosophia de ente" (i.e., "ontology, the philosophy of being"). It is very likely that Göckel included this term in his own writings due to inspiration from Lorhard."

October 27, 2006: Dr. Marco Lamanna, Bari University (Italy) send me some important details:

"In July 2006 I had the opportunity to consult a copy of the *Ogdoas Scholastica* (1606) of Lorhard in the University Library in San Marino. The neologism *ontologia* appears four times in the course of the work. On three occasions it occurs in the genitive singular (*Ontologiae*): on the frontispiece, in the title of the section on metaphysics, and at the end of this same section. Only on one occasion (in the dedicatory letter) does the word appear in the accusative case (*Ontologiam*). I was subsequently able to consult Lorhard's *Theatrum philosophicum* at the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel. This work, the second (amplified) edition of the *Ogdoas Scholastica*, and appeared posthumously at Basel in 1613. The *Theatrum philosophicum* is made up of twelve parts (*continens Grammaticen Latinam, Graecam, et Hebraeam, Logicen, Rhetoricen, Arithmeticen, Geometriam, Musicen,*

Astronomicen, Ethicen, Physicen, Metaphysicen seu Ontologiam). The parts that appear here in addition to the material in the *Ogdoas* are the sections on Hebrew grammar, arithmetic, geometry and music. In the dedicatory letter of the *Theatrum philosophicum*, Lorhardus writes "*hancque Dodecada Scholasticam confeci*" (i.e. a work of twelve parts), in contrast to what he had written in 1606: "*hancque Ogodoada Scholasticam confeci*" (i.e. a work of eight parts).

In September 2006 I confirmed that the part of the work dealing with metaphysics (*Metaphysices seu Ontologiae Diagraphe*) is identical in the *Ogdoas* and in the *Theatrum*, and also discovered that Lorhardus was not the author of this chapter. In fact, what Lorhard did was to create a diagrammatic representation, in the Ramist tradition, of the *Metaphysicae Systema methodicum* of Clemens Timpler, which ran through nine editions, including some unauthorized imprints (Steinfurt 1604, Lich 1604, Hanau 1606, Frankfurt a.M. 1607, Marburg 1607, Hanau 1608, Frankfurt a.M. 1612, Hanau 1612, Hanau 1616).

[See: Joseph S. Freedman, *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The life, significance and philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1988].

Since Lorhard finished working on his *Ogdoas Scholastica* (the dedicatory letter was dated 24 February 1606), he could presumably only have had the 1604 editions of Timpler's work to consult. Lorhard faithfully repeats most of the theorems with which Timpler had begun each of his chapters, except for a few minor differences, explicable by the fact that Lorhard was adapting Timpler's work to diagrammatic form and that the *Ogdoas* was a book for *studiosis adolescentibus* of the Gymnasium in Sankt Gallen where he was rector. The only important difference is that Lorhard introduces a new word, not found in Timpler, "*Ontologia*", by which he means all metaphysics. In the title page of the *Ogdoas* and in the title of his Ramistic diagram, Lorhard equates the two words with the phrases "*Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae*", and "*Metaphysicae seu Ontologiae Diagraphe*" respectively. (A similar phrase also occurs in the dedicatory letter).

I have also found another copy of the Ogdoas Scholastica (1606), in the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt in Halle, in

addition to the four copies indicated on the website *Ontology. Theory and History*."

April 27, 2011: An update on Lorhard from Marco Lamanna:

Latest Findings on Jakob Lorhard and the Rise of the Term Ontology

"My latest finding at the Universitätsbibliothek Marburg of the *Lysis duorum sophismatum pro omnipraesentia carnis Christi in Eius Persona* by Jakob Lorhard, gives us the definitive confirmation of the presence of Lorhard in Marburg in 1607.
The work regards a public discussion held by Lorhard at the Faculty of Theology of Marburg's Philipps-Universität in 1607. It contains two dedications: the first to Hermann Vultejus (1565-1634), professor of law and chancellor at University of Marburg, and the second to Gregor Schönfeld (1559-1628), professor of theology and superintendent in Hessen.
In the work, Lorhard for the most part discusses the theme of the omnipresence of Christ in the world, contrasting every pantheistic degeneration.
Lorhard's "exoteric" approach is evident. He argues only on the basis of the literal exegesis of the Sacred Scripture, as evident also in his *Kurtzer begriff Dess wahren ungefälschten Christenthumbs*, completed on his return from Marburg to St. Gallen and published posthumously in 1610.
Probably, the unsuccess of his appointment as professor of theology in Marburg was caused by the distance of Lorhard's theology from the esoteric and apocalyptic researches that were being affirmed in Marburg and at the court of the prince Moritz of Hessen in Kassel, for example with a theologian like Raphael Egli (1559-1622). Perhaps this is the reason that led his return to St. Gallen from Marburg, just four months later, in semptember 1607.
The publication in Marburg of the Lysis not only confirms the indications contained in the biography of Lorhard by Georg Leonhardt Hartmann, but also confirms above all the hypothesis formulated by Peter Øhrstrøm, Jan Andersen, Henrik Schaerfe (*What has happened to Ontology*, in F. Dau / M.-L, Mugnier, G. Stumme (eds.), Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg 2005): Rudoph Göckel most probably met Lorhard in Marburg between may and

September of 1607, and from Lorhard thus renewed the neologism *ontology*."

THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF "ONTOLOGY" IN ENGLISH

According to the last printed edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (Second edition, 1989) the first occurrence of "ontology" was in *An Universal Etymological English Dictionary* (1721) by Nathaniel Bailey (born ? - died 1742): "An Account of Being in the Abstract."
Isaac Watts (1674-1748) in his *Logic, or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth. With a Variety of Rules to Guard against Error, in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well as in the Sciences* (1724) wrote: "In order to make due enquiries into all these, and many other particulars which go towards the complete and comprehensive idea of any being, the science of ontology is exceeding necessary. This is what was wont to be called the first part of metaphysics in the peripatetic schools" I. VI. 9.
The first book in English with "ontology" in the title is: Isaac Watts - "*Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects, (...); With some Remark s on Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. To which is subjoined a brief Scheme of Ontology, or the Science of Being in general with its Affections*" (1733).

The on-line *Draft Revision* of the Oxford English Dictionary (September 2008) give as first occurrence (discovered by Fred R. Shapiro in a message to the *Linguist List* (December 25, 2005): Gideon Harvey (1636/7-1702): *Archelogia philosophica nova; or, New principles of Philosophy. Containing Philosophy in general, Metaphysicks or Ontology, Dynamilogy or a Discourse of Power, Religio Philosophi or Natural Theology, Physicks or Natural philosophy* - London, Thomson, 1663, Book II, Chapter One, pp. 17-18: "It is [Metaphysics] called also the First Philosophy, from its nearest approximation to Philosophy, its most proper Denomination is *Ontology*, or a Discourse of a Being."

THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF "ONTOLOGIA" IN A WORK PUBLISHED IN GERMAN

The poet Christian Weise (1642 - 1708) in a novel published in German in 1675 with the pseudonym *Catharinum Civilem* made use of the Latin "ontologia":

"Denn durch die PHILOSOPHIE. wird allhier nicht eine DISPUTATION aus der ONTOLOGIA verstanden sondern die rechte PHILOSOPHIA PRACTICA, welche sich in dem Lichte der Natur und in denen Menschlichen Verrichtungen umbsiehet und dannen hero einen festen Grund der unverfälschten Klugheit gestellet hat." (Chapter VIII, p. 181)

Christian Weise, *Die drey Klügsten Leute in der gantzen Welt*, Leipzig, J. Fritzsch, 1675 (Critical edition in: *Sämtliche Werke*, XVIII, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005, p. 112)

THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF "ONTOLOGIE" IN DENMARK

February, 24th 2004: I received this message from Dr. Jan Andersen (research assistant with Professor Peter Oehrstroem at the Department of Communication. Aalborg University, Denmark) on the origin of "ontology" in Denmark:

"The Danish-Norwegian author Jens Kraft (1720-1765) published a text book in Danish titled 'Ontologie' as a part of his 'Metaphysik' in 1751. When the book was published Kraft was a professor (mathematics and philosophy) at the Soroe University. 'Ontologie' was meant as a text book aimed at the students there. 'Ontologie' was a part of the larger work 'Metaphysik' which also contained 'Cosmologie' (1752), 'Psychologie' (1752) and 'Naturlig Theologie' (1753). Kraft was a dedicated admirer of Christian Wolff and had

(before writing the book) attended Wolff´s lectures at Halle University, Germany, but, as opposed to Wolff, Kraft was an adherent of Newtonian theory, and is considered to be the prime spokesman and the introductor of Newton to Denmark and Norway (the two countries being one united kingdom at the time). Kraft is mentioned in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography (Charles Coulston Gillispie ed.) vol. VII, New York 1973, Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 490 in an article written by Kurt Moeller Pedersen. Kraft´s book can be found at the Statsbiblioteket in Aarhus, Denmark."

Ontologie,
eller
den første Deel
af
Metaphysik.
Skrevet
til
Soroe Ridder-Academies
Nytte.
Kiøbenhavn 1751
paa Autors egen Bekostning.

Jens Kraft, *Ontologie'*, frontispiece of the Book.

TEXTS WITH THE TERM "ONTOLOGIA" FROM LORHARD TO CLAUBERG (1606-1664)

1. Lorhard, Jacob. 1606. *Ogdoas Scholastica, Continens Diagraphen Typicam Artium: Grammatices (Latinae, Graecae), Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Metaphysices, Seu Ontologiae*. St. Gallen.

   According to the *Bibliographia philosophica vetus, Pars 1. Philosophia generalis*, by Wilhelm Risse, the volume is available only in two German Libraries: the Staatsbibliothek Augsburg and the Lüneburg Ratsbibliotek, but I discovered a third copy, not cited by Risse, in the Kantonsbibliothek St. Gallen, Switerland.
   From 1998, a fourth copy is available in the "Fondo Young sulla memoria e la mnemotecnica" (Morris N. Young's Fund on memory and mnemotechnics) at the Library of the San Marino University; a fifth copy was discovered by Marco Lamanna, University of Bari, Italy in the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt in Halle.

2. Wegelin, Thomas. 1608. *Disputatio Theologica De Christo*. Tubingae: Gruppenbach.

   Dissertation. (Advisor: Johann Georg Sigwart), see p. 9. Available at München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.

3. Lorhard, Jacob. 1613. *Theatrum Philosophicum, Continens Grammaticen Latinam, Graecam, Et Hebraeam, Logicen, Rhetoricen, Arithmeticen, Geometriam, Musicen, Astronomicen, Ethicen, Physicen, Metaphysicen Seu Ontologiam*. Basilea.

   Second expanded edition of Lorhard (1606).

4. Rodolphus, Goclenius. 1613. *Lexicon Philosophicum Quo Tanquam Clave Philosophiae Fores Aperiuntur*. Frankfurt.

   s.v. *abstractio* p. 16.
   Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1964 (with the *Lexicon philosophicum Graecum*).

5. Lobetantz, Matthias. 1613. *Disputatio Ontologica De Bono Et Malo*. Rostock.

   Dissertation. (Advisor: Andreas Hojer).

A copy is available at the Bayerische StaatsBibliothek - Signature: 4 Diss. 2968#Beibd.24.

6. Alsted, Johann Heinrich. 1620. *Cursus Philosophici Encyclopaedia Libris Xxvii: Complectens Universae Philosophiae Methodum, Serie Praeceptorum, Regularum & Commentariorum Perpetua*. Herborn.

   Two volumes; see vol. I p. 149.
   Vol. II with the title: *Septem artes liberales, quae constituunt tertium encyclopediae philosophicae tomum*.
   Reprint of the 1630 edition: *Encyclopaedia. Septem tomis distincta* - Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1989.

7. Capsius, Liborius. 1627. *Sapientia (Vulgo Metaphysica) Idealis. Pro Acquirenda Philosopho-Theologica Akribeia*. Erfurt.

   See p. 28.

8. Calov, Abraham. 1636. *Metaphysica Divina, Pars Generalis Praecognita Ii*. Rostock.

   See p. 4.

9. Segers, Johannes Christophorus. 1639. *De Ontologia Generali*. Erfurt.

   Dissertation. (Advisor: Liborius Capsius).
   Available at the Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt / Gotha - Signature: LA. 4° 00261 (21).

10. Flottwel, Johann. 1640. *Disputatio Prima Ontologica D.T.O.M.A. Et Consensu Amplissimae Facultatie Philosophicae Exercitii Et Indagandae Veritatis*. Regiomonti: Johanni Reusneri.

    Dissertation. (Advisor: Johann Hund).
    A microfilm is available at the Bayerische StaatsBibliothek, Signature: Film R 2001.281,NWA-1267.

11. Caramuel y Lobkowitz, Juan. 1642. *Rationalis Et Realis Philosophia*. Louvain.

See p. 65.

12. Clauberg, Johannes. 1647. *Elementa Philosophiae Seu Ontosophia. Scientia Prima, De Iis Quae Deo Creaturisque Suo Modo Communiter Attribuuntur, Distincta Partibus Quatuor*. Groningen.

13. Micraelius, Johannes. 1653. *Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum (First Edition)*. Jena.

    s.v. *Metaphysica*.

14. Clauberg, Johannes. 1660. *Ontosophia Nova, Quae Vulgo Metaphysica, Theologiae, Iurisprudentiae Et Philologiae, Praesertim Germanicae Studiosis Accomodata. Accessit Logica Contracta, Et Quae Ex Ea Demonstratur Orthographia Germanica*. Duisburg.

15. Micraelius, Johannes. 1662. *Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum (Second Edition)*. Stettin.

    Reprinted with an introduction by Lutz Geldsetzer: Düsseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co. 1966.

16. Mildeheupt, Christian Heinrich. 1663. *Dissertatio Ontologica De Quaestione an Conceptus Entis Sit Unus*. Lipsiae: Wittigau.

    Dissertation. (Advisor: Dietrich von Wida).
    Dresden Sächsische Landesbibliothe / Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek - Signature: Coll. diss.A.78,30.

17. Harvey, Gideon. 1663. *Archelogia Philosophica Nova; or, New Principles of Philosophy. Containing Philosophy in General, Metaphysicks or Ontology, Dynamilogy or a Discourse of Power, Religio Philosophi or Natural Theology, Physicks or Natural Philosophy*. London: Thomson.

    The first occurrence of "ontology" in English.

18. Clauberg, Johannes. 1664. *Metaphysica De Ente, Quae Rectius Ontosophia*. Amsterdam.

A SELECTION OF STUDIES ON THE ORIGINS OF THE LATIN WORD "ONTOLOGIA"

"In the prolegomena to his *Elementa philosophiae sive Ontosophiae* (1647), Johannes Clauberg remarks: 'Since the science which is about God calls itself Theosophy or Theology, it would seem fitting to call Ontosophy or Ontology that science which does not deal with this and that being, as distinct from the others owing to its special name or properties, but with being in general.' This text may be held, in the present state of historical knowledge, for the birth certificate of ontology as a science conceived after the pattern of theology, yet radically distinct from it, since being qua being is held there as indifferent to all its conceivable determinations. 'There is, Clauberg says, a certain science which envisages being inasmuch as it is being, that is, inasmuch as it is understood to have a certain common nature or degree of being, a degree which is to be found in both corporeal and incorporeal beings, in God and in creatures, in each and every singular being according to its own mode.' Leibniz will later praise Clauberg for such an undertaking, but he will regret that it had not been a more successful one. The very word "ontology" occurs at least once in an undated fragment of Leibniz, (1) and one can expect accidentally to meet it later in various places, (2) but it is not until 1729 that it finally comes into its own with the Ontologia of Christian Wolff."

Notes

(1) Louis Couturat, *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz,* (Paris 1903) p. 512
(2) For instance, in J.B. Duhamel *Philosophia vetus et nova* 2nd ed. 1681, according to P. Gény, *Questions d'enseignement de philosophie scholastique* (Paris 1913) p. 48

From: Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952 p. 112-113. French edition: *L'être et l'essence*. Paris, Vrin,1948 (Second revised edition 1962).

"C'est un fait que l'*Ontologia* de WOLFF constitue une étape importante de l'histoire de la métaphysique, même s'iln'est pas vrai, comme on le dit trop souvent, qu'elle soit la toute première Ontologie. Avant lui déjà, en effet, CLAUBERG avait fait paraître à Amsterdam en 1656 une Metaphysica de ente quae rectius Ontosophia, aliarum Disciplinarum, ipsiusque quoque Jurisprudentiae et Litterarum, studiosis accomodata, car ainsi qu'il le déclare: sicuti...geosofia vel geologia dicitur quae circa Deum occupata est scientia: ita haec, quae non circa hoc vel illud ens speciali nomine insignitum vel proprietate quadam ab aliis distinctum, sed circa ens in genere versatur, non incommode Ontosophia vel Ontologia dici posse videatur (Opera omnia, Amstelodami, 1691 t. I, p. 281). De même, en 1669, le Père Réginald, dominicain, publia un ouvrage réédité à Paris en 1878 et intitulé: *Doctrinae Divi Thomae Aquinatis tria principia, cum suis consequentiis*, dont la première partie traite de l'être en général sous le titre: De Ontologia, cependant que Jean-Baptiste Du HAMEL, dans sa: *Philosophia vetus et nova ad usum scholae accomodata, in regia Burgundia ohm pertractata*, Parisiis, 1678, emploie le mot Ontologia dans le même sens, lorsque, dans le tome III de cet ouvrage, divisant la métaphysique en trois parties, il déclare: In primo quae ad entis ipsius naturam, principia, affectiones et primas velut species pertinent, exsequimur; adeo ut Ontologiam seu entis scientiam hoc tractatu complexamur. Atque haec est prima philosophia aut scientia generalis, ex qua reliquae dimanant (p. 10 et 11 de l'édition de 1687).
Mais ces auteurs ne sont pas les premiers à avoir frayé la voie de l'Ontologie. Le terme même semble avoir fait sa première apparition, tout au moins sous sa forme grecque, dans le *Lexicon philosophicum quo tamquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur* de Rudolph GOCLENIUS (Frankfurt, 1613), où l'on peut lire à l'article: *abstractio*, p. 16, dans la marge: οντολογία, et philosophia de ente, et dans le corps de l'article: οντολογία, idest philosophia de ente seu de transcendentibus.

vero ſeparátur ratione, non etiã ſeparantur definitione vt patet in formis Naturalib. Ioh. Talentonius Philoſophus & Medicus Parmenſis acutiſſim⁹ l.3.c.9. Itaq; Ariſtot. dixit formas naturales eſſe ſimiles ſimitati & Mathematicas curuitati. Simitas nõ poteſt definiri ſine mentione materiæ ſeu ſubiecti, q̃ eſt Naſus: At curuitas definitur ſine mentione ligni vel ęris, omninoq; ſẽſibilis materię ſeu naturalis corporis.

Abſtractio ſeu ſecretio igitur, alia eſt facilior, alia difficilior, vt: affectiones externę facilius ratione abiungi poſſe videntur à ſubiectis, quam internæ ſeu intimæ.

ABSTRACTIO MATERIÆ in ſcientijs contemplatricibus.

Abſtractionis Materiæ in ſcientjs Theoreticis tres ſunt Modi.

ὀντολογία & philoſophia de ENTE.

Seiuncto & Abſtractio à materia eſt à

- *Singulari ſeu ſenſili.* Signata, vt hoc vel illo corpore. Abſtractio *phyſica* hæc eſt.
- *Cum ſingulari, tum vniuerſali,* etiam ſecundum rationem tantum, vt à corpore ſimpliici aut mixto. *Mathematica* hæc eſt. & ὀντολογικὴ, idest, Philoſophiæ de ente ſeu Tranſcendentibus.
- *Omni* tam *ſecundum rem*, quam *ſecundum rationem. Transnaturalis* de Deo & Intelligentiis hæc eſt. Hæc ſeiunctio eſt, quam recentiores nonnulli vocant abſtractionem omnimodam à Materia per eſſentiam.

Hanc diſtinctionem habet Alexander Alenſis in 6.Met.text.2.

Sunt qui Metaphyſicã Abſtractionẽ à materia dicant fieri ſecundũ rem & rationẽ, illamq; faciant duplicẽ: Vnam per eſſentiã, qualis cernatur in Deo: Alterã per indifferentiã, quæ conueniat in prædicata trãſcendentia, Bonũ, Verũ, Ens, & dicantur eſſe immaterialia, ac ſecundum rem abſtracta à materia, eo q̃ indifferenter inueniantur tã in reb. materialib. quã iis, quæ vacant materia: cui⁹ diſtinctionis κρίσιν † ego aliorũ iudiciis relinquo. Etſi huius diſtinctionis auctores erudite & ſubtiliter refutare videtur Ben. Peterius libr.1. Phyſ. Nã ſi hęc ratio iſtius nouę appellationis valeret, propter eandẽ cauſam dicere aliquis poſſet, illa prædicata, Ens, Bonum, &c. eſſe phyſica & materialia, quia non ſolum in rebus materiæ expertibus, ſed etiam in his, quæ habent materiam, reperiũtur. Quod eſt indifferens ad aliqua nõ magis referri dicitur ad vnũ illorũ, quã ad alterũ. Si ens eſt indifferens ad res materiales & immateriales, nõ ideo fit abſtractũ ſecũdum rẽ à materia, ſed ab vtroq; rerum genere abſtrahi poteſt tãtum ſecundũ rationẽ: non ſecus atq; animal tantum ratione poteſt ſeparari ab homine & bruto. Itaq; merito reprehenderetur, qui affirmaret, animal vniuerſe ſumptum, quod perſe indifferens ſit ad rationale & irrationale, eſſe poti⁹ rationale quam irrationale. Sed magis ſubtilia hæc videntur quam vtilia. Itaq; ad πολυμαθημοσύνην ſane referantur.

† [indiciũ.]

Rudolf Göckel, *Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, informatum opera et studio Rodolphi Goclenii*, Frankfurt, 1613: *abstractio* ('ontologia' is written in Greek).]

C'est encore sous sa forme grecque qu'on le rencontre chez Abraham CALOV qui, dans sa: *Metaphysica divina a principiis eruta, in abstractione entis repraesentata ad S. S. Theologiam applicata, monstrans terminorum et conclusionum transcendentium usum genuinum abusum hereticum constans* (Rostockii, 1636), déclare: Scientia de ente, Metaphysica appellatur

communiter a rerum ordine, οντολογα rectius ab objecto proprio (*Scripta philosophica*, Lubecae, 1651, p. 145) et qui, tout au long de cet de cet ouvrage, appelle ainsi οντολογα la science de l'être; à tel point que sa *Metaphysica divina*... peut être considérée, dans l'état actuel de nos connaisances, comme la première ontologie. Quoi qu'il en soit, on peut bien dire qu'avec CALOV, l'Ontologie en tant que discipline est déjà née. Et c'est cette science de l'être en général que les scolastiques du XVII siècle se sont plu à ériger en une sorte d'introduction à la philosophie - d'où le nom de philosophie première qu'ils lui donnèrent encore -- et qu'ils réduisirent peu à peu à n'être qu'un vocabulaire ou un lexique philosophique, destiné à servir d'instrument de base à l'enseignement de la métaphysique, grâce à la définition des termes employés par celle-ci, comme nous l'apprennent: Johann Franz BUDDE dans une longue note de son ouvrage: *Isagoge historico-theologica in theologiam universam singulasque ejus partes*, Lipsiae, 1727, lib. I, cap. IV, 28, t. I, p. 252-261, et surtout Jacob THOMASIUS dans son: *Historia variae fortunae quant Metaphysica jam sub Aristotele, jam sub Scholasticis, jam sub Recentibus experta est*, ajoutée en appendice à ses *Erotemata metaphysica pro incipientibus*, Lipsiae, 1692, p. 19-87.

Ainsi donc, lorsque l'ouvrage de WOLFF parut, l'ontologie était une conquête de la philosophie vieille déjà d'à peu près cent ans. Mais, à défaut d'en avoir été le créateur, il peut bien être considéré comme son réformateur et son rénovateur. Car, indépendamment du fait qu'il a été le premier à lui donner des dimensions matérielles aussi considérables et à en faire un traité bien à part à côté des autres traités constituant l'ensemble de la métaphysique, il s'est élevé contre la prétention d'en faire purement et simplement un lexique philosophique et a tenté de l'ériger en authentique science première qua *omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur*, comme le dit son titre. Il lui attribue, en effet, pour rôle d'établir les principes et de définir les concepts nécessaires aux autres disciplines, non seulement philosophiques, mais aussi scientifiques et utiles à la pratique de la vie, en même temps qu'il vise à y édifier une théorie générale de l'être, ainsi que le veut la définition qu'il en donne au 1: *Ontologia seu Philosophia prima est scientia entis in genre, seu quatenus ens est*. En un mot, pour être l'héritier des scolastiques du XVII siècle, et tout en adoptant leur réduction de la philosophie première à l'Ontologie, alors qu'elle était coextensive à toute la

métaphysique chez ARISTOTE, WOLFF n'en a pas moins donné à celle-ci un statut à la fois plus ample et plus ferme. Et c'est ce qui fait que son nom est resté plus intimement lié que celui de ces derniers à son apparition." (p. 116).

From: Jean École, *La Philosophia prima sive Ontologia de Christian Wolff: Histoire, doctrine et méthode,* Giornale di metafisica, 1961/1 pp. 114-125 (reprinted in: Jean École, *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* Paris, Vrin, 1985 pp. 8-19).

"Christian Wolff popularized (in philosophical circles) the word 'ontology' (*ontologia, Ontologie*). The word appears in the title of his *Philosophia prima sive ontologìa methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnes cognitionis humanae principia continentur*, first published in 1730. *Ontologia seu philosophia prima* is defined as *scientia entis in genere, quatenus ens est* (op. cit., § 1). Ontology uses a "demonstrative [i.e., rational and deductive] method" (ibid., § 2), and purports to investigate the most general predicates of all *entes* as such (ibid., § 8). Following Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten (>*Metaphysica*, 1740) defined ontology (also called ontosophia, metaphysìca, metaphysica universalis, architectoníca, philosophia prima) as "the science of the most general and abstract predicates of anything" (op. cit., § 4), in so far as they belong to the first cognitive principles of the human mind (ibid., § 5). Kant launched an epoch-making attack against rational ontology in the sense of Wolff and Baumgarten; for ontology was to him both a pseudo-science and a temptation. He was convinced that he had succeeded in eliminating it by the "transcendental Analytic." The whole *Critique of Pure Reason* is, in a way, the work of a man who was obsessed, and deeply distressed, by ontology. On the other hand, the expression 'ontological proof (*ontologischer Beweis*) used by Kant is not a mere alternative expression to 'Anselmian proof; it is intended to emphasize the very nature of the proof. Since Kant is at the crossroads of modern thought, it is important to know what he had in mind when he decided to overthrow the ambitious projects of rational ontologists. An examination of the origins of the concept of ontology is an indispensable step in the clarification of Kant's thought.

Although the concept of ontology preceded the word 'ontology', it can be assumed that only when such a word (or the alternative word, 'ontosophy') carne into use, could philosophers begin to understand fully all the implications of the concept." (p. 36) "Unless I have missed the pertinent texts, a new name for a new discipline of the character stated above -- which is at the same time 'a new name for some old ways of thinking' - occurred only in the Seventeenth Century. It was proposed by philosophers who did not belong to the Schools, but who had been directly or indirectly influenced by the Scholastic tradition supplemented by the modern rationalist tradition. A number of historians (Rudolf Eucken, Etienne Gilson, Hans PichIer, Max Wundt, Heinz Heimsoeth) mention Johannes Clauberg as the first philosopher who used the new term we are looking for: the term 'ontology.' This is not the case. The first instance occurs in Rudolf Goclenius (*Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, Informatum opera et studio Rodolphi Goclenii*. Francoforti, 1613). In his *Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, Rudolf Eisler refers to this instance, but fails to indicate its significance. In a way, Eisler was right, because it has no significance.(1) The word 'ontology' occurs in Goclenius's *Lexicon* on page 16 as follows: "οντολογα, philosophia de ente." This is all. Furthermore, it occurs on the left margin of the article "Abstractio," in which the author discusses the concept of abstractio materiae according to Alexander of Hales. lf this were not enough, Goclenius does not even include an article on Metaphysics or First Philosophy in his Lexicon. There is, indeed, an article on Philosophy (Philosophia) which contains various definitions, among them the following one: Philosophy can be understood *per excellentiam as prima philosophia* (definition 4). Therefore, if it is true that Goclenius actually used the word 'ontology' he did very little with it. Neither does he mention such a word in his *Isagoge* (Rod. Goclenii ... *Isagoge in peripateticorum et Scholasticorum primam philosophiam quae vulgo dicitur Metaphysica*, Francoforti, 1612). Here the expression prima philosophia is introduced as a technical term for the more "common" Metaphysica. Goclenius writes to this effect: '1. Duae sunt communissimae disciplinae liberales: Logica, Metaphysica, quae sapientia dicitur ... 3. Metaphysica seu prima philosophia cognitio communis est eorum, quae sunt altissimis causas & prima principia; ... 9. Prima philosophia scientia de Ente qua ens, hoc est,

universaliter sumto' (P.A. 4). He therefore relapsed into a relatively long established tradition in philosophical terminology, but 'to relapse into' is probably too strong an expression when he had scarcely done anything to produce a new terminology. At any rate, his introduction of the word 'ontology' in the Lexicon does not seem to be the result of a careful plan; it looks more like a purely casual and inconsequential remark." (pp. 38-39).
Notes

(1) Jean École, in an article on Wolff's *Ontologia* (Rivista di metafisica, XVI [1961], 114-125) published after the present one was written, also mention Goclenius.
[École's article is the French version of the author's Latin "Introductio" to his critical edition of Wolff's *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia*, Hildesheim: Olms, 1962].

From: José Ferrater Mora, "On the Early History of 'Ontology' ", in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 24, 1963 pp. 36-47.

"Wir gehen vom Titel "Ontologia" aus Dieser ist dem Christian Wolff ganz selbstverständlich. Er benutzt ihn, ohne über seine Herkunft Rechenschaft abzulegen. Dabei ist nicht die historisch verstandene Herkunft entscheidend, sondern die ausgewiesene Zugehörigkeit dieses Titels zum Wesen der in ihm ausgesprochenen Prima Philosophia aus gerade diesem Wesen. Bekanntlich ist der Titel "Prima Philosophia" ein von Aristoteles der Sache und dem Kern der Sache des Denkens verliehener Titel. Dieser Vorgang der Namensgebung ist kein beliebiger! Der Titel "Prima Philosophia", beziehungsweise "prothé filosofia" wird dem Denken beigegeben, als es die ihm zugehörige Gestalt aus seinem eigenen Wesen annimmt. Die ihm später zugetragenen Titel "Metaphysik" und "Ontologie" sind dagegen nur Nebentitel.
Johannes Micraelius (1597 - 1658) schreibt in seinem Lexicon Philosophicum: Metaphysicae objectum est Ens quatenus Ens est. Unde etiam vocatur aliquibus ; (1).Er spricht hier ausdrücklich von "einigen"! Einer davon ist Johannes Clauberg (1622 - 1665), der oft als der erste genannt wird, der den Titel "Ontologia" gebraucht. Dieser verfaßte ein Werk: Elementa philosophiae sive Ontosophia (Groningen 1647). 1660 kam das Buch, oder vielmehr sein Hauptteil, unter einem anderen Titel als: Ontosophia nova, quae

vulgo Metaphysica (Duisburg) heraus; es konnte 1664 unter einem nochmals geänderten Titel erscheinen: Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia, Amsterdam. Bereits in der ersten Ausgabe von 1647 ist der Titel "Ontosophia" auch durch den Titel „Ontologia" verdeutlicht (2). Die dritte Ausgabe ist später in die Opera philosophica aufgenommen worden (1691). Dort lautet der Passus: Sicuti autem: Ontologia dicitur quae circa Deum occupata est scientia: ita haec, quae non circa hoc vel illud ens speciali nomine insignitum vel proprietate quaedam ab aliis distinctum, sed circa ens in genere versatur, non incommode Ontosophia vel Ontologia dici posse videatur (3).
Wenig später heißt es: Est quaedam scientia, quae contemplatur ens quatenus ens est, hoc est in quantum communem quandam intelligitur habere naturam vel naturae gradum, qui rebus corporeis et incorporeis, Deo et creaturis, omnibusque adeo et in singulis entibus suo modo inest. Ea vulgo Metaphysica, sed aptius Ontologia vel scientia Catholica, eine allgemeine Wissenschaft, et philosophia universalis nominatur. 13). Der Titel "Ontologia" findet sich jedoch noch vor Clauberg. Abraham Calov (1612 - 1686) hat ihn schon 1636 in seiner Metaphysica divina: Scienta de Ente Metaphysica appellatur communiter a rerum ordine, ' οντολογα; rectius ab objecto proprio (4). Und noch vor Calov benutzt ihn Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588 - 1638). Er gibt 1620 seinen *Cursus philosophici Encyclopaedia* heraus. Dort heißt es: *Metaphysica est sapientia quae considerat ens qua ens: alias dicitur prima philosophia*, et οντολογα in Lexico Goclenii pag. 16 (5). Alsted verweist hier auf den Schulmetaphysiker Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius, 1547 - 1628), der nach allem, was wir wissen, der erste gewesen ist, der den Titel "Ontologia" geprägt hat (6)." (pp. 265-266)

Notes

(1) Johannes Micraelius, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, Jena 1653, pag. 654.
(2) Johannes Clauberg, *Elementa philosophiae sive Ontosophia*, Groningen 1647, pag. 3.
(3) Johannes Clauberg, *Opera omnia philosophica, partim antehac separatim, partim nunc primum edita ura Joh. Theod. Sehalbrudhii,* Amsterdam 1691, pag. 281 a. a. O, p. 283.
(4) Abraham Calov, *Metaphysica divina, Pars generalis*, Rostok 1636, *Praecognita* II, pag. 4. In den *Scripta philosophica* wird der

Pars specialis nachgeliefert (Rostok 1650/51). In beiden In den Scripta philosophica wird der Pars specialis nachgeliefert (Rostok 1650151). In beiden Teilen der *Metaphysica divina* findet sich der Titel 'ontologia' mehr als ein dutzendmal in Buch- und Kapitelüberschriften. Er ist stets in griechischen Buchstaben geschrieben. Es sieht Buch- und Kapitelüberschriften. Er ist stets in griechischen Buchstaben geschrieben. Es sieht ganz so aus, als ob Clauberg der erste ist, der den Titel Ontologia in lateinischen Buch staben schreibt.
(5) *Cursus philosophici Encyclopaedia Libri XXVII*, Opera et studio Johannis Henrici Alstedii, Herborn 1620, Liber V, *Metaphysica, Pars prima, De Transcendentibus,* Caput I Ens, pag. 149.
(6) Das hätte man schon immer im Eisler nachschlagen können: Rudolf Eisler, *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*, 4. Aufl., Berlin 1927, Artikel "Ontologie". Trotzdem hielt sich hartnäckig die Behauptung, Clauberg sei der Erfinder dieses Titels gewesen

From: Ernst Vollrath, "Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica Generalis und eine Metaphysica Specialis", *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, April-June 1962, XVI, 2.

"La thèse de Goclenius qui sépare radicalement la *prima philosophia* et la *metaphysica* (1), nous paraît d'autant plus intéressante que son auteur est très vraisemblablement celui qui a forgé pour la première fois (2) le mot d'ontologie, destiné par la suite à nommer précisément cette *philosophia prima* comme science universelle, dans sa séparation de toute recherche théologique appréhendée désormais comme 'spéciale'. On peut lire en effet, sous la plume de Goclenius, mais encore sous sa forme grecque, le terme d' ontologia, non pas à vrai dire dans son Isagoge, mais dans le célèbre *Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, informatum opera et studio Rodolphi Goclenii*, publié quelques années plus tard, à Francfort en 1613. (3) Il est très significatif de trouver cette première occurrence du terme à l'article *abstractio*. Nous avons déjà signalé (cf. chapitre III, p. 458 sq.) que Pérérius introduisait son opposition insolite entre philosophie première métaphysique à partir d'une réflexion critique sur la doctrine classique ('aristotélico-thomiste') de l'abstraction, et que Suárez développait le plus nettement l'orientation ontologique de son projet métaphysique en fonction de

sa doctrine de l'abstraction et de la *praecisio* (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, II, 2, 15-16)."
(1) Est-il besoin de souligner qu'une telle opposition est contraire à l'esprit de l'enquête aristotélicienne comme à l'élaboration terminologique des commentateurs les plus anciens?
(2) La prudence est ici plus que jamais de mise. Après avoir rédigé ces pages, nous avons été mis, grâce à l'obligeance de J. S. Freedman, à qui l'on doit un excellent travail (*Deutsche Schulphilosophie im Reformationszeitalter 1500-1650*, dact., Münster, 1984), sur la piste d'un auteur assez singulier et à la vérité peu connu, un certain Jacobus Lorhardus, recteur au Gymnasium de Saint-Galles, qui publie à Bâle en 1613, comme secunda editio un *Theatrum philosophicum* qui présente à la manière ramiste une série de tabelles à travers lesquelles se répartissent toutes les disciplines philosophiques. Or le 'diagraphe' qui introduit les divisions de la Métaphysique est précisément intitulé : *Metaphysicae seu Ontologiae Diagraphe* (p. 157). Et il se termine, après la division des ficta ou des êtres de raison, par ces mots : *Finis Ontologiae*. L'ouvrage de Lorhardus est très remarquable également dans sa définition la plus générale de la Métaphysique qui fait évidemment référence à Clemens Timpler (cf. supra, p. 265 sq.): " Metaphysicae (quae est epistheme tou noetoue noeton quatenus ab homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile) partes duae sunt... ! "(ibid.).
(3) Reprint Hildesheim, 1964. Signalons aussi qu'en revanche le terme *ontologia* n'apparaît pas, du moins à notre connaissance, dans le *Lexicon philosophicum graecum* de 1615 (Marbourg). (p. 410 n. 6)

From: Jean-François Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique,* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1990.

LUTHERANS VS. CALVINISTS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS

In Calvinism the idea of a synthetic presentation of doctrine was retained, but the encyclopedia of the sciences was enlarged and

transformed into a system of systems, governed by a theory of the arts, a “technology”, according to which philosophical conclusions were presented as derived from nature and theological conclusions as derived from revelation. Whereas Lutheran thinkers - regarding their teaching as essentially practical - adopted the analytic order in presenting their theological teaching, Reformed theologians of the early seventeenth century in Germany regarded their science as the theoretical and used rather a synthetic order in the presentation of doctrine. In accordance with the architectonic spirit of Calvinist Scholasticism, Reformed dogmatics began, in accordance with the synthetic order, with the glory of God as the first cause and final goal of all things, and treated his eternal decrees of providence and predestination before taking up his government of the world in time.

In this conception natural theology formed an integral part of the *cognition Dei perfecta* at which theology aimed. Reformed writers tended, therefore, to distinguish clearly between natural theology and the doctrine of being - a distinction only reluctantly accepted by the Lutherans. Calvinist authors spoke of two sorts of doctrine, a doctrine of God to the extent that he is accessible to human reason and a doctrine of being which had the function of assigning to each of the particular disciplines its proper domain.

The Marburg professor Rudolph Clementius (d. 1628) distinguished two separate disciplines, a universal science called “first philosophy” or “ontology” and a particular science called “natural theology”. Ontology deals with being, its properties and its principles; natural theology studies the various types of immaterial being: God, the intelligences and the human soul. The term “metaphysics” was used to designate both. In the works of authors like Bartholomeus Keckckermann (d. 1609) of Heidelberg and Danzig, Clemens Timpler (d. 1624) of Heidelberg and Steinfurt, and Johann Heinrich Alsted (d. 1638) of Herbom there then appeared a new, unified vision of the encyclopaedia of the scientific disciplines in which ontology had the role of assigning to each of the particular disciplines its proper domain. This new vision was grounded in a conception of doctrine which was specifically a product of the Renaissance, a conception which set it apart from the Aristotelianism of both Catholic Scholasticism and Lutheran Orthodoxy. According to the traditional Aristotelian understanding, taken up by Catholic theologians, scientific knowledge was - as we

have seen - made up of conclusions which are both true and certain, because they are the result of a demonstration based on an evident principle or cause. “Science” was the habit or faculty by which the mind is disposed to assent to such conclusions. Only necessary, universal statements can be scientific; there can be no demonstration of contingent, singular facts and no science of changeable things as such.

Calvinist writers departed from this traditional definition of scientific knowledge in a way which was conditioned by Reformed theology. Because they wanted to assure the truth and certainty of theological conclusions, they extended the range of scientific validity beyond the universal conclusions which natural theology can derive from the properties of things to the singular, contingent facts of history which are dependent on God’s providential care and which revealed theology holds, on the testimony of Scripture, to be principles of knowledge.

In the approach of men like Keckermann scientific doctrine was, for this reason, understood as a body of knowledge, systematically ordered so as to make it possible for a learned man to impart the habit of scientific knowledge to others by correct explanation. The notion of a *corpus doctrinae* differed from the Lutheran idea in a way which betrayed the influence of humanism. Whereas Lutheran writers concerned themselves primarily with theological doctrines and sought simply to show the logical connections between individual theological teachings, the Calvinists saw theological doctrine as part of the sum total of the knowledge which has been gained by man in the course of history and transmitted to the present generation by written and oral tradition. The task of the teacher was to order, to systematize, the doctrine of each of the disciplines and to relate them to one another in a new encyclopaedia of knowledge. In his *Praeeognita philosophica* (Hanau 1608) Keckermann presented a general theory of science - now we should probably say a theory of art - in which he appealed to the norms of certitude which had been proposed by Melanchthon: revelation, the universal sense experience of men, common innate notions and the orderly presentation of syllogistic conclusions (*Opera, Corpus Reformatorum*, XIII 149-53, *De anima, Causae certitudinis)*. Keckermann went beyond Melanchthon, however, by defining the « intellectus ordinis in syllogismo as a facultas artificialis acquisita per certam disciplinam ». By “faculty” he meant an internal source

of certitude which is a habit or disposition - in accordance with the Aristotelian conception. By the “discipline” through which the habit is acquired, he meant the external, ordered body of doctrine handed down in the traditional liberal arts which must be mastered by the learned man.
The most significant word in Keckermann’s definition is the word “artificial”. He described the habit acquired by the learned man not as “scientific”, but rather as “artificial”, because it concerns conclusions which belong to all the liberal arts and includes both universal conclusions drawn from the nature of things and singular, contingent conclusions based on tradition, for the reason that knowledge of both types of conclusion can be gained by the systematic application of methodical principles. (pp. 127-129)

Charles H. Lohr, "*Technologia*: The Calvinist Theory of Science in the Renaissance", in Gregorio Piaia (ed.), *La presenza dell'aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità*, Roma-Padova: Editrice Antenore 2002, pp. 123-132.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY

"In 1620 the Calvinist Johannes Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638) takes up the term 'ontology' and identifies ontology with metaphysics or 'first philosophy' as 'general discipline of being'. This ontology has a general part which deals with transcendentia and a special part which deals with praedicamenta (categories). Alsted opposes this general discipline or ontology to inferior disciplines which are concerned with special beings such as physics with natural bodies, mathematics with quantity), as well as to the science of transnatural beings, which he calls pneumatica or pneumatologia, the science of God, angels, and separate souls. Metaphysics or ontology is the most general discipline, which cannot have a double subject (being and God) (*Cursus philosophici Encyclopaedia,* 1620, Lib. V-VI). Johann Micraelius (I579-1658) departs from the reduction of metaphysics to the science of being as being and sees it as embracing also the special sciences of pneumatology (theology,

angelography, psychology). These he opposes to ontology as the general part (see the articles 'Metaphysica' and 'Philosophia' in his *Lexicon philosophicum* of 1653). Micraelius thereby seems to coin the distinction between *metaphysica generalis* and *metataphysica specialis*, a distinction which has been current ever since. Thee notion of 'ontology' was also affected by Cartesianism. Johannes Clauberg distinguishes three kinds of entia: being as thinkable (*ens cogitabile*), being as something (*aliquid*), and being as thing or substantial being (*res sive ens substantiale*). Ontology or 'ontosophy' deals with being in the third sense and it presupposes the science of thinkable things, in other words metaphysics or 'first philosophy', as this is elaborated in Renée Descartes's *Meditationes* (*Metaphysica de Ente, quae rectius Ontosophia*, 1664, 1, 1-5). Traces of this same distinction, between ontology and a science or method of thought, appear also in the 18th century, for example in the work of Christian Wolff and in Kant. According to Wolff, ontology deals with being in general, but it can also be termed 'first philosophy' in so far as it concerns first principles and notions 'which are used in reasoning' . The method of ontology conforms to that of mathematics (*Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*, 1730, 'Prolegomena')."Kant identifies ontology (the system of all those concepts and principles of reason which relate to objects in general) with the first part of the system of his metaphysics of nature. Ontology in this sense presupposes the method or propaedeutic of the critique of pure reason, the knowledge of the limits of human knowledge. Kant's reformed ontology is concerned only with objects which are accessible to human knowledge (appearing objects, ontology of 'immanent thought') and it is based on the principles of this knowledge developed by Kant in his 'analytic of the pure understanding' (*CPR,* Letter to Beck. 211 January 1792). (On the relations of methodology, metaphysics, and ontology, see also Johann Friedrich Herbart. for example *Kurze Enzvklopädie der Philosophie*, 1831, 11, 190, and Lotze).
Also in the 18th century. the German tradition tends sometimes to locate the object of ontology in the essence of things, rather than in the things themselves. In Wolff's work, this transformation becomes manifest in the fact that the first thing, conceived in being is not existence, but essence (*Philosophia prima*, 144). In Christian August Crusius, ontology becomes explicitly a science of the 'general essence of things', and he sees this essence as something to be

analysed entirely a priori (*Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten*, 1745, 1, 5: see also Georg Bernhard Bilfinger. (1693-1750), Johann Heinrich Lambert, and Hegel).
As for the relation between metaphysics and ontology, Wolff (*Philosophia rationalis, 'Discursus praeliminaris'*, 79, 99), Crusius (*Entwurf*, 1, 5), and Kant (*CPR, Reflection* 4851) remain faithful to the distinction between general metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics (psychology or pneumatology, cosmology, theology).
In the 19th and 20th centuries, the evolution of the notion of 'ontology' can again be analysed in terms of the distinction between the object of ontology and the relation of ontology to other disciplines. The relation between ontology, 'epistemological' sciences and metaphysics is discussed by authors such as Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Nicolai Hartmann, and Günther Jacoby (1881-1969)."

From: Léo Freuler, "ONTOLOGY. I: History of Ontology", in: Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology,* Philosophia Verlag GMBH, Munchen 1991, pp. 637-640.

"The study of being in so far as this is shared in common by all entities, both material and immaterial. It deals with the most general properties of beings in all their different varieties.
The books of Aristotle's Physics deal with material entities. His Metaphysics (literally 'what comes after the Physics'), on the other hand, deals with what is beyond or behind the physical world - with immaterial entities - and thus contains theology as its most prominent part. At the same time, however, Aristotle conceives this 'metaphysics' as having as its subject matter all beings, or rather being as such. Metaphysics is accordingly identified also as 'first philosophy', since it deals with the most basic principles upon which all other sciences rest.
From the very beginning, then, an alliance was established between theology and the science of being qua being, and this alliance was sustained successfully throughout the Middle Ages. By the seventeenth century, however, the two disciplines were beginning to fall apart, and there was effected a distinction between metaphysica generalis on the one hand - the science of the most general concepts or categories of being - and metaphysica specialis on the other -

embracing not only theology but also other special sciences of being, including psychology (the science of finite mind) and cosmology. 'Ontology', now, is just another name for metaphysica generalis as thus conceived. The tern was introduced into philosophy by the German Protestant Scholastic Rudolphus Goclenius (Rudolf Göckel) in his *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613) and was given currency above all through the influence of Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

Where metaphysics had traditionally confined itself to the treatment of existent beings, Leibniz, Wolff and others dealt also in their metaphysical writings with the being of what is merely possible. It fell to Meinong in his ' *Uber Gegenstandstheorie*' (1904) to conceive the project of an absolutely general 'theory of objects', which would embrace within its subject matter not merely actual and possible objects, but also impossible objects, obtaining and non-obtaining states of affairs and other higher-order objects, merely hypothetical objects, and also objects 'beyond being and non-being' which are as it were awaiting realization.

In part under the influence of Meinong, in part also under the inspiration of contemporary work in logic and mathematics, Husserl put forward in his *Logical Investigations* (1913-21) the idea of a 'pure theory of objects' or 'formal ontology', a discipline which would deal with such formal-ontological categories as: object, state of affairs, property, genus, species, unity, plurality, number, relation, connection, series, part, whole, dependence, magnitude, open and closed set, boundary, manifold, and so on.

Formal ontology would deal also with the different formal structures manifested by entire regions of being. To each such formal structure there would then correspond in principle a number of alternative material realizations, each having its own specific material or regional ontology. The most important such material ontology relates to the natural world of spatio-temporally extended things, and thus includes ontological theories of space, time, movement, causality, material body, and so on.

Next in order of development is the material ontology of organic entities, followed by the material ontology of minds (of thinking bodies and of their mental acts and states), perhaps also by the material ontology of cultural and institutional formations." (pp. 373-374)

From: Barry Smith, *Ontology*, in: Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), *A Companion to Metaphysics,* Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1995.

TINOLOGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO ONTOLOGY?

"In our contribution to the *Festschrift* in honour of Ruedi Imbach the focus will be on the term « tino-logia ». The notion is not mentioned in the most complete philosophical dictionary of our time, the *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie,* which appeared in 13 volumes from 1971-2007. The vocable was suggested by French scholars two decades ago in their analysis of the genealogy of Western metaphysics and has since then found acceptance. « Tinology » is meant to characterize an alternative for the traditional ontological model of metaphysics. Influential was an observation made by Jean-Francois Courtine at the end of his monumental study on the metaphysics of Francis Suárez : « En rigueur de termes, l'ontologie classique-moderne devrait donc plutot être caracterisée comme une 'tinologie' »(1). The emergence of this neologism and its historical place is the first thing that calls for attention.

The emergence of the notion

The notion « tinology » originated in the study of ancient philosophy, was next applied to modern philosophy and finally also assigned to medieval philosophy.

1. In the continuation of the conclusion just cited, Courtine refers to Pierre Aubenque for the phrase « tinology », but does not specify this reference (2). It turns out that Aubenque puts forward the expression and explains its philosophical significance in an essay on Plato's *Sophist* (3). The analysis of the text is reason for a summary of the basic features of Stoic ontology: (i) only bodies « are » and can be called « beings » ; (ii) there are incorporeal realities, which are not « beings », namely place, time, void and the *lekton («* sayable ») ; (iii) bodies and incorporeals, which constitute the Stoic world, are joint members of a single supreme genus, which is called « something » *(ti)*. It is the title for the most general determination, of which « being » is only a specification (4).

Aubenque's objective is to show the critical potential of the Stoic doctrine. In the history of ontology, the concept of « being » has again and again been found to be too determined and too limited, for instance, as « idea » or « substance », in proportion to the universal extension it claims. The Stoic « tino-logy » offer the possibility of « un dépassement de l'ontologie surdéterminée du substantialisme au profit d'une doctrine plus englobante du « quelque chose », c'est-e-dire, de la détermination en général » (3) Although the term « tinology » thus refers to a doctrinal development in ancient philosophy, its introduction has a general aim. It signifies an alternative model of metaphysics, insofar as it is based on a more encompassing notion than « being ».

2. In his study on Suárez, Courtine exploits the critical potential of the term. He applies the notion « tinology » to modern philosophy. He recognizes that the systematics underlying the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* is the Scholastic tradition of transcendental thought, but also highlights, the « modernity » of Suárez's metaphysics by presenting his thought as a « turn » (« le tournant Suárezien ») in the history of this discipline. The *Disputationes Metaphysicae* took a decisive step towards the early modern understanding of metaphysics, which devised an alternative for the Aristotelian ontological model.

One of its features is that knowability becomes the ultimate criterion of entity. At the end of this development metaphysics is no longer conceived as a science of (real) being, but as an « onto-logic », as a science of what is thinkable, a theory of « something *(ti)* in general », which can therefore be characterized as a « tinology » (6). In Courtine's reading, the most significant sign of this transformation is Suárez's identification of *ens* and *res*. The central notion of his ontology, becomes a new concept of « reality » *(realitas),* which does not refer to what actually « is », but to the more encompassing notion of *res,* less in the sense of « thing » than of « something » *(aliquid)* -- in an exemplary way expressed as « quelque chose » in French and « etwas » in German (7).

3. Courtine sees a prefiguration and preparation of the modern turn to a « tino-logical »understanding of metaphysics in medieval philosophy. He ascribes a partcular importance to Henry of Ghent's account of *res,* according to which « thing » is the most universal concept and « the first object of metaphysical thought » (8). His conclusion inspired Olivier Boulnois, who explicitly labels one of the

forms of metaphysics in the Middle Ages as « tinology ». Duns Scotus's First Philosophy is a tinology rather than an ontology, since it is the science of *res* or *aliquid,* that is, of all that is not nothing *(non-nihil)*. This notion is more encompassing than « being », because it includes real being as well as what is merely thinkable (9). In the next pages, we make some observations on the search for an alternative, tinological model of metaphysics in medieval philosophy." (pp. 729-730)

Notes

(1) J.F. Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique,* Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1990, p. 536.
(2) Ibid. : « selon une heureuse suggestion de P. Aubenque ».
(3) P. Aubenque, « Une occasion manquée : la genèse avortée de la distinction entre l' 'étant' et le 'quelque chose' », in Id. (ed.), *Etudes sur le* Sophiste *de Platon,* Bibliopolis, Napoli 1991, p. 367-385.
(4) Ibid., p. 379-380. Cf. D. Sedley, « Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics », in K. Algra *et al.* (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 355-411, in particular p. 382-411.
(5) Aubenque, « Une occasion manquée », p. 384-385.
(6) Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique,* p. 535-536.
(7) Ibid., p. 537 ; p. 263-264.
(8) Cf. J.F. Courtine, « Res », *in Historisches Wijrterbuch der Philosophie,* VIII, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1992, col. 892-901 (on Henry : col. 896-898).
(9) O. Boulnois, *Etre et répresentation. Une génealogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle),* Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1999, p. *51*2-514. Cfr Id., Heidegger, l'ontothéologie et les structures médiévales de la métaphysique », *Quaestio* 1 (2001), p. 379-406, in particular 402ff.

From: Jan A. Aertsen, "Tino-logia: An alternative for Ontology?" In Atucha Iñigo et al. (eds.), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, Turnhout: Brepols 2011, pp. 729-737.

See also: Jan A. Aertsen, 'Res' as Transcendental. Its Introduction and Significance, in: Graziella Federici Vescovini (ed.), *Le problème des Transcendantaux du XIVe au XVIIe siècle*, Paris: Vrin, 2002, pp. 139-155, in particular the final section: *Medieval Metaphysics:*

(Supertranscendental) Tinology or (Transcendental) Ontology? pp. 153-155.

(to be continued...)

SUGGESTED READINGS

An updated *status quaestionis* of the current research can be found in: Michaël Devaux / Marco Lamanna: *The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606 - 1730)* - in: *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* vol. 9, 2009, pp. 173-208. Turnhout: Brepols. (The volume, edited by Costantino Esposito with the cooperation of Marco Lamanna, contains the Acts of International Conference *Origin and Development of Modern Ontology,* held at Università di Bari (Italy) 15-17 May 2008).

Peter Øhrstrøm, Jan Andersen, Henrik Schärfe, "What has Happened to Ontology" in: Conceptual Structures: Common semantics for sharing knowledge. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, ICCS 2005, Kassel, Germany, July 17-22, 2005, Berlin: Springer 2005, pp. 425-438

"Abstract: Ontology as the study of being as such dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, but the term itself was coined in the early 17th century.
The idea termed in this manner was further studied within academic circles of the Protestant Enlightenment. In this tradition it was generally believed that ontology is supposed to make true statements about the conceptual structure of reality. A few decades ago computer science imported and since then further elaborated the idea of 'ontology' from philosophy. Here, however, the understanding of ontology as a collection of true statements has often been played down. In the present paper we intend to discuss some significant aspects of the notion of 'ontology' in philosophy and computer science. Mainly we focus on the questions: To what extent are computer scientists and philosophers -- who all claim to be working with ontology problems -- in fact dealing with the same problems? To what extent may the two groups of researchers benefit

from each other? It is argued that the well-known philosophical idea of ontological commitment should be generally accepted in computer science ontology."

Peter Øhrstrøm, Sara L. Uckelman Henrik Schärfe, "Historical and Conceptual Foundations of Diagrammatical Ontology", in: Simon Polovina, Richard Hill, Uta Priss (eds.), *Conceptual Structures: Knowledge Architectures for Smart Applications*. 15th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, ICCS (2007), Sheffield, UK, July 22-27, 2007, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007 pp. 374-386.

"Abstract: During the Renaissance there was a growing interest for the use of diagrams within conceptual studies. This paper investigates the historical and philosophical foundation of this renewed use of diagrams in ontology as well as the modern relevance of this foundation. We discuss the historical and philosophical background for Jacob Lorhard's invention of the word 'ontology' as well as the scientific status of ontology in the 16th and 17th century. We also consider the use of Ramean style diagrams and diagrammatic ontology in general. A modern implementation of Lorhard's ontology is discussed and this classical ontology is compared to some modern ontologies."

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Selected Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

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   Sommaire: Jean-Christophe Bardout et Vincent Jullien: Avant-propos 7; Jacob Schmutz: Qui a inventé les mondes possibles? 9; Jean-Christophe Bardout: Remarques sur l'impossibilité cartésienne des mondes possibles 47; Vincent Jullien: Le Monde, concept incertain du XVIIe siècle. L'exemple de l' *Aristarque* contre le Monde cartésien 71; Gilles Olivo: "Le mystérieux critère de la distinction des vérités nécessaires et des vérités contingentes" ou l'embarras d'une solution: Leibniz et la question du meilleur des mondes possibles 93; Roland Lehoucq: La foire aux univers 131; Stéphane Chauvier: Les possibles sans les mondes 147-165.

2. "Origini E Sviluppi Dell'ontologia (Secoli Xvi-Xxi) / Origins and Developments of Ontology (16th-21th Century) / Naissance Et Développements De L'ontologie (Xvième-Xxième Siècles) / Entstehung Und Entwicklungen Der Ontologie (Xvi-Xxi Jahrundert) / Origins and Developments of Ontology (16th-21st Century)." 2009. *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of the Metaphysics* no. 9.

The volume, edited by Costantino Esposito with the cooperation of Marco Lamanna, contains the Acts of the International Congress *Origin and Development of Modern Ontology*, held at Università di Bari (Italy) 15-17 May 2008. Indice: Costantino Esposito: Introduzione. Dalla storia della metafisica alla storia dell'ontologia VII-XXXI; I. Alle origini dell'ontologia moderna: l'orizzonte tardo-scolastico e rinascimentale. Joseph S. Freedman, The Godfather of Ontology? Clemens Timpler, "All that is Intelligible", Academic Disciplines during the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries, and Some Possible Ramifications for the Use of Ontology in our Time 3; Mario S. de Carvalho: Tra Fonseca e Suarez: una metafisica incompiuta a Coimbra 41; Jacob Schmutz: Les innovations conceptuelles de la métaphysique espagnole post-suarézienne: les *status rerum* selon Antonio Pérez et Sebastiån Izquierdo 61; Paolo Ponzio: *Notitia sui est esse suum*. Nota sull'ente e sull'io nel pensiero metafisico di Tommaso Camapanella 101; II. L'età cartesiana e le metafisiche del razionalismo. Giulia Belgioioso: L'invenzione dell'ontologia cartesiana nelle interpretazioni del Novecento 113; Massimiliano Savini: Johannes Clauberg e l'esito cartesiano dell'ontologia 153; Michaël Devaux / Marco Lamanna: The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606-1730) 173; Filippo Mignini: Dell'ontologia in Spinoza 209; Stefano Di Bella: Crisi e rinascite della sostanza. L'eredità leibniziana nell'ontologia analitica da Russell a Kripke (e oltre) 225; Luigi Cataldi Madonna: L'ontologia sperimentale di Christian Wolff 253; Alexei N. Krouglov: Die Ontologie von Tetens und seiner Zeit 269; Riccardo Pozzo: L'ontologia nei manuali di metafisica della Aufklärung 285; Norbert Hinske: Ontologie oder Analytik des Verstandes? Kants langer Abschied von der Ontologie 303; Klaus Düsing: Grundformen der Ontologie bei Kant und bei Hegel 311; Stefano Poggi, Da Wolff a Herbart: l'ontologia di un soggetto inesistente 325; Giusi Strummiello: Beyond the Possible. The Overturning of Early Modern Ontology in Schelling 335; IV. Prospettive novecentesche. Jean-Franois Courtine: Husserl et la réhabilitation de l'ontologie comme ontologie formelle 353;

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann: Metaphysik und Ontologie in Heideggers fundamentalontologischem und ereignisgeschichtlichem Denken 379; Maurizio Ferraris: Documentalità e ontologia sociale 389; Varia. Note Cronache Recensioni 409; A Note from the Editors 453; Gli Autori 455; Indice dei nomi 459-469.

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    Contents: 1. The point of departure of Kant's concept of metaphysics as "transcendental philosophy": metaphysics as *scientia transcendens* in the doctrine of John Duns Scotus; 2. The mediation of the Scotistic concept of metaphysics as *scientia transcendens* by Francisco Suárez' *Disputationes metaphysicae*; Kant's concept of "transcendental philosophy" ; 4. Kant's transformation of fundamental concept of the Scotistic *scientia transcendens*.
    "In the following, we will investigate metaphysics' status as a scientific discipline, through an examination of the medieval sources of the approach that most profoundly transformed modem metaphysics, i.e. Kantian transcendental philosophy. Starting with Kant's direct sources we will trace the discussion back to the ideas of John Duns Scotus (§ 1) and of Francisco Suárez (§ 2), in order to demonstrate with regard to its most important features just how Kant received (§ 3) and transformed (§ 4) these ideas."

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"Nel dibattito seguito al cosiddetto *Ontological Turn* della filosofia analitica contemporanea un posto di assoluto rilievo ha avuto, e continua ad avere, l'ipotesi di distinguere l'ambito dell'ontologia da quello della metafisica. Si tratta solo dell'ultima insorgenza di un dibattito epistemologico che ha conosciuto più riprese nel corso dei secoli, in contesti anche molto differenti tra loro. A livello strettamente terminologico, la prima distinzione dell'ontologia dalla metafisica si registra all'inizio del XVII secolo, all'interno della *Schulmetaphysik* riformata, in particolare calvinista. È in quell'ambito che un autore come Rudolph Gōckel (lat. Goclenius) potè intestarsi una simile operazione a seguito delle istanze scaturite dall'"importazione" dei modelli metafisici dell'aristotelismo gesuita (in particolare di Benet Perera, più che di Francisco Suárez) nella Germania protestante. Erano trascorsi quasi ottant'anni dall'interdetto pronunciato da Lutero contro la metafisica e le sue pretese epistemologiche. Il "ritomo" alla metafisica tra i calvinisti coincise pertanto con la nascita dell'ontologia come scienza propriamente detta e con la distinzione di quest'ultima dalla metafisica, intesa perlopiù come teologia: nel corso delle dispute tra riformati e protestanti si affinerà un modello che dominerà il dibattito scolastico in ambito continentale sino

agli anni di Kant, determinando profonde conseguenze nel modo di pensare la realtà."

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    "From latest findings the "birth of ontology" has emerged as a debate in which three Reformed authors originally participated: Rudolph Goclenius, Clemens Timpler and Jakob Lorhard. Under this new label (" *ontologia*"), the Calvinist Goclenius aims to make the model of science of being first proposed by the Jesuit Benet Perera standard within Reformed scholastic philosophy. This paper focuses on the dispute between Goclenius and Timpler concerning the status of metaphysics and its subject-matter (*ens*). According to Timpler the subject of the universal part of metaphysics is not being qua being but the purely intelligible (*intelligibile*), a concept even more general than that of being. In this solution Timpler drew upon the Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca, who seemed to approve of the hypothesis that the concept of *ens* might be subordinated to *aliquid*, in a single passage of his *Commentarii in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*.
    Unlike Timpler, Goclenius adopts the more traditional thesis according to which each noetic definition, however abstract and universal, has to be conceived " *sub specie entis*". Still, Goclenius' point of view is only seemingly "traditional", just like the doctrine of being on which he builds his metaphysics – or rather his "ontology" –, which is based on a new elaboration of the concept of being and that of other transcendentals. In particular, Goclenius removes the concepts of *res* and *aliquid* from the list of transcendentals, and he puts them into extensional identity with the concept of *ens*. This philosophical choice of Goclenius is not new, but draws upon the doctrine of " *synonymia entis*", proposed also by Suárez in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (DM 3.2.5)."

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"The bibliographical history offers an interesting point of view for a better understanding of the rise and development of ontology, as an autonomous discipline, in early modern thought. After Luther's interdict, the metaphysics was neglected in many protestant academies and excluded from the disciplinary classifications (§§ 1-2). The return of metaphysics, at the end of the 16th century, coincided, in many cases, with the affirmation of the new scholastic paradigm of ontology (§ 3). An illustrious precedent of this paradigm was constituted by the Jesuit Francisco Suárez and his *Disputationes metaphysicae* (§ 5). The Jesuit models - not only that by Suárez, but also those by Benet Perera and Pedro da Fonseca - represented the standard on which Calvinists and Lutherans built their own metaphysics in an ontological way. This paper provides a conspicuous number of case studies in which the passage from metaphysics to ontology becomes definitively clear: this debate takes place throughout the first handbooks, treatises, magisterial and doctoral disputations (§ 6) proposed by the Calvinist and Lutheran authors."

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57. Petersen, Peter. 1921. *Geschichte Der Aristotelischen Philosophie Im Protestantischen Deutschland*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

    Reprint: Stuttgart, Friedrich Frommann (Günther Holzboog), 1964.

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    "The aim of this paper is to focus on the distinction between logic and metaphysics in German philosophy from Philipp Melanchthon to G.W.F. Hegel. Its scope is a temporal route that goes from the Renaissance to the 19th century, and which exhibits a movement from one extreme to another. Thus, Melanchthon -- owing to his nominalistic background -- was in fact repelled by metaphysical forms and chose not to include metaphysics among the philosophical sciences. For him, metaphysics was to be identified with logic. On the other hand, Hegel was repelled by logical formalism and did not include logic among the philosophical sciences. For Hegel, logic was to be identified with metaphysics. While Melanchthon and Hegel are the subjects, respectively, of the first and last parts of this paper, the second, the third, and the fourth parts are dedicated to the understanding of the relationship between logic and metaphysics in the work of Scheibler, Leibniz and Kant." p. 57

59. Prouvost, Géry. 1993. "La Naissance De L'ontologie." *Revue Thomiste* no. 93:478-484.

"Le point de départ de cette réflexion est le livre de Jean-Franois Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*. Ce type de travaux manifeste un questionnement au sujet de la métaphysique, il s'agit d'en saisir le statut, l'objet et la nature en instaurant un dialogue avec la pensée de type historico-philosophique de Gilson. Ce dialogue est le signe d'un retour à la métaphysique où se prolonge la circularité entre philosophie et histoire."

60. Schmutz, Jacob. 2000. "Bulletin De Scolastique Moderne (I)." *Revue Thomiste* no. 100:270-341.

"Ce bulletin entend offrir un premier état des lieux de la recherche internationale dans le domaine de la théologie et de la philosophie scolastiques des XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Un liminaire général présente brièvement les approches historiographiques qui ont prévalu jusqu'aujourd'hui, propose ensuite une tentative de définition et enfin relève quelques caractères significatifs de cette tradition de pensée. Suivent alors les discussions critiques d'une trentaine de titres publiés au cours des cinq dernières années."
Voir en particuler la section C pp. 297-314:
Métaphysique ou ontologie?
1) Genèse et structure des métaphysiques modernes
2) Logique et ontologie chez Pedro da Fonseca
3) Suárez Gallicus
4) Théorie des distinctions et ontologie
5) Une métaphysique de la volonté: Antonio Pérez

61. Solana, Marcial. 1928. *Los Grandes Escolásticos Españoles De Los Siglos Xvi Y Xvii : Suas Doctrinas Filosóficas Y Su Significación En La Historia De La Filosofia*. Madrid: Jaime Ratès.

62. ———. 1940. *Historia De La Filosofia Española. Epoca Del Renacimiento. Tomo Terciero*. Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales.

63. Sparn, Walter. 1976. *Wiederkehr Der Metaphysik. Die Ontologische Frage in Der Lutherischen Theologie Des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag.

64. Tommasi, Francesco Valerio. 2008. *Philosophia Transcendentalis. La Questione Antepredicativa E L'analogia Tra La Scolastica E Kant*. Firenze: Olschki.

    "Giorgio Tonelli and Norbert Hinske showed that sources of the German Aristotelianism are necessary to clear the Kantian use of the term «transcendental», but thy could not find a direct source. Thanks to new evidences, the Author proposes Franz Albert Aepinus as this often searched "missing link". On this basis, the Kantian transcendental philosophy is interpreted as an answer to the structural problem of the Scholastic transcendental philosophy: the necessity and impossibility of a prepredicative plane."

65. Tonelli, Giorgio. 2006. *A Short-Title List of Subject Dictionaries of the Xvith, Xviith, and Xviiith Centuries as Aids to the History of Ideas*. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.

    Extended edition revised and annotated by Eugenio Canone and Margherita Palumbo.
    First edition: London, Warburg Institute, 1971.

66. Vollrath, Ernst. 1962. "Die Gliederung Der Metaphysik in Eine *Metaphysica Generalis* Und Eine *Metaphysica Specialis*." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 16:258-284.

67. Walton, Craig. 1969. "Malebranche's Ontology." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:143-162.

68. Wille, Dagmar von. 1991. *Lessico Filosofico Della Frühauflklärung. Christian Thomasius - Christian Wolff - Johann Georg Walch*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

69. Wollgast, Siegfried. 1988. *Philosophie in Deutschland Zwischen Reformation Und Aufklärung*. Berlin: Akademie

Verlag.

70. Wundt, Max. 1939. *Die Deutsche Schulmetaphysik Des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

71. ———. 1945. *Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie Im Zeitalter Der Aufklärung*. Tübingen: Mohr.

    Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1964.

Related pages

History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant (1597-1781)

Bibliography of Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: I. From Fonseca to Poinsot (1560 - 1644)

Bibliography of Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: II. From Scheibler to Lambert (1645 - 1777)

Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609): The Creator of the Term "*Ontologia*"

Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics as the Science of Real Beings

Christian Wolff's Ontology: Existence as "Complement of Possibility"

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Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609): The Creator of the Term "*Ontologia*" (1606)

Works by Jacob Lorhard

The first edition of his *Ogdoas Scholastica* contains the first occurrence of the Latin term"*Ontologiae*".

1. *Disputatio de systasei actionum*. Tubingae: Georg Gruppenbach, 1591.
2. *Propositiones de vera et reali praesentia corporis et sanguinis Christi in s. coena*. Tubingae: Gruppenbach, 1592.
3. Disputatio de vera et Aristotelica methodo demonstrandi. Dissertation. (Defender: Georg Johannes Peplis). Tubingae: Gruppenbach, 1592.
4. *Liber de adeptione veri necessarii seu apodictici, in quo habes, candide lector, luculentam rationem et methodum conficiendi syllogismi necessarii, omnium philosophorum indefessis studiis et laboribus, ex obscurissimo Aristotele quaesitam*. Tubingae: Gruppenbach, 1597.
5. *Ogdoas Scholastica, continens Diagraphen Typicam artium: Grammatices (Latinae, Graecae), Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae*. Sangalli: Straub, 1606.
6. *Theatrum Philosophicum: In quo Artium Ac Disciplinarum Philosophicarum plerarumq[ue] omnium, Grammatices Latinae, Graecae, & Hebraeae: Logices; Rhetorices; Arithmetices; Geometriae; Musices; Astronomices; Ethices; Physices; Metaphysices; Praecepta, in perpetuis Schematismis ac Typis, tanquam in speculo, cognoscenda obiiciuntur*. Basileae: Waldkirch, 1613. Second, expanded edition of Lorhard (1606).



OGDOAS
SCHOLASTICA,
CONTINENS
Diagraphen Typicam
Artium
Grammatices { Latinæ. Græcæ.
Logices.
Rhetoricæ.
Astronomices.
Ethices.
Physices.
Metaphysices, seu Ontologiæ.
Ex Præstantiorum hujus temporis virorum lucubrationibus,
Pro Doctrinæ & virorum studiosorum, juventutis
CONFECTA
a
Iacobo Lorhardo, Gymnasij Sangal-
lensis Rectore, & in Ecclesia
Christi servo.
APVD GEORGIVM STRAVB
Sangallis ANNO. 1606.

Vadiana Biblioth.

Ogdoas Scholastica (1606): *The Diagraph of Ontologia*

METAPHYSICAE SEV ONTOLOgiæ Diagraphe.

- Metaphysicæ (*quæ est* Πατρικὴ τῶν νοητῶν ἢ νοήσεων, *quatenus ab homine naturalis rationis lumine sine ullo materiæ conceptu est intelligibile.*) *partes sunt duæ; Altera*
  - Vniversalis, *quæ cõsistit in Intelligibilium & Entium tùm*
    - Generalissimis *distributionibus.* Intelligibilis *autem notetur*
      - Distributio: *Intelligibile est vel*
        - λόγος: Intelligibile *dicitur omne, quod intellectu percipi ac comprehẽdi potest.*
        - Nihil: *hoc simpliciter non est aliquid.*
        - Aliquid: *quod simpliciter non est nihil. Est q̃ vel*
          - Positivum, *quod ponit seu affirmat quidpiam. Est q̃ vel*
            - Essentia. *Vide A.*
            - Ens. *Vide B.*
          - Negativũ. *Vide RRR.*
    - Communissimis *attributis. Vide C.*
  - Particularis. *Vide EE.*



Fig. 1 First page of Lorhard's ontology

Translation from: Peter Øhrstøm, Sara L. Uckelman, Henrik Schärfe, "Historical and Conceptual Foundations of Diagrammatical Ontology", in: Uta Priss, Simon Polovina, Richard Hill (eds). *Conceptual Structures: Knowledge Architectures for Smart Applications*, Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, Sheffield, UK, July 22-27, 2007, Berlin: Springer 2007, pp. 374-386.

Related pages

Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Annotated Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Bibliography of Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: I. From Fonseca to Poinsot (1560 - 1644)

Bibliography of Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: II. From Scheibler to Lambert (1645 - 1777)

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Bibliography of the Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: I. From Fonseca to Poinsot (1560 - 1644)

Philosophers in chronological order:

1. Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599)
2. Benet Perera (Benedictus Pererius) (1535-1610)
3. Diego de Zúñiga (1536-1597)
4. Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius) (1547-1628)
5. Francisco Suárez (1548-1617)
6. Gabriel Vasquez (Vazquez) (1549-1604)
7. Diego Mas (Didacus Masius) (1553-1608)
8. Cristóbal de los Cobos (1553-1613?)
9. Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609)
10. Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)
11. Cornelius Martini (1568-1621)
12. Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572-1609)
13. Francisco de Araujo (1580-1664)
14. Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638)
15. Joannes a sancto Thoma (John Poinsot) (1589-1644)

Suggested readings: among the most important studies on this period, I suggest: Courtine (1990) (fundamental) and (2005), Freedman (1999), Honnefelder (1990) and (2002), Leinsle (1985), Lohr (1988, the best introduction in English), Marion (1975), (1981) and (1988), Schmutz (2000), Wundt (1939 and (1945), Zimmermann (1998).

For the complete references see: Selected Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599)

Being (not God) is the subject of Metaphysics - Exclusion of accidental beings and beings of reason from Metaphysics

"Comprising four quarto volumes, Fonseca's *In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*(Commentary on the Books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) contains a critical Greek text which he himself established from the best available manuscripts and printed editions. (...)
After rejectirig opinions which bold that the subject of metaphysics is God, Aristotelian 'separate substances', or being in the categories, Fonseca says that the first and adeguate subject of metaphysics is being -- in so far as it is common to God and creatures (*In libros Metaphysicorum* IV c.1 q.1 s.3). Understood in this way, being is analogous, although as said of species within one genus or of individuals within one species it is univocal. Between God and creatures, between created substance and accidents, between different classes of accident, and between real being and being of reason, being is analogous by analogies both of proportion and of attribution. As God is related to his being, so in proportion a created substance is related to its being. Likewise, as created substance and its being are related, so in proportion is an accident related to its being. Again, as one kind of accident is disposed to its existence so is each other kind of accident to its existence. And as real beings are disposed to their being, so beings of reason are to theirs (*Metaphysicorum* IV c.2 q. l s.5, 7). An analogy of attribution obtains among accidents as an analogy of two things to a third (that is, created substance), while between accidents and substance it is analogy of one to the other. The same is true of beings of reason among themselves and then in comparison with real being; for beings of reason do not depend less upon real beings than do accidents upon substance. Again, a creature is being only by attribution or reference to God. Pursuing this, Fonseca distinguishes between formal and objective concepts. A formal concept is an 'actual likeness' (*actualis similitudo*) of a thing that is understood, produced by the intellect in order to express that thing. An objective concept is that thing is understood in so far as it is conceived through the formai concept. Both the formal and the objective concept of being are one, but not perfectly so for the reason that they do not prescind perfectly from the concepts of the

members which divide being. Being as such is transcendent as are also the concepts of thing, something, one, true and good (*Metaphysicorum* IV c.2 q.2 s.1, 4-5; q.5 s.2).
In God alone there is a perfect identity of essence and existence. In every creature, essence is distinct from existence, but not as one thing from another. Rather, says Fonseca, a created essence is as distinct from its existence as a thing from its ultimate intrinsic mode. In this opinion, he tells us, he is following Alexander of Hales and Duns Scotus (12) (*Metaphysicorum*, IV c.2 q.3 s.4). It is possible that here Fonseca has also to some extent anticipated the Suárezian doctrine of modes.
Excluded from the subject of metaphysics are accidental beings (*entia per accidens*) and beings of reason. An accidental being, in the sense excluded, is a juxtaposition of two or more beings which lack any (intrinsic) relation to one another (*Metaphysicorum* IV c.1 q.1 s.3). Beings of reason are those which exist only inasmuch as they are objects of understanding. Within such beings of reason, as they stand in contrast with mind-independent real beings, Fonseca distinguishes proper being of reason from one which is fictitious. Properly taken, a being of reason is one whose being depends upon the understanding in such way that it can still be said of real beings, for example, the concepts of genus, species, and the like. A fictitious being as such is a being whose essence depends upon the understanding in such way that it cannot be said of any real being, for example, a chimera, a goat-stag, or the like (*Metaphysicorum* IV c.7 q.6 s.5).

From: John P. Doyle - Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-99) - in: Edward Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - New York, Routledge, 1998 Vol. III, p. 689.

Texts

1. Fonseca, Pedro da. 1564. *Institutionum Dialecticarum*. Lisbon.

   Reprint: *Instituições dialécticas. Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo,* Introduão, estabelecimento do texto, tradução e notas por Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1964 (2 voll.).

2. ———. 1577. *Commentariorum in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*. Rome.

   Original edition in 4 volumes (1615-1629).
   Rome, 1577; Vol. II: Rome, 1589; Vol. III: Évora, 1604; Vol. IV: Lyon, 1612; (reprint: Cologne Voll. I-III, 1615; Vol. IV 1629).
   Reprint of 1615-1629 edition: *Commentarii in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae,* Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964 (2 volumes).

3. ———. 1591. *Isagoge Philosophica*. Lisbon.

   Reprint: *Isagoge Filosófica* - Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1965.
   Latin text and English translation by João Madeira in Appendix to his Ph. D. thesis: "Pedro da Fonseca's *Isagoge Philosophica* and the Predicables from Boethius to the *Lovanienses*" (2006).

Studies

1. "Pedro Da Fonseca." 1953. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* no. 9.

2. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1968. "Petrus Fonseca and Material Implication." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 9:227-228.

   "I intend to show that the sixteenth century Jesuit, Petrus Fonseca, whose *Institutionurn Dialecticarum libri octo* (1564) was one of the most popular textbooks of the period, was well acquainted with [material implication].
   Fonseca introduces the subject in his discussion of the appropriateness of the name hypothetical' as applied to compound propositions."

3. ———. 1997. "Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being." In *Logic and the Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by A., Easton Patricia, 47-63. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

"Petrus Fonseca was a Portuguese Jesuit who lived from 1528 to 1599. He was one of those responsible for drawing up the Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum* which set the curriculum for Jesuit schools across Europe, and he was also responsible for initiating the production of the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle, or Conimbricenses, which served as texts for many schools and universities in the seventeenth century. He was himself the author of two popular texts, an introduction to logic, and a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. His logic text was one of two alternatives prescribed by the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599, and may have been used at La Flèche; his *Metaphysics* commentary was used at many Jesuit schools, and may also have been used at La Flèche.
In short, Fonseca was a leading figure in the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition of the lat *e* sixteenth century, a tradition which lies behind many of the developienis in early modem philosophy, and which in many ways is more important than the humanist tradition represented by Petrus Ramus.
I have chosen to discuss Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy of being both because an examination of these issues will help us to understand how logic came to be bound up with the philosophy of mind and because the history of how these issues were treated helps solve a small problem about Descartes's sources. My paper has four parts. I shall begin by giving a historical outline of treatments of analogy and their relevance to Descartes. Secondly, I shall discuss late medieval theories of signification, particularly as they appear in Fonseca, in order to show how logicians turned away from spoken language to inner, mental language. Thirdly, I shall explain how it was that analogy, as a theory of one kind of language use, was particularly bound up with the discussion of concepts. Finally, I shall look at the distinctions Fonseca made while discussing the concepts associated with analogical terms." p. 47 (notes omitted).

4. Coxito, Amândio Augusto. 2004. "O Universal Lógico Em P. Da Fonseca E No Curso Conimbricense." *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* no. 13:299-324.

5. Doyle, John P. 1998. "Fonseca, Pedro Da (1528-1599)." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Craig, Edward, 688-690. New York: Routledge.

   Vol. III.

6. Felipe, Donald. 1996. "Fonseca on Topics." In *Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Iii. Symposium on the History of Logic*, edited by Ignacio, Angelelli and Cerezo, Maria, 43-64. Berlin:

   de Gruyter.
   "Fonseca's treatment of topics in the rather substantial section on topics in *Institutionum dialecticarum* is of interest for at least three reasons. First, although the works of Bird, Stump, and Green-Pederson have shed a great deal of light on the tradition of the topics from Boethius to the 15th century, little is known about later scholastic views on topics in the late 16th and 17th centuries. The tract on topics in Fonseca's well-circulated logic book is certainly a good place to begin an examination of this obscure area. Second, in the tract on topics in ID a heavy dependence on Boethius's works *De topicis differentiis* and *In Cicerona topica* is very evident; a legitimate prima facie concern is that Fonseca's views on topics are unoriginal and not worth the trouble of careful study. I think it can be shown, however, that Fonseca's views on topics are very different from those of Boethius. Not only does Fonseca conceive of the primary purpose of topics in a different way from Boethius, but certain features of Fonseca's treatment of topics reflect the concerns of non-scholastic approaches to logic in the 16th century, e.g. the humanist concern for usefulness and relevance of logic, the humanist and Ramist concerns for pedagogy and easy memorization. What results is a rather unusual, hybrid treatment of topics. Finally, Fonseca's views on topics happen to provide some rather interesting background to Cartesian criticism that certain rules of dialecticians hinder the natural light of reason in the discovery of truth."

7. Ferreira da Silva, Custódio Augusto. 1960. *Teses Fundamentais Da Gnoseologia De Pedro Da Fonseca*. Lisboa:

Tipografia da União Gráfica.

8. Ferreira, Joaquim Gomes. 1966. "Pedro Da Fonseca, Sixteenth Century Portuguese Philosopher." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 6:632-644.

9. Madeira, João. 2006. *Pedro Da Fonseca's Isagoge Philosophica and the Predicables from Boethius to the Lovanienses*, Leuven University.

   Contains in Appendix the Latin text and an English translation of Fonseca's *Isagoge Philosophica*.

10. ———. 2006. "Bibliografia De E Sobre Pedro Da Fonseca." *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* no. 15:195-208.

11. Maierù, Alfonso. 1999. "Metafisica Ed Enti Geometrici: Benito Pereyra, Pedro Fonseca, Francisco Suárez." In *Sciences Et Religions De Copernic À Galilée (1540-1610)*, 47-62. Rome: École Francaise de Rome.

12. Martins, António Manuel. 1982. "Fonseca E O Objeto Da Metafísica De Aristóteles." *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* no. 38:460-465.

13. ———. 1991. "A Metafísica Inacabada De Pedro Da Fonseca." *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* no. 47:517-533.

    "This paper starts from the fact that the fourth volume of Fonseca's "Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros" (CMA) contains no "quaestiones" to Met. XII. An analysis of several explicit remissions to topics and questions to be developed in the context of that Artistotelian script (Met. XII), made by Fonseca in several places in volumes I, II and III of his CMA, reveals that his project was, from the beginning, to develop in the IV volume the subjects related to the philosophical discourse about God, divine attributes, omnipotence and freedom, contingency as well as to the separate substances'. This indicates clearly that the metaphysics of Fonseca remained unfinished given the fact that the text on an important thematic cluster was not published notwithstanding the inclusion of such text in the

original project of Fonseca. It is sustained that this fact should be taken in due consideration in any global interpretation of Fonseca's thought as well as in any comparison with other (finished) ontologies. Suarez is the most obvious case but not the only one."

14. ———. 1994. *Lógica E Ontologia Em Pedro Da Fonseca*. Lisboa: Fundaao Calouste Gulbenkian.

    Indice Geral: 0. Introduão 9; 1. A obra de Fonseca 15; 2. Determinaão do objecto da metafisica 61; 3. Essência e existência 191; 4. Transcendentais e categorias 235; 5 O principio de não contradião 345; 6. Conclusâo 371 Bibliografia 377-386.
    English abstract: "The aim of the dissertation is to show the place of Fonseca's work in the history of ontology. Starting with a close analysis of the texts connected with the core of classical metaphysics it is argued that the Commentarii in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis far reacher than a mere textual commentary of Aristotle's text and represent one of the rare efforts to bring out a real synthesis of the main theoretical problems and questions emerging in the context of the aristotelian project of a first philosophy. This systematic work is carried out in the second half of the sixteenth century, just before the beginning of modern philosophy. Chapter one is dedicated to a brief account of Fonseca's work in his historical context. The remaining chapters explores some of the central topics of Fonseca's ontology. Chapter two, after a brief discussion of the aristotelian project of first philosophy, follows the transformation of this project in Fonseca's text discussing in particular his analysis of the concept of being under the heading ens commune and the meaning of the thesis of analogia entis as well as the distinction between a formal and an objective concept of being. In chapter three we discuss the question of the distinction between essence and existence in order to grasp the meaning of Fonseca's thesis of a modal distinction ex natura rei. Chapter four seeks to articulate Fonseca's interpretation of the classical doctrine of the transcendentals (unum, bonum, uerum). The wish to articulate the universality and transcendentality of the concept of being has taken us to introduce the problem of the

categories in this chapter and a brief historico-critical survey beginning in Aristotle and ending in Kant. Finally, chapter five discusses the meaning of the principle of non contradiction in Aristotle and in Fonseca."

15. ———. 1999. "Tópica Metafísica: De Fonseca À Suárez." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, António Manuel and Ribeiro, Dos Santos Leonel, 157-168. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

16. ———. 1999. "Pedro Da Fonseca E a Recepão Da Metafísica De Aristóteles Na Segunda Metade Do Séc. Xvi." *Philosophica: Revista do Departamento de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa* no. 14:165-178.

    "It is claimed that in order to a better understanding of the reception of the text of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle in the second half of the sixteenth century one must carefully distinguish the commentaries to the whole work from texts that treat particular questions. Although much work is still to be done, the great commentary of Pedro da Fonseca appears as the major original commentary to the *Metaphysics* produced during that period."

17. Romeo, Luigi. 1979. "Pedro Da Fonseca in Renaissance Semiotics: A Segmental History of Footnotes." *Ars Semeiotica.An International Journal of Semiotics* no. 2:187-204.

18. Slattery, Michael. 1957. "Two Notes on Fonseca." *Modern Schoolman* no. 34:193-202.

19. ———. 1957. "Fonseca on Logical Univocity." *Modern Schoolman* no. 34:193-202.

Benet Perera (Benedictus Pererius) (1535-1610)

"The problem that continues to haunt the commentators [of Aristotle] is how to reconcile *philosophia prima* as universal *scientia de ente* with *philosophia prima* as *theologia* . The latter appears to be a special science rather than a universal one, since it studies one particular being (albeit the highest one), whereas the former studies being qua being. Aristotle had already recognised this problem and had come up with a solution that proved so cryptic that it provoked even more discussion. (26)

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this discussion received an entirely new impulse in Protestant metaphysics. Although the early reformers had a very low opinion of Aristotelian metaphysics, by the end of the sixteenth century their successors had taken to writing textbooks on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which copied the model of earlier commentaries. In fact, the Protestant scholasticism that emerged from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards drew heavily on the great Commentaries of the Counter Reformation, notably the ones composed by the Spanish Jesuits. (27) Faced with the institutional problem of how to teach theology and philosophy, the Protestant masters turned back to systematic Aristotelian philosophy of the familiar kind.(28) Moreover theological contorversies within Lutheranism and between Lutheranism and Calvinism "made precise definitions of terms like 'substance' and 'accident, 'nature' and 'person' absolutely imperative. (29)

This fuelled a keen interest in Aristotelian metaphysics. The Protestants were trying to construct a metaphysics conceived as a universal science of being, a *scientia de ente* . This meant the removal of all the heterogeneous elements of Aristotelian metaphysics that could only with difficulty be combined with this "pure" science of being. Hence we find in most Protestant metaphysicsa marked tendency to separate natural theology from metaphysics as a science of being *qua* being. Therefore, by separating true metaphysics as a universal science of being from natural theology as a *scientia particularis*, the ubiquitous problem of the subject matter of metaphysics was solved. The first to make this separation in the sixteenth century was actually a Jesuit, Benito Pereira (c 1535-1610). (30) His solution was taken up in various ways by Protestant scholastics, both Calvinist and Lutheran, such as Nicolaus Taurellus (1547-1606), Abraham Calov (1612-1686) and Rudolphus Goclenius the Elder (1547-1628). This tradition was not

an isolated German phenomenon but also spread to England. By distinguishing between "first" or "summary philosophy" and natural theology, Francis Bacon clearly draws on this tradition as well."

From: Cees Leijenhorst - *The mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The late Aristotelian setting of Thomas Hobbes' natural philosophy* - Leiden, Brill, 2002 pp. 23-24.

(26) Aristotle, Met. VI (E), 1, 1026a29-32. For an interesting recent account of this problem see Michael Frede, *The Unity of general and special metaphysics: Aristotle's conception of metaphysics,* in: M. Frede, *Essays in ancient philosophy*, (Oxford, 1987), pp. 81-95. For a comprehensive overview of older postions, see Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian "metaphysics". A study in the Greek background of Mediaeval thought*, (Toronto 1951, Third revised edition Toronto, 1978) pp. 1-68.
(27) See Lewalter, *Spanisch-jesuitische Metaphysik und deutsch-luterische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrunderts* (Hamburg, 1935; Reprint Darmstadt, 1967).
(28) On Melanchthon's use of Aristotle, see Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy. The case of Philip Melanchthon*, (Cambridge, 1995)
(29) Charles Lohr, "Metaphysics," (1988) p. 620. See also Walther Sparn, Wiederkher der Metaphysik: die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des frühen 17. Jahrunderts (Stuttgart, 1976) and Donnelly, "Calvinist Thomism," *Viator*, 7 (1976, pp-441-455), p. 442.
(30) On the sixteenth and seventeenth century debate conceming the relation between universal scientia de ente and particular theology, see Rompe, Die Trennung; and Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. For medieval "separatist" arguments, see Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik, pp. 292-314; and Lohr, "Metaphysics," pp. 587-590.

Texts

1. Perera, Benet. 1576. *De Communibus Omnium Rerum Naturalium Principiis Et Affectionibus Libri Quindecim*. Romae.

2. Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*; reprinted Paris, 1579; Lyon, 1585; Cologne, 1595.

Studies

1. "Benet Perera (Pererius, 1535-1610). A Renaissance Jesuit at the Crossroads of Modernity." 2014. *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphyisics* no. 14:3-327.

   Table of Contents: Paul Gilbert: La preparazione della *Ratio studiorum* e l'insegnamento di filosofia di Benet Perera 3; Christoph Sander: The War of the Roses. The Debate between Diego de Ledesma and Benet Perera about the Philosophy Course at the Jesuit College in Rome 31; Ulrich G. Leinsle: Der Widerstand gegen Perera und seine Physik in der oberdeutschen Jesuitenprovinz 51; Marco Lamanna: Mathematics, Abstraction and Ontology: Benet Perera and the Impossibility of a Neutral Science of Reality 69; Mário S. de Carvalho: Between Rome and Coimbra: A Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuit Psychologies (Benet Perera and the Coimbra Course) 91; Francesco Marrone: Conoscenza e realtà. Benet Perera e la *quaestio de primo cognito* 111; Giovanni Ventimiglia: *Magna est disceptatio tam inter Philosophos quam inter Theologos*. Pererius e la questione della distinzione reale fra essenza ed esistenza 167; Costantino Esposito: La durata dell'essere. Benet Perera sul tempo 195; Paul Richard Blum: Platonic References in Pererius's Comments on the Bible 215; Annalisa Cappiello, Marco Lamanna: Il principio dell'unicità del vero dalla bolla *Apostolici regiminis* (1513) alla Rivoluzione scientifica 229; Paolo Ponzio: Perera, Bellarmino, Galileo e il "concordismo" tra Sacre Scritture e ricerca scientifica 257-269.

2. Blackwell, Constance. 2003. "The Vocabulary for Natural Philosophy. The "De Primo Cognito" Question - a Preliminary Exploration: Zimara, Toletus, Pererius and Zabarella." In *Lexiques Et Glossaires Philosophiques De La Renaissance*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Marta, Fattori, 287-308. Louvain-la-neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Etudes Médiévales.

3. ———. 2004. "Thomas Aquinas against the Scotists and Platonists. The Definition of Ens: Cajetano, Zimara, Pererio 1495-1576." *Verbum.Analecta Neolatina* no. 6:179-188.

   "Thomas Aquinas is usually studied as a metaphysician, this is not the reading given to him by three Renaissance philosophers. At the turn of the sixteenth century there were at least two schools of Thomists, one influenced by Avicenna and Scotus, and the other influenced by Averroes, a reading of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas himself. The discussion below traces how the interpretation of Thomas' *De ente et essentia* was changed from being a text for metaphysics to one used for physics. One of the meanings of ens-being-was as a term that was coterminous with the object. As a result, the debate over the first thing thought or the De primo cognito debate centered around the meaning for the term ens, the following essay demonstrates how it moved from metaphysics to physics."

4. Blum, Paul Richard. 2006. "Benedictus Pererius: Renaissance Culture at the Origins of Jesuit Science." *Science & Education* no. 15:279-304.

   Rerinted in R. P. Blum, *Studies on Early Modern Aristotelianism*, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp. 139-182. "Benedictus Pererius (1535-1610) published in 1576 his most successful book *De principiis*, after he had taught philosophy at the Roman College of the Jesuits. It will be shown that parts of this book are actually based on his lectures. But the printed version was intended as a contribution to the debate within his Order on how science should be conceived. Pererius redefined the meaning of scientific speculation to the effect that metaphysics was split into ontology and natural theology, and that further speculative sciences, such as physics, gained their own competence. Throughout this book, as well as in his warning against magic and in his commentaries on the Bible, the Jesuit addresses Renaissance strains of neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism, and syncretism."

5. De Pace, Anna. 1993. *Le Matematiche E Il Mondo. Ricerche Su Un Dibattito in Italia Nella Seconda Metà Del*

Cinquecento. Milano: Franco Angeli.

Capitolo VII. *Benedetto Pereira erede e critico di Piccolomini*, pp. 75-120.

6. Giacobbe, Giulio Cesare. 1977. "Un Gesuita Progressista Nella 'Quaestio De Certitudine Mathematicarum' Rinascimentale: Benito Pereyra." *Physis. Rivista internazionale di Storia della Scienza* no. 19:51-86.

7. Giacon, Carlo. 1946. *La Seconda Scolastica, Vol. Ii: Precedenze Teoriche Ai Problemi Giuridici, Toledo, Pereira, Fonseca, Molina, Suarez*. Milano: Bocca.

   Ristampa Torino: Nino Aragno Editore, 2004.
   Capitolo II, pp. 31-66.

8. Lalla, Sebastian. 2007. "Benedictus Pererius Und Aristoteles." In *Der Aristotelismus in Der Frühen Neuzeit, Kontinuität Oder Wiederaneignung?*, edited by Frank, Günter and Speer, Andreas, 43-63. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

9. Lamanna, Marco. 2009. "'De Eo Enim Metaphysicus Agit Logice'. Un Confronto Tra Pererius E Goclenius." *Medioevo* no. 34:315-360.

10. Rompe, Elisabeth Maria. 1968. *Die Trennung Von Ontologie Und Metaphysik. Der Ablösungsprozess Und Seine Motivierung Bei Benedictus Pererius Und Anderen Denkern Des 16. Und 17. Jahrhunderts*. Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität.

Diego de Zúñiga (1536-1598)

Texts

1. Zúñiga, Diego de. 1597. *Philosophiae Prima Pars, Qua Perfecte Et Eleganter Quatuor Scientiae Metaphysica,*

Dialectica, Rhetorica Et Physica Declarantur, Ad Clementem Octavum Pontificem Maximum. Toledo.

Partial Spanish translation: *Metafísica (1597)*, Introducción, traducción y nota de Gerardo Bolado, Pamplona: Eunsa 2008.

Studies

1. "Diego De Zúñiga." 1999. *La Ciudad de Dios* no. 212.

   Contents: Modesto González Velasco: Fray Diego de Zúñiga (1536-ca.1598): biografía, escritos y bibliografía: 5-57; Victor Navarro Brotons: La recepción de la obra de Copérnico en la España del siglo XVI: el caso de Diego de Zúñiga: 59-104; Gerardo Bolado Ochoa: La "Física" de Diego de Zúñiga OSA: 105-147; Lera San José: Javier, Fray Diego de Zúñiga OSA, "In Iob commentaria", 1584: 149-182.

2. Arámburu Cendoya, Ignacio. 1961. "Diego De Zúñiga, Biografía Y Nuevos Escritos (I)." *Archivo Agustiniano* no. 55:51-103.

3. ———. 1961. "Diego De Zúñiga, Biografía Y Nuevos Escritos (Ii)." *Archivo Agustiniano* no. 55:329-384.

4. Bolado Ochoa, Gerardo. 1985. "Fray Diego De Zúñiga O.S.A.: Una Filosofía Como Enciclopedia De Las Ciencias Y Las Artes En El Siglo Xvi." *Revista Agustiniana (Madrid)* no. 26:105-150.

5. ———. 1989. "La Unión De Los Estudios Filosóficos Y Retóricos En La Enciclopedia De Fray Diego De Zúñiga (1536-1599?). Aproximación a La "Retórica"." *Revista Agustiniana (Madrid)*:557-587.

6. ———. 1999. "La "Fisica" De Diego De Zúñiga, Osa." *La Ciudad de Dios* no. 212:105-147.

7. ———. 2000. *Fray Diego De Zúñiga, Osa (1536-Ca. 1598). Una Aproximaciòn Biogràfica*. Madrid: Revista Agustiniana.

8. ———. 2003. "Presentación De La "Dialéctica" De Diego De Zúñiga (1536 Ca.-1598)." *Revista Agustiniana (Madrid)*:465-500.

9. Gallego Salvadores, Juan José. 1974. "La Metafísica De Diego De Zúñiga (1536-1597) Y La Reforma Tridentina De Los Estudios Eclesiásticos." *Estudio Agustiniano* no. 9:3-60.

10. González Velasco, Modesto. 1999. "Fray Diego De Zúñiga (1536 - C. 1598): Biografía, Escritos Y Bibliografía." *La Ciudad de Dios* no. 212:5-57.

Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius) (1547-1628)

"Goclenius is best described as a protestant Scholastic', his most important contribution to the metaphysics being terminological. He is the first philosopher to use the word *ontologia* [in Greek] (*) to describe general metaphysics (...) Strangely enough, this word does not appear in the *Isagoge*, but rather in the *Lexicon* . Still, his use of the word precedes that of Calovius by 23 years (...), and that of Jean-Baptiste Duhamel by 65 (...).
Although he does not use the term *ontologia* in the *Isagoge*, Goclenius does distinguish general metaphysics from special metaphysics in this work and a fortiori stood the concept of general metaphysics. The distinction between general and special metaphysics is not Goclenius's invention, however. The Spanish Jesuit Benito Pereira (c. 1535-1610) had already made it by 1562 (see Rompe *Die Trennung von Ontologie und Metaphysik. Der Ablösungsprozess und seine Motivierung bei Benedictus Pererius und anderen Denkern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*1968, pp. 7-13) and an earlier manuscript making the distinction has been found (Zimmermann *Ontologie oder Metaphysik. Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik an 13. und 14. Jahrundert* 1965, p. 60).
Both Wundt and Vollrath seem to have discovered the distinction between general and special metaphysics only in the *Praefatio* of Goclenius's *Isogoge* and have remarked that this distinction does not appear in the main text of the work. This is incorrect, however.

The second part of the *Isagoge* is a series of disputations, the first of which, entitled *De ente Communi, ad omnes Categorias conseguente* discusses this distinction (Rompe is aware of this and hers is at present the most trustworthy account of Goclenius's work) Goclenius says that some divide first philosophy (*prima philosophia*), which is usually called 'metaphysics', into two parts. The first is universal and studies the most general notion of being common to all things (*de Ente in communi*). The second part is particular and deals with God, divine spirits (*daemones*), and disembodied intellect (*intellectus separatus a corpore*, p. 126). Goclenius ascribes this view to Aristotle and then goes on to say that he prefers to divide things up differently. Knowledge (*scientia*) should be divided into a universal and a particular part, and the universal part should be called 'first philosophy'. The particular part in turn should be divided into a 'transnatural' part which deals with God, and a 'natural' one, which deals with natural entities (pp. 126-7).
Goclenius's idea of knowledge, then, has a particular part which seems to contain every specific science. In contrast, Perera includes only theology, 'spiritology', and psychology, and Christian Wolff only theology, psychology, and cosmology, within special metaphysics. Thus Goclenius is proposing a way of cutting up the sciences such that *prima philosophia* is truly cast in the role of the queen of the sciences, lording over them all as the *scientia universalis* . On the face of it, Goclenius's taxonomy of metaphysics is more reasonable than that of Wolff or Pereira. If one is going to take seriously the notion of a 'superscience' which studies the most abstract idea of being which the objects of all specific sciences share, then one is compelled, I think, to include all of the particular sciences within specific metaphysics. This is true *unless,* of course, one has platonic misgivings about the possibility of being able to have knowledge about substances which have matter mixed up in them. However, a good Scholastic, wedded as he is to the spirit of Aristotle, has no such misgivings."

(*) The term *ontologia* was coined by Jacob Lorhard in 1606 [Note added by Raul Corazzon]

From: *Goclenius, Rudolphus* by Jeffrey Coombs - in: *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology* - Edited by Barry Smith Barry and Hans Burkhardt. Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991, pp. 312-313.

"Thus the Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius in the preface to his *Isagoge in primam philosophiam* (1598), spoke of two separate sciences, a universal science called 'first philosophy' and a particular science called 'metaphysics'. First philosophy deals with being, its properties and its principles; metaphysics studies the various types of immaterial being: God, the intelligences and the human soul."

From: Charles H. Lohr - *Metaphysics and natural philosophy as sciences: the Catholic and the Protestant views in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* - in: Constance Blackwell, Sachiko Kusukawa (eds.) . Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. Conversations with Aristotle - Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, p. 291.

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   Reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967.

2. ———. 1592. *Physicae Disputationes in Septem Libros Distinctae*. Frankfurt.

   Partial translation in German: Rudolphus Goclenius, *Disputationen zur Natur-Wissenschaft 1592,* translated with introduction, notes and name index by Hans Günther Zekl, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007.

3. ———. 1598. *Isagoge in Peripaticorum Et Scholasticorum Primam Philosophiam, Quae Dici Consuevit Metaphysica*. Frankfurt.

   Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1976.
   Translated in German: Rudolphus Goclenius, *Isagoge. Einführung in die Metaphysik 1598, t*ranslated with introduction, notes and an essay on the author by Hans Günther Zekl, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005.

4. ———. 1609. *Conciliator Philosophicus*. Cassellis.

   Reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977.

5. ———. 1613. *Lexicon Philosophicum Quo Tanquam Clave Philosophiae Fores Aperiuntur*. Frankfurt.

Reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964 (with the *Lexicon philosophicum Graecum*).

6. ———. 1615. *Lexicon Graecum Philosophicum*. Marburg.

   Reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964 (with the *Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur*).

7. ———. 1625. *Metaphysica Exemplaris*. Wittenberg.

Studies

1. Lamanna, Marco. 2009. ""De Eo Enim Metaphysicus Agit Logice". Un Confronto Tra Pererius E Goclenius." *Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* no. 34:315-360.

2. ———. 2013. *La Nascita Dell'ontologia Nella Metafisica Di Rudolph Göckel (1547-1628)*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

   "Nel dibattito seguito al cosiddetto *Ontological Turn* della filosofia analitica contemporanea un posto di assoluto rilievo ha avuto, e continua ad avere, l'ipotesi di distinguere l'ambito dell'ontologia da quello della metafisica. Si tratta solo dell'ultima insorgenza di un dibattito epistemologico che ha conosciuto più riprese nel corso dei secoli, in contesti anche molto differenti tra loro. A livello strettamente terminologico, la prima distinzione dell'ontologia dalla metafisica si registra all'inizio del XVII secolo, all'interno della *Schulmetaphysik* riformata, in particolare calvinista. È in quell'ambito che un autore come Rudolph Gōckel (lat. Goclenius) potè intestarsi una simile operazione a seguito delle istanze scaturite dall'"importazione" dei modelli metafisici dell'aristotelismo gesuita (in particolare di Benet Perera, più che di Francisco Suárez) nella Germania protestante. Erano trascorsi quasi ottant'anni dall'interdetto pronunciato da Lutero contro la metafisica e le sue pretese epistemologiche. Il "ritomo" alla metafisica tra i calvinisti coincise pertanto con la nascita dell'ontologia come scienza propriamente detta e con la distinzione di quest'ultima dalla metafisica, intesa perlopiù come teologia: nel corso delle dispute tra riformati e

protestanti si affinerà un modello che dominerà il dibattito scolastico in ambito continentale sino agli anni di Kant, determinando profonde conseguenze nel modo di pensare la realtà."

3. Moreau, Pierre-Franois. 2002. "Wolff Et Goclenius." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 65:7-14.

Gabriel Vasquez (Vazquez) (1549-1604)

Texts

1. Vazquez, Gabriel. 1598. *Commentariorum, Ac Disputationum in Primam Partem S. Thomae. Tomus Primus. Complectens Viginti Sex Quaestiones Priores*. Alcalà.

2. ———. 1598. *Commentariorum in Primam-Secundae S. Thomae*. Alcalà.

   Two volumes: second volume printed 1605.

3. ———. 1609. *Commentariorum in Tertiam Partem*. Alcalà.

   Four volumes (1609-1615).

Studies

1. Baldini, Ugo. 2004. "Ontology and Mechanics in Jesuit Scholasticism: The Case of Gabriel Vazquez." In *Scientiae Et Artes. Die Vermittlung Alten Und Neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst Und Musik. Vol. I*, edited by Mahlmann-Bauer, Barbara, 99-142. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

2. Lapierre, Michael J. 1999. *The Noetical Theory of Gabriel Vasquez, Jesuit Philosopher and Theologian (1549-1604). His View of the Objective Concept*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen.

   Contents: Foreword I; Preface III; Acknowledgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. Historical overview 5; 2. Life and times of

Gabriel Vasquez 11; 3. Concept and external world 21; 4. Cocept and truth 35; Concept and knowledge 55; 5. Concept and Being 75; 7. Concluding observations 93; Appendix A. Chronological table of Vasquez's life 97; Appendix B. List of the writings of Gabriel Vasquez 99; Bibliography 103; Index of names and subjects 109.

3. Schmutz, Jacob. 2002. "Le Miroir De L'univers: Gabriel Vazquez Et Les Commentateurs Jésuites." In *Sur La Science Divine*, edited by Bardout, Jean-Christophe and Boulnois, Olivier, 382-411. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

4. Wells, Norman J. 1994. "John Poinsot on Created Eternal Truths Vs. Vasquez, Suárez and Descartes." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:425-446.

Diego Mas (Didacus Masius) (1553-1608)

Texts

1. Mas, Diego. 1587. *Metaphysica Disputatio De Ente Et Eius Proprietatibus*. Valencia.

   Critical edition of the Latin text and Spanish translation witgh the title: *Disputación metafísica sobre el ente y sus propiedades (1587)* - Pamplona, EUNSA, 2003. Parte I: traducción castellana; Parte II: Original latino.
   Contains a reprint of the essay: *El Maestro Diego Mas y su Tratado de Metafísca. La primera metafísica sistemática* by Jordán Gallego Salvadores, pp. 17-88 (originally published in: *Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia* 43 (1970), pp. 3-92).]: 07

Studies

1. Bastit, Michel. 2004. "De L'intérêt D'une Lecture Traditionnelle De Saint Thomas: La Question De L' *esse* Chez Diego Mas." *Revue Thomiste* no. 104:447-468.

" *Résumé*. On essaie ici de tester sur un texte de Diego Mas la fécondité théorique d'une lecture traditionnelle thomiste, au sens de lecture au sein d'une école. À partir des questions concernant l'ordre de l'existence à la forme et à l'essence, on aperoit progressivement que la rigoureuse procédure scolastique utilisée par l'auteur du texte reconduit son lecteur à la question elle-même, et le met ainsi en mesure d'être philosophe en acte. En outre cette rigueur permet à une pensée de ce type d'entrer en rapport avec les développements de la philosophie exacte moderne et contemporaine où se manifeste aujourd'hui un regain d'intérêt pour la métaphysique et l'ontologie que l'on aurait tort de négliger."

2. Gallego Salvadores, Juan José. 1970. "El Maestro Diego Mas Y Su Tratado De Metafísica. La Primera Metafisica Sistematica." *Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia* no. 43:3-92.

   Reprinted in: Diego Mas, *Disputación metafísica sobre el ente y sus propiedades* - Edited by Santiago Orrego and Juan Cruz Cruz - Pamplona, EUNSA, 2003, pp. 17-88.

3. ———. 1973. "La Aparición De Las Primeras Metafísicas Sistemáticas En La España Del Xvi. Diego Mas (1587), Francisco Suárez Y Diego De Zúñiga (1597)." *Escritos del Vedat* no. 3:91-162.

4. ———. 2004. "El Dominico Valenciano Diego Mas Y La Primera Metafísica Sistemática." In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 209-223. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

Cristóbal de los Cobos (1553-1613?)

Texts

1. Los Cobos, Cristóbal. 1948. " *In Metaphysicam* Por Cristóbal De Los Cobos, S. J. Salamanca, 1582-1583 (Ms. Inédito) (*)." In *Actas Del Iv Centenario Del Nacimiento De Francisco Suárez 1548-1948. Vol. I*, 375-413. Madrid: Dirección General de Propaganda.

   (*) De la colección de manuscritos estudiados durante los homenajes centenarios tributados al Doctor Eximio. (Edited by Eleuterio Elorduy).

Studies

Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)

"Within three of his writings, Timpler notes that the study and knowledge of metaphysics is required for the study and knowledge of all other philosophical disciplines. For this reason, Timpler's Metaphysics textbook merits examination here prior to consideration of his other philosophical writings. The basic components of Timpler's Metaphysics textbook can be outlined as follows:



Timpler considers the subject matter of metaphysics to be everything which is intelligible to human beings; therefore, All that is Intelligible (*omne intelligibile*) is the all-inclusive category within which all component parts of Timpler's metaphysics are subsumed. Timpler divides the category All that is Intelligible into Something (*aliquid*) and Nothing (*nihil*). Each individual intelligible falls within one and only one of these two categories.
Timpler asserts that Nothing cannot be perfectly defined. His brief remarks concerning Nothing shall be presented within chapter 15 section 17 and within chapter 20 section 9. Timpler's "Something" (*aliquid*) is equivalent to "Being" (*esse; est*) in the broadest sense of the latter. Timpler's "Being" can be explained with the use of the following table:

TABLE 2



"Being" (understood in its broadest sense) includes A and C yet excludes B.
The broadest and most basic distinction made within Timpler's Metaphysics textbook, therefore, is the distinction made between something (i.e., "Being" understood in its broadest sense) and Nothing (i.e., Non-Being). There is no medium between Something and Nothing; any given intelligible object falls into one and only one of these two categories. According to Timpler, these two categories are contradictorily opposed to one another. The principle which states this contradictory opposition--i.e., which states that it is absolutely impossible for an intelligible subject matter to be both Being and Non-Being simultaneously -- is the principle of contradiction; Timpler regards this principle to be indemonstrable and absolutely necessary. The principle of contradiction is the most important rule contained within Timpler's Metaphysics textbook; in so far as it comprises All that is Intelligible, it regulates the entire subject matter of that textbook.

Timpler also notes that the principle of contradiction is "that primary complex principle which is basic to all of the arts" (i.e., to both the liberal arts and the illiberal arts).
It must be emphasized that All that is Intelligible and the Principle of Contradiction (all sub-categories of the former are regulated by means of the latter) are the broadest, most general categories not only of Timpler's Metaphysics textbook, but of all of his other writings as well. These two categories embrace the entirety of Timpler's thought as expressed within his various philosophical writings. The study of metaphysics is basic to the study of all other disciplines partly due to the fact that it directly deals with these two general categories which are basic to every other discipline."

From: Joseph S. Freedman - *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The life, significance and philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624).* Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1988, pp. 210-211 (notes omitted).

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   Two volumes.

Cornelius Martini (1568-1621)

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Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572-1609)

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2. Muller Richard A. " *Vera Philosophia Cum Sacra Theologia Nusquam Pugnat*. Keckermann on Philosophy, Theology and the Problem of Double Truth." *Sixteenth Century Journal* 15 (1984): 341-365.

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2. ———. 1987. *Metafísica. La Ontología Aristotélico-Tomista De Francisco De Araújo*. Ciudad de México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM.

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Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638)

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   Vol. I Praecognita disciplinarum; II. Philologia; III. Philosophia theoretica; IV. Philosophia practica; V. Tres superiores facultates; VI. Artes mechanicae; VII. Farragines disciplinarum. Reprint of the 1630 edition: *Encyclopaedia. Septem tomis distincta* - Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1989.

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   Texts edited with introduction and commentary.

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   On Alsted see pp. 100-139.

Related pages

Pages on the History of Ontology in Modern and Contemporary Thought:

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Annotated Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

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Christian Wolff's Ontology: Existence as "Complement of Possibility"

Bibliography of Joseph S. Freedman on Philosophy in Continental Europe (1500 - 1700)

[Theory and History of Ontology]

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Bibliography of the Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries: II. From Scheibler to Lambert (1645 - 1777)

Philosophers in chronological order:

1. Christoph Scheibler (1589-1653)
2. Johannes Micraelius (1597-1658)
3. Sebastian Izquierdo (1601-1681)
4. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)
5. Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606-1682)
6. Abraham Calov (1612-1686)
7. Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665)
8. Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684)
9. Jean Baptiste Du Hamel (1624-1706)
10. Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736)
11. Johann Franz Budde (Buddeus) (1667-1729)
12. Christian Wolff (1679-1754)
13. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762)
14. Christian August Crusius (1715-1775)
15. Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777)

Suggested readings: among the most important studies on this period, I suggest: Courtine (1990) (fundamental) and (2005), Freedman (1999), Honnefelder (1990) and (2002), Leinsle (1985), Lohr (1988, the best introduction in English), Marion (1975), (1981) and (1988), Schmutz (2000), Wundt (1939 and (1945), Zimmermann (1998).

For the complete references see: Selected Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Christoph Scheibler (1589-1653)

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   On Scheibler see pp. 63-65.

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3. Roncaglia, Gino. 2003. "Modal Logic in Germany at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century: Christoph Scheibler's *Opus Logicum*." In *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Logic, 1400-1700*, edited by

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Johannes Micraelius (1597-1658)

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Sebastian Izquierdo (1601-1681)

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Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)

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6. ———, ed. 2006. *Rem in Seipsa Cernere. Saggi Sul Pensiero Filosofico Di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)*. Padova: Il Poligrafo.

   Con introduzioni di Alessandro Ghisalberti e Gregorio Piaia.

7. Knebel, Sven K. 2002. "Entre Logique Mentaliste Et Métaphysique Conceptualiste: La *Distinctio Rationis Ratiocinantis*." *Études Philosophiques*:145-168.

   "In the scholastic way of spelling out "A = A", some sort of distinction intervened between the relata, viz. the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. To distinguish between the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and *ratiocinantis* was commonplace from the sixteenth up to the eighteenth centuries. But how to make sense of a distinction that is without any foundation

in the object itself? Mastri's account marks a crisis within Scotism, since his reception of Peter Aureol's conceptualism made it possible to give the d *istinctio rationis ratiocinantis* a metaphysical rather than a logical interpretation."

Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606-1682)

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Abraham Calov (1612-1686)

"His most interesting metaphysical works are the *Metaphysica divina pars generalis* and the *Metaphysica divina pars specialis* . Calovius's logical / epistemological works, the *Gnostologia* and *Noologia*, may be of some interest, although as logic the works are weakened by the psychologism which is often found in logic texts of that period and school.
Calovius is a good example of the typical Protestant metaphysician of the 17th century. According tu Calovius, one's metaphysical studies should be guided by the truths of revealed faith, in this case orthodox Lutheranism. Without the guidance of the celestial light, all our travels into scholarly study are nothing more than pitiable wandering. But we cannot follow this celestial light unless we pay attention to both Scripture and nature. Calovius reveals himself to be a true scholastic by naming Aristotle the foremost philosopher. Thus, the main task of Calovius's work is to reconcile the revealed truths of orthodox Lutheranism with the principles of Aristotle's metaphysics. That one is so enabled to refute the errors of agnostic natural scientists, Socinians (a favourite target of Protestant attacks, this Protestant sect denied the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ), Jesuits, Calvinists, and other heretics, so much the better. Still, *both* soumces of knowledge are required: without Aristotelian natural science, there will be factual errors; without Scripture, heresy. (*Hinc tot errores, tot haereses* .)
Metaphysics, according to Calovius, is the wisdom of being qua being (*sapientia Entis qua Entis*). This definition should be understood as denoting one discipline, which is also called 'ontology' or 'transcendental wisdom' (*ontologia* [in Greek] *sive transcendentalis Sapientia*). The usual and improper sense of 'metaphysics' adopted by the Jesuit Benito Pereira (c. 1535-1610). according tu whom metaphysics is concerned with disembodied spirit, is rejected. Indeed, he says, they hallucinate who make the object of metaphysics either God or immaterial substance, and they plainly do not understand the nature of wisdom.
Thus, Calovius believes that the mistake of people like Pereira was to fail to acknowledge a notion of being which is general enough to be common both to spiritual and material beings. This, of course, may not be entirely fair to Pereira and other Thomists,

since theological discomfiture may arise from claiming that God and creatures are subsumed under a general concept of being. Does this most general of concepts logically or ontologically precede God? Or is the dignity of God affected by sharing the notion of being with beings like you and me?
Metaphysics, fmally, must deal with what *really* is, not merely what *could* be. Calovius claims that truly and properly, metaphysics concerns itself with non-complex, essential, positive, real, actual being (*Ens incomplexum, per se, positivum, reale et actuale*).
Only in an attenuated sense does it contain complex, accidental, deprived beings, beings of reason, and potential beings (*Entia complexa, per accidens, privationes, Entia rationes et in potentia*). Calovius prefers to limit metaphysics tu the former, and we might not incorrectly cali him an 'actualist'. Atfer all, Calovius wonders, how does one abstract notion of being common to actual and potential being, if potential being is not truly being?"

From: *Calovius, Abraham* by Jeffrey Coombs - in: *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology* - Edited by Barry Smith Barry and Hans Burkhardt. Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991, pp. 112-113.

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2. ———. 1651. *Scripta Philosophica*. Lubecca.

   Reprint Wittenberg 1673. Contents: I. Gnostologia; II. Noologia seu habitus intelligentiae; III. Metaphysicae divinae pars generalis; IV. Metaphysicae divinae pars

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Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665)

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1. Clauberg, Johannes. 1647. *Elementa Philosophiae Seu Ontosophia*. Groningen.

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   Repris dans:Hans Werner Arndt, Sonia Carboncini-Gavanelli et Jean École (eds.), *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne,* Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2001, pp. 117-130.

6. Lagrée, Jacqueline. 2002. "Sens Et Vérité Chez Clauberg Et Spinoza." *Philosophiques* no. 29:121-138.

   "This paper aims to show how the Spinozistic hermeneutical position in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* is founded in a particular tradition, that of Johannes Clauberg, which makes a strong distinction among the *sensus genuinus* (i.e., the meaning intended by the author), the true meaning, and the truth. L. Meyer, a physician and friend of Spinoza, accepts this distinction but he reduces the true meaning to the truth as it is understood in the philosophy of Descartes or Spinoza. Spinoza, however, maintains the distinction between true meaning and truth, and for him the Bible keeps its holy character as long as it helps man to practice justice and charity. Human reason brings out the universal moral teachings of the Bible and it fosters a community of those who genuinely seek the truth."

7. Mancini, Italo. 1960. "L' *ontosophia* Di Johannes Clauberg E I Primi Tentativi Di Soluzione Cartesiana." In *Festschrift H. J. De Vleeschauwer*, 66-83. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

8. Savini, Massimiliano. 2006. "L'insertion du cartésianisme en logique: la *Logica vetus & nova* de Johannes Clauberg." *Revue de Métaphisique et de Morale*:73-88.

   "The *Logica vetus & nova* published by Johannes Clauberg (1654) is directly inspired by the works of Descartes. For this reason, this text is commonly considered as the first handbook of 'cartesian' logic. Which are, therefore, the Cartesian elements distinguishing this logic from the previous ones? Our aim is to show that there are two main aspects which Clauberg derives from the works of Descartes: on the one hand the foundation of logic on the *perceptio clara et distincta*; on the other the role of *medicina mentis* assumed by logic, on the basis of a philosophical theory of prejudices that has been derived from the Principia philosophiae (but also from Bacon). Clauberg's logic, anyway, does not accept the most radical innovations of Cartesian theory of knowledge: in this way it is still bound up with the scholastic tradition."

9. ———. 2011. *Johannes Clauberg. Methodus Cartesiana Et Ontologie*. Paris: Vrin.

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11. Trevisani, Francesco. 1993. "Johannes Clauberg E L'aristotele Riformato." In *L'interpretazione Nei Secoli Xvi E Xvii. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Studi Milano (18-20 Novembre 1991) Parigi (6-8 Dicembre 1991)*, edited by Canziani, Guido, 103-126. Milano: Franco Angeli.

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13. Viola, Eugenio. 1975. "Scolastica E Cartesianesimo Nel Pensiero Di J. Clauberg." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 67:247-266.

14. Weier, Winfried. 2000. "Leibnitiana Bei Johannes Clauberg." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 32:21-42.

    "It is a much neglected fact that the young Leibniz expressed particular interest for the philosophy of Johannes Clauberg, a follower of Descartes with Aristotelian outlook who taught at the University of Duisburg. Indeed he found here, against the background of Cartesianism, important impulses and preconceptions for important basic positions of his, which in many respects can be understood as extensions and unfoldings of Claubergian approaches. In this way nothing less than a story of creation and development of Leibnizian thought is uncovered, e. g. from the gnoseological (symbolism of ideas; differentiation of nominal and real definitions, truths of reason and fact; the importance of real existence for the coherence of concepts) to the ontological area (the preparation of Leibnizian monadology through the question about the character of being in the innate ideas of Descartes; development of the concept of potency by means of that of facultas to that of virtus, of the *petites perceptions* of Leibniz and accordingly, for the first time in intellectual history, to his basic understanding of the unconscious): Further development of the anthropological question formulation through the idea of pre-established harmony."

Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684)

Texts

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Jean Baptiste Du Hamel (1624-1706)

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   Tomus posterior, qui Physicam generalem et specialem tripartitam complectitur.

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Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736)

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   See the chapter V: *Jean le Clerc: Lockean empiricism in textbook format (1692),* pp. 70-88.

Johann Franz Budde (Buddeus) (1667-1729)

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Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762)

"Baumgarten's basic argument for the existence of a special faculty of sensitive cognition leads back to the core of his metaphysics. To be aware of the material perfection of the world from a finite point of view is, he held, possible only in a sensitive way that is not overwhelmed by abstractive concepts of the intellect. For Baumgarten, beauty is the observable phenomenon representing this material perfection, and the finite created mind is able to gain consciousness of it because of its original disposition to represent the reality and order of the world by clear but confused perceptions. Baumgarten elaborates a set of conditions for the 'art of thinking beautifully' (*ars pulchre cogitandi*). He hereby relies on the doctrines of 'special metaphysics': cosmology, psychology, and the discipline yielding the ultimate ground of the relation between these, namely natural theology.
In his account of metaphysics Baumgarten in general follows Wolff. The first main part is 'ontology' or 'general metaphysics'. This sets out the 'predicates of being'. Baumgarten interprets the

principle of contradiction in a way which yields the basic ontological concept 'something' or simply 'thing' (ens): what is not 'A and not-A', i.e. 'nothing' (*nihil*), is 'something' (*non-nihil*). The universal connection of all things is governed by the principle of *ratio* and *rationatum* : whatsoever B exist, is founded in something other A, and at the same time there is something other C which is founded in B. The further universal predicates are *unum*, *ordo*, *verum*, and *perfectum*, traditionally called the 'transcendental' predicates of being.
Baumgarten's ontology manifests much sophistication. Yet there are profound difficulties which cannot be ignored. How, for example, can the universal predicates be compatible with each member of such disjunctive predicates as: necessary/contingent; changeable/unchangeable; real/unreal; singular/universal; total/partial; finite/infinite; simple/composed; substance/accidence? The universal and disjunctive predicates constitute the internal determination of the *ens qua ens* . They differ altogether from such external (or 'relative') predicates as: similar and diverse, simultaneous, successive, cause and caused, etc. The ontological predicates then furnish the basic material for most of the arguments of special metaphysics. In two points Baumgarten proves especially his independence from Wolff: in his doctrine of monads as immaterial, inextended substances; and in his doctrine of pre-established harmony in the absence of *influxus physicus* .
He herewith reinstitutes the genuine ideas of Leibniz, more than any other of the Wolffians."

From: *Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb* by Kalus E. Kaehler - in: *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology* - Edited by Barry Smith Barry and Hans Burkhardt. Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991, pp. 77-78.

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   "Historically Wolff recedes from Leibniz while Baumgarten, coming nearer to Leibniz, recedes from Wolff. If they are compared on two major issues: monadology and preestablished harmony, together with the principle of sufficient reason, concept of substance as force, concept of individual substance, it appears (as in our work on Baumgarten's metaphysics) that Baumgarten is more Leibnizian than Wolff. His metaphysics is the first Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy; he assumes and develops, with the methodology of Wolff, the philosophy of Leibniz."

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Christian August Crusius (1715-1775)

"Crusius, in his *Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten* (*Sketch of necessary rational truths*; Leipzig, 1745), divided metaphysics into ontology, theology, cosmology, and pneumatology, in explicit opposition to Wolff's ordering of the metaphysical sciences.
Ontology begins, not with first principles, but with the notion of a thing in general, directly connected with the notion of a "really given thing'. Only after introducing these notions did Crusius discuss essence, existence, and causality. Crusius regarded existence as indefinable and as a primary notion arising from sensation.
In his discussion of causality, Crusius expounded a principle of determining reason, his version of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Crusius held, against Wolff, that a sufficient reason suffices only for free actions insofar as they are free. Rational truths and natural events not depending on free causes need a more cogent foundation, a determining reason. This principle does not derive from the principle of identity, but rather from what we must conceive or what we cannot conceive as united or separate, and thus from a new case of the principle of *cogitabilitas*. Crusius, aiming at a sharper distinction between mechanism and free actions, held that the real nature of causality is unknown and that our knowledge of causal connections is based on the constant conjunction of two events in experience. This, of course, cleared the path for the members of his school to accept the Humean critique of the causal connection.

Crusius's ontology reveals a general characteristic of his metaphysics. His was not a monolithic system beginning with a single principle and deducing from it all subsequent notions and propositions, as was Wolff's. Rather, it was founded both on several independent principles and on a multitude of elementary notions that could be defined only by an appeal to reality (by their concrete representation)--notions such as existence, space, time, and force; or, in psychology, the particular powers of the soul, some mental faculties, and pleasure and pain. Through Hoffman Crusius derived this view from Locke's doctrine of simple ideas, but he supposed that the number of elementary notions (which he once called categories) could be infinite."

From: Giorgio Tonelli - Crusius, Christian August. In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edwards Paul. New York: Macmillan 1967. Vol 2, pp. 268-271.

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   "In this paper we examine some passages of a logical treatise by Christian August Crusius. It seems that Crusius anticipated what might be called the circle of deduction, first discussed by Lewis Carroll.
   The question now emerges: why was it possible for Crusius to have deeper logical insights than his contemporaries, given that he was not a brilliant logician? The answer here proposed traces these insights back to his very peculiar philosophical premisses, which have been important for Kant's development in his early career."

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Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777)

"A. Simple concepts. Simple, or fundamental, concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) are a subclass of empirical concepts (*Erfahrungsbegriffe*) and must be found by the Lockean method

of collecting and inspecting (*Musterung*) examples. But whereas empirical concepts may be erroneous (i.e., may have no object corresponding to them) and give only a mere delusory appearance of things, the fundamental concepts are derived from the experience of the *sensu interno* and must be granted even by the skeptic (the solipsist, *der Egoist*) who denies the existence of everything except himself and his experience.(45) The simple concepts can only be ostensively defined, not nominally. They can appear as predicates in a judgment whose subject is a complex empirical concept; but in this case the subject can be analyzed into simple concepts, and the original judgment will thereby be resolved into tautologies ("white is white"), simple negative propositions like Locke's intuited disagreements of ideas ("white is not black"), or relational propositions (such as "space has length, breadth, and height" or "motion has velocity and direction") .(46)

B. Combinations of simple concepts. Our knowledge of such propositions is a priori, for though experience is necessary if we are to have the concepts, we do not have to experience their combinations to see the truth of the propositions.(47) The various sciences are based upon some of the simple concepts (for example, geometry on that of space, chronometry on that of time, phoronomy on space and time, "agathology" on the concept of good), and Lambert builds up large and elaborate tables showing what simple concepts are involved in each of the branches of science and philosophy.(48)

But while Lambert is clear in his theory of simple concepts, his theory of their combination is no more satisfactory than that of Crusius. Lambert uses a weaker form of Crusius' criterion of what can or cannot be thought together, calling it the criterion of "thinkability" (*Gedenkbarkeit*). But while thinkability is a test for a concept, something stronger is needed as a test for judgment; "not to be thought apart," or "must be thought together" as Crusius would say, are needed. This criterion of thinkability, or inseparability, applies to propositions whose predicate is included in the subject, as Leibniz thought; but obviously it will not work for that reason on propositions connecting simple subjects and predicates. Lambert sometimes appeals to the law of

contradiction, which in turn is based upon the incredibility (*nicht-glauben-lassen*) of contradictions(49) and sometimes to the mere possibility of thinking a combination of ideas under maxim that "cogitabile is equal to possibile."(50) But if Gedenkbarkeit is too weak a test, the law of contradiction is too stringent, and Lambert must rightly confess that the "fons possibilitatis duos ideas combinandi has not been fully discovered."(51) It was to remain hidden until Kant clearly distinguished the synthetic a priori from the analytic; and to explain the kind of combinations Lambert and Crusius were concerned with required the whole labor of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The total system of all the simple concepts and their permissible combinations constitutes what Lambert calls the realm of truth.(52) It is equally the object of logic (i.e., the science of reason, *Vernunftlehre*) and ontology, which is therefore completely a priori, since it deals with objects only insofar as they are possible. Still, Lambert does not wish the realm of truth to be defined solely in formal terms as a set of non-contradictory propositions having simple concepts as their subjects. He speaks rather of a harmony(53) reigning in the realm of truth. Harmony is what later in the history of philosophy will be called "coherence." Each proposition in the system is not only consistent with all the others, but harmonizes with it in some more intimate fashion, supporting and being supported by all the others. Every erroneous proposition can be discovered by a stepwise process *(Schritt für Schritt,* as Lambert liked to say) of testing it against each of the others; but since every proposition is ultimately reducible to simple concepts which are always logically true, every error contains some truth which we are to discover by analysis. The most harmonious system is, by definition, the logically true system: wholly unified, with no contingencies, and completely comprehensive. Any lacuna is a warning, and any dissonance a sign of error.(54)"

(45) *Criterium veritatis* §§ 45, 80; *Methode*, Notanda § 14 and §5 36; *Neues Organon* I, §§ 653-656.

(46) N *eues Organon* I §§ 656, 659; II,, §§ 32, 33, 72, 73.

(47) Ibid., I, §§ 634-644, 656-657.

(48) "Table of the simple conceptual correlates of fundamental disciplines," *Architektonic* § 53.
(49) *Neues Organon*, II, § 162; *Architektonic,* 5 273.
(50) *Methode*, Notanda 5 19, A.
(51) Ibid., p,
(52) *Architektonic* §§ 229, 231, 273; *Methode*, §§ 23-25; but the term is not used in the *Criterium veritatis*.
(53) Compare Neues Organon I S§662 and II §§ 160-161 with II, § 180.
(54) Ibid., II, §§ 191-240.
From: Beck Lewis White. *Early German Philosophy*. *Kant and his Predecessors*. Cambridge: Belknap Press 1969, pp. 406-407.

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   The work is divide in four parts: I. *Dianoiology*, the laws of thought; II. *Alethiology*, the doctrine of truth; III. *Semiotic*, the doctrine of signs; 4. *Phenomenology*, the doctrine of appearances.

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INTRODUCTION

References to the Latin edition of the Disputationes Metaphysicae (= DM) are to the edition in two volumes edited by Charles Berton reprinted in the Luis Vivés edition (voll. 25-26).

"Suarez's contributions are important in three areas in particular: philosophy, law, and theology. From a philosophical standpoint his most important works are: De anima, which contains much of his psychology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind; De gratia, which deals with issues of philosophical theology involving free will and determinism; and the monumental Disputationes metaphysicae. The last is undoubtedly one of the great works of Western philosophy. It is the first systematic and comprehensive treatise on metaphysics composed in the West that is not a commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Furthermore, it summarizes and evaluates the metaphysical thought of fifteen hundred years of medieval and scholastic metaphysical speculation. Indeed, it is to this day the most complete and comprehensive exposition of scholastic and Aristotelian metaphysics. Its fifty-four disputations cover every metaphysical topic known during Suarez's time. De legibus is Suarez's most important work dealing with legal and political theory. In it he explores in detail the nature of law and of civil society. Suarez's views on international law (ius gentium) make him one of its founders. Suarez's contributions in theology are contained in his numerous books on the subject. He touched upon almost every aspect of sacred doctrine, from the Trinity to questions pertaining

to the spiritual life. This has made his theological writings a standard source of Catholic theology. Moreover, his role in helping to shape the response of the Catholic Counter-Reformation to the rise of Protestantism, guarantees a prominent place for his ideas in history. Suarez's place in the history of philosophy is frequently disputed. Some authors place him firmly in the medieval tradition, claiming that he should be seen as perhaps the last world-class figure of that tradition before modem philosophy changes the philosophical direction of the West. Others see Suarez as providing the foundation for some of the views that were going to form the core of modem philosophy. Under the latter interpretation he is seen as a precursor of modem philosophy, rather than as the term of a medieval process of development." (pp. 260-261, notes omitted).

From: Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Francisco Suárez: the Man in History", *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 65, 1991, pp. 259-266.

"Perhaps the most important enterprise of the *Doctor eximius*, the *Disputationes metaphysicae* is a complete résumé of his own and previous Scholastic thought on a myriad of questions, arranged in the form of fifty-four "Disputations" dealing with various topics systematically. (...)
In format, Suárez's *Disputationes* represented a radical departure from previous metaphysical treatises. Until its appearance, metaphysics had been explicitly treated either just incidentally in the form of *Opuscula* ("little works"), such as St. Thomas Aquinas's *De ente et essentia* ("On Being and Essence"), or in commentaries on the text of Aristotle. Both methods were clearly unsatisfactory, the one incomplete and the other shackled to the rambling obsolete order of Aristotle. So Suárez says that he intends to give, preparatory to theology, a complete exposition of metaphysics which, instead of following the text of Aristotle, will proceed in a systematic fashion.
In executing his intention, the *Doctor eximius* has divided his work into two main parts, to which correspond two tomes. After explaining in the first Disputation the object, the dignity, and the utility of metaphysics, he proceeds in the first part to treat of

being in general, its properties and causes. In the second tome, he descends to items under being, considering them from a metaphysical viewpoint.
The first part studies the concept of being (Disputation 2) which, representing in some way everything that entails an order to existence, transcends all genera, species and differences. It will encompass everything real, from extrinsic denominations, through mere possibles, to the subsistent, purely actual, and necessary reality of God. Following this is a treatment of the essential properties of every being inasmuch as it is a being, namely, unity, truth and goodness. Under the discussion of unity, space is given to questions concerning the principle of individuation (Disputation 5), the reality of universal natures (Disputation 6), and the various kinds of distinction (Disputation 7). The discussion of truth (Disputation 8) is balanced by discussion of falsity (Disputation 9) and that of goodness (Disputation 10) by that of evil (Disputation 11) After the essential properties, there follows a consideration of the causes of being. Disputation 12 treats causes in general while Disputations 13-25 deal with various types of causes. Concluding this first part, Disputation 26 presents a comparison of causes with their effects and Disputation 27 considers the mutual relations of causes one to another.
The second part opens with the division of being into infinite and finite (Disputation 28). Infinite being, or God, is the subject of the next two Disputations. In Disputation 29, the existence and unicity of God is demonstrated metaphysically. Disputation 30 goes on to investigate, as far as unaided human reason can, the divine perfection, simplicity, immensity, immutability, wisdom, and omnipotence. With Disputation 31 Suárez begins his treatment of finite being. It is this Disputation which is the locus of the famed Suárezian denial of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. In Disputation 32, Suárez considers the distinction of substance and accident in general. Substance is treated in metaphysical detail through the next four Disputations while the different categories of accident are the subject matter of Disputations 37 to 53. The fifty-fourth Disputation, (...) concludes the whole work with a discussion of "beings of reason" including negations, privations, and reason-

dependent relations -- all of which fall outside real being, the object of metaphysics." (pp. 8-10, notes omitted)

From: John P. Doyle "Introduction" to: Francisco Suárez, *On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1995.

"It is generally agreed that modern philosophy places greater stress on the subjectivity of the knower than on the objective reality of the known, as does medieval philosophy. Suárez, when faced with a basic problem of metaphysics, whether the concept of "being" is one or multiple, decided, without any Scholastic precedent, to make a subjective state of mind (*conceptus formalis entis*) the criterion for establishing the unitary sense of objective reality (*conceptus obiectivus entis*). When problems like that of "being" became too difficult to resolve by the usual medieval objective" approach, Suárez recommended recourse to the "subjective" because it was better known (*notior*) to us than the objective, especially as the subjective is produced "by us and in us" (*a nobis et in nobis*). On the basis of the principle that "to one formal concept one objective concept necessarily corresponds;"*uni conceptui formali unus conceptus obiectivus necessario respondet*, Suárez, as never before in Scholasticism, made extra-mental reality dependent for its truth on in intra-mental concept, thus changing the main thrust of medieval philosophy. Descartes adopted the same approach when faced with he basic problem of his system, of establishing, through the resources of the intellect, knowledge that was objectively certain. Like Suárez, he made an intra-mental concept the criterion for determining extra- mental reality. The intra-mental concept was the thinker's "cogito"; the extra-mental reality was the thinker's existence, "sum"; with the certainty of the existence following as a necessary consequence, "*ergo*", from the intra-mental concept itself.
Suárez could not have become the founder of modern philosophy before he had worked out his own system, the technical vocabulary of which provided the groundwork for the emerging modern systems. This vocabulary was first needed to systematize metaphysics. The long subjection to the unmethodical text of

Aristotle had delayed the attainment of this important philosophical object, realised at last in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*.
In the two volumes of that great work, the philosophy of being was given a binary structure, characterized, though not by its author, as general (vol. 1) and special (vol. 2) metaphysics. *General metaphysics* has as its theme the common concept of being, its general attributes, and its causes; and s *pecial metaphysics*, the kinds of being contained under the common concept, (*) classified in two dichotomies, the primary of finite and infinite, and the secondary of substance and accident. Suárez also furnished the burgeoning modern systems with vocabulary as groundwork for their ideas, in many cases the vocabulary anomalously grew to be alien to the system that was its source. How was this possible? Through that system undergoing anamorphosis, a condition where something distorted occasionally appears to be regular; indeed so regular, that the distorted ideas seem to belong to the nature of anamorphosed thing itself. Which may explain why the realist Suárez is made out to be a crypto-idealist, and it may be that the philosophies of realism (Scholasticism) and idealism (modern philosophies) have some hidden affinity and are closer together than one would suppose." (pp. 27-28)

Notes

(*) Suárez describes *general* metaphysics and its "propriam et adaequatam rationem, ac deinde proprietates eius et causas." DM 2: 1, introductory paragraph [25: 64] "... de communi conceptu entis, illiusque proprietatibus, quae de illa reciproce dicuntur.' DM 28, introductory paragraph [26: 1]. He describes *special* metaphysics as "res omnes, quae sub ente continentur, et illius rationem includunt, et sub obiectiva ratione huius scientiae cadunt, et a materia in suo esse abstrahunt." DM 2: 1, introductory paragraph [25: 64] "... definitas rationes entium... divisiones varias ipsius entis et membrorum eius... primam et maxime essentialem divisionem entis in finitum et infinitum secundum essentiam seu in ratione entis." DM 28, introductory paragraph [26: 1].

From: José Pereira, *Suárez Between Scholasticism and Modernity*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2007.

AN OVERVIEW OF SUÁREZ'S METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

"The two large folio volumes of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* appeared in Salamanca in 1597. In his brief foreword, "Ad lectorem," Suárez indicates his reason for undertaking this project: "It is impossible for anyone to become a competent theologian unless he builds upon a solid metaphysical foundation." He develops this view in the *Prooemium* or prologue to his work. The science of metaphysics, he holds, is indispensable for a mastery of theology. More intimately than any other human field of knowledge, it is connected with theology; it has for its object the most universal and supreme principles which embrace all being and are the foundation of all knowledge. This function of metaphysics was for Suárez a compelling motive for interrupting his theological labors and producing, in one systematic, comprehensive work, the results of his metaphysical studies and investigations, begun many years before. The prologue reads as follows:

> "Sacred and supernatural theology relies on divine illumination and on principles revealed by God. However, it is cultivated by human reasoning and investigation, and therefore enlists the aid of truths naturally known, using them as ministers and instruments to develop its deductions and to illustrate divine truths. But of all the natural sciences, that which holds the primacy and has won the name of first philosophy is most valuable for promoting sacred and supernatural theology. For among them all it approaches most closely to the science of divine things, and also explains and vindicates those natural principles which embrace the universe of being and in one way or another stand at the basis of all learning.

For this reason I wished to revise and expand what I have worked out for my students and publicly taught on various occasions during many years concerning this natural wisdom, so that the results of my reflections might be made available to the general public. Accordingly I am forced for a time to interrupt, or rather to postpone, the more weighty commentaries and disputations on sacred theology I am so busily engaged in, as well as the taxing labor required for their publication.

It often happened that while I was treating of divine mysteries, metaphysical problems would come up. Without a knowledge and understanding of these, the higher mysteries of Christianity can scarcely, if at all, be discussed as they deserve. Hence I had to mingle baser questions with supernatural subjects, a practice that is annoying to readers and is not very profitable for them; or else, to avoid this awkward procedure, I had briefly to propose my own opinion in such matters, and Its demand of toy readers a blind faith in my judgment. This was embarrassing for me, and could well seem out of place to them. Metaphysical principles and truths are so closely interwoven with theological conclusions and deductions, that if knowledge and full understanding of the former are lacking, knowledge of the latter must necessarily suffer.

Led on by such considerations, I yielded to repeated requests and decided to write the present work. I have arranged all the metaphysical disputations according to a method calculated to combine comprehensive treatment with brevity, and so to be of greater service to revealed wisdom. Hence it will not be necessary to divide the work into several books. For all that pertains to this doctrine and is suitable to its subject matter in the light of the method adopted, can be fully handled in a limited number of disputations. What belongs to "pure philosophy" or dialectics has, so far as possible, been left out as not in keeping with the scope of the work. I shall adhere to this norm, even though I am aware that other writers on metaphysics devote much space to such subjects. But before I

begin to treat of the subject-matter of this doctrine I shall, God willing, discuss wisdom or metaphysics itself, its object, use, necessity and its attributes and rewards."

The work falls into two main parts, coinciding with the two volumes in which it was published. It comprises fifty-four disputations in all. The first volume treats of metaphysics in its broadest comprehension: being as such, and the properties and causes of being. The first disputation deals with the object of metaphysics; the second inaugurates an exposition of the concept of being. Disputations III to XI discuss the passions and transcendental properties of being. Disputations XII to XXVII embody the author's doctrine on causes.

The second volume opens with a consideration of infinite and finite being. Two disputations deal with natural knowledge of the existence, nature, and attributes of God. The remaining disputations are devoted to the metaphysics of finite being, distributed according to the Aristotelian categories.

As the title indicates, the work is cast in the form of disputations. The discussions follow a regular pattern. First, the problem is stated. Then the various solutions that have actually been proposed by philosophers are reviewed (*Variae opiniones*). Thirdly, Suárez gives what he considers to be the true doctrine or, as the case may be, the most probable theory (*Vera sententia or Resolutio quaestionis*). A refutation of opposing views often brings the disputation to a close." (pp. 6-7)

From: Cyril Vollert, "Introduction" to: Francisco Suárez, *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputatio VII),* translated from the Latin with an introduction by Cyril Vollert, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1947.

An outline of the METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

I. The nature of metaphysics (1)

II. The transcendentals: being and its attributes (2-11)
A. Being (2, 3)
B. One (4, 5- 7)
C. True (8, 9)
D. Good (10, 11)

III. The causes of being (12-27)
A. Causes in general (12)
B. The material cause (13, 14)
C. The formal cause (15, 16)
D. The efficient cause (17-19, 20-22)
E. The final cause (23, 24)
F. The exemplar cause (25)
G. Relation of the causes to their effects and to each other (26, 27)

IV. The division of being into infinite and finite (28-31)
A. The distinction between infinite and finite being (28)
B. The existence and nature of the First Being (29, 30)
C. Finite being (31)

V. The division of finite being into substance and accident (32-38)
A. The distinction between substance and accident (32)
B. Created substance in general (33)
C. Primary substance (or *suppositum*) (34)
D. Immaterial substance (35)
E. Material substance (36)
F. Accidents in general (37, 38)

VI. The division of accidents into the nine categories (39-53)
A. The division of accidents into the nine highest genera (39)
B. Quantity (40, 41)
C. Quality (42-46)
D. Relation (47)
E. Action (48)
F. Passion (49)
G. Time (50)
II. Place (51)
I. Position (52)
J. Having (53)

VII. Real being versus being of reason (54)" (pp. XVI-XVII)

From: Alfred J. Freddoso, Introduction to: *On Efficient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1994.

THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IN THE FIRST THREE DISPUTATIONS

"In the twenty-seven Disputations which make up the first volume, Suárez is concerned with being in general while, symmetrically, in the twenty-seven Disputations of the second volume he descends to particular being -- in effect dividing metaphysics itself into a general and a special part.
In the very first Disputation (*Opera omnia*, Paris: Vivès [1856]: vol. 25, pp. 1-64), he tells us that the object of metaphysics is "being insofar as it is real being." Explaining this, in Disputation 2 (pp. 64-102) he uses two distinctions already familiar to Scholastic authors. The first is between the formal concept as an act of the mind and the objective concept as what is immediately the object of that act. This latter may be an individual thing or some common feature (ratio) of things. It may, further, be something mind-independent, whether actual or possible, or it may be something merely objective or mind-dependent. The second distinction is between being as a participle, which refers to actual existents and being as a noun, which refers to whatever is not a simple fiction but is true in itself and apt really to exist. The object of metaphysics is then identified with the "common objective concept of being as a noun." This precise object, which reflects Avicenna's (980-1037) understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, abstracts from existence and, as common, transcends all categories, genera, species and differences to embrace everything real. This last runs a range from extrinsic denominations (such as "being right," "being left," "being known," or "being willed"), 9 through mere possibles (which reduce to non-contradiction), to actual created substances and

accidents, to the subsistent, purely actual, necessary, untreated, and infinite reality of God. Over this range, the common concept of being as a noun is analogous with what Suárez will call "an analogy of intrinsic attribution." In this analogy, a unified concept of being is shared, in an order that is intrinsic to it, by different beings (God and creatures, substance and accidents) in such way that the being of what is posterior depends upon and indeed "demands" (postulat) the being of what is prior.
Disputation 3 (pp. 102-115) offers a general treatment of the transcendental properties, namely unity, truth, and goodness, which belong to every being insofar as it is a being." (pp. XI-XII, notes omitted)

From: John P. Doyle, "Introduction" to: Francisco Suárez, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29,* South Bend: St. Augustine Press 2004, pp. IX-XXIV.

"To what extent Suárez, despite his token references to Thomas Aquinas, follows Scotus' approach is evident from the definition of the subject matter of metaphysics in the first of the 54 disputations. Here he discusses six possible solutions to the problem, but dismisses all of them as either too comprehensive or too restrictive. The subject matter of metaphysics is neither everything that is knowable nor the "supreme real being" (Suárez, *Disp. Met*. 1.1.9), i.e. God or the immaterial being; nor is it the finite being that is the subject matter of physics. Rather, the subject matter of metaphysics is "being as such" (*ens inquantum ens*), i.e. a common determination (ibid. 1.1.23 and 26) that is grasped in a concept that abstracts from all categorial determinations as well as from being finite/infinite, being caused/uncaused, and being material/immaterial. Metaphysics is, therefore, the "most general science" (ibid. 1.5.14), because it treats of the "*rationes universales transcendentales*" (ibid. 1.2.27). That is to say, metaphysics is a *scientia transcendens* in the Scotistic sense. Because the immaterial being (God) cannot be known except through previously known transcategorial attributes of being, metaphysics as transcendental science and metaphysics as theology coincide.

According to Suárez, metaphysics deals with the "formal" as well as the "objective" concept of being. By the formal concept of being, Suárez understands the act of knowing, which "*ex unica et prima impositione*" (ibid. 2.2.24) yields an intentional representation of the object; by the objective concept he designates that which is intentionally represented by that act. In other words, Suárez does not assume a theory of concepts characterized by a noetic-noematic parallelism of *res* and *conceptus*; rather he accepts Ockham's critical approach towards a strictly realistic interpretation of universal concepts. Since Scotus himself does not rely on that parallelism when it comes to the concept of being, Suárez can substantially follow Scotus and apply 'being' to a first and unified formal concept which, in virtue of its imposition, represents a first and unified objective concept of absolutely simple content that grasps all different beings in an indeterminate way, i.e. as being.

To the formal concept of being there corresponds an appropriate and immediate objective concept, which is explicitly neither substance nor accident, neither God nor creature, but which designates these in a unified way, i.e. inasmuch as they are similar and agree in being. (ibid. 2.2.8)

What does the objective concept that corresponds to the formal concept of being mean? According to Suárez, it is a determination that transcends the generality of the genus; this determination cannot be defined, but only explicated through its relationship to actual existence. 'Being' means "that which can exist" (*id quod aptum est esse seu realiter existere*: ibid. 2.4.7); the possibility of existence is grounded in an ontological disposition which (as we have seen before) appears in the non-contradiction of the internal contents constituting essences.

Because entity in the sense of being(ness) -- which in a concrete being is identical with the entity or being(ness) of that being -- is grasped indeterminately by the concept of being, that concept has an "illimitability and transcendence" (ibid.2.6.10) on account of which it precedes all more determinate modes. First among those more determinate modes, according to both Suárez and Scotus, is the classification "finite/infinite", which Suárez understands in terms of "intensity"; this allows him to interpret finite being as a non-determinate mode of an intensive quantity and infinite being

as the "totally indivisible infinity of perfection which in itself is most real and complete" (ibid. 30.2.25)." (pp. 62-63)

From: Ludger Honnefelder, "Metaphysics as a Discipline: from the "Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients" to "Kant's Notion of Transcendental Philosophy"."" In *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, edited by Russell L. Friedman and Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003, pp. 53-74.

EXCLUSION OF THE "BEINGS OF REASON" FROM THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

"As every historian of philosophy knows, Aristotle thought the subject of metaphysics was "being insofar as it is being" and from this subject he excluded "being as true". Centuries after Aristotle, Francisco Suárez, S.J., designated the subject of metaphysics more explicitly as "being insofar as it is real being".
The addition of "real" to Aristotle's formula highlighted the inclusion of all that can as well as does exist (4). Against the backdrop of two already well known distinctions - (1) between formal and objective concepts, and (2) between being as a participle and being as a noun -- for Suárez the subject so conceived was identical with "the objective concept of being as a noun" (5). Concurrently, while being was said to be analogous with regard to hierarchically ordered objects (God and creatures, substance and accidents) with an intrinsic attribution of the perfection it represented (6), such analogy presupposed a common, unitary, and all but univocal, concept (7). But from that concept and from the subject of metaphysics Suárez excluded "beings of reason" (8), which he subsumed under Aristotle's being as true (9), and of which impossible objects, in the sense of those that would be self-contradictory, furnished the paradigm case. (10)" (pp. 297-298)

Notes

(4) DM 2, 4, n. 3 (XXV, 88).
(5) Cf. DM 2, s. 4, n. 3 (XXV, p. 88). For the distinction between formal and objective concepts in writings available to Suárez, cf. Thomas de Vio, Cardinalis Caietanus, *In "De ente et essentia*", c. 1, qu. 2, ed. P. Laurent. Taurini, Marietti, 1934, pp. 25-28, and Pedro da Fonseca, S.J., *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros*, L. IV, c. 2, q. 2. ed. Coloniae, Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615, I, pp. 710-11. On being as a noun in contrast to being as a participle, see e.g. P. Fonseca, *In Met. Arist.,* L. IV, ch. 2, qu. 2, s. 2 (I, p. 740). Also see the texts of Duns Scotus (1265-1308) given by M. Fernandez Garcia, O.F.M., *Lexicon Scholasticum*. Quaracchi, Ex Typographia Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1910, p. 241. We may note that Scotus in one of the texts cited by Fernandez Garcia refers to the distinction as "antique": "Solet antiquitus dici, quod ens potest esse participium, vel nomen", *Opus prim. super I Periherm*., q. 8, n. 10. Before Scotus, cf. St. Thomas, Quodlib. II, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Spiazzi. Taurini, Marietti, 1956, p. 24.
(6) Cf. DM 28, s. 3 (XXVI, p. 13); ibid., d. 32, sec. 2 (XXVI, p. 319); ibid., d. 2,
s. 2, n. 14 (XXV, pp. 69-70); ibid., d. 12, s. 1, nn. 13-24 (pp. 378-82); also see his treatment of the analogous notion of "cause", ibid., d. 27, s. 1, nn. 9-11 (p. 952).
(7) Cf. DM 2, s. 2, n. 36 (XXV, p. 81).
(8) DM 1, s. 1, n. 6 (XXV, p. 4); ibid., n. 26 (p. 11); ibid., d. 4, s. 8, n. 4 (p. 138); ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 794); and ibid., d. 54, prol. 1 (p. 1014).
(9) Cf. DM 54, s. 1, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 1016) where he is speaking about beings of reason in general; cf. ibid., s. 3, n. 1 (p. 1026); and ibid., s. 5, n. 16 (p. 1035), where he is immediately speaking about true statements regarding chimerae.
(10) On this, see my article, "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (I)", in *Vivarium*, XXV, 1 (1987), esp. pp. 69-75. For Suárez's overall teaching on "beings of reason", cf. DM 54, *De Entibus Rationis* (XXVI, pp. 1014-41). For an English version, cf. *Francisco Suárez, S.J.: On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, translated with

introduction and notes by J. P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995. On impossible objects after Suárez see my article, "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeen Century Debate about Impossible Objects", in *The Review of Metaphysics*, XLVIII (1995), pp. 771-808.

From: John P. Doyle, "Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy", In: Stephen F. Brown (ed.), *Meeting of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, Turnhout: Brepols 1998, pp. 297-315.

HEIDEGGER'S APPRECIATION OF SUÁREZ

"Heidegger reserves the place of honor in his exposition [*of the Thesis of Medieval Ontology*] for the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), a figure whose pre-eminence for Heidegger is both systematic and historical. Suárez is the bridge between the Middle Ages and the modern world (*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* 111-16/ English translation 79-83). It was through Suárez that the metaphysics of Scholasticism flowed into modern thinkers; his influence is clearly detectable in Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Schopenhauer, Kant, and Hegel. Suárez abandoned the format of the *commentarium* employed by the classical Scholastic thinkers and developed instead a strictly philosophical and systematic treatise entitled *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Although it was written in the seventeenth century, it is the first major systematic Scholastic treatise on metaphysics (GP 112/80). St. Thomas' major works, for example, are either commentaries or, when they are systematic, theological treatises. The Disputationes is divided into fifty-four tracts. The first twenty-seven treat of *metaphysica generalis* (or *ontologia*); the next twenty-six treat of special beings (*metaphysica specialis*); the fifty-fourth is devoted to beings of reason (*entia rationis*). In general metaphysics Suárez investigates the properties of the abstract concept of being in general. In special

metaphysics, he investigates God and creatures, that is, infinite and finite beings. This distinction between general and special metaphysics was imported fully intact by Wolff and made its way to the center of Kant's architectonic -- to the distinction between the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic -- in the Critique of Pure Reason." (p. 69)

From: John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas. An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics,* New York: Fordham University Press 1982.

"The first *Disputatio* treats: *De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae,* of the essence of First Philosophy or metaphysics. Suárez begins in the introduction (3) by discussing the various designations of metaphysics (*varia metaphysicae nomina*), and does so with independent recourse to Aristotle. Here he finds that metaphysics is designated as *sapientia* (*sophia*), *prudentia* (*phronesis*), then as *prima philosophia* (*proté philosophia*), then as *naturalis theologia*(*theologiké*) -- which Suárez here interprets in a sense quite unlike that of antiquity (*quoniam de Deo ac divinis rebus sermonem habet, quantum ex naturali lumine haberi potest* 4) – and finally as *metaphysica*.
Suárez says that this natural theology or First Philosophy is called metaphysics because it deals with God (ex *quo etiam metaphysica nominata est* 5). He thereby gives the expression a different meaning from that of Aquinas. Aquinas uses the expression *metaphysica* insofar as it treats *de ente in communi*. Suárez, on the other hand, says it is called metaphysics because it is theology. He remarks that this title 'metaphysics' does not stem from Aristotle himself, but from his interpreters (*quod nomen non tam ab Aristotele, quam ab ejus interpretibus habuit* 6). However, he is of the opinion that Aristotle did put together this collection.
He explains the expression 'metaphysics' in a sense that deviates from the explanation given by Aquinas, and brings in another point of view which is significant in the history of metaphysics: *de his rebus, quae scientias seu res naturales consequuntur*. (7) (...) The *Metaphysics* is not concerned, then, with such books as come after those about physics, rather 'coming after' is now taken in the

sense of *content*: knowledge of the suprasensuous is later than that of the sensuous. In the order of appropriation, in the order in which knowledge of the suprasensuous arises, in the sequence of investigation, metaphysical knowledge is placed after knowledge of physics. Suárez stresses the *méta* in the sense of *post* and understands this *post* in the sense of the stages of knowledge proceeding from the sensuous to the suprasensuous. At the same time however he brings into play the interpretation in terms of content: *méta*, afterwards, that which comes afterwards, which exceeds the sensuous." (pp. 52-53)

Notes

(3) Suárez, *Disputatones Metaphysicae*. Disp I *Opera Omnia* Ed. C. Berton (Paris, 156ff.) vol. 25 pp. 1 ff.
(4) *ibid.*
(5) *ibid.*
(6) *ibid.*
(7) *ibid.*

From: Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude*, translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993.

"Suárez is the thinker who had the strongest influence on modem philosophy. Descartes is directly dependent on him, using his terminology almost everywhere. It is Suárez who for the first time systematized medieval philosophy and above all ontology. Before him the Middle Ages, including Thomas and Duns Scotus, treated ancient thought only in commentaries, which deal with the texts seriatim. The basic book of antiquity, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, is not a coherent work, being without a systematic structure. Suárez saw this and tried to make up for this lack, as he regarded it, by putting the ontological problems into a systematic form for the first time, a form which determined a classification of metaphysics that lasted through the subsequent centuries down to Hegel.

In accordance with Suárez' scheme, distinctions were drawn between *metaphysica generalis*, general ontology, and *metaphysica specialis*, which included *cosmologia rationalis*, ontology of nature, *psychologia*, ontology of mind, and *theologia rationalis,* ontology of God. This arrangement of the central philosophical disciplines recurs in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Transcendental logic corresponds in its foundations to general ontology. What Kant deals with in transcendental dialectic, the problems of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology, corresponds to what modern philosophy recognized as questions. Suárez, who gave an exposition of his philosophy in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), not only exercised great influence on the further development of theology within Catholicism but, with his order colleague Fonseca, had a powerful effect on the shaping of Protestant Scholasticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their thoroughness and philosophical level are higher by far than that which Melanchthon, for example, attained in his commentaries on Aristotle." (p. 80)

From: Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translation, introduction, and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter. Revised edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. (Lecture course given at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927).

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METAPHYSICAL WORKS BY FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

The standard edition of Suárez's works is: André Michel and Charles Berton (eds.), *R. P. Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu, Opera omnia*, Parisiis apud Ludovicum Vivès (1856-1861) in 26 volumes, with two additional volumes of indexes (27-28).

The main philosophical works are:

a) *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (DM): The first edition was published in Salamanca (Spain) in 1597 (two wolumes) with the title *Metaphysicarum disputationum, in quibus et universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur,* and reprinted Mainz 1605.

The standard edition, edited by Charles Berton who adopted the current title, is part of the edition of the *Opera omnia*, voll. 25 (I-XXVII) and 26 (XXVIII - LIV). This edition is reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 2009.

b) *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis "De anima",* Introduction and critical edition by Salvador Castellote, Spanish translation by C. Baciero and L. Baciero: vol. I (*Disputations* I-II) Madrid, Labor, 1978; vol. II (*Disputations* III-

VII) 1981, vol. III (*Disputations* VIII-XIV), Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1981.

c) *De essentia, existentia et subsistentia* in: Jesús Iturrioz, "Un primer opúscolo de Suárez, desconocido hasta ahora," *Estudios eclesiásticos* 18: 330-359 (1944); reprinted in: J. Iturroz, *Estudios sobre la metafísica de Francisco Suarez, S. J.*, Madrid, Ediciones Fax, 1949.

PARTIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE

1. Suárez, Francisco. 2004. *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index Locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Translated with an introduction (pp. 7-19) and notes by John P. Doyle.
   The *Index* is the preface to the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*.
   Content: English translation: 20-247; Corresponding Latin texts: I. Ad lectorem 248; II. Disputatio II: Prooemium 250; III. Index Locupletissimus 252; IV. Index Disputationum 390; Persons Mentioned in the Index 410; Bibliography 413; Index of Names 424-426.
   "Balancing the system in the *Disputationes*, the Index amounts to a late medieval commentary, “by way of question,” on the first 12 books of the *Metaphysics*. Shorter in length than, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas’ (1225–1274) commentary on the same 12 books, Suárez’s *Ample Index* more than makes up for that by cross-referencing the *Disputationes* itself hundreds of times. In fact, the *Index* and the *Disputationes* are exactly as Suárez intended them to be, complementary of one another and mutually supportive." (Doyle, p. 8).

"However, because there will be very many who will desire that this whole doctrine be collated with the books of Aristotle, not only in order to better perceive on what principles of the so great Philosopher it is based, but also in order that it be more easily and usefully employed for understanding Aristotle himself, I have also sought to provide the reader in this matter with an elaborate index, in which, if it is attentively read, most easily (if I am not mistaken) all those things which Aristotle treated in the books of *Metaphysics* can be comprehended and retained in memory. And again, [with that index] all questions can be at hand which are customarily raised among the expositors of these books." (Suárez, p. 21).

2. ———. 2021. *Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics* . Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
   Translated and annotated, with corrected Latin text, by Shane Duarte.
   "Section 1: Identifying the adequate object or subject of metaphysics.
   Suárez classifies metaphysics or first philosophy as a natural science (*scientia naturalis*) (DM 1.2.17). In so classifying it, he in no way means to identify it with a branch of physics or natural philosophy. Rather, “natural” is here contrasted with “supernatural,” so that in this sense of the expression mathematics also counts as a natural science, whereas sacred or supernatural theology, based on divine revelation, does not.
   Suárez further classifies metaphysics as a real science (*scientia realis*), since it is about things (*res*) or real beings (DM 1.2.13). The implicit contrast here is with a rational science (*scientia rationalis*) such as logic, which is not about any thing or real being, but is commonly thought to deal with objective second intentions (e.g., genus, species, subject, predicate, antecedent, consequent), which are beings of reason or items existing only objectively in the mind as objects of thought. Suárez also classifies metaphysics as a theoretical or speculative science (*scientia speculativa*) (DM 1.2.13), since it has the contemplation of

truth as its highest end, unlike the practical and productive sciences, whose truths are ordered to some further goal (i.e., action or production)." (pp. XXVI-XXVII)

3. ———. 1982. *Suárez on Individuation. Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and Its Principle (De Unitate Individuali, Elusque Principio)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Translated from the Latin with introduction (pp. 1-27), notes, glossary (pp. 175-279), and bibliography (pp. 281-287) by Jorge J. E. Gracia.
   "When thinking about an individual concrete thing such as a man or a tree, one may consider those features that the thing has or seems to have in common with other things, or alternatively, those features that are peculiar or unique to the thing under consideration. If the common features are part of what distinguishes the thing from a larger group of things and at the same time makes it part of a smaller group of things, the members of which can be distinguished only in terms of individual features, then one is thinking of what was commonly known in the Middle Ages as the thing's "nature." If, on the other hand, one considers those features that set a thing apart from all other things, including those falling together with it into a group, then one is considering the thing's individuality. In either case the content of the thought seems to be different. Take Peter, for instance. A consideration of his nature focuses on his humanity; that is, the feature or group of features such as rationality, capacity to laugh, etc., that make him human and in respect of which he is both indistinguishable from other human beings and distinguishable from non-human beings such as dogs, trees and rocks. A consideration of Peter's individuality, on the other hand, will focus only on that feature or group of features which separate Peter from Paul and any other individual being, whether human or not. In the first case we think of the ways in which Peter is the same as other human beings, In the second of the ways in which Peter is unique. The cluster of philosophical problems concerned with the

nature of a thing is usually designated as "the problem of universals," those concerned with individuality are gathered under the term "the problem of individuation," Suárez's attention in Disputation V is directed toward the latter. Contrary to a widespread misconception, the complexity of the problem of individuation was not ignored by scholastics. Most were aware that there is more than one issue related to individuality, and a few of them isolated and discussed the four most important ones. These are, in logical order: the nature of individuality, the extension of individuality, the ontological status of individuality in the individual and its relation to the nature, and, finally, the cause or causes that bring about individuality. When references to the medieval or scholastic problem of individuation are found in contemporary literature, it is usually the last that is meant. And not without reason because up to the fourteenth century one seldom finds a careful and clear distinction between these four different issues, and much more effort is put into the solution of the last than any of the others. Yet, it is also evident that as the age progresses they become more and more defined until we find late scholastics like Suárez carefully separating them in their discussions. Some never became quite independent in treatment, however. The first one, the nature of individuality, was usually discussed in the context of the second, the extension of individuality. And even the second does not become the subject of separate investigation until late in the Middle Ages. Only the last two issues, the ontological status of individuality and its cause or causes, were generally discussed in isolation from the others. Suárez's treatise is consistent with this practice. He deals with the nature of individuality in the context of its extension (Sect. I), giving separate analyses of the ontological status of individuality (Sect. II) and it cause in various entities (Sects. III-VII). The last two Sections of the Disputation take up a problem related to the individuality of accidents: whether numerically different accidents can be present in the same subject simultaneously and successively." (Introduction, pp. 1-2)

"In Conclusion I would like to stress four important points. The first is the completely philosophical character of Suárez's analysis. Although some theological considerations and examples creep in once in a while, the discussion is guided wholly by philosophical principles. The arguments given are philosophical, and the criteria by which various views and arguments are judged are also philosophical. Often Suárez will explicitly make the point that an argument is not philosophical enough, meaning that it is based on theological assumptions, or that a particular problem that had surfaced in the discussion is theological and therefore outside the scope of his discussion (Sect. II, §§ 30 and 37). It is clear, then, that at this time, and for Suárez at least, philosophy and in particular metaphysics had a place of its own among the sciences, independent of theology. In this Suárez is no less modern than Descartes or Leibniz who, as it is well known, read the *Metaphysical Disputations* avidly.
The second point is that Suárez's analysis of individuality is ontological in character. He is not primarily concerned with the discernibility of the individual and its cause, although he is aware both of the problems related to the knowledge of the individual and the epistemological problems related to the way we distinguish between two individuals (Sect. III, § 28 and VII, § 4). The roots of discernibility are always referred to by Suárez, as they are in the scholastic tradition dating back to Thomas, as "signs" or "indications" of individuality rather than its causes or principles.(38) The latter are prior to the former both logically and ontologically, even though the former are prior in human experience. This is why Suárez, like most of philosophers who put ontology before epistemology, cannot adhere to what in contemporary philosophy goes by the name of "the principle of identity of indiscernibles," since such a principle implies a reversal of what Suárez would regard as the proper order between these two sciences. His primary concern is with individuality as it independent of human consideration.
Thirdly, I would stress Suárez's contribution to the controversy surrounding the problem of individuation.

Besides the subtlety and originality of many of the arguments he proposes, four factors stand out: (1) His identification of the nature of individuality as indivisibility, and of distinction as a result of individuality rather than a constituent of it. (2) His explicit discussion of the extension of individuality, a problem seldom treated separately by his predecessors, whose views on the subject were in many cases no more than implicit uncritical assumptions rather than explicitly discussed philosophical commitments. (3) His original interpretation of Scotus' doctrine of haecceitas as an answer to the problem of the ontological status of individuality rather than to the problem concerned with the cause individuality. (4) The merits of his own view on the causal analysis of individuality, which avoids some of the most obvious pitfalls of other views and presents a unified and economic solution to this most vexing philosophical problem. The numerous other merits of Suárez's analysis will become evident, no doubt, to the careful reader.
The fourth most important point I would stress in closing is the centrality of this problem within Suárez's metaphysics. This is evident from the place that the discussion of individuation has within the whole framework of the *Metaphysical Disputations*. As a kind of unity, individuality is discussed just after the general notion of transcendental unity in Disputation IV. This indicates that he considered it the most important kind of the first of the three basic attributes of being (unity, truth, goodness). Universal and formal unit are discussed only after individual unity, in Disputation VI. For it is individual unity that makes all other unity possible. As such, the Disputation V reveals the core of Suarecian metaphysics." (Introduction, pp. 23-24)

4. ———. 1964. *On Formal and Universal Unity (Disputatio Vi: De Unitate Formali Et Universali)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Disputation VI. Translated from the Latin with an introduction (pp. 1-27) by James F. Ross.

"The unity of the scholastic tradition on universals is illustrated by a list of metaphysical points on which Aquinas, Scotus, Occam, and Suárez all agree and an indication of the one or two major points on which there is substantial disharmony, although there existed a common tradition as to mode of discussion.

All four authors are agreed that: (1) There are no universals to be found existing independently both of the operations of the mind and of the existence of singular things; and further that such a notion is inconsistent. (2) Anything that really exists (that is, exists independently of consideration by the human mind and of any mind other than the Divine Mind) is a particular or singular thing, a primary substance. (3) Whatever is actually universal is an *ens rations*, a mental being called a "concept," whose existence (analogically speaking) is derived from the operations of the conceiving mind. (4) There is a foundation *in re* and independently of the operations of the mind for the universality of the concept which is actually universal. (5) The foundation *in re* is, at least in part, the form found in the individual. (6) The foundation *in re* can be called a universal by extrinsic denomination, i.e., by analogy of attribution based upon the causal relation which holds between the foundation *in re* and the actual universal found in the mind.(48) (7) The universal concept is formed by the mind through a process called "abstraction"; (on this point there are many important distinctions and differences which will not be treated herein). (8) There is a real similarity in things of the same nature, a similarity which is the foundation of the "commonness" of the nature or quiddity.

Other than differences in psychology which we must gloss over, the chief discrepancies among these authors are found in the following areas: (1) the manner in which the forms in individuals are the foundation *in re* for the universal concept and (2) the analysis of the claim that two things are similar because they have something in common. There are several notions of commonness or community involved, several interpretations of the expression "common nature" and consequently several analyses of the expression "the

form in the individual is the foundation *in re* for the universality of the concept." These two points are intimately connected, since for each of the four authors, and especially for Suárez, the explanation of the similarity of things is directly connected with the explanation of the foundation of universality.

In brief, Suárez and Scotus are very similar in their psychological doctrine of universals, whereas Aquinas, Occam, and Suárez are all much closer together on the metaphysics of the matter than any one of them is to Scotus, who stands closer to Plato and Augustine. Suárez's view is truly a syntheses of the work of his predecessors, and comparison with those writers should not be used to make him join some older "camp," but should function merely to clarify the various strands of tradition woven into his original design.(49)

Finally a comparison of starting points is useful:

1) Scotus says we must postulate community (which is a logical consequence of possibility) of natures and must seek causal explanations of universality and singularity, which are logically posterior to community.

2) Occam says we must postulate singularity as a principle of explanation, not itself explicable, and proceed to explain universality and community, which are logically posterior.

3) Suarez and Aquinas say we must have a principle of individuation to explain singularity and must also seek explanations of community and universality, which are logically posterior to the principles of composition (essence-existence, matter-form) through which we solve the problem of the one and the many. As a result, all three factors, universality, communicability, and individuation must be explained in terms of prior metaphysical principles." (*Introduction*, pp. 26-27).

(48) At first sight it might appear that Occam would deny this; but his statement that nothing extra-mental is to be called universal, clearly had in mind literal or proper predication. He had no interest in analogous talk and might still have resisted the point; but his own position compells acquiescence, since he holds for causal dependence of

concepts upon particular things. Scotus, too, might seem to resist; but by the same arguments would have to agree, since his position is stronger and entails this one.
(49) The richness of Suárez's *Disputation on Universals* cannot be tapped in an introduction. A much more extensive analysis of Suárez's theory will be forthcoming from the author in a general history of the discussion of universals during the middle ages.

5. ———. 1947. *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputatio Vii: De Variis Distinctionum Generibus)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Translation from the Latin, with an introduction (pp. 1-15) by Cyril Vollert (reprinted 1976).
   "Disputation VII has been chosen as a sample of the metaphysics of Suárez for two reasons. First, it is typical both of his method and of his philosophical thought; many of his characteristic doctrines are briefly treated in it, or at least are indicated. Secondly, it introduces his teaching on the modes, without which much of his philosophy is unintelligible, and above all propounds his theory on distinctions, a point of capital importance for a grasp of Suarezian metaphysics. As the views of Suarez on distinctions and modes are clearly brought out in the Disputation itself, there seems to be no need of a preliminary exposition of these tenets in survey form.(28) Suarez treats of distinctions in the context of his discussion on the unity of being, Disputations IV to VII. Disputation IV deals with *unum* in general, Disputation V with individual unity and the principle of individuation, Disputation VI with universals, and Disputation VII with the various kinds of distinctions. The connection between the question of unity and that of distinctions is explained by Suárez himself in the introduction to Disputation VII. Section 3 of this Disputation, on "the same" and "other," is added to the treatise on distinctions in order to round out the general discussion of unity.

The main reason why a philosopher's theory of distinctions is important is that his solution to the problem of distinctions is a key to his concept of being. For distinctions are based on the nature of being; therefore a metaphysician's view of the nature of distinctions leads to an understanding of his doctrine of being itself.(29) In reading Disputation VII, the student can profitably ponder whether any ideas developed in it support the suggestion put forth by a scholar of our own day, who is both a profound philosopher and a shrewd appraiser of intellectual trends:

Everything is accounted for if we recall that Suarez lived in a nominalistic milieu, and that, despite his avowed reaction in favor of realism in logic, he did not fully succeed in keeping his metaphysics free from this influence.(30)"

Indispensable, too, for an appreciation of Suarezian metaphysics, is his modal theory. Suarez perceived that most things are highly complex, composed as they are of distinct entities, substantial and accidental. Hence he concluded that their essential union is tenuous, or even impossible, without some ultimate bond. This bond is a mode of being. He saw, further, that every created being is subject to numberless determinations which lie outside its essence, but do not contribute new reality to it. The mode supplies the complement of finality. It closes and terminates an essence; it is not a formal, but a completing act.

The Suarezian system is coherent in its complicated structure. Suarez remains faithful to his primary concepts of entity, unity, existence, and distinction, and traces out their implications to the ultimate conclusion. No greater mistake could be made than to attempt to "purify" the system by suppressing the modes. Take away the modes, and the Suarezian structure collapses; just as, in his view, without the unifying function of the modes, finite beings themselves would fall apart. Whether for a mind craving for reality the modes provide satisfying fare, is another question. A study of Disputation VII should help toward an answer." (Vollert, Introduction, pp. 12-13).

(28) A sufficiently detailed account of these two questions may be found in P. E. Nolan, "The Suarezian Modes," Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention of the Jesuit Educational Association (Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1931), pp. 184-200.
(29) This point has been fully discussed by Michael V. Murray, S.J., in his hitherto unpublished doctoral dissertation, *The Theory of Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Francis Suarez*, Fordham University, 1944. Dr. Murray advances cogent reasons, well fortified by historical research, for his conclusion that Suarez was thoroughly imbued with the widespread nominalism of his time.
(30) J. Maréchal, *Le point de depart de la métaphysique*, I (2d. ed., Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1927), p. 185.

6. ———. 1989. *The Metaphysics of Good and Evil According to Suárez. Metaphysical Disputations X and Xi and Selected Passages from Disputation Xxiii and Other Works*. München: Philosophia Verlag.

   X: *De Bono seu bonitate transcendentali*; XI: *De Malo*; XXXIII: *De substantia creata in communi*.
   Also contains translations of: *Tractatus de divina substantia ejusque attributis*, book III chapter 3, §§ 9-11; chapter 7 §10 and *De divina praedestinatione et reprobatione,* book 1, chapter 5, §§ 2-3; book 3, chapter 8, §§.1-2; book 5, chapter 4, §§ 1-3.
   Translation, with introduction (pp. 17-101), notes and glossary (pp. 217-265) by Jorge J. E. Gracia, Douglas Davis.
   "The subject matter of Disputations X an XI concerns the metaphysical issues that surrounds good and evil. Other matters, also of interest both to philosophers and theologians, such as the problem concerning the foundation of moral judgments, and the problem that the existence of evil poses for those who believe in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and good supreme being, are largely omitted. These and related issues were as important in Suarez's times as they are today, and he addressed them explicitly and in some detail, but not in the *Disputationes*

metaphysicae. Following his lead, we have in general omitted reference to these matters with one exception: in order to give the reader a more complete view of Suarez's overall doctrine of evil, we have selected from his opera various texts that address some theological issues which have received considerable attention in contemporary philosophical circles, and which reveal Suarez's views on these matters and complement the views presented in Disputation xi. These texts have been placed in the Appendix.

In spite of the relative brevity, systematic organization, and clarity of thought of Disputations X and XI, the text is not easy to understand for a modern reader. As in many scholastic texts of the late medieval and Renaissance periods, the discussion is carefully organized, but the issues and arguments are so intricate and the number of technical terms so large, that even those familiar with the philosophical literature of the times are likely to find the text difficult to follow at times. Since the translator should avoid altering the style and general tone of the text, we have had to use other means to facilitate its understanding: we have added an Introduction, notes where they seemed appropriate and, in order to keep their number down, a glossary of technical terms at the end. The Introduction has been kept general; it presents a summary and interpretation of Suarez's position and places it within a philosophical and historical framework. Its aim is propaedeutic. The purpose of the notes is primarily to identify the references to other authors made by Suarez, but in a few instances they are used also to solve particular problems that arise in the text or to clarify important uses of terms that appear infrequently in the Disputations. The texts contained in the Appendix are presented without notes, except for those that identify their origin, because they are fragments of works which may eventually appear in more complete translations; we leave their annotation then for the translator of the complete works. The Glossary, in contrast with the notes, deals with recurring difficulties of interpretation arising from the use of technical terminology. Its purpose is not

only to clarify Suarez's use of these terms, but also to identify the common understanding of them by scholastics and, when possible, to point to their source in Aristotle or in his Latin commentators. It is intended primarily to help non-specialists, and thus also makes clear how particular Latin terms have been translated into English. In the English-Latin Index the reader will find the Latin equivalent or equivalents of the English terms used in the text, which in turn will facilitate the use of the Glossary. Finally, the Bibliography lists the works cited in order to help the location of references, and author and subject indexes should aid the reader in locating pertinent materials." *Introduction*, pp. 14-15).

7. ———. 2000. *On the Formal Cause of Substance. Metaphysical Disputation Xv (De Causa Formali Substantiali)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy; Introduction (pp. 7-16) and explanatory notes by John Kronen.
   "The Specific Problems Addressed in Disputation XV
   One of the things that made Suárez, a great thinker was his impatience with vagueness of any sort and his systematic thoroughness. In this regard Disputation XV is no exception. Never before or since has there been so thorough a treatment of the Aristotelian notion of form. In the course of the Disputation Suárez considered the existence and nature of substantial forms, their eduction, their causality and effect, and their unity. Finally, to be complete, Suárez, treated what he called the "metaphysical form," though this is only analogous to the substantial form in the proper sense. We shall briefly summarize Suárez's views with respect to each of these issues, and discuss the main reasons he gave for them. But we must warn the reader that no summary of Suárez, much less one this brief, can give any idea of the exhaustiveness and sophistication of his discussion of substantial form; to get the proper sense of these, one must turn to Suárez himself.

Section I: The existence of substantial forms

The first question Suárez treated in Disputation XV concerns the existence of substantial forms. This might seem a rather odd procedure. One might think it suitable first to give a definition of what substantial forms are, before attempting to prove their existence. Disputation XV does have a short section which presents a very thorough definition of substantial form, but it is the fifth section in Disputation XV. Why did Suárez wait so long to give this definition? The reason is simple: substantial forms are inferred entities, not observables. Their very nature, therefore, can only be established on the arguments which present reasons for believing they exist. Accordingly, Suárez first gave arguments for the existence of substantial forms, and answered objections to positing them, before defining them. Furthermore, he regarded some of these objections as important enough to merit sections of their own; hence, he did not give a definition of substantial forms until he had both argued for their existence and responded, to his own satisfaction, to objections against positing them.

The arguments Suárez gave for supposing substantial forms exist are of two sorts, *a posteriori* and *a priori*. The *a posteriori* arguments briefly are: 1) Human beings are constituted by matter and a substantial form; therefore, other material substances are as well; 2) Substantial forms are necessary to root the various essential properties of things; 3) Substantial forms are necessary to provide an explanation for the return of a thing to its connatural state after it has been altered from without; 4) Substantial forms are necessary to explain why the intense application of one power impedes the application of another power; and 5) Substantial forms are necessary to provide proper termini of substantial changes. The single a priori argument is that substantial forms are not intrinsically impossible, and are demanded by the order of the universe, the perfection of the universe, and the perfection and unity of material substances.

Sections 2-4: The eduction of substantial forms

Suárez gave several objections to positing the existence of substantial forms. The one he regarded as the most grave focuses on their origin. It takes the form of a dilemma: 1) If substantial forms exist, then they come to be either a) by creation or b) not by creation. Not (a), since this would require continual miracles. Not (b), since when substantial change occurs the form itself must come to be from nothing; but to come to be from nothing is to be created. Hence, there are no substantial forms.

Suárez accused this argument of laboring under a false dilemma since it fails to consider that forms could come to be without being either 1) created or 2) made out of something. In the course of making his case, Suárez argued that creation is opposed not only to making something *out of something*, but also to making something *in something*. Thus, though he admitted that substantial forms are not made out of anything, as that would lead to an infinite regress, he argued that they are made in something, that is, in a matter properly organized to receive a them. In so arguing Suárez gave a very clear notion of what it means for a substantial form to be educed from the potency of matter. It is for it to be made with a dependency, both in coming to be and being, in a properly disposed bit of matter.

After having given a clear account of the nature of eduction in general, Suárez took up some very particular problems concerning the eduction of substantial forms. The first problem is whether or not matter always temporally precedes form in every eduction, and the second is whether or not forms are made as such. Without going into his reasons here, Suárez's answer to the first question is that matter need not *temporally* precede form, but need only *ontologically* or *logically* precede it, insofar as matter is the subject of form. His answer to the second question is that form, as a proper part of a complete substance, is not made as such, though it is itself made from nothing, but rather the composite, which the form partially constitutes.

Section 5: The nature of substantial forms

Having given a barrage of arguments to prove forms exist, and having answered crucial objections against supposing

that they exist, Suárez gave a very precise definition of substantial forms. According to Suárez, a substantial form is "a simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a composite substance." This differs from the traditional definition of form, which is "an intrinsic cause giving being to a thing." Though Suárez used this definition in defining formal causality in DM XII, he did not favor it here because of his disagreement with Thomistic metaphysics. For Suárez form completes the being of a composite, giving it powers particular to a specific sort of substance, but it does not give complete substantial being to a thing; in particular, it does not give the being of matter to a thing. Since, according to Suárez, the Thomists held that form channels the act of existing to matter and thus, in some sense, gives matter its own proper being,(11) Suárez decided not to give the traditional definition of form here, preferring instead one that is more in harmony with his own doctrine of a merely conceptual distinction between essence and existence in finite beings.

Sections 6-9: The causality and effects of substantial forms

In accordance with the general method Suárez adopted in treating the causes of being, after he proved the existence of substantial form and gave a clear definition of it, Suárez went on to treat, in a typically exhaustive manner, of its causality and its effects. The first topic Suárez discussed with respect to a form's causality is its principle of causing. The principle of causing of a thing is the faculty or power *in virtue of which* it causes when it causes. Thus the principle of causing of June Anderson's singing is her vocal chords and her trained musical ability. According to Suárez, the principle of causing of a form is nothing other than the form itself. This is related to the actual causality of the form. For Suárez form, as an intrinsic cause of being, does not cause by creating something distinct from itself in a composite substance; rather, it causes by simply uniting its own essence to the other constituent of the composite. Thus the causality of form is simply its union with matter.

The conditions required for a form to cause are: 1) its existence;(12) 2) its spatial proximity to its subject; and 3) appropriate dispositions on the part of its subject. The first two of these are absolutely necessary (i.e., not even God could bring it about that form causes in their absence); the last is only naturally necessary (i.e., in the natural order dispositions on the part of matter are necessary for the form to inform it, but God could bring it about that form informs in the absence of these. For example, He could bring it about that a human soul informs the body of a cat).

The effects of form are: 1) the actualization of matter and 2) the composite. These are in reality [*ex natura rei*] the same effect taken from the point of view of different relations, in the way that getting a majority of the vote in the general election and being elected president are the same. That is to say, the actualization of matter's potency to be something, say a pig, is *nothing other* than the very constitution of the composite substance of a pig. For Suárez, form gives being to matter only in a certain respect. For example, it may give being to matter by actualizing its potential to be a pig. However, form does not give being to matter by giving matter its own being qua matter. In this, Suárez disagreed with the Thomists and their doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence. Nevertheless, though form does not give being intrinsically to matter by actually constituting that being, matter has such a minimal existence that it cannot naturally exist without a dependency on form; only by the absolute and infinite causal power of God can matter exist denuded of all form.(13)

Section 10: The unicity of substantial form

A much debated question in the middles ages was whether or not there is more than one substantial form to each substance. The Franciscans held that there is more than one substantial form in higher substances such as human beings and animals.(14) Their reasons for holding this were diverse, and each of them was treated by Suárez in section 10. However, there seems to have been two main reasons for their doctrine. The first is that, as higher substances share certain powers and properties with lower beings but also

possess powers peculiar to their own levels of being, several forms must be posited in them to account for their similarity with and difference from lower beings. The second main reason is that there is evidence that lower forms remain in compounds (e.g., it seems that water is present in plants, animals and humans); therefore, it would seem that compounds are characterized by the forms of the elements that make them up as well as by their own peculiar forms. Scotus added a new argument for the view that there is more than one form in humans based upon the metaphysical distance between the human soul and the body. The human soul, he reasoned, is too perfect to immediately inform naked prime matter; hence, in order for the soul to inform a certain piece of matter, it is necessary that matter be first informed with the form of corporeity, which gives it extension and the required organic structure. Scotus thought his theory confirmed by the fact that human bodies do not immediately corrupt after death.

The Franciscan tradition came under strong attack on these points from Thomas Aquinas and his followers. Aquinas argued, in the first place, that it is impossible for there to be more than one substantial form in a single composite since, as substantial form gives substantial being, a plurality of substantial forms yields a plurality substantial beings. But each substance can only have one substantial being since it is impossible for a *single* thing in a category to be *many things* in that category. Further, Aquinas argued that, as a higher form can do anything a lower can, there is no need to posit many substantial forms to account for the higher powers of humans and animals; one form will give the human being, for example, not only the higher powers of reason, but also the lower powers of sensation, growth, reproduction, etc.(15)

Suárez agreed with the Thomistic tradition in holding that there can only be one complete substantial form in each composite, and he further agreed with the reasons the Thomistic tradition gave in support of this view. However, Suárez disagreed with Aquinas and the Thomists in one major respect. Aquinas had argued that all substantial forms

are simple and without entitative parts, apparently on account of their function as unifiers of the composite substance.(16) His view seemed to be that a substantial form cannot give substantial unity to a thing unless it is itself fully one. Suárez, however, held that all substantial forms other than the human are composed of parts, and he thought these parts are incomplete substantial forms. This disagreement with the Thomists probably is related to Suárez's view that essence and existence are not really distinct. Such a view forced Suárez to grant more independence to the parts making up a substance, for example, form and matter, and this made him more open to the possibility that a composite substance that is truly essentially one could be constituted out of really distinct, albeit incomplete, substantial parts.

Section 11: Metaphysical form

For the sake of completeness, Suárez rounded off his discussion of substantial form with an account of the nature and reality of metaphysical form. Suárez noted, however, that metaphysical form, in whatever sense it is taken, is not a true form because it is not an entity which, by informing some being really distinct from it, constitutes a complete substantial essence. Metaphysical form is, then, form only by analogy.

Suárez distinguished two sorts of metaphysical form. The first is the complete essential nature of a thing, taken as an individual. Thus, as a human nature is constituted out of form and matter, an individual person's metaphysical form is her body informed by her soul. Such a "form," though it could be said to give a person being, is not really distinct from the person whose form it is, and it does not constitute the being of anything by informing some subject really distinct from it. Nevertheless, Suárez did not hold that any individual's essence is precisely identical with her since she is constituted, not simply by her essence, but by a substantial mode terminating her essence and making it incommunicable to another in the way in which Christ's human essence was communicated to His Divine Essence.

For Suárez complete individual essence along with substantial mode constitutes the supposite or hypostasis. The second sort of metaphysical form Suárez discussed Is logical form. This form is equivalent to the difference in a "genus-difference" definition of a thing. Thus, in the traditional definition of human being as "rational animal," "animal" is the genus which is informed or determined by the difference "rational." So "rational" is said to be the formal element in the definition and "animal" the material element. But, as Suárez did not believe that universals really exist and held rather that they are mind-dependent relations, he did not think of differences as really combining with genera to form the real essences of things. Hence, he did not regard logical form as being a form in the true sense of the word. It is rather a form only by a kind of analogy with real, physical forms, i.e., with forms which actually exist and inform a subject really distinct from themselves." (Introduction, pp. 9-14).

(11) Whether or not Aquinas held this view, Suárez was less certain. But he was certain it was the view of the Thomists. See the present disputation, sect. 8, para. 2.

(12) It should be noted that the existence of the form, though necessary for it to cause, is not a causal condition in the most proper sense of the word, according to Suárez. The reason is that a causal condition must be really distinct from that of which it is a causal condition, and nothing, according to Suarez, is really distinct from its existence.

(13) For Suárez form gives matter the property "being actualized by such and such a form," and the property "being a human body"; it does not give it the property "being such and such a form" or the property "being the substance constituted by such and such a form and such and such matter." Thus my soul gives my body the property "being actualized by a human form," but it does not give it the property "being a human soul" or the property "being a human being."

(14) On this see Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy: Vol. 2, Medieval Philosophy*, Part I (Garden City: The Newman Press, 1950), pp. 304-305.

(15) *Summa theologiae*, Part I, Q. 76, a. 4.
(16) *Summa theologiae*, Part 1, A. 76, a. 8. On this matter, see Thomas Harper, *The Metaphysics of the School,* Vol. II (New York: Peter Smith, 1881), pp. 655-672.

8. ———. 1994. *On Efficient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

   XVII: *De causa efficiente in communi*; XVIII: *De causa proxima efficiente, ejusque causalitate, et omnibus quae ad causandum requirit*; XIX: *De causis necessario, et libere seu contingenter agentibus, ubi etiam de fato, fortuna et casu*.
   Translated with an introduction (pp. XIII-XX) by Alfred J. Freddoso.
   "Of the six disputations dealing with efficient causality, the first triad (17-19), contained in the present volume, is concerned mainly with creaturely efficient causality, while the second triad (20-22) deals with the three modes of God's efficient causality: namely, creation, conservation, and general concurrence. Disputations 17-19 constitute, as far as I know, the longest, most profound, and most thorough tract ever written on creaturely efficient causality from an Aristotelian perspective. Let me briefly describe each of these disputations.
   Disputation 17, entitled "On the Efficient Cause in General," provides a general characterization of efficient causality and its various modes. In section 1 Suárez expounds and modifies Aristotle's definition of an efficient or agent cause as that "whence there is a first beginning of change or rest," carefully distinguishing the efficient cause from the other three Aristotelian causes: namely, the formal, material, and final causes. He concludes that an efficient cause is an extrinsic per se principle that communicates esse, or being of some sort, to an effect by the mediation of an action. In section 2 Suárez goes on to discuss the main divisions of efficient causes: namely, (i) *per se* versus *per accidens*, (ii) physical versus moral, (iii) principal versus instrumental,

(iv) univocal versus equivocal, and (v) primary versus secondary. Along the way he also makes some illuminating remarks about the important distinction between agent causes or principles properly speaking and the sine qua non conditions required in order for those agents to exercise their causal power.

Disputation i8, entitled "On the Proximate Efficient Cause and on its Causality and on All the Things that it Requires in order to Cause," deals with the metaphysics of creaturely causation in general and especially with the efficient causality proper to material substances and their accidents. Section contains Suárez's reply to occasionalism and other theories that either deny that material substances are efficient causes at all or else severely limit the general range of effects that can be produced by them. Sections 2-6 treat general metaphysical issues concerning the efficient principles involved in the production of new substances and accidents. Then in sections 7-9 Suárez discusses the three most disputed sine qua non conditions for efficient causality: namely (i) the condition that the thing acting (agent) be distinct from the thing acted upon (patient), (ii) the condition that the agent be spatially proximate to the patient, and (iii) the condition that the agent be initially dissimilar to the patient. Having completed his treatment of the principles and prerequisites of efficient causality, he next (section 10) takes up the ontological question of what it is that formally constitutes a substance or accident as an actual efficient cause. Finally, in section 11 he lays out the metaphysics of destructive or corrupting efficient causality.

Disputation 19, entitled "On Causes that Act Necessarily and Causes that Act Freely or Contingently; also on Fate, Fortune, and Chance," turns to issues concerning causal necessity and contingency. In sections 1-3 Suárez gives a precise characterization of the distinction between causes that act by a necessity of nature and causes that act without necessity; in addition, he takes up the disputed question of whether there could be any causal contingency in the created world if, contrary to fact, God acted only by a necessity of nature. Sections 4-9 go into great depth on the

nature of free choice and include an extended treatment of controversial issues surrounding the relationship between intellect and will in free action. Finally, sections 10-12 take up a series of questions concerning fate, fortune, and chance." (Introduction, pp. XVII-XIX).

9. ———. 2002. *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence. Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press.

   XX: *De Prima Causa efficiente, primaque ejus actione quae est creatio*; XXI: *De Prima Causa efficiente, et alter ejus actione, quae est conservatio;* XXII: *De prima Causa, et alia ejus actone, quae est cooperatio, seu concursus cum causis secundis*.
   Translation, notes, and introduction (pp. XI-CXXIII) by Alfred J. Freddoso.
   "Efficient causality in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*: context and overview
   I will now provide an overview of Suárez's treatment of efficient causality in Disputations 17-22. My intent is to give the reader some initial idea of the range of questions Suárez deals with and in this way to set a context within which to situate my later discussions of scholastic metaphysics and of the disputations on divine action. I will introduce a few technical terms here, but will defer an explication of them to Parts 2 and 3 of this introductory essay.
   The treatment of efficient causality falls into the first half of the Disputationes Metaphysicae (Disputations 1-27), which treats of being in general prior to its division into infinite being and finite being and, a fortiori, prior to the further division of finite being into substance and accident. After the initial investigations into the nature of metaphysics in Disputation 1 and into the essential notion of being in Disputation 2, Suárez turns in Disputation 3 to a general discussion of the transcendental properties (passiones) of being, which he identifies as one (being as undivided in itself), true (being as an object of cognition) and good (being as an object of love and desire). Disputations 4-7 deal with

oneness or unity, focusing on individual unity (or individuality), formal unity (or universality), and the various types of distinctions among beings. Disputations 8-9 deal with truth and falsity and Disputations 10-11 with good and evil.

It is at this juncture, in Disputation 12, that Suárez begins his treatment of the causes of being. Since metaphysical inquiry is often said to aim at a knowledge of the principles of being, he first discusses the notion of a principle and its relation to the notion of a cause. The term 'principle', he tells us, can be used in a wide sense to designate the first element in any sort of ordering, real or merely conceptual, and in this sense it is obviously more inclusive than the term `cause'. However, 'principle' is used most properly in a narrower metaphysical sense to designate "that which truly and directly communicates (*influens*) some sort of being (*esse*) to that of which it is the principle," or, in other words, that on which a real entity depends in some way for its existence.(31) Suárez is careful to point out, however, that even on this narrower reading the notion of a principle is still broader than the notion of a cause, since within the Blessed Trinity there is a communication of being without causality. For the Father is a true principle eternally 'generating' the Son, and the Father and Son together are true principles eternally 'spiraling' the Holy Spirit, despite the fact that these intraTrinitarian 'relations of origin' involve no causality, strictly speaking. The reason for this, Suárez explains, is that in these relations the principle's own being is in no way distinct from the being of which it is the source; that is, the being (or, nature) which the Son receives from the Father is the Father's very own being and nothing else, and the being (or nature) which the Holy Spirit receives from the Father and the Son is their very own being and nothing else.(32)

A cause, on the other hand, is a principle that communicates being or *esse* distinct from its own being to that of which it is a cause.(33) And a cause's causality is just "that influence or concurrence by which a cause, within its own genus, actually gives being to the effect."(34)

These definitions are meant to apply to every Aristotelian genus of cause material, formal, efficient, and final.(35) Material and formal causes are called 'intrinsic' causes because they do in a sense communicate their own being to the composite which they constitute by their union; however, they satisfy the notion of a cause because the being or esse of the composite substance which results from their union is distinct from the being of either the matter or the form. Efficient and final causes, by contrast, are wholly extrinsic to the entities to which they communicate being. (36)

)It is within this general framework that Suárez situates his tract on efficient causality, the longest and most meticulous such tract in the history of scholasticism. Of the six disputations dealing with efficient causality, the first triad (17-19) is concerned mainly with efficient causality as exercised by creatures,(37) while the second triad (20-22), contained in the present volume, focuses on the three modes of divine efficient causality that can be investigated by the natural light of reason, viz., creation, conservation, and general concurrence. I will now give brief descriptions of each of these six disputations, bearing in mind that in Parts 5-7 below I will be giving a more detailed analysis of the three disputations on divine action (20-22).

Disputation 17, entitled "On the efficient cause in general," provides a broad characterization of efficient causality and its various modes. In Section 1 Suárez expounds and modifies Aristotle's definition of an efficient or agent cause as that "whence there is a first beginning of change or rest," carefully distinguishing the efficient cause from the other three Aristotelian causes. An efficient cause, he concludes, is an extrinsic per se principle that communicates esse or being of some sort to an effect by means of an action. In Section 2 he lays out the main divisions of efficient causes, namely, (a) *per se* (immediate) vs. *per accidens* (mediate) causes, (b) physical vs. moral causes, (c) principal vs. instrumental causes, (d) univocal vs. equivocal causes, and (e) primary or first cause vs. secondary causes, where this last distinction is equivalent to the distinction between God

as an agent and creatures as agents. Along the way he also makes some illuminating remarks about the important distinction between an agent cause or efficient principle, properly speaking, and the sine qua non conditions that are prerequisites for an agent's exercising its causal power.
Disputation 18, entitled "On the proximate efficient cause, and on its causality, and on all the things which it requires in order to cause," deals with the metaphysics of creaturely causality in general and especially with the efficient causality proper to material substances and their accidents. Section 1 contains Suárez's reply to occasionalism and other theories that either deny that material substances are efficient causes or else put severe a priori limitations on the range of effects that can be produced by them. Sections 2-6 treat certain metaphysical issues concerning the efficient principles involved in the production of new substances and accidents. Then in Sections 7-9 Suárez discusses in detail the three prerequisites for efficient causality that stand in most need of careful unpacking, namely, (a) the condition that the thing acting (agent) be distinct from the thing acted upon (patient), (b) the condition that the agent be spatially proximate to the patient, and (c) the condition that the agent be initially dissimilar to the patient. Having completed his treatment of the principles and prerequisites of efficient causality, he next (Section 10) takes up the ontological question of what it is that formally constitutes a substance or accident as an actually acting efficient cause. Finally, in Section 11 he propounds the metaphysics of destructive or corruptive efficient causality.
Disputation 19, entitled "On causes that act necessarily and causes that act freely or contingently, and also on fate, fortune, and chance," turns to issues concerning causal necessity and contingency. In Sections 1-3 Suárez gives a precise characterization of the distinction between agents that act by a necessity of nature and agents that act without necessity; in addition, he takes up the disputed question of whether there could be still be causal contingency in the created world if, contrary to fact, God acted only by a necessity of nature. Sections 4-9 go into great depth about

the nature of free choice and include an exhaustive treatment of scholastic debates over the relation between intellect and will in free action. Finally, Sections 10-12 take up a series of questions concerning fate, fortune, and chance.

Disputation 20, entitled "On the First Efficient Cause and on his first action, which is creation," begins in Section 1 by asking whether natural reason can prove that creation ex nihilo is possible. Here Suárez argues that (a) there is no incoherence either in the concept of creation itself or in the concept of the power to create, and that (b) if we assume the existence of God, we can prove that such a power in fact exists and has been exercised. Along the way he tries to show, against the ancient philosophers, that matter is created, and he ends with an interesting discussion of whether Aristotle himself believed in creation ex nihilo. Section 2 takes up the disputed question of whether creation requires an absolutely unlimited power, or whether instead some creature could have the limited power to create at least some entities as a principal cause; and in Section 3 Suárez tries to answer the related, but distinct, question of whether any creature could act as an instrumental cause in God's creative action. Section 4 investigates the ontological status of the action of creation, an issue that will become clearer when I talk about the ontology of action in Part 3 of this introductory essay. Finally, Section 5 asks whether creation presupposes the prior non-existence of the thing created, or whether instead it is possible that some entities should have been created from eternity without any beginning.

Disputation 21, entitled "On the First Efficient Cause and on his second action, which is conservation," begins in Section 1 by investigating whether natural reason can prove that created beings depend for their existence on the continual actual influence of the First Cause. Section 2 explicates the relation between creation and conservation, while Section 3 asks whether conservation is a divine prerogative.

Disputation 22, entitled "On the First Cause, and on his third action, which is cooperation, or concurrence, with

secondary causes," begins in Section 1 by asking whether in order for a created agent to act, it is necessary that God, in addition to creating and conserving that agent along with its causal powers, should also cooperate with it in its very acting. After concluding that the answer is affirmative, Suárez asks in Section 2 whether this cooperation on God's part consists in his giving to the secondary cause itself some power or principle of action that it did not previously have on its own, or whether instead God's actual cooperation has its terminus just in the effect produced by that agent. Section 3 pursues this matter further by asking how God's concurrence is related to the secondary cause's action and to the subject of that action. Section 4 turns to the manner in which God concurs. Here Suárez tries to show that God's manner of granting concurrence to freely acting agents must differ from his manner of grunting concurrence to naturally acting agents. Finally, in Section 5 Suárez gripes that secondary agents do not depend essentially in their acting on any beings other than God.

With this brief overview in hand, we are now ready to look more closely at the ontological framework within which Suárez works out his account of efficient causality in general and God's causality in particular." (Introduction, pp. XXV-XXIX).

(31) See DM 12.1.25.

(32) See especially DM 12.2.6-10. In a moment I will contrast this intra-Trinitarian communication of being with that of the 'intrinsic' causes of creatures.

(33) DM 12.2.4-7.

(34) DM 12.2.13.

(35) Suárez also asks whether exemplar causes — that is, the ideas that serve as paradigms for intellectual agents and specify their actions — constitute a separate genus of cause. He treats this matter at length in Disputation 25, which is devoted exclusively to exemplar causality. There he identifies the exemplar cause as a certain antecedent condition of efficient causality that precedes the actions of intelligent agents.

(36) In Disputation 23 Suárez argues for the claim that, despite their peculiarities, final causes fully satisfy the definition of a cause.
(37) An English translation of these three disputations is available in Francisco Suárez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17-19, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

10. ———. 2004. *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press.

XXVIII: *De divisione entis in infinitum et finitum*; XXIX: *De Primo et increato Ente, an sit*.
Translated and edited with an introduction (pp. X-XXIV) by John P. Doyle.
"A Summary of Disputation 28: (11)
As mentioned, the two Disputations that are translated in the present work open the second part of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* and mark the turn from being in general to particular beings. Their concern is with, first in Disputation 28, a comprehensive division of being in general, and after in Disputation 29, the existence of the principal member of this division, namely, that being which is God.
Disputation 28 is divided into three Sections, which ask about the legitimacy and the sufficiency of the division, as well as whether the dividend, i.e. being, is univocal or analogous between God and creatures. In the first Section (Vives: vol. 26, pp. 1-8), the question is whether being is rightly divided into infinite and finite being? Doubts arise from the fact that "infinite" and "finite" on their face do not appear to cover the whole range of being but rather look to be restricted to accidental being in the category of quantity (§ 1). In addition, the terms of the proposed division seem obscure, especially the term "infinite" (§ 2). Suárez's answer is to analyze the terms (§ 3) and then to defend the division as one that is good and necessary (§ 4) as well as first and most evident (§ 5). It is equivalent to other divisions such as being by itself *(ens a se*) and being from another (*ens ab*

alio) (§§ 6-7) or, with clarifications, necessary being and contingent being (§§ 8-12). It is also equivalent to: essential being and being by participation (§ 13), created being and uncreated being (§ 14), or being in act and being in potency (§§ 15-16). Suárez next compares the first division with the rest (§ 17), explains the terms of the first division by comparison with quantity (§ 17), and closes the first Section (§ 18) with a reply to objections raised at its beginning.
Section 2 (vol. 26, pp. 8-13) opens with reasons for doubting the sufficiency of the division. These include that fact that relations, because they are found both in creatures and in God, seem to be neither finite nor infinite and do not therefore fit the division (§ 1). Something akin to this occurs from the case of Christ who is both finite and infinite inasmuch as he is both God and man (§ 2).
Again, there is question regarding the free acts of the Divine Will, which would apparently be at once both contingent and necessary (§ 3). Then there is an opinion of Duns Scotus to the effect that being should first be divided into quantified and non-quantified being, and that the division into finite and infinite is a subdivision of quantified being (§ 4). After addressing this last opinion (§§ 5-6), Suárez goes on to defend the sufficiency of the divisions proposed in Section 1, especially that in terms of being by itself and being from another (§ 7). He then gives extended expositions of and answers to the difficulties proposed about relations, Christ, and Divine free acts (§§ 8-16).
Section 3 of Disputation 28 (vol. 26, pp. 13-21) begins with a rejection of the view that the term being as used between God and creatures is simply equivocal (§ 1). A quite opposite view, which was held by Duns Scotus (1266-1308), is that being is said univocally of God and creatures (§ 2). After explaining the reasons for this view and for its opposition to analogy in this context (§§ 3-4), Suárez himself presents an opinion that the term being is indeed said analogously of God and creatures (§ 5), discusses arguments in support of this (§§ 6-8), and replies to objections that may be raised against these arguments (§ 9). Subsequently, he inquires about the kind of analogy that is present here (§ 10) and

rejects Cajetan's doctrine that there is "a proper analogy of proportionality" between God and creatures (§ 11). Also rejecting any "analogy of attribution to a third thing," that is, any position that would affirm that God and creatures are called being only by reference to something else, he next affirms that there is here "an analogy of one to another," which is to say that creatures are being in reference to God and the term being is said more principally of God than of creatures (§ 12). At this point, he brings in the "Platonic" opinion that God is not being but rather above being, which occasions a brief explanation of the name of God in Exodus 3,14 (§ 13). Following this, he explains and affirms that the analogy of being here is intrinsic inasmuch as creatures are designated beings from their own intrinsic being and not just extrinsically from God (§§ 14-17). Finally, his reply to objections and arguments in support of univocity closes the third Section and the Disputation itself (§§ 18-22).

IV. A Summary of Disputation 29:

Though almost twice as long, Disputation 29 like the one before is again divided into three Sections. Section 1 (vol. 26, pp. 21-34) begins after two introductory paragraphs (§§ 1-2) in which Suárez gives reasons for the location of the subject matter of the Disputation in this place and remarks how he will leave aside as much as possible items which depend for their understanding on Revelation. The first Section then asks whether and/or by what means the existence of God can be demonstrated. Among the Scholastic Doctors, Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420) has denied the possibility of such a demonstration. To this Suárez makes the brief but revealing reply that already by the various divisions of being that have been presented in the previous Disputation the existence of "some being which is uncreated or not produced" has been proven (§ 1). The obvious implication is that by now the existence of God has in effect been proven. But immediately the question arises: by what means, physical or metaphysical, is this properly done? On one side, the opinion of Averroes is that the means is physical, namely the motion of the heavens (§ 2). The contrary opinion, that of Avicenna and later of Duns Scotus

among others, holds that the means must be metaphysical (§ 3) — that is, not motion but being itself. A third and a fourth opinion hold in different ways that the task must belong to both physics, that is natural philosophy, and metaphysics (§§ 4-5). In different ways the means would thus be both physical and metaphysical. In Suárez's judgment the second opinion is certainly the true one but there can be some probability in the fourth position, if it is rightly explained (§ 6).

At this juncture, he examines at length the physical argument that proceeds by the medium of motion and for various reasons he finds it wanting (§§ 7-17). Then he considers another physical argument, from the operations and the essence of the rational soul (§ 18). This too comes up short, unless we first pose a question about the soul's being, which is a metaphysical question (§ 19). Here Suárez gives the metaphysical argument that is based upon a broader and deeper principle than the physical one, "Whatever is moved is moved by another." The metaphysical principle is "Whatever is made or produced is made by another" and the argument itself concludes to an unmade Maker (§§ 20-21). An objection of a possibly circular chain of causes is dismissed as every bit as inadmissible as a thing's causing itself (§ 22). Other objections involve an infinite number of causes that would preclude any arriving at a first uncaused or unmade cause. There are different ways to conceive such an infinity of causes. Suárez explains such ways in detail and shows their insufficiencies (§§ 23-40). The first Section ends (§§ 41-42) with a brief rehearsal of and summary judgment upon the opinions listed at the beginning.

Section 2 (pp. 34-47) gets more exact and asks: whether one can show in an a posteriori way that there is only one uncreated being which will in fact be God? The thought here is that although the basic demonstration has been displayed in the previous Section or even in the previous Disputation, it needs precision. For it might be the case that while by now an unmade or uncreated being has been proven to exist, perhaps there is more than one such, which would mean

that we have not reached the true God, who is unique (§§ 1-2).
In a totally opposite direction is a position, which has been associated with St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), to the effect that the existence of God is self-evident and therefore need not and in fact cannot be demonstrated (§ 3). Suárez's own view is that the existence of God can be demonstrated but it is necessary first to be clear about what we mean by God, that is to say what it is we are attempting to demonstrate (§ 4). This he tells us is "a certain most noble being which both surpasses all the rest and from which as from a first author all the rest depend, which, accordingly, should be worshipped and venerated as the supreme deity" (§ 5). There are, he says, two ways to prove the existence of such a God: "one is completely a posteriori and from effects; the other is immediately a priori, although remotely it also is a posteriori" (§ 7). In the first way, "the beauty of the whole universe and the wonderful connection and order of all things in it sufficiently declare that there is one first being, by whom all things are governed and from whom they draw their origin" (ibid). Four objections are that (1) this may prove that there is one governor of the world but not necessarily that there is one creator, (2) this proof does not rule out a number of rulers who might govern the world by consensus, (3) it says nothing about spiritual beings themselves or their connection with the present material world, and (4) this proof does not foreclose on there being another world besides this one (§ 8). Suárez goes on in paragraphs following to answer these objections in detail. In reply to the first, he draws from the ancient Christian writer, Lactantius (ca. 240-320), the lesson that "the universe can be governed only by him by whose counsel and power it has been created" (§ 9). He then devotes eleven paragraphs (§§ 10-20) to further explain this in the cases of the elements, mixed bodies (more or less perfect), and especially the heavens. In this last regard, he pays special attention to the causality between the heavens and sublunar natural things. The second objection is met through nine paragraphs (§§ 21-29) in which Suárez argues that a number of world rulers

would require that such be at once intelligent but also imperfect and liable to disagreement among themselves. The third objection is presented in more detail (§ 30) and answered over six paragraphs (§§ 31-36) in which Suárez treats the Aristotelian separate substances. From the motion of the heavens their existence is at best only probable, and even if they do exist they must be creatures of God. Finally, in reply to the fourth objection, Suárez shows the reasonable character of the Christian doctrine that God is not limited to making only one world and could indeed be the creator of any number of worlds besides this one, with the result that the objection has no force (§ 37).

Nevertheless, at this point Suárez tells us: "from this and the preceding objection I am convinced that the reasoning made to prove that there is only one unproduced being and that all the rest of beings have been made by that being does not conclude absolutely about all beings, but only about those which can fall under human cognition by way of natural reasoning or philosophy. Therefore, in order that the argument conclude universally, there necessarily must be employed a demonstration a priori, which ... we will pursue in the following Section" (ibid.)

Section 3 (pp. 47-60) first affirms the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of God in a priori manner from cause to effect, since obviously God has no cause (§ 1). Nevertheless, once He has been, in an a posteriori way, demonstrated to exist, it is possible secondarily to use a priori demonstrations to arrive at some of his properties or attributes (§ 2). However, this is not easy to do, as Suárez shows by rejecting an argument which has been offered to prove God's unicity on the basis that being can belong first and through itself only to a single unproduced being (§§ 3-7). He then proposes two more arguments that purport to prove that there cannot be several beings that exist of themselves. However, objections can be made to both of these arguments (§§ 8-10). A fourth argument, which Suárez finds "very probative," is to the effect that singularity must belong by nature to an unproduced being; therefore such a being cannot be multiplied (§ 11). While objection may be

made to this reasoning, Suárez thinks it can be defended (§ 12) and indeed, if it is rightly understood, it may strengthen the first argument offered (§ 13). He further infers that being can belong to other things only by way of efficient causality or effective emanation from the first unproduced being (§ 14). Suárez then considers at length a fifth argument, which he thinks is "enough by itself and also confirms the preceding argument" (§ 15) to the effect that two or more unproduced beings could be neither the same nor diverse in species (§§ 15-22). This leads to an explanation of a text from Aristotle that seems at variance with this (§ 23). At this point, a sixth argument is introduced to show that a first unproduced being which is supreme and infinite in its perfection and most powerful in its acting produces "all things that are" (§ 24). An objection is raised to the effect that if it were to produce all things it would produce itself (§ 25), which, of course, is absurd. Suárez answers that it belongs to the perfection of that being and subsequently to its power "that it is not itself producible by itself' while all else is produced by it (§ 26). Yet another argument can be taken, says the Doctor eximius, "from the causality of the ultimate end" (§ 27) and objections to this are raised and answered (§§ 28-31). Now Suárez states his conclusion - "From all of this, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that God exists" - and reaffirms its metaphysical character (§ 32). "Lastly," he says, "from all that has been said it can be clear by, so to speak, a certain most evident experience how far from truth is the opinion ... which asserted that the existence of God is so self-evident that, for that reason, it could not be demonstrated" (§ 33). This occasions a final discussion of self-evident propositions (§ 34) as well as of reasons that could motivate such an opinion (§§ 34-37)." (Introduction, pp. XIV-XVIII).

(11) What follows is meant to be little more than an outline. Readers are advised to look at what Suárez has to say for himself, albeit in the present poor English version, rather than rely upon any synopsis of that.

11. ———. 1983. *On the Essence of Finite Being as Such, on the Existence of That Essence and Their Distinction (Disputatio Xxxi)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

XXXI. *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et de illius Esse, eorumque distinctione*.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction (pp. 3-43) by Norman J. Wells.
"The bulk of Suárez's written work, edited as well as unedited, reflect his various teaching positions as philosopher and as theologian. However, a number are inspired directly by his state as a religious and a member of the Society of Jesus. Still others have their origin in the legal and political disputes of the day. The structure and contents of most of these works, their extent and quality, can be viewed with convenience in the twenty-six (or twenty-eight) volume edition of Vivés.
A. *Disputationes Metaphysicae*
It is against this over-all backdrop, especially the theological tracts, that Suárez's famous *Disputationes Metaphysicae* must be seen, if for no better reason than that this is the way Suarez viewed his metaphysical investigations themselves. For in both the *Ad Lectorem* as well as the *Prooemium* to this work, Suarez indicates the occasion and purpose of his metaphysical work with explicit consideration of its relation to his theological inquiries.
Sensitive to the pedagogical demands upon a discipline, Suarez confesses that in the course of his theological teaching, he has had to make rather spontaneous, frequent and extensive reference to metaphysical considerations. And this was required for the simple reason that "metaphysical principles and truths are so closely interwoven with theological conclusions and arguments, that if knowledge and full understanding of the former are lacking, knowledge of the latter must necessarily suffer."(*Prooemium*, XXV, 1ab) Such asides, Suárez finds, are not only burdensome to the *legentes*, but personally embarrassing, since it demanded of his hearers a blind faith in his judgment.

In addition to these immediate pedagogical problems, there are more substantive and overriding reasons presiding at the origins of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. Suárez sees clearly that, though sacred and supernatural theology is founded upon divine illumination and principles revealed by God, due to its human condition, such theology must utilize truths which are naturally known as well. It is in this latter area that metaphysics proves so indispensable, for of all the sciences known to man, it comes closest to the science of divine things. Moreover, without any proper knowledge of metaphysical problems, the Christian mysteries could scarcely be probed and discussed. In short, Suárez is convinced that "our philosophy ought to be Christian and the servant of divine theology." (*DM, Ad Lectorem, XXV*). In the matter of the internal organization of such a discipline as metaphysics, Suárez takes a stand that is significant both historically and methodologically. For he finds himself at odds with the then current practice in the history of Western metaphysics: the medieval technique of commenting on an authoritative text by way of the *quaestio* elaborated, somewhat erratically, within the context of the books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. By way of a methodological corrective, Suarez insists that the *ordo doctrinae*, required and demanded by the very object of this discipline, must be heeded in the sequence and hierarchical arrangement of problems and discussions. On this latter score, Suárez also finds himself quite disenchanted and critical of Aristotle's own method, sequence and organization. Consequently, observing the *ordo doctrinae* as Suárez sees it, the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* begin with an initial consideration of the object of the metaphysical enterprise, its dignity and utility. This is followed by an extensive consideration of the meaning and significance of that object, *ens*, its properties and its causes. This, in turn, is complemented by a consideration of the *inferiores rationes* of *ens*, i.e., the division of *ens* into c *reatum-creator* and further divisions including all the special *genera* and grades of *ens*, closing with a consideration of *ens rationis* in Disputation 54.

B. *Disputation Thirty-One*
As part of this latter division, the thirty-first Disputation, comprised of fourteen separate sections of varying length, is explicitly concerned with laying bare the structure of finite being.
The first section serves as a general introduction to the historical as well as the doctrinal dimensions of this problem. Sections two to four constitute a more specialized introduction wherein Suarez's own basic and guiding principles are set down and established. Sections five to seven are, for the most part, of a critical character, negatively as well as positively. The remaining bulk of the discussion, comprising sections eight to fourteen, deal with the consequences and particular difficulties arising from the various historical traditions in this matter. Hence, they are meant to bolster and confirm, directly and indirectly, Suárez's own principles and conclusions as well as support his negative criticisms. (*Introduction*, pp. 4-6, notes omitted).

12. ———. 2006. *On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica Xlvii)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

XLVII: *De relationibus realis creatis*.
A translation from the Latin, with an introduction (pp. 9-35) and notes by John P. Doyle.
"Summaries of the Sections of Disputation 47.
This portion of my Introduction owes much to the summary given by Sergio Rabade Romeo and his associates in their edition with Spanish translation of the Disputationes metaphysicae.(95) As they correctly lay it out, the Forty-Seventh Disputation can be articulated as follows:
1. Relation in general — its existence, its essence, and its division (Sections
1-4).
2. Categorical Relation — its essential definition, its subject, foundation, and
terminus (Sections 5-9).

3. The Aristotelian division of relative beings, based on a threefold foundation (Sections 10-15).
4. The question of whether one relation can be the terminus of another (Section 16).
5. The structure of the category of relation (Section 17).
6. The properties of relation (Section 18).

And then descending to the different Sections in turn:

Section I

Beginning with the issue of the real existence of relation, Suárez enumerates up to five reasons for doubting such existence (paragraphs 1-7). He then presents three different opinions: (1) there are no true real relations (paragraph 8); (2) relations exist, but they do not constitute a special category of being (paragraph 9); and (3) in created things there are real relations, which make up a proper and special category (paragraph 10). This last is the most accepted opinion and it is demonstrated by the teachings of the Catholic Faith and by rational arguments (paragraphs 11-15).

Section II

This is the key Section, in which the reality of a relation is directly addressed. It is first necessary to clarify how a real categorical relation is distinguished from substance and all absolute accidents in order to explain the reality and the nature of created relations (paragraph 1). In this regard, Suárez presents and rejects four different opinions (paragraphs 2-10). He then lingers with another opinion—held by many, especially Nominalists—which defends a distinction of reason with a basis in reality between relation and its absolute foundation (paragraphs 11-17). Next, without approving the distinction between the "being in" and the "being toward" of a relation, he admits the indicated Nominalist opinion (paragraph 22). Finally, he answers the arguments of the other opinions (paragraph 23) and the arguments remaining from Section 1 (paragraphs 24-25).

Section III

The Third Section treats the divisions of relation (paragraph 1). The first division is into real relation and relation of reason. It is only real relation which constitutes the category

"toward something" (paragraphs 2-5). The second division is into relation "according to being said" and relation "according to being" (paragraphs 6-9). The third division is into transcendental relation and categorical relation (paragraphs 10-13).

Section IV

Suárez tells us that it is very difficult to explain the difference between categorical and transcendental relations (paragraph 1). It is possible to think of some differences that should be rejected (paragraphs 2-8). Others can be admitted (paragraphs 9-15). From this the inference is that the category "toward something" includes only relations that are categorical in a proper sense (paragraph 16). The remaining paragraphs (17-21) of this Section contain the reply to a difficulty raised in Section 1.

Section V

In this Section the Doctor eximius explains the essence and the proper definition of a categorical relation (paragraphs 1-4), and also explains as well as resolves the difficulties which the mentioned division encounters (paragraphs 5-13).

Section VI

This short Section is limited to proving that a categorical relation requires a subject, a foundation, and a terminus (paragraphs 1-6).

Section VII

As was said in the just preceding Section, a categorical relation needs a foundation (paragraph 1), which in some way is distinguished from the subject of a relation (paragraphs 2-3). This foundation can be either an accident or the substance itself (paragraphs 4-9). Although the question is discussed, Suárez prefers not to separate a foundation from a reason for being founded (paragraphs 10-14).

Section VIII

For a categorical relation there is also required a real terminus (paragraph 1). But must this terminus exist in actuality? There are reasons to doubt that (paragraph 2), and one author has thought that a terminus that is real and really existing is not necessary (paragraph 3). Suárez

maintains the contrary, and in so doing he follows the common opinion of philosophers and theologians (paragraphs 4-7). He answers the arguments of Gregory of Rimini (paragraph 8), and he rejects the opinion that the terminus belongs to the essence of a relation (paragraphs 9-12). Finally, he affirms that not even by the absolute power of God can a relation remain without a terminus (paragraphs 13-14).

Section IX

For a real relation it is necessary that the foundation and the terminus, formally considered, be distinguished with a real distinction, although this does not have to be equal in all cases (paragraphs 1-6).

Section X

Suárez proposes to examine the division which Aristotle has made of relation looking at a threefold foundation (paragraph 1). Having first explained the Aristotelian doctrine (paragraphs 2-4), he raises the two main questions which arise with respect to that doctrine: (1) whether each one of the members of the stated division is designated in a fitting manner, and (2) whether the division includes the whole range of categorical relations. With regard to the first, there are various arguments which present difficulty (paragraphs 5-10), and the same is true with regard to the second (paragraph 11). Nevertheless, the two questions are answered in the sense of approving the division which Aristotle has made (paragraphs 12-16).

Section XI

It is necessary to answer each one of the difficulties of the preceding Section (paragraph 1). Beginning with the first class of relations, which is founded on unity (paragraphs 2-3), it is affirmed that a relation of unity can be founded on the realities of all the categories (paragraph 4) and there is explained the sense in which one relation can be the foundation of another (paragraphs 5-13). In passing, he explains to which class relations of identity, similarity, and equality belong (paragraphs 14-15). The Section ends by affirming that generic unity can found a real relation

(paragraphs 16-19) and by indicating the characteristics of relations of the first class (paragraphs 20-21).

Section XII

In order to treat the second class of relations (paragraph 1), the problem is tithed of whether all the relations of this class are real (paragraph 2). Suárez replies by setting up some distinctions (paragraphs 3-4). He concerns himself then with the proximate foundation of paternity (paragraphs 5-6), and of the relation of agent (paragraphs 7-8), whether it is in act (paragraph 9) or in potency (paragraphs 10-14).

Section XIII

Regarding the third class of relations, founded upon the character of measure paragraph 1), Suárez presents and resolves a difficulty about the authentic ought of Aristotle (paragraphs 2.9).

Section XIV

Is the Aristotelian division sufficient and adequate? (paragraph 1). To answer this question, Suárez indicates how all real relations are reduced to the three kinds, which make up the stated division (paragraphs 2-8).

Section XV

After indicating the double sense in which non-mutual relations can be taken (paragraph 1), Suárez makes a division between reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations (paragraph 2) and raises a difficulty in their regard (paragraphs 3-7). To resolve this difficulty, he affirms that there are some non-mutual relations, which are properly found in the third Aristotelian class of relations (paragraph 8). Then he replies to opposing arguments (paragraphs 9-12) and resolves difficulties proposed at the beginning (paragraphs 13-15). Next, he presents the opinion of the Nominalists about relations in God from time (paragraph 16) and, against them, denies that such relations are real (paragraphs 17-29).

Section XVI

This Section concerns the question of whether the formal terminus of one relation is another relation or has an absolute character (paragraph 1). Having explained the title of the Section (paragraph 2), Suárez presents and explains

different opinions (paragraphs 3-5). He crystallizes his thought in the following assertions: (1) in non mutual relatives, the reason why one extreme is the terminus of the relation of the other is not a relation that is opposite to that of the other, but the very entity itself or a property of that terminus (paragraphs 6-13); (2) In mutual relations, the raison d'être of a terminus is also some absolute character that constitutes the formal foundation of the opposite relation (paragraphs 14-22). With this an answer is given to the bases of the other opinions, explaining the sense in which relatives are simultaneous in nature, in knowledge, and in definition (paragraphs 23-34), and finally treating of the termini of the divine relations (paragraphs 35-38), and of relative opposition (paragraphs 39-40).

Section XVII

It is proposed to treat the structuring of the category, "toward something" (paragraph 1). The first difficulty is in knowing how all relatives can be reduced to one single genus (paragraph 2). There is accepted the possibility of one single supreme genus which includes all relatives (paragraph 3) and there is adduced the solution which some offer to the motive for doubting (paragraphs 4-5). This solution is probable even though it supposes a false basis (paragraph 6). Suárez affirms that the relative in general Is not in an order to another as to its correlative (paragraphs 7-8), that the relative in general has a terminus in general which corresponds to it (paragraph 8), and that the common character of terminus does not constitute a proper category (paragraph 10). Afterwards, he raises the question of the contraction of the supreme genus of relatives into its inferiors (paragraphs 11-14), the question of the origin of the essential and specific difference of relations (paragraph 15), and the question of the simultaneity of various relations—which differ only numerically—in the same subject (paragraphs 16-23). He ends the Section by rejecting an opinion about the relation that a son has with respect to a father and a mother (paragraphs 24-28).

Section XVIII

This is the shortest Section. It designates as properties of all relatives: not having a contrary; being susceptible of more or less; receiving the designation of "convertibles"; being simultaneous in nature; and also being simultaneous in knowledge and definition (paragraphs 1-6)." (*Introduction*, pp. 28-33).
(95) Cf. Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones metafisicas, edicion y traduccion de Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sanchez y Antonio Puigcerver Zanon, 7 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1960-1966), vol. 6, pp. 631-4.

13. ———. 1995. *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation Liv*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Translated from the Latin with an introduction (pp. 1-56) and notes by John P. Doyle.
"B. The Prologue and Division of the Disputation:
In a brief prologue to his 54th Disputation, the *Doctor Esimius* notes that beings of reason are not real beings and that they are thus excluded from the direct and proper object of metaphysics. Along with this, however, he remarks how necessary their study is and offers some justification for their inclusion in his metaphysical work.(24) Of interest here is his assessment of them as "not true beings, but as quasi-shadows of being." As such, they have no intrinsic intelligibility, but must be known only indirectly through other things. Immediately flowing from this is the fact that they, like Meinong's later "homeless objects,"(25) are not of direct and primary concern for any science.
All the same, inasmuch as beings of reason are of use in a variety of sciences, they can be grasped and must be treated in some way. In fact, Suarez believes, their treatment is exclusively the concern of the metaphysician. For, even though beings of reason have no true being, they are, as mentioned, "shadows" of being. Like being then they have what he calls a "quasi-transcendentality,"(26) which by itself would remove them from the province of any science other than metaphysics. It is true that more particular

disciplines, such as physics or logic, sometimes treat certain beings of reason (e.g., privation, the void, or second intentions such as *species* or *genus*) in connection with their proper scientific objects. But only metaphysics is wide enough to consider, albeit obliquely and concomitantly with its proper object, the whole range of beings of reason as such.

After the *Prologue*, the Disputation splits into six *Sections*. Of these, the first two treat the existence, the nature, and the causes of beings of reason. Sections 3 and 4 consider how such beings of reason are divided. As Suárez sees it, the traditional listing of negations, privations, and relations of reason will exhaust the types that divide beings of reason. Section 5 will then more closely examine negations and privations and Section 6 will go on to treat relations of reason." *Introduction*, 20-21).

(24) For this exclusion and justification, see also DM 1, s. 1, n. 6; XXV, 3-4. For Aristotle's earlier exclusion of "being as true" from the concern of metaphysics, cf. note 10, above [See *Metaphysics* VI, c. 4, 1027b 34-1028a 3; *ibid.*, XI, c. 8, 10695a 22 ff.].

(25) For this, see A. Meinong, *Ueber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 8-27 and "Zur Gegenstandstheorie" in *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstsdarstellungen* (Leipzig, 1923), translated as Appendix I, "Meinong's Ontology," by Reinhardt Grossmann, in *Meinong* (London, 1974), pp. 224-229. Also cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1982), "Homeless Objects," pp. 37-52.

(26) Suárez's frequent employment of the prefix "quasi" is worth noting. Thus in the sections to follow, he will speak of "quasi-essence," "quasi-essential features," "quasi-essential foundation," "quasi-disposition," "quasi-difference," "quasi-passion," and a "quasi-material" cause of beings of reason (as well as imply quasi-formal and quasi-efficient causes for them). Again, he will speak of "quasi-induction" as well as "quasi-intrinsic," "quasi-extrinsic," and "quasi-common" characteristics in their regard. Without pushing it, I cannot

help but think of Meinong (in *Ueber Annahmen* [Leipzig, 1910]), speaking of *Quasi-Transzendenz* (220, 228), *Quasi-Wirklichkeit* (224, 226, 263-4, 266), *Quasibedeutung* (59), *Quasiinhalt* (264, 277, 286, 312), etc.

14. ———. 2012. Selections from De Anima. Münich: Philosophia Verlag.

    On the Nature of the Soul in General - On the Immateriality and Immortality of the Rational Soul.
    Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy.
    Introduction and explanatory notes by John Kronen.
    Table of Contents: Introduction 9; Disputation I: On the Substance of the Soul in General; Question 1: Whether the soul is act in the sense of being a substantial form 30; Question 2: Whether and in what way the soul is first act 45; Question 3: Whether the soul possesses an essential ordination to an organic body 65; Question 4: What the quidditative definition of the soul is and how one definition is proven through another 84; Disputation II 108; Question 3: Whether the principle of understanding in humans is something incorporeal, subsistent, and immortal 108; Bibliography 177-188.
    "Suárez's *De anima*, like his *Metaphysical Disputations*, is not a commentary on Aristotle, though Suárez, in a general way, follows the order of topics laid out by Aristotle in his *De anima*, and he refers to Aristotle's seminal work with great frequency. In the first Disputation of Suárez's *De anima*, translated here in its entirety, Suárez treats of living beings taken as a whole. In this Disputation he links his psychology to his general metaphysics. This is particularly clear in the first question of the Disputation, which gives a brief proof of Aristotelian hylomorphism, as well as giving a proof of the existence of a special class of material substances which are distinguished from other material substances in that they are capable of immanent actions, i.e. actions which begin and end in the same substance.(9) Even plants, in this way, are "self moving" in the actions of nutrition and growth. In the later questions of this

Disputation Suárez answers questions pertaining to the nature of the substantial form (i.e. the soul) characteristic of all living beings. Throughout the Disputation Suárez is chiefly committed to defending a substantivalist view of the nature of the soul and, hence, of the human person, against notions of the person that adumbrate the psychological concept of it found in Locke's writings, and that echo the ancient Buddhist "no-self" doctrine. But Suárez is equally committed to defending, against dualism, that the soul is an incomplete substance, which is by its nature ordered to informing an appropriately disposed matter in order to constitute with it a living substance.

We have translated all of Disputation I because it casts light on how Suárez, and the Scholastics in general, understood the science of the soul. They did not understand it to be an investigation of immaterial substances à la Descartes, because souls are not substances. They are, at best, incomplete substances which, with matter, constitute a living organism. In this respect it might be better to speak of "the science of living beings" or even of "biology", rather than of "the science of the soul". But even that would not be quite right either since, although the Scholastics were more interested than is often thought with the physical structures of living beings, as well as in the essential roles these structures play in explaining the powers of living beings,(10) they were not very advanced in these questions and, unlike most contemporary biologists, they did not conceive of the "principle of life" in living beings as a complex set of relations between inanimate substances, but as a "thing" or *res*. In short, though for them the soul is an *incomplete* substance, it is nevertheless an incomplete *substance*, not an instance of an especially complex way of arranging inanimate substances." (pp. 16-17)

(9) For an excellent account of the Scholastic notion of "immanent action" see Des Chene, *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 57-67. Des Chene notes that some Scholastics preferred to define living actions as "intrinsic", i.e. such that no being other than the being doing

the action could produce the effect of the action. On this definition, for example, growth would not be a vital action since God could produce in the plant the result of the act of growing (i.e. He could produce the greater quantity), but seeing would be a vital action since not even God could do "my seeing" for me.
(10) See Des Chene, *Life's Form*, pp. 34-39.

PARTIAL FRENCH TRANSLATIONS

1. ———. 1999. *Suárez Et La Refondation De La Métaphysique Comme Ontologie*. Paris: Éditions Peeters.

   Étude et traduction de l *'Index détaillé de la métaphysique d'Aristot*e de F. Suárez par Jean-Paul Coujou

2. ———. 1998. *Dispute Métaphysiques I, Ii, Iii*. Paris: Vrin.

   I: *De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae*; II: *De ratione essentiali seu conceptu entis*; III: *De passionibus entis in communi, et principiis ejus*.
   Text intégral présenté, traduit et annoté par Jean-Paul Coujou.
   Introduction: *Suárez et la Renaissance de la métaphysique* pp. 7-45

3. ———. 2009. *Disputes Métaphysiques Xxviii-Xxix*. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon.

   Traduit du latin, présenté et annoté par Jean-Paul Coujou. Introduction pp. 7-89.

4. ———. 1999. *La Distinction De L'étant Fini Et De Son Être. Dispute Métaphysique Xxxi*. Paris: Vrin.

   XXXI: *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et illius esse, eorumque distinctione*.
   Texte intégral, présenté, traduit et annoté par Jean-Paul Coujou.

5. ———. 2001. *Les Êtres De Raison. Dispute Métaphysique Liv*. Paris: Vrin.

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1. ———. 2007. *Disputazioni Metafisiche I-Iii*. Milano: Bompiani.

   Introduzione, traduzione e note di Costantino Esposito. In appendice *Le "disputazioni Metafisiche" nella critica contemporanea*. Nuova edizione riveduta e ampliata (prima edizione, Milano, Rusconi, 1996)

2. ———. 1976. *Über Die Individualität Und Das Individuationsprizip. Fünfe Metaphysische Disputaton*. Hamburg: Meiner.

   Translated with an Introduction by R. von Specht.

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1. ———. 1960. *Disputaciones Metafisicas*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos.

   Seven volumes edited and translated by Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, Antonio Piucerver Zanón (1960-1966)

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2. "Francisco Suárez." 1991. *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65.

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   "Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) is a major figure in the history of Western thought. His contributions to metaphysics, the philosophy of law, and Catholic theology are well recognized in Continental Europe and Latin America, but they are seldom acknowledged in the English-speaking world. Hopefully, this issue of the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* will help repair the long standing neglect of Suarez among English-speaking scholars.
   This collection of articles attempts to present various aspects of Suarez's thought, although it concentrates primarily on metaphysical topics, reflecting current interests in his philosophy. Suarez's political philosophy and the philosophy of law are not represented because the articles commissioned on those topics never materialized, nor were there submissions in those areas. Thus, these important aspects of Suarez's teaching do not receive the

attention they deserve in this collection." (Preface by Jorge J. E. Gracia).

3. Aertsen, Jan A. 2012. *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (Ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden: Brill.

   Contents: Preface XIX-XX; Introduction 1; One. The Concept of *transcendens* in Medieval Thought: What is beyond and what is common 13; Two: Conditions, Presuppositions and Sources of a Doctrine of the Transcendentals 35; Three. The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals (ca. 1225): Philip the Chancellor 109; Four. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Franciscan Masters [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure] 135; Five. Albertus Magnus: Different Traditions of thought and the Transcendentals 177; Six: Thomas Aquinas: A First Model 209; Seven. Henry of Ghent: The onto-theological transformation of the doctrine 273; Eighth. The German Dominican School: Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart 315; Nine. Duns Scotus: A Turn in the Doctrine of the Transcendentals 371; Ten. Discussions on the Scotist Conception [Francis of Meyronnes, Peter Thomae, Nicholas Bonet, Francis of Marchia] 433; Eleven. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Nominalism [William of Ockham, John Buridan] 515; Twelve. Neoplatonic Critiques of Transcendental Metaphysics [Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa] 545; Thirteenth. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Renaissance Philosophy [Lorenzo Valla, Pico della Mirandola] 569; Fourteen. The "Metaphysical Disputations" of Francisco Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity 587; Fifteenth. The Doctrine of the "Supertranscendentals": An Alternative Model? 635; Sixteen. Conclusion: The Importance of the transcendental way of thought for medieval philosophy 657; Bibliography 707; Index Nominum 741; Index Rerum 747-756.

4. Agostini, Igor. 2008. *L' Infinità Di Dio. Il Dibattito Da Suàrez a Caterus (1597-1641)*. Roma: Editori Riuniti.

5. Aho, Tuomo. 2007. "Suarez on Cognitive Intentions." In *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima*, edited by Bakker, Paul J.J.M. and Thijssen, J.M.M.H., 179-203. Aldershot: Ashgate.

6. Åkerlund, Erik. 2009. "Suárez on Forms, Universals and Understanding." *Studia Neoaristotelica* no. 6:159-182.

   "The interpretations in the secondary literature of Suárez' position in the "classical" debate on the status of universals vary considerably. In this article, the problem is looked at from a slightly different angle: that of Suárez' basic metaphysics of substantial forms and his views concerning understanding and knowledge. These areas of Suárez' thought are thoroughly analysed and related to each other. Regarding the question of the status of universals it is argued that Suárez' thought in the areas of substantial forms and of understanding generally supports the reading of Suarez as a "moderate nominalist"."

7. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1995. "Suárez on the Analogy of Being. Some Historical Background." *Vivarium* no. 33:50-75.

   "I argue that Suárez is best read as part of a tradition which predates Cajetan with respect to the classification of types of analogy, and which to some extent predates Scotus in its insistence on a concept of being which is both one and analogical. I draw on three Fifteenth century philosophers and theologians, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, and Soncinas, and one Sixteenth century writer, Domingo de Soto."

8. Aubenque, Pierre. 1999. "Suárez Et L'avénement Du Concept D'être." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 11-20. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque, *Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique*, Paris: Vrin 2009 pp. 331-340

9. Barrón, Jorge Uscatescu. 1995. "El Concepto De Metafisica En Suárez: Su Objeto Y Dominio." *Pensamiento* no. 200:215-236.

   "Se trata de una interpretacion de la primera disputacion de las *Disputationes metaphysicae* de Suárez. El objeto de la metafisica es el ser real en general con exclusion del ente de razon y del ente "per accidens". Asi pues, el dominio de la metafisica es la totalidad de los entes reales por si. A continuacion se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafisica debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada obra de Suárez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtua el caracter generalisimo de la metafisica, que de por si esta mas alla de la division del ser material e inmaterial. Por ultimo, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la metafisica como ciencia y el ser real en general."

10. Barroso, Fernández Óscar. 2006. "Suárez, Filósofo De Encrucijada O Del Nacimiento De La Ontología." *Pensamiento* no. 232:121-138.

    "The present work studies the different interpretations proposed in the 20th century concerning the metaphysics of Francisco Suárez. They are divided in three groups: essentialist, existentialist, and
    objectivist. The essentialist interpretation has been maintained fundamentally by Thomist authors, the most outstanding scholar among them being E. Gilson. The existentialist interpretation, headed by J. Hellín, can be analyzed as a reaction to the essentialist interpretation. The noetic-objectivist interpretation finds its inspiration in M. Heidegger, and its definitive impetus in the works of J. F. Courtine.
    With Courtine, we will maintain that Suárez cannot be classified either as an essentialist or as an existentialist.

Efforts to classify him as such will encounter concrete difficulties, since Suárez opens up a new realm for metaphysics, the ontological, situated within the perspective of intentionality and beyond the perspective of effectivity and creation within which medieval metaphysics moves."

11. Bastit, Michel. 1989. "Interprétation Analogique De La Loi Et Analogie De L'être Chez Suárez: De La Similitude À L'identité." *Études Philosophiques* no. 44:429-443.

12. Beuchot, Mauricio. 1992. "La Esencia Y La Existencia En Los Escolásticos Post-Medievales. La Lucha Entre Francisco Suárez Y Juan Martínez De Prado." *Doctor Communis* no. 45:153-161.

13. Blanchette, Olivia. 1999. "Suárez and the Latent Essentialism of Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 53:3-19.

    "Suárez is viewed by Heidegger and others as having set ontological problems in a form that has marked the whole of modern metaphysics or ontology. It is in this context that Heidegger himself came to his idea of ontological difference as redefining the question of being in a way that had never been seen before. In his *Marburg lectures* of 1927 Heidegger traces Kant's essentialist conception of being, or rather of reality, back to the late Scholastics who separated essence from existence, which he says was not the same as positing the ontological difference, but which could explain why Kant was unable to raise the question of being in the same way that Suárez would not allow for any real distinction between essence and existence. In his attempt to get beyond the essentialism of modern ontology as found in Kant as well as Suárez, however, Heidegger falls short because he continues to think of "Sein" in essentialist terms as different from being, without ever getting back to the ancient idea of being as act understood as transcending essence in finite being."

14. Burlando, Giannina. 2006. "Suárez on Intrinsic Representationalism." In *Intellect Et Imagination Dans La Philosophie Médiévale. Actes Du Xie Congrès International De Philosophie Médiévale De La Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M), Porto, Du 26 Au 31 Août 2002. Vol. Iii*, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 1941-1957. Turnhout: Brepols.

    "Does Suárez avoid the criticisms about nonintrinsic representations?
    This paper tries to show how the ontological moves that avoid the Danto-Dennett (D-D) charges of circularity and regress are the ones Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) makes. The author argues that the rejection of the agent intellect, particularly its transduction function and, in general, his conception of *conceptus objectivus* constitutes Suárez's recognition of the D-D problems. Hence, the real issue about representations turns out to be over causation. Suárez's doctrines of harmony, and intrinsic representations are necessarily connected. Secondly, the article also shows that Dennett is confused at a certain point."

15. Cantens, Bernardo J. 1999. *Suárez and Meinong on Beings of Reason and Non-Existent Objects*, University of Miami.

    Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 9938315.

16. ———. 2000. "The Relationship between God and Essences and the Notion of Eternal Truths According to Francisco Suárez." *Modern Schoolman* no. 77:127-143.

    "An understanding of the relationship between God and the essences of His creatures is of vital importance for any contemporary theist in understanding the nature of God and the created world. Historically, this concern received a great deal of attention and has been an essential component of many philosophical systems (e.g. St. Augustine's, St. Thomas' and Ockham's). In contemporary circles,

philosophers such as Plantinga have revived the discussion. The difficulties that have permeated the historical and contemporary discussions of this topic are: (1) the nature of essences (i.e. Are they eternal? Are they necessary? What is their ontological status? Do non-existent beings have essences?) and (2) how are essences related to God (i.e. Are they necessary because God willed them as such or is their necessity independent of God's will? Are they ontologically independent of God or are they part of God's intellect?). In this paper, I want to explore the notion of essence and its relation to God in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez and establish three conclusions. First, the major one is that Suárez presents an original doctrine, which differs from the more popular Thomistic doctrine, and can serve as a springboard for new thoughts on this topic. Second, I want to demonstrate that Suárez is able to reconcile the seemingly contradictory position of maintaining the special character of the necessity of essences while not delimiting God's freedom. Finally, I will point out the similarity between Suárez's notion of the necessity of essences, entailed in his doctrine of eternal truths, and Plantinga's "necessity of nature"."

17. ———. 2002. "Ultimate Reality in the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez." *Ultimate Reality and Meaning.Interdisciplinary Studies in thePhilosophy of Understanding* no. 25:73-92.

    "In this paper I examine Francisco Suárez's conception of ultimate reality in his metaphysics. First, I present a succinct biography on Francisco Suárez. Second, I discuss the structure, organization, style and influence of his major philosophical work, the *Metaphysical Disputations*. Finally, I explore Suárez's view on ultimate reality as real being (*ens reale*). I discuss Suárez's view on the relationship between real being (*ens reale*) and possible being (*ens posible*) and how these relate to being (*esse*). I conclude by discussing God's place in Suárez's conception of reality."

18. ———. 2003. "Suárez on Beings of Reason: What Kinds of Beings (*Entia*) Are Beings of Reason, and What Kind of Being (*Esse*) Do They Have?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 77:171-187.

"Beings of reason or non-existent objects have always been a source of mind-boggling paradoxes that have vexed philosophers and thinkers in the past and present. Consider Bertrand Russell's paradox: 'if A and B are not different, then the difference between A and B does not subsist. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?' Or Meinong's paradox: 'There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.' At the root of these troubling conundrums are two basic questions: What are beings of reason? What kind of existence do they have? Francisco Suárez was well aware that a solution to the metaphysical questions concerning the essential character of beings of reason and their ontological status would serve as the key to solving the puzzles and paradoxes just described. A solution to these metaphysical questions would also bring about an understanding of how we talk about beings of reason and other problems that they give rise to in the philosophy of language. In this paper, I present Suárez's view on the nature and ontological status of beings of reason and clarify some of the following questions: What kind of beings (*entia*) are beings of reason? What kind of being (*esse*) do beings of reason have? This latter concern is related to the following metaphysical issues: What are real beings? What is the nature and ontological status of possible beings? What is the distinction between real beings, actual beings, and possible beings?"

19. Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, eds. 1999. *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

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20. Carraud, Vincent. 2002. *Causa Sive Ratio. La Raison De La Cause De Suárez À Leibniz*. Paris: Press Universitaires de France.

    Chapitre I pp. 103-166.

21. Cerqueira, Gonalves Joaquim. 1999. "Francisco Suárez E a Modernidade Filosófica - a Distinão Essência-Existência." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*,

edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 121-132. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

22. Conze, Eberhard. 1928. *Der Begriff Der Metaphysik Bei Franciscus Suarez*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

    Einleitung 1-4; I. Der Gegenstand der Metaphysik 5
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23. Copleston, Frederick Charles. 1953. *A History of Philosophy. Vol. Iii: Ockham to Suárez*. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne.

    See Chapter XXII and XXIII pp. 353-405.

24. Coujou, Jean-Paul. 1999. *Suárez Et La Refondation De La Métaphysique Comme Ontologie. Étude Et Traduction De L'index Détaillé De La Métaphysique D'aristote De F. Suárez*. Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters.

25. ———. 2001. *Le Vocabulaire De Suárez*. Paris: Ellipses.

26. ———. 2009. "Durée Et Existence Chez Suárez." *Revue Thomiste* no. 109:589-620.

"In the Metaphysical Disputation L, Suárez draws insights from Aristotle and Saint Augustine in order to examine the ontological connection that could be established between duration and existence. This insight opens up into the metaphysical realm by raising an anthropological and theological inquiry about the body, life and death. Our own being is rooted in a sensible reality which is identical to the duration it manifests, simply because it endures in being. Suárez's concept of duration confirms the metaphysical principle according to which any being actually exists in virtue of the fact that it is individual and singular. Thus, the ability to be, which qualifies real being, appears under the mode of what is possible. This, in Suárez's work, is significant both with regards to politics and history."

27. ———. 2012. *Pensée De L'être Et Théorie Politique: Le Moment Suarézien*. Louvain: Peeters.

Vol. I: "Cet ouvrage se propose d'examiner chez Suárez (1548-1617), comment la théorie du droit et de la loi prolonge la pensée de l'étant élaborée par la métaphysique en une compréhension ontologique du politique. Il s'agit précisément de mener à son terme, dans un système unifié du savoir, la détermination de l'étant en procédant à son extension à la question de l'être de l'homme et de l'être-en-commun propre à la société politique.
Au commencement du XVII° siècle, une autre direction pour l'accomplissement du projet ontologique non identifiable à celle d'une science mathématique de la nature se profile et préfigure une récurrence persistante des origines de la philosophie. Ainsi, on trouve dans le système suarézien la retranscription originale et réactualisée d'une ligne de force traversant la pensée antique: l'ontopolitique. Il devient alors nécessaire afin d'expliciter et de justifier cette orientation, de déterminer à la fois le fondement et la spécificité de la relation instaurée par Suárez entre l'ontologie, la théologie, l'anthropologie et le politique; ces domaines demeurent indissociables d'une crise et d'un

renouveau de la philosophie première s'énonant comme accomplissement éthique de la raison métaphysique."
Vol. II et III: "Au commencement du XVII° siècle, une autre direction pour l'accomplissement du projet ontologique non identifiable à celle d'une science mathématique de la nature se profile et préfigure une récurrence persistante des origines de la philosophie. Ainsi, on trouve dans le système suarézien la retranscription originale et réactualisée d'une ligne de force traversant la pensée antique: l'ontopolitique. Il devient alors nécessaire afin d'expliciter et de justifier cette orientation, de déterminer à la fois le fondement et la spécificité de la relation instaurée par Suárez entre l'ontologie, la théologie, l'anthropologie et le politique; ces domaines demeurent indissociables d'une crise et d'un renouveau de la philosophie première s'énonant comme accomplissement éthique de la raison métaphysique. Cet ouvrage se propose d'examiner chez Suárez (1548-1617), comment la théorie du droit et de la loi prolonge la pensée de l'étant élaborée par la métaphysique en une compréhension ontologique du politique. Il s'agit précisément de mener à son terme, dans un système unifié du savoir, la détermination de l'étant en procédant à son extension à la question de l'être de l'homme et de l'être-en-commun propre à la société politique. Au commencement du XVII° siècle, une autre direction pour l'accomplissement du projet ontologique non identifiable à celle d'une science mathématique de la nature se profile et préfigure une récurrence persistante des origines de la philosophie. Ainsi, on trouve dans le système suarézien la retranscription originale et réactualisée d'une ligne de force traversant la pensée antique: l'ontopolitique. Il devient alors nécessaire afin d'expliciter et de justifier cette orientation, de déterminer à la fois le fondement et la spécificité de la relation instaurée par Suárez entre l'ontologie, la théologie, l'anthropologie et le politique; ces domaines demeurent indissociables d'une crise et d'un renouveau de la philosophie première s'énonant comme accomplissement éthique de la raison métaphysique."

28. Courtine, Jean-Franois. 1976. "Nominalisme Et Pensée Classique. La Situation Privilégiée De L'œuvre De F. Suárez." *Recherches sur le XVIIe siècle* no. 1:21-34.

29. ———. 1979. "Le Projet Suarézien De La Métaphysique. Pour Une Étude De La Thèse Suarézienne Du Néant." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 42:253-274.

    "The ultimate aim of the present study is the determination of the sense of the Being as "objectity" in Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. However the question is not directly approached, but by bringing to light a non-thematic thesis upon nothingness. The *Disputationes* in their ontological intention itself and through their architectonic point out in direction of a metaphysics of the yet undeterminated object (*aliquid-nihil*), metaphysics that will find its full development through the German *Schulmetaphysik* until Kant."

30. ———. 1980. "Le Statut Ontologique Du Possible Selon Suarez." *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia* no. 7:247-268.

31. ———. 1983. "Le Principe D'individuation Chez Suárez Et Chez Leibniz." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 23:174-190.

    Supplementary volume

32. ———. 1985. "Ontologie Ou Métaphysique?" *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 7:3-24.

33. ———. 1988. "Suárez Et La Tradition Aristotelicienne De La Métaphysique." In *Aristotelismus Und Renaissance. In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*, edited by Kessler, Eckhard, Lohr, Charles H. and Sparn, Walter, 101-126. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

34. ———. 1989. "Différence Ontologique Et Analogie De L'être. Le Tournant Suárezien." *Bulletin de la Société Français e de philosophie*:41-76.

35. ———. 1990. *Suárez Et Le Système De La Métaphysique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

36. ———. 1996. "Théologie Morale Et Conception Du Politique Chez Suárez." In *Les Jésuites À L'âge Braoque 1540-1640*, edited by Giard, Lucie and Vaucelles, Louis de, 261-278. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon.

37. ———. 1999. *Nature Et Empire De La Loi. Études Suaréziennes*. Paris: Vrin.

38. ———. 2005. *Inventio Analogiae. Métaphysique Et Ontothéologie*. Paris: Vrin.

    Part III, chap. 2: *L'analogia entis et sa situation dans la métaphysique de Suárez* pp. 291-336; Part III, chap.. 3: *Cajétan - Suárez* pp. 337-357.

39. Cronin, Timothy J. 1960. "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suárez and Descartes (First Part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 38:269-288.

40. ———. 1961. "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suárez and Descartes (Second Part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 39:23-38.

41. ———. 1966. *Objective Being in Descartes and in Suárez*. Roma: Gregorian University Press.

42. ———. 1966. "Objective Reality of Human Ideas: Descartes and Suarez." In *Wisdom in Depth. Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, S. J.*, edited by Daues, Vincent, Holloway, Maurice and Sweeney, Leo, 68-79. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co.

43. Cross, Richard. 2005. "Duns Scotus and Suárez at the Origins of Modernity." In *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy. Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth*, edited by Hankey, Wayne J., 65-80. Aldershot: Ashgate.

44. Daniel, Stephen H. 2000. "Berkeley, Suárez, and the "Esse-Existere" Distinction." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 74:621-636.

"For Berkeley, a thing's existence " *esse*" is nothing more than its being perceived "as that thing". It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the " *esse*" of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley's " *existere is percipi or percipere*" thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between " *esse*" and " *existere*" ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following the Stoics, Berkeley proposes that, "as" the existence of ideas, minds "subsist" rather than "exist" and, accordingly, cannot be identified as independently existing things."

45. Darge, Rolf. 1999. "Grundthese Und Ontologische Bedeutung Der Lehre Von Der Analogie Des Seienden Nach F. Suárez." *Philosophische Jahrbuch* no. 166:312-333.

46. ———. 1999. " *Ens Inquantum Ens*. Die Erklärung Des Subjekts Der Metaphysik Bei F. Suarez." *Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévales* no. 66:335-361.

47. ———. 2000. "" *Ens Intime Transcendit Omnia*": Suárez' Modell Der Transzendentalen Analyse Und Die Mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* no. 47:150-172.

"The study seeks an approach to the proper outlines of Suárez's ontology in the context of the scholastic tradition of metaphysics. It shows, that Suárez synthesizes elements from different ontological traditions in a new explanation of the transcendentality of being. This explanation does not follow -- as the prevailing interpretation of Suárez's position suggests -- the 'via Scoti'; rather it is unfolded as a countermove to it on a common ground. In consequence of it Suárez replaces Scotus's model of the transcendental

analysis by another conception, which takes up the pre-Scotistic doctrine of the transcendentals."

48. ———. 2000. "Suárez' Analyse Der Transzendentalien 'Ding' Und 'Etwas' Im Kontext Der Scholastischen Metaphysiktradition." *Theologie und Philosophie* no. 75:339-358.

"Some scholastic authors count 'thing' and 'something' amongst the transcendental attributes of being. The study seeks to explain Suárez's analysis of these attributes with regard to the scholastic debate on the number of the *passiones entis*. It shows that Suárez integrates different traditions on the basis of an original understanding of 'being' or 'thing'. Recent interpretations of Suárez's ontological approach are questioned by the author's conclusion, that Suárez does not take up Henry of Ghent's and Scotus's scheme of the first conceptions and excludes from metaphysics the reduction of being to '"res"' in the sense of the mere thinkable or *possibile logicum*."

49. ———. 2000. "Die Grundlegung Einer Allgemeinen Theorie Der Transzendentalen Eigenschaften Des Seienden Bei F. Suárez." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 54:341-364.

"The study seeks to explain the central idea in Suárez's general theory of the transcendental properties of being with regard to its background in the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals. It questions the prevailing view that Suárez adopts Scotus's doctrine of the *passiones entis* and leads to the conclusion that Suárez -- within the new framework of his explanation of real being -- rather takes up and reshapes the pre-Scotist doctrine of the transcendentals."

50. ———. 2001. "Suárez' Begriff Der Transzendentalen Einheit." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 43:37-57.

51. ———. 2003. "Seinswahrheit Und Erkenntniswahrheit. Francisco Suárez Und Die Thomistische Lehre Von Der Analogia Veri." In *Die Logik Des Transzendentalen. Festschrift Für Jan A. Aertsen Zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 246-265. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    "According to Thomas Aquinas 'true' is predicated essentially of things with reference to truth in the intellect. His reflections on the relation between transcendental and cognitive truth raise questions which in later scholasticism -- in connection with difficulties within the doctrine of analogy -- give rise to controversies on the structure and ontological meaning of the *analogia veri*. In the Thomistic tradition Cajetan's solution had a strong influence, although it reduces ontological truth to a mere extrinsic denomination of things.
    Against this solution Suárez develops a new interpretation of the order of predication of 'true'. It confirms both (a) the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the original place of truth is the
    intellect, and (b) the traditional doctrine of the transcendentals according to which true is not an extrinsic denomination of things, but their inner entity under a certain respect. The study seeks to
    explain Suárez's solution against its historical background."

52. ———. 2003. "Eines Oder Vieles. Zu Einem Grundproblem Der Scholastischen Theorien Über Das Eine." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 57:27-52.

    "On the background of the Aristotelian doctrine of the One which is convertible with being, scholastic theories of the One meet with a difficulty that challenges their underlying ontological principles: how can the doctrine of the convertibility of 'one' and 'being' be reconciled with the Aristotelian doctrine, according to which 'one' and 'many' are first differences or opposites of the first division of being? If one divides being, it cannot be converted with 'being' in a proposition, and vice versa. Among the attempts to solve the problem on the basis of the conception of an

essential identity of being and one, two main types of solutions may be distinguished. The study seeks to characterize their outlines and ontological implications and explains, how the different approaches emerge within the framework of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics."

53. ———. 2004. *Suárez' Transzendentale Seinsauslegung Und Die Metaphysiktradition*. Leiden: Brill.

54. ———. 2004. "Suárez' Theorie Der Ontischen Wahrheit Und Die Metaphysiktradition." *Theologie und Philosophie* no. 79:31-54.

55. ———. 2004. "Vom Guten Der Dinge. Suárez' Theorie Des Ontischen Guten Und Die Metaphysiktradition." In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 133-159. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

56. ———. 2006. "Kognitive Und Ontologische Wahrheit Bei Suárez." In *Intellect Et Imagination Dans La Philosophie Médiévale. Actes Du Xie Congrès International De Philosophie Médiévale De La Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M), Porto, Du 26 Au 31 Août 2002. Vol. Iii*, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 1929-1940. Turnhout: Brepols.

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58. Di Vona, Piero. 1968. *Studi Sulla Scolastica Della Controriforma. L'esistenza E La Sua Distinzione Metafisica Dell'essenza*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

59. Doig, James Conroy. 1977. "Suárez, Descartes, and the Objective Reality of Ideas." *New Scholasticism* no. 51:350-371.

60. Doyle, John Patrick. 2010. *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction: The Theme of this Collection, its Contents, its Character and Rationale XIII-XVI; 1. Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence 1; 2. Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles 21; 3. Suárez on the Analogy of Being 41; 4. Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger 89; 5. The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence 109; 6. Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez, S.J. 123; 7. Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth 161; 8. Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit 209; 9. Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition, "This is My Body" 235; 10. Suárez on Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians 257; 11. Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations 315; 12. Suárez on Human Rights 333; 13. Francisco Suárez on the Interpretation of Laws 357; 14. Postscript and Prospectus 389; Bibliography 393; Index of Names 409; Index of Terms 413-416.
"The main theme in these studies is twofold. The first is theoretical, centering on the Suarezian conception of being and metaphysics. As Etienne Gilson pointed out in *Being and Some Philosophers,* this conception had its origin in Avicenna's understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, an understanding which passed through Duns Scotus to Suarez and then on to Suárez's successors, notably Christian Wolff. I still accept Gilson's basic account of Suárez's lineage, which account was also basic for these studies in their original appearance. But now (in 2010) I would modify it along the line suggested by Rolf Darge, who has emphasized the difference of the Suarezian concept of being and its descent to its inferiors versus the Scotistic concept of being as *simpliciter simplex* as this descends to its inferiors by

differences outside itself.(1) The second theme takes up the practical side of Suárez's philosophical and theological interests, including his views on human society, law and morality, Church and state, international law, and human rights. The first theme is represented in different metaphysical and epistemological dimensions through eight studies, while the second is the major concern of the last four essays.
The introduction to the collection attempts to give an overview of Suarez the man, his published writings, his philosophical thought, and some of his influence." (p. XI)
(1) For this, see Rolf Darge, *Suárez transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysik-tradition* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004).

61. Esposito, Costantino. 1995. "Ritorno a Suárez. Le *Disputationes Metaphysicae* Nella Critica Contemporanea." In *La Filosofia Nel Siglo De Oro. Studi Sul Tardo Rinascimento Spagnolo*, edited by Lamacchia, Ada, 465-573. Bari: Levante Editori.

    Reprinted with additions as *Le "disputazioni Meetafisiche" nella critica contemporanea* - in the Italian translation of the three first *Metaphysical Meditations*: Francisco Suárez - *Disputazioni metafisiche* - Milano, Bompiani, 2007. pp. 747-853 (with a detailed bibliography pp. 711-744).

62. ———. 1999. "Das Seiende Und Das Gute. Francisco Suárez Zwischen Thomas Von Aquin Und Martin Heidegger." In *Vom Rätsel Des Begriffs. Festschrift Für F.-W. Von Herrmann Zum 65. Geburtstag.*, edited by Coriando, Paola-Ludovika, 341-356. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt.

63. ———. 2001. "The Concept of Time in the Metaphysics of Suárez." In *The Medieval Concept of Time. The Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by Porro, Pasquale, 383-398. Leiden: Brill.

64. ———. 2001. "Heidegger, Suárez E La Storia Dell'ontologia." *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 1:407-

430.

65. ———. 2003. "Existence, Relation, Efficience. Le Noeud Suarézien Entre Métaphysique Et Théologie." *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 3:139-161.

    Volume titled: *Existence*.

66. Fernandez Burillo, Santiago. 1992. "Introducción a La Teoría Del Conocimiento De Francisco Suárez." *Pensamiento* no. 48:211-230.

67. ———. 1997. "Las *Disputaciones Metafisicas* De F. Suárez S .J., Su Inspiracion Y Algunas De Sus Lineas Maestras. En El Iv Centenario De La Primera Edicion (1597-1997)." *Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval* no. 4:65-86.

    "Four centuries after the first edition of "Disputationes Metaphysicae" (1597), that vast work is still the greatest issue from the Spanish philosophy. F. Suárez is the author of one of the most important synthesis of the scholar philosophy. The key of everything he means and also of Disputationes", can be found in the idea of freedom in causality and action. From this concept, some topics are shown: act and potentiality, cause, creation, etc. We explain Suárez's metaphysics from an existential point of view and refuse the accusation of abstractism."

68. Ferrater, Mora José. 1953. "Suárez and Modern Philosophy." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 14:528-547.

69. Forlivesi, Marco. 2002. "La Distinction Entre Concept Formal Et Concept Objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri." *Études Philosophiques* no. 60:3-30.

    "This study shows how a theory of object, and of "objectity" is elaborated, from XIIIth century's scholasticism to the XVIIth century, through a series of conceptual creations and interpretative breaks. It runs into the opposition between

formal and objective concept in the XVIIth century. From this rediscovered story follows a new assessment on the cartesian argument for God's existence."

70. ———. 2004. "Ontologia Impura. La Natura Della Metafisica Secondo Francisco Suárez." In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 161-207. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

71. ———. 2006. "Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suarez's Texts." *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 5:559-686.

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73. Gómez Caffarena, José. 1959. "Sentido De La Composición De Ser Y Esencia En Suárez." *Pensamiento* no. 15:135-154.

74. Goudriaan, Aza. 1999. *Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis Bei Suárez Und Descartes Im Zusammenhang Mit Der Niederländischen Reformierten Theologie Und Philosophie Des 17. Jahrunderts*. Leiden: Brill.

    "This volume deals with basic questions regarding the philosophical knowledge of God in Suarez and Descartes, two very different, but historically linked early-modern philosophers. It has two parts devoted to Suarez and Descartes respectively. Each section examines the path along which philosophy can acquire knowledge of God, the adequacy which is ascribed to this knowledge, as well as selected topics of the doctrine of God's attributes.
    Special attention has been given to both critical and positive reactions to Suarez and Descartes on the part of seventeenth-century Dutch Reformed theologians.

The author argues that Descartes, in comparison with Suarez, reduced the theological interests of philosophy and also limited the starting points for attaining to a philosophical knowledge of God. On the other hand, Descartes elevated the presumed adequacy of this knowledge."

75. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 1979. "What the Individual Adds to the Common Nature According to Suárez." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:221-233.

    "In M *etaphysical Disputation* V, section 2, Suárez criticizes the views of Thomas, Ockham and Scotus on what the individual adds to the common nature. Then he proceeds to state his own view as follows: (1) the individual adds something real to the common nature, (2) nonetheless, what the individual adds is not really or modally distinct from the common nature, (3) rather, it is conceptually distinct from it, since (4) a conceptual distinction does not require that what is added be conceptual. In this paper I examine briefly the nature of the problem at stake, Suárez's view, and the apparent inconsistency between (1), (2), (3) and (4) above. As a conclusion I submit (a) that Suárez's position is fully consistent, (b) although different from those of Thomas, Scotus and Ockham, with which it has been compared often and (c) that the apparent inconsistency is due to an ambiguity in the use of the term 'addition'."

76. ———. 1991. "Suárez Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65:287-309.

    "Mentalism in metaphysics is the view that the object of study of metaphysics is something mental rather than something real. Suárez has been identified as a key figure in the development of mentalism in early modern philosophy. Contrary to this view I argue that Suárez did not take any unambiguous steps toward mentalism and that his position is concordant with the medieval Aristotelian tradition of realism. In the article I examine Suárez's view of the nature

of metaphysics, its object, and the ontological status of that object."

77. ———. 1991. "Francisco Suárez: The Man in History." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65:259-266.

"Suárez decided early in life that he would pursue an ecclesiastical career. Accordingly, he went to Salamanca to study canon law. While engaged in his studies there, he requested admission into the Society of Jesus. At first he was refused admission for reasons of health and what was perceived as a lack of proper intellectual capacity. Insistence paid off, however, and he was allowed to join the order in 1564. After completing his studies, he began a teaching career that would last for over fifty years, taking him to some of the most reknown institutions of his time: Segovia, Valladolid, Rome, Alcalá, Salamanca, and Coimbra. Suárez died in Lisbon, at the age of seventy, on September 25, 1617. Suárez did not publish early in his life. His first work, *De Incarnatione Verbi,* appeared in 1590, when he was forty two years of age. After this initial publication, however, a steady stream of works followed: *De mysteriis vitae Christi* (1592), *De sacramentis I* (1595), *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), *Varia opuscula theologica* (1599), *De sacramentis II* (1602), *De censuris* (1603), *De Deo uno et trino* (1606), *De virtute et statu religionis I and II* (1608 and 1609), *De legibus* (1612), and *Defensio fidei catholicae* (1613). Several other works appeared posthumously: *De gratia I and III* (1619), *De angelis* (1620), *De opera sex dierum, De anima* (1621), and *De fide, spe, et caritate* (1621), *De virtute et statu religionis III and IV* (1624 and 1625), *De ultimo fine* (1628), *De gratia II* (1651), *De vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis* (1655), *Opuscula sex inedita* (1859), and *Conselhos y pareceres* (1948). Moreover, there are still numerous manuscripts awaiting editing and publication. Obviously, Suarez was a tremendously prolific author; his published works fill twenty-eight large volumes. A good number of Suarez's works were presented as commentaries on Thomas's *Summa theologiae*, a clear

testimony to the importance that Suarez and his contemporaries attached to the Angelic Doctor. In fact, however, many of these works are largely independent treatises for which Thomas's *Summa* is only a thematic occasion." (pp. 260-261).

78. ———. 1992. "Suárez and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals." *Topoi* no. 11:121-134.

    "This article discusses Suárez's views concerning the transcendentals, that is, being and those attributes of it that extend to everything. In particular it explores Suárez's notion of transcendentality and the way in which he conceived the transcendental attributes of being are related to it. It makes two claims: first, that Suárez has an intensional rather than an extensional understanding of transcendentality; and, second, that Suárez's understanding of truth and goodness, as expressing real extrinsic denominations based on real relations, appears to contain an inconsistency."

79. ———. 1993. "Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 67:349-354.

    "This article is a reply to N. J. Wells' article " *Esse Cognitum* and Suárez revisited" ("ACPQ" 67, 3 (1993): 339-348) prompted in turn by my article "Suárez's conception of metaphysics: a step in the direction of mentalism?" ("ACPQ" 65 (1991): 287-309). I argue that, contrary to what Professor Wells' believes: first, he has not clarified the status of the objective concept, and, second, he must accept that, if his interpretation were correct, metaphysics, for Suárez, would be concerned with what is in the mind, rather than with what is outside it."

80. ———. 1994. "Francis Suárez (B. 1548; D. 1617)." In *Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650)*, edited by Gracia,

Jorge J.E., 475-510. New York: State University of New York Press.

"This article presents an analysis of Suárez's position on individuation. It discusses Suárez's views of transcendental unity and individual unity and their relations, the ontological status of individuality, the individuation of substances (by designated matter, form, existence, and entity), the individuation of accidents (by substance), and the presence of accidents differing only numerically in the same subject. It claims that Suárez's accomplishment is not only to be found in his systematic approach, but also in his abandonment of a reliance on faith in matters philosophical and in the introduction of various precisions which clarify the issues surrounding individuation."

81. ———. 1998. "Suarez (and Later Scholasticism)." In *Routledge History of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Marenbon, John, 452-474. New York: Routledge.

82. ———. 1998. "The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suarez and Kant." In *Was Ist Philosophie Im Mittelalter?, Qu'est-Ce Que La Philosophie Au Moyen Age? What Is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?. Akten Des X. Internationalen Kongresses Für Mittelalterliche Philosophie Der Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale, 25. Bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas, 213-225. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

83. ———. 2003. "The Language of Categories: From Aristotle to Ryle, Via Suárez and Kant." In *L'élaboration Du Vocabulaire Philosophique Au Moyen Âge*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Steel, Carlos, 337-355. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

84. Gracia, Jorge J.E., and Novotný, Daniel D. 2014. "Trascendentales Y Categorías En La Metafísica De Suárez." In *Right and Nature in the First and Second Scholasticism. / Derecho Y Naturaleza En La Primera Y Segunda*

Escolástica, edited by Culleton, Alfredo Santiago and Pich, Roberto Hofmeister, 449-458. Turnhout: Brepols.

85. Grosso, Giuseppe. 1995. "Sulla Distinzione Di Essenza Ed Esistenza in Suárez." In *La Filosofia Nel Siglo De Oro. Studi Sul Tardo Rinascimento Spagnolo*, edited by Lamacchia, Ada, 415-427. Bari: Levante Editori.

86. Guy, Alain. 1979. "L'analogie De L'être Selon Suárez." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 42:275-294.

    "Counter to Scotus (who affirms the university of the being) and Peter Aureol (who sustains its equivocity), also against saint Thomas (who defends only the analogy of proportion), Suárez, in the 28th of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (third section), pleads for "the analogy of intrinsic attribution of the being." His realism is mixed with some Occamism."

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   "This article deals with the question of Suárez's conception of being, which *prima facie* seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception and a conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez's doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the "uncommon doctor"'s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this question receives an answer against the background of Suárez's critique of Scotus's conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows an exposition of Suárez's doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of *esse* for *ratio entis*.

In the last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the *Metaphysical Disputations*."

2. ———. 2009. "The Nature of Suárez's Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and Their Main Systematic Strains." *Studia Neoaristotelica* no. 6:99-110.

   "The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez's metaphysics. They are as follows: "Univocalization" of the concept of being and transcendental properties, "reification" of the act-potency doctrine, "ontologization" of individuality, "conceptualization" of the Scotist perspective, "existential" character of the concept of being, "epistemologization" and "methodologization" of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern "main-stream" philosophy."

3. ———. 2009. "The Unity of Suárez's Metaphysics." *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* no. 34:475-505.

4. ———. 2014. *Universals in Second Scholasticism: A Comparative Study with Focus on the Theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), Joao Poinsot O.P. (1589-1644), and Bartolomeo Mastri Da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673), Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676)*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

   "This study aims to present a comparative analysis of philosophical theories of universals espoused by the foremost representatives of the three main schools of early modern scholastic thought. The book introduces the doctrines of Francisco Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617), the Thomist John of St. Thomas, O.P. (1589-1644), and the Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673) and Bonaventura Belluto, O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). The author examines in detail their mutual doctrinal delineation

as well as the conceptualist tenet of the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), whose thought constitutes an important systematic point of comparison especially with Suarez's doctrine. The book offers the first comparative elaboration of the issue of universals, in both its metaphysical and its epistemological aspects, in the era of second scholasticism."

5. Hellin, José. 1962. "El Concepto Formal En Suárez." *Pensamiento* no. 18:407-432.

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   Contents: Acknowledgments VII; List of Contributors VIII; List of Abbreviations IX; Bejamin Hill: Introduction 1; I. Background and Influence. 1. Michael Edwards: Suarez in a Late Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology and Authority 25; 2. Roger Ariew: Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation 38; II. Metaphysics. 3. Christopher Shields: Shadows of Being: Francisco Suárez's *Entia Rationis* 57; 4. Jorge Secada: Suárez on Continuous Quantity 75; III. Natural Philosophy. 5. Dennis Des Chene: Suárez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause 89; 6. Helen Hattab: Suárez's Last Stand for the Substantial Form 101; IV. Mind and Psychology. 7. James B. South: Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body 121; 8. Cees Leijenhorst: Suárez on Self-Awareness 137; 9. Marleen Rozemond: Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul 154; V. Ethics and Natural Law. 10. Thomas Pink: Reason and Obligation in Suárez 175; 11. James Gordley: Suárez and Natural Law 209; Bibliography 230; index 291.

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10. ———. 1949. *Estudios Sobre La Metafisica De Francisco Suárez, S.I.* Madrid: Ediciones Fax.

11. Kainz, Howard P. 1970. "The Suárezian Position on Being and the Real Distinction: A Analytic and Comparative Study." *Thomist* no. 34:289-305.

    "In elucidating the relationship between "existence" and "essence", it seems that two fundamental options are open: 1) to ground existence in existence itself; or 2) to ground existence in nothingness. Thomas Aquinas, in his doctrine on essence as potentiality, chooses the latter option, for all practical purposes. Suárez, in order to avoid grounding existence in nothingness, chooses the former option. One result of his choice is the purely mental "distinction" between essence and existence."

12. Karofsky, Amy D. 2001. "Suárez's Doctrine of Eternal Truths." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 39:23-47.

    "In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths expounded in *Metaphysical Disputation* XXXI, Chapter XII, Sections 38-47. There, Suárez considers and rejects several theories before developing his own. Because it is somewhat difficult to determine what view Suárez ultimately adopts, interpretations of this passage tend to vary. I argue that the interpretations of Norman Wells, Armand Maurer and John P. Doyle are inadequate, since Suárez wants a solution to the problem of eternal truths that does not depend upon the will of the divine being and one that avoids any ontological commitment to unactualized, possible success."

13. ———. 2001. "Suárez's Influence on Descartes's Theory of Eternal Truths." *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* no. 10:241-262.

"There is a philosophical problem, what I will call the problem of eternal truths, that can be stated as follows: If an unactualized, possible essence has no being and is, hence, absolutely nothing, then what grounds the eternal and necessary truth of propositions that purport to be about them? If there were no men, what would ground the necessary truth, "Man is a rational animal"? And what grounded the truth of that proposition prior to the creation of the world? (If it was in fact true at that moment?)"

14. Knebel, Sven K. 2011. *Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches Aus Dem Nachlass Des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González De Santalla (1624-1705). Abhandlung Und Edition*. Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner.

Text based on the partial edition of two Latin manuscripts in the Bibliotheca Universitaria de Salamanca: 1) *Disputationes in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis et in duo libros De Generatione et Corruptione* and 2) *Disputationes in Metaphysicam, et libros De Anima, quibus adiuncti sunt duo ultimi tractatus Logicae De Interpretatione, et de Priori, et Posteriori Resolutione*.

15. Kronen, John. 1991. "Essentialism Old and New: Suárez and Brody." *Modern Schoolman*:123-151.

"A revived interest in essentialism characterizes much recent Anglo-American philosophy. In this article I compare and contrast one of the most articulate and well-argued recent versions of essentialism, that of Baruch Brody, with that of the last great system builder of the Schoolmen, Francis Suárez. I argue that Suárez's account of essentialism has advantages over Brody's because in positing a form that is entitative or thing-like as the chief constituent of the essences of substances Suárez's account is better able to explain the substantial unity of substances."

16. ———. 1997. "Substances Are Not Windowless: A Suárezian Critique of Monadism." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 71:5-81.

"Recently, Thomas Huffman has defended Leibniz's metaphysics of substance. In this paper I offer a critique of that metaphysics from the point of view of the metaphysics of Leibniz's near contemporary, Francis Suárez. In my critique I show that Suárez's Aristotelianism is better able to account for the existence of composite substances than is Leibniz's metaphysics and that Leibniz's implicit arguments against the Suárezian account of substance fail. I conclude, based upon this, that Suárez's metaphysics should be preferred to Leibniz's since it better accords with the common sense notion that things such as humans and cats are true substances and not mere aggregates."

17. Larrainzar, Carlos. 1977. *Una Introducción a Francisco Suárez*. Pamplona: EUNSA.

18. Lejenhorst, Cees. 2007. "Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought." In *Forming the Mind Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 237-262. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"In this paper I have to limit myself to only a few late Aristotelian authors.
I shall deal with Thomas de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan) and Francesco Suarez.
Cajetan was one of the key figues in the rise of the so-called *seconda scolastica*, the counter-reformational attempt to build a new Christian philosophy that fused revelation with Aristotelian thought. Moreover, his ideas about sense perception were heavily attacked by Suarez, who is probably the best known and most influential Jesuit authors, who were so important in shaping late Aristotelianism. In this fashion, our sample of case studies is arguably limited, but nevertheless quite representative for

sixteenth-century Aristotelian accounts of sense perception. By way of conclusion, this article ends with a brief exploration of how the debate on sense perception and its relation to the metaphysics of the chain of being changed with the advent of modern philosophy, in particular with Descartes." (p. 241)

19. Lohr, Charles H. 2002. "Possibility and Reality in Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*." In *Res Et Verba in Der Renaissance. Proceedings of a Colloquium Held at Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel in 1998*, edited by Kessler, Eckhard and Maclean, Ian, 273-286. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

20. Lombardo, Mario Gaetano. 1995. *La Forma Che Dà L'essere Alle Cose. Enti Di Ragione E Bene Trascendentale in Suarez, Leibniz, Kant*. Milano: Istituto Propaganda Libraria.

21. Lopez, Jesus Garcia. 1969. "La Concepcion Suarista Del Ente Y Sus Implicaciones Metafisicas." *Anuario Filosofico* no. 2:137-167.

22. Marion, Jean-Luc. 1996. "A Propos De Suárez Et Descartes." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 50:109-131.

23. ———. 1996. "Substance Et Subsistance. Suárez Et Le Traité De La *Substantia* Dans Les *Principia* I, § 51-54." In *Questions Cartésiennes Ii*, 91-99. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Italian translation: *Sostanza e sussistenza. Suárez e il trattato della substantia nei Principia I, 51-54,* in: Jean-Robert Armogathe, Giulia Belgioioso (eds.), *Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994)*, Atti del convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione dell'opera, Parigi, 5-6 maggio 1994, Lecce 10-12 novembre 1994, Napoli: Vivarium.
    "Étude de la conception cartésienne de la substance à la lumière d'un rapprochement avec la définition de la

substance comme subsistance chez Suarez. Soulevant le problème de l'indétermination entre univocité et analogie, selon que le concept concerne le fini ou l'infini, l'Auteur examine le double paradoxe de la définition épistémologique et de la définition ontique de la substance."

24. Martins, Antonio Manuel. 1999. "Tópica Metafísica: De Fonseca À Suárez." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 157-168. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

25. Menn, Stephen. 1997. "Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes." In *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, edited by White, Kevin, 226-256. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

26. Miner, Robert C. 2001. "Suárez as Founder of Modernity: Reflections on a "Topos" in Recent Historiography." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 18:17-36.

    "The aim of this paper is to query a notion that appears with increasing frequency in recent narratives of modern philosophy. The notion is that the secret founder of modernity is not Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes, but Francisco Suárez. This paper examines three attempts to make the case of Suárez as the founder of modern philosophy and finds each of them deficient. First, I examine the treatment of Suárez in Etienne Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers*. Secondly, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre's characterization of Suárez as an essentially antihistorical thinker in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*. Thirdly, I attempt to disambiguate several claims about Suárez that are characteristically bundled together by post-Heideggerian readings of Suárez as the founder of a new science of ontology. The conclusion is that while it would be premature to reject the possibility that Suárez is the founder of modern philosophy, the precise sense in which he would fit this description has not been persuasively delineated."

27. Nadler, Stephen. 1989. *Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

On Suárez see: Chapter 18. *Objective being in Suá rez and Descartes*, pp. 147-165.

28. Noreña, Carlos G. 1981. "Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts." *New Scholasticism* no. 55:348-362.

"Ockham's failure to explain the ontological conditions for the possibility of universal predication partially justifies the traditional view of him as a nominalist. Ockham rejected the basic aristotelian and Thomistic doctrines about common natures, the principle of individuation and relations. Suárez avoided both the Platonizing realism of Scotus and the nominalistic leanings of Ockham with his carefully articulated theories on the limitation of the act, the principle of individuation, and the difference between essence and existence. Scholastic thought on the ontological status of universal concepts centers on issues which are fundamental to the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and which a comprehensive theory of knowledge cannot avoid."

29. ———. 1983. "Heidegger on Suárez: The 1927 Marburg Lectures." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 23:407-424.

"Heidegger's thought on Suarez has been studied for the most part by scholastic philosophers with a particular doctrinal intent, in the context of Heidegger's views on the history of ontology, and on the narrow basis of a few passing remarks in some of Heidegger's works.(1) The 1975 publication of Heidegger's (Summer Semester, 1927) lectures on *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, and their recent translation into English by Professor Hofstadter, make possible a better documented and more conclusive analysis of the subject.(2) Unfortunately, other relevant sources still remain unpublished, such as

Heidegger's lectures and seminars on the history of philosophy from St. Thomas to Kant, medieval mysticism, St. Augustine, and Renaissance scholasticism. All of them, however, give a clear indication of Brentano's influence upon Heidegger's early thought and demonstrate an interest in medieval philosophy which one seldom finds among contemporary thinkers. In this essay we intend 1) to summarize Heidegger's views on medieval scholastic philosophy in general and those of Suärez in particular, and(2) attempt to retrieve from the Marburg lectures what Heidegger left unsaid and unthought on the scholastic distinction between essence and existence." (p. 407)

(1) Some scholars have argued that Heidegger's criticism of medieval ontology was fully justified when directed against Suárez, but radically unfair to St. Thomas. To this group belong: *G. Siewerth, Das Schicksal der Metaphysik vom Thomas zu Heidegger* (Einsideln, 1959); R. Echauri, *Heidegger y la Metafísica Tomista* (Buenos Aires, 1970); B. Rioux, *L'être et la vérité chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal-Paris. 1963); C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain. 1961); J. P. Doyle, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics," *The Modem Schoolman*, 49 (1972), 201-221; O. N. Derisi, "Approximaciones y diferencias entre la fenomenología existencialista de Martin Heidegger y la ontología de Santo Tomás," *Sapientia*, 22 (1967), 185-192; W. R. Korn, "La question de l'être chez Martin Heidegger," *Revue Thomiste*, 71 (1971), 33-58.

More favorable toSuárez were H. Meyer, *Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin* (Munich, 1968); and M. Schneider, "Der angebliche Essentialismus des Suarez," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, 24 (1961), 40-68.

Finally, there are those philosophers who think that both St. Thomas and Suárez fully deserve Heidegger's criticism. See. e.g., H. Siegfried, *Die Warhrheit und Metaphysik bei Suárez* (Bonn. 1967).

Heidegger's references to Suárez can be found in *Sein und Zeit* (*Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by F. W. von Herrmann, vol. 2, Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 30; *Die Frage nach dem Ding*

(Tübingen, 1962). 77; and *Nietzsche* (Pfullingcn, 1961), II, 418.
(2) The lectures *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (henceforth GP) were published in 1975 as vol. 24 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. They were reviewed by M. E. Zimmermann in the *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 17 (1977), 235-237. and in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39 (1979). 537-550. Professor A. Hofstadter's excellent translation was published in 1981 by Indiana University Press under the title Basic Problems of Phenomenology (henceforth BP). I want to thank both Indiana U. Press and Professor Hofstadter for their kind permission to quote the English translation.

30. ———. 1985. "Suárez and Spinoza: The Metaphysics of Modal Being." *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia* no. 12:163-182.

31. Novák, Lukáš, ed. 2014. *Suárez's Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Table of Contents: Lukáš Novák: Regaining the Context for Suárez: An Introduction to the Volume 1-7; Note on Editorial Policies. List of Abbreviations 8-10; Part One. General Metaphysics 11; Marco Forlivesi: In Search of the Roots of Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Hervaeus Natalis, Orbellis, Trombetta 13-37; Rolf Darge: Zum historischen Hintergrund der Transzendentalienlehre in den *Disputationes metaphysicae* 39-62; Giannina Burlando: Suárez on Translatio vocis 'Veritas' 63-86; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez, the Analogy of Being, and its Tensions 87-104; Marko J. Fuchs: Univozität und Distinktion Metaphysische Grundstrukturen bei Duns Scotus, Suárez, Descartes und Spinoza 105-116; Costantino Esposito: The Hidden Influence of Suárez on Kant's Transcendental Conception of 'Being', 'Essence', and 'Existence 117-134; Marco Lamanna: Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez; 135-151; Jorge Uscatescu Barrón: Das

Gedankending und der Gegenstant der Metaphysik: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Analogie zwischen dem Realen Seienden und dem ens rationis in den *Disputationes metaphysicae* des Suárez 153-181; Daniel D. Novotný: The Historical Non-Significance of Suárez's Theory of Beings of Reason: A Lesson from Hurtado 183-208; Parto Two. Speical Themes 209; Jorge Secada: Suárez's Nominalist Master Argument: *Metaphysical Disputations 5, 1* 211-236; Saverio Di Liso: The Efficient Cause in Domingo de Soto 237-257; Simo Knuuttila: The Connexions between Vital Acts in Suárez's Psychology' 259-274; Anna Tropia: Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the "connexio potentiarum" in the Present State 275-292; Stephan Schmid: Suárez and the Problem of Final Causation 293-308; Robert Fastiggi: Suárez in Relation to Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus on Proving God's Existence 309-323; Author Profiles 325-328; About the Editor 329-330; General Index 331-344; Index of Persons 345-348; Index of Greek Terms 348.

32. Novotný, Daniel D. 2013. *Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era*. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle. The first part of this book is structured around a close reading of Suarez's main text on the subject, namely *Disputation* 54. The second part centers on texts on this topic by other outstanding philosophers of the time, such as the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), the Italian Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-73), and the Spanish-Bohemian-Luxembourgian polymath Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606-82)."

33. Olivo, Gilles. 1993. "L'homme En Personne. Descartes, Suarez, Et La Question De L' *ens Per Se*." In *Descartes Et Regius. Autour De L'explication De L'esprit Humain*, edited by Verbeek, Theo, 69-91. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

34. ———. 1995. "L'impossibilité De La Puissance: Les Conditions De La Pensée De L'individu Chez Suarez." In *L'individu Dans La Pensée Moderne Xvie-Xviiie Siècles / L'individuo Nel Pensiero Moderno. Secoli Xvi-Xviii*, edited by Cazzaniga, Gian Mario and Zarka, Yves Charles. Firenze: ETS.

35. Owens, Joseph. 1957. "The Number of Terms in the Suárezian Discussion on Essence and Being." *Modern Schoolman* no. 34:147-191.

36. Peccorini, Francisco. 1972. "Suárez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many." *Thomist* no. 36:433-471.

    "The purpose of this article is to find out whether Suárez's attempt to reconcile analogy with the thesis of the perfect unity of the concept of 'ens' was successful. To this effect, Suárez's basic premises - his theory of the universals and his conception of existence as such - are discussed. The former is dismissed on the grounds that in it the would be link between conceptualism and realism is no link at all because it rests only on an inductive abstraction which in turn is unworkable inasmuch as it is incompatible with the basic Suárezian tenet that the first direct concept is of the individual only. It is shown also how Suárez nullifies his claims of analogy by accounting for the genesis of his concept of 'ens' in terms of his theory of the universals which necessarily opens up to a univocal format. Finally, the article tackles the second premise - Suárez's conception of existence as such understood as a thing and points to its equivocating effect on the concept of 'ens'."

37. ———. 1974. "Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez, and Recent Interpreters." *Thomist* no. 38 (606):655.

    "Given the decisive influence of Suárez's conception on modern and contemporary nominalism, a thorough criticism is carried out on different levels: (1) through a 'prima facie' logical analysis of his arguments; (2) through an exhaustive criticism of José M. Alejandro's interpretation

of Suárez's position, which is bent upon updating his mentor's foundation; and finally (3) on the basis of an ' *ad hominem*' dialogue centered on Suárez's Thomistic claims. It is the contention of this article that through his eclectic solution Suárez jeopardized both the nature of the agent intellect -- by hollowing out its whole ontological value -- and the thesis of the primacy of the individual in epistemology -- by leaving our knowledge unexplained in its most fundamental respects and providing it only with unrealistic grounds. This makes it incumbent upon the author to show that the Thomistic thesis of indirect knowledge of the singular proves to be fully satisfactory if examined in the light of Bernard J Lonergan and Karl Rahner's writings."

38. Pereira, José. 1996. "John of St. Thomas and Suárez." *Acta Philosophica* no. 5:115-136.

    "Classical Thomism, originated by Aquinas, developed by Cajetan and consummated by John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), had many critics, chief among them Francisco Suárez, the prime thinker of Baroque Scholasticism. His critique initiated changes in Thomism, leading John, among other Thomists, to abandon the commentarial method followed by the older Scholastics; to occasionally substitute the Suárezian metaphysical distinction for the real distinction characteristic of Thomism; to concede that the foundational Thomist tenet of the limitation of existence by essence is debatable; and to accept Suárez's definition of God as "ipsum intelligere subsistens" rather than as "ipsum esse subsistens". "

39. ———. 1999. "The Achievement of Suárez and the Suarezanisation of Thomism." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 133-156. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

40. ———. 2004. "The Existential Integralism of Suárez, Reevaluation of Gilson's Allegation of Suárezian

Essentialism." *Gregorianum* no. 85:660-688.

"In declaring that 'existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance', Suárez accords to existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their identity indicated by the term *essentia realis*, or 'existent essence'. Being (*ens*) is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes existence that is both actual (*ens ut participium*) and aptitudinal (*ens ut nomen*). 'Actual' existence is realized extra-mentally, while the 'aptitudinal' is existence insofar it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez employs is distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his *essentia realis* as a kind of Thomist reified concept affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian *essentia realis* no more than *cogitabilitas*."

41. ———. 2007. *Suarez. Between Scholasticism and Modernity*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

42. Pérez San Martin, Héctor. 1999. "Determinación Del Objeto Y Estudio De La Metafísica, Sus Límites Y Su Correlato Con El Nombre De Esta Ciencia Según El Pensamiento Del P. Francisco Suárez." *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia* no. 26:5-39.

43. Rinaldi, Teresa. 1998. *Francisco Suarez. Cognitio Singularis Materialis: De Anima*. Bari: Levante.

44. Riva, Franco. 1979. "La Dottrina Suáreziana Del Concetto E Le Sue Fonti Storiche." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 71:686-699.

"Suárez's doctrine of concept while historically accepting the contribution of the mayor philosophical traditions of Middle Ages, has its own originality as it proceeds from the

metaphysical fundamental, i.e., from the constant reference to the doctrine of power and act which is only typical of Suárez. Theoretically, Suárez (whom Descartes read at La Flèche) definitely reaffirms the intention of knowledge supporting the form of immediate realism. Beyond any gnosiological dualism he demonstrates by exclusion the identity of *verbum* and high intellective and proposes (differing in opinion with Thomas Aquinas) to define "the concept of id quo res concipitur", reducing it to pure instrument or mere sign, the reality of which all lies in the significance."

45. Robinet, André. 1980. "Suárez Dans L'œuvre De Leibniz." *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia* no. 7:191-209.

    "Statistiquement, Suárez est l'un des auteurs les moins cités par Leibniz (quatorze mentions). Aucune étude directe ne lui est consacrée dans les manuscrits connus. Les références de Leibniz a Suárez sont étudiées autour de sept concepts (métaphysique, principe d'individuation, causalité, harmonie préetablie, *de vinculo substantiale*, eucharistie, *scientia media*) une étude comparative "fondée en realité textuelle" devient alors édifiable."

46. Roig Gironella, Juan. 1948. "La Síntesis Metafisica De Suárez." *Pensamiento* no. 4:169-213.

47. ———. 1987. "La Analogía Del Ser En Suárez." *Espíritu Cuadernos del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana* no. 36:5-48.

48. Ross, James F. 1962. "Suárez on "Universals"." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 59:736-747.

    "This is an exposition of Francis Suárez's treatment of the following two questions: (1) what sort of "community" obtains among things that are properly said to be of the same sort? (2) in what sense can any "reality" be correctly called universal? The paper explains Suárez's claims that there are real universals and that there is fundamentally but

not formally a real community in reality. The pivotal problem is seen to concern the meaning of 'similarity', since it does "not" mean having something in common. The paper offers the only resolution of the problem reconcilable with Suárez's own statements, indicating that it commits him to a very novel (in his time) form of conceptualism."

49. Salas, Victor M., and Fastiggi, Robert L., eds. 2015. *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden: Brill.

    Table of contents: Preface; Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi: Introduction: Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work 1-28; Jean-Paul Coujou: Political Thought and Legal Theory in Suárez 29-71; Jean-Franois Courtine: Suárez, Heidegger, and Contemporary Metaphysics 72-90; Rolf Darge: Suárez on the Subject of Metaphysics 91-123; Costantino Esposito: Suárez and the Baroque Matrix of Modern Thought 124-147; Robert Fastiggi: Francisco Suárez as Dogmatic Theologian 148-163; Daniel Heider: Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Universals 164-191; Simo Knuuttila: Suárez's Psychology 192-220; John Kronen: Suárez's Influence on Protestant Scholasticism: The Cases of Hollaz and Turretín 221-247; Daniel Novotný: Suárez on Beings of Reason 248-273; Paul Pace: Suárez and the Natural Law 274-296; Joseé Pereira: Original Features of Suárez's Thought 297-312; Michael Renemann: Suárez's Doctrine of Concepts: How Divine and Human Intellection are Intertwined 313-335; Victor Salas: Between Thomism and Scotism: Francisco Suárez on the Analogy of Being 336-362; Epilogue; List of Contributors; Bibliography; Index of Names; Index Rerum.

50. Sanz, Victor. 1989. *La Teoría De La Posibilidad En Francisco Suárez*. Pamplona: EUNSA.

51. ———. 1992. "La Reducción Suáreciana De Los Transcendentales." *Anuario Filosofico* no. 25:403-420.

    "The notion of *aliquid* and *res*, excluded by Suárez from the transcendentals, nevertheless are of primary importance in

the understanding of the notion of being, a key aspect of suárecian ontology."

52. Schmutz, Jacob. 2002. "Un Dieu Indifférent. La Crise De La Science Divine Dans La Scolastique Moderne." In *Le Contemplateur Et Les Idées. Modèles De La Science Divine Du Néoplatonisme Aux Temps Modernes*, edited by Boulnois, Olivier, Schmutz, Jacob and Solère, Jean-Luc, 185-221. Paris: Vrin.

53. ———. 2004. "¿Abatir O Ensalzar a Francisco Suárez?" In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, 5-16. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

    Preface to the volume.

54. ———. 2004. "Science Divine Et Métaphysique Chez Francisco Suárez." In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 347-379. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

55. ———, ed. 2004. *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice: Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

56. Schöndorf, Harald. 2004. "La Nada Real. La Doctrina De Los Entes Posibles En La *Disuputaciones Metafísicas* De Fracisco Suárez." In *Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote*, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 381-403. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.

57. Schwartz, Daniel, ed. 2012. *Interpreting Suárez. Critical Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Notes on Contributors VII-VIII; Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations and method of citation IX; 1. Daniel Schwartz: Introduction 1; 2. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Daniel D. Novotný: Fundamentals in Suárez's metaphysics: transcendentals and categories 19; 3. Christopher Shields: The reality of substantial form: Suárez, *Metaphysical disputations* XV 39; 4. Jorge Secada: Suárez on the ontology of relations 62; 5. Bernie Cantens: Suárez's cosmological argument for the existence of God 82; 6. Thomas Pink: Action and freedom in Suárez's ethics 115; 7. Terence H. Irwin: Obligation, rightness, and natural law: Suárez and some critics 142; 8.Daniel Schwartz: Suárez on distributive justice 163; 9. Gregory M. Reichberg: Suárez on just war 185; Bibliography 205; Index 214.

58. Seigfried, Hans. 1972. "Kant's Thesis About Being Anticipated by Suárez?" In *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, edited by Beck, Lewis White, 510-520. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    "The paper attempts to clarify a notion in Kant's philosophy which is much discussed today, by referring back to the doctrine of Suárez, an historically influential representative of traditional ontology. It tries to give a rational account of the Suárezian doctrine of possibility and reality by making explicit those assumptions which make it comprehensible and which were still, after some important modifications, the presuppositions underlying Kant's thesis that being is obviously not a real predicate or (a predicate which stands for) something real but merely the positing of a thing."

59. Sgarbi, Marco, ed. 2010. *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

    Table of Contents: Preface 5; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez: End of the Scholastic *epistéme*? 9; Salvador Castellote: El 'túnel del tiempo'. Tiempo, movimiento y su medida, la teoría de los puntos y la indivisibilidad, según Suárez 29; Marco Forlivesi: Francisco Suárez and the rationes

studiorum of the Society of Jesus 77; Anna Tropia: Suárez as a Scotist. The Portrait of the Doctor Eximius in Losada's Commentary on the Soul 91; Daniel Heider: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza's (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas 105; Marco Lamanna: Tra Fonseca e Suárez. L'ingresso della nozione di *ens reale* nella *Schulmetaphysik* 141; Igor Agostini: Suárez, Descartes e la dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio 169; Stefano Di Bella: *Tota sua entitate*. Suárez and Leibniz on Individuation 205; Marco Sgarbi: Francisco Suárez and Christian Wolff. A Missed Intellectual Legacy 227; Valerio Rocco Lozano: L'eredità nascosta di Suárez nel sistema hegeliano 243; Jacopo-Niccolè Bonato: Le occorrenze di Suárez nell'opera di Brentano 261; Federico Baccaccini: *Quasi umbrae entium*. Suárez e Brentano sull' *ens rationis* 271-294.

60. Siewerth, Gustav. 1959. *Das Schiksal Der Metaphysik Von Thomas Zu Heidegger*. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag.

    Reprinted in G. Siewerth, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, Düsseldorf, Patmos, 1987.
    See Chapter IX: *Die Objektivierung ders Denkens*, pp. 19-37.

61. South, James B. 2001. "Francisco Suárez on Imagination." *Vivarium* no. 39:119-158.

    "I discuss two themes in Suárez's account of internal sensation: the number of internal sense powers and the activities of the internal sense. I show that Suárez rejects a plurality of internal sense powers arguing that there need be only one such power. I then explore his account of the act of internal sensation showing its relation to both external sensation and intellectual knowledge. Most notably, I show why Suárez was compelled to posit an "agent internal sense" and how he manages to remain consistent with his view that there is only one internal sense power."

62. ———. 2001. "Suárez and the Problem of External Sensation." *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* no. 10:217-

240.

63. Specht, Rainer. 1997. "Aspects 'Cartésiens' De La Théorie Suarezienne De La Matière." In *Lire Descartes Aujourd'hui*, edited by Sepré, Olivier and Lories, Danielle, 21-45. Louvain: Peeters.

64. Svoboda, David. 2007. "Francisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the Many." *Studia Neoaristotelica* no. 4:158-172.

"Suárez's solution to the problem of the conceptual Addition of the One to being follows firstly the Aristotelian-Averroistic tradition mediated by Aquinas. According to this tradition, the One adds to being only a negative determination. Suárez claims that the One does not signify any positive perfection either really or conceptually distinct from being as such. Suárez's own solution to the problem is presented in a critical discussion with many different conceptions, but Suárez pays most attention to the theory of certain, mainly Franciscan, authors who hold that the One adds to being a positive perfection which is only conceptually distinct from being as such. The main argument for this thesis is based on the assumption that indivision is to be taken as a double negation, by which an affirmation is expressed. This concept of indivision was, according to Suárez, also defended by Aquinas, who holds that the negation which is expressed by the One negates the division of one being from another. Suárez rejects this solution and proposes his own conception, according to which the One does not negate the negative moment of the division of one being from another, but the positive moment of an essential division of a being in itself. The One thus negates a real positive division of being in itself. On the basis of this theory, Suárez further rejected Aquinas's (and the Thomistic) conception of a conceptual priority of the One over the Many, which was put forth as an answer to the old Aristotelian problem of a privative opposition between the One and the Many. Suárez defends the real priority of an

indivision over a division as well as a real and conceptual priority of the One over the Many. Suárez's conception seems to us to be compatible with his concept of a negative Addition of the One to being. "

65. Teixeira, António Braz. 1999. "Suárez E O Objecto E a Naturaleza Da Metafísica." In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiao E Modernidade*, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 37-44. Lisboa: Edioes Colibri.

66. Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "Francisco Suarez's Theory of Analogy and the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas." *Angelicum* no. 72:353-362.

67. Uscatescu Barron, Jorge. 1995. "El Concepto De Metafisica En Suarez: Su Objeto Y Dominio." *Pensamiento* no. 51:215-236.

    "Se trata de una interpretacion de la Primera Disputacion de las *Disputationes metaphysicae* de Suarez. El objeto de la metafisica es el ser real en general con exclusion del ente de razon y del ente *per accidens*. Asi pues, el dominio de la metafisica es la totalidad de los entes reales por si. A continuacion se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafisica debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada obra de Suarez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtua el caracter generalisimo de la metafisica, que de por si esta mas alla de la division del ser material e inmaterial. Por ultimo, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la metafisica como ciencia y el ser real en general."

68. Vleeschauwer, Herman Jean de. 1949. "Un Paralelo Protestante a La Obra De Suárez." *Revista de Filosofia* no. 8:365-400.

69. Volpi, Franco. 1993. "Suárez Et Le Problème De La Métaphysique." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no.

98:395-411.

"L'article attire l'attention sur l'importance du "tournant" Suárezien dans l'historie de la métaphysique conue comme *onto - théo - logie*, mettant en lumière les decisions qui sont prises par Suárez par rapport aux "topoi" les plus importants de la pensée scolastique et de la pensée moderne. L'éxtraordinaire fortune de Suárez s'explique par le fait qu'il n'est pas seulement le dernier scolastique, mais aussi le premier moderne."

70. Wells, Norman J. 1955. *The Distinction of Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Francis Suárez*.

Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Toronto.
Abstract: "The name of Francis Suárez is a famous one in the history of philosophy, not to mention the histories of theology and law. Indeed, his position on the question of the distinction between essence and existence in creatures, the subject matter of this thesis, is especially notorious. However, though his final position on this question is quite well known, the philosophical milieu surrounding that decision and undoubtedly influencing it, is, in contrast, rather obscure. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the latter aspect of the problem.
Suarez himself is our best guide since he lists the three famous traditions on this question up to his day and cites men and arguments on behalf of each. The first tradition, that of the "Thomists", is the real distinction which maintains, for Suarez, that the essence and existence of a creature are really distinct as duae res or two beings, and mutually separable, each being able to exist apart from the other. The second tradition, that of the modal distinction, also holds for a similar real distinction in creatures as between a res or a being and its mode which are not mutually separable. The third tradition, the distinction of reason and the position of Suárez, rejects any kind of real distinction of essence and existence in a creature and affirms a distinction which is the work of the intellect and is not at all present in the thing.

Research into the sources of the five arguments Suárez attributes to the "Thomists" he lists has found that the first two are explicit in such "Thomists" as Giles of Rome, John Capreolus, Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Chrysostomus Javellus. The other three arguments are not found in the texts of these men noted by Suárez. But the common denominator of all the arguments is that they affirm a real distinction between an uncreated esse essentiae or essence and a created esse existentiae or existence. That is, for Suarez, these men distinguish what comes to be by an efficient cause, namely, existence, and what does not come to be by an efficient cause, namely, essence. Thus Suárez sees that the "Thomist" school undergoes the doctrinal influence of Avicenna and this Neo-Platonic tradition through St. Albert, Henry of Ghent, and possibly Meister Eckhart.

On behalf of the second tradition, Suarez cites some texts of John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Dominicus Soto which purportedly support this modal distinction. In this tradition, esse existentiae, according to Suarez, is a mode which is a positive existential entity in his own right as in the first tradition. However, unlike the latter, it cannot endure apart from the essence of which it is the mode. Thus, the second tradition differs from the first, not so much on the notion of essence which is the same, but on the degree of reality each will attribute to esse existentiae. Of interest is the fact that no such position is found in the texts of Scotus and Henry of Ghent. The texts of Soto do contain a doctrine of esse existentiae as a mode of essence but do not describe it as a positive existential reality.

The third tradition is manifested in the texts of the sixteen men cited by Suarez as its exponents although there is a variety of formulation as to the type of distinction of reason in question. However, this tradition is one in interpreting the real distinctions of the first two traditions to be between duae res or a res and its mode. It is also one in rejecting these two traditions. Moreover, this third tradition is one in holding that the essence and existence in question is the actual existing essence and esse in actu exercito. It is

between these that there is only a distinction of reason. However, these men agree that the essence abstractly conceived or essence as possible is distinguished from actual existence or actual essence as non-being from being. The basic reason for their rejection of a real distinction is that something cannot be intrinsically constituted in the existential order by something really distinct from it. For each is a being in its own right as distinct from the other. More basic than this is the fact that there is no esse existentiae in addition to the esse essentiae of a creature. Existence means nothing more than the actual existing essence and in no way signifies an existential actus essendi nor any accidental accretion. The men of this third tradition are characterized for Suarez by the fact that they are all opponents to some extent of any kind of a Platonic realism within being which is the most manifest feature of the first two traditions on this question.

In explaining the principles behind this third tradition Suarez first lakes steps to remove any autonomous essential actuality apart from the divine intellect since he sees very clearly that the first two traditions follow from their doctrine of the divine ideas. For them, the divine ideas are the essences of creatures endowed with an esse essentiae in themselves as in Henry of Ghent. In Suarez' eyes this looks too much like the divine ideas enjoying some eternal existential status apart from God or that they have been created from eternity. As his first principle, and that of the third tradition, Suarez maintains that the essences of creatures, prior to their creation, are absolutely nothing in the sense of enjoying no real existential status. Though a critic of this Avicennian tradition on the divine ideas, Suarez still remains within that tradition since he endows the essences of creatures in the divine intellect with an esse possibile, an esse objectivum or an esse cognitum in much the same fashion as Duns Scotus in his critique of Henry of Ghent and as Durandus in his critique of the same doctrine. Thus, in his critique of any Platonic realism of essence Suarez remains within the tradition of Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent but much farther along that doctrinal curve

which leads to the nominalism of Ockham. Suarez, in his second principle, carries his critique of any realism of essence into the created order of existing things. For, this principle states that ens in potentia and ens in actu are immediately distinguished as non-being and being. In this Suarez counters those who maintained that ens in potentia or essence enjoys some positive mode of being, though diminished, within the existent creature and his critique follows the pattern of the defense of his first principle. Suarez' criticisms even carry within the tradition on the distinction of reason, rejecting all except the one which enables him to deny that existence is of the essence of the creature. He finds this feature in what he calls a distinction of the reasoned reason -- a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. Because a creature has been created or is contingent it can cease to be and can found a concept of itself as non-existent. This concept of a creature prescinded from existence outside its causes but apt to exist, unlike a chimera, is signified by essentia for Suarez. The same concept of that creature as existing and outside its causes is signified by existentia. Existentia is denied of essentia creaturae because the concept of the possible essence does not explicitly include what is signified by existentia or is included in the concept of the actual essence. In a word, the possible essence and the actual essence are mentally distinguished and the concept of the actual essence as possible and the concept of the same essence as actual are likewise so distinguished. Thus Suarez' distinction of reason is a result of a comparison between two concepts or rather, different degrees of contraction or adequation of one concept with respect to the actual existing essence, the one more confused and obscure and less contracted than the other. It is just such a distinction which enables Suarez lo deny existcntia of essentia creaturae. Hence, this distinction between essence and existence is said to be in the existent thing and founded on it by extrinsic denomination from the concepts of this one existent essence.

By way of this extrinsic denomination Suarez can maintain that the existent essence has some internal metaphysical

structure of essence and existence. For, on the basis of the two concepts of essence and existence and their degrees of adequation 10 the existent essence, the concept of existence is said to contract and be contracted by the concept of essence. In this way existence is said to be added to essence. This conceptual structure of the contracted and the contracting is then imposed on the actual essence by extrinsic denomination from these concepts. Thus the constant insistence of Suarez on the intrinsic constitution of the actual essence by existence does not imply any metaphysical structure within the actual existent but is a conceptual structure imposed on this existent. Versus an order of essence within being uarez offers an order of a radically contingent essence which is being itself, impervious to any existential co principle as it is to any distinction within it. In this struggle against the Platonic realism of essence in the first two traditions, being, in the hands of Suarez, has lost its metaphysical dimension to the extent it has become an impenetrable, impervious, indistinct essence. Reality is only metaphysical by extrinsic denomination and the science of metaphysics itself becomes nothing more than an analysis of concepts."

71. ———. 1957. "The Number of Terms in the Suárezian Discussion on Essence and Being." *Modern Schoolman* no. 34:147-191.

72. ———. 1962. "Suárez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction between Essential Being and Existential Being." *New Scholasticism* no. 36:419-444.

73. ———. 1979. "Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J. C. Doig." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:515-523.

"This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, *Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of ideas*. On the basis of primary and secondary source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that

teaching. Thus Doig's claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in general, and the part they play in metaphysics."

74. ———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part I)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 58:73-106.

75. ———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part Ii)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 58:159-174.

76. ———. 1984. "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suárez." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 22:25-50.

77. ———. 1990. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suárez." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 28:33-61.

78. ———. 1993. ""Esse Cognitum" and Suárez Revisited." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 67:339-348.

    "The purpose of the work is to clarify the ambiguous use, in Suárez, of the terms " *esse cognitum/esse objectivium*" so that no charge of "mentalism" can be brought while, at the same time, it can be acknowledged that " *res*" enjoys an intramental mode of using, i.e., "objectively" (" *conceptus objectivus*") as well as an intramental "normal" mode of being (" *conceptus formulis*")."

79. ———. 1994. "Javelli and Suárez on the Eternal Truths." *Modern Schoolman* no. 72:13-35.

    "An examination of Suárez's position on the Eternal Truths by bringing to bear upon it a controversy between Chrysostomus Javelli, O. P. (+1538) (who is defending Harvey Nedellec, a.k.a. Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. (+1323) and Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O. P. (+1494) on the issue of efficient causality with respect to necessary essential

propositions and the distinction between a non-existential use of the copula "est" *vs* an existential use thereof."

80. ———. 1994. "John Poinsot on Created Eternal Truths *Vs* Vasquez, Suárez and Descartes." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:425-446.

    "An examination of John Poinsot's discussion of created eternal truths wherein he criticizes Gabriel Vasquez's interpretation of Aquinas' position on the eternal truths. What is taken to task is Vasquez's insistence upon a positive eternal aptitudinal truth on the part of necessary as well as contingent truths with regard to creatures. This is such that these truths are not eternal because known by God's eternal intellect. Rather, they are eternally true (aptitudinally) in themselves apart from the divine intellect. Linkage to Suárez's and Descartes' positions on created eternal truths is also considered."

81. ———. 1994. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Arnauld, Descartes, and Suárez." In *The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents*, edited by Kremer, Elmer J., 138-163. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

82. ———. 1998. "Descartes and Suárez on Secondary Qualities: A Tale of Two Readings." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 51:565-604.

83. Yela Utrilla, Juan F. 1948. "El Ente De Razón En Suárez." *Pensamiento* no. 4:271-303.

84. Zubimendi Martínez, Julián. 1984. "La Teoría De Las Distincciones De Suárez Y Descartes." *Pensamiento* no. 40:179-202.

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René Descartes. Bibliographie Chronologique et Annotée (Première Partie: 1616-1640)

Deuxième Partie (1641-1650)

INTRODUCTION

Cette bibliographie des œuvres de Descartes en ordre chronologique tient compte aussi des publications non comprises dans l'édition Adam-Tannery; dans les citations l'orthographe, qu'à la fin du XVIIe siècle n'était pas encore totalement fixée, est modernisée; pour chaque texte je donne la référence aux suivant éditions:

1. AT = Charles Adam, Paul Tannery (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres*, Nouvelle présentation par J. Beaude, P. Costabel, A. Gabbey et B. Rochot, Paris: Vrin 1964-1974 (Édition du Jubilé, 1996, 11 volumes); première édition 1897-1913 (Les tomes I-V contiennent la *Correspondance*).

2. B Op. I = Giulia Belgioioso (éd.), *René Descartes, Opere 1637-1649*, con la collaborazione di I. Agostini, F. Marrone, M. Savini, Testo francese e latino a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2009.

3. B Op. II = Giulia Belgioioso (éd.), *René Descartes, Opere postume 1650-2009*, con la collaborazione di I. Agostini, F.

Marrone, M. Savini, Testo francese e latino a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2009.

4. CO = Vincent Carraud, Gilles Olivo (éds.), *René Descartes, Étude du bon sens, La recherche de la vérité et autres écrits de jeunesse (1616-1631)*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2013.

5. O I = Jean-Marie Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes I. Premiers écrits. Règles pour la direction de l'esprit*, Paris: Gallimard, 2016.

6. O III = Jean-Marie Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes III. Discours de la Méthode et Essais*, Paris: Gallimard, 2009.

Pour la *Correspondance*, je donne les réfèrences aux éditions Adam-Tannery (AT, volume et pages), Armogathe (O VIII, 1 et 2, volume et pages), Belgioioso (B, et le nombre de la lettre).

Pour la liste des éditions de références et des abréviations voir René Descartes. Outils de recherche: Biographies, Dictionnaires et Lexiques des Ses Œuvres

L'INVENTAIRE DES ECRITS DE DESCARTES

1. [Inventaire de Stockholm] *Inventaire succinct des Écrits*. 1656.

2. AT X 5-12; *Note manuscrite de Leibniz des papiers de Descartes* (AT X 208-209).
   Inventaire des papiers qu'il avait emportés en Suède; un autre inventaire, rédigé à Leyde n'a pas été retrouvé.
   "A la mort de Descartes, 11 février 1650, un inventaire fut dressé à Stockholm, le 14 février, des papiers qu'il avait emportés en Suède, et un autre à Leyde, le 4 mars, de ceux

qu'il avait laissés en Hollande. Baillet, dans sa *Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes* 1691, t. II, p. 427-8, et 428-9), nous apprend, avec force détails, comment ont été faits les deux inventaires; mais il ne donne le texte ni de l'un ni de l'autre. Des recherches faites en Hollande (septembre 1894), pour retrouver le second, n'ont pas abouti. Et d'ailleurs nous savons, par des témoignages du temps, que Descartes avait emporté à Stockholm ses papiers principaux."
(Charles Adam, AT X, pp. 1-2, notes omises)
Une traduction latine abrégée de l'inventaire se trouve dans: Pierre Borel, *Elenchus manuscriptorum Cartesii Stocholmi repertorum post Eius obitum anno 1650,* in: *Vitae Renati Cartesii summi philosophi compendium*, Paris 1656, pp. 16-19; texte Français publié en 1887 par Bierens de Haan et, dans un version révisée, par Charles et Henri Adam en 1894 (AT X pp. 5-12).
Dans l' *Introduction* à l'édition critique de la correspondance de l'an 1643, Theo Verbeek a montré que l'inventaire n'a pas été rédigé à Stockholm le 14 février 1650, mais à La Haye avec la collaboration de Christiaan Huygens à la fin du 1653 ou au début du 1654 (*The Correspondence of René Descartes 1643*, édité par Theo Verbeek, Erik-Jan Bos, Jeroen van de Vern, Utrecht, Zeno Institute for Philosophy The Leiden–Utrecht Research Institute, 2003, pp. XV-XXI).
"All this confirms that the 'Stockholm inventory' cannot date from 1650. In fact, it is likely that it was made in The Hague, with the help of Christiaan Huygens, somewhere at the end of 1653 or the beginning of 1654, that is, almost four years after Descartes' papers came into Chanut's possession." (p. XXI).

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

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inédit de 1616." *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* no. 2 (1988):123-145.
Retrouvée en 1981 à Poitiers, manque dans AT.
Édition critique du texte latin (pp. 125-131) avec la traduction en Français , (pp. 131-133) de la thèse en droit soutenue à Poitiers le 21 décembre 1616.
Première édition : Jean-Robert Armogathe et Vincent Carraud, "Texte original et traduction Français e d'un inédit de Descartes: *Dédicace du placard de la licence en droit*", *Archives de Philosophie*, 50, 1987, *Bulletin Cartésien* XV, pp. 1-4.
Texte latin et traduction Français e, CO, pp. 21-29; texte latin et traduction italienne, B Op. II, 1454-1461; nouvelle traduction par Jean-Marie Beyssade et Michelle Beyssade avec la collaboration d'André Laingui, O I, 46-49.
Traduction anglaise dans : Kurt Smith, "Descartes' Life and Works", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (URL = plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-works/).
"Les écrits authentiques du jeune Descartes sont rares : la lettre d'un jeune Descartes, «collégien à La Flèche», devant être attribuée à son frère Pierre, les premiers textes repérés remontent aux manuscrits décrits dans l'inventaire de Stockholm; ils ne nous sont parvenus que par les extraits traduits par A. Baillet dans sa *Vie* ou dans les textes, aujourd'hui perdus, publiés et traduits par Foucher de Careil.
Le document que nous présentons est donc important à double titre: par les renseignements biographiques nouveaux fournis sur une période encore mal connue de la vie de René Descartes, d'une part; par le texte lui-même, d'autre part. Nettement plus longue que les dédicaces habituelles des placards de thèses, la dédicace de 1616 se présente comme une autobiographie intellectuelle, et même comme une «histoire de [mon] esprit» (pour reprendre, en anticipant, l'expression de Guez de Balzac): c'est ce qui nous a autorisé, dans l'annotation, à citer fréquemment la première partie du *Discours de la Méthode*. « Le philosophe qui dit 'je' » est d'abord celui qui «représente sa vie» et écrit

l'histoire de ses études jusqu'à ce qu'il fût «reu au rang des doctes», l'histoire de son esprit. De cette dédicace, Descartes aurait déjà pu dire : «ne proposant cet écrit que comme une histoire»." (p. 123).

2. Descartes, René. 1618-19?; 1628? *L'art de l'escrime (Extraits de Baillet)*.
   Baillet I 35, II 407; AT X, 535-538; B Op. II, 916-917.
   "Descartes passa l'hiver de la fin de 1612 et du commencement de 1613 dans la ville de Rennes, à revoir sa famille, à monter à cheval, à faire des armes, et aux autres exercices convenables à sa condition. On peut juger par son petit traité d'*Escrime* s'il y perdit entièrement son temps."
   Baillet I, VIII, 35.
   "Nous trouvons aussi parmi les manuscrits de M. Descartes un petit traité touchant la manière de faire des armes sous le titre de l'*Art d'escrime*, où il paraît que la plupart des leons qu'il y donne sont appuyées sur sa propre expérience. Après avoir dit quelque chose en général de la qualité de l'épée et de la manière de s'en servir, il divise son traité en deux parties.
   Dans la première il fait « voir comme on peut s'assurer contre tous les efforts de l'adversaire, et en tirer de l'avantage pendant qu'on est en *mesure longue*, et comme on peut le mettre sûrement en *mesure courte* ». Dans la seconde il examine comment étant entré en mesure courte, on peut infailliblement vaincre. Et pour cela il suppose deux hommes d'égale grandeur, d'égale force, et d'armes égales, se réservant à marquer ensuite ce qu'il y a à faire en cas d'inégalité."
   Baillet II, XX, 407 ; *Abrégé* 23 et 326.
   Selon Paul Adam la date de composition de ce petit traité (aujourd'hui perdu) serait le 1628 ; selon Carraud et Olivo, 1618-1619 (CO, pp. 35-36) .
3. Beeckman, Isaac. 1618-19. *Extraits du Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman*.
   Le *Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634*, (abrégé CDW) a été publié en quatre volumes par Cornelis de Waard, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1953.

Texte latin AT X : I. *Varia*, 44-66; B Op. II, 1316-1335; II. *Physico-mathematica,* 67-78; B Op. II, 1336-1351; traduction par Frédéric de Buzon, O I, *Notes du Journal (1618-1619)*, 85-97; *Opuscules de Descartes insérés dans le* Journal *de Beeckman* 98-106.
AT X, I. *Varia* : Angulum nullum esse male probavit Des Cartes 46 ; II. Turbo puerorum, id est *een worptop*, cur erectus flet, cùm vertitur 51 ; III. Chordae majores intactas minores et consonantes tactae movent 52 ; IV. Physico-mathematici paucissimi 52 ; V. Fistula fortius inflata cur in octavam abeat 53 ; VI. Testudinis (*een lute*) chordas disponere 53 ; VII. Quartâ à consonante chorda remota non tremit. — Quarta à quintâ dignoscere 54 ; VIII. Quadratum radici aequale datum 54 ; IX. Mr. Duperon 56 ; X. Bisectio in musicis facillima et gratissima 56 ; XI. Lapis cadens in vacuo cur semper celerius cadat 58 ; XI bis. Lapidis cadentis tempus supputatum 58 ; XII. Modi non dulces et iclus testimonio probati 61 ; XIII. Modi modorum argumento probati 62 ; XIV. Modi modorum ab objeftione defensi 63 ; XV. Ars Lulli cum Logicâ collata 63-66.
AT X, II. *Physico-mathematica* : I. Aquae comprimentis in vase ratio reddita à D. Des Cartes 67 ; II. Lapis in vacuo versus terrae centrum cadens quantum singulis momentis motu crescat, ratio Des Cartes 72-74.
"Une des découvertes les plus importantes pour la compréhension de l'évolution de la pensée cartésienne fut celle du *Journal* tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 jusqu'à sa mort, survenue le 19 mai 1637 (*). C. de Waard retrouva ce manuscrit à la bibliothèque de Middelburg en juin 1905; immédiatement avisé, Ch. Adam en tint compte dans le tome X des *Œuvres* de Descartes. Cela suppose une grande rapidité de travail : le tome X parut en 1908, mais l'*Avertissement* d'Adam est daté du 15 décembre 1905. D'autres fragments du *Journal,* beeckmaniens cette fois, paraissent dans l'édition que le même C. de Waard donne de la *Correspondance* de M. Mersenne à partir de 1933. On peut remarquer qu'à mesure que les textes de Beeckman sont connus, se modifie favorablement l'image de leur auteur ; il est vrai qu'elle était d'assez mauvaise qualité au

rapport de certaines lettres de Descartes, et surtout de Baillet. Un témoin de cette évolution est A. Koyré, qui écrivait en 1939 dans les *Études Galiléennes*, p. 108-9 que « la publication par M. Cornelis de Waard de nouveaux fragments du *Journal* de Beeckman (...) a modifié sensiblement l'image que l'on se faisait, ou plus exactement que l'on ne se faisait pas du Physicien hollandais. En effet, Beeckman, on s'en rend compte maintenant, mérite pleinement l'appellation de *vir ingeniosissimus* dont l'avait gratifié Descartes ; et, ce qui plus est, il nous apparaît désormais comme un chaînon de première importance dans l'histoire de l'évolution des idées scientifiques ; enfin, son influence sur Descartes semble avoir été beaucoup plus profonde que l'on n'a pu le supposer jusqu'ici (...). » A fortiori, cette image s'améliore encore davantage grâce à la publication de la quasi intégralité du *Journal* par, encore et toujours, C. de Waard. Les quatre tomes de cette édition paraissent à La Haye entre 1939 et 1953 ; ils renferment avec l'indication du foliotage l'essentiel des notes scientifiques, à l'exception très notable de la copie que Beeckman fit faire du *Compendium Musicae* vers 1628, de quelques notes d'intérêt divers: détails familiaux, observations météorologiques, informations maritimes etc. (...)

Le *Journal* est décrit avec une grande exactitude dans le premier tome de l'édition, pp. XXV-XXXIV ; il se compose d'environ cinq cents feuilles contenant de brèves notes de lecture, de pensées propres, et de remarques concernant les rencontres que faisait Beeckman. Les notes relatives à Descartes ont en premier attiré l'attention, et ceci justement. L'intérêt des renseignements fournis par Beeckman est en effet capital. Les textes cartésiens consignés sont les premiers que nous connaissons, et il apparaît invraisemblable que l'on en découvre d'antérieurs. D'autre part, ils occupent une position critique dans la vie du philosophe ; ils terminent les années d'étude, et débutent une production propre. Descartes rencontra Beeckman (1) le 10 novembre 1618 à Breda. Très rapidement une estime mutuelle s'installe : « Ce Poitevin a fréquenté beaucoup de

Jésuites et autres hommes de science. Il dit cependant n'avoir jamais rencontré personne, à part moi, qui use, ce dont je me réjouis, de ce mode d'étude, et joigne exactement la physique avec la mathématique. Et moi, je n'ai jamais parlé qu'à lui de ce mode d'étude (2) ». A de nombreuses reprises les suites de cette rencontre ont été décrites (3); en particulier, les commentateurs mettent en relation les fragments cartésiens du *Journal* avec les *Cogitationes Privatae*. C'est le cas de l'ensemble des *Premières Pensées de Descartes*, que M. H. Gouhier publia en 1958 (Paris, Vrin). D'une faon générale, on peut dire cependant que les historiens des sciences ont fait porter l'accent sur des problèmes « nobles » tels celui de la chute des graves; en revanche, sauf exceptions, ont été négligés les problèmes relatifs à l'acoustique, que nous voudrions décrire avec quelques détails." (pp. 1-3; Frédéric de Buzon, *Descartes, Beeckman et l'acoustique*, Archives de philosophie, 44, 1981, pp. 1-8).

(1) La rencontre est racontée par Lipstorp puis Baillet, cités dans A-T, X, p. 47-51. Voir G. Rodis-Lewis, *L'œuvre de Descartes*, Paris, Vrin 1971, p. 25 et note p. 435.

(2) Nous reprenons la traduction de Mme Rodis-Lewis (op. cit., p. 26) en rétablissant, contre une suggestion d'A-T X, p. 52, le texte original: le *g* de *gaudeo* est parfaitement lisible sur le ms.

(3) Voir les notes bibliographiques de Mme Rodis-Lewis, op. cit., et C. L. Thiss-Schoute, *Nederlands cartesianisme*, Amsterdam 1954, pp. 557-560.

(*) [Beeckman était né le 10 décembre 1588]

"Examinons, dans cette masse énorme de documents, ceux qui se rapportent sans conteste à Descartes, puisqu'il y est nommé. Ils se trouvent en quatre endroits différents :

[1618-1619]

1. — Fol. 97 verso, à fol. 1 18.
2. — Fol. 160 recto, à fol. 178 verso.
3. — Fol. 287 verso, à fol. 290 verso.

[1628-1629]

4. — Fol. 333 recto, a fol. 334 recto, 1. 34. — Fol. 338 recto, 1. 9, à fol. 340 recto, 1. 24. — Fol. 341 verso, 1. i6-30. — Fol.*

352 recto, 1. 8-24." (Charles Adam, AT X, *Avertissement*, p. 22).

4. Descartes, René. 1618. *Musicae Compendium*.
   AT X, 89-141; B Op. II, 30-105; traduction Français e par Frédéric de Buzon, O I, 149-189.
   Le manuscrit original est perdu ; première édition posthume: *Musicae compendium,* Trajecti ad Rhenum: Gisberti a Zyll & Theodori ab Ackersdijck, 1650.
   Traduction Français e sur le manuscrit originel par Nicolas-Joseph Poisson (1637-1710) publiée dans : *Traité de la mechanique composé par Monsieur Descartes. De plus l'abrégé de musique du mesme autheur mis en franois. Avec les éclaircissemens nécessaires* (l'*Abrégé* est à pp. 53-98 ; les *Elucidationes physicae in Cartesii musicam* de N.-J. Poisson à pp. 101-127), Paris, 1668 (reprint: *Abrégé de musique*, suivi des *Eclaircissements physiques sur la musique de Descartes,* Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1990, introduction et notes par Pascal Dumont, préface de Joseph-Franois Kremer).
   Édition critique avec traduction, présentation (pp. 5-49) et notes par Frédéric de Buzon, *Abrégé de Musique. Compendium Musicae*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987.
   C'est la première œuvre de Descartes, rédigée du 10 novembre au 31 décembre 1618 pour son ami Isaac Beeckman.
   Le *Journal* de Beeckman contient "la copie du *Compendium Musicae* que Descartes, à Bréda, remit à Beeckman pour ses étrennes de 1619. Celui-ci le confia en 1627 au copiste qui écrivait en gothique et qui copia encore d'autres documents de la même époque (...). Lorsque Beeckman fit relier ses papiers en 1628, cet écrit et ceux du même lot devaient interrompre l'ordre chronologique des notes. Beeckman restitua l'original à Descartes en 1629. Depuis lors divers savants hollandais en prirent des copies : Constantin Huygens en 1637 et Van Schooten vers 1640, dont les exemplaires sont conservés respectivement à la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Leyde et à celle de l'Université de Groningue." (Cornelis de Waard,

Avertissement au premier volume du *Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. Tome 1 : 1604-1619*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939, p. XXXVIII.)
Sur l'approche mathématique de Descartes à la musique, voir la lettre à Beeckman du 24 janvier 1619: "Si vous considérez cela, et le reste de ma *Musique*, (8) avec attention, vous verrez que tout ce que j'ai écrit des intervalles des consonances, des degrés et des dissonances s'y trouve démontré de faon mathématique, mais en gros, de manière confuse et beaucoup trop concise.
Mais en voilà assez pour aujourd'hui. Le reste à plus tard." (AT X 153; O VIII 2, 320; B 1).
(8) Le *Compendium musicae*, offert à Beeckman quelques semaines plus tôt.
"Comme l'indique son nom, le *Compendium Musicae* est un traité de musique, et non pas d'harmonie ; ce terme même n'apparaît pas. Cette remarque prend de l'intérêt lorsque l'on aperoit que, situation unique à notre connaissance, le rythme est traité avant les consonances et les problèmes de hauteur. D'autre part, un ensemble de propositions préalables, les *Praenotanda*, définit les limites de l'objet musical, et plus généralement de l'objet esthétique ; ces propositions produisent également la théorie du rythme et la théorie de la consonance. On comprend aussi qu'on ait pu en inférer une esthétique cartésienne (10)." (Frédéric de Buzon, *Présentation*, p. 8).
(10). V. O. Revault d'Allones, *L'esthétique de Descartes*, Revue des Sciences humaines, n° 61, 1951.
"Les commencements d'une méthode.
Lorsqu'il publia une nouvelle édition du *Discours de la Méthode* le P. Poisson remplaa, en quelque sorte, la *Géométrie* par un traité de mécanique, l'*Explication des machines et engins*, et par la traduction de l'*Abrégé*. [*] Ces deux œuvres étaient donc promues au rang d'essais de la méthode, au même titre que la *Dioptrique* et les *Météores*. Il y a là un abus évident, puisque les *Essais* étaient avec le *Discours* œuvres publiques, alors que les opuscules ainsi annexés n'étaient pas évidemment destinés à être publiés ; et l'*Abrégé* moins encore, que son auteur destinait aux

seules archives beeckmaniennes. De plus, si l'on admet que la méthode de Descartes est contenue initialement dans les *Regulae*, et si l'on date le plus probablement cet ouvrage autour de 1628, on ne peut croire que l'*Abrégé* soit la mise à l'épreuve d'une méthode que Descartes ne révélerait à lui-même que dix ans après.

Il reste que l'assimilation de Poisson fait signe vers un problème majeur, celui de la méthode de Descartes avant la méthode, qui pourrait contribuer à définir certaines constantes logiques, voire psychologiques à l'œuvre dès 1618. Quelques caractères peuvent sans doute être ainsi décrits.

En premier lieu, on peut noter qu'à la différence des traités de musique antérieurs — que Descartes n'a pas sous la main (43) —, et à l'unisson des productions scientifiques et philosophiques ultérieures, l'*Abrégé* néglige à peu près toute référence historique, et ne fonde jamais la vérité de son discours sur la moindre évocation des autorités passées; le traité est suffisant par rapport à la chose même, et comme dans la *Géométrie*, Descartes laisse à son lecteur le soin de tirer les conclusions des prémisses. Il n'y a là que l'essentiel. Ce qui explique à la fois l'importance du traité dans l'histoire de la théorie (44), et un certain mépris dans la musicologie classique (45).

De plus, si la méthode n'est jamais thématisée pour elle-même dans l'*Abrégé*, elle offre des analogies intéressantes avec la suite de l'œuvre. On a déjà souligné le fait que Descartes procède constamment du simple au complexe; mais on peut aussi considérer la corde, réduite à sa seule dimension de longueur, comme, précisément une *dimensio*, au sens de la Règle XIV, c'est-à-dire « le mode et la raison, selon laquelle on considère que quelque sujet est mesurable » (46), ou bien une nature simple. Autre nature simple, le temps, et ses divisions qui correspondent aux passions du corps ; l'*Abrégé* ainsi se borne à étudier les paramètres par lesquels la musique est mesurable, en négligeant les qualités (timbres, nuance forte / piano, etc.), laissés aux physiciens (47).

Enfin il est remarquable que Descartes réduise la connaissance de la nature réelle du son et de sa perception par l'oreille au minimum nécessaire à une théorie de l'art. Il y a d'ailleurs une continuité au plan même des exemples avec les textes ultérieurs ; la Règle XIII évoque la question discutée vers 1628 par Mersenne et Beeckman relative aux cordes de grosseur et de tension différentes; comme il l'avait fait en 1618, Descartes met entre parenthèses toute référence à la vibration de la corde, cette donnée n'étant pas conue comme nécessaire (48).
Ainsi, l'écrit de circonstance qu'est le *Compendium Musicae* a des résonances précises dans l'œuvre ultérieure, tant du côté de l'application de la mathématique à la réalité physique que du côté de la physiologie et de la théorie des passions. C'est sur ce double registre que joue constamment Descartes ; si l'art a pour fin d'émouvoir les passions, définition commune à Descartes et à Caccini (49), il reste la tâche philosophique de connaître ces passions; les silences de Descartes sur les passions forment ainsi l'indication d'un programme (50).
Il resterait à définir la musique de Descartes après le *Compendium* ; elle est connue par la correspondance, et l'on sait le talent de critique déployé par Descartes dans la querelle de Boësset et de J. A. Ban; mais l'ensemble paraît inachevé: « Si je ne meurs que de vieillesse, j'ai encore envie quelque jour d'écrire de la théorie de la musique » (51)."
(Frédéric de Buzon, *Abrégé de Musique*, cit., *Présentation*, pp. 16-18).
[*] *Discours de la Méthode, plus Dioptrique, les Météores, la Mécanique et la Géométrie, qui sont des essais de cette méthode*, Paris: Ch. Angot, 1668.
(43). Descartes indique ne pas se rappeler certaines propriétés, AT X, p. 133 et p. 140.
(44). Dans une bibliographie abondante, on relèvera ici que W. C. Printz, dans l'*Historische Beschreibung der Sing- und Klingkunst*, Dresde, 1690, chap. XII, § 72, fait gloire à Descartes d'avoir le premier considéré la tierce majeure comme une consonance parfaite ; que Rameau, *Traité de l'harmonie*, Paris, 1722, dérive du *Compendium* la plupart

des concepts initiaux. V. aussi les appréciations de H. Riemann, *Geschichte der Musiktheorie*, Berlin, 1921, p. 419-420.
(45). Le *Descartes et la musique* d'A. Pirro (Paris, Fischbacher, 1907, rééd. Genève, Vlinkoff, 1973) est un brillant exemple de mésinterprétation du projet cartésien, en ce qu'il néglige les enjeux physico-mathématiques, et favorise exagérément l'interprétation des règles de composition.
(46). *Règles pour la direction de l'esprit*, AT X, p. 447, trad. J.-L. Marion, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1977, p. 67.
(47). AT-X, p. 89.
(48). V., dans l'édition citée supra des *Règles*, l'*Annexe v* du P. Costabel sur la loi des cordes vibrantes.
(49). G. Caccini, *Le nuove musiche,* Florence, 1601. L'analogie des formules caccinienne et cartésienne est signalée par G. Rodis-Lewis, "Musique et Passions au XVIe siècle (Monteverdi et Descartes)", *Dix-septième siècle*, 1971, n° 92 (cette étude portant essentiellement sur la querelle Ban-Boësset, à partir du tome X de la *Correspondance* de M. Mersenne).
(50). AT-X, p. 111 et 140.
(51). Descartes à Constantijn Huygens (4 février 1647), AT IV, 791 [O VIII 2, 162; B 601).

5. ———. 1619. *[Registre de 1619].*
Le registre autographe de Descartes, légué par Clerselier à l'abbé Legrand, a été perdus après la mort de Legrand dès 1704.
Index des titres: *Parnassus* (18 fuillets); *Praeambula* (4 pages); *Experimenta* (cinq feuillets et demi); *Democritica* (sept ou huit lignes); *Olympica*.
CO, 50-83: Les fragments philosophiques sont édités (52-64), traduits (53-65) et annotés (67-83) dans : "<Registre de 1619> *Parnassus, Democritica, Praembula, Experimenta*; Parnasse, Démocritiques, <Notes:>, Préambules, Observations, <Inventer>.
"L'article *C* de l'Inventaire de Stockholm énumère plusieurs titres de petits traités, que Descartes avait écrits, ajoute-t-on, « en sa jeunesse ». Les textes originaux, remis comme

nous savons à Clerselier, sont, à l'heure qu'il est, malheureusement perdus. Toutefois quelque chose, et même, on peut le dire, l'essentiel en a été conservé par deux voies différentes. Baillet eut ces textes entre les mains, et il en fît mention, et les traduisit même en plusieurs endroits, dans sa *Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes* en 1691. D'autre part, les mêmes textes avaient été mis déjà par Clerselier à la disposition de Leibniz, pendant un séjour de celui-ci à Paris en 1675-76 ; Leibniz en avait pris une copie, et cette copie fut déposée plus tard avec ses papiers à la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre." (AT X, *Avertissement,* p. 173).
"M. Chanut ambassadeur de France en Suède, et le baron de Kroneberg commis par la reine Christine, pour assister à l'inventaire de ce qu'il avait laissé à sa mort, trouvèrent parmi les écrits de sa composition un registre relié et couvert de parchemin, contenant divers fragments de pièces différentes auxquelles il paraît qu'il travailla pendant ce temps-là. C'était: 1. *Quelques considérations sur les sciences* en général [le titre du manuscrit est *Parnassus*]; 2. Quelque chose de l'*algèbre*, 3. Quelques pensées écrites sous le titre *Democritica*; 4. Un recueil d'observations sous le titre *Expérimenta*; 5. Un traité commencé sous celui de *Preambula: Initium sapientiæ timor Domìni*; un autre en forme de discours, intitulé *Olympica*, qui n'était que de douze pages, contenait à la marge, d'une encre plus récente, mais de la même main de l'auteur, une remarque qui donne encore aujourd'hui de l'exercice aux curieux. Les termes auxquels cette remarque était conue portaient: *XI Novembris 1620, cœpi intelligere fondamentum Inventi mirabilis*, dont M. Clerselier ni les autres cartésiens n'ont encore pu donner l'explication. Cette remarque se trouve vis-à-vis d'un texte qui semble nous persuader que cet écrit est postérieur aux autres qui sont dans le registre, et qu'il n'a été commencé qu'au mois de novembre de l'an 1619. Ce texte port ces termes latins: *X Novembris 1619, cùm plenus forem Enthoumsiasmo, & mirabilis scientiæ fundamenta reperirem &c.*
Mais le principal de ces fragments, et le premier de ceux qui se trouvaient dans le registre était un recueil de

Considérations mathématiques, sous le titre de *Parnassus*, dont il ne restait que trente-six pages. Le sieur Borel a cru que c'était un livre composé l'an 1619, sur une date du premier jour de janvier, que M. Descartes avait mise à la tête du registre. Mais il se peut faire que la date n'ait été que pour le registre en blanc, et qu'elle n'ait voulu dire autre chose, sinon que M. Descartes aura commencé à user de ce registre le premier de janvier 1619, pour continuer de s'en servir dans la suite des temps selon ses vues et sa volonté. L'opinion du sieur Borel n'en est pourtant pas moins probable, puisque M. Chanut a remarqué dans l'Inventaire de M. Descartes que tous les écrits renfermés dans ce registre (a) paraissent avoir été composés en sa jeunesse." (Baillet I, 50-51)

(a) Coté C de l'Inventaire.

"Descartes est mort à Stockholm le 11 février 1650 ; trois jours après, le 14, un inventaire fut dressé des papiers qu'il avait emportés en Suède (*). Il en reste deux copies ; l'une, assez fautive appartenait à Constantin Huygens et se trouve à la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Leyde; l'autre, qui est à la Bibliothèque nationale, vient sans doute de la collection Clerselier. Charles Adam a soigneusement édité ce texte au début du tome X des *Œuvres*.

Cet inventaire contient vingt-trois articles, A à Z, les lettres I et J ne comptant que pour une, et de même U et V. Les écrits les plus anciens de Descartes se trouvent à l'article C (1).

Il s'agit d' « un petit registre en parchemin, quotté en dedans de la couverture: Anno 1619 *Kalendis Januarii* ». Ceci veut dire que Descartes a décidé, le 1er janvier 1619, de se servir de ce registre.

Ouvrons-le. Il se présente ainsi :

1° « 18 feuillets de considérations mathématiques sous un titre : *Parnassus*. »

2° « six feuillets vides »

3° « six feuillets écrits »

4° « En prenant le livre d'un autre sens, le discours intitulé *Olympica*, et à la marge : *XI Novembris coepi intelligere fundamentum inventi mirabilis*. »

5° « Reprenant le livre en son droit sens, sont deux feuillets écrits, de quelques considérations sur les sciences ; »
6° « puis une demi-page d'algèbre »
7° « puis douze pages vides »
8° « puis sept ou huit lignes intitulées *Democritica* »
9° « huit ou dix feuillets blancs » (2)
10° « cinq feuillets et demi écrits, mais en tournant le livre, sous ce titre *Experimenta* »
11° « douze feuilles blanches »
12° « quatre pages écrites sous ce titre : *Praeambula. Initium sapientiae timor Domini.* »
« Tout ce livre cotté C, ajoute l'auteur de l'inventaire, paraît avoir été écrit en sa jeunesse. »
L'examen de ce registre montre deux choses :
D'abord, la plupart de ces écrits semblent n'être que des commencements destinés à recevoir une suite sur les pages blanches que le jeune homme laisse après chacun d'eux. Ensuite, le cahier a été commencé par les deux bouts."
(1) AT X, p. 7-8.
(2) Les mots « huit ou dix feuillets » peuvent paraître étranges ; en fait, il y a huit feuillets blancs + le verso de la feuille dont le recto porte les *Democritica* + le verso du dernier feuillet des *Experimenta*.
Henri Gouhier, *Les premières pensées de Descartes*, Paris, Vrin, 1979 pp. 11-12.
(*) Sur la date voir la note a l'*Inventaire succinct des écrits* [Inventaire de Stockholm].

6. ———. 1619. *[Registre de 1619:] Parnassus (Ms. de Leibniz : Cogitationes privatæ).*
Première édition (texte latin et traduction Français e) : Foucher de Careil I, 2-56; AT X, 213-248; B Op. II, 1060-1095; traduction par Frédéric de Buzon et André Warusfel, O I, 198-214.
"Je terminerai complètement mon traité avant Pâques, et si je trouve des libraires et s'il me paraît digne, je le publierai comme je l'ai promis aujourd'hui, 1620, 23 février" (AT X, p. 218, original en latin): nous ne savons pas à quel écrit se réfère Descartes.

"Nous pensons comme Henri Gouhier que la partie physique et mathématique des *Cogitationes privatae* a de bonnes chances de reproduire le *Parnassus*, qui s'ouvre avec le souvenir de la rencontre de Beeckman du 10 novembre 1618 (AT X, 219, 5). "
(CO, p. 67).
"Le texte de ces dernières notes surtout, tel que l'a donné Foucher de Careil, est des plus défectueux. Et comme le manuscrit manque, pour contrôler ce texte et y faire les corrections nécessaires, grand a été notre embarras. Le regretté Paul Tannery eût sans aucun doute réussi à déchiffrer ces énigmes; mais nous l'avons perdu trop tôt, et avant qu'il eût pris la peine d'y regarder de près. Nous avons dû nous adresser ailleurs. Par bonheur, une des lettres à Beeckman, qui viennent d'être retrouvées, nous fournissait la preuve que Descartes s'était encore servi, en ces premières années, de *caractères cossiques* (voir ci-avant, p. 155-156)."
(...)
"Gustav Enestrom, directeur de la Bibliotheca Mathematica, à Stockholm, possède en pareille matière la plus incontestable autorité. Fort obligeamment, il voulut bien se mettre à l'œuvre, et travailler pour Descartes : comme on pouvait s'y attendre, il remit tout en ordre et expliqua fort bien les passages déclarés ailleurs inexplicables. Nous le désignerons, à la fin des notes qu'il a rédigées pour cette édition, par les initiales de son nom G. E."
(Charles Adam, AT X, pp. 211-212).
"Charles Adam avait publié les *Cogitationes privatæ* respectant la structure du texte donné par Foucher de Careil, certes en l'amendant fortement, mais sans tenter de distinguer entre les différents ensembles de notes pour se rapprocher de la description de l'inventaire de Stockholm. Celui-ci, de même que la lecture de Baillet (*Vie*, I, p. 50-51), permet cependant de distinguer des centres d'intérêt et autorise le regroupement des notes scientifiques sous le titre qui les désignait. La question de savoir ce qui était précisément contenu dans le *Parnassus* est cependant indécidable dans son détail, en raison de l'état des sources et

parce que l'on doit reconnaître avec Henri Gouhier que « Leibniz n'a [...] pas suivi l'ordre du registre quand on l'ouvre du côté de la couverture datée » (*Les Premières Pensées de Descartes*, p. 15 : en effet, les premières remarques transcrites par Leibniz ne relèvent pas des mathématiques, même en prenant le terme au sens le plus large, c'est-à-dire associant mathématiques pures et appliquées. L'éditeur doit écarter les textes qui, visiblement, dépendent des autres ensembles du recueil." (Frédéric de Buzon et André Warusfel, *Présentation*, O I, 194).

7. ———. 1619. *[Registre de 1619:] Praeambula (Ms. de Leibniz : Cogitationes privatæ).*
AT X, 213-248; B Op. II, 1060-1095; traduction par Michelle Beyssade, O I, 198-220 et 270-274.
"Les papiers de Descartes, remis par Chanut à son beau-frère Clerselier, et qui n'ont pas été retrouvés, ne nous sont pas connus seulement par les extraits qu'en a donnés Baillet, dans sa *Vie* du philosophe (voir ci-avant, p. 173-177). Le même Baillet prévient le lecteur que, pour l'aider dans sa tâche, l'abbé Nicaise a pris la peine « d'écrire à Rome, d'où M. Auzout, qui a vu M. Descartes à Paris, et M. Leibnitz, *qui a eu communication des originaux chez M. Clerselier*, ont envoyé ce que la mémoire a pu leur suggérer sur ce sujet ». (*Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes*, 1691, Préface, p. xxvi.) Leibniz fut, en effet, à Paris en 1675 et 1676; curieux de tout ce qui se rapportait au philosophe Français , non seulement il obtint communication des papiers qui restaient de lui, mais il en fit copier et en copia lui-même au moins une bonne partie. Ses copies, qui portent des dates en plusieurs endroits (24 février et 1er juin 1676), furent déposées après sa mort, avec bien d'autres manuscrits, à la Bibliothèque Royale de Hanovre, et y demeurèrent longtemps ignorées. Ce fut seulement vers le milieu du xix siècle, que le comte Foucher de Careil, mis sur cette piste par l'indication de Baillet rappelée ci-dessus, et par quelques déclarations de Leibniz lui-même dans sa correspondance, réussit à les découvrir enfin. Il les publia aussitôt, avec quelques autres documents (lettres à Wilhem, Huygens, La Thuillerie, etc.), en deux volumes d'*Œuvres inédites de Descartes* (Paris,

Auguste Durand, in-8, cxvii-158 et xxii-238 pages, 1859-1860)." (AT X, *Avertissement*, p. 207).
"*Cogitationes privatae* est le titre que Foncher de Careil met en tête de ces fragments. L'avait-il trouvé dans le MS. de Leibniz, ou bien est-ce un titre de son invention? Cette dernière hypothèse est la plus vraisemblable. — Le même éditeur ajoute en note : « Leibniz, qui a copié ce manuscrit, nous avertit en marge qu'il l'a découvert et qu'il en a pris copie le 1er juin 1676, c'est-à-dire pendant son séjour à Paris. » — Nous reproduisons, en haut des pages, la pagination de Foucher de Careil : comme il donne en regard du latin une traduction Français e, les pages du latin n'ont que des numéros pairs, et les autres des numéros impairs." (AT X, *Avertissement*, p. 213).

8. ———. 1619. *[Registre de 1619:] Experimenta*.
AT X, 189-190; Baillet I, 102-103; B Op. II, 892-895; traduction par Michelle Beyssade, O I, 259-260.
"Le fragment intitulé *Experimenta* n'avait que « cinq feuillets et demi » (p. 8 ci-avant, l. 6-7). Peut-être donc l'avons-nous aussi tout entier, dans les deux grandes pages de Baillet, t. I, p. 102-103 ; au moins en avons-nous l'essentiel. Et là encore l'abondance et la précision des détails permettent de croire que le biographe de Descartes a traduit fidèlement, bien qu'on ne puisse jurer qu'il n'a rien ajouté. — Quant à la date, elle se détermine approximativement ainsi. Descartes raconte une aventure de sa traversée, par mer, d'Allemagne en Hollande, exactement, du port d'Embden en West -Frise, peut-être à Amsterdam. Nos idées sur cette première période des voyages du philosophe sont un peu changées depuis la découverte du *Journal* de Beeckman. Nous savons maintenant qu'en 1619, pour se rendre des Pays-Bas dans la Haute-Allemagne, au lieu de prendre par terre directement, il fit un grand détour par le Danemark, la Pologne, la Hongrie, la Bohême et l'Autriche (ci-avant p. 159, l. 2-6, et p. 162, l. 8-13), et s'embarqua le 29 avril à Amsterdam pour Copenhague. Il craignait que les mouvements de troupes entre les Pays-Bas et la Bavière ne rendissent la route peu sûre. Mais elle ne l'était sans doute pas davantage au retour.

Faut-il donc croire que Descartes sera revenu, sinon tout à fait par le même chemin, au moins par la Silésie, le Brandebourg, le Mecklembourg, qui est l'itinéraire que Baillet lui fait suivre, enfin Hambourg et Embden ? Enfin, comme nous savons, par une lettre de lui, que, le 3 avril 1622, il était à Rennes (t. I, p. 1), son retour en France a dû s'effectuer l'automne de 1621, et c'est alors sans doute qu'eut lieu l'aventure, dont le récit fait le principal si non l'unique objet des *Expérimenta*." (AT X, 175-176).

9. ———. 1619. *[Registre de 1619:] Democritica*.
"On sait que *Democritica* est le titre de « 7 ou 8 lignes » contenues dans le fameux petit registre en parchemin ouvert en 1619 et coté C dans l'inventaire de Chanut (1), contenant également le *Parnassus*, les *Experimenta* et les *Praeambula*. Rien n'est connu de ce texte, en particulier on ignore s'il s'agit de notes de lecture ; *Democritica* semble signifier, par analogie avec d'autres auteurs, des opinions inspirées de Démocrite (2), et rien chez Beeckman n'indique à l'époque une lecture de la doxographie démocritéenne. Peut-être alors faudrait-il revenir sur la composition du mot et donc sa signification : Demo-critica ?" (p. 41, Frédéreic de Buzon, "Democritica: la réfutation cartésienne de l'atomisme", dans: Jean Salem (éd.), J.Salem (ed.) *L'atomisme aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, pp. 27-41)
(1) A.T., X, 8.
(2) *Democritici* signifie, chez Leibniz notamment, les auteurs s'inspirant de Démocrite. — Voir en partic., le fragment *Corpus non est substantia* qui s'applique parfaitement à Descartes (pour la seule première phrase !) : *Intelligo autem per corpus non id quod Scholastici ex materia et forma quadam intelligibili componunt sed quod molem alias Democritici vocant. Hoc ajo non esse substantiam.* («J'entends par corps non ce que les scolastiques composent à partir de la matière et d'une forme intelligible, mais ce qu'autrement les Democritici nomment masse. Je dis que ce n'est pas une substance»); in Leibniz (G. W. F.), *Nouvelles Lettres et opuscules inédits*, éd. Foucher de Careil, Paris, 18S7 (réimpression: Hildesheim,

1971), p. 171. —Voir aussi les notes sur Cudworth (VE 406 p. 1887).
Selon J. Sirven "La seule hypothèse plausible est donc, que l'allusion au songe de 1619 nous donne tout ce que nous connaissons des *Democritica*, tandis que les autres morceaux d'allure psychologique se rattachent à des préoccupations scientifiques. On s'explique sans peine, alors, que Leibniz ait transcrit d'abord la phrase relative à l'année 1620, qui se trouvait dans les *Expérimenta* (2), puis nous ait donné une ou deux lignes des *Democritica* et enfin deux fragments de la section qu'il rencontrait en continuant ses extraits. Mais, quand il passa aux Olympica, il trouva en marge la réflexion signalée par Baillet, « écrite d'une ancre plus récente, mais toujours de la même main de l'auteur ». Se souvenant alors qu'il venait d'écrire une phrase à peu près identique tirée des *Experimenta*, il se contenta d'ajouter lui-même en marge de sa copie : « Olympica. X. nov. coepi intelligere fundamentum inventi mirabilis (3). »"
(2) La place de cette réflexion dans les *Experimenta* coïncide très bien avec l'hypothèse faite par Milhaud sur la nature de la découverte du 11 nov. 1620, dont nous parlerons plus loin.
(3) Leibniz a transcrit : X Nov., tandis que Baillet donne la date du : XI Nov. Est-ce une faute de Baillet, de Leibniz, ou plus probablement de Foucher de Careil ? Le manuscrit de Leibniz ne se trouvant plus à Hanovre, on ne saurait le dire.
Les annéues d'apprentissage de Descartes (1596-1628)
Albi: Imprimerie cooperative du Sud-Ouest 1928, p. 68.
Selon cette hypothèse les sept ou huit lignes des *Democritica* sont identifiées avec le texte de AT X, 216 l. 19-25.

10. ———. 1619. *Olympica (Extraits de Baillet)*.
Première édition: Baillet I, 50-61 / 80-86 / 120; AT X, 179-188; B Op. II, 879-891; CO, 99-108; traduction par Michelle Beyssade, O I, 252-259.
Fernand Hallyn, dans *Les Olympiques de Descartes*, Genève: Droz, 1995, donne trois textes: I. *Le premier récit de Baillet*, (I, pp. 80-86), II. *Le deuxième récit de Baillet*, (*Abrégé,* pp. 37-39), III. *Cogitationes privatae. Pensées*

pour moi-même, (Foucher de Careil, I, 10-12) : "On ne reprend ici que ceux qui faisaient partie des *Olympica* selon l'hypothèse d'Henri Gouhier (*Les premières pensées de Descartes*, Paris, Vrin, 1958 et 1979)." p. 41.
Ce texte contient le récit de trois songes de Descartes la nuit du 10 au 11 novembre 1619 : "s'étant couche *tout rempli de son enthousiasme*, et tout occupé de la pensée d'*avoir trouvé ce jour-là les fondements de la science admirable". (*Baillet I, p. 80).
"*Les « Songes » de Descartes*
Le texte se trouve dans la biographie de Baillet qui le tire des *Olympica*. Plus exactement, Baillet en donne une traduction paraphrasée avec quelques citations de l'original latin. Il s'agit du morceau qui ouvre le « discours » écrit sous le titre *Olympica* sur le « petit registre en parchemin ». Les pages qui nous le font connaître laissent supposer un récit bien conduit et rédigé avec un certain souci littéraire, non une suite de notes hâtivement griffonnées.
Baillet ouvre donc le cahier de Descartes et écrit : « Il nous apprend que le dixième de Novembre mil six cent dix-neuf, s'étant couché tout rempli de son enthousiasme, et tout occupé de la pensée d'avoir trouvé ce jour-là les fondements de la science admirable, il eut trois songes consécutifs en une seule nuit, qu'il s'imagina ne pouvoir être venus que d'en hauts (80). » (Gouhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33).
(80) Baillet, t. I, p. 81; AT t. X, p. 181. Remarquons que « *ce jour là* » semble ajouté par Baillet qui traduit le texte latin donné plus haut, p. 32.
"Les historiens de Descartes parlent comme s'il n'y avait qu'un seul texte sur les rêves de novembre 1619 : le récit des *Olympica* tel que Baillet nous l'a transmis (86). Or il y en a deux. Ceci résulte de la comparaison entre un fragment lu dans la copie de Leibniz et les passages des *Olympica* qu'il rappelle.
Voici le fragment tel que Foucher de Careil l'a présenté (87) :
*Anno 1620, intelligere coepi fundamentum inventi mirabilis.**
Somnium 1619, nov. in quo carmen 7 cujus initium:

Quod vitae sectabor iter?...
Auson
*[En marge :] *Olympica, X nov. coepi intelligere fundamentum inventi mirabilis*.
Ce fragment ne vient pas des *Olympica*.
1° La première ligne avec sa note rappelle évidemment le début des *Olympica* :
X novembris 1619, cum plenus forem enthousiasmo, et mirabilis scientiae fundamenta reperirem (88)... Baillet nous dit qu'en marge, « d'une encre plus récente, mais toujours de la même main de l'Auteur », on lisait: *XI Novembris 1620, coepi intelligere fundamentum inventi mirabilis* (89).
La première ligne du fragment n'est pas exactement semblable à celle que Baillet a lue dans la marge des *Olympica* et qu'il déclare être de la main de Descartes. C'est même pourquoi quelqu'un a transcrit en face la phrase lue dans les *Olympica*, substituant involontairement X à XI: est-ce Descartes? ne serait-ce pas plutôt Leibniz? Peu importe : que ce soit l'un ou l'autre, le fragment est tiré d'une page du petit registre qui n'est pas celle où commence le récit des songes.
2° La seconde ligne rappelle l'épisode final du troisième songe : là aussi le rêveur lit le vers d'Ausone. Mais, dans notre fragment, il s'agit d'une simple note sans verbe : « Songe, nov. 1619, là, poème 7 qui commence : Quel chemin de la vie suivrai-je ? Auson. » Ces lignes n'ont pu être découpées dans le récit visiblement rédigé que suit Baillet, même en tenant compte des enjolivements.
Le vers du poète latin, d'ailleurs, n'apparaît lié à une date dans aucun des trois passages où le traducteur le cite ; la première fois, le rêveur « tombe » sur lui en ouvrant au hasard un *corpus poetarum*, la seconde, il essaie vainement de le retrouver dans le même recueil; la troisième, il y reconnaît un « bon conseil » (90). On ne voit vraiment pas comment l'un de ces morceaux pourrait bien être le contexte du fragment.
Le fragment ne vient pas des Olympica. D'où vient-il ?

La série B du registre est faite de trois groupes de textes sous les rubriques : *Praeambula, Experimenta, Olympica*. Ces lignes se trouvent sur la copie avant le premier fragment incontestablement extrait des *Olympica*, mais séparées de celui-ci par deux autres « pensées ». Si, comme c'est vraisemblable, Leibniz suit l'ordre du registre, cette situation porte à croire qu'elles viennent des *Experimenta*.
(...)
Ce fragment serait-il donc une note sur un cas d'*experimentum* ?
Il y a tout lieu de croire que ces deux courts alinéas constituaient un tout sur le petit registre comme sur la copie de Leibniz telle que nous la connaissons par Foucher de Careil. Il s'agit donc d'une note qui rapproche deux faits et c'est le rapprochement de ces deux faits qui est l'objet même de la note.
(...)
La note sur le rêve des *Experimenta* n'est pas un morceau de fable : elle rappelle deux faits et l'un de ces faits est un songe de la nuit du 10 au 11 novembre 1619.
Tout n'est donc pas fictif dans le récit des *Olympica*.
A la fin du troisième rêve, selon le récit, Descartes se réveille en train d'interpréter le vers : *Quod vitae sectabor iter*? Souvenir immédiat qui effleure la conscience et dont elle part pour rappeler ce qui le précède, c'est, dans le rêve reconstruit, le morceau le plus pur du rêve rêvé. Or, d'après la note des *Experimenta*, c'est là aussi le souvenir d'un rêve réellement rêvé dans la nuit du 10 au 11 novembre 1619.
Tout le reste du récit serait-il une fable, cela n'empêcherait pas qu'un fragment de vrai rêve ne se trouve au centre, à l'instant où, en droit, tout aboutit et d'où, en fait, tout part dans le déroulement des pseudo-rêves." (Gouhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41).
(86) Sauf Sirven, *Les Années d'apprentissage de Descartes (1596-1628)*, Paris, Vrin, 1928 p. 65 sq.; mais sa restitution du petit registre est tout à fait différente de celle qui a été proposée ici, de sorte que nos interprétations sont divergentes.

(87) *Cogitationes privatae*, AT t. X, p. 216 ; Foucher de Careil, t. I, p. 8.
(88) Baillet, t. 1, p. 50 (AT t. X, p. 179) et p. 81 (AT t. X, p. 181).
(89) *Ibidem*, t. I, p. 51 (AT t. X, p. 179) ; sur ce texte, voir plus loin, ch. IV, p. 74.
(90) Baillet, t. I, p. 83 et 84 (AT t. X, p. 184).

11. ———. 1619 (automne) - 1623 (printemps). *Studium Bonae Mentis (Extraits de Baillet)*.
Première édition: Baillet II 406; Baillet I 26 / 34 / 87-91 / 109-110; II 66 / 477 / 479 / 486-487 / 531 / 545; AT X, 191-204; B Op. II, 897-915; traduction par Michelle Beyssade, O I, 260-268; CO, 127-140 (l'édition la plus complète).
"Un autre ouvrage latin que M. Descartes avait poussé loin, et dont il nous reste un ample fragment est celui de l'*Étude du bon sens*, ou de l'*Art de bien comprendre*, qu'il avait intitulé *Studium bonae Mentis*. Ce sont des considérations sur le désir que nous avons de savoir, sur les sciences, sur les dispositions de l'esprit pour apprendre, sur l'ordre qu'on doit garder pour acquérir la sagesse, c'est-à-dire la science avec la vertu, en joignant les fonctions de la volonté avec celles de l'entendement. Son dessein était de frayer un chemin tout nouveau ; mais il prétendait ne travailler que pour lui-même, et pour l'ami à qui il adressait son traité sous le nom de *Museus*, que les uns ont pris pour le sieur Is. Beeckman principal du collège de Dordrecht, d'autres pour M. Mydorge ou pour le P. Mersenne."
Baillet VII, chapitre 20, p. 406.
"On peut interpréter d'abord ce terme au sens général d'entreprise, ou d'œuvre, et non au sens d'un ouvrage littéraire ou philosophique particulier. Mais il semble bien que Descartes ait conu dès ce moment le projet de consigner le fruit de ses réflexions dans un livre et de le publier. En tout cas, il s'est promis à lui-même, quelques mois plus tard, d'achever un livre avant Pâques 1620 et de l'éditer : « Omnino autem ante Pascha absolvam tractatum meum, et si librariorum mihi sit copia dignusque videatur, emittam, ut hodie promisi, 1620, die 23 Febr. » (*) *Cogit. privatae*, t. X, p. 218, 1. 3-5.

On ignore ce que peut avoir été ce traité, mais rien ne s'opposerait à ce que ce fût le *Studium bonae mentis* (t. X, p. 191-203), dont ce que nous savons correspond exactement aux préoccupations méthodologiques et morales de Descartes à cette époque : Ce sont des considérations sur le désir que nous avons de savoir, sur les sciences, sur les dispositions de l'esprit pour apprendre, sur l'ordre qu'on doit garder pour acquérir la sagesse, c'est-à-dire la science avec la vertu, en joignant les fonctions de la volonté avec celles de l'entendement. Son dessein était de frayer un chemin tout nouveau ; mais il prétendait ne travailler que pour lui-même et pour l'ami à qui il adressait son traité sous le nom de Museus, que les uns ont pris pour le sieur J. Beeckman, principal du collège de Dordrecht, d'autres pour M. Mydorge ou pour le P. Mersenne (A. Baillet, t. II, p. 406 ; AT X, p. 191). Ces identifications de personnages sont purement conjecturales et il n'y a pas à en tenir compte, d'autant moins que Museus pourrait fort bien n'avoir été qu'un interlocuteur imaginaire ; mais tout le reste s'accorde avec l'élaboration de la méthode et de la morale provisoire que Descartes situe entre novembre 1619 et mars ou avril 1620."
Gilson, *Discours de la méthode. Texte et Commentaire*, Paris: Vrin, 1925 (deuxième édition revue 1926), p. 181 (note a AT VI, p. 17, l. 8 ".. l'ouvrage..." [O III, 92]).
(*) *J'ajoute la traduction et les notes de Fernand Hallyn* : "D'autre part, je terminerai complètement mon traité avant Pâques, et si j'ai matière à livres (1) et si le traité en paraît digne, je le publierai, comme je l'ai promis aujourd'hui, le 23 septembre (2) 1620".
(1) Leon de Foucher de Careil (« librorum »). AT corrige en « librariorum » en se fondant sur la version de Baillet (« libraires »). Gouhier, *La pensée religieuse de Descartes*, Paris: Vrin 1979, p. 105 (première édition 1924) traduit par « copistes ». Aucune des traductions proposées jusqu'à présent (« livres », au sens courant, pour « librorum », « libraires » ou « copistes » pour « librariorum ») n'est vraiment satisfaisante dans le contexte. Je propose de maintenir « librorum », mais de comprendre le mot au sens

de « parties d'un ouvrage », les « livres » dont devrait se composer le traité projeté.
(2) « Février » chez Baillet. Cf. l'introduction (p. 25), où est adoptée la leon de Baillet mais aussi, ici-même, la contribution de G. Rodis-Lewis, qui maintient « septembre ».
"« La vraie philosophie dépend de l'entendement. » Le *Studium* ne institue pas seulement, comme Étienne Gilson l'avait remarqué, un petit traité *De la philosophie*; il est le premier *traité de philosophie* de Descartes, ouvrant la voie au traité de « vraie philosophie » que seront les *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. Libérant ce champ inédit pour Descartes est la philosophie, le *Studium bonae mentis* s'avère donc être un texte décisif, en dépit de son inachèvement et de son démembrement — décisif dans son échec même. C'est pourquoi il constitue la pierre de touche la présente édition. C'est un texte difficile aussi, puisque seules les *Regulae* délivrent pleinement le sens de cet échec : à ce titre, le *Studium* et les *Regulae* constituent véritablement un tout indissociable. En charge de li présenter et de l'exploiter tant qu'il restait inédit, Baillet aura baissé les bras, alors même que l'intelligence du *Studium* lui eût ouvert de tout autres perspectives sur le jeune Descartes. Nous osons espérer que les propositions avancées ici pour en restituer le projet parviendront à esquisser la figure d'un Descartes devenant philosophe. Observons cependant d'emblée que l'ordre et les objets des considérations qui suivent sont encore manifestement d'origine aristotélicienne. Descartes commence en philosophie en répétant à sa manière le livre A de la *Métaphysique*, c'est-à-dire en faisant un *De philosophia* — ce qu'Étienne Gilson avait vu, moyennant un rapprochement avec la *Lettre-préface* aux *Principes* (AT IX-2, 2-8 et 4, 23): Baillet «aurait dû traduire [*Studium Bonae mentis*] par: *Étude de la sagesse*, ou même, plus simplement, *De la philosophie* » *Commentaire*, p. 82, selon AT IX-2, 3 qui reprend en Français l'*Epistola dedicatoria des Principia*, AT VIII-1, 4, 24, *studium sapientiae*), suivi à juste titre par Jacques Sirven : «Il y avait là [*sc.* dans les

considérations sur le désir que nous avons de savoir du *Studium*] comme un ressouvenir du premier livre des *Métaphysiques* d'Aristote » (*Les Années d'apprentissage de Descartes (1596-1628)*, Albi: 1928 p. 293). Il ne sera donc pas étonnant que peu après Descartes écrive sa propre *Peri tès alètheias theoria*, *De veritate quidem theoria* (Aristotle, *Métaphysique* α 1993 a 30), protreptique qui deviendra recherche de la vérité, *veritatis inquisitio*. Dans la mesure où la *Lettre-préface* obéit à une terminologie scolaire, conformément au genre du manuel, on peut considérer qu'elle reprend le projet du *Studium* comme commencement de la philosophie — à quelque vingt-cinq ans de distance, ces deux textes se répondent silencieusement : c'est pourquoi le livre A y est présent, quoique différemment." Vincent Carraud, note 2 à l'*Étude du bon sens*, dans CO, p. 141.

Dans une lettre à Beeckman du 26 mars 1619 Descartes expose son projet :

"Je suis arrivé ici [à Bréda] il y a six jours, et je me suis remis au culte des Muses avec plus de zèle que jamais. J'ai établi en ce court laps de temps, à l'aide de mes compas (2), quatre démonstrations remarquables et tout à fait neuves.

(...)

C'est autre chose que je cherche maintenant pour l'extraction des racines d'une somme (de plusieurs quantités incommensurables entre elles); si j'y parviens, comme je l'espère, je mettrai bien en ordre toute cette science, à condition de vaincre mon indolence et si le destin m'en donne le loisir.

Pour ne rien vous cacher de ce que j'entreprends, je voudrais donner au public non pas un *Ars brevis* comme Lulle (7), mais une science toute nouvelle (8), par laquelle on puisse résoudre tous les problèmes possibles, en n'importe quel genre de quantité, continue or discontinue."

(...)

C'est une entreprise infinie, et qui dépasse un seul homme, projet incroyablement ambitieux mais j'entrevois un je-ne-sais-quoi de lumineux dans l'obscur chaos de cette science

et je pense pouvoir par ce moyen dissiper les ténèbres les plus épaisses."
(AT X, 156-158, O VII, 2, 321-322; B 2).
(2) Les compas sont ceux que Descartes décrira dans la *Géométrie* II et III (AT VI 391 et 443 [O III, 430 et 471]).
(7) R. Lull, *Artificium sive Ars brevis ad absolvendam omnium artium encyclopœdiam*, ou encore *Ars brevis, quae est imago Artis generalis*, écrit en 1308, imprimé à Barcelone, 1481, souvent réimprimé ensuite (voir sa mention dans Beeckman = AT X 63-65).
(8) Note en marge : « méthode générale [*ars generalis*] pour résoudre toutes les questions » (Beeckman IV 59, n. 7).

12. ———. 1619-20 ou 1623?-1625 - hiver 1627-28. *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*.
Rédaction initiée en Allemande en 1619-1620 où à Paris en 1623, interrompue et reprise en France en 1626-1628 et jamais complétée.
AT X 359-469; B Op. II, 684-815; traduction et notes par Jean-Marie Beyssade et Michelle Beyssade, avec la collaboration de Frédéric Buzon et Denis Kambouchner, O I, 324-497.
Une copie (non autographe) du texte latin avec les seize premières Règles (*), a étée découverte à la Cambridge University Library en 2011 par Richard Serjeantson, qui en prépare une édition.
(*) manque la deuxième partie de la Règle IV [sur la *mathesis universalis*].
Je donne en parenthèse les abréviations communément utilisées pour les manuscrits et les éditions anciennes.
(N) = Première publication : Jan Hendrik Glazemaker (1620-1682) traduit le manuscrit latin en néerlandais vers le 1680 ; la traduction fut publiée à Amsterdam en 1684, avec le titre *R. Des Cartes Regulen van de bestieringe des verstants*.
(A) = La première édition du texte latin fut publiée en 1701 in *R. Des-Cartes Opuscula posthuma, physica et mathematica*, Amsterdam : P. & J. Blaeu ; l'édition Adam-Tannery ne tient pas compte de la traduction néerlandaise.
(O) = Le manuscrit original est perdu.

(H) = Nous avons une copie de l'original (manuscrit de Hanovre : première édition par Charles Adam, "Ren. Cartesii Regulae de inquirenda veritate", *Revue Bourguignonne de l'Enseignement Supérieur*, 11, 1901, pp. 1-89) fait en 1678 et acheté par Leibniz.
(L) = Cette copie contient de nombreuses erreurs et Leibniz l'a corrigée.
(R) = Une autre copie faite vers 1680 et qui appartenait à Johannes de Raey (1622-1701), probablement utilisée pour les premières éditions, est aujourd'hui perdue.
Éditions critiques des *Regulae*:
Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Texte critique établi par Giovanni Crapulli avec la version hollandaise du XVIIème siècle, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Kritisch revidiert und herausgegeben von Heinrich Springmeyer, Lüder Gäbe und Hans Günter Zekl, Hamburg: Meiner, 1973.
Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Cogitationes privatae, Übersetzt und herausgegeben von Christian Wohlers, Hamburg Felix Meiner, 2011.
Traductions:
Règles pour la direction de l'esprit, Traduction et notes par Joseph Sirven, Paris: Vrin, 1945.
Règles pour la direction de l'esprit, Traduction et notes par Jacques Brunschwig. Préface, dossier et glossaire par Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung, Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2002 (première édition de la traduction dans F. Alquié (éd.), René Descartes, *Œuvres philosophiques,* Paris: Garnier, I, 1963, pp. 67-204).
Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l'esprit en la recherche de la vérité, Traduction selon le lexique cartésien, et annotation conceptuelle par Jean-Luc Marion. Avec des notes mathématiques de Pierre Costabel, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
La première mention se trouve dans l'*Inventaire de Stockholm* des écrits de Descartes à la lettre F: "Neuf cahiers reliés ensemble, contentant partie d'un traité des règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l'Esprit en la recherche de la Vérité". (AT X, p. 9).

"En plusieurs endroits de sa *Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes* (1691), Baillet donne une traduction Français e de passages des *Regulae*. Le texte latin qu'il avait sous les yeux n'était pas celui que nous avons publié, et qui se trouvait en Hollande et ne fut imprimé qu'en 1701, mais le texte original, qui venait de Clerselier, et qui a disparu depuis lors. La traduction de Baillet n'en est que plus précieuse, puisqu'elle atteste à la fois l'existence de ce texte primitif et sa conformité avec la copie qui nous en a été conservée.
« ...M. Clerselier... s'est trouvé le possesseur unique de tout ce que M. Descartes avait jamais écrit, tant de ce qui était fini que de ce qui n'était que commencé. Mais, après une recherche exacte qui s'est faite de cette Logique prétendue parmi ses papiers, il ne s'est rien trouvé... qui puisse passer pour Logique, si l'on en excepte ses *Règles pour la direction de l'esprit dans la recherche de la vérité* (en marge: *C'est un manuscrit latin, non achevé, qui est entre nos mains*), qui peuvent servir de modèle pour une excellente Logique, et qui font sans doute une portion considérable de sa Méthode, dont ce que nous avons d'imprimé à la tête de ses Essais, ne fait qu'une petite partie. »
(Baillet I, p. 282.)
« Parmi ceux (*les ouvrages de M. Descartes*) que les soins de M. Chanut ont fait échoir à M. Clerselier, il n'y en a point de plus considérable ni peut-être de plus achevé, que le traité latin qui contient des *Règles pour conduire nôtre esprit dans la recherche de la vérité*. C'est celui des manuscrits de M. Descartes, à l'impression desquels il semble que le Public ait le plus d'intérêt. On est déjà prévenu sur sa valeur et son prix par la lecture que M. Clerselier en a communiquée à quelques curieux, et par le témoignage que le célèbre Auteur de l'*Art de penser* (en marge : *Part. 4, chap. 2*) a rendu du bon usage qu'on en peut faire. »
(AT X, 477).
Clerselier a montré le manuscrit aux auteurs de la *Logique de Port Royal* qui l'ont utilisé pour la deuxième édition : "La *Logique de Port-Royal* contient un long passage, qui correspond à une partie des Règles XIII et XIV. Comme

nous l'avons expliqué dans l'*Avertissement* (p. 351-2), ce passage a pour nous la valeur d'un témoin : il atteste l'existence d'un texte original, que nous n'avons plus, mais que Clerselier avait encore et qu'il a communiqué à Arnauld pour le traduire. On chercherait d'ailleurs en vain cette traduction dans la première édition : *La Logique ou L'Art de penser contenant, outres les règles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles propres à former le jugement*. (A Paris, chez Jean de Launay, sous le Porche des Escoles de Sorbonne, M,DC.LXII. In-12, pp. 473, plus 5 p. Extrait du Privilège, 1er Avril 1662: Permis au sieur Le Bon... Achevé d'imprimer, 6 juillet 1662.) Le passage qui nous intéresse n'apparaît que dans la seconde édition : *La Logique ou L'Art de penser: contenant* etc. (comme précédemment). *Seconde édition, revue et augmentée*. (A Paris, chez Charles Savreux, au pied de la Tour de Nostre Dame, à l'enseigne des Trois Vertus, M.DC.LXIV.) C'est aussi un in-12; le passage en question s'y trouve, p. 391-397, avec cette note: « La plus grande partie de ce que l'on dit ici des questions, a été tirée d'un manuscrit de M. Descartes, que M. Clerselier a eu la bonté de prester. » Cette note et le passage visé se retrouvent dans toutes les éditions postérieures de la *Logique de Port-Royal,* à partir de la deuxième, Partie IV, chapitre II." (AT X 470).
Voir l'édition critique : Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, *La logique ou l'art de penser (dite Logique de Port-Royal)*, édité par Dominique Descotes, Paris: Champion, 2011.
"Le passage suivant du P. Poisson atteste aussi l'existence d'un texte des *Regulae*, autre que celui que nous avons donné ; et cet autre texte était l'original, tandis que le nôtre n'est qu'une copie.
Observation sur la troisième règle de la Méthode de Descartes : Conduire par ordre mes pensées, etc. (Tome VI de la présente édition, p. 18, l.27) :
«... j'ay rencontré dans un Manuscrit, qu'il avait commencé dés les premières années qu'il s'appliqua sérieusement à l'étude, que pour venir à bout de toutes les difficultés qu'on propose, il faut:
1, les connaître distinctement chacune en particulier ;

2, les dépouiller de tout ce qui ne leur est point essentiel dans le sens auquel on les considère ;
3, les réduire et les diviser en petites parties ;
4, examiner avec attention chacune de ces parties, commenant par les plus simples ;
5, il faut rapporter toutes ces parties, en les comparant les unes aux autres.
Voilà à quoi aboutit toute la finesse des méthodes qu'on a trouvées et qu'on trouvera jamais. Elle est également nécessaire dans la Physique et dans la Géométrie. L'article de ces règles le plus difficile à mettre en pratique, c'est ce dernier : tant parce qu'on ne connait pas assez les termes qu'on doit comparer, qu'à cause qu'on a besoin d'un *Moyen*, qu'on appelle *Medium* dans l'École, qui n'est pas aisé à trouver. »
(*Commentaire ou Remarques sur la Méthode de René Descartes,* par L. P. N. I. P. P. D. L., à Vendôme, M.DC.LXX. Partie II, 6e observation, p. 76.)
(AT X, 476).
En 1676 Leibniz rencontrait Clerselier : "J'ai été aujourd'hui avec Mons. de Tschirnhaus, pour lui donner la connaissance de Mons. Clerselier, et pour lui faire voir les relies de Mons. des Cartes.
Il nous montra un discours de Mons. des Cartes *de la recherche de la vérité*; il y avait environ 22 règles expliquées e illustrées. En Latin." (AT X, 208).
Leibniz et Ehrenfried Tschirnhaus (1651-1708) transcrivirent tous les deux des manuscrits : "en particulier Tschirnhaus qui entre 1676 et 1682 en fit parvenir des copies en Hollande à des amis qui appartenaient au cercle spinoziste, et à Hanovre à Leibniz qui avait quitté Paris en novembre 1676. Durant cette période, le projet d'une édition des mss. à dû mûrir chez les deux amis sous l'impulsion ou du moins avec les encouragements de Clerselier. Nous suivons la trace de ce projet, qui en définitive n'aboutit pas, d'abord à Paris, puis à Amsterdam. Ce dont nous sommes en tout cas certains c'est que Leibniz s'est trouvé dès novembre 1676 en possession d'une copie des *Regulae* et

que Tschirnhaus dès 1678 montre qu'il a pris connaissance directement du texte.
(...)
A partir des premières années du XVIIIe siècle nous ne possédons plus de renseignements au sujet des mss. cartésiens, passés des mains de Legrand à celles de Marmion, professeur de philosophie au Collège des Grassins, et nous perdons par conséquent la trace du ms. original des *Regulae*." (Giovanni Crapulli, *Introduction* à l'édition critique, René Descartes, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p. XIII)

13. ———. 1619-20. *De Solidorum Elementis (Ms. de Leibniz)*.
Le texte originel de Descartes "Environ seize feuillets in octavo sous ce titre : *Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis*" (*Inventaire succinct des écrits,* lettre M, AT X 10), est perdu, mais nous possédons la copie faite par Leibniz à Paris en 1672-1676 et publiée pour la première fois par Foucher de Careil, vol. II, pp. 214-226.
AT X 265-276; *Additions* in AT XI 690-692; nouvelle édition par Pierre Costabel dans la *Nouvelle présentation* de AT (1966) X 276 et 687-689; B Op. II, 1224-1237; traduction par André Warusfel, O I, 221-231.
Nouvelle édition avec traduction en anglais par Pasquale Joseph Federico, *Descartes on Polyhedra. A Study of the* De Solidorum elementis, New York, Springer, 1982.
Édition critique, avec introduction, traduction, notes et commentaires par Pierre Costabel, *René Descartes. Exercices pour les éléments des solides. Essai en complément d'Euclide. Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1987.
"Le présent ouvrage est le résultat d'une longue histoire. Le manuscrit mathématique de Descartes qui est ici l'objet d'une restitution a eu un sort tourmenté. Conservé dans les papiers de l'auteur pendant plus d'un demi-siècle, il a disparu peu de temps après avoir eu la chance d'être lu par Leibniz à Paris. Mais la transcription effectuée par ce lecteur exceptionnel a connu le silence des pièces d'archives jusqu'au milieu du XIXe siècle, et elle n'est sortie de l'ombre que pour tomber entre les mains de lecteurs plus avertis de

la mathématique de leur temps que des précautions à prendre avec des textes anciens. Elle a ainsi davantage retenu l'attention par les suggestions qu'elle paraissait fournir à un moment de l'évolution de la pensée mathématique, moment caractérisé par la prise de conscience de l'importance de l'analyse de la situation (*Analysis situs*), et si elle a joué un rôle dans les réflexions consécutives, elle n'a pas tardé, au début du siècle actuel, à être objet de graves réserves, réserves dont la pointe acérée n'a cessé de se préciser. Manque de rigueur, absence de point de vue authentiquement topologique, les raisons de renvoyer ce texte au silence sont aujourd'hui pressantes aux yeux de quelques-uns.
L 'effort de restitution du texte lui-même, qui a été entrepris vers 1894 et réalisé en 1908 avec le tome X de la grande édition des *Œuvres de Descartes* par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, est donc survenu dans une ambiance peu favorable à sa consistance propre et à sa réception. Affaire d'érudition cartésienne il est apparu dès le début, et il l'est resté jusqu'à la récente mise à tour de l'édition susdite en 1966.
Principal acteur de cette mise à jour, dans les limites de notes correctrices à apporter à la première édition, le présent éditeur savait dès cette époque qu'il y avait lieu de procéder à une prise en charge réellement convenable et il en a fixé les traits à l'occasion de divers articles tout en préparant l'édition nouvelle, séparée, délivrée des conditions restrictives imposées par l'insertion dans des Œuvres complètes monumentales. Il y a près de dix ans que cette édition était prête, mais publier était une autre affaire que d'établir la matière de la publication. Il fallut trouver un éditeur au sens ordinaire et Français du terme." (Pierre Costabel, *René Descartes. Exercices pour les éléments des solides, Avertissement*, pp. V-VI).

14. ———. 1628. *Censura quarundam epistolarum Domini Balzacii.*
AT I, 7-11; CO, 194-202, traduction du XVIIe siècle, pp. 195-203; B 14; traduction par Michelle Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner, O I, 285-289; O VIII 2 345-349 (traduction du XVIIe siècle).

Première édition : Claude Clerselier (éd.), *Lettres de mr. Descartes*, Paris, Charles Angot, vol. I, 1657, lettre C (février-mars 1628), pp. 462-471.
1628 est la datation proposée par Clerselier; Balzac en remercia Descartes le 30 mars 1628.
Pour les *Lettres* de Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac (1597-1654), Paris, 1624 (réédition : *Les premières lettres de Guez de Balzac,* voir l'édition critique précédée d'une introduction par H. Bibas et K.-T. Butler, Paris: Droz 1933-34, 2 volumes).
La *Censura* (ou *Jugement de quelques* Lettres *de Balzac*) de Descartes est aussi publiée dans Guez de Balzac, *Socrate chrétien* [1652], édition critique de Jean Jehasse, Paris: Champion, 2008, avec une nouvelle traduction, pp. 243-249.

15. ———. 1628. *[De la Divinité]*.
CO pp. 214-216; ce texte n'a pas été retrouvé.
"Ce fut durant cet été [1628] qu'il voulut écrire *De la Divinité*, voyez ci-après au livre III, chap. Ier." (Baillet I, 153, en marge).
"C'était la chaleur du climat de son pays qu'il ne trouvait point favorable à son tempérament par rapport à la liberté de son esprit, dont la jouissance ne pouvait être quelque trouble, lorsqu'il était question de concevoir des vérités, où l'imagination ne devait point se mêler. Il s'était aperu que l'air de Paris était mêlé pour lui d'une apparence de poison très subtil et très dangereux ; qu'il le disposait insensiblement à la vanité; et qu'il ne lui faisait produire que des chimères. C'est ce qu'il avait particulièrement éprouvé au mois de juin de l'année 1628, lorsque, s'étant retiré de chez M. Le Vasseur pour étudier loin des compagnies, il entreprit de composer quelque chose sur la divinité. Son travail ne put lui réussir faute d'avoir eu les sens assez rassis ; outre n'était peut-être pas d'ailleurs assez purifié ni assez exercé pour pouvoir traiter un sujet si sublime avec solidité." (Baillet I, 171).

16. ———. 1628? *[De deo Socratis]*.
CO, pp. 173-179; ce texte n'a pas été retrouvé.

« L'on nous parle encore d'un autre traité de M. Descartes, intitulé *De Deo Socratis*, où il examinait ce que pouvait être cet *esprit familier* de Socrate, qui fait le sujet de l'entretien des curieux depuis tant de siècles. Mais il parait que c'était un bien déjà aliéné, lorsque son Auteur fit le voyage de Suède. Aussi ne se trouva-t-il point parmi les autres dans l'Inventaire que l'on fit de ses écrits après sa mort. Comme il est tombé en d'autres mains que celles de M. Clerselier, nous ne pourrons contribuer à sa publication que par des prières, pour porter ceux qui en sont devenus les maîtres à lui procurer le jour. Voici par avance ce que M. Descartes pensait de cet esprit familier de Socrate, et ce qu'il en mandait à la princesse Palatine sa disciple : « Et ce qu'on nomme communément le génie de Socrate, n'a sans doute été autre chose, sinon qu'il avait accoutumé de suivre ses inclinations intérieures, et qu'il croyait que l'événement de ce qu'il entreprenait serait heureux, lorsqu'il avait quelque secret sentiment de gaieté, et au contraire qu'il serait malheureux lorsqu'il était triste. Il faut avouer néanmoins qu'il y aurait de la superstition à s'attacher à cette opinion autant qu'on dit qu'il y était attaché. Car Platon rapporte de lui qu'il demeurait même au logis toutes les que son génie ne lui conseillait pas d'en sortir. Mais touchant les actions importantes de la vie, lorsqu'elles se trouvent si douteuses que la prudence ne peut enseigner ce qu'on doit faire, il me semble qu'on a grande raison de suivre les conseils de son génie; et qu'il est utile d'avoir une forte persuasion que les choses que nous entreprenons sans répugnance et avec la liberté qui accompagne d'ordinaire la joie ne manqueront pas de nous bien réussir. » (Baillet II, 408: lettre à Elisabeth du novembre 1646, AT IV, 530; O VIII 2, 270; B 578).

17. ———. 1628 (automne) - 1629 (été). *[Traité de métaphysique]*.
CO, 217-227; ce traité en latin, aujourd'hui perdu, (son premier projet de métaphysique) est mentionné par Descartes dans :
a) la lettre à Gibieuf du 18 juillet 1629: "Je me réserve à vous importuner lorsque j'aurai achevé un petit traité que je commence (5), duquel je ne vous aurais rien mandé qu'il ne

fût fait, si je n'avais peur que la longueur du temps vous fît oublier la promesse que vous m'avez faite de le corriger et y ajouter la dernière main ; car je n'espère pas en venir à bout de deux ou trois ans, et peut-être après cela me résoudrai-je de le brûler, ou du moins il n'échappera pas d'entre mes mains et celles de mes amis sans être bien considéré ; car si je ne suis assez habile pour faire quelque chose de bon, je tâcherai au moins d'être assez sage pour ne pas publier mes imperfections." (AT I 17; O VIII 2, 790-791; B 17);
(5) Les commentateurs rapprochent ce « petit traité » du « petit *Traité de Métaphysique*, lequel j'ai commencé étant en Frise, et dont les principaux points sont de prouver *l'existence de Dieu, et celle de nos âmes*, lorsqu'elles sont séparées du corps, d'où suit leur immortalité », Descartes écrit à Mersenne, 25 novembre 1630 (AT I 182, [O VIII 1, 85] B 36); voir aussi à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630 (AT I 136, [O VIII 1, 67] B 30).
les lettres à Mersenne du:
b) 15 avril 1630: "Pour votre question de Théologie, encore qu'elle passe la capacité de mon esprit, elle ne me semble pas toutefois hors de ma profession, parce qu'elle ne touche point à ce qui dépend de la révélation, ce que je nomme proprement Théologie; mais elle est plutôt métaphysique (*) et se doit examiner par la raison humaine. Or j'estime que tous ceux à qui Dieu a donné l'usage de cette raison, sont obligés à le connaître, et à se connaître eux-mêmes. C'est par là que j'ai tâché de commencer mes études ; et je vous dirai que je n'eusse su trouver les fondements de la physique, si je ne les eusse cherchés par cette voie. Mais c'est la matière que j'ai le plus étudiée de toutes, et en laquelle, grâce à Dieu, je me suis aucunement satisfait ; au moins pensé-je avoir trouvé comment on peut démontrer les vérités métaphysiques, d'une faon qui est *plus* évidente que les démonstrations de géométrie ; je dis ceci selon mon jugement, car je ne sais pas si je le pourrai persuader aux autres. Les 9 premiers mois que j'ai été en ce pays, je n'ai travaillé à autre chose, et je crois que vous m'aviez déjà ouï parler auparavant que j'avais fait dessein d'en mettre quelque chose par écrit ; mais je ne juge pas à propos de le

faire, que n'aie vu premièrement comment la physique sera reue. (**)" (AT I 143-144; O VIII 1, 72; B 30);
(*) [Première occurrence du terme *métaphysique* dans les écrits de Descartes]
(**) [Descartes se réfère ici au *Monde*, qui ne sera pas publié en raison de la condamnation de Galilée en 1633]
c) 25 novembre 1630 : "J'éprouverai en la *Dioptrique* si je suis capable d'expliquer mes conceptions, et de persuader aux autres une vérité, après que je me la suis persuadée: ce que je ne pense nullement. Mais si je trouvais expérience que cela fût, je ne dis pas que quelque jour je n'achevasse un petit traité de métaphysique, lequel j'ai commencé étant en Frise, et dont les principaux points sont de prouver *l'existence de Dieu, et celle de nos âmes*, lorsqu'elles sont séparées du corps, d'où suit leur immortalité." (AT I 182; O VIII 1, 85: B 36);
d) Mersenne, vers le 20 avril 1637: "Il y a environ huit ans que j'ai écrit en latin un commencement de Métaphysique (4) (...) et si l'on fait une version latine de ce livre (5), comme on s'y prépare, je l'y pourrai faire mettre." (AT I 350; O VIII 1, 139; B 104).
(4) En 1629 (à Gibieuf, 18 juillet 1629, AT I 17 1. 7, [O VIII 2, 790] B 17; à Mersenne, (15 avril 1630, AT I 144 l. 19, [O VIII 1, 72] B 30).
(5) La traduction latine du *Discours* et des *Essais* (sauf la *Géométrie*), œuvre d'Étienne de Courcelles, n'apparut qu'en 1644. CM suggère qu'un projet a pu se constituer dès 1637 avec le jeune Van Schooten, qui publia en 1649 une traduction latine de la *Géométrie*.

18. Beeckman, Isaac. 1628-29. *Extraits du Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman*.
AT X, 331-348; treize extraits mathématiques en latin de 1628-1629; B Op. II, 1352-1379; traduction Français e par Frédéric de Buzon, O I, *Notes de (1628-1699)*, 107-120.
I. Historia Des Cartes ejusque mecum necessitudo. — Docti cur pauci 331 ; II. Algebrae Des Cartes specimen quoddam 333 ; III. Angulus refractionis à Des Cartes exploratus 335 ; IV. Chordarum musicarum crassitiei ratio 337 ; V. Solis radijs comburere remotissima 338 ; VI. Ellipsis in quâ

omnes radij paralleli concurrunt in puncto medij densioris 338 ; VII. Hyperbola per quam radij in unum punctum concurrunt 340 ; VIII. Ellipsis pars per quam radij in aère exacte concurrunt 340 ; IX. Hyperbola per quam omnes radij paralleli in unum punctum exacte incidant demonstrata 341 ; X. Parabolâ duo média proportionalia inveniri posse demonstratur 342 ; XI. Parabolâ œquationes Cosicas lineis exponere 344 ; XII. Lunae an litterae inscribi possint absentibus legendae 347 ; XIII. Consonantias omnes ex continua chordae bisectione 348.

19. Descartes, René. 1629. *Anatomica quaedam ex M.to Cartesii. Problemata (Ms. de Leibniz).*
Anatomica quaedam ex M.to Cartesii AT XI, pp. 549-621; B Op. II, 1104-1197; *Problemata* AT XI, 621-634; B OP. II, 1197-1219.
Première édition du texte latin avec une traduction Français e dans Foucher de Careil: vol. I. *Observationes Meteorologicae*, 72-100 (AT XI-621-634); *Physiologia* 100-155; Vol. II *Partes similares, et excrementa, et morbi* 66-85; *Anatomica quaedam* 86-134; *Observationum anatomicarum* 134-209.
Nouvelle édition dans René Descartes, *Écrits physiologiques et médicaux,* Présentation, textes, traduction, notes et annexes de Vincent Aucante, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2000.
Dans cette édition la première partie, *La génération des animaux*, contient les fragments 1-44 de 1630-1632, 45-72 de 1637, 73-76 de 1648.

20. ———. 1629. *Remedia, et vires medicamentorum (Ms. de Leibniz).*
Première édition du texte latin avec une traduction Français e dans Foucher de Careil, vol. II, 210-213.
AT XI, pp. 641-644; B Op. II, 1216-1219.
Nouvelle édition dans René Descartes, *Écrits physiologiques et médicaux,* Présentation textes, traduction, notes et annexes de Vincent Aucante, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2000.
Dans cette édition la deuxième partie, *Fragments de thérapeutique*, contient les fragments T1-T9 de 1628

(*Remèdes et forces des médicaments*) et T10-T14 de 1631.

21. ———. 1629; 1638-40. *Excerpta ex mss. R. Des-Cartes (Ms de Leibniz)*.
Première édition dans R. Des-Cartes *Opuscula posthuma, physîca & mathematica,* Amsterdam 1701, pp. 1-17 (publié à la fine du volume, avec une nouvelle numération).
AT X, pp. 285-324; B. Op. II, 994-1051; O III, pp. 532-562.
I. Polygonorum inscriptio 285 ; II. Horum Usus Trigonometricus 289 ; ni. Numeri Polygoni 297 ; IV. De Partibus Aliquotis Numerorum 300 ; V. Radix Cubica Binomiorum 302 ; VI. Circuli Quadratio 304 ; VII. Tangens Cycloïdis 305 ; VIII. Tangens Quadratariae per Cycloïdem 307 ; IX. Aequationum Asymmetriae Remotio 308 ; X. Ovales Opticae Quatuor 310 ; XI. Earum Descriptio et Tactio 313-324.
"Le volume intitulé : R. Des-Cartes *Opuscula posthuma, physîca & mathematica* (Amstelodami, ex typographia P. & J. Blaeu, MDCCI), donne à la fin, avec une pagination spéciale (p. 1-17), une série de fragments mathématiques sous la rubrique : *Excerpta ex MSS. R. Des-Cartes*." (AT X, p. 279).
Il s'agit de 12 fragments, la plupart écrits en 1638-1640; le plus étendu, sur les Ovales, a été écrit avant 1629.

22. ———. 1629-48. *Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium. De saporibus*.
Première édition latine dans R. Des-Cartes *Opuscula posthuma, physîca & mathematica,* Amsterdam 1701, pp. 1-23.
AT XI, pp. 505-538; 539-542; B Op. II, 936-983; 984-987.
Nouvelle édition dans René Descartes, *Écrits physiologiques et médicaux,* Présentation, textes, traduction, notes et annexes de Vincent Aucante, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2000.
Voir aussi: Annie Bitbol-Hespériès, "Sur quelques *errata* dans les textes biomédicaux latins de Descartes, AT XI", *Bulletin cartésien* XLIV 2013, *Archives de Philosophie*, 2015/1 Tome 78, pp. 45-55: "En préparant l'édition des textes médicaux de Descartes, à paraître dans le volume II des *Œuvres complètes* de Descartes chez Gallimard (coll.

Tel), dirigées par Jean Marie Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner, j'ai été conduite à proposer la correction de quelques coquilles figurant dans les éditions des textes latins des *Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium* et des *Excerpta anatomica* et reprises dans les traductions. " (p. 45).

23. ———. 1629 (octobre) - 1633. *Le Monde, ou Traité de la lumière*.
AT XI, 3-118; B OP. II, 214-359.
Premières publications :
1) *Le Monde de Mr. Descartes ou le Traité de la Lumière, et des autres principaux objets des Sens. Avec un Discours du Mouvement local, et un autre des Fièvres composez selon les principes du même Auteur*, Paris: Jacques Le Gras, 1664 (le texte est basé sur un copie de l'original, les deux Discours placés à la suite ne sont pas de Descartes).
2) Clerselier 1677, pp. 405-511.
Édition critique : *Le Monde, l'Homme*, Introduction de Annie Bitbol-Hespériès; textes établis et annotés par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et Jean-Pierre Verdet, Paris: Seuil, 1996.
Titres de chapitres introduits par Clerselier dans son édition du *Traité du monde* : I. De la différence qui est entre nos sentiments et les choses qui les produisent ; II. En quoi consiste la chaleur et la lumière du feu ; III. De la dureté et de la liquidité ; IV. Du vide, et d'où vient que nos sens n'aperoivent pas certains corps ; V. Du nombre des éléments, et de leurs qualités ; VI. Description d'un nouveau monde, et des qualités de la matière dont il est composé ; VII. Des lois de la nature de ce nouveau monde ; VIII. De la formation du soleil et des étoiles de ce nouveau monde ; IX. De l'origine et du cours des planètes et des comètes en général, et en particulier des comètes ; X. Des planètes en général, et en particulier de la terre et de la lune ; XI. De la pesanteur ; XII. Du flux et du reflux de la mer ; XIII. De la lumière ; XIV. Des propriétés de la lumière ; XV. Que la face du ciel de ce nouveau monde doit paraître à ses habitants toute semblable à celle du nôtre ; XVI-XVII [Ces Chapitres n'ont pas été retrouvés] ; Pour le XVIII Chapitre, voir *L'Homme*.

"Le plan du *Monde* décrit dans le *Discours*
La cinquième partie du *Discours* est consacrée, à un résumé du *Monde*, à la faveur duquel Descartes brosse à larges traits les principaux chapitres et le mouvement général de ce livre où il comptait déposer ses connaissances en physique. De manière schématique, voici la table des matières reconstituée de ce *Monde* qui n'a jamais vu le jour, sinon plus tard dans les *Principes*.
1. Description de la matière.
2. Les lois de la nature.
3. Description des différentes combinaisons possibles de cette matière originelle selon les lois dégagées au deuxième paragraphe, ce qui donne les différents éléments : cieux, terre, planètes, comètes, soleil, étoiles fixes, lumière, etc.
4. Description du monde visible, en général de tous les phénomènes qui sont au-dessus de la terre (mouvements et qualités des Cieux).
5. Description des phénomènes terrestres : pesanteur, flux et reflux des océans, origine des mers, montagnes, etc., métaux, plantes, sable, feu, verre — métamorphose apparente des éléments.
6. Les êtres animés : les animaux, l'homme, ses fonctions, son anatomie. (*)
7. La conclusion est centrée sur l'immortalité de l'âme humaine que Descartes établit par la différence entre l'homme et l'animal-machine.
Ce plan est guidé par un mouvement ascendant qui, trouvant son origine dans la matière inanimée, s'achève par révocation de l'immortalité de l'âme. L'esprit reconstruit probablement l'univers, en partant de l'évidence fournie par le spectacle de la matière elle-même régie par les lois de la mécanique, et achève son chemin en affirmant sa différence, c'est-à-dire son immortalité.
Une étroite correspondance peut être établie entre cette organisation et celle des *Principes* : à la deuxième partie des *Principes* (« Des principes des choses matérielles ») correspondent les chapitres que nous avons numérotés 1, 2 et 3; à la troisième partie (« Du monde visible ») le chapitre 4; et à la quatrième partie (« De la terre ») le chapitre 5. Les

racines métaphysiques de la première partie des *Principes* sont dispersées dans les quatre premières parties du *Discours*, à condition d'en retirer la morale par provision et les textes biographiques qui expliquent leur genèse."
* A ce moment du développement s'intercale l'explication détaillée de la circulation du sang.
Pierre-Alan Cahné, *Un autre Descartes. Le philosophe et son langage*, Paris: Vrin, 1980, pp. 257-258.
Le Monde est commencé en octobre 1629 : "Je ne laisse pas de vous en avoir très grande obligation, et encore plus de l'offre que vous me faites de faire imprimer ce petit traité que j'ai dessein d'écrire; mais je vous dirai qu'il ne sera pas prêt de plus d'un an. Car depuis le temps que je vous avais écrit il y a un mois, je n'ai rien fait du tout qu'en tracer l'argument, et au lieu d'expliquer un phénomène seulement, je me suis résolu d'expliquer tous les phénomènes de la nature, c'est-à-dire toute la physique. Et le dessein que j'ai me contente plus qu'aucun autre que j'aie jamais eu, car je pense avoir trouvé un moyen pour exposer toutes mes pensées en sorte qu'elles satisferont à quelques-uns et que les autres n'auront pas occasion d'y contredire." (lettre à Mersenne du 13 novembre 1629, AT I 70; O VIII 1, 33; B 23).
Le 22 juillet 1633 "Mon traité (9) est presque achevé, mais il me reste encore à le corriger et à le décrire (10) ; et parce qu'il ne m'y faut plus rien chercher de nouveau, j'ai tant de peine à travailler, que si je ne vous avais promis, il y a plus de trois ans, de vous l'envoyer dans la fin de cette année (11), je ne crois pas que j'en pusse de longtemps venir à bout ; mais je veux tâcher de tenir ma promesse (12)." (lettre à Mersenne, AT I, 268; O VIII 1, 107; B 59).
(9) *Le Monde*.
(10) Comprendre : *à le transcrìre* (ou bien, comme le suggère AM, lire *récrire* ?).
(11) Voir à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630 (AT I, 137 l. 16-17; [O VIII 1, 67] B 30) et novembre 1630 (AT I, 179 l. 12-13; [O VIII 1, 83] B 36).
(12) Une lettre de Golius à Huygens (1er novembre 1632, *Brwg*, [*De Briefwisselìng van Constantjin Huygens*, (1608

1687), 6 voll., ‘s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1911-1917] t. 1, 375) indique que Descartes en est à rédiger la philosophie de l'âme humaine, qu'il fait remonter à Dieu ; Descartes, dit-il, s'est retiré à Deventer pour rédiger en paix. Dans le *Discours*, celui-ci indique : « J'avais décrit, après cela, l'âme raisonnable et fait voir qu'elle ne peut aucunement être tirée de la puissance de la matière, ainsi que les autres choses, mais qu'elle doit expressément être créée », et il poursuit : « Il y a maintenant trois ans que j'étais parvenu à la fin du traité qui contient toutes ces choses » (AT VI, 59-60 [O III, 430 et 471]).
"... je ne vous promets pas de mettre ici des démonstrations exactes de toutes les choses que je dirai, ce sera assez que je vous ouvre le chemin par lequel vous les pourrez trouver de vous-même, quand vous prendrez la peine de les chercher. (...) Et pour faire ici un tableau qui vous agrée, il est besoin que j'y emploie de l'ombre aussi bien que des couleurs claires. Si bien que je me contenterai de poursuivre la description que j'ai commencée, comme n'ayant autre dessein que de vous raconter une fable." (AT XI, 48).
Dans le *Discours de la méthode*, en se référant au *Monde*: " ... pour ombrager un peu toutes ces choses, et pouvoir dire plus librement ce que j'en jugeais, sans être obligé de suivre ni de réfuter les opinions qui sont reues entre les doctes, je me résolus de laisser tout ce monde ici à leurs disputes, et de parler seulement de ce qui arriverait dans un nouveau, si Dieu créait maintenant quelque part, dans les espaces imaginaires, assez de matière pour le composer, et qu'il agitât diversement et sans ordre les diverses parties de cette matière, en sorte qu'il en composât un chaos aussi confus que les poètes en puissent feindre, et que, par après, il ne fît autre chose que prêter son concours ordinaire à la nature, et la laisser agir suivant les lois qu'il a établies » (AT VI, 43).
Dans la lettre à Mersenne du 15 avril 1630, après avoir exposé sa théorie de la création des vérités éternelles, Descartes écrit: "J'espère écrire ceci, même avant qu'il soit 15 jours, dans ma *Physique* ;" (AT I, 146; O VIII 1, 73; B 30); on trouve un écho de ces pensées à la fine du chapitre VI et dans le chapitre VII: "Si j'y mettais la moindre chose qui fût

obscure, il se pourrait faire que parmi cette obscurité il y aurait quelque répugnance (**) cachée dont je ne me serais pas aperu, et ainsi que, sans y penser, je supposerais une chose impossible; au lieu que, pouvant distinctement imaginer tout ce que j'y mets, il est certain qu'encore qu'il n'y eût rien de tel dans l'ancien monde, Dieu le peut toutefois créer dans un nouveau, car il est certain qu'il peut créer toutes les choses que nous pouvons imaginer.
(...)
Et il est facile à croire que Dieu, qui comme chacun doit savoir est immuable, agit toujours de même faon. Mais, sans m'engager plus avant dans ces considérations métaphysiques, je mettrai ici deux ou trois des principales règles suivant lesquelles il faut penser que Dieu fait agir la nature de ce nouveau monde et qui suffiront, comme je crois, pour faire connaître toutes les autres." (AT XII, 36-38).
(**) *Au XVIIe siècle, répugnance signifie déjà dégoût, mais aussi contrariété, opposition et contradiction, et c'est le sens qu'il faut ici retenir*. (Note de A. Bitbol-Hespériès, *Le Monde, l'Homme*, cit., p. 24).
Le Chapitre VII donne la définition de Nature : "Sachez donc, premièrement, que par la Nature je n'entends point ici quelque Déesse, ou quelque autre sorte de puissance imaginaire, mais que je me sers de ce mot pour signifier la Matière même en tant que je la considère avec toutes les qualités que je lui ai attribuées comprises toutes ensemble, et sous cette condition que Dieu continue de la conserver en la même faon qu'il l'a créée. Car de cela seul qu'il continue ainsi de la conserver, il suit de nécessité qu'il doit y avoir plusieurs changements en ses parties, lesquels ne pouvant, ce me semble, être proprement attribués à l'action de Dieu, parce qu'elle ne change point, je les attribue à la Nature ; et les règles suivant lesquelles se font ces changements, je les nomme les lois de la Nature." (AT XI, 36-37).
La "fable" du *Monde*.
C'est dans la lettre à Mersenne du 25 novembre 1630 que Descartes use pour la première fois cette expression : "Et je ne pense pas après ceci me résoudre jamais plus de faire

rien imprimer, au moins moi vivant : car la fable de mon *Monde* (10) me plaît trop pour manquer à la parachever". (AT I, 179; O VIII 1, 83; B 36).
(10 Voir à Mersenne, 13 novembre 1629 (AT I, 70; [O VIII 1, 33] B 23).
Au terme du chapitre V et au débout du Chapitre VI Descartes écrit : "Il me reste ici encore beaucoup d'autres choses à expliquer, et je serais même bien aise d'y ajouter quelques raisons pour rendre mes opinions plus vraisemblables. Mais afin que la longueur de ce discours vous soit moins ennuyeuse, j'en veux envelopper une partie dans l'invention d'une fable, au travers de laquelle j'espère que la vérité ne laissera de paraître suffisamment, et qu'elle ne sera pas moins agréable à voir que si je l'exposais toute nue.
Chapitre VI
Permettez donc pour un peu de temps à votre pensée de sortir hors de ce monde pour en venir voir un autre tout nouveau que je ferai naître en sa présence dans les espaces imaginaires (*). Les Philosophes nous disent que ces espaces sont infinis, et ils doivent bien en être crus puisque ce sont eux-mêmes qui les ont faits. Mais afin que cette infinité ne nous empêche et ne nous embarrasse point, ne tâchons pas d'aller jusqu'au bout ; entrons-y seulement si avant que nous puissions perdre de vue toutes les créatures que Dieu fit il y a cinq ou six mille ans, et après nous être arrêtés là en quelque lieu déterminé, supposons que Dieu crée de nouveau tout autour de nous tant de matière que, de quelque côté que notre imagination se puisse étendre, elle n'y aperoive plus aucun lieu qui soit vide." (AT XI, 31-32).
(*) ...*espaces imaginaires*... "dans la philosophie scolastique, où le monde est considéré comme fini, les espaces fictifs que l'imagination seule conoit au-delà des limites du monde et de l'espace réels. Cf. *Index scolastico-cartésien*, pp. 96-97." (Etienne Gilson, *Discours de la méthode. Texte et commentaire*, Paris: Vrin, 1925, p. 383); voir aussi Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, XXX, 7, 28: "extra hunc autem mundum nihil est, nam spatium imaginarium non est, sed imaginatione fingitur

(au-delà de ce monde, il n'y a rien; car l'espace imaginaire n'existe pas, mais est forgé par l'imagination)."; voir aussi *Disputationes metaphysicae*, LI, *De "ubi"*, passim.
"... je vous prie me mander s'il n'y a rien de déterminé en la religion, touchant l'étendue des choses créées, savoir si elle est finie ou plutôt infinie, et qu'en tous ces pays qu'on appelle les espaces imaginaires il y ait des corps créés et véritables ; car encore que je n'eusse pas envie de toucher cette question, je crois toutefois que je serai contraint de la prouver." (lettre à Mersenne du 18 décembre 1629, AT I, 86; O VIII 1, 41; B 25).
Descartes a renoncé à la publication après la condamnation de Galilée (cfr. la lettre à Mersenne 28 novembre 1633: "Mais comme je ne voudrais pour rien au monde qu'il sortît de moi un discours, où il se trouvât le moindre mot qui fut désapprouvé de l'Eglise, aussi aimé-je mieux le supprimer, que de le faire paraître estropié. (10)" (AT I, 270-271; O VIII 1, 108; B 60).
(10) Rapprocher du récit de la sixième partie du *Discours* (dont la rédaction se poursuivit jusqu'en mars 1636, AT VI, 60 l. 4-61 l. 2 [O III, 121]) Il est peu crédible de mettre en doute la sincérité de Descartes : le protestant Claude Saumaise écrivait le 7 mars 1638 à l'abbé Ismaël Bouillard à propos du *Monde* que si Descartes « était moins bon catholique, il nous l'aurait déjà donné, mais il craint de publier une opinion qui n'est pas approuvée à Rome » (ce qui, de surcroît, aurait été contre-productif pour l'adoption de son système en France et chez les jésuites), texte inédit cité par Henk J. M. Nellen, « Ismaël Boulliaud (1605-1694) : astronome, épistolier, nouvelliste et intermédiaire scientifique; ses rapports avec les milieux du libertinage érudit », in *Études de l'Institut Pierre Bayle, Nimègue*, 24, APA-Holland University Press, 1994, p. 70.
"Pendant l'été 1634, Descartes écrit à Beeckman au sujet de la propagation de la lumière. Aucune lettre connue de Descartes ne date du début de l'année 1635. Mais le 16 avril 1635, Descartes écrit à Golius qu'il a lu à M. de Zuilichem, c'est-à-dire à Constantin Huygens qu'il vient de rencontrer, « une partie de sa *Dioptrique* (282) ». En mai, il réfléchit à

«la cause de la lumière (283) » et évoque les couronnes et les parhélies. Puis, dans les mois qui suivent, il écrit que, « depuis la condamnation de Galilée », il a « entièrement séparé de son *Monde* le traité sur “les lunettes” », et qu’il l'a « revu et entièrement achevé ». Il se « propose de le faire imprimer seul dans peu de temps ». Il ajoute également qu’il « juge maintenant hors de saison» de « faire voir son *Monde* avec le mouvement défendu » (284).
Ces indications sont très précieuses parce qu’elles montrent d’une part que Descartes abandonne l’idée de publier *Le Monde*, et d’autre part qu’il se consacre maintenant à *La Dioptrique*, en vue de sa publication. De sorte que la composition de *La Dioptrique* a alors évolué, et qu’elle s’est notamment augmentée d’un approfondissement des réflexions inaugurales du *Monde* sur la lumière, mais plus encore des analyses du chapitre XVIII du *Monde* consacré à *L’Homme*. En effet, les références directes à *La Dioptrique* figurant dans *Le Monde* incluant *L’Homme* permettent de voir quel en était le noyau initial. Ainsi, *Le Monde* renvoie directement à *La Dioptrique* pour l’explication de la réflexion et de la réfraction (285), qui se trouve au discours second de l’*Essai* de 1637. *L’Homme* se réfère explicitement à *La Dioptrique* au sujet de la taille des verres (objet de la réflexion de Descartes depuis 1629), parce que la figure du cristallin ressemble à celle d’un verre hyperbolique (286), dont les particularités sont exposées au discours huitième de l’*Essai* de 1637.
L’Homme cite à nouveau *La Dioptrique* en ce qui concerne le mécanisme de la vision (287), exposé dans les discours troisième et sixième de l’*Essai* de 1637."
(282) AT 1, 314. [O VIII 1; 647; B 71]
(283) AT I, 318. [O VIII 1; 648; B 74]
(284) AT I, 322. [O VIII 1; 121; B 75] Lettre datée de l’automne 1635 dans AT et de juin ou juillet 1635 dans Alquié, et probablement adressée à Mersenne.
(285) AT XI, 9, 102, 106, 116.
(286) AT XI, 153, 156.
(287) AT XI, 187.

Introduction de Annie Bitbol-Hespériès à R. Descartes, *Le Monde, l'Homme*, Paris: Seuil, 1996, pp. XXXV.
"Pour les lunettes, je vous dirai que depuis la condamnation de Galilée (4), j'ai revu et entièrement achevé le Traité que j'en avais autrefois commencé (5) ; et l'ayant entièrement séparé de mon *Monde*, je me propose de le faire imprimer seul dans peu de temps (6). Toutefois parce qu'il s'écoulera peut-être encore plus d'un an, avant qu'on le puisse voir imprimé, si M. N. (7) y désirait travailler avant ce temps-là, je le tiendrais à faveur, et je m'offre de faire transcrire tout ce que j'ai mis touchant la pratique, et de lui envoyer quand il lui plaira." (lettre à Mersenne (?) mars 1635 ?, AT I, 322; O VIII 1, 121; B 75)
(4) Descartes est souvent revenu dans ses lettres à Mersenne sur la condamnation de Galilée (1633) : fin novembre 1633 (AT I, 270-273, [O VIII 1, 107-109;] B 60); février 1634 (AT I, 281-282, [O VIII, 1; 109-110] B63); 15 mai 1634 (AT I, 298-299, [O VIII 1, 114-118] B 66).
(5) La rédaction de la *Dioptrique*, dont Descartes a souvent entretenu Mersenne (25 novembre 1630, AT I 182 1. 13 sq., [O VIII 1, 82-85] B36; juin 1632, AT I, 254 l. 3 sq., [O VIII 1, 102-104] B 55).
(6) En effet, Descartes écrit à Golius le 16 avril 1635 : « Monsieur de Zuyleichem [Huygens], que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir ces jours à Amsterdam, après avoir eu la patience d'ouïr lire une partie de ma *Dioptrique*... » et envoie à Huygens une copie du texte le 25 avril 1635 (AT I, 585-586; [O VIII 2, 13-14] B 72).
(7) Cl-Inst : de Beaune (suivi par AT ? et AM ?); CM V 125 n. 5 suggère Mydorge, « plutôt que Ferrier, à qui Descartes avait déjà donné ses instructions depuis longtemps ».

24. ———. 1629 (octobre) - 1633. *L'Homme*.
AT XI, 119-215; B Op. II, 362-507. Ce traité est le XVIIIe Chapitre du *Monde*.
Premières publications :
1) Traduction latine de Florent Schuyl : *Renatus Des Cartes De Homine, figuris et latinitate donatus a Florentio Schuyl*, Leyden: P. Leffen & F. Moyardum. 1662.
2) Édition du texte original : Clerselier 1677, pp. 1-98.

Édition critique : *Le Monde, l'Homme*, Introduction de Annie Bitbol-Hespériès; textes établis et annotés par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et Jean-Pierre Verdet, Paris: Seuil, 1996.
Dans une lettre à Mersenne du 18 décembre 1629 Descartes écrit : "je veux commencer à étudier l'anatomie. (44)" (AT I, 102; O VIII 1, 49; B 25).
(44) Première mention des études d'anatomie de Descartes : on retrouve ce souci dans à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630 (AT I, 137 l. 5-6 [O VIII 1, 68; B 30]), 20 février 1639 (AT II, 525 l. 14-18 [O VIII 1, 326; B 204]) et 13 novembre 1639 (AT II, 621 l. 3-15 [O VIII 1, 351; B 224]); Descartes en parle aussi au médecin Plempius le 15 février 1638 (AT I, 523, l. 1-3 [O VIII 1, 407; B 146]) ; voir aussi le *Traité de l'Homme* (AT XI 120 l. 25-121 l. 9) et le *Discours* (AT VI, 47 l. 1-8 [O III, 112]).
"Le plan suivi dans le *Traité de l'Homme*.
Ce traité, qui est une description systématique de la machine qu'est le corps, est très construit, de manière concertée et révélatrice d'une hiérarchie et du constant souci de totalité de Descartes. Car, encore que toute cette machine soit régie, en toutes ses fonctions, par les mêmes principes issus de la mécanique la plus élémentaire, Descartes ne laisse pas de suivre un ordre qui reproduit, dans le microcosme du corps, la structure générale de l'exposé qu'il utilise pour décrire le macrocosme du monde.
Mais d'abord, les données : le plan du *Traité de l'Homme* est le suivant.
En un premier temps, c'est le cours du sang qui guide le développement, depuis son origine jusqu'à sa métamorphose en une autre substance :
— la digestion des viandes, le circuit des aliments, le foie, le sang ;
— la respiration ;
— la circulation du sang ;
— la croissance ;
— la raréfaction du sang, origine des esprits animaux.
La deuxième partie du développement suit maintenant le cours des esprits animaux, ce qui conduit Descartes à décrire les systèmes nerveux, moteur et sensible :

— le système nerveux, moteur, les nerfs-tuyaux et les muscles ;
— le système nerveux sensible, les nerfs-filets ;
— le mécanisme des sentiments intérieurs (faim, soif, etc.) ;
— les esprits animaux et les passions.
Enfin, une dernière parties2 est centrée sur les fonctions du cerveau:
— les fonctions de la veille (imagination, mémoire, etc.) ;
— les fonctions du sommeil (les songes).
La conclusion insiste sur l'identité entre cette machine créée par la nature et celle issue de l'industrie humaine (horloge)."
Pierre-Alan Cahné, *Un autre Descartes. Le philosophe et son langage*, Paris: Vrin, 1980, pp. 259.
"Les notes de cette édition du traité de *L'Homme* montrent les points de rencontre nombreux entre le chapitre XVIII du *Monde* et *La Dioptrique*. La convergence de ces textes ne doit d'ailleurs aucunement surprendre, puisque, nous l'avons vu, ils ont été élaborés dans les mêmes années. Mais, à plusieurs reprises, des phrases identiques se retrouvent d'un texte à l'autre, ce qui laisse penser qu'après la condamnation de Galilée Descartes a inséré dans *La Dioptrique* plusieurs passages du traité de *L'Homme* consacrés à l'explication du sens de la vue. Ce qui est intéressant à remarquer, c'est que l'esprit qui anime Descartes n'a pas changé entre le début de la rédaction de *L'Homme* et de *La Dioptrique*, et le remaniement du texte de *La Dioptrique* à partir de 1635, en vue de sa publication."
Introduction de Annie Bitbol-Hespériès à René Descartes, *Le Monde, l'Homme*, Paris: Seuil, 1996, pp. XXXV-XXXVI.
Voir aussi: Sylvain Matton, "Un témoignage oublié sur le manuscrit du *Traité de l'homme* de Descartes", *Bulletin cartésien* XXXVI, *Archives de philosophie*, 68, 2005, p. 7-8 et Franco A. Meschini, "Filologia e scienza. Note per un'edizione critica de L'Homme di Descartes", in F. A. Meschini (éd.), *Le opere dei filosofi e degli scienziati. Filosofia e scienza tra testo, libro e biblioteche*, Firenze, Olschki, 2011, p. 165-204.

25. ———. 1630. *[La théorie de la création des vérités éternelles].*

La théorie de la création des vérités éternelles comme fondement métaphysique de la physique.
Cette théorie est formulée pour la première fois dans une lettre à Mersenne : le débat commence le 15 avril 1630, en posant comme thème, en réponse à des lettres perdues de Mersenne, “les vérités mathématiques que vous appelez éternelles”. La même année, le philosophe en discute aussi bien avec lui dans deux autres lettres, qu'avec Beeckman dans une lettre du 17 octobre de la même année. Le débat se prolonge jusqu'en 1649 : il est présent dans la correspondance avec Arnauld, dans la lettre à Mersenne du 27 mai 1638 et, surtout, dans celle à Mesland du 2 juin 1644. On peut considérer que le débat se termine le 5 février 1649 avec la discussion entamée avec More sur les vérités contradictoires. Dans les œuvres imprimées, la théorie ne sera publiée que dans les *Responsiones* (AT VII, 380 et 435-436). Vagues allusions dans le *Discours de la méthode*, V (AT VI 41 ll. 12-13 [O III, 108]) et dans les *Principia philosophiae* (I, §§ 22 et 24; AT VIII-1, 13-14).

26. ———. 1630-31 (?). *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*.
AT X, 495-527; B Op. II, 826-871; CO 249-341; dialogue (incomplet) écrit en Français , dont l'original est perdu.
Les sources existant sont :
1) une copie (partielle) en Français , conservée à Hanovre (H) faite par Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651 - 1708) sur le manuscrit en possession de Clerselier, datée 16 novembre 1676 et envoyée à Leibniz en février 1677 (AT X pp. 495-514).
2) la traduction néerlandaise complète (N): Amsterdam 1684.
3) la traduction latine complète (A): *Inquisitio veritatis per lumen naturale*, in *Opuscola posthuma, physica et mathematica,* Amsterdam 1701, pp. 67-90 (AT X, 514-527).
CO donne le texte Français e pour la partie existante, la traduction latine et le texte néerlandaise avec la première traduction Français e de cette version (par Corinna Vermeulen).

Édition critique : René Descartes, *La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*, sous la direction de Ettore Lojacono, textes établis par Erik Jan Bos, lemmatisation et concordances du texte Français par Franco A. Meschini, index et concordances du texte latin et néerlandais par Francesco Saita, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2002, avec un essai de Ettore Lojacono. Pour une interprétation et une datation de *La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle de René Descartes*, (pp. VII-XL) et une note "La présente édition", par Erik-Jan Bos (pp. XLI-LXV).
Ettore Lojacono donne un bilan complet des débats consacrés à la datation du texte (pp. 161-201).
Traductions :
La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle, Introduction, Appendices, Notice biographique et bibliographique par Ettore Lojacono, Introduction et commentaire historique et conceptuel, textes revus par Massimilano Savini, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009.
La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle, traduction et notes par Emmanuel Faye, Paris: Librairie Générale Français e, (Le Livre de Poche), 2010.
"La première édition de la *Recherche de la vérité* fut publiée à Amsterdam, en 1684, dans une traduction néerlandaise. Sous le titre de *Onderzoek der waarheit door 't naturelijk licht* (N) le texte fut ajouté, avec une traduction des *Regulae*, à l'édition néerlandaise du vol. III de la *Correspondance* de Descartes, telle qu'elle avait été publiée par Clerselier. Enfin, dans le même volume on trouve une traduction du *Traité de la lumière* ou *Le Monde*. Le traducteur de la *Correspondance* et du *Monde* était J. H. Glazemaker. L'identité du ou des traducteurs de la *Recherche* et des *Regulae* est inconnue. Rieuwertsz avait commencé l'impression de la correspondance en l'automne de 1682. Elle était achevée au printemps de 1684." (*La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle,* "La présente édition", p. LIV).
"La version latine de la *Recherche*, *Inquisitio veritatis per lumen naturale* (A), due à un traducteur inconnu, fut

publiée en 1701 dans le recueil des *Opuscula posthuma*, qui constituent le vol. IX (le dernier) des *Opera omnia de Descartes*, commencés en 1692 par une « Société de libraires ». Dans cette édition, A couvre 23 pages, la première de 28 lignes la dernière de 27, les autres de 38. Au sein des *Opuscula posthuma* A forme une unité typographique propre, avec sa propre pagination et sa propre page de titre : *Regulae ad directionem ingenii, ut et Inquisitio veritatis per lumen naturale* : *Regulae*, pp. 1-66; *Inquisitio veritatis*, pp. 67-90). Dans la *Préface* on ne trouve aucune indication sur la provenance des copies. En fait, l'éditeur anonyme s'est acquitté de sa tâche en donnant simplement quelques citations de Baillet." (*La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle,* "La présente édition", p. LVI).

"Dans la présente édition on trouve le texte intégral des trois sources, H, N et A. Le texte de H, comme source principale du texte Français , a été imprimé avant les autres. Il a été établi sur la base d'un collationnement du texte imprimé dans G. W. Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe,* Zweiter Band : 1676-1679, Berlin, 1987 avec des photocopies de H. Enfin, on a collationné ce texte avec l'original de Hanovre. Dans l'édition de H pour une certaine mesure (voir § 3.1) le texte a été normalisé et en plusieurs passages on a préféré la leon de N et A à celle de H (voir § 3.2). Pour N et A les textes de base ont été les exemplaires de la Bibliothèque universitaire d'Utrecht, collationnés avec quatre autres exemplaires (voir §§ 2.2 et 2.3). Pour l'édition de N et de A nous avons suivi les critères présentés ci-dessous. Pour faciliter une étude comparative de ces textes ils sont imprimés l'un en regard de l'autre." (*La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle,* "La présente édition", p. LIX).

Voir aussi: Siegrid Agostini, "2002-1013 : une décennie d'édition de *La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*", *Bulletin cartésien* XLIII, *Archives de philosophie*, 77, 2014, p. 163-170.

27. ———. 1637. *Discours de la méthode. Pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les sciences. Plus la*

Dioptrique. Les Météores. Et la Géométrie. Qui sont des essais de cette Méthode. Leyde: Imprimerie Ian Maire.
AT VI, 1-515; B Op. I, 24-653; O III, 81-508.
Avertissement V; *Frontispice des Essais* XIII; *Discours de la méthode* 1; *La Dioptrique* 79; *Les Météores* 229; *La Géométrie* 367; *Avertissement* 486; *Tables des principales difficultés qui sont expliquées dans La Dioptrique* 487; *Tables des principales difficultés qui sont expliquées aux Météores* 498; *Table des matières de la Géométrie* 511; *Privilège* 515.
Première édition anonyme : 8 juin 1637 (réimpression anastatique Lecce: Conte Editore, 1987).
Discours de la méthode : AT VI, 1-78.
Date de composition : hiver 1635-36 - printemps 1637 (sur la chronologie de l'œuvre voir les études de Gilbert Gadoffre, Láscaris Comneno, Elie Denissoff et Edwin Curley, dans ma bibliographie sur les sources de la pensée de Descartes).
Après avoir renoncé à publier *Le monde*, Descartes entreprend en 1635 un nouveau projet, qui sera terminé en mars 1637 et aboutira dans la publication du *Discours* :
"Pour le traité de physique dont vous me faites la faveur de me demander la publication (5), je n'aurais pas été si imprudent que d'en parler en la faon que j'ai fait, si je n'avais envie de le mettre au jour, en cas que le monde le désire, et que j'y trouve mon compte et mes sûretés. Mais je veux bien vous dire, que tout le dessein de ce que je fais imprimer à cette fois, n'est que de lui préparer le chemin, et sonder le gué. Je propose à cet effet une méthode générale (6), laquelle véritablement je n'enseigne pas, mais je tâche d'en donner des preuves par les trois traités suivants (7), que je joins au discours où j'en parle, ayant pour le premier un sujet mêlé de philosophie et de mathématique (8), pour le second, un tout pur de philosophie (9); et pour le 3e, un tout pur de mathématique (10), dans lesquels je puis dire que je ne me suis abstenu de parler d'aucune chose, (au moins de celles qui peuvent être connues par la force du raisonnement), parce que j'ai cru ne la pas savoir; en sorte qu'il me semble par là donner occasion de juger que j'use

d'une méthode par laquelle je pourrais expliquer aussi bien toute autre matière, en cas que j'eusse les expériences qui y seraient nécessaires, et le temps pour les considérer. Outre que pour montrer que cette méthode s'étend à tout, j'ai inséré brièvement quelque chose de métaphysique, de physique et de médecine dans le premier discours (11). Que si je puis faire avoir au monde cette opinion de ma méthode, je croirai alors n'avoir plus tant de sujet de craindre que les principes de ma physique soient mal reus; et si je ne rencontrais que des juges aussi favorables que vous, je ne le craindrais pas dès maintenant." (lettre à [Germain Habert, abbé de Cérisy], [avril ?] 1637, AT I 370-371; O VIII 2, 833; B109).
(6) Seule occurrence du syntagme « méthode générale » dans le corpus cartésien.
(7) Les trois *Essais* (*Dioptrique, Météores, Géométrie*).
(8) La *Dioptrique*.
(9) Les *Météores* (rappelons que « philosophie » signifie « philosophie naturelle », c'est-à-dire ce que nous appelons la « physique »).
(10) La *Géométrie*.
(11) Dans les 4e et 5e parties du *Discours* (AT VI, 31-60 [O III, 102-121]).
En 1636 Descartes, qui se trouve à Leyde, confie l'impression du livre à Mersenne : "Il y a environ cinq semaines que j'ai reu vos dernières du dix-huit janvier, et je n'avais reu les précédentes que quatre ou cinq jours auparavant. Ce qui m'a fait différer de vous faire réponse, a été que j'espérais de vous mander bientôt que j'étais occupé à faire imprimer. Car je suis venu à ce dessein en cette ville (2); mais les [Elzevier (3)] qui témoignaient auparavant avoir fort envie d'être mes libraires, s'imaginant, je crois, que je ne leur échapperais pas lorsqu'ils m'ont vu ici, ont eu envie de se faire prier, ce qui est cause que j'ai résolu de me passer d'eux (4); et quoique je puisse trouver ici assez d'autres libraires, toutefois je ne résoudrai rien avec aucun, que je n'aie reu de vos nouvelles, pourvu que je ne tarde point trop à en recevoir. Et si vous jugez que mes écrits puissent être imprimés à Paris plus commodément qu'ici, et

qu'il vous plût d'en prendre le soin, comme vous m'avez obligé autrefois de m'offrir (5), je vous les pourrais envoyer incontinent après la vôtre reue. (...) Et afin que vous sachiez ce que j'ai envie de faire imprimer, il y aura quatre *Traités* tous Français , et le titre en général sera: *Le Projet d'une Science universelle qui puisse élever notre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection. Plus la Dioptrique, les Météores, et la Géométrie ; où les plus curieuses Matières que l'Auteur ait pu choisir, pour rendre preuve de la Science universelle qu'il propose, sont expliquées en telle sorte, que ceux mêmes qui n'ont point étudié les peuvent entendre*. En ce *Projet* je découvre une partie de ma *Méthode*, je tâche à démontrer l'existence de Dieu et de l'âme séparée du corps, et j'y ajoute plusieurs autres choses qui ne seront pas, je crois, désagréables au lecteur." (lettre à Mersenne du mars 1636 AT I, 338-339; O VIII 1, 135; B 83).
Le 1 avril 1636 Descartes donne à lire son manuscrit à Constantin Huygens : "Je ne manquerai de me trouver demain à votre logis incontinent après votre dîner, puisqu'il vous plaît me faire la faveur de me le permettre (2); et je porterai avec moi tous ceux de mes papiers qui seront assez au net pour les pouvoir lire, afin que vous en puissiez choisir ceux dont la lecture vous sera le moins ennuyeuse, et que j'aie le bonheur de savoir au vrai le jugement que vous en ferez." (lettre à Huygens du 31 mars 1636 AT I, 605; O VIII 2, 21; B 86).
Dans le contrat d'édition avec l'imprimeur Jean Maire (Leyde, 2 décembre 1636) le titre change : "le dit DES CARTES mettra entre les mains du dit LE MAIRE toute la copie d'un livre intitulé: *La méthode etc. plus la Dioptrique, les Météores et la Géométrie"* (le contrat est publié dans Gustave Cohen, *Écrivains Français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle*, Paris: Champion, 1920, pp. 503-504).
L'expression "Discours de la méthode" fait sa parution dans deux lettres à Huygens et à Mersenne:
Lettre à C. Huygens du 25 février 1637: "Monsieur Golius m'avertit dernièrement de votre part que vous jugiez le mot de "discours" superflu en mon titre, et c'est l'un des sujets

de remerciement que j'ai à vous faire. Mais je m'excuse sur ce que je n'ai pas eu dessein d'expliquer toute la méthode mais seulement d'en dire quelque chose, et que je n'aime pas à promettre plus que je ne donne, c'est pourquoi j'ai mis « *Discours de la Méthode* »; au lieu que j'ai mis simplement «la *Dioptrique*» et «les *Météores*», parce que j'ai tâché d'y comprendre tout ce qui faisait (6) à mon sujet. Que si cette raison ne vous contente et que vous m'obligiez de m'en faire savoir votre jugement, je le suivrai comme une loi inviolable. Il me semble aussi que je dois ôter toute la glose que j'avais mise à la fin (7) et laisser seulement ces mots « *Discours de la Méthode* etc. plus la *Dioptrique*, les *Météores* et la *Géométrie* qui sont des essais de cette méthode »." (AT I, 620-621; O VIII 2, 26; B 104).
(6) « Faire à » : convenir.
(7) Descartes avait proposé à Mersenne en mars 1636 le titre [déjà cité : *Le Projet d'une Science universelle,* etc.]
Lettre à Mersenne du 20 avril 1637: "Mais je n'ai su bien entendre ce que vous objectez touchant le titre; car je ne mets pas *Traité de la Méthode,* mais *Discours de la Méthode*, ce qui est le même que *Préface ou Avis touchant la Méthode*, pour montrer que je n'ai pas dessein de l'enseigner, mais seulement d'en parler. Car comme on peut voir de ce que j'en dis, elle consiste plus en pratique qu'en théorie, et je nomme les traités suivants des *Essais de cette Méthode*, parce que je prétends que les choses qu'ils contiennent n'ont pu être trouvées sans elle, et qu'on peut connaître par eux ce qu'elle vaut : comme aussi j'ai inséré quelque chose de métaphysique, de physique, et de médecine dans le premier discours, pour montrer qu'elle s'étend à toutes sortes de matières." (AT I, 349; O VIII 1, 139; B 83).
Le titre définitif ressemble à une œuvre de Jacopo Aconcio (1492 - 1567), *De Methodo, hoc est de recta investigandarum tradendarumque artium ac scientiarum ratione,* Basilée 1558, réimprimé en 1617 à Leyde par le même éditeur du *Discours*, mais une influence directe n'est pas démontrée.
Dans cette œuvre Descartes réutilise des écrits précédents :

La *Première partie* du *Discours* (AT VI, 1-11 [O III, 81-87]) reprend le projet d'une *Histoire de mon esprit* dont parle Guez de Balzac dans la lettre à Descartes du 30 mars 1628: "Au reste, Monsieur, souvenez-vous, s'il vous plaît, de l'*Histoire de Votre Esprit*. Elle est attendue de tous nos amis, et vous me l'avez promise en présence du Père Clitophon, qu'on appelle en langue vulgaire Monsieur de Gersan. Il y aura plaisir à lire vos diverses aventures dans la moyenne et dans la plus haute région de l'air ; à considérer vos prouesses contre les Géants de l'École, le chemin que vous avez tenu, le progrès que vous avez fait dans la vérité des choses, etc." (AT I 570; B 15).
La *Deuxième partie* (AT VI, 11-22 [O III, 88-95]) est une adaptation et une rectification des certain thèmes des *Règles pour la direction de l'esprit*: "Pendant les dix années qui s'écoulèrent entre les deux ouvrages, Descartes a très sensiblement modifié ses vues méthodologiques: les *Regulae* proposaient une mathématique universelle qui assimilait à des segments de droite — soit à une dimension spatiale — tout ce qui est susceptible de mesure, alors que la *Géométrie* achemine le lecteur vers une notion de mathématiques pures, vers une « géométrie qui est avant tout une algèbre ». Un pas décisif a été franchi, et Léon Brunschvicg (*) montre sans peine que le deuxième chapitre du *Discours* s'en trouve par là même éclairé : certains développements sont si étroitement liés qu'ils ne s'expliquent que l'un par l'autre. De même que la sixième partie est une introduction à la Dioptrique et aux Météores, la deuxième est une introduction à la Géométrie." (Gilbert Gadoffre, *La chronologie des six parties*, in : Nicolas Grimaldi et Jean-Luc Marion (éds.), *Le Discours et sa méthode*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1987, p. 21.)
(*) Léon Brunschvicg, *Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes*, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, juillet 1937, [pp. 277-324; repris dans: L. Brunschvicg, *Écrits philosophiques*, tome I, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1951, pp. 11-54].

La *Troisième partie* (AT VI 22-31 [O III, 96-101]) contient la morale provisoire; sur les raison de cette inclusion, voir la lettre à Henricus Reneri pour Alphonse de Pollot d'avril ou mai 1638 : "Au reste j'ai été obligé de parler de cette résolution et fermeté touchant les actions, tant à cause qu'elle est nécessaire pour le repos de la conscience, que pour empêcher qu'on ne me blâmât de ce que j'avais écrit que, pour éviter la prévention, il faut une fois en sa vie se défaire de toutes les opinions qu'on a reues auparavant en sa créance : car apparemment on m'eût objecté que ce doute si universel peut produire une grande irrésolution et un grand dérèglement dans les mœurs. De faon qu'il ne me semble pas avoir pu user de plus de circonspection que j'ai fait, pour placer la résolution, en tant qu'elle est une vertu, entre les deux vices qui lui sont contraires, à savoir l'indétermination et l'obstination.
Il ne me semble point que ce soit une fiction, mais une vérité, qui ne doit point être niée de personne, qu'il n'y a rien qui soit entièrement en notre pouvoir que nos pensées ; au moins en prenant le mot de pensée comme je fais, pour toutes les opérations de l'âme, en sorte que non seulement les méditations et les volontés, mais même les fonctions de voir, d'ouïr, de se déterminer à un mouvement plutôt qu'à un autre etc., en tant qu'elles dépendent d'elle, sont des pensées. Et il n'y a rien du tout que les choses qui sont comprises sous ce mot, qu'on attribue proprement à l'homme en langue de philosophe : car pour les fonctions qui appartiennent au corps seul, on dit qu'elles se font dans l'homme, et non par l'homme." (AT II, 35-36; O VIII 2, 542; B 164).
Voir aussi l'*Entretien avec Burman* :
"III. Texte 64. AT VI 22, l. 29 [O III, 96] une moral par provision, qui ne consistait qu'en trois ou quatre maximes, DONT JE VEUX BIEN VOUS FAIRE PART (que je veux bien AJOUTER À MON ÉCRIT).
L'auteur n'écrit pas volontiers touchant la morale (6), mais les Régents et autres pédants l'on contraint d'ajouter à son écrit ces règles parce que, autrement, ils prétendraient qu'il

n'a ni religion ni foi, et que, par le biais de sa méthode, il veut les renverser (7)." (Burman 144; AT V, 178).
La *Quatrième partie* (AT VI, 31-40 [O III,]102-108) est dédiée à la métaphysique et utilise le *Petit traité de métaphysique* (perdu) de 1629 : "Descartes présente lui-même la Quatrième Partie du *Discours* comme un abrégé par rapport à ce manuscrit latin qui, au contraire, semble être une sorte de première rédaction par rapport aux *Méditations* ou du moins par rapport à celles qui ouvrent l'ouvrage». Ainsi il y avait dans la pensée de Descartes plus que dans son texte lorsqu'il écrivait la Quatrième Partie du *Discours*. Quant à savoir quel est ce « plus », des hypothèses différentes sont permises : ce qui est certain, c'est que, en ce qui concerne l'épreuve critique du commencement, l'évolution de la pensée n'est pas seule en cause." (Henri Gouhier, *La pensée métaphysique de Descartes*, Paris: Vrin, 1962, p. 67).
Cette partie a été ajouté au moment de l'impression : "Il est vrai que j'ai été trop obscur en ce que j'ai écrit de l'existence de Dieu dans ce traité de la *Méthode*, et bien que ce soit la pièce la plus importante, j'avoue que c'est la moins élaborée de tout l'ouvrage ; ce qui vient en partie de ce que je ne me suis résolu de l'y joindre que sur la fin, et lorsque le libraire me pressait. Mais la principale cause de son obscurité vient de ce que je n'ai osé m'étendre sur les raisons des sceptiques, ni dire toutes les choses qui sont nécessaires *ad abducendam mentem a sensibus*: car il n'est pas possible de bien connaître la certitude et l'évidence des raisons qui prouvent l'existence de Dieu selon ma faon, qu'en se souvenant distinctement de celles qui nous font remarquer de l'incertitude en toutes les connaissances que nous avons des choses matérielles; et ces pensées ne m'ont pas semblé être propres à mettre dans un livre, où j'ai voulu que les femmes mêmes pussent entendre quelque chose, et cependant que les plus subtils trouvassent aussi assez de matière pour occuper leur attention. J'avoue aussi que cette obscurité vient en partie, comme vous avez fort bien remarqué, de ce que j'ai supposé que certaines notions, que l'habitude de penser m'a rendu familières et évidentes, le

devaient être aussi à un chacun; comme par exemple, que nos idées ne pouvant recevoir leurs formes ni leur être que de quelques objets extérieurs, ou de nous-mêmes, ne peuvent représenter aucune réalité ou perfection, qui ne soit en ces objets, ou bien en nous, et semblables; sur quoi je me suis proposé de donner quelque éclaircissement dans une seconde impression. (8)" (lettre à Antoine Vatier du 22 février 1638, AT I, 560; O VIII 1, 574-575; B 149).
(8) C'est dans les *Méditationes* (1641) que Descartes pourra préciser sa définition des idées.
Descartes était bien conscient des limites de sa première publication sur la métaphysique: "Pour votre seconde objection, à savoir que je n'ai pas expliqué assez au long, d'où je connais que l'âme est une substance distincte du corps, et dont la nature n'est que de penser, qui est la seule chose qui rend obscure la démonstration touchant l'existence de Dieu (3), j'avoue que ce que vous en écrivez est très vrai, et aussi que cela rend ma démonstration touchant l'existence de Dieu malaisée à entendre. Mais je ne pouvais mieux traiter cette matière, qu'en expliquant amplement la fausseté ou l'incertitude qui se trouve en tous les jugements qui dépendent du sens ou de l'imagination, afin de montrer ensuite quels sont ceux qui ne dépendent que de l'entendement pur, et combien ils sont évidents et certains. Ce que j'ai omis tout à dessein, et par considération, et principalement à cause que j'ai écrit en langue vulgaire, de peur que les esprits faibles venant à embrasser d'abord avidement les doutes et scrupules qu'il m'eût fallu proposer ne pussent après comprendre en même faon les raisons par lesquelles j'eusse tâché de les ôter, et ainsi que je les eusse engagés dans un mauvais pas, sans peut-être les en tirer. Mais il y a environ huit ans que j'ai écrit en latin un commencement de Métaphysique (4), où cela est déduit assez au long, et si l'on fait une version latine de ce livre, comme on s'y prépare, (5) je l'y pourrai faire mettre. Cependant je me persuade que ceux qui prendront bien garde à mes raisons touchant l'existence de Dieu, les trouveront d'autant plus démonstratives, qu'ils mettront plus de peine à en chercher les défauts, et je les prétends

plus claires en elles-mêmes qu'aucune des démonstrations des géomètres en sorte qu'elles ne me semblent obscures qu'au regard de ceux qui ne savent pas *abducere mentem a sensibus*, suivant ce que j'ai écrit en la page 38 (6).". (lettre à Mersenne du 20 avril 1637, AT I, 349-350; O VIII 1, 139; B 104).
(4) En 1629 (à Gibieuf, 18 juillet 1629, AT I, 17 l. 7, B17; à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630, AT I, 144 l. 19, B30).
(5) La traduction latine du *Discours* et des *Essais* (sauf la *Géométrie*), œuvre d'Étienne de Courcelles, n'apparut qu'en 1644. CM suggère qu'un projet a pu se constituer dès 1637 avec le jeune Van Schooten, qui publia en 1649 une traduction latine de la *Géométrie*.
(6) AT VI, 37 [O III, 105] (« qu'ils n'élèvent jamais leur esprit au-delà des choses sensibles »). Voir les objections soulevées par Petit (lettre des 17-27 mai 1638, AT II, 144, l. 13-21; [O VIII 1, 187] B 167).
La *Cinquième partie* (AT VI 40-60 [O III, 108-121])est un résumé du *Monde* et de ses études de physiologie, "particulièrement l'explication du mouvement du cœur" (AT VI, 1 [O III, 81]) commencés en 1629 ("je veux commencer à étudier l'anatomie", lettre à Mersenne du 18 décembre 1629, AT I, 102), après la découverte par William Harvey de la circulation du sang (*Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus,* Francfurt 1628), cfr. la référence au "médecin d'Angleterre" (AT VI, 51 [O III, 115]).
"La première mention d'un «médecin», dans la correspondance de Descartes, figure dans la lettre au Père Mersenne du 8 octobre 1629, [AT I, 25; O VIII 1, 30; B 19] où Descartes écrit: «Pour la raréfaction, je suis d'accord avec ce médecin (27), et (28) ai maintenant pris parti touchant tous les fondements de la Philosophie ; mais peut-être que je n'explique pas l'*œther* comme lui. (29)»".
(27) Selon AT (I 30n), il s'agirait du médecin Christophe Villiers (1596-1661/70); mais CM (II 302 n. 2) propose Sébastien Basson, qui introduisit dans une physique corpusculaire l'hypothèse de l'éther pour expliquer les phénomènes de raréfaction et, de faon plus générale, le vide (*Philosophiae naturalis adversus Aristotelem librì XII*,

Genève, 1621). Il fut lu par Beeckman (au printemps 1623, Beeckman II 243), et par Merline (*Quaestiones in Genesim*, 1623, col. 1838 ; *Impiété des déistes*, 1624, I, p. 238) ; Descartes le cite (parmi les *novatores*, entre Giordano Bruno (Giulio Cesare Vanini) dans une lettre à Beeckman (lettre du 17 octobre 10, AT I, 158, B 34). Dans les *Regulae* (AT X, 424 1. 13), Descartes envisage au-delà de l'air un éther très pur sur le modèle de Basson. Descartes nie le vide dans le *Monde* (il y travaille à partir de la fin de 1629) et dans ses lettres de février-avril 1630. C'est probablement de lui que Descartes écrit à Huygens : « Il n'est vaillant qu'à détruire les opinions d'Aristote » 8 mars 1636, AT I, 603; [O VIII 2, 20] B 84).
(28) Clerselier Lettres : « ai pris parti là-dessus, comme sur presque tous les fondements de la Physique ».
(29) Clerselier Lettres : « Lorsque j'aurai l'honneur de vous voir, nous aurons moyen de nous en entretenir plus particulièrement », *add*.
La *Sixième partie* (AT VI 40-78 [O III, 121-133]) a été rédigée dans les derniers mois du 1635, comme préface de la *Dioptrique* et des *Météores*.
"Or comme ce n'est pas des racines, ni du tronc des arbres, qu'on cueille les fruits, mais seulement des extrémités de leurs branches, ainsi la principale utilité de la Philosophie dépend de celles de ses parties qu'on ne peut apprendre que les dernières. Mais, bien que je les ignore presque toutes, le zèle que j'ai toujours eu pour tâcher de rendre service au public est cause que je fis imprimer, il y a dix ou douze ans, quelques essais des choses qu'il me semblait avoir apprises. La première partie de ces essais fut un *Discours touchant la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences*, où je mis sommairement les principales règles de la Logique et d'une Morale imparfaite, qu'on peut suivre par provision pendant qu'on n'en sait point encore de meilleure. Les autres parties furent trois traités : l'un de la *Dioptrique*, l'autre des *Météores*, et le dernier de la *Géométrie*." *Lettre-Préface* aux *Principes de philosophie* (AT IX-2, 15).

28. ———. 1637. *La Dioptrique*.

AT VI, 81-226; B Op. I, 118-311; O III, 148-262.
La *Dioptrique* est le premier essai composé par Descartes : les premières notes sur l'optique et la réfraction sont dans les *Cogitationes privatae* de 1619-20 (AT X, 242-247); en 1632 Descartes écrit à Golius "je fis tailler un verre, il y a cinq ans" lettre du 2 février 1632 (AT I, 239, note; O VIII 1, 1023, n. 36; B 50) ; la composition de la *Dioptrique* pourrait donc être initiée en 1628. (Sur les relations de *La Dioptrique* avec *Le Monde* et *L'Homme* voir les notes à ces textes).
Dans le XVII siècle avec le terme *Dioptrique* était utilisé pour la théorie de la réfraction: "La troisième [partie de l'Optique] enseigne comment nous voyons par rayons qui sont rompus, comme quand nous regardons un bâton qui est partie dans l'eau, partie dans l'air et se nomme *Dioptrique*, ou *Mesoptrique*, parce qu'elle considère la faon par laquelle les rayons passent par les milieux divers, comme quand il traversent l'air, l'eau, et le verre en même instant: on pourrait ainsi nommer cette partie *Anaclastique*, ou *Diaclastique*. L'art de la peinture dépend de ces 3 parties." Marin Mersenne, *La Vérité des sciences contre les Septiques* [sic] *ou Pyrrhoniens,* Paris: 1625, pp. 229-230 (édition moderne: *La Vérité des sciences contre les Sceptiques ou Pyrrhoniens*. Édition et annotation par Dominique Descotes, Paris: Champion, 2003.
Descartes la cite dans une lettre à Mersenne du 25 novembre 1630: "J'y veux insérer un discours où je tâcherai d'expliquer la nature des couleurs et de la lumière, lequel m'a arrêté depuis six mois, et n'est pas encore à moitié fait ; mais aussi sera-t-il plus long que je ne pensais, et contiendra quasi une physique tout entière (8) ; en sorte que je prétends qu'elle me servira pour me dégager de la promesse que je vous ai faite, d'avoir achevé mon *Monde* dans trois ans (9), car c'en sera quasi un abrégé. Et je ne pense pas après ceci a me résoudre jamais plus de faire rien imprimer, au moins moi vivant : car la fable de mon *Monde* (10) me plaît trop pour manquer à la parachever, si Dieu me laisse vivre assez longtemps pour cela; mais je ne veux point répondre de l'avenir. Je crois que je vous enverrai ce

Discours de la lumière, sitôt qu'il sera fait, et avant que de vous envoyer le reste de la *Dioptrique*" (AT I, 179; O VIII 1, 83; B 36).
(8) Voir à Mersenne, 13 novembre 1629 (AT I, 70 l. 6-11, B 23) et 18 décembre 1629 (AT I, 85 l. 6-86 l. 1; [O VIII 1, 33] B 25).
(9) Voir à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630 (AT I 137 l. 15-17; [O VIII 1, 68] B 30).
(10) Voir à Mersenne, 13 novembre 1629 (AT I 70; [O VIII 1, 33] B 23).
"En fait, il semble que Descartes, loin d'avoir envoyé ce Discours de la lumière « avant le reste de la Dioptrique », en ait ajourné la mise au point ; car au cours de l'année 1632, il qualifie à deux reprises de « première partie » ce qui, dans la rédaction définitive, constitue le Discours second, consacré à la réfraction (15). Par contre, ce Discours de la lumière, qui devait être un abrégé du *Monde*, prend de telles proportions qu'il devient bientôt un Traité de la Lumière appelé à couvrir tout le champ de la Physique (16).
Dernière remarque enfin : le *Monde* est « presqu'achevé » en juillet 1633 (17), la *Dioptrique* « entièrement », dans le courant de 1635 (18), les *Météores*, repris en main une fois la *Dioptrique* terminée, en 1636 (19). Ces détails chronologiques un peu vétilleux, pour ne pas dire fastidieux, permettent d'affirmer qu'entre 1629 et 1636, Descartes a mené de front les trois traités, quitte à interrompre l'un pour se consacrer à tel autre (20)." (pp. 290-291), Simone Martinet, "Rôle du problème de la lumière dans la construction de la science cartésienne", *XVIIe siècle*, n° 136, 1982, pp. 285-309.
(15) Voir [à Golius], [janvier 1632], I, p. 235 [O VIII 1, 644-645; B 49], et à Mersenne, [juin 1632], I, p. 255 [O VIII 1, 102-103; B 55].
(16) Voir à Mersenne, 23 décembre 1630 : « Je vous dirai que je suis maintenant après à démêler le chaos pour en faire sortir de la lumière, qui est l'une des plus hautes et plus difficiles matières que je puisse jamais entreprendre, car toute la physique y est presque comprise (5)», I, p. 194 [O VIII 1, 88; B 40].

(5) Descartes est en train de rédiger son *Monde, ou Traité de la lumière* : Il insiste sur son importance à plusieurs reprises (à Mersenne, 13 novembre 1629, AT I, 70 l. 6-11, [O VIII 1, 33] B 23; 25 novembre 1630, AT I, 179 l. 10, [O VIII 1, 83] B 36, et au P. Vatier, 22 février 1638, AT I 562 l. 10 sq., [O VIII 1, 576] B 149).
(17) À Mersenne, 22 juillet 1633, AT I, p. 268 [O VIII 1, 107] B 59].
(18) Voir à Mersenne, date difficile à préciser [mars 1635 ?], AT I, p. 322 [O VIII 1, 121; B 75], et à Huygens, 1 novembre 1635, AT I, p. 591 [O VIII 2, 14; B 77].
(19) Voir à Huygens, 1 novembre 1635, AT I, p. 591 [O VIII 2, 14; B 77], et *Météores*, Disc. VI, p. 298, qui relate une observation personnelle « faite l'hiver passé 1635 ».
(20) De telle sorte qu'il n'est pas étonnant qu'il soit fait référence à la *Dioptrique*, dans le *Monde*, achevé pourtant antérieurement (cf. *Traité de la Lumière ou Monde*, ch. II, p. 9, ch. XIV, p. 102, ch. XV, p. 106) et dans les *Météores*, commencés, sinon terminés plus tôt (*Météores*, Disc. I, p. 233 et p. 234 ; Disc. V, p. 279; Disc. VIII, p. 331 et p. 337). Et que, inversement, Descartes se retranche volontiers derrière le « Traité qui contient tout le corps de [sa] Physique », soit pour justifier le statut des « suppositions « qui sont avancées au début de chacun des Essais (cf. *Discours de la méthode,* VI partie, p. 76), soit pour répondre à des questions ou à des objections qui lui sont adressées après la publication des *Essais*, cf. [à Vatier], [22 février 1638], AT I, p. 562 [O VIII 1, 575; B 149] ; à Ciermans, [23 mars 1638], AT II, p. 71 et p. 74 [B 159] ; à Morin, [13 juillet 1638], AT II, p. 201 [O VIII 2, 466-467; B 172] ; à Mersenne, 9 janv. 1639 et 19 juin 1639, AT II, p. 483 [O VIII 1, 310-311; B 200] et p. 564 O VIII 1, 336-337; B 216].
En janvier 1632 la première partie (Discours I et II) est terminée : "Au reste pour ce que vous me mandez, et que M. H[ortensius] (4) me témoigne que vous désirez voir de ma *Dioptrique*, je vous en envoi la première partie (5), ou j'ai tâché d'expliquer la matière des réfractions, sans toucher au reste de la philosophie." (lettre à Golius du janvier 1632, AT I 235; O VIII 1, 644-645; B 49).

(4) Clerselier-Lettres: "H." ; AT complète par le nome de Martin Van de Hove (Hortensius, 1605-1639), mathématicien et astronome.
(5) *Dioptrique* I et II (AT VI 81-105 [O III, 148-262])
Dans l'automne 1635 Descartes écrit : "Pour les lunettes, je vous dirai que depuis la condamnation de Galilée (4), j'ai revu et entièrement achevé le Traité que j'en avais autrefois commencé (5) ; et l'avant entièrement séparé de mon *Monde*, je me propose de le faire imprimer seul dans peu de temps (6)." (lettre à X (Mersenne?), AT I 322 [O VIII 1, 121; B 75).
(4) Descartes est souvent revenu dans ses lettres à Mersenne sur la condamnation de Galilée (1633) : fin novembre 1633 (AT I 270-273, [O VIII 1, 107-109] B 60); février 1634 (AT I 281-282, [O VIII 1, 109-110] B 63); 15 mai 1634 (AT I 298-299, [O VIII 1, 117-118] B 66).
(5) La rédaction de la *Dioptrique*, dont Descartes a souvent entretenu Mersenne (25 novembre 1630, AT I 182 l. 13 sq., [O VIII 1, 85] B 36; juin 1632, AT I 254 l. 3 sq., [O VIII 1, 102] B 55).
(6) En effet, Descartes écrit à Golius le 16 avril 1635 [AT I 314-316; O VIII 1, 647-648; B 71] : « Monsieur de Zuylichem (4), que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir ces jours à Amsterdam (5), après avoir eu la patience d'ouïr lire une partie de ma *Dioptrique*... » et envoie à Huygens une copie du texte le 25 avril 1635 (AT I 585-586, [O VIII 2, 13-14] B 72).
(4) Descartes venait de rencontrer Constantin Huygens (Monsieur de Zuylichem) à Amsterdam, du 29 mars au 6 avril 1635 (*Dagboek* [*Dagboek Van Constantijn Huygens*, éd. J. H. W. Hunger, *Bijlage Van Oud-Holland*, IIIe année, viii-88-14-viii pages, Amsterdam 1885], p. 26).
(5) Voir à Wilhem, 23 mai 1632 (AT I, 253-254, [O VIII 2, 1] B 54), et à Huygens, 11 décembre 1635 (AT I, 597-601, [O VIII 2, 17-19] B 80).
Le texte est terminé en 1635 : lettre à Golius du 16 avril 1635, AT I 314-316; O VIII 1, 647-648; B 71.
"En la *Dioptrique*, la matière des réfractions et l'invention des lunettes, j'y parle aussi fort particulièrement de l'Œil, de la Lumière, de la Vision, et de tout ce qui appartient à la

Catoptrique et à l'Optique." (lettre à Mersenne du mars 1636 AT I, 338-340; O VIII 1, 134-136; B 83).
"Par la *Dioptrique*, j'eus dessein de faire voir qu'on pouvait aller assez avant en la Philosophie, pour arriver par son moyen jusques à la connaissance des arts qui sont utiles à la vie, à cause que l'invention des lunettes d'approche, que j'y expliquais, est l'une des plus difficiles qui aient jamais été cherchées. Par les Météores, je désirai qu'on reconnût la différence qui est entre la Philosophie que je cultive et celle qu'on enseigne dans les écoles où l'on a coutume de traiter de la même matière." *Lettre-Préface* aux *Principes de philosophie* (AT IX-2, 15).

29. ———. 1637. *Les Météores*.
AT VI, 231-376; B Op. I, 314-487; O III, 284-390.
L'origine des *Météores* est le phénomène des parhélies (faux soleils) observé a à Frascati le 20 mars 1629 par le Jésuite Christoph Scheiner (1573-1650).
"Le 20 de mars on avait vu dans cette ville cinq soleils en même temps, c'est-à-dire quatre parhélies ou faux soleils autour du Soleil. Le P. Scheiner jésuite allemand, qui était pour lors à Rome, en avait fait l'observation avec quelques autres mathématiciens du lieu ; et le cardinal Barberin qui était toujours fort zélé pour l'avancement des sciences en avait envoyé une description à M. de Peiresc conseiller au parlement de Provence, avec la figure du phénomène. Monsieur Peiresc en avait fait faire plusieurs copies, pour communiquer la chose à tous les savants de sa connaissance, et pour les exciter à donner leurs réflexions sur le phénomène." (Baillet I, 188).
"C'est à cette observation des parhélies, que le public est redevable en partie du beau traité des *Météores* que M. Descartes lui donna quelques années après. Il interrompit ses *Méditations métaphysiques*, pour examiner par ordre tous les météores ; et il travailla plusieurs jours sur cette matière, avant que d'y trouver de quoi se satisfaire. " (Baillet I, 191).
Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc (1580-1637), ayant reu la relation directement de C. Scheiner en donna des copies à Pierre Gassendi.

Ayant reu une copie de Gassendi, Henri Reneri la publia avec le titre *Phaenomenon rarum et illustre Romae observatum 20 Martij Anno 1629*, (Amsterdam 1629) et en envoya une copie manuscrite à Descartes en juillet 1629 : "Car je n'ai point l'esprit assez fort, pour l'employer en même temps à plusieurs choses différentes, et comme je ne trouve jamais rien que par une longue traînée de diverses considérations, il faut que je me donne tout à une matière, lorsque j'en veux examiner quelque partie. Ce que j'ai éprouvé depuis peu, en cherchant (4) la cause de ce phénomène duquel vous m'écrivez (5) ; car il y a plus de deux mois (6) qu'un de mes amis (7) m'en a fait voir ici une description assez ample, et m'en ayant demandé mon avis, il m'a fallu interrompre ce que j'avais en main (8), pour examiner par ordre tous les Météores, auparavant que je m'y sois pu satisfaire. Mais je pense maintenant en pouvoir rendre quelque raison, et suis résolu d'en faire un petit traité (9) qui contiendra la raison (10) des couleurs de l'arc-en-ciel (11), lesquelles m'ont donné plus de peine que tout le reste, et généralement tous les phénomènes sublunaires." (lettre à Mersenne du 8 octobre 1629, AT I, 22-23; O VIII 1, 29-30; B19).
(4) Clerselier-lettres : "pour trouver".
(5) Le jésuite romain Scheiner avait observé quatre parhélies (faux soleils) à Frascati le 20 mars 1629. Ces observations ont été connue de toute l'Europe savante par le relais de Peiresc, à qui le cardinal Barberini avait fait parvenir une copie. Gassend, informé par les frères Dupuy, s'employa à les expliquer, en particulier auprès de Peiresc, et au cours de son voyage en Flandres et aux Pays-Bas (été 1629), de Beeckman et de Reneri. La « description assez ample » dont parle Descartes peut être son explication *Phaenomenon rarum et illustre Romæ observatum*, dont le texte imprimé semble n'avoir été diffusé qu'en novembre-décembre 1629, mais qui fut remis par Gassend à Reneri le 14 juillet (voir lettre de Gassend à Peiresc, 21 juillet 1629, CM II 244 et 247n).
(6) Clerselier-lettres : « trois mois ».

(7) Henri Reneri, en juillet 1629. Il s'inscrit comme étudiant à Leyde le 13 octobre 1629.
(8) Le « petit traité de métaphysique », « commencé en Frise », dont Descartes parle à plusieurs reprises (à Mersenne, 15 avril 1630; AT I 136, [O VIII 1, 67] B 30; 25 novembre 1630, AT I 182, [O VIII 1, 85] B 36; vers le 20 avril 1637 AT I 350, [O VIII 1, 139] B 104; à Gibieuf, 18 juillet 1629, AT I 17, [O VIII 2, 790] B 17) est soit une première version des *Meditationes*, soit un « traité sur la divinité » (Baillet I, 170-171 et 190).
(9) Le huitième discours des *Météores* (qui paraîtra dans les *Essais* de 1637) ; le dixième discours porte sur les parhélies.
(10) Clerselier-lettres : « l'explication ».
(11) Descartes avait pu voir en Italie les arcs-en-ciel artificiels des fontaines de Tivoli.
Descartes retourne sur le sujet dans une lettre à Mersenne du 13 novembre 1629 : "Je suis bien marri de la peine que je vous ai donnée de m'envoyer ce phénomène (2), car il est tout semblable à celui que j'avais vu. Je ne laisse pas de vous en avoir très grande obligation, et encore plus de l'offre que vous me faites de faire imprimer ce petit traité que j'ai dessein d'écrire ; mais je vous dirai qu'il ne sera prêt de plus d'un an. Car depuis le temps que je vous avais écrit il y a un mois, je n'ai rien fait du tout qu'en tracer l'argument, et au lieu d'expliquer un phénomène seulement, je me suis résolu d'expliquer tous les phénomènes de la nature c'est-à-dire toute la physique. Et le dessein que j'ai me contente plus qu'aucun autre que j'aie jamais eu, car je pense avoir trouvé un moyen pour exposer toutes mes pensées en sorte qu'elles satisferont à quelques-uns et que les autres n'auront pas occasion d'y contredire." (AT I 70; O VIII 1, 32-33; B 23).
(2) Sur les parhélies, comme sur le « petit traité », voir la lettre 4 (AT I, 23; [O VIII 1, 29] B 19.
Lettre à Constantin Huygens du 1 novembre 1635 : "J'ai dessein d'ajouter les *Météores* à la *Dioptrique*, et j'y ai travaillé assez diligemment les deux ou trois premiers mois de cet été (4), à cause que j'y trouvais plusieurs difficultés que je n'avais encore jamais examinées, et que je démêlais avec plaisir. Mais il faut que je vous fasse des plaintes de

mon humeur : sitôt que je n'ai plus espéré d'y rien apprendre, ne restant plus qu'à les mettre au net, il m'a été impossible d'en prendre la peine, non plus que de faire une préface que j'y veux joindre (5); ce qui sera cause que j'attendrai encore deux ou trois mois avant que de parler au libraire." (AT I, 592; O VIII 2, 15; B 77).
(4) Dès février 1635, il avait noté des observations sur la chute de la neige (voir F. C. Frank, « Descartes' Observations on the Amsterdam Snowfalls of 4, 5, 6 and 9 February 1635 », *Journal of Glaciology*, 13, 1974, p. 535-539).
(5) [Première allusion au *Discours de la méthode* :] Le livre envisagé devait réunir la *Dioptrìque*, les *Météores* et une préface (qui deviendra le *Discours de la méthode*). Descartes annoncera l'addition de la *Géométrie* dans la lettre à Mersenne de mars 1636 (AT I, 339 l. 16, [O VIII 1, 135; B 83) et racontera au P. Deriennes : « [...] c'est un traité que je n'ai quasi composé que pendant qu'on imprimait mes *Météores*, et même j'en ai inventé une partie pendant ce temps-là » (AT I, 457-458, à Deriennes 22 février 1638, [O VIII 2, 578-579] B 147).
"Au reste, si M. Gassendi a quelques autres remarques touchant la neige, que ce que j'ai vu dans Kepler, et remarqué encore cet hiver, *de Nive sexangula et grandine acuminata* (7), je serai bien aise de l'apprendre ; car je veux expliquer les météores le plus exactement que je pourrai (8)." (lettre à Mersenne, 4 mars 1630, AT I, 127 O VIII 1, 62; B 28).
(7) Kepler a publié en 1611 le traité *De nive sexangula et grandine acuminata*.
(8) Descartes a dû connaître (par Mersenne) l'observation de Gssend; (à la fin de son *Examen* du 4 février 1629 : voir Gassend 4 février 1629 (CM II 196-199).
Dans une lettre à Chanut du 6 mars 1646, Descartes écrit : "Une seule observation que je fis de la neige hexagone, en l'année 1635, a été cause du traité que j'en fait (5)." (AT IV, 377; O VIII 2, 668; B 545).
(5) Dans les *Météores* VI (AT VI 298 1. 8 sq. [O III, 329]); (observation du 5 février 1635 (voir AT XI, 623-624 et 626-

627) ; voir à Mersenne, 4 mars 1630 (AT I, 127, [O VIII 1, 62] B 28) et 30 août 1640 (AT III 166, [O VIII 1, 404] B 269 : longue note dans E. Lojacono (éd.), *Opere scientifiche di René Descartes*, t. 2, Turin, Classici UTET, 1983, p. 434.
Voir AT XI, p. 635 : "Par un vent du nord, avec neige et verglas la veille. Les grains de neige étaient de cette grosseur, ils ressemblaient à l'humeur cristalline de l'œil, étaient transparents, et j'en ai remarqué un ou deux qui avaient autour d'eux six rayons très-courts, tirant sur le blanc pâle, et surpassant la glace. Ce même jour, 5 février [1635], j'ai noté une grande diversité d'étoiles de neige. D'abord quelques lames solides taillées en hexagone, d'une parfaite transparence, polies et minces, de grandeurs égales." (texte en latin; traduction de Foucher de Careil, p. 81).
"Aux *Météores*, je m'arrête principalement sur la nature du Sel, les causes des Vents et du Tonnerre, les figures de la Neige, les couleurs de l'Arc-en-Ciel, où je tâche aussi à démontrer généralement quelle est la nature de chaque Couleur, et les Couronnes, ou Halones, et les Soleils, ou Parhelia, semblables à ceux qui parurent à Rome il y a six ou sept ans." (lettre à Mersenne, mars 1636, AT I 340; O VIII 1, 135; B 83).
"Par les *Météores*, je désirai qu'on reconnût la différence qui est entre la Philosophie que je cultive et celle qu'on enseigne dans les écoles où l'on a coutume de traiter de la même matière." *Lettre-Préface* aux *Principes de philosophie* (AT IX-2, 15).

30. ———. 1637. *La Géométrie*.
AT VI, 368-485; B. Op. I, 490-653; O III, 415-512.
Une traduction latine par Frans Van Schooten (le jeune) (1615-1661) paru à Leyde: Maire 1649.
La *Géométrie* est le seul ouvrage mathématique publié par Descartes et résume les résultats de 19 années de recherches ; sa rédaction l'a occupé dans les premiers mois de 1637: "C'est un traité que je n'ai quasi composé que pendant qu'on imprimait mes *Météores*, et même j'en ai inventé une partie pendant ce temps-là (4); mais je n'ai pas laissé de m'y satisfaire, autant ou plus que je ne me satisfais d'ordinaire

de ce que j'écris." (lettre à Jean Deriennes du 22 février 1638 (AT I, 458; O VIII 1, 578-579; B 147).
(4) La *Dioptrique* était prête pour l'impression dès octobre 1635 (Huygens à Descartes, 28 octobre 1635, AT I, 588 l. 5-6, B 76).
Lettre à Mersenne, fin décembre 1637: "Et je ne suis pas bien aise d'être obligé de parler avantageusement de moi-même; mais parce qu'il y a peu de gens qui puissent entendre ma *Géométrie*, et que vous désirez que je vous mande quelle est l'opinion que j'en ai, je crois qu'il est à propos que je vous dise qu'elle est telle, que je n'y souhaite rien davantage; et que j'ai seulement tâché par la *Dioptrique* et par les *Météores* de persuader que ma méthode est meilleure que l'ordinaire, mais je prétends l'avoir démontré par ma *Géométrie*." (AT I, 477; O VIII 1, 149; B 136).
Sur la difficulté de l'œuvre voir:
l'*Avertissement* : "Jusques ici j'ai tâché de me rendre intelligible à tout le monde ; mais, pour ce traité, je crains qu'il ne pourra être lu que par ceux qui savent déjà ce qui est dans les livres de Géométrie: car, d'autant qu'ils contiennent plusieurs vérités fort bien démontrées, j'ai cru qu'il serait superflu de les répéter, et n'ai pas laissé, pour cela, de m'en servir." (AT VI 368)
et la lettre à Florimond de Beaune du 20 février 1639: "J'ai été extrêmement aise de voir vos *Notes* (*) sur ma *Géométrie* (2); et je puis dire, avec vérité, que je n'y ai pas trouvé un seul mot qui ne soit entièrement selon mon sens. En sorte que j'ai admiré que vous ayez pu reconnaître des choses que je n'y ai mises qu'obscurément (3), comme en ce qui regarde la généralité de la méthode, et la construction des lieux plans et solides, etc.
(...)
Toutefois je puis assurer que je n'ai rien omis de tout cela qu'à dessein, excepté le cas de l'asymptote que j'ai oublié. Mais j'avais prévu que certaines gens, qui se vantent de savoir tout, n'eussent pas manqué de dire que je n'avais rien écrit qu'ils n'aient su auparavant, si je me fusse rendu assez intelligible pour eux ; et je n'aurais pas eu le plaisir, que j'ai eu depuis, de voir l'impertinence de leurs objections. Outre

que ce que j'ai omis ne nuit à personne ; car pour les autres, il leur sera plus profitable de tâcher à l'inventer d'eux-mêmes, que de le trouver dans un livre. Et pour moi, je ne crains pas que ceux qui s'y entendent m'imputent aucune de ces omissions à ignorance ; car j'ai partout eu soin de mettre le plus difficile, et de laisser seulement le plus aisé." (AT II, 510-512; O VIII 2, 691-692; B 203).
(2) Voir à Mersenne, 9 février 1639 (AT II, 499 l. 20-24, [O VIII 1, 320] B 202). Les *Notes brèves* de Debeaune [dans le texte originel Français] ont été publiées dans AM III 353-401 (voir aussi la lettre de Debeaune à Schooten, 1648-1649 dans AM III 321-322).
(*) [Ces *Notes* seront publiées dans la traduction latine de la *Géométrie* en 1649: *In geometriam Renati Descartes notæ breves*, Amsterdam, 1659.]
Après la publication, Descartes ne montre plus d'intérêt pour la géométrie : "Mais n'attendez plus rien de moi, s'il vous plaît, en géométrie; car vous savez qu'il y a longtemps que je proteste de ne m'y vouloir plus exercer, et je pense pouvoir honnêtement y mettre fin." (à Mersenne, 12 septembre 1638, AT II, 361-362; O VIII 1, 273-274; B 187).
"Enfin, en la *Géométrie*, je tâche à donner une faon générale pour soudre tous les problèmes qui ne l'ont encore jamais été. Et tout ceci ne fera pas, je crois, un volume plus grand que de cinquante ou soixante feuilles (8). Au reste, je n'y veux point mettre mon nom, suivant mon ancienne résolution (9), et je vous prie de n'en rien dire à personne, si ce n'est que vous jugiez à propos d'en parler à quelque libraire, afin de savoir s'il aura envie de me servir, sans toutefois achever, s'il vous plaît, de conclure avec lui, qu'après ma réponse ; et sur ce que vous me ferez la faveur de me mander, je me résoudrai." (lettre à Mersenne du mars 1636, AT I, 340; O VIII 1, 136; B 136).
(8) Le volume imprimé fera 66 feuilles, dont 10 pour le *Discours*.
(9) Voia à Mersenne, 25 novembre 1630 (AT I, 179-180; [O VIII 1, 83-64] B 36.
"Enfin, par la *Géométrie*, je prétendais démontrer que j'avais trouvé plusieurs choses qui ont été ci-devant

ignorées, et ainsi donner occasion de croire qu'on en peut découvrir encore plusieurs autres, afin d'inciter par ce moyen tous les hommes à la recherche de la vérité." *Lettre-Préface* aux *Principes de philosophie* (AT IX-2, 15).

31. ———. 1637. *Explication des engins par l'aide desquels on peut avec une petite force lever un fardeau fort pesant [Traité de mécanique]*.
AT I, 435-447; B 129; O III, 568-577.
Le texte est annexe à la lettre à Constantin Huygens du 5 octobre 1637 ; la première édition est celle publiée en 1668 par Nicolas Poisson avec le *Compendium musicae*.

32. ———. 1638. *Calcul de Mons. Des-Cartes*.
AT X 659-680; édition critique par Fréderic de Buzon in B Op. II, 1472-1528.
Dans le dernier paragraphe d'une lettre à Claude Mydorge du 1 mars 1638, Descartes écrit: "Si vous désirez que je vous envoie quelques adresses particulières touchant le calcul, j'ai ici un ami qui s'offre de les écrire (27), et je m'y offrirais bien aussi, mais j'en suis moins capable que lui, à cause que je ne sais pas si bien remarquer en quoi on peut trouver de la difficulté." (AT II 23; O VIII 1, 672; B152).
(27) Il s'agit de l'*Introduction à la Géométrie*, ou *Introduction au Calcul de Monsieur Descartes*, attribuée à Godefroid Van Haestrecht [1592/93 - 1659] (voir la présentation de F. de Buzon, in B Op. II, 1465-1529).
De ce document, il y a trois manuscrits :
1) H : retrouvé par Charles Adam dans la Bibliothèque Royale de Hanovre parmi les papiers de Leibniz et publié dans AT X.
2) L : retrouvé par Cornelis de Waard en 1917 parmi les papiers de Charles Cavendish et publié dans Charles Adam et Gaston Milhaud (éds.) *René Descartes. Correspondance*, Paris, Alcan 1936-, vol. III, pp. 323-352.
3) M : retrouvé par Frédéric de Buzon parmi les manuscrits de Marcus Meibom à la Bibliothèque Royale de La Haye et publié dans B Op. II, 1473-1529 avec le titre: *Recueil du Calcul, qui sert à la Géométrie du Sieur Des-Cartes*.

33. ———. 1639? *De refractione*.
AT XI, 645-646; B Op. II, 1390-1393.

La date précise de composition est incertaine.

34. ———. 1640. *Invention de la racine cubique des nombres binomes*.
AT III 188, l. 3 - 190, l. 19; nouvelle édition reprise de l'édition Costabel: AT V 612-615; B Op. II, 1440-1447.
Première édition : Pierre Costabel, "Descartes et la racine cubique des nombres binômes", *Revue d'histoire des sciences*, 22, 1969, pp. 97-116 (texte au pp. 99-102); repris dans P. Costabel, *Démarches originales de Descartes savant*, Paris, Vrin, 1982, pp. 122-126.
"Le document illustre la phase ultime du débat engagé en 1639 entre Stampioen et Waessenaer, celui-ci agissant pour le compte de Descartes. "(p. 97).

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Première Partie (1616-1640)

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Pour la liste des éditions de références et des abréviations voir René Descartes. Outils de recherche: Biographies, Dictionnaires et Lexiques des Ses Œuvres

1. ———. 1641. *Meditationes de prima Philosophia in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demostrantur*. Parisiis: Michaelem Soly.
   AT VII : *Epistola* 1; *Praefatio ad Lectorem* 7; *Synopsis sequentium sex Meditationum* 12; *Meditatio I-VI* 17-90; *Objectiones Primae* 91; *Responsio Authoris* 101; *Objectiones Secundae* 121; *Responsio* 128; *Rationes Dei existentia et animae a corpore distinctionem probantes, more geometrico dispositae* 160; *Objectiones Tertiae cum Responsionibus Authoris* 171; *Objectiones Quartae* 196; *Objectiones Quintae* 256; *Responsio* 347; *Disquisitio metaphysica Gassendus Sorberio* 392; *Objectiones Sextae* 412; *Responsio* 422; *Objectiones Septimae cum Notis Authoris* 464; *Epistola ad patrem Dinet* 563-603.
   B Op. I, 680-799; *Objectiones cum Responsionibus*, 800-1395.

Les *VII Objectiones* et l' *Epistola ad patrem Dinet* sont ajoutées dans la deuxième édition.
Date de composition : octobre 1639 - mars 1640.
Première édition : 28 août 1641.
Deuxième édition revue avec le titre : *Meditationes de prima philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia, et animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demostrantur*.
Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1642 (réimpression anastatique Lecce, Conte Editore, 1992).
Après le *Traité de métaphysique* de 1628-29 (qui n'a pas été conservé) et la *Quatrième partie* du *Discours de la méthode* c'est le premier texte publié par Descartes sur la métaphysique (*La Recherche de la Vérité* a été publié seulement en 1684).
La première mention de l'œuvre est dans la lettre à Mersenne du 13 novembre 1639 : "Les opinions de vos Analystes, (*) touchant l'existence de Dieu et l'honneur qu'on lui doit rendre, sont, comme vous écrivez, très difficiles à guérir ; non pas qu'il n'y ait moyen de donner des raisons assez fortes pour les convaincre, mais parce que ces gens-là, pensant avoir bon esprit, sont souvent moins capables de raison que les autres. Car la partie de l'esprit qui aide le plus aux mathématiques, à savoir l'imagination, nuit plus qu'elle ne sert pour les spéculations métaphysiques. J'ai maintenant entre les mains un discours, où je tâche d'éclaircir ce que j'ai écrit ci-devant sur ce sujet ; il ne sera que de cinq ou six feuilles d'impression; mais j'espère qu'il contiendra une bonne partie de la métaphysique. Et afin de le mieux faire, mon dessein est de n'en faire imprimer que vingt ou trente exemplaires, pour les envoyer aux vingt ou trente plus savants théologiens dont je pourrai avoir connaissance, afin d'en avoir leur jugement, et apprendre d'eux ce qui sera bon d'y changer, corriger ou ajouter, avant que de le rendre public." (AT II, 622; O VIII 1, 351-352; B 224).
(*) [Les géomètres de Paris]
La rédaction est terminée en mars 1640 : "Je ne ferai point imprimer mon essai de *Métaphysique* (14) que je ne sois à Leyde, où je pense aller dans cinq ou six semaines (15)"

lettre à Mersenne, 11 mars 1640 (AT III, 35-36; O VIII 1, 367-368; B 246).
(14) Ls *Meditationes* seront imprimés à Paris en 1641, puis à Amsterdam en 1642.
(15) Descartes date de Leyde toute une série de lettres écrites entre le 7 mai 1640 et le 18 mars 1641.
En novembre 1640 le livre est envoyé à l'imprimeur: "Le peu que j'ai écrit de métaphysique est déjà en chemin pour aller à Paris (5), où je crois qu'on le fera imprimer, et il ne m'en est resté ici qu'un brouillon si plein de ratures, que j'aurais moi-même de la peine à le lire, ce qui est cause que je ne puis vous l'offrir ; mais sitôt qu'il sera imprimé, j'aurai soin de vous en envoyer des premiers, puisqu'il vous plaît me faire la faveur de le vouloir le lire, et je serai fort aise d'en apprendre votre jugement." Lettre à Colvius du 14 novembre 1640, AT III, 248; O VIII 2, 586; B 287).
(5) Voir à Mersenne, 11 novembre 1640 (AT III 238-239, [O VIII 1, 424] B 285) « [...] je vous envoie enfin mon écrit de *Métaphysique*... »
Descartes envoie une copie du manuscrit à Huygens et Mersenne :
- Constantin Huygens : "J'ai envoyé dès hier ma *Métaphysique* à Monsieur de Zuylichem pour vous l'adresser ; mais il ne l'enverra que dans huit jours, car je lui ai donné ce temps pour la voir. Je n'y ai point mis de titre, mais il me semble que le plus propre sera de mettre *Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima Philosophia*; car je ne traite point en particulier de Dieu et de l'âme, mais en général de toutes les premières choses qu'on peut connaître en philosophant. Vous verrez assez, par les lettres que j'y ai jointes, quel est mon dessein; et je n'en dirai ici autre chose, sinon que je crois qu'il n'y aura pas de mal, avant que de la faire imprimer, de stipuler avec le libraire qu'il nous en donne autant d'exemplaires que nous en aurons de besoin, et même qu'il les donne tout reliés ; car il n'y a pas plaisir d'acheter ses propres écrits, et je m'assure que le libraire pourra bien faire cela sans y perdre. Je n'aurai besoin ici que d'environ trente exemplaires ; pour Paris, c'est à vous de

juger combien il nous en faudra." Lettre à Mersenne du 11 novembre 1640 (AT III, 235-236; O VIII 1, 424; B 283).
- Marin Mersenne : "Je vous envoie enfin mon écrit de *Métaphysique*, auquel je n'ai point mis de titre, afin de vous en faire le parrain, et vous laisser la puissance de le baptiser (2). Je crois qu'on le pourra nommer, ainsi que je vous ai écrit par ma précédente, *Meditationes de prima Philosophia* ; car je n'y traite pas seulement de Dieu et de l'âme, mais en général de toutes les premières choses qu'on peut connaître en philosophant par ordre. Et mon nom est connu de tant de gens que, si je ne voulais pas le mettre ici, on croirait que j'y entendrais quelque finesse, et que je le ferais plutôt par vanité que par modestie (3).
Pour la lettre à Messieurs de Sorbonne (4), si j'ai manqué au titre, ou qu'il y faille quelque souscription, ou autre cérémonie, je vous prie d'y vouloir suppléer, et je crois qu'elle sera aussi bonne, étant écrite de la main d'un autre, que de la mienne. Je vous l'envoie séparée du traité, à cause que, si toutes choses vont comme elles doivent, il me semble que le meilleur serait, après que le tout aura été vu par le P. Gibieuf (5), et, s'il vous plaît, par un ou deux autres de vos amis, qu'on imprimât le traité sans la lettre, à cause que la copie en est trop mal écrite pour être lue de plusieurs, et qu'on le présentât ainsi imprimé au Corps de la Sorbonne, avec la lettre écrite à la main; en suite de quoi il me semble que le droit du jeu sera qu'ils commettent quelques-uns d'entre eux pour l'examiner (6) ; et il leur faudra donner autant d'exemplaires pour cela qu'ils en auront besoin, ou plutôt autant qu'ils sont de docteurs (7), et s'ils trouvent quelque chose à objecter, qu'ils me l'envoient, afin que j'y réponde ; ce qu'on pourra faire imprimer à la fin du livre. Et après cela il me semble qu'ils ne pourront refuser de donner leur jugement, lequel pourra être imprimé au commencement du livre, avec la lettre que je leur écris. Mais les choses iront peut-être tout autrement que je ne pense ; c'est pourquoi je m'en remets entièrement à vous et au P. Gibieuf, que je prie par ma lettre (8) de vouloir vous aider à ménager cette affaire : car la *Vélitation* que vous savez (9) m'a fait connaître que, quelque bon droit qu'on puisse avoir,

on ne manque pas d'avoir toujours besoin d'amis pour le défendre. L'importance est en ceci que, puisque je soutiens la cause de Dieu, on ne saurait rejeter mes raisons, si ce n'est qu'on y montre du paralogisme, ce que je crois être impossible, ni les mépriser, si ce n'est qu'on en donne de meilleures, à quoi je pense qu'on aura assez de peine."
Lettre du 11 novembre 1640 (AT III, 239-240; O VIII 1, 424-425; B 285).
(2) Voir à Mersenne, 18 mars 1641 (AT III 340, [O VIII 1, 457] B 305) : « vous en serez, s'il vous plaît, le parrain ».
(3) L'ouvrage, comme on sait, parut sous le titre *Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur*.
(4) L'*Epistola dedicatoria* (AT VII 680-686) : en se tournant vers la faculté de théologie, Descartes montrait avoir renoncé à attendre un soutien de ses anciens maîtres jésuites.
(5) Clerselier Lettres : « Le P. G. », et ailleurs.
(6) Ce qui fut fait le 1er août 1641, avec la nomination de quatre docteurs (« commissaires »), Chastelain, Potier, Hallier et Cornet, « pour examiner la *Métaphysique* de Monsieur Descartes ». Il n'en est plus question par la suite, l'assemblée du 2 septembre se bornant à approuver les conclusions de l'assemblée précédente (l'achevé d'imprimer des *Meditationes* est du 28 août) ; voir J.-R. Armogathe, « L'approbation des *Meditationes* par la faculté de théologie de Paris 1641 », *Bulletin cartésien* XXI-XXII, p. 1-3, *Archives de philosophie* 57, 1, 1994.
(7) C'était la procédure habituelle, qu'on trouve par exemple appliquée au livre de Pierre Dabillon, *De la divinité défendue contre les athées*, Paris, 1642, approuvé quelques semaines plus tôt par la Faculté.
(8) À Gibieuf, 11 novembre 1640 (AT III, 238 l. 8-9, [O VIII 2, 792] B 284).
(9) Sur l'affaire des thèses du P. Bourdin, voir lettre 76, n. 2, p. 940 et dossier Jésuites, lettre 6, [O VIII 1, 582-591] B 261.

2. ———. 1641. *Propositio demonstrata*.
Première édition: Clerselier, III, 1667, 475-479.
AT III, 708-714 (CCXLIII bis); O III, 519-524.

La proposition démontrée est la suivante : "Étant donné une section conique quelconque et un point situé comme on veut hors de son plan, on cherche un cercle qui soit une base du cône que décrit une droite tournant, à partir du point donné comme sommet, autour de la section conique donnée; car il n'est pas douteux que la surface ainsi décrite ne soit conique, et une fois qu'on a trouvé le cercle qui est une base, cela peut se démontrer facilement."
"Entre avril et septembre 1641, Descartes rédigea (ou fit rédiger) en latin une solution à un vieux problème géométrique qui aurait été reproposé à la communauté mathématique par Desargues. Mydorge et Roberval sont censés avoir donné également chacun la leur (dont on ne sait rien aujourd'hui).
Notre Annexe X montre que Fermat s'est aussi intéressé à la question.
Le texte de cette *Propositio* a été publié pour la première fois, sous le titre indiqué plus haut, par Claude Clerselier en 1667 dans le volume III de la *Correspondance* de Descartes, pages 475-479 (en annexe à la lettre LXXXIII du 12 octobre 1648. Le manuscrit semble perdu, et nul ne sait si, par exemple, les six figures qui y sont insérées sont plus ou moins de la main de Descartes, ou fortement interprétées - et dégradés - par son éditeur.
(...)
Une nouvelle traduction Français e de ce texte figure dans l'Annexe I. "
André Warusfel, *L'œuvre mathématique de Descartes dans La Géométrie: de la résolution des équations algébriques à la naissance de la géométrie analytique*, thèse de doctorat, 2010, disponible en ligne à l'adresse: philosophie.ac-creteil.fr/IMG/pdf/Geometrie.pdf (pp. 576-577, notes omises).

3. ———. 1642. *Meditationes De Prima Philosophia, In quibus Dei existentia, et animae humanae à corpore distinctio, demonstrantur*. Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium.
AT VII : deuxième édition de l'œuvre publiée en 1641.
"De quelle faon maintenant convient-il d'utiliser les éditions anciennes, soit pour le contenu du présent volume, soit pour

l'établissement du texte ?
Pour le contenu, la seconde édition, celle de 1642, doit évidemment faire loi. La première édition, en effet, est incomplète : il y manque les septièmes *Objections*, qui n'avaient pas été envoyées à temps pour y figurer, et qui d'ailleurs ont été faites, non pas, comme les autres, sur une copie manuscrite adressée avant toute impression par Mersenne aux théologiens ou philosophes dont il provoquait les critiques, mais sur le volume imprimé dès le 28 août 1641, et que le P. Bourdin, auteur des septièmes Objections, étudia de lui-même à seule fin de le critiquer. Descartes ayant joint, en outre, à ces septièmes Objections, accrues de ses propres Notes, la Lettre qu'il écrivit ensuite au P. Dinet, nous ne les séparerons pas non plus dans le présent volume." (AT VII, *Avertissement* à l'édition de 1983, p. XI).
"La différence la plus notable entre la première et la deuxième édition "est un assez long passage qui termine les *Réponses* de Descartes aux quatrièmes *Objections* d'Antoine Arnauld : ce passage très important sur l'Eucharistie, envoyé d'abord en 1640 à Mersenne, n'avait point paru dans la première édition, en 1641, sans doute afin d'obtenir plus aisément l'approbation de la Sorbonne ; il fut rétabli naturellement dans l'édition de 1642 (voir ci-après, p. 252, l. 22, à p. 256, l. 8)." (AT VII, *Avertissement* à l'édition de 1983, p. XIII).

4. ———. 1642. *[Epistola] Ad Reverendo Patri Dinet*. Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium.
AT VII, 563-603; B Op. I 1426-1475.
Traduction Français e par Claude Clerselier dans la deuxième édition des *Méditations Métaphysiques* (1661).
Nouvelle traduction par Theo Verbeek dans : René Descartes et Martin Schoock, *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988, pp. 131-151.
Table des matières : Jean-Luc Marion : Préface 7; Theo Verbeek: Introduction 19; Narration Historique de la manière dont la philosophie nouvelle a été soutenue d'abord, puis abolie, précédée du Témoignage de l'Académie d'Utrecht 71; René Descartes : Lettre à Dinet 125; Martin Schoock : L'Admirable Méthode 153; René Descartes :

Lettre à Voet 321; René Descartes : Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d'Utrecht 401; Theo Verbeek : Notes 439-540. Sur l'histoire de la *Querelle*, voit l'*Introduction* de Theo Verbeek, pp. 19-66.
Theo Verbeek a traduit en Français les pièces principales de la controverse entre Descartes et Gijsbert Voet (1589-1676) dans *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, cit. :
"...d'abord la *Lettre au Père Dinet*, qui, publiée en appendice à la seconde édition des *Meditationes* (1642) déclenche, en mentionnant les attaques de G. Voet contre Regius et Descartes, un conflit ouvert ; ensuite la réplique de Schoock, suscitée par G. Voet, sous le titre de *La Méthode Admirable de la nouvelle philosophie cartésienne* (1643) qui attire, en retour, la *Lettre à G. Voet* où, pour la première fois (mai 1643), Descartes accepte le combat direct ; la réponse prendra l'aspect d'une *Narration historique* (octobre 1643), suivant de peu un arrêt pris par les magistrats d'Utrecht contre Descartes (13 septembre 1643), précédant aussi de peu une intervention en faveur de Descartes de M. de la Thuillière, Ambassadeur de France. La querelle fut cependant assez vive pour que Descartes adresse encore, un an et demi plus tard, une *Lettre apologétique aux Magistrats d'Utrecht* (juin 1645) et tienne à la publier en mars 1648. L'importance du dossier se marque au nombre des pièces qui le composent (et de nombreuses lettres pourraient s'y adjoindre), mais aussi au temps que lui consacre Descartes — pourtant si soucieux de son loisir et de son repos : pendant près de six ans, tout son temps de travail (et il s'agit des *Principia* puis des *Passions de l'âme*) sera conquis sur la distraction et l'inquiétude d'une polémique de plus en plus âcre et dangereuse. Il paraît donc impossible, au simple vu de ces titres et de ces dates, de sous-estimer, encore plus d'ignorer, un épisode aussi important et importun de la vie de Descartes. Le travail de Theo Verbeek se justifie donc entièrement, ne fût-ce que d'un point de vue historique ; il contribuera, comme un document indispensable, à la connaissance du premier cartésianisme hollandais."
(Jean-Luc Marion, *Préface* à *La Querelle d'Utrecht,* p. 8).

"Les Jésuites semblaient être un peu plus partagés que les pères de l'Oratoire sur la philosophie de M. Descartes ; et la diversité des opinions était grande dans leur Compagnie sur ses *Méditations métaphysiques*. Les uns se contentaient de goûter ses principes et ses raisonnements, ou de louer ses bonnes intentions et ses efforts, sans aller au-delà, comme le P. Noël, le P. Fournier, le P. J. Franois, le P. Grandamy, le P. Dinet, qui était provincial de France à Paris, le P. Charles son parent, qui était assistant du général de la Compagnie de Rome. Le P. Dinet qui avait été autrefois son préfet à La Flèche, ayant fait un voyage à Rome sur la fin de la même année [1642], ne manqua point d'entretenir le P. Charlet du livre de ses *Méditations* ; et il voulut donner avis au philosophe de tout ce qui s'était dit de plus obligeant entre eux à son sujet, par une lettre qu'il lui en écrivit de Rome vers le commencement de l'avent. M. Descartes crut devoir faire part de la joie qu'il en reut au P. Mersenne dans le même temps des étrennes de l'année suivante. Il lui marqua aux termes du P. Dinet l'estime que le P. Charlet faisait de ses études, et qu'il avait pour sa personne ; croyant que ce père n'attendait à se déclarer ouvertement pour sa philosophie qu'après la publication de ses *Principes*."
Baillet II, chapitre VIII, 159-160.
"De plus, je ne voudrais pas qu'on me croie sur parole lorsque je parle de la vérité des écrits que je promets, mais qu'on en juge par les *Essais* que j'ai déjà donnés. Car loin d'y avoir expliqué une ou deux questions, j'en ai discuté des centaines qui auparavant n'avaient pas été traitées de la sorte. Et quoique beaucoup de personnes aient lu mes écrits d'un œil jaloux et aient fait de leur mieux pour les réfuter, personne, autant que je sache, n'a été à même d'y trouver autre chose que de la vérité. Qu'on fasse la liste de toutes les questions qui, depuis tant de siècles où il y a des philosophies, ont été résolues par leur moyen : on n'en trouvera probablement ni beaucoup, ni de très importantes. J'ose même prétendre qu'il n'y a jamais eu de question dont je ne pourrais montrer que la solution qu'on en a donnée à partir des principes propres à la philosophie péripatéticienne est fausse et mal fondée. Qu'on en fasse

l'épreuve : qu'on les propose, non pas toutes il est vrai, car je ne crois pas qu'elles vaillent la peine d'y employer beaucoup de temps, mais quelques-unes des plus spéciales. On verra que je tiendrai mes promesses (42). Ma seule restriction, que je fais pour prévenir tout sujet de chicane, est que si je dis "principes propres à la philosophie péripatéticienne", je ne veux pas parler de ces questions dont la solution est tirée soit de l'expérience commune de tous les hommes, soit de la considération des figures et du mouvement qui est le fait des mathématiciens, soit enfin de ces notions métaphysiques qui sont généralement reues et que j'admets comme les autres : on les trouvera dans mes *Méditations*.
Qu'on me permette encore ce qui paraîtra un paradoxe : en tant que cette philosophie est jugée péripatéticienne, et différente des autres, elle ne contient rien qui ne soit pas nouveau ; et la mienne rien qui ne soit pas ancien. Car en ce qui concerne les principes, je n'admets que ceux qui, jusqu'ici, ont été partagés par tous les philosophes et qui de ce fait sont les plus anciens de tous. Et en ce qui concerne ce que j'en déduis par après, je ne fais que montrer ce que contenaient ceux-là d'une faon implicite, mais cela d'une faon tellement claire qu'on voit que cela aussi, se trouvant naturellement dans l'esprit des hommes, est en réalité très ancien. D'autre part, les principes de la philosophie ordinaire étaient de toute faon nouveaux à l'époque où ils furent inventés par Aristote ou par d'autres. Ils ne sont pas maintenant meilleurs qu'ils n'étaient jadis. On n'en déduit rien qui ne soit pas controversé, et qui ne puisse être changé ou adapté à la faon d'une École ou au gré du premier philosophe venu. Par conséquent il n'y a rien qui soit plus nouveau, puisqu'on la renouvelle tous les jours (43)."
(*Lettre à Dinet*, traduction de Theo Verbeek, *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, cit., p. 140, AT VII, 580).
(42) Voir le commentaire de Schoock, *Admiranda Methodus*, section II chap. 4.
(43) Voir pour tout ce passage, d'une part ce que dit Descartes dans son Discours (VI, AT VI, 77 ; [O III, 132-133]), d'autre part le commentaire mordant de Schoock dans l'*Admiranda Methodus*, section Π, chap. I. C'est à

partir d'une notion pareille que certains cartésiens amorceront la "philosophia novantiqua", synthèse originale d'aristotélisme et de cartésianisme ; voir A. Heereboord, *Meletemata Philosophica* (Lugd. Bat., 1654) ; *Philosophia Naturalis cum commentariis Peripateticis* (Lugd. Bat., 1663) ; J. de Raei, *Clavis Philosophiae Naturalis Aristotelico-Cartesianae* (Lugd. Bat., 1654) ; *De Sapientia Veterum* (Amstel., 1669) ; et en général J. Bohatec, *Die Cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und reformierten Dogmatik des 17. Jahrhunderts,* Leipzig, 1912.

5. ———. 1642. *Excerpta P. Kircher, De magnete*.
AT XI, 635-639; B Op. II 1386-1389.
Annotations à l'œuvre d'Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) *De magnete sive de arte magnetica* Romae: L. Grigarani, 1641.
Lettre du 5 janvier 1643 à Constantin Huygens : "... j'espère qu'elle ne retardera point l'impression de ma Philosophie, en laquelle j'approche de l'endroit où je dois traiter de l'aimant (8). Si vous jugez que le gros livre que vous avez de cette matière, duquel je ne sais point le nom (9), m'y puisse servir, et qu'il vous plaise de me l'envoyer, je vous en aurai obligation" (AT III 801; O VIII 2, 107; B379)
(8) Il s'agit des §§ 133-183 des *Prìncipia* IVa (AT VIII-1 275-311).
(9) Le *Magnes* d'Athanase Kircher (Rome, 1641, 916 p. in-4° ; Cologne, 1643, 797 p. in-4°); Huygens l'envoie à Descartes avec sa réponse du 7 janvier 1643 et un commentaire acerbe contre les jésuites : « Voici d'ailleurs l'Aimant de Kircherus, où vous trouverez plus de grimace que de bonne étoffe, qui est l'ordinaire des jésuites. Ces écrivasseurs pourtant vous peuvent servir en des choses *quœ facti sunt, non jurìs* [qui sont d'ordre du fait et non du droit]. Ils ont plus de loisir que vous à se pourvoir d'expériences : on se peut prévaloir au besoin de leurs rapports » (AT III 802, B380).

6. ———. 1643. *Epistola Renati Des-Cartes Ad celeberrimum Virum D. Gisbertum Voetium*. Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium.
La première édition est suivie de la traduction néerlandaise : *Brief van Rene Des Cartes aen den vermaerden D. Gisbertus Voetius*, Amsterdam 1643.

AT VIII-2, 1-194; B Op. I 1493-1691.
Traduction de Victor Cousin dans son édition des *Œuvres de Descartes*, vol. XI, Paris: Levrault, 1825, pp. 3-198 ; cette traduction a été reprise par Theo Verbeek dans *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988, pp. 327-399, avec l'omission de la sixième partie.
"C'est ainsi que, croyant écrire une lettre, l'abondance de la matière a produit un livre. Je l'ai divisé en neuf parties, afin que chacune pût se lire à part, et peut-être avec moins d'ennui.
Dans la première, je réponds à l'introduction du livre sur la *Philosophie Cartésienne* [1], dans laquelle l'auteur a voulu faire l'énumération sommaire de mes vices.
Dans la seconde, je récompense M. Voet en racontant quelques-unes de ses actions qui m'ont d'abord fait connaître ses vertus.
Dans la troisième, je parcours le premier et le second chapitre du même livre sur la *Philosophie Cartésienne*.
Dans la quatrième, j'expose mon sentiment sur l'usage des livres et la doctrine de Voet.
Dans la cinquième, je traite brièvement des autres chapitres de ce livre, c'est-à-dire du reste des deux premières sections.
Dans la sixième, j'examine le livre de la *Confrérie de la Vierge*.
Dans la septième, je considère les mérites de M. Voet, et l'exemple de charité chrétienne et de probité qu'il a donné dans cet ouvrage.
Dans la huitième, je reviens au livre sur la *Philosophie Cartésienne*, et j'en réfute la préface (que je n'avais pas encore vue) et la troisième section.
Dans la neuvième, je réponds à la quatrième et dernière section du même livre, et je montre en même temps que ses auteurs sont coupables de la calomnie la plus odieuse et la plus inexcusable."
(AT VIII-2, 11-12; *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, cit., p. 330).
[1] Martin Schoock (1614-1669, élève de Voetius), *Admiranda Methodus Novae Philosophiae Renati De Cartes*, Ultrajecti [Utrecht] : ex officina Joannis van

Waesberge, 1643 (traduction Français e par Theo Verbeek, dans *La Querelle d'Utrecht*. cit., pp. 157-320).
"Il paraît d'abord incontestable que, dans ses trois textes polémiques, Descartes retrouve et parfois développe certaines des thèses caractéristiques de sa philosophie.
1. Il invoque, contre Voet, la *bona mens* (AT VIII-1, 45, ll. 12-13), pour la mettre en équivalence avec l'*humana sapientia* (43, ll. 15-17), sur le modèle de la *Regula I* (AT X, 359, l. 6 - 360, l. 15).
2. Cette *bona mens* définit à son tour le domaine de la lumière naturelle, où la théologie révélée ne peut intervenir (AT VII, 598, ll. 5-11), conformément à une distinction déjà fixée par la *Regula III* (AT X, 370, ll. 16-25) et le *Discours de la Méthode* (AT VI, 28, l. 16 [O III, 100]) : ce départ entre les deux lumières, naturelle (raison) et révélée (foi, volonté), devient d'ailleurs aussitôt un argument contre ceux qui prétendent censurer des thèses philosophiques au nom de l'autorité religieuse ; car Voet passe d'une *facultas* (théologie) à une autre (médecine ou philosophie) par une faute de méthode, avant tout abus de pouvoir : "... censuram tuam theologicam absque ullo rationis praetextu ad quaestiones pure philosophicas extendere volueris..." (*) (VIII-2, 132, ll. 17-19). La *ratio naturalis* (51, l. 31) régente absolument le domaine qu'elle suffit à définir (3). Ainsi, face au décret de l'Université qui impose aux professeurs en débat théorique d'être "...contentos modica libertate disserendi in singularibus nonnullis opinionibus..." (AT VII, 593, ll. 11-12), de se contenter d'une liberté restreinte de discussion sur plus d'une opinion, il faut revendiquer sans concession la liberté philosophique, absolue dans les limites de la raison : "... liberum enim semper fuit philosophari." (AT VIII-2, 3, ll. 11-12).
3. Par suite, Descartes mentionne aussi ici sa *Methodus ad quaerendam veritatem* (53, 4-5), dans les termes mêmes de la *Regula IV*, qu'il oppose, comme le faisaient les *Regulae III* et *X*, à la logique de l'Ecole : la *bona mens* ne peut s'exprimer en syllogismes (43, 17 sq.), sauf à sombrer dans la *Sophistarum Dialectica* (46, 16), "...puerilis illa Dialectica, cujus ope olim Sophistae, nulla scientiam

habentes, de qualibet re copiose disserebant ac disputant”** (50,19-22). Et, conformément à la *Regula IV*, la méthode ne disqualifie les figures du syllogisme que parce qu’elle utilise, comme autant de modèles de la vérité, les figures mathématiques (AT VII, 596, 19). Aucune "magie" (ibid.) ne peut lui être honnêtement opposée, puisque c’est elle qui élimine la magie des formes substantielles (4). Il convient aussi de noter d’autres thèses, directement liées aux *Meditationes*, dont elles offrent un commentaire indispensable. Ainsi la réponse à G. Voet nous donne-t-elle successivement une nouvelle définition de l’innéisme comme ce que "...ex proprii ingenii viribus cognoscere possimus" (AT VIII-1, 166, 24-25, et 166, 15-167, 14), une remarquable définition de *ens* "...ab essendo sive existendo...” (60, 13), une très éclairante distinction entre le *verus Deus et l'aliquis deceptor summe potens* de la *Meditatio I* (60, 16-26) (5). Enfin la cause habituelle de l'erreur trouve, dans le même texte, une détermination temporelle, qui anticipe sur la question de la liberté d’indifférence : "Si vero loquimini de diversis temporibus, quia ille qui nunc habet veram fidem, vel evidentem alicujus rei naturalis scientiam, potest alio tempore illam non habere : hoc inferi tantum infirmitatem humanae naturae, quae semper iisdem cogitationibus non immoratur, non autem quod in ipsa scientia ullum dubium debeat esse" (AT VIII-1, 170, 8-14)***. Quelques mois plus tard, nous retrouvons en effet cet argument, d'abord dans la discussion avec le P. Mesland — " la nature de l'âme est de n'être quasi qu'un moment attentive à la même chose"—, puis dans l'entretien avec la princesse Elisabeth : "... nous ne pouvons être continuellement attentifs à la même chose, quelque claires et évidentes qu'aient été les raisons qui nous ont persuadé ci-devant quelques vérités..." (6) ; ce thème, qui provient certes de la *Meditatio V* (AT VII, 69, 18-20), trouve donc dans la polémique avec Voet un relais sur le chemin de son ultime développement. Ainsi, ces écrits de circonstances appartiennent-ils pourtant indiscutablement à l’œuvre théorique de Descartes : ils en mobilisent explicitement maints thèmes récurrents, qu'ils amplifient et qui, en retour,

les confirment (7)." (Jean-Luc Marion, *Préface* à *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, cit., pp. 9-10)
(*) "...comment vous avez voulu étendre, sans l'ombre d'une raison, votre censure théologique à des questions purement philosophiques... "
(**) "cette Dialectique puérile à l'aide de laquelle les anciens Sophistes, sans posséder aucune instruction solide, dissertaient et disputaient avec une admirable faconde sur n'importe quel sujet"
(***) "Si vous voulez parler d'instants différents, entendez-vous que celui qui a, maintenant, une foi véritable ou une connaissance évidente de quelque objet naturel pourrait ne pas l'avoir à un autre moment."
(3) G. Voet ne cesse, au contraire, de passer illégitimement d'un domaine à l'autre (AT VIII-1, 32,12-13 ; 33,12-18 ; 75,4-9; 88, 8-12 ; 132,15-20 ; 133,17-22 ; 242,18-243,14). Lorsque Descartes lui reproche d'usurper le rôle d'un prophète - "Sic ergo edam Voetius inter Prophetas" (103,27) -, il reprend en fait la mise en garde du *Discours de la Méthode* à propos de la théologie, pour laquelle "...il est besoin d'avoir quelque extraordinaire assistance du ciel, et d'être plus qu'homme." (*D.M.*, AT VI, 8, 16-17 [O III, 86]), et dont il faut s'abstenir "...nisi quatenus modo extraordinario et supernaturali a Deo impellebantur" (AT VIII-1, 124, 13-14). Mais "...omnes homines sumus" (VIII-1, 91, 28), "...des hommes purement hommes..." (D.M., AT VI, 3, 21-22 [O III, 82]).
(4) Les formes substantielles sont discutées, durant la querelle d'Utrecht, en AT VII, 587, 6 sq., et AT VIII-1, 32, 10 ; 26,13 ; et 62, 18.
(5) Il faut insister sur l'importance de cette remarque pour l'interprétation des définitions successives de Dieu dans les *Meditationes* (voir notre analyse dans *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes*, Paris, 1986, § 16, p. 223 sq.).
(6) Voir successivement *Á Mesland*, 2 mai 1644, AT IV, 116, 6-8 [O VIII 1, 612; B 454], et *Á Élisabeth*, 15 septembre 1645, AT IV 295, 24-28 [O VIII 2, 228; B 521].
(7) On relèvera aussi l'étonnante validation du cogito dans l'hypothèse où l'on conclurait seulement à *sibi videri existere* (AT VIII-1, 165, 11 - 166, 6).

7. ———. 1644. *Specimina philosophiae: seu Dissertatio de methodo rectè regendae rationis et veritatis in scientiis investigandae: Dioptrice, et Meteora*. Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzeverium.
"Ex Gallico translata, et ab Auctore perlecta, variisque in locis emendata."
AT VI, 517-720.
Édition critique avec une introduction en anglais par Corinna Lucia Vermeulen, *René Descartes, Specimina philosophiae. Introduction and Critical Edition*, Utrecht, "Quaestiones Infinitae", volume 53, (2007).
"La présente édition critique remplace la seconde partie du volume VI de l'édition d'Adam et Tannery, très insuffisante et manifestement constituée avec peu de soin : C. Vermeulen y a distingué plus d'une centaine d'erreurs (cf. p. 73)." Kavier Kieft, *Bulletin cartésien* XXXVIII (2009), *Archives de philosophie*, 2010/1 (Tome 73), p. 33.
"Ces essais, que j'ai moi-même écrits en Français [...] ont été, quelque temps après, traduits en latin par un de mes amis ; la version m'a été transmise afin que je puisse changer, à discrétion, tout ce qui ne me plaisait pas [...] ce que j'ai fait en plus d'un endroit ; mais, peut-être, en ai-je laissé passer beaucoup d'autres ; et ces derniers seront facilement reconnaissables, par rapport aux autres, parce que, presque partout, le traducteur fidèle s'est efforcé de faire du mot à mot, tandis que j'ai souvent changé le sens des phrases, et j'ai cherché à corriger non pas ses mots, mais mon sens." (Note de Descartes après l'*Index*, traduction par Giulia Belgioioso).
"Le sieur Elzevier voyant avancer son impression des *Principes* de M. Descartes vers la fin fit solliciter l'auteur de lui permettre d'imprimer en même temps la traduction latine de ses *Essais*, après laquelle les étrangers qui n'avaient point l'usage de la langue Français e aspiraient depuis la première édition de ces *Essais*. Cette traduction avait été faite depuis peu de mois par M. [Étienne] de *Courcelles*, l'ancien ministre et théologien Français , retiré en Hollande comme M. Rivet, M. Desmarets, M. Blondel, M. de Saumaise, et plusieurs autres savants calvinistes de

France. M. de Courcelles avait embrassé le parti des arminiens, et avait même donné lieu à quelques zélés gomaristes de le souponner de socinianisme. Il était originaire d'Amiens en Picardie, mais il était né à Genève le 2 de mai 1586. Après avoir été quelque temps ministre des réformés en France, il avait passé en Hollande, et avait succédé à Simon Episcopius dans la chaire en théologie des remontrants à Amsterdam, où il eut Arnaud de Poelenbourg pour successeur, | et après lui Philippe de Limborch. Il mourut à Amsterdam le 22 de mai de l'an 1659."
(...)
"Il mit en latin le *Discours de la méthode*, la *Dioptrique*, et le traité des *Météores*. Mais il ne toucha point à la *Géométrie*, soit qu'il la jugeât au-dessus de sa portée, soit qu'il eût avis que M. Schooten se fût chargé de la traduire. M. Descartes, ayant donné son consentement pour l'impression de la traduction des trois traités, fut prié de la revoir auparavant, pour juger de sa conformité avec son original. Il ne refusa point d'user de son droit d'auteur, et se servit de cette occasion pour y faire quelques changements, comme nous avons remarqué qu'il fît à ses *Méditations* sur la traduction Français e de M. le duc de Luynes. Ce fut donc sur ses propres pensées qu'il fit des corrections, plutôt que sur les paroles du traducteur latin, à qui il rendit le témoignage d'avoir été fidèle et scrupuleux, jusqu'à s'efforcer de rendre le sens de l'auteur mot pour mot. Ce témoignage de M. Descartes en faveur de M. de Courcelles se trouvant à la tête de la traduction latine a dû satisfaire toutes les personnes raisonnables, qui auraient été en peine de savoir la raison des différences qui se trouvent entre le Français et le latin; et il peut servir à condamner la mauvaise foi du sieur Jacques de Rèves, dit *Revius*, (*) qui à prétendu faire un crime d'infidélité à M. de Courcelles de tous ces changements, et qui a fait injure à M. Descartes en soutenant que tous ces endroits n'exprimaient point sa pensée." (Baillet II, chapitre XIV, 213-215.)
(*) [Jakob Reefsen (1586 - 1658). Voir l'édition moderne de son œuvre éditée par Aza Goudriaan: *Jacobus Revius, A*

Theological Examination of Cartesian Philosophy. Early Criticisms (1647), Leyden, Brill 2002.]
"Le caractère propre du *Discours de la méthode* peut se rechercher aussi dans une deuxième direction : les conditions de sa réception. En effet le " projet ” implique, en 1637, l'ambition d’une réception, d'autant plus qu’il s'agit d'une très large réception pour laquelle Descartes renonce au latin et se confie au Français : « Et si j'écris en Français , qui est la langue de mon pays, plutôt qu'en latin, qui est celle de mes précepteurs, c'est à cause que j’espère que ceux qui ne se servent que de leur raison naturelle toute pure, jugeront mieux de mes opinions, que ceux qui ne croient qu'aux livres anciens » (*Discours de la Méthode*, [AT VI] 77, 24-30 [O III, 97]).
(...)
Lors de sa première parution, rien ne laisse supposer que l'usage du Français en ait accru la diffusion, bien au contraire. Ainsi, selon A. Baillet, c'est son éditeur lui-même qui suscita, en 1644, une traduction latine du *Discours* et des *Essais* (amputés de la *Géométrie*), les fameux *Specimina*.
(...)
On ne saurait mieux avouer que le vrai public scientifique - " les étrangers " -, que l'éditeur, mieux peut-être que l’auteur, connaît et devine, n'avait pas encore lu le *Discours* et les thèses avant 1644. Bref, s'il fallait encore «... traduire les Essais de sa philosophie en une langue qui put contribuer à rendre toute la terre cartésienne », c’est que, justement, le texte Français n’avait pas encore suffi à rendre toute cette terre cartésienne. Cet aveu en demi-teinte trouve une indiscutable confirmation dans le nombre comparé des différentes éditions ; alors qu'entre 1637 et la fin du siècle, le *Discours* et les *Essais* ne comptent, en Français , que cinq éditions (Leyde 1637 ; Paris 1657, 1658, 1668 deux fois), les *Specimina*, à partir de 1644, en connaissent dix (Amsterdam 1644, 1650, 1656 deux fois, 1664, 1672, 1685, 1692 et Francfort s/M. 1692) ; ainsi les *Specimina* ne font que retrouver l'étiage habituel des autres ouvrages latins de Descartes : les *Meditationes* reoivent quatorze éditions

jusqu'en 1709 (tandis que leur traduction Français e n'en offre que quatre) (2). La publication du *Discours* remonte certes à 1637, mais l'on peut soutenir l'hypothèse que sa lecture et sa réception ne commencent vraiment qu'en 1644, avec les *Specimina Philosophiae seu Dissertatio de Methodo Recte regendae rationis et veritatis in scientiis investigandae ; Dioptrice et Meteora. Ex Gallico translata et ab Auctore perlecta, variisque in locis emendata*.
Cette double publication, et donc le retard qu'elle impose à la réception du Discours de la méthode et des *Essais*, produit plusieurs paradoxes qui ouvrent autant de questions à la recherche. - Les *Specimina* n'offrent pas seulement une simple traduction latine d'un texte Français de référence : ils se donnent comme une édition révisée par l'auteur et par lui ?) corrigée, *ab Auctore perlecta, variisque in locis emendata*. Sans surévaluer la portée de cette indication, que son éditeur a parfaitement pu introduire sans l'avis ou la collaboration de Descartes, il faut relever certaines modifications et ajouts que l'on peut, raisonnablement, attribuer à l'auteur ; ne serait-ce, par exemple, que la célèbre définition marginale de l'idée comme «... omni re cogitata, quatenus habet tantum esse quoddam objectivum in intellecto » [AT VI, 559]. L'étude systématique des variantes entre le texte Français et sa version en latin n'a été, jusqu'ici, qu'esquissée (en particulier par E. Gilson) ; elle seule déterminera quel texte a effectivement été lu par le public philosophique." (Jean-Luc Marion, *Ouverture*, dans: Henry Méchoulan (éd.), *Problématique et réception du* Discours de la méthode *et des* Essais, Paris: Vrin 1988, pp. 18-20)
(2) Nous suivons ici les indications fournies par A. J. Guibert, *Descartes. Bibliographie des œuvres de Descartes publiées au XVIIème siècle*, Paris, C.N.R.S., 1976. Sur ces questions, on tiendra compte des remarques de P. Costabel, " Propos de bibliographie matérielle. Editions et émissions des œuvres de Descartes de 1657 à 1673 ", in *Bulletin Cartésien* V, *Archives de Philosophie*, 1976, p. 445-456.

8. ———. 1644. *Cartesius (Ms. de Leibniz)*.

Bibliothèque Royale de Hanovre. MS. de Leibniz. Catalogué par Eduard Bodemann, p. 54 de son ouvrage cité p. 549 ci-avant (*), note *a* avec l'indication : « *Bl. 19-22, ohne Uebersch., fehlerhafte, z. Th. von L. corrig. Abschr.* ».
(*) [*Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Kôniglichen ôffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover*, von Dr. Eduard Bodemann (Hannover und Leipzig, 1895)]
AT XI, 647-653; B Op. II, 1394-1405.
Édition critique par Vincent Carraud: "Cartesius"*, Bulletin Cartésien* XV, *Archives de Philosophie*, 1985, 3, pp.1-6; "*Cartesius*, ou les pilleries de Mr. Descartes" présentation, traduction et annotation par Vincent Carraud, *Philosophie*, mai 1985, pp. 3-19.
Cette copie MS. remplit deux grandes feuilles, dont chacune est pliée en deux : soit en tout quatre feuillets, ou huit pages d'écriture. Elle comprend deux parties bien distinctes, dont la seconde seule porte un titre : *Annotationes quas videtur D. des Cartes in sua Principia Philosophiae scripsisse*. Cette seconde partie commence au tiers environ de la 6e page, et continue jusqu'à la fin de la 8e. Tout ce qui précède, pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 et 6 (premier tiers de celle-ci), se compose de pensées ou réflexions détachées, dont chacune est séparée de la suivante par un signe : deux petits traits horizontaux, barrés de deux petits traits verticaux. (Le même signe sépare encore la seconde partie de la première.) Cette première partie porte seulement en tête le nom, écrit après coup et au crayon, de *Cartesius*. Les huit pages sont de la même écriture, qui n'est plus celle de Leibniz ; mais celui-ci a fait, de sa main, quelques corrections à des endroits fautifs. Le fait qu'il ait corrigé lui-même ce texte, montre qu'il y attachait une certaine importance, et qu'il le croyait sans doute de Descartes.
Est-ce bien cependant un texte authentique de notre philosophe ? Nous n'oserions l'assurer. Toutefois, dans la première partie, la date d'une observation astronomique, *20 sept. 1642* (p. 650), serait un argument favorable, et de même quelques renvois aux *Principes*, dans la seconde partie. (Voir ci-avant, p. 545.)" (AT XI, p. 647).

"Cette série de notes, découverte tardivement, constitue une énigme pour les chercheurs. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis a plaidé énergiquement en faveur de son authenticité (166), verdict que Pierre Costabel confirme sans hésitation (167), alors que Vincent Carraud y voit un assemblage éclectique et semble incliner à croire à une série de notes de lecture que Descartes aurait prise sur d'autres auteurs (168), plutôt que vers un ensemble de pensées appartenant au corpus philosophique cartésien." (Vlad Alexandrescu, *Croisées de la Modernité. Hypostases de l'esprit et de l'individu au XVIIe siècle*, Bucarest: Zeta Books 2012, p. 110)
(166) G. Rodis-Lewis, « Cartesius », *Revue philosophique*, 2, 1971, p. 211-220.
(167) P. Costabel, Recension sur l'article de G. Rodis-Lewis cité ci-dessus, 1973, p. 444-446.
(168) V. Carraud, « Cartesius ou les pilleries de Mr Descartes », *Philosophie*, 6, mai 1985, p. 3-19.
"Avant d'aborder les points les plus originaux de ces pages, il convient donc de se demander quelle pourrait être leur provenance.
Le caractère fragmentaire des pensées, leur insertion parmi certaines observations scientifiques répondent bien au nom de miscellanea qu'emploie Leibniz, pour évoquer les registres que Clerselier lui a communiqués, ainsi qu'à « Mons. de Tschirnaus » (5). Or Tschirnhaus est l'auteur de cette copie *Cartesius*, revue et corrigée de la main de Leibniz (6). Leibniz parle de « deux volumes de miscellanea, reliés l'un en in-4°, l'autre en in-8°, où il y a beaucoup de choses physiques, des expériences et observations anatomiques de Mons. des Cartes, quelques expériences sur les métaux, et en fait de médecine (... *lacune*). Je m'étonne pourtant, ajoutait-il, qu'il n'y a rien davantage de cette nature » (7). Les indications de Leibniz correspondent parfaitement à la description du « registre en petit
quarto », coté E dans l' « Inventaire succinct des Ecrits qui se sont trouvés dans les coffres de Monsr. Descartes après son décès à Stockholm en feb. 1650 » (8) : tableau des angles de réfraction selon Vitellio, poids des métaux, remarques sur l'aimant, et plusieurs séries de feuillets sur la

génération des animaux, les « remèdes et vertus des médicaments », et « prenant ledit registre de l 'autre côté, il y a seize pages d observations sur la nature des plantes et des animaux »." pp. 213-214 (Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, "Cartesius", *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, 2, 1971, pp. 211-220)
(5) AT X, 208-209, écrit de la main de Leibniz, Bibliothèque de Hanovre, Tschirnhaus, n° 159.
(6) Bibliothèque de Hanovre, manuscrit IV, vol. I, 4 k Bl. 19-22 : « Ce manuscrit est sans doute de la main de Tschirnhaus » (P. Costabel, Appendice à la réédition du t. XI d'Adam-Tannery, p. 730 ; le P. Costabel nous a communiqué la photocopie de ce manuscrit, et nous a confirmé l'intérêt scientifique de plusieurs de ces notes).
(7) AT X, 208-209.
(8) AT X, 5-12, et 8-9 pour le registre E.
"Une note du registre *Cartesius* (AT XI 650/BC XIV, Liminaire 1) relate une expérience d'observation d'étoile fixe en date de septembre 1642." Sur cette note voir: Édouard Mehl, "Note complémentaire sur une observation astronomique et la recherche d'une parallaxe stellaire (septembre 1642)", dans *Bulletin cartésien* XLV (2014), *Archives de philosophie*, 2016/1 (Tome 79), pp. 189-193.

9. ———. 1644. *Principia philosophiae*.
AT VIII-1, 1-329; la première édition est précédée d'une lettre-dédicace à la princesse Élisabeth de Bohême (1618-1680); B Op. 1706-2211.
Traduction : *Principes de la philosophie, Première partie, sélections d'articles des parties 2, 3, et 4 et Lettre-Préface*, Texte latin de Descartes. Texte Français de l'abbé Picot. Traduction nouvelle par Denis Moreau. Introduction et notes par Xavier Kieft, Paris: Vrin 2009.
Descartes utilise pour la première fois l'expression "principes de ma philosophie" dans la lettre du février 1634 à Mersenne : "Pour la cause qui fait cesser le mouvement d'une pierre qu'on a jetée, elle est manifeste ; car c'est la résistance du corps de l'air, laquelle est fort sensible. Mais la raison de ce qu'un arc retourne étant courbé est plus difficile, et je ne la puis expliquer sans les principes de ma

Philosophie, desquels je pense être obligé dorénavant de me taire." (AT I, 287; O VIII 1, 112; B 65).
"Que signifie « philosophie » ? Qu'est-ce qu'un cours de philosophie ? Comme l'indique la *ratio studiorum* des collèges jésuites, et plus généralement la très grande majorité des cours de philosophie, la philosophie comprend quatre parties distinctes : la logique, la physique, la métaphysique et la morale (2). Témoignent de la quadripartition de la philosophie le cours que Descartes a choisi de lire en 1640, celui d'Eustache de Saint-Paul, *Summa Philosophiae quadripartita de rebus Dialecticis, Moralibus, Physicis et Metaphysicis* (Paris, 1609) (3) ou encore, parmi bien d'autres en latin, le premier cours complet de philosophie en langue Français e, celui de Scipion Dupleix : *Corps de Philosophie contenant la Logique, la Physique, la Métaphysique et l'Ethique* (4). La philosophie dont Descartes livre les *Principia* désigne donc, conformément à son projet initial, le « corps de philosophie tout entier » (AT IX-2, 17 ; Alquié III, 782). C'est pourquoi Descartes peut l'appeler sa Philosophie (5) ou sa *Summa philosophiae* (6), selon une appellation également scolaire. Une somme ne désigne pas un traité complet et qui descend dans les détails (c'est-à-dire « approfondit ») (7), mais au contraire une présentation d'ensemble, sommaire au sens propre, un abrégé. Au demeurant, le texte de la Lettre-préface aux *Principes* attribue-t-il à la philosophie la même étendue et une répartition analogue, selon la comparaison célèbre : « Ainsi toute la philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la Métaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se réduisent à trois principales, à savoir la Médecine, la Mécanique et la Morale » (AT IX-2, 14 ; Alquié III, 779-780)." (Fréderic de Buzon, Vincent Carraud, *Descartes et les « Principia » II. Corps et mouvement*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1994, p. 10)
(2) Voir la présentation donnée par Etienne Gilson dans ses *Commentaires au Discours de la méthode*, Paris, Vrin, 6e éd., 1987, p. 117-119.

(3) Plusieurs fois réédité jusqu'en 1626 : voir AT III, 196, et les art. Eustache de Saint-Paul (par R. Ariew et F. Ferrier) du *Dictionnaire des philosophes* et de l'*Encyclopédie philosophique*, Paris, PUF, 1993 et 1992. Pour Abra de Raconis, *Totius philosophiae, hoc est Logicae, Moralis, Physicae et Metaphysicae... tractatio*, voir AT III, 236. Pour les Conimbres, Tolet et Rubius, voir AT III, 194-196, et Etienne Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien*, Paris, Vrin, 1979, p. VIII-IX.
(4) Titre de 1632, qui reprend les éditions des parties séparées de 1600,1603, 1607 et 1610, souvent rééditées jusqu'en 1645. La collection du « Corpus des œuvres de philosophie en langue Français e » (Paris, Fayard) a publié ce *Corps de philosophie* (la logique, la physique, la métaphysique et l'éthique sont parues respectivement en 1984,1990,1992 et 1994, les trois dernières éditées par Roger Ariew). Deux motifs au moins rendent ces cours tout à fait intéressants. D'une part, ils permettent de prendre conscience de la nouveauté de la physique cartésienne et de son intérêt philosophique propre — tout en mesurant le très grand nombre de questions que Descartes ne traite pas. D'autre part, ces manuels imposent pour plusieurs siècles le vocabulaire technique de la philosophie en Français . Voir les art. « Scipion Dupleix » [1569 - 1661] (par R. Ariew et J.-R. Armogathe) des dictionnaires cités ci-dessus.
(5) Par exemple dans les Lettres à Mersenne du 3 décembre 1640, ou du 2 février 1643 (AT III, 252, [O VII, 1, 429; B 289] AT III 615 [O VIII 1, 502; B 385]; Alquié III, 15).
(6) Lettre à Huygens du 31 janvier 1642 (AT III, 782; [O VIII 2, 99; B 342] Alquié II, 920).
(7) « Approfondir » ne signifie pas « remonter » aux principes, mais « descendre » dans toutes les conséquences, ou, comme dit Pascal, « pénétrer vivement et profondément les conséquences des principes » (fr. 511 [édition Lafuma des *Œuvres complètes*, coll. « L'Intégrale », Paris, Seuil, 1963]. Au demeurant Pascal « trouve bon qu'on n'approfondisse pas l'opinion de Copernic » (fr. 164). Les *Principia*, au moins dans leurs deux premières parties,

n’approfondissent pas (fr. 553). Voir Vincent Carraud, *Pascal et la philosophie*, Paris, PUF, 1992, chap. III.
Dans une lettre à Mersenne du 30 septembre 1640 (avant même l’envoi du manuscrit des *Meditationes*) Descartes écrit : "Je ne ferai point encore mon voyage pour cet hiver (11) ; car, puisque je dois recevoir les objections des jésuites dans 4 ou 5 mois, je crois qu'il faut que je me tienne en posture pour les atteindre.
Et cependant j'ai envie de relire un peu leur philosophie, ce que je n'ai pas fait depuis 20 ans (12), afin de voir si elle me semblera maintenant meilleure qu'elle ne faisait autrefois. Et pour cet effet, je vous prie de me mander les noms des auteurs qui ont écrit des cours de philosophie et qui sont le plus suivis par eux, et s'ils en ont quelques nouveaux depuis 20 ans ; je ne me souviens plus que des Conimbres (13), Toletus (14) et Rubius (15).
Je voudrais bien aussi savoir s'il y a quelqu'un qui ait fait un abrégé de toute la philosophie de l'École, et qui soit suivi ; car cela m'épargnerait le temps de lire leurs gros livres. Il y avait, me semble, un Chartreux ou Feuillant qui l'avait fait ; mais je ne me souviens plus de son nom (16)." (AT III, 185; O VIII 1, 409; B 272)
(11) Voir à Mersenne, 30 juillet 1640 (AT III, 127; [O VIII 1, 389; B 262] : Descartes renonait au voyage envisagé pendant l'été 1640.
(12) Clerselier-Lettres : « depuis 20 ans », omis.
(13) Il s'agit des *Commentaires* sur Aristote, qui constituaient un cours complet de philosophie, établis et publiés à partir de 1592 par des professeurs jésuites du collège de Coimbra, au Portugal (E. Goës, C. de Magellhães et S. Couto) sur la demande du général Claudio Aquaviva et du provincial du Portugal Pedro de Fonseca.
(14) Francisco Toledo (Toletus, 1532-1596), jésuite espagnol, en 1593, enseigna au Collège romain ; il publia à partir de 1561 de nombreux commentaires d'Aristote.
(15) Clerselier-Lettres : « Toletus et Rubius », omis. Antonio Rubio (Ruvius, 1548 - 1615), jésuite espagnol, auteur de plusieurs commentaires d'Aristote.

(16) Eustache de Saint-Paul (Asseline), religieux feuillant, *Summa Philosophica quadripartita*, Paris, 1609; voir à Mersenne, 11 novembre (AT III, 233 l. 11, [O VIII 1, 421] B 283), 3 décembre 1640 (AT III, 251 l. 15, [O VIII 1, 421] B 289 et 22 décembre 1641 (AT III, 470 l. 7 sq., [O VIII 1, 481] B 334). Voir aussi Benoist Pierre, *La Bure et le Sceptre. La congrégation des Feuillants dans l'affirmation des États et des pouvoirs princiers (vers 1560-1660)*, Paris, 2006 (CD-Rom, annexe III).
Première annonce du livre dans la lettre du 11 novembre 1640 à Mersenne : "Pour la philosophie de l'École, je ne la tiens nullement difficile à réfuter, à cause des diversités de leurs opinions ; car on peut aisément renverser tous les fondements desquels ils sont d'accord entre eux ; et cela fait, toutes leurs disputes particulières paraissent ineptes. J'ai acheté la *Philosophie* du Frère Eustache de Saint-Paul, qui me semble le meilleur livre qui ait jamais été fait en cette matière ; je serai bien aise de savoir si l'auteur vit encore (7). (...)
Je répondrais très volontiers à ce que vous demandez touchant la flamme d'une chandelle, et choses semblables ; je vois bien que je ne vous pourrai jamais bien satisfaire touchant cela, jusqu'à ce que vous ayez vu tous les principes de ma philosophie, et je vous dirai que je me suis résolu de les écrire avant que de partir de ce pays, et de les publier peut-être avant un an. Et mon dessein est d'écrire par ordre tout un cours de ma philosophie en forme de thèses, où, sans aucune superfluité de discours, je mettrai seulement toutes mes conclusions, avec les vraies raisons d'où je les tire, ce que je crois pouvoir faire en fort peu de mots ; et au même livre, de faire imprimer un cours de la philosophie ordinaire, tel que peut être celui du Frère Eustache, avec mes notes à la fin de chaque question, où j'ajouterai les diverses opinions des autres, et ce qu'on doit croire de toutes, et peut-être à la fin je ferai une comparaison de ces deux philosophies (9). Mais je vous supplie de ne rien encore dire à personne de ce dessein, surtout avant que ma *Métaphysique* soit imprimée ; car peut-être que, si les Régents le savaient, ils feraient leur possible pour me

donner d'autres occupations, au lieu que, quand la chose sera faite, j'espère qu'ils en seront tous bien aises. Cela pourrait aussi peut-être empêcher l'approbation de la Sorbonne, que je désire, et qui me semble pouvoir extrêmement servir à mes desseins : car je vous dirai que ce peu de métaphysique que je vous envoie contient tous les principes de ma physique.
(...)
Je verrai aussi le cours de philosophie de Monsieur de Raconis (12), qui, je crois, se trouvera ici : car s'il était plus court que l'autre (13), et aussi bien reu, je l'aimerais mieux. Mais je ne veux rien faire en cela sur les écrits d'un homme vivant, si ce n'est avec sa permission, laquelle il me semble que je devrais aisément obtenir, lorsqu'on saura mon intention, qui sera de considérer celui que je choisirai, comme le meilleur de tous ceux qui ont écrit de la philosophie, et de ne le reprendre point plus que tous les autres. Mais il n'est point temps de parler de ceci, que ma *Métaphysique* n'ait passé." (AT III, 230-234; OT VIII, 1, 421-423; B 283)
(7) Eustache de Saint-Paul Asseline, religieux feuillant (1573 - 26 décembre 1640), est l'auteur d'une *Summa philosophica quadripartita* (Paris, 1609) (*). Sur lui, voir l'article de M. Standaert (*Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, t. 4-2, Paris, 1961, col. 1701-1705).
(9) On sait que le projet, considérablement modifié, donnera en 1644 les *Principia philosophiae*.
(12) Charles-Franois Abra de Raconis [1580 - 16 juillet 1646], *Totius Philosophiae hoc est Logicae, Moralis Physicae et Metaphysicae : brevis & accurata tractatio*, Paris, 1637 [première édition 1617].
(13) La *Summa* d'Eustache de Saint-Paul.
(*) [Le premier volume de la *Summa philosophica quadripartita, de rebus Dialecticis, Moralibus, Physicis et Metaphysicis*, contenait la logique et l'éthique, le second la physique et la métaphysique.]
"En réalité, les *Principia*, annoncés dans cette lettre pour la première fois, seront un livre d'une conception totalement différente. Il ne s'agit pas d'une brève série de thèses, mais

d'un grand livre de 300 pages (in-4°) (2); il ne contient pas un texte de philosophie scolastique comme point de comparaison; et, par conséquent, sa composition était un travail d'au moins trois années (3). Nous n'avons aucune idée de la raison qui conduisit Descartes à abandonner son premier projet ; sa correspondance reste silencieuse sur ce point (4). Mais sa première déclaration reste très importante, parce qu'elle nous rappelle qu'on doit lire les *Principia* comme un livre de classe, un manuel. C'était une aide-mémoire d'instruction, qui portait comme un défi à une légion (toujours croissante) de publications scolastiques contemporaines et notamment, en France, aux deux manuels dont la correspondance de Descartes signale la lecture à l'automne de 1640, avant de se mettre à écrire les *Principia*: celui du feuillant Eustache de Saint-Paul (1573-1640), et celui d'un client de Richelieu, évêque de Lavaur, Franois d'Abra de Raconis (mort en 1646) (5)." (Lawrence W.B. Brockliss, "Rapports de structure et de contenu entre ls *Principia* et les cours de philosophie des collèges", dans : Jean-Robert Armogathe, Giulia Belgioioso (éds.), Descartes: *Principia philosophiae* (1644-1994), Napoli, Vivarium 1996, pp. 491-492)

(2) Dans l'édition latine de 1644 in-4°.

(3) Les *Principia* ont été écrits au château d'Endegeest près de Leyde.

(4) Selon sa correspondance, il avait abandonné ce projet en décembre 1641, mais il est possible qu'il ait pris la décision beaucoup plus tôt : voyez A.T., n, p. 470: à Mersenne 22 décembre 1641.

(5) Eustache Asseline dit Eustachius de Sancto Paulo, *Summa philosophiae quadrapartita*, Paris, C. Chastellain, 1609; De Raconis, *Totius philosophiae brevis tractatio*, 4 parties en deux volumes, Paris, De la Noue, 1622. Il y avait des éditions de tous les deux à Paris jusqu'en 1640. Ils furent lus par Descartes en novembre 1640 : voyez AT III, pp. 233, 251: correspondance avec Mersenne, 11 novembre et 3 décembre [O VIII 1, 424-425; B 283; O VIII 1, 427-429; B 289].

"En résumé : les *Principia* appartiennent à une tradition bourgeonnante, une tradition toujours relativement neuve, celle du manuel de philosophie. Cependant aux mains de Descartes, cette tradition fut développée dans une direction nouvelle. Les sciences de la philosophie étant réduites à deux, la physique devenait une science inorganique, et la méthode syllogistique, scolastique et historique était remplacée par une méthode quasi-euclidienne. Donc, les *Principia* n'étaient pas un manuel de type traditionnel. Mais, en revanche, il s'agissait certainement d'un manuel dont la structure, le contenu et la méthode d'argumentation étaient déterminés par le besoin de produire un ouvrage manifestement nouveau, mais suffisamment traditionnel pour retenir l'intérêt des lecteurs aristotéliciens et susceptible de gagner leurs esprits comme un travail plus solide et plus moderne que ses concurrents. C'est-à-dire, pour comprendre les *Principia* comme texte, on doit réaliser qu'il s'agit d'un livre étroitement associé avec la philosophie des écoles, et pas simplement parce que Descartes restait dans une certaine mesure sous l'influence d'Aristote.
Il est en effet possible qu'un événement dans l'enseignement de la philosophie puisse expliquer pourquoi Descartes a composé les *Principia* au début des années quarante. Il semble qu'il prit la décision d'écrire un manuel pendant le mois d'octobre 1640, à la suite d'une première décision de lire des livres de philosophie scolastique, annoncée à Mersenne le 30 septembre. Cependant la décision de composer un manuel n'était pas une conséquence inévitable de sa lecture d'Eustache, parce que son dessein original était seulement de se préparer mieux pour répondre à une attaque lancée par les jésuites de Paris contre sa *Dioptrique* et ses *Météores* de 1637, attaque que Descartes avait du reste provoquée (52). Il est probable que cette seconde décision peut être attribuée aux activités du médecin mécaniste à l'université d'Utrecht, Henri Regius (1598-1679). Regius se disait disciple de Descartes : il avait été autorisé à expliquer les problèmes de physique à Utrecht en mai de 1640 et le 10 juin il organisa une soutenance publique où on discuta des mérites d'une physiologie

mécaniste. Son enthousiasme lui gagna l'hostilité des autres professeurs, surtout du théologien Voetius, qui croyait que la philosophie mécaniste menaait la foi : Descartes, pendant l'été, fut obligé de défendre son acolyte devant les autorités universitaires (53). On ne peut pas douter que Regius fût un esprit fort, qui développait le mécanisme dans une direction matérialiste et anti-cartésienne (54). En conséquence, on peut suggérer que Descartes se trouva forcé de préparer son manuel pour révéler au monde (hollandais d'abord) quelle était en réalité sa physique et pour démontrer sa compatibilité avec la foi chrétienne (calviniste ou catholique). On doit rappeler que les *Principia* furent publiés d'abord à Amsterdam en latin et que dans le paragraphe final Descartes soumettait son livre au jugement de l'Eglise, pas spécifiquement l'Eglise catholique (55)."
(Lawrence W.B. Brockliss, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-510)
(52) Un jésuite parisien, Bourdin, avait organisé une soutenance au collège de Clermont à Paris où les idées de Descartes étaient critiquées, et Descartes, par Mersenne, avait demandé que la Société lui communiquât ses objections directement : voyez AT III, pp. 160-85: lettres à Mersenne, 30 août, 15 et 30 septembre [1640; O VIII 1, 401-405; B 269; O VIII 1, 405-408; B 271; O VIII 1, 408-414; B 272].
(53) AT II pp. 568-9 [lettre de Regius à Descartes du 14 juillet 1639; B 217], 616-7 [lettre de Regius à Descartes, octobre-novembre 1639; B 223] , 624-5 [lettre de Regius à Descartes du 3 décembre 1639 B 229]; III, pp. 1 [lettre de Regius et Emilius à Descartes, janvier 1640; B 238], 60-1 [lettre de Regius à Descartes du 5 mai 1640; B 251], 63-72 [lettre de Regius à Descartes du 5 mai 1640; B 251], 202-3 [lettre de Regius à Descartes du 7 octobre 1640; B 276]: correspondance entre Descartes et Regius, 1639-40.
(54) Regius continuait à soutenir une physique mécaniste à l'Université d'Utrecht en 1641 et Descartes commenait à critiquer plus fortement les idées de son admirateur : voyez AT III, pp. 365-75, 443 , 462-4. Aujourd'hui on considère Regius comme un mécaniste dont les idées se développaient indépendamment de Descartes : voyez P. Dibon, *Der*

Cartesianismus in den Niederlanden, in *Der Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts*, hrsg. von J.-P. Schobinger, Basel, Schwabe, 1992, vol. II, pp. 357-358.
(55) AT IX-2, p. 325. Il est intéressant de constater que dans la lettre à Mersenne où Descartes annonait son intention d'écrire un manuel (11 novembre), il passa sa colère sur Voetius et informa Mersenne de la tentative du théologien hollandais pour réduire Regius au silence : AT IX-2, p. 231.
Descartes apprend que le Père Eustache est mort : "Je suis désolé de la mort du Père Eustache ; car encore que cela me donne plus de liberté pour faire mes notes sur sa philosophie, j'eusse toutefois mieux aimé le faire avec sa permission, et de son vivant. (22)" (AT III, 286; O VIII 1, 445; B 299)
(22) Voir à Mersenne, décembre 1640 (AT III, 259, [O VIII 1, 433-434] B 291). Eustache de Saint-Paul est mort le 26 décembre 1640.
Le projet originel est abandonné dans la lettre à Mersenne du 22 décembre 1641 : "Je vous renvoie la lettre du Père Bourdin, que j'ai trouvée peu judicieuse ; mais je n'en ai pas voulu toucher un seul mot, à cause que vous me l'aviez défendu (5). Je crois bien que son Provincial l'a envoyé, pour vous demander s'il était vrai que j'écrivisse contre eux, mais non pas pour me menacer de choses qu'ils savent bien que je ne crains pas, et qui peuvent bien plus m'obliger à écrire que m'en empêcher. Il est certain que j'aurais choisi le *Compendium* du Père Eustache, comme le meilleur, si j'en avais voulu réfuter quelqu'un; mais aussi est-il vrai que j'ai entièrement perdu le dessein de réfuter cette philosophie; car je vois qu'elle est si absolument et si clairement détruite, par le seul établissement de la mienne, qu'il n'est s besoin d'autre réfutation; mais je n'ai pas voulu leur en rien écrire, ni leur rien promettre, à cause que je pourrai peut-être changer de dessein, s'ils m'en donnent occasion. Et pendant je vous prie de ne craindre pour moi aucune chose ; car je vous assure que, si j'ai quelque intérêt d'être bien avec eux, ils n'en ont peut-être pas moins d'être bien avec moi, et de ne se point opposer à mes desseins : car, s'ils le faisaient, ils m'obligeraient d'examiner quelqu'un de leur cours, et de

l'examiner de telle sorte, que ce leur serait une onte à jamais." (AT III, 470; O VIII 1, 481; B 334)
(5) Le P. Bourdin avait donc remis à Mersenne un écrit confidentiel, pensant bien que Descartes en aurait connaissance ; et celui-ci envoie à Mersenne une lettre destinée à être lue par le P. Dinet (voir dossier Jésuites).
Lettre à Constantin Huygens du 29 juillet 1641 : "Pour la Physique, ou plutôt le Sommaire de toute la philosophie, dont il vous plaît me demander des nouvelles, |e ne saurais le faire si tôt imprimer à cause qu'il n'est que peu commencé (6) mais je suis résolu de n'entreprendre aucune autre chose jusqu'à ce qu'il soit achevé. L'épreuve que j'ai faite jusqu'ici des jugements et des objections qu'on me peut faire me donne espoir que je n'aurai pas beaucoup de peine à maintenir mes opinions lorsque je les aurai publiées, et que cela ne me détournera point du dessein que j'ai de continuer à chercher ce que j'ignore." (AT III, 773; O VIII 2, 95; B 323)
(6) Descartes écrivait déjà à Mersenne le 11 novembre 1640 (AT III 233, [O VIII 1,] B 283) : « Mon dessein est d'écrire par ordre tout un Cours de ma philosophie en forme de Thèses, où, sans aucune superfluité de discours, je mettrai seulement toutes mes conclusions, avec les vraies raisons d'où je les tire, ce que je crois pouvoir faire en fort peu de mots », et encore : 31 décembre 1640 (AT III 276, [O VIII 1, 441] B 293) : « J'ai résolu d'employer à écrire ma Philosophie en tel ordre quelle puisse aisément être enseignée. »".
Lettre à Constantin Huygens du 31 janvier 1642 : "Peut-être que ces guerres scolastiques seront cause que mon *Monde* se fera bientôt voir au monde (24), et je crois que ce serait dès à présent, sinon que je veux auparavant lui faire apprendre à parler latin; et je le ferai nommer *Summa Philosophiæ* (25), afin qu'il s'introduise plus aisément en la conversation des gens de l'École, qui maintenant le persécutent et tâchent à l'étouffer avant sa naissance, aussi bien les Ministres (26) que les jésuites". (AT III, 782; O VIII 2, 99-100; B 342)
(24) Le jeu de mots est de Huygens : voir à Descartes, 15 (AT II, 679, B 212) et 28 mai 1639 (AT II, 680, B 214).

(25) Voir à Mersenne, 22 décembre 1641 (AT III 465, [O VIII 1, 480-481] B 333).
(26) Les pasteurs calvinistes.

10. ———. 1645? *Annotationes quas videtur D. Des Cartes in sua Principia philosophiae scripsisse*.
Première édition dans Foucher de Careil, vol. I, 59-71.
AT XI, 654-657; B Op. II, 1096-1103.
Traduction Français e de P. et M. Testard, *Remarques que Descartes semble avoir écrites sur ses* Principes de la Philosophie *(titre de Leibniz)*, AT IX-2, pp. 361-362 : "Dans ce tome IX-2 de la réédition de la publication Adam-Tannery, consacré à la version Français e des *Principes*, nous pensons être utile au lecteur en lui donnant une traduction du texte latin dont Leibniz avait conservé la copie par Tschirnhaus et qui se trouve au tome XI p. 654-657."
"Leibniz n'a pas douté que ce texte émanait de Descartes lui-même. Il a seulement hésité sur l'affirmation de la relation de ce texte avec une volonté de l'auteur de commenter la version latine imprimée de la première partie des *Principia*. Les remarques de Descartes sur les *Principes de philosophie* sont de simples notes, mais elles forment un appendice précieux à l'ouvrage qu'elles commentent. On n'en discutera pas l'authenticité après le témoignage de Leibniz, qui a de sa main ajouté la mention suivante : *Annotationes quas videtur D. Cartesius in sua Principia philosophiæ scripsisse*. Mais si ce *videtur* laissait planer quelque doute (1), il suffirait, pour convaincre les plus incrédules, de l'étude du texte et de la collation avec les *Principes*. Descartes y parle en son nom : « On peut voir, dit-il, le paragraphe 21 de la première partie de mes *Principes de philosophie*. » Que veut-on de plus ? Si le témoignage de Leibniz ne suffit pas, nous avons celui de Descartes."
(Foucher de Careil, vol. I, p. LXXXI)
(1) Nous renvoyons du reste, pour les preuves de l'authenticité, à la préface, ou elles sont établies d'une manière spéciale.

11. ———. 1645. *Lettre apologétique aux Magistrats de la ville d'Utrecht Contre Messieurs Voëtius, Père et Fils*.

Première publication : traduction latine *Querela apologetica ad amplissimum Magistratum Ultrajectinum*, Vristadium: L. Misopodem, 1656; texte Français dans: Claude Clerselier (éd.), *Lettres de Mr. Descartes* (3 vols.) Paris : Charles Angot, III : 1667, pp. 1-49.
AT VIII-2 201-273; B Op. II, 117-193.
"La *Lettre Apologétique*, adressée non pas exactement "aux Magistrats" mais à la Municipalité ou Corps de Ville d'Utrecht (1) est le dernier mot de Descartes sur l'affaire et la suite immédiate du procès de Groningue. D'après Baillet, en effet, Descartes "envoya incontinent ces Actes (c'est-à-dire le procès verbal de l'action contre Schoock) aux Magistrats d'Utrecht sans prétendre néanmoins leur reprocher leur mauvaise conduite, ou se constituer parti contre Voetius et Dematius, mais pour voir s'ils feraient quelque chose en réparation du passé." (Baillet, *Vie de M. Descartes*, vol. II, p. 257) (2). Mais la Municipalité, sans doute lassée de l'affaire et craignant de nouvelles polémiques, se contenta de réitérer son interdiction de publier des écrits pour ou contre Descartes (Kernkamp I [G. W. Kernkamp, éd., *Actea et Decreta Senatus ; Vroedschapsresolutiën en andere bescheiden betreffende de Utrechtsche Academie*, vol. I, Utrect, 1936], p. 218 ; cf. Baillet II, p. 257-258) et envoya une copie de ce décret à Descartes. Cette nouvelle interdiction était dirigée contre les adversaires de Descartes : Voetius était en train de résumer l'impression de la lettre ouverte de Schoock à Descartes, apparemment afin de discréditer le jugement de Groningue (Baillet II, p. 258). Mais le geste ne fut pas compris. Descartes expédia immédiatement la *Lettre Apologétique*, prête probablement depuis longtemps. Elle arriva Utrecht le 13 juin 1645, la lettre étant datée d'Egmond le 16 juin selon le nouveau calendrier : on suivait aux Pays-Bas le style "ancien", rejetant par anti-papisme le calendrier grégorien). Dans les *Actes*, en effet, on fait état d'un "latijnse missiv van Des Cartes aen Burgermeesteren ende Vroetschap deser Stadt, gedateert t'Egmond den XVIen deser, stilo novo" ("une missive latine de Descartes au Bourgmestres et à la municipalité de cette ville, en date d'Egmond, le 11 de ce

mois, selon le style nouveau" Kernkamp, I, p. 219). On demanda au Secrétaire de la traduire, non pas parce que sans cela on ne pourrait en prendre connaissance (la plupart doivent avoir bien connu le latin (3)), mais probablement pour faire traîner les choses en longueur.
Ce premier texte était en latin, et c'est également en latin que la *Lettre* fut, pour la première fois publiée, en 1656. Toutefois, en 1648, Descartes avait fait faire deux traductions, l'une en néerlandais l'autre en Français , qu'il envoie encore à Utrecht où elles sont reues le 24 mars. De ces deux textes le premier seul a été conservé. Descartes a noté sur la dernière page :
"J'ai fait traduire cet écrit en flamand ; mais pour ce que c'est une langue que j'entends fort peu, je prie ceux qui le liront, d'avoir principalement égard au Français , duquel seul je puis répondre." (AT YIII-2, 275).
Cette missive aussi est ignorée, et Descartes lui-même part, tout d'abord pour la France et, en 1649, pour la Suède où il mourra en 1650. Excepté le texte néerlandais dont nous avons parlé, les originaux envoyés à Utrecht sont perdus. Cependant Descartes en avait conservé des copies qui, dans l'inventaire dressé après sa mort, figurent ainsi :
"L.- Renati Descartes querela apologetica ad amplissimum Magistratum Ultrajectinum contra Voetium et Dematium.
O.- Un écrit contenant neuf cahiers en forme de Lettre à Messieurs... contre le Sr Voetius." (voir AT VIII-2, vii.)
Aussi est-ce sous le titre de *Querela Apologetica* qu'on publiera en 1656 le texte latin. L'occasion de cette édition est, comme le précise la page de titre, la *Theologia Naturalis* de Paul Voet, publiée également en 1656, dans laquelle celui-ci est revenu sur des questions vieilles de dix ans. Dans cet ouvrage, en effet, Paul, pour protester une nouvelle fois de l'honneur de son père, avait publié (p. 253-264) les témoignages de l'Académie, et du Consistoire, attestant de sa probité, le décret de la Municipalité qui avait déclaré la *Lettre à Voet* un "écrit diffamatoire", un jugement des trois professeurs de droit de Leyde sur le procès de Groningue, et le jugement de la Cour d'Utrecht sur le procès de Voetius et de Dematius contre Schoock (4). C'est pour

répondre à ces accusations "des Voet et des Voetiens", dont il est dit dans la *Préface* qu'ils semblent vouloir "surpasser les flammes éternelles de l'Etna et du Vésuve", qu'on publie maintenant ce petit ouvrage inconnu du public. D'après le préfacier, on satisfait ainsi un désir de Descartes qui, en quittant les Pays-Bas pour la Suède, en avait laissé une copie chez des amis avec l'intention de la faire publier, au cas où il serait impossible d'obtenir sans éclat la réparation qu'il cherchait. Cette *Préface* pose par ailleurs un problème de critique textuelle, en avanant que le texte original avait été écrit en Français et que le texte latin était une traduction faite par un ami. Sur ce point, cependant, les Actes de la Municipalité sont formels : la première missive était en latin. Dès lors, ou bien l'éditeur, qui est d'ailleurs inconnu (5), se trompe, ou bien il a travaillé sur la traduction Français e que Descartes avait fait faire et qui se trouvait également parmi les papiers décrits dans l'inventaire. Ainsi le texte latin pourrait bien ne pas être celui envoyé par Descartes à Utrecht.
Quant au texte Français , il a été publié par Clerselier en 1667, dans le cadre de son édition des Lettres de Descartes, où la Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d'Utrecht figure dans le vol. III. C'est ce texte que nous avons retenu." (Theo Verbeek (éd.), René Descartes et Martin Schoock, *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988, pp. 403-405)
(1) C'est-à-dire Gysbertus Voetius et son fils Paul.
(2) Il s'agit du jugement du 16 mars 1642 (voir notre "Introduction" et *Narration*, p. 121-122).
(3) C'est effectivement ce qui est suggéré dans la brochure néerlandaise *Aengevangen Proceduuren* et qui a conduit Descartes à insister auprès des Etats de Groningue en 1644.
(4) Officiellement l'action contre Descartes n'a jamais été arrêtée ; on l'a étouffée pour complaire aux Etats, au Stathouder et à l'ambassadeur de France.
(5) Reneri était mort le 16 mars 1639 ; l'oraison funèbre avait été prononcée le 18 mars suivant par le professeur d'histoire Antonius Æmilius. Le texte avait été imprimé par l'imprimeur de l'Académie (des exemplaires se trouvent

dans la Bibliothèque Universitaire d'Amsterdam et dans la British Library de Londres) et réimprimé dans le recueil des Orationes d'Æmilius [Antonius Æmilius, *Orationes, quarum pleraeque tractant argumentum politicum: Accedunt nonnulla eiusdem in utraque lingua Poemata*. Utrecht 1651.]

12. ———. 1647. *Les Méditations métaphysiques de René Des-Cartes touchant la première philosophie dans lesquelles l'existence de Dieu, et la distinction réelle entre l'âme et le corps de l'homme, sont démontrés*. Paris: Chez la Veuve Jean Camusat et Pierre Le Petit.
AT IX, 1 : *Le Libraire au Lecteur* 1 ; [*Épitre*] *à Messieurs les Doyen et Docteurs de la Sacrée Faculté de Théologie de Paris* 4 ; *Abrégé des six méditations suivantes* 9 ; *Méditations touchant la première philosophie* 13 ; Premières Objections 73 ; Réponses 81 ; Secondes Objections 96 ; Réponses 102 ; Exposé géométrique 124 ; Troisièmes Objections et Réponses 133 ; Quatrièmes Objections 153 ; Réponses 170 ; Avertissement de l'Auteur touchant les Cinquièmes Objections 198 ; Avertissement du traducteur 200 ; Lettre de Descartes à Clerselier 202 ; Sixièmes Objections 218 ; Réponses 225 ; Privilège 245-246.
B Op. I: *Avertissement de l'Auteur touchant les Cinquièmes Objections*, 1396-1397; *Lettre de Monsieur Descartes à Monsieur C.L.R.,* 1398-1411; *Avertissement du traducteur*, 1412-1413; *Le Libraire au Lecteur*, 1414-1417.
"Traduites du Latin de l'Auteur par Mr. le D.D.L.N.S. [Charles d'Albert, Duc de Luynes] Et les Objections faites contre ces Méditations par divers personnes très-doctes, avec les réponses de l'Auteur. Traduites par Mr. C.L.R. [Claude Clerselier]."
"Malgré le désir de Descartes, Clerselier avait publié les cinquièmes objections et réponses, en les rejetant à la fin du volume, après les sixièmes. Elles étaient suivies d'une lettre de Descartes répondant au recueil d'instances de Gassendi. Mais les septièmes objections et réponses et la lettre au P. Dinet ne figurèrent que dans la seconde édition Français e que Clerselier fit paraître en 1661. Plus exigeant que l'auteur lui-même, Clerselier avait revu et corrigé non seulement sa

traduction des objections et réponses, mais aussi et surtout celle du duc de Luynes agréée pat Descartes." (Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Introduction à R. Descartes, *Meditationes De Prima Philosophia - Méditations Métaphysiques*, Texte latin et traduction du Duc de Luynes, Paris: Vrin 1978, p. XII).

"Il [Descartes] écrivit à Chavagnes le 11 de Septembre [1644] à l'abbé Picot qui lui avait mandé dans sa dernière qu'il avait déjà traduit les deux premières parties de ses *Principes,* et il lui marqua que pour lui il n'avait pas encore trouvé depuis son départ de Paris le temps de lire la traduction Français e de ses *Méditations* faite par M. le duc de Luynes (5), qu'il avait apportée dans la pensée de s'en faire une occupation agréable dans le cours de son voyage." (Lettre à Picot, 11 septembre 1644; Baillet II, 220; AT IV 138; O VIII 2, 507; B464)

(5) Voir à Clerselier, 10 avril 1645 (AT IV 193, [O VIII 2, 714-715] B490)

"M. Descartes recevait de fréquentes nouvelles des grands fruits que faisait lecture de son dernier livre à Paris, où on l'assurait que personne ne s'était encore élevé contre sa doctrine (11). Ses progrès n'étaient pas moindres en Hollande : et dès le mois de Février M. de Hoogheland lui avait envoyé trois thèses différentes soutenues depuis peu à Leyde (12), et ne contenant que ses opinions. Ces succès le firent songer à faire imprimer les traductions Français es de ses *Méditations* et de ses *Principes*. N'ayant pas remarqué tout l'empressement possible dans Elzevier pour ces éditions en notre langue (13), il prit des mesures avec Monsieur Clerselier et Monsieur Picot, pour les faire faire à Paris. Mais la version des *Principes* n'était pas encore achevée." (Lettre à Picot, 9 février 1645; Baillet II 265; AT IV 176; O VIII 2, 509; B484)

(11) Note en marge dans Baillet : « lettre MS à Picot du 9 février 1645. Lettre MS à Clerselier du même jour ».

(12) Voir à Pollot, 8 janvier 1644 (AT IV 77, [O VIII 2, 564-565] B441).

(13) Note en marge dans Baillet : « Elzevier se plaignait du peu de débit des *Principes*, comme Maire [de Leyde] s'était

plaint au sujet des *Essais*. »
"Monsieur de Sorbière s'était habitué à Leyde (4) pour étudier plus particulièrement les défauts de Monsieur de Saumaise. Mais il ne s'occupait pas tellement de la considération de ce grand homme qu'il ne retournât souvent à Eyndegeest par manière de promenade, et qu'il n'en rapportât toujours quelque nouveau prétexte d'animer Monsieur Gassendi à écrire contre Monsieur Descartes. Mais pour donner un contrepoids au tort que la plume de cet excellent homme pourrait faire aux *Méditations* de Monsieur Descartes, Dieu permit qu'un Seigneur de la Cour de France entreprît de faire une traduction Français e des mêmes *Méditations*, pour en faire connaître plus particulièrement le mérite dans le Royaume, et en procurer la lecture à tous ceux qui n'ayant pas l'usage de la langue des savants, ne laisseraient pas d'avoir de l'amour et de la disposition pour la Philosophie. Il faut avouer que la fin de l'auteur de la traduction n'avait été que la satisfaction particulière qu'il trouvait à exercer son style sur de grands sujets, sans songer à rendre service au Public. Mais sa traduction ayant été recueillie et envoyée à Monsieur Descartes par sa permission, elle fut jugée propre à faire beaucoup honneur à notre Philosophe et à donner un grand relief à sa Philosophie, et Monsieur le Duc de Luynes son auteur fut prié d'en souffrir la publication (5).
Peu de jours après Monsieur Clerselier, l'un des plus zélés et des plus vertueux amis de Monsieur Descartes entreprit de traduire aussi en notre langue les objections faites à ces *Méditations* avec les réponses de Monsieur Descartes. Cette traduction était excellente aussi bien que celle de Monsieur le Duc de Luynes. Mais l'un et l'autre jugèrent que si elles devaient voir le jour, il fallait qu'elles fussent revues auparavant par l'auteur même des *Méditations*, afin qu'en les confrontant avec ses pensées il pût les mettre le plus près de leur original qu'il serait possible et leur en imprimer le caractère. Monsieur Descartes fut obligé de se rendre à un avis si important. Mais, sous prétexte de revoir ces versions, il se donna la liberté de se corriger lui-même, et d'éclaircir ses propres pensées. De sorte qu'ayant trouvé quelques

endroits (6) où il croyait n’avoir pas rendu son sens assez clair dans le Latin pour toutes sortes de personnes, il entreprit de les éclaircir dans la traduction par quelques petits changements, qu'il est aisé de reconnaître à ceux qui confèrent le Français avec le Latin. Une chose qui semblait avoir donné de la peine aux traducteurs dans tout cet ouvrage, avait été la rencontre de plusieurs mots de l'art, qui paraissant rudes et barbares dans le Latin même, ne pouvaient manquer de l'être beaucoup plus dans le Français , qui est moins libre, moins hardi, et moins accoutumé à ces termes de l'École (7). Ils n'osèrent pourtant les ôter partout, parce qu'ils n'auraient pu le faire sans changer le sens dont la qualité d'interprètes devait les rendre religieux observateurs. D'un autre côté Monsieur Descartes témoigna être si satisfait de l'une et de l'autre version, qu'il ne voulut point user de la liberté qu'il avait pour changer le style, que sa modestie et l'estime qu'il avait pour ses traducteurs lui faisait trouver meilleur que n’aurait été le sien. De sorte que par une déférence réciproque qui a retenu les traducteurs et l'auteur, il est resté dans l'ouvrage quelques-uns de ces termes scolastiques, malgré le dessein qu'on avait eu de lui ôter le goût de l'école en le faisant changer de langue. Cet éclaircissement touchant la traduction des *Méditations* et des *Objections* est nécessaire, non seulement pour justifier les traducteurs sur les changements dont l’auteur est le seul responsable, mais pour faire voir aussi que la traduction Français e vaut mieux que l’original Latin, parce que Monsieur Descartes s'est servi de l'occasion de la revoir pour retoucher son original en notre langue. C'est un avantage qu'a eu aussi dans la suite la version Français e des *Principes* de Monsieur Descartes faite par l’Abbé Picot (8). De sorte que tous ses ouvrages Français tant originaux que traduits sont préférables à ceux qui sont Latins. C'est-à-dire que toutes les traductions qu'il a revues valent mieux que ses originaux mêmes.

Pour ne rien omettre de ce qui peut regarder la traduction des *Méditations*, il suffit de remarquer qu'encore qu'elle ait été faite en 1642, néanmoins la révision ou la correction par Monsieur Descartes ne s’en fit qu'en 1645, et que la

première impression qui en fut faite à Paris ne fut en état de paraître que pour les étrennes de l'an 1647." (Baillet II 171-173; AT IV 193-195; O VIII 2, 715-716; B 490)
(4) Note en marge dans Baillet : « Lettr(es) et Disc(ours) de Sorb(ière) ».
(5) Il est souvent question de cette traduction des *Meditationes* dans la correspondance : voir à Picot, 11 septembre 1644 (AT IV 138, [O VIII 2, 507] B464) et 9 février 1645 (AT IV 177, [O VIII 2, 508-509] B484); à Clerselier, 10 avril 1645 (AT IV 192-195, [O VIII 2, 714-716] B490), 20 décembre 1645 (AT IV 338-339, [O VIII 2, 716-717] B531), 12 janvier 1646 (AT IV 357-358, [O VIII 2, 717] B539), 23 février 1646 (AT IV 362, [O VIII 2, 718] B542) et 9 novembre 1646 (AT IV 563-564, [O VIII 2, 725] B585); et enfin à Picot encore, 8 juin 1647 (AT V 63-64, [O VIII 2, 515-516] B626).
(6) Note en marge dans Baillet : « Lettr(e) MS de Desc(artes) à Clersel(ier) du 10 d'Avril 1645. »
(7) Note en marge dans Baillet : « Ibid. lettr(e) à Clerselier MS ».
(8) Voir à Picot, 17 février 1645 (AT IV 180-181, [O VIII 2, 509-510] B 486).
Michelle Beyssade et Jean-Marie Beyssade ont publié une nouvelle édition des *Méditations métaphysiques. Objection et Réponses*, Paris: Garnier-Flammarion 1979 (édition revue et corrigée 2011) :
"Les textes retenus ont été établis à partir des deux éditions Adam et Tannery (AT) et F. Alquié, mentionnées dans la bibliographie. Nous les avons vérifiés sur les éditions originales, latines (1641 et 1642) et Français e (1647). Pour la commodité des lecteurs, nous indiquons toujours la pagination correspondante dans l'édition AT à laquelle les commentateurs modernes font tous référence : soit que notre texte reproduise le texte d'AT, soit qu'il en donne une traduction (quand l'original latin n'a pas été traduit du vivant de Descartes, ou que la traduction n'a pas été revue et autorisée par lui, auquel cas elle ne figure pas dans l'édition AT).

Même revues et autorisées par Descartes, les traductions de Luynes et de Clerselier s'écartent souvent de l'original latin. Nous n'indiquons ni les dédoublements (deux mots Français rendant un mot latin) ni les additions qui visent à expliciter une expression : nous ne signalons que les différences qui modifient le sens. Pour les *Méditations*, nos notes reprennent en caractères droits le dernier mot Français qu'une traduction exacte garderait et ajoutent la suite en italiques.
Quand elles n'ont pas été revues et autorisées par Descartes, nous avons pourtant retenu de préférence les traductions de l'époque, en particulier celle de Clerselier, et nous en avons corrigé les inexactitudes les plus manifestes.
Nous avons modernisé l'orthographe, et modifié la ponctuation. Nous avons également retouché, pour le texte latin des *Méditations*, la répartition en alinéas, incertaine dans les éditions originales (dont Descartes a lui-même dénoncé de ce point de vue les insuffisances) et refaite arbitrairement dans l'édition AT. Nous avons respecté les alinéas du texte Français , sauf en de rares endroits où nous avons retenu les améliorations apportées par Clerselier dans l'édition de 1661.
Aux *Méditations*, et aux *Objections et Réponses* qui les suivent, nous joignons quatre lettres, écrites par Descartes entre la rédaction des *Méditations* et l'édition latine de 1642 : elles constituent autant de réponses à des objections, qui n'ont pas trouvé place dans l'œuvre publiée." (*Note sur le texte de cette édition*, pp. 31-32)
Michelle Beyssade a donné une nouvelle traduction du texte latin : *Descartes Méditations métaphysiques. Meditationes de prima philosophia*. Texte latin accompagné de la traduction du Duc de Luynes. *Méditations de philosophie première*. Présentation et traduction de Michelle Beyssade, Paris : Le Livre de Poche, 1990.

13. ———. 1647. *Les Principes de la philosophie écrits en latin par René Descartes et traduit en Franois par un de ses Amis*. Paris: Henry Le Gras.
AT IX-2, 1-325; traduction de Paul Picot (1614 - 1668).

Lettre à Picot du 11 septembre 1644 : "Ce fut au Crévis qu'il [Descartes] apprit que les exemplaires imprimés de ses *Principes* étaient enfin arrivés de Hollande à Paris ; Monsieur Picot lui manda qu'il n'avait point trouvé d'expédient plus propre à se consoler de son absence, que la traduction Français e de cet ouvrage, qu'il avait commencée dès son départ de Paris sur l'exemplaire imparfait (2) qu'il avait apporté par avance de Hollande dans sa valise.
(...)
Il écrivit à Chavagnes le 11 de Septembre [1644] à l'abbé Picot qui lui avait mandé dans sa dernière qu'il avait déjà traduit les deux premières parties de ses *Principes*, et il lui marqua que pour lui il n'avait pas encore su trouver depuis son départ de Paris le temps de lire la traduction Français e de ses *Méditations* faite par Monsieur le duc de Luynes (5), qu'il avait apportée dans la pensée de s'en faire une occupation agréable dans le cours de son voyage." (Baillet II, 219-220; AT IV, 138; O VIII 2, 507; B 464)
(2) Note en marge de Baillet : « sans figures ».
(5) Voir à Clerselier, 10 avril 1645 (AT IV, 193; [O VIII 2, 714-716] B 490).
Lettre à Picot du 8 novembre 1644 : "Après la fête de saint Simon (2), le P. Mersenne délivré de l'impression du gros recueil de pièces physiques et mathématiques qu'il intitula *Cogitata Physico-Mathematica*, et n'ayant plus rien au départ de Monsieur Descartes qui pût le retenir à la Ville, partit pour un voyage de huit ou neuf mois en Italie (3) ; et Monsieur Descartes, ayant le reste des exemplaires de ses *Principes*, sous la disposition de Picot, chez la veuve Pelé, libraire de la rue Saint-Jacques (4), prit la route de Calais pour retourner en Hollande (5). Il fut arrêté par les vents dans cette ville pendant près de quinze jours, où il ne put s'occuper d'autre chose que de la lecture de la version Français que l'abbé Picot son hôte avait faite de son livre des *Principes* et dont il avait apporté les deux premières parties avec lui. Il en écrivit au traducteur le 8 de novembre pour lui marquer qu'il la trouvait excellente, et qu'il ne pouvait la souhaiter meilleure." (Baillet II, 246-247; AT IV 147; O VIII 2, 508; B 468)

(2) Le 28 octobre.
(3) Constantin Huygens recommande Mersenne à Jean-Louis Calandrini à Genève, le 30 août 1644 (*Brwg* [*De Briefwisselìng van Constantjin Huygens*, (1608-1687), 6 voll., ‘s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1911-1917] 55, vol. 4, n. 3723) et le même jour (n. 3724) à J. Van Santen, lieutenant du prince d'Orange, pour lui laisser visiter le château d'Orange.
(4) Sur la veuve Pelé et ses relations avec les Elzevier, voir H.-J. Martin, *Livre, pouvoir et société à Paris au XVII siècle*, 3e éd., Genève, éd. 1999, t. I, p. 315.
(5) Note en marge dans Baillet : « lettre à Picot du 8 novembre 1644 ».
Lettre à Picot du 9 février 1645 : "L'abbé Picot ne lui [à Descartes] envoya la troisième partie (2) que le mois de Février de l'année suivante, et il n'en parut pas moins satisfait (3). L'abbé l'ayant accompagnée de quelques difficultés dont il de demandait l’explication, Monsieur Descartes en lui envoyant cette explication lui manda que ces difficultés mêmes, de la manière dont il les lui a proposées, faisaient honneur à sa traduction et montraient que le traducteur entendait parfaitement la matière ; parce qu'elles n'auraient pu tomber dans l'esprit d'une personne ne l'aurait entendue que superficiellement (4)." (Baillet II, 246-247; AT IV 147; O VIII 2, 508; B 468)
(2) De la traduction Français e des *Prìncipia*.
(3) Note en marge dans Baillet : « t. 3 des *Lettres* p. 612 du 17 février [c’est la lettre suivante]; item lettre MS de Descartes à Picot du 9 février 1645 ».
(4) Note en marge dans Baillet : « lettre MS à Picot du 1er juin 1645 ».
Changements dans la traduction Français e :
"L'historique de cette traduction se trouve a sa place dans la *Vie de Descartes*, [de Paul Adam] au dernier volume de l'ancienne édition. (*) On ne donnera donc ici que les renseignements relatifs au texte même.
L'édition Français e de 1647, comparée a l'édition latine de 1644, offre d'abord une particularité importante. Entre l'*Épitre* ou la Dédicace a la princesse Elisabeth, placée en

tête dans l'une comme dans l'autre, et les *Principes* proprement dits, Descartes a inséré, dans la traduction, une *Lettre de l'Auteur à celui qui a traduit le Livre*, laquelle, ajoute-t-il, *peut ici servir de Préface*." (p. III)
(...)
"De qui ce texte est-il exactement ? De l'abbé Picot seul, qui est, comme on sait, « l'ami de Descartes », qui a traduit le livre des *Principes* ? Ou bien, en certains endroits, de Descartes lui-même, qui a revu la traduction ? Ou même peut-être, car on serait tenté ' aller jusque-là, de Descartes seul, qui aurait alors récrit en Français , pour une partie, sinon en entier, ses *Principia Philosophiæ* ?
Pour la traduction des *Principes*, nous n'avons guère qu'une phrase, la première de la Lettre-préface à l'abbé Picot : « La version que vous avez pris la peine de faire de mes *Principes* est si nette et si accomplie, quelle me fait espérer qu'ils seront lus par plus de personnes en Français qu'en Latin, et qu'ils seront mieux entendus.» (Ci-après, p. 1, l. 5-9.)" (p. VII)
(...)
"Deux témoignages, l'un et l'autre du XVIIe siècle, semblent d'abord trancher définitivement la question. Le premier se trouve dans un vieil exemplaire de la première édition des *Principes* en Français , celle de 1647 : les marges des pages donnent un assez bon nombre de notes manuscrites, de trois ou quatre écritures différentes; l'une est certainement de l'abbé Legrand, qui prépara, nous l'avons vu, une édition nouvelle des Œuvres de Descartes, mais mourut en 1704, sans avoir eu le temps de rien publier. Plusieurs de ces notes (non pas celles de Legrand, il est vrai), remontent a l'année 1659 ; c'est la date donnée par l'une d'elles, que nous reproduisons à la page 119 ci-après." (*Avertissement* aux *Principes de la philosophie*, AT 9-2, p. X)
"En regard de cet article, on lit à la marge de l'exemplaire annoté : « La version est ici de Mr D. (*Note MS. d'une première main, peut-être celle de Clerselier ? Ce qui suit est d'une autre main, surement celle de Legrand*) Ce que nous jugeons ainsi à cause de l'original que nous en avons entre les mains écrit de sa propre main (*primitivement de la*

propre main de Mr Desc., ces derniers mots barrés). Et il n'est pas croyable que si cette version n'était pas de lui, il se fut donné la peine de la transcrire, lui qui d'ailleurs était si accablé d'affaires. » Cette note si importante a été discutée dans notre *Avertissement*."

Note de Paul Adam au § 41 de la Troisième partie : Que cette distance des Étoiles fixes est nécessaire pour expliquer les mouvements des Comètes (AT IX-2, p. 121)

"La première édition Adam-Tannery comportait ici la phrase :

« au premier volume de la présente édition », ce qui indiquait que l'intention initiale des éditeurs avait été de placer la *Vie de Descartes* en tête de leur publication et situait le commencement de la réaction du présent Avertissement à une époque antérieure à 1896. En fait, l'intention ne fut pas suivie d'effet, puisque la *Vie de Descartes* par Ch. Adam (datée de 1910) se trouve dans le dernier tome, numéroté XII, de ce qui est devenu maintenant l'ancienne édition Adam-Tannery.

D'où la correction introduite par nous dans le texte.

Voici l'essentiel de ce que l'on trouve au tome XII p. 360-361 concernant l'historique de la traduction évoqué en ce début de l'Avertissement des *Principes*.

« Sitôt les *Principes* publiés en latin, Picot se mit à les traduire.

Descartes était alors en France ; avant de retourner en Hollande, il avait déjà reu la première et la seconde partie, mises en Français .

Le reste vint le rejoindre à Egmond. Et à ce propos, une question encore se pose. Il a existé de cette traduction un manuscrit aujourd'hui perdu, manuscrit autographe qui commenait à l'article 41 de la troisième partie : ce manuscrit pouvait faire croire qu'a partir de là jusqu'a la fin, la traduction était de Descartes lui-même, et non de Picot ; bien mieux, ce n'était plus une traduction, mais le propre texte, et un texte Français du philosophe (1). De fait, nous savons que quelques parties peut-être, ne fut-ce que celle qui est relative à l'aimant, ont été au moins résumées par lui en Français pour son ami Pollot, qui ne savait pas le latin

(2). Et nous savons aussi que la traduction Français e contient de nombreuses additions, lesquelles sans doute Picot n'eût point osé faire de son autorité, et qui, par conséquent, sont de Descartes. C'est même ce qui permet de résoudre le problème. Qui donc, en effet, pouvait insérer, chacune à sa place, toutes ces additions dans le texte déjà traduit, sinon l'auteur, et nul autre que lui ? Et il l'aura fait en recopiant le tout de sa main, travail délicat que lui seul encore pouvait faire, ce qui explique qu'il en ait pris la peine. C'est ainsi que nous avons deux textes pour les *Principes de la Philosophie* : le texte latin, publié d'abord en 1644, et un texte Français , publié en 1647, traduction du premier pour la plus grande part, et pour le reste addition de Descartes lui-même. Il ne sera pas sans intérêt de noter, chemin faisant, en quel sens ont été faites ces additions : quelle préoccupation ou arrière-pensée ne révèlent-elles pas a et là ? »

On ne peut qu'être surpris de la différence de ton que cet « historique » (publié en 1910) présente avec les p. X a XVIII du présent *Avertissement* qui porte la signature de Ch. Adam à une date (décembre 1904) toute proche de la mort de P. Tannery (27 novembre).

Tandis que ces pages aboutissent à des conclusions très nuancées en raison des constatations concernant la traduction des règles du choc, l' « historique » se fait affirmatif pour l'attribution à Descartes lui-même de toutes les additions par rapport au texte latin. C'est donc un fait qu'entre 1904 et 1910 Ch. Adam n'a pas cru devoir conserver la prudence qui s'exprime si remarquablement à la fin de l'*Avertissement* p. XX.

Le lecteur qui suivrait l'invitation de ce premier paragraphe de l'*Avertissement* et se fierait a la version de l' « historique » telle qu'elle apparait dans le tome XII de la précédente édition Adam-Tannery, risquerait d'être induit en erreur. Les nuances et la prudence que nous soulignons comme les qualités majeures de l'*Avertissement* sont à observer soigneusement.

Conformément à la suggestion de la page XVIII et à l'attention portée par Paul Tannery aux règles du choc, la

comparaison attentive du texte latin et de la version Français e pour les articles 43 à 52 de la IIe partie est révélatrice. Mais, tandis que pour les articles 46 à 52 les corrections et additions sont pertinentes, pour les articles 43 à 45 les modifications par rapport au texte latin introduisent des non-sens flagrants que l'on ne saurait en aucune manière attribuer à Descartes. Cf. Pierre Costabel « Essai critique de quelques concepts de la mécanique cartésienne », *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, t. XX, N° 80, 1967, p. 235-252.
La critique interne impose au moins pour le passage indiqué la certitude d'une situation étrange : à savoir la juxtaposition, dans l'édition Français e des *Principe*s, d'éléments corrigés et d'éléments abandonnés par l'auteur au jugement infirme de son traducteur.
L'histoire de la traduction est donc encore à faire et garde ses secrets.
Pour Picot, traducteur des *Principes*, voir la notice biographique au tome IV de la *Correspondance* de Descartes par Adam et Milhaud p. 402 et pour Pollot la notice au tome I de la même publication p. 459.
Notons encore que les remarques relatives au style de Picot, que le présent *Avertissement* contient p. VIII et IX, sont confirmées par la récente découverte d'une lettre de Picot a Carcavi, du 5 août 1649. Cette lettre ou Picot est consulté en tant que commentateur autorisé des *Principes* est actuellement en cours de publication par les soins de J. Beaude pour le dernier numéro du tome XXIV (1971) de la Revue d'Histoire des Sciences (P.U.F.). [*]" (*Appendice* de Bernard Rochot à la nouvelle édition de AT 9-2, Paris: Vrin 1989, pp. 354-355)
(1) cf. *infra*, p.121, note a.
Voir pour ce qui suit, l'*Avertissement*, p. X-XVIII.
(2) A.T., IV, p. 73, l. 37 ; du 1er janvier 1644. Pollot (Pallotti) était d'origine italienne. cf. AT XII, p. 360, note.
[*] Joseph Beaude, "Lettre inédite de Picot à Carcavi relative à l'expérience barométrique (5 août 1649)", *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences*, 24, 1971, pp. 233-246.

14. ———. 1647. *Lettre de l'Auteur à celui qui a traduit le livre laquelle peut ici servir de Préface* Paris: Henry Le Gras. Première édition : Appendice à la traduction des *Principes de la philosophie* par Paul Picot.
AT IX-2, 1-20; B Op. I, 2214-2237.
Lettre-préface des Principes de la philosophie, présentation et notes par Denis Moreau, Paris: GF-Garnier-Flammarion 1996.
La préface est annoncée dans la lettre à Étienne Charlet du 4 décembre 1646 : "Les lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de la part de Votre Révérence m'ont extrêmement obligé (2), et j'aurai soin d'empêcher, autant qu'il sera en mon pouvoir, qu'aucun de mes amis ne fasse rien contre les bons conseils que j'y trouve. Ce m'est beaucoup quelles m'apprennent que vous ne trouverez point mauvais, si, sans attaquer personne en particulier, on dit son sentiment, en général, de la philosophie qui s'enseigne communément partout. C'est un sujet auquel il est malaisé de s'abstenir de tomber; mais, parce que avait été commencé par un de mes amis, ne m'a pas satisfait, je l'ai prié de ne point continuer ; et afin de pouvoir mieux user de toute la circonspection et retenue qui sera requise pour faire que cela n'offense personne, je pense que je prendrai moi-même la plume, non point pour en écrire un long discours, mais pour mettre seulement par occasion, dans une préface (3), les choses dont il me semble que ma conscience m'oblige d'avertir le public. Car je puis dire, en vérité, que si je n'avais suivi que mon inclination, je n'aurais jamais rien fait imprimer, et que je n'ai point d'autre soin que de m'acquitter de mon devoir, ni d'autre passion que celle qui est excitée par le souvenir des obligations que je vous ai, et me fait être... " (AT IV, 587-588; O VIII 1, 638; B 594)
"M. Descartes partit de La Haye le 7 de juin [1647] pour Rotterdam, d'où il écrivit le lendemain à l'abbé Picot sur le point de passer à Middelbourg pour s'embarquer le jour suivant à Flessingues, dans l'espérance d'arriver au bout de quinze jours à Paris, où il fut reu et logé par cet ami, qui depuis le premier voyage de M. Descartes en France avait quitté la rue des Écouffes pour celle de Geoffroy-l'Ânier, où

il avait pris une maison conjointement avec Mme Scarron de Mandine. Son dessein était de passer en Bretagne dès le commencement de juillet, pour régler les affaires qui servaient de prétexte à son voyage. Mais l'édition Français e de ses *Principes* qui s'achevait entre les mains de leur traducteur son hôte lui donna occasion de différer de quelques jours, tant pour y faire une préface, que pour voir entièrement débarrassé de cette occupation un homme qui devait être de sa compagnie dans son voyage." (Baillet II, 323)

15. ———. 1648. *Notae in programma quoddam sub finem anni 1647 in Belgio editum, cum hoc titulo: Explicatio mentis humanae, sive animae rationalis, ubi explicatur quid sit, et quid esse possit*. Amstelodami: Ex Officina Ludovici Elzevirii.
Remarques sur une œuvre de Henricus Regius (Hendrik De Roy, 1598-1679).
AT VIII-2, 341-369; B Op II, 2250-2287.
Traduction Français e de Claude Clerselier: *Remarques de René Descartes sur un certain placard imprimé aux Pays-Bas vers la fin de l'année 1647, qui portait ce titre : Explication de l'esprit humain, ou de l'âme raisonnable : où il est montré ce qu'elle est, et ce qu'elle peut être*, dans Clerselier-Lettres, t. I, p. 434-462, repris Alquié, t. III (1643-1650), pp. 787-820.
Descartes. Lettres à Regius et Remarques sur l'explication de l'esprit humain, Texte latin, traduction, introduction et notes par Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Paris: Vrin 1959.
Table des matières : Introduction 7-19; Lettres de Descartes à Regius (texte latin et traduction) [16 lettres de Descartes à Regius; 2 lettres de Regius à Descartes) 21-141; Notes sur le Placard de Regius : XIX. Lettre d'envoi de Descartes [à Hogelande ?], [décembre 1647] 142; Remarques de R. Descartes sur un certain placard... intitulé : Explication de l'Esprit humain ou de l'Ame raisonnable, où il est montré ce qu'elle Est et ce qu'elle peut être 143; Texte de Regius 146; Examen du placard 154;
Appendice.

I. Extraits de l'Epître de Descartes à Voet [mai 1643] (sur quelques objections à sa métaphysique)
A. 190; B. 192;
II. Textes choisis de Regius (*Philosophia naturalis*...)
A. Critique du privilège du *Cogito* 196; B. Rapports de la pensée et de l'étendue 196; C. Douter du corps n'implique pas que l'esprit en soit réellement distinct 198; D. L'âme peut aussi bien être mode corporel, attribut ou substance 200; E. L'âme ne pense pas toujours en acte : sa dépendance des conditions organiques 202; F. Certitude et révélation divine 202; G. Critique des idées innées et des preuves cartésiennes de l'existence de Dieu 206-213.
"Ces divers textes, ainsi rapprochés, sont rendus plus accessibles au grand public par la confrontation avec l'original latin d'une traduction Français e suffisante pour la compréhension d'ensemble du texte. Des versions anciennes utilisées (5) sont assez lâches et devraient inciter le lecteur à interpréter plus strictement le détail du latin : pour l'y aider nous les avons revues de près, mis entre crochets dans le texte Français les additions et paraphrases dont Clerselier surtout est coutumier, souligné par des caractères gras, les divergences portant sur un ou deux mots, corrigé directement sans le mentionner à chaque fois quelques erreurs de détail incontestables, et indiqué en note une traduction plus précise dans les seuls cas où cette rectification pouvait embarrasser un débutant." (pp. 17-18, notes omises)
(5) Dans le premier volume des *Lettres de Descartes* publié en 1657, Clerselier donne le texte latin des lettres à Regius, qu'il nomme M. De Roy : lettres n° 81-99, suivies pour les « Remarques sur un certain placard... » par une version « faite autrefois » (préface), sans le texte original. C'est cette traduction des *Notae* qui est ici reproduite et pour les lettres à Regius, celle des éditeurs parisiens de 1724-1725, t. II, p. 228-482, 1. n0· 12-30 (cf. notre édition des *Lettres à Arnauld et Morus*, Vrin, 1953, Introduction, p. 8-9). Pour les deux passages de l'*Epistola ad Voetium*, qui n'avait jamais été traduite avant l'édition V. Cousin (1825, t. II), la parenté du style des éditions anciennes avec celui de

Descartes ne jouant plus, nous proposons notre propre version, comme pour les textes de Regius traduite en *Appendice*.
Une traduction inédite du texte latin sous la direction de Denis Moreau est disponible à l'adresse : caphi.univ-nantes.fr/Traduction-inedite-du-texte-latin
"« Opuscule des plus rares, dont L. Elzevier a été l'éditeur, mais qui sort des presses de Fr. Hackius à Leyde », ajoute Alphonse Willems, p. 269-270 de son ouvrage, *Les Elzevier* (Bruxelles, 1880).
Dès 1650, le même texte fut reproduit, au volume des *Méditations* en latin, après les sixièmes *Objections et Réponses*, dans les cinq éditions successives des Elzevier, 1650, 1654, 1663, 1670 et 1678, et plus tard dans celles des Blaeu, à Amsterdam, à partir de 1683. (Voir notre t. VII, p. IX-XII.)
Cependant Clerselier avait donné, au tome I, p. [542-571], de ses Lettres de Mr Descartes, 1657, à la suite de la lettre 99, une version Français e des *Notæ in Programma*, sous le titre suivant : REMARQUES DE RENÉ DESCARTES, Sur un certain Placard imprimé aux Pays-Bas vers la fin de l'année 1647, qui portait ce titre : *Explication de l'Esprit humain, ou de l'Ame raisonnable, où il est montré ce qu'elle est et ce qu'elle peut être. Version*. Clerselier avertit, dans la Préface de ce tome I, qu'il a fait autrefois cette version lui-même. (Voir notre t. V, p. 625, l. 25-28.) N'étant donc qu'une version de Clerselier, elle n'a pas à figurer dans une édition des *Œuvres* de Descartes, et nous n'avons à nous occuper que de l'original, qui est le texte latin." (AT VIII, 2, *Avertissement*, p. XI.)
"Sur la fin de l'année 1647 l'on vit paraître en Hollande deux écrits latins auxquels il semblait que M. Descartes ne devait point se montrer indifférent. Le premier était directement contre lui, et était intitulé *Considération sur la méthode de la philosophie cartésienne*. Il avait pour auteur ce Revius théologien de Leyde qui, n'ayant pu réussir à faire condamner les écrits de M. Descartes, n'avait su faire autre chose que d'appliquer à ses chagrins le remède qu'il avait entre ses mains, et de prendre la voie des satires et des

libelles, pour se donner une satisfaction, qu'il n'avait pu recevoir de ses supérieurs. M. Descartes ayant remarqué que ce libelle n'était rempli que de *cavillations inutiles*, et de calomnies trop noircies pour pouvoir être crues de personne, jugea qu'il devait plutôt en rendre grâce à son auteur que de s'en tourmenter, parce que cet auteur montrait assez par là qu'il n'avait rien trouvé dans ses écrits qu'il pût reprendre avec quelque apparence de justice, et qu'ainsi il en confirmait mieux la vérité, que s'il avait entrepris de les louer publiquement.

L'autre écrit latin qui parut en même temps le toucha davantage, quoiqu'il ne s'adressât à lui qu'indirectement, et qu'il pût dissimuler la chose sans intéresser sa réputation. Il avait pour titre *Explication de l'Esprit humain ou de l'Ame raisonnable, où l'on montre ce qu'elle est et ce qu'elle peut être*. Il fut imprimé à Utrecht, premièrement en forme de petit livre sous le nom de M. Regius son ancien disciple, et ensuite en feuille étendue par manière de programme ou placard pour être affiché dans les places et les rues, sans nom d'auteur ni d'imprimeur. M. Descartes l'ayant reu de cette seconde forme reconnut aussitôt l'auteur par le style et par le bruit commun. Il y remarqua plusieurs opinions qu'il jugeait fausses et pernicieuses ; et parce qu'on était encore assez communément persuadé que M. Regius était toujours dans les sentiments qu'il lui avait inspirés autrefois, il se crut obligé de découvrir les erreurs de cet écrit, de peur qu'elles ne lui fussent imputées par ceux qui, n'ayant pas lu ses ouvrages, et surtout ses *Méditations*, tomberaient par hasard sur la lecture de cet écrit de Regius. Il en composa la réfutation en latin sur la fin du mois de décembre, et elle fut imprimée à Amsterdam avant qu'il en sût (a) rien, et sans sa participation, avec des vers et une préface qui n'eurent point son approbation, quoique les vers fussent de son ami M. Heydanus (b) qui n'avait pas jugé à propos d'y mettre son nom (c). Nous avons aujourd'hui cette réfutation traduite en Français au premier volume de ses lettres précédée de l'écrit ou placard de M. Regius, contenant vingt et un articles ou assertions par manière de thèses sur l'Ame raisonnable, où cet auteur avait mis pour conclusion ce que M. Descartes

avait dit autrefois dans l'Épître dédicatoire de ses *Principes*, qu'*il n'y a point de gens qui parviennent plus aisément à une haute réputation de piété que les superstitieux et les hypocrites*. M. Regius fit une réponse assez modeste aux observations que M. Descartes avait faites sur son placard. Mais toute sa modération ne fut point capable d'attirer une réplique de M. Descartes." (Baillet II, 334-335)
(a) a. Sous le titre de *Nota in Programma quoddam*, etc.
(b) Je croirais que c'est plutôt M. Huyghens.
(c) Tome I, p. 434, 439.
Sur ce texte de Descartes voir :
Theo Verbeek, *Descartes et Regius. Autour de l'Explication de l'esprit humain*, Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi 1993.
Table des matières : Th. Verbeek: Préface V-IX; Th. Verbeek: Le contexte historique des *Notae in programma quoddam* 1; G. Rodis-Lewis: Problèmes discutés entre Descartes et Regius: L'âme et le corps 35; A. Bitpol-Hespéries: Descartes et Regius: leur pensée médicale 47; G. Olivo: L'homme en personne 69; H. H. Kubbinga: Le concept d' » individu substantiel « chez Beeckman et chez Descartes 93; Bibliographie 105; Index 113-114.
Alain de Libera, *Remarques sur un placard : Descartes contre Regius*, dans Julein Dutant, Davide Fassio, Anne Meylan (éds.), *Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel*, Genève: Université de Genève, Faculté des Lettres, pp. 647-673 /disponible en aligne à l'adresse : unige.ch/lettres/philo/publications/engel/liberamicorum/ ("Le « sujet cartésien » est sorti du placard en janvier 1648, avec les *Notae in Programma* publiées en réponse au libelle de Regius, et mises à l'Index dès 1663." (p. 656).

16. ———. 1647/1648. *La description du corps humain et de toutes ses fonctions*.
Première publication : Clerselier 1664, pp. 99-154 avec le titre "*La formation du fœtus*", qui est de Clerselier: voir l'*Avertissement* dans AT XI p. 219.
AT XI 223-286; B Op. II, 510-597.
Préface de Claude Clerselier aux éditions 1664 et 1677 du *Monde* et de l'*Homme*, AT XI, pp. XI-XXIV; B Op. II, 598-669.

Première partie : Préface 223 ; Seconde partie : Du mouvement du Cœur et du Sang 228 ; Troisième partie : De la Nutrition 246 ; Digression, dans laquelle il est traité de la formation de l'Animal. Quatrième partie : Des parties qui se forment dans la semence 253 ; Cinquième partie : De la formation des parties solides 273-286.
L'*Inventaire de Stockholm*, à la lettre *G* donne cette description du manuscrit : "Un traité intitulé *La Description du corps humain*, où il y a quatre feuillets de suite, et deux autres feuillets dont la suite ne se trouve point jointe, aussi un (en blanc), contenant le titre des chapitres d'un traité à faire de la nature de l'homme et des animaux. A cette liasse ont été joints dix ou douze feuillets, en partie interrompus, qui traitent du même sujet, mais sans qu'il paraisse de liaison avec les précédents." (AT X, 9-10).
"L'inventaire des papiers de Descartes indique, à la lettre G, un Traité MS. intitulé : *La Description du corps humain*. Voir t. X, p. 9, l. 17.) Une lettre MS. de Clerselier, que nous avons aussi imprimée (*ibid*. p. 13-14) , en donne le commencement.
Or ce commencement est identique aux premières pages d'un Traité que Clerselier a publié, dans son volume de 1664, à la suite du *Traité de l'Homme*, sous le même titre initial de *La Description du Corps humain*, bien qu'il imprime en haut des pages ce titre différent *De la Formation du Fœtus*.
L'authenticité de cette publication est donc assurée incontestablement.
A vrai dire, ce double titre de Clerselier demande explication. Mais c'est que le Traité, d'ailleurs inachevé, comprend aussi deux parties distinctes : la première, en effet, entreprend une description du corps humain, ou plutôt de ses fonctions, avec un programme complet que s'était tracé Descartes (p. 112-113, édit. Clerselier), et qu'il n'a fait qu'entamer ; la seconde apparaît comme une digression, et c'est bien ainsi que Clerselier la présente (ibid., p. 137) ; elle explique la formation de l'animal. Mais entre les deux la soudure existe, et non pas une soudure artificielle : Descartes l'a faite lui-même de sa main.

Toutefois le second titre de Clerselier : *De la Formation du Fœtus*, semble bien être de l'éditeur ; outre qu'il ne convient pas à l'ensemble du traité, et ne désigne réellement que la seconde partie, la « digression » , Descartes aurait intitulé celle-ci *De la Formation de l'animal* ; et c'est aussi le titre que nous mettrons en haut des pages, pour cette seconde partie, réservant pour la première : *Description du Corps humain*." (AT XII, 219-220)
Lettre à la princesse Élisabeth du 31 janvier 1648 : "... j'ai maintenant un autre écrit entre les mains, que j'espère pouvoir être plus agréable à Votre Altesse : c'est la description des fonctions de l'animal et de l'homme." (AT V, 112 = Baillet II, 337-338; O VIII 2, 292; B642).

17. ———. 1648. *Projets d'une école des arts et métiers (Extraits de Baillet)*.
Baillet II 433-434; AT XI, 659-660; B Op. II, 918-921.
"Une offre d'un autre ami, M. d'Alibert lui plut davantage. Celui-ci songeait à fonder une École des arts et métiers, dont il aurait fourni les frais, et qui devait être ouverte en dehors des heures ou des jours de travail, aux artisans et ouvriers désireux de s'instruire. L'idée répondait bien aux vues de Descartes sur l'union de la théorie et de la pratique, ou de la science et de ses applications : la science toute seule reste sans effets utiles, et l'art ou le métier, sans la science, n'est qu'une routine aveugle, incapable de se perfectionner." (Charles Adam, *Vie et œuvres de Descartes*, Paris: Cerf, 1910, p. 470.)

18. ———. 1648. *[Entretien avec Burman] Responsiones Renati Des Cartes ad quasdam difficultates ex Meditationibus ejus, etc., ab ipso haustae*.
Première édition dans : *Revue Bourguignonne de l'Enseignement supérieur*, 1896, pp. 1-52.
AT V, 146-179; B Op. II, 1246-1307.
Traductions :
Entretien avec Burman. Manuscrit de Göttingen, Texte présenté, traduit et annoté par Charles Adam, Paris: Boivin 1937 (Seconde édition Paris: Vrin, 1975).
L'entretien avec Burman, Édition, traduction et annotation par Jean-Marie Beyssade, Paris: Presses universitaires de

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Éditions utilisées par Burman :
Renati Descartes, *Meditationes De Prima Philosophia, In quibus Dei existentia et animae humanae a corpore distinctio demonstrantur. His adiunctae sunt variae objectiones doctorum virorum in istas de Deo et anima demonstrationes; Cum Responsionibus Authoris. Secunda editio septimis objectionibus antehac non visis aucta*. Amstelodami, Apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1642);
Renati Des-Cartes, *Principia Philosophiae*, Amstelodami, Apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, Anno 1644);
Renati Descartes, *Notae in Programma quoddam, sub finem anni 1647 in Belgio editum cum hoc titulo: Explicatio mentis humanae sive animae rationalis, ubi explicatur quid sit et quid esse possit,* Amstelodami, Apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1648
Renati Des Cartes, *Specimina Philosophiae seu Dissertatio De Methodo*... Amstelodami, apud Ludovicum Elzevirium 1644).
"Ce sont donc des difficultés proposées de vive voix à Descartes par Burman, avec les réponses recueillies par le même Burman de la propre bouche du philosophe, à Egmond, le 16 avril 1648. Quelques mots du feuillet 88, recto, I. 6-7, permettent de reconstituer la scène : ce fut une conversation pendant le repas ; on était à table et ou causait en mangeant (*jam ego concipio et cogito simul me loqui et edere*, dit Descartes donnant comme exemple ce qu'il fait en ce moment). Ailleurs, ayant à citer, (f. 36 verso, l. 5) deux

noms de ville, les premiers qui lui viennent è l'esprit sont Alcmaer, la ville la plus proche d'Egmond, et Leyde, la ville natale de sou interlocuteur.
Franois Burman, en effet, était né à Leyde, en 1688. Fils de pasteur, il devint lui-même pasteur ; on le trouve un an à Hanovre, en cette qualité, puis un an à Leyde sous-régent au collège des Etats, enfin professeur de théologie à Utrecbt où il mourut le 21 novembre 1679 ; son oraison funèbre fut prononcée par Grævius, dont nous avons rencontré le nom tout à l'heure, dans le même cahier, avec la date de 1691.
Burman était donc un tout jeune homme en 1648 : il n'avait que vingt ans, et ou ne sait ce qu'on doit le plus admirer des difficultés qu'il propose à cet âge ou de la complaisance avec laquelle lui répond le philosophe, âgé de cinquante-deux ans déjà, et de plus auteur du *Discours de la méthode*, des *Méditations métaphysiques* et des *Principes de Philosophie*.
Peut-être aussi Descartes avait-il connu le père à Leyde ; on s'expliquerait alors qu'il causât eu toute liberté devant le fils d'un ami. Il parle, en effet, sans ménagement aucun, des théologiens et même de Saint Thomas ; il dit son mot sur Aristote et sur la Bible ; il met enfin ce petit étudiant dans la confidence de ses derniers travaux, l'hiver de 1647-1648, et même de son régime de vie, régime intellectuel (s'occuper de physique surtout, bien plutôt que de métaphysique) et régime du corps ; bien des détails intimes et tout personnels viennent ainsi confirmer ou compléter ceux que l'on connaissait déjà sur Descartes.
De retour à Amsterdam, Burman y rencontre Clauberg, qui, né en 1623, n'était sou ainé que de six ans, et lui fait part de cette conversation. Avait-elle été rédigée déjà, séance tenante, par Burman seul ? ou bien les deux jeunes gens s'entendirent-ils pour la rédiger ensemble, le 10 avril, c'est-à-dire quatre jours après la date même de la conversation, qui avait eu lieu le 16 avril ?
Sont-ce enfin les propres paroles de Descartes, en quelque sorte sténographiées par son interlocuteur, ou seulement le souvenir qu'il en avait gardé, et qu'il a peut-être arrangé avec un ami préoccupé comme lui des doctrines cartésiennes ? Les mots : *responsiones Renati des Cartes*...

ab ipso haustœ réponses recueillies de la bouche même de Descartes, et pour ainsi dire puisées à la source), ainsi que l'indication exacte de plus de soixante pages ou articles avec une ligne de chacun textuellement citée rendent la première supposition des plus vraisemblables. Eu tout cas Clauberg prit lui-même copie du texte ainsi rédigé, et c'est la copie de Clauberg qui a été copiée ensuite à Dordrecht, le 13 et 14 juillet, on ne sait en quelle année ni par qui. Clauberg mourut à Duisbourg, le 31 janvier 1665 ; en 1691, parut à Amsterdam une édition de ses *Opera philosophica*, 2 vol. in-4, où ne se trouve pas cette conversation de Descartes et de Burman. Faut-il conjecturer de là qu'elle aurait été copiée pour compléter l'édition, et vers le même temps, cette année 1691 étant aussi mentionnée dans le cahier manuscrit, au feuillet 21, comme date d'une lettre à Grævius ? Le cahier ne serait d'ailleurs entré que plus tard dans la bibliothèque de Crusius [*] (né lui-même en 1715, peut-être seulement à la date de 1751, inscrite, nous l'avons vu, en haut de la première page." (Charles Adam, "Manuscrit de Gottingen. Descartes (Méditations, Principes, Méthode)", *Revue Bourguignonne de l'Enseignement supérieur*, 1896, pp. 2-3)

"Le MS. est paginé seulement au recto des feuilles ; f. 27 à f. 43 inclus. Il comprend trois parties : objections et réponses, 1° sur les *Méditations*, 2° sur les *Principes*, 3° sur le *Discours de la Méthode*.

Les passages sont indiqués avec renvois aux pages de la seconde édition latine des *Méditations* (Amsterdam, Louis Elsevier, 1642), aux articles de chaque livre des *Principes*, et aux pages de la traduction latine du *Discours de la Méthode*, etc. (Amsterdam, Louis Elsevier, 1644). Après l'indication de chaque passage se trouve ordinairement une objection, puis la réponse de Descartes, puis une nouvelle objection, puis une nouvelle réponse, etc. Les réponses sont le plus souvent annoncées par la lettre R, tandis que rien n'annonce les objections. Cela n'a pas d'inconvénient, lorsqu'il n'y a qu'une objection et aussi qu'une réponse à la suite. Mais, s'il y a deux, ou trois, ou même quatre objections successives, il a fallu trouver l'endroit où chacune d'elles commence et se

détache de la réponse qui précède. Nous avons indiqué cet endroit par la lettre O entre crochets (O désignant les objections, comme R les réponses). (Charles Adam, AT V, 150).
[*] "Le cahier catalogué à Göttingen Cod. Ms. philol. 264, fit partie de la bibliothèque d'un Crusius (on lit au verso du premier feuillet : « Ex Bibl. M. Crusii »).
"Adam (2), suivi par John Cottingham (3) et Jean-Marie Beyssade (4), estime qu'il doit s'agir de Christian August Crusius (1715-1775), adversaire de Leibniz et Wolff, qui devint professeur de théologie à Leipzig en 1750. Mais en réalité, comme l'indique Hans Werner Arndt (5), il doit plus vraisemblablement s'agir de Magnus Crusius (1697-1751), le livre paraissant être entré dans l'actuelle Niedersächsische Staats und Universitätsbibliothek où M. Crusius était théologien, l'année même de sa mort, comme l'atteste la date 1751 inscrite sur le premier feuillet où apparaît également un cachet Ex Bibliotheca Acad. Georgiæ Augustæ - George Auguste étant le nom de l'Université, fondée en 1737." (Xavier Kieft, "L'Entretien de Descartes avec Burman : un malentendu historico-philosophique", *Klesis. Revue philosophique,* 11, 2009, pp. 108–134)
(2) Édition de 1896, p. 1 et Adam [1937], p. VIII.
(3) *Descartes' Conversation with Burman*, translated with introduction and commentary by J. Cottingham, Oxford, Clarendon, 1976 (désormais cité « Cottingham »), p. XII.
(4) Beyssade [1981], p. 5.
(5) R. Descartes, *Gespräch mit Burman*, Übersetzt und herausgegeben von H. W. Arndt, Hambourg, Meiner, 1982 (désormais cité « Arndt »), p. I et pp. XXVII-XXVIII. Arndt pense même avoir identifié l'écriture du dit Magnus Crusius.
Johannes Clauberg cite un passage de l'*Entretien avec Burman* (AT V 177) dans le chapitre XVIII de sa *Defensio cartesiana*, Amstelodami, 1652 (repris dans *Opera Omnia Philosophica*, Amstelodami 1691, p. 1000, réedition Hildeshein: Georg Olms 1968)

19. ———. 1648. *[Traité de l'érudition].*
Dans une lettre à Descartes du 5 décembre 1647 Élisabeth de Bohême, princesse Palatine, écrivait :

"Cela vous montre combien le monde a besoin du *Traité de l'Érudition*, que vous avez autrefois voulu faire. Je sais que vous êtes trop charitable pour refuser une chose si utile au public, et que, pour cela, je n'ai pas besoin de vous faire souvenir de la parole que vous [m']en avez donnée." (AT V 97, 4-19 = Baillet II, 337; B636).
Le 31 janvier 1648 Descartes répond :
"J'ai reu les lettres de votre Altesse du 23 décembre presque aussitôt que les précédentes, et j'avoue que je suis en peine touchant ce que je dois répondre à ces précédentes, à cause que votre Altesse y témoigne vouloir que j'écrive le *Traité de l'Érudition*, dont j'ai eu autrefois l'honneur de lui parler. Et il n'y a rien que je souhaite avec plus de zèle, que d'obéir à vos commandements ; mais je dirai ici les raisons qui sont cause que j'avais laissé le dessein de ce traité, et si elles ne satisfont à votre Altesse, je ne manquerai pas de le reprendre. (2) La première est que je n'y saurais mettre toutes les vérités qui y devraient être, sans animer trop contre moi les gens de l'École, et que je ne me trouve point en telle condition que je puisse entièrement mépriser leur haine (3). La seconde est que j'ai déjà touché quelque chose de ce que j'avais envie d'y mettre dans une préface qui est au-devant de la traduction Français e de mes *Principes*, laquelle je pense que votre Altesse a maintenant reue. La troisième est que j'ai maintenant un autre écrit entre les mains, que j'espère pouvoir être plus agréable à Votre Altesse : c'est la description des fonctions de l'animal et de l'homme." (AT V, 111-112 = Baillet II, 337-338; O VIII 2, 292; B642).
(2) On peut se demander s'il ne s'agit pas ici des *Regulae* (voir Descartes, *Écrits de jeunesse*, éd. V. Carraud, Paris, 2013).
(3) Allusion à ses démêlés à Leyde (avec Revius) et à Utrecht (avec Voet).

20. ———. 1649. *Les passions de l'âme*. Paris: Henry Le Gras. AT XI, 301-488; B Op. I, 2300-2527.
Traduction latine : *Passiones animae per Renatum Des-Cartes: Gallice ab ipso concriptae, nunc autem in exterorum gratiam Latina civitate donatae ab*

H.D.M.I.V.L., Amstelodami apud L Elzevirium, 1650 (la traduction est de Henricus Des-Marets, fils de Samuel Desmarets (1599-1673); voir : Paul Dibon, "La Traduction latine des Passions de l'âme", dans *Regards sur la Hollande du siècle d'or*, Napoli, Vivarium, 1990, pp. 523-550.)
Premières références au thème des "passions de l'âme" dans les écrits de Descartes :
"En ce qui concerne la variété des passions que la musique peut exciter par la variété de la mesure, je dis qu'en général une mesure lente excite en nous également des passions lentes, comme le sont la langueur, la tristesse, la crainte, l'orgueil, etc., et que la mesure rapide fait naître aussi des passions rapides, comme la joie, etc. Il faut en dire autant des deux genres de battue : la mesure carrée, qui se résout toujours en membres égaux, est plus lente que celle qui est battue en triplât, c'est-à-dire celle qui se compose de trois parties égales. La raison en est que celle-ci occupe davantage le sens parce qu'il y a en elle plus de membres à remarquer — à savoir trois —, tandis qu'il n'y en a que deux dans l'autre. Mais une recherche plus exacte de cette question dépend d'une excellente connaissance des mouvements de l'âme, et je n'en dirai pas davantage." (AT X 95; traduction du latin par Frédéric de Buzon, *Abrégé de Musique. Compendium Musicae*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987, 62).
"A la suite de cela, il faudrait maintenant parler des diverses vertus des consonances à exciter les passions ; mais une recherche plus exacte de cette manière peut être tirée de ce qui a été dit, et dépasserait les limites d'un abrégé. Car ces vertus sont si variées et dépendent de circonstances si légères qu'un volume entier ne suffirait pas à épuiser la question." (AT X, 111; *Abrégé de Musique cit.*, 88)
"De là, et d'autres choses semblables on pourrait déduire plusieurs choses concernant la nature des degrés, mais cela serait long. Il suit que je devrais traiter maintenant de chaque mouvement de l'âme qui peut être excité par la musique, et je pourrais montrer par quels degrés, consonances, rythmes et choses semblables ils doivent être

excités ; mais cela dépasserait les limites d'un abrégé." (AT X, 140; *Abrégé de Musique, cit.*, 138)
"Il y a dans tout esprit certaines parties qui, touchées même légèrement, excitent des passions fortes.
Ainsi un enfant qui a l'âme généreuse, si on le gronde, ne pleurera pas, mais il s'emportera ; un autre versera des larmes.
Si l'on nous dit que de grands malheurs sont arrivés, nous nous attristerons ; si l'on ajoute qu'il y avait en cause quelque méchant, nous nous mettrons en colère. Le passage d une passion à une autre se fait par les passions voisines ; quelquefois pourtant il y a des passages violents par les contraires : supposez par exemple que la nouvelle d'un grand malheur se répande tout à coup au milieu de la joie d'un festin.
De même que l'imagination se sert des figures pour concevoir les corps ; de même l'intelligence emploie certains corps sensibles pour figurer les choses spirituelles, comme le vent, la lumière. Une philosophie plus profonde peut élever l'esprit par la connaissance à des hauteurs sublimes." (*Cogitationes privatæ*, AT X 217 (traduction du latin par Foucher de Careil, I, 11).
"Premièrement, pour ce qui est des esprits animaux, ils peuvent être ou moins abondants, et leurs parties plus ou moins grosses, et plus ou moins agitées, et plus ou moins égales entre elles une fois que l'autre (138) ; et c'est par le moyen de ces quatre différences, que toutes les diverses humeurs ou inclinations naturelles (139) qui sont en nous (au moins en tant qu'elles ne dépendent point de la constitution du cerveau, ni des affections particulières de l'âme) sont représentées en cette machine. Car, si ces esprits sont plus abondants que de coutume, ils sont propres à exciter en elle des mouvements tout semblables à ceux qui témoignent en nous de la *bonté*, de la *libéralité* et de l'*amour* ; et de semblables à ceux qui témoignent en nous de la *confiance* ou de la *hardiesse*, si leurs parties sont plus fortes et plus grosses ; et de la *constance*, si avec cela elles sont plus égales en figure, en force, et en grosseur ; et de la *promptitude*, de la *diligence*, et du *désir*, si elles sont plus

agitées ; et de la *tranquillité d'esprit*, si elles sont plus égales en leur agitation. Comme, au contraire, ces mêmes esprits sont propres à exciter en elles des mouvements tout semblables à ceux qui témoignent en nous de la *malignité*, de la *timidité*, de l'*inconstance,* de la *tardiveté* (a), et de l'*inquiétude*, si ces mêmes qualités leur défaillent (b).
Et sachez que toutes les autres humeurs ou inclinations naturelles sont dépendantes de celles-ci (140). Comme l'*humeur joyeuse* est composée de la promptitude et de la tranquillité d'esprit ; et la bonté et la confiance servent à la rendre plus parfaite. L'*humeur triste* est composée de la tardiveté et de l'inquiétude, et peut être augmentée par la malignité et la timidité. L'*humeur colérique* est composée de la promptitude et de l'inquiétude, et la malignité et la confiance la fortifient. Enfin, comme je viens de dire, la libéralité, la bonté, et l'amour dépendent de l'abondance des esprits, et forment en nous cette humeur qui nous rend complaisants et bienfaisants à tout le monde. La curiosité et les autres désirs dépendent de l'agitation de leurs parties ; et ainsi des autres." (AT XI, 166-167; *Le Monde, l'Homme*, Introduction de Annie Bitbol-Hespériès; textes établis et annotés par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et Jean-Pierre Verdet, Paris: Seuil, 1996, pp. 146-147)
Le 11 juin 1640 Descartes écrit à Mersenne : "J'écrirai à Monsieur de Zuylichem (84) pour lui demander le livre de Monsieur de la Chambre (85) et vous en dirai mon sentiment." (AT III 87; O VIII 1, 383; B 255).
(84) Lettre à Huygens perdue (Huygens était alors en campagne militaire en Flandre).
(85) Marin Cureau de La Chambre [1594 - 1669], *Les Caractères des passions*, 1640 (privilège du 15 décembre 1639) ; il s'agit des *Passions pour le bien* ; un second volume, *Les Passions courageuses*, paraîtra en 1645.
Lettre à Mersenne du 28 janvier 1641 : "J'ai reu, il y a déjà quelques semaines, le livre de Monsieur de la N. (9), et un autre du dixième livre d'Euclide mis en Français (10). Mais pour vous avouer la vérité, sur ce que Monsieur de Zuylichem m'avait dit, avant de me les envoyer, qu'ils ne contenaient rien de fort exquis, et que j'avais d'autres

occupations, je les ai laissé reposer, après avoir lu deux ou trois heures dans le premier, sans rien y trouver que des paroles."
(9) Peut-être les *Caractères* de Marin Cureau de La Chambre, dont il est déjà question dans à Mersenne, 11 juin 1640 (AT III 87, [O VIII 1, 383] B 255) et 28 octobre 1640 (AT III 207, [O VIII 1, 415-416] B 278).
(10) Le *Traité des quantités* de J.-A. Le Tenneur.
En 1645 Descartes suggère à la princesse Élisabeth de lire le *De vita beata* de Sénèque (lettre du 21 juillet, (AT IV 253; O VIII 2, 208; B511) ; voir aussi les lettre du 4 août 1645 : "Lorsque j'ai choisi le livre de Sénèque *De vita beata*, pour le proposer à Votre Altesse comme un entretien qui lui pourrait être agréable, j'ai eu seulement égard à la réputation de l'auteur et à la dignité de la matière, sans penser à la faon dont il la traite, laquelle ayant depuis considérée, je ne la trouve pas assez exacte pour mériter d'être suivie." (AT IV, 263, [O VIII 2, 209] B 514), et du 18 août 1645 : "J'ai dit ci-devant ce qu'il me semblait que Sénèque eût dû traiter en son livre ; j'examinerai maintenant ce qu'il traite." (AT IV, 271-272; O VIII 2, 224; B 517).
Descartes expose les premières esquisses de sa théorie des passions dans trois lettres à Élisabeth : 1 septembre 1645 (AT IV 281-287; O VIII 2, 219-223; B 524) ; 15 septembre 1645 (AT IV, 290-296; O VIII 2, 225-2231; B 519) ; 6 octobre 1645 (AT IV, 304-317; O VIII 2, 231-239; B526).
Le commencement du livre est annoncé dans la lettre à la princesse du 3 novembre 1645 : "J'ai pensé ces jours au nombre et à l'ordre de toutes ces passions, afin de pouvoir plus particulièrement examiner leur nature ; mais je n'ai pas encore assez digéré mes opinions, touchant ce sujet, pour les oser écrire à Votre Altesse, et je ne manquerai de m'en acquitter de plus tôt qu'il me sera possible." (AT IV, 331; O VIII 2, 242; B 529).
Un première version du livre est terminée au début de 1646 (lettre d'Élisabeth du 25 avril) : "Cela m'a empêché jusqu'ici de me prévaloir de la permission, que vous m'avez donnée, de vous proposer les obscurités que ma stupidité me fait

trouver en votre *Traité des passions* (3), quoiqu'elles sont [sic] en petit nombre, puisqu'il faudrait être impassible, pour ne point comprendre que l'ordre, la définition et les distinctions que vous donnez aux passions, et enfin toute la partie morale du traité, passent tout ce qu'on a jamais dit sur ce sujet." (AT IV 404; O VIII 2, 252; B 554).
(3) Descartes s'était rendu le 7 mars à La Haye (à Chanut, 6 mars 1646, AT IV, 376 l. 11, [O VIII 2, 252] B 545) et avait pu y laisser à la princesse une copie manuscrite de son *Traité des passions de l'âme*.
Voir aussi la lettre à Élisabeth du mai 1646: "Je reconnais, par expérience, que j'ai eu raison de mettre la gloire au nombre des passions (2) ; car je ne puis m'empêcher d'être touché, en voyant le favorable jugement que fait Votre Altesse du petit traité que j'en ai écrit (3) Et je ne suis nullement surpris de ce qu'elle y remarque aussi des défauts, parce que je n'ai point douté qu'il n'y en eût en grand nombre, étant matière que je n'avais jamais ci-devant étudiée, et dont je n'ai fait que tirer le premier crayon (4), sans y ajouter les couleurs et les ornements qui seraient requis pour la faire paraître à yeux moins clairvoyants que ceux de Votre Altesse." (AT IV 407; [O VIII 2, 254] B 556).
(2) *Passions de l'âme* III § 204 (AT XI, 482).
(3) Voir lettre à Élisabeth, 25 avril 1646 (AT IV, 404; [O VIII 2, 252] B 554).
(4) Au sens d' « esquisse ».
Le 20 novembre 1647 Descartes envoi une copie manuscrite de son livre à la Reine Christine de Suède : "J'ai appris de Monsieur Chanut (2) qu'il plaît à Votre Majesté que j'aie l'honneur de lui exposer l'opinion que j'ai touchant le Souverain Bien, considéré au sens que les philosophes anciens en ont parlé ; et je tiens ce commandement pour une si grande faveur, que le désir que j'ai d'y obéir me détourne de toute autre pensée, et fait que, sans excuser mon insuffisance, je mettrai ici, en peu de mots, tout ce que je pourrai savoir sur cette matière." (AT V, 81-82; O VIII 2, 311; B 631).
(...)

"J'omets encore ici beaucoup d'autres choses, parce que, me représentant le nombre des affaires qui se rencontrent en la conduite d'un grand royaume, et dont Votre Majesté prend elle-même les soins, je n'ose lui demander plus long audience. Mais j'envoie à Monsieur Chanut quelques écrits (4), où j'ai mis mes sentiments plus au long touchant la même matière, afin que, s'il plaît à Votre Majesté de les voir, il m'oblige de les lui présenter, et que cela aide à témoigner avec combien de zèle et de dévotion, je suis..." (AT V 87-88; O VIII 2, 314; B 631).
(2) Voir lettre de Chanut, 21 septembre 1647 (AT V, 89-90, B 628; lettre résumée par Descartes à Élisabeth, 20 novembre 1647, AT V 89-92, [O, VIII, 2, 289-290] B633).
(4) Les *Passions de l'âme* et plusieurs lettres envoyées à Élisabeth (21 juillet 1645, AT IV 251-253, [O VIII 2, 207-209] B511 ; 4 août 1645, AT IV 263-268, [O VIII 2, 209-212] B514; 18 août 1645, AT IV 271-278, [O VIII 2, 214-218] B517; 1er septembre 1645, AT IV, 281-287, [O VIII 2, 219-223] B517; 15 septembre 1645, AT IV, 290-296, [O VIII 2, 225-229] B521, et, en partie, 6 octobre 1645, AT IV, 304-317, [O VIII 2, 231-239] B 526); à Élisabeth, 20 novembre 1647 (AT V, 90 l. 25-91 l. 3, [O VIII 2, 289-290] B 633).
Descartes fait ses dernières modifications entre avril et août 1649 : "Pour le traité des *Passions*, je n'espère pas qu'il soit imprimé qu'après que je serai en Suède (3); car j'ai été négligent à le revoir et y ajouter les choses que vous avez jugé y manquer, lesquelles l'augmenteront d'un tiers ; car il contiendra trois parties, dont la première sera des passions en général, et par occasion de la nature de l'âme, etc., la seconde des six passions primitives, et la troisième de toutes les autres." (AT V, 354; O VIII 2, 725; B 697).
"L'accroissement d'environ un tiers n'implique pas nécessairement que le contenu de la troisième partie y ait été ajouté en totalité : les développements sur la générosité, et les conclusions générales du *Traité* n'étaient-ils pas au moins ébauchés dans cette « partie morale » qui satisfaisait si fort Élisabeth (3) ? Mais les observations de détail de la Princesse concernaient essentiellement la seconde partie actuelle (4)." (Genèvieve Rodis-Lewis, *Introduction* à son

édition de *Les passions de l'âme*, Paris: Vrin, 2010, p. 26 (première édition 1994).
(3) 25 avril 1646, AT IV, 404 [O VIII 2, 252; B 554].
(4) Ch. Adam avait d'abord rapporté une remarque d'Élisabeth à l'art. 170 (AT IV, 414, note), mais la langueur est déjà évoquée dans les articles 119 à 121 (AT XI, 298). La seconde partie, sous sa forme définitive, amorce plusieurs renvois à la troisième, précisément à propos de la générosité (art. 83, 145).

21. ———. 1649. *La naissance de la paix. Ballet*.
Texte d'un ballet dansé au château royal de Stockholm le jour de la naissance de Christine de Suède le 18 décembre 1649.
AT (nouvelle édition) V 616-627; B op. II, 1412-1435.
La première édition (Stockholm, Jean Janssonius, 1649 disponible à l'adresse : diglib.hab.de/wdb.php?dir=drucke/20-4-quod-2f-6) à été découverte par Johan Nordström dans la *Bibliotheca Carolina Rediviva* de Uppsala et publiée par lui et Albert Thibaudet avec le titre: *Un Ballet de Descartes. La Naissance de la Paix*, Revue de Genève, pp. 173-185 (avec une introduction de A. Thibaudet (pp. 161-170) et une note de J. Nordström (pp. 171-172).
L'authenticité de cet écrit a été déniée par Richard A. Watson, "René Descartes n'est pas l'auteur de la Naissance de la paix", *Archives de Philosophie*, 53, 1990, pp. 389-401 et *Descartes's Ballet. His Doctrine Of the Will and His Political Philosophy*, St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, 2007 (avec la traduction du texte) et par Matthijs van Otegem, *A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637-1704)*, Utrecht: Proefschrift Universiteit, 2002, vol. II, pp. 731-735.
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis a défendu l'authenticité de l'œuvre (*contra* Watson) dans: "Gli ultimi scritti di Descartes", traduit en italien par Leon Ginzburg, *Discipline Filosofiche*, 1993, pp. 15-42, version Français e dans : G. Rodis-Lewis, *Le développement de la pensée de Descartes,* (recueil d'articles), Paris: Vrin, 1997, pp. 203-223.

22. ———. 1649. *Projet de comédie (Extraits de Baillet)*.

Baillet II, 407-408 (le texte est perdu); AT XI 661-662; B Op II, 922-923.
"Nous avons pareillement une espèce de Comédie Français e, qu'il fit en prose mêlée de quelques vers, pendant son séjour à la Cour de Suède. Ce fut l'un des fruits de l'oisiveté où la Reine le retint durant l'absence de l'Ambassadeur de France, dont elle attendait le retour. La pièce est imparfaite, et le quatrième Acte ne paraît pas même achevé. Elle a tout l'air d'une Pastorale ou Fable bocagère. Mais quoiqu'il semble avoir voulu envelopper l'amour de la Sagesse, la recherche de la Vérité, et l'étude de la Philosophie, sous les discours figurez de les personnages ; on peut dire que tous ces mystères seront assez peu importants au Public, tant qu'il jouira des autres écrits, où M. Descartes s'est expliqué sans mystères. » (Baillet II, 407)

23. ———. 1650. *Projet d'une académie à Stockholm (Extraits de Baillet)*.
AT XI 663-665; Baillet II, 411-413; B Op. II, 925-929.
C'est le dernier écrit de Descartes (1 février 1650).
"...La Reine, qui ne songeait à rien moins qu'à l'incommoder, l'obligea, dans le fort de la maladie de M. l'Ambassadeur, de retourner encore au Palais après-midi pendant quelques jours, pour prendre avec elle la communication d'un dessein de Conférence ou d'Assemblée de Savants, qu'elle voulait établir en forme d'Académie, dont elle devait être le chef et la protectrice. Elle regarda M. Descartes comme l'homme du meilleur conseil qu'on put écouter sur cet établissement, et elle le choisit pour en dresser le plan et pour en faire les règlements. Il lui porta le mémoire qu'il en avait fait, le premier jour de Février, qui fut le dernier qu'il eut l'honneur de voir la Reine." (Baillet II, p. 411).

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René Descartes. Outils de Recherche en Français

INTRODUCTION

Cette page contient une liste annotée des biographies, dictionnaires, concordances et répertoires bibliographiques sur Descartes en langue Français e; pour les études en anglais voir: Descartes. Bibliographies, Concordances, Dictionaries, Lexica

ABRÉVIATIONS

Note su les éditions de la Correspondance de Descartes:

L'édition Adam-Tannery est devenue obsolète après la publication de nouvelles éditions par G. Belgioioso (texte original latin ou Français et traduction italienne, lettres dans l'ordre chronologique) et par J.-R. Armogathe (lettres en latin publiées en traduction Français e, groupées par correspondant), pour un total de 735 lettres; cette édition donne seulement "la correspondance active (les lettres de Descartes), en donnant en note les éléments de correspondance passive (parfois des lettres entières) nécessaires à la bonne compréhension." (O VIII, 1, p. 22)

Je cite les lettres de Descartes après l'édition de Armogathe (O VIII, 1 et 2), mais je donne aussi la référence à l'édition Adam-

Tannery (AT I-V, X: *Supplément à la Correspondance*, pp. 538-632) et le numéro de la lettre dans l'édition Belgioioso (B); pour la correspondance passive, je cite le texte de l'édition Belgioioso, avec la référence à l'édition AT.

1. Abrégé = Adrien Baillet, *La vie de mr. Des-Cartes. Réduite en abrégé*, Paris: G. de Luynes, 1693.

2. Alquié = Ferdinand Alquié (éd.), *Descartes, Œuvres philosophiques*, Paris: Garnier: Tome I (1618-1637), 1963; Tome II (1638-1642), 1967; Tome III (1643-1650), 1973; édition revue 2010.

3. AM = Charles Adam, Gérard Milhaud (éds.), *Descartes. Correspondence publiée avec une introduction et des notes*, Vol. 1-2 Paris: Alcan; vol. 3-8 Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1935-1963.

4. AT = Charles Adam, Paul Tannery (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres*, Nouvelle présentation par J. Beaude, P. Costabel, A. Gabbey et B. Rochot, Paris: Vrin 1964-1974 (Édition du Jubilé, 1996, 11 volumes); première édition 1897-1913 (Les tomes I-V contiennent la *Correspondance*).

5. B = Giulia Belgioioso (éd.), *René Descartes, Tutte le lettere*, con la collaborazione di I. Agostini, F. Marrone, F. A. Meschini, M. Savini e J.-R. Armogathe, Testo francese, latino e olandese a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2009.

6. B Op. I = Giulia Belgioioso (éd.), *René Descartes, Opere 1637-1649*, con la collaborazione di I. Agostini, F. Marrone, M. Savini, Testo francese e latino a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2009.

7. B Op. II = Giulia Belgioioso (éd.), *René Descartes, Opere postume 1650-2009*, con la collaborazione di I. Agostini, F. Marrone, M. Savini, Testo francese e latino a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2009.

8. BAB = Giulia Belgioioso, Jean-Robert Armogathe (éds.), *René Descartes, Isaac Beeckman, Marin Mersenne. Lettere 1619-1648*, Testi latini e francesi a fronte, Milano: Bompiani, 2015.

9. Baillet = Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes,* 2 vols., Paris: D. Horthemels, 1691.

10. Burman = René Descartes, *L'entretien avec Burman*, Édition, traduction et annotation par Jean-Marie Beyssade. Suivi d'une études sur *RSP ou Le monogramme de Descartes* Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1981.

11. Clerselier 1664 = Claude Clerselier (éd.), *L'Homme de René Descartes et un Traité de la formation du foetus du mesme autheur. Avec les remarques de Louys de La Forge, ... sur le Traité de l'homme de René Descartes et sur les figures par lui inventées. [Suivi de la version de la préface que M. Schuyl a mise au devant de la version latine qu'il a faite du traité de l'homme.]*, Paris: C. Angot, 1664.

12. Clerselier 1677 = Claude Clerselier (éd.), *L'homme de René Descartes, et La formation du foetus. Avec les remarques de Louis de La Forge. A quoy l'on a ajouté Le Monde ou Traité de la lumière du mesme autheur. Deuxième édition revue et corrigée,* Paris: Theodore Girard, 1677.

13. Clerselier Lettres = Claude Clerselier (éd.), *Lettres de M. Descartes*, trois volumes, Paris: Charles Angot, I (1657), II (1659), III (1667).

14. Cl-Inst = Claude Clerselier (éd.), *Lettres de M. Descartes*, trois volumes, Paris: Charles Angot, I (1657), II (1659), III (1667), exemplaire de l'Institut de France, ée. J.-R. Armogathe et G. Belgioioso, 3 vol. + 3 fasc., Lecce: Conte Editore.

15. CM = Marin Mersenne, *Correspondnce du P. Marin Mersenne, réligieux minime*, commencée par Mme Paul

Tannery, publiée et annotée par Cornelis De Waard, 17 vol. Paris: CNRS, 1932-1988.

16. CO = Vincent Carraud, Gilles Olivo (éds.), *René Descartes, Étude du bon sens, La recherche de la vérité et autres écrits de jeunesse (1616-1631)*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2013.

    "Le présent ouvrage réunit donc l'ensemble des écrits de Descartes, de 1616 à 1631, excepté, bien sûr, les œuvres qui lui ont été attribuées mais dont nous ne connaissons que le titre, ou au contraire celles qui ont déjà fait l'objet d'éditions et de commentaires séparés, mais dont des pages signets marquent simplement l'emplacement: le *Compendium musicae*, le *De solidorum elementis* et les *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. Portant sur la genèse de la pensée philosophique de Descartes, il n'inclut pas davantage ses essais scientifiques, que d'autres, plus compétents que nous en la matière, éditeront de leur côté. Il comprend donc les écrits philosophiques du jeune Descartes, précédés, pour des raisons que l'originalité de sa dédicace fera apparaître en son lieu propre, du placard de sa licence en droit, soit:
    — un ensemble de notes que l'on peut attribuer ou rattacher aux diverses parties du *Registre de 1619*;
    — les *Olympica*, qui font mémoire de la découverte des «fondements de la science admirable»;
    — le *Studium bonae mentis*, essai de restitution;
    — la *Censura quarumdam Epistolarum Domini Balzacii*, texte latin et traduction Français e de Clerselier;
    — *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*, fragment Français conservé dans les papiers de Leibniz, traduction néerlandaise de 1684, première traduction Français e de la traduction néerlandaise, traduction latine de 1701." p. 8.

17. Corr. 1643 = Theo Verbeek, Erik-Jan Bos, Jeroen van de Ven (eds)., *The Correspondence of René Descartes 1643*, Quaestiones Infinitae Volume XLV, Utrecht: Zeno Institute

for Philosophy, 2003. (First volume of a new critical edition of the Correspondence).

18. Corr. Regius = Erik-Jean Bos (ed.), *The Correspondence between Descartes and Henricus Regius*, Utrecht: The Leiden-Utrecht Research Institute of Philosophy, 2002.

19. Foucher de Careil = Louis-Alexandre Foucher de Careil (éd.), *Œuvres inédites de Descartes, précedèes d'une introduction sur la méthode*, 2 vols., Paris: Auguste Durand, I, 1859, II, 1860.

20. O I = Jean-Marie Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes I. Premiers écrits. Règles pour la direction de l'esprit*, Paris: Gallimard, 2016.

21. O III = Jean-Marie Beyssade et Denis Kambouchner (éds.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes III. Discours de la Méthode et Essais*, Paris: Gallimard, 2009.

22. O VIII, 1 = Jean-Robert Armogathe (éd.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes VIII. Correspondance, 1*, Paris: Gallimard, 2013.

23. O VIII, 2 = Jean-Robert Armogathe (éd.), *René Descartes, Œuvres complètes VIII. Correspondance, 2*, Paris: Gallimard, 2013.

24. Opuscula posthuma = *Opuscula posthuma, physica et mathematica*, Amstelodami: P. & J. Blaeu, 1701

25. Querelle = Theo Verbeek, (ed.), *La Querelle d'Utrecht*, Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988. (Table des Matière: Jean-Luc Marion: Préface 7; Theo Verbeek: Introduction 18; Narration historique 71; René Descartes: Lettre à Dinet 125; Martin Schoock: L'Admirable Méthode 153; René Descartes: Lettre à Voet 321; René Descartes: Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d'Utrecht 401; Theo Verbeek: Notes 439-539).

BIOGRAPHIES ANCIENNES (JUSQU'AU 1950)

1. Beeckman, Isaac. 1939. *Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634, publié avec une introduction et des notes*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
   Le *Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634*, a été publié en quatre volumes par Cornelis de Waard, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1953: Tome I: 1604-1619; (1939) Tome II: 1619-1627 (1942); Tome III: 1627-1634 [1635] (1945); Tome IV: Supplément (1953).
   Les passages sur Descartes ont été publiés dans l'édition Adam-Tannery des *Œuvres de Descartes*:
   I. Varia: 15 extraits (AT X, 41-66); II. Physico-Mathematica: 1) Aquae comprimentis in vase ratio reddita à D. Des Cartes (AT 67-74; 2) Lapis in vacuo versus terrae centrum cadens quantum singulis momentis motu crescat, ratio Des Cartes (AT X, 75-78).
   Voir aussi dans AT X. *Beeckman et Descartes (1618-1619). Avertissement* (1905), par Adam Tannery, pp. 17-39.
   Lettres de Descartes à Beeckman:
   1619: I. 24 janvier, II. 26 mars, III. 20 avril, IV. 23 avril, V. 29 avril;
   1630: VI. septembre, VII. 17 octobre;
   1634: VIII. 22 août.
   Lettre de Beeckman à Descartes:
   1619: 6 mai.
   Édition de la correspondance entre Descartes, Beeckman et Mersenne: Giulia Belgioioso et Jean-Robert Armogathe (éds.), *René Descartes, Isaac Beeckman, Marin Mersenne. Lettere 1619-1648*, édition intégrale avec traduction italienne en face, Milan: Bompiani, 2015.
2. Lipstorp, Daniel. 1653. *Specimina philosophiae cartesianae, quibus accedit eiusdem authoris Copernicus redivivus, seu de vero mundi systemate liber singularis*. Lugduni Batavorum: Elsevier.
   Contient la première biographie de Descartes.

"Au défaut d'une Vie parfaite, il s'est trouvé des auteurs qui ont au moins tenté d'en donner des abrégés ou des fragments. Celui qui semble y avoir le moins mal réussi est le sieur Daniel Lipstorpius de Lübeck professeur dans l'université de son pays. Cet auteur, n'ayant pas voulu laisser perdre les particularités de la vie de M. Descartes qu'il avait apprises en Hollande tant de M. Schooten l'ancien que de M. de Raey docteur en médecine, nous a donné en deux feuilles d'impression plus que l'on aurait dû attendre d'un étranger qui n'a travaillé que sur des relations subreptices. Quoique ce soit très peu de chose par rapport à la vie de M. Descartes, on doit lui savoir gré de ce qu'il a dit, sans lui reprocher ses omissions ou ses négligences. Quelque grand que soit le nombre de ses fautes, il est louable de n'en avoir pas fait encore davantage. C'est à M. de Raey qu'il était particulièrement redevable de tout ce qu'il a dit de meilleur; mais parce qu'il a oublié de le reconnaître au moins publiquement, je me crois obligé de suppléer à ce défaut, et de rendre à M. de Raey la justice qui lui était due par M. Lipstorpius. Il est bon que l'on sache que 'a été à l'insu de M. de Raey et sans sa participation que M. Lipstorpius a publié ce qu'il en avait appris touchant la vie de M. Descartes. M. de Raey avait un disciple nommé M. van Berhel jeune homme de beaucoup d'esprit et de grande capacité, à qui il avait donné divers petits mémoires curieux. M. Lipstorpius, ayant reu de M. van Berhel quelques-uns de ces mémoires qui regardaient M. Descartes, les avait donnés de bonne foi au public, sans examiner s'il avait besoin du consentement de M. de Raey, ou s'il devait les autoriser de son nom.
Ce fragment de la Vie de M. Descartes fut imprimé à Leyde l'an 1653 parmi les Essais de D. Lipstorpius touchant la philosophie cartésienne."
Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Monsieur Descartes*, (1691), Préface, pp. XIII-XV.
"Au tome I, Lipstorp donne, dans un *Appendix*, une courte biographie de Descartes, p. 69-94; encore les cinq dernières pages sont-elles remplies par le texte des inscriptions ou épitaphes en l'honneur du philosophe, si bien que quinze

pages et demie tout au plus sont consacrées au récit de sa vie." (Charles Adam, *Vie et Œuvres de Descartes. Étude historique*, Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1910, p. VI).
"En dehors de la France, Daniel Lipstorpius, professeur à l'Université de Lubeck, a publié en 1653 un fragment sur la vie de Descartes dans ses *Specimina philosophiae* in-4° Ludg.-Batav., et Jean Tepelius a fait paraître à Nuremberg, en 1664, *Historia philosophiae cartesianae*, in-12, qui n'est qu'une brochure et dont un seul chapitre, fort incomplet comme tout le reste, est consacré à la vie de Descartes." Francisque Bouillier, *Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne*, Paris, 1868, p. 31.
"Le volume se divise en trois parties, auxquelles il faut ajouter l'essai conclusif en forme de défense de la théorie copernicienne: le *Copernicus redivivus*. Les trois parties qui composent les *Specimina* contiennent, respectivement, une justification de la méthode mathématique suivie par Descartes, une exposition des règles du mouvement *more geometrico demonstratas*, et, enfin, un traité sur l'air." Massimiliano Savini, *Johannes Clauberg*. Methodus cartesiana *et ontologie*, Paris: Vrin, 2011, p. 281. (voir aussi *Les* Specimina philosophiae cartesianae *de Daniel Lipstorp*, pp. 281-292.)

3. Borel, Pierre. 1656. *Vitae Renati Cartesii, Summi philosophi compendium*. Paris: Ioannem Billaine et Mathurini Dupuis.
"Mais sur la fin de la même année [1653] l'on vit paraître à Castres en Languedoc une espèce d'abrégé de la même Vie composé par le sieur Pierre Borel médecin du roi, et dédié à M. Pélisson. Il fut réimprimé à Paris trois ans après; puis à Francfort et à Leipzig en 1670 et en 1676. Et enfin inséré parmi les Mémoires du sieur Henning Witte imprimés à Francfort l'an 1677. Il paraît que l'auteur de ce petit Abrégé n'a écrit que sur ce qu'il pouvait avoir appris de son ami M. de Villebressieu qui avait demeuré pendant quelque temps avec M. Descartes. De sorte que si on en excepte quelques faits généraux, comme sont ordinairement ceux qu'on ne retient qu'en gros pour les choses passées dont on ne tient point de registre, il semble qu'il n'y ait point de sûreté dans tout le reste. L'auteur ne s'est pas fort embarrassé des

circonstances particulières qui pouvaient servir à vérifier ses faits. Il ne s'est assujetti à aucun ordre ni pour les temps ni pour les espèces. Il n'a donné à son écrit ni style ni forme; et la manière dont il a confondu toutes choses peut nous faire juger qu'il n'y a rien dans son Abrégé qui soit plus remarquable que l'industrie avec laquelle il a su entasser tant de fautes dans un si petit espace.
M. Borel s'est fait la justice de ne regarder son écrit que comme une ébauche imparfaite et comme un simple prélude d'une juste histoire qu'il semblait promettre, au cas qu'il se trouvât suffisamment pourvu de facultés, et du secours nécessaires à un ouvrage de cette nature. Et M. Lipstorpius a eu la modestie de s'excuser d'une semblable entreprise sur les difficultés qu'il y trouvait tant de son côté que de celui de M. Descartes.
Mais vingt ans après il s'est rencontré un autre Allemand plus courageux, qui sans s'épouvanter des obstacles qui rebutaient les autres, a voulu enfin donner au public le grand ouvrage qu'on attendait depuis tant de temps. Il le fit paraître à Nuremberg l'an 1674 sous le titre magnifique de M. Johannis Tepelii *Historia Philosophia Cartesiana*. C'est un ouvrage de quatre petites feuilles d'impression, divisé en six chapitres, dont il n'y a que le premier qui regarde précisément la vie de M. Descartes. Il serait peut-être plus utile s'il était moins superficiel, ou s'il avait pu se garantir des fautes de ceux qu'il a copiés. Mais on ne peut disconvenir que le sieur Gérard de Vries n'ait eu très grande raison de l'estimer très peu, et de regarder ce petit écrit comme une pièce tout à fait indigne de son grand titre. M. Tepelius a cru peut-être en rehausser l'éclat par une pompeuse dédicace, dont le seul titre occupe six pages pour étaler les noms et qualités de cinq officiers de justice à la tête de son épître. Ce qui nous fait regarder tout le corps de l'ouvrage comme un petit monstre plus capable de nous faire rire que de nous effrayer. "
Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Monsieur Descartes*, (1691), Préface, pp. XV-XVII.
"Avant Baillet, un autre Français , Pierre Borel, médecin de Castres, avait écrit une vie de Descartes: Renati Cartesii

summi phîlosophi Compendium, publié à Castres en 1653. Mais cette vie est très-courte, incomplète, sans ordre; elle a été rédigée sur oui dire et n'a de remarquable que l'enthousiasme de l'auteur pour Descartes."
Francisque Bouillier, *Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne*, Paris, 1868, p. 31
Cette première édition n'est pas citée dans la liste de ses œuvres que Borel a publié dans son *Trésor de recherches et antiquitez gauloises et franoises réduites en ordre alphabétique* (1655); en outre à p. 26 et p. 47 Borel cite l'ouvrage de Lipstorp (1653) et d'autres ouvrages datés de 1654: la première édition est donc très probablement celle de 1656.
Repris dans Roger Ariew, Daniel Garber (eds.), *Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England*, Bristol: Thoemmes, 2002, vol. 3: *Biographies of Descartes*: Pierre Borel, *A Summary or Compendium, of the Life of the Most Famous Philosopher Renatus Descartes* (1670); Marcus Zurius Boxhorn, *Epitome of the Life of Descartes*, in: Pierre Borel, *A Summary or Compendium, of the Life of the Most Famous Philosopher Renatus Descartes* (1670); Adrien Baillet, *The Life of Monsieur Des Cartes* (1693).
Le livre contient la première édition de l'inventaire des manuscrits de Descartes retrouvés à Stockholm après sa mort: *Elenchus manuscriptorum Cartesii Stocholmi repertorum post Eius obitum anno 1650* (pp. 16-19).
"Si cette biographie se ressent des lacunes de sa documentation, elle vaut toutefois par sa date même de parution, un an avant les publications de Clerselier, comme par ses annexes, puisque, à côté des épitaphes de la tombe de Descartes à Stockholm, on y trouve la liste des ouvrages imprimés ou manuscrits de Descartes, ainsi qu'une dizaine de lettres au P. Mersenne et deux à l'Électeur Palatin."
(Pierre Chabbert, *Pierre Borel (1620 ?-1671)*. In: *Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications*, tome 21, n°4, 1968. pp. 303-343).

4. Baillet, Adrien. 1691. *La vie de monsieur Des-Cartes*. Paris: D. Horthmels.
Deux volumes.

Réimpression anastatique: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1972; Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 2010; nouvelle édition en un volume: *La vie de monsieur Descartes par Adrien Baillet s*uivi de *Abrégé de la vie de M. Baillet par Bernard de La Monnoye*, Paris: Les Cinquante / Éditions des Malassis, 2012. [l'auteur de la vie de de Baillet est son neveu, Augustin Frion: cfr. Jean-Pierre Niceron, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des hommes illustres dans la république des lettres avec un catalogue raisonné des leurs Ouvrages*, Paris: Briasson, 1730, vol X, p. 127]
Sur Baillet voir: Leonard J. Wang, *The Life and Works of Adrien Baillet*, [1649-1706] thèse inédite, Columbia University, 1955, 298 pages (disponible en format PDF chez UMI Dissertation Express, ref. n. 0012074).
"Pour moi j'avoue l'intention que j'ai eue de faire tout sérieusement la vie de M. Descartes, et même l'histoire du cartésianisme jusqu'à la mort de son auteur; et je comprends aisément que j'aurais mauvaise raison de vouloir décliner le jugement de ceux qui voudront examiner mon ouvrage sur toutes les règles d'une vraie histoire.
Afin de leur faciliter les voies, je crois devoir leur montrer du doigt les sources où j'ai puisé, et leur indiquer les personnes qui pourraient garantir ce qui m'est venu par leur canal. Je déclare d'abord que je n'ai donné l'exclusion à aucun livre imprimé tel qu'il pût être; et que je me suis servi aussi utilement des écrits composés par les ennemis et les adversaires de M. Descartes, que des ouvrages faits par ses amis et ses sectateurs. Mais on me permettra de dire que rien ne s'est trouvé plus à mon usage que les œuvres même de notre philosophe; et que parmi ces œuvres il n'y en a point eu de plus propres à mon dessein que les trois volumes de ses lettres (*) avec son *Discours de la méthode*. J'ai retiré aussi de grands avantages des manuscrits qu'il avait laissés en mourant entre les mains de l'ambassadeur de France en Suède; et de plusieurs autres papiers qui se sont heureusement conservés chez quelques-uns de ses amis. J'ai tâché de mettre en œuvre les témoignages de tous ceux qui ont eu quelques relations avec M. Descartes, et surtout des personnes de probité, qui ayant vu et connu

notre philosophe à Paris, en Hollande, et en Suède, sont encore au monde pour pouvoir prêter leur ministère à la vérité."
Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Monsieur Descartes*, (1691), Préface, pp. XX-XXI.
(*) Claude Clerselier. *Lettres de Mr Descartes*, 3 vols., Paris, Charles Angot, 1657, 1659, 1667 (réimpression anastatique de la troisième édition (1666-1667) de l'exemplaire de l'Institut de France avec les annotations autographes de Jean-Baptiste Legrand et Adrien Baillet, par les soins de Jean-Robert Armogathe et Giulia Belgioioso, Lecce: Conte Editore, 2005).
"Baillet a publié eu 1691 une *Vie de Descartes,* en 2 vol. in-4°, dont il a donné l'année suivante un abrégé en 1 vol. in-12. Baillet est de beaucoup le meilleur et le plus complet de tous les biographes de Descartes.
Il a eu le concours de tous les amis de Descartes; il a puisé aux sources les plus sûres et dans les pièces originales. Aussi son histoire abonde-t-elle- en détails intéressants, en renseignements précieux sur la vie, sur la personne et sur les ouvrages de Descartes. Mais malheureusement Baillet, qui est tout à fait dépourvu d'esprit philosophique et de sens critique, mêle à son récit une foule do hors-d'œuvre, de plates réflexions, de minuties, tandis que souvent il omet ce qu'il nous importerait le plus de savoir pour l'histoire de la philosophie de Descartes. Nous ne dirons donc pas avec M. Cousin que l'ouvrage de Baillet est excellent, mais, d'un autre côté, nous ne saurions approuver ce jugement trop sévère qu'en porte Malebranche: « La Vie de M. Descartes par M. Baillet n'est propre qu'à rendre ridicules ce philosophe et sa philosophie. » (Correspondance inédite publiée par l'abbé Blampignon, p. 13.) (**)"
Francisque Bouillier, *Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne*, Paris, 1868, p. 31.
(**) Nicolas Malebranche, *Œuvres complètes*, sous la direction d'André Robinet, Paris: Vrin, 1978, vol. XIX, *Correspondance et actes (1690-1715)*, p. 561.

5. ———. 1692. *La vie de mr. Des-Cartes. Réduite en abrégé*. Paris: G. de Luynes.

Deuxième édition révisée, Paris, 1693.
Édition moderne: *Vie de Monsieur Descartes*, Paris, La Table Ronde, 1946, réimpression 1992). Cette édition omit l' *épitre à Monseigneur le Chancelier* et l' *Avertissement*, pp. 1-2.
English translation: *Life of Monsieur Descartes, Containing the History of His Philosophy and Works*, London: R. Simpson, 1693.
Traduzione italiana di Lelia Pezzillo: *Vita di Monsieur Descartes*, Milano, Adelphi, 1996.
"Je ne me suis pas contenté de suivre dans cet *Abrégé* l'ordre que je m'étais prescrit dans l'histoire de la vie de M. Descartes, et d'en observer l'économie dans la même division des livres et des chapitres. Je me suis encore assujetti autant que j'ai pu à ne le composer que des mêmes expressions, afin qu'on y puisse retrouver la vie de M. Descartes toute entière, mais en petit, comme une miniature représente un portrait qui se trouve ailleurs dans un grand tableau."
Adrien Baillet, *Avertissement*.
"M. Baillet était déterminé à laisser en repos ses *Auteurs déguisés*, aussi bien que la suite de ses *Jugements des savants*, en attendant que la Providence lui présentât l'occasion indispensable d'en continuer la publication, lorsque M. l'abbé Legrand l'engagea avec quelques autres intéressés à ranger par ordre les mémoires qu'il avait recueillis sur la vie et la philosophie du célèbre philosophe de nos jours M. Descartes. En bien moins d'un an elle fut mise sous la presse, dès le 19 février 1691 le libraire Hortemels chargé de ce livre trouva fort son compte avec les étrangers, et en trois mois de temps il leur envoya plus de la moitié de l'édition. Si la mort ne l'avait enlevé, il se flattait d'en donner une seconde. Cependant comme on était bien aise d'avoir en France une *Vie de Descartes* qui fut courte et à bon marché, et qu'on menaait de réduire en abrégé celle qui y paraissait dans une juste étendue, M. Baillet, docile aux remontrances de ses amis, se mit à renfermer en un petit in-12 les deux in-4° de la vie de son philosophe."

Augustin Frion (neveu de Baillet), *Abrégé de la vie de M. Baillet*, dans le premier volume de Adrien Baillet, *Jugemens des savans sur les principaux ouvrages des auteurs,* revus, corrigés et augmentés par M. [Bernard] de La Monnoye, Paris: C. Moette, 1722, Amsterdam 1726, pp. 19-20.

6. Millet, Joseph. 1867. *Histoire de Descartes avant 1637; suivi de L'analyse du Discours de la méthode et des Essais de philosophie*. Paris: Didier.
"La vie de Descartes, esquissée d'abord d'une manière imparfaite et tout à fait insuffisante par Lipstorpius (1) et Borel (2), a été écrite ensuite par Baillet (3) d'une manière beaucoup moins incomplète, mais d'un style lourd, prétentieux, emphatique, qui seul justifierait notre tentative.
Cet ouvrage a d'autres défauts: « il renferme beaucoup d'inutilités et de minuties (4), il est rempli d'anachronismes (5), et Huyghens (6) en a relevé quelques-uns. Leibniz (7) a également signalé plusieurs erreurs dans ce travail dont l'auteur « est dépourvu de sens critique et d'esprit philosophique (8).» L'auteur, fort ignorant en toutes choses, est surtout effrayé des épines de l'Algèbre; la Géométrie est pour lui lettre close, et il est incapable de discuter les idées métaphysiques de Descartes, il néglige une chose qui est cependant de la plus haute importance quand on écrit la biographie d'un savant inventeur et d'un philosophe: il oublie de nous donner la filiation des idées et des inventions, de retracer l'histoire psychologique du penseur et du chercheur. Ce travail était donc à faire: la beauté et la grandeur du su jet nous ont tentés, et sans nous laisser décourager par les difficultés et les périls de l'entreprise, nous avons voulu reproduire d'une manière complète et exacte, et replacer sous les yeux de tous, avec sa physionomie vraie, l'une des plus grandes figures du XVIIe siècle et de tous les siècles. Descartes est l'un des pères de la pensée moderne, nul n'a fait plus que lui pour renouveler et transformer nos idées sur le monde et sur Dieu; ce sera donc un spectacle curieux et instructif que d'assister à l'évolution de son génie.

Pour écrire cette histoire rien ne nous a été plus utile que les ouvrages mêmes de Descartes, particulièrement les lettres et les ouvrages de sa jeunesse publiés en 1860 par M. Foucher de Careil (9). Nous mettrons en seconde ligne Baillet lui-même, dont l'ouvrage est une mine où il faut savoir puiser. Nous avons emprunté aussi quelques détails à Lipstorpius et à Borel. Lipstorpius tenait tous ses renseignements de Raey, ami de Descartes, et de Van Berhel, disciple de Raey.
Pierre Borel avait appris ce qu'il nous a donné de M. de Villebressieux, dont nous parlerons plusieurs fois, qui avait connu Descartes à Paris, et avait été demeurer avec lui pendant plusieurs années en Hollande. Je n'ai pu me procurer l'ouvrage de Tépelius: *Historia Philosophiae cartesianae*, qui n'était du reste, selon Baillet, qu'un ouvrage superficiel et tout à fait indigne de son titre." (XVII-XIX)
(1) V. *Specimina,* Phil. cartes. Leyde, 1653.
(2) V. *Centuries* et observ. medico-phys. Castres, 1653; Francfort, 1670.
(3) Vie de M. Desc., 1691, 2 vol.; abrégé, 1 vol., 1692.
(4) V. Niceron, Mém., vol. XXXI, p. 314.
(5) V. Lettre de l'abbé Nicaise, dans les Fragm. de phil. mod. de M. Cousin, p. 91.
(6) V. Remarques de Huyghens, dans le même vol. de M. Cousin, p. 47 sqq.
(7) Remarques de Leibniz sur l'Abrégé de la vie de Descartes, par Baillet, manuscrit de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre.
(8) V. Bouillier, Hist. de la phil. cart., t. I, p. 31, note.
(9) V. éd. des lettres de Clerselier, et celle de 1724; V. l'exemplaire de l'éd. de Clerselier, qui est à la bibliothèque de l'institut; V. les posthumes, éd. 1701, Amsterdam; l'éd. des Œuvres de Descartes, par Cousin; — les Inédites de Descartes, par le comté F. de Careil.

7. ———. 1870. *Descartes: son histoire depuis 1637, sa philosophie, son rôle dans le mouvement général de l'esprit humain*. Paris: C. Dumoulin.
Ce deuxième volume a aujourd'hui seulement un intérêt historique.

"Nous touchons au terme de la carrière que nous voulions parcourir. Nous avons fait connaître, autant que cela a dépendu de nous, l'âme et la doctrine de Descartes. Mais comme les détails en toute chose font d'ordinaire perdre la vue de l'ensemble, il nous reste à réunir les traits épars de cette physionomie à la fois énergique et tendre, héroïque et méditative, à rassembler dans un cadre restreint les éléments essentiels de cette philosophie et à en apprécier la valeur et le rôle historique.
Les deux traits dominants de l'âme de Descartes sont la force de la volonté et l'étendue de la raison. Cette force de volonté enfante les résolutions énergiques et persévérantes, et d'abord la résolution mère et inspiratrice de toutes les autres celle de bâtir en philosophie sur des fondements nouveaux, de refondre complètement et comme d'un seul jet la science tout entière. Cette entreprise, l'une des plus vastes qui aient jamais été tentées, il la poursuit sans relâche depuis sa seizième année jusqu'à sa mort; nul accident ne l'arrête ou ne le fait dévier, nul obstacle ne le rebute, nul mauvais vouloir, nulle persécution n'est capable de l'ébranler, ni seulement d'altérer la calme sérénité de son âme. De là vient la sincérité, parfois un peu rude, et la loyauté absolue de son caractère. Qu'aurait-il à cacher, ne voulant que le vrai et le bien, et le voulant avec résolution? L'âme de Descartes est d'une sincérité parfaite avec les autres et, ce qui est plus rare, avec elle-même. (pp. 355-356).

8. Adam, Charles. 1910. *Vie et Œuvres de Descartes. Étude historique*. Paris: Léopold Cerf.
Supplément à l'édition Adam-Tannery des œuvres de Descartes.
Nouvelle édition, abrégée et révisée, Paris: Boivin & Cie, 1937.
"Comme cette édition est à l'usage de ceux que l'histoire de la philosophie intéresse, nous en avons fait un instrument de travail aussi utile que possible, n'hésitant pas à y prodiguer les renseignements sans compter: chaque lecteur saura bien y choisir ce qui lui convient, et laisser là le reste. Néanmoins, quantité de documents n'ont pu être utilisés de

la sorte, qui méritaient d'être publiés aussi; leur place était donc indiquée dans une *Étude sur la vie et les œuvres de Descartes*.

Ce titre a paru préférable à tout autre. C'est, en effet, une étude sur Descartes seulement, que nous avons voulu donner, et non pas sur le Cartésianisme. Aussi n'avions nous que faire de cette longue liste de livres qui se sont succédé depuis plus de deux siècles et demi, et qui ont pour objet le commentaire ou la critique de la philosophie cartésienne, sans ajouter un document à ceux que possédait déjà le XVIIe siècle sur la personne de Descartes: chacun de ces livres nous expose la pensée, sans doute fort intéressante, de son auteur propre, bien plus que celle du philosophe lui-même, et sous une apparence historique, il a toujours en réalité un caractère plus ou moins dogmatique. (Et nous craignons bien de n'apporter aussi, en dépit de nos efforts, qu'un livre de plus qui ne sera pas exempt de cet inévitable défaut, un livre à prétentions objectives, mais qui sera seulement peut-être un peu moins subjectif que les précédents.) Pourtant nous étudierons, non pas l'œuvre de Descartes, son œuvre de philosophe, ou son influence sur les siècles suivants et qui dure encore aujourd'hui, mais plutôt ses ouvrages, et les conditions et circonstances dans lesquelles chacun a été composé et publié.

Le présent volume n'est pas un livre de philosophie, à proprement parler, mais un livre d'histoire: ajoutons, si l'on veut, d'histoire de la philosophie, et aussi de la science, ou plus simplement une contribution à l'histoire des idées en France et de l'esprit Français au XVIIe siècle.

La seule *Vie de Descartes*, un peu complète, que l'on eût jusqu'alors, était celle d'Adrien Baillet; et elle date de 1691 (1). Lui-même raconte, dans sa *Préface*, que Chanut, bien mieux que personne, eût écrit cette vie, et après Chanut, Clerselier, qui avait aussi connu « intérieurement » le philosophe. Après eux, il nomme un Oratorien, le P. Nicolas Poisson, qui en fut vivement sollicité par la reine Christine et par Clerselier lui-même, et qui se contenta de donner, en 1670, un petit livre de *Commentaires ou Remarques sur la Méthode de René Descartes*. Enfin, il nomme encore l'abbé

Jean-Baptiste Legrand, devenu, après la mort de Clerselier en 1684, le dépositaire des papiers du philosophe, et qui préparait une nouvelle édition de ses œuvres; Legrand s'empressa de mettre à la disposition de Baillet tous les documents qu'il avait recueillis déjà. (2)
Nous pouvons dire que les deux tomes publiés par Baillet sont passés presque en entier dans les onze volumes de notre édition et dans ce volume XII. C'était, pour une bonne part, un assemblage de documents, dont les originaux sont maintenant perdus, et que nous ne connaissons que par les extraits qu'il en a imprimés: bien des pages ont été découpées, pour être mises chacune à sa place au cours de la correspondance ou des œuvres, comme il a été dit dans l'Introduction du tome I (3)." (pp. II-IV)
(...)
"La principale différence entre l'œuvre de Baillet et la nôtre sera dans l'esprit général qui anime chacune d'elles.
Mais les grandes lignes restent à peu près les mêmes, et de nombreux détails se trouvent confirmés, avec d'autres qui s'y ajoutent, grâce à une documentation nouvelle.
Celle-ci consiste d'abord dans des pièces d'archives, publiques et privées, notamment sur la famille de Descartes: bon nombre ont été découvertes et publiées, ces cinquante dernières années, par des érudits de Touraine, de Poitou, de Bretagne. Quelques-unes ont été recueillies en Hollande. On les trouvera, chacune à sa place, avec l'indication de leur provenance. Puis nous avions la correspondance complète (ou peu s'en faut) du philosophe, et surtout rétablie dans l'ordre chronologique, ce qui la rend bien plus instructive, et permet de suivre pus à pas la marche de sa pensée. En outre, plusieurs collections de lettres ont été retrouvées et imprimées, que Baillet n'a point connues: lettres de Pollot (publiées en 1869), et de la princesse Elisabeth (en 1879), lettres de Constantin Huygens le père, de Brégy, de Chanut, de Brasset, de Beeckman, la plupart publiées dans cette édition pour la première fois.
Sans doute la physionomie générale de Descartes n'en est point changée du tout au tout; mais elle est mieux éclairée,

et bien des particularités curieuses s'y révèlent ou y apparaissent dans un meilleur jour." (pp. IX-X)
(1) *La Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes*. (A Paris, Chez Daniel Horthemels, rue Saint Jacques, au Mécénas. M.DC.XCI.) « Épître à Monseigneur » Le Chancelier », signée : A. B. (6 pages, non numérotées). Ce Chancelier était Louis Boucherat, exécuteur de la révocation de l'Édit de Nantes. Préface, p. i-xxxvi. Tables, p. xxxvii-lix. Privilège du 1er mars 1691, au sieur Adrien Baillet. Achevé d'imprimer, 6 juillet 1691.
Première partie, in-4, pp. 417; seconde partie, pp. 602. Abrégé du même ouvrage en 1693, pet. in-12, pp. 318. — Adrien Baillet naquit à La Neuville-en-Hez, près de Beauvais, le 13 juin 1649, et mourut à Paris, le 21 janvier 1706, bibliothécaire de M. de Lamoignon depuis 1680, et prêtre depuis 1676. Publications, entre autres: *Traité de la dévotion à la Sainte Vierge*, 1693; *Traité de la conduite des âmes*, 1694; et surtout *Les Vies des Saints*, 17 vol. in-8, de 1695 à 1701.
(2) Baillet, l *oc. cit.*, préface : pp. X-XI (Chanut), XI-XII (Clerselier), XII-XIII (Poisson), et XII-XIII (Legrand).
(3) Ibid., pages XLIX-L.

9. Cohen, Gustave. 1921. *Écrivains Français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle*. Paris: Champion. Reprint Geneva: Slatkine, 1976.
Table des matières: Introduction 7; Livre I: Régiments Français au service des États 14; Livre II: Professeurs et étudiants Français à l'université de Leyde (1575 à 1648) 141; Livre III: La philosophie indépendante. René Descartes en Hollande 357; Pièces justificatives 693; Index 721-756.
Le livre III contient une biographie complète de Descartes, pp. 357-691.
"Que Descartes ait séjourné en Hollande, c'est un fait connu de tous nos écoliers, qu'il n'a pas laissé de surprendre un peu, mais l'étonnement des étudiants hollandais, en l'apprenant, n'était pas moindre, surtout en entendant parler des endroits choisis par le grand philosophe pour les plus longs de ses séjours: Franeker, Endegeest, Egmond, lieux si éloignés des centres de la vie néerlandaise qu'ils

n'éveillaient en leur esprit que des souvenirs assez vagues et beaucoup d'entre eux ne les connaissaient souvent même que de nom.
Pourquoi Descartes les avait préférés, ces lieux et d'autres, au cours de sa vie errante, quelle trace il y avait laissée de son passage, voilà ce qu'il importait de rechercher. Partout je me suis efforcé de le suivre; j'ai refait pieusement toute la série des pèlerinages cartésiens: parfois, comme à Egmond ou à Franeker, je n'ai plus même trouvé les pierres de sa maison, mais à Endegeest, je me suis arrêté quelques minutes dans la salle où peut-être il a rêvé. En tout cas, le cadre est resté le même, l'aspect du site n'a point changé, et l'on peut laisser errer ses regards sur les champs où sa pensée flotta.
Certes, bien des faits que l'on trouvera dans ce Livre III ne sont pas une révélation: c'est à l'active et ingénieuse patience de M. Adam, de ses collaborateurs et de ses prédécesseurs qu'on les doit. A lui et à M. Tannery revient l'honneur de nous avoir dotés d'une édition monumentale de Descartes mais, justement parce qu'elle est un monument dans tous les sens du mot, ses treize gros in-4° demeurent inaccessibles au grand public, voire aux lettrés et aux savants qui n'ont pas une bibliothèque à leur disposition. Pourtant, quelle œuvre magistrale que cette biographie de Descartes par M. Ch. Adam, qu'on lit au tome XII.
C'est une étude presque définitive, on n'aura pas la vanité de la recommencer ici, mais, en même temps qu'une biographie, elle est surtout une analyse de l'œuvre et cette œuvre, en tant qu'elle ne traite pas proprement de la Hollande ou qu'elle n'est pas déterminée directement par elle, ne nous concerne point.
C'est d'ailleurs souvent un inconvénient de mêler l'œuvre et la vie. Nous voudrions nous borner uniquement à celle-ci, et dans celle-ci, avant tout, à ses périodes hollandaises, les principales et les décisives il est vrai, ce qui, par conséquent, ne sera peut-être pas sans utilité.
Et d'abord, s'il est infiniment précieux et fécond de repenser les systèmes des philosophes, il ne l'est pas moins, car

l'histoire de la philosophie n'est parfois que l'histoire des philosophes, de revivre leur existence, de tâcher de s'ennoblir par elle, surtout quand ils l'ont exclusivement consacrée à la perfection de leur intelligence et à la recherche de la vérité.
Ensuite, à étudier les séjours en Hollande de Descartes, non pas séparément, ce qui les fait prendre pour une fantaisie incompréhensible, mais dans le cadre des présentes études, consacrées à l'attraction qu'a exercée sur tous les Français de la fin du XVIe et du commencement du XVIIe siècles la République des Provinces-Unies, ces séjours semblent tout à fait naturels, presque nécessaires, ces voyages et cet établissement apparaissent comme une marche presque attendue vers le pays de la Liberté.
Le fait que Descartes est et veut rester catholique (nous aurons à y insister encore) souligne la valeur et l'extension de cette liberté: c'est le moment de renouveler cette affirmation que la Hollande n'est pas seulement le Refuge protestant, qu'elle est aussi le refuge catholique, ou, si l'on préfère, le Refuge de la pensée indépendante. Aussi aura-t-elle offert asile à deux des plus grands créateurs de systèmes du XVIIe, un Français : René Descartes, et un juif d'origine espagnole: Baruch d'Espinoza. Ce n'est pas le moindre prestige de cette terre féconde en miracles." (pp. 357-358).

10. Sirven, Jacques. 1928. *Les années d'apprentissage de Descartes (1596-1628)*. Albi: Imprimerie Coopérative du Sud-Ouest.
Reprint: New York, Garland, 1987.
Table des matières: Préface 9; I. Les premières influences 23; II. Les premiers écrits de Descartes 56; III. L'orientation décisive du cartésianisme 114; IV. L'orientation décisive du cartésianisme (suite) 169; V. L'orientation décisive du cartésianisme (suite et fin) 226; VI. Tentatives nouvelles 290; VII. Le *Regulae* 342; Conclusion 443; Bibliographie 463; Table des noms propres 491-496.
"Il est presque de règle, dans l'histoire de la philosophie et dans celle des sciences, d'affirmer que Descartes ne doit rien ou à peu près rien à ses devanciers. Ce « postulat » est

admis sans contestation, même par des philosophes très avertis.
(...)
'y a-t-il pas là, comme l'ont déjà remarqué un certain nombre de penseurs, un de ces « préjugés » qu'on accepte d'autorité sur la foi d'une tradition scolaire? N'y a-t-il pas là encore une manifestation de cette tendance intellectuelle vers le moindre effort qui explique la tyrannie rigide que les systèmes font peser sur les individus? Le cas qui nous occupe vaut la peine d'être examiné avec le plus grand soin, en tenant compte de toutes les ressources que les historiens et les penseurs modernes mettent à notre disposition. Mais il n'est pas possible de le faire avec fruit, sans avoir résolu auparavant un ensemble de problèmes historiques dont quelques-uns ont à peine été abordés. C'est pourquoi il nous semble inutile pour l'instant d'examiner les raisons sur lesquelles on a pu se fonder pour faire du cartésianisme une exception aussi considérable dans l'histoire des idées. Il vaut mieux avouer que ces thèses générales méconnaissent beaucoup trop d'aspects d'une réalité infiniment complexe, qui n'est jamais débrouillée qu'en partie.
Au fond, le travail le plus utile consiste à rechercher comment se sont transmises les diverses théories philosophiques ou scientifiques, à suivre les fils d'une trame ininterrompue sur bien des points et à noter les endroits où elle a pu se briser. La tâche qui s'impose à nous de ce point de vue plus modeste et en procédant par ordre, comme l'eût recommandé Descartes, sera donc de bien voir les liens qui unissent le système cartésien à la pensée des auteurs qui l'ont influencé. Nous n'envisagerons même pas l'ensemble de ce système, mais seulement la première forme qu'il a revêtue, jusqu'au moment où notre philosophe s'est retiré en Hollande pour en établir les principes définitifs. Notre sujet ainsi délimité, il nous reste à fixer la marche à suivre pour dégager la véritable originalité de Descartes, durant ces années de méditations fécondes où son esprit conut le dessein d'une science universelle et fit à proprement parler l'apprentissage de ses forces. (pp. 9-10)
(...)

"Dans le cas qui nous occupe, il nous faudra surtout examiner les rapports de Descartes avec les scolastiques, et, lorsque nous parlerons de l'École ou de la scolastique, nous n'entendrons pas l'ensemble des philosophes qui ont vécu au Moyen-Âge, mais seulement les auteurs que Descartes a connus. C'est pourquoi nous citerons les manuels qui étaient utilisés dans les classes des PP. Jésuites à son époque, plutôt que saint Thomas ou les philosophes antérieurs (3). Il semble bien en effet que Descartes n'ait consulté saint Thomas qu'après 1628, au moment où il voulait achever sa métaphysique, et pour recourir à la source des conceptions qu'on lui avait enseignées durant ses études.
Nous laisserons de côté par suite la question de savoir si ces manuels reproduisent exactement le thomisme: c'est un problème tout à fait en dehors de notre point de vue. Il faut d'ailleurs reconnaître que ces manuels sont plus fidèles qu'on ne le reconnaît d'ordinaire à l'esprit de saint Thomas et que les anathèmes lancés parfois contre « la scolastique décadente des XVe et XVIe siècles » seraient à réviser sur bien des points. Quoi qu'il en soit, il nous reste maintenant à examiner quels textes nous serviront comme sources de notre exposé historique et pourquoi nous avons limité cet exposé à l'année 1628. (pp. 15-16)
(3) A moins que nous n'ayons évidemment à légitimer un emprunt direct à quelqu'un de ces philosophes.

BIOGRAPHIES RÉCENTES

1. Gouhier, Henri. 1958. *Les premières pensées de Descartes. Contribution à l'histoire de l'Anti-Renaissance*. Paris: Vrin. Table des matières: Avant-propos 7; I. Un petit registre en parchemin 11; II. Du Parnasse à l'Olympe 19; III. 10 et 11 novembre 1619; IV. L'hiver 1619-1620 59; V. Une pensée de jeunesse abandonnée par l'âge mur 86; VI. Polybe le Cosmopolite 104; VII. Descartes et les Rose-Croix 117; Conclusion 142; Appendice: Le roman Rosi-Crucien 150,

Notes 158; Additions et correction de la deuxième édition (1979) 163; Index 167; Index des additions 170.
"En révisant *La Pensée religieuse de Descartes* en vue d'une seconde édition, nous avons été frappé par l'obscurité qui enveloppe « les années d'apprentissage de Descartes », même après l'intéressant ouvrage de l'abbé J. Sirven. De là l'idée d'écrire une *Jeunesse de Descartes*. Mais, pour mériter ce titre, l'ouvrage devrait comprendre deux gros chapitres pour lesquels le temps et la compétence nous feraient défaut; il faudrait, en effet, reprendre l'étude des enseignements philosophiques et littéraires au Collège de La Flèche, puis celle des milieux scientifiques parisiens pendant le premier tiers du XVIIe siècle. Le présent ouvrage apportera simplement des matériaux à cette *Jeunesse de Descartes* dont nos lacunes mêmes feront sentir la nécessité.
Une exégèse des premiers textes, une critique de quelques sources biographiques, des indications pour situer certains personnages de l'histoire, peut-être trouvera-t-on le livre bien gros pour des questions aussi particulières et pour des réponses aussi hypothétiques. C'est pourtant ainsi que se fait l'histoire des présocratiques ou des anciens stoïciens. Les méthodes qui ont été éprouvées en histoire de la philosophie ancienne doivent être bonnes en histoire de la philosophie moderne, lorsque les textes modernes posent les mêmes questions que les textes anciens: restitution d'ouvrages perdus, établissement de chronologie, critique des traditions et de témoignages qui ne sont pas ceux de témoins.
Une telle étude sera, en un sens, un commentaire des trois premières parties du *Discours de la Méthode*. Il n'est certes pas question de présenter le jeune Descartes tel que le voit, ou le veut faire voir le philosophe de 1637. Bien au contraire, il s'agit de montrer d'où vient l'auteur du *Discours* et des *Méditations*: pour connaître l'homme qui cherche « le chemin de sa vie », on commencera donc par oublier ce qu'il a trouvé au bout du chemin. D'ailleurs, les trois premières parties du *Discours* ne ressemblent ni à des mémoires ni à des confessions: Descartes raconte « l'histoire de son esprit

»; il écarte volontairement les anecdotes et les scènes de la vie privée; d'autre part, de « l'histoire de son esprit », il extrait ce qui lui paraît essentiel à la lumière de l'œuvre déjà accomplie, il efface donc les ratures, coupe les longueurs, oublie les hésitations. Ceci admis, il reste pourtant qu'il travaille une matière faite de souvenirs: une méthode comparative est alors requise pour faire apparaître ce qui vient de la mémoire dans la vision rétrospective et détacher ce que la biographie peut retenir de l'arrangement autobiographique (1).

Il ne suffît d'ailleurs pas de retrouver les faits et les pensées dans leur vérité originelle, pré-cartésienne, avant que la mémoire du philosophe ne les ait organisés: il y a aussi une autre mémoire à considérer, la tradition qui les conduit jusqu'à nous. L'historien commence aujourd'hui sa recherche non pas dans le monde où respirait René Descartes mais dans celui où la bibliographie le conduit et le guide; là le philosophe ne chemine plus au milieu de ses contemporains; il dialogue avec les philosophes qui l'ont interprété, avec les historiens qui l'ont expliqué. Ainsi, les faits ont maintenant pour contexte autant la vie posthume de Descartes que sa vie réelle; les pensées ne sont plus liées à des paroles prononcées pour certains hommes d'une certaine époque, mais leur universalité a en quelque sorte dé-temporalisé leur expression; nous les recevons à travers un langage historiquement usé, que les premiers lecteurs comprenaient à la lumière de leurs souvenirs scolaires et de l'actualité littéraire, religieuse ou sociale, mais que, trois siècles plus tard, les lecteurs comprennent dans la mesure où justement il paraît capable de communiquer des idées sans date. L'histoire de l'histoire sera ici partie importante de la critique historique.

En tête d'un ouvrage qui doit tant à ceux de ses prédécesseurs, est-il besoin de prévenir un contre-sens? Essayer de retrouver en histoire des données aussi immédiates que possible est une chose; faire table rase de tout le travail des interprètes et des chercheurs en est une autre. La première est une exigence méthodologique; la seconde ne serait qu'une absurdité. L'histoire doit

simplement tenir compte d'un fait indiscutable: le philosophe ne survit pas dans le monde où il a vécu." (pp. 5-6)
(1) Sur le problème de la valeur historique du Discours, voir : Paul Janet, *Descartes, son caractère et son génie*, dans *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, 15 janvier 1868; Alfred Espinas, *Descartes et la Morale*, Bossard, 1925, t. I, ch. II et III, notamment p. 21-22, 55-57; G. Cantecor, *La vocation de Descartes*, dans *Revue philosophique*, novembre 1923; *L'oisive adolescence de Descartes*, deux articles de la *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, 1930; Et. Gilson, *Commentaire*, p. 98-100, 101-102; Henri Gouhier, *Essais sur Descartes*, 1937. Appendice I.

2. Tillmann, Alexandre. 1976. *L'itinéraire du jeune Descartes*. Lille: Atelier reproduction des thèses Université Lille III. Contenu: Introduction I-V; En Hollande 890; Les "Regulae ad directionem ingenii" 913; "Le Monde" 1166; "L'Homme" 1292; Appendice. Descartes et l' "affaire" Galilée. Excerpta 1397; Table des hors-texte 1417; Notices 1418; Index de noms; Addenda et Corrigenda.
Thèse présentée devant l'Université de Paris IV le 19 avril 1975.
Il s'agit du quatrième volume (pp. 885b - 1418e, le seul publié) d'une œuvre en six volumes.
"Ce volume, que nous nous permettons de présenter comme thèse principale de Doctorat ès Lettres en Sorbonne (Etat), entreprise sous la direction de Monsieur le Professeur Henri Gouhier, membre de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques, fait pairie d'un travail en six volumes - déjà rédiges et dactylographiés - consacrés à René Descartes.
Il est le quatrième volume de ce travail, si on y englobe les "prolégomènes à une étude sur Descartes" qui forme la thèse complémentaire de Doctorat ès Lettres, entreprise sous la direction de Monsieur le Professeur Olivier Lacombe, thèse qui a été enregistrée et a reu le permis d'imprimer de la Sorbonne dès 1968 et le troisième volume si on se reporte seulement au travail intitulés "L'Itinéraire du jeune Descartes", ce dernier contenant cinq volumes." (pp. I-II).

3. Rodis-Lewis, Genèvieve. 1995. *Descartes. Biographie*. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
   Traduction anglaise: *Descartes. His Life and Thought*, translated by Jane Marie Todd, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
   Traduction italienne: *Cartesio. Una biografia*, traduzione di Gennaro Auletta e Mathilde Anquetil, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997.
   "Une biographie du philosophe doit éclairer certains points, proprement historiques et souvent mal connus, mais aussi s'efforcer d'approcher cette personnalité exceptionnelle. Vigoureux et rigoureux, sûr de lui jusqu'à mépriser trop souvent ceux qui refusent ses interprétations, Descartes s'est aussi montré patient, capable de surmonter les différends dès qu'une bonne volonté se manifeste, accueillant aux gens de condition modeste, désirant s'instruire, chaleureux en quelques profondes amitiés, tout en fuyant comme importuns les curieux et les conversations purement mondaines. La « franchise » qu'il fait « profession d'observer en toutes ses actions », « sans aucune dissimulation ni artifice », vient après cet aveu: sa « principale finesse » est de n'en point avoir (a).
   Son abondante correspondance, au ton parfois très libre, est la meilleure source pour mieux dévoiler ce caractère complexe, avec ses enthousiasmes et ses violences, sa patience aussi et ses réserves quand il éprouve quelque défiance. Nous en avons multiplié les citations. Leurs références, appelées par des lettres (a, b...') figurent au bas des pages, afin de permettre aux curieux d'en voir éventuellement le contexte, sans que ce soit nécessaire. Et nous avons reporté à la fin du volume des notes (appelées par des chiffres) qui permettront d'approfondir, voire de discuter, certains points: elles sont plutôt destinées aux spécialistes, mais aussi à ceux qu'embarrasserait un détail. Il serait préférable de les réserver pour une seconde lecture, et de suivre d'abord le conseil de Descartes, quand il a préfacé la traduction Français e des *Principes de la philosophie*, son ouvrage le plus technique, exposant l'essentiel de sa métaphysique et les principales questions

de la physique: le parcourir « d'abord tout entier ainsi qu'un roman, sans forcer beaucoup son attention, ni s'arrêter aux difficultés qu'on y peut rencontrer »; puis, si on a « la curiosité » d'en savoir plus, on peut le reprendre en soulignant les difficultés, dont de nouvelles lectures apporteront sans doute la solution". (pp. 8-9)
(a) À Élisabeth, janvier 1646; AT IV, 357.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT AU TEMPS DE DESCARTES

1. Rochemonteix, Camille de. 1889. *Un collège de jésuites aux XVIIe & XVIIIe siècles: le Collège Henri IV de La Flèche*. Le Mans: Leguicheux.
Tome I: Préface I-IV; Première partie: Histoire; Pièces justificatives 201-309;
Tome II: Chapitre I: Pensionnat et externat: *Ratio studiorum* 1; Chapitre II: Éducation religieuse 103; Pièces justificatives 175-332;
Tome III: Chapitre I: Enseignement littéraire à La Flèche, principalement du Latin et du Grec 1; Chapitre II: La langue Français e à la Flèche 131; Pièces justificatives 215-353;
Tome IV: Chapitre I: Théologie, philosophie, sciences, histoire et géographie à la Flèche 1; Chapitre II: Séances théologiques, philosophiques, littéraires, dramatiques; examens, distributions des prix 149: Chapitre III: Action religieuse en dehors du collège 213; Chapitre IV: Expulsion des Jésuites du collège de La Flèche en 1762 285; Pièces justificatives 321-441.
Index détaillé du tome IV, Chapitre I: Théologie, philosophie, sciences, histoire et géographie à La Flèche: Aristote et saint Thomas. Circulaires de St. Franois de Borgia et d'Aquaviva.- Enseignement de la théologie à La Flèche; principaux professeurs. Le P. Philippe Thibault. Cours de philosophie: sa durée, inscription des élèves. - Exercices divers: leons, répétitions, sabbatines,

menstruales, disputes philosophiques. Programme des trois années de philosophie. - Les Pères Gandillon, Challemoux, Le Breton, Gaultruche, Pajot. René Descartes à La Flèche: ses œuvres philosophiques, ses partisans et ses adversaires. - Les Jésuites et Descartes; les Pères Véron, Noël, Charlet, Binet, Bourdin, Vatier, Denis Mesland, etc. - Ouvrages de Descartes et de Malebranche mis à l'Index. Le Malebranchisme dans la Compagnie de Jésus. Les Pères André et du Tertre à La Flèche. Les trente propositions du P. Michel-Ange Tamburini. Étude et progrès des Sciences mathématiques, de l'Histoire et de la Géographie.

"Nous nous proposons de faire connaître un collège de Jésuites aux XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècles, d'en reproduire la physionomie. Nous dirons comment il se fondait, quelle éducation on y recevait, quels usages et quel règlement on y suivait, ce qu'on y enseignait. Aucun livre de ce genre n'a été composé; les preuves et les documents peu connus ou nouveaux, que nous apportons à l'appui de ce travail, seront lus avec plaisir, croyons-nous, de ceux qui s'intéressent aux questions d'instruction publique. Raconter les faits, éviter, autant que possible, de les discuter et de les apprécier, telle sera notre ligne de conduite; la simple exposition de la vérité historique a plus de force et d'empire sur les esprits pour les éclairer et les convaincre, que l'écrit polémique où la passion s'insinue, presque toujours par quelque endroit." (tome I, p. II.)

"Nous avons vu les conditions d'admission des pensionnaires au collège royal de La Flèche; suivons-les maintenant pas à pas dans leur vie de chaque jour. Le règlement différait sensiblement de celui de nos internats actuels; la journée de l'écolier n'était pas celle d'aujourd'hui. En arrivant au collège, le pensionnaire, s'il était fils de famille, déposait son épée dans la chambre des armes. A chaque épée on attachait une fiche de bois, portant le nom du propriétaire; le P. Ministre avait dans sa chambre un jeton semblable, et ce jeton servait d' *exeat* les jours de sortie.

Le gentilhomme, en quittant l'épée, faisait oublier sa naissance. Plus de distinction entre le noble, le bourgeois et

le roturier, car il y avait là aussi quelques roturiers, dont la pension était payée par des prélats ou de grands seigneurs, et qui se destinaient à l'état ecclésiastique. Pas d'autre supériorité entre ces jeunes gens de toutes les classes sociales que celle du mérite et du succès. Descartes, qui vécut plus de huit ans dans ce milieu, garda toujours le souvenir du remarquable esprit d'égalité qu'il y vit régner, et du fond de la Hollande, trente ans après, il écrivait à un de ses amis : « Il y a à La Flèche quantité de jeunes gens de tous les quartiers de la France. L'égalité que les Jésuites mettent entre eux, en ne traitant guère d'autre faon les plus relevés que les moindres, est une invention extrêmement bonne pour leur ôter la tendresse et les autres défauts qu'ils peuvent avoir acquis par la coutume d'être chéris dans les maisons de leurs parents (*). » (tome II, pp. 27-28)
(*) *Vie de Descartes*, par Adrien Baillet. Paris, 1691, p. 33. [lettre à un ami inconnu du 12 septembre 1638, AT II, 377-379; B 190].

2. *Actes du Colloque Universitaire de la Flèche "La Formation de Descartes"*. 1997. La Flèche: Prytanée National Militaire. Table des matières: Avant-propos 3; Programme du colloque 4;
Première partie: Allocutions d'ouverture 7;
Deuxième partie: Actes du Colloque 21,
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis: Un élève du Collège jésuite de La Flèche: René Descartes 25; Yves-Marie Bercé: Vocation militaire, vie dans les armées au temps de Descartes 37; Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron: Le problème de l'ego chez Bérulle, Descartes et Poussin 55; Antonella Romano: L'enseignement des mathématiques à La Flèche dans les années de la formation de Descartes 75; Laurence Renault: Descartes et la scolastique ou la critique cartésienne du *thaumazein* 105; Frédéric de Buzon: La formation musicale de Descartes et sa première œuvre, le *Compendium musicae* 149; Pierre Lefebvre: Dans quelle mesure Descartes influena-t-il la médecine de son temps? 163; Denise Leduc-Fayette: Descartes et l'idée de Dieu 179; Luce Giard: Le système éducatif des jésuites à l'époque de Descartes 199;

Allocution de clôture du *Colloque Descartes* à La Flèche 227;
Troisième partie:
Daniel Potron: La Flèche, aperu historique 239; Jean Petit: La Flèche, Descartes et le Prytanée 243; Épitaphe latine de Descartes 245; Traduction Français e de l'épitaphe latine 246.

INDEX ET CONCORDANCES

1. Gilson, Étienne. 1979. *Index scholastico-cartésien*. Paris: Vrin.
Seconde édition revue et augmentée, avec un *Supplément* (pp. 337-357) et une *Postface* (1966, pp. 358-370), seule autorisée par l'auteur (Première édition 1913).
"Il convient de remarquer d'abord que cet ouvrage ne porte pas comme titre: L'influence de la scolastique sur Descartes; ni même: Descartes et la scolastique. C'est qu'en effet nous ne nous proposons ni de mesurer cette influence ni de chercher les rapports de la philosophie cartésienne avec celle de l'École. Un travail de ce genre ne pourrait être entrepris que partiellement et, pour dire toute notre pensée sur ce point, il ne conduirait à aucun résultat définitif ni surtout complet. Pour expliquer historiquement la pensée de Descartes il est nécessaire de la considérer à la fois en elle-même, dans ses rapports avec la scolastique, et aussi dans ses rapports avec certaines sources théologiques qui ne sont pas toujours d'origine scolastique. C'est pourquoi un travail qui supposerait comme base unique les rapports de la philosophie cartésienne avec celle de l'École serait nécessairement unilatéral et plus propre à voiler la vérité historique qu'à la découvrir.
(...)
Notre but pourrait donc se définir de la faon suivante: donner un relevé aussi complet que possible des expressions et conceptions qui-sont passées de la philosophie scolastique dans le texte de Descartes.

(...)
Nous ajouterons qu'il voudrait être un instrument de travail utile. A cet égard nous avons eu une double préoccupation: lui assurer une valeur historique, et le rendre pratique.
En ce qui concerne le premier point la voie était toute tracée. On sait que pour la théologie la base de l'enseignement de la Flèche était saint Thomas, et que, d'ailleurs, Descartes n'a jamais cessé de le consulter. C'est donc dans l'enseignement de saint Thomas que nous avons cherché les textes théologiques qu'il convenait de rapprocher de ceux de Descartes [Voir sur ce point G. de Rochemonteix, *Le collège Henri IV de la Flèche*, tome IV, passim]. En ce qui concerne la philosophie proprement dite nous avions à consulter, outre saint Thomas qui là encore était le maître à peu près incontesté, Suárez. Nous avons rappelé ailleurs que Descartes en a connu quelque chose, et à coup sûr il en a été influencé indirectement. Les *Metaphysicæ disputationes* étaient pour la métaphysique le « livre du maître » des professeurs de Descartes; c'est pourquoi nous avons cru nécessaire d'y recourir [Pour les éditions des ouvrages écrits par des PP. Jésuites nous renvoyons à Sommervogel (*), dont il nous a semblé inutile de transcrire ici les longues colonnes]. Une source plus importante est cependant sans conteste l'ensemble des commentaires ou manuels alors utilisés dans l'enseignement. Descartes en cite un certain nombre qu'il dit avoir connus à la Flèche [AT III, 185, 11-18] : ce sont les *Commentarii collegii conimbricensis*, et les commentaires de Toletus et Ruvio [Voir Sommervogel, aux articles cités]. A ces ouvrages composés par des Pères de la Compagnie il convient de joindre le petit manuel du Feuillant E. de saint Paul que Descartes a connu et qui résume fidèlement, et surtout avec une concision rare pour l'époque, l'enseignement de l'École." (pp. II-V).
(*) Carlos Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, (9 volumes), Bruxelles - Paris, 1890-1900.

2. Janowski, Zbigniew. 2000. *Index Augustino-Cartésien. Textes et Commentaire*. Paris: Vrin.

"Notre travail ne consiste pas à restituer les conditions de la réception de la philosophie de Descartes parmi ses contemporains, ni à déterminer la ressemblance conceptuelle entre la métaphysique cartésienne et la théologie augustinienne. Il s'agit plutôt de voir quelle influence réelle et directe la lecture des œuvres de saint Augustin a exercé sur Descartes et sur la formation de sa métaphysique. Aussi notre travail est-il tributaire des études d'Etienne Gilson (22) et d'Alfred Espinas (23) qui ont initié l'enquête sur le rapport entre Descartes et saint Augustin. La thèse de Gilson, qui consistait avant tout à démontrer l'existence d'un lien entre certains thèmes cartésiens et l'augustinisme du Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, a été soumise aux critiques d'Henri Gouhier (24) et, plus récemment, à celles de Jean-Luc Marion (25)." (p. 16)
(...)
"C'est précisément cette question d'un emprunt possible que nous allons poser à notre tour afin d'établir jusqu'à quel point l'existence d'une telle relation est avérée. C'est dans ce cadre que s'inscrit l'index que nous avons établi des passages des œuvres de saint Augustin qui trouvent un écho dans la métaphysique de Descartes. Une des principales difficultés de ce travail réside dans la détermination certaine des arguments, concepts ou fragments que Descartes a empruntés aux œuvres de saint Augustin; à ce propos, il est important de souligner que, fréquemment, ce qui, chez ce dernier, occupe quelques dizaines de pages, ne représente chez Descartes qu'un seul paragraphe ou une seule phrase. Et inversement, ce qui, chez saint Augustin, est une phrase ou une remarque faite en passant, prend chez Descartes la forme d'un argument élaboré. Par ailleurs, on ne peut pas négliger le fait que la pensée de Descartes est postérieure de douze siècles à celle de saint Augustin, et qu'entre temps, le méticuleux travail philosophique des penseurs scolastiques a transformé le latin parlé en un langage technique et précis. De plus, saint Augustin n'était pas philosophe, au sens scolastique du terme: son langage est souvent vague et manque de cette précision si caractéristique des penseurs scolastiques et de Descartes lui-même. Il est ainsi difficile de

déterminer jusqu'à quel point certaines idées de Descartes ne sont pas la transcription, en un latin cartésien technique, de termes augustiniens. Pour notre part, nous nous en sommes tenus, dans l'index, aux fragments dont nous pouvons affirmer avec certitude que Descartes les connaissait." (p. 17)
(...)
"Nous avons divisé l'index en deux parties: la première correspond aux emprunts incontestables; la seconde, à ceux qui ne le sont pas. La première partie ne comprend quasiment que des citations littérales. En ce qui concerne les emprunts possibles, nous les avons insérés dans la section « Des additions ». Puisque le plus grand nombre des emprunts de saint Augustin se retrouve presque exclusivement dans les *Méditations*, ou plus exactement dans la Première, Deuxième, Quatrième, et Sixième Méditation, nous avons créé un index qui correspond à l'ordre numérique des *Méditations*, en intégrant la doctrine des vérités éternelles, et à la pagination de ces mêmes *Méditations*. Une telle classification, par opposition à la structure thématique, permet de mesurer, avec le plus de précision possible, l'influence de saint Augustin sur Descartes alors qu'il rédigeait son œuvre principale. Nous avons fait cependant quelques exceptions à cette classification: nous avons, par exemple, inclus quelques fragments des *Principes* (1644) ou des lettres de Descartes, mais uniquement en tant que ces fragments renvoyaient à des arguments déjà présents dans les *Méditations*." (pp. 18-19)
(22) Etienne Gilson, *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie*, (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1913). Voir la critique de la méthodologie de Gilson de Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris, PUF, 1981), p. 140-160. La rôle de la thèse de Gilson dans la développement d'études cartésiennes est discutée dans son article « L'instauration de la rupture: Gilson à la lecture de Descartes », in *Etienne Gilson et Nous: La philosophie et son histoire* (Paris, Vrin, 1979), p. 13-34.

(23) A. Espinas, *Descartes et la morale* (Paris, Éditions Bossard, 1925), t. I, chap. IV, p. 184-211; « Pour l'histoire du Cartésianisme », in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (1906); « L'idée initiale de la philosophie de Descartes », in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (1917).
(24) Henri Gouhier, *La pensée religieuse de Descartes*, (Paris, Vrin, 1924).
(25) Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes*, (Paris, PUF, 1981).

3. Armogathe, Jean-Robert, and Marion, Jean-Luc, eds. 1976. *Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de René Descartes*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.
Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, vol. 10.
"L'Index des *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* est le premier instrument de travail publié par l'Equipe Descartes (C.N.R.S.), qui poursuit depuis plusieurs années des recherches sur l'œuvre de Descartes.
(...)
La méthode suivie est celle que le Laboratoire d'Analyse Statistique des Langues Anciennes (L.A.S.L.A., Liège, Belgique) a employée, depuis plusieurs années, pour produire de nombreux index d'auteurs classiques, en particulier de textes de Sénèque. Rappelons brièvement qu'à partir d'un enregistrement du texte en lecture continue (mots et ponctuation), l'ordinateur propose pour chaque item un lemme (3) et une analyse grammaticale codée." (p. XI)
(3) Par lemme, nous entendons le mot tel qu'il figure au dictionnaire.
"L'édition critique d'Adam et Tannery, parue en 1908 dans le tome X des *Œuvres de Descartes*, reposait sur deux sources du traité: un manuscrit conservé à la Königliche öffentliche Bibliothek (actuellement Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek) de Hanovre (H), qui avait appartenu à Leibniz, et l' *editio princeps* du traité dans les *Opuscula posthuma physica et mathematica* de Descartes, parus à Amsterdam en 1701 chez P. et J. Blaev. La version hollandaise établie par J. H. Glazemaker publiée en 1684, c'est-à-dire plus de quinze ans avant le texte original latin,

dans le tome III des *R. Descartes Brieven* chez J. Rieuwertsz d'Amsterdam, bien que connue des éditeurs des *Œuvres* de Descartes, n'avait jamais été prise en considération.
Nous avons tenté dans le passé de reconstruire les phases du travail préparatoire de Charles Adam pour l'édition de 1908 (5), édition qui est à la base de l' *Index verborum* que nous présentons; cette recherche nous a permis d'une part d'en relever les défauts et les limites, presque inévitables dans une entreprise aussi vaste et complexe que celle d'une édition moderne intégrale des écrits de Descartes, et d'autre part de tirer des indications utiles pour une nouvelle édition critique.
L'édition que nous avons établie (6), parue en 1966 en même temps que la réédition du tome X des *Œuvres* de Descartes (7) repose essentiellement sur une nouvelle collation directe des deux sources H et A, avec la rectification de quelques attributions erronées et la récupération de variantes qui avaient échappé à Adam, sur la distinction entre les leons originales du manuscrit (H) et les interventions dues à la main de Leibniz, qui corrigeait les formes erronées ou qu'il jugeait telles ou encore essayait de remédier aux omissions et aux lacunes, sans recourir directement à une autre source (L) (Adam note rarement la distinction et n'identifie jamais les interventions comme étant de Leibniz), et sur l'exploitation, jamais faite jusqu'alors, de la version hollandaise de Glazemaker (N), qui d'ailleurs grâce à un examen comparatif avec H et A permet de remonter à l'existence d'un manuscrit différent de H et de celui sur lequel reposait l' *editio princeps*. (G. Crapulli)" (pp. XV-XVI)
(5) G. Crapulli, *Note all'edizione critica di Adam-Tannery delle 'Regulae ad directionem ingenij' di Descartes*, "Rivista critica di storia della filosofia", XIX (1964), I, pp. 54-61.
(6) R. Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, texte critique établi par Giovanni Crapulli avec la version hollandaise du XVIIème siècle ("Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idées", 12), La Haye 1966.

(7) Le texte et l'apparat critique restent les mêmes que ceux de l'édition de 1908. Dans un Appendice dû à M. Bernard Rochot et au R. P. Pierre Costabel sont rectifiées quelques notes de l'apparat critique et sont présentées quelques modifications au texte d'Adam sur la base de remarques d'Hamelin, Gouhier, Le Roy, Alquié.

4. Cahné, Pierre-Alain, ed. 1977. *Index du Discours de la Méthode de René Descartes*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo. Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, vol. 12.
"L'Equipe Descartes (1) poursuit, avec la publication de l'index lemmatisé du *Discours de la Méthode*, le travail d'indexation des œuvres de Descartes commencé avec la publication, dans la même collection, de l'index des *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. En raison des difficultés que l'on rencontre lors de l'établissement d'un tel index sur texte Français , une brève présentation s'impose.
1 - Le *Discours de la Méthode* a d'abord fait l'objet d'une indexation automatique des formes, sur les programmes du Centre de lexicologie politique de l'École Normale Supérieure de Saint-Cloud, Equipe de Recherches Associée au C.N.R.S. n° 56 (Pierre Lafon, ingénieur). Le texte retenu était celui publié par Adam et Tannery au tome 6 des *Œuvres* de Descartes (1ère édition 1902; édition revue par B. Rochot: 1973). Le traitement informatique a été fait à la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (Paris), sur un terminal relié à l'ordinateur IBM 370-168 du centre de calculs d'Orsay.
2 - A partir de cette liste alphabétique des formes, accompagnées du total de leurs occurrences et de leurs références, une lemmatisation manuelle a été pratiquée selon les principes suivants:
a. en raison des variations orthographiques constatées dans les textes du XVIIème siècle, il a été décidé de suivre, pour les lemmes, l'orthographe des entrées du *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue Français e* de Paul Robert. Les formes sont pour leur part reproduites dans l'orthographe de l'édition de référence (2).
b. les substantifs sont lemmatisés sous le masculin singulier; les verbes sous l'infinitif; les adjectifs sous le

masculin singulier; les comparatifs et superlatifs synthétiques doivent être recherchés sous l'adjectif au - positif; les pronoms personnels déclinés se trouvent sous le cas sujet.
c. nous avons lemmatisé certaines locutions conjonctives dont les éléments sont disjoints. Ainsi on trouvera Si... que, encore ... que ...
d. nous avons établi un glossaire de mots à prédicativité faible ou nulle, pour lesquels nous ne donnons que le nombre total d'occurrences. Ce glossaire a été établi en fonction de la spécificité du texte étudié: nous avons estimé qu'ÊTRE, pour trois de nos usages, méritait de figurer parmi les mots prédicatifs, donc avec toutes les références. De même les 864 occurrences du pronom personnel de la première personne du singulier ont été données (3).
e. les homographes sont distingués par un indice numérique; ils sont présentés dans l'ordre suivant: substantif, adjectif, adverbe, préposition, conjonction. Ainsi PRATIQUE 1 est le substantif, tandis que PRATIQUE 2 est l'adjectif; BIEN 1 est le substantif, BIEN 2 est l'adverbe, etc. Six homographes parmi les items fonctionnalisés, n'ont pas été désambiguïsés: en, le, ou, que, qui, un.
Cinq emplois d'ÊTRE ont été distingués:
ÊTRE 1: emploi nominal
ÊTRE 2: emploi absolu
ÊTRE 3: emploi locatif
ÊTRE 4: auxiliaire
ÊTRE 5: copule
ÊTRE 4 et ÊTRE 5 figurent dans le glossaire.
Pour SI, nous avons séparé l'emploi de SI, adverbe d'intensité, de celui de SI adverbe engagé dans une relation consécutive:
SI 1: conjonction de subordination introduisant l'interrogation indirecte
SI 2: adverbe d'intensité
SI 3: conjonction introduisant l'hypothèse Les formes sous le lemme sont rangées dans l'ordre alphabétique (4).
f. le texte indexé contient 22.688 formes regroupées en 1630 lemmes." (pp. IX-X)

(1) Equipe associée à l'Equipe de recherches 56 du C.N.R.S. (Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques), directeur: M. le professeur René Taton.
(2) Le lemme, créé par la nécessité de l'indexation, n'appartient pas au texte cartésien: notre solution s'impose donc et sur le plan pratique et sur le plan théorique.
(3) L'Equipe Descartes peut fournir, sur demande, les références pour toutes les occurrences des mots du glossaire.
(4) Les difficultés de la lemmatisation manuelle ont introduit quelques rares exceptions à ce principe.

5. Marion, Jean-Luc, Massonie, J.-Ph., Monat, P., and Ucciani, L., eds. 1996. *Index des Meditationes de prima Philosophia de R. Descartes*. Besanon: Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Franche-Comté.
Sommaire: J.-L. Marion: Préface IX-XIII; L. Ucciani: Avant-propos XV-XVII; Texte des Méditations 1-89; Index lemmatisé 91-211; Concordances partielles 213-252; J.-Ph. Massonie: Édition électronique 253-275.
"Puisque Descartes pense qu'il faut faire un index, nous en avons fait un - celui des *Meditationes*. Ce n'est évidemment pas le premier. Sans remonter à *Paraphrasis in Cartesii Meditationes* de Clauberg (Duisbourg, 1657), ni au *Lexicon rationale sive Thesaurus philosophicus* de Chauvin (Rotterdam, 1692), on doit reconnaître un rôle de pionnier à E. Gilson, dont l' *Index scolastico-cartésien* parut au début du siècle (Alcan, Paris, 1913, nouvelle édition J. Vrin, 1979): encore manuel, donc sélectif, il offre pourtant la première esquisse d'une indexation par concepts de l'œuvre entière de Descartes, correspondance comprise; il remplit aujourd'hui encore, en sus des comparaisons qu'il voulait permettre avec les scolastiques, une fonction d'indexation purement cartésienne. Mais les premiers indices automatiques (sauf la lemmatisation, manuelle ou contrôlée manuellement) n'apparurent que récemment. D'abord J.-R. Armogathe et J.-L. Marion, *Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii* de René Descartes, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo X, Corpus Cartesianum 1, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Rome, 1976, XXII-163 p., élaboré avec la collaboration du LASLA (Prof. L. Delatte,

Université de Liège) et du Prof. G. Crapulli (voir «Bulletin Cartésien VII», Archives de Philosophie, 1997/3, p. 15). Puis P.-A. Cahné, *Index du Discours de la Méthode de René Descartes*, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo XII, Corpus Cartesianum 2, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Rome, 1977, X-90 p., qui avait bénéficié du programme d'indexation automatique élaboré par P. Lafon (Centre de lexicologie politique, E.N.S. Saint-Cloud, E.R.A. - C.N.R.S. 56, voir «Bulletin Cartésien VIII», Archives de Philosophie, 1979/4, p.26-27). Dans les deux cas, aucune concordance ni liste de co-occurrences n'accompagnait l'index (1).
On doit à A. Robinet (CNRS/Université Libre de Bruxelles) d'avoir tenté à la fois de dépasser cette limitation et de s'appliquer aux *Meditationes* - ou plutôt, et c'est qui rendait encore insatisfaisant ce travail pourtant précieux, les *Méditations Métaphysiques*. En effet, il ne s'agissait dans *«Cogito 75». René Descartes. Méditations Métaphysiques* (Paris, J. Vrin, 1976) que de traiter la traduction du duc de Luynes, parue en 1647, voire sa révision par F. Alquié: malgré le sous-titre, le texte utilisé, à la lettre non cartésien, n'avait donc rien de «définitif» : il ne suivait d'ailleurs même pas la pagination d'AT IX-1 (nouvelle mise en page et numérotation continue des lignes par Méditation).
Néanmoins, à condition de remonter au latin de 1641/2 par AT VII et d'y contrôler le Français , ce lexique devenait très utile, augmenté qu'il était d'un choix d'une dizaine de concordances, de cooccurrences et de listes de fréquences.
Le traitement du texte latin des *Meditationes*, entrepris dès 1978 par l'Équipe Descartes (essentiellement par J.-R. Armogathe) et par d'autres centres devait longtemps buter sur des difficultés diverses (de lemmatisation surtout). Il vient enfin d'aboutir avec la récente *Concordance to Descartes' Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*. Prepared by Katzuzo Murakami, Meguru Sasaki and Tetsuichi Nishimura. Preface by Takefumi Tokoro, qui vient de paraître chez Olms/Weidmann, Hildesheim, 1995[2]. Seul l'usage montrera les mérites de ce magnifique outil de travail; on notera cependant ses deux options massives: il se borne au support papier, donc se ferme à l'exploration d'un

hyper-texte, il privilégie fortement la concordance sur l'index. Deviendront-elles ses deux limites? La tentative de l'Université de Besanon se caractérise au contraire (comme l'indique L. Ucciani) par 1) le privilège accordé au lexique, exhaustif et lemmatisé, suivant à la fois la pagination et les lignes d'AT VII et une numérotation continue de ces mêmes lignes afin de faciliter le repérage; 2) des co-occurrences, en nombre limité, mais où l'on a privilégié des termes à forte technicité métaphysique; 3) le complément du support-papier par une disquette (consultable avec HyperCard sur Macintosh), ouvrant ainsi des possibilités d'interrogation beaucoup plus nombreuses et souples; 4) l'économie de moyens (donc de coût), qui devrait permettre à un public individuel (et non pas seulement institutionnel) d'utiliser cet outil d'accès privilégié au texte de Descartes. Nous espérons que ces caractéristiques permettront à cet index - qu'il fallait donc faire - de tenir son rôle, parmi ceux qui sont déjà disponibles et surtout ceux, plus nombreux, qui viendront très vite s'y adjoindre." (pp. IX-XI)

(1) Des esquisses de résultats accompagnèrent ces publications: P. Costabel et P.-A. Cahné, «L'étude textuelle automatique appliquée aux œuvres de Descartes: état présent des travaux», «Bulletin Cartésien III», Archives de Philosophie, 1974/3, p. 453-8; J.-L. Marion, «A propos d'une sémantique de la méthode». Revue internationale de Philosophie, 103/5, 1975; P. Costabel et J.-R. Armogathe, «Premiers résultats de l'Équipe Descartes», I° Colloquio Internationale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. Atti a cura di Marta Fattori e Massimo Bianchi, Rome, 1976; Equipe Descartes, «Sémantèse d'ordre-ordo chez Descartes», II° Colloquio Internationale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. Atti a cura di Marta Fattori e Massimo Bianchi, Rome, 1979, p. 282 sq.

(2) Un utile travail l'avait d'ailleurs préparée: T. Tokoro, Les textes des «Meditationes», Cuo U.P., Tokyo, 1994, qui collationne non seulement les éditions de 1641, 1642 et les corrections de Descartes (AT V, 36-37), mais celles d'AT 1904, d'AT 1973, de G. Rodis-Lewis 1945 et d'Alquié 1967.

6. Robinet, André, ed. 1976. *Cogito 75. René Descartes. Méditations métaphysiques*. Paris: Vrin.
   Table des matières: André Robinet: Introduction I-VIII; Les Méditations métaphysiques par René Descartes 1; INDEX I: Index statistique 66; INDEX II: Index des occurrences 68; INDEX III: Index de fréquence décroissante des formes 115; INDEX IV: Index des coefficients de fréquence 117; INDEX V: Extraits des tables de concordance 121; INDEX VI: Tableaux de co-occurrences 133-140.
   "Après, MONADO 74, (*) voici une nouvelle opération informatique appliquée aux textes de philosophie: COGITO 75. Nos premiers balisages prenaient pour cible deux textes célèbres de Leibniz: les présents dépouillement concernent les *Méditations métaphysiques* de Descartes.
   Nous présentons plusieurs résultats portant sur l'examen lexicographique du texte Français . Nous avons suivi pour ce faire l'édition classique qu'a fait paraître Monsieur Alquié, car elle reconstitue le Français ancien en orthographe moderne. Cependant, nous avons maintenu les majuscules qui figurent dans la reproduction de l'original par Adam-Tannery (Soleil, Géométrie etc...), ainsi que certaines locution qui ne nous paraissaient pas devoir être modernisées (pour ce que...; ou bien des imparfaits mis à la place des passés simples originaux). Cette traduction date de 1647; elle fut l'œuvre du duc de Luynes et reut approbation et correction de la part de Descartes. La référence au texte latin de 1640 reste nécessaire si l'on approfondit les question soulevées dans ces deux écrits, dont les reliefs lexicographiques ne sont pas exactement les mêmes. La frappe de ce texte a été effectuée de manière à permettre la perforation ligne à ligne qui conduit nos index à diriger le consultant vers le repérage précis des termes recherchés." (pp. V-VI)
   (*) Anne Becco, *Du simple selon G. W. Leibniz. Discours de métaphysique et Monadologie. Étude comparative critique des propriétés de la substance appuyée sur l'opération informatique "Monado 74"*, préface par Yvon Belaval, Paris: Vrin, 1975.

7. Meschini, Franco Aurelio, ed. 1996. *Indice dei «Principia Philosophiae» di René Descartes. Indici lemmatizzati, frequenze, distribuzione dei lemmi*. Firenze: Olschki. Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, vol. 67.
   Indice: Introduzione XI; Lettere, sigle, simboli XIX; Index locorum et verborum del testo 1; Index locorum et verborum dei titoletti a margine 311; Index locorum et verborum dei *marginalia* 353; Distribuzione dei lemmi del testo 357; Distribuzione dei lemmi dei titoletti a margine 391; Lista di frequenza decrescente de lemmi del testo 405; Lista di frequenza decrescente dei lemmi dei titoletti a margine 429; Lista di frequenza in ordine alfabetico dei lemmi del testo 439; Lista di frequenza in ordine alfabetico dei lemmi dei titoletti margine 463.
8. ———. 2001. "Concordances lemmatisées du texte Français ." In *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle de René Descartes*, édité par Lojacono, Ettore, 66-288. Milano: Franco Angeli.
   Textes établis par Erik Jan Bos; lemmatisation et concordances du texte Français par Franco A. Meschini; index et concordances du texte latin et néerlandais par Francesco Saita.
   "Le texte Français lemmatisé est celui qu'Erik-Jan Bos a établi pour le présent volume. Cette édition a été la première à prendre en considération, dans la phase de *recensio*, la traduction néerlandaise (Amsterdam, 1684). Elle constitue un précieux instrument pour le spécialiste de Descartes, en tant qu'elle présente en plusieurs endroits une lecture nouvelle par rapport au texte édité par Charles Adam en 1906 (2)."
   (...)
   "Le présent travail est publié vingt-quatre ans après l'index du *Discours de la méthode* dans la collection *Corpus cartesianum* du *Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* (3); ayant parfois pris des options différentes, nous devons au lecteur quelques explications. Pour être, nous avons distingué seulement trois lemmes (verbe-copule, verbe auxiliaire et substantif). Nous n'avons pas retenu comme lemmes ni les locutions conjonctives ni les locutions prépositives, mais

nous les avons décomposées par éléments. À la différence des travaux du *Corpus cartesianum* qui se limitent à un *index verborum* lemmatisé, nous présentons ici les concordances lemmatisées.
Pour le reste, nous avons suivi les mêmes critères que ceux établis dans les volumes de J.R. Armogathe et J.L. Marion (pour les *Regulae*), P.A. Cahné (pour le *Discours*) et moi-même (pour les *Principia*) dans la même collection (4) l'entrée du lemme (ou lexème, qui est une abstraction par rapport au texte) a été prise dans un dictionnaire de référence, le *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue Français e* de Paul Robert (5), les formes étant celles du texte de Descartes (6). Nous donnons la totalité des occurrences pour chaque lemme, ainsi que les formes suivies de leur quantité (nombre d'occurrences) et de leur adresse (page et ligne)."
(...)
"Le texte indexé contient 4943 occurrences, le total des formes est de 1269, réparti entre 796 lemmes."
(...)
"L'intérêt lexical de la *Recherche* est multiple: à commencer par la métaphore du gué pour désigner la méthode, inconnue - me semble-t-il -du reste du corpus, qui peut être une réminiscence de Montaigne (11) et fait penser, plus directement, au *vadum* des *Septimae objectiones et responsiones*, expression comme «la consummation (sic!) des siècles», expression inusité dans le discours cartésien, qui semble provenir d'un emprunt ou d'une influence, et qui peut fournir un indice de lecture ou de citation, utile éventuellement pour aider à la datation. Autre *hapax* cartésien, enfin, *personne neutre*, qui rappelle le fréquent emploi de *neuter* chez le P. Bourdin. Dans le même contexte des *Objectiones septimae*, rappelons, dans la partie de notre texte traduit du Français en latin, le mot *battologia*.
A un lecteur attentif, le lexique de la *Recherche* donne l'impression d'avoir intégré des matériaux pour ainsi dire étrangers ou hétérogènes. Cela ne doit pas sembler étrange: nous retrouvons le même phénomène dans les *Responsiones*, dont le genre littéraire appelle la contagion

avec des termes utilisés par les objecteurs, ou bien encore les *Météores*, où la présence d' *hapax* cartésiens signale les emprunts opérés par Descartes.
La clé de la *Recherche*, et la *vexata quaestio* de sa datation, semblent devoir être cherchées en dehors de Descartes, mais non pas, comme l'ont proposé d'illustres interprètes, dans les circonstances ou rencontres biographiques de Descartes, mais peut-être dans les pages de ses interlocuteurs."
(2) Dans cette note je ne prends en considération que le texte Français , mais la *collatio* du texte latin et du texte néerlandais a donné des résultats tout aussi intéressants pour la partie parvenue uniquement dans la traduction, pour lesquels cfr. les notes de Bos en bas du texte latin, son introduction dans le présent volume et son article (*La première publication de* La Recherche de la Vérité en 1684), publié dans «Nouvelles de la République des Lettres », 1999, 1, pp. 13-26. Sur un point où je m'écarte de l'interprétation de Bos cfr. *Postilla cartesiana. Note di lessicologia e filologia cartesiana*, dans «Physis», 2000 (1), pp. 151-165: 160-163.
(3) P.A. Cahné, *Index du Discours de la Methode de René Descartes*, (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 12), Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1977.
(4) Cfr. F.A. Meschini, *Indice dei Principia Philosophiae di René Descartes*, (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 67), Firenze, Olschki, 1996.
(5) P. Robert, *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue Français e*, Paris, Le Robert, 1985[2].
(6) Cfr. S. Govaerts, J. Denooz, *La codification d'un texte latin sur cartes mécanographiques IBMI*, in «Revue de l'organisation internationale pour l'étude des langues anciennes par ordinateur», 1974, p. 7 et J.R. Armogathe, J.L. Marion, *Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de René Descartes*, (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 10), Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1976, p. XI.
(11) Montaigne, *Essais*, I, 50. Je suis débiteur à E. Lojacono de cette indication.

RESOURCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES

1. "Bulletin cartésien." 1972. *Archives de Philosophie*.
   Fondé en 1972 par l'équipe Descartes dirigée par Pierre Costable, est publié dans la revue *Archives de Philosophie* chaque année et vise à dresser une liste de tous les ouvrages et articles sur Descartes offrant une recension plus ou moins détaillée selon l'importance du texte enregistré.
   "Pour la période 1800-1960, les chercheurs disposent de la *Bibliographia Cartesiana* de Gregor Sebba (Nijhoff: La Haye 1964). Ce Bulletin annuel va tenter de remédier à l'absence de bibliographie courante des études sur Descartes. Nous ne pouvons envisager pour l'instant de répertorier systématiquement tous les philosophes « cartésiens»: notre but essentiel étant de rendre service, notre méthode sera plus souple que rigoureuse en dehors des études sur Descartes lui-même. Nous avons renoncé à couvrir la décennie 1960-1969, sans perdre pour autant l'espoir de publier une bibliographie de cette période, avec la collaboration de Gregor Sebba et Wolfgang Rod.
   A quelques exceptions près, nous n'avons retenu ici que des études et des textes publiés en 1970; nous avons suivi dans la présentation un ordre thématique, l'ordre alphabétique étant rétabli dans la Table publiée au 4e cahier des *Archives*." (*Archives de Philosophie* 35, 1972, 263)
2. Guibert, Albert-Jean. 1976. *Bibliographie des œuvres de René Descartes au XVIIe siècle*. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
   Table des matières: Introduction 9; 1637. Discours de la Méthode 11; 1637. Géométrie 23; 1641. Les Méditations Métaphysiques 39; 1643. Lettres de M^{r}. Descartes 11; 1644. Specimina Philosophiae 101; 1644. Principes de la Philosophie 115; 1648. Notae in programma 143; 1649. Les Passions de l'âme 147; 1649. La Naissance de la Paix 175; 1650. Abrégé de la Musique 179; 1656. Magni Cartesii manes 189; 1662. L'Homme 193; 1664. Le Monde 209; 1668. La Mécanique 215; 1701. Opuscula posthuma 219; 1861. Mathematica de solidorum elementis 223. Recueils collectifs factices. (Opera Philosophica) 227.

"Une Bibliographie est une création continue. A peine l'ouvrage est-il publié qu'apparaissent miraculeusement ici et là des éditions jusqu'alors inconnues que leurs propriétaires signalent à l'attention de l'auteur.
Ces éditions, enfouies dans les bibliothèques privées, peuvent ne jamais voir le jour. Mais, si par suite de circonstances familiales malheureuses, une vente publique vient disperser tout ou partie de ces livres, pourtant jalousement conservés depuis plusieurs générations, on voit alors surgir des éditions du plus haut intérêt.
Il en est de même lorsque, par bonheur, le possesseur est un bibliophile ou un collectionneur lettré. Il se fait alors un devoir de les signaler et souvent même de les communiquer. C'est exactement ce qui s'est passé pour les Bibliographies de J.B.P. Molière et de Jean Racine. Il en résulte qu'un travail de ce genre n'est presque jamais complet lorsqu'il est publié pour la première fois.
La Bibliographie de Descartes que nous proposons n'échappe pas à la règle. Néanmoins, nous nous sommes efforcé, avec les matériaux que nous possédons ou que nous avons pu consulter, de rassembler en un tout cohérent tous les travaux de Descartes publiés au XVIIe siècle.
(...)
Or, notre ambition, bien que limitée aux ouvrages publiés au XVIIe siècle, était de créer un ensemble ordonné et le plus complet possible de toutes les éditions tant Français es que latines éditées à cette époque.
Nous nous sommes gardé de céder à la tentation d'empiéter sur le domaine littéraire, scientifique ou philosophique, ce qui n'est pas le rôle d'un bibliographe. Ce domaine immense de synthèse et d'analyse a été admirablement étudié par Messieurs Adam et Tannery dans leur édition monumentale de 1910 rééditée tout récemment par les soins du C.N.R.S. et par d'éminents philosophes. Il ne nous appartenait pas d'y revenir sinon de nous y reporter pour certaines particularités.
La Bibliographie que nous proposons est en réalité la première des Œuvres de Descartes. Elle s'arrête au début du XVIIIe siècle car nous estimons que les publications

ultérieures, dont nous ne méconnaissons pas l'importance et l'efficacité, ne présentent pas aux yeux du bibliophile ou de l'homme de sciences ou de lettres le même intérêt que celles éditées du vivant de l'auteur ou de ses contemporains. Nous voulons donc croire et espérer que ce travail suscitera d'heureuses vocations et incitera les possesseurs d'éditions inconnues à nous révéler leur existence et à enrichir ainsi notre patrimoine bibliographique." (*Introduction*, pp. 9-10).

3. Armogathe, Jean-Robert, and Carraud, Vincent. 2003. *Bibliographie cartésienne (1960-1996)*. Lecce: Conte Editore.
   Avec la collaboration de Michaël Devaux et Massimiliano Savini.
   "Le présent ouvrage a pour objet de continuer la présentation bibliographique raisonnée des travaux sur Descartes entreprise par Gregor Sebba pour la période antérieure à 1960 (*Bibliographia cartesiana*, La Haye, 1964). Livres et articles ont été répertoriés et indexés par des mots clés permettant des enquêtes bibliographiques précises.
   (...)
   La Bibliographie cartésienne est divisée en trois sections: *Opera, Thesaurus* et *Corpus*.
   La première section: *Opera*
   Un souci d'utilité pour l'usager a conduit à retirer du *Corpus*, pour les présenter à part, les écrits de Descartes (éditions et traductions), qui constituent la première section (*Opera*). Nous avons éliminé de cette section les publications à usage scolaire et les morceaux choisis. Pour les traductions, nous avons essayé de présenter une sélection d'ouvrages, ne retenant que ceux qui sont tenus pour "classiques" dans les différentes langues. Par commodité, enfin, nous avons joint à cette section *Opera* quelques instruments bibliographiques et lexicologiques (qui ne figurent donc pas dans le *Corpus*). Un Index particulier renvoie aux œuvres publiées ou traduites dans cette section.
   La seconde section: *Thesaurus*

Une bibliographie de grande taille peut se révéler totalement inutilisable si des indications sur l'importance relative des items ne sont pas données au lecteur candide. Au fil des quatre mille références, nous avons retenu celles qui nous ont semblé devoir faire l'objet d'une mention particulière. Il ne s'agit pas d'un palmarès; le choix du *Thesaurus* réunit 323 items qu'il nous a semblé utile de signaler. Un critère décisif fut la réception et l'influence des ouvrages ou articles dans la communauté scientifique. Ces items se trouvent donc mentionnés à deux reprises: dans le *Thesaurus*, d'une part, mais aussi, à leur place alphabétique dans le *Corpus*. C'est cependant dans le *Corpus* seul que l'on trouvera, en outre, les discussions auxquelles les items retenus dans le *Thesaurus* ont donné lieu, ainsi que leurs traductions.

Les items retenus dans cette section ont fait l'objet d'un dépouillement plus poussé, avec l'établissement d'un plus grand nombre de mots clefs pour chaque titre analysé. Leur numéro est celui de leur ordre dans le *Corpus*, il est imprimé en chiffres gras dans l'index des mots clés, permettant ainsi de retrouver, pour une recherche rapide, les principales références.

La troisième section: *Corpus*

Cette section réunit par ordre alphabétique (d'auteurs et de titres pour les collectifs) plus de quatre mille items, ouvrages et articles, complétant la *Bibliographia cartesiana* de Gregor Sebba jusqu'à l'année 1996 incluse, la date du quatrième centenaire de la naissance de Descartes représentant un terminus *ad quem* symbolique et bibliographique pertinent. L'année 1996 semble être une date charnière (3): le nombre annuel de publications est resté extrêmement élevé dans les années suivantes.

(3) Une idée de l'importance numérique des publications qui ont suivi l'année 1996 peut être tirée de l'inventaire établi par Michaël Devaux, "Le quatrième centenaire de la naissance de Descartes: présentation des colloques et des communications", *Bulletin cartésien* XXVI, *Archives de philosophie*, 1998, 1, pp. 1-25.

Related pages

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René Descartes. Bibliographie Chronologique et Annotée (Deuxième Partie: 1641-1650)

Descartes: Bibliographies, Concordances, Dictionaries, Lexica

Bibliographie des études en Français sur les sources de la philosophie de Descartes

Bibliography of the studies in English on the sources of Descartes' philosophy

Theory and History of Ontology

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The Philosophy of Descartes. A List of Bibliographical Tools in English

INTRODUCTION

This page gives a list of the main biographies, dictionaries, lexica and bibliographies on Descartes in English; for the resources in French see:
Descartes: Biographies, Bibliographies, Dictionnaires, Lexiques

ANCIENT BIOGRAPHIES

1. Boxhorn, Marcus Zuerius. 1670. *A Summary or Compendium of the Life of the Most Famous Philosopher Renatus Descartes, written originally in Latin by Peter Borellus ... ; to which is also added an epitome of his life by Marcus Zurius Boxbornius* London: George Palmer. Translation of Pierre Borel, *Vitae Renati Cartesii, Summi philosophi compendium*, Paris, 1656.
   Epitome by Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn (1612-1653) pp. 58-107.
   "This Translation, or rather Collection, out of Peter Borellus, Physician to the French King; and Marcus Zurius Boxhornius Historiographer in the University of Leyden, presents you with the Life of the Famous Monsieur Descartes, giving you an account of his Parentage and Education, during his Minority, as well as the Course and

Method of his Study, in his Riper Years; together, with an exact Catalogue of all his Manuscripts, which were found at Stockholm in Sweden, after his Death; and the names of all his Books that have been Published, with the Places where they were Printed; as also the several Epitaphs that were bestowed upon him by his Contemporaries, after his Decease. If this Epitome receive a kind entertainment; 'tis very probable (when the Author, according to promise, exposed a larger Treatise to public View, concerning this Subject) that it may be also taught to speak English, for the satisfaction of those who want the advantage of the Latin, and are only skilled in our Mother-Tongue. This Compendious Discourse of the Life of so Eminent a Person, and great a Light in the Firmament of Learning, is all that we can furnish you with at present, till we meet with an opportunity to gratify you with a more Complete Relation in a larger Volume."(orthography slightly modernized)
Pierre Bayle dedied to Boxhorn the article "Zuerius Borxhonius" in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, fifth edition, Amsterdam, 1740, vol. IV, pp. 560-568.
Reprinted in Roger Ariew, Daniel Garber (eds.), *Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England*, Bristol: Thoemmes, 2002, vol. 3: *Biographies of Descartes*: Pierre Borel, *A Summary or Compendium, of the Life of the Most Famous Philosopher Renatus Descartes* (1670); Marcus Zurius Boxhorn, *Epitome of the Life of Descartes*, in: Pierre Borel, *A Summary or Compendium, of the Life of the Most Famous Philosopher Renatus Descartes* (1670); Adrien Baillet, *The Life of Monsieur Des Cartes* (1693).

2. Baillet, Adrien. 1693. *The life of Monsieur Des Cartes containing the history of his philosophy and works: as also the most remarkable things that befell him during the whole course of his life*. London: R. Simpson.
English translation of Adrien Baillet, *La vie de mr. Des-Cartes. Réduite en abregé*, Paris, 1692.
3. Sebba, Gregor. 1982. "Adrien Baillet and the Genesis of His *Vie de M. Des-Cartes*." In *Problems of Cartesianism*, edited by Lennon, Thomas M., Nicholas, John M. and Davis, John

W., 9-60. Kingston & Montreal: McGill's Queens University Press.

"The story of the *Vie de M. Des-Cartes* begins with the unexpected death of Descartes in Stockholm in 1650, when the French ambassador Chanut his friend and host, took possession of the philosopher's unpublished manuscripts. He later turned them over to Claude Clerselier who published three volumes of correspondence, with enough manuscript left over to make one more. At his death in 1684 he left his material to Abbé Legrand with a sum of money for publishing this volume. (94) Instead of doing so, Legrand planned a new complete edition of the works and correspondence of Descartes.

A Life was to be added presumably a relatively brief one since it was to be part of this edition, Adam has described Legrand's editorial work in detail, using the information given in Baillet's preface. Legrand made a thorough and quite successful search for missing correspondence and sought out persons who had known Descartes. There is no indication that his biographical work went beyond writing minutes of the information he collected. Legrand seems to have been an excellent, careful editor, but he could never come to an end.

He worked for twenty years, died in 1704, and still nothing had been published.

The biography would have shared the fate of Legrand's edition had it not been lifted out of its status as an introductory piece. The idea of making it an independent work cannot have come from Legrand, judging from his way of working. He had no sense for what was urgently needed at the time, or else he would have published Descartes's *inedita* without delay, following them up with the Life of Descartes. There is no doubt that Cartesians of all types kept abreast of Legrand's plans and work. Unlike Legrand they were not concerned with editorial problems. A new edition including material as yet unknown would be a philosophical event, but the event took its time and the need for action was pressing. Somehow Descartes needed to be disengaged from the theological entanglement he had so carefully

avoided in his own lifetime. When, where, and how the answer was found we do not know. But we can say what it was: the germ of an idea, embedded in a technicality. Detach the "Vie de Mr. Descartes" from the "Œuvres de Descartes" and make it a book in its own right, in the language and spirit of the *Discours de la méthode* not of the *Meditationes de prima philosophia*. Taking the biography out of the context of the "Œuvres" changed the concept and function of the proposed life of Descartes. The change made it necessary to find a swifter writer than Legrand." (pp. 48-49)
(...)
"Thanks to Baillet's hints, the pieces begin to fall into place. We know already from Frion that Baillet did the actual writing in "less than a year" before giving the manuscript to the printer at the end of February 1691; since it had to be submitted to the censor, actual writing would have begun between January and March 1690. He was able to complete the writing in such a short time thanks to his systematic way of putting "un peu d'ordre" into the material he had accumulated, so that the writing task consisted chiefly in producing a continuous narrative. The preparation of the material while waiting for information must have taken much longer than the writing itself." (p. 51)
"Perhaps it is not amiss to close with a word about the auteur *malgré lui*. Baillet preserved invaluable texts and information that would have been lost without him, but he preserved them in his own fashion. A thorough study of his style, his manner of translating and paraphrasing, and his scholarship is needed in attempting to reconstruct lost texts for which he is the only source. This requires following his development from the Jugemens to the Vie. As to his so-called hagiographic bias, we need to quote only one text. It stands in the second volume of the *Vie de Mr. Des-Cartes*, on p. 381. Speaking of Pascal, he says : "... au lieu de borner ses vues à la recherche de tout ce qui peut contribuer à la félicité temporelle de cette vie, comme avoit fait M. Descartes, il s'éleva ... jusqu'à celle des vérités de notre Religion, où M. Descartes ne s'était jamais jugé capable

d’atteindre.” It is as simple as that. One cannot rise to the “verities of our Religion” without putting the “temporal felicity of this life” down where it belongs. To the peasant scholar from Beauvais this was an indisputable fact, but he had enough discipline to make his confession of faith where nobody would look for it, instead of allowing his religious radicalism to distort his portrait of Descartes." (pp. 59-60)
(94) See Adam's summary in AT 1 XLII ff. and Baillet, *Vie de M. Des-Cartes*, I :XXII.
Adam's judgment of the value of Baillet's work is still the best we have (AT, I :XLV).
The mass of detail piled up by Baillet "sans faire grâce aux lecteurs de tant de menus faits" has become invaluable to the modem historian because of "ce souci minutieux du réel qui caracterise Baillet". This is a very different tone from that of Ménage, La Monnoye, and Boschet, but Baillet had learned meticulous scholarship in the hard school of the *Jugemens*. He now knew what to guard against.

MODERN BIOGRAPHIES

1. Haldane, Elizabeth Sanderson. 1905. *Descartes. His Life and Times*. London: J. Murray.
Reprint Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992.
"Any Life of Descartes is, of course, mainly dependent upon his very considerable correspondence, principally written and framed with a view to future publication.
Of Descartes' *Letters* as MM. Adam and Tannery tell us, the first important edition is that of Clerselier, in three volumes, published at Paris by Charles Angot in 1657-67. Clerselier had at his disposal Descartes' manuscripts, copies of many of his letters and notes, taken by him to Sweden and enumerated in a catalogue made just after his death. These had been given to Chanut, the French ambassador in Sweden, and Descartes' great friend, who contemplated publishing them. This task, however, he handed over to Clerselier, his brother-in-law, and likewise the author's

friend. The packet was duly dispatched to France, which, after many delays, it reached in 1653. It travelled by Rouen, and was entrusted to a vessel which made its way to Paris by river. Unluckily, near Paris, the boat was wrecked, and for three days the precious manuscripts remained submerged in water. Wonderful to relate, "by Divine permission," the papers were recovered some distance off, and were duly hung up in various rooms to dry; but since this was done by unintelligent servants, much confusion resulted, as can easily be imagined. (*) In endeavouring to rearrange the manuscripts, the greatest difficulty was experienced; and more especially was this so in reference to the *Letters*. The papers, all of which had not been used, were finally bequeathed by Clerselier, in 1684, to Legrand, who assisted Baillet in writing his *Life of Descartes*. Baillet and Legrand set about their work of writing the Life with the greatest vigour. Legrand, not content with handing over to Baillet Descartes' manuscripts and Clerselier's memoirs, made it his business, Baillet tells us, to go to see everyone in Paris from whom he might receive the slightest help.
He wrote to Brittany, Touraine, Languedoc, Holland, Sweden, and Germany, in order to interest his friends and relations in the project, and recovered certain communications from Regius of Utrecht, and the greater part of those from Descartes to the Abbé Picot, to Clerselier, to Tobie d'André; as also some from Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Chanut, etc. Baillet also acknowledges the help received from Descartes' nephews, M. de Kerleau and M. de Chavagne (both Descartes' brothers being dead), and also from his niece, M.lle Catherine Descartes. These provided family papers regarding the philosopher's ancestry and private life, while the sons of Clerselier and Chanut supplied all that they could of what was useful in their fathers' manuscripts. M. le Vasseur, son of Seigneur d'Etioles, the relative, friend, and host of Descartes while in Paris, supplied what material he could, as did many others whose names Baillet gratefully quotes in his Preface." (*Prefatory note,* pp. VIII-IX)
(...)

For a Life of Descartes, besides the Letters and the most interesting bit of autobiography in the " Method," the *Life* of Baillet is naturally the source from which all others have been derived, and its value is largely due to its simplicity and accuracy. Baillet tells us that he aimed at saying what he had to say simply, telling just what his subject thought, saw, and did without adornment, and this is exactly what he accomplished. He does not aspire to criticise, but tries to tell his tale with exactitude and fidelity, not indulging in over-much laudation nor concealing faults where present. Baillet has no false estimation of his own powers. He regrets deeply that Chanut, who knew Descartes so well, and who was, in his eyes, so well fitted for the work, did not see his way to undertake the writing of Descartes' life. Failing Chanut, Baillet would have liked Clerselier to undertake the task. Clerselier knew Descartes; he had the material and leisure necessary, besides the ability, but he did not do more than collect and preserve his writings. The Queen of Sweden, seeing- that these two refused, endeavoured to procure the services of Père Poisson of the Oratory, who had written on the " Method." Clerselier offered to assist him as far as material was concerned, but the plan fell through." (pp. X-XI)
(...)
"The only English life of Descartes of any importance is the excellent little book by Professor [John Pentland] Mahaffy, [*Descartes*] published as one of Blackwood's Philosophical Classics in 1880. Norman Smith's *Studies in Cartesianism*, 1903, is an acute criticism of his philosophy; and there is, of course, besides, the well-known article on *Cartesianism* in the Encyclopedia Britannica, by the Master of Balliol." (p. XI)
(*) *Vie de M. Descartes* par Adrien Baillet, 1691, vol. II., p. 428.

2. Shea, William R. 1991. *The Magic of Numbers and Motion. The Scientific Career of René Descartes*. Canton (MA): Science History Publications.
Contents: Preface IX-X; 1. The young man from Poitou 1; 2. The early physics 15; 3. The Mathematical Breakthrough 35;

4. The Quest for musical harmony 69; 5. Descartes and the Rosicrucian enlightenment 93; 6. The Search for method and Rules for Direction 121; 7. The Optical triumph (1625-1628) 149; 8. Metaphysical Meditations 165; 9. Unweaving the rainbow 191; 10. The Action of Light 227; 11. Matter and motion in a new world 251; 12. The Laws and rules of motion 279; 13. Publish or perish 317; Conclusion 341; Appendix: Chronology or Descartes' life 351; Bibliography 355; index 365-371.
"My goal has been to follow Descartes in his journey, and to provide a comprehensive, but by no means exhaustive, survey of his scientific career from his student days at the Jesuit College of La Flèche to his departure for Sweden where he had been summoned by Queen Christina. I have tried to follow Descartes' injunction to be clear (but not clear at all costs), and I am sanguine enough to hope that the reader will be sufficiently stimulated and intrigued by what he finds in this book to turn to Descartes' own works. I have kept my discussion of mathematics in Chapter Three as simple as possible, but anyone who wishes to skip this section at first reading has not only my sympathy, but the assurance that the gist is summarized in a few pages at the end. A chronology of the main events of Descartes' life will be found in the Appendix.
My work could not have been undertaken without the pioneering efforts of Gaston Milhaud (*Descartes Savant,* 1921), Paul Mouy (*Le Développement de la Physique Cartésienne*, 1934), and J. F. Scott, (*The Scientific Work of René Descartes*, 1952)." (pp. IX-X).
(...)
"We have seen how Descartes called upon God to vouchsafe the reliability of our knowledge of the external world. Likewise he appealed to the simplicity and immutability of God's action to justify his laws of nature. The Second Law, for instance, "only depends on God conserving each thing by his continuous action, hence at the very instant that he conserves it. It so happens that among motions, only straight motion is entirely simple and such that its nature is comprised in an instant." (25) I believe that it is in passages

such as these that we gain our best insight into Descartes' deeply entrenched belief in the basic unity of science, metaphysics, and natural theology. Whatever change is brought about in the world, it is caused by mechanical action, but this does not make it less marvelous. God implants simple and self-evident notions of matter and motion in the human mind at the very instant that he creates it. Likewise God produces and sustains the motion of bodies at each and every instant that they are moving. Without these God-given notions, we would be unable to perceive motion, and without God's direct intervention, there would be no motion to be perceived. The magic of numbers and motion is rooted in the transcendental rationality of the Ultimate Mind." (p. 349)
(25) *The World*, Chap. 7, p. 45.

3. Gaukroger, Stephen. 1995. *Descartes. An Intellectual Biography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents: Chronological Table XIV; Introduction 1; 1. 'A Learned and Eloquent Piety' 15; 2. An Education in Propriety, 1606-1618 38; 3. The Apprenticeship with Beeckman, 1618-1619 68; 4. The Search for Method , 1619-1625 104; 5. The Paris Years, 1625-1628 135; 6. A New Beginning, 1629-1630 187; 7. A New System of the World 1630-1633 226; 8. The Years of Consolidation , 1634-1640 293; 9. The Defence of Natural Philosophy , 1640-1644 354; 10. Melancholia and the Passions, 1643-1650 384; Notes 418; Biographical Sketches 471; Select Bibliography 481; Index 489-499.
"I have a vivid and happy memory of my first reading of Descartes, for it was with unbounded enthusiasm that I devoured the Discourse on Method, sitting in the shade of a tree in the Borghese Gardens in Rome in the summer of 1970, just before I started studying philosophy at university. But I cannot honestly say that my enthusiasm was fuelled by my subsequent undergraduate courses on Descartes, which simply followed the trade winds, in an obsessive but completely de-contextualized way, through the tired old questions of the cogito and the foundations for knowledge. So it was that my interest in the early seventeenth century

came to be stimulated by Galileo rather than Descartes, and it was to Galileo that I devoted my main attention while a research student at Cambridge in the mid-1970s. While there, however, Gerd Buchdahl and John Schuster revealed to me a different Descartes, a more authentic and vastly more engaging one, whom I only began to explore properly ten years later. It is this Descartes who is the subject of this book, and I warn readers—if 'warn' is the right word, as some may breathe a sigh of relief—that it is not the Descartes from whom philosophers have made such a good living for decades that they will find here. But I have not simply set out to write the history of science or cultural history. Descartes is, after all, the figure who stands at the beginning of modern philosophy, just as Plato stands at the beginning of ancient philosophy. While I shall argue that his philosophical achievements are much more intimately linked to his interest in what subsequently have been considered 'scientific' questions than is commonly realized, my aim is not thereby to take Descartes out of the realm of philosophy, but rather to throw light on how he did philosophy.

It is with some trepidation that I pursued this goal through the genre of intellectual biography, even though my own early interest in philosophy had been fired by Simone de Beauvoir's incomparable intellectual autobiography. People read intellectual biographies with different expectations, from the naïve attempt to understand, at a distance as it were, how a 'great mind' works, to attempts to model one's own thought and career on that of someone one admires. Perhaps the most famous example of modelling is Thomas Mann, who evidently tried to mirror in his own intellectual development the stages in Goethe's intellectual development, although I think there are very many less explicit cases, and that biography generally has played an important role in 'self-fashioning' since the nineteenth century. This makes it a rather delicate genre, both from the point of the view of the reader and from that of the writer. Self-fashioning is part of the rationale behind reading, and perhaps behind writing, intellectual biographies, but any

self-fashioning will have to be very indirect in the present case. While the thesis of Jacques Le Goff, that modernity did not begin and the Middle Ages did not effectively cease until the French and Industrial Revolutions, is stronger than anything I would wish to argue in this book, I have no doubt that the culture in which Descartes lived and worked is much more remote from our own than is commonly recognized. This has consequences for biography, because a biography explores the emotional life of its subject, and the more removed from our own culture our subject is, the deeper the problems about how we are to succeed in this exploration. I have tried to be more responsive than my predecessors to the difficulties that these issues raise, with the result that there is much greater concentration on the culture in which Descartes worked than one finds in earlier biographies. But I am also very conscious of the problems of over-contextualization, and I have tried to make sure that neither the subject of my biography, nor his contribution, slips out of focus." (*Preface,* pp. VII-VII)

4. Watson, Richard. 2002. *Cogito, Ergo Sum. The Life of René Descartes*. Boston: Godin.
"There are two main traditions of Descartes biography. In his *La Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes* (1691), Adrien Baillet started the French Catholic apologetic tradition, the goal of which is to establish that Descartes's life is worthy of the Great Metaphysician. It has been continued most recently by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis in her *Descartes: His Life and Thought* (1998). Baillet was recommended by the fact that he was undertaking a seventeen-volume *Lives of the Saints*. He demurred that he knew little about Descartes, but then he threw himself into the task with the zeal of a full-fledged member of the Saint Descartes Protection Society. The founder of this society (this joke probably goes back at least to Descartes's death in Stockholm in 1650) was the French ambassador to Sweden, Hector-Pierre Chanut, who refused to allow Descartes's remains to be buried in a Lutheran cemetery. Descartes's reputation was then managed for many years by Chanut's brother-in-law, Claude Clerselier.

Clerselier edited Descartes's letters, deleting passages that conflict with church doctrine and adding passages of his own composition where they were most needed to illustrate the faith proper to a pious Catholic philosopher. This can be checked, however, only against a few letters of which there are independent copies, for none of the original manuscripts, papers, notes, and letters that Clerselier and Baillet had are extant today. They were given to Jean-Baptist Legrand, and after he died, to his mother in 1706. Despite many searches, that is the last we ever hear of them.
The second main line of Descartes biography has most recently been continued by Stephen Gaukroger in his *Descartes: An Intellectual biography* (1995). In this tradition, the stress is on the analysis of Descartes's works to show him as the Great Scientist who founded not only Modern Philosophy but also Modern Science.
The present work belongs to neither the religious nor the scientific apologetic tradition. Given how much paper has been lost since the seventeenth century, I cannot look at original sources for much of the story I tell, but must depend on editors and chroniclers such as Clerselier and Baillet, who are not fully trustworthy. The result is a skeptical biography, as full of doubt about tradition and authority as was Descartes himself.
Here. then, is the life of René Descartes. It is the first biography of Descartes since 1920 that is based on substantial new research, and the only one ever written for general readers. It is the story of the man, not of the monument." (pp. 22-23)

5. Clarke, Desmond M. 2006. *Descartes. A Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface and Acknowledgments VII; Note on Texts and References IX; Descartes Family Tree X; Introduction 1; 1. A Lawyer's Education 6; 2. In Search of a Career (1616-1622) 37; 3. Magic, Mathematics, and Mechanics: Paris, 1622-1628 67; 4. A Fabulous World (1629-1633) 97; 5. The Scientific *Essays* and the *Discourse on Method* (1633-1637) 126; 6. Retreat and Defence (1637-1639) 156; 7. Metaphysics in a Hornet's Nest (1639-1642) 184; 8. The French Liar's

Monkey and the Utrecht Crisis 218; 9. Descartes and Princess Elizabeth 248; 10. *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644) 276; 11. The Quarrel and Final Rift with Regius 307; 12. Once More into Battle: The Leiden Theologians (1647) 337; 13. Thoughts of Retirement 366; 14. Death in Sweden 394; Appendix 1: Descartes' Principal Works 419; Appendix 2: Places Where Descartes Lived 421; Notes 425; Bibliography 489; Index 503-507.

"Descartes died in Sweden in 1650, a few weeks before his fifty-fourth birthday. He had spent most of his adult life in relative seclusion in what is now the Netherlands, while the Thirty Years' War waxed and waned around him. By 1667, when some French Cartesians arranged for the return of his remains to Paris, they had begun to publicize his works, to develop a characteristically Cartesian philosophy, and to be identified by critics as a 'sect'. These early supporters included many philosophers who, apart from Nicolas Malebranche, are probably remembered today only as marginal figures in the history of Western thought. The name of Descartes, however, remains readily recognizable. He has entered the canon of Western philosophy so securely that that there is no longer any dispute about his significance.

Why was he important? Hardly for the phrase by which he is popularly remembered today, both by students of philosophy and by other readers: ' *I think, therefore I am*'. This was not an original insight on his part, and it had a relatively minor role in his work. During the past century, Descartes has often been read as a metaphysician or, perhaps as frequently, as a philosopher who took seriously the arguments of sceptics. Alternatively, he is classified as a philosopher of subjectivity, as someone who outlined an internal map of the human mind and defended the irreducibility of conscious experiences. Finally, there are those, especially feminist critics, who think of Descartes as having exaggerated the significance and capacity of reason at the expense of the emotional life. For them, Descartes was a mere 'rationalist'.

Descartes' life reveals a much more complex and interesting character than any of these labels suggests. As an intellectual in the early seventeenth century, he might have directed his energies toward political philosophy (as Hobbes did), to theological disputes (as Pascal did), or to the renewal of humanistic and classical learning for which Erasmus had earlier provided an outstanding model. Alternatively, he might have channeled his genius exclusively into mathematics (as his contemporaries Fermat and Roberval did); had he done so, he would surely have exceeded by far the novelty and ambition of their achievements. Although all these interests featured to some extent in his life, Descartes' primary focus was elsewhere. He is best characterized as a philosopher of the Scientific Revolution." (pp. 1-2)

6. Nadler, Steven. 2013. *The Philosopher, the Priest, and the Painter: A Portrait of Descartes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Contents: Illustrations IX; Acknowledgments XIII; 1. Prologue: A Tale of Two Paintings 1; 2. The Philosopher [René Descartes] 8; 3. The Priest [Augustijn Alsten Bloemaert, (1585-1659)] 36; 4. The Painter [Frans Hals, (1580-1666)] 55; 5. "Once in a Lifetime" 87; 6. A New Philosophy 111; 7. God in Haarlem 143; 8. The Portrait 174; Notes 199; Bibliography 219; Index 227-230.
   "Exploring such art historical and biographical questions about a painting [*] might seem an odd way to frame a book about a philosopher. But Hals's image of Descartes, now the image of Descartes (primarily by way of the Louvre copy), has become quite familiar. Indeed, it has become too familiar. While Descartes's famous phrase "I think, therefore I am" has been transformed by overuse, parody, and misunderstanding into a kind of all purpose slogan easily adapted for a variety of occasions, philosophical and otherwise, Hals's depiction of the philosopher has been devalued almost to the point of anonymity by seemingly endless reproduction and caricature in a wide variety of media: innumerable book covers, works of fine and

decorative art, commercial and editorial illustrations, even lowbrow entertainment.

One of the goals of this book is to restore to Hals's portrait of Descartes some of its originality and luster by reconstructing the biographical and historical contexts of its production. At the same time, such a project is a prime opportunity for presenting Descartes and his philosophy to a broad audience. The true story behind Hals's painting, as familiar as that image has become, can well serve as the scaffolding for an accessible study of Descartes himself. Just as "I think, therefore I am" represents only the starting point of a grand philosophical project that became the dominant intellectual paradigm of the seventeenth century, Hals's small painting can provide entrée to the life and mind of the ambitious thinker it so effectively portrays.

This is not a biography in the conventional sense. Most of Descartes's life, including much that happened during the decade on which this book is focused, lies outside the scope of its story. Nor is this book intended to be another detailed analytic study of Descartes's philosophy. There are many scholarly monographs exploring Descartes's work in epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and mathematics; there are also a number of fine general introductions to his thought, as well as several recent biographies. As valuable as such academic studies are, I would rather take my lead from Hals. The Haarlem artist has given us a small, intimate portrait of a great thinker. I want to do the same: a presentation of Descartes and his ideas in the form of a small, intimate portrait, a rendering of those years that culminated in some groundbreaking philosophical doctrines and a modest but intriguing work of art.

Descartes belongs as much to the intellectual culture of the Dutch Golden Age as he does to the grand history of Western philosophy whose development he so strongly influenced. It thus seems perfectly appropriate, if a bit unorthodox, to use a seventeenth-century Dutch painting as a portal into his world." (pp. 6-7)

[*] The portrait of Descartes made by Frans Hals in 1649.

DICTIONARIES, LEXICA AND CONCORDANCES

1. Cottingham, John. 1993. *A Descartes Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Contents: Preface VII; Note on the use of this book 1; Abbreviations 3; Introduction: Descartes' Life and Works 5; DICTIONARY ENTRIES A-Z 11; Bibliography 170; Index 175-187.
   "The secondary literature on Descartes is gigantic. Since almost all the topics covered in the entries that follow have been the subject of scores of learned articles, if not entire books, any attempt to aim for completeness in discussing the issues involved would be self-defeating. In what follows I have tried to trace out the main outlines of Descartes' thought, attempting as far as possible to let the Cartesian texts speak for themselves (though specialist readers will be well aware of the compression and selectivity that the demands of concision have inevitably required). Although Descartes is an astonishingly lucid writer, that very lucidity can be a pitfall, since terms whose sense at first appears transparent may in fact carry connotations or presuppositions whose import is far from straightforward; in such cases I have tried to show something of the intellectual background which shaped Descartes' ideas, despite his claim to be 'starting afresh'. Apart from citations from such early sources, and some writings from contemporaries or near contemporaries of Descartes, individual entries have been kept clear of references to the works of commentators and critics; a selection of some of the most important of these secondary works will be found in the Bibliography." (p. 1)
2. Ariew, Roger, Des Chene, Dennis, Jesseph, Douglas M., Schmaltz, Tad M., and Verbeek, Theo. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy*. Lanham: Scarecow Press.

Reprinted in 2010 with the title: *The A to Z of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy*.
Contents: Jon Woronoff: Editor's Foreword IX; Preface XI; Chronology XIII; Introduction 1; THE DICTIONARY 13; Bibliography: Introduction 261; Texts and Editions: Descartes 265; Texts and Editions: Other Writers 267; Works on Descartes 281; Works on Cartesians and Other 17th-Century Figures 293; About the Authors 303.
"This *Historical Dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy*, as befits a dictionary, includes many entries on Descartes's writings, concepts, and findings. Since it is historical, there are other entries on those who supported him, those who criticized him, those who corrected him, and those who together formed one of the major movements in philosophy: Cartesianism. To better understand the period, there is a brief chronology, and to see how Descartes and Cartesianism fit into the general picture, there is a helpful introduction and a biography. Since everything cannot be summed up in one volume, there is an ample bibliography that directs readers to numerous other sources on issues of particular interest." (p. IX)

3. Smith, Kurt, ed. 2015. *The Descartes Dictionary*. London: Bloomsbury.
Contents: Acknowledgments VI; About this dictionary VII; Introduction 1; A sketch of Descartes's life 1; A sketch of Descartes's philosophical system 5; Descartes in the classroom 24; Terms and names 29; Bibliography 123-131.
"This dictionary has been geared specifically for undergraduate students. The terms and philosophical concepts included are those that have typically proven difficult for students coming to Descartes's writings for the first time.
Descartes's philosophical career spanned almost his entire adult life. He was a living, breathing human being, warts and all. We need to remind ourselves of this because human beings, real human beings, change and grow. This includes what they think about, how they think about those things, and so on. It would be unreasonable, then, when examining

the entire span of Descartes's philosophical writings to expect to find a single, unified, perfectly consistent view. We must allow for the likelihood of a change in mind. It would be equally unreasonable to expect to find just one set of terms whose meanings remained the same over that same span of work. An important aim of this dictionary is to track these sorts of changes if and when they occur.

(...)

When provoked by critics, Descartes (on occasion) admits that he was using certain philosophical terms differently from how they were used in the Schools. Johannes Caterus (1590–1657), for example, author of the First Set of Objections of the *Meditations*, expressed concerns over what he took to be Descartes's odd use of certain terms. He asks Descartes, for instance, to explain what he had meant by the terms "idea," "objective being," and "nothing." Later in the First Set of Objections, he expresses concern over Descartes's use of "real distinction." Caterus complains that Descartes uses these terms very differently from the way the Schools used them.

Descartes's replies to such critics are not always that illuminating, for he will sometimes simply shrug off the concern, or simply admit that he is using a term differently than it had been used by others.

Even so, he usually says enough in other places that allow us to figure out what he meant by the term in question. In light of this, where appropriate, the then-standard usage of a term will be noted in an entry, so as to help the reader better understand the import of Descartes's change in its usage.

Since Descartes wrote almost exclusively in Latin and in French (though he wrote some letters in Dutch), it is sometimes helpful to the English reader to see the actual words he used. To this end, when helpful, this dictionary will include the Latin and French terms that Descartes actually used. They will be provided directly following the term to be defined, and in many cases they will appear in the entry itself. Concerning "definitions," it should be noted that it is rare that a one-liner will suffice. In many cases, if not most, determining what a term means requires some

discussion of other texts. Even in cases where Descartes provides an actual definition, simply repeating it will not be enough to understand the full philosophical import of the term defined. So, the reader should think of each entry not so much as a definition proper, but as a discussion of the term in question.

The following entries are based entirely on Descartes's writings—on the actual texts. Even so, the entries have been informed (and improved!) by looking to the secondary literature. It is worth noting that a careful study of the secondary literature reveals that there is, not surprisingly, no ultimate consensus on Descartes's views. Rather, one finds many interesting interpretations in scholarly competition with one another. With this in mind, and in trying to provide the reader with some sense of the array of interpretations available, the relevant secondary literature has been incorporated into certain entries, these influences provided at the end of each entry. But even here, these references are not definitive. They are only suggestions about where one might begin the next step in one's research." (pp. VII-IX)

4. Nolan, Lawrence, ed. 2016. *The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Contents: List of Figures XIV; List of Contributors XVII; Abbreviations XXIII; Introduction and Notes on How to Use This Work XXV; Acknowledgments XXIX; Chronology XXXI; Descartes' Life and Works XXXV; Annotated Bibliography LXVII-LXVIII; Entries 1-767; Index 769-778.
   "The *Cambridge Descartes Lexicon* is more like an encyclopedia or a compendium than a traditional dictionary, both in its scope and in its content. Many of the entries are fairly lengthy, especially those devoted to important subject terms such as "Cogito Ergo Sum," "Free Will," "God," "Human Being," "Idea," "Law of Nature," and "Representation." Most of the subject entries are also "scholarly" in the sense that they introduce readers to debates in the secondary literature. The authors of these entries sometimes present these debates without defending their own views, but in many cases they take an interpretive

stand. Authors of overlapping entries were encouraged to stake out opposing positions (see, e.g., “Body,” “Individuation,” and “Substance”). The result is that by reading just a few pages, readers can familiarize themselves with almost any given scholarly dispute and get a sense of the arguments and textual evidence for various interpretations.
(...)
In addition to the 149 subject entries – which include articles on Descartes’ individual works such as the *Discourse on Method* and the *Principles of Philosophy* – there are 107 intellectual biographies of various figures, including official objectors to the *Meditations* such as Arnauld, Gassendi, and Hobbes; notable contemporaries and immediate successors such as Leibniz, Locke, Newton, and Spinoza; medieval and Scholastic predecessors such as Augustine, Aquinas, Eustachius, Scotus, and Suárez; important correspondents such as Princess Elisabeth, Constantijn Huygens, and Mersenne; and followers such as Desgabets and Régis. The intellectual biographies briefly sketch each figure’s life and accomplishments and then discuss the relation of that person’s thought to Descartes’. They also trace Descartes’ influences, record the reception of his ideas by critics, and discuss the ways in which his acolytes developed or adapted his views. All of the entries are written in a lucid style and thus accessible to a wide audience, including philosophers generally, those working in related disciplines, and students. Written by the largest and most distinguished team of Cartesian scholars ever assembled for a collaborative research project (ninety-one contributors from ten countries), the *Cambridge Descartes Lexicon* aspires to serve as the definitive and most comprehensive reference source on Descartes and Cartesianism." (pp. XXV-XXVI)

5. Murakami, Katsuzo, Sasaki, Meguro, and Tetsuichi, Nishimura., eds. 1995. *Concordance to Descartes’ Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*. Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann.
Preface by Takefumi Tokoro.

"The present volume is a Concordance-Index to Descartes' *Meditationes* (*Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, in Volume VII of the *Œuvres de Descartes*, published by Charles Adam & Paul Tannery), accompanied by a brief grammatical analysis of its text.

This Concordance-Index, for the main body of its text, relies basically on the standard edition of Descartes' works, the one just cited above (hereafter abbreviated as AT). Assisted by First Computer, Tokyo (Yoshiaki YOSHIDA), we first translated it into machine-readable form, and then, using the OCP (Oxford Concordance Program) in operation at the Computer Centre, Tokyo University, made various attempts to obtain a series of outputs. This enabled us to base our further treatment of the text on a version which, while on the whole remaining that of the AT edition, is superior to it in a number of respects. The strategy we adopted might be in need of some explication.

It must be emphasized in the first place that conformity to the AT text does not necessarily mean conformity to the work of Descartes himself. As is well known, a simple comparison of the AT text with several editions of the *Meditationes* published in the seventeenth century suffices for illustrating many points where the former departs from the latter. This is particularly noticeable as regards indentation and punctuation. (The AT creates many new paragraphs of its own and has a tendency to cut Descartes' long sentences into a number of shorter sentences.) And, of course, differences in indentation and punctuation result in differences in the use of capital letters. Furthermore, the use of diacritics even within the AT text falls short of being consequent in itself (for instance, no rule seems to govern the distinction of *multo* and *multò*, both used as adverbs).

In the second place, however, we did not consider that these facts should prevent us from choosing the AT text as the basis of our project. On the contrary, in the absence of a rigorous critical edition of the *Meditationes*, upon a thoroughly exhaustive comparison of its First and Second editions, the AT text rightly remains the standard reference for every serious student of Descartes and no other choice

could be reasonably conceived. It is thus hoped that the present Concordance-Index will prove itself to be an indispensable tool for the preparation of a future revised edition of the *Meditationes*. These are the considerations behind our strategy.

Almost every inflectional word, as well as every indeclinable word judged to be of some interest to students of Descartes, are presented in context. Indeclinable words judged otherwise are presented in the word index format, i. e., without their contexts. Thus, in refusing to omit any word-forms actually occurring in *Meditationes*, we hope that the present volume will be useful to students not only of philosophy but also of language. Each word is accompanied by a brief grammatical comment, placed at the context headings of its inflectional variants. It is noted through a system of abbreviation and following an order of rank according to which these variants are arranged. The system of abbreviation and the rules governing the order of rank will be stated in the *Explanatory Notes*.

In the actual process of grammatical analysis, our first concern was to be as rigorous and precise as possible, to distinguish, for instance, the first person singular form of the future indicative from that of the present subjunctive, or the nominative case from the accusative case even when, for some verbs, nouns and adjectives, they happen morphologically to be the same. But after having kept unwaveringly to this principle, we finally decided to temper this rigour in the style of exposition, lest the inevitable subtleties it sometimes leads to should hinder, rather than help the reader, from having easy and natural access to our work. Thus, regarding nouns, adjectives and relatives, we give no indication to the case in which they are put in a given context, retaining the distinction only of number for nouns, and only of gender for adjectives and relatives. The distinction of degree is noted for adverbs only. With verbs, we had to be even more sparing of grammatical distinctions. For each verb entered as a lemma (except for SVM - see below), all of its occurrences are arranged in the simple

order of their appearances within the text of *Meditationes*." (pp. I-II)

6. Janowski, Zbigniew. 2004. *Augustinian Cartesian Index. Texts and Commentary*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press. Expanded English translation of: *Index Augustino-Cartésien. Textes et Commentaire*.
   Augmented Augustinian citations, and added indices and commentaries for Saint Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Francis Bacon, and Montaigne.
   "The present work was intended as a literal translation from the French original. I however, as I was working on it, I realized the considerable impact the Works of Francis Bacon have had on the formation of Cartesian philosophy. Although *The Augustinian-Cartesian Index* is, as the title suggests, devoted to Augustine's influence on Descartes, it is at the same time a work that is primarily concerned with the study of the sources of Descartes's philosophy. The inclusion of an appendix on Bacon is only consistent with the character of such a work. (In Appendix 4, I have included most of the passages identified by André Laland in his seminal article, "Sur quelques textes de Bacon et de Descartes," in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1911 [19, pp. 296 - 311]. These are marked as XI-XVI.) Likewise, the inclusion of an appendix on Montaigne seemed to me justified. In contradistinction to St. Augustine or Bacon, Montaigne's influence on Descartes has been recognized for a long time. A number of passages have been identified by Cartesian scholars in the past. However, they are dispersed through learned books and journals, and have never been collet led in a handy form for comparative purposes.
   While working on *The Augustinian-Cartesian Index*, I was finishing my *Cartesian Theodicy: Descartes' Quest for Certitude*, (*) in which I present an Augustinian reading of Descartes's Meditations. Although the topic and scope of the two works are different, I have included a few fragments from *The Cartesian Theodicy* in my commentary to the *Index*." (p. XI).
   (*) Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000.

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   PART ONE. INTRODUCTION TO DESCARTES STUDIES [1-562] 1; PART TWO. ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 1800-1960 [1001-3612] 149; PART THREE. INDICES 419; Systematic Index 421; Analytical Index 434; Abbreviations 502-510.
   "This book offers a new type of working tool for Cartesian studies. It presents the literature of the last 160 years in alphabetical order (Part Two), combined with a systematic analytical survey (Part One) and a detailed topical index to the whole (Part Three). This organization makes it possible to turn bibliography from a repository of references into a workshop of research. The systematic survey of Part One and the topical index of Part Three, together, offer a *mise au point* of Descartes studies over their full historical and topical range.
   The results have often been surprising and illuminating to the author, and if his experience is any guide, the reader, too, will begin to wonder about certain seemingly well-settled points, or marvel at the Protean shapes which our elusive philosopher assumes when mighty commentators force him to reveal his true nature.
   (...)
   Part I (*Introduction to Descartes Studies*) divides the field into eleven broad areas.
   It offers critical notices and references to the bulk of significant contributions, covering as much as one-fifth of the whole literature. Other useful items which could not be incorporated in Part I for technical or other reasons will be found annotated in Part II; they are of course fully indexed. Each main title in Part I is annotated; in addition I have

listed all reviews I could locate, discussions in books and articles as well as book reviews proper; condensed but detailed tables of content indicate the scope of works that cover a great variety of topics. If I could rewrite Part I in the light of the understanding I gained by making the detailed topical index, selection and emphasis as well as my evaluations of some contributions would be different. But the changes would not be decisive. Part I would still include every undoubtedly indispensable work, and most of the works I did select as being exceptionally useful. I would still add important older works of no great current value because they give the necessary historical perspective to the picture of Descartes scholarship. And I would still emphasize contributions neglected because they appeared where the Descartes scholar would hardly look for them, because they were written in a minor language, or because they just had bad luck. Nor would I tone down the language of my notices: I do not think that grey is the only color suitable for painting the Cartesian rainbow.

As to my critical evaluations, they are no better than my judgment: *caveat emptor*. The user will form his own better judgment anyway, and to him the literature will look different, if only because there will be even more of it: "majoremque habemus rerum experientiam," as Descartes said when he was a very young man.

Part II (*Alphabetical Bibliography*) is a comprehensive listing of all the literature on Descartes from 1800 to 1960 which I could locate, including the material contained in Part I. The total is close to 3000. I doubt that anything of major significance has been overlooked, but complete coverage cannot be claimed; besides, the limits of this type of compilation cannot be precisely drawn.

Part III contains the indices that serve as key to the material presented in Part I and II. The Systematic Index gives a synopsis of the Analytical Index and draws attention to useful entries that might be overlooked. The Analytical Index is quite detailed. Every topic that appears in a title, notice, or table of contents (but not under reviews) has been indexed, with extremely few exceptions (*minima non curat*

praetor). In addition, many books and articles of importance have been indexed from the original, including major works by Alquié, Bouillier, Gilson, Gouhier, Gueroult, Norman Kemp Smith, Thijssen-Schoute and others." (pp. (IX-X)

2. Chappell, Vere, and Doney, Willis, eds. 1987. *Twenty-Five Years of Descartes Scholarship, 1960-1984. A Bibliography*. New York: Garland.
   Contents: Introduction VI; Sources XI; Abbreviations XIII; Twenty-Five Years of Descartes Scholarship; Appendix: Editions and Translations of Descartes's Own Writings 163; Index 175-183.
   "Scholarly interest in the work of René Descartes has burgeoned in the last twenty-five years. Much of the resulting literature has been produced by philosophers, who have approached Descartes not only as historians concerned to understand and interpret the Cartesian texts, but also as metaphysicians and epistemologists preoccupied with the same problems that confronted Descartes. But Descartes was not just a philosopher in the restricted twentieth-century sense of the word. He also made important contributions to the sciences—mathematics, physics, and biology. And his writings have influenced dramatists, poets, and novelists. Thus Cartesian studies have been pursued by recent historians of science and literary scholars as well as by philosophers.
   Our aim in this bibliography has been to document the entire scholarly literature on Descartes, from 1960 through 1984, in most of the languages in which it has been produced and in all of the fields in which Descartes is currently a subject of interest. We took 1960 as our starting point because that is the last year covered by Gregor Sebba in his monumental *Bibliographia Cartesiana*. Our reason for stopping with 1984 is simply that we had collected enough items by then to fill a sizeable volume.
   The items we have included are written in Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. We have listed a few items in other languages in cases where a published translation into one of

the above-mentioned languages exists. In the course of our investigations, we found references to a number of works on Descartes in Polish, Russian, and Japanese; to a few in other Slavic languages; and to one or two each in Hungarian, Romanian, Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have also been told of some recent studies in Chinese. Since we lacked the resources to verify these references, however, we have left them out of our list." (p. VI)
(...)
"It is interesting to note that, during our period, more items of Cartesian scholarship were published in English than in any other language. Of the 2,502 entries in our main list, 1,141 or 46% are in English. The next most prevalent language is French, with 747 entries (29%). Then come German, Italian, and Spanish, with 215, 214, and 116 (9%, 9%, and 4%), respectively.
The work of Descartes had a strong impact on the philosophers, scientists, and writers who succeeded him. A good deal of Cartesian scholarship deals with these later "Cartesians" as well as, or instead of, with Descartes himself. It is impossible to draw a clear line between studies which are primarily devoted to Descartes himself and those in which the primary emphasis is on some other Cartesian thinker or thinkers. But we have sought to include everything that might reasonably be thought to belong in the former category; and we have deliberately excluded some items that we judged to fall in the latter. We have not in any case made a systematic survey of works in which Cartesian writers other than Descartes himself are the main object of concern." (p. VII)

3. Van Otegem, Matthijs. 2002. *A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637-1704)*. Utrecht: Zeno institut for Philosophy.
Two volumes.
"With this thesis a complete bibliography has become available of all works of Descartes published in the seventeenth century, regardless the country or the language the book was published in. Most of the texts are not preserved in manuscript so there was a strong need of a

bibliography of the printed works. Half of the seventeenth-century editions of Descartes were published in the Netherlands. Descartes spent most of his philosophical career in the Low Countries and in this period Dutch printers controlled the larger part of the European book trade. Naturally, many of Descartes' works were published in France as well, but also editions were printed in England, Italy and Germany.
In this bibliography not only editions are described as such but also features of individual copies are recorded. By making detailed descriptions of the copies textual differences are discovered in the texts preserved, which is of interest to the study of Descartes' philosophy. Van Otegem not only visited Dutch libraries, but also libraries in England, France, Germany and Italy. Each text of Descartes' published separately is described in its own chapter, in which all editions are listed and their mutual relationships are determined. Each chapter starts with an introduction dealing with the historical context.
The results of this research are threefold. Firstly, the bibliography offers a complete survey of all editions of Descartes published in the seventeenth century. 15 previously unknown editions were found; 14 published in Latin and 1 in French. Secondly, the historical context is stressed in which all editions came about. New facts are unveiled about the involvement of Descartes and others in the printing of his works and about Descartes efforts to stimulate the reception of his works by distributing presentation copies. Finally, many variants are found between the collated copies, not only offering insight in the printing practices in the seventeenth century but also providing new leads for the study of the texts themselves. It has become clear that new scholarly editions are needed of some of Descartes' works." (From the Summary of the dissertation)

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INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

Après une section introductive, cette bibliographie est divisée en deux parties: la première suit la chronologie des œuvres de Descartes, la deuxième un ordre thématique :

1. Études d'ensemble sur la philosophie de Descartes ;

Première partie :

1. 1616-1619: Premiers écrits : *Licence end Droit*, *Compendium musicae*, *Extraits de Baillet* ;
2. 1620-1628: *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* : La recherche de la *mathesis universalis* ;
3. 1629-1636: *Le Monde*, *L'Homme* et autres écrits biologiques, *La Recherche de la Vérité* ;
4. 1637: *Discours de la méthode* ; le *cogito* ;
5. 1637-1639: *Essais de cette méthode* et autres écrits scientifiques ;
6. 1640-1643: *Meditationes de prima philosophia* ;
7. 1644-1648: *Principia philosophiae* et écrits polémiques ;
8. 1649-1650: *Les passions de l'âme* ; derniers écrits.

Deuxième partie :

1. La défi su scepticisme ;
2. L'argument ontologique ;
3. La notion de substance ;
4. La vérité ;
5. La généalogie du sujet moderne.

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"Ce volume reproduit le plus souvent les communications, en leur laissant dans leur style oral, comme elles ont été prononcées. Ces textes eux-mêmes sont très différents selon la taille et la conception. Ils vont de la courte note sur *René Descartes, étudiant poitevin* jusqu'à des études relativement longues sur la morale ou sur la fondation métaphysique de la physique. Quant à l'apparat d'érudition, *Descartes politique* est une méditation décantée, allégée quasiment de toute référence savante tandis que les *Notes sur les Modalités de l'ego* se livrent à une permanente analyse textuelle. Finalement, quant à l'ordre selon lequel les sept articles se suivent, il ne reproduit pas celui de leur succession effective lors du colloque. Nous avons modifié cet ordre et ce fut d'ailleurs l'unique changement que nous nous sommes permis d'effectuer dans la présentation de ce recueil." (p. 8)

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"De tous les élèves de ce collège, René Descartes est le plus célèbre: tentons de préciser comment ces années studieuses ont contribué à orienter sa pensée. Le collège de La Flèche fut ouvert par les Jésuites au début de 1604: Henri IV leur avait donné à cette intention le « Châteauneuf » qui venait de sa grand-mère et où lui-même avait fait plusieurs séjours.
(...)
Contre les erreurs de Baillet et d'Adam (au T. XII des *Œuvres Complètes*, non réimprimé) nous avons bien établi (en faisant vérifier dans les archives des jésuites que le P. Charlet est arrivé à La Flèche seulement en octobre 1606) son entrée à Pâques 1607: à cause de sa santé fragile « on avait attendu la fin de l'hiver et du carême », mais Charles Adam avait d'abord suivi Baillet qui croyait que René avait

ainsi suivi de peu son aîné Pierre, entré dès l'ouverture du collège au début de 1604.
Puis dans les additions et corrections, voyant enfin que les dates de Baillet sont contestables, pourquoi Adam retient-il Pâques 1606 à 1614 après avoir mentionné entre parenthèses « (sinon peut-être de Pâques 1607 à 1615) » sans jamais réexaminer ce dernier point ?
Il pouvait savoir par Sommervogel que Charlet avait encore prêché à Paris en 1606, probablement pendant le carême, ce qui exclut qu'il ait pu être à La Flèche pour Pâques. Adam savait aussi (c'est dans une note sans commentaire) que Pierre Descartes, sorti en 1612, avait passé la même semaine à Poitiers en 1613, baccalauréat et licence en droit; il ne se demandait pas alors pourquoi René ne l'y aurait pas suivi; et pour ce dernier, il sait (ce qu'ignorait Baillet) qu'il a passé ces deux examens la même semaine en novembre 1616. Si, comme il le suppose, le jeune homme est resté deux ans à Poitiers, n'aurait-il pas acquis séparément ces deux grades en 1615 et 1616 ? Adam suggère que durant ces deux années, Descartes aurait pu commencer à étudier la médecine, alors qu'on n'a aucun signe d'intérêt pour cette discipline avant qu'à la fin de I629 où il commence à étudier l'anatomie, pour construire la science des vivants. Quand il rencontre Beeckman à l'automne de 1618, celui-ci vient d'être reu Docteur en médecine (à Caen): il n'en est jamais question entre eux... Tout concorde donc pour ne plus remettre en question ces dates.
Ainsi, les trois dernières années étant consacrées, selon l'usage, à la philosophie, les élèves ont eu pour professeur le Père Étienne Noël auquel Descartes envoie dès le 14 juin 1637 le *Discours de la méthode*, avec une lettre personnelle qui le remercie de son enseignement: il lui offre ce « fruit (...) duquel vous avez jeté les premières semences en mon esprit, comme je dois aussi à ceux de votre Ordre tout le peu de connaissance que j'ai des bonnes lettres » (I, 823).
Quand ils anticipaient de trois ans sa scolarité, et parce que le nom de Noël, alors recteur de La Flèche, convenait bien au destinataire que l'auteur priait de faire lire ce livre par ceux « qui en avaient le plus de loisir », Adam et Tannery

supposaient que Descartes aurait connu Noël comme simple « répétiteur » (en se trompant d'ailleurs sur celui qui aurait enseigné la philosophie en 1609-1612). Une seconde lettre en octobre le remercie de son « souvenir » et de son « affection ». Quand il reporte enfin à 1611-1614 ces trois dernières années à La Flèche, Adam (dans l'édition Adam et Milhaud de la *Correspondance*, avec traduction des lettres latines, revient à l'enseignant qui précédait Noël, le Père Fournet (repris également par F. Alquié). Mais cela fait double emploi avec l'exemplaire que Descartes lui avait fait remettre par Plemp (Plemp à Descartes, 15 septembre 1637; I, 399) sans avoir eu les mêmes relations personnelles qu'avec son propre professeur, Descartes l'avait connu lors des discussions mensuelles qui réunissaient les élèves des trois classes de philosophie (1)." (p. 27-29)
(1) Tout cela est bien établi par Sirven dès 1928 dans *Les années d'apprentissage de Descartes* et adopté par Gilson dans l'édition de 1930 de son *Commentaire*.

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English Summary: "Descartes, the awakening of a mathematician.
This paper is devoted to the young Descartes and to the development of his mathematical thought from 1618 to 1629, since the meeting with Beeckman until his departure towards Holland. His period of dreaming, that has been crucial in the development of his personality, is also evoked. One can distinguish various steps in the progressive maturation of the mathematical thought of Descartes in these earlier Cartesian mathematics, previous to the *Géométrie*. The mathematical features of some Cartesian texts of the time are examined: "the" letter to Beeckman and the *Cogitationes Privatae,* then the Rules for the direction of the mind (*Regulae*), and finally the discovery of the *construction of the solutions* of equations of the third and fourth degree, which as been conclusive for the "awakening" of Descartes as a mathematician. A figure of thought, the so-called "medium term" which is central in young Descartes, as well as three of his mathematical embodiments, proportional means, Cartesian compasses, and "ruler-and-slide", are especially highlited. The following papers III, IV, V), dealing with three Cartesian discoveries and using modern mathematic symbolism, complete this paper." (p. 43)
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"Lorsque je parle ici de Descartes « l'homme », je m'emploierai à approcher sa personne, et non à l'étudier dans le sens de son ouvrage intitulé « L'Homme ». C'est à partir de la biographie que j'ai publiée fin 1995 que je voudrais présenter, de faon beaucoup plus simple que les très belles méditations que vous venez d'écouter, quelques problèmes pour lesquels je présente des hypothèses, (en soulignant que ce ne sont que des hypothèses, ou assez exceptionnellement des rectifications d'erreurs trop souvent répétées par des gens éminents), et ceci malgré certaines corrections de la grande *Vie de Descartes* par Baillet: elle reste irremplaable par les documents qui ont depuis disparu et qu'il nous a transmis; mais il n'a pas assez distingué ce qui est sûr et ce qui est contestable ou même faux." (p. 15)

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1620-1628: *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*

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"Nous nous proposons tout simplement d'offrir au lecteur une synthèse des éléments essentiels du *Mathématisme de Descartes*, c'est-à-dire de la tentative cartésienne de construire une science universelle de caractère mathématique à partir d'une méthode qui se présente comme une généralisation de la méthode mathématique (2). (...)

Afin de mieux situer le mathématisme cartésien, notre étude sera précédée d'une brève esquisse de la vie intellectuelle de Descartes : 1° son évolution intellectuelle à partir du premier « enchantement de son esprit » lorsqu'il apprenait les mathématiques au Collège de La Flèche jusqu'à l'envoûtement qui s'exprime dans le songe où Descartes prend conscience de sa vocation, à savoir la réalisation d'une science universelle de caractère mathématique pour le bien de l'humanité; 2° les grandes étapes parcourues par Descartes dans la réalisation de ce projet.

L'étude historique sera suivie d'une critique de structure et d'un jugement de valeur qui signaleront les difficultés congénitales du mathématisme cartésien.

Vu l'ampleur d'une telle étude, nous avons dû nous limiter à l'essentiel et passer sous silence plusieurs problèmes importants. Nous avons conscience aussi du caractère quelque peu schématique inhérent à toute synthèse. Nous savons de plus que la pensée de Descartes contient des richesses et des virtualités qui dépassent les cadres du

système cartésien comme tel; il n'était pas dans notre propos d'en faire l'inventaire. Seul le mathématisme cartésien, la philosophie de Descartes considérée comme système, a fait l'objet de notre étude et de notre critique. En effet, considérée de ce point de vue, la philosophie cartésienne « universellement baignée d'une clarté mathématique (6) » est le premier exemple — et peut-être le plus évident — dans l'histoire de la pensée moderne, de l'insuffisance d'une philosophie qui tente arbitrairement de réduire la pensée humaine à l'une ou l'autre de ses dimensions." (pp. 7-8)
(2) Dans le cinquième chapitre de son ouvrage *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New-York, Scribner, 1952, p. 125-151), M. Gilson pose d'une faon précise, quoique succincte, le problème du mathématisme de Descartes. C'est dans le même esprit que celui de cet éminent historien de la philosophie, que nous voulons poursuivre le présent travail.
(6) J. Maritain, *Le Songe de Descartes*, Paris, Editions Corrêa, 1982, p. 75.

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"Ne concerne directement le cartésianisme que le célèbre article « Dieu trompeur et malin génie » [Chapitre X]. En se référant à des thèses développées par Gabriel Biel et Grégoire de Rimini (mentionnées par Mersenne, AT VII, 125, elles sont aujourd'hui rendues accessibles en Français dans Olivier Boulnois (éd.), *La Puissance et son Ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther*, Paris, Aubier, 1994), l'Auteur donne un contenu précis à la *vetus opinio* mentionnée dans la *Meditatio Ia*: *Deum esse qui potest omnia*. Ceci permet de repenser à nouveaux frais le rapport entre Dieu trompeur et malin génie, et montre s'il le fallait encore qu'une connaissance précise des traditions médiévales est indispensable à la bonne intelligence de l'*ordo rationum*." (Edouard Mehl, Bulletin Cartésien, XXXI).
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"Il ne faut ni surestimer, ni sous-estimer l'importance de la réflexion menée par Mersenne pour élaborer une définition vraiment cohérente du concept de métaphysique. Ne pas la surestimer : Mersenne, nous le verrons, reprend pour l'essentiel des positions traditionnelles, issues de la scolastique thomiste par l'intermédiaire de Suárez, le plus souvent comme des évidences mentionnées sans aucune source ni discussion, tant elles paraissent aller de soi. D'ailleurs ces positions n'ont rien d'original, si l'on les compare, ne fût-ce que rapidement, à celles d'autres contemporains, surtout parmi les *minores*. Mais c'est

paradoxalement pour ces mêmes raisons qu'il ne faut pas sous-estimer la contribution de Mersenne. Au double titre d'ancien élève de La Flèche et de correspondant principal, voire presque unique durant les premières années, de Descartes, il apparaît un témoin privilégié pour mesurer à sa juste dimension l'originalité en progrès de l'auteur des *Meditationes*. En offrant un état de la question d'une définition du concept de métaphysique, Mersenne permet d'abord une description équilibrée de l'opinion philosophique dominante au début du siècle et, ensuite, par ses hésitations et ses contradictions, un diagnostic sur la difficulté du problème ainsi désigné. Car il faut bien reconnaître ici une réelle aporie, qui rend seule intelligible l'originalité de la solution cartésienne."

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An annotated bibliography of recent studies in English on the philosophy of Descartes

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   "Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it is argued, involves a rejection of this idea of absolute conceivability and can be seen as a constructivist view of intelligibility and rationality."
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"Descartes' image of the tree of knowledge from the preface to the French edition of the *Principles of Philosophy* is usually taken to represent Descartes' break with the past and with the fragmentation of knowledge of the schools. But if Descartes' tree of knowledge is analyzed in its proper context, another interpretation emerges. A series of contrasts with other classifications of knowledge from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries raises some puzzles: claims of originality and radical break from the past do not seem warranted. Further contrasts with Descartes' unpublished writings and with school doctrines lead to the ironic conclusion that, in the famous passage, Descartes is attempting to appeal to conventional wisdom and trying to avoid sounding novel."
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Emmanuel Faye and chapter 7 as “Les premières tentatives vers une scolastique cartésienne: la *Correspondance* de Descartes et les Jésuites de La Flèche sur l’Eucharistie,” in *Momenti della biografia intellettuale di Descartes nella Correspondance,* ed. Jean-Robert Armogathe and Giulia Belgioioso. A portion of chapter 8 was published as “Les *Principia* en France et les condamnations du cartésianisme,” in *Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994)*, ed. Jean-Robert Armogathe and Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), pp. 525-640, and of chapter 10 was issued as “Critiques scolastiques de Descartes: le *cogito*,” *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 53, no. 3 (1997): 587-604." (pp. IX-X).

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at Leipzig, *Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui,* in his early treatise on transubstantiation, and in his mature work (*Nouveaux Essais*, etc.). I compare these treatments with René Descartes' principle of individuation for ensouled creatures, from the *Letters to Mesland* on transubstantiation, and with the theses of various late scholastics (those of Scipion Dupleix, Antoine Goudin, René de Ceriziers, and Théophraste Bouju, among others). I conclude that whatever might have appeared novel in the proposals of Descartes and Leibniz for the principle of individuation were also traditional options; in this respect, the difference between early modern and medieval philosophy does not seem to have been philosophical at bottom."

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"It is widely agreed that Descartes took ideas to be the objects of knowledge and that his theory of clear and distinct ideas arose from his attempt to find a way of picking out those ideas whose truth was so certain and self-evident that the thinker could be said to know them with certainty. To say of an idea that it is clear and distinct was, he believed, to say of it both that it was certainly true and that any claim to know it was justified. No other criterion need be appealed to. It is at this point, however, that most of those who set out to expound Descartes' theory of knowledge are brought to a standstill. The part played by clear ideas is obvious enough, but what did Descartes mean by `clear and distinct'? This paper is an attempt, not to make an original contribution to the study of Descartes, but to elucidate his terms and evaluate his criterion in the light of what both he and others have written." (p. 89)
(...)
"The fact that Descartes adopted the word ‘idea’ is itself significant. When scholastic philosophers discussed human cognition, they spoke of the mind as containing concepts (*species, intentiones*). They claimed that these concepts originated through our sense perceptions, and hence that they stood in some relation to external objects. The term ‘concept’ was contrasted with the term ‘idea’. Ideas were the

eternal essences or archetypes contemplated by God, and the question of their external reference did not arise. They were an integral part of God's mind. God could create instances of one of his ideas, but his idea was in no way dependent upon the existence of such instances. Descartes took the word 'idea' and applied it to the contents of the human mind because he wanted to escape the suggestion that these contents must be in some sense dependent on the external world as a causal agent. (9) He wished to establish the logical possibility that a mind and the ideas contained within it are unrelated to other existents, and can be discussed in isolation from them.

Descartes saw the term 'idea' as having a very wide extension.

He said " . . . I take the term idea to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives,"(10) where the verb 'perceive' refers to any possible cognitive activity, including sensing, imagining and conceiving.(11) Thus a sense datum, a memory, an image, and a concept can all be called ideas. This, of course, leads to the blurring of distinctions. For Descartes, "I have an idea of red" may mean that I am now sensing something red, or that I have a concept of the colour red, even if I am not now picking out an instance of that concept. Moreover, when Descartes speaks of an idea, he may be taking it as representative of some object or quality in the physical world, as when he says "I have an idea of the sky and stars," or he may be referring to the meaning he assigns to a word, as when he says "I have an idea of substance." Nor does he make any distinction between "having an idea" and "entertaining a proposition." Such statements as "Nothing comes from nothing" and "The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles" are categorized as 'common notions',(12) and are included among the contents of the mind. Descartes does remark that in some cases an idea may be expressed by a name, in other cases by a proposition,(13) but he does not bother to pursue this line of inquiry.

One of the characteristics of an idea is 'objective reality', a scholastic phrase which Descartes adopted, but used in a

new way. In scholastic writings the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ have meanings which are the reverse of the modem meanings. An object like a table exists subjectively or as a subject if it has spatio-temporal existence, if it is real or actual. In contrast, the concept of a table can be looked at as having two kinds of existence. The concept *qua* concept has formal existence, but the concept as having some specifiable content is said to have objective existence, or existence as an object of thought. The concepts of a table and of a chair are formally similar but objectively different. So far as subjective realities were concerned, the scholastics assigned them different grades of reality according to their perfection and causal power. For instance, a substance is more perfect and causally more efficacious than an accident, hence a man has a higher grade of reality than the colour red.

It was also held that every effect had a cause with either an equal or a higher grade of reality. These doctrines were not seen as having any relevance to concepts. As formally existent, a concept has of course to have some cause, but the content of the concept was not seen as having any independent reality. Descartes, however, felt that the objective reality could be considered independently of its formal reality, and that it must be graded just as subjective reality was graded. The idea of a man, he felt, has more objective reality than the idea of a colour. Moreover, the cause of the idea containing a certain degree of objective reality must have an equal or greater degree of subjective reality. For instance, the idea of God has so high a degree of objective reality that only God himself is perfect enough to be the cause of such an idea.(14)" (pp. 91-93)

(...)

"Although Descartes struggled to defend his criterion, his struggles ended in an impasse. He had made the mistake of trying to prove too much. He had wanted to develop an introspective technique by which he could be sure of recognizing those ideas which were objects of certain knowledge; but such an enterprise was doomed from the start. He could only escape from the objection that nothing

about an idea can justify us in making judgment about its external reference by entering into an uneasy and unjustifiable alliance with God; and by such an alliance he negated his claim that a single criterion for true and knowable ideas could be found." (p. 105)
(9) E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross (eds.) , *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, (Cambridge, 1911) [cited as 'HR'] vol. II, 68.
(10) HR II, 67-8.
(11) HR I, 232.
(12) HR I, 239.
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"In the *Third Meditation* Descartes, who is at the beginning sure only of his own existence, presents a complex proof for the existence of God which is based on the fact that he finds within himself an idea of God. I intend to ignore the supplementary proof which deals with the conservation of his existence, and to focus on his discussion of the properties of ideas, for it is here that Descartes is most difficult to comprehend yet most vulnerable to criticism. With the exception of Gassendi's remarks in the *fifth objection*, I shall concentrate upon what Descartes himself had to say, for a thorough survey of all the secondary sources often serves only to obscure the main issue." (p. 331)
(...)
"Descartes reinforced his arguments with various claims about the nature of predicates and the way in which we come to understand them. He thought, mistakenly, that one could not only distinguish between negative and positive predicates, but that one could demonstrate the logical priority of such positive predicates as 'infinite' or 'perfect' by showing that one can only understand the finite or imperfect in the light of a prior acquaintance with the infinite or perfect. (29) However, although he seems now to

be talking about epistemology rather than ontology, it turns out that his claims rest upon the same assumptions about the content and causation of ideas as are involved in the main proof, so they do not need to be discussed further. However liberal one is in granting Descartes his desired premises, I think it is fair to conclude that his arguments do not prove what they purport to prove. This seems to be a strong indication that one will lose nothing by being illiberal from the very beginning." (p. 340)
(29) E. Haldane and G. Ross, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* (Cambridge, 1968), I, 166.

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"In this paper I shall use Rubius's tract on analogy to show how a rich medieval tradition survived into the seventeenth century and to shed some light on the problem of Descartes's sources for the notion of an idea's objective reality. I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall state the problem as it has been set out in recent secondary literature. Second, I shall trace the distinction between formal and objective concepts from the early fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in the context of the discussion of analogical terms. Third, I shall examine the analogical use of terms as it was presented by Rubius. Fourth, I shall explain why a theory of language use and a theory of concepts carne to be linked together. Finally, I shall discuss what Rubius had to say about formal and objective concepts, and I shall suggest a relationship between this account and Descartes's own attitude towards mental contents and simple natures."
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"The Latin word “hyperbole” comes from the Greek verb υπερ-βάλλω, a composite form of hypér (behind) and bállein (throw, throw further, behind and therefore to go further).
The goal of the essay is to clarify the use and the meaning of this concept in the XVIIth century especially considering the figures of René Descartes (1596-1650) and one of his most famous correspondents, the French writer Louis Guez de Balzac (1597-1654). The essay is divided into four parties. In the first one, it focuses on the relationships between Descartes and Balzac and their intellectual formation. In the second part, some relevant examples of definitions given in the XVIIth century of geometrical and rhetorical hyperboles are proposed. The third part of the essay is devoted to the transformation of the figure of the hyperboles achieved by Guez de Balzac. In the fourth part of the essay is analysed the uses of the hyperboles in Descartes; a particular attention is here devoted to the texts of the Third and Fourth Replies to Hobbes and Arnauld, in connection to the final part of the Sixth Meditation."
French version with the title: *«Toute hyperbole tend à nous amener à la vérité par l’excès de la vérité, c’est-à-dire par le mensonge»: les parcours hyperboliques qui amènent à la vérité de Balzac à Descartes*, in: Vlad Alexandrescu (ed.), *Branching Off. The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of Knowledge*, Bucarest: Zeta Books, 2009, pp. 256-288.

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"The article discusses the decline of Aristotelian physics at the University of Paris in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A course of physics remained essentially Aristotelian until the final decade of the seventeenth century, when it came under the influence of Descartes. But the history of physics teaching over this period cannot be properly appreciated if it is simply seen in terms of the replacement of one physical philosophy by another. Long before the 1690s, the traditional Aristotelianism of the Schools had been forced to come to terms with the New Science to some degree, while the Cartesianism of the early eighteenth century was always alive to the challenges to Descartes's particular physical theories. Except in the early seventeenth century the physics course at Paris was always in a state of change. The replacement of Aristotelian by Cartesian physics too involved the development of a novel epistemology. Although both Aristotelian and Cartesian professors believed that natural philosophy was a science of causes based upon a priori principles, the latter had a far more probabilist conception of physics."
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119; 4 Hobbes 163; Conclusion: Time and the Science of the Soul between Disciplines 207; Bibliography 209; Index 219-224.

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    "Something very important happened in our knowledge of the physical world in the seventeenth century. A number of very smart people made discoveries about the natural world that fundamentally changed our way of looking at things. But as important as the individual accomplishments of individual seventeenth-century scientists were, an important part of the story lies in the disciplinary and institutional history of that important century. What was new and important was not only Copernicus and Kepler, Descartes and Galileo, Leibniz and Newton, but the changes that happened in the larger framework in which they work. In particular, I think that there was a major change in what might be called the disciplinary geography, the way in which the disciplines that deal with our knowledge of the natural

world changed in their relations with respect to one another. This involves not only intellectual changes, but, perhaps as importantly, changes in the institutions that involve the investigation of nature and the dissemination of new knowledge and points of view.
The story is very big and very complex, and I cannot hope to tell it all in a single article. But in this short essay I would like to give a bare outline of what the whole story might look like. I will begin with an overview the state of the disciplines that are concerned with the natural world ca. 1600. I will then trace through the way in which the disciplinary geography changes over the course of the century."

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"Although we now dismiss Kant's suggestion that logic was already essentially a completed science, we ourselves embrace its ghost, the idea that the conception of logical inference with which we are most familiar is just the common conception of our illustrious philosophical ancestors. This ghost works mischief. It causes us to think whiggishly of the history of logic and so lends respectability to the thought that only since 1879 has there been great logic. More concretely, I shall argue here, the idea that were is and always has been a single dominant conception of valid inference (ours) blinds us to part of Descartes's project. By setting that project against its medieval

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"Descartes famously claimed that a human soul is a single substance without any parts. But he also affirmed that the soul has two faculties, namely intellect and will, which act as 'two concurrent causes'. This looks quite puzzling. How can there be two causes in a single and indivisible substance? What is their ontological status? And how do they act? This chapter discusses these questions, paying particular attention to Descartes' scholastic background. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. Descartes rejected Suárez's theory, which took faculties to be really distinct parts and inner agents of the soul, while defending Ockham's theory, which considered them to be mere ways of acting of a single soul. The two explanatory models gave rise to different accounts of the unity of the soul."
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there be two causes in a single and indivisible substance? What is their ontological status? And how do they act? This chapter discusses these questions, paying particular attention to Descartes' scholastic background. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. Descartes rejected Suárez's theory, which took faculties to be really distinct parts and inner agents of the soul, while defending Ockham's theory, which considered them to be mere ways of acting of a single soul. The two explanatory models gave rise to different accounts of the unity of the soul."

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"One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed "physico-mathematics". This signalled a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy, non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more 'physicalised', more closely intertwined with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes' physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases one could literally "see the causes". Optics took pride of place within Descartes' physico-mathematics project, because he believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes' early physico-mathematical program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes

resources for his later work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system."

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"In view of some recent research, (1) the stage would seem to be set to make a beginning with a long-standing suggestion of Professor Gilson to compare Descartes' doctrine on distinctions with that of Francis Suarez. (2) Accordingly, one would expect that the immediate point of departure for such a comparison would be their respective interpretations of the formal distinction of Duns Scotus. This would then introduce the more formal discussion of distinctions in each man. A closing consideration should then be devoted to the doctrine of each on essence and existence since this is the context in which Descartes frames a very important statement of his position on distinctions. In short, then, one should confront Descartes on Scotus, then on distinctions and finally on essence and existence. The same confrontation should then be made with Suarez." (p. 104)
(...)
"In regard to Descartes, the primary focus will be first on his reply to the objections of Caterus to his *Meditations*; (4) then on his *Principles* (5) and finally on one of Descartes' letters. (6)" (p. 105)
(1) T. J. Cronin, S.J., "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suarez and of Descartes," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1961), 269-288; XXXIX (1961), 23-38. See also his briefer statement "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Descartes and of His Adversary," *Journal of the History of Idea*s, XXI (1960), 553-559. My own article, "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXV (1961), 172-190 goes behind Suarez to the Thomistae. Leonhard Gillen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes' zur

zeitgenössischen Scholastik," *Scholastik*, XXXII (1957), 41-66. These articles concern Descartes' knowledge of Suarez and Scholasticism. Another article of mine "Suarez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction Between Essential Being and Existential Being," *The New Scholasticis*m, XXXVI (1962), 419-444, contains information on Suarez' ambiguous position in regard to Scotus' formal-modal distinction. This is important for any ultimate comparison with Descartes' attitude on the same question and for his doctrine on distinction in general.
(2) *Index scolastico-cartésien*, (Paris: Alcan, 1913), p. 87, where, in the context of the term, *Distinction*, wherein Descartes has insisted that the formal distinction of Scotus "non differre a modali" and following a text of Suarez on this point in Scotus, Professor Gilson notes: "C'est sans aucun doute à cette interprétation de la distinction formelle de Duns Scot qu'il faut rapporter le texte [AT] IV, 350, 13-16, où Descartes pose trois distinctions: 'Realem, Modalem et Formalem, sivc rationis ratiocinatae,' Si l'on remarque en outre qu'au texte [AT] VII, 120, 15 et 24-25, Descartes réduit comme Suarez cette même distinction formelle à la distinction modale; si l'on remarque enfin que, parmi toutes les classifications possibles des distinctions. Descartes choisit précisément celle de Suarez, on sera conduit à penser que Suarez peut être considéré comme la source probable de Descartes en ce qui concerne la doctrine des distinctions...".
(4) *Resp. Iae*; VII. 120.15 - 121.14. All references to works of Descartes are to the Adam-Tannery edition. So the above reference indicates Descartes' reply to the first objections to his *Meditations*, ed. Adam-Tannrry, vol. VII, page 120, line 15 to page 121, line 14.
(5) *Prin. Phil.*, I, 60-62; VIII. 28.18-30.25.
(6) To *X*; IV. 348.7 - 350.29. [Lettre à Mesland [?] , Egmond 154 ou 1646, O VIII, 1, pp. 634-635; B 536.]

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145. ———. 1979. "Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J. C. Doig." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:515-523.
"This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, *Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of ideas*. On the basis of primary and secondary source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that teaching. Thus Doig's claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in general, and the part they play in metaphysics."
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"An examination of the sources of Descartes' remark to Hobbes that his use of the term "idea" derives from the use of it by the philosophers to designate the "forms of perception" in the divine mind. The texts of Fonseca and Suárez on exemplary causality on both human and divine levels are analyzed and presented as available proximate sources of Descartes' allusion. The role played the distinction between the formal and objective concepts in both sources is examined and related to Descartes' use of the same distinction."
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Christian Wolff's Ontology: Existence as "Complement of Possibility"

INTRODUCTION: BEING AND EXISTENCE

"Let us open Wolff's *Ontology* and read his *Preface*: "Prime Philosophy (namely, metaphysics) was first laden by the Scholastics with enviable praise, but, ever after the success of Cartesian philosophy, it fell into disrepute and has become a laughing stock to all." (10) What Wolff clearly sees then is that, since the time when Descartes "grew weary of metaphysics," there still may have been metaphysicians, but there has been no metaphysics. As a distinct science, metaphysics has simply ceased to be. And Kant himself was only echoing Wolff when he wrote in his *Preface* to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "There was a time when metaphysics used to be called the queen of sciences ... Now, in our own century, it is quite fashionable to show contempt for it." Our own century here is the eighteenth century, which was the century of both Wolff and Kant.
When he made up his mind to put a stop to that technical decadence in the field of philosophy, Wolff was keenly conscious of carrying on the work of the great Scholastics. What they had done was not perfect, but that was the thing to do, and, since it could be done better, Wolff himself was going to do it all over again. Let us be as precise as possible. Wolff did not wish to be reproached with bringing back a Scholastic philosophy that was dead. In point of fact, that was not what he wanted to do. But he was claiming the right to retain at least Scholastic terminology, for all there was to be done about it was, keeping the same terms,

to build up better definitions and more exactly determined propositions. (11)

This is what Wolff set about doing first with the term "being," and it is typical of his attitude that he can reach it only through the notion of possibility. "Being," Wolff says, "is what can exist and, consequently, that with which existence is not incompatible: *Ens dicitur quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non repugnat*. (12) In other words, what is possible is a being: *Quod possible est, ens est*. (13) Besides, Wolff adds, this is a metaphysical notion which is accepted by all, and which exactly tallies with common language. "Being," "something," "possible;" here are so many words that are practically synonymous, and metaphysics does nothing more than bring their implicit meanings out in the open. True enough, what is commonly called a "being" is something that exists, but he who understands that a A is being because it exists will as easily understand that, if A exists, it is because it can exist.(14) Possibility then is the very root of existence, and this is why the possibles are commonly called beings. The proof of it is that we commonly speak of beings past or future, that is, of beings that no longer exist or that do not yet exist. In any case, their being has nothing to do with actual existence; it is, though a merely possible being, yet a being.

In order to probe more deeply into the knowledge of being, what we have to do is to inquire into the causes of its possibility. The first one is, of course, the one we have already mentioned, namely, the absence of inner contradiction; but this is not enough. In order to posit a being, one must ascribe to its notion such constituent parts as are not only compatible among themselves, but are its primary constituent parts. The primary constituents of a being are those which are neither determined by some element foreign to that being, nor determined by any one of the other constituent elements of the same being. If an element supposedly foreign to some being were determining with respect to any one of those elements which enter its constitution, then it would not be foreign to it; it would be one of its constituent elements. On the other hand, if some of the constituent elements of a being determine each other, then we must retain only the determining elements as constituent parts of that being.(15) In short, every being is made up of such elements as are both

compatible and prime. Such elements shall be called the "essentials" of being (*essentialia*), because they constitute the very essence. Hence this conclusion, whose full significance it is superfluous to stress: Essence is what is conceived of being in the first place and, without it, being cannot be.(16) Thus, the essence of the equilateral triangle is made up of the number three and of the equality of its sides; again, the essence of virtue is made up of a habit (*habitus*) of the will and of the conformity with natural law of the acts which follow from that habit. Let any one of those conditions be altered, there is left neither equilateral triangle nor virtue; let them be all posited, then there is equilateral triangle and virtue. The presence of the "essentials" of the thing is therefore both necessary and sufficient to define its essence. Those "essentials" always entail certain properties which are inseparable from them and, since a thing never is without its "essentials," it is also inseparable from the thing. Such properties are called the "attributes" of being. As to its "modes," they are such ulterior determinations which are neither determined by the essence nor contradictory with it. The attributes of a being are always given with it, but not its modes, which are what the Scholastics used to call "accidents."

In a being so conceived, the "essentials" obviously are the very core of reality. Taken as non-contradictory, they ensure the possibility of being. It is through its "essentials" that a being is possible: *Per essentialia ens possibile est*. Now, since the essence of being is one with its possibility, he who acknowledges the intrinsic possibility of a thing knows also its essence. We are saying "acknowledges," and rightly so, for it is possible to account for the attributes of being from the "essentials" of that being, but there is no accounting for the fact that those "essentials" belong to it. Since they are prime, there is nothing above them from which they could be deduced. As to the modes, they cannot be deduced from their essence either. For, what makes up an essence accounts for the fact that such and such a mode may belong to a certain being; it does not account for the fact that such a mode actually does belong to it. The reason for the actual presence of modes in a given being must always be looked for outside that being. We call "external" those beings which constitute the sufficient reason for the actual presence, in a given being, of

modes which cannot be sufficiently accounted for by its essence alone. The essence then is for any being the sufficient reason for the actual presence of its attributes and of the possible presence of its modes(17) Hence its nominal definition: "Essence is that which is conceived of a being in the first place, and in which is to be found the sufficient reason why all the rest either actually belongs to it or else may belong to it: *Essentia definiri potest per id quod primum de ente concipitur et in quo ratio continetur sufficiens, cur caetera vel actu insint, vel finesse possint*." (18) The scrupulously exacting method which Wolff was using in his determination of being was entirely his own, but the results achieved by that method had really nothing new. And Wolff himself was clearly aware of it." (pp. 114-116)

Notes

(10) Wolff, *Ontologia*, beginning of the Preface. Cf.: "*Si Cartesius non fastidio philosophiae primue correplus fuisset ...*"
(11) Wolff, *Ontologia*, n. 12, pp. 4-5
(12) Ibid., n. 134, p. 60
(13) Ibid., n. 135, p. 60
(14) Ibid., n. 139, p. 61
(15) Ibid., n. 142, p. 62
(16) Ibid., n. 144, p. 63
(17) Ibid., n. 167, p. 77
(18) Ibid., n. 168, p. 72

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From: Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1952 (Second edition corrected and enlarged; first edition 1949).

"In Christian Wolff we have a Leibniz purged of poetry, but also purged of some exaggerated conceptions, for example, the drowsy or slumbering monads, and the phenomenal character of space.

All is built into an immense, systematic exposition, magnificent in its formal rigour and clarity, and building on, though also improving, the ontological, cosmological, and theological doctrines of the Aristotelian schoolmen and, in particular, of Suárez. (The improvements are possibly due to Platonizing influences, which modified the ingrained love of the individual instance so characteristic of the Aristotelians.) Christian Wolff expounded his systematization both in a German version (the *Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Natural Theology*, etc.), and also in a Latin version (a *Logic* (1728), an *Ontology* (1730), a *Cosmology* (1731), a *Psychology* (1732 and 1734), a *Natural Theology* (1736-7), and a *Universal Practical Philosophy* (1738-9)). There are also many political writings of interest. To this vast system, with its innumerable Epigonoi -- Bilfinger, Meier, Rüdiger, Baumgarten, Tetens, Crusius, and so on -- Kant made his great emendations, which have been exaggerated into the idealisms, and later the positivisms, by which the thought and even the public policy of Europe has been bemused. What is, however, amazing is the immense volume and solid merit of Wolff's works, and the almost total misunderstanding and neglect that has since enshrouded them, so that copies of Wolffian books are hardly to be found in libraries outside of Germany.
(...)
Wolff's Ontology begins (27) with the assertion of the two laws of contradiction and sufficient reason, both fundamental to the assertion that something is, or that it is not. The former requires that what is must be free from inner conflict, the latter that, if it does not, like a necessary being, have a reason for being in its own nature, it must depend on such a reason in something other than itself. The law of causation, as we ordinarily understand it, is for Wolff only a special form of the law of sufficient reason, pertinent to temporal, changeable things and their states (71). From these principles Wolff proceeds to the consideration of the metaphysical modalities, of which the most fundamental is the possible, the negation of the self-contradictory, or logically impossible. Everything actual, he holds, is by the law of contradiction possible, but he here embraces some invalid theorems, for instance, that a possible consequence can only have possible premisses. Obviously, modal logic is still insecure,

though Wolff's treatment of apagogic proof in 98 is of some interest. From Wolffian principles it follows that the notion of an entity not wholly determinate is 'imaginary', and that the indeterminate is only what is for us determinable, and that it will have to be determined by a sufficient reason (111, 117). There is no room in Wolffianism, any more than in Leibnizianism, for radical alternativity: Kant, however, will diverge from this position under the influence of Crusius.

All this leads, however, to Wolff's treatment of what he calls an entity: an entity is defined as any thing which can exist, to which existence is not repugnant. Thus warmth in this stone is a something, an entity, since a stone certainly can be warm or a warm stone can exist. There does not need to be any actual stone-warmth for us to have an entity before us. An entity is, however, rightly called fictitious or imaginary, if it lacks existence, which does not, however, make it less of an entity. These near-Meinongian positions are of great contemporary interest, and form the spring-board for much of Kant's later criticisms of the ontological proof, which is Wolffian enough to treat 100 possible dollars as if they certainly vere something. Wolff goes on to draw the distinctions of essential features and attributes, on the one hand, which always must belong to an entity, and its modes, on the other hand, which are merely the characters that it can have and also can not have. Obviously, however, something must be added to possibility to raise it to full existence, and this Wolff is simply content to call the possibility-complement (174). It rather resembles the modal moment of Meinong. He proposes to deal with this possibility-complement separately in his discussions of different spheres, for example, theology, cosmology, and psychology, since the intrinsically sufficient reason which makes God an actual existent is not at all like the extrinsically sufficient reason which underlies existence in the cosmological sphere. It is deeply characteristic, and deeply interesting, that Wolff should make actuality a mere enrichment of the possible, not the latter an impoverished abstraction from the former. The efforts of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Quine, and so on have shown the hopelessness of trying to elucidate the possible in terms of the actual: the traditional priority may well prove more successful. Both tendencies are of course manifest in Kant's treatments of

possibility, the 'modern' in, for example, the Postulates of Empirical Thought, and the Wolffian in many 'transcendental' contexts. Individuation does not, for Wolff, represent a going beyond the possible. It merely occurs where we have the complete determination which the logico-ontological laws require, and there are, accordingly, imaginary and fictitious as well as real ones. The latter may be far more determinate than any characters in fiction, but they will still lack a final nuance of determination. There are, likewise, incompletely determinate specific and generic properties of individuals, all of which must rank among imaginary entities, though some, connected with actual instances, will obviously be less imaginary than others. Wolff has here developed points which Meinong was later to develop in his doctrine of complete and incomplete objects, and there are also many anticipations of the modern theory of possible worlds." (pp. 38-41)

From: John Niemeyer Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object. A Hermeneutic Study*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981.

"One cannot plunge directly into Wolffian natural theology, however, since it must be viewed within the closely knit context of a certain conception of philosophy and ontology. From Wolff's opening definition of philosophy as 'the science of possibles, in so far as they can be' or have an essential nature, it is evident that his is a system of possibility and essence in which the role of existence is a subordinate one. It is not a totally de-existentialized philosophy; it is one in which knowable and systematically exploitable being primarily means the possible essence and in which existence is admitted only by virtue of some correlation it has with this essence. What does not stand out so clearly is the reason why Wolff settled upon this essentialist viewpoint and yet never totally submerged the distinctive reality of existence.
Part of the explanation comes from Wolff's complex intellectual heritage. He was just as thoroughly familiar with the critical work of the skeptics and empiricists as with the rationalist tradition. The skeptical arguments convinced him of the impossibility of demonstratively defending our knowledge of the existing external world, either through a rationalist deduction or through an

empiricist inference. Hence he concluded that it was too risky to base his philosophy upon the thesis of the reality of the material universe; his fundamental definitions remained deliberately neutral about the independent existence of a world corresponding with our ideas. This skeptically generated neutrality inclined him to focus upon the essential and the possible, without making any primary commitments about sensible existents. Nevertheless, the British scientists and philosophers also convinced him of the danger of entirely ignoring the existential aspect.

As a compromise, Wolff calls for a union in holy matrimony of three kinds of human knowledge: historical, philosophical, and mathematical. Historical knowledge means the empirical assurance, gained mainly through sense experience and experiments, that certain things exist or occur. Wolff hails it as the foundation of all philosophy and the constant guide of all inferential reasoning. Yet he wavers between saying that empirical knowledge assures us indubitably that certain things actually do exist and saying that it merely makes us reflectively aware of having the ideas of things that can exist or come to be. This ambiguity about the import of sense experience stems from his basic epistemological neutrality and leads him to depreciate its certainty. Experiential certainty concerns the bare fact (real or ideal) and does not extend to the sufficient reason for the fact. Hence philosophical certainty must be non-experiential in its own proper form. Every ounce of it (to use Wolff's own emphatic phrase) derives from the use of the mathematical method, which risks nothing on the real existent but concentrates upon the determinate quantity of possible objects and essential relations. This method enables philosophy to determine with perfect certainty the reasons why objects may come to be or why being is possible. Hence philosophy is primarily a study of the internal essentialia, or essential components, and the external reasons, or causes of the possibility of these essential components. Existence is studied properly in philosophy only to the extent that it can be drawn out with certainty from the known essential structure. Wolff never removes the radical dichotomy between empirical and mathematico-philosophical certainties, between knowledge of fact and of possible essence. Their matrimonial bond is not based upon some unifying doctrinal principle but rests solely

upon Wolff's personal awareness of the need for both approaches. His desire to found philosophy on an existential basis in experience is blocked by the skeptical critique, and he is thereby forced to locate philosophical certainty in the possible essences and their sufficient reasons. And yet he is also unwilling to follow 'Leibniz in overcoming the distinction between truth's of fact and truths of essence by means of the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz accords the primacy to this principle, since it expresses the dynamic law of quasi-autonomous essences, to which God must give a consent decree governing His creation of the existing world. For Wolff, however,,the essences are unequivocally grounded in the divine intellect and enjoy no quasi-independence. Hence the principle of sufficient reason can give essential connections or reasons for facts, but it cannot furnish any deductive certitude concerning the actual facts themselves or existential productions of the divine will, There is no objectively determining ground which shapes God's existential decisions and closes the gap in man's philosophical system. Hence the principle of sufficient reason must remain subordinate to the principle of contradiction, which provides an indubitable certainty, at least, about the internal consistency and possibility of the essential traits as such.

In conformity with this view of philosophy, Wolff then defines ontology as the science of being, i.e., of that which can exist or that to which existence is not repugnant. In the main, it is the science of essence, namely, "that which is first of all conceived about being, and in which is contained the sufficient reason why other aspects either actually belong to it or can belong to it." Ontology is a strict science precisely because it confines itself to a general study of being as possible or essentially constituted -- he sphere where a mathematically rigorous certitude is obtainable. Existence figures in ontology either obliquely, as the complement of possibility, or negatively, as the furnisher of a norm of non-repugnance. As the directly known act of a thing, it does not come within the scope of ontology, which remains a nonexistential discipline. Because of the nonexistential character of ontology or general metaphysics, Wolff requires three special parts of metaphysics to determine the principles of the possibility of existence in the three main areas of being. Cosmology studies the

reasons of being in the contingent, material world; psychology deduces the soul as the sufficient reason for the existence of mental acts; natural theology demonstrates God as the ground of existence for His own attributes and modes, as well as for the existence of the world. Natural theology presupposes these other sciences. From ontology, it draws its general principles and orientation; from cosmology, a factual basis in the material world; from psychology, a basis in the soul and also some special insight into the spiritual perfections which help us to know God's nature.". (pp. 134-136, notes omitted)

From: James Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1959.

AN OVERVIEW OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF'S PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA SIVE ONTOLOGIA

"Wolff's *Ontology* is a long, systematic treatise of what had been generally called before him "metaphysics" or "first philosophy." The term 'ontology' to refer to this rather traditional discipline had antecedents before Wolff used it in the title of his book, however. In 1647 Clauvergius [Johannes Clauberg] published a treatise with the title *Elementa philosophiae sive ontosophia* in which he explicitly argued in favor of a more precise name for what was generally called "metaphysics." The primary reason behind the shift of terminology had to do with the object of study of the discipline, which Clauvergius identified with being in general.(10) Wolff, following suit, titled his book *Philosophia prima sive ontologia* (1729), defining the subject of study as the science of being in general, that is, of being insofar as it is being. (11)
The *Ontology*, in comparison with the extensive systematic metaphysical treatises of late Scholastics, is fairly short. It is divided into three sections: a section entitled "Prolegomena" and two parts. The Prolegomena deals with the nature of ontology and of the terms and notions with which it concerns itself. In the first

of the two parts into which the rest of the treatise is divided, Wolff discusses the notion of being in general and the properties that follow from it. In the second part, he is concerned with the various species of being. The first part is divided in turn into three subsections, dealing respectively with the principles of ontology, the essence and existence of being, and the general attributes of being. After Wolff discusses identity and similarity in Chapter 1, he then deals with singular and universal being in Chapter 2. Thus, the discussion of singularity, which for Wolff is equivalent to individuality, precedes the discussion of necessity, contingency, quantity, quality, relation, truth, perfections, and related notions.(12) It is also worthy of note that in the chapter devoted to individuality and universality, individuality is listed and discussed first.

The relative position that individuality occupies in relation to other fundamental metaphysical notions, including universality, indicates the importance that Wolff attached to it as well as its more fundamental and central role in the *Ontology*. Not that such importance and central role were something new. Throughout the Middle Ages there had been a progressive shift of emphasis from universality to individuality, which is clearly evident as early as the thirteenth century when Duns Scotus discussed universals in the context of individuals in the *Opus oxoniense*, contrary to what had been customary before him. This shift is most evident in Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*, where individuality is given separate, prior, and more extensive treatment than all the other common properties of being.

What is most significant and different structurally speaking about Wolff's *Ontology,* vis-à-vis the later Scholastic tradition, is something else, namely, the epistemic and methodological considerations that are contained in the beginning of the work. They are found in two places. In the Preface Wolff presents some general statements about his modus operandi, indicating among other things that his aim is to make clear notions that are only confusedly found in common as well as in previous philosophical discourse, and also pointing out that he intends to follow the rigorous mathematical method popular among other modern philosophers. In Section 1, he begins the discussion with an examination of the methodological principles that guide his

investigation. The principles in question are the "principle of contradiction" and the "principle of sufficient reason." The methodological concerns expressed both in the Preface and in Section 1 are certainly an indication of the epistemic bent that Wolff gave to the *Ontology* and that do not seem to have affected the work of many late Scholastics. Suárez's *Disputationes*, for example, go directly from a discussion on the nature of metaphysics to the discussion of the common properties of being and do not contain in the Preface the kind of procedural comments that characterize the *Ontology*. What distinguishes Wolff's *Ontology*, then, is that between the discussion of the nature of metaphysics and of the common properties of being he adds a section on methodological principles and that he prefaces the whole work with a series of remarks on the same topic. Thus, although the *Ontology* aims to be a work of metaphysics, from its very beginning we are confronted with epistemic and methodological considerations. Does this mean that its contents suffered from the epistemologism that characterize most other modern metaphysical works? I argue yes at least as far as individuation is concerned." (pp. 222-223)

Notes

(10) Etienne Gilson has discussed at length the implications that Clauvergius's definition of metaphysics and change of terminology had for the discipline in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), pp. 112ff.
(11) *Ontologia*, par. 1, p. 1: "*Ontologia* seu *Philosophia prima* est scientia entis in genere, seu quatenus ens est." The emphasis in all Latin texts is that of Wolff.
(12) Not all authors use the terms 'singularity' and 'individuality' interchangeably. As far back as the early Middle Ages, Gilbert of Poitiers and others introduced distinctions in their meaning. See my *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the early Meddle Ages*, Munich, Philosophia Verlag, 1986, Chapter 3.

From: Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Christian Wolff on Individuation", in: Kenneth F. Barber and Jorge J. E. Gracia (eds.), *Individuation*

and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy. Descartes to Kant, Albany: State University of New York Press 1994, pp. 219-243.

PHILOSOPHIA
PRIMA,
SIVE
ONTOLOGIA,
METHODO SCIENTIFICA
PERTRACTATA,
QUA
OMNIS COGNITIONIS
HUMANÆ PRINCIPIA
CONTINENTUR.

AUTORE
CHRISTIANO WOLFIO,

EDITIO NOVA
PRIORI EMENDATIOR.

FRANCOFURTI ET LIPSIÆ, MDCCXXX.
PROSTAT IN OFFICINA LIBRARIA RENGERIANA.

Christian Wolff - *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* (1730)

THE PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE ON THE PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL (1728)

"The *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General* presents Wolff's master plan for the synthesis of knowledge. Written in 1728, it was intended to serve as the general introduction to his Latin survey of the branches of systematic philosophy, with subsequent volumes on logic, cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, ontology, natural theology, and moral philosophy. Though in writing the *Preliminary Discourse* Wolff used many notions he intended to develop more fully in these later volumes, the book nevertheless is a basically self-contained discussion; in fact, this work contains Wolff's clearest presentation of his theory of the division and method of the sciences, and its main historical interest lies along these lines.

The overall outline of Wolff's theory is presented in Chapter One of the Preliminary Discourse. He defines history as knowledge of the facts pertaining to both the material world and the world of consciousness, and as such, history provides the empirical foundation of the sciences. But as Aristotle had pointed out centuries earlier, knowledge of the facts is one thing and knowledge of the reason of the facts is quite another thing. This latter constitutes the proper province of philosophy. His third major division of natural knowledge, namely, mathematics, which deals with our knowledge of the quantity of things, employs a method of extraordinary power which is applicable to philosophy; insofar as philosophy shares in the values of mathematical method, it attains to complete certitude. Thus Wolff recognizes the importance of both the empirical methods of historical knowledge and the rational methods of the mathematical sciences. And for him, philosophy is the common meeting ground of these two methods.

The definition of philosophy presented in Chapter Two is of considerable interest. As the science of the possibles insofar as they can be, philosophy must concern itself both with the intelligibility of the world of the possibles and also with the reasons why certain of these possibles become actual. The former is governed by the Principle of Contradiction while the latter is controlled by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. What this means in brief is that for something to be possible it must be internally consistent. The criterion for determining this mutual consistency and intelligibility of the component elements of a possible is the Principle of Contradiction. However, this principle alone does not explain the fact that some possibles are actual while others are not; the mere internal consistency of a possible does not confer actuality upon it. A full understanding of the actual must go beyond the Principle of Contradiction to include an explanation of why this possible rather than another is actual. This further explanation is what is demanded by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Furthermore, existence is understood by Wolff to be the final complement in the order of possibility." As a result, all philosophical problems for Wolff deal with the constitution and ordering of possibilities or essences. The two great principles are adequate to govern all of these essentialistic relationships, and

the door is thus opened for the casting of the entire philosophical enterprise into the formal, deductive pattern outlined in Chapter Four.
Both the order of demonstration within each individual science and the proper subordination of the various sciences to each other are determined by the demands of one continuous deductive sequence. Wolff explains these relationships in great detail in Chapters Three and Four. The individual parts of philosophy are distinguished exclusively on the basis of subject matter or material object divisions, as is clear from the summary on the following page, and each branch of philosophy is carefully located in its proper place of subordination to the more basic disciplines. Further, according to Wolff, the methods of deductive logic apply universally to all these disciplines." (pp. IX-XI)

From: Richard J. Blackwell, "Introduction" to: Christian Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill 1963.



Christian Wolff's Classification of Sciences in the *Preliminary Discourse to Philosophy in General* (1728).

TWIN PILLARS OF PHILOSOPHY: THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION AND

SUFFICIENT REASON

Wolff's explicit presentation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason occurs at the beginning of his *Ontologia*. (44) His approach to this Principle and the Principle of Contradiction is not by way of the notion of being and a deduction therefrom, although a cursory glance at the arrangement of his text might lead one to think so, especially after familiarity with later manuals which follow this development. Rather, Wolff makes these "twin pillars of philosophy" more intuitional than deductive; they are the *given* of the rationalistic mind generating its own data and starting points.(45)

Systematically, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is preceded by the Principle of Contradiction, and Wolff places the foundation of this latter in an obvious experience of mental life: *While we are judging something to be, it is impossible at the same time to judge it not to be(*46) From this conscious experience of the nature of our minds, we concede without need of proof the proposition enunciated in general terms as the Principle of Contradiction: *It cannot happen that one and the same thing be and at the same time not be*. Or, another form of the same: *If A is B, it is false that the same A is not B*.(47)

To demonstrate the fecundity of this basic axiom, Wolff explores its logical implications and leaves little doubt that the principle for him is a purely formal one, a kind of *aliquid* to which subsequent concepts in his system may be tied. If it were not a true principle, he argues, then the same predicate could and could not pertain to the same subject under the same determinations, and the same proposition could be both false and true at the same time.(48) Besides "contradiction is simultaneity in affirming and denying,"(49) it is contained in two propositions, of which "one takes away what the other posits."

The important point is that the process of building concepts and working out demonstrations is insured by this principle against logical failure. Negatively, it is important to note that while this treatment is placed under ontology and the subject of being in general, yet with no systematic reference to or involvement of

existential judgment or sensation, it is not possible to denote this principle as anything more than logical.

Proceeding next to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff does not make any detailed reference to the question of its relation to the Principle of Contradiction. To anyone following through within the system itself, the question of whether it reduces to the Principle of Contradiction is answered by the fact that the latter is the one systematically prior, and this priority makes reduction possible.(50)

Clearly, the dual sovereignty granted these principles by Leibniz no longer holds. Leibniz had located the relation between the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the realm of the rational through his distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Wolff unified that realm of the rational around the Principle of Contradiction.(51) Again we can note the lack of existential reference in the fact that this realm remained distinct from that of the singular concrete sensible data of experience. Under the influence of Locke and the rise of empirical science, Wolff and his successors heightened the reality of this latter realm and deepened the realization and the value of its experience. But the systematic failure to incorporate it into an existential union with the realm of the rational will continue to haunt modern philosophy.

Unity in the order of essence, however, is impressively systematic. The possible as the non-contradictory, we shall see, gives to the Principle of Contradiction a primacy which it can share with no other. The *ratio* or reason whereby things are understood is ultimately explicable in terms of the opposition between "nothing" and "something," the latter being the systematic coherence of clear and distinct ideas whose right to, and precise determination of, a place in the system ultimately depends on the Principle of Contradiction. The Non-Contradictory is "something."(52)

This application of the primacy of essence to a theory of method grants priority to the Principle of Contradiction over the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and to the Principle of Sufficient Reason over causality. In other words, when Wolff has defined philosophy in terms of possibles rather than causes, he must use *ratio* instead of *causa* to describe the object of the metaphysical

search, and it is one of the inevitabilities of such a system that "reasons grow more rational and logical; causes, more empirical and real."(53) The deductive method of mathematics becomes the unique method of philosophy, and here-and-now existential reference is obtained by "common sense" joined sometimes with a pious use of Sacred Scripture.

By "Sufficient Reason," Wolff meant whatever explains why something is; it is "that whence it is understood why anything is." (54) He gives two examples: The three sides of the triangle, or rather, its three-sidedness is sufficient reason for the three angles because this suffices for us to understand the triangle as having three angles.(55) In the order of motivation and action he further instances the case of a man rising to his feet out of respect for some person who has just entered the room. From the fact of this entry, plus the reverence due the newcomer, it can be understood why the man in the room rises to his feet and hence a sufficient reason for the action is assigned.

In keeping with his methodology of building notions and demonstrations from previously established concepts, it is now necessary to define the meaning of "nothing" and "something" as involved in the notion of "sufficient reason." This is very simply managed in terms of the basic building block itself, the notion or concept. We call that "nothing" to which no notion corresponds. And "something" is that to which some notion can be attributed or corresponds.(56)" (pp. 35-38)

Notes

(44) Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, No. 70 ff.

(45) Part I of the *Ontologia* bears the title, "Concerning Being in General and the Properties Which Flow Therefrom." But this first part immediately divides into two parts: Section 1, "Concerning the Principles of First Philosophy," and Section II, "Concerning Essence and Existence and certain related notions of being." Section I is composed of two chapters devoted to the two Principles, Contradiction and Sufficient Reason. It is only in Section II that he takes up the discussion of being and its notions, a discussion which proceeds by way of the possible and

impossible, determined and indetermined, to Chapter III, "Concerning the Notion of Being."
It is within this framework as taken over by the successors of Wolff that we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason migrate back and forth as to relative position in the subject matter. In Bü1lfinger (*Dilucidationes*), for instance, the Principles come after the treatment of the possible-impossible, necessary and contingent. In John G. Feder's *lnstitutiones logicae et metaphysicae* (Editio quarta; Gottingen: J. Dietrich, 1797 preface 1777), No. 63, they appear in the Logic, part II, "Concerning the right use of the intellect in seeking truth," Chapter I, "Concerning the principles of truth and the various modes of knowing them." To this migratory characteristic of the Principle of Sufficient Reason we shall return in Chapter Six.
(46) Wolff, *Philosophia prima, sive ontologia*, No. 27. So also with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as we shall see below.
(47) "Naturae igitur mentis nostrae nobis conscii ad exempla attendentes sine probatione concedimus propositionem terminis generalibus enunciatem: *Fieri non potest, ut idem simul sit & non sit, seu quod perinde est, si A sit B, falsum est idem A non esse B*, sive A denotet ens absolute consideratum, sive sub data conditione spectatum." Ibid., No. 28. "Propositio haec: Fieri non potest, ut idem simul sit & non sit, dicitur *Principium Contradictionis*, ob rationem mox adducendam. *Principium* autem *Contradictionis* jam olim adhibuit Aristoteles *eodem usi sunt Scholastici in philosophia prima instar axiomatis generalis*." Ibid., No. 29.
(48) Ibid., Nos. 30, 31.
(49) Ibid., No. 30.
(50) Wilbur Urban, "The History of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Its Metaphysical and Logical Formulations,"*Princeton Contributions to Philosophy*, I, No. 3 April, 1900, p. 27. Urban sees in paragraphs Nos. 66-70 a statement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as a logical law by means of deduction from the law of contradiction; he finds Wolff, in confusing real grounds with the grounds of knowledge, guilty of a *petitio principii*. Hans Pichler, *Über Christian Wolff's Ontologie* (Leipzig, Durr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910), p. 7, calls Wolff's proof a word-play.

(51) Émile Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: Alcan, 1934), Vol. II, part II, 361.
(52) Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, Nos. 59-59.
(53) Norman Wilde, *Friedrich Henrich Jacobi: A Study in the Origin of German Realism* (New York: Columbia College, 1894), p. 27.
(54) Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, No. 56.
(55) The triangle example is reminiscent of Spinoza, and a favorite example with rationalists. Like Leibniz, Wolff was still faced with the threat of Spinozism. With no systematic distinction between the true and the real that is supported by existential reference, his only escape from being pushed into Spinoza's universe-version of "everything that exists has a cause or reason why it exists" was to *assert* as a starting point the reality of the possible. The primacy of *essence* has a way of becoming the *primacy of the logically necessary*, where what is not *impossible* is *necessary*, i.e., *is*.
(56) “Nihilum dicimus, cui nulla respondet notio.” Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, No. 57; cf. Nos. 59 and 60.

From: John Edwin Gurr, *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in some Scholastic Systems 1750-1900*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1959.

EXISTENCE IS A MODE OF FINITE BEINGS

"Because the being of Wolff's metaphysics is possible being, existence is not one of its essential determinants. In fact, Wolff defines existence as "... The complement of possibility. And existence is also called Actuality." (44) Because existence is neither an essential of being nor an attribute inseparable from it, existence must be regarded as a mode. Hence it will depend upon a cause outside the being which possesses it. Therefore, as Gilson observes, in the philosophy of Christian Wolff, "the sufficient reason for the actual existence of any finite being is never to be

found in that being itself; it always is to be found in another one." (45)
All this is necessary for a proper understanding of Wolff's definition of substance as a subject which is modifiable and perdurable. Because substance in Wolff's ontology is a possible being, it can be readily seen why Wolff calls it a subject which is modifiable rather than modified. The being of Wolff's metaphysics is possible being, not actual or existent being. Modes are characteristics or determinations of existent being, consequently while a substance is conceived as capable of having modes (capax aliorum), these accidental determinations are never actually possessed by it in its ontological or possible existence."
"And this is why, in the philosophy of Christian Wolff, existence is completely excluded from the field of ontology. There are special sciences to deal with all the problems related to existence and none of them is ontology. Are we interested in finding out the sufficient reason for the existence of God or for that of the world? Natural theology will give the answer. Do we want to know how those beings which make up the material world are, though contingent, yet determined? Cosmology will inform us about it. Are we wondering how, in the human mind, the possibles are drawn from potency to act? Psychology holds the key to that problem. When today we make use of the term, 'ontology,' what it means to us is just the same as 'metaphysics.' Not so in the philosophy of Wolff, who needed a new word to designate a new thing. Strictly speaking, an ontology is a metaphysics without natural theology, because it is a metaphysics without existence." (pp. 28-29)

Notes

(44) Wolff, *Philosophia prima*, No. 174.
(45) Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. 119.

From John V. Burns, *Dynamism in the Cosmology of Christian Wolff. A Study in Pre-Critical Rationalism*, New York: Exposition Press 1966.

Related pages

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Christian Wolff's Metaphysical Works: An Annotated Bibliography

A SELECTION OF WOLFF'S METAPHYSICAL WORKS

A complete bibliography of the works by Christian Wolff can be found in:

École Jean. *La métaphysique de Christian Wolff*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1990.

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   "Ce recueil est la reprise du numéro spécial que la revue Il Cannochiale a consacré à Wolff en 1989 (no 2-3), à l'initiative de deux jeunes chercheurs italiens: Sonia Carboncini et Luigi Cataldi Madonna.(...).
   Il a trouvé tout naturellement sa place dans la troisième série de notre réédition des Gesammelte Werke de Wolff qui, à côté des études les plus importantes publiées de son temps, en contiennent d'autres plus récentes. Car il est

composé de douze articles aussi intéressants que variés répartis en trois sections intitulées: Le système et la méthode, La philosophie théorique, La philosophie pratique. Sept ont trait à sa métaphysique, deux à sa morale, les trois autres respectivement à sa méthode, à sa physique et à sa conception de la société. Le tout est précédé d'une introduction dans laquelle Sonia Carboncini et Luigi Cataldi Madonna retracent l'histoire de cette réédition et celle de la partie philosophique de son œuvre, dont ils présentent de faon claire et précise les grandes lignes dans leurs rapports avec celles de ses prédécesseurs et de ses successeurs.
Ces articles, qui ont pour auteurs sept allemands, trois italiens, un hollandais et un Français , appartenant à des horizons philosophiques fort différents, attestent que l'actuel regain d'intérêt pour la pensée de Wolff n'est pas seulement le fait de quelques rares spécialistes isolés. Et l'on peut voir là le signe qu'après avoir été éclipsée par la philosophie kantienne et postkantienne, celle de Wolff, sans jamais plus connaître l'énorme succès qu'elle eut de son vivant et immédiatement après sa mort, est enfin en train de trouver sa juste place dans l'histoire des idées.
C'est en tous les cas grâce à de tels travaux qu'elle y parviendra pleinement. Et il est à souhaiter qu'ils continuent à se multiplier, afin qu'elle soit de mieux en mieux connue et qu'en particulier, pour ce qui ce du domaine métaphysique, 'on cesse d'en parler à partir des critiques de Kant qui ne connaissait guère celui-ci qu'a travers les exposés trop succincts et souvent déformants des Wolffiens infidèles que sont Baumgarten, Baumeister et Gottsched."
Et c'est dire que le champ des recherches sur Wolff, loin d'être clos, reste largement ouvert, d'autant que son œuvre est immense et véritablement encyclopédique."
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   Yet Wolff already mentions a few considerations in this first part that are extremely close to the beginning of his philosophy: he presents from the start something very similar to a cogito. Moreover the assets of this first chapter are recaptured whenever every one of the five following chapters opens. Would there be therein sufficient matter at stake to evidence that the Wolffian Metaphysics is grounded in a psychological experience?
   Hence the author tests here such a hypothesis through the successive analysis of the status of Ontology, of Logics and of empirical Psychology, through a joint reading of the *German Metaphysics* and of the *German Logics*."

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"Christian Wolff's understanding of Leibniz's monadology, framed out from his own underlying philosophical principles, had a definite and direct influence on the Eighteenth-century new elaboration of the "physical monad" theory."

24. Buchenau, Stephanie. 2004. "Sinnlichkeit Als Erkenntnisvermögen. Zum Begriff Der Vernunftähnlichen in Der Psychologie Christian Wolffs." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 197-212. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

25. Burns, John V. 1966. *Dynamism in the Cosmology of Christian Wolff. A Study in Pre-Critical Rationalism*. New York: Exposition Press.

Contents: Introduction 9; I. Substance 17; II. Bodies 51; III. The elements 83; IV Conclusion 101; Bibliography 111; Index of proper names 115; Subject index 117-122.
"Dynamsim is the theory that bodies are composed of inextended points of force. In the manuals of Scholastic philosophy this theory is listed and refuted as a fallacious attempt to account for the constitution of bodies by explaining away matter. The theory of Dynamism "culminates in the system of Leibniz, who reduced corporeal substance to units of a spiritual character *(monads)* analogous to souls. For Leibniz, extension, indeed sensible reality as a whole, is nothing more than an appearance or a symbol, and the corporeal world as such is absorbed in the spiritual.." (1)
In this analysis it is our intention to present a study of Christian Wolff's dynamic theory of substance and in particular his metaphysical foundations of the material universe.
To realize this purpose we intend first to treat Wolff's notion of *(a)* substance, *(b)* simple substance and its characteristics, and *(c)* composed being or compound

substance and its characteristics, especially as these are in contrast with the characteristics of simple substance.
The second chapter will deal with bodies and their apparent constituents: matter and motor force, as these are explained by Christian Wolff.
The third chapter will be devoted to the "elements," which Wolff contends are the true and ultimate constituent principles of bodies." p. 17
(1) Jacques Maritain, An *Introduction to Philosophy,* trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and Ward, n.d. [1931]), p. 166.

26. Campo, Mariano. 1939. *Cristiano Wolff E Il Razionalismo Precritico*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

    Two volumes. Reprint in one volume: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1980

27. Camposampiero Favaretti, Matteo. 2009. *Conoscenza Simbolica. Pensiero E Linguaggio in Christian Wolff E Nella Prima Età Moderna*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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29. ———. 2006. "Biangoli Rettilinei E Centauri: L'ontologia Di Wolff E Meinong." In *Le Ragioni Del Conoscere E Dell'agire. Scritti in Onore Di Rosaria Egidi*, edited by Calcaterra, Rosa, 44-56. Milano: Franco Angeli.

30. Carboncini, Sonia. 1989. "L'ontologia Di Wolff Tra Scolastica E Cartesianesimo." *Il Cannocchiale.Rivista di Studi Filosofici* (2-3):131-155.

    Reprinted in: Jean École (ed.) - *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne* - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 2001.

31. ———. 1991. *Transzendentale Wahrheit Und Traum. Christian Wolffs Antwort Auf Die Herausforderung Durch Den Cartesianischen Zweifel*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

32. Cataldi Madonna, Luigi. 1984. "La Metodologia Empirica Di Christian Wolff." *Il Cannocchiale.Rivista di Studi Filosofici* no. 1-2:59-93.

    Reprinted in: L. Cataldi Madonna - *Christian Wolff und das System des klassisschen Rationalismus. Die 'philosophia experimentalis universalis'* - pp. 12-46.

33. ———. 1994. "Christian Wolff E L'ermeneutica Filosofica Dell'illuminismo Tedesco." *Intersezioni.Rivista di Storia delle Idee* no. 14:393-414.

    Reprinted in: L. Cataldi Madonna - *Christian Wolff und das System des klassisschen Rationalismus. Die 'philosophia experimentalis universalis'* - pp. 175-196.

34. ———. 1999. "Il Connubio Della Ragione Con L'esperienza Come Fondamento E Scopo Del Programma Filosofico Wolffiano." In *La Filosofia Pratica Tra Metafisica E Antropologia Nell'età Di Wolff E Vico*, edited by Cacciatore, Giuseppe, Gessa-Kurotschka, Vanna, Poser, Hans and Sanna, Manuela, 111-129. Napoli: Guida.

    Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Napoli, 2-5 aprile 1997.

35. ———. 1999. "Teoria E Critica Della Ragione Nella Filosofia Di Christian Wolff." *Studi Settecenteschi* no. 19:9-34.

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Del Razionalismo Classico: La Philosophia Experimentalis Universalis. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

37. ———, ed. 2005. *Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der Vernunft. Beiträge Zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs. Gedenkband Für Hans Werner Arndt*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

38. ———, ed. 2005. *Wolffiana I: Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der Vernunft*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

    Beiträge zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs. Gedenkband für Hans Werner Arndt, mit acht Rariora.
    Vorwort; Hans Werner Arndt: Nachruf; Einleitung; Ehrenpromotion von Jean École; Plenums- und Abendvorträge.
    "Christian Wolff to whom Hans Werner Arndt devoted an important part of his life's work provides the thematic frame for this collection of commemorative essays. The articles deal with the role Wolff played in the history of philosophy, and various aspects of his metaphysics, logic, epistemology and practical philosophy. Thus, the collection becomes part of the Wolff revival initiated by Hans Werner Arndt about two decades ago.
    The authors, who share Arndt's commitment to the German philosopher, pay tribute to Arndt for the rediscovery of Christian Wolff and his work, which he made available to philosophical research.
    The supplement of this volume consists of eight lesser-known essays by Arndt. They are to demonstrate the scope of his interest in philosophy, which went far beyond Christian Wolff."

39. Ciafardone, Raffaele. 1978. *L'illuminismo Tedesco. Metodo Filosofico E Premesse Etico-Teologiche*. Rieti: Il Velino.

    Chapter IV: Ragione ed esperienza in Christian Wolff pp. 89-114; Appendix: Christian Wolff pp. 236-251.

40. ———. 1983. "Von Der Kritik an Wolff Zum Vortkritischen Kant. Wolff-Kritik Bei Rüdiger Und Crusius." In *Christian*

Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 289-305. Hamburg: Meiner.

41. ———. 1998. "Ontologia E Scienze Empiriche in Christian Wolff." *Colloquium Philosophicum.Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia* no. 3:239-256.

42. Corr, Charles A. 1970. "Certitude and Utility in the Philosophy of Christian Wolff." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* no. 1:133-142.

    "Christian Wolff is frequently caricatured as a pedant wholly devoted to rational clarity and certitude. My thesis is that Wolff's obvious interest in mathematical method, the "natural logic" of the human mind, and the rehabilitation of the categorical syllogism is in terms of their service to practical and scientific utility. This contention is supported by the way in which Wolff finds room for probability and the hypothesis in philosophy. The present article sets forth these themes."

43. ———. 1972. "Christian Wolff's Treatment of Scientific Discovery." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 10:323-334.

    "Recent interest in a 'logic of discovery' recalls similar themes in the early 18th century. One philosopher who discussed such a problem was Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Wolff sought to formulate an 'ars inveniendi' or art of discovery to supplement his logic. This article describes Wolff's incomplete notion of an art of discovery and suggests that, although he did not achieve his goal, his sensitivity to the many dimensions of the problem may continue to be helpful today."

44. ———. 1973. "The Existence of God, Natural Theology, and Christian Wolff." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* no. 4:105-118.

"This article examines some elements of 'natural theology' as conceived by one of its principal proponents, the German philosopher Christian Wolff. Topics considered are Wolff's explicit comments on the character of this discipline and its role in his philosophy, together with his twin a posteriori and a priori proofs of the existence of God. The intention is both historical, in elucidating Wolff's philosophy and some of its implications for the thought of other philosophers of his time, and problematical, in terms of the adequacy of the natural theology paradigm for a contemporary philosophical approach to the existence of God."

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46. ———. 1975. "Christian Wolff and Leibniz." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 36:241-262.

    "This article contends that the familiar stereotype of Christian Wolff as little more than a systematizer and popularizer of the doctrines of Leibniz is unsatisfactory both in itself and in the light of the available evidence. This thesis is argued by citing Wolff's own statements concerning his relationship to Leibniz, by noting some historical evidence involving the two men, and by surveying a variety of doctrinal points of difference, largely taken from Wolff's methodology and metaphysics. The effect is not so much to settle the matter but to describe the state of the problem and to call for further study."

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50. ———. 1983. "Cartesian Themes in Wolff's German Metaphysics." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 113-120. Hamburg: Meiner.

51. Croizer, Jacques. 2001. *Les Héritiers De Leibniz. Logique Et Philosophie, De Leibniz À Russell*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

See: I. L'Aufklärung 1. 'Le Maître des allemands' pp. 35-66; 2. Le mouvement de l'Aufklärung pp. 67-73.

52. Drechsler, Wolfgang. 1997. "Christian Wolff (1679-1754) a Biographical Essay." *European Journal of Law and Economics* no. 4:111-128.

"This essay narrates chronologically the life of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), arguably the most eminent German philosopher between Leibniz and Kant, and an important figure in the development of thought about the state and its tasks as well as about the national economy. It is the first longer biographical sketch of Wolff in English, other than skeletal encyclopedia entries, since 1934, and the first original English one since 1910. Special attention is paid to

Wolff's formal honors, academic calls, salary questions, and the political, historical, and academic background, and particularly to his ennoblement, as Wolff may well have been the first scholar to receive such a high Imperial recognition on the basis of his scholarly work alone."

53. Eichards, Robert J. 1980. "Christian Wolff's Prolegomena to Empirical and Rational Psychology: Translation and Commentary." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* no. 124:227-239.

54. Engfer, Hans-Jürgen. 1982. *Philosophie Als Analysis. Studien Zur Entwicklung Philosophischer Analysiskonzeptionen Unter Dem Einfluss Mathematischer Methodenmodelle Im 17. Und Fruhen 18. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

    See Chapter V. Synthetische und analytische Methodenansätze bei Wolff pp. 219-263.

55. ———. 1983. "Zur Bedeutung Wolffs Für Die Methdendiskussion Der Deutschen Aufklärungsphilosophie. Analytische Und Synthtische Methode Bei Wolff Und Beim Vorkritischen Kant." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 48-65. Hamburg: Meiner.

56. Euler, Werner. 2004. "Bewusstsein, Seele, Geist. Untersuchungen Zut Transformation Der Cartesischen 'Cogito' in Der Psychologie Christian Wolffs." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 11-50. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

57. Fabbianelli, Faustino, Goubet, Jean-Franois, and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, eds. 2011. *Wolffiana IV. Zwischen Grundsãtzen Und Gegestãnden. Untersuchungen Zur Ontologie Christian Wolffs*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

"This volume embodies the new and lively interest in Christian Wolff which has been continuously developing over recent decades. It also bears witness to the rediscovery of ontology, a field of knowledge which has become increasingly visible, especially in recent years, in international philosophical reflection. The volume contains papers in German, French and Italian given at the international conference "Età dei Lumi e filosofia. L'ontologia di Christian Wolff", held in Parma from 19-21 February 2009. It is divided into six sections: "Structure and properties of Wolff's ontology", "'Signs'", "'Designation' and 'Ficta'", "Ontology in Wolff's thought", "Ontological debates", "The fate of Wolff's ontology" and "Wolff's ontology in the 20th century". The essays are complemented by an editors' introduction, an extensive bibliography and an index of names and subjects."

58. Favaretti Camposampiero, Matteo. 2009. *Conoscenza Simbolica. Pensiero E Linguaggio in Christian Wolff E Nella Prima Età Kantiana*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

59. Findlay, John Niemeyer. 1981. *Kant and the Transcendental Object*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    See Chapter II. The historical background of Kant's critical teaching. 1. The metaphysical principles of Leibniz and Wolff from the abiding background of Kant's thought, even when they are only used to prove certain characters of experienced objects to be phenomenal 29; II. Main points in Wolff's ontology 38; III. Main points in Wolff's cosmology and rational psychology 46; IV. Main points in Wolff's rational theology 52-57.

60. Frängsmyr, Tore. 1975. "Christian Wolff's Mathematical Method and Its Impact on the Eighteenth Century." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 36:653-668.

    "Christian Wolff is often regarded to be one of the most influential philosophers of the 18th century, but yet he is ignored or treated very briefly in modern histories of

philosophy. This paper will try to give an answer to this problem and also to specify what kind of influence Wolff had."

61. Gerlach, Hans-Martin, ed. 2001. *Christian Wolff. Seine Schule Und Seine Gegner*. Hamburg: Meiner.

62. Gerlach, Hans-Martin, Schenk, Günter, and Thaler, Burchard, eds. 1980. *Christian Wolff Als Philosoph Der Aufklärung in Deutschland*. Halle-Wittenberg: Wissenschaftspublizistik der Martin-Luther-Universität.

    Hallesches Wolff-Kolloquium 1979 anlässlich der 300. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages.

63. Gilson, Étienne. 1948. *L'être Et L'essence*. Paris: Vrin.

    Second revised edition 1962.
    See the Appendix: *Aux origines de l'ontologie* pp. 141-183.

64. ———. 1949. *Being and Some Philosophers*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

    Second revised edition 1952.
    Chapter IV. Existence versus Being pp. 108-155.

65. Gómez Tutor, Juan Ignacio. 2004. *Die Wissenschaftliche Methode Bei Christian Wolff*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

    "The scientific method stands at the centre of all Wolff's work. It forms the programme which gives his whole philosophy its decisive characteristics. This monograph offers the first comprehensive analysis of Wolff's method. It enables us to understand that Wolff's conception of his scientific method was the result of a long process which was still not complete even in his later works. Such a finding contradicts both the prevalent myth of Wolff as a monolithic figure who never underwent any intellectual development and the easy verdict of much scholarship that Wolff's Latin works are simply a repetition of his German ones. At the same time this book emphasises Wolff's importance for the

theory of method and broadens our current perspective on the scientific method."

66. Goubet, Jean-Franois. 2002. "Fondement, Principes Et Utilité De La Connaissance. Sur La Notion Wolffienne De Système." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 65:81-103.

67. ———. 2003. "Psychologie Et Métaphysique. Autour De Christian Wolff." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 128:275-277.

68. ———. 2003. "Force Et Facultés De L'âme Dans La *Metaphysique Allemande*." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 193:337-350.

69. ———. 2005. "La Traduction De La Métaphysique Allemande Du Xviiie Siècle." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 195:523-536.

    "The major works of XVIIIth century German metaphysics (Wolff, Crusius, Bilfinger, Baumgarten, Meier, Lambert) have not been recently translated into French. The translation of those texts must first take into account the circulation between languages (Latin, German, French) which characterizes them but, above all, should let the proper metaphysical meaning of the notions surge. Thus, one should be led to specify more precisely the meaning of *Deutlichkeit* and *Evidenz*, to distinguish between *Vermögen* and *Kraft*, and to tell whether *Beschaffenheit* means something like *Wesen* or something like *Natur*. One will also have to ponder over *Zusammenhang, Erklärung, auseinandersetzen*, etc. Such is the price to be paid so as to be able to drag away Wolff and others like him from the unfair disrepute they fell."

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71. Gracia, Jorge J.E. 1993. "Christian Wolff on Individuation." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 10:147-164.

Reprinted in: Kenneth F. Barber and Jorge J. E. Gracia (eds.) - *Individuation and identity in early modern philosophy* - Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994 pp. 219-244.
"This article is divided into three parts. First, I examine briefly the nature of Wolff's "Ontology", its method, and the place that the discussion of individuality and individuation occupies in the overall structure of the text. Second, I present and characterize Wolff's view of individuation. Finally, I explore the extent to which Wolff's theory of individuation displays the influence of the epistemologism prevalent in modern philosophy. I defend two main theses. First, I claim that Wolff's theory of individuation is a bundle view with a strong accidental component. Second, I argue that the
influence of the epistemologism of modern philosophy is one of the factors that led Wolff to adopt the view of individuation that he did."

72. Grapotte, Sophie; and Prunea-Bretonnet, Tinca, eds. 2011. *Kant Et Wolff. Héritages Et Ruptures*. Paris: Vrin.

73. Gurr, John Edwin. 1959. *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems 1750-1900*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

See: *The point of departure in Leibniz and Wolff* pp. 11-49. "In this treatment of Wolff we will consider his use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason under three general headings suggested by his own arrangement of the matter, especially in the *Ontology*. 1. We shall see it presented as one of the twin pillars of philosophy, functioning as an axiom basic to his system, but subordinate to the Principle of Contradiction, and with the ultimate meaning of *ratio* derived from the system itself. 2. This will be followed by a quick glance at Wolff's history of the Principle and his theory of its origin. 3. The analysis will conclude with a view of the Principle in the overall context of Wolff's metaphysics and method." p. 35

74. Heimsoeth, Heinz. 1956. *Studien Zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Metaphysische Ursprünge Und Ontologische Grundlagen*. Karlsruhe: Müller.

See: *Christian Wolffs Ontologie und die Prinzipienforschung Immanuel Kants. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* pp. 1-92

75. Hinske, Norbert. 1983. "Wolffs Stellung in Der Deutschen Aufklärung." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 306-319. Hamburg: Meiner.

76. ———. 1999. "La Psicologia Empirica Di Wolff E L'antropologia Pragmatica Di Kant. La Fondazione Di Una Nuova Scienza Empirica." In *La Filosofia Pratica Tra Metafisica E Antropologia Nell'età Di Wolff E Vico*, edited by Cacciatore, Giuseppe, Gessa-Kurotschka, Vanna, Poser, Hans and Sanna, Manuela, 207-224. Napoli: Guida.

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See: Dritter Teil. Metaphysik als Ontologie: Die Explickation der Seiendheit als *non contradictio* bei Christian Wolff pp. 295-381.

79. Kim, Chang Won. 2004. *Der Begriff Der Welt Bei Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius Und Kant. Eine Untersuchung Zur Vorgeschichte Von Kants Weltbegriff Von 1770*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Contents: *Ch. Wolff:* Der Glaube an die Macht der Vernunft in seiner Metaphysik - Die Bedeutung des Begriffs «allgemein» in seiner allgemeinen Kosmologie - Seine Kosmologie liefere sowohl der natürlichen Theologie als auch den Naturwissenschaften sichere Grundlagen - Die Analysis seiner Weltbegriffe - Die Gründe für die Veränderungen innerhalb der Definition des Weltbegriffs - Der Einwand Joachim Langes - *A. G. Baumgarten:* Der Begriff der Welt - Die negative Formulierung des Totalitätsbegriffs als *series, quae non est pars alterius* - Der Wegfall der Begriffe *inter se connexum, simultanea* und *successiva* - Das Problem seiner Verwendung des Begriffs *actuale* bei der Definition der Welt - *Ch. A. Crusius:* Der wesentliche Unterschied seiner neuen «metaphysischen Kosmologie» von der Wolffschen - Der Weltbegriff und der Begriff der realen Verknüpfung - *Kant:* Die Frage nach dem Kontext der Definition der Welt in der Dissertation von 1770 - Das Hauptthema der Dissertation - Die ältere Version des Begriffs des Grundes der Form der Welt - Die veränderte Auffassung vom Raum - Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Sensibilen und dem Intelligibilen - Der Grund der Form der Verstandeswelt und die Gründe der Form der Sinnenwelt - Die Definition der Welt in der Dissertation von 1770.

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    "The background of the paper is the question after the sources of Kantian philosophy in the field of logic. This question refers to a second question whether Kant knew the consequences of the analytic logic of Leibniz directly from Leibniz's writings or indirectly from the logic of Christian Wolff and his adherents. As a result of the investigation it could be demonstrated that there are basic differences between Leibniz and Wolff in the field of logic and that these differences are based in fundamentally different positions of the two philosophers."

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92. ———. 1977. "I Primi Principi Della Metafisica Di Christian Wolff." In *Ermeneutica, Logica E Altri Saggi*, edited by Giacon, Carlo, 195-232. Padova: Antenore.

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95. ———, ed. 2007. *Wolffiana III: Christian Wolff Tra Psicologia Empirica E Psicologia Razionale*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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    "The comparison of *Psychologia empirica* and *Psychologia rationalis* is one of the themes which are of fundamental importance to the understanding of Christian Wolff's philosophy. As is generally known, the terms themselves go back to the two major Latin works first published in 1732 and 1734. Contrary to the prevalent opinion which has viewed the difference between *Psychologia empirica* and *Psychologia rationalis* as purely a matter of tradition, here it is viewed rather as a distinction formulated in a specific way for Wolff and arising from the encounter between modern metaphysics and new scientific methods. Following the celebrations in 2004 to mark the 250th anniversary of Wolff's death, a scholarly conference took place at the University of Verona in 2005 with the aim of reconstructing this theme for the interpretation of a way of thinking which is too easily interpreted as the clearest example of an abstract and dogmatic rationalism. In the essays published here attention is drawn instead to the central role of experience which allows a continual comparison of psychic facts and philosophical considerations. From this comes the importance of the comparison with Locke and Malebranche, as well as analyses of what are known as ideales sensuales or typical processes of imagination and of symbolic language, and the possibility of the application of mathematics to psychometrics. Historically-based comparisons (Alsted, Baumgarten, Meier, Kant, Herbart) are also present, illuminating the afterlife of a way of thinking which surely prepared the ground for the development of a new philosophical anthropology."

96. ———, ed. 2007. *Christian Wolff Tra Psicologia Empirica E Psicologia Razionale*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Atti del seminario internazionale di studi, Verona, 13-14 maggio 2005

97. Merker, Nicolao. 1967. "Cristiano Wolff E La Metodologia Del Razionalismo (Prima Parte)." *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* no. 22:271-293.

98. ———. 1968. "Cristiano Wolff E La Metodologia Del Razionalismo (Seconda Parte)." *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* no. 23:21-38.

99. Morrison, James C. 1993. "Christian Wolff's Criticism of Spinoza." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 31:405-420.

100. Mugnai, Massimo. 2005. "Logic and Mathematics in the 18th Century: Before and after Christian Wolff." In *Wolffiana 1: Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der Vernunft: Beiträge Zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs; Gedenkband Für Hans Werner Arndt*, edited by Cataldi Madonna, Luigi, 97-109. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

101. Paccioni, Jean-Paul. 2002. "L'aptitude À Exister Et La Métaphysique Wolffienne." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 65:65-80.

102. ———. 2003. "Wolff, L'expérience Et La Raison Non Pure." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 128:307-322.

"This paper analyzes how experience, both a priori and a posteriori knowledge, are articulated in Christian Wolff's work. It thus shows that the pattern opposing rationalism to empiricism cannot be applied to the latter. After having studied Tschirnhaus' influence, then Leibniz' on Wolff, the research carries forward on how the latter considers intuitive knowledge. Thus does appear the part played according to Wolff by perception in the building of notions and the status he grants to the latters. Hence the status of

both meaning of, and part played by, the "non pure" reason."

103. ———. 2003. "Dieu Dans Le Miroir. Leibniz, Wolff Et L'actualisation Du Monde." *Études Philosophiques* no. 66:371-387.

"This study aims to show how Wolff differs from Leibniz, in the context of *Deutsche Metaphysik* regarding the theme of world actualization. In this new context, the mirror metaphor must be applied more traditionally to all creatures, and the workings of the best of all possible worlds principle must be reviewed. It is on the basis of these transformations that the theory of universal harmony and the causality problem were transmitted to Kant."

104. ———. 2004. ""Wolff Est-Il Le Vrai Inventeur De La Psychologie Rationelle?" L'expérience, L'existence Actuelle Et La Rationalité Dans Le Projet Wolffien De Psychologie." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 77-100. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

105. ———. 2006. *Cet Ésprit De Profondeur. Christian Wolff L'ontologie Et La Métaphysique*. Paris: Vrin.

106. ———. 2007. "Leibniz, Wolff Et Les Monades Science Et Métaphysique." *Revue de Synthèse* no. 128:275-278.

107. ———. 2007. "Leibniz, Wolff Et La Métaphysique Traitée Selon La Méthode Scientifique." *Revue de Synthèse* no. 128:295-310.

"Wolff's philosophy is often defined by commentators as 'dogmatic Leibnizism'. However, if we try to read the expression in a positive light, we discover what exactly distinguishes Wolff's metaphysics from that of Leibniz, thereby establishing Wolff's real contribution to the history of thought. First of all, the notion of 'dogma' presented in

Wolff's philosophy is analyzed. This notion recalls the demonstrative model provided by mathematics and especially, Euclid's *Elements*. According to axiomatic patterns, ontology is thought of as the 'first philosophy'. This aspect cannot be separated from the function of a posteriori knowledge in Wolff's thinking. This permits us to comprehend the function of ontology, Wolff's cosmology, and his invention of the notion of 'teleology'."

108. Paganini, Gianni. 1994. "Psychologie Et Langage Chez Ch. Wolff." In *Aufklärung Und Erneuerung. Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Universität Halle Im Ersten Jahrundert Ihres Bestehens (1694-1806)*, edited by Jerouschek, Günter and Sames, Arno, 118-124. Hanau: Dausien.

109. Paolinelli, Marco. 1971. *Fisico-Teologia E Principio Di Ragion Sufficiente. Boyle, Maupertuis, Wolff, Kant*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

110. ———. 1974. "Metodo Matematico E Ontologia in Christian Wolff." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 66:3-39.

111. Pape, Ingetrud. 1966. *Tradition Und Transformation Der Modalität. I. Möglichkeit - Unmöglichkeit*. Hamburg: Meiner.

    See: Christian wolff pp. 174-216.

112. Park, Jeongwoo. 2007. "Le Débat Wolffien Sur L'idéalisme De Leibniz Lors De La Première Diffusion De La Monadologie Latine." *Revue de Synthèse* no. 128:325-340.

113. Paz, Bogusław. 2001. "Christian Wolffs Ontologie: Ihre Voraussetzungen Und Hauptdimensionen (Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Philosophie Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz)." In *Christian Wolff. Seine Schule Und Seine Gegner*, edited by Gerlach, Hans-Martin, 27-49. Hamburg: Meiner.

114. Peursen, Cornelis-Anthonie van. 1983. "Ars Inveniendi in Rahmen Der Metaphysik Christian Wolffs. Die Rolle Der Ars Inveniendi." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 66-88. Hamburg: Meiner.

115. ———. 1987. "Christian Wolff's Philosophy of Contingent Reality." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 25:69-82.

"Was the rejection by Wolff of the classification of the "Leibniz-wolffian philosophy" justified? This article draws attention to the notion of "contingency" in Wolff as distinguishing him from Leibniz. The "possible worlds" of Leibniz are overpopulated with events, those of Wolff are empty. For Leibniz contingent existence is the highest grade of possibility, for Wolff it needs, however, a "complementum possibilitatis." Wolff is not a pure rationalist but he defends the "marriage between ratio and experience"."

116. Pichler, Hans. 1910. *Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie*. Leipzig: Dürr.

117. Pimpinella, Pietro. 1984. ""Spiritus" Nella *Psychologia Rationalis* Di Christian Wolff." In *Spiritus. IV Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 7-9 Gennaio 1983*, edited by Fattori, Marta and Bianchi, Massimo, 429-447. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, vol. 32

118. ———. 2002. "Experientia / Erfahrung." In *Experientia. X Colloquio Internazionale, Roma, 4-6 Gennaio 2001*, edited by Veneziani, Marco, 367-397. Firenze: Olschki.

Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 91

119. ———. 2004. "Ontologia E Logica in Christian Wolff." In *Metafisica Logica Filosofia Della Natura. I Termini Delle Categorie Aristoteliche Dal Mondo Antico All'età Moderna*,

edited by Canone, Eugemio, 343-373. Sarzana: Agorà Edizioni.

120. Poli, Roberto. 1992. "Twardowski and Wolff." In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 45-56. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.

121. Poser, Hans. 1975. "Zum Begriff Der Monade Bei Leibniz Und Wolff." In *Akten Des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses Hannover 17-22 Juli 1972*, 383-395. Wiesbaden: Steiner.

Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 14 (vol. 3).

122. ———. 1979. "Die Bedeutung Des Begriffs "Ahnlichkeit" in Der Metaphysik Christian Wolffs." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 11:62-81.

"The concept of similarity is used to exemplify in what way Wolff conveys a new content to a traditional concept. Similarity functions in his system as a link between a priori ontology and a posteriori knowledge, because it is similarity on which relies Wolff's theory of abstraction, his doctrine of order (which also includes the concepts of perfection, of space and time) and even his characterization of human faculties of knowing (e. g., expectation of similar events, wit and penetration)."

123. ———. 1983. "Mögliche Erkenntnis Der Möglichkeit. Die Transformation Der Modalkategorien Der Wolffschen Schule in Kants Kritischer Philosophie." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 20:129-147.

124. ———. 2005. "Zwischen Kants Kritik Und Leibniz' Lösung : Christian Wolffs "Complementum Possibilitatis"." In *Wolffiana 1: Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der Vernunft: Beiträge Zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs; Gedenkband Für Hans Werner Arndt*, edited by Cataldi Madonna, Luigi, 185-203. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

125. Puech, Michel. 1990. *Kant Et La Causalité. Étude Sur La Formation Du Système Critique*. Paris: Vrin.

See: II. La question de la causalité dans la métaphysique allemande; 2. Le système de Wolff pp. 72-91; 3. Les manuels des wolffiens pp. 91-106; 4. Les arguments des anti-wolffiens pp. 106-117; 5. L'éclectisme des post-wolffiens pp. 117-127.

126. Rey, Anne-Lise. 2004. "Ontologie Et Psychologie Dans La Pensée De Christian Wolff: La Raison De L'actualisation." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 101-122. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

127. Ricken, Ulrich. 1989. *Leibniz, Wolff Und Einige Sprachtheoretische Entwicklungen in Der Deutschen Aufklärung*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

128. Risse, Wilhelm. 1970. *Die Logik Der Neuzeit*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

Vol. II: 1640-1780.
See: *Wolff und seine Schule* pp. 579-659.

129. Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre. 2003. "Mémoire, Réflexion Et Conscience Chez Christian Wolff." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 128:351-360.

130. ———. 2004. "Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs Und Die Scholastische Tradition." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 243-256. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

131. Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, and Goubet, Jean-Franois, eds. 2004. *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

132. Ruello, Francis. 1963. "Christian Wolff Et La Scolastique." *Traditio.Studies in Ancient and Medieval History* no. 19:411-425.

133. Rumore, Paola. 2007. *L'ordine Delle Idee. La Genesi Del Concetto Di "Rappresentazione" in Kant Attraverso Le Sue Fonti Wolffiane (1747-1787)*. Firenze: Le Lettere.

134. Rutherford, Donald. 2004. "Idealism Declined: Leibniz and Christian Wolff." In *Leibniz and His Correspondents*, edited by Lodge, Paul, 214-237. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

135. Saine, Thomas. 1987. "Who's Afraid of Christian Wolff?" In *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*, edited by Kors, Alan Charles and Korshin, Paul J., 102-133. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

136. Scaglione, Aldo. 1980. "Direct Vs. Inverted Order: Wolff and Condillac on the Necessity of the Sign and the Interrelationship of Language and Thinking." *Romance Philology* no. 33:496-501.

137. Schneiders, Werner, ed. 1983. *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*. Hamburg: Meiner.

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138. ———. 1983. *Auflkärung Und Vorurteilskritik. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Vorurteilstheorie*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

See: IV. Gnoseologische Vorurteilskritik 155-202; V. Pragmatische Vorurteilskritik 203-262.

139. ———. 1983. "Deus Est Philosophus Absolute Summus: Über Christian Wolffs Philosophie Und Philosophiebegriff."

In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 9-30. Hamburg: Meiner.

140. ———. 1989. "Christian Wolff Über Verstand Und Vernunft." *Il Cannocchiale.Rivista di Studi Filosofici*:39-59.

    Reprinted in: S. Carboncini, L. Cataldi Madonna (eds.) - *Nuovi studi sul pensiero di Christian Wolff* - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1989

141. Schnepf, Robert. 2007. "Allgemeine Metaphysik Als Erste Philosophie. Zum Problem Kategorialer Begriffsbildung in Christian Wolffs Ontologie." In *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 1*, edited by Stolzenberg, Jürgen and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, 181-203. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

142. Schonfeld, Martin. 2002. "Christian Wolff and Leibnizian Monads." *Leibniz Review* no. 12:131-135.

143. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 2006. "Critique Et Réfondation De La Métaphysique Chez Kant: Les Progrès De La Métaphysique Et La Critique Du Système Leibniziano-Wolffien." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 69:567-599.

    "In his late writing, *The Progresses of Metaphysics* (1791) Kant is summarizing all his metaphysics whilst criticizing traditional metaphysics and, above all, the Leibniz-Wolff's system (which is, according to him, its summit). Because *finiteness* of human thinking is occurring, traditional metaphysics -- affair of reason and logic -- is revealed to be *void*. Kant then refunds metaphysics on that what is *given* (the pure intuitions, the moral law of liberty and, in a certain sense, the empiricism of sensible world) for to hinder its "sinking into the nothing". He distinguishes three states of metaphysics: its "sure progress" in critical transcendental "ontology", its "skeptical stop" in speculative cosmology and its moral practical progress to the

supersensible ideas (before all of God and immorality). Metaphysics, elevating so itself to the supersensible and considering from it the sensible world, is then proving itself to be a knowledge which is fundamentally *different* from all ontical empirical knowledge."

144. Senn, Peter. 1997. "What Is the Place of Christian Wolff in the History of the Social Sciences?" *European Journal of Law and Economics* no. 4:147-232.

Reprinted in: Jürgen Backhaus (ed.) - *Christian Wolff and Law and Economics. The Heilbronn Symposium* - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1998, pp. 37-122.
"This paper explores the place of Christian Wolff in the history of social science in English. The "Introduction" places Wolff in the context of the pre-history of modern social science. Samples are given of the great range of subjects on which he wrote. The importance of the German context is stressed. The second part is devoted to a sample of what the literature contains by and about Wolff. It emphasizes philosophy and science. Part three is a survey of works in the history of the social sciences that mention Wolff. He has a substantial place in political science and psychology, a much smaller place in economics and history, virtually none in anthropology, geography, and sociology. In the applied social sciences, he is found in the history of education. Possible reasons are given. Part four is devoted to the relationships of philosophy and philosophers in the pre-history of the social sciences. They were important in several different ways because they both shaped and reflected how many people thought about science and social problems. The "Summary and Conclusion" describes the present status. His contributions are summarized. He was a pivotal figure in the making of the German conception of social science. This is a preliminary study emphasizing the issues and problems that a more detailed examination would require. Several conventional judgments are challenged and possibilities for further research suggested."

145. Stiening, Gideon. 2004. ""Partes Metaphysicae Sunt Duae: Deues & Mentes". Anmerkungen Zur Entstehung Und Entwicklung Der Psychologie Als *Metaphysica Specialis* Zwischen Rudolph Goclenius Und Christian Wolff." In *Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische Und Historische Untersuchungen*, edited by Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre and Goubet, Jean-Franois, 213-232. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

146. Stolzenberg, Jürgen, and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 1*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4-8 April 2004.
Vorwort, Nachruf auf Hans Werner Arndt, Einleitung, Ehrenpromotion von Jean Ecole, Plenums- und Abendvorträge.

147. ———, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 2*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4-8 April 2004.
System der Metaphysik. Logik. Ontologie. Psychologie. Inhalt: Sektionsvorträge. SEKTION i: SYSTEM DER METAPHYSIK. Oliver-Pierre Rudolph: Das Fundament des Wolffschen Systems der Philosophie 15; Thierry Arnaud: La fondation de la Theologie naturelle dans le systeme de la Métaphysique allemande 25; Henry Alexander Henrysson: Purposes, Possibilities and Perfection. The Metaphysical System of Leibniz and Wolff 39; Violetta L. Waibel: Die Systemkonzeptionen bei Wolff und Lambert 51; Jindrich Karásek: Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Zur systematischen Begründung des Systems der Metaphysik bei Wolff und Kant 71; Cornelia Buschmann: Scientia affectiva practica - scientia practica universalis - scientia possibilium. Wolffs Wissenschaftsbegriff - Prolegomenon oder Abbreviatur der Metaphysik? 99; SEKTION 2: LOGIK. Juan Ignacio Gómez Tutor: Die wissenschaftliche Methode

bei Christian Wolff 113; Ursula Neemann: Der Zusammenhang zwischen formalen und ontologischen Aspekten in der Urteilstheorie von Christian Wolff 124; Jean-Francois Goubet: Das Verhältnis zwischen mathematischer Methode und Logik 141; Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero: Usage des mots et connaissance symbolique
chez Christian Wolff 153; Luigi Cataldi Madonna: Erfahrung und Intuition in der Philosophie von Christian Wolff 173; Vadim Kurpakov: Zum Einfluss von Wolff und Wolffianem auf die Kantische Logik 195; Hanno Birken-Bertsch: Erfahrung, Subreption und Idealismus. Von Wolff zu Kant 205; Konstantin Pollok: Christian Wolffs Begriffs- und Urteilstheorie als Vorläufer einer inferentiellen Semantik 219; SEKTION 3: ONTOLOGIE. Anne-Lise Rey: La lecture wolffienne de la Dynamique leibnizienne. Un moyen d'identifier la specificité de la notion de substance chez Wolff 237; Bogusław Paz: Methode und Wahrheit bei Wolff 219; Vitaly IVanov: Principium omnium primum. Zur Frage nach der Stellung des Widerspruchsprinzips in der Ordnung der Explikation des Begriffs des Seienden in der Wissenschaft der Ontologie 273; Jeongwoo Park: Metaphysik des Spielraums. Wolffs Neubestimmung des Eventusbegriffs hinsichtlich des Seienden, des Systems und der Freiheit, insbesondere gegen Spinoza 291; Carlos Morujäo: Wolff, Kant und der Begriff der Existenz 301; Nelly Motroschilova: Kritik des 20. Jahrhunderts am ontologischen Projekt Christian Wolffs 311; SEKTION 4: PSYCHOLOGIE.
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Gedächtnistheorie von Christian Wolff und der Wolff-Schule 391; Raffaele Ciafardone:
Kraft und Vermögen bei Christian Wolff und Johann Nicolaus Tetens mit Beziehung auf Kant 405;
Siglenverzeichnis 415-420.

148. ———, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 3*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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Kosmologie. Theologie. Praktische Philosophie.

149. ———, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 4*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften. Ästhetik und Poetik.

150. ———, eds. 2010. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 5*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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Wolff und seine Schule. Wirkungen Wolffs. Wolff in Halle. Verttreibung und Rückkerhr.

151. Theis, Robert. 2004. "Significations Et Limites De La Pensée Du Fondement Chez Christian Wolff." *Études Germaniques* no. 59:41-61.

152. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1967. "Christian Wolff." In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edwards, Paul, 340-344. New York: Macmillan.

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153. ———. 1971. "The 'Weakness of Reason' in the Age of Enlightenment." *Diderot Studies* no. 14:217-244.

154. ———. 1975. "The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in Kant's Time." *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* no. 30:243-294.

On Wolff see pp. 243-250.

155. ———. 1976. "Analysis and Synthesis in Xviiith Century Philosophy Prior to Kant." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 20:178-213.

156. Ungeheuer, Gerold. 1983. "Sprache Und Symbolische Erkenntnis Bei Wolff." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen Zu Seiner Philosophie Und Deren Wirkung Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 89-112. Hamburg: Meiner.

157. Verducci, Daniela. 1982. "Esperienza E Ragione Nella *Metafisica Latina* Di Christian Wolff." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 5:485-504.

158. Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis. 1973. "A Propos Des Manuscrits D'émile Ravier Sur Wolff." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 28:39-44.

"Émile Ravier, auteur de la celebre bibliographie de Leibniz, a laissé un très riche ensemble de manuscrits sur Wolff, ainsi qu'une traduction complete en Français de l'ouvrage de Mariano Campo, *Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo precritico*. On a montré les rapports de Wolff à Leibniz d'apres les manuscrits d'Émile Ravier, qui revelent que Wolff ne voulut jamais être le porte-parole de la pensée leibnizienne en Allemagne. Il serait possible à partir de là de detruire le mythe du "leibniziano-wolffisme" dont parle Kant pour le refuter."

159. Vitadello, Anna Maria. 1973. "Experience Et Raison Dans La Psychologie De Christian Wolff." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 71:488-511.

"Cet éxposé de la psychologie de Christian Wolff adopte un point de vue descriptif et épistémologique. Le but de

l'auteur fut de saisir la psychologie wolffienne dans l'intentionalité de son langage, qui, tout en restant philosophique et même substantialiste, laisse entrevoir une direction assez nette dans l'ensemble. Celle-ci prefigure, d'une faon lointaine mais significative, la psychologie de laboratoire; c'est-a-dire une science qui traite empiriquement de l'expérience psychologique au moyen de l'introspection et sur le modèle des sciences de la nature, en s'appuyant sur un dualisme tranché. Tout en suggerant les apories où s'engage une methode introspective en psychologie, cette analyse s'est tenue cependant a un propos introductif."

160. Wille, Dagmar von. 1991. *Lessico Filosofico Della Fruhaufklarung: Christian Thomasius, Christian Wolff, Johann Georg Walch*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

161. Zedler, Heinrich. 2001. *"Wolff (Christian)" Und "Wolffische Philosophie"*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

    Two articles from H. Zendler's *Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste* (Leipzig and Halle 1748). Preface by Jean École.

162. Zingari, Guido. 1980. "Die Philosophie Von Leibniz Und Die "Deutsche Logik" Von Christian Wolff." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 12:265-278.

    "In this paper the possibility of comparing some speculative positions of Leibniz and Wolff concerning logic and theory of knowledge is considered on the basis of a reading of the *Deutsche Logik* especially as it refers to Leibniz. The affinities and above all the diversities of the conclusion, to which the two philosophers come, emerge from this reading. Theoretical presuppositions, such as the reduction of the critical exigency to Wolff's method or the method of analysis in Leibniz, are to be seen against Cartesian teaching. While undeniably ignoring the most original acquisitions of Leibniz's logic and theory of knowledge, from the symbolic assumption to implicit thoughts, and under the influence of

English empiricism, Wolff elaborates a complex notion of experience which aims at is own autonomous validity."

WOLFFIANA: A MULTI-VOLUME COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON CHRISTIAN WOLFF

1. Cataldi Madonna, Luigi, ed. 2005. *Wolffiana I. Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der Vernunft*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

   Beiträge zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs. Gedenkband für Hans Werner Arndt, mit acht Rariora.
   Vorwort; Hans Werner Arndt: Nachruf; Einleitung; Ehrenpromotion von Jean École; Plenums- und Abendvorträge.
   "Christian Wolff to whom Hans Werner Arndt devoted an important part of his life's work provides the thematic frame for this collection of commemorative essays. The articles deal with the role Wolff played in the history of philosophy, and various aspects of his metaphysics, logic, epistemology and practical philosophy. Thus, the collection becomes part of the Wolff revival initiated by Hans Werner Arndt about two decades ago.
   The authors, who share Arndt's commitment to the German philosopher, pay tribute to Arndt for the rediscovery of Christian Wolff and his work, which he made available to philosophical research.
   The supplement of this volume consists of eight lesser-known essays by Arndt. They are to demonstrate the scope of his interest in philosophy, which went far beyond Christian Wolff."

2. Stolzenberg, Jürgen, and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 1*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4-8 April 2004.
Vorwort, Nachruf auf Hans Werner Arndt, Einleitung, Ehrenpromotion von Jean Ecole, Plenums- und Abendvorträge.

3. ———, eds. 2007. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung*. *Teil 2*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

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   System der Metaphysik. Logik. Ontologie. Psychologie.
   Inhalt: Sektionsvorträge. SEKTION i: SYSTEM DER METAPHYSIK. Oliver-Pierre Rudolph: Das Fundament des Wolffschen Systems der Philosophie 15; Thierry Arnaud: La fondation de la Theologie naturelle dans le systeme de la Métaphysique allemande 25; Henry Alexander Henrysson: Purposes, Possibilities and Perfection. The Metaphysical System of Leibniz and Wolff 39; Violetta L. Waibel: Die Systemkonzeptionen bei Wolff und Lambert 51; Jindrich Karásek: Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Zur systematischen Begründung des Systems der Metaphysik bei Wolff und Kant 71; Cornelia Buschmann: Scientia affectiva practica - scientia practica universalis - scientia possibilium. Wolffs Wissenschaftsbegriff - Prolegomenon oder Abbreviatur der Metaphysik? 99; SEKTION 2: LOGIK. Juan Ignacio Gómez Tutor: Die wissenschaftliche Methode bei Christian Wolff 113; Ursula Neemann: Der Zusammenhang zwischen formalen und ontologischen Aspekten in der Urteilstheorie von Christian Wolff 124; Jean-Francois Goubet: Das Verhältnis zwischen mathematischer Methode und Logik 141; Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero: Usage des mots et connaissance symbolique chez Christian Wolff 153; Luigi Cataldi Madonna: Erfahrung und Intuition in der Philosophie von Christian Wolff 173; Vadim Kurpakov: Zum Einfluss von Wolff und Wolffianem auf die Kantische Logik 195; Hanno Birken-Bertsch: Erfahrung, Subreption und Idealismus. Von Wolff zu Kant 205; Konstantin Pollok: Christian Wolffs

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6. ———, eds. 2010. *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung. Teil 5*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

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   Wolff und seine Schule. Wirkungen Wolffs. Wolff in Halle. Verttreibung und Rückkerhr.

7. Marcolungo, Ferdinando, ed. 2007. *Wolffiana III. Christian Wolff Tra Psicologia Empirica E Psicologia Razionale*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

   Atti del seminario internazionale di studi, Verona, 13-14 maggio 2005.
   "The comparison of *Psychologia empirica* and *Psychologia rationalis* is one of the themes which are of fundamental importance to the understanding of Christian Wolff's philosophy. As is generally known, the terms themselves go back to the two major Latin works first published in 1732 and 1734. Contrary to the prevalent opinion which has viewed the difference between *Psychologia empirica* and *Psychologia rationalis* as purely a matter of tradition, here it is viewed rather as a distinction formulated in a specific way for Wolff and arising from the encounter between modern metaphysics and new scientific methods. Following the celebrations in 2004 to mark the 250th anniversary of Wolff's death, a scholarly conference took place at the University of Verona in 2005 with the aim of reconstructing this theme for the interpretation of a way of thinking which is too easily interpreted as the clearest example of an abstract and dogmatic rationalism. In the essays published here attention is drawn instead to the central role of experience which allows a continual comparison of psychic facts and philosophical considerations. From this comes the importance of the comparison with Locke and Malebranche, as well as analyses of what are known as ideales sensuales or

typical processes of imagination and of symbolic language, and the possibility of the application of mathematics to psychometrics. Historically-based comparisons (Alsted, Baumgarten, Meier, Kant, Herbart) are also present, illuminating the afterlife of a way of thinking which surely prepared the ground for the development of a new philosophical anthropology."
Indice: Sigle 1; Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo: Introduzione 9; Axel Bühler: Ad Hans Werner Arndt (1930-2004), *in memoriam* 13; Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo: Christian Wolff e il progetto di una psicologia filosofica 15; Jean-Francois Goubet: L'usage de la raison selon Wolff: entre logique, psychologie et anthropologie 35; Riccardo Pozzo: La logica di Wolff e la nascita della logica delle facoltà 45; Oliver-Pierre Rudolph: Aussenwelt und Aussenweltbewusstsein in der Psychologie Christian Wolffs 53; Davide Poggi: L' *Essay* di J. Locke e la *Psychologia empirica* di Christian Wolff 63; Manuela Mei: Sensazioni e *Ideae sensuales* nella filosofia di Christian Wolff 95; Luigi Cataldi Madonna: Immaginazione e arte geroglifica nella psicologia cognitiva di Christian Wolff 113; Ivan Valbusa: Psicologia e sistema in Alsted e in Wolff 131; Antonio Moretto: Matematica e psicologia empirica in Wolff 145; Clemens Schwaiger: Das Problem des Handelns wider besseres Wissen bei Wolff, Baumgarten und Meier 167; Paola Rumore: Materiali per la ricostruzione della prima diffusione e ricezione tedesca della psicologia empirica di Wolff 177; Stefano Poggi: Ontologia e psicologia: Herbart contro Wolff 195; Riccardo Martinelli: Wolff, Kant e le origini dell' antropologia filosofica 205.

8. Fabbianelli, Faustino, Goubet, Jean-Franois, and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, eds. 2011. *Wolffiana IV. Zwischen Grundsãtzen Und Gegestãnden. Untersuchungen Zur Ontologie Christian Wolffs*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

   "This volume embodies the new and lively interest in Christian Wolff which has been continuously developing over recent decades. It also bears witness to the rediscovery

of ontology, a field of knowledge which has become increasingly visible, especially in recent years, in international philosophical reflection. The volume contains papers in German, French and Italian given at the international conference "Età dei Lumi e filosofia. L'ontologia di Christian Wolff", held in Parma from 19-21 February 2009. It is divided into six sections: "Structure and properties of Wolff's ontology", "'Signs'", "'Designation' and 'Ficta'", "Ontology in Wolff's thought", "Ontological debates", "The fate of Wolff's ontology" and "Wolff's ontology in the 20th century". The essays are complemented by an editors' introduction, an extensive bibliography and an index of names and subjects."

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Siglen und Abkürzungen VII; Faustino Fabbianelli, Jean-Franois Goubet, Oliver-Pierre Rudolph: Einleitung XI.
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Selected Bibliography of Jan A. Aertsen. Writings in English

Jan Adrianus Aertsen (Amsterdam, 1938 - 2016), formerly professor of Medieval Philosophy and Modern Catholic Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam (since 1984), was the director of the *Thomas Institute* in Cologne (Germany) until 2003; his areas of interest were the history of transcendentals, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart.

A complete bibliography of his writings up to 2002 was published by Sabine Folger-Fonfara in:
Martin Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburstag*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 30), pp. XXIII-XXXII.

I give an updated bibliography with the omission of the publications in Dutch and of some minor writings.

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1. Aertsen, Jan A. 1984. *Medieval Reflections on Truth. Adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel. Inaugural address on the occasion of his taking up the chair of Medieval philosophy of the Free University in Amsterdam on November 9, 1984.
"There are certain basic words which form the undertone of our thinking and of the manner in which we experience

things. These basic words are not unchangeable; they often receive a different content . . . One such basic word is 'truth'."

This is the start of the report of the Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, issued in 1981, "On the nature of the authority of Scripture".(1) How does it happen that the Bible is read so differently? In searching for an answer to this problem, the report adopts a course remarkable within the. Reformed tradition. It poses a truly philosophical question: "What is truth?" That the Bible is read differently is related to the fact that not all people mean the same by what they call "truth".

If I want to raise this same question today, then I am in good company - though I must add at once that it is the matter rather than the company that motivates me. From the outset, that is, as early as with the Greeks, philosophy and truth are seen in an intimate connection. Aristotle, for example, describes philosophy as the "theory" of truth.(2) It is in the Middle Ages, however, that for the first time treatises appear under the title of *De veritate,* where truth itself is explicitly made the object of reflection. I would like to draw your attention to medieval observations on the query about truth.

'Adaequatio rei et intellectus' as the medieval formula of truth and the criticism of it.

Is an exposition on this theme worthwhile, though? Do we not already know what truth was in the Middle Ages? Probably there is no formulation in scholastic thought that has become more widely known. Even those who did not enjoy the privilege of a classical education are able to say that truth is *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. What is meant by that seems to be clear. The formula appears to express the "natural" idea of truth, i.e., the correspondence between thought and reality. The determination of truth as *adaequatio* has become so self-evident that, as the *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe* states, it is the point of depart and reference for all contemporary discussions on truth.(3) It can be added that this occurs mostly in a critical sense. Two examples may suffice.

In the above-mentioned synodal report the first chapter sketches the changes in the concept of truth over the course of time. The so-called subject/object relation underlies the entire exposition, apparently from the unquestioning presupposition that this relation is fundamental to the phenomenon of truth as such. The changes in the concept of truth, then, are described in three phases. Successively the report speaks of "objective truth", "subjective truth" (in systems of thought like idealism and existentialism), and finally, of a newer conception called the "relational" concept of truth - the objective and the subjective in one. This means that "truth always occurs within a relation, within the 'relatedness' of man to something else."(4) As the report claims, moreover, this relational concept of truth links up with what the Bible calls truth.

The objective concept of truth - the most current idea of truth - is represented by the medieval formula, phrased "truth is the correspondence of the human way of picturing things with the matters themselves." The human way of imagining things, the human consciousness, is like a mirror able to reflect "the objective state of affairs". This conception of truth is not only ascribed to Thomas Aquinas, but to a great variety of people: " . . . Greek philosophers, . . . the classical Reformed theologians, . . . the logician Bertrand Russell, . . . the Marxist Lenin". The drawback of this conception, in the assessment of the report, is that man is very passive. Does knowing the truth not demand man's activity, research; and wrestling? Without a human spirit there is no truth.

An entirely different criticism can be found in Heidegger, who dealt most thoroughly with the western conception of truth. The lectures he delivered at the University of Freiburg during the winter semester of 1942-43 appeared in 1982 in the *Gesamtausgabe* of his works under the title *Parmenides*.(5) Strictly speaking, the title is misleading for actually these lectures deal with the essence of truth, the identical subject that engaged Heidegger in writing *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,* which dates from the same time. In the lectures, however, there is "a more direct confrontation

with the history of western thought".(6) In his view a change in the essence and "locus" of truth has evolved in philosophy. Truth becomes "rightness" *(Richtigkeit)* of knowing and asserting; it is no longer "unconcealedness" *(aletheia)* of being, as it was for the early Greek thinkers. The medieval formulation fixes this essential transformation. " `*Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem' Im Sinne dieser Umgrenzung des Wesens der Wahrheit als Richtigkeit denkt das gesamte abendländische Denken von Platon bis zu Nietzsche.* "(7) Truth becomes a characteristic of a mental act within man. Inevitably the problem then arises how a psychical process in the inner man can be brought into agreement with things outside.(8) This traditional and current conception of truth, however, is derivative *(abkünftig)*. Parmenides' thought reveals "the road of truth, far away from the beaten track of men". *(Fragm.* B 1, 27). It can give us a reminder of the forgotten "primordial" sense of truth, the unhiddenness of being, which is the ground of the possibility of rightness. But when the proper function of philosophy is to "re-mind", we are also allowed to ask of this twofold criticism: do we recall the meaning of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus* at all? Does it have a merely derivative sense, i.e., the rightness of thought? On the other hand, does the formula imply that truth is "reflection" and leave the human mind out of account? These questions lead, me this afternoon to focus on medieval views of truth, in which the idea of the *adaequatio* plays a central role." (pp. 3-5)

Concluding observations.

Looking back over the course of this discussion, we may conclude that the criticism of the medieval *adaequatio*-formula, outlined at the beginning, did not grasp its original meaning. Neither is this conception concerned with truth in a merely derivative sense, nor does it ignore man's activity. For in the previous analysis we observed that Thomas's notion of true includes first, transcendentality, second, relationality, third, anthropocentrism, fourth, the fulfilment in an act of the intellect, fifth, the necessity of a norm and measure, sixth the intrinsic connection with the word,

seventh, the relation to the divine Logos, and finally, the identity with God Himself. These moments are implicitly or explicitly expressed in the formula *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, in which every term is charged with meaning. Compared to the breadth of this conception, modern theories appear to be a reduction of the integral process of truth. It is philosophically important to note that in the medieval approach what is fundamental to truth is not the duality of subjective and objective from which then their togetherness has to be conceived. Rather, it is the primordial conformity of being and intellect that is fundamental to truth. Indeed, as we have seen, being and thinking are the same in the Origin.

Another remarkable aspect in this medieval view is the attempt to integrate philosophical and religious truth. This endeavour runs parallel to the philosophical introduction of the synodal report of the Reformed Churches, with which I began this address. Its intention is that the "relational" concept of truth links up with what the Bible calls truth. Thomas's conception lies concretely in the notion of word, a good example of the way in which his understanding of truth is deepened by a theological reflection. But that which fundamentally enables the integration is the basic idea of the transcendentality of truth. This conception underlies his entire discussion.

The medieval doctrine of the transcendentals - being, one, true, good, and beautiful - forms "the heart of scholastic ontology and metaphysics."(93) This doctrine will be the subject of my research over the coming years. Today I wanted to present you with a sample of it.(94)

Notes:

(1) In the Dutch original, the report carries the title *God met ons . . . over de aard van het Schriftgezag*, published in: Kerkinformatie, nr. 113 (Febr. 1981). The report was translated into English by the Secretariat of the Reformed Ecumenical Synod, Grand Rapids, Mich., U.S.A.

(2) *Metaphysica* II, c. I, 993 a 30. Cf. 993 b 20.

(3) L.B. Puntel - Wahrheit, in: *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe* III, München, 1974, 1651. Cf. Th. de Boer -

De eindigheid van de mens en de oneindigheid van de waarheid. De geschiedenis van het fenomenologisch waarheidsbegrip van Brentano tot Levinas, in: *De eindige mens?*, Bilthoven, 1975, 55 f.
(4) o.c., 10 (in the English translation).
(5) Frankfurt am Main, 1982 (Gesamtausgabe II. Abteilung, Bd. 54).
(6) Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, in: *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, 73-97. See also for Heidegger's view of truth *Sein und Zeit*, VIII ed., 1957, 212 f.; Vom Wesen des Grundes, in: *Wegmarken*, 25 f.; Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, in: *id.*, 109-144; *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main, III ed., 1965, 31 f.; 107 f.; 112 f.
Cf. W. Brettschneider - *Sein und Wahrheit. Über die Zusammengehörzgkeit von Sein und Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers*, Meisenheim, 1965; J. van der Hoeven - Heidegger, Descartes, Luther, in: *Reflecties, Opstellen voor Prof. dr. J.P.A. Mekkes*, Amsterdam, 1968, 71-116; Th. de Boer - *o.c.*, 78 f.; E. Tugendhat - Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit, in: G. Skirbekk (Hrsg.) - *Wahrheitstheorien. Eine Auswahl aus den Diskussionen fiber Wahrheit im 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main, 2nd edition, 1980, 431-448.
(7) Parmenides, 73.
(8) id., 74.
(93) J.B. Lotz - Zur Konstitution der transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Sein nach Tomas von Aquin, in: *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter* (Hrsg. P. Wilpert), Berlin, 1963, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia Bd. 2) 334.
(94) Cf. my essay "The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas" to be published in *The New Scholasticism* [59, 1985, pp. 449-470]

2. ———. 1988. *Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought*. Leiden: Brill.
Translated by Herbert Donald Morton from the Dutch Dissertation *Natura en Creatura. De denkweg van Thomas van Aquino* (Amsterdam, 1982) .

Contents: List of Abbreviations XI; Preface XIII; Introduction 1; 1. From questioning towards knowing 7; 2. By the way of predication (*Per via predicationis*): Definition and participation 54; 3. By the way of causality (*Per viam causalitatis*) 92; 4. The way of truth (*Via veritatis*); 5. By the way of reason (*Per viam rationis*) 191; 6. Hodo-logy 230; 7. Principium 279; 8. Finis 337; Epilogue 391; Bibliography 397; Index Rerum 409-413.
"The study presented here is the revised version of a doctoral dissertation that was submitted to the Central Interfaculty (Faculty of Philosophy) of the Free University in Amsterdam in fulfillment of the requirements of the Doctorate of Philosophy and defended publicly on April 16, 1982. That this dissertation was originally published at a Protestant university may be considered a sign of common responsibility for a Doctor of the still undivided western Christendom." (from the Preface).
"Our aim was to develop an interpretation of the inner coherence and direction of Thomas's philosophizing. This objective was pursued by following his way of thought and by seeking to fathom the motives of his quest for intelligibility. Now that this inquiry has been brought to an end, it turns out that our investigation of Thomas's way of thought has proceeded according to the order of the transcendentals "being," "true," and "good." Their logical order, which Thomas sketches, is that "being" is the first and that "the true" and "good" come after it, in this order. For, so he argues in *S. Th.* I, 16, 4, "knowledge naturally precedes the appetite." "Being" is the first, "good" the ultimate.
From the triad "being"-"true"-" good," their convertibility, and their conceptual nonidentity a number of coherences can be brought to light that were not always signalized or worked out by Thomas himself. They are nonetheless most illuminating for the movement of Thomas's thought, and also for the course of our investigation. These coherences show that in what has preceded, a multiplicity of themes has been traversed according to a definite pattern." (p. 391)

(7) The result of Aristotle's exposition in *Metaph*. II is the thesis: "There is the same disposition of things in being and in truth" (4.3.1.). On the analogy of this thesis Thomas himself frames the statement: "There is the same disposition of things in goodness and in being" (8.1.1.). A hierarchical order can be found in being, the true, and good. Whatever is in any way and is true and is good is to be reduced to the first Being, to the maximally True and to the ultimate Good, namely, God. The causal relation of God to the world is therefore threefold. He is 'causa efficiens', 'exemplaris', and 'finalis'. With this threefold causality Thomas connects the triad of transcendental determinations 'ens (or: unum) - verum - bonum'.

This coherence of the transcendentals with the divine causality makes clear that the "anthropocentrism" in Thomas's doctrine is to be specified: man is marked by a transcendental openness, certainly, is "in a certain sense all things," but not in a constitutive sense. It is typical of the medieval approach to inquire into the origin of being, into the ground of the truth and goodness of things. This origin and ground is conceived as "creation." Every being is true and good because it is thought and willed by the Creator. The relational character of the transcendentals "true" and "good" is ultimately founded in the relation to the divine intellect and will.

The divine foundation of the transcendentals is connected by Thomas with the circulation in God Himself, the eternal coming forth of the Persons. "Being" (or: "one") is attributed by appropriation to the Father, "true" to the Son, and "good" to the Spirit. This connection with the divine Trinity provides the basis for developing a trinitarian interpretation of that which is creaturely. In the conceptual nonidentity of the transcendentals ' *ens - verum - bonum*' the threefold structure of that which is comes to expression. Viewed in the light of the Triune causality, the different components of that which is concur into a unity.

"Being," "true," and "good" are not only common names but also divine names. The relation of what is common to what is proper to the Transcendent is conceived by Thomas in

terms of "participation." He subscribes to Aristotle's criticism of this Platonic idea by stating that there are no separate, self-subsisting Forms of natural things. But Thomas, in the prologue to his commentary to pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus,* recognizes the legitimacy of this doctrine with regard to what is most common. Only in the case of transcendental forms can a first be posited which is the perfection essentially and as such subsistent. All else must consequently be understood as participation in this perfection. Against this background it becomes understandable that Thomas conceives "creation" preeminently as "participation."
The doctrine of the transcendentals is found to have an important, integrating function in Thomas's way of thought. In man's quest for intelligibility, the transcendentals present a comprehensive perspective on nature and creature. Their circular ways come to an end in the return to the Origin, in which "being," "true," and "good" are perfectly one." (pp. 395-396).

3. ———. 1996. *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Preface IX-X; Introduction 1; One. The Beginnings of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals 25: Two. Thomas's General Account of the Transcendentals 71; Three. Metaphysics and the Transcendentals 113; Four. Being as the first Transcendental 159; Five. One as Transcendental 201; Six. True as Transcendental 243; Seven. Good as Transcendental 290; Eight. Beauty: A forgotten Transcendental? 335; Nine. Transcendentals and the Divine 360; Conclusions 416; Bibliography 439; Index Nominum 455; Index Rerum 459-467.
Spanish translation: *La Filosofía medieval y los trascendentales. Un estudio sobre Tomás de Aquino*, Pamplona: Eunsa 2003.
"The title of this book speaks of "Medieval Philosophy" and "the Transcendentals." It can be read as affirming that there is a philosophy in the Middle Ages and that this philosophy encompasses a doctrine of the transcendentals alongside many others.

But our aims in this work are more ambitious. Our title means to suggest a more intrinsic relation between the terms "Philosophy" and "Transcendentals" than mere juxtaposition. We want to show that philosophy in the Middle Ages expresses itself as a way of thought which can be called "transcendental." The present book may therefore be seen as a contribution to the discussion of the question: what is philosophy in the Middle Ages? A recent review of literature offers a telling example of the relevance of this question: "Unmistakably philosophical research about the Middle Ages has fallen into a crisis (...) It is even impossible to reach agreement on the premise what philosophy means in the Middle Ages.(1) '"

(1) A. Speer and J.H.J. Schneider, "Das Mittelalter im Spiegel neuerer Literatur", in: *Theologische Quartalschrift* 172 (1992), p. 235.

(...)

In this introductory chapter I want first to analyze three different answers to the question "Is there a medieval philosophy?" that are (or were) important for the place of the Middle Ages in the history of philosophy. This analysis affords me an opportunity to take stock of the current study of medieval philosophy (0.1.-0.3.), I will then explain how I myself approach the period, indicating what, in my view, is constitutive for the thought of the Medium Aevum (0.4.). This final section will clarify the intention of this book." (pp. 1-2).

(...)

"Is there a medieval philosophy? Thus far I have discussed three significant conceptions, those of Gilson, of the Cambridge History and of De Libera. They have made substantial contributions to the study of medieval philosophy, but I have formulated objections to all three because they do not provide sufficient insight into the philosophical dimension of medieval thought. Now in order to make some progress in this question, I am interested in statements by medieval writers in which they personally indicate what they consider to be fundamental to their thought or what they regard as decisive for the possibility of

philosophy. Such "ego" statements are relatively rare among Scholastic authors, but they are not altogether absent. I mention four examples, all taken from *theologi*. [The authors discussed are Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Meister Eckhart.] (p. 17).

"The transcendental way of thought is neglected in the conceptions of medieval philosophy discussed above. Although the doctrine of the transcendentals is the core of medieval metaphysics, the doctrine is not considered at all in Gilson's The Spirit. In the Cambridge History it receives only one brief reference (p. 493), and it remains outside of consideration in De Libera's determination of the place of medieval philosophy. One of the objectives of the present study is to show not only that the "forgotten" doctrine is important for our understanding of medieval philosophy, but also that the idea of medieval philosophy as a transcendental way of thought does not exclude the other conceptions, but incorporates them.

The conception of medieval philosophy as transcendental thought expresses already in its terminology a moment of continuity with modern philosophy, for the term 'transcendental' is generally reserved for the way of thought inaugurated by Kant.

Kant brings the project of his three Critiques together under the title of "Transcendental Philosophy," but he himself recognizes that this notion has a long tradition. In the Critique of Pure Reason (B 113) he points to the 'transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients" and quotes the proposition "so famous among the Schoolmen: quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum," At the same moment, however, he distances himself from the traditional conception. 'These supposed transcendental predicates of things are nothing else but logical requirements and criteria of all knowledge of things in general" (B 114) .

'Transcendental' in the Kantian sense is concerned with the mode of our cognition of objects, insofar as this mode of cognition is possible a priori.

The Kantian perspective has strongly affected the study of medieval transcendental thought. An example of the

connection of medieval thought with "modernity" is to be found in Kurt Flasch's important study on Nicholas of Cusa which contains a chapter, entitled "Metaphysics and Transcendental Thought in the Middle Ages. (56) Flasch does not refer here to the doctrine of the transcendentals, for he wants to take the term 'transcendental' exclusively in a Kantian sense, that is, as transcendental-logical. (57) Every transcendental philosophy, in his view, is based on the idea that the world of objects is constituted by the human mind. Transcendental thought in the Middle Ages is therefore related to those thinkers who acknowledge a constitutive function of the human mind, such as the German Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg (d.
after 1310), They show "a much more modern Middle Ages than it is generally supposed. "(58)
Yet this transcendental-logical approach seems questionable from a historical point of view. It makes the Kantian position the exclusive criterion for determining what transcendental thought is in the Middle Ages. Medieval philosophers, however developed their own concept of transcendentality, and it is this way of thought that Kant called the 'Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients'.
It would be more appropriate historically and philosophically to consider the medieval doctrine as a distinctive form within the tradition of transcendental philosophy.
The French scholar S. 8reton wrote in 1963 that the doctrine of the Transcendentals is "classic and yet poorly known."·(59) His observation still holds. We only possess two general studies on this subject, the first by H. Knittermeyer, the other by G. Schulemann.
Both studies go back to the 1920's and must be regarded as out of date. Their main shortcomings are that they do not pay sufficient attention to the historical and doctrinal background of the formation of the doctrine in the thirteenth century and fail to give an explicit analysis of the notion of transcendentality. A new history of transcendental thought in the Middle Ages is required.(61)

The focus in this book will be on Thomas Aquinas (1 224/5-1274), a representative of medieval thought, whose importance for the transcendental way of thought is often neglected or underestimated. Although libraries have been written on his thought, and although we possess various studies of some aspects of his doctrine of the transcendentals, it is striking that a comprehensive study of Aquinas's doctrine is lacking. This book will till this lacuna and wants to show that the doctrine of the transcendentals is not, as has been suggested, "a small, rather insignificant part' of his metaphysics," (62) but is of fundamental importance for his thought. By the same token, the study will substantiate in an exemplary way the claims made in this section concerning the conception of medieval philosophy as a transcendental way of thought.

Thomas Aquinas was, however, not the first to formulate the doctrine of the transcendentals. The beginning of the doctrine is to be located in the first half of the thirteenth century; it coincides with the introduction of a voluminous body of new philosophical literature into the Latin West. Not only the entire corpus aristotelicum, but also the writings of Arabic philosophers become available in translation at this time. In the first chapter we will analyze the beginning of the doctrine of the Transcendentals. It is, of course, a requirement of modern scholarship on Thomas to place his philosophy in its proper historical context. The first chapter provides the background for Thomas's transcendental thought and enables us to see its traditional and innovative aspects," (pp. 21-24)

(56) K. Flasch, *Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Problemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung*, Leiden 1973, pp. 105 ff.

(57) See the extensive note in *ibid*., p. 103.

(58) Ibid., p. 156. Cf. on Dietrich of Freiberg K. Flasch, "Kennt die mittelalterliche Philosophie die konstitutive Funktion des menschlichen Denkens? Eine Untersuchung zu Dietrich von Freiberg", in: *Kantstudien* 63 (1972), pp. 182·206.

(59) S. Breton, "L'idée de transcendantal et la genèse des transcendantaux chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin". in: *Saint Thomas d'Aquin aujourd'hui,* Paris, 1963. p. 45.
(60) H. Knittermeyer, *Der Terminus Transzendental in seiner historischen Entwicklung bis Kan*t, Marburg 1920; G. Schulemann, *Die Lehre der Transzendentalen in der scholatischen Philosophie* (Forschungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie lind der Pädagogik, vol. IV,2), Leipzig 1929.
(61) Cfr. J..A. Aertsen, "The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: The Current State of Research", in: *Bulletin de la Philosophie médiévale*, 33 (1991), Pl'· 130-147. See also the special issue of *Topoi* 11 (1992). devoted to the 'Transcendentals in the Middle Ages," (ed. J.J.E. Gracia) It contains contributions by J..J.E. Gracia, S. Dumont, J. Marenbon, J.A. Aersten and S. MacDonald.
(62) L. Honnefelder, "Die Rezeption des scotischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert", in: *Theologische Realenzycklopedie* vol IX, sV. "Duns Scotus/Scotisumus II, Berlin/New York 1982, p. 233; *id.*, Transzedentalität und Moralität. Zum mittelartelichen Ursprung zweier zentraler Topoi der neuzeitlichen Philosophie, in: *Theologissche Quartalschrift* 172 (1992). p. 184.

4. ———. 2012. *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Preface XIX-XX; Introduction 1; One. The Concept of *transcendens* in Medieval Thought: What is beyond and what is common 13; Two: Conditions, Presuppositions and Sources of a Doctrine of the Transcendentals 35; Three. The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals (ca. 1225): Philip the Chancellor 109; Four. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Franciscan Masters [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure] 135; Five. Albertus Magnus: Different Traditions of thought and the Transcendentals 177; Six: Thomas Aquinas: A First Model 209; Seven. Henry of Ghent: The onto-theological transformation of the doctrine 273; Eighth. The German Dominican School: Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart 315; Nine. Duns Scotus: A Turn in the Doctrine of the

Transcendentals 371; Ten. Discussions on the Scotist Conception [Francis of Meyronnes, Peter Thomae, Nicholas Bonet, Francis of Marchia] 433; Eleven. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Nominalism [William of Ockham, John Buridan] 515; Twelve. Neoplatonic Critiques of Transcendental Metaphysics [Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa] 545; Thirteenth. The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Renaissance Philosophy [Lorenzo Valla, Pico della Mirandola] 569; Fourteen. The "Metaphysical Disputations" of Francisco Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity 587; Fifteenth. The Doctrine of the "Supertranscendentals": An Alternative Model? 635; Sixteen. Conclusion: The Importance of the transcendental way of thought for medieval philosophy 657; Bibliography 707; Index Nominum 741; Index Rerum 747-756.

"The present work represents the completion of a research project that has engaged me intensively throughout my scholarly life. Its origins reach back to my inaugural address on the occasion of taking up the Chair of Medieval Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam (1984). At the end of this lecture, *Medieval Reflections on Truth, 'Adaequatio rei et intellectus',* I concluded that the idea of the transcendentality of truth underlies these reflections and announced that the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals "will be the subject of my research over the coming years".

This programmatic statement, typical of an ambitious new professor, turned out to be a fortunate choice. The choice had been motivated by a twofold interest. Historically, the doctrine of the transcendentals is an innovative contribution of the Middle Ages to the history of philosophy; the origin of transcendental thought is not to be sought in modern philosophy but is medieval. Systematically, the transcendental terms "being", "one", "true" and "good" concern what is first *in* a cognitive respect and what is fundamental; they express "basic" words of philosophy.

The project resulted in a large number of studies, including the monograph *Medieval Philosophy and the*

Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas (1996). In the Introduction, I advanced the provocative thesis of an intrinsic connection between medieval philosophy and transcendental thought, already suggested by the main title of the book. My argument was that the theory of the transcendentals is essential for insight into the properly *philosophical* dimension of medieval thought, which is often developed in a theological context; medieval philosophy *can* be regarded as a way of transcendental thought. The thesis provoked critical comments and questions: does it not presuppose an "essentialist" conception of medieval philosophy and ignore its real diversity? In my view, the critique was based on a misunderstanding, which could only be removed by providing a complete history of the doctrine of the transcendentals that shows the multiplicity of transcendental thought in the Middle Ages.
In 2003, on the occasion of my retirement as Director of the Thomas Institute at the University of Cologne, thirty-five colleagues, friends and students offered me an impressive Festschrift with the title *Die Logik des Transzendentalen*. The editor of the volume expressed the hope (p. XXI) that the various contributions would stimulate the realisation of the planned history of the doctrine of the transcendentals in a not too remote future. The Festschrift was indeed both a tribute and a stimulus." (from the Preface)

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ESSAYS IN ENGLISH

Abbreviations: DT = Doctrine of the Transcendentals

1. Aertsen, Jan A. 1985. "The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas." *New Scholasticism* no. 59:449-470.
"In many medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: " being and good are convertible " *(ens et Comm convertuntur)*.(1) That is to say, " being " and " good " are interchangeable terms in predication *(converti enim est conversim praedicari)*.(2) Wherever " being " is predicated of something, the predicate " good " is involved as well.
That must imply that " good " is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to " being ", as a result of which " being " is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility.(3) " Good " is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being." In other words, " good " is coextensive with " being ", it is one of the so-called *transcendentie* which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as " transcendentals ".
(1) Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, Inq. 1, Tract. 3, q. 3, membrum 1, c. 1, a. 1, "An idem sit bonum et ens "; Bonaventure, In *II Sent.,* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens et bonum eonvertuntur, sicut volt Dionysius ", d. 34, a. 2, q.

3, fundam. 4; Albert the Great, *De Bono* q. 1, a. 6; Summa *Theol*. tract. 6, q. 28; Thom. Aquinas, *In I Sent*. 8, 1, 3; *De Ver*. XXI, 2; In *De Hebdomadibus,* lect. 3; Summa *Theol*. I, 18, 3.
(2) Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver*. I, 2 obj. 2.
(3) *De Pot*. IX, 7 ad 5: Bonum quod est in genre qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ante, quod nullam rem supra ens addit.
(4) *De Ver*. I, 1: modus generaliter consequens omne ens.
(5) Comp. Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae* tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3: Bonum dicit intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genus sicut et ens.

2. ———. 1986. "The Circulation-Motive and Man in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas." In *L'homme et son univers au moyen âge. Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale, 30 août - 4 septembre 1982, Vol. I*, edited by Wenin, Christian, 432-439. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters.
"Little attention is usually paid to this divine circular motion in the interpretation of Thomas' work, even though Thomas himself says in the prologue to the first book of his Commentary on the *Sententiae* that this bringing forth is the «reason» *(ratio)* of every subsequent process. The *circulatio* within God is the archetype of the work of creation. A trinitarian interpretation of Thomas' thought, albeit unusual, finds support in this idea. And his reflections on the originating order of the Trinity could also open up fruitful perspectives for further thought about (the problematics of) his thought.
In his explanation of the Trinity, Thomas gives a new elaboration of the concept of relation. In the divine *circulatio* there are relation of primordiality which are subsistent : «In God relation and essence do differ in being from each other, but are one and the same» *(S. Th.,* I 28, 2). Relation is not an accidental category of substance; being and relation belong « originally» together.
This idea has remained outside of Thomas' metaphysics of creation. But it is this model of relation,which is philosophically important for a renewed reflection on

created being. The relation of the creature to God is not accidental as Thomas claimed (18), but for the creature to be is to be in relation. At precisely this point a more comprehensive notion of finite being can be developed. There is the three-foldness in the creature: of subsistent-being, what-being, and act-being. These components agree in *esse,* which is a being from, through, and to God. In relationship to the Triune-Origin there is unity.

In man the Trinity is represented in a distinctive *way,* viz., according to the identical character of activity *(secundum eamdem rationem rationis, De potentia,* 9, 9). The processes of intellection and volition are found in man. Man, who is a person, is therefore *imago Trinitatis*. It la in this idea that the «anthropocentrism» of medieval thought most clearly comes to the fore.

The manner, however, in which man's movement to God is worked out by Thomas, formed a second «crux» in his thinking. Here again we find in his elaboration of the idea of relation, possibilities for giving his penetrating intuition of the circular motion of egress and return a more integral meaning.

Man is destined to one purpose, viz., communion with God. His drama consists not so much in the natural inability to close the circle through knowing, as in the aversion from his own essentially relational mode of existence. The circular motion thereby comes to stand in a concrete salvation history. This moreover offers the possibility of doing justice to the internal coherence of the structure of the *Summa Theologiae*. In the prologue to bk. 1, 2, Thomas indicates this design: the first part deals with God, and «the procession of all creatures from Him»; the second with the movement of the rational creature toward Him; and the third with Christ who as man is the way *(via)* of our tending to God. The second person of the Trinity, the Word, became flesh in order to show mankind the way (back) to its Origin. True *human-being* is possible only by God's grace.

In summary: the new perspective which Thomas' reflection on the faith mystery of the divine process opens up, is

philosophizing oriented to the perfection of being-itself in being toward something else." (pp. 438-439)
(18) *De potentia,* 3,3 ad 3.

3. ———. 1987. "Natural Law in the Light of the Doctrine of Transcendentals." In *Lex et Libertas. Freedom and Law according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophy, Rolduc, November 8-9, 1986*, edited by Elders, Leo and Hedwig, Klaus, 99-112. Città del Vaticano: Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso e di Religione Cattolica.
4. ———. 1989. "Method and Metaphysics: The v *ia resolutionis* in Thomas Aquinas." *New Scholasticism* no. 63:405-418.
5. ———. 1990. "Aquinas and the Classical Heritage: A Response." In *Christianity and the Classics. The Acceptance of a Heritage*, edited by Helleman, Wendy E., 83-89. Lanham: University Press of America.
   Reply to the essay by Arvin Vos: *As the Philosopher Says: Thomas Aquinas and the Classical Heritage*, same volume, pp. 69-82.
   "Arvin Vos has written an excellent paper on Thomas Aquinas and the classical heritage. His paper shows admiration for and affinity with Aquinas's achievement. I share this admiration; Aquinas is a great thinker. Now it is a mark of great thinkers that the content of their thought is so full and rich that one can put emphasis on different aspects. And this is what I intend to do in my response by making some comments and raising some questions. My reflections, stressing a number of underlying ideas, are primarily meant as a supplement to what has been said.
   In order to present my remarks in a systematic and coherent way, I take as a starting point a statement of Aristotle which I will develop in four steps, more or less related to the main parts of Vos's paper: (1) the background of the thirteenth century; (2) Thomas's attitude towards Aristotle; (3) the relationship between faith and reason; and (4) the conclusion concerning the question whether **the** classical heritage can be integrated in the Christian position." (p. 83)

6. ———. 1990. "The Eternity of the. World: The believing and the philosophical Thomas. Some Comments." In *The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries*, edited by Wissink, Jozef, 9-19. Leiden: Brill.
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   "An important, new development in medieval philosophy was the constitution of the doctrine of the transcendentals (DT) in the thirteenth century. The term « transcendental » - the medievals themselves speak of *transcendens* -- suggests a kind of surpassing. What is transcended are the special modes of being that Aristotle called the « categories », in the sense that the transcendentals are not restricted to one determinate category. « Being » and its « concomitant conditions », such as « one », « true » and « good », « go through *(circumeunt)* all the categories » (to use an expression of Thomas Aquinas). DT is thus concerned with those fundamental philosophical concepts which express universal features of reality.
   The doctrine played a prominent role in later medieval thought. The study of it is essential for our understanding of philosophy in this period, since, according to J.B. Lotz, [« Zur Konstitution der transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Seins nach Thomas von Aquin », in P. Wilpert(ed.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Vol. 2). Berlin 1963, pp. 334-340] p. 334), DT is « the core of Scholastic ontology and metaphysics ». Remarkably, however, research on this doctrine has hitherto been rather limited. The observation, made by the French scholar S. Breton [« L'idée de transcendental et la genèse des transcendentaux chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin » in *Saint*

Thomas d'Aquin aujourd'hui. Paris 1963, pp. 45-74] p. 45) in 1963, that DT is « classic and yet poorly known », still holds. An example of its neglect is the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (ed. N. Kretzmann, 1982) that contains only one brief reference (p. 493, to Ockham). In this contribution I want to take stock of the current state of research on DT, to assemble and discuss the relevant literature, to indicate certain lacunas, and to make some suggestions for further research." (p. 130).

9. ———. 1991. "Good as Transcendental and the Transcendence of the Good." In *Being and Goodness*, edited by MacDonald, Scott, 56-73. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
"Conclusion.
In *ST* Ia.6.4 ("Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?") Thomas concludes that the Platonic view appears to be unreasonable in affirming that there are separate forms of natural things subsisting of themselves; still, it is absolutely true that there is something first that is essentially being and essentially good which we call God. Hence, everything can be called 'good' and 'being,' insofar as it participates in the first being, which is essentially good. To this conclusion Thomas still adds, however, an important remark. That every being is good through an external cause by no means excludes each things being called through a goodness that is formally its own goodness. "And so of all things," Thomas ends, "there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses."
This text can serve as a summary of our analysis, which is focused on the relation between the good as transcendental and the transcendence of the Good. I want to emphasize four points of philosophical importance in Thomas's reflection on the good.
First, Thomas really understands the good transcendentally by establishing an intrinsic connection between being and goodness. To be is the actuality of everything and thereby a good proper to each thing. Things are called good in virtue of an inner goodness. It is characteristic of finite things that although being and good are convertible, there is in them

nonetheless a nonidentity between being absolutely and good absolutely.

Second, because the good is transcendental, Thomas applies to it the predication essentially or by participation. This predication expresses the transcendence of the divine goodness and the creaturely character of the goodness of other things. That which is in any way good must be reduced to what is good by its essence as to its origin. That things are good through an intrinsic goodness is not incompatible with their dependence on that which is the good itself.

Third, from a historical point of view, Thomas effects a kind of synthesis between the Aristotelian way of thought and Aristotle's conception of the good, on the one hand -- the good is something common and the essential forms of things are inherent in them -- and the Platonic way of thought and Plato's conception of the good, on the other hand -- the Form of the Good is "separate" from particular goods.

Fourth, Thomas effects a synthesis in still another respect. Characteristic of Boethius's position, according to MacDonald,(29) is the creation approach to explaining the relation between being and goodness. Aristotle's view, in contrast, exemplifies what might be called the nature approach. This approach explains what it is for a thing to be good by referring to the nature of the thing. "The historical significance of *DH* [Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*] MacDonald says, "consists largely in its offering an interesting account of the nature of goodness which is possibly incompatible ... with the sort of account medieval philosophers found in Aristotle." Thomas's reflection on the claim *that* all things are good and on question *how* they are good can be regarded as a philosophically original synthesis of the nature approach and the creation approach."(30) The nature approach explains the intrinsic goodness of things, for 'nature' says what beings are *in themselves;* it always refers to an intrinsic principle. Now, it is Thomas's transcendentality claim that everything is good, insofar as it is. Things are good (in a certain respect) in virtue of their own being. So all things owe their being good to their

nature. The creation approach explains that everything is called 'good' through an external cause, for 'creature' says *being-related* to the Origin of things. Creation expresses that things received their being and goodness from another. Their goodness consists in their relation to the transcendent good, that is, in their participation in what is goodness itself." (pp. 72-73)
(29) MacDonald "Boethius's Claim That All Substances Are Good." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 70:345-79, 1988. (See also the Introduction in this volume.)
(30) The relation between nature an creature in Thomas is the central theme of Aertsen 1988a [*Nature and Creature*]

10. ———. 1991. "Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?" *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* no. 1:68-97.
11. ———. 1991. "Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274). The natural desire for knowledge and its supernatural fulfillment." In *Bringing into Captivity every Thought. Capita selecta in the History of Christian Evaluations of non-Christian Philosophy*, edited by Klapwijk, Jacob, Griffioen, Sander and Groenewoud, Gerben, 95-122. Lanham: University Press of America.
12. ———. 1992. "Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas." *Topoi.An International Journal of Philosophy* no. 11:159-171.
"Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals in *De veritate* 1, 1, that deals with the question "What is truth?". The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals.
The first part of the paper (sections 1--4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that "truth is not in things but in the mind", leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as "adequation of thing and intellect" enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between

two terms, both of which can be called "true" because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5--7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If "truth" is transcendental, it must be convertible with "being". Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility.
Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things." (p. 159)

13. ———. 1992. "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)." In *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Meijer, Pieter A., 120-140. Leiden: Brill.
"In this contribution I would like to investigate whether and in which way the opposition between ontology and henology took shape in medieval thinkers and was a subject of discussion. I will focus my inquiry on three Dominicans of different generations, namely, Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg. The last one is the least well known of the three. Yet I want to begin with him, since we find in his work not only a justification but also a philosophical deepening of our question." (p. 122)
(...)
5. Conclusion
In my paper I first presented a medieval version of the question: "Metaphysics of Being or philosophy of the One?" - namely, the interpretation of Berthold of Moosburg. In his commentary on Proclus [*] he traces the opposition between ontology and henology to the different structures of

thought associated with Aristotelianism and Platonism, which we have indicated with the keywords "transcendentality" and "transcendence" of the first. I then proceeded to use Berthold's model to elucidate the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Master Eckhart. To this analysis I would add three concluding observations.

First, we can ascertain that for Thomas and Eckhart the transcendental and transcendent approaches do not form an absolute opposition. Thomas posits a causal relation between God and the *maxime communia*. Transcendentals are to be traced to God as their cause. Eckhart identifies. God and the *transcendentia*. That which is most general is God.

Secondly, both in Thomas and in Eckhart the doctrine of transcendentals is found to have an integrating function. That is notable, because Berthold regards this doctrine as typical of the Aristotelian position. Now this theory certainly contains anti-Platonic elements, as we observed in Thomas, such as the emphasis on predicative generalness. But transcendentals have yet another aspect, which Berthold does not mention, an aspect which played an essential role in the development of the doctrine. Generally, the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor, written about 1230, is regarded as the first treatise on transcendentals. In the prologue of this work Philip observes that "being," "one," "true" and "good" are not only that which is most common but are sometimes also "appropriated," that is, treated as "proper" to something. For in Scripture these names are attributed pre-eminently to God, they are also divine names. (90) The attention given this second kind of naming is undoubtedly influenced by pseudo-Dionysius, who functions in Berthold as an eminent witness for the Platonic view. Thus we see that in the context of the doctrine of *transcendentia* themselves the question must arise concerning the relation between the most general which goes through all categories, and the divine which surpasses all categories.

Thirdly, the medieval doctrine of transcendentals is pluriform. The solutions of Thomas and Eckhart diverge.

Philosophically more important, however, is that in which they agree. Characteristic of philosophy is a transcending movement. It surpasses the concrete things of experience in quest of a first, from which reality can be understood. The answer to the question of what this first is can be sought in different directions. Berthold sketches two options: the first is the most general, which is the precondition for man's intellectual knowledge; or the first is the cause of the being of things but is not itself of the nature of the caused. Thomas and Eckhart represent a type of philosophical thought in which the two options in question are connected. That is their contribution to the debate about what philosophy should be: ontology or henology." (pp. 139-140)
[* See note 16:] Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli: Prologus. Propositiones 1-13* (Corpus Philosophorum Teotonicorum Medi Aevi VI, 1) ed. by M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese and L. Sturlese, Hamburg 1984. The first volume contains a valuable ?Einleitung' by K. Flasch (XI - XXVIII). See also A. de Libera, *Introduction à la mystique rhénane d'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart*, Paris 1984.
(90) Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis *Summa de bono* (ed. N. Wicki), Bern 1985, 4 - 5. *Cf.* H. Pouillon, 'Le premier traité des propriétés transcendantales. La *Summa de bono* du Chancellier Philippe', *Revue neoscolastique de philosophie* 42 (1939), 40 - 77.

14. ———. 1992. "The Platonic Tendency of Thomism and the Foundations of Aquinas's Philosophy." *Medioevo* no. 18:120-140.
15. ———. 1993. "Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting." In *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 12-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"In this chapter Aquinas's attitude towards philosophy, his leading sources, and the aims of his philosophical interest are clarified in two complementary ways. First, his writings, which are very voluminous in spite of his relatively early death, will be placed within the historical context of the thirteenth century. An overview of his work and its

philosophical relevance will be provided in connection with the most important intellectual developments in this period -- the rise of the university, the reception of Aristotle, and the conflict between the faculties (sections II-IV). Subsequently, Aquinas's view of philosophy and of its relationship to theology will be elaborated in a more systematic way (sections V-X)." (p. 14)

16. ———. 1995. "The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1230)." In *Quodlibetaria. Miscellanea studiorum in honorem Prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes Anno Iubilationis suae Conimbrigae MCMXCV*, edited by Santiago de Carvalho, Mario A., 269-286. Porto: Fundaão Eng. António de Almeida.
A revised version of this study form the Chapter Three of *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (2012), pp. 109-133.
"Our comparative inquiry does not allow any other conclusion than that Philip the Chancellor, in the introductory questions of his *Summa de bono,* really presents something new. His intention of going back into the "ground of thought" by reducing our understanding of questions to the *communissima* results in the earliest systematic formulation of a doctrine of the transcendentals. The doctrine is introduced as the philosophical answer to the dualism of Manichaeism. For the first time, Philip brings together four basic notions, "being", "one", "true", and "good", and investigates their mutual relations. But his account bears the marks of a first draft; it is rather terse and sometimes little explicit.
Viewed from a historical perspective, his doctrine has an atypical aspect, insofar as it is centered in a metaphysics of the good. The context of the doctrine generally is a conception of metaphysics, in which "being" is the proper subject of this science. Philip recognizes that *ens* is the first concept, but he does not say much about it. His interest concerns "the good", a notion that is richer than *(habundat)* "being". Two elements of Philip's doctrine were especially directive for subsequent discussions of the transcendentals.

The first is his view of the twofold relation between the *communissima:* there exists a real identity between them -- they are convertible according to their supposits --, but they differ according to their concepts. The other element concerns the order of the most common notions, which is based on the notion of "indivision". It is somewhat paradoxical that Philip does not deal separately with *unum,* whereas the *ratio* of "one" determines his understanding of *bonum* and *verum*.
The *Summa de bono* was attentively read and frequently used, especially in the Franciscan milieu. The influence of Philip's account of the *communissima* is manifest in two works that were composed about twenty years after his *Summa,* namely, in the Franciscan *Summa theologica* attributed to Alexander of Hales, and in *De bono,* an early writing of the Dominican Albert the Great." (pp. 132-133)

17. ———. 1995. "Tendencies and Perspectives in the Study of Medieval Philosophy." In *Bilan et perspectives des études médiévales en Europe. Actes du premier Congrès européen d'Études Médiévales, Spoleto, 27 -29 mai 1993*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline, 107-128. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération internationale des instituts d'études médiévales.
18. ———. 1996. "Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent." In *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)*, edited by Vanhamel, Willy, 1-18. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
"From the account of the relation between *res* and *ens* it is possible to draw a number of conclusions pertinent to Henry's way of thought and his point of departure.
I. The first conclusion is that it is incorrect to say that in his thought there is an insoluble tension between the primacy of being and that of thing. Henry describes the relation between the first concept, that of "thing" in the most general sense, and the second concept, that of "being," as a relation of foundation. "Something cannot have the character of being unless it first has the *ratio* of thing in the sense of *reor, reris,* in which the *ratio* of that being is founded *(fundatur)*. (46)

2. The firstness of *res* is not an a priori condition of knowledge, that is, a "transcendental form" in the Kantian sense. It can be an idle concept, such as an imaginary thing. The firstness is related, as appeared from the discussion of the seventh *Quodlibet,* to the way in which the human intellect is "moved" by reality. The relation of foundation between *res* and *ens* is worked out by Henry in two respects, from the angle of the theory of science and ontologically.
3. From the angle of the theory of science, the relation is that between the precognition of a quiddity and intellectual knowledge of it. At the first level, *res* in the sense of *reor, reris* is the most general concept, the *communissimum* of the seventh *Quodlibet*. At the second level, "being" is the first and most general concept. Henry's statement that *ens* is the first that is *scientifically* known *(scita)* must be understood in this precise sense.
In ontological respect, the relation between the first and the second concept is the relation between the still undetermined thing and the thing that is determined by its essence. The quidditative being however is not determined to this or that thing, to creator or creature, to substance or accident. It is understood, Henry states, under the aspect of being that is the subject of metaphysics. (47) Not the first mode of "thing" but the second mode is the point of departure of metaphysics.
The level of quidditative being is the level of the transcendentals. Henry's identification of *res, ratitudo* with *ens* is the answer to the question (see section 3, above) why *res* is not named in Henry's account of the transcendentals. It is the concept that lies at the basis of his doctrine of being and of the most general *intentiones*. In comparison to his predecessors, the novelty of Henry's doctrine is the central place he attributes to Avicenna's notion of "thing." That *res, ratitudo* lies at the basis of Henry's doctrine explains the fact that he, otherwise than in the tradition, understands truth as a real relation to the exemplar.
Another distinctive feature of Henry's doctrine of the transcendentals is its being preceded by a more general concept, the cognition of "thing" in the broadest sense. For

the clarification of this relation one may utilize a distinction that emerged in post-medieval philosophy. In a study of the concept of *res,* Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff has called attention to the fact that in the seventeenth century transcendental concepts were opposed to "super-transcendental" concepts, which are said not only of real but also of fictitious beings. Examples of these super-transcendental concepts are *cogitabile* and *opinabile*.(48) Henry's notion of *res* may be regarded as an anticipation of such concepts." (pp. 17-18).
(46) *Summa* 34.2 (ed. R. Macken, p. 175): "Et tamen rationem esse nihil potest habere, nisi prius habendo rationem rei dictae a reor, in qua fundatur ratio esse ilius."
(47) Cf. *Summa* 24.3 (fol. 138v P).
(48) L. Oeing-Hanhoff, *"Res* comme concept transcendental et sur-transcendental", in: M. Fattori and M. Bianchi (ed.), *Res* (III Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo), Rome 1982, pp. 285-296.

19. ———. 1997. "Thomas Aquinas: Aristotelianism versus Platonism?" In *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou 6-8 octobre 1995 organisé par la S.I.E.P.M.*, edited by Benakis, Linos G., 147-162. Turnhout: Brepols.
20. ———. 1998. "What is First and Most Fundamental? The Beginnings of Transcendental Philosophy." In *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Age? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?. Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. Bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas, 177-192. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
21. ———. 1998. "Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus." In *John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996)*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 13-26. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"In the prologue of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Duns Scotus explains the name 'metaphysics' as *transcendens scientia*, that is, the science that is concerned with the *transcendentia*.(1) This explanation is indicative of the prominent place Scotus ascribes to the doctrine of the transcendentals, which was formulated for the first time in the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor that is datable about 1225. The connection between the object of first philosophy and the transcendentals is not in itself new, although the identity posed by Scotus is more radical than in his predecessors.(2) Yet it is no exaggeration to say that Scotus's philosophy marks a new phase in the history of the doctrine of the *transcendentia*.

Scotus understands the concept 'transcendental' differently than his predecessors did. To thinkers of the thirteenth century, transcendental properties are *communissima*. 'Being, 'one,'true' and 'good' 'transcend' the Aristotelian categories because they are not limited to one of them but are common to all things. According to Scotus, however, it is not necessary that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated of every being; it is not essential to the concept *transcendens* that it has many inferiors. In his *Ordinatio* he determines the concept negatively: 'what is not contained under any genus' or 'what remains indifferent to finite and infinite'. (3) This definition makes possible a vast extension of the transcendental domain; the most important innovation is formed by the so-called disjunctive transcendentals, which are convertible with being, not separately but as pairs.

The fact that the transcendental properties are not necessarily identical with the *communissima* is, I suspect, the reason why the expression *transcendentia*, which occurs only sporadically in thinkers like Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, gains the upperhand in Scotism and becomes the usual term.

About Scotus's doctrine of the transcendentals, in contrast to that of other medieval thinkers, we are well informed by Allan B. Wolter's pioneering study, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus*

(1946). Yet there are aspects of his doctrine that have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. One of them is Scotus's treatment of the transcendentals 'one, 'true' and 'good,' which as such are convertible with being. In my contribution I want to show that with respect to the traditional transcendentals, too, Scotus breaks new ground and approaches critically the views of his thirteenth-century predecessors. Because he discusses most extensively the relation between being and one, I foals on this discussion." (pp. 13-14)
* The original version of this study will appear in T. Noone and G. A. Wilson (eds.), *Essays in Honor Girard Etzkorn: Franciscan Texts and Traditions*, Franciscan Studies 56 (1998) [pp. 47-64].
(1) *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, prol., n. 18: Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta', quod est 'trans', et 'ycos', 'scientia', quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.
(2) Albert the Great, *Metaphysica* I, tract. 1, ch. 2 (Opera omnia XVI, 1, ed. B. Geyer, 5, 13-14), who uses the phrase *prima et transcendentia* in his analysis of the subject matter of metaphysics. For Thomas Aquinas's doctrine, see J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Leiden, Brill 1996, 113-158.
(3) *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8, part t, q. 3, nn. 113-114 (ed. Vaticana IV, 206).

22. ———. 1998. "Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:47-64.
23. ———. 1998. "The Philosophical Importance of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Thomas Aquinas." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 52:249-268.
24. ———. 1998. "Beauty: Medieval Concepts." In *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. Vol. I*, edited by Kelly, Michael, 249-251. New York: Oxford University Press.
25. ———. 1999. "The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals. New Literature." *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* no. 41:107-121.

"In 1597 Francisco Suarez published his *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* a work that had an incredible influence on seventeenth century philosophy. The most salient feature of his metaphysics is the central position of the *transcendentia* or *transcendentalia* (Suarez uses these terms as synonyms) : Disp. 2-11 deal with being, unity, truth and goodness. In comparison with Aristotle's conception of a science of being, metaphysics had acquired a « transcendental » character. As Suarez knew very well, this transformation had taken place in the Middle Ages.
In the *Bulletin* 33 (1991), pp. 130-147, I analyzed the current state of research on the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals (= DT), which is essential for our understanding of philosophy in this period. In the present article I will assemble and discuss the relevant literature of the last decade, adding some older publications that were not mentioned in the first report." (p. 107)
[The first report listed 104 titles, the current report 84].

26. ———. 1999. "Is There a Medieval Philosophy? I. The Case of Thomas Aquinas. II. The Case of Meister Eckhart." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 39:387-412.
27. ———. 1999. "Thomas Aquinas on the Good. The Relation between Metaphysics and Ethics." In *Aquinas's Moral Theory. Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann*, edited by Scott, MacDonald and Stump, Eleonore, 235-253. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
28. ———. 2000. " *Transcendens - Transcendentalis*. The Genealogy of a Philosophical Term." In *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au moyen âge. Actes du Colloque internationale de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la S.I.E.P.M.*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Steel, Carlos, 241-255. Turnhout: Brepols.
"In the study of medieval philosophy it is customary to speak of the doctrine of the « transcendentals » (1). We have to realize, however, that this term comes from the vocabulary of modern philosophy. The medieval authors themselves speak of *transcendentia*. What is the significance of this fact ? What is in those names ? By way of

introduction, we consider the two terms, « transcendent » and « transcendental », more closely in order to make clear that the interference of the conceptual language of modem philosophy with that of medieval philosophy is not coincidental. The difference in terminology points to a doctrinal evolution. (p. 241)
(...)
"By way of conclusion, let me sum up the main results of our inquiry into the genealogy of the *term transcendentia* (in the sense of transcendentals »).
(i) The first philosophical account of a doctrine of the transcendentals is presented in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*. This work did not use the term *transcendentia,* but later in the thirteenth century Roland of Cremona, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas applied the term to a systematic doctrine of the *communissima*. The origin of the doctrine is not the Platonic-Augustinian idea of « transcensus », but rather the Avicennian tradition of primary notions.
(ii) The term *transcendentia* already existed before the emergence of a systematic doctrine. Albert the Great's commentaries and some texts from the *Logica modernorum* strongly suggest that the term originates in logical discussions, focussing on the distinctive nature of certain (« transcendental ») terms." (p. 255)
(1) I myself wrote a book with the title *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas,* Leiden - New York, 1996.

29. ———. 2002. "'Res' as Transcendental. Its Introduction and Significance." In *Le problème des Transcendantaux du XIVe au XVIIe siècle*, edited by Federici Vescovini, Graziella, 139-155. Paris: Vrin.
"The history of *res* as a transcendental term is an intriguing one: it could be described in terms of a success-story: from "nothing" to "king". In the first account of a doctrine of the transcendentals, the *Summa de bono* written by Philip the Chancellor ca. 1225-28, *res* is not mentioned at all. In the prologue Philip states that « most common *(communissima)* are these : *ens, unum, verum, bonum »,*

whose mutual relations he investigates in the next questions (1). *Res* is also absent in the expositions by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and Albert the Great: they restrict the number of transcendentals to the four that Philip had listed in his *Summa* (2).
Thirty years after Philip, however, the picture changes. In his account of the transcendentals in *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1 -- the most extensive one in the thirteenth century --, Thomas Aquinas incorporated *res* into the doctrine. He distinguishes six *transcendentia,* in the order *ens, res, unum, aliquid, verum* and *bonum* (3). Yet the role of the new transcendental *res* in Thomas and the Thomistic tradition in general remains somewhat marginal. A good illustration offers a treatise from the 14th century, the *Tractatus de sex transcendentibus,* composed by Franciscus de Prato (who was lector in Perugia from 1343-45). The treatise is an attempt to systematize the doctrine on the basis of Thomas's teachings. Contrary to the order in *De veritate, res* holds the last place in this work, and its treatment is substantially briefer than those of the traditional transcendentals (4).
But in the generation after Thomas Aquinas, *res* started, as we shall see a splendid career. A notable reaction against Thomas's doctrine is Lorenzo Valla's philosophical mainwork *Dialecticae disputationes* (first version 1439) (5) In these disputations, Valla critically inquires into the basic notions of traditional philosophy, starting with the six primordial prin ciples *(primordia)* which the Aristotelians called *transcendentia*. They regarded these principles as the "princes of princes" or the "kings", but according to Valla a plurality of firsts is impossible ; only the monarchy is good. He will therefore investigate which among the six is the true *rex imperator,* that is, the most comprehensive *(capacissima)* notion (6).
Valla's conclusion is that only *res* can claim this title. It is evident *unum* is to be understood as "one *res", aliquid* as "another *res",* etc. But how about the notion *ens,* to which the Aristotelians give a place honour? In Valla's view, the term does not have a universal force of its own, but its force is wholly borrowed from another, namely from res (7) His

arguments are marked by the (humanistic) linguistic turn; they are mainly philological. *Ens is* a participle that is to be resolved into a relative pronoun and a verb : *id quod est*. *Id* is to be resolved into *ea res,* so that finally *ens* can be reduced to *ea res que est* (8). When we say, for instance "the stone is being" *(lapis est ens),* the expression means "the stone is thing *(res)* which is". But does such a formula make any sense, when simpler and clearer to say "the stone is a *res"?* The words "that which is" cannot mean that the stone is "the thing that is", because only God "is" in the proper sense *(Exodus* 3,14). When therefore it is said of something else than God that it is "being" *(ens),* one uses an inappropriate way of expression (9).
The dignity of a transcendental was given only to *res* (10). To illustrate its position, Valla alludes to a story, reported by Herodotus in his *Historiae* (III, 86), a work that Valla translated into Latin. Six Persians contested the empire, but when Darius managed to become the king of the Persians, the other five descended from their horses and rendered hommage to the king. Similarly the other five transcendentals descend in order to honor *res* (11).
With respect to the remarkable history of "thing" I want to raise three questions: How did *res* come into philosophy, why did it enter philosophy and what did it bring about in philosophy, for our understanding of "reality" (12)?" (pp. 139-141 notes renumbered)
(1) Philippus Cancellarius, *Summa de bono,* prol. (ed. N. Wicki, t. I, Bern, 1985, p. 4).
(2) Cf. J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas,* Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, p. 25-70.
(3) Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Leonina t. XXII, 1, Roma, 1970, p. 3-8).
(4) Cf. the recent edition by B. Mojsisch « Franciscus de Prato, Tractatus de sex transcendentibus », *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike and Mittelalter* 5, 2000, p. 177-217.
(5) The different versions were edited by G. Zippel in two volumes : *Lorenzo Valla Repastinatio dialectice et*

philosophie t. I, Retractatio totius dialectice cum fundamentis universe philosophie; t. II, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, Padova, 1982. [A new edition is now available: Lorenzo Valla, *Dialectical Disputations,* Latin text and English translation by B. P. Copenhaver and L. Nauta. (I Tatti Renaissance Library), Harvard University Press, 2012 (two volumes).]
Cf. S.I. Camporeale, *Lorenzo Valla, Umanesimo e teologia,* Firenze 1972, p. 153-162. M. Laffranchi, « *L'interpretazione "retorica" del linguaggio dei trascendentali in Lorenzo Valla* » in A. Ghisalberti (ed.), *Dalla prima alla seconda Scolastica. Paradigmi e percorsi storiografici,* Bologna 2001, p. 167-199.
(6) Lorenzo Valla, *Retractatio* I, cap. 1,n. 9 (ed. Zippel I, p. 11) : « Ea numero sex dicuntur : "ens", "aliquid", "res", "unum", "verum", "bonum". Que quoniam sunt altiora principia et velut principum principes et quasi (ut istis videtur) quidam imperatores et reges (...), de his prius ordine ipso dicendum est 0. Cap. 2, n. 1 : « Iam primum non plures esse debere imperatores ac reges, sed unum (...). Ergo quod ex his vocabulum, sive que vocabuli significatio sit imperator et rex, idest omnium capacissima (...), inquiramus ».
(7) Lorenzo Valla, *Retractatio* I, cap. 2, n. 12 (ed. Zippel I, p. 14) : « Quo palam est, omnem vim non naturalem habere, sed, ut sic dicam, precariam ac mutuo sumptam ». *Repastinatio* I, cap. 2, n. 9 (ed. Zippel II, p. 369) : « Quare quis non videt "ens" non habere suapte natura aliquam universalem vim, sed omnem mutuari ab illo 'res' ? ».
(8) Lorenzo Valla, *Retractatio I,* cap. 2, n. 11 (ed. Zippel I, p. 14) : « Igitur si "ens" ita resolvitur : "id quod est", et "id" resolvitur "ea res", profecto "ens" ita resolvetur : "ea' que est" ».
(9) Lorenzo Valla, *Retractatio I,* cap. 2, n. 12 (ed. Zippel I, p. 14-15) : « Quid enim sibi vult verbi causa "lapis est ens", id est "ea res, quae est' ? Quid faciunt ille voces "ea que est", cum sit et apertius et expeditius et satius, "lapis est res' ? (...) cum presertim absurda videatur oratio: "lapis est ea res que est", sive "lapis est res que est", quasi nihil sit proprie

nisi solus lapis, aut quicquid erit illud, de quo dicemus ipsum esse "rem, que est" : que oratio de solo Deo propria est (...). Itaque cum de alia re quam de Deo dicitur quod sit "ens", inepte dicitur ».
(10) Lorenzo Valla, *Repastinatio* I, cap. 2, n. 12 (ed. Zippel II, p. 370) : « Quo fit ut solum sit "res", quod transcendentis dignitate donetur ».
(11) Lorenzo Valla, *Retractatio* I, cap. 2, n. 2 (ed. Zippel I, p. 11-12) : « Apud me autem ex his sex que nunc quasi de regno contendunt, non aliter "res" erit rex, quam Darius Hystaspis filius futurus rex erat ex illis sex Persis, qui regnum sorti permisere ». Cap. 2, n. 16 (ed. Zippel I, p. 15).
(12) There does not exist a comprehensive study on *res as* a philosophical concept. A good overview is offered by J. F. Courtine, *Res, in Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie,* vol. 8, Basel 1992, p. 892-901. The volume *Res. Atti del III (Colloquio internazionale del Lessico intellettuale europeo,* ed. by M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, Rome 1982 (Lessico intellettuale europeo, 26), contains two interesting contributions : J. Hamesse, *Res chez les auteurs philosophiques du XIIe et XIIIe siècles ou le passage de la neutralité a la spécificité* (p. 91-104); L. Oeing-Hanhoff, *Res comme concept transcendental et sur-transcendental* (p. 285-296). See also R. Darge, "Suarez" Analyse der Transzendentalien "Ding" und "Etwas" im Kontext der scholastischen Metaphysiktradition », *Theologie und Philosophie* 75, 2000, p. 339-358.

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"When I was invited to comment upon the theme of the section -'Truth in Thomas Aquinas' - I pondered on the best way of meeting the request. I asked myself: What is most important in his conception of truth? The following comments are designed to be an answer to that question and are based on Thomas's remarks in *De veritate*. As such, my answer does not pretend to be definitive, but is based on

personal reflections that are indebted to on-going discussions in the German academic world to which I belong. That said, I would hope that my comments possess some general relevance to other students of Thomas. It is my view, that the salience of Thomas's view of truth can be appreciated by means of highlighting four substantive points.

1. First and foremost we should attend to Thomas's approach to the question *quid sit veritas*.

(...)

2. Having considered the transcendentality of the truth, Thomas then solicits an answer to the question as to what it is.

(...)

3. There is truth in things; 'truth' is also predicated of the intellect.

What, then, is the primary 'locus' of truth: the thing or the intellect?

In his reply to this question (*De veritate* q. 1, a. 2) Thomas advances the idea of the *analogy* of the true; this predicate is said of many things according to an order of priority and posteriority, that is, in relation to one (thing) that possesses the *ratio* of the predicate primarily. The classical application of the doctrine of analogy concerns the term 'being'. The novelty of Thomas's thinking here is to be seens in his application of the analogy to the predicate 'true', in order to determine the relation between the truth of being and the truth of the intellect.

(...)

4. At *De veritate* 1,4 Thomas poses the question that dominates the first systematic account of truth in the history of philosophy, Anselm of Canterbury's work *De veritate*: 'Is there only one truth by which all things are true?' Anselm had answered this question affirmatively; there is only one truth in the proper sense (*proprie*), the divine truth. Thomas's reply is more differentiated: truth is properly found in the human or divine intellect; primarily in the divine intellect; secondarily in the human intellect. A human truth, too, is truth in the proper sense.

The power of truth manifests itself in its claim of having absolute force; it holds without respect of persons. Thomas gives a remarkable example of that in *his Commentary on the Book Job*. He interprets the dispute between Job and God after the model of a medieval disputation. But Thomas wonders whether such a disputation is appropriate, since God is far superior to any human being. Truth does not change because of the difference of persons.
When somebody speaks the truth, he cannot therefore be defeated, irrespective of the person, with whom he disputes (*cum aliquis veritatem loquitur, vinci non potest cum quocumque disputat*). (8)
In summary, four ideas are most important in Thomas's conception of truth: the transcendental character of truth; its relationality (truth as adequation); the primary 'locus' of truth is the mind; and a human truth also is a truth in the proper sense. Seen together, they reflect the novelty of his philosophical thought and its relevance." (pp. 50-54)
(8) *Expositio super Iob* c. 13 (ed. Leonina vol. XXVI, 1965, 87).

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"This essay examines Aquinas's analysis of the human desire to know, which plays a central role in his thought. (I.)

This analysis confronts him with the Aristotelian tradition: thus, the desire for knowledge is a "natural" desire. (II.) It also confronts him with the Augustinian tradition, which deplores a non-virtuous desire in human beings that is called "curiosity." (III.) Aquinas connects the natural desire with the Neoplatonic circle motif: principle and end are identical. The final end of the desire to know is the knowledge of God. (IV.) Aquinas also connects the end of the natural desire to know with Christian eschatology, teaching that man's ultimate end is the visio Dei. This end, however, is "supernatural." (V.) Duns Scotus severely criticizes central aspects of Aquinas's account. (VI.) As a rejoinder to Scotus's objections, we finally consider Aquinas's view on the proper object of the human intellect."

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"This essay in honour of Carlos Steel examines a fundamental thesis behind the medieval metaphysics of the good, namely the «goodness of being» thesis, according to which everything that is is good. The basic text used is a *Quodlibet* disputed by the Parisian master Gerard of Bologna at the beginning of the fourteenth century, in which he discusses various determinations of the nature (*ratio*) of the good. This discussion reveals the difficulties to which the metaphysics of the good can lead: is it really the case that every being is good?"
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"In our contribution to the *Festschrift* in honour of Ruedi Imbach the focus will be on the term « tino-logia ». The notion is not mentioned in the most complete philosophical dictionary of our time, the *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie,* which appeared in 13 volumes from 1971-2007. The vocable was suggested by French scholars two decades ago in their analysis of the genealogy of Western metaphysics and has since then found acceptance. « Tinology » is meant to characterize an alternative for the traditional ontological model of metaphysics. Influential

was an observation made by Jean-Francois Courtine at the end of his monumental study on the metaphysics of Francis Suarez : « En rigueur de termes, l'ontologie classique-moderne devrait donc plutot être caracterisée comme une 'tinologie' »(1). The emergence of this neologism and its historical place is the first thing that calls for attention." (p. 729)

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Kommentierte Bibliographie Jan Aertsen Beitrag zur Geschichte der Transzendentalen Etüden

Aufsätze

Abkürzungen: DT = Lehre der Transzendentalen

1. Aertsen, Jan A. 1985. "Der wissenschaftstheoretische Ort der Gottesbeweise in der *Summa Theologie* des Thomas von Aquin." In *Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L. M. de Rijk, Ph. D. on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 161-193. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
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   [*This study is a discussion of three contribution by Gottfried Martin.*]
   An outstanding place in the history of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals was attributed to William of Ockham by a study of the German scholar G. Martin (37). His thesis is

that Ockham's denial of the reality of the categories except that of substance and quality must be understood as « transcendental philosophy ». Ockham regarded quantity and relation as general conditions that do not add a distinct reality to things, that is, as « transcendental being ». In Martin's later publications (38 and 39), we encounter again the view that Ockham was a vital link in the tradition of transcendental philosophy from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to Kant, Martin's Ockham-interpretation has hardly been discussed." (from J. A. Aertsen, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 33 1991, p. 138).
(37) *Wilhelm von Ockham. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnungen*. Berlin, 1949.
(38) *Immanuel Kant. Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie*. Berlin, 1950 (4th ed., 1969), pp. 115-134.
(39) *Allgemeine Metaphysik. Ihre Probleme und ihre Methode*. Berlin, 1965, pp. 82-89.

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"In still another, more fundamental, respect the introduction of Aristotle's works in the West was of importance. The reception of his *Metaphysics* led to independent reflection on the question of the proper subject of this science. Not without reason, L. Honnefelder, « Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansatze und Folgen der Wiederbegriindung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert », in J.P. Beckmann e.a. (ed.), *Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien and Paradigmen*. Hamburg, 1987, pp. 165-186, has characterized this development as « the second beginning of metaphysics ». It is noteworthy that the Middle Ages did not adopt the theological conception of metaphysics that prevailed among the Greek commentators on Aristotle. In the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus we find a decidedly « ontological » view. Against the background of this conception of metaphysics, the interest in the transcendentals becomes understandable, for they are

the universal properties of being. Metaphysics becomes *scientia transcendens* -- the term appears for the first time in Scotus' Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (prol., n. 5)." (from J. A. Aertsen, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 33 1991, p. 132).

5. ———. 1988. "Die Transzendentalienlehre bei Thomas von Aquin in ihren historischen Hintergründen und philosophischen Motiven." In *Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen*, edited by Zimmermann, Albert, 82-102. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "A by medieval standards extensive systematics of DT is presented by Thomas Aquinas in *De veritate,* qu. 1, art. 1. This text includes an important new element, namely, the introduction of relational transcendentals. Through this innovation Thomas departs from Philip the Chancellor's version of DT. A transcendental is not necessarily expressed by a negation, an indivision, as Philip meant, but can also be determined by something positive, a relation. Thomas understands the transcendentals « true » and « good » in relation to the two faculties of a spiritual substance, that is, to intellect and will. Although we possess various studies concerning some aspects of Aquinas's DT, the general significance of this doctrine for his philosophy seems to be underestimated." (from J. A. Aertsen, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 33 1991, p. 135).
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Annotated Bibliography of John P. Doyle (1966-2016)

John Patrick Doyle (born 1930) is Professor Emeritus of philosophy at Saint Louis University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Kenrick-Glennon Seminary in Shrewsbury, Missouri; his main area research is late medieval philosophy; he has published seven volumes of translations from Latin, a volume of Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, and over fifty articles, essays, and encyclopedia entries.

I wish to thank Professor Doyle for helping me to complete this bibliography.

Abbreviations:

> *CSS* = John P. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*. Edited by Victor M. Salas, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2010
>
> *BBK* = John P. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing. Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being*. Edited by Victor M. Salas, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2012

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1. Doyle, John Patrick. 1966. *The Metaphysical Nature of the Proof for God's Existence According to Francis Suárez S.J.*, University of Toronto.
   Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
2. ———. 1967. "Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles." *Modern Schoolman* no. 44:29-48.
   Reprinted as Chapter 2 in *CSS*.
   "The first of twelve essays which follow the introduction ("Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles") agrees with Etienne Gilson's view of Suárez as an heir to the Avicennian doctrine of the possibles, while it adds the refinement that a possible here equates with a not-impossible or with a non-self-contradictory essence. The key to this is provided by the Scotist doctrine that "What is not non-being, is being" *(Quod non est non-ens est ens)*. The main distillate from Suárez's teaching is a lowest common denominator concept of being which is found everywhere from mere possibles to the most actual being of God." (*CS* p. XI).
   "This article shows that for Francisco Suarez the core reality of possible beings is their non-self-contradiction. Their intrinsic claim to inclusion under the common concept of Being and the Suarezian analogy of Being resides in the fact that as non-repugnant they are not non-being. So understood, they are actually nothing but still more than mere beings of reason. Of themselves, they are eternally true and apt to be known, even if there were no God. Far beyond this, their reality is such that if they were not what they are, there would be no God and, ' *a fortiori*', none of the actual creatures which depend upon him."
3. ———. 1969. "Suárez on the Analogy of Being (First part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 46:219-249.
   Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *CSS*.
   "The next essay (" *Suarez* on the Analogy of Being") presents the ground plan of Suarezian metaphysics and gives a more detailed account of Suárez's thoughts on the formal and objective concepts of being, as well as on being as a participle and being as a noun. Coupled with this is his identification of the subject of metaphysics with the *one common objective concept of being as a noun*. This in turn

is identified with what is *apt to exist* - what is non-contradictory of itself and what importantly excludes beings of reason. The basic Suarezian analogy of intrinsic attribution presupposes this common concept and works within it. The essay goes on to show the main program of Suárez's metaphysics, which is to treat the general concept of being and then to follow its internal demand for partition into God and creatures. In this, real being for Suarez is *one,* but neither a genus nor *simpliciter simplex* in the manner of Scotus. In creatures as well as in God, its common denominator is aptitude for existence in the sense of intrinsic non-contradiction. This marks the difference between possibles and beings of reason and reduces real being in the widest sense to that which is "not nothing." Then despite the gradation in their analogous sharing of being, God and creatures, including mere possibles, are equal in their lack of intrinsic contradiction." (*CS* p. XII).

4. ———. 1969. "Suárez on the Analogy of Being (Second part)." *Modern Schoolman* no. 46:323-341.
   Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *CSS*.
   "Francis Suárez doctrine of the analogy of being requires that one common character of being be found intrinsically but unequally, according to an order of prior and posterior, in those inferiors of which the one, common, objective concept of being as a noun is predicated.
   Problems are that the requirement of intrinsicality has forced Suarez to give a shadow reality to merely possible things while the need for inequality has militated against the all important unity of the common character or concept of being."
5. ———. 1972. "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics." *Modern Schoolman* no. 49:201-220.
   Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *CSS*.
   "The third essay ("Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger" - which is a change from the original title, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics"), contends that Heidegger's criticism of medieval metaphysics is aimed directly at the Avicennian-Scotistic-Suarezian metaphysics rather than at that of St. Thomas Aquinas.

While written from a Thomistic viewpoint, for present purposes this essay highlights the difference between the Suarezian science of being as the non-contradictory and the Thomistic metaphysics of *esse*. For the Suarezian metaphysics, the essay notes nuances and raises questions linked with: the Scotistic equation of being and thinkability; the rooting of thinkability in non-contradiction; using the *passiones disjunctae entis* as the basis of a progression in metaphysics; justifying any progression in a metaphysics of the non-contradictory; and Heidegger's rejection of any speech-governed metaphysics as well as his accusation of *"Seinsvergessenheit."* This essay might be improved by an addendum that would take into account Heidegger's famous Marburg lectures, which were not available at the time I composed my original text." (*CSS* p. XII).
"Regarding Heidegger's appraisal of Scholastic metaphysics, we have asked: (1) is he right about the sort of metaphysics represented by Scotus and Suarez? and (2) is he correct in equating all medieval metaphysics with this type of Scotistic-Suarezian metaphysics?
We have answered the first question in the affirmative and have replied negatively to the second."

6. ———. 1972. "Person: a Christian Contribution." *Social Justice Review* no. LXV:184-186.
7. ———. 1972. "A Suggested Modification of the Critical Text of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus " *Manuscripta. A Journal for Manuscript Research* no. 16:30-32.
8. ———. 1973. " *Ipsum Esse* as God-Surrogate: The Point of Convergence of Faith and Reason for St. Thomas Aquinas." *Modern Schoolman* no. 50:293-296.
"Since, for St. Thomas Aquinas, "cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis," even revealed truths must be phrased in terms which we can naturally understand. But the very best term which we can naturally muster for God-talk is "ipsum esse," a term to which we come across the medium of a demonstration "quia" from the being of creatures. As such, it has obvious limitations.

It does not supply us with an immediate knowledge of the divine reality, but it is, instead, a surrogate for God who remains unknown in himself. This surrogate then is employed in theology not only at the level of "de Deo uno" but also at the very heart of "de Deo trino". As so employed, it is patently the point of convergence of faith and reason for St Thomas."

9. ———. 1974. "Saint Bonaventure and the Ontological Argument." *Medieval Studies* no. 52:27-48.
"For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of St Anselm.
Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics; they involve the experience of common intelligibility.
With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of that intelligibility. Implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality and for thought."
10. ———. 1979. "Some Thoughts on Duns Scotus and the Ontological Argument." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:234-241.
"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of "thinkability" is non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps: (1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also comes close to making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond internal possibility, includes an external potency."
11. ———. 1982. "The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence." In *History of Philosophy in the Making. A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th*

Birthday, edited by Thro, Linus J., 105-117. Washington: University Press of America.
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *CSS*.
"Essay four after the introduction ("The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence") pursues the entailment of the common concept of being as a noun as it is divided into God and creatures. Fundamentally, the essay argues that Suárez's metaphysical proof for God's existence, which is the pivotal point of his metaphysics and whose Avicennian roots he has expressly embraced, amounts to an ontological argument of the type later criticized by Kant." (*CSS* p. XII).

12. ———. 1984. "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez S.J." *Vivarium* no. 22:121-160.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in *CSS*.
"In the next essay *("Prolegomena* to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J."), I looked to discover in Suárez's use of *extrinsic denomination* rules which might adumbrate the Kantian *a priori*. While I found that in regard to extrinsic denomination Suarez did observe conventions which I was able to catalog, these did not in any clear way anticipate Kant. Indeed, I may have discovered the opposite. For although, on its face, extrinsic denomination might seem to be simply a matter of names imposed by us on things, my study showed that Suarez thought it to be a feature of things themselves, anterior to any operation of ours. In this, it clearly stood on the side of real being as opposed to being of reason." (*CS* p. XII-XIII).
"At times, extrinsic denomination for Suarez seems close to, if not synonymous with, a mere naming from the outside. But at other times, it is regarded as a feature of things themselves. In this article, there is some description and some examples of extrinsic denomination according to Suarez. Following this, are some of his reasons for and sources of such denomination. Special attention is paid to his use of extrinsic denomination in connection with the properties and categories of being. Finally, there are listed conventions and other items observed in Suarez's use of extrinsic denomination."

13. ———. 1984. "The Unborn as Person." In *Restoring the Right to Life: The Human Life Amendment*, edited by Bopp, James Jr., 81-88; 218-221. Provo, Utah.
14. ———. 1985. "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs." In *Semiotics 1984*, edited by Deely, John, 567-576. New York: University Press of America.
" *Conimbicenses* is the name of a group of Jesuit professors of philosophy at the University of Coimbra during the latter half of the sixteenth century. It is also the name given to a five volume set of philosophical commentaries on Aristotle which they edited and published between 1592 and 1606. The last volume to appear was a Logic entitled: *Commentarii in universam dialecticam Aristototelis* (Friedrich Stegmuller, *Filosofia e teologia nas universidades de Coimbra e Evora no seculo XVI*, Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, 1959 pp. 95-96).
(...)
The particular work, with which I am now concerned, is their commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. More precisely, my concern is with the first chapter of that commentary. Entitled *De signo* (On the Sign), it runs over 60 pages in quarto. While some treatment of signs at this place in Aristotelian commentary was common among the Scholastics, these pages of the *Conimbricenses* represent, as far as I know, the first really major treatise on signs as such which we have from the Scholastic period. The table of contents of the chapter gives a pretty fair indication of its character.
Principal issues raised are four: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the divisions of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words (*voces*) and of writing; (4) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth and falsity. Along the way there are sub-questions about the essence of a sign, the possibility of something being a sign of itself, signs as actual or aptitudinal, the relations involved in signs, *et cetera*. Although this commentary is a work of logic, the *Conimbricenses* explicitly aware of further epistemological, psychological, metaphysical, and theological questions

which can be raised with regard to signs and signification. At the same time, they also display a remarkable understanding of the breadth and scope of semiotics itself. *Some* of the items which they have touched on different ways are the following: language, syntactical speech, laughing, nodding, coughing, persons talking in sleep, persons lying, persons emitting words without thought. They consider the signification of negative words, of syncategorematic words such as "if", nonsense words like "Blictri", and words like "chimaera" and "goat-stag" to which no real things correspond. They are interested in the signs involved in writing and reading, especially voiceless reading. Coupled with a discussion of the physiological bases of speech and hearing, they treat the relation of deafness and an inability to speak or communicate." pp. 567-568.

15. ———. 1987. "Suárez on Truth and Mind-Dependent Beings: Implications for a Unified Semiotic." In *Semiotics 1983*, edited by Jonathan, Evans and Deely, John, 121-133. New York: University Press of America.
16. ———. 1987. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)." *Vivarium* no. 25:47-75.
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.
*"*The sixth essay after the introduction ("Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth"), against a background view of truth as a function of being, considers Suárez's response to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. If truth consists in a conformity between the mind and reality, how can there be any truth where there is no independent reality? Most of all, how can there be any truth where something would be impossible of realization? In last analysis, Suárez's reply turns upon the significative cast of the words involved in the expression of beings of reason, especially so called impossible objects. Because, unlike mere nonsense words such as *"Blytiri"* or *"scyndapsus,"* words like *"goat-stag"* or *"chimera"* have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some

statements being true even as others are false." (*CSS* p. XIII).

17. ———. 1987. "Peter John Olivi on Right, Dominion, and Voluntary Signs." In *Semiotics 1986*, 419-429. New York.
18. ———. 1988. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)." *Vivarium* no. 26:51-72.
    Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.
    "From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western philosophical tradition that truth is a function of being. One need only remember the general Platonic doctrine of Forms, which are at once 'really real' and the locus of intelligibility of truth. Francis Suarez has passed on the common teaching of the Schoolmen that truth is threefold. (1) There is a truth in words, in writing, and in what he calls 'non-ultimate concepts' which is termed truth 'in signifying'. (2) There is a truth in the intellect knowing things, which is called truth 'in knowing'. And (3) there is a truth in things, which is a truth 'in being'."
    "This is the completion of a two-part article which considers Suarez's reply to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. That reply turns upon the significative cast of the words expressing beings of reason, especially "impossible" beings. Because such words, unlike nonsense syllables, have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false."
19. ———. 1988. "Thomas Compton Carleton S.J.: On Words Signifying More Than Their Speakers or Makers Know or Intend." *Modern Schoolman* no. 66:1-28.
    "For Carleton (1591-1666) words have power to signify independent of their speakers. Moreover, while first wordmaker may control the extension of his words, he cannot control their intension. Words can signify something more clearly to a hearer than that same thing was understood by the one who first established a word to express it. Carleton clearly demarcates the roles of speakers and wordmakers and foreshadows current concerns about extension versus intension of words."

20. ———. 1990. " *Extrinsic Cognoscibility*: a Seventeenth Century Supertranscendental Notion." *Modern Schoolman* no. 68:57-80.
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *BBK*.
"This essay explores the area of intentionality in late Scholasticism. For Suarez the subject of metaphysics is 'real being' which is transcendental but exclusive of beings of reason. After Suarez, the Calvinist Clemens Timpler says that the subject of metaphysics is 'the intelligible,' which encompasses both real and unreal, even impossible, beings. Also for 17th century Jesuit logicians what seems common to real beings and beings of reason, including impossible objects, is 'cognoscibility.' More precisely, this is 'extrinsic cognoscibility,' which is labeled 'supertranscendental.' In Timpler and the Jesuits I see anticipations of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* (Theory of objects)."
21. ———. 1991. "Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65:311-334.
Reprinted as Chapter 8 in *CSS*.
"The next essay ("Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit") explores Suárez's reply to the question: how is a science such as geometry somehow undivided in itself and divided off from arithmetic, or from other speculative sciences such as physics and metaphysics? Is there a basis in things themselves for such indivision and division? Or is it something entirely or in part supplied by the knower? Connected with this is a question about the growth of a habit of science. Suárez's view is that any collection of conclusions making up a scientific habit will have at best only an artificial unity but nevertheless one which in some way rests on an aptitude in things to be so unified. However, as the essay shows, this view plainly raises as many questions as it answers, and Suárez's admitted perplexity is understandable." (*CS* p. XIII).
22. ———. 1991. "Francisco Suárez: On Preaching Gospel to People Like the American Indians." *Fordham International Law Journal* no. 15:879-951.
Reprinted as Chapter 10 in *CSS*.

"The ninth essay after the introduction ("Francisco Suarez: On Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians") was written in commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of America. As its title suggests, the essay considers Suárez's doctrine on evangelization against the background of a new situation, a new opportunity, and new obligations for European Christians. On the basis of related passages and themes in his Opera omnia it attempts to fathom some of his deepest thoughts with respect to the personhood and rights of the American Indians in face of Christ's last command that his followers teach all nations. Along the way, it presents a fairly extended study of Suárez's views on the basic equality of all human beings, the character of human society (domestic and especially political), morality and law (Eternal, natural, and civil, including the "law of nations" [jus gentium]), sovereignty, jurisdiction, war and conquest, Church and state, as well as a host of other issues." (*CS* p. XIV).

23. Doyle, John Patrick, and Charron, William C. 1993. "On the Self-Refuting Statement 'There is no Truth'. A Medieval Treatment." *Vivarium* no. 31:241-266.
"It is commonly known that 14th and 15th century logicians were deeply interested in the properties of self-referring statements.
Perhaps, however, it could be better known that medieval theologians were also interested in them. In this regard, one important discussion centered around the proposition "There is no truth" ("Nulla Veritas est"). Construed as a universal negative about an entire class of items of which it itself is a member, it is partially self-referring. And just because it is self-referring it also seems to be self-refuting: if it is true, then it is false; if it is false, then something is true. Thus, its contradictory is necessarily true, namely "There is some truth".
The history here goes back many centuries through a line of theologians and ultimately to St. Augustine. (1) Following him, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, and others claimed to

have found in the self-refutation of the denial of truth a foundational premise adequate
to support other claims about God and immortality. But this was not without opposition from theological colleagues and successors, including Aquinas, Scotus, and in the post medieval period, Cajetan, and Toletus. Criticism came at either of two points: the critics
objected(a) that the self-referring character of the denial of truth does not entail the truth of what is claimed, or (b) that the truth which the self-refutation is purported to establish is not itself sufficient to found the metaphysical constructions it is further claimed to found.
An unraveling of this ancient debate -- beginning our story with Augustine in the 4th century and ending it with Toletus in the 16th reveals the appreciation among these theologians of ever more powerful tools of logical analysis, tools that have proven to be of lasting use." (pp. 241-242)
(1) Interest in self-refutation is common among ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. SextusEmpiricus provides a notable statement of the alleged self refutation of the proposition in which we are interested. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I 398-9, II 55, ed. and tr. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge 1935, II, 213, 265. "Now as to those who assert that all things are false,... they are confuted. For if all things are false, the statement 'All things are false,' being one of the 'all things', will be false. And if the statement 'All things are false' is false, its contradictory, 'Not all things are false,' will be true. Therefore, if all things are false, not all things are false." (p. 265) For the history of the notion of self- refutation, see M. F. Burnyeat, 'Protagoras and Self- Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy', in: *The Philosophical Review*, 85 (1976), 44-69.

24. Doyle, John Patrick. 1994. "Poinsot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:337-362.
"John Poinsot (a.k.a. Joannes a sancto Thoma (1589-1644) was heir to a common division of beings into these that are in themselves real and those which are entirely dependent upon human reason. Those division went back to Aristotle's

split between being as found in the categories and being as true. In the Middle Ages and thorough the period of the Spanish Revival, it was found, *mutatis mutandis,* in Averroes (d. 1198), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Henry of Ghent (1217?-1293), John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and just about everyone else in the Scholastic tradition.
One of the very few exceptions that I know to this general rule was Francis of Mayronnes, O.F.M. (d. ca. 1325), who denied the existence of beings of reason. Not only an heir, Poinsot himself embraced and transmitted the common view. For him, beings were either real or rational. Real beings (*res extra animam*) were those which exist, or can exist, independently of the human mind and which belong in the Aristotelian categories. Rational beings, or beings of reason, in the sense which contrasts with this, were those which do not belong to the categories, and which cannot exist outside human understanding. That there are such beings of reason was not for Poinsot a matter of doubt."

25. ———. 1995. "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: a Seventeenth Century Debate About Impossible Objects." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 48:771-808.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *BBK* and as Post-Scriptum in: Victor M. Salas (ed.), *Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013, pp. 329-367.
"This article concerns a 17th Century debate over whether there are self-contradictory impossible objects of understanding or whether there is no intellectual object which is not some actual or possible being. The debate, which has its roots in the Greek and Scholastic traditions, is presented especially between two Jesuits: Thomas Compton Carleton and John Morawski, respectively, a proponent and an opponent of impossible objects. The article itself does not take sides in the debate, but, inasmuch as he wrote later, Morawski is presented as espousing his own view and answering arguments in support of Carleton's position."

26. Suárez, Francisco. 1995. *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV by Francisco Suárez*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* is to this day the most comprehensive and systematic treatise on metaphysics written from an Aristotelian perspective. It addresses every metaphysical issue raised by medieval and Renaissance scholastics and discusses the views of all important figures who preceded Suárez. As such it is a treasure-trove not only for the metaphysician but also for the historian and has exercised enormous influence on early modern philosophy, particularly in Continental Europe. (...) The Disputation deals with mental entities and, therefore, contains relevant discussions to the philosophy of mind and the ontological status of intensional objects."
Jorge J. E. Gracia - State University of New York at Buffalo.
"In a finely wrought and philosophically intelligible translation of this 54th Disputation of Suárez, John P. Doyle has documented with care the ancient Greek and Medieval sources of Suárez's discussion, its influence upon many hitherto unknown late Scholastic writers and the relevance of Suárez's intentionality theory to such prominent figures in early, middle and late Modern thought as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, B. Russell, Heidegger and others."
Norman J. Wells, Boston College.
27. Doyle, John Patrick. 1996. "Silvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) on Four Degree of Abstraction." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 36.
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *BBK*.
"Mauro says there are four degrees of abstraction. The lowers is 'physical', abstracting from material singulars. The second is 'mathematical', abstracting not just from singulars, but also from sensible and changeable matter as such. A third is 'metaphysical', abstracting from all matter and opening on to real immaterial being. Peculiar to Mauro and marking a departure from orthodox Aristotelianism is

the last and highest degree, which is 'logical'. At this level, we consider intentional being -- which he says is more immaterial than real being, including that studied by metaphysics, in as much as 'being known' is identical with being elevated from matter."

28. ———. 1997. "Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?" *Review of Metaphysics* no. 50:783-815. Reprinted as Chapter 8 in *BBK*.
"Medieval transcendentals are on the side of things while Kantian transcendentality is on the side of the knower. Is there a link between the two in the Seventeenth-Century scholastic understanding of 'supertranscendentals'? In the century before Kant, scholastic supertranscendental being was primarily identified with extrinsic intelligibility and regarded as a contribution of the knower. It was said to be the same as 'the object as such' (objectum ut tale). This seems very close to 'der Gegenstand uberhaupt' which Kant has called a 'missing concept' above the dichotomy of the possible and the impossible."
29. ———. 1997. "Two Thomists on the Morality of a Jailbreak." *Modern Schoolman* no. 74:95-115.
30. ———. 1997. "Vitoria on Choosing to Replace a King." In *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, edited by White, Kevin, 45-58. Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press.
"Anyone familiar with the development of Hispanic philosophy in the Age of Discovery must be aware of the importance of Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492-1546). Perhaps, however, that person will be surprised to hear that Vitoria, the holder of the *Catedra de Prima* in theology at the University of Salamanca, never published any of his own works. Instead, it was through his teaching that, during and after Spain's golden century, Vitoria influenced countless disciples, especially in areas of ethical and political thought. There are estimates of up to one thousand auditors attending some of his lectures. He himself in one place comes close to confirming that figure. But more than this, in the decades that followed, almost all the great moralists of the age looked back to Vitoria as their foremost authority.

Their names read like the honor roll of Spanish and Counter-Reformation Scholasticism. But also outside Spain and Catholic Scholastic circles, in the dawning age of international jurisprudence, Vitoria exercised patent influence on important figures such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Looking at all his influence and at the dearth of work published while he lived, it was with perfect truth that Domingo Bañez (1528-1604) could refer to him as "another Socrates"."

31. ———. 1997. "Reflections on Persons in Petri Dishes." *Linacre Quarterly* no. 64:62-76.
32. Vitoria, Francisco de. 1997. *On Homicide and Commentary on Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae Q. 64 (Thomas Aquinas)a*. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
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The Text of St. Thomas in *Summa theologiae* IIa-IIae, qu. 64 239;
Appendix A 253; Appendix B 259; Appendix C 260;
Bibliography 261; Subject Index 263; Name Index 266-269.

33. Doyle, John Patrick. 1998. "The 'Conimbricenses' on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images." *Modern Schoolman* no. 76:17-31.
"Seneca distinguished two theories about images in a mirror. The first is that we see 'simulachra' and through their mediation we pass to things. The second is that in the mirror we immediately see things. The 'Conimbricenses', Jesuits at the Sixteenth-Century University of Coimbra, regarded mirror images as signs and, aware of Seneca's distinction, they favored the second theory. In so doing, they contrasted formal and instrumental signs and thought mirror images to be formal signs. All of this put them at odds with Thomas Aquinas who apparently favored Seneca's first theory. It also puts them at odds with the present-day semiotician, Umberto Eco, who says that mirror images are not signs."
Translated in Russian by Lada Tsipana as: 'Koimbrskie scholastiki o semioticheskom charaktere zerkalnich otrazhenij', *Verbum* (St. Petersburg Society of Philosophy), 5, pp. 93-109.
34. ———. 1998. "Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre." *Medioevo* no. 24:1-30.
Reprinted as Chapter 9 in *BBK*.

"For the innocent of geography, let me first explain that Finisterre is a cape in northern Spain at the westernmost point of the Spanish mainland. It marks an end of Europe; beyond Finisterre there is only the ocean. As readers of this essay may see, 'supertranscendental nothing' is arguably a philosophical Finisterre which was a farthest point of speculation reached by European philosophers in the seventeenth century. But what readers also may see is that this apparently ultimate item of seventeenth-century European philosophy was possibly pushed even farther out, at what might then to some have seemed beyond Spain and Europe the very end of the earth itself, in Santiago, Chile [by Miguel Viñas, S. J. (1642-1718)]."

35. ———. 1998. "Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy." In *Meeting of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., 297-315. Turnhout: Brepols.
"As every historian of philosophy knows, Aristotle thought the subject of metaphysics was «being insofar as it is being» and from this subject he excluded «being as true». Centuries after Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, S.J., (1548-1617) designated the subject of metaphysics more explicitly as «being insofar as it is *real* being» (*).
The addition of «real» to Aristotle's formula highlighted the inclusion of all that *can* as well as does exist. Against the backdrop of two already well known distinctions -- (1) between formal and objective concepts, and (2) between being as a participle and being as a noun -- for Suarez the subject so conceived was identical with "the objective concept of being as a noun". Concurrently, while being was said to be analogous with regard to hierarchically ordered objects (God and creatures, substance and accidents) with an intrinsic attribution of the perfection it represented, such analogy presupposed a common, unitary, and all but univocal, concept. But from that concept and from the subject of metaphysics Suarez excluded "beings of reason", which he subsumed under Aristotle's *being as true,* and of

which impossible objects, in the sense of those that would be self-contradictory, furnished the paradigm case.
On at least one occasion, Suarez did use the word "supertranscendental" to label a notion wide enough to cover both a transcendental and a predicamental relation (**) -- but not to signify anything common between real beings and beings of reason. Nevertheless, there does seem to be some kind of supertranscendent community here. Real being is transcendent, but real beings and beings of reason are in some more than transcending way the same inasmuch as they both can be objects of cognition. Yet Suarez will allow only a community of name and not of concept between real being and being of reason. At the same time, he has distinguished between being which is the object of metaphysics and being which is the object of cognition generally." (notes omitted)
(*) Cf. Disputationes Metaphysicae (hereafter DM), d. 1, s. 1, n. 26, Opera omnia, ed. C. Berton. Paris, Vivés, 1856-1866, XXV, p. 11.
(**) 11 DM 48, s. 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 869).

36. ———. 1999. "Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations." In *Religion and International Law*, edited by Janis, Mark W. and Evans, Carolyn, 103-120. London.
Reprinted as Chapter 11 in *CSS*.
"The tenth essay ("Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations") repeats a great deal of what is found in the ninth essay both in content and even style. Its inclusion in the present volume was considered justified, however, since its focus is much narrower than the ninth essay, not to mention that there are nine years separating the two essays and both were written for different audiences. "Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations" concerns the law of nations, which for Suarez was a quasi-medium between natural law and the positive human law of individual states. Closely following upon the natural law, the law of nations is not as necessary as that law. In truth, it has the character of positive law. Yet its precepts differ from those of civil law inasmuch as they are unwritten and have been established by the customs not of a single state or province but rather by those of all, or

almost all, nations. In this way, like the state itself, the *jus gentium* has its origin in human consensus. Along the way here we will see Suárez's general teaching with regard to *"jus"* which in different contexts he translates as "law" or as "right." This will then lead into the next essay." (*CS* p. XIV).

37. ———. 2000. "Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition: "This is my Body"." *Modern Schoolman* no. 77:145-163. Reprinted as Chapter 9 in CSS.
"Essay eight in order ("Suarez on the Truth of the Proposition, `This is My Body-) treats a problem coming from Suárez's Aristotelian doctrine of truth vis-a-vis the Council of Trent's dogma of Transubstantiation. The model case of truth is offered by a present indicative proposition which correctly affirms the identity of its subject with its predicate. "This is my Body" aims to do that. But the dogma requires in this proposition a basic non-identity between its subject and predicate. So it appears that the subject is bread, while the substantially different predicate is Christ's Body. Suarez considered earlier opinions and then advanced his own soution to the problem, a solution which gives us insight into not only his doctrine respecting truth but also his understanding of objectivity." (CS p. XIII-XIV).
"Best known for his systematic study of metaphysics and his teaching on law, Francisco Suarez was arguably the greatest theologian in the history of the Jesuits. While the particular doctrine that I am now treating was published in 1587 in the wake of his teaching sacramental theology at Alcali de Henares, there is no indication that he ever changed his mind on it.
My precise present focus is on Suarez's treatise, De Eucharistia, Disputation 58, Sections 4 to 9, which cover pages 322-336, in Volume 20 of the Vivès edition (Paris, 1856-78) of his Opera omnia. In that place, he is commenting on St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Part III, Question 78, and is raising questions with regard to the formula of Eucharistic consecration: most specifically, the words: This is my Body." p. 145.

38. ———. 2001. "Francisco Suárez, S.J. on Human Rights." In *Menschenrechte: Rechte und Pflichten in Ost und West*,

edited by Wegmann, Konrad, Ommerborn, Wofgang and Roetz, Heiner, 105-132. Muenster: LIT Verlag.
Reprinted as Chapter 12 in *CS*.
"The eleventh study ("Suarez on Human Rights") addresses a controverted matter in Scholastic philosophy - the doctrine of subjective rights which has been generally associated with Suarez. In fact, Suarez here accented something already in the Scholastic tradition, something which then later came to be termed a "subjective right." Suarez himself called it a "moral faculty" - understanding "moral" as intentional rather than physical and "faculty" as a power, an authority, a claim, a warrant, or a license. Moreover, he did not reject the earlier "objective" notion of rights, with its understanding of *"jus"* as the object of the virtue of justice. Rather, he presupposed a common objective order of justice upon which ultimately all rights would be grounded. But he did emphasize and to a certain extent modify something that existed in the tradition before himself, namely, the thought that :ndividuals can be the bearers of personal rights, not in opposition to but in distinction from the common "right" which is the object of justice. An added nuance here is that subjective rights may be understood not just over against an objective right but also as moral faculties which are possessed by persons who are subject to human authority opposite that authority to which they are subject." (*CS* p. XIV-XV).
"For most observers, the American Declaration of Independence is a milestone in the history of human rights. From its promulgation in 1776 down to present time it has served as a philosophical base for various democratic systems of government and as a logical, if not an always demonstrably historical, starting point for the expansion of human rights claims in such current-century documents as the United Nations Universal Declaration and the. Geneva Conventions. However, it has long been recognized that the Declaration of Independence has its own philosophical antecedents, most notably perhaps in the work of John Locke (1632-1704). Our aim now is to go back before Locke and to show such antecedents in the Scholastic philosophy

which Locke himself imbibed as a young student at Oxford where he first enrolled in 1652. More specifically, I will point to their presence in the work of arguably the greatest Jesuit philosopher-theologian of all time, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). (*)
(*) For a recent overview of Suarez, the man, his work, and his influence, See John P. Doyle, " *Suárez, Francisco," Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York, 1998), vol. 8; pp. 189-196.

39. ———. 2001. *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated with introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"The *Conimbricenses* were late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra. Chief among them were Emmanuel de Goes (1542-1597), Cosmas de Magelhães (1551-1624), Balthasar Alvarez (1561-1630), and Sebastian do Couto (1567-1639). Although not usually numbered among the *Conimbricenses*, their confrere in the Society, Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), had promoted the novel idea of a philosophical *cursus* authored by the Jesuits of Coimbra. The treatise *De Signo* (On the Sign) is the commentary to the first chapter of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*.
The work raises five principal questions: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the division of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words and of writing; (4) Whether concepts are the same among all and whether spoken words are different; then (5) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth or falsity."

40. ———. 2001. "On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality." *Modern Schoolman* no. 79:57-78.
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *BBK*.
"With his own intention of instructing novices, Luis de Lossada, S.J. (1681- 1748), has summarized the new, yet old, terminology of the disputed Scholastic doctrine of intellectual intentionality. (*) Although the Scholastics (and I to entitle the present essay) have ambiguously used the term 'intention' -- first in relation to will and then to

understanding, in executing his intention Lossada has employed it simply to designate an act of the human intellect. Such an act may be either first or second, depending upon whether it directly represents the physical reality of its object or reflexly represents an object as already known or insofar as it has some being derived from the intellect. From these intellectual acts, the words which signify things as first and directly conceived are called `terms of first intention,' while those which signify things as secondly and reflexly known are called 'terms of second intention,' that is to say terms corresponding to a second intending by the intellect. Examples of the former terms may be 'man,' 'animal,' or 'sun,' while terms like 'universal, 'genus,' 'species,' 'subject,' or 'predicate' are examples of the latter. Moreover, since objects are customarily named from the knowledge they terminate, both first and second intentions (whether one looks at acts of understanding or the words which express them) may be either 'formal' or 'objective'."
(*) *Cursus philosophici Logica*. Tr. I disp. 2 c. 4, n.1; ed. Barcinonae: Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana, 1883 [originally: Salamanca, 1724], vol. I, p. 204. (Notes omitted).

41. ———. 2003. "Gedankendinge und Imagination bei den Jesuiten des 17. Jh." In *Imagination -- Fiktion -- Kreation: Das kulturschaffende Vermögen der Phantasie*, edited by Dewender, Thomas and Welt, Thomas, 213-228. München - Leipzig: K. G. Saur - Verlag.
Translated in German by Thomas Dewender.
The original English version is published as Chapter 6 in *BBK* with the title: *Beings of Reason and Imagination*.

42. ———. 2003. "The Borders of Knowability: Thoughts from or Occasioned by Seventeenth-Century Jesuits." In *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aerstsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 643-658. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Reprinted as Chapter 11 in *BBK*.
"This essay concerns the upper and the lower borders between what is and what is not knowable for human beings, particularly as these borders were variously

considered by some seventeenth-century Jesuit thinkers. Expanding, let me say that the boundary above is reached when one confronts the reality of God, who while He may be evidently knowable in Himself is not so, at least in this life, for us. In contrast, the lower boundary seems to run between that which is in itself knowable and that which is totally unknowable either for us or for God. This lower boundary is reached at the level of what is intrinsically impossible and what to that extent fails of being and of being knowable.

A further refinement is suggested from geography. Take the Alps as a natural boundary between Italy and France. As any tyro knows, this boundary has a double face, inasmuch as we can view it either from the side of Italy or of France, that is from either a cisalpine or a transalpine perspective. Apply this to the borders of knowability. The cisalpine side of the upper border is somehow supplied by our human knowledge groping toward God - especially through negative theology in the wake of Pseudo-Dionysius and through what seventeenth-century Scholastics termed the metaphysical essence of God. The transalpine side is the reality of God in Himself which is beyond the present grasp of a human mind. The lower border will be at the interface of the possible and the impossible. More exactly, its cisalpine side will enclose both the possible and the impossible. Its transalpine side will in some way exclude both the possible and the impossible.

For what follows I will use Jesuit sources in the wake of Francisco Suarez, S. J. (1548-1617), but I will principally focus on one Jesuit, Maximilian Wietrowski (1660-1737), whom I have treated in other places. This will occasion forays into Jesuits between him and Suarez, most singularly: Thomas Compton Carleton (1591 -1666), Sylvester Mauro (1619-1687), and André Semery (1630-1717), as well as one publishing after, Miguel Viñas (1642-1718). At times I will go outside Jesuit writings to clarify or to confirm points and finally I will suggest conclusions against the backdrop of Thomistic theology, which the

Jesuits, by their "Constitutions" and "Ratio Studiorum", were obliged wherever possible to follow." (notes omitted)

43. ———. 2004. "Wrestling with a Wraith: André Semery, S. J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle's Goat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable." In *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, edited by Pozzo, Riccardo, 84-112. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Reprinted as Chapter 10 in *BBK*.

44. Suárez, Francisco. 2004. *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29 by Francisco Suárez, S.J.* South Bend: St. Augustine Press. Translated and edited from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"The two Disputations that are translated in the present work open the second part of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* and mark the turn from being in general lo particular beings. Their concern is with, first in Disputation 28, a comprehensive division of being in general, and after in Disputation 29, the existence of the principal member of this division, namely, that being which is God.
Disputation 28 is divided into three Sections, which ask about the legitimacy and the sufficiency of the division, as well as whether the dividend, i.e. being, is univocal or analogous between God and creatures. In the first Section (Vivès: vol. 26, pp. 1-8), the question is whether being is rightly divided into infinite and finite being? Doubts arise from the fact that "infinite" and "finite" on their face do not appear to cover the whole range of being but rather look to be restricted to accidental being in the category of quantity (§ 1). In addition, the terms of the proposed division seem obscure, especially the term "infinite" (§ 2). Suarez's answer is to analyze the terms (§ 3) and then to defend the division as one that is good and necessary (§ 4) as well as first and most evident (§ 5). It is equivalent to other divisions such as being by itself *(ens a se)* and being from another *(ens ab alio) (§§* 6-7) or, with clarifications, necessary being and contingent being (§§ 8-12). It is also equivalent to: essential being and being by participation (§ 13), created being and uncreated being (§ 14), or being in act and being in potency

(§§ 15-16). Suarez next compares the first division with the rest (§ 17), explains the terms of the first division by comparison with quantity (§ 17), and closes the first Section (§ 18) with a reply to objections raised at its beginning." p. XIV.

"Though almost twice as long, Disputation 29 like the one before is again divided into three Sections. Section 1 (vol. 26, pp. 21-34) begins after two introductory paragraphs (§§ 1-2) in which Suarez gives reasons for the location of the subject matter of the Disputation in this place and remarks how he will leave aside as much as possible items which depend for their understanding on Revelation. The first Section then asks whether and/or by what means the existence of God can be demonstrated. Among the Scholastic Doctors, Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420) has denied the possibility of such a demonstration. To this Suarez makes the brief but revealing reply that already by the various divisions of being that have been presented in the previous *Disputation* the existence of "some being which is uncreated or not produced" has been proven (§ 1). The obvious implication is that by now the existence of God has in effect been proven. But immediately the question arises: by what means, physical or metaphysical, is this properly done? On one side, the opinion of Averroes is that the means is physical, namely the motion of the heavens (§ 2). The contrary opinion, that of Avicenna and later of Duns Scotus among others, holds that the means must be metaphysical (§ 3) -- that is, not motion but being itself. A third and a fourth opinion hold in different ways that the task must belong to both physics, that is natural philosophy, and metaphysics (§§ 4-5). In different ways the means would thus be both physical and metaphysical. In Suarez's judgment the second opinion is certainly the true one but there can be some probability in the fourth position, if it is rightly explained (§ 6).

At this juncture, he examines at length the physical argument that proceeds by the medium of motion and for various reasons he finds it wanting (§§ 7-17). Then he considers another physical argument, from the operations

and the essence of the rational soul (§ 18). This too comes up short, unless we first pose a question about the soul's being, which is a metaphysical question (§ 19). Here Suarez gives the metaphysical argument that is based upon a broader and deeper principle than the physical one, *"Whatever is moved is moved by another."* The metaphysical principle is *"Whatever is made or produced is made by another"* and the argument itself concludes to an unmade Maker (§§ 20-21). An objection of a possibly circular chain of causes is dismissed as every bit as inadmissible as a thing's causing itself (§ 22). Other objections involve an infinite number of causes that would preclude any arriving at a first uncaused or unmade cause. There are different ways to conceive such an infinity of causes. Suarez explains such ways in detail and shows their insufficiencies (§§ 23-40). The first Section ends (§§ 41-42) with a brief rehearsal of and summary judgment upon the opinions listed at the beginning." pp. XV-XVI.

45. ———. 2004. *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis) - by Francisco Suárez*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"As the reader will see, the following volume is divided into translations and the corresponding Latin texts. The translations are in order:
(1) *Suarez's Plan for his Metaphysical Disputations*. This is his preface to the 1597 edition. It is an address to his reader in which he lays out his intention as a Christian theologian to pursue a Christian philosophy, specifically a metaphysics which will be at the service of his theology. This metaphysics will be in two main parts. The first of these will be what will shortly after be called an "ontology" or a general science of being, in which after establishing "real being insofar as it is being" as the object of metaphysics, he will proceed to study its properties, its principles, and its causes. The second part will then descend from the general concept of being to study those beings, God and creatures, substances and accidents, which are contained under that concept. Finally, it should

be noted that in this preface he speaks of the present Index and gives his reader some idea of its purpose.
(2) *The Proemium to the Second Metaphysical Disputation*. This short piece is important. After again indicating the systematic plan of the *Disputationes,* it contrasts that with the disorganized text of Aristotle and commentaries on it. But then he says that, in order to satisfy "students of Aristotle," he has added the present Index which follows the order of the *Metaphysics* and which gives cross-references to the *Disputations*. It will also, he tells us, comment at times directly on the text of Aristotle and will explore matters which for whatever reasons have not been covered well enough in the *Disputations*.
(3) Next comes the *Most Ample Index* itself. In this Suarez, as he promised, follows the order of the *Metaphysics,* essentially commenting on it as I have said, "by way of question." To appreciate this Index, a modem reader should have some familiarity with Aristotle's text and the main problems interpreters have encountered with it. To facilitate that, I have at he start of most Books added a summary of the remarks of Jules Tricot, the important French translator of the *Metaphysics*. I chose Tricot's remarks for a number of reasons. First, they were succinct. Second, they were the thoughts of an authentic scholar. Third, while Tricot's scholarship may be a few decades old, it is still valuable for understanding the main nineteenth and twentieth-century debates about the composition and the meaning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, debates which often bear on problems which Suarez and the medievals encountered. Finally, there is something which will not be evident from the summaries I gave, but which was in the background of my choosing Tricot. This is that he, unlike many contemporary writers, extends his interest out beyond the text of Aristotle to the traditions of his Greek and Latin commentators. In short, Tricot pursues understanding of Aristotle in a way which I am certain Suarez would endorse.
(4) *An Index of Disputations:* This amounts to a Table of Contents for the fifty-four Disputations which comprise the main portion of Suarez's work. To make it easier for readers

to find these Disputations I have added volume and page numbers to Suarez's list. A further benefit of this may be that a reader will be able to see at a glance the relative importance which Suarez attached to each Disputation from the number of pages he allotted to it. In passing I did notice minor variations between some of the Section headings in the main text of the *Disputationes* and the Index of Disputations. Generally, in my notes I ignored such variations and mentioned them only on rare occasions. Following the translations, the next portion of the current volume is devoted to the Latin texts. Thus I have transcribed in their original language the Preface to the whole work, the Prologue to the Second Disputation, the Most Ample Index itself, and the Index of the Disputations. The most important notes that I added contain the Latin translations mentioned above, i.e., those of Moerbeke, Argyropoulos, Bessarion, and Fonseca. On this score, let me say that I deliberately separated the Greek of Aristotle from the Latin of Suarez and these others. My purpose in this was to allow interested persons to compare the Latin translations without the immediate distraction of the Greek. At the same time, the Greek will be available and matched directly to my English translation of Suarez's Latin. My hope is that this is clear and that it makes some sense to interested readers. The volume includes a *Dramatis Personae,* that is, a list of and a few facts about persons whom Suarez mentions in the Ample Index. Again, I have added a bibliography of sources in various languages to which readers may go for more in depth understanding of the issues raised in the translated texts."

46. Doyle, John Patrick. 2005. "Two Sixteenth-Century Jesuits and a Plan to Conquer China. Alonso Sanchez and José de Acosta: An Outrageous Proposal and its Rejection." In *Rechtsdenken: Schnittpunkte West und Ost. Recht in den gesellschafts- und staatstragenden Institutionen Europas und Chinas*, edited by Wegmann, Konrad and Holz, Harald, 253-273. Münster: LIT Verlag.
"I. The Plan of Alonso Sanchez SJ.

II. The Great Plan in Detail: Ten Sections of Preparing, Pursuing, and Safe-Guarding the Conquest of China
III. The Opponent of he Plan: José de Acosta S.J.
IV. Several Reasons, Technico-practical and Moral, against the Plan
V. The Royal Decision: Renunciation of the Plan.

I. The Plan of Alonso Sanchez S. J. of Conquering China

The first of our two Jesuits, Alonso Sânchez (1547-1593), has been called "a Jesuit like no other." (1) Born in the province of Guadalajara in Spain, he entered the Society of Jesus in 1565 at the age of 17. (2) In 1571 he was ordained a priest and in 1579 he was sent by his Order to Mexico and then on to the Philippine Islands, where he disembarked in September of 1581 at the city of Manila, which had been founded ten years earlier by Miguel Lopez de Legazpe (1510-1572). In the years that followed, Sânchez gained prominence in the Philippines and made two trips from there to China.

His first trip, in 1582, was to the Portuguese enclave at Macao. (3) His purpose was to acquaint the Portuguese with, and to gain their acceptance of, the fact that Philip II of Spain had in 1580 also assumed the throne of Portugal and that now the whole Iberian peninsula was united under one rule. In this Sânchez was most successful and upon returning to the Philippines he was acclaimed as a skilled diplomat. Well known for his virtue, his learning, and his zeal for souls, (4) he still became a figure of controversy even within the Jesuits. (5) This last was largely because of his penchant for crossing the line between affairs of church and state and in particular for his view with regard to China. (6)

(1) "Un jésuite tel qu'il n'y a en eut jamais de semblable: Alonso Sanchez." H. Bernard, SJ, "La Théorie du protectorat civil des missions en pays infidèle: ses antécédents historiques et sa justification théologique par Suarez," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 64 (1937), pp. 261-93, esp. p. 266.

(2) For dates in Sànchez's life, cf. Joseph Dehergne, SJ., *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine de 1552 à 1800* (Roma:

Institution Historicum, SJ., 1973), pp. 238 - 9; also, cf. F. Zubillaga, "Sánchez, Alonso (Alfonso). Misionero," in *Diccionario histôrico de la Compañia de Jésus: biogrqfico-temático*, Charles E. O'Neill, Joaquin Ma. Dominguez, directores (Roma: Institutum Historicum, S.I.; Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2001 vol. 4, pp. 3486-7.
(3) The Portuguese had had a trading station at Macao since 1537.
(4) Cf. Antonio Astráin, SJ., *Historia de la Compañia de Jésus en la asistencia de España*, 7 vols. (Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1912 -1925), vol. 3, pp. 549 - 50.
5 For some modem reflection of this, cf. “Il Sanchez faceva profusione di consacrare un tempo eccessivo adorazione, ma sembra essere stato un uomo piuttosto portato agli eccessi." *Fonti Ricciane: Documenti originali concernenti Matteo Ricci e la storia delle prime relazioni tra l'Europa e la Cina (1579 - 1615)*, cd. Pasquale M. D'Elia, S.I., tomo 1 (Roma: La Libreria dello Stato, 1942), p. 214, n. 5. For an extended and reasonably balanced view, see W.C. Repetti, SJ., *History of the Society of Jesus in the Philippine Islands*, (Manila: Good Shepherd Press, 1938), pp. 77 - 79.
(6) Cf. Zubillaga, p. 3487.

47. ———. 2006. "Hervaeus Natalis, O.P., (d. 1323) On Intentionality: Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath." *Modern Schoolman* no. 83:85-124.
"It is generally known that Franz Brentano (1828-1917) came through a tradition Aristotelian-Scholasticism to a philosophy which stood in opposition to Kant and to the main stream of German idealism after. It is also often thought that nothing in that tradition was more influential than its intentionality doctrine. Central for Brentano's early development, intentionality was a doctrine whose Scholastic origin he himself indicated, when in 1874, he wrote:
"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is

not here to be understood as a reality) or immanent objectivity."
Since 1874, for proponents, opponents, and simple observers of Brentano and of intentionality doctrine, whatever else may be at issue the general consensus has been that the term "intentionality" indicates a direction from knower to known. *Mutatis mutandis,* so understood, intentionality continued to be important for various phenomenological philosophies which stemmed from Brentano. In this vein, Brentano's most recognized disciple, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is credited with introducing the term itself into modern philosophy, has described its basic signification as "the property of being conscious of something." This direction from consciousness to the object (which Brentano himself influenced by the problem of non-existent objects later at least in part rejected in his famous *Abkehr vom Nichtrealen* has been regarded as central in Husserl's work even by critics. The same direction appears in the work of others dependent upon Brentano and a glance at secondary sources will confirm its almost universal acceptance as the common view.
In the Middle Ages, from the Latin Avicenna on, the term "intention" (*intentio*) can be found throughout the thirteenth century. However, to my knowledge, somewhat surprisingly, the actual word, "intentionality" (*intentionalitas*), first appears only when we come to the fourteenth-century writing of Hervaeus Natalis. It was a bigger surprise for me to find that Brentano in one place actually mentioned Hervaeus and listed three of his works. But the biggest surprise was to discover that for Hervaeus the direction of *intentionality* as such was not from knower to known but rather opposite wise -- from known to knower! My purpose now is to recount and perhaps to sharpen that discovery as well as to go further and touch on some of its possible *Wirkungsgeschichte*." pp. 85-86 (notes omitted).

48. ———. 2006. "Francisco Suárez, S. J. (1548-1617) on the Interpretation of Laws." *Modern Schoolman* no. 83:197-222.
Reprinted as Chapter 13 in *CSS*.

"The twelfth and final essay ("Francisco Suarez on the Interpretation of Laws") will serve to bring out some of the breadth and depth of Suarez's great work, *De Legibus*. For that I have picked out just one of its 246 chapters and have given a brief exposition of that chapter against the civil and canon law background before which it was written. In this, I have followed Suarez to speak generally of interpretation of the words of a law, the mind of the lawgiver, and the reason for the law, in the two directions of expanding and of restricting that law. Along the way, I have treated such issues as various types of law which Suarez recognized, the legal codes he had to cope with, the interpreters on whom he relied, the absence of any written constitution, yet, at the same time, some *de facto* practices and principles substituting for that. I have also highlighted his own skills at interpretation in other contexts. Lastly, I have added an Appendix here which using particular laws will show more concretely some of the points made in the essay." (*Cs* p. XV).

49. ———. 2006. "Mastri and Some Jesuits on Possible and Impossible Objects of God's Knowledge and Power." In *Rem in seipsa cernere: saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)*, edited by Forlivesi, Marco, 439-468. Padova: Il Poligrafo.
50. Suárez, Francisco. 2006. *On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII) by Francisco Suárez*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated from Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"There are two main places in which Aristotle has dealt with the category of relation. These are: (a) *Categories*, Chapter 7, and (b) *Metaphysics*, Book V, Chapter 15. As will become apparent, these places will be central for Suarez's treatment of relation in *Disputation* 47." p. 19.
"At very least, without pinning the matter down at all points, it is safe to say that relation is central to any overall understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories and even more to any understanding of his wider doctrine beyond.

As I have mentioned, there are two principal places in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (DM) in which Suarez treats relation. These are the present Disputation 47 and then Disputation 54, Section 6. The obvious dividing line between them is that between real being in the categories and "being as true" which by Suarez's time has come to be identified with being of reason. (77) But even as we say this, it is important once again to note that real relation extends beyond the category of relation and also that in the Second Section, Paragraph 22, of Disputation 47 Suarez will come exceedingly close to a reduction of real relation to a simple act of the knower, that is, a connotation.

There are other places in the *Disputationes* where in various ways Suarez has touched upon relation. While I have not explored them all in the present work, they do frequently shine added light on this work. For examples, let me mention his treatment of "prior and posterior" in the *Index locupletissimus* at Book Five, Chapter 11; (78) his discussion-in the context of his treatment of distinction -- of relation and its terminus; (79) his discussion of relation in the context of truth; (80) various points he makes about relation in treating transcendental goodness; (81) his contrast of finite created relations and infinite divine relations as regards the essences in which they are found; (82) the divine relations of paternity and filiation as dissimilar; (83) or within a context of his discussion of quantity, a further discussion of the characters of "measure" and "measured," (84) etc.

As may be gathered from some of the examples just mentioned, there are Christian dimension of relation both in Suarez's sources and in his own teaching. These are linked particularly with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. On both these themes, besides what he has said in the *Disputationes*, (85) he has written special works, which contain much on the subject of relation." pp. 26-27.

(77) For some of the history of this identification, cf. Theo Kobusch, "Ens inquantum ens und ens rationis: ein aristotelisches Problem in der Philosophie des Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von Ockham," in Aristotle in Britain during

the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the International Conference at Cambridge, 8 -11 April 1994 organized by the Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale, edited by John Marenbon (Turnhout, Brepols, 1996), pp. 157-175, esp. 158-9.
(78) See Index ..., V, c. 11, q. 1, vol. 25, p. xxii; Francisco Suarez, A Commentary ..., pp. 89-90.
(79) DM 7, 2, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 270.
(80) DM 8, 2, nn. 3-9, vol. 25, pp. 278-9.
(81) For example, cf. DM 10, 1, nn. 3-5, vol. 25, p. 329; ibid., 3, nn. 11-15, pp. 350-51
(82) DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12.
(83) DM 29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53.
(84) DM 40, 3, nn. 9-10, vol. 26, pp. 540-41.
(85) As regards relation and the Trinity, cf. DM 7, 2, n. 27, vol. 25, p. 270; DM 10, 3, nn. 16-18, pp. 351-2; DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12; DM 29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53; and DM 47, 4, n. 21, below. As regards relation and the Incarnation, sec., e.g.: DM 47, 4, n. 9, below.

51. Doyle, John Patrick. 2007. "Hispanic Scholastic Philosophy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, edited by Hankins, James, 250-269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Hispanic scholastic philosophy in this chapter designates a sixteenth and seventeenth-century stream of philosophy which flowed out of medieval universities, increased to a torrent on the Iberian peninsula, then poured into other regions of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. Arising in the wake of Spanish and Portuguese explorations and conquests, which at the end of fifteenth and through the sixteenth century brought radically new, and usually bloody, encounters between European and non-European peoples, it was at its core concerned with such encounters. Other background were furnished by the Counter-Reformation, especially the reforms of the Council of Trent (1545-63) and its aftermath; the late Renaissance debates among philosophers, humanists and skeptics; and the revival of Thomistic texts and thought. Two subjects stand out as particularly important and influential: (1) moral and

juridical philosophy centering on "the law of nations" (the *jus gentium*) and (2) theoretical philosophy, which included Aristotelian physics but culminated in metaphysics.
For present purposes the birth year of Hispanic philosophy was 1526, when Francisco de Vitoria, OP (1492-1546), was elected to the Cátedra de Prima, in theology at Salamanca and began lectures on the "Second Part of the Second Part" (IIa-IIae) of the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. This introduced the Summa as the principal textbook in theology and also inaugurated a Thomistic revival in theology and in philosophy at Salamanca, then elsewhere. Choosing a terminal date for Hispanic philosophy here is more arbitrary, but a plausible one is 1718, when Miguel Viñas, SJ (1642-1718) died. It may immediately be noted that while Vitoria taught in Spain and belonged to the older religious order of the Dominicans, Viñas was a Jesuit who taught at Santiago in Chile. In the period under discussion two salient facts are the passage of philosophical leadership from the Dominicans to the Jesuits, and the spread of Hispanic philosophy overseas from the Iberian peninsula, especially to Latin America. The development of that philosophy between 1526 and 1718 occurred within this broader context of a general shift from an old to a new religious order and from the Old World to a New. What follows is a very limited sketch of figures and themes in that development." pp. 250-251.

52. Hervaeus, Natalis. 2008. *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d.1323) The Doctor Perspicacissimus On Second Intentions*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Volume One - An English translation and Volume Two - A Latin edition by John P. Doyle.
"These volumes present a first critical Latin edition and an English translation of an important, but very difficult to read and understand, medieval treatise. As almost everyone knows, the notion of intentionality comes from the Middle Ages. What is less known is that Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) was the first one explicitly to consider it as such. Even less known is the fact that he carne to it not immediately from the Aristotelian *De Anima,* but rather from the

division in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* between "being as being" and "being as true." Least of all known is the fact that Hervaeus, who uses the term"intentionality" in the present work 235 times, regards its significance as a relation of reason which runs in the direction of known or knowable to knower. Apart from its exceedingly obscure Latin style, what particularly makes this work difficult to understand is its multi-layered reflection on things and non-things, its reflection on Hervaeus thinking itself, and its reflection on his thinking about his thinking about things and non-things."

53. Doyle, John Patrick. 2009. "Hervaeus Natalis On Intentionality: its Direction and Some Aftermath." In *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., Dewender, Thomas and Kobusch, Theo, 261-283. Leiden: Brill.
A longer version of this article appeared in *The Modern Schoolman*, 83, 2006, pp. 85-124.
54. ———. 2010. *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Edited by Victor M. Salas.
Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction: The Theme of this Collection, its Contents, its Character and Rationale XIII-XVI; 1. Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence 1; 2. Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles 21; 3. Suárez on the Analogy of Being 41; 4. Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger 89; 5. The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence 109; 6. Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez, S.J. 123; 7. Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth 161; 8. Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit 209; 9. Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition, "This is My Body" 235; 10. Suárez on Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians 257; 11. Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations 315; 12. Suárez on Human Rights 333; 13. Francisco Suárez on the Interpretation of Laws 357; 14. Postscript and Prospectus 389; Bibliography 393; Index of Names 409; Index of Terms 413-416.

"The main theme in these studies is twofold. The first is theoretical, centering on the Suarezian conception of being and metaphysics. As Etienne Gilson pointed out in *Being and Some Philosophers,* this conception had its origin in Avicenna's understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, an understanding which passed through Duns Scotus to Suarez and then on to Suárez's successors, notably Christian Wolff. I still accept Gilson's basic account of Suárez's lineage, which account was also basic for these studies in their original appearance. But now (in 2010) I would modify it along the line suggested by Rolf Darge, who has emphasized the difference of the Suarezian concept of being and its descent to its inferiors versus the Scotistic concept of being as *simpliciter simplex* as this descends to its inferiors by differences outside itself.(1) The second theme takes up the practical side of Suárez's philosophical and theological interests, including his views on human society, law and morality, Church and state, international law, and human rights. The first theme is represented in different metaphysical and epistemological dimensions through eight studies, while the second is the major concern of the last four essays.
The introduction to the collection attempts to give an overview of Suarez the man, his published writings, his philosophical thought, and some of his influence." (p. XI)
(1) For this, see Rolf Darge, *Suárez transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysik-tradition* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004).

55. ———. 2010. "Suárez and some Precursors on *Lex* and *Ius*." In *Politische Philosophie und Rechtstheorie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Abteilung II: Untersuchungen: Lex und Ius. Band I*, edited by Fidora, Alexander, Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias and Wagner, Andreas, 393-427. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog.
56. ———. 2011. "St. Thomas Aquinas On Theological Truth." In *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, edited by Emery, Kent, Friedman, Russell L. and Speer, Andreas, 571-590. Ledien: Brill.

"Aquinas (1225-1274) clearly recognized two kinds of theology, namely, that of the philosophers, which is metaphysical, and that based upon divine revelation, which is "sacred doctrine" (*sacra doctrina*). Each will be in its way a science with its own distinctive subject matter and procedure. At the same time, there will be continuity between the two theologies inasmuch as faith, grace, and supernature presuppose nature. However, both philosophical and sacred theology have different subjects and relate to God in different ways. As it is ostensibly part of metaphysics, philosophical theology has common being (*ens* or *esse commune)* as its subject and relates to God as the extrinsic principle of that subject. Sacred theology has God and divine things as the subject to which it seems immediately to relate. To the degree that both theologies are conceived as scientific, each, in line with the norms of the *Posterior Analytics,* will need to presuppose the existence and essence of its subject and then explore the attributes and/or principles of that subject. In the case of philosophical theology, the subject of metaphysics will be the being that is commonly experienced in this sensible world and God will be established as its extrinsic principle. In the case of sacred theology, God will be the subject of the science, which will then go on with the help of revelation to consider his nature and attributes. In this, God and the articles of faith will be first principles of sacred theology. To prove its principles, sacred theology will not have a way intrinsic to itself, but neither will it reject the common principles of human reasoning itself." (pp. 571-573, notes omitted).

57. ———. 2011. "The Falling Dog and the Numerical Unity of Motion." In *Tolle Lege. Essays on Augustine and on Medieval Philosophy in Honor of Roland J. Teske, SJ*, edited by Taylor, Richard C., Twetten, David and Wreen, Michael, 253-276. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
58. ———. 2012. *On the Borders of Being and Knowing. Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Edited by Victor M. Salas.

Table of Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction XIII-XVI; 1. Sprouts from Greek Gardens: Antisthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (first publication) 1; 2. Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth 19; 3. Extrinsic Cognoscibility 67; 4. Impossible Objects 95; 5. The Teleology of Impossible Objects 127; 6. Beings of Reason and Imagination 151; 7. Four Degrees of Abstraction 167; 8. From Transcendental to Transcendental 185; 9. Supertranscendental Nothing 215; 10. Wrestling with Wraith 243; 11. The Borders of Knowability 273; 12. Conclusion 293; Bibliography 301; Indices 319-326.
"Sylvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) noted that human intellects can grasp what is, what is not, what can be, and what cannot be. The first principle, 'it is not possible that the same thing simultaneously be and not be,' involves them all.
The present volume begins with Greeks distinguishing 'being' from 'something' and proceeds to the late Scholastic doctrine of 'supertranscendental being,' which embraces both. On the way is Aristotle's distinction between 'being as being' and 'being as true' and his extension of the latter to include impossible objects. The Stoics will see 'something' as the widest object of human cognition and will affirm that, as signifiable, impossible objects are something, more than mere nonsense. In the sixteenth century, Francisco Suárez will identify mind-dependent beings most of all with impossible objects and will also regard them as signifiable. By this point, two conceptions will stand in opposition. One, adumbrated by Averroes, will explicitly accept the reality and knowability of impossible objects. The other, going back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, will see impossibles as accidental and false conjunctions of possible objects. Seventeenth-century Scholastics will divide on this line, but in one way or another will anticipate the Kantian notion of 'der Gegenstand überhaupt.' Going farther, Scholastics will see the two-sided upper border of being and knowing at God and the negative theology, and will fix the equally double lower border at 'supertranscendental being' and 'supertranscendental nonbeing,' which non-being,

remaining intelligible, will negate the actual, the possible, and even the impossible."
59. Wade, William Ligon. 2013. *On the Teacher: Saint Augustine & Saint Thomas Aquinas. A Comparison*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Edited by John P. Doyle.
60. Doyle, John Patrick. 2016. *John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on Sacred Science: Cursus Theologicus I, Question 1, Disputation 2*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press. Edited by Victor M. Salas and translated by John P. Doyle. To be published March 2019.

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2. Bayle, Pierre vol. III p. 113
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4. Bruno, Giordano vol. III p. 525
5. Cambridge Platonists vol. IV p. 52
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7. Ficino, Marsilio vol. VIII p. 70
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9. Innate Ideas vol. XI p. 178
10. Malebranche, Nicolas vol. XIII p. 87
11. Occasionalism vol. XIV p. 320
12. Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni vol. XV p. 294

13. Ramus, Petrus vol. XVI; p. 82
14. Rationalism vol. XVI pp. 92-93
15. Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, vol. XVII p. 234
16. Spinoza, Baruch vol. XVIII pp. 187-188
17. Suárez, Francisco vol. XVIII p. 312
18. Telesio, Bernardino vol. XIX p. 83
19. William of Ockham vol. XX pp. 154-155.

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1. Collegium Conimbricense vol.II pp. 406-408
2. Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-1599) vol. III pp. 688-690
3. John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) vol. V pp. 117-120
4. Soto, Domingo de (1494-1560) vol. IX pp. 37-40
5. Suárez, Francisco (1548-1617) vol. IX pp. 189-196
6. Toletus, Franciscus (1533-1596) vol. IX pp. 433-435

Supertranszendent, *Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Forschungsprojekt der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur,* Edited by Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gründer, Basel, Schwabe AG. Verlag, 1999, vol. X cols. 643-649.

Suárez, Francisco, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 2. Supplement, 2010, pp. 1043-1047.

Hervaeus Natalis, *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, New York, Spriner, 2011, pp. 472-473.

TRANSLATION

"Peter John Olivi (1248-1297): *A Disputed Question: 'What Does Right or Dominion Posit?' or 'About Voluntary Signs'*."

Translated from: "Question de P. J. Olivi 'Quid ponat ius vel dominium' ou encore 'De signis voluntariis'", ed. P. Ferdinand Delorme, O.F.M., Antonianum, XX (1945) pp. 309-330. Published by the Translation Clearing House, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University.

FESTSCHRIFT

Victor M. Salas (ed.), *Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013.
Table of Contents: Victor M. Salas: Editor's Foreword 9; 1. Stephen Brown: The Eternity of the World According to Peter of Candia 31; 2. Rolf Darge: Suarez & Medieval Transcendental Thought 65; 3. Thomas Dewender: John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen on Chimerae, & Impossible Objects 95; 4. Marco Forlivesi: "Ut ex etymologia nominis patet? John Punch on the Nature & the Object of Metaphysics 121; 5. Jennifer Hart-Weed: Actions Speak Louder Then Words: What Aquinas Learned from Maimonides 157; 6. Daniel Heider: Abstraction, Intentionality, & Moderate Realism: Suárez & Poinsot 177; 7. Ludger Honnefelder: John Duns Scotus's Approach to Metaphysics 213; 8. Jack Marler: Thomistic Ornithology: A Brief Note 229; 9. Daniel Novotný: Twenty Years after Suárez: Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 241; 10. Michael Renemann: Man's Ability to Understand His Own Understanding: Aquinas, Kant, & Modern Physics 269; 11. Victor M. Salas: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, & Edith Stein on Essential Being 285; 12: Roland Teske, S.J.: Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent's Metaphysical Argument 309; John Patrick Doyle: *Post Scriptum*: Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders 329; About the Contributors 369; Index of Names 373; Index of Terms 377-384.

The twelve essays contained in this volume are a tribute to the career and scholarship of John Patrick Doyle offered by his former students, colleagues, and friends. Chapter 1, an edition of Peter of Candia's *Commentarium in II librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, which pertains to the question of the eternity of the world, is Stephen Brown's contribution to this volume. In chapter 2 Rolf Darge discusses Suarez's understanding of the transcendental character of being and takes pains to distinguish it from Scotus's *conceptus entis simpliciter simplex*. In chapter 3 Thomas Dewender offers an examination of a subject near and dear to Doyle, impossible objects, according to the logical and semantic analyses of John Buridan and his followers, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Ingham. Marco Forlivesi's contribution, chapter 4, considers the role epistemology plays for John Punch in determining the proper object of metaphysics. Chapter 5 offers Jennifer Hart-Weed's consideration of how Moses Maimonides's account of divine actions informs much of Thomas Aquinas's analogical theory of religious language. Chapter 6 is Daniel Heider's contribution, wherein it is argued that Suárez's ontological theory of universals, even when compared to John Poinsot's theory of universals, proves to be an equivalent — if not stronger — form of moderate realism than that of the Thomists. Ludger Honnefelder's essay, chapter 7, identifies the nature, scope, and peculiar features of Duns Scotus's metaphysics, identifying it as a truly transcendental science. Jack Marler's contribution, chapter 8, on the *De ente et essentia*'s, 'phoenix example' argues that Thomas's intention is to show how even (created) individuals that are one of a kind, like the phoenix, are such that their essence too is really distinct from their *esse*. In chapter 9 Daniel Novotny places Francisco de Araújo's theory of *entia rationis* into opposition with that of Suárez and argues that, while the former is not exactly the philosophical equal of the latter, nonetheless, Araújo improves upon and ultimately holds a more consistent theory than Suárez. Chapter 10, Michael Renemann's contribution, argues that self-consciousness according to Thomas Aquinas is not nerely as anemic as those sympathetic to Kant might consider it to be is but a truth-revealing power that has significant implications in contemporary experimental science. My own contribution, chapter 11, examines

the notion of essential being as a point of convergence between the medieval metaphysics of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, on the one hand, and, on the other, the phenomenology of Edith Stein. Finally, in chapter 12 Roland Teske, S.J., discusses Henry of Ghent's metaphysical argument for God's existence and finds it problematic because of a faltering effort to synthesize a fundamentally Platonic Augustinian abstraction theory with an Aristotelian analogy of being. The volume concludes with a *post scriptum* featuring a reprint of one of Doyle's own articles on imaginary beings. In this essay Doyle, the consummate historian of philosophy, traces the lineage of beings of reason from a cast off of the Aristotelian metaphysics (i.e., being as true) to the vexing centerpiece of late Scholastic metaphysics. Questions pertaining to the metaphysical status of such "shadowy" beings eventually give rise to that topic which would eventually preoccupy much of Doyle's scholarship, namely, supertranscendental being."

Related pages

Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics as the Science of Real Beings

Index of the Pages with Annotated Bibliographies of Contemporary Historians of Philosophy

Theory and History of Ontology

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Bibliographie Choisie de Jean École (tous les écrits sur Christian Wolff). Première partie: 1961-1983

INTRODUCTION

Né le 2 mars 1920 à Craon (La Mayenne) professeur de métaphysique à l'Université Catholique d'Angers de 1957 à 1969, il a publié l'édition critique des Œuvres latines de Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

Une bibliographie complète au 1994 est contenue dans: Robert Theis et Claude Weber (eds.) - *De Christian Wolff à Louis Lavelle: métaphysique et histoire de la philosophie: recueil en hommage à Jean École à l'occasion de son 75e anniversaire* - Hildesheim, Georg Olms 1995 (VIII, 313 pages) - (Studien und Materialen zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 39).
Cette page contient tous le livres de Jean École et ses articles sur la philosophie wolffienne; pour la bibliographie de Christian Wolff (de 1791 à 2004) voir: Gerhard Biller (Éditeur / Herausgegeber) - *Wolff nach Kant. Eine Bibliographie* - Mit einem Vorwort von Jean École - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 2004 (IX, 251 pages, 3105 titres).

ESSAIS SUR CHRISTIAN WOLFF

1. École, Jean. 1961. "La "Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia" de Christian Wolff. Histoire, doctrine et méthode." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 16:114-125.
   Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 8-19.
   "Philosophie première, en ce sens qu'il faut commencer par elle pour avancer ensuite dans les divers domaines de la connaissance, *l'Ontologia* de Wolff serait tout aussi bien dénommée philosophie générale, étant donné son universalité. En tant que science de l'être pris dans toute son extension, elle étudie, en effet, outre les principes qui dirigent la connaissance de l'être, tout ce qui appartient ou peut appartenir à l'être, ainsi que les diverses formes qu'il peut revêtir et les rapports que peuvent avoir entre elles ces diverses formes; et c'est pourquoi, après avoir examiné le principe de contradiction et celui de raison suffisante, elle envisage, tour à tour, la nature de l'être et ses propriétés ou ses affections, à savoir l'identité et la similitude, la singularité et l'universalité, la nécessité et la contingence, la quantité, la qualité, l'ordre, la vérité et la perfection, puis sa différenciation en être composé et en être simple, à laquelle se rattache la considération de l'étendue, de l'espace, du temps et du mouvement, ensuite sa division en être fini et en être infini, enfin les relations de ces divers êtres, notamment sous la forme de la causalité. Car comme tout est soit de l'être, soit propriété de l'être, elle s'intéresse nécessairement à tout ce que l'être est ou peut-être, même s'il est vrai qu'elle se contente souvent de déblayer le terrain pour les autres disciplines du savoir auxquelles elle sert d'introduction.
   C'est ainsi, par exemple, que l'analyse des notions d'identité, de similitude, de quantité, d'infiniment grand et d'infiniment petit, est destinée à servir de fondement aux mathématiques. Il faut en dire autant de tout ce qui trait à la singularité et à l'universalité de l'être, par rapport à la logique qui a aussi beaucoup à prendre dans le chapitre consacré à la notion de déterminé. Tout ce qui concerne la qualité, la nature de l'être composé et de l'être simple, l'étendue, le continu, l'espace, le temps et le mouvement,

sert de toute évidence de préparation en partie à la psychologie, en partie à la cosmologie et aux sciences physiques, de même que les considérations relatives à l'infini métaphysique défrichent la voie de la théologie naturelle. Mais toutes ces analyses, qui peuvent à première vue, sembler très disparates, font partie intégrante de la théorie générale de l'être, qui leur sert de cadre en formant l'armature de l'ontologie wolffienne. A vrai dire même, la question de la nature de l'être y commande toutes les autres ou leur est sous-jacente; d'où son importance qui est d'autant moins indéniable qu'elle est non seulement la part centrale, mais aussi la plus originale et la plus inédite de tout l'ouvrage.

Pour Wolff, en effet, l'être s'identifie à l'essence définie par la possibilité conue comme l'absence de contradiction, et l'essence est constituée par les *essentialia* qui ont en eux-mêmes leur raison suffisante, tout en contenant celle des attributs et des modes, lesquels forment, avec les *essentialia,* ce qu'on pourrait appeler les éléments constitutifs de l'être. Car les *essentialia* ne sont pas autre chose que les tout premiers éléments de l'être, du fait qu'ils ne sont pas contradictoires entre eux et ne sont pas déterminés par d'autres, pas plus qu'ils ne se déterminent mutuellement, cependant qu'ils déterminent les attributs qui, comme eux, appartiennent toujours à l'être, en même temps qu'ils contiennent aussi en eux la raison suffisante des modes qui peuvent affecter l'être. Tout être, de ce point de vue, c'est-à-dire ramené à l'essence ou, si l'on veut, aux *essentialia* avec lesquels l'essence s'identifie, a donc en soi sa raison suffisante; mais cela n'implique pas pour autant, qu'il soit nécessaire, tout au moins absolument, puisque, hormis l'être dont l'essence est la raison suffisante de l'existence, tous les autres, dont l'existence est un mode de l'essence, ne le sont qu'hypothétiquement.

Nous sommes donc placés d'emblée en face d'un véritable primat de l'essence. Et c'est ce qui explique tout d'abord, que presque toute la doctrine wolffienne de l'être, qu'il s'agisse, par exemple, de la détermination des genres et des espèces, de l'analyse des qualités ou de la nature de la

substance et des accidents, tourne autour de l'agencement des *essentialia* et de leurs déterminations: attributs et modes, si l'on peut ainsi s'exprimer, car, à proprement parler, les modes ne trouvent dans les *essentialia* que la raison de leur possibilité et non celle de leur actualité qui est à chercher, selon les cas, dans les modes antécédents ou dans un autre être, ou encore en partie dans les premiers, en partie dans le second. Cela explique encore qu'elle soit entièrement fondée sur les deux principes de contradiction et de raison suffisante. Car les essences sont en premier lieu régies par la loi de non-contradiction, en tant qu'elles doivent tout d'abord être possibles, c'est-à-dire non contradictoires. Et si l'on veut ensuite les expliquer, il n'est pas d'autre moyen que d'en chercher la raison suffisante, c'est-à-dire de leur appliquer le principe leibnizien soigneusement distingué du principe de causalité. Car, comme Wolff l'a parfaitement vu et démontré, le principe de causalité concerne l'existence ou, si l'on veut, l'essence actualisée, et ne joue pas dans le domaine de l'essence pure, dont on ne peut rendre compte qu'en recherchant la raison suffisante de ce qu'elle est et de ce qui lui appartient ou peut lui appartenir. Et comme on ne peut remonter au-delà de l'essence considérée en elle-même, on ne peut trouver cette raison suffisante qu'en elle, c'est-à-dire dans les *essentialia* qui la constituent et en lesquels se situe en même temps la raison suffisante des attributs et des modes qui en découlent ou peuvent en découler. D'où la triple affirmation de la nécessité, de l'éternité et de l'immutabilité des essences; car ces trois propriétés ne sont que des conséquences du fait qu'elles ont en elles-mêmes leur raison suffisante.

Ainsi la science de l'être et, par le fait même, toute l'Ontologie de Wolff, est-elle essentiellement et uniquement une science des essences, d'où la considération de l'existence est, en fait, bannie ou presque. Car, lorsqu'il lui arrive de parler de cette dernière, c'est très rapidement et sans s'y arrêter, comme à propos de la contingence et de la causalité, sous le biais du rattachement des êtres contingents à l'être nécessaire et de celui des causes secondes à la cause première, ou d'une manière tout à fait

implicite, comme dans la définition du temps et de l'espace, le premier comme ordre des êtres successifs, et le second comme ordre des êtres coexistants. En un mot, Wolff mène toute son *Ontologie*, comme s'il n'était pas de son ressort de traiter de l'existence qui n'est, selon sa définition lapidaire, que le *complementum possibilitatis* (§ 74).
Or c'est par là surtout qu'elle fait date dans l'histoire de la métaphysique, puisque c'est la première fois, semble-t-il, depuis Avicenne qui faisait déjà de l'existence une sorte d'accident de l'essence, qu'a été poussée aussi loin l'exorcisation de l'existence. Quoi qu'il en soit, d'ailleurs, c'est en tous les cas ce primat exclusif attribué à l'essence qui a permis à Wolff de couper radicalement, comme cela n'avait jamais encore été fait, l'ontologie de la théologie naturelle; car, dans une telle perspective, l'étude des conditions générales de l'être se suffit à elle-même, sans qu'il soit besoin d'y insérer l'examen de sa source, que requiert nécessairement la considération de son existence. Et c'est ce qui permet d'affirmer qu'il a été beaucoup loin que Suárez et les scolastiques post-suaréziens dans l'essentialisation de l'être, dont la philosophie aura tant de mal à se défaire après lui." (pp. 117-120)

2. ———. 1963. "Un essai d'explication rationnelle du monde ou la "Cosmologia generalis" de Wolff." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 18:622-650.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 20-48.
" On ne peut certes contester que la publication de la *Cosmologia Generalis* constitue un évènement digne d'intérêt pour l'histoire de la philosophie. Car si Wolff n'a pas été, comme on l'affirme souvent à tort, le fondateur de l'Ontologie, qui a été érigée en discipline distincte des autres parties de la philosophie, sans doute au XVIe siècle, par les auteurs des premiers manuels de philosophie, (*) il a créé le terme *Cosmologia generalis* et a écrit le premier traité paru sous ce titre, ainsi qu'il le revendique hautement." (...) p. 21
"Le propre de la *Cosmologia generalis* n'est d'ailleurs pas seulement de servir de science rectrice par rapport à la physique et à la cosmologie expérimentale, mais aussi de

fournir à la théologie naturelle les instruments indispensables pour la démonstration de l'existence de Dieu et l'analyse de ses attributs (p. 11x, 12x, et § 6). L'étude du *nexus rerum*, de l'ordre du monde et de lois qui régissent les changements qui y surviennent, découvre, en effet, la contingence foncière de l'univers, qui appelle un fondement extérieur à lui et nécessaire, dont il appartient à la théologie naturelle d'établir l'existence et d'éclairer la nature. C'est même là, à en croire Wolff, l' *uberrimus fructus* de cette nouvelle science (not. § 6), qu'il s'honore d'avoir créée. Mais tout ceci apparaîtra plus clairement au fur et à mesure que nous avancerons dans l'inventaire des principaux thèmes de cet ouvrage, qu'on peut ramener à cinq : I) le *nexus rerum*, 2) l'union du mécanisme et du dynamisme, 3) la transposition de l'atomisme et sa combinaison avec la philosophie corpusculaire, 4) l'essai de mécanique a priori, 5) l'ordre de la nature et la possibilité du miracle." (pp. 23-24)
(...)
"Il nous est, en effet, possible de porter un jugement d'ensemble sur elle, maintenant que nous en avons dégagé les thèmes essentiels. L'ouvrage de Wolff porte la marque des grands courants de pensée du XVIIe et du XVIIIe siècles. Tantôt il les combat vigoureusement, comme dans l'analyse du *nexus rerum*, de la contingence des lois du mouvement et de la possibilité du miracle, directement dirigée contre Spinoza. Tantôt il cherche, dans la ligne de Leibniz, à en faire la synthèse, comme dans tout ce qui a trait à l'atomisme à la philosophie corpusculaire, au mécanisme et au dynamisme. A vrai dire même, sur ce dernier point, Wolff prolonge davantage Leibniz qu'il ne le suit à proprement parler, de même que dans son essai de mécanique a priori, dont Leibniz avait certes jeté les fondements, mais sans lui donner d'aussi amples développements. On peut être surpris, voire rebuté, au premier abord, par l'appareil impressionnant de définitions et de démonstrations qui s'enchaînent les unes aux autres, employé par Wolff pour traiter de ces questions. Mais si l'on ne se laisse pas arrêter par cette faon de procéder, qui le

rendit célèbre et dont on ne peut contester la rigueur et la précision, on est entrainé, par la lecture de la *Cosmologia generalis* au plus fort de la passionnante mêlée qui a opposés philosophes et savants de cette grande époque. Et l'on ne peut pas être insensible à l'effort courageux tenté par Wolff pour la dominer." (p. 47)
(*) Cf. notre introduction à la nouvelle édition de la *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia,* p. VII-IX.

3. ———. 1964. "Cosmologie wolffienne et dynamique leibnizienne. Essai sur les rapports de Wolff avec Leibniz." *Etudes Philosophiques*:3-9.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 177-183.
"Si paradoxal que cela puisse être, il en est en philosophie comme en bien d'autres domaines, les slogans qui entretiennent les préjugés et les erreurs ont la vie dure et sont presque indestructibles. Le cas de Wolff en offre un exemple typique. Comme le dit très justement M. Gusdorf, Wolff «est une des victimes de l'histoire de la philosophie qui, concentrant toute la lumière sur les personnalités reconnues comme des génies, laisse dans l'ombre tout le reste. (1) ». Certes, tous les traités et manuels d'histoire de la philosophie le mentionnent toujours, mais en le présentant, la plupart du temps, comme le compilateur et le vulgarisateur des thèses de Leibniz. Et, comme on ne le lit plus depuis longtemps, cette opinion se transmet fidèlement, de génération en génération, aux étudiants en philosophie. Il est vrai qu'elle a des racines profondes et déjà deux fois centenaires; car, dès le vivant de Wolff, on prit coutume de parler, comme d'un seul bloc, de la philosophie Leibnizio-Wolffienne (2), et bon nombre de ceux qui le combattirent lui reprochèrent de ne pas faire autre chose que de reprendre les grandes lignes de la philosophie de Leibniz, comme Joachim Lange, par exemple, son ennemi acharné, qui l'accusait, entre autres, de ne pas proposer d'autre conception des éléments que celle de Leibniz. Or Wolff, non seulement n'admit jamais ce reproche global, comme en témoignent maints passages de son œuvre, mais il se défendit encore vigoureusement

contre cette accusation précise de Lange, avec une netteté qui rie laisse rien à désirer).
Une telle attitude ne peut qu'inciter à y regarder de plus près, afin de se rendre compte si oui ou non Wolff a fait plus que synthétiser et vulgariser la doctrine de Leibniz. Et c'est ce que nous nous proposons de faire, en limitant notre étude aux données de la Cosmologie wolffienne. Cela nous permettra d'examiner l'accusation de Lange, à l'instant évoquée, et de nous faire une idée exacte de la position de Wolff par rapport au monadisme leibnizien, ce qui est d'une importance capitale. Car, s'il est démontré que Wolff, comme il le prétend, ne l'admet pas et ne suit pas Leibniz sur ce point fondamental, comment pourra-t-on encore soutenir qu'il est le disciple fidèle de celui qu'il n'aurait cependant pas refusé de reconnaître comme son maître?" (pp. 3-4 notes omises).
(1) *Introduction aux sciences humaines. Essai critique sur leurs origines et leur développement,* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1960 (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg, fasc. 140), p. 180.
(2) Deux titres d'ouvrages, entre beaucoup d'autres, en attestent : celui de Georg Volckrnar Hartmann, *A Einleitung zur Historie der Leibnizisch-Wolffischen Philosophie, und der darinnen von Herrn Prof. Langen erregten Controvers,* Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1737, et celui de Carl Günther Ludovici, *Neueste Merküivirdigkeiten der Leibnitz-Wollfischen Weltweisheit,* Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1738.

4. ———. 1966. "Des rapports de l'expérience et de la raison dans l'analyse de l'âme ou la "Psychologia empirica" de Christian Wolff." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 21:589-617. Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 49-77.
"Or il faut dire tout d'abord que c'est Wolff qui a définitivement introduit le terme *Psychologia* pour désigner la science de l'âme, même s'il est vrai qu'il ne l'a pas créé. Rares, en effet, sont ceux qui, avant lui, l'ont employé." (p. 590)
(...)

"Or, avec l'emploi qu'en fait Wolff, et grâce au succès éclatant de son enseignement, le terme *Psychologia*, comme précédemment ceux d' *Ontologia*, et de *Cosmologia*, acquiert droit de cité dans le vocabulaire philosophique et devient très rapidement usuel. Si donc Wolff n'en peut être dit le père, il en peut du moins être considéré comme le parrain.
Mais il n'a pas seulement assuré définitivement l'usage du terme *Psychologia*, il a, en outre, été le premier, semble-fil, à diviser la psychologie en deux traités distincts: la *Psychologia empirica* et la *Psychologia rationalis* (*)." (p. 592)
(...)
D'une part donc, une analyse de l'âme fondée sur une mise en ordre des données de l'expérience et visant, comme l'explique encore la préface de la *Psychologia empirica* (p. 11x, 13x), à découvrir les lois selon lesquelles s'exercent ses facultés; de l'autre, à partir du concept de l'âme, une détermination *a priori* de ses facultés et de la raison qui fait que leurs lois sont telles que l'expérience nous les révèle. (p. 593)
(...)
"Tel est ramené à l'essentiel, l'ensemble des questions traitées par Wolff dans sa *Psychologia empirica,* qu'il considère non seulement comme un complément apporté à la *Logica, à* propos de opérations de l *' intellectus* (p. 12x, § 9), mais aussi comme l'aide indispensable de la *Theologia naturalis* dans la détermination des attributs divins dont la notion ne peut être éclairée qu'à partir de celle des facultés de l'âme humaine (p. 15x, 16x, § 7 et not.), enfin et surtout comme la base indispensable de toute la philosophie pratique, qui ne peut prétendre régir la vie humaine, qu'en se fondant sur une connaissance nette et précise de ces facultés et tout particulièrement de ce qui est ou non en notre pouvoir (p. 13x-15x, § 8 et not.).
Peut-être trouvera-t'on que, dans l'examen de ces questions, Wolff n'apporte rien qui ne fut déjà connu et exploré avant lui. Mais, si l'on n'en peut disconvenir, il reste que sur plusieurs points, tout en utilisant largement ses devanciers,

il les dépasse cependant par son effort d'approfondissement des questions, par exemple dans son étude de la mémoire, dans celle de l'emploi des signes, et dans son analyse de la marche que suit l' *intellectus* vers la découverte de la vérité. Comment ne pas reconnaître encore un effort de renouveau dans sa description des *affectus,* qui mérite de retenir l'attention non seulement en raison de la clarté de la classification qu'elle en propose, mais aussi à cause des nombreuses notations fines qu'elle contient et dont nous n'avons pu faire ressortir la richesse? Comment enfin ne pas admirer la rigueur avec laquelle il définit les rapports de l'appétit et de l'aversion avec la connaissance du bien et du mal? Mais ce qui fait surtout l'intérêt de la *Psychologia empirica,* c'est le tableau d'ensemble qu'elle présente des facultés de l'âme et qui met si bien en lumière leur unité et leur continuité. Sans doute peut-on regretter que cette synthèse laisse délibérément de côté les conditions et les manifestations somatiques de leur exercice. Mais Wolff garde le mérite d'avoir, le premier, dressé un bilan aussi complet des résultats de l'observation portant sur l'esprit humain.

Or ceci ajouté à sa volonté de séparer la psychologie empirique de la psychologie rationnelle, et au projet, qu'il n'a pas réalisé, mais qui était nouveau à cette époque, de calquer la psychologie empirique sur le type de la physique expérimentale, et d'exprimer *stilo mathematico* (not. § 522) la mesure des phénomènes psychiques, contribue à faire de la *Psychologia empirica* un ouvrage qui marque, dans l'histoire de la psychologie, une étape importante; au point qu'un historien récent (**) des sciences humaines a pu écrire qu'elle est "le premier traité de psychologie digne de ce nom et publié sous ce nom." (p. 617)

(*) Wolff ne revendique pas la paternité des termes: *Psychologia empirica* et *Psychologia rationalis;* mais nous ne les avons pas trouvés chez ses prédécesseurs.

(**) Gusdorf, *Introduction aux sciences humaines,* Paris, 1960, troisième partie, c. 4, p. 181.

5. ———. 1969. "De la nature de l'âme, de la déduction de ses facultés, de ses rapports avec le corps, ou la "Psychologia

rationalis" de Christian Wolff." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 24:499-531.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 79-111.
"Dans la *Psychologia empirica*), Wolff s'était donné pour tâche de dresser l'inventaire des facultés de l'âme et des lois auxquelles elles obéissent. Il s'agissait, pour lui, d'y présenter une analyse de l'âme basée sur l'expérience privilégiée que constitue, en ce domaine, la conscience de ce qui se passe en nous, sans toutefois négliger l'observation externe, et en faisant appel aussi au raisonnement pour mettre en lumière comment ces facultés dépendent les unes des autres. La méthode de la *Psychologia empirica* était donc déjà rationnelle en même temps qu'expérimentale; mais la raison n'y avait d'autre rôle que d'établir avec rigueur l'enchainement des faits observés.
Dans la *Psychologia rationalis,* Wolff entreprend de rendre compte *a priori* de ces faits. Il se sert ici de la raison pour montrer, à partir du concept ou, si l'on veut, de l'essence de l'âme, pourquoi celle-ci possède les facultés décrites dans la *Psychologia empirica,* et pourquoi ces facultés obéissent aux lois énoncées dans ce traité. Mais cette déduction n'est cependant pas l'œuvre de la raison pure, car Wolff y fait perpétuellement appel aux données de l'expérience.
Or, à l'en croire, jamais encore pareille entreprise n'avait été tentée. Et c'est parce qu'il craignait que sa nouveauté ne rebutât ses lecteurs, qu'il se décida à présenter séparément l'analyse empirique des facultés de l'âme et leur déduction *a priori,* afin que les résultats de la première ne fussent pas rejetés en bloc avec les propositions de la seconde. D'où ses deux traités de psychologie qui forment cependant un seul tout indissociable, du fait qu'il n'est possible de rendre compte *a priori* que de ce qui est connu d'abord *a posteriori*.
On ne peut donc attendre de la *Psychologia rationalis* un acroissement de nos connaissances sur l'âme; tout au plus la déduction *a priori* peut-elle permettre de découvrir des détails de notre vie intérieure que par la seule observation nous ne réussirions pas à déceler (§ 8, 9, not. 227). Tout le

but de la *Psychologia rationalis* est d'éclairer davantage les données déjà certaines, puisqu'elles sont celles de l'expérience, recueillies dans la *Psychologia empirica,* en cherchant à expliquer pourquoi elles sont telles (§ 7).
Dans ces conditions, le plan de la *Psychologia rationalis* s'impose de lui- même. Il s'agit d'abord d'analyser et de définir avec le plus grand soin possible l'essence et la nature de l'âme (sect. 1, c. 1). Puis il convient de montrer comment chacune de ses facultés, distinguées dans la *Psychologia empirica,* trouve son explication dans cette essence et cette nature: les facultés de connaissance d'abord, c'est-à-dire: la *facultas sentiendi* (c. 2), l'imagination (c. 3, § 178-276), la mémoire (c. 3, § 277-332, 350-356), la *facultas fingendi* (c. 3, § 333-349), l'attention (c. 4, § 357-379), la réflexion (c. 4, § 380-387), *l'intellectus* (c. 4, § 388-479); les facultés d'appétition ensuite, c'est-à-dire: l'appétit et l'aversion sensibles (sect. 2, c. 1), l'appétit et l'aversion rationnels (c. 2).
Dans ces deux premières sections Wolff édifie ce qu'il appelle à diverses reprises sa théorie de l'âme, qu'on peut bien considérer comme la première partie de ce traité, bien qu'il ne le divise pas ainsi, et dans laquelle il met aussi en lumière la correspondance harmonique des opérations de l'âme et des mouvements du corps. Après quoi il examine les différents systèmes qui tentent d'expliquer cette correspondance, puis analyse les principaux attributs de l'âme.
D'où les deux autres sections qui suivent, et qui constituent comme deux autres parties: la première où il étudie ces systèmes, d'une faon générale d'abord (sect. 3, c. 1), puis chacun en particulier: celui de l'influx physique (c. 2), celui des causes occasionnelles (c. 3), celui de l'harmonie préétablie (c. 4); la seconde où il disserte de la nature de l'esprit et de la spiritualité de l'âme (sect. 4, c. 1), de son origine, de son union avec le corps et de son immortalité (c. 2), enfin de l'âme des bêtes (c. 3)." (pp. 500-502 omises nombreuses notes).

6. ———. 1973. "De la démonstration "a posteriori" de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu, ou la "Theologia

naturalis, Pars I" de Christian Wolff (Première partie)."
Giornale di Metafisica:363-388.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 113-138.
"Après les prolégomènes, qui servent d'introduction générale à cet ensemble, et dans lesquels Wolff définit sa conception de la théologie naturelle, la première partie, que nous analyserons seule ici, est divisée en sept chapitres où il est traité tour à tour: de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu en général (c. 1); de l'intelligence, des idées et de la science de Dieu (c. 2); de la volonté, de la puissance divines et de la permission du mal (c. 3); de la sagesse de Dieu, de sa bonté et de l'utilisation du mal (c. 4); de la création, de la conservation, du concours de Dieu au mal, de son gouvernement et de la Providence (c. 5); du droit de Dieu sur les créatures (c. 6); de quelques autres attributs de Dieu et de son essence (c. 7). La seconde partie, elle, est subdivisée en deux sections dont la première a pour but de rendre raison *a priori* tant de l'existence (c. 1), que des attributs divins: intelligence (c. 2), volonté (c. 3), création, providence et puissance (c. 4), et dont la seconde contient l'examen critique des différentes erreurs relatives à Dieu: athéisme (c. 1); fatalisme, déisme et naturalisme (c. 2); anthropomorphisme, matérialisme et idéalisme (c. 3); paganisme, manichéisme, spinosisme et épicurisme (c. 4).
Alors qu'on définit communément la théologie naturelle comme la science de Dieu et des choses divines. Wolff en propose cette autre définition: «scientia eorum, quae per Deum possibilia sunt, hoc est, eorum, quae ipsi insunt, et per ea, quae ipsi insunt, fieri posse intelliguntur» (§ 1), tout en faisant remarquer qu'elle ne s'oppose pas à la première, puisqu'il faut entendre par choses divines ce qui est possible du fait que Dieu existe et qu'il a tels attributs. Il précise, en outre, qu'il s'agit d'une discipline philosophique, acquise par les lumières de la raison, et qu'elle se distingue par là, sans confusion possible, de la théologie surnaturelle, qui s'appuie sur la révélation (not. § 1, 9 et not.).
Parce qu'elle est une science rationnelle et aussi parce qu'on ne peut obtenir d'une autre faon la connaissance de ce qui

ne tombe pas sous les sens, la théologie naturelle doit démontrer que Dieu existe, quels sont ses attributs, et quelles choses sont possibles par ceux-ci (§ 2, 3 et not. § 4). Or, dans ce but, il lui faut partir d'une définition nominale de Dieu. Car, d'une part, pour démontrer l'existence de Dieu, encore faut-il connaître la signification de ce terme (§ 5, 9), et, d'autre part, de cette définition, doivent être déduits tous les attributs divins (§ 6); d'où il suit que cette définition ne doit rien contenir de plus que ce qui est nécessaire à cette déduction (§ 7). En plus de cette définition, on ne peut utiliser dans la *Theologia naturalis,* d'autres principes que ceux qui reposent sur une expérience incontestable ou sur d'autres démonstrations (§ 8), comme celles des traités qui l'ont précédée (§ 11 et not., *Discursus praeliminaris,* § 96), et qui tendent vers elle comme vers leur but (p. 25x lignes 11-13). Ainsi faut-il y admettre tout particulièrement: la nécessité des essences définie dans *l'Ontologia,* § 299-303, le *nexus rerum,* la théorie des éléments et la perfection du monde établis dans la *Cosmologia,* sect. 1, c. 1, sect. 2, c. 2-3, sect. 3, c. 2, de même que l'existence des âmes démontrée dans la *Psychologia empirica,* pars I, sect. 1, c. 1 (p. 22x ligne 4 - p. 24x ligne 16). En ce qui concerne plus spécialement la démonstration de l'existence de Dieu, Wolff souligne qu'un seul argument suffit pour acquérir la certitude en ce domaine, et que point n'est besoin, par conséquent, de les multiplier. Ce qui serait d'ailleurs une complication inutile, car chacun d'eux nécessiterait une définition nominale différente dont il faudrait déduire les attributs divins, à moins de démontrer que c'est le même être dont les divers arguments prouvent l'existence (§ 10 et not.).

Par la preuve que Dieu existe, la théologie naturelle apporte la réfutation de l'athéisme (§ 12). Mais elle doit aussi fournir la notion distincte de ses attributs (§ 13). Et, pour ce faire, elle doit utiliser les termes qui servent à désigner ceux-ci selon leur signification communément admise (§ 14), et notamment selon les sens qu'ils ont dont l'Écriture. Car le but de cette discipline est de convaincre les athées qu'existe l'Être que l'Écriture appelle Dieu; et d'ailleurs, quand on

parle de Dieu, note Wolff, c'est toujours dans le sens où l'Écriture emploie ce terme (§ 15-16)." (pp. 465-367)

7. ———. 1973. "De la démonstration "a posteriori" de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu, ou la "Theologia naturalis, Pars I" de Christian Wolff (Deuxième partie)." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 28:537-560.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 139-162.
"Telle est la face du Dieu de Wolff, dont tout l'exposé précédent montre qu'il ressemble beaucoup à celui de Leibniz, au point que d'aucuns seront peut- être tentés de conclure que Wolff n'a fait ni plus ni moins, dans la *Theologia naturalis, pars I,* que reprendre à son compte l'ensemble des thèmes de la théologie leibnizienne. Cela est indéniable au sujet des deux points qui commandent le reste de la doctrine: la formation des idées des choses dans l'intelligence divine, et le choix du meilleur monde.
Pour Wolff, comme pour Leibniz, l'intelligence divine, étant toujours en acte et même acte pur, ne peut pas ne pas former les idées des choses; ce qui revient à dir que ces idées existent nécessairement en elle, sans éclairer toutefois le comment de leur formation. Mais il faut noter que Wolff, bien avant d'écrire la *Theologia naturalis,* avait proposé de l'expliquer en disant, un peu à la manière des Thomistes (148), que Dieu forme les idées des choses, lorsqu'en contemplant les perfections de son essence, il conoit toutes les faons possibles de les représenter hors de lui, comme en témoigne sa *Lettre à Leibniz* du 2 Décembre 1705 (149). Et il a repris et développé cette explication dans la seconde partie de la *Theologia naturalis,* 102 et not.
Quant à la création du monde, selon Wolff comme selon Leibniz, il ne convient pas à Dieu, en raison de la perfection de son intelligence et de sa volonté, d'en choisir un autre que le plus parfait et le meilleur, bien qu'il aurait pu cependant en créer un autre; ce qui à leurs yeux sauvegarde la liberté de la création. Et lorsqu'il s'agit d'expliquer l'existence du mal dans le monde le meilleur ou, plus exactement lorsqu'il s'agit de concilier la thèse du meilleur des mondes avec le déploiement du mal en son sein, Wolff,

pas plus que Leibniz, n'apporte d'argument convaincant en faveur de l'Optimisme.
A noter que, comme Leibniz, Wolff fait siennes beaucoup de thèses de la doctrine scolastique, et notamment thomiste, sur Dieu." (pp. 558-559)

8. ———. 1976. "De quelques difficultés à propos des notions 'd'a posteriori' et 'd'a priori' chez Wolff." *Teoresi* no. 31:23-34.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 132-143.
"Comme l'indique le titre de cet article, nous n'entendons pas exposer ici, de faon exhaustive, la doctrine de Wolff sur les rapports de l'a posteriori et de l'a priori, ce qui reviendrait à développer sa théorie générale de la connaissance, à laquelle nous consacrerons une autre étude, mais seulement signaler les difficultés auxquelles se heurte l'interprétation de certaines de ses affirmations et aussi de certains de ses silences à propos de ces deux notions, tant dans sa classification des différentes sortes de connaissance que dans son exposé des preuves de l'existence de Dieu.
Pour ce qui est de la première question, il note que tout ce que nous connaissons, nous l'acquérons soit a posteriori, soit a priori, c'est-à-dire soit par l'expérience, soit par le raisonnement, en précisant que la connaissance a posteriori s'opère par le moyen des sens pour tout ce qui est extérieur à nous, grâce à l'aperception pour ce qui se passe en nous, et que la connaissance a priori est l'oeuvre de l'entendement discursif, c'est-à-dire de la raison.
D'une part donc, l'expérience sensible qui consiste dans l'attention prêtée à nos perceptions tant externes qu'internes et se ramène à l'intuition, sans englober les jugements qui portent directement sur celles-ci; d'autre part, la raison qui, de propositions déjà connues, en déduit d'autres qui ne l'étaient pas. La première porte sur les singuliers, puisque nous ne percevons que ceux-ci; la seconde a pour objet les vérités universelles dont la raison, a pour fonction de découvrir le lien.
A ces deux formes de connaissance, il en ajoute une troisième: la connaissance mixte, acquise en partie a

posteriori, en partie a priori, c'est-à-dire à la fois par l'expérience et par la raison, en donnant comme exemple la conclusion du raisonnement qui, à partir des effets du soleil connus a posteriori, et grâce à la médiation de la notion de feu, permet d'affirmer que le soleil est un feu.
Il distingue par ailleurs deux sortes de raison : la raison pure et la raison non pure. La raison est pure, lorsqu'on n'admet dans le raisonnement que des définitions et des propositions connues a *priori,* c'est-à-dire acquises elles-mêmes par le raisonnement, comme c'est le cas en arithmétique, en géométrie et en algèbre. Elle n'est pas pure, lorsqu'on admet aussi dans le raisonnement des définitions et des propositions connues *a posteriori,* c'est-à-dire par l'expérience, comme en physique et en astronomie par exemple." (pp. 23-25 nombreuses notes omises)

9. ———. 1977. "De la démonstration "a priori" de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu, et des erreurs sur Dieu, ou la "Theologia naturalis, Pars II" de Christian Wolff (Première partie)." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 32:85-109.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 163-187.
"Dans les prolégomènes de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I,* qui servent d'introduction générale à l'ensemble de sa théologie naturelle, Wolff avait défini avec beaucoup de rigueur sa conception de celle-ci, tant du point de vue de l'objet que de celui de la méthode, en la distinguant nettement de la théologie révélée. Point n'était donc besoin, pour lui, d'y revenir dans la *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* mais seulement de préciser la raison de cette seconde partie et ce qui la différencie de la première. Il s'en explique dans la préface de ce nouveau traité.
Alors qu'il s'était efforcé, dans la première partie, de démontrer l'existence et les attributs de Dieu à partir de la considération du monde (9), son but, dans la seconde, est d'effectuer cette démonstration à partir de la notion de l'être très parfait et de la nature de l'âme (10); ou, comme il dit encore, de démontrer l'existence de Dieu à partir de la notion de l'être très parfait et de déduire ses attributs de la considération de notre âme (11). Ces formules se complètent

plus qu'elles ne s'opposent. Car, souligne-t-il, nous ne pouvons connaître la nature de l'être très parfait qu'à partir de celle de notre âme et il s'ensuit que démontrer l'existence de Dieu à partir de la notion de l'être très parfait revient à le faire à partir de la connaissance de notre âme (12).
Aussi se croit-il autorisé à conclure que cette preuve, qu'on dénomme *a priori,* parce qu'elle consiste à inférer l'existence nécessaire de Dieu de sa définition comme l'être très parfait (13), est non moins *a posteriori* que celle qui s'appuie sur la considération du monde (14).
Nous aurons à revenir sur cette affirmation qui ne laisse pas de surprendre. Mieux vaut, pour le moment, suivre l'exposé de Wolff. Or il indique qu'il s'agit, malgré tout, d'une autre sorte de preuve qui implique une autre faon de démontrer les attributs divins et commande un autre système de théologie que celui contenu dans la première partie (15). Il précise par exemple (§627 et not.) que, dans celle-ci, on confère à Dieu les attributs qui permettent de rendre compte de l'existence des âmes et du monde, alors que, dans la seconde, on connaît ses perfections, en lui attribuant au degré suprême et *per modum actus,* ce qui appartient à l'âme *per modum facultatis*. Encore faut-il noter que, dans la seconde partie, il ne se borne pas à démontrer autrement ce qui l'a déjà été dans la première, mais y traite de questions qu'il n'a pas abordées dans celle-ci (16) et que nous aurons l'occasion d'indiquer. Toutefois, parce qu'il considère comme complet (17) le système de théologie qui y est exposé et qui s'appuie sur la définition de Dieu comme l'être nécessaire, raison suffisante de tout ce qui est, il n'est pas question, pour lui, d'en développer, dans la seconde partie. un autre aussi complet, fondé sur la notion de l'être très parfait, mais d'en démontrer seulement les thèses principales (18).
Or, s'il a consacré à celles-ci les quatre chapitres de la première section, qui couvrent la moitié de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* bien qu'il ait affirmé, dans la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I* (19), qu'il n'est pas besoin de démontrer l'existence de Dieu de plusieurs faons, c'est à n'en pas douter à cause du succès remporté par la preuve *a priori*

après que Descartes l'eût illustrée à la suite de saint Anselme (20), et parce qu'il entendait lui conférer une force qu'à son avis Descartes n'a pas réussi o)à lui donner (21). Mais une autre raison l'y a sans doute également poussé, qu'il indique lui-même (22) lorsqu'il affirme qu'il est plus facile de déduire les attributs divins de la connaissance de notre âme que de celle du monde.

4. Quoiqu'il en soit, la *Theologia naturalis, Pars II* se divise en deux sections très distinctes: - la première dans laquelle il analyse la notion de l'être très parfait et démontre *a priori* l'existence de Dieu (c. 1), ainsi que ses principaux attributs: entendement (c. 2), volonté (c. 3), création, providence et puissance (c. 4); la seconde dans laquelle il se livre à un examen critique des erreurs fondamentales sur Dieu: Athéisme (c. 1), Fatalisme, Déisme, Naturalisme (c. 2), Anthropomorphisme, Matérialisme, Idéalisme (c. 3), Paganisme, Manichéisme, Spinozisme, Épicurisme (c. 4). Autant de points que nous allons envisager tour à tour; et, tout d'abord, le problème de la preuve *a priori*." (pp. 87-88)

(9) *Theologia naturalis, Pars I,* praefatio, p. 24*, lignes 8-16, *Theologia naturalis, Pars Il,* praefatio, p. 11*, lignes 10-13, § 429, 627.

(10) *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* page de litre, dedicatio, p. 7*, lignes 3-6, § 429.

(11) *Ibid.,* praefatio, p. 12*, lignes 1-4.

(12) *Ibid.,* praefatio, p. 12*, lignes 7-14, p 13*, lignes 10-12.

(13) *Ibid.,* praefatio, p. 12*, lignes 4-7.

(14) *Ibid.,* praefatio, p. 13*, lignes 10-11.

(15) *Ibid.,* praefatio, p. 14*, lignes 2-12, not. 5 82, p. 53. Il avait déjà signalé dans la première partie, not. 5 302, p. 302, qu'il ne se bornerait pas dans la seconde à répéter ce qu'il a déjà démontré dans celle-ci.

(16) *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* praefatio, p. 11*, lignes 5-10, not. § 113, *Theologia naturalis, Pars I,* not. § 302.

(17) Dans la page de titre et la préface de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I,* p. 20*, lignes 8-19, ainsi que dans la préface de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars /1,* p. 11*, lignes 2-3, il le qualifie *d'integrum.* Et chaque fois que, dans la seconde partie, il renvoie à la première, c'est toujours sous

l'appellation: *in systemate* ou: *in systemate nostro,* afin de bien marquer qu'il n'a édifié qu'un seul système de théologie naturelle et non pas deux.
(18) Cf. not. §20, p. 15, not. §35, p. 23, not. § 47, p. 28, not. § 100, p. 75, not. § 117,
p. 86, not. § 369, p. 330, § 404, p. 363.
(19) *Theologia naturalis, Pars I, §* 10, p. 12-13, *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* praefatio, p. 14*, lignes 14-16.
(20) Cf.: Descartes, *Discours de la méthode,* V (Adam-Tannery, VI, p. 36), *Med. V, Primae Responsiones, Secundae Responsiones,* Rationes ..., prop. 1, *Quintae Responsiones,* in Med. V (VII, p. 114-120, 149-152, 166-167, 382-383), *Principia philosophiae, I,* 14 (VIII-1, p. 10), - saint Anselme, *Proslogion,* proemium, c. 2, 3, *Liber pro insipiente,* 1, 2, 4, 5.
(21) *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* dedicatio, p. 9*, lignes 8-11, praefatio, p. 14*, lignes 1-2, *Theologia naturalis, Pars I,* not, § 1094, p. 1057.
(22) *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* praefatio, p. 14*, lignes 21 - p. 15*, lignes 5.

10. ———. 1977. "De la démonstration "a priori" de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu, et des erreurs sur Dieu, ou la "Theologia naturalis, Pars II" de Christian Wolff (Deuxième partie)." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 32:238-272.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp. 187-222.
"Arrivés au terme de notre analyse de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars II,* il nous reste à dresser le bilan de son apport. Wolff a raison d'affirmer qu'elle n'est pas la simple répétition sous une autre forme des thèses qu'il a démontrées dans la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I.*
C'est évident pour toute la seconde section où il procède à l'examen critique des erreurs sur Dieu; les quatre chapitres qu'elle comporte sont absolument neufs. Ils répondent à coup sûr au besoin de se justifier contre les attaques des théologiens piétistes de Halle et notamment de Joachim Lange, son ennemi acharné, qui l'accusait de verser dans les unes et les autres, à l'exception du Manichéisme. Mais, par-delà ce souci apologétique, ils manifestent un indéniable

effort de clarté et de rigueur en une matière où régnait à l'époque une grande confusion. On peut certes regretter qu'il n'ait pas cru bon de se référer à des sources précises pour les exposer et les critiquer, sauf en ce qui concerne le Spinozisme, qu'il a tort de taxer d'athéisme, mais au sujet duquel il a dénoncé avec beaucoup de vigueur les difficultés que soulève la thèse de l'unicité de la substance.
Cela est non moins vrai de la première section. On peut le montrer négativement, en énumérant les points de la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I* sur lesquels Wolff ne revient pas, comme la science de simple intelligence et la science de vision, le droit de Dieu sur ses créatures, sa sainteté, sa justice et son essence, ainsi que ceux qu'il ne fait qu'effleurer alors qu'il les avait abondamment développés, comme l'Optimisme et le problème du mal, l'organisation des fins par la sagesse divine, de décret de Dieu et son mode de présence. Mieux vaut le faire positivement en insistant sur ce qui est nouveau dans cette section et qu'on peut ramener à trois points principaux: la preuve *a priori* de l'existence de Dieu, l'origine des idées dans son entendement et la détermination des *affectus* qui peuvent lui être attribués. Son exposé de la preuve *a priori* vient heureusement compléter la *Theologia naturalis, Pars I* dans laquelle il n'avait fait état que de la preuve *a posteriori* et plus exactement de la preuve par la contingence. Le fait qu'il ait tenu à en traiter à part souligne l'intérêt qu'il lui portait, malgré ses réserves quant à la présentation qu'en a fait Descartes. Celles-ci le situent dans le sillage de Leibniz, mais il a présenté cette preuve de faon plus détaillée et plus didactique que ce dernier." pp. 268-269.
"Dans ces conditions, il est possible malgré tout de conclure que la seconde partie de la *Theologia naturalis* apporte des compléments à la fois importants et intéressants à la première, avec laquelle elle forme un ensemble remarquablement complet des question relatives à Dieu, envisagées à la lumière de la raison. Dans la préface à cette seconde partie (p. 21 C, lignes 2-5), Wolff se targue d'avoir été plus loin en ce domaine que ses prédécesseurs. Le compliment qu'il s'adresse ainsi n'est pas démérité. Car,

dans la foulée de Descartes, il a contribué, plus que quiconque, à l'élaboration d'une théologie naturelle proprement dite, c'est-à-dire d'une métaphysique de Dieu, libérée de la tutelle de la théologie révélée, tant dans sa méthode que dans les questions dont elle traite." (p. 272)

11. ———. 1978. "La conception wolffienne de la philosophie d'après le "Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere"." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 1:403-428.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 163-222.
"Le *Discursus praeliminaris* est composé de 6 chapitres où il est traité tour à tour: -- des trois formes historique, philosophique et mathématique, de la connaissance humaine (c. 1), -- de la définition et des caractéristiques de la philosophie (c. 2), -- de ses différentes parties (c. 3), -- de sa méthode (c. 4), du style qu'il convient d'y employer (c. 5); -- enfin de la "libertas philosophandi", c'est-à-dire des possibilités d'expression qui doivent être reconnues au philosophe (c. 6).
L'ensemble constitue un véritable manifeste, dans lequel Wolff exprime sa conception de la philosophie, dont nous allons tenter de dégager les principaux points, marqués par les titres de ces six chapitres, mais en regroupant leurs paragraphes lorsqu'ils relèvent d'un même thème.
Nous pouvons, selon Wolff, exercer trois sortes de connaissance ou, plus exactement, exercer notre connaissance de trois faons. La première, qu'il dénomme historique, consiste dans la découverte de ce qui existe ou se produit dans le monde matériel et en nous (§ 1-2), c'est-à-dire dans la saisie pure et simple des faits (§ 7, 17). La seconde, dite philosophique, est la recherche de la raison de ces faits; ce qui revient à dire qu'elle tend à expliquer pourquoi ces faits existent ou se produisent (§ 4-7, 17). La troisième, qu'il appelle mathématique, cherche à déterminer la quantité c'est-à-dire, dans son esprit, le degré en plus ou en moins qui affecte tout ce qui est fini, tant dans le domaine matériel que dans celui de l'âme (§ 13 et not., 14, 17).

Au sujet de la première, il précise qu'elle est acquise par les sens, soit externes, soit internes (§ 1). A propos de la seconde, il est facile d'inférer de ses propos qu'elle est l'oeuvre de l'entendement discursif ou de la raison (§ 9). Quant à la troisième, elle requiert certes la mesure, mais aussi la démonstration (not. § 14, 19). Si bien que ces trois formes de la connaissance humaine pourraient, selon leur origine, c'est-à-dire du point de vue des moyens mis en œuvre, être regroupées en deux catégories: d'une part la connaissance historique ou sensible, d'autre part la connaissance philosophique et la connaissance mathématique qui font appel à la raison, si les développements de Wolff au sujet de la première ne s'y opposaient.

2. Il considère, en effet, comme en faisant partie, ce que nous apprenons par ouï-dire, par exemple que les enfants élevés parmi les animaux ne savent pas exercer leur raison (not. § 1). 11 explique, en autre, comme Descartes (4), qu'il y a une connaissance historique des vérités philosophiques et mathématiques, lorsqu'on les connaît sans pouvoir les démontrer (§ 9, 15-16, 19, 50-53, 156). Il distingue enfin de la connaissance historique, qu'il appelle commune et à laquelle suffit l'attention prêtée aux donnée des sens, la connaissance historique, qu'il qualifie de secrète ("arcana") et dans laquelle la raison doit suppléer aux sens (§ 20 et not., 21), bien qu'elle puisse être ramenée à la première, grâce aux arts et à l'expérimentation (§ 24, 25). Autrement dit, il désigne, sous l'appellation générale de connaissance historique, des réalités fort différentes qui ne se laissent pas ramener à la pure activité des sens, à part la connaissance historique commune, laquelle se confond avec la connaissance vulgaire (§ 23) (5) et constitue le plus bas degré de la connaissance humaine (§ 22). L'exemple de connaissance par ouï-dire qu'il donne relève déjà de l'entendement, non discursif s'entend. A combien plus forte raison cela est-il vrai des vérités philosophiques et mathématiques que nous ne pouvons démontrer, mais que nous comprenons cependant, et c'est pourquoi il emploie le verbe "intelligere" à propos des premières (§ 50, 54). Quant

aux faits cachés, sur lesquels porte la connaissance historique secrète, comme la composition de la lumière établie par Newton (6), il faut non seulement les découvrir, mais aussi les démontrer (§ 20 et not.), ce qui requiert l'intervention de la raison" (pp. 404-405)

12. ———. 1979. "De la notion de philosophie expérimentale chez Wolff." *Etudes Philosophiques* (4):397-406.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 53-62.
"Wolff s'est beaucoup intéressé à la philosophie expérimentale, comme le prouve le fait qu'il a publié une vingtaine d'articles' et deux ouvrages' sur des sujets relevant de cette discipline, dont il parle, en outre, très souvent dans ses autres écrits, dans deux desquels il lui consacre tout un chapitre. Dans ces articles, ces deux ouvrages et ces deux chapitres, la philosophie expérimentale ne fait qu'un, pour lui comme pour Newtons, avec la physique expérimentale. Les descriptions d'expériences et d'instruments qu'il y donne, ainsi que les considérations qui accompagnent ces descriptions, ne présentent plus guère d'intérêt aujourd'hui, sinon pour l'historien des sciences; aussi ne nous y arrêterons-nous pas. Par contre, les diverses notations dont il parsème ses autres écrits au sujet de la nature et surtout du domaine de la philosophie expérimentale méritent l'attention; car elles dénotent une conception de celle-ci, pour le moins originale, que nous nous proposons d'examiner.
L'essentiel de cette conception peut se résumer d'un mot : au lieu de cantonner la philosophie expérimentale dans les limites de la physique, comme on l'a fait jusqu'alors, il faut l'étendre à toutes les parties de la philosophie. C'est là un point sur lequel Wolff revient à diverses reprises, en indiquant à et là quelques autres disciplines susceptibles de faire appel à l'expérience, à savoir, selon l'ordre chronologique des textes : la théologie, la morale, la politique, la psychologie, l'ontologie et la cosmologie générale." pp. 397-398.
"Quoi qu'il en soit, Wolff ne s'explique pas sur ces points pourtant importants. Et ce manque de précision, qui traduit

un manque de netteté dans sa conception de la nature de la philosophie expérimentale, est sans doute à l'origine de ses déclarations contradictoires au sujet de la psychologie empirique. En effet, tantôt il affirme qu'elle ne ressortit pas à la connaissance historique, tantôt au contraire il prétend qu'elle est une pure histoire de l'âme, et cela de faon d'autant plus incompréhensible que la première affirmation se rencontre dans le *Discursus praeliminaris* et la seconde dans la *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica,* qui ont été publiés en un seul volume.

Aussi en arrive-t-on à la conclusion que la conception wolffienne de la philosophie expérimentale, si originale et intéressante soit-elle, n'en laisse pas moins d'être imprécise. Et la raison en est à chercher dans le fait que les rôles respectifs de l'expérience et de la raison n'y sont pas suffisamment délimités. Autrement dit, nous retrouvons là le problème des rapports de l'a *posteriori* et de l'a *priori,* que Wolff, nous l'avons montré ailleurs, n'est pas parvenu à éclairer pleinement.

Mais il reste que cette conception s'appuie sur une notion large et souple de l'expérience, sous ses deux formes, qui permet d'étendre son emploi à toutes les parties de la philosophie, en respectant la diversité de la nature de leurs objets. Et c'est là ce qui mérite d'en être retenu et qui est du plus haut intérêt. Car il ne fait pas de doute que l'emploi conjugué de l'expérience et de la raison, comme il le dit fort bien, «ad certitudinem cognitionis plurimum facit, et progressum in scientiis juvat». Seulement, afin d'éviter toute ambiguïté, en raison de l'usage, établi avant Wolff et retenu après lui, de considérer le terme de philosophie expérimentale comme synonyme de physique expérimentale, mieux vaudrait parler, pour caractériser ce qui est non seulement l'essentiel de son enseignement sur ce point, mais aussi la marque spécifique de sa méthode, d'une extension de l'emploi de l'expérience, plutôt que d'une extension de la philosophie expérimentale, à tous ces domaines. N'est-ce pas d'ailleurs ce qui ressort de ce qu'il dit des rapports de la connaissance philosophique et de la connaissance historique qui ne fait qu'un avec l'expérience"

? 1l affirme, en effet, que la première ne peut se passer de la seconde, qui lui sert de fondement indispensable, en même temps que parfois de confirmation", et ajoute : «Nobis per omnem philosophiam sanctum est utriusque connubium». En tous les cas, cet aspect de sa philosophie est d'autant plus digne de remarque qu'il est l'un des représentants les plus authentiques et les plus célèbres du rationalisme, et que l'histoire a surtout retenu l'usage qu'il a fait de la méthode démonstrative, c'est-à-dire *a priori*. C'est au point qu'on a souvent porté contre lui l'accusation d'avoir pratiqué un rationalisme outrancier; ce qui, on le voit, est à la fois faux et injuste. Car, par son souci de faire partout appel à l'expérience pour établir les points de départ de ses démonstrations ou pour confirmer les conclusions de celles-ci, il a tracé, entre le rationalisme pur qui n'attribue de valeur qu'à la déduction *a priori,* et l'empirisme strict qui ne fait fond que sur l'expérience, une voie médiane permettant d'éviter les écueils de l'un et de l'autre". (pp. 397-398)

13. ———. 1979. "En quel sens peut-on dire que Wolff est rationaliste?" *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 11:45-61.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 144-160.
"Objet d'une vogue considérable de son vivant et durant les premières années qui suivirent sa mort, Wolff fut très vite éclipsé par Kant et les Post-Kantiens, dont le succès le relégua, non pas dans l'oubli, car on n'a jamais cessé de parler de lui, mais parmi les auteurs qu'on ne lit plus. Et c'est ce qui explique que tant d'ouvrages d'histoire de la philosophie aient pu colporter et colportent encore sur son compte des contrevérités aussi tenaces que regrettables, par exemple qu'il n'a fait que systématiser et vulgariser la pensée de Leibniz', qu'il ramène toutes les démonstrations de l'existence de Dieu à la preuve ontologique', ou qu'il a soutenu un rationalisme outrancier et si absolu qu'il ne laisse aucune place à l'expérience dans la constitution du savoir.
C'est ce dernier point que nous nous proposons d'examiner ici, du moins pour une part. Car le rôle qu'il attribue à la raison dans l'acquisition de la connaissance intellectuelle

permet de distinguer un autre sens dans lequel on peut dire qu'il est rationaliste. Et c'est pourquoi le titre de cette étude est exprimé au pluriel." (p. 144)

14. ———. 1979. "Les preuves wolffiennes de l'existence de Dieu." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 42:381-396.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 184-199.
"Wolff a exposé trois preuves de l'existence de Dieu, qu'il dénomme respectivement : a posteriori, par l'ordre de la nature, et a priori. Par preuve a posteriori, il entend celle qui part de la démonstration de la contingence de l'existence de l'âme et du monde et en cherche la raison suffisante dans un être nécessaire distinct de l'une et de l'autre. La preuve par l'ordre de la nature est une variante de la précédente, en tant qu'elle procède, de la même faon, à partir de la démonstration de la contingence des lois du mouvement. Quant à la preuve a priori, elle requiert non seulement la démonstration de la possibilité de l'être très parfait, mais aussi celle de l'existence de l'être nécessaire avec lequel il ne fait qu'un, pour conclure qu'il ne peut pas ne pas exister. Ces preuves supposent, en outre, qu'on démontre que conviennent les attributs conférés à Dieu par l'Écriture: dans les deux premiers cas, à l'être nécessaire; dans le troisième, à l'être très parfait." (*Résumé*, p 381)

15. ———. 1981. "Logique formelle et logique de la vérité dans la "Philosophia rationalis sive Logica" de Christian Wolff. Première Partie." *Filosofia Oggi* (4):339-373.
Repris dans: Études et documents photographiques sur *Wolff,* pp. 65-131.
"La Philosophia rationalis sive Logica (1) est le premier des grands traités latins de Wolff. Son texte, précédé de celui du Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere, comporte deux parties après les "Prolegomena" où il expose sa conception de la nature et de l'objet de la logique. La première, qu'il qualifie de théorique, correspond à ce qu'on a pris coutume d'appeler logique mineure, comme il le fait lui-même (not. 5 1125), ou encore logique formelle, et est divisée en quatre sections dans lesquelles il traite tour à tour des présupposés psychologiques et ontologiques de la

logique (sect. 1), des notions (sect. 2), des jugements (sect. 3) et des raisonnements (sect. 4). La seconde, qu'il dénomme pratique, comprend six sections. Les deux premières, consacrées au discernement du vrai et du faux, du certain et de l'incertain (sect. 1), aux moyens de découvrir la vérité (sect. 2), se rapportent à la logique, dite par opposition, majeure ou matérielle (2). Dans les trois suivantes, il fixe les règles de la rédaction, de l'examen, et de la lecture des livres (sect. 3), celles de la communication de la vérité, qu'il s'agisse de convaincre, de réfuter, de se défendre, de mener une dispute ou d'enseigner (sect. 4), et celles de l'estimation des forces nécessaires dans chacun des domaines précédents (sect. 5). Dans la dernière, il éclaire l'usage de la logique dans la pratique de la vie et la faon de l'apprendre (sect. 6). Autrement dit, les deux premières sections de la seconde partie relèvent de ce qu'on peut appeler la logique de la vérité et les quatre dernières de la méthodologie.

De cet ensemble, nous n'analyserons que la logique formelle et la logique de la vérité, après avoir examiné, sous forme de préliminaires, la définition que donne Wolff de la logique, ainsi que les notions psychologiques et métaphysiques qu'il considère comme ses fondements.

Wolff définit la logique: la science qui dirige l'esprit humain dans la connaissance de la vérité (§ 1-2), c'est-à-dire la science des règles qu'il doit suivre pour la découvrir (§ 3)." (pp. 339-340)

(1) *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientifica pertracta et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata*, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1728, 1732, 1740.

(2) Alors que les appellations: logique formelle et logique matérielle sont devenues courantes seulement depuis Kant, celles de logique mineure et de logique majeure semblent avoir fait leur apparition chez les Scolastiques du XVIIème siècle, qui se servaient aussi des termes: petite logique et grande logique, cependant que des auteurs comme Jungius et Micraelius utilisaient ceux de logique générale et de logique spéciale.

16. ———. 1982. "Des différentes parties de la métaphysique selon Christian Wolff." In *Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen zur seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung. Mit einer Bibliographie der Wolff-Literatur*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 121-128. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Repris dans: Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur *Wolff,* pp. 15-22.
"Dans le *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, situé en tête de la *Philosophie rationalis sive Logica*, et où il brosse le programme d'ensemble de la philosophie, Wolff indique, comme il l'avait déjà fait dans la *Ratio praelectionum Wolffianarum in Mathesin et Philosophiam universam*, que la métaphysique comporte quatre parties qui doivent être traitées dans l'ordre suivant: Ontologie, Cosmologie générale, Psychologie, Théologie naturelle. Et il justifie cet ordre en soulignant que, dans la métaphysique comme en tout autre domaine, doivent précéder les parties dont les autres tirent leurs principes; ce qui est le cas de l'Ontologie par rapport à toutes les autres, de la Cosmologie générale par rapport à la Psychologie, ainsi que de ces deux dernières par rapport à la Théologie naturelle.
Or telles sont les quatre disciplines métaphysiques qu'il a développées successivement dans ses traités latins, en scindant la Psychologie en Psychologie empirique et en Psychologie rationnelle, et la Théologie naturelle en deux sous-parties aussi: la première *a posteriori*, la seconde *a priori*; ce qui donne la classification suivante: Ontologie, Cosmologie générale, Psychologie empirique, Psychologie rationnelles, Théologie naturelle *a posteriori* et Théologie naturelle *a priori*.
Mais, dans les *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, qui constituent sa métaphysique allemande, il avait, sans employer ces appellations, adopté un autre ordre, plaant la Psychologie empirique avant la Cosmologie générale, parce qu'il jugeait celle-là plus facile pour ceux qui débutent dans l'étude de la philosophie, comme il l'explique dans l' *Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schrifften* . . . Et

ce n'est qu'après que Thümmig, dans ses *Institutiones philosophiae Wolffianae in usus Acatlemicos adornatae*, eût présenté la métaphysique wolffienne en situant la Cosmologie générale avant la Psychologie empirique, et que Bilfinger eût fait de même dans les *Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo, Anima et Mundo et generalibus rerum affectionibus*, que Wolff fit sienne cette répartition. Cela ne change rien à vrai dire à sa conception d'ensemble de la métaphysique, que l'on n'est pas dès lors étonné de le voir définir comme la science de l'être, du monde en général et des esprits, c'est-à-dire de l'âme et de Dieu. Mais ce qu'il faut noter, c'est que, ce faisant, il lui attribue un champ d'investigation beaucoup plus vaste qu'Aristote et les Scolastiques d'une part, Descartes d'autre part." p. 121
"Telle est dans toute son ampleur et toute sa richesse la classification wolffienne des différentes parties de la métaphysique. Nouvelle et originale par son insertion de la Cosmologie générale à côté de la Psychologie, déjà introduite par Descartes dans le schéma aristotélico-scolastique réduit à l'Ontologie et à la Théologie naturelle, elle l'est non moins par celle de l'Ontologie expérimentale, de la Cosmologie générale expérimentale, de la Psychologie empirique et de la Théologie naturelle expérimentale à côté des parties dogmatiques correspondantes. Car, par ce double élargissement du domaine de la métaphysique, Wolff a profondément transformé la conception de la nature de celle-ci, nous l'avons dit, et celle de sa méthode, en mettant en plus vive lumière qu'on ne l'avait fait avant lui le rôle que doit jouer l'expérience en union avec la raison dans sa constitution, comme dans celle de tout le reste du savoir. Et, ce faisant, il a rappelé avec un rare bonheur aux métaphysiciens qu'il n'est pas d'autre voie possible pour eux que ce qu'il dénomme si justement et si joliment le *connubium rationis et experientiae*." (p. 128 notes omises).

17. ———. 1982. "Logique formelle et logique de la vérité dans la "Philosophia rationalis sive Logica" de Christian Wolff. Deuxième Partie." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 5:71-102.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 65-131.

"Il nous reste à porter un jugement sur ces deux parties de la logique de Wolff que nous venons d'analyser.
1. Pour ce qui est de la première, qu'il appelle logique théorique, il va sans dire qu'elle n'est pas formelle au sens où l'on entend aujourd'hui ce terme; car s'il y utilise les variables littérales dans l'énoncé des syllogismes pour désigner les termes concrets, il n'exprime pas les constantes logiques par des symboles, malgré sa formation mathématique et son intérêt pour le projet leibnizien d'une caractéristique universelle. Mais il est possible d'affirmer qu'elle l'est au sens défini par Kant (*), à savoir que les notions, les jugements et les raisonnements y sont étudiés abstraction faite de leur contenu. Et il faut même souligner que, de ce point de vue, elle est plus formelle que beaucoup de traités scolastiques, ainsi que la logique de Jungius et celle de Port-Royal, par son souci de renvoyer à la logique de la vérité le soin d'établir les relations des propositions opposées et des conclusions des syllogismes avec la vérité et la fausseté, de même que l'analyse des démonstrations. Toutefois Wolff n'expose pas la logique formelle ainsi conue dans son intégralité, mais seulement ce dont la connaissance est indispensable pour formuler les règles de la logique pratique, ainsi qu'il l'indique à diverses reprises (§ 115 et not., not. § 299, § 397, 408) et conformément à sa définition de la logique comme la science directrice de l'esprit dans la connaissance de la vérité. Et c'est ce qui explique les lacunes de cette partie de son traité et la rapidité avec laquelle il traite certaines questions. (...)
2. Ce qui vient d'être dit de la logique formelle vaut également de la logique de la vérité. On y retrouve l'appel aux mêmes notions ontologiques dans l'analyse des jugements tant intuitifs que discursifs et dans celle des définitions nominales. La définition de la vérité logique comme la possibilité de déterminer le prédicat par la notion du sujet constitue une explicitation et un approfondissement dignes de remarque de celle proposée par Tschirnhaus, et à travers elle de celle de Descartes dont Tschirnhaus s'est inspiré. L'importance du lien établi par Wolff entre la démonstration et la découverte de la vérité

ou, plus exactement, la saisie de la raison de la vérité, car la seule observation peut suffire pour découvrir la vérité, n'échappera à personne.
La logique de la vérité présente encore l'avantage de contenir, ainsi d'ailleurs que le chapitre sur les fondements psychologiques de la logique, les linéaments d'une théorie de la connaissance, qu'il serait intéressant d'expliciter, en les complétant à l'aide des notations a et là éparses dans ses autres traités et ses articles. Pour nous borner à ce qu'il en dit ici, rappelons: - 1) qu'il attribue deux sources à toutes nos connaissances: l'expérience sensible et le raisonnement, qui portent respectivement sur les êtres singuliers et sur les notions universelles; ce qu'il exprime en affirmant que toute connaissance est soit a posteriori, soit a priori, la seconde étant l'apanage exclusif de l'entendement discursif; - 2) qu'il explique que nous passons de la représentation de l'individuel à celle de l'universel, soit en réfléchissant sur ce qui est peru, soit en séparant ce qui est commun à plusieurs notions, soit en déterminant ce qui ne l'est pas ou en déterminant autrement ce qui l'est déjà d'une certaine faon dans une notion donnée ou, si l'on veut, soit par la réflexion, soit par l'abstraction, soit par une détermination arbitraire. D'où suit: - 1) que la connaissance a priori s'enracine dans la connaissance a posteriori; - 2) que l'abstraction n'est qu'un des moyens qui assurele passage de celle-ci à celle-là." (pp. 98-99)
"Ajoutons seulement qu'il résulte de ce qui vient d'être exposé à partir de la *Logica*, que l'objet de la connaissance intellectuelle est entièrement constitué par les notions des genres et des espèces. Car si l'on ne fait pas appel à l'entendement intuitif, en tant que faculté indépendante de la raison, il est seulement possible d'envisager les idées selon leur extension, puisqu'on obtient dès lors la notion distincte des choses en les rattachant à leur genre et à leur espèce grâce au raisonnement et non en cherchant à avoir une vue compréhensive de leur essence grâce à l'intuition abstractive. Aussi ne peut-on s'étonner de voir Wolff en définitive tenir pour synonymes les deux appellations: notions et notions universelles.

De là ne suit pas pour autant que sa logique formelle, pour en revenir à elle, soit extensiviste. Bien au contraire, elle est plutôt compréhensiviste. Qu'il suffise d'en apporter pour preuve le fait qu'il y traite les propositions comme des attributives et ramène les catégoriques aux hypothétiques d'une part, et d'autre part qu'il y utilise, pour exprimer celles qui sont universelles, les adjectifs: omnis ou omne et non les adjectifs: omnes ou omnia." (p. 102)

18. ———. 1983. "Les rapports de la raison et de la foi selon Christian Wolff." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 15:205-214. Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 229-238.
"Lorsqu'on traite du rationalisme de Wolff, on a d'ordinaire en vue la faon dont il conoit les rapports de la raison et de l'expérience. Mais *ce* n'est là qu'une des facettes du problème qui ne peut être pleinement élucidé que si l'on envisage aussi comment il comprend ceux de la raison et de la foi. Or c'est là un aspect méconnu de sa pensée, sans doute parce que dans ses traités latins il n'y fait que de brèves allusions et que l'on néglige trop souvent les *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses* où il s'en explique.
Ce point mérite d'autant plus l'attention que les Piétistes, comme Joachim Lange, son collègue de la Faculté de théologie de Marburg, l'ont accusé de détruire la religion révélée et que certains auteurs récents lui reprochent de ne pas reconnaître d'autres vérités que celles qui sont fondées sur l'évidence rationnelle.
Autrement dit, on retrouve à propos de ces seconds rapports la même appréciation négative qu'au sujet des premiers, laquelle repose sur le même préjugé que Wolff est un rationaliste intransigeant ne reconnaissant pas plus des vérités transcendant la raison qu'un concours de l'expérience à l'établissement des vérités rationnelles. Or ce jugement est complètement faux et ne tient pas compte de ses affirmations les plus explicites, ainsi que nous nous proposons de le démontrer en nous appuyant surtout sur les *Horae subsecivae*, mais sans négliger l'apport de ses autres ouvrages.

Une remarque préalable s'impose. Wolff à vrai dire ne traite pas directement et pour eux-mêmes des rapports de la raison et de la foi, mais à travers ceux de la philosophie et de la théologie' avec lesquels il les confond. C'est là une position discutable, mais que nous acceptons telle quelle, nous bornant à dégager de l'examen de ces derniers rapports sa conception de ceux de la raison et de la foi.
A cette fin nous délimiterons d'abord le domaine de la foi, tout en analysant le mode de connaissance dont elle relève, à partir de ce qu'il dit de l'objet de la théologie et de ses différentes parties. Puis nous expliquerons en quoi consiste la méthode qu'il préconise d'appliquer à la théologie, afin de préciser comment elle doit y être utilisée, car c'est surtout cette utilisation qui soulève la question des rapports de la raison et de la foi. Après quoi nous tirerons les conclusions auxquelles conduira notre exposé." (pp. 229-230)

19. ———. 1983. "Les "Opuscola metaphysica" de Christian Wolff." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 6:213-243.
Repris dans: *Introduction à l'Opus Metaphysicum de Christian Wolff,* pp.223-252.
"Sous ce nom *d'Opuscula metaphysica,* nous désignons deux petits écrits de Christian Wolff, intitulés,
-- le premier: De *differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis, nec non systematis harmoniae praestabilitae et hypothesium Spinosae luculenta commentatio, in qua simul genuina Dei existentiam demonstrandi ratio expenditur et multa religionis naturalis capita illustrantur,* Halae Magdeb., 1723, 1737,
-- le second: *Monitum ad commentationem luculentam de differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis, quo nonnulla sublimia metaphysicae ac theologiae naturalis capita illustrantur, Halae Magdeb.,* 1723, 1737 (1).
Bien qu'il ne les range pas sous cette étiquette, ils appartiennent à la catégorie de ce qu'il appelle ses «Schutzschrifften». Car ils contiennent ses réponses à des critiques formulées par Joachim Lange, professeur de théologie à Halle, où il enseignait aussi à l'époque, contre ses thèses métaphysiques exposées dans la *Ratio praelectionum Wolffianarum in Mathesin et Philosophiam*

universam, Halae, Magdeb., 1718, et surtout dans les *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit mitgetheilet,* Franckfurt und Leipzig, 1720." (pp. 213-214)
(...)
"Nous en avons fini avec la présentation de la *Luculenta commentatio* et du *Monitum*. Il faut maintenant dresser le bilan de leur apport.
Pour enchaîner avec ce qui précède, nous commencerons par sa critique du Spinosisme. Elle tourne tout entière autour du fatalisme universel. Mais certaines conséquences qu'il en tire, comme la négation de la perfection des choses, celle de la liberté divine et humaine, la confusion de Dieu avec la nature, appellent des réserves.
Il n'a pas vu que si Spinoza rejette la perfection apparente attribuée aux choses en fonction de leur finalité, il n'en reconnaît pas moins la perfection plus profonde de leur essence, qui tient au fait qu'elles ont été produites avec une souveraine perfection, puisqu'elles suivent nécessairement de l'essence divine qui est absolument parfaite.
Il n'a pas tenu compte que Spinoza, tout en refusant à Dieu et à l'homme la liberté conue comme un libre arbitre, affirme cependant que Dieu est parfaitement libre du fait qu'il existe et agit en vertu de l'absolue perfection de son être conformément aux lois de sa nature raisonnable, se rapproche de la perfection et se libère de la servitude du corps.
Il n'a pas enfin été sensible au sens pourtant si vif qu'a Spinoza de la distance infinie qui sépare, si l'on peut ainsi s'exprimer, la substance de ses modes ou, si l'on veut, de la différence radicale de nature qui existe entre l'absolument infini et tout ce qui est fini, comme l'atteste la difficulté qu'il éprouve à dériver le second du premier. Faute de quoi, il n'a pas compris que Spinoza était habité par un authentique sens de Dieu qui s'oppose à ce qu'on l'accuse d'avoir confondu Dieu avec la nature.
Il est vrai qu'il était poussé à attaquer Spinoza sur ces trois points par le besoin de se défendre contre les accusations

dont il était lui-même l'objet. Il est vrai aussi qu'il s'y trouvait en accord avec la plupart des philosophes et des théologiens de son temps. Il est certain enfin qu'il y déduit des conséquences qui étaient en germe dans les principes posés par Spinoza. Mais il reste que son tempérament dogmatique et logicien lui a fait méconnaître la complexité de la doctrine de celui-ci et l'a empêché de voir qu'elle ne se laisse pas ramener à un schéma unique.
Ceci dit, il faut cependant reconnaître que l'ensemble de sa critique du Spinosisme, outre certains aspects nouveaux, comme le rapprochement entre Spinoza et les partisans des idées arbitraires au sujet du fondement des possibles, ne laisse pas d'être rigoureuse et pertinente, en tant qu'elle se situe au niveau de ce qu'il appelle les raisons métaphysiques." (pp. 240-241 notes omises)
(1) Nous les désignerons désormais comme suit: *Luculenta commentatio* et *Monitum* dans le texte, et: L.C. et M. dans les notes.

20. ———. 1983. "A propos du projet de Wolff d'écrire une "Philosophie des Dames"." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 15:46-57. Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 217-228.
"Quoi qu'il en soit, si l'on se rappelle le but ultime assigné par Manteuffel à la « Philosophie des Dames » (*), à savoir oeuvrer pour le bonheur de l'humanité, en essayant de rendre les femmes raisonnables et par elles les hommes, il apparaît que ce projet de Wolff n'est pas étranger à son dessein de rendre la philosophie utile à la pratique de la vie tant publique que privée.
C'est là un aspect de sa pensée qui n'a pas été assez remarqué. On le considère la plupart du temps comme un théoricien pur, faute d'avoir prêté suffisamment attention au fait que la *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica* n'est pas seulement *ad usum scientiarum*, mais aussi *ad usum vitae aptata*, ainsi que l'indique son titre, et que sa partie pratique est beaucoup plus développée que sa partie théorique, d'une part; d'autre part, que ses traités de métaphysique ouvrent tous la voie à sa philosophie pratique qui, avec les deux tomes de la *Philosophia practica*

universalis, les huit du *Jus naturae,* les cinq de la *Philosophia moralis sive Ethicam,* celui du *Jus gentium* et celui de *l'Oeconomica,* constitue la part de son œuvre la plus importante quantitativement. Ce préjugé vient aussi de ce qu'on rélègue d'ordinaire au second plan derrière ces traités *les Horae subsecivae Marburgenses,* sans relever la portée pourtant très significative de leur titre: *quibus philosophia ad pubiicam privatamque utilitatem aptatur*.
Ces *Horae subsecivae* sont destinées à montrer l'aide irremplaable apportée par la philosophie à la théologie révélée, au droit et à la médecine, c'est-à-dire aux disciplines enseignées dans les Facultés supérieures qui préparent à la vie publique", en leur proposant sa propre méthode dont l'emploi les rendra rigoureuses, ainsi que les notions directrices qui leur permettent d'affiner et de préciser les leurs. Mais elles fourmillent aussi de notations plus practico-pratiques, si l'on peut ainsi s'exprimer." (pp. 565-566 notes omises)
(*) Lettre du 8 Mai 1739.

21. ———. 1983. "Des rapports de Wolff avec Leibniz dans le domaine de la métaphysique." In *Leibniz, Werk und Wirkung. IV Internationaler Leibniz Kongress, Hannover, 14-19 November 1983. Vorträge.*, 153-163. Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft.
Repris dans: Beiträge zur Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Studia leibnitiana, Supplementa XXVI). Hannover 1986, pp. 88-96.
"A propos des rapports de Wolff avec Leibniz dans le domaine de la métaphysique, est née de son vivant l'opinion qu'il n'a fait qu'y systématiser les thèses de celui-ci. Quoi qu'il en soit de sa valeur, elle présente l'intérêt d'inviter à tenter une approche d'ensemble du problème, comme d'ailleurs sa propre déclaration en réaction contre elle qu'il s'est très peu inspiré du philosophe de Hannovre.
Pour en juger, nous apporterons d'abord quelques précisions sur l'origine de cette opinion. Puis, à partir de la déclaration de Wolff, nous passerons en revue les questions sur lesquelles il s'est écarté de Leibniz. Nous relèverons

ensuite celles à propos desquelles il a reconnu explicitement sa dépendance vis-à-vis de lui. Nous examinerons aussi les emprunts qu'il lui a faits, en les taisant, dans la solution de quelques autres. Enfin nous prendrons en considération la faon dont il a utilisé ses sources leibniziennes reconnues ou pas. Le tout, en nous en tenant aux données les plus importantes que fournit son œuvre latine sur ces divers points." (p. 153)
(...)
"Si rapide et partielle soit l'enquête que nous venons de mener, elle a fait apparaître que les rapports de Wolff avec Leibniz dans le domaine de la métaphysique ne se laissent pas enfermer dans l'alternative que nous évoquions au début. S'il s'écarte de l'héritage leibnizien sur beaucoup de points, celui-ci n'en est pas moins présent dans son élucidation de nombreux autres, même et y compris lorsqu'il n'en fait pas état. Aussi ne peut-on souscrire à sa déclaration qu'il y a "paucissima Leibnitii" dans sa métaphysique et doit-on l'interpréter comme l'expression de son irritation en face des allégations de Lange. Il faut au contraire affirmer, en le paraphrasant, qu'il y a utilisé "-multa Leibnitii", mais de faon si personnelle qu'il est faux de prétendre avec ce dernier qu'elle n'est qu'une systématisation de celle de Leibniz.
Cette wolffianisation, si l'on peut dire, des thèses leibniziennes, est un point important à noter. Il serait facile de le prouver à partir de son illustration du principe de raison suffisante qu'il a tenté de démontrer et dont il a fait le grand principe d'explication sur lequel reposent toutes les parties de sa métaphysique, à partir aussi de sa théorie du *nexus rerum* qu'il a tirée de la définition leibnizienne du monde et qui sert de fondement à sa cosmologie générale, cependant qu'elle aide entre autres à délimiter les contours de la représentation de l'univers dans la connaissance humaine et à illustrer la doctrine des fins voulues par Dieu, partir encore de sa défense de l'Optimisme qu'il s'est efforcé d'établir du double point de vue de la volonté et de la puissance de Dieu, de sa sagesse et de sa bonté.

Dans ces trois cas, et l'on pourrait en citer beaucoup d'autres, il a si bien inséré et fondu dans sa propre métaphysique ses emprunts à Leibniz, qu'ils en font véritablement partie et qu'on peut dire qu'il a construit avec son propre système. Peut-être est-ce parce qu'il en avait conscience qu'il a tu certains d'entre eux.
En terminant nous citerons une autre de ses déclarations qui nous semble bien résumer ses rapports avec Leibniz en métaphysique, comme d'ailleurs dans tout le reste de sa philosophie, car elle met en lumière leur commun dénominateur et montre, du même coup, que leur complexité est plus apparente que réelle, tout en les situant dans l'ensemble de ceux qu'il a entretenus avec les autres philosophes dont il s'est aussi approprié certains thèmes: "Usus sum principiis Leibnitii, quando ceteris erant consona et veritas eorum mihi patebat, quemadmodum scholasticorum et aliorum." (p. 163 notes omises).

22. ———. 1983. "La critique wolffienne du Spinozisme." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 46:553-567.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 200-215.
"Pour l'apprécier équitablement, il faut certes tenir compte de l'état de l'interprétation du Spinozisme au XVIIe siècle et des motifs, sinon des mobiles, qui ont amené Wolff à le combattre. Tout le portait à la sévérité. Mais l'on ne peut s'empêcher de regretter que sa critique soit entièrement négative. Il n'a relevé que les difficultés de cette philosophie qui lui en ont caché la beauté et la grandeur. De plus son tempérament dogmatique et logicien lui a fait méconnaître, à diverses reprises, sa complexité, notamment sur trois points flagrants: la perfection des choses, la liberté divine et humaine, la nature de Dieu et ses rapports avec les autres êtres.
Sur le premier point, il n'a pas vu que si Spinoza rejette la perfection apparente attribuée aux choses en fonction de leur finalité, il n'en reconnaît pas moins la perfection plus profonde de leur essence, qui tient au fait qu'elles ont été produites avec une souveraine perfection, puisqu'elles

suivent nécessairement de l'essence divine qui est absolument parfaite".
Sur le second, il n'a pas tenu compte que Spinoza, tout en refusant, à Dieu et à l'homme, la liberté conue comme un libre-arbitre, affirme cependant que Dieu est parfaitement libre, du fait qu'il existe et agit en vertu de la perfection de son essence", et que l'homme, dans la mesure où il tend à persévérer dans son être, conformément aux lois de sa nature raisonnable, se rapproche du même coup de la perfection et se libère de la servitude du corps".
Sur le troisième, obnubilé par l'affirmation que les choses particulières sont des modifications des attributs de Dieu, il n'a pas été sensible au sens pourtant si vif qu'a Spinoza de la distance infinie qui sépare, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, la substance de ses modes ou, si l'on préfère, de la différence radicale de nature qui existe entre l'absolument infini et tout ce qui est fini, comme l'atteste la difficulté qu'il éprouve à dériver le second du premier'". Faute de quoi, Wolff n'a pas compris que Spinoza était habité par un authentique sens de Dieu, qui s'oppose à ce qu'on l'accuse aussi bien d'avoir confondu Dieu avec la nature, que d'être athée.
Mais ces graves réserves exprimées, il faut ajouter que sur beaucoup d'autres points, notamment dans ce qui a trait à la conception du nécessaire, du possible, de la substance et de ses attributs, la critique qu'a faite Wolff de la philosophie de Spinoza ne manque ni de pertinence, ni de rigueur. A vrai dire, il a même dénoncé les difficultés de celle-ci avec plus d'à propos et de sérieux que beaucoup de ceux qui l'ont précédé dans cette voie, en évitant leurs exagérations, même s'il a pu s'inspirer d'eux et, ce, parce que sa propre critique se situe, comme cette philosophie elle-même, en l'y suivant, au niveau de ce qu'il appelle les raisons métaphysiques'". Qui plus est, il y fait même preuve parfois de nouveauté, par exemple avec le rapprochement qu'il opère entre Spinoza et les partisans des idées arbitraires au sujet du fondement des possibles. Et c'est pourquoi elle ne mérite pas l'oubli dans lequel elle est tombée." (pp.565-567)

VOIR AUSSI

Bibliographie Choisie de Jean École. Deuxième partie: 1984-2008

VOIR AUSSI (PAGES EN ANGLAIS)

Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Ontology before Kant: Christian Wolff's Metaphysical Work

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Bibliographie Choisie de Jean École (tous les publications sur Christian Wolff). Deuxième partie: 1984-2008

ESSAIS SUR CHRISTIAN WOLFF

1. ———. 1984. "Wolffius redivivus." *Revue de Synthèse* no. 116:483-501.
   Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 5-23.
   "La méthode de la philosophie, telle qu'il la conoit, est donc à la fois démonstrative et expérimentale, qu'il s'agisse de la philosophie théorique ou de la philosophie pratique, pour reprendre la grande division proposée par les premiers historiens de sa pensée, comme Ludovici.
   De la philosophie pratique, composée de la philosophie pratique universelle, du droit naturel, de la morale, de la politique, du droit des gens et de l'économique, nous ne dirons rien non plus, parce que nous la connaissons mal.
   Reste la philosophie théorique, c'est-à-dire la logique, la métaphysique et la physique dans laquelle il fait rentrer, outre la physique expérimentale et dogmatique, la physiologie animale et végétale, et la téléologie.
   Si, en ce qui concerne la physique expérimentale et la physiologie, il est parfaitement au courant des recherches de son temps, il va sans dire que l'intérêt de son apport en ces domaines n'est plus aujourd'hui que d'ordre historique aussi.
   La logique, qu'il divise en deux parties : la logique théorique et la logique pratique, en contient en fait trois. Car la

seconde se subdivise en logique de la vérité et en méthodologie. Dans la première qui correspond à la logique formelle, il prend soin de considérer les notions, les propositions et les raisonnements en faisant strictement abstraction de leur contenu, et il renvoie à la logique de la vérité la tâche d'établir les relations des propositions opposées et des conclusions des raisonnements avec la vérité et la fausseté, de même que l'analyse de la démonstration. Si bien que si la partie théorique de sa logique n'est pas formelle au sens actuel du terme, car il n'exprime pas les constantes logiques par des symboles, malgré son goût pour le projet leibnizien d'une caractéristique universelle, elle l'est au sens encore admis par Kant, et de faon beaucoup plus pure que nombre de manuels scolastiques. Dans la partie méthodologique, il expose en détail les règles de la transmission de la vérité par les écrits et l'enseignement oral, ainsi que de son accueil. L'ensemble contient, en outre, les linéaments d'une théorie de la connaissance qu'il n'a jamais développée explicitement, mais qu'on peut tenter de reconstituer en s'appuyant aussi sur son analyse psychologique des fonctions de connaissance et les multiples notations dont sont parsemés ses ouvrages de métaphysique.

Or la métaphysique constitue la pièce centrale de son système. Elle suit la logique et est tout entière orientée vers la philosophie pratique ; ce qui montre que se sont également trompés ceux qui le tiennent pour un théoricien pur. Cependant, s'il ne cultive pas la théorie pour elle-même, il ne laisse pas d'y exceller. Et l'on peut dire que sa métaphysique est, de ce point de vue, en dépit des longueurs des traités latins, un monument remarquable, d'autant plus digne d'attention qu'elle joue, si l'on peut dire, le rôle de plaque tournante entre la philosophie scolastique, celles de Descartes et de Leibniz, d'une part, la philosophie kantienne et celles qui l'ont suivie, d'autre part.

Elle est composée de l'ontologie, de la cosmologie générale, de la psychologie empirique, de la psychologie rationnelle et de la théologie naturelle. Cette division, reprise par Kant qui l'a léguée à la postérité, en refusant toutefois d'y maintenir

la psychologie empirique, nous semble aujourd'hui toute naturelle. Mais elle ne s'est pas imposée d'emblée. Chez les Aristotélico-Scolastiques, la métaphysique comprenait seulement l'ontologie et la théologie naturelle. Si certains Scolastiques post-suaréziens y faisaient rentrer timidement la psychologie, c'est Descartes qui l'y a définitivement introduite, mais il en supprimait ou presque l'ontologie. En redonnant plein droit de cité à celle-ci, Wolff renoue avec la tradition aristotélico-scolastique, mais il garde l'apport cartésien en ce qui concerne la psychologie, et surtout il lui ajoute la cosmologie générale ; ce que personne n'avait jamais encore tenté.
Or cet élargissement du champ de la métaphysique est lié à une conception de sa nature tout autre que celle de ses prédécesseurs. D'abord science de l'être en tant qu'être et de sa source, puis science des êtres immatériels, si l'on s'en tient, pour résumer, aux grands courants, elle devient avec Wolff la science de l'être en général et des différentes sortes d'êtres que sont le monde, l'âme humaine et Dieu." (pp. 498-500)

2. ———. 1984. "De la méthode universelle selon Christian Wolff." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 7:179-192.
Repris dans: *Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 161-174.
""Le méthode, il n'est pas un seul philosophe du XVIIème siècle qui n'en ait parlé dans le sillage de Descartes, et durant la première moitié du suivant s'est développée la controverse au sujet de l'emploi de la méthode des mathématiques en philosophie (*). Le climat intellectuel de l'époque était tellement marqué par cette question, que Wolff ne pouvait manquer de l'aborder. Il s'en est même beaucoup préoccupé, comme en attestent les nombreux endroits de son œuvre où il en parle. Les plus importants sont sans contredit: le chapitre 4 du *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, les écrits divers: lettres, préfaces à des ouvrages d'autres auteurs, programmes de cours, qui ont été réunis dans les *Meletemata Mathematico-Philosophica*, et beaucoup d'articles des *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses*. Mais alors

qu'il se contente, dans le *Discursus,* de codifier les règles à suivre pour que la philosophie soit claire, rigoureuse et certaine, et dans les écrits des *Meletemata* d'affirmer que l'application des mêmes règles conduit aux mêmes résultats dans toutes les autres disciplines, notamment dans la théologie, le droit et la médecine, dans les *Horae subsecivae,* tout en rappelant les dites règles, il explique pourquoi leur portée est universelle et montre comment à partir d'exemples pris en ces trois domaines. Autrement dit, c'est dans les *Horae subsecivae* que Wolff livre l'ensemble de sa conception de la méthode et c'est donc à cet ouvrage qu'il faut recourir pour l'exposer dans son intégralité, sans toutefois négliger de faire appel aux autres textes qui éclairent certains de ses détails en soulignant l'importance qu'ils revêtaient à ses yeux.
Le plan de cet exposé est imposé par ce qui vient d'être dit. Parce que Wolff s'emploie d'abord à préciser la méthode de la philosophie et montre ensuite l'utilité et la nécessité de son utilisation partout où s'exerce la recherche de la vérité, nous commencerons par examiner la nature de cette méthode, ses réquisits, son fondement et les résultats qu'elle procure, puis nous nous attacherons à éclairer son universalité à partir de l'application qu'il en fait à la théologie, au droit et à la médecine." (pp. 179-180 notes omises)
(*) Sur l'histoire des doctrines concernant la méthode aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles, cf.: Hans Werner Arndt, *Methodo scientifica pertractatum. Mos geometricus und Kalküllbegriff in der philosophischen Theorienbildung des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, New York, 1971, Walter de Gruyter; et sur la controverse en question: Giorgio Tonelli, *Der Streit über die mathematische Methode in der Philosophie in der ersten Halte des 18. Jahrhunderts und die Enstehung von Kants Schrift über die Deutlichkeit*, in Archiv für Philosophie, 1959, Heft 9/1, 2, p. 37-68.

3. ———. 1986. "Du rôle de l'entendement intuitif dans la conception wolffienne de la connaissance." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 68:280-291.

Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 55-66.
"Wolff, pas plus qu'aucun autre philosophe avant Kant, n'a élaboré une théorie de la connaissance. Mais cela ne l'a pas empêché de s'intéresser, comme la plupart d'entre eux, aux divers problèmes que pose la connaissance, notamment celui de son origine, c'est-à-dire des facultés qu'elle met en jeu. On trouve de nombreuses notations à ce sujet dans la *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, dans la *Psychologia empirica*, dans deux articles intitulés, le premier: *Solutio nonnullarum difficultatum circa mentem humanam obviarum, ubi simul et agitur de origine notionum et facultate ratiocinandi* (1707), le second: *Leges experientiarum fundamentales* (1708), quelques-unes aussi dans ses autres traités latins et dans les *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses*, pour nous borner à son *Corpus latinum*.
Or si nous nous reportons au premier des traités qui viennent d'être indiqués, il y affirme on ne peut plus nettement qu'il y a deux sources, et seulement deux, de toutes nos connaissances: les sens et la raison. (...)
Ainsi assimile-t-il la connaissance acquise par les sens, qu'il dénomme encore expérience, à la connaissance a posteriori, d'une part; la connaissance obtenue en raisonnant, donc grâce à l'entendement discursif, à la connaissance a priori, d'autre part; et semble du même coup exclure toute autre source.
Pour achever de caractériser l'une et l'autre, il précise que la première est intuitive et a pour objet ce qui est singulier, c'est-à-dire les individus; que la seconde, qui est discursive, porte sur les notions universelles. Si bien qu'on en arrive à la double équation: connaissance sensible ou a posteriori, intuitive et singulière; connaissance intellectuelle ou a priori, discursive et universelle.
Il faut signaler encore que, sous le nom de connaissance intuitive, il range à la fois celle acquise par les sens et celle due à l'imagination. Après l'avoir définie de faon générale: « *quae ipso idearum intuitu absolvitur*», et expliqué: « *rem intuitive cognoscere dicimur, quatenus ideae ejus, quam habemus, nobis sumus conscii*», il en donne comme

exemples tant la saisie par les sens d'un arbre qui nous est présent, que la représentation d'un triangle par l'imagination. (...)
L'affirmation de la dépendance de l'imagination par rapport à la *facultas sentiendi* se comprend aisément, puisqu'elle ne fait que reproduire la représentation des choses perues par les sens, en leur absence. D'où le nom commun de perceptions qu'il donne tant aux sensations qu'aux actes de l'imagination, ainsi qu'aux représentations qui en résultent, tout en appelant idées sensuelles celles acquises par les sens et phantasmes celles produites par l'imagination.
Mais les termes dans lesquels il s'exprime ne font que poser avec plus d'acuité le problème de l'existence de l'entendement intuitif, puisqu'il identifie purement et simplement la connaissance intuitive et la connaissance sensible entendue en un sens large, et l'oppose radicalement à celle obtenue par l'entendement discursif, sans faire la moindre place au premier.
Il y a là une difficulté que nous avions signalée dans notre introduction à la réédition de la *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, en remettant à plus tard de la résoudre. Et c'est ce que nous nous proposons de faire dans l'étude présente."
(pp. 280-281 notes omises)

4. ———. 1986. "Contribution à l'histoire des premiers principes. Exposé de la doctrine wolffienne." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 9:225-239.
Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 83-97.
"Comme Jean-Baptiste du Hamel, dont il s'est peut-être inspiré, Wolff place n tête de son *Ontologia* l'examen des principes de contradiction et du tiers-exclu, auxquels il ajoute celui de raison suffisante qu'ignorait celui-ci. Et il les appelle «principia philosophiae primae».
Il est bien connu que le principe de raison suffisante a été formulé expressément et ainsi dénommé par Leibniz, alors que les deux premiers étaient utilisés depuis toujours. Mais l'on a peu remarqué que les expressions servant à désigner ceux-ci sont d'origine tardive. On ne les rencontre pas encore, en effet, au XVIème siècle chez Fonseca et Suárez

par exemple, ni même au XVIIème chez Descartes, Clauberg et Bayle, pas plus que chez les auteurs de lexiques philosophiques, comme Goclenius, Chauvin et Micraelius. Mais Jungius, dans la *Logica Hamburgensis* qui date de 1638, parle de «duo principia contradictionis», en rangeant sous cette dénomination ce que nous appelons maintenant principe de contradiction et principe du tiers-exclu. Et l'on sait que Leibniz utilise le terme principe de contradiction dans le sens actuel, ainsi que parfois celui de principe d'identité, qu'on lui doit sans doute, en le traitant comme synonyme du premier. Quant à l'appellation principe du tiers-exclu, nous ne l'avons pas rencontrée avant Wolff; mais il l'emploie de faon si naturelle qu'on peut penser qu'elle existait déjà chez des petits scolastiques aujourd'hui oubliés.
Nous exposerons tout à tour sa conception des principes de contradiction et du tiers-exclu d'abord, celle du principe de raison suffisante ensuite, en les situant par rapport aux doctrines antérieures, puis la faon dont il explique les rapports et la portée du premier et du troisième, avant de mettre en lumière sa dépendance et son originalité dans toute cette question." (p. 225)
(...)
"Avant de terminer, nous voudrions tenter de mieux situer la conception de Wolff par rapport à celles qui l'ont précédée, en regroupant les notations dont nous avons émaillé notre exposé.
Tout d'abord, de faon générale, malgré la formule si typique: « *Eam experimur mentis nostrae naturam »,* qu'il employe pour préparer l'énoncé des premiers principes, il n'en fait pas, comme Descartes, de pures lois de la connaissance, mais les tient, à la manière d'Aristote et de Thomas d'Aquin, pour les lois de l'être qui, en tant que telles, dirigent la connaissance.
Pour ce qui est plus particulièrement du principe de raison suffisante, il est à peine besoin de dire qu'il doit beaucoup à Leibniz dont il s'est fait l'écho. Mais il importe de souligner ce par quoi il en diffère. D'abord, il a très nettement distingué ce principe de celui de causalité dont Leibniz

semble parfois le rapprocher. Ensuite, alors que celui-ci n'a fait que le poser, sans tenter d'en donner la moindre preuve, Wolff, tout en reconnaissant qu'on peut l'admettre comme un axiome, s'est efforcé, plus ou moins bien il est vrai, de le démontrer tant *a priori* qu' a *posteriori*. Il l'a de plus formulé de faon plus générale et même absolue. Par ailleurs, il l'a appliqué à Dieu plus explicitement. A quoi il faut ajouter qu'il écrit parfois, par exemple dans la *Cosmologia generalis,* «principium convenientiae sive rationis».
Or Leibniz conoit le principe de convenance, qui régit les choix de la sagesse divine, comme une application du principe de raison suffisante et ne l'identifie pas avec. Enfin Wolff, plus que Leibniz, dans la pratique, a fait de ce principe le fondement et la pierre de touche de toute sa philosophie, notamment des différentes parties de sa métaphysique. Et l'on peut noter qu'à propos de l'usage qu'il en fait dans l'ontologie, mais cela vaut aussi de la cosmologie générale, de la psychologie et de la théologie naturelle, il déclare: « An vero Leibnitius eodem modo usus fuerit hoc principio, ego non dixerim, cum Leibnitianas circa philosophiam primam meditationes huc usque viderim nullas. »
En un mot, Wolff ne s'est pas contenté de répéter Leibniz, ni même de systématiser ce qu'il connaissait de sa pensée. Il a précisé et développé la doctrine du principe de raison suffisante, il a étendu ses applications. Et il a su si bien lui imprimer sa marque personnelle et l'intégrer dans son propre système, que son nom y reste à jamais attaché comme celui de Leibniz. (*)
(*) Cette étude était déjà à l'impression, quand le Professeur Hans Werner Arndt de Mannheim nous a indiqué que Leibniz a lui aussi tenté de donner une démonstration a priori du principe de raison suffisante dans un texte inédit publié par Zocher dans *Leibniz Erkenntnislehre*, in *Leibniz zu seinen 300. Geburstag*, Berlin, 1952, p. 15. La voici, telle que ce dernier l'a retranscrite: « Propositio: Nihil est sine ratione sufficiente seu quicquid est habet rationem sufficientem. Def. 1: Ratio sufficiens est qua posita res est. Def. 2: Requisitum est quo non posito res non est.

Demonstratio: Quicquid est, habet omnia requisita. Uno enim non posito non est per def. 2. Positis omnibus requisitis res est. Nam si non est, deerit aliquid quo minus sit, id est requisitum. Ergo omnia requisita sunt ratio sufficiens per def. 1. Igitur quicquid est habet rationem sufficientem. q.e.d.»." (pp. 238-239)

5. ———. 1986. "Wolff et la Bible." In *Le siècle des Lumières et la Bible (Bible de tous les temps)*, edited by Belaval, Yvon and Bourel, Dominique, 805-822. Paris: Beauchesne. Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 194-211.
"Dans son *Eigene Lebensbeschreibung* (1) Wolff nous apprend que ses parents l'habituèrent à lire la Bible chaque jour dès son enfance. Une telle pratique ne pouvait que lui donner une connaissance remarquable du texte sacré, dont attestent les multiples références et les nombreuses citations qui parsèment ses ouvrages. Nous en dresserons d'abord, la liste (2) de leur importance et de leur variété. Puis nous nous emploierons à éclairer la faon dont il les utilise. Mais ses rapports avec la Bible ne se réduisent pas à la connaissance qu'il en a et à l'utilisation qu'il en fait. Il a en outre proposé de suivre dans l'interprétation dc l'Ecriture la méthode qu'il préconise pour parvenir, en tout domaine, à la clarté et à la certitude. Et c'est là un troisième point que nous examinerons, avant de dire quelques mots de son explication de quelques passages du Nouveau Testament à l'aide de cette méthode." (p. 805)
(1) Rédigée en 1743 et publiée seulement en 1841 par Heinrich Wuttke sous le titre *Christian Wolffs eigene Lebensbesschreibung*. *Herausgegeben mit einer Abhandlung über Wolff*, Leipzig 1841, elle a été rééditée par Hans Werner Arndt avec les deux biographies dues respectivement à Friedrich Christian Baumeister et à Johann Christoph Gottsched dans un recueil intitulé *Biographie* in *Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke,* Abteilung I, Band 10, Hildesheim 1980, où sont respectées les paginations de ces trois ouvrages. Le passage en question se trouve p. 112 de l' *Eigene Lebensbeschreibung*.

(2) Dans notre *Index auctorum et locorum Scripturae sacrae ad quo Wolffius in opere metaphysico et logico remittit,* Hildesheim 1985, pp. 181-196 (*Ges. Werk.,* Abt. III, Band 10), et dans notre Introduction à la réédition des *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses*, Hildesheim 1983, vol. I, pp. CVII-CX (*Ges. Werk.,* Abt. II, Band 34) nous avons indiqué où se trouvent toutes ces références et toutes ces citations dans les ouvrages de Wolff.

6. ———. 1987. "La critique wolffienne des systèmes d'explication des rapports de l'âme et du corps." *Il Cannocchiale* no. 1-2:3-21.
   Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 175-193.
   "Le débat autour des systèmes d'explication des rapports 4e l'âme et du corps était encore très vif au XVIIIème siècle. Après avoir penché, dans sa jeunesse, pour les causes occasionnelles à cause des difficultés de l'influx physique', Wolff l'abandonna rapidement, mais sans prendre parti pour l'harmonie préétablie malgré sa préférence pour celle-ci. C'est surtout dans la *Psychologia rationalis* qu'il examine ces trois systèmes. Il porte sur chacun d'eux un jugement dénué de tout esprit partisan et qui, parce qu'il est basé sur une information fort vaste à défaut d'être toujours solide, offre une vue d'ensemble sur la question. Aussi est-il intéressant de le connaître." (p. 3)
7. ———. 1989. "Note sur la définition wolffienne de la philosophie." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 21:205-208.
   Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 171-174.
   "Il est notable que, de la définition donnée par Wolff de la philosophie en général, on n'a la plupart du temps retenu que son énoncé brut: la science des possibles, de tous les possibles, sans se préoccuper des explications dont il l'accompagne sur ce qu'il entend par possibles et sur la faon dont à son avis la philosophie doit les envisager. Or, cette faon de faire, surtout si l'on rapproche cette définition, prise telle quelle, du climat indéniablement essentialiste de sa métaphysique de l'être, risque de conduire à lui prêter

d'exclure de l'objet de la philosophie tout ce qui est actualisé, et ce serait là une erreur regrettable.
Afin de le montrer, nous commencerons par collationner les différentes formulations qu'il a proposées de cette définition, sans les séparer des éclaircissements susdits.
On trouve la première en 1709 dans la préface des *Aërometriae Elementa* (1): "Philosophiam ego definire soleo (2) per rerum possibilium, qua talium, scientiam." (3) Il explique aussitôt après: "Philosophi igitur est, non solum nosse, quae fieri possint, quae non; sed et rationes perspicere, ob quas aliquid fieri potest, vel *esse* nequit", en ajoutant: "Quaenam vero dicis possibilia? Nonne, quae vel sunt, vel esse possunt." (4)
La seconde se rencontre en 1712 dans le *Vorbericht von der Welt-Weisheit,* §1, situé en tête de la *Deutsche Logik* (5) *:* "Die Welt-Weisheit ist eine Wissenschaft aller möglichen Dinge, wie und warum sie möglich sind." A sa suite, § 3, il déclare: "Möglich nenne ich alles, was seyn kan, es mag entweder wurcklich da seyn, oder nicht.", puis, § 4, de ce que: "Alles hat einen Grund, warum es ist.", il conclut, § 5: "Solchergestalt muss ein Welt-Weiser nicht allein wissen, dag etwas möglich sey, sondern auch den Grund anzeigen können, warum es seyn kan." (6) Dans la version latine qu'il a effectuée lui-même de cet ouvrage (7), il traduit ainsi ce qui précède: § 1: "Philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt.", § 3: "Possibile hic appello, quod contradictionem nullam involvit, seu, quod existere potest, sive acte existat, sive minus.", § 4: "Necessitas rationis sufficientis", § 5: "Ea de causa philosophus non solum nosse debet, *esse* quid possibile. Sed rationem quoque reddere tenetur, cur quid *esse* vel fieri possit." (8)
La troisième figure dans *le Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere,* qui précède le texte de la logique latine (9) publiée en 1728, "Philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt.", au § 29 dans la note duquel il retrace brièvement l'histoire de cette définition, mais sans faire allusion à la *Deutsche Logik*. A la suite de quoi il explique, § 31: "In philosophia reddenda est ratio, cur possibilia actum consequi possint." (10) et précise, § 32:

"Quodsi ergo plura fuerint, quorum unum perinde possibile est ac cetera, philosophia docere debet, cur illud potius fiat aut fieri debeat, quam cetera." (11)." (pp. 171-172)
(1) *Aërometriae Elementa, in quibus aliquot Aëris vires cic proprietates juxta methodum Geometrarum demonstrantur*, Lipsiae, 1709, Hildesheim, 1981, praefatio, p. 13-14 (non paginées).
(2) En ce sens qu'il a proposé cette définition dès 1703 dans ses leons privées à l'Université de Leipzig, et qu'il en a discuté en 1705 dans une correspondance, malheureusement perdue, avec Caspar Neumann, Inspecteur des églises et des écoles de la Confession d'Augsburg à Breslau; cf.: *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, not. § 29, p. 13.
(3) Il répète deux autres fois cette formule dans cette même préface, p. 14, 15.
(4) Ibid., p. 14-15.
(5) Halle im Magdeb., 1712, Hildesheim, 1965, p. 115.
(6) Ibid.
(7) *Cogitations rationales de viribus intellectus humani earumque usu legitimo in veritatis cognitione cum iis, qui veritatem amant, communicatae et nunc ex sermone Germanico in Latinum translatae*, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1730, 1735, 1740, 1765, Hildesheim, 1983, p. 1.
(8) Ibid., p. 2.
(9) *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientifica pertractata et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata. Praemittitur Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1728, 1732, 1740, Hildesheim, 1983, p. 13.
(10) Ibid., p. 14.
(11) Ibid., p. 14.

8. ———. 1990. "La notion d'être selon Wolff ou la "désexistentialisation de l'essence"." *Il Cannocchiale* no. 2-3:157-173.
Repris dans: Sonia Carboncini & Luigi Cataldi-Madonna (eds.), *Nuovi studi sul pensiero di Christian Wolff,* Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1992 et dans: *Nouvelles études et*

nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff, pp. 98-114.
"La première tâche de la théorie de l'être que se propose de construire Wolff dans la *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* est de préciser ce qu'il faut entendre par être. Mais, d'après lui, cette notion n'est pas primitive: celle d'impossible la transcende et celle de détermination sert à la déduire. Aussi fait-il précéder son analyse de celle de l'impossible et du possible, de l'indéterminé et du déterminé.
I. Impossible et Possible. Indéterminé et Déterminé.
A) *Définitions de l'impossible et du possible*
1. Il considère la notion d'impossible comme la plus simple de toutes et en donne cette définition: «quicquid contradictionem involvit».
Or cela revient à affirmer que, dans l'impossible, «idem simul esse, et non esse ponitur». Et, comme la nature de notre entendement est telle que nous ne pouvons juger que la même chose en même temps est et n'est pas, il s'ensuit que nous ne pouvons nous représenter l'impossible, donc qu'aucune notion véritable ne lui correspond, et qu'il se confond avec le néant.
2. Le possible, lui, parce qu'il est ce qui n'est pas impossible, n'enveloppe aucune contradiction. Aussi est-il quelque chose et, de ce fait, une notion lui correspond.
Wolff assimile le possible au non-contradictoire, comme les mathématiciens avec lesquels il souligne son accord sur ce point x; il le fera aussi à propos de l'indéterminé et du déterminé. Il n'envisage donc ici que ce que saint Thomas appelait la possibilité absolue qui résulte «ex habitudine terminorum» , et que, pour sa part, il dénomme la possibilité de la chose. Il indique d'ailleurs que sa définition est conforme à celle de l'Aquinate: «possibile est, quod si ponatur in esse, non sequitur impossibile».
Mais à cela ne se réduit pas sa doctrine de la possibilité qu'il va compléter bientôt en précisant les rapports de la possibilité ainsi conue avec ce qu'il appelle la possibilité intrinsèque et la possibilité extrinsèque d'exister. Et, dans la *Theologia naturalis,* il l'enrichira encore en distinguant entre les possibles *absolute spectata* et ceux qui le sont *in*

systemate redacta, ainsi qu'entre les possibles primitifs premiers et seconds et les possibles dérivatifs.
Pour le moment lui est nécessaire et lui suffit la définition du possible par la non-contradiction, laquelle, nonobstant sa forme négative, est, à son avis, la seule qui permet de reconnaître sans risque d'erreur ce qui est possible, si du moins on prend soin de démontrer qu'il n'y a pas de contradiction, comme il est indispensable d'établir aussi qu'une chose est contradictoire pour pouvoir la déclarer impossible." (pp. 157-158)
(...)
"Les composants de la notion d'Être
A) *L'être et le possible*
Pour éclairer la notion d'être, Wolff se sert d'abord de celles d'impossible et de possible.
Ce qui est impossible étant contradictoire ne peut exister, en vertu du principe de contradiction. C'est un non-être.
Par contre, du fait que le possible n'enveloppe pas la contradiction, il n'y a pas de raison suffisante pour qu'il n'existe pas. Aussi, malgré le rejet de la première définition critiquée ci-dessus, on peut cependant dire que ce qui est possible peut exister, si on ne le rapporte pas à sa cause, car la non-répugnance à exister est une propriété strictement interne.
Or, fait-il remarquer, on appelle être ce à quoi l'existence ne répugne pas, ainsi que cela ressort du langage commun où on désigne sous ce nom, non seulement les choses qui existent, mais aussi celles qui ont existé et celles qui existeront, et on peut dès lors considérer le possible comme un être.
Mais on ne peut conclure de là, ainsi que l'ont fait certains que Wolff tient l'être et le possible pour une seule et même chose. Car, souligne-t-il y, la notion d'être ajoute à celle du possible, qui ne connote que la possibilité de la chose ou sa non-contradiction, la non-répugnance à exister qui constitue ce qu'il appelle la possibilité intrinsèque d'exister, laquelle suit de la première.
Ainsi donc, et c'est un point très important à noter, la notion d'être en général implique, pour lui, non pas l'existence,

mais seulement la possibilité d'exister." (p. 162 notes omises)

9. ———. 1991. "De la connaissance qu'avait Kant de la métaphysique wolffienne, ou Kant avait-il lu les ouvrages métaphysiques de Wolff?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 73:261-276.
Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 152-167.
"Selon l'opinion courante, la philosophie critique s'est formée en réaction contre la métaphysique de Wolff. Mais, parce que Kant attribue à celui-ci des thèses qu'il n'a pas professées, comme l'harmonie préétablie et le monadisme, parce qu'aussi il lui adresse certains reproches injustifiés, par exemple de n'avoir proposé qu'un critère logique de distinction entre la connaissance sensible et la connaissance intellectuelle, et de n'avoir présenté qu'une preuve *a priori* de l'existence de Dieu, force est d'admettre qu'il n'avait pas lu ses textes s'y rapportant. Et, comme il est possible de trouver la source de ces assertions et de la plupart des autres de Kant concernant la métaphysique de Wolff dans les manuels de Baumgarten surtout, mais aussi de Baumeister et de Gottsched, on en arrive à la conclusion qu'il ne devait guère connaître cette métaphysique qu'à travers ceux-ci qui la déforment souvent." (*Sommaire*).
" *Conclusion*
I. Nous voici arrivés au terme de notre enquête et en mesure d'en tirer les conclusions.
Parmi les textes que nous avons collationnés, il en est deux: celui où il est question de la force morte des corps tirés ou poussés, et cet autre où l'existence est qualifiée *d'omnimoda determinatio,* dont nous ne pouvons affirmer qu'ils ne supposent pas la lecture des ouvrages métaphysiques de Wolff.
Il faut aussi reconnaître que ceux qui contiennent des déclarations vagues, de même que celui où Kant fait allusion au « somnio objective sumto », ceux encore où il garde le silence sur le « connubium rationis et experientiae » et sur l'insertion de la cosmologie générale parmi les disciplines métaphysiques, celui enfin où il a pu parler de la possibilité

de Dieu d'après Baumeister, ne peuvent non plus rendre certaine cette conclusion. Mais ils forment avec ceux que nous allons rappeler aussi un ensemble qu'on ne peut dissocier et dont l'analyse conduit vers elle.
En effet, les renvois à Baumgarten en même temps qu'à Wolff à propos de la démonstration du principe de raison suffisante et de la définition de l'existence d'une part, d'autre part la ressemblance de la définition de la raison avec celle qu'en propose Baumeister, donnent à penser que Kant a pu effectuer cette critique à partir de la *Metaphysica* du premier, et emprunter cette définition aux *Institutiones metaphysicae* du second. Parce que la faon dont il présente la preuve de l'unicité du monde actuel et celle de l'existence de Dieu rappelle l'exposé de celle-là par Baumgarten et le résumé de celle-ci par Gottsched, on peut penser encore qu'il en parle d'après eux, en se servant de plus du vocabulaire de Baumgarten pour formuler la seconde. Quant au critère de distinction entre la connaissance sensible et la connaissance intellectuelle, il a dû l'emprunter à Baumgarten qui ne retient qu'une partie, la moins importante, des explications de Wolff. Enfin, au sujet de l'harmonie préétablie et de la monadologie, il n'aurait pas soutenu que celui-ci en est partisan, s'il avait lu ses déclarations dans la *Deutsche Metaphysik* et dans *l'Opus metaphysicum*.
Ce regroupement des textes de Kant met en lumière que l'examen des trois derniers vient seulement renforcer la conviction acquise peu à peu au cours de celui des précédents - à l'exception des deux tout premiers - qu'il n'avait pas une connaissance directe de la métaphysique de Wolff. A cause des deux textes en question et parce que d'autres ont pu nous échapper, nous ne pouvons certes pas prétendre qu'il n'avait strictement rien lu des ouvrages où elle est exposée. Mais, parce que ceux que nous avons retenus ont trait à des thèses aussi variées qu'importantes, il nous semble possible d'affirmer qu'il ne devait guère connaître autre chose de cette métaphysique que ce que lui en avaient appris les manuels dans lesquels on peut trouver

la source de ses jugements sur elle." (pp. 274-275 notes omises)

10. ———. 1993. "Les pièces les plus originales de la métaphysique de Christian Wolff (1679-1754), le "Professeur du genre humain"." In *Aufklärung als Mission. La mission des Lumières. Akzeptanzprobleme und Kommunikationsdefizite. Accueil réciproque et difficultés de communication. Actes du Colloque de Luxembourg, 1989*, edited by Schneiders, Werner, 103-114. Marburg: Hitzeroth.
Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 23-33.
"L'oeuvre de Wolff peut être qualifiée d'encyclopédique, tant il est vrai qu'il a traité «de omni re scibili» à son époque ou peu s'en faut, sans qu'on puisse alléguer là-contre qu'on la divise d'ordinaire en deux parties correspondant à ses ouvrages de mathématiques et à ceux de philosophie. Car, dans les premiers, il n'expose pas seulement l'arithmétique, l'algèbre, la géométrie et la trigonométrie, mais encore, comme c'était la coutume alors, des disciplines aussi diverses que l'astronomie, la mécanique, l'aérométrie, l'hydraulique, l'hydrologie, l'optique, la dioptrique, la chronologie, l'architecture, pour n'en citer que quelques-unes; et, dans les seconds, il aborde les questions relevant de la logique, de la métaphysique, du droit naturel, de la morale, du droit des gens, de l'économique, ainsi que de la physique conue comme comprenant, outre la physique au sens actuel du terme, la physiologie, l'anatomie, la botanique et la chimie, il fait aussi rentrer dans la philosophie l'étude rationnelle des arts tant manuels que libéraux, celle encore de la jurisprudence, enfin la méthodologie de la théologie révélée dogmatique, morale et scripturaire.
Le tout tient en un corpus énorme de 34 ouvrages en 58 volumes, de 34 opuscules et de 40 articles, les uns en allemand, les autres en latin, sans compter les préfaces, les comptes rendus et les lettres.
(...)

C'est sans contredit la partie philosophique de son œuvre et plus particulièrement sa métaphysique qui l'a rendu célèbre. (...)
Elle se situe au confluent des doctrines scolastique, cartésienne, leibnizienne et lockienne, dont elle est un essai de synthèse. Mais si cette tentative, beaucoup plus que les 4600 pages de *l'Opus metaphysicum,* en fait un véritable monument et s'inscrit en faux contre l'accusation sans cesse répétée qu'il n'a fait que vulgariser les thèses de Leibniz, l'originalité de Wolff en ce domaine se manifeste davantage par son apport sur certains points particuliers, parmi lesquels nous retiendrons les trois où elle est la plus éclatante: l'introduction de l'étude du monde et des corps dans la métaphysique, la transposition et la synthèse de la Philosophie corpusculaire, de l'Atomisme et du Monadisme dans l'explication des corps, la libération de la théologie naturelle par rapport à la tutelle de la théologie révélée. Qu'il ait innové dans chacune de ces questions, c'est ce que nous nous proposons de montrer, en nous appuyant sur les traités de l' *Opus metaphysicum,* paree qu'ils expriment l'état définitif de sa pensée et qu'ils sont beaucoup plus élaborés que l'esquisse de la *Deutsche Metaphysik*. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne la première, c'est au *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*, situé en tête de la *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica,* que nous ferons appel, car c'est là qu'il s'explique le plus complètement sur l'objet de la métaphysique." (pp. 103-104)

11. ———. 1994. "De la nature de la raison, de ses rapports avec l'expérience et la foi selon Christian Wolff." In *Vernunftbegriffe der Moderne. Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1993*, edited by Fulda, Hans Friedrich and Hortsmann, Rolf-Peter, 127-139. Stuttgart.
Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp. 67-79.
"Il est normal que Christian Wolff, dont Hegel dit, dans ses *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie,* ' *dass [er] ... erst das Philosophieren in Deutschland einheimisch gemacht hat*', ait sa place dans un Congrès qui porte sur le concept de raison dans la philosophie moderne et dont le

premier Colloque est consacré au rationalisme précritique, car il ne fait pas de doute qu'il est l'un des principaux représentants de celui-ci.
La chose est tellement connue qu'il est inutile d'insister. Mais on se contente la plupart du temps de l'enregistrer, sans chercher à approfondir ce qu'il entend exactement par raison, alors qu'il en propose deux conceptions qui, de prime abord, semblent s'opposer, et c'est ce que nous nous proposons de faire en premier lieu. Ensuite on s'est trop longtemps plu - et Kant n'a pas fait exception - à le présenter comme un rationaliste pur ne faisant fond que sur la déduction et s'il est vrai qu'on a pris conscience de nos jours qu'il a beaucoup fait appel aussi à l'expérience, il reste que sa conception d'ensemble des rapports de la raison et de l'expérience a rarement été dégagée, et c'est ce que nous allons tenter dans un second temps. Mais, à ces deux premières questions ne se ramène pas tout le problème de son rationalisme; il y en a une troisième relative à la faon dont il a envisagé les rapports de la raison et de la foi et à laquelle on s'est fort peu intéressé, alors qu'il est indispensable de faire également la lumière sur ce point si l'on veut avoir une vue aussi complète que possible de sa doctrine sur la raison." (p. 127)

12. ———. 1995. "Des rapports de l'essence et de l'existence selon Wolff." In *Aufklärung und Skepsis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts. Günter Gawlick zum 65. Geburstag*, edited by Kreimendahl, Lothar, Hoche, Hans-Ulrich and Strube, Werner, 72-79. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
13. ———. 1996. "La définition de l'existence comme le complément de la possibilité et les rapports de l'essence et de l'existence selon Christian Wolff." *Etudes Philosophiques*:261-273.
Repris dans: *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff,* pp.115-127.
"Mon exposé s'appuiera surtout sur la *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia,* beaucoup plus complète et plus élaborée que le deuxième chapitre de la *deutsche Metaphysik* qui a trait à l'ontologie. Pour plus de brièveté, j'indiquerai seulement le

numéro des paragraphes de ce traité, sans rappeler à chaque fois son titre. Sous le nom de note, je désignerai le texte en petits caractères de ces paragraphes.

Être, possible, essence, existence

1. La définition de l'existence comme le complément de la possibilité se rattache à la question des rapports de l'essence et de l'existence qui, chez Wolff comme chez tous les représentants de la métaphysique de l'être, se situe elle-même au cœur d'une théorie générale de l'être. Aussi est-il indispensable, si l'on veut éclairer ce point de sa doctrine, de présenter d'abord les lignes de faîte de cette théorie avec lesquelles cette définition et cette question entretiennent des rapports étroits.

Pour construire cette théorie, il ne part pas de l'expérience qui nous impose sa présence ou, si l'on veut, son existence, mais de l'analyse de sa notion. Et c'est ce qui l'a immanquablement conduit à voir dans l'essence ce qui est d'abord connu dans l'être et à la fois ce qui sert de fondement à toutes ses propriétés (§ 168). Voyons comment.

Se référant au langage commun dans lequel on parle aussi bien, fait-il remarquer, des êtres passés et futurs que des êtres présents ou actuels, il en conclut que l'être peut être défini, de faon générale, ce à quoi l'existence ne répugne pas, c'est-à-dire comme ce qui peut exister (§ 134, 139). Or telle est aussi la définition générale du possible qu'il rappelle juste auparavant (§ 133). Et c'est ce qui a fait que certains, comme Étienne Gilson *(L'être et l'essence,* Paris, Vrin, 1948, c. 5, p. 170), ont pu penser qu'il tient l'être et le possible pour une seule et même' chose. Mais, ainsi qu'il le souligne: «Possibile... et ens non prorsus synonyma sunt» (not. § 135) et, pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de passer en revue les différentes sortes de possibilités qu'il distingue.

3. La première d'entre elles est constituée par la propriété de n'être pas contradictoire. Il s'agit là de ce que Thomas d'Aquin, auquel il se réfère dans la *Luculenta commentalio... (§,* 7), appelait la possibilité absolue en indiquant qu'elle résulte « ex habitudine terminorum» *(In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum* lib. 9, lect. 2, n° 1807). Il

la dénomme pour sa part : «possibilitas rei» (not. § 99, not. § 103, not. § 135). A ce stade, le possible, c'est donc essentiellement ce qui n'enveloppe pas la contradiction et, par conséquent, comme il le dit encore, ce qui n'est pas impossible (§ 85).

Or, à la notion du possible ainsi conu, celle d'être, du moins celle d'être en général ajoute, poursuit-il, la non-répugnance à exister qui ne se confond pas avec la non-contradiction, mais s'ensuit, en tant que de celle-ci ne découle aucune raison suffisante pour que le possible ne soit pas actualisé ou, si l'on préfère, aucune raison suffisante pour qu'il n'existe pas« (§'133). A cette non-répugnance à exister qui est la caractéristique de l'être en général, Wolff donne, dans un premier temps, le nom de « possibilitas existendi» (not. § 134, not. § 135), puis celui plus précis de « possibilitas intrinseca existendi» (not. § 175), lorsqu'il traite de l'être en puissance, c'est-à-dire tel qu'il l'entend, de l'être qui peut avoir la raison suffisante de son existence en d'autres êtres, afin de la distinguer de la possibilité propre à celui-ci, qu'il qualifie de «possibilitas extrinseca existendi».

Entre ces deux dernières sortes de possibilités, il y a toute la différence qui existe entre une, propriété appartenant à l'être envisagé en lui-même, c'est-à-dire, ainsi qu'il, sera précisé ultérieurement, en vertu de son essence, et une autre propriété qui lui vient de ses rapports avec la ou les causes pouvant le poser dans l'existence.

4. Ainsi apparaît-il que ce n'est pas seulement la, notion de possible, mais aussi celle d'être, qui est plus complexe qu'on pourrait le croire au premier abord, d'autant qu'il distingue de l'être en général, outre l'être en puissance, l'être en acte ou, qui existe, en les considérant l'un et l'autre comme les deux espèces en lesquelles se divise l'être en général considéré comme leur genre (not. § 175).

Quoi qu'il en soit, pour nous en tenir à ce dernier dont nous sommes partis et qui constitue, selon Wolff, l'objet de *l'Ontologia* (§ 1), il est clair que, s'il ne se confond pas avec la «possibilitas rei» définie par la non- contradiction, par, contre, il s'identifie à la « possibilitas intrinseca existendi». Et de là suit que l'existence est exclue de sa notion (not. §

134); ce qui revient à prétendre qu'il n'est qu'essence. Ainsi, faut-il expliciter ce que connote pour lui le terme essence, si l'on veut pénétrer plus avant dans la compréhension de ce qu'il entend par être en général et de ses rapports avec l'existence." (pp. 263-264)

14. ———. 1996. "Contribution à l'histoire des propriétés transcendentales de l'être." *Filosofia Oggi* no. 19:367-394. Repris dans: *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne,* pp. 131-158.
"Les propriétés transcendentales de l'être, comment l'énoncé de ce titre n'évoquerait-il pas aussitôt la fameuse formule scolastique: «Ens, unum, verum, bonum convertuntur», à laquelle on ramène trop souvent à tort la doctrine de ces propriétés, qui est beaucoup plus complexe que le donne à penser la dite formule? Je n'entreprendrai pas d'en exposer toutes les composantes, mais seulement un point précis, à savoir l'extension de cette appellation à beaucoup d'autres déterminations que l'unité, la vérité et la bonté, qui s'est fait jour dès le Moyen Age, mais s'est beaucoup accrue à partir de la fin du XVIème siècle.
Dans un premier temps, je m'appliquerai à brosser le tableau des principaux types de conceptions de ces propriétés qui ont été proposées au cours de l'histoire de la haute scolastique et de la scolastique tardive, et je clôturerai mon enquête avec Christian Wolff qui n'appartient ni à l'une, ni à l'autre, parce que sa propre conception apparaît comme le point extrême auquel ont conduit celles des petits Scolastiques qui ont élargi considérablement le domaine de ces propriétés. Dans un second temps, je tenterai d'éclairer pourquoi et comment s'est produit cet élargissement." (p. 367)

15. ———. 1997. "La doctrine wolffienne de la nécessité et son enracinement dans la tradition." In *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff*, 35-53. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Conférence donnée au Colloque *Tradition et émancipation*, Vianden, 30 juin - 3 Juillet 1991 (Inédit).
"Notre titre peut pas ne pas faire penser aux critiques du théologien piétiste Joachim Lange contre la métaphysique

de Christian Wolff, car il est bien connu qu'il les a centrées sur la question de la nécessité. Mais on a peu remarqué que, ce faisant, il a fortement contribué â mettre en lumière la place importante qu'y tenait cette question et il faut lui en donner acte.
Pourtant nous n'avons pas l'intention de retracer les étapes de cette âpre et longue controverse -- elle dura plus de treize ans -- qui aviva les passions dans les milieux non seulement universitaires, mais aussi politiques et amena Frédéric-Guillaume Ier, circonvenu par Linge, à chasser Wolff de son royaume. Point n'est question pour nous non plus de brosser le tableau complet et détaillé des objections inlassablement répétées par Lange et ses partisans dans un nombre considérable de volumes et de libelles, car elles portent à faux en tant qu'elles visent à accréditer l'idée que Wolff n'a fait que professer un spinozisme déguisé n'osant s'afficher ouvertement.
Ce que nous nous proposons, c'est d'exposer la doctrine wolffienne de la nécessité pour elle-même, tant dans ses principes que dans ses applications et d'en éclairer les sources." (p. 35)

16. ———. 1997. "Wolff était-il leibnizien?" In *Nouvelles études et nouveaux documents photographiques sur Wolff*, 131-151. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
"Vaste question que celle-ci, tant l'oeuvre de Wolff, comme celle de Leibniz, est véritablement encyclopédique; ils ont, en effet, traité, l'un et l'autre, «de omni re scibili» ou presque à leur époque. Et c'est pourquoi je vous propose de la restreindre au domaine de la métaphysique, qui en est la partie la plus intéressante pour les philosophes que nous sommes.
Or très vite, du vivant de Wolff qui est né en 1679 et est mort en 1754, s'est fait jour l'idée, qu'on s'est plu ensuite à colporter, alors qu'on ne le lisait plus, jusqu'à nos jours où on commence à le redécouvrir, qu'il n'a guère fait que vulgariser en les systématisant les grandes thèses de la métaphysique de Leibniz.
Aussi importe-t-il de retracer, au moins dans les grandes lignes, l'origine et l'histoire de cette opinion, avant de faire

appel aux textes de Wolff pour essayer de déterminer si elle est ou non justifiée." (p. 131)
(...)
"Nous revenons par là aux réflexions de tout à l'heure sur son éclectisme. Chez Leibniz, comme chez ses autres prédécesseurs, Wolff a choisi ce qui lui semblait conforme à la raison et qu'il pouvait démontrer, pour en faire un ensemble nouveau et cohérent. On peut certes parler à ce sujet de systématisation. Mais cette systématisation, loin d'avoir seulement pour objet les thèses de Leibniz, s'étend aussi à celles des autres auteurs dont il s'est également inspiré et surtout elle consiste davantage dans l'édification de ce nouvel ensemble que dans l'explicitation de la métaphysique leibnizienne. En un mot, Wolff n'est le pur disciple ni de Leibniz, ni de ceux-ci. On ne peut même pas prétendre qu'il avait une plus grande affinité intellectuelle avec Leibniz qu'avec les Scolastiques, par exemple du fait qu'il a développé et approfondi l'enseignement de celui-là, alors qu'il a contracté et résumé les thèses de ceux-ci. Mais on peut voir dans cette faon différente de traiter le premier et les seconds la marque d'une indépendance d'esprit qui est la preuve d'une indéniable, quoique relative, originalité et d'une réelle vigueur intellectuelle. L'une et l'autre s'affirment d'ailleurs dans cette dernière déclaration de Wolff dans le *Monitum de sua philosophandi ratione...,* qu'on peut citer en guise de conclusion : « *Ego magna Leibnitii in scientiam merita veneror, non tamen instar idoli colo, cum... nihil admitto, nisi quod notionibus meis conforme deprehendo*» (*)." (p. 151)
(*) In: *Meletemata Mathenzatico-Philosophica...* Sect. 1, n. 37, p. 171.

17. ———. 1998. "Christian Wolff était-il un Aufklärer?" In *Aufklärung als praktische Philosophie. Werner Schneider zum 65. Geburstag*, edited by Grunert, Frank and Vollhardt, Friedrich, 31-44. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Repris dans: *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne,* pp. 172-185.
18. ———. 1999. "La place de la *Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia* dans l'histoire de l'Ontologie et sa

réception chez Christian Wolff." In *Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) and Cartesian Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, edited by Verbeek, Theo, 61-74. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Repris dans: *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne,* pp. 117-130.
"Que Wolff ait lu la *Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia*, c'est ce que prouve le fait qu'il en parle de faon précise, qu'il indique toujours, sauf une fois, le paragraphe et le plus souvent la page, que de plus il en cite trois fois le texte "expressis verbis". Ajoutons qu'il s'y réfère au moins onze fois, dont dix dans la *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia* ... publiée en 1730 à Frankfurt et Leipzig où elle fut rééditée en 1736, et une autre dans les *Horae subcesivae Marburgenses* ... de 1731, parues aux mêmes endroits en 1735.
Il notes à son propos que, malgré l'effort qu'y a tenté Clauberg, en 1664, d'améliorer l'ontologie, Leibniz n'en a pas moins appelé en 1693, dans le *De primae philosophiae emendatione* ...," à réformer cette discipline, puis prétendu, dans un propos recueilli par Joachim Friedrich Feller dans l' *Otium Hannoveranum*... qui date de 1718, qu'elle était toujours "inter quaerenda". Et l'on peut penser que c'est parce que Wolff partageait cette opinion qu'il a écrit sa *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia*.
Toujours est-il que, outre ce jugement général, il en porte d'autres, pour la plupart critiques aussi, sur quelques-unes des définitions de Clauberg.
Si l'on suit l'ordre dans lequel il s'y réfère, on trouve d'abord celle du possible. À son propos, il fait remarquer qu'en le définissant: ce qui peut être produit par une cause quelconque, du moins par Dieu, Clauberg confond la possibilité absolue constituée par la propriété de n'être pas contradictoire avec la possibilité extrinsèque d'exister, celle de l'être qui peut avoir en un autre la raison de son existence. Il ajoute qu'en affirmant que c'est là ce que notre esprit peut comprendre clairement et distinctement, Clauberg s'en tient certes au critère cartésien de la distinction du vrai et du faux, mais qu'il aurait dû définir le

possible: ce dont on peut démontrer qu'il peut être produit par une cause quelconque, du moins par Dieu, car il aurait alors proposé une notion claire et distincte de la possibilité de produire, avec à charge de prouver ensuite que quelque chose peut être ainsi produit.
Il passe ensuite aux définitions de l'essence et de la nature, à propos desquelles il rappelle d'abord que Clauberg déclare que toutes les propriétés qui peuvent être attribuées à une chose, une seule est première, principale, interne et embrasse en quelque sorte les autres ou en est comme la racine et le fondement et que c'est là ce qu'on appelle l'essence, ainsi que nous l'avons déjà vu; cependant qu'on lui donne le nom de nature eu égard aux propriétés et aux opérations qui découlent de cette chose. Puis il lui donne acte d'avoir bien vu qu'essence et nature sont parentes, mais il lui reproche de ne pas avoir suffisamment marqué ce en quoi elles conviennent et ce en quoi elles diffèrent.
(...)
La conclusion qu'on peut tirer des propos de Wolff sur la *Metaphysica de ente*, c'est qu'il ne la tenait pas dans une très grande estime, car il en dit somme toute peu de bien. Il ne s'agit pourtant pas d'une critique purement négative. Avec Clauberg, comme avec les autres auteurs auxquels il se réfère, il fait preuve d'éclectisme, en ne retenant de sa doctrine que ce qui lui semble conforme à la raison et qu'il peut démontrer. Aussi peut-on cependant affirmer que la lecture de la *Metaphysica de ente* a été pour lui une occasion d'affiner sa pensée.
Rien ne permet de prétendre qu'il a connu les deux premières éditions de l ' *Ontosophia*, puisqu'il ne parle que de la troisième et ne donne de références qu'à celle-ci. Mais on ne peut pas ne pas être frappé par l'étroite parenté qui existe entre cette affirmation de la " *Praefatio ad lectorem*" de la première, à savoir que, dans cette doctrine générale de l'être, "omnis cognitionis et scientiae, naturali lumine partae, fundamenta et semina continentur", et le titre de la *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia ... qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur*.

Enfin, si l'on note que, parmi les manuels d'ontologie parus après celui de Clauberg, Wolff ne se réfère ni à celui de du Hamel, ni à celui de Budde, qu'il connaissait pourtant à coup sûr, par comparaison avec les dix fois qu'il fait appel à la *Metaphysica de ente,* on peut voir là une preuve de plus qu'il lui reconnaissait malgré tout une certaine importance." (pp. 68-70 notes omises)

19. ———. 2001. "Une étape de l'histoire de la métaphysique: l'apparition de l'Ontologie comme discipline séparée." In *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne. Textes de Hans Werner Arndt, Sonia Carboncini-Gavanelli, Jean École*, edited by École, Jean, 95-116. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
"Après avoir connu une certaine éclipse due sans doute au succès de la philosophie kantienne et des doctrines post-kantiennes qui ont pratiquement éliminé la discipline qu'il désigne, le terme ontologie est redevenu un terme courant du vocabulaire philosophique, grâce en partie à Husserl et à Heidegger. On connaît la distinction du premier entre l'ontologie formelle et les ontologies matérielles ou régionales, et la tentative du second' pour constituer la métaphysique du «Dasein» en une ontologie fondamentale. On sait aussi que Sartre a sous-titré L'être et le néant': «Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique», et que Lavelle a publié un petit traité intitulé Introduction à l'ontologie. Pour nous limiter à ces quelques exemples, tous ces auteurs ont gardé à ce terme son sens étymologique de science de l'être, tout en concevant cette-ci de faons fort différentes que connaissent leurs lecteurs.
Mais peu d'entre eux ont une idée de l'événement qu'a constitué l'apparition des premières ontologies. Les historiens de la philosophie eux-mêmes y ont prêté peu d'attention parce que les acteurs de cette apparition étaient de petits représentants de la Scolastique tardive qui ont consacré à cette discipline des manuels à l'usage de leurs élèves. Pourtant l'apparition et la multiplication de ces manuels est une étape de l'histoire de la métaphysique qui présente de l'intérêt pas seulement pour les érudits, mais pour tous ceux qui sont soucieux d'obtenir une vue

d'ensemble complète des idées en ce domaine. Et c'est ce que nous nous proposons de montrer." (p. 95 notes omises)

20. ———. 2001. "Des rapports de la métaphysique de Wolff avec celle des Scholastiques." In *Autour de la philosophie Wolffienne. Textes de Hans Werner Arndt, Sonia Carboncini-Gavanelli, Jean École*, edited by École, Jean, 55-69. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
"En faisant de l'ontologie une discipline séparée de la théologie naturelle et qui joue le rôle d'introduction générale aux autres parties de la métaphysique, ainsi qu'aux autres disciplines philosophiques en tant qu'elle affine les notions et établit les principes nécessaires à l'ensemble du savoir d'une part, et d'autre part se présente comme une théorie générale de l'être, Wolff se situe indéniablement dans la lignée des petits Scolastiques qui, dés la fin du XVIème siècle, pendant tout le XVIIème et encore au XVIIIème, ont envahi le devant de la scène philosophique, et qui firent tant et si bien qu'à leur époque elle avait définitivement acquis droit de cité.
Mais, alors que ces auteurs n'avaient publié que des manuels souvent réduits à l'état de lexiques philosophiques, en se bornant à disserter de faon abstraite sur l'essence et les propriétés de l'être, ainsi qu'il le déplore - et c'est ce qui explique son rejet par Descartes et l'appel de Leibniz, déjà évoqué, à l'améliorer, -- Wolff, pour sa part, a fait de sa *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*, un grand traité beaucoup plus élaboré et beaucoup plus complet. En appelant cette discipline *«Ontologia* seu *Philosophia prima»,* il suit certains de ces auteurs comme Jean-Baptiste du Hamel qui expliquait, comme il le fait, qu'elle est appelée «Ontologia» en tant qu'elle contient une théorie générale de l'être, et «Philosophia prima» en tant qu'elle définit les notions et établit les principes en usage dans le raisonnement.
Tout donne à penser que c'est aussi de Jean-Baptiste du Hamel qu'il s'inspire en ouvrant son traité sur l'étude des premiers principes, même s'il est vrai qu'aux deux seuls retenus par celui-ci: le principe de contradiction et celui du tiers exclu, il ajoute le principe de raison suffisante.

II ne fait pas de doute non plus qu'il a repris des Scolastiques les divisions de la cause efficiente en: principale et instrumentale, prochaine et éloignée, immédiate et médiate, et celles de la cause finale en: principale et secondaire, prochaine et éloignée, déjà effectuées en totalité par Thomas d'Aquin, en partie par Suarez.
Quant à la distinction entre les signes naturels et artificiels, primitifs et dérivatifs, elle avait déjà été proposée par Thomas d'Aquin entre autres, et Clauberg en avait retenu le premier couple." (p. 63 notes omises)

21. ———. 2007. "Remerciement. "Le professeur du genre humain". Discours sur le Métaphysique de Wolff." In *Wolffiana II. Christian Wolff und die europäische Aufklärung. Teil 1*, edited by Stolzenberg, Jürgen and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, 27-37. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4-8 April 2004.
"... je voudrais ajouter quelques mots sur Wolff lui-même que des Français , -- dont il parle dans une de ses lettres (2) au Comte Ernst von Manteuffel son protecteur, sans malheureusement préciser de qui il s'agit --, ont dénommé le "Professeur du genre humain", appellation que Heinrich Wuttke dans l'introduction à son édition de la *Christian Wolffs eigene Lebensbeschreibung*, (3) a latinisé en le qualifiant de "Professor universi generis humani". "Professeur du genre humain", Wolff pourrait être appelé aussi "Docteur universel", non seulement en raison de son rayonnement extraordinaire dans tout l'Europe du XVIIIème siècle et de l'intérêt qu'il suscite encore aujourd'hui un peu partout dans le monde, comme le révèle ce congrès, mais aussi parce qu'il est le type même de l'esprit encyclopédique qui a en fait, traité "de omni re scibile" ou presque à son époque, qu'il s'agisse -- et ce ne sont là que quelques-uns des domaines du savoir qu'il a investis --, qu'il s'agisse des mathématiques proprement dites, de l'astronomie, de la mécanique, de la physique, de le physiologie, de la médicine, du droit, de la politique, de la

théologie surnaturelle, de l'exégèse et de toutes les parties de la philosophie: logique, métaphysique et morale.
Or pour ce qui est de ces dernières, si l'on a unanimement reconnu qu'il fut un grand professeur, très grand même, on lui a la plupart du temps refusé le titre de grand philosophe. Sans doute ne peut-il être mis sur le même pied que Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza par exemple. Mais, pour ne retenir que le domain métaphysique, force est de reconnaître qu'il a fait preuve d'ingéniosité et d'innovation dans chacune de ses parties, comme on peut le montrer facilement à l'aide de quelques exemples.
Tout d'abord, c'est à lui, que nous devons leur nombre et leur répartition toujours admise de nos jours: l'Ontologie, la Cosmologie générale, la Psychologie et la Théologie naturelle, et nul avant lui n'avait systématisé avec autant de rigueur l'enseignement de chacune d'elles et l'ordre de succession qui les unit: l'Ontologie servant de propédeutique à toutes les autres en leur fournissant les principes et les notions directrices dont s'édifier, la Cosmologie servant de base, entre autres, à la preuve a posteriori de l'existence de Dieu avec la démonstration de la contingence du monde. et la Psychologie à l'analyse de ses attributs à partir de celle de nos facultés, l'une et l'autre dans la Théologie naturelle.
Son Ontologie apparaît comme la réalisation du vœu formulé par Leibniz (4) de voir cette discipline réformée, améliorée, tant elle tranche par son ampleur et la profondeur de ses analyses avec les manuels des petits Scolastiques du XVIIIème siècle qui l'ont séparée de la Théologie naturelle à laquelle elle était étroitement liée jusqu'à eux (5) et qui se contentaient le plus souvent d'y donner des définitions en leur ajoutant des notations rapides. Sans doute se situe-t-il dans la lignée de Suarez en y proposant une conception de l'être accordant à l'essence la primauté par rapport à l'existence: mais, en faisant de celle-ci ce qui, dans les êtres contingents, s'ajoute à l'essence pour la faire passer de l'état de possibilité à celui d'actualité, (6) il en vient à poser entre l'une et l'autre, chez ceux-ci, une distinction réelle, alors que Suarez, en les concevant comme

les deux éléments constitutifs de ce qu'il appelle l *'essentia realis*, (7) ne reconnaissait entre elles qu'une distinction de raison. Il y différencie aussi beaucoup mieux que Leibniz le principe de raison suffisante de celui de causalité en expliquant que la cause est ce dont dépend l'existence d'une chose, son source directe; la raison suffisante, ce qui permet de comprendre pourquoi cette chose existe (8) et, pour éclairer ceci, il allègue l'exemple des êtres contingents qui ont leur cause dans leur série en tant qu'ils sont déterminés par ceux qui les précèdent, mais dont on ne peut rendre pleinement compte qu'en les rattachant à un être nécessaire extérieur à cette série, qui en est la raison suffisante. (9) Son traité d'Ontologie se singularise encore par l'introduction, en tête de son explication des propriétés des êtres composés, d'un chapitre sur la nature de l'étendue, de l'espace, du lieu, de la position, du temps et du mouvement, (10) d'ordinaire rattaché à la Philosophie de la nature, et cette introduction est d'autant bien venue qu'Il est impossible de comprendre l'être composé sans faire appel à ces notions." (pp. 29-30)
(2) Cité par Wuttke dans son introduction à la Wolffs eigene Lebensbeschreibung In: Wolff, Bibliographie, note 1 p. 72 [Leipzig: Weidmann 1841; reprint Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1982]
(3) Ibid., note 1, p. 72
(4) *De Philosophiae primae emendatione et notione substantiae* (GER., Phil., IV, p. 468).
(5) Cf. mon étude: *Une étape de l'histoire de la métaphysique: l'apparition de l'Ontologie comme discipline séparée*, 2001, p. 85-116.
(6) Wolff, Ontologia, § 132-178, p. 113-147.
(7) Disp. 2, sect. 4, § 7, Disp. 31, sect. 1, § 12-13.
(8) Wolff, Ontologia, § 56, p. 39, § 881, p. 622.
(9) Ibid., § 321-324, p. 252-257.
(10) Ibid., Pars II, Caput 2, p. 425-477.

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"Des treize études que nous avons réunies dans ce volume onze ont déjà paru dans des revues ou des actes des congrès, deux sont inédits. (...) Tous ces études ont été réprises telles qu'elles ont été publiées ou prononcées. D'où quelques inévitables rédites que nous prions le lecteurs d'excuser." (*Avertissement,* pp. 9-10).

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Philosophische Systematik im Anschluss an Leibniz (1995) 287
Christian Wolffs Stellung zur "Ars characteristica combinatoria" (1965) 299.
Avant-propos de Jean École: "J'ai déjà publié dans cette méme série des Gesammelte Werke de Christian Wolff deux recueils (a) de mes études sur sa pensée. A la composition de celui-ci se sont associés Hans Werner Arndt et Sonia Carboncini-Gavanelli, bien connus par leurs savants travaux sur cet auteur. D'où la plus grande richesse de ce troisième volume en raison des intéréts différents de nous trois pour telle ou telle partie de la philosophie wolffienne.Y sont envisagés tour à tour: la théorie de la connaissance (Arndt), la métaphysique et plus spécialement l'ontologie (Carboncini-Gavanelli, École), la morale expérimentale (Arndt), les rapports de Wolff avec les Scolastiques (Carboncini-Gavanelli, École), et Leíbniz (Arndt, Carboncini-Gavanelli), les réactions de Reimarus (Arndt), Crusius (Carboncini-Gavanelli), et des Piétistes, notamment Thomasius (Arndt, Carboncini-Gavanelli), à ses positions logiques pour ce qui est du premier, métaphysiques en ce qui concerne les autres.Toutes ces études (19 en tout, dont 8 de Hans Werner Arndt, 6 de Sonia Carboncini-Gavanelli, et 5 de moi) ne portent pas exclusivement sur Wolff, mais s'y rapportent en tant qu'elles tendent à le situer dans l' histoire

des idées; ce qui explique le titre retenu pour ce recueil: Autour de la philosophie wolfienne.A l'exception de trois d'entre eux, ces textes ont paru dans des revues, des volumes d'hommage ou des actes de congrès indiqués dans la Table des matières. Le premier: Zu Begriff und Funktion der 'moralischen Erfahrung' in Christian Wolffs Ethik de Hans Werner Arndt n'est cependant inédit que quant à la langue, car une traduction italienne en a été publiée sous le titre: Concetto e funzione dell' 'Esperienza morale' nell'Etica di Christian Wolff. (b) Il en est de même du deuxième: Des rapports de la métaphysique de Wolff avec celle des Scolastiques, qui faut partie des miens et a été traduit en allemand sous ce titre: Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scolastik (c). Quant au troisième: Une étape de l'histoire de la métaphysique: l'apparition de l'ontologie comme discipline séparée, il n'est inédit qu'en partie du fait qu'it est une contraction et une synthèse de deux autres de mes écrits: La place de la Metaphysica de ente quae rectius Ontosophia dans l'histoire de l'Ontologie et sa réception chez Wolff, et: Contribution à l'histoire des propriétés transcendentales de l'étre. Malgré les répétitions que cela occasionne, j'ai cru bon de ne pas l'éliminer, parce que seul il donne une vue complète de l'état de cette discipline à ses origines et jusq'à Wolff."
a) Études et documents photographiques sur Wolff, 1988. - Nouvelles études et nuoveau documents photographiques sur Wolff, 1997.
b) In: La Filosofia Pratica tra Metafisica e Antropologia nell'era di Wolff e Vico, Studi Vichiani vol. 29, ed. G. Cacciatore, V. Gessa-Kurotschka, H. Poser, M. Senna, p. 269-294.
c) In: Vernunftkrink und Aufklärung. Studien zur Philosophie Kants und seines Jahrhunderts, herausgegeben von Michael Oberhausen unter Mitwirkung von Heinwich P Delfosse und Riccardo Pozzo, 2001 Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Fromann-Holzboog, p. 115-128.

11. ———. 2003. *Les grandes notions de la métaphysique lavellienne et son vocabulaire*. Genova: L'Arcipelago.

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VOIR AUSSI

Bibliographie Choisie de Jean École. Première Partie: 1984-2008

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Bibliography of Joseph S. Freedman on Philosophy in Central Europe (1500-1700): First Part

'Central Europe' should be roughly equated with the Holy Roman Empire and with the German language area of Europe.

Second Part of the Bibliography: 2005-2014

BOOKS

1. Freedman, Joseph S. 1984. *Deutsche Schulphilosophie Im Reformationszeitalter (1500-1650). Ein Handbuch Für Den Hochschulunterricht*. Münster: MAKS Publikationen

   148 pages. Second edition revised edition (1985), 171 pages. "This short textbook was published in connection with my seminars on the Reformation Era and Central European schools and universities during the 16th and early 17th centuries."
   Inhalt: Abbildungen 7; Verzeichnis der Abbildungen 15; Vorwort der Herausgeber 17; Vorwort - Technischer Hinweis 19; Kapitel 1. Einleitung, zugleich ein Schlußwort 21; Kapitel 2. Der historische Hintergrund 27; Kapitel 3. Schulen und Universitäten im Reformations Zeitalter: Organisation, Studiengang und Lehrstoff 31; Kapitel 4. Der philosophische Lehrbetrieb und philosophische Unterrichtsmethoden 47; Kapitel 5. Die berufliche Laufbahn des Schulphilosophen 55; Kapitel 6. Die philosophischen Fächer: Einige Einteilungen 59; Kapitel 7. Theoretische Philosophie: Metaphysik, Physik und Mathematik 67; Kapitel 8. Praktische Philosophie: Ethik, Oeconomia und Politik 81; Kapitel 9. Philologie: Logik, Rhetorik und Grammatik 97; Kapitel 10. Theologie als Gegenstand der Schulphilosophie 107; Kapitel 11. Die verschiedenen Richtungen der Philosophie (Sectae Philosophorum) 115; Kapitel 12. Die Schulphilosophie im Reformationszeitalter: Quellen und Ausstrahlungen 121; Zeichen und Abkürzungen 130; Auswahlbibliographie 131-148.

2. ———. 1988. *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms

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Chapter 10: A. The Organization of Timpler's Individual Philosophical Writings. B. Timpler's Short Treatise on the Liberal Arts (Technologia). C. The Interrelatedness of Academic Disciplines Within Timpler's Thought: Mathematics and Theology Within Timpler's Writings 187
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"This monograph is a substantially revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation, which was defended at the University of Wisconsin-Madison on September 16, 1982; it bore the title, "The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)." It was written and researched while residing in the Federal Republic of Germany for the ten years previous to its completion. In its present revised form, chapter 11, 12, 17, and 20 of the dissertation have been completely rewritten. Chapters 7 and 18 have been rewritten in part. Minor alterations and corrections have been undertaken in all of the remaining chapters. The bibliography has been expanded in order to include the multitude of additional seventeenth century works discussed in chapter 7 as well as to list relevance secondary literature which has appeared since 1982.
(...)
Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624) has been chosen as the subject matter of this study principally because the quality of his philosophical writings stands out very noticeably in comparison to that of works written by other late sixteenth and early seventeenth century academic philosophers. Indeed, it could be argued that he was one of the most talented philosophers active in Europe between 1550 and 1650. However, he was less influential than some of his contemporaries (e.g., his own disciple Bartholomaeus Keckermann); one explanation for this shall be ventured in chapter 7 section 16 of this monograph.
Clemens Timpler not only exemplifies the highest standards of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century European academic philosophy, but his works also provide an excellent survey of its scope and content. Timpler published

textbooks on metaphysics, physics, logic, rhetoric, ethics, family life (*oeconomica*), politics, optics, and human physiognomy presented well systematized and very detailed presentations of the major philosophical disciplines studied in his day (barring mathematics and grammar). Therefore, the examination of Timpler's philosophy also serves as a very useful vehicle to gain a general understanding of the parameters of and topics discussed within late sixteenth and early seventeenth century European philosophy considered as a whole. For this reason, the specialized as well as the general scope of this monograph is reflected in its title." (From the Foreword)
Six reviews of this monograph (in French, German, and Italian) have appeared.

3. ———. 1999. *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities*. Aldershot: Ashgate

   Variorum Collected Studies Series.
   "This is a collection of seven of my published articles and an introductory article titled “The Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Writings on Academic Philosophy: Some Methodological Considerations.” (pp. 1-40)."
   Contents: Preface VII-VIII; Introduction. The Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century Writings on Academic Philosophy: Some Methodological Considerations 1-40 (*First Publication*); II. Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era 117-166 (*1985*); III. Cicero in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century Rhetoric Instruction 227-254 (*1986*); IV. The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c. 1570-c. 1630 98-152 (*1993*); V. Aristotle and the Content of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era (1500-1650) 213-253 (*1993*) VI. Encylopedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (ca. 1500-ca. 1700) 212-256 (*1994*); VII. Classifications of Philosophy, the

Sciences, and the Arts in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe 37-65 (*1994*); VIII. The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609) 305-364 (*1997*); Index of Academic Institutions 1-3; Index of Authors and Persons (Pre-AD 1800) 1-10; Index of Concepts/Terms and People/Places 1-9.

"Instruction in philosophy and the arts was a normal part of the university-level and secondary education routinely received by students in late medieval and early modem Europe. Yet the study of this instruction has received relatively little attention by modem scholars. The articles in this collection focus on this largely neglected area of research with a primary focus on Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The purpose of article I is to bring together as well as to expand upon many of the topics discussed and conclusions stated in articles II through VIII; in doing so, the concepts of classification and definition as well as some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century views concerning "schools of philosophers" (*sectae*) are discussed. Article II draws a connection between the evolving role of philosophy instruction within the institutional framework of Central European schools and universities between ca. 1500 and ca. 1650 and the evolution of the philosophy concept during that same period. Article III is devoted to discussion of how and why Cicero's writings were used to teach rhetoric at European schools and universities during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Article IV begins by presenting evidence - published by Walter Ong - that the writings of Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon were printed most often in Central Europe than anywhere else, and mainly between c. 1570 and c. 1630; this article then examines why that was the case, and attributes this not to the influence of ideology, but instead mainly to pragmatic decisions made at individual Central European academic institutions.

Article V focuses on the manner in which Aristotle's wrtings were utilized in Central Europe during the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth; it is argued that individual philosophers and individual academic

institutions elected to utilize Aristotle's writings largely due to practical considerations and not because of any general affinity for "Aristotelianism" or "Aristotelian" views. Article VI examines the evolution of the encyclopedic philosophical writings produced in Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in doing so, attention is given to the decline and subsequent rebirth of the discipline of metaphysics, to the concepts of method and system, to the writings of Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon, to the evolution of philosophical curricula at Central European schools and universities, and to the manner in which encyclopedia and related concepts are utilized in writings of this period. Article VII focuses on classifications of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; attention is given to definitions of philosophy, mention of individual philosophical disciplines, discussions of the liberal arts, and the evolution of the philosophy concept itself. Article VIII provides new biographical and bibliographical material concerning Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609); it also discusses Keckermann's contributions to intellectual history as well as why and how he became so famous in academic circles during the early seventeenth century." (from the Preface)
"1. Topics discussed within this collection of articles; 2. Definitions and classifications within the context of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thought and beyond; 3. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writings on philosophy normally arose within the context of academic instruction; principal philosophical subject matters (academic disciplines) and genres of philosophical writings during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; 4. Academic philosophical writings vs. academic writings on jurisprudence, medicine and theology; 5 . Academic philosophical writings vs. non-academic treatises; 6 . Schools of philosophers (*sectae*) as discussed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; ideological constructs and the study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century academic philosophy; 7. To what extent was religious confession a major factor within sixteenth- and

seventeenth-century academic philosophy? 8 . To what extent were there variations between different regions of Europe with regard to academic philosophy? 9. Complex philosophical concepts (e.g., nature, signs, theory of knowledge) and the parameters of individual academic disciplines in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; 10 . Due to the rudimentary state of our knowledge concerning sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophy, the conclusions arrived at in this volume are stated in cautious terms; the primary aim of this volume is to further research in this subject area.

1. Articles II through VIII of this collection all pertain to texts on philosophy and the arts as utilized at schools and universities during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with an emphasis on Central Europe. These seven articles focus on three kinds of topics: 1. authors of these texts, 2. the academic institutions at which those authors taught and produced texts in published and unpublished form, 3. terms, concepts, and subject areas discussed within texts. The three indices which accompany this collection are devoted to 1., 2., and 3. above.

The authors mentioned in this collection represent a small sampling of the thousands of such authors who taught at Central European schools and universities - or whose writings circulated there - during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. An addition, four separate articles (III, IV, V, and VIII) focus on how educators of the High and Late Renaissance discussed two ancient authorities (i.e., Aristotle and Cicero) and two more "recent" ones (i.e., Petrus Ramus and Bartholomew Keckermann). Curriculum plans and texts specifically intended for or used at individual academic institutions in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Central Europe are the principal sources used in order to discuss those same academic institutions; one article (II) focuses primarily on curriculum plans.(1) The concepts of philosophy (via "classifications of philosophical disciplines") and encyclopedia (via "encyclopedic philosophical writings") are discussed within two separate articles in this collection (VI and VII). The

concepts of classification, definition, nature, and sign are discussed within sections 2 and 9 of this introductory article.
(1)Article VIII, however, also makes extensive use of some additional kinds of primary source materials (e.g., academic correspondence, dedications/prefaces to published textbooks, and the minutes of faculty governing bodies at the University of Heidelberg) as sources of biographical information." (pp. 1-2)

4. Feingold, Mordechai, Freedman, Joseph S., and Rother, Wolfgang, eds. 2001. *The Influence of Petrus Ramus. Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences*. Basel: Schwabe

   Schwabe Philosophica 1.
   Contents: Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman, Wolfgang Rother: Preface, 7; Wolfgang Rother: Ramus and Ramism in Switzerland 9; Theo Verbeek: Notes on Ramism in the Netherlands 38; Thomas Elsmann: The Influence of Ramism on the Academies of Bremen and Danzig: A Comparison 54; Joseph S. Freedman: Melanchthon's Opinion of Ramus and the Utilization of Their Writings in Central Europe 68; Riccardo Pozzo: Ramus' Metaphysics and its Criticism by the Helmstedt Aristotelians 92; Erland Sellberg: The Usefulness of Ramism 107; Mordechai Feingold: English Ramism: A Reinterpretation 127; Elizabethanne Boran: Ramism in Trinity College, Dublin in the Early Seventeenth Century 177; Kees Meerhoff, "Beauty and the Beast": Nature, Logic and Literature in Ramus 200; Guido Oldrini, The Influence of Ramus' Method on Historiography and Jurisprudence 215; Ian Maclean: Logical Division and Visual Dichotomies: Ramus in the Context of Legal and Medical Writing 228; Nicholas Jardine and Alain Segonds: A Challenge to the Reader: Ramus on Astrologia without Hypotheses 248; Index of Names 267-285.

5. Freedman, Joseph S., Strohm, Christoph, and Selderhuis, Herman J., eds. 2006. *Späthumanismus Und Reformierte Konfession. Theologie, Jurisprudenz Und Philosophie in Heidelberg an Der Wende Zum 17. Jahrundert*. Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck

   Spätmittelalter und Reformation. Band 31.
   Inhaltsübersicht: Eike Wolgast: Geistiges Profil und politische Ziele des Heidelberger Späthumanismus; Cornel A. Zwierlein: Heidelberg und "der Westen" um 1600; Joseph S. Freedman: The Influence of Petrus Ramus in Heidelberg from 1572 through the Early Seventeenth Century; Don R. Sinnema: Johann Jungnitz on the Use of Aristotelian Logic in Theology; Günter Frank: Ethik bei Viktorin Strigel und Abraham Scultetus; Kees Meerhoff: Bartholomew Keckermann and the Anti-Ramist Tradition at Heidelberg;
   Willem van 't Spijker: Heidelberger Gutachten in Sachen Vorstius; Herman J. Selderhuis: Das Recht Gottes. Der Beitrag der Heidelberger Theologen zu der Debatte über die Prädestination; Theodor Mahlmann: Die Prädestinationslehre Georg Sohns (1551-1589) juristisch gelesen; Detlef Döring: Samuel Pufendorf und die Heidelberger Universität in der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts; Christoph Strohm: Weltanschaulich-konfessionelle Aspekte im Werk Heidelberger Juristen.
   §§§Lorenz, Sönke, Köpf, Ulrich, Freedman, Joseph S., and Bauer, Dieter R, eds. 2012. *Die Universität Tübingen Zwischen Scholastik Und Humanismus*. Ostfildern: Thorbecke
   Tübinger Bausteine zur Landesgeschichte, 20.

ARTICLES

1. Freedman, Joseph S. 1985. "Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools

and Universities During the Reformation Era." In *History of Universities. Vol. 5*, 117-166. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reprinted as Essay II in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.

"In order to assess the place which philosophy instruction had within the organisational framework of schools and universities in Central Europe during the Reformation era (c.1500-1650), one should first briefly take a closer look at the concept of philosophy. This concept is very frequently discussed in philosophical encyclopedias, in textbooks on metaphysics, physics, mathematics, ethics, politics and logic, and in other kinds of works as well. Within the context of these discussions philosophy is usually divided into various disciplines. Three classifications of philosophical disciplines by Central European authors are presented in tables a, b, and c.

Detailed discussion of such classifications lies beyond the scope of this paper. Only the following points need concern us here. Physics, mathematics, ethics, family life (*oeconomica*), and politics appear in virtually all of these classifications made during the 1500-1650 period. Metaphysics is occasionally omitted, especially in those classifications presented by some sixteenth-century Protestant philosophers. Family life is sometimes considered as a sub-category of politics. The seven liberal arts (i.e. grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) are usually included within these classifications. Arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy normally fall within the realm of mathematics. Increasingly from about the year 1550 onwards some authors argue that philology (i.e. logic, rhetoric, grammar, and sometimes poetry and/or history) is not properly speaking a part of philosophy, but rather preparation for and an instrument of the same. This latter development -- as we shall see -- was reflected within the philosophy curriculum of Central European academic institutions during the Reformation era." p. 117

"Metaphysics played an important role in the philosophical curriculum of fifteenth-century Central European universities. By the 1520s, however, metaphysics instruction began to be removed from the curriculum.(97) This was especially true at Protestant universities (e.g. Basel, Leipzig, Rostock, Tubingen, and Wittenberg).(98) Yet at some Catholic universities -- e.g. Ingolstadt (1526), Vienna (1537), and Heidelberg (1551) -- metaphysics instruction was also absent. Beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, metaphysics instruction was strongly emphasised at Jesuit academic institutions (e.g. the University of Dillingen) and at those universities where the Jesuits were able to influence or determine the philosophy curriculum (e.g. Cologne, Ingolstadt). At some Protestant universities metaphysics instruction slowly resurfaced in the course of the late sixteenth and early seventeeth centuries.(99) Sometimes subject matter taken from the discipline of metaphysics was taught as part of physics and/or ethics and/or logic instruction." pp. 124-125

(97) No easy explanation can be given for this development; this problem will be discussed in another article.

(98) Metaphysics was taught at the University of Leipzig through the year 1542 but not thereafter; see Leipzig (1502-1558), pp. 667-669.

(99) Max Wundt held to this opinion; see Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1939), pp. 5, 12-13, 34-69. To date little evidence has been produced to the contrary. At the Altdorf Academy in 1586 and 1589 and at the University of Giessen in 1607 the professor of logic also taught metaphysics; by 1618 in Altdorf and by 1629 in Giessen there was a professor of logic and metaphysics. See Altdorf (1586), fol. B1 Altdorf (1589), fol. B1r; Altdorf (1618); table 1.

2. ———. 1985. "Classification and Definition within 16th and 17th Century Philosophy." In *Studien Zur Klassifikation, Systematik Und Terminologie. Theorie Und Praxis. Akten Der 6. Jahrestagung Des Münsteraner Arbeitskreises Für*

Semiotik, Münster 25. Und 26. September 1984, edited by Dutz, Klaus D., 321-354. Münster: Institut für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft und MAkS Publikationen.

3. ———. 1986. "Cicero in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Rhetoric Instruction." *Rhetorica* no. 4 (3):227-254.

   Reprinted as Essay III in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.
   "Any systematic attempt to investigate the role of Cicero within rhetoric instruction in 16th- and 17th-century Europe will uncover an overwhelming amount of relevant source material in printed and manuscript form extant in hundreds -- if not thousands -- of European archives and libraries. The assertion that Cicero was used within this rhetoric instruction amounts to little more than the statement of a self-evident fact. Less evident is how and why Cicero's writings were used to teach rhetoric during the period from 1500 to 1700. A variety of source materials will be examined here in order to arrive at tentative answers to these two questions." (p. 227)
   (...)
   "A thorough investigation of the use of Cicero's writings at European schools and universities during the 16th- and 17th-centuries will require work with printed and manuscript material pertaining to a substantial number of schools and universities within the various regions of Europe. (55) Printed and archival source materials pertaining to individual academic institutions must be located, collected, and carefully evaluated. These sources contain information concerning a wide variety of subject matters, including the use of Cicero's writings. On the basis of the facts presented in tables g through m the following two hypotheses can be ventured at this time. (56)
   First, in school instruction Cicero's works on rhetoric were studied alongside with his works on other subject matters. At most schools rhetoric was taught in connection with other subjects, e.g., logic, grammar, history, ethics, and politics. (57) Cicero's works on subject matters other than

rhetoric were often read in this connection. Interdisciplinary collections of commonplaces such as the Ciceronianus of Petrus Ramus could also be utilized. (58) At Jesuit schools Cicero's writings were used at all pre-philosophy levels of instruction; at Protestant schools they were normally used in the more advanced grades but not in elementary instruction. (59) At universities and within university-level instruction held at other academic institutions, however, Cicero's works generally were utilized within rhetoric instruction but only infrequently within other parts of the curriculum. (60)

Second, at 16th- and 17th-century schools and universities Cicero was usually not the only author read within the theoretical component of rhetoric instruction. Use was made there of writings by Aristotle, Cicero, Hermogenes, and Quintilian as well as of works by more "modem" rhetoricians such as George of Trebizond (1395-1472/3?), Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), and Cyprianus Soarez (1524-1593). (61) At most academic institutions Cicero appears to have been read alongside many other authors within this theoretical instruction. Yet in most cases Cicero was the principal or only author used within the practical component of rhetoric instruction." (pp. 238-239)

(55) A large number of such academic institutions are discussed in Joseph S. Freedman, "Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era," History of Universities, 5 (1986), (forthcoming).

(56) Tables h through m are based upon the following sources: h: Rudolf Kink, ed., *Geschichte der kaiserlichen Universität zu Wien*, vo1. 2: *Statutenbuch der Universität* (Wien: 1854; reprint ed., Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969), pp. 376-383; i: *Leges Academiae Genevensis* (Genevae: Oliva Roberti Stephani, (1559)), fol. Clr-C2r, C3v-C4v [Wolfenbüttel HAB: Pd 72); j: *Verzameting van Stukken, die Betrekking hebben tot Overijsselsch Regt en Geschiedenis*, Tweede Afdeeling, Zevende Stuk (Deventer: J. De Lange, 1872), pp. 77-83; k: *Catalogus librorum ad quorum explicationem academici professores Collegii*

Mussi Pontani Societatis Iesu aggredientur ad festum S. Lucae anno domini 1605 (Prostant exemplaria apud Melchiorem Bemardum serenissimi Lotharingiae Ducis, & Universitatis typographum, 1605) (Dillingen/Donau, Studienbibliothek: XV y 13, fol. 244); 1: Hans Georg Gundel, ed.. *Statuta Academiae Marpurgensis deinde Gissensis de anno 1629* (Marburg: Eiwert, 1982), pp. 103, 126-127, 139, 154-167, 213-217 (especially pp. 166, 213-216) [based on the original in Giessen UA: Hs 33b); Reinhold Vormbaum, ed., *Die evangelischen Schulordnungen des siebenzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1863), pp. 375-383.

(57) For example, one rhetoric textbook by Melchior Junius presents systematically arranged lists of commonplaces taken from the disciplines of ethics, family life, politics, and history. See Melchior Junius, *Methodus eloquentiae comparandae, scholis rhetoricis tradita* (Argentinae: Per Lazarum Zetznerum, 1592), pp. 113-125 [Mainz StB: 1 / w / 859 (1)].

(58) Also see no. 2a in table c.

(59) An outline of instruction held at the Jesuit University of Dillingen (Danube) each year from 1564 until 1614 can be constructed on the basis of extant timetables. Works by Cicero were utilized at every level through the Rhetoric grade but at no level higher than that latter grade. See Catalogus lectionum, 1564-1614 [Dillingen/ Donau, Studienbibliothek: XV y 134, fol. 192-243].

(60) Occasionally Cicero's writings were also used to teach ethics at the university level; for example, see *Rector et professores Academiae lenensis . . . lectiones theologicae . . . iuridicae . . . medicae . . . philosophicae* (Ienae: 27 lunij 1564) [Wolfenbiittel HAB: 95.10 Quodl. 2° (245)].

(61) Concerning Trebizond see John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond. A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 4, 234. On Soarez see Lawrence Flynn S.J., "De arte rhetorica of Cyprian Soarez S.J.," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 42 (1956), 367-74 and 43 (1957), 257-65.

4. ———. 1986. "Signs within 16th and 17th Century Philosophy: The Case of Clemens Timpler (1563/64-1624)." In *Geschichte Und Geschichtsschreibung Der Semiotik. Fallstudien. Akten Der 8. Arbeitstagung Des Münsteraner Arbeitskreises Für Semiotik, Münster 2.-3.10.1985*, edited by Dutz, Klaus D. and Schmitter, Peter, 101-118. Münster: MAkS Publikationen.

5. ———. 1988. "Die Karriere Und Bedeutung Von Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)." In *400 Jahre Arnoldinum 1588-1988. Festschrift*, 69-77. Greven: Eggenkamp.

6. ———. 1992. "Aristotelianism and Humanism in Late Reformation German Philosophy: The Case of Clemens Timpler, 1563/64-1624." In *The Harvest of German Humanism. Papers in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz*, edited by Fleischer, Manfred, 213-232. St. Louis: Concordia Press.

"Clemens Timpler (1563/64-1624), a German Calvinist philosopher and professor at the Gymnasium illustre Arnoldinum in Steinfurl/West-phalia from 1595 to 1624, is an unknown to most scholars of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Tables 1, 2, and 3 present some basic information concerning him in summary form. In Table 1 (2) Timpler's family ties and career are outlined. Like most other German philosophers of the Late Reformation period —here we shall speak of the period between c.1550 and c.1650—he taught philosophy as his profession." (p. 213)
(...)
"It is Timpler's philosophical writings—and in particular the sources cited therein— which are of primary concern for us here. These sources are summarized in Table 3. (10) As is evident from this table, Aristotle was by far the author most often cited by Timpler. Furthermore, many of the late 16th and early 17th century authors whom Timpler himself cites — e.g., John Case, Bartholomew Keckermann, Francesco Piccolomini, Amandus Polanus, Jacopo Zabarella—do likewise within their own writings.(11) Aristotle's writings were used in philosophy instruction at all or almost all

German academic institutions during the Late-Reformation period (see Tables 7, 8, and 9).
Indeed, those German academic philosophers of the Late-Reformation philosophers of the Late-Reformation era who studied and used Aristotle's writings virtually comprise a universal set Therefore, the term "Aristotelianism"—which itself was not used in this period— only provides us with a very limited amount of information concerning these philosophers. (12) More important and more difficult is the problem of how individual Late-Reformation German philosophers used Aristotle within their own writings." (p. 215)
(...)
"The term *Aristotelianism*, therefore, can be understood so as to refer to almost all of Late-Reformation German philosophy. The same uppears to be the case with *humanism*. Like Aristotelianism, the term humanism was not used in the Late-Reformation period. Walter Ruegg has traced the first known use of the German term Humanismus back to the year 1808. (19) Here I shall speak of two basic ways of understanding the terms humanism and Humanismus: 1. that of Jacob Burckhardt and 2. that of Paul Oskar Kristeller.
Among the major characteristics which are attributed by Jacob Burckhardt to "Renaissance humanist" Italian civilization of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries are 1. the development of the human individual and 2. the centrality and dignity of man. (20) On the basis of Table 6 (21) it is clear that man has central importance within the philosophy of Clemens Timpler. All that is intelligible to man is the subject matter of metaphysics. (22) Man was created for God's sake; however, all other creatures were created by God for man's sake. Timpler makes a number of statements to the effect that man must preserve him- or herself. " (p. 217)
(...)
"In his article "The Humanist Movement,' ' Paul Oskar Kristeller notes that the term "Renaissance Humanism" ultimately is derived from the Latin *studia humanitatis*; in

the 15th and 16th centuries, the *studia humanitatis* stood for a concise group of scholarly disciplines (i.e„ for grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy). (24) According to Kristeller, therefore, the studia humanitatis during these two centuries essentially constituted an educational curriculum. Considered in this way, humanism also has an integral place within the curriculum of German schools and universities during die Late-Reformation period." (p. 218)

(2) See Joseph S. Freedman, *European Academic Philosophy in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563-1564)*, 2 vols. (Hildesheim et al.; Georg Olms, 1988), chapters 2, 3, 4 (pp. 7-45, 454-88) and pp. 738-39.

(10) See Freedman, *Academic Philosophy / Timpler*, pp. 128-31, 134, 142, 563-68; Table 3 presents this material in abridged form.

(11) Concerning John Case see the following monograph: Charles B. Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983).

(12) The terms *Aristotelici* and *Peripatetici* are occasionally used in philosophical wotks during this period, though the precise meaning of these two terms is rarely or never explained. Johann Heinrich Alsted mentions the *Peripatetici* within his classification of the various philosophical schools; see Johannes-Henricus Alstedius, *Philosophia digne restituta* (Herbomae Nassoviorum: 1612), p. 93 [Marburg UB: XIV c 136],

(19) Walter Ruegg, Cicero und der Humanismus (Zürich: Rhein-Veriag, 1946), pp. 2-3.

(20) Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 2 vols., introduction by Benjamin Nelson and Charles Trinkaus, translated by S.G.C. Middlemore (New Yoric: Harper and Row, 1958), 1: 143-50; 2: 351-52.

(21) These statements are summarized in Freedman, Academic Philosophy / Timpler, pp. 445-46, 733-34.

(22) For Timpler, All that is Intelligible (omne intelligible) is all that which man can leam by means of the human

intellectual process; see Ibid., pp. 210-12, 412, 604-05, 714. (24) Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Humanist Movement,“ *Renaissance Thought. The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains* (New Yoik: Harper, 1961), pp. 9-10,19-20.

7. ———. 1993. "Aristotle and the Content of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities During the Reformation Era (1500-1650)." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* no. 137 (2):213-253.

   Reprinted as Essay V in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.
   "The philosophy of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation Era, i.e., of the period between 1350 and 1650, has been largely ignored by historians of philosophy. A few philosophers of this period
   i.e., Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and Francis Suarez (1548-1617) - have frequently been studied by twentieth-century historians of philosophy. However, thousands of philosophers of that three-hundred-year period have been neglected. The writings of those philosophers arose from their academic instruction at schools and universities scattered throughout Europe. One general fact is known concerning a large portion of these writings: they make substantial use of Aristotle's works. How should one proceed in attempting to understand these writings and the manner in which they utilize Aristotle?
   Generally, there has been a tendency to place these authors within the framework of the "Aristotelian tradition" or "Aristotelianism." It is the purpose of this article to examine the merits of that tendency. To what extent do these two concepts help us to, or deter us from, understanding European philosophy of the late fourteenth through the early seventeenth centuries?
   This article will focus on the manner in which Aristotle's writings were utilized in Central Europe during the second half of this period, i.e., between 1500 and 1650. At individual Central European schools and universities during

this period, philosophy instruction included some or all of the following disciplines: metaphysics, physics, mathematics, ethics, family life (*oeconomica*), politics, logic, rhetoric, grammar, poetics, and history. Texts by Aristotle were usually utilized to some extent in the instruction of metaphysics, physics, ethics, family life, politics, logic, rhetoric, and poetics. In concentrating on Central Europe during these one and one-half centuries, extant sources can be utilized in order to answer the following three questions: 1. In what ways are Aristotle's texts utilized at individual academic institutions during the Reformation era? 2. In what manner do individual philosophers use Aristotle's writings during this period? 3. How does a group of sixteenth and seventeenth-century philosophers interpret Aristotle when discussing individual philosophical concepts?" (2)
(2) The focus of this article is limited to Central Europe during the Reformation Era for the following two reasons: 1. The curriculum of Central European schools and universities during the Reformation Era can be discussed on the basis of primary sources extant both in manuscript and printed form; however, such sources are much harder to find for schools and universities in other parts of Europe. 2. Central European philosophical works of the late Middle Ages are largely in manuscript form. These works are scattered throughout Europe; the vast majority of them have not yet been read or in many cases even been sifted. The following article discusses-and gives primary source bibliography for- a large number of these Central European institutions: Joseph S. Freedman, "Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era," History of Universities vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985): 117-166. (some notes omitted)

8. ———. 1993. "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, C. 1570 - C.1630." *Renaissance Quarterly* no. 56 (1):98-152.

Reprinted as Essay IV in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.

"For what reasons di Academicians select to use or not to use any given textbook for their own classroom instruction during the Renaissance? To what extent did ideological or pragmatic considerations influence such decisions? In this article these questions are posed to examine the use of the writings ofPetrus Ramus (1515- 1572) and Omer Talon (ca. 1510- 1562) at schools and universities in Central Europe during the six decades between 1570 and 1630. Did "Ramist" academicians of this period make use in the classroom of writings by these two authors because of some fundamental agreement with their views? Or were these two authors preferred during these six decades because their writings could be used eclectically and/or they fit well into specific parts of the curriculum at certain academic institutions?

In the period between 1570 and 1630 there were over 30 universities and hundreds of schools in the German-language area of Europe. A large amount of curricular information-largely in the form of annual, semi-annual, or occasional outlines of instruction as well as personal or official correspondence-exists for many of these schools and universities. Textbooks and printed disputations arising from instruction held at these academic institutions are also extant. This assessment of the use of writings by Ramus and Talon in Central European academic institutions is based on the examination of a substantial portion of this evidence. The task of finding and evaluating such evidence pertaining to other parts of Europe must be left for a separate study." (p. 98)

"It was the period between 1570 and 1630, therefore, which saw the most extensive use of the writings of Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon at Central European schools. Among the points made by Walter J. Ong in his monograph on Ramus are the following.125 First, opposition to Ramus from university-level academics was strong and often very well articulated. Second, Ramus's works on logic and rhetoric were relatively uncomplicated in their content. And third,

Ramus's writings were best received by, and to a large extent intended for, younger students. Ramus's influence in Central Europe between 1570 and 1630 can be explained within the context of these three points. In Central Europe during these six decades the writings of Ramus found their most extensive use within the realm of the pre-university level curriculum.
On the basis of the evidence presented in this article, it would appear that it was largely for pragmatic reasons that Ramus was used at some individual academic institutions but not at others in Central Europe during the period between 1570 and 1630. It is difficult to use ideology to explain these developments. Ramus's disciples and commentators generally used Ramus's writings eclectically. Some Ramus commentators (e.g., Friedrich Beurhusius, Severinus Sluterus) also published commentaries on Aristotle, Cicero, or some combination of these and/or other authors. The opinions of individual "Ramists" on a given topic -- e. g., the classifications of philosophical disciplines, the concept of method -- differed markedly. In fact, it is difficult to make any sense at all of the term "Ramist" when discussing the use of Ramus's writings in Central Europe between 1570 and 1630. The extent to which "Ramism" can or cannot be used as a viable category to explain the use of writings by Ramus and Talon at schools and universities beyond Central Europe is a topic which merits further attention." p. 144 (notes omitted)

9. ———. 1994. "Instruction in Philosophy and the Arts in Early Modern Central Europe: Some Thoughts Concerning the Reproduction of Select Primary Source Materials." *Chloe.Beihefte zum Daphnis* no. 25:961-974.

   Conference Proceedings, "Editionsdesiderate zur frühen Neuzeit. Beiträge zur Tagung der Kommission für die Edition von Texten der Frühen Neuzeit" held at Wolfenbüttel, Germany, October 4-7, 1994 (Zweiter Teil). "The bulk of the textbooks used in sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century Europe which are extant have

survived as printed works. This is especially true in the case of editions of works by Aristotle, Cicero, and other ancient as well as modem authors; the same also applies to most commentaries and independently titled textbooks.
Student lecture notes usually have survived as manuscripts. Disputations did not begin to be commonly published in Central Europe until the latter decades of the sixteenth century. Academic correspondence generally is extant in manuscript form, though some collections of such correspondence were published during the early modem period.
Reference works, official academic orations, and announcements of lecture offerings for the coming semester or year were normally published, while curriculum plans frequently were not. Some printed works contained important handwritten addenda such as owner's marks, autographs, student notes, and corrections; some broadsheets and other short printed works have survived due to the fact that they were inserted between leaves of manuscripts.
All of these various types of sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century works written on diverse philological and philosophical subject-matters together constitute a very large quantity of extant printed and manuscript material. How can one determine which samples of these materials should be edited and/or reproduced in print or non-print formats? In order to provide an answer to this question, three preliminary questions can be posed here: 1. At which libraries and archives are these materials found and how thoroughly have these materials been catalogued there? 2. Which bibliographies of these early modem philological and philosophical works are available? 3. What works have already been made edited and/or reproduced in some format?
Germany does not have a national library having a role comparable to that of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and of the British Library in London. But Germany does have hundreds of libraries and archives that house sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth- century printed

works and manuscripts. The Duke August Library in Wolfenbuttel and the Bavarian State Library in Munich are among the most important repositories of philological and philosophical materials from this time period. The Duke August Library has been especially active in publishing catalogs describing its own sixteenth- and seventeenth-century printed works and in making its own bibliographic records accessible electronically. And its holdings - together with those of the Bavarian State Library - form the core of the multivolume *Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachbereich erschienenen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts* [VD 16]." (pp. 965-966)

10. ———. 1994. "Classifications of Philosophy, the Arts, and the Sciences in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 72 (1):37-65.

    Reprinted as Essay VII in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.
    "One aspect of the history of philosophy which has received relatively little attention is how the philosophy concept itself has been classified into parts and how these classifications have evolved over the centuries. A few studies have focused on the development of these classifications in the ancient and medieval West; several other studies have discussed their development in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. Classifications of philosophy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have been almost completely neglected; during those two centuries the manner in which philosophy -- and related concepts such as the arts, the liberal arts, the sciences, and encyclopedia -- was divided into parts underwent some significant changes. Philosophy was taught at universities and schools throughout Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and served to prepare students for study of theology, medicine, and jurisprudence.' A large volume of writings -- both in printed and in manuscript form -- was produced in conjunction with this philosophy instruction. Many textbooks on metaphysics, physics, mathematics,

ethics, logic, and other subjects written during this period contained a section on the concept of philosophy, while some writings were devoted specifically to that latter topic. When examining the philosophy concept, most authors provided a definition or definitions thereof before proceeding to classify its parts. Some authors also included discussion of the various schools (sectae) of philosophers. Despite the fact that many attempts were made to define philosophy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these definitions generally do not provide us with much information concerning the philosophy concept itself. This is partially due to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century views with respect to definitions. During those two centuries, definition theory was normally discussed within logic textbooks and within short treatises specifically devoted to the subject matter of both definition and classification or just definition alone." p. 37 (notes omitted)
This article has its origin in a lecture given at the Fourth International Leibniz Congress at Hannover, Germany in November of 1983 [*]; it appears here in expanded and revised form.
[* Published in *Leibniz Werk und Wirkung. IV Internationale Leibniz-Kongress. Vorträge*, Hannover, 14. bis 19. Novembre 1983, Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 1984, pp. 193-202.]

11. ———. 1994. "Encyclopedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe During the High and Late Renaissance (C. 1500 - C. 1700)." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 37:212-256.

    Reprinted as Essay VI in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.
    "The history of encyclopedias begins in the ancient world and extends up to the present day. What is an encyclopedia? 1 What kinds of encyclopedias are there? And to what extent are encyclopedias intended for pupils at schools, for students at universities, or for some other, non-academic groups of people?

This article will attempt to provide answers to these questions within the limited context of Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.(*) It is important to keep in mind that the Latin. term *encyclopaedia* was only one of many terms that were used during that period in order to denote or describe such works. And a few of these terms -- such as method (*methodus*) and system (*systema*) -- can be regarded as very significant for the development of encyclopedias in Central Europe during these two centuries.

Some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century encyclopedias intended to cover all academic subjects, including theology, jurisprudence, medicine, and philosophy. Other encyclopedias only covered one or several of these areas; still others covered the mechanical arts, occult science, or popular subject matter. This article focuses primarily on the area of philosophy, that is, on encyclopedic writings on philosophy that are "interdisciplinary" insofar as they discuss at least two philosophical disciplines." (pp. 212-213, notes omitted)

"The first years of the seventeenth century saw three concurrent developments in Central Europe. First, the metaphysics emerged as a preeminent philosophical discipline. Second, the the term systema began to be used in the titles of comprehensive textbooks on many philosophical as well as non-philosophical disciplines. Third, there was a sharp increase in the number of encyclopedic philosophical writings. Shortly before the year 1620, there was a virtual explosion in the number of such writings, which then continued to appear commonly in Central Europe through the seventeenth century and thereafter.

As indicated earlier, the discipline of metaphysics contains concepts relevant to all other philosophical disciplines. Just as works on metaphysics and interdisciplinary philosophical works disappeared together in the early sixteenth century, they began to reappear together at the end of that same century. Systematic textbooks on individual disciplines intended to cover the entire scope of those disciplines. This new emphasis on the comprehensive coverage of individual

academic disciplines from the year 1600 onwards went hand-in-hand with the reemergence of encyclopedic philosophical writings which were intended as comprehensive philosophical textbooks." p. 234
(*) It is within the context of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Central Europe that a sufficient diversity and quantity of primary source materials -- including both philosophical texts by individual authors and detailed information concerning the curricula of individual academic institutions -- could be found in order to arrive at conclusions concerning the evolution of encyclopedic philosophical writings.

12. ———. 1997. "The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (D. 1609)." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* no. 141 (3):305-364.

    Reprinted as Essay VIII in: *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700*.
    "In conclusion, the following three questions can be posed with respect to Keckermann and his writings. First, what was Keckermann's contribution to intellectual history? Second, why was Keckermann so famous during the early seventeenth century? And third, which of these first two questions should concern us most, and why?
    With regard to the first question, Keckermann can be considered to have made at least three contributions to intellectual history. First, Keckermann was one of the earliest Western thinkers to use the term "system" to describe academic treatises; his detailed discussion of the component parts of systematic textbooks appears to be the first of this kind and may have been without parallel during the entire seventeenth century. Second, Keckermann was exceptional in so far as he stressed that each academic discipline -- barring metaphysics -- has its own history. Keckermann documented the history of individual disciplines by including chronologically and systematically arranged bibliographies within writings on some of those disciplines. In his multi-volume history of logic, Wilhelm

Risse refers to Bartholomew Keckermann as the first historian of logic. (81) Keckermann's bibliographies, which are evidence of his broad knowledge of scholarship in his time, can still be used today to identify the names of many important sixteenth-century authors of academic works. Third, Keckermann was able to integrate discussion of rhetoric, history, collections of aphorisms, dictionaries, emblems, and other "humanist" subject matter within logically arranged and systematically organized treatises. He stressed the relevance of this humanist subject matter to public life. It could be argued that Keckermann made a valuable contribution to early modern European intellectual history insofar as he was successful in incorporating a form of civic humanism within a scholastic framework. (82)
Turning to the second question, at least eight reasons can be given in order to help explain Bartholomew Keckermann's fame during the seventeenth century. First, his academic career and the publication of his many writings began at an opportune time; higher education had been expanding in Central Europe during the late sixteenth century and continued to do so through the first quarter of the following century. (83)
Second, academic encyclopedias and encyclopedic collections of academic writings began to appear in Central Europe in about the year 1600; they were published -- and used within academic instruction -- with increasing frequency during the following decades. (84) The author of the preface to the 1614 edition of Keckermann's collected works pointed to their encyclopedic scope and to their enhanced usefulness as a result of that scope. (85) Keckermann published works on almost all of the academic disciplines taught by his contemporaries.
Third, Keckermann began his career by publishing primarily in the discipline of logic, for which there was a tremendous demand at Central European schools and universities during his time. His many types of logic textbooks were able to be used in logic instruction at various levels. Fourth, the years around 1600 saw the introduction of a number of new textbook formats in Central Europe; with his Systema and

his Prolegomena, Keckermann belonged to that group of scholars at the forefront of these new developments. Fifth, he used the writings of Aristotle eclectically and the writings of Ramus critically at a time when many other school and university professors chose to do likewise. Sixth, he won the enthusiastic support of colleagues, friends, and students, who edited and published many of Keckermann's works both before and after his early death. Seventh, published attacks directed against Keckermann's writings -- beginning in the year 1599 -- by a host of enemies helped to make him better known. And eighth, Keckermann's reputation had a snowball effect. Some academic institutions and individual professors chose to use his writings in part because of their reputation and of their relative availability in a period when libraries and the book trade functioned less effectively than they do today.

Turning to the third question, I would like to suggest that the study of Keckermann's contribution to intellectual history deserves less attention than does the study of his career and of his systematically-written works. Thousands of professors and other teachers published their writings during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Most of the writings of these authors have been unread for centuries; many of these writings have yet to be rediscovered, assuming that they are still extant at all. So while Keckermann appears to have made several important contributions to European intellectual life within the context of schools and universities, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that he was at least partially preempted by thinkers whose works are still unread or unknown. And it should also be noted that originality was not valued by Keckermann's contemporaries in the same way as it is by twentieth-century scholars. It was not uncommon in Keckermann's time for the authors of academic writings to defend themselves against -- or to attack others with -- the charge of "unwarranted novelty. (86)

On the other hand, if we pose the question how Keckermann's career was so successful, our answer also

provides us with information concerning the academic and intellectual environment of his time. The general parameters affecting Keckermann's academic career also pertained to thousands of other individuals who were pursuing such careers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Certain paths led to successful careers at academic institutions; as part of this process, a professional scholar such a Keckermann might fail to receive the offer of a certain academic position but might also decline to accept another position. (87)

In addition, Keckermann's academic writings generally appear to have differed relatively little in content from the content of writings of other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors, including the hundreds of sixteenth-century authors whom he cited as well as those seventeenth-century authors who made use of Keckermann's writings within their own. (88) In studying Keckermann's writings on metaphysics, physics, mathematics, ethics, family life, politics, logic, rhetoric, and history, we are looking at a corpus of learned views that -- barring a relatively small number of controversial points of doctrine -- basically represented the curriculum in the arts and the sciences during his time.

To summarize, the value of studying Keckermann's career and writings lies not so much in the fact that he was original in some scientific, or intellectual sense of that word. Instead, while studying Keckermann we are also provided with a wealth of information concerning academic life in his time as well as concerning a large body of knowledge taught to tens of thousands of students at European schools and universities. It could be argued that the study of the career and writings of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European professional scholars pertains more to social history or cultural history in some broad sense than it does to intellectual history." (pp. 323-325)

(81) Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, vol. 1, 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag / Gunther Holzboog, 1964), 9.

13. ———. 1999. "Philipp Melanchthon's Views Concerning Petrus Ramus as Expressed in a Private Letter Written in 1543: A Brief Assessment." In *Melanchthon Und Die Marburger Professoren. Vol. Ii*, edited by Mahlmann-Bauer, Barbara, 841-848. Marburg: Universitätsbibliothek.

14. ———. 2001. "Melanchthon's Opinion of Ramus and the Utilization of Their Writings in Central Europe." In *The Influence of Petrus Ramus*, edited by Feingold, Mordechai, Freedman, Joseph S. and Rother, Wolfgang, 68-91. Basel: Schwabe.

"Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560) and Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) can be considered as two of the sixteenth century's most significant educators. To what extent were the writings of these two authors utilized in Central European schools and universities during the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries? Were Melanchthon and Ramus regarded as complementary or as contrary authorities? The search for answers to these two questions requires examination of the ways in which writings on the arts by Ramus (i.e., logic, rhetoric, grammar, arithmetic, and geometry) and Melanchthon (i.e., logic, rhetoric, grammar, physics, the soul, and ethics) were utilized during that period. This article will attempt to provide such answers through discussion of the following ten points:
1. the demand for Ramus' writings on logic as well as other arts disciplines;
2. the demand for Melanchthon's writings on logic and the other arts;
3. adoption of, and commentaries on, Melanchthon's writings on the arts;
4. adoption of, and commentaries on, Ramus' writings on the arts;
5. polemical writings against Ramus' writings on the arts;
6. the lack of extant polemical writings against Melanchthon's writings on the arts;
7. the frequency with which sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writings on the arts authored by both Lutherans and

Calvinists utilized works by Ramus in combination with works by Melanchthon;
8. the eclectic and independent manner in which Melanchthon, Ramus, Aristotle, and other authors were utilized by late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writings on the arts;
9. revised versions of Ramus' and Melanchthon's writings on the arts;
10. differences between individual commentaries on Ramus' and Melanchthon's writings on the arts." (pp. 68-69)

15. ———. 2001. "'Professionalization' and 'Confessionalization': The Place of Physics, Philosophy, and Arts Instruction at Central European Academic Institutions During the Reformation Era." *Early Science and Medicine* no. 6 (4):334-352.

Abstract: "During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, physics was regularly taught as part of instruction in philosophy and the arts at Central European schools and universities. However, physics did not have a special or privileged status within that instruction. Three general indicators of this lack of special status are suggested in this article. First,teachers of physics usually were paid less than teachers of most other university-level subject-matters. Second, very few Central European academics during this period appear to have made a career out of teaching physics. And third, Reformation Era schools and universities in Central Europe emphasized language instruction; such instruction not only was instrumental in promoting the confessional-i.e., Calvinist, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic agendas of those same schools and universities, but also helped to prepare students for service in nascent but growing state governments."
"Why did Central European academic institutions place primary emphasis on language - and not physics - within their instruction on philosophy and the arts during the Reformation Era? Two answers to this question will be ventured here. First, the nascent

development of state governments - at the local, regional, and supra-regional levels as well as by secular and ecclesiastical authorities - during this period went hand-in-hand with the need for individuals who could use language training (especially the ability to
speak and write well) in the service of these governments. Second, it could be argued that competition between Calvinists, Lutherans, and Roman Catholics had a major impact within Central European education during this period, and especially from the mid-sixteenth century onwards.The establishment of new schools by Protestants in the decades after 1550 had its counterpart in the establishment of Jesuit educational institutions beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century.(56) And while Lutherans and Calvinists
established (or expanded some already existing Protestant schools into) multi-level, consolidated schools, Jesuits kept pace with that development by gradually adding upper-level grades to some of their own Central European schools. (57) The establishment or expansion of a Calvinist, Lutheran, or Roman Catholic academic institution at a given locality was sometimes matched by the establishment or expansion of an academic institution representing an opposing confession at a nearby location. (58) One could make the case that this expansion and confessional competition in the realm of Central European education actually increased as the Thirty Years' War approached and began. It appears that this confessional competition gave birth to some pedagogical innovations in the early decades of the seventeenth century; these innovations included the introduction of comprehensive encyclopedic instruction-accompanied by the publication of encyclopedic philosophical writings intended for students-at the school level, by the development of a large number of new academic subject-matters (usually referred to as "disciplines"), by the introduction of the term "system" as a name for methodically ordered textbooks (*), and by what appears to have been the increasing emphasis placed on the development of curricular materials for students at various

academic levels.(59) And two of Europe's best known educational innovators from the early modern period - i.e., Wolfgang Ratke (1571-1635) and Johannes Amos Comenius (1592-1670)--were active during this same period.(60)" (pp. 350-351)
(56) Refer to Freedman (1999), I (12-13), II (121-22).
(57) The gradual expansion of the Luzern Jesuit Academy from 1574 onwards can be traced through the extant *Catalogi personarum et officiorum a prima origine Collegii nostri Lucernensis*, 1574 [-1773] [Luzern SA:Cod KK70]; also see the following general study pertaining to this same topic: Karl Hengst, *Jesuiten an Universitaten und Jesuiten universittten*, Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, Neue Folge, 2 (Paderborn, 1981).
(58) The very close proximity of a Protestant Academyin Lauingen (Danube) to the Jesuit University of Dillingen (Danube) is mentioned in Freedman (1999), II (146, 148-49). The *Gymnasium illustre Arnoldinum* in Steinfurt (Westphalia) appears to have been largelyintended as a Calvinist counterweight to a Jesuit Academy in nearby Miinster (Westphalia); refer to the discussion given in Freedman (1988), 46-48, 489-90.
(59) Refer to Freedman (1999), VI; concerning the introduction of such new subject-matters see Freedman (1999), VII (46-47). Bartholomew Keckermann's publication of logic textbooks at various academic levels of difficulty is discussed in Freedman (1999), VIII (317-18).
(60) See Freedman (1999), I (13, 39-40).
(*) [On the introduction of the term *systema*, see J. S. Freedman, *The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609)*, pp. 312-314.]

16. ———. 2002. "Philosophical Writings on the Family in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe." *Journal of Family History* no. 27 (3):292-342.

    "Recent research on the early modern European family has largely been based on archival sources that are extant for relatively few localities during this same period. This

research can be augmented by examining discussions of the family contained within academic writings on theology, jurisprudence, medicine, and philosophy during the early modern period. This article focuses on philosophical writings that arose in connection with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century academic instruction. These writings routinely discuss the proper relationship between husband and wife, between parents and children, and between masters and servants; also discussed are various categories of domestic possessions and how these possessions should be acquired and administered. Within these philosophical writings, one controversial issue pertaining to family life is sometimes raised: whether servants are more essential to the family than children. These writings uniformly equate the family with the nuclear family; in doing so, they provide collaboration for similar findings by social and demographic historians."

17. ———. 2003. "When the Process Is Part of the Product: Searching for Latin-Language Writings on Philosophy and the Arts Used at Central European Academic Institutions During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." In *Germania Latina Latinitas Teutonica. Politik, Wissenschaft, Humanistische Kultur Vom Späten Mittelalter Bis in Unsere Zeit. (Band Ii)*, edited by Kessler, Eckhard and Kuhn, Heinrich C., 565-591. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

    "While Central Europe witnessed a growing trend towards the use of the vernacular during the 16th century, Latin still remained the dominant language in Central European academic institutions well into the 18th century. This paper will discuss Latin language writings on philosophy and the arts which arose in connection with academic instruction at those academic institutions. More specifically, this paper will focus on the following six questions (1-6): 1. What are the various subject-matters which comprised "philosophy and the arts" at Central European academic institutions during the 16th and 17th centuries? 2. What are the various

genres of writings -- and the component parts of these genres -- that comprised philosophy and the arts? 3. How does one find such writings at individual libraries and other information repositories within as well as beyond Germany? 4. What are some of the factors and problems involved in searching for such writings? 5. How does this search process enable us to gain knowledge concerning 16th- and 17th-century writings on philosophy and the arts? 6. Can this search process provide us with additional insights pertaining to yet other areas of inquiry?" (p. 565)
(...)
"Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writings on philosophy and the arts - which normally arose in connection with academic instruction both in and beyond Central Europe - have generally remained unstudied to up the present day. One principal reason for this can be suggested here: the process involved in finding such writings is quite complex but rarely understood. Yet it would be a mistake to focus only on the published results of such research; when undertaking the study of these writings, the research process usually cannot be clearly separated from the resulting product.(54)
Much of the knowledge one has concerning these writings on philosophy and the arts is derived from one's own research in progress, i.e., from that stage or stages when one is in the process of finding primary source materials, some of which may be used in one or more publications. This knowledge can often be used to assist other researchers, including professional colleagues as well as students. And this process - with its many facets and variations - will have to be revisited as a necessary component of all future research and
publication pertaining to this same genre of writings." (p. 591)
(54) The importance of process as a part of product has been recognized by many individuals from the business world and well as by academics in some fields; for example refer to the following serial articles: Edwin E. Bobrow, »Successful New Products ar Product of Process,«

Marketing News 28, no. 9 (April 25, 1994): E10; Samuel S. Myers, Performance Reading Comprehension - Product or Process,«Educational Review 43, no. 3 (1991): 257-272.

18. ———. 2004. "Academic Philosophical and Philological Writings on the Subject-Matter of Women, C. 1670-C. 1700." In *Geschlechterstreit Am Beginn Der Europäischen Moderne. Die Querelle Des Femmes*, edited by Engel, Gisela, Hassauer, Friederike, Rang, Brita and Wunder, Heide, 228-244. Königstein/Ts: Verlag Ulrike Helmer.

Kulturwissenschaftliche Gender Studies, Vol. 4.
"Suzanne Hull begins the preface to her exemplary book titled »Women According to Men: The World of Tudor-Stuart Women« with the following paragraph:
The goal of this book is to provide an introduction to the world of English women from 1525 to 1675, using the written words of men of that time. It was an era recorded, in print, almost exclusively by men. More than 99 percent of all publications were by male authors (1).
Hull's point applies aptly to discussions of women and gender in philosophical and philological writings which arose in connection with instruction held at schools and universities in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. In fact, no such writings authored by women are known to have survived (2). And furthermore, it was not until about the year 1670 that men began to publish – in relatively moderate quantities – writings on the subject matter of women; these publications on women appear to have been limited – with no, almost no or very few exceptions – to Central Europe and Scandinavia.
This article addresses the following four questions.
– What kinds of philosophical and philological writings discussed women and gender during the 16th and 17th centuries?
– Which sorts of specific topics pertaining women and gender were discussed within these writings?
– Why did an increased number of academic writings written on the subject-matter of women begin to be

published from shortly before the year 1670 onwards?
– Why do such writings have been published only – or overwhelmingly – in Central Europe and in Scandinavia through the year 1700?" (p. 228)
(...)
"Two volumes on family life (*oeconomica*) by Christian Wolff (1679-1754) were published in the years 1754 and 1755, respectively (74). Wolff subordinates the wife to the husband within the household. He states that it is in accordance with order and with the nature of things that the husband occupy himself with tasks which are masculine and more difficult while the wife should concern herself with tasks which are feminine and easier (75).
The four primary qualities – which had been used during the 16th and 17th centuries to justify prejudicial attitudes towards women – appear to have had no presence within Wolff's philosophical writings; did some other philosophical concept(s) stand in for the four primary qualities in this regard? His occasional references to »physical capability« (*habilitas physica*) and »virtue« (*virtus*) may have been meant to serve in part to serve this purpose (76). But more detailed examination of the views expressed within philological and philosophical writings by Christian Wolff and other 18th century academic authors lies outside the scope of the present study (77)." (p. 236)
(1) Suzanne W. Hull, Women according to Men. The World of Tudor-Stuart Women, Altamira Press 1996, 9.
(2) This is not to say that there were no philosophical and philological writings authored by women during these two centuries. For example, refer to the following: Olympia Fulvia Morata, *Omnium eruditissimae latina et graeca, quae haberi potuerunt, monumenta* (Basileae: Apud Petrum Pernam, 1558) [Heidelberg UB: D 8544 Res]; Anna Maria a Schurman, *Opuscula hebraea, graeca, gallica, prosaica & metrica* (Lugduni Batavorum: Ex officina Elsevirorium, 1648) [Hannover LB: Ba-A 1717]; (Margaret) [Cavendish], Duchess of Newcastle, *Grounds of natural philosophy: divided into thirteen parts* ... The second edition, London, (1668). [Berlin SB: 40 Nl 144272].

(74) Christianus L. B. de Wolff, Oeconomica methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars prima in qua agitur de societatibus minoribus, conjugali, paterna, et herili (Halae Magdeburgicae: Prostat in officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1754) [Erlangen UB: 40 Phs. I, 47 Qu],
(Reprint edition: Hildesheim und New York, Georg Olms, 1972). Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke. II. Abteilung. Lateinische Schriften. Band 27. Oeconomica; Christianus L. B. de Wolff, Oeconomica methodo scientifica pertractata pars reliqua, in qua
agitur de societatibus minoribus, conjugali, paterna, et herili. Post fata beati autoris continuata et absoluta a Michaele Christoph. Hanovio (Magdeburgicae: Prostat in officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1755) [Erlangen UB: 40 Phs. I, 47 Qu] (Reprint edition:
Hildesheim und New York: Georg Olms, 1972) *Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke*. II. Abteilung. Lateinische Schriften. Band 28. *Oeconomica*.
(75) »Ordini & naturae rerum nihil est convenientius, quam ut maritus praesit actionis masculinis & difficilioribus, uxor femininis potissimum facilioribusque ...« Wolff, *Oeconomica ... pars reliqua* (1755) (cf.73), 603 (§767).
(76) Wolff, Oeconomica ... pars prima (1754) (cf. 73), 52-53 (§37), 378 (§225).
(77) I am currently preparing to publish an article devoted to Christian Wolff's two treatises on family life (*oeconomica*), (cf. 74).
The following abbreviations are used:
HAB = Herzog August Bibliothek / Duke August Library; KB = Kunglige Biblioteket /Royal Library; LB = Landesbibliothek / Provincial Library; SB = Staatsbibliothek State Library; StB = Stadtbibliothek / Municipal Library; U of Ill, U-C: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Special Collections; UB = Universitätsbibliothek / University Library; ULB = Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek / University and Provincial Library; UStB = Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek / University and Municipal Library; ZB = Zentralbibliothek

19. ———. 2004. "The Soul (*Anima*) According to Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624) and Some of His Central European Contemporaries." In *Scientiae Et Artes. Die Vermittlung Alten Und Neuen Wissens in Literatur, Kunst Und Musik*, edited by Mahlmann-Bauer, Barbara, 791-830. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz.

"This paper will focus on the concept of the soul as expounded within the extant writings of Clemens Timpler (1563/4- 1624)" (p. 791)
"Timpler's views on the soul will be placed into the context of some selected views on that same subject-matter presented by sixty of his Central European contemporaries, i. e. by Calvinist, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic authors who taught philosophy and the arts at Central European schools and universities between 1590 and 1625. (4) These views on the soul have survived within published writings (principally disputations, textbooks, and orations) as well as within manuscripts (mainly lecture notes). (5)
Timpler's views on the soul are contained for the most part within his textbooks on metaphysics and animate physics (*Empsychologia*) - first published in the years 1604 and 1607, respectively - as well as within five published disputations - published in the years 1594, 1597, ca. 1597, 1609, and 1611 - over which he presided; some material contained within his textbooks on general physics, inanimate physics *(Apsychologia*), ethics, logic, and human physiognomy as well as within his collection of philosophical exercises also
pertain to this subject matter. (6) It is mainly short disputations on the concept of the soul published by Timpler's Central European contemporaries that will be utilised in this article in order to place some of his views on this subject-matter into a broader context. (7)" (pp. 792-793)
(4) In arriving at the sum of sixty authors here I have only counted each praeses of any given disputation as its author. If one was to count the praeses as well as the respondens in

the case of each disputation listed in the bibliography, the number of authors would
be considerably higher than sixty. General discussions concerning Renaissance notions on the soul have been published by Kessler (1988) and Park (1988); Kennedy (1980), Kuhn (1996), and Spruit (1997) discuss aspects of the concept of the soul as understood by two Italian authors, Bernardino Telesio (1509 - 1588) and Cesare Cremonini (1550 - 1631). See section E of the bibliography in this article.

(5) Here it should be noted that Central European Roman Catholic authors published very few philosophical textbooks during the period between 1590 and 1625. The bulk of textbooks pertaining to philosophy and the arts that were utilized by Roman Catholic
academic institutions in Central Europe during this period were written by Italian, Portuguese and Spanish authors. Some lecture notes in manuscript form — written by Central European Roman Catholic professors as well as by their own students - are extant; for example, see Wenk and Zurcher (1623). Yet printed disputations provide us with the bulk of philosophical source material for Roman Catholic philosophy instruction held between the years 1590 and 1625.

(6) See section A of the bibliography for the known publishing history of these writings by Timpler as well as Freedman (1988). Timpler's names for his textbooks on "inanimate" physics (*Apsychologa*) and "animate" physics (*Empysckologi*a) may have been his
own creations. In the course of the seventeenth century such new names for treatises - as well as sections of treatises- were not uncommon. Refer to the discussion given in Freedman (1999), VII, pp. 37-65 (no. 47). In his textbook on metaphysics (first published in the year 1604) he also refers - in M: L.4C.5Q.9 (pp. 461-462)- to his own *Anthropologia*, which apparently was never published separately; it was published as Book 3 of his textbook on *Animate Physics* in the year 1607. Previous to the year 1607, an *Anthropologia*

authored by Timpler possibly circulated at the Steinfurt Academy in manuscript form.
(7) In the case of Timplers Roman Catholic Central European contemporaries, such short disputations serve as our main body of extant source material (refer back to footnote 5 above). And due to the complexity of the anima concept it has been deemed best to
place Timplers views on this subject-matter in context by focusing on a small number of relatively clear issues that appear within short writings as well as within longer ones. Nonetheless, a few longer writings by Timpiers Lutheran and Calvinist Central European contemporaries devoted in whole or in part to the concept of soul have been utilized here as well; see Alstedius (1620), Casmannus (1594), Ulianus (1598), Caufungerus/ Magirus (1603), Hippius (1603), Hotstius (1607), Keckermannus (1614), Lorhardus (1613), Magirus (1600), Scheiblerus (1614), Strigelius (1590) and Wolfius (1590). Two short orations by Lutheran authors - i. e., Rhesius (1600) and Granius (1608) - have also been used.
[Works cited]
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Arts in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe. The Modern Schoolman 72, no. 2 [1994]: pp. 37-65.
Freedman, Joseph S.: European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4 - 1624), 2 Vols, Hildesheim, Zurich and New York: Georg Olms 1988 (Studien und
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Kennedy, Leonard A.: Cesare Cremonini and the Immortality of the Human Soul, in: Vivarium 18, no. 2

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Kuhn, Heinrich C.: Venetischer Aristotelismus am Ende der aristotelischen Welt. Aspekte der Welt und des Denkens des Cesare Cremonini (1550- 1631), Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang 1996 (Europaische Hochschulschriften. Series 20: Philosophy. Volume 490).
Park, Katharine: The Organic Soul, in: Schmitt, Charles, B. et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge ec al.: Cambridge University Press 1988, pp. 464- 484.
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Bibliography of Joseph S. Freedman on Philosophy in Central Europe (1500-1700): Second Part

'Central Europe' should be roughly equated with the Holy Roman Empire and with the German language area of Europe.

First Part of the Bibliography: 1984-2004

ARTICLES

1. ———. 2005. "Disputations in Europe in the Early Modern Period." In *Hora Est! On Dissertations*, 30-50. Leiden: Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden.

   Kleine publicaties van de Leidse Universiteitsbibliotheek, Nr. 71.
   "During the early modern period, disputations constituted a major component of the curriculum at schools and universities scattered throughout Europe. Disputations and disputation theory are the subject matter of a number of recent publications. (1) A number of recent scholarly writings on university history have also included detailed discussion of this same topic. (2)
   The present article intends to highlight some results of this recent research (including my own as Scaliger fellow in Leiden) and place it within the context of the abundant and valuable holdings at the Leiden University Library.
   A working definition of disputation can be constructed by looking at the theory as well as the practice of disputations. (3) The disputations were frequently examined within the context of textbooks and other writings on logic. (4) Beginning in about the year 1550, writings devoted specifically to the subject-matter of disputations were published in Europe. (5) Curriculum plans, instructional schedules, and statutes frequently discuss disputations that are to be held, often mentioning genres and categories thereof. (6) And
   most importantly, one can examine actual extant disputations themselves, though it is possible to become almost overwhelmed by the sheer mass and variety of them which are extant in European and non-European libraries
   Within this complex context, disputations during the early

modern period can be understood here as logical exercises – held on a very wide range of possible subject-matters – which were held by two or more participants as part of academic instruction at European schools and universities. (7)
These disputations were almost invariably held in Latin and were known by a variety of different names. Disputatio and dissertatio were especially common; exercitatio / exercitationes and thesis / theses were among other terms which was sometimes used. (8) To date, a multi-institutional or multiregional pattern for the use of these various terms has yet to be identified.
At Leiden University, the inaugural disputation in philosophy – i.e., the disputation held in partial fulfillment of requirements for the terminal degree in philosophy and the arts – apparently was known as a *disputatio philosophica inauguralis* until the 1720s, when the name seems to have changed to *dissertatio philosophica inauguralis*. (9)" (p. 30)
(1) Among recent encyclopedia articles, books/monographic treatises, journal articles and bibliographies pertaining to this topic the following can be mentioned here: Hanspeter Marti, 'Dissertation' and 'Dissertation', Gert Ueding, ed., Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer,1994): pp. 866–884; Margreet J. A. M. Ahsmann, Collegium und Kolleg. Der juristische Unterricht an der Universität Leiden 1575–1630 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Disputationen, aus dem Niederländischen übersetzt von Irene Sagel-Grande (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000); Donald Leonard Felipe, The Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin (USA): 1991); Hanspeter Marti, 'Die Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Dokumentationswert alter Dissertationen,' Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres 1 (1981): pp. 117-132; Ferenc Postma and Jacob van Sluis, Auditorium Academiae Franekerensis: Bibliographie der Reden, Disputationen und Gelegenheitsdruckwerk

der Universität und des Athenäums in Franeker 1585-1843 (Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy, 1995); Hanspeter Marti, Philosophische Dissertationen deutscher Universitäten (München et al.: K. G. Saur, 1982). The following older study is still valuable: Ewald Horn, Die Disputationen und Promotionen an den deutschen Universitäten vornehmlich seit dem 16. Jahrhundert, Elftes Beiheft zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1893; reprint ed.: Nendeln / Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint / Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1968).

2. Disputations and their place in instruction during the 16th and 17th centuries – primarily in Central Europe – are frequently mentioned within the following collection of articles: Joseph S. Freedman, Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500–1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities, Variorum Collected Studies Series CS 626 (Aldershot et al.: Ashgate / Variorum, 1999), Index 3.
A very valuable discussion of disputations, together with a detailed list and analysis of philosophy disputations held at the University of Basel during the 17th Century is given in Wolfgang Rother, Die Philosophie an der Universität Basel im 17. Jahrhundert. Quellen und Analyse (Dr. phil. Dissertation, Universität Zürich, 1980), pp. 62-66, 97-99, 326-330, 450-451.

3. The concept of definition was itself a subject-matter that was regularly discussed as part of academic instruction on logic during the early modern period; the concept of definition – including various kinds of definitions – was also usually examined in published writings on logic. For example, refer to the following: Cornelius Valerius, Tabulae, quibus totius dialecticae praecepta maxime ad usum disserendi necessaria breviter & summatim exponuntur, ordine perspicuo digestae (Antwerpiae: Ex officio Christophori Plantini, 1575), pp. 27-32 [UBL 191 E 26: 2]; Johannes Rudolphus Faber, Totius logicae Peripateticae corpus ... Nec-non totius organi Aristotelico-Ramei compendium (Aurelianae: Apud viduam & haeredes Petri de la Roviere, 1623), pp. 537-542 [UBL 546 B 12]; Daniel Wyttenbachius, Praecepta philosophiae logicae

(Amstelodami: Apud Caearem Noëlem Guerin, 1781), pp. 142-166 [UBL 652 B 11]. Definition itself was considered by early modern academic authors as a problematic concept. A detailed discussion of the concepts of classification and definition is given in Freedman, Philosophy and the Arts (see footnote 2), I: 2-7.
4. Hundreds of examples could be given in this connection, including the following: Bartholomaeus Keckermannus, Gymnasium logicum, id est, de usu et exercitatione logicae artis absolutiori & pleniori, libri III. Annis ab hinc aliquot in Academia Heidelbergensis privates praelectionibus traditi (Hanoviae: Apud Guilliemum Antonium, 1608), pp. 122-152 [UBL 650 D 9: 2]; Faber, Totius logicae [...] compendium (see footnote 3), pp. 537-542; P[etrus] van Musschenbroek, Institutiones logicae praecipue comprehendentes artem argumentandi. Conscriptum in usum studiosae juventutis (Lugduni Batavorum: Apud Samuelem Luchtmans et filium academiae typographus, 1748), pp. 197-206 [UBL 652 B 8]; Wyttenbachius, Praecepta (see footnote 3), pp. 235-238. The above-mentioned work by Keckermann was first published in the year 1605; refer to Joseph S. Freedman, 'The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609)', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 141, no. 3 (September 1997): pp. 305-364 (343).
5. These also included disputations held on the subject-matter of disputations themselves; for example, see Joh. Nagelius (praes.) & Leonh. Appoltus (resp.): Specimen academicum [...] de modo disputandi. Altorfii, 1737 [UBL 17 B 68]. The topic of this disputation – the manner in which Jewish teachers in Nuremberg and in Regensburg conduct disputations when teaching their students – is very unusual during the early modern period. The text thereof is written in Latin but contains many passages in Hebrew.
6. The following detailed discussion of disputations within a curriculum description for a school in Duisburg published in the year 1561 can be mentioned here: Henricus C. Geldorpius, De optimo genere interpretandae philosophiae, in quo explicatur simul ratio atque ordo Scholae Dusburgensis (s.l.: 1561) [UBL 20643 F 16]. Numerous

curriculum plans in which disputations are discussed and cited within Joseph S. Freedman, 'Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era,' History of Universities 5 (1985): pp. 117-166.
7. Hanspeter Marti's definitions of disputatio (German: Disputation) and dissertation (German: Dissertation) point to the difficulties involved in any attempt to define each concept. His definitions are given here in full: 'Allgemein versteht man unter D[isputation] ein Streitgespräch oder eine Streitschrift, speziell die seit dem hohen Mittelalter bis zum späten 18. Jh., an Universitäten und anderen Schulen neben der Vorlesung (lectio) verbreitete, institutionell festverankerete Art des gelehrten Unterrichts. Die Vielfalt der Erscheinungsformen sowohl der mündlichen wie der schriftlichen D[isputation] lässt keine allgemeingültige Beschreibung ihres Ablaufs bzw. ihrer Gattungsmerkmale zu. Typisch für die Bedeutungsvielfalt des Begriffs <D[isputation]> ist, daß damit nicht bloß das Streitgespräch und die schriftliche Thesenbehandlung (Dissertation), sondern auch, obwohl selten, der Gegenstand des mündlichen Disputationsaktes bezeichnet wird.' Marti, 'Disputation' (see footnote 1): 866; 'Unter einer D[issertation] wird heute einzig die Inauguraldissertation, Hauptbedingung für den Erwerb des Doktorgrades an den Universitäten, verstanden.
Deshalb wird hier vor allem auf sie und ihre Geschichte eingegangen. Bis ca. 1800 wurde jede Abhandlung <D[issertation]> genannt, die den Gegenstand einer mündlichen, auch bloß übungshalber veranstalteten Disputation vorstellte und in der Regel dem Streitgespräch als Einladungsschrift zugrundelag. Als D[issertation] konnte damals auch eine akademische Streitschrift bezeichnet werden, über die nicht disputiert wurde oder, seltener, eine Rede sowie der ganze Disputationsakt.'
Marti, 'Dissertation' (see footnote 1): 880.
8. See the various title pages reprinted in this publication. The online catalog of Leiden University Library provides with extant information concerning this transition of names.

An online search conducted on January 12, 2005 provided the following information. An ‘any word’ search for disputatio philosophica inauguralis produced inaugural disputations held at Leiden University in the years 1642, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1663, 1664, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670, 1671, 1672, 1676, 1679, 1680, 1681, 1684, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1693, 1698, 1702, 1703, 1707, 1721 and 1728. An ‘any word’ search for dissertatio philosophica inauguralis resulted in finding inaugural disputations held at Leiden University in the years 1725, 1728, 1730, 1734, 1743, 1745, 1751, 1753, 1764, 1766, 1769, 1774, 1780, 1790, 1808, 1818, 1822 and 1831.

2. ———. 2005. "A Neglected Treatise on Scientific Method (*Methodus Scientifica*) Published by Joannes Bellarinus (1606)." In *Geschichte Der Hermeneutik Und Die Methodik Der Textinterpretierenden Disziplinen*, edited by Schönert, Jörg and Vollhardt, Friedrich, 43-82. Berlin: de Gruyter.

   Historia Hermeneutica. Series Studia Band 1.
   "The text consists ofan introduction and four 'Books' [libri]. In the introduction, Bellarinus equates scientific method [methodus scientifica] with the practice of the sciences [praxis scientiarum].
   In Book 1 [Concerning science and the knowable], Bellarinus defines science [*scientia*] in terms of cognition [cognitio].
   In Book 2 [Concerning rules of logic], it is noted that science focuses on universals.
   In Book 3 [Concerning the instruments of knowledge], is stated that ten instruments [instrumenta], through which cognition [cognitio] is made certain [certa] and evident [evidens].
   In Book 4 [Concerning method] Bellarinus defines method [methodus] as the correct way to discover, 'be taught' and teach [scientific] knowledge [recta ratio scientiam inveniendi, discendi, atque docendi]; he equates method with scientific method when this knowledge is perfect knowledge."

"As common as discussions of method - and of scientific method in particular -are in recent scholarship and pedagogy, our knowledge of the early evolution of these two concepts is still relatively scant.(1) This article will highlight a neglected treatise on the concept of scientific method - published by Joannes Bellarinus in the year 1606 (*) - which appears to be the first known published treatise bearing this title. This treatise can be placed in the context of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century discussions of method, definition theory, classification theory, and the classification of academic disciplines. Such early discussions of scientific method and related concepts can be used to provide useful insights pertaining to recent scholarly discussions on these same subject-matters.

The history of the concept of method during late middle ages has not yet been studied extensively. And while this concept was mentioned occasionally within some writings during the early sixteenth century, it was not until mid-century that the concept of method begins to be accorded direct and extensive discussion. Such discussions of method are very numerous from the 1550s onward. The bulk of these discussions - contained within treatises on method itself, within treatises on logic, and within treatises on other subject-matters -have yet to be studied; the authors of many treatises containing such discussions on method have been forgotten for centuries.

(...)

A thorough examination of the concept of method during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries would require a separate study extending well beyond the parameters of this article. Here the following summary points can be made concerning discussions of method during this period (I - III): (I) the distinction between method and order was sometimes discussed during this period, as was the distinction between method and reason (ratio); (II) the concept of method was often understood as having various degrees of perfection and/or imperfection; (III) the concept of method was often explained with the aid of the concepts of definition and/or classification and/or

demonstration.(5) As shall be elucidated shortly, all three of these points pertain to the content of Joannes Bellarinus's treatise on scientific method." (pp. 43-45, some notes omitted)

(*) Joannes Bellarinus: Praxis scientiarum, seu methodus scientifica practice considerata, ex Aristotele potissimum accepts. Mediolani: Apud haer. Pontij & Joan. Baptistam Piccaleum impressores archiep. I606.

(1) The books by Henry Batter and Lutz Danneberg cited in this article provide bibliographical information on recent studies pertaining to method and scientific method. Henry H. Bauer: Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method. Urbana and Chicago 1992; Lutz Danneberg: Methodologien. Struktur, Aufbau und Evaluation. (Erfahrung und Denken 71). Berlin 1989. -- The following older but still very valuable study examines the concept of method as discussed by selected Italian, English, and German authors during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: Neal W. Gilbert: Renaissance Concepts of Method. New York 1960.

(5) The concept of method as examined by numerous Central European authors during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is discussed in Joseph S. Freedman: Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities. (Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS626). Alderhot u.a. 1999 - see here particularly my articles: The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c.1570-c.1630, pp. 106-111; Encyclopedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (ca. 1500-ca. 1700), pp. 222.223, p. 232, p. 245 (Table L) and pp. 251-252 (Table R). The concept of method was discussed - from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards - within treatises specifically devoted to method as well as within general treatises on the subject-matter of logic: for example, refer to the following: Hieronymus Borrius: De Peripatetica docendi atque addiscendi methodo. Florentine: Apud Bartholomacum Sermattellium 1584. [Chicago, Illinois. USA, Newberry Library: Case / B / 235 / .1034); Augustinus

Hunnius: Dialectica seu generalia logices pracepta (...) consueverunt. Lovanii: Apud Hieronymum Wellaeum 1561 (pp. 165-171: de methodo). [Municipal Library / Stadtbibliothek (StB) Trier: A0 / 80 / 20 (2)1 Many additional writings from this period pertaining to the concept of method are mentioned in the monograph Renaissance Concepts of Method by Neal Gilbert (fn. 1).

3. ———. 2006. "Ramus and the Use of Ramus at Heidelberg within the Context of Schools and Universities in Central Europe, 1572-1622." In *Späthumanismus Und Reformierte Konfession. Theologie, Jurisprudenz Und Philosophie in Heidelberg an Der Wende Zum 17. Jahrundert*, edited by Strohm, Christoph, Freedman, Joseph S. and Selderhuis, Herman J., 93-126. Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck.

   "The brief residence of Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) in Heidelberg (1569-1570) is a matter of record; detailed examination thereof has also been given by Kees Meerhoff, both in a previous publication as well as in his contribution to this volume (1). Yet very little is known concerning the extent to which Ramus's writings were utilized in Heidelberg during the five decades following his death. In this article, extant evidence concerning the utilization of Ramus's writings in Heidelberg between 1572 and 1622 is evaluated within the context of how Protestant academic institutions in Central Europe made use of those writings in the course these same decades (2)." p. 93
   (1) Kees Meeerhoff, *Ramus et l'Université. De Paris à Heidelberg (1569-1570)*, in: Idem/Michel Magnien (eds.), *Ramus et l'Université*, Paris: Editions Rue d'Ulm, 2004, 89-120.
   (2) The year 1572 has been chosen here since it is the year of Ramus's death.
   "In an earlier publication I have argued that there does not appear to have been a "Ramist" position with regard to the following two selected points of doctrine: the classification of philosophical disciplines and the concept of method. Tables V-XI will be utilized in order to investigate whether

or not one can speak of a "Ramist" and/or a "Non-Ramist" position with regard to a third point of doctrine: the concept of definition. Definition was an important concept that was regularly discussed within writings on logic during the 16th and 17th centuries (56).

Table V provides a synopsis of how Wilhelm Roding discusses the concept of definition within his 1574 edition of the logic of Petrus Ramus; Roding republished this edition in 1576, i.e. while a teacher in the Paedagogium in Heidelberg". At the top of Table V, the manner in which definition - together with conjugate, *notatio* and *distributio* - is subsumed within the subject-matter of logic is evident. *Notatio* is the category Ramus uses to refer to nominal definition. For Ramus, definition is synonymous with what many other authors referred to as "real definition" (*definitio rei*). Ramus's distinction between perfect and imperfect definition (the latter considered as synonymous with "description") appears to have been adopted by the vast majority of authors who discuss the concept of definition during the late 16th and early 17th centuries.(58) Roding's own commentary pertaining to Ramus's "that which is defined" (definition) is presented in full at the bottom of Table V; this commentary includes a positive comment concerning Aristotle (see Table V: C.)

Tables VI and VII contain dichotomous charts - which outline sub-categories of definition given by Petrus Ramus and Philipp Melanchthon - within a text on logic published in Lemgo by Rupertus Erytropilus in the year 1588. (59) On the basis of these two sub-categories of definition, the following three points can be made. First, Ramus's categories of definition are much simpler than Melanchthon's. Melanchthon's categorization includes a list of laws and conditions as well as a list of rules, all of which serve to regulate the making of good definitions; Ramus's categorization, on the other hand, presents some examples of definitions but no regulations that govern them. Second, Melanchthon divides definition into *definitio nominis* and *definitio rei*; for Ramus, *definitio* is equivalent to *definitio rei*. And third, both Ramus and Melanchthon

distinguish between perfect definition and imperfect definition.
Yet Ramus equates imperfect definition with description while Melanchthon does not." (pp. 106-107, some notes omitted)
(56) Refer to the discussion of definition (and the related concept of classification) in the following article: Joseph S. Freedman, *The Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth Century Writings on Academic Philosophy: Some Methodological Considerations*, in: IDEM, *Philosophy and the Arts,* I: 1-40, 2-7. 24-28.

4. ———. 2007. "Christian Wolff's Two-Volume Philosophical Treatise on the Family (*Oeconomica*) in Context." In *Christian Wolff Und Die Europäische Aufklärung*, edited by Stolzenberg, Jürgen and Rudolph, Oliver-Pierre, 217-231. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

   Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4.-8. April 2004.
   Teil 3: Sektion 5: Kosmologie; Sektion 6: Theologie; Sektion 7: Praktische Philosophie.
   "The past decades have witnessed a steadily increasing interest in the career and philosophy of Christian Wolff.(1) The focus of the current study is a work which Christian Wolff began to publish shortly before his death: his two-volume philosophical treatise on family life (*oeconomica*). (2) This treatise has not been accorded attention within scholarship pertaining to Wolff nor within the very sparse existing literature pertaining to philosophical writings on the family.(3) Yet this same treatise not only provides discussion and insights concerning a number of points of doctrine extending beyond the subject matter of oeconomica, but also presents some hereto neglected biographical information concerning Christian Wolff himself.
   Table 1 (p. 229 f. below) presents a section and chapter synopsis of Christian Wolffs two-volume philosophical treatise on family life and also gives full bibliographical

references for each volume of this treatise. The treatise as a whole is divided into four sections. Section 1 (consisting of three chapters) and the first two chapters of section 2 were published in 1754 within the first volume of this treatise; chapters 3 through 5 of section 2, section 3 (chapters 1 through 3), and section 4 (chapters 1 through 3) were published in 1755 within the second volume.
Originally published in 1754 and 1755, respectively, these two volumes appear not to be been republished or reissued until 1972 (as part of the scholarly Olms edition of Christian Wolffs writings). The entire text of the treatise consists of a total of 900 axioms, which correspond to the treatise's short introduction (*Prolegomena*) together with the content of sections 1 through 4." (p. 217)
(...)
"Before proceeding to discussion of Wolffs philosophical treatise on family life, brief attention should be given to the first volume - originally published in the year 1728 - of Wolffs three-volume treatise on logic. (4) This first volume actually is devoted to the subject-matter of philosophy considered generally. (5) In this work, Wolff divides that subject-matter into the following general parts: logic, metaphysics, practical philosophy, physics, and what he refers to as "philosophy of the arts" (philosophia artium). (6) Metaphysics consists of ontology, general cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, and natural theology; included within philosophy of the arts are grammar, rhetoric, and poetics. (7) Wolff places *oeconomica* - along with universal practical philosophy, natural law (*jus naturae*), ethics, politics, and the "law of nations" (*jus gentium*) - within the category of practical philosophy.
In the introduction to the first volume of his Oeconomica Wolff notes the dependence of this same discipline on psychology and ethics; he also notes that ethics itself presupposes ontology, psychology, natural theology, universal practical philosophy, and cosmology.8 Wolff states that Oeconomica discusses the actual practice of that subject-matter which is demonstrated in theory within his own treatise on natural law. Missing from this list is politics,

and Wolff considers *oeconomica* as a separate acadmeic discipline therefrom." (pp. 218-219)
(...)
"Wolffs philosophical treatise on the family contains very frequent citations, however, from some of his other philosophical writings. In the introduction to his Oeconomica Wolff names the philosophical disciplines which serve as the foundation for family life. Yet conversely, Wolffs Oeconomica provides valuable discussion concerning a number of other philosophical topics; these topics include (1) the concept of scientific method and (2) two ontologically basic categories - *habilitas physica* and (natural) virtue -which rest at the foundation of human generation and subsequent growth, and (3) a number of concepts which fall within the general realm of epistemology. His *Oeconomica* is worthy of examination not only because it presents a detailed, philosophical, systematic treatment of the family as well as education within a domestic framework, but also - and perhaps more importantly for historians of philosophy - because it provides interesting and valuable discussion of some points of doctrine the significance of which extend beyond the domains of family and domestic life." (pp. 226-227)
(1) 1305 titles are listed within Biller's bibliography on Christian Wolff; title numbers 1050 through 1305 were published between 1998 and 2004 while title numbers 495 through 1049 were published between 1980 and 1997; see Biller, [*Wolff nach Kant. Eine Bibliographie*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms,] 2004.
(2) See Table 1, p. 229 f. below.
(3) Some professional literature on natural law within Wolff s writings touches tangentially on selected topics which also are discussed within Wolff s Oeconomica', see Biller, 2004, p. 81 (448), 114 (681-682), 194 (1229), 198 (1250); also refer to footnote 16 below.
(4) Logica, 1.
(5) The full title of this general treatise on the subject-matter of philosophy is given within footnote 14 below.

(6) Logica, 1, §§ 55-75; in § 39 in this same work Wolff seems to argue that philosophy of law and philosophy of medicine might also be included within the realm of philosophy.
(7) Logica, 1, §§ 40, 71. Also included here within philosophy of the arts is a subject-matter referred by Wolff as Technica; here (§ 71) Wolff appears to indicate that these subject-matters often are excluded from philosophy.
(8) Oeconomica, 1, § 4.
(Some notes omitted)

5. ———. 2007. "The 'Melanchthonian Encyclopedia' (1597) (*) of Gregor Richter (1560-1624)." In *Fragmenta Melanchthoniana. Band 3: Melanchthons Wirkung in Der Europäischen Bildungsgeschichte*, edited by Frank, Günther and Lalla, Sebastian, 105-141. Ubstadt, Heidelberg, and Basel: Verlag Regionalkultur.

   (*) *Judicia florentis scholae Melanchthonis* (1592); *Criseis Melanchthonianae* (1597).

6. ———. 2008. "An Extraordinary Broadsheet on Natural Philosophy: The *Theatrum Universitatis Rerum* (1557) by Christophorus Mylaeus." In *Sol Et Homo. Mensch Und Natur in Der Renaissance. Festschrift Zum 70.Geburtstag Für Eckhard Kessler*, edited by Ebbersmeyer, Sabrina, Pirner-Pareschi, Helga and Ricklin, Thomas, 241-315. München: Wilhelm Fink.

   Humanistische Bibliothek: Texte und Abhandlungen. Reihe I: Abhandlungen. Band 59.
   "The present study is devoted to a broadsheet consisting mainly of an extensive series of such dichotomous charts pertaining principally to the subject-matter of natural philosophy. This broadsheet -- bearing the title "Theatre of the Universe of Things" (*Theatrum universitatis rerum*) -- was published in the year 1557 by Christophorus Mylaeus [Christophe Milieu] d. 1570). Only one published copy thereof is known to have survived."(*) p. 242

"The very top of the broadsheet presents the title of the work -- *Theatrum universitatis rerum* as well as the division of its subject-matter (u *niversitas rerum*) into *Natura ipsa* and *Natura altera*. The bulk of the broadsheet consists of dichotomous charts that also include longer and shorter text segments. These dichotomous charts and accompanying texts focus mainly on natural philosophy and include discussion -- contained pages A through O -- of incorporeal things, celestial heavens, stars, the four elements (fire, air, water, and earth), inanimate 'corporal things (e.g., stones, metals), plants (e.g., roots, herbage, fruits, trees), beasts (e.g., fish, birds, mammals), the human being considered with respect to his/her component parts, and the human being considered as a whole. Captions placed above selected segments of these dichotomous tables briefly summarize the content of those segments; this content is also supplemented by texts that are placed below -- and linked to -- other segments of these same dichotomous tables.
(...)
Table C (I.-VI.) summarizes the content of the dichotomous tables that together serve to constitute the bulk of his own *Theatrum universitatis rerum*. Its principal subject-matter is u *niversitas rerum*, which Mylaeus describes as 1. that variety of all things to be found in nature and 2. the unity, harmony, and consensus brought to this diversity and discord (through God). In the *Theatrum universitatis rerum*, Mylaeus notes (I. of Table C) that "the universe of things" (*universitas rerum*) consists of five components without clearly listing what they are. These five components, however, clearly correspond to the titles to the five "Books" (*libri*) contained within the 1551 edition of Mylaeus's treatise on historiography (Table B): 1. *De natura*, 2. *De prudentia*, 3. *De principatu (principatus)*, 4. *De sapienti*a, and 5. *De literatura*.
In the Theatrum universitatis rerum, these five components are paired with two distinct categories of nature. The first (*natura ipsa*) corresponds directly to natura; the second (*natura altera*) comprises *prudentia, principatus, sapientia*,

and *literatura*. The terms "nature" (*natura*) and "natural" (*naturalis*) were used in a multitude of ways within philosophical writings during the sixteenth century; the prominence which Mylaeus gives to these two uses of the term nature in this broadsheet was probably less common He describes both *natura ipsa* and *natura altera* at some length, and states that the latter is the "imitator, assistant, and vicar" (*imitatrix, adiuntrix, & vicaria*) of the former.' On the basis of Mylaeus's description of natura altera, it could be understood as equivalent to -- or: roughly equivalent to -- human nature. Humans are made -- by virtue of the goodness of "that same superior, providing, and ingenious nature" (i.e., God) -- with a body that empowers us to act and a mind that empowers us to contemplate." (pp. 244-245, notes omitted)
(*) Christophorus Mylaeus, Theatrum universitatis rerum. Basileae: Ex officina Johannis Oporini, 1557 mense Martio. The only known extant copy is owned by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munchen and has the call number 20 Enc. 19m / Res [a digital copy is now available at the Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum (MDZ)].

7. ———. 2008. "Die Debatte Um Frauen Und *Gender* in Der Schulphilosophie Des 16. Und 17. Jahrhunderts. Der Fall Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)." In *Heißer Streit Und Kalte Ordnung*. *Epochen Der "Querelles Des Femmes" Zwischen Mittelalter Und Gegenwart*, edited by Hassauer, Friederike, 206-217. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.

   [The Debate on Women and Gender in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Academic Philosophy: The Case of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)].
   "Philosophie wurde im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert an Schulen und Universitäten in ganz Europa gelehrt. In den einzelnen akademischen Institutionen verstand man darunter das Studium einiger oder aller der folgenden wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen: Metaphysik, Physik, Mathematik, Ethik, Familienleben (*oeconomica*), Politik, Logik, Rhetorik, Grammatik, Poetik und Geschichte. (1) Im Rahmen jeder

dieser Disziplinen wurde ein breites Spektrum an verschiedenen Themen mehr oder minder eingehend erörtert. Die meisten philosophischen Texte, die in diesen zwei Jahrhunderten – sowohl druckschriftlich wie manuskriptschriftlich – zirkulierten, entstanden in Verbindung mit der genannten akademischen Lehre.
Zwei eng miteinander verknüpfte Themen werden in diesem Artikel von besonderem Interesse sein: Frauen und Gender. Sie werden in den veröffentlichten Schriften eines in dieser Epoche tätigen Philosophielehrers erörtert: Clemens Timpler (1663/4-1624). (2)" (p. 205)
(...)
"Es wurde erwähnt, daß einige von Timplers Ansichten über Frauen auch von anderen akademischen Philosophen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts vertreten wurden.(53) Timpler scheint zu einer großen Gruppe jener Philosophen gehört zu haben, deren Ansichten über Frauen vielleicht am genauesten als Mittelgröße zwischen zwei Extremen beschrieben werden können. Timpler hätte sich sicherlich nicht der Meinung angeschlossen, daß Frauen keine Menschen seien (54) – eine Auffassung, die im Zeitraum zwischen 1500-1700 einige Anhänger zu haben schien. Timpler hätte ebensowenig die Meinung akzeptiert, daß Frauen keine moralischen Tugenden hätten. (55) Gleichwohl wäre er wohl kaum so weit gegangen, in seinen Schriften den Frauen ausführliches Lob zu spenden.56 Eine eingehendere Untersuchung des Konzepts von ›Frauen und Gender‹ innerhalb einer großen Anzahl philosophischer Werke des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts werden vonnöten sein, sollen Timplers Ansichten zu diesem Thema präziser in einen größeren Zusammenhang gestellt werden." (p. 216)
(1) Der folgende Aufsatz erörtert Fachgebiete der Philosophie als Gegenstände des Philosophieunterrichts in Zentraleuropa: Freedman, Joseph S.: »Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era«, in: History of Universities, 5, 1985, S. 117-166 (Nachdruck in: Freedman, Joseph S.: Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700. Teaching and Texts in

Schools and Universities, Aldershot u.a. 1999, II (Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS 626)).
(2) Vgl. Freedman, Joseph, S.: *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)*, 2 Bde., Hildesheim u.a. 1988 (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. 27). Im folgenden Buch ist Clemens Timpler kurz erwähnt: Maclean, Ian: *The Renaissance Notion of Woman*, Cambridge u.a. 1983. Einige Titel aus der inzwischen zahlreichen Literatur zu Frauen und Gender in der Frühen Neuzeit (in umgekehrter chronologischer Reihenfolge): Richards, Penny u. Munns, Jessica: Gender, Power, and Privilege in Early Modern Europe, Women and men in history, Harlow 2003; Jansen, Sharon: The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe, New York 2002; Wunder, Heide: *He is the Sun, She is the Moon: Women in Early Modern Germany*. Übers. v. Thomas Dunlap, Cambridge, MA 1998; Hull, Suzanne W.: *Women according to Men: the World of Tudor-Stuart* Wogen, Walnut Creek, CA 1996); Weisner, Merry E.: *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge u.a. 1993; Schiebinger, Londa: *The Mind has no Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science*, Cambridge, MA 1989. Vgl. auch die Titel in Anm. 56.
(53) Vgl. nochmals die in den Anm. 11, 23, 27, 31, 46, 48, 51 und 52 erwähnten Schriften.
(54) Vgl. Fleischer, Manfred S.: »›Are Women Human?‹ The Debate of 1595 between Valens Acidalius and Simon Gediccus«, in: Sixteenth Century Journal, 12, no. 2, Summer 1981, S. 107-121. Es wurde darauf hingewiesen, daß Timpler – ähnlich wie viele andere Philosophen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts – die Vorstellung von Frau als Sklavin des Mannes ablehnte; vgl. Anm. 31.

8. ———. 2009. "Necessity, Contingency, Impossibility, Possibility, and Modal Enunciations within the Writings of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)." In *Spätrenaissance-Philosophie in Deutschland 1570-1650. Entwürfe Zwischen*

Humanismus Und Konfessionalisierung, Okkulten Traditionen Und Schulmetaphysik, edited by Mulsow, Martin, 293-318. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The four modal concepts of necessity, contingency, possibility, and impossibility are examined within Timpler's textbook on metaphysics. Section 8 of Timpler's collection of philosophical exercises is devoted to discussion of necessity and contingency. Timpler's textbook on logic discusses necessary and contingent formal enunciations and also presents brief treatment of the concept of modality itself.

In discussing modal concepts and modality Timpler cites a variety of sources. Most frequently cited are Aristotle, Sacred Scripture, "scholastics" (*scholastici*), Franciscus Piccolomineus (1520-1604), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and Jacob Zabarella (1533-1589). Timpler's discussions of modal concepts also include citations of other authorities, including Cicero, St. Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Averroes, Chrysostomus Javellus, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Benedictus Pererius (c. 1535-1610), Petrus Ramus (1515-1572), and Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609). In the case of some of the questions (*quaestiones*) and problems (*problemata*) contained in Timpler's writings pertaining to modal concepts, however, no sources are cited at all.

With regard to Timpler's citations of sources the following two points should be mentioned. First Timpler may have relied on some authorities more heavily that his infrequent citations of them would suggest. And second, Timpler was usually quite eclectic in his use of such authorities. In many cases for example, when arguing in his textbook on metaphysics that something is possible which nonetheless never was nor will be -- Timpler uses Aristotle in order to support his own view. Yet when arguing that absolute necessity does not conflict with free will, Timpler cites several passages from Aristotle to the contrary; yet Timpler concludes that Aristotle's testimony is not sufficient in this case. In his textbook on metaphysics, Timpler argues that

Jacob Zabarella incorrectly defines necessary and contingent things; in doing so, Timpler notes that Zabarella misinterprets Aristotle. On the other hand, Timpler agrees with Zabarella's distinction between that which is possible and that which is absolutely necessary.
Timpler appears to have regarded himself primarily as a metaphysician, and he makes metaphysics central to his thought. Most of Timpler's views on modality are elucidated within his textbook on metaphysics. The most basic ontological components of this latter textbook are diagrammed in Table A1." (pp. 295-296).

9. ———. 2009. "The Godfather of Ontology? Clemens Timpler, "All That Is Intelligible", Academic Disciplines During the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries, and Some Possible Ramifications for the Use of Ontology in Our Time." *Quaestio.Yeabook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 9:3-40.

   Paper read at the International Conference *Origin and Development of Modern Ontology*, held at the Università di Bari (Italy) 15-17 May 2008.
   "The first known mention of the term ontology (*ontologia*) occurs in a short encyclopedic treatise – within the section therein that examines metaphysics – first published by Jacob Lorhard in the year 1606 (1). Lorhard's discussion of metaphysics – which he equates with ontology – is excerpted directly from a textbook on metaphysics first published by Clemens Timpler in the year 1604 (2). What was (and: is) the significance of this new concept, and what part did the metaphysics of Timpler play in its introduction? This article will endeavor to place possible answers to these questions into the following four broader contexts: 1) the scope of academic disciplines taught during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; 2) concepts that could/should be considered as being ontologically basic/important – and those academic disciplines which discussed them – during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; 3) the emergence of encyclopedic

academic writings and the concept of «All that is Intelligible» (omne intelligibile) during the early seventeenth century; 4) ontology as understood in the early seventeenth century as well as some potential applications of ontology in our time. This contextual material includes philosophical texts and curricular information with a primary (but not exclusive) focus on Central Europe." (p. 3)
(1) J. LORHARDUS, *Ogdoas scholastica: continens diagraphen typicam artium: grammatices latinae, grammatices graecae, logices, rhetorices, astronomices, ethices, physices, metaphysices, seu ontologiae*, Apud Georgium Straub, Sangalli 1606 [Halle ULB: Gc 6]. Concerning this work by Jacob Lorhard, refer to the following doctoral dissertation (Department of Philosophy, University of Bari, Italy): M. LAMANNA, *La nascita dell'ontologia. L'opera metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547-1628)*, Dipartimento di Filosofia - Università degli Studi di Bari, 2008 [now published: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2013]. Also refer to the following Website: www.formalontology.it [now moved to www.ontology.co].
(2) C. TIMPLERUS, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum*, Excudebat Theoph[ilus] Caesar, Steinfurti 1604 [Marburg UB: XIV b 100]. The following additional imprints of this textbook are extant (listed here by place and date of publication): Lich 1604, Hanau 1606, Frankfurt a.M. 1607, Marburg 1607, Hanau 1608, Frankfurt a.M. 1612, Hanau 1612, and Hanau 1616. Timpler's short treatise on the liberal arts (*Technologia*) was included with all of these extant imprints from the year 1606 onwards. In this article, the 1616 imprint will be cited: C. TIMPLERUS, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum [...] in principio accessit eius technologia; hoc est tractatus generalis et utilissimus de natura et differentiis artium liberalium*, Apud Petrum Antonium, Hanoviae 1616 [Freiburg/Br. UB: B 2272 bi]. A full bibliography of all of the imprints of all of Timpler's extant published writings is given in J.S. FREEDMAN, *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries: The Life, Significance, and*

Philosophy of Clemens Timpler, 1563/64-1624, 2 vols., Olms, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 1988 («Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie», 27), vol. 2, pp. 740-768.

10. ———. 2010. "Published Academic Disputations in the Context of Other Information Formats Utilized Primarily in Central Europe (C. 1550-C. 1700)." In *Disputatio 1200-1800. Form, Funktion Und Wirkung Eines Leitmediums Universitärer Wissenskultur*, edited by Gindhart, Marion and Kundert, Ursula, 89-128. Dordrecht: Springer.

    "What is – or: what can be understood to fall under the umbrella of – an academic disputation? An answer to this question can be approached by placing such disputations within the context of other information formats – which could also be referred to in this context as instructional media – that were utilized in academic instruction (held primarily in the German language area of Europe) during the period between 1550 and 1700. (1)
    When comparing disputations to other information formats / instructional media the following two general questions arise: 1. What is meant by – and what is included within the context of – information formats / instructional media? 2. To what extent can and/or should disputations be considered to include (a) published disputations as well as (b) disputations that were held orally but concerning the content of which we have relatively little – or no – written information?
    The constituent parts of academic instruction during this period canbe placed within two broad categories: 1. the presentation of accepted knowledge and doctrines falling within subject-matters belonging to the academic curriculum and 2. academic exercises ntended to provide students with basic skills pertaining to that curriculum. Accepted knowledge and doctrines normally were orally delivered to students in the form of lectures. Many of these lectures have survived in written form, either as unpublished manuscripts (as lecture manuscripts and as

notes taken by students) or in published form (usually as textbooks). (2) Also extant – both in published and unpublished form – are collections of commonplaces, encyclopaedias, lexicons and other book-length writings generally intended
to supplement lectures and published textbooks. (3)" (pp. 89-90)
(1) (...) 1547 is the earliest publication date of any disputation that could be located in the course of research done for this study (and previous studies by this author). Manuscript records of such disputations from the early sixteenth century do exist; two such manuscript collections can be mentioned. Disputations held at the University of Leipzig in partial fulfilment of the Master of Arts degree from 1512 through 1553 are extant at Leipzig UA: Urkundliche Quellen B 066 (1512–1527), B 067 (1527–1539), B 068 (1540–1553). A collection of public and private disputations held at the University of Heidelberg Faculty of Arts during the years 1537 and 1538 is extant in manuscript form: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana (Vatican Library, Vatican City) Pat. Lat. 201; a film of this collection is available at Saint Louis (Missouri / USA), Vatican Film Library: Film Roll 3638.
One may ask why there do not appear to be any (or: hardly any) published disputations prior to this date. It could be argued that opposition to intricately organized (i.e., »scholastic«) disputations by some (»humanist«) authors active in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (e.g., Desiderius Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives) served as a factor here, cf. the relevant discussion given in Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang, *From Oral Disputation to Written Text. The Transformation of the Dissertation in Early Modern Europe*, in: History of Universities 19 (2004), pp. 129–187 (159–161, 184). The earliest examples of published disputations found here were published in connection with instruction at the University of Königsberg in the late 1540s (see the first title cited within fn. 36 as well as A. in Table 13). It could also be argued that Jesuit academic institutions played a leading role holding published disputations during

the second half of the sixteenth century, cf. the following publications: Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Dilinganae disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Disputationen an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Dillingen 1555–1648*, Regensburg 2006; Gerhard Stalla, *Bibliographie der Ingolstädter Drucker des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Baden-Baden ²1977.
(2) Refer to the following article: Ann Blair, *Note-Taking as an Art of Transmission*, in: Critical Inquiry 31 (2004), pp. 85–107.
(3) Refer to the following publications (monograph, article, and bibliography): Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought*, Oxford 1996; reviewed by Joseph S. Freedman in Scientia poetica 2 (1998), pp. 222–242; Joseph S. Freedman, *Encyclopedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (c. 1500 – c. 1700)*, in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 37 (1994), pp. 212–256 as reprinted in Joseph S. Freedman, *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500–1700*. Teaching and Texts at European Schools and Universities during the High and Late Renaissance, Aldershot / Brookfield 1999, VI; Giorgio Tonelli, *A short-title list of subject dictionaries of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries as aids to the history of ideas,* London 1971, exp. ed., rev. and annot. by Eugenio Canone, Firenze 2006.

11. ———. 2012. "Philosophy Instruction, the Philosophy Concept, and Philosophy Disputations Published at the University of Ingolstadt, C. 1550 - C. 1650." In *Dichtung - Gelehrsamkeit - Disputationskultur. Festschrift Für Hanspeter Marti Zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Sdzuj, Reimund B., Seidel, Robert and Zegowitz, Bernd. Köln, Wien, und Weimar: Böhlau Verlag.

    "In the year 1981, Hanspeter Marti published an article on the value of published philosophical disputations (that is, disputations published in connection with philosophy

instruction at academic institutions) for research on topics pertaining to Early Modern
European studies. (2) The following year, this article was followed by his publication of an extensive bibliography of philosophical disputations published in Central Europe between the years 1660 and 1750. (3) His bibliography has been widely utilized in the three decades following its publication; in part due to the publication thereof, increased attention has also been accorded to disputations as an important academic genre. (4)
The present study is focused on philosophical disputations published in Ingolstadt – in connection with academic instruction held at the University there – during the hundred-year period between c. 1550 and c. 1650. Here, provisional answers will be given to
the following five questions. First, what was the scope of philosophy instruction at the University of Ingolstadt during the period between c. 1550 and c. 1650? Second, how did this scope evolve during that same period? Third, what were those subject-matters falling
within the parameters of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts at the University of Ingolstadt during the period? Fourth, what can be said concerning the content of this Ingolstadt philosophy instruction? And fifth, to what extent can published philosophical disputations help provide answers to these first four questions?
One additional, more general question must also be posed here. During the 16th and 17th centuries, which academic subject-matters were generally understood to fall within the parameters of European academic philosophy? An answer can be ventured here on the
basis of discussions of this same matter found in literally hundreds of philosophical writings published during these two centuries. (5)"
(2) Marti: *Der wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Dokumentationswert* (1981) as cited in full in the Bibliography [In: Nouvelles de la République des Lettres 1 (1981): 117–132.]. „Philosophical Disputations“ here refer to philosophical disputations and dissertations published in

connection with academic instruction. No attempt will be made here to distinguish between disputations and dissertations; refer to Hanspeter Marti's articles on the same in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* (1994) as cited in the Bibliography. [Tübingen: Niemeyer]
(3) Marti: *Philosophische Dissertationen* (1982) as cited in the Bibliography. [*Philosophische Dissertationen deutscher Universitäten 1660–1750. Eine Auswahlbibliographie*, unter Mitarbeit von Karin Marti. München: K.G. Saur, 1982.]
(4) Refer to Freedman: *Published academic disputations in the context of other information formats used primarily in Central Europe (c. 1550–c.1700)* (2010) and Freedman: *Disputations in Europe in the Early Modern Period* (2005); these two articles were published in volumes (cited here in the Bibliography) that are devoted to the subject-matter of disputations (and dissertations).
(5) Freedman: *Classifications* (1994) discusses classifications of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts during the 16th and the 17th centuries.

12. ———. 2012. "Johann Kahl's Collection of Writings on Practical Philosophy (1595) in Context." In *Philosophie Der Reformierten*, edited by Frank, Günther and Selderhuis, Herman J., 241-298. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat: Frommann-Holzboog.

    PP = Johann Kahl, *Propaideia Practica* (1595).
    "Johann Kahl (Joannes Calvinus or Calvus) is best known as an author of legal treatises. (1) His Law Dictionary – first published in 1600 with the title »Lexicon juridicum« – continued to be republished into the second half of the 17th century. (2)
    He also authored two treatises and two orations pertaining largely to practical philosophy, all of which were published in the year 1595. (3) These two treatises and two orations – as well as their relevance for jurisprudence and to Kahl's own commitment to Christianity – serve as the focus of this study." (p. 241)

(...)
"In commenting Kahl's writings on practical philosophy, the following five general Conclusions can be ventured. First, logic and Christianity are both given substantial emphasis – and also are closely interrelated – within Kahl's writings. (111) Kahl
specifically emphasizes the importance of logic for all academic disciplines, and notes its particular importance for jurisprudence.(112) Kahl uses logic – as evident of his use of »method« (methodus), »logical analysis« (analysis logica), and other logical
concepts (e.g., causality) – throughout his writings.(113) And Kahl refers to prudence, the arts, intelligence, science, and wisdom as »logical« virtues(s) (virtus logica). (114)"
(...)
"Second, it has already been noted that Clemens Timpler utilized – and may have been the first person to introduce (in the year 1604) – the concept of »morality« (*honestas*); for Timpler, *honestas* is goodness that is normative »in and through itself« (*in se et per se*) within a specific social environment – as opposed to moral (i.e., universally valid) goodness. (122) Kahl did not make this distinction, yet it would appear that some components thereof can be ascertained within several statements found within his writings. In his discussion of the virtue of beneficence (when considered as a sub-category of virtue), Kahl notes the nothing is more pleasant and more unifying than the »similarity of good morals« (*morum similitudo bonorum*) among family members, citizens, and people (generally speaking). (123)
(...)
Third, Kahl appears to place substantial emphasis on the subject-matter of war. (125)
He regards it to be of the highest priority for a commonwealth *(respublica*) to keep intact the right to wage war. (126) In the synopsis *(Synopsis politices brevissima*) that precedes the text of Kahl's Commentary on Aristotle's »Politics« war and peace is

mentioned within one of his three definitions of the commonwealth. (127)"
(...)
"Fourth, one can ascertain an independent outlook within Kahl's philosophical writings. Kahl's use of logical analysis provides him with a mechanism that (for example) he can use to organize commentary on Aristotle and Cicero in an independent manner; this also provides contexts for independent statements and judgments. "
(...)
"And fifth, a number of topics discussed – and positions taken – within Kahl's philosophical writings serve as indications not only of his interest in jurisprudence, but also of the importance of the former for the latter. (132)" (pp. 262-267)
(1) Recent literature that mentions Johann Kahl includes the following [Bibliography, G.]: STROHM: *Calvinismus and Recht* [Calvinismus und Recht. Weltanschaulich-konfessionelle Aspekte im Werk reformierter Juristen in der Frühen Neuzeit, Tübingen 2008 (Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation. Studies in the Late Middle Ages, Humanism, and the Reformation 42).] as well as the articles authored by MAHLMANN/STROHM and ZWIERLEIN within STROHM/FREEDMAN/SELDERHUIS (Eds.): *Späthumanismus* [*und reformierte Konfession. Theologie, Jurisprudenz und Philosophie in Heidelberg an der Wende zum 17. Jh*. Spätmittelalter und Reformation, Vol. 31, Tübingen 2006.]
(2) Refer to the editions [Bibliography, D.] published in 1600, 1610, 1611, 1619, 1664, 1665, 1670, 1683, 1734, and 1759.
(3) Refer to the citations of these philosophical writings in Table C; in Bibliography [D.] these writings are also cited along with three philosophical disputations – published in 1599, 1600, and 1602 – in which Kahl is listed as the presider thereof.
(111) Kahl sometimes appears to use the terms »theology/theological« and »religion« as synonymous

with Christianity; for example, see PP 71; 77 (and V. in Table E.) as well as PP, 111 (and IV. in Table F). The importance of both logic and Christianity in Kahl's »Themis Hebraeo-Romana [...] Iurisprudentia Mosaica [...] methodice digesta« (1595) is discussed – with the aid of extensive quotations from that legal treatise – in STROHM: Calvinismus und Recht [Bibliography, G.] 136 – 139.
(112) »Dialectica tam necessaria est [...] nedum in Iurisprudentia, inter omnes satis vaga & dispersa, evaserit, nisi forte peculiare ab ipsa natura lumen atque acumen logicum singulari Dei benedictione sortitus fuerit. Atque hinc plures Topica legalia, in usum Iuris studiosorum iam pridem exhibuerunt.« PP, 5. One additional indication of Kahl's emphasis on the importance of logic for jurisprudence is evident from the title of his »Jurisprudentiae Romanae [...] synopsis methodica« (1595) [Bibliography, G.] as well as from the title of his treatise cited in footnote 111 above.
(113) For example, see PP, 2 – 73; 77; 97; 104 ff; 107 f (as quoted in III. C. of Table F); 128; 131(– 147);
168 and II. in Table G; also see PP3, fol.*5 r, lines 1 ff; fol.*5 v, lines 2 – 24, 44 f.
(114) See PP, 111 (and IV. in Table F)
(122) Refer to footnotes 109 and 110, to the corresponding passages in the text of this article, and to Table P.
(123) PP, 136 f. Also see footnote 56 and the corresponding passage in the text of this article.
(125) Kahl, of course, was not alone in discussing war within academic writings during this period; for example, two editions of a treatise on war by Albericus GENTILIS (Alberico Gentili) are cited in E. of the Bibliography. Philosophical writings devoted to – or containing sections on politics normally devoted some attention to the subject-matter of war; refer to the following writings (cited in E. of the Bibliography):FREIGIUS: *Quaestiones oeconomicae et politicae*, 151; HOCKENHAFFEN: *Axiomata disciplinae moralis*, 150 – 153 (nos. 38 – 63);
KIRCHNERUS/VELBRUGGEN: *Philosophiae practicae*

synopsin, fol. D2 v – D4 r (nos. 160 – 175); TIMPLERUS: *Philosophiae practicae* [...] *politicam*, 454 – 506.
(126) In this context, Kahl also notes that war should be waged in accordance with the following
guide lines: »In respublica autem maxime quoque conservanda sunt iura belli (quod suscipiendum est eam solum ob causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur) nec post victoriam crudeliter
tractandi devicti, verum tuendi, ait.« PP, 135 f.
(127) »Respublica vero seu politia est ad populi legitime consociati salutem iuste facta ordinatio: quicumque demum casus, seu pacis, seu belli, inciderit.« PP3, fol.*6 r. All three of Kahl's definitions
of respublica are quoted within footnote 74.
(132) It has already been noted that (i.) Kahl's interest in jurisprudence probably began prior to his return to Heidelberg in 1586 and (ii.) he began to teach jurisprudence and publish legal writings well before he became a professor of jurisprudence in 1605; refer back to footnotes 16 and 17 as well as to the corresponding passages in the text of this article. An introductory section in one of Kahl's treatises on jurisprudence discusses the importance of philosophy (including logic and rhetoric) for the study of jurisprudence: CALVINUS, *De jurisprudentiae Romanae studio recte conformando* (1600) [Bibliography, D.] 1 – 48.

13. ———. 2012. "Johann Heinrich Alsteds, 'Philosophia Digne Restituta' (1612) Ein Kurzer Überblick Über Inhalt Und Bedeutung Des Werkes." *Nassauische Annalen* no. 123.

Johann Heinrich Alsted's *Philosophia digne restituta* (1612): A Brief Overview at Its Contents and Significance. Wiesbaden: Verein für Nassauische Altertumskunde und Geschichtsforschung.

14. ———. 2012. "Georg Liebler's Textbook on Physics (1561) in the Context of His Academic Career." In *Die Universität Tübingen Zwischen Scholastik Und Humanismus*, edited by

Lorenz, Sönke, Köpf, Ulrich, Freedman, Joseph S. and Bauer, Dieter R., 249-296. Ostfildern: Thorbecke.

Tübingen Bausteine zur Landesgeschichte 20.
"Instruction in the academic discipline of physics during the sixteenth century has received relatively little attention. (1) The textbook on physics first published by Georg Liebler in 1561 – and subsequently republished in expanded form in the year 1573 – appears
to have been widely disseminated during the last four decades of the sixteenth century. (2)
The 1561 edition of Liebler's textbook – in the context of his own career and of writings published by his own contemporaries – serves as the focus of the current study." (p. 249)
(...)
"Among the most difficult concepts mentioned within academic writings on physics – and also within other philosophical subject matters – during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is the concept of nature. The terms "nature" (*natura*) and "natural"
(*naturalis*) had a wide range of different meanings within individual academic writings during this period; individual authors sometimes did not explain all, some, or any of the ways in which they used these two terms.
In a broadsheet largely devoted to natural philosophy that was published in the year 1557 by Christophorus Mylaeus (Table I), a central distinction is made between "nature itself" (*natura ipsa*) and natura altera. (46) The latter is apparently equivalent (or: roughly
equivalent) to human nature; the former – which is not directly defined or described – serves as the subject matter of his broadsheet. However, the terms nature and natural appear to have been utilized in (at least) eleven additional ways by Mylaeus in this
broadsheet (C in Table I). (47)"
(...)
"The following general comments concerning the 1561 edition of Liebler's textbook on physics can be ventured

here. First, Liebler appears to adopt a rather rigid disciplinary approach in his textbook on physics; he appears to avoid discussion of issues and questions that are interdisciplinary in scope.123 Second, he seems constrained by – or at least conscious of – the need to avoid too much discussion of detailed subject matter in his textbook.124 And third, it would appear that he sometimes struggles with the task of writing his textbook, which – as mentioned earlier – could be described as not being particularly well organized. (125)

Any real or perceived problems with Liebler's textbook on physics notwithstanding, his textbook was republished – in its original or expanded version – at least ten times following its initial publication in the year 1561. (126) And the expanded version of this textbook – published for the first time in 1573 – may have been the only extant textbook containing extensive commentary on the physics of Petrus Ramus. (127) An examination of this expanded, 1573 version of Liebler's textbook on physics, however, falls beyond the scope of the present study."

(1) The 1561 edition of Liebler's textbook on physics (*Epitome philosophiae naturalis*) will be referred to here as Liebler (1561).

This edition of Liebler's textbook on physics contains two separate paginations. The first pagination comprises the title page, the dedication, and a page of verse; the second pagination (pages 1 through 301) contains the actual text. In citing the text, the appropriate page numbers (without reference to the fact that they are contained within the second pagination) are given.

A copy of this 1561 edition owned by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München has been used to prepare the text, footnotes, and tables of this article; a copy hereof owned by the Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen is the source of the four pages from that same work that have been reproduced as illustrations in this article.

Refer to the following literature (cited in full in G of the Bibliography): Des Chene [Dennis. *Physiologia: Natural*

Philosophy in late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought. Ithaca, New York [et alia]: Cornell Univ. Press,] (1996); Freedman, "Professionalization" (2001); Freedman, "Mylaeus" (2008); Grafton and Siriasi [eds., *Natural particulars : nature and the disciplines in Renaissance Europe*. Dibner Institute studies in the history of science and technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,] (1999); Leinsle [Ulrich G. *Dilinganae disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Disputationen an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Dillingen, 1555–1648*. Jesuitica. Vol. 11. Regensburg: Schnell und Steiner,] (2006).
(2) Refer to a. A.-B. in Table B as well as A. 1.–2. in the Bibliography.
(46) Mylaeus, *Theatrum universitatis rerum* (1557) [Bibliography, F] as cited fully in Freedman, "Mylaeus" [Bibliography, G], p. 245, footnote 29; the relevant texts from this broadsheet are quoted there on pages 302–312. The 1551 edition of Christophorus Mylaeus's treatise on historiography consists of five "Books" (libri); Book 1 is devoted to natura ipsa (which also is the subject matter of his *Theatrum universitatis rerum*). *Natura altera* is the focus of the remaining four Books; Books 2, 3, 4, and 5 discusses *prudentia, principatus, sapientia, and literatura*, respectively. See Mylaeus, *De scribenda universitatis scribendae* (1551) [Bibliography, F]. Concerning *natura altera* also refer to relevant texts as discussed, cited, and quoted in Freedman, "Mylaeus" [Bibliography, G], pp. 245, 282 (Table B), 312 (Table L, nos. 48–51).
(47) Mylaeus, *Theatrum universitatis rerum* (1557) [Bibliography, F] as cited fully in Freedman, "Mylaeus" [Bibliography, G], pp. 268–269, footnote 182.
(125) The following passage would appear to suggest that Liebler felt overwhelmed when attempting to discuss simple natural bodies: "Hactenus de primis et simplicibus naturae corporibus disservimus: nunc ad ea quae ex illis componuntur, nostra sese convertet oratio: ... Quorum omnium causas brevissime, sequentes vestigia Aristotelis, explicare conabimur." Liebler (1561), p. 253. A very brief, single-page table of contents was included in the 1563

imprint (and all subsequent extant imprints) of Liebler's textbook on physics; a (longer) subject-index accompanied all extant imprints thereof from 1586 onwards; refer to a. in Table B as well as to A. 1.–2. in the Bibliography.
(126) See a. in Table B as well as A. 1.–2. in the Bibliography.
(127) The writings – mainly on logic, rhetoric, grammar, geometry, and arithmetic – of Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon appear to have spread most widely in Central Europe from 1570 onwards; refer to the documentation and discussion given in the following article: Freedman, "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus" [Bibliography, G].

15. ———. 2012. "Philosophy Instruction, the Philosophy Concept, and Philosophy Disputations Published at the University of Ingolstadt, C. 1550 - C. 1650." In *Dichtung - Gelehrsamkeit - Disputationskultur. Festschrift Für Hanspeter Marti Zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Sdzuj, Reimund B., Seidel, Robert and Zegowitz, Bernd. Köln, Wien, und Weimar: Böhlau Verlag.

    "In the year 1981, Hanspeter Marti published an article on the value of published philosophical disputations (that is, disputations published in connection with philosophy instruction at academic institutions) for research on topics pertaining to Early Modern
    European studies. (2) The following year, this article was followed by his publication of an extensive bibliography of philosophical disputations published in Central Europe between the years 1660 and 1750. (3) His bibliography has been widely utilized in the three decades following its publication; in part due to the publication thereof, increased attention has also been accorded to disputations as an important academic genre. (4)
    The present study is focused on philosophical disputations published in Ingolstadt – in connection with academic instruction held at the University there – during the

hundred-year period between c. 1550 and c. 1650. Here, provisional answers will be given to
the following five questions. First, what was the scope of philosophy instruction at the University of Ingolstadt during the period between c. 1550 and c. 1650? Second, how did this scope evolve during that same period? Third, what were those subject-matters falling
within the parameters of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts at the University of Ingolstadt during the period? Fourth, what can be said concerning the content of this Ingolstadt philosophy instruction? And fifth, to what extent can published philosophical disputations help provide answers to these first four questions?
One additional, more general question must also be posed here. During the 16th and 17th centuries, which academic subject-matters were generally understood to fall within the parameters of European academic philosophy? An answer can be ventured here on the
basis of discussions of this same matter found in literally hundreds of philosophical writings published during these two centuries. (5)"
(2) Marti: Der wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Dokumentationswert (1981) as cited in full in the Bibliography [In: Nouvelles de la République des Lettres 1 (1981): 117–132.]. „Philosophical Disputations“ here refer to philosophical disputations and dissertations published in connection with academic instruction. No attempt will be made here to distinguish between disputations and dissertations; refer to Hanspeter Marti's articles on the same in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* (1994) as cited in the Bibliography. [Tübingen: Niemeyer]
(3) Marti: Philosophische Dissertationen (1982) as cited in the Bibliography. [*Philosophische Dissertationen deutscher Universitäten 1660–1750. Eine Auswahlbibliographie*, unter Mitarbeit von Karin Marti. München: K.G. Saur, 1982.]
(4) Refer to Freedman: *Published academic disputations in the context of other information formats used primarily in Central Europe (c. 1550–c.1700)* (2010) and Freedman:

Disputations in Europe in the Early Modern Period (2005); these two articles were published in volumes (cited here in the Bibliography) that are devoted to the subject-matter of disputations (and dissertations).
(5) Freedman: *Classifications* (1994) discusses classifications of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts during the 16th and the 17th centuries.

16. ———. 2012. "Central European Academic Text on Preaching and Sermons During the Final Quarter of the Seventeenth Century: In the Service of Pietist Preaching?" In *Aus Gottes Wort Und Eigener Erfahrung Gezeiget*, edited by Soboth, Christian and Sträter, Udo, 227-255. Halle: Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen.

    Erfahrung - Glauben, Erkennen, and Gestalten im Pietismus. Beiträge zum III. Internationalem Kongress für Pietismusfoschung 2009.

17. ———. 2014. "The History of 'Scientific Method' (Methodus Scientifica) in the Early Modern Period and Its Relevance for School-Level and University-Level Instruction in Our Time." In *Renaissance Now! The Value of the Renaissance Past in Contemporary Culture*, edited by Dooley, Brendan. Oxford, Bern, Berlin, et al.: Peter Lang.

    "Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is often associated with the concept of scientific method (*methodus scientifica*); however, it cannot be documented that he directly refers to it within his writings. (1) Yet it does appear that this concept began to be mentioned and discussed no later than during Bacon's lifetime. (2)
    Scientific method was discussed by what appears to have been a relatively small number of authors during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. (3) Yet these early discussions of this concept are relevant to present day debates concerning the utilization of the scientific method when placed in the context of academic instruction at the school - and university - levels.

Scientific method appears to have its origin as a sub-category of the concept of method. Method [*methodus*] apparently began to be discussed as an independent concept from about the year 1550 onwards. (4) Textbooks on logic frequently (if not usually) contained a chapter or a section on method; monographic treatises and disputations devoted to this same concept are also extant. Method was often considered to have (at least) the two basic sub-categories of synthetic method and analytic method.
The concept of scientific method itself is mentioned no later than in the year 1578, when Jacob Zabarella briefly discusses it within his published treatise on method [*De methodis*]. (7) According to Zabarella, scientific method has two component parts, one of which is 'synthetic' [*demonstrativa*] and the other 'analytic' [*resolutiva*]. It is possible that other sixteenth-century authors - prior to, in, or after the year 1578 - utilized this concept as well. (9)
The first known work published specifically on the subject-matter of scientific method appeared in the year 1606. Its author, Joannes Bellarinus, was an Italian, Roman Catholic cleric whose writings - first published during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries - were largely theological in content. (10) He published a large work which included a compilation of Tridentine doctrine and Roman Catholic catechism; that work apparently was first published in 1607 and went through at least twelve editions, including one from the year 1877. His treatise on scientific method, on the other hand, appears to only have been republished once (in 1630); very few copies of the 1606 edition of this treatise appear to have survived. (11)
Bellarinus's treatise on scientific method, which was first published in Milan in 1606, has the following title: *Praxis scientiarum, seu methodus scientifica practicae considerata. Ex Aristotele potissimum accepta*. It consists of a dedication, a detailed table of contents, a short index, and the text. The text consists of an introduction and four 'Books' [*libri*]. In the introduction, Bellarinus equates scientific method [*methodus scientifica*] with the practice of the sciences [*praxis scientiarum*]. (13)" (pp. 287-292

(...)
"One can conclude by making the following two general points. First, the scientific method can be utilized in elementary level instruction in order to teach logical ways of solving problems, analytical / critical thinking, and deductive reasoning, that is, general skills that transcend (natural) science instruction proper. Analogously late 16th-, 17th- and 18th-century discussions of scientific method are closely linked to the domain of logic.
They also focus on 'science' [*scientia*] insofar as science is understood to comprise a wide range of academic disciplines beyond [natural] science. (101)
One could make the case that the manner in which scientific method has often been utilized in instruction at the elementary school level over the past twenty-five years has its historical precedents dating back to the earliest known published discussions of this concept.
And second, while one might argue that logical thinking and deductive reasoning - both of which can be linked to the scientific method - do not themselves directly result in discovery; they also are not without relevance thereto. Louis Pasteur's assertion, 'Chance only Favours the Prepared Mind' summarizes this point. Many of our simple, routine tasks - which we sometimes do so regularly that we are no longer conscious of them - are actions informed in great part by logic, thereby providing basic parameters for our more complex undertakings. We generally utilize methods - some of which we may or may not regard (or label) as scientific - in order to increase our chances of making discoveries and/or reaching other goals.
In the context of research, we endeavour to employ rational strategies for what we might refer to when we use constructs such as 'the systematic search for chance finds'." (pp. 314-316; some notes omitted)
(1) While Chapter 2. of Book 6 of Bacon's *De dignitate & augmentis scientiarum* is devoted to the subject-matter of method, he does not mention scientific method as such; see Francis Bacon, *Opera Francisci Baronis de Verulamio [... tomus primus: qui continet de dignitate & augmentis*

scientiarum libros IX. (Londini [London]: In officina Joannis Haviland, 1623) [hereafter Bacon (1623)], 284-92. (...)
At the beginning (135) of Book 3 Chapter 1 of that same work, Bacon divides 'science' *[scientia*] into theology and philosophy; the latter is divided into natural theology *[numen*], natural philosophy [*natura*], and the study of man [*homo*], which includes a range of additional subject-matters beyond theologyand natural philosophy; also see pages 141, 144, 145, and 181-2 with regard to Bacon's classification of the subject matters falling within the (broad) scope of science.
(2) Scientific method is apparently not mentioned in any of the three works by Francis Bacon - *The Twoo Books of Francis Bacon. On the proficence and advancement of learning, divine and humane* (London: Printed [byThomas Purfott and Thomas Creede]
for Henrie Tomes, 1605.) [hereafter Bacon (1605)], Francis Bacon [=Franciscus de Verulamio], *Instauratio magna*. (Pars secunda, Novum organum.) Apud Joannem Billium typographum regium, 1620. [Oxford, Bodleian Library: Arch. A. c. 5] [hereafter Bacon (1620], and Bacon (1623) - cited in fn. 1. But here the following point must be noted. The subject-matter of the present study limits itself to those writings where 'scientilic method' - and its Latin-language equivalent, *methodus scientifica* - are specifically mentioned. One could argue that a discussion of the history of the scientific method should not be so limited. In that case, however, one would need to find a viable and defensible way of deciding what does and does not fall within the framework of scientific method over a given extended period of time.
(3) This assertion is to be understoodwith respect to the tens of thousands of academic writings from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries (almost all of which were written in Latin) that are extant - in published and in manuscript form - at libraries in and beyond Europe. The overwhelming majority of these writings have not been utilized beyond the eighteenth century (or earlier).

(4) The first published work - or one of the first published works - devoted specifically to the concept of method is Jodocus Willichius, *De methodo omnium artium et disciplinarum informanda opusculum, una cum multis utilibus et necessarijs exemplis*. Francofordii ad Viadrum [Frankfurt/Oder]: Johannes Eichorn, 1550. Berlin SB: A 1573 (nr. 1) [hereafter Willichius, *De methodo* (1550)]. The best general survey concerning the concept of method during this period remains Neal Ward Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, I960). Also referto the following two discussions of method: Joseph S. Freedman, 'The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c.1570 - c.1630' *Renaissance Quarterly* 46, no. I (Spring 1993), 98-152: 107-11; Joseph S. Freedman, 'Encyclopedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (c. 1500-c.1700), Archiv for Begriffgeschichte 37 (1994), 212.-56, 221-3, 245-6. These two articles have been reprinted in Joseph S. Freedman, Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700 Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS626 (Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Variorum, 1999), IV and V, respectively.
(7) See Jacobus Zabarella, *Opera logica*. (Venetiis [Venice]: Apud P. Meietum, 1578) [hereafter Zabarella (1578)]; here the 1597 edition of Zabarella's *Opera Logica* (as reprinted in 1966) has been used; see id., *Opera logica [...] affixa praefatio Joannis Ludovici Hawenreuteri [...] editio tertia*. (Coloniae [Cologne]: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, I597; reprinted with an edition by Wilhelm Risse. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, I966), [hereafter Zabarella (1597)]. It is possible that Zabarella utilized this term elsewhere in a work (in printed or manuscript form) prior to the year 1578.
(9) Refer to the point made in footnote 3·
(10) Joannes Bellarinus's treatise on scientific method is discussed in detail - together with brief discunssion of his theological writings - in the following article: Joseph S. Freedman, 'A Neglected Treatise on Scientific Method (methodus scientifica) published by Joannes Bellarinus (1606)' Jorg Schönert und Friedrich Vollhardt, eds.,

Geschichte der Hermeneutik und die Methodik der textinterpretieren den Disziplinen, Historia Hermeneutica. Series Studia 1 (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2005), 43-82: 43-5, 65-6.
(11) The only copy of Bellarinus published in 1630 that I have located to date is Joannes Bellarinus, *Speculum humanae atque divinae sapientiae, seu Praxis scientiarum et methodus scientifica*. (Mediolani [Milan]: Apud haeredes P. Pontii, 1630) [Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale: Z 11253]. Concerning extant copies of the 1606 edition, refer to Freedman, 'Bellarinus' (fn. 10), 43.
(13) Bellarinus (I606), 3 (Num. 4).
(101) Bellarinus uses the term *scientia* to mean 'knowledge' as well as to mean 'science: In the latter sense, *scientia* is not identified with what would be referred to as natural science in the United States today. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, *scientia* usually denotes a wider or narrower range of academic disciplines (or is understood more broadly to mean 'knowledge'); refer to the following: Freedman, 'Bellarinus' (fn. 10), 46 (fn. 8), 48, 69; Joseph S. Freedman, 'Classifications of Philosophy, the Arts, and the Sciences in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe' TheModern Schoolman, vol. 72, no. 1 (November 1994), 37-65 and reprinted in Freedman, *Philosophy and the Arts* (fn. 4), VII; Giorgio Tonelli, 'The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in Kant's Time' Rivista critica di storia della flosofia 30 (1975), 243-95. Concerning Francis Bacon's use of the term *scientia* refer to footnote 2 in this article.

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Édouard Jeauneau sur la Philosophie Médiévale. Bibliographie Choisie

INTRODUCTION

Édouard Jeauneau (1924 -) ancien Professeur de Philosophie au séminaire de Chartres et au Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies à Toronto, directeur de recherches au CNRS, a publié des éditions critiques de Guillaume de Conches, Jean Scot Érigène et Maxim le Confesseur.
Je donne une bibliographie de ses écrits sur la philosophie médiévale.
Pour une bibliographie complète voir:

1. Paul Edward Dutton, *Publications par / by Édouard Jeauneau*, dans: Haijo Jan Westra (ed.), *From Athens to Chartres. Studies in Honour of Édouard Jeauneau*, Leiden: Brill 1992, pp. XVII - XXVII (132 titres).
2. Paul Edward Dutton, *Édouard Jeauneau: Publications 1991-2014*, dans: Willemien Otten, Michael I. Allen (eds.), *Eriugena and Creation: Proceedings of the eleventh International Conference on Eriugenian Studies, held in honor of Edouard Jeauneau, Chicago, 9 - 12 November 2011*, Turnhout: Brepols 2014, pp. XIX - XXIX (80 titres).

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   "Writing chapters I and IV was primarily the responsibility of E.J. whereas chapters II and III were in the first instance that of P.D.; we both participated actively in writing the Conclusion, Chapter V. Each of us counts himself responsible for the work in its entirety." (p. 9)

"In short, the conclusion of Rand's article [*] was twofold : i. that there were two Irish hands (i^1 and i^2) entering corrections, additions, and enlargements in Eriugena's manuscripts; 2. that neither i^1 nor i^2 is Eriugena's hand. The first conclusion is now commonly accepted by all scholars who study these manuscripts. If this conclusion is a solid one, that is, that two Irish hands worked to enlarge and correct Eriugena's writings, then four hypotheses are theoretically possible concerning the relation of these two hands to the author:

Hypothesis I : neither i^1 nor i^2 is Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis II : both i^1 and i^2 are Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis III : i^2 is Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis IV : i^1 is Eriugena's hand.

These seem to be the only possible hypotheses regarding the Irish handwriting associated with Eriugena." (p. 20)

[*] E.K. Rand, "The Supposed Autographa of John the Scot", in *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, 5 (1918—1923), no. 8 [13 October 1920, pp. 135-141, with 11 plates].

(...)

"Terence Alan Martyn Bishop, after studying carefully the Irish script contained in the manuscripts of Eriugena's works, concluded that, of the two Irish hands distinguished by Rand, i^2 could not be Eriugena's autograph, while i^1 had the better claim to be so. (51)" (p. 26)

(51) T.A.M. Bishop, "Autographa of John the Scot", in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, Laon, 7-12 juillet 1975, Paris, C:N.R. S. 1977, pp. 89-94.

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"C'est sur l'ordre de Charles le Chauve qui encourageait l'étude des Pères que Jean Scot s'est mis à traduire et cette cour était un milieu propice. C'est par le Ps.-Denys qu'il a été introduit à la patristique grecque. Il est passé ensuite naturellement à Maxime le Confesseur et à Grégoire de Nysse. Il n'eut sans doute entre les mains aucune œuvre profane. Il a fait œuvre de philosophe en même temps que de traducteur."
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Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 659-673.
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38. ———. 1982. "Gloses et commentaires de textes philosophiques (IXe-XIIe s.)." In *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales. Définition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain-la-Neuve 25-27 mai 1981*, 117-131. Louvain-la-Neuve: Publications de l'Institut des Etudes médiévales.
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Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 301-332.
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Repris dans: *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 321-337.
44. ———. 1987. "Le renouveau érigénien du XII siècle." In *Eriugena Redivivus. Zur Wirkungeschichte seines Denkens im Mittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 26-46. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 439-460.
"Je me contenterai d'étudier le rôle joué par le douzième siècle dans la transmission des textes érigéniens. Pour ce faire, il me paraît indispensable d'examiner individuellement chacune des oeuvres de l'Erigène. Chacune d'elles, en effet, a eu son destin propre, sa fortune particulière, qui ne coïncident pas toujours - ou plutôt, qui coïncident rarement - avec la fortune et le destin des autres oeuvres.
Je ne dirai rien des 'Annotationes in Martianum' dont la fortune est riche certes, mais qui soulèvent des problèmes d'authenticité quasiment insolubles(4). Du 'De

praedestinatione', il n'y a rien à dire. En effet, comme le remarque son récent éditeur, "il n'en est fait aucune mention ... dans la littérature théologique du Moyen Age", et il ne sera "exhumé qu'au XVIIe siècle, lors de la controverse janséniste"(5).
Des traductions érigéniennes, au contraire, il y aurait beaucoup à dire, moins en ce qui concerne Grégoire de Nysse et Maxime le Confesseur, qu'en ce qui concerne le pseudo-Denys. Mais, exception faite de la 'Hiérarchie céleste', nous n'avons pas d'édition critique de la traduction de Denys par Jean Scot; et si l'histoire de la tradition dionysienne en Occident a déjà été explorée par d'excellents pionniers, il s'en faut, et de beaucoup, qu'elle nous soit en tout point connue. Pour ces raisons, je vous prie de m'excuser si je passe sous silence cet important aspect de l'influence érigénienne au douzième siècle. Enfin, j'écarte de mon propos les 'Carmina'.
(,,,)
Mon champ d'investigation se limitera à cette partie de l'oeuvre érigénienne que Dom Cappuyns aimait se représenter sous la forme d'un triptyque: sur le panneau central le 'Periphyseon', sur l'un des volets l'homélie 'Vox spiritualis' et le commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean, sur l'autre volet les 'Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem'(8).
(4) H. Liebeschütz. “The Place of the Martianus ‘Glossae’ in the Development of Eriugena’s Thought”, dans *The Mind of Eriugena. Papers of a Colloquium*, Dublin, 14-18 July 1970, édit. J. J. O’Meara - L. Bieler, Dublin 1973, pp. 49-58. G. Schrimpf, “Zur Frage der Authentizität unserer Texte von Johannes Scottus‘Annotationes in Martianum’”, ibid., pp. 125-139. C. Leonardi, “Glosse eriugeniane a Marziano Capella in un codice Leidense”, dans *Jean Scot Erigène et l’histoire de la philosophie*, édit. R. Roques, Paris 1977, pp. 171-182. On consultera les communications faites par M. Claudio Leonardi au colloque Jean Scot écrivain tenu à Montréal en 1983 (édit G.-H. Allard) et au colloque Eriugena rediuiuus tenu à Bad Homburg en 1985 [dans ce volume pp. 77-88).

(5) G. Madec, Edit. *Iohannis Scotti de diuina praedestinatione liber*, CCM 50, Turnhout 1978, pp. IX et X.
(8) M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée*, Louvain - Paris 1933, p. 182.

45. ———. 1987. "Jean Scot et la métaphysique du feu." In *Études érigéniennes*, 297-319. Paris: Études augustiniennes.
46. ———. 1987. "Le thème du retour." In *Études érigéniennes*, 365-394. Paris: Études augustiniennes.
47. ———. 1988. "Jean Scot traducteur de Maxime le Confesseur." In *The Sacred Nectar of the Greeks: The Study of Greek in the West in the Early Middle Ages*, edited by Herren, Michael W. and Brown, Ann Shirley, 257-276. London: King's College.

"Jean Scot, surnommé l'Erigéne, s'est distingue, au IXe siècle, non seulement comme penseur, mais comme traducteur. Les principaux textes grecs traduits par lui sont: les oeuvres complétés de Denys l'Arëopagite, une oeuvre de Grégoire de Nysse, le *De imagine* (vulgairement appelé *De opificio hominis*), et deux oeuvres de Maxime le Confesseur, les *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* et les *Ambigua ad Iohannem*. L'art de traduire, tel que Jean Scot l'a pratiqué, a fait l'objet de plusieurs études. A l'exception d'un article, qui porte sur la traduction de Grégoire de Nysse,(1) ces études s'appuient sur la traduction de Denys.(2) La raison en est simple: les seules traductions érigéniennes qui aient été éditées jusqu'ici sont précisément celles de Grégoire de Nysse et du pseudo-Denys.(3) La version érigénienne des *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, en partie publiée,(4) et celle des *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, qui doit être publiée prochainement,(5) devraient permettre d'élargir l'enquête. Ayant consacré une bonne dizaine d'années à préparer l'édition de la version érigénienne des *Ambigua*, j'ai pu, en marge de mon travail d'éditeur, faire certaines observations sur la traduction de Jean Scot, ses mérites et ses déficiences. Les remarques qui suivent sont le résultat de ces observations. Il ne faut pas y chercher un exposé systématique des problèmes relatifs à Jean Scot traducteur. Ce sont des notes de lecture, rien de plus." (p. 257)

(...)
"En bref, la traduction érigénienne des *Ambigua ad Iohannem* n'intéresse pas seulement le philologue; elle interésse aussi - j'allais dire surtout - l'historien des idées. Car la découverte de Maxime a joué un rôle prépondérant dans la formation de la pensée philosophique de Jean Scot. Or, c'est en le traduisant, que Jean Scot a découvert Maxime. Ne voir dans les traductions érigéniennes que les non-sens, les contresens et les a-peu-près, c'est regarder les choses par le petit bout de la lorgnette, et oublier l'essentiel: un homme est là, aux prises avec une pensée entièrement nouvelle pour lui, luttant contre la gangue du langage qui la dérobe â ses yeux. De ce combat inégal, lutte de Jacob contre l'Ange, l'Erigène, en dépit de quelques erreurs de tactique, est finalement sorti avec honneur." (p. 272)
(1) P. Levine, "Two Early Latin versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa's περὶ κατασκευης ἀνθρώπουν," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), 473-492.
(2) G. Théry, "Scot Erigène traducteur de Denys," *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 6 (1931), 185-278. R. Roques, "Traduction ou interprétation? Brèves remarques sur Jean Scot traducteur de Denys," dans J.J. O'Meara et L. Bieler (éds.), *The Mind of Eriugena. Papers of a Colloquium*, Dublin, 14-18 July 1970 (Dublin 1973), 59-76; reproduit dans R.Roques, *Libres sentiers vers l'érigénisme* (Rome, 1975), 99-130. J.Pépin, "Jean Scot traducteur de Denys: l'exemple de la Lettre IX," dans G.H. Allard (éd.), *Jean Scot écrivain. Actes du IVe Colloque international, Montreal*, 28 août - 2 septembre 1983 (Montréal et Paris, 1986), 129-141.
(3) Notons, toutefois, que l'étude de Philip Levine, citée ci-dessus (n. 1) a paru avant l'édition de la version erigénienne: M.Cappuyns, "Le De imagine de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Erigène," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965), 205-262.
(4) C. Laga et C. Steel (éds.), *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium, I. Quaestiones l-LV*, una cum latina interpretatione loannis Scotti Eriugenae iuxta posit a, CCSG 7, (Turnhout, 1980). Le second volume (Quaestiones LVI-LXV) est sous presse [1990].

(5) E. Jeauneau (éd.), *Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae latinam interpretationem* CCSG 18 (sous presse) [1988].

48. ———. 1988. "Berkeley, University of California, Bancroft Library MS 95 (Notes de lecture)." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 50:438-456.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 675-698.

49. ———. 1989. "L'édition du livre IV du *Periphyseon*." In *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo. L'organizzazione del sapere in età Carolingia*, 469-486. Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'Alto Medioevo.

50. ———. 1989. "Jean Scot Érigène: grandeur et misère du métier de traducteur." In *Traduction et traducteurs au Moyen Age. Actes du colloque international, Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes, 26-28 mai 1986*, edited by Contamine, Geneviève, 99-108. Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 231-242.

51. ———. 1990. "Jean Scot et la métaphysique des nombres." In *Begriff und Metapher. Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena*, edited by Beierwaltes, Werner, 126-141. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 461-477.
"Parmi les disciplines que les penseurs antiques et médiévaux ont pratiquées avec ferveur, celles qui déroutent le plus le lecteur moderne sont probablement l'étymologie et l'arithmologie. Il est tenté de voir en elles des tics ou des manies, excusables chez des gens qui ont eu la malchance de naître en des temps moins éclairés que le sien: dans le meilleur des cas il les excuse, il a de la peine à les prendre au sérieux. Nos ancêtres, cependant, voyaient différemment les choses. Ni l'étymologie ni l'arithmologie n'étaient pour eux jeux puérils. A leurs yeux, l'une et l'autre étaient des voies privilégiées pour accéder à la connaissance du réel.
(...)
On pourrait dire que, pour toute une famille d'esprits, tant dans l'antiquité tardive que dans le Moyen Age, l'étymologie était la métaphysique des noms, cependant que l'arithmologie était la métaphysique des nombres6.

Comment Jean Scot a-t-il pratiqué cette dernière? C'est ce que je me propose d'examiner ici." (p. 126)
(...)
"J'ai promis de revenir sur la division quadripartite de la nature. Le nombre quatre, avons-nous dit, est le nombre de l'univers, d'un univers ordonné. Ce nombre, selon les Pythagoriciens, "contient les racines de la nature éternelle"(127). Il convient donc parfaitement à une division de la nature. Mais pourquoi précisément la division de la nature telle que Jean Scot l'a formulée au début du Periphyseon? Les quatre membres de cette division sont: I. Nature qui crée et n'est pas créée IL Nature qui est créée et qui crée III. Nature qui est créée et qui ne crée pas IV. Nature qui ne crée pas et qui n'est pas créée(128). Inglis Patrick Sheldon-Williams n'avait pas manqué d'observer que cette division de la nature n'est pas sans analogie avec une division quadripartite des nombres, que l'on trouve chez Philon d'Alexandrie(129). Si l'on examine les nombres qui sont contenus dans les limites de la décade, on constate que ces nombres se répartissent en quatre catégories: I. Nombres qui engendrent et ne sont pas engendrés II. Nombres qui sont engendrés et qui engendrent III. Nombres qui sont engendrés et qui n'engendrent pas IV. Nombres qui n'engendrent pas et ne sont pas engendrés(130). Il va sans dire que Jean Scot n'a pas lu Philon d'Alexandrie. Mais la division quadripartie des nombres a pu lui arriver par d'autres intermédiaires. Sheldon-Williams proposait Macrobe et saint Augustin. Sans exclure entièrement ces derniers, il me semble que Martianus Capella est un meilleur candidat(131). La seule différence remarquable entre les deux divisions concerne le verbe: creare chez Jean Scot, generare (γεννάν) chez Philon. En fait, la différence est moins importante qu'on pourrait croire. Martianus Capella considère les verbes gignere et procreare comme pratiquement interchangeables; et, parlant de la tétrade (quatre), il écrit: "Tétras autem et créât et creatur"(132). Faut-il conclure que les spéculations pythagoriciennes sur les nombres ont pu donner à Jean Scot l'idée de sa division quadripartite de la nature? Ce n'est là

qu'une hypothèse. Si elle était démontrée, elle confirmerait l'opinion que j'ai essayé de formuler dans ce petit essai, à savoir que la "métaphysique des nombres" peut déboucher parfois sur la métaphysique tout court." (p. 141)
127 πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως φιζώματ' Εχονσαν (Sextus Empiricus, *Aduersus arithmeticos*, 2. Cf. ci-dessus, n. 78.
128 *Periphyseon,* I, 36.21-24; PL 122, 441B.
129 *Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon*, lib. I, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Dublin 1968, p. 222-223.
130 Philon d'Alexandrie, *De opificio mundi*, 99 (Cohn-Wendland, editio minor, vol. 1, Berlin 1896, p. 27,28-31; traduction de R. Arnaldez, Paris 1961, p. 207).
131 E. Jeauneau, *Etudes érigéniennes*, Paris 1987, p. 367-368.
132 "Namque omnes numeri intra decadem positi aut gignunt alios aliisque gignunturaut procre-antur; hexas, ogdoas generantur tantummodo, tétras autem et créât et creatur, heptas uero quod nihil gignit eo peruirgo perhibetur, sed quod a nullo nascitur hinc Minerva est." (Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis*, VII, 738; éd. A. Dick - J. Préaux, p. 372-373). Pour un texte corrigé on consultera l'édition de James Willis [*], p. 266-267.
[*] *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, Leipzig : B.G. Teubner 1983,

52. ———. 1991. "The Neoplatonic Themes of *Processio* and *Reditus* in Eriugena." *Dionysius* no. 15:3-29.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 511-539.
"Needless to say my purpose is not to draw up an inventary of all the Neoplatonic elements which Eriugena could cull from the works of Pseudo-Dionysius. As I have said before, I shall concentrate on two themes, those of *Processio* (Procession) and *Reditus* (Return), and examine how - successfully or not - these Neoplatonic themes have been integrated into the Eriugenian synthesis." (p. 8)
(...)
"In fact, these two notions constitute the leitmotiv of Eriugena's major work, the *Periphyseon*. According to him, they are also among the most important themes developed

by Maximus the Confessor in his *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, for in this book, the reader may discover
what the Procession is, namely the multiplication of divine Goodness through all beings, from the supreme to the lowest, beginning with the general Essence of all things first, descending then to the most general genera, then to the less general of them, then from the less special species to the most special of them through differences and properties; again what is the Return - i.e., unification - of divine Goodness, through the same steps, from the infinitely various multiplicity of all beings up to the supreme unity of all things, that is in God and is God. And so God is all things, and all things are God. (30)" (p. 10)
(...)
"*Periphyseon* is not only a discourse about the division (or Procession), but also, and at the same time, a discourse about unification (or Return).
And if the two themes, Procession and Return, cannot be considered independently from each other, it is because neither can be understood separately from the third member of the triad, i.e., Immanence. Books III and IV of *Periphyseon* belong to the literary
genre called *Hexaemeron*, meaning a treatise on creation, in which the author follows the narrative of the six days of Genesis. The purpose of Eriugena, however, is not to show the temporal unfolding of the created multiplicity from the creating Unity. If it were that, his *Periphyseon* would be a Biblical commentary, not a philosophical dialogue. The purpose of Eriugena is not to give an historical account of creation, but rather to establish firmly its rational foundations." (p. 11)
(30) *Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae latinam interpretationem*, Epistula ad Karolum Regem, 27-35 (CCSG 18, p. 4). Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, I.3.4.

53. ———. 1991. "*Vox spiritualis Aquilae*. Quelques épis oubliés." In *From Augustine to Eriugena. Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in honor of John O'Meara*,

edited by Martin, Francis X. and Richmond, John A., 107-116. Washington: Catholic University of America Press. Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 499-510.
"Lorsque, en 1969, j'éditai l'homélie érigénienne *Vox spiritualis Aquilae*, je la fis précéder d'une introduction dans laquelle, entre autres choses, j'esquissais à grands traits la fortune de ce texte.(1) Depuis, de nouveaux témoignages de cette fortune sont venus à ma connaissance. Ce sont eux que je voudrais présenter ici. Avant toute autre chose, je tiens à dire que la plupart de ces témoignages m'ont été signalés par des collègues ou des amis. La glane que j'en ai faite n'a pu être rassemblée que grâce à leur concours. Elle est un des fruits du mouvement d'intérêt pour la pensée érigénienne que le professeur John J. O'Meara a su capter et auquel il a réussi à communiquer une nouvelle et vigoureuse impulsion; il est juste de lui en faire hommage.
La preuve la plus évidente de la fortune de la *Vox spiritualis* est le grand nombre des manuscrits qui nous en ont conservé le texte. On en comptait cinquante-quatre en 1969. Depuis lors, seize témoins nouveaux ont été découverts, ce qui porte à soixante-dix le nombre des manuscrits qui, en tout ou en partie, contiennent l'homélie érigénienne.2 A cela s'ajoutent les bréviaires, dans lesquels cette homélie, réduite à quelques lignes il est vrai, est cependant représentée." (p. 107)
"Un autre témoin de l'influence de la *Vox spiritualis* à l'époque carolingienne est un commentaire sur les *Opuscula sacra* de Boèce qu'Edward K. Rand a publié sous le nom de Jean Scot.(9) En réalité, ce commentaire, le plus ancien que nous possédions sur les opuscules théologiques de Boèce, n'est pas de Jean Scot, mais d'un auteur anonyme, incontestablement influencé par lui.(10)" (pp. 108-109)
(1) Jean Scot, *Homélie sur le Prologue de Jean*, Coll. Sources chrétiennes, 151 (Paris, 1969), 130-67.
(9) E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus. I. Der Kommentar des Johannes Scottus zu den Opuscula sacra des Boethius* (Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters 1,2), Munich 1906.

(10) M. Cappuyns, “Le plus ancien commentaire des Opuscula sacra et son origine,” dans RTAM[*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*] 3 (1931), 237-72. H. Silvestre, “La Consolation de Boèce et sa tradition littéraire,” dans *Revue d‘Histoire ecclésiastique* 64 (1969), 27-28 [23—36]. C. Leonardi, “La controversia trinitaria nell’ epoca e nell’opera di Boezio,” dans *Atti del Congresso internazionale di studi boeziani* (Rome, 1981), 109, n. 5 [109-22].

54. ———. 1991. "Heiric d'Auxerre disciple de Jean Scot." In *L'Ecole carolingienne d'Auxerre de Murethach à Rémi, 830-908: Entretiens d'Auxerre 1989*, edited by Iogna-Prat, Dominique, Jeudy, Colette and Lobrichon, Guy, 353-370. Paris: Beauchesne.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 479-498.
"Bien des facteurs interviennent dans la formation d’un grand écrivain ou d’un grand penseur. Le moindre d’entre eux n’est pas le génie, condition sine qua non à laquelle aucune école, aucune technique ne sauraient suppléer. Cependant, ni l’art d’écrire ni l’art de penser ne sont donnés au berceau. Ils se cultivent, ils se développent, si le terrain est propice : c’est à quoi servent les écoles et les maîtres. Le talent littéraire d’Heiric d’Auxerre force l’admiration. Comment s’est-il formé, et sous l’influence de quels maîtres ? Nous pouvons sans crainte d’erreur en citer trois : Haymon d’Auxerre, Servat Loup, et Jean Scot surnommé l’Erigène. Heiric a lui-même reconnu sa dette envers les deux premiers dans la préface à ses Collectanea : à Loup il se dit redevable de sa culture profane, à Haymon de sa culture théologique(1). Il ne mentionne pas le troisième, auquel il est redevable de ce que, non sans anachronisme, nous appelons sa culture philosophique. D’après la « Généalogie des lettrés » (*Grammaticorum Διαδοχή*) de Gautbert, c’est l’Irlandais Hélie, devenu par la suite évêque d’Angoulême, qui aurait initié Heiric à la pensée de Jean Scot(2). Le Frère Quadri a fait justement remarquer qu’un tel intermédiaire n’est pas indispensable. On a tout lieu de croire en effet qu’Heiric a connu Jean Scot personnellement au cours d’un séjour à Saint-Médard de Soissons(3). Si

l'Erigène n'est pas nommé dans la préface des *Collectanea,* c'est sans doute parce que cette œuvre ne lui doit rien." (p. 353)
(...)
"L'influence érigénienne est particulièrement évidente en trois passages de la *Vita sancii Germani* : l'I*nuocatio*, la préface du livre VI, les vers 536-566 du livre VI. Hâtons-nous de dire que le caractère érigénien de ces passages est connu depuis longtemps. Ludwig Traube, en rééditant en 1896 dans les *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, [M.G.H.] *Poetae Latini Aeui Carolini*, III, la *Vita sancti Germani* (éditée une première fois par les Bollandistes et reproduite par la Patrologie latine, tome 124, colonnes 1131-1208), eut la bonne idée de publier les scholies qui accompagnent les vers d'Heiric dans le manuscrit latin 13757 de la Bibliothèque Nationale. Or, plusieurs de ces scholies ne sont rien d'autre que des extraits du *Periphyseon*. Hauréau fut sans doute le premier à identifier les citations érigéniennes véhiculées par les scholies de la *Vita sanctii Germani*(24). Mais c'est à Traube que revient le mérite de l'avoir fait de façon systématique. Les notes de son édition contiennent les références au *Periphyseon* (édité par Floss dans le tome 122 de la Patrologie latine). Il suffit donc, pour étudier l'érigénisme de la *Vita sancti Germani*, d'utiliser les références données par Traube, en les complétant, et en les corrigeant à l'occasion. C'est ce que j'ai essayé de faire, en comparant l'édition des Monumenta Germaniae Misterica avec le manuscrit qui a servi à l'établir." (356)
(1) Préface aux *Collectanea*, vers 11-14 (M.G.H., *Poetae* III, p. 427).
(2) Texte cité par L. Traube dans M.G.H., *Poetae* III, p. 422, n. 2.
(12) B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* (cit. n. 12), Ie partie, Paris 1872.
(24) B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* (cit. n. 12), Ie partie, p. 181-184.

55. ———. 1991. "Note critique sur une récente édition de la *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* et de la *Theologia 'Scholarum'*

d'Abélard." *Revue des Etudes augustiniennes* no. 37:151-158.

56. ———. 1992. "Le *De paradiso d'Ambroise dans le livre IV du Periphyseon*." In *Sophies maietores (Chercheurs de sagesse). Hommage à Jean Pépin*, edited by Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, Madec, Goulven and O'Brien, Denis, 561-571. Paris: Institut d'études Augustiniennes.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 217-229.

57. ———. 1994. "Θεοτοκία grecs conservés en version latine." In *Philohistor. Miscellanea in honorem Caroli Laga septuagenarii*, edited by Schoors, Antoon and Van Deun, Peter. Leuven: Peeters.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 255-279.

58. ———. 1994. "De l'art comme mystagogie (Le Jugement dernier vu par Érigène)." In *De l'art comme mystagogie. Iconographie du Jugement dernier et des fins dernières à l'époque gothique*, edited by Christe, Yves, 1-8. Poitiers: Centre d'Études supérieures de Civilisation médiévale. Actes du colloque de la Fondation Hardt tenu à Genève du 13 au 16 février 1994.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 559-568.
Résumé: "Lorsqu'il aborde le thème des fins dernières, Érigène dénonce sans ménagement, parfois avec sarcasme, les représentations sensibles qui en sont proposées dans la prédication courante, voire dans les homélies des Pères. Aurait-il condamné, s'il avait pu les connaître, les grandioses compositions qui ornent les porches de nos cathédrales ? Ne le concluons pas trop vite. En effet, on trouve chez cet auteur les linéaments d'une esthétique sacrée. Cette esthétique pourrait se résumer en un mot, emprunté à Denys l'Aréopagite et à Maxime le Confesseur : mystagogie (introduction aux mystères). Loin d'exclure l'art, Érigène lui assigne un rôle primordial, celui de frayer la voie à la contemplation théologique. L'erreur qu'il dénonce consiste à s'arrêter en chemin, à prendre le vestibule pour le sanctuaire."

59. ———. 1995. "Le 'Cogito' érigénien." *Traditio* no. 50:95-110.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 541-558.

"Qu'il y ait un Cogito érigénien, personne, je pense, n'y contredira. Que la source ultime en soit saint Augustin, personne non plus ne le contestera. Mais ce Cogito est-il vraiment une anticipation, une première ébauche du Cogito cartésien? Cela est beaucoup moins sûr. Pour en décider, le mieux est de relire les textes dans lesquels Érigène a formulé son Cogito. Assurément, cela a déjà été entrepris par d'excellents chercheurs, notamment par celui auquel je dédie amicalement ces lignes.(7) Mon excuse pour rouvrir le dossier est la suivante. Je viens de préparer une édition du livre 4 du *Periphyseon*.(8) A cette occasion j'ai dû relire le passage dans lequel a été formulé le Cogito érigénien. Or, pour des raisons que j'exposerai dans un instant, l'établissement du texte ne va pas sans difficulté. Avant de discuter du Cogito lui-même, il importe de s'assurer de la fiabilité du texte qui le contient. Je me propose de procéder en deux temps: 1) La formulation du Cogito érigénien; 2) Sa portée philosophique. (p. 96)

"Le Cogito érigénien se trouve formulé au livre 4 du Periphyseon, 776 BC.

Dans le manuscrit le plus ancien (Reims, Bibliothèque municipale MS 875, fol. 291r), exemplaire de travail, chargé, voire surchargé de grattages, de ratures, de corrections, et d'additions de toute sorte, le passage qui nous intéresse a été remanié. La plupart de ces remaniements sont dus à l'une des deux mains irlandaises que l'on rencontre dans les manuscrits érigéniens, très précisément la main que l'on appelle "i^1" et qu'à juste titre on considère comme étant celle d'Érigène lui-même. Je considérerai ce point comme acquis et parlerai de "la main d'Érigène" là où de plus prudents que moi parleraient de "la main i1."

Disons tout de suite que les remaniements apportés par Érigène à la formulation de son Cogito sont d'ordre plus littéraire que doctrinal. Ils n'en ont pas moins dérouté les lecteurs et les éditeurs du *Periphyseon*. Il n'est donc pas superflu de les examiner. Je reproduirai d'abord le texte tel qu'on le lit dans le manuscrit de Reims; je rappellerai ensuite comment les différents éditeurs du *Periphyseon*

l'ont compris; enfin je dirai comment, à mon avis, on doit le lire." (p. 96)
"En bref, la triade essentia, uirtus, operatio (οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια) n'est introduite que pour acheminer vers une autre triade, mens, ratio, sensus interior (νοὺς, λόγος, διάνοια), qui est, en l'homme, l'image de la Trinité créatrice. (74)
Sur ce point comme sur plusieurs autres, Érigène se plaît à souligner l'accord de Denys l'Aréopagite et d'Augustin d'Hippone.
(...)
Ce recours aux autorités patristiques montre bien que nous sommes sortis du champ philosophique du Cogito et entrés dans le champ de la réflexion théologique, celui de la Fides quaerens intellectum. Mais cela ne remet pas en question ce que le Cogito érigénien a établi: "L'âme humaine sait qu'elle est une nature douée de raison et d'intellect; elle ne connaît l'essence ni de l'intellect ni de la raison". (78)" (p. 110)
(7) Brian Stock, "lntelligo me esse: Eriugena's Cogito," *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, éd. R. Roques (Paris, 1977), 328-35. Willemien Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leyden, 1991), 184-89, 207-08, 210-11.
(8) Collection "Scriptores Latini Hiberniae," 13 (Dublin, 1995).
(74) *Periphyseon* 1. 486BC, 489C-489D, 505C-D; 2. 567AB; 4 825C.
(77) *Periphyseon* 5. 941D-942B.
(78) *Periphyseon* 4. 776C.

60. ———. 1995. "Some remarks on the Muckle translation of Abelard's *Adversities*." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 57:337-343. En collaboration avec Edward A. Synan.
61. ———. 1996. "*Artifex Scriptura*." In *Iohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and Hermeneutics*, edited by Van Riel, Gerd, Steel, Carlos and McEvoy, James, 351-365. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 67-83.
62. ———. 1996. ""Sensus" dans l'exégèse biblique du haut Moyen Âge (IXe-XIIe siècle)." In *Lessico Intellettuale*

Europeo 66: Sensus-Sensatio. VIII Colloquio Internazionale. Roma 6-8 Gennaio 1995, edited by Bianchi, Luigi Massimo, 25-35. Firenze: Olschki.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 85-97.

63. ———. 1997. "Néant divin et théophanie (Érigène disciple de Denys)." In *Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, edited by de Libera, Alain, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 331-337. Paris: Vrin.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 137-145.
64. ———. 1997. "Denys l'Aréopagite, promoteur du néoplatonisme en Occident." In *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale*, edited by Benakis, Linos G., 1-23. Turnhout: Brepols.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 111-135.
65. ———. 1997. "L'abbaye de Saint-Denis introductrice de Denys en Occident." In *Denys l'Aréopagite et sa postérité en orient et en Occident*, edited by de Andia, Ysabel, 361-378. Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes.
Actes du colloque international, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 147-166.
66. ———. 1997. "Jean de Salisbury et Aristote." In *Aristote, l'École de Chartres et la Cathédrale. Actes du colloque des 5 et 6 juillet 1997*, edited by Faloci, Roger, 33-39. Chartres: Association des Amis du Centre Médiéval Européen de Chartres.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 403-411.
67. ———. 1997. "La place de la *Consolation de Philosophie* de Boèce dans les "Manuels de l'Étudiant" en la première moitié du treizième siècle." In *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109. Actes du Colloque International*, edited by Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, 181-201. Turnhout: Brepols.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 413-435.
68. ———. 1997. "Les Maîtres chartrains." In *Monde médiéval et société chartraine. Actes du colloque tenu à Chartres, 8-10 septembre 1994*. Paris: Picard.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 699-715.

69. ———. 1997. "L'École de Chartres." In *"Dedens mon livre de pensée...". De Grégoire de Tours à Charles d'Orléans, une histoire du livre médiéval en région Centre*, edited by Holtz, Louis, Rabel, Claudia and Lalou, Elisabeth, 54-74. Paris: Somogy éditions d'art.
70. ———. 1998. "Érigène et Grégoire de Nysse." In *Du copiste au collectionneur. Mélanges d'histoire des textes et des bibliothèques en l'honneur d'André Vernet*, edited by Nebbiai-Dalla Guarda, Donatella and Genest, Jean-François, 57-69. Turnhout: Brepols.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 201-215.
71. ———. 2000. "Le commentaire de Guillaume de Lucques sur les *Noms divins*." In *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter*, edited by Boladjev, Tzotcho, Kapriev, Georgi and Speer, Andreas, 177-195. Turnhout: Brepols.
Internationales Kolloquium in Sofia von 8. bis 11. April 1999 unter der Schirmherrschaft der Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 183-200.
72. ———. 2000. "La figure de Melchisédech chez Maxime le Confesseur." In *Autour de Melchisédech. Mythe - Réalités - Symbole. Actes du colloque européen des 1er et 2 juillet 2000.*, 51-59. Chartres: Association des Amis du Centre Médiéval Européen de Chartres.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 243-253.
73. ———. 2000. "L'influence des traductions érigéniennes sur le vocabulaire philosophique du Moyen Âge : simples remarques." In *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Steel, Carlos, 157-169. Turnhout: Brepols.
Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven, 12-14 septembre 1998, organisé par la Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 569-583.
"Que les traductions érigéniennes de Denys l'Aréopagite et de Maxime le Confesseur aient pu influencer le vocabulaire philosophico-théologique du Moyen Âge latin, tout le monde, je pense, est disposé à l'admettre. Quant à juger cette influence, dire précisément dans quelle mesure et avec

quel succès les néologismes créés par Érigène au neuvième siècle pour le besoin de ses traductions sont entrés dans le langage philosophique des siècles suivants, c'est là une entreprise qui demanderait un long examen. Disons tout de suite que je n'ai eu ni le temps ni la force de m'y livrer. Dans ces conditions, il me faut confesser que, ne pouvant traiter à fond le sujet que je m' étais imprudemment proposé, je me limiterai à quelques remarques, que je distribuerai en deux catégories, suivant qu'Érigène, pour ses traductions, a dû recourir à des néologismes ou qu'il s'est contenté d'adapter, en leur insufflant un sens nouveau, des mots latins qui existaient déjà. Commençons par la partie la plus visible de l'iceberg, les néologismes." (p. 157)
"Il est au moins un mot du vocabulaire philosophico-théologique créé par Érigène qui a survécu, et même a connu un franc succès, à savoir *supernaturalis*. Le P. de Lubac, qui a consacré un livre entier à la notion de « surnaturel » et à son développement historique, écrit : « C'est bien en tout cas au IXe siècle, par les traductions carolingiennes du pseudo-Denys, celle d'Hilduin et celle de Jean Scot Érigène, que *supernaturalis* fait sa véritable entrée dans la théologie. Encore au XIIe siècle, les divers Sententiaires l'ignorent, comme l'ignorait saint Anselme, comme l'ignorent saint Bernard et beaucoup d'autres »(48). Bien entendu, le sens donné par les théologiens modernes au mot *supernaturalis* diffère notablement de celui que lui donnait Érigène. Mais s'il s'agit du mot lui-même, il semble bien que Jean Scot — et accessoirement Hilduin, dont la traduction eut une diffusion limitée(49)—soit responsable de l'introduction de *supernaturalis* dans le vocabulaire théologique latin."
(48) H. de Lubac, *Surnaturel. Études historiques*, Paris, 1946, p. 327.
(49) La traduction d'Hilduin [*des traités du Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite*] fut utilisée par Guillaume de Lucques et par quelques porrétains.

74. ———. 2001. "*Nisifortinus:* le disciple qui corrige le maître." In *Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages. A Festschrift*

for Peter Dronke, edited by Marenbon, John, 113-130. Leiden: Brill.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 585-603.
"Dans la courte monographie que Paul Dutton et moi-même avons consacrée aux autographes érigéniens, nous nous sommes efforcés de démontrer que l'écriture de i^2 n'est pas celle d'Erigène.(5) Ce point semble bien établi désormais. Il s'ensuit que la Version III, contenue dans le manuscrit B (Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Ms. Phil. 2,1) et dont i^2 est responsable, n'a probablement pas reçu le 'Bon à tirer' de l'auteur. Le manuscrit B a été exécuté par d'excellents copistes carolingiens, qui avaient pour tâche de recopier, sous la surveillance de i^2, le manuscrit R (Reims, Bibliothèque municipale, Ms. 875), exemplaire de travail de l'auteur. Le rôle de i^2 dans la confection de B a été celui d'un 'éditeur' : il a ajouté des titres et des gloses dans les marges, et, là où l'auteur avait renvoyé de façon vague au *Periphyseon*, il a pris soin de préciser de quel livre il s'agit.(6) C'est lui aussi, sans doute, qui a décidé d'intégrer les notes marginales au texte principal.(7) Mais ses interventions ne s'arrêtent pas là : il a pris avec le texte d'Erigène des libertés qu'un auteur moderne ne serait certainement pas disposé à accorder à son éditeur.(8)
Nous voilà avertis. La Version III, celle du manuscrit B, a été 'arrangée' par i^2 : nous ne pouvons pas lui faire entière confiance. La Version IV, 'édition revue et corrigée' de la Version III, est encore moins fiable." (p. 114)
(...)
"Le rôle joué par i^2 dans la transmission du texte du *Periphyseon* est si important, ses interventions si fréquentes qu'on se sent mal à l'aise de ne pouvoir désigner le personnage autrement que par un sigle : i^2 (l'Irlandais numéro 2). À défaut d'un nom, ne pourrait-on lui donner un surnom ? J'ai pensé à *Nisifortinus*, sobriquet qui évoque la manière par laquelle cet Irlandais introduit certaines de ses remarques personnelles concernant la pensée de son compatriote Jean Scot Érigène." (p. 120)

(5) É. Jeauneau - P. E. Dutton, *The Autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 108-110.
(6) É. Jeauneau - P. E. Dutton, *The Autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 85-93.
(7) *Periphyseon* III, ed. É. Jeauneau (Turnhout 1999) (CCCM 163), pp. xvi—xix.
(8) Pour quelques exemples de cette manière de faire, cf. ibid., pp. xxi-xxiii.

75. ———. 2002. "Érigène entre l'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Rome. Le *Filioque*." In *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, edited by Bakker, Paul J.J.M., Faye, Emmanuel and Grellard, Christophe, 289-321. Turnhout: Brepols.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 605-639.
"Le neuvième siècle est une période d'affrontement entre l'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Rome (Constantinople). Les relations entre les deux parties de l'empire, toujours difficiles, se détériorent alors de façon spectaculaire. Les causes en sont multiples. Les Byzantins s'inquiètent de la montée en puissance de la dynastie carolingienne ; les interventions fréquentes des monarques francs en Italie les indisposent; le couronnement impérial de Charlemagne par le pape, le 25 décembre 800, met un comble à leur irritation. A cela s'ajoutent les querelles théologiques, en premier lieu la querelle des images.
(...)
L'autre querelle théologique entre F Ancienne Rome et la Nouvelle est celle du « Filioque ». Le Symbole de la foi chrétienne dit « Symbole de Nicée-Constantinople » (381) s'exprime ainsi à propos de la troisième personne de la sainte Trinité: «(Je crois) aussi à l'Esprit-Saint, Seigneur et vivifiant, qui procède du Père». Or, en Espagne, depuis la fin du sixième siècle au moins, on avait pris l'habitude d'ajouter: «et du Fils» («Filioque»). Cette habitude s'était progressivement étendue à d'autres parties du monde latin, non point à Rome toutefois, où l'on était resté fidèle au texte authentique, non contaminé, du Symbole de la foi. Cependant, la cour franque avait adopté le « Filioque » : on le chantait à Aix dans la chapelle impériale. Avec le temps,

les clercs latins en étaient arrivés à considérer le « Filioque » comme partie intégrante du Symbole de Nicée-Constantinople." (pp. 289-290)
(...)
"Sur la question débattue de la procession du Saint-Esprit Erigène est allé dans la direction des Grecs aussi loin qu'un Latin de son temps et de son milieu pouvait le faire, peut-être plus loin même qu'aucun Latin ne le fera par la suite. Cela signifiait pour lui naviguer à contre-courant, aller à l'encontre des idées reçues, au risque de déplaire au prince qui l'honorait de son estime et de sa protection. Cependant, il s'est efforcé de concilier les points de vue divergents. C'est là un trait de son caractère. Bien que sa carrière ait commencé par une controverse sur la prédestination - controverse où on l'avait poussé plus qu'il ne s'y était engagé vraiment -, il est un homme de conciliation. Là réside, me semble-t-il, l'intérêt de sa position par rapport aux nombreux controversistes, grecs ou latins, qui ont traité de la procession du Saint-Esprit et du « Filioque». Pour conciliante qu'elle fût, cependant, sa solution avait peu de chance d'aboutir à un accord : les adversaires n'avaient pas envie de se réconcilier." (p. 320=

76. ———. 2002. "Les Sirènes dans le chœur des Vieillards." In *Religion, Text, and Society in Medieval Spain and Northern Europe: Essays in Honor of J. N. Hillgarth*, edited by Burman, Thomas E., Meyerson, Mark D. and Shopkow, Lea, 319-334. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
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77. ———. 2003. "The Neoplatonic Theme of Return in Eriugena." In *Patristica. Proceedings of the Colloque of the Japanese Society for Patristic Studies. Vol. 7*, 1-14.
Repris dans: *Tendenda vela*, pp. 641-656.
"Among the many triads dear to Neoplatonists, one of the best known is probably that which they use to explain how the universe is regulated by harmonious relations between the cause and its effects. These relations are formulated by Proclus (d. 485) in proposition 35 of his *Elements of Theology*: "Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from

it, and reverts upon it" Hence, in Greek the three parts of the triad are: *monê* (immanence in the cause, rest), *proodos* (procession from the cause), *epistrophê* (return to the cause, conversion). This famous triad, with many other Neoplatonic teachings, found its way into Christian thought, thanks to a skillful writer who claimed to be Dionysius the Areopagite. But the man in question could not have been the same one who had converted to Christianity upon hearing the discourse of Saint Paul before the Areopagus of Athens in the year 51 A.D. In fact, an analysis of writing style and vocabulary demonstrates that the text attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite could not have been written before the end of the fifth century. The "forgery," however, was clever, for to attribute writings strongly and deeply influenced by the "pagan" philosophy of Proclus to Dionysius the Areopagite, the first bishop of Athens, was the surest way to protect them against any suspicion of heresy. Who could contradict the convert of Paul, depositary of an esoteric teaching which complemented the exoteric teaching delivered by the Apostle to the Gentiles in his Epistles?
Translated from Greek into Latin, first by Hilduin in the second quarter of the ninth century, then by John Scottus Eriugena in the third quarter of the same century, the works of Dionysius the Areopagite were increasingly made available to Latin readers through the centuries. Certainly, important elements of Neoplatonic philosophy borrowed by the Latin Fathers, notably by Saint Augustine, had already entered the Latin world. However, thanks to Eriugena's Latin rendering of the works of Dionysius, a new stream of Neoplatonic philosophy penetrated the Western part of the Christian world. While the Augustinian stream was mostly indebted to Plotinus and Porphyry, the Dionysian one owed much to Proclus.
Yet Eriugena's importance is not exhausted by his role as translator from Greek to Latin. The inventive nature of his thought created, for the first time in history, an original synthesis of the two main streams of Neoplatonism, the one originating in Plotinus and the other in Proclus. The work in which this synthesis is presented is a philosophical dialogue

between a Master and his Disciple, which the author entitled Periphyseon. The general framework of this dialogue is the famous triad of which we spoke above, or, more precisely, the last two parts of it Procession (procession and Return (*reditus, reuersio*). The Procession, which is also multiplication (*multiplicatio*) and division (*divisio*), is the movement by which all things descend from Divine Goodness. The Return, which is also unification (*congregatio, adunatio*), is the movement by which all things return to the supreme unity, God. The plan itself of the *Periphyseon* faithfully follows this twofold movement. Books I, II, III and IV correspond to the movement of Procession: From “Nature which creates and is not created” (Book I), we descend to “Nature which is created and also creates” (Book II) , and then to “Nature which is created and does not create" (Books III and IV). Book V is entirely dedicated to the movement of return, a return whose end is “Nature which neither creates nor is created.”
Procession and Return are the warp and the woof from which this marvellous tapestry, the Periphyseon, is woven." (pp.. 1-2, notes omitted)

78. ———. 2003. "Thomas of Ireland and his *De tribus sensibus sacrae scripturae*." In *With Reverence for the Word. Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, edited by McAuliffe, Jane Dammen, Walfish, Barry D. and Goering, Joseph W., 284-291. New York: Oxford University Press.
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VOIR AUSSI

Bibliographie sur l'Œuvre Philosophique de Jean Scot Érigène:

Première Partie: A - J

Deuxième Partie: K - Z

Theory and History of Ontology

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Giorgio Tonelli (1928-1978): Bibliography of the Writings on Kant and the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This page contains a bibliography of Giorgio Tonelli's writings in English; for his essays in Italian, French and German, please follow the links at the bottom of the page.

1. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1961. "Critiques of the Notion of Substance Prior to Kant." *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* no. 23:285-301.

   "The Ages of Reason and Enlightenment aimed not only to advance knowledge but also tried to distinguish carefully between things which can and cannot be known. Characteristic of those ages is the manner in which metaphysical speculation was reduced by the sciences or brushed aside by the leading philosophical schools.
   The general problem of the *limits of human understanding* became one of the leading philosophical themes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Doubts about the possible scope of human reasoning concerned not only God, the spirits, and the nature of the human soul, (1) but also went to the very core of that reality which man was then trying to subdue intellectually; several conceptual elements were discovered whose nature many thinkers found mysterious and inaccessible to the mind. In fact, beside a clear awareness of the limits of human understanding in general, the notions of *mathematical infinity*, (2) *force*, (3)

and *substance* were considered by many philosophers to be above man's reason. The purpose of the present paper is to study the criticisms which were directed against the last of these notions, criticisms which played a rather important role in the famous "Copernican revolution" of 1769 at the start of Kant's critical period. (4) We shall consider not only criticisms of the notion of substance itself, but also those of the closely related notions of *essence* and *materia prima* ; these often include the notion of substance, or serve as a foundation for." (pp. 285-286)
(1) For opinions about the human soul in that period see: G. Tonelli, *Elementi melodologici e metafisici in Kant precritico* (1745-1768), Cap. VII, § 30 and foll. About God's unintelligibility, Ibid., Cap. VII, § 17 (In the II Vol., to be published in short. Vol. I, Torino 1959).
(2) See G. Tonelli, *Le problème des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVllle siècle et la genèse du criticisme kantien particulièrement par rapport à la question de l'infini* , "Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale", 1959.
(3) See Tonelli, *Elementi*, Cap. VII, § 21 and foll.
(4) A not very thorough history of the notion of substance is in K. Heidmann, *Der Substanz-Begriff von Abälard bis Spinoza*, Berlin 1889, (Dissertation).

2. ———. 1963. "The Law of Continuity in the Eighteenth Century." *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* no. 24-27:1619-1638.

   "Some excellent research has been made into the eighteenth-century attitude towards the assumption that nature's ways are essentially simple, and towards the principle of least action (1). But another methodologically fundamental principle, upon which the learned men of the time concentrated their attention, and which caused them much bitter argument, namely the law of continuity, has not yet been studied with a more systematic and modem approach. The only historical survey of the question is G. Ploucquet's old dissertation, published in 1761, which one

very rarely meets nowadays, for it is almost completely forgotten*.
The purpose of the present paper is to fill this gap. We shall first summarise the question as it stood in the seventeenth century, and we shall try to expound in greater detail the vicissitudes the problem suffered during the period in which we are chiefly interested.
The topics treated by A. O. Lovejoy in his well-known work The Great chain of being (1933; the Cambridge, Mass. 1957 edition is quoted), show some important similarities to the question we propose to study. Our problem is in fact much more precise and limited, but this will not prevent us from recalling from time to time some pertinent elements from Lovejoy's book." (p. 1619)
(1) for a bibliography of these works, and an original contribution to the history of that problem, see G. Tonelli, *Elementi metafisici e metodologici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768*, Torino 1959, i. cap.l, nota (80) and cap.u, nota (3).
* G. Ploucquet, *Dissertatio historìco-cosmologica de lege continuitatis sive gradationis leibnitiana* (Tübingen 1761).
(...)
"Conclusion.
The case of the principle of continuity in the eighteenth century is very interesting indeed in the history of ideas. It is a good example of a badly defined and exceedingly general principle, whose multifarious applications extended the dispute to widely different fields. One has the feeling that its acceptance or rejection was never based on an independent discussion of its purely theoretical side—whose very imprecision led to a very elastic interpretation, making any abstract examination practically useless; no, they were rather motivated by the more or less welcome consequences which could be drawn from the principle in a specific case, about which an author usually had preconceived ideas, in case, that is, he was not motivated merely by personal hostility towards its real or pretended supporters or detractors. Many of the people partaking in the discussion seemed, wittingly or unwittingly, to ignore at least some of the opinions previously expressed in die dispute, and

attacked positions which nobody had thought of defending, and which really only represented a rough vulgarisation of the principle.
The climax of the dispute (the Berlin Academy against Wolff) seems to have been brought about for merely personal motives. In fact at both earlier and later periods the principle played a fairly important rôle in some fields of science more or less independently of theoretical discussions about it, and after the waning of those discussions." (p. 1638)

3. ———. 1966. "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part I." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 4:109-131.

   Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 183-203.
   "The importance of the theory of genius in Kant's philosophy was realized comparatively early in the history of *Kantforschung*, and several works have been devoted to this subject (1) But nobody has, until now, tried to reconstruct the development of Kant's ideas on genius utilizing the materials contained in his *Nachlass*, published by Adickes. (2) This is what I shall attempt in the present paper, limiting the study to the period from 1770 to 1779, coinciding with Kant's preliminary works for the elaboration of the *Critique of Pure Reason* .
   First I shall try to establish Kant's opinions on genius in the aforesaid span of time, second, to trace the sources of such opinions in Kant's cultural background." (p. 109)
   (1) See especially: K. Hoffman, *Die Umbildung der Kantischen Lehre vom Genie* in Schellings System des transscendentalen Idealismus (Bern: 1907, Berner Studien zur Philos. u. ihrer Geschiehte, LIII); R. Schlapp, *Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der "Kritik der Urteilskraft"* (G6ttingen: 1901); O. Schöndörffer, "Kant's Definition vom Genie," *Altpreussische Monatsschrift*, 1893, xxx; O. Wichmann, "Kant's Begriff vom Genie und seine

Bedeutung" *Deutsche Akademische Rundschau,* Jhg. II, 12 Sem., Folge N. 2; 7, 15 Jan. 1925.
Schlapp's work, utilizing Kant's *Kollegheftе* (or notes taken from his lectures), is peculiarly important.
(2) In Kants *Gesammelte Schriften*, published by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften. This is the edition we refer to in our quotations. We give only the number of the volume and the page for the printed works of Kant, and the number of the volume and that of the *Reflexion* for the *Nachlass* . We refer to the last issue of the Preussische Akademie Ausgabe edition. We intend to utilize Kant's *Nachlass* following the same criteria as in: G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti* (Torino: 1955), Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 35 Tomo 3, Parte III. See pp. 7-10, 192, 253-255.

4. ———. 1966. "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part Ii." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 4:209-224.

   Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 203-234.

5. ———. 1969. "Divinae Particula Aurae; Genial Ideas, Organism, and Freedom: A Note on Kant's *Reflection N. 938* ." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:192-198.

   Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 237-245.
   "In § 21 of my article "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)," published in this journal (1) two years ago, I quote from Kant's *Reflection* N. 938, of which the complete text is as follows:
   Spirit is referred to the universal, because it is a kind of *divinae particula aurae*, and it draws from the Universal Spirit. Therefore, Spirit [in itself] has no particular

characters; but it vivifies in different ways, following the different talents and sensitivities [of men] it meets, and, as these are so multifarious, every [human] Spirit has something peculiar. One should not say: geniuses. [But: there is only one genius.] It is the unity of the Soul of the World. (2)

Kant refers to this Spirit as the source of both genial or "original" ideas in the human mind and of organic life in the ouside world (KETG, §§ 22, 23). This theory derives of course from the ancient Platonic-Stoic-Hermetic-etc. doctrine of the Soul of the World, which had a tremendous diffusion not only in the Middle Ages (School of Chartres, etc.) but also from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century and even later, especially among Stoic, Cabbalistic, Hermetic, Pansophic, and Mosaic philosophers, both in psychology (where the human soul was taken as a part of the soul of the World) and in natural philosophy among the opponents of mechanism (either in general or in connection with living organisms only) (3)."

(1) IV (1966), 209; the article is printed in two parts, pp. 109-131 and 209-224 (cited hereafter as KETG).

(2) "Weil der Geist aufs allgemeine geht, so ist er so zu sagen *divinae particula aurae* und aus dem allgemeinen Geist geschöpft. Daher hat der Geist nicht besondere Eigenschaften, sondern nach den verschiedenen Talenten und Empfindsamkeiten, worauf er fallt, belebt er verschiedentlich und, weil diese so mannigfaltig seyn, so hat ieder Geist was eigenthtimliches. Man muss nicht sagen: Die genie's. Es ist die Einheit der Weltseele" (Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* [Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften], XV [1923], part 1, 416). This *Reflection* is a note on Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* . According to Adickes, it was probably written between 1776 and 1778, less probably in 1772. s See "World Soul" (with bibliographical references, by T. Gregory and G. Tonelli) in the 1967 ed. of the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*. A still useful, although very partial, historical account of this doctrine is given by A. Rechenberg (praeses) and J. D. Gilttner (Auctor &

Respondens), *De mundi anima dissertatio* (Lipsiae, 1678). See also KETG, note 153.

6. ———. 1971. "The "Weakness" of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment." *Diderot-Studies* no. 14:217-244.

   Reprinted in *Scepticism in the Enlightenment* (1997), pp. 35-50.
   Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 21-41.
   "Among the different aspects of the problem of limits I have been surveying, hardly one may be found where eighteenth-century thought had not been heralded in some aspects at least by thinkers of the proceeding century. This happens, of course, in all ages and for all problems. In some cases, as for the critique of the notions of substance and of that of infinity, eighteenth-century philosophers were, in the main, repeating old arguments. But on the whole, the Anglo-French Enlightenment gave to these attitudes an importance and a diffusion previously unknown: opposition to ontology, and partially to logic, agnosticism in respect of transcendent subjects in general, claimed ignorance of the inner texture and properties of bodies and of the first causes. Opposition to hypotheses and to general systems not founded on experience are, both in their extention and in their stress, a basic novelty in modern philosophy. For this, seventeenth-century philosophy was much more an Age of Reason than was the Enlightenment; and this “reason” was unmasked by the Enlightenment as a specious and obnoxious pretension of the human mind. The Enlightenment’s reason sometimes merely paid lip service to Revelation; however this outer limit of reason was replaced by an inner and more effective one, which could also be reconciled with Revelation, with the advantage, perhaps, of a clearer “separation of powers”.
   The German Enlightenment was, as it were, more “traditionalist”, especially in Wolff’s case: only a few of the limiting attitudes were accepted by Wolff. On he other hand, the school of Thomasius and Crusius represented, for very

special reasons, a kind of via media, and was the catalyzer of a creative synthesis between the Anglo-French and the German approach. In this way, positions which could appear “Traditional” as sponsored by Wolff became the foundation of future German philosophy; “traditionalism” and “modernism” in the history of thought are nothing but relative terms.

If we may still speak of “traditionalism” then, the Enlightenment was on the whole much less revolutionary that it has sometimes been represented; this has already become clear concerning its political theory, but should also be extended to other aspects of the century’s thought.

The Anglo-French Enlightenment, with its intellectual modesty and respect for its heralds in the preceding century, shows one side of this attitude, an attitude matched in the practice of a very real quest for discovery, but exalted, at the same time, by an equal respect for science. Philosophy, certainly, is no longer the servant of theology, but it partially becomes the servant of science. And this is shown, among other things, by the basic impact of Newtonianism on the problem of limits, an impact which has not been as yet sufficiently clarified. In fact, it is a commonplace in our day to talk about Newton’s role in the development of philosophy, but as soon as this role is clearly defined, an escape is found in some vague and frequently erroneous statement.

The German Enlightenment, less humble in its intentions, showed its modesty by facts: it refrained from relegating to the scrap-heap many basic attitudes of eighteenth-century thought, and reshaped them into formulas pregnant with future developments.

In contrast to romantic philosophy’s frenzy for originality at any cost, the Enlightenment philosophy was not haunted by a quest for novelty for novelty’s sake. In fact it gave full regard to its predecessors while simultaneously opening up numerous new directions for science to follow in the ensuing centuries." (pp. 243-244)

7. ———. 1971. *A Short-Title List of Subject Dictionaries of the Xvith, Xviith, and Xviiith Centuries as Aids to the History of Ideas* . London: Warburg Institute.

   Second extended edition revised and annotated by Eugenio Canone and Margherita Palumbo, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2006.
   Contents: Introduction 1; Symbols for names of libraries 5; List I: Sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century dictionaries as aids to the history of ideas 7; Chronological-systematic index of dictionaries included in List I 37; List II: Pseudo-dictionaries, dictionaries not ordered alphabetically, or of minor importance 43; List III: Dictionaries not located 53; Index of names 57; Index of anonyma 64.
   "Introduction.
   Historians of sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century ideas are realizing increasingly that dictionaries contemporary with the period under consideration are in many cases a basic aid to their work. Some of these reference books are well-known, and are currently used by scholars in all fields. Nevertheless, a more careful inquiry into this kind of source discloses an unsuspected number of works which are mostly unknown or difficult to locate.
   The aim of this bibliography is to provide for the first time an extensive list of these dictionaries and their basic locations in Europe, together with some information concerning their doctrinal affiliations, diffusion and present usefulness. I have been collecting and examining these materials in the major European libraries during the past fifteen years. I acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Professor Enrico de Angelis, Professor Alberto Martino, Dr. P. F. Mugnai (who received a grant from the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche in Rome for this purpose), and my wife, Dr. Grazia Tonelli, all of whom helped me during the final stage of work on this bibliography by research in several libraries; to Miss Pamela Sargent, for revising and typing the manuscript, and to Miss Susan Cabral for typing the indexes.

I hope that my work may stimulate interest in the history of lexicography. Studying the development of the criteria and methods of lexicography, the connexion of dictionaries with doctrinal trends contemporary to them, and their influence on the evolution and diffusion of thought should be a basic field in the history of ideas, as well as a further contribution towards a more adequate use of this kind of source in general research. (a)

This Bibliography is divided into three lists.

The FIRST LIST includes those dictionaries which, first, meet the basic criteria of selection, and second, have been located and examined.

(I) *Criteria of selection:*

(a) Only dictionaries disposed in alphabetical order have been included. In fact, many encyclopaedias are ordered systematically, and cannot be used as dictionaries any more than any general treatise can. Since the only basic criterion which has proved to be generally effective in making a distinction is that of alphabetical order, some works which are strictly related to dictionaries but which do not fulfil this condition have been excluded from the first list (but included in the second).

(b) Only subject dictionaries have been included. Onomastic dictionaries (historical, geographical, etc. which do not list terms, but only names of persons and/or places) have beeen excluded.

(c) Subject indexes to works, compiled either by authors or by editors, have been excluded, with the exception of a few of major importance, which are traditionally known or frequently referred to as dictionaries.

(d) Works bearing the name of dictionaries, or usually referred to as such, although they are not dictionaries but treatises, have been excluded from the first list (but included in the second).

(e) Dictionaries prior to 1500 or posterior to 1800 have been excluded in general, with the following exceptions: first, of a few dictionaries prior to 1500 which were still influential (and eventually reprinted) after that date; secondly, of a few

dictionaries immediately posterior to 1800 which echo ideas of the preceding century.
(f) *Ana*, which are collections of memorabilia or excerpts from the works of a single author (many of which are alphabetically ordered) have been excluded, because they are listed in already existing extensive bibliographies. (b)
(g) Dictionaries answering to the previously listed criteria, but which are of minor importance, such as bi-lingual dictionaries and compendious dictionaries and encyclopaedias for practical use only, dictionaries of merely linguistic interest, and purely technical dictionaries (e.g., of legal cases, chemical formularies, collections of medical prescriptions, etc.) have been excluded from the first list. Some of them have been included in the second list, because their notoriety or their title might mislead one into considering them useful to the history of ideas. Comprehensive lists of these dictionaries may be found in existing bibliographies of dictionaries. (3)
(II) *Location*. All items included in the first list have been checked as to their presence (1) in the major Roman libraries (as listed below in the list of library symbols); (2) in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (N.P.) ; (3) in the British Museum (B.M.) ; and (d) in the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen (G.). Normally, locations in other libraries are given only for items which are not to be found in any of the above-mentioned libraries.
N.B. All editions of the same work are listed which have either been examined or identified through library catalogues or general and special bibliographical works and studies. Differences among titles or contents of different editions have been referred to in so far as they could be established in the above ways.
A chronological-systematic index, attached to the first list, and referring to it-only, allows a general view of all items as ordered (1) by centuries, (2) by categories of dictionaries within a century, (3) by the date of the first edition within a category. It is followed by a list of dictionaries devoted to a single author.

The SECOND LIST includes items which have been located and seen, but which do not answer to the criteria of selection listed above. The purpose of this second list is: (a) to give an account of items which were seen, but excluded from the first list, in order to establish that they have not been overlooked; (b) to point out that some of them may nevertheless be used as dictionaries. In this case, the location is given.

The THIRD LIST includes items which could not be located, although they are listed in bibliographies, or referred to elsewhere. Therefore, their character and utility could not be established. This third list is intended as an aid to further research.

It may be interesting to know that microfilms of dictionaries included in the first list, and not present in Roman libraries, are being collected at the Istituto di Filosofia of Rome University.

(a) Attempts in this direction are: E. H. Lehmann, *Geschichte des Konversationslexikons*, V, Leipzig 1934; B. Wendt, *Idee und Entwicklungsgeschichte der enzyklopädischen Literatur*, Würzburg-Aumühle 1941 ; K. W. Krauss, 'Zur Lexikologie der Aufklärung', in *Romanische Forschungen*, LXVT, 1955 ; W. Gerber, sub voce 'Philosophical Dictionaries and Encyclopedias', in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. by P. Edwards, New York-London 1967; L. Geldsetzer, *Einleitung* to J. Micraelius, *Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum* (reprint), Düsseldorf 1966. See also Zischka's work, quoted below. For the history of juridical lexicography, see H. E. Dirksen, *System der juristischen Lexikographie*, Leipzig 1834.

(b) H. W. Lawätz, *Handbuch für Büche freunde und Bibliothekare*, T. I, Bd. III, Halle 1789, pp. 476fF. ; Jacques Lacombe, *Encyclopédiana, ou Dictionnaire des 'Ana'*, Paris 1791; A, F. Aude, *Bibliographie critique des ana,* Paris 1910. Some titles of this kind do not end in *ana*, for instance: [J. C. Scaliger], *Electa Scaligerea, h.e. J. C. Scaligeri Sententiae, Praecepta, Definitiones, Axiomata, ex universis*

illius operibus selecta, et per certas Locorum Communium classes disposita . . ., Hanoviae 1634.
(c) See Durey de Noinville, *Table alphabétique des Dictionnaires en toutes sortes de langues*, Paris 1758; W. Marsden, *A Catalogue of Dictionaries, Vocabularies, Grammars, and Alphabets*, London 1796; N. Trubner, *A Catalogue of Dictionaries and Grammars of the Principal Languages and Dialects of the World*, London 1872, ed. K. W. Hiersemann, London 1882; J. R. Hulbert, *Dictionaries: British and American*, London 1955; W. Zaunmülier, *Bibliographisches Handbuch der Sprachwärterbücher*, New York, London, Stuttgart 1958; G. A. Zischka, *Index lexicorum*, Wien 1959. Many of the items listed in my bibliography are unknown to all these authors.

8. ———. 1972. "Early Reactions to the Publication of Leibniz's "Nouveaux Essais"." In *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*561-567. Dordrecht: Reidel.

   Revised version as: *Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the "Nouveaux Essais" (1765)* .
   "Leibniz' *Nouveaux Essais*, written in 1703-05 (cited in the following as: N E), were posthumously published by Raspein 1765, at the beginning of a moderately significant Leibniz revival. Now, as the great upheaval in Kant's thought took place in 1769, and as one of the main characteristics of this upheaval was the rejection of sensibility as the sole source of knowledge, it is easy to infer that Kant's reading of the N E may have been one of the elements which prompted him to adopt his new solution. It is not my ambition to answer this difficult question at this time but I will try to clear the ground for an answer to it by inquiring into the early reactions of philosophical circles, especially German, to the appearance of the N E. If the peculiarity of the doctrines of the N E concerning the origin of knowledge was widely noticed, and if the picture of Leibniz' philosophy was modified accordingly, Kant could

have been stimulated by such a widespread reaction to pay special attention to the problem." (p. 561)

9. ———. 1972. "A Contribution Towards a Bibliography on the Methodology of the History of Philosophy." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 10:456-458.

   "A recent issue of the *Monist* (53, 4, October, 1969) was devoted to the "Philosophy of the History of Philosophy." The articles were prefaced by an "Introduction and Bibliography" by Lewis White Beck. The following list is an addition to that bibliography, omitting those contributions not contained in it but quoted in other places in the same issue of the *Monist* ." (p. 456)
   (...)
   I also wish to point out that, obviously, the methodology of the history of philosophy would greatly profit from taking into consideration methodological research in other branches of history. This includes not only general history, history of science, and the sociology of knowledge (which are rather easy to reach bibliographically), but also those branches of history less obviously connected with our interest or less well-known in English-speaking scholarship:
   (1) Hermeneutic. This ancient approach, employed again by Joachim Wach (*Das Verstehen*, Ttibingen, 1926. Reprinted, Hildesheim, 1966), was revived with major changes by Emilio Betti (*Teoria generale dell'interpretazione*, 2 vols., Milano, 1955). It evoked a tremendous response in Germany, culminating in the famous work by Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen, 1960. The ensuing debate about this work brought forth a very large number of subsequent contributions.
   (2) Special attention should be paid to the methodology of etymology, onomasiology and semasiology -- branches of philology closely related to the history of ideas. The most important contributors to this field are Kurt Baldinger and Helmut Gipper. The point of view of the latter was summed up by H. Gipper and H. Schwarz in the "Introduction" to their *Bibliographisches Handbuch zur*

Sprachinhaltsforschung (Kön und Opladen, 1962). The *Handbuch* itself, an indispensable tool for all historians of ideas, has not yet been completely published.
(...)
(3) Also to be kept in mind is the methodology of the history of art, especially useful in connection with the problem of periodization. In this respect, after the well-known W. Pinder's *Das Problem der Generation* (reprinted, Munich, 1961), it is necessary to mention E. H. Gombrich's *Norma e forma: Critica valutativa e morfologia stilistica nella storia dell'arte* (Torino, 1963. Quaderni della "Biblioteca filosofica di Torino," No. 6), and the discussion on "Criteria of Periodization in the History of European Art," in *New Literary History* 1 (1970)." (pp. 457-458)

10. ———. 1973. "A Contribution to the Bibliography of General Subject Indexes." *Studi internazionali di filosofia* no. 5:211-214.

"Professor Archer Taylor, the famous bibliographer and historian of bibliography, published a history of the *General Subject-Indexes Since 1548,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966, 335 p.
This work is a new pioneering enterprise of its author: in fact it is the first in its field. It is a detailed study of the development of general bibliographical subject-indexes of books since the Renaissance, i.e, it lists and discusses all those bibliographies: (a) which are ordered by subjects, alphabetically or systematically; (b) but which are general, i.e., not limited to a particular held (e.g., Theology only, Medicine only, etc.). General subject-indexes limited to a single nation and/or language are included, as well as a few specialized general indexes, e.g., subject-indexes to journals. The subject catalogs of some libraries are included, as they are practically identical with general subject-indexes. Some of the works considered are manuscripts. The author also studies some plans for subject-indexes which never were actualized at all, some subject-indexes which never were completed, and some theoretical discussions on the

methodology of the indexes in question. I do not understand why the author does not also take into consideration the basic works on bibliotheconomy, in as far as they concern theoretical discussions on the classification of books, or provide classified lists of books to be used as a blueprint for organizing a library; in fact, the problems and the lists in question are identical to those belonging to a general subject-index, as one can see e.g., in the well-known writings on the subject by E. Edwards (1859), J. Petzhold (1866), A. Maire (1896), E. C. Richardson (1901), Berwick-Sayers 41954), etc.

This is an important contribution to the history of ideas from three points of view: first, because as a history of a branch of bibliography it studies a significant aspect of the development of the organization of learning; second, because it is in many cases a study of an aspect of the history of the systematization of knowledge, i.e., of the classification of the sciences and of their sections; third, because many of the works described are still very useful as bibliographical instruments for the scholars of our time. In fact, many of these works have not been superseded by more recent compilations, and are still basic sources of reference for some periods and areas. Professor Taylor's descriptions are frequently very helpful in determining their present utility although this is not the major aim of this book, the scope of which is first and foremost historical.

I am listing here some titles which should be added to Professor Taylor's study, but I must warn the reader that as the index of names *(Compilers of Subject-Indexes* and *Kindred Works*) at the end of Professor Taylor's book only lists a few of the names actually mentioned in his work, it is possible that some of the titles in question are mentioned, but escaped my attention. All the works listed below, if they are not described as plans or theoretical discussions of a classification, are general subject-indexes ordered systematically, i.e., in none of them the basic organization is alphabetical, although their sub-sections may occasionally be ordered alphabetically. In many of them the classification merely consists in a few general headings, and under each

heading the entries are listed alphabetically by the names of the authors." (p. 211)

11. ———. 1974. "Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the "Nouveaux Essais" (1765)." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 12:437-454.

    Revised version of *Early Reactions to the Publication of Leibniz's* "Nouveaux Essais" (1972).
    Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 111-136.
    "Leibniz' *Nouveaux Essais*, written in 1703-1705 (cited hereafter as NE), were posthumously published by Raspe (1) in 1765, at the beginning of a Leibniz revival which was also marked by the large Dutens edition of 1768. As the great upheaval in Kant's thought took place in 1769, and as this upheaval had as one of its main characteristics the rejection of sensibility as the sole source of knowledge, (2) it is easy to infer that Kant's reading of the NE may have been one of the elements prompting him to adopt his new solution. It is not the ambition of this paper to answer that difficult question: rather it is an attempt towards clearing the ground for an answer to it, by inquiring into the early reactions of philosophical circles, especially German, to the appearance of the NE. To what extent was the significance of the particular doctrines expounded in the NE noticed? To what extent did contemporary philosophers realize that these were to profoundly modify the picture of Leibniz' psychological tenets? And, therefore, to what extent could Kant have been stimulated by a widespread reaction to pay special attention to the pecu!iarities of that work? In conformity with this purpose, I shall focus my research on the question of the origin of knowledge. As it is my task to reconstruct a general philosophical atmosphere, I will not confine my research to philosophic reactions prior to 1769, but will also take into consideration some attitudes of the following decade. As frequently happens in the history of

ideas, the impact of a certain event may be noticed almost immediately after its occurrence, but the documentation of its effects may be available only after a certain delay. But they are nevertheless indicative of that prior impact. Before starting this enquiry, I shall: (1) point out the difference between the doctrine in question as it is expounded in the NE and as it appeared in the previously published works of Leibniz; (2) examine the interpretations of Leibniz' psychology prior to 1765, especially as represented in the version which was accepted by Wolff and incorporated into his system." (p. 437)
(1) *œuvres philosophiques latines et Français es du feu Mr. de Leibniz tirées de ses Manuscrits qui se conservent dans la Bibliothèque royale à Hanovre et publiées par M. Rud. Eric Raspe. Avec une preface de Mr. Kaestner, Professeur en mathématique à Göttingue* (Amsterdam et Leipzig, 1765).
(2) Tonelli, "Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant," Kant-Studien, LIV (1963), 369 ff.

12. ———. 1974. "Kant's Ethics as Part of Metaphysics: A Possible Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant's "Dream of a Seer" " In *Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts. Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider*, edited by Walton, Craig and Anton, John P., 236-263. Athens: Ohio University Press.

    Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 259-282.
    "One of the most remarkable traits of Kant's system of philosophy is the fact that Ethics is classified as a part of Metaphysics, as it appears in the titles of two of Kant's major works: *The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Metaphysics of Morals* . It is just too bad that no commentator, as far as I know, ever stressed the importance of this fact, and of the underlying problems; the fact was taken for granted, the problem ignored. It is high time to call some attention to it.

Actually, this is one of the most dramatic changes Kant introduced into the structure of philosophy as a whole; before him, a subordination of Ethics to Metaphysics was, as far as I know, totally unheard of. Metaphysics had been subordinated to Ethics by Spinoza, probably under the influence of the later developments of Stoicism, but the opposite had never been attempted.

This of course does not mean that before Kant Ethics never had been founded on Metaphysics; on the contrary, this foundation of Ethics is certainly one of the most generally accepted positions. Nevertheless, Ethics had been considered all the same as an independent science, and not as a part of Metaphysics.

On the other hand, if Kant considers Ethics as a part of Metaphysics, this does not mean that in his thought the dependency of Ethics on Metaphysics is increased; on the contrary, Ethics becomes systematically totally independent of Metaphysics *stricto sensu* ; but, as we shall see, it becomes a part of Metaphysics because it is transformed into a foundation of it, and this is quite new.

The expression "Metaphysics of Morals" (*Metaphysik der Sitten*) appears, as far as I know, for the first time in Kant's letter to Herder of May 9, 1768, where Kant states that he is working on a Metaphysics of Morals which should be completed within that year. But, in a letter to Lambert of December 31, 1765, Kant had already announced a work on the "Metaphysical Foundations of Practical Philosophy."

The expression "Metaphysics of Morals" is repeated in Kant's letter to Lambert of September 2, 1770, (1)1 where our author states that he is busy right then writing a treatise (which never was published) on that subject, without adding any further comments.

In the *Logik Blomberg* (1771) and in the *Logik Philippi* (1772), moral philosophy is not subordinated to the general heading of metaphysics.(2) In the *Metaphysik L1* (1775-1780), Metaphysics and Moral philosophy are said to be the two pure philosophical sciences, (3) and in the *Lectures on Ethics* of 1780-1781, philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical philosophy, (4) but a Metaphysics of Morals is

not mentioned. In his lectures Kant frequently takes a more conservative stand than in his private correspondence, in his personal notes or in his published works.

In a letter to Herz, written towards the end of 1773, Kant announces a detailed plan for his own work: he intends to write a treatise on “transcendental philosophy,” which would be a *Critique of Pure Reason* ; afterwards, he intends to publish a *Metaphysics*, which would be divided into a *Metaphysics of Nature* and a *Metaphysics of Morals* . The last one would appear first. (5)

Towards the end of the decade, in his lectures on *Philosophical Encyclopaedia* (1777-1780), (6) Kant expounds his new notion of ethics even in class. Practical philosophy should be divided, in his saying, into: (1) *transcendental practical philosophy*, dealing with the use of freedom in general; (2) *practical rational philosophy* viz. *Metaphysics of Morals*, dealing with the good use of freedom; (3) *practical anthropology* . (7) We need not consider (3) here, because this section clearly does not belong to pure philosophy. (8) As for (1), it is easy to identify it with that section or aspect of a *Critique of Pure Reason* which deals with the transcendental foundations of morality. (9) Therefore (2) corresponds to the *Metaphysics of Morals* properly.

It is well known that in the section on *Architectonic* of the *Critique of Pure Reason* metaphysics is divided into *Metaphysics of Nature* and *Metaphysics of Morals* . But Kant felt the need of adding a few words of explanation for a denomination so unusual:

The term ‘metaphysics,’ in its strict sense, is commonly reserved for the metaphysics of speculative reason. But as pure moral philosophy really forms part of this special branch of human and philosophical knowledge derived from pure reason, we shall retain for it the title ‘metaphysics’. (10)

Still, in the *Prolegomena* (1783), Metaphysics and Morals lire mentioned separately. (11) But in a *Reflection* dated by Adickes in 1783-84, Metaphysics is divided again into Metaphysics of Nature and of Morals. (12) In the

Metaphysik Volckmann (1784-85), Kant expands on this distinction. (13)
In 1785, the publication of the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* lends a final official character to this denomination, referring to a science belonging to pure philosophy in as far as this is limited to particular objects of the understanding.(14) The need for a special *Critique of Pure Practical Reason* is also acknowledged. (15)
The question, in fact, is settled from now on. In the later years, only after 1790, Morals is distinguished from Metaphysics in the division of the parts of a certain conception of philosophy in general, called "cosmopolitan," which conception seems to have been unknown before, and which seems not to replace, but to flank, the older conception and division. (16) In fact, the established denomination reappears in the *Metaphysics of Morals* published in 1797. (pp. 236-240)
(1) I. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe (Berlin und Leipzig), X (2nd edition), pp. 74, 56 and 97. Professor Norbert Hinske called my attention to the letter of 1768, and to another letter from Hamann to Herder of February 16, 1767, where Hamann states: "Kant arbeitet an einer Metaphysik der Moral" (J. G. Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, Wiesbaden 1956, Vol. II, p. 390); in another letter to Herder of August 28, 1768, Hamann writes: "Kantens Metaphysik der Moral hält mich in Erwartung" (ibid., p. 421).
(2) *Op. cit* ., XXIV, 1,1 pp. 31, 314.
(3) *Op. cit* ., XXVIII, 5,1, p. 173.
(4) I. Kant, *Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik*, hrsg. v. P. Menzer (Berlin, 1924), p. 1.
(5) Kant, *Ges. Schr*., X, p. 145.
(6) For the correct datation, see my review of its edition, *Filosofia*, XIII (1962), pp. 511-514.
(7) I. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Logik*, Bd. I, *Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie* (Berlin, 1961), p. 38. (This edition of Kant's lectures, although published by the Berlin Academy, is not a part of the *Gesammelte Schriften* . This edition was discontinued after

Vol. 1.) Nevertheless, on p. 67, *Moral* and *Metaphysik* seem to be distinguished.
(8) See ibid., p. 68.
(9) It is well known that Kant realized the need to write a *Critique of Practical Reason* only after 1781. The *Critique of Pure Reason* was supposed, at least until 1785, to take care of the transcendental foundation of both the Metaphysics of Nature and the Metaphysics of Morals.
(10) B. 870. I quote the *Critique of Pure Reason* using the pagination of the second edition (B). Where the second edition (1787) does not conform to the first, that will be pointed out. For translation into English, I follow N. Kemp Smith.
(11) Kant, *Ges. Schr* ., IV, p. 363 (§60).
(12) *Op. cit* ., XVIII, pp. 284-85 (Refl. #5644).
(13) *Op. cit*., XXVIII, 5,1, p. 364. On p. 362 a justification of sorts is given for the presence of metaphysics in ethics; but it cannot serve our purpose because, according to this justification, metaphysics is present in *all* rational sciences, including mathematics (p. 363).
(14) *Op. cit* ., IV, p. 388. Kant adds: "Auf solche Weise entspringt die Idee einer zweifachen Metaphysik, einer *Metaphysik der Natur* und einer *Metaphysik der Sitten* " (*ibid* .). But what precedes hardly can be considered a clear explanation of this conclusion.
(15) *Loc. cit* ., p. 391.
(16) The first appearance of this doctrine which can be dated with certitude is that in the Metaphysik L2 of 1790-91 (op. cit., XXVIII, 5, 2,1, pp. 532-33). The same notion of "cosmopolitan" philosophy reappears in the Wiener Logik of 1794-96 (op. cit., XXIV, I, 2, pp. 798-99), but there is no division. This leads me to think that the section of the Logik J'dsche expounding the same doctrine, and giving the same division (op. cit., IX, pp. 24-25), derives from the Kollegheft of 1790 which, along with another from 1782, was used by Jäsche to compile his text.

13. ———. 1974. "Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment." *Studia leibnitiana* no. 55:106-

126.

Reprinted in *Scepticism in the Enlightenment* (1997), pp. 51-68.
"In the year 1767 Pierre-Jacques Changeux published a work entitled *Traité des Extremes, ou des éléments de la science de la réalité* (Amsterdam, 2 vol.). In the "Avertissement" the author states that his work had been undertaken at first as an article commissioned by the *Encyclopédie*, but that it had expanded so much that it had not been finished in time (I, p. V). In fact, the volume of the *Encyclopédie* with the letter R had been published in 1765, and included an article "Réalité" which was completely insignificant, which had nothing to do with Changeux's ideas.
A summary of Changeux's books by Vallet was published in the *Encyclopédie d'Yverdon*, (1) under the heading of "Extrèmes" (vol. XVIII, 1772). At the end of the article more about Changeux's work was promised in an article "Réalité", but this article never was published (it should have appeared in vol. XXXVI, 1774). We do not know the reason for this omission, but it is quite possible that the dangerous character of Changeux's work had been noticed in the meanwhile, and that timid de Felice had preferred to suppress that article.
Vallet's article was reproduced in the *Supplément* of Diderot's Encyclopédie (Paris-Amsterdam 1776-77), and incorporated in the later editions of the *Encyclopédie* ; but the new article "Réalité", still promised in Vallet's article did not appear." (pp. 106-107).
(...)
"In my opinion, Changeux's main work deserves some attention for two reasons. The first, and the most peculiar, is his notion of the " *Ex trèmes* "; the second is the fact that he is a rather typical (and comparatively late) representative of that major sceptical trend in French XVIIIth Century philosophy whose importance has been hitherto almost entirely ignored. Changeux's most peculiar thesis is that everything man is, or man can know, lies in the middle of

two extremes, which are an infinity of magnitude and an infinity of smallness. All things, or their qualities, are extremes, in as far as they are extended or diminished as much as the imagination allows it (I, 1). The extremes are nothing but words expressing relationships (I. vi). In the present constitution of man, the extremes meet each other, without merging: and reality lies in the middle (I, vi, 8). The extremes are not only terms connected with relationships: they are relative to the different minds thinking them. They also correspond to infinity as applied to all kinds of knowledge - but infinity is conceived differently by the different men (I, vi, viii). The extremes do not contradict each other (I, 3-4): in fact, the universe subsists through an opposition of contraries (I, 9). The middle point *(milieu*) is the highest degree of reality (I, 14), although this middle point is not the same for all men (I, 17); there are infinite middle points which are only apparent (I, 18)." (p. 108)
(...)
"I will consider now the second basic aspect of Changeux's work, i.e., its scepticism, whose importance can be assessed only in connection with the general development of this school of thought in XVIIIth Century France. The only survey of Enlightenment scepticism we have is a well known article by R. H. Popkin (12), which provides a broad frame of reference, but which neglects many details. Using some research recently produced by other scholars, and adding some elements of my own, I will try to draw a very summary picture of XVIIIth Century French scepticism prior to Changeux. It will appear that scepticism was much more largely diffused in France in that time than it has been hitherto realized: so much, that it is probably justified to consider it as the methodological trend by far dominating in that area. In comparison, German contemporary scepticism was an extremely limited phenomenon (13); as for British scepticism, although it was represented by high ranking personal- ities such as Hume and Bolingbroke, it does not seem to have mastered many other adepts (14)." (pp. 110-111)

(1) B. De Felice, *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire universal raisonné des connaissances humaines*, 42 vol. Yverdon 1770-1775.
(12) R. H. Popkin, *Scepticism in the Enlightenment*, in: *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, XXVI, 1963, pp. 1321 ff.
(13) See my essay, *Kant und die antiken Skeptiker*, in: *Studien zu Kant's philosophischer Entwicklung*, hrsg. v. H. Heimsoeth, Hildesheim 1967, p. 109 (and footnotes referred to it).
(14) I must remark for the sake of objectivity that my search of the British philosophy of that time was not as extensive by far as that of French and German philosophy, and so this side of the picture is not yet quite clear in my mind. But I suspect that a further inquiry would not significantly change the present perspective.

14. ———. 1974. "Lumières - Aufklärung: A Note on Semantics." *Studi internazionali di filosofia* no. 6:166-169.

"There are few periods in the intellectual history of the weslern world which were hypostatized more than the one called « Enlightenment ». Considering this era as a whole determined in time (1700 to 1800?) and in space (Central and Western Europe?) is an historical device whose use certainly was expedient in E. Cassirer's and P. Hazard's time, hut which is quite inadequate now (1). It is very encouraging to notice that some of the best research workers are moving towards a more intensive, and less extensive inquiry in this field: such are for example Norbert Hinske and Frieder Lötzsch (2).
But, to begin with, it is necessary to establish when the terms of « Lumières », « Aufklärung » (and their synonyms) appeared, and what they meant at that time. The general historical problems connected with « light » as a metaphor for « knowledge » were pointed at e.g., by H. Blumenberg almost two decades ago (3). But it is only recently that some precise answers to this question were given, not in general, but exactly in connection with the period in question: F.

Schalk and R. Mortier provided the outline of a solid background for the French « Lumières » (4). Schalk's and Mortier's papers are extremely interesting and instructive: still, I think that another dimension of the problem should be explored (both for «Lumières» and «Aufklärung»): the connection between « light of nature » and « right reason », « universal reason », « good sense » and « common sense », expressions which were synonyms for centuries. Inquiring into this side of the question could possibly clarify the need for a further inquiry into the connection between what is traditionally called « Enlightenment » and what is called « Common Sense Philosophy »; a connection which would probably prove not to be entirely accidental (5).
Another obvious direction of expansion of the problem is the exploration of the connections between « lumières », « Aufklärung », and « The Age of Reason », « le siècle philosophique », « das kritische Jahrhundert », and other denominations of that era, in order to establish in how far they simply overlap, and in how far they reveal different aspects of that very complex phenomenon.
As for the German « Aufklärung », apart from the data offered also on this theme by Schalk in the paper mentioned above, some interesting elements are provided by Th. Mahlmann (6), and an even more thorough and important investigation was produced by Horst Stuke, in his article « Aufklärung », in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (7).
It is my intention to list here a few elements which might tentatively prove to be useful for gaining a more detailed view of the problems involved." (p. 166)
(1) I present the reason for my misgivings about the protracted use of this approach in my article: « The Weakness of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment »), *Diderot Studies,* 1971, and in: « La philosophie allemande de Leibniz a Kant », in *Histoire de la Philosophie*, vol. II, ed. by Y. Belaval, Paris 1973.
(2) *Was ist Aufklärung? Beiträge aus der Berlinischen Monatsschrift* . In *Zusammenarbeit mit M. Albrect ausgewählt, eingeleitet* ... von Norbert Hinske; F. Lötzsch, « Zur Genealogie der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?:

Mendelssohn, Kant und die Neologie », in: *Theokratia,* 11, 1970-1972. See also: *Aufklärung (Volk und Wissen, volkseigener Verlag)*, Berlin 1971.
(3) H. Blumenberg, « Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit », *Studium Generale*, X, 1957.
(4) F. Schalk, « Zur Semantik von Aufklärung in Frankreich », *Festschrift W. v. Wartburg zum 80. Geburtstag*, hrsg. v. K. Baldinger, Tübingen 1968, vol. I; R. Mortier, « Lumière et lumières. Histoire d'une image et d'une idée », in: R. Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*, Genève 1969.
(5) I will provide an outline of the history of this question in my article « Gesunder Verstand - Gesunde Vernunft », to be published in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, hrsg. v. J. Ritter, Basel-Stuttgart. This article will offer further reference to studies in this field.
(6) In his article in the *Historisches Wörterbuch*, cit., vol. I, 1971, pp. 633-634, s.v. « Aufklärung ».
(7) *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, hrsg. v. O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Kosellek, vol. I, Stuttgart 1971, p. 243ff. Stuke promises to produce a monograph entirely devoted to this subject.

15. ———. 1974. "More About General Subject Indexes." *Studi internazionali di filosofia* no. 5:185-186.

"In the last issue of this yearbook I published « A Contribution to the Bibliography of General Subject Indexes », dealing with works other than those studied by Archer Taylor in his book General Subject - Indexes since 1548, Philadelphia 1966.
The following are new additions to the same, according to the same criteria, collected by me during the last year, in particular at the Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris). I saw the works followed by the acrostic BN at the Bibliothèque Nationale." (p. 186)

16. ———. 1975. "The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in Kant's Time." *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* no. 30:243-294.

"In order to understand the meaning and the originality of Kant's classification of the parts of philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the status of the *Critique* itself within Kant's system, it is necessary to survey briefly the history of this problem, at least in the years immediately preceding the formation of Kant's doctrines.
It would be impossible here to inquire farther back into the history of this question, which would require not one but several volumes in order to be adequately expounded. So that I shall begin a detailed examination of the developments of this problem after the well known classification of the *Encyclopédie*, prefixing only a few precedents indispensable for understanding the further course of the dispute. As the history of this problem is only one of the prerequisites needed for understanding Kant's classification, and the status of the first *Critique*, I shall refrain on this occasion from drawing conclusions in connection with Kant.
The problem of the classification of the parts of philosophy is frequently conceived as an aspect of the more general question of the classification of the sciences at large: therefore I shall have in many cases to enlarge accordingly the field of my inquiry." (p. 243)
[The works discussed are:
§ 1. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, Francofurti et Lipsiae 1728. (The basic discussion is to be found in the *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere* preceding the work).
§ 2. Samuel Christian Hollmann (1696-1787), *Dissertatio philosophica de vera Philosophiae Notione: ... pars prior*, Vitebergae 1731; ... *pars posterior,* Vitebergae 1733; *Dissertatio philosophica de definiendis justis scientiarum philosophicarum limitibus prior,* Gottingae 1736.
§ 3. Joachim Georg Darjes (1714-1791), *Introductio in artem seu Logicam theoretico-practicam*, Jeane 1742.

§ 4. Christian August Crusius (1715-1775), *Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschichen Erkenntnis* (1747), in *Die philosophischen Hauptwerke*, hrsg. v. G. Tonelli, Vol. III, Hildesheim 1965.
§ 5. David Hume (1711-1776), *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1748) ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1951, §§ 131-132.
§ 6. *The diffusion of the classification of the "Encyclopédie"*.
§ 7. *German classifications, 1753-1779*.
§ 8. *Condillac (1775), D'Alembert and the new "metaphysics"*.
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780), *Cours d'études* (1775) dans *œuvres philosophiques*(3 voll.), Paris 1947-1951: A regular division of the sciences is expounded at the beginning of the *Art of Reasoning* (I, pp. 617-620); Jean le Rond D'Alembert (1717-1783), *Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie* (1751) ed. Ducros, Paris 1930.]

17. ———. 1975. "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic." In *Akten Des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (6-10 April 1974)*, 186-191. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Reprinted in: Giorgio Tonelli, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic. A Commentary on Its History*, edited by David H. Chandler, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1994, pp. 1-10.
Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 285-291.
"It is obviously impossible to understand a book correctly, if it is not clear what that book is about. It may seem strange, considering how much work has been done on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, that it has not yet been finally established what the subject matter of this treatise is. According to an earlier interpretation, dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and still accepted in the English-speaking countries, it is a treatise on the theory

of knowledge. According to an interpretation dating from the twenties of our century, and originating from Nicolai Hartmann, Max Wundt and Heinz Heimsoeth, it is a treatise on metaphysics. It is my contention that the subject matter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot be properly defined as theory of knowledge (gnosiology, epistemology), and that defining it as metaphysics is correct, but only partially: in fact it is, in my opinion, a treatise on logic as much as on metaphysics.

I. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is not a treatise on the theory of knowledge for the simple reason that a particular science called theory of knowledge neither existed in Kant's time, nor existed before as an independent discipline; and Kant certainly did not introduce it, since it does not exist in his vocabulary. I do not know when this new philosophical science was established, but I suspect that it was brought about in the early nineteenth century within the Kantian school, by some philosophers who tried, misunderstanding Kant's teaching, to establish a status for their own interpretation of his doctrines, according to which logic was identified with what Kant calls general logic: thus, the methodological parts of logic had to be given a status of a new science, and the Critique of Pure Reason was wrenched from its original context and made into a theory of knowledge. This had, among other baneful consequences, that of leading students to consider the Critique as a gnosiology in general, and not only, as expressly stated by Kant, as a methodology of pure knowledge. Kant certainly had to refer in his Critique to mixed knowledge as well, but this happened only incidentally in connection with the proper theme of the inquiry." (pp. 1-2)

(...)

II. In fact, the *Critique* is a work on methodology, and, more exactly, on the methodology of metaphysics. It has been argued that the statement: "it is a treatise on method," appears only in the Preface to the second edition (1787). But, for those who are familiar with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century terminology, this fact is spelled out very clearly on many occasions in the first edition, when Kant

compares the *Critique* to the "King's road" or "high-road" of metaphysics (*Weg, Königlicher Weg, Heeresstraße, Heeres-Weg,* sometimes *Fußsteig*): the terms way, road, high road, et cetera traditionally and unequivocally referred, for obvious etymological reasons, to method. And the study of method belonged to logic.

A careful reading of the *Critique* shows that this work is one of the "special logics" for the particular sciences, which Kant opposes, as methodologies, to "general logic." These special logics are assigned to the sciences in question as part and parcels of them: ;)ut still, they are the special logics (or methodologies) of those sciences. That Kant did not make this more clear, can be explained by the fact, in the first place, that it seemed to him that he had made it clear enough to those who understand the philosophical language of his time; and, in the second place, that he usually cared very little to explain what seemed very clear to him.

But conclusive evidence for this view is given by Kant's Reflection 5644 (*AK.-Ausg* . XVIII, pp. 285-286), dated by Adickes in 1784-1785. There we read:

Transcendental philosophy precedes metaphysics, which, like logic, does not deal with objects, but with the possibility, the content and limits of all knowledge of pure reason. It is the logic of pure rational knowledge (...). Critique is what inquires into the possibility of the object of metaphysics .

The dating and the status of this statement are confirmed by a passage in a course on metaphysics offered by Kant in 1784-1785, the so-called *Metaphysik Volckmann* (op. cit., p. 363), where Kant dictated in class, in the introductory part of the course:

Transcendental philosophy is in connection with metaphysics what logic is in connection with philosophy as a whole (...).

In connection with the pure use of reason, a special logic will be necessary, which is called transcendental philosophy; here no objects are considered, but rather our reason itself, as it happens in general logic. Transcendental philosophy could also be called transcendental logic.

Here it should be noticed that transcendental philosophy (or ontology) is identified with the *Critique* : it is well known that Kant identified them in the nineties, but actually this identification occurred much earlier—in fact, it is also in some Reflections prior to 1781. I shall add that the two statements quoted are by no means isolated: only, they are those where the fact under consideration is stated most clearly." (pp. 4-5)

18. ———. 1975. "Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy." In *Bewusst Sein. Gerhard Funke Zu Eigen*, edited by Bucher, Alexius J., Druë, Hermann and Seebohm, Thomas M., 126-144. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag H. Grundmann.

    Italian translation in: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 149-168.

19. ———. 1976. "Analysis and Synthesis in Xviiith Century Philosophy Prior to Kant." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 20:178-213.

    "I can not inquire here into the history of these notions, as prior to the XVIIIth Century, although the knowledge of that history is essential in order to fully understand its XVIIIth Century developments. Fortunately, I can refer to some studies on the subjects which, at least, partially describe the precedents of the issues in question (1). It is noteworthy, that XVIIth Century philosophy had already very much simplified these issues, in comparison, e. g., with their treatment during the Renaissance (2). The XVIIIth Century introduces, comparatively, a further simplification, although this problem is still amply debated and connected with many basic questions.
    However, after Kant loaded these terms with multifarious and mostly new meanings, they underwent a revival which has lasted until our days. But, in order to understand these developments, it is essential to reconstruct their immediate

historical premises, which only can make them adequately intelligible.
It can be said in general that, according to an ancient tradition, the analysis or *resolutio* (*Auflösung*) is that cognitive procedure which, beginning from sensible and/or complex representations, aims at establishing their constituent parts, and, furthermore, the constituent parts of these parts, until some “simple” or “irresoluble” elements, or the “causes” of the “effects”, are reached, which are the "elementary notions” or the “first principles”.
The synthesis or *compositio* (*Zusammensetzung*), on the contrary, begins with those elementary notions and first principles, and, combining them and deducing from them, elaborates more complex notions and propositions, viz. derives the “effects” from the “causes”, until it reaches, if it can complete its procedure, at least a part of those representations which were at the foundation of the analytical process, and, also, new representations not offered by experience. Thus, both processes coincide at least partially in their results, as the basic two scientific methods proceeding in opposite directions, which are called to perform different tasks, but also to confirm each other.
Their nature and function raise, of course, many controversies. The basic problems are the following: 1) What is the nature of the elementary ideas and of the first principles which the analytical method aims to reach, and which lie at the foundation of the synthetic process; 2) What are the proper aim and use of the two methods in philosophy. The answer given to these questions shall fundamentally affect the conception of both methods as understood by the different philosophers.
It is also necessary to keep in mind that the terms in question are not only used in philosophy. They are also currently part and parcel of the chemical terminology, and mathematicians used the term “analysis” since the Greek antiquity. These different meanings sometimes interfere with the philosophical ones: therefore I shall occasionally refer to them, in particular when this interference occurs." (pp. 178-179)

(1) See L. M. Regis, "Analyse et synthèse dans l'œuvre de Saint Thomas", *Studia Mediaevalia in honorem ad. Rev. P. R. J. Martin*, Brugis Flandr. 1948, pp. 303 ff. ; H. Schepers, *A. Rüdigers Methodologie und ihre Voraussetzungen*, Köln 1959 (*Erg.-Hefte* der Kant-Studien, N. 78), pp. 18 ff.; S. E. Dolan, "Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse," *Laval théologique et philosophique*, VI, 1950; H. J. de Vleeschauwer, *More seu ordine geometrico demonstratum,* Pretoria 1961 *(Mededelings van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika*, C. 27); N. W. Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method*, New York, 1960; J. H. Randall jr., *The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science*, Padova 1961; E. de Angelis, *Il metodo geometrico nella filosofia del Seicento*, Pisa 1964 (p. 59 ff. in particular); A. Crescini, *Le origini del metodo analitico. Il Cinquecento*, Udine 1965; H. Schüling, *Die Geschichte der axiomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert*, Hildesheim—New York 1969; W. Röd, *Geometrischer Geist und Naturrecht. Methodengeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Staatsphilosophie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, München 1970 (*Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Abhandlungen, Neue Folge*, H. 70.); H. W. Arndt, *Methodo scientifica pertractatum*, Berlin—New York 1971; *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, ed. by J. Ritter, Vol. 1, Basel—Stuttgart 1971, s. v. "Analyse/Synthese", by L. Oeing-Hanhoff; C. B. Boyer, "Analysis: Notes on the Evolution of a Subject and a Name", *The Mathematics Teacher,*XLVII, n. 7, Nov. 1954; A. Crescini, *Il problema metodologico alle origini della scienza moderna*, Roma 1972.
The most comprehensive XVIIth century treatise devoted to the subject is M. Eifler, *Methodologia particularis*, Regiomonti 1639. It is also essential to realize that there were many discussions about the methods in question in Protestant theology: the so-called Lutheran orthodoxy was committed to the analytic method, although it conceived it in a different way from that of the philosophers. See E. Weber, *Die analytische Methode der lutherischen*

Orthodoxie, Habil.-Schr. Halle, Naumburg a. S. 1970; id., *Der Einfluß der Protestantischen Schulphilosophie auf die orthodox-lutherische Dogmatik,* Leipzig 1908, I Hpt.
(2) De Angelis, *Op. cit* ., pp. 116—117; Arndt, *Op. cit* ., passim.

20. ———. 1976. "The Philosophy of D'alembert. A Sceptic Beyond Scepticism." *Kant Studien* no. 67:353-371.

"D'Alembert's philosophical work is studied very little in our time, with the sole exception of his Discours préliminaire whidi, for obvious reasons, cannot be so easily ignored (1). We are now provided with an excellent modern biography of our author (2), whose scientific work has also been studied recently (3), but as for his philosophy we still have to rely on Muller's monograph, on a little known, onesided but penetrating study by Misch, and on a few more recent contributions (4).
D'Alembert originally expounded his philosophical views in his Eléments de Philosophie (1759; Eclaircissements, 1767) (5), which I consider the most authentic expression of his thought, whereas, as it could be expected, his philosophical articles in the Encyclopédie (6) evaded many dangerous questions. However, also in the Eléments our author did not speak his mind entirely (7). More daring views are expressed in some posthumous Eclaircissements to the Eléments, and in some letters to Frederick II. Obviously, d'Alembert's Discours préliminaire of 1751 is also a document of basic importance.
What I contend is (1°) that d'Alembert's philosophy is a radical form of scepticism, in the spirit of what is in my opinion the main trend in French Enlightenment philosophy, as represented by Quesnay, Condillac, Maupertuis, Buffon, etc. (8). And (2°) that d'Alembert simultaneously strove towards a kind of rationalistic phenomenism which, potentially at least, tended to overcome scepticism in its traditional form.
D'Alembert's scepticism, as that of most French philosophers of his age, had not been hitherto adequately

evaluated. Grimsley, Casini, Hankins, and others prior to them, had been aware of it, but they failed to put this view in the correct perspective — simply because this perspective had not yet been introduced. As for G. Klaus, this is his main contention against Ley's materialistic interpretation, but his perspective is strictly Marxistic, and is limited to some general statements.

But I do think that this is the key for understanding d'Alembert's individuality as a philosopher, and for finding a solution for what has recently been called "the problem d'Alembert". From this standpoint, I think that I can show that d'Alembert as a philosopher was not an alter ego either of Voltaire, or of Diderot, or of Condillac: Voltaire and Diderot merely underwent temporary sceptical crises, and Condillac was nothing more than a half-sceptic (9), whereas d'Alembert was in fact much closer to Maupertuis. Still, d'Alembert's views can not be reduced to those of Maupertuis for plenty of good reasons: among which, I want to stress, is his attempt towards overcoming that scepticism which, most probably, has originally been his basic philosophical motivation; this attempt probably corresponds to what some scholars call d'Alembert's "rationalism", but this could not be correctly interpreted as long as it was not located into the perspective of d'Alembert's scepticism.

I certainly do not mean that this perspective, and in particular the account I shall give of it in this paper, could exhaustively describe d'Alembert's personality as a philosopher: there is obviously much more to it. But this view, if further developed, could provide an hitherto missing individualized nucleus for an adequate foundation of a - renewed exploration of d'Alembert's contribution to philosophy."

(1) See: R. McRae, *The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant*, Toronto 1951, p. 107 f.; M. Da Ponte Orvieto, *L'unità del sapere nell'Illuminismo*, Padova 1968. H. Dieckmann, *The Concept of Knowledge in the Encyclopédie,* in: *Essays in Comparative Literature*, ed. by H. Dieckmann, Levy and Motekat, St. Louis, Mo. 1961. A new

edition of F. Venturi's book of 1946, *Le origini dell'Enciclopedia*, was published Torino 1963.
(2) R. Grimsley, *Jean d'Alembert (1717—83)*, Oxford 1963.
(3) Th. L. Hankins, *Jean d'Alembert. Science and the Enlightenment*, Oxford 1970. Hankins pays very little attention to d'Alembert's philosophy, whose importance he explicitly denies. W. L. Scott, in his *The Conflict Between Atomism and Conservation Theory 1644—1860*, London — New York 1970, devotes several pages to d'Alembert's views on the subject. F. Diaz, in his *Filosofia e politica nel Settecento francese*, Torino 1962, studies rather extensively d'Alembert's political position.
(4) M. Muller, *Essai sur la philosophie de Jean d'Alembert*, Paris 1926; G. Misch, *Zur Entstehung des französischen Positivismus,* Berlin 1900; see also: M. Förster, *Beiträge zu Kenntnis und Charakter der Philosophie d'Alemberts,* Diss. Jena 1892; A. Körbel, *D'Alemberts Vorrede zur Enzyklopädie*, Progr., Bielitz 1907; L. Kunz, *Die Erkenntnistheorie d'Alemberts*, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XX, 1907; M. Schintz, *Die Anfänge des französischen Positivismus 1: D'Alemberts Erkenntnislehre*, Straßburg 1914; A. Carrigós, *Juan d'Alembert, artifice de la filosofia de la moral*, Revista de Correos y Telégrafos, XLII, 1941; H. Ley, *Zur Bedeutung d'Alemberts*, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, I, 1951—1952; G. Klaus, *D'Alembert und die Materialisten*, ibid., II, 1952—1953; H. Ley, *D'Alembert und die Idealisten*, ibid., II, 1952—1953; G. Klaus, *Bemerkungen zur Erkenntnistheorie d'Alemberts*, ibid., Ill, 1953—1954; R. E. Butts, *Rationalism in Modern Science, d'Alembert and the esprit simpliste*, Bucknell Review, VIII, 1959; R. Grimsley, D'Alembert and Hume, Revue de Littérature comparée, XXXV, 1961; M. Retzler, The d'Alembert Question: a Study in Problematics, *Diderot Studies* VI, 1964; P. Casini, D'Alembert epistemologo, *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia*, XIX, 1964; O. P. Arvesen, Jean *Le Rond d'Alembert, Det Kongelinge Norske Videnskabers Selskabs*, Forandeling Bd. 42, 1969, Trondheim 1970; P. Casini, Il problema d'Alembert, *Rivista*

di Filosofia, LXI, 1970; id., *Introduzione all'Illuminismo*, Bari 1973.
(5) I refer as *EPh* to the edition of the *Eléments* published in d'Alembert's *Œuvres*, vol. II, Paris 1805. This edition was reprinted by Olms, Hildesheim 1965, with the title *Essai sur les Eléments de Philosophie*, with introduction, notes and index by R. N. Schwab, who in his notes lists the variants of the original edition, and refers to the analogous passages in the articles of the *Encyclopédie* and in other works by d'Alembert. (*Ecl* . refers to the *Eclaircissements* (1767) contained in *EPh* .) I refer as *DP* to the *Discours Préliminaire* from the edition by L. Ducros, Paris 1930, as *E* to the first edition (1751—1765) of the *Encyclopédie*, for d'Alembert's articles and Preface to vol. III, and, for his other works, as *OE* to the edition of the *Œuvres* published by A. Belin, Paris 1821 f., 5 vol., and as *OF* for the *Lettres et correspondences inédites*, ed. Ch. Henry, Paris 1789. *TD* refers to the *Traité de Dynamique*, Paris 1743.
(6) The most important are: *Corps, Cosmologie, Démonstration, Dictionnaire, Egoisme, Elément des sciences, Expérimental, Genève, Géomètre, Géométrie, Système* .
(7) Frédéric II, *Œuvres*, Berlin 1846—1849, vol. XXIV, p. 457 (letter to Frederick of Dec. 12, 1766).
(8) For a survey of this trend see my article *J.-P. Changeux and French Enlightenment Scepticism*, Studia Leibnitiana, LV, 1974, where I also discuss the question of a definition of XVIIIth Century scepticism. I discuss another general aspect of this question, *viz* . its connection with the problem of the limits of the human mind, in *The Weakness of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment,* Diderot Studies, XIV, 1971.
(9) See my article quoted in Note 8.

21. ———. 1978. "Critique" and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A Historical Survey." *Kant Studien* no. 69:119-148.

"Incredible as it may seem, the boundless secondary literature about Kant does not offer one single account of the history of the term "Critique" prior to its appearance in

his works. This neglect probably stems from the feeling that the meaning of the term in question can be taken as a matter of course, and that, after all, this term is so widely used that it has not much of a specific meaning left, — albeit in its derivation “Criticism”, as one of the denominations of Kant’s school of thought, i. e. as a synonym of “Transcendental Idealism” or of “Kantianism”.
This feeling is only partially justified. In fact, in European languages, during the XVIIIth Century the terms “Critique” (and “Criticism”), with the related “critic” (formerly “critick”), “critical” and “to criticize” were extremely fashionable ones, lavishly and promiscuously used. The same happened, e. g. with “reasonable” (*vernünfftig*) during the first half of the XVIIIth Century, and “pragmatical” (*pragmatisch*) during the second half of that Century, which were in Germany most popular catch words among intellectuals. However, in the first place, “Critique” etc. were at that time loaded with a greater significance than in ours, as symbols of a general intellectual and social change which partially had taken place, and partially was more or less utopically called for: Kant himself claimed, in the Preface to the first edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that “Our age is specifically the age of Criticism (*Kritik*), to which everything must submit” (2); and he was by no means the only one who held this opinion. Now, this has to be taken into account, if we do not want to miss some important rational and emotional connotations implied by these terms in the XVIIIth Century, while in our time they became anodyne words of the common language, having lost their prior charge of sophisticated intellectual belligerency. In the second place, the XVIIIth Century was still close to a time when the meaning of these terms had been much more specific, and occasionally they still retained, or at least echoed this heritage of the past. In the third place, they were developing in the XVIIIth Century a few new specific meanings, to which, as it will appear, Kant’s use of “Critique” was significantly related; thus, “Critique” etc. were used by Kant not just casually, as obvious fashionable terms of his time, but also, and, I think,

primarily, in a hitherto unsuspected meaningful way which will offer important indications for a better understanding of Kant's work.
Still, the field in question has been partially explored. E. Gudemann (s.v. " *Kritikos"* in A. F. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, *Real-Enzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. XI, Stuttgart 1921) and J. E. Sandys (*A History of Classical Scholarship*, 3 vols., New York 1958, I, p. 6-11) gave some account of the grammatical and literary uses of this terminological complex in Antiquity; R. Wellek ("The Term and Conceptof Literary Criticism", in: R. Wellek, *Concepts of Criticism*, New Haven and London 1953) offered an excellent outline of its development as "literary criticism", and R. Kosellek (*Kritik und Krise. Ein Beitrag zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt*, Freiburg-München 1959, p. 87 ff.) briefly examined some aspects (chiefly the scriptural and the political) of its role in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. I will not duplicate Gudemann's, Sandys' and Wellek's research, which I shall briefly summarize, while basically considering different aspects of the problem." (pp. 120-121)
(...)
"Thus, it can be assumed that if Kant selected the title of "Critique" for his major work, this not only reflected the prestige of a term very fashionable in that time, and the generical meaning of that term in philosophy: but, in accordance with the spirit of his enterprise, he selected it as a qualification of his work as a work primarily on Logic, and in particular on a Logic centered on verification and correction (226). And this is perhaps the sole probably direct influence of Catholic thought of that time on Kant's major work." (p. 147)
(226) See G. Tonelli, *Kant's "Critique of pure Reason" within the Tradition of Modern Logic*, Part II, Ch. IV, in preparation [1994], on the term "Critique" in Kant.

22. ———. 1978. "Themiseul De Saint Hyacinthe (H. Cordonnier, 1684-1746). A Smiling Sceptic." *International Studies in Philosophy* no. 10:163-166.

"Although he is completely unknown from this viewpoint, Saint Hyacinthe is not only interesting, but surprising. Humorous and embattled, this journalist and erudite had to emigrate to Holland where he died (2). In 1743 he published his *Recherehes Philosophiques* (3), a quite remarkable work, particularly for the considerable knowledge of ancient philosophy it shows, as well as of the philosophy of the XVIIth Century: a knowledge which at least in part undoubtedly is direct.
St. Hyacinthe, for example, certainly read Descartes very carefuIly. This stock of knowledge, with their finesse and rigour, are set to work, as we shall see, with the art of a great juggler.
S1. Hyacinthe belongs to that sceptical trend which was one of the major features of the French Enlightenment, echoes and adapts to his own ends preceding doctrines, and opens the path for future developments (2).
The *Recherches* bear a dedication to the King of Prussia, Frederik III (*sic*), who already had made a reputation as a protector of the unbelievers, and this may have fostered some hopes on the part of the author. But either our author was not very informed of the genealogy of the King, or this is one more joke, perhaps a revenge for help denied.
The work begins with a detailed discussion of the different philosophical systems, all of them rejected for whatever reasons. But in saying, that he intends to establish a philosophy as solid as mathematics, in going out of his way in order to stress the need for an exact terminology, and in discussing the problems arising from this view, our author is especially hard on the sceptics. When we see later how solid he considers mathematics to be, and what sleights-of-hand he performs with the terms he uses, we will have some good reason to believe that these initial protestations are a manifestation of the author's sense of humor rather than of his speculative preoccupations." (p.163)
(...)
"What does all this mean? It is clearly empty talk: if we establish that we do not know the « ground of the existence» of all things « as they are in themselves »,

because all we know are the properties of these things, coming thereupon to the conclusion that, *therefore*, these properties are « the thing itself as much », and they « allow to know» the ground of its existence, we run into a patent *non sequitur* : all is saved, with the exception of logic.
In so doing, our author revives a similar theses supported by Brunet, transforming it into a caricature (5).
On this shaky foundation, St. Hyacinthe triumphantly proceeds to prove God's existence (pp. 323-355) and that of the finite beings; we also learn that the soul is different from matter (p. 487), and some more edifying truths.
The pleasurable reading of this book, which is of a remarkable intellectual standing, is only limited by the afterthought that the author could have developed (if it is licit to say « could have» while dealing with history), on the foundation of his scepticism, a revolutionary subjective phenomenism, instead of intrenching himself into the caricature of traditional metaphysics. Perhaps he was prevented from doing this either by the conditions of his time, or by his own stand as a radical sceptic. However, St. Hyacinthe's philosophy represents an extreme case which can not be ignored if we want to understand the atmosphere of his time, and the presuppositions for the rise of a much more solid kind of scepticism: that of Maupertuis and D'Alembert, although we can not be assured that they knew St. Hyacinthe's work, and, if so, whether they profited from it." (p. 166)
For a survey of French XVIIIth Century scepticism see my article « Pierre Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment», in *Studia Leibnitiana*, VI, 1974, p. 112 ff.
(2) See: P. M. Horsley, « The de Saint Hyacinthe», *Comparative Literature Studies*, IV, 1943.
(3) *Recherches philosophiques sur la nécessité de s'assurer par soi-même de la vérité ...*, Rotterdam et La Haye 1743.
(5) Claude Brunet, *Journal de Médecine*, Août, Septembre, Octobre 1686, pp. 209-285.

23. ———. 1979. "The Scepticism of Franois Quesnay." *International Studies in Philosophy* no. 11:77-89.

"Franois Quesnay (1694·1774), professionally a surgeon and physician, is famous for his works on Economics, as one of the major figures of the Physiocratic school; also his medical work has been given some attention, but his philosophical stand has been entirely neglected, although it seems to me to be very remarkable. The ideas Quesnay deals with certainly exerted an important influence on Quesnay's friends Diderot, d'Alembert, Helvetius, Buffon, Turgot, etc., and certainly did not escape Maupertuis' attention.
A first statement of Quesnay's philosophical views can be found in his *Essai physique sur l'économie animale,* first published in 1736 in one volume; we will study it in the much enlarged three-volume edition of 1747. This work is sometimes quoted by XVlllth Century experts, but its basic meaning and its importance have not been recognized. "Animal economy" meant, in the language of that time, "physiology" in a very wide sense; but only vol. II of this work deals with physiology proper, while vol. I provides a general philosophical foundation, and vol. III examines the psychical powers of man." (p. 77)
(...)
"In conclusion, Quesnay does not question the metaphysical notion of "cause," but he asserts that we can not know causes as they are in themselves; however, this does not prevent us from establishing them phenomenally in order to give a foundation to empirical knowledge." (p. 81)
(...)
"Volume VI of the *Encyclopédie* (1756) contains an article "Evidence (*métaphysique*)" by Quesnay, (6) which in fact is a short survey of the basic points of philosophy in general. Here, our author tries to convey his scepticism in a more subtle way than in the *Traité*, and several times pretends to fight against Pyrrhonism (p. 765, 779, 785). Besides other differences, he seems to lean toward Malebranchism much more than in the *Traité*, and this is easy to understand if we realize that Malebranche's thought provided excellent

ammunition for the sceptics, as the examples of Foucher, Lanion, etc., prove.
This attitude is certainly explained by the fact that this article appeared in a collective and already very famous work: a more open stand could have compromised other people and the entire enterprise which, as facts would show very soon, already contained sufficient grounds for scandal." (p. 83)
(...)
"Comparing the doctrines of the article "Evidence," with those of the *Traité*, we can notice some interesting particular differences, besides the peculiar general tone described at the beginning of this section. The activity of the mind, still accepted in the *Traité*, is reduced in the article to almost complete passivity. The more daring tone of the *Traité* finds its expression in the doubt cast on the difference between dream and reality and on the hypothesis of the vision in God, in the possibility of the inherence of motion to matter, of' the materiality of the soul, and in the foundation of the immortality of the soul in divine justice only - all these points are abandoned in the article of the *Encyclopédie* .
A few more interesting philosophical doctrines can be found in the *Recherches philosophiques sur l'evidence des vérités géometriques*(Paris 1773).
To this late work Quesnay prefixed an introduction entitled *Examen des advantages de la géometrie sur la métaphysique* . Here our author introduces a distinction between demonstrative geometry, which is evident because its propositions are founded on sensation, and the geometry "of the imperceptibles" (p. V) or "indeterminables" (p. XXIV), (10) also called "metaphysical geometry" (p. 111): no metaphysical ideas can be demonstrated (p. IX; cf. p. XLIII). The senses can found the truths of demonstrative geometry because
geometrical points are sensible, and not merely ideal as mathenlatical points (p. XIII); although they are not physical points, because they are not divisible (p. XIV), they are extended (p. XXXI). The finite, not the infinite, is the

object of geometry (p. XXXIV-XXXV). Obviously, this view of geometry is similar to that of Hume, and could have been suggested by him." (p. 88)
Editor's note: The author completed a first draft of th is paper on the day before his death. Mrs. Grazia Tonelli and the editors have made minimal stylistic corrections, but otherwise publish it as he left it.
(6) Quoted from F. Quesnay, *œuvres économiques et philosophiques*, ed. Oncken, Francfort 1888 (reprint Aalen 1965).
(10) For "Indeterminable Geometry" see: Ch. Hutton, *Mathematical and Philosophical Dictionary*, London 1795 (reprint Hildesheim-New York 1973), art. "Indeterminable."

24. ———. 1994. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic. A Commentary on Its History* . Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Edited from the Unpublished Works of Giorgio Tonelli by David Chandler.
"The world of Kant scholarship was electrified in 1974, when Giorgio Tonelli presented a brief summary of his life's work. His was a meticulous study: the plethora of sources shaping Kant's world, particularly the nature and scope of logic. Tonelli found widely held interpretations of Kant to be inadequate, even wrong.
At the end of that brief summary, given at the Fourth International Kant Congress in Mainz, Tonelli promised to publish a book with the detailed justification for this rethinking of Kant. Here is that book.
Tragically Tonelli's life was cut short. Though he had hoped to include more chapters, the evidence Tonelli provides is ample in the three he was able to complete. Kant scholars will find it necessary to reconsider received interpretations and assumptions in light of this ground-breaking work.
The richness, complexity and development of Kant's thought can never be exhausted. New paradigms are indispensable in order to deepen our understanding. This is perhaps the central significance of Giorgio Tonelli's life-long

scholarly endeavors. Providing the historical and conceptual details that suggest new interpretations and approaches, it becomes possible to question some widely accepted assumptions and interpretations. What is undoubtedly most valuable for English-speaking Kant scholarship is that this brings us ever closer to understanding ideas and their development in Kant and his predecessors in their original historical context. Such a hermeneutical principle is crucial in approaching any text. Very specific studies in the original sources must be the foundation of scholarship. On the other hand, the critical scholar must distinguish carefully a source of an idea from merely the historical background for an idea. This distinction was perhaps occasionally blurred in Tonelli's corpus." (pp. XII-XIII)
(...)
"At virtually every mention of the Jäsche *Logic* Tonelli includes the dates 1782 and 1790. Referring to two notebooks from these years shows that Tonelli does not seem to understand the source of the Jasche Logic. The work of Terry Boswell provides the most current estimate vis-a-vis the sources of this work. They likely include students' notes, Kant's reflections, editorial additions by Jäsche and material from Meier's compendium on logic, which text Kant used in his logic courses for some forty years. See Boswell's "On the Textual Authenticity of Kant's Logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 9 (1988), pp. 193-203; and his *Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zum Kantischen Logikhandbuch* (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York, Paris: Peter Lang, 1991; in the series *Studien zur Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 3).
At the time Tonelli wrote, the widely accepted date for the *Wiener Logik* and the *Logik Pölitz* was 1790. Thanks to subsequent computer analysis of word usage and frequency, the best estimate today is that they were written in the early 1780s. The most helpful resource on this issue is Norbert Hinske's "Einleitung" in *Kant-Index*, vol. 14: Personenindex zum Logikcorpus, ed. Norbert Hinske, et al. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Günther Holzboog, 1991; in the series *Forschungen und Materialien zur*

deutschen Aufklärung, Abteilung III: Indices, vol. 18), pp. ix-cv. Consequently, all Tonelli's references to the dates of these works have been dropped." (pp. XV-XVI)

25. Popkin, Richard H., De Olaso, Ezequiel, and Tonelli, Giorgio, eds. 1997. *Scepticism in the Enlightenment* . Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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    "This volume contains a discussion between three scholars in the history of philosophy, myself [R. H. Popkin], the late Giorgio Tonelli and the late Ezequiel Olaso. What started the discussion was a brash paper I gave on "Scepticism in the Enlightenment" at the first international congress on the Enlightenment, held in Geneva in the summer of 1963. Soon thereafter two brilliant younger scholars, Giorgio Tonelli and Ezequiel de Olaso, started publishing studies leading from what I had said, and showing areas that I had not probed, and offering interpretations that went much further than what I had originally presented.
    Tonelli, in one of the essays published here, said, "The only survey of Enlightenment scepticism we have is a well known article by R.H. Popkin, which provides a broad frame of reference, but which neglects many details". Olaso called my study a pioneering one, "the first all-embracing survey of

[scepticism] of the period". But both of these scholars pointed out right away that there was much more to said on the subject than what I had presented.
"Scepticism" is a loose term that has been used to apply to any kind of doubts, and particularly, doubts about certain aspects of the Judeo-Christian religion. It also applies to a rigorous epistemological doubt about the possibility of attaining knowledge that cannot be questioned. It is this latter sense that we were concerned with, the legacy of the Greek sceptical traditions of the Pyrrhonists and the Academics during the eighteenth century. We had many discussions in person and in writing on this subject. For a decade I continued my original view, that eighteenth century scepticism was primarily and almost exclusively the view of David Hume and those he influenced. However, over time I was overwhelmed by the strength of the arguments and new materials and interpretations that Tonelli and Olaso offered, showing a much richer canvas of epistemological sceptical discussions than I had considered."
(...)
"Giorgio Tonelli was born in 1928 in Italy. He did his undergraduate and graduate studies at the University of Pisa, where he received his doctorate in 1947. He supplemented his studies at the Sorbonne, Basel, Naples and many German institutions. He became professor of German literature at Pisa, and later moved to the United States in 1969 where he became a professor of the history of philosophy at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He published extensively on Kant and on the background of his philosophy, on the German intellectual world of the eighteenth century, and on the philosophical views of many of the philosophes. He sometimes published in French, German, Italian or English. He was also a great initiator of projects to further the study of the history of philosophy. He founded the journal, now called, *International Studies in Philosophy* : he founded the important series *Studien und Materialen zur Geschichte der Philosophie* . He was very active in committees and

conferences in America and Europe on topics in the history of philosophy and the history of the Enlightenment. He played a most significant role in opening up new topics and outlooks in the history of ideas, and he encouraged many budding scholars in America and Europe." (pp. IX-XI)

26. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1997. "Kant and the Ancient Sceptics." In *Scepticism in the Enlightenment*, edited by Popkin, Richard H., De Olaso, Ezequiel and Tonelli, Giorgio, 69-98. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    English translation by John C. Laursen of *Kant und die antiken Skeptiker* in: H. Heimsoeth, D. Henrich, and G. Tonelli (eds.), *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967, pp. 93-123. "The historical problematic of the sceptical tradition since the Renaissance has been raised again recently in a splendid book by Richard Popkin. (1) The author traces the relationships between the revival of ancient scepticism and the new sceptical attitudes from Erasmus to Descartes, and promises a future continuation of his work that will reach down to Kierkegaard. Our investigation here is intended as a contribution to the penultimate steps of that continuation. We shall not be raising the general problem of Kant's relationship to scepticism: a decision about this far-reaching question will first be possible when its presuppositions (namely, the progress of the sceptical tradition up to Kant) have been clarified. We will therefore mainly limit ourselves to one part of the problem: Kant's relationship with the ancient sceptics, with special attention to terminological questions.
    It goes without saying that one should not believe that this part of the problem can be considered wholly in isolation. One reason for this is that in all likelihood Kant's knowledge of ancient scepticism was not based on a firsthand study of the ancient Greek texts, (2) but rather on the received image of the Greek sceptics, mainly as it was to be found in the modern sceptics, their opponents, and the historians of philosophy of the times. It will therefore be necessary to

allude to some aspects of the history of modern scepticism; especially to Pierre Bayle and his followers in the eighteenth century.
An evaluation of the attitude of Kant toward the ancient sceptics naturally also presupposes an assessment of his relationship with scepticism in general, and especially to the scepticism of his times. But in respect to this question, as in the case of the previous one, we will limit ourselves to generally accepted features and certain special indications and particulars, in order not to go too far out of the range of our problem." (p. 69)
(...)
"What, then, is the state of the case with Kant's "scepticism"? First, one must distinguish between the pre-Critical and the Critical periods. At the end of the first, and indeed between 1765 and 1768, the "zetetic" attitude of 1765 and many places in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer signal a certain approximation to scepticism, with respect to which Hume probably played a certain role, although not one which can be ascertained any more exactly. (138) But Kant should still not be considered as a follower of mitigated (and even less of radical) scepticism in this period according to the traditional meaning of this characterization, just as little as he should be considered an empiricist at that time. Kant had indeed excluded from the realm of human knowledge many areas of metaphysics and established that other areas were knowable only empirically. He had also rejected all abstract and purely a priori grounded metaphysics through his grounding "in concreto" of philosophy. But through his proofs "in concreto" he thought he could reach some metaphysical truths of absolute and not purely of empirically universal validity. His position thus belonged to the problematic of the limits of human understanding, and not to the classical problematic of scepticism. His undeniable bent toward scepticism of this period was thus only selective and partial (in that in connection with some problems concerning supersensible objects he was a radical sceptic; in connection with other objects that are knowable purely empirically he was a mitigated sceptic; and in

connection with further problems concerning metaphysically knowable objects, he was not sceptical at all). That is, his doubts should be understood as preliminary (Cartesian) doubts. Kant's position thus should not be considered sceptical in the true sense.

In the Critical period, Kant's rejection of ancient scepticism and of every "radical" scepticism stands as a final result. It is true that he sharply defined the limits of our knowledge, and everything beyond the empirical was excluded. But significant chief indicators distinguish his position from "mitigated" scepticism. He was convinced that he had constructed a firmly founded system.

He maintained that men were capable of universal and necessary knowledge within the realm that was left to them, although this may not correspond to the most basic being of things.

Apart from all the other recognized differences that separate Kant from mitigated scepticism, these two above-mentioned chief indicators should be sufficient to demonstrate that his expressed personal attitude should not be considered a palingenesis of the scepticism of his times, and that Kant's protestations that he fought scepticism by using the sceptical method should be taken as earnest, and not only with respect to radical but also with respect to mitigated scepticism. Thus, Kant not only broke a middle way (as Bacon, Gassendi, Bayle (139) and many others, especially in Kant's time, had tried to do), but broke a new way between dogmatism and scepticism, in which the old opposition between the two positions was for the first time set up on a fully new plane, even if it was not finally transcended.

Also with reference to its sources, Kant's philosophy ought not to be considered as a development or even a fundamental renovation of the empirical scepticism of his age. The Critique of Pure Reason owes too many of its basic concepts to the German scholastic tradition, especially as it had been developed in the 1760's and 1770's by the students of Crusius, Hollmann, and Darjes (as we hope to show in another place), for it to be considered simply as a product of "modern forces". It is rather a creative synthesis of the "old"

and the “new”, where “old” and “new” are concepts that are purely relative and subject to easy reversal." (pp. 85-86)
(1) Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, Assen 1960; see the review by G. Tonelli, *Filosofía* XV, 2, 1964, [pp. 327-332] (also appearing separately under the title *Un libro sallo scetticismo da Erasmo a Descartes*, Torino 1964) for a detailed discussion of the special methodological problems of this theme. Further: M.L. Wiley, *The Subtle Knot. Creative Scepticism in XVIIth Century England*, London 1952; H.G. Van Leeuwen, *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-169* 0, The Hague 1963; R.A. Watson, *The Downfall of Cartesianism, 1673-1712,* The Hague 1966; R.H. Popkin, “Scepticism and Counter-Reformation in France”, *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, LI, 1960; R.H. Popkin, “The High Road to Pyrrhonism”, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, II, 1965; R.H. Popkin, “The Traditionalism, Modernism, and Scepticism of René Rapin”, *Filosofia,* XV, 1964; and especially R.H. Popkin, “Scepticism in the Enlightenment”, *Studies on Voltaire and the XVIII Century*, XXVI, 1963, where the author simplifies the perspective set forth in his book, taking into account only “absolute scepticism” and the reactions against it.
(2) We have indeed found no grounds for assuming that Kant had even read Sextus Empiricus. See, in general: A. Samson, *Kants kennis der Grieksche philosophie*, Alphen a. d. Rijn, 1927 (Utrecht Dissertation).
(138) Compare Tonelli, “Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kauzaibeziehungen”, *Kant-Studien* 57, 1966, pp. 417-456.
(139) Compare Gassendi, *Opera*, op. cit., I, p. 79; Van Leeuwen, op. cit, pp. 6,105.

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BIBLIOGRAFIA

Giorgio Tonelli è stato uno dei maggiori studiosi della storia della filosofia nel Settecento; i suoi scritti, pubblicati in italiano, inglese, francese e tedesco sono apparsi in volumi e riviste e solo in piccola parte raccolti in volume.
Questo passo della Prefazione al suo primo libro contiene una sintesi della sua metodologia di ricerca: "Una monografia storica è veramente degna di tale nome allorché non soltanto vi si muta il quadro del soggetto trattato, ma allorché essa anche contribuisce in qualche modo a cambiare la mentalità con cui è opportuno scrivere monografie storiche concernenti un cerchio di soggetti assai più vasto del proprio. Se non ci illudiamo di avere con questo libro introdotto delle notevoli innovazioni in materia, speriamo però che esso valga almeno a dimostrare la necessità e la fruttuosità di un metodo storiografico che dovrebbe essere noto ma che, in storia della filosofia, viene applicato solo in una trascurabile minoranza di casi. Un atteggiamento fondamentale della nostra ricerca, e che implica tutta una particolare messa in valore del materiale a disposizione, consiste nel non considerare lo sviluppo nel tempo dei vari motivi, come interessante solo agli effetti dei chiarimenti che esso possa gettare su una qualche opera maggiore che essi preparano, considerando quest'ultima come un tutto concluso. È senza dubbio significativo che un Autore abbia voluto redigere ad un certo punto una certa parte delle proprie idee in un'opera di notevole importanza, ed è

opportuno esaminare le ragioni per cui ciò avviene, e lo spirito di sistema secondo cui ciò avviene; spirito di sistema in generale ben diverso dai motivi reali che hanno portato l'Autore a quelle tali idee. Ma è ugualmente importante cercare di comprendere come siano nate tali idee, interessandosi alla dinamica del pensiero dell'Autore di per sé, indipendentemente dall'interesse per le sistemazioni occasionali, la cui giustificazione storica dipende proprio dallo studio di quella dinamica. Perché la dinamica del pensiero di un Autore ci rivela dei fatti psicologici e culturali importanti, indipendentemente dai risultati «definitivi» raggiunti due o venti anni dopo dall'Autore stesso." *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica* (1955), p. 9.
Una bibliografia completa (fino al 1979) è stata pubblicata da Claudio Cesa nel *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*, 1980, pp. 40-46 ed in una versione aggiornata al 1987 nel volume a cura di Claudio Cesa e Norbert Hinske in collaborazione con Sonia Carboncini, *Kant und sein Jahrundert. Gedenkschrift für Giorgio Tonelli* Berna: Peter Lang, 1993, pp. 187-204.
In questa versione ho omesso le numerose recensioni ed alcuni scritti minori, ma ho aggiunto quelli apparsi dopo il 1987; la bibliografia è suddivisa in quattro sezioni in base alla lingua: scritti in italiano, francese, inglese e tedesco.

1. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1954. "La Formazione Del Testo Della *Kritik Der Urteilskraft*." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*:423-448.

   "La *Kritik der Urteilskraft* è nota per essere una delle più oscure opere di Kant; quantunque esista una notevole quantità di studi sull'argomento, ben pochi di essi valgono a gettare qualche raggio di luce su tale amalgama di materiale almeno in apparenza eterogeneo e contradditorio. — La ragione di ciò è la stessa, per cui la maggioranza degli scritti di storia della filosofia è di scarso aiuto alla comprensione dei testi che essi riguardano: e cioè che si tratta il più sovente di divagazioni speculative sull'argomento, da un preteso punto di vista teorico, piuttosto che di una paziente ricostruzione delle idee dell'autore nel loro esatto significato storico in rapporto al loro tempo, nelle loro origini e nel loro

sviluppo. E la situazione resterà invariata fino a che non sarà chiaro a tutti che un testo, filosofico non è uno scritto esoterico da affrontarsi con un presunto dono di illuminazione interiore, ma è nè più nè meno che uno speciale tipo di documento delle idee di una persona e di un'epoca, che deve essere esaminato secondo la mentalità ed il metodo filologici e storici propri di ogni ricerca di storia delle idee.

La mancanza di un simile tipo di considerazione si fa particolarmente sentire a proposito della *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Di essa, come di tutti gli altri scritti di Kant, esistono ottime edizioni critiche, ma la questione della formazione e della cronologia interna del testo è stata quasi completamente negletta. Tale problema è tanto più importante in quanto principalmente da indicazioni ottenute per questa via possiamo sperare di comprendere qualcosa della connessione del vario e discordante materiale che essa contiene. Quasi tutti gli interpreti se ne sono accorti, ma essi hanno in generale fornito giustificazioni teoretiche non documentate e in generale del tutto immaginarie per la volta a volta affermata o negata coerenza fondamentale dell'opera. Ricordiamo che i testi di Kant presentano tutti molto chiaramente segni ben conservati di una stratificazione successiva non eliminata da una rielaborazione finale; i più chiari esempi di ciò sono la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, la *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, e la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, la cronologia interna delle quali è stata più o meno studiata.

La possibilità di un tale tipo di ricerca in Kant è data dal suo modo di redigere, dipendente sia dal suo carattere che dalla sua epoca. Egli stesso ce ne ha lasciato una testimonianza, conservata nella *Anthropologie Brauer* (Collegium Antropologicum [sic]... gesammelt von Th. Fr. Brauer... 13 Oct. incept. 1779) proveniente dal 1779-1780. — Se si vuole scrivere un'opera, egli dice, è necessario lasciar libero corso alla immaginazione. Bisogna anzitutto fissare bene in testa l'idea principale, poi frequentare la società, o leggere libri divertenti su soggetti del tutto diversi — l'immaginazione ne è cosi eccitata, e parecchie idee nascono." (pp. 423-424)

(...)
"La base di tale analisi è, abbiamo detto, filologica, e cerca di evitare per quanto è possibile l'appello ai molto dubbi « inneren Gründe ». Ma bisogna onestamente precisare che non ci si può fondare qui sul fatto lingua in senso stretto, cioè su di una semplice statistica dell'uso dei vocaboli e delle forme grammaticali e sintattiche; la quale ricerca non darebbe nel caso nostro, come è evidente dato il breve periodo esaminato (dal 1787 al 1790), alcun frutto. Si tratta invece di isolare una serie di termini tecnici caratteristici, mediante una analisi molto elementare che ciascun lettore attento può agevolmente ripetere, ed osservarne l'impiego nelle diverse parti della *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, supponendo che, data appunto la loro importanza concettuale, la loro assenza o presenza sia indizio abbastanza sicuro per definire le diverse fasi dello sviluppo del pensiero di Kant.
Premesso questo, appare quanto sia vano cercare di creare artificialmente in molte opere di Kant una inesistente congruenza assoluta di tutti i particolari, e insieme come sia ingiustificato il trasformare le evoluzioni e le oscillazioni in inconseguenze e contraddizioni." (p
p. 426-427).

2. ———. 1955. "Kant, Dall'estetica Metafisica All'estetica Psicoempirica. Studi Sulla Genesi Del Criticismo (1754-1771) E Sulle Sue Fonti." *Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*.

   "Le ricerche, dei cui risultati in questo volume non esponiamo che una prima parte, nacquero, diversi anni or sono, da un problema di cui non potevamo prevedere, allora, la vasta portata. Il nostro interesse verteva sull'esatto significato della terza Critica kantiana. Cioè principalmente sulla questione del rapporto dei diversi e, apparentemente almeno, eterogenei motivi contenuti in essa, e del rapporto tra essa e gli altri scritti di Kant. Il che equivale, in breve, a domandarsi perché Kant abbia scritto una Critica del Giudizio, e perché l'abbia scritta proprio in quel modo.

La nostra intenzione era ed è, si è già capito, puramente ed esclusivamente storica. Ove con questo s'intenda però anche ed eminentemente la storia di quell'aspetto della cultura che è il pensiero speculativo, nella sua viva connessione con gli altri aspetti delle idee e degli eventi della persona e del tempo studiati.
Un simile atteggiamento ci ha, come è ovvio, portato a cercare una soluzione del nostro problema in una ricostruzione dello sviluppo delle idee, e principalmente delle idee estetiche, di Kant, anteriormente al 1790.
Questo ci ha avviato a considerare la personalità di Kant filosofo principalmente da un punto di vista lasciato finora quasi completamente in ombra: quello da cui egli appare il depositario e il rielaboratore della tradizione della Psychologia empirica fondata da Wolff e dai suoi seguaci e avversari, con le sue implicazioni e corrispondenze in sede, tra l'altro, di logica.
Tra i risultati delle nostre ricerche, uno dei più rilevanti è forse che il considerare il nostro Autore da una tale quinta prospettica, opportunamente combinata a quelle tradizionali, ci avrebbe permesso di superare il dilemma esegetico, ormai inveterato nella *Kantforschung*, tra *Kant als Erkenntnisstheoretiker* e *Kant als Metaphysiker,* permettendoci di rintracciare un importante motivo unitario nella complessa personalità kantiana, che congiunga i suoi interessi metodologici da un lato e ontologico-metafisici dall'altro, traducendoli sul piano comune dell'epistemologia.
Non vogliamo affermare di avere così rintracciato il centro della personalità teoretica di Kant, ma un centro non meno importante degli altri, trascurato in generale sinora dagli storici, che hanno avuto il torto di prendere troppo alla lettera la polemica del Kant critico contro la psicologia, negligendo così di considerare quanto egli di fatto dovesse a tale scienza.
Siamo stati dunque condotti a ricercare i rapporti tra lo sviluppo delle idee estetico-psicologiche di Kant, e quello delle sue idee gnoseologiche, logiche, metafisiche, e morali. Andavamo incontro a dei risultati di cui noi stessi eravamo i

primi ad essere sorpresi: venivamo portati ad un riesame di buona parte delle principali questioni della filosofia kantiana, che apparivano spesso rischiarate da una luce totalmente diversa da quella tradizionale. Venivamo così condotti ad una revisione e ad una riformulazione di molte delle idee correnti sulla carriera filosofica di Kant, che, integrate alle altre prospettive più tradizionali, vogliono ormai essere un elemento indispensabile alla comprensione globale della genesi del criticismo.
Esponiamo così nel presente volume un primo segmento temporale dei filoni studiati. Incontriamo in Kant, intorno al 1754, i primi sparsi accenni di estetica, la cui importanza è, in tale momento, puramente subalterna. Assistiamo quindi ad un graduale spostamento di contenuti e di visuali che porta il motivo estetico-psicologico, nell'ambito della evoluzione generale della personalità kantiana, a divenire sempre più importante e, almeno ad un certo momento, assolutamente dominante. Ed è un momento di non scarso rilievo, perché si tratta nientemeno che della rivoluzione dell'anno 1769, il cui interrogativo ci pare finalmente di aver chiarito. Con l'esame della parte avuta da una tale problematica nella elaborazione della Dissertatio del 1770, la cui interpretazione ne esce più o meno capovolta, concludiamo questa sezione delle nostre ricerche. Speriamo di poter dare presto alle stampe il resto dei nostri risultati." (*Prefazione*, pp. 1-2).
(...)
"IV. I nostri risultati. — Vogliamo ora richiamare brevemente l'attenzione sui principali punti a proposito dei quali il nostro lavoro presume apportare un contributo originale.
In generale, saranno utili agli studiosi di letteratura comparata e di filosofia settecentesca le indagini particolari ambientali che abbiamo dedicato a molti concetti caratteristici. Basti ricordare quelli di bellezza intellettuale, di grazia, di individuo, di subordinazione, di giuoco e molti altri. Ci è inoltre occorso di mettere in luce diverse importanti personalità della storia dell'estetica, ingiustamente trascurate dagli studiosi contemporanei.

Ricordiamo solo Leone Ebreo, [Antoine Gombaud, Chevalier de] Mère, [Franois] Cartaud de la Vilate.
In particolare e rispetto a Kant, abbiamo tentato nel *primo capitolo* di mostrare l'interesse di certe sue dottrine estetiche giovanili, normalmente trascurate, come contenenti degli interessanti germi di sviluppi posteriori.
Nel *secondo capitolo* abbiamo fornito la più ampia analisi e ricostruzione culturale esistente dei motivi fondamentali delle *Beobachtungen* [*Considerazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime*], compiendo un passo decisivo verso una valutazione globale dell'operetta giovanile di Kant. Abbiamo dedicato speciale cura alla delimitazione degli influssi, particolarmente inglesi e tedeschi, ossia del ruolo giocato principalmente da Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Mendelssohn, Cartaud de la Vilate, oltre che Rousseau e forse anche Burke.
Abbiamo inoltre analizzato le *Bemerkungen* [alle *Considerazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime*] nel modo più ampio che sia stato sinora fatto: ne sono emersi dei motivi, specialmente morali, sinora trascurati.
Nel *terzo capitolo* siamo venuti anzitutto rivedendo e precisando, mediante una più precisa aderenza alle *Riflessioni* e una più ampia ricostruzione dell'ambiente, le teorie del Baeumler sui rapporti tra estetica e logica in Kant e sulla questione dell'individuo e del passaggio tra universale e singolo. Il nostro apporto è stato principalmente caratterizzato da un approfondimento del rapporto tra Kant, Baumgarten e Lambert. Abbiamo mostrato, contro il Baeumler (1), l'influenza della *Aesthetica* del primo sull'evoluzione della mentalità kantiana. Abbiamo poi messo in luce l'importanza capitale della *Logica* del Crusius, di cui non era stato studiato che l'influsso su Kant rispetto alla metafisica (Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie im 18. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, 1924, Heimsoeth, *Metaphysik und Kritik bei Chr. A. Crusius,* Berlin 1926).
Abbiamo quindi ricostruito una fase transizionale sinora ignorata della estetica kantiana, quella '65-'69 e analizzato

più a fondo sin nei più sottili motivi la fase ’69-’71, trovando spiegazioni nuove per diversi suoi atteggiamenti.
Questo ci ha portato a ricostruire una fase totalmente trascurata ed assai interessante della morale di Kant, quella ’69-'70; il cui legame con l’estetica dello stesso periodo è uno dei grandi motivi unitari del pensiero kantiano che ci è stato dato di mettere in luce. E abbiamo rintracciato in Crusius e Mendelssohn l’ispirazione di tali dottrine.
Finalmente, nel *quarto capitolo* abbiamo aumentato il corredo di fonti delle dottrine gnoseologiche precritiche; anche qui è emersa preponderante l’influenza del Crusius logico. Abbiamo proceduto ad una reinterpretazione, nei rapporti dell’estetica, di diverse operette di Kant Abbiamo posto l’accento sulla spesso trascurata *Nachricht* (2), restituendole la sua originalità e il suo valore programmatico; modificato l'inquadramento e proposto nuove istanze esegetiche per lo scritto sulle *Gegenden* (3); ricostruito la totalmente ignorata e fondamentale fase gnoseologica del ’69, avanzando una ipotesi esatta per spiegare la grande rivoluzione intercorsa nel pensiero di Kant; studiate le egualmente trascurate *Riflessioni* della fase ’69-’70; capovolto la interpretazione tradizionale della *Dissertatio*, che da scritto d’avanguardia viene ad essere considerato fondamentalmente come un ripiegamento su posizioni più prudenziali nei confronti della rivoluzione del ’69; chiarito e reinterpretato, alla luce del materiale precedentemente raccolto, una serie dei concetti e degli atteggiamenti fondamentali della *Dissertatio* stessa; e finalmente rintracciato un altro grande motivo unitario del pensiero kantiano, nelle rispondenze tra gnoseologia ed estetica (nonché morale), quale agente degli avvenimenti del '69 e del ’70. Una delle più importanti manifestazioni di tale motivo unitario si riscontra nella assodata derivazione della teoria della sensibilità della *Dissertatio* dall’estetica come critica del gusto. Questo ci mette sulla via di una reinterpretazione, che tenteremo in altra sede, della Estetica Trascendentale della *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, rintracciandone i nessi con la contemporanea e successiva Critica del Gusto di Kant.

Il quadro del più nevralgico periodo del Kant precritico ne esce così profondamente mutato.
In generale, i motivi che veniamo perseguendo ci scoprono un caso assai caratteristico ed interessante nella storia delle idee: cioè il caso di un motivo, quello estetico, che mantenendo immutato il proprio oggetto esteriore (cioè il bello naturale e d'arte), muta profondamente il proprio apparato concettuale e terminologico, la propria importanza, il proprio posto e la propria funzione nella struttura concettuale speculativa di Kant, e nella sua dinamica, e sinanco il suo valore nell'ambito della personalità di Kant uomo. Nata marginalmente dalla tradizione metafisico-psicoempirica, l'estetica ha all'inizio un posto secondario. Per venire poi subitamente distaccata, sulle orme degli inglesi, dalla tradizione precedente, ed essere inserita in quella antropologica e morale; perdendo così quasi completamente contatto col mondo speculativo di Kant, per occupare invece la ribalta di Kant *Philosoph für die Welt* e delle razionalizzazioni semiletterarie dei suoi pratici atteggiamenti sociali.
Riassorbita poco dopo nel mondo speculativo della evoluzione ulteriore di Kant teoretico, e da essa inserita in senso nuovo nella tradizione psicoempirica, l'estetica è improvvisamente investita, in tale connubio, da una impressionante dinamica interna, che conduce, nel '69, ad una brusca ristrutturazione di tutto il mondo speculativo di Kant, ad una esplosione da cui poco esce che non sia transvalutato o modificato nel breve giro di alcuni mesi. Dopo di ciò, il focus dell'interesse di Kant, e il centro evolutivo del suo pensiero, si spostano ad altri argomenti che evolvono indipendentemente, e l'estetica entra in una fase nettamente conservatrice che durerà fino al '75-'76, mostrando appena i germi delle grandi rivoluzioni successive.
Assistiamo del pari a diverse fasi di integrazione della personalità speculativa di Kant. Fino al '69 i vari filoni del suo pensiero si sviluppano in relativa indipendenza tra loro, o tutt'al più a coppie: metafisica e morale, estetica e metafisica, morale ed estetica, gnoseologia ed estetica. Ma

nel ’69 un motivo unitario, non sappiamo fin dove chiaramente formulato, e fin dove invece puramente riducibile ad un atteggiamento del background o forma mentis (non ci pare che l’aggettivo « subconscio », con le sue gravi implicazioni, sia qui appropriato, o che almeno sia imprudente usarlo), viene a dominare ed a produrre uno sviluppo contemporaneo, coerente e interconnesso di estetica, gnoseologia, e morale; quindi il potenziale dinamico si concentra nell’indagine gnoseologica, e gli altri due motivi passano, per un certo periodo, all’immobilità di un secondo piano. Abbiamo tentato, per quanto ci è stato possibile in base al materiale a disposizione, alle ricerche collaterali, e agli strumenti mentali che possediamo, di fornire alcune spiegazioni di tali eventi.
Di passaggio, ci è avvenuto di smontare, o almeno di intaccare, il mito di un Kant fanatico ammiratore della natura, luogo comune della *Kantforschung*. Le sue espressioni in proposito sono state mostrate quali derivazioni di puro riflesso di una moda letteraria in gran voga nell’ambiente.
Al contrario, abbiamo notato che un reale interesse personale e sociale di Kant, quello per la «bella conoscenza» o per la popolarità, veicolo di educazione per un più largo strato della popolazione, e di una maggior comprensione tra gli uomini, ha certo contribuito a spingerlo ad affermare l’universale validità delle rappresentazioni umane come fondata su fattori estetici." (pp. 11-14)
(1) Alfred Baeumler, *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Ihre Geschichte und Systematik*, Band 1, Halle: Niemeier 1923, p. 115.
(2) *Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen im Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766* («Akademie Ausgabe », Bd. II).
(3) *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume*, 1768 («Akad. Ausg.», Bd. II).

3. ———. 1956. "L'origine Della Tavola Dei Giudizi E Del Problema Della Deduzione Delle Categorie in Kant." *Filosofia* no. 7:129-138.

Tradotto in tedesco come: *Die Voraussetzungen zur Kantischen Urteilstafel in der Logik des 18. Jahrunderts* in: Friedrich Kaulbach, Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.), *Kritik und Metaphysik. Studien. Heinz Heimsoeth zum 80. Geburtstag*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966, S. 134-158.
"È noto come il problema della formazione delle tavole dei giudizi e delle categorie di Kant sia uno dei più delicati e discussi della *Kantforschung*. Il de Vleeschauwer (1) ha riassunto egregiamente le controversie in proposito, tentando una soluzione personale del problema. Secondo quanto egli viene a concludere, la tabella delle categorie kantiana deriverebbe in parte da Aristotele, in parte da Hume, in parte da Newton (op. cit., pp. 219-20) (2). Kant non avrebbe semplicemente tratto la tavola delle categorie da quella dei giudizi, ma avrebbe sviluppato contemporaneamente entrambe (p. 232). La tavola dei giudizi, poi, è tratta, come Kant stesso dichiara, dalia tradizione logica (p. 244). Kant avrebbe modificato le tavole di giudizi allora correnti, aggiungendo a ciascuno dei tipi generali di giudizio una terza forma speciale (ibidem). Il de Vleeschauwer presenta quindi in un quadro sinottico le tabelle di giudizi elaborate da diversi predecessori e contemporanei di Kant, da Melantone a Wolff, sulle quali i precedenti *Kantforscher* avevano già richiamato l'attenzione. Un esame di tale quadro sinottico mena il de Vleeschauwer alla evidente conclusione, che Kant non segui in particolare nessuna delle tabelle che aveva a disposizione, ma che operò una specie di sintesi tra esse. Ciò che resta perfettamente misterioso è il principio, mediante il quale Kant avrebbe operato tale sintesi selettiva, ovvero la ragione che lo spinse ad elaborare la sua particolare tabella di categorie.
Chiedendoci quale potrebbe essere la soluzione di simile problema, ci siamo immediatamente resi conto della non completezza del quadro sinottico presentato dal de Vleeschauwer. Anzitutto citare Melantone come unico precedente della filosofia del '700 tedesco è fare un torto a quella legione di aristotelici del XVII secolo, la cui importanza, ancora lungi dall'essere riconosciuta appieno,

consiste principalmente nell'aver mantenuto in vita e sviluppato, al di fuori e contro gli attacchi del cartesianesimo e dell'empirismo e platonismo inglesi, una tradizione metafisica, senza tener conto della quale è impossibile comprendere sia Leibniz, che il grande idealismo tedesco dei secoli XVIII e XIX.
Ora, gli aristotelici tedeschi del '600 avevano ampiamente sviluppato sia una logica (e una teoria del giudizio), che una metafisica (con relativa discussione dei concetti, ontologici fondamentali). Vogliamo solo rammentare uno dei padri della filosofia tedesca, il Göckel, il quale, discutendo l'Organo di Aristotele (3), discetta « de Quantitate », « de Qualitate », « de Relatis » (p. es. « Maritas euim non potest esse, nisi & uxor eius fit, et altero intereunte alterum relativum nomine pristino excidit »), « de Alicubi », e « de Aliquando », « de Situ » (« stare, pendere, supra et infra »). Un'ampia ricostruzione delle categorie e delle forme di giudizio nel '600 tedesco sarebbe senz'altro un compito interessante, per quanto non privo di difficoltà. Ma dubitiamo molto della sua utilità nei riguardi della ricostruzione del pensiero di Kant, tenendo conto del fatto che Kant stesso ignorava quasi certamente la filosofia tedesca anteriore all'era del Thomasius, e che è persino difficile rintracciare in Kant qualche eco del pensiero dei primi thomasiani, cioè di quelli che precedettero il sorgere della scuola wolffiana. Per quanto sia interessante notare come in tempi già vicinissimi a Kant, tale tradizione perdurasse ancora. Il gesuita tedesco Mayr (4), ad esempio, continua la tradizione aristotelica e tomistica, e menziona illustrandole ampliamente, nella sua Logica, le categorie aristoteliche: substantia, quantitas, relativ, qualitas, actio, passio, ubicatio, duratio, situs, habitus.
Ma a noi basterà, come stiamo per mostrare, completare il quadro sinottico per quello che concerne il XVIII secolo tedesco, per fare un decisivo passo innanzi verso la soluzione del nostro problema. E non intendiamo neppure citare tutti i logici del '700 tedesco che il de Vleeschauwer trascura, ma solo quelli, da noi selezionati, che presentano uno speciale interesse riguardo a Kant." (pp. 129-130)

(4) Antonio Mayr, S.J.: *Philosophia peripatetica antiquorum principiis et recentiorum experimentis conformata*. Ingolstadii, 1789, I Logica, 708 sgg.
[Gli autori esaminati nel resto dell'articolo sono:
- Samuel Christian Hollmann (1696-1787), *In universam philosophiam introductio*, Vitembergae, 1734, I, pp. 119-135;
- Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), *Die Vernunftlehre*, [1756] citato dall'edizione di Hamburg und Kiel, 1790;
- Christian August Crusius (1715-1775), *Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss*, Leipzig, 1747 [reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965];
- Christian Wolff (1679-1754), *Philosophia rationalis sive logica*, Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1728 [reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1983];
- Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, Halle, 1752 [si tratta di una versione abbreviata della *Vernunftlehere* (1752) su cui si veda: Riccardo Pozzo: *Georg Friedrich Meiers "Vernunftlehre": eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holboog, 2000];
- Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), *Neues Organon*, Leipzig, 1764 [traduzione italiana: *Nuovo Organo*, a cura e con un'introduzione di Raffaele Ciafardone, Bari: Laterza, 1977].
"Ci sembra quindi di aver fornito una spiegazione sufficiente — salvo i chiarimenti complementari che ci proponiamo di dare in altra sede, riguardo al sorgere del *Duisburgischer Nachlass* [(1755) traduzione italiana: *Fondo Duisburg,* Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 2000] — della via seguita da Kant per elaborare la sua tavola di giudizi; e ci risulta che egli non fece che operare una semplificazione della tavola di Crusius, sia eliminandone alcuni elementi che corrispondevano a strutture diverse del suo sistema, sia epurandone il portato metafisico di alcuni titoli (che pur non poteva abbandonare in quanto strettamente corrispondenti a concetti metafisici che gli erano assai cari) col renderne il significato più strettamente logico (17).

Con ciò ci sembra anche di avere compiuto un passo avanti nella spiegazione della genesi della tavola delle categorie. Evidentemente, solo uno studio approfondito del *Duisburgischer Nachlass* potrà portarci a giustificare i correlati categoriali dei giudizi di quantità e di qualità, e l'importanza assunta per Kant dalle categorie di relazione e modalità. Ma crediamo, intanto, di avere anche addotto elementi atti a chiarire l'apporto alla formazione della tavola delle categorie della scoperta dell'analogia tra concetti puri e giudizi, per quanto cioè le categorie si siano disposte e plasmate secondo uno schema quaternario e tricotomico ispirato a Crusius, e la cui correlazione con alcuni gruppi categoriali già organati da Kant nel *Duisburgischer Nachlass* è stata certo una ragione, se non la ragione, della costruzione dell'analogia stessa tra categorie e giudizi." (pp. 134-136)

(17) Il problema, come lo abbiamo ricevuto, è molto chiaramente riassunto dal de Vleeschauwer nei termini seguenti: « Kant n'a pas posé en révolutionnaire; il a bien pu avoir l'impression qu'il s'appuyait sur un travail collectif et, quant à l'essentiel, définitif. Il a inventé la relation comme rubrique de jugements, vraisemblablement par analogie avec la table des catégories; il a rompu avec l'habitude (purement formale) de mettre la qualité avant la quantité, mais il n'a inventé aucune forme spéciale de jugement. Toutes le formes dont il parle étaient présentes dans les manuels de l'époque qu'il avait sous la main, mais aucun manuel, par contre, ne renferme le schème, qui est donc une construction personnelle de Kant. Il faut l'attribuer à un schème de catégories antérieurement construit, dont il fallut faire usage pour les jugements afin de faire éclater la parfaite correspondence entre eux. L'étude de notre tableau comparatif indique, d'autre part, combien il est malaisé de dire où s'est adressé Kant pour compléter les lacunes qu'il avait pu remarquer dans la tradition des écoles » (p. 248). Dalla nostra ricerca risulterebbe una maggiore influenza della tavola dei giudizi sulla tavola delle categorie, e sarebbe chiaro che il modello che Kant ha seguito per « colmare le lacune » non è che quello di Crusius. Questa soluzione

avvierebbe ad una più piana e storicamente più sicura comprensione del sorgere della tavola dei giudizi, senza dover ricorrere, come ad esempio K. Reich (*Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel,* Diss., Rostock.-Berlin, 1932), ad una complicata giustificazione speculativa completamente priva di conferma documentaria.

4. ———. 1957. "Lo Scritto Kantiano Sulla "Vera Valutazione Delle Forze Vive" (1747)." *Filosofia*:621-662.

   Ristampato in Elementi... (1959) pp. 1-42.
   "Il proposito principale di Kant nei *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*... (1747), quello di risolvere una particolare, per quanto importante, diatriba concernente i principi della meccanica, non ci interessa in questa sede. Ci sembra plausibile il suggerimento di [Mariano] Campo, che Kant abbia scelto tale tema di laurea — uno dei più controversi della fisica del suo tempo, e pel quale erano stati versati veri fiumi d'inchiostro — su suggerimento del suo maestro Knutzen (1). Quello che è significativo dal nostro punto di vista, è di notare alcune posizioni metafisiche che Kant assume nel corso della discussione, nonché alcune distinzioni metodologiche che Kant viene via via facendo, e dalle quali dipende fino ad un certo punto la soluzione stessa, che egli dà del problema centrale.
   L'operetta presenta un bell'esempio di esposizione caotica e involuta, soprattutto nella prima delle sue tre parti; i cambiamenti di argomento e le digressioni sono all'ordine del giorno. Comunque, le prime pagine contengono una serie di premesse o fondamenti metafisici della susseguente trattazione, che ci rivelano i primi atteggiamenti di Kant in materia (2).
   Il filo del ragionamento, come abbiamo detto, è piuttosto imbrogliato. Kant espone *pêle-mêle* una serie di concetti metafisici tradizionali, tentando di dar loro una fisionomia personale, ma senza seguire un rigoroso ordine espositivo. Il discorso vaga rimbalzando tra diversi scogli, indulgendo in discontinuità e ripetizioni. Piuttosto che seguirlo passo per

passo sarà quindi opportuno tentare di sintetizzare i punti di arrivo." (p. 1)
(...)
"La formazione filosofica di Kant risulta da un fondo aristotelico-leibniziano, cui si vengono combinando degli apporti dei newtoniani e degli avversari di Wolff. Con Wolff stesso la posizione di Kant presenta certo delle analogie, ma si tratta in generale di elementi aristotelici o leibniziani comuni a Wolff e ad altre personalità non wolffiane; se qualche apporto specifico di Wolff ha luogo, Kant pare non rendersene conto; comunque egli mostra contro Wolff una notevole animosità specifica, oltre a difendere più o meno implicitamente delle posizioni nettamente anti-wolffiane, quali l'influsso fisico e la forza di attrazione, nonché la critica al metodo matematico in filosofia e allo spirito di sistema.
La posizione del giovane pensatore è quindi largamente autonoma: è impossibile farlo rientrare in alcuna delle scuole del suo tempo. Da tutti egli attinge liberamente ciò che gli accomoda, respingendo ciò che non lo soddisfa.
Terminiamo ricordando come una recensione alle *Forze Vive* sia apparsa sui *Nova Acta Eruditorum* del 1752. Si tratta di un violento attacco; dato il trattamento inflitto da Kant a Wolff nel suo scritto, non c'era invero nulla di meglio da attendersi dai giornalisti lipsiensi.
La recensione si occupa esclusivamente dell'aspetto metafisico dell'operetta: e i due punti messi in discussione sono la natura della forza, e l'arbitrarietà della tridimensionalità dello spazio. Quel misto di influsso fisico e di attrazione newtoniana, da Kant patrocinato, non poteva non destare scandalo; e scandalo ancor maggiore destava la relativizzazione della geometria. I giornalisti lipsiensi pare non si rendano conto che se Kant, nella sua giovanile avventatezza, aveva assunto senza troppa riflessione delle posizioni di punta, non gli mancavano però alcune buone ragioni ed alcuni autorevoli precedenti." (p. 32)
(1) M. Campo, *La genesi del criticismo kantiano*, Varese 1953, p. 4.

(2) Questo tipo di redazione involuta ed erratica, che antepone nel testo dottrine cronologicamente posteriori a dottrine che rappresentano una fase speculativa anteriore, senza modificare queste ultime; e che procede esponendo verità parziali per giungere poi a verità definitive, senza modificare in base a queste ultime la struttura delle prime, è una caratteristica di molte opere kantiane, il cui significato storico illustrammo in un nostro articolo: cfr. G. Tonelli, *La formazione del testo della « Kritik der Urteilskraft*, « Revue Internationale de Philosophie », XXX (1954).

5. ———. 1958. "La Tradizione Della Categorie Aristoteliche Nella Filosofia Moderna Sino a Kant." *Studi Urbinati di Storia Filosofia e Letteratura (Serie B)* no. 32:121-143.

"Introduzione.
L'attenzione di coloro che si interessano alla filosofia di Kant si è spesso concentrata sul problema dell'origine storica della tavola delle categorie, che si incontra nella *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Come è noto, la natura delle singole categorie e la loro distribuzione nella tabella si spiega in buona parte attraverso il parallelismo con la tavola dei giudizi, la origine della quale abbiamo avuto occasione di studiare in altra sede (1). Ma restano con ciò ancora aperte altre questioni non prive d'importanza, cioè: da dove siano derivate l'idea che si diano in metafisica alcuni concetti fondamentali irriducibili gli uni dagli altri, e l'esigenza di dedurre rigorosamente tali concetti riducendoli ad una precisa tabella, nonché, per qual via sia giunto a Kant il termine aristotelico "categoria", raramente usato nel XVIÍI secolo.
Alcuni importanti lavori sono stati già dedicati a questo tema: Trendelenburg (2) e Ragnisco (3) scrivevano delle storie della dottrina delle categorie dall'antichità greca sino a Kant ed oltre, Rosmini (4) tornava, più superficialmente, sullo stesso tema, e Heimsoeth (5) concentrava recentemente la sua attenzione sui rapporti tra le categorie di Kant e i termini ontologici di Wolff.

Ciò che ci spinge a tornare sull'argomento è il fatto, che le ricerche di Trendelenburg e Ragnisco diventano molto sbrigative a partire dal XVI secolo, cioè proprio dall'epoca che prelude al pensiero kantiano. Ci proponiamo quindi di riassumere brevissimamente quanto è stato stabilito da tali Autori a proposito dell'antichità e del medio evo, e di allargare la ricerca a partire dal tardo Rinascimento, per renderla vieppiù particolareggiata coll'avvicinarsi al tempo di Kant, e specialmente per quel che riguarda la Germania. Non ci proponiamo che di esaminare alcuni autori più importanti, e di considerare solo alcuni aspetti generali del problema: addentrarsi nella discussione della evoluzione di ogni singola categoria renderebbe il nostro compito enorme, e sarebbe per di più inutile allo scopo che stabilimmo rispetto a Kant. Solo per quel che riguarda la prima metà del XVIII secolo la nostra ricerca aspira ad una certa completezza." (pp. 121-122)
(...)
"Ci sembra quindi di poter affermare, in conclusione, che è estremamente probabile che Kant abbia elaborato la propria dottrina delle categorie riferendosi per diversi rispetti alla dottrina degli aristotelici in materia; dottrina ancora viva in certe tradizioni tedesche ai tempi di Kant, attraverso le quali egli poteva agevolmente risalire ai più importanti testi del secolo precedente concernenti tale soggetto. Simile riferimento ci aiuta sia a comprendere meglio la genesi della teoria kantiana, sia ad apprezzarne alcuni particolari aspetti." (p. 143)
(1) G. Tonelli, *L'origine della tavola dei giudizi e del problema della deduzione delle categorie in Kant*, Torino 1956 (anche in «Filosofia», 1956-VII, 1).
(2) A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, Berlin 1846. [traduzione italiana in due volumi separati: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, *La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1994; *La dottrina delle categorie nella storia della filosofia*, Monza: Polimetrica, 2004]
(8) P. Ragnisco, *Storia critica delle categorie dai primordi della filosofia greca sino a Hegel,* Firenze: M. Cellini 1871.

(4) A. Rosmini-Serbati, *Saggio storico sulle categorie e la dialettica*, Torino 1883.
(5) H. Heimsoeth, *Studien sur Philosophie Immanuel Kants*, Köln 1956, Chr. Wolffs *Ontologie und die Prinzipienforschung I. Kants, Ein Beitrag sur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*. Vedere anche, dello stesso Autore: *Zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, in: *Nicolai Hartmann, der Denker und sein Werk*, Göttingen 1952.

6. ———. 1958. "La Polemica Kantiana Contro La Teleologia Cosmologica (1754-1756)." *Filosofia*:633-569.

   Ristampato in *Elementi*... (1959) pp. 43-126.
   "Dopo avere evidentemente abbandonato il proposito di continuare lo scritto sulle *Forze Vive* (1), Kant pubblicava nel 1755 una ponderosa opera cosmologica che ci apprestiamo ora a considerare secondo i nostri speciali interessi: la *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*.
   Il proposito generale dello scritto è né più né meno quanto Kant aveva, di passaggio, annunciato qualche anno prima (2): spiegare tutti gli eventi naturali mediante poche leggi universali semplici e comprensibili, riducendo al minimo indispensabile l'intervento divino nella struttura e nel corso del mondo. Principio, di per sé, molto chiaro; ma la cui dimostrazione dà luogo, come c'è da aspettarsi, a parecchi grossi e complicati problemi.
   L'opera, infatti, copre, direttamente o indirettamente, i più svariati argomenti di metafisica e di cosmologia. La cosmologia sembra però (come la fisica nelle *Forze Vive*) avere, nella determinazione delle soluzioni particolari, una parte dominante.
   L'origine del proposito generale sopra enunciato quale lo si incontra già nelle *Forze Vive* (3) non è di per sé chiara: è dubbio cioè se esso sia emerso dalle riflessioni sul problema delle forze vive, o se esso risponda, già nel 1747, a un preannunciarsi della problematica della *Naturgeschichte*. Bisogna però riconoscere che la formulazione datagli nel 1747 (quantunque perfettamente applicabile alla posizione

del 1755) è cosi generica, da ammettere le precisazioni più svariate, e eventualmente più discordanti da quelle della *Naturgeschichte*. Inoltre bisogna riconoscere che l'impostazione di molti problemi è, nella *Naturgeschichte*, cosi diversa che nelle *Forze Vive*, che se nel 1747 un corrispondente dei problemi cosmologici particolari del 1755 già esisteva, esso doveva essere in veste ben diversa da quella ricevuta otto anni dopo." (p. 43)

(1) Proposito espresso nella lettera ad Haller (?) del 23 Ag. 1749 (X, 2).

(2) Cfr. il mio precedente studio *Lo scritto kantiano sulla « Vera valutazione delle forze vive » (1747),* § 49.

(3) Cfr. Lo scritto kantiano cit., §§ 49 e 55. Tale proposito generale si può scindere in due aspetti fondamentali di significato ben distinto: il primo corrisponde alla vecchia massima « principia sine necessitate non sunt multiplicanda », il secondo corrisponde al principio della semplicità delle vie, o della via più breve, nato in una occasione ben precisa, la polemica sulle leggi dell'ottica tra Fermat e Clerselier (cfr. *Lo scritto kantiano* cit., nota 80). Il primo aspetto implica anzitutto che la natura è basata su pochi e semplici principi, i quali sono molto fecondi, dai quali cioè è possibile dedurre l'immensa varietà dei fenomeni naturali; in secondo luogo, che tale immensa varietà di fenomeni è ordinabile in tipi, ovvero in un sistema di leggi, e non è una infinita varietà caotica; perché la natura, sebbene presenti un grandissimo numero di tipi di fenomeni differenti, si comporla rispetto ad ogni tipo di fenomeni sempre nello stesso modo, in maniera semplice e costante (dando luogo cioè a leggi naturali e non a una sequela di eventi singoli in cui non è possibile generalizzare nulla). Il secondo aspetto, particolarmente sottolineato da Leibniz e Malebranche, implica che la natura, in ciascuno dei suoi fenomeni, si comporterà sempre nella maniera più semplice, ovvero sceglierà la via piu breve per raggiungere un certo effetto (*lex parsimoniae*): da ciò Maupertuis svilupperà poi il principio della minima quantità d'azione. In effetti, il secondo aspetto non è probabilmente che uno sviluppo del primo, il quale viene in generale insieme sostenuto da

coloro che sostengono il secondo, p. es. Fermat, Leibniz, Malebranche, onde di fatto la distinzione dei due aspetti talora è assai difficile. In Kant, nella *Forze Vive*, sono presenti entrambi gli aspetti; nella *Naturgeschichte* invece Kant si fonderà principalmente sul primo aspetto. Ci chiedemmo altrove quale fosse stata l'origine della posizione kantiana in proposito nella *Forze Vive*, posizione che poi divenne d'importanza centrale nella *Naturgeschichte* sotto l'influenza di certi testi di Maupertuis, che sostenevano entrambi gli aspetti del principio (cfr. § 15 e *Lo scritto kantiano* ecc., note 80 c 87); testi che però erano apparsi posteriormente alla *Forze Vive*.
Sarà quindi opportuno accennare a qualche altro precedente di tali dottrine, per comprendere più esattamente la posizione di Kant. R. Boyle, in *A free inquiry into the vulgarly received Notion of Nature* (*Works*, London 1744, IV, p. 404) accoglie il principio «Natura semper agit per vias brevissimas », ma limitandolo; più in là il principio sembra acquistare un significato anche piu ampio (p. 417): « And it seems very suitable to the Divine Wisdom, that is so excellently displaved in the fabrick and conduct of the universe, to imploy in the world, already framed and compleated, the fewest and most simple means, by which the phaenomena, designed to be exhibited in the world, couìd be produced ». Newton stesso, come vedemmo (*Lo scritto kantiano* ecc., nota 80) raccomandava di non moltiplicare inutilmente le cause dei fenomeni naturali, e assicurava (cfr. nota 54 del presente studio) che i fenomeni naturali derivano da due o tre leggi universali, e che il corso della natura è semplice e uniforme. Wolff e Crusius accettavano la *lex parsimoniae* (cfr. Joh. G. H. Feder, *Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysicae*, Göttingcn 1781, § 60; *Logik und Metaphysik*, Göttingen 1786, p. 319). Castel affermava la semplicità della natura (*Traité de Physique*, Paris 1724, I, p. 380); Privat de Molières sosteneva che non bisogna moltiplicare i principi senza necessità, e che bisogna dedurre gli effetti naturali dalle supposizioni più semplici (*Leons de Physique*, Paris 1734, I, p. 3); Joh. Bernoulli ribadiva il principio della semplicità: la natura non fa nulla

invano *(Opera omnia*, Lausannae & Genevae 1742, IV, p. 24).
Si può giungere quindi alla conclusione che il principio, quale fu da Kant enunciato nella *Forze Vive*, rispondeva ad una opinione generica molto diffusa, e che egli lo impiegò solo estrinsecamente in funzione antiwolffiana, poiché Wolff stesso in certo modo lo accettava, soprattutto come *lex parsimoniae*. Il contenuto intrinsecamente antiwolffiano del principio derivò quindi poi dall'influsso di Maupertuis. È curioso però notare come Mairan e più tardi D'Alembert (cfr. note 38 e 41 del presente studio) accusassero (e forse non senza fondamento) il principio della via più semplice e più breve di introdurre le cause finali in fisica, mentre tale principio era invece sostenuto da antiteleologisti dichiarati, quali Malebranche, Maupertuis e Kant. Giacché siamo in argomento, vogliamo accennare a qualche sviluppo della questione. Notissima è la polemica tra Maupertuis e König sulla questione della paternità del principio della minima azione, e le discussioni a cui presero parte D'Arcy, D'Alembert e Euler (cfr. P. Brunet, *Étude historique sur le principe de la moindre action*, Paris 1938, soprattutto pp. 26 sgg.). Il *Gesetz der Sparsamkeit* si ritrova in H. S. Reimarus (*Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*, Hamburg [1754] 1781, p. 288 sgg.); J. B. Scarella enuncia il *principium brevissimae viae* (*Physicae generalis methodo mathematica tractatae*... Tomus III, 1757, p. 420), che anche G. Ploucquet riprende (*Fundamenta philosophiae speculativae*, Tubingae 1759, § 812), che ricorre in Lambert c Buffon (cfr. Feder, loc. cit.), ed al quale J. N. Tetens dedica un apposito saggio (*Commentatio de principio minimi,* Buezzovii et Vismariae 1769). Vedere inoltre, in generale, J. F. Montucla, *Histoire des Mathématiques*, III, Paris 1802, p. 643 sgg., e A. Kneser, *Das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung von Leibniz bis zur Gegenwart*, Leipzig 1929; su Leibniz, L. Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz*, Paris 1901, p. 229; su Malebranche, M. Guéroult, *Malebranche*, T. II, 1, Cap. VII, § 10 (di prossima pubblicaz. [1958]); su Maupertuis, P. E. B. Jourdain, *Maupertuis and the Principle of least action*,

«Monist», XXII (1912); M. Guéroult, *Dynamique et Métaphysique leibnitiennes*, Paris 1934, pp. 215 sgg.; R. Dugas, *Le principe de la moindre action dans l'œuvre de Maupertuis,* « La Revue Scientifique », LXXX (1942); su Kant, J. Vuillemin, *Physique et métaphysique kantiennes*, Paris 1955, p. 100 (nota). Per l'aspetto del principio che si riferisce alla costanza e uniformità (semplicità) delle leggi della natura, vederne l'ampia trattazione in G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica*, Torino 1955 (« Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino », Serie 3, Tomo 3, P. 1), § 87.

7. ———. 1959. *Elementi Metodologici E Metafisici in Kant Dal 1745 Al 1768. Saggio Di Sociologia Della Conoscenza*. Torino: Edizioni di "Filosofia".

   Indice: Prefazione V; Introduzione XV-XXIII; Lo scritto kantiano sulla "Vera valutazione delle forze vive" 1; A. Motivi metafisici 1; B. Motivi metodologici 18; La polemica kantiana contro la teleologia cosmologica (1754-1756) 43; A. "Storia Naturale e teoria generale del cosmo" (1755): Motivi metafisici 43; B. Motivi metodologici 79; C. Gli scritti minori 91; Il primo tentativo ontologico (1755) 127; A. Motivi metafisici nella "Nova Dilucidatio"127; B. Motivi metodologici nella "Nova Dilucidatio"146; Appendice: La dottrina dell'ente e delle sue determinazioni nelle scuole tedesche 151; Kant dal 1756 al 1762 173; A. La "Monadologia physica" (1756) 173; B. Lo scritto sul "Moto e la Quiete" (1758) 193; G. Le "Considerazioni sull'ottimismo" (1759) 198; D. Lo scritto sul Sillogismo (1762) 204-236. "Presentiamo in questo libro il frutto di una nuova serie di ricerche sulla formazione della filosofia kantiana. Queste ricerche sono in un certo senso parallele e complementari a quelle da noi precedentemente pubblicate sotto il titolo: *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica - Studi sulla genesi del criticismo* (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti, Torino 1955 (Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 3°, Tomo 3°, Parte II). Ciò non toglie che il presente libro costituisca un tutto perfettamente autonomo.

L'impossibilità di procedere verso lo studio del Kant più maturo senza avere ben chiari i termini del suo sviluppo giovanile è stata da lungo tempo compreso dalla *Kantforschung*. L'ultimo, e il miglior risultato come monografia d'insieme, in questo senso, è dato dal recente lavoro di M. Campo, *La genesi del criticismo kantiano*, I-II, Varese 1953, che copre il periodo fino al 1768.
Nel nostro lavoro sopra citato abbiamo approfondito lo studio sopratutto dei motivi estetici e psicologici (e in parte antropologici) di Kant precritico, che non ci parevano essere stati adeguatamente trattati nelle numerose precedenti ricerche. L'ultimo capitolo di tale lavoro conteneva anzitutto un rapido sguardo sulla metafisica e metodologia kantiana sino al 1768 ispirato alle monografie esistenti sull'argomento, quindi il primo tentativo di una ricostruzione della rivoluzione del 1769 fondata su materiali sinora mai studiati, e una reinterpretazione della *Dissertatio* da tale punto di vista.
Procedendo ulteriormente nello studio del pensiero kantiano, ci sentimmo tosto insoddisfatti del quadro offertoci dalle precedenti monografie, per quanto importanti e valide esse fossero, della metafisica e della metodologia kantiana fino al 1768, e ci decidemmo a rivedere a fondo per nostro conto tali questioni. Il presente libro contiene una esposizione completa dello sviluppo del pensiero di Kant dagli inizi al 1768, per quanto concerne la metafisica e la metodologia (che comprende anche la logica), eccetto il problema metodologico dei rapporti tra universale e singolo, che ci sembra essere stato adeguatamente trattato nel nostro precedente lavoro. In effetti, buona parte del presente libro concerne problemi di filosofia naturale se non addirittura di storia della scienza: abbiamo dovuto infatti studiare a fondo anche molti aspetti di Kant *Naturforscher*, che sono in qualche modo collegati col suo pensiero metafisico; mentre abbiamo tralasciato lo studio di quelle sue dottrine fisiche e cosmologiche che non interessano che la storia delle scienze naturali.
La completezza della nostra monografia non esigeva che ripetessimo per disteso certi risultati delle ricerche

precedenti; spesso li abbiamo riassunti rapidamente, rinviando in proposito sopratutto al volume di Campo, che li espone e completa sempre con eccellente perspicuità; ma questo concerne in generale dei particolari estrinseci, o dei riferimenti ad aspetti di Kant precritico esorbitanti dai limiti precisi della nostra ricerca." (pp. V-VI)

8. ———. 1959. "Il Primo Tentativo Ontologico Di Kant (1755)." *Filosofia*:241-274.

   Ristampato in *Elementi*... (1959) pp. 127-171.
   La *Nova Dìlucidatio* veniva redatta, come il *De Igne*, per scopi accademici; ma la prova da superare era più importante, e l'argomento scelto più impegnativo. Per la prima volta Kant si allontana dai consueti argomenti di filosofia naturale, per affrontare di petto i più ardui problemi ontologici. Ci è impossibile dire se questo nuovo orientamento non abbia avuto come ragione contingente il consiglio di qualche suo patrono accademico: ma sta di fatto che tale interesse più puramente metafisico, comunque esso sia stato suscitato, doveva ormai diventare profondo e stabile accanto agli altri, vecchi e nuovi, naturalistici ed estetico-antropologici; e affermarsi, nel decennio successivo, assieme al motivo psicoempirico, come il centro della personalità scientifica di Kant.
   Bisogna però notare che l'urgenza di certi problemi metafisici era stata sentita da Kant sin dall'inizio, e che la discussione di essi aveva serpeggiato attraverso le maggiori questioni degli scritti di filosofia naturale. Il fatto che ora l'ontologia si imponga in primo piano può dunque in parte derivare da un bisogno, finalmente sentito da Kant, di discutere a fondo certe premesse, dalla esatta determinazione delle quali egli aveva visto cosi strettamente discendere l'interpretazione cosmologica del mondo.
   Sarebbe però un errore considerare la *Nova Dìlucidatio* come un semplice approfondimento dei problemi metafisici che abbiamo sin qui incontrati. Se la mentalità generale che regge quei problemi e la *Nova Dìlucidatio*, è fondamentalmente la stessa, o se per lo meno (come

mostreremo più oltre) nello sviluppo di tale mentalità non vi è frattura, non bisogna dimenticare che i problemi metafisici precedenti saranno, invero, discussi nella nuova sede, ma solo in una parte di essa; e che si affermeranno invece ivi molti problemi ontologici, nuovi per la penna di Kant. Sarà ora nostro compito cercare di chiarirne la derivazione.
Vogliamo aggiungere qualche parola sulla forma letteraria dell'operetta: come quattro delle cinque dissertazioni preparate da Kant per necessità accademiche, essa è redatta in latino, a onor del vero irsuto e claudicante oltre ogni dire. Essa è, come le tre sorelle, divisa in brevi paragrafi, e, come le due più prossime nel tempo, ordinata in proposizioni e dimostrazioni *more geometrico*, nel più arcigno stile scolastico. Non è certamente un caso che Kant abbia redatto in tedesco, e in una più sciolta forma saggistica, tutte le opere e operette non destinate ad essere presentate *amplissimae facultati philosophicae* (1). La forma scolastica sapeva troppo del passato, mentre l' *essay* era la moda d'avanguardia dell'ambiente di Kant giovanile, sulle tracce dei francesi e degli inglesi. (Vedere anche § 27). Non è dunque per libera scelta che Kant stese la *Nova Dilucidatio* in questo modo; né sappiamo poi addirittura se in generale avrebbe scritto tale opera se fosse stato libero di scegliere (2)." (pp. 127-128)
(1) Unica eccezione saranno i *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, scritti *more geometrico*, trattandosi di un'opera di filosofia naturale. Si noti però che l'opera sulle *Forze Vive*, dissertazione di dottorato, era stata redatta in tedesco, ma secondo l'ordinamento per brevi paragrafi accompagnati da una indicazione di contenuto marginale proprio dei trattati scolastici tradizionali tedeschi.
(2) Cfr. K. Vorländer, *I. Kant, der Mann und das Werk*, Leipzig 1924, I, p. 94.

9. ———. 1959. "Eclettismo Di Kant Precritico." *Filosofia*:560-573.

Ripreso ed ampliato in *Elementi*... (1959) pp. 173-192.
"Pochi mesi dopo la conclusione della *Nova Dilucidatio*, Kant presentava alla Facoltà Filosofica della Università Albertina una nuova dissertazione, intitolata *Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I continet monadologiam physicam*, necessaria per permettergli di ottenere un insegnamento effettivo come *Magister* o libero docente al posto del defunto M. Knutzen (cfr. I, 579).
L'atteggiamento metodologico enunciato nella prefazione dell'opuscolo (I, 475-76) è assai chiaro: la filosofia naturale deve, per non perdersi in vane elucubrazioni, fondarsi sull'aiuto dell'esperienza ed aiutarsi mediante la geometria; questo tutti lo riconoscono, ma alcuni si rifiutano di ammettere altre cose che quelle che *experientiae testimonio immediate innotescunt*; in questo modo è invero possibile *exponere* le leggi della natura, ma non l'origine e la causa di tali leggi.
Kant allude qui evidentemente al dichiarato agnosticismo metafisico di Newton (1).
Per quest'ultimo scopo, è necessario giovarsi della metafisica, che sola può far conoscere le cause prime e la natura vera e propria dei corpi, che stanno alla base dei fenomeni esperibili.
Una simile presa di posizione è, dopo quanto abbiamo visto precedentemente, comprensibile senza fatica. Se, infatti, nelle *Forze Vive* Kant proclamava la superfluità dell'esperienza, egli sosteneva al tempo stesso quella distinzione tra geometria e metafisica, che qui è chiaramente mantenuta.
La *Naturgeschichte* implicitamente, e il *De Igne* esplicitamente, facevano invece valere energicamente, in senso newtoniano, la necessità di affiancare alla geometria l'aiuto dell'esperienza, sembrando lasciar da parte la metafisica, che però di fatto non mancava di ispirare numerose considerazioni fondamentali. Abbiamo giustificato altrove un simile cambiamento di prospettiva (2)." (p. 173)

(1) Cfr. G. Tonelli, *La question des bornes de l'entendemenl humain au XVIIIe siècle, et la genèse du criticisme kantien, particulièrement par rapport au problème de l'infini* in corso di stampa, § 5.
(2) Cfr. Cap. II, § 71.

10. ———. 1959. "Bibliografia Degli Appunti Dei Corsi Universitari Tenuti Da Kant, Sinora Pubblicati E Della Letteratura Pertinente." *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* no. 38:492-499.

"A. *Corsi di lezioni pubblicati integralmente o per estratti* (1).
N.B. I seguenti Corsi di lezioni sono citati nell'ordine cronologico stabilito dalla critica. Accanto ad ogni indicazione si troveranno i rinvii alle monografie e studi che stabiliscono la datazione, e che si occupano in generale delle altre questioni del testo o di esegesi. Qualora le datazioni proposte siano parecchie, è stata scelta la più attendibile, tenendo conto dei risultati degli studi più recenti, ma vengono addotte anche le altre. Una discussione, caso per caso, sulla datazione prescelta è qui impossibile, sia in quanto esorbita dai compiti di questa bibliografia, sia perché sarebbe utile solo se fondata su di un contatto diretto coi manoscritti, ora purtroppo inaccessibili.
Tale datazione è quindi qui proposta a puro titolo indicativo in base agli argomenti addotti dalla critica, raggiungibili sempre mediante i rimandi di cui sopra.
I titoli dei Corsi non sono quelli originali, ma rispondono alla denominazione corrente ormai divenuta tradizionale. Segue il titolo originale, ove esista. Da questa lista sono escluse le lezioni stampate o fatte stampare da Kant stesso e comprese nella *Preußische Akademie Ausgabe*.
[segue un elenco di 34 testi]
B. *Studi principalmente filologici e riguardanti la storia del testo, sulle "Vorlesungen" edite inedite*.
[segue un elenco di 67 studi]
(1) La maggior parte degli originali o delle sole trascrizioni esistenti di tali Corsi è andata perduta durante la seconda

guerra mondiale. Quelli ancora in possesso della *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften* verranno editi a cura del valente kantista Dr. G. Lehmann. [cfr. volume XXIV dell'edizione]

11. ———. 1960. "Bibliografia Dei Corsi Universitari Tenuti Da Kant. Addenda." *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* no. 39:160.

    [7 studi, da aggiungere ai 67 citati nel precedente articolo].

12. ———. 1975. "Kant E I Caratteri Delle Nazioni." *Filosofia*:129-138.

    "È noto che Kant fu animato, durante il corso dell'intera sua carriera intellettuale, da un vivo interesse per la psicologia empirica o, come allora veniva anche chiamata, per l'antropologia. Questo interesse riguardò anche il campo più specifico di quella che nei nostri giorni è detta psicologia differenziale delle nazioni, cioè lo studio comparato delle caratteristiche psicologiche dei diversi popoli.
    Con questo Kant non faceva che continuare una millenaria tradizione culturale, i cui primi documenti conservatici risalgono all'antica Grecia, e i cui cultori furono sia viaggiatori e geografi, sia storici, filosofi e poligrafi. Basti ricordare Erodoto, lo pseudo Polemo, Teofrasto, i fisionomi greci, Plinio il Vecchio, Plutarco, Stefano di Bisanzio. L'enciclopedismo medievale raccolse questa tradizione, che fu sviluppata più tardi da Cusano, Montaigne, Hall, Overbury, Deserpz, de Bruyn, Charron e molti altri, fino a quel classico del genere che è l' *Icon animorum* di John Barclay (Londra 1614), ove si incontra la tipica affermazione generale: « Saecula pene singula genium habere, diversumque a ceteris. Esse praeterea cuilibet regioni proprium spiritum, qui animas indigenarum, in certa studia et mores quodammodo adiget » (Cap. II) (1).
    La tradizione in questione è affiancata da un'altra, ad essa relata: quella del « primitivismo », o della esaltazione del carattere e dei costumi talora della umanità primeva, talaltra di alcuni popoli « selvaggi », in contrasto con la «

corruzione » dei popoli civilizzati: anche in questa corrente si definisce, o si esplora, lo spirito di una certa età del genere umano (1'« età dell'oro », il « paradiso terrestre », lo « stato di natura ») o di certe determinate popolazioni (i Germani, gli Indiani d'America, i montanari Svizzeri, ecc.) (p. 129)
(...)
"Uno studio complessivo delle caratteristiche nazionali secondo Kant (6) sarà possibile solo allorché tutti quelli che ci sono rimasti tra i quaderni di appunti presi alle sue lezioni di antropologia saranno stati pubblicati nell'àmbito dell'edizione generale degli scritti kantiani. Per il momento dobbiamo accontentarci di qualche sondaggio preliminare, cercando di paragonare le sue primissime opinioni in proposito, tramandateci nelle *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönes und Erhabenen* (1764), con le più tarde, espresse nella *Anthropologie Dohna* (1791) e nella *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (scritta nel 1796-1797). Il lungo tratto di tempo, e i molti avvenimenti intercorsi, ci permetteranno di mettere in evidenza una certa evoluzione del pensiero kantiano. (p. 133)
(...)
"Scorrendo queste pagine, il lettore non avrà potuto resistere alla tentazione di paragonare le descrizioni settecentesche, e particolarmente kantiane, del carattere dei diversi popoli, con le immagini di tali popoli che sono diffuse ai nostri giorni, e con quanto gli ultimi due secoli di storia ci hanno insegnato su di essi; e si sarà talora stupito di certe coincidenze, e talaltra avrà sorriso di certe radicali divergenze di giudizio o da qualche errata previsione. E si sarà forse convinto che, se una conclusione non solamente storica può trarsi da quanto precede, questa è che tali immagini, nel modo in cui esse venivano e vengono ancora elaborate, non sono che il frutto di un fenomeno o di fabulazione, o di percezione sociale altamente relativo e arbitrario, cristallizzato in molti casi dal successo di una tradizione pubblicistica che lo diffonde e lo perpetua — per cui la « prova dei fatti » conferma tali immagini non pili di quanto confermi i pronostici dell'astrologia." (p. 138)

(1) Non esiste alcuna storia generale di questa tradizione. Utili elementi possono essere ricavati da: J. C. Spener, *Historia doctrinae de temperamentis hominum*, Halle 1704; H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in its Origin and Background*, New York 1948; M. T. Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries,* Philadelphia 1964; G. Cocchiara, *Storia del Folklore in Europa*, Torino 1952; A. Collignon, *Le 'Portrait des esprits' de Jean Barclay*, Nancy 1906.

13. ———. 1987. *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

A cura di Claudio Cesa.
Indice: Prefazione di Claudio Cesa 11; La «debolezza» della Ragione nell'età dell'Illuminismo 19; La discussione sui limiti dell'intelletto umano nel Settecento e la genesi del criticismo kantiano, con particolare riferimento al problema dell'infinito 43; La disputa sul metodo matematico nella filosofia della prima metà del Settecento e la genesi dello scritto kantiano sull' 'evidenza' 79; La concezione leibniziana delle idee innate e le prime reazioni alla pubblicazione dei *Nouveaux Essais* (1765) 109; Zabarella ispiratore di Baumgarten o l'origine della connessione tra estetica e logica 137; L'ambiente storico-culturale di Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana 147; La ricomparsa della terminologia dell'aristotelismo tedesco durante la genesi della *Critica della ragion pura* 169; Primi sviluppi della teoria del genio in Kant (1770-1779) 181; *Divinae particula aurae*. Idee geniali, organismo e libertà. Una nota sulla *Riflessione 938* di Kant 235; Due fonti inglesi dimenticate della morale kantiana 247; L'etica kantiana parte della metafisica: una possibile ispirazione newtoniana? Con alcune osservazioni su «I sogni di un visionario» 257; La *Critica della ragion pura* di Kant nel contesto della tradizione della logica moderna 283; Cos'è la storia della filosofia? 293; Indice dei nomi 311-318.
"I saggi qui presentati, come del resto gli altri lavori di Tonelli, sono densi di richiami alle tradizioni, ed ai contesti

(le dispute teologiche, filosofiche, scientifiche, e magari anche le beghe universitarie) che hanno influito, o che possono aver influito, nell'orientare un pensatore in una direzione piuttosto che in un'altra. Ma il lettore si accorgerà agevolmente che non viene proposto né un livellamento né un determinismo: c'è, anzi, una cura minuziosa a delineare i tratti distintivi dei personaggi, anche di terz'ordine, che vengono evocati, ed è proprio la estrema ricchezza delle combinazioni a rendere impensabile ogni forma di determinismo. Tanto più che, come egli notò proprio a proposito di Kant, « la storia della filosofia si trova spesso nella necessità di prendere in considerazione vari elementi esplicativi di carattere irrazionale o semi-irrazionale », situati fuori, insomma, da quella « consequenzialità » che il pensatore riconosceva, ed alla quale si era magari richiamato nelle sue proprie argomentazioni.
Sulla metodologia della storia della filosofia Tonelli rifletté a lungo; l'articolo presentato in chiusura di questo volume è il compendio di un lavoro molto più vasto, rimasto inedito. Rispetto alle metodologie filosoficamente motivate, egli proponeva una metodologia « storica », e, come puntigliosamente precisava, relativa « ad uno solo dei numerosi punti di approccio complementari (o livelli di lavoro) »: gli elementi, cioè, che occorre possedere per mettersi in grado di comprendere correttamente un testo filosofico. Sarebbe qui fuori luogo riassumere; basterà dire che l'articolo di Tonelli è articolato sulla distinzione tra l'ordine genetico delle dottrine, l'ordine sistematico (cioè l'organizzazione di un nucleo teorico sulla base di certi princìpi costruttivi o fondanti) e l'ordine espositivo volta ripartito in specifici momenti). Se il dichiarato proposito è di indicare le condizioni di una adeguata comprensione di un testo particolare, questa è in realtà soltanto il punto di arrivo di una ricerca che investe primariamente l'autore e l'epoca. Ma non è da perdere di vista, inoltre, che quel che si vuol raggiungere è una conoscenza completa del sistema concettuale, nella quale dovrebbero trovare spiegazione anche quelle che al lettore sembrano aporie (o che l'autore stesso considerò, in altra fase del suo pensiero, aporie); per

le quali non basta appellarsi a motivi « psicologici » o « sociologici », perché questi illustrano soltanto « alcuni » dei caratteri di un pensiero, e in « certi » momenti del suo svolgimento.
Quando tutti questi elementi saranno stati vagliati, occorrerà tirar le somme studiando la struttura del testo. E, a questo proposito, ho l'impressione che la procedura di Tonelli, in tanti dei suoi scritti, sia stata più attenta alle strutture sistematiche di quanto egli non abbia dichiarato nel suo articolo metodico. Non credo comunque si tratti di una contraddizione. Era ovvio che, in via di principio, Tonelli dichiarasse che nessun sistema concettuale abbia una « validità universale », e che nessun passaggio da una idea all'altra vada considerato come « una deduzione consequenziale in senso stretto ». Ma, chiarito questo, l'argomentare del filosofo (quando è un filosofo serio) merita attenta considerazione: la genesi, insomma, avvia alla comprensione del testo, non la sostituisce. E l'attenzione che Tonelli ha sempre dedicato alla struttura sistematica delle opere di Kant (ma esempi analoghi si potrebbero moltiplicare) mostra come vivo in lui fosse il senso per le « ragioni » della filosofia. È anche per questo, credo, che lo si debba a buon diritto dire storico delle idee filosofiche, e non semplicemente storico delle idee." (dalla Prefazione di Claudio Cesa, pp. 16-17)

14. ———. 1987. "La «Debolezza» Della Ragione Nell'età Dell'illuminismo." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*, 19-41. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *The "Weakness" of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment*, in Diderot-Studies, XIV, 1971, pp. 217-244. "La concezione tradizionale dell'Illuminismo è stata già messa in questione; essa è stata criticata nel suo complesso, ad esempio da Funke, ed in senso parziale, relativamente ad uno specifico ambito, da Vyverberg (1). Assai significativo qui è soprattutto l'approccio di R. H. Popkin al problema dello scetticismo settecentesco (2); quella dello scetticismo fu infatti una delle questioni principali dibattute in

quell'epoca, e Hume non costituì affatto un caso isolato. Benché, tuttavia, io personalmente propenda a riconoscere allo scetticismo settecentesco una diffusione ancora più larga di quanto non faccia lo stesso professor Popkin (3), quello scettico non può venir considerato un orientamento comune (e tanto meno tipico) del XVIII secolo; anche la corrente anti-scettica fu, è evidente, di capitale importanza, raggiungendo il suo momento culminante in Inghilterra con la scuola del senso comune e, in Germania, con Kant. Viceversa, l'accentuazione dei limiti dell'intelletto umano può considerarsi (con poche, ma importanti eccezioni) un'attitudine diffusa e, in certa misura, persino tipica, del XVIII secolo.

Vorrei ora esporre brevemente l'ovvia differenza di fondo tra la posizione scettica e la posizione volta a stabilire i confini dell'intelletto umano, anche se ciò può comportare alcune eccessive semplificazioni.

Lo scetticismo mette in dubbio la possibilità, per la ragione umana, di raggiungere una qualsivoglia verità assoluta con certezza dimostrativa (e, in alcuni casi, anche con certezza morale: il pirronismo « storico »); per lo scetticismo, l'essenziale è la « qualità » della conoscenza, il genere di certezza possibile per l'uomo.

La posizione volta a stabilire i limiti della ragione umana, al contrario, si interessa dell'estensione della conoscenza razionale (di qualsiasi genere).

Entrambe le posizioni, naturalmente, possono essere complementari. Per uno scettico assoluto il problema dei limiti non esiste neppure, ma uno scettico moderato, che ammetta la possibilità della conoscenza probabile, è in genere interessato a determinare i limiti di questa conoscenza. Molti pensatori, tuttavia, pur orientandosi verso la determinazione dei confini dell'intelletto, non sono affatto scettici; essi possono ritenere la certezza dimostrativa possibile entro i limiti dell'intelletto umano (o, per meglio dire, possono di fatto fissare dei confini diversi per la conoscenza, uno per la conoscenza certa, l'altro per quella probabile), e possono in tal modo pensare che la

verità assoluta (o perlomeno la conoscenza necessaria ed universale) sia, in parte, alla portata dell'uomo." (pp. 21-22)
(...)
" Questa rassegna, in verità assai incompleta, delle posizioni filosofiche del XVIII secolo volte a determinare i limiti dell'intelletto umano, necessita almeno di un'aggiunta finale, che funga da esempio di un tipo di limitazione che non deriva, come negli esempi precedenti, dai confini imposti alla ragione dalla autorità dell'esperienza, ma dalla intrinseca debolezza della ragione stessa per quanto concerne le sue capacità concettuali. Si tratta del concetto di infinito. L'infinito, da questo punto di vista, non implica direttamente l'idea di esistenza — ed è perciò in qualche misura indipendente dalle leggi dell'esperienza.
Esistono due tipi radicalmente diversi di infinito: l'infinito qualitativo degli attributi di Dio, e l'infinito quantitativo della creazione. L'esistenza del primo tipo di infinito non può essere considerata un problema particolare a sé stante, poiché essa è già implicita nell'esistenza di Dio; il secondo tipo di infinito è considerato esistente non attualmente, ma solo potenzialmente. Bisogna fare un'eccezione per alcuni pensatori, d'estrazione per lo più spinoziana, come Raphson o Terrasson, i quali consideravano il mondo infinito in atto. Il problema essenziale è tuttavia se questo infinito — sia esso esistente in Dio o in potenza nel mondo — possa o meno venir concepito dalla ragione umana. È quasi superfluo ricordare che questo rappresenta uno tra i tanti problemi che l'Illuminismo aveva ereditato dalla tradizione plurimillenaria della filosofia occidentale. Nell'Età della Ragione predomina, nell'affermazione di un'intrinseca debolezza della ragione, un atteggiamento negativo. L'uomo, in quanto è un essere finito, può avere solo un'idea negativa o imperfetta dell'infinito, benché questa idea sia utile ed indispensabile in molti ambiti, dalla teologia alla matematica, e benché la sua verità debba essere rivendicata anche se non può venire direttamente compresa. In Gran Bretagna Raphson, Clarke, Collier, Berkeley, Hume e Madaurin concordavano su questo punto; in Francia, Crousaz, Buffon, d'Alembert, Robinet. In Germania Wolff,

l'apostolo della potenza della ragione, tentò di imporre una soluzione di compromesso, ma venne contestato da Crusius, Reimarus, Lambert e Kant." (p. 38)
(1) Vedi G. Funke, *Das sokratische Jahrhundert*, Introduzione all'antologia, da lui curata, *Die Aufklärung*, Stuttgart, 1963; H. Vyverberg, *Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment*, Cambridge Mass., 1958.
(2) R. H. Popkin, *Scepticism in the Enlightenment*, in « Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century », XXVI, 1963.
(3) Vedi il mio studio *Kant und die antiken Skeptiker*, in *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung*, hrsg. v. H. Heimsoeth, Hildesheim, 1967.

15. ———. 1987. "La Discussione Sui Limiti Dell'intelletto Umano Nel Settecento E La Genesi Del Criticismo Kantiano, Con Particolare Riferimento Al Problema Dell'infinito." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *La question des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVIIe siècle et la genèse du criticisme kantien, particulièrement par rapport au Problème de l'infini,* in « Revue de Métaph ysique et de Morale », LXV, 1959, pp. 396-427.
    "Hume e Kant non sono stati i primi a proclamare la necessità di ammettere che lo spirito umano non può conoscere tutto, e ad imporre il rispetto dei suoi limiti: troppo spesso lo si dimentica, quando si cerca di ricostruire le origini della filosofia kantiana. Per questo ci proponiamo di delineare qui un quadro molto sintetico del problema all'epoca della formazione filosofica di Kant.
    Se dovessimo trattare in maniera esaustiva il tema da noi affrontato ci troveremmo dinanzi ad un compito smisurato, il cui assolvimento andrebbe ben al di là di ciò ch'è necessario per una comprensione migliore della personalità di Kant. In effetti si tratterebbe in primo luogo di scrivere nientemeno che la storia dello scetticismo, su cui d'altronde sono state pubblicate diverse opere (1) ma non saremmo che

all’inizio, poiché è evidente che numerosi pensatori i quali non possono essere considerati in nessun modo degli scettici hanno riconosciuto che la capacità umana di conoscere non è illimitata. Occorrerebbe infine parlare di tutti quei mistici che tendevano a sminuire o a negare il valore della conoscenza razionale al solo scopo di far posto alla fede o all’illuminazione interiore.

Ciò che ci proponiamo qui dunque è soltanto la descrizione dell’aspetto del problema nei suoi tratti più generali nel corso della prima metà del Settecento, il che ci costringe ad occuparci anzitutto rapidamente di quei grandi pensatori del Seicento che esercitavano ancora un influsso importante nel secolo successivo. Rinunciamo dunque a studiare certi pirroniani veramente caratteristici del Seicento, come La Mothe Le Vayer, Huet, Glanville, ecc. (2), la cui importanza non va oltre i confini della loro epoca.

Il problema che ci accingiamo a trattare presenta naturalmente parecchi aspetti differenti: in effetti si può cercare di stabilire l’estensione delle conoscenze possibili nelle direzioni più divergenti e si possono concepire in maniera molto diversa i limiti di queste conoscenze.

Ci accontenteremo pertanto di dividere il nostro tema in due parti principali: nella prima ci occuperemo del problema dei limiti in generale; nella seconda esporremo più in particolare il problema specifico dei limiti dello spirito umano in rapporto all’infinito, problema che assorbiva all’epoca la parte maggiore delle discussioni dedicate al nostro tema. Trascureremo dunque consapevolmente diversi aspetti più specifici della questione, come il dubbio dei cartesiani circa la validità della conoscenza sensibile e le crisi delle nozioni di sostanza e di forza; si trattava, per questi ultimi, di problemi riconosciuti nel Settecento tra quelli di più difficile soluzione per l’uomo (3). In particolare i newtoniani moderati ammettevano che la forza d’attrazione era qualcosa di misterioso e d’inesplicabile dal punto di vista della filosofia meccanica (4). Allo stesso modo in teodicea gli avversari dell'ideologismo dichiaravano ch’era impossibile penetrare i disegni della saggezza divina e ch’era meglio spiegare i fenomeni mediante le cause

efficienti (5); per non parlare poi delle incertezze riguardo al problema della libertà.
Eviteremo così pure di discutere certe forme d'idealismo che, più che i limiti dell'intelletto umano, presuppongono che non si possa conoscere nulla del mondo sensibile perché, in realtà, il mondo sensibile non esiste." (pp. 45-46)
(...)
"Kant ha cominciato abbastanza presto ad occuparsi della questione dei limiti dell'intelletto umano. Nella *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* [Storia naturale universale e teoria del cielo] del 1765 esprime i suoi dubbi sulle capacità conoscitive dell'uomo per le ragioni seguenti: anzitutto i sensi s'ingannano; in secondo luogo è impossibile per l'uomo cogliere ciò ch'è smisurato (189). Tuttavia la possibilità d'applicare le matematiche alla cosmologia conferisce a questa scienza un valore di certezza che compensa la debolezza dei nostri sensi (190). È vero però che la branca della cosmologia di cui Kant in modo particolare si occupa, cioè la cosmogonia, può essere matematizzata solo fino ad un certo punto, essendo fondata piuttosto su un ragionamento analogico (191). E questo perché tale branca è fondata su principi metafisici, principi che non sono suscettibili di certezza, in quanto hanno a che fare con nozioni implicanti l'infinità sia quantitativa, sia metafisica: e solo Dio può concepire l'infinito (192). Esiste d'altra parte un altro oggetto che presenta almeno pari difficoltà dell'infinito alla conoscenza: l'organismo vivente (193).
È evidente che il dubbio concernente la conoscenza sensibile, dubbio superato mediante la conoscenza matematica, dipende più o meno direttamente dalla ben nota formulazione cartesiana. Il dubbio riguardante le conoscenze fondate su nozioni infinite dev'essere attribuito in parte ad un atteggiamento antiwolffiano ispirato dai pietisti, e da Crusius in particolare; in parte all'influsso metodologico di un ispiratore della *Naturgeschichte*, Wright of Durham (194). D'altra parte, in generale, il fatto che si avanzino delle riserve riguardo ai limiti delle conoscenze umane è un atteggiamento polemico nei confronti

dell'ortodossia wolffiana. La difficoltà di conoscere l'organismo vivente è un tema molto diffuso nel Settecento. Appunto perché si riconosce l'impossibilità della spiegazione meccanica degli esseri viventi (dottrina anch'essa antiwolffiana), si proclama misteriosa la natura di questi ultimi, rifiutando la teleologia come spiegazione razionale soddisfacente (195).
Il tema dell'incomprensibilità dell'infinito metafisico ritorna nella *Nova Dilucidatio* del 1755 (196); ma è nel *Beweisgrund* [L'unico argomento possibile per una dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio] del 1762 che si annuncia un tema nuovo: vi sono delle nozioni composte ch'è impossibile (per l'uomo) analizzare (197); questo tema riappare nel saggio sulla *Deutlichkeit* [Ricerca sull'evidenza dei primi principi della teologia naturale e della morale] del medesimo anno (198). Abbiamo visto che tale dottrina è di derivazione crusiana.
I *Träume eines Geistersehers* [Sogni di un visionario spiegati coi sogni della metafisica] del 1776 recano delle novità importanti: Kant fa rilevare che vi sono nozioni le quali non sono fondate, direttamente « indirettamente, su nessun dato, e che possono essere pensate solo negativamente: queste nozioni, che appartengono in generale alla pneumatologia, sono puramente immaginarie (199). Anche la nozione della natura spirituale di Dio è soltanto negativa (200). In realtà tutto ciò che riguarda la natura spirituale, la libertà e la predestinazione rientra in questa categoria (201). In più, vi sono dei rapporti fondamentali inerenti a ciò ch'è dato che non si possono concepire (*einsehen*), poiché la loro natura non è fondata sull'identità; per esempio, la forza di attrazione. Questi rapporti possono essere conosciuti soltanto sulla base dell'esperienza (202). La nozione kantiana dei limiti è dunque, nel 1766, molto complessa e molto differenziata. L'importanza attribuita da Kant all'esperienza dipende certamente dall'atteggiamento di Newton e Locke al riguardo, atteggiamento sottolineato da alcune tendenze filosofiche del tempo, rappresentate soprattutto da Baumgarten e da Lambert; tendenze che avevano portato

Kant ad esigere dalla metafisica un procedimento in concreto, vale a dire un controllo sperimentale continuo mediante esempi reali (203). La diffidenza riguardo alle teorie pneumatiche è ispirata forse più precisamente da Locke. Quanto all'insufficienza dell'identità per spiegare certi rapporti reali, si tratta di una teoria che Kant aveva tratto da Crusius nel suo scritto sulle *Negative Grössen* [Saggio per introdurre in matematica il concetto delle grandezze negative]; Crusius tuttavia non ne faceva un motivo di dubbio, o di limitazione dell'intelletto: questo sviluppo è in Kant originale. Bisogna comunque notare che ai tempi di Kant l'attrazione era in genere considerata ima forza misteriosa.

Rinunciamo a discutere lo sviluppo ulteriore del problema dei limiti dell'intelletto in Kant: ci basta aver raccolto qui la documentazione necessaria per affrontare questo problema; il suo esame approfondito ci condurrebbe troppo lontano e richiederebbe l'analisi di un numero ben maggiore di fattori che qui non abbiamo potuto prendere in considerazione, in altra sede (204) abbiamo parlato dei cambiamenti di prospettiva nella questione dei limiti al tempo della rivoluzione copernicana del 1769 ed abbiamo mostrato l'interesse che questo problema destava nello stesso periodo in Lambert." (pp. 64-65)

(1) C. F. Stäudlin, *Geschichte und Geist der Skeptizismus*, 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1794; J. F. I. Tafel, *Geschichte und Kritik des Skeptizismus*, Tübingen, 1834; H. Was, *Geschiedenis van het Scepticisme*, I, England, Utrecht, 1870. [cfr. ora gli scritti di Richard H. Popkin, in particolare *The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle* (terza edizione ampliata), Oxford University Press, 2003 e la traduzione italiana della prima edizione (1960), *Storia dello Scetticismo*, Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2008]

(2) Cfr. Stäudlin, op. cit., II vol.

(3) Cfr. il nostro articolo *Critiques of the Notion of Substance prior to Kant*, d'imminente pubblicazione in « The Journal of the History of Ideas » [cfr. invece «Tijdschrift voor Philosophie», 1961, pp. 285-301].

(4) G. Tonelli, *Elementi metafisici e metodologici in Kant precritico*, Torino, 1959, vol. I, cap. II, 28 e sgg.
(189) I. Kant, *Schriften*. Preussische Akademie-Ausgabe, Bd. I, Berlin, 19102, p. 229.
(190) *Ibid*., p. 230.
(191) *Ibid.,* pp. 235-236.
(192) *Ibid*, p. 256 e pp. 309-310. i» Ibid., pp. 229-230.
(193) *Ibid*, p. 229-230
(194) Cfr. G. Tonelli, *Elementi metafisici e metodologici*..., cap. II, S 53.
(195) *Ibid*., cap. II, § 17.
(196) *Ibid*., p. 405.
(197) Kant, *Schriften*, ed. cit., Bd. II, 19122, p. 70 [trad. ìt. di P. Carabellese, riv. e accresciuta da R. Assunto e R. Hohenemser, Bari, 1953, p. 109].
(198) *Ibid*, p. 280 [trad. it. dt., pp. 227-228].
(199) *Ibid*., pp. 351-352 [trad. it. dt., p. 404].
(200) *Ibid*., p. 321 [trad. it. dt., p. 371].
(201) *Ibid.,* pp. 369-371 [trad. it. dt., pp. 423-425].
(202) *Ibid*., pp. 370-371 [trad. it. cit., pp. 424-425].
(203) Cfr. G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica* ..., cit., SS 82-90 e 136-137.
(204) *Ibid*., cap. IV, prima sezione.

16. ———. 1987. "La Disputa Sul Metodo Matematico Nella Filosofia Della Prima Metà Del Settecento E La Genesi Dello Scritto Kantiano Sull' 'Evidenza' " In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Der Streit über die mathematische Methode in der Philosophie in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung von Kants Schrift über die 'Deutlichkeit'*, in « Archiv für Philosophie », IX, 1959, pp. 37-66.
    "Nel presente articolo viene proposta un'indagine sulle premesse storiche e sullo spunto della dottrina kantiana sul metodo matematico del 1762. A questo scopo ci sembra necessario considerare brevemente la problematica del Seicento, con la speranza che il nostro tentativo di trattare

in poche pagine un problema tanto vasto non appaia troppo arrischiato: un'indagine approfondita di tale questione importante richiederebbe uno spazio ben maggiore, ma qui ci limiteremo a richiamare ciò ch'è indispensabile per la comprensione della trattazione kantiana del problema. A tal fine ricorreremo anche alle opinioni di diversi filosofi di grandezza minore, che sotto questo riguardo solitamente vengono trascurati ma che tuttavia sono molto interessanti nell'insieme: e ciò per ricreare l'atmosfera in cui il problema è stato affrontato da Kant.

L'applicabilità e la sufficienza del metodo matematico in filosofia divengono già nel Seicento una delle questioni più dibattute della filosofia europea. (1) Già all'inizio del secolo Morin aveva cercato di dimostrare con un procedimento di tipo matematico l'esistenza di Dio (2), ed è noto come Descartes abbia introdotto nella filosofia in generale il metodo matematico (3). Naturalmente questa impostazione incontrò una vivace opposizione da parte degli aristotelici. Come esponente caratteristico della reazione anticartesiana sotto questo aspetto può essere forse considerato J. B. Du Hamel, il quale sosteneva che i concetti della geometria avevano un mero carattere immaginario e che pertanto era sbagliato introdurli nella fisica (4). Il problema del carattere immaginario o reale dei concetti geometrici era naturalmente vivo fin dall'antichità. In Suarez, ad esempio, si trova un'ampia esposizione delle diverse opinioni scolastiche in proposito, le quali discutono la questione in maniera molto più approfondita c complessa di quanto non sia avvenuto in epoca posteriore (5). Anche nel Seicento venne sottolineata la differenza tra i concetti di estensione geometrica e fisica, ad esempio da Sennert e da Gassendi (6); Ledere richiamò pure con vigore la differenza tra matematica e filosofia (7).

Il più importante fautore dell'introduzione nella metafisica del metodo e del modo d'esposizione euclideo è stato, com'è noto, Spinoza, in quanto prosecutore e innovatore della tradizione cartesiana. Nonostante il sospetto di ateismo che per tal motivo accompagnava il matematismo metafisico, il metodo matematico fu accolto proprio dagli avversari di

Spinoza specialmente in Francia, dove fu impiegato per respingere le dottrine dell'ebreo olandese. Il primo della serie di questi avversari (1679) è stato Huet (8), seguito da Fénelon, Silléry, Lamy, Régis, Langehart, Bayle e Mairan (9)." (pp. 81-82)
(...)
"Già nel suo primo scritto sulle 'forze vive' Kant aveva sottoli-nèato la differenza tra il concetto fisico e quello matematico di corpo (138), una differenza che — ovviamente — non può essere considerata originale. Egli sosteneva che la sua metafisica avrebbe raggiunto la medesima evidenza e rigore dimostrativo della matematica. Nel' *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* [Storia naturale universale e teoria del cielo] e nella dissertazione *De Igne* Kant aveva impiegato la matematica nella filosofia della natura secondo il modello newtoniano. Lo stesso discorso va fatto per la posteriore *Monadologia physica* e per il saggio sul movimento e la quiete: si tratta di scritti di filosofia della natura, ma anche nella contemporanea *Nova Dilucidatio* di contenuto ontologico e metafisico Kant applica almeno esteriormente il metodo matematico (139).
La situazione invece è diversa nell ' *Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* [Unico argomento possibile per una dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio] del 1763, in cui Kant afferma essere attualmente impossibile servirsi del metodo matematico in filosofia: ciò provocherebbe solo una sorta di 'mania del metodo' suscettibile delle peggiori conseguenze. A suo avviso questa impossibilità dipende dal fatto che i concetti metafisici non sono stati ancora analizzati esaurientemente: non si sa perciò con precisione il loro contenuto e di conseguenza non si può procedere con essi col metodo matematico. La « certezza matematica » in metafisica è ciononostante pur sempre una meta ideale della metodologia kantiana: se un giorno si riuscirà ad analizzare compiutamente i concetti metafisici, cioè a renderli del tutto chiari e distinti, allora si potrà Cominciare finalmente a costruire la vera metafisica, ch'è capace di certezza

matematica (140). Il contrasto col metodo wolffiano è ora chiaro: una metafisica secondo il modello matematico è da considerarsi al presente impossibile ed inutile.
Tuttavia una chiarificazione metodologica fondamentale di questi problemi compare appena nello scritto *Über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral* [Ricerca sull'evidenza dei primi principi della teologia naturale e della morale] del 1762. Kant è impegnato ad approfondire lo iato tra metafisica e matematica: i concetti matematici vengono definiti mediante una composizione arbitraria (sinteticamente); la definizione dei concetti metafisici può avvenire invece soltanto per via analitica, dal momento che qui si ha a che fare con enti reali, che bisogna assumere cosi come sono e considerare poi attraverso la risoluzione o analisi più accurata nei loro elementi semplici. Inoltre i segni matematici (simboli o figure) sono idonei a ridare l'essenza dei concetti matematici; in questi segni ci si può rappresentare in maniera sensibile tali concetti ed è dunque possibile procedere in matematica in concreto, vale a dire sensibilmente (mediante esempi chiari e dimostrazioni evidenti, accessibili e comprensibili a tutti).
I segni o termini metafisici non sono invece idonei ad un simile trattamento, poiché non li si può risolvere nei loro elementi semplici: i segni metafisici non possono essere combinati secondo regole semplici e chiare, e dunque una combinatoria metafisica è impossibile. La metafisica può procedere solo in abstracto, cioè in maniera intellettuale.
Ancora: la matematica è costruita sopra un numero determinato di concetti fondamentali: i concetti-base metafisici sono invece senza numero, e lo stesso vale per gli assiomi o principi indimostrabili. La matematica dunque è facile, semplice, comprensibile; la metafisica invece difficile e confusa. La metafisica deve allo stato presente limitarsi all'analisi dei concetti: solo quando questa analisi sarà giunta a compimento la metafisica potrà procedere per via sintetica, secondo il modello matematico (141).
Kant non intendeva però dire con questo che la matematica per il momento è indifferente per la metafisica in generale.

Di fatto egli impiega all'occasione concetti e dimostrazioni matematiche nello scritto cronologicamente contiguo sulle grandezze negative (142), e ciò non va considerato in contraddizione con le teorie dello scritto sull'evidenza. In realtà lo schema delle grandezze negative non è di tipo matematico: gli elementi matematici degli esempi e delle dimostrazioni occasionali costituiscono un'aggiunta esteriore.
Le dottrine dello scritto sull'evidenza hanno certamente avuto la loro origine nelle prese di posizione dell'Accademia prussiana, tuttavia anche l'influsso di Crusius è stato sicuramente determinante: Kant cita esplicitamente di preferenza Crusius piuttosto che altri pensatori. La polemica contro la combinatoria è certamente affiorata già nella *Nova Dilucidatio,* tuttavia la tesi dell'infinità numerica dei principi metafisici fondamentali proviene da Tonnies e da Tetens (143).
Kant dunque non ha rifiutato totalmente il metodo matematico in filosofia: vi si rinuncia per il momento, ma rimane pur sempre come obbiettivo per il futuro. La venerazione per Newton impedì verosimilmente il rigetto completo della matematica. Alla presa di posizione sul problema presente nell'Unico argomento e nello scritto sull'evidenza è probabile che Kant sia stato spinto unicamente perché i suoi due padrini sul piano filosofico, Crusius e Maupertuis, s'erano espressi positivamente al riguardo. Ciò può spiegare perché Kant solo relativamente tardi abbracciò questa tesi, cioè dopo che anche l'ambiente dell'Accademia berlinese s'era espresso in tal senso. La sua precedente considerazione per la matematica non può essere in alcun modo ricondotta ad un riguardo per Wolff, giacché la polemica nei suoi confronti fu in Kant fin dagli inizi ben decisa. Basta solo pensare a quale considerazione aveva acquistato un uso moderato del metodo matematico grazie ad uomini come Leibniz e Newton e si comprenderà facilmente perché Kant appena così tardi e con simili riserve si è distaccato dal metodo geometrico." (pp. 92-93)
(138) Cfr. G. Tonelli, *Elementi metodologici*..., Cap. I, §§ 36-37, 41-43.

(139) *Ibid.*, Cap. IV, SS 1-2.
(140) *Ibid.*, Cap. V, A.
(141) *Ibid.*, Cap. VI, A.
(142) *Ibid.*, Cap. VI, B.
(143) G. Tonelli, *La tradizione delle categorie aristoteliche nella filosofia moderna sino a Kant*, in «Studi Urbinati», Serie B, 1958.

17. ———. 1987. "La Concezione Leibniziana Delle Idee Innate E Le Prime Reazioni Alla Pubblicazione Dei *Nouveaux Essais* (1765)." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the « Nouveaux Essais » (1765)*, in «Journal of the History of Philosophy », 1974, pp. 437-454.
    "I *Nouveaux Essais* di Leibniz, scritti nel periodo 1703-1705 (e d'ora in poi citati come *NE*), furono pubblicati postumi da Raspe (1) nel 1765, all'inizio di una rinascita di interesse per Leibniz di cui è segno anche la grande edizione Dutens del 1768. Poiché la grande svolta nel pensiero di Kant si produsse nel 1769, e fu contrassegnata in particolare dal rifiuto della sensibilità quale fonte unica della conoscenza (2), è facile concludere che proprio la lettura dei *NE* possa essere stata uno tra gli elementi determinanti che spinsero Kant ad adottare la sua nuova soluzione.
    Non è pretesa di questo studio rispondere a tale difficile questione: Il nostro tentativo è piuttosto quello di preparare il terreno per un'eventuale risposta al problema, muovendo dall'analisi delle prime reazioni che si ebbero nei circoli filosofici, in special modo tedeschi, alla comparsa dei *NE*. In che misura vennero afferrati l'importanza ed il significato delle particolari dottrine esposte nei *NE*? Fino a che punto i filosofi contemporanei si resero conto che esse avrebbero profondamente modificato il quadro complessivo dei principi della psicologia di Leibniz? E, per conseguenza, fino a che punto avrebbe potuto Kant venir spinto da una reazione generalizzata a prestare particolare attenzione alla

peculiarità di quell'opera? Per rispondere a questi interrogativi, focalizzerò la mia ricerca sul *problema della origine della conoscenza*.
Poiché il mio intento è quello di ricostruire un'atmosfera filosofica nel suo complesso, non limiterò la mia indagine alle reazioni filosofiche precedenti al 1769, ma prenderò in considerazione anche alcune posizioni del decennio successivo. Come frequentemente accade nella storia delle idee, mentre la forza d'urto di un certo evento può venir riconosciuta già nei momenti immediatamente successivi al suo accadimento, la documentazione dei suoi effetti nel tempo può rivelarsi accessibile solo dopo un certo periodo. Tali effetti sono da considerarsi nondimeno indicativi di quella forza d'urto che li ha preceduti.
Prima però di dare inizio a quest'indagine, desidero chiarire due punti preliminari: intendo infatti, in primo luogo, mettere in luce le diverse modalità di trattamento della dottrina in questione nei *NE* e nelle opere di Leibniz pubblicate in precedenza in cui essa compare; passerò poi, in secondo luogo, ad esaminare le interpretazioni della psicologia di Leibniz precedenti al 1765, e, in particolar modo, la versione che di essa venne accolta da Wolff e incorporata nel suo sistema." (pp. 111-112)
(...)
"Se dunque un'eventuale lettura dei *NE* ha realmente inciso sulla rivoluzione filosofica di Kant del 1769, questo non è stato per effetto di una reazione positiva collettiva seguita alla comparsa dei *NE,* poiché per lungo tempo ancora dopo il 1769 questa reazione non ebbe, semplicemente, luogo. L'influsso dei *NE* su Kant può spiegarsi dunque soltanto in base a ragioni d'ordine personale, a differenza di molte altre posizioni filosofiche assunte da Kant tra il 1769 e il 1780. Esso può però, almeno parzialmente, spiegarsi anche grazie all'influenza esercitata da Crusius su Kant. Sebbene infatti Kant in principio non accettasse il moderato innatismo di Crusius, la conoscenza della teoria di Crusius può aver richiamato la sua attenzione sull'analoga dottrina di Leibniz, e l'influenza congiunta di entrambe le concezioni può aver

costituito un importante elemento nella celebre svolta del 1769.
Non credo che la forma ormai antiquata d'innatismo difesa da pochi filosofi cattolici tedeschi (93) possa aver svolto alcun ruolo. E questo vale anche per alcuni fattori non sensibili presenti nella teoria dell'Ideale di Winckelmann e di Wieland (94): questa teoria si riferiva specificamente all'estetica, ed influenzò certamente Kant, ma più tardi, ed in un'area del tutto differente (95)." (pp. 126-127)
(93) Qualche forma di innatismo è presente specialmente tra i Benedettini, come I. Graw (1749. Vedi W. A. Mühl, *Die Aufklärung an der Universität Fulda mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der philosophischen und juristischen Fakultäten* [Fulda, 1961], p. 41) e G. Cartier (vedi B. Jansen, *Philosophen katholischen Bekenntisses in ihrer Stellung zur Philosophie der Aufklärung*, in «Scholastik», XI [1936], p. 10). Ma anche il gesuita Redlhammer era sostenitore della dottrina delle idee innate (vedi C. Werner, *Der Heilige Thomas von Aquin*, III [Regensburg, 1889], p. 637).
(94) Questa teoria compare in un'opera postuma (scritta nel 1759) di Winckelmann, e, nel 1764, nella sua *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*. Wieland espose la stessa concezione in un saggio del 1777. Si veda, per entrambi, G. Tonelli, « Ideal », voce in *Dictionary of thè History of Ideas*, ed. Philip Wiener [New York, 1973].
(95) Vedi G. Tonelli, *Kant's Early Theory of Genius*, 1770-1779, in « Journal of thè History of Philosophy », IV (1966). [Ora tradotto in italiano e raccolto nel presente volume. N. d. T.].

18. ———. 1987. "Zabarella Ispiratore Di Baumgarten O L'origine Della Connessione Tra Estetica E Logica." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Zabarella inspirateur de Baumgarten ou l'origine de la connexion entre esthétique et logique*, in « Revue d'Esthétique », IX, 1956, pp. 182-192.

"Non occorre ricordare il posto che occupa, nella storia dell'estetica, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762): tutti sanno che l'estetica gli deve il proprio nome. E noi abbiamo avuto l'occasione di richiamare altrove (1), recentemente, il suo influsso su Kant, in quel periodo molto delicato della storia del criticismo che va dal 1765 al 1770. Uno dei punti importanti di questa dottrina è il rapporto tra teoria del bello e logica." (p.139)
(...)
"Queste idee di Baumgarten hanno, ci pare valga la pena di rilevarlo, dei precedenti molto interessanti in un pensatore italiano del Cinquecento: Zabarella (1553-1589), l'autore del *De rebus naturalibus* e di commenti importanti su Aristotele, che professò a Padova un tomismo molto evoluto in direzione dell'umanesimo rinascimentale (3). Zabarella infatti pretende di essere il primo a dimostrare la connessione tra logica e 'poetica', e non abbiamo degli elementi che ci spingano a dubitare del suo diritto di priorità. Retorica e poetica sono, secondo Zabarella, *partes logicae et philosophiae instrumenta*; ciò che nessuno fino ad allora aveva sostenuto (*nomo hactenus declaravit*: l. II, cap. XIII, p. 78). Retorica e poetica, a dire il vero, non fanno parte né della filosofia 'contemplativa' né della morale (cap. XIV, p. 78). Esse sono anzitutto, come la grammatica, facoltà strumentali e più precisamente *instrumenta civilis disciplinae,* ossia sono utili all'azione (ibid. e cap. XV, p. 82); si direbbe, con linguaggio odierno, che non hanno né un valore speculativo né un valore etico, bensì un valore pragmatico. In effetti la retorica contribuisce a inculcare la moralità (p. 83), la poetica a correggere i costumi (p. 84). Inoltre esse fanno parte della logica che, a sua volta, non è né scienza né morale, ma *disciplina instrumentalis* come la grammatica (1. I, cap. X, p. 22) (4). Ora retorica e poetica non fanno parte della logica generale, che « insegna la forma stessa del ragionamento » (*docet ipsam ratiocinandis formami*): fanno parte invece della logica particolare che permette che, « volendo usare il discorso per questo o quel fine, sappiamo a quale materia, cioè a quali proposizioni occorre applicare tale forma; e che troviamo le

proposizioni stesse, quando occorra, e le abbiamo a disposizione » (5)." (pp. 140-141)
(...)
"In conclusione, anche se la teoria baumgarteniana (che si trova nella *Metaphysica*) dell'estetica o scienza del bello, come scienza della facoltà inferiore o della conoscenza sensibile in generale, può essere agevolmente spiegata prescindendo da una dipendenza diretta dal testo di Zabarella (15), l'influenza del filosofo padovano ci sembra estremamente probabile riguardo alla dottrina specifica (che s'incontra nell' *Aesthetica* di Baumgarten) dell'induzione estetica e dell'esempio, come complemento di un ragionamento razionale insufficiente. Baumgarten avrebbe notato una certa analogia tra la propria posizione e quella dell'italiano ed avrebbe utilizzato alcuni suoi suggerimenti ben precisi, conferendo loro una funzione indubbiamente originale nell'insieme di un sistema ben diverso. Questo intreccio di tradizione cartesiano-leibniziana e di tradizione averroista avrebbe costituito una nuova piattaforma di cui Kant, sensibile anche ad altre suggestioni e problemi, doveva in seguito far rilevare la debolezza: il suo tentativo di chiarificazione del problema doveva condurre alla rivoluzione del 1769.
È interessante altresì notare che il discepolo più importante di Baumgarten, G. F. Meier, in un'opera di estetica (16) comparsa dopo la *Metaphysica* di Baumgarten, ma prima dell' *Aesthetica* di questi, sviluppa, muovendo dalle posizioni speculative della *Metaphysica* del suo maestro, una teoria del sillogismo estetico e dell'induzione estetica che non è molto lontana dalle dottrine esposte in seguito da Baumgarten stesso nella aua *Aesthetica*, benché meno vicina alla dottrina zabarelliana di Baumgarten." (p. 144)
(1) G. Tonelli, *Kant dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica*, Torino, 1955, spec. cap. IV.
(3) Lo citeremo qui da J. Zabarella, Opera Logica, ed. postrema, Francofurti, 1626: De Natura Logicae, libri duo. [di quest'opera è disponibile una nuova edizione a cura di Dominique Bouillon con testo latino e traduzione francese a

fronte: Jacques Zabarella, *La nature de la logiqu*e, Parigi: Vrin, 2009]
(4) Una *disciplina instrumentis* dev'essere distinta anche dall'arte. Infatti è « quidem habitus animi; non tamen effectivus alicujus operis extra animum, sed ipsomet animo: adeo ejus operatio est immanens » (l. I, cap. VII, pp. 16-17); diversamente sarebbe un'arte.
(5) Ut ad alium et allumi scopum discursum uri volentes, sciamus cui materiae, id est, quibus propositionibus ea forma applicanda sit, ipsasque propositiones, quando opus fuerit, inveniamus, et in promptu habeamus (l. II, cap. IX, p. 85).
(15) Infatti, come abbiamo mostrato altrove, l'ambiente offriva molteplici stimoli in questa direzione: più di una volta, e specialmente in Leibniz, si riscontra una identificazione della bellezza con una conoscenza chiara ma confusa (non distinta). Ed alcuni pensatori tedeschi del Settecento ripresero prima di Baumgarten, per la verità molto superficialmente, la connessione tra scienza del bello e logica, probabilmente sotto l'influsso di Zabarella. Su tutti questi punti cfr. G. Tonelli, op. cit., cap. IV.
(16) G. F. Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften*, 3 Bde., Halle, 1748-1749-1750.

19. ———. 1987. "L'ambiente Storico-Culturale Di Königsberg E La Formazione Della Filosofia Kantiana." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy*, in « Bewusstsein. Gerhard Funke zu eigen », Bonn: Bouvier, 1975, pp. 126-144.
    "Circa vent'anni fa (1) Gerhard Lehmann faceva notare che, per quanto strano potesse sembrare, c'era un numero davvero limitato di studi sulla vita di Kant, e quelli esistenti avevano per di più il difetto di non prendere nella dovuta considerazione alcuni aspetti fondamentali del problema, primo fra tutti quello dei possibili rapporti rinvenibili tra la vita di Kant come semplice essere umano e ciò che egli,

come filosofo, aveva prodotto. A quel tempo questo corrispondeva al vero, se si eccettuano quel tanto di attenzione solitamente riservata, nella maggior parte delle biografie di Kant, ai suoi insegnanti e alla sua educazione, e qualche studio dedicato ai suoi gusti letterari e alle sue esperienze del bello nella natura e nell'arte, fattori, questi, che avrebbero condizionato le sue idee in materia di estetica (2). Quell'osservazione risulta tuttavia oggi ancor più pertinente, poiché da quando, nel 1954, vennero avanzate dallo stesso Lehmann alcune proposte di ricerca in quella direzione, non è stato fatto in realtà alcun passo avanti. Con la sua esortazione Lehmann intendeva suggerire la opportunità di indagare in modo più approfondito lo sviluppo della personalità kantiana in quanto strettamente connesso alla sua evoluzione filosofica; personalmente, però, ritengo ci sia anche qualcosa in più da dire a proposito del generale ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg, e dell'eventuale influenza che esso esercitò su alcuni aspetti del pensiero di Kant; bisogna, in altri termini, favorire un accostamento al problema che non muova soltanto da una prospettiva psicologica, ma utilizzi anche quella della sociologia della conoscenza. Questo non significa ovviamente che la filosofia di Kant possa venire, in tal modo, « spiegata »; significa soltanto che un'indagine di questo tipo può fornire qualche chiarimento per quanto riguarda alcuni caratteri più o meno generali di quella filosofia, relativi a certi momenti della sua evoluzione. Ovviamente, le generali condizioni politiche e religiose della Prussia esercitarono senza dubbio un forte influsso sul pensiero politico e religioso eli Kant, ed anche questo aspetto richiederebbe uno studio approfondito (3). Ciò che in questo contesto desidero tuttavia prendere in considerazione, è la situazione intellettuale a Königsberg negli anni che videro i primi sviluppi della filosofia kantiana, muovendo da un esame preliminare di quei presupposti storici che sono indispensabili per comprendere una tale situazione. Königsberg e in particolare la sua università, l'Albertina, costituirono infatti lo scenario di alcune aspre lotte tra fazioni filosofico-religiose, che non

possono non aver lasciato traccia sulla iniziale prospettiva filosofica di Kant, formatasi in quell'ambiente. I fatti in questione non sono stati ritenuti significativi dai biografi di Kant, Vorländer incluso: essi non hanno afferrato la loro importanza, né hanno favorito la loro comprensione; l'ispirazione a carattere prevalentemente agiografico dei loro lavori ha inoltre impedito loro di andare a fondo di certe intricate e controverse questioni, o ha fatto sì che essi non vi annettessero alcuna importanza in relazione a Kant." (pp. 149-150)

(1) G. Lehmann, *Kant's Lebenskrise*, in « Neue deutsche Hefte », 1954, p. 510 sgg. (Rist. in G. Lehmann, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants*, Berlin, 1969).

[N.B. Gli argomenti trattati in questo saggio sono stati ripresi ed approfonditi da Marco Sgarbi, *Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico. L'ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana,* Bern: Peter Lang, 2010.

Riassunto del volume a cura dell'autore:

"Nel suo pionieristico lavoro *Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy* (1975), Giorgio Tonelli lamentava l'assenza di un'indagine approfondita sull'ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg e dell'eventuale influenza che esso esercitò su alcuni aspetti del pensiero di Kant, al di là di lavori biografici di evidente carattere agiografico che hanno spesso impedito agli studiosi di andare a fondo di controverse questioni dalle quali la filosofia kantiana avrebbe tratto origine. La presente ricerca mira a colmare questa lacuna esaminando la situazione intellettuale di Königsberg negli anni che videro emergere i primi tentativi filosofici kantiani, partendo dall'assunto che Königsberg con la sua università costituirono lo scenario privilegiato di riferimento dal quale Kant di fatto attinse fondamentali idee e problemi. In particolare l'attenzione è posta sulla tradizione aristotelica, sulla *Schulphilosophie*, e sulla corrente dell'eclettismo, le quali dominarono l'ambiente regiomontano sino all'avvento della filosofia critica kantiana.

La metodologia seguita è quella elaborata da Norbert Hinske della *Begriffsgeschichte* e della *Quellengeschichte* come anche quella dell' *intellectual history* e della storia dei problemi. Il lavoro è fondato su documenti nuovi, originali, inediti o ritrovati, come i *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse* 1703-1719, le *Einladungsschriften*, e i manuali aristotelico-scolastici adottati ufficialmente all'Albertina.
Nell'introduzione si cerca di giustificare l'importanza di un lavoro sull'impatto dell'ambiente intellettuale regiomontano sul Kant precritico rispetto soprattutto ai risultati già ottenuti dalla ricerca, mentre nel primo capitolo è esamina la storia della cattedra di logica e metafisica a Königsberg dagli inizi del XVIII secolo sino a Kant. Il secondo capitolo tratta il problema della logica delle facoltà in Kant rispetto alla tradizione aristotelica di Königsberg, in particolare in relazione alle discipline della noologia e della gnostologia. Il terzo e il quarto capitolo esaminano i primi interessi kantiani per la metafisica e il passaggio dall'ontologia alla logica alla luce della tradizione della *Schulphilosophie* di Königsberg. Il quinto e il sesto capitolo trattano delle prime riflessioni logico-metodologiche di Kant con particolare riferimento alla tradizione metodologica regiomontana e ai problemi legati alla sillogistica e all'ars combinatoria.
Il risultato del lavoro mostra come dai fallimenti dei progetti logici e metafisici precritici legati alle influenze ricevute dall'ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg, Kant abbia tratto le idee e gli spunti per la stesura della *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*." (p. 11)]

20. ———. 1987. "La Ricomparsa Della Terminologia Dell'aristotelismo Tedesco Durante La Genesi Della *Critica Della Ragion Pura*." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-aristotelischen Terminologie bei Kant während der Entstehung der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'*, in « Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte », IX, 1964, pp. 233-242.

"In questa relazione presenterò alcuni risultati cui sono pervenuto nell'ambito delle mie ricerche sulla genesi della *Critica della ragion pura*. Poiché tali ricerche non sono ancora concluse, quanto è qui esposto va considerato come provvisorio (1).

Le mie ricerche si riferiscono agli anni tra il 1769 e il 1781, cioè al periodo che intercorre tra la 'gran luce' del 1769 e la *Critica della ragion pura*. Sono stati usati come fonti le *Reflexionen* dal *Nachlass* e gli appunti delle lezioni di quegli anni, unitamente alle opere a stampa ed alle lettere. La datazione delle *Reflexionen* proposta dall'Adickes s'è confermata finora nel complesso attendibile, anche in rapporto alle altre fonti.

In relazione a questo convegno il mio interesse è principalmente terminologico. Non è mia intenzione perciò in questa sede di esaminare il vero e proprio sviluppo del pensiero kantiano dal punto di vista della problematica (sto preparando a tal riguardo una monografia apposita); mi limiterò invece a cercar di chiarire l'origine dei nuovi termini che Kant assume in questo periodo. Per 'nuovi termini' intendo termini che Kant in precedenza non ha affatto usato, oppure usato solo occasionalmente e in maniera non sistematica (2).

Fino al 1768 Kant ha fatto uso, in metafisica e nella metodologia, della terminologia abituale nelle scuole tedesche della prima metà del Settecento. Ma già nel 1769 compaiono importanti innovazioni, senza dubbio in corrispondenza con la grande svolta nel pensiero avvenuta in quell'anno; e nel periodo successivo continuano ad apparire nuovi termini, sicché alla fine il vocabolario della *Critica della ragion pura* presenta un quadro profondamente mutato rispetto al periodo precritico.

Kant non amava introdurre propri neologismi, preferendo piuttosto accogliere spesso termini da altre lingue.

Le fonti per i nuovi termini kantiani posteriori al 1769 sono affatto eterogenee. È tuttavia possibile delimitare in certo qual modo due grandi gruppi: al primo appartengono i termini provenienti dall' *Essay* di Locke e dai *Nouveaux Essais* di Leibniz, al secondo quelli derivanti dalla tradizione

dell'aristotelismo tedesco. I termini del primo gruppo s'incontrano soprattutto negli anni 1769-1770, quelli del secondo nel periodo successivo.
Ritengo causa determinante della svolta del 1769 la pubblicazione nel 1765 dei *Nouveaux Essais* leibniziani. Essi fecero indubbiamente un'impressione profonda su Kant e lo indussero, forse per la prima volta, ad uno studio accurato dell' *Essay* lockiano. Le dottrine di Locke e di Leibniz, unitamente ad alcuni saggi di Hume, diedero a Kant la possibilità di trovare una nuova soluzione ad una problematica molto complessa che già da anni lo vedeva impegnato (3)." (pp. 171-172)
(...)
"Le categorie di Kant (che peraltro non sono affatto *genera summa*) non sono certo riconducibili alle categorie aristoteliche, ma ai *Grundbegriffe* [concetti elementari] o *unauflösliche Begriffe* [concetti non risolvibili] che compaiono in Crusius, Tönnies, Tetens, Lambert e altri (14). Probabilmente Kant ha deciso dopo il 1770-1771 di chiamare categorie i suoi concetti elementari seguendo uno spunto di Crusius, il quale in una sua lunga nota afferma che le proprie categorie hanno il medesimo significato di quelle aristoteliche, purché queste ultime vengano rettamente intese, anzitutto come illimitate quanto al numero, che può essere addirittura infinito (15). Certo Kant, a questo riguardo, ha di mira piuttosto la costruzione di una tavola delle categorie conclusa (deduzione delle categorie): quest'esigenza, che non compare in lui prima almeno del 1770-1771, deriva a sua volta indubbiamente dalla tesi che Lambert, nella sua *Architektonik* del 1771, sosteneva con grande energia, e cioè che la *Grundlehre* [Dottrina elementare] o metodologia deve contenere un elenco completo dei 'concetti elementari semplici' (*einfache Grundbegriffe*) (16). A far accogliere comunque quest'esigenza nell' *Architektonik* (che negli anni Settanta ha esercitato su Kant un influsso durevole e profondo, senz'altro ben più dell' *Organon* di Lambert, che a questo proposito è molto più noto e viene più spesso citato) può avere concorso in Kant anche il ricordo delle critiche che a

partire dal Rinascimento erano state indirizzate alle categorie aristoteliche, il cui nome egli ha trasferito ai suoi concetti elementari." (pp. 173-174)
(...)
"Si può comunque affermare che la maggior parte dei termini nuovi che Kant adotta dal 1769 fino alla *Critica della ragion pura* appartengono piò alla tradizione della scolastica tedesca del Seicento che alla filosofia dell'epoca immediatamente precedente Kant. Si tratta di termini che, molto in uso nel Seicento, erano stati poi trascurati dalle scuole antiaristoteliche del Settecento, oppure di termini che, noti ma non molto diffusi nel Seicento, nel secolo successivo erano pressoché caduti in dimenticanza. L'attenzione di Kant è stata attirata su alcuni di questi termini dai suoi contemporanei, ma il fatto stesso ch'egli abbia accolto con particolare predilezione simili rimandi al linguaggio scolastico degli aristotelici, e che poi abbia attinto anche da sé nuovi termini dalla medesima fonte, ha sicuramente un significato storico che trascende il mero aspetto linguistico.
In effetti Kant, dopo il 1769, era perfettamente consapevole che le sue tesi metodologiche erano del tutto nuove e comportavano una rottura col passato. Per sottolineare la sua originalità, e per evitare nello stesso tempo confusioni tra i propri concetti e quelli dei contemporanei, Kant si è sentito costretto in molti casi ad introdurre per i suoi nuovi concetti dei termini anch'essi nuovi. Forse vocaboli o trasposizioni originali sarebbero stati la soluzione migliore, ma sarebbero potuti apparire un segno di presunzione agli occhi dei contemporanei, o almeno avrebbero potuto suscitare diffidenza e disagio. Kant ha preferito perciò richiamarsi a quell'antica e rispettabile tradizione ch'era l'aristotelismo, la cui terminologia non era certo più in voga, ma nell'ambiente accademico era pur sempre ancora comprensibile — e ciò specialmente a Königsberg, dove l'aristotelismo s'era mantenuto vivo ben dentro il Settecento (21).
In tal modo era evitato il pericolo di una confusione con le dottrine dei contemporanei ed anche i termini, pur riempiti

di un contenuto interamente nuovo, non avevano un suono estraneo alle orecchie del lettore.
Nella scelta e nella formulazione del suo vocabolario Kant si è comportato in maniera completamente diversa rispetto ai filosofi dell'inizio del Settecento, che seguendo il modello wolffiano nelle loro opere in lingua tedesca avevano sostituito o tradotto i termini greci e latini con composti, all'occorrenza appositamente coniati, di origine germanica: Kant preferisce trasporre semplicemente in una forma soltanto esteriormente tedesca termini greci e latini, come usavano fare alcuni dei suoi immediati contemporanei.
È bensì vero che i concetti di Kant sono, sul piano del contenuto, molto lontani dai loro omonimi aristotelici; tuttavia in alcuni casi è possibile affermare che i riferimenti terminologici esteriori stabiliti da Kant hanno sviluppato un certo influsso intrinseco. A questo proposito abbiamo già accennato al problema della deduzione delle categorie; inoltre si può supporre, ad esempio, che l'adozione dei termini analitica e dialettica per designare due gruppi di problemi della metodologia ha provocato anche una separazione di questi problemi, che d'allora in poi, secondo il modello della *Introductio in artem inveniendi* [1742] di Darjes, dovettero essere trattati in due sezioni diverse (mentre nella *Dissertatio* [del 1770] erano apparsi ancora in connessione reciproca): ciò ha comportato indubbiamente importanti trasformazioni strutturali." (pp. 179-180)
(1) La forma espositiva comporta l'impossibilità di presentare la documentazione in tutta la sua ampiezza. Alcuni problemi sono già stati da me trattati in articoli appositi e spero di poter presto pubblicare in altra forma ulteriori ricerche.
(2) Per la terminologia di Kant nell'epoca precedente il 1769 cfr. G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti,* in «Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino», serie 3, Tomo 3, Parte II. Torino, 1955 e Id., *Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768*, vol. I, Torino, 1959.

(3) Per il tentativo di una spiegazione della 'rivoluzione copernicana' del 1769 cfr. G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica*..., cit., SS 149-164, in cui peraltro non trattiamo l'influsso di Locke e di Leibniz, ma soltanto l'occasionale problematica che ha reso Kant disponibile all'influsso di Locke e di Leibniz; cfr. anche G. Tonelli, *Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant,* in « Kant-Studien », 1963 (LIV), pp. 369-375.
(15) C. A. Crusius, *Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, Leipzig, 1762, § 137, *Anmerkung*.
(16) J. H. Lambert, *Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in der philosophischen und in der mathematischen Erkenntniss*, 2 Bde., Riga, 1771, I, § 34.
(21) M. Wundt, *Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Tübingen, 1945 [rist.: Hildesheim, 1964], p. 117 e sg

21. ———. 1987. "Primi Sviluppi Della Teoria Del Genio in Kant (1770-1779)." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

Traduzione di *Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)*, in « Journal of the History of Philosophy », IV, 1966, diviso in due parti, rispettivamente alle pp. 109-131 e pp. 209-224 della rivista.
Prima parte:
"L'importanza della teoria del genio nella filosofia di Kant venne riconosciuta relativamente presto nella storia della *Kantforschung*, e all'argomento sono stati dedicati diversi lavori (1). Nessuno ha tuttavia, fino ad oggi, tentato di ricostruire lo sviluppo delle idee di Kant sul genio utilizzando il materiale contenuto nel suo *Nachlass*, pubblicato da Adickes (2). Questo è appunto quanto io tenterò di fare nel presente lavoro, limitando la mia analisi agli anni a cavallo tra il 1770 e il 1779, durante i quali Kant venne svolgendo gli studi preliminari alla elaborazione della *Critica della ragion pura*.
Cercherò dapprima di definire quali fossero le idee di Kant sul genio nel suddetto arco di tempo, ed in secondo luogo

tenterò di rintracciarne le origini nel retroterra culturale di Kant." (p. 183)
(...)
"Se tentiamo ora di trarre qualche conclusione circa la funzione dello spirito, possiamo dire che esiste un senso più generale del termine, in base al quale lo spirito viene definito principio vivificante dell'animo (intelletto più sensibilità) per mezzo di un'idea (concetto *a priori*, regola universale). Il termine spirito viene poi usato in due sensi più ristretti. In un primo senso lo spirito, in quanto elemento pertinente al talento (e nella misura in cui il talento viene distinto dal genio), vivifica un oggetto mediante un'idea *precedentemente data*; in questo senso esso è vivificante e può essere, in certa misura, nuovo, dal momento che il talento è una facoltà produttiva di qualcosa di *nuovo* (o di un nuovo espediente) conformemente però a regole *conosciute* (vedi sopra parr. 3 e 4). Lo spirito non è però, in questo senso, originale. Questa prima accezione più ristretta del termine è illustrata in modo sommario e per lo più poco chiaro nel materiale in esame, e i caratteri più precisi della sua fisionomia vengono soltanto desunti, per necessità di chiarezza, da altri elementi del tipo di quelli analizzati nei parr. 3, 4 e 7.
In un secondo senso particolare, illustrato in modo assai più ampio da Kant, lo spirito, inteso non più soltanto come spirito spontaneo, ma anche come spirito *originale*, viene considerato sinonimo di genio, o un elemento di esso. Uno spirito originale di questo tipo è creatore di nuove idee. Tuttavia, nei contesti pertinenti, il significato dello spirito come elemento del genio viene per lo più generalmente circoscritto alla sua funzione vivificante, mentre l'elemento propriamente creativo viene più spesso chiamato genio (nel senso di costellazione di facoltà), e non spirito. Solo in poche *Riflessioni* lo spirito viene totalmente identificato col genio." (pp. 188-189)
(1) Vedi in particolare: K. Hoffman, *Die Umbildung der Kantischen Lehre vom Genie* in *Schellings System des transscendentalen Idealismus* (Bern, 1907, Berner Studien zur Philos. u. ihrer Geschichte, LIII); R. Schlapp, *Kants*

Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der « Kritik der Urteilskraft » (Göttingen, 1901); O. Schondorffer, *Kant's Definition vom Genie*, « Altpreussische Monatsschrift », 1893, XXX; O. Wichmann, *Kant's Begriff vom Genie und seine Bedeutung*, « Deutsche Akademische Rundschau », Jhg. II, 12 Sem., Folge N. 2; 7, 15 Jan. 1925. Lo studio di Schlapp, che si avvale dei *Kolleghefte* di Kant (appunti presi dalle sue lezioni), è particolarmente importante.
(2) Nei *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, pubblicati dalla *Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften*. A questa edizione rinviano le nostre citazioni. Indichiamo solo il numero del volume e la pagina per le opere pubblicate di Kant, e il numero del volume e quello della *Riflessione* per quel che riguarda il *Nachlass*. Facciamo riferimento all'ultima edizione degli scritti nella *Preussische Akademie Ausgabe*. Intendiamo utilizzare il *Nachlass* di Kant secondo gli stessi criteri definiti in G. Tonelli, Kant, *dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti*, (Torino, 1955), Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 3*, Tomo 3, Parte III. Vedi pp. 7-10, 192, 253-255.
Seconda parte:
"In sostanza, il genio (o spirito) rappresenta una facoltà spirituale davvero straordinaria. Esso è una forza creativa, i cui prodotti possono trovarsi nell'esperienza, e neppure dedursi razionalmente leggi universali della mente; il genio è spontaneo, è libero, è quale di cui non si può render ragione (si potrebbe dire, *spiritus fiat ubi vult*) è una facoltà che rende l'uomo capace di arrivare a certe nozioni, diversamente inattingibili, che sono analoghe alle idee di Dio, analoghe cioè alle strutture trascendentali del mondo quale dovrebbe propriamente essere. « L'uomo stesso non conosce questo spirito peculiare, e non i moti di esso in proprio potere », scrive in un passo Kant (*Rifl.* 93 XV). Altrove tuttavia egli sembra offrire qualche elemento ulteriore di chiarificazione di questa forza misteriosa contrapponendola all'arte (non geniale). L'arte (107), come già sappiamo, è come un giardino, in cui tutto è disposto metodicamente secondo regole: il genio è invece come un

bosco in cui la natura libera e feconda sparge i propri doni (*Rifl*. 734 XV). Nel genio, la natura rende superflua l'arte *(Rifl*. 922, XV); il genio è fecondato dalla natura plastica (= creativa) (*Rifl*. 936, XV); lo spirito non è soggetto alla volontà dell'uomo, ma i suoi moti provengono dalla natura (*Rifl*. 831, XV). Come si è visto in precedenza (par. 4), lo spirito non è una facoltà singola, ma è l'universale vivificazione di tutte le facoltà. Nella *Rifl*. 938, XV, Kant tenta una spiegazione metafisica di questo carattere psicoempirico dello spirito: « Lo spirito, essendo rivolto all'universale, è, per così dire, *divinae particula aurae*, e viene attinto dallo spirito universale. C'è un solo genio: è l'unità dell'anima del mondo (*die Einheit der Weltseele*) » (108).

È noto che, a partire dal 1770, il mondo costituisce per Kant un *phaenamenon* la materia del quale è data dai sensi, mentre i diversi tipi di forme e strutture intellettuali che gli ineriscono derivano dal soggetto. La « natura » tende inoltre a venir riguardata come una sorta di livello più profondo del soggetto stesso; la « natura umana » di quest'ultimo è solo un concetto empirico, contrapposto come tale ad un altro concetto empirico, quello di « mondo esterno »: all'origine tanto della natura umana che del mondo esterno sembra esserci una « natura » genericamente indifferenziata, effetto diretto della potenza creatrice di Dio. Ora, per spiegare il mondo fenomenico nella sua interezza e, a maggior ragione, per soddisfare bisogni morali trascendenti, nulla di quanto nel mondo fenomenico è suscettibile di spiegazione dal punto di vista del soggetto empirico è, di per sé, sufficiente. I concetti empirici e le regole dell'arte hanno infatti un raggio d'azione limitato. Al di là di essi, le strutture della realtà e del dovere morale possono venir colte soltanto se il livello più profondo del soggetto (quello che rappresenta al tempo stesso l'origine del soggetto e del mondo, vale a dire l'anima del mondo) riesce ad emergere aprendosi un varco entro l'intelaiatura costituita dalle forme pure e dalle strutture intellettuali, suscitando in tal modo una nuova consapevolezza che deriva direttamente dallo spirito di Dio; è la Natura *in personam*, nella sua veste più segreta e

solenne e nel suo giusto anelito verso la perfezione, che si rivela nell'uomo e viene da esso realizzata.
Questo retroterra metafisico è da raccomandare particolarmente, come esempio istruttivo, all'attenzione di coloro che sono soliti considerare Kant un pensatore di freddo raziocinio, alieno da qualsivoglia divagazione di natura trascendente." (pp. 204-205)
(...)
"In conclusione, si può osservare che quasi nessuna delle idee di Kant sul genio può definirsi originale per quel che riguarda la sua fisionomia culturale di superficie. Persino alcune divergenze di opinione che caratterizzavano il suo ambiente, come ad esempio l'ambiguità della posizione che dichiarava il genio libero dalle regole e, ciò malgrado, rispettoso di esse, o, ancora, il rapporto mai del tutto definito tra spirito e genio, vengono rispecchiate dalle corrispondenti oscillazioni del pensiero di Kant.
E tuttavia, il modo particolare in cui Kant selezionò e rimodellò alcuni di quei tratti del genio, spesso tra loro contrastanti, che avevano trovato espressione nelle teorie elaborate dai suoi contemporanei, deve essere compreso solo sulla base della sua personale evoluzione, e non può spiegarsi tramite la semplice rilevazione statistica di quelle caratteristiche che venivano prevalentemente attribuite al genio nel suo ambiente. Inoltre, la struttura sistematica che Kant diede all'insieme di questi tratti, e ad ognuno di essi singolarmente, si colloca, per la sua profondità, molto al di sopra del livello di quella che seppero elaborare i suoi contemporanei, ed è sostanzialmente originale. Non è possibile a questo punto investigare la genesi di questa selezione e di questa sistematizzazione; essa dipende in larga misura dallo sviluppo della teoria dell'idea (tanto nel campo estetico, che in quello della metodologia della metafisica) che si determinò negli anni compresi tra il 1770 e il 1780, e che verrà preso altrove in esame; dobbiamo quindi, per il momento, contentarci di esporre semplicemente i risultati cui pervenne Kant, visti sullo sfondo dell'ambiente che gli era proprio." (p. 216)

(107) Bisogna ricordare che il termine « arte » privo di attributi sta ad indicare un concetto molto ampio che comprende tanto le arti meccaniche, o mestieri, che l'aspetto tecnico dell'arte del bello.
(108) Come si è visto nella nota 36, Kant aveva fatto riferimento molti anni prima, ma in un diverso senso, ad un *Weltgeist* [spirito del mondo].

22. ———. 1987. " *Divinae Particula Aurae*. Idee Geniali, Organismo E Libertà. Una Nota Sulla *Riflessione 938* Di Kant." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Divinae Partícula Aurae*; Genial Ideas, Organisation and Freedom: A Note on Kant's Reflection N. 938, in « Journal of the History of Philosophy », 1969, pp. 192-198.
    "1. Nel par. 21 del mio articolo « Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779) » (1), cito dalla *Riflessione* 938 di Kant, il cui testo completo è il seguente:
    Lo spirito, essendo rivolto all'universale, è, per così dire,, e viene attinto dallo spirito universale. Pertanto lo spirito [in se stesso] non ha proprietà particolari, ma, a seconda dei diversi talenti e delle sensibilità [dell'uomo] cui viene attribuito, vivifica nei modi più diversi; e dato che questi sono del più vario genere, ogni spirito ha qualche cosa di peculiare. Non si deve dire: i geni [c'è, invece, un solo genio], È l'unità dell'anima del mondo (2).
    Kant si riferisce a questo spirito come alla fonte tanto delle idee geniali o « originali » nella mente umana, quanto della vita organica nel mondo esterno (PSGK, parr. 22, 23). Questa teoria deriva naturalmente dall'antica dottrina platonico-stoico-ermetica dell'Anima del Mondo, che ebbe un'enorme diffusione non soltanto nel Medioevo (Scuola di Chartres etc.), ma anche dal Rinascimento fino al diciottesimo secolo e perfino più tardi, specialmente tra filosofi stoici, cabbalisti, ermetici, pansofici e mosaici, tanto in psicologia (dove l'anima umana veniva intesa come una parte dell'anima del Mondo) che nella filosofia naturale tra

gli oppositori del meccanicismo (inteso o in generale, o in relazione soltanto agli organismi viventi) (3).
Nella Germania all'inizio del diciottesimo secolo, questa dottrina era ancora sostenuta, nel campo della filosofia naturale, da Christian Thomasius (4), e da alcuni dei suoi allievi, quali Lange e Rüdiger; essa ricopriva anche un ruolo importante in generale nella teoria di Swedenborg della vita e dell'anima, e Swedenborg era, naturalmente, molto noto a Kant (e nella Germania in genere, dove Oetinger era uno dei suoi più ferventi apostoli). Non è dunque sorprendente che Kant faccia riferimento ad una tradizione tanto diffusa, impiegandone la terminologia in un modo che non può essere considerato interamente metaforico, quantunque all'interno del sistema di Kant i concetti corrispondenti subissero molti mutamenti fondamentali, fino al momento in cui riapparvero, in una forma in verità irriconoscibile, nella *Critica del giudizio*.
Nondimeno, la formula « divinae particula aurae » non era stata frequentemente impiegata nella sterminata letteratura sull'Anima del Mondo, e può essere ai qualche interesse chiarire la sua origine (soprattutto poiché questo ci consentirà di esaminare il retroterra della dottrina kantiana dello spirito). Quando Kant inseriva del latino nel contesto tedesco delle sue *Reflexionen*, ciò avveniva o perché stava citando qualche testo latino o perché (caso assai più frequente) aveva la sensazione che la terminologia filosofica latina corrente al suo tempo si prestasse ad un miglior uso di quella tedesca. In quest'ultimo caso, Kant soleva ricombinare liberamente i vecchi termini in nuove frasi (o latine, o per metà tedesche e per metà latine).
Entrambe le ipotesi possono venire considerate per la formula in questione. Cominciando dalla seconda, è piuttosto facile ritrovare espressioni simili, quantunque non identiche, all'interno della letteratura sulla Anima del Mondo. Soprattutto nella corrente stoica di questa tradizione, era piuttosto usuale definire l'anima (intesa o specificamente come anima umana, o, in generale, come il principio della vita) una particella o ima scintilla dello spirito di Dio (5). J. C. Sturm, ad esempio, sebbene non

fosse uno stoico, chiamava l'anima « efficaciae divinae quasi particula » (6), e Christian Wolff osteggiava l'opinione di alcuni filosofi antichi, e di Spinoza, secondo la quale l'anima è una « partícula mentis divinae » (7)." (pp. 237-238)

(1) G. Tonelli, *Kant's Early Tbeory of Genius (1770-1779)*, in «Journal of the History of Philosophy», IV (1966), p. 209; l'articolo è pubblicato in due parti, pp. 109-131 e pp. 209-224. [Ora tradotto in italiano e riportato in questo stesso volume sotto il titolo *Primi sviluppi della teoria del genio in Kant (1770-1779)*. A tale articolo si farà d'ora innanzi riferimento nel testo con la sigla PSGK. N. d.T.].

(2) « Weil der Geist aufs allgemeine geht, so ist er so zu sagen divinae particula aurae und aus dem allgemeinen Geist geschöpft. Daher hat der Geist nicht besondere Eigenschaften, sondern nach den verschiedenen Talenten und Empfindsamkeiten, worauf er fällt, belebt er verschiedentlich und, weil diese so mannigfaltig seyn, so hat jeder Geist was eigenthümliches. Man muss nicht sagen: Die genie's. Es ist die Einheit der Weltseele » (Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* [Berlin, Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, XV (1923), parte 1, p. 416]. Questa *Riflessione* è una nota sulla *Metaphysica* di Baumgarten. Secondo Adickes, venne probabilmente scritta tra il 1776 e il 1778, meno probabilmente nel 1772.

(3) Vedi la voce « World Soul » (con riferimenti bibliografici, a cura di T. Gregory e G. Tonelli), nell'ed. del 1967 della *New Catholic Encyclopedia*. Un resoconto storico ancora utile, quantunque molto parziale, di questa dottrina è dato da A. Rechenberg (*praeses*) e J.D. Güttner (*Auctor & Respondens*), *De mundi anima dissertatio* (Lipsiae, 1678). Vedi anche PSGK, nota 153.

(4) Si vedano i miei *Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768* (Torino, 1959), I, pp. 97-98. Christian Thomasius era stato influenzato, sotto questo aspetto, tanto dall'interesse di suo padre (Jakob Thomasius) per la filosofia stoica (v. sotto), quanto dalla tradizione tedesca comeniana e pansofica del diciassettesimo secolo — una tradizione collegata in vari modi con il pietismo. Christian Thomasius aveva avuto rapporti con il pietismo nel corso di

un'importante fase della sua evoluzione, ed i suoi allievi erano pietisti.
(5) Lo spirito di Dio è l'Anima del Mondo e non, beninteso, lo Spirito Santo della Trinità, perlomeno per la tradizione cristiana occidentale, fatta eccezione per alcuni eretici. Indubbiamente in diversi casi (come per Sturm, v. sotto) autori dell'Occidente cristiano usarono simili espressioni in riferimento a Dio stesso, e non all'Anima del Mondo, perché generalmente, a loro modo di vedere, l'anima umana e la vita organica sono prodotte direttamente da Dio (e non dalla Natura meccanica); questi autori, ovviamente, non credevano nell'esistenza di un'Anima del Mondo.
(6) *Physica electiva* (Norimbergae, 1697), I, p. 193: «gloriati insuper & laeta mente nobis subinde gratulati, quod qui sumus, vivimus & movemur, in ipso (Deo) vivamus, moveamur, & simus, h. e. per illam ipsam efficaciae divinae quasi particulam, quam corpori nostri fabricae specificae, & sic aliorum admirabiliter variantibus structuris singulis, applicatam... ».
(7) *Theologia naturalis* (Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1737), II, par. 708: « Corpora & animae non sunt in Deo tanquam partes in toto, nec dici possunt particulae Dei... *Schol.* Fuere inter philosophos veteres, qui animam dixere particulam mentis divinae... ».

23. ———. 1987. "Due Fonti Inglesi Dimenticate Della Morale Kantiana." In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

Traduzione di *Deux sources britanniques oubliées de la morale kantienne*, in *Mélanges A. Koyré, publiés à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire,* Paris: Hermann 1964, vol. II, pp. 469-505.
"Parecchi studi sono stati dedicati all'esame delle dottrine morali di Kant nel loro sviluppo (1), ma il quadro generale che ne risulta presenta ancora delle lacune molto gravi: (2) Wolff, Crusius, Baumgarten, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Rousseau e diversi altri moralisti sono stati studiati in una maniera più o meno soddisfacente nel loro rapporto con la

morale kantiana, ma restano ancora da compiere molte esplorazioni di nuove fonti e molte indagini precise sulle fonti rintracciate fino ad ora.
Intendiamo qui portare un piccolo contributo a questo compito che appare ancora immenso, richiamando alcune dottrine di due moralisti inglesi, David Fordyce e Richard Price, che hanno avuto probabilmente un certo influsso sullo sviluppo della morale kantiana tra il 1762 e il 1775.
L'opera di Fordyce, *Elements of Moral Philosophy*, uscì a Londra nel 1754; una traduzione francese di Jancourt fu pubblicata all'Aia nel 1756 col titolo *Éléments de philosophie morale*, e una traduzione tedesca, *Anfangsgründe der Sittenlehre*, comparve a Berlino nel 1757. Quel che c'interessa in Fordyce è l'importanza da lui attribuita alla nozione d'obbligo, che acquista una struttura razionale precedente il piacere morale. Esiste in verità un « senso morale », una sorta d'« istinto » che impone delle valutazioni necessarie (3) che costituiscono l'obbligo; l'obbligo morale è per così dire « l'impronta della mano di Dio » su di noi (4) (beninteso, in quanto imposizione interiore e spontanea); si tratta perciò di una « voce distinta e ben forte della natura » (5). Ma quest'obbligo non nasce « da un semplice legame tra certe passioni » (6); d'altronde il piacere morale è posteriore all'idea di obbligo (7); la virtù, in definitiva, non è che la ragione, in quanto « percepisce la simmetria che esiste in una simile economia di facoltà e di passioni » (8)." (p. 249)
(...)
"L'opera di Fordyce c'interessa in ultima analisi soprattutto come veicolo probabile di diffusione del pensiero di [John] Balguy in Germania.
Nessuna traduzione è stata fatta, in francese o in tedesco, dell'opera di Richard Price *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* [Esame delle questioni e difficoltà principali in morale] (London, 1758), ma il suo rapporto con certe dottrine di Kant è così stretto ch'è indispensabile studiarla in relazione al filosofo di Königsberg (21). Si può affermare che Kant abbia conosciuto direttamente l'opera di Price? Le analogie che vedremo lo

lasciano sospettare. È vero che il problema di sapere se Kant era capace di leggere, sia pure con difficoltà, la letteratura filosofica in inglese, non è stato ancora risolto; ma anche nel caso si neghi questa possibilità è un fatto ben noto che tra i suoi migliori amici Kant contava dei commercianti scozzesi residenti a Königsberg, persone molto colte con cui intratteneva dei rapporti intellettuali su un piano molto elevato (22). Per esempio uno di questi amici, J. Green, era stato incaricato da Kant, in occasione di un viaggio a Stoccolma, di fare una specie di intervista a Swedenborg: quest'ultimo eccitava in quel momento la curiosità di Kant, che pubblicherà ben presto i *Träume eines Geistersehers* [Sogni di un visionario] (usciti nel 1765) (23). Si può dunque concludere che nell'epoca che ci interessa esisteva una sorta di collaborazione intellettuale tra Kant e almeno un amico scozzese, che avrebbe potuto assai facilmente tradurgli o riassumergli le novità letterarie inglesi.
La posizione di Richard Price in morale deriva certamente in parte da quella di Balguy; ma Price aggiunge altri elementi di grande interesse.
Il fattore razionalista è indubbiamente importante in lui, ma se l'intelletto è la fonte delle idee del giusto e dell'ingiusto (24), a differenza di S. Clarke e dei moralisti della perfezione, la percezione di queste idee è da lui considerata immediata e indipendente da ogni ragionamento (25)" (p. 251)
(1) La citazione di questi studi si troverà nell'opera recente di J. Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, Meisenheim a. G., 1962, ad eccezione di: J. Bohatec, *Die Religionsphilosophie Kants in der 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft', mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer theologisch-dogmatischen Quellen*, Hamburg, 1938 [ristampa: Hildesheim, 1966]; G. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti,* Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 3, Parte II, Torino, 1955; D. Henrich, *Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft*, in: *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken*,

Festschrift für H.-G. Gadamer, Tübingen, 1960. Per le dottrine sull'ottimismo cfr.: G. Tonelli, *Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768*, vol. I, Torino, 1959, pp. 198 e sgg.
(2) Si vedano a questo proposito le lunghe discussioni contenute nella nostra recensione dell'opera di Schmucker citata, recensione d'imminente pubblicazione presso *Filosofia* [1962 (XIII), pp. 670-678],
(3) Citiamo dalla traduzione francese, p. 53.
(4) p. 58.
(5) p. 47.
(6) p. 40.
(7) p. 57.
(8) pp. 38-39.
(21) Esiste un'edizione moderna di quest'opera, a cura di D. Daiches Raphael, Oxford, 1948. Nella sua prefazione l'editore rileva l'analogia tra le dottrine di Price e quelle di Kant, ma non si pone il problema di un influsso. Su Price cfr. L. Aquist, *The Moral Philosophy of Richard Price*, Lund-Kobenhavn, 1960.
(22) Cfr. K. Vorländer, *I. Kant, der Mann und das Werk*, 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1924, I, p. 122; sul problema cfr. Tonelli, *Kant, dall'estetica...*, cit., p. 134.
(23) Cfr. C. O. Sigsted, *The Swedenborg Epic. The Life and Work of E. S.,* New York and London, 1952, p. 303.
(24) Citiamo dall'edizione originale, p. 60.
(25) p. 59: « Il giusto e l'ingiusto denotano idee semplici e devono essere perciò attribuiti ad una facoltà di percezione immediata dell'intelletto umano ».

24. ———. 1987. "L'etica Kantiana Parte Della Metafisica: Una Possibile Ispirazione Newtoniana? Con Alcune Osservazioni Su «I Sogni Di Un Visionario» " In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Kant's Ethics as a part of Metaphysics: a possible newtonian Suggestion? with Some Comments on Kant's « Dream of a Seer »*, in « Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts. Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider »,

ed. by C. Walton and J. P. Anton, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974, pp. 236-263.
"Uno degli aspetti più notevoli del sistema filosofico kantiano è rappresentato dal fatto che l'etica viene in esso classificata come parte della metafisica, come si vede dai titoli di due tra le opere più importanti di Kant, la *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi* e la *Metafisica dei costumi*. È davvero un peccato che nessun commentatore abbia mai, per quanto almeno mi risulta, sottolineato l'importanza di questo fatto e dei problemi ad esso sottesi; il fatto è stato dato per scontato, il problema ignorato. È tempo dunque di richiamare l'attenzione su di esso.
Si tratta in realtà di uno dei mutamenti più radicali apportati da Kant alla struttura della filosofia nel suo complesso; prima di lui, per quanto io ne sappia, non si era sentito mai parlare di una subordinazione dell'etica alla metafisica. La metafisica era stata subordinata all'etica da Spinoza, probabilmente sotto l'influsso dei tardi sviluppi dello stoicismo, ma il tentativo opposto non era mai stato compiuto.
Questo non significa ovviamente che prima di Kant l'etica non fosse mai stata *fondata* sulla metafisica; al contrario, questa fondazione dell'etica rappresentava senza dubbio una delle posizioni più comunemente adottate. Malgrado ciò però, l'etica era stata sempre considerata una scienza indipendente, e non una parte della metafisica.
Non si deve d'altro canto pensare che per Kant considerare l'etica parte della metafisica equivalga ad ammettere una maggiore dipendenza dell'etica dalla metafisica stessa: l'etica diviene, al contrario, totalmente e sistematicamente indipendente dalla metafisica *strictu sensu*; ma, come vedremo, diviene parte della metafisica in quanto si trasforma appunto in fondazione di essa: è questo che rappresenta dunque la vera novità.
L'espressione « metafisica dei costumi » (*Metaphysik der Sitten*) compare, per quanto mi risulta, per la prima volta nella lettera di Kant a Herder del 9 maggio 1768, in cui Kant afferma di stare lavorando ad una metafisica dei costumi che dovrebbe esser finita entro l'anno. Ma in una lettera a

Lambert del 31 dicembre 1765, Kant aveva già preannunziato un lavoro sui « fondamenti metafisici della filosofia pratica ». L'espressione « metafisica dei costumi » viene ripetuta nella lettera di Kant a Lambert del 2 settembre 1770 (1), in cui il nostro autore dichiara di essere al momento occupato nella stesura di un trattato (che non venne mai pubblicato) su quell'argomento, senza fornire però ulteriori indicazioni in proposito.
Nella *Logik Blomberg* (1771) e nella *Logik Philippi* (1772), la filosofia morale non è ricondotta sotto il titolo generale di metafisica (2). Nella *Metaphysik L1* (1775-1780), la metafisica e la filosofia morale vengono chiamate le due scienze filosofiche pure (3), e nelle *Lezioni di etica* del 1780-1781, la filosofia viene suddivisa in filosofia teoretica e filosofia pratica (4), ma non viene fatta alcuna menzione di una metafisica dei costumi. Nelle sue lezioni Kant adotta spesso posizioni più conservatrici di quelle espresse nella sua corrispondenza privata, nelle sue osservazioni personali o nei lavori dati alle stampe.
In una lettera a Herz, scritta verso la fine del 1773, Kant annuncia un piano dettagliato del proprio lavoro: egli ha in mente di scrivere un trattato di « filosofia trascendentale », che costituirebbe una *Critica della ragion pura*, e intende in seguito pubblicare una *Metafisica*, che verrebbe suddivisa in una *Metafisica della natura* e in una *Metafisica dei costumi*. Quest'ultima parte sarebbe la prima a vedere la luce (5).
Verso la fine degli anni '70, nelle sue lezioni sull *'Enciclopedia filosofica* (1777-1780) (6), Kant espone la sua nuova concezione dell'etica anche in classe. La filosofia pratica dovrà suddividersi, a suo parere, in: 1) *filosofia pratica trascendentale*, che tratta dell'uso della libertà in generale; 2) *filosofia razionale pratica*, ovverosia *Metafisica dei costumi,* che tratta del buon uso della libertà; 3) *antropologia pratica* (7). Non è necessario, in questa sede, prendere in esame il punto 3), dal momento che esso chiaramente non fa parte della filosofia pura (8). Quanto al punto 1), esso è facilmente identificabile con quella sezione, o aspetto, della *Critica della ragion pura* che tratta dei

fondamenti trascendentali della moralità (9). Per conseguenza, il punto 2) corrisponde propriamente alla *Metafisica dei costumi*.
È noto che nella sezione della *Critica della ragion pura* dedicata all' *Architettonica* la metafisica è suddivisa in *metafisica della natura* e *metafisica dei costumi*. Kant sentì tuttavia il bisogno di aggiungere qualche parola di spiegazione ad una denominazione tanto inconsueta:
La metafisica della ragione speculativa, è ciò che si vuol dire in *senso stretto* metafisica; ma in quanto la morale pura appartiene a un ramo a parte della conoscenza umana e filosofica derivante dalla ragion pura, noi le vogliamo mantenere quella denominazione (10).
Nei Prolegomeni (1783), tuttavia, metafisica e morale vengono menzionate separatamente (11). In una *Riflessione* datata da Adickes agli anni 1783-1784, la metafisica viene però suddivisa nuovamente in metafisica della natura e metafisica dei costumi (12). Nella *Metaphysik Volckmann* (1784-1785), Kant tratta ampiamente di questa distinzione (13).
Nel 1785, la pubblicazione della *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi* conferisce un definitivo carattere di ufficialità a questa denominazione, riferendosi con questo titolo ad una scienza che appartiene alla filosofia pura nella misura in cui questa è circoscritta a determinati oggetti dell'intelletto (14). Viene inoltre riconosciuta la necessità di una speciale *Critica della ragion pura pratica* (15).
La questione è dunque, d'ora in avanti, definita. Negli anni successivi, solo dopo il 1790 la morale verrà nuovamente distinta dalla metafisica, allorché si tratterà di procedere alla suddivisione in parti di un certo concetto della filosofia in generale, chiamato « cosmo-politico » [weltbürgerlich], che sembra fosse sconosciuto in precedenza, e che non pare sostituirsi, ma piuttosto affiancarsi al vecchio concetto e alla vecchia suddivisione (16). L'unificazione ormai consolidata ricompare infatti nel titolo della *Metafisica dei costumi*, pubblicata nel 1797." (pp. 259-261)
(1) I. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Akademie-Ausgabe (Berlin und Leipzig), X (2ed.), pp. 74, 56 e 97. Il prof.

Norbert Hinske ha richiamato la mia attenzione sulla lettera del 1768, e su di un'altra lettera di Hamann a Herder, datata 16 febbraio 1767, in cui Hamann dichiara: « Kant sta lavorando ad una metafisica della morale » (J. G. Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, Wiesbaden, 1956, vol. II, p. 390); in un'altra lettera a Herder, del 28 agosto 1768, Hamann scrive: « La metafisica della morale di Kant mi tiene in attesa» (*ibid*., p. 421).
(2) *Op. cit*., XXIV, 1, 1, pp. 31, 314.
(3) *Op. cit*., XXVIII, 5, 1, p. 173.
(4) I. Kant, *Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik*, hrsg. von P. Menzer, Berlin, 1924, p. 1 [cfr. I. Kant, *Lezioni di etica*, tr. it. di A. Guerra, Bari, 1971, p. 3].
(5) Kant, *Ges. Schr*., X, p. 145.
(6) Per l'esatta datazione, si veda la mia recensione dell'edizione delle lezioni in «Filosofia», XIII, (1962), pp. 511-514.
(7) I. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Logik,* Bd. 1, *Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie* (Berlin, 1961), p. 38. (Quest'edizione delle lezioni di Kant, benché pubblicata dall'Accademia di Berlino, non fa parte delle *Gesammelte Schriften*. La pubblicazione di quest'edizione è cessata dopo il vol. I). Ciò nonostante, a p. 67, morale e metafisica sembrano venir distinte.
(8) Vedi *ibid.,* p. 68.
(9) È noto che Kant riconobbe la necessità di scrivere una *Critica della ragion pratica* solo dopo il 1781. Fino almeno al 1785, Kant riteneva che dovesse essere la *Critica della ragion pura* ad occuparsi della fondazione trascendentale tanto della metafisica della natura che della metafisica dei costumi.
(10) B. 870. Cito dalla *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* seguendo la paginatura della seconda edizione (B) dell'opera (cfr. I. Kant, *Ges. Schr*., vol. III, Berlin und Leipzig, 1911). Verranno indicati gli eventuali punti in cui la seconda edizione (1787) si differenzia dalla prima (1781). [Per la trad. it. dei passi kantiani citati, rinviamo a I. Kant, *Crìtica della ragion pura*, trad. it. di G. Gentile e G. Lombardo Radice, ed. riveduta e con glossario a cura di V. Mathieu, Bari, 1972.

Nel caso presente, la citazione rinvia al vol. II, p. 636. N.d.T.].
(11) Kant, *Ges. Schr.*, IV, p. 363, par. 60 [cfr. I. Kant, *Prolegomeni ad ogni futura metafisica*, trad. it. di P. Carabellese, ed. riveduta a cura di R. Assunto, Bari, 1979, pp. 132-133. N.d.T.].
(12) *Op. cit.*, XVIII, pp. 284-285 (Riflessione 5644).
(13) *Op. cit.*, XXVIII, 5, 1, p. 364. A p. 362 viene presentata una sorta di giustificazione per la presenza della metafisica nell'ambito dell'etica; tale giustificazione non può tuttavia servire ai nostri scopi, giacché in base ad essa risulterebbe che la metafisica è presente in tutte le scienze razionali, compresa la matematica (p. 363).
(14) *Op. cit.*, IV, p. 388. [Cfr. I. Kant, *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, trad. it. a cura di P. Chiodi in I. Kant, *Scritti morali*, Torino, 1970, p. 44. N.d.T.] Kant aggiunge: « Sorge così l'idea di una duplice metafisica, della natura e dei costumi » (trad. it., op. cit., ibid.). Difficilmente però quanto precede può considerarsi una chiara dimostrazione di questa conclusione.
(15) *Loc. cit.*, p. 391 [I. Kant, *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, op. cit., trad. it., p. 47].
(16) Nella *Metaphysik L 2* del 1790-1791 (Kant, op. cit., XXVIII, 5, 2, 1, pp. 532-533) si ha la prima comparsa — databile con sicurezza — di questa dottrina. La stessa idea di una filosofia « cosmo-politica » si ritrova nella *Wiener Logik* del 1794-1796 (op. cit., XXIV, 1, 2, pp. 798-799), ma non c'è, in questo caso, alcuna suddivisione. Questo fatto mi fa pensare che quella sezione della *Logik Jäsche* che espone la medesima dottrina e presenta la medesima partizione (op. cit., IX, pp. 24-25 [trad. it. parziale in I. Kant, *Che cosa significa orientarsi nel pensare*, trad. e introduzione di M. Giorgiantonio, Lanciano, 1930 (1975, 2* ed.), pp. 91-93. N.d.T.], derivi dal *Kollegheft* del 1790, che venne usato da Jäsche, assieme ad un altro *Kollegheft* del 1782, per stendere il suo testo.

25. ———. 1987. "La *Critica Della Ragion Pura* Di Kant Nel Contesto Della Tradizione Della Logica Moderna." In *Da*

Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

Traduzione di *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modem Logic*, in « Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Mainz, 6-10 April 1974 », G. Funke, J.Kopper (Hrsg.). Kant-Studien 65, 1975, Sonderheft.
"È evidentemente impossibile comprendere un testo correttamente, se non è chiaro ciò di cui esso parla. Se si pensa a quanto lavoro è stato sinora dedicato all'analisi della *Critica della ragion pura* di Kant, potrà dunque sembrare strano che non si sia ancora giunti a stabilire quale sia in definitiva l'argomento di quest'opera. Secondo una prima e più antica interpretazione, che risale all'inizio del XIX secolo e viene tuttora accettata nei paesi di lingua inglese, la *Critica* sarebbe un trattato di teoria della conoscenza. Secondo un'interpretazione che risale agli anni venti del nostro secolo, e deriva da Nicolai Hartmann, Max Wundt e Heinz Heimsoeth, la *Critica* sarebbe invece un trattato di metafisica. Secondo il mio punto di vista, l'argomento della *Critica della ragion pura* non può propriamente definirsi in termini di teoria della conoscenza (gnoseologia, epistemologia), e definirlo in termini di metafisica può essere corretto, ma soltanto in parte: in effetti la *Critica* è, a mio giudizio, un trattato tanto di logica che di metafisica." (p. 285)
(...)
"La *Critica* è in realtà un'opera di metodologia e, più esattamente, di metodologia della metafisica. E stato fatto notare che l'affermazione kantiana secondo cui « essa è un trattato del metodo » compare in effetti solo nella Prefazione alla seconda edizione (1787). Per coloro tuttavia che hanno una qualche familiarità con la terminologia del XVII e del XVIII secolo, quest'idea è già chiaramente rinvenibile in più d'un passo della prima edizione dell'opera, laddove Kant paragona la Critica alla « via regia » o alla « strada maestra » della metafisica [*Weg* (via), *Königlicher Weg*, (via regia), *Heeresstrasse*, *Heeres-Weg* (strada

militare, via strategica), talvolta *Fusssteig* (sentiero, cammino pedonale)]: i termini « via », « strada », « strada maestra », etc. venivano tradizionalmente ed inequivocabilmente riferiti al « metodo », per evidenti ragioni etimologiche. E lo studio del metodo faceva parte della logica.
Un'attenta lettura della Critica rivela che quest'opera costituisce una di quelle « logiche speciali » proprie delle scienze particolari che Kant contrappone, come metodologie, alla « logica generale ». Queste « logiche speciali » sono ascritte alle scienze in questione come loro parti integranti: ma nondimeno esse costituiscono le logiche speciali (o metodologie) di quelle scienze. Che Kant non chiarisse meglio questo punto può spiegarsi, da una parte, col fatto che poteva sembrargli di averlo già sufficientemente chiarito per coloro che erano in grado di comprendere il linguaggio filosofico del tempo; e, dall'altra, col fatto che egli era solito preoccuparsi ben poco di spiegare ciò che a lui sembrava essere tanto evidente. Una testimonianza decisiva in tal senso è offerta tuttavia dalla *Riflessione* 5644 (Akademie-Ausgabe XVIII, pp. 285-286), datata da Adickes agli anni 1784-1785, in cui si legge: « La filosofia trascendentale precede la metafisica, la quale, come la logica, non si occupa di oggetti, ma della possibilità, del contenuto e dei limiti di ogni conoscenza della ragion pura. Essa è la logica della conoscenza razionale pura [...]. La critica è quella che indaga la possibilità dell'oggetto della metafisica ». La datazione ed il carattere di questa affermazione trovano conferma in un passo di un corso di metafisica tenuto da Kant nel 1784-1785, la cosiddetta *Metaphysik Volkmann*, dove Kant dettò in classe, nella sezione introduttiva del corso: « La filosofia trascendentale è, in rapporto alla metafisica, ciò che la logica è in rapporto alla filosofia nel suo insieme. In relazione all'uso puro della ragione, sarà necessaria una logica speciale, che è chiamata filosofia trascendentale; in essa non si prende in considerazione alcun oggetto, ma piuttosto la nostra stessa ragione, così come avviene nella logica generale. La filosofia trascendentale potrebbe chiamarsi anche logica

trascendentale ». Si dovrebbe osservare come, in questo passo, la filosofia trascendentale (o ontologia) venga identificata con la critica: è noto che Kant le identificò negli anni '90, ma in realtà questa identificazione aveva avuto luogo assai prima — ricorrendo, in effetti, anche in qualche *Riflessione* anteriore al 1781. Aggiungerò che le due affermazioni sopra citate non sono in alcun modo affermazioni isolate: esse sono soltanto quelle in cui l'argomento in esame è formulato nel modo più chiaro." (pp. 287-288)

26. ———. 1987. "Cos'è La Storia Della Filosofia?" In *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi Sul Pensiero Del Settecento*. Napoli: Prismi Editrice.

    Traduzione di *Qu'est-ce que l'histoire de la Philosophie?*, in « Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger », CLII, 1962, pp. 289-306.
    "Quel settore fondamentale della storia della filosofia che ha per oggetto lo studio monografico di un testo particolare sembra non tener debito conto, in generale, di alcune premesse metodologiche essenziali per la posizione dei problemi storici che ogni studioso in possesso della *forma mentis* dello storico dovrebbe porsi.
    È nostro intento qui esporre in modo molto succinto alcune prospettive fondamentali che dovrebbero guidare ogni analisi in questo settore. Ci limitiamo qui — vogliamo sottolinearlo — a descrivere le categorie principali di uno solo dei numerosi punti d'approccio complementari (o livelli di lavoro) seguendo i quali si potrebbe organizzare una ricerca storica di questo tipo." (p. 295)
    (...)
    (Abbiamo rilevato l'utilità e l'urgenza di elaborare una storia dell'evoluzione dello spirito consequenziale nel pensiero filosofico. Allo stesso modo bisognerebbe porsi più chiaramente il problema dell'evoluzione dello spirito letterario, dello spirito sistematico e dello spirito di comunicazione e probatorio nel pensiero filosofico. Nei filosofi i mutamenti della forma letteraria, di quella

sistematica e della forma di comunicazione e di prova sono strettamente legati ai mutamenti dottrinali, cosicché non si può immaginare una storia della filosofia scientificamente concepita che non tenga conto di questi fattori. Sarebbe dunque importante elaborare delle storie speciali in cui questi elementi siano specificamente studiati in un modo più adeguato, il che permetterebbe d'avere a propria disposizione delle prospettive generali a partire dalle quali lo studio specifico dei testi verrebbe reso più facile." (p. 308)

27. ———. 1995. "Organo, Canone, Disciplina, Dottrina in Kant (1765-1780)." *Studi Kantiani* no. 8:11-30.

"Quando Kant cerca di spiegare che cosa vuol essere la sua *Critica della ragion pura*, egli di solito usa due coppie di termini opposti, «canone» opposto a «organo» e «disciplina» a «dottrina»: la *Critica* è un canone, non un organo; è una disciplina, non una dottrina.
Lo scopo principale di questo lavoro è di chiarire il significato di questi termini per Kant, nel suo sviluppo fino alla prima edizione della *Critica della ragion pura* nel 1781. Agli inizi degli anni Sessanta, Kant definisce ancora la logica come uno «strumento» (1) e, di essa, ha una concezione tradizionale. Nell 'Annuncio dei suoi corsi, pubblicato nel 1765, Kant distingue due tipi di logica. Il primo è una critica ed una prescrizione (*Vorschrift*) del senso comune (*gesunden Verstandes*), come una introduzione alla scienza (*logica naturalis*, nella terminologia delle scuole). Il secondo è una critica ed una prescrizione per la scienza vera e propria (*logica artificialis*), di cui costituisce l'organo, al fine di rendere regolare il procedimento (*Verfahren*) della scienza e di comprendere la natura della disciplina, unitamente ai mezzi usati per il suo sviluppo. L'esposizione della metafisica sarà seguita da alcune considerazioni sul metodo particolare di questa scienza, come suo organo. Questo dovrà seguire e non precedere l'esposizione della metafisica in un corso di filosofia, perché sarebbe impossibile spiegare questo organo se prima non sono stati offerti esempi della sua applicazione. Altrimenti Kant, in

questo corso, esporrà soltanto il primo tipo di logica (2). I termini «disciplina» e «dottrina» vengono usati come sinonimi di «scienza» (3).
In una lettera a Mendelssohn dell'8 aprile 1766, Kant scrive che egli considera la metafisica come una disciplina *(disciplin*) molto importante, ma che trova necessario toglierle le sue dogmatiche vesti, trattando le sue sedicenti dottrine in maniera scettica. Questo procedimento negativo è una preparazione per un progresso positivo in questa scienza. Un senso comune incorrotto ed ingenuo ha bisogno di un organo; ma le false dottrine di un talento pervertito (come sono quelle della metafisica) richiedono un catartico (4). Egli pensa di aver sviluppato importanti vedute volte a fissare il metodo (*Verfahren*) di questa disciplina della metafisica, vedute che sono non soltanto prospettive (*Aussichten*) generali, ma che possono essere usate praticamente (*in der Anwendung*) come modelli adeguati di valutazione (*Richtmaas*) delle dottrine metafisiche (5).
Il significato di queste prese di posizione è chiaro per coloro che hanno familiarità con la terminologia filosofica del Settecento. Affrontare lo studio del metodo scientifico, appartiene in linea di principio alla scienza della logica, che include la metodologia. I precetti metodologici, che possono essere messi in pratica, appartengono a quella sezione della logica che si chiama «logica pratica», una sezione che viene spesso identificata con la metodologia, sicché Kant qui sottolinea semplicemente il fatto che i precetti che ha in mente costituiscono una metodologia genuina per il semplice fatto che possono essere messi in pratica. Inoltre questa metodologia non sarà un «organo», uno strumento di invenzione, volto all'acquisto di una conoscenza positiva, ma un modello di verità mirante a purificare la metafisica (come un catartico) dalle sue dottrine erronee. Essa quindi ha una funzione negativa, preliminare alla elaborazione di una metafisica genuina. In altri termini, essa è principalmente un criterio di valutazione, o, come vedremo in seguito, un «canone».
In realtà, per alcuni anni Kant sarà indeciso nel giudicare quale sia il modo migliore per classificare questa

metodologia. Come tale, essa appartiene alla logica, e sarà alla fine definita come logica. Ma, nella misura in cui è una metodologia speciale per la metafisica, può anche essere considerata come appartenente alla metafisica in quanto preparazione ad essa. Questa definizione della logica come parte della metafisica può anche essere giustificata con il significato attribuito alla metafisica da Condillac e da d'Alembert, che la identificavano con lo studio delle facoltà conoscitive della mente umana, o con la metodologia (6)."

(1) *Logik Herder*, 1762-1764, *AK.-Ausg*. XXIV.1, p. 3.

(2) *AK.-Ausg*., II, pp. 310-311.

(3) *AK.-Ausg*., II, pp. 307-310, 312. «Disciplina» è già stata usata col significato di «scienza» nel 1762 (pp. 280-281), e ritornerà con lo stesso significato nel 1768 e nel 1770 (pp. 377, 410). «Dottrina» è già stata usata come «scienza» nel 1755 (I, p. 416). Vedi anche la *Riflessione* 1575 (XVI, p. 15,1766-1769?) e la *Riflessione* 1579 (XVI, p. 19, 1. 1-2, 1760-1770?). Una distinzione tra una «dottrina», una «disciplina» ed una «scienza» è introdotta nella *Metaphysik Herder* (1762-1764), XXVIII. 1, p. 156, ma non viene data nessuna spiegazione su di essa. Un'altra distinzione tra 1° critica, 2° disciplina come dottrina o istruzione (*Unterweisung*) e 3° scienza è presente nella *Riflessione* 626 (XV, pp. 271-272), ma la datazione di questa *Riflessione* è molto incerta (1762-1772?). La logica come organo è menzionata nella *Riflessione* 1567 (XVI, p. 7). Nella *Riflessione* 1579 (XVI, p. 18, 1. 28 - p. 19, 1. 4), la logica del senso comune (= logica naturale) viene definita come una critica, mentre la logica come scienza (= logica artificiale) è una dottrina. La prima è un catartico del senso comune, come la grammatica, la seconda è un organo. Ulteriori aggiunte alla stessa *Riflessione*, che contengono una distinzione tra dottrina e disciplina, hanno una datazione molto incerta. Esse suggeriscono che la logica intesa come disciplina è una critica, intesa come dottrina è un organo.

(4) La nozione psicologica platonica e aristotelica di catartico sembra che sia stata poco usata nella filosofia del diciassettesimo e diciottesimo secolo. Vedi anche il mio articolo *'Critique' and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A*

Historical Survey, in «Kant-Studien», LXIX, 2, 1978, § 2. Kant talvolta usava l'ortografia «catharcticon», che io trascriverò con «catharticon».
(5) *AK.-Ausg.*, X, pp. 70-71.
(6) Vedi il mio articolo *The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in Kant's Time*, in «Rivista critica di storia della filosofia», XXX, 3, 1975.

PAGINE COLLEGATE

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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Giorgio Tonelli (1928-1978): Bibliographie des écrits sur Kant e la Philosophie du XVIIIe Siècle

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Cette page contient une bibliographie des écrits de Giorgio Tonelli en Français ; pour ses essais en italien, anglais et allemand, s'il vous plaît suivez les liens au bas de la page.

1. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1956. "Zabarella inspirateur de Baumgarten ou l'origine de la connexion entre esthétique et logique." *Revue d'Esthétique*:182-192.
   Traduction italienne dans: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Studi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 139-146.
2. ———. 1959. "La nécessité des lois de la nature au XVIIIe siècle et chez Kant en 1762." *Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications* no. 12:225-241.
   "II n'est pas besoin de souligner l'importance de la question des lois du mouvement aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Il ne manque d'ailleurs pas d'exposés détaillés des théories diverses qui se sont suivies, à savoir des différentes lois et « mesures » élaborées par Galilée, Descartes, Huygens, Leibniz, etc. (1). Mais ce qui manque c'est une recherche particulière sur un caractère spécial de ces différentes lois: le degré de nécessité qui leur était attribué. Cette question acquiert une importance particulière dans l'étude de la philosophie kantienne, car, on le verra, on rencontre chez Kant, dans la période précritique, un revirement soudain à

propos de ce problème, revirement qui ne peut être compris en ignorant les précédents historiques de ce dernier.
Nous nous proposons donc d'ébaucher ici rapidement les positions des principaux philosophes du XVIIe siècle sur ce point, et de décrire avec plus d'exactitude l'état de la question au XVIIIe siècle, en particulier dans le cas de l'Allemagne.
Les termes du problème (que nous énonons maintenant dans la formulation qu'ils ont reue dans les écoles allemandes du XVIIe siècle) sont les suivants: quel est le degré de nécessité qu'il faut attribuer aux lois du mouvement, lois qui s'identifient d'ailleurs avec les lois générales de la nature (2) ? Tout le monde était d'accord sur le fait que ces lois étaient nécessaires par rapport à la nature: en fait, des lois contingentes ne sont pas des lois, car rien ne garantirait alors l'uniformité des opérations de la nature, ou, plus exactement, il n'y aurait pas d'uniformité de ces opérations, donc il n'y aurait pas de lois et, à proprement parler, il n'y aurait même pas de nature : le monde ne serait qu'un miracle perpétuel.
Ces lois doivent donc être nécessaires par rapport à la nature; si Dieu veut les interrompre, il s'agit d'une intervention extraordinaire, à savoir d'un miracle." (p. 225)
(1) Le meilleur exposé est peut-être encore celui qu'on rencontre chez J. K. Fischer, *Geschichte der Physik*.... (8 vol., 1801-1808), surtout t. II, pp. 316 sq. ; t. IV, pp. 88 sq.
(2) Voir par exemple, J. M. Verdries, *Conspectus philosophiae naturalis*, Gissae, 1720, pp. 8-9 : « Leges naturae sunt rationes resistentiae et motus, quibus corpora se invicem afiîciunt, et quas constanter, necessitate naturae, pro essentiali dispositione et inseparabilibus proprietatibus observant. »

3. ———. 1959. "La question des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVIIIe siècle et la genèse du criticisme kantien, particulièrement par rapport au problème de l'infini." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 65:396-427.
Traduction italienne dans: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Studi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 45-78.

"Hume et Kant n'ont pas été les premiers à proclamer la nécessité d'admettre que l'esprit humain ne peut pas tout connaître, et d'imposer le respect de ses bornes: voilà ce qu'on oublie trop souvent, lorsqu'on tâche de reconstruire les origines de la philosophie kantienne. C'est bien pour cela que nous nous proposons d'ébaucher ici un tableau très sommaire de la question au temps de la formation philosophique de Kant. Si nous devions traiter à fond le thème que nous affrontons, nous nous trouverions en présence d'une tâche énorme, dont l'exécution dépasserait largement ce qui est nécessaire à une compréhension meilleure de la personnalité de Kant. En fait, il s'agirait d'abord de n'écrire rien moins que l'histoire du scepticisme, sur laquelle plusieurs ouvrages ont d'ailleurs été publiés (*); mais ceci ne serait que le commencement, car il est évident que de nombreux penseurs, qu'on ne peut d'aucune faon considérer comme des sceptiques, ont reconnu que la capacité humaine de connaître n'est pas illimitée. Il faudrait enfin parler de tous ces mystiques, qui ne tendaient à affaiblir ou à nier la valeur de la connaissance rationnelle que pour faire place à la foi ou à l'illumination intérieure. Ce que nous nous proposons de faire ici n'est donc que de décrire l'état de la question dans ses aspects les plus généraux au cours de la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle ; ce qui nous force à nous occuper d'abord rapidement de ceux, parmi les grands penseurs du XVIIe siècle, qui exeraient encore une influence importante au siècle suivant. Nous renonons donc à étudier certains pyrrhoniens très typiques du XVIIe siècle, tels que La Mothe Le Vayer, Huet, Glanville, etc. dont l'importance ne dépasse pas les bornes de leur époque. La question que nous allons traiter a naturellement plusieurs aspects différents: en fait, on peut chercher à établir l'extension des connaissances possibles dans les directions les plus divergentes, et on peut concevoir les bornes de ces connaissances d'une faon très variée. Nous nous limiterons pourtant à diviser notre thème en deux parties principales : dans la première, nous nous occuperons du problème des bornes en général ; dans la deuxième, nous exposerons plus particulièrement la

question spéciale des bornes de l'esprit humain par rapport à l'infini, question qui absorbait à l'époque la plus grande partie des discussions consacrées à notre thème. Nous négligerons donc consciemment plusieurs aspects plus particuliers de la question, tels que le doute des cartésiens quant à la validité de la connaissance sensible, et les crises des notions de substance et de force; ces dernières étaient parmi les problèmes qu'on reconnaissait, au XVIIIe siècle, être les plus difficiles à résoudre pour l'homme (2). En particulier, les newtoniens modérés reconnaissaient que la force d'attraction était quelque chose de mystérieux et d'inexplicable du point de vue de la philosophie mécanique (3). De même, en théodicée, les adversaires du téléologisme déclaraient qu'il était impossible de pénétrer les desseins de la sagesse divine, et qu'il valait mieux expliquer les phénomènes au moyen des causes efficientes (4); pour ne pas mentionner les incertitudes en ce qui concerne le problème de la liberté. Nous éviterons, de même, de discuter certaines formes d'idéalisme qui présupposent, plutôt que des bornes de l'esprit humain, le fait qu'on ne peut rien connaître du monde sensible, car, en vérité, il n'y a pas de monde sensible." (pp. 396-397)
(...)
"La polémique sur les bornes des connaissances acquit en Allemagne une importance particulière du fait qu'elle devînt un des grands thèmes des disputes entre wolffiens et antiwolffiens. L'origine culturelle de l'opposition contre Wolff était sans doute théologique; mais la querelle se transposa aussitôt en métaphysique, en gardant peu de traces apparentes de son origine religieuse. Il faut d'ailleurs reconnaître que les limitations des connaissances demandées par les antiwolffiens n'eurent comme effet direct que la renonciation à discuter certains mystères religieux; pour le reste, il y avait peu de domaines où les antiwolffiens fussent résignés à l' « ignoramus »; en vérité, ils n'étaient pas beaucoup plus prudents que leurs adversaires. Cependant, l'affirmation des bornes de l'entendement entraînait une série de conséquences vis-à-vis des principes ontologiques et de la conception méthodologique de la

connaissance, qui exerceront les influences les plus remarquables sur la formation philosophique de Kant. Kant lui-même ne venait à s'intéresser que peu à peu au problème des bornes de l'entendement; évidemment il avait absorbé celui-ci parmi les autres éléments de sa polémique antiwolffienne; mais la mise en termes initiale qu'il donne au problème est plutôt éclectique, pour ainsi dire cosmopolite, plutôt que typiquement antiwolffienne. Pour la suite, son attitude ne change pas: il continue à s'approprier soit des éléments tirés de l'antiwolffisme allemand, soit des éléments plus ou moins analogues aux premiers, qui lui étaient offert par l'Angleterre et par la France. Ce n'est que plus tard que, surtout sous l'influence de Locke et de Hume, le thème des bornes acquiert chez Kant l'importance centrale qu'on lui connaît, et que ce thème n'avait eu jusqu'alors que chez les empiristes anglais; mais il ne faut jamais oublier les polémiques locales de l'Allemagne du XVIIIe siècle, qui ont éveillé chez Kant un intérêt pour un monde différent, et des sympathies pour ce qu'il trouvait dans ce monde d'analogue à ces polémiques; cela devait contribuer si puissamment à former sa personnalité philosophique, en pleine réaction contre le dogmatisme et le rationalisme wolffiens." (pp. 426-427)
(*) Carl Fried. Stäudlin, *Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus*, 2 Bde, Leipzig, 1794 ; J. F. I. Tafel, *Geschichte und Kritik des Skeptizismus*, Tübingen, 1834 ; H. Was, *Geschiedenis van hat Scepticisme*, 1, England, Utrecht, 1870.
(1) Voir Stäudlin, op. cit.. 11 vol.
(2) Voir notre article *Critiques of the Notion of Substance prior to Kant*, à paraître dans « The Journal of the History of Ideas ».
(3) G. Tonelli, *Elementi metafisici e metodologici in Kant precritico*, Torino, 1959, Vol. I, cap. II, SS 28 et suiv.
(4) Ibid., Cap. II, §§12 et suiv.

4. ———. 1962. "Qu'est-ce que l'histoire de la philosophie ?" *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 152:289-306.

Traduction italienne dans: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Studi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 295-309.
"Il semble que ce secteur fondamentaule l'histoire de la philosophie, qui a pour objet *l'étude monographiqe d'un texte en particulier* ne tient pas assez compte, en général, de certaines prémisses méthodologiques essentielles à la position des problèmes historiques que tout chercheur doué de *la forma mentis* de l'historien devrait se poser.
Nous nous proposons d 'exposer ici d'une faon très succincte quelques perspectives fondamentales qui devraient diriger toute analyse en ce domaine. On ne vise ici, nous tenons à le faire remarquer, qu'à décrire les catégories principales d'un seul parmi les nombreux points d'approche complémentaires (ou niveaux de travail), suivant lesquels on pourrait organiser une recherche historique de ce genre." (p. 289)

5. ———. 1964. "Deux sources britanniques oubliées de la morale kantienne." In *Mélanges Alexandre Koyré, publiés à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire. Vol. II: L'aventure de l'esprit*, 469-505. Paris: Hermann.
Traduction italienne dans: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Studi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, pp. 249-256.
6. ———. 1973. "La philosophie allemande de Leibniz à Kant." In *Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome II: De la Renaissance à la Révolution kantienne*, edited by Belaval, Yvon, 728-785. Paris: Gallimard.
Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, 36.
"La période que nous allons étudier est d'habitude définie comme l' « âge des Lumières » (*Aufklärung*), mais nous tâcherons d'employer ce terme aussi peu que possible: il donne lieu à trop de controverses. L' *Aufklärung*, quand commence-t-elle ? Avec Thomasius, avec Wolff, ou plus tard? Et quand finit-elle? Est-ce que Kant en marque le couronnement ou la fin? Et comment séparer nettement l' *Aufklärung* de certaines tendances qui, tout en s'opposant manifestement à elle, appartiennent quand même à l'esprit du temps et la pénètrent parfois profondément?

Il ne nous, reste qu'à nous réfugier dans des critères chronologiques: nous nous occuperons d'abord de la philosophie thomasienne-piétiste (jusqu'en 1725-1730), ensuite du wolffîsme (jusqu'en 1750-1755), enfin de la philosophie populaire, avec sa floraison d'intérêts nouveaux, et de la néologie (jusqu'à 1780), sans pourtant négliger les groupes d'opposition, ou les isolés de marque. Nous ne pourrons toutefois étudier le *Sturm und Drang* (1770-1780), car son épanouissement, aussi violent qu'éphémère, ne trouve son sens et ne pénètre en profondeur qu'à l'époque suivante; de même, il nous faudra négliger, complètement ou en partie, des personnalités remarquables, telles que Platner, Lichtenberg, Jacobi, Herder, Pestalozzi, qui ne donneront que plus tard le meilleur de leur œuvre." (p. 728)
"La période précritique de Kant.
Si Immanuel Kant était mort avant 1781, nous ne devrions consacrer ici que quelques lignes à son œuvre philosophique. Mais sa grandeur future demande un examen sommaire des ouvrages de sa période précritique, indispensable pour comprendre la formation du criticisme.
Fils d'un artisan, Kant ne put continuer ses études que grâce à des bourses gagnées par ses mérites, et par des sacrifices assez durs. Issu d'une famille piétiste, Kant fut éduqué au lycée Fridericianum, imbu de l'esprit piétiste. Cela a suggéré aux historiens beaucoup de spéculations sur des composantes « piétistes » de la pensée kantienne; en fait, on n'en trouve trace ni dans sa morale, ni dans sa philosophie de la religion; nous verrons plus loin ce que cela peut signifier.
Il est essentiel de se rendre compte de l'état de l'université de Königsberg à cette époque. Les piétistes étaient parvenus à dominer les universités de l'Allemagne protestante autour de 1710; mais les aristotéliciens avaient résisté à Königsberg, à Wittenberg et à Rostock. À Königsberg, piétistes et wolffiens représentaient une sorte d'opposition extra-universitaire: ce n'est qu'en réunissant leurs forces, et avec l'aide de Frédéric-Guillaume Ier, qu'ils purent s'emparer, en 1725, du pouvoir académique. Mais leur alliance fut éphémère. Les piétistes avaient à peine gagné la partie qu'ils

se retournèrent contre leurs alliés wolffiens: aucun wolffien orthodoxe ne fut toléré dans l'université, aucun wolffien, même modéré, ne reut jamais un poste de titulaire.
Toutefois le roi, voulant maintenir la paix entre les deux partis, encore menacés par les vieux aristotéliciens, envoya à Königsberg le théologien Fr. Alb. Schultz, piétiste qui avait reu une formation wolffienne: nommé d'abord directeur du Fridericianum, Schultz devint, en 1732, recteur de l'université, qu'il domina presque sans interruption jusqu'à sa mort. Mais ses sympathies pour les wolffiens étaient en fait assez tièdes: il les toléra sans les aider.
Donc la situation de l'université de Königsberg pendant les études de Kant, et par la suite, est assez claire: elle était dominée par des piétistes, qui avaient abandonné la philosophie thomasienne piétiste au cours de leur alliance avec les wolffiens; le wolffisme orthodoxe était officiellement condamné; des wolffiens non orthodoxes, tel M. Knutzen, n'étaient que tolérés. L'influence de Knutzen sur Kant, d'ailleurs, a été exagérée; elle a laissé bien peu de traces; Knutzen lui-même n'était certainement qu'un philosophe médiocre.
Le milieu de Königsberg suggérait donc surtout un éclectisme antiwolffien indéterminé, nécessairement ouvert à la possibilité d'influences nouvelles: et voilà, autour de 1745, l'épanouissement de l'Académie de Berlin, avec son newtonianisme, et l'affirmation de la philosophie de Crusius, l'antidote par excellence contre le wolffisme. C'est de Maupertuis et de Crusius que Kant va se nourrir dès ses débuts: son « wolffisme » de jeunesse est un mythe qu'il est temps de détruire. Et son « piétisme » se réduit au fond à ses sympathies pour la philosophie crusienne, dernière expression importante de l'école de Thomasius.
Kant s'intéressa d'abord à des problèmes de philosophie naturelle, mais son approche révèle des intérêts métaphysiques très prononcés. Son livre *Sur la véritable estimation des forces vives* (1747) est l'une des premières démarches pour introduire l'attractionnisme newtonien en Allemagne, et la première tentative de lui donner une fondation métaphysique d'origine leibnizienne. L'esprit

antiwolffien de cet ouvrage n'est que trop clair: les éléments leibniziens qu'il contient étaient assez largement acceptés à l'époque, et n'étaient nullement une marque de wolffianisme. Il en sera de même des autres éléments « wolffiens » que nous trouverons chez Kant.

L' *Histoire naturelle et théorie générale de l'univers* de 1755, avec les travaux mineurs publiés dans le même temps, sont surtout un plaidoyer pour la conception mécanique de l'univers matériel, à la suite de Maupertuis, et contre cette physicothéologie que Wolff avait dû accepter.

L'attractionnisme est accentué davantage; mais il est accompagné d'une cosmogonie qui reste fidèle au mécanisme cartésien, que Newton n'aurait jamais acceptée.

La *Nova Dilucidatio* (1755), dissertation peu originale, révèle une influence crusienne très remarquable. Dans sa *Monadologia physica* (1756), Kant adopte des positions assez analogues à celles de Boscovich: une fois de plus, c'est une conciliation entre Newton et Leibniz. Dans ses *Considérations sur l'optimisme* (1759) Kant défend — en éclectique — une position wolffienne, acceptée d'ailleurs par plusieurs non-wolffiens, et qu'il abandonnera bientôt.

Dans sa *Démonstration de l'existence de Dieu* (1762), Kant nous donne pour la première fois une contribution assez intéressante à l'ontologie, contribution qui ne restera pas sans suite dans son développement ultérieur. Nous ne voulons que mentionner une thèse capitale de cet ouvrage : la nécessité absolue des lois du mouvement. C'est, au fond, du spinozisme: mais Bernoulli et d'Alembert avaient soutenu la même position.

Kant a montré jusqu'ici un intérêt particulier pour la métaphysique ou pour la philosophie naturelle. L'année 1762 marque un tournant capital: l'ouvrage sur les *Fondements de la théologie naturelle et de la morale* est surtout méthodologique; et l'influence de Crusius est plus forte que jamais.

Les *Observations sur le sentiment du beau et du sublime* (1764) et le *Programme* (1765) vont encore plus loin: Kant, en dépit de toute méfiance souvent exprimée contre elle, est bien proche de la « philosophie populaire »: descriptions

anthropologiques, démonstrations in concreto; c'est par ce moyen qu'il espère réformer la métaphysique traditionnelle. C'est un programme déclaré, d'ailleurs, depuis 1762: mais les moyens méthodologiques de la réforme sont maintenant plus à la page; la rupture avec la forme d'esprit dominante est définitive. De plus, l'influence des Anglais et de Rousseau devient capitales: elle sera désormais à la base de la morale et de l'esthétique de Kant.
Voilà l'esprit qui dicte, en 1766, les *Rêves d'un voyant*, dirigés contre Swedenborg aussi bien que contre Wolff: les rêves d'un voyant (Swedenborg) ne valent guère plus que les rêves d'un métaphysicien (Wolff): c'est la crise de la notion de causalité, et de la métaphysique classique en général.
L'article sur les *Régions de l'espace*, de 1768, ne doit pas nous tromper: c'est une autre application, bien qu'éphémère, de la méthode *in concreto*.
La *Dissertatio* de 1770 (avec les *Réflexions* qui la précèdent et qui la suivent) marquera la fin de cet état d'esprit, tout en étant sa conséquence: mais nous voilà au seuil de la philosophie « critique ». Kant revient aux spéculations abstraites, mais elles seront dictées en grande partie par les expériences des années précédentes." (pp. 772-775)

7. ———. 1974. "Introduction. Bibliographie et histoire du texte." In *Pierre Louis Maupertuis, Oeuvres, I*, V-LXXXIII. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
8. ———. 1975. "Maupertuis et la critique de la métaphysique." In *Actes de la Journée Maupertuis. Créteil, 1-12-1973*, 79-90. Paris: Vrin.
Repris dans *La pensée philosophique de Maupertuis. Son milieu et ses sources* (1987), pp. 8-16.
"Maupertuis est, d'abord, un philosophe de la nature: nous voulons donc commencer par l'examen de sa conception métaphysique de ce monde extérieur, a l'étude duquel il a consacré la plus grande partie de sa vie. Cela nous réserve quelques surprises: ce naturaliste est, en fait, un ultraphénoméniste. La réduction des qualités primaires aux qualités secondaires est complète. La dureté, l'étendue, n'appartiennent pas aux objets pas plus que l'odeur, le son et le goût. L'étendue n'a que la prérogative d'être perue par

deux sens différents, le toucher et la vue; prérogative illusoire: “L’étendue, comme ces autres, n’est qu’une perception de mon âme transportée à un objet extérieur, sans qu’il y ait dans l’objet rien qui puisse rassembler à ce que mon âme apperoit”. D’ailleurs, les idées de la durée et de l’étendue ne sont pas “plus distinctes” que celles des autres qualités, et elles sont perues de la même faon; elles n’ont donc pas plus de “réalité” que celles-ci: dans le monde extérieur, tous les “objets ne sont que de simples phénomènes” (1). Maupertuis se réfère explicitement à Berkeley sur ce point. En admettant cela, on “anéantit toute distinction qu’on voudroit faire entre deux manières d’exister, l’une dans l’esprit, l’autre au dehors” (2). Mais procédons par degrés, et considérons d’abord que “des êtres inconnus excitent dans notre âme tous les sentiments, toutes les perceptions qu'elle éprouve; & sans ressembler à aucune des choses que nous appercevons, nous les représentent toutes” (3). Les objets extérieurs nous sont donc complètement inconnus en eux-mêmes; pourtant, il y a peut-être des objets extérieurs. Lesquels? On peut supposer tout au plus que “Le choc de quelques corps peut bien en être la cause ou l’occasion [des sentiments]” (qu’on remarque l’expression “occasion”); mais le choc est un mouvement: et “comment une perception rassembleroit-elle à un mouvement?” (4)." (pp. 8-9)
(1) Œuvres , Lyon 1768, II, 230-234 (*Lettres* 1752). Voir aussi, œuvres, I, 273, 281-282 (*Réflexions philosophiques sur l'origine des langues*, 1748).
2) Œuvres, I, 298 (*Réponse à Boindin*, 1756).
3) Œuvres, II, 234 (*Lettres*, 1752).
4) Œuvres, II, 228-229 (*Lettres*, 1752).

9. ———. 1987. *La pensée philosophique de Maupertuis. Son milieu et ses sources*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Édition posthume par Claudio Cesa.
Table des matières: Préface 1; Introduction 3; Première partie. La vie et l’oeuvre: I. La vie 6; II. La critique de la métaphysique 8; III. L’existence de Dieu 16; IV. Origine et valeur de la connaissance 25; V. La méthode de la connaissance 34; VI. La philosophie naturelle 44; VII. La

morale 50; VIII. La religion de Maupertuis 54; Deuxième partie. La place de Maupertuis dans l'histoire de la pensée et les sources de ses doctrines: IX. Maupertuis et les grands philosophes du passé 57; X. Quelques nouvelles perspectives historiques de la pensée maupertuisienne 63; XI. Les sources des doctrines particulières 90; XII. Origine et méthode de la connaissance 131-144.

"Au moment de sa mort (28. 4. 1978) Giorgio Tonelli ne travaillait plus depuis quatre ans au volume sur Maupertuis. Cela ne signifiait pas qu'il avait abandonné définitivement l'espoir de le terminer ou qu'il ne s'intéressait plus au sujet. Au contraire il revenait souvent à l'idée d'écrire une histoire du scepticisme au XVIIIème siècle. Il en avait du reste donné d'avance deux chapitres sous forme d'articles consacrés à P.-J. Changeux (1974) et à D'Alembert (1976). Il avait été attiré par Maupertuis une dizaine d'années auparavant, à l'occasion d'une réimpression anastatique — due à ses soins — des œuvres dans l'édition de Lyon 1768 (G. Olms Verlag, Hildesheim— New York, 4 tomes, 1964—1975). Il avait songé d'abord à écrire une introduction philosophique comme celle qu'il avait rédigée pour *Die philosophischen Hauptwerke* de Ch. A. Crusius; mais son texte finit par prendre les dimensions d'un volume. Il décida alors de se borner pour l'Introduction du premier tome des œuvres à une histoire du texte et à une bibliographie, en se réservant d'achever son ouvrage sur la pensée philosophique de Maupertuis en des temps meilleurs. Ces temps meilleurs n'arrivèrent jamais. Il fit lui-même publier seulement quelques dizaines de pages de son manuscrit sous forme d'articles: *Maupertuis et la critique de la métaphysique*, dans *Actes de la journée Maupertuis* — Créteil 1. XII. 1973 (Paris, Vrin, 1975, pp. 79—90); *Themiseul de Saint Hyacynthe. A smailing sceptic* et *The scepticism of Franois Quesnay*, dans "International Studies in Philosophy", 1978 (X), pp. 163-166 et 1979 (XI), pp. 77-89 respectivement (le dernier en partie remanié et augmenté par rapport à l'état du manuscrit que nous publions).

Le volume que nous présentons maintenant au public n'est pas terminé. Il manque au dernier chapitre la conclusion,

qui, d'après une note manuscrite, aurait dû traiter des réflexions de Maupertuis sur l'innéisme. Un autre chapitre, qui aurait dû traiter des polémiques de Maupertuis avec Wolff et son école, manque complètement. Le reste était prêt, avec son apparat de notes complet, mis à jour pour l'année 1970 à peu près.
L'auteur avait fait dactylographier la première partie, qui correspond aux chapitres 1—8; la deuxième partie, plus étendue, est restée manuscrite et je l'ai dactylographiée moi-même. Je prends sur moi toute la responsabilité des erreurs et malentendus éventuels. Une mise à jour bibliographique serait tombée tout à fait mal à propos, à cause, entre autre, de la manière très personnelle de travailler de Giorgio Tonelli.
Je remercie Madame Grazia Olivieri Tonelli, qui, en me confiant le manuscrit, a bien voulu honorer une amitié de plus de trente ans, née entre Giorgio et moi dès les années de l'université; je remercie Pierre Quillet, vieil ami de Gioigio, qui a bien voulu relire les épreuves; et je remercie aussi l'éditeur Georg Olms, qui a accueilli le volume dans une collection que Giorgio Tonelli avait fondée et dirigée pendant plusieurs années." (Préface de Claudio Cesa, p. 1)
"En 1752 Maupertuis recueillait pour la première fois une partie de ses ouvrages dans un volume intitulé œuvres. En 1753 paraissaient ses œuvres en deux volumes, et en 1756 en quatre volumes. Cette édition était réimprimée en 1768, après la mort de l'auteur. Maupertuis mourut de la tuberculose à l'âge de 60 ans et dix mois, en 1759; en 1756 sa santé était précaire, telle qu'elle l'avait été depuis longtemps, mais rien ne nous fait penser qu'il considérât sa fin comme imminente. Ses intérêts philosophiques étaient encore bien vivants: en 1756 il avait écrit un Mémoire sur la preuve de l'existence de Dieu (qui parut en 1758, et qui ne fut donc inclus ni dans l'édition des œuvres de 1756, ni dans sa réimpression de 1768); encore en 1756, il avait fait annoncer par l'Académie de Berlin un concours pour l'année 1758, dont le thème était philosophique. Notre auteur avait sans doute l'intention de développer dans d'autres ouvrages ses idées philosophiques, biologiques, etc., et il aurait réuni

par la suite ces ouvrages dans des éditions ultérieurement élargies des œuvres, y incluant le Mémoire de 1756. La mort l'en a empêché. Nous devrons donc considérer l'édition de 1756 (avec l'addition du Mémoire de 1756) comme définitive, par rapport à l'état de la pensée de Maupertuis à la fin de sa vie.

Cette édition n'est certainement pas complète. Elle représente surtout le tableau que Maupertuis, en ce moment là, voulait donner de son œuvre: un tableau décidément influencé par des événements qui avaient modifié assez profondément son attitude dans une direction bien facile à établir.

Ayant débuté comme "géomètre", Maupertuis fut nommé en 1746 président de l'Académie des Sciences et Belles Lettres de Berlin, la seule qui eut, en ce temps-là, une classe de philosophie. Cette classe avait été établie au cours de la réorganisation de l'Académie, voulue par Frédéric II de concert avec Maupertuis, qui entre 1740 et 1746 séjourna fréquemment a Berlin.

Maupertuis se trouva donc à la tête d'une Académie particulièrement "philosophique" - soit qu'il ait désiré lui-même de lui donner ce caractère, soit qu'il ait cédé au désir du monarque. Le président d'une telle Académie devait donc être un philosophe lui-même. Maupertuis se trouva dès lors obligé de développer ses talents philosophiques. A cela il faut ajouter le fait que, se trouvant alors dans un pays, l'Allemagne, profondément consacré à la philosophie spéculative, surtout wolffienne, notre auteur dut élargir le domaine de sa mission intellectuelle en élaborant des doctrines d'une importance plus générale, dans le but d'éclairer une nation qui, de son point de vue, était encore plongée dans une sorte de barbarie métaphysique.

Nous ne devrons donc pas nous étonner si, dans ses œuvres, Maupertuis renona à réimprimer quelques travaux purement scientifiques qui, tout en étant bien importants, auraient alourdi le recueil, et dilué sa signification "philosophique". Ce n'est pas que Maupertuis ait renié son illustre passé de savant, qui est d'ailleurs assez représenté dans les œuvres: mais son but est surtout de donner une

image de lui-même qui soit conforme à sa fonction de président de l'Académie de Berlin.
Eh bien, en dépit de ce que ses contemporains — et surtout Voltaire — en ont dit, Maupertuis, en tant que philosophe, a une valeur incontestable: soit par rapport à l'Age des Lumières en France, soit — et surtout - par rapport à son influence en Allemagne. Entre autres choses, il exera sur la période précritique de Kant une influence qui, à notre avis n'a pas été assez remarquée.
Sa personnalité philosophique, si contestée, ne manque point de traits saillants: nous en étudierons plusieurs par la suite. Pour l'instant, nous insisterons sur un élément qui nous paraît fondamental. Maupertuis philosophe a été surtout accusé d'ambiguités, d'incertitudes, bref, d'un développement trop dynamique, et trop désordonné, pour être cohérent. Mais nous ne sommes pas de cet avis. Au contraire, nous croyons, et nous nous» efforcerons de démontrer, que sa pensée, en général, présente des caractères systématiques constants, qui dominent tout a fait sur une évolution qui, tout en étant incontestable, ne représente qu'un facteur secondaire. L'illusion d'un Maupertuis philosophe "incohérent" dépend surtout, à notre avis, de sa personnalité de savant; celle-ci impose à ses doctrines philosophiques une méthodologie qui donne lieu à des malentendus. En fait, Maupertuis échelonne une hiérarchie d'hypothèses qu'il ne faut pas hypostasier en tant que doctrines métaphysiques arrêtées. ' Il part dans une certaine direction possible (tout en tenant compte des autres possibilités), en épuisé les développements, et se replie souvent, par un processus familier aux savants, sur un autre direction qui lui paraît promettre des meilleurs résultats. Tout en ne-reniant- pas la possibilité abstraite des directions écartées, aussitôt qu'il s'est rendu compte qu'elles ne sont que des culs-de sac, ou qu'elles ne sont pas suffisamment établies, il poursuit une voie differente. Il ne s'agit donc pas tellement de revirements et de révisions, il s'agit plutôt de l'esprit méthodologique d'un homme de science, qui croit de son devoir d'explorer à fond les voies différentes, avant de se décider à en poursuivre une. Voilà,

croyons — nous le secret des “repentirs” de sa pensée, qui au fond n’en sont pas. D’après un plan assez précisément arrêté, probablement à partir du début, il développe des thèses différentes, pour parvenir à la fin à des conclusions qui, tout en n’étant que probables, constituent pourtant un système harmonique qui mérite une place d’honneur dans son époque.

Mais parfois Maupertuis ne croit pas pouvoir se décider entre plusieurs alternatives hypothétiques: en ce cas il poursuit l’une ou l’autre, d’après ce que les circonstances lui suggèrent; souvent, il en poursuit plusieurs en même temps. Les contrastes qui en résultent ne sont en général qu’apparents: comme chacune des alternatives n’est qu’une conjecture, il est parfaitement licite de développer des conjectures inconciliables entre elles, pour en déceler les implications, dans le but d’en évaluer la probabilité relative. Ceci est, encore une fois, un processus qui est familier aux savants.

Par dessus le marché, nous nous rendrons bientôt compte du fait que Maupertuis, en tant que philosophe, est un “sceptique académique” parfait; et la stratégie philosophique que nous venons de décrire est bien typique de l’école sceptique.

Il serait bien difficile de décider si le scepticisme de Maupertuis n’est qu’une conséquence de son esprit scientifique, ou si les deux se sont développés ensemble. Du point de vue de la chronologie des œuvres, Maupertuis philosophe est sans doute postérieur à Maupertuis savant. Mais il nous reste à considérer l’influence des philosophes sceptiques de l’époque sur la formation de la méthodologie scientifique maupertuisienne: notre auteur connaissait sans doute l’oeuvre de Bayle, et nous verrons que les doctrines de Quesnay présentent des analogies profondes et frappantes avec celles de Maupertuis. Il se peut donc que l’origine de l’esprit de la philosophie maupertuisienne soit pour le moins autant philosophique que scientifique.

Malheureusement, nous n’avons aucun élément qui nous permette d’établir l’époque, et la portée, de ces influences. Par dessus le marché, le fait que Maupertuis ait connu — à

quelque époque que ce soit — l'oeuvre de Quesnay n'est qu'une conjecture très probable.
A la rigueur, dans une perspective historique plus vaste, ce problème devient si compliqué, qu'il serait absurde de vouloir le résoudre d'une faon tranchante. Au cours des dernières décennies on s'est de plus en plus rendu compte du fait que l'école sceptique, des le début du XVIIe siècle, a contribué puissamment à la naissance de l'esprit scientifique "moderne", et qu'en même temps les succès tangibles remportes dans les sciences naturelles par ceux qui étaient animés par cette forma mentis a joué un rôle important dans l'affermissement ultérieur de la philosophie sceptique. Nous sommes donc en présence d'un phénomène d'interaction, si non d'identification, de deux méthodes, l'une philosophique, l'autre scientifique: il sera probablement impossible d'évaluer exactement la contribution respective des deux facteurs à l'évolution des idées en question, prises dans leur ensemble. Cette incertitude ne fait que compliquer ultérieurement le problème par rapport à Maupertuis: et il n'est pas raisonnable de se poser des problèmes que l'on doit considérer comme insolubles. Nous voulons nous consacrer ici, nous le répétons, a l'étude de la pensée-philosophique de Maupertuis, si intéressante et si négligée. Maupertuis savant a été largement étudié dans la monographie classique de Brunet, et les recherches successives ont ajouté bien peu au tableau qu'il en a donné sauf pour ce qui concerne les études de Guéroult sur les lois du mouvement, et de Roger pour la biologie. Nous ne sommes d'ailleurs pas compétents pour approfondir ces problèmes. Mais Brunet s'est contenté de traiter d'une faon sommaire, parfois bien superficielle et naïve, la pensée philosophique de son auteur: et Guéroult et Roger n'ont approfondi que des problèmes particuliers. Notre contribution sera donc centrée sur cet aspect de la pensée maupertuisienne." (*Introduction*, pp. 3-5)

VOIR AUSSI

Giorgio Tonelli: Scritti su Kant e la filosofia del Settecento

Giorgio Tonelli on Kant and the Philosophy of Enlightenment

Giorgio Tonelli über Kant und die Philosophie des XVIII. Jahrhunderts

Index of the Pages with Annotated Bibliographies of Contemporary Historians of Philosophy

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Giorgio Tonelli (1928-1978): Bibliographie der Schriften von Kant und die Philosophie des XVIII. Jahrhunderts

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Diese Seite enthält eine Bibliographie der Schriften Giorgio Tonelli in deutscher Sprache; für die Essays in Italienisch, Französisch und English, folgen Sie bitte den Links am Ende der Seite.

1. Tonelli, Giorgio. 1957. "Von Den Verschiedenen Bedeutungen Des Wortes *Zweckmäßigkeit* in Der *Kritik Der Urteilskraft*." *Kant-Studien* no. 49:154-166.

   "Vorwort. Der Begriff „Zweckmäßigkeit" ist bekanntlich unter den wichtigsten, aber auch den schwersten der *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1), da seine verschiedenen speziellen Bedeutungen im Laufe des Vortrages nicht beständig gehalten werden. Verschiedene Versuche sind in der Vergangenheit gemacht worden, um ihren Gebrauch zu einem kohärenten allgemeinen Schema zurückzuführen. Aber auch der letzte und ernstere, der Versuch Marc-Wogaus (2), gerät aus der Abstraktheit seiner historischen Einstellung in manche Ungereimtheiten und Dunkelheiten. Es ist von uns schon anderswo dargestellt worden (3), wie der Text der *Kritik der Urteilskraft* eine schwierige und kontrastreiche Entstehung gehabt habe, wie die verschiedenen Änderungen des allgemeinen Entwurfes im Laufe der Redaktion es zeigen —; Änderungen, deren tiefe

Spuren in der Terminologie und in der eigentlichen Struktur des Werkes geblieben sind. Es ist also ein nicht nur unhistorischer, sondern auch nutzloser Versuch, eine künstliche Zusammenstimmung zu schaffen, wo wir es mit Lehren, die in verschiedenen Zeiten und unter verschiedenen Standpunkten entstanden sind, zu tun haben; Die einzige annehmbare Weise, die Frage anzugehen, ist eine Geschichte der Entwicklung der verschiedenen Begriffe und der Termini, in denen sie ausgedrückt weiden, zu entwerfen, wobei das Hauptproblem nicht die Zusammenstimmung, sondern die Entwicklung ist.
Wir werden diesen Versuch für den Terminus Zweckmäßigkeit unternehmen, und zwar mit Beschränkung auf die rein terminologische Fragestellung. Anderswo hoffen wir eine historische Interpretation dieser philologisch bestimmten data anbieten zu können (4).
Die Reihenfolge der Redaktion der verschiedenen Teile der Kritik der Urteilskraft ist, wie wir früher dargelegt haben (5), die folgende gewesen: 1) Analytik des Schönen; 2) Deduktion der reinen ästhetischen Urteile; 3) Dialektik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft; 4) Erste Einleitung; 5) Analytik des Erhabenen; 6) Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft; 7) [Zweite] Einleitung und Vorrede. Wir werden also in unserer Analyse dieser Ordnung folgen." (S. 154-155)
(..)
"IX. Schlußwort. Versuchen wir jetzt, die entstandenen Schemata kurz au vergleichen, um besser die einzelnen Änderungen zu bemerken. Im I. und II. Schema findet man die subjektive, formale Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck nur im Sinne der Schönheit; im III, Schema erscheint neu die Zweckmäßigkeit der empirischen Naturgesetze, formale, logische Zweckmäßigkeit genannt, während die Naturschönheit zur realen, absoluten Zweckmäßigkeit zu gehören scheint. Im IV., V. und VI. Schema ist die Schönheit subjektive, formale Zweckmäßigkeit-, als solche wird, sie im V. mit der Zweckmäßigkeit der empirischen Gesetze zusammengelegt, nur wird sie im VI. als innere Zweckmäßigkeit von der äußeren des neuentstandenen

Erhabenen unterschieden; und beide werden als a priori im betreffenden Urteile von der anderen subjektiven Zweckmäßigkeit, der Annehmlichkeit, unterschieden. Die letztere ist gegenüber der ersteren als nicht bloß formal im VII. Schema bestimmt, das übrigens mit dem VI. übereinstimmt, van der beigefügten Benennung „ästhetische Zweckmäßigkeit“ und von der Auslas-sung der Termini innere und äußere zur Unterscheidung von Schönheit und Erhabenheit abgesehen. Das Erhabene wird in den Schemata VIII und IX noch nicht berücksichtigt, wo die Schönheit als subjektive Zweckmäßigkeit sich noch mit der Zweckmäßigkeit der empirischen Gesetze zusammenfindet.
Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit (auch „Materie des nexus finalis") ist im I. Schema etwas ziemlich Unbestimmtes. Tatsächlich vermag ihre Dichotomie als Nützlichkeit und Vollkommenheit solche Termini nicht völlig klarzumachen. Nur aus den Zusammenhängen, die uns Kant in seiner Schrift über den Gebrauch ... darbietet, können wir annehmen, daß Vollkommenheit dort schon mit dem Organismus zu tun hatte; der Text aber erwähnt nur die Produkte der menschlichen Kunst (in der anhängenden Schönheit), und früher, in der Analytik des Schönen, war der Terminus Vollkommenheit nur auf die moralische Güte eines Gegenstandes bezogen. Auch das Wort Nützlichkeit wird nicht klar entweder auf das menschliche Tun .und Lassen oder möglicherweise auf eine äußere Naturzweckmäßigkeit bezogen. Das Schema II nennt entschieden solche Zweckmäßigkeit material, aber nur die anhängende Schönheit betreffend. Im III. Schema scheint der Organismus mit der Naturschönheit als reale, absolute Zweckmäßigkeit zusammengestellt zu werden, und real wird er auch im V. genannt. Vom IV. Schema ab betrifft die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit grundsätzlich den Organismus, aber im VI. und VIII. wird sie als innere bzw, Vollkommenheit von der äußeren bzw. Nützlichkeit (im VI. relativ genannt) unterschieden. Im VIII. Schema wird sie als material von der empirischen der menschlichen Kunst wie von dem neuen Begriff der intellektuellen bloß formalen

Zweckmäßigkeit der geometrischen Figuren unterschieden. In dem IV. und IX. Schema kommt sie als Zweckmäßigkeit der Form eines Gegenstandes vor, und material wird sie in den Schemata [I], II und VIII genannt. Im VIII. und IX. Schema erscheint die Moralität als eine besondere Art Zweckmäßigkeit bzw. als innere Bestimmung des Menschen.

Wenn wir nun unsere Ergebnisse mit den A- und B-Schemata, die von Marc-Wogau (S. 71 des zitierten Buches) angegeben werden, vergleichen, so -erhellt, daß beide aus einer artifiziellen Verallgemeinerung entstanden sind, die keiner wirklichen Stufe des Kantischen Denkens entspricht. (Man konnte vielleicht das Schema B als eine unpräzise Vereinfachung unseres VI. Schemas betrachten.) Was das Schema A betrifft, ist zu bemerken, I. daß die Zweckmäßigkeit der geometrischen Figuren vor allem objektiv ist, als der subjektiven Zweckmäßigkeit entgegengesetzt; 2. daß die Annehmlichkeit vor allem subjektiv oder ästhetisch ist, als der objektiven Zweckmäßigkeit entgegengesetzt; 3. daß das moralisch Gute als absichtlich, bzw. als innere Bestimmung des Menschen gar keine objektive, reale Zweckmäßigkeit ist, da es nicht, auch nicht hypothetisch, empirisch verifizierbar ist; daß das relativ Gute, nämlich das Nützliche des menschlichen Wirkens, nicht praktisch, sondern bloß technisch ist

Trotzdem können einige der von Marc-Wogau klargestellten Unterscheidungen als eine nützliche Vervollständigung unserer Ergebnisse betrachtet werden. Schließlich wollen wir noch einmal empfehlen, keine willkürlichen allgemeinen Schemata zu bilden, sondern jede Stelle aus dem näheren Zusammenhang zu interpretieren. Künstliche allgemeine Schemata entsprechen nur einer ungerechtfertigten Rationalisierung -und nicht den Absichten Kants; sie ändern die wirkliche Ordnung der Begriffe, sie in einen einzigen Zusammenhang zwingend und schwere Verwirrungen in den Beziehungen zwischen Allgemeinerem und Besonderem verursachend; und wenn man solche Schemata zur Interpretation des Textes anwendet, so wird der Sinn dadurch verstellt, daß man schon anfangs einige

Beziehungen zu Begriffen setzt, die wirklich erst später in der Entwicklung des Textes entstehen; und vice versa.“ (S. 165-166)
(1) Die *Kritik der Urteilskraft* wird aus der (Ist) Originalausgabe zitiert. Die *Erste Einleitung* aus der Ausgabe Lehmanns im XX. Band der Preußischen Akademie Ausgabe. Die übrigen Werke Kants aus der Preußischen Akademie Ausgabe, wenn andere Angaben fehlen.
(2) S. K. Marc-Wogau, *Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Uppsala-Leipzig, 1938, wo (S. 69, Anm.) die vorhergehenden Versuche zitiert werden.
(3) In unserem Aufsatze: *La formazione del testo della Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Bruxelles, Okt. 1954.
(4) In einer Monographie, die wir über die *Kritik der Urteilskraft* vorbereiten.
(5) Vgl. La formazione del testo della *Kritik der Urteilskraft*.

2. ———. 1959. "Der Streit Über Die Mathematische Methode in Der Philosophie in Der Ersten Hälfte Des 18. Jahrunderts Und Die Entstehung Von Kants Schrift Über Die Deutlichkeit." *Archiv für Philosophie* no. 9:37-66.

   Italienisch Übersetzung: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, S. 81-107.

3. ———. 1962. "Der Historische Ursprung Der Kantischen Termini "Analytik" Und "Dialektik"." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 7:120-139.

   "Bekanntlich sind zwei Hauptteile der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ mit „transzendentale Analytik“ und „transzendentale Dialektik“ überschrieben. Die Termini Analytik und Dialektik sind selbstverständlich keine Neologismen. Jedoch hat noch niemand bisher untersucht, aus welcher Tradition Kant hier geschöpft hat, und immerhin könnte man annehmen, daß er diese Ausdrücke willkürlich der älteren Philosophie entnommen und ihnen eine neue Bedeutung beigelegt hätte. Im folgenden werden

wir dagegen zeigen, daß beide Termini und ihr spezifischer Gebrauch bei Kant aus der deutschen Tradition des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts stammen. Kant hat sie freilich mit einer neuen Bedeutung erfüllt, blieb dabei aber ganz im Rahmen einer heimischen Überlieferung.
Eine zusammenfassende Übersicht über die Entwicklung der beiden fraglichen Termini wird unsere kurze Untersuchung einleiten (1)." (S. 120)
(...)
“III. Die Einteilung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Transzendentale Analytik und Transzendentale Dialektik ist zweifellos nach dem Vorgang von Darjes vorgenommen worden. Kant kannte die Darjes’sche Philosophie sehr gut, er hatte sich mit ihr mehrfach auseinandergesetzt und stand in einigen Einzelheiten unter dem Einfluß von Darjes und seiner Schule (104).
Der Inhalt der kantischen transzendentalen Analytik und Dialektik ist deutlich ein ganz anderer als der der gleichnamigen Teile der aristotelischen Handbücher; doch der hypothetische und antithetische Charakter der transzendentalen Dialektik entspricht wohl dem Begriffe der logica probabilium bzw. disputatrix. Diese Analogie dürfte Kant bewogen haben, den aristotelischen Terminus zu übernehmen. Der Stand der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung zu seiner Zeit läßt uns mit Gewißheit annehmen, daß Kant dabei den Terminus Dialektik völlig bewußt der aristotelischen Tradition gemäß verwendet und nicht im Sinn der platonisch-ramistischen. — Mit dem Terminus Analytik konnte er schon deshalb direkt an Aristoteles anknüpfen; da dieser Ausdruck ohnehin allein im aristotelischen Sinn im Gebrauch war. Kant hat in seinem Streben, für seine neuen philosophischen Begriffe passende Termini zu finden, die geeignet wären, diese von den wolffischen und anderen zu seiner Zeit geläufigen scharf zu differenzieren, auch in anderen Fällen mehrmals auf die ältere aristotelische Tradition in Deutschland zurückgegriffen: seine Übernahme des Terminus Kategorie bietet ein weiteres Beispiel dafür (105). Diese seine Terminologie vereinigt in sich die

Vorteile, zu Kants Zeit nicht allzu gewöhnlich zu sein und dabei doch durch eine glänzende Vergangenheit zugleich geadelt und allgemeinverständlich geworden zu sein. Der Unterschied der kantischen Begriffe von ihren aristotelischen Entsprechungen war dabei auffallend genug, daß eine Gefahr der Verwechslung nicht bestand.“ (S. 139)
(1) Vgl. im allg. G. Capone Braga, *Della Dialettica*, „Giornale di Metafisica“ IX, 1954; G. Losacco, *Storia della dialettica I* (bei den Griechen), Firenze 1922; N. Abbagnano, E. Paci, C. A. Viano, E. Garin, P. Chiodi, P. Rossi, N. Bobbio, *Studi Sulla dialettica,* Torino 1958; L. Sichirollo, *Aristotelica*, Urbino 1961, „Recenti ricerche sulla dialettica aristotelica“; für weitere Hinweise, s. Materialien zur Begriffsgeschichte, „Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte“, Bd. 5, 1960, siehe Artikel „Dialektik“.
(104) Siehe G. Tonelli, Elementi metafisici e metodologici in Kant (1745-1768), Vol. I, Torino 1959, passim und: A crisis in the Notion of Substance in the XVIII Century, „Tijdschrift voor Philosophie“, 1961, XXIII.
(105) Siehe G. Tonelli, La tradizione delle categorie aristoteliche nella filosofia moderna sino a Kant, „Studi Urbinati“, 1958, XXXII.

4. ———. 1963. "Die Umwälzung Von 1769 Bei Kant." *Kant Studien* no. 54:369-375.

   "Es ist hier unsere Absicht, die von uns schon einmal vorgetragene Erklärungshypothese zur Umwälzung der Kantischen Philosophie im Jahre 1769 weiterzubilden und zu berichtigen. Diese Hypothese wurde in ihrer ersten Form in unserem Band *Kant dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica pslcoempirica* (Torino, 1955, „Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 3a, Tomo 3, Parte II") dargestellt; sie soll in einem weiteren und fast vollendeten Werk über die Entstehung der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ihre endgültige Gestalt erreichen. Diese historische Erklärung und Interpretation gründet sich sowohl auf Kants Druckschriften wie auf die Nachlaßreflexionen. Nur das Wesentliche, von dem, was wir, dem gegenwärtigen Stand

unserer Untersuchungen entsprechend, feststellen zu können glauben, sei hier angedeutet.
Das bedeutendste Merkmal der Umwälzung vom Jahre 1769 ist, unserer Ansicht nach, die damals völlig zur Geltung gekommene *Trennung der Sinnlichkeit vom Verstände*. Die Deutung von Raum und Zeit als reine Formen der Anschauung, von einigen metaphysischen Grundbegriffen als synthetische Begriffe des Verstandes, dürfte nur eine Folge der erwähnten Trennung sein. Die Voraussetzungen für diese Trennung treten schon seit der Schrift über die *Negativen Größen* (1763) allmählich in Erscheinung. Kant hatte in seiner Dissertation über die *Deutlichkeit* (1762) behauptet (in Übereinstimmung mit der Meinung der deutschen philosophischen Schulen seiner Zeit), daß es möglich sei, das Mannigfaltige der Empfindung (das Reale) in seine Elemente zu analysieren, und diese Elemente wieder aufzulösen, bis die ihnen zugrunde liegenden einfachen Grundbegriffe erreicht weiden: und zwar so, daß die Erkenntnis der empfundenen Dinge durch diese Analyse ihre Deutlichkeit gewinnt, wogegen die nicht weiter auflösbaren Grundbegriffe ihre Deutlichkeit durch den entgegengesetzten Prozeß erreichen, nämlich durch die Synthese, indem sie, miteinander zusammengesetzt, nochmals zur Mannigfaltigkeit des ' Wirklichen kommen, die man als Ausgangspunkt genommen hatte. Kant) behauptete jedoch, und dieses gegen die Meinung der Schulen, daß man in Wahrheit immer noch weit entfernt davon war, die besprochenen Grundbegriffe analytisch festgestellt zu haben.
Die Welt war also damals für Kant, der Terminologie der Schulen gemäß, ein System von Gattungen und Arten, die nach, dem Satz der Identität einander subordiniert sind. Dieser Satz, obwohl zur Begründung des Realen unzureichend (denn dazu war auch der Satz des zureichenden Grundes notwendig, welcher, den Ansichten von Crusius gemäß, vom Satze der Identität grundverschieden war — wie Kant in der *Nova Dilucidatio* behauptet hatte), fand doch in dieser Welt nichts, das seiner Form fremd war." (S. 369-370)

5. ———. 1964. "Das Wiederaufleben Der Deutsch-Aristotelischen Terminologie Bei Kant Während Der Enstehung Der "Kritik Der Der Reinen Vernunft"." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* no. 9:233-242.

   Italienisch Übersetzung: G. Tonelli, *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento*, Napoli: Prismi, 1987, S. 171-180.

6. ———. 1966. "Die Voraussetzungen Zur Kantischen Urteilstafel in Der Logik Des 18. Jahrhunderts." In *Kritik Und Metaphysik Studien. Heinz Heimsoeth Zum Achtzigsten Geburtstag*, edited by Kaulbach, Friedrich and Riiter, Joachim, 134-158. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

   Deutsch Übersetzung von *L'origine della tavola dei giudizi e del problema della deduzione delle categorie in Kant*, Filosofia, 7, 1956, S. 129-138.

7. ———. 1966. "Die Anfänge Von Kants Kritik Der Kausalbeziehungen Und Ihre Voraussetzungen Im 18. Jahrhundert." *Kant Studien* no. 57:419-456.

   "Dem gegenwärtigen Zustand der Kantforschung gemäß darf man sowohl sagen, daß die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kausalität den Kern des Problems der Beziehungen zwischen Kant und Hume, wie daß die Beziehungen Kant/Hume den Kern des Problems von den Anfängen von Kants Kausalitätskritik bilden. Das Ziel dieser Untersuchung wird hauptsächlich eine Umgestaltung einer solchen Sachlage sein: und zwar dadurch, daß wir zeigen werden, wie Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen aus einer Problematik entsprang, die in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts so verbreitet war (und die wiederum mit der Gesamtlage der philosophischen Entwicklung jener Zeit in Verbindung war), daß sowohl eine ausschließliche wie eine vorzügliche Beziehung auf Hume in diesem Bezug kaum noch einen Sinn hat. Dadurch werden auch die Grenzen unserer Untersuchung bestimmt: es ist hier nicht unsere Ansicht, die Frage zu erörtern, welche Rolle das

Kausalitätsproblem in der Entstehung von Kants Kritizismus gespielt habe; eine Frage, die wir schon bei anderen Gelegenheiten besprochen haben (1), Die bisherigen Behandlungen der Geschichte des Kausalitätsproblems (2) beleuchten nur die Hauptepisoden seiner Entwicklung und bieten daher keiner Anhalt für unsere Besprechung; zumal da wir diese Entwicklung aus der besonderen Perspektive der Krise des Kausalbegriffes studieren sollen. Man darf zwischen dem Ende des 17. und dem Anfang des 18, Jahrhunderts vier verschiedene kritische Einstellungen zum Kausalitätsproblem als typisch betrachten. Wir werden erstens den Okkasionalismus Malebranches und die vorherbestimmte Harmonie Leibnizens, ihren weitreichenden Unterschieden zum Trotz, zusammennennen. Als zweite typische Einstellung betrachten wir die Methodologie der Naturwissenschaft, wie Newton sie verstanden hat. Als dritte den relativen metaphysischen Skeptizismus der thomasisch-pietistischen Philosophenschule, in Beziehung auf die Kausalitätslehre Rüdigers und besonders Aug. Fried. Müllers. Als vierte und letzte die Erkenntnislehre Burthogges. Wir wollen nun diese verschiedenen Fragestellungen einzeln betrachten." (S. 419-420)
(1) Siehe: G. Tonelli, Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempiriea, Torino 195! (Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 3", Tomo 3, Parte II), S. 248ff Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant, in: Kant-Studien 54 (1963), S. 369ff.
(2) E. König, Die Entwicklung des Causalproblem, Leipzig 1888; E. Wentscher, Ge schichte des Kausalproblems in der neueren Philosophie, Leipzig 1921; E. Cassirer, Das Et kenntnisproblem, Bd. II, Berlin 1922.

8. ———. 1967. "Kant Und Die Antiken Skeptiker." In *Studien Zu Kants Philosophischer Entwicklung*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz, Henrich, Dieter and Tonelli, Giorgio, 93-123. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Englisch Übersetzung: *Kant and the Ancient Sceptics*, in R. H. Popkin, E. De Olaso, G.Tonelli (Hrsg.), *Scepticism in the Enlightenment*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997, pp. 69-98.

9. ———. 1969. "Einleitung." In *Christian August Crusius, De Philosophischen Hauptwerke. Band I*, V-LXV. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

10. ———. 1969. "Einleitung." In *Johann Georg Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie Der Schönen Künste*, V-XIX. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Definitions of *Ontology*. From Christian Wolff to Edmund Husserl

Defining "Ontology"

a) *One of the best available dictionaries gives the following definition of Ontology*:
"1. A science or study of being: specifically, a branch of metaphysics relating to the nature and relations of being; a particular system according to which problems of the nature of being are investigated; first philosophy.
2. a theory concerning the kinds of entities and specifically the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a language system."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, s.v. "ontology".

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b) *The first sense is commonly used in the philosophical tradition:*

"In contemporary philosophy, formal ontology has been developed in two principal ways. The first approach has been to study formal ontology as a part of ontology, and to analyse it using the tools and approach of formal logic: from this point of view formal ontology examines the logical features of predication and of the various theories of universals. The use of the specific paradigm of the set theory applied to predication, moreover, conditions its interpretation."

The second line of development returns to its Husserlian origins and analyses the fundamental categories of object, state of affairs, part, whole, and so forth, as well as the relations between parts and the whole and their laws of dependence - once all material concepts have been replaced by their correlative form concepts relative to the pure 'something'. This kind of analysis does not deal with the problem of the relationship between formal ontology and material ontology." (p. 199)

Liliana Albertazzi, "Formal and Material Ontology" in: Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996, pp. 199-232.

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c) *The second sense is used in research on Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Representation; one of the best known definitions is Tom Gruber's:*

"An *ontology* is an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an ontology is a systematic account of Existence. For knowledge-based systems, what “exists” is exactly that which can be represented. When the knowledge of a domain is represented in a declarative formalism, the set of objects that can be represented is called the universe of discourse. This set of objects, and the describable relationships among them, are reflected in the representational *vocabulary* with which a knowledge-based program represents knowledge. Thus, we can describe the ontology of a program by defining a set of representational terms. In such an ontology, definitions associate the names of entities in the universe of discourse (e.g., classes, relations, functions, or other objects) with human-readable text describing what the names are meant to denote, and formal axioms that constrain the interpretation and well-formed use of these terms." (pp. 199)

Tom Gruber, "A Translation Approach to Portable Ontology Specifications" in: *Knowledge Acquisition*, 5, 1993, pp. 199-220.

This definition has been criticized by Guarino and Giaretta that, after examining seven possible interpretations of

ontology, (1) *write:*
"A starting point in this clarification effort will be the careful analysis of the interpretation adopted by Gruber. The main problem with such an interpretation is that it is based on a notion of conceptualization (introduced in: Genesereth, Michael R. and Nilsson, L. "Logical Foundation of Artificial Intelligence" Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos: California, 1987) which doesn't fit our intuitions, (...): according to Genesereth and Nilsson, a conceptualization is a set of extensional relations describing a particular state of affairs, while the notion we have in mind is an intensional one, namely something like a conceptual grid which we superimpose to various possible state of affairs. We propose in this paper a revised definition of a conceptualization which captures this intensional aspect, while allowing us to give a satisfactory interpretation to Gruber's definition." (p.26)

Notes

The definitions are:

1. 1. Ontology as a philosophical discipline
2. 2. Ontology as a an informal conceptual system
3. 3. Ontology as a formal semantic account
4. 4. Ontology as a specification of a conceptualization
5. 5. Ontology as a representation of a conceptual system via a logical theory
6. 5.1 characterized by specific formal properties
7. 5.2 characterized only by its specific purposes
8. 6. Ontology as the vocabulary used by a logical theory
9. 7. Ontology as a (meta-level) specification of a logical theory

Nicola Guarino, Pierdaniele Giaretta, "Ontologies and Knowledge Bases. Towards a Terminological Clarification", in: N.J.I. Mars (ed.), *Towards Very Large Knowledge Bases*, Amsterdam: IOS Press 1995, pp. 25-32.

Guarino gives this definition: "Since this paper is deliberately addressed to an interdisciplinary audience, it is advisable to pay attention to some preliminary terminological clarifications, especially because some crucial terms appear to be used with different senses in different communities (4). Let us first consider the distinction between "Ontology" (with the capital "o"), as in the statement "Ontology is a fascinating discipline" and "ontology" (with the lowercase "o"), as in the expressions "Aristotle's ontology" or "CYC's ontology". The same term has an uncountable reading in the former case, and a countable reading in the latter. While the former reading seems to be reasonably clear (as referring to a particular philosophical discipline), two different senses are assumed by the philosophical community and the Artificial Intelligence community (and, in general, the whole computer science community) for the latter term.
In the philosophical sense, we may refer to an ontology as a particular system of categories accounting for a certain vision of the world. As such, this system does not depend on a particular language: Aristotle's ontology is always the same, independently of the language used to describe it. On the other hand, in its most prevalent use in AI, an ontology refers to an engineering artifact, constituted by a specific vocabulary used to describe a certain reality, plus a set of explicit assumptions regarding the intended meaning of the vocabulary words. This set of assumptions has usually the form of a first-order logical theory (5), where vocabulary words appear as unary or binary predicate names, respectively called concepts and relations. In the simplest case, an ontology describes a hierarchy of concepts related by subsumption relationships; in more sophisticated cases, suitable axioms are added in order to express other relationships between concepts and to constrain their intended interpretation.
The two readings of ontology described above are indeed related each other, but in order to solve the terminological impasse we need to choose one of them, inventing a new name for the other: we shall adopt the AI reading, using the word conceptualization to refer to the philosophical reading. So two ontologies can be different in the vocabulary used (using English or Italian words, for instance) while sharing the same conceptualization." (p. 4)

Notes

(4) I elaborate here on some material already published in Guarino, N. and Giaretta, P. 1995. "Ontologies and Knowledge Bases: Towards a Terminological Clarification". In N. Mars (ed.) *Towards Very Large Knowledge Bases: Knowledge Building and Knowledge Sharing 1995*. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 25-32.
(5) In this case, an ontology is sometimes called a formal ontology, although we shall use the expression "formal ontology" only to refer to a philosophical research field.

From: Nicola Guarino "*Formal Ontology and Information Systems*", in: N. Guarino (ed.), *Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the First International Conference, Trento, Italy, 6-8 June 1998* Amsterdam: IOS Press 1998, pp. 3-15.

DESCRIPTIVE, FORMAL AND FORMALIZED ONTOLOGY

"I shall distinguish descriptive, formal and formalized ontology. Each of these ontologies comes in two guises: domain-dependent and domain-independent. Domain-dependent ontologies concern categorically closed regions of being; on the other hand, a domain independent ontology may be properly called general ontology. (...) Descriptive ontology concerns the collection of such prima facie information either in some specific domain of analysis or in general.
Formal ontology distills, filters, codifies and organizes the results of descriptive ontology (in either its local or global setting). According to this interpretation, formal ontology is formal in the sense used by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. Being 'formal' in such a sense therefore means dealing with categories like thing, process, matter, whole, part, and number. These are pure categories that characterize aspects or types of reality and still have nothing to do with the use of any specific formalism.

Formal codification in the strict sense is undertaken at the third level of theory construction: namely that of formalized ontology. The task here is to find the proper formal codification for the constructs descriptively acquired and formally purified in the way just indicated. The level of formalized constructions also relates to evaluation of the adequacy (expressive, computational, cognitive) of the various formalisms, and to the problem of their reciprocal translations.
The close similarity between the terms 'formal' and 'formalized' is somewhat unfortunate. One way to avoid the clash is to use 'categorical' instead of 'formal'.
Most contemporary theory recognizes only two levels of work and often merges the level of the formal categories either with that of descriptive or with that of formalized analysis. As a consequence, the specific relevance of categorical analyses is too often neglected.
The three levels of ontology are different but not separate. In many respects they affect each other. Descriptive findings may bear on formal categories; formalized outcomes may bear on their twin levels, etc. To set out the differences and the connections between the various ontological facets precisely is a most delicate task." (p. 183)

From: Roberto Poli, "Descriptive, Formal and Formalized Ontologies", in: Denis Fisette (ed.), *Husserl's* Logical Investigations *Reconsidered*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003, pp. 183-210.

"The idea of a formal ontology arose around the turn of the present century in the work of Edmund Husserl. It coincides in many respects with what is nowadays sometimes called 'analytic metaphysics' or with attempts to use formal methods to solve classical philosophical problems relating to the notions of being, object, state of affairs, existence, property, relation, universal, particular, substance, accident, part, boundary, measure, causality, and so on. Formal ontology thus includes several sub-disciplines, of which the most developed is the theory of part and whole, as sketched by Husserl in the third of his Logical Investigations and later worked out as a formal theory by

Leśniewski. Formal-ontological ideas are present also in much contemporary work on naïve physics and in the formal theories of the common-sense world canvassed by workers in the field of artificial intelligence research.
The idea of a formal ontology is placed in a network of conceptual oppositions: it admits of different senses according to which of its two constituent elements is given priority. If the emphasis is placed on 'ontology' then the principal distinction is between 'formal' and 'material' (that is between 'formal ontology' and 'material ontology'); if instead the emphasis falls on 'formal', the contrast is between 'ontology' and 'logic' ('formal ontology' vs. 'formal logic'). This situation raises some important questions: When one speaks of 'ontology', how can its formal aspects be distinguished from its material ones? When we talk about the 'formal', how can we distinguish between logic and ontology?" (*Foreword by the Editors*, p. VII)

From: Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996.

"One hundred years ago, Edmund Husserl was perhaps the first philosopher to pay any interest to the formal treatment of some of the most fundamental questions of ontology. Powerful tools of logic were developed in those days, and this new development inspired in a natural way various attempts to use these techniques within this prestigious area of philosophical inquiry. Through Husserl's younger colleague, Roman Ingarden, and in the light of related ideas of Leśniewski and other members of Lwow-Warsaw School, these ideas spread rapidly, particularly in the Polish scientific community.
Philosophical inquiries into ontology in an advanced formal setting were put forward first by Stanislaw Leśniewski. Inspired by the contemporary discussion on the foundations of mathematics, Leśniewski was interested in finding a formal framework appropriate for the ontological grounding of both mathematics and logic. The basic system was Mereology, i.e. the general theory of collective sets. Ontology itself arises from Protothetic. All his axiomatic systems came about in an elegant yet somewhat exotic notation. (1) Leśniewski's mereology was

intended to play the part of an alternative to set theory. Later -- as an axiomatic 'calculus of individuals' -- it appears to be a proper extension of set theory rather than a competitive calculus. Thomas Mormann's article 'Topological Representations of Mereological Systems' (2) can be seen as a recent example of that line of research. He shows that nothing is lost when a reasonable mereological system is substituted by its topological model. That brings mereology into contact with well developed mathematical theories and may help mereology, as Mormann concludes, "to leave its present state of theoretical immaturity". In any case, mereology can be treated as a contribution to formal ontology only if it carries a meaningful theory of (the construction of) universes. The same holds for (pure) set theory itself, which is sometimes taken to be the most usable and convenient base for any formal ontological system (cf. Quine's discussion of this topic in various places, and for several other approaches see e.g. Poli and Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology* Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996; Scheffler and Urchs, "Ontologic. Essays on Formal Ontology", *Logic and Logical Philosophy*, Torun, Copernicus University Press, vol. 2, 1995)." (p. 11)

Notes

(1) Tadeusz Kotarbinski served as a faithful translator of Leśniewski's rather esoteric writings for the broader public. Most of Leśniewski's successors both within and outside the Lwow-Warsaw School set out their own considerations on formal ontology in the spirit of his systems. They often, however, use Kotarbinski's explication of these ideas.
(2) [Same volume, pp. 463-486].

From: Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs, "Philosophical Entities. An Introduction", in: Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs (eds.), *Things, Facts and Events*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000, pp. 1-64.

DEFINITIONS BY SOME LEADING PHILOSOPHERS

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ (1646-1716)

There are three occurrences of the term *ontologia* in Leibniz:

"Ontologiam seu scientiam de Aliquo et Nihilo, Ente et Non ente, Re et modo rei, Substantia et Accidente" ("Ontology or the science of something and of nothing, of being and not-being, of the thing and the mode of the thing, of substance and accident."

From: Louis Couturat, *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz*, Paris: Alcan 1903. Reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1961, p. 512 (*Introductio ad Encyclopaediam Arcanam)* (Now in: G. W. Leibniz *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe,* VI Sektion: Philosophische Schriften, Band IV, Text n. 126 p. 527.)

In a fragment titled by the Editors *De duobus systematis scientiarum* (1693?) on the classification of books in a library Leibniz in a deleted paragraph wrote: "Philosophici *doppelt unterstr*. (aaaa) Dida (bbbb) Logicam, Mnem (cccc) Didacticam, (aaaaa) Mnemonicam, (bbbbb) Logicam (aaaaaa) Rhet (bbbbbb) oratoriam seu (aaaaaaa) Persuasoriam (bbbbbbb) partem Rhetoricae persuasoriam, Mnemonicam; (aaaaaaaa) Metaphysicam, (bbbbbbbb) Ontologiam". (*Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2004, Reihe IV, Bd. V, p. 592, ad. l. 25.

The third occurrence was published by Nicholas Jolley, "An Unpublished Leibniz MS on Metaphysics", *Studia Leibnitiana*, 7 (1975), 2, p. 179, l. 81 and var. ad l. 81: "Scientiam autem genera lis quam vulgo Ontolog...", but he later altered his text to read: "Scientia autem generalis quam dicam Metaphysicam vocant".

(See: Michaël Devaux, Marco Lamanna, "The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606-1730)", *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of the Metaphysics*, 9, 2009, pp. 173-208 (on Leibniz see pp. 197-198).

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679-1754)

"If you wish to study philosophy fruitfully, then logic must be given the very first place. Logic treats the rules which direct the cognitive faculty to the knowledge of truth. Now we should study philosophy in such a way as to acquire complete certitude. Hence, he who studies philosophy should know how to proceed in the knowledge of truth. Consequently, he should be acquainted with logic. Hence, logic must be given the very first place.
It might also be mentioned that those who are beginning in philosophy overcome their inexperience by studying logic. We have already given the reason for this. He who is unacquainted with logic does not know how to examine definitions and demonstrations with rigor. Therefore, he easily admits as certain things which greatly disagree with evidence. And he often thinks he understands things which he has not examined.
However, if everything in logic is to be demonstrated, then principles must be borrowed from ontology and psychology. Logic treats of the rules which direct the intellect in the knowledge of all being, for the definition of logic does not restrict it to any species of being; therefore, it ought to teach us what to look for in order to know things. Now that which pertains to the general knowledge of being is derived from ontology. Hence it is clear that, in order to demonstrate the rules of logic, principles must be taken from ontology.
Furthermore, since logic explains how to direct the intellect in the knowledge of truth, it ought to teach how the operations of the intellect are used in knowing truth. Now we must learn from psychology what the cognitive faculty is and what its operations are. Hence it is also clear that, in order to demonstrate the rules of logic, principles must be taken from psychology.

This will be clearer when you have learned logic and have compared it with ontology and psychology. We have experienced this many times while carefully investigating the rules of logic and their reasons.
If all things in logic are to be rigorously demonstrated with genuine proofs, then logic must come after ontology and psychology. Logic derives its principles from ontology and psychology. Now the parts of philosophy should be ordered in such a way that those parts come first which provide principles for other parts. Therefore, ontology and psychology should precede logic if everything in logic is to be rigorously demonstrated and if its rules are to be genuinely proven. Demonstrative method requires that logic be treated after ontology and psychology. However, the process of learning requires that logic precede all the other parts of philosophy, including ontology and psychology. Both methods cannot be observed. Weighing this more carefully, we should realize that he who does not know logic cannot be usefully acquainted with ontology and psychology. However, the principles of ontology and psychology which pertain to logic can be easily explained in logic. Therefore, we choose the method of learning in preference to the method of demonstration.
Another reason why this approach is preferable is that ontological principles are definitions and psychological principles are established from experience. Consequently, ontological principles can be understood and admitted as true, even though the other things which are treated in ontology have not yet been examined. And the presuppositions of logic which can be demonstrated in psychology can be grasped a posteriori." (p. 17)
"Philosophy is the science of the possibles insofar as they can be." (*ibid.*, pp. 39-40)
"There are some things which are common to all beings and which are predicated both of souls and of natural and artificial bodies. That part of philosophy which treats of being in general and of the general affections of being is called ontology, or first philosophy. Thus, ontology, or first philosophy, is defined as the science of being in general, or insofar as it is being.
Such general notions are the notions of essence, existence, attributes, modes, necessity, contingency, place, time, perfection,

order, simplicity, composition, etc. These things are not explained properly in either psychology or physics because both of these sciences, as well as the other parts of philosophy, use these general notions and the principles derived from them. Hence, it is quite necessary that a special part of philosophy be designated to explain these notions and general principles, which are continually used in every science and art, and even in life itself, if it is to be rightly organized. Indeed, without ontology, philosophy cannot be developed according to the demonstrative method. Even the art of discovery takes its principles from ontology." (*ibid.*, pp. 45-46)

From: Christian Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General* 1728), translated, with an introduction and notes, by Richard J. Blackwell, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1963.

ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN (1714 - 1762)

"Prolegomena to Metaphysics [1-3]
1. METAPHYSICS is the science of first principles in human cognition.
2. Ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology belong to metaphysics.
3. NATURAL METAPHYSICS is the cognition of matters treated in metaphysics that are attained through the mere use of these matters. If artificial [metaphysics] explained in 1 is also added to it, then it is useful (1) for the development of its concepts, (2) for the determination and conception of its first principles, and (3) for the continuation and certainty of its proofs, etc.

PART ONE: ONTOLOGY [4-35c]
Prolegomena [4-6]

4. ONTOLOGY (ontosophy, metaphysics, cf. 1, universal metaphysics, architectonic, first philosophy) is the science of the general predicates of a thing.

5. The predicates of a thing that are more general are the first principles of human cognition, thus ontology belongs (2), with reason, to metaphysics (1, 4).
6. Ontology contains the predicates of a thing (4), (I) [that are] internal, (I) universal, which are in each thing, (2) disjunctive, one of which is in each thing; (II) relative." (p. 89)
Translated from Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* (Frankfurt, 1757, 4th ed., 1739 1st ed.), reprinted at 15:4-54 and 17:23-226 of Immanuel Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Königlich-Preussischen Akademe der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1902-).

From: Eric Watkins, *Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason. *Background Sources Materials*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009.

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

"In the course of the present semester which has just begun, I propose to hold private lectures on the following science, which I intend to handle in an exhaustive fashion.
1. Metaphysics. (...) I hope that I shall be able in the near future to present a complete account of what may serve as the foundation of my lectures in the aforementioned science. Until that time, however, I can easily, by applying gentile pressure, induce A. G. Baumgarten, the author of the text book on which this course will be based [the Metaphysica (1739)] -- and that book has been chosen chiefly for the richness of its contents and the precision of its method -- to follow the same path. Accordingly, after a brief introduction, I shall begin with empirical psychology, which is really the metaphysical science of man based on experience. (...)The second part of the course will discuss corporeal nature in general. (...) Since everything in the world can be subsumed under these two classes [organic and inorganic], I shall then proceed to ontology, the science, namely, which is concerned with the more general properties of all things." (pp. 294-295)

From: *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Programme of His Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766*, translated and edited by David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote in: Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

"The Transcendental Analytic accordingly has this important result: That the understanding can never accomplish *a priori* anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given too us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic *a priori* cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (A 247 / B 303)" (p. 345)

From: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.

"Thus all pure *a priori* cognition, by means of the special faculty of cognition in which alone it can have its seat, constitutes a special unity, and metaphysics is that philosophy which is to present that cognition in this systematic unity. Its speculative part, to which this name has been especially appropriated, namely that which we call metaphysics of nature and which considers everything insofar as it is (not that which ought to be) on the basis of a priori concepts, is divided in the following way.
(*a*)
Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understanding and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles that are related to objects in general, without assuming objects that would be given (*Ontologia*); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects

(whether they are given by the senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), and is therefore physiology (though only *rationalis*). (A 845 / B 873)"

(*a*) Inserted in Kant's copy of the first edition:
"I would divide it in accordance with the classes of the categories, so that in the third category, which contains the other two, yields the idea of the science:
“1. General ontology [*Allgemeine Wesenlehre*]; 2. Theory of nature; 3. Cosmology [*Weltwissenschaft*]; 4. Theology." (E CLXXXIII, p. 54; 23:43). This is the last emendation Kant made in his copy of the first edition.

> "Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts. 1. Ontology. 2. Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. Rational Theology. The second part, namely the doctrine of nature of pure reason, contains two divisions, *physica rationalis* and *psychologia rationalis*. (A 847 / B 875)" (pp. 698-699)

From: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.

"We now begin the science of the properties of all things in general, which is called ontology. (...) One easily comprehends that it will contain nothing but all basic concepts and basic propositions of our a priori cognition in general: for if it is to consider the properties of all things, then it has as an object nothing but a thing in general, i.e., every object of thought, thus no determinate object. Thus nothing remains for me other than the cognizing, which I consider. (The science that deals with objects in general, will deal with nothing but those concepts through which the understanding thinks, thus of the nature of the understanding and of reason, insofar as it cognizes something a priori. - That is transcendental philosophy, which does not say something a priori of objects, but rather investigates the faculty of the understanding or of reason for cognizing something a priori; thus with regard to content it is a self-cognition of the

understanding or of reason, just as logic is a self-cognition of the understanding and of reason with regard to form; the critique of pure reason belongs necessarily to transcendental philosophy. But since one used to treat ontology without a critique - what was ontology then? An ontology that was not a transcendental philosophy. Thus one philosophized back and forth without asking: can one do that? Transcendental philosophy is the result of critique, for if I can represent the extent and the sources in a connection then the connected representation of the a priori principles is transcendental philosophy, and if I take all the consequences that flow from that, then that is metaphysics; without critique I do not know whether the concepts of pure reason and pure understanding are all there or whether some are still missing - because I have no principles. One set no boundaries to reason, and thereby went as far as one was able. They indeed comprehend that in matters of experience they cannot mix everything together, but a priori they can comprehend everything, and that because no one can refute them)." (pp. 140-141)

From: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Part III *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1782-1783), translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997.

"Philosophy, like mathematics as well, can be divided into two parts, namely into the *pure* and into the *applied*. - *Metaphysics* is the system of pure philosophy. The word metaphysics means a science which goes beyond the boundaries of nature. (Nature is the summation of all objects of experience.)
A principle *principium* is a general rule, which again contains other rules under it. lf we take together all pure concepts which can be entirely separated from the empirical ones, then we attain thereby a science.
Philosophical cognition consists of mere concepts *a priori*.
Physics is the philosophy of nature insofar as it depends on principles from experience; but *metaphysics* is the philosophy of nature insofar as it depends on *a priori* principles. *Moral philosophy* teaches us the practical principles of reason. The

concepts *toward which everything seems to be aimed* is the concept of a *highest being and of another world*.
Metaphysics is *necessary*. Its ground is reason, which is never to be satisfied by empirical concepts. Reason finds satisfaction neither in the consideration of things, nor in the field of experience, i.e, in the sensible world. The concepts of God and of the immortality of the soul, these are the two great incentives on whose account reason went out beyond the field of experience.
A major question is: *how are* a priori *cognitions possible*? The whole pure mathematics is a science which contains only *a priori* concepts, without its supporting their ground on empirical concepts. That there are thus actual *a priori* cognitions is already proved; indeed, there is a whole science of sheer pure concepts of the understanding. But the question arises: how are the *a priori* cognitions possible? The science that answers this question is called critique of pure reason. Transcendental philosophy is the system of all our pure a priori cognitions; customarily it is called *ontology*. Ontology thus deals with things in general, it abstracts from everything particular. It embraces all pure concepts of the understanding and all principles of the understanding or of reason.
The main sciences that belong in metaphysics are: *ontology, cosmology*, and *theology*.
(...)
Ontology is a pure doctrine of elements of all our a priori cognitions, or: it contains the summation of all our pure concepts that we can have *a priori* of things." (pp. 307-308)

From: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Part V. *Metaphysik L2* (1790-1791?), translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997.

"Ontology is the first part that actually belongs to metaphysics. The word itself comes from the Greek, and just means the *science of beings,* or properly according to the sense of the words, the *general doctrine of being*.
Ontology is the doctrine of elements of all my concepts that my understanding can have only *a priori*.

ON THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE. The first and most important question in ontology is: how are a priori cognitions possible? This question must be solved first, for the whole of ontology is based on the solution of this question. Aristotle decided the proposition in that he rejected all a priori cognitions, and said that all cognitions were empirical, or that they were based on the first principles of experience. For his main proposition was: nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses . Through this he overturned all a priori cognitions. But Plato said that all our a priori cognitions arose from an original intuition.

We have no innate concepts at all, but rather we attain them all, or we receive acquired concepts. The understanding acquires concepts by its paying attention to its own use. All that can be said of that is this: that there are certain a priori cognitions, even when it seems that they are taken from experience, or that they are used beyond the boundaries of experience. There is in our reason a certain dialectic, that is: a certain art of illusion, which shows me either something true or false. A good dialectician must maintain at the same time and with the same facility thesis and antithesis of a matter, or he must at the same time prove the truth and falsity of a matter, or be able to say yes or no. Dialectic contains a conflict which indicates that it is impossible to proceed dogmatically here in metaphysics." (p. 309)

From: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* - Part V. *Metaphysik L2* (1790-1791?), translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997.

"Ontology is that science (as part of metaphysics) which consists in a system of all concepts of the understanding, and principles, but only so far as they refer to objects that can be given to the senses, and thus confirmed by experience. It makes no allusion to the super-sensible, which is nevertheless the final aim of metaphysics, and thus belongs to the latter only as a propaedeutic, as the hallway or vestibule of metaphysics proper, and is called transcendental philosophy, because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a priori.

In this field there has not been much progress since the days of Aristotle. For as grammar is the resolution of a speech-form into its elementary rules, and logic a resolution of the form of thought, so ontology is a resolution of knowledge into the concepts that lie *a priori* in the understanding, and have their use in experience; a system whose troublesome elaboration we may very well be spared, if only we bear in mind the rules for the right use of these concepts and principles, for purposes of empirical knowledge; for experience always confirms or corrects it, which does not happen if our design is to progress from the sensible to the super-sensible, for which purpose an assessment of the powers of understanding and its principles must indeed be carried out with thoroughness and care, in order to know from whence, and with what props and crutches, reason can venture upon its transition from the objects of experience to those that are not of this kind. Now the celebrated Wolf has rendered an incontestable service to ontology, by his clarity and precision in analysing these powers; but not by any addition to our knowledge in that area, since the subject matter was exhausted.
However, the above definition, which merely indicates what is *wanted* of metaphysics, not what there needs to be done *in it*, would simply mark it out from other doctrines as a discipline belonging to philosophy in the specific meaning of the term, to the doctrine of wisdom, and prescribe its principles to the absolutely necessary practical use of reason; though that has only an indirect relation to metaphysics considered as a scholastic science and system of certain theoretical cognitions a priori, which are made the immediate topic of concern. Hence the explanation of metaphysics according to the notion of the schools will be that it is the system of all principles of purely theoretical rational knowledge through concepts; or in brief, that it is the system of pure theoretical philosophy." (p. 354)

From: Immanuel Kant, *What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* (1793/1804) - in: *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781*, edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.

"The first stage of metaphysics can be called that of ontology, since it does not teach us to investigate the essence of our concepts of things by a resolution into their elements, which is the business of logic; it tells us, rather, what concepts of things we frame to ourselves *a priori*, and how, in order to subsume thereunder whatever may be given to us in intuition generally; which in turn could not happen save insofar as the form of *a priori* intuition in space and time makes these objects knowable to us merely as appearances, not as things-in-themselves. In this stage, reason sees itself obliged, in a series of conditions, subordinated one to another and each in turn conditioned without end, to progress incessantly towards the unconditioned, since every space and every time can never be represented as anything but part of a still larger given space or title, in which the conditions for what is given to us in each intuition must still be sought, in order to attain to the unconditioned." (p. 376)

From: Immanuel Kant, *What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* (1793/1804), in: *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781*, edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.

SALOMON MAIMON (1753-1800)

"After what has already been said, it is easy to think that I associate a quite different concept with the word ontology than the concept usually associated with it. That is to say, for me ontology is not a science that is applicable to the thing in itself, but only to appearances. It cannot have a wider domain. Here I will deal specifically with those points where I differ from the Wolffians, and hence also from Kant; for to say what others have already said would be superfluous, My exposition follows Baumgarten's paragraph ordering, so that the reader may more easily grasp the difference between our approaches). (1)

Ontology is the science of the most general properties of things; that is to say, not the properties of a thing in general (of a thing determined through no condition), but the properties of every a priori determined thing. As a part of metaphysics., it differs from logic as much as from the doctrine of nature as follows: logic relates merely to the form of thinking., without relation to any determined object whether determined a priori or a posteriori), while the doctrine of nature relates itself only to an object determined a posteriori. For example, the form of hypothetical propositions in logic is expressed like this: if one thing is supposed then another thing must necessarily be supposed. Here the subject (thing) is determined only by the predicate (relation of antecedent to consequent). In physics the form is expressed like this; 'heat expands ails.: here the subject of the relation ([between] heat and air) is determined by means of a posteriori conditions, In metaphysics, on the other hand, it is expressed like this: if A comes first, and B follows it according to a I rule, then the supposition of A makes it necessary to suppose B. In this case the subject of the relation of cause and effect) is determined by means of a time-determination (succession according to a rule) that is a priori. So the concept or principle of cause belongs to metaphysics. The objects of logic can be compared to transcendental magnitudes (which are not determined in relation to one another by any algebraic equation), while the objects of metaphysics can he comparcd to variable magnitudes (which are determined only by means of their relation to one another), and the objects of physics to continuous magnitudes." (pp. 126-127)

Notes

(1) Maimon's paragraph numbering in fact follows not the original Latin text of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* but that of Georg Friedrich Meter's abridged German translation: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* trans. G. F. Meier, (Halle: 1783).

From: Salomon Maimon, *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), translated by Nick Midgley et. al., London-New York: Continuum 2010.

BERNARD BOLZANO (1781-1848)

" I therefore think that mathematics could best be defined as a science which deals with the general laws (forms) to which things must conform in their existence. By the word 'things', I understand here not merely those which possess an objective existence independent of our awareness, but also those which simply exist among our ideas, either as individuals i.e. intuitions, or simply as general concepts, in other words, everything at all which can be an object of our perception. Furthermore, if I say that mathematics deals with the laws to which these things conform in their existence, this indicates that our science is concerned not with the proof of the existence of these things, but only with the conditions of their possibility. When I call these laws general, I mean it to be understood that mathematics never deals with a single thing as an individual, but always with whole genera. These genera can of course be higher or lower, and on this will be based the classification of mathematics into individual disciplines.

The definition given here will certainly not be found too narrow, for it clearly covers everything that has previously been counted in the domain of mathematics. But I am more afraid that it might be found rather too wide, and the objection might be made that it leaves too little for philosophy (metaphysics), as the latter will be limited by my definition to the single concern of proving, from *a priori* concepts, the real existence of certain objects. Mathematics and metaphysics, the two main parts of our a priori knowledge, would, by this definition, be contrasted with each other so that the first deals with the general conditions under which existence of things is possible; the latter, on the other hand, seeks to prove a priori the reality of certain objects (such as the freedom of God and the immortality of the soul). Or, in other words, the former concerns itself with the question, how must things be made in order that they should be possible? The latter raises the question, which things are real -- and indeed (because it is to answered a priori) -- necessarily real? Or still more briefly, mathematics

would deal with hypothetical (1) necessity, metaphysics with absolute necessity." (p. 183)

Notes

(1) However, not all its propositions have this hypothetical form, because the condition, especially in chronometry and geometry, where it is the same for all propositions, is tacitly assumed.

From: Bernard Bolzano, "Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics" (1810), translated by William Ewald in: *From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics*, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996.

FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1917)

"*The Fourfold Distinction of Being*.Being is a homonym. Its several senses fit into the fourfold distinction of accidental being: being in the sense of being true, being of the categories, and potential and actual being.
'Being is said in various ways' [*to de on legetai men pollachos*], says Aristotle in the beginning of the fourth book of his *Metaphysics* (Met. IV. 2 1003a33). He repeats this in Books VI and VII and several more times in other places. In these passages he enumerates a number of concepts, each of which, in different ways, is called a being. In Met. IV. 2 1003b6 he says "one thing is said to be because it is substance, another because it is an attribute of substance, still another because it is a process toward substance, or corruption of substance, or privation of substantial forms or quality of substance, or because it produces or generates substance or that which is predicated of substance, or because it is a negation of such a thing or of substance itself. For this reason we also say that non-being is non-being." The various sorts of being which are here enumerated can be reduced to four kinds: (1) Being which has no existence whatever outside the understanding (privation, negation; *stereseis, apophaseis)*; (2)

The being of movement and of generation and corruption (process toward substance, destruction; *hodos'eis ousian, phthora*); for though these are outside the mind, they do not have complete and perfect existence (cf. Physics III.1.201a9); (3) Being which has complete but dependent existence (affections of substance, qualities, things productive and generative; *pathe ousias, poietika, genetika*); (4) The being of the substances (*ousia*). Another enumeration of concepts to which the appellation "being" is attached in different ways is given in Met. VI. 2 1026a33. In that passage, one kind of being is said to be accidental being, another being in the sense of being true, whose opposite is non-being in the sense of being false. Besides, there is said to be another kind of being which divides into the categories, and, in addition to all of them, potential and actual being. It will be noted that this division, too is fourfold, but does not consistently correspond to that in Book IV.
Thus the distinction of being given in Book VI will provide the organization of our investigation. We shall deal, first of all, with the accidental being, then with the being in the sense of being true and non-being in the sense of being false, then with potential and actual being and finally with the categories. In his Metaphysics Aristotle dealt with the last two in opposite order. He first had to acquaint us with substance [ousia] and with its form and matter (Met. VIII) in order to be able to speak afterwards of potential and actual being. Since our essay is not intended to become a complete ontology, the first order is more suitable to our purposes, and the subsequent development itself will justify its adoption." (pp. 3-5)

From: Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862), translated by Rolf George, Berkeley: University of California Press 1975.

"A metaphysical theory may begin with the following explication of words: By that which is, when the expression is used in the strict sense, we understand a thing; for example, a body, a mind, or a topoid of more or fewer than 3 dimensions. A part of a body or of a topoid may also be called a thing. And so a number of things taken together may also be called a thing. But it would be

wrong to suppose that the two parts of a thing taken together constitute an additional third thing. For where we have an addition the things that are added must have no parts in common. Thus we may say, for example, that a triangle has three angles, but not that it has three pairs of angles: angles A and B form a pair, as do B and C, and also C and A, but each of these pairs has a part in common with each of the others.
(...)
The expression ' *that which is*' is also used in various extended senses:* (a) The resources of language enable us to form an abstractum for every concretum. For the concretum, that which is, there is the abstractum, being; for body, there is the abstractum corporeality, for mind, there is spirituality or mentality, for lover, there is love; for which knows, there is knowledge; for that which is formed, there is form; and so on. What do these abstracta denote? Obviously not the same things as do the corresponding concreta; this would be a pointless duplication of names. Sometimes the relation between the concrete and abstract terms is explained by saying: "That which is formed is formed in virtue of its form. For example, that which is round is round in virtue of its roundness; and whatever is a body is a body in virtue of its corporeality or its corporeal nature." It has also been said that the roundness is in that which is round and that the corporeal nature is in the body. This seems to suggest that the concretum is related to the abstractum as part to whole. Indeed, the abstractum has been called the formal part of the concretum; the concretum is then said to be that which is denoted by the concrete term because it contains the abstractum as part.
(a) If abstracta were in fact thus parts of concreta there would be no objection to including abstracta among those things which are in the proper sense. But actually they are not parts. A division of the concretum into two parts one of which is the form corresponding to the abstractum is plainly impossible. This division is purely fictive: it amounts to saying that a thing has as many parts as there are predicates that apply to it. Using abstracta in this way, one says that a thing is round because roundness is included among its parts just as one says that an animal is hairy because hair is included among its parts. But

whereas an animal's hair is a real thing which can be separated from the animal both in fact and in thought, the contrary is true of the so-called roundness, which can neither exist by itself nor be thought of by itself. Fictions of this sort are often harmless, and they may even be useful, as when mathematicians treat circle as a regular polygon with an infinite number of sides or assume that parallel lines meet in infinity. If such fictions served no purpose whatever, they would hardly have come into use. But what has been expressed by abstract terms can always be expressed by concrete ones, without recourse to fictions. Leibniz pointed out that by such rephrasing a number of difficulties that baffled the Scholastic philosophers are easily disposed of. So far as linguistic usage is concerned, we can say, not only that there is something round, but also that there is such a thing as roundness; but we must bear in mind that the "is" in the latter statement is used in an extended sense, and that the only thing that can properly be said to be here is the thing which is round.

(b) Instead of saying that a thinker is thinking of something, one can also say that there is something which is thought about by him. Here, again, we are not dealing with what may be said to be in the proper sense - indeed, the person in question may himself deny that what he is thinking about is something that there is. Even a contradiction in terms, something that is plainly impossible. can be something that is thought about. We have just said that not roundness but that which is round is in the strict sense; similarly, not the contemplated round thing, but the person contemplating it is what is in the strict sense. This fiction, that there is something which exists as a contemplated thing, may also prove harmless, but unless one realizes that it is a fiction, one may be led into the most glaring absurdities. Things which exist as objects of thought do not constitute a subspecies of genuine being, as some philosophers have assumed. Once we have translated statements about such fictive objects into other terms, it becomes clear that the only thing the statement is concerned with is the person who is thinking about the object. What I have said here with general reference to that which is contemplated or thought about also applies, of course, to that which is affirmed.

(c) If one says, something is past or something is future, one is making an affirmation. But one is not thereby affirming or

accepting something as being. One is making an affirmation in the temporal mode of the past or the future instead of the temporal mode of the present. If one were to say "The past Caesar is," instead of saying "Caesar is past" he would be using is in an extended sense. The case would be analogous to that in which, instead of saying that there can be no such thing as a round square, one says that a round square is an impossibility. Once again, a different phrasing would be a suitable way of showing that we are not dealing with a strict interpretation of being.
(d) Many other examples of improper use of the - is - could be cited. Consider, for example, the statement that there is a time that has neither beginning nor end or the statement that there is a three-dimensional space indefinitely in all directions. It is easy to see on the basis of what has been said already that such statements do not refer to anything than can be in the strict sense. Time and space seem to belong to the abstracta. This means that what is in the strict sense, is not space or time, but rather that which is spatial and that which is temporal. Instead of speaking of space and time, we should speak of "things that are spatial, "things that are spatially different," "things that are temporal," "things that are simultaneous," and so on. Those philosophers who say that there is an infinite space as precondition of everything spatial conceive of this space as a thing. But this doctrine has no basis; indeed it is demonstrably false and absurd. Similarly, what philosophers have called time would be a thing if it actually existed. But time, thus considered as a thing, is a philosophical aberration. And this is so even if it is true that there is a thing that had no beginning and will always be, a thing that is continuously undergoing changes and producing changes in everything outside itself, thus making indirectly necessary the uniformity of the temporal process in things. Such an entity would not correspond to the thing that philosophers have thought of as being time." (pp. 16-19 notes omitted)

From: Franz Brentano, *The Theory of Categories* (1933), translated by Roderick M. Chisholm and Norbert Guterman, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981.

ALEXIUS MEINONG (1853-1920)

"We must turn, in the first place, to a philosophical discipline which is not as yet part of the tradition, which is therefore in a certain sense new, and about which I have said some things which were intended to be of a fundamental nature. To begin with, it is impossible to give a regular definition of entity [Gegenstand]; for genus and differentia are lacking, since everything is an entity. However, the etymology of the word '*gegenstehen*' yields at least an indirect characteristic, since it points to the experiences which apprehend entities; but these experiences must not be thought of as somehow constituting the entities. Every inner experience, at least every sufficiently elementary one, has such an entity; and insofar as the experience finds an expression - hence first of all in the words and sentences of language - this expression has a meaning [Bedeutung], and this meaning is always an entity. All knowledge, too, deals therefore with entities.

But large and important groups of entities have found no home in the traditional sciences; these sciences, moreover, are for the most part exclusively concerned with a knowledge of reality [*Wirklichen*], while even unreal things with being, things without being, possibilities, and even impossibilities can be objects of knowledge, namely, of a knowledge which is of interest to the as yet theoretically naive person only, as it were, when it promises to serve as a means for knowledge of reality. In contrast to such a preference for reality, which, in fact, has been overcome so far in no science, there exists the obvious need for a science which deals with entities without any restriction, especially without restriction to the special case of existence, so that it can be called existence-free [*daseinsfrei*].This science about entities as such, or about pure entities, I have called the theory of entities.

Much of what belongs to this theory has already been studied under the title 'Logic' (especially: 'Pure Logic'); and that modem mathematical logic belongs completely to the realm of the theory of entities is only concealed by its goal of being a calculus, which

seems to favor an extensive externalization [*Veräusserlichung*] in the sense of the logic of extensions, while it is just a complete internalization [*Verinnerlichung*] which the theory of entities strives for and makes possible. People have dealt with topics from the theory of entities since antiquity under the heading of 'Metaphysics,' and, especially, under the heading of 'Ontology' as a part of metaphysics; and they have not always failed to recognize the characteristic feature of freedom from existence. But as a goal in itself, the concept of a theory of what is free from existence has, so far as I can see, never been espoused. According to this concept, there belongs to the theory of entities everything that can be made out about entities irrespective of their existence (for example, whatever it is that holds for the class of all colors which make up the 'color space,' as distinguished from the 'color body' which is restricted to the psychologically given); hence, everything that is a matter of a priori knowledge, so that the a priori can be treated as a defining characteristic of the kind of knowledge of which the theory of entities consists.

What belongs to the theory of entities is thus what is rational. Insofar [as it is that], it is therefore anything but a newly discovered country, but rather, in regard to one of its most important parts, mathematics, the justly admired standard of scientific precision. What is new is, perhaps, an insight into the peculiarity of this country and into the nature of its boundaries - unless one should rather speak of its boundlessness. In this respect, it is a kind of companion piece to metaphysics which tries to comprehend the totality of reality, while the theory of entities, because of its freedom from existence, tries to encompass also everything that is not real. Naturally, this freedom from existence does not mean that entities as such cannot have existence in the true sense. The fact that the kind of consideration and knowledge peculiar to the theory of entities therefore also appears where it can be applied to existents, constitutes one of the main values of the postulation of the new science.

Just as the concept of an entity in general is to be determined, at least cum grano salis, with an eye on apprehension, so are the main groups of entities characterized in regard to the main groups of apprehending experiences; and apprehensions are, as mentioned, all elementary experiences. Corresponding to the four

main groups of the latter - to presentation [*Vorstellen*],thought [*Denken*], emotion [*FühIen*],and desire [*Begehren*] - there are, therefore, four main groups of entities: objects [*Objekte*], objectives [*Objektive*], dignitatives [*Dignitative*], and desideratives [*Desiderative*]. However, the characteristics of the latter are not derived from the characteristics of the apprehending experiences. For this reason, nothing stands in the way of assigning to the immeasurable realm of objects, for example, also the inner experiences, even though these inner experiences cannot be given through presentations, but can only be apprehended through self-presentation or with the help of imagination." (Appendix I, pp. 224-225)

From: Alexius Meinong, "Self-Presentation" (1921), translated in: Reinhardt Grossmann, *Meinong*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974.

KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI (1886-1938)

"In order to explain the meaning of the word 'object' further, one can also - as we have done already - point to the linguistic designation and assert that everything which is designated is an object. Such designation uses either nomina understood in a grammatical sense, or it uses phrases consisting of nomina and other expressions, or, finally, it uses other parts of speech, assuming that they have been converted into nouns. One can, therefore, say that everything which is designated by a noun or by an expression which is used as a noun is an object in the sense here adopted.
Now, since everything can be object - object of presentation - the subject of the presentation itself not excluded, those who conceive of the object as the summum genus are justified. Everything which is, is an object of a possible presentation; everything which is, is something. And here, therefore, is the point where the psychological discussion of the difference between content and object of presentations turns into metaphysics.

The objects of presentations have indeed been viewed from a meta physical point of view up to the present time. In calling them *onta* [in Greek], *entia* [in Latin], one revealed the way which led to them. However, that the Aristotelian on - like the ens of medieval philosophy - is nothing else but the object of presentations is shown by the fact that all doctrines about the ens, as far as they are correct, hold for the object of presentations. We shall confine ourselves here to the most famous of these doctrines.

1. The object is something different from the existent; some objects have existence in addition to their objecthood [*Gegenständlichkeit*], that is, in addition to their property of being presented (which is the real sense of the word 'essentia'); others do not. What exists is an object (*ens habens actualem existentiam*), as is also what merely could exist (ens possibile); even what never can exist but what can only be conceived of (ens rationis) is an object; in short, everything which is not nothing, but which in some sense is "something," is an. object. (1). In fact, the majority of scholastics maintain that "aliquid" is synonymous with "ens," in contrast to those who conceive of the former as an attribute of the latter.

2. Object is summum genus. Scholastics express this by the statement that the concept of ens is not a generic concept, but is a transcendental concept, because it "*omnia genera transcendit*."

3. Every object of a presentation can be object of a judgment and object of an emotion. This is the meaning of the scholastic doctrine that every object of a presentation is "true" and "good." The (metaphysical) truth of an object does not consist in being judged in a (logically) true judgment; as little as its "goodness" depends on whether the feeling concerning it is good in the ethical sense or not. Rather, an object is called true inasmuch as it is object of a judgment, and it is called good inasmuch as it is related to an emotion. (...)

4. An object is called true with regard to its ability to be judged; it is called good with regard to its ability to be the object of an emotion. The question could be raised whether the object has, in an analogical manner, an attribute which expresses its conceivability and which, therefore, would be a name of the object inasmuch as it is presented. Now, medieval philosophy

knows of a third attribute of the object; every ens, according to this philosophy, is not only verum and bonum, but also unum. We shall investigate in a different context - since this question will arise there quite naturally - what this unity means for the presentation of an object, especially whether we may see in it the analogue in the sphere of presentations to truth in the sphere of judgments and goodness in the sphere of emotions.

5. If the object of presentations, judgments, and feelings is nothing else but the Aristotelian-scholastic ens, then metaphysics must be definable as the science of objects in general, taking this word in the sense here proposed. And this is indeed the case. The particular sciences, too, deal with nothing else but the objects of our presentations, their changes, their properties, as well as the laws according to which objects affect each other. Only, the particular sciences always deal with a more or less limited group of objects, a group which is formed by the natural context or a certain purpose. The natural sciences, in the widest sense of the word, for example, are concerned with the peculiarities of those objects which one calls inorganic and organic bodies; psychology investigates the properties and laws characteristic of mental phenomena, of mental objects. Metaphysics is a science which considers all objects, physical - organic and inorganic - as well as mental, real as well as non-real, existing objects as well as non-existing objects; investigates those laws which objects in general obey, not just a certain group of objects. What we here mean is expressed by the venerable definition of metaphysics as the science of being [*Seienden*] as such.(2) The backward glance at some of the points of the scholastic doctrine of ens is supposed to characterize as precisely as possible the meaning which we connect, in the present investigation, with the word 'object'. Summarizing what was said, we can describe the object in the following way. Everything that is presented through a presentation, that is affirmed or denied through a judgment, that is desired or detested through an emotion, we call an object. Objects are either real or not real; they are either possible or impossible objects; they exist or do not exist. What is common to them all is that they are or that they can be the object (not the intentional one!) of mental acts, that their linguistic designation is the name, (...) and that considered as genus, they form the

summum genus which finds its usual linguistic expression in the word 'something.' Everything which is in the widest sense "something" is called "object," first of all in regard to a subject, but then also regardless of this relationship." (pp. 34-37)

Notes

(1) Some philosophers, like Suárez, withhold the name ens from what has merely a "ficta" or "chimaerica essentia" and give it only to the "essentia realis." However, this restriction seems to involve an inconsistency. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* II, sect. 4.
(2) Compare Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* vol. I, chapter 1, par. 1.

From: Kazimierz Twardowski, *On the Content and Objects of Presentations* (1894), translated and with an introduction by Reinhardt Grossmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1977.

EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938)

"Section 5. The concept of Pure logic as MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS (the unity of the "analytic doctrine of forms for that which can be an object on the one hand with the categories of meaning on the other). The "Positivity" of logic and the philosophical Problem of its phenomenological elucidation. - Positive science in general and phenomenology.
I turn now to the misinterpretations having to do with my idea of a "pure logic:" which present themselves in various ways depending on the standpoint from which the philosophical reader approaches the *Logical Investigations*. It might be best here if I meet these misinterpretations by pointing out positively what is essential to my position with special emphasis upon the points which have not received enough attention.
"Pure logic," in its most comprehensive extension characterizes itself by an essential distinction as "*mathesis universalis*." It develops through a step-by-step extension of that particular

concept of formal logic which remains as a residue of pure ideal doctrines dealing with "propositions" and validity after the removal from traditional logic of all the psychological misinterpretations and the normative-practical goal positings [*Zielgebungen*]. In its thoroughly proper extension it includes all of the pure "analytical" doctrines of mathematics (arithmetic, number theory, algebra, etc.) and the entire area of formal theories, or rather, speaking in correlative terms, the theory of manifolds [*M annigfaltigkeitslehre*] in the broadest sense. The newest development of mathematics brings with it that ever new groups of formal-ontological laws are constantly being formulated and mathematically treated which earlier had remained unnoticed. "*Mathesis universalis*" as an idea includes the sum total of this formal *a priori*. It is, in the sense of the "Prolegomena," directed toward the entirety of the "categories of meaning" [*Bedeutungskategorien*] and toward the formal categories for objects correlated to them or, alternatively, the *a priori* laws based upon them. It thus includes the entire *a priori* of what is in the most fundamental sense the "analytic" or "formal" sphere - a sense which receives a strict specification and clarification in the third and sixth investigations." (pp. 28-29)

From: *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations. *A Draft of a Preface to the* Logical Investigations (1913), edited by Eugen Fink, translated with introductions by Philip J. Bossert and Curtis H. Peters, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1975.

"Region and Category. The Analytic Region and its Categories (...)
Let us start from formal ontology (always as pure logic in its full extent as mathesis universalis) which, as we know, is the eidetic science of any object whatever. Anything and everything is an object in the sense proper to formal ontology, and an infinity of various truths, distributed among the many disciplines of mathesis, can be established for it. But they all lead back to a small stock of immediate or "fundamental" truths which function as "*axioms*" in the disciplines of pure logic. We define now as *logical categories or categories of the logical region, any object whatever: the fundamental concepts of pure logic* which occur in

those axioms - the concepts by means of which, in the total set of axioms, the logical essence of any object whatever becomes determined, or the concepts which express the unconditionally necessary, and constituent determinations of an object as object, of anything whatever in so far as it can be something at all. Because the purely logical, in the sense delimited by us with absolute exactness, determines that concept of the "*analytic*" (25) as contrasted with the "*synthetic*," which alone is important (but which is important fundamentally) to philosophy, we may also designates these categories as *analytic*." (pp. 21-22)
(...) "*apophantic logic*," although it makes statements exclusively about significations, is nevertheless part of formal ontology in the fully comprehensive sense. Still one must set the signification-categories apart as a group by themselves and contrast them with the others as the formal objective categories in the pregnant sense. (26)" (p. 22)

Notes

(25) AUTHOR FOOTNOTE: cf. *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. II, “Third Investigation,” §§ 11 ff.
(26) AUTHOR FOOTNOTE: On the division of logical categories into signification-categories and formal-ontological categories, cf. *Logische Untersuchungen* vol. I 67 [*Logical Investigations* pp. 236f.] The entire "Third Investigation" specifically concerns the categories of whole and part. A that time I did not venture to take over expression "ontology" which was objectionable on historical grounds; rather I designated this investigation (p. 222 of the first edition) as part of an “*apriorische Theorie der Gegenstande als solcher*"" [“apriori theory of objects as objects”] a phrase contracted by Alexius Meinong to make the word "*Gegenstandtheorie*" ["object-theory"]. Now that times have changed, however, I consider it more correct to rehabilitate the old expression, "ontology".

From: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. *First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* (1913), translated by F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1982.

Related pages

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Definitions of *Ontology*. From Nicolai Hartmann to the Present Time

NICOLAI HARTMANN (1882-1950)

"All ontology has to do with fundamental assertions about being as such. Assertions of this sort are precisely what we call categories of being. Like the Kantian categories - which, as far as content is concerned, are also precisely this: fundamental assertions about being - they have the character of universal constitutive principles comprising all more specialized ontological assertions. Hence, the new ontology might be expected to provide a transcendental deduction also of these ontological assertions. Otherwise, it is argued, it could not guarantee their objective validity. That, however, would mean that this ontology in its turn was in need of an epistemological foundation which would have to provide the justification of a priori principles of an even wider scope.
Thereby a way for ontology is traced, and this way once more follows the scheme of the old deductivity. But it is here that the roads of the old and the new ontology part. Just as in regard to the problem, of being it is today no longer a question of substantial forms and of the teleological determination of actual processes by these forms, so also the problem at issue is no longer that of a post factum justification of a priori principles. The categories with which the new ontology deals are won neither by a definition of the universal nor through derivation from a formal table of judgments. They are rather gleaned step by step from an observation of existing realities. And since, of course, this method of their discovery does not allow for an absolute criterion of truth,

here no more than in any other field of knowledge, it must be added that the procedure of finding and rechecking is a laborious and cumbersome one. Under the limited conditions of human research it requires manifold detours, demands constant corrections, and, like all genuine scholarly work, never comes to an end.

Here one may truly and literally speak of new ways of ontology. The basic thesis can possibly be formulated like this: The categories of being are not a priori principles. Only such things as insights, cognitions, and judgments can be a priori. In fact the whole contrast between a priori and a posteriori is only an epistemological one. But ontology is not concerned with knowledge, much less with mere judgments, but with the object of knowledge in so far as this object is at the same time "transobjective," that is, independent of whether or to what extent being is actually transformed into an object of knowledge. The principles of the object in its very being are in no way eo ipso also cognitive principles. In some fields they can be quite heterogeneous, as the manifold admixtures of the unknowable in nearly all basic problems of philosophy amply prove. From this alone it follows that the principles of being cannot be a priori principles of our intellect, that they, as a matter of fact, are just as indifferent to the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable as the being whose principles they are." (pp. 13-14)

From: Nicolai Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology* (1949), translated by Reinhard C. Kuhn, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1953.

"The true characteristics of reality do not depend on the categories of space and matter but on those of time and individuality. Ontologically considered, time and space are not categories of equal worth: Time is by far more fundamental than space. Only material things and living beings, including the processes through which their existence flows, are spatial. But spiritual and psychic processes, as well as material processes, are temporal. For everything real is in time and only a part of it in space --we might say, only one half of the real world, its lower forms.

Inseparably joined with temporality is individuality. This consists in nothing but singleness and uniqueness. The real is perishable and thereby also unrepeatable. The same sort of thing recurs, never the same identical thing. This holds true of historical events as well as of cosmic motions, of persons as well as of things. Only the universal recurs, for, considered by itself, it is timeless, always existing, eternal. This timelessness was once considered in the old ontology to be a being of a higher order, indeed, even the only true being. But, in truth, it is rather a dependent, a merely ideal being, and the universal has reality nowhere else but in the real particulars which are both temporal and individual. What once was considered a kingdom of perfection, the kingdom of essences, whose faint copies things were supposed to be, has proved itself to be a kingdom of incomplete being which becomes independent only through abstraction. In the recognition of this lies perhaps the most striking contrast of the new ontology to the old.

That is why the new ontology can very well grapple with the deep problems of German idealism, why it can deal with the spirit and freedom, social life and history, just as well as with the cosmos and the organism. Hence new light may be expected to be shed by it on the characteristic situation and activity of man as a spiritual being within a non-spiritual, law-determined world.

These reflections are but a small section from a chapter on categorial analysis. Here they are only sketched. They justly demand a much more exact discussion of space, time, process, psychic act, reality, and so forth. Particularly reality, the pure mode of being of the structures and processes which form the world, is a very difficult subject for analysis. In order to understand reality the philosopher must start with an examination of the relationship of possibility and actuality -- for centuries the fundamental problem of ontology. And the revolution in the whole problem of being extends even to these very foundations of being. For what the old ontology teaches about potency and act -- a relationship according to which everything real is a realization of a pre-existing disposition and all being is destined to become what it is by disposition -- proves to be far from adequate in view of the broadened problem of reality. It is incumbent upon us to introduce a new concept of 'real possibility' (Realmöglichkeit) which no longer coincides with

essential possibility but which signifies the totality of conditions present at a given time within the real context. To this must correspond just as novel a concept of 'actual reality' (Realwirklichkeit) which is no longer thought of as the goal of an anthropomorphically conceived tendency, as if the processes in the cosmos were tied to the activity of an intelligence. Rather such actual reality must in every case be considered to be the complex result of a far-flung context of determinants. A whole science concerns itself with these inner relationships of reality considered as a mode of being. It forms the core of the new ontology, and, in contrast to an analysis of categories directed toward the structural content, it may be called modal analysis." (pp. 25-27)

From: Nicolai Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology* (1949), translated by Reinhard C. Kuhn, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1953.

STANISLAW LESNIEWSKI (1886-1939)

"Leśniewski's system of logic consists of two theories, which he called Protothetic and Ontology. Of these the former is perhaps the most comprehensive Logic of Propositions which has ever - been devised. It goes beyond the classical Calculus of Propositions in several respects. It allows for instance for functorial variables for which constant functors of the Calculus of Propositions can be substituted.' It provides for the use of the universal quantifier to bind both the propositional and the functorial variables. It has a rule of definitions, which enables us to extend at will the variety of semantical categories within the field of the Logic of Propositions, and, in addition, it has a rule of extensionality; but the most significant point about Protothetic is that with its aid we can derive theses which enable us to dispose of the-usual rules for operating with the universal quantifier in any deductive theory of loser generality. In the edifice of the possible deductive theories Protothetic forms the very base. It requires no more fundamental theory than itself whereas other

deductive theories, not included in it, have to be built on it or on a part of it. This is the case with Ontology.
If Protothetic is the most comprehensive Logic of Propositions then Ontology is the most comprehensive Logic of Names. Roughly speaking, it comprises the traditional logic in its modernized form and has counterparts of the Calculus of Predicates, the Calculus of Classes, and the Calculus of Relations including the Theory of Identity.
(...) At first sight Leśniewski's use of the term Ontology may seem curious and daring, but it should become clearer as we proceed that he was eminently justified. In fact his whole conception of logic was ontological through and through in a truly classical sense. (...)Contrary to the widely accepted practice Leśniewski intended his logic to be an interpreted system. He attached definite meanings to his constants and regarded the theses of his deductive theories as true propositions in the sense in which propositions of empirical sciences are accepted as true. It is with this in mind that we should approach his theories. Ontology has been described as the most comprehensive Logic of Names because its most characteristic expressions belong to the semantical category of names, just as the most characteristic expressions of Protothetic belong to the semantical category of propositions. If, however, we take into account the contents of Ontology then it would be more appropriate to describe it as a theory of what there is. Just as astronomy tells us something about heavenly bodies, the theses of Ontology tell us something about things, or objects if one prefers, or individuals. Since in accordance with Leśniewski's intentions theses of Ontology are to be regarded not as mere 'well formed formulae' but as meaningful propositions which can be examined for their truth or falsity, it is essential that we should understand as clearly as possible the ontological vocabulary. Only when we have mastered this vocabulary can a further step be made, namely the one which consists of a critical study of those ontological theses which are already at our disposal. Finally, we may try to discover new truths, which we can formulate in terms of the ontological vocabulary, and assign them their proper places in the theory by deducing them from the axiom or establishing their independence." (pp. 124-126 of the reprint, note omitted)

From: Czeslaw Lejewski, *On Leśniewski's Ontology*, in: Ratio vol. I, n. 2, 1958, pp. 150-176 (Reprinted in: Jan T. J. Srzednicki, V. F. Rickey (eds.), *Leśniewski' Systems. Ontology and Mereology*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1984, pp. 123-148.

ROMAN INGARDEN (1893-1970)

"The ontological analyses of works of art affected Ingarden's entire ontology. Its best elaboration is contained in *Spór o istnienie swiata* (The controversy over the existence of the world, 1947-48). A being, i.e., an object, can be considered in three different respects: (1) the material one, (2) the formal one, and (3) the existential one (modes of being). Ingarden understands ontology as based on eidetic insight and intuitive analyses of the contents of ideas, i.e., upon the EIDETIC METHOD, which enables one to discover the necessary and purely possible relations between the pure ideal qualities. Ontology is for him the most general theory of objects. He distinguishes it from metaphysics, which fulfills the role of an applied theory of objects and which, being based on ontology, considers the nature and essence of factual beings. The eidetic character distinguishes metaphysics from the so-called real sciences.
Ontology aims at obtaining a general spectrum of eidetic possibilities and necessities with reference to any objects whatever. In the frame of an existential ontology, which has nothing to do with Martin Heidegger's FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, Ingarden distinguishes and clearly defines four mutually exclusive pairs of moments of being: something can be (1) existentially autonomous or heteronomous, (2) existentially original or derivative, (3) existentially separate or not separate, and (4) existentially self-dependent or contingent. Considerations connected with the analysis of the second pair has led Ingarden to an original interpretation of the relation of causality. His analysis of time has brought some additional pairs of existential moments, such as actuality and non-actuality; persistence and fragility; and fissuration and non-fissuration. These differentiations enables

him to distinguish and describe four basic modes of being (consisting of non-contradictory combinations of existential moments). These are: (I) absolute being (autonomous, original, separate, self-dependent); (2) temporal (real) being; (3) ideal (extra-temporal) being; and (4) purely intentional (quasi-temporal) being. We cannot experience any existing object without its mode of being.
In epistemology Ingarden distinguishes: (1) the pure theory of knowledge, which is actually a part of ontology, because he describes it as an a priori analysis of the general idea "knowledge"; (2) criteriology, which researches such epistemic values as objectivity and adequacy; and (3) the critique of knowledge, which evaluates factually obtained results of scientific and philosophical cognition." (pp. 348-349)

From: Andrzej Przylebski, *Roman Ingarden*, In: Lester Embree, and alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997, pp. 348-350.

MARIO BUNGE (1919-2020)

"ONTOLOGY The serious secular version of metaphysics. The branch of philosophy that studies the most pervasive features of reality, such as real existence, change, time, chance, mind, and life. Ontology does not study constructs, i.e., ideas in themselves. These are studied by the formal sciences and epistemology. Hence the expression 'ontology of mathematics' makes sense only in the context of objective idealism (such as Pythagoras's and Plato's). By contrast, the question 'What is the ontological status of mathematical objects?' is meaningful in all contexts, and in a fictionist philosophy of mathematics it has a simple answer: None. (...) Ontology can be classed into general and special (or regional). General ontology studies all existents, whereas each special Ontology studies one genus of thing or process-physical, chemical, biological, social, etc. Thus, whereas general ontology studies the concepts of space, time, and event, the ontology of the

social investigates such general sociological concepts as those of social system, social structure, and social change. Whether general or special, ontology can be cultivated in either of two manners: speculative or scientific. The ontologies of Leibniz, Wolff, Schelling, Hegel, Lotze, Engels, Mach, W. James, H. Bergson, A. N. Whitehead, S. Alexander, L. Wittgenstein, M. Heidegger, R. Carnap, and N. Goodman are typically speculative and remote from science. So is the contemporary possible worlds metaphysics. Warning: the expression 'the ontology of a theory' is sometimes misleadingly employed to designate the reference class or universe of discourse of a theory. The expression is misleading because ontologies are theories, not classes." (pp. 200-201)

From: Mario Bunge, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Amherst: Prometheus Books 1999.

FRED SOMMERS (1923-2014)

"The main object of the ensuing analysis is to tie together several seemingly disparate topics. These include: (a) a theory of types (that is, a theory describing the way terms are conjoined to form category correct statements in a natural language); (b) a formal theory of ontological categories and ontological features; (c) a theory of predication (that is, a theory accounting for the subject-predicate distinction and one which provides certain formal characteristics of the binary relation 'is predicable of'); (d) a procedure for enforcing ambiguity.
The results of the analysis support the main features of the Russell program. I take these to be that (a) clarification of natural language is ontologically revealing and discriminatory of the sorts of things there are; (b) linguistic structures and ontological structures are isomorphic. The meaning of 'ontology' in what immediately follows is 'the science of categories.'(...)
The ontologist is interested in categories; he is, qua ontologist, not interested in whether a thing is red or whether it is green but

in whether it is colored. Even this is not altogether accurate: he is interested in its character of being colored or colorless. For the ontologist 'colored' means | red | which is the same thing as colored or colorless. A toothache is neither, but water can be either red or not red or colored or colorless.
We speak as ontologists when, for example, we say that points belong to the category of extension even though they belong to the class of extensionless things. The category of extension is defined by the predicate | extended | and points belong to it. Concepts do not belong to it since they are neither extended nor extensionless. Space (spatial) is another category word since it has no complement which is not categorial. And if the word 'color' is taken to include that 'color' we call 'colorless,' it too is a category word. (pp. 351-352).

From: Fred Sommers, "Types and Ontology"*The Philosophical Review*, 72, 1963, pp. 327-363.

Sommers defines 'ontology' as the 'science of categories' ('Types and Ontology,' p. 351). More specifically, it is the systematic attempt to say what categories are, how they are determined, and how they are related to one another. Ontology is, of course, nothing new. Plato's theory of forms, Aristotle's Categories, Russell's theory of types are three quite obvious examples of attempts at a science of categories. But it is Sommers' own theory which comes closest to a complete, workable theory of categories. So what is a category? It is a group of things, a class--but a special kind of class. We saw above that a class consists of all those things of which some given term is true. The notion true of is the source of one of the problems with classes. Consider how we negate. Modern logicians take all the kinds of negation which can occur in a natural language sentence as amounting to the negation of the entire sentence.
(...)
Let us make a distinction between what a term is true of and what it spans ('Types and Ontology,' p. 329). A term spans whatever either it or its negation could be used to sensibly characterize. And all the things spanned by a given term constitute the category with respect to that term. Thus, while the lowest prime is

in the counter-class of 'married,' it is not in the category determined by 'married.' While a term and its negation exclusively and exhaustively divide the world, a term and its negation both determine the same category, which need not exhaust the world. This is because whatever can be sensibly characterized by a term can be sensibly characterized by its negation. Spanning is not defined in terms of truth. While a term and its negation are never true of the same things, they both span the same things. For example, whatever can be sensibly characterized as married can equally well be characterized (though perhaps falsely) as unmarried. It would be false, but nonetheless sensible, to characterize Queen Elizabeth as unmarried. On the other hand, neither 'married' nor 'unmarried' can be used to characterize the lowest prime number. To characterize it in either way would be senseless, nonsense, category mistaken.
While classes are defined in terms of truth, categories are defined in terms of spanning (which in turn is defined in terms of sense). A category with respect to a term 'X' will include the class of X things and some (usually not all) of the counter-class of X things. The class of married things has in it me, the Queen, my wife, etc. The counter-class has my son, the Pope, the Moon, Mars, etc. (viz. anything of which 'married' is not true). The category with respect to 'married' has me, the Queen, my wife, my son, the Pope, etc., but not the Moon, Mars, etc. For, while 'married' is false of, say, both my son and Mars, it spans only the former and not the latter." (pp. 4-5)

From: George Englebretsen, *A Reintroduction to Sommers' Tree Theory*, in *Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1990, pp. 1-32.

ERNST TUGENDHAT (1930-

"Lecture 3. Ontology and semantics.

It is at the beginning of Book IV of his Metaphysics that Aristotle first introduces his new conception of philosophy. 'There is a science which studies being as being.' Indeed the special character of this science vis-à-vis the other sciences is supposed to consist in the fact that whereas the latter investigate a particular sphere of being philosophy investigates being as being. (1) What distinguishes the concept of being, for Aristotle, is that it is the most general concept. (2) For of everything and anything one can say that it is. Everything and anything, therefore, can be called being.

Clearly Aristotle arrives at his new conception of philosophy by dropping the aspect of justification from the preliminary conception developed at the beginning and settling exclusively for the aspect of highest generality. The highest, pre-eminent science, called philosophy, is universal, but does not have a justificatory role in relation to the particular sciences. This conception, since it is orientated towards the concept of being (on), leads to the conception of philosophy as ontology. (..)An explicitly semantic enquiry was, however, unknown to Aristotle. This is why he called predicative determinations both onta (beings) and legomena (something said). (3) In the Middle Ages this undecidedness became the starting-point of the nominalism controversy. Aristotle refused to follow Plato in treating the meaning of predicates as an independent object. However, because he failed to perceive the semantic dimension he inevitably objectified their meaning. The result is a peculiar extension of the concept of being (on). It is - together with the concepts of the one and of something - more comprehensive than that of an object (tode ti). The title 'ontology' now begins to iridesce. It would have an unequivocal sense if one were to define it, as I initially did, and as is usual in analytical philosophy, in terms of the concept of an object, or, which amounts to the same thing, in terms of the concept of being in the sense of existence; 'ontology' would then mean 'theory of objects'. In contrast to this the introduction of ontology by Aristotle, which became standard in the tradition, contains a tension which was not resolved in the tradition. This tension is a consequence of Aristotle's dual orientation: on the one hand, to the - objectual - formula 'being as being'; on the other hand, to the verbal form 'is'. He lets himself be guided by

this verbal form even where it does not connote being in the sense of existence, i.e. where the 'is' is not the 'is' of a being; and since the formula 'being as being' nonetheless remains the guiding principle, the formalizing approach, which in itself would have led away from the restriction to the problem of objects, is again being cast into an objectual terminology. Aristotelian ontology transcends the formal theory of objects in the direction of a formal semantics, but in such a way that what emerges is misinterpreted in terms of an object-oriented perspective, owing to the lack of awareness of the semantic dimension.
Thus if one views the traditional elaboration, essentially determined by Aristotle, of the idea of a philosophical fundamental discipline as ontology from a language-analytical perspective (one of reflection on the meaning of words) it turns out to be unsatisfactory in regard to both of the aspects in Aristotle's preliminary conception of philosophy. Firstly, in regard to its justification: the object-orientated Aristotelian formal discipline lacks a foundation in a method of reflection; such a foundation would be provided by a formal semantics (though whether this is the only possible foundation we do not yet know). Secondly, in regard to its scope: its claim to universality could only seem convincing so long as one remained orientated to objects. But the orientation to everything (and that means: to all objects) appears itself restricted as soon as one focusses on the realm of the formal itself. The perspective on objects then corresponds to just one semantic form among others." (p. 21)

Notes

(1) 1003 a22-25, 1025 b7-10.
(2) 998 b220f.
(3) cf. e.g. 1045 b30 f.

From: Ernst Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy. Lecture on the Philosophy of Language*, translated by P. A. Gorner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982.

REINHARDT GROSSMANN (1931-2010)

"Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that govern these categories? In chemistry, by comparison, we search for chemical elements and the laws which they obey; and in physics we try to discover the elementary particles and their laws. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is larger; its viewpoint, fundamentally different.

When Anaximander speculated that everything is made up from the four elements -- fire, earth, air, and water -- he proposed, in effect, a rudimentary theory of chemistry. And so did Anaximenes when he maintained that everything consists of various densities of air. Ontology was born when someone realized that any view of this sort implies a distinction between individual things, on the one hand, and their properties, on the other. Ontology was born when someone realized that there are, not only different kinds of individual thing, but also different kinds of entity. This realization must have led almost immediately to a number of distinctly ontological questions. How, precisely, do individuals and properties differ? How are they related to each other? Are there perhaps any other kinds of entity? And so on. Plato's theory of forms deals with just these sorts of questions, and we think of it, therefore, as one of the first ontological inquiries. (...)But properties are not the only kind of abstract entity, as we shall see. There are numbers and, hence, there is arithmetic. There are sets and, hence, there is set theory. There are several kinds of abstract entity and, hence, several further kinds of inquiry, distinct both from the natural sciences and from ontology. And this fact raises a number of new questions for ontology. How do these kinds of abstract entity differ from each other? How are they connected with each other? And how are they related to individual things? What looks at the beginning of the ontological enterprise like the fundamental dichotomy, namely, the distinction between individuals and properties, turns out to be just one of many equally basic distinctions.

A particular ontological theory must of course strive to accommodate all of these differences and connections. It must

attempt to present us with a complete list of categories. Everything there is must find a place in the system. The theory is unsatisfactory if it is incomplete, that is, if there are entities which are not categorized. It may be argued, for example, that classes have no place within the Aristotelian framework of substance and modification of substance. But it is not enough that everything should find a category in the theory. Everything must be fitted to the proper category. An ontological theory is also faulty if it assigns entities to the wrong categories. For example, a Cartesian would contend that Aristotelians misplace the mind: A mind is a substance in its own right and not, as Aristotelians claim, a mere modification of a substance. Or it might be argued, to turn to the present, that natural numbers are, not classes of classes, but quantifiers of a certain kind. Nor, finally, must the ontology contain distinctions that make no differences. Categorial distinctions must not be made capriciously. Categories are not to be multiplied arbitrarily. Aristotelian ontology may be accused of introducing a spurious distinction by separating so-called essential from accidental properties.

Hand in hand with the discovery of categories goes the discovery and formulation of categorial laws. To discern the former is, in a sense, to find the latter; for these laws specify how the categories differ from each other and resemble each other. There is again a similarity to the natural sciences. In physics, the fundamental laws describe the behavior of elementary particles. In ontology, similarly, the fundamental laws describe the behavior of categories. For example, individuals are subject to change, while properties are not. Individuals, furthermore, even though they exemplify properties, are never exemplified by anything. Laws of this nature distinguish between different categories; and the second law mentioned also shows how they establish connections between categories. Properties are connected with entities by means of what I shall call "the nexus of exemplification." Classes, on the other hand, are connected with entities by the membership relation. And it may be thought, mistakenly as we shall see, that properties and classes determine each other mutually." (pp. 3-5)

From: Reinhardt Grossmann, *The Categorial Structure of the World*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1983.

NINO COCCHIARELLA (1933-

"Metaphysics consists of the separate disciplines of ontology and cosmology, each with their respective methodologies.
Formal ontology connects logical categories -- especially the categories involved in predication -- with ontological categories.
The goal of a formal ontology is the construction of a *lingua philosophica*, or *characteristica universalis*, as explicated in terms of an *ars combinatoria* and a *calculus ratiocinator* as part of al formal theory of predication.
A formal ontology should serve as the framework of a *characteristica realis*, and hence as the basis of a formal approach to science and cosmology. It should also serve as a framework for our commonsense understanding of the world." (p. 23)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism*, New York: Springer 2007.

"Comparative formal ontology is the study of how different informal ontologies can be formalized and compared with one another in their overall adequacy as explanatory frameworks. One important criterion of adequacy of course is consistency, a condition that can be satisfied only by formalization. Formalization also makes explicit the commitments of an ontology.
There are other important criteria of adequacy as well, however, in addition to consistency and transparency of ontological commitment. One major such criterion is that a formal ontology must explain and provide an ontological ground for the distinction between being and existence, or, if the distinction is rejected, an adequate account of why it is rejected. Put simply, the problem is: Can there be things that do not exist? Or is being the

same as existence? Different formal ontologies will answer these questions in different ways.
The simplest account of the distinction between being and existence is that between actualism and possibilism, where by existence we mean physical existence, i.e., existence as some type of physical object; and by being we mean possible physical existence, i.e., physical existence in some possible world.
According to possibilism, there are objects that do not now exist but could exist in the physical universe, and hence being is not the same as existence. In actualism being is the same as existence.
Possibilism: There are objects (i.e., objects that have being or) that possibly exist but that do not in fact exist.
Therefore: Existence = Being.
Actualism: Everything that is (has being) exists.
Therefore: Existence = Being.
Now the implicit understanding in formal ontology of both possibilism and actualism is that the objects that the quantifier phrases in these statements range over are values of the variables bound by the first-order quantifiers ? and ? (for the universal and existential quantifiers, respectively), and hence that what has being (on the level of objects) is a value of the (object) variables bound by these quantifiers. In other words, to be (an object, or thing) in both actualism and possibilism is to be a value of the bound object variables of first-order logic. This means that in possibilism,where being is not the same as existence, existence must be represented either by different quantifiers or by a predicate, e.g., E!, which is the predicate usually chosen for this purpose.
Another criterion of adequacy for a formal ontology is that it must explain the ontological grounds, or nature, of modality, i.e., of such modal notions as necessity and possibility, and in particular the meaning of possible physical existence. If the modalities in question are strictly formal, on the other hand, as is the case with logical necessity and possibility, then it must explain the basis of that formality.
This criterion cannot be satisfied by a set-theoretic semantics alone, especially one that allows for arbitrary sets of possible worlds (models) and so-called accessibility relations between those worlds. Such a semantics may be useful for showing the

consistency of a modal logic, or perhaps even as a guide to our intuitions in showing its completeness; but it does not of itself provide an ontological ground for modality, or, in the case of logical modalities, explain why those modalities are strictly formal.
We restrict our considerations here to how physical existence, both actual and possible, is represented in a formal ontology. This does not mean that the formal ontologies considered here cannot be extended so as to include an account of how abstract objects might be represented as well, if allowed at all." (pp. 105-106)

Nino Cocchiarella, *Actualism versus Possibilism in Formal Ontology*, in: Roberto Poli, Johanna Seibt (eds.), *Theory and Applications of Ontology. Vol 1: Philosophical Perspectives.*, Dordrecht: Springer 2010, pp. 105-118.

JERZY PERZANOWSKI (1943-2009)

"2. Ontology and its parts.
Ontology is the theory of what there is, the theory of being. It considers the full ontological universe, all items that are possible, describing and classifying them and searching for the principles of this universe, principles of taking together the plurality of ontic objects, particular beings, into one -- the Being.
Thus two questions govern ontological investigations: what is possible and why? The second question, concerning the being's principles, may be strengthened to the deepest -- last in logical order -- question: how that which is given, or rather what there is, is possible? The question about principles of being, i.e. general laws of nature, plus the question hat makes possible what there is and renders impossible what there isn't?Because of its matter and problematic ontology is the most general discursive discipline. It is the general theory of possibility. By the nature of its questions it is also very modal.
3. Ontology has two sides: descriptive -- phenomenological, and theoretical -- formal.

Hence, it is divided into three parts: onto-ontics (In brief: ontics), ontomethodology and ontologic.
4. Ontics is devoted to the selection of ontological problems and notions, their differentiation, classification and analysis. Doing ontics we construe the conceptual net of a given ontological theory, i.e. its categories. It is also one of the tasks of ontics to state ontological hypotheses, based on the previous analysis of concepts.
Ontics, being a part of ontology, is itself complex. Its further description depends on the general idea of ontology, on accepted classification of ontological concepts. For example, Ingarden has distinguished three parts of ontology: the material ontics, the formal ontics and the existential one. Notice that his ontology is, in our terms, ontics!5. Ontomethodology concerns ways of doing ontology, methods and types of ontological constructions as well as principles of choice between ontological statements and theories. Examples of such ontomethodic principles are: tine principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and Ockham's razor.
Indication and discussion of the appropriate principles is necessary for sure for any critique of ontological theories, particularly the critique of the logical means used in ontology.
6. Ontologic is a logic of the ontic realm, It is an investigation of ontological connections, concerning particularly logical relations between pieces of optic information. Also, it is a theory of the fundament of ontic relations.
Ontologic considers the organization of the ontological universe, trying to describe its mechanism. It describes the complexity of the Being, looking for its laws and base - the Logos.
7. Ontics is a purely descriptive and analytical discipline, ontologic is speculative and formal. They are, however, closely connected and interrelated disciplines, affecting one another. The product of ontics is a description, usually complex, of the ontological universe, whereas ontologic supplies different theories of this universe.
Certainly, at present ontic considerations are more common. In ontology we have many descriptions and claims, but not as many theories.

Among Polish ontologists, for instance, Ingarden may be regarded as a typical ontics reasoner, while Leśniewski should be treated as a typical ontologician." (pp. 23-24)

From: Jerzy Perzanowski, *Ontologies and Ontologics* in: Ewa Zarnecka-Bialy (ed.), *Logic Counts*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990, pp. 23-42.

"2. Beings, the Being and Being.
2.1 Ontology is the discipline of being. It is the theory of what there is, why and how.
As the tradition makes clear, the verb 'to be' used here is ambiguous. It refers either to the domain of existing objects, depending therefore on an appropriate theory of existence, or to what really exists (in a metaphysical sense) - to logos which is behind existing items and behind the facts. The latter realm emerges when emphasis is placed on the second part of the above definition, i.e., on the questions: why and how?The answer we are looking for is of the form: there is x because x is possible and in addition for existing objects x satisfies certain specific conditions of existence. Possibility is frequently explained as a matter of consistency or coherence, whereas existence conditions are specified in terms of stability, homeostasis, actualization, etc.
2.2 Ontology is distinguished by its extreme generality and by the richness and fertility of its basic notions.
The most basic ontological notions are notions of a particular being and the being. Both notions can be approached in at least three ways: possibilistically, connectionally (or qualitatively), and through what we shall call verb-type-ontologies.
2.3 In the verb-type-approach both notions - of a being and the being - are obtained from the verb 'to be' by transformations and nominalizations.
The theory behind the latter is quite complicated, much more than is the grammar of the verb 'to be' itself, and this is complicated enough. In most Indo-European languages we must distinguish at least eleven variants of the verb 'to be', which leads to a rather rich variety of verb-type-ontologies.
A being here is defined as any item which is in a sense specified according to an appropriate variant of the verb 'to be'.

The verb 'to be' has its basic form in the context 'S is P', where it denotes a binary relation. The most general verb-type-ontology is therefore the general theory of relations. By specification of variants of the verb 'to be' we obtain variants of the verb-type-ontology, for example the ontology of things and properties and the set-theoretic ontology.
2.4 In the possibilistic approach a being is defined as any possible object, hence the ontological universe is understood as the space of all possibilities. Its ontology is therefore the general theory of possibility.
2.5 The qualitative or connectional approach deals with the most traditional concept of a being, defined as any item having some quality (or as a subject of qualities).
Here at least three topics need further elaboration: the ontological connection itself and the items connected: qualities and subjects. In consequence, there are four variants of this type of ontology: the qualitative one, stressing qualities, the subjective one, putting emphasis on subjects (individuals); the connectional one, stressing the formal side of the ontological connection, and the eclectic one, which tries to develop all three factors in unison. In the present essay I shall consider several fundamental topics of connectional ontology." (pp. 64-65)

From: Jerzy Perzanowski, *The Way of Truth*, in: Roberto Poli, Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996, pp. 61-130.

JORGE J. E. GRACIA (ca. 1947-2021)

"I must now make a few brief comments about the principal parts of metaphysics. This is necessary because often particular authors confuse metaphysics with some of its parts, thus unnecessarily restricting the scope of the discipline. The discussion of such a taxonomy, then, prevents confusions which may obscure the nature of metaphysics.

Some of the parts of metaphysics with which it is most frequently confused are ontology, etiology, philosophical anthropology, theology, and philosophy of language. There are many others, but for the sake of brevity I shall use only these as examples.
Consider those philosophers who identify metaphysics with ontology. Ontology is concerned with the study of the most fundamental categories of being and with the relations among them. This naturally explains the use of the term "ontology" and suggests that the discipline deals with being, a traditional description of the object of metaphysics. The use of the term "ontology" to refer to metaphysics appears in early modern philosophy and is still with us. Indeed many contemporary metaphysicians speak of their discipline as ontology.
Yet, if ontology involves only the subject matter mentioned, it is clear that it excludes much that metaphysicians discuss. For example, much of what is discussed in the philosophy of mind falls outside ontology, for it does not concern the development of the fundamental categories of being and the exploration of the relations among them. It concerns rather the categorization of the mind and the description of its relations to various categories, and this does not seem to be a part of ontology." (pp. 147-148, notes omitted)

From: Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Metaphysics and Its Task. The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1999.

KIT FINE (1946-

"An ontology consists of all those items which are, in an appropriate sense, accepted. There are different views as to what it is for an item to be accepted into an ontology. For some, it is merely a matter of existence or being; for others, it is a matter of real existence or being, where this is something which stands in contrast to ordinary existence or being. This is an issue which, important as it is, will not concern me here; for most of what I have to say will remain correct under any reasonable

understanding of the term. However, it is perhaps worth pointing out that I do not require the term to have any psychological connotations. An item is accepted into an ontology because it should be there, not necessarily because someone puts it there. It is, if you like, the ontology which accepts the item and not the person who endorses the ontology.

An ontology is total; it includes everything that is accepted. By contrast, we may talk of a partial ontology or of a subontology, which includes some, but perhaps not all, of what is accepted.

An ontology is actual; it includes everything that it is correct to accept. By contrast, we may talk of a possible ontology, which consists of everything that might be accepted (as the total ontology).

One might take a sceptical stand on either of these two distinctions. One might hold that there is no such thing as a total, as opposed to a partial, ontology; for any ontology there is always a larger ontology within which it is contained. (The paradoxes have led some to hold such a view for the ontology of sets). And one might also hold that there is no such thing as an actual, as opposed to a possible, ontology. There is nothing which counts as the correct ontological stand; there are merely different, equally legitimate, stands.

I shall not engage with the first form of scepticism, though what I have to say can, to some extent, be made to accommodate it. However, I shall engage with the second form. I shall attempt to see how absolutist notions might be eschewed in the description of an ontology.

This is not because I endorse the second form of scepticism. It is more that I am interested in the distinction on which the position rests rather than with the position itself. The sceptic draws a line. But one may be interested in the line without accepting it as a boundary." (p. 265)

From: Kit Fine, "A Study of Ontology", *Noûs* 25, 1991, pp. 263-294.

DALE JACQUETTE (1953-2016)

"The word ontology has four established meanings in philosophy. There are two intersecting sets of distinctions. Pure philosophical ontology is different from applied scientific ontology, and ontology in the applied scientific sense can be understood either as a discipline or a domain.
Ontology as discipline is a method or activity of enquiry into philosophical problems about the concept or facts of existence. Ontology as a domain is the outcome or subject matter of ontology as a discipline. Applied scientific ontology construed as an existence domain can be further subdivided as the theoretical commitment to a preferred choice of existent entities, or to the real existent entities themselves, including the actual world considered as a whole, also known as the extant domain. Ontology as a theoretical domain is thus a description or inventory of the things that are supposed to exist according to a particular theory, which might but need not be true. Ontology as the extant domain, in contrast, is the actual world of all real existent entities, whatever these turn out to be, identified by a true complete applied ontological theory. As a result, we must be careful in reading philosophical works on ontology, when an author speaks of "ontology" without qualification, not to confuse the intended sense of the word with any of the alternatives." (pp. 2-3)

From: Dale Jacquette, *Ontology*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002.

>*ROBERTO POLI (1955)*

"Ontology is the theory of objects. And it is so of every type of object, concrete and abstract, existent and non-existent, real and ideal, independent and dependent. Whatever objects we are or might be dealing with, ontology is their theory. *Object* is used in this sense as synonymous with the traditional term *Being*."
"THESIS 1. An ontology is not a catalogue of the world, a taxonomy, a terminology or a list of objects, things or whatever

else. If anything, an ontology is the general framework (= structure) within which catalogues, taxonomies, terminologies may be given suitable organization. This means that somewhere a boundary must be drawn between ontology and taxonomy.
THESIS 2. An ontology is not reducible to pure cognitive analysis (in philosophical terms, it is not an epistemology or a theory of knowledge). Ontology represents the 'objective' side (= on the side of the object), and the theory of knowledge the subjective side (= on the side of the knowing subject) of reality. The two sides are obviously interdependent, but this is not to imply that they are the same (exactly like the front and rear of a coin). In order to conduct ontological analysis, it is necessary to 'neutralize', so to speak, the cognitive dimension, that is, to reduce it to the default state. I assume that the default state is the descriptive one, where the dimensions of attention, of interest, etc., are as neutral as possible (= natural attitude). It is of course possible to modify the default state and construct ontologies of the other cognitive states as well, but this involves modifications of the central structure.
THESIS 3. There is nothing to prevent the existence of several ontologies, in the plural. In this case too, ontological study is useful because, at the very least, it renders the top categories explicit and therefore enables verification of whether there are reasonable translation strategies and of which categorization can serve best to achieve certain objectives." (p. 313)

From: Roberto Poli, "Ontology for Knowledge Organization", in Rebecca Green (ed.), *Knowledge Organization and Change*, Indeks, Frankfurt, 1996, pp. 313-319.

Related pages

Definitions of *Ontology*. First Part: from Christian Wolff to Edmund Husserl

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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Key Terms in Ontology. Introductory Remarks

INTRODUCTION

The following pages are an attempt to give a synthetic panorama of the current research on some main concepts of ontology, both from an historical and from a theoretical point of view.
The main authors who contribute to the philosophical refinement of the concepts will be cited, with special attention paid to the relevant contributions from linguistics, when appropriate, and bibliographical references for further study; attention will be given to the linguistic relativity hypothesis: i.e. what influence (if any) the structure and lexicon of language had on the thought.
The "question of being" initially evolved in Greece and India (1), (Greek and Sanskrit are both Indo-European languages), but not in China or Islam (the difficulties of translating the concept of "being" in Arabic are illustrated by the well-known Al-Farabi's chapter in his "*Kitab-al-huruf*" - *The book of Letters*) (2).
Philosophers, with few exceptions (e.g. Wilhelm von Humboldt, or Adolf Trendelenburg's work on the grammatical origin of Aristotelian *Categories*) have generally neglected this problem, or have spoken of the excellence of Greek language to explain the historical origins of metaphysics (e.g. Martin Heidegger: "For along with the German language, Greek (in regard to the possibilities of thinking) is at once the most powerful and the most spiritual of languages") (3). I think that a consideration of the recent results of linguistic research would provide a better evaluation of the question.

In some cases an attempt will be made to give a brief information about the equivalent concepts of Arabic, Chinese and Indian philosophy to offer a comparative vision of the problems.
I will made these additions only with much hesitation; I am not an Orientalist and my only justification is the lack of relevant information available on the Internet about this important subject; perhaps experienced scholars will supply more advanced contributions to complete, and if necessary to correct, my job.
I hope to add other items in future; suggestions and criticism are equally welcome.

Notes

(1) "There is no equivalent to the Aristotelian project of a 'science of being qua being' in the Indian philosophical tradition, nor the Platonic perplexity about being and nonbeing; nor is there an explicit counterpart to Wolff's conception of 'ontology'. Yet being is one of the central and pervasive themes of Indian thought. It is the object of intense reflection, discussion, and disagreement, and a catalyst of debate among the competing schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. "Wilhelm Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 21.
(2) See: Amina Rachid, "Dieu et l'être selon Al-Farabi: le chapitre de 'l'être' dans le *Livre des Lettres*", in: Centre d'Étude pour la Religion du Livre (ed.), *Dieu et l'Être. Exégèses d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20.11-24*, Paris: Études augustiniennes 1978, pp. 179-190.
(3) Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, New Haven: Yale University Press 2000 p. 60.

SOME RESOURCES FOR ASIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. Reyna Ruth. *Dictionary of Oriental Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Coronet Books 1977.
2. Grimes John. *A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1996.
3. Leaman Oliver. *Key Concepts in Asian Philosophy*. New York: Routledge 1999.
4. Dainian Zhang. *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press 2002.

Related pages

In parenthesis the Greek / Latin original term.

Being (*Einai, Esse*)

Existence (*Hyparkein, Existentia*)

Nonexistence

Substance (*Ousia, Substantia*)

Mathesis universalis

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Key Terms in Ontology: *Being*

THE CONCEPT OF BEING IN LINGUISTICS

"Any linguistic study of the Greek verb be is essentially conditioned, and perhaps ultimately motivated, by the philosophic career of this word. We know what an extraordinary career it has been. It seems fair to say, with Benveniste, that the systematic development of a concept of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, and then in a more mechanical way from the Stoics to Plotinus, relies upon the pre-existing disposition of the language to make a very general and diversified use of the verb *einai*. Furthermore, insofar as the notions expressed by *on, einai*, and *ousia* in Greek underlie the doctrines of Being, substance, essence, and existence in Latin, in Arabic, and in modern philosophy from Descartes to Heidegger and perhaps to Quine, we may say that the usage of the Greek verb be studied here forms the historical basis for the ontological tradition of the West, as the very term "ontology" suggests.
At the same time it is generally recognized that this wide range of uses for the single verb *eimi* in Greek reflects a state of affairs which is "peculiar to Indo-European languages, and by no means a universal situation or a necessary condition." (1) The present monograph series on "the verb 'be' and its synonyms" shows just how far the languages of the earth may differ from one another in their expression for existence, for predication with nouns or with adjectives, for locative predication, and so forth. The topic of be can itself scarcely be defined except by reference to Indo-European verbs representing the root *es-. The question naturally arises whether an historical peculiarity of this kind can be of any

fundamental importance for general linguistics and, even more pressing, whether a concept reflecting the Indo-European use of *es- can be of any general significance in philosophy." (p. 1)

Notes

(1) Émile Benveniste, "Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue" (1958), in: *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, (Paris, 1966) p. 73.

From: Charles H. Kahn, *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*, Dordrecht: Reidel 1973, reprinted Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003 with a new Introduction).

THE CONCEPT OF BEING IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (BEFORE HEIDEGGER)

"The great intellectual adventure that is Greek philosophy may be regarded, on a somewhat simplistic view, as structured around three basic questions, occurring historically in the following order: What is the world made of? or What *is* there?; What should we do?; How can we know? These may be soon as lying behind what were later distinguished (perhaps first, in a formal way, I,. Plato's pupil Xenocrates as the three main divisions of Greek philosophy, physics, ethics, and logic.
I am here concerned only with the first and most basic question, since that constitutes the inquiry about being. Before beginning a historical survey, it would be well to attempt a definition of the concept with which we are concerned. In the context of Greek thought, then, 'being" (often characterized by the additional qualification "real" or "true") denotes sonic single, permanent, unchanging, fundamental reality, to which is habitually opposed the inconstant flux and variety of visible things. This reality is initially seen simply as a sort of substratum out of which the multiplicity of appearances may evolve, but progressively there come to be added to it other features, such as absolute unity (or,

conversely, infinite multiplicity), eternity (ultimately timelessness), incorporeality for, conversely, basic corporeality), and rationality (or, conversely, blind necessity). in short, "being" (*on,* or *ousia*) becomes in Greek philosophy the repository of all the concepts that can be thought up to characterize the idealized opposite of what we see around us -- its counterpart, which comprises all aspects of the everyday physical world, being termed "becoming" (*genesis*)." (p. 51)

From: John Dillon, *The Question of Being*, in: Jacques Brunschwig, Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd (eds.), Harvard: Harvard University Press 2000 pp. 51-71.

In a first acceptation, the word being is a noun. As such, it signifies either d being (that is, the substance, nature, and essence of anything existent), or being itself, a property common to all that which can rightly be said to be. In a second acceptation, the same word is the present participle of the verb 'to be.' As a verb, it no longer signifies something that is, nor even existence in general, but rather the very act whereby any given reality actually is, or exists. Let us call this act a 'to be,' in contradistinction to what is commonly called 'a being.' It appears at once that, at least to the mind, the relation of 'to be' to 'being' is not a reciprocal one. 'Being' is conceivable, 'to be' is not. We cannot possibly conceive an 'is' except as belonging to some thing that is, or exists. But the reverse is not true. Being is quite conceivable apart from actual existence; so much so that the very first and the most universal of all the distinctions in the realm of being is that which divides it into two classes, that of the real and that of the possible. Now what is it to conceive a being as merely possible, if not to conceive it apart from actual existence? A 'possible' is a being which has not yet received, or which has already lost, its own to be. Since being is thinkable apart from actual existence, whereas actual existence is not thinkable apart from being, philosophers will simply yield to one of the fundamental facilities of the human mind by positing being minus actual existence as the first principle of metaphysics." (pp. 2-3)

From: Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Second edition, 1952.

"When the early Greek thinkers initiated philosophical speculation, the very first question they asked themselves was: What stuff is reality made of? Taken in itself, this question was strikingly indicative of the most fundamental need of the human mind. To understand something is for us to conceive it as identical in nature with something else that we already know. To know the nature of reality at large is therefore for us to understand that each and every one of the innumerable things which make up the universe is, at bottom, identical in nature with each and every other thing. Prompted by this unshakable conviction, unshakable because rooted in the very essence of human understanding, the early Greek thinkers successively attempted to reduce nature in general to water, then to air, then to fire, until one of them at last hit upon the right answer to the question, by saying that the primary stuff which reality is made of is being.

The answer was obviously correct, for it is not at once evident that, in the last analysis, air and fire are nothing else than water, or that, conversely, water itself is nothing else than either air or fire; but it cannot be doubted that, whatever else they may be, water, air and fire have in common at least this property, that they are. Each of them is a being, and, since the same can be said of everything else, we cannot avoid the conclusion that being is the only property certainly shared in common by all that which is. Being, then, is the fundamental and ultimate element of reality. When he made this discovery, Parmenides of Elea at once carried metaphysical speculation to what was always to remain one of its ultimate limits; but, at the same time, he entangled himself in what still is for us one of the worst metaphysical difficulties. It had been possible for Parmenides' predecessors to identify nature with water, fire or air, without going to the trouble of defining the meaning of those terms. If I say that everything is water, everybody will understand what I mean, but if I say that everything is being, I can safely expect to be asked: what is being? For indeed we all know many beings, but what being itself is, or

what it is to be, is an extremely obscure and intricate question. Parmenides could hardly avoid telling us what sort of reality being itself is. In point of fact, he was bold enough to raise the problem and clear-sighted enough to give it an answer which still deserves to hold our attention." (pp. 6-7)

From: Étienne Gilson, *Being and some philosophers* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Second edition, 1952.

THE CONCEPT OF BEING ACCORDING TO HEIDEGGER

"If for us Being is just an empty word and an evanescent meaning, then we must at least try to grasp fully this last remnant of a connection. So we ask, to begin with: 1. What sort of word is this anyway -- Being -- as regards its formal character as a word? 2. What does linguistics tell us about the originary meaning of this word? To put this in scholarly terms, we are asking 1) about the grammar and 2) about the etymology of the word Being.
The grammatical analysis of words is neither exclusively nor primarily concerned with their written or spoken form. It takes these formal elements as clues to definite directions and differences in direction in the possible meanings of words; these directions dictate how the words can be used within a sentence or within a larger discursive structure. (...)We can easily see that un the formation of the word Being, the decisive precursor is the infinitive 'to be.' This form of the verb is transformed into a substantive. The character of our word Being, as a word, is determined, accordingly, by three grammatical forms: verb, infinitive, and substantive. Thus our first task is to understand the meaning of these grammatical forms. Of the three we have named, verb and substantive are among those that were first recognized at the start of Western grammar and that even today are taken as the fundamental forms of words and of language in general. And so, with the question about the essence of the substantive and of the verb, we find ourselves in the midst of the

question about the essence of language. For the question of whether the primordial form of the word is the noun (substantive) or the verb coincides with the question of the originary character of speech and speaking. In turn, this question entails the question of the origin of language. We cannot start by immediately going into this question. We are forced onto a detour. We will restrict ourselves in what follows to that grammatical form which provides the transitional phase in the development of the verbal substantive: the infinitive (to go, to come, to fall, to sing, to hope, to be, etc.).

What does "infinitive" mean? This term is an abbreviation of the complete one: modus infinitivus, the mode of unboundedness, of indeterminateness, regarding the manner in which a verb exercises and indicates the function and direction of its meaning. (...).

Above all we must consider the fact that the definitive differentiation of the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in the Greek form of onoma and rhema was worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being that has been definitive for the entire West. This inner bond between these two happenings is accessible to us unimpaired and is carried out in full clarity in Plato's Sophist. The terms onoma and rhema were already known before Plato, of course. But at that time, and still in Plato, they were understood as terms denoting the use of words as a whole. Onoma means the linguistic name as distinguished from the named person or thing, and it also means the speaking of a word, which was later conceived grammatically as rhema. And rhema in turn means the spoken word, speech; the rhetor is the speaker, the orator, who uses not only verbs but also onomata in the narrower meaning of the substantive.

The fact that both terms originally governed an equally wide domain is important for our later point that the much-discussed question in linguistics of whether the noun or the verb represents the primordial form of the word is not a genuine question. This pseudo-question first arose in the context of a developed grammar rather than from a vision of the essence of language, an essence not yet dissected by grammar." (pp. 55-60, notes omitted)

From: Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, New Haven: Yale University Press 2000.

THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING: THE VERB "BE" IN ANCIENT HEBREW

"On the other hand, by means of the so-called noun clause the Hebrew language is much better able to express the 'static' or 'that which is' in its logical sense than the Greek and our modern languages permit with their copula and their verbs of inaction. We shall define the noun clause in agreement with Gesenius-Kautzsch, in order to be able to understand the 'being' expressed in it. Every sentence, the subject as well as the predicate of which is a noun or noun equivalent is called a noun clause, while in a verbal clause the predicate is a finite verb. This distinction is indispensable for more subtle understanding of Hebrew syntax (as of Semitics in general) because it is not merely a matter of an external, formal distinction in meaning but of one that goes to the depths of the language. The noun clause, the predicate of which is a substantive, offers something fixed, not active, in short, a 'being'; the verbal clause on the other hand asserts something moving and in flux, an event and an action. The noun clause with a participial predicate can also assert something moving and in flux, except that here the event and action is fixed as something not active and enduring, as opposed to the verbal clause. For our purpose, it is not necessary to discuss all the various kinds of noun classes, and in particular not those with participial predicates which should logically be considered as verbal clauses." (pp. 35-36, some notes omitted)

Notes

(1) Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm Gesenius (1786-1842) and Emil Friedrich Kautzsch (1841-1910), *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*. Edited and enlarged by E. Kautzsch Translated and revised from the German 28th edition by Arthur Ernest Cowley. 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. [Reprinted by Oxford University Press in 1995].

From: Thorleif Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, English updated translation by Jules Moreau, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960; reprinted by W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. Original edition: *Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952 (second revised edition 1954).

"What is the basic fact of 'being' for the Israelites will result from the analysis of the verb *hayah* that follows.
A) The verb *hayah*: We must devote special attention to this verb not only because it occurs most frequently but also because the verbal problems discussed above are concentrated in this verb and appear in it in their most difficult form. (...) The most important meanings and uses of our verb 'to be' (and its equivalents in other Indo-European languages) are: (1) to express being or existence; (2) to serve as a copula. Now, as we have shown above, Hebrew and the other Semitic languages do not need a copula because of the noun clause. As a general rule, therefore, it may be said that *hayah* is not used as a copula; real or supposed exceptions to this rule will be cited later. The characteristic mark of *hayah*, in distinction from our verb 'to be', is that it is a true verb with full verbal force. The majority of formal considerations as well as the actual ones lead to this conclusion:
I. The peculiarity of emphasizing the verbal idea by use of the infinitive absolute before finite verbs;
II. the occurrence of the passive form *Niph'al*;
III. its frequent occurrence in parallel with other verbs whose verbal force is beyond doubt; this is so frequent an occurrence that a few examples will suffice: Jahveh hurled a great wind, and a mighty tempest was (Jonah 1.4); God created (made, spoke) and the corresponding thing was (Gen. 1.3, 9, 11); its parallel use

with *qûm* = 'be realized' (Isa. 7.7; 14.24); the messengers of the king command the prophet Micaiah to prophesy safety and victory, 'Let thy word be as the word of one of them (i.e. the prophets of good fortune)', (I Kings 22.13).
The meaning of hayah is apparently manifold; hayah has thus been considered to some extent a general word which can mean everything possible and therefore designates nothing characteristic. Closer examination reveals, however, that this is not the case. It is therefore necessary to establish the many meanings and shades of meaning of hayah and to find their inner connexion. We shall use first the results of Ratschow (1) who has examined the occurrences of *hayah* in the Old Testament with a thoroughness hardly to be excelled and in whose work is to be found extensive evidence. He found three principal meanings: 'to become', 'to be', and 'to effect'; but these are related internally and form a unity. In the main this will be right, and it agrees with our understanding of Hebrew thought; we must object, however, to details." (pp. 38-39, notes omitted).

Notes

(1) Carl H. Ratschow, *Werden und Wirken, Eine Untersuchung des wortes hajah als Beitrag zur Wirklichkeitserfassung des Alten Testaments* ("Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft", 70), Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1941.

From: Thorleif Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek,* English updated translation by Jules Moreau, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960; reprinted by W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. Original edition: *Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952 (second revised edition 1954).

"In modern biblical theology it is commonly held that the Israelites were not interested in 'existence' as distinct from active existence, action or life; and correspondingly that the language has no means of expressing mere existence. The same seems to be the opinion of Boman, who several times says that a static being is a nothing to the Israelites.

It was mentioned earlier that 'the verb 'to be' as copula or existential was one of the subjects of the questionnaire circulated by Basson and O'Connor and reported on in their article. On this question they got an answer, and they report as follows: 'Semitic languages have in general no copula, but Hebrew and Assyrian both have a special word for "exists" '.1 Does this contradict the opinion I have just described?There are at least three linguistic phenomena which are relevant to the discussion of 'to be' in Hebrew:(a) The ordinary type of sentence where the copula 'is' is used in English, such as 'David is the king', 'he is the man', has no verb as copula in Hebrew. Hebrew uses the nominal sentence, which is a mere juxtaposition of the two elements 'David' and 'the king'. The nominal sentence is a very well-established feature of Semitic syntax. A common addition is the pronoun 'he' or 'she' introduced after the subject, giving the sentence 'David-he-the-king'. Since this pronoun is not indispensable and is indeed very frequently not so inserted, I think it can be neglected in a discussion of the copula.
(b) The verb hayah 'to be'. This is discussed at length by Boman, and I shall later make some remarks about his treatment of it. For the present we have to make clear only the most important fact for the co-ordination of hayah with other terms corresponding to English 'to be': it is only at certain points that this verb coincides in function with 'to be as copula or existential'. In a very large number of its occurrences it will be well translated by 'come to be' or 'come to pass'. Or, conversely, English sentences using 'is' in the present tense either as copula or as existential will seldom be rendered into Hebrew with hayah; they will much more normally use the nominal sentence, or the particle yel 'there is'. We are not on the other hand justified in removing hayah altogether from the sphere of what is relevant to English 'is' and making it equivalent (say) to English 'become'. For example, a statement like 'the earth is waste' will have the nominal sentence, and no verb; but if we put it in the past and say 'the earth was waste (and is no longer so)', then the verb hayah is used, as in Gen. I: 2. It would be quite perverse to insist on the meaning 'became' here, and so a certain overlap with 'be' has to be observed. In fact the sense of 'come to he' or 'come to pass' is not to be explained by going over to 'become' as the basic sense, but by noticing that very frequent

uses have an ingressive element which with a verb meaning 'be' will lead to a sense roughly of 'come to be' or 'come to pass'.
(c) The word yeš; 'there is' and the opposite 'ayin or 'en 'there is not'. This is of course the 'special word for exists ' mentioned in the report above. Boman in his discussion of 'being' does not mention this frequent and important word at all. Moreover, a considerable complication is introduced into the discussion by this word. Basson and O'Connor (1) are right in saying that it is a 'special word for 'exists', in the sense that it is not normally used as a copula in sentences like 'David is the king'. You use it in sentences like 'There is a dish on the table' or 'There is a God in heaven'.
The complication to which I refer is that this word, which we might describe rather vaguely as a particle, is certainly not a verb, has some of the characteristics of the noun and may be translated 'being, existence' in a rather over-literal rendering.
(...)
"Now another point of some importance can be illustrated from this word. The point I wish to make is that the question whether the Israelites laid any emphasis on 'mere' existence as distinct from active existence of some kind is a different one from the question whether their language had words that could express 'mere' existence. The word yeš; can be well translated by 'there is', and as in English 'there is' we press too far if we try to find in it the expression of 'mere' existence. In fact many cases which use it have also some locality indicated: 'There is bread in my house', 'There is Yahweh in this place'. This is no doubt the 'existential' sense of 'is' as against the 'copula' type. Nevertheless 'exists' would not be a good translation in these sentences, since we would not normally say 'Bread exists in my house' or 'There exists a dish on the table'. In other words, the 'existential' use of the word 'is' does not coincide semantically with 'exists' and does not raise the problem of 'mere' existence, especially when a locality is indicated."(pp. 58-61, some notes omitted)

Notes

(1) A. H. Basson, and D. J. O'Connor, "Language and Philosophy: Some Suggestions for an Empirical Approach", *Philosophy*, XXII

(1947) pp. 49-65.

From: James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

ON THE MEANING OF "EINAI" AND "TO ON" IN ANCIENT GREEK

"BEING. The closest equivalent to the word "being" in ancient Greek is *to on,* the present participle of *einai,* to be *(ON, ONTA).* The first part of Parmenides' poem has as its focus *esti,* the third person singular of *einai,* and *to eon,* the equivalent of *to on* in Parmenides' dialect. For Parmenides, "being"*(to on)* is one, timeless and changeless, and this, he says, is "the truth"; all talk about plurality and change is "opinion"*(doxa),* and not the truth about "being."

Since *to on* and *to onta* are, in ordinary Greek, often used as stand-ins for names of one or more individual things, other Greek philosophers looked for other locutions to talk about "being" in ontologically loaded contexts. One of Plato's favorite locutions to refer to the forms *(eide)* is *to ontos on,* using the adverb made from the participle to intensify its meaning, literally, "the beingly being," but typically translated into English as "the really real." *Ontos* was in common use to mean, roughly, "really" or "actually" or "in fact" but combining it with the participle seems to be Plato's coinage.

Plato also adopts the abstract noun built on the same participle, *ousia,* the stem *ont* -- plus the abstract noun ending -- *sia*. In ordinary Greek, this word must have some of the resonance that "existence" has in ordinary English, but it is most often used, outside of philosophical contexts, to talk about property or wealth or about important personal characteristics. In English translations of Plato's dialogues, the word *ousia* is sometimes rendered "Reality" and sometimes "being," while in English translations of Aristotle the word "being" fairly reliably translates

"to on," and *ousia* is typically translated "substance" or "entity" *(see OUSIA).*
Thus, in those of Plato's dialogues where the forms play a role the distinction between being and becoming is equivalent to the distinction between forms and phenomena *(phainomena),* or between Object of knowledge *(epistemë)* and object of opinion *(doxa).*
Aristotle does not use the locution *to ontos on;* apart from his exceedingly widespread use of the word *ousia*. We may note the locution *to on he on,*typically translated "being qua being," and *to on haplos* (that which simply is). More generally, Aristotle frequently talks of the many senses of "being": in one way, "being" (*to einai,* the infinitive, or *to on*) has as many senses as the categories (i.e., 10), but there is also a distinction between potential and actual being, between essential and accidental, and an equation of being and truth.
The Stoics tend to use the word *hyparchein* for both existence and predication." (pp. 67-68)

From: Anthony Preus, *Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Lanham: Scarecow Press, 2007.

"*einai*: to be, to exist; to on: that which is, the real; ousia: being, essence. This verb caused great philosophical difficulty to the Greeks and consequential difficulties for us. Much of the trouble arises from the fact that one can say Platôn esti - Plato exists - or Platôn esti philosophos -- Plato is a philosopher - making use of the same verb, whereas in English 'Plato is' is at best an unidiomatic way of saying that he exists. This double use led some earlier Greek philosophers to think that a sentence beginning Platôn ouk esti... must deny the existence of Plato even if the next word is barbaros. This leads to translation difficulties for us, as for instance with the sentence ei ti phaneiê hoion hama on to kai mê on, to toiouton metaxu keisthai tou eilikrinôs ontos kai tou pantôs mê ontos (Plato Rep. 478d), which might be translated either as 'if something should appear such as both to have and not to have a certain predicate [we said that] such a thing would lie between being clearly of that sort and not being so at all' or as 'if something should appear such that it

simultaneously exists and does not exist [we said that] such a thing would lie between clearly existing and not existing at all'. It was presumably these difficulties that led Parmenides to say such things as khrê to legein to noein t'eon emmenai esti gar einai, mêden d'ouk estin - that of which one can speak and think must be: for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be (Parmenides in Simplicius, Physics 117.4). In an impersonal use esti frequently means 'it is possible' as in estin adikounta mêpô adikon einai - it is possible to do what is unjust without being an unjust person (Aristotle N.E. 1134a 17), and in the quotation from Parmenides above. There are also adverbial expressions such as estin hote, sometimes, and estin hôs, in some ways.".

"*on*: to on, in the widest sense, is everything that is and, as such, is contrasted with to mê on, that which is not; in a narrower use to on, sometimes called for clarity to ontôs on, the really real, is unchanging and imperishable and eternal, and is contrasted with the gignomenon that is changing and perishable. In the dispute between Parmenides and the atomists it is hard to doubt that to mê on as the non-existent is confused with empty space: oute gar an gnoiês to ge mê on: ou gar anuston -- you cannot know that which is not; it is impossible (Parmenides, fr. 2); ouden gar estin ê estai allo parex tou eontos -- nothing other than what is either is or will be (Parmenides, fr. 8). But Simplicius reports Leucippus as saying ouden mallon to on ê to mê on huparkhein -- there is that which is no more than that which is not (Simplicius, Physics 28.12); here to mê on seems to be the kenon, void; cf. the den of Democritus. In the narrower use, to men pantelôs on pantelôs gnôston -- the completely real is completely knowable (Plato Rep. 477a); ei gar panta to onta tou agathou ephietai, dêlon hoti to prôtôs agathon epekeina esti tôn ontôn -- for if everything that is aims at the good, it is clear that the primary good transcends things that are (Proclus, Elements of Theology 8); to gar houtôs on proteron têi phusei tou gignomenou esti - that which is in this [narrow] way is prior in its nature to the becoming. (Simplicius, Physics 1337.4)." (pp. 49-50)

From: James Opie Urmson, *The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary* London: Duckworth 1990.

"*on ónta* (pl.): being, beings.
1. The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of Parmenides' series of logical dichotomies between being and nonbeing (me on): that which is, cannot not be; that which is not, cannot be, i.e., a denial of passage from being to nonbeing or genesis (q.v.; fr. 2), and its corollary, a denial of change and motion (fr. 8, lines 26-33, 42-50; for the theological correlatives of this, see nous 2). Secondly, being is one and not many (fr. 8, lines 22-25) . And finally, the epistemological premiss: only being can be known or named; nonbeing cannot (fr. 3; fr. 8, line 34); see doxa. Being, in short, is a sphere (fr. 8, lines 42-4g) . Most of the later pre-Socratics denied this latter premiss (cf. stoicheion and atomon), as did Plato for whom the really real (to ontos on) were the plural eide, and who directed the latter half of the Parmenides (137b-166c) against it.
2. The solution to the nonbeing dilemma (for its epistemological solution, see doxa and heteron) and the key to the analysis of genesis began with Plato's positing of space (see hypodoche) in which genesis takes place, and which stands midway between true being and nonbeing (Tim. 52a-c). For Plato, as for Parmenides, absolute nonbeing is nonsense (Sophist 238c), but there is a relative grade illustrated not only by the Receptacle cited above, but by sensible things (aistheta) as well (Sophist 240b; Timaeus. 35a, 52c). Among the Platonic hierarchy of Forms, there is aneidos of being; indeed it is one of the most important Forms that pervade all the rest (Sophist 254b-d; compare this with the peculiar nature of on in Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a) . Further, Plato distinguishes real beings (ontos onta) from those that have genesis, and in Timaeus 28a he works out an epistemological-ontological correlation: onta are known by thought (noesis) accompanied by a rational account (logos); generated beings are grasped by opinion (or judgment, see doxa) based on sensation (aisthesis).
3. Since being is the object of the science of metaphysics (Metaphysics 1031a) Aristotle's treatment of on is much more elaborate. The first distinction is between "being qua being" (to on he on), which is the object of metaphysics, and individual beings (onta), which are the objects of the other sciences. This is

the view in Metaphysics 1003a, but Aristotle is not consistent on the point: elsewhere (see Metaphysics 1026a; Physics 192a, 194b; De an. 403b) he states that metaphysics studies being that is separate and unmoving (see theologia). Again, 'being' is peculiar in that it is defined not univocally or generically, but analogously through all the categories (Metaphysics 1003a), and in this it is like 'one' (hen) (Metaphysics 1053b) and 'good' (agathon) (ibid. Nichomachean Ethics I, 1096b) ; see katholou. There follows a basic distinction (ibid. 1017a-b): something 'is' either accidentally, or essentially, or epistemologically, or in the dichotomy act (energeia) / potency (dynamis). The epistemological 'being' (see doxa) is dealt with elsewhere (see Metaphysics 1027b-1028a, 1051a-1152a), as is potency/act (see Metaphysics Theta passim), so Aristotle here concentrates his attention on what 'is' essentially. It is something that falls within the ten kategoriai (Metaphysics 1017a) and is, primarily, substance (ousia; ibid. 1028a-b). A somewhat different point of view emerges from Aristotle's breakdown of the various senses of nonbeing (me on) in Metaphysics 1069b and 1089a: something is not either as a negative proposition, i.e., a denial of one of the predicates, or as a false proposition, or finally, kata dynamin, i.e., by being something else only potentially but not actually. It is from this latter that genesis comes about (see also dynamis, energeia, steresis) .

4. In the Plotinian universe the One (hen) is beyond being (Enneads V, 9, 3; compare Plato's description of the Good beyond Being in Republic 509b and see hyperousia). The realm of being begins on the level of nous since both being and nous are contained in nous (ibid. V, 5, 2; V, 9, 7). Nonbeing is treated in much the Platonic and Aristotelian fashion: matter (hyle) that is only a replica (eikon) of being is only quasi-being (Enneads I, 8, 3). Philo, with his strongly developed feeling of divine transcendence (see hyperousia), restricts true being to God alone (Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat. 44., 160), arid introduces into the discussion the metaphysical interpretation of the famous phrase in Exodus 3, 14: 'I am who am'; see hypodoche, hyle, genesis." (pp. 141-142)

From: Francis Edwards Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms. A Historical Lexicon* New York: New York University Press, 1967.

"There can be no doubt that Parmenides' Goddess's philosophy course is concerned with 'being.' But saying this is not saying anything. In Greek, as in Spanish [or English], 'to be' is a verb and, like any verb it can be used as a noun, and then we can speak of 'being' (used as a noun). But this verbal noun is essentially different in Greek than it is in other languages, and so we cannot ignore the problem. This specificity is one of the results of the flexibility of the Greek language, which permits all kinds of juggling. E. Benveniste wrote that "the linguistic structure of Greek created the predisposition for the notion 'to be' to have a philosophical vocation." (1) Indeed, the use of the verb 'to be' as a noun absolutely does not mean what Philosophers call 'being' (the noun). To use an infinitive as a noun in Spanish it must be preceded by an article, in this case 'el' ['the']. Then the infinitive 'ser"'['to be'] becomes 'el ser' ['the being'] used as a noun, in Greek 'tò eînai.' However, this formula never figured among the concerns of the Greek philosophers. No Greek philosopher who inquired into what today we might call 'the being of things,' or even 'certain types of beings,' including the supreme being, ever asked 'what is tò eînai?' literally 'what is being?' As we know, especially since the Aristotelian systemization, the formula used by all Greek philosophers to ask the question of being is tí esti tò ón (to eon in Parmenides), 'What is being?' 'Tò eon' is the present participle of the verb to be, used as a noun. The difficulty of grasping the scope of this neuter present participle (since there is also a masculine and a feminine present participle) has always given rise to all kinds of misunderstandings, since its use as a noun, represented by the neuter article 'tó,' is deceptive, and so Parmenides avoids it whenever he can. Indeed, just as verbal-noun infinitives always have a dynamic character, something similar occurs with the participle tò on, which as a present participle means that which is being,' that which engages in the act of being now. In all that I have said up till now, philosophy is absent: I have only summarized, perhaps too superficially, what

Benveniste calls 'un fait de langue,"' (2) a fact about Greek simply as a language.
It is upon this linguistic fact that Parmenides reflects. In Greek the word for 'things' is ónta. Even in current everyday language, things are 'beings,' 'something(s) that is (are),' 'that which is being.' Philosophy has not yet come into it: that's the way the Greek language is. But why do we call something that is a 'being'? Because the fact of being manifests itself in that which is; if there is that which is, then the fact of being is assumed. Without the fact of being, there would not be things that are. This sort of platitude will constitute the nucleus of Parmenides' philosophy. And that is the reason why his thinking starts from an analysis of the notion of the fact of being, arrived at from the evidence that 'is' is occurring. If there is something undeniable for anyone who is, it is 'is.' If Greek syntax allowed the formula, we could say, with R. Regvald, that the basic question would be 'tí esti ésti,' 'What is 'is'?" (pp. 59-60, some notes omitted)

Notes

(1) Emile Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, Paris: Gallimard, 1959 p. 73.
(2) *ibid*. p. 71 note 1.

From: Néstor-Luis Cordero, *By Being, It Is. The Thesis of Parmenides* Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004.

"It is an understatement to claim that 'being' is one of the central concepts of ancient Greek metaphysics. Unfortunately, there is a split between contemporary commentators as to what is under discussion when being is the topic. On one side are those who think that these discussions are basically about existence; what exists, the various sorts of existence, what can be inferred from the fact that something exists, etc. On the other side are those who believe that these discussions are investigations into the nature of predication; of being something or other, the various ways a thing can be what it is, what can be inferred from the fact that a thing is something or other, etc. Obviously these are two quite different topics. For example, on the existence

interpretation, as I shall call it, one of Parmenides' main points is that we cannot (meaningfully) speak of what does not exist. His mistake is to think that words and phrases which purport to refer but which do not refer are meaningless. On the predication approach, Parmenides is correctly pointing out that we cannot speak about nothing (what is not anything at all) and still be speaking. His mistake is to confuse not being something or other with not being anything at all. (1) On the existence interpretation, it is perhaps fair to say that Plato's distinction between real being and a lesser sort is a distinction between kinds of existence. On the predication approach, it is a distinction between really being this or that and being in a way or qualifiedly this or that. One's view of Greek metaphysics is going to be strongly influenced by which approach one takes. A little can be said about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches without getting into the details where, as we all know, the devil dwells. In philosophical discussions of being we frequently find the Greek, 'èsti', occurring without a completion. On the predication approach, sentences of the form, 'x is', are understood as meaning much the same as, 'x is something or other', in the way that, 'x sees', means much the same as, 'x sees something or other'. Furthermore, 'x is something or other', is understood as different in meaning from, 'x exists'. For example, Centaurs do not exist but they are mythical creatures, discussed, thought of and sometimes believed in. Thus, they are something or other though they do not exist. The problem for the predication approach is that there is no unambiguous use of, 'x is', to mean, 'x is something or other', in ordinary Greek. Such sentences can, however, mean, 'x exists'. This is a significant point in favor of the existence reading. This would probably be the end of the story were it not for the fact that in the metaphysical texts in question examples are given or inferences are drawn which make it clear that predication is in some way involved. For example, in the Theaetetus, 152 a ff., Socrates introduces Protagoras' relativism as follows: "Man is the measure of all things - of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not." Though an existential reading is perfectly natural, it is all but contradicted by what follows. Socrates illustrates the quoted dictum by pointing out that a wind may be chilly to one person

and not chilly to another, i. e., that a thing may be thus and so to one person and not be that to another. Existence seems not to be in question. The strength of the predication approach stems from the fact that frequently the philosophical texts in question require us to somehow understand the verb,'ἐστί', as the copula."
"Mohan Matthen, "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth", presents and defends what is perhaps the most detailed and well worked out existence approach in the literature.(2) After pointing out that Greek philosophers sometimes use the verb, 'einai', in such a way that it seems to express both existence and predication, he presents an interesting account of this phenomenon which allows us to read absolute occurrences of the verb as neither the copula nor as (con)fused but as meaning simply, 'exists'. The assimilation of these occurrences to the copula is achieved by arguing that speakers of ancient Greek were committed to the existence of a type of entity which is unfamiliar to us and which he calls a 'predicative complex'.(3) These are entities which exist as long as, and only as long as, a corresponding predicative sentence is true." (pp. 321-322)

Notes

(1) Richard J. Ketchum "Parmenides on What There Is", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20/2 (1990), 167-190.
(2) "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth", Phronesis, 28/2 (1983), 113-135.
(3) Matthen sometimes writes as if his thesis is restricted to philosophical Ancient Greek as opposed to Ancient Greek generally. For example, the task he sets for himself is to explain why Greek Ontologists accepted some principles which he in turn uses to account for the apparent ambiguity (p. 116). I shall assume here, however, that this thesis is intended to cover Ancient Greek generally. Greek ontologists other than Aristotle were at least sometimes writing for the general public. If the principles in question were accepted only by the ontologists, the various uses of 'shat' would have been as confusing to the ancient Greek as they are to us. If we restricted the thesis to ontologists, we would also need some explanation as to why the ontologists assumed principles of which the ordinary Greek was unaware."

From: Richard J. Ketchum, "Being and Existence in Greek Ontology", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 80, 1998, pp. 321-332.

FROM GREEK TO LATIN: SENECA'S EPISTLE 58 ("THE LETTER ON BEING")

"Today more than ever I understood how impoverished, indeed destitute, our vocabulary is. When we happened to be discussing Plato, a thousand things came up which needed names but lacked them; but there were some which, though they used to have names, had lost them owing to our fussiness. But who would tolerate fussiness in the midst of destitution?
(...)
6. You're asking, 'What is the point of this introduction? What's the purpose?' I won't hide it from you. I want, if possible, to use the term 'essentia' with your approval; but if that is not possible I will use the term even if it annoys you. I can cite Cicero as an authority for this word, an abundantly influential one in my view. If you are looking for someone more up-to-date, I can cite Fabianus, who is learned and sophisticated, with a style polished enough even for our contemporary fussiness. For what will happen, Lucilius [if we don't allow essentia]? How will [the Greek term] ousia be referred to, an indispensable thing, by its nature containing the foundation of all things? So I beg you to permit me to use this word. Still, I shall take care to use the permission you grant very sparingly. Maybe I'll be content just to have the permission
7. What good will your indulgence do when I can find no way to express in Latin the very notion which provoked my criticism of our language? Your condemnation of our Roman limitations will be more intense if you find out that there is a one-syllable word for which I cannot find a substitute. What syllable is this, you ask? To on. You think I am dull-witted -- it is obvious that the word can be translated as 'what is'. But I see a big difference

between the terms. I am forced to replace a noun with a verb. But if I must, I will use 'what is'
8. Our friend, a very learned person, was saying today that this term has six senses in Plato. I will be able to explain all of them to you, if I first point out that there is such a thing as a genus and so too a species. But we are now looking for that primary genus on which other species depend and which is the source of every division and in which all things are included. It will be found if we start to pick things out, one by one, starting in reverse order. We will thus be brought to the primary [genus]." (pp. 3-4)

From: Seneca, *Selected Philosophical Letters*, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by Brad Inwood, New York: Oxford University Press 2007.

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Selected bibliography in English on the definition of "Being"

Theory

1. Benardete, José A. 1954. "On Being and Nothing." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 7:363 - 367.
   "We are launching in this essay an inquiry into first principles, in an endeavor to answer, if only in part, the presiding question of all metaphysics: What is it to be? Metaphysics is here projected as a demonstrative science, demonstrative in the strictest of senses, quite as Aristotle and Spinoza, to name but two philosophers, envisaged the discipline." (p. 363)
   (...)
   "For us the decisive question is not, Why is there Being at all? Why not far rather Nothing? Our question is: Since some (but not all) possibles must be enacted, why this possible and not that one? The answer to our question cannot be found in the schedule of possibles itself where all the entries are equally indifferent to enactment. The agency of coercion must be sought outside of the mere possibles, in a necessary ground of all being and of all non-being." (p. 367)
2. Berti, Enrico. 2002. "Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle." In *Individuals, Essences and Identity*. *Themes of Analytic Metaphysics* , edited by Bottani, Andrea, Carrara, Massimiliano and Giaretta, Pierdaniele, 79-107. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media.

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"Although the first language of Western philosophy was Greek, its main stream passed through Semitic languages (Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew) before returning to Indo-European languages (scholastic Latin, French,

English, German). It was in Arabic, which sharply separates the existential and copulative functions, that the distinction between existence and essence emerged.(4)
An adequate account of the development of theWestern concept of Being in its linguistic context would require the co-operation of specialists in many disciplines. But it may be useful to offer a preliminary sketch, as a focus for future criticism and inquiry. I shall therefore cover much ground in a little space, and intrude into several fields within which I am not an authority." (p. 223)
(...)
"A philosopher therefore cannot adapt his use of 'Being' to the functions of 'to be' in English grammar; he must either stick bravely to the conviction that there is a single concept of Being behind the different functions of *einai,* which is hidden by the grammars of non-Indo-European languages, and which even among the languages of Western philosophy is perfectly displayed only in Greek and Latin, or he must discard the verbal noun 'being' as incurably ambiguous. However difficult he may find it to choose the second alternative while he is thinking in the living language with its deep roots in the past, the artificial language of symbolic logic enables him to make the choice without even noticing what he is doing. In symbolic logic the verb 'to be' dissolves into the sign of existence (∃), which is not a predicate but a quantifier, and
three separate copulae, the signs of identity (=), class membership (∈) and class inclusion (⊆)." (p. 231)
(4) Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* , Paris 1948, p. 55; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* , Paris 1948, pp. xix, xx, 150-56; Soheil M. Afnan, *Avicenna* , London 1958, pp. 115-21.

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"The present volume is the first of a series of studies analysing the verb 'to be' and/or synonyms in a number of languages. It is expected that these studies will provide some of the necessary foundational material for research in logic, the theory of knowledge, and ontology; and possibly in other philosophical disciplines. The concluding volume of the series will attempt to assess the linguistic and philosophical impact of all the contributions.
There is no definite principle of arrangement of the contributions, which are published in the order in which they reached the editor's desk." (FEditorial Preface by John W. M. Verhaar)
Two projected volumes were never published in this series: a study on 'to be' in biblical Hebrew and biblical Greek by James Barr (*) and a concluding volume with an attempt to asses the linguistic and philosophical impact of all the contributions).
(*) On the subject see: James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, Chapter 4. *Verbs, action and time - (d) - The Verb 'To Be'* , pp. 58-71.
33. ———, ed. 1967. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Vol. 1: Classical Chinese. Athapaskan. Mundari* . Dordrecht: Reidel.
34. ———, ed. 1968. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Vol. 2: Eskimo. Hindi. Zuni. Modern Greek. Malayalam. Kurukh* . Dordrecht: Reidel.
35. ———, ed. 1968. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Vol. 3: Japanese. Kashmiri. Armenian. Hungarian. Sumerian. Shona* . Dordrecht: Reidel.
36. ———, ed. 1969. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Vol. 4: Twi.*

Modern Chinese. Arabic . Dordrecht: Reidel.
37. ———, ed. 1972. *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Vol. 5: Urdu / Turkish / Bengali / Amharic /Indonesian / Telugu / Estonian* . Dordrecht: Reidel.
38. Williams, Christopher J. F. 1992. *Being, Identity, and Truth* . Oxford University Press.
39. Woodward, Richard. 2013. "Towards Being." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 86 (1):183-193.
40. Yuasa, Yasuo. 2005. "Image-Thinking and the Understanding of "Being": The Psychological Basis of Linguistic Expression." *Philosophy East and West* no. 55:179-208.
41. Żełaniec, Wojciech. 1998. "Is "Being" Predicated in Only One Sense, After All?" *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 6:241-258.
Abstract: "In this essay, I argue that for sentences of form “A is B” there is a distinction between identity and “mere” predication to be made, and that Leśniewski’s Ontology puts us in a better position to make this distinction than first-order predicate logic. I also gesture at how Ontology could help us to decide questions of identity. The nub of the matter seems to be a “primordial” sense of the copula that Ontology has at its basis."

History

1. Adamson, Peter. 2002. "Before Essence and Existence: al-Kindī's Conception of Being." *Journal of History of Philosophy* no. 40:297-312.
"It would appear that al-Kindī considered the study of metaphysics to be primary in his endeavor to reconstruct Greek thought. His most significant remaining work, *On First Philosophy*, assimilates metaphysics or “first philosophy” to theology, the study of “the First Truth Who is the Cause of every truth.” His survey of the works of

Aristotle likewise confirms that the Metaphysics studies God, His names and His status as the First Cause.
(...)
We might suspect, then, that al-Kindī took Aristotle's aim in the *Metaphysics* of studying "being qua being" as central to his own undertaking, and indeed as central to an adequate philosophical understanding of God.
In this paper I shall try to confirm this suspicion through a study of al-Kindī's corpus, focusing specifically on his conception of being, or, rather, on his conceptions of being; for as we shall see there are two competing treatments of being in al-Kindi. First, in common with the Arabic Plotinus and the *Liber de Causis*, he has a conception that emphasizes the simplicity of being, and opposes being to predication.
Second, he has a complex conception of being indebted to Aristotle. These two conceptions can be reconciled: simple being, I will argue, is prior to and underlies complex being. Finally, I will suggest that al-Kindī's simple conception of being anticipates Avicenna's distinction between existence and essence, but only to a limited extent." (pp. 298-299 Notes omitted)

2. Aertsen, Jan A. 1985. "The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas." *The New Scholasticism* no. 59:449-470.
"In many medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: " being and good are convertible " *(ens et Comm convertuntur)*.(1) That is to say, " being " and " good " are interchangeable terms in predication *(converti enim est conversim praedicari)*.(2) Wherever " being " is predicated of something, the predicate " good " is involved as well.
That must imply that " good " is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to " being ", as a result of which " being " is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility.(3) " Good " is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every

being." In other words, " good " is coextensive with " being ", it is one of the so-called *transcendentie* which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as " transcendentals ".
(1) Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, Inq. 1, Tract. 3, q. 3, membrum 1, c. 1, a. 1, "An idem sit bonum et ens "; Bonaventure, In *II Sent.,* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens et bonum eonvertuntur, sicut volt Dionysius ", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4; Albert the Great, *De Bono* q. 1, a. 6; Summa *Theol.* tract. 6, q. 28; Thom. Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 3; *De Ver.* XXI, 2; In *De Hebdomadibus,* lect. 3; Summa *Theol.* I, 18, 3.
(2) Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver.* I, 2 obj. 2.
(3) *De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 5: Bonum quod est in genre qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ante, quod nullam rem supra ens addit.
(4) *De Ver.* I, 1: modus generaliter consequens omne ens.
(5) Comp. Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae* tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3: Bonum dicit intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genus sicut et ens.

3. ———. 1998. "Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus." In *John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996)*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 13-26. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"In the prologue of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Duns Scotus explains the name 'metaphysics' as *transcendens scientia*, that is, the science that is concerned with the *transcendentia*.(1) This explanation is indicative of the prominent place Scotus ascribes to the doctrine of the transcendentals, which was formulated for the first time in the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor that is datable about 1225. The connection between the object of first philosophy and the transcendentals is not in itself new, although the identity posed by Scotus is more radical than in his predecessors.(2) Yet it is no exaggeration to say that Scotus's philosophy marks a new phase in the history of the doctrine of the *transcendentia*.

Scotus understands the concept 'transcendental' differently than his predecessors did. To thinkers of the thirteenth century, transcendental properties are *communissima*. 'Being, 'one,'true' and 'good' 'transcend' the Aristotelian categories because they are not limited to one of them but are common to all things. According to Scotus, however, it is not necessary that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated of every being; it is not essential to the concept *transcendens* that it has many inferiors. In his *Ordinatio* he determines the concept negatively: 'what is not contained under any genus' or 'what remains indifferent to finite and infinite'. (3) This definition makes possible a vast extension of the transcendental domain; the most important innovation is formed by the so-called disjunctive transcendentals, which are convertible with being, not separately but as pairs.

The fact that the transcendental properties are not necessarily identical with the *communissima* is, I suspect, the reason why the expression *transcendentia*, which occurs only sporadically in thinkers like Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, gains the upperhand in Scotism and becomes the usual term.

About Scotus's doctrine of the transcendentals, in contrast to that of other medieval thinkers, we are well informed by Allan B. Wolter's pioneering study, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (1946). Yet there are aspects of his doctrine that have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. One of them is Scotus's treatment of the transcendentals 'one, 'true' and 'good,' which as such are convertible with being. In my contribution I want to show that with respect to the traditional transcendentals, too, Scotus breaks new ground and approaches critically the views of his thirteenth-century predecessors. Because he discusses most extensively the relation between being and one, I foals on this discussion." (pp. 13-14)

* The original version of this study will appear in T. Noone and G. A. Wilson (eds.), *Essays in Honor Girard Etzkorn:*

Franciscan Texts and Traditions, Franciscan Studies 56 (1998) [pp. 47-64].
(1) *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, prol., n. 18: Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta', quod est 'trans', et 'ycos', 'scientia', quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.
(2) Albert the Great, *Metaphysica* I, tract. 1, ch. 2 (Opera omnia XVI, 1, ed. B. Geyer, 5, 13-14), who uses the phrase *prima et transcendentia* in his analysis of the subject matter of metaphysics. For Thomas Aquinas's doctrine, see J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Leiden, Brill 1996, 113-158.
(3) *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8, part t, q. 3, nn. 113-114 (ed. Vaticana IV, 206).

4. al-Kutubi, Eiyad S. 2015. *Mulla Sadra and Eschatology: Evolution of Being*. New York: Routledge.
5. Allen, Elliott B. 1960. "Hervaeus Natalis: An Early "Thomist" on the Notion of Being." *Mediaeval Studies*:1-14.
6. Anderson, James F. 1965. *St. Augustine and Being: A Metaphysical Essay*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
7. Bechtle, Gerald. 2000. "The Question of Being and the Dating of the Anonymous *Parmenides* Commentary." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:393-414.
"This article was originally intended to precede the publication of my book (Bechtle 1999a) devoted to the extant fragments of the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Parmenides,* also known as Anonymus Taurinensis.' The aim of this article was then-and it still is now-to make the scholarly world acquainted with some of the main reasons, i.e., my view of `the question of being', for my novel thesis of a pre-Plotinian date for this *Commentary* which has almost unanimously been ascribed to Porphyry. Since the thesis of the Porphyrian authorship goes back to the great French scholar P. Hadot (see in particular Hadot 1961, 1965, 1968a, and 1968b), one can say that his thesis has been generally accepted for some thirty years or, at least, it has not been seriously challenged. This fact is easily explained since neither before nor after Hadot has there been a

thorough and critical examination of the evidence. Hadot's thesis concerning the identity of the author being the only serious one in more than a century since research on the *Commentary* first started, my idea was that probably a lot of questions had not been answered. Reconsidering all of Hadot's evidence and adding some new elements, I determined that the *Commentary is* very likely of pre-Plotinian date. Additional work on lamblichus and post-Plotinian Platonism negatively confirms this thesis since one can virtually exclude Iamblichus and any of the major Platonists following him as possible authors of the *Commentary."* (p. 393)

8. Benardete, Seth. 1977. "The Grammar of Being." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 30:486-496.
   Critical study of Charles H. Kahn, *The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek* (Reidel: 1973).
9. Bernasconi, Robert. 1987. "Descartes in the History of Being: Another Bad Novel?" *Research in Phenomenology* no. 17:75-102.
10. Berti, Enrico. 2001. "Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 101:185-207.
    Abstract: "I. In analytic philosophy, so-called 'univocalism' is the prevailing interpretation of the meaning of terms such as 'being' or 'existence', i.e. the thesis that these terms have only one meaning (see Russell, White, Quine, van Inwagen). But some analytical philosophers, inspired by Aristotle, maintain that 'being' has many senses (Austin, Ryle). II. Aristotle develops an argument in favour of this last thesis, observing that 'being' and 'one' cannot be a single genus, because they are predicated of their differences (*Metaph*. B 3). III. But 'being' for Aristotle has also a unity, i.e. 'focal meaning', which coincides with substance (*Metaph*. F 2), and substance has not only an ontological priority, but also a logical priority, in respect to the other beings, as was shown by G. E. L. Owen. IV. This 'focal meaning' cannot be identified with primary substance, i.e. with the unmovable mover, as some interpreters pretend, because this latter has only an ontological, not a logical, priority in respect to the

world. V. The impossibility of this interpretation results from Aristotle's rejection of an essence and a substance of being (*Metaph*. B 4), i.e. the rejection of what the Christian philosophers called *esse ipsum subsistens*."

11. Bobik, Joseph. 1965. *Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
12. Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 29:66-95.
13. Boman, Thorleif. 1960. *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Translated by Jules L. Moreau from the German *Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit den Griechischen* (second edition; first edition 1952), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1954, with the author's revisions to January 1960.
14. Bos, Egbert Peter. 2000. "Nature and Number of the Categories and the Division of Being According to Domingo de Soto." In *Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, 327-353. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
15. Bos, Egbert Peter, and van der Helm, A.C. 1998. "The Division of Being Over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus." In *John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308): Renewal of Philosophy*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 183-196. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Acts of the Third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996).
16. Bradshaw, David. 1999. "Neoplatonic Origins of the Act of Being." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 53:383-401.
17. Braine, David. 2006. "Aquinas, God and Being." In *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, edited by Paterson, Craig and Pugh, Matthew S., 1-24. Aldershot: Ashgate.
18. Brentano, Franz. 1975. *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Edited and translated by Rolf George.

Contents: Editor's Preface XI; Preface XV; Introduction 1; I. The Fourfold Distinction of Being 3; II. Accidental Being 6; III. Being in the Sense of Being True 15; IV. Potential and Actual Being 27; V. Being According to the Figures of the Categories 49; Notes 149-197.

19. Brock, Stephen L. 2006. "On Whether Aquinas's "Ipsum Esse" Is "Platonism"." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 60:269-303.
20. ———. 2007. "Thomas Aquinas and “What Actually exists”." In *Wisdom's Apprentice. Thomistic Essays in Honor o/ L. Dewan O. P.*, edited by Kwasniewski, Peter A., 13-39. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
21. ———. 2007. "Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse. Thomas Aquinas and the *De hebdomadibus*." *Nova et Vetera (English edition)* no. 4:465-494.
22. Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the *Sophist*: a Ssyntactical Enquiry." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 4:49-70.

"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the Sophist the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.

Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai , 'to be'. This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of `to be', which has usually been associated with the distinction

between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is, the copula."
(1) *Symploke Eidon* (1955) and *Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59* (1957), both reprinted in *Plato I*, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.

23. ———. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In *Companions to Ancient Thought: Language*, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The existence of at least these three distinct uses of 'is' was taken for granted by commentators and assumed to apply, by and large, to ancient Greek, though with some salient differences. These include the fact that Greek can and regularly does omit *esti* in the present tense, though not in other tenses, and that the complete 'is' is still very much a going concern, though more or less defunct in modern English. The fact that the *esti* of the copula can be omitted means that a predicative use of *esti* can convey a nuance over and above that of the mere copula (for instance connoting what really is F rather than merely appearing F, or what is enduringly F).
And the fact that current English has more or less abandoned the use of the complete 'is' to mean 'exist' (as in Hamlet's 'To be or not to be), while in Greek it is very much a going concern, may lead us to question whether the complete *esti* really shares the features of the 'is' which means (or used to mean) 'exist'." (p. 215)
(...)
"I cannot offer here a full account of what I take to be the results of the *Sophist,* far less a defence of such an account, but confine myself to a few points. To the question whether the dialogue distinguishes an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of predication, I have indicated my answer: that it does not, but it does draw an important distinction between identity-sentences and predications (see section I and n. 2 above). Here I focus on the question whether and if so how it distinguishes complete from incomplete uses. I shall suggest that Plato developed a better theory about the negative 'is not' than his argumentation in the *Republic* suggests, while

continuing to treat the relation between the complete use (X is) and the incomplete (X is F) in the way I have described in section IV, that is, by analogy with the relation between 'X teaches' and 'X teaches singing'." (p. 229)
(...)
"Conclusion
In our attempts to understand and evaluate the claims and arguments of ancient philosophers we have to use conceptual tools, including ones not available to the philosophers themselves. Indisputably the analytical investigations in this century of the metaphysics of, say, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle have yielded invaluable insights. But where these have involved enquiries concerning the verb 'to be' they have tended to use what may be an inappropriate framework - that of certain modern distinctions in the verb 'to be'. In particular, commentators have been misled by the English word 'exist', which now has the role of the more-or less defunct complete 'is' (as in 'To be or not to be'); they have assumed that Greek *esti,* when complete, like 'exist', does not allow a completion, and has a role sharply distinct from the *esti* in a predication. I have argued that a different picture emerges from Plato and Aristotle, both from their usage of *esti* and from their explicit discussions. Even where they do draw attention to the two syntactic uses (complete and incomplete), as Plato perhaps does at *Sophist* 2 5 5c12-d 7, and Aristotle in the passages cited in section V, they should not be described as elucidating a difference between the 'is' of existence and that of predication, or indeed as noting a difference of any great philosophical importance. When we try to understand the arguments which seem to depend crucially on the verb 'to be' we should beware of
seeking to impose or to discern our currently favoured distinctions, for in ancient Greek the conceptual web was woven differently, and in the case ofthe verb 'to be' it was, comparatively speaking, a seamless one." (p. 236)

24. Brown, Stephen. 1965. "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being. The Interpretations of Henry of Ghent,

Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli." *Franciscan Studies* no. 25:117-150.
25. Buchanan, Emerson. 1962. *Aristotle's Theory of Being*. Cambridge (MA): University, Mississippi.
26. Calvo, Tomás. 2014. "The Verb 'Be' (εἰμὶ) and Aristotelian Ontology." *Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía* no. 33:45-55.
27. Caster, Kevin Joseph. 1996. "The Real Distinction Between Being and Essence according to William of Auvergne." *Traditio* no. 51:201-223.
28. ———. 1996. "The Distinction between Being and Essence according to Boethius, Avicenna, and William of Auvergne." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 73:309-332.
"A close analysis of William of Auvergne's metaphysics reveals a distinction between being and essence that more closely approximates the celebrated real distinction of St. Thomas than has generally been recognized. Like St. Thomas, William maintained both a real distinction and a real composition between being and essence in the metaphysical structure of the concrete thing. Since William's position thus represented a marked development in the history of philosophy with respect to this topic, it is obviously valuable to look at William's sources, namely, Boethius and Avicenna. Of course, I am in no sense suggesting that the study of Boethius and Avicenna is valuable only for the insights it might lend to one's perspective of William's position. On the contrary, such study is eminently valuable in itself.

1. Boethius's Contribution to the Doctrine of the Real Distinction

In his *Opuscula Sacra*, Boethius distinguishes between being (*esse*) and that which is (*id quod est*). Because William, who borrowed Boethius's terminology for his own position, was especially influenced by the *De hebdomadibus*, one needs to look at this work in order to reach a more complete understanding of William. While the scholarly opinion on Boethius's distinction is quite divergent, Pierre Hadot's work — in my opinion — represents the best of the scholarly interpretations

regarding this topic. Hadot not only seems best to capture Boethius's doctrine, but his perspective of Boethius also highlights what William seemed to find in him.
In "La distinction de l'être *et de l'étant dans le De Hebdomadibus de Boèce*," Hadot summarizes the differences between being (esse) and that which is (id quod est) as they appear in the axioms found in the De hebdomadibus. The characteristics of being (esse) and that which is (id quod est) may be translated as follows. Being: 1) "is not yet," 2) "in no way participates in anything," and 3) "has nothing besides itself added on." That which is: 1) "has received the form of being," 2) "has received being," 3) "participates in that which is being," 4) "is and exists," 5) "is able to participate in something," and 6) "is able to have something besides the fact that it is." (1)
(1) See Pierre Hadot, "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le *De hebdomadibus de Boèce*," *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter*, Miscellanea Mediavalia, 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), p. 147. The characteristics of *esse*: 1) "nondum est," 2) "nullo modo aliquo participat," and 3) "nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum." The characteristics of *id quod est*: 1) "accepit formam essendi," 2) "suscipit esse," 3) "participat eo quod est esse," 4) "est atque consistit," 5) "participare aliquo potest," and 6) "potest habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est."

29. ———. 2004. "William of Auvergne and St. Thomas Aquinas on the Real Distinction between Being and Essence." In *Being and Thought in Aquinas*, edited by Hackett, Jeremiah, Murnion, William E. and Still, Carl N., 75-108. New York: Stte University of New Yok Press.
30. Cheng, Chung-ying. 2009. "*Li* and *Qi* in the *Yijing*: A Reconsideration of Being and Nonbeing in Chinese Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. Supplement to volume 36:73-100.
31. Cunningham, F. A. 1970. "Richard of Middleton O.F.M. on 'Esse and Essence'." *Franciscan Studies* no. 30:49-76.
32. D'Ancona, Cristina. 2011. "Platonic and Neoplatonic Terminology for Being in Arabic Translation." *Studia graeco-arabica* no. 1:23-45.

33. De Haan, Daniel D. 2014. "A Mereological Construal of the Primary Notions *Being* and *Thing* in Avicenna and Aquinas." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 88:335-360.
Abstract: "This study has two goals: first, to show that Avicenna's account of *being* and *thing* significantly influenced Aquinas's doctrine of the primary notions; second, to establish the value of adopting a mereological construal of these primary notions in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Aquinas. I begin with an explication of the mereological construal of the primary notions that casts these notions in terms of wholes and parts. *Being* and *thing* refer to the same entitative whole and have the same extension, but they are distinct in intension according to the different entitative parts they signify. Existence and essence constitute the two most fundamental entitative parts of every entitative whole. *Being* is taken to mean that which has existence, and *thing* signifies that which has essence. I then show how this mereological construal of the primary notions clarifies a number of texts in Avicenna and Aquinas. Finally, I address a few arguments against employing this mereological interpretation of the primary notions."
34. ———. 2020. *Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing*. Leiden: Brill.
35. de Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1952. *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the *Metaphysics* 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the *Organon* 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.
From the Introduction: "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and

ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them.
Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modem logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).
I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." (pp. 6-7)

36. ———. 1988. "On Boethius' Notion of Being. A Chapter of Boethian Semantics." In *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 1-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reprinted as chapter I in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, edited by E. P. Bos, Northampton: Variourum Reprints, 1989.
"From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just applying and adapting what was handed down to them. No student of medieval speculative thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental progress was made, it was theological problems which initiated the development. This applies to St Augustine and

Boethius, and to the great medieval masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature (Being).
It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises, especially *De hebdomadibus*.
(...)
My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is most clearly seen in the main argument of *De hebdomadibus* where they may be actually seen at work.
As is well known, the proper aim of *De hebdomadibus* is to point out the formal difference between *esse* and *esse bonum,* or in Boethius's words: 'the manner in which substances *are good* in virtue of their *being,* while not yet being substantially good' (38.2-4). Its method consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:
(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole and *id quod est* = the constitutive element which causes the object's actually' being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.
(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being *(forma essendi,* or *ipsum esse)* and the object's actuality as such (*id quod est* or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.
(c) The distinction between *esse* as 'pure being' (= *nihil aliud praeter se habens admixtum),* which belongs to any form, whether substantial or incidental, and *id quod est* admitting of some admixture (lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in fact implies the distinction between *esse simpliciter* and *esse aliquid*.
(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', *tantum esse aliquid,* and '*being* something *qua* mode of *being'*. It is made in Axiom V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further distinction made within the notion

of *id quod est*. It points out the differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of being *some* thing and that caused by the main constituent *(forma essendi)* which causes an object's *being simpliciter*.
(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one effecting an object's *being subsistent,* the other its being *some* thing, where the '*some* thing' (*aliquid*) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.
The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a solution to the main problem: although the objects (*ea quae sunt,* plural of *id quod est*) *are* (*are good*) through their own constitutive element, *being* (*being good*), nevertheless they are not identical with their constitutive element nor (*a fortiori*) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation." (pp. 1 and 22-23).

37. De Vio, Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan. 1953. *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
38. Dillon, John. 2009. "The Question of Being." In *Greek Thought. A Guide to Classical Knowledge*, edited by Brunschwig, Jacques and Lloyd, Geoffrey E.R., 51-71. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
39. Dumont, Stephen. 1987. "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scouts and William of Alnwick." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 49:1-75.
40. ———. 1988. "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. The *De ente* of Peter Thomae." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 50:186-256.
41. Elders, Leo. 1993. *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective*. Leiden: Brill.
42. Fitzpatrick, Noel A. 1971. "Walter Chatton on the Univocity of Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 31:88-177.
43. Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb *to be*." *Apeiron* no. 14:87-95.
44. Floyd, Juliet. 2006. "On the Use and Abuse of Logic in Philosophy: Kant, Frege and Hintikka on the Verb 'To Be'."

In *The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka*, edited by Auxier, Randall E. and Hahn, Lewis E., 137-188. Chicago: Open Court.

"Jaakko Hintikka is a radical and wildly ambitious philosopher. Over the course of more than forty years he has attempted to refashion the whole of logic and philosophy in his own image, urging the overthrow of most everything analytic philosophy inherited from Frege and Russell. He argues that the correct philosophical Logic (with a capital "L" to designate "the real Logic") is his "independence-friendly" logic, wedded to his construals of modal and epistemic logic in the context of game-theoretic semantics, and he calls for a reappraisal of every philosophical problem in light of this conception. Hintikka thereby rejects what became for philosophers (after Hilbert, Gōdel, and Quine) the standard answer to the question, What is Logic?, viz., first-order logic, unmoved by its commonly supposed advantages: topic-neutrality, wide curricular, mathematical, and philosophical acceptance, general (if not universal) applicability, recursively axiomatizable completeness with respect to deductive validity, and classical syntax and semantics for negation. He is not swayed either by the expressive power of second-order logic. He wants a system that is, expressively speaking, somewhere in between. To understand him as a philosopher is to be able to fathom why.

It is not the aim of this essay to come fully to grips with Hintikka's persistent campaign to overthrow the present order of things. Instead, I shall try to characterize his self-conception in broad brushstrokes. Section 1 of the essay aims to situate Hintikka's thought within the context of recent analytic philosophy. Section 2 canvasses his criticisms of Frege's and Russell's fundamental logical notions. Section 3 assesses his treatment of the classical Ontological Argument for God's existence in light of these criticisms. First, I contrast his treatment of the argument with that of Michael Dummett. Next, I consider what Hintikka has left out of philosophical account in his particular reconstruction of the argument, suggesting that it

is precisely this which is most telling with respect to his own philosophy. In section 4 I delve into a more detailed analysis of Hintikka's treatment of Kant's philosophy of logic, with the aim of showing how his own philosophical preconceptions shape his historical readings." (pp. 137-138)

45. Frank, Richard M. 1956. "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term Anniyya." *Les Cahiers de Byrsa*:181-201.
Reprinted in R. M. Frank, *Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism in Medieval Islam*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, Essay IV.
46. ———. 1978. *Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mutazila in the Classical Period Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
47. Gál, Gedeon. 1992. "Geraldus Odonis: On the Univocity of the Concept of Being." *Franciscan Studies* no. 52:23-51.
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50. Gould, Josiah B. 1974. "Being, the World, and Appearance in Early Stoicism and Some other Greek Philosophies." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 28:261-288.
51. Haaparanta, Leila. 1985. *Frege's Doctrine of Being*. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica.
52. Hankey, Wayne. 1980. "Aquinas' First Principle: Being or Unity?" *Dionysius* no. 4:133-172.
53. Heiman, Ambrose. 1953. "Essence and Esse According to Jean Quidort." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 15:137-146.

54. ———. 1959. "Two Questions Concerning the *Esse* of Creatures in the Doctrine of Jean Quidort." In *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, edited by O'Neil, Charles J., 51-67. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
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57. ———. 1986. "The Varieties of Being in Aristotle." In *The Logic of Being*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo and Hintikka, Jaakko, 81-114. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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59. Husain, Martha. 1976. "The Question 'What is Being' and its Aristotelian Answer." *The New Scholasticism* no. 50:293-309.
"This paper takes its point of departure from a recent article by Joseph Owens: "The content of existence," (*) which argues that being is unknowable in terms of concepts since it either has all cognitive (when contrasted with not-being) or none at all (when contrasted with beings). These dilemmas can be resolved by means of Aristotle's categories as the intrinsic formal structure of being, and as constituting the cognitive content of being "qua" being. In terms of this cognitive content, being is conceptualized, becomes knowable, and can be meaningfully contrasted with both not-being and beings. Beyond the resolution of Owens' dilemmas, the paper goes on to examine the need for meaningful contrasts in all knowledge as well as the adequacy and relevance of Aristotle's categories in relation to modern science."
Joseph Owens, *The Content of Existence,* in: Milton K. Munitz (ed.), *Logic and Ontology,* New York: New York University Press 1973, pp. 21-36.
60. Jacobi, Klaus. 1985. "Peter Abelard's Investigations into the Meaning and Functions of the Speech Sign *Est*." In *The Logic of Being*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo and Hintikka, Jaakko, 1-15. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"Although Peter Abelard was the most distinguished teacher of logic of his time, a logic understood to be the science of argumentative discourse, he was not destined to found a new philosophical tradition. The historical situation offers at Least a partial explanation -- the pace of philosophical and theological research was so brisk in the twelfth century that many of the established schools enjoyed life spans of at most two or three generations of teachers. The restlessness of the times is embodied to a special degree in Abelard.(1) His writings include commentaries, in many cases several to a work, on the logical works of Aristotle and Porphyry then available, handed down in the form of Boethius' translations, and on Boethius' own logical works. Abelard has to take a number of positions into consideration here: several commentaries on Aristotle by ancient scholars, by Boethius, and by Abelard's own predecessors and teachers, and furthermore the grammatical theories of Priscian and those deriving from Abelard's contemporaries. He discovers with distinctive acumen that the tradition he is examining is disunited and full of tensions on basic questions. It is in the analysis and discussion of these tensions that he finds the field of his own philosophical research. He expects to reach solutions by intensifying the controversies, not by seeking harmony. Thus he traces argument and counter-argument in great thoroughness of detail and from a dizzying succession of points of view, abandoning theses and offering countertheses. What his students could learn from him was not so much a particular theory as his method of formulating and discussing problems.

The situation is much the same for us. If we turn to Abelard in our inquiry into the logic and semantics of the speech sign 'est', we must discover anew the questions which concerned him. In the first Part of this Paper, I will sketch some of the discussions conducted by Abelard in order to make clear in what contexts he found himself confronting questions on the variations of meaning, function, or use of the expression 'est'. In the second part, I will group various theses which Abelard deals with appropriately. It is my intention to plot out the full range of the theories discussed

and to mark points of conflict. In the third and final part, I will make some cautious comments on the deeper current of unity to be observed in Abelard's reflections, a current perhaps more easily discernible to the modern eye then it was to Abelard himself." (pp. 145-146)
(1) Cf. Jolivet (1969), Chapter IV; de Rijk (1980). Also compare Häring (1975), who explains the meager transmission of Abelard's works as at least partially attributable to Abelard's style of thinking and writing. His philosophical "works" were not written as books intended to be recopied and handed down but as records of his own thinking to be used in teaching. A thesis which he adheres to with conviction at one point in his writings may reappear later or even in a reworking of the first source as being subject lo doubt or in need of revision.

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62. Kahn, Charles H. 1966. "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being." *Foundations of Language* no. 2:245-265. Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 16-40.
63. ———. 1973. *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhhar (ed.), *The Verb 'Be' and Its Synonims*. *Philosophical and Grammatical Studies,* Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the verb *einai*.
"This book began unintentionally in 1964, when I tried to put together a brief description of the pre-philosophical uses of the Greek verb be in order to lay the groundwork for an interpretation of the more technical use of the verb by the philosophers beginning with Parmenides. But the task was harder and longer than I thought, and it gradually became clear that no adequate description of the Greek data could be given without confronting a number of major issues in linguistic theory and in the philosophy of language.

As often happens in so-called empirical research, the terms in which the problem is posed and the recognition of what might count as a solution turn out to depend upon certain theoretical assumptions about the nature of the subject matter and the appropriate form for description, analysis, and explanation. In this case there was the preliminary question of an appropriate method for describing and classifying the different uses of the verb, and the closely connected question of the relationship between a syntactic or formal analysis of these uses and a semantic account in terms of difference of meaning. Similar questions would arise in the study of any verb. But the verb be poses specific philosophic problems of its own: how are we to define or clarify the concepts of subject, predicate, copula, and verb of existence? And there is the problem of the verb be itself: in what sense is this system of distinct uses a unity? Is the possession of a single verb be with such a diversity of uses only a historical accident of Indo-European? And does it follow that the concept of Being is only a philosophic illusion?" (*Preface* (1973), XLV)

"Thus the argument of my book reaches two conclusions, one linguistic and one philosophical. The philosophical conclusion, my defense of Greek ontology, rests on my account of the system of *einai* but does not follow from it. Greek ontology might be defended on different grounds, and a reader might accept my account of the system of *einai* but doubt its value as a defense of ontology. Furthermore, I have not tried to demonstrate the fruitfulness of my linguistic analysis for the interpretation of Greek philosophy. That could be done only by a detailed analysis of Platonic and Aristotelian texts.(1) The current study remains, after all, essentially a grammatical prolegomenon to the history of Greek ontology." (*Introduction* (200), p. VIII)

(1) For the application of my account of *einai* to Parmenides, see Kahn (2002) ["Parmenides and Plato," in V. Caston and D. W. Graham (eds.), *Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos*.

Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, pp. 81-93] with references there to earlier publications.
[In the *Appendix* to the *Introduction* (2003) Kahn replies to four important critical reviews of the first edition of his book:]
Ernst Tugendhat, "Die Seinsfrage und ihre sprachliche Grundlage," *Philosophische Rundschau* 24 (1977), pp. 161-176: "Tugendhat's review contains a number of penetrating criticisms, some of which I am inclined to regard as justified." (p. XXXIII)
Seth Benardete, "The Grammar of Being," *Review of Metaphysics* 30 (1977), pp. 486-496. "Seth Benardete has contributed a number of valuable corrections to my description of the Greek usage of *einai*." (p. XXXIV)
Joachim Klowski, Review in Gnomon 47 (1975), pp. 737-746. "Klowski criticizes my exposition from the point of view of traditional philology and doubts the utility of introducing transformational grammar." (p. XXXV)
Cornelis Jord Ruijgh, "A review of Ch. H. Kahn, The verb 'be' in Ancient Greek," in *Lingua* 48 (1979), pp. 43-83. [in French] "The most thorough and detailed discussion of my book is by C. J. Ruijgh, a linguist who is also a specialist in Greek. (Unfortunately, this 1979 publication came to my attention only quite recently, as the result of a citation in De Rijk [*Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology*. Leiden: Brill 2002, two volumes]. I recommend this review for a full, fair, and accurate report of the contents and claims of the book. I discuss here some points in which Ruijgh disagrees with me." (p. XXXVII)

64. ———. 1973. "On the Theory of the Verb 'to be'." In *Logic and Ontology*, edited by Munitz, Miton, 1-20. New York: New York University Press.
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Paper read at a symposium at Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario.

Published also in: *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 15-16, 1979 pp. 20-33.

66. ———. 1981. "Some philosophical uses of 'to be' in Plato." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:105-134. Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 75-108.
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68. ———. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." *La Parola del Passato* no. 43:237-261.
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69. ———. 2004. "A Return to the Theory of the Verb *be* and the Concept of Being." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:381-405. Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being,* New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 109-142.
"The recent reprinting of my book *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek* by Hackett Publishing, thirty years after its appearance in 1973, gave me the opportunity to rethink and reformulate the theoretical framework for my description of the Greek verb. Since the audience for the reprinted book will inevitably be restricted, I present here a more accessible, slightly revised version of the new (2003) *Introduction*. In the original 1973 book, the theoretical discussion was far too long and not always consistent. What follows is a more concise and, I hope, more coherent version of my theoretical account of *einai*."
70. ———. 2009. *Essays on Being*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Introduction 1; 1. The Greek verb 'to be' and the concept of Being (1966) 16; 2. On the terminology for *copula* and *existence* (1972) 41; 3. Why existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy (1976) 62; 4. Some philosophical uses of 'to be' in Plato (1981) 75; 5. A return to the verb 'to be' and the concept of Being (2004) 109; 6. The thesis of Parmenides (1969) 143; 7. Being in Parmenides and Plato (1988) 167; 8. Parmenides and Plato once more (2002) 192; Postscript on Parmenides (2008): Parmenides

and physics. The direction of the chariot ride in the proem. The epistemic preference for Fire 207; Bibliography 219; Index of names 227.
"The papers reprinted here, published over a stretch of forty years, reflect my continuing concern with two distinct but intimately related problems, one linguistic and one historical and philosophical. The linguistic problem concerns the theory of the Greek verb *to be*: how to replace the conventional but misleading distinction between copula and existential verb with a more adequate theoretical account. The philosophical problem is in principle quite distinct: to understand how the concept of Being became the central topic in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle. But these two problems converge on what I have called the veridical use of *einai*. In my earlier papers I took that connection between the verb and the concept of truth to be the key to the central role of Being in Greek philosophy. I think that clue pointed in the right direction, but I would now interpret the veridical in terms of a more general function of the verb that I call 'semantic', which comprises the notions of existence and instantiation as well as truth."

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77. ———. 2002. "Aquinas' Theory of the Copula and the Analogy of Being." *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis* no. 5:159-176.
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79. ———. 2012. "Being." In *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Marenbon, John, 403-420. New York: Oxford University Press.
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82. Knuuttila, Simo, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1986. *The Logic of Being*. *Historical Studies*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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87. Li Vecchi, Joseph, Scalambrino, Frank, and Kovacs, David K. 2020. *The Philosophy of Being in the Analytic, Continental, and Thomistic Traditions: Divergence and Dialogue*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
"The philosophy of being is as old as philosophy itself; in fact, depending upon your understanding of philosophy, it may even be older. Thus, as long as there will be philosophy, there will always be the philosophy of being. However, books on the philosophy of being have tended to be written from the point of view of, or privileging, just one tradition from the history of Western philosophy.
So, on the one hand, the three of us thought it would be a valuable contribution to the literature regarding the philosophy of being, if we were to write a book that would specifically speak from the different points of view of three major philosophical traditions.(1) On the other hand, we thought an initial introductory section regarding the philosophy of being in general would help orient readers to the context of our book.(2)"
(1) It is our belief that readers will become familiar with different philosophical traditions by exploring how each tradition approaches the philosophy of being. On the one hand, we recognize that these traditions may be incommensurable. On the other hand, it is our hope that this project will contribute to a renewed sense of philosophical “pluralism” and “ecumenism.”
(2) Whereas this section was constructed through a collaborative effort on our parts, the remaining portions of the book were constructed by each of us independently. That is to say, each of us bears the responsibility for representing our respective traditions: Joseph P. Li Vecchi for the Thomistic, Frank Scalambrino for the Continental, and David Kovacs for the Analytic.

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95. ———. 1988. "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being." *Speculum* no. 63:22-57.
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99. ———. 1956. "The 'De Quidditatibus Entium' of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of Thomistic Metaphysics." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 18:173-203.
100. ———. 1966. "Cajetan's Notion of Being in His Commentary on the *Sentences*." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 28:268-278.
101. Menn, Stephen P. 2003. "Metaphysics: God and being." In *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, edited by McGrade, A. S., 147-170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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103. Montagnes, Bernard. 2004. *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
104. Morgenstern, Amy. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'to be' Behind: an Alternative Reading of Plato's *Sophist*." *Dionysius* no. 19:27-50.
"In this paper, I critically assess readings of Plato's *Sophist* which, influenced by the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, have in the latter half of the twentieth century set the terms for discussions of this text's central issues. While aware that these readings are often at odds with each other and, therefore, do not form one coherent reading, I argue that the basic theoretical move unifying these readings -- equating the Greek terms *esti, to on*, and *ta onta* with the verb 'to be,' understood existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign -- cannot serve as the basis of an illuminating approach to the Eleatic stranger's investigation."
105. Moro, Andrea. 2018. *A Brief History of the Verb To Be*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
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109. ———. 1957. "The Accidentality of Esse According to Giles of Rome." *Gregorianum* no. 38:103-115.
110. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1977. "Post-Avicennan Islamic Philosophy and the study of Being." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 17:265-271.
"In this article, after a brief discussion of the position of Ibn Sina concerning the distinction between existence and

essence, a survey is made of the views of later Islamic thinkers of various schools including "Kalam", "Ishraqi" theosophy and theoretical sufism of the school of Ibn Arabi concerning ontology. The study culminates with Mulla Sadra who brought the discussion of being among Muslim thinkers to full fruition. After this chronological survey, the distinction between the study of being in later Schools of Islamic thought and those of the West is made clear and it is shown how despite a similar background, Islamic and Western thought part ways on this basic issue. Later Islamic students of ontology emphasized that the subject of philosophy is the study of the act of existence, the "actus essendi", while Western thought became ever more concerned with the existent or "ens". In conclusion the relation between the theoretical study of being and practical and operative spiritual methods for the realization of being in the Islamic world is indicated." (p. 265)

111. Nogales, Gómez Salvador. 1972. "The Meaning of *Being* in Aristotle." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 12:317-339.
"In order to deal with the complex concept of being, Aristotle distinguished between synonyms and homonyms, and these two categories were further subdivided. Things with nothing in common possess being and in every being there is something identical. We recognize matter and being only by analogy. Accident is a dimension of being but is not an entity in itself."
112. O'Farrell, Frank. 1982. "Aristotle's Categories of Being." *Gregorianum* no. 63:87-131.
113. O'Meara, Dominic. 1976. "Being in Numenius and Plotinus: Some Points of Comparison." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 21:120-129.
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114. Owens, Joseph. 1978. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

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115. Paprzycka, Katarzyna. 1993. "Carnap and Leibniz on the Problem of Being." In *Possible Ontologies*, edited by Augustynek, Zdzislaw and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 163-177. Rodopi: Amsterdam.
"The title of the present paper appears provocative as it brings together one of the most prominent fighters of metaphysics, R. Carnap, a famous metaphysician and a very difficult metaphysical problem. In fact, Leibniz, whose stance on that very issue we have chosen to relate to that of Carnap's, has not written about the problem of being explicitly either. We will thus ask the reader for some patience as we will try to demonstrate that they both do so implicitly.
Our task is perhaps even more complex with respect to Carnap for aside of being an extraordinarily consistent and systematic thinker, he has also been very self-conscious methodologically. It is remarkable that the system of *Aufbau,* to which we will restrict our attention, was supposed to be a mere illustration of some methodological principles developed in the so-called construction theory. Accordingly, almost none of the moves in his system lacks a justification. As a result, there are not too many degrees of interpreter's freedom." (p. 163)
116. Pelletier, Francis. 1990. *Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
117. Perl, Eric D. 2014. *Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition*. Vol. Brill: Leiden.
118. Perreiah, Alan. 1968. "De Conceptu Entis: A Reconsideration." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 46:50-56.
119. Pini, Giorgio. 2001. "Being and Creation in Giles of Rome." In *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 / After the Condemnation of 1277*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A., Emery, Kent and Speer, Andreas. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte / Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts.

120. ———. 2005. "Univocity in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle." *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medioevale* no. 30:69-110.
121. Priest, Stephen. 1999. "Husserl's Concept of Being: From Phenomenology to Metaphysics." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* no. 44:209-222.
122. Principe, Walter H. 1967. *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Chapter I. *The Philosophical Background* (pp. 21-72), in particular § 2. *Ens, Esse,* and *Existere* (pp. 23-42).
123. Prior, William. 1980. "Plato's Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the *Sophist*." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 18:199-211.
"In this paper I argue that Plato does not, as most scholars believe, distinguish different senses or uses of the verb 'to be' in the "Sophist". He succeeds in differentiating existential statements from statements of identity and predications, but with the aid of a verb 'to be' which he takes to be univocal and to be equivalent to 'to participate in'. I offer an analysis of "Sophist" 251a-257c, and focus in particular on 255e-256e. This passage displays numerous parallels with the middle dialogues, and it is misleading to treat it as indicative of a change in Plato's metaphysics."
124. Przezdziecki, Joseph J. 1959. "Thomas of Sutton's Critique on the Doctrine of Univocity." In *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, edited by O'Neil, Charles J., 189-208. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
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127. Schiappa, Edward. 1997. "Interpreting Gorgias's 'Being' in "On Not-Being or On Nature"." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* no. 30:13-30.

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"If, in what follows under the general title of 'Being', we are to give an outline of the rebirth of metaphysics as ontology, we cannot avoid giving an account in detail of the various ontological projects of that time. What is to be clarified can be described as a rehabilitation of the 'problem of being' as a genuinely philosophical problem. This 'problem of being' must obviously be posed in such a way that it cannot be solved by any of the procedures of the empirical sciences; otherwise, any philosophical theory of being would be superfluous. On the other hand, the 'problem of being' should also not be reducible to the problem of knowledge, as the whole of Criticism had taught, since then the attempt to break out of the epistemological ghetto would fail. A third general condition, accepted by all the new ontologists, is that modern ontology should not proceed in a dogmatic fashion in Kant's sense; this also rules out simple reference back to pre-Kantian traditions. The rehabilitation of philosophy as theory of knowledge also remains decisive for the new ontology, to the extent that it regards an epistemological self-justification as absolutely indispensable. The priority of the question of being over that of knowledge, which is the general characteristic of the new ontology, should itself he seen as the result of epistemological reflection: since the time of Lotze, the argument that the subject is him: self an existent and the knowledge-relation a relation of, being had played a central role in that connexion. In Hegel's words, the new ontology saw itself as an immanent critique of epistemology, not as its simple opposite. The success of this critique was then felt as the great liberation 'to things themselves'." (pp. 194-195)
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"The pervasiveness of Being is the doctrine that everything is. This doctrine would he false if something was not. That being is pervasive is not a trivial claim. An ontology might he motivated by the desire to quantify over non-beings in such a way that we can say that *something* is a flying man without implying that some *being* is a flying man. If such a distinction is allowed, then it might be thought that something is not, even though no *being* is not.

Pervasiveness then would be true for beings but not for 'somethings.'
This chapter explores the different positions that philosophers from Parmenides to Aristotle take on the question of the pervasiveness of Being, and traces some of the relations linking those positions to one another." (p. 293)

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"According to Aquinas the word “being” (*ens*) signifies “that which is” or “that which exists.” This complexity within the notion of being implies that one does not grasp it by the process of abstraction alone—the intellect’s first operation whereby it understands what something is without affirming or denying anything of it. While he acknowledges that this intellectual operation suffices for one to grasp the quidditative aspect of being (“that which”), Aquinas appeals to the intellect’s second operation (whereby one affirms or denies by composing or dividing), often referred to as judgment, to account for one’s grasp of the existential aspect of being and thus to complete one’s understanding of being as that which is. As he explains, while the intellect’s first operation is directed to the nature (essence) of a thing, its second operation is directed to a thing’s existence (*esse*)." (p. 77, notes omitted)
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"Dans une très fine étude portant sur l'origine du terme arabe *annlya*, parue dans les *Cahiers de Byrsa*, Richard Frank a consacré plusieurs pages à l'étude du vocabulaire syriaque de l'être, en particulier aux traductions syriaques des expressions grecques τὸ ὂν et τὸ εἶναι, comme sources possibles du mot arabe étudié.(1) Les quelques remarques qui suivent, consacrées à l'étude de textes syriaques touchant au vocabulaire de l'être et à des notions voisines, se veulent ainsi un hommage aux recherches remarquables d'acuité faites par Richard Frank, et elles se situent en quelque manière dans leur prolongement, même si elles ne visent pas à l'explication du mot arabe susdit.(2)
Notre propos se limndera ici au domaine syriaque, et nos remarques porteront sur les textes de deux auteurs des Vie et Vile siècles respectivement: Scrgius de Res'ainâ (mort en 536) et Jacques d'Édesse (mort en 708)." (p. 101)

(1) R. Frank. *The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term Anniyya*. dans: *Cahiers de Byrsa* 6 (1956) p. 81-201.
(2) Sur les différents emplois philosophiques du mot *annlya* chez les auteurs de langue arabe, voir la brève note de A. Hasnawi, *Anniyya ou Inniyya (essence, existence),* dans: l'*Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle. Les notions philosophiques*. II. Pans: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. p. 101-102. Sur les mots ou les expressions grecques, dont *annlya* et les expressions formées à l'aide de ce terme sont les traductions, voir le relevé très détaillé et précis donné dans *A Greek ami Arabic Lexicon (GALex),* éd. G. Endress and D. Gutas, I.4. Leiden: Brill. 1997. p. 428-436.

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A. Le contenu du livre de M. Kahn: §2. L'ontologie des philosophes et les problèms des deux emplois de *einai;* le choix de la théorie transformationnelle de Harris. - §3. Les différentes acceptions des termes 'sujet', 'prédicat' et 'copule'. - §4. L'application de la théorie transformationnelle au grec ancien. - §5. La description des emplois copulatifs de *einai* (copule nominale, copule locative, etc.). - §6. La théorie générale de la copule: valeur statique, marque de la prétention de vérité. - §7. Les emplois existentiels (six types), l'emploi possessif et 1'emploi potentiel de *einai*. - *§*8. L'emploi veridical de *einai*. - *§9*. L'unité des emplois de *einai:* dès l'indo-éuropeen, l'emploi copulatif serait central. - §10. L'accentuation de *esti* et sa place dans l'ordre des mots; la phrase nominale; *to* on et *ousia*.
B. Observations critiques: §11. Objections gènérales; la coexistence d'une analyse copulative et d'une analyse non-copulative sans différence sémantique dans certains types de phrases. - §12. Le caractère vague des termes d'ordre sémantique 'valeur fondamentale' et `valeur centrale'. - §13. La valeur fondamentale de *einai,* qui se manifeste surtout dans la construction absolue: 'être present', 'être là' sans spécification ultérieure (valeur présentielle; les nuances 'subsistantielle' et 'existentielle')., §14. Le rapport entre *einai* et ses composés *(pareinai, eneinai,* etc). - §15. L'emploi vital de *einai*. - *§*16. L'emploi strictement existentiel du type *esti Zeux*. - *§*17. L'emploi strictement existentiel du type *estin ostix* ...; le passage aux emplois métaphoriques et abstraits de *einai*. - *§*18. L'emploi de *einai* avec un nom d'action comme sujet. - §*19*. L'emploi-veridical de *einai*. - *§*20. L'emploi de *einai* avec un complement de lieu: le passage à la construction copulative. - §21. Le caractère non spécifié de la valeur fondamentale de *einai* explique son emploi copulatif; la phrase nominative simple. - §22. La phrase nominative cumulative: l'apposition. - §23. La phrase verbale monolectique (à sujet inclus). - §24. La phrase verbale à sujet extèrne. - §25. La phrase élémentaire du type *kuon esti:* construction absolue et construction copulative. - §26. La phrase du type *outo z Swkratm z esti*. - *§27*. L'ambiguité syntaxique d'autres types de phrases,

notamment de ceux qui comportent un quantificateur. - §28. Le caractère non impersonnel de la construction du type *nus esti*. §29. L'ambiguité syntaxique de la construction impersonnelle du type oion te esti makestai. - §30. La construction impersonnelle du type *esti makestai*. - §31. La construction impersonnelle du type *esti makestai* (emploi potentiel; la fonction adverbiale de l'infinitif); les types *anagke esti makestai* et anagkaion esti makestai. - §32. Conclusion."

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Key Terms in Ontology: *Existence*. Definitions by Major Philosophers

INTRODUCTION

"I think an almost unbelievable amount of false philosophy has arisen through not realizing what 'existence' means." (p. 234)

From: Bertrand Russell, *Logic and Knowledge. Essays 1901-1950*, New York: Macmillan 1956.

"Philosophical discussion of the notion of existence, or being, has centered on two main problems which have not always been very clearly distinguished. First, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of fictitious objects, such as centaurs, dragons, and Pegasus; second, there is the problem of what we are t o say about the existence of abstract objects, such as qualities, relations, and numbers. Both problems have tempted philosophers to say that there are inferior sorts of existence a s well as the ordinary straightforward sort, and they therefore often suggest that we use the word "being" to cover both kinds but restrict "existence" to "being" of the common, non-fictitious, non-abstract sort. (Sometimes the term "reality" is proposed for "existence" or for "being.") T he problems of fiction and abstraction are different, how ever, for there are both real and fictitious abstractions. For example, the integer between two and four is real, but the integer between two and three is fictitious. On the other hand, there are both concrete and abstract fictions; for example, the winged horse of Bellerophon and the integer between two and three. Accordingly, philosophers have often

dealt with the two problems in quite different ways and perhaps ought to do so.
While these are the two main problems, there are others, f or example, that of what we are to say of the being of objects which have not yet begun, or have now ceased, to exist. The history of this subject, moreover, has been tangled with theological issues, to which it will be necessary to refer at certain points." (p. 493)

From: Paul Edwards (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan 1967, entry *Existence*, by Arthur Norman Prior; Second edition: Donald M. Borchert (ed.), New York: Thomson Gale 2006, vol. 3, pp. 493-500.

"The Indo-European languages in which all the philosophers from Parmenides to Sartre have written have a verb represented in English by 'be', which some of the time at least does the same work as is done by 'exist'. Everything that can be called philosophy of existence that was written by the Greek philosophers of antiquity was expressed with the help of 'einai', the Greek equivalent of 'be'; and it is impossible to reach any clear understanding of their doctrines without examining how they used this word, and how its synonyms in other languages are used." (Preface, p. VIII-IX) "German and French idioms, which most frequently use 'Es gibt' and 'Il y a' in place of 'There is', seem to show a stronger awareness than English of the difference between existential propositions and propositions ascribing properties to objects. Nevertheless even these languages have forms 'Es ist' and 'Il est', which make use of equivalents of the verb 'be', as English uses 'be' in 'There is' and 'There are', and one would have to look further a field to find languages where there was no possibility of construing an existential judgement as predicating being of an object or objects in the same way as dwelling in Transylvania or coming down the road can be predicated of an object or objects. Latin, as we have seen, has the simple unadorned use of 'est' and 'sunt' as a possible substitution for the verbs 'existit' and 'existunt'. Classical Greek, which lacks any word obviously equivalent to 'exist', is forced to use parts of 'einai', its synonym for 'be', much more widely than the languages we have mentioned, for the expression of existential judgements.

Thereby hangs a philosophical story of epic dimensions, a Great Chain of Philosophies of Being." (p. 3)

From: Christopher John Fards Williams, *What is Existence?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981.

"In the extended discussion of the concept (or concepts) of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, the theme of existence does not figure as a distinct topic for philosophical reflection. My aim here is to defend and illustrate this claim, and at the same time to suggest some of the reasons why it is that the concept of existence does not get singled out as a topic in its own right. Finally, I shall raise in a tentative way the question whether or not the neglect of this topic was necessarily a philosophical disadvantage.
Let me make clear that my thesis is limited to the classical period of Greek philosophy, down to Aristotle. The situation is more complicated in Hellenistic and Neoplatonic thought, (...) I suspect that a careful study of these Greek terms would reveal that even in their usage we find no real equivalent of our concept of existence. In any case, this later terminology (...) plays no part in the formulation of Plato's and Aristotle's ontology, and I shall ignore it here. My general view of the historical development is that existence in the modern sense becomes a central concept in philosophy only in the period when Greek ontology is radically revised in the light of a metaphysics of creation: that is to say, under the influence of Biblical religion. As far as I can see, this development did not take place with Augustine or with the Greek Church Fathers, who remained under the sway of classical ontology. The new metaphysics seems to have taken shape in Islamic philosophy, in the form of a radical distinction between necessary and contingent existence: between the existence of God, on the one hand, and that of the created world, on the other." (p. 7)
(...)
To return now to the question with which we began: Why does existence not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy? In principle the answer is clear. My explanation is that in Greek ontology in its early stages, in Plato and Parmenides, the veridical

concept was primary, and the question of Being was the question of "reality" as determined by the concept of truth. Since this conception of reality is articulated in Plato by copula sentences of the form "X is Y," it turns out that even the concept of existence gets expressed in this predicative form: as we have seen, Platonic Greek for "X exists" is "X is something" . In the scheme of categories which Aristotle takes as the starting point for his own investigation of being, this same predicative pattern serves as the primary device for analyzing what there is, and for showing how the various kinds of being are related to one another. So it is naturally the theory of predication, and not the concept of existence, which becomes the central and explicit theme of Aristotle's metaphysics, as it was the implicit theme of Plato's discussion of Being in the *Sophist*. (p. 15).

From: Charles H. Kahn, *Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy*, in: Parviz Morewedge (ed.), *Philosophies of Existence. Ancient and Medieval*, New York: Fordham University Press 1982, pp. 7-17. (Reprinted in C. H. Kahn. *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 62-74.)

ORIGINS OF THE TERM "EXISTENCE"

"The terminology for existence is much more complicated, and I can only give a rough sketch of the problem. We have first to consider how ὑπάρχειν (hyparkein) comes to be used as a synonym for εἶναι (einai) in its "existential" use, and then to follow the history of *existere* as the Latin rendering of ὑπάρχειν in this sense. Either topic could supply a separate monograph. ὑπάρχειν originally means "to make a beginning", "to take the initiative", "to take the first step (in doing so-and-so)", e.g. to begin a guest-friendship (in the earliest occurrence of the verb, *Odyssey* 24.286) or to initiate hostilities (...)
Thus before ὑπάρχειν becomes specialized as a verb of "existence" we find it used in a predicative construction as an expressive

equivalent for εἶναι as copula verb.
It is, however, not this copula use but the more frequent construction with the dative that accounts for the first technical use of the verb in philosophy: the use in which it expresses in logical terms the attributive relation which is normally expressed in grammatical form by the copula. Instead of "A is B" Aristotle prefers to say τὸ β το` ἀ ὑπάρχειν B belongs to A" (Prior Analytics 25a,5 and throughout). Hence τα ὑπάρχοντα attributes (of a subject) " e.g. at De Interpretatione 16b 10. (And see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicum 789a29-b2; compare the more non-technical use ibid. a12-28.) Since "what belongs to a thing" includes not only its accidents but also essential or substantial attributes in the first category, ὑπάρχειν is said in as many ways as εἶναι, i.e. in as many ways as there are categories or combinations of categories (Pr. An. 48b2-4, 49a6-9). (...)
Apart from this technical use in logic and grammar, the most common meaning of ὑπάρχειν in later Greek seems to be that which we render as 'to exist' or "'to be real'. (This occasionally leads to rather ludicrous confusion, when a late commentator can no longer distinguish between Aristotle's technical sense and his own ordinary use of ὑπάρχειν. (...).
It should be pointed out that although this use of ὑπάρχειν for real existence (in contrast to a mere word or an imaginary object) seems to be the dominant use in late Greek philosophy, the corresponding verb may still be construed both with paralocative and nominal predicates, as we can see from Sextus' discussion of the existence of the gods, e.g. IX-I43 (...).
And the same predicative construction is normal for the corresponding verb *exsistere* in classical Latin (as will be seen in a moment). In neither case, then, would our familiar contrast between an existential and a copulative verb naturally arise.(...)
I have neither space nor skill to follow the history of *exsistere, exsistentia* in Latin. I note, however, that like other derivatives of *stare, exsistere* serves in Varro, Lucretius, and later authors as a stylistic variant for *esse*, often with the nuance (suggested by *ex*-) of 'emerge' come into being' 'be produced'. As in the case of ὑπάρχειν this quasi-existential sense of exsistere is fully compatible with the copulative construction: *(pecora) quae post*

tempus nascuntur, fere vitiosa atque inutilia exsistunt. (Varro *Rerum rust*. II.1.7)
The noun *exsistentia* seems not be attested before Marius Victorinus and Candidus in the 4th century A.D. It is a learned invention, designed to render ὑπάρχειν; in metaphysical texts where the latter term is distinguished from οὐσια (substantia) as the more general concept, sheer being without categorial determination, while οὐσια presents some determinate form of being, like 'substance' in the first Aristotelian category: Id est exsistentia vel subsistentia vel, si ... dicas ... vel exsistentialitatem vel substantialitatem vel essentialitatem (*Adversus Arium* III.7.9, cited in Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris, 1968), II p. 29 text 40).
But this terminology was not taken up by Boethius, who apparently preferred *esse* to *exsistere* as a rendering of the technical use of ὑπάρχειν for pure, indeterminate being. (1)
As we have seen, Priscian in the 6th century A.D. renders ὑπάρχειν as substantivum. Thus neglected by Boethius and Priscian, the technical use of *exsistentia* as contrasted with *substantia* in late Neo-Platonism had no direct impact on early medieval terminology.
Abelard's usage is mixed. He often employs *exsistere, exsistens* for 'to exist', 'existing (thing)', but rarely uses the abstract noun and then in a rather surprising way: *exsistentiae rerum* seems to mean '(actual) states of affairs' in contrast to res, the existing thing, whose existence may be expressed by *esse*. (*Dialectica*, 154, 11 and 156, 29. Compare Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, p. 206).
Aquinas' usage is even more Boethian: his normal expression for what we call 'existence' is *esse* or *actus essendi*. Only with the *esse existentiae* of Duns Scotus at the end of the thirteenth century do we find *existentia* firmly established as a technical term contrasted with *essentia*. Thus the modern terminology of 'existence' seems to derive from Scotus.
What connections (if any) can be traced between Scotus' use of *existentia* and the technical terminology of Victorinus nearly a millennium earlier, I do not know. In his translations of Proclus, William of Moerbeke renewed the ancient practice of rendering ὑπάρχειν by *existentia*, (P. O. Kristeller, *Journal of Philosophy*,

1962, p. 77) and these translations must have had some influence on the shaping of the medieval terminology. But ὑπάρχειν for Proclus is not quite the same either as *exsistentia* for Victorinus or *existentia* for Scotus. What role was played here by the concepts and terminology of Islamic philosophy I can only guess. The history of 'existence' seems to consist largely of still unanswered questions.(2)" (pp. 151-155)

Notes

(1) Compare they key passage of Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* with the corresponding citation from Damascius in P. Hadot "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le 'De Hebdomadibus' de Boèce", *Miscellanea Medievalia*, 2, (1963), pp. 147 and 151, n. 25. Boethius shows no trace of the exsistentia-substantia distinction we find in Victorinus and Candidus. It has been pointed out (by Graham, below) that Boethius normally renders the substantival το`ὄν by the artificial form ens, but sometimes resorts to the more natural Latin form exsistens for the verbal-adjectival use of the Greek participle as predicate or attribute.
(2) For some remarks on the contrast between Arabic and Greek terminology for "being", see A. C. Graham "'Being' in Linguistics and Philosophy", *Foundations of Language*, 1 (1965), 223 ff. For doctrinal contacts between Avicenna and Duns Scotus on the question of existence, see E. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence*, pp. 128-131.

From: Charles H. Kahn, *On the Terminology for Copula and Existence*, in: S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown (eds.), *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday*, London: Bruno Cassirer 1972, pp. 141-158. (Reprinted in C. H. Kahn. *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 41-61.)

LOGIC AND EXISTENCE

"The contemporary attempts to determine in a purely logical way the nature of existence, by constructing a logic of existence(1) or a free logic which makes "no assumptions about the existence of the purported designata of its terms, general or singular,"(2) seems to be still premature as long as the problem of existence in its philosophical implications is not adequately resolved. Historically, there are three main problems in logic involving a conception of existence, which clearly show that the logical problem of existence has a philosophical background influencing the "logic of existence" in its technical sense.

The first problem arose in the period of the algebra of logic, when G. Boole (implicitly) and E. Schroeder (explicitly) introduced the concept of the empty class. This innovation resulted in a criticism of the traditional square of opposites and Aristotelian syllogistics, and the conception of the existential import of categorical statements. A further consequence, already recognized in the period of G. Frege and B. Russell, was the interpretation of particular statements as existential statements and of universal statements as hypothetical ones. It was maintained that "all general propositions deny the existence of something or other," (3) and for these reasons no valid inference of a statement with existential import from a statement without existential import was admitted.

The second problem comprises the "fanciful Russellian analyses of proper names in existential contexts,"(4) with its special theory of descriptions, directed against Meinong's conception that a grammatically correct denoting phrase stands for an object, even if it does not subsist, and a similar view of H. MacColl who assumed two sorts of individuals -- real and unreal.(5) Russell's theory of descriptions is evidently a philosophical reflection of his views concerning the nature of existence as the fundamental problem cf ontology, a technical term introduced for the first time by Chr. Wolff in his *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* . . . (1730). For philosophical reasons, Russell attempts to refute the ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury. In the course of his argument. he adopts both conclusions of Kant's refutation in his Critique of Pure Reason (B 620ff), namely that (1) "all existential propositions are synthetic" and that (2) "Being is

obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing." His conviction that "existence is quite definitely not a predicate" is another reason for his introduction of the concept of the existential qualifier.
The third problem, introduced recently by W. V. Quine in his famous dictum, "To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable,"(6) is connected with the contemporary discussion on universals and the attempts to reformulate the language of logic and mathematics in a nominalistic sense.(7)" (pp. 157-158)

Notes

(1) See esp. H. S. Leonard, "The Logic of Existence," *Philosophical Studies*, VII, 49-64 [1956].
(2) K. Lambert, "Free Logic and the Concept of Existence," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, VIII, 138 [1967]. Comp. J. Hintikka, "Existential Presuppositions and Existential Commitments," *Journal of Philosophy*, LVI, 135 [1959].
(3) B. Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," *Monist*, XXIX, 191 [1918].
(4) S. Candlish, "Existence and the Use of Proper Names," *Analysis*, XXVIII, 157 [1968].
(5) Comp. B. Russell, "On Denoting," *Mind*, N. S., XIV, 479-493 [1905]
(6) W. V. Quine, "On What There Is," *Review of Metaphysics*, II, 32 [1948].
(7) See, e.g., N. Goodman and W. V. Quine, "Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism," *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, XII, 105-22 [1947]; I. M. Bochenski, A. Church, and N. Goodman, *The Problem of Universals,* (Notre Dame, 1956).

From: Karel Berka, "Existence in Modern Logic", in Cael G. Vaught (ed.), *Essays in Metaphysics*, University Park: Pennsylvania University Press 1970, pp. 157-174.

PHILOSOPHERS' DEFINITIONS OF "EXISTENCE:" AVICENNA (IBN SINA) (980-1037)

[*First distinction between essence and existence*]

"The primary analysis of the nature of being, its application to numerous things, and an introduction to the exposition of substance.
Being is recognized by reason itself without the aid of definition or description. Since it has no definition it has neither genus nor differenzia because nothing is more general than it.(1) Being does not have a description since nothing is better known than it. It is possible that one can recognize its name in one language by means of another language. Thus, by some means, it is possible to acquaint someone with what is meant by a term like being. For example, if being appears in Arabic, it can be explained in Persian, and one can indicate that it is that from which other things are derived.
In its first division, being is prima facie of two kinds: the one is called substance and the other accident. Accident is that whose being subsists in something else, so hat that being which is complete without it is either active by itself or due to something else. An example of this condition is the whiteness of a cloth. We note that the cloth exists either by itself due to itself, or by means of those things which bring about its being. Whiteness subsists in a dependent manner in it. Whiteness and whatever is analogous to it are called accidents. In this context, the receptable of whiteness is called a subject, although in another context something else is meant by 'subject'. Thus, a substance is that which is not an accident, whose being, moreover, is not in a subject, but is a reality such that the being of that reality that essence are not receptive to another thing having the aforesaid characteristics. One may regard the substance as a receptable which lacks this character. But to be active, this substance needs to be accepted by this receptacle whose reality we t establish later when we clarify its nature. One may regard the substance neither

as a receptable nor as being in a receptacle, as we shall also establish subsequently when we explain its being. This, then, is called a 'substance'." (pp. 15-16).

(1) "The term used by ibn Sina to designate 'being' is hasti, a Persian term for which no equivalent appears in his Arabic texts. To be sure, in Shifa' he points out the term wujud (existence) has several meanings: (1) *haqiqa* (the essence, reality of something, the fact that it exists), and (2) the particular existence of something, and by making these distinctions, he confirms his awareness of the various senses of 'existence', but even in view of these different senses of 'existence', there is still no term in his Arabic works which could render hasti adequately. Although one could attempt to find a Greek equivalent for this term translating it perhaps as *tò òn hê òn* by which 'being-qua-being' is commonly rendered, one should nevertheless be cautious not to equate this term with *ousía* for the reason that *ousía* is sometimes defined as 'substance'. Ibn Sina, however, holds 'being' in the sense of *basti* to be the most determinable concept. Hence, if we choose to accept the translation of *ousía* for being, then ibn Sina's views will definitely be at odds with those of many Neo-Platonists, such as Proclus, who states that the One and the Gods are to be regarded as 'supra being' (hyperoûsios) (Elements, p. 105), or Plotinus, who proclaims that the One generates gennetés (being) (*Enneads* V [1]). In view of the preceding discussion in this chapter, it is evident that ibn Sina's doctrine disagrees with that of these Greek philosophers, for he asserts that nothing is above being, and whatever exists is a determination of being. However, Aristotle's notion of being-qua-being as tò òn hé òn (*Metaphysica*, book IV, ch. 1) corresponds to ibn Sina's notion of hasti. Aristotle's position becomes clear in subsequent sections of the Metaphysica when he indicates that mathematics 'cuts off ' a part of being, whereas metaphysics investigates being as being, ignoring those elements of being which are related to it in an accidental manner (i.e. are a determination of being). For a detailed account of this topic, see J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, Toronto, 1953, esp. ch. 7 and 8. In order to achieve greater clarity on this issue and circumvent various ambiguous usages of the term ousía, Owens suggests the use of the term ' entity' as a better translation of it." (pp. 112-113)

From: Parviz Morewdge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sina). A critical translation-commentary and analysis of the fundamental arguments in Avicenna's Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-i-ala i (The Book of Scientific Knowledge)*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973.

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ (1548-1617)

[*Essence and existence according to Suárez*]

"To avoid an equivocation in terms and to make it unnecessary later to make distinctions about an essential being, an existential being or a subsistential being or a being of truth in a proposition, I suppose by being we understand the actual existence of things. For essential being, if it is truly distinguished from existence, adds nothing real to the essence itself, but only differs from it in the way it is conceived or signified. Hence, just as the essence of a creature as such, in virtue of its concept, does not say that it would be something actually real with being outside its causes, so the essential being as by standing precisely in this, does not express an actual being by which an essence outside it causes would be constituted in act. For if to be actual in this latter way is not of the essence of the creature, neither will it be able to pertain to its essential being. Hence, being of a creature as such will prescind of itself from actual being outside its causes by which a created thing comes to be beyond nothing, by which name we designate actual existential being. But subsistential being is also more contracted than existential being, for the latter is common to substance and accidents. The former is proper to substance. Besides, subsistential being (as I suppose from what is to be proved below) is something distinct from the existential being of a substantial created nature and separable from it, because it does not constitute a nature in the order of actual entity, which pertains to existence. Now the being of truth in a pro position of itself is not a real and intrinsic being, but it is an objective being

in the intellect as it is composing; hence it belongs also to privations. For we say, accordingly: Blindness is or A man is blind, as Aristotle discusses at greater length in book 5 of Metaphysics, chapter seven. Hence, the discussion is about created existence concerning which, furthermore, we suppose that it is something real and intrinsic to an existing thing; this seems self-evident. For through existence a thing is understood to be something in the nature of things. Therefore, it is necessary that existence be both something real and intrinsic, that is, within the existing thing itself. For a thing cannot be existing by some extrinsic denomination or some being (ens) of reason. Other wise, how would existence constitute a real being (ens) in act and beyond nothing?" (p. 45).

"I say thirdly: that being by which the essence of a creature is formally constituted in essential actuality is the true existential being. (...) Now this statement is proved in a variety of ways. First, because this being, understood precisely, is sufficient for the truth of this statement with a second adjacent: essence is. Hence, that being is true existence. The consequence is clear, for according to the common meaning and human conception, the is of a second adjacent, is not divorced from time. But it signifies being in act in the realm of things, which all of us understand by the name existence or by existential being. You will say that the "is" is always said truly of an actual essence, yet not formally because of the actuality of an essence, nor on account of that being by which it is formally constituted in such actuality, but because it never has this being without existence, although distinct from such an essential being or actuality. But against this retort the antecedent of the argument given is proved. For, by this actual essential being, taken formally and precisely, such an essence is a being (*ens*) in act and distinguished from a being (*ens*) in potency. Hence, by virtue of that being, such an essence is, for the inference is correct: it is a being (*ens*) in act; therefore it is. For to be a being (*ens*) in act does not reduce the character of being (*ens*) which includes the verb "is". So, even if we grant that this actual essential being depends on a further limit or act, as on a necessary condition or something of this sort, still that very being will formally constitute a being (*ens*) in act and will distinguish the latter from a being (*ens*) in potency. Thus, by

virtue of that being a thing is truly and absolutely said to be, just as an accident by virtue of its being is said to be a being (*ens*) in act and to be absolutely, even though that being requires an inherence in a subject so that, without it, it could not exist naturally." (p. 74).

From: Francisco Suárez, *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est et de illius esse eorumque distinctione. (Disputatio XXXI)* - (Translated as: *On the Essence of Finite Being as Such, on the Existence of that Essence and Their Distinction*, by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1983).

RENÉ DESCARTES (1596-1650)

"To know what existence is, all we have to do is to understand the meaning of the word, for it tells us at once what the thing is which the word stands, for, in so far as we can know it. There is no need here for a definition, which would confuse rather than clarify the issue" (AT X, 525; CSM II, 418).

From: René Descartes, *Recherche de la Verité*, in: Charles Adam, Paul Tannery (eds.), *Oeuvres de Descartes*, Paris: Vrin, 1964-1976 (12 volumes; referred as 'AT'); translated as: *The Search of Truth*, in: J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (eds.) *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985 (referred as 'CSM').

[*According to Descartes, existence is a property*]
"Here I do not see what sort of thing you want existence to be, nor why it cannot be said to be a property just like omnipotence - provided, of course, that we take the word 'property' to stand for any attribute, or for whatever can be predicated of a thing; and this is exactly how it should be taken in this context." (AT VII, 382; CSM II 262)"

From: René Descartes, *Replies to the Objections [by Gassendi] to the Fifth Meditation*.

BARUCH SPINOZA (1632-1677)

"I call a thing impossible whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it to exist; necessary whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it not to exist; and possible whose existence be contradictory for it to exist; necessary whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it not to exist; and possible whose existence, (*) by its very nature, does not imply a contradiction -- either for it to exist or for it not to exist -- but whose necessity or impossibility of existence depends on causes unknown to us, so long as we feign its existence. So if its necessity or impossibility, which depends on external causes, were known to us, we would have been able to feign nothing concerning it.
[54] From this it follows that, if there is a God, or something omniscient, he can feign nothing at all. For as far as We are concerned, after I know that I exist, (s) I cannot feign either that I exist or that I do not exist; nor can I feign an elephant which passes through the eye of a needle; nor, after I know the nature of God, can I feign either that he exists or that he does not exist. (t) The same must be understood of the Chimera, whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it to exist. From this what I have said is evident: that the fiction of which we are speaking here does not occur concerning eternal truths. (u) I shall also show immediately that no fiction is concerned with eternal truths.
[55] But before proceeding further, I must note here in passing that the same difference that exists between the essence of one thing and the essence of another also exists between the actuality or existence of the one thing and the actuality or existence of the other. So if we wished to conceive the existence of Adam, for example, through existence in general, it would be the same as if, to conceive his essence, we attended to the nature of being, so that in the end we defined him by saying that Adam is a being.

Therefore, the more generally existence is conceived, the more confusedly also it is conceived, and the more easily it can be ascribed fictitiously to anything. Conversely, the more particularly it is conceived, then the more clearly it is understood, and the more difficult it is for us, [even] when we do not attend to the order of Nature, to ascribe it fictitiously to anything other than the thing itself This is worth noting." (pp. 24-25) [56] Now we must consider those things that are commonly said to be feigned, although we understood clearly that the thing is not really as we feign it. E.g., although I know that the earth is round, nothing prevents me from saying to someone that the earth is a hemisphere and like half an orange on a plate, or that the sun moves around the earth, and the like. 1f we attend to these things, we shall see nothing that is not compatible with what we have already said, provided we note first that we have sometimes been able to err, and now are conscious of our errors; and then, we can feign, or at least allow, that other men are in the same error, or can fall into it, as we did previously.
We can feign this, I say, so long as we see no impossibility and no necessity. Therefore, when I say to someone that the earth is not round, etc., I am doing nothing but recalling the error which I, perhaps, made, or into which I could have fallen, and afterwards feigning, or allowing, that he to whom I say this is still in the same error, or can fall into it. As I have said, I feign this so long as I see no impossibility and no necessity.

Notes

(s) Because the thing makes itself evident, provided it is understood, we require only an example, without other proof. The same is true of its contradictory -- it need only be examined for its falsity to be clear. This will be plain immediately, when we speak of fictions concerning essence.
(t) Note. Although many say that they doubt whether God exists, nevertheless they have nothing but the name, or they feign something which they call God; this does not agree with the nature of God, as I shall show later in the proper place.
(u) By an eternal truth I mean one, which, if it is affirmative, will never be able to be negative. Thus it is a first and eternal truth

that God is; but that Adam thinks is not an eternal truth. That there is no Chimera is an eternal truth; but not that Adam does not think." (II, 20)"
(*) Joachim (*Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940) suggests reading *essentia*, though the *Opera Posthuma's 'existentia'* is supported by the Nagelate Schriften. If it were not for the immediately following phrase (*ipsa sua natura*), I would think this almost certainly correct. 1 have translated the Latin as it stands, but (with Eisenberg) I feel certain that what Spinoza means is that the essence of the thing by itself does not entail either that the thing cannot, or that it must, exist. [Note by Edward Curley]

From: *Treatise on the Emendation of the intellect*, in: *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ (1646-1716)

[*According to Leibniz, existence is not a property*]

> "Existence. It can be doubted very much whether existence is a perfection or degree of reality; for it can be doubted whether existence is one of those things that can be conceived -- that is, one of the parts of essence; or whether it is only a certain imaginary concept, such as that of heat and cold, which is a denomination only of our perception, not of the nature of things. Yet if we consider more accurately, [we shall see] that we conceive something more when we think that a thing A exists, than when we think that it is possible. Therefore it seems to be true that existence is a certain degree of reality; or certainly that it is some relation to degrees of reality. Existence is not a degree of reality, however; for of every degree of reality it is possible to

understand the existence as well as the possibility. Existence will therefore be the superiority of the degrees of reality of one thing over the degrees of reality of an opposed thing. That is, that which is more perfect than all things mutually incompatibles exists, and conversely what exists is more perfect than the non-existent, but it is not true that existence itself is a perfection, since it is only a certain comparative relation [comparatio] of perfections among themselves." (p. 165)

From: Robert Merrihew Adams, *Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994 (undated memorandum by Leibniz).

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679-1754)

"Christian Wolff was a rationalistic school philosopher in the German Enlightenment. During the period between the death of Leibniz (1714) and the publication of Kant's critical writings (1780s), Wolff was perhaps the most influential philosopher in Germany.
(...) Wolff thought of philosophy as that discipline which provides reasons to explain why things exist or occur and why they are even possible. Thus, he included within philosophy a much broader range of subjects than might now be recognized as 'philosophical'. Indeed for Wolff all human knowledge consists of only three disciplines: history, mathematics and philosophy.
(...) For Wolff, the immediate objective of philosophical method is to achieve certitude by establishing an order of truths within each discipline and a system within human knowledge as a whole. The ultimate goal is to establish a reliable foundation for the conduct of human affairs and the enlargement of knowledge." (pp. 776-777)

From: Charles A. Corr, "Wolff, Christian", in: Edward Craig (ed.), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Routledge

1998.

"Wolff's Ontology begins (27) with the assertion of the two laws of contradiction and sufficient reason, both fundamental to the assertion that something is, or that it is not. The former requires that what is must be free from inner conflict, the latter that, if it does not, like a necessary being, have a reason for being in its own nature, it must depend on such a reason in something other than itself. The law of causation, as we ordinarily understand it, is for Wolff only a special form of the law of sufficient reason, pertinent to temporal, changeable things and their states (71). From these principles Wolff proceeds to the consideration of the metaphysical modalities, of which the most fundamental is the possible, the negation of the self-contradictory, or logically impossible. Everything actual, he holds, is by the law of contradiction possible, but he here embraces some invalid theorems, for instance, that a possible consequence can only have possible premisses. Obviously, modal logic is still insecure, though Wolff's treatment of apagogic proof in 98 is of some interest. From Wolffian principles it follows that the notion of an entity not wholly determinate is "imaginary', and that the indeterminate is only what is for us determinable, and that it will have to be determined by a sufficient reason (111, 117). There is no room in Wolffianism, any more than in Leibnizianism, for radical alternativity: Kant, however, will diverge from this position under the influence of Crusius.
All this leads, however, to Wolff's treatment of what he calls an entity: an entity is defined as any thing which can exist, to which existence is not repugnant. Thus warmth in this stone is a something, an entity, since a stone certainly can be warm or a warm stone can exist. There does not need to be any actual stone-warmth for us to have an entity before us. An entity is, however, rightly called fictitious or imaginary, if it lacks existence, which does not, however, make it less of an entity. These near-Meinongian positions are of great contemporary interest, and form the spring-board for much of Kant's later criticisms of the ontological proof, which is Wolffian enough to treat 100 possible dollars as if they certainly were something. Wolff goes on to draw

the distinctions of essential features and attributes, on the one hand, which always must belong to an entity, and its modes, on the other hand, which are merely the characters that it can have and also can not have. Obviously, however, something must be added to possibility to raise it to full existence, and this Wolff is simply content to call the possibility-complement (174)." (pp. 39-40).

From: John N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object. A Hermeneutic Study*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

"Being is what can exist and, consequently, that with which existence is not incompatible" (§ 134)
"Hinc existentiam definio per complementum possibilitatis" (Existence is defined as the complement of possibility)." (§ 174)

From: Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* (1730), (First Philosophy, or Ontology).

CHRISTIAN AUGUST CRUSIUS (1715-1775)

"Crusius was a pivotal figure in the middle period of the German Enlightenment, linking Pufendorf and Thomasius with Kant. Though sometimes wrongly characterized (for example by Hegel) as a Wolffian, he was instead an important critic of that position. His system reflected a new alliance between Pietism and Lutheran orthodoxy, offering a comprehensive antirationalist, realist, and voluntarist alternative to the neoscholastic tradition as renovated by Leibniz. Crusius was important in Kant's development and helps us understand the latter's philosophical Protestantism." (p. 736)

From: Michael J. Seidler, "Crusius, Christian August", in: Edward Craig (ed.), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Routledge 1998.

"Crusius' influence on Kant. Recent historical scholarship has stressed Crusius' importance in Kant's development, and the view that Kant's philosophy was rooted in Wolff's system has been more and more questioned. Recent research has shown that Kant, educated in the Pietistic, eclectic, and anti-Wolffian milieu of Königsberg University, was mainly trying in his precritical development (1745-1768) -- despite the nonorthodox Wolffian influence of his teacher, Martin Knutzen -- to counteract Wolffian philosophy in an increasingly original way. He therefore appealed both to recent anti-Wolffian trends -- to Maupertuis and his Berlin circle and through Maupertuis to Newton -- and to Crusius, the new leader of Pietist philosophy and only nine years his senior, whose reputation grew tremendously from 1744 on. Crusius' influence on Kant consists in six main points, some of which were also held by other Pietist philosophers or by Maupertuis. Crusius stressed the limits of human understanding, a theme that recurs in Kant's writings under different forms from 1755 on. He rejected the Ontological Argument, as did Kant after 1755, and he later rejected all theoretical proofs of God's existence. He assumed a multiplicity of independent first principles; Kant did so after 1755. He denied the importance of formal logic, and simplified it. He rejected the possibility of defining existence, and accepted a multiplicity of simple notions. He rejected the mathematical method as applied to philosophy. Kant adopted these last three positions in 1762.
Kant's Crusianism reached its climax in his Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der naturlichen Theologie und der Moral ("Investigations Concerning the Distinctness of the Fundamental Principles of Natural Theology and Morals," Berlin, 1764), written in 1762. By 1763 Kant's enthusiasm for Crusius' philosophy was waning, but he did not reject the six tenets above and was still influenced by Crusius on individual points as late as the 1770s. Bohatec has claimed that Crusius' doctrines in revealed theology exerted some influence on Kant's late works in religion." (p. 270).

From: Paul Edwards (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan 1967, entry "Crusius, Christian August", by Giorgio Tonelli.

[First definition of existence as a predicate]

Existence is "that predicate of a thing by virtue of which the thing is to be encountered somewhere and at some time outside thought." (section 46)

From: Christian August Crusius, *Entwurf der notwendingen Venunftwharheiten*, (1745), (Sketch of Necessary Truths of Reason).

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

(under construction)

BERTRAND RUSSELL (1872-1970)

"Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object, of thought-in short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves. Being belongs to whatever can be counted. If A be any term that can be counted as one, it is plain that A is something, and therefore that A is. 'A is not' must always be either false or meaningless. For if A were nothing, it could not be said not to be ; 'A is not' implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence that A is. Thus unless 'A is not' be an empty sound, it must be false. Whatever A may be, it certainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them. Thus being is a general attribute of everything, and to mention anything is to show that it is.

Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. To exist is to have a specific relation to existence-a relation, by the way, which existence itself does not have. This shows, incidentally, the weakness of the existential theory of judgment-the theory, that is, that every proposition is concerned with something that exist, For if this theory were true, it would still be true that existence itself is an entity, and it must be admitted that existence does not exist, Thus the consideration of existence itself leads to non-existential pro, positions, and so contradicts the theory. The theory seems, in fact, to have arisen from neglect of the distinction between existence and being Yet this distinction is essential, if we are ever to deny the existence of anything. For what does not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence ; and hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent." (pp. 449-450)

From: Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, New York: W. W. Norton Company 1903, second edition 1937.

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   towards the intuitions that support Frege's approach, it looks as if Fregeanism has won the day. In this paper, however, I try to develop a compromise solution. This compromise consists in abandoning the assumption shared by both Fregeanism and Neo-Meinongianism, namely that the notion of existence adds something to the content of a statement. To the contrary, we should think of existence as a redundant notion. In other words, I will argue that we should be deflationist about existence. Moreover, the kind of deflationism I propose relies on what I call the existence

equivalence schema, a schema which follows the blueprint of the well-known truth equivalence schema. From such a perspective, we can say that Fregean philosophers rightly deny the status of a discriminating property to existence; and, conversely, Neo-Meinongians, too, rightly reject the view that existence is captured by quantification or expresses a universal property of objects. Finally, the argument that we should take a deflationist approach to existence builds upon an analysis of natural language (general) existential statements and their intuitive entailment-relations."

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22. Griffin, Nicholas. 1977. "Do We Need Predication?" *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 16:653-663. "The paper is concerned with the standard distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. It deals, in particular with attempts by Fred Sommers ("Journal of Philosophy", 1969) and Michael Lockwood ("Philosophical Review", 1975) to show that the distinction is ill-founded since identity statements are predications of singular terms. This proposal is criticized mainly on the grounds that the notion of a singular term depends upon identity and thus can't be used in a program to eliminate identity. An alternative means of removing the distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication, by eliminating predication in favour of relative identities using Geach's suggestion that "x" is "F" is equivalent to "x" is the same "F" as something, is briefly sketched."
23. Haaparanta, Leila. 2001. "Existence and Propositional Attitudes: a Fregean Analysis." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:75-86.
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"I have given my essay this title because it roughly indicates the boundaries of the topic to be discussed and at the same time hints at the method that will be adopted in my analysis. The problem of existence will interest me only to the extent to which it enters the province of logical enquiry and I shall try to disentangle it a little by departing from the generally accepted interpretation of the quantifiers and by bringing in other concepts related to that of existence." (p. 104)
(...)
"I wish to conclude with a brief summary of the results. The aim of the paper was to analyse rather than criticize. I started by examining two inferences which appeared to disprove the validity of the rules of universal instantiation and existential generalization in application to reasoning with empty noun-expressions. Then I distinguished two different interpretations of the quantifiers and argued that under what I called the unrestricted interpretation the two inferences were correct. Further arguments in favour of the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers were brought in, and in particular it was found that by adopting the unrestricted interpretation it was possible to separate the notion of existence from the idea of quantification. With the aid of the functor of inclusion two functors were defined of which one expressed the notion of existence as underlying the theory of restricted quantification while the other approximated the term exist(s) as used in ordinary language.

It may be useful to supplement this summary by indicating some aspects of the problem of existence which have not been included in the discussion. I analyzed the theory of quantification so far as it was applied in connection with variables for which noun-expressions could be substituted and my enquiry into the meaning of exist (s) ' was limited to cases where this functor was used with noun-expressions designating concrete objects or with noun-expressions that were empty. It remains to explore, among other things, in what sense the quantifiers can be used to bind predicate variables and what we mean when we say that colours exist or that numbers exist. These are far more difficult problems, which may call for a separate paper or rather for a number of separate papers." (p. 119)

30. Lesle, John, and Kuhn, Robert Lawrence, eds. 2013. *The Mystery of Existence: Why Is There Anything At All?* Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
31. Lockwood, Michael. 1975. "On Predicating Proper Names." *The Philosophical Review* no. 84:471-498.
"Mill's *System of Logic* is not often turned to by contemporary philosophers as a source of insights regarding the philosophy of language. To be sure, the terms "connotation" and "denotation," which Mill coined, have passed into quite general circulation; and Mill's doctrine of proper names has recently regained a certain popularity-largely as a result of the writings of Kripke. But the notions of connotation and denotation seem generally to be understood in the context of a Fregean or Carnapian scheme of thought which is, to a large extent, alien to Mill's own way of conceiving language; and Mill's views on proper names are usually discussed entirely without reference to what, for Mill, constitutes their theoretical rationale.
To some, it may come as a surprise to learn that Mill actually had anything amounting to a *theory* of language. In fact, however, there is to be gleaned from Mill's *Logic* a theory of quite considerable sophistication -- which I shall attempt, in part, to reconstruct and defend. What will emerge from our discussion is a conception of proper names which combines elements that might seem, at first blush,

incompatible with one another. I shall argue that the Kripke-Donnelian conception of proper names as "rigid designators" or purely referential devices is anticipated by Mill to an even greater degree than is generally recognized; but that, curiously, this conception does not prevent Mill from allowing that proper names can function as genuine predicates. We shall find that, even for Mill, there is, after all, *a* sense in which proper names might be said to connote."

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41. ———. 1986. "'Exists' and Existence." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 40:237-270.
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51. ———. 1995. "Existence Sentences." In *The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz*, edited by Sinisi, Vito and Wolenski, Jan, 227-236. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Ajdukiewicz noted that singular existentials were regarded as meaningful in the Lesniewskian -- existentials as copula claims -- tradition but as meaningless within the Frege-Russell -- existentials as quantifier claims -- tradition. By utilizing identity ("=") in the Frege-Russell tradition and noting that it shares features with the Lesniewskian copula (both are sentence forming functors that take nouns as arguments), one can criticize the arguments for meaninglessness that were originally given. Nowadays it is quite common to use identity to express singular existentials. The paper's conclusion is that neither identity nor the copula provide the right basis for understanding existentials, but some feature they share in common."
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"The concept of existence has been of great importance in many different philosophical systems. One well-known discussion of existence comes in Kant's attack on the ontological argument. Kant argued that existence is not a

defining predicate or, as is more commonly said, a property. However, as he also noted, the ontological argument seems to depend for its cogency on the assumption that existence is a property of things. Kant does seem right about this, at least for some versions of the ontological argument. For instance, Anselm held that a really existing supreme being is greater than a supreme being that exists solely in the understanding. Existence thus seems to be a great-making property for Anselm, and thus it surely qualifies as a property. Kant is usually credited with being the first to notice that existence is not a property, and for seeing the connection that this point has to the ontological argument. Kant's insights here, as elsewhere, seem to me to be of fundamental importance. However, I think as well that Berkeley had something like the same insight concerning existence as we find in Kant, though of course Berkeley made no further allusion to the ontological argument. That is, Berkeley sees well before Kant that existence is not a property, or what Berkeley would have called a quality. Indeed, in a sense to be explained below, it is this insight that lies behind Berkeley's attempt to show that for all non-perceivers, to be is to be perceived.

Berkeley says in the Commentaries that his great discovery, something he thinks is really new, is how to understand the notion of existence. He means, no doubt, how we are to understand existence itself. This new way of thinking of existence, in turn, leads him to his famous principle of *esse is percipi* (EIP). A natural reading, then, would be that what Berkeley holds regarding existence and what he takes as genuinely new is just the EIP principle itself. The great discovery about existence would be that it is intimately linked to perception.

This way of thinking of the matter, I argue, is not correct. One aim of this paper is to show that the EIP principle is not Berkeley's great discovery about existence. That principle, rather, is something that flows out of his discovery about existence. In fact, I think Berkeley has two fundamental discoveries about existence, each of which in its own way is more basic than the EIP principle. The first discovery is that

Locke's way of thinking of existence is deeply flawed, something that commits Locke to holding that there is an abstract idea of existence. Further, this Lockean conception of existence is closely related to a certain way of understanding the EIP principle. A second equally important discovery about existence, is that we do not have any idea of existence, and this is because there is nothing to have an idea of. Berkeley sees clearly, well ahead of both Hume and Kant, that existence is not a property or quality of things; this is his own most profound discovery about existence. This fact leads to a way of understanding the EIP principle, though one that is quite different from that associated with the Lockean conception of existence.

A second aim of the paper will turn out to be directly linked to these two ways of thinking of existence. This aim is that of explaining a certain vacillation in Berkeley's texts when he is commenting on the status of the EIP principle. In some passages he says that the EIP principle is a necessary truth, one whose denial is a "manifest repugnancy" or a contradiction. Elsewhere, Berkeley says that the denial of the EIP principle is meaningless, a contention that would result in the EIP principle being at best a contingent truth. In yet other passages Berkeley states his point disjunctively: either the denial of the EIP principle is a contradiction, or it is meaningless. My claim is that this vacillation is not indicative of a certain hesitancy on Berkeley's part, or anything that shows that he was unsure of what to say about the EIP principle. On the contrary, Berkeley knows exactly what is at issue. The denial of the EIP principle is contradictory, I argue, when we think of existence along Lockean lines. Thus, a mistaken conception of existence yields that the EIP principle is a necessary truth. On the other hand, the denial of the EIP principle is meaningless, when existence is understood along Berkeleyan lines. That is, on the correct account of what existence is, the EIP principle is a contingent truth. Berkeley's two great discoveries about existence produce two distinct versions of the EIP principle.

I do not deny the fundamental role of the EIP principle in Berkeley's positive metaphysics. Indeed, I follow Tipton in regarding the principle as the dominant, basic principle in the metaphysical scheme worked out in the Principles and the Three Dialogues.* My claim is, rather, that the EIP principle is not Berkeley's basic discovery about existence, and in that sense it is not his fundamental insight. It is, instead, this fundamental insight from which the EIP principle derives." (pp. 43-45)

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"1. *Is Existence a Univocal or an Equivocal Conception?*
There is no denying that many different sorts of things exist. And there is also no denying that they exist in many different sorts of ways. But is the *existence* at issue in these different contexts always the same? Is *the same idea* operative when we say different sorts of things 'exist' do they 'exist' in the same *sense* of this philosophically crucial terms?
The issue comes down to this: Can one give a strictly *uniform* account in explicating wherein the existence of different sorts of things lies? Or does the meaning-analysis of the notion of existence lead to different destinations in different settings? Is existence a univocal conception or is it equivocal, so that the different uses of 'exists' are unified

only by a 'family resemblance'? These questions define the problem-area of the present discussion." p. 57
(...)
"8. Consequences. Our analysis thus indicates the lack of any workable uniform conception to provide a covering umbrella for all these modes of existence. The philosophical study of existence -- ontology --emerges from these considerations as a complex and internally diversified issue. No simple synoptic formula-such as Quine's well-known thesis 'to be is to be the value of a variable' -- is adequate to this ramified and variegated issue.
Despite this diversity, the logical analysis of the modes and modalities of existence is nevertheless a useful undertaking. For unless one becomes clear as to the composition of the concepts at issue, it is not possible to explore profitably their philosophical ramifications and interrelationships. Insofar as philosophy is a matter of the cost-benefit analysis of the pros and cons of various theoretical positions-as indeed it is, in large measure-the exploration of logico-conceptual distinctions of the sort we have dealt with here can play a useful role in the philosophical enterprise.
Nominalism is a particularly straightforward case in point. For the nominalist (or at any rate the most prominent sort of nominalist), universals are no more than collection-principles for the assembling of suitably resembling *actualia*. Now the present deliberations have made it clear both what the commitments of this position are and what difficulties they encounter. For if universals are no more than points of resemblance among actually existing things, then it follows at once that the only properties that exist (really and genuinely exist -- in the solely here -- appropriate sense of the term) are those properties which are actually exemplified by reals. The consequences of the position abolish the line of distinction between property *existence* and property *exemplification*. An analysis of the consequences of the position make it easy to see what difficulties it encounters. Think again of such examples as Hume's missing shade of blue, the toothy smile of the Cheshire cat, or the unrealized values of parametrized

properties (like height, weight, or temperature). All these now disappear as real (i.e., existing) properties. An analytical scrutiny of existence concepts shows that such a nominalism proposes on philosophico-ideological grounds (e.g.,'"economy' or 'simplicity,' etc.) to legislate a narrower range of alternatives than 'the logic of the case' strictly requires. The present considerations suggest that this doctrine enjoins upon us an ontological posture that is in fact *smaller* than life." p. 65-66).

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    "The subjects discussed in the following sections are to a certain extent scattered in text-books of modern logic. Some of the equivocations dealt with were already known to Aristotle and the Scholastics. Most of the inspiration for my observations comes from the logical and philosophical works of Prof. *Willard van Orman Quine*." (note 1 p. 239). See in particular the § 2. *The Functions of 'Is'* pp. 204-215.
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68. van Fraassen, Bas C. 1978. "Essence and Existence." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 12.
"1. *Nominalism and Necessity*. The differences between medieval nominalists and realists, which foreshadowed current philosophical disagreements, concerned existence. But the issues were not simple: realists postulated essences or real natures in order to explain the regularities in the actual world. Thus the nominalists, abhorring the existence of such abstract entities, found themselves also in a dispute over necessities: whether some things must, and others could happen, and whether these modal facts do, or are needed to, explain what actually happens.
The firm standpoint taken by the nominalists, as I understand them, was the one that became characteristic of the British empiricists later: the only necessities are those which derive from the connections among terms. As Nicholas of Autrecourt formulated it: there can be no inference from the existence or non-existence of one thing to that of another. In that case, realists held, there is no explanation to be had of the regularities in nature-they are one and all coincidences. This realist criticism was later sharply formulated by Peirce, especially in his remarks on Mill. (1)
The appearances are certainly all against the nominalists. For we do say that some things must, and others could happen, and in this way explain what does happen. Scientists, far from having a Quinean canonical idiom, speak just that way. The nominalists' first and basic move in this game is to say that all natural necessities are elliptic for conditional verbal necessities. This sheet on which I write must burn if heated, because it is paper-yes. But the only necessity that is *really* there is that all paper must burn

when heated. This is so, but means only that we would not call something 'paper' if it behaved differently. (This is a naive formulation, but I shall not here present the process of sophisticating it.) There are technical difficulties for logicians in making sense of this move; but when sufficiently refined, the position that all non-verbal necessities are ellipses for conditional necessities *ex vi terminorum* can be held. (2)

There is however, a special problem, as Quine pointed out very early on, about necessities *de re*. In the above example, the nominalist really *denied* that this sheet must burn if heated. He replaced the necessity of the consequent by the necessity of the consequence, to use their inimitably concise jargon. What is true only, he asserted, is that this sheet *is* paper, a contingent fact, and that any paper must burn if heated, a necessary universal conditional which is not peculiarly about this sheet at all. So he denies the necessity *de re* asserted.

But we are very accustomed to assert necessities and possibilities *de re,* and are a bit suspicious of any philosophical position that accuses everyone of habitual and systematic logical error. Could we ever follow the nominalist on this issue and really feel comfortable-at home in the world of Antoine Roquentin, protagonist of *La Nausée,* who perceives every natural fact and connection as radically contingent?

In the remainder of this essay I shall examine what I believe to be the main philosophical and logical puzzles in the history of this problem." pp. 1-2.

(1) C. S. Peirce, "Uniformity" in his *Essays in the Philosophy of Science,* ed. by V. Thomas (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957); see especially p. 157; compare also "The Reality of Thirdness" in the same collection, especially pp. 166-167.

(2) See my "The Only Necessity is Verbal Necessity," *The Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 74 (1977), pp. 71-85.

69. van Inwagen, Peter. 2008. "McGinn on Existence." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 58:36 - 58.
70. Vander Laan, David. 1997. "The Ontology of Impossible Worlds." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 38:597-

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71. Williams, Christopher John Fard. 1981. *What is Existence?* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
72. Williams, Donald C. 1962. "Dispensing with Existence." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 59:748-762.
73. Wippel, John F., ed. 2011. *The Ultimate Why Question. Why Is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?* Washington, D.C:: The Catholic University of America Press.
74. Witherall, Arthur. 2016. *The Problem of Existence*. New York: Routledge.
"In this book I shall investigate the question: 'Why is there something instead of nothing?' It is an extraordinary question, rarely asked and rarely answered. It does not easily arise in conversation, for it cannot be openly and cheerfully debated. Instead it appears as a kind of phantom, shrouded in mist and darkness. The question itself, even in the context of a philosophy classroom, has a strange and disquieting atmosphere. It seems to come from the void, and it depends upon the dreadful contrast between being and nothingness, raising the possibility of knowing both. In asking us to reflect upon this contrast, this question lies at the extreme end of philosophical inquiry, and it deserves to be recognized as such. Transcending all of the normal conceptual structures and standards, asking for an explanation beyond any explanatory framework, it seems both inescapable and incalculable.
Yet I will provide an answer to it of a certain kind, through a gradual process involving an investigation of many possible responses. The final result of this process will be represented not as a simple proposition with a distinct information content, but as a general schema which may be instantiated by a variety of explanatory propositions. As such, my answer will not entirely form a closure of the inquiry that is opened up, but I believe that it forms a coherent and complete response, in at least the sense that the investigation has a distinct conclusion." Chapter 1)
75. Yagisawa, Takashi. 2005. "A New Argument Against the Existence Requirement." *Analysis* no. 65 (1):39–42.

76. Young, Michael J. 1979. "Existence, Predication, and the Real." *The New Scholasticism* no. 53:295-323.
"Kant argues that existential judgments cannot be understood as attributing existence, as a predicate, to those things whose existence is asserted. (1) This seems correct, but it gives rise to a serious problem. For as I point out in section I, it seems to imply that existential judgments do not involve any predication whatsoever, and thus that they are not really judgments. One might hope to avoid this paradoxical conclusion by arguing that existential judgments are predicative in form but that they do not attribute existence, as a predicate, to anything; as I point out in Section II, various philosophers have maintained just this. I argue in section III that this view, though not without value, is finally untenable. In section IV, I then point out what I take to be the source of the difficulties that have been discussed and suggest how they are to be resolved. In section V, I point out the implications of this suggestion for the judgment that God exists, and indicate a possible line for further thought on this topic."
(1) Cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A592-602=B020-630.

Related pages

Key Terms in Ontology: *Existence*

Selected bibliography on the History of *Existence* in Philosophy

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   "This essay aims, first, at describing the conflict between the theory of predication (classical, Aristotelian) prevailing in philosophy until the end of the 19th century, and the theory arisen with the new logic (modern, Fregean). Three features characterize the pre- Fregean period: 1) conflation of predication and subordination (extensionally: membership and class-inclusion), 2) conflation of identity and predication, 3) the view of quantificational phrases (e.g. "some men") as denoting phrases. A possible fourth feature is suggested by the consideration of the so-called Locke's "general triangle". Most of the paper is devoted to the first feature, also called the "principal" one, stated by Aristotle. Frege seems to be the first, in 1884, to reject the first feature; he also rejected, not less vehemently, the second and the third features. Fregean predication theory became standard, and just taken for granted in the subsequent developments of logic as well as in the mainstream of philosophy. The second aim of this paper is to evaluate - relative to the notion of predication submitted in section I - the conflict between the two traditions, and to determine if both are somehow right, or one is right and the other wrong.

The main result is that the Fregean revolution in predication theory is, at least with regard to the first and second features of the classical view, a clarification that would probably be welcomed by the classical authors themselves *(pace* Hintikka's "Logic of Being")."

3. Bäck, Allan. 1987. "Avicenna on Existence." *Journal of History of Philosophy* no. 25:351-367.
   "In Islamic philosophy, in particular, with Ibn Sina (Avicenna), there appears, in quite explicit form, a view of predication at odds with many current interpretations of Aristotle and views of predication. That view is that the simple affirmative categorical proposition 'S is p' is to be read as 'S is (existent) as a p', and that for its truth it is required both that S be existent and that S be p. This paper sketches out the development of that view. It then shows how this view resolves such vexing problems in interpreting Aristotle's logic and ontology as the existential import assumption and his view of First philosophy."
4. Bennekom, R.van. 1984. "Existential and Other Sentences in Ancient Greek." *Mnemosyne* no. 37:257-263.
5. Bonevac, Daniel. 1982. "Kant on Existence and Modality." *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 64:289-300.
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   Abstract: "The framework of this paper is a defense of Burnet's construal of Apology 30b 2-4. Socrates does not claim, as he is standardly translated, that virtue makes you rich, but that virtue makes money and everything el se good for you. This view of the relation between virtue and wealth is paralleled in dialogues of every period, and a sophisticated development of it appears in Aristotle. My philological defense of the philosophically preferable translation extends recent scholarly work on eínai in Plato and Aristotle to gígnesthai, which is the main verb in the disputed sentence. When attached to a subject, both verbs make a complete statement on their own, but a statement that is further completable by adding a complement. The important point is that the addition of a complement does

not change the meaning of the verb from existence to the copula. Proving this is a lengthy task which takes me into some of the deeper reaches of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology, and into discussion of whether Greek ever acquired a verb that corresponds to modem verbs of existence. I conclude that even when later authors such as Philo Judaeus, Sextus Empiricus and Plotinus debate what we naturally translate as issues of existence, none of the verbs they use (*eínai, úpárkhein, úphestekénai*) can be said to have existential meaning."

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See Chapter 6.3: *The Meanings of "Is": Aristotle. Frege, Russell* pp. 227-231.

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16. Forgie, William. 1975. "Kant and the Question: "Is Existence a Predicate?"." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 5:563-582.
    "Kant gave a two-fold answer to the question, 'Is existence a predicate?'. His view that existence is not a first-level predicate, i.e., a predicate of objects like horses, stones, and you and me, is widely known. What is not so well-known, however, is his claim that existence is a second-level predicate, a predicate of concepts or of a collection of predicates. In this paper I hope to show why his arguments for both claims are unsuccessful." (p. 563)
17. ———. 2000. "Kant and Frege: Existence as a Second Level Property." *Kant Studien* no. 91:165-177.
    Abstract: "Both Kant and Frege maintained that existence is a second-level predicate or property. And, broadly speaking, each tried to establish this conclusion in the same way. However, their arguments differ at crucial places. I believe that a close look at these differences will uncover major obstacles to the success of the project itself."
18. ———. 2007. "Gassendi and Kant on Existence." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 45:511-523.
    Abstract: "In rejecting Descartes's ontological proof for the existence of God, Gassendi maintained that existence is not a property and Kant said that it is not a "real predicate". It is commonly supposed that both are making the same claim. Some have even thought that they advance essentially the same argument for that same claim. I believe none of this is correct. Gassendi and Kant offer different arguments. And

they are arguing for different conclusions. These differences stem from a more fundamental one: they mean different things by existence."

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    "In this paper I shall discuss what Aquinas meant by his term *esse*, or *actus essendi*, “ act of existing ”. Another synonym that he uses — *quo aliquid est*, “ that by which a thing is (or: exists) ”—suggests a convenient division of the subject: we can first discuss Aquinas’s philosophical use of *quo*, “ that by which ”, and then consider which sense of *est*, which sort of existential statements, may be relevant to Aquinas’s doctrine of *esse*. But we shall see that, having got thus far, we cannot arrive at the meaning of the whole phrase *quo aliquid est*, or the reasons for the way Aquinas uses it, simply by combining our separate considerations about *quo* and *est*." (p. 251)
21. Haaparanta, Leila. 1986. "Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege." In *Frege Synthesized*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila and Hintikka, Jaakko, 155-174. Dordrecht: Reidel.
    From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In her article 'Frege on Existence' Leila Haaparanta emphasizes that Frege's greatest insight was the idea of first-order language, which, to a large extent, motivated the rest of his innovations. Haaparanta focuses her attention on Frege's concept of existence, which receives special attention in Frege's thought in connection with the thesis concerning the ambiguity of such words for being as the English 'is'. The ambiguity thesis was an important part of the Fregean paradigm of first-order logic. Haaparanta argues that Frege does not only assume the word 'is' to be

ambiguous but that he considers 'exists', or the 'is' of existence, to be an equivocal word. She suggests that the equivocity view has a metaphysical and epistemological background in Frege's thought. Her paper thus pushes a great deal further the suggestions of Jaakko Hintikka mentioned earlier in this Introduction." (p. 6)

22. Harari, Orna. 2003. "The Concept of Existence and the Role of Constructions in Euclid's *Elements*." *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* no. 57:1-23.
"This paper examines the widely accepted contention that geometrical constructions serve in Greek mathematics as proofs of the existence of the constructed figures. In particular, I consider the following two questions: first, whether the evidence taken from Aristotle's philosophy does support the modern existential interpretation of geometrical constructions; and second, whether Euclid's *Elements* presupposes Aristotle's concept of being. With regard to the first question, I argue that Aristotle's ontology cannot serve as evidence to support the existential interpretation, since Aristotle's ontological discussions address the question of the relation between the whole and its parts, while the modern discussions of mathematical existence consider the question of the validity of a concept. In considering the second question, I analyze two syllogistic reformulations of Euclidean proofs. This analysis leads to two conclusions: first, it discloses the discrepancy between Aristotle's view of mathematical objects and Euclid's practice, whereby it will cast doubt on the historical and theoretical adequacy of the existential interpretation. Second, it sets the conceptual background for an alternative interpretation of geometrical constructions. I argue, on the basis of this analysis that geometrical constructions do not serve in the *Elements* as a means of ascertaining the existence of geometrical objects, but rather as a means of exhibiting spatial relations between geometrical figures." (p. 1)
23. Henry, Desmond Paul. 1964. "Being, Essence, and Existence." *Logique et Analyse* no. 25-26:104-110.
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Reprinted in: Simo Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), *The Logic of Being,* Dordrecht: Reidel 1986 pp. 249-268.
"The ontological argument fails because of an operator order switch between (1) "necessarily there is an (existentially) perfect being" and (2) "there is a being which necessarily is (existentially) perfect". Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2) is problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that "is" ("ist") is ambiguous between existence, predication, identity, and class-inclusion. To restore the ontological argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect (roughly) that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of this extra premise by his thesis that existence is not a "real" predicate."
26. ———. 1999. "On Aristotle's Notion of Existence." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 52:779-805.
Reprinted in: J. Hintikka, *Analyses of Aristotle,* Drodrecht: Springer, 2004, pp. 1-22.
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Reprinted in: J. Hinitkka, *Analyses of Aristotle,* Dordrecht: Springer 2004 pp. 127-138.
"Aristotle did not consider the Frege-Russell distinction between the "is"ses of identity, existence and predication as an ambiguity. On each occasion, any of these component senses of "einai" might or might not be present. The

existential sense (existential force) was in a Barbara-type syllogism conveyed from the major term to the minor term by the middle term. For this reason the middle term was the proximate cause of the minor one: it is what lent the minor one its existence. Likewise Aristotle had to assume existential force only for the widest (generic) term of each science."

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32. Kannisto, Toni. 2016. "*Positio contra complementum possibilitatis* – Kant and Baumgarten on Existence." *Kant-Studien* no. 107:291-313.
Abstract: "In the course of his philosophy, in various contexts, Kant comes to reject three theses about existence: (i) that the thoroughgoing determination of a thing implies its existence, (ii) that existence is a real predicate or determination of a thing, and (iii) that existence is the complement of inner possibility or essence.
Kant's target here is Baumgarten, who advocates these theses as the criterion, classification, and definition of existence. In this article I seek to clarify Kant's elusive theory of existence through its opposition to Baumgarten. I will show that Kant's refutation of (i)–(iii) does not stand alone but is grounded on his own definition of existence as

(absolute) positing. Thus contrary to common practice, Kant's negative claims about what existence is not cannot be understood in isolation but must be taken as jointly dependent on Kant's positive claim about what existence is. I will show that theses (i)–(iii) fail because they presuppose that existence contributes to the intension or content of a concept, whereas according to Kant existence in fact posits a (non-empty) extension of the concept."

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37. Lewis, Frank A. 1975. "Did Plato Discover the *Estin* of Identity?" *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* no. 8:113-143.
Summary. "(I) The notion of an is of identity in English. Some passages from Plato suggesting the existence of the comparable notion of a special *estin* of identity in Greek. (II) What in particular would lead Plato to recognize such a special sense of *estin?* Forms, participation, and predication. In the account of ordinary singular predications, a predicate 'Y' is true of a subject *X* just in case *X* participates in the form the Y associated with. (III) Self-participation. If nothing can participate in itself, then for any forms *X* and Y, *X* participates in Y and so is Y only if *X* is not Y. Even if self-participation is allowed, still in the majority of cases a subject is not what it participates in. The difficulty for all theories of predication which wish to explain how a thing can *be* something which it also *is not*. (IV) The *is* of identity re-examined. Some fallacies which

might support the notion, and some arguments against it. (V) *Sophist* 255e11-256d10. Plato does not explicitly recognize an *estin* of identity. Four competing, "equally best" accounts of the grammatical theory he may implicitly be invoking: (i) the *estin* of identity; (ii) relational terms; (iii) the definite article; (iv) the *not* of nonidentity. (VI) Conclusion. The notion of a special *estin* of identity has little basis in Plato's text."

38. Lizzini, Olga L. 2003. "*Wugud-Mawgud*/Existence-Existent in Avicenna. A key ontological notion of Arabic philosophy " *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 3:111-138.
39. Malcolm, John. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is'/'Teaches' Analogy." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:281-296.
"Lesley Brown suggests that Parmenides and Plato were not guilty of an oft-alleged existence/predication confusion since the relevant Greek verb, when used as a copula, had a built-in existential connotation, just as the same use of "teaches" can be understood both completely and incompletely. I challenge this approach on the grounds that it implies that the ancient Greeks were in the impossible position of not being able unproblematically to attribute properties to subjects recognized not to exist. I attempt to show that the evidence Brown presents for her thesis from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle is inconclusive."
40. Mates, Benson. 1979. "Identity and Predication in Plato." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:211-229. Reprinted in: S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka, *The Logic of Being,* Dordrecht: Reidel 1986 pp. 29-47.
"In coming to terms with the well-known difficulties concerning such Platonic assertions as "beauty is beautiful," "justice is just," "beauty is more beautiful than anything else," etc., modern commentators have frequently invoked the received notion that the verb "to be" has two or more senses, including in particular the so-called identity and predicative senses. The present paper argues in detail that this verb can be consistently understood as having a single sense throughout Plato's texts, and that such an

interpretation does less violence to his doctrines than do the more usual accounts."

41. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:113-135.
"This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy -- I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second.
I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it. Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the *Metaphysics*."
42. Maurer, Armand. 1946. "*Esse* and *essentia* in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 8:68-86.
43. Mendelsohn, Richard L. 1987. "Frege's Two Senses of 'Is'." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 28:139-160.
"It is widely believed that there are two senses of 'is', the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication, and that this distinction was clearly drawn by Frege in *On Concept and Object,* although it was anticipated by others, perhaps, e.g., by Plato in the *Sophist*. As opposed to this received view, I will argue that Frege had not successfully distinguished two senses of 'is', indeed that his argument leads to precisely the opposite conclusion; on the other hand, the distinction Plato had supposedly drawn in the *Sophist,* which seems to rest on a semantics Frege was explicitly rejecting, is, given that semantic framework, viable.
Frege had introduced this distinction in order to buttress his view that proper names could not serve as genuine predicates: a proper name occupying ostensible predicate

position could not be functioning as a predicate because the 'is' in such a statement would have to be the 'is' of identity, not the 'is' of predication.
I will argue that Frege had been mistaken on this point as well. More generally, I will argue that Frege's theoretical analysis of language is not, as he had thought, incompatible with proper names being allowed to play a genuinely predicative role.
My remarks are prompted by Michael Lockwood's stimulating article, *On Predicating Proper Names* (1975), which contains an extensive and detailed criticism of Frege's position."

44. Morewedge, Parviz, ed. 1982. *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*. New York: Fordham University Press.
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"The question "Was 'existence' ever a predicate?" in a way already suggests its own answer, that this is really the wrong question to ask, because 'existence' has always been a predicate. Even those, such as Kant, who supposedly opposed this view, in fact held it. They merely denied that 'existence' is a "normal" first-order predicate. Not only Kant, but also Bolzano, Frege and Russell claimed that it is a second-order predicate. There is substantive disagreement between Kant and Bolzano on the one hand and Frege and Russell on the other over two issues: the former claim that this second-order predicate applies to no concept analytically and that it can be properly ascribed to a singular concept, whereas the latter deny both of these claims."
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"A recent article in this quarterly about 'Aquinas on 'Exists',' opens with the statement, 'At the outset of *On Being and Essence* Aquinas distinguishes two senses of 'ens' (being or existent).' (1) Here, this reader stops 'At the outset' and reflects: is it justifiable-speaking linguistically and metaphysically -- to offer two seemingly alternative if not even synonymous renderings of the one Latin word '*ens*,' viz., 'being' or (and/or) 'existent'?
The present writer belongs to the small chorus of language-sensitive medievalists who feel pressed to sing *extra chorum* because they have conclusive evidence that the translation of the Latin *esse* (as also of the Greek *einai)* by the usual existence-terminology leads to a flawed interpretation of the

'onto-logical' thought world where use is made of the 'being'-term *ens* (and its Greek equivalent).
(...)
The basic issue is simple enough, but precisely because it is so simple and obvious it runs the risk of being overlooked. All I can do here is present a series of brief pointers toward the fateful bifurcation of the Latin *esse* (and the Greek *einai)* into 'be(ing)' and 'exist(ence).' In doing this, I hope that an objective listing of the pertinent facts which, in their roots, are of an unambiguous linguistic nature, will constitute an instance of that philosophical rhetoric which in the same issue of *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* was called a 'technique of persuasion.' (2) " (pp. 89-90)
(1) Russell Panier and Thomas D. Sullivan, "Aquinas on 'Exists'," in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67, (1993), 247.
(2) id. p. 257.

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"In classical Latin, the verb *esse,* incompletely rendered by today's 'to be,' was the word expressing what today is divided over the verbs 'be' and 'exist.' As I quoted Vlastos in reference to the similar situation in Greek (*'Ens' described as 'Being or existent'* 13), 'This kind of knowledge ... even a Greek child would have had. I invited our contemporary philosophers 'to crawl under the linguistic thought-skin of adult Greek and Latin philosophers,' not perhaps in order to agree but at least to understand what they were saying (and then, if they see fit, to disagree). When, by some mysterious process, the verb *existere* began to be used as the participle of *esse,* the inevitable apparently happened: the fuller meaning of *esse,* was gradually-and uncritically-transferred to *existere*. The etymology of *ex(s)istere* yields a simple sense, namely, 'come out of,' 'appear' and 'be there,' indicating yes-or-no situations; consequently, the richer meaning of Aquinas's *esse* (the verb) was fated to become flattened to indicate (rather than 'signify') the plain fact of

'exist(ence)' (often referred to by the new late-Latin noun *existentia,* see n. 4). The mountainous landscape where Aquinas saw a rich variety of interconnected 'beings' was leveled to the flatland of isolated, barren existents; the various depths of the existing beings came to be viewed as a conglomerate of unrelated, juxtaposed existents."

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    "Our aim is to explain as briefly as we can (1) why there is good reason to use 'existence-terminology,' and (2) why some considerations against it, including what we take to be Professor Nijenhuis's main reasons, should not deter us. In the course of discussing these points we also will indicate why any of this matters for the future of Thomistic studies.

The first reason to permit oneself to use 'existent' or 'existing thing' for 'ens' is that fine dictionaries such as *The New Shorter Oxford* and *The American Heritage* (to take a couple at hand) give 'existence' as the first entry under 'being.' That, no doubt, is why translators commonly use 'existence-terminology.' Professor Nijenhuis acknowledges that dictionaries inter-define being and existence and that translators follow suit, but he thinks that both err. Maybe so, but it seems quite clear who bears the *onus probandi*. The second reason, often neglected by proponents of 'being-terminology,' is that if we refuse to allow that when Aquinas talks in terms of 'ens' and 'esse' he is talking in one way or another about existing things and about existence, we have no way of comparing Aquinas on existence with anyone who talks about existence. To insist that Aquinas is not talking about the same topic as Frege, Russell, Quine and others because 'ens,' 'esse' and the like are to be translated only in terms of 'being' is to beg some pretty big questions and to seal off Aquinas's thought from the contemporary world of ideas. No doubt some feel that it is more important to understand Aquinas in light of predecessors such as Clarenbald of Arras than Frege, but it seems to us that unless at some point we are willing to consider how Aquinas's thought holds up when examined with the best contemporary work in mind, we will certainly not have served Aquinas or philosophy well." (pp. 83-84)

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"An initial consideration is given of the tensions involved in the perspective of the historian of philosophy. Thereafter, Greek, medieval and early modern positions on being or existence are discussed. Beginning with Parmenides and terminating with Plotinus, the dominant refrain of Greek philosophy is that being is form. With Avicenna, an aspect of being beyond form is isolated -- the existential dimension. However, metaphysics still focuses on the formal; existence remains untapped. In a singular departure from tradition, existence for Thomas Aquinas is no longer a "topping off" of an autonomous essence. It is the primordial, most basic dimension of anything that is "really other than and different from essence". However, this has always been interpreted with Avicennian or Aristotelian spectacles on. This has led to the position of Suarez affirming the identity of essence and existence. The stage is set for appreciating the concept of existence as completely empty and vacuous."

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"Das Wort exsistentia erscheint erstmalig im Lateinischen- in den theologischen Werken des Marius Victorinus, in denen es fast immer zur Übersetzung von hyparxis; dient, im Gegensatz zu dem Wort substantia das ousia übersetzt, und zu subsistentia, das hypostasis wiedergibt. (1) Exsistentia ist abgeleitet von exsistere, das in der philosophischen Sprache oft für esse eintrat, zumal in der

Form des Partizips.(2) Exsistere seinerseits wurde auch zur Übersetzung von hyparkein verwendet, wie aus der Timaios-Übersetzung des Calcidius ersichtlich.(3)
Für das Verständnis der Vorgeschichte des Begriffes Existenz ist es daher unerläßlich, sorgfältig die Bedeutung zu präzisieren, die das Wort hyparkein innerhalb des technischen Wortschatzes der griechischen Philosophie aufweist, und die vorliegende Studie möchte einen Beitrag zu einer derartigen Untersuchung liefern. Zunächst soll zu zeigen versucht werden, daß das Wort hyparkein innerhalb der Stoa eine Seinsweise bezeichnet, die dem Geschehen, dem Akzidenz, dem Prädikat zukommt und der Seinsweise des Subjektes gegenübergestellt wird. Danach soll diese Bedeutung des hyparkein einerseits mit dem aristotelischen, andererseits mit dem neuplatonischen, Gebrauch dieses Wortes verglichen werden." (p. 115)
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(2) CICERO, De officiis, I, 30, 107: "Ut in corporibus magnae diaim;litudines suns, sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam uarietates " Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium, I, 33, 7: "In potentia exsistens ad id quod est esse."
(3) Calcidius, Timaeus, 50, 23, Wasznik: "In reputatione quidem et consideratlone, uere existentis uereque peruigilis naturae." Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 B.

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Related pages

Key Terms in Ontology: *Existence*

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Key Terms in Ontology: *Nonexistence*. History of the Problem of Nonexistent Objects

INTRODUCTION

"The totality of what exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the objects of knowledge. This fact easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing (...) or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be something for which science has no application or at least no application of any worth." (p. 79)

From: Alexius Meinong, "On the Theory of Objects", in: Roderick M. Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, Translated by I. Levi, D. B. Terrell, R. M. Chisholm, Glencoe, Ill: Free Press 1960, pp. 76-117.

"Whether or not there are non-existent objects seems to be one of the more mysterious and speculative issues in ontology. To affirm that there are non-existent objects is to affirm that reality consists of two kinds of things, the existing and the non-existing. The existing contains all of what is in our space-time world, plus all abstract objects, if there are any. Most people, it seems fair to say, would think that this is all there is. For the only real question in ontology can be what kinds of existing things there are. However followers of Meinong maintain that this isn't all there is. There is also another kind of things, those that do not exist. And to say this, the

Meinongians continue, is to accept that reality is divided into two basic kind of things, the existing and the non-existing. Whether or not reality contains two basic categories of things, existing and non-existing, or only one, existing, is what the debate about non-existent objects is all about. And as such it seems to be the most speculative of the debates in ontology." (p. 249)

Thomas Hofweber, "Quantification and Non-Existent Objects", in: Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.), *Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence*, Stanford: CSLI Publications 2000, pp. 249-278.

"In this book I consider the ancient problem of nonbeing, the problem whether there are non-existent objects. Holding that there are seems to imply the contradiction that there exist things that do not exist. On the other hand, in common parlance we very often speak of things that do not exist. Sherlock Holmes does not exist, he is a fictional character. Pegasus is mythical and hence non-existent. Phlogiston has turned out not to exist. Extinct species no longer exist, future items do not exist yet, there are all sorts of possible things that do not exist. Atheists certainly believe that God does not exist. So we employ the notion of nonexistence widely and quite comfortably. Furthermore, non-existent things seem to have properties: Sherlock Holmes is a detective who plays the violin, he is not a banker; Pegasus is a winged horse, not a flying fish. The appearance is that ordinary discourse is committed to items that are some- how there and have properties, and yet are said not to exist. Does common language then assume contradictory entities? Surely there cannot be such things. But if not, what are we talking about in these cases? This is a tangle indeed; my purpose in this book is to sort through the strands wound together here and to use the resulting clarifications to deal with various philosophical issues." (p. 1)

Charles Crittenden, *Unreality: the Metaphysics of Fictional Objects*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991.

"I think that it would be useful to have a detailed study of the history of non-existent objects, but I am sure that this would be the culmination of a life's work if done well. (...) One must be aware of

the dangers which await one who enters the treacherous waters between the Scylla of ignorance of the history of philosophy and the Charybdis of simplicistic formulations of that history." (p. 68)

Kenneth J. Perszyk, *Non-existent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1993.

"Non-existence theories first arose in the early Stoa. A doctrine of non-things, detailed in Chrysippus' discussion of the four Stoic categories, might well be traced back to Zeno. Among these non-existent 'things' were immaterial grammatical causes (lekta) which acted semantically as the verification principles of existential propositions (axiomata). In his critique of Aristotle in the in the [Logica] Ingredientibus, Abaelard arrived at a similar theory in his discussion of propositional dicta.
Infrequent classical references to the Stoic theory, coupled with misinterpretations, point to the pervasive influence of the Aristotelian association of the categories with things." (p. 80)

Daniel F. Blackwell, *Non-Ontological Constructs: The Effects of Abaelard's Logical and Ethical Theories on His Theology: A Study in Meaning and Verification*, Bern: Peter Lang 1988.

DIVISIONS OF BEING IN STOIC PHILOSOPHY

"The Stoics want to place above this [the existent] yet another, more primary genus... Some Stoics consider 'something' the first genus, and I shall add the reason why they do. In nature, they say, some things exist, some do not exist. But nature includes even those which do not exist -- things which enter the mind, such as Centaurs, giants, and whatever else falsely formed by thought takes on some image despite lacking substance."
Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 10.218 (SVF 2.331, part)
"They [the Stoics] say that of something some are bodies, others incorporeals, and they list four species of incorporeals -- sayable (lekton), void, place and time."

Simplicius On Aristotle's Categories 66,32-67,2 (SVF 2.369, part)
"The Stoics see fit to reduce the number of the primary genera, and others they take over with minor changes. For the make their division a fourfold one, into substrates, the qualified, the disposed, and the relatively disposed."
"In Stoic usage, just as in Epicurean, the ordinary Greek verb 'to be' (einai) can with relative safety be rendered 'exist', despite its vexed earlier history in Greek philosophy. This translation is further justified by some of the Stoic conceptual distinction discussed below.
(...)
The Stoics avoid the common Platonist assumption (...) that to be something is already to exist. To be something is rather, it seems, to be a proper subject of thought and discourse. Most such things do also exist, in that they are bodies. But an incorporeal like a time, or a fictional object like a Centaur, does not. Since, however, expressions like 'Centaur' and 'today' are taken to name something, even though that something has no actual or independent existence (independent, that is, of the world's motion in the case of time, or of someone's mental image, in the case of the Centaur), Although they deny themselves the term 'exist' for such cases, the Stoics have recourse to the broader term under which it falls, 'subsist' (huphistasthai) This latter term, in its Stoic usage, seems to capture the mode of being that Meinong called bestehen and Russell rendered by 'subsist' (in his 1904 articles on Meinong in Mind 13 [reprinted in: Douglas Lackey (ed.) - Essays in Analysis - pp. 21-93]. For Meinong, similarity or Pegasus, for instance, subsist but does not exist. With existing things, however, they share the fact that they have a character (Sosein), just as in Stoicism both a real horse and a Centaur are 'something'. We could render the Stoic distinction between 'exist' and 'subsist' by saying 'There's such a thing as a rainbow, and such a character as Mickey Mouse, but the don't actually exist'."
'Something' is the highest genus, including as it does incorporeals and fictional entities as well as bodies (see stemma above)."
Seneca, *Letters*, 58.13-15 (SVF 2.332, part)." (pp. 163-164)"

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SVF = Hans von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Lipsia 1903-1905)

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DIVISIONS OF BEING IN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

DIVISIONS OF ACT AND POTENCY

- **Act (Actual Being)**
  - 1. Entitative act (act of being, existence, *esse*)
  - Formal act
    - *a*) Whole essence or nature
      Form or determining part of a nature
    - *b*) First act (substantial form)
      - Subsistent
      - Non-subsistent
    - Second act (accidental form)
      - Essential (proper)
      - Contingent
    - *c*) First act (the power)
      - Remote
      - Proximate
    - Second act (activities of the power)
  - 2. Pure act
    Mixed act
  - 3. Complete act
    Incomplete act
  - 4. Act of the perfect
    Act of the imperfect
  - 5. Unreceived
    - Of existence (God)
    - Of form (angel's nature)
  - Received act

- **Potency (Potential Being)**
  - Active (is an act, either a nature or a power)
  - Passive
    - Subjective
      - 1. Pure potency (prime matter)
      - Mixed with act
        - Substantial (to be other substance)
        - Accidental
      - 2. Natural
        - Essential (non-contradictory)
        - Existential (producible)
      - Obediential
    - Objective
      - Intrinsic (absolute, metaphysical)
      - Extrinsic (relative to a cause)

From: Bernard Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company 1956 p. 14.

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   Table of Contents: Hector-Neri Castaneda: Objects, Existence, and Reference. A Prolegomenon to Guise Theory 3; William J. Rapaport: Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology 61; Roderick M. Chisholm: On the Positive and Negative States of Things 97; Ruth Barcan Marcus: Possibilia and Possible Worlds 107; Richard Sylvan: Toward an Improved Cosmo-Logical Synthesis 135; John Woods: God, Genidentity and Existential Parity 181; Gary Rosenkrantz: On Objects Totally Out Of This World 197; Czeslaw Lejewski: Logic and Non-Existence 209; Herbert Hochberg: Existence, Non-Existence, and Predication 235; Edgar Morscher: Was Existence Ever a Predicate? 269; Richard E. Grandy: On the Logics of Singular Terms 285; Gerald Vision: Reference and the Ghost of Parmenides 297; Joseph Margolis: Reference as Relational: *Pro* and *Contra* 327; Kent Bach: Failed Reference and Feigned Reference: Much Ado About Nothing 359; Nicholas Griffin: Russell's Critique of Meinong's Theory of Objects 375: Panayot Butchvarov: Our Robust Sense of Reality 403; Dale Jacquette: Meinong's Doctrine of the Modal Moment 423; Karel Lambert: Non-Existent Objects: Why Theories About Them Are important

439; Edward N. Zalta: Lambert, Mally and the Principle of Independence 447; Ermanno Bencivenga: Meinong: A Critique From the Left 461; Ernest Sosa: Imagery and Imagination — Sensory Images and Fictional Character 485; Johannes Brandl: Gegenstandslose Gedanken 501; Barry Smith: The Substitution Theory of Art 533; C.J.F. Williams: Kant and Aristotle on the Existence of Space 559; Keith Lehrer: Reid on Conception and Nonbeing 573; Marian David: Non-Existence and Reid's Conception of Conceiving 585; Roderick M. Chisholm: George Katkov as Philosopher 601-602.

2. "Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy." 2016. *Meinong Studies* no. 6:99-140.
   Mauro Antonelli, Marian David (eds.).
   Contents / Inhalt:Stefania Centrone: Relational Theories of Intentionality and the Problem of Non-Existents 1; Peter Andres Varga: The Non-Existing Object Revisited: Meinong as the Link between Husserl and Russell? 27; Dale Jacquette: Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke's 1973 John Locke Lectures 69; Michele Paolini Paoletti: Paradise on the Cheap. Ascriptivism about Ficta 99; Xavier de Donato-Rodriguez; Meinong's Theory of Assumptions and its Relevance for Scientific Contexts 141; Jutta Valent: Christian von Ehrenfels. Eine intellektuelle Biographie: Neue Forschungsergebnisse aus dem Nachlass 175; Markus Roschitz: Zu Ernst Mallys Lebensgang, Umfeld und akademischer Laufbahn 207-257
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"In recent papers Peter van Inwagen (1996) and Jonathan Lowe (1996) have discussed the `fundamental' (1) question of metaphysics `Why is there anything at all?'. In different ways they argue that the *nihilist* hypothesis that there might be just nothing can be set aside, either because it is impossible for there to be nothing (Lowe 1996: 118) or because this hypothesis is `as improbable as anything can be' (van Inwagen 1996: 99). By contrast I shall here defend the nihilist hypothesis. r
The point at issue does not simply concern the metaphysics of existence. It also connects with debates concerning modal concepts. David Lewis explicitly declares `there isn't any world where there's nothing at all. That makes it necessary that there is something' (1986: 73). The reason for this, as Lewis explains, is that because he conceives a world as a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things, there cannot be an empty world, since mereology does not permit `empty sums'. A little surprisingly, David Armstrong, whose combinatorial theory of possibility is in many respects opposed to that of Lewis, also embraces this conclusion, because `the empty world is not a construction from our given elements (actual individuals, properties and relations)' (1989: 93). Armstrong takes this view despite the fact that his theory permits the construction of representations of `contracted worlds' which lack actual individuals, properties and relations because he conceives of worlds as maximal states of affairs and holds that where there is nothing at all, there is no state of affairs. Thus for both Armstrong and Lewis the nihilist hypothesis is to be rejected because the conception of a possibility (or world) has sufficient substance, as a mereological sum or a state of affairs, to demand the existence of something *as* a part or constituent."
(1) This is how Heidegger describes the question in Heidegger *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1959. It is characteristically unclear what, if any, answer to it Heidegger offers.

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Contents: List of Contributors IX; Sara Bernstein and Tyron Goldschmidt: Introduction XI; 1. Sara Bernstein: Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being 1; 2. Graham Priest: Nothingness and the Ground of Reality: Heidegger and Nishida 17; 3. Roy Sorensen: Thales' Riddle of the Night 34; 4. Fatema Amijee: Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental 50; 5. Filippo Casati and Naoya Fujikawa: Against Gabriel: On the Non-Existence of the World 69; 6. Koji Tanaka: How Can Buddhists Prove That Non-Existent Things Do Not Exist? 82; 7. Bryan Frances: How Ordinary Objects Fit into Reality 97; 8. Eddy Keming Chen: The Cosmic Void 115; 9. Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi: Ballot Ontology 139; 10. Aaron Segal: Something Out of Nothing: What Zeno Could Have Taught Parmenides 165; 11. Tyron Goldschmidt and Samuel Lebens: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: An Argument for Anti-Nihilism 187; 12. Craig Warmke: Ostrich Actualism 205; 13. John A. Keller and Lorraine Juliano Keller: Saying Nothing and Thinking Nothing 226; 14. Arif Ahmed: Why It Matters What Might Have Been 251; 15. Jacob Ross: Explanatory Relevance and the Doing/Allowing Distinction 268; 16. Carolina Sartorio: Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Omissions 294; 17. Daniel Rubio: Death's Shadow Lightened 310; Index 329-331.
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16. ———. 1986. "On the positive and negative states of things." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:97-106. "Following Bolzano, I suggest that there are two types of entity: those that are states of other things and those that are not. The second type includes, not only substances, in the traditional sense, but also such abstract objects as numbers, attributes and propositions. It is argued that the theory of states, when combined with an intentional account of negative attributes, will yield a theory of negative entities and of events."
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"There are genuine references to non-existent objects, as can be seen through elucidating reference in common language and applying the criteria enumerated to expressions used in writing and speaking about fiction. The concept of a fictitious entity is simply accepted in the adoption of the language-game' of fiction and has no undesirable ontological consequences. To think otherwise is to fail to attend to the conceptual status of such talk. Accounts of fictional discourse by Russell, Ryle, and Chisholm are found objectionable. The concept of existence is touched on, and consequences concerning reference to abstract and other objects and also concerning method in ontology mentioned."
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The volume contains 13 new papers concerning the semantic and metaphysical issues arising from empty names, non-existence, and the nature of fiction. The contributors include some of the most important researchers working in these fields. Some of the papers develop and defend new positions on these matters, while other papers offer some important new perspectives and criticisms of the existing approaches. The book contains a comprehensive introductory essay by the editors which provides a survey of the philosophical issues concerning empty names, the various responses to these issues, and the literature to date. The book is composed by three parts: I. Empty names; II. Pretense; III. Ontology.
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"The main philosophical question about non-existents is whether there really are any. My own view is that there are none. But even if this is granted, we may still ask what they are like, just as the materialist may consider the nature of sensations or the nominalist the nature of numbers.
On this further topic, there seem to be three main divisions of thought, which may be respectively labelled as:
(i) platonism /empiricism;
(ii) literalism /contextualism;
(iii) internalism / externalism.
Let me attempt a rough characterization of these divisions. More refined formulations will come later. On a platonic conception, the non-existent objects of fiction, perception, belief and the like do not depend for their being upon human activity or upon any empirical conditions at all; they exist, or have being, necessarily.
Under an empirical conception, on the other hand, these objects are firmly rooted in empirical reality; they exist, or have being, contingently. On an extreme conception of this sort, these objects are literally created and are brought into being by the appropriate activity either of or within the agent.
(...)
All in all, the three divisions provide for 8 (= 2^3) combinations of positions. Each, I think, is coherent, but some are more natural than others. For example it is natural, though not necessary, for the 'platonist' to accept internalism and for the 'empiricist' to accept externalism; for the means by which the objects are individuated will naturally be taken to provide conditions for their existence or being.
My own view on these questions is given by empiricism, contextualism and extemalism, not that this is a common combination in the literature. This view will be defended in the second part of this paper. In the present part, I am concerned to discuss a view that combines internalism with contextualism and platonism; and in the third part, I shall discuss the literalist position, mainly in association with platonism and internalism. I have not attempted

systematically to consider all of the possible combinations of position. I have only looked at the more prominent or plausible of the views, though what I say on them should throw light on what is to be said of the others.
The plan of the present part is as follows. In section A2, I discuss general methodological issues facing any philosophical study of nonexistents and, in particular, defend the claim that one can say what they are like without presupposing that there really are any. In section B, I try first to delineate more precisely the subjectmatter of our theories and then to describe the problems of providing identity and existence conditions with which any such theory should deal. In section C, I give an initial formulation of an internalist theory, which is successively refined in section D. Finally, in section E, I give two major criticisms of the theory as thus developed. A more detailed account of each section is given in the list of contents.
It is of the greatest importance to note that the present part does not contain my own views on the subject. It is only in the last section of this part that the internalist position is criticized, and it is only in the second part of this paper that my own, more positive, views are developed." (pp. 97-99)

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Review of: Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
"There has recently been a rebellion within the ranks of analytic philosophy. It has come to be appreciated that, in the debate between Russell and Meinong, Russell was perhaps mistaken in his criticisms and Meinong was perhaps correct in his views. As a consequence, an attempt was made to rehabilitate the Meinongian position, to defend it against the most obvious attacks and to develop it in the most plausible ways. T. Parsons was among the first of the contemporary philosophers to make this attempt, (1) and so it is especially appropriate that his views should now be set out in a book.
I should say, at the outset, that I thoroughly approve of the Meinongian project. As Parsons makes clear (pp. 32— 38),

we refer to non-existents in much the same way as we refer to other objects. It is therefore incumbent upon the philosopher to work out the principles by which our discourse concerning such objects is governed. Not that this is necessarily to endorse a realist position towards the objects of the resulting theory. Nominalists and Platonists alike may attempt to set out the principles that govern arithmetical discourse; and it is in the same spirit that the realist or anti-realist may attempt to set out the principles of our fictional discourse.

Despite my approval of the project, I must admit to some misgivings as to how Parsons has carried it out. These misgivings are of two kinds. There are first some internal criticisms, requiring only change within Parsons' basic approach. There are then some external criticisms, requiring change to the basic approach.

These criticisms, though, should not be thought to detract from the merits of Parsons' book. It is, in many ways, an admirable contribution to the field.

It gives weight both to the interest and the legitimacy of the Meinongian enterprise; it pinpoints the difficulties which any satisfactory theory must deal with; and in its solution to those difficulties, it sets up a theory with a degree of rigour and systematicity that should serve as a model for years to come. As a well worked-out and accessible contribution to object theory, there is no better book." (pp. 95-96)

(1) Others include Castafieda [1], Rapaport [7], Routley [8] and Zalta [9].

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Abstract: "Many who think that some abstracta are artefacts are fictional creationists, asserting that fictional characters are brought about by our activities. Kripke (1973), Salmon (1998, 2002), and Braun (2005) further embrace mythical creationism, claiming that certain entities that figure in false theories, such as phlogiston or Vulcan, are likewise abstracta produced by our intentional activities. I here argue that one may not reasonably take the metaphysical route travelled by the mythical creationist. Even if one holds that fictional characters are artefact one ought not further hold that mythical objects are, too."
43. ———. 2017. "On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, and Scientific Hypothesizing." *Res Philosophica* no. 94 (1):177-188.
Abstract: In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth” (2014), I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism—the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts—is false. One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky (2016); she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta—specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters. I argue here that even if we admit inadvertently created abstracta into our ontology, my argument survives. I ultimately defend a view on which fictional characters (if real) may be countenanced as created abstracta whether purposefully created or not, yet mythical objects are best taken to be discoverable, Platonic abstracta (if real). We can

see that such a hybrid ontology is justified once we take proper note of the nature of the sorts of authorial activities involved in fictional storytelling and scientific hypothesizing."

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"Some years ago, I published an article about Meinong's theory of objects. (1) I listed there four main theses of Meinong's view:
(1) The golden mountain (and other nonexistents) has no being at all.
(2) Nevertheless, it is a constituent of the fact that the golden mountain does not exist.
(3) Furthermore, it has such ordinary properties as being made from gold.
(4) Existence is not a constituent of any object.
And I argued in that paper that only thesis (1) is true. In particular, I insisted that (3), which I consider to be the most characteristic feature of Meinong's view, is false. Since then, there have been quite a few discussions of Meinong's view. I would like, in response to some of these works, to reiterate my earlier criticism of Meinong. My purpose is threefold. Firstly, I would like to state once more my own view, which is a version of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, as clearly as possible. Secondly, I shall defend my past contention that the golden mountain is not golden against some recent objections. And thirdly and most importantly, I want to describe the dialectic of the philosophical problem as I perceive it. It seems to me to be an exasperating shortcoming of the discussion that most participants do not clearly state the basic options and their reasons for preferring some to others."
(1) Meinong's Doctrine *of* the *Aussersein of* the Pure Object', *Noüs,* 8 (1974, pp. 67-81. See also my *Meinong* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974).

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Abstract: "Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formalization of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be established if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities."
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"What follows is not an historical exercise. The basic concern is neither with Meinong's nor his disciples' and advocates' reasons for thinking the theory of nonexistent objects (= nonsubsistent objects in Meinong's sense of the word 'nonsubsistent') important. Instead I shall try to set aside preexisting reasons — there are lots of these — on behalf of the importance of the theory of nonexistent objects, and adduce a couple of unbiased reasons — what Hugues Leblanc sceptically calls "excuses" — aimed at vindicating the development of theories of such objects. It will not follow from this discussion that one must believe in nonexistent objects anymore than one must believe in ideal objects important as the latter are (in the minds of many) to the interpretation of the theory of classical mechanics.
The reasons on behalf of the importance of the theory of nonexistent objects to be advanced are not mutually exclusive, the first having to do with utility or applications of the theory of nonexistent objects, and the second with the smoothness of essentially classical logical theory with identity." (p. 439)
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Abstract: "In Thomistic metaphysics, the domain of ens rationis pertains to a hazy region of “non-real” being, laying outside of the proper scientific subject of metaphysics. In addition to negations and privations, a very important domain of entia rationis pertains to that of relationes rationis, especially such relationes as play a role in human

reasoning. Logic, studying these “non-real” relations, thus focuses on a unique, if hazy, realm of “non-being.” While this particular type of ens rationis receives the lion’s share of attention among Thomists, there is evidence that similar reflection should be given to two additional domains of experience, namely that of “moral being” and “artificial being” (i.e., the being of artifacts). This paper lays out the general metaphysical concerns pertaining to each of these domains, providing an outline of topics pertinent to a Thomistic discussion of the intentional existence involved in logic, moral realities, and artifacts."

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85. Priest, Graham. 2011. "Creating Non-Existents." In *Truth in Fiction*, edited by Lihoreau, Franck, 107-118. Frankfurt:

Ontos Verlag.
Abstract: "Towards Non-Being gives a noneist account of the reference of words which do not refer to existent objects —in the context, in particular, of intentional states. The account is a realist one, in the sense that the domain of objects is the same at each world, and so does not depend on the behaviour of objects which exist there. In this paper, I discuss an anti-realist version of the theory. What non-existent objects are available at a world supervenes on the behaviour of the existent—and, particularly, sentient—beings at that world. An appropriate formal semantics is given; and its philosophical ramifications—notably, with respect to the naming of non-existent objects— are explored."

86. ———. 2016. *Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Second edition. (First edition 2005)
87. ———. 2019. "Objects That Are Not Objects." In *Quo Vadis,Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen*, edited by Szatkowski, Miroslaw, 217-229. Berlin: de Gruyter.
88. Prior, Arthur Norman. 1971. *Objects of Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Edited by Peter Thomas Geach and Anthony J. P. Kenny.
89. Przelecki, Marian. 1981. "On What there Is Not." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 8:123-129.
"It is my contention (which I shall try to defend in what follows) that the text of the dialogue contains thoughts and ideas that closely correspond to those characteristic of modern logical semantics. The difficulties which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him find their explicit counterparts in the discussions of contemporary logicians and semanticists.
This statement, however, needs some qualification. The text of the dialogue is comprehensive and indefinite enough to allow for different readings and interpretations. It is only some interpretation of some of its fragments that may be said to yield that version of its problems which is suggested

below. I would, however, contend that the interpretation advanced is a warranted one and the fragments so interpreted essential for the author's standpoint. One more point should be explicitly stated beforehand. Referring to what I call modern logical semantics, I mean by this a definite semantic theory: model theoretic semantics in its standard version, which might be regarded as a "classical" form of contemporary logical semantics. Some deviations from this use will be indicated in what follows.
The most important philosophical content of the dialogue is contained in its second part (esp. in the paragraphs 237-264). The main problem concerns the semantic characteristic of falsehood and, involved in it, notion of not-being." (p. 123)

90. Rapaport, William J. 1985/86. "Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:61-95.
"This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" - the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Aussersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented."

91. Rast, Erich. 2010. "Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects." In *Fiction in Philosophy*, edited by Lihoreau, Franck.
Abstract: "An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a more Millian fashion. It is argued that classical possibilism is ontologically more neutral than is commonly

thought, because it allows for the formulation of various forms of reductionism within the object language."

92. Rescher, Nicholas. 1982. "The Concept of Nonexistent Possibles." In *Essays in Philosophical Analysis*, 73-110. Boston: University Press of America.
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103. Smith, David Woodruff. 1975. "Meinongian Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 1:43-71.
104. Stone, Jim. 2010. "Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision." *Analysis* no. 70:638-644.
105. Swanson, Carolyn. 2012. "A Meinongian Minefield? The Dangerous Implications of Nonexistent Objects." *Human Affairs* no. 22:161-177.

Abstract: "Alexius Meinong advocated a bold new theory of nonexistent objects, where we could gain knowledge and assert true claims of things that did not exist. While the theory has merit in interpreting sentences and solving puzzles, it unfortunately paves the way for contradictions. As Bertrand Russell argued, impossible objects, such as the round square, would have conflicting properties. Meinong and his proponents had a solution to that charge, posing genuine and non-genuine versions of the Law of Non-Contradiction. No doubt, they had a clever response, but it may not adequately address Russell's concern. Moreover, as I argue, genuine contradictions are inherent to the set of all nonexistent objects. And such contradictions lead to even further absurdities, for example, that nonexistent objects have and lack every property. Unfortunately, such implications of the theory make it too treacherous to adopt."

106. Sylvan, Richard. 2003. "The Importance of Nonexistent Objects and of Intensionality in Nathematics." *Philosophia Mathematica* no. 11 (1):20-52.
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111. von Solodkoff, Tatjana, and Woodward, Richard. 2013. "Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 87:558-583.
112. Walters, Lee. 2015. "The Problem of Nonexistence: Truthmaking or Semantics? Critical Notice of *The Objects of Thought*, by Tim Crane." *Disputatio* no. 7:231-245.

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"Non-existence provides big problems for ontology and modest for logic. Logical problems of non-existence consist in licensing inferences in which sentences with empty terms arc involved. The standard predicate logic solves this question by presupposing that every individual constant has an object to which it refers. This means that empty domains are excluded from semantics for the first-order logic. However, there is a temptation to consider logic without existential presuppositions.
The ontological problem of non-existence leads to the question of the meaning of 'nothing'. We encounter "various conceptions of nothing" in the history of philosophy from Parmenides to our times. However, nothing (or nothingness) is always a negation of being.
Since we have distributive and collective (mereological) concepts of being, we also should distinguish nothing in the distributive and mereological meaning. This difference is important because only the former leads to the paradox of nothing of all nothings, analogical to the paradox of all sets. A closer analysis of the nothing in the distributive sense shows that any meaningful talk about non-existence requires a relativisation to a fixed domain of discourse. This seems to entail that the empty set is the formal model of nothing what means that the concept of absolute nothing in the distributive sense is simply inconsistent. To some extent, being and nothing are mutually dual. This motivates that the concept of nothing is governed by so-called dual logic connected with processes of rejection. More specifically, statements on "nothing" are not asserted but rejected."
115. Woodbridge, James A., and Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2009. "Linguistic Puzzles and Semantic Pretence." In *New Waves*

in Philosophy of Language, edited by Sawyer, Sarah, 250-284. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.

116. Yagisawa, Takashi. 2019. "Imagining Fictional Characters." In *Quo Vadis,Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen*, edited by Szatkowski, Miroslaw, 203-216. Berlin: de Gruyter.
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"The authors develop precise statements of the conditions under which there are nonexistent objects and of the conditions under which any two such objects are identical. Essentially, for any describable condition on properties, there is a nonexistent object which includes (but doesn't necessarily exemplify) just the properties satisfying the condition. The logic of inclusion is developed in detail. It is shown how these nonexistent objects can serve as the denotations of the names of fictional characters."
119. Zvolenszky, Zsofia. 2016. "Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects, and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation." *Res Philosophica* no. 93:311-333.
Abstract: "My goal is to reflect on the phenomenon of inadvertent creation and argue that—various objections to the contrary—it doesn’t undermine the view that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. My starting point is a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The challenge: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently created an abstract artifact, then the “inadvertent creation” element turns out to be inescapable yet theoretically unattractive. Based on considerations about actually existing concrete objects featured in fictional works (as Napoleon is in Tolstoy’s War and Peace), I argue that independently of

one's stand on mythical objects, admitting fictional characters as abstract artifacts is enough to give rise to the challenge at hand; yet this very point serves to undermine the challenge, indicating that inadvertent creation is not nearly as worrisome as Goodman suggests. Indeed, the inadvertent creation phenomenon's generality extends far beyond objects of fiction and myth, and I will use this observation to counter a further objection. Taking fictional characters (and mythical objects) to be abstract artifacts therefore remains a viable option."

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   "This paper provides a critical edition of Francis of Prato's *Treatise on Being of Reason* (*Tractatus de ente rationis*). It is prefaced by a historico-philosophical introduction. Francis's *Treatise* is one of the first Italian reactions to the

diffusion of William of Ockham's philosophy of language and logic. Francis argues here against Ockham's reduction of being of reason to acts of cognition, accounted for as items existing 'subjectively' (subiective) in the mind. By contrast, following Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis, he proposes a relational and 'objective' account of being of reason."

4. Andersen, Claus A. 2014. "Ens Rationis Ratiocinatae and Ens Rationis Ratiocinantis: Reflections on a New Book on Beings of Reason in Baroque-Age Scholasticism." *Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics* no. 14:315-327.
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   "I. *Prefatory Note*.
   In the following paper I shall be discussing a particular problem of meaning and reference as it was formulated by a group of logicians who studied and/or taught at the University of Paris in the early sixteenth century.(1) In alphabetical order they are: Johannes Celaya (d. 1558) who was in Paris from 1500 or 1505 until 1524; Ferdinandus de Enzinas (d. 1528) who was in Paris from about 15x8 until 1522; John Major (1469-1550) who was in Paris from 1492 or 1493 until 1517 and again from 1525 to 1531; William Manderston who taught at Sainte-Barbe from about 1514 and returned to Scotland in or shortly before 1530; Juan Martinez Siliceo (1486-1556) who left Paris in about 1516; Hieronymus Pardo (d. 1502 or 1505); Antonius Silvester who taught at Montaigu; and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) who left Paris in 1519. I shall also discuss the work of the Spaniard Augustinus Sbarroya and the Germans Jodocus

Trutvetter (d. 1519) and Johannes Eckius (1486-1543). Both Sbarroya and Eckius were well acquainted with the works of the Paris-trained logicians. Further material is drawn from the fifteenth-century Johannes Dorp and the anonymous author of *Commentum emendatum et correctum in primum et quartum tractatus Petri Hyspani*. The work of the medieval authors Robert Holkot, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen will appear as it was described by early sixteenth-century authors.

II. *Introduction*.

One of the main features of late medieval semantics was the attempt to formulate a unified theory of the reference of general terms. It is true that this attempt was not explicitly discussed, but many of the problems which arose in the context of such topics as signification, supposition, ampliation, appellation, and the logical relations between sentences clearly owed their existence to the assumption that general terms always referred to spatio-temporal individuals; and in the solutions offered to these problems, much ingenuity was employed to ensure that this assumption was modified as little as possible, if at all. I have already shown in two earlier papers how some logicians dealt with reference in the modal context “For riding is required a horse” and in the intentional context “I promise you a horse.” (2) At the end of this paper, I shall discuss another intentional sentence, "A man is imaginarily an ass”, which was thought to present a difficulty. However, it would be a mistake to think that context was the only complicating factor, for there were general terms which placed an obstacle in the path of those seeking a unified theory, not only by virtue of the contexts in which they appeared, but by virtue of their meaning. The favourite example of such terms was “chimera”, but “irrational man”, “braying man”, and “golden mountain” also served as illustrations. The problem was not merely that they failed to refer, but rather that they were thought to be incapable of referring because the objects which they apparently denoted were impossible just as, for the modern reader, a round square is impossible. The main purpose of the present paper is to explore the way

in which the problem was presented, and some of the solutions which were offered." (pp. 57-58)
(...)
"VI. *Conclusion.*
This survey of the way some early sixteenth century logicians treated the problem of chimeras reveals very clearly the alternatives faced by any philosopher who wants to give a unified theory of the reference of general terms. If one adopts a purely extensionalist interpretation of propositions, and allows only ordinary spatio-temporal entities into one's universe of discourse, then one is faced with the choice between rejecting as false many sentences, such as "I imagine a chimera", which one would wish to accept as true, and accepting as true many sentences, such as " "Chimera" signifies an ass", which one would wish to reject as false. If one extends one's universe of discourse to include imaginary objects which are not just ordinary objects regarded in a certain way, one faces grave ontological problems. On the other hand, to appeal to appellation theory is to acknowledge that no purely extensionalist interpretation of all propositions can be given and that no unified theory of reference is possible; and to adopt Holkot's solution is to admit that sentences which seem to be structurally similar are not in fact similar and that some sentences which appear to be about objects in the world are in fact about the contents of our own minds. On the whole my sympathies lie with those who abandoned the belief that both general terms and subject-object sentences can be given a uniform treatment, but I have great respect for the subtlety and sophistication with which arguments for a uniform treatment were presented. Post-medieval logicians were by no means mindless followers of their medieval predecessors." (p. 79)
(2) E. J. Ashworth, 'For Riding is Required a Horse': A Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic, in : *Vivarium* 12 (1974), 94-123; E. J. Ashworth, 'I Promise You a Horse': A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late Fifteenth and

Early Sixteenth Century Logic, in: *Vivarium* 14 (1976), 62-79, 139-155." (pp. 57-58)

7. Bakaoukas, Michael. 2003. *Nothing Exists. A History of the Philosophy of Non-Being*. Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation.
8. ———. 2014. "Nonexistence: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of the Problem of Nonbeing." *E-Logos. Electronic Journal fro Philosophy*:3-25.
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   Abstract: "One of the most widespread claims combining epistemology and metaphysics in post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy was that every object of thought is real. In Muʿtazilite reading, it was endorsed due to a theory of knowledge which states that knowledge is a connection or relation between the knower and the object known. Avicennists accepted it due to the rule that in a proposition “s is p” if p is something positive s has to be positive and real too. Hence, insofar as one can conceptually distinguish between two non-existent items, they have to be real. In this article, the author presents significant consequences of this theory: the acceptance and denial of non-existent yet real extramental objects; the concept of mental existence as an alternative solution; the conceivability of paraconsistent ideas and their reality or reducibility to some real objects."
10. Blackwell, Daniel F. 1988. *Non-Ontological Constructs. The Effects of Abaelard's Logical and Ethical Theories of His Theology: A Study in Meaning and Verification*. Bern: Peter Lang.
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    Reprinted in: P. Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham,* pp. 268-300.
12. ———. 1948. "*Notitia intuitiva* of Non-existents According to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322)." *Franciscan Studies* no.

6:388-416.
13. Bostock, David. 1984. "Plato on 'Is Not' (*Sophist,* 254-9)." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:89-119.
"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the Greek verb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and those that are incomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement of some kind (which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there is no complement, and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to be true' or something of the kind. What role the complete uses of the verb have to play in the *Sophist* as a whole is a vexed question, and one that I shall not discuss. For I think it will be generally agreed, at least since Owen's important article of 1971, (1) that in our central section of the *Sophist* it is the incomplete uses that are the centre of Plato's attention. Anyway, I shall confine my own attention to these uses, and accordingly my project is to elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where the 'is' is incomplete. I might also add here that, for the purposes of the *Sophist* as a whole, I am in agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be crucial was the account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes, merely ancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has already done so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As we shall see, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about 'not' without first considering his views on the incomplete 'is'.
Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means the same as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign of predication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased. The vast majority of commentators on the *Sophist* seem agreed that Plato means to distinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the verb.(2) This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see the distinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity

that he fails to see, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central section of the *Sophist* is therefore one grand logical mistake." (pp. 89-90)
(1) *Plato on Not-Being* in *Plato I,* ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 223-267.
(2) One may note P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), 298; J. L. Ackrill, 'Plato and the Copula', *Journal of Hellenic Studies,* LXXVII (1957), 1-6 esp. 2; J. M. E. Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XIV (1962), 23-64 esp. 51; W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge, 1962), 89; I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, vol. II (London, 1963), 449; R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Sophist* (Manchester, 1975), 151; J. Malcolm, 'Plato's Analysis of *to on* and *to me on* in the Sophist', *Phronesis*, XII (1967), 130-46 esp. 145; Owen, above n. 1, 256; G. Vlastos, 'An Ambiguity in the Sophist' in his *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, 1973), 287; and I would add J. McDowell, 'Falsehood and not-being in Plato's Sophist' in *Language and Logos*, ed M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), 115-34 (discussed below). But the older commentators do not always agree, e.g. F. M. Comford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935), 296, and A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman* (London, 1961), 82. More recently J. C. B. Gosling, *Plato* (London, 1973), 216-20, has put the case for scepticism, and F. A. Lewis, 'Did Plato discover the *estin* of identity?', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, VIII (1975), 113-43, has argued it at length.

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"Beings of reason or non-existent objects have always been a source of mind-boggling paradoxes that have vexed philosophers and thinkers in the past and present. Consider Bertrand Russell's paradox: 'if A and B are not different, then the difference between A and B does not subsist. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?' Or Meinong's paradox: 'There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.' At the root of these troubling conundrums are two basic questions: What are beings of reason? What kind of existence do they have? Francisco Suárez was well aware that a solution to the metaphysical questions concerning the essential character of beings of reason and their ontological status would serve as the key to solving the puzzles and paradoxes just described. A solution to these metaphysical questions would also bring about an understanding of how we talk about beings of reason and other problems that they give rise to in the philosophy of language. In this paper, I present Suárez's view on the nature and ontological status of beings of reason and clarify some of the following questions: What kind of beings (*entia*) are beings of reason? What kind of being (*esse*) do beings of reason have? This latter concern is related to the following metaphysical issues: What are real beings? What is the nature and ontological status of possible beings? What is the distinction between real beings, actual beings, and possible beings?"
17. Carson, Scott. 2000. "Aristotle on Existential Import and Non Referring Subjects." *Synthese* no. 124:343-360.
Abstract: "Much contemporary philosophy of language has shown considerable interest in the relation between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to influence work in the history of philosophy as well.(1) In his *Categories* and *De interpretatione,* Aristotle presents an analysis of language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism

between the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding of language is at least in part dependent upon our understanding of the relationships that exist among the enduring πράγματα that we come across in our daily experience. Part of the foundations underlying Aristotle's doctrine of categories seems to have been a concern, going back to the Academy, about the problem of
false propositions: language is supposed to be a tool for communicating the way things are, and writers in antiquity were often puzzled by the problem of how we are to understand propositions that claim that reality is other than it is.(2) Aristotle's analysis of propositions raises a particular problem in this regard: if the subject of a proposition does not refer to anything, how can the proposition be useful for talking about a state of the world? The problem falls into two separate but related parts: propositions whose subjects are singular terms and hence make claims about some particular thing, and propositions whose subjects are general terms and hence make claims about classes. In this paper I will explain Aristotle's treatment of each kind, focusing in particular on what has widely been perceived as a problem in his treatment of singular terms. My discussion of his treatment of general terms will be more brief, but will show that his treatment of them is consistent with his treatment of singular terms."

(1) An interesting treatment of this topic that illustrates how such concerns intersect with issues in the history of philosophy can be found in Diamond (1996), Introduction II (pp. 13–38). Whittaker (1996) also touches on these themes.

(2) On the treatment by ancient philosophers of the problem of falsehood see Denyer (1991).

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19. Cesalli, Laurent, Libera, Alain de, and Goubier, Frédéric. 2013. "Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every, Even Non-existent Ones? Distribution and Universals in the *Opus puerorum* " In *Logic and Language in the Middle Ages: A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen*, edited by Leth Fink, Jacob, Hansen, Heine and Mora-Márquez, Ana María, 305-336. Leiden: Brill.
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21. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1982. "Meinong Reconstructed versus Early Russell Reconstructed." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 11:183-214.
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 119-151.
"Contemporary philosophy is in a rut, according to Terence Parsons in his recent book *Nonexistent Objects*, ([NO]), and it is one that stems from the (post-1905) work of Bertrand Russell. The main characteristic of this “Russellian rut” ([NO], 1) is strict adherence to the thesis that being, or being something, amounts to being something that exists—or equivalently that ‘there is’ is to be equated with ‘there exists’ ([NO], 6). This view is now so well entrenched, according to Parsons, that it is a main stay of what he also calls the orthodox tradition.
Now the orthodox view is in a rut, according to Parsons, “because it’s a view in which most of us are so entrenched that it’s hard to see over the edges” ([NO], 1). Naturally, if we want “to look over the edge and see how things might be different” ([NO], 8), as any objective seeker of truth would, then “we need to encounter an actual theory about nonexistent objects” (ibid.). It is the construction and presentation of such a theory that is Parsons’s concern in *Nonexistent Objects*.
(...)

"Now we do not object to Parsons's choice of Meinong's theory here, nor for that matter to his elegant reconstruction and presentation of that theory. We do think, however, that a more balanced recognition of Russell's overall view is called for and that perhaps the best way to make the Meinongian notion of a concrete object understandable to the orthodox tradition is to compare it with the general Russellian notion of a concrete individual, i.e., the Russellian notion of an individual that can exist but which might in fact not exist. Indeed, on the basis of the analysis and comparison we shall give here, it is our position that the Meinongian notion of a concrete object, at least as reconstructed by Parsons, is parasitic upon, though in a beneficent way, the Russellian notion of a concrete individual, existent or otherwise." (pp. 119-121)

References

[NO] Parsons, Terence, *Nonexistent Objects*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980.)

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23. ———. 1994. "John Poinsot On How to Be, Know, and Love a Nonexistent Possible." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:321-335.
24. D'Onofrio, Sandro Roberto. 2017. "Notes Concerning the Ontological Status of the Objective Concept of the ens rationis in Antonio Rubio's Teaching " In *Scholastica Colonialis: Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, 16th-18th Centuries*, edited by Hofmeister Pich, Roberto and Culleton, Alfredo Santiago, 207-229. Turnhout: Brepols.
25. Dancy, Russell M. 1991. *Two Studies in the Early Academy*. New York: State University of New York Press.
Contents: Preface IX, Introduction XI-XII; Study I. Predication and immanence: Anaxagoras, Plato, Eudoxus, and Aristotle 3; Study II. Ancient non-beings: Speusippus and others 63; Notes 121; Bibliography 179; Index locorum 205; General index 215.

26. David, Marian. 1986. "Nonexistence and Reid's Conception of Conceiving." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:585-599.
Abstract: "Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve the apparent contradiction. Reid's way out of the dilemma is clarified by contrasting it with less satisfactory solutions."
27. Davis, Leo Donald. 1975. "The Intuitive Knowledge of Non-Existents and the Problem of Late Medieval Skepticism." *The New Scholasticism* no. 49:410-430.
28. Doyle, John Patrick. 1987. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)." *Vivarium* no. 25:47-75.
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.
"The sixth essay after the introduction ("Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth"), against a background view of truth as a function of being, considers Suárez's response to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. If truth consists in a conformity between the mind and reality, how can there be any truth where there is no independent reality? Most of all, how can there be any truth where something would be impossible of realization? In last analysis, Suárez's reply turns upon the significative cast of the words involved in the expression of beings of reason, especially so called impossible objects. Because, unlike mere nonsense words such as *"Blytiri"* or *"scyndapsus,"* words like *"goat-stag"* or *"chimera"* have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false." (*CSS* p. XIII).
29. ———. 1988. "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)." *Vivarium* no. 26:51-72.

Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *CSS* and as Chapter 2 in *BBK*.
"From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western philosophical tradition that truth is a function of being. One need only remember the general Platonic doctrine of Forms, which are at once 'really real' and the locus of intelligibility of truth. Francis Suarez has passed on the common teaching of the Schoolmen that truth is threefold. (1) There is a truth in words, in writing, and in what he calls 'non-ultimate concepts' which is termed truth 'in signifying'. (2) There is a truth in the intellect knowing things, which is called truth 'in knowing'. And (3) there is a truth in things, which is a truth 'in being'."
"This is the completion of a two-part article which considers Suarez's reply to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. That reply turns upon the significative cast of the words expressing beings of reason, especially "impossible" beings. Because such words, unlike nonsense syllables, have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false."

30. ———. 1994. "Poinsot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:337-362.
"John Poinsot (a.k.a. Joannes a sancto Thoma (1589-1644) was heir to a common division of beings into these that are in themselves real and those which are entirely dependent upon human reason. Those division went back to Aristotle's split between being as found in the categories and being as true. In the Middle Ages and thorough the period of the Spanish Revival, it was found, *mutatis mutandis,* in Averroes (d. 1198), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Henry of Ghent (1217?-1293), John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and just about everyone else in the Scholastic tradition.
One of the very few exceptions that I know to this general rule was Francis of Mayronnes, O.F.M. (d. ca. 1325), who denied the existence of beings of reason. Not only an heir, Poinsot himself embraced and transmitted the common

view. For him, beings were either real or rational. Real beings (*res extra animam*) were those which exist, or can exist, independently of the human mind and which belong in the Aristotelian categories. Rational beings, or beings of reason, in the sense which contrasts with this, were those which do not belong to the categories, and which cannot exist outside human understanding. That there are such beings of reason was not for Poinsot a matter of doubt."

31. ———. 1995. "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: a Seventeenth Century Debate About Impossible Objects." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 48:771-808.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *BBK* and as Post-Scriptum in: Victor M. Salas (ed.), *Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013, pp. 329-367.
"This article concerns a 17th Century debate over whether there are self-contradictory impossible objects of understanding or whether there is no intellectual object which is not some actual or possible being. The debate, which has its roots in the Greek and Scholastic traditions, is presented especially between two Jesuits: Thomas Compton Carleton and John Morawski, respectively, a proponent and an opponent of impossible objects. The article itself does not take sides in the debate, but, inasmuch as he wrote later, Morawski is presented as espousing his own view and answering arguments in support of Carleton's position."

32. ———. 2006. "Mastri and Some Jesuits on Possible and Impossible Objects of God's Knowledge and Power." In *Rem in seipsa cernere: saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)*, edited by Forlivesi, Marco, 439-468. Padova: Il Poligrafo.
"Why are some things possible while others are not? Is possibility and/or impossibility ultimately from God Himself? If so, how can this be understood? Is it, as St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) thought, stemming from God's intellect in such way that creatures are possible inasmuch as the divine essence is thought by God to be imitable in various ways? Accordingly, God's intellect rather

than possible creatures would be the cause of their multiplicity. But further obstacles are posed by the Divine simplicity. St Thomas himself has addressed the question of how can the absolutely simple Divine intellect understand at once many things? Or how can what is simple be imitable in various ways? How can what is perfectly one be the last ground of plurality? This last difficulty was highlighted in the time between Plato and St. Thomas by those to whom it seemed, at best, that from what is simply one, necessarily only one thing could proceed.

Contrasted with this, perhaps the final ground for things being many as well as possible or impossible might be that God has freely willed them so. This seems to have been the view of Henry of Ghent (1217-1293) when he said that the passive potency of creatures and the active power of God are correlative. It was also the thought of William of Ockham (ca. 1290-1349), whose disciple, Gabriel Biel (1410?-95), has gone even more decidedly along this path. Are possibilities themselves, then, creatures of God, depending on His will to make them as they are? If yes, is it in God's power to make other things possible and then to create them - things which are now impossible? Could God make square circles or a second God? Without restraint from what is beforehand possible, could God abrogate the present moral order and substitute another in its place?

(Or can there be a third, on its face more Platonic, position which would find the source of multiplicity, possibility, and impossibility in other beings which are equally independent with God? Other Gods or "Semi-gods"? Like Plato's Demiurge, could the Christian God be bound by a set of antecedent possibilities which are not other Gods and which are not His creatures but which are simply "there", governing His action? We might recoil from such a position, but that won't solve problems.

2. Some sources

The 17th century Conventual Franciscan, Bartolomeo Mastri, (1602-1673), came to such problems chiefly as a continuator and an interpreter of Duns Scotus (1266-1308), for him "the Doctor". (17) But between Mastri and the

Subtle Doctor centuries had intervened, during which there were other interpreters and different lines of thought about possibles and impossibles. The present paper is confined to Mastri's views both personal and as an interpreter; and it will try to relate these views to those of some 17th-century Jesuit thinkers whose works were known to him.
Primary sources for Mastri's doctrine will be in his (so posthumously called) *Cursus integer* of philosophy, the first three volumes of which he co-authored with his friend and fellow Franciscan, Bonaventura Belluto (1601-1678), (18) whereas the last two, which contain his metaphysical disputations, he afterwards produced alone. (19) My emphasis will be on his metaphysical Disputation 8 (On the Essence and Existence of Finite Being) and, from their joint logic, Disputation 3, question 6 (On Beings of Reason). I will also draw on Mastri's later *Disputationes theologicæ* which contain his mature doctrine. (20) The remote source for Mastri's views will be the writings of his master, Duns Scotus, especially the *Ordinatio*, most particularly, Book I, distinctions 35, 36, and 43. (21) Someone always present will be the Irish Franciscan, John Punch (Poncius, 1603-1672/3), who was over decades Mastri's principal opponent. (22)". (pp. 440-443, many notes omitted).
(17) On Mastri, see M. Forlivesi, *"Scotistarum princeps". Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) e il suo tempo*, Padova: Centro studi antoniani, 2002. In English, cf. B. Crowley, "The Life and Works of Bartholomew Mastrius, O.F.M. Conv. 1602-1673", in *Franciscan Studies*, 8 (1948), pp. 97-152.
(18) I have used the following edition: Mastrius - Bellutus, *Philosophise ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, Venetiis: Apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1727.
(19) Here I have used Mastrius, *Disputationes in XII Aristotelis Stagiritæ libros Metaphysicorum*, 2 vols., Venetiis: Typis Marci Ginammi, 1646-1647.
(20) For this I have used: Mastrius, *Disputationes theologicæ, I In primum librum Sententiarum*, Venetiis: Apud Ioannem Iacobum Hertz, 1675 (archetypal edition Venetiis: Apud Ioannem Iacobum Hertz, 1655). In addition,

I have had access to: Mastrius, *Disputationes theologicæ, I In primum lihrum Sententiarum*, Venetiis: Ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1719. From what I have seen, I would judge the 1675 edition to be better.
(21) In Joannes Duns Scouts, *Opera omnia*, ed. Commissio scotistica, Civitas Vaticana: Typis polyglottis vaticanis, 1950-.
(22) I. Poncius, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Arnaud et Petri Borde, 1672. On Punch, cf. M.J. Grajewski, "John Punch, Franciscan Scotist of the Seventeenth Century", in *Franciscan Studies*, 6 (1946), pp. 54-92. For Punch versus Mastri here, see J. Coombs, "The Possibility of Created Entities in Seventeenth-Century Scotism", in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 43 (1993), pp. 447-459; St. Sousedík, "Der Streit um den wahren Sinn der scotischen Possibilienlehre", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, eds. L. Honnefelder, R. Wood and M. Dreyer, Leiden - New York - Köln: E. J. Brill, 1996, pp. 191-204; and T. Hoffmann, *"Creatura intellecta". Die Ideen und Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius*, Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2002, especially ch. 7, pp. 263-304.

33. ———. 2012. *On the Borders of Being and Knowing. Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Edited by Victor M. Salas.
Table of Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction XIII-XVI; 1. Sprouts from Greek Gardens: Antisthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (first publication) 1; 2. Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth 19; 3. Extrinsic Cognoscibility 67; 4. Impossible Objects 95; 5. The Teleology of Impossible Objects 127; 6. Beings of Reason and Imagination 151; 7. Four Degrees of Abstraction 167; 8. From Transcendental to Transcendental 185; 9. Supertranscendental Nothing 215; 10. Wrestling with Wraith 243; 11. The Borders of Knowability 273; 12. Conclusion 293; Bibliography 301; Indices 319-326.

"Sylvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) noted that human intellects can grasp what is, what is not, what can be, and what cannot be. The first principle, 'it is not possible that the same thing simultaneously be and not be,' involves them all.
The present volume begins with Greeks distinguishing 'being' from 'something' and proceeds to the late Scholastic doctrine of 'supertranscendental being,' which embraces both. On the way is Aristotle's distinction between 'being as being' and 'being as true' and his extension of the latter to include impossible objects. The Stoics will see 'something' as the widest object of human cognition and will affirm that, as signifiable, impossible objects are something, more than mere nonsense. In the sixteenth century, Francisco Suárez will identify mind-dependent beings most of all with impossible objects and will also regard them as signifiable. By this point, two conceptions will stand in opposition. One, adumbrated by Averroes, will explicitly accept the reality and knowability of impossible objects. The other, going back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, will see impossibles as accidental and false conjunctions of possible objects. Seventeenth-century Scholastics will divide on this line, but in one way or another will anticipate the Kantian notion of 'der Gegenstand überhaupt.' Going farther, Scholastics will see the two-sided upper border of being and knowing at God and the negative theology, and will fix the equally double lower border at 'supertranscendental being' and 'supertranscendental nonbeing,' which non-being, remaining intelligible, will negate the actual, the possible, and even the impossible."

34. Ebbesen, Sten. 1986. "The Chimera's Diary." In *The Logic of Being*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo and Hintikka, Jaakko, 115-143. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, *Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction. Collected Essays,* Volume 1, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 35-57.
"My feelings towards philosophers are mixed. For centuries they have used me as an experimental animal, keeping me on a minimum of being. In a way I may owe them my “life”,

but their experiments have weakened me so much that the end may be drawing near. If my weakness proves fatal, please inform the Centaur, Goat-Stag and Pegasus, who are my next of kin. If the philosophers kill me, I expect them to keep at least one of my relatives alive in order to continue the experiments. If we are all doomed, I would like to secure us a place in man's memory. This is why I have put together these extracts from my diary, recording the sufferings to which I and my tribe have been subjected." (*)"
(*) "This paper reproduces the manuscript left by the chimera, but I have added references to books and manuscripts, plus a few notes which appear in square brackets. The reader will notice that the chimera has wisely disregarded accidental changes of philosophers' choices of example when they need a composite animal. The chimera takes remarks about, e.g., the goat-stag as remarks aimed at itself. As a matter of fact, Aristotle and the Greek Aristotelian commentators prefer the goat-stag (τραγελαφος) and the centaur (ἱπποχένταυρος). In the Hellenistic period, the centaur, the scylla and the chimera are the standard examples. In Latin medieval texts the chimera (inherited from Manlius Boethius) is vastly more popular than any of the other composite animals."

35. Ebbesen, Sten, and Pinborg, Jan. 1982. "Thott 581 40, or de ente rationis." In *English Logic in Italy: 14th and 15th Centuries*, edited by Maierù, Alfonso, 111-146. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
36. Eck, Job van. 2002. "Not-Being and Difference: on Plato's *Sophist* 256 d 5-258 e 3." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:63-84.
"Plato's analysis of falsity at *Sophist* 263 is given in terms of not being and difference. 'Theaetetus flies' is false because what is different is stated as the same, and what is not as what is, (263 D 1-2), things that are different from what is the case concerning him (viz. flying) are described as the same (as what is the case about him). That there are indeed many 'not-beings' in the sense of things different from the things that are, the Eleatic Stranger (ES) and Theaetetus remarked some lines above, 'for we said there are many

things that are with regard to each thing and many things that are not (263 B 11-12), referring to 256 E 6-7, 'so, with regard to each of the forms, being is many and not-being is indefinite in quantity'. In this way they had been disobedient to Parmenides, who had stated, 'Never shall it force itself on us that things that are-not are.' But they had gone even further in their disobedience: 'but we have not merely shown that the things that are-not are, but also brought to light the form not-being happens to have' (258 D 5-7).
The context of both points has caused commentators a lot of problems. The main question is, how is it that something (i.e. a form) is called an *ouk on* in 256 D 8-257 A 6? Is it because it is different from the form of being; or is it because it is different from any thing (i.e. any form) it is not identical with? And on which of the two lines is the form of not-being defined as it is introduced in the section that follows, in 258 A 11-B 8 and 258 D 7-E 3? Only a few commentators have tackled the problems systematically, and as far as I know no interpretation has been reached that is both coherent and sound. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is possible, as I shall argue in the following. I shall discuss the passages at issue, criticize commentaries that have been given, and present the interpretation intended." (pp. 63-64, Greek omitted)

37. Findlay, John Niemeyer. 1933. *Meinong's Theory of Objects*. London: Oxford University Press.
Contents of the Second Edition: Preface to the Second Edition V-XV; I. The Doctrine of Content and Object 1; II. The Pure Object and Its Indifference to Being 42; III. The Theory of Objectives 59; IV: The Modal Moment 102; V. Objects of Higher Order 113; VI. The Theory of Incomplete Objects 152; VII. The Modal Properties of Objectives 185; VIII.The Apprehension of Objects 218; IX. Valuation and Values 264; X. Dignitatives and Desideratives 303; XI. Appraisal of Meinong 322; Index 349-353.
Second edition in 1963 (Gregg Revivals Reprint); the chapters IX and X were added in this edition.

Reprinted with the title: *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values* and a new *Introduction*. *Findlay and Meinong* by Dale Jacquette (pp. XXV-LIV), Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995.

38. Folescu, Marina. 2016. "Thinking About Different Nonexistents of the Same Kind: Reid's Account of the Imagination and its Nonexistent Objects." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 93:627-649.
Abstract: "How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling's prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts? It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: (i) on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon of singular imaginings of different nonexistents of the same (fictional) kind; (ii) while, at the same time, to attribute this position to Thomas Reid, thus correcting some misunderstandings of his view on imagination."
39. Frank, Richard M. 2000. "The Non-Existent and the Possible in Classical Ash'arite Teaching." *MIDEO. Miscellanies of the Dominican Institute for Oriental Studies in Cairo* no. 24:1-37.
40. Gale, Richard M. 1974. "Bergson Analysis of the Concept of Nothing." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 51:269-300.
41. Goubier, Frédéric, and Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2015. "When the World is Not Enough: Medieval Ways to Deal with the Lack of Referents." *Logica Universalis*:213-235.
Abstract: "According to several late medieval logicians, the use the universal quantifier 'omnis' creates the requirement that the sentence refers to at least three items—the principle of *sufficientia appellatorum*. The commitment is such that, when the quota is not fulfilled, one has to import the missing items from the realm of the nonexistent. While the central argument for this principle, whose origin is Aristotle's *De Caelo*, stems from the contrast between unrestricted universal quantifiers and binary quantifiers,

the discussion is often mixed with another issue, concerning the requirement of a plurality of referents for universals. In this paper, we try to distinguish those different issues and map the reactions of xiiith authors to the principle of *sufficientia appellatorum*."

42. Griffin, Nicholas. 1986. "Russell's Critique of Meinong's Theory of Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:375-401.
43. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1969. "Non-Existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 6:17-32.
44. ———. 1974. "Meinong's doctrine of the "Aussersein" of the pure object." *Nous* no. 8:67-82.
45. Habib, Nicholas. 1985. "A Medieval Perspective on the Meaningfulness of Fictitious Terms: A Study of John Buridan." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:73-82.
46. Haller, Rudolf. 1986. "Nonexistence and Predication." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26.
47. Heider, Daniel. 2016. "The Notitia Intuitiva and Notitia Abstractiva of the External Senses in Second Scholasticism: Suárez, Poinsot and Francisco de Oviedo." *Vivarium* no. 54:173-203.
Abstract: "This paper analyzes the theories of three representatives of Second Scholasticism, namely Francisco Suárez, SJ, John Poinsot, OP, and Francisco de Oviedo, SJ, on the issue of the intuitive and abstractive cognition of the external senses. Based on a comparison of their theories, linked to the historical starting point of the debate in the first decades of the fourteenth century (Peter Auriol, John Duns Scotus, Francis
of Meyronnes, William of Ockham and Walter Chatton), the paper argues that the doctrinal and argumentative matrix of these authors' texts is significantly 'present' in the Second Scholastics as well. 1) As far as naturally produced sensation is concerned, all these authors, including Poinsot, follow the Scotistic justification of the natural infallibility of the external senses; 2) regarding the possibility of supernaturally

caused objectless perception, Poinsot's position can be labelled, surprisingly, Scotistic; 3) Suárez's theory, although partly similar to the doctrine of the late Ockham, is an idiosyncratic stance; 4) Oviedo's conception, even more distant from that of Ockham, can be characterized as 'Auriolian' and 'Chattonian'. "

48. Hübner, Karolina. 2016. "Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* no. 97:58-88.

    Abstract: "The article proposes a new solution to the long-standing problem of the universality of essences in Spinoza's ontology. It argues that, according to Spinoza, particular things in nature possess unique essences, but that these essences coexist with more general, mind-dependent species-essences, constructed by finite minds on the basis of similarities ('agreements') that obtain among the properties of formally-real particulars. This account provides the best fit both with the textual evidence and with Spinoza's other metaphysical and epistemological commitments. The article offers new readings of how Spinoza understands not just the nature of essence, but also the nature of being, reason, striving, definitions, and different kinds of knowledge."

49. Jacquette, Dale. 1982. "Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 15:1-19.

    "In his difficult work On Emotional Presentation, Meinong introduces the concept of defective objects. These are meant to provide part of the solution to Mally's paradox about self-referential thought. But the discussion of defective objects is ambiguous in ways which give rise to a dilemma.
    It is not clear whether defective objects are supposed to be a special kind of intentional object on Meinong's theory, or whether they are not really supposed to be intentional objects at all. If defective objects are a special kind of intentional object, then it is possible to put forward a strengthened version of Mally's paradox which cannot be solved by the theory of defective objects. The strengthened paradox represents a counter-example to the intentionality

thesis, according to which every psychological experience is directed toward an object of intention. But if defective 'objects' are not really intentional objects at all, then psychological experiences which have defective objects will themselves constitute counter-examples to the intentionality thesis. In either case, the thesis cannot be consistently maintained." (p. 1)

50. ———. 1989. "Mally's Heresy and the Logic of Meinong Object Theory." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 10:1-14.
51. ———. 1989. "On the Objects' Independence from Thought by Ernst Mally: Translation and Commentary " *Man and World* no. 22:215-231.
52. ———. 1995. "Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:233-271. "Meinong introduces the concept of implexive being and nonbeing to explain the metaphysics of universals and as a contribution to the theory of reference and perception. Meinong accounts for Aristotle's doctrine of the inherence of secondary substances in primary substances in object theory terms as the implection of incomplete universals in complete existent or subsistent objects. The derivative notion of implexive so-being is developed by Meinong to advance an intuitive modal semantics that admits degrees of possibility. A set theoretical interpretation of Meinong's mereological concept of the implection of incomplete beingless objects in existent or subsistent complete objects is proposed. The implications of Meinong's concept of implection are exploited to answer extensionalist objections about "Meinong's jungle," defending the ontic economy of an extraontological neo-Meinongian semantic domain that supports individual reference and true predication of constitutive properties to beingless objects."
53. ———. 1996. *Meinongian Logic. The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1;
Part One: Meinong's theory of Objects.
I. Elements of Object theory 7; II. Formal semantic paradox in Meinong's Object theory 12; III. Meinong's theory of

Defective Objects 37; IV. The Object theory intentionality of ontological committment 56; V. Logic, mind and Meinong 70; VI. Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment 80;
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"Alexius Meinong and his circle of students and collaborators at the Philosophisches Institut der Universität Graz formulated the basic principles for a general theory of objects.(1) They developed branches and applications of the theory, outlined programs for further research, and answered objections from within and outside their group, revising concepts and sharpening distinctions as they proceeded. The object theory that emerged as the result of their efforts combines important advances over traditional systems of logic, psychology, and semantics.The fate of object theory in the analytic philosophical community has been unfortunate in many ways. With few exceptions, the theory has not been sympathetically interpreted. It has often met with unfounded resistance and misunderstanding under the banner of what Meinong called "The prejudice in favor of the actual". (2) The idea of nonexistent objects has wrongly been thought to be incoherent or confused, and there are still those who mistakenly believe that the theory inflates ontology with metaphysically objectionable quasi-existent entities.' These criticisms are dealt with elsewhere by object theory adherents, and are not considered here. In what follows, the intelligibility of an object theory such as Meinong envisioned is assumed, and ultimately vindicated by the construction of a logically consistent version. The inadequacies of extensionalist theories of ontological commitment and definite description, hallmarks of the

Russell-Quine axis in recent analytic philosophy, justify an alternative intentional Meinongian object theory logic. Analytic philosophy survives the rejection of extensionalist treatments of definite description and ontological commitment, since analytic methods are not inherently limited to any particular set of extensional or intentional assumptions.

A comprehensive historical treatment of Meinong's philosophy is not attempted in these chapters, though some historical issues are addressed. Some of Meinong's most important philosophical writings have now been translated or are expected to appear in the near future, and there are several recent commentaries on Meinong's work, including Richard Routley's *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Terence Parsons' *Nonexistent Objects*, and Karel Lambert's *Meinong and the Principle of Independence*. These studies have contributed to renewed interest in and unprejudiced reappraisal of object theory. Analyses of the subtle turnings in Meinong's thought over several decades may be found in J. N. Findlay's *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, Reinhardt Grossmann's *Meinong*, Robin Rollinger's *Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals*, and Janet Farrell Smith's essay "The Russell-Meinong Debate". These works trace the complex development of Meinong's early nominalism or moderate Aristotelian realism in the *Hume-Studien* to his mature realistic interpretation of relations and factual objectives or states of affairs as subsistent entities, the theory of objects of higher order, and the doctrine of the *Aussersein* of the pure object. I have relied on these among other sources, I cannot hope to improve on them in some respects, and my topic in any case is somewhat different. I am concerned exclusively with the logic, semantics, and metaphysics or ontology and extraontology of Meinong's theory. Accordingly, I shall not discuss Meinong's epistemology, theory of perception, or value theory, which I nevertheless regard as essential to an understanding of his philosophy as a whole. The logic, semantics, and metaphysics of object theory are in a sense

the most fundamental aspects of Meinong's thought, and therefore require the most careful preliminary investigation. The formal system I develop is a variation of Meinong's vintage *Gegenstandstheorie*, refined and made precise by the techniques of mathematical logic. The proposal offers an integrated three-valued formalization of Meinongian object theory with existence-conditional abstraction, and modal and non-Russellian definite description subtheories. The logic is motivated by considerations about the need for an object theory semantics in the correct analysis of ontological commitment and definite description. Applications of the logic are provided in phenomenological psychology, Meinongian mathematics and metamathematics, criticism of ontological proofs for the existence of God in rationalist theodicy, the interpretation of fiction and scientific law, and formal resolutions of Wittgenstein's private language argument and the paradox of analysis. In some areas it has been necessary to depart from Meinong's official formulation of the theory. But I have tried to make these differences explicit, justifying them by argument and evaluating alternative interpretations. This I believe is in keeping with the spirit of the first exponents of object theory, who did not advance their views as a fixed body of doctrine, but maintained an openminded scientific attitude, and continually sought to achieve a more accurate approximation of the truth.

(1) I refer to Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* as a theory of objects, but alternative English equivalents have been proposed which should also be considered. Reinhardt Grossmann argues that the theory must be called a theory of entities because it includes not merely objects (*Objekte*), but objectives or states of affairs (*Objektive*). Grossmann, Meinong [1974], pp. 111-12: "If we keep in mind that Meinong will eventually divide all entities (other than so-called dignitatives and desideratives) into objects on the one hand and objectives on the other, we cannot speak of a theory of objects as the all-embracing enterprise, but must speak -- as I have done and shall continue to do -- of a theory of entities." This argument is inconclusive, since

objectives are also objects of a kind, which Meinong describes as objects of higher order (hOherer Ordnung), superiora founded on inferiora or lower order objects. An objective in any case can be as much an object of thought as any other nonobjective object, as when someone thinks about the fact that Graz is in Austria, and thereby makes that state of affairs an object of thought. In this sense, the theory of objects, of lower and higher order, is already all-embracing in the way Grossmann thinks Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* is meant to be. Nicholas Griffin identifies a further difficulty in Grossmann's terminological recommendation. In "The Independence of Sosein from Sein" [1979], p. 23, n. 2, Griffin writes: "Grossmann standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's '*Gegenstand*', which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I have switched back either to 'object' or to the even more neutral term `item'." Griffin's choice of translation agrees with Richard Routley's in *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* [1981], where Routley refers to a theory of items distinct in some respects from but directly inspired by Meinong's theory of objects. Routley's 'theory of item" is perhaps better used to designate his own special version of object theory, which he also denotes `noneism'. Neither Grossmann's nor Routley's terminology carries the intentional force of '*Gegenstand'*, which as Meinong explains is etymologically releated to '*gegenstehen*', to stand against or confront, as objects of thought are supposed to confront and presetn themselves to the mind.
(2) Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects" ("Uber Gegenstandstheorie") [1904], pp. 78-81.
(3) In his early work, Meinong expressed the belief that nonexistent objects have what he then called *Quasisein*. "The Theory of Objects", pp. 84-5. Meinong here refers to the first edition of his *Über Annahmen* [1902], p. 95. See J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values* [1963], pp. 47- 8. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* [1981], pp. 442, 854. Routley reports that Meinong

renounced the theory of *Quasisein* in favor of the *Aussersein* thesis by 1899 (presumably with the publication in that year of his essay "*Uber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung*"). As a statement of the frequent misinterpretations of Meinong's object theory that persist today, see P.M. S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, revised edition [1986], p. 8: "The Theory of Descriptions ... enabled Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entities (such as the square circle) which, it had appeared, must in some sense subsist in order to be talked about ..."

54. John, of St.Thomas (John Poinsot). 1949. "Entia Rationis and Second Intentions." *The New Scholasticism* no. 23:395-413.
Translated from Latin by John J. Glanville. Donald G. Hollenhorst and Yves R. Simon.
55. Kelley, Francis. 1978. "Some Observations on the 'Fictum' Theory in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis." *Franciscan Studies* no. 38:260-282.
56. Klima, Gyula. 1993. "The Changing Role of *Entia rationis* in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction." *Synthese* no. 96:25-58.
"In this paper I want to argue for two theses concerning entia rationis. My first thesis is that entia rationis, in what I would call the via antiqua (1) sense, are objects of thought and signification, required by a certain kind of semantics, but undesirable as objects simpliciter in ontology. My second thesis is that this systematic role of entia rationis in the via antiqua tradition of mediaeval thought was simply eliminated by the advent of Ockhamist semantics, which opened the way towards a radical reinterpretation of the concept of entia rationis and towards a new research programme for ontology.
In the next section of this paper, therefore, I start my discussion with a case study of the systematic role played by entia rationis in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, a typical representative of the via antiqua tradition, occasionally drawing parallels with and taking illustrations from the works of other mediaeval thinkers, too. (2) In the

third section I give a systematic account of all kinds of entia rationis against the background of a comprehensive semantic theory constructed in the spirit of the via antiqua tradition. In the fourth section I describe the ways William Ockham's approach changed this semantic background, and examine how these changes influenced the concept of entia rationis. In the concluding section of the paper I present a simple formal reconstruction of what I take to be Ockham's basic innovations in semantics, and discuss briefly the new ontological programme it initiated."
(1) One of course has to be very cautious when applying such an expression so much involved in scholarly debate. In the rest of this paper I want to use it in a very restricted, technical sense, referring to a particular way of constructing semantic theory, sharply distinguishable from Ockham's and his followers' way (both to be described later). What I think may justify such a usage is the clear connection of these ways of doing semantics with the manners in which broader philosophical, theological, and methodological issues were treated in the two great trends getting separated later in mediaeval thought. Indeed, this paper may perhaps serve as a modest contribution to the characterisation of the two viae from the point of view of the connections between semantics and ontology. As to the debates concerning the proper characterisation of via antiqua vs. via moderna, see, e.g., Moore (1989).
(2) To be sure, by presenting Aquinas's views as representative of what I call 'via antiqua semantics' I do not want to deny the immense variety of semantic views in mediaeval philosophy even before Ockham. I take Aquinas's views as typical, however, as contrasted with Ockham's, precisely in those of their features that rendered the via antiqua framework unacceptable for Ockham.

57. Lambertini, Roberto. 1989. "Resurgant entia rationis. Matthaeus de Augubio on the object of logic." *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* no. 59:3-60.
58. Leclerq, Bruno, Richard, Sébastien, and Seron, Denis, eds. 2015. *Objects and Pseudo-Objects. Ontological Deserts and*

Jungles from Brentano to Carnap. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
59. Lehrer, Keith. 1986. "Reid on Conception and Nonbeing." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:573-583.
60. Marchesi, Andrea. 2018. "Husserl's Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory." *Grazer Philosophische Studien*:343-367.
61. Marrama, Oberto. 2016. "Spinoza on Fictitious Ideas and Possible Entities." *The European Legacy* no. 21:359-372.
Abstract: "The aim of this article is twofold: to provide a valid account of Spinoza's theory of fictitious ideas, and to demonstrate its coherency with the overall modal metaphysics underpinning his philosophical system. According to Leibniz, in fact, the existence of romances and novels would be sufficient to demonstrate, against Spinoza's necessitarianism, that possible entities exist and are intelligible, and that many other worlds different from ours could have existed in its place. I argue that Spinoza does not actually need to resort to the notion of possible entities in order to explain the incontrovertible existence of fictions and fictitious ideas. In order to demonstrate this, I will first show how, according to Spinoza, true ideas of nonexistent things need not be regarded as fictitious ideas. Then I will show by which means Spinoza can justify the real existence of fictions and fictitious ideas in the human mind through our present knowledge of actually existing things, to conclude that fictitious ideas neither add anything to what we already know of things, nor do they increase the extent of the existing conceivable reality by demanding the existence of possible non-actualised entities."
62. McDowell, John. 1982. "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen*, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 115-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the

disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the Sophist (§§5 and 6 below) -it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can and should be made even sharper." (p. 115)

63. McGrade, Arthur S. 1985. "Plenty of Nothing: Ockham's Commitment to Real Possibles." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:145-156.
64. Melamed, Yitzhak Y. 2000. "On the Exact Science of Nonbeings: Spinoza's View of Mathematics." *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* no. 49:3-22.
65. Mié, Fabian. 2011. "Plato's *Sophist* on Negation and Not-Being." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 363-372. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "This brief paper develops an interpretation of Plato's theory of negation understood as an answer to Parmenides' paradoxes concerning not-being. First, I consider some aspects that result from an analysis of *Sophist* 257b–259d, formulating some general theses which I then go on to unfold in more detail in the following section. Finally, I show what exactly Plato's so-called overcoming of the Eleatic problem related to negation and falsehood is; and I outline some of the main semantic and metaphysical consequences that are entailed by this overcoming."
66. Millán-Puelles, Antonio. 1996. *The Theory of the Pure Object*. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter.

Original Spanish edition: *Teoría el objeto puro*, Madrid: Ediciones RIALP, 1990. Translated and edited by Jorge García-Gómez.

67. Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'not-Being': some literary contexts that bear to Plato." In *Arktouros. Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, edited by W., Bowersock Glen, Walter, Burkert and C.J., Putnam Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Reprinted in: John P. Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: Plato,* Albany: State University of New York Press 1983, pp. 59-69.
"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (μηδὲν or ουδὲν). (1) Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" = "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen. (2) His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the *Sophist*, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: *meden* or *ouden* can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "'what is not anything, what not in anyway is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unindentifiable, no subject." (3) In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may—in certain contexts—work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I

borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for μὲ ον, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be." (p. 59 of the reprint).
(1) See Parmenides B 6.2, cf. B 7.1, B 8.7-13, B 9.4; Plato *Rep*. 478 B 12-C 1, *Tht*. 189 A 10, *Soph*. 237 C7-E 2. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in *Plato, I, Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 225-227.
(2) Owen, "Plato on NotBeing," pp. 241-248 and passim. For use of this assumption in interpreting Parmenides, see D. J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides," in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Phronesis, suppl. vol. 1 (Assen and New York, 1973) 12.

68. Nichols, Ryan. 2002. "Reid on Fictional Objects and the Way of Ideas." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 52:582-601.
69. Novotný, Daniel D. 2006. "Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in Post-Suarezian Scholasticism, 1600-1650." *Studia Neoaristotelica* no. 3:117-141.
"In 1597 Francisco Suárez published a comprehensive treatise on beings of reason (*entia rationis*) as part of his *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Subsequent scholastic philosophers vigorously debated various aspects of Suárez's theory. The aim of this paper is to identify some of the most controversial points of these debates, as they developed in the first half of the seventeenth century. In particular, I focus on the intension and the extension of 'ens rationis', its division (into negations, privations and relations of reason) and its causes. Additionally, I will discuss how Suárez's views sparked a number of debates within the classical view, debates which ultimately led to the emergence of various alternative theories, especially among the Jesuits. These non-classical views radically revise the previous classical conception of beings of reason."
70. ———. 2009. "Forty-Two Years after Suárez: Mastri and Belluto's Development of the Classical Theory of Entia Rationis." *Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics* no. 8:473-498.

71. ———. 2012. "Scholastic Debates About Beings of Reason and Contemporary Analytical Metaphysics." In *Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic* edited by Novak, Lukas, Novotný, Daniel D., Sousedik, Prokop and Svoboda, David, 25-40. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
72. ———. 2013. *Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era*. New York: Fordham University Press.
"Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle. The first part of this book is structured around a close reading of Suarez's main text on the subject, namely *Disputation* 54. The second part centers on texts on this topic by other outstanding philosophers of the time, such as the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), the Italian Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-73), and the Spanish-Bohemian-Luxembourgian polymath Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606-82)."
73. ———. 2015. "Suárez on Beings of Reason." In *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*, edited by Salas, Victor M. and Fastiggi, Robert L., 248-273. Leiden: Brill.
74. O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1-26. London: University College London Press.
English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur le* Sophiste *de Platon*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991, pp. 317-364.
"Here I must omit detailed argument (which I have published elsewhere) (11) and limit myself to a simple outline of the structure of the whole.
Esti does not mean "being is" (Cornford's emendation) at the beginning of the poem. But the *esti* of the first path does acquire a subject in the course of the argument. For the goddess does later claim as a development of the first way the proposition *eon emmenai* (fr. 6.1): "it is necessary to say

this, and to think this, namely that being is", or ". . . that there is being".(12)

That is not the case however for the path which is opposed to the path of persuasion, a path "from which we can learn nothing" (fr. 2.5-8). This path is expressed by the negation of *esti* (fr. 2.5): " 'is not' and it is necessary not to be". This path has no subject and never acquires one, for the substantivized participle, "what is not" (*to me eon*, fr. 2.7-8), proves to be as unknowable as the simple indicative statement: "is not".

Hence a crucial difference between the first and second way. "Being" or "what is" (eon) can be added as a development of the first way (esti) whereas "is not" (auk esti) and "what is not" (*to me eon*) are never joined to form a proposition; both expressions are equally impossible and equally unknowable statements of the second way.

It is true that, in the course of the poem, the goddess does produce a composite statement where the negative participle is added to the positive verb (*einai me eonta*, fr. 7.1): "things that are not, are". That composite statement does not represent either of the two paths introduced at the beginning of the argument. It is, instead, an impossible combination of the two ways, a combination which is not only false, but contradictory (cf. fr. 6).

The false and contradictory combination of "is" and "is not" (fr. 7.1: "things that are not, are") represents the "opinions of mortals in which there is no true conviction" (fr. 1.30; cf. fr. 8.38-41).

Thus the whole poem turns upon the opposition between "is" and "is not" (fr. 2), on the development of "is" into "being is" (fr. 6.1-2) and the recognition which this will bring of a being that is "unborn" and "imperishable" (fr. 8.1-21), and finally on the impossible conjunction of "is" and "is not" which underlies the whole of our belief in a world where things are not unborn and are not imperishable, the world where "things that are not, are" (fr. 7.1).

An impossibly rapid survey of an unconventional interpretation of Parmenides, but one which will allow me

to turn to the criticism made of Parmenides by Plato in the *Sophist*."
(11) Mainly in my contributions to the two volumes of the work quoted in n. 2 above. [*Études sur Parménide*, Paris: Vrin 1987]
(12) Fr. 6.1: *khre to legein to noein t' eon emmenai*. This text is not the same as that printed in Diels-Kranz (d. n. 1 above). For the repetition of the article (to), see *Etudes sur Parménide*, vol. I, p. 24.

75. ———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In *The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk*, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.
"Plato, in writing the *Sophist*, "did not consider it beneath his dignity to return to the great Parmenides" . Any reader of Plato's dialogue must therefore do likewise. But whose Parmenides should we return to? If modern interpretations of the *Sophist* are legion, so too are the reconstructions that are currently on offer, from modern scholars, of the fragments of Parmenides.
Which one should we take on board?
Two names in particular stand out. Miss G. E. M. Anscombe was a close associate of Wittgenstein, and is generally acknowledged as one of the leading philosophers of her day. Professor W. K. C. Guthrie was a pupil of F. M. Cornford, and is the only historian of ancient philosophy who has had both the knowledge and the ambition to undertake a history of Greek philosophy that would rival the great work of Eduard Zeller.(2) Both scholars therefore have impeccable credentials. Both have written on Parmenides.(3)
One or other or both, one might surely think, will have been able to recover from the extant fragments ideas that will make sense of the criticisms of Parmenides that loom so large in Plato's *Sophist*." (p. 19)
(2) See Guthrie (1962-1981). Sadly, Guthrie did not live to complete his majestic enterprise; the last volume takes us only as far as Aristotle. Cf. Zeller (1844) and (1919-1920). Gomperz (1896-1909) is too chatty to be a serious rival.

(3) Guthrie (1965) 1-80. Anscombe (1969), reprinted in Anscombe (1981) 3-8. Cf O'Brien (1987) 206 n. 25. Miss Anscombe goes so far as to entitle the first volume of her *Collected papers* (1981) *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*. Obviously therefore she does not consider her contribution on Parmenides to be a mere πάρπεργον."

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77. Paolini Paoletti, M. 2013. "Commentary of Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: an Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items by R. Routley." *Humana Mente* no. 6:275-292.

78. Parsons, Terence. 1975. "A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 1:73-76.
"Meinong is best known as the loser of the Russell-Meinong debate of 1905. Russell had the last word then, and (unfortunately) most of us know only his version of Meinong's views.' But there is more to be said on Meinong's side. In an earlier paper I tried to develop a version of Meinong's ontology which is clear, consistent, and immune to Russell's attacks. Most importantly, that theory preserves - rather than analyses away - Meinong's radical and exciting ontological views: that there are non-existent objects; that there are impossible objects; etc.
So what? We want more of a theory than clarity and consistency; we also want reason to believe that it's true. How might we offer evidence in favor of such a theory? I think that the only evidence that we ever have in favor of a general metaphysical theory is that it has many interesting applications. The Meinongian theory agrees with more orthodox theories in its treatment of existing objects, so any evidence in its favor will consist of applications to issues concerning non-existent objects. The present paper contains one of these; it's an application of the Meinongian theory to an analysis of fictional objects.
By "fictional" I do not mean "non-existent", but rather "occurring in fiction". Many fictional objects are indeed non-existent, and it is their non-existence that in some sense causes all the problems, but fictional works also abound in reference to real objects, and this fact must be taken into account.
I will begin by giving an exposition of the Meinongian ontology." (p. 73)
79. Pasniczek, Jacek. 1995. "Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:293-303.
"Contemporary formalizations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid.
However, in the same formalizations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects

inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properties are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuitive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratification of formulas). We need, however, to look for phenomenologically well-grounded protections against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects."

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"Although in his early works Spinoza is critical of “beings of reason” (entia rationis), nonetheless he thinks that they are useful in certain contexts. This paper discusses the metaphysical and epistemological status of “beings of reason”—such as universals, measurements, and value terms—and tries to explain how, even if they are problematic, they can be useful. I shall argue that Spinoza borrows from Suarez and other neo-scholastics the idea that beings of reason are analogical. The regulatory function of beings of reason depends upon the possibility—a possibility that is most often not realized—of the similarity of the imaginative entity to an actual being. I discuss the role of beings of reason in Spinoza’s conception of the part-whole relation and the construction of an imaginative sign. I shall claim that the case of beings of reason sheds light on the nature of the imagination itself in the Ethics. "

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discussions to the philosophy of mind and the ontological status of intensional objects."
Jorge J. E. Gracia - State University of New York at Buffalo. "In a finely wrought and philosophically intelligible translation of this 54th Disputation of Suárez, John P. Doyle has documented with care the ancient Greek and Medieval sources of Suárez's discussion, its influence upon many hitherto unknown late Scholastic writers and the relevance of Suárez's intentionality theory to such prominent figures in early, middle and late Modern thought as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, B. Russell, Heidegger and others."
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Lambros Couloubaritsis: La logique du mythe et la question du non-être 323; André-Jean Voelke: Vide et non-être chez Leucippe et Démocrite 334; Curzio Chiesa: Idées de négations 353; Enrico Berti: Etre et non-être chez Aristote: contraires ou contradictoires? 365; André: de Muralt: L'être du non-être en perspective aristotélicienne 375; Jacques Brunschwig: Sur une façon stoïcienne de ne pas être 389; Dominic O'Meara: La question de l'être et du non-être des objets mathématiques chez Plotin et Jamblique 405; Fernand Brunner: L'aspect rationnel et l'aspect religieux de la philosophie de Plotin 417; Bibliographie d'Henri Joly 431-432.

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Tous deux réalistes, ils témoignent de l'influence d'Aristote et du stoïcisme.

Plotin manifeste ainsi une tendance nominaliste dans le cadre de son réalisme, tendance critiquée par Jamblique qui, tout en décelant la présence des nombres à chaque niveau de la réalité, semble concevoir les objets mathématiques comme la projection par l'esprit humain de principes supérieurs."

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"Si Aristote a eu le mérite de distinguer avec beaucoup de netteté *l'art de la logique* de la philosophie elle-même, considérant cet art comme un *organon,* un instrument de la pensée, saint Thomas, commentateur d'Aristote, continue son effort; et dans une perspective critique il précise que si la philosophie regarde *l'ens naturae, l'ens extra animam,* la logique, elle, considère *l'ens rationis,* ce qui ne peut naître que dans notre connaissance intellectuelle (1).
Examinons ici les principaux textes où saint Thomas expose sa pensée sur ce point, pour essayer d'en saisir toute la signification et, à partir de là, mieux comprendre le réalisme de sa métaphysique. Car si *l'ens naturae* ne se définit pas par *l'ens rationis* - c'est plutôt l'inverse qui a lieu, puisque *l'ens per se* est *l'ens extra animam,* il peut cependant être mieux manifesté, pour nous, grâce à *l'ens rationis*. Il y a là quelque chose d'analogue à ce qui a lieu entre *f'ens naturae* et *l'ens artificiale* (qui peut, lui aussi, être appelé *ens rationis* en un sens élargi): *l'ens artificiale* se définit en fonction de *l'ens naturae,* et non l'inverse; mais la comparaison des deux nous aide à mieux saisir ce qu'est *l'ens naturae* au sens fondamental et premier." (p. 91)
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Key Terms in Ontology: *Substance*. History and Definitions by Major Philosophers

INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF 'SUBSTANCE'

"The term 'substance' is one of the most confusing terms in philosophy. For Aristotle, at least some of the time, the paradigm cases of substances were, as he put it, 'this man, this horse', i.e. particular things of that kind. For complicated historical reasons, however, substance has sometimes come to be equated with what Aristotle called 'matter'; thus iron and sulphur, and other stuffs, have come to be called 'substances'. For further complicated historical reasons substance came to be regarded by e.g. Locke as the underlying something or other which is supposed to give support to the properties that inhere in it. Indeed the Latin etymology of the term 'substance' will suggest to anyone having a sensitivity to it that notion of something standing beneath the properties. Locke thus called it a 'something I know not what' -- a suggestion that is not conveyed by either of the other two usages. The situation is complicated still further by the fact that the Latin etymology is relevant only to those modern discussions which rely on the term 'substance'. The Greek word which Aristotle used -- 'ousia' -- and which is traditionally translated 'substance' has none of the suggestions that the Latin etymology of 'substance' provides, but has additional suggestions of its own, particularly a connexion with being. (The feminine present participle of the verb 'to be' in Greek is ousia; ousia has the form of an abstract noun and is for that reason naturally to be translated 'being' or 'beingness', but Aristotle often uses the word with an article to

indicate a particular kind of being, a particular kind of thing.)" (p. 60)

From: David Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984.

"For Aristotle, 'substances' are the things which exist in their own right, both the logically ultimate subjects of predication and the ultimate objects of scientific inquiry. They are the unified material objects, as well as the natural stuffs, identifiable in sense-experience, each taken to be a member of a natural species with its 'form' and functional essence. Entities in other categories -- qualities, actions, relations and so forth -- are treated as dependent on, if not just abstracted aspects of, these independent realities. With the rise of mechanistic physics in the seventeenth century, the Aristotelian multiplicity of substances was reduced to universal matter mechanically differentiated. This move sharpened the issue of the relation of mind to the physical world. The consequent variety of ways in which the notion of substance was manipulated by materialists, dualists, immaterialists and anti-dogmatists encouraged later scepticism about the distinction between independent realities and human abstractions, and so idealism. Twentieth-century conceptualism, like some earlier versions of idealism, rejects the distinction altogether, commonly ascribing the logical priority of material things in natural language to the utility of a folk physics, as if they were the theoretical entities of everyday life. As such, their identity and existence are determined only through applications of a theory outdated by modern science. Yet this 'top-down', holistic philosophy of language is belied by the detailed insights of traditional logic, which point clearly to a 'bottom-up' account of classification and identity, that is an account which recognizes the possibility of perceptually picking out material objects prior to knowledge of their kind of nature, and of subsequently classifying them. The idea that material things are theoretical entities, and that their individuation is accordingly kind-dependent, is a hangover from an atomistic approach to perception which calls on theory to tie sensory information together. A more accurate understanding of sensation as the already integrated presentation

of bodies in spatial relations to one another and to the perceiver is consonant with the possibility denied by the idealist - namely, that, with respect of its primitive referents, language and thought are shaped around reality itself, the independent objects given in active sense-experience. That the coherence or discrete unity of material objects has a physical explanation does not mean that physics explains it away." (p. 205)

From: Michael R. Ayers, "Substance" in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Routledge 1998.

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    "Among the many still unsolved problems of Aristotelian exegesis is that concerning the relationship between the three types of substance which are distinguished in book XII of the *Metaphysics*, that is to say, terrestrial (mobile and corruptible), celestial (mobile and incorruptible), and supracelestial (incorruptible and immobile) (1). In fact some scholars supposed they could regard this relationship as an

instance of *pros hen* homonymy (2), involving a priority of the immobile substance which is not only ontological but also logical (3); some identified it with the relationship of succession *(to ephexes*), understood as a particular sort of pros hen homonymy and therefore as implying logical priority as well (4); finally, some identified it with the relationship of succession itself, without specifying whether this should be regarded as implying not only ontological, but also logical priority (5). In spite of this variety of solutions, it seems to me that the problem has not been discussed with sufficient thoroughness and, especially, that the following issues have not been definitively clarified : a) whether in fact the three above-mentioned types of substance are irreducible to a common genus, and therefore give rise to a true and proper homonymy or equivocity of the notion of substance; b) whether this homonymy, if it subsists, allows some sort of logical unification, i.e. a priority of a genus in relation to the others which is not only ontological but also logical; also, what would be the precise nature of this logical priority.

An answer to these questions seems important for the general interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy. As a matter of fact, since substance, for Aristotle, is what gives unity to all being, a decision concerning the type of unity which it possesses determines the conception which we must have of the very unity of being; and since, furthermore and that of the other types of substance, that is to say, the problem of the unity, and therefore of the possibility, of the science of being qua being, i.e. of philosophy itself.

The present investigation does not claim, of course, to provide a definitive reply to the questions enumerated above, but merely offers itself as a contribution to their discussion, by analyzing some passages in Aristotle which have not been sufficiently taken into account in this connexion." pp. 55-56

(1) Cf. Aristot., *Metaph*. XII 1, 1069a33-34; 6, 1071b3-4. For convenience I mention the former under the denomination of terrestrial substances, though they occupy the whole sphere under the sky of the moon, and the latter under the

denomination of supracelestial substances, though, to be exact, they, being immaterial, could not be localized spatially.
(2) J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, Toronto, 1963 (2nd ed.), 279-300, 455-473; G. Patzig, *Ontologie und Theologie in der "Metaphysik" des Aristoteles*, Kant-Studien 52, 1960-61, 199-201.
(3) By "ontological priority" (*physei* or *ousiai*) I mean the possibility that some things have of existing independently of others, while the latter cannot exist without them (cf. *Metaph*. VII, 1019a1-4); by "logical priority" (*logoi*) I mean the fact that the notion of some things is necessarily contained in the notion, or definition, of others, while the notion of these others is not contained in the definition of the former (*Metaph*. V 11, 1018b30-36). On this distinction cf. G. E. L. Owen, *Logic and Metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle*, in: *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century*, Goteborg 1960, 170-72.
(4) H. J. Kramer, *Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der "Metaphysik" des Aristoteles*, Kant-Studien 58, 1967, 349; H. Happ, *Hyle*, Berlin 1971, 337-342.
(5) G. Colle, Aristote, *Métaphysique*, Livre IV, Louvain-Paris 1931, 63; J. Tricot, Aristote, *La Métaphysique*, Paris 19622, I, 190, n.4; G. Reale, Aristotele, *La Metafisica*, Napoli 1968, I, 329.

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    "Basil is somewhere in between Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines of substance, while his mind is also guided on these matters by his theological predecessors and contemporaries. It is possible to see evidence in Basil of deeply ingrained habits of thought which he carries into his writings from his early training in Stoic dialectic. One outstanding example of this may be seen in his insistence that the ousia of God must have its being securely rooted in a hypostasis, while the Stoics would say that nothing can exist without the possession of ousia (their first category) as a qualified thing (*poion*). What one does not find in Basil is a doctrine of divine substance and persons which can support a consistent conceptuality derived from Stoic logic."

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    "Dans le présent article, nous nous proposons d'examiner un aspect de la théologie d'Augustin, à savoir son emploi du terme *essentia*. P. Hadot se demande si Augustin «a ignoré la théologie trinitaire de Victorinus ou a renoncé à l'utiliser», sans choisir l'un des termes de l'alternative (1); peut-être une lecture attentive de quelques passages montrera-t-elle qu'Augustin a volontairement renoncé à suivre son prédécesseur." p. 436
    (1) P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus,* Paris 1968, p. 477.

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"The Ages of Reason and Enlightenment aimed not only to advance knowledge but also tried to distinguish carefully between things which can and cannot be known. Characteristic of those ages is the manner in which metaphysical speculation was reduced by the sciences or brushed aside by the leading philosophical schools.
The general problem of the *limits of human understanding* became one of the leading philosophical themes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Doubts about the possible scope of human reasoning concerned not only God, the spirits, and the nature of the human soul, (1) but also went to the very core of that reality which man was then trying to subdue intellectually; several conceptual elements were discovered whose nature many thinkers found mysterious and inaccessible to the mind. In fact, beside a clear awareness of the limits of human understanding in general, the notions of *mathematical infinity*, (2) *force*, (3) and *substance* were considered by many philosophers to be above man's reason. The purpose of the present paper is to study the criticisms which were directed against the last of these notions, criticisms which played a rather important role in the famous "Copernican revolution" of 1769 at the start of Kant's critical period. (4) We shall consider not only criticisms of the notion of substance itself, but also those of the closely related notions of *essence* and *materia prima*; these often include the notion of substance, or serve as a foundation for." (pp. 285-286)
(1) For opinions about the human soul in that period see: G. Tonelli, *Elementi melodologici e metafisici in Kant*

precritico (1745-1768), Cap. VII, § 30 and foll. About God's unintelligibility, Ibid., Cap. VII, § 17 (In the II Vol., to be published in short. Vol. I, Torino 1959).
(2) See G. Tonelli, *Le problème des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVllle siècle et la genèse du criticisme kantien particulièrement par rapport à la question de l'infini*, "Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale", 1959.
(3) See Tonelli, *Elementi*, Cap. VII, § 21 and foll.
(4) A not very thorough history of the notion of substance is in K. Heidmann, *Der Substanz-Begriff von Abälard bis Spinoza*, Berlin 1889, (Dissertation).

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   Contents: Preface XI; -XIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Some preliminary doctrines 11; 3. Properties I 19; 4. Properties II 47; 5. Powers and dispositions 69; 6. Relations 85; 7. Particulars 95; 8. States of affairs 113; 9. Independence 139; 10. Modality 148; 11. Number 175; 12. Classes 185; 13. Totality states of affairs 196; 14. Singular causation 202; 15. Laws I 220; 16. Laws Ii 242; 17. The unity of the world 263; References 270; Index 277.
   "During the past twenty years or so, I have been working on ontological questions. What are universals, laws of nature, dispositions and powers, possibilities and necessities, classes, numbers? The present essay tries to bring all these topics together in a unified metaphysical scheme, an ontology. As a result, there is a certain amount of recapitulation of earlier writing. But putting the pieces together turned out to be quite difficult. A good deal of further work was necessary. Many mistakes, as I now think of them, had to be corrected. So what follows is not a mere sum of past thinking." (From the Preface)

"The hypothesis of this work is that the world, all that there is, is a world of states of affairs. Others, Wittgenstein in particular, have said that the world is a world of facts and not a world of things. These theses are substantially the same, though differently expressed.

The general structure of states of affairs will be argued to be this. A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular (at a later point to be dubbed a*thin* particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds between two or more particulars. Each state of affairs, and each constituent of each state of affairs, meaning by their constituents the particulars, properties, relations and, in the case of higher-order states of affairs, lower-order states of affairs, is a contingent existent. The properties and the relations are universals, not particulars. The relations are all external relations.

It is useful to admit*molecular* states of affairs. These, however, are mere conjunctions (never negations or disjunctions) of the original states of affairs. Molecular states of affairs constitute no ontological addition to their conjuncts. But in one special case, to be mentioned in a moment, they become very important.

For first-order states of affairs, that is, states of affairs that do not have states of affairs as constituents, the Tractarian thesis of Independence is somewhat speculatively, but nevertheless hopefully, advanced. No such state of affairs entails or excludes the existence of any other wholly distinct state of affairs. Given Independence, a rather simple and straightforward Combinatorial theory of what possibilities there are, can be put forward. If Independence fails, things get more complicated.

The present theory is not biased towards Atomism nor is it biased against Atomism. An*epistemic* possibility that requires to be noted is the possibility that every (first-order) state of affairs is molecular, that is, analysable into a conjunction of states of affairs. (A simple if to a degree controversial example:*a* ' being F may be equivalent to*a* 's being G & a' being H, with F=G & H. The pattern may be repeated for G and H, and so for ever.) Every first-order state of affairs may be a nest of first-order states of affairs:

states of affairs all the way down. To allow for this epistemic possibility, a Combinatorial theory of what possibilities there are requires further elaboration." pp. 1-2.

3. Ayers, Michael. 1991. "Substance: Prolegomenon to a Realist Theory of Identity."*Journal of Philosophy* no. 88:69-90.
"The aim of the present paper is to show how traditional realist doctrines, suitably interpreted, have an explanatory force that pragmatism or any other form of conceptualism cannot hope to match. The explanations it supplies are of structural features of our thinking to which considerations drawn from the philosophy of physics are simply irrelevant. Although preconceptualist realists disagreed over what things are paradigm substances, as well as over the details of what it is to be a substance, it is not difficult to extract from the tradition at least a rough list of the category's leading characteristics. Such a list of properties should even help us to map and understand the disagreements and divergences. Yet orthodoxy and broad principles are more relevant to the immediate purpose than heresy and idiosyncratic variations. The present argument will therefore assume that such things as horses and plane trees are paradigm substances, whereas homoeomerous substances such as gold and water call for special, but integrally related treatment (treatment sketched out below under the heading "materiality"). Attributes, such as a thing's redness or squareness, and events, actions, or processes, such as walks, walking, thunderstorms, and the like, exemplify nonsubstances or (for the sake of a single name) "modes."
Most of the claims embodied in the following list have on occasion been impatiently brushed aside, or simply ignored, by modern philosophers arguing on behalf either of empiricism or of conceptualism. Some of them, however, have been reinterpreted and absorbed into this or that version of conceptualism. One aim of the present argument is to reveal the coherence of the list, which will emerge in so far as each item can be explained, and needs to be explained, by reference to the others. Some effort will be made, of course, to present the principles as tenable,

although more than one principle will be modified after consideration of the motives for which it has been held.
1. Substances are the ultimate subjects of predication, and therefore the only beings with independent existence.
2. Substances are real unities (both natural and logical).
3. Substances are material. Individual substances are distinguished from one another at any one time by their matter.
4. Substances exist all at once, and exist through time, or endure. (Events, in contrast, take time or unfold.)
5. Substances are active, the ultimate sources of change. Their underlying natures or essences are the ultimate principles of explanation.
6. Only substances fall into true natural kinds, and every truly individual substance is a member of a natural kind.
Let us consider these candidate properties of the category seriatim." (pp. 69-70).

4. Bastit, Michel. 2012.*La Substance. Essai Métaphysique* . Les Plans sur Bex (Suisse): Les Presses Universitaires de l'IPC.
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"La question de la substance s'impose au philosophe, en dépit des dénégations de certains ou en raison de ces dénégations.
Les expériences les plus naïves semblent bien nous présenter le monde sous forme d'êtres relativement autonomes dont dépendent d'autres réalités moins autonomes. Peut-être ces expériences premières sont-elles illusoires et doivent-elles être remises en cause par une connaissance mieux informée, notamment par les acquis des sciences naturelles. En tout état de cause, il est

nécessaire et important de prendre position sur cette question. Bien des raisons militent en faveur de l'inscription de la substance à l'ordre du jour de la philosophie. Si toute la réalité doit se diviser en réalités autonomes et réalités non autonomes, la description et la compréhension de l'ensemble de la réalité est engagée dans cette problématique. La substance s'impose plus encore à la réflexion si l'on considère que la philosophie doit énumérer les êtres. Pour compter, il faut en effet catégoriser et donc distinguer à quel type d'êtres on a à faire. Mais la catégorisation implique à son tour de préciser les relations de dépendance entre les catégories et donc aussi entre les êtres. Le mot de réalité désigne ici l'être, l'ensemble des étants, de sorte qu'en mettant en relation ceux-ci entre eux il soit possible de parvenir à savoir quels sont ceux qui dépendent les uns des autres et quelles sont les causes de cette dépendance. Le terme de la recherche sera ainsi une connaissance des relations qui constituent la réalité et de ce fait mènera à la connaissance de cette réalité considérée elle-même comme un effet de ces relations de dépendance." (p. 11)
(...)
"Le premier chapitre de cet ouvrage est consacré à déterminer et justifier la méthode adoptée pour l'étude de la substance. Nous commenons par argumenter en faveur du réalisme, après quoi nous justifions naturellement l'utilisation d'une méthode descriptive et analytique, par décomposition et résolution, à condition de pousser cette analyse descriptive jusqu'à une analyse causale faisant ressortir les dépendances ontologiques inscrites dans la réalité. Sans recourir en permanence aux instruments formalisés, l'analyse est formelle au sens où elle ne vise pas à l'analyse d'une substance particulière mais à celle de la substance comme telle.
Le second chapitre essaie de saisir les intuitions les plus élémentaires qui conduisent vers la substance à partir d'une analyse du langage le plus ordinaire et de l'expérience sensible élémentaire. Il semble important, dans le cadre de l'option réaliste défendue et adoptée, de pouvoir demeurer

en lien avec ces données primitives, même aux cours des analyses les plus abstraites.
Le troisième chapitre établit la réalité des accidents en montrant qu'il existe une partie de la réalité, accessible aux sens, qui est plus contingente et fluctuante que d'autres. Il précise que cette partie de la réalité n'existe que dans et grâce à l'existence d'une seconde partie de la réalité moins contingente et plus permanente, les substances. La question de l'existence de réalités intermédiaires entre ces deux-ci est traitée en distinguant des substances et des accidents concrets les propriétés et les accidents abstraits. Au terme, la division entre les substances et les accidents est largement justifiée et la confusion entre les deux types d'être apparaît contestable et dommageable à une description fidèle du monde.
Le chapitre quatre entame l'analyse de la substance elle-même et examine si elle peut se comprendre comme un ensemble de propriétés ou de tropes. La réponse est négative en raison de l'universalité des propriétés, de leur caractère abstrait et enfin du risque de défaut d'unité, que leur compréhension comme ce dont est faite la substance - fait courir à la substance. La discussion des tropes, tout en saluant leur caractère actuel, montre que leur notion est contradictoire et que leur mode d'unité ne permet pas non plus de rendre compte de la substance. On conclut à la nécessité d'une forme individuelle actuelle où se réalisent l'unité et l'actualisation des propriétés.
Le chapitre cinq discute l'identification de la substance soit avec un pur individu soit avec un pur substrat. Ces identifications s'avèrent impossibles en raison de l'indétermination des purs individus ou du substrat. Tout en acceptant le rôle fondamental du substrat pour certaines substances, il est démontré que seule la forme peut rendre compte de la détermination et de l'appartenance du substrat aux substances.
Le chapitre six exhibe les caractères fondamentaux de la substance et montre qu'ils résistent aux mises en cause dont ils sont l'objet sur la base soit des théories de la quadridimensionalité, soit de la non-localité, les unes et les

autres inspirées par une interprétation discutable et nullement nécessaire des données scientifiques contemporaines. La discussion de l'individualité, de la distinction des endurants et des perdurants permet de conclure à la nécessité, pour préserver l'identité et l'indépendance de la substance, d'une partie substantielle première informante et déterminante. A partir de ces acquis est présentée une table des catégories qui place la substance actuelle au premier rang et dont dépendent les autres catégories d'êtres.
Le chapitre sept rejette la conception modale de la substance. Puis il examine un certain nombre de conceptions de la substance comme essence, comme famille de parties, comme individu existant et en retient certains éléments: partie première, dépendance et indépendance ontologiques, causalité. Enfin il montre comment la substance conue comme forme, partie première de la substance, actuelle, est seule capable de rendre compte complètement de la substance et de la manière dont elle existe." (pp. 14-16).

5. Boutot, Alain. 1998. "Les Théories De La Morphogenèse Et Le Dilemme De La Substance."*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 2.
"Les théories de la morphogenèse, à travers une approche tout-à-fait originale, c'est-à-dire structurale des morphologies, mettent un terme à cet idéalisme des relations. Dans ces théories, les formes empiriques ne sont pas de simples accidents de la matière, des épiphénomènes sans consistance, des configurations aléatoires dues au jeu des forces internes ou externes en présence, mais le reflet de structures mathématiques bien déterminées. Grâce à cette analyse, elles parviennent à concilier — dans une certaine limite bien évidemment — les deux points de vue que nous venons d'opposer: la thèse substantialiste et l'antithèse relationniste. Elles réussissent à conjuguer d'une manière qui pourra paraître paradoxale à première vue le primat des relations sur la substance, et le primat des substances sur les relations. Elles relativisent tout autant qu'elles substantialisent les relations. (35)" (p. 199)

(35) Afin de prévenir tout malentendu, il convient de lever dès à présent une ambiguïté concernant le sens que nous donnons ici au mot « substance ». Dans le chapitre 5 des*Catégories* , Aristote distingue deux acceptions de la substance: la substance peut désigner d'une part l'individu, le composé de matière et de forme (la substance première), et d'autre part l'essence (la substance seconde). Lorsque nous parlons d'une « relativisation » des substances, nous prenons le mot « substance » dans le premier de ces deux sens (individu), mais lorsque nous parlons d'une substantialisation des relations, nous le prenons dans le second (essence). La raison d'être de cette ambiguïté apparaîtra par la suite.
"On dit quelquefois que la philosophie moderne a substitué la question du sens à la vieille question de l'essence. Pour les modernes, à la différence des anciens, les choses n'ont pas d'essence, pas de nature, mais un sens, et ce sens leur vient du sujet ou de l'esprit. « C'est (...) nous-mêmes, dit Kant, qui introduisons l'ordre et la régularité dans les phénomènes que nous appelons nature, et nous ne pourrions les y trouver s'ils n'y avaient pas été mis originairement par la nature de notre esprit »(41). Cet antagonisme du sens et de l'essence est au fond une nouvelle formulation du dilemme de la substance dont nous sommes parti. Les théories de la morphogenèse réussissent à réduire cet antagonisme en concevant l'essence comme sens, c'est-à-dire comme structure et réciproquement. Elles amorcent ce faisant la constitution de ce que Thom appelle une sémiophysique. une physique du sens. La nature a un sens qu'il s'agit de découvrir. Ce sens est contenu dans des structures typiques, qui ne sont pas des constructions axiomatiques plus ou moins arbitraires, des systèmes formels, mais possèdent une objectivité fondamentale. Elles constituent la raison d'être de la chose, et abritent son essence. Cette sémiophysique nous reconduit d'une certaine manière dans les parages de la pensée aristotélicienne de l'être naturel comme composé d'une matière et d'une forme. Elle ne la reproduit certes pas purement et simplement, mais la renouvelle en profondeur en substituant à la vieille

notion de forme le concept moderne de structure, réalisant ainsi l'alliance apparemment improbable de la substance et de la relation." (p. 204)
(41)*Critique de ia raison pure* . Paris, PUF. 1975. p. 140.

6. Brennan, Sheilah O'Flynn. 1977. "Substance within Substance."*Process Studies* no. 7:14-26.
"It is undoubtedly true that Whitehead's conception of the presence of one actual entity in another plays a key role in his metaphysics. On it, indeed, he bases such central themes of his philosophy as his concepts of organism, internal relations, universal relativity, process, and time. Nevertheless, not all Whiteheadian scholars have been convinced that he has successfully accounted for the immanence of substance within substance.(1) The following study will undertake an investigation of Whitehead's metaphysics in order to determine whether it provides adequate support for his claim. At the same time, since Whitehead supposes his position to traverse directly an Aristotelian thesis, the article will also attempt to establish in what manner and to what extent Whitehead is in fact in opposition to the Greek philosopher." (p. 14)
(1) 1 Cf. Dorothy Emmet,*Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (New York: 1966), pp. xxii-xxvi. After reading her hook, Whitehead expressed appreciation, but took her to task for stressing the transmission of form to the neglect of his theory of immanence. You seem to me at various points," he writes, "to forget my doctrine of 'immanence' which governs the whole treatment of objectification. Thus at times you write as the connection between past and present is merely that of a transfer of character." In the preface of the second edition, Emmet confesses that she is at a loss to explain what Whitehead meant. "I do not know," she says, "that anyone has really elucidated it. Professor Christian had a try at it in his*An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* but came down on the view that what are repeated from one actual occasion to another are characteristics. '[his is undoubtedly the view which is easiest to make plausible, and I was inclined to it myself; but we have Whitehead's emphatic statement that it is not what he

meant." Victor Lowe also testifies to the fact that "many philosophers laid down*Process and Reality* unconvinced that the author had said clearly how one actual entity can be present in another" (Understanding Whitehead [Baltimore, 1966], p. 360). Quoting Whitehead, he indicates what he thinks might be the reason for this lack of understanding: "The truism that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to mean that we can only feel in terms of universals." However, even if one admits on the basis of experience alone that one feels individuals, and that by this very fact one is inclined to the view that somehow individuals are immanent, the question still remains: Does Whitehead's metaphysics provide an adequate philosophical account of this fact of experience?

7. Broackes, Justin. 2006. "Substance."*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 106:131-166.
"The Aristotelian notion of a First Substance (like Fido the dog), an enduring thing with perhaps changing properties, became ridiculed and rejected in the period from Locke to Hume. I clarify the idea and explain how, when separated from some unnecessary accretions, it emerges as a notion to which we are all committed, perhaps, indeed, innocently. One standard objection (that the substance ends up, absurdly, having 'no properties') involves the misconception that the Aristotelian subject of Fido's properties needs to be some extra item, other than, literally, Fido. The main rival view treats things as 'bundles' of properties or 'tropes'; I explore some difficulties in conceiving the components of the bundles. The root of the trouble, I think, lies in the Humean view that if two things are non-identical, they must also be capable of existing separately: this immediately, and disastrously, makes it impossible to recognize ontological dependence between non-identical objects. I end by replying to two special worries: that if substances existed at all, they would be imperceptible and unknowable."
8. Bunge, Mario. 1977.*Treatise on Basic Philosophy*. *Iii: Ontology: The Furniture of the World* . Dordrecht: Reidel.
"This book and its companion, namely Volume 4 of our*Treatise,* concern the basic traits and patterns of the real

world. Their joint title could well be*The Structure of Reality*. They constitute then a work in ontology, metaphysics, philosophical cosmology, or general theory of systems. Our work is in line with an old and noble if maligned tradition: that of the pre-Socratic philosophers, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Helvetius, d'Holbach, Lotze, Engels, Peirce, Russell, and Whitehead. But at the same time it departs from tradition in the matter of method. In fact our aim is to take the rich legacy of ontological problems and hints bequeathed us by traditional metaphysics, add to it the ontological presuppositions of contemporary scientific research, top it with new hypotheses compatible with the science of the day, and elaborate the whole with the help of some mathematical tools.

The end result of our research is, like that of many a metaphysical venture in the past, a conceptual system. It is hoped that this system will not be ridiculously at variance with reason and experience. It is intended moreover to be both exact and scientific: exact in the sense that the theories composing it have a definite mathematical structure, and scientific in that these theories be consistent with and moreover rather close to science - or rather the bulk of science. Furthermore, to the extent that we succeed in our attempt, science and ontology will emerge not as disjoint but as overlapping. The sciences are regional ontologies and ontology is general science. After all, every substantive scientific problem is a subproblem of the problem of ontology, to wit,*What is the world like?*

After a long period underground, talk about metaphysics has again become respectable. However, we shall not be talking at length about ontology except in the Introduction. We shall instead do ontology. In the process we shall attempt to exhibit the mathematical structure of our concepts and we shall make the most of science. Being systematic our ontology may disappoint the historian. Being largely mathematical in form it will be pushed aside by the lover of grand verbal (but sometimes deep and fascinating) systems - not to speak of the lover of petty verbal matters.

And being science-oriented it will fail to appeal to the friend of the esoteric. Indeed we shall be concerned with concrete objects such as atoms, fields, organisms, and societies. We shall abstain from talking about items that are neither concrete things nor properties, states or changes thereof. Any fictions entering our system will be devices useful in accounting for the structure of reality. (Constructs were dealt with in Volumes 1 and 2 of this work.)" pp. XIII-XIV.
Contents: Preface to*Ontology I* XIII; Acknowledgements XV; Special symbols XVI; Introduction 1; 1. Substance 26; 2. Assembly 39; 3. Thing 108; 4. Possibility 164; 5. Change 215; 6. Spacetime 276; 7. Concluding remarks 330; Bibliography 334; Index of names 344; Index of subjects 348-352.

9. Campbell, Keith. 1990.*Abstract Particulars* . Oxford: Blackwell.
Contents: Preeface XI-XII; 1. A One-category Ontology 1; 2. The Problem of Universals 27; 3. Some General Objections to Trope Theory 53; 4. The Pattern of the Properties 81; 5. Relations, Causation, Space-Time and Compresence 97; 6. Fields: Draling with the Boundary Problem 135; 7. The Human and Social Worlds 157; Notes 175; References 181; Index 185-187.
"Many philosophers have held, explicitly or implicitly, that any comprehensive survey of the world's constituents would include the casts of qualities and relations that occur at particular places and times as the qualities and relations of particular objects. It is not so common to affirm that such cases are themselves particulars in their own right, rather than deriving their particularity from their association with a substance, but this was G. F. Stout's distinctive claim (Stout, 1905).
D. C. Williams took another step: these cases, or tropes as he called them, not only form a distinct and independent category of existent, they are the very alphabet of being, the simple, basic, primal items from which all else is built or otherwise derives (Williams, 1966). In presenting his view, Williams acknowledged that it 'calls for completion in a dozen directions at once'. This work is my attempt to press

ahead towards that completion. The great, liberating insight which Stout and Williams offer us is this: properties can be particulars, so the denial of univcrsals need not be the denial of properties. In other words. Particularism (which is economical, plausible and appealing) does not have to take the form of Nominalism (which is economical, but neither plausible nor appealing).

While the principal inspiration for this book is Williams' work, I have also gained a great deal from discussions with David Armstrong, who remains a Realist about Univcrsals, but whose successive publications in this area provide sympathetic treatments of the trope or abstract particularist view (Armstrong, 1978, 1989).

Another colleague, John Bacon, has pursued the trope idea in a more formal way (Bacon, 1988, 1989), while David Lewis treats it as a serious option for dealing with certain intractable problems facing Realism over universal (Lewis, 1983, 1986). Wilfrid Sellars recognized tropes by another name, although not, I think, as the sole fundamental category.

Frank Ramsey counselled that when a philosophical dispute presents itself as an irresolvable oscillation between two alternatives, the likelihood is that both alternatives are false and share a common false presupposition. It is my contention that Realism and Nominalism in the problem of universals exhibit precisely this pattern, their common, false presupposition being that any quality or relation must be a universal.

This book explores the implications of this position. It also argues for theses about relations (Foundationism) and basic physical properties (field theory), which are particularly congenial to a trope philosophy, but are in large measure independent of it. They have merits irrespective of the truth about properties in general." (from the*Preface*).

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George F. Stout, "Things and Sensations",*Proceedings of the British Academy* , 2, 1-13.

Donald C. Williams,*Principles of Empirical Realism* , Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1966.

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David M. Armstrong,*Universals* , Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
John Bacon, "Four modal modellings",*Journal of Philosophical Logic* , 17, pp. 207-220.
John Bacon, "A single primitive trope-relation", *Journal of Philosophical Logic* , 18, pp. 141-154.
David Lewis, "New work for the theory of universals",*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* , 61, pp. 343-377.
David Lewis, "Against structural universals",*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* , 64, pp. 25-46.

10. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1996.*A Realistic Theory of Categories. An Essay in Ontology* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX;
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1. Introduction 3; 2. The Nature of Attributes 11; 3. The Existence of Attributes 19; 4. Propositions as Reducible to Attributes 23; 5. The Intentional Structure of Attributes 29; 6. The Primacy of the Intentional 35;
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7. The Ontology of the Theory of Classes 45; 8. The Nature of Relations 51; 9. Times and the Temporal 55; 10. States and Events 71; 11. Spatial Entities and Material Substance 85; 12. Persons and Their Bodies: Some Unanswered Questions 99;
Part Three: Homeless Objects
13. Appearances 109; 14. Intentionalia 115; 15. Fictitious Objects 121;
Part Four: Application to Philosophical Theology
16. Necessary Substance 127;
Notes 133; Index 145.
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12. Code, Alan. 1978. "No Universal Is a Substance."*Paideia* :65-74.

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14. Correia, Fabrice. 2005.*Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions* . München: Philosophia Verlag.
Contents: Introduction 11; 1. Preamble 17; Introductory Break 39; 2. Simple Dependence I: Presentation, and Rejection of Some Accounts 43; 3. Metaphysical Grounding 57; 4. Simple Dependence II: The Foundational Approach 69; 5. Some Other Notions of Existential Dependence 93; 6. Supervenience 135; Appendix: A. The Logic 155; B. Disjunctive Sums 161; C. Parameter Covariance 163; Bibliography 165; List of Figures 169; List of Symbols and Notations 171; List of Named Propositions, Conditions and Rules 173; Index 175.
"Some methodological points have to be made clear from the start. It is not my intention in this work to claim, for instance, that such and such entities are actually existentially dependent, in whichever sense, upon such and such entities, e.g. that mental phenomena depend on brain phenomena, accidents on substances, or again wholes on parts. I am not here interested in how the world is—not even in how the world must be or might be, if 'must' and 'might' are understood as expressing metaphysical necessity and possibility, respectively. My investigation is a conceptual one: I am interested in the notions of existential dependence, not in their extensions, be it in the actual world or in other metaphysically possible worlds. That is to say, this work is not one of metaphysics, if we agree to take metaphysics to be specifically concerned with what there is and how the things there are relate to one another—in this world alone, or in arbitrary metaphysically possible worlds. It may rather be called a work of meta-metaphysics, or of ontology if one wishes; for it is primarily concerned with the concepts which may be used by the metaphysician in his attempt to propose a picture of the universe. (1)

Such ontological investigations are of central importance, of course. For insofar as he wants to provide us with a satisfactory picture of the world, the metaphysician must as clearly as possible explain the basic concepts he uses.
He may then play the role of the ontologist; or alternatively, he may invoke some already available ontological study." (p. 13)
(1) There is no well established terminology which we can rely on here. The terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ have been both used in various ways, sometimes even as synonymous.
"Defining the category of substance is normally not taken to be giving a mere stipulative definition of the predicate ‘is a substance’. One usually starts with a certain view as to what belongs to the category (paradigmatic substances) and as to what is outside of the category (paradigmatic nonsubstances), and one then tries to find necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the category which respect the initial view. This is how I shall understand the activity of defining substances." (p. 127)

15. Daly, Chris. 1994. "Tropes."*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 94:253-261.
16. Denby, David A. 2007. "A Note on Analysing Substancehood."*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 85:473-484.
"I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two 'quasi-logical' independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions."
17. Denkel, Arda. 1992. "Substance without Substratum."*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 52:705-711.
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Contents: Acknowledgements XI; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Ultimacy and objecthood 16; 3. Individuation and objecthood 44; 4. Identity and individuality 71; 5. Change, matter and identity 93; 6. Properties, particularity and objecthood 153; 7. Essence and individuality 195; 8. Causation and particular properties 228; Works cited 248; Index 258.

"The present study concerns the nature of object, change and property. I propose to introduce my discussion of these issues by an informal sketch of the development of some of the earliest attempts made in the same direction. I am interested in looking into the way in which the relevant fundamental problems of ontology and the principal rational attempts to solve them first emerged. My descriptions are not intended to be historically complete (or perhaps even fully accurate), and I will allow myself some freedom of interpretation." (p. 1)

"Below I formulate a more explicitly ontological version, often used in current philosophical debates. The argument begins by observing
that the sensible world of particular entities is full of repetitions and recurrences. It looks as though the same colour, the same
pattern, is here, there, and scattered all over the universe. This shirt, that pencil, the sea and the sky are all blue. Many particulars
share the same thing; they all have blue as a common aspect.
There seem to be identities, therefore, amongst non-identical particulars. This fact is neither something we create, nor a mere
appearance. It reflects the truth, and hence the existence of universals must be acknowledged.
If plausible, this argument establishes that there exist universal entities shared by a multiplicity of particulars. As such, however, it does not demonstrate that universals reside in a world different from that of the concrete particulars of perception. Thus there is an open choice between placing them in an independent transcendent

reality, or within manifest things. Plato took the former alternative, and Aristotle opted for the latter, each choice being made at a certain cost.
I have tried to trace some of the main lines of the ancient background of the philosophical debate concerning change, object and property. Some later historical material and contemporary contributions will be supplied as the main discussion develops. Thus parts of chapters 2, 5 and 6 will be concerned with properties and universals; parts of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will treat objecthood.
Change will be among the principal topics of chapters 4 and 7." (p. 9)

19. ———. 2000. "The Refutation of Substrata."*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 61:431-440.
20. Dewan, Lawrence. 2006. "The Importance of Substance." In*Form and Being*. *Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics* , 96-130. Washington: Catholic University of America Press. Originally (1997) published on the website of the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame.
21. Fernández Beites, Pilar. 2008. "Teoría De La Sustantividad: Una Necesaria Ampliación De La Teoría De La Sustancia."*Pensamiento* no. 64:197-223.
"This article aims to expound the ontological theory of Xavier Zubiri in order to come up with a «theory of substantivity» capable of incorporating the classical theory of substance. An even more fundamental difference than classical theory's distinction between substance and accidents is the distinction between whole and parts: the independent or autonomous parts that structure the real are not principally «substances» but «substantivities» or wholes. But defending a theory of substantivity does not presuppose rejecting the theory of substance. In the theory of substantivity, substance continues to play an important ontological role for two reasons. First, because we cannot descriptively do away with the substance-accident relation: a substantivity has to be considered a substance (not in the strict sense) insofar as it supports accidents and the same is true with the «independent parts», since their independence is precisely the expression of their

substantiality. Second, we cannot give up the theory of substance because we have to admit at least the existence of a substance in the strict sense, of a simple substance (simplicity in the strict sense), which is the «I» as pure subject (the «soul» of classical theory). And it is at this point that the article definitely distances itself from the later Zubiri."

22. Fine, Kit. 1994. "Essence and Modality."*Philosophical Perspectives* no. 8:1-16.
"The concept of essence has played an important role in the history and development of philosophy; and in no branch of the discipline is its importance more manifest than in metaphysics.
Its significance for metaphysics is perhaps attributable to two main sources. In the first place, the concept may be used to characterize what the subject, or at least part of it, is about.
For one of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of things, with what they are.
But the metaphysician is not interested in every property of the objects under consideration. In asking 'What is a person?', for example, he does not want to be told that every person has a deep desire to be loved, even if this is in fact the case.
What then distinguishes the properties of interest to him? What is it about a property which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is?
It is in answer to this question that appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers." p. 1.
It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central

importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion. The one notion is, if I am right, a highly refined version of the other; it is like a sieve which performs a similar function but with a much finer mesh.
I shall also argue that the traditional assimilation of essence to definition is better suited to the task of explaining what essence is. It may not provide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide us with a good model of how the concept works. Thus my overall position is the reverse of the usual one. It sees real definition rather than de re modality as central to our understanding of the concept." p. 3

23. ———. 1994. "Compounds and Aggregates."*Noûs* no. 28:137-158.
"Some objects appear to be composed of parts: a quantity of sand of its grains, a throbbing pain of its throbs, a set of its members, and a proposition of its constituents.
There seem to be two fundamentally different ways in which an object can be composed of parts. One is nonstructural in character; the parts just merge. The other is structural; the parts hang together within a structure. Thus of the examples above, the first two, the sand and the pain, are composed from their parts in a nonstructural fashion, while the last two, the set and the proposition, are composed in a structural manner.
The notion of a nonstructural method of composition may be taken to be one which conforms to certain structure-obliterating identity conditions. These are as follows: order and repetition among the composing objects is irrelevant to the result; the composition of a single object is the object itself; and the composition of compositions of objects is the composition of those very objects'. Thus the first of these conditions excludes concatenation as a nonstructural method of composition; while each of the remaining conditions excludes the set-builder (the operation which composes a set from its members).
Let us agree to call any nonstructural method of composition a method of fusion. There is a particular such

method, I call it aggregation, which has been very prominent in the literature on part-whole. It may be characterized as a method of composition which conforms to the identity conditions above and which also conforms to the following existence conditions: the aggregate of objects which exist in time exists at exactly those times at which one of the objects exists; and an aggregate of objects which are located in space occupies, at any given time at which it exists, exactly those places which are occupied by one of the objects.

It has often been supposed that aggregation is a legitimate method of composition, that objects may be composed from others in conformity with the conditions set forth above. What has made aggregation so attractive, apart from any intuitive appeal it may have, are two main factors (which will be discussed in more detail later in the paper). The first, and most important, is the identification of a thing with the content of its spatio-temporal extension. The second is the identification of a thing with the fusion of its time-slices. Both of these forms of identification require that the objects fuse in the manner of aggregation.

It has also often been supposed that aggregation is the only legitimate method of fusion. Part of the appeal of this further position may arise from a general hostility to different methods of composition, whether they be methods of fusion or not. Under the form of nominalism championed by Goodman, for example, there can be no difference in objects without a difference in their parts; and this implies that the same parts cannot, through different methods of composition, yield different wholes.

However, I suspect that many of those who would be open to structural methods of composition would still not be open to distinct nonstructural methods of composition. For it is hard to see, especially given the identification of a thing with its spatio-temporal content, what other methods of fusion there might be; and it is hard to see how there could be alternative conceptions of a fusion, of a whole at the same level as its elements and formed without regard to their order or repetition.

Let us call the extreme position, that there is only one method of composition, mereological monism; let us call the less extreme position, that there is only one method of fusion, fusion monism; and let us call that particular version of fusion monism according to which aggregation is the sole method of fusion aggregation monism.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that the last of these three positions is mistaken. I want to show that there is a method of fusion which is not aggregative, i.e. which does not conform to the characteristic existence conditions for aggregates. However, my attack on this position may be relevant to the two other positions as well. For granted that aggregation is itself a legitimate method of fusion, it follows that fusion monism should be dropped in favour of a pluralist position. And to the extent that the adoption of monism depended upon a general hostility to structural considerations, the way is then open to the admission of structural methods of composition.

It is also my intention to attack two related forms of monistic doctrine. For just as we can single out the aggregative method of nonstructural composition, so we can single out the aggregative way of being a nonstructural part and the aggregative kind of nonstructural whole. One might then maintain that not only does aggregation constitute the only nonstructural method of composition, but that it also constitutes the only nonstructural way of being a part and the only nonstructural way of being a whole. We therefore have three forms of monism, one with respect to composition, another with respect to part, and a third with respect to whole. As will later become clear, the two further forms of monism aresuccessively weaker than the original; and so their denials might be taken, in mimicry of Quine, to comprise three grades of mereological involvement.

From the discussion of monism will emerge objections to two other prominent doctrines: extensionalism and mereological atomism. According to the first of these, things are the same when their extensions (spatial, spatio-temporal, or modal-spatio-temporal) are the same; and according to the second, parts are prior to their wholes.

For the purposes of attacking the aggregation monist, I have assumed that aggregation is a legitimate method of fusion. Towards the end of the paper, I suggest that there is no such method and propose a form of fusion monism in which some other method of fusion takes the place of aggregation. However, my tentative endorsement of fusion monism is not meant in any way to lend support to a general monist position."

24. ———. 1994. "Senses of Essence." In*Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus* , edited by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 53-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"One may distinguish between tbe essential and accidental properties of an object. A property of an object is essential if it must have the property to be what it is; otherwise the property is accidental.
But what exactly is meant by this account? It has been common to give a further explanation in modal terms. A property is taken to be essential when it is necessary that the object have the property or, alternatively, when it is necessary that it have tbe property if it exist. For reasons that I have already given in my paper “Essence and Modality,” I doubt whether this or any other modal explanation of the notion can succeed. Indeed, I doubt whether there exists any explanation of the notion in fundamentally different terms. But this is not to deny the possibility of further clarification; and it is the aim of the present paper to provide it.
What I shall do is to distinguish some of the closely related ways in which the notion may be understood. This will be important for getting clearer both on which claims can be made with its help and on which concepts can be defined with its help. In particular, we shall see that several different senses of ontological dependence correspond to the different senses of essence. The task is also important for the purpose of developing a logic of essentialist reasoning; for most of the different senses of essence that we distinguish will make a difference to the resulting logic. My main concern in this paper has been with making the

distinctions, and not with drawing out their implications; but I hope it is clear from the examples what some of these implications are." (p. 53)

25. ———. 1994. "Ontological Dependence."*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 95:269-290.
"The usual account of ontological dependence in terms of necessity is criticized; and an alternative account of terms of essence is proposed. Different notions of dependence are seen to correspond to different notions of essence."
26. ———. 1995. "The Logic of Essence."*Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 24:241-273.
27. ———. 1999. "Things and Their Parts."*Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 23:61-74.
"I wish to sketch a theory of the general nature of material things. It is a theory on which I have been working for some time; and what I present here is the merest sketch. Details are slid over, significant questions not raised, and controversial assumptions left undefended. But I hope, all the same, that enough is said to indicate the relevance of the theory to questions concerning the nature of material things and the plausibility of its answers.
One way into the theory is through consideration of part-whole. Things have parts; and so we are led to consider how they are capable of having the parts that they do. What in their nature accounts for their division into parts? It has often been supposed that we may give an adequate answer to this question by conceiving of a material thing as the material content of a space-time region or as a successive stream of matter. But I believe that there are enormous difficulties with these positions and that, once they are taken into account, we are led to adopt a very different conception of a material thing and of its relationship to its parts.
Central to the paper is a distinction between two different ways in which one thing can be part of another. It can, in the first place, be apart in a way that is relative to a time. It is in this way, for example, that a newly installed carburetor is now apart of my car, whereas earlier it was not, or that certain molecules are now parts of my body though later,

through the exercise of natural bodily functions, they no longer will be.
In the second place, one object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to a time. For something that is a part in this way, it is not appropriate to ask when, or for how long, it is a part; it just is a part. It is in such a way that the pants and the jacket, for example, are parts of a suit or various atoms are parts of a water molecule, or two particular pints of milk are parts of a quart of milk, or various time-slices, if there are such things, are parts of a persisting individual." p. 61

28. ———. 2000. "Semantics for the Logic of Essence."*Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 29:543-584.
"This paper provides a possible worlds semantics for the system of the author's previous paper*The Logic of Essence* . The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects just in case it is true in any possible world compatible with the nature of those objects. It is shown that a slight variant of the original system is sound and complete under the proposed semantics."

29. ———. 2003. "The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter."*Mind* no. 112:195-234.
"Many philosophers have thought that a material thing is, or may be, one and the same as its matter - that a statue, for example, may be the same as the clay from which it is made or a river the same as the water which flows through it. There appears to be a powerful argument against such views, for the thing in each of these cases would appear to have properties not possessed by its matter.
Thus the clay of a statue may exist even though the statue itself has ceased to exist and the river may be composed of different water at different times even though this cannot be true of the water that composes it at any given time. However, these philosophers have responded to this argument by claiming that the apparent difference in properties represents, not a difference in the objects themselves, but a difference in the descriptions under which they may be conceived. We may conceive of a given thing as

a statue or some clay or as a river or a body of water, for example, and, depending upon how the object is conceived, we will say one thing about it rather than another.
It is the aim of this paper to show that this counter-response cannot be sustained and that the original argument against identity should therefore be allowed to stand. This is no easy task since there would appear to be nothing in the immediate linguistic data to settle the question one way or the other.
However, by working through the consequences of the counter-response for the rest of our language, I think it may be shown to be extremely implausible. The paper is in two main parts. The first (§§1-4) is largely concerned with setting up the problem. We characterize the different forms the identity theory can take (§1), explain how the argument in favor of non-identity might in principle break down (§2), present the most plausible versions of such arguments (§3), and then consider the most plausible counter-response to them (§4). The second part (§§5-8) embarks on a detailed investigation of the difficulties with the counter-response. It is shown to be unable to account for a wide variety of different linguistic data, that is loosely classified according as to how reference to a material thing might be achieved. Four main kinds of case will be considered: those in which a sort is explicitly invoked (§5); those in which it is implicitly invoked (§6); those in which the very notion of reference is itself used in securing reference(§7); and those in which there is reference to a plurality of things (§8)." (p. 195)

30. Gorman, Michael. 2006. "Independence and Substance."*International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 46 (2):147-159.
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32. ———. 2012. "On Substantial Independence: A Reply to Patrick Toner."*Philosophical Studies* no. 159:293-297.
33. ———. 2014. "Two Types of Features: An Aristotelian Approach."*Ratio* no. 27:140-154.
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Options."*Axiomathes* no. 23:343-364.
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38. ———. 2004. "Substance: Things and Stuffs."*Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* no. 78:239-261.
39. Healey, Richard. 1995. "Substance, Modality and Spacetime."*Erkenntnis* no. 42:287-316.
40. Hennig, Boris. 2008. "Substance, Reality, and Distinctness."*Prolegomena* no. 7:5-20.
"Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily and clearly separated from everything that is not its object. It follows that if our idea of God is our most distinct idea, as Descartes claims, then God must be a substance in the Cartesian sense of the term. Also, if we can have an idea of a thinking subject which does not in any sense refer to bodily things, and if bodily things are substances, then mind and body must be two different substances."
41. Hiller, Avram. 2013. "Object-Dependence."*Essays in Philosophy* no. 14:33-55.
42. Hoeltje, Miguel, Schnieder, Benjamin, and Steinberg, Alex, eds. 2013.*Varieties of Dependence. Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence* . München: Philosophia Verlag.
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Teil I Grundzüge einer Alltagsontologie von Dingen 19; 1. Was ist eine Alltagsontologie? 19; 2. Was sind Partikularien? 31; 3. Dinge sind Partikularien 34; 4. Dinge und andere

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"Im ersten Hauptteil habe ich versucht, Grundzüge einer Alltagsontologie von Dingen zu entwerfen und gegen einige grundlegende Einwände zu verteidigen. In diesem zweiten Teil möchte ich einen Schritt weiter-, wenn man so will, in die Kategorie der Dinge „hineingehen“, und untersuchen, ob es nicht innerhalb dieser Kategorie weitere ontologisch signifikante Differenzen gibt, die es rechtfertigen, innerhalb der Dinge eine Gruppe mit genau umschreibbaren Besonderheiten anzugeben.
Dabei wird der Begriff „Substanz“ eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Um es vorwegzunehmen, werde ich Substanzen als „Subspezies“ oder „Genus“ innerhalb der umfassenden Kategorie der Dinge einführen. Das mag vom Gebrauch von „Substanz“ bei manchen AutorInnen abweichen. Und zwar insofern, als bei manchen „Ding“ und „Substanz“ als Synonyme aufgefasst werden. Auch von der klassischen Ontologie unterscheide ich mich, insofern nämlich, als ich „Substanz“ eben nicht als Bezeichnung einer Kategorie im ontologisch technischen Sinne verstehe. Ich werde nun im zweiten Hauptteil versuchen, diese Abweichungen möglichst umfassend einzuführen und auch ontologisch zu begründen. Der Weg dazu weist einige Parallelen auf zu jenem im ersten Teil. Dort habe ich Dinge als eine Kategorie im Bereich der Partikularien bestimmt, und zwar so, dass ich zunächst nicht-dingliche Partikularien ins Auge gefasst habe, das sind Ereignisse und Zustände. Dinge aber wurden durch den Verweis auf die Unterschiede zu Ereignissen und Zuständen charakterisiert. Hier werde ich mit Artefakten beginnen, um die nicht-artifiziellen Dinge über Differenzen

zu den ersteren ontologisch zu bestimmen. Ich verrate dem/der LeserIn wohl kein großes Geheimnis, dass allein damit, nämlich mit nicht-artifiziellen Dingen oder Vorkommnissen natürlicher Arten, Substanzen gemeint sein können.
Dass Substanzen Lebewesen sind, steht ebenfalls schon hier zu vermuten, muss jedoch begründet werden; v.a. meine These, dass „Substanz“ und „Lebewesen“, bzw. „Lebewesen“ und „Vorkommnis natürlicher Arten“ extensionsgleich zu verstehen sind. Es gibt m.a.W. keine nicht-lebendigen Substanzen, natürlich auch keine Lebewesen, die keine Substanzen sind.
Über all dies soll in diesem zweiten Hauptteil gehandelt werden." (p. 125)

49. Kearns, John T. 1970. "Substance and Time."*Journal of Philosophy* no. 67:277-289.
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"How should we define physicalism or minimal physicalism? In my view, this question calls for stipulation because these are theoretical terms without a uniform use. Different views of psychophysical relations are physicalistic in different ways and to different degrees, and there is an obvious interest in clarifying and distinguishing these views and determining which are true. My aim in this chapter will be to do some of the clarifying and distinguishing. Stipulation of a unique thesis as physicalism or minimal physicalism must come with a rationale, and as I have none to offer I shall not pursue this." (p. 152)
(...)

"Ontological physicalism for concrete particulars is the view that both substance physicalism and concrete event physicalism hold. I have argued that this is equivalent simply to the view that the world is governed by laws with purely physical antecedents. And from this definition its close ties to the principle of physical closure can be seen. The basic idea behind physical closure is that the best explanations of physical phenomena are physical. Ontological physicalism can now be seen to entail physical closure, because a world governed by laws with purely physical antecedents will be one in which every physical phenomenon is fully explained by physical laws and prior physical conditions. But the converse is false. Physical closure does not entail ontological physicalism, because it holds in the noninteractive substance dualistic world we considered in which minds can perceive and think but cannot influence the physical world. However, physical closure does entail that the effecting of physical states is governed by purely physical laws, and this can indeed be taken as an equivalent formulation of the principle.
In conclusion, I have argued that ontological physicalism for concrete particulars is best regarded not as some primitive thesis but as the thesis that the world is governed by laws of succession with purely physical antecedents. In coming to understand in what ways the world is physicalistic, we are interested in whether all first-order properties instantiated in the spatiotemporal world are physical (on the various plausible interpretations of this),23 whether there is libertarian choice, and whether there is downward causation. I have argued that these questions absorb the question whether there are nonphysical particulars." (p. 168)

54. Loux, Michael J. 1976. "The Concept of a Kind."*Philosophical Studies* no. 29:53-61.
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Contents: 1. The possibility of metaphysics 1; 2. Objects and identity 28; 3. Identity and unity 58; 4. Time and persistence 84; 5. Persistence and substance 106; 6. Substance and dependence 136; 7. Primitive substances 154; 8. Categories and kinds 174; 9. Matter and form 190; 10. Abstract entities 210; 11. Facts and world 228; 12. The puzzle of existence 248; Bibliography 261; Index 269.
From the Preface: "My overall objective in this book is to help to restore metaphysics to a central position in philosophy as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own distinctive methods and criteria of validation. In my view, all other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions thus making metaphysics unavoidable-so that we should at least endeavour to do metaphysics with our eyes open, rather than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of uncritical assumption. I believe that this is beginning to be acknowledged more widely by philosophers as various research programmes for instance, in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of quantum physics-are being seen to flounder through inadequacies in their metaphysical underpinnings. For that reason, I hope that a book like this will prove to be a timely one.
Because Chapters 1 and 2 partly serve to introduce themes explored in greater detail later in the book, I have not written an Introduction as such. Doing so would have involved unnecessary repetition. However, it may help the reader if I supply here a brief synopsis of the book's contents. In Chapter 1, I attempt to characterize the distinctive nature of metaphysics as an autonomous intellectual discipline and defend a positive answer to Kant's famous question, `How is metaphysics possible?', distinguishing my own answer from that of various other schools of thought, including some latter-day heirs of Kantianism. A key ingredient in my defence of metaphysics is the articulation of a distinctive and, in my view, indispensable notion of*metaphysical possibility-conceived*

of as a kind of possibility which is not to be identified with physical, logical, or epistemic possibility.
Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of two of the most fundamental and all-pervasive notions in metaphysics-the notion of an*object* and the notion of*identity* and explores their interrelationships. In the course of this exercise a central ontological distinction-that between*concrete* and*abstract* objects is brought to the fore, my contention being that this is at bottom a distinction between those objects that do, and those that do not,*exist in time* ." (from the Preface).

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"Terms like 'wisdom' are commonly held to refer to abstract objects that are properties. On the basis of a greater range of linguistic data and with the support of some ancient and medieval philosophical views, I argue that such terms do not stand for objects, but rather for kinds of tropes, entities that do not have the status of objects, but only play a role as semantic values of terms and as arguments of predicates. Such 'non-objects' crucially differ from objects in that they are not potential bearers of properties. "
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"The question of substance in the philosophy of physics has three branches: logical, physical, and epistemological. The first is a problem in pure philosophy: is the notion of " substance " in any sense a " category," i.e. forced upon us by the general nature either of facts or of knowledge? The second is a question of the interpretation of mathematical physics: is it (a) necessary, or (b) convenient to interpret our formulae in terms of permanent entities with changing states and relations? The third concerns the relation of perception to the physical world."
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92. ———. 2005. "How Not to Define*Substance* . A Comment Upon Hoffman and Rosenkrantz."*Ratio* no. 18:107-117. "The article is a critical examination of Joshua Hoffman's and Gary Rosenkrantz' approach to the traditional category of individual substance. On several places they offered an analysis of the concept of a substance in terms of some highly sophisticated notion of generic independence. Though ingenious, and even though it might be extensionally adequate, their account cannot provide an informative analysis of the concept in question, because it exhibits a peculiar kind of circularity. It is shown that one cannot establish, on the basis of their analysis, that a given entity is a substance, if one does not already know that it is one in advance. The circularity of their account is examined in detail, and it is explained how it could have arisen."
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Key Terms in Ontology: *Substance*

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Key Terms in Ontology: *Mathesis Universalis*. the Search for a Universal Science

INTRODUCTION

"Preliminary remark: It is never quite clear what (the modern concept of *mathesis universalis* as such exactly signifies, let alone how it may be defined. The expression itself (1) is a composite of the Greek μάθησεως latinized by transcription to *mathesis*, and the Latin *universalis*. The latinized *mathesis*, generally meaning, according to the dictionaries, learning / knowledge / science (= *disciplina* or *scientia*), (2) more specifically designates *mathematic* (= *scientia mathematica*), though it can even mean astrology. Hence the first and general sense of *mathesis universalis* signifies no more than universal science (*disciplina universalis* or *scientia universalis*). However – and this will be very important – since this "science" has a rather mathematical ring to it, we should on second thoughts take it to be an equivalent of s *cientia mathematica universalis* (3) (or *generali*s or *communis*: due to the underlying Greek terminology, there is no difference between universal, general, or common in antiquity – things will have changed by Leibniz' time at the latest, of course).
This more specific meaning, i.e., universal (or general or common) mathematical science or universal mathematic, is essential, and more or less the bottom line for most occurrences of the expression, though it still remains very vague. However, the emphasis of this paper lies, with regard to the concept of mathesis universalis not so much on the historical details as on

the more general systematical outlines. Therefore it should suffice to begin our work with an understanding of *mathesis universalis* that implies not much more than universal (or general or common) mathematical science, which of course still allows for a range of diverse meanings. What matters is to remain true to the sense of *mathesis universalis* while not confusing the two very different notions somehow inherent in the Latin, i.e., that of universal mathematic on the one hand and that of universal science on the other. A clear line should be drawn between these two concepts, of which the former is mathematical (even though sometimes in a wider sense), the latter not. I trust that it will become clear in this paper that both for historical and systematical reasons it is not only justified, but even necessary, to draw this general distinction between universal mathematic and universal science in this way." (pp. 129-130)

Notes

(1) The major work of reference with regard to the Renaissance and Early Modern history of *mathesis universalis* (mainly in the context of Paduans, Jesuits, and Humanists/Ramists) remains G. Crapulli, *Mathesis universalis*. Genesi di un'idea nel XVI secolo, Roma 1969 (as his focus is on the sixteenth century, Crapulli treats neither Descartes nor Leibniz, but only their predecessors). For the history of the term as such cf. R. Kauppi, "Mathesis universalis", in: J. Ritter/K. Gründer (ed.), *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 5: L-Mn, Basel/Stuttgart 1980, col. 937-938 and also J. Mittelstrass, "Die Idee einer Mathesis universalis bei Descartes", *Perspektiven der Philosophie: Neues Jahrbuch* 4 (1978), 177-178.
(2) Descartes himself was clear about the fact that not much can be gained from the word itself: hic enim vocis originem spectare non sufficit; nam cum Matheseos nomen idem tantum sonet pod disciplina (*Regula IV*, *Oeuvres* X, 377,16-18).
(3) D. Rabouin, "La 'mathematique universelle' entre mathematique et philosophie, dAristote a Proclus", *Archives de Philosophie* 68 (2005), 249-268, discusses the concept's ambiguous character between philosophy and mathematics. Cf. also his paper "Les interpretations renaissantes de la

'mathematique generale' de Proclus", to be published in the proceedings (ed. A. Lernould and B. Vitrac) of the International Conference on *Le Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Elements d'Euclide*, forthcoming from Septentrion (Presses Unversitaires de Lille) [Alain Lernould (ed.), *Études sur le Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Éléments d'Euclide*, Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2010].

From: Gerald Bechtle, "How to Apply the Modern Concepts of *Mathesis Universalis* and *Scientia Universalis* to Ancient Philosophy. Aristotle, Platonisms, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Descartes". In Kevin Corrigan and John D. Turner (eds.), *Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern*, Leiden: Brill 2007, pp. 129-154.

"The design of mathesis universalis, for short MU, was stated in the 17th century as part of the rationalistic philosophy of this time including a program of mathematization of sciences (see Weingartner, 1983). However, the significance of MU is not restricted to that period. It belongs to main ideas of Western civilization, its beginnings can be traced to Pythagoreans and Plato.

Immediate sources of the 17th century MU are found in the 15th century revival of Platonism whose leading figure was Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), the author of "Theologia Platonica". He was accompanied by Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), also by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543). All of them may have taken as their motto the biblic verse, willingly quoted by St. Augustine, Omnia in numero et pondere et mensura disposuisti, Sap. 11, 21. The core of their doctrine was expressed in Ficino's statement that the perfect divine order of the universe gets mirrored in human mind due to mind's mathematical insights; thus mathematics proves capable of the role of an universal key to the knowledge; hence the denomination mathesis universalis.

This line of thought was continued in the 16th century by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630); it penetrated not only mechanics and astronomy but also medical sciences as represented by Teophrastus Paracelsus of Salzburg

(1493-1541). No wonder that in the 17th century the community of scholars was ready to treat the idea of MU as something obvious, fairly a commonplace, before Descartes made use of this term in his "Regulae ad directionem ingenii". "Regulae" did not appear in print until 1701, hence the term itself could not have been taken from this source. In fact, it was used earlier by Erhard Weigel, a professor of mathematics in Jena (Leibniz's teacher) who wrote a series of books developing the program of universal mathematics: "Analysis Aristotelis ex Euclide restituta", 1658 (an interpretation of Aristotle's methodological theory in the light of Euclid's practice); "Idea Matheseos Universae", 1669; "Philosophia Mathematica: universae artis inveniendi prima stamina complectens", 1693 (see Arndt, "Einführung des Herausgegebers", in: Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedanken*, Halle (1713) edited by H. W. Arndt, Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1965).
The last of the listed titles involves one of the key concepts of the MU program: ars inveniendi, i.e. the art of discovering truths in a mathematical way. There were two approaches to this art, differing from each other by opposite evaluations of formal logic. According to Descartes, formal logic of Aristotle and schoolmen was useless for the discovery of truth; according to Leibniz, ars inveniendi was to possess the essential feature both of formal logic and of mathematical calculus, viz. the finding of truths in formae (in virtue of form)." (pp. 525-526)

From: Witold Marciszewski, "The principle of Comprehension as a Present-Day Contribution to *mathesis universalis*", *Philosophia Naturalis* 21, 1984, pp. 523-537.

MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS IN HUSSERL

"Husserl finds in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's notion of mathesis universalis the first systematic attempt to unify the formal apophansis of Aristotle with the formal mathematical analysis deriving from Franciscus Vieta. According to Husserl, Leibniz saw

the possibility of combining the formalized scholastic logic with other formal disciplines devoted to the forms that governed, for example, quantity or spatial relations or magnitude. Leibniz distinguished between a narrower and a broader sense of mathesis universalis. In the narrower sense, it is the algebra of our ordinary understanding, the formal science of quantities. But since the formalization at work in algebra already makes conceivable a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially determinate mathematical disciplines such as geometry, mechanics, and acoustics, we arrive at a broader concept emptied of all material content, even that of quantity. When applied to judgments, this formal discipline yields a syllogistic algebra or mathematical logic. But, according to Leibniz, this formal analysis of judgment ought to be combinable with all other formal analyses. Hence, the broader mathesis universalis would identify the forms of combination applicable in any science, whether quantitative or qualitative. Only thereby would it achieve the formality allowing it to serve as the theory-form for any science, whatever the material region to which that science is directed.

According to Husserl, however, Leibniz does not give an adequate account of how this unity is achieved. Husserl's development of Leibniz's notion of mathesis universalis recognizes the identity of apophantic logic and mathematical logic insofar as both apply to the forms of judgments and of arguments at different levels of abstraction. Moreover, when the principles of a mathematical logic are applied to any object whatever, it becomes clear, given the identity of the judgment as posited and the judgments as supposed, that mathematical logic can also be understood as formal ontology. Formal ontology as the formal theory of objects is characterized in the first instance by its contrast with formal apophantic logic. Formal ontology investigates a set of forms – correlative to those we find in apophantic logic – forms that Husserl calls "object-categories" (Gegenstandskategorien). These categories include object, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, relation, set, ordered set, combination, connection, and the like. Formal ontology, however, is united with formal logic, for logic concerns the state of affairs just as supposed in the judgment. This means that meaning-categories (*Bedeutungskategorien*) and

object-categories are the same forms, but they are considered differently and named differently in the natural and critical attitudes." (pp. 129-130)

From: John J. Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy* Lanham: Scarecrow Press 2007.

"*Apophantics as a doctrine of sense and a logic of truth*. From the above said it emerges that formal logic, as classically conceived, reflects the attitude of that person who performs the critique but whose judging is not a direct one but a judgement about judgements. Formal logic is constituted like an apophantic logic, whose object is the predicative judgement. This should not constitute a limitation for logic - as in fact has been the case so far - says Husserl - for apophansis contains all the categorical intentional entities. In other words, classical formal logic kept on the apophantic level, abandoning the very aim of knowledge comprised in the "intentionality" of the judgement. However, says Husserl, judgements conceived of as "intentional entities" pertain to the region of sense. The phenomenological analysis of the sense-directed attitude leads Husserl to the following conclusions: there is a region of sense wherein a judgement is meaningful irrespective of whether or not it is exact. This shows that sense transcends the act of referring to the given subjects, sense is "transcendental" and senses are ideal poles of unity (*Formale und Transzendentale Logik,* p. 119). Hence it follows that pure logic has the following divisions: the doctrine of sense and the doctrine of truth, for we have seen that the sense of a judgement and its truth are two different things.
Having thus examined the whole content of classical analytics, a content which though implied is yet not explicit, in his opinion, Husserl concludes that analytics, thus conceived, represents that Mathesis Universalis i.e. that universal science dreamt of by Leibniz which has four levels:
(a) as Mathesis Universalis, the systematic form of theories; (b) as pure Mathesis, of non-contradiction; (c) as Mathesis o f the possible truth; (d) as Mathesis of pure senses." (p. 367)

From: Anton Dumitriu, *History of Logic*, Volume III, Tubridge Wells: Abacus Press 1977.

"Husserl's analyses of the mathesis universalis, in keeping with their detailed presentation in *FTL* [*Formal and Transcendental Logic* 1929], continue to offer a durable foundation for more extensive phenomenological investigations of the formal sciences. Here Husserl makes a particularly important distinction, one of exemplary significance for the whole of phenomenological description. In the first place, the mathesis universalis understood as objectively existing science -- in Husserl's terminology as objective logic (26) -- is to be phenomenologically-descriptively analyzed. In the second place, these investigations directed toward objective logic are to be supplemented through a subjective logic i. e., (27) through analyses of the cognitive structures of mathematical or logical knowing. The problems Husserl takes on in *FTL* according to these terms are particularly, (i) the relation between formal logic and mathematics (their co-extension and distinguishability), and (ii) the inner structure of the mathesis universalis. Both problems will be briefly addressed in what follows.

The conception of the mathesis universalis that Husserl clearly grasps for the first time in the *Prolegomena* is barely altered in the *FTL* of 1928, which describes mathesis universalis as a science in which formal logic and mathematics blend together in the sense of *co-extension*. (28) In their respective traditional formal logic and mathematics possessed a clear thematic orientation, on the basis of which they were "undoubtedly separate sciences" [*FTL*, 80]. Since the "breakthough of algebra" however, abstract mathematics is no longer the science of number and quantity, and abstract logic is no longer the science of the structures of content-related language that orients itself toward the grammar of natural language (a characterization that applies equally to the Brentanian understanding of logic as a general theory of correct [natural-language] reasoning). It would already have been problematic enough if the traditional logic now in the form of Boolean algebra had, as "apophantic mathematics" [*FTL*,77], become a field of abstract mathematics. But it proved

additionally to be the case that ever further sectors of mathematics could themselves be seen as a (Boolean) algebra, which dissolved even the traditional division of disciplines within mathematics. What was left over was thus a comprehensive formal science on the basis of a comprehensive (algebraicized) methodology.

However, it is due not only to a methodological alignment that, after the "breakthrough of algebra," formal logic and mathematics blended together. The formula "a ? b = b ? a" can, for example, be easily reformulated in a first-order language, whereby the transition to formal logic is achieved. Yet the form-variables *a,b,...* are maintained in this transition, and consequently the logician has the same region of abstract objects in front of him, objects whose constitutive laws were initially considered by the mathematician. Thus the question arises whether and (when yes) in what sense formal logic is distinguishable from mathematics *at all*,(29) from the mathematics Husserl refers to as *formal ontology* -- is e., the science "of the possible categorial forms in which substrate objectivitis can truly exist." [*FTL,*145].

It is one of the most notable results of *FTL* that Husserl developed precisely the sense in which the two sciences are finally distinct from one another. In keeping with the two-fold character of phenomenological analysis, this distinction is based upon the results of subjectively as well as objectively directed phenomenological descriptions. The first direction leads to the concept of "critical attitude" [*FTL*, 45, 46], which permits a distinction between the attitude (*Einstellung*) of the logician from that of the mathematician. The critical attitude of the logician is tantamount with an act of reflection, which is the necessary condition for encountering a judgment as judgment. The mathematician, on the other hand, remains for the most part in an objectively-directed attitude even after he has carried out the abstraction from the material determinations of the object. In his characteristic reflective attitude, the logician directs his attention to the speaking about (abstract) objects, which makes it possible to isolate the structures of this speech. Thus even when logic, in a fashion analogous to formal ontology, speaks about an object-sphere, it refers to the objects and relations in this sphere through the judgment [*FTL*, 54].

Objectively this distinction in attitude reveals itself to the extent that the judgment is the fundamental concept of formal logic. In the reformulation of the group-axioms in a first-order language, the axioms stand before us as judgments that are grammatically well formulated in the sense of inductive definitions. Au introductory text-book on group-theory, for example, will normally introduce neither the syntax of formalized mathematical language nor a formal concept of proof. In other words, in contrast to formal logic, whose fundamental conceptual inventory includes "judgment" or "judgment-set", these concepts are never even issues in mathematics [cf. *FTL*, 24]. Mathematics (in its traditional and abstract form) remains in an unreflective attitude which does not in principle thematize the speaking about objects [cf. *FTL*, 546]. It is occasionally necessary of course, to adopt the critical attitude for the purpose of the fundamental mathematical activity of proof. For the mathematician, this "methodological exception" from the unreflective attitude is motivated by a methodical modalization of the judgment carried out in the direct attitude. We shall return to this in the last two sections.

Since the delimiting of formal logic and mathematics will play a decisive role in the understanding of mathematical incompleteness, this must be treated in somewhat more detail. In the *LI* [*Logical Investigations*] of 1900/01, Husserl draws a concise distinction between state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) and judgment.(31) States of affairs are experienced as being in the world; they are the objective truth-maker of the judgment, hence an analogon to the objects of perception, to which the psychic acts of perceiving are directed. With this distinction;, Husserl clears up a problem that many thinkers toward the end of the 19th century struggled to resolve.(32) Husserl belongs for this reason alone among Bolzano and Frege as one of the pioneers of modern logic.(33) It is therefore very much in the spirit of Husserl when Tarski remarks in his 1935 essay that he intends to do justic, to the intentions expressed in the following dictum: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true."(34) Logic in the period after Husserl lost sight, however, of what Brentano and Husserl called "descriptive psychology"(35)" (pp. 105-108)

Notes

(26) Husserl's concept of logic (in the objective sense) is at least two-fold. On the one hand Husserl speaks of a "fully developed formal logic" [*EJ= Experience and Judgment* 2], which, as mathesis universalis, would encompass abstract formal logic as well as abstract mathematics. On the other hand he speaks of formal logic as a special science, in which case it is up to the reader to distinguish on every occasion whether Husserl is referring to traditional (Aristotelian) formal logic or to modem mathematicized logic as discipline within the mathesis universalis.

(27) Husserl deals with the distinction between the objective and subjective aspects of logic in, for example, the *Introduction* to *FTL*.

(28) In and of itself, the idea of coextension is already present in the *Prolegomena*. In the *Ideen* it is made explicit, in *FTL* analyzed in detail.

(29) On formal ontology *FTL*, 24; III/1, 10. The problem here exposed was aptly described by Kleene 24 years later in the following way: "In a mathematical theory, we study a system of mathematical objects. How can a mathematical theory itself be an object for mathematical study?" (Stephen Cole Kleene, *Introduction to metamathematics,* Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1952, 59).

(30) Husserl distinguishes between judgments and the spoken or written expression of judgments (on this see *FTL*, 5). His concept of judgment not so far away from what is commonly referred to as "proposition" in the terminology of analytic philosophy. At the same time, it is important that the judgment (i. e., the proposition) be opposed not to the expression, but rather that the judgment (as proposition) be opposed to the object of the judgment (where of course the judgment itself can also be made into the object of a higher-level judgment through a particular act of reflection.) Since the judgment can only be given together with an expression (in phenomenological parlance: the judgment is founded on the expression), the presumption of ' Platonic' metaphysics is here unjustified. Dealing with the constitution of judgments would call for detailed phenomenological-

psychological investigations into the phenomenology of spoken and written language, analyses that cannot be carried through within the confines of this essay.
(31) The talk of states of affairs can be found in Husserl's work wherever the question is one of truth and its subjective correlate evidence, thus, for example, in the fourth *LI*, 39. The term "Sachlage", however, should -- even when this expression is employed in the *LI* (e.g. iv *.LI*, 28) -- be regarded with a view to its decisive formulation in 59 of *EJ*. It is not to be confused with state of affairs.
(32) This is the result of the thoroughgoing historical investigation in Barry Smith "Logic and the *Sachverhalt*", *The Monist* 72 (1989), 52-69. On this see also the remarks on the roll of Stumpf, Brentano, Meinong, Twardowski, or Reinach in the development of the concept of *Sachverhalt*.
(33) Best known is of course the influence of Husserl's concept of "pure logical grammar" in Leśniewski and his followers (on this Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "Husserl' conception of a Purely Logical Grammar." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 17 (1955-57) 362-9).
(34) Adam Tarski (Der Wahrheistbregriff in den formalisierten Sprachen." *Studia Philosophica* 1 (1935), 261-465. English translation: H. Feigl, and W. Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*. New York (NY): Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.

From: Olav K. Wiegand, "Phenomenological-Semantic Investigations into Incompleteness", In Olva K. Wiegand et al. (eds.), *Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Thomas M. Seebohm*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2000, pp. 101-132.

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GENERAL STUDIES

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   Table des matières: Introduction 9; La constitution de la "mathématique universelle" comme problème philosophique 33; I. Aristote 37; II. "Mathématique universelle" et théories mathématiques: Aristote, Euclide,

Epinomis 85; III. Le moment néo-platonicien 129; Vers la science de l'ordre et de la misure 193; Introduction 193; IV. La renaissance de la mathématique universelle 195; V. La *mathesis universalis* cartésienne 251; Conclusion 347; Annexe I. *La quaestio de scientia mathematica communi* 363; Annexe II. Essai bibliographique sur la *mathesis universalis* chez Descartes et Leibniz 367; Bibliographie 375; Index nominum 397-402.

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   " “I know much, it is true, yet I’d like to know everything”: Obviously Wagner, the self-confident servant of Goethe’s *Faust* (verse 601) wanted to compare with God whereas in universal topic of humanism and baroque times - the historical Faust died in the 1530ies - should only enable men to participate in God's universal knowledge. The epoch overflowed with universalisms, like universal arithmetic, art, characteristic, harmony, instruments, language, magic, mathematics, method, science, symbolism. By all means, universality or at least generality corresponding to unity ranked above diversity corresponding to plurality. “Pluralitas num quam est ponenda sine necessitate”, Ockham had already said, “plurality must never be assumed without necessity”.
   Evidently this attitude corresponded to the political situation of the 17th century. It was the time of absolutism, of absolute monarchs. Yet, we must be careful not to rush to conclusions. 19th and 20th centuries physicists of democratic societies liked and like reductionist unifications: the Grand Unified Theory (GUT) and even the hypothetical Theory Of Everything (TOE) are taking shape.

Harmony instead of controversy, certainty instead of uncertainty, evidence instead of obscurity: Since Platonic times mathesis was the discipline which seemed to be especially appropriate to guarantee these ideals. The better if it even seems to grant immortality: For "Archimedes will be remembered when Aeschylus is forgotten because languages die and mathematical ideas do not. 'Immortality' may be an inappropriate word, but probably a mathematician has the best chances of whatever it may mean", as the English mathematician Godefrey Harold Hardy asserted (1993, 81). (*)

No wonder that mathesis played a crucial role in the history of the idea of a universal science. I would like to discuss five essential aspects of this history:

1. Capstone; 2.Tree of science; 3. Human reason; 4. Ocean of sciences; 5. Theory with practice; Epilogue." (p. 77)

(*) [G. H. Hardy, *A Mathematician Apology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993 (first edition 1940).]

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3. Mittelstrass, Jürgen. 1979. "The philosopher's conception of "Mathesis Universalis" from Descartes to Leibniz." *Annals of Science* no. 36:593-610.

"In Descartes, the concept of a 'universal science' differs from that of a 'mathesis universalis', in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the *Meditations*, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a 'universal calculus' as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his 'characteristica universalis'. The characteristica universalis was never completed-it proved impossible, for example, to

list its basic terms, the 'alphabet of human thoughts'-but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way."

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"Introduction.
Since Einstein sought a unification of relativity theory and quantum theory, two generations of physicists have tried to establish such a theory in order to unify the most efficient macroscopic theory with the extremely powerful microscopic one, but up to now they have not managed it. In many disciplines we are confronted with competing models that are successful within different and even overlapping areas, but which are at the same time incompatible with each other, seen from a more universal standpoint. To develop a unifying theory, is thus one of the greatest challenges.
Why do we take this as a challenge at all? In a historical perspective, this is far from evident: for nearly two thousand years, nobody felt disturbed by the fact that, to locate the position of a planet by means of the Ptolemaic system, one had to make three different mathematical calculations with no theory in common. The method developed by Copernicus, was by no means more precise in its results, nor was it simpler in its calculations, it had only one advantage, not belonging to physics, but to metaphysics, as it proposed one uniform procedure! Differing from the methodology of the School, which, for each quaestio postulated its correspondent appropriate method, and which, therefore, could not lead to universal theory, we are now confronted with the idea of unity, corresponding to an absolutely different image of science, the idea there should be a unity of science or even a unified science! At the beginning, reasons for this had been vague, they hinted at the unity of Gods creation; and its echo might be seen in a secularized version in C. Fr. v. Weizsäcker's *Unity of Nature* (*). The

first theoretical approach is developed in the rationalistic tradition, more precisely, in Descartes and his embracing *Mathesis universalis*. The same aim is to be found in Leibniz and his proposal of a *Scientia generalis*, as well as in the intention of Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna circle in postulating a Unified science. In all these cases we are confronted with the question how this all-embracing universal science is related to the singular and diverging sciences, and what the borders of the principles of subordination are."
(...)
"Our search for a link among changing and mutual exclusive sciences shall take the way from Descartes to Leibniz and Neurath on the one hand and Collingwood and Kuhn on the other. It leads to a discussion of Toulmin s thesis of an evolutionary character of all scientific development, a thesis which is taken as support for the post-modern worldview. Against all these attempts, the guiding thesis of this paper is to show that we have to accept truth as a regulative idea behind each scientific undertaking." (pp. 3-5)
(*) [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1980]

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Études en Français

1. Breton, Stanislas. 1969. *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus*.
   Suivi de *Principes philosophiques des mathématiques d'apres le Commentaire de Proclus aux deux premiers livres des Eléments d'Euclide*, par Nicolai Hartmann ; traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Pesloüan.
2. Rabouin, David. 2005. "La 'mathématique universelle' entre mathématique et philosophie, d'Aristote à Proclus." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 68:249-268.

English Studies

1. Rabouin, David. 2005. "La 'mathématique universelle' entre mathématique et philosophie, d'Aristote à Proclus." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 68:249-268.
2. Bechtle, Gerald. 2007. "How to Apply the Modern Concepts of *Mathesis Universalis* and *Scientia Universalis* to Ancient Philosophy. Aristotle, Platonisms, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Descartes." In *Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern*, edited by Corrigan, Kevin and Turner, John D., 129-154. Leiden: Brill.
   Abstract: "This chapter concentrates on applying modern concepts like *mathesis universalis* and *scientia universalis* to the Ancient Philosophy of Aristotle, Platonisms, Gilbert of Poitiers and Descartes and to reconsider the available evidence so as to view seemingly well-known doctrines in a new light. To do this one needs to find an appropriate instrument for this, as Napolitano (*) undoubtedly has; the new conceptual tool should not only be some kind of gadget, but should also be made to do real work. In the present case, a distinction between, rather than a conscious conflation of, *mathesis universalis* (common or universal mathematic) and *scientia universalis* (universal science), might help us to consider some well-known (though obviously often uncertain) doctrinal facts about well-known philosophers from a new perspective. It has surprising shifts of emphasis and the introduction of new distinctions may eventually cause us to ask new systematic questions."
   "However, the emphasis of this paper lies, with regard to the concept of *mathesis universalis* not so much on the historical details as on the more general systematical outlines. Therefore it should suffice to begin our work with an understanding of *mathesis universalis* that implies not much more than *universal* (or *general* or *common*) *mathematical science*, which of course still allows for a range of diverse meanings. What matters is to remain true to the sense of *mathesis universalis* while not confusing the two very different notions somehow inherent in the Latin,

i.e., that of *universal mathematic* on the one hand and that of universal science on the other. Λ clear line should be drawn between these two concepts, of which the former is *mathematical* (even though sometimes in a wider sense), the latter not. I trust that it will become clear in this paper that both for historical and systematical reasons it is not only justified, but even necessary, to draw this general distinction between *universal mathematic* and *universal science* in this way." (p. 130)
(*) Linda M. Napolitano Valditara, *Le idee, i numeri, l'ordine. La dottrina della* mathesis universalis *dall'Accademia antica al neoplatonismo*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1988.

3. Cantù, Paola. 2010. "Aristotle's prohibition rule on kind-crossing and the definition of mathematics as a science of quantities." *Synthese* no. 174:225-235.
"The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development of mathematics into a general science of quantities. Special reference is made to Proclus' commentary to Euclid's first book of *Elements*, to the sixteenth century translations of Euclid's work into Latin and to the works of Stevin, Wallis, Viète and Descartes. The prohibition rule on kind-crossing formulated by Aristotle in *Posterior analytics* is used to distinguish between conceptions that share the same name but are substantively different: for example the search for a broader genus including all mathematical objects; the search for a common character of different species of mathematical objects; and the effort to treat magnitudes as numbers."
4. Klein, Jacob. 1968. *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Translated from the original German: *Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra*, published in Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie und Physik, Abt. B, Studien, v. 3, 1934.
Reprinted: New York, Dover Publications, 1992.

See in particular: Chapter 11.3: The reinterpretation of the *katholou pragmateia* as *Mathesis Universalis* in the sense of a*rs analytice*, pp. 178-185, and Chapter 12: The cconcept of *number*: A. In Stevin (186), B. In Descartes (197), C. In Wallis, pp. 211-224.

Studi Italiani

1. Napolitano Valditara, Linda M. 1988. *Le idee, i numeri, l'ordine. La dottrina della mathesis universalis dall'Accademia antica al neoplatonismo*. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
   Indice: Capitolo Primo: Per una definizione di *mathesis universalis*: notazioni storiche ed indicazioni semantiche. La definizione cartesiana di *mathesis universalis*, 11; Il concetto di *mathesis universalis* nei secoli XVI e XVII, 26; Capitolo Secondo: Le principali fonti (storiche e teoriche) della *mathesis universalis:* Platone, Aristotele, Euclide, Proclo.
   L'uso delle fonti 45; Le fonti storiche: dai " problemi" ai "teoremi"; dal numero figurato alla *quantitas* 50; Le fonti teoretiche: Euclide 74; Le fonti teoretiche: Proclo, 96; Capitolo Terzo: Il progetto della *mathesis universalis* nell'Accademia antica.
   Riflessioni introduttive, 149; Speusippo, 156; Senocrate 185; Eudosso di Cnido e la teoria delle proporzioni. Teorie e problemi dell'*Epinomide* 209; Conclusioni sull'Accademia antica 229;
   Capitolo Quarto: La flessione della *mathesis universalis* fra il III ed il I scolo a. C.
   L'Accademia scettica e l' "irrazionalità" dell'epoca ellenistica 283; La prima Accademia scettica: Arcesilao di Pitane 286; La nuova Accademia scettica: Carneade di Cirene 293; Filone di Larissa, Antioco di Ascalona e la ripresa del realismo 306; La scuola scientifica di Alessandria fra teoria e tecnica. Rigore ed invenzione in Archimede 310;
   Capitolo Quinto: Alcune connessioni tra *mathesis universalis*, filosofia medioplatonica e neo-pitagorismo 343.

Il medioplatonismo 343; La sistemazione delle scienze nel *Didaskalikòs*: il ruolo dell'analisi ed il significato della dialettica 348; La caduta della matematizzazione nella *Ideenlehre* medioplatonica. Plutarco, la φίλη ἀριθμητική ed il pitagorismo 378; Il neopitagorismo, l'aritmologia ed il matematismo di Nicomaco di Gerasa 413; L'esemplarità matematica nella nuova teologia neopitagorica e medioplatonica 434; La matematica dell'età imperiale: storia e storiografia 469;
Capitolo Sesto: Appunti per una connessione fra *mathesis universalis* e neoplatonismo.
Mathesis universalis e neoplatonismo 537; Giamblico di Calcide: Περὶ της κοινής μαθηματικής ἐπιστήμης, 539; Conclusioni.
Concezione arcaico-tradizionale del numero e *mathesis universalis* 573; Le definizioni del numero e la dottrina dei principi dualistica e monistica 575; Forme della *mathesis universalis* nella tradizione platonica e pitagorica 577; Le relazioni d'ordine 580; *Ordo geometrìcus* e gnoseologia 583; I correttivi al matematismo 586.
Bibliografia 593; Indice dei luoghi 617-652.

Estudios en Español

1. Ortiz de Landázuri, Carlos. 2000. "Mathesis universalis en Proclo de las aporias cosmologicas al universo euclideo." *Anuario Filosofico* no. 33:229-257.
English Abstract: "The author shows how Proclo is a precursor of 'Mathesis universalis' concept, without admitting the aporetic method of mathematics which is in Plato, Aristotle and Euclides thought. Today, his paradigm is rejected but it is a decisive factor to understand the sources of Western thought. This study deals with the works of Brisson, Cleary, Trudeau, Beierwaltes and Schmitz."

RENAISSANCE PERIOD: BEFORE DESCARTES

Études en Français

1. Angelini, Annarita. 2006. "« Un autre ordre du monde » : Science et mathématiques d'après les commentateurs de Proclus au *Cinquecento*." *Revue d'histoire des sciences* no. 59:265-283.
2. Bonnet, Stéphane. 2005. "La philosophie mathématique de Giordano Bruno." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 68:315-330.
3. Helbing, Mario Otto. 2000. "La fortune des Commentaires de Proclus sur le premier livre des *Éléments* d'Euclide à l'époque de Galilée." In *La philosophie des mathématiques de l'Antiquité tardive. Actes du colloque international Fribourg, Suisse (24-26 septembre 1998)*, edited by Bechtle, Gerald and O'Meara, Dominic J., 173-193. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse.
4. Mehl, Édouard. 2010. "La science capitale: Johann Valentin Andreae et les mathématiques." In *Religion und Naturwissenschaften im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, edited by Greyerz, Kaspar von, Kaufmann, Thomas, Siebenhüner, Kim and Zaugg, Roberto, 124-142. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.
5. Rabouin, David. 2010. "Le rôle de Proclus dans les débats sur la 'mathématique universelle' à la Renaissance." In *Études sur le Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Eléments d'Euclide*, edited by Lernould, Alain, 217-234. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Press Universitaires du Septentrion.

Énglish Studies

1. Bockstaele, Paul. 2009. "Between Viète and Descartes: Adriaan van Roomen and the *Mathesis Universalis*." *Archiv for History of Exact Sciences* no. 63:433-470.

"Adriaan van Roomen published an outline of what he called a *Mathesis Universalis* in 1597. This earned him a well-deserved place in the history of early modern ideas about a universal mathematics which was intended to encompass both geometry and arithmetic and to provide general rules valid for operations involving numbers, geometrical magnitudes, and all other quantities amenable to measurement and calculation. '*Mathesis Universalis*' (MU) became the most common (though not the only) term for mathematical theories developed with that aim. At some time around 1600 van Roomen composed a new version of his MU, considerably different from the earlier one. This second version was never effectively published and it has not been discussed in detail in the secondary literature before. The text has, however, survived and the two versions are presented and compared in the present article. Sections 1-6 are about the first version of van Roomen's MU the occasion of its publication (a controversy about Archimedes' treatise on the circle, Sect. 2), its conceptual context (Sect. 3), its structure (with an overview of its definitions, axioms, and theorems) and its dependence on Clavius' use of numbers in dealing with both rational and irrational ratios (Sect. 4), the geometrical interpretation of arithmetical operations multiplication and division (Sect. 5), and an analysis of its content in modern terms. In his second version of a MU van Roomen took algebra into account, inspired by Viète's early treatises; he planned to publish it as part of a new edition of Al-Khwarizmi's treatise on algebra (Sect. 7). Section 8 describes the conceptual background and the difficulties involved in the merging of algebra and geometry; Sect. 9 summarizes and analyzes the definitions, axioms and theorems of the second version, noting the differences with the first version and tracing the influence of Viète. Section 10 deals with the influence of van Roomen on later discussions of MU, and briefly sketches Descartes' ideas about MU as expressed in the latter's *Regulae*."

2. Cifoletti, Giovanna. 2006. "From Valla to Viète: The Rhetorical Reform of Logic and Its Use in Early Modern

Algebra." *Early Science and Medicine* no. 11:390-423. "Lorenzo Valla's rhetorical reform of logic resulted in important changes in sixteenth-century mathematical sciences, and not only in mathematical education and in the use of mathematics in other sciences, but also in mathematical theory itself. Logic came to be identified with dialectic, syllogisms with enthymemes and necessary truth with the limit case of probable truth. Two main ancient authorities mediated between logical and mathematical concerns: Cicero and Proclus. Cicero's 'common notions' were identified with Euclid's axioms, so that mathematics could be viewed as core knowledge shared by all human kind. Proclus' interpretation of Euclid's axioms gave rise to the idea of a universal human natural light of reasoning and of a *mathesis universalis* as a basic mathematics common to both arithmetic and geometry and as an art of thinking interpretable as algebra. "

Studi Italiani

1. Crapulli, Giovanni. 1969. *Mathesis universalis. Genesi di una idea nel XVI secolo*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo. Indice: Premessa 7; I. Il V libro degli *Elementi* di Euclide, il *Commento al I libro degli Elementi* di Proclo e la problematica di una scienza matematica comune 9; II. La 'scientia communis' matematica nel *Commentarium de certitudine mathematicarum* di A. Piccolomini (1547). L'insegnamento delle matematiche allo Studio padovano sulla metà del sec. XVI: F. Delfino, P. Catena, F. Barozzi 33; III. Il *Commento* di Proclo nelle interpretazioni di P. Ramo e C. Dasipodio: 'dialectica' e 'communis scientia universalis' 63; IV. La 'scientia mathematica communis' in analogia alla 'prima philosophia' secondo B. Pereira 93; V. Il progetto della 'prima mathesis' nell'*Apologia pro Archimede* di A. van Roomen 101; VI. La 'mathematica generalis' nella *Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum* di J. H. Alsted (1613) 125; VII. Conclusioni sulla *mathesis universalis* nel sec. XVI;

Appendici.
I. Scritti matematici (1564, 1570, 1593) di C. Dasipodio 157; II. Dalla 'Cosmographia' (1585) di F. Barozzi 205; III. La 'Apologia pro Archimede' (VI-VIII capp.; 1597) di A. van Roomen 209; IV. La 'Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum' (1613) di J. H. Alsted 243;
Indici.
Indice terminologico 277; Indice dei nomi propri 279-285.

Estudios en Español

1. Vieira Oliveira, Zaqueu. 2011. "Vida e Obra de Adriaan van Roomen (1561-1615)." *Anais do IX Seminário Nacional de História da Matemática*:1-12.
English Abstract: "Adriaan van Roomen (Louvain, 1561 – Mainz, 1615) was mathematician and physician. He studied mathematics and philosophy in Cologne, then studied medicine in this city and then in Louvain and Italy. In 1585, on a trip to Rome, received the degree of *medicinae licenciatus*.
From 1586 to 1592 was professor of mathematics and medicine at the University of Louvain and in 1593 became the first professor of medicine at the newly founded University of Wurceburgo. In 1594 received the degree of doctor of medicine in Bologna. Between 1596 and 1603 was the Chapter mathematician's Cathedral of Wurceburgo [Würzburg]. Many of his works are medical theses defended his students who taught classes at universities. Already some of his work in astronomy, botany, meteorology and fireworks are just compilations of works by ancient authors or their períod. Already in mathematics, some of his works also contain references to ancient authors, but his ideas about *mathesis universalis* and trigonometry, show the originality of van Roomen and present it as a big calculator. The most important mathematical works of van Roomen are: *Ideae Mathematicae pars prima* (1593), *Problema Apolloniacum* (1596) and *In Archimedis circuli dimensionem* (1597) and astronomy *Ouranographia sive*

caeli descriptio (1591) and *Speculum Astronomicum* (1606). Van Roomen also communicated with various scholars of his time through correspondence. The Jesuit Priest Christoph Clavius was the most correspondent goals, however we find letters to the astronomers Johannes Kepler and Christoph Grienberge."

RENÉ DESCARTES

René Descartes: les *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* et la recherche de la *mathesis universalis*

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ

Études en Français

1. Berlioz, Dominique. 1993. "Langue adamique et caractéristique universelle chez Leibniz." In *Leibniz and Adam*, edited by Dascal, Marcelo and Yakira, Elhanan, 153-168. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects.
2. Couturat, Louis. 1901. *La logique de Leibniz: d'aprés des documents inédits*. Paris: Felix Alcan.
   Reprint: Hildesheim, Olms, 1961 e 1985.
3. Gérard, Vincent. 2006. "Leibniz et la mathématique formelle." *Philosophie* no. 92:29-55.
4. Knecht, Herbert. 1981. *La logique chez Leibniz. Essai sur le rationalisme baroque*. Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme.
   Voir le Chapitre III: *La mathématique universelle* pp. 91-123.
5. Rauzy, Jean-Baptiste. 1995. "Quid sit natura prius ? La conception leibnizienne de l'ordre." *Revue de Métaphysique*

et de Morale no. 98:31-48.
6. Schmitz, François. 2000. "La pyramide de Leibniz. Note sur le logiquement possible et la logique modale." *Cahiers de Philosophie du Langage* no. 4:63-99.

English Studies

1. Weingartner, Paul. 1983. "The ideal of the mathematization of all sciences and of "more geometrico" in Descartes and Leibniz." In *Nature Mathematized. Historical and Philosophical Case Studies in Classical Modern Natural Philosophy*, edited by Shea, William R., 151-195. Dordrecht: Reidel.
2. Westerhoff, Jan C. 1999. "'Poeta Calculans': Harsdorffer, Leibniz, and the "mathesis universalis"." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 60:449-467.
   "This paper seeks to indicate some connections between a major philosophical project of the seventeenth century, the conception of a "mathesis universalis", and the practice of baroque poetry. I shall argue that these connections consist in a peculiar view of language and systems of notation which was particularly common in European baroque culture and which provided the necessary conceptual background for both poetry and the *mathesis universalis*."
3. Dascal, Marcelo. 1987. *Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought*. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishers.
4. Mittelstrass, Jürgen. 1985. "Leibniz and Kant on mathematical and philosophical knowledge." In *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz*, edited by Okruhlik, Kathleen and Brown, James Robert, 227-261. Dordrecht: Reidel.
   See in particular § 2 *Mathesis universalis* pp. 232-239.
5. Pombo, Olga. 1987. *Leibniz and the Problem of a Universal Language*. Münster: Nodus Publikationen.
6. ———. 2002. "Leibniz and the encyclopaedic project." In *Ciência, tecnologia y bien comun: la actualidad de Leibniz*, 267-278. Valencia: Editorial de la Universidas Politecnica de Valencia.

"My talk will have three moments. In a *first moment*, I will try to identify the main determinations of encyclopaedic project in its whole. Since Varro (116-24 b.c.), *Rerum Divinorum et Humanorum Antiquitates*, St. Isidorus (560-636) *Etimologies*, Alsted *Encyclopaedia Omnia Scientiarum* (1630), or Diderot and D'Alembert *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers* (1751-1765), to the *Internet* - which constitutes (I will argue) the most recent and eloquent development of the history of encyclopaedism - the aim will be to look for what is common to all this kind of excessive works. In a *second moment*, I will attempt to understand how Leibniz's idea of encyclopaedia inserts itself in that project of all times, what specific place Leibniz occupies within those many attempts. In the *third moment*, I will try to estimate the presence of Leibniz's idea of encyclopaedia in subsequent developments of encyclopaedism, namely in the XX / XXI century. This will be my humble contribution to this Congress whose major purpose is to think out the actuality of Leibniz."

7. Rabouin, David. 2012. "Interpretations of Leibniz's *Mathesis universalis* at the beginning of the XXth Century." In *New Essays on Leibniz Reception. In Science and Philosophy of Science 1800-2000*, edited by Krömer, Ralf; and Chin-Drian, Yannick, 187-201. Dordrecht: Springer. "In his doctoral dissertation, completed in 1922 under the direction of Edmund Husserl and published in 1925 in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschungen*, Dietrich Mahnke proposed a very valuable overview of the so-called "Leibniz Renaissance". As indicated by the choice of his title: *Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik*, this renaissance was seen by Mahnke as marked by a tension between two Leibnizian programs: that of a "universal mathematics" and that of a "metaphysics of individuation". His agenda was to propose a way of reconciling these two programs through a point of view inspired by the development of Husserlian phenomenology. In this paper, I will concentrate on the first program, "universal

mathematics” or *mathesis universalis*, and see how the interpretation of this Leibnizian theme was indeed a key point in the demarcation between different ways of articulating logic, mathematics and philosophy at the beginning of the XXth century. I will pay particular attention to the way in which commentators carefully selected their texts in the Leibnizian corpus. It will be an occasion to exhibit certain postulates lurking behind classical interpretations of Leibniz in the studies by Russell, Couturat, Cassirer, or Brunschvicg. I will then contrast these readings with another interpretation of Leibniz’s *mathesis universalis*, permitted by a better access to the texts and a somewhat calmer discussion around the relationship between logic, mathematics and philosophy. " (p. 187)

8. ———. 2019. "Mathematics and Imagination in Early Modern Times: Descartes and Leibniz’ mathesis universalis in the light of Proclus’ Commentary of Euclid’s Elements." In *Knowledge and the Power of Imagination, 17th-18th Centuries*, edited by Vermeir, Koen. Dordrecht: Springer. Not yet published.

Deutschen Studien

1. Danek, Jaromit, and Möckel, Christian. 2000. "Idee der Mathesis universalis - die logische Vernunft: Leibniz und Husserl." In *Phänomenologie und Leibniz*, edited by Cristin, Renato and Kiyoshi, Sakei, 88-121. Freiburg: Alber.
2. Heinekamp, Albert. 1975. "Natürliche Sprache und Allgemeine Charakteristik bei Leibniz." In *Akten des II Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses. Hannover, 17-22. Juli 1972. Vol IV: Erkenntnislehre, Logik und Sprachphilosophie*, 257-286. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
3. Mahnke, Dietrich. 1925. "Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik." *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschungen*:305-612.
   Reprint: Stuttgart: Frommann 1964.

4. Poser, Hans. 1979. "Signum, notio und idea. Elemente der Leibnizschen Zeichentheorie." *Zeitschrift für Semiotik* no. 1:309-324.
English Abstract: "Leibniz' approach towards a "*characteristica universalis*", a "universal art of signs" (Zeichenkunst), as an essential instrument of human knowledge is rooted both in the Cartesian ideal method of a universal mathesis and in the *ars magna* as a universal language comprising all the simple concepts and their combinations. The *signum* (sign vehicle) expresses a *notio* (concept) based on an idea fundamental to the *res* (object). The assumption here is that an isomorphic relationship between the logical and ontological areas is the precondition enabling denotation. However, the deficiency of human thought prevents characterization in its entirety; a multitude of sign systems - "Bereichscharakteristiken", area-specific characteristics - take the place of this ideal. Under these conditions it is also possible to transpose ordinary language into a *lingua rationis*. Beyond that, the importance of ordinary language consists in its correlating sign and meaning."
5. Risse, Wilhelm. 1969. "Die *Characteristica Universalis* bei Leibniz." *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia* no. 1:107-116.
6. Schneider, Martin. 1988. "Funktion und Grundlegung der Mathesis Universalis im Leibnizschen Wissenschaftsystem." *Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft* no. 15:162-182.
7. Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf. 1856. *Über Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik*. Berlin: Königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Estudios en Español

1. Cardoso, Adelino. 1996. "Mathesis Leibniziana." *Philosophica: Revista do Departamento de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa*:51-77.
"Dans cet article, l'auteur essaie de montrer qu'on trouve chez Leibniz une "mathesis", c'est-a-dire une conception du savoir et de l'organisation des savoirs, originale, laquelle est

entierèment discernable d'autres "mathesis" qui ont été proposées par ses contemporains du XVIIe siecle. Du point de vue thématique, l'auteur croit que cette " mathesis" reçoit son intelligibilité de la relation que Leibniz établit entre la métaphysique et les mathématiques. Sous ce rapport, on constate des vraies transformations dans la pensée de Leibniz, dès le moment où il fait son adhesion au mécanisme (1668) jusqu'à la formulation de sa dernière pensée. Dans cette évolution, la correspondance avec de Volder joue un role décisif."

AFTER LEIBNIZ

Études en Français

1. Charrak, André. 2009. *Empirisme et théorie de la connaissance. Réflexion et fondement des sciences au XVIIIe siècle*. Paris: Vrin.
2. Tosel, André. 2005. "La “Science nouvelle” de Vico face à la “mathesis universalis” " *Noesis* no. 8:1-12.

English Studies

1. Jesseph, Douglas M. 2010. "The “merely mechanical” vs. the “scab of symbols”: seventeenth century disputes over the criteria of mathematical rigor." In *Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics* edited by Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten, 273-288. London: College Publications.
   "This paper deals with seventeenth-century understandings of rigorous demonstration. Although there was a widely-shared concept of rigor that has its origins in classical Greek sources, philosophers in the early modern period were divided over how to characterize the ultimate foundation for

mathematics. One group (whom I term the “geometric foundationalists”) held that seeming physical concepts such as space, body and motion, were properly foundational. The other group (whom I call “algebraic foundationalists”) claimed that the true foundations of mathematics must be abstract notions of quantity which were the subject of algebra, or even a more general *mathesis universalis* that encompassed all reasoning about number and measure. The geometric foundationalists faced the objection that they had introduced “merely mechanical” or insufficiently abstract principles into the foundations of mathematics. In contrast, the algebraic foundationalists needed to rebut the accusation that they based mathematics on a “scab of symbols”, or empty notation divorced from anything real or substantial. I argue that this episode offers some useful insights into general questions about foundations, and can help us understand what is at stake in disputes over foundational issues, as well as how such disputes rise to prominence and then fade away."

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de Hankel, etc.) qui norment les possibilité d'admission d'objets dans le champ analytique formel; 3) la géométrie comme science de l'espace est exclue de ce champ; 4) il existe en revanche une analogie radicale entre l'axiologie formelle et la *mathesis universalis*; 5) Husserl n'est pas seulement redevable a Leibniz de l'idée de *mathesis universalis*, mais également de sa conversion philosophique; 6) la *mathesis* philosophique pensée a la lumière de la théorie de la connaissance telle qu'elle est élaborée par Leibniz vers 1684 n'est, ni ne veut être, une théorie de l' être, mais une théorie pure de la signification; 7) cette théorie de la signification s'articule sur une métaphysique formelle dont Husserl emprunte le concept a Lotze. Elle a pour tâche de décrire les formes idéales auxquelles doivent correspondre les relations entre les éléments d'un monde, quel qu'il soit."

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Husserl introduit l'idée d'une *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* pure en tant qu'entreprise méta-théorique dont le but est d'étudier les relations entre théories, à savoir la manière par laquelle une théorie est dérivée ou fondée à partir d'une autre. Dès lors, lorsque Husserl affirme que le meilleur exemple d'une telle théorie pure des multiplicités se trouve dans les mathématiques, cela risque donc de prêter à confusion. En effet, la théorie pure des théories ne saurait être simplement identifiée aux mathématiques qui relèvent de la topologie, mais considérée en tant que *mathesis universalis*. Bien qu'une telle position ne fût sans doute pas entièrement claire en 1900-01, Husserl ne tardera pas à relier explicitement théorie des multiplicités et *mathesis universalis*.En ce sens, la *mathesis universalis*, théorie des théories en général, est une discipline formelle, apriori et analytique qui a pour but l'analyse des catégories sémantiques suprêmes et des catégories d'objets qui leur sont corrélées. Dans cet article j'essayerai de comprendre le développement de la notion de *Mannigfaltigkeit* au sein de la pensée de Husserl (de ses débuts mathématiques jusqu'au rôle central qu'elle jouera plus tard) à partir de l'arrière-fond et du contexte mathématique du développement de la philosophie de Husserl lui-même."

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   See in particular § 2. *Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the mathesis universalis,* pp. 105-111.
   "Husserl's analyses of the mathesis universalis, in keeping with their detailed presentation in FTL [Formal and Transcendental Logic 1929], continue to offer a durable foundation for more extensive phenomenological investigations of the formal sciences. Here Husserl makes a particularly important distinction, one of exemplary significance for the whole of phenomenological description. In the first place, the mathesis universalis understood as objectively existing science -- in Husserl's terminology as objective logic (26) -- is to be phenomenologically-descriptively analyzed. In the second place, these investigations directed toward objective logic are to be

supplemented through a subjective logic i. e., (27) through analyses of the cognitive structures of mathematical or logical knowing. The problems Husserl takes on in FTL according to these terms are particularly, (i) the relation between formal logic and mathematics (their co-extension and distinguishability), and (ii) the inner structure of the mathesis universalis. Both problems will be briefly addressed in what follows." p. 105

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   "The author's aim is to point out interpretations of modal logic which are compatible with the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The book consists of three parts with ten chapters. In the first part (pp. 19-77) the author presents E. Husserl's conception of a "mathesis universalis". For Husserl, the mathesis universalis contains both, formal mathematics and formal (symbolic) logic. It has a hierarchical structure consisting of a pure logical grammar, a logic of consequences and a logic of truths. The author pays special attention to the differences between formal logic and formal mathematics which can be observed despite their extensional identity.\par In the second part (pp. 81--143) the author presents what he calls "phenomenological semantics", i.e. the phenomenological theory of modalization being a general analysis of intentions. The author distinguishes three levels of modalization, the level of protological passive synthesis, the

level of protological active synthesis, and the level of (logical) predication.\par The third part (pp. 147--194) combines the results of the preceding parts in a phenomenological criticism of modern modal logic, especially its interpretation as possible worlds semantics. The problems of applying this semantics to natural language are seen as anchor points of phenomenological criticism. The provability interpretation of modal logic is proposed as a genetic interpretation, notwithstanding the problems which Hilbert's program and Husserl's closely related idea of definite manifolds had with Gödel's and Church's results. (Volker Peckhaus)".

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

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   "Original, stirring interpretation of Descartes's concept of mathesis universalis as a science of pure, naked quantities without any concrete reality, hence independent of imagination in Descartes's sense. Descartes recognized this conception to be practically unattainable; his algebraic geometry was merely the most useful and convenient compromise he could find. The thesis rests on distinctions between "imagination" acting in time and "understanding"

outside time; memory and perception; deductive reasoning and immediate cognition. Important appendix on Descartes's and Vieta's analysis "au point du vue du role de l'imagination" (37-41); also on Descartes's *Regulae* (42-45), to the understanding of which this study makes a profound contribution." (Sebba, p. 102).

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    "Les trois disciplines théorétiques, métaphysique, mathématique et physique constituent le lieu essentiel d'intervention de la philosophie de Descartes dans les discussions de l'âge classique, et encore dans les nôtres, mais trop souvent de manière séparée. Il s'agit dans cet essai de comprendre comment l'une des tâches que Descartes assigne à la philosophie première, au-delà de la validation extérieure des sciences contre le scepticisme, est d'en redéfinir les objets et d'en retracer les frontières, de manière à assurer l'intelligibilité intégrale du réel qui se présente à l'esprit comme phénomène, et ce jusqu'aux passions de l'âme. Cette discussion concerne au premier chef les concepts cartésiens de mathématique et la manière

dont Descartes, en particulier dans les Méditations, recompose la mathématique pure à partir de la figure et du mouvement pour identifier l'essence des corps, et donc la possibilité d'une physique, à son objet. Sont concernées les positions fondamentales de Descartes en philosophie naturelle: rapport entre physique et mathématique, lois de la nature, atomisme, théorie des substances individuelles, et, en contrepoint, les instruments de connaissance, particulièrement la sensation et l'imagination."

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"Décrire la *Géométrie* comme un « essai » illustrant la méthode cartésienne, ou comme une application des règles formulées dans le *Discours de la Méthode*, conduit, à notre avis, à sousestimer le lien entre ce brillant « essai » et l'œuvre philosophique de Descartes. Certes, une telle description de la *Géométrie* fait état d'une dépendance entre l'unique application mathématique de la méthode cartésienne et les principes métaphysiques sur lesquels elle se fonde. Mais il faut bien noter que le lien entre la *Géométrie* et la méthode cartésienne que l'on suggère par là paraît faible. La conséquence est que les études consacrées à ce texte se divisent en analyse « philosophique » et en analyse « mathématique ». En fait, lorsqu'on prend en compte l'ensemble de l'œuvre cartésienne dans son rapport avec la *Géométrie*, la situation paraît toute différente. Les *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, en particulier, permettent d'établir un lien plus étroit entre la méthode cartésienne et la *Géométrie*.
L'objet de cet article est de mettre en évidence tous ces rapports; nous examinons les questions historiographiques soulevées ci-dessus et, en particulier, les conséquences de la séparation entre une approche philosophique et une approche purement mathématique. Nous prétendons que cette séparation est sans fondement dans le cas de l'œuvre cartésienne et qu'elle est susceptible de conduire à des conclusions discutables."
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"L'œuvre de Descartes, et notamment les *Regulae*, a été interprétée dans son rapport avec la philosophie ancienne ou médiévale. Un vaste domaine de recherche est aujourd'hui ouvert qui lie les *Regulae* à leur environnement immédiat. Plus de 20.000 ouvrages portant le titre *dialectica* voient le jour de 1520 à 1630 qui traitent de l'invention, de l'intuition, de la déduction, de la méthode, de l'ordre, de la série et de l'application de ces concepts dialectiques aux autres savoirs, notamment mathématiques. Ces logiques d'inspiration variée se heurtent entre courants dont la typologie est repérable. Les *Regulae* se réfèrent à l'un d'entre eux par leur plan d'ensemble, par leurs disposition de détail, par leurs concepts et par leur philosophie. Cette appartenance ramiste est commandée par la *Dialectique* de La Ramée de 1555. Cet article analyse le concept de dialectique dressé contre l'*Organon*, son fondement dans l'intuition des natures simples, son développement en *mathesis universalis* au travers des cent années de travaux qui précèdent l'élaboration cartésienne des *Regulae*. Or ces dispositions ne cesseront pas d'avoir cours dans l'œuvre cartésienne." (p. 3)

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"Le quatrième des concepts de la dialectique presentée dans les "Regulae" de Descartes répond a une lourde histoire au cours de laquelle il est consideré comme étant la suite naturelle du recours à la méthode. Depuis Dasypodius jusqu'a Romanus, ces concepts, issus des travaux de La Ramée sur la dialectique et sur Euclide, ont eté longuement travaillés et discutés, notamment par les auteurs du courant ramiste. Le choix particulier fait par Descartes répond a une disposition ordinaire dans la logique du XVIeme siècle et se propage par lui a travers le XVIIeme siècle."

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"L'histoire du texte des *Régles pour la Direction de l'Esprit* (*Regulae*) de Descartes est un peu singulière: non publié du vivant de Descartes, il n'a paru qu'en 1701, dans les *Opera Posthuma* d'Amsterdam. De façon plus significative, et contrairement aux autres traités cartésiens perdus, ce texte secret n'est jamais explicitement evoqué par Descartes, fût-ce au détour d'une correspondance. Par leur étroite dépendance vis à vis des mathématiques, les *Regulae* sont cependant un texte majeur, constitutives de la pensée de leur auteur dans ses années de jeunesse (1619-1628), et par là de toute la philosophie moderne. Descartes avait jugé le texte suffisamment important pour I'emmener à Stockholm, où il a été découvert apres sa mort, dans ses papiers. Entre les mathématiques et les *Regulae*, ce texte "éclatant et obscur" (J.P. Weber), il est ces trois types principaux de rapports croisés que nous tâcherons d'analyser: historiquement d'abord, quelles furent la formation et I'expérience mathématique du jeune Descartes, qui constituerent, à notre sens, I'armature conceptuelle du texte. Quelles sont ensuite les voies par lesquelles, dans les *Regulae*, Descartes a pu transmuer cette expérience mathématique premiere à la fois en une pratique, une méthode, une théorie de la connaissance, enfin en une épistémologie assez radicalement neuve. Enfin, et prenant

Descartes au sérieux nous examinerons à I'occasion cette question: quel est le sort réservé, de nos jours, à cette épistémologie cartésienne, en particulier confrontée aux mathématiques contemporaines?"

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concerning the nature of mathematical truth. In each case, the mathesis universalis is designed to fit the innate capacities of the mind and the objects studied by mathesis are set apart from the mind as purely mechanical and geometrically representable objects. Second, Descartes' account of perceptual cognition, the principles of which are found in the Regulae , is examined. In this account, Descartes describes perception as a mechanical process up to the moment of conscious awareness. This point of awareness and the corresponding actions of the mind are, he claims, independent from mechanical principles; they are incorporeal and cannot be explained reductively. Finally, when Descartes outlines the explanatory bases of his natural science, he identifies certain "simple natures." These are the undetermined categories according to which actual things can be known. Descartes makes an explicit distinction between material simples and intellectual simples. It is argued that this distinction suggests a difference in kind between the sciences of the material world and the science or pure knowledge of the intellectual world. Though the Regulae is focused on physical or material explanations, there is a clear commitment to distinguishing this type of explanation from the explanation of mental content and mental acts. Hence, the Regulae demonstrates Descartes' early, methodological commitment to substance dualism."

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"A careful analysis of *Rule IV* requires the acceptance of a later dating for this fragment -- probably as late as 1639-1640, when the *Meditations* were uppermost in Descartes's thought. It also permits a clarification of his terminology: Mathesis is a science of necessary relations. 'Mathesis universalis', rather than a mere extension of 'mathesis', is a distinct discipline which transforms systems of necessary relations into genuine 'scientia' by providing the underlying conditions for the very possibility of knowledge. Thus, Descartes provides not a simple mathematical method, but a very profound methodology."

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Related pages

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Linguistic Relativism (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) vs. Universal Grammar

INTRODUCTION

"Early in the twentieth century, American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942) inaugurated an important expansion of scientific investigation of the languages of native North America. As part of a broad critique of nineteenth-century evolutionary arguments he stressed the equal value of each language type and their independence from race and cultural level. He argued that each language necessarily represents an implicit classification of experience, that these classifications vary across languages, but that such variation probably has little effect on thought or culture. His student Edward Sapir (1884-1939) accepted the main thrust of Boas' position but came to feel that the closely knit system of categories in a language could represent incommensurable analyses of experience with effects on speakers' conceptual view points and aesthetic interpretations. Gestalt and psychoanalytic psychology and Sapir's own literary efforts also played a role in his thinking on this issue. Sapir's concern was not with linguistic form as such (for example, whether a language uses inflections or not), nor with linguistic content or meaning as such (for example, whether a language could refer to a particular referent), but rather with the formal organization of meaning characteristic of a language, the regular ways meanings are constructed (for example, grammatical categories and patterns of semantic composition). Despite the suggestiveness of his formulation, Sapir provided few specific illustrations of the sorts of influences he had in mind.

Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941), a gifted amateur linguist independently interested in these issues as they related to the nature of science, came into contact with Sapir in 1930 and began developing these views to a more systematic way. He analysed particular linguistic constructions, proposed mechanisms of influence, and provided empirical demonstrations of such influences on belief and behavior. However, his views on this issue are known to us largely through letters, unpublished manuscripts and popular pieces, which has led to considerable debate about his actual position. In this context, the one article on this issue prepared for a professional audience must be given special weight (see Whorf 1956). (1)Whorf argued that each language refers to an infinite variety of experiences with a finite array of formal categories (both lexical and grammatical) by trouping experiences together as analogically 'the same' for the purposes of speech. These categories also interrelate in a coherent way, reinforcing and complementing one another, so as to constitute an overall interpretation of experience. Languages vary considerably not only in the basic distinctions they recognize, but also in the assemblage of thesecategories into a coherent system of reference. Thus the system of categories which each language provides to its speakers is not a common, universal system, but one peculiar to the individual language, and one which makes possible a particular 'fashion of speaking'.
But speakers tend to assume that the categories and distinctions of their language are natural, given by external reality. Further, speakers make the tacit error of assuming that elements of experience which are classed together on one or another criterion for the purposes of speech are similar in other respects as well. The crux of Whorf's argument is that these linguistic categories are used as guides in habitual thought. When speakers attempt to interpret an experience in terms of a category available in their language they automatically involve the other meanings implicit in that particular category (analogy) and in the overall configuration of categories in which it is embedded. And speakers regard these other meanings as being intrinsic to the original experience rather than a product of linguistic analogy. Thus, language does not so much blind speakers to some obvious reality, but rather it suggests associations which are not

necessarily entailed by experience. Ultimately, these shaping forces affect not only everyday habitual thought but also more sophisticated philosophical and scientific activity. In the absence of another language (natural or artificial) with which to talk about experience, speakers will be unlikely to recognize the conventional nature of their linguistically based understandings." (p. 471)

Notes

(1) "The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language" (1939) reprinted in B. L. Whorf Language, thought, and reality. Selected writings. Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1956 pp. 134-159).

From: John A. Lucy, "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis", in: Edward Craig (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London, New York: Routledge 1998.

"The original idea, variously attributable to Humboldt, Boas, Sapir, Whorf, was that the semantic structures of different languages might be fundamentally incommensurable, with consequences for the way in which speakers of specific languages might think and act. On this view, language, thought, and culture are deeply interlocked, so that each language might be claimed to have associated with it a distinctive world view.
These ideas captured the imagination of a generation of anthropologists, psychologists, and linguists, as well as members of the general public. They had deep implications for the way anthropologists should conduct their business, suggesting that translational difficulties might lie at the heart of their discipline. However, the ideas seemed entirely and abruptly discredited by the rise of the cognitive sciences in the 1960s, which favoured a strong emphasis on the commonality of human cognition and its basis in human genetic endowment. This emphasis was strengthened by developments within linguistic anthropology, with the discovery of significant semantic universals in color terms, the structure of ethno-botanical nomenclature, and (arguably) kinship terms.

However, there has been a recent change of intellectual climate in psychology, linguistics, and other disciplines surrounding anthropology, as well as within linguistic anthropology, towards an intermediate position, in which more attention is paid to linguistic and cultural difference, such diversity being viewed within the context of what we have learned about universals (features shared by all languages and cultures). New work in developmental psychology, while acknowledging underlying universal bases, emphasizes the importance of the socio-cultural context of human development. Within sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology there has also been increasing attention to meaning and discourse, and concomitantly a growing appreciation of how interpretive differences can be rooted as much in the systematic uses of language as in its structure." (pp. 2-3)
(...)
"The boldness of Whorf's formulation prompted a succession of empirical studies in America in the 1950s and early 1960s aimed at elucidating and testing what now became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.
Anthropological and linguistic studies by Trager, Hoijer, Lee, Casagrande, and others have been well reviewed elsewhere (see Lucy Language diversity and thought. A reformulation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis chapter 3; and this volume). These studies hardly touched on cognition, but in the same period a few psychologists (notably Lenneberg, Brown, Stefflre) did try to investigate the relation between lexical coding and memory, especially in the domain of color, and found some significant correlations (again see Lucy chapter 5). This line of work culminated, however, in the celebrated demonstration by Berlin & Kay (1969) of the language-independent saliency of "basic colors," which was taken as a decisive anti-relativist finding, and effectively terminated this tradition of investigations into the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There followed a period in which Whorf's own views in particular became the butt of extensive criticism.
It is clear from this background that the "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis in its classical form arose from deep historical roots but in a particular intellectual climate. Even though (it has been

closely argued by Lucy op. cit.) the original hypothesis has never been thoroughly tested, the intellectual milieu had by the 1960s entirely changed. Instead of empiricism, we now have rationalistic assumptions. Instead of the basic tenets of structuralism, in which each linguistic or social system must be understood first in internal terms before comparison is possible, modern comparative work (especially in linguistics) tends to presume that one can isolate particular aspects or traits of a system (e.g. aspect or subjecthood) for comparison. The justification, such as it is, is that we now have the outlines of a universal structure for language and perhaps cognition, which provides the terms for comparison. It is true that the assumption of unconscious processes continues, but now the emphasis is on the unconscious nature of nearly all systematic information processing, so that the distinctive character of Whorf's habitual thought has been submerged.
In this changed intellectual climate, and in the light of the much greater knowledge that we now have about both language and mental processing, it would be pointless to attempt to revive ideas about linguistic relativity in their original form. Nevertheless, there have been a whole range of recent intellectual shifts that make the ground more fertile for some of the original seeds to grow into new saplings. It is the purpose of this volume to explore the implications of some of these shifts in a number of different disciplines for our overall view of the relations between language, thinking, and society." (pp. 6-7)"

From: John J. Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson, *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS

"In traditional scholarship concerning the intellectual roots of the so-called Sapir -Whorf Hypothesis' -- a term perhaps first used by

Harry Hoijer (1904-1976) in 1954 in a paper at a conference devoted to the subject, but probably made more widely known through John B. Carroll's (b. 1916) posthumous edition of Benjamin Lee Whorf s papers in 1956 (cf page 27) -- these are traced largely, but not exclusively, to German language theory of the 17th (e.g., Leibniz) through the early 19th century, which, in Humboldt's version, connects the 'inner form' of a language with the particularity of a world view of the nation that speaks it. This traditional view (surveyed in Koerner 1992) has recently been challenged by Joseph (1996) and, where Whorf's work in general is concerned, by Lee (1996) in her monograph treatment of Whorfs 'theory complex' (especially Chapter 3). In this short paper the argument is made that these seemingly opposite positions concerning intellectual indebtnedness are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but that an allowance should he made for the presence, latent or keenly felt, of two distinct but at least loosely connected layers of influence discernible in the work of North American linguists and anthropologists studying indigenous languages from Whitney to Whorf and his followers. So while the first, perhaps more general and less explicit kind of influence (at least where Whorf is concerned) derives from a fairly long-standing tradition in German philosophy of language, appropriate room should definitely be given to the more immediate sources of the idea that one's native language determines individual and cultural patterns of thought which Joseph (1996) has documented so carefully, this idea held by Herder and, notably, by Humboldt (which he dubs the 'magic key' view), whereby language is seen as embodying the national mind and unfolding in line with the Romantic concept of history, in contrast to the other version (dubbed by him 'metaphysical garbage'), which envisions language developing within an evolutionary view of history and which is seen as introducing obstacles to logical thought. This latter view, Joseph holds, appears to have been commonplace in Cambridge analytical philosophy, represented most prominently by Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), and in Viennese logical positivism, reflected in the Work of Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970). Joseph identifies Charles Kay Ogden (1889-1957) as the key link between Cambridge and Vienna, whose

influential book of 1923 *The Meaning of Meaning,* co-authored with Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893-1979), subtitled "The influence of language on thought and of the science of symbolism", contains, Joseph demonstrates, many of the positions held by both Whorf and Sapir.
According to Joseph (1996), Sapir's positive review of the same year of Ogden and Richards' influential book marks a turning point from his view of language as a cultural product (as in his 1921 book *Language*, which incidentally was one of the works criticized in Ogden and Richards) to a sort of template around which the rest of culture is structured, as argued in his "The Status of Linguistics as a Science" (1929), This paper, Joseph suggests, like others of Sapir's writings from 1923 on, takes up the rhetoric of 'metaphysical garbage' almost exclusively. Whorf in turn, drawn by Sapir to structuralism from originally mystical interests in language - beginning with his discovery in 1924 of the quasi-Cabbalistic writings of Antoine Fahre d'Olivet (1768-1825), likewise takes up this 'garbage' line, interweaving it with 'magic key' only in the two years between Sapir's death and his own. Joseph in his important, indeed ground-breaking study on the subject -- also investigates other influences on Whorf, for instance the writings of the analytic philosopher Count Alfred Korzybski (1879-1950), founder of the General Semantics movement in the United States. As a result, my own paper, like my previous research on the subject, can be regarded as dealing more with part of the general intellectual climate that informed American scholarship during much of the 19th and the early 20th century, than with most of the direct, textually traceable sources, of the so-called Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis that Joseph had identified." (pp. 1-2)

From: E. F. K. Koerner, *Towards a 'Full Pedigree' of the 'Sapir-Whorf Hipothesys'. From Locke to Lucy*. In: Martin Pütz and Marjolijn H. Verspoor (eds.), *Explorations in Linguistic Relativity*, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2000, pp. 1-24.

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"Against recent arguments, which define alternative conceptual schemes in terms of failure of translatability and insist that since such schemes cannot be translated, they cannot be made intelligible, I argue that even if Whorf is mistaken about the Hopi, he does describe, using the same grammatical criteria as Strawson, a scheme radically different to that described in "Individual's" (our scheme). It seems appropriate to mark the difference by "alternative conceptual scheme." Further, I claim that not translation but rather a process of substitution of, or addition to, a first language is the key to understanding a radically different second language."

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7. Björk, Ingrid. 2008. *Relativizing Linguistic Relativity. Investigating Underlying Assumptions About Language in the Neo-Whorfian Literature*. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet.

   "This work concerns the linguistic relativity hypothesis, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which, in its most general form claims that 'lan-guage' influences 'thought'. Past studies into linguistic relativity have treated various aspects of both thought and language, but a growing body of literature has recently emerged, in this thesis referred to as neo-Whorfian, that empirically investigates thought and language from a cross-linguistic perspective and claims that the grammar or lexicon of a particular language influences the speakers' non-linguistic thought.
   The present thesis examines the assumptions about language that underlie this claim and criticizes the neo-Whorfian arguments from the point of view that they are based on misleading notions of language. The critique focuses on the operationalization of thought, language, and culture as separate vari-ables in the neo-Whorfian empirical investigations. The neo-Whorfian stud-ies explore language primarily as 'particular languages' and investigate its role as

a variable standing in a causal relation to the 'thought' variable. Tho-ught is separately examined in non-linguistic tests and found to 'correlate' with language.
As a contrast to the neo-Whorfian view of language, a few examples of other approaches to language, referred to in the thesis as sociocultural appro-aches, are reviewed. This perspective on language places emphasis on prac-tice and communication rather than on particular languages, which are vie-wed as secondary representations. It is argued that from a sociocultural per-spective, language as an integrated practice cannot be separated from tho-ught and culture. The empirical findings in the neo-Whorfian studies need not be rejected, but they should be interpreted differently. The findings of linguistic and cognitive diversity reflect different communicational practices in which language cannot be separated from non-language."

8. Black, Max. 1959. "Linguistic Relativity: The Views of Benjamin Lee Whorf." *The Philosophical Review* no. 68:228-238.

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Reprinted 1991.

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    "Presented are virtually unknown contributions to analytical philosophy by 18th and 19th century German philosophers with striking anticipations of Wittgenstein and 20th century analytical thought as well as of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity.
    Language is seen in its transcendental function; ordinary language as an indispensable metalanguage. An interdependence theory of language and thought leads to regard philosophy as critique of language and cognition. Its task: the elimination of metaphysics and pseudoproblems, The clarification of concepts and the meaning of propositions. The method claims therapeutic consequences."

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    "This is the first part of a two-part essay on Benjamin Lee Whorf's linguistic relativism: the thesis that the grammatical structure of one's language "shapes" the "form" of one's thoughts. This thesis has often been treated by anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists as an empirical claim, subject to scientific investigation, and a principal aim of this essay is to assess that general view of Whorf's thesis.

In this first part of the essay, a number of criticisms of Whorf's relativism are considered and are shown to rest on various misconceptions of Whorf's thesis."

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    "Intended as a commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Whorf's death, this paper reviews the revival of the thesis of linguistic relativity (the so-called "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis") in linguistics. If the demise of Whorf's hypothesis, in the early Sixties, was tantamount to an irrevocably condemnation by the philosophical community, then how should philosophers react to the rejuvenation of Whorf's hypothesis?

In my opinion philosophers should take seriously the recent attempts to reformulate that hypothesis in order to avoid oversimplifications. I challenge William Harvey, (*Philosophy Today*, summer 1996, pp. 273-286) by arguing that he is guilty of such an oversimplification."

22. Ellos, William J. 1982. "Benjamin Lee Whorf and Ultimate Reality and Meaning." *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* no. 5:140-150.

    "Surface and depth structure forms the central focal point of Whorf's creative work. In his developed system surface language-forms are called phenotypes and depth-elements are termed cryptotypes. Meaning is the interplay between the two. Penotypes are overt categories and cryptotypes are covert categories. Selective categories may be overt or covert but basically they work along lexemic lines. Modulus categories may be overt or covert but basically they work along grammatical lines. Semantic categories tend to be surface groupings of linguistic elements and hence carry no meaning."

23. Feuer, Lewis S. 1953. "Sociological Aspects of the Relations between Language and Philosophy." *Philosophy of Science* no. 20:85-100.

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    "There can be no coherent "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis. Sapir's mentalism, in contrast to Whorf's associationism, is best understood in the rationalist tradition. His phonology is almost Platonist: "psychological reality" -- i.e., patterns of phonemes -- control both production and perception of speech. His anthropology is also reminiscent of Plato in its insistence on a dialectical relationship with native informants. However his epistemological insight that "syntax modulates understanding" resembles a central theme of Wittgenstein's later philosophy."

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    "After some general remarks both on the problem of language and thought and on the linguistic relativity debate the present state of research and discussion shall be demonstrated by two examples. The first concerns the relation between colour vision and colour terms, the second some possible differences between China and the West with respect to the linguistic and cognitive use of counterfactuals. A concluding section will contain some systematic reflections."

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31. Goddard, Cliff. 2008. "Whorf Meets Wierzbicka: Variation and Universals in Language and Thinking." *Language Sciences* no. 25:393-432.

"Probably no contemporary linguist has published as profusely on the connections between semantics, culture, and cognition as Anna Wierzbicka. This paper explores the similarities and differences between her "natural semantic metalanguage" (NSM) approach and the linguistic theory of Benjamin Lee Whorf. It shows that while some work by Wierzbicka and colleagues can be seen as "neo-Whorfian", other aspects of the NSM program are "counter-Whorfian". Issues considered include the meaning of linguistic relativity, the nature of conceptual universals and the consequences for semantic methodology, the importance of polysemy, and the scale and locus of semantic variation between languages, particularly in relation to the domain of time. Examples are drawn primarily from English, Russian, and Hopi."

32. Gumperz, John J., and Levinson, Stephen C., eds. 1996. *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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    "The linguistic relativity (Whorfian) hypothesis states that language influences thought. In its strongest form, the hypothesis states that language controls both thought and perception. Several experiments have shown that this is false. The weaker form of the hypothesis, which states that language influences thought, has been held to be so vague that it is unprovable. The argument presented herein is that the weaker Whorfian hypothesis can be quantified and thus evaluated. Models of cognition developed after Whorf's day indicate ways in which thought can be influenced by cultural variations in the lexical, syntactical, semantic, and

pragmatic aspects of language. Although much research remains to be done, there appears to be a great deal of truth to the linguistic relativity hypothesis. In many ways the language people speak is a guide to the language in which they think."

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    "This research concerns how children learn the distinction between substance names and object names. Quine (1969) proposed that children learn the distinction through learning the syntactic distinctions inherent in count/mass grammar. However, Soja et al. (1991) found that English-speaking 2-year-olds, who did not seem to have acquired count/mass grammar, distinguished objects from substances in a word extension task, suggesting a pre-linguistic ontological distinction. To test whether the distinction between object names and substance names is conceptually or linguistically driven, we repeated Soja et al.'s study with English- and Japanese-speaking 2-, 2.5-, and 4-year-olds and adults. Japanese does not make a count-

mass grammatical distinction: all inanimate nouns are treated alike. Thus if young Japanese children made the object-substance distinction in word meaning, this would support the early ontology position over the linguistic influence position. We used three types of standards: substances (e.g., sand in an S-shape), simple objects (e.g., a kidney-shaped piece of paraffin) and complex objects (e.g., a wood whisk). The subjects learned novel nouns in neutral syntax denoting each standard entity. They were then asked which of the two alternatives -- one matching in shape but not material and the other matching in material but not shape--would also be named by the same label. The results suggest the universal use of ontological knowledge in early word learning. Children in both languages showed differentiation between (complex) objects and substances as early as 2 years of age. However, there were also early cross-linguistic differences. American and Japanese children generalized the simple object instances and the substance instances differently. We speculate that children universally make a distinction between individuals and non-individuals in word learning but that the nature of the categories and the boundary between them is influenced by language."

43. Imai, Mutsumi, and Mazuka, Reiko. 2007. "Language-Relative Construal of Individuation Constrained by Universal Ontology: Revisiting Language Universals and Linguistic Relativity." *Cognitive Science* no. 31:385-413.

    "Objects and substances bear fundamentally different ontologies. In this article, we examine the relations between language, the ontological distinction with respect to individuation, and the world.
    Specifically, in cross-linguistic developmental studies that follow Imai and Gentner (1997), we examine the question of whether language influences our thought in different forms, like (1) whether the language specific construal of entities found in a word extension context (Imai and Gentner, 1997) is also found in a nonlinguistic classification context; (2) whether the presence of labels *per se*, independent of the

count-mass syntax, fosters ontology-based classification; (3) in what way, if at all, the count-mass syntax that accompanies a label changes English speakers' default construal of a given entity?
On the basis of the results, we argue that the ontological distinction concerning individuation is universally shared and functions as a constraint on early learning of words. At the same time, language influences one's construal of entities cross-linguistically and developmentally, and causes a temporary change of construal within a single language. We provide a detailed discussion of how each of these three ways language may affect the construal of entities, and discuss how our universally possessed knowledge interacts with language both within a single language and in cross-linguistic context."

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55. Landesman, Charles. 1961. "Does Language Embody a Philosophical Point of View?" *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 14:617-636.

"Examining the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the author addresses the questions whether language affects perception and whether grammatical categories affect conceptual categories. he argues that advocates of linguistic relativity have attributed to language an unjustified degree of causal efficacy and that linguistic idealism is contradicted by the results of experimental psychology. Then, considering the claimed correlation between grammatical and conceptual categories, he argues that grammar has no metaphysics and does not influence thought. The author concludes that language in use embodies a point of view only in the weak sense that relations and distinctions implicit in necessary concepts constitute a philosophical theory about reality."

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In evaluating the linguistic relativity hypothesis, it is necessary to avoid using terms in such a way as to empty the hypothesis of empirical content; it is also necessary to separate related but
distinct issues. There is no reason to accept any strong version of the hypothesis when this is understood to pertain to differences in cognition due to non-universal aspects of language structure.
Generative grammarians have been led by their orientation and findings to reject the hypothesis, But their ideas on the relation between language and thought have often been confused and burdened by gratuitous assumptions. It is argued that 'semantic representations', the semantic objects determined by linguistic principles, cannot be equated with

the primary structures manipulated in cognition, termed 'conceptual structures'. It is further argued, With lexical and grammatical examples from various languages, that semantic representations are not universal, even granted essential uniformity of cognition for all speakers and the viability of an informal notion of semantic equivalence between sentences."

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60. Lohmann, Johannes. 1976. "Saint Thomas Et Les Arabes (Structures Linguistiques Et Formes De Pensée)." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*:30-44.

61. Lounsbury, Floyd G. 1969. "Language and Culture." In *Language and Philosophy. A Symposium*, edited by Hook, Sidney, 3-29. New York: New York University Press.

62. Lucy, John A. 1992. *Grammatical Categories and Cognition. A Case Study of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

63. ———. 1992. *Language Diversity and Thought. A Reformulation of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

64. ———. 1997. "Linguistic Relativity." *Annual Review of Anthropology* no. 26:291-312.

65. Lyon, Gordon. 1999. "Language and Perceptual Experience." *Philosophy* no. 74:515-534.

" This paper examines a series of experiments on recognition-memory for colors, often thought to support the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. the article argues that the hypothesis of perceptual familiarity provides a plausible, non-Whorfian explanation of the results. language is not influencing nonlinguistic perception here, since recognition-memory for perceptual simples is itself mediated by language"

66. Macnamara, John. 1991. "Linguistic Relativity Revisited." In *The Influence of Language on Culture and Thought. Essays in Honor of Joshua A. Fishman's Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, 45-60. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

67. Manchester, Martin L. 1985. *The Philosophical Foundations of Humboldt's Linguistic Doctrines*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

68. Mandelbaum, Maurice. 1979. "Subjective, Objective, and Conceptual Relativisms." *The Monist* no. 62:403-428.

    "This paper is concerned with relativism regarding factual knowledge. (Relativism regarding value-judgments is not discussed.) That position is identified with the view that assertions cannot be judged true or false in themselves, but must be judged with reference to one or more aspects of the total situation in which they are made. Three forms of relativism are discussed: subjective relativism (e.g., C. A. Beard); objective relativism (e.g., J. H. Randall, jr.); conceptual relativism (e.g., B. L. Whorf; T. S. Kuhn). in each case an acceptance of arguments in favor of the position is held to involve prior commitment to a non-relativistic interpretation of some judgments concerning matters of fact; thus, the position is self-limiting."

69. Mannheim, Bruce, and Hill, Jane H. 1992. "Language and World View." *Annual Review of Anthropology* no. 21:381-406.

70. Marking, Kasoer C. 1962. "Some Qualifying Remarks on Linguistic Relativity." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22 (566):573.

71. Mathiot, Madeleine, ed. 1979. *Ethnolinguistics: Boas, Sapir and Whorf Revisited*. The Hague: Mouton.

    A collection of nine papers.

72. Miller, Robert Lee. 1968. *The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics. A History and Appraisal*. The Hague: Mouton.

73. Moschonas, Spiros A. 2004. "Relativism in Language Ideology: On Greece's Latest Language Issues." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* no. 22:173-206.

    "Language relativism can be associated with two major conceptions: that "each language has or is a particular spirit" and that "each language has or is a-real or imagined-territory." Spirituality and territoriality combined give rise to the ideology of a language as a realm. This ideology of Modern Greek as a regime language has become dominant after the official establishment of a standard norm (demotic) and the resolution of the perennial "Greek Language Question." As it is evidenced by a host of "language issues" raised in the Greek newspapers since 1976, relativism has determined what counted as a "language issue" that was worth publishing, which language issues were eligible for public debates, and the extent to which language issues were allowed to penetrate "public opinion"."

74. Müller-Vollmer, Kurt. 1990. "From Sign to Signification: The Herder-Humboldt Controversy." In *Johann Gottfried Herder: Language, History, and the Enlightenment*, edited by Koepke, Wilhelm, 9-24. Columbia: Camden House.

75. Niemeier, Susanne, and Dirven, René, eds. 2000. *Evidence for Linguistic Relativity*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Papers presented at the 11th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, held August 1993 at the University of California.

76. Ogden, Charles Kay, and Richards, Ivor. 1923. *The Meaning of Meaning; a Study of the Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

77. O'Neall, Sean. 2008. *Cultural Contact and Linguistic Relativity among the Indians of Northwestern California*. Norman: University Of Oklahoma Press.

78. Pederson, Eric. 2007. "Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity." In *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, edited by Geeraerts, Dirk and Cuyckens, Hubert, 1012-1044. New York: Oxford University Press.

79. Penn, Julia M. 1972. *Linguistic Relativity Versus Innate Ideas. The Origins of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in German Thought*. The Hague: Mouton.

80. Pinxten, Rik, ed. 1976. *Universalism Versus Relativism in Language and Thought*. The Hague: Mouton.

    Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses [sic]

81. Pütz, Martin, and Verspoor, Marjolijn H., eds. 2000. *Explorations in Linguistic Relativity*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Martin Pütz and Marjolijn H. Verspoor: Preface; Introduction IX; E.F.K. Koerner: Towards a 'full pedigree' of the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis': From Locke to Lucy 1; Jürgen Trabant: How relativistic are Humboldt's "Weltansichten"? 25; Penny Lee: When is 'linguistic relativity' Worf's linguistic relativity? 45; Juliane House: Linguistic relativity and translation 69; Peter Mühlhäusler: Humboldt, Whorf and the roots of ecolinguistics 89; Wallace Chafe: Loci of

diversity and convergence in thought and language 101; Nick J. Enfield: On linguocentrism; Paul R. Hays: From the Jurassic dark: Linguistic relativity as evolutionary necessity 159; Sydney M. Lamb: Neuro-cognitive structure in the interplay of language and thought 173; David B. Kronenfeld: Language and thought: Collective tools for individual use 197; Gary B. Palmer and Claudia Woodman: Ontological classifiers as polycentric categories, as seen in Shona class 3 nouns 225; Robert E. MacLaury: Linguistic relativity and the plasticity of categorization: Universalism in a new key 249; Bruce Hawkins: Linguistic relativity as a function of ideological deixis 295; Linda L. Thornburg and Klaus-Uwe Panther:
Why we subject incorporate (in English): a post-Whorfian view 319; Minglang Zhou: Metalinguistic awareness in linguistic relativity: Cultural and subcultural practices across Chinese dialect communities 345; Subject index 365.

82. Quine, Willard van Orman. 1960. *Word and Object*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

83. ———. 1969. "Natural Kinds." In *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 114-138. New York: Columbia University Press.

84. Reding, Jean-Paul. 1986. "Greek and Chinese Categories: A Reexamination of the Problem of Linguistic Relativism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 36 (4):349-374.

85. ———. 1997. "L'utilisation Philosophique De La Metaphore En Grèce Et En Chine: Vers Une Metaphorologie Comparée." *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 129:1-30.

"Everything leads us to believe that an 'exotic' language produces exotic metaphors, which in turn condition those modes of thought different from our own. Comparative analysis of a metaphorical field common to Greece and China (light and the mirror) shows that the philosophical differences do not proceed from the various material of the

metaphors used, but rather from the different attitudes to language. The hypothesis of linguistic relativism far from being either weakened or confirmed by this comparative analysis, appears itself to depend on the manner in which Greek and Occidental thought conceived the relation of thought to language."

86. ———. 2004. *Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

87. Robins, Robert H. 1976. "The Current Relevance of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis." In *Universalism Versus Relativism in Language and Thought*, edited by Pinxten, Rik, 99-107. Mouton: The Hague.

    Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses [sic]

88. Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio. 1973. *Ideologies of Linguistic Relativity*. The Hague: Mouton.

89. Ruddick, Sara. 1969. "Extreme Relativism." In *Language and Philosophy. A Symposium*, edited by Hook, Sidney, 41-47. New York: New York University Press.

90. Sapir, Edward. 1921. *Language. An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

91. ———. 1929. "The Status of Linguistics as a Science." *Language* no. 5:207-214.

    "The long tried methods of Indo-European linguistics have proved themselves by the success with which they have been applied to other fields, for instance Central Algonkian and Athabaskan. An increasing interest in linguistics may be noted among workers in anthropology, culture history, sociology, psychology, and philosophy. For all of them linguistics is of basic importance: its data and methods show better than those of any other discipline dealing with socialized behavior the possibility of a truly scientific study

of society. Linguists should, on the other hand, become aware of what their science may mean for the interpretation of human conduct in general."

92. ———. 1949. *The Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Reprinted with a new foreword by David G. Mandelbaum and an epilogue by Dell H. Hymes in 1985.

93. Sauer, Werner. 1985. "A Note on "Plato's Reasoning and the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis"." *Metaphilosophy* no. 16:235-238.

94. Soja, Nancy, Carey, Susan, and Spelke, Elizabeth S. 2008. "Ontological Categories Guide Young Children's Inductions of Word Meaning: Object Terms and Substance Terms." *Cognition* no. 38:179-211.

    "Three experiments assessed the possibility, suggested by Quine (1960, 1969) among others, that the ontology underlying natural language is induced in the course of language learning, rather than constraining learning from the beginning. Specifically, we assessed whether the ontological distinction between objects and non-solid substances conditions projection of word meanings prior to the child's mastery of count/mass syntax. Experiments 1 and 2 contrasted unfamiliar objects with unfamiliar substances in a word-learning task. Two-year-old subjects' projection of the novel word to new objects respected the shape and number of the original referent. In contrast, their projection of new words for non-solid substances ignored shape and number. There were no effects of the child's knowledge of count/mass syntax, nor of the syntactic context in which the new word was presented. Experiment 3 revealed that children's natural biases in the absence of naming do not lead to the same pattern of results. We argue that these data militate against Quine's conjecture."

95. Stroinska, Magda, ed. 2001. *Relative Points of View: Linguistic Representation of Culture*. New York: Berghahn Books.

96. Swanson, J.W. 1961. "Linguistic Relativity and Translation." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:185-192.

    "The thesis of "linguistic relativity" argued for by Whorf is by no means novel. The main elements of Whorf's views can be found as far back as the writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and more lately in those of Ernst Cassirer. But among those who have espoused the thesis of linguistic relativity Whorl, at least, has attempted to give some empirical content to the theory through his investigations of certain American Indian languages. And it is to the stimulation of Whorl's writings that the renewed interest in the doctrine of linguistic relativity in the last few years can be traced. In this paper I shall not attempt an exegesis of Wharf's somewhat obscure writings, but rather propose three different interpretations of the notion of linguistic relativity without attempting to relate them to Whorl's writings except in a casual way. My chief concern will be to furnish an analysis or explication of the thesis of linguistic relativity, not a study of Whorl's writings."

97. ———. 1961. "Landesman on Linguistic Relativity." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 15:336-339.

98. Thomson, David S. 1994. "The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: *Worlds Shaped by Words*." In *Conformity and Conflict. Readings in Cultural Anthropology*, edited by McCurdy, David W. and Spradley, James, 79-90. New York: Harper Collins.

    Eight edition.

99. Walton, Kendall Lewis. 1973. "Linguistic Relativity." In *Conceptual Change*, edited by Pearce, Glenn and Maynard, Patrick, 1-30. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"This paper is an attempt to make sense of the idea that different languages embody or reflect different "conceptual schemes," different ways of experiencing or perceiving the world. The following (apparent) dilemma is discussed: if a language is translatable into English it cannot embody a scheme different from ours, but if it is not translatable we cannot know that it embodies a different scheme, even if it does; hence it is impossible to find examples which confirm the thesis that different languages embody different conceptual schemes.
An account of one kind of difference of conceptual scheme is developed which avoids this dilemma."

100. Wardy, Robert. 2000. *Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

101. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1956. *Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings*. Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Edited and with an introduction by John B. Carroll. Foreword by Stuart Chase.

Related pages

Linguistic Relativism (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) vs. Universal Grammar

Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium (two traditions in 20th century philosophy)

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Semiotics and Ontology: The Rediscovery of John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas)

INTRODUCTION

"The seventeenth-century Portuguese Dominican, John of St Thomas or John Poinsot, was a major figure in late scholastic philosophy and theology. Educated at Coimbra and Louvain, he taught both disciplines in Spain: at Madrid, Plasencia and Alcalà. Aspiring to be a faithful disciple of Thomas Aquinas, he published a three-volume Cursus philosophicus thomisticus (Thomistic Philosophical Course) and before he died began the publication of a *Cursus theologicus* (Theological Course). His philosophical writing was explicitly on logic and natural philosophy. However, in both his philosophical and theological works, he treated many metaphysical, epistemological and ethical issues. His logic is divided into two parts, formal and material. Of particular interest is his semiotic doctrine which appears in the second part. In natural philosophy, he explained Aristotle with a Thomistic slant. While following Aquinas in theology, John at times developed his master's doctrine along new lines."

From: John P. Doyle, "John of St. Thomas (1589-1644)", - in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. V p. 117-120, New York: Routledge 1998.

"Thus the story even of the sign begins with the discovery of nature as a reality prior to and in various ways escaping human purposes. The story of the sign, in short, is of a piece with the

story of philosophy itself, and begins, all unknowingly, where philosophy itself begins, though not as philosophy. To proceed to tell the story of the sign in other ways is of course not impossible; but each such alternative approach leaves out too many of the pieces needed even for the effort of re-telling the story more succinctly when we turn around to explain what we have discovered - at least if we want to tell the tale in the most convincing and complete manner possible.
Our purpose in these pages, then, is to make the discovery which, we will argue, introduces postmodernity (the end of the story for now) clear and credible, and for this nothing less than a general history of philosophy will do. Even if we do not have to explore every theme of that history, we must yet explain all those themes that pertain to the presupposition of the sign's being and activity, in order to arrive at that being and activity with sufficient intellectual tools to make full sense of it as a theme in its own right. And those themes turn out to be nothing less or other than the very themes of ontology and epistemology forged presemiotically, as we might say, in that laboratory for discovering the consequences of ideas that we call the history of philosophy'. If the discovery of the sign began, as a matter of fact, unconsciously with the discovery of nature, then the beginning of semiotics was first the beginning of philosophy, for only as philosophy are the foundations of semiotics possible - even if semiotics is what philosophy must eventually become, as we shall see. Nothing begins where it ends; the best stories are told not from the middle; and, while the end of a tale may do much to illumine its beginnings, the end is hardly a substitute for the beginning."

From: John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001, pp. 19-20.

"On the showing of his volumes' titles, Poinsot treats of Logic and Natural Philosophy. As a matter of public avowal he treats neither of Metaphysics nor of Ethics, whence to one inspecting the work superficially will it readily appear that Poinsot has said nothing or

next to nothing on these matters. But to anyone who not only looks at the index of questions and articles, but who also reads the text attentively in its entirety, will find that practically everything expounded by modern authors under the title of Ontology can be found in Poinsot under his treatment of Material Logic and under his treatment of causes and the ground of motion in the Natural Philosophy. Likewise for the fundamentals of Criteriology, which can be found treated in the Second Part of the Logic in the questions on foreknowledge and premises, demonstration and scientific knowledge. The fact that our author does not provide a specific dissertation on Metaphysics and especially on Ethics within the compass of his Cursus Philosophicus, while unfortunate from our point of view, should not lead anyone to think that Poinsot has written little or nothing on these for matters in other places. Matters pertaining to natural theology and to ethics were left for thematic treatment in the *Cursus Theologicus*, according to the custom of that age, and, specifically, the matters of natural theology to the Commentary on the First Part [Poinsot, *Tomus Primus Cursus Theologici*1637, Tomus Secundus 1643], those of Ethics to the Commentary on the Second Part [Poinsot Tomus Quartus and Quintus 1645, Tomus Sextus 1649] of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas, where all these matters are found treated at great length." (p. XII)

From: Beato Reiser, *Editoris Praefatio* to: *Ioannes a Sancto Thoma (Poinsot) Ars logica (1631-1632) nova editio a Raiser*, Turin: Marietti 1930.

THE NAME OF THE AUTHOR: João Poinsot - Joannes de S. Thoma - Juan de Sto Tomás - Jean de St.Thomas - Giovanni di S. Tommaso - John of St. Thomas

"It is not often that a special discussion has to be devoted to the name of the author of a given work, though indeed such a

problem is far from unheard-of. There are a number of considerations that make such a discussion useful in the present case. Accordingly, I will proceed to identify the author of our text in two steps: First, by explaining why I have settled on 'John Poinsot' as the most appropriate for our purpose of the several variant names he might be and has been called by; Second, by recounting the events of his life in the context of European history of the time.
(...)
The principal posthumous editors of Poinsot's works - Reiser in the case of the *Cursus Philosophicus*, the Solesmes editors in the case of the *Cursus Theologicus* - use for their author's name the Latin form "Joannes a Sancto Thoma" ("John of Saint Thomas"). It was this name in this form that Poinsot himself attached to the first three volumes he himself edited of his Cursus Theologicus. Nonetheless, the following three posthumous volumes of the Cursus Theologicus revert to the variant, "Joannes de Sancto Thoma," which is also the form used on the early editions of the volumes of the Cursus Philosophicus one time, in the 1635 Douai edition of the *Artis Logicae Prima Pars*, with the spelling "Johannes..."In personal correspondence, our author often wrote and signed in the vernacular of Spain, "Juan de S. Thoma" (or "Thomas," "Toma," "Tomâs").
The Solesmes editors seem to think that use of the Latin "de" form arose in this case from assimilation to the Spanish version of the Latin "a Sancto Thoma," to wit, "de Santo Thoma" (and "de Sancto Thoma" is not incorrect Latin in any case), but that it was "a Sancto Thoma" that was the form Poinsot actually received in religious life.
The surname "Poinsot" certainly belonged to our author by birth, but its etymological connotations create yet other problems in the present case, since to modern ears it is unmistakably French in flavor, though our author's father came from Austria while his mother (Maria Garcez) was Portuguese, and he himself was educated in Portugal and Belgium, after which he entered for the rest of his life the heartland of Spain, where he studied, taught, and labored, ending his days in the Council of the King. Living at the time just prior to the emergence of the nation states as we

think of them today, Poinsot belongs to no "nationality" in the usual sense.
Portuguese by maternal blood, Viennese and French (Burgundian) by paternal blood, Portuguese, Belgian, and Spanish by education, it is very difficult to say how such a man identified himself in the civil order. How would he think of himself? Certainly, no modern category would be the likely answer to that question.
(...)
On all versions, John is the English form of our author's first name. That his family surname was Poinsot is equally certain. Hence, for our English edition of his semiotic,. the first such in any language, we thus nominally identify our author." (pp. 421-424, notes omitted)

John Deely, "Editorial Afterword" to the *Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1985.

TRACTATUS DE SIGNIS

"The semiotic of John Poinsot here presented autonomously for the first time was disengaged from a larger work entitled the *Ars Logica*, itself but the first two parts of a five-part *Cursus Philosophicus*. Since this work has a considerable historical interest in its own right, and in order to minimize the violence of editing the tractatus de signis into a whole independent of that original context, we have settled on the following manner of presentation.
Putting ourselves in the position of a reader coming to the *Ars Logica* for the first time and interested only in Poinsot's discussion of signs, we asked ourselves: What sections of the work would this hypothetical reader have to look at in order to appreciate that discussion both in its own terms and in terms of the whole of which it originally formed a part? To what extent are these separable philosophically? The pages that follow make up

our solution to this problem. We have left Poinsot's text stand virtually entirely according to the order he proposed for it within the *Ars Logica* as a whole. To make this order clear, we have included title pages, and all general statements Poinsot set down concerning the whole (and therefore the *Treatise* as part), inserting where appropriate and to bridge necessary jumps a series of brief comments designated "semiotic markers," designed to show the reader how the rationale of all editing is derived from the original author's own intentions; and second, we have included all and only those sections of the whole which have a direct bearing on understanding the doctrine proposed in the Treatise on Signs proper, as the semiotic markers make clear.

In other words, we have tried to provide the reader with a guided tour of the *Ars Logica* that leads directly to an understanding of the doctrine of signs contained in that work, but does so by enabling him or her to appreciate the historical origin of the account in the context of its author's own understanding of previous logical and philosophical traditions. We have chosen this format as the one best suited, so far as we could judge, to exhibit the unique mediating status Poinsot's *Treatise* occupies "archeologically," as it were, in the Western tradition between the ontological concerns of ancient, medieval, and renaissance philosophy, and the epistemological concerns of modern and contemporary thought.

At the end of the work, the reader will find a lengthy "Editorial Afterword" explaining the entire work and giving its background and prospectus, much the sort of materials commonly given in an Introduction to a translated work. The device of the semiotic markers made it possible in this case to bypass the need for lengthy introductory materials enabling the reader to grasp the editorial structure of the whole, yet without of course obviating the need for detailed discussions somewhere of the principles of the English text, and of the historical situation of the author and his work. Thus we have been able to enter simply and directly into the doctrinal content of the main text, without cluttering its entrance with more than a very few lines of contemporary origin.

The reader will also find at the end of the work a complete series of indices to this entire edition, both to its main text (which indices are explained at length in the "Afterword" just mentioned)

and to its accompanying editorial materials, followed by a comprehensive list of bibliographical references. Bibliographical references not complete in the markers or in the notes on the text will be found there. All indexical references to the *Treatise* itself with its attendant parts (i.e., to the bi-lingual portions of this edition) are by page and line numbers, thus providing the reader with the exact place of each reference in this English edition of Poinsot's text and, at the same time, the almost exact place in the parallel column of the Latin original. Similarly, all cross references to other parts of Poinsot's *Cursus Philosophicus*, as in the running heads of the present edition, are according to the pages, columns (a, b), and lines of the Reiser edition, as set out in the "Abbreviations" immediately preceding this preface." (pp. 1-2)

John Deely, "*To the Reader of this Edition*", *Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1985.

OUTLINES OF FORMAL LOGIC

"The *Ars Logica* is a long work of 839 double-columned pages, some 280,000 words. Its two main divisions are: *Formal Logic* and *Material Logic*. As John of St. Thomas puts it: "In the first part we deal with everything that belongs to the form of the art of Logic and to prior resolution. These are the things Aristotle dealt with in *De Interpretatione* and *Analytica Priora*, and are customarily taught beginning students in Outlines. But in the second part we shall deal with everything that belongs to logical matter, or to posterior resolution, especially as it is in demonstration, towards which Logic is principally ordered."The First Part contains a short text of formal Logic suited for beginners, followed by an explanation for advanced students (in 8 "*Quaestiones Disputandae ad Illustrandum Difficultates Aliquas Huius Textus*," subdivided into 29 articles) of the more difficult

points of the short text. Only the short text for beginners is translated in the present volume.
The Second Part is "longer and more diffuse because the matter of any art normally has more things demanding consideration than the form does." The proper matter of the art of Logic will be propositions in which a demonstration can take place. If strict demonstration requires reduction to principles known per se, then the propositions strictly demonstrable must be those that are necessary and per se connected. Now, we know that contingent predicates give contingent propositions. For necessary propositions we need essential or proper predicates. Here then we have a means for discovering necessary matter: unfold the ordered lines of the predicaments, in which all things are reduced to their top genera, and where for each predicament is given the higher and lower predicates between which an essential connection is discovered. However, since predicaments cannot be known without the predicables, which are the modes of predicating essentially or accidentally, these too must be matter for the art of Logic. Thus the matter of Logic contains these three: 1) predicables, the modes of predication; 2) the ten predicaments, the classes and top genera to which all natural things and their essential predicates are reduced; 3) the forming of per se propositions and strict demonstrations. These, then, are the three divisions of *Material Logic*. For the first, John of St. Thomas bases his teaching on the text of Porphyry. For the last two, on the texts of Aristotle. And as a sort of introduction to the whole of *Material Logic* he considers (in 5 questions and 24 articles) the nature of the science of Logic itself. The most fundamental parts of his *Material Logic* have been translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst.
According to John of St. Thomas, and to Aristotle and St. Thomas before him, Logic deals with the operations of reason. Its "function is to direct the reason lest it err in the manner of inferring and knowing." The natural divisions of Logic then follow the different kinds of mental operations. Thus *Formal Logic* is divided into three books: 1) what pertains to the simple apprehension (first operation of the mind); 2) what pertains to judgment (second operation) ; 3) what pertains to reasoning and inference (third operation). Material Logic too, though indirectly

of course, is divided according to the mental operations. Its direct object is the matter, taken generally, that the mind deals with, i.e. necessary predicates and their connecting lines. Still, the manner of predicating, the reduction of all essential predicates to the ten predicaments, and the forming of per se propositions and strict demonstrations are mental operations even when they depend on the matter known." (p. 5-6, Notes omitted)

Francis C. Wade, "Introduction" to John of St. Thomas, *Outlines of Formal Logic*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1955.

THE MATERIAL LOGIC OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS: BASIC TREATISES

"We do not need to elaborate on the reasons why the integral translation of a work which fills 839 two-column pages in the latest edition was held impossible. Since a choice had to be made, we turned to the field of material logic, where the shortage of great books is particularly felt. (...) But no more than about three fifths of John of St. Thomas' writings in material logic could be included within reasonable space limits. Our choice was governed by both doctrinal and pedagogical concerns. We made it a rule never to abridge an exposition having the character of a whole. Our shortest units are long articles. In several cases, our unit is a whole "question." On the subject of demonstration, it is the whole set of "questions" corresponding to the *Posterior Analytics*. Whoever is aware of the situation of logical studies in our time knows that the most vexing of our problems is the problem of logic itself. Accordingly, much space is given to the issues concerning the object and nature of logic (I). The problem of the universal (II) is obviously of central significance for all logic and for the philosophy of knowledge. The "antepredicamental" discussions (III), consisting principally of an inquiry into analogy, constitute a masterly contribution to the theory of meaning. The doctrine of analogy presented here is the subject of further developments in the articles on the division of being into

categories (IV). The long study of the first four categories (IV) is a store of elaborate information on concepts basic in all parts of philosophy and in the interpretation of the sciences. From a certain standpoint, the pages on quantity and on relation can be considered supplementary to the introductory pages on the object of logic. Taken together, these three sections present much material and many precise instruments for the improvement of our ideas on the relations between the logical and the mathematical sciences. Section V is concerned with four timely issues: signification, the relation of knowledge to actual existence, reflection, and formalization. Lastly (VI) we present without any omission John of St. Thomas' treatment of demonstration and science.
(...) Much of the doctrine contained in John of St. Thomas' formal logic is available in the *Formal Logic* of Jacques Maritain. The *Short Treatises* which, from a pedagogical standpoint, constitute the core of John of St. Thomas' teaching in formal logic, have been translated by Francis C. Wade under the title of *Outlines of Logic* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955)." (pp. XX-XXI)

Yves R. Simon, "Foreword" to *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1955.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE OF THOMAS AQUINAS

"One might expect a Thomist of the strict observance to engage in the kind of close commentary on the text that characterized Thomas's own commentaries on Aristotle, or Cajetan's on the *Summa*, but in both his philosophical and his theological work, John writes in relative independence of the text that prompts the discussion. He will summarize rapidly the relevant work of Aristotle, and then go on to a discussion guided as much by later controversy as by the text itself. So, too, there is in the theological

writings a kind of tour de monde survey of what others have said on the question before launching into his own solution. But the vast theological effort was prefaced by three sizeable essays: an analysis of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a discussion of the authority the thought of St. Thomas enjoys in the Church, and the analysis of the *Summa theologiae* translated here. The full title is: *Isagoge ad D. Thomae theologiae. Explicatio connexionis et ordinis totius Summae Theologiae D. Thomae, per omnes ejus materias*.
John's introduction is just that - it is not a commentary or analysis of the text of the *Summa theologiae*, but a bearing of its infrastructure, displaying the ordering principles that brought together the vast treasury of Christian theology in as economical and perspicuous a manner as possible. In many ways, John's task was simple: all he had to do was pick up on the quite overt remarks of St. Thomas as to why a topic or treatise comes before or after others, what the inner ordering of a treatise was, what the ordering of the articles within a question was, and, not to put too fine a point on it, why the objections in a given article come in the order they do. The *Summa theologiae* was written for theological, though not philosophical, beginners, and it aims to give a swift, accurate, and adequate sense of the theological terrain. From that point of view, John can be said to have provided an outline of an outline. This is not to disparage what he has done. There are enormous advantages to being acquainted with the skeleton of the *Summa* before examining the flesh that covers it. There is no need to overstate John's achievement to see it as something for which the neophyte can be grateful and which, even for one who thinks himself an adept, not only reinforces the old sense of the storied order of the *Summa* but, in its hurried and pedestrian prose, contains more than one precious nugget absent from more ambitious commentaries." (pp. IX-X)

Ralph McInerny, "Preface" to *Introduction to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas: The Isagoge of John of St. Thomas*, South Bend: St. Augustine Press 2004.

POINSOT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LOGIC AND SEMIOTICS

"Poinsot, so far as present knowledge goes, holds the privileged position in semiotic historiography of being the earliest systematizer of the 'doctrine of 'signs. Not until the work of Peirce in our own day do we again encounter a 'semiotic of comparable energy and scope. In 1632, Poinsot published, as part of his series of courses in philosophy at the University of Alcalâ, Spain, a highly original, systematically conceived *Treatise on Signs* (*Tractatus de Signis*) (1930), which fits exactly 'Locke's definition of semiotic proposed some 58 years later, at the close of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (details in Deely, *Introducing Semiotic. Its History and Doctrine*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982), and taken up again by Peirce. From this point of view, Poinsot's work provides us with the first of several "missing links" in the history of logic and 'philosophy after 'Ockham (e. 1350), enabling us to trace backwards through the Iberian schools of Coimbra (notably in the work of Petrus Fonseca [1564] and the team of workers he organized, the so-called "Conimbricenses"), Salamanca (Suárez, Soto, and others), and Alcalâ, a heretofore largely untold story of developments that are exceptional in import for semiotics (Deely 1982).
Doctrinally, Poinsot's work achieves a new, entirely experiential point of departure for the enterprise of philosophy, and reconciles in so doing the seemingly opposed orders of nature and 'culture. Poinsot begins his Treatise on Signs by drawing attention to a central feature of 'semiosis that must, in his opinion, be a first concern of semioticians to safeguard and give adequate account of, namely, the fact that, in our experience, signs bring together natural and social phenomena. The sign, he points out (Book 1, Question I: 646b26-45), is something neither preclusively natural nor preclusively social, but both inclusively, for while all signs as such acquire their signification and actually exist only within some living being's experience, nonetheless, within that very experience, the connection between signs and what they signify sometimes seemsto have roots outside our experience of their

connection (the case of "natural" signs), and other times seems to have no reality other than the one derived from the experience itself of social interaction (the case of customary and stipulated signs). Thus the first task of the semiotician, in Poinsot's judgment, is to secure a standpoint superior to the division of being into what exists independently of our 'cognition (ens reale 'mind-independent being') and what exists dependently upon cognition (ens rationis mind-dependent being'). For Poinsot, semiotic must take its stand, in the felicitous description by Sebeok, squarely "at the intersection of nature and culture." This simple description of semiotic's initial task already amounts to a revolution within the perspective of natural philosophy or "physics" traditional in Poinsot's day. For the sole concern of that tradition was to uncover and explicate the structure of ens reale, which they thought to have achieved, after "Aristotle, with the division of mind independent being into substances, or natural units of independent existence, with their accidents, or various properties and characteristics. Thus, the division of being into the Aristotelian categories of substance and the various types of accident was generally thought to be the permanent achievement of ontology in the Latin age.

Poinsot's approach to semiotic entirely undercuts this categorial scheme, going beneath it and beginning with an analysis of experience prior to the possibility of the working out of any such scheme. He establishes a fundamental ontology in just that sense which Heidegger calls for in our own time, namely, an "ontology" that accounts for the categorial interconnections and lays bare the ground of the prior possibility of truth as a "correspondence" between thought and being. Poinsot finds this fundamental ontology in our experience of the ways in which things appear to be relative. Poinsot observed (following in this Aquinas [*Quaestione disputate de anima* c. 1266: q. 28] and Cajetan [*Commentaria in Summa theologicam*, 1507] before him) that, as a mode of reality, relation is unique in that its essence (*esse ad aliud* 'being between') is separate from its cause or ground of existence (*esse in alio* 'the character or feature upon which a relation is founded'), which is not the case for any other mode of reality. Poinsot sees in this the ultimate reason for the possibility of semiosis: relation in what is proper to it, namely,

suprasubjectivity or intersubjectivity (*esse ad*), is indifferent to realization now in nature, now in thought, now in both. Relation in this sense, precisely as indifferent to the opposition of what depends upon and what is independent of cognition, Poinsot calls relatio secundum esse 'relation according to the way it has being' or 'ontological relation' (see Deely 1982).

By contrast, things that are related exist subjectively as something in their own right, not just between other things sustaining them in a derivative way. And yet, if we seek to explain why they are as they are or how they might be altered from their present state, we find it necessary to refer to what the individuals in question themselves are not. Thus, even the individual entities and "natural units" of experience existing in their own right - even substances in Aristotle's scheme, the most absolute of the subjective entities - are seen to be relative when it comes to the question of how they come to be or of how they are to be accounted for. Relativity in this sense, precisely as infecting the whole scheme of categories of cognition-independent existents, Poinsot termed relatio secundum dici 'relation according to the way being must be expressed in discourse', or (synonymously) relatio transcendentalis 'transcendental relation'.

With this division of being, then, into transcendental and ontological relation, Poinsot has two simple "categories" that are exhaustive and exclusive, but whose terms are entirely matters of direct experience (unlike Aristotle's division of being into substance and accident, which was also exhaustive and exclusive, but directly experienced only on the side of certain accidents: comprehensive discussion in Powell *[Freely Chosen Reality]* 1982), and whose relevance to the doctrine of signs is immediate. For all authors agree, and indeed experience makes quite unmistakable, that every sign as such is a relative being (something making known another than itself), and since, by the prior terms of the analysis of relative being, we know that there are only two irreducible types of relativity, it remains only to apply that analysis to our experience of semiosis in order to determine in what precisely a sign consists (the formalis ratio signi, as Poinsot puts it), that is to say, what is it that constitues a sign in its proper being? The answer to this question is ontological relation, an answer which enables Poinsot to resolve a

number of aporia that have plagued accounts of signifying from ancient times down to the present, and which turn out to be decisive for °epistemology and philosophical thought generally."

From: John Deely, "Poinsot, John", in: General Editor, Thomas A. Sebeok; Editorial Board, Paul Bouissac [et al.] *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, Berlin / New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1986.

"John of St Thomas' logic is divided into two parts. In the first part, his concern is with the formal theory of correct thinking. This part, which includes such medieval items as supposition, exponibles and consequences, corresponds especially to the Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain and the Prior Analytics of Aristotle. In the larger second part, which corresponds to the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, plus the Categories and the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, he deals with material logic, which is a general theory of scientific demonstrations and the necessary connections they involve depending upon their content. Organized according to the three operations of the intellect (simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning) the first part treats of terms, propositions, consequences and syllogisms, along the way attending to definitions, divisions and their various facets. In the second part, John reflects upon the nature of logic itself, which he thinks is at once an art and a science. As science, he says, 'logic is essentially and absolutely in virtue of its own principles speculative, but it takes on the manner of a practical science in so far as it offers rules and direction for speculation itself' (Ars Logica, II q.1 a.4). The object of logic is beings of reason, such as species, genus, subject, predicate, antecedent, consequent and so on, formed by the mind's reflections upon its own operations. Such beings of reason, which have some foundation in reality outside the mind, fall under a wider notion that includes beings of reason like chimeras. These last lack such a foundation because they are impossible (that is, self-contradictory) objects. Contrasted with both sorts of beings of reason are real beings which are divided into the various Aristotelian categories.

The categories are the central concern of the second part of John's logic. He rejects Duns Scotus' teaching that ens (being) is said univocally of the categories.. Rather, as Cajetan thought, 'being' as said of the categories is 'formally analogous with an analogy of proper proportionality' (Ars Logica, II q.14 a.3). Passing through each category in succession he concurs with Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas (Summa theologiae Ia. 28.1) to the effect that relation is unique because it can be found in the order either of real being or being of reason. Only relation, since it is not just 'in' something but also 'towards' something, can transcend categorial status and be conceived apart from real existence either in itself (that is, the mode of existence proper to a substance) or in something else (the mode proper to an accident). This thought was to be central to John's doctrine of signs.
The doctrine of signs itself, which in part at least reflects the influence of John's Jesuit teachers at Coimbra, forms a treatise which runs over questions 21-3 in the second part of his logic. Essentially relational, signs are divided first into formal and instrumental, and second into natural, conventional and customary. All signs make something else known: formal signs (for example, a concept or an impressed species) do so without themselves first being known; instrumental signs (such as smoke or a spoken word) are themselves first known and then lead to the knowledge of something else. Natural signs (smoke) differ from conventional signs (words) inasmuch as the former simply arise from causal connections in the natural order while the latter result from human choice. Customary signs also result from choice but can be natural when a custom leads us naturally to its cause. Signs involve two non-reciprocal relations: between the sign and the significate (as in the relation of measured to measure) and between the sign and the cognitive power of a knower (as in the relation of measure to measured). Considered just as such, these relations are not in the line of physical causality but rather in that of intentionality in which the sign substitutes for the significate. Within this line of intentionality the ability of relation to transcend real being and being of reason becomes the basis of a unified semiotic doctrine respecting all signs of whatever sort they are."

From: John P. Doyle, "John of st. Thomas (1589-1644)", in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Routledge 1998.

Related pages

Selected Bibliography of John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas)

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Selected Bibliography of John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas)

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   Editor's Note: "These pages are from a translation of the Basic Treatises of the Logic of John of St. Thomas, to be published by the University of Chicago Press, [*The material logic of John of St. Thomas: basic treatises* (1955), pp. 60-76] whose courtesy for the present excerpt is gratefully acknowledged."

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   "In 1631-1632 John Poinsot (otherwise known as John of St. Thomas) published his Ars Logica at Alcalá. From this massive work John Deely has extracted all those parts relating to the theory of signs, and has given them the general heading of Tractatus de Signis (Treatise on Signs), though it should be noted that the Treatise on Signs proper consists of just three Questions related to Aristotle's Perihermenias. The project is a valuable one, for Poinsot was an interesting writer in his own right who frequently had original observations to make. Deely's contribution, so far as the edition and translation are concerned, is superb; and the book itself is a splendid example of the printer's art. However, I have some very grave reservations about Deely's interpretation of Poinsot's work, and it is these reservations

that I intend to discuss here. Others (notably Sebeok 1986) have already sung the praises of Deely and Poinsot; and as one of the few philosophers who has actually read some of the sixteenth-century authors to whom Poinsot was indebted, I feel it incumbent on me to point out that there is another side to the coin. However, I do not intend my remarks to detract in any way from the achievement represented by Deely's version of the Treatise on Signs.
I shall first discuss Deely's attitude toward the historical interpretation of Poinsot and how it differs from my own. In so doing, I shall show that there was a tradition of placing the discussion of signs in a Perihermenias commentary. Second, I shall discuss the topic of relations, since Deely claims that the 'revolutionary' nature of Poinsot's doctrine of signs stems from his classification of relations. I shall remark that a very similar classification of relations is found in at least one of Poinsot's sources, namely Domingo de Soto (1494-1560). Third, I shall discuss the details of the theory of signs as described by some early sixteenth-century writers, and I shall show that the general lines of Poinsot's classification are due to Domingo de Soto. Finally, I shall make some remarks about other aspects of the translation and editorial material which seem to need further comment.
* John N. Deely (trans. and ed.), with Ralph Austin Powell, *Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

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"Kant was unaware, as are most academic philosophers today, that late Latin scholastics, especially on the Iberian peninsula, had also struggled for an account of the intellect's ability to order our experience of the real and so constitute a properly scientific object. The results of this effort were, of course, quite unlike those of the Kantian solution and compatible with a completely different view of the natural order. Even more important for the history of Western philosophy, the results were immediately and thoroughly eclipsed by the rise of Cartesianism. The great scholastic effort to understand how scientific objects are constituted passed from the modern period into intellectual oblivion. Yet there are ample reasons to think that an exploration of these forgotten, pre-Kantian views might shed some light on contemporary efforts to fashion a postclassical epistemology and philosophy of science. Despite the more primitive cosmology, basic concepts of epistemological theory developed by the Latins are far more easily disengaged from medieval physics than are Kantian concepts from Newtonian mechanics. Kant is committed in principle to the view that space, for example, is mathematizable a priori in a completely deterministic manner. This is a much more wide-ranging and deeply-rooted metaphysical commitment than is the claim, for example, that there are only six observable planets.
What follows is an examination of a generally forgotten theory of objective constitution--one that avoids

unnecessary entanglements with the determinism of Newtonian mechanics if only by predating the Cartesian and Kantian turns. It is a theory that in principle allows nature to live by other rules than those of mechanical necessity and one that, I believe, rightly recognizes that nature's laws can suffer exception without thereby destroying the possibility of scientific knowledge. Moreover, it is a 'bridge' theory that unites classical and contemporary philosophic tendencies, for despite its strong medieval roots, it is a theory largely committed to the fundamental insight of modernity that the knower, in some measure, must condition the object known." p. 55

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Semiotics and Ontology: The Rediscovery of John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas)

Theory and History of Ontology

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Annotated Bibliography of John Deely. First part: 1965-1998

INTRODUCTION

John Deely (1942-2017) was the Rudman Chair in Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston.

"If there is one notion that is central to the emerging postmodern consciousness, that notion is the notion of sign. And for understanding this notion, nothing is more essential than a new history of philosophy. For the notion of sign that has become the basis for a postmodern development of thought was unknown in the modern period, and before that traces back only as far as the turn of the 5th century AD. Yet the context within which the general notion of sign was first introduced presupposes both the ancient Greek notion of "natural sign" (semeion) and the framework of Greek discussions of nature and mind which provoked the development of philosophy in the first place as an attempt to understand the being proper to the objects of experience. Not only does it emerge that the sign is what every object presupposes, but, in modern philosophy, the conundrum about the reality of the "external world", the insolubility of the problem of how in theory to get beyond the privacy of the individual mind, springs directly from the reduction of signification to representation. So here is one of the ways in which the four ages of this book can be outlined: preliminaries to the notion of sign; the development of the notion itself; forgetfulness of the notion; recovery and advance of the notion. Tracing the development of the notion of sign from its beginning

and against the backdrop of Greek philosophy yields an unexpected benefit by comparison with more familiar historical approaches. Every modern history of philosophy has been essentially preoccupied with the separating off from philosophy of science in the modern sense, especially in and after the seventeenth century. From this point of view, many of the continuing philosophical developments of the later Latin centuries tend to drop out of sight. It has become the custom to present modem philosophy, conventionally beginning with Descartes (17th century), simply as part and parcel of the scientific break with the authors of Latin tradition, and to treat the bringing of nominalism into the foreground of Latin thought by William of Ockham (14th century) as if that were the finale of Latin development.

This hiatus of two and a half centuries in the history of philosophy, however, effectively disappears when we make our way from ancient to modern times by tracing mainly the development of the philosophical notion of signum. From the High Middle Ages down to the time of Descartes we find a lively and continuous discussion of sign which, through a series of important if unfamiliar controversies on both sides of the thirteenth century, leads to a basic split in the closing Latin centuries. On one side stand those who think that the general notion of sign is an empty name, a flatus vocis, a nominalism, no more than a "relation of reason", an ens rationis. On the other side are those who are able to ground the general notion in an understanding of relation as a unique, suprasubjective mode of being, a veritable dual citizen of the order of ens reale and ens rationis alike, according to shifting circumstances.

Modern philosophy, from this point of view, appears essentially as an exploration of the nominalist alternative; and postmodern thought begins with the acknowledgment of the bankruptcy of the modern effort, combined with the determination pioneered by C. S. Peirce to explore the alternative, "the road not taken", the "second destiny" that had been identified in the closing Latin centuries but forgotten thereafter. Peirce's postmodern resumption of premodern epistemological themes produces a number of immediately dramatic and surprising results (beginning with the cure for the pathology dividing our

intellectual culture between the personae of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde).
So derives the title for this work, Four Ages of Understanding: ancient Greek thought, the Latin Age, modern thought, postmodern thought. The book is a survey of philosophy in what is relevant to the "understanding of understanding" from ancient times to the present. It is intended both as a reference work in the history of philosophy and a guide to future research - a "handbook for inquirers" in history, philosophy, and the humanities generally, including historians and philosophers of science. The book also aims to aid in the classroom those professors willing to wean a new generation from the "standard modern outlines" of philosophy's history which serve mainly to support the post-Cartesian supposition that history is of next to no import for the doing itself of philosophy."

From: John Deely - *Four ages of understanding. The first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the turn of the Twenty-first century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001. pp. XXX-XXXI.

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   "This is an essay on the meaning of Being ('das Sein') in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. its principal conclusion is that with the notion of 'Sein,' Heidegger has picked up again a theme first introduced into Western thought by Averroes and Aquinas, forgotten after the death of Poinsot in 1644, namely, the reality of 'ens intentionale' as an order of existence irreducibly other than the order of material nature. The point is demonstrated by showing the correspondence of Seidegger's 'Sein/Seiende' distinction with the 'intentionale/entitativum' distinction of Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism."

6. ———. 1967. "The Problematic of Metaphysical Knowledge." *Philosophy Today* no. 11:184-206.

   "If metaphysical knowledge is truly a distinct and formally unified cognitive discipline which touches the way things are in some commonly fundamental way, then the nature and extent of such knowing should admit of an at least minimal characterization. With the question of whether there is after all a genuinely metaphysical mode of understanding experience into which our minds can thematically enter explicitly in mind, this essay probes into the problem of establishing a critical point of departure for metaphysical ontology properly and recognizably so called."

7. ———. 1968. "The Immateriality of the Intentional as Such." *New Scholasticism* no. 42:293-306.

   "This article takes occasion from the discussion of intentionality set forth in chapter 12 of Mortimer J. Adler's

recent book, 'The difference of man and the difference it makes,' to clarify a number of points in the classical theory of intentionality which are largely unknown or misrepresented in such current discussions as the one Adler both reports on and extends. It achieves this clarification by a close scrutiny of Adler's text, directing attention at critical points to the signal analyses of Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon which go farther into this problem of intentionality than any other contemporary writings."

8. ———. 1969. "The Philosophical Dimensions of the Origin of Species. Part I." *Thomist* no. 33:75-149.

   "This article is a comprehensive assessment of the major writings on natural species from Aristotle to the present, aiming to understand in what sense the ancient views were transformed after Darwin. It draws a clear distinction between the approach of classical philosophy and that of modern science to the problem of species, coupled with a comparative assessment of the methods of classical vs. modern philosophy in dealing with the question of specific differences in nature. The problems of causality, chance, and progress (evolutionary direction) are discussed in the framework of the species concepts. A detailed analytical outline is given after the conclusion."

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10. ———. 1969. "Evolution and Ethics." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* no. 43:171-184.

    Reprinted in: John Deely and Raymond J. Nogar (eds.) - *The problem of evolution. A study of the philosophical repercussions of evolutionary science* - New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973 pp. 187-209.
    "This article seeks to determine the nature of the connection between evolutionary and ethical theory. To achieve this it proceeds from a statement of the possible connections to

consider the idea of nature seemingly entailed by the data of evolutionary science, delineating here the general notion of good co-entailed, the distinction between physical and moral goodness, the 'naturalistic fallacy', being and ought, the mutual implication of 'natural' and 'positive' law. It concludes with a resolution of the possible connections initially limned."

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    "Beginning from certain remarks on abstraction by Peter Geach, this article outlines a classical view of the highest levels of cognitive organization attainable in principle by animal consciousness, and indicates the indispensable role played by such attainments in the formation of properly intellectual cognition. By a careful culling, the relevant texts from Aquinas' corpus are gathered in a consistent framework and related to the contemporary conclusions of H. H. Price and M. J. Adler adversative to Geach."

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    Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Preface IX; A note of reference stile XI; List of symbols used XIII; Analytic Table of Contents XVII-XXVIII; Introduction 1; I. The situation of Heidegger in the tradition of Christian philosophy 9; II. The problem of language and the need for a re-trieve 17 III. The forgottenness of Being 29; IV. Form Man and the *Cogito Sum* to Dasein 43; V. Dasein and the regress to conscious awareness 62; VI. *Intentionalität and Intentionale*: two distinct notions 78; VII. Dasein and the intentional life of Man 88; VIII. The presuppostioned priority of the Being-Question 111; IX. Phenomenology: the medium of the Being-Question 134; X. From the early to the later Hiedegger 156; XI. Conclusion: the denouement of our re-trieve 171; Postscript: a note on the genesis and implications of this book 178; Appendix I: The thought of Being and theology

184; Appendix II: metaphysics and the thought of M. Heidegger 189; Selected bibliography 194; Index of proper names 199-200.

"In making it clear that the essential thought of Heidegger is concerned principally with what scholasticism has referred to in passing (so to speak) as the order of *esse intentionale* strictly understood, however, I intend to make it equally clear that with Martin Heidegger *philosophy itself* has achieved a measure of progress. For if the area of *esse intentionale* has been clearly delimited by the great scholastics, it has been almost entirely neglected or misunderstood by the majority of philosophers; and even in those rare writings, such as the works of John of St. Thomas, where its fundamental structure is rightly characterized, its proper actuality is never rendered fully thematic. Even as the ancients knew full well that the earth was a globe, yet knew nothing of the actual topography of the other side, so is the notion of *esse intentionale* the *"antipodes"* or unexplored region in their metaphysical topography concerned, as it was, principally with tracing the nature of change and the substance/accident dimension of act-potency compositions, i.e., with *esse entitativum,* rather than with the dimension of intersubjectivity and the then little realized problem of intersubjectivity *par excellence,* the nature of the domination of man's existence by a total view of reality (culture, *Weltanschauung,* etc.) not known to reduce to fact, or of *Historicity*." (...)

Yet however complex and subtle accuracy compels its detailed analyses to be, this book has a simple ground plan. It develops through eight stages, covered by ten chapters:

1. Stage one does no more than place our considerations in the context of contemporary currents of thought, pointing out the difficulty and utility of arriving at a consistent understanding of the direction of Heidegger's thought (Chapters I and II).
2. Stage two consists in a direct consideration of Heidegger's original philosophical experience as providing an approach to the meaning of "Being" in terms of the presence of beings

in awareness and social life rather than simply in themselves (Chapter III).
3. Stage three delineates the difficulty of formalizing this experience of intersubjectivity in a definite question serving to guide further inquiry, of translating the mystery of Being into a structured problematic accessible to properly philosophical research (Chapter IV).
4. In stage four are brought out the double set of considerations necessary to analytically adequate the structured unity of Dasein as disclosed by virtue of the fact that Dasein's uttermost *(äusserst)* possibility is at the same time its ownmost *(eigenst)* and *non-relational (unbezügliche)* (Chapters V and VI). 5. The fifth stage makes clear that the contribution of Heideggerean thought to the progress of philosophy stems principally from rendering the intersubjective dimension of human reality thematic, from thematizing that dimension of Dasein according to which it enjoys its "objectively scientific priority," as Heidegger puts it, for phenomenological research (Chapter VII).
6. Stage six makes clear the functional interdependence which obtains between the ontic-ontological structure of Dasein's temporal unity and the priority in philosophy of the phenomenological over the metaphysical sense of the Being question (Chapter VIII).
7. Stage seven examines the identity of Heidegger's conception of the phenomenological attitude and research-mode with his thought of Being *(Denken des Seins)* (Chapter IX).
8. The final stage traces the passage from the early to the later Heidegger as necessitated from within by the suppression of the act-potency structures which gave determinateness and direction to the analyses of *Sein and Zeit,* showing that in these terms the celebrated turning in Heidegger's way of thought provides the justification and completes the demonstration of each sequential stage in our Retrieve." (pp. 3-4).

13. ———. 1971. "The Myth as Integral Objectivity." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*

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"This article attempts a definition and division of myth in order to clarify the relations between mythical thought and critical reflection. By means of this clarification, a further attempt is made to vindicate the uniqueness in principle of objective existence over against that of physical and mental events alike, in terms of the indifference of thought to being and non-being in its relation to objects, an indifference unmistakably exhibited by the functioning of myth in human culture."

14. ———. 1972. "The Ontological Status of Intentionality." *New Scholasticism* no. 46:220-233.

"In a recent article, Richard Aquila argues that Brentano's intentionality thesis as developed by Chisholm is either devoid of ontological significance, or carries a commitment to non-existent objects. The argument is that a relation, if it is genuine, implies the reality of its term. I show this argument to be mistaken, by pointing out the classical distinction between the formality of a relation, which derives from its being referential, and the reality or existence of a relation, which derives from its foundation in some subject. In terms of this distinction, it is perfectly possible, under certain privileged conditions (discussed in this article), for a true relation to exist without there having to be any real term for that relation. Hence it is false to assert that the thesis concerning the intentionality of the mental depends for its ontological significance on a commitment to a realm of mind-independent non-existent objects."

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"Assuming language sometimes succeeds in referring to objects, this article considers the question: how is such success possible? What enables language to refer? After showing that behavioral psychology and the theory of

meaning as use provide no answer, an answer is drawn (by way of an infinite regress argument) from the dependence of language on an essentially relative entity T, which as such is indifferent to the physical reality of its term. Some implications are developed as critique of views of Frege, Meinong, Russell, Quine, and Wittgenstein; and it is suggested in conclusion that the capacity of language to refer to what does not physically exist is the key to the nature of thought."

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"This article takes up the problem of linguistic reference as it has been stated in current Anglo-American philosophy, but introduces into the discussion basic considerations derived from a 1632 'Tractatus de signis' by John Poinsot. The argument shows why the concept of use' is incapable of providing foundations for a philosophy of language, and how the necessary alternative concept leads to radical revision of basic positions widely held in recent analytic and linguistic philosophy concerning mental events and states."

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"This essay surveys epistemological theory as it has developed from the beginnings of modern philosophy to the present time, in order to show how the development of a doctrine of signs (semiotic) provides, both historically and theoretically, as alternative understanding of knowledge that is far more consonant with common experience than any of the traditional mainstream modern or contemporary views, and thus portends a revolution for philosophy."

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Contents: Acknowledgments VI; List of diagrams VIII; Foreword by Thomas A. Sebeok IX; Author's Preface XIII-XVI;
Objectives 1; Part I: Historical Content 5; Section 1. Point of departure and method 7; 2. Exploratory: the Ancient World (Greek and Latin) 13; 3. Exploratory: the indigenous Latin development 23; 4. Exploratory: cognition theory among the Latins 43; 5. Exploratory: the drift toward semiotic consciousness 47; 6. Explanatory: modern times to the present 67; 7. Summation 83;
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Appeindeces 125; Appendix I: On the notion "Doctrine of Signs" 127; Appendix II: On the distinction between words

and ideas 131;
Notes 143; References and indices 205; Index of conceptts and terms 235; Index of persons, places, and works 240
"The first part of this book is an initial attempt to establish an outline of the history of logic expressly from the standpoint of a doctrine of signs as defined by John Locke under the heading of semiotic. No effort has been made in this part to explore the standpoint so defined (that is left for the second part). What has been attempted rather is to indicate in a summary fashion and from the point of view of a philosopher a general sketch of the place and circumstances in Western culture where semiotic consciousness was first thematically achieved, to the extent at least that we are able to determine this in the light of the history of logic and philosophy as the "experts" present it to us, supplemented of course by an actual reading, first-hand, of the texts on which the outline relies - not all of which, by any means, have been weighed evenly if at all in the researches so far of the expert historians.
This fact already indicates the extent to which semiotic historiography will be achieved only by upsetting and revising, often in radical ways, the conventional outlines and histories of thought which have become standard fare in the universities of today. The writing of this history eventually must inevitably take the form also of a *structuring anew* of the entire history of ideas and of philosophy, in order to bring to the fore and make explicit the semiotic components latent by the nature of the case (all thought being through signs) in each of the previous thinkers who have wrestled since ancient times with foundational questions of knowledge, experience, and interpretation generally.
(...)
The second part of this book can no longer claim to be historical (though it tries not to be ignorant of history). Insofar as it differs from Part I, it does so under the inspiration of a remark made by Paul Bouissac at the sixth annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America on the 2nd of October, 1981, in his presentation, "Figurative vs.

Objective Semiosis." All previous semiotic "theories," he observed, be they Greimasian, Saussurean, Peircean, Poinsotian, have come to the study of signs late in the day, on the basis of a thoroughly worked out system of concepts, a "pre-existing philosophical paradigm." To this prejacent paradigm, then, their subsequent notions of signification were referred and required to conform. The coming of age of semiotic as a perspective in its own right requires exactly the reverse. It can have no paradigm of philosophy given in advance. Beginning with the sign, that is, from the function of signs in our experience taken in their own right (semiosis), it is the task of semiotic to create a new paradigm - its own - and to review, criticize, and correct so far as possible all previous accounts of experience in the terms of *that* paradigm.

These remarks, filled at the time with the passion and life of the speaker, were spontaneous there and poorly paraphrased here. Yet they struck me then and seem to me now with undiminished force exactly *justes,* exactly to capture in a flash of insight the task against whose demands the movement that has grown up around us must finally be measured. To answer Herbert's question (1981), what contributes toward meeting these demands in the work going on today is the revolutionary part of semiotics, what does not so contribute belongs to merely passing fad and fashion.

Like Part I, therefore, Part II of this book is heuristic rather than didactic. It seeks not to outline but to adumbrate the reorientation of thought made possible by the semiotic point of view not (indeed) in all areas, but at least in the area of the foundations of knowledge and experience, and at the interface of modern with (in lieu of the better term yet to be coined) post-modern times. Semiotics is capable of mediating a change of age as profound and total as was the separating off of modern times from the Latin era. Then, the cutting edge of transition was modern science, experimental and mathematical, coming of age. Today it is the interpretive activity of the mind becoming conscious of its

full range, ground, and instruments, that is, semiotics." pp. 1-4.

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    (In the fourth edition the chapters from eight to eleven are new, and the first, but especially the third and fourth chapters contain important additions).

Contents of the Fourth edition: K. Kull, S Salupere, P. Torop: *Semiotics has no beginning* pp. IX; Author's Preface to the Fourth Edition XXVI; Author's Preface to the first edition XXIX; Thematic epigraphs 1; 1. Literary semiotics and the doctrine of signs 1; 2. Semiotics: method or point of view? 12; 3. Semiosis: The subject matter of semiotic inquiry 26; 4. Signs: The medium of semiosis 51; 5. Zoosemiotics and anthroposemiotics 74; 6. Physiosemiosis and phytosemiosis 111; 7. Retrospect: history and theory in semiotics 1368. Prospect: a new beginning for the sciences 171; 9. The quasi-error of the external world 183; 10. How semiotics unifies human knowledge 202; 11. The definition of Human Being 215; References 233; Translators' afterword 260; Dictionary of terms 262; Name Index 266-268.

"The aim of the book, then, is to fill the need for an answer to the question of just what is the essential nature and what are the fundamental varieties of possible semiosis. The substance of the answer to this twofold question is contained in chapters 3 through 6. Corresponding to this answer is the answer in chapter 2 to the prior question of what semiotics itself-the knowledge corresponding to the subject matter-basically is. And bracketing this whole discussion by way of opening and closing is a kind of sociological look at semiotics today in chapter 1, balanced by a historical look at semiotics in retrospect and prospect in chapter 7.

This is a book I have long wanted to write and one that has, for even longer, needed to be written; but, at least for this author, only recently have the essential insight and opportunity come together for expressing in a coherent overall framework the basic concepts of semiotics." pp. XXIX-XXX.

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    Contents: List of figures IX; Preface XI-XIII; Preliminaries 1; Part. I. Signification 11; Part II. Textuality 53; Part III. Critick 83; Part IV. Otherness 121; Paragraphal glosses 135; Appendix: The ethics of terminology 173; References 175; Index of persons mentioned 199; Index of conceptions 202; About the author 241.
    "This book is the best argument I can make to date that the perspective required to develop a doctrine of signs in the fullness of its proper possibilities implies also an understanding of human experience that will be for the first

time integral and adequate to the task of providing the measure of human knowledge in the whole of its extent, as distinguished from imposing upon experience and systems of belief some ideological measure designed to dismiss large parts thereof a-priori. To minimize the difficulty of the argument, the book has been set up in such a way as to emphasize the autonomy of the paragraphs.
The present work is published in the hope especially of drawing other workers into the labor of understanding the human use of signs, recognizing all the while that the work perforce advances along an asymptotic curve ill-suited to dogmatic beliefs of any stripe. A community of inquirers cannot escape from the need to provide its own authority, and at the same time to ground that authority critically on the nodes and intersections of objective being with physical being." pp. XII-XIII.
"I will proceed in four parts.
In Part I, I will examine the generic element in the semiotic definition of *anthropos* as *animal linguisticum,* that is to say, what is common to zoösemiosis and anthroposemiosis through the action of signs in the building up of "experience" as something in its own right superordinate to the brute secondness of environmental interactions. This I do under the heading of Signification. And here, following up on Sebeok's suggestions, we will see how the basic notion of modeling system extends much wider than the linguistic base assigned to it by the Tartu school.
In Part II, under the heading of Textuality, I will examine, so to say, the linguisticization of the world of experiencethat is, the species-specific element of experience that makes the human modeling system, or experience anthroposemiotically considered, different from the modeling system of animals employing communication systems lacking the code constitutive of the *signum expertum ad placitum* (the sign experienced linguistically, let us say). This sign will appear as ultimately rooted as such in the relation of signification grasped and deployed in its distinction from the perceptible sign-vehicle and the content signified. We will thereby see how textuality, virtual in the

Umwelt, becomes actual through the indefinite decompositions and recompositions of experience linguistically construed by means of the establishment of a praeterbiological code which no longer, as in Sebeok's notion (cf. Baer *Thomas A. Sebeok doctrine of signs* in: *Classics of semiotics,* 1981: 183), adequates the Uexküllian notion (1940) of "meaning-plan", because textuality breaks the proportion between biological heritage and object as such experienced. In a word, we confront in the codes whereby experience is textualized the differentiating factor in the semiotic definition of *anthropos* as *animal linguisticum.*

This examination of code will bring us to the third element in this modeling of anthroposemiosis -- Part III of the essay, examination of the curiously detached domain called "Critick" in the wide and generic sense explained above (§ 17) as taken from Locke's *Essay,* wherein that equally curiously detached exercise called "criticism" takes place according to various forms. Therein, at one and the same time, what is most distinctive and what is most feeble in anthroposemiosis coincide to create that illusion whereby the literary aspect of semiosis is raised to the Pinnacle of intellectual achievement and treated perversely as a self-contained and autonomous exercise of semiotic competence. Here we will make explicit a point that will have been established virtually in the two previous stages of the diso‡cussion: the critical function and faculty is a subspecies of semiotic competence rather than identical with semiotic competence. Subordinate to and subtended by much broader processes of semiosis, criticism in any specific sense owes its validity to its connection with, rather than to its misleading appearance of autonomy within, those processes. It is a question of appreciating the expanse of the framework and depth of the foundation that belongs to semiotics today by birthright as an offspring of the doctrine of signs gestated by the Iberians after 1529 (Soto's *Summulae),* crystallized thematically in Poinsot's *Treatise* of 1632, named by Locke in 1690, and implemented by Peirce in its wholesale possibilities with the essay on

categories of 1867 and in the many essays thereafter until his death in 1914.
Once the expanse of the framework has been grasped, it will be possible, in a few concluding remarks (Part IV on "Otherness"), to show how "constituting the other" is not unique to anthropology but is rather the basic activity of human intelligence essentially dependent on linguistic means. What is unique and uniquely interesting about anthropology is simply that "the other" is, normally, a conspecific whom we encounter only after socialization to maturity has occurred on the basis of cultural rules and expectations alien to our own socialization."

61. ———. 1993. "How Does Semiotic Effect Renvoi?" *American Journal of Semiotics* no. 11:11-61.

    Reprinted as chapter 8 of: New beginnings: early modern philosophy and postmodern thought pp. 201-244

62. ———, ed. 1993. *Semiotics, 1992*. Lanham: University Press of America.

63. ———. 1994. "What Happened to Philosophy between Aquinas and Descartes?" *Thomist* no. 58:543-568.

64. ———. 1994. *New Beginnings. Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

    Contents: List of illustrations X; Preface: The way to Postmodenity by Lucia Santaella-Braga XI; Technical prenote and acknowledgements XV-XVI; Introduction: On reading this book 3; Part I: The historical contacts. 1. Stating the question 13; 2. The historical prejudices 27; 3. Outlining Latinity with rinsed eyes 39; 4. The problem of novelty in the writings of Late Latin Scholasticism 53; 5. Locke's proposal for semiotic: what was new and what was not 109; Epilogue to Part I: Further signs 145; Part II: Expanding the speculative links; 6. How do signs work? 151; 7. The Grand Vision 183; 8. Renvoi 201; Transition to the future: the way

of signs 245; Appendix 1: Contrasting ontological and Transcendental relatives 249; Appendix 2: Longer Latin citations 255; References 261; Index 295-310.
"This book concerns the theme of new beginnings within philosophy, the changes of age which define philosophical epochs. The theme is taken up not in its full scope as a speculative issue, but concretely in terms of the two most recent such turning points: the origins of modern philosophy out of Latin times and the origins of postmodern philosophy out of modern times. Each of these eras arises out of and defines itself against the backdrop of the paradigm of philosophy accepted in the background period. But what is unusual in the case I am considering is that the modern paradigm was so formed as to conceal from the outset fundamental themes of premodern Latin thought which are, in effect, resumed and foregrounded (with new accents and emphases, to be sure) by the postmodern development. Between the late Latin matrix of early modern philosophy and postmodernism there is a measure of speculative continuity which the classical modern development conceals. That underarching continuity or subtension is what I want to bring to the surface.
Even so restricted and concretized, the transitions at issue are large. To make their handling manageable, in Part I of the book I have focused on them as they are embodied in key figures: especially René Descartes, 1596-1650, and John Locke, 1632-1704 (and, to a lesser extent, George Berkeley, 1685-1753, and David Hume, 1711-1776), for the understanding of the origins of distinctively modern philosophy; Charles Peirce, 1839-1914, and Martin Heidegger, 1889-1976, for the understanding of the central thrust of postmodernism in philosophy; and John Poinsot, 1589-1644, for demonstrating speculative links which bind the matrix of the two at either end-the dawn and the dusk-of essentially modern philosophy.
Thus there are five key figures in the book, but Poinsot is the central one. He is central, however, not as an isolated thinker but as a representative-a unique and uniquely qualified representative, as the reader will learn-of the Latin

Age both in its last phase as providing the matrix of early modern philosophy and in its full extent so far as it was a development of the logical, physical, and metaphysical writings of Aristotle assimilated to the milieu of medieval and renaissance Latin culture. In the same way, Descartes and Locke, Peirce and Heidegger, appear in these pages not as individual thinkers but as paired thinkers representative, respectively, of modernism and postmodernism in philosophy. All five figures, then, are personifications of the theme, and are preented as instantiating it.
(...)
This book sets out to redress the imbalances and correct some distortions, in order to motivate philosophers and historians of philosophy to see and review their materials in a new light-and above all to start reading some new texts which will not only make it possible to tell, but will shortly compel us to tell, a quite different "story of modern philosophy" than the stale one-sided tale we have been repeating to generations upon generations of students since the 1800s." pp. 3-4

65. ———. 1994. "Why Investigate the Common Sources of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?" In *Semiotics 1994*, edited by Spinks, Cary William and Deely, John, 34-50. New York: Peter Lang.

66. ———. 1994. "A Morning and Evening Star: Editor's Introduction." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 68:259-278.

"This special issue of the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* devoted to John Poinsot is complemented by a mélange of four additional essays in Poinsot's honor, three of which appear in *The Thomist,* and one in *The Modern Schoolman*. (1) Given the neglect Poinsot's work has suffered throughout the modern period, it is at least surprising to find the 350th anniversary of his death commemorated by such a range of learned essays celebrating his current relevance, and appearing in three of

the oldest learned journals in the American Catholic university world (dating back, respectively, to 1927, 1939, and 1920).
Such homage is certainly befitting for the work of a man whose epistemological writings were considered by Jacques Maritain to be the only synthesis capable of bringing the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas effectively to bear on the critical situation as it developed in modernity. (2) My abduction is that the homage may be regarded more as auspicious of what the future holds for Poinsot's work in emerging from the shadows of modernity than as redressing a past neglect. These essays in honor of Poinsot in the several journals commemorate the past, by they celebrate the future, marking, in fact, a prospect of postmodernity." pp. 259-260.
(1) John Deely, "What Happened to Philosophy between Aquinas and Descartes?"; James Bernard Murphy, "Language, Communication, and Representation in the Semiotic of John Poinsot"; John D. Kronen, "The Substantial Unity of Material Substances according to John Poinsot" *The Thomist, 58,* no. 4 (October 1994); Gerard J. Dalcourt, "Poinsot and the Mental Imagery Debate," *The Modern Schoolman,* 72, n . 1 (November *1994).*
2 Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. supervised by Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, *1959), 387.* See further John Deely, "Semiotic in the Thought of Jacques Maritain," *Recherche Sémiotique / Semiotic Inquiry* 6, no. 2 (1986): 1-30.

67. ———. 1994. "Locke's Philosophy Vs. Locke's Proposal for Semiotic." *American Journal of Semiotics* no. 11:33-37.

68. ———. 1995. "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 48:539-566.

Co-author: Mauricio Beuchot.
"The prevalence today of 'semiotics' as the preferred linguistic form for designating the study of signs in its

various aspects already conceals a history, a story of the ways in which, layer by layer, the temporal achievement we call human understanding builds, through public discourse, ever new levels of common acceptance each of which presents itself as, if not self-evident, at least the common wisdom. Overcoming such present-mindedness is not the least of the tasks faced by the awakening of semiotic consciousness. (...)

There are a host of reasons, from superficial to profound, that play a role in the current dominance of 'semiotics' as the preferred linguistic form for designating the study of signs. The reversal of dominance in the discursive rivalry between 'semiology' and 'semiotics' as cultural forms of understanding, we want to suggest, is owing to the gradual, not to say grudging, recognition of the comparative depth, scope, and importance of the studies authored, on the one hand, by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and those who took their principal inspiration in the study of signs from his work; and, on the other hand, by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and those who took principal inspiration in the study of signs from his work. Saussure, of course, coined the term 'semiologie,' while Peirce, though he did not coin the word 'semiotic,' nonetheless took it over from the desuetude into which it had fallen as a neologism at the end of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690 and put it into current circulation.(*) (p. 539.

(*) See John Deely, "John Locke's Place in the History of Semiotic Inquiry," in Semiotics 1986, ed. John Deely and Jonathan Evans (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 406-18. For Locke's actual text itself of 1690, see "Coining the Name," in Frontiers in Semiotics, 2-4, with detailed analysis of the coinage in Luigi Romeo, "The Derivation of 'Semiotics' through the History of the Discipline," Semiosis 6, no. 2 (1977): 31-8; John Deely, "Semiotic and the Liberal Arts," The New Scholasticism, 59, no. 3 (summer 1985): 296-322; and John Deely, "Locke's Proposal for Semiotics and the Scholastic Doctrine of Species," The Modern Schoolman 70, no. 3 (March 1993): 165-88.

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Historically layered references 743; Gloss on the references 835; Index 837; Timetable of figures 1015-1019.
"If there is one notion that is central to the emerging postmodern consciousness, that notion is the notion of sign. And for understanding this notion, nothing is more

essential than a new history of philosophy. For the notion of sign that has become the basis for a postmodern development of thought was unknown in the modern period, and before that traces back only as far as the turn of the 5th century AD. Yet the context within which the general notion of sign was first introduced presupposes both the ancient Greek notion of "natural sign" *(semeion)* and the framework of Greek discussions of nature and mind which provoked the development of philosophy in the first place as an attempt to understand the being proper to the objects of experience. Not only does it emerge that the sign is what every object presupposes, but, in modern philosophy, the conundrum about the reality of the "external world", the insolubility of the problem of how in theory to get beyond the privacy of the individual mind, springs directly from the reduction of signification to representation. So here is one of the ways in which the four ages of this book can be outlined: preliminaries to the notion of sign; the development of the notion itself; forgetfulness of the notion; recovery and advance of the notion.

Tracing the development of the notion of sign from its beginning and against the backdrop of Greek philosophy yields an unexpected benefit by comparison with more familiar historical approaches. Every modern history of philosophy has been essentially preoccupied with the separating off from philosophy of science in the modern sense, especially in and after the seventeenth century. From this point of view, many of the continuing philosophical developments of the later Latin centuries tend to drop out of sight. It has become the custom to present modern philosophy, conventionally beginning with Descartes (17th century), simply as part and parcel of the scientific break with the authors of Latin tradition, and to treat the bringing of nominalism into the foreground of Latin thought by William of Ockham (14th century) as if that were the *finale* of Latin development.

This hiatus of two and a half centuries in the history of philosophy, however, effectively disappears when we make our way from ancient to modern times by tracing mainly the

development of the philosophical notion of *signum*. From the High Middle Ages down to the time of Descartes we find a lively and continuous discussion of sign which, through a series of important if unfamiliar controversies on both sides of the thirteenth century, leads to a basic split in the closing Latin centuries. On one side stand those who think that the general notion of sign is an empty name, *a flatus vocis,* a nominalism, no more than a "relation of reason", an *ens rationis*. On the other side are those who are able to ground the general notion in an understanding of relation as a unique, suprasubjective mode of being, a veritable dual citizen of the order of *ens reale* and *ens rationis* alike, according to shifting circumstances.

Modern philosophy, from this point of view, appears essentially as an exploration of the nominalist alternative; and postmodern thought begins with the acknowledgment of the bankruptcy of the modern effort, combined with the determination pioneered by C. S. Peirce to explore the alternative, "the road not taken", the "second destiny" that had been identified in the closing Latin centuries but forgotten thereafter. Peirce's postmodern resumption of premodern epistemological themes produces a number of immediately dramatic and surprising results (beginning with the cure for the pathology dividing our intellectual culture between the *personae* of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde).

So derives the title for this work, *Four Ages of Understanding:* ancient Greek thought, the Latin Age, modern thought, postmodern thought. The book is a survey of philosophy in what is relevant to the "understanding of understanding" from ancient times to the present. It is intended both as a reference work in the history of philosophy and a guide to future research - a "handbook for inquirers" in history, philosophy, and the humanities generally, including historians and philosophers of science. The book also aims to aid in the classroom those professors willing to wean a new generation from the "standard modern outlines" of philosophy's history which serve mainly to support the post-Cartesian supposition that history is of

next to no import for the doing itself of philosophy." pp. XXX-XXXI.

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    "This is an essay in what used to be, and still largely is, called the "philosophy of mind", a designation heavy with the dualistic assumptions of classical modernity. When those assumptions wrapped up in that traditional classification are jettisoned in favor of an epistemological paradigm compossible with semiosis, it becomes clear that what we are dealing with is straightforwardly a semiotics of the cognitive activities of living organisms. The following pages are better viewed under this clarification.
    Dr. Anthony Russell claimed that the clarification makes of the essay "the first treatment of the distinction between

sense and intellect worth reading since the days of Locke and Hume". Be that as it may, if the reader adjudges the work worth having read, the game shall have been worth the candle.

Semiotics is nothing more or other than the knowledge we develop by studying the action of signs, and it receives its various divisions from the various ways and regions in which that action is verified. This study presupposes nothing more than a notion of sign as one thing standing for another in a relation of *renvoi,* that is to say, an irreducibly triadic relation, actual or virtual, but in the case of cognitive life, it seems, always actual. Such a general notion of sign is verified, at the extremes, in phenomena we call "natural" and in phenomena we call "cultural", as well as in the intermediary phenomena of social interaction such as sociology, for example, studies it. But - and this is one of the more surprising upshots of contemporary semiotic research - the actual proposal of such a general notion of sign appears to be no older than Augustine, and a creation of the specifically Latin Age of philosophical history.

Proposed at the end of the fourth century, the semiotic point of view did not receive a warrant until the early seventeenth century, when it was for the first time demonstrated how the early Latin proposal for a general notion of sign, applicable in a single sense to the extremes of nature and culture, could be vindicated through the fact that relation according to the way it has being is indifferent to whether its subjective foundation or ground be taken from physical interaction and being or from cognitive activity alone. This establishment of a unified object or subject matter for semiotic investigation was in principle revolutionary for our understanding of human experience and the knowledge which derives there-from. It unified in a single instrument or medium the otherwise diverse products of speculative knowledge about the natures of things and practical knowledge about human affairs and the application thereto of speculative knowledge.

The first author who succeeded in giving voice to the underlying unity of the being in relation upon which all

action of signs as such depends was John Poinsot (1589-1644), an Iberian philosopher of mixed Burgundian and Portuguese descent. In the text of his *Tractatus de Signis,* published in 1632, the new beginning implicit in the adoption of the semiotic point of view is in two ways at least symbolized. First, the text expressly notes that the sign requires a standpoint superior to the division of being into what is and what is not independent of cognition, which translates, in modern parlance, into a standpoint superior to the confrontation of realism with idealism. Second, the compass of the *Tractatus de Signis* text unites what were, in the then-traditional liberal arts curriculum of the European universities, the opening discussions of logic with the concluding discussions of the theory of knowledge." pp. IX-X.

11. ———. 2002. "The Absence of Analogy." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 55:521-550.

    "The doctrine of analogy as the Latins came distinctively to develop it pretty much began its philosophical life in the Stagirite's reply to the Parmenidean One doctrine. There is no one way to say being, replied Aristotle, but, on the contrary, many ways; irreducibly many. At least, as we will see, this was the point from which it developed among the Latins after Thomas Aquinas, who took up Aristotle's point more fully and in some strikingly different ways than is suggested by the Greek of Aristotle. We will see that precisely for want of an understanding of the foundational implications of Aquinas's doctrine of analogy and his corollary doctrine of the transcendental "properties" of being, most of his late modern followers, in their battle against Descartes and the idealism in general that became the hallmark of modernity, fell into that trap (native to the way of things) of proceeding "as if a philosophy of being could not also be a philosophy of mind," (*) and quite missed the problem of being-as-first-known, as shall appear." (p. 522)

(*) Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge, trans, from the 4th French edition under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Scribner's, 1959), 66: "comme si une philosophie de l'etre ne pouvait etre aussi une philosophie de l'esprit."

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"With Peirce, in recovering from the Latins the general notion of sign, (1) and in advancing that notion both by naming distinctively its third term and by shifting the focus from the being to the action of signs (so that it is well understood that, in that spiral of semiosis (2) we call experience, representamen, significate, and interpretant are constantly changing places as abductions give way to deductions and deductions to retroductions provenating yet

further abductions, and so on, in a semiosis that *would be* infinite did not death intervene to curtail the process in the individual case), what we were handed was precisely a new set of categories. (3) This "new list", *like* the categories of Aristotle, purported to contain modes of being as able to exist independently of mind and able to be known precisely in that dimension of their being; *but unlike* Aristotle's were not restricted to that order of prospective existence, "ens reale". *Like* Kant's categories, the new list purported to reveal the input of mind into objectivity; *but unlike* Kant's was not restricted to the mind-dependent dimension of what is consequently known, "ens rations". In short, by revealing how mind-independent and mind-dependent being *interweave* in the constitution of experience as a semiotic web of relations whose nodes, reticles, or interstices precisely present to us an objective world *both* natural and cultural in its provenance and knowability, the new list of categories carries us forward beyond modernity and not simply back to some older viewpoint ("realism") adequately presaged in both ancient Greek and medieval Latin thought.

In short, semiotics proves for philosophy neither a question of premodern (though it draws on ancient discussion of relation as much as on medieval discussion of sign) nor modem, but precisely postmodern in its positive essence. For semiotics enables us to see clearly what, for philosophy, modernity consisted in, and why modern philosophy proves wanting when it comes to the analysis of science, language, and knowledge - to matters epistemological generally. For all thought is in signs, and signs are sustained by their distinctive action, which is exhibited in but cannot be confined or reduced to language, as semiology and late modem analytic thought (after the "linguistic turn") beguiled their followers into believing." pp. 28-29

(1) Beuchot and Deely *Common sources for the semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Poinsot,* 1995; Deely *Why investigate the common sources of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?* 1994.

(2) See the Diagram in Part III, p. 164 below.

(3) Peirce 1867: *Collected Papers* 1. 545-559.

14. ———. 2003. "The Quasi-Error of the External World. An Essay for Thomas A. Sebeok, in Memoriam." *Cybernetics & Human Knowing* no. 10:25-46.

    Abstract: "There is a story according to which Professor Sebeok was on a panel of distinguished speakers who received from the audience a challenge to show cause why the basic ideas of semiotics, such as that of Umwelt, were not simply one more version of solipsistic idealism. Each of the speakers in turn addressed the matter, each beginning with a protestation (outdoing in earnestness the previous speaker) to the effect that, Of course, I am not a solipsist. Finally, Tom's turn arrived. He shrugged, and said simply: I'm a solipsist. It was one of those seminal moments, of which Tom created so many, like the time in Toronto where he mentioned in passing in his main remarks that Everyone thinks of language in terms of communication. But language has nothing to do with communication. In the question period, the very first questioner challenged him on the point. You said that language has nothing to do with communication, the audience member reminded him. Why did you say that? Because it doesn't, Tom answered pointedly, and proceeded to call on the next questioner."

15. ———. 2003. "The Semiotic Animal (Long Version)." In *Logica, Dialogica, Ideologica. I Segni Tra Funzionalità Ed Eccedenza*, edited by Petrilli, Susan and Calefato, Patrizia, 201-219. Milano: Mimesis.

16. ———. 2003. "The Word 'Semiotics': Formation and Origins." *Semiotica* no. 146:1-49.

    Revised and expanded in: *Why semiotics?*.

17. ———. 2003. "On the Word Semiotics, Formation and Origins." *Semiotica* no. 146:1-50.

18. ———. 2003. "The Semiotic Foundations of the Human Sciences from Augustine to Peirce." *Recherche Sémiotique / Semiotic Inquiry* no. 23:3-29.

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    Contents: Chapter 1. Why semiotics? 3; Chapter 2. Tentatives of terminology 11; Chapter 3. My guess at the riddle 53; Appendix A. The first programmatic statement toward a doctrine of signs (Locke 1689) 59; Appendix B. The second programmatic statement toward a doctrine of signs (Saussure 1916) 62; Appendix C. The Latin prelude to a doctrine of signs (Poinsot 1632) 66; Historically layered references 71; Index rerum 89-96.
    "The word 'semiotics' as a matter of interest today can hardly be discussed apart from a consideration as well of its late modern competitor in intellectual culture, 'semiology'. Seldom has the struggle to define the soul of a newly emerging cultural epoch, in the present case 'postmodernism' as bearing on a molting of philosophical tradition itself, been so succinctly encapsulated as in the late 19th and 20th century history and contest between these two terms. To this spectacle we arrive late enough in the game to realize that semiotics is the term that has carried the day, in the sense of portending the main future line of development of the doctrine of signs within intellectual culture.
    The formation and origins of semiotics as a dictionary item, that is to say, as a publicly recognized lexical item of natural language, is what will concern us here. We will see that from its earliest appearances in the English tongue the word semiotics has been bound up with a twofold notion or question: What is to be understood by the doctrine of signs? and What name is most proper to understanding the development of such a doctrine?
    The word has ancient roots in Greek medicine, we will see; but its late modern/postmodern establishment in English is what will concern us here. I have chosen the device of numbered paragraphs to facilitate the reader's grasp of the

investigative steps, empirical in the broad sense, that I have taken by examining sequences of dictionaries to track the emergence and variations on 'semiotics' as an English lexical item in its own right. Whatever its overtones and provenances from the past and from other languages, within neither Greek nor Latin does the term seem ever to have existed as such, certainly not with its definitive (at least for the time of the twenty-first century's first decade!) postmodern significance of the doctrine that signs consist in every case in a triadic relation of referral.

The being of sign as consisting universally in a relation essentially triadic is a postmodern view of premodern provenance, as is coming to be widely known in semiotics, if sometimes to the consternation of Peircean purists who prefer to overlook or deny Peirce's debt to the Latins in this particular; but the appropriation of 'renvoi' as the term properly to name this fundamental recognition is of recent vintage, coming only after Jakobson (1896-1982), indeed, and with certain essential revisions taken into account, (*) to arrive at the henceforward classical formula for sign (the action of which is the subject matter of semiotic investigation): *aliquid alicuique stat pro alio,* 'one thing standing for another to some third party'. This formulation is the latest molting, we will see subsequently, of a distinguished lineage."

(*) See Jakobson "Coup d'ceil sur le devéloppement de la sémiotique", in *Panorama sémiotique / A Semiotic Landscape,* Proceedings of the First Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Milan, June 1974, ed. Seymour Chatman, Umberto Eco, and Jean-Marie Klinkenberg (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 3-18. Also published separately under the same title by the Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies as a small monograph (= Studies in Semiotics 3; Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1975); and in an English trans. by Patricia Baudoin titled "A Glance at the Development of Semiotics", in *The Framework of Language* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Studies in the Humanities, Horace R. Rackham School of Graduate Studies, 1980),1-3 viewed

under the two correctives, Deely *New beginnings. Early modern philosophy and postmodern thought* followed by Deely *A sign is what?* 721-22. Cf. Deely *The impact on philosophy of semiotics* passim.

20. ———. 2004. "The Role of Thomas Aquinas in the Development of Semiotic Consciousness." *Semiotica* no. 152:75-139.

    Abstract: "'Semiotic consciousness' is the awareness we have of the role and action of signs in the world. This essay examines the role of Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) in the growth of semiotic consciousness among the Latins, as Charles Sanders Peirce will take up the matter in influencing the twentieth-century establishment of semiotics as a global intellectual movement. Although Aquinas never focused on the subject of signs for its own sake, he frequently treats of it in relation to other direct investigations in a great variety of contexts. The result of his treatments is to have left a series of texts which, though not without their inner tensions, contain a series of consequences and connections which can be developed into a unified theory of the being constitutive of signs as a general mode. Precisely this theory was spelled out systematically for the first time in the 1632 Treatise on Signs of John Poinsot, expressly grounded in a pulling together of Aquinas's various texts together with a careful analysis of the role of signs in human experience. The resulting doctrinal perspective proves to have been implicit in Aquinas and to lie at the foundation of Peirce's notion of signs as triadic relations, a notion he took over from the later Latins and developed anew, particularly in shifting the focus from the being to the action proper to signs, or 'semiosis'. It is this appropriation and shift that marks the boundary between modernity and postmodernism in philosophy, with respect to which the writings of Aquinas are like a taproot."

21. ———. 2004. "The Semiosis of Angels." *Thomist* no. 68:205-258.

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27. ———. 2004. "' *Semeion*' to Sign by Way of Signum: On the Interplay of Translation and Interpretation in the Establishment of Semiotics." *Semiotica* no. 148:187-227.

28. ———. 2004. "Dramatic Reading in Three Voices: A Sign Is *What*?" *American Journal of Semiotics* no. 20:1-66.

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30. ———. 2005. "The Semiotic Animal (Definitional Version)." In *Semiotics 2003*, edited by Williamson, Rodney, Sbrocchi, Leonard and Deely, John. Ottawa: Legas.

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    "A postmodern humanism consistent with the thought of Thomas Aquinas requires a new definition of human being, one which extends the classical understanding of «rational animal» on the basis of a study of what is distinctively human within the action of signs. Ancient and medieval philosophy was generally "realistic", but failed to distinguish thematically between objects existing as such only in knowledge and things existing whether or not known. The understanding of the human being that accompanied this orientation was expressed in the formula "rational animal" (animal rationale). Modern philosophy came to an understanding of the difference between objects existing in knowledge and things existing independently of knowledge, but at the price of failing to show how things can themselves become objects. The understanding of human being that accompanied the modern divorce of objects from things was enshrined in the formula "thinking thing" (res cogitans). Philosophy became "postmodern" when, through work recovering and advancing the original semiotic consciousness of the Latin Age systematized in the 17th century work of John of St. Thomas, it became possible to understand how, through the action of signs, objects and things are interwoven in the fabric of human experience that transcends the modern opposition of realism to idealism. The understanding of human being that develops from and together with this postmodern perspective is precisely captured in the formula "semiotic animal" (*animal semeioticum).* "

32. ———. 2005. *Augustine and Poinsot: The Protosemiotic Development*. Sofia: Tip-Top Press.

33. ———. 2005. *Purely Objective Reality*. Sofia: Tip-Top Press.

"In his *Letter on Humanism* of 1947, Heidegger declared that the subject/object opposition and the terminology that accrues to it had still not been properly addressed in the history of philosophy, and he awaited a proper disquisition that resolved the problem. To date, that has not been provided. This volume explains and solves the prevailing problems in the subjectivity/objectivity couplet, in the process making an indispensable contribution both to semiotics and to philosophy. This book shows that what is thought to be 'objective' in the commonplace use of the term is demonstrably different from what objectivity entails when it is revealed by semiotic analysis. It demonstrates in its exegesis of the 'objective' that human existence is frequently governed by examples of a 'purely objective reality' -- a fiction which nevertheless perfuses, is perfused by, and guides experience. The ontology of the sign can be mind-dependent or mind-independent, just as the status of relation can be as legitimate on its own terms whether it is found in *ens rationis* or in *ens reale*. The difference in the awareness of human animals consists in this very contextualization that Deely's writings in general have made so evident: the ability to identify signs as sign relations, and the ability to enact relations on a mind-dependent basis. *Purely Objective Reality* offers the first sustained and theoretically consistent interrogation of the means by which human understanding of 'reality' will be instrumental in the survival -- or destruction -- of planet Earth."

34. ———. 2005. "Defining the Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of Human Being Superseding the Modern Definition "Res Cogitans"." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 79:461-481.

"As modernity began with a redefinition of the human being, so does postmodernity. But whereas the modern

definition of the human being as res cogitans cut human animals off from both their very animality and the world of nature out of which they evolved and upon which they depend throughout life, the postmodern definition as semeiotic animal both overcomes the separation from nature and restores the animality essential to human being in this life. Semiotics, the doctrine of signs suggested by Augustine and theoretically justified by Poinsot, developed in our own day after Peirce, introduces postmodernity by overcoming the Kantian epistemological limits on the side of ens reale and showing the social constructions superordinate to ens reale as essential to animal life."

35. ———. 2005. "Why the Semiotic Animal Needs to Develop a Semioethics." In *The Semiotic Animal*, edited by Deely, John, Petrilli, Susan and Ponzio, Augusto, 207-221. Ottawa: Legas Publishing.

    "This paper will discuss why the definition of human being as semiotic animal necessarily implies a semioethic, in light of how, as a definition, it both differs from the classical (ancient and medieval) definition of the human being as "rational animal" and replaces the modern definition of human being as "res cogitans". At issue here is the classical distinction between speculative and practical thought, and how the definition of ethics as belonging determinately to the practical sphere is affected by the establishment of semiotics as transcending that classical distinction. I will consider how the perspective of semiotics impacts upon the traditional ideas of ethics, and how these traditional ideas, in turn, are absorbed into or transformed by the notion of a "semioethics"."

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    The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD 354 to 1644 (from the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)

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"The collection is complementary to the sister collection of Robert Innis, Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), which is a superb assemblage of neoclassic authors, contemporary more or less, but most now dead, and mirroring the embryonic stage through which semiotics first established itself on the contemporary scene. The two collections represent, respectively, points of departure, on the one hand, and trajectories of travel since.
There remains to explain the articulation of the parts of the present collection in their specific character.
Part I explains the origin of the term "semiotic" as it comes to us from Locke, and conveys specifically a perspective, as Winance put it (1983: 515), "able to assimilate the whole of epistemology and natural philosophy as well", where "nature" is understood, as Aquinas explained in such a context (c.1269: 1.1.2), "ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam" -- "in such a way as to include whatever there is of being".
Part II does not treat of all the main semiotic systems known to exist, but only of those three concerning which programmatic research statements are as such extant. This part treats therefore of the three main semiotic systems so far explored as such by teams of researchers cognizant of their orientation and concerned to establish it as such. Further frontiers remain, and some of them (by no means all, or even always accurately) have already been indicated in the position paper of Anderson et al. (1984), "A Semiotic Perspective on the Sciences: Steps Toward a New Paradigm".
Part III concerns themes common to the breaking down and breaking through of the confines imposed by the various linguistic paradigms, as semiotics has moved into its broader perspective of development.
Part IV illustrates the penetration of semiotics into some areas already well established in traditional terms. This section is the most incomplete, inasmuch as the influence of

semiotics extends to many "traditional spheres" besides those specified here; but we have chosen the readings for this section with an eye to their exploratory merit. The point of the section is to illustrate lines of possible over already achieved development.
Part V, finally, returns to the name, for the purpose of exploring now not its origins, but its future. It might equally well have been titled "Prospective Semiotics".
In short, the volume begins with the text of Locke's original proposal, followed by a philosophical-historical exegesis of that proposal, and develops through a series of essays establishing the connection of the original semiotic perspective to traditional lines of specialized thought (including philosophy itself) and exhibiting the possibilities of that original perspective in more or less detailed applications to major problem areas. The readings globally taken provide, as we have said, a corrective and an enhancement of popular conceptions of semiotic today.
We aim at nothing less than a full-scale "paradigm shift", in the popular consciousness, from the exclusively literary, structuralist, and Saussurean pars to the inclusive biological, philosophical, and Peircean totum." pp. XVI-XVII.

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The Frege-Russell 'Is' Ambiguity Thesis

The meaning of the word "Is"

This page use the font Lucida Sans Unicode for logical symbols.

"One of the most interesting open problems in the history of formal sciences concerns the rise of modern logic epitomized by the Frege-Russell theory of quantifiers. One of the cornerstones of this theory is the distinction between the allegedly different meanings of verbs for being. According to received wisdom, such verbs are multiply ambiguous between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity, and the is of subsumption. This view, also known as the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis, is built into the notations that have been used in logic since the turn of the 20th century, in that the allegedly different meanings are expressed differently in the usual logical notations. (1) The is of identity is expressed by the identity sign a = b, the is of predication by a singular term's filling the argument slot of a predicative expression P(a), the is of existence by the existential quantifier (∃x)P(x), and the is of subsumption by a general conditional of the form (Vx) (x ∈ S ⊃ x ∈ P). Both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell attached great importance to the ambiguity of the verb is. During the 20th century it became commonplace to subscribe to this thesis even though it is not necessary or even fully obvious (cf. [Hintikka 1979]; [Mates 1979]). But then again, it turns out that after the Middle Ages no philosopher assumed such multiple ambiguity before the 19th century. What happened? How did the Frege-Russell thesis come about? In what follows, I approach these questions from a historical point of view. I first say a few introductory words about the treatment

of existence in Aristotle and Kant, and thereafter focus on the 19th century English developments in the field of the algebra of logic and on the ideas of George Boole and Augustus De Morgan in particular.

Aristotle considered the Frege-Russell distinction but rejected it. His treatment of existence in the context of a syllogistically constructed science was in rough agreement with the ancient Greek language, in which there were no separate verbs for existence. Existence was expressed by the absolute construction with ἐστιν which looks like a special case of predication, e.g., "Zeus is" as a limiting case of such statements as "Zeus is a god" or "Zeus is powerful". In effect, Aristotle treated the different Frege-Russell senses of different components in the force of ἐστιν. *Each of these components could be absent or present on any one occasion of the use of* ἐστιν. In syllogistic reasoning, existence was sometimes present as part of the force of the predicate term, sometimes absent. The existential force trickled down from the most general terms of the sense in question along a sequence of syllogistic conclusions. Hence, in any one particular science existential force had to be assured, according to Aristotle, only for the widest generic term defining the field of that science:

> Thus we assume the meaning alike of unity, straight, and triangular; but while as regards unity and magnitude we assume also the fact of their existence, in the case of the remainder proof is required. [*An. post.*, A 10, 76a, 34-36]

> Existence could not serve alone as a predicate term because it would have been too broad a term, not restricted to any one category and thus not an essence of anything [*An. post.*, B 7, 92b, 13-15]. In this sense, according to Aristotle, existence was not a predicate. However, it could be a part of the force of a predicate term.

It is often said that Kant's discussion of existence includes a criticism of the idea that existence is a predicate. In fact, it includes a stronger criticism, namely the rejection of the idea that existence could be even a part of the force of a predicate term. According to Kant, existence adds nothing to a concept of a thing:

> '*Being*' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. [...] The small word 'is' adds no new predicate. [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 625]
>
> This does not mean that Kant embraced the Frege-Russell thesis. It means that at the turn of the 19th century the notion of existence became homeless, as far as the logical representation of different propositions was concerned. It must be admitted, though, that Kant's criticism served to disassociate the predicative and the existential uses of is from one another. According to Leila Haaparanta, Kant seems to have inspired the Frege-Russell distinction [Haaparanta 1986].

After Kant the next major development in logical theory was the algebra of logic that originated in England around the mid-19th century.(2) The following two ideas came to the forefront:
1) the operators corresponding to the syllogistical standard forms of universal and particular judgments were treated as duals;
2) universal judgments were taken to be relative to some universe of discourse and were inevitably taken as the non-existence of exceptions in that domain.
Because of the duality, existential quantifier expressions came to express existence. The homeless notion of existence thus found a new home, no longer in the predicative *is* but in the existential quantifier.
Before moving on to take a closer look upon the ideas of Augustus De Morgan and George Boole, it is important to acknowledge that neither of them introduced existential or universal quantifiers, and therefore they must not be regarded as early pioneers of the predicate calculus. However, at least De Morgan seems to have been aware of at least some of the difficulties that arose in the absence of quantifiers [Goerge C. Smith (ed.), *The Boole-De Morgan Correspondence: 1842-1864*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982, p. 24]." (pp. 255-257)

Notes

(1) Stanislaw Leśniewski's notation provides an important exception here.

(2) Strictly speaking it was upon Leibniz's initiative that the idea of an algebraic structure of logic began to grow -- even though it was Boole who really started its systematic development.

From: Risto Vilkko, "Existence, Identity, and the Algebra of Logic", in Benedikt Löwe, Volker Peckhaus, and Thomas Räsch (eds.), *Foundations of the Formal Sciences. The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences*, London: College Publications 2006, pp. 255-265.

'BEING' FROM A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW

"Nowadays, logicians tend to draw a sharp distinction between the 'existential' function of 'the verb *to be*' and, its various 'predicative' or 'copulative', functions. The philosophical importance of this distinction lies in the fact that most modern philosophers would say that existence cannot be predicated of objects in the same sense as their various attributes, or properties, but is presupposed in the identification of objects or in any reference to them. (...)
It is worth noting, however, that in English 'the verb to be' is not used as freely in existential sentences as it was in Greek: it is such sentences as *God is* (where 'the verb to be' is perfectly normal in Greek) that have mainly interested philosophers. What would generally be described as the 'existential' use of 'the verb to be' in English is not common except with a locative or temporal complement. Examples of this usage are (i) There are lions in Africa, and (ii) The accident was yesterday. We shall discuss such 'existential' sentences presently.
Among the 'predicative' uses of 'the verb to be' logicians customarily distinguish: (a) the *identification* of one entity with another ($a = b$: e.g. *That man is John*); (b) *class-membership* ($b \in C$: e.g. *John is a Catholic*, 'John is a member of the class of persons characterized as Catholic'); and (c) class-inclusion ($C \subset D$: *Catholics are Christians*, 'The members of the class of persons

characterized as Catholic are included among the members of the class of persons characterized as Christians').
Though logically important, the distinction between class-membership and class-inclusion does not appear to be of any syntactic significance in most languages. The distinction between 'characterizing' and 'sortal' sentences (...) is, however, of considerable importance: cf. *Apples are sweet* and *Apples are fruit*, The former tend to have an 'adjectival' predicate (in languages where one can draw a distinction between 'adjectives' and 'verbs'), and the latter a nominal predicate. The syntactic analysis of sentences with nominal predicates (e.g. *Apples are fruit*, *John is a soldier*, *Mary is still a very young girl*) is a very complex matter: we shall not go into the question here. We will disregard the differences between various subtypes of nominal predicates and treat them all like 'adjectival' predicates. For terminological convenience, we will refer to both classes of sentences (whether they are 'characterizing' or 'sortal', and regardless of any other differences) as *attributive*." (pp. 388-389)

From: John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1968.

THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING AND THE "IS" AMBIGUITY THESIS

"This history involves more changes and contrasts than one might perhaps expect. For one thing, we twentieth-century philosophers are wont to approach the notion of being by means of the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis. As we all know this thesis concerns the notion of being, as codified in verbs for being in languages like the English *is*, German *ist* or the ancient Greek *estin*. What it asserts is that these verbs are multiply ambiguous. We have to distinguish (according to this thesis) from each other the *is*es of existence, identity, predication and subsumption. Indeed we are in fact supposed to have learned to distinguish them from each other in practice, for we have all been taught to use first-order

logic as our canonical notation in logic and logical analysis. It is in order for me to emphasize the word ambiguity here. Every half-way sensitive analyst (or perhaps I should say, every sensible analyst) will grant that verbs for being like the English is are used in different ways on different occasions. What the Frege-Russell thesis does, is to blame these differences in use on the ambiguity of a single word, instead of explaining the difference in use away in some other way, for instance by reference to the context of use. The Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis has played a major role in twentieth-century philosophy. With his usual modesty, Russell (1914, p. 50) called it "the first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks". One of the many surprises in my brief history of the concept of being is how recent a belief in the Frege-Russell thesis is in the history of philosophy. As far as I know, it is not found in a clear form before the nineteenth century. Its genesis needs and deserves a closer scrutiny, but apparently different versions of the ambiguity thesis were adopted independently of each other by different thinkers. Some historians assign the credit (or the blame) for introducing the distinction between the existential *is* and the predicative *is* to Kant. (But see below.) In contrast, the thesis is conspicuous by its absence from such philosophers as Aristotle.
(...)
As was indicated, it has been claimed that the Frege-Russell distinction can be traced back to Kant and his thesis that "existence is not a predicate". Meinong's case shows that this cannot be the full story. For one important thing, even though he adopted a part of the Frege-Russell distinction, at the same time existence was in a sense a predicate according to Meinong. After all, only existential judgements were for him contingent." (pp. 29-31)

From: Jaakko Hintikka, "Meinong in a Long Perspective,"*Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50, 1995, pp. 29-45.

CHARLES H. KAHN ON "BEING" IN ANCIENT GREEK

"I am not myself a linguistic relativist. I want, in effect, to defend the concept of being against its modern detractors. What I hope to do in this paper is to show that when the Greek concept of being (as introduced by Parmenides and developed by Plato) is properly understood it represents a valid and indeed inevitable topic for philosophic inquiry. It turns out, in fact, to be fundamentally the same topic that is pursued in the modern ontological tradition of Frege, the early Wittgenstein, and Quine. And it also turns out to be very different from the questions of personal existence and the human condition which dominate that other school of modern ontology associated with the name of Heidegger. (2)

In order to meet the challenge of linguistic relativism, we must first give an adequate account of the linguistic functions of the verb 'be,' *(eimi* in ancient Greek), and then show that these functions provide the basis for a coherent concept and a clear philosophical question. Let me briefly indicate in advance what I take the solution to be. The concept of being in Greek philosophy refers to the nature of reality or the structure of the world, in the very general sense of 'the world,' which includes whatever we can know or investigate and whatever we can describe in true or false statements. The question of being is then: How must the world be structured in order for inquiry, knowledge, science, and true discourse or, for that matter, false discourse to be possible?

On this view of the concept of being, the key notion is that of truth -- the goal of science and the aim of declarative speech. If the claims of linguistic relativism have seemed plausible in regard to the concept of being, that is due in part to the fact that they rely upon an inadequate account of the functions of the verb 'be,' an account in which the connections with truth and falsehood --what I call the 'veridical' uses of the verb are generally overlooked. Once we put the notion of truth at the heart of the Greek concept of being, the internal coherence and general significance of this concept will become clear. I have argued elsewhere that this

concept of being does not rest on an illegitimate confusion, since it brings together three distinct notions -- existence, predication, and truth -- which belong together in any ontology or in any metaphysical scheme. (3) At the same time it is important to recognize that these three notions *are* distinct, and that the distinction between them was not always clearly seen in Greek philosophy, precisely because the same verb *eimi,* and its participle *on,* was used to express all three. Here, as elsewhere, it is important to give the devil his due; if we do not, as the saying goes, he will take more than his share. In defending the concept of being against the charge of linguistic confusion, it is important to recognize the genuine possibilities for confusion that were latent in the multiple usage of the verb. If we bear in mind the distinctions between existence, predication, and truth, and recognize that these distinctions were often overlooked because of a single linguistic expression for all three, we will be in a better position to interpret a number of perplexing passages in Plato, Aristotle, and Parmenides, for we will be in a position to articulate some problems more clearly than the Greek philosophers were able to do. My guess is that the same may be true for Indian philosophy, for the basic functions of the verb *as* in Sanskrit seem to be very nearly the same as those of *eimi* in Greek. If my linguistic analysis of the verb 'be' is adequate for Greek, it (or a similar analysis) ought to be adequate for Sanskrit. And if the linguistic analysis of 'be' can shed useful light on the Greek concept of being, the same relation ought to hold between an analysis of the Sanskrit verb and the Indian concept of being. Since I am not an Indologist, I offer this parallel only for what it may be worth, as a heuristic hypothesis and as a challenge to Sanskrit scholars and specialists in Indian philosophy. I shall limit myself to the Greek material, and proceed in two steps. First I shall report some of the results of the linguistic analysis of the Greek verb which I have published elsewhere. Then I shall apply this analysis to the interpretation of two key passages for the development of the terminology and concepts of Greek ontology. The first passage is from the poem of Parmenides, where the concept of being makes its first appearance in the philosophical tradition of the West. The second passage is Plato's initial

exposition of the doctrine of Forms in the *Phaedo,* where we have the first full-scale statement of Plato's own ontology.
I begin, then, by summarizing some results of the linguistic analysis. One central feature of my account is the claim that the verb 'be' in Greek -- and, I dare say, in Indo-European generally -- is primarily and fundamentally a copula and not a verb of existence, as comparative linguists have usually held. There is no evidence for the traditional assumption that the verbal root *es* originally meant only existence (or the like) and gradually declined into the use as "mere copula." By claiming that the copula uses the primary, I meat, not only that they are factually (or statistically) predominant front the earliest texts, but also that they provide the only possible point of departure for a theoretic account of the whole system of uses for the verb. I do not claim that the copula uses are older than the others, but only that *if* we regard them as older we can understand how the other uses *could* have developed from them. Talk of "development" here is a mere theoretical convenience, like a myth of creation or an original social compact, a conceptual device that serves to clarify the relations of logical priority and dependence between different factors in a complex system.
From the point of view of the language, then, the primary or central use of the verb is as a copula. (4) By a copula use I mean an occurrence of the verb with a predicate adjective ("I am tall"), a predicate noun ("I am a man"), or a prepositional phrase ("I am in the conference room"). The copula use includes the so-called 'is' of identity: "I am C.K." ; "I am the first speaker this afternoon." The verb 'be' as copula in Indo-European is characterized by two features which are important for the philosophical development. The first I call the *locative,* the second the *durative* aspect. By the locative feature I mean the fact that the verb serves for predication in general, not only with nominal predicates (predicate nouns and adjectives or participles) but specifically for statements of place, like "We are in this room." This locative use seems so essential to the meaning of the verb that we find Aristotle saying that most people believe that whatever is, is somewhere; what is nowhere is nothing: for Greek common sense, a thing cannot really *be* unless it is somewhere. Beginning with Plato, some philosophers will deny

the necessity of this connection between being and being in some place. But it has a strong intuitive hold on the Greek feeling about "what is."

The second feature of the Indo-European copula, the durative aspect, is even more decisive for the Greek view of being. This is the aspect which contrasts 'be' with 'become,' *eimi* with *gignomai* as copula verb (and *as* with *bhu* in Sanskrit). What is at issue here is not simply the aspectual opposition familiar in comparative linguistics, where the present-imperfect stem is contrasted with aorist and perfect, but a more general linguistic contrast between being in a state or being in a place, on the one hand, and change of state or change of place on the other hand. This general aspectual contrast is best described as an opposition between *stative* and *mutative,* or *static* and *kinetic.* We can illustrate the opposition in English by contrasting "I am tired" with "I become tired," "I am tall" with "I grow tall," "I am in Canada" with "I go to Canada" or "I arrive in Canada." This aspectual contrast seems to be much more general than Indo-European, for it is founded in the nature of things, and there is likely to be some expression for it in every language. But it is characteristic of Indo-European that the root *es* is typically, and in Greek almost exclusively, used to express the stative aspect, whereas a variety of other copulas are used for predication with a mutative nuance (there is no single root for 'be'. There is no *single* Indo-European word for 'become,' as there is a single root for 'be'). There is, in short, an essential connection in Indo-European between the idea of being and the idea of stability or remaining in the same state.

So far we have considered only the copula or predicative uses of 'be.' There are of course other, non-copulative uses, of which I will mention only two. One is the existential use, or rather the family of uses with an existential sense. As an example we may take the familiar Homeric verse, "There is a city Ephyre in the corner of horse-nourishing Argos." The connection of this existential use with the copula construction ("Ephyre is a city," "Ephyre is in Argos") is fairly obvious. Other existential uses are farther removed from the copula construction, but I shall not go into these complications here.

Finally we have what I call the veridical use, where 'be' expresses neither predication nor existence but the truth of a statement or a

belief. The standard veridical construction is of the form "Things are as you say,"*esti tauta houto hosper su legeis,* or for short, *esti tauta* or *esti houto*. Curiously enough, the ancient veridical use has recently had a vigorous revival in colloquial English: "Tell it like it is." The distinctive features of the veridical construction are (1) that the verb is not construed with a predicate but with an implied or explicit comparison to a clause of saying or thinking ("it is ... like you say"), and (2) that the underlying subject of the verb is a sentence or a sentential content roughly speaking, a proposition: the 'it' refers to a sentence, expressed or understood. The importance of this veridical use in ancient Indo-European is reflected by the widespread use of the root *es,* and above all its participial derivatives (from *sant),* in the sense of 'truth': in Greek *ontos, toi onto,* 'truly' ; *legein ta onta* 'state the facts' ; in archaic English we find 'sooth' for 'truth' ; and in Sanskrit there are the familiar derivatives of *sat* (e.g., *satya)* in the same sense.
So much for the linguistic preliminaries. We have first the copula uses with their locative connotation or locative application and their durative-stative aspect. We have next the existential uses; and, finally, the veridical construction with the related uses of the participial forms to mean 'truth.' Now my claim about the philosophic development of the Greek concept of being is roughly this: the last-named use must be placed first. The point of departure for the philosophers is the veridical use and the notion of truth. Philosophers are primarily concerned with knowledge or the search for knowledge, and hence with truth in speech and in thought. But as the veridical construction shows, the concept of truth involves some kind of correlation or 'fit' between what is said or thought, on one side, and what is, or what is the case, or the way things are, on the other side. Let us call this the correlation between assertion and reality, where 'assertion' is used neutrally both for saying that it is so and for thinking that it is so ; and 'reality' is used simply as a convenient abbreviation for the fact that it is so or what happens to be the case. In saying that the concept of truth implies a correlation or a 'fit' in this sense between assertion and reality, I think we beg no metaphysical questions. We simply articulate the connection of ideas expressed in the Greek locutions *esti tauta* and *esti houto*. And precisely the

same connection is expressed in the modern locution "Tell it like it is."

So we see how the philosophers' interest in knowledge and truth, taken together with the use of 'be' and its participle to mean 'truth' or 'what is so,' immediately leads to the concept of being as reality. I repeat, I am using 'reality' here not in any large metaphysical sense but simply as a convenient term in the hermeneutical metalanguage: as a mere name or counter for the facts that make true statements true and false statements false, or for whatever it is "in the world" (for whatever "is the case") that makes some assertions and some judgments correct and others mistaken. If I assert either in thought or in speech that the sun is shining, and if what I assert is true, then the corresponding 'reality' is simply the fact that the sun is shining.

So far I have said nothing about 'be' as verb of existence or as copula. I have shown only that starting from the veridical locutions and the notion of being as truth we immediately get to the related notion of being as reality, in a suitably loose and generalized sense of 'reality.' I think that these two notions, together with the locative idea that whatever is, is somewhere, and with the durative-stative aspect of the verb, are all we require for interpreting Parmenides' notion of being. Of course, we can easily see how the existential and copula uses of 'be' will also turn up, if we think of the reality in question as expressed by a subject-predicate sentence-for instance, by the sentence "The sun is shining." For if this sentence is true, then its subject (the sun) must exist. And the sentence uses the copula verb 'is' to predicate something of this subject, namely that it is shining, or that its light reaches us. So when we are talking about truth and reality, the existential and copulative uses of 'be' are never far away. But I insist that if we begin to interpret the concept of being by looking for existential or copula uses of the verb, we will not only make unnecessary trouble for ourselves; we may miss the real point. We will not only play into the hands of the linguistic relativists; we will fail to grasp the essential features of the Greek concept of being." (pp. 32-36)

Notes

(2) I shall not dwell here upon the contrast between the Greek and the Heideggerian conceptions of Being. See my remarks on "static being and personal Dasein" in The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht : Reidel, 1973), pp. 415-19.
(3) In addition to Chapter 8 of *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*, see "On the Theory of the Verb 'to be,'" in *Logic and Ontology*, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New York : New York University Press, 1973), pp. 1-20. In these studies I was primarily concerned with the unity of the linguistic system of the verb as ordinarily used. By contrast, the present paper deals explicitly with the special quasi-technical use of the verb and its nominal derivatives (by and obcria) to formulate the philosophic concept of Being. I thus return to the topic originally sketched in "The Greek Verb 'to be' and the Concept of Being," Foundations of Language 2 (1966): 245-65.
(4) This linguistic claim that the copula uses are fundamental for the system of the verb as a whole is logically independent of my claim that, as a fact in the history of philosophy, the idea of truth (and falsehood) associated with the veridical uses is the primary notion for the development of the metaphysical concept of Being in Plato and Parmenides. Either claim might be in error without the other thesis being affected either way. But of course there is some connection between the function of copula and the veridical idea. See my remarks on the notion of truth-claim implicit in the copula use, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, pp. 186-91, 407f.

From: Charles H. Kahn, "Linguistic Relativism and the Greek Project of Ontology", in Mervyn Sprung (ed.), *The Question of Being*, University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press 1978, pp. 31-44.

ESTI IN ANCIENT GREEK

"Whether ἐστι is orthotone ((ἔστι) or enclitic depends solely on its position: ἔστι when initial (or quasi-initial: see below), otherwise ἐστι. This is both stated by ancient grammarians and confirmed

by linguistic theory ; (1) the modern differentiation between ἐστι copula, ἐστι to affirm existence or possibility, is mistaken. (2) The accentual treatment of verbs in Greek will originally have been the same as in Sanskrit: all finite verbs in independent clauses unaccented when not initial, accented only when initial. Most unaccented verbs acquired an accent under the rule of limitation, and became thereby orthotone; (3) the few forms short enough to remain unaccented acquired an accent by analogy with related forms which were not. Only two tenses are capable of remaining unaccented in all their forms, the pres. indic. of εἰμι and of φημι; and these are precisely the two tenses which could be enclitic in historical Greek. (4) Their enclisis is a survival from the old universal enclisis of verbs; it should operate, therefore, in the same way in which that enclisis operated, in accordance with position. (5)
According to Herodian (i. 553) ἐστι is orthotone not only when initial but also after οὐ, καί, εἰ, ἀλλά, ὡς, τοῦτο. If this is true, it means that the original initial accentuation was extended, surprisingly, to a number of quasi-initial positions.(6) But it may, in part at least, be false: the Homeric scholia (BT *On Iliad* I. 63 ; cf. A on 6. 152) say expressly that ἐστι is orthotone only when initial and after οὐ." (pp. 425-426)

Notes

(1) See Wackernagel, *'Der griechische Verbalakzent' Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung,* 23, [1877], 457 ff., (= *Kleine Schriften*, 1955, 1058 ff.); I give only the barest essentials.
(2) I say 'modern' (it was propounded by Gottfried Hermann, *De emendanda ratione graecae grammaticae pars I.* [Lipsia, 1801], 84 ff.), but it seems to have its root in antiquity: I notice at the last moment (what the handbooks ignore) that Eustathius (*On Iliad.*, p. 880. 22, discrepantly with his remarks *On Odyssey*. p. 1600. 53) and Photios (s.v. ἐστιν) record a view that the accent varies with the meaning (paroxytone ἐπειδα`ν αποφαινώμθά περί του ὡς ὑπάρχει [ἀποφαινώμεθα αυτοι περί τοῦὑπάρχειν τι Phot.], οἷον ἐστι πόλις Ἐφύρη, oxytone ὁταν πρόσ ἐρώησιν ἀποκρινώμεθαα); cf. also schol. T *On Iliad*. 23. 157 and 549.

There seem to have been divergent practices; but we shall do well to prefer that which linguistic theory shows to have been original.
(3) Hence their recessive accent (which was then universalized in all positions: e.g. initial γνοιέσ [Sanskrit *jñeyás*] supplanted by γνίοεσ from enclitic γνοιεσ.
(4) Enclisis of φημι is perhaps the surest token that enclisis of εἰμι is not conditioned by its 'weakness of meaning' as copula.
(5) The original orthotone accents should have been (on the analogy of Sanskrit) εἰμι (ἐσσι) ἔστἐἐστο ̀ν ἐσμἐν ἐστἐ ἐἰσιand similarly φημι etc.; but all save ἐστι are traditionally oxytone (εἰμι, φημί, etc.). Influence of the enclitic forms in all but the commonest case? But there is some evidence for initial φῆμι: Tyrannion cited by Eustathius *On Odyssey*, p. 1653, 58.
(6) 'Surprisingly', for this 'quasi-initial' position is precisely the position (second in their clause) to which enclitics tend.

From: W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides - Hippolytos*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1964.

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   Abstract: "One of the founders of modern logic, G. Frege, has insisted on the variety of meanings of the little word “is.” He explicitly distinguished four such meanings (sheer predication or subsumption, identity, assertion, and existence); a fifth meaning (subordination) follows from Frege’s new theory of predication. It is part of the Fregean doctrine that special symbols corresponding to different meanings of “is” are to be used. Such distinctions have been strongly challenged by J. Hintikka, in a twofold way: theoretically and historiographically. Neither challenge is regarded as successful. Behind the conflict on “is” two opposite conceptions of language may be perceived: language as culture versus language as nature (“natural language”)."
2. Boger, George. 2018. "Existential Import and an Unnecessary Restriction on Predicate Logics." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 39:109-134.
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categorical propositions. One notable problem concerns invalid instances of subalternation in the case of a universal proposition with an empty subject term. To remedy problems, logicians restrict first-order predicate logics to exclude such terms. Examining the historical origins of contemporary discussions reveals that logicians continue to make various category mistakes. We now believe that no proposition per se has existential import as commonly understood and thus it is unnecessary to restrict first-order predicate logics to non-empty classes. After introducing the problem, we trace some nineteenth century treatments of the issue to locate a source of misconstruing propositional import in misconceptions of 'implies' and 'affirms' and name the process/product fallacy, along with the translation of categorical sentences using quantifiers and accommodating an empty class. Next we treat some metalogical matters to orient our discussion by which we provide a more precise nomenclature about 'sentence' and 'proposition' to correct previous misconceptions; here we uncover a common category mistake in respect of a proposition's efficacy. The semantic distinction between agent and force is helpful in this connection. We conclude by showing that logicians have reinserted existence as a predicate, a position previously excised by Kant, and that the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis applies only to relationships within a categorical sentence between grammatical predicate and subject."

3. Corazza, Eros. 2018. "Names, Identity, and Predication." *Philosophical Studies* no. 175:2631–2647.
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as to dismiss the sign of identity altogether, some told us. I will try to discuss the advantages and/or disadvantages of this approach and investigate whether Frege's view that the 'is' of identity must be distinguished from the 'is' of predication (copula) can be reconciled with the fact that names can appear in predicative position."

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   Contents: Preface 3; A note on the textual references and the bibliography 5; I. Introduction 9; II. The interpretational framework 27; III. The origin of the thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'Is' 47; IV. Identity and predication 59; V. Existence 128; VI. Concluding remarks 159; Bibliography 162; Index of names 179.
   "The purpose of this work is to clarify the philosophical basis of Frege's doctrine concerning the word 'is'. Frege's doctrine of being is partly considered in its historical setting, formed mainly by Leibniz and Kant. Since the ambiguity thesis is one of the cornerstones of Frege's new logic, this work will, to some extent, help to indicate how Frege arrived at his great logical innovation. I shall proceed by first presenting a short survey of the different approaches to Frege's philosophy and thereafter outlining Frege's historical setting (Chapter II.1.). Then I shall present the

main features of Frege's view of logic (Chapter II.2.). After that, I shall say a few words of the history of the word 'being' in philosophical and philological literature and study Frege's texts concerning the ambiguity doctrine (Chapter III). In Chapter IV there is a discussion on Frege's distinction between identity and predication with reference to Leibniz's and Kant's thought and some remarks are also made on class-inclusion. In Chapter V there are comments on Frege's doctrine of existence with reference to Kant's ideas. Finally, I shall make some concluding remarks on Frege in a wider historical context (Chapter VI). Chapter II will give the interpretational framework for considering Frege's doctrine of being. Chapters IV and V are meant to show how this general hypothesis works in the textual material and thereby to yield a detailed interpretation of Frege's view." (pp. 16-17)

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   From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In her article 'Frege on Existence' Leila Haaparanta emphasizes that Frege's greatest insight was the idea of first-order language, which, to a large extent, motivated the rest of his innovations. Haaparanta focuses her attention on Frege's concept of existence, which receives special attention in Frege's thought in connection with the thesis concerning the ambiguity of such words for being as the English 'is'. The ambiguity thesis was an important part of the Fregean paradigm of first-order logic. Haaparanta argues that Frege does not only assume the word 'is' to be ambiguous but that he considers 'exists', or the 'is' of existence, to be an equivocal word. She suggests that the equivocity view has a metaphysical and epistemological background in Frege's thought. Her paper thus pushes a great deal further the suggestions of Jaakko Hintikka mentioned earlier in this Introduction." (p. 6)
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"Meinong's thought is considered in relation to several major conceptual problems, including the Frege-Russell thesis that words like *is* are multiply ambiguos and Aristotle's treatment of existence. This treatment leads to a problem of how to interpret quantifiers. The three main possible interpretations are: (i) quantifiers as ranging over actual individuals (or individuals existing in some one world); (ii) quantifiers as ranging over a set of possible individuals; (iii) quantifiers merely as a way of specifying the interdependencies of the concepts (forms) specified by syllogistic terms. The subsequent history of philosophers' and logicians,' treatments of existence is characterized by a tension between (i)-(iii). Meinong's position is in the main (iii) whereas Russell in his *On Denoting* defended (i). The contrast between (i) and (iii) has a counterpart in nineteenth-century discussions about foundations of mathematics."
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"One of the characteristic features of contemporary logic is that it incorporates the Frege-Russell thesis according to which verbs for being are multiply ambiguous. This thesis was not accepted before the nineteenth century. In Aristotle existence could not serve alone as a predicate term. However, it could be a part of the force of the predicate term, depending on the context. For Kant existence could not even be a part of the force of the predicate term. Hence, after Kant, existence was left homeless. It found a home in the algebra of logic in which the operators corresponding to universal and particular judgments were treated as duals, and universal judgments were taken to be relative to some universe of discourse. Because of the duality, existential quantifier expressions came to express existence. The orphaned notion of existence thus found a new home in the existential quantifier."
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See Vol. I, Chapter IV. *Naming* § 4 *Predication*.
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Abstract: "In “Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument” (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called “Kant–Frege view” (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege’s treatment of existence)

is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant ‘is’ is ambiguous.
In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka’s arguments against the Kant–Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege’s claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant–Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence."

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Expanded version of the article published in 1915 (reprinted in Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz, eds., *Obiter Scripta. Lectures, Essays and Reviews by George Santayana,* New York: Scribner's Sons, 1936, pp. 189-212); reprinted also in: Martin A. Coleman (ed.), *The Essential Santayana: Selected Writings,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, pp. 138-148.
"This selection first appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* (21 [1924]: 365-77), A shorter version with the same title was published in 1915 (*The journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 12 (1915 1:66-68). As early as 1914 Santayana had intended the article as the first chapter of his *Realms of Being*. The 1924 article was republished in *Obiter Scripta*, and in a letter to the editors of that volume Santayana wrote: "I am also glad that you have rescued the '*Meanings of the Word "Is"* '.On re-reading that article, I feel that it contains my whole philosophy in a very clear and succint form; I was dissuaded by a friend from putting it into *The Realm of Essence*, and also by my own feeling that it covered too much ground to go into that volume. Here [in *Obiter Scripta*] it is in its place." (*The Letters of George Santayana*, Book Five, 1933-1936: *The Works of George Santayana*, Volume V, Book Five, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003, p. 158). The seven meanings of the word "is" that Santayana distinguished

demonstrate different realms of being that make up his ontological system." (M. Coleman, p. 138 of the 2009 reprint)

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"One of the most interesting open problems in the history of philosophy concerns the genesis of contemporary logic epitomized by the Frege-Russell theory of quantifiers. One of the cornerstones of this theory is the distinction between the allegedly different meanings of ordinary-language verbs for being. According to the received view, such verbs are multiply ambiguous between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity, and the is of subsumption. This assumption (a.k.a. Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis) is built into the notations that have been used in logic since Frege and Russell, in that the allegedly different meanings are expressed in the usual logical notations differently. It turns out that no philosopher before the 19th century assumed the Frege-Russell thesis.
It can be shown that Aristotle considered the Frege-Russell distinction but rejected it. He treated existence as a part of the force of a predicate term. Some people have ascribed it to Kant. However, it is false to say that Kant created, or maintained, the Frege-Russell thesis. His discussion of existence is often said to include a criticism of the idea that existence is a predicate. Strictly speaking it includes a stronger criticism, viz. the rejection of the idea that existence could be as much as a part of the force of a predicate term. Hence, after Kant the notion of existence became an orphan, as far as the logical representation of different propositions in syllogistic logic was concerned.
The next main development in logical theory was the algebra of logic that originated in England around the mid-19th century. The following two ideas came to the forefront: (1) the operators corresponding to our universal quantifier and existential quantifier were treated as duals; (2)

universal quantifier expressions were taken to be relative to some universe of discourse, and was inevitably taken as the non-existence of exceptions in that domain. Because of the duality, existential quantifier expressions came to express existence. The orphaned notion of existence thus found a home, no longer in the predicative is but in the existential quantifier. This helps to explain the independent discovery of quantifiers by Frege and by Peirce.
This paper concentrates on what happened to the notion of existence after Kant and before Frege. Particular attention is paid to the English developments around mid-19th century and to the work of George Boole and Augustus De Morgan in particular."

31. Wiggins, David. 1995. "The Kant–Frege–Russell View of Existence: Toward the Rehabilitation of the Second-Level View." In *Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus*, edited by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Raffman, Diana and Asher, Nicholas, 93-115. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"At the acme of the influence in philosophical logic of Russell and Frege, few can have predicted that, after their deaths, the idea that they both sought to discredit of existence as a first-level concept (or property of individuals) would so soon be restored.
(...)
This was that the existence of an item (or items) x of level n is always a property of x's concept, which is a level (n + 1) concept, not a level (n + 2) property of x itself. But the situation nobody predicted would appear to be the actual one. As something believed and positively advocated in its Fregean purity, the Frege-Russcll view has virtually disappeared from sight.
Such an outcome might prompt an adherent of the Frege-Russell view to try to refute the new first level doctrine. But, in the absence of any attempt to refurbish the Frege- Russell account or resolve its difficulties, that would be absurdly premature. It would be still more premature to try to explore the relation of the restated Frege-Russell account to

> the substitutional interpretations of quantifiers whose possibility our admired honorand has so long and persistently defended against cavil and misrepresentation. The most I shall attempt here is to make the Frege-Russell view visible again. (pp. 93-94)

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Language as Calculus *vs.* Language as Universal Medium

INTRODUCTION

"An initial reference-point in this area is provided by Leibniz's distinction between two components of his ambitious project in mathematical logic or, rather, project to create a mathematical logic. On the one hand, Leibniz proposed to develop a *characteristica universalis* or *lingua characteristica* which was to be a universal language of human thought whose symbolic structure would reflect directly the structure of the world of our concepts. On the other hand, Leibniz's ambition included the creation of a *calculus ratiocinator* which was conceived of by him as a method of symbolic calculation which would mirror the processes of human reasoning.
When Leibniz's project began to be realized in the nineteenth century, its two components were taken up by different research traditions. The 'algebraic' school represented by Boole, Peirce, and Schröder sought to develop in the spirit of Leibniz's *calculus ratiocinator* mathematical techniques by means of which different kinds of human reasoning could be mastered. In contrast, Frege himself noted, his *Begriffsschrift* was to be primarily a *characteristica universalis* in Leibniz's sense, a *Formelsprache des reinen Denkens* (cf. here Sluga, "Frege against the Booleans", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 28, 1987, pp. 80-98). Admittedly, Frege made claims for it also as a *calculus ratiocinator*, but those claims were not met with enthusiasm. Husserl contradicted them, apparently thinking (as Tarski did later) that a *lingua universalis* cannot be purely

formal. In any case, as Jourdain snidely noted, Frege's formalism was singularly clumsy as a means of actual reasoning: "... using Frege's symbolism as a calculus would be rather like using a three-legged stand-camera for what is called 'snap-shot' photography" (Jourdain, "Preface" to Louis Couturat, *The algebra of Logic*, 1914 pp. III-X). Subsequent attempts to find specific help for the purpose of concrete work in logic or in the foundations of mathematics have tended to confirm rather than to disconfirm Jourdain's judgment. The theoretical interest of Frege's ambitious project is due to its being an attempted *characteristica universalis* or at least *lingua characteristica mathematicae*, not to its being a viable *calculus ratiocinator*." (pp. IX-X)

From: Jaakko Hintikka, *Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator. An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.

"Answering Schröder's criticisms of *Begrifsschrift*, Frege states that, unlike Boole's, his logic is not a *calculus ratiocinator*, or not merely a *calculus ratiocinator*, but a *lingua characterica*.(1) If we come to understand what Frege means by this opposition, we shall gain a useful insight into the history of logic. The opposition between calculus ratiocinator and lingua characterica has several connected but distinct aspects. These various aspects, most of the time not stated by Frege, have to be brought out by a study of his work. From Frege's writings a certain picture of logic emerges, a conception that is perhaps not discussed explicitly but nevertheless constantly guides Frege. In referring to this conception I shall speak of the universality of logic.
This universality of Frege's *lingua characterica* is, first, the universality that quantification theory has in its vocabulary and that the propositional calculus lacks. Frege frequently calls Boole's logic an 'abstract logic' (2), and what he means by that is that in this logic the proposition remains unanalyzed. The proposition is reduced to a mere truth value. With the introduction of predicate letters, variables, and quantifiers, the proposition becomes articulated and can express a meaning. The new notation allows the symbolic rewriting of whole tracts of

scientific knowledge, perhaps of all of it, a task that is altogether beyond the reach of the propositional calculus. We now have a lingua, not simply a calculus. Boole's logic, which cannot claim to be such a lingua, remains the study, in ordinary language, of algebraic relations between propositions. This study is carried out in ordinary language and is comparable to many branches of mathematics, say group theory. In Frege's system the propositional calculus subsists embedded in quantification theory; the opposition between *lingua* and *calculus* is, in this respect, not exclusive, and that is why Frege writes that his own logic is not merely a *calculus ratiocinator*.(3) However, the opposition between *calculus ratiocinator* and *lingua characterica* goes much beyond the distinction between the propositional calculus and quantification theory. The universality of logic expresses itself in an important feature of Frege's system. In that system the quantifiers binding individual variables range over all objects. As is well known, according to Frege, the ontological furniture of the universe divides into objects and functions. Boole has his universe class, and De Morgan his universe of discourse, denoted by '1'. But these have hardly any ontological import. They can be changed at will. The universe of discourse comprehends only what we agree to consider at a certain time, in a certain context. For Frege it cannot be a question of changing universes. One could not even say that he restricts himself to one universe. His universe is the universe. Not necessarily the physical universe, of course, because for Frege some objects are not physical. Frege's universe consists of all that there is, and it is fixed." ((pp. 324-325)

Notes

(1) Schröder's criticisms are contained in his review of *Begriffsschrift*, published in *Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik* 25 (1880), *Historisch-literarische Abtheilung*, 81-94. Frege's reply was an address to a learned society, delivered on 27 January 1882 and published in its proceedings, 'Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', *Sitzungs-berichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft fur das Jahr 1882* (Jena 1883), pp. 1-10, reprinted in Gottlob Frege,

Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsatze, Hildesheim 1964, pp. 97-106. [English translation by Terrell Ward Bynum in: Gottlob Frege, *Conceptual Notation, and Related Articles*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972, reprinted 2000, pp. 90-100] On the origin of the expression '*lingua characterica*' see Günther Patzig's footnote 8, on p. 10 of Gottlob Frege, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Göttingen 1966.
(2) See, for instance, Frege's comments on Boole in 'Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift' (mentioned in footnote 1), pp. 1-2.
(3) In 'Über die Begriffsschrift des Herr Peano and meine eigene', *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlichen Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Mathematisch-physische Classe* 48 (1897), 361-378, [English translation in: Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy*, edited by Brian McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1984, pp. 234-248]. Frege writes on p. 371: "Boole's logic is a calculus ratiocinator, but no lingua characterica; Peano's mathematical logic is in the main a lingua characterica and, subsidiarily, also a calculus ratiocinator, while my Begriffsschrift intends to be both with equal stress." Here the terms are used with approximately the meanings given in the present paragraph: Boole has a propositional calculus but no quantification theory; Peano has a notation for quantification theory but only a very deficient technique of derivation; Frege has a notation for quantification theory and a technique of derivation.

From: Jean van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language", *Synthese* 17, 1967, pp. 324-330.

"Sir Isaiah Berlin has shown how to understand Tolstoi on the basis of the insight that Tolstoi was a fox who believed that he was a hedgehog (1). It is time we realize similarly what Frege was: a semanticist who did not believe in semantics. This insight we owe largely to van Heijenoort, who describes it by speaking of two conceptions of language and logic (2). He called them conceptions of logic as language and logic as calculus. More generally, and perhaps a shade more aptly, we might label them conceptions of language as the inescapable medium of

communication (in brief, "language as medium") and language as calculus.

The most general form of the former I can think of is that we cannot according to this view get "outside" our language, as it were look on it from outside. The reason is that the results of all such "viewing" must be expressible in our language. Now this language presupposes in all its uses certain semantical relations (relations of representation) between language and reality. (Otherwise we could not use language in our transactions with reality.) But since these semantical relations are presupposed in each and every use of language, they cannot be expressed in language. Any attempt to do so involves a circularity and hence results in nonsense or tautology.

I am not putting forward these views as being unchallengeable. Indeed, they are challenged by the view of language and its logic as calculus. According to this view we can do all or most of the things the contrary opinion deemed impossible. Among other things, we can think of the representative relationships between language and the world as being varied radically and in a large scale. The point of using the term "calculus" is hence not to compare language to an uninterpreted calculus, a mere game with characters, but to emphasize that language, including our very own home language, is in principle freely reinterpretable like a calculus, at least for the purposes of a semanticist.

As van Heijenoort already pointed out, the development of all systematic logical semantics (model theory) thus presupposes some variant of the view of language as calculus. For one of the leading ideas of all model theory is to vary the interpretation of some part of the language in question in a way the view of language as medium does not countenance. As we saw, the stronger forms of this view even forbid saying anything significant and nonvacuous about the basic semantical relationships (relationships of naming, reference, or otherwise named representation)." (pp. 716-717)

Notes

(I) Isaiah Berlin. *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. London, 1957.

(2) Jean Van Heijenoort, "Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus". *Synthese*. vol. 17 (1967). pp. 324-330.

From: Jaakko Hintikka, "Frege's Hidden Semantics", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 33, 1979, pp. 716-722.

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   "This paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort's (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka's (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl's phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model-theoretical, logic-as-calculus view. However, Husserl's philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl's position shows that holding a model-theoretical view of logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher's views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy."

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Reprinted in:
R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (editors) - *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science* - vol. 3 (1967) *, In Memory of Norwood Russell Hanson, Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium on Philosophy of Science, 1964/1965* (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1967), pp. 440-446
Jean van Heijenoort - *Selected essays* - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1985, pp. 11-16
and in: Jaakko Hintikka - *Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator. An ultimate presupposition of Twentieth-century philosophy* - Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 233-239.

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"Of these essays, 1 and 5 are being published elsewhere at the same time but have not been published before. Essays 2, 4 and 6-8 are published without any changes. For technical reasons, it has not been feasible to make them completely

uniform typographically or to bring their references completely up to date. Essay 3, which is the mainstay of the argumentation of this volume, has been revised for republication. In particular, its sections 9 and 12 have been thoroughly rewritten."

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    "Our task will be to construct portions of a directly depicting language which will enable us to represent the most general structures of reality. We shall draw not on standard logical treatments of the contents of epistemic states as these are customarily conceived in terms of propositions. Rather, we shall turn to a no less venerable but nowadays somewhat neglected tradition of formal ontology: not sentences or propositions, but maps, diagrams or pictures, shall serve as the constituents of our mirror of reality."

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    "One can distinguish two different approaches toward language in Leibniz's work. On one hand, he considers natural language insufficient and would like to replace it by a 'rational' language (*lingua philosophica*), while on the other hand, he is an empirical researcher of language who collects phenomena from the most diverse languages in order to compare them with other languages. The literature about Leibniz highlights only these two aspects of his work, and usually considers them to be incompatible. The relationship between Leibniz's remarks about ' *characteristica universalis*' and his theories about natural language is explored. Even though Leibniz did not produce an explicit theory about this relationship, a difference between these two is clearly implied in his remarks. Natural language and characteristica are to Leibniz, basically different in their existence, their function, and their

performance. Nevertheless, they both form integral components of Leibniz's monad theory."

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    Contents: Vorwort VII-VIII; 1. Einleitung 1; 2. Die Idee der *mathesis universalis* bei Leibniz 25; 3. Die frühe Rezeption Leibnizscher *mathesis universalis* und Logik 64; 4. Die "logische Frage" und die Entdeckung der Leibnizschen Logik 130; 5. Leibniz und die englische Algebra der Logik 185; 6. Ernst Schröder: "Absolute Algebra" und Leibnizprogramm 233; 7. Schluss 297; Verzeichnisse 309-412.

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"The first task is that of delineating the differences between Frege's conception of logic and the contemporary one. I shall start with the latter. Explicit elaborations of it are surprisingly uncommon. (In most writing on issues in philosophical logic,
it is implicitly assumed; yet many textbooks gloss over it, for one pedagogical reason or another.) There are various versions; I will lay out the one formulated by Quine in his textbooks (1) as it seems to me the clearest.
On this conception, the subject matter of logic consists of logical properties of sentences and logical relations among sentences. Sentences have such properties and bear such relations to each other by dint of their having the logical forms they do. Hence, logical properties and relations are defined by way of the logical forms; logic deals with what is common to and can be abstracted from different sentences. Logical forms are not mysterious quasi-entities, à la Russell. Rather, they are simply schemata: representations of the composition of the sentences, constructed from the logical signs (quantifiers and truth-functional connectives, in the standard case) using schematic letters of various sorts (predicate, sentence, and function letters). Schemata do not state anything and so are neither true nor false, but they can be interpreted: a universe of discourse is assigned to the quantifiers, predicate letters are replaced by predicates or assigned extensions (of the appropriate r-ities) over the universe, sentence letters can be replaced by sentences or assigned truth-values. Under interpretation, a schema will receive a truth-value. (pp. 25-26)
(...)

Such a schematic conception is foreign to Frege (as well as to Russell). This comes out early in his work, in the contrast he makes between his *Begriffsschrift* and the formulas of Boole: "My intention was not to represent an abstract logic in formulas, but to express a content through written signs in a more precise and clear way than it is possible to do through words." (2) And it comes out later in his career in his reaction to Hilbert's *Foundations of Geometry:* "The word 'interpretation' is objectionable, for when properly expressed, a thought leaves no room for different interpretations. We have seen that ambiguity [*Vieldeutigkeit*] simply has to be rejected." (3) There are no parts of his logical formulas that await interpretation. There is no question of providing a universe of discourse. Quantifiers in Frege's system have fixed meaning: they range over all items of the appropriate logical type (objects, one place functions of objects, two place functions of objects, etc.). (p. 27)
(...)
On Frege's *universalist conception,* then, the concern of logic is the articulation and proof of logical laws, which are universal truths. Since they are universal, they are applicable to any subject matter, as application is carried out by instantiation. For Frege, the laws of logic are general, not in being about nothing in particular (about forms), but in using topic-universal vocabulary to state truths about everything. (p. 28)
(...)
My central aims in this paper have been to delineate Frege's universalist conception of logic and contrast it with a more familiar one, to show that this conception connects with many other points in Frege's philosophy, and to suggest that the conception is a well-motivated one, given the nature of Frege's project. Of course, today most of us would find the schematic conception (or some variant of it) far more natural, if not unavoidable. But I hope to have caused us to reflect on how much else has to shift in order to make it." (p. 41)

(1) *Elementary Logic* (Boston: Ginn, 1941) and *Methods of Logic* (New York: Holt, 1950).
(2) "Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift," *Jenaische Zeitschrift far Naturwissenschaft 16,* Supplement (1882): 1-10, p. 1
(3) "Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie," *Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung* 15 (1906): 293-309, 377-403, 423-430, p. 384.

29. Haaparanta, Leila. 1985. *Frege's Doctrine of Being*. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica.

30. ———. 1988. "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl." *Synthese* no. 77:73-98.

31. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1979. "Frege's Hidden Semantics." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 33:716-722.

"From my observations, several corollaries follow for the recent discussions concerning Frege in the literature.
For instance, the truly interesting historical problem is not to find anticipations of Frege on sense and reference in earlier philosophers or, more generally, to study Frege's theory in its relation to his predecessors. The fascinating novelty which I for one would very much like to understand better is how Frege came upon his ideas about extensional logic, ideas which were radically different from the great majority of traditional philosophers. Furthermore, the deep objects of comparison and contrast in twentieth-century philosophy are not later theories of senses (or their partial dispensability as in Kripke) or other theories of intensional contexts but those recent findings which challenge Frege's treatment of first-order logic.
Among these targets of challenge, the most important ones are probably the paucity of Frege's ontology (set of categories represented by his primitive symbols), the so-called Frege principle (1), and the Frege-Russell claim that ordinary-language words like the English "is" and the German "ist" are ambiguous between the "is" of existence,

identity, predication, and subsumption (2). In some ways, the true import of Frege's tacit first-order semantics is best seen from the criticisms to which these three cornerstones of Frege's semantics have been subjected." p. 722
(1) See here my paper "Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages" (forthcoming).[Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman (eds.) - Philosophy and grammar: papers on the occasion of the Quincentennial of Uppsala University - Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981 pp. 37-58]
(2) See my paper, "'Is', Semantical Games, and Semantical Relativity." Journal of Philosophical Logic. vol. 8 (1979), 433-468.

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33. ———. 1984. "A Hundred Years Later: The Rise and Fall of Frege's Influence in Language Theory." *Synthese* no. 59:27-49.

34. Kluge, Eike Henner W. 1977. "Frege, Leibniz "Et Alii"." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 9:266-274.

    "Patzig has argued that Frege's use of the phrase 'lingua characterica' constitutes an insufferable pleonasm that no-one with first-hand knowledge of Leibniz's writings would have committed. On this he bases an argument to show that Frege's knowledge of Leibniz was weak and garnered from secondary sources. I show that this claim ignores certain crucial Leibniz quotes by Frege which he could have found only in the Gerhardt edition of Leibniz's mathematical works and his correspondence, and lay the foundation for an analysis of the historical influence of Leibniz on the development of Frege's thought."

35. ———. 1980. "Frege, Leibniz and the Notion of an Ideal Language." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 12:140-154.

"This paper examines the question, whether and to what degree Leibniz's project of an ideal language -- of a "lingua characterica" which at the same time can also function as a "calculus ratiocinator" -- had an influence on Frege's project of a "Begriffsschrift". It concludes that not only are there sufficient conceptual similarities to warrant an hypothesis of historical connection, but that there are also historical indications in Frege's own writings to that effect."

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    Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the *Logical Investigations*, as an example of a larger body of theories dubbed `language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus."

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    "This paper investigates the role of Edmund Husserl in the development of formal or model-theoretic semantics

through glasses of the distinction of language as calculus vs. language as universal medium, introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch. In particular, the paper raises the question of possible Husserl's influence on the conception of language accepted in Polish philosophy, in particular by Lesniewski and Tarski."

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The Problem of Universals: the Contemporary Debate

FORMAL ONTOLOGY AND THEORY OF UNIVERSALS

"The central feature of a formal ontology is how it represents the nexus of predication, which depends on what theory of universals it assumes.
The three main theories of universals are nominalism, conceptualism, and (logical or natural) realism.
The analysis of the fundamental forms of predication of a formal ontology may be directed upon the structure of reality or upon the structure of thought.
Natural realism, and in particular Aristotle's ontology, is directed upon the structure of the natural world, and the preeminent mode of being is that of concrete individual things, or primary substances. There are two major forms of natural realism, moderate realism and modal moderate realism.
Aristotle's moderate natural realism has two types of predication: predication of species and genera (natural kinds), and predication of properties and relations.
Kant's and Husserl's categorial analyses, unlike Aristotle's, are directed upon the structure of thought and experience rather than upon the structure of reality. The categories function on this account to articulate the logical forms of judgments and not as the general causes or grounds of concrete being.
Husserl's formal ontology is based on a transcendental logic in which the laws and rules of logic are justified in terms of subjective analyses of presumed *a priori* structures that provide

the evidence for the objective versions of those of those laws and rules.
There are two problems regarding the completeness of a formal ontology: first, the problem of the completeness of the categories of an ontology, and second, the problem of the completeness of the deductive laws that are based on those categories.
Set theory provides only an external semantics for a formal ontology; unless that ontology is set theory itself, which has no nexus of predication, and hence strictly speaking is not a formal ontology. An incompleteness theorem for a formal ontology based a set-theoretic semantics need not show that the ontology is incomplete with respect to an internal semantics. In particular, sometimes general models are a better representation of a formal ontology's internal semantics than are. so-called "standard" models.
Conceptual realism is a, formal ontology framed within the context of a naturalistic epistemology and a naturalistic approach to the relations between language, thought, and reality as based on our scientific knowledge of the world.
Conceptual realism is based on a conceptualist account of the speech and mental acts that underlie reference and predication. It is directed in that regard primarily upon the structure of thought. But, because its methodology is based on a linguistic and logical analysis of our speech and mental acts, it is not committed to a phenomenological reduction of those acts. Nor does it preclude such a reduction.
Conceptual realism contains both a natural realism and an intensional realism, each of which can be developed as separate subsystems that are compatible within the larger framework, one containing a modern form of Aristotelian essentialism, and the other containing a modern counterpart of Platonism based on the intensional contents of our speech and mental acts." (pp. 23-24)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism*, New York: Springer 2007.

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   "1 . *The central issue*. At the heart of David Lewis' case against structural universals lies his contention that two different things cannot be composed of exactly the same parts.
   Here is what I take to be a counter-example to his principle. Let a and *b* be two particulars, and R be a non-symmetrical relation. Let it be the case that *a* has R to *b,* and that *b* has R to *a*. We have two distinct states of affairs ('two different things'), yet, in a clear sense of the word 'composed', they are composed of exactly the same parts: *a, b* and R.
   The two states of affairs may be called *structures*. In his important recent book *The Categorical Structure of the World* (1983, Section 101), Reinhardt Groomsman offers the following identity-conditions for structures. S1 and S2 are

the very same structure if and only if (a) they contain- the very same nonrelational parts; (b) they contain the very same relations; (c) *the same parts stand in the same relations to each other*. In my counter-example, the two structures contain the very same non-relational parts, the very same relations, but it is not the case that the same parts stand in the same' relation to each other.

My counter-example to Lewis' principle was chosen because, although it involves structures, it does not involve structural universals. This shows, I think, that the difficulty raised by Lewis is best thought of as an argument against postulating any universals, structural or otherwise; or, at least, as an argument against postulating relations which are universals.

Lewis, of course, would not allow the counter-example. By far the simplest way for him to deal with it is by adopting a philosophy of what, following D. C. Williams (1953) *,* and, more recently, K. K. Campbell (1981) *,* he calls 'tropes'. Tropes are properties and relations, but they are properties.' and relations conceived not as universals but as particulars.;-On this; view 'of relations, my alleged counter-example becomes two states of affairs, *a* R1 *b,* and *b* R2 *a,* where R1 and R2 are not identical, although they may, resemble exactly. (The *universal R* perhaps reduces to an equivalence-class of exactly resembling tropes.) Given this account, I have certainly not produced a counter-example to Lewis' view that two different things cannot: be composed of exactly the same things.

But is not the dispute now a stand-off? Lewis can use his principle against a philosophy of universals. I can use universals to produce a counter-example to his principle. Indeed, is not Lewis close to begging the question against me?

It may be replied that Lewis' view is the more economical. He puts forward an attractive-sounding principle. I have to deny that the principle holds in
all cases, and my reason is that it is defeated by those suspicious characters: universals.

To this I reply that economy in a metaphysics can only be judged, as Mark Johnston has put it to me, `in the end-game'. For myself, I believe that universals are great explainers. The loss on the roundabouts as a result of having to deny Lewis' principle may well be made up with interest on the swings. In any case, as the great Dr. Tarrasch said, `before the end-game, the Gods have placed the middle-game'.
What it would be nice to have, but what I cannot supply, is formal description of an operation which will take one from any unordered set of universals to possible structural universals which involve nothing but members of the set.' (I say `possible' in order to respect the Principle of Instantiation which I believe should apply to all universals.) Such an operation will permit the one universal in the original set to appear in more than one `place' in the structural universal. (E.g. an F having R to an F which has R to a third F.) A parallel is the way that, in a set of sets, the very same individual may be found as a member of different sub-sets." pp. 85-86.

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   "This book is intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergraduate student and should also be suitable for graduate seminars. However, I hope that it will also be of interest to professional philosophers, particularly those who are sympathetic to the project of an empirical metaphysics. Since the publication of my book Universals and Scientific Realism in 1978, although my views have remained the same in broad outline, I have become aware of various mistakes and omissions in what I said then. The present

work, therefore, besides introducing the topic, tries to push the subject further ahead.
I now think that a particular type of moderate Nominalism, moderate because it admits properties and relations, but a Nominalism because it takes the properties and relations to be particulars rather than universals, can be developed as an important and quite plausible rival to a moderate Realism about universals. In the earlier book I gave such a Nominalism only brief consideration. By contrast, in this work a battle between Nominalists and Realists over the status of properties and relations becomes one main theme. In general, I have largely confined myself to moderate Nominalisms and moderate Realisms. That host of contemporary philosophers who unreflectively substitute classes of particulars for properties and relations I take to be immoderate Nominalists. However, many of the arguments that I bring against the more moderate Natural Class theory are also arguments against this orthodoxy." (From the Preface)
"It is time to bring the matter to a conclusion. Metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries. One day, perhaps, the subject will be transformed, but for the present the philosopher can do no more than survey the field as conscientiously as he or she can, taking note of the opinions and arguments of predecessors and contemporaries, and then make a fallible judgment arrived at and backed up as rationally as he or she knows how.
Of all the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I believe, is the real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be universals or particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what properties and relations are required may be obscure, and in any case not for the philosopher to determine. But I hope that the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3, criticizing the versions of the Natural Class and Resemblance theories that try to do without properties and relations, will be thought weighty. Blobs are out; we require layer cakes. Reality must have more fundamental structure than the stricter Nominalisms allow. The introduction of properties and relations then involves, I

argued, the admission of states of affairs (facts) into our ontology." p. 135
(...)
"Therefore, the fate of the Universals theory may turn on the questions of the inexact resemblance of universals and of the nature of laws. But if both questions go as I surmise that they will go, the Universals theory seems ahead of even the best Trope theory.
Drawing a figure from the game of chess, Mark Johnston has suggested to me that the dispute between a suitably sophisticated theory of universals and a suitably sophisticated theory of tropes can only be decided in the end game. Maybe. We are probably only at the beginning of the middle game as yet.
We have seen in Chapter 6 the remarkable way that the Universals and Trope theories, when thought through, turn out to run parallel in many respects. We may in the end have to reconsider an idea of H. H. Price's (*Thinking and experience,* Hutchinson, 1953, Ch. 1, pp. 30-32) that Universals and Resemblance theories are no more than "alternative languages," although, unlike Price, we will surely need to move to a trope version of a Resemblance theory.
At any rate, the Problem of Universals is alive and well and may commend itself to those happy few who feel the intellectual fascination in what D. C. Williams called "grubbing around in the roots of being." p. 139

5. ———. 1991. "Classes Are State of Affairs." *Mind* no. 100:189-200.

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   "At the heart of D. M. Armstrong's theory of universals in [N], [U] and [L] is a set of basic theses about monadic universals, or properties, as he calls them. The theses lay

down the *a priori* conditions under which a one, place predicate simple or compound) may stand for a property. Thus there are predicates standing for no property. We may nevertheless say for convenience that they stand for `features', without here attempting a closer semantic analysis of this way of speaking. The rough idea is that a `feature' is a class-concept. As (placeholders for) one-place predicates, I use F, G.
That F is a property or a universal will be expressed by the (closed) sentence UF. The theory of U, of universalhood, is the metaphysical core of Armstrong's theory of universals. My purpose here is to clarify the core so far as formal means -permit."
[N] *Nominalism and realism* vo. 1 of *Universals and scientific realism,* Cambridge 1978.
[U] *A theory of universals*, vol. 2 of same.
[L] *What is a law of nature?,* Cambridge 1983.

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    "The papers contained in this publication were read at the Aquinas Symposium sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame on March 9-10, 1956. Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., of the University of Notre Dame, coordinator of the Aquinas Symposium, had invited scholars representing several divergent views on the nature of

Universals to present, within the limits of a relatively short paper and a subsequent discussion period, some aspects of the problem of Universals. Response to his invitation was very gratifying.
Out of the meeting came three papers that literally make up a symposium: Professor Alonzo Church of Princeton University, Professor Nelson Goodman of the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor I. M. Bochcnski, o.P., of the University of Fribourg and Visiting-Professor at the University of Notre Dame read papers that converge on the Problem of the Universals from three different philosophic positions. Professor Richard McKeon of the University of Chicago was the discussion leader at all of the sessions. These papers, with a minimum of editing by the respective participants, are now made available in this edition."

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14. Campbell, Keith. 1990. *Abstract Particulars*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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16. Cleve, James van. 1994. "Predication without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 54:577-590.

    "In this paper I wish to consider the merits of Realist theories of predication vis-à-vis three varieties of Nominalism, which Armstrong has dubbed Predicate Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism, and Ostrich Nominalism) In Part I, I shall argue that Ostrich Nominalism is the most satisfactory position of these four, and that the Realist view favored by Armstrong and many

others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two varieties of Nominalism. In Part II, I shall consider difficulties for the argument of Part I."

17. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1986. *Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

    "Predication theory has been a subject of philosophical concern since at least the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It is in its way the locus of a number of philosophical issues both in metaphysics and epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals.
    The latter problem, sometimes all too simply put as the question of whether there are universals or not, is especially germane to the notion of predication since a theory of universals is at least in part a semantic theory of predication; and it is just to such a theory that we must turn in any philosophical investigation of the notion of predication.
    In doing so, however, we need not assume the truth or superiority of any one theory of universals over another. Indeed, an appropriate preliminary to any such assumption might well consist of a comparative analysis of some of the different formal theories of predication that can be semantically associated with these different theories of universals: for just as the latter provide a semantics for the former, it is only through the logical syntax of a formal theory of predication that the logical structure of a theory of universals can be rendered perspicuous. That, in any case, is the principal methodological assumption for the approach to the problem of universals we shall undertake in the present monograph where we will be more concerned with the construction and comparison of the abstract logical systems that may be associated with different theories of universals than with the metaphysical or epistemological issues for which they were originally designed. It is our hope and expectation, however, that these comparative formal analyses will be instrumental toward any philosophical

decision as to whether to adopt a given theory of universals or not.

The original use of the term "universal" goes back to Aristotle according to whom a universal is that which can be predicated of things *(De Interpretatione, 17 a* 39). We shall retain the core of this notion throughout this essay and assume that whatever else it may be a universal has a predicable nature and that it is this predicable nature which is what constitutes its universality.

Nothing follows from that assumption, however, regarding whether a universal is (1) merely a predicate expression (nominalism) of some language or other; (2) a concept (conceptualism) in the. sense of a sociobiologically based cognitive ability or capacity to identify, collect or classify, and characterize or relate things in various ways; or (3) a real property or relation existing independently of both language and the natural capacity humans have for thought and representation (realism). We propose to take each of these interpretations or theories of universals seriously in what follows at least to the extent that we are able to associate each with a formal theory of predication. Our particular concern in this regard, moreover, will be with the explanation each provides of the predicable nature of universals, i.e., of that in which the universality of universals consists.

Our discussion and comparison of nominalism, conceptualism and realism, accordingly, will not deal with the variety of arguments that have been given for or against each of them, but with how each as a theory of universals may be semantically associated with a formal theory of predication. Our assumption here, as indicated above, is that insofar as such an associated formal theory of predication provides a logically perspicuous medium for the articulation of the predicable nature of universals as understood by the theory of universals in question, then to that extent the formal theory may itself be identified with the explanation which that theory of universals provides of the predicable nature of universals. It is in the sense of this assumption, moreover, that we understand a philosophical

theory of predication to be a formal theory of predication together with its semantically associated theory of universals." pp. 11-12.

18. Eberle, Rolf. 1970. *Nominalistic Systems*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

19. Forrest, Peter. 1986. "Ways Worlds Could Be." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 64 (1):15-24.

20. ———. 1986. "Neither Magic nor Mereology: A Reply to Lewis." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 64 (1):89-91.

    "In 'Against Structural Universals', David Lewis provides an important critique of the theory of structural universals developed by D.. M. Armstrong, and which I use in 'Ways Worlds Could Be'. Lewis' chief criticism is based on the thesis that the only unanalysable, sui generis, :mode of composition is that of mereology. (1) I call that the Either Mereology or Magic Thesis. Lewis claims that the 'generation of sets out of their elements is not some unmereological form of composition'. He, rightly in my opinion, treats a set as the mereological sum of unit sets. And -- here' I disagree -- -he insists that the generation of unit sets is 'not composition at all.'
    In reply to Lewis I shall attack the Either Mereology `or Magic Thesis by arguing:
    (1) That it does not follow from a conceptual analysis. (2)
    (2) Although it has considerable prima facie appeal it is not robust enough to be used to argue against structural universals
    and (3) Lewis himself is committed to counter-examples lo, it.
    I conclude that Either Mereology or Magic Thesis is merely' an interesting conjecture, which would hold for some ontologies, but which Lewis should not advance and which has no power to refute my own theory of possibility."
    (1) Against Structural Universals', this issue of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* pp. 25-46 .

(2) Nor is it obvious that Lewis intended it to be.

21. Gosselin, Mia. 1990. *Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism. Ontological and Epistemological Implications of the Work of W. V. O. Quine and of N. Goodman*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

22. Hale, Bob. 1987. "Abstract Objects." In. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

23. Hochberg, Herbert. 1988. "A Refutation of Moderate Nominalism." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 66 (2):188-207.

"Russell offered what has become a classic argument for the existence of universal properties in his 1911 paper 'On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. (1) My concern in this paper is not with the cogency of the argument he offered there, but with a moderation of the nominalist's position that concedes a point to Russell. (1) Some nominalist's have recently acknowledged Russell's claim that a universal 'connection' or `relation' of similarity is involved in taking qualities to be particular-instances, or 'quality-moments' in Husserl's terminology, and have argued as follows. The realist recognises particulars and universals. In addition, the realist acknowledges a universal connection or tie or nexus or predication relation - exemplification, say. Thus, the realist recognises three distinct kinds of things: particulars, universal qualities (including relations) and a connection between particulars and universals. The 'moderate' nominalist recognises particular quality-instances and a universal connection - exact similarity. Consequently, Russell's argument, at best, does not force a universal *relational quality* upon the nominalist, but merely forces the nominalist to recognise *a universal connection* that is a correlate of the realist's exemplification connection, and not of the realist's universal qualities and relations.(2) In a way, the modification of the nominalist's position is a tribute to Bradley's 'paradox', which can be taken to force one to recognise, as Russell

sometimes did, that there is a basic predication relation that cannot be included as a relation among relations without initiating a vicious regress. (3)

The moderate nominalist can then reject Russell's claim that a universal relational quality must be recognised. Since the similarity relation is the analogue of the realist's exemplification connection, it is not a 'standard' universal. And, as any view must recognise such a connection, giving Bradley his due, the nominalistic advocate of quality-instances merely recognises, in his way, what the realist must also recognise: a 'connection' exemplification `tie' (or several `ties'): the nominalist recognises particular quality-instances and a universal `similarity tie'. Thus, while Russell's argument is neither blocked nor denied, it is seemingly deprived of its sting.

I shall argue that the moderate nominalist's argument fails for a number of reasons. (It is worth noting that Wilfrid Sellars has long advocated a variant of this kind of nominalism, though he sought to avoid *explicitly* accepting either a universal tie or quality-instances.) (4) One reason the argument fails is that it tries to avoid one kind of entity by giving another type of entity a two-fold function. The realist's exemplification connection performs only one function. It serves to connect particulars to universals so that we have states of affairs (5) to provide truth conditions for atomic sentences. In short, it combines elements into complexes. The nominalist's connection is *not merely a connection* in that sense. It not only connects exactly similar qualityinstances into what we may call 'similarity-facts', but, by so doing, it provides the qualitative content for an object. This is readily seen when we note that the realist's connection *may or may not obtain,* in the sense that a state of affairs may or may not obtain, *given the elements - the particular and the quality* - that enter into it. The nominalist's similarity fact must obtain, given the elements that enter into it, and is thus necessary, just as the similarity relation may be said to be 'internal', as opposed to an 'external' tie of exemplification. Thus, the relation of exact

similarity is quite different from a connecting tie like exemplification." pp. 188-189
(1) Russell's classic argument will not do as it was presented. It will do in an amended form. On this point see my 'Russell's Proof of Realism Reproved', Philosophical Studies 37, 1980.
(2) I am indebted to D. M. Armstrong for calling my attention to this variant of nominalism and to discussion of it with him.
(3) Russell's concern with the Bradley paradox was partially responsible for his holding, in the manuscript of 1913 entitled Theory of Knowledge, that facts involved logical forms which were not constituents. See Chapter VII of the manuscript, published as vol. 7, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, ed. E. Eames et. al. (London: 1984).
(4) On Sellars' nominalism see my 'Logical Form, Existence, and Relational Predication', in Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ed. H. Wettstein, et. al. (Minneapolis: 1981), reprinted in my book Logic, Ontology and Language (Munich: 1984).
(5) Questions arise regarding 'possible' facts or states of affairs that do not 'obtain'. Such issues, though relevant to the dispute between realists and nominalists, will be avoided in this paper.

24. Jacquette, Dale. 2006. "Bochenski on Property Identity and the Refutation of Universals." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 35:293-316.

    "An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I. M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of

identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox."

25. Johansson, Ingvar. 2000. "Determinables as Universals." *The Monist* no. 83 (1):101-121.

26. Katz, Jerrold, and Postal, Paul. 1991. "Realism Vs. Conceptualism in Linguistics." *Linguistics and Philosophy* no. 14:515-554.

27. Küng, Guido. 1967. *Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language. An Enquiry into the Contemporary Views on Universals*. Doridrecht: Reidel.

    Revised edition (Original edition: *Ontologie und logistische Analyse der Sprache Eine Untersuchung zur zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion* - Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1963).
    Contents: 0. Introduction 1; Part One: The logistic analysis of language and the relation of representation. 1. A philosophical revolution 23; 2. From the theory of knowledge to the logical analysis of language 30; 3. From the psychological concept to the graphical sign 38; 4. The relation of representation 51; Part Two: The relation of representation of predicate signs and contemporary views on universals. 5. Bertrand Russell 66; 6. Ludwig Wittgenstein 80; 7. Rudolf Carnap 86; 8. Stanislaw Lesniewski 102; 8. W. V. Quine and N. Goodman 127; 10. The interpretations of predicate signs 161; 11. Conclusion 180; Bibliography 188; Index of names 201; Index of subjects.
    "It is the aim of the present study to introduce the reader to the ways of thinking of those contemporary philosophers who apply the tools of symbolic logic to classical philosophical problems. Unlike the "continental" reader for whom this work was originally written, the English-speaking reader will be more familiar with most of the philosophers discussed in this book, and he will in general not be tempted to dismiss them indiscriminately as 'positivists and 'nominalists'. But the English version of this

study may help to redress the balance in another respect. In view of the present emphasis on ordinary language and the widespread tendency to leave the mathematical logicians alone with their technicalities, it seems not without merit to revive the interest in formal ontology and the construction of formal systems.
A closer look at the historical account which will be given here, may convince the reader that there are several points in the historical development whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed: I mention, e.g., the shift from the traditional three-level semantics of sense and denotation to the contemporary two-level semantics of representation; the relation of extensional structure and intensional content in the extensional systems of Wittgenstein and Carnap; the confusing changes in labelling the different kinds of analytic and apriori true sentences; etc. Among the philosophically interesting tools of symbolic logic Lesniewski's calculus of names deserves special attention. Despite the pioneering efforts of Professor C. Lejewski, philosophers still have not caught on to it so far." (from the Preface).

28. Landesman, Charles, ed. 1971. *The Problem of Universals*. New York: Basic books.

    Contents: On the relations of universals and particulars, by B. Russell; Universals and resemblances, by H. H. Price; On concept and object, by G. Frege; Frege's hidden nominalism, by G. Bergmann; Universals, by F. P. Ramsey; Universals and metaphysical realism, by A. Donagan; Universals and family resemblances, by R. Bambrough; Particular and general, by P. F. Strawson; The nature of universals and propositions, by G. F. Stout; Are characteristics of particular things universal or particular? by G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout; The relation of resemblance, by P. Butchvarov; Qualities, by N. Wolterstroff; On what there is, by W. V. Quine; Empiricism, semantics, and ontology, by R. Carnap; The languages of realism and nominalism, by R. B. Brandt; Grammar and existence: a preface to ontology, by W.

Sellars; A world of individuals, by N. Goodman; Bibliographical notes pp. 307-308.

29. Landini, Gregory, and Foster, Thomas. 1991. "The Persistence of Counterexample: Re-Examining the Debate over Leibniz Law." *Noûs* no. 25:43-61.

30. Largeault, Jean. 1971. *Enquête Sur Le Nominalisme*. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts.

31. Lewis, David. 1986. "Against Structural Universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 64 (1):25-46.

32. ———. 1986. "Comment on Armstrong and Forrest." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 64 (1):92-93.

33. Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward. 1995. "Naturalized Platonism Versus Platonized Naturalism." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 92 (10):525-555.

34. Loux, Michael J., ed. 1970. *Universals and Particulars. Readings in Ontology*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Second revised edition 1976.
    "Few philosophical issues have proved as persistent as the problem of universals. In virtually every period in the history of philosophy the existence of universals has been a central focus of philosophical concern; and like any recurrent issue, the problem has received different interpretations in different historical contexts. It is, nonetheless, possible to abstract a common theme from the variety of interpretations; for whatever else has been at issue, the concept of a multiply exemplifiable object has always been pivotal in the debate over universals. One party to the dispute (the *Platonist* or *metaphysical realist)* contends that our ordinary notions of property, action, relation, and kind all presuppose an ontology of multiply exemplifiable objects. Different objects, realists have claimed, can *possess* one and the same property; different

persons can *perform* one and the same action; different things can *belong to* one and the same kind; and different n-tuples (i.e., pairs, triples, etc.) of objects can *enter into* one and the same relation. According to the realist, their jointly possessing, performing, belonging to, and entering into are all cases of multiple exemplification; and what they jointly possess, perform, belong to, or enter into is *a universal*. Nominalists, on the other hand, have denied the possibility of multiple exemplification and with it the reality of universals. Some have agreed that objects can and do possess properties, enter into relations, and perform actions, but have contended that it is impossible for different objects to possess numerically one property, for different persons to perform numerically one action, and for different n-tuples of objects to enter into numerically one relation; whereas, other nominalists have refused to attribute any ontological status whatever to properties, actions, kinds, and relations." pp. 3-4

Contents: UNIVERSALS. The existence of universals by Michael J. Loux 3; The world of universals by Bertrand Russell 25; On what there is by W. V. O. Quine 33; Universals by D. F. Pears 44; Particular and general by P. F. Strawson 59; Qualities by Nicholas Wolterstorff 87; Universals and family resemblances by Renford Bambrough 106; Universals and metaphysical realism by Alan Donagan 125; Abstract entitites by Wilfrid Sellars 156; On the nature of universals by Nicholas Wolterstorff 206; PARTICULARS. Particulars and their individuation by Michael J. Loux 235; The identity of indiscernibles by Max Balck 250; The identity of indiscernibles by A. J. Ayer 263; The identity of indiscernibles by D. J. O'Connor 271; Bare particulars by Edwin B. Allaire 281; Particulars re-clothed by V. C. Chappell 291; Another look at bare particulars by Edwin B. Allaire 296; Do relations individuate? by J. W. Melland 304; Particulars and their qualities by D. C. Long 310; Essence and accident by Irving Copi 331; Essence and accident by Hugh S. Chandler 347; World and essence by Alvin Plantinga 353; Bibliography 387-396.

35. MacBride, Fraser. 2004. "Whence the Particular-Unversal Distinction?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 67:181-194.

36. Marsonet, Michele. 2002. *The Problem of Realism*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

37. Maurin, Anna-Sofia. 2002. *If Tropes*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

38. Mellor, D.H. 1992. "There Are No Conjunctive Universals." *Analysis* no. 52:97-103.

    "In short, just calling particulars and universals 'parts' of facts will not distinguish them even from functions like conjunctions, negation and disjunction, let alone from each other. Nor will it tell us whether there are conjunctive universals. For the answer to that question will now depend on whether the specifically universal type of parts of facts includes non-ultimate parts. If it does, there will be conjunctive universals; if not, not. So to say that there are such universals, just because parts are generally taken to include non-ultimate parts, would simply beg the question. Moreover this answer to it will now give advocates of conjunctive universals far more than they want. (...)
    I conclude that none of Oliver's models of how particulars and universals constitute facts will tell us whether, and if so why, there are conjunctive universals." p. 99

39. Mellor, D.H., and Oliver, Alex, eds. 1997. *Properties*. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Contents: Introduction by D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver 1; I. Function and concept by Gottlob Frege 34; II. The world of Universals by Bertrand Russell 45; III. On our knowledge of Universals by Bertrand Russell 51; IV. Universals by F. P. Ramsey 57; V. On what there is by W. V. Quine 74; VI. Statement about Universals by Frank Jackson 89; VII. 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? by Michael Devitt 93; VIII. Against 'Ostrich' Nominalism: a reply to Michael Devitt by D. M. Armstrong 101; IX: On the elements of Being: I by Donald C. Williams 112; X. The metaphysics of

abstract particulars 125; XI. Tropes by Chris Daly 140; XII. Properties by D. M. Armstrong 160; XIII. Modal realism at work: properties 173; XIV. New work for a theory of Universals by David Lewis 188; XV. Causality and properties by Sydney Shoemaker 228; XVI. Properties and predicates by D. H. Mellor 255; Notes on Contributors 268; Select bibliography 270; Index of Names 275-276.
"Particular objects have *properties,* respects in which they may be alike or differ. People running are alike in motion, if not in shape or size, and differ in that respect from people standing still; spheres are alike in shape,
not in size or motion, and differ in that respect from cubes; and so on. Similarly with *relations*. Take Don and his son Bill, and Kim and her daughter Ann. Don's parent -- child relation to Bill holds also between Kim and Ann. In this respect these so-called *ordered* pairs-written (Don,Bill) (Kim,Ann) -- are like all other parent-child pairs, and differ from any other pair, like (Don, Ann) or the child-parent pair (Bill,Don), whose first member is not a parent of the second. Similarly with relations of three or more particulars. These are respects which ordered triples, quadruples etc. (n-tuples in general) may be alike or differ. Suppose Don is older than Kim, who is older than Bill, who is older than Ann. Then (Don,Kim,Bill) and (Ann,Bill,Don) are alike in that the middle member of each triple is *between* the other two in age -- if not perhaps in height or weight -- and differ in this respect from triples, like (Don,Bill,Kim), whose members are not ordered by age. Describing relations in this way, as properties of n-tuples of particulars, if of course
course artificial, but the artifice has a point. The point is to remind us that properties and relations raise similar questions, about what it is for particulars and groups of particulars to differ or to be alike, questions that are best tackled together. And the answers to these questions matter both themselves and in their implications, e.g. for *change:* since to change in some respect is just to differ in that respect at different times. Thus a
particular that differs in colour but not in shape at different times thereby changes its colour but not its shape, just as

Bill's outgrowing his father is (Don,Bill) changing by ceasing to be an instance of the *taller than* relation. In what follows, we shall usually work with properties for ease of presentation. When what we say about properties does not apply to relations we shall say so and when there is something distinctive to be said about relations we shall say it.

The most important questions about the kinds of sameness, difference and change that properties embody concern their reality and objectivity. Do particulars change or stay the same, resemble or differ from each other, independently of how we think of or describe them? That is, do properties exist in their own right-and if so which?

But if these are the important questions about properties, they can hardly be our first ones. For just as we cannot know that unicorns do not exist (but that if they did they would do so independently of our thinking so) without knowing what unicorns are, so we cannot know whether and which properties exist without knowing what properties are. So our first question is this: what sort of entities are properties like running and relations like being taller than?

This question involves at least two comparisons. First, how do properties relate to the predicates that apply to the particulars (and n-tuples of particulars) which have those properties: how are running and being taller than related to what `runs' and `is taller than' mean? And second, how do properties differ from and relate to the particulars that have them?

These questions would be hard enough to answer if everyone agreed on the meanings of predicates, on what fixes their meanings and on the nature of the particulars they apply to. But these too are contentious matters, a fact which complicates our questions by making answers to them parts of semantic and metaphysical package deals, which need to be assessed *en bloc*. This fact, and the long history of the subject, also makes different writers use different terms for what we are calling `properties', `predicates' and 'particulars'-and also use these terms to mean different things. So to help readers understand the

readings that follow and relate them to each other, we shall note in passing some of these other uses." (from the Introduction).

40. Moreland, James Porter. 1985. *Universals, Qualities, and Quality-Instances: A Defense of Realism*. Lanham: University Press of America.

41. ———. 1991. "How to Be a Nominalist in Realist Clothing." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 39:75-101.

42. ———. 2001. *Universals*. Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

    Contents: Preface and acknowledgements VII; 1. The problem(s) of universals 1; 2. Extreme nominalism and properties 23; 3. Moderate nominalism ands properties 50; 4. Minimalist realism: Wolterstorff's kinds and Armstrong's properties 74; 5. Traditional realism: properties are abstract objects 97; 6. Traditional realism: issues and objections 114; 7. The individuation of particulars 140; Notes 158; Bibliography 170; Index 181.
    "This book is a study in analytic ontology with a focus on issues and options at the core of the problem of universals. The problem of universals is actually a cluster of related issues central to debates among extreme nominalists, moderate nominalists and advocates of various forms of realism about the ontological status of properties. The book is intended to be an introduction to the topic and I have aimed the level of exposition at upper level undergraduates, graduate students and professional philosophers, and I believe the book should be of value to all three groups. Given the intended audience, the book is an introduction, not in the sense of being aimed at beginning students in philosophy, but in the sense of seeking to focus on the most important issues central to the subject matter. Because of this focus and space limitations, I have of necessity refrained from addressing certain topics in the study of universals that have been prominent in the past ten years, specifically: the relationship between higher and lower

order universals; the relationship between universals and causation, laws of nature and scientific explanation; the use of moderate (especially trope) nominalism to do work in various areas of philosophy. As interesting as these topics may be, those who study them bring to their reflections positions on the more fundamental topics about universals. And, often, philosophers who discuss these current issues seem unfamiliar with or inadequately appraised of important distinctions and arguments at the core of those more fundamental topics. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus in this book on those subjects that have been of perennial importance to the study of universals. There is a gap in the recent literature in these areas on which I focus, and I have tried to make a contribution to filling that gap." (from the Preface).

43. Newman, Andrew. 1992. *The Physical Basis of Predication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

44. Oliver, Alex. 1992. "Could There Be Conjunctive Universals?" *Analysis* no. 52:88-103.

    "Recently D. H. Mellor (1) has revived an argument of Ramsey's against the existence of complex universals. Although he believes in simple universals, Mellor argues that negative, disjunctive and conjunctive universals do not exist. I will show that his argument rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts. Despite the recent renewal of interest in a metaphysics of facts, conspicuously little has been said about the relationship between a fact and its constituents. I sketch three models of this relationship, only one of which sanctions the identity criterion. It turns out that this model does not fit Mellor's interpretation of Ramsey's theory of facts. I conclude by showing that Ramsey's argument does nothing to rule out one kind of conjunctive universal." p. 88
    (1) D. H. Mellor, *Properties and predicates,* in his *Matters of metaphysics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 pp. 170-182.

45. Quinton, Anthony. 1973. *The Nature of Things*. London: Routldge & Kegan Paul.

46. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2000. "What Is the Problem of Universals?" *Mind* no. 109:255-273.

    "In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like "a has the property F", that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain properly. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One."

47. ———. 2002. *Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

48. ———. 2002. "The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis." *Philosophical Papers* no. 31:39-47.

49. Stegmüller, Wolfgang. 1977. "The Problem of Universals Then and Now." In *Collected Papers on Epistemology, Philosophy of Science and History of Philosophy. Vol. I*, 1-65. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Original German: *Das Universalienproblem eisnt und jetzt* in: *Archiv für Philosophie*, 6 (1956) pp. 192-225 and 7 (1957) pp. 45-81.

50. ———. 1978. *Das Universalien-Problem*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

51. Strawson, Peter Frederick, and Chakrabarti, Arindam, eds. 2006. *Universals, Concepts and Qualities. New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Contents: Introduction byArindam Chakrabarti; Strawson on universals byPranab Kumar Sen; Reply to Pranab Sen by P.F. Strawson; Universals and other generalities by Jonardon Ganeri; Predicates and properties: an examination of P.K. Sens' theory of universals by Fraser McBride; Buddhist nominalism and desert ornithology by Mark Siderits; Universals transformed: the first thousand years after Plato by Richard Sorabji; Conceptualism by Chris Swoyer; The concept horse by Harold W. Noonan; Universals and particulars: Ramsey's scepticism by Bob Hale; How not to trivialize the identity of indiscernibles by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra; Universals and the defence of ante rem realism by George Bealer; Particulars have their properties of necessity by David Armstrong; Properties in abundance by Wolfgang Künne; A category of particulars by P.F. Strawson; On perceiving properties byArindam Chakrabarti; Index.

52. Teichmann, Roger. 1992. *Abstract Entities*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

53. Urbani Ulivi, Lucia, ed. 1981. *Gli Universali E La Formazione Dei Concetti*. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.

54. Williams, Donald. 1986. "Universals and Existents." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 64 (1):14.

    "The somewhat dusty problem on which I engage us here is about as inclusive and 'ontological' as any, and I would introduce it by developing some implication of the remark that our philosophical object, the world, and each part of it, is (naturally enough) a totality of what is. The italicized phrase at once brings to the pedagogic mind certain further

catchwords which point up the contrast between what a thing is and that it is. The 'what' here however has itself stood for two meanings. By 'what it is' we may mean it, the thing, the particular case it is, the individual subject, denoted by an` ordinary proper name, so that what exists when Socrates exists is Socrates; but we may mean again its nature, the kind it is, the character generally said to be connoted by a common noun or conveyed by descriptive adjectives and denoted by an abstract noun, so that to answer what exists when Socrates exists is to say that it is a man, is wise, is snubnosed, and so forth, or even that the 'what' of it is Humanity, Wisdom, Snubnosedness, etc. The dichotomy here is sometimes signalized by distinguishing within the import of the present 'what', considered in contrast with the 'that', a narrower sense of 'what' which we pedagogues sometimes express by '(the) such', viz., the kind or character, in contrast with '(the) this', viz., the case or instance. The, problem of universals, which is the clearer and easier of the problems associated with the opposition of 'essence and existence', is that of the real distinction and connection of the two referents of our more inclusive 'what', the such and this, and especially the assessment of the view that these involve an entity of one category, an abstract universal, which inheres in or qualifies an entity of another category, a concrete particular."
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article by the late Professor Donald C. Williams (1899-1983) dates from about 1959.

55. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 1970. *On Universals. An Essay in Ontology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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

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The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

Some appreciations of Bolzano's philosophy

"Bernhard Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, published in 1837, a work which in its treatment of the logical 'theory of elements' far surpasses anything that world-literature has to offer in the way of a systematic sketch of logic. Bolzano did not, of course, expressly discuss or support any independent demarcation of pure logic in our sense, but he provided one de facto in the first two volumes of his work, in his discussions of what underlay a *Wissenschaftslehre* or theory of science in the sense of his conception; he did so with such purity and scientific strictness, and with such a rich store of original, scientifically confirmed and fruitful thoughts, that we must count him as one of the greatest logicians of all time.
He must be placed historically in fairly close proximity to Leibniz, with whom he shares important thoughts and fundamental conceptions, and to whom he is also philosophically akin in other respects." (Chapter Ten, Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano, § 61, p. 142)

From: Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations,* vol. I, *Prolegomena to a Pure Logic* [1900], London and New York: Routledge 1970.

"While the idealists were removing every trace of objectivity from Kant's semantics, there was in a corner of the Austro-Hungarian empire, ignored by the leaders of German philosophy, a Czech priest by the name of Bernard Bolzano, who was engaged in the most far-reaching and successful effort to date to take semantics out of the swamp into which it had been sinking since the days of Descartes. Bolzano was the first to recognize that transcendental philosophy and its idealistic sequel were a *reductio ad absurdum* of the semantics of modem philosophy. He was also the first to see that the proper prolegomena to any future metaphysics was a study not of transcendental considerations but of what we say and its laws and that consequently the *prima philosophia* was not metaphysics or ontology but semantics. The development of these ideas in his monumental *Wissenschaftslehre* and in a variety of other writings established Bolzano as the founder of the semantic tradition. Bolzano's philosophy was the kind that takes from and then gives life to science. His approach to semantics was developed in dialectical interplay with the decision to solve certain problems concerning the nature of mathematical knowledge. Kant had not even seen these problems; Bolzano solved them. And his solutions were made possible by, and were the source of, a new approach to the content and character of a priori knowledge." (p. 23)

From: J. Alberto Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.

"Bernard Bolzano was a lone forerunner both of analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
Born in Prague in the year when Kant's first Critique appeared, he became one of the most acute critics both of Kant and of German Idealism. He died in Prague in the same year in which Frege was born; Frege is philosophically closer to him than any other thinker of the nineteenth or twentieth century.
Bolzano was the only outstanding proponent of utilitarianism among German-speaking philosophers, and was a creative mathematician whose name is duly remembered in the annals of this discipline. His *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) of

1837 makes him the greatest logician in the period between Leibniz and Frege.
The book was sadly neglected by Bolzano's contemporaries, but rediscovered by Brentano pupils: its ontology of propositions and ideas provided Husserl with much of his ammunition in his fight against psychologism and in support of phenomenology, and through Twardowski it also had an impact on the development of logical semantics in the Lwow-Warsaw School." (p. 823)

From: Wolfgang Künne, "Bolzano, Bernard" in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. II p. 823-827, New York: Routledge 1998.

An overview of Bolzano's philosophy

"It is as logician, methodologist, and epistemologist that Bolzano, after a long period of neglect, regained philosophical attention in the twentieth century. Mainly in order to combat radical skepticism, he found it necessary to base his teachings in these fields on certain ontological conceptions. He was convinced that there exist truths-inthemselves *(Wahrheiten an sich*) prior to and independent of language and man. These truths he carefully distinguished from truths expressed in words and conceived truths. The set of truths-in-themselves is a subset of the set of propositions (in-themselves) (*Sätze an sich*), again to be distinguished from propositions expressed in words and conceived propositions. Propositions consist of terms (ideas-in-themselves, *Vorstellungen an sich*).
These are likewise to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the words or word sequences by which they are denoted and, on the other, from subjective ideas that occur in our mind. Although linguistic entities and conceived entities exist concretely, terms, propositions, and truths do not. Terms were equally carefully distinguished from their objects, whether or not these objects themselves existed concretely. Though Bolzano was a Platonist (in the modern sense), his ontology was rather remote from that

of Plato or, for that matter, from that of Immanuel Kant, in spite of the common *an sich* terminology.

Beyond these negative determinations, Bolzano had little positive to say on the ontological status of terms and propositions except that they are the matter (*Stoff*) or sense (*Sinn*) of their correlates in language and thought.

Terms can be either simple or complex and either empty (*gegenstandslos*) or nonempty (*gegenständlich*); if nonempty, they are either singular or general. Examples of empty terms are −1, 0, Nothing, Round Square, Green Virtue, and Golden Mountain; absolutely simple terms are Not, Some, Have, Be, and Ought, but Bolzano was uncertain about others. Simple, singular terms he called intuitions (*Anschauungen*).

Propositions are composed of terms and are perhaps best regarded as ordered sequences of terms, while the content (*Inhalt*) of a proposition is the (unordered) set of the simple terms out of which the terms constituting the proposition are composed. The content of a complex term is similarly defined. The terms 3^5 and 5^3 are different, though they have the same content. The terms 2^4 and 4^2 are different, though they have not only the same content but even the same object. With this conception of content, the traditional doctrine of the reciprocity between the extension of a term (the set of objects falling under it) and the content of a term can easily be seen to be invalid.

Among Bolzano's many idiosyncratic convictions, perhaps the most interesting, but also the most strange to the modern mind, was his belief that each branch of science has a unique, strictly scientific presentation, which for him meant not only a unique finite axiom system (a belief he shared with many) but also an essentially unique entailment (*Abfolg*e) of each theorem of this science by the axioms, a belief which might well be unique to Bolzano.

This relationship of entailment, as presented by Bolzano, is very peculiar and obscure. Bolzano was never quite sure that he understood it himself, though he was convinced that there objectively must exist some such relationship, that each science must have its basic truths (*Grundwahrheiten*) to which all other truths of that science stand in the peculiar relation of consequence (*Folge*) to ground (*Grund*). Bolzano was constantly

struggling to differentiate this relation of entailment from the relation of derivability (*Ableitbarkeit*), which was the basic relation of his logic. Though he did not succeed in putting his theory of entailment into consistent and fruitful shape,- and could not possibly have done so, in view of the chimerical character of his goal,- his acumen, mastery of the contemporary logical and methodological literature, intellectual honesty, and lifelong self-criticism more than made up for his numerous shortcomings. Bolzano remains a towering figure in the epistemology, logic, and methodology of the first half of the nineteenth century." (p. 647)

From: Yeoshua Bar-Hillel, *Bolzano, Bernard*, in: Paul Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan 1967, vol. 2, pp. 337-338; Second edition: Donald M. Borchert (ed.), New York: Thomson Gale 2006, vol. 1, pp. 646-648.

"Bolzano's philosophy is notable for its clarity and for his reliance on logical argument. This, his monadological metaphysics and his many-sidedness helped to earn him his sobriquet of 'the Bohemian Leibniz'. Bolzano's stalking horse was Kant, whom he respected as an important philosopher but with whom he disagreed on many fundamental matters. A follower, Franz Prihonsky, collected his critical discussions of Kant into a volume entitled *Neue Anti-Kant*. So Neurath's epithet about Austrian philosophy being spared Kant is wrong: Bolzano took Kant very seriously, but disagreed with him.
The most characteristic doctrine of Bolzano's philosophy is his semantic Platonism, which anticipates that of Frege. Bolzano distinguished mental judgements and linguistic sentences (*Sätze*) from what he called *Sätze an sich*, which I shall call 'propositions'. Likewise he distinguished mental ideas (*Vorstellungen)* and linguistic names from *Vorstellungen an sich*, which I shall call 'concepts'. The *an sich* entities, propositions and concepts, are abstract and timeless: they are the meanings of linguistic expressions and the contents of significative mental acts. Bolzano had an argument against scepticism which he thought proved the existence of true propositions. Suppose there were no truths. Then the proposition that there are no truths

would be a truth, so by *reductio* there is at least one truth. Since any proposition *p* is distinct from (though equivalent to) the proposition that it is true that *p*, it follows for Bolzano that there are infinitely many truths, and these are all abstract propositions (in themselves). Some years later Dedekind produced a similar (and similarly flawed) argument to try and show the existence of an infinite set. It is important that for Bolzano false propositions have the same ontological status as true ones, and objectless concepts have the same status as concepts under which objects fall.

This Third Realm of the in-itself is brilliantly wielded by Bolzano to define and explain truth and falsity, logical truth and logical falsity, logical consequence, compatibility, derivability, analyticity, logical analyticity, probability, degrees of derivability and probabilistic inference. His definition of logical consequence differs little from that of Tarski, which it anticipated by about a century, and his theory of logical truth anticipates that of Quine. In logic it seems to have been Bolzano's fate to have invented wheels that others more famously reinvented after him. Had his views been widely known and available in readable texts in or shortly after his lifetime, I estimate that the advance of logic would have been accelerated by at least thirty, perhaps even fifty years. Where he falls short of Frege is that he does not have the concept of a formal system, where axioms are laid down and theorems follow by precisely defined syntactic rules of inference. Bolzano on the other hand prefers to work throughout with semantic concepts. The most important of these is the idea of *variation*. If we take a proposition and consider some logical part of it, whether a concept or another proposition, then we can consider what happens when we allow this part to vary and consider the range of its possible variants. For example if we take the proposition *John loves Mary* then we could replace *John* by *Fred, Harry, Elisabeth* etc., usually providing only that the name replacing John always denotes, and consider various properties of the class of variants so obtained. It is amazing how many different logico-semantic concepts Bolzano can define using this one idea. In one respect though he remains old-fashioned and Leibnizian, namely in his affection for the subject,- predicate form of propositions. The basic form of proposition for Bolzano is

A has b, where A is the subject-concept and b is an abstract name for a predicate-concept, e.g., instead of *This is red* he would say *This has redness*. He even thought that every proposition could be tortured into this form. Our recent relational example would be *John has love for Mary*. Two philosophically interesting concepts are truth and existence. For *It is true that it rains in Spain* Bolzano has *The proposition that it rains in Spain has truth* and for *Tigers exist* he has *The concept of tiger has objectuality*, meaning that at least one thing falls under it. The latter analysis will evoke memories of Kant and Frege: like them Bolzano considers existence a second-level concept. Even non-existence has subject,- predicate form: *There are no unicorns* becomes *The concept of unicorn has objectlessness*. Metaphysically Bolzano was an atomist and monadist, his monads, unlike those of Leibniz, having a physical location. Taking the idea of atoms as physical points seriously led him into an odd theory of contact. At a point on its surface a physical body may have an atom (and so be closed there) or lack an atom (or be open there). Consider now two non-overlapping bodies in contact at a certain point. If they were both open there they would fail to be in contact there, since there would be a spatial point between them that neither occupies. If they were both closed there they could not be in contact without sharing a point, in which case they would overlap. Hence contact can only take place where one body is open and the other is closed. Bolzano's chief metaphysical work was *Athanasia, or Reasons for the Immortality of the Soul*. Here he took the standard view that the soul is a monad and hence indestructible. The book contains an ontology of substance and accidents, which he calls *adherences*." (pp. 112-114)

From: Peter Simons, "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists", in: Anthony O'Hear (ed.), *German Philosophy Since Kant*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 109-136.

"[Bolzano] composed his two main works from 1823 though 1841: the *Wissenschaftslehre* (4 vols., 1837) and the posthumous *Grössenlehre*.
(...)

Bolzano recognized a profound distinction between the actual thoughts and judgments (*Urteile*) of human beings, their linguistic expressions, and the abstract propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and their parts which exist independently of those thoughts, judgments, and expressions. A propostion in Bolzano's sense is a preexistent sequence of ideas-as-such (*Vorstellungen an sich*). Only propositions containing finite ideas-as-such are accessible to the mind. Real thins existing concretely in space and time have subsistence (*Dasein*) whereas abstract objects such as propositions have only logical existence. Adherences, i.e., forces, applied to certain concrete substances give rise to subjective ideas, thoughts, or judgments. A subjective idea is a part of a judgment that is not itself a judgment. The set of judgments is ordered by a causal relation.
Bolzano's abstract world is constituted of sets, ideas-as-such, certain properties (*Beschaffenheiten*), and objects constructed from these. Thus, sentence shapes are a kind of ideas-as-such, and certain complexes of ideas-as-such constitute propositions. Ideas-as-such can be generated from expressions of a language by postulates for the relation of being an object of something. Analogously, properties can be generated by postulates for the relation of something being applied to an object.
(...)
In the *Grössenlehre* Bolzano intended to give a detailed, well-founded exposition of contemporary mathematics and also to inaugurate new domains of research. Natural numbers are defined, half a century before Frege, as properties of "bijective" sets (the members of which can be put in one-to-one correspondence), and real numbers are conceived as properties of sets of certain infinite sequences of rational numbers. The analysis of infinite sets brought him to reject the Eudidean doctrine that the whole is always greater than any of its parts and, hence, to the insight that a set is infinite if and only if it is bijective to a proper subset of itself. This anticipates Peirce and Dedekind. Bolzano's extension of the linear continuum of finite numbers by infinitesimals implies a relatively constructive approach to nonstandard analysis. In the development of standard analysis the most remarkable result of the *Grössenlehre*

is the anticipation of Weirstrass's discovery that there exist nowhere differentiable continuous functions.
The *Wissenschaftslehre* was intended to lay the logical and epistemological foundations of Bolzano's mathematics. A theory of science in Bolzano's sense is a collection of rules for delimiting the set of scientific textbooks. Whether a class of true propositions is a worthwhile object of representation in a scientific textbook is an ethical question decidable on utilitarian principles.
Bolzano proceeded from an expanded and standardized ordinary language through which he could describe propositions and their parts. He defined the semantic notion of truth and introduced the function corresponding to a "replacement" operation on propositions. One of his major achievements was his definition of logical derivability (*logische Ableitbarkeit*) between sets of propositions: B is logically derivable from A if and only if all elements of the sum of A and B are simultaneously true for some replacement of their non-logical ideas-as-such and if all elements of B are true for any such replacement that makes all elements of A true. In addition to this notion, which is similar to Tarski's concept of consequence of 1936, Bolzano introduced a notion corresponding to Gentzen's concept of consequence. A proposition is universally valid (*allgemeingültig*) if it is derivable from the null class. In his proof theory Bolzano formulated counterparts to Gentzen's cut rule.
Bolzano introduced a notion of inductive probability as a generalization of derivability in a limited domain This notion has the formal properties of conditional probability. These features and Bolzano's characterization of probability density by the technique of variation are reminiscent of Wittgenstein's inductive logic and Carnap's theory of regular confirmation functions.
The replacement of conceptual complexes in propositions would, if applied to a formalized language, correspond dosely to a substitution-semantic conception of quantification. His own philosophical language was based on a kind of free logic. In essence, Bolzano characterized a substitution-semantic notion of consequence with a finite number of antecedents. His quantification over individual and general concepts amounts to the introduction of a non-elementary logic of lowest order

containing a quantification theory of predicate variables but no set-theoretical principles such as choice axioms. His conception of universal validity and of the semantic superstructure of logic leads to a semantically adequate extension of the predicate-logical version of Lewis's system S5 of modal logic without paradoxes. It is also possible to simulate Bolzano's theory of probability in a substitution-semantically constructed theory of probability functions. Hence, by means of an ontologically parsimonious superstructure without possible-worlds metaphysics, Bolzano was able to delimit essentially the realms of classical logical truth and additive probability space." (pp. 93-94)

From: Jan Berg, "Bolzano, Bernard", in: Robert Audi (ed.), *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Second Edition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.

The importance of Bolzano's logic

"Why look back now? Let me start by stating my non-historian's view of the modem history of logic. Like many scientific disciplines, flourishes while being ill-defined. Despite textbook orthodoxy, the issue what logic should be about is a legitimate topic of discussion, and one to which answers have varied historically. One key topic is reasoning: its valid laws for competent users, and perhaps also its sins: mistakes and fallacies. But the modern core also includes independent concerns such as formal languages, their semantic meaning and expressive power. Moreover, the modem research literature, much of it still in a pre-textbook stage, reveals a wide range of topics beyond reasoning and meaning, dealing with general structures in information, and many-agent activities other than reasoning, such as belief revision or communication. Thus, the agenda of logic keeps evolving, as it should. In this light, going back to the pioneers is not just a matter of piety, but also of self-interest.
One striking feature of older literature is its combination of issues in logic with general methodology of science. One sees this with

Bolzano, Mill, or Peirce, but also with major modem authors, such as Tarski, Carnap, or Hintikka. The border line between logic and philosophy of science seems arbitrary. Why have 'confirmation', 'verisimilitude', or 'theory structure' become preserves for philosophers of science, and not for logicians? This separation seems an accidental feature of a historical move, viz. Frege's 'contraction of concerns', which tied up logic closely with the foundations of mathematics, and narrowed the agenda of the field to a point where fundamentalists would say that logic is the mathematics of formal systems. Admittedly, narrowing an agenda and focusing a field may be hugely beneficial. Frege's move prepared the ground for the golden age of logic in the interbellum, which produced the core logic curriculum we teach today. At the same time, broader interests from traditional logic migrated, and took refuge in other disciplines. But as its scientific environment evolved in the 20th century, logic became subject to other influences than mathematics and philosophy, such as linguistics, computer science, AI, and to a lesser degree, cognitive psychology and other experimental disciplines.
Compared with Frege, Bolzano's intellectual range is broad, encompassing general philosophy, mathematics, and logic. This intellectual span fits the above picture. Even so, I am not going to make Bolzano a spokesman for any particular modern agenda. The current professional discussion speaks for itself. But I do want to review some of his themes as to contemporary relevance. Incidentally, the main sources for the analysis in my 1985 paper, besides reading Bolzano himself, have been Kneale & Kneale 1962, and Berg 1962. After the Vienna meeting this autumn of 2002, I learnt about Rusnock 2000, whose logic chapters turned out sophisticated and congenial.

A short summary of Bolzanian themes:

- We quickly enumerate those points in Bolzano's logical system that are the most unusual and intriguing to logicians. These will return at lower speed in later sections.
- The systematic idea of decomposing propositions into general constituents is linguistically attractive, and reminiscent of abstract analyses of constituent structure in

categorial grammars (Buszkowski 1997, Moortgat 1997, van Benthem 1991).

- In doing so, looking at different ways of setting the boundary between *fixed* and *variable* vocabulary in judging the validity of an inference is another innovation, which ties up with the recurrent issue of the boundaries of 'logicality'.
- Moving to logical core business, acknowledging different styles of reasoning: 'deducibility', 'strict deducibility', or statistical inference, each with their own merits, is a noteworthy enterprise quite superior to unreflected assumptions of uniformity.
- As to detailed proposals, consider Bolzano's central notion of deducibility. It says that an inference from premises φ to a conclusion Ψ is valid, given a variable vocabulary A (written henceforth as $\varphi \Rightarrow A\ \Psi$) if (a) every substitution instance of the A's which makes all premises true also makes the conclusion true, and (b) the premises must be consistent. Clause (a) is like modem validity, modulo the different semantic machinery, but with a proviso (b) turning this into a non-monotonic logic, the hot topic of the 1980s. Moreover, the role of the vocabulary argument A making inference into a ternary relation really, will also turn out significant later.
- But also other notions of inference are reminiscent of modem proposals trying to get more diversity into how people deal with large sets of data, such as 'strict deducibility': using just the minimal set of premises to get a given conclusion.
- Bolzano's statistical varieties of inference involve counting numbers of substitutions that make a given statement true. Such connections between qualitative logic and quantitative probability were still alive in Carnap's inductive logic, a fringe topic at the time, but they are coming back in force in modem logic, too.
- Very striking to logicians at the interface with AI is Bolzano's formulation of systematic properties of his notions of inference, such as versions of transitivity or the deduction theorem, some depending on the fixed/variable constituent distinction. No truth tables, model-theoretic

semantics, and their ilk, but instead, some of the more sophisticated structural theory of inference that carne in fashion in the 1980s.

All these themes do, or should, occur in modern logic! Let's take them up now one by one." (pp. 12-14)

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From: Johann van Benthem, "Is There Still Logic in Bolzano's Key?", in: Edgar Morscher (ed.), *Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1999.

"In an introductory chapter, Bolzano defines a science as an "aggregate of truths whose known portion is important enough to be set forth in a special book" and logic as the science which deals with the division of the domain of all truths into suitable parts, and supplies the rules for the composition of the respective treatises. These rules and the division of the domain of all truths are discussed in the final, fourth volume of the German edition.

But before the domain of truths can be divided into sections, and treatises written, a sufficient number of truths must first be discovered. Accordingly, the theory of science proper is preceded by a book entitled *Erfindungskunst* (Heuretic), which is concerned with the discovery of truths. This section, in turn, presupposes a discussion of the conditions of human knowledge in general. But epistemology can be transacted only if it is preceded by a theory concerning the entities which are known, namely propositions in themselves and their terms (Theory of Elements). Finally, the first section of the work is the Theory of Fundamentals, in which Bolzano undertakes to prove that there are truths in themselves and that some of them can be known." (pp. XXVIII-XXIX)

From: George Rolf, *Editor's Introduction*, to: Bernard Bolzano, *Theory of Science*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1972.

The main thesis contained in the *Theory of Science* consists in a clear distiction between psychology and logic. This work, as well as Bolzano's other works on logic, was given little consideration by his contemporaries. Husserl was the first to point out the exceptional importance of Bolzano's conception, considering him as "one of the greatest logicians of all times".
In Bolzano's view, logic is "a theory of science" -- Wissenschaftslehre. which explains the title of the above cited treatise on logic.
The work is divided into five parts:
1) *Fundamentallehre* -- fundamental theory. In this part Bolzano points out that truths must be considered in themselves -- *Wahrheiten an sich*, separating the logical content from the corresponding logical process.
2) *Elementarlehre* -- elementary theory. In this part he treats of the theory of representations of sentences and deductions. Here also Bolzano admits, as he did for truth, that there are "representations in themselves -- *Vorstellungen an sich* and "sentences in themselves" -- *Sätzen an Sich*.
3) *Erkenntnislehre* -- the theory of knowledge. That is the theory of the conditions that truth must conform to in relation to human intelligence.

4) *Erfindungskunst* -- the art of discovering truth.
5) *Eigentliche Wissenschaftslehre* -- the theory of science proper. This part is concerned with "truth" in the field of special sciences. The three fundamental concepts on which Bolzano's theory is based are: "sentence in itself", "representation in itself", and "truth in itself".
By "sentence in itself" he understands that which can be thought in a sentence, irrespective of the fact whether this sentence has been thought or not, expressed or not. In this way, he marks a fundamental distinction between thinking a sentence and the sentence itself. The "sentence in itself" is neither representation, nor judgement; Bolzano does not specify what such a sentence is, but he says what it is not. A "sentence in itself" has no existence whatsoever, since only thought sentences or asserted sentences exist in the mind of the one who thinks; the sentence is the content of thought, which content has no real existence. So, for instance, the sentence "life is not the greatest good of all" is a "sentence in itself", when we consider only its significant content -- its sense --, irrespective of the fact whether it is true or false.
As to the "representation in itself", this does not exist in us, it exists independently of the subject's consciousness; therefore, although several subjects may have the same representation, it is not multiplied but unique, and this is, in fact, Bolzano's argument in favour of the objectivity of representation. Let us take the above quoted sentence, "life is not the greatest good of all"; "life" and "the greatest good of all" are representations in themselves and are elements of the given sentence. The sum of representations in a sentence forms its content. This "objective representation" does not need, like the "proposition in itself" or the objective proposition, a subject who should think of, or express it but, like the latter, "it is not anything existing and yet it is a certain something" -- *Zwar nicht als etwas Seiendes, aber doch als ein gewisses Etwas* (*Wissenschaftslehre*, vol. 1, p. 217). More precisely "representation in itself" consists of something but not of something existing. Therefore "representations in themselves" are neither true nor false.
The third of Bolzano's concepts is "truth in itself", which expresses something as it is, irrespective of whether it was or not thought or expressed by some one. The object of truth needs

nothing of what exists. So, for instance, the truth that "truth is nothing existing", does not require any real object (*op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 112).
After this analysis of significations Bolzano proceeds to the examination of other logical concepts, of logical value, logic relation and deduction, and he comes to the conclusion that logic is a science of meaning. This is pure logic -- *Die reine Logik* -- independent of psychology, with an a priori value, but not in the Kantian sense.
Husserl will be influenced by these basic ideas of Bolzano's philosophy and in this way will attempt to definitely eliminate psychologism in logic." (vol. III, pp. 354-355)

From: Anton Dumitriu, *History of Logic*, Tubridge Wells: Abacus Press 1977 (4 volumes).

Bolzano's contribution to logic

"The *Wissenschaftslehre* [*WL*] (1837) by Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) is one of the masterpieces in the history of logic. In this encyclopedic work Bolzano intended to construct a new and philosophically satisfactory foundation of mathematics. The search for such a foundation brought forth valuable by-products in logical semantics and axiomatics. For example, Bolzano introduced the notion of abstract, non-linguistic proposition and described its relations to other relevant notions such as sentence, truth, existence and analyticity. Furthermore, he studied relations among propositions and defined highly interesting notions of validity, consistency, derivability and probability, based on the idea of "replacing" certain components in propositions. In set theory, he stated the equivalence of reflexivity and infiniteness of sets and considered isomorphism as a sufficient condition for the identity of powers of infinite sets. He conceived of a natural number as a property characterizing sets of objects, even though he did not base his development of arithmetic on this notion, and analyzed sentences about specific numbers in a way reminiscent

of Frege and Russell. In a posthumous manuscript from the 1830's (recently published) he developed a theory of real numbers, which differs from those of Dedekind, Weierstrass, Méray and Cantor. Bolzano's real numbers may be identified with certain sequences of rational numbers.

Logic in Bolzano's sense is a theory of science, a kind of metatheory, the objects of which are the several sciences and their linguistic representations. This theory is set forth in Bolzano's monumental four-volumes work *Wissenschaftslehre* (hereafter referred to as *WL*). Bolzano's very broad conception of logic with its strong emphasis on methodological aspects no doubt accounts for the type of logical results which he arrived at. The details of his theory of science proper are given in the fourth volume of the *WL* and belong to the least interesting aspects of his logic. On the other hand, Bolzano's search for a solid foundation for his theory of science left very worthwhile by-products in logical semantics and axiomatics. His theory of propositions in the starting-point of these results.

Bolzano became more and more aware of the profound distinction between the actual thoughts of human beings and their linguistic expressions on the one hand, and the abstract propositions and their components which exist independently of these thoughts and expressions on the other hand. Furthermore, he imagined a certain fixed deductive order among all true propositions. This idea was intimately associated with his vision of a realm of abstract components of propositions constituting their logically simple parts.

For the following presentation of Bolzano's theory of propositions I have to define some terms. A concrete sentence occurrence is a sequence of particles existing in space and time, arranged according to the syntactic rules of a grammar, and contrasting with its surroundings. A simple sentence shape, on the other hand, is a class of similar concrete occurrences of simple sentences. A compound sentence shape is built up recursively from simple sentence shapes by means of syntactic operations. Not every compound sentence shape has a corresponding concrete sentence occurrence. Two compound sentence shapes may be considered identical if they are built up from identical simple sentence shapes in the same way. Two simple sentence

shapes are identical if they contain the same sentence occurrences.
Now consider the compound sentence containing the following concrete sentence occurrence: 'a simple sentence shape is a class of similar sentence occurrences or it is not the case that a simple sentence shape is a class of similar sentence occurrences'. In another sense one could say that this sentence shape, which is an abstract logical object outside of space and time, contains two sentence occurrences, i.e., two abstract "occurrences" of the simple sentence shape containing the following concrete inscription: 'a simple sentence shape is a class of similar sentence occurrences'. In the following, I will use the expression 'sentence occurrence' exclusively in the first, concrete sense.
Bolzano's notion of abstract non-linguistic proposition (*Sätz an sich*) is a keystone in his philosophy and can be traced in his writings back to the beginnings of the second decade of the 19th century. I shall try to characterize Bolzano's conception of propositions by means of certain explicit assumptions. These assumptions also give information about the relation between propositions and other logically interesting objects.
In his logic Bolzano utilizes a concept which is an exact counterpart of the modern logical notion of existential quantification. Therefore, he could have stated that (1) There exist entities, called 'propositions', which fulfill the following necessary conditions (2) through (15). (Cf. *WL* 30 ff.)
Thus, propositions possess the kind of logical existence developed in modern quantification theory. However, (2) A proposition does not exist concretely in space and time *(WL* 19).
According to Bolzano, both linguistic and mental entities such as thoughts and judgments are concrete (*WL*, 34, 291). Hence, propositions could not be identified as concrete linguistic or mental occurrences. Furthermore,(3) Propositions exist independently of all kinds of mental entities (*(WL* 19).
Therefore the identification between propositions and mental dispositions sometimes made in medieval nominalism cannot be applied to propositions in Bolzano's sense.
A proposition in Bolzano's sense is a structure of ideas-as-such. Hence, an idea-as-such (*Vorstellung an sich*) is a part of a proposition which is not itself a proposition (*WL* 48). But to he

able to generate propositions we have to characterize ideas-as-such independently of propositions. This is in fact implicit in Bolzano. He worked extensively with the relation of being an object of an idea as-such, which corresponds in modern logic to the relation of being an element of the extension of a concept. In terms of this relation, taken as a primitive by Bolzano, certain postulates may be extracted from his writings which concern the existence and general properties of ideas-as-such.
Independently of human minds and of linguistic expressions there exists a collection of absolutely simple ideas-as-such. As examples Bolzano mentions the logical constants expressed by the words 'not', 'and', 'some', 'to have', 'to be', 'ought' (*WL*, 78); but he admits being unable to offer a more comprehensive list. He seems to mean that each complex idea A can be analyzed into a sequence *S*(A) of simple ideas which would probably include certain logical constants.
I shall call this sequence *S*(A) the 'primitive form' of A. The manner in which a complex idea is built up from simple ones may be expressed by a chain of definitions. So it appears that some complex ideas behave somewhat like the open formulas of a logical calculus. Bolzano assumes that two ideas are strictly identical if and only if they have the same primitive form (*(WL* 92, 119, 557)." (pp. 147-150)

From: Jan Berg, *Bolzano's Contribution to Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics*, in: R. O. Gandy, J. M. Hyland (eds.), *Logic Colloquium '76*, Amsterdam: North Holland 1977, pp. 147-171.

Bolzano's contribution to semiotics

"The Prague philosopher, Bernard Bolzano, in his major work the *Theory of Science* (1837), mainly in the last two of the four volumes, reserves much space for semiotics. The author frequently cites Locke's Essay and the *Neues Organon*, and discovers in Lambert's writings "an semiotics many very estimable remarks", though these are of little use "for the

development of the most general rules of scientific discourse", one of the aims Bolzano sets himself (par. 698).
The same chapter of *The Theory of Science* bears two titles, one of which, -- *Semiotik* -- appears in the table of contents (vol. IV, p. XVI), the other of which -- *Zeichenlehre* -- heads the beginning of the text (p. 500); paragraph 637, which follows, identifies both designations -- the theory of signs or semiotics (*Zeichenlehre Oder Semiotik*). If, in this chapter and in several other parts of the work, the author's attention is held above all by the testing of the relative perfection of signs (*Vollkomenheit oder Zweckmässigkeit*) and particularly of signs serving logical thought, then it is in the beginning of the third volume that Bolzan? tries to introduce the reader to the fundamental notions of the theory of signs throughout par. 285 (pp. 67-84) which overflows with ideas and is titled "the designation of our representations" (*Bezeichnung unserer Vorstellungen*).
This paragraph begins with a bilateral definition of the sign, "An object through whose conception we wish to know in a renewed fashion another conception connected therewith in a thinking being, is known to us as a *sign*". A whole chain of geminate concepts follows, some of which are very new, while others, referring back to their anterior sources, are newly specified and enlarged. Thus Bolzano's semiotic thoughts bring to the surface the difference between the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of a sign as such and the significance (*Sinn*) that this sign acquires in the context of the present circumstance, then the difference between the sign (1) produced by the addresser (*Urheher*) and (2) perceived by the addressee who, himself, oscillates between understanding and misunderstanding (*Verstehen und Missverstehen*). The author makes a distinction between the thought and expressed interpretation of the sign (*gedachte und sprachliche Auslegung*), between universal and particular signs, between natural and accidental signs (*natürlich und züfallig*), arbitrary and spontaneous *(willkürlich und unwillkürlich*), auditory and visual (*hörbar und sichtbar*), simple (*einzeln*) and composite (*zusamengestzt*, which means "a whole whose parts are themselves signs"), between unisemic and polysemic, proper and figurative, metonymical and metaphorical, mediate and immediate signs; to this classification he adds lucid footnotes on

the important distinction to be made between signs (*Zeichen*) and indices (*Kennzeichen*) which are devoid of an addresser, and finally on another pressing theme, the question of the relationship between interpersonal (*an Andere*) and internal (*Sprechen mit selbst*) communication." (pp. 202-203 of the reprint)

From: Roman Jakobson, *A Glance at the Development of Semiotics*, in *The Framework of Language*. Translated from the French by Patricia Baudoin, Ann Arbor: Michigan Studies in the Humanities, Horace R. Rackham School of Graduate Studies 1980 and reprinted in: R. Jakobson, *Selected Writings. Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology,* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1985, pp. 199-218.

Bolzano's ontology

"The first basic notion of Bolzano's ontological system is the part relation. Its domain, i.e., the set of all objects bearing it to something, embraces concrete substances, abstract objects, and collections. The converse domain of the part relation, i.e., the set of all objects to which it is borne, contains collections only.
Some collections are concrete entities existing in space and time, the rest are abstract sums or other sets. Concrete sums are composed of substances and adherences, i.e., forces. Forces applied to certain substances give rise to subjective ideas or judgements. Further results of such applications are the concrete sentence occurrences. A subjective idea is a part of a judgement which is not itself a judgement. The set of judgements is ordered by a special causal relation.
Bolzano's abstract world is constituted of sets, abstract sums, certain attributes (i.e., properties or relations), ideas-as-such, and objects constructed on the basis of these entities. Thus, sentence shapes are a kind of properties, and certain complexes of ideas-assuch constitute propositions. The notion of an idea-as-such can be constructed from expressions of a language by means of

axioms for the relation of being an object of something. Analogously, properties can be generated by axioms for the relation of something being applied to an object. The converse of this relation, i.e., the relation of an entity having a property, and the relation of being an object of an idea-as-such are fundamental ontological constants of Bolzano's.

Natural numbers are defined as properties of bijective sets, and real numbers are essentially conceived of as properties of sets of certain infinite sequences of rational numbers. The analysis of infinite sets leads to a generalization of the part relation by scrapping the doctrine that the whole is always greater than any of its parts. The extension of the linear continuum of finite numbers by infinitesimals within the coarsest free algebraic filter settles definite limits to Bolzano's approach to analysis.

A part relation in a narrower sense, viz., the relation of being a subsequence of a sequence of abstract objects, holds among ideasas-such and propositions. Furthermore, the relation of derivability holds among propositions, and true propositions are ordered by the relation of entailment.

Among the relations holding between the constituents of the concrete world and the abstract world there are the relations of a substance having a property or being an object of an idea-as-such. Moreover, the relations of an idea-as-such or proposition being the subject matter of a subjective idea or a judgement, respectively, establish ontologically important connections between the abstract world and the concrete world.

The main features of Bolzano's ontology may be schematized as follows:



(...)
The question whether a rational reconstruction of Bolzano's ontology is possible will be sustained like a pedal point throughout the present study. In many respects, indeed, his ontological system is a model of thrift, comprehensiveness, and deductive cogency. He shows us how to grasp a self-contained, abstract "third" world (in Popper's sense) embracing the realms of classical logical truth and additive probability spaces without indulging in possible worlds, states of affairs, facts, and all that. Admittedly, from a modern point of view certain aspects of his ontology may look like Dr. Johnson's dog walking on its hind legs: it is not always done quite well, but you are surprised to find it done at all. To rational bipeds of our time it should be more instructive, though, to watch this performance rather than amazing at metaphysical cephalopods wallowing in clouds of ontological splendors, or gazing at recondite cogitators crawling on all fours through a self-induced verbal fog." (pp. 31-32)
(...)
"Ontology without possible worlds.
A minimal requirement for pursuing philosophy of science and mathematics is the access to sentence (or formula) shapes, an

adequate truth definition, substitution, and some set-theoretic principles. The first three notions allow a semantic demarcation of the
realms of classical logical truth and additive probability spates. Apart from syntactic identity, the strongest semantic principle of individuation for sentence shapes is logical equivalence. If one should insist on abstract objects with stronger semantic identity conditions, as Bolzano did for reasons of philosophical foundations, then non-linguistic propositions may be tendered. Bolzano proceeded from an expanded and standardized ordinary language by means of which he could describe the universe of propositions and their parts. We have seen that this exposition can be organized into explicit postulate systems. The existence of propositions and their parts being thus guaranteed, Bolzano defined the semantic notion of truth and introduced the function corresponding to a "replacement" operation on propositions. He could also easily have rendered an exact definition of the notion of a sentence shape. The replacement of conceptual complexes in propositions enabled him to develop the essential parts of classical logic and probability theory without resorting to ontologically lavish constructions.
Bolzano's notion of proposition offers an interesting alternative to the corresponding concepts developed in modern possible-world semantics. (For a lucid survey, see Edgar Morscher, *Propositions and all that: Ontological and epistemological reflections*, in: L. M. de Rijk (ed.), *Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans*, Nijmegen, 1987, pp. 241-257) According to a representative theory of this kind, a proposition is a function sending possible worlds onto truth-values. A possible world is a maximally consistent set of states of affairs. A state of affairs is somehow conceived of as being built up from members of the domain of individuals and their attributes. Moreover, a fact is a real state of affairs. Thus, a concrete object and its attributes can be parts of a state of affairs. For example, the concrete individual Kurt Waldheim and the property of being the 42nd president of the United States of America would, according to this view, be parts of the state of affairs that Kurt Waldheim is the 42nd president of the U.S.

The main flaws of this approach to the ontology of propositions are, first, that propositions expressed by logically equivalent sentences conflate and, second, that a concrete object can never be part 01 a state of Alai's which is nut a fact. lot example, the real Kurt Waldheim can never be part of the state of affairs of someone being the 42nd president of the U.S.

The latter obstacle can be removed by representing concrete things by bundles of world-lines, i.e., by sets of sets of world-points. The real Kurt Waldheim, e.g., is thereby represented by a bundle of world-lines which will never enter into a state of affairs containing the property of being the 42nd president of the U.S. The fictitious Kurt Waldheim figuring in such a state of affairs branches off from the bundle representing the real Kurt Waldheim at a certain space-time point in the world of 1993. In view of the highly abstract character of this approach, an alternative remedy might be to leave states of affairs unanalyzed and take them as primitive entities. From the ontological point of view, however, we could then as well get on directly with propositions.

An attempt to evade the former difficulty of propositions conflating under logical equivalence of the corresponding sentences by proffering new categories of intensional objects will be a great expense to unyielding ontologians. One device may be to take the functions sending the possible worlds onto truth-values in intension. Hence, a practicable theory of propositions based on a possible-world semantics would have to postulate the existence of sets of sets of world-points, and moreover of properties, relations, and function concepts. An attempted entity-saving measure of introducing the attributes by functions in extension from possible worlds onto sets of individuals or sets of n-tuples of individuals would be redundant, however, since attributes are parts of the constituents of possible worlds.

An ontology based on Bolzano's system of propositions would only have to postulate the existence of one category of intensional objects, namely ideas-as-such, and could otherwise employ purely extensional set-theoretic and algebraic methods. A possible objection to Bolzano's ontology might be raised on account of the fact that it cannot yield the semantics of epistemic and other non-classical logics. In these regions outside the analysis of the

foundations of science and mathematics, it may be argued, real philosophy begins with the search for new semantic superstructures while the metaphysical dusk of possible worlds approaches."

From: Jan Berg, *Ontology without Ultrafilters and Possible Worlds. An Examination of Bolzano's Ontology,* Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1992.

Bolzano on the limits of knowledge

Bolzano, whose concept 'truths in themselves' was employed by Husserl (...), set himself the task of clarifying the concept of unknowability and of finding out whether it has any instances. The § 314 of his *Wissenschaftslehre* bears the title: "Whether our ability to know has definite limits" ("Ob es bestimmte Grenzen für unser Erkenntnisvermögen gebe?"). The target of Bolzano's criticism is Kant, as the next paragraph (315) makes clear: "The doctrine of the critical philosophy on this" ("Die Lehre der kritischen Philosophie hierüber").
One would expect that Hartmann carefully studied Bolzano's reasoning before presenting his own theory. At least, he should have commented on Bolzano's arguments, and tried to refute them. One's expectations grow higher due to his citation of Husserl, who obviously received the concept of truths in themselves from Bolzano (Husserl praised Bolzano in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen*). However, nothing seems to indicate that Hartmann was familiar with Bolzano's reasoning against unknowability in § 314.(11) The *Wissenschaftslehre* which Hartmann had thoroughly studied is that of Fichte (cf. *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, pp. 45—80). This is not only a scholarly point, because Bolzano's analysis of the knowability problem is one of the most remarkable ever presented of it and his arguments present a severe challenge to anybody who thinks that human knowledge has absolute

limits. Bolzano's contribution was unknown to Hartmann — but surely not unknowable.

According to Bolzano, there is an infinite number of true propositions. But, because we have a finite capacity of comprehending these propositions, it may be asked whether our ability to know has definite limits and whether we are able to determine these. Before answering this question, says Bolzano, we first have to clarify what we understand by such limits to our ability to know and by their determination.(12) One may determine the limits of a certain power either completely or incompletely. Complete determination concerns everything that the power can and cannot bring about, whereas incomplete or partial determinations concern only something the power can or cannot accomplish. A complete determination of our ability to know should characterize in a perfect way the totality of the truths which we know and of the truths we are not able to know; otherwise a determination of this ability is incomplete. It is the complete determination that is needed: certain sentences, which truthfully state what we are able to know and what not.

'Knowledge' here means true justified belief. One may speak of the (public) knowledge of the whole of humanity or of all finite minds in the cosmos, or of the (personal) knowledge of some individual. The question of the determination of the limits of knowledge concerns *criteria* which allow us to decide whether *answering* a given *question* does not exceed our ability to know. If such criteria could be given, we would be able to abstain from a spurious search. The criteria should concern knowability in principle and not only what is presently or up to now unknowable. The fact that we have not been able to know a certain truth up to the present time does not imply that this will also be impossible for us in the future. The criteria should characterize a class of truths which we not only do not know at present, but will never know, at least as long as we are human beings.(13)

After these considerations, it should be clear enough what is being searched for. There are three possible ways of proceeding:

1) *enumerating* all unknowable truths

2) *indicating* unknowables by giving a property which characterizes them

3) *looking* for such propositions the truth or falsity of which is not only unknown but will never be found out.(14)
This means that we may use either an *extensional* or an *intensional* procedure. It is clear that procedure 1) is self-refuting, Bolzano claims: if we know that the propositions p_1..., p_n are true and unknowable to us, then they must be knowable to us.(15) It is more difficult to see that procedure 2) is also a dead end. In indicating unknowables, we have to use such characterizations as All A's are unknowable to us.
No truths of the form 'A is X' are knowable to us.(16)
But these kinds of statements are illegitimate and self-contradictory, according to Bolzano. If we can characterize a thing by a property (say 'A'), then we know something of it, at least what it has in common with other things. However, the sentence "We cannot know anything of A" is a sentence about A, so that it is a contradiction to say that one does not know of A at all, i.e., that one cannot express any true proposition about it.
It may be said that, by claiming something to be unknowable, one does not mean that none of its properties are known, or that no proposition can be expressed about it. It may be claimed that a thing is unknowable to us if we cannot specify any of its *real* properties. Bolzano refutes this claim as follows: the property 'A' by which we comprehend a thing, is a real property of that thing, because the features of that thing are such as belong only to things which are subsumable under 'A.' For instance, colour belongs to the properties of a star. Somebody could claim that it is not a real property, because only physical properties (mass, density, heath) are real. If nothing else than the colour were known of a star, it would then be unknown, and might remain unknowable as to its real properties. Bolzano's argument means that the claim "All stars whose properties other than colour cannot be known are unknowable to us" is self-refuting. If we identify a distant star by virtue of its colour (e.g., Vega as being blue), then that colour is a genuine feature of the star, because it belongs only to those things which have the same colour. Accordingly, the property "stars whose properties other than colour cannot be known" (A) *fails to characterize* something genuinely unknowable.

A further claim would be to say that an unknowable thing is unknowable due to such real properties which are not subsumable under 'A.' This claim may be expressed as follows: All such properties ('X') as do not belong to the property 'A,' by which we characterize the ' A'-things, are unknowable to us. No truths of the form 'All A's are X' are knowable to us, to the extent that 'X' is not included in the content of 'A.'(17)
Thus, the adjectives of our language might in principle fail to attain the richness of the properties characteristic of things in the world, and we would be unable to acquire knowledge of all objective properties. Admittedly, says Bolzano, there may be properties of things which are not included in our designations. But then the truth of a proposition concerning these properties should be proved on the basis of the special character of these designations. Can such a special character of designations be known? If it can be known, then it is a contradiction to maintain that it is unknowable.(18) On the other hand, if one does not come to know those properties which are not included in the content of 'A,' then one has no reason to assume their existence.(19) For instance, there is no reason to assume that there may be colours outside the reach of our colour-words.
Bolzano applies the above considerations to a criticism of Kant's hypothesis that there are things in themselves which are in principle unknowable. According to him, that hypothesis is self-contradictory: the proposition that insensible things cannot be the contents of our synthetic judgments *is itself a synthetic judgment* about them.(20) Bolzano also criticizes Kant's distinction between sensible and insensible objects, because he thinks that it is in some respects misleading.(21) Furthermore, he criticizes Kant's antimonies. According to Bolzano, the proofs which Kant presented for the theses and antitheses contain many errors.(22)
The third possibility of showing that knowledge has absolute limits is not self-refuting, as the other two are in Bolzano's analysis. This possibility is based, like the first one, on extensional considerations. The main idea is to *suggest candidates* — propositions the truth or falsity of which can never be discovered. Bolzano's objection to this procedure is that it is *difficult to prove* statements concerning unknowability. The fact

that we have up to now been unable to decide whether the property ‘B’ belongs or does not belong to the things of class ‘A’ does not entitle us to conclude that we will never have any reason for such a decision. In order to make the difficulty clearer, Bolzano studies two different possibilities: the connexion between the concepts ‘A’ and ‘B’ may be
(i) purely conceptual, or
(ii) empirical.
In the first case, the history of mathematics can teach us about many questions which could not be decided for centuries but in the end were decided by suitable means. Nobody can be sure that a conceptual connexion not yet known cannot be discovered by the painstaking analysis of the concepts involved and their comparison not only with each other but also with related concepts.(23) In so far as empirical questions are concerned, nobody can anticipate the rich possibilities of future experience. Bolzano’s example is an especially happy one: it is not known what the moon’s inhabitants look like (the *Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1837). A modem example would be the question whether there are intelligent beings in other planetary systems. According to Bolzano, all possible “proofs” of unknowability are in fact based on a questionable argument from the limitations of the present state of knowledge to an unsurpassable limitation. (24)
Bolzano then considers a possible objection: because his analysis results in the impossibility of giving a limitation of our ability to know, this result itself seems to be a kind of limitation of this ability. His answer to the objection is the following: he does not maintain that it will never be possible to set a limit to knowability — only that he does not himself know of such a limit. Furthermore, the result that it is impossible to differentiate knowability from unknowability can be considered as an indication of a truth concealed for ever *only under the presupposition* that there really *is* an absolute limit of knowledge. Bolzano does not subscribe to this presupposition; he thinks rather that we cannot draw the limit between knowability and unknowability simply because there *is no such limit*. Human knowledge can be enriched ad *infinitum*.(25)" (pp. 103-106)

Notes

(11) Hartmann knew Bolzano's theories of sentences in themselves and truths in themselves, and eagerly accepted them; cf. *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, p. 25 and "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," *Kleine Schriften* I, p. 134. Cf. also J. N. Mohanty *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead. A Study in recent Platonism* (1957), p. 42: "Bolzano's doctrine of 'Satz an sich' is accepted with admiration ..." (Mohanty points to *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* p. 25).

(12) B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 314, p. 232.
(13) *Ibid.*, pp. 233 ff.
(14) *Ibid.*, pp. 234 ff. The expressions "enumerate" and "indicate" have been used by J. Berg *Bolzano's Logic* (1962), p. 70.
(15) B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 314, p. 234: "Wenn wir die Grenzen, die unser eigenes oder die das Erkenntnisvermogen der ganzen Menschheit hat, zu bestimmen suchen: so leuchtet ein, dies konne nicht dadurch geschehen, daB wir die Wahrheiten, die fur uns Einzelne oder fur alle Menschen unerreichbar sind, namentlich angeben; denn um dieB zu vermogen, miiBten sie uns nicht unbekannt, sondem bekannt seyn."
(16) Cf. the reconstruction of Bolzano's argument by A. Wedberg *Filosofins historia III. Fran Bolzano till Wittgenstein* (1966), p. 96. [English translation: *A History of Philosophy: From Bolzano to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984]
Cf. also a similar reconstruction by J. Berg (1962), p. 70.
(17) Cf. A. Wedberg (1966), p. 96; J. Berg (1962), p. 70.
(18) B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 314, p. 236.
(19) *Ibid.*: "Ich nun fur meinen Theil gestehe, von einer solchen Eigenthiimlichkeit gewisser Vorstellungen keine KenntniB zu haben."
(20 B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 315, p. 247 f.
(21) *Ibid.*, pp. 246 ff.
(22) *Ibid.*, pp. 250 ff.
(23) B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 314, p. 237. Cf. D. Hilbert (1965), p. 298: "[I]n der Mathematik gibt es kein

Ignorabimus!”
(24) B. Bolzano, *Wissenchaftslehre* III, § 314, pp. 236 ff.
(25) *Ibid.*, p. 238.

From: Arto Sitonen, *Problems of Aporetics*, Helsinki: Suomlainen Tiedeakademia 1989.

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1. Morscher, Edgar. 2008. *Bernard Bolzano's Life and Work*. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag.
   Table of contents: Preface 9; Introduction 13; 1. Bolzano's life and scientific career 17; 2. Bolzano's removal from Office and the "Bolzano Trial" 23; 3. A short survey of Bolzano's work 29; 4. Logic 33; 5. Epistemology and philosophy of science 75; 6. Ethics 89; 7. Aesthetics 107; 8. Political and social philosophy 113; 9. Philosophy of religion and theology 125; 10. Metaphysics 135; 11. Philosophy of nature and of physics 139; 12. Philosophy of mathematics 141; 13. Metaphilosophy and history of philosophy 149; 14. The so-called Bolzano Circle and Bolzano's influence on the development of the sciences and on intellectual history 151; Appendix: A formal reconstruction of Bolzano's method of idea-variation and of his definitions of logical truth and of logical consequence 159; Bibliography 169; Index of names 207.
   "Despite the enormous increase of interest in Bolzano's philosophy during the last decades, an up-to-date monograph on Bolzano's philosophy is still a desideratum. The last book that might be called a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy dates from almost 100 years ago; it is Shmuel Hugo Bergmann's *Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos* (Halle/S. 1909), written in the spirit of

the Brentano school, in particular of Bergmann's teacher Anton Marty.
When I was invited by the Editors of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* to contribute the entry on Bernard Bolzano, I took it as a challenge for starting my long-standing plan to write a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy. The present book is, to be clear, merely the first step toward this end. In this respect I can benefit from the generous copyright regulations of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy which allow the entries to appear also in print. The author welcomes any kind of comments and criticism to the present printed version of the Internet article in order to take them into consideration in his projected monograph on Bolzano's philosophy.
(...)
I dedicate this book to the greatest and most meritorious Bolzano scholar ever, Jan Berg, without whom Bernard Bolzano would not be seen as the outstanding philosopher as we now know him to be." (From the Preface)

2. Rusnock, Paul, and Šebestik, Jan. 2019. *Bernard Bolzano: His Life and Work*. New York: Oxford University Press.
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"In the English-speaking world, Bolzano is best known for his work in logic and mathematics. There are certainly things of great importance and beauty in these parts of his work. We have already written, each of us, on these matters, and will have more to say about them in this book. But a faithful portrait of Bolzano cannot limit itself to this, for until he was 40 years old, he was only able to pursue these subjects in his spare time. With his considerable gifts in these non-controversial areas, he certainly might have led a

distinguished life of speculation as a mathematician or philosopher. Instead he chose quite deliberately to plunge into the turbulent political life of his homeland, applying his formidable intelligence, energy, and determination to the reform of his society and its institutions. It is here that we shall begin." (p. 3)

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"Introduction
Bernard Bolzano's (b. 1781-d. 1848) originality and numerous anticipatory insights have deserved him a unique position in the history of philosophy. While scholarship trudged for more than a hundred years after his death, in the second half of the 20th century, Bolzano emerged at once as the most significant logician between Leibniz and Frege, one of Kant's most scrupulous and formidable critics, and what may have been one of the greatest single influences on Brentano's students, in particular Twardowski and Husserl, beside Brentano himself. For a variety of reasons—e.g. methodological and thematic proximity—analytic philosophers have found in Bolzano a congenial interlocutor. As a result, most commentaries and discussions tend to focus on aspects of Bolzano's views on logic and its philosophy, in particular his treatment of questions relating to analyticity, deducibility, and grounding in his *opus magnum*, the *Theory of Science* (1837). But the wealth of ideas we find throughout his work is far from exhausted. Because Bolzano research is young, there still subsist substantial gaps in the literature. More importantly, perhaps, there is ample space for reassessments of standard interpretations. The present bibliography is designed so as to both provide interested researchers and prospective scholars with a sense of those issues that constitute the

poles of current discussions and leave room for ulterior updates."

Studies on Bolzano's Logic and Ontology

Abbreviations: WL = Bolzano's Wissenschafslehre (1837)

1. *Bernard Bolzano, 1781-1848 Bicentenary. Impact of Bolzano's Epoch on the Development of Science*. 1982. *Acta Historiae Rerum Naturalium Necnon Technicarum*. Prague: Institute of Czechoslovak and General History CSAS Proceedings of the Bernard Bolzano's Bicentenary Conference, Prague, September 7-12, 1981.
   Contents: (only the contributions on Bolzano are cited): Zdenèk Ceska: B. Bolzano and the Charles University 3-8; Lubos Novy: Bolzano's contribution to science and society 9-23; Günter Kröber: Bernard Bolzano und das Problem des Wissenschfatlich-technischen und sozialen Fortschrittes 103-128; Jan Janko: Veränderungen der Naturgeschichte und ihre Differenziation in der I. Hälfte des 19. Jahrunderts 129-154; Joseph W. Dauben: Progress of mathematics in the early 19th century: Context, contents and consequences 223-260; Jan Berg: 415-425; Karel Berka: B. Bolzano's philosophy of science 427-442; Jonathan Cohen: Bolzano's theory of induction 443-457; Helmut Metlzer: Bernard Bolzano Beitrag zum Gestaltwandel der Logik 479-489.
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   II. Basic Questions of Logic and Semantics.
   Jan Berg: Bolzano and Situation Semantics: Variations on a Theme of Variation 373-377; Peter Simons: Bolzano, Tarski, and the Limits of Logic 378-405;
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IV: Probability, Induction and Syllogistic.
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V. Contributions on Bolzano's Metaphysics.
Rolf George: Bolzano on Time 452-468.

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Contents: Preface; VI; Dagfin Føllesdal: Bolzano's Legacy 1; Jan Berg: Bolzano, the Prescient Encyclopedist 13; Jan Šebestik: Bolzano, Exner and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy 33; Paul Rusnock: Bolzano and the Traditions of Analysis 61; Peter Simons: Bolzano on Collections 87; Ali Behboud: Remarks on Bolzano's Collections 109: Mark Siebel: Variation, Derivability and Necessity 117; Edgar Morscher: Bolzano's Method of Variation: Three Puzzles 139; Rolf George: Bolzano's Programme and Abstract Objects 167; Mark Textor: Bolzano's Sententialism 181; Wolfgang Künne: Propositions in Bolzano and Frege 203: Michael Dummett: Comments on Wolfgang Künne's Paper

241; Carsten Uwe Gieske: Bolzano's Notion of Testifying 249-266.
"From January 3rd to January 5th 1997 the international symposium *Bolzano and Analytical Philosophy* took place in Hamburg.
(---)
Michael Dummett once called Bernard Bolzano the "great-grandfather of analytical philosophy".[*] The aim of the symposium was to explore whether Bolzano's analytical great-grandchildren can still learn from their Bohemian ancestor. We hope the symposium will stimulate further systematic and exegetical research in thisarea." (from the *Preface*)
[*] Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press 1993, p. 171.

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7. Adair-Toteff, Christopher. 2002. "Bolzano's *Gesamtausgabe*." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 10:127-133

"Shortly after Bolzano's death there was an attempt to collect his works as a *Gesamtausgabe*, but there was little interest. Another attempt was made to honour the sixtieth anniversary of his death in 1908 but that also failed.
The *Wissenschaftslehre* was republished in four volumes in the early 1930s, but it was not until the late 1960s that a number of international Bolzano scholars succeeded in planning the Bernard Bolzano *Gesamtausgabe*. The first of a projected 100+ volumes appeared in 1969 – an introductory book that was a biography. The *Gesamtausgabe* is composed of four series:
I Writings (*Schriften*);
II Posthumous writings (*Nachlaß*);
III Correspondence (*Briefwechsel*);
IV Documents (*Dokumente*)." (p. 128)
(...)
"Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* was published in four volumes in Germany in 1837. It consists of five Books: Theory of Fundamentals, Theory of Elements, Theory of Knowledge, Heuretic, and Theory of Science Proper.
In the first book Bolzano defines *Wissenschaftslehre* as the attempt to provide an account of science in general. Its function is not to discuss any individual sciences but rather to determine the rules by which all truths can be determined to belong to the individual sciences. He acknowledges that he is using science and doctrine in slightly unusual terms but insists that his account is superior to either Fichte's or Hegel's. Bolzano maintains that Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* offers a mistaken attempt to provide a doctrine of knowledge in general. Bolzano does admit that he does not really understand Fichte's philosophy. Bolzano also admits to a similar lack of comprehension of Schelling and Hegel.
Bolzano uses a number of technical terms. One is a 'proposition in itself' (*Satz an sich*) which he takes to be an assertion that something is or is not the case. A proposition in itself need not be uttered or even thought. In a similar vein Bolzano speaks of 'truth in itself' (*Wahrheit an sich*) or 'objective truth' that does not have real existence in contrast to recognized truths that do exist. And, there are

‘representations in themselves’ (*Vorstellungen an sich*). Examples of ideas in themselves would be ‘Caius’ and ‘wisdom’ in the proposition ‘Caius has wisdom’. Representations in themselves have neither truth nor existence. Much in the first three books appears to be an attack on Kantian philosophy – he has no use for Kant’s psychology and his *Ding an sich*. But, these books are not simply negative. He claims to have shown that there are truths and that we can recognize them and he sets out the conditions under which we can recognize them." (p. 129)

8. Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1950. "Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions." *Methodos*:32-55
   Published also in *Theoria* 16, 1950, pp. 91-117.
   Reprinted in: Y. Bar-Hillel, *Aspects of language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press - The Hebrew University, 1970, pp. 3-28.
   "In view of recent discussions on the nature of analytic truth, it should be rather interesting to inquire into the treatment which this subject received by the most outstanding logician of the first half of the 19th century, the Austrian philosopher, theologician, and: physicist Bernard Bolzano.
   Our investigation will turn upon section 148 of Bolzano's four volumed masterwork *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837). Only occasionally shall we need to refer to other parts of this work. This section, headed "Analytic or Synthetic Propositions", comprises pages 83-89 of the second volume and is divided into three subsections of less than two pages altogether, followed by four annotations, filling the next five pages. I dwell so long upon these bibliographical particulars only to bring into full light the wealth of systematic and historic material contained in these few pages.
   1. Pre-History.
   Bolzano's aim, in § 148, was to define a concept which could serve as an adequate explication for what is now commonly termed 'logical truth'. Though this aim is nowhere explicitly stated, there can be no doubt about it, just as Kant before

him and many logicians after him doubtless aimed at the same target when they proposed their respective definitions. Bolzano devotes the greater part of his fourth annotation the discussion of many such attempts made by his predecessors and contemporaries. He mentions *Aristotle, Locke, Crusius* (the German logician of the first half of the 18th century who was probably the first to use the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' in their Kantian senses), Kant and many other minor philosophers. He easily succeeds in proving the inadequateness of Kant's two definitions for analytic', the one given in his *Logik* and equating, in effect, Analytic (1) with Identical, the other much better known in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, where he proposes to call propositions 'analytic', whose predicate-concept is contained (perhaps in a hidden manner) in the subject-notion. Bolzano points out (p. 87) the vagueness of the term 'contained' and argues that, according to a quite natural interpretation of this term, the proposition « The father of Alexander, King of Macedonia, was King of Macedonia » ought to be analytic, a consequence which Kant certainly did not intend to be drawn.
But to even more refined versions of Kant's definition, given by some of his followers, replacing the vague 'contained' by more concise terms, such as those making use of 'essential characteristics', Bolzano objects that only one type of proposition conforms to them, namely 'A (which is B) is B'. But should not, continues Bolzano, also propositions of the type 'Every object is either B or non-B' be counted among the analytic propositions?
Having thus convinced himself of the inadequateness of all prior approaches, he started to attack the subject along a new and highly original line." (pp. 3-4 of the reprint).

9. ———. 1952. "Bolzano's Propositional Logic." *Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung* no. 1:65-98
Reprinted in: Y. Bar-Hillel, *Aspects of language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press - The Hebrew University, 1970, pp. 33-68.

"1848 is a remarkable year not only in general history; in the history of human culture and thought it will be remembered also as the birth year of *G. Frege*, "the greatest logician of the 19th century",(2) and should be remembered as the year in which the death of the greatest logician between Leibniz and Frege, the Czech Bernard Bolzano, occurred. So far, little has been done to evaluate his important contributions to logical theory,(3) and I hope that the present article will help to undo this undeserved wrong.

The purpose of this article is very restricted: only a small part of Bolzano's investigations will be dealt with, i.e. his propositional logic, and even this in a limited degree. This theory is in my opinion not only a master-work of outstanding historical interest, I also believe that it contains many features neglected even by modern symbolic logic and nevertheless worthy of close study. I am convinced that such a study will considerably enrich our logical technique and terminology.

Since our principal aim is to emphasize the impact which Bolzano's ideas should have on contemporary logic, I shall allow myself to depart, sometimes considerably, from his original account and even to disregard parts of his theory unacceptable to us which do not play any decisive role in its construction, all this, of course, after due warning shall have been given.

I shall summarize the contents of §§147, 154-160 of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), with which alone this study is concerned, in 28 definitions and 95 theorems. Most of these theorems will not be proved, for the sake of brevity, but the reader will, in general, be able to supplement the proofs by himself. Many definitions and a few theorems will be illustrated by simple examples. Major departures from Bolzano's original account will be specially mentioned and justified.

In the second part of the study I shall outline the place of Bolzano's contribution within the framework of modern semantics, by its detailed comparison with the corresponding parts of R. Carnap's two volumes of Studies in Semantics. This comparison will give us a certain

perspective on the bearing of Bolzano's highly original innovations for modern research, and on the other hand enable us to see clearly the precise nature of some of his shortcomings." (pp. 33-34)
(1) This article has been written as an outcome of conversations with Professor Hugo Bergman of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and a joint reading of the relevant passages of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*. It is to Professor Bergman that I owe the general ideas on which this paper is based.
(2) According to A. Tarski, *Introduction to Logic*, 1941, p. 19.
(3) The following is a list of the most important articles dealing mainly with Bolzano's contributions to logic which have appeared in the last two decades:
W. Dubislav Bolzano as Vorlaufer der mathematischen Logik", Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, vol. 44 (1931), pp. 448-456.
H. Scholz, "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos", Semesterberichte, 9. Semester, 1936/37, pp. 1-53.
H. Scholz, "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos", Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule, n. s. vol. 6 (1937), pp. 399-472.
H. R. Smart, "Bolzano's Logic", The Philosophical Review, vol. 53 (1944), pp. 513-533.
I have not been able to get hold of Scholz's second article, but since it is, according to the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, only a somewhat broader version of his first article, the loss is probably not too great. My quotations from Scholz will therefore refer always to his first article.

10. ———. 2006. "Bolzano, Bernard." In *Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second edition. Vol. 1*, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 646-648. New York: Thomson Gale
First edition 1967.
"Bernard Bolzano, a philosopher, theologian, logician, and mathematician, was born in Prague, where his father, an Italian art dealer, had settled; his mother was a German merchant's daughter. Bolzano studied mathematics, philosophy, and theology in Prague and defended his

doctor’s thesis in mathematics in 1804; he was ordained a Roman Catholic priest the following year. Shortly thereafter he was appointed to a temporary professorship in the science of religion at Karlova University in Prague and two years later was given a newly established chair in this field. Some time later he was accused of religious and political heresy and was removed from his teaching position in December 1819. Bolzano spent much of his time thereafter with the family of his friend and benefactor, A. Hoffmann, at their estate in southern Bohemia. He had difficulty getting his later publications through the Metternich censorship. Some of his books were put on the Index, and many appeared only posthumously. Some manuscripts are yet to be published; the most important of these are in the National Museum and the University Library in Prague, others are in the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna. In December 1848, Bolzano died of a respiratory disease from which he had suffered for most of his life." (p. 646)

11. Behboud, Ali. 1997. "Remarks on Bolzano's Collections." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:109-115
"With his "zoology of general kinds of collective entities"[*], Peter Simons has sketched - in a very helpful way - some main alternatives for possible interpretations of Bolzano's collections. As he pointed out, we may not have more thanjust a best fit - and, in fact, he proposes that Bolzano' s account is "a distinct and distinctive theory of collections". I do agree with Simons that there are many difficulties we have to face when we try to fit Bolzano' s account into one of our theories. Also, ignoring the considerable historical interest for the moment, the price the technical inconveniences as weIl as the conceptual complexities which such a fit might require in the end could be too high to be of any practical interest. Nevertheless, I would like to try my luck for a best fit. (1)" (p. 105)
(1) Simons is clearly right that Bolzano does not develop a systematic theory of collections. However, collections play a fundamental role for Bolzano (even beyond his mathematical theories), since anything whatsoever is either

a collection or an "atom" (*einfach*). So it is no surprise thatthe notion of a collection is almost ubiquitous in Bolzano's works.
[*] P. Simons, *Bolzano on Collections*, (1997), p. 87.

12. Bellomo, Anna, and Massas, Guillaume. 2021. "Bolzanos' Mathematical Infinite." *The Review of Symbolic Logic*:1-55
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part–whole principle, according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano's mature theory of the infinite and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano's infinite sums can be equipped with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring, and that Bolzano's views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent."
13. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2002. "Husserl and Bolzano." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 98-100. Dordecht: Kluwer
"Bolzano's influence on Husserl has recently come to be appreciated at its true worth. It is actually an extremely important one.
Husserl recalls that he attended a lecture given by Brentano on *The Paradoxes of the Infinite*. But he mayalso have heard of Bolzano from his mathematics professor Karl Weierstrass. Papers written by the Brentanist Benno Kerry (*Ueber Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung* 1885-1891) also had a certain bearing on Husserl's knowledge of Bolzano. The insightful discussion of the Bolzanian thesis of "representations without object" to be found in Twardowski's book *On Content and Object of Presentations* succeeded in interesting Brentano's pupil in that author definitively.
The psychological point of view adopted by Husserl in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* does seem to be very far removed

from that of Bolzano. However, on the other hand, Husserl's break with psychologism, which took place during the years 1894-1896, appears to have had a direct bearing on Husserl's better acquaintance with Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* during that period. We now know that in 1896 Husserl gave a course which was not, as is commonly believed, a draft of the *Prolegomena*, but was rather a survey of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*. [*]
What really matters is that the break with Brentanian psychologism was indeed a Bolzanian move. Such a move allows us to speak of a "Bolzanian tum" in Husserl's thought, taking place around 1896. From that point of view, Husserl's thought, "phenomenology", may and must be understood as a (quite strange) kind of compromise between Brentanian descriptive psychology and Bolzanian propositionalism." (p. 98)
[*] E, Husserl, *Logik. Vorlesung 1896*, edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann, Dordrecht: Springer 2001.

14. Benthem, Johan van. 1984. *Lessons from Bolzano*. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Leland Stanford Junior University
"Bernard Bolzano's contributions to logic, largely unnoticed in the 19th century, have been receiving ever more attention from modern logicians (cf. Scholz, 1937; Berg, 1962; Corcoran, 1975). As a result, it has already become something of a commonplace to credit Bolzano with the discovery of the notion of logical consequence in the semantic sense. Now, this particular attribution, whether justified or not, would at best establish a historical link between modern logical concerns and Bolzano's work. The purpose of the present note, however, is to bring out three important aspects of that work that are still of contemporary systematic interest. No detailed textual study of Bolzano is needed to substantiate our suggestions. We shall refer to well-documented 'public' aspects of the 'Wissenschaftslehre' (Bolzano, 1837), pointing out their more general logical significance." (p. 1).
References

Jan Berg, *Bolzanos's Logic*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1962.
John Corcoran, "Meanings of Implication." *Diálogos*, 9, pp. 59-76, 1975.
Heinrich Scholz, "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzano's: Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung." *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule*, 6, pp- 399-472, 1937.

15. ———. 1985. "The Variety of Consequence, According to Bolzano." *Studia Logica* no. 44:389-403
Abstract: "Contemporary historians of logic tend to credit Bernard Bolzano with the invention of the semantic notion of consequence, a full century before Tarski. Nevertheless, Bolzano's work played no significant role in the genesis of modern logical semantics. The purpose of this paper is to point out three highly original, and still quite revelant themes in Bolzano's work, being a systematic study of possible types of inference, of consistency, as well as their meta-theory. There are certain analogies with Tarski's concerns here, although the main thrust seems to be different, both philosophically and technically. thus, if only obliquely, we also provide some additional historical perspective on Tarski's achievement."
16. ———. 2003. "Is There Still Logic in Bolzano's Key?" In *Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 11-34. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag
"Bolzano is widely seen as the philosopher of abstract propositions, far removed from psychological blemishes. Nevertheless, many themes in this paper suggest links with the actual reasoning performed by non-Platonic humans like us. We saw this with attention to diverse styles of task-dependent reasoning, with degrees of logicality for the expressions of natural language that we actually use, with inferences transferring information across discourse situations, with global architecture of reasoning styles, or with mixtures of such neatly compartmentalized logical activities as semantic evaluation and proof. When we take all this seriously, it becomes hard not to go one step further, and do something which Frege has forbidden - but probably

also Bolzano: take the psychological facts seriously. All the above topics border on cognitive science and the experimental study of human reasoning, and the eventual agenda of modem logic will also have to come to better terms with that than the by now pretty stale slogan of 'anti-psychologism'.
Conclusions.
We have surveyed some aspects of Bolzano's logic from a modern standpoint, stressing in particular his different styles of consequence, the essential ternary nature of consequence when language is taken into account, and the mixed notion of consequence in a model. In all three cases we included some new technical observations to show that the issues are still alive. But the more general thrust is this. Bolzano's work remains interesting for logic today, both in its general sweep, and in some of its details. Partly, it is attractive precisely because it is so non-mainstream, and hence valuable for modern agenda discussions. Its themes crossing logic and philosophy of science reflect current rapprochements, while its thrust also seems to fit with some themes from AI. Classical mathematical logic has had an Austrian icon in Kurt Gödel: modem logic might consider at least having a Czech-Austrian patron saint." (pp. 30-31).

17. ———. 2013. "Bernard Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*." *Topoi* no. 32:301-303
"In this review, I will focus on Mr. Bolzano's thoughts about logic, even though he offers much more than that to readers interested in theory of science and general philosophy. Modern logic has become more and more technical, cutting itself loose from its broader origins as the study of reasoning, and philosophers of logic slavishly play up to this trend by devising ever more arcane criteria of 'logicality' that apply only to a small elite of 'logical constants', making it harder and harder for new themes to enter the field. Refreshingly, Mr. Bolzano does none of this. He resolutely ignores received wisdom in logic textbooks, and deftly avoids entanglement in the scholasticism of our modern age. Instead, he just goes back to what logic is about, and rethinks it afresh." (p. 301)

18. Berg, Jan. 1962. *Bolzano's Logic*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell
Contents: Preface 5; Introduction 7; Abbreviations 12; I. Bolzano's life and work 13; II. A logical frame 33; III. Bolzano's fundamental notions 41; IV. Bolzano's logic of variation 92; V. Other logical theories 146; VI. Bolzano's logic of entailment 151; VII. Bolzano's philosophy of mathematics 165; Bibliography 179; Index of proper names 213-214.
"Bernard Bolzano made essential contributions to, *inter alia*, theology, logic, and mathematics. For political reasons, however, he was prevented from influencing to a full extent the age in which he lived. As a mathematician his name has survived, although many of his most remarkable results were not published until a century after their conception. As a logician he has begun to appear again in scattered articles and comments. In this study I have tried to give an exposition and evaluation of the main ideas of his logic from a modern viewpoint.
Important parts of Bolzano's theories of logic and semantics were new with him, and when these ideas reappear later they were independent of him. This position, in part outside of the historical development, makes it highly pertinent to compare Bolzano's theories directly with modern logic. When tracing the lineage of some of Bolzano's ideas I have even projected the earlier theories onto a modern scheme of reference.
In the first chapter I shall briefly mention the genesis of Bolzano's main works. But I am not primarily interested in the genetic aspect of Bolzano's theories. Therefore, as often as possible I shall consider Bolzano's various formulations of his ideas as if they were parts of a simultaneous whole. My analysis of Bolzano's achievements in logic, semantics, and mathematical philosophy is based on his mature production after 1820, when he started writing his *magnum opus*, the *Wissenschaftslehre*. The works chiefly consulted are:
(1) *Wissenschaftslehre*, I-IV (Bolzano (15) mostly abbreviated "WL"). [Names followed by parenthesized

numerals refer to the bibliography; see the last paragraph of this introduction.]
(2) *Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano's mit F. Exner* (Bolzano (54), "BE").
(3) *Erste Begriffe der allgemeinen Grössenlehre* (Bolzano (78), "AG").
(4) *Reine Zahlenlehre. Erster Abschnitt. Von dem Begriffe, den allgemeinsten Beschaffenheiten und der Bezeichnungsart der Zahlen* (Bolzano (79), "RZ").
(5) *Unendliche Grössenbegriffe* (Bolzano (81), "UG").
(6) *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre und Religionswissenschaft in einer beurtheilenden Uebersicht* (Bolzano (z5), "WU").
(7) *Einleitung zur Grössenlehre* (Bolzano (83), "EG").
(8) *Paradoxien des Unendlichen* (Bolzano (45), "PU").
For (3)-(5) and (7) I have utilized Bolzano's unpublished manuscripts. In general I have presupposed that some editions of (1), (2), and (8) are accessible to the reader.
Chapter I presents in a concentrated form some biographical and bibliographical facts about Bolzano. The manuscripts used are described and dated. Some topics lying outside of logic proper and dealt with in published or unpublished works of Bolzano are also touched upon. The most representative portraits of Bolzano - one of which has not been published before - are reproduced.
Chapter II describes the logical machinery to be used in the formalization and the comparative analysis of Bolzano's logic. This chapter may be read cursorily and used as future occasion may require. The system expounds the so-called elementary logic, i.e., classical predicate logic of first order with identity. In view of its simplicity and non-controversial character, elementary logic seems at present to be an expedient object for comparison in research in the history of logic. To be sure, we know nothing for certain about the future of logic; maybe the logics of tomorrow will differ greatly from those of today. However, it is likely that our elementary logic will be translatable into or representable within these conceivable new systems. But there is always the possibility that new systems of logic will promote a

deeper understanding of certain features of the objects analysed.
Chapters III-VII expound those aspects of Bolzano's theories of logic, semantics, and mathematical philosophy which seem to me fundamental. Certain sections of these chapters are subdivided into two parts; part A describes Bolzano's ideas and part B offers commentaries on A. In order to shorten the exposition, definitions and arguments are sometimes formalized even in A, and sometimes auxiliary notions not found in Bolzano are introduced with explicit caution. In doing so I have always attempted to stay within or very close to Bolzano's sphere of ideas. This does not mean, of course, that I have always followed the order in which Bolzano presents his definitions and theories in the *Wissenschaftslehre* or elsewhere. Nor have I stinted myself at times in giving very free paraphrases of Bolzano's mode of expression. In proving theorems I try to reproduce Bolzano's line of thought without copying his manner of speaking. In part B, Bolzano's logic is compared with modern theories. I attempt to show how certain gaps could be filled in and how Bolzano's theories could be elaborated and made more precise. Moreover, under B some forerunners of Bolzano and selected parts of the modern literature concerning him are discussed.
In the annotated bibliography, part A embraces the literature on Bolzano and his own works. References to part A are given by names followed by numerals within parenthesis. References to part B of the bibliography are effected by placing a "B" after the parenthesized numerals. In references to manuscripts, folio numbers are qualified by "r" and "v", meaning, as usual, recto and verso respectively." (*Introduction*).

19. ———. 1966. "Bolzano's Notion of Proposition." In *Ost und West in der Geschichte des Denkens und der kulturellen Beziehungen. Festschrift für Eduard Winter zum 70. Geburtstag. Mit einem Geleitwort von A.P. Juskevic*, edited by Steinitz, Wolfgang, 519-526. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
20. ———. 1967. "What Is a Proposition?" *Logique et Analyse* no. 39/40:293-306

"Certain theories of modern logic have the purpose of defining interesting classes of linguistic expressions, such as the set of sentences of a language, or relations between expressions, such as derivability among formulas. Other theories aim at describing semantic relations between linguistic expressions and nonlinguistic objects, such as the relation of being the meaning of an expression. Yet a third kind of theories may give a direct analysis of non-linguistic objects which could stand in semantic relations to linguistic expressions.
This paper first propounds and discusses certain constructions of the second kind and then attempts an explication of the third kind of the notion of non-linguistic proposition. However, only a limited class of propositions (called "elementary propositions") will be explained, viz., propositions corresponding to the sentences of a language of elementary logic. Admittedly, this explication will have merely a remote connection with the problems of ordinary language. On the other hand, a tradition of logical semantics has accumulated since the 19th century dealing with technical and more or less formalized languages, and it may be worth while to attempt a solution of some problems encountered in such studies.
In writing this paper I have profited from comments and criticism of Professor A. Wedberg, University of Stockholm." (p. 293)

21. ———. 1972. "Bolzano's Theory of an Ideal Language." In *Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia*, edited by Paul, Anthony, Olson, Raymond and Wright, Georg Henrik von, 405-415. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press
"In his logical inquiries Bolzano employed a partly formalized language embracing an ordinary language extended by constants, variables, and certain technical expressions. In the second volume of the Wissenschaftslehre he investigated the relations of this semiformalized philosophical language to colloquial language (WL, sections 127-46, 169 84). He believed that all sentences of colloquial language were 'reducible' to sentences of certain canonical forms expressed in the philosophical language. These

canonical sentences were said to mirror their corresponding propositions in the sharpest way.
Had Bolzano's theory of reduction been completely developed it might have resulted in the construction of an ideal language for philosophical analysis. In this ideal language, however, sentences of canonical form would not play quite the same role as the atomic sentence forms on the basis of which more complex forms are built up in modern quantification theory. It seems, on the contrary, that Bolzano intended even the most complicated sentences to have canonical forms or to be reducible to sentences having such form.
This paper attempts a reconstruction of an extensional Bolzanian ideal language on the level of elementary logic. After some preliminary explanations of fundamental notions in Bolzano's logic, the main points of his theory of reduction of sentences are described. Two principles that determine the construction of an elementary Bolzanian ideal language emerge from the exposition. We then move toward building such a language and begin by modifying the standard representation of elementary logic, replacing the universal and existential quantifiers by Hilbert's e-operator. By further modifications of both the syntax and the underlying semantics, a logical language satisfying the two principles is obtained." (pp. 405-406)

22. ———. 1977. "Bolzano's Contribution to Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics." In *Logic Colloquium '76*, edited by Gandy, Robin O. and Hyland, John Martin, 147-171. Amsterdam: North-Holland
"The *Wissenschaftslehre* was intended merely as a prelude to Bolzano's work on mathematics. His main ambition was to recreate the whole body of contemporary mathematics in accordance with the vision of an abstract hierarchy of true propositions. For Bolzano this task implied the creation of entirely new foundations for certain branches of mathematics, as may be seen from his highly interesting efforts directed toward basing geometry on topological concepts.

In carrying out this program, most of the means of expression of modern quantification theory were in essence available to Bolzano.
He came very close to modern notions of satisfaction, logical truth, consistency and logical consequence. On the other hand, the formal deductive machinery of quantification theory is practically non-existent in Bolzano's works. This syntactic machinery appears only in Frege, who created the first strictly logistical system at the end of the 19th century. Bolzano's lack of interest in developing particular logical calculi most probably stems from his aspects of logic and mathematics and of science in general.
The notion of calculus in the modern logistical sense was first clearly considered by Leibniz. His basic dream was of an effectively decidable, interpreted calculus embracing all "eternal" truth. Bolzano was justifiably critical of this overambitious program and presented instead his own theory of the *Abfolge* structure of nonlinguistic propositions, thereby taking his stand away from that line of development in logic which leads to modern syntactic concept formation. A reason for Bolzano's general lack of interest in questions of logical syntax was no doubt his profoundly intensional, non-linguistic approach to logic.
Bolzano's central thesis, that there are abstract objects which differ from both mental occurrences and all kinds of linguistic expressions, has been advocated by later philosophers of the German-speaking countries, inter alia by Lotze, Brentano in his earlier period, Meinong and Frege. Lotze and Frege never refer to Bolzano's work, though, and the others protested their independence of Bolzano. Husserl admits that he received vital influences from Bolzano, but his notions of "ideal" objects derive from Lotze's and not from Bolzano's logic.
Among the great Western philosophers Bolzano is perhaps the least influential. In epistemology, logic and mathematics his most fervent disciples were not able to propagate his ideas with sufficient vigor.
His keen criticism of German idealistic philosophy and his important discoveries in logic: semantics and mathematical

philosophy silently died away.
A contributing cause of Bolzano's lack of influence on the development of the philosophical disciplines was, of course, the fact that most of his works were, for political reasons, published anonymously in editions not easily accessible. Furthermore, an immense number of unpublished manuscripts in a partly almost indecipherable handwriting is to be found in archives in Prague and Vienna. Several unfruitful attempts have been made in the last 150 years to bring out more or less complete editions of Bolzano's works. It is to be hoped that the latest venture launched in Stuttgart, West Germany, will prove more successful." (pp. 170-171)

23. ———. 1982. "A Requirement for the Logical Basis of Scientific Theories Implied by Bolzano's Logic of Variation." *Acta Historiae Rerum Naturalium Necnon Technicarum* no. 12:415-425
Bernardo Bolzano (1781-1848) - Bicentenary. Impact of Bolzano's epoch on development of Science - Conference papers, Prague 7-13 September 1981.

24. ———. 1986. "A Logic of Terms with an Existence Operator." In *Logic and Abstraction. Essays Dedicated to Per Lindström on his Fifthieth Birthday*, edited by Furberg, Mats, Wetterström, Thomas and Aberg, Claes, 71-94. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis
"1. Introduction
In this paper a language L^* of elementary logic satisfying the following two conditions will be constructed:
(C 1) each expression in L^* consists of an n-ary function symbol **f** applied to n arguments (n > 0);
(C 2) if in L^* **f** is a predicative function symbol, $\mathbf{t_i}$ a term, and J an interpretation for a particular i (1 < i < n) under which $\mathbf{t_i}$ is empty, then $\mathbf{f}(t_1 \cdots t_n$ is false under J.
Here **f** is a predicative function symbol of L^* if **f** under a suitable mapping, corresponds to a predicate of one of the standard versions of elementary logic.
The language L^* differs from standard representations of elementary logic in that it replaces the universal and

existential quantifiers with Hilbert's ε-operator and modifies both the syntax and the underlying semantics accordingly. An elementary logic with a non-trivial existence predicate is in itself interesting, and when combined with a logic of terms can be utilized for research in the history of logic. (Cf. Berg [1972]."

References

J. Berg, Bolzano's theory of an ideal language. R. E. Olson & A. M. Paul (Eds.): *Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia* pp. 405-415 (Baltimore).

25. ———. 1987. "Bolzano and Situation Semantics: Variations on a Theme of Variation." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:373-377

"The distinction between logical and non-logical notions plays a significant role in Bolzano's theory and he is fully aware of its importance even though he has to admit that various scholars may differ in their opinion on what a *logical idea* is (WL § 148.3). Tarski has tried to clarify the distinction between logical and non-logical notions (Adam Tarski, *What are logical notions?* History and Philosophy of Logic, 7, 1986, pp. 143-154). A notion of Euclidean geometry, e.g., is invariant under all similarity transformations, and a topological notion is invariant under all continuous transformations. Analogously, a *logical notion* may be conceived of as a concept which is invariant under all bijective mappings of the domain of individuals onto itself. (In this sense even the classical reduction problem of critical realism can be solved: A physical notion is a concept invariant under a Galilei or a Lorentz transformation.)

It is possible to vary not only the non-logical ideas-as-such contained in propositions but even some or all logical ideas. Actually, such a variation is implied by the algebraic approach to logic. The propositions of Bolzano correspond to the values of the propositional variables of modern logic. (p. 374)

(...)

Bolzano seems to have intended, however, variation exclusively over non-logical ideas-as-such. That he did not

allow a variation of the copula is abundantly clear from his way of introducing the notion of variation in his *Einleitung zur Grossenlehre* (Bolzano (2A7), p. 62). Here he presupposes that only the subject and predicate ideas of a proposition or parts thereof be varied. Furthermore, his proofs of certain variation-logical theorems show that he would not allow a variation of the logical constants of negation, truth, and the copula in the form of an inclusion between ideas-as-such (WL §§ 154.19, 155.21)." (p. 375)

26. ———. 1987. "Is Russell's Antinomy Derivable in Bolzano's Logic?" *Philosophia Naturalis*:406-413
"In his encyclopedic work *Wissenschaftslehre* Bernard Bolzano expounded a theory of logical truth which constitutes an outstanding achievement in the history of Western thought. This informal theory is essentially based on a substitutional truth-value semantics without certain existence presuppositions and contains a general proof theory. In his substitutional semantics Bolzano introduced notions such as universal validity, consistency, consequence, analyticity, and probability by means of the technique of variation of concepts. In his proof theory he treated the notion of entailment, which is a generalization of a special case of the relation of logical consequence, and studied proof trees generated by the relation of entailment which exhibit the objective connection between all true propositions. In view of this wealth of important notions it seems worthwhile to investigate the possibility of a consistent reconstruction of Bolzano's logic. In particular, it must be examined how his theory fares with a fundamental set-theoretic antinomy such as that of Russell." (p. 406)
(...)
"There is, therefore, no such thing as an idea of all ideas which are not objects of themselves, and Bolzano could scarcely be blamed for having no idea of something which does not exist in any sense at all. Under a reasonable interpretation of Bolzano's theory of ideas-as-such there is no trouble-maker around who could generate an antinomy analogous to that of Russell." (p. 411)

27. ———. 1987. "Bolzano on Induction." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:442-446
"Bolzano combined the fundamental notions of his theory of probability and his proof theory to achieve a logical analysis of the principles of induction. The relation between the conclusion and the premisses of an inference of incomplete induction or analogy is an interior probability relation in Bolzano's sense. The principles of induction endow the relation between the premisses and the conclusion with the character of a relation between ground and consequence. From Bolzano's subsumption of the rule of incomplete induction under the syllogistic rule of Barbara, it follows that this relation is a special case of Bolzanian derivability." (p. 442)
28. ———. 1992. *Ontology Without Ultrafilters and Possible Worlds: An Examination of Bolzano's Ontology*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag
Contents: Vorwort der Herausgeber [Edgar Morscher] 7; Einleitung von Edgar Morscher 13;
Jan Berg: Ontology Without Ultrafilters and Possible Worlds 29
Introduction 31; § 1. Collections, sets, and sums 34; § 2. Numbers, infinite sets, and infinitesimals 39; § 3. Ontology without ultrafilters 48; § 4. Ideas, properties, and intuitions 52; § 5. Propositions, sentences, and judgements 64; § 6. Validity, derivability, and entailment 79; § 7. Substances, adherences, and causes 88; § 8. Ontology without possible worlds 91;
List of special symbols 95; References 97-100.
"The first basic notion of Bolzano's ontological system is the part relation. Its domain, i.e., the set of all objects bearing it to something, embraces concrete substances, abstract objects, and collections. The converse domain of the part relation, i.e., the set of all objects to which it is borne, contains collections only.
Some collections are concrete entities existing in space and time, the rest are abstract sums or other sets. Concrete sums are composed of substances and adherences, i.e., forces. Forces applied to certain substances give rise to subjective

ideas or judgements. Further results of such applications are the concrete sentence occurrences. A subjective idea is a part of a judgement which is not itself a judgement. The set of judgements is ordered by a special causal relation. Bolzano's abstract world is constituted of sets, abstract sums, certain attributes (i.e., properties or relations), ideas-as-such, and objects constructed on the basis of these entities. Thus, sentence shapes are a kind of properties, and certain complexes of ideas-as-such constitute propositions. The notion of an idea-as-such can be constructed from expressions of a language by means of axioms for the relation of being an object of something. Analogously, properties can be generated by axioms for the relation of something being applied to an object. The converse of this relation, i.e., the relation of an entity having a property, and the relation of being an object of an idea-as-such are fundamental ontological constants of Bolzano's." (p. 31)
(...)
"The question whether a rational reconstruction of Bolzano's ontology is possible will be sustained like a pedal point throughout the present study. In many respects, indeed, his ontological system is a model of thrift, comprehensiveness, and deductive cogency. He shows us how to grasp a self-contained, abstract "third" world (in Popper's sense) embracing the realms of classical logical truth and additive probability spaces without indulging in possible worlds, states of affairs, facts, and all that. Admittedly, from a modem point of view certain aspects of his ontology may look like Dr. Johnson's dog walking on its hind legs: it is not always done quite well, but you are surprised to find it done at all. To rational bipeds of our time it should be more instructive, though, to watch this performance rather than amazing at metaphysical cephalopods wallowing in clouds of ontological splendors, or gazing at recondite cogitators crawling on all fours through a self-induced verbal fog." (p. 33)

29. ———. 1992. "The Connection Between Bolzano's Logic of Variation and His Theory of Pprobability." In *Bolzano's*

Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop, 107-120. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"In his monumental four-volume work *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837) - in the sequel denoted by 'WL' - Bolzano introduced several new concepts for the analysis of the structure of scientific theories. In particular, he tried to lay down a logically satisfactory foundation of mathematics and the theory of probability. During the search for such a foundation he became aware of the distinction between the actual thoughts of human beings and their linguistic expressions on the one hand, and abstract propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and their components which exist independent of these thoughts and expressions on the other hand.
Bolzano described the relations of propositions to other relevant notions such as those of sentence, truth, existence, and analyticity. Furthermore, he studied relations among propositions and defined highly interesting notions of validity, consistency, derivability, and probability, based on the method of «replacing» certain components in proposition. A proposition in Bolzano's sense is a structure of ideas-as-such (*Vorstellungen an sich*). According to Bolzano, each complex idea-as-such can be analyzed into a sequence of simple ideas which include certain logical constants such as those expressed by the words 'not', 'and', 'some', 'all', 'to have', or 'ought' (WL §§ 61, 78.1, 116.3). The manner in which a complex idea-as-such is built up from simple ones may be expressed in a language by a chain of definitions." (p. 1907)

30. ———. 1994. "The Ontological Foundations of Bolzano's Philosophy of Mathematics." In *Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala*, edited by Prawitz, Dag and Westerstähl, Dag, 265-271. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"The basic notion of Bolzano's ontological system is the part relation.
Its domain embraces concrete substances, abstract objects, and collections; the converse domain contains collections only.

Some collections are concrete entities existing in space and time, the rest are abstract sets.
Bolzano's notion of a set implies that a set cannot be a member of itself. Hence, there is no danger of an antinomy similar to that of Russell arising in Bolzano's ontological system of sets.
Bolzano's abstract world is constituted of sets, certain attributes (i.e., properties and relations), ideas-as-such, and objects constructed on the basis of these entities. Thus, certain complexes of ideas-as-such constitute propositions. The notion of an idea-as-such can be constructed from expressions of a language by means of axioms for the relation of being an object of something. Analogously, properties can be generated by axioms for the relation of something being applied to an object. The converse of this relation and the relation of being an object of an idea-as-such are fundamental ontological constants of Bolzano's." (p. 265)

31. ———. 1997. "Bolzano, the Prescient Encyclopedist." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:13-32
Abstract: "In his *Wissenschaftslehre* Bernard Bolzano tried to lay down a logically satisfactory foundation of mathematics and theory of probability. Thereby he became aware of the distinction between the actual thoughts and judgments of human beings, their linguistic expressions and the abstract propositions *(Sätze an sich)* and their components (*Vorstellungen an sich)*. This ontological distinction is fundamental in Bolzano's thinking paired with a universal world view in the sense that philosophy, mathematics, physics and metaphysics should be build upon the same logical foundations. Bolzano's enterprise is sketched in the light of examples from his logical semantics, proof theory, number theory, theory of truth and his variation logic."
32. ———. 2000. "From Bolzano's Point of View." *The Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry* no. 83 (1):47-67
"I am going to present logic, logical semantics, ontology, proof theory, the foundations of mathematics, and certain

aspects of the philosophy of nature from Bolzano's point of view.
In his monumental four-volume work *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837) Bolzano introduced several new concepts for the logical analysis of the structure of scientific theories. In particular, he tried to lay down a logically satisfactory foundation of mathematics and the theory of probability. During the search for such a foundation he became aware of the distinction between the actual thoughts and judgements of human beings, their linguistic expressions, and the abstract propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and their components which exist beyond space and time. This ontological distinction is fundamental in Bolzano's philosophy. In his terminology, real things have actuality whereas abstract objects have logical existence bare of actuality.
Bolzano worked extensively with the relation of being an object of an idea-as-such (a *Vorstellung an sich*). The object of an idea-as-such can be either an abstract object or a concrete object existing in space and time.
The relation of being an object of an idea-as-such corresponds in modem semantics to the relation of being an element of the extension of a concept." (47)
(...)
"Bolzano is indubitably one of the greatest philosophers of the German language. His world view was a universal one in the sense that philosophy, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics should build upon the same logical foundations. In fact, he already recognized many of the essential things to come in logic and the foundations of mathematics." (p. 67)

33. ———. 2003. "Bolzano's Heuristics." In *Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 35-56. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag
"In the fourth part of the *Wissenschaftslehre* [WL], contained in the third volume of the original 1837 edition, Bolzano treats *heuristics* or the "art of discovery", i.e., the "rules to be observed in the search for new truths" (§ 9. Note 3; cf. also § 15.2). The first main section of Bolzano's

heuristics embraces the *general rules* of this discipline (§§ 325 -348).
Logic in Bolzano's sense is a theory of science the objects of which are the different sciences and their linguistic representations (§ 15). According to Bolzano a science is a set of true propositions (*Sätze an sich*) worthy of representation in a textbook. Logic or the *theory of science* is a set of rules which are necessary and sufficient for a representation to satisfy certain criteria concerning scientific textbooks (§ 1). In view of this very broad conception of logic it is fairly obvious that heuristics is an integrant part thereof." (p. 35)
This paper was already presented in 1991 at the International Bolzano Symposium in Salzburg, but has never been published since.

34. ———. 2003. "The Importance of Being Bolzano." In *Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 153-166. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag
"1. Logical consequence
Ever since Aristotle philosophers have occupied themselves with the question whether a given statement follows from another statement. The first published precision of this notion in modern times was undertaken by the Polish logician Alfred Tarski in 1936. Accordingly, a closed formula F is a logical consequence of a set of formulas F if and only if F is true under every interpretation of the nonlogical constants under which all elements of F are true. Logical constants are inter alia connectives of sentential logic (expressed by words like "not", "and", "or", "if - then") and quantifiers of predicate logic (such as "for all" and "there is"); hence, the interpretation of these constants is determined.
But who conceived this notion of logical consequence (mutatis mutandis) already a hundred years earlier?'
Right: The Bohemian philosopher, ontologist, logician, mathematician and theologian Bernard Bolzano!
Upon substitution of abstract nonlinguistic propositions for closed formulas and variants of propositions for

interpretations, we get precisely a special case of Tarski's notion of logical consequence. (A variant of a proposition P is a proposition identical with P up to at least one nonlogical component.) Incidentally, at the university of Warsaw Tarski was a student of Lukasiewicz's who lectured inter alia on Bolzano's logic.

Just like Bolzano Tarski admitted being unable to exactly distinguish between logical and nonlogical constants. Not until thirty years later did he formulate a necessary condition for the property of being a logical constant. Furthermore, if all constants of the formal language in question were regarded as logical, the notion of material implication, would emerge. Even this weakest of all notions of consequence was introduced by Bolzano and is playing an important role in some of his deduction rules.

Tarski presupposed a fixed domain as a realm of reference for the interpretations. Even Bolzano did not conceive of a combined quantification over domains and components of propositions. (By introducing a predicate for domains and letting the quantifiers refer to this predicate, however, one can represent all theorems of the model theory developed later on.)

Nowadays we know, of course, that Tarski's notion of logical consequence is unsuitable if the set-theoretic language is enlarged by a generalized existence quantifier expressing that there is an absolutely infinite class C (in the sense that C does not include exactly K elements for any cardinal number K). This esoteric fact of modern set theory cannot, however, diminish our appreciation of Bolzano's achievement.

2. Analytic propositions

A fundamental distinction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is that between analytic and synthetic judgements. In modern logical semantics analyticity is often considered a relation between a sentence S, a set of definitions, and a language L. For instance, one can say that S in L is analytic with respect to D if S is a logical consequence of D in L which embraces S and the elements of D.

But who formulated an analogous explication of analyticity within the system of abstract propositions already in the 1830s?
Right: Bernard Bolzano!" (pp. 153-154)
(...)
"6. Situation semantics
In modern so-called situation semantics, established at the beginning of the 1980s by the American logician and linguist Jon Barwise, a notion of consequence is introduced which is stronger than that of Tarski. In situation semantics certain set-theoretic structures are considered models and a situation is a partial submodel thereof. The primitive notion is the confirmation of a sentence in a model by a situation. For example, a sentence of the form of "A or not A" is a logical consequence of any sentence in the sense of Tarski but not a strong consequence of it.
But who discovered this notion of strong consequence even a hundred years earlier?
Right: Bernard Bolzano!
In his logic Bolzano considered not only the variants with respect to the sequence of all nonlogical components of propositions but also the variants with respect to all subsequences. By that counterparts of main laws of situation semantics turn into theorems of Bolzano's logic." (p. 156)
(...)
17. Estimation
Thus some outstanding achievements of Bolzano's on the fields of logic, semantics, and mathematics have been delineated. The fact that the connection of most of these achievements with modern research remained unknown until the 1960s is due to the circumstance that the study of Bolzano's work took a new turn then and that eventually editions of the often hardly legible manuscripts of the literary remains could be published in the Collected Works of Bernard Bolzano.
Moreover, particularly in Bolzano's logical semantics there are many original ideas which have no precise affinity with modern theories. In addition to that he accomplished

extensive investigations into concepts of epistemology, philosophy of nature, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and theology." (p. 165)

35. Berka, Karel. 1982. "Bolzano's Philosophy of Science." In *Bernard Bolzano, 1781-1848 Bicentenary. Impact of Bolzano's Epoch on the Development of Science*, 427-442. Prague: Institute of Czechoslovak and General History CSAS.
36. ———. 1983. "The Ideal of Mathematization in B. Bolzano." In *Nature Mathematized. Historical and Philosophical Case Studies in Classical Modern Natural Philosophy. Vol. 1*, edited by Shea, William R., 291-298. Reidel: Kluwer
"In my contribution I would like to draw attention to the views on the ideal of mathematization held by B. BoJzano, a later follower of Leibnizian rationalism.
This analysis will show the evolution of conceptions elaborated in the epoch of *mathesis universalis* on this topic in a period basically influenced by the philosophy of Kant and other representatives of German classical philosophy." (p. 291)
(...)
"The discussions concerning the acceptability of the fifth postulate of Euclid's *Elements* and the various attempts to prove it, seem to him to be clear evidence that the problem in question does not lie in the demonstration of the certainty of this postulate, but in finding the objective ground of its validity. In his work *Die drey Probleme der Rectification, der Complanation und der Cubirung* (1811), he claims that we cannot accept as a basic truth any proposition which admits a further ground of its truth. BoJzano does not doubt that this postulate is true, requiring only to have its validity grounded in an objective way, independently of our subjective feeling of certainty." (p. 291)
(...)
"Bolzano's conception, which extends and modifies the Leibnizian project of mathematization is explicitly proclaimed in part II, "On the mathematical method", of his *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der*

Mathematik (1810) and further elaborated in other mathematical works, especially in his *Einleitung zur Grossenlehre*, and in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, where the logical aspects of mathematics and its methodology are taken into consideration." (p. 292)

37. ———. 1988. "Natural Deduction in Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*." In *Intensional Logic, History of Philosophy and Methodology. To Imre Ruzsa on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, edited by Bodnàr, István M., Maté, András and László, Pólos, 203-212. Budapest: Department of Symbolic Logic, Eotvos University.
38. ———. 1998. "Bernard Bolzano. A Historian of Logic." *History of Science and Technology* no. 31:121-130
Abstract: "Bolzano´s *Theory of Science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*) contains a great amount of very valuable information concerning the development of logic from its beginnings in Aristotle till the post-Kantian period. In a critical exposition Bolzano presents views of his predecessors and compares them with his own standpoint. The paper presents a selective survey of various conceptions developed by Aristotle, G. W. Leibniz and his followers G. Ploucquet, J. H. Lambert and S. Maimon together with their Bolzanian interpretation. The historical analyses in his principal logical work are, thus, at the same time a witness of his own opinions toward different topics in logic."
39. Betti, Arianna. 1998. "*De Veritate*: Another Chapter. The Bolzano-Lesniewski Connection." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 115-137. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"In 'De Veritate: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski' Jan Wolenski and Peter M. Simons related an intriguing story of the "Austro-Polish obsession with truth". Wolenski and Simons mention the Bohemian philosopher Bernard Bolzano several times, with particular reference to absoluteness and sempiternity of truth in Twardowski and Lesniewski.
(...)

In the following I wish to point out three issues. First, in the so-called prelogistic writings the early Lesniewski defines truth of sentences in such a way that truth conditions are the same - *mutatis mutandis* - as Bolzano's.
Secondly, from this point of view the links between the early and the late Lesniewski, in this case between some parts of his early writings and some aspects of Ontology, are closer than they are commonly believed to be. Thirdly, in this perspective it can be shown that some of Bolzano's views come near to Lesniewski's Ontology. In discussing Bolzano's views I shall mostly follow Casari's reading of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*." (p. 115)

40. ———. 2006. "Sempiternal Truth. The Bolzano-Twardowski-Lesniewski Axis." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, edited by Jadacki, Jacek Jusliuz and Pasniczek, Jacek, 371-399. Amsterdam: Rodopi
"Twardowski [*] had revived Bernard Bolzano's ideas on the subject [eternity and sempiternity of truth], and, mainly thanks to him, these became known in the Lvov-Warsaw School (see, for instance, Jadacki 1993, p. 191). There is no doubt that Lesniewski knew Twardowski's ideas and it seems evident that the latter influenced him: Lesniewski's results are mostly compatible with the "absolutistic" content of Twardowski's 1900 article. And, similarly, no doubts can be raised about the Bolzanian origin of the aspects of eternity and sempiternity of truth defended by Twardowski in *Relative Truths* (see, for instance, Wolenski and Simons 1988, p. 430, n. 24; and Simons 1992, Ch. 2, p. 15, n. 11; see also Smith 1988, p. 325): though his name is not quoted, traces of Bolzano's legacy can be found even in the examples given by Twardowski, some of which are the same as used by Bolzano in his *Wissenschaftslehre*. Yet, since Bolzano, Twardowski and Lesniewski supported different theories of meaning with different ontological presuppositions, "sempiternity of truth" actually stands for three different conceptions. This paper is a survey of these three conceptions. I suggested elsewhere a comparison between Bolzano and the early Lesniewski as to their theories of meaning and truth, claiming the possibility of a (direct or

indirect) influence of Bolzano upon Lesniewski. The analysis presented here is also meant as a contribution to the picture sketched there." (p. 372, notes omitted)
[*] “On the So-Called Relative Truths” (1900) in J. Brandl and J. Wole?ski (eds.), *Kazimierz. Twardowski - Actions, Products and other Topics in Philosophy,* Amsterdam: Eodopi 1999, pp. 147-168. J. Brandl and J. Wole?ski (eds.),
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Jadacki, J.J. (1993). Kazimierz Twardowski’s Descriptive Semiotics. In: Coniglione et *al.,* eds. (1993), pp. 191-206.
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Smith, B. (1988). Ka*simir Twardowski: An Essay on the Borderlines of Ontology, Psychology and Logic.* In: Szaniawski, ed. (1988), pp. 313-375.
Szaniawski, K., ed. (1988). Th*e Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. T*he Hague: Nijhoff.
Wolenski, J. and P.M. Simons (1988). D*e veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski. I*n: Szaniawski, ed. (1988), pp. 391-443.

41. ———. 2006. "The Strange Case of Savonarola and the Painted Fish. On the Bolzanization of Polish Thought." In *Actions, Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 55-81. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
"I have previously discussed in several papers specific Bolzanian elements present in the Polish tradition. This paper will not, for the most part, add anything in particular to that. The new - and rather blunt hypothesis to be put forward here is that, despite appearances, Twardowski also contributed *de facto* to slowing down the reception of Bolzano's most modem logical discoveries. For in Poland Bolzano was to remain one logician among many for rather long. It was chiefly thanks to two factors that Bolzano's star could, slowly, begin to rise in Poland, or, at least, that the

fundamental achievements of his logic could be known. One factor is antipsychologistic (more precisely Platonistic) influence coming from Husserl and from Twardowski's student Lukasiewicz. The other factor is the change in the conception of logic which took Polish logic from, say, Sigwart, to Tarski through Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz," (p. 55)

42. ———. 2010. "Explanation in Metaphysics and Bolzano's Theory of Ground and Consequence." *Logique et Analyse* no. 56:281-316
"In "Troubles with Truth-making: Necessitation and Projection." Erkenntnis 64: 61-74 (2006a, and in "Truth-Making without Truth-Makers." Synthese 152: 21-46 (2006b), Benjamin Schnieder criticizes truthmaking as a relation between entities in the world and the truths those entities 'make true'. In (2006b), his criticism exploits a notion of conceptual explanation that is very similar to Bolzano's grounding. In the first part of this paper, I offer an analysis of Bolzano's grounding. I discuss some open problems and argue that Bolzano's grounding is not a systematization of the ordinary notion of 'because' as others have maintained, but of the technical notion of explanatory proof in the context of an axiomatic conception of (proper) science. On the basis of this analysis, in the second part, I offer a critical discussion of Schnieder 2006b's arguments against truthmaking. I conclude that the latter are not very effective from a methodological point of view and that Bolzano's original position fares better in this respect; still, truthmaker theorists will be able to defend truthmaking only at a high price."

43. ———. 2012. "Bolzano's Universe: Metaphysics, Logic, and Truth." In *Categories of Being. Essays on Metaphysics and Logic*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila and Koskinen, Heikki J., 167-208. New York: Oxford University Press
"Thanks to a handful of publications from the last decade, however, Bolzanian metaphysics has begun to receive more attention than ever before.(1)
It is not difficult to show why Bolzanian metaphysics matters. Bolzano's logic builds on firm ontological and

mereological foundations. Logic as a science has a realm of its own, that of the *an sich*, in the strong sense that logic is the science of a special kind of object, namely, propositions-in-themselves and ideas, and their qualities. Furthermore, the edifice of logic rests on a mereological conjecture regarding the basic form of propositions and is constructed by exploiting mereological relations between propositions and ideas, plus a device of semantic ascent, involving very special ideas with very special qualities, called symbolic ideas.

Th e first and main aim of this essay is to present an overview of Bolzano's universe from the point of view of his metaphysics and its relationship to logic, relying fundamentally on his major work, the *Wissenschaftslehre*. This I shall do in sections II–VI. Although these sections are chiefly intended as an exposition of the state of the art on the matter, I shall make no secret of preferring a reading of Bolzano as a "Platonistic nominalist," as Textor puts it—as a Platonist about propositions and a nominalist about properties. (2) My second aim, in sections VII–IX, shall be to answer the open question of whether in Bolzano there is any "ontology of truth," as one may call it, though with some hesitation." (pp. 167-168)

(1) Among others, Künne 1998; Schnieder 2002; Textor 2004.

(2) Textor 2004 , 10. That Bolzano is a Platonist about propositions is the predominant view, which I follow here. Among those who disagree, cf. Cantù 2006 , 10.

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Schnieder, Benjamin. 2002. *Substanz und Adhärenz: Bolzanos Ontologie des Wirklichen*. Sankt Augustin: Academia.

Textor, Mark. 2004. Bolzanos Ontologie. In *Die Bedeutung Bernard Bolzanos für die Gegenwart*, ed. K. Strasser. Prague: Filosofia.

44. Beyer, Christian. 2004. "Bolzano and Husserl on Singular Existential Statements." In *Phenomenology & Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 69-88. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
"Which form does the propositional content take that is judged when a given speaker sincerely utters a sentence in order to assert a singular existential statement? Two thought-provoking answers to this question have been proposed by Bernard Bolzano and, when commenting upon Bolzano's proposal, by Edmund Husserl. In Section 1 of this paper the author clarifies what he means by "singular existential statements". In Section 2 Bolzano's proposed analysis is sketched. In Section 3 the author exposes the earlier Husserl's conception of "logical reflection" and draws upon it to explain why Husserl, around 1900, subscribed to Bolzano's proposal. Following this, he reconstructs and considers in detail the later Husserl's discussion of that proposal and Husserl's own mature theory of singular existential statements as manifested in a 1917/18 lecture series, both of which shed light upon a conception that is of central importance for Husserlian phenomenology: the conception of "noematic sense" (Section 4)." (p. 71)

45. Bodnar, Joanne. 1976. *Bolzano and Husserl: Logic and Phenomenology*
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, available at ProQuest Dissertation Express.
Contents: Introduction 1; I. Bolzano's Anti-Psychologism 5; II. Bolzano's Theory of Meaning 41; III. Bolzano's Basic Logical Relations 51; IV. Truth to Bolzano 63; V. Husserl's Anti-Psychologism 76; VI. Husserl's Theory of Meaning 99; VII. Basic Logical Relations in Husserl 113; VIII. Truth to Husserl 128; IX. Recapitulation 144; X. Conclusion 151; Bibliography 164-168.
"Bernard Bolzano and Edmund Husserl both present some form of ontological framework for logic rather than a

linguistic framework. Their works predate the pragmatic and semantic theories of Tarski and Carnap. Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1837. (2)And Husserl's major logical thinking was formulated before 1935. (3) But neither of them seem receptive to a semantic foundation for logic, because of their rationalist-platonist leanings. Both strongly oppose the view that logic is taken from psychological experience by generalization. They have a viewpoint which is perhaps closer to the classical outlook than to either of the others, since they consider the foundation of logic to be the acceptance of meanings as entities — entities which are in some important ways related to actual and possible being and its structure.

Bolzano and Husserl each make crucial modifications on traditional platonism as a philosophy of logic. A basic thesis which they both do accept is that the logical entities such as the proposition with its elements and its relations are ideal unities, which are independent of their being thought. But the logical entities are not platonic forms in which spatio-temporal existences "participate" — nor are they determined by spatio-temporal existence in any way. They are independent of the subject or knower as well as of the facts of material existence.(4)

Thus the logical entities are what they are whether they ever come to expression or not. They have a character similar to that of numbers or other "abstract" mathematical objects, but it cannot be said that they arise in experience as abstractions from the empirical world. Although there is disagreement about the question of abstraction in Bolzano — with some Bolzano commentators such as Rolf George seeing little difference between Bolzano and Carnap — this tendency to read Bolzano's work as if he were a pragmatist obscures the originality of Bolzano.(5)

His differences from semantic and empiricist thinking are well worth investigating. Husserl's approach too deserves consideration for its uniqueness. Crediting Bolzano with giving a starting point in philosophy of logic, Husserl "discovered" Bolzano and brought his work out of obscurity. He makes use of the work of Bolzano however, only to

transform it thoroughly. If certain common themes are selected for exposition, the positions of Bolzano and Husserl are both seen to be modifications of the classical platonism. This provides a basis for a comparison of Bolzano and Husserl." (pp. 3-5).

(2) Bolzano's work under consideration is *Theory of Science*, ed. and trans. by R. George (Berkeley, 1972), hereafter cited simply as Bolzano. English paginations are used, but section numbers apply to all German editions as well. The Theory of Science is a condensation of Wissenschaftslehre, vols. 1-4 (Sulzbach, 1837). R. George follows in large measure the F. Kambartel edition of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* vols. 1-2, entitled *Grundlegung der Loqik* (Hamburg, 1963) in which Bolzano's original has been condensed, with the omitted passages summarized by the editor.

(3) Works by Husserl principally under consideration are *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900 and 1913), trans. by J. N. Findlay (New York, 1976); and *Formale und Transzendentale Loqik* (1929), trans. by D. Cairns (Hague, 1969).

(4) See: U. Neemann, *Bernard Bolzanos Lehre von Anschauung und Begriff in ihrer Bedeutung für erkenntnistheoretische und pädaqogische Probleme* (Paderborn, 1972) pp. 81 and 144. for discussions of how Bolzano's logical entities differ from Plato's forms and from Kant's subjective categories.

(5) See: R. George, "Editor's Introduction" in Bolzano's *Theory of Science*, (Berkeley, 1972) p. xxx. Also note J. Berg, *Bolzano's Logic* (Stockholm, 1962) pp. 49-50, where he expresses the view that Bolzano takes logical entities as abstractions.

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1. Cantù, Paola. 2011. "Bolzano Versus Kant: Mathematics as a Scientia Universalis." In *Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. Vol. 1*, edited by Reboul, Anne. Dordrecht: Springer
   Abstract: "The chapter will discuss some changes in Bolzano's definition of mathematics attested in several quotations from the *Beyträge, Wissenschaftslehre* and *Größenlehre*: Is mathematics a theory of forms or a theory of quantities? Several issues that are maintained throughout Bolzano's works will be distinguished from others that were accepted in the *Beyträge* and abandoned in the *Größenlehre*.
   Changes will be interpreted not only as a consequence of the new logical theory of truth introduced in the *Wissenschaftslehre* but also as a consequence of the overcome of Kant's terminology, and of the radicalization of Bolzano's anti-Kantianism.
   It will be argued that Bolzano's evolution can be understood as a coherent move, if one compares the criticism on the notion of quantity expressed in the *Beyträge* with a different and larger notion of quantity that Bolzano developed already in 1816. This discussion is based on the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by Bolzano can be identified with works by von Spaun and Vieth.

Bolzano's evolution will be interpreted as a radicalization of the criticism of the Kantian definition of mathematics and as an effect of Bolzano's unaltered interest in the Leibnizian notion of *mathesis universalis*. As a conclusion, it will be argued that Bolzano never abandoned his original idea of considering mathematics as a *scientia universalis*, i.e. as the science of quantities in general, and it will be suggested that the question of ideal elements in mathematics, which has been interpreted as a main reason for the development of a new logical theory, can also be considered as a main reason for developing a different definition of quantity."

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von Spaun F.A.R. (1805) *Versuch das Studium der Mathematik durch Erläuterung eniger Grundbegriffe und durch zweckmässigere Methoden zu erleichtern*. Göbhardt, Bamberg-

2. Casari, Ettore. 1989. "Remarks on Bolzano's Modalities." In *Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica: le teorie della modalità*, edited by Corsi, Giovanna, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 319-322. Bologna: CLUEB

"1. *The Roots of Bolzano's Interest in Modalities*.

From an autobiographical note quoted by Winter ([1], p.32), we learn that as Bolzano was 17 years old and began to read the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, he was soon strongly attracted by the distinctions of Judgments into a priori and a posteriori and into analytic and syntetlc as well as by the distinction of representations into Intuitions and concepts, whereas he was very hurted by the immediate use, without any previous explanation, of the concepts of experience and of necessity. A significant part of Bolzano's work may be seen as an attempt to clarify the preceding notions and to substantiate their distinctions. In particular, his theory of (absolute) modalities is his answer to the question about necessity, an answer which he derives from his answer to the question about experience. Necessity is indeed first reduced to necessary truth; this latter is identified with true

proposition in Itself which doesn't depend upon experience; depending upon experience is identified with containing intuitions; intuitions are a logically well defined kind of representations In themselves (Ideas).
Bolzano's theory of modalities has been scarcely considered up to now; the most careful analysis has been done by E. Morscher ([2], pp.87-92). In the following we will embed Bolzano's theory of the absolute modalities, as presented mainly in the *Wissenschaftslehre* §182, into the general framework of his logic we have reconstructed elsewhere ([3], [4]) and which will be only sketched here. We will not consider his theory of relative modalities." (p. 319)
(...)
"*Last Remarks*. As alluded to in §1, Bolzano's primary interest was in the notion of necessary truth. The whole of his modal theory, although interesting in many respects, is far from being satisfactorily refined. So, for instance, we remark that according to Bolzano, every standard proposition whose subject is unobjectual [*gegenstandIos*], that is, referring to no object, is false, it follows that all such propositions are possible (although their being true may be Impossible). That truth is a quality and that there is an Idea which refers to it, are, of course, rather disquieting assumptions. From their discussion in [4], it follows that a very important question is whether the idea [*p*], which refers to *p*, has also *p* as its part. In the present context, the question presents itself, in particular, with respect to the problem about the conceptuality of a proposition having the idea [*p*] as its subject, under the hypothesis of the conceptuality of the proposition *p* and vice versa; a problem which immediately arises, when considering, for instance, iterated modalities." (p. 323)
Bibliographical Note
[1] E. Winter, *Die geistige Entwicklung Bolzanos*, in E. Winter, P. Funk, J. Berg, *Bernard Bolzano, Ein Denker und Erzieher Im Österreichischen Vormärz*, Sitz.-Ber. d. Öst. Ak.d. Wiss., Phil.-Hist.Kl., Bd. 252, Abhdl. 5, Hf. 8, Wien 1967, pp. 29-74.

[2] E. Morscher, *Philosophische Logik bei Bernard Bolzano*, in Bolzano-Symposion: "Bolzano als Logiker", Sitz.-Ber. d. Öst. Ak.d. Wiss., Phil.-Hist. Kl., Bd.293, Abhdl. 5, Hf. 12, Wien 1974, pp. 77-105.
[3] E. Casari, *Bemerkungen über die Bolzanosche Wissenschaftslehr*e, in *Logik und Grundlagenforschung*, H.Scholz-Kolloquium, Aschendorff, Münster i. W., 1985, pp. 53-66.
[4] E. Casari, *An Interpretation of some ontological and semantical notions In Bolzano's logic,* to appear in the proc. of the meet. (1987) of the Florence Center for Hist, and Phil. of Sc.: *Wissenschaftslehre 1B37-1987.*

3. ———. 1992. "An Interpretation of Some Ontological and Semantical Notions in Bolzano's Logic." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 55-105. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"In the following, the attempt is done to clarify some significant features of Bolzano's logical system with particular attention to its development in the *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL). This system is viewed as a theory trying to identify certain quite general properties, relations and operations of *things [Dinge],* in the most general and unbiased sense of this word. For sake of simplicity and determinateness of the formulations, the current logical symbolism is *used*. The point of view of the theory is *elementary,* that is to say, we always work with *particular notions* about the things without allowing us any consideration of *arbitrary notions* about the things. 'x', 'y', 'z', ... are used as variables for things." (p. 55)
4. ———. 2006. "Some Remarks on Bolzano's Notion of a Quality." In *Logic and Philosophy in Italy. Some Trends and Perspectives. Essays in honor of Corrado Mangione*, edited by Ballo, Edoardo and Franchella, Miriam, 185-201. Milano: Polimetrica.
5. ———. 2016. *Bolzano's Logical System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
"As already mentioned, many specialist studies have analysed many of the questions that arise from the first three parts of Bolzano's work, as well as providing

comprehensive expositions of them, often very successfully. Yet, it seems to us that there remains room for a more systematic reconsideration of Bolzano's logical thought. This book is concerned precisely with this aim. In undertaking this task, the book is intended as an exploration, not so much of the more specifically discursive aspects of Bolzano's logical thought—already amply studied—as much as one aimed at identifying the singularly coherent and systematic nature of the logic presented in the *Wissenschaftslehre*.
In order to render as visible as possible the systematic nature of that logic, I have decided to present it within a formal system. Despite being surprising even to me, it has become clear that in pursuing this aim, it is sufficient to adopt the approach of the predicate calculus with identity and choice operator, that is, enlisting the wellknown Hilbert's epsilon calculus. As this book reveals, the formalization of Bolzano's logic in this calculus emerges quite effortlessly." (Preface, p. VIII)

6. ———. 2017. "Husserl and Bolzano." In *Essays on Husserl's Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics*, edited by Centrone, Stefania, 75-91. Springer
Abstract: "The paper examines the all too often neglected role of the Czech philosopher and mathematician Bernard Bolzano for Husserl's work, from ca. 1893–1894 onwards. Husserl himself finds it important to stress in an appendix to chapter 10 of the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* that his investigations are not "in any sense mere commentaries upon, or critically improved expositions of, Bolzano's thought patterns", but that they "have been crucially stimulated by Bolzano… ".
The paper examines early Bolzano's ideas on the ground-consequence relation, Bolzano's logical universe as presented in his masterpiece, the monumental *Wissenschaftslehre*, the role of Hermann Lotze in making Husserl receptive for Bolzano and, finally, a lecture course on logic held by Husserl at the University of Halle in 1896 [*], working out just what Husserl is taking, and not taking, from Bolzano."

[*] E. Husserl, [LV'96] *Logik: Vorlesung 1896,* ed. by E. Schuhmann. *Husserliana* Materialienbände I (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001)

7. Cellucci, Carlo. 1992. "Bolzano and Multiple-Conclusion Logic." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 179-189. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"The aim of this paper is to assess Bolzano's logical work in the light of contemporary logical developments. This has been done before by others, most recently by van Benthem, (1) but everybody has his own approach and my approach -- whatever its value -- will be somewhat different from the current one. Make no mistake, I am not going to discuss once again to what extent Bolzano anticipated modern logic. On the contrary I will try to show how far he was from moden logic. In order to do so I will compare Bolzano with the tradition of multiple-conclusion logic." (p. 179)
(1) J. van Benthem, *The Variety of Consequence, According to Bolzano*, Studia Logica 44, 1985, pp. 389-403.
8. Centrone, Stefania. 2010. "Functions in Frege, Bolzano and Husserl." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 31:315-336
Abstract: "This explorative article is organized around a set of questions concerning the concept of a function. First, a summary of certain general facts about functions that are a common coin in contemporary logic is given. Then Frege's attempt at clarifying the nature of functions in his famous paper *Function and Concept* and in his *Grundgesetze* is discussed along with some questions which Freges' approach gave rise to in the literature. Finally, some characteristic uses of functional notions to be found in the work of Bernard Bolzano and in Edmund Husserl's early work are presented and elucidated."
"4. Bernard Bolzano
In this section, I want to show that the set–theoretical notion of a function is implicitly at work in Bolzano's logic of variation. Bolzano's own use of the term 'function' is not pertinent here, for he employs this term only in the context of 'x is a function of y1, y2,..., yn' where the correlated entities are what he calls *Größen* (magnitudes).(24) Thus, Bolzano's usage of the term (unlike Frege's) is restricted to

the field of mathematics. The entities his logic of variation is concerned with are not magnitudes, but propositions and their non-propositional parts." (p. 325)
(24) Bolzano 1830–1835, [J. Berg, ed., *Einleitung zur Grössenlehre. Erste Begriffe der allgemeinen Grössenlehre*, BGA Series 2A, vol. 7, 1975], p. 229.

9. ———. 2016. "Early Bolzano on *Ground-Consequence* Proofs." *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* no. 2:215-237
Abstract: "In his early *Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics* (1810) Bernard Bolzano tries to characterize rigorous proofs *(strenge Beweise*). Rigorous is, prima facie, any proof that indicates the grounds for its conclusion. Bolzano lists a number of methodological constraints all rigorous proofs should comply with, and tests them systematically against a specific collection of elementary inference schemata that, according to him, are evidently of ground-consequence-kind. This paper intends to give a detailed and critical account of the fragmentary logic of the *Contributions*, and to point out as well some difficulties Bolzano's attempt runs into, notably as to his methodological ban on 'kind crossing'."
10. Chattopadhyaya, Debi Prasad. 1979. "Bolzano and Frege: A Note on Ontology." In *Logic, Ontology and Action*, edited by Banerjee, K.K., 214-242. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
11. Chihara, Charles. 1999. "Frege's and Bolzano's Rationalist Conceptions of Arithmetic." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:343-361
Abstract: "In this article, I compare Gottlob Frege's and Bernard Bolzano's rationalist conceptions of arithmetic. Each philosopher worked out a complicated system of propositions, all of which were set forth as true. The axioms, or basic truths, make up the foundations of the subject of arithmetic. Each member of the system which is not an axiom is related (objectively) to the axioms at the base. Even though this relation to the base may not yet be scientifically proven, the propositions of the system include all of the truths of the science of arithmetic. I conclude the article by

analyzing the respective views of Frege and Bolzano in the light of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem."

12. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1986. "On the Positive and Negative State of Things." In *Non-Existence and Predication*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 97-106. Amsterdam: Rodopi
Abstract: "Following Balzano, I suggest that there are two types of entity: those that are states of other things and those that are not. The second type includes, not only substances, in the traditional sense, but also such abstract objects as numbers, attributes and propositions. It is argued that the theory of states, when combined with an intentional account of negative attributes, will yield a theory of negative entities and of events."
13. ———. 1986. "The Self in Austrian Philosophy." In *Von Bolzano zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition der österreichischen Philosophie = From Bolzano to Wittgenstein. The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Nyíri, János Kristóf 71-74. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky
Reprinted in: R. M. Chisholm, *On Metaphysics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 156-161.
"Bolzano's definition of substance provides us with a kind of key to the conceptions of the self in Austrian philosophy. His definition is as clear as anyone could possibly wish. He says that there are two kinds of things: (I) those things that are states or conditions of other things ("Beschaffenheiten von anderen Dingen"); and (II) those things that are not states or conditions of other things: "the latter are what I call *substances*."(1) Examples of things that are states or conditions of other things are "the color, smell and weight of a body," the beliefs that a particular person has, the sensations that he has, and the actions that he performs. Examples of substances-of things that are not states or conditions of other things -are physical bodies and selves. Bolzano says, in Leibnizian fashion, that, if there are things that are states or conditions of other things, then there are things that are not states or conditions of other things.(2) If we use the term "substance" in the way he suggests, then we

need not ask whether a given philosopher believes in substances; we need ask only what the things are that function for him as substances." (p. 156 of the reprint)
(1) Bolzano, *Athanasia oder Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Sulzbach: J. G. v. Seidleschen Buchhandlung, 1838), [second enlarged edition; first edition 1827] p. 283.
(2) Bolzano (1827), p. 22. He holds that *Beschaffenheiten* may themselves have *Beschaffenheiten* and that such things as numbers also have *Beschaffenheiten* (p. 22), and he seems to hold that God has a *Beschaffenheit* (p. 22).

14. ———. 1989. "Bolzano on the Simplicity of the Soul." In *Traditionen und Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie*, edited by Gombocz, Wolfgang, Rute, Heiner and Sauer, Werner. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
15. ———. 1991. "Bernard Bolzano's Philosophy of Mind." *Philosophical Topics* no. 19:207-216
"The views of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1842) concerning the nature of psychological properties and the nature of what it is that has those properties are of first importance to philosophy. I shall discuss some of them here in the hope that what I say may lead to a more systematic study and evaluation.
Bolzano's best known works are the *Theory of Science* [Wissenschafteslehre], first published in 1837, and *The Paradoxes of the Infinite* [Paradoxien des Unendlichen], first published in 1851. The present topic is discussed in detail in *Athanasia: Or Grounds for the Immortality of the Soul*, published in 1838.(2) This work has not been translated into English." (p. 205, note 1 omitted)
(...)
"Bolzano, then, is concerned with presenting considerations which, he thinks, indicate that only simple substances can think. In order to avoid a fundamental misunderstanding, we must be clear about one fundamental point. In setting out on his investigations, Bolzano assumes that it is not known that thinking things are identical with physical bodies. Hence he does not presuppose the thesis according to which we are identical with our bodies or with some proper part of our bodies. Others, of course, may

presuppose the contrary of this thesis. But any *criticism* of Bolzano that is based upon the contrary thesis and that does not include a positive defence of this contrary thesis would be question begging." (p. 207)
(2) *Athanasia; oder Griinde fur die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Sulzbach: J. G. v. Seidleschen Buchhandlung, 1838). [Second enlarged editon; first edition 1827.]

16. Claas, Jan. 2021. "Leibniz and Bolzano on Conceptual Containment." *European Journal of Philosophy*:1-19
Abstract: "Philosophers often rely on the notion of conceptual containment and apply mereological terminology when they talk about the parts or constituents of a complex concept. In this paper, I explore two historical approaches to this general notion. In particular, I reconstruct objections Bernard Bolzano puts forward against a criterion that played a prominent role in the history of philosophy and that was endorsed, among others, by Leibniz. According to this criterion, a concept that represents objects contains all and only the concepts that represent properties the objects must have in order to be represented by the former concept.
Bolzano offers several counterexamples and arguments against the criterion. I argue that while some of them presuppose a strongly mereological understanding of containment, which Leibniz is not committed to, one of them also succeeds without relying on demanding mereological principles."
17. Coffa, J. Alberto. 1982. "Kant, Bolzano and the Emergence of Logicism." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 74:679-689
"Bolzano was the first to recognize the fallacy behind the principle of synthetic judgments. The crucial step in Kant's inference for the need to appeal to intuition in synthetic judgments was the premise that from concepts alone only analytic knowledge can be derived. Astonishingly, there isn't a single argument in the Critique for this claim; all Kant says about it is that "it is evident" (A47, B64).(6) What is evident, instead, is that Kant had confused true in virtue of concepts with true in virtue of definitions, or, in his own language, he had erroneously identified judgments whose

predicate is not contained in their subject-concept with judgments that extend our knowledge (*Erweiterungsurteile*). Against this, Bolzano was the first to make a point that even Frege would miss: that Kant's analytic judgments, far from exhausting the grounding power of the conceptual resources of our language, mobilize only a very modest fraction of them, the logical concepts. Bolzano's characterization of analyticity is well known, and it has often been noted that it anticipates not Frege's proof-theoretic treatment but the more modern semantic approach by means of interpretations. What is less well known is the reasoning that led Bolzano to this proposal. After reviewing a number of attempts to explain the point of Kant's notion of analyticity, Bolzano comments that "none of these explanations singles out what makes these [analytic] propositions important. I believe that this consists in the fact that their truth or falsity does not depend upon their constituent representations but remains unaltered, whatever changes one may make in some of these representations . . . This is the ground of my preceding definition."(7) Thus, the reason why Bolzano came to his celebrated insight on the semantic characterization of logical truth is that he saw that Kant's analytic judgments, far from being those grounded on the information implicit in the constituent concepts, were grounded on only a few of those concepts, thus concluding that a proper definition of analyticity should emphasize the extent to which all other concepts are to be ignored." (p. 684)

(6) For a very modest effort toward an argument, see Ak 20, 340.

(7) *Wissenschaftslehre* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1929), vol. II, sec. 148, p. 88.

18. ———. 1991. *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Second Chapter: *Bolzano and the Birth of Semantics* pp. 22-40.

"While the idealists were removing every trace of objectivity from Kant's semantics, there was in a corner of the Austro-Hungarian empire, ignored by the leaders of German

philosophy, a Czech priest by the name of Bernard Bolzano, who was engaged in the most far-reaching and successful effort to date to take semantics out of the swamp into which it had been sinking since the days of Descartes. Bolzano was the first to recognize that transcendental philosophy and its idealistic sequel were a *reductio ad absurdum* of the semantics of modern philosophy. He was also the first to see that the proper prolegomena to any future metaphysics was a study not of transcendental considerations but of what we say and its laws and that consequently the *prima philosophia* was not metaphysics or ontology but semantics. The development of these ideas in his monumental *Wissenschaftslehre* and in a variety of other writings established Bolzano as the founder of the semantic tradition.
Bolzano's philosophy was the kind that takes from and then gives life to science. His approach to semantics was developed in dialectical interplay with his decision to solve certain problems concerning the nature of mathematical knowledge. Kant had not even seen these problems; Bolzano solved them. And his solutions were made possible by, and were the source of, a new approach to the content and character of a priori knowledge. We shall illustrate the point by focusing on one of Bolzano's favorite mathematical topics, the calculus." (p. 23)

19. Cohen, Jonathan L. 1982. "Bolzano's Theory of Induction." In *Impact of Bolzano's Epoch on Development of Science - Conference Papers Prague 1981*, 443-457. Prague: Ustav ceskoslovenských a svetových dejin CSAV
Also published in: Merrilee H. Salmon (ed.), *The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism*, Dordrecht: Springer 2011, pp. 29-40.
Abstract: "Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre was published in 1837, although most of it seems to have been written during the decade 1820–1830. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic was published in 1843, but had been in gestation or preparation since 1825. Neither author seems to have exercised any influence on the other, and in their views about the fundamental nature of logical and mathematical

reasoning they notoriously represented very different trends. Bolzano sought to direct philosophers' attention away from mental processes towards relationships between ideas in themselves and between propositions in themselves, while Mill's logic insisted on a study of the mental process which takes place whenever we reason, of the conditions on which this process depends, and of the steps of which it consists. But in their views about the methodology of natural science the divergences are much more finegrained. Both assign a central role to the search for causes and both discuss the same basic procedures for the discovery of these. It is just that Bolzano shows a greater sensitivity than Mill does to the inherent difficulties of the enterprise."

20. Corcoran, John. 1975. "Meanings of Implication." *Diálogos* no. 9:59-76
Reprinted in: R. I. G. Hughes (ed.), *A Philosophical Companion to First-order Logic,* Indianapolis: Hackett 1993, pp. 85-100.
"In philosophical and mathematical discourse as well as in ordinary scholarly contexts the term 'implies' is used in several clear senses, many of which have already been noticed and explicated. The first five sections of this article codify and interrelate the most widely recognized meanings. Section 6 discusses a further significant and common use. Section 7 discusses and interrelates Tarski's notion of logical consequence, the "model-theoretic" notion of logical consequence, and Bolzano's two grounding relations. The eighth section employs the use-mention distinction to separate the three common grammatical categories of 'implies'. Section 8 also shows that criteria based on use-mention are not reliable indications of intended usage of 'implies'. The ninth and last section relates the above to the counterfactual and gives reasons for not expecting to find 'implies' used to express counterfactuals. A summary is provided."
"Summary and Conclusion: In the first five sections we have distinguished twelve uses of the term 'implies'. At the outset we distinguished: implies1 (truth-functional), implies2

(logical consequence) and implies3 (logical deducibility). Next we distinguished three elliptical or enthymematic varieties of implication: C-implies1, C-implies2 and C-implies3. In none of these six senses did "A implies B" presuppose the truth of A. Then we discussed the cases wherein "A implies B" is used to mean "The-fact-that-A implies B," which does presuppose the truth of A. We paraphrased the latter as "A is true and A implies 13" where 'implies' indicates any of the previous six senses of the term. Thus, at that point, twelve senses of implies were distinguished, six which do not presuppose the truth of the implying sentence and six which do. Of the six which do, three are enthymematic.
In addition, the three original senses were carefully distinguished and interrelated, and possible causes of confusion were identified.
Then, building on some off-hand observations of Russell, we related the truth-functional use of 'implies' to two further notions which have been used as explications of traditional logical consequence. We also brought in Bolzano's relative implication and his two grounding relations.
We argued briefly that counterfactuals are not normally expressed using 'implies' and that the distinction between use and mention cannot be used as a test for distinguishing different meanings of 'implies'.
Use of 'implies' as a transitive verb taking a human subject has been ignored."

21. de Jong, Willem R. 2001. "Bernard Bolzano, Analyticity and the Aristotelian Model of Science." *Kant-Studien* no. 91:328-349
"In this article I intend to make clear that Bolzano's perception and use of the distinction in question [analytic-synthetic] should also be understood in the framework of this model of science. The effect of doing so is to render more comprehensible Bolzano's highly personal and, in its application, upon first acquaintance rather strange characterization of the analytic-synthetic distinction. This characterization can then also be placed more easily in its historical context. [Joëlle] Proust aside, most interpreters

have looked somewhat askance at Bolzano's notion of analyticity. And most of them seem not to be able to go on and do much with this apparently anomalous element in Bolzano's thinking. (4)
In § 2 Bolzano is presented as an adherent of the Aristotelian model of science. Section 3 discusses briefly Kant's view of the analytic-synthetic distinction; Bolzano studied it thoroughly. In § 4 his criticism of Kant's notion of analyticity is considered, while in § 5 and § 6 Bolzano's own characterization of this distinction is discussed. Section 7 connects Bolzano's notion of analyticity with his view of derivability or (logical) inference. In the following two sections this theme is further elaborated and developed in the light of the Aristotelian model of science and the notion of scientific demonstration implicit in it. Finally, § 10 presents some conclusions." (pp. 328-329)
(4) Cf. Y. Bar-Hillel, "Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions." *Theoria* 16 (1950), pp. 91-117; p. 100. W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford 1962, p. 367. J. Berg, "Introduction." In: B. Bolzano, *Theory of Science* (ed. by J. Berg; transl. by B. Terrell), Dordrecht 1973, pp. 12-44; p. 18. Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition*, Cambridge, 1991, p. 34.

22. ———. 2010. "The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege " *Synthese* no. 174:237-261
Abstract: "This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis. But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and

synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them."

23. Detlefsen, Michael. 2010. "Rigor, Re-proof and Bolzano's Critical Program." In *Construction. Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann*, edited by Bour, Pierre Edouard, Rebuschi, Manuel and Rollet, Laurent, 171-184. London: King's College Publications
"Introduction
The so-called critical movement in nineteenth and twentieth century foundational thinking(1) was described by the American mathematician George Miller (1863–1951) as one in which "[o]ur geometric intuitions are forced into the background" [27, p. 530] as, more and more, "logical deductions from definitions" (*loc. cit.*) take their place.
The main sources of this movement, as both Miller and others described them, were the widely advertised problems concerning geometrical intuition as a guide to our thinking about continuity and differentiability. As mathematicians became increasingly sensitive to the press of these problems, they also "naturally became . . .more exacting in regard to rigor" (*loc. cit.*), and this renewed emphasis on rigor became the central element of nineteenth and early twentieth century attempts to "arithmetize" mathematics. How the notion of rigor mentioned was conceived and what its principal benefits were taken to be are prime concerns for me here. A better understanding of these matters should contribute to a better understanding of rigor and its motives and benefits overall. Therewith, I believe, should also come a fuller appreciation of the attention given to rigor by nineteenth century foundational thinkers. These at any rate are my chief goals here." (p. 171)
(1) "Critical" was the term that was used by Felix Klein (cf. [20]) and various other writers (cf. e.g. [22]), F. Engel ([8]), J. Merz (cf. [25] and [26]), C. Keyser (cf. [17], [18] and [19]) and G. Kneebone (cf. [24]) to describe the proposals in the nineteenth century that called for the reformation of proof practices in mathematics, particularly analysis.

24. Drozdek, Adam. 1997. "Logic and Ontology in the Thought of Bolzano." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 5:3-18

"Logic and theology were two domains of great importance to Bolzano. His attempt to reconcile the demands of these two domains led Bolzano to very strong logical realism, or, objectivism, whereby theology could be put on a firm ground. The paper analyzes the problem of objective concepts, propositions, and truths, with an attempt to give an interpretation of these entities, to account for their puzzling ontological status in Bolzano's system.
Bolzano is one of the forerunners of modern logic; however, his logical, and also mathematical, discussions were conducted in the context of very serious concern about the ontological status of the logical constructs. In the context of logic, he discusses the problem of propositions (*Sätze*) and their special category, namely truths; and ideas (*Vorstellungen*), and their special categories, namely intuitions (*Anschauungen*); and concepts. What is interesting in Bolzano's analyses is the considerable effort he devotes to distinguishing subjective propositions and ideas from objective propositions and ideas, the latter also called propositions and ideas in themselves. What is particularly puzzling in Bolzano's philosophy is the ontological status of the latter. According to Bolzano, objective propositions and ideas do not exist, they are not real, and yet they make logic possible." (pp. 3-4)

25. Dubucs, Jacques, and Lapointe, Sandra. 2006. "On Bolzano's Alleged Explicativism." *Synthese.An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* no. 150:229-246
Abstract: "Bolzano was the first to establish an explicit distinction between the deductive methods that allow us to recognise the certainty of a given truth and those that provide its objective ground. His conception of the relation between what we, in this paper, call "subjective consequence", i.e., the relation from *epistemic reason* to consequence and "objective consequence", i.e., grounding (*Abfolge*) however allows for an interpretation according to which Bolzano advocates an "explicativist" conception of proof: proofs par excellence are those that reflect the objective order of grounding. In this paper, we expose the

problems involved by such a conception and argue in favour of a more rigorous demarcation between the ontological and the epistemological concern in the elaboration of a theory of demonstration."

26. Duhn, Anita von. 2001. "Theoretical Laws and Normative Rules: Kant and Bolzano's Views on Logic." In *Kant und die Berliner Aufklarung. Akten des 9. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band V: Sektionen XV-XVIII*, edited by Gerhardt, Volker, Horstmann, Rolf-Peter and Schumacher, Ralph, 3-12. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
"Does logic instruct us how to think correctly? If so, what place does methodology have in logic? Is logic an instrument which provides rules for correct thinking or a system of proof for scientific theories, or is the doctrine of method merely an appendix to a doctrine of elements? The question whether logic is an *organon* is related to the question whether logical laws are theoretical truths or normative laws. Kant and Bolzano agree that logical laws basically provide us with truths, but that they can be apprehended as telling us how to think. (1) So a theoretical judgment that something is the case precedes the normative judgment that we may or should do something about it. Does it follow that Kant and Bolzano also agree on the question of whether logic is an *organon* which instructs us how to think? I will show that despite their divergent positions on logic, both authors claim that we apply normative rules because they are true." (p. 3)
(1) Kant and Bolzano agree with Husserl and Frege, who thought that a normative act, such as demanding or permitting, presupposes a theoretical act, such as judging or believing and that every law that states what *is* can be apprehended that one *ought* to think in accordance with it. Cf. Frege (1893) *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,* intro. XV; Husserl (1900) *Prolegomena,* §§ 3, 13-14. I discuss this issue in *"Is logic a theoretical or practical discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano",* to appear in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. [vol. 84, no. 3 (2002) pp. 319-333]

27. ———. 2003. "Bolzano's Account of Justification." In *The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evalutation and*

Future Perspectives, edited by Stadler, Friedrich, 21-33. Dordrecht: Kluwer

"Bolzano investigated the following problem. How can we determine whether or not a certain truth is basic without recourse to subjective criteria based on intuition or immediate perceptual knowledge? For him, the criterion of self-evidence is not a means for justifying propositions because it does not provide us with a scientific proof presenting the objective reasons for a proposition, reasons that hold independently of our knowledge.(1) Bolzano intended to provide a workable alternative to the criterion of intuitive self-evidence, and claims that we have to search for proof even of self-evident propositions – at least until it becomes clear that and why no proof could be required.(2) I reconstruct Bolzano's account of justification, which is designed to replace the criterion of self-evidence and provide a scientific basis for the demonstrative sciences. I then argue that although Bolzano succeeded in devising a procedure for grounding truths, his theory fails on the account that it implicitly reintroduces an epistemological problem." (p. 21)

(1) 1804, § 3 (*Betrachtungen über einige Gegenstände der Elementargeometrie* (1804) in Bolzano 's early mathematical works, Czechoslovak Studies in the History of Science, Prague, 1981. Partial English translation by S. Russ in W. Ewald, *From Kant to Hilbert,* vol. 1, OUP, 1996); *Beyträge II* (1810), §§2, 11, 12, 21 (*Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (1810) in *Bolzano's early mathematical works*, op.cit. (*Beyträge*). English translation by S. Russ in W. Ewald, *op.cit*.); 1817 (*Purely analytic proof* ...), § 1; English translation by S. Russ in W.Ewald, *op.cit*; WL IV, §525; (*Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), 4 vols, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1981 (WL)) and the *Anti-Euklid*, a manuscript in Bolzano's Nachlass edited by Karel Vecerka, Sbornik, Prague, 1967, pp. 204-215, who dates the text around 1840. Jan Sebestik, however, situates the text closer to 1816.

(2) 1804, §3.

28. Dummett, Michael. 1997. "Comments on Wolfgang Künne's Paper." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:241-248
Comments on: W. Künne, *Propositions in Bolzano and Frege* (1997).
"Entertaining and judging (§§ 1,3)
I feel some doubt about Wolfgang Künne's definition (E1)
x is a subjective idea
iff
x is not a judgement *&*
possibly for some *y* (*y* is a judgement and *x* is part of *y*).
A judgement must be some particular person' s judgement, and occur at a particular time. Künne might now be judging that Bolzano misunderstood Kant; but suppose he is not. Are we to say that Künne now has a subjective idea of misunderstanding on the strength of the fact that he might be making that judgement?
The awkwardness arises from the difficulty of fitting (merely) entertaining or grasping a proposition into Künne's Figure 1. A proposition is indeed always something that it is possible to judge; but "*X* entertains the proposition *P*" cannot be defined as "Possibly *X* judges that *P*".
Entertaining a proposition has to be acknowledged as a type of mental act in its own right, and as one more generic than judging: one that, like judging, has a proposition as its object (content, matter). Failure to acknowledge this leads to the complications of Figure 5." (p. 241)
29. Etchemendy, John. 1990. *The Concept of Logical Consequence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Chapter 3: *Tarski on Logical Truth*, pp. 27-50.
"Though my concern in this book is not historical, a few preliminary words should be said about the complicated heritage of the model-theoretic definitions of the logical properties. As I mentioned, these definitions are generally credited to Tarski's 1936 article, and for the purposes of this book, there is no need to question this attribution.
What is clearly right about it is that Tarski's article contains the only serious attempt to state, in its most general form, the analysis underlying the standard definitions, and to put forward a detailed philosophical justification for that

analysis. It is, so to speak, the philosophical locus of the model-theoretic definitions.
From a historical point of view, though, attributing the definitions to Tarski alone oversimplifies the situation a great deal.(4) For one thing, most of the main features of the analysis were anticipated, in various different ways, by earlier authors, including Bolzano (1837), Padoa (1901), Bernays (1922), Hilbert and Ackermann (1928), and Gödel (1929). Of all of these, Bolzano's discussion is by far the most extensive; in Chapter 3, I will briefly describe his account and motivate certain features of Tarski's analysis by comparing it with Bolzano's." (p. 7)
(4) For a more detailed discussion of the historical relationship between Tarski's analysis and the model-theoretic definitions, see Etchemendy (1988).
"I approach Tarski's account of logical truth and logical consequence indirectly, by considering first a simpler account developed by Bolzano nearly a century earlier.(1) The two accounts are remarkably similar; indeed, Tarski initially entertains what is, for all intents, precisely the same definition as Bolzano's, but modifies it for reasons I will eventually explain. But in spite of the striking similarity in the two accounts, Tarski was unaware of Bolzano's work until several years after the initial publication of his article. The key difference between the two accounts is simply that Bolzano employs substitution where Tarski uses the more technical, and for the purposes more adequate, notion of *satisfaction*." (p. 27).
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Armand Colin. Translated as "Logical Introduction to Any Deductive Theory." In Jean van Heijenoort, ed., *From Frege to Godel*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

30. Fine, Kit. 2022. "Some Remarks on Bolzano on Ground." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin. New York: Oxford University Press
"Bolzano takes the notion of grounding to be *factive*, so that grounds and consequences are always true propositions. But he also acknowledges that we sometimes invoke a non-factive notion of grounding.
Kit Fine discusses how Bolzano proposes to understand such a notion and critically assesses Bolzano's proposal from the perspective of the recent debate about grounding and its logic." (p. 37)
31. Føllesdal, Dagfin. 1981. "Comments on Quine." In *Philosophy and Grasmmar: Papers on the Occasion of the Quincentennial of Uppsala University*, edited by Kanger, Stig and Öhman, Sven, 29-35. Dordrecht: Reidel
Comments on W.V.O. Quine, *Grammar, Truth, and Logic*, same volume, pp. 17-28.
"I shall now comment on some points in the paper which, it seems to me,would be well worth discussing by our group. I will concentrate on the following three points:
1. Logical particles.
2. Syntactic ambiguities.
3. Demonstratives." (p. 29)
(...)

"One hundred and fifty years ago, Bolzano2 was the first to have the idea of demarcating logic the way Quine does with the help of a set of logical particles which are held constant, while the other non-logical expressions are freely substituted for one another. However, Bolzano's idea received little attention until it was rediscovered afresh in the mid-thirties by Quine and Ajdukiewicz(3) independently of one another. All the basic ingredients are there in Bolzano: the steps that Bolzano goes through are the same as Quine's and in the same order:
1. Specify a vocabulary of logical particles.
2. Define what it means for two expressions to have the same logical form:
Two expressions have the same logical form if they can be obtained from one another by the substitution of non-logical expressions for non-logical expressions.
3. Define logical truth:
A sentence is logically true if and only if all sentences with the same logical form are true." (pp. 29-30, a note omitted)
(3) Quine, W. V., 'Truth by Convention', in O. H. Lee (ed.), *Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead* (Longrnans, New York, 1936). Reprinted in W. V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox* (Random House, New York, 1966), and in various other places, including Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), *Reading in Philosophical Analysis* Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949). Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz, 'Sprache und Sinn', *Erkenntnis* 4 (1934), 100-138.

32. ———. 1997. "Bolzano's Legacy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:1-11
Original German published as: *Bolzanos bleibende Leistungen* in: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy,* Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004, pp. 57-68.
Abstract: "Bemard Bolzano (1781-1848) was an original and independent thinker, who left a lasting legacy in several areas of philosophy. Four such areas are singled for special attention: political philosophy, ethics and theology, logics and semanties, and mathematics. In all these areas he was

far ahead of his time. He had pioneering ideas in political philosophy and in ethics and philosophy of religion, and he argued for them in a brilliantly clear way. In logic and semantics he anticipated Frege, Camap and Quine on important points, and he had intriguing, yet to be explored, ideas on intuition and other fundamental philosophical notions. In the foundations of mathematical analysis and the theory of infinite sets he anticipated Weierstrass and Cantor."

33. ———. 2001. "Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on Reference and Object." In *Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy*, edited by Floyd, Juliet and Shieh, Sanford, 67-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press
"Bolzano was a main influence on the development of Husserl's phenomenology.
Husserl gives generous credit to Bolzano in several of his works and refers to him frequently. Husserl first came across Bolzano when, barely twenty, he read *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*(2) during his studies with Weierstrass in Berlin. And he renewed this acquaintance with *Paradoxien des Unendlichen* in 1884-1885 when he followed Brentano's lectures in Vienna on "Die elementare Logik und die in ihr notigen Reformen."
But it was only later, in the mid-1890s, that Husserl started serious study of Bolzano's *Theory of Science*,(3) which he earlier had regarded as "strange" ("fremdartig"). Husserl had then decided to give up work on the second volume of the psychologistic *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) and had started working on what was to become his first phenomenological work, the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901). Husserl states that he came to appreciate Bolzano, and in particular his theory of propositions (*Satze an sich*) and representations (*Vorstellungen an sich*), through studying Lotze's interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas. Husserl interpreted Bolzano in a platonistic manner, which Husserl claimed—I think unjustly—was foreign to Bolzano ([*Husserliana*] XXII, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen* (1890-1910)] p. 130)." (pp. 67-68)

(2) Bernard Bolzano, *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, ed. F. Prihonsky (Berlin: Mayer and Miiller, 1889; originally published 1851).
(3) Bernard Bolzano, *Theory of Science,* abridged, ed. and trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, originally published 1837).

34. Fossati, Lorenzo. 2019. "Neither Aristotle nor Kant. Bernard Bolzano on Categories." In *Categories: Histories and Perspectives 2*, edited by D'Anna, Giuseppe and Fossati, Lorenzo, 77-94. Hildesheim: Georg Olms
"The second Book of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the *Elementarlehre* (Theoryof Elements) is divided into four Parts; the first one is dedicated to the ideas in themselves (it is in the first volume of *Wissenschaftslehre*, the second volume take into account propositions in themselves, true propositions and inferences). This first Part, which includes §§ 46-120, is divided into four Chapters and introduces the notion of objective representation (often indicated as "idea"), its internal attributes and the distinction between the representations on the basis of their interrelation and of their relation to other objects (WL I: 214--571).
Each paragraph is followed by some notes where Bolzano appeals to ancients and modems to point out his own theses. At the end of the Chapter on ideas in themselves he adds a further Appendix (§§ 115-120) entitled "Previous Treatments of the Subject Matter of this Part," which helps better point out the big picture.
In particular, two paragraphs are devoted to categories-§ 118 to the categories of the "ancients" and § 119 of the "modems." He thus underlines his willingness to investigate any aspect and to involve all different kinds of interlocutors, but first and foremost his constant necessity to confront Aristotle and Kant." (pp. 77-78, notes omitted)

35. Fraisopi, Fausto. 2014. "The Quasi-Ontology of "An-Sich". Bernard Bolzano's *Theory of Science* between Leibnitian *Ars Combinatoria* and the Husserlian Idea of *mathesis universalis*." *Avello Publishing Journal* no. 4:1-25
Abstract: "Starting from the critical position that Husserl assumes against Bolzano and hisidea of *mathesis*

universalis, this paper focuses and emphasizes Bolzano's project for a *mathesis* and the differences between this project and Leibniz's. Putting into an historical perspective these three forms of *mathesis*, by Leibniz, Bolzano, and Husserl, we / I open in so doing a theoretical perspective concerning the nonontological dimension of idealities they form and articulate *mathesis* as such. The an-ontological Combinatorics of propositions and of ideas in themselves, suggests, Bolzano maintains, the possibility of a treatment of Combinatorics independently from these ontological and metaphysical presuppositions that formed and structured the Leibnitian *ars combinatoria*. In this sense, the philosophical position of a "semantic Platonism," assumed by Bolzano, opens the perspective of a non-metaphysical but modular *mathesis* that we can articulate and widen beyond an ontological commitment."

36. Franks, Curtis. 2014. "Logical Completeness, Form, and Content: An Archaeology." In *Interpreting Gödel: Critical Essays*, edited by Kennedy, Juliette, 78-106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
§ 2: *Bolzano's question*, pp. 81-92.
"Bernard Bolzano engaged in the profound study of two distinct notions of logical consequence over several decades in the early nineteenth century.
The work most remembered and highly regarded by modern logicians, because of its striking resemblance to twentieth century set-theoretical definitions of consequence, concerns the Ableitbarkeit ("derivability") relation.
In his 1837 masterpiece, Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano in fact defines a network of concepts – validity, compatibility, equivalence, and derivability – in terms of one another in a way very similar to contemporary presentations. Here is his definition of the last of these: [Wissenschatslehre, § 155, text omitted]." (p. 81)
"Bolzano's two theories of logical consequence are themselves not precise enough for their correspondence with one another to be subject to proof. All the same, the question is at the center of Bolzano's thought.

The procedural *Ableitbarkeit* relation provides a calculus of inference.
The ontological *Abfolge* relation is a feature of the world absolutely independent of our ability to reason about it. By establishing that these notions correspond, we would ensure that the logical structure of the world is accessible, that some line of thought could trace the dependencies of truths, that the reasons behind the complex facts of reality are discoverable and comprehensible." (p. 92)

37. George, Rolf. 1961. *The Problems of the Infinite and the Continuum in Some Major Philosophical Systems of the Enlightenment*, Michigan State University
Unpublished Ph.D thesis, available at Michigan State University, Digital repository.
Contents: Introduction 1; Chapter I: Leibniz 19; Chapter II: Berkeley 63; Chapter III: Bayle 111; Chapter IV: Kant 133; Chapter V: Bolzano 192; Conclusion 215; Bibliography I-V.
"The philosophers discussed in this dissertation are Leibniz, Berkeley, Bayle, Kant, and Bolzano. Its aim is to show that certain difficulties connected with infinite and continuous sets were recognized by these philosophers, and that their systems were, at least in part, designed in such a way that these difficulties did not arise in them.
(...)
Bolzano was the first to realize that the so-called Paradox of Galileo is no paradox at all, but simply describes a common property of all infinite sets.
As concerns the constitution of continua the problem was that neither the assumption that a continuum ultimately consists of unextended parts, nor that it consists of extended parts seemed defensible. Against the former case it was argued that unextended parts, no matter how many, cannot make a finite extension, against the'latter that extended parts are not ultimate, but are further divisible. Bayle held that none of the logical alternatives are defensible, so that no one need bother to change whatever opinion he happens to have on the subject.
(...)

Bolzano declared that in a continuum every point has a neighbor within any distance, no matter how small. This definition, although ultimately unsatisfactory, proved to be of great help in discovering various important properties of continuous sets." (Fom the Abstract)

38. ———. 1972. "Enthymematic Consequence." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 9:113-116
"Enthymemes were traditionally defined as incomplete or incompletely stated syllogisms.
Arguments of this sort, though formally invalid, must be allowed to have some merit, and although the restriction to syllogisms is undesirable, the definition at least has the advantage of precision.
(...)
I shall argue in this paper that, while it is true that enthymematic arguments can be augmented so that valid arguments result, it is not wise to define enthymemes in these terms. I shall instead give a definition of enthymematic consequence which is similar to Tarski's definition of logical consequence; one can even arrange matters so that the latter becomes a limiting case of the former.
The definition can then be used to generate additional premisses which will convert enthymematic arguments into logically valid ones. It will thus automatically provide the desired restriction upon missing premisses.
I shall then show that the definition gives the same results as the traditional account within the domain of syllogisms, and that outside this domain it singles out a class of invalid but plausible arguments which seem to answer to many logicians' intuition of what an enthymeme is, if we can take the examples in their textbooks as a clue." (p. 113)
(...)
"It remains to give a logician his due who more than a hundred years ago propounded a theory of logical consequence which in one definition accounted for both logical and enthymematic validity: Bernard Balzano. He defined consequence thus: "I say that propositions *M, N, O* ... follow from Propositions *A, B, C, D*, ... with respect to the

variable parts *i, j*, ... if every class of representations whose substitution for *i, j*, ... makes all of *A, B, C, D*, ... true also makes all of *M, N, O*, ... true."(6) It has been pointed out that Balzano anticipated Tarski by almost exactly a hundred years in his definition of logical consequence.(7) Indeed, if the variable parts *i, j,* ... are taken to consist of all and only the extralogical terms of *A, B, C, D*, ... , *M, N, O*, ... the definition is close to that of Tarski (though Bolzano demands that the premisses be consistent). Cases where *i, j,* ... include more or fewer than the extralogical terms were generally regarded as somewhat quaint. In particular, it has not been seen that cases of Bolzano-entailment where the class of "variable" terms is smaller than the class of extralogical terms are just those argument forms which we are wont to call enthymemes." (p. 116)
(6) Bernard Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, Vol. 2 (Sulzbach, 1837), p. I 14.
(7) E.g., by Heinrich Scholz.

39. ———. 1983. "Bolzano's Consequence, Relevance and Enthymeme." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 12:299-318
"Historians of logic tend to view their task as the application of modern insights and symbolic techniques to old texts. Perhaps they do this on the assumption that what is good in these works must be an adumbration of what was recently done and is now well known. This holds, at any rate, for most discussions of Bolzano's theory of logical consequence. In the present paper I shall reverse this procedure and comment on some problems and beliefs of contemporary logic from what I take to be Bolzano's point of view. This will have the advantage of bringing out more forcefully than a straight exegesis what his view was and will also, I hope, put in doubt certain contemporary dogmas.
I begin by applying his definition of consequence to propositional logic. Bolzano did not entertain this branch of logic, and to this extent my account is ahistorical. That it is, nonetheless, a straight extension of his theory is shown by the fact that all 23 theorems about consequence which he proves in his *Theory of Science* hold in this application I

then consider how C. I. Lewis's so-called "independent proof" for *A &* -A |= B fares in this system (it fails). After some comments on the proof, I show that in Bolzano-consequence premisses and conclusion share a subsentence (a necessary condition of relevance). There follows a discussion of enthymemes and a general procedure for generating the so-called "nutting premiss". At the end I sketch a taxonomy of consequence relations and briefly remark on earlier interpretations of Bolzano's work. In using the first person plural (from now on) I mean to speak for those who think Bolzano's approach sound, a group that includes at least Bolzano and myself." (p. 299, notes omittred)

40. ———. 1983. "A Postscript on Fallacies." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 12:319-325
"Bolzano is justly esteemed for his opposition to psychologism in logic. It is most fitting, therefore, that his definition of consequence has enabled us to strike a blow at the residual psychologism that is found in the customary treatment on enthymemes.(1) We shall now do the same for the so-called formal fallacies." (p. 319)
(1) See section (9) of the preceding essay. [*Bolzano's Consequence, Relevance and Enthymeme*]

41. ———. 1986. "Bolzano's Concept of Consequence." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 83:558-564
Reprinted in: Dale Jacquette (ed.), *Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology*, Malden: Blackwell, 2002, pp. 205-209.
"Plainly, to identify a speech as an argument and to understand its premises and conclusion is not the same as knowing what argument is intended. What is missing? Bernard Bolzano defines the concept of consequence thus: Propositions *M, N, O*, . . . follow from propositions *A, B, C, D*, . with respect to variable parts *i, j*, . . . if every class of ideas whose substitution for *i, j*, . . . makes each of *A, B, C, D*,. . . true also makes all of *M, N, O*, . . . true.(1)
The *i, j* . . . are constants tagged for substitution; I shall call them *variands*." (p. 558)
(...)

"The conception of consequence here adumbrated has two features that should recommend it to logicians who are concerned not with the development of formal systems, but with the analysis of infor- mally stated arguments and the identification of fallacies. The first of these is that arguments of invalid form are invalid. In the classical view, this is not the case, as Gerald Massey has pointed out with clarity and vigor.(3)
(...)
In Bolzano's view, the evaluation of any argument must begin with the identification of variands. If their variation generates an invalid form, the argument is invalid; if not, not. It is of course possible to make mistakes in this, just as sentences can be misunderstood. It is a cultural, and perhaps even a human, failing that we do not usually indicate the variands explicitly. But these are problems of communication. Plainly, it is often possible, and sometimes important, to identify formal fallacies. It therefore seems that in this respect Bolzano's account of consequence is superior to the classical. A second positive feature of Bolzano's conception is that it gives a promising account of enthymemes. Although he concentrates on arguments in which all indexical elements are variands (this being the proper province of logic, cf. WL § 223), his definition does not exclude cases in which only some of them are. We readily identify 'Socrates' as the variand in 'Socrates was a man, therefore Socrates was mortal'. That is, we understand this argument as implicitly claiming that every substitution on 'Socrates' that makes the premise true also makes the conclusion true. If we had to construct a device for computing the "missing premise" (which we intuitively take to be 'All men are mortal'), we would have it state that fact. It would, that is, form the universal closure on the variand, over the conditional consisting of premise and conclusion, and voila, the missing premise results. This procedure works for all syllogistic enthymemes, and is only slightly more complex when no singular terms are involved. No principle of charity or other proviso is needed. I venture the guess that some such computation is going on even in our

own minds when, with a speed that must compel wonder, we determine what all the world takes to be the missing premise in such a case."
(1) *Wissenschaftslehre* (Sulzbach, 1837), § 155, no. 2, vol. ii, pp. 199 ff. Translated as *Theory of Science*, R. George, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), p. 209. Henceforth WL.
(3) "The Fallacy behind Fallacies," in P. A. French, T. E. Vehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, eds., *The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1981), pp. 499 ff.

42. ———. 1987. "Bolzano on Time." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:452-468
"In the first volume of the *Wissenschaftslehre* Bolzano claims that "by the word 'time' we mean nothing but that particular determination in a real thing which is the condition for correctly attributing to it a given property."(1) He says that from this *all* properties of time can be deduced. This is supported by just one example, namely, that several contrary properties can be attributed to the same substance only on condition that times differ. This follows directly, since sentences with contrary predicates can be true only if their subjects differ. Hence one and the same substance can have contrary attributes only on the assumption that its time determinations are not the same.
In Chapter 412 he maintains that a theory can have the status of a science even if its extent is very small. Consequently, he says, "the theory of time (the properties of time, not of the art of measuring it) deserves to be treated as a special science (i.e. the pure theory of time) although this science can consist of only a very few propositions."(2) Kant, he objects, should not have denied it the name of science for no other reason than its small extent.
In the following chapter Bolzano adds that a theory need not be denied the status of a science even if everyone already knows its propositions. Again the theory of time serves as an example. He maintains that all theorems of the pure theory of time are obvious to everyone *(sind jedem von selbst schon bekannt)* (3) *,* but that it should be considered to be a science nonetheless.

These are sweeping claims. Given the voluminous publications, the many controversies and the continuing interest in the subject of time they seem strange, even absurd. I begin by discussing these assertions, then add some reflexions on Bolzano on *time perception,* and end with a brief account of his criticism of Kant's views." (p. 452)
(1) *Wissenschaftslehre* I, 365. Citations follow the first edition.
(2) IV, 52.
(3) IV, 53.

43. ———. 1992. "Concepts of Consequence." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 3-26. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"It has been held since antiquity that in all deductive argumentation there is a formal element or aspect. I wish to distinguish, and contrast, two ways of characterizing this. One of them I call «logic of schemata», or the «Received View», and the other, which was first articulated by Bolzano, «logic of variation». I shall investigate how these concepts of consequence succeed in addressing five concerns, not all of them logical issues, as we now understand logic, but connected with argumentative practice and certain epistemic matters.
(1) For the sake of completeness I mention first that a definition of consequence should fix a relation that satisfies certain formal requirements, i.e. a cut rule, thinning, and the like. There is a conventionally accepted set of these, described, e.g. by Gentzen. If a consequence relation shows deviations from this, it must be a reasoned difference that should be argued for. Also, a consequence relation (specifically logical, rather than enthymematic consequence) should be defined in such a way that first order predicate logic is strongly complete, that is, that if A is a consequence of a set of sentences X, then A should be deducible from X in a finite sequence of steps.
(2) A defensible definition of consequence should have the form, broadly, «If an argument satisfies this definition, it is valid, otherwise not». Contemporary definitions fail, as a

rule, to satisfy the «otherwise not» clause. It is, however, argumentative practice to convict arguments of being formally fallacious. This can only be based on the assumption that if we have *fully understood* an argument, we can judge it to be valid or invalid - setting aside such esoterica as undecidable cases. I think it desirable that a definition of consequence allow an account of invalidity as well as validity.
(3) I shall consider a definition of logical consequence to be superior if is it broad enough to explain why we concede merit to some formally invalid arguments enthymemes), but withhold approbation from others (gross non-sequiturs), that is, if it treats *logical consequence* as a special, though perhaps the most important and interesting, case.
(4) Arguments as presented in both informal and formal contexts can be ambiguous, even if they are constructed of unambiguous sentences, and even if they are couched in a language that stipulates a rigid distinction between logical and extralogical constants. I call an argument *naked* if all that is presented are premisses, conclusion, and an inference indicator, like «therefore». I shall maintain that when we understand an argument, we understand more than the sentences of which it is composed, and more than the unspecified claim that the conclusion *somehow* follows from the premisses. That is, we grasp more than the naked argument. If we fail in this, we may misconstrue arguments, which amounts to saying that naked arguments can be ambiguous. I suggest that an acceptable theory of consequence should allow us to bring into focus the problem of argument ambiguity.
(5) It is desirable that a concept of consequence, if it does not itself define a «relevant» relation, can at least be augmented so that it does. (A consequence relation is here called relevant if it stipulates or implies that premisses and conclusion share some element)." (pp. 3-4)

44. ———. 1997. "Psychologism in Logic: Bacon to Bolzano." *Philosophy and Rethoric* no. 30 (3):213-242
Reprinted in: Dale Jacquette (ed.), *Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism. Critical and Historical Readings on the*

Psychological Turn in Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003, pp. 21-49.
"The first logician to conceive of logic as a matter wholly apart from psychology was Bolzano. He did, however not neglect the old concerns. Of the four volumes of his *Wissenschaftslehre* only the first two (and not all of them) deal with the objective world of propositions in themselves. The third is epistemology, dealing with the manifestation of propositions in the mind: a judgment, in contrast to a proposition, which is abstract and mind independent, now is a mental episode whose "matter" is a proposition in itself. In this part of the work he discusses all those issues that tended to be mixed into the discussion of logic itself: clarity and obscurity of representations, knowledge and error, as well as the "art of discovery" which now has its proper place as a part of epistemology. The last volume, finally, is given over to the presentation of a science in the form of a treatise of the subject.
This is the old "methodology", the theory of combining discovered truths into the system of a science." (p. 39 of the reprint)
(...)
"I hope to have clarified in this paper at least some of the strands of psychologism that ran through the history of logic between Bacon and Bolzano. Much had to be left out. My thesis — if I may be said to have argued one — has been that there were different kinds of intrusion of psychology into logic, some due to a conception of logic that included much of what is now assigned to other fields, others due to cultural and ideological persuasions, and still others to the obsession that logic is the science of thinking." (p. 44 of the reprint)

45. ———. 1997. "Bolzano's Programme and Abstract Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:167-180
Abstract: "Most of the Bolzano literature is exegetical, neglecting, unfortunately, the great potential of his logic as the beginning of a *Programme*. Specifically, his unorthodox construal of the consequence relation as triadic, and his account of logical form are promising beginnings which

even as they stand shed light on question of relevance, the ancient problems of enthymemes and others. Instead of developing these suggestions, Bolzano scholars have been occupied with elucidating the ontology of sentences in themselves, and related topics. I argue, and believe to be in agreement with Bolzano, that the nature of sentences is fully explained by the relations that hold between them, just as money has no nature or essence beyond the transactions it makes possible. It follows that the development of his logic would contribute at least as much to the understanding of sentences than any exegesis."

46. ———. 2003. "Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism." In *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*, edited by Fisette, Denis, 95-108. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"As we saw, the view that subjective ideas are parts of judgments was not new, but Bolzano's theory of objective contents allowed him to avoid a certain confusion. It was generally acknowledged that ideas pass through the mind when one thinks, i.e. judges. At the same time they were thought to be sensations, or the copies of sensations, that is, visual or auditory sense data.
They were often described in terms not consistent with their roles as terms of judgments, i.e. as extended, round, moving, receding, as semblances of their objects, etc. (cf. Exner, supra) [*]. But mental occurrences of this sort cannot be terms of judgments. Hume, for example, claimed reasoning to be the operation of our thoughts and ideas, but it is not very plausible to think of it as an operation on something that can be blue, round, divided, or point-like. Bolzano was not a victim of that confusion. For him a subjective idea is part of a mental proposition or at least could be such a part, and must have the character that goes with this role. He concentrates on the logical functions of ideas, thus avoiding certain classical mistakes. In particular the view that knowledge consists in the similarity or resemblance between our ideas and their objects is exposed as fallacious. Terms of propositions refer to their objects, they need not resemble them. The truth of a proposition, and hence our knowledge of an object, does not depend

upon the similarity between idea and object. Rather, "a proposition is true if we connect with the idea of an object the idea of an attribute which this object actually has" (WL §42). This rejection of the resemblance theory is not based on the classical argument that we can never know whether our ideas resemble their objects since we can never compare the two, the object being altogether inaccessible. Rather, the critical point is that it is of no consequence whether an idea resembles its object." (pp. 105-106)
(...)
"Bolzano had a very generous conception of the scope of logic, which for him included a logic of discovery, epistemology and a lot of communication theory. He insisted that logic in this broad sense needed to make use of psychological theory. However, the Theory of Elements in the first two volumes of WL on which "logic as a science must be built" (Husserl) is a historical first in avoiding all connection with psychological doctrine." (p. 108)
[*] Bernard Bolzano, *Letter to Franz Exner,* 18th December 1834, in: *On the Mathematcal Method and Correspondence with Exner*, Amsterrdfam: Rodopi 2004, pp.157-174.

47. ———. 2004. "Intuitions—the Theories of Kant and Bolzano." In *Semantik und Ontologie. Beiträge zur philosophischen Forschung*, edited by Siebel, Mark and Textor, Mark, 319-354. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
"Bolzano credits Kant with impressing on the philosophical public the distinction between intuition (*Anschauung*) and concept (*Begriff*). But making the distinction is one thing, explaining it is another. Bolzano is not happy with Kant's account (*WL* I, § 77),(1) but his critique does not connect well with Kant's theory. The gulf between them, in both substance and terminology, is too deep. Despite the divergence between the two philosophers on almost any topic, Bolzano paid more attention by far to Kant and Kantian logicians than any other tradition or school, for good reasons."
(...)
"Mathematical propositions are purely conceptual, and so intuitions will play no role in their proof or analysis. They

can be established a priori because they are purely conceptual. Bolzano's theory of intuition supports this profoundly important tenet of his thought. His redefinition of "Anschauung" was thus not merely an exercise in persuasive definition, and the appropriation of a popular and important expression for different purposes. According to Bolzano (and in truth, I might add) there are no such things as Kantian intuitions. Bolzano's construal of the word, whatever its shortcomings, certainly removes the temptation to seek geometrical and arithmetic truth in intuitions, yet preserves the root connotation that *Anschauungen* are those thought episodes that represent our direct empirical awareness." (p. 35)

(1) Bolzano 1837. The *Wissenschaftslehre* is cited as *WL* plus number of volume.

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Selected Bibliography on Bernard Bolzano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Third Part: Gie - L

Studies on Bolzano's Logic and Ontology

1. Gieske, Carsten Uwe. 1997. "Bolzano's Notion of Testifying." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:249-266
   Abstract: "The notion of testifying (or testimony) is the central notion of Bolzano's theory of communication. In his Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science) Bolzano gives an analysis of this notion. It shows surprising parallels to Paul Grice's attempt to define "A meantNN something by x". I will begin with an explanation of some parts of the analysis and continue with an investigation of the relationship between Bolzano's analysis and that of Grice. In conclusion I would like to present some evidence supporting the hypothesis that several of the virtues of Grice's theory had already been developed by Bolzano, whose approach even has the advantage of a better definition than Grice's, as Bolzano's analysis provides a better basis for defining a notion of successful communication of information."
2. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1961. "Frege's Ontology." *Philosophical Review* no. 70:23-40
   Reprinted in: E. D. Klemke, *Essays on Frege*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1968, pp. 79-98.
   On Bolzano see pp. 23-27.
   "I begin by describing some features of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, for much of what I shall have to say about Frege can best be understood against the background

of Bolzano's view.(4) According to Bolzano, all things are of one of three kinds:
First, there are different kinds of mental states (*subjective Vorstellungen*), namely, (a) individual ideas (*subjective Einzelvorstellunge*n), (b) general ideas (*subjective Allgemeinvorstellungen*), and (c) thoughts (*gedachte Saetze*). Things of these three kinds are supposed to exist in individual minds; in this respect they are "subjective" rather than "objective."(5) Second, there are so-called objects$_1$ (*Gegenstaend*e), namely, (a) individual things and (b) properties (*Beschaffenheiten and Relationen*). These things are not in any individual mind, but exist independently of minds and are therefore "objective" rather than "subjective." (6)
Third, there are senses (*objective Vorstellungen*), namely, (a) individual concepts (*objective Einzelvorstellungen*), (b) general concepts (*objective Allgemeinvorstellungen*), and (c) propositions (*Saetze an sich*). These things differ from mental states in that they are as "objective" as objects$_1$. But they also differ from the latter. One important difference is that they are more closely connected with mental states than are objects$_1$. (7)" (pp. 23-24)

(4) Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* (new ed., 4 vols.; Leipzig, 1929). Compare also Y. Bar-Hillel, "Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions," *Methodos*, II (1950), 32-55; and H. R. Smart, "Bolzano's Logic," *Philosophical Review*, LIII (I944), 513-533.
(5) *Wissenschaftslehre*, I, 77, 99, 219.
(6) *Ibid*., pp. 219-222, 331, 378-387.
(7) *Ibid*., pp. 2I6-2I8.

3. Hafner, Johannes. 2000. "Bolzano's Criticism of Indirect Proofs." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:385-399
Abstract: "The bearing of *Ableitbarkeit* and the compatibility requirement on the possibility of indirect proofs in Bolzano's logic has frequently been misconstrued. Without additional assumptions concerning the logical structure of indirect proofs and the relationship between proofs and *Ableitbarkeit* the compatibility requirement does

not in general preclude indirect proofs. Bolzano's own objections to them are raised in the context of *Abfolge*, not *Ableitbarkeit*. Closer inspection shows that there are in fact two distinct criticisms in play. Identifying and analyzing them clarifies what exactly Bolzano views as the problem of indirect proofs."

4. Hale, Bob, and Wright, Crispin. 2015. "Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions." *Grazer Philosophische Studien*:325-364
   Abstract: "We begin by drawing attention to some drawbacks of what we shall call the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this we contrast the definition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano in his *Wissenschaftslehre*.
   If Bolzano's definition is viewed, as Bolzano himself almost certainly did not view it, as attempting to capture the notion of analyticity as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning which occupied centre stage during the first half of the last century and which, Quine's influential assault on it notwithstanding, continues to attract philosophical attention, it runs into some very serious problems. We argue that Bolzano's central idea can, nevertheless, be used as the basis of a new definition which avoids these problems and possesses definite advantages over the Frege-Quine approach. Our itle notwithstanding, we make no claim to contribute to the exegesis of Bolzano's thought and works, which we must leave to those more expert in these matters than we are. Naturally, we have done our best not to misrepresent Bolzano's views, and believe we have avoided doing so. But it bears emphasis that it is no part of our intention to suggest that the modifications to his definition which we propose would have had any appeal for him, or that he had, or would have had, any sympathy with the project which motivates them."
5. Haller, Rudolf. 1992. "Bolzano and Austrian Philosophy." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 191-206. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
   "It would be fruitful to compare in detail some of the formulations in Twardowski, Husserl, Meinong, Mier, and

Kerry, with the original work of Bolzano, a task which cannot be done here. That we cannot rely in all cases on a clear-cut causal relation from reading Bolzano to the adoption of his arguments may not wonder us. To speak about an entire tradition is always a tricky thing, since traditions are not easily to be identified. But if we may use the expression `tradition' then part of a philosophical tradition is that its main tenets recur in different writings and the same or at least similar methods are applied. The fact, however, that even the philosophers of the Vienna Circle claimed to be part of this tradition has been overlooked for a long time. After all, *logical empiricism* was only one of the labels they accepted. Neurath's preferred name «rational empiricism» is somewhat nearer to what was the significant principle of Austrian philosophy. It was the attempt to base the system of science on an ontology of objects. For both fields the tradition starting with Bolzano provided a good basis to build up a philosophical program. To investigate how many of the philosophers of this tradition came to similar conceptions under an influence of Bolzanoan ideas *without a wider knowledge of his work* and to *explain,* how at the same time we find a strong impact of this conception in different philosophers will remain a task for further research." (pp. 205-206).

6. Jaray, Kimberly. 2006. "Reinach and Bolzano: Towards A Theory of Pure Logic." *Symposium.Journal of the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy* no. 10:473-502
"The work of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) on states of affairs, judgment, and speech acts bears striking similarities to Bernard Bolzano's work in the area of general logic. It is my belief that these similarities suggest that Reinach used Bolzano's logical work to assist with his own. Three considerations support this view. First, Bolzano's work in *Die Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) was considered by Husserl to be the necessary foundation for any work in logic. Second, Bolzano's logic was a suitable alternative to Immanuel Kant's in that he formulated his essential relations as inexistent yet real, not Platonic or belonging to a transcendental realm. Third, Reinach did not openly

criticize Bolzano in the manner he did the Austrians of the Brentano school, suggesting that Bolzano's logic was more complementary with his own. Due to his untimely death in 1917, Reinach's work on states of affairs and logic remains incomplete, some of it even lost or destroyed. I shall here offer a few brief remarks about Husserl as he was Reinach's mentor and friend, but an in depth discussion of the differences between Reinach and Husserl will not be offered in this paper. Secondary literature tells us that Reinach admired Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, in which phenomenology was said to concern itself with "primarily the discovery of the terra firma of pure logic, of the *Sachen* (things) in the sense of objective entities in general and of general essences in particular," and further "this phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences." These acts of discovering and describing essences or things themselves became the foundation of Reinach's realist ontology: things themselves surround us in the world and our access to them does not require a transcendental turn. It was precisely this realist foundation that allowed Reinach to develop and extend his phenomenological work to logic, legal philosophy, and speech acts as well. This conception of the nature and goal of phenomenology allowed Reinach and other phenomenologists a manner in which to analyze experience with its essential connections without either falling prey to psychologism or resorting to Platonism: phenomenology for them was truly a realist alternative." (p. 473)

7. Kasabova, Anita. 2002. "Is Logic a Theoretical or Practical Discipline? Kant and / or Bolzano." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 84:319-333
"Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say,

if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as "is" or "have", but no normative expressions, such as "ought", "ought not" or "may". A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form "it ought to be". Theoretical propositions express what is, whereas practical propositions express what should be. So a theoretical discipline is descriptive and a normative discipline is prescriptive, but what does a theoretical discipline describe? According to one view, logic is only theoretical and only describes how things are. Logic as a purely theoretical discipline can then be said to be about mental or linguistic activities, or about non-temporal entities and their non-natural connections, such as entailment or derivability. The practical alternative of this purely theoretical view is that logic is only a practical discipline. Its propositions tell us how we may, should or should not judge and reason. Logic as a normative discipline states norms for human activities. According to another view, logic is primarily a theoretical discipline and its counterpart says that logic is primarily a practical discipline. Yet another view of logic says that it can be conceived as both theoretical and practical." (p. 319). "Which view of logic does Bolzano take? Whereas Husserl insists on delineating a separate pure logic, Bolzano's Theory of Science combines theoretical and practical logic. Unlike Husserl and contrary to Kant, Bolzano claims that logic as a theory of science, must have both a theoretical and a practical character. Bolzano's wide understanding of logic as a Wissenschaftslehre or doctrine of how to present sciences (WL I, § 1) extends to epistemology and methodology, including didactic and methodological rules for classifying and teaching the sciences. These latter are collections of truths (WL I, § 1) and it is the practical task of a theory of science or logic to direct our acquaintance with these collections of true propositions. Bolzano even claims that logic in this wide sense is essentially a normative discipline, which depends on psychology (WL I, § 11) (21) and that logic proper (22) is a methodology containing laws that regulate our acquisition of knowledge (WL I, § 15.2) (23)." (p. 326).

(21) Cf. also Heinrich Fels, “Die Philosophie Bolzanos”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, vol. 40, pp. 319-448, 1927, pp.319-448).
(22) Bolzano calls the 4th part of the *Theory of Science* “Eigentliche Wissenschaftslehre”.
(23) Cf. Heinrich Scholz, *Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos*, Verlag Oeffentliches Leben, Berlin.1937, p.421.

8. ———. 2004. "Colour Sensations and Colour Qualities: Bolzano Between Modern and Contemporary Views." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 12:247-276
"What are colour sensations? Sensations are the basic constituents of our perceptual states. They are primitive mental events and are usually distinguished from the conceptual component of more complex mental states, such as beliefs or judgements. For instance, we may see a certain colour or hear a sound without understanding what it is, but we do not remember a colour or sound, nor believe that there is a colour such as tawny, or want to hear a certain sound, without having some idea of what it is." (p. 247)
(...)
"How does Bolzano distinguish between colour sensations and colour qualities? He explains the fact that we have colour sensations by assuming that these latter are caused by real properties of objects and, in the *Wissenschaftslehre* and the *Athanasia*, he claims that colours are dispositional properties or secondary qualities. His causal thesis on colour perception is that colours are properties or attributes of things and we assume that these properties are the cause of our colour sensations and the reason for our judgements that we are seeing coloured things.(12)
His claim that colours are dispositional qualities underlies his examination of physical experiments on colours, which I reconstruct in the next but one section. I then bring the implications of his view into the contemporary discussion of whether colours are dispositional or physical qualities of objects." (p 249)
(12) *Aetiologie*, in *Mathematische und Philosophische Schriften 1810–1816,* BBGA, 2, Nachlass A, vol. 5. §§ 14–15.

9. ———. 2006. "Bolzano's Semiotic Method of Explication." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 23:21-39
"This paper is programmatic: it presents a so-far undiscussed part of Bolzano's *Theory of Science*, namely the *Semiotics*.(1) Bolzano's account of explication is reconstructed to show his contribution to the contemporary discussion." (p. 21)
(...)
"In the second section of the semiotics dealing with the use of signs in treatises and manuals, Bolzano introduces the notion of *Verständigung*.
In German, a *Verständigung* means to inform someone of something, to communicate with someone and to make oneself (or something) understood.(7) Bolzano's English and French translators use the word *explication* for translating *Verständigung*, for this notion concerns the interpretative relation between linguistic and mental events: the relation between signs and intentions and the way in which we understand words. A *Verständigung* is more than the mere grasping or understanding of a word, however, for this word designates the linguistic act of making something explicit in such a way that it is understood by others and thus this concept plays an important role in communication." (p. 21-22)
(1) Bolzano, Bernard (1837), *Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science)*, Sulzbach, Seidel, [WL] IV, §§ 637-677; (1833-1841) *Von der mathematischen Lehrart (On the mathematical method)*, in Bernard Bolzano *Gesamtausgabe*, Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 1969-, Nachlass II, A, 7, [ML] § 9.
(7) The noun *Verständigung* is the nominalization of the verb *verständigen*, which means "to inform" ("den Leser zu verstandigen") or "to communicate."
The second use occurs especially with constructions using the genitive, e.g., "den Gastfreund der Ursache ihres Kummers zu verständigen" or "der jungen Fiirstin meine Liebe zu verständigen." Sich verstandigen means "to make oneself understood" and, more specifically, "to correct mistakes or misunderstandings" (Missverständnisse). See H. Paul, *Deutsches Worterbuch* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1896,

1935), pp. 608-609, as well as contemporary dictionaries of the German language, such as the *Wahrig* (1966), Bertelsmann, (2002).

10. Kasabova, Anna. 2012. "Bolzano's Semantic Relation of Grounding: A Case Study." In *Inference, Consequence, and Meaning: Perspectives on Inferentialism*, edited by Gurova, Lilia, 85-103. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
    Abstract: "I reconstruct Bolzano's account of the grounding relation (*Abfolge*) which, I argue, is a precursor of inferentialism as a basis for semantics and I apply the grounding relation to a particular case: episodic memory. I argue that the basis of episodic memory is not the empirical relation of causality but the semantic relation of grounding which explains why we remember some things rather than others."
11. Kasabova, Anita. 2013. "Dubislav and Bolzano." In *The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism*, edited by Milkov, Nikolay and Peckhaus, Volker, 205-228. Dordrecht: Springer
    "Brief Introduction
    Walter Dubislav (1895–1937) was an active member of the Berlin Group of logical empiricismin the early 1930s. A philosopher, mathematician and logician, he shared the thematic focus of the Berlin Group on the natural sciences, mathematics and logic. He shared the methodological demand of the Berlin Group that philosophical method of inquiry should follow the rigor and precision of formal sciences in exposition and logical reasoning (Rescher 2006, 283). A rigorous methodology for philosophy was also required by Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), the Prague mathematician, logician and philosopher. Was it Bolzano's efforts to separate logic from psychology in the *Theory of Science* (Bolzano 1837) or his reconstruction of mathematics in the *Contributions to a Better Founded Exposition of Mathematics* (1810) which attracted Walter Dubislav's attention?
    Dubislav was not interested in Bolzano's early attempts to develop a mathematical method for expounding objective

dependence relations which hold between judgments as grounds and consequences (Bolzano 1810, II, § 2). His research is focused on the later Bolzano (1837). In a series of papers published between 1929 and 1931, he deals with Bolzano's Kant-criticism and Bolzano's contribution to modern logic. More specifically, he examines what he calls Bolzano's propositional functions (*Aussage- oder Satzfunktion*), his notion of analyticity and analytic statements, as well as his notions of probability (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*) and derivability (*Ableitbarkeit*)." (p. 205)

12. ———. 2013. "Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity – Does it Fall Short of Logical Precision?" *Philosophical Alternatives* no. 6:13-34
Abstract: "My commentary is Kant-friendly and I begin by re-situating the Siebel-Bolzano-Kant discussion on analytic judgments in regard to their history, namely, to Aristotle's predication. I focus on Siebel-Bolzano's objections that Kant's analytic judgments (i) have a definiens permitting too broad an interpretation, and (ii) that the definiens is too narrow. I re-examine Kant's use of 'covertly' and 'identity of concepts' and argue pace Mark Siebel that Kant's analytic judgments make explicit the shared content of subject and predicate. I then re-examine Kant and Bolzano's notion of (essential) distinctive feature (*Merkmal*) discussed by Siebel in the context of the 'contained in'/'contained under' issue, and show that Kant's analytic judgments are nominal definitions."
13. Kluge, Eike Henner. 1980. "Bolzano and Frege: Some Conceptual Parallels." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 10:21-41
"Recent Frege scholarship has evidenced a growing interest in the historical basis of Frege's thought. By and large, that interest has focussed on the figure of Leibniz, and although there is still some disagreement over the precise nature and extent of the latter's influence, the fact that it exists is apparently beyond dispute. However, there is another historical figure, of some importance in his own right, whose influence on Frege - or, to be more precise, the

possibility of whose influence on Frege - has largely been ignored. I am referring to Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848). The purpose of this paper is to expose some interesting not to say profound similarities between certain fundamental doctrines of the two thinkers, and to suggest on that basis the likelihood of an influence of the former on the latter should be seriously considered." (p. 21)

14. Kneale, Wiiliam, and neale, Martha. 1962. *The Development of Logic*. Oxford Clrendon Press
Chapter V. *Logic after the Renaissance*. § 5. *Bolzano and Mill*, pp. 358-371.
"According to Bolzano a science in the objective sense of that word is a sum of objective truths. If it is set forth in a treatise, the truths of which it consists must, of course, be known to some man, but truths are not in general to be identified with truths known to men. On the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that the great majority of them are known only to God. For an objective truth is a true proposition-in-itself (*Satz-an-sich*), that is to say, a true propositional content, something thinkable or expressible but not necessarily thought or expressed.(6) Often the word 'judgement' is used in this sense, but it is not suitable as a technical term because it is sometimes used also for the act as opposed to the content of judging; and apart from that it would be misleading if applied to a content which was not believed but merely considered as an hypothesis. 'Judgement' is in fact just one of many words that we can use to refer to propositional contents in special contexts. Others are 'premiss' and 'conclusion', which logicians introduced as descriptions for sentences occurring in certain positions in arguments but used later as though they were designations for propositional contents." (p. 360)
(6) *Wissenschaftslehre* § 12.

15. Konzelmann, Ziv Anita. 2009. "Naturalized Rationality. A Glance at Bolzano's Philosophy of Mind." *Baltic International Yearbook ofCognition, Logic and Communication* no. 4:1-21
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano's philosophy of mind is closely related to his metaphysical conceptions of substance,

adherence and force. Questions as to how the mind is working are treated in terms of efficient (causal) faculties producing simple and complex representations, conclusive and non-conclusive judgments, and meta-representational attitudes such as believing and knowing. My paper outlines the proximity of Bolzano's account of "mental forces" to contemporary accounts of faculty psychology such as Modularity Theory and Simple Heuristics. While the modularist notions of domain specificity and encapsulated mental faculties align with Bolzano's allotment of domain specific tasks to correspondingly specified psychological forces (e.g. judging to "judgmental force", inferring to "inferential force" etc.), the emphasis of Simple Heuristics on accurate "fast and frugal" processes aligns with Bolzano's views regarding cognitive resources and the importance of epistemic economy. The paper attempts to show how Bolzano's metaphysics of mind supposes a conception of bound rationality that determines his epistemology. Combining the rationalist concern for epistemic agent responsibility in the pursuit of knowledge with a strong confidence in the reliability of causal processes to generate the right beliefs, his epistemology shows close affinities with contemporary Virtue Epistemology. According to Virtue Epistemology, knowledge requires that true beliefs be generated by reliable processes typical of a virtuous character. The thesis that Bolzano anticipates virtue epistemological considerations is corroborated by his discussion of heuristic principles that set the norms for the acquisition of knowledge. The paper explores possible relations between such principles and the presumed low-level heuristics of cognitive processes."

16. ———. 2011. "Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth." *Synthese* no. 183:27-45
Abstract: "The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano's epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano's notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their

foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational.
The twofold attempt to examine one's assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano's notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believing."

17. Koren, Ladislav. 2014. "Quantificational Accounts of Logical Consequence I: From Aristotle to Bolzano." *Organon F* no. 21:22-44
Abstract: "So-called quantificational accounts explicate logical consequence or validity as truth-preservation in all cases, cases being construed as admissible substitutional variants or as admissible interpretations with respect to non-logical terms. In the present study, which is the first from three successive studies devoted to quantification accounts, I focus on the beginning of systematic theorizing of consequence in Aristotle's work, which contains the rudiments of both modal and formal accounts of consequence.
I argue, *inter alia*, that there is no evidence for the claim that Aristotle propounded a quantificational account, and that for a full-fledged quantificational approach in a modern style we need to turn to Bolzano's substitutional approach, whose motivation, structure and problems are explained in the second part of this study."
"Bolzano might have been the first to elaborate rigorously on this very idea in his account of logical validity and deducibility. The following passage deserves a full quote: Among the definitions of [the concept of deducibility] ... one of the best is that of Aristotle: 'a syllogism is a discourse in

which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.' Since there can be no doubt that Aristotle assumed that the relation of deducibility can hold between false propositions, the 'follows of necessity' can hardly be interpreted in any other way than this: that the conclusion becomes true whenever the premises are true. Now it is obvious that we cannot say of one and the same class of propositions that one of them becomes true whenever the others are true, unless we envisage some of their parts as variable.
For propositions none of whose parts change are not sometimes true and sometimes false; they are always one or the other. Hence when it was said of certain propositions that one of them becomes true as soon as the others do, the actual reference was not to these propositions themselves, but to a relation which holds between the infinitely many propositions which can be generated from them, if certain of their ideas are replaced by arbitrarily chosen other ideas. (Bolzano 1972, § 155, 219-220)" (p. 33)
References
Bolzano B. (1837/1972): *Theory of Science*. Translated and edited by R. George. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Translation of selected parts of *Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausführlichen und grösstentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter*. 4 Vols. Sulzbach: J. E. v. Seidel.

18. Krämer, Stephan. 2011. "Bolzano on the Intransparency of Content." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 82:189-208
Summary: "Content, according to Bolzano, is intransparent: our knowledge of certain essential features of the contents of our contentful mental acts (such as their identity and composition) is often severely limited. In this paper, I identify various intransparency theses Bolzano is committed to, and present and evaluate the defence he offers for his view. I argue that while his intransparency theses may be correct, his defence is unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that improving on his defence would require substantial modifications to his general epistemology of content."

19. Krause, Andrej. 2006. "Are Bolzano's Substances Simple?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 80:543-562
Abstract: "This article analyzes one aspect of Bolzano's metaphysics. It discusses the question of whether, according to Bolzano, substances are simple or not. In the opinion of some commentators, he accepts composed substances, that is, substances having substances as proper parts. However, it is easily possible to misinterpret his position. This paper first tries to reconstruct Bolzano's definitions of the concept of substance and suggests that he should be able to agree with the following final definition: x is a substance if and only ifx is real and not a property. After this, it is shown that, according to Bolzano, every substance is simple in a fourfold sense: No substance has (1) adherences as parts, (2) substances as proper parts, (3) spatially extended parts, and (4) temporal parts."
20. Kriener, Jönne. 2017. "Bolzano." In *The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic: From Aristotle to Tarski*, edited by Malpass, Alex and Antonutti Marfori, Marianna, 121-142. New York: Bloomsbury Academic
"This chapter presents core elements of the logic developed by the Austrian mathematician and philosopher Bernard Bolzano during the fi rst decades of the nineteenth century. * For Bolzano, logic deals with scientific reasoning quite generally. A science for him is an ordered body of true propositions. Accordingly, I will begin by explaining Bolzano's notion of proposition.
When we engage in science, our reasoning crucially involves the derivation of some propositions from others. Bolzano's most advanced innovation in logic is his theory of deducibility (*Ableitbarkeit*). Famously, it anticipates some aspects of the modern concept of logical consequence. Finally we deal with a more demanding, and less well understood, way in which Bolzano took scientific truths to be ordered: his notion of grounding (*Abfolge*). Grounding is central to Bolzano's thinking about science, and thus an important part of Bolzano's logic." (p. 121)
21. Künne, Wolfgang. 1997. "Propositions in Bolzano and Frege." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:203-240

Reprinted in W. Künne, *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*, pp. 157-195 and in Michael Beaney and Erich H. Reck (eds.), *Gottlob Frege. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. I: Frege's Philosophy in Context*, New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 124-153.
Abstract: "In the Preface to his book *Frege and Other Philosophers* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996] Michael Dummett says: “The only nineteenth-century philosopher of whom it would be reasonable to guess, just from the content of his writings and those of Frege, that he had influenced Frege, is Bernhard Bolzano, who died in the year Frege was born; but there is no evidence whatever that Frege ever read Bolzano”.(1) Apart from one grave mistake this seems to me to be exactly right. Did you notice the “grave” mistake? Bolzano’s first name is spelled with an “h” and thereby deprived of its Italian flavour.(2)
To be sure, there were two mathematically minded philosophers and one philosophically minded mathematician who emphatically appealed to Bolzano in the course of their discussions with Frege. So he was made aware of the fact that Bolzano’s work was potentially relevant for his own concerns. But Husserl, Kerry and Korselt were critical of Frege, and Frege in turn was very critical of them. Perhaps that’s why he never bothered to read an author they praised, — who knows... (3)
There are many respects in which a comparison between Bolzano and Frege could be philosophically fruitful. But what is most striking for everyone who reads both Frege’s *Logische Untersuchungen* and Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* is the close similarity between what Frege calls *Gedanken* and what Bolzano calls *Sätze an sich*. In the literature this resemblance is frequently mentioned, but I have never seen a detailed investigation into this topic. (4) In this paper I shall recall some of the well-known respects, and point out some less well-known respects, in which F(rege)-Propositions and B(olzano)-Propositions (as I shall call them) resemble each other. But I am at least as keen to underline some philosophically important differences beneath those similarities."

(1) Dummett, vii. The same claim is to be found in Dummett *Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt /M., 1988, 34; *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, Cambridge/MA, 1993, 24, and *Frege. Philosophy of Mathematics*, London, 1991, 47. I cannot take seriously E.-H. Kluge's contention that there was "a de facto, perhaps even unconscious influence that manifested itself in a similarity of conceptual approach and a parallelism of positions defended" (Kluge "Bolzano and Frege: Some Conceptual Parallels, in: *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 10 (1980), pp. 21-42, 21 ff.). Several extremely careless translations from the *Wissenschaftslehre* in Kluge's article seem to be symptomatic of a rather superficial acquaintance with Bolzano's work. I also disagree with much of his interpretation of Frege.
(2) Bemard(o)'s father was born at the Lago di Como. By the way, the misspelling is endemic. In Vienna it marred even the attempt to name a street after Bolzano.
(3) Cp. Künne "Die Ernte wird erscheinen...' Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1849-1939)", pp. 9-82, esp. 31-50; revised version in this volume: 326-359.
(4) Of course, in Dummett *Ursprünge.../Origins...* ch. 4, it is also duly registered, but the focus is rather on Frege.

22. ———. 1998. "Bolzano, Bernard." In *Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Craig, Edward, 824-828. New York: Routledge
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano was a lone forerunner both of analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Born in Prague in the year when Kant's first *Critique* appeared, he became one of the most acute critics both of Kant and of German Idealism. He died in Prague in the same year in which Frege was born; Frege is philosophically closer to him than any other thinker of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Bolzano was the only outstanding proponent of utilitarianism among German-speaking philosophers, and was a creative mathematician whose name is duly remembered in the annals of this discipline. His *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) of 1837 makes him the greatest logician in the period between Leibniz and Frege. The book was sadly neglected by Bolzano's

contemporaries, but rediscovered by Brentano's pupils: Its ontology of propositions and ideas provided Husserl with much of his ammunition in his fight against psychologism and in support of phenomenology, and through Twardowski it also had an impact on the development of logical semantics in the Lwów-Warsaw School."

23. ———. 2001. "Constituents of Concepts: Bolzano vs. Frege." In *Building on Frege. New Essays on Sense, Content, and Concept*, edited by Newen, Albert, Nortmann, Ulrich and Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer, 267-285. Stanford: CLSI Publications
Reprinted in: W. Künne, *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2008, pp. 211-232.
"In section 1 of this paper I shall point out that in one respect the grandfather of analytical philosophy was more conservative than its great-grandfather: Frege at least partially endorsed the Canon of Reciprocity which was a prominent ingredient of the post-Cartesian logical tradition, Bolzano rejected it completely. In section 2 I shall try to defend one part of this bipartite principle. In section 3 I shall try to show that this line of defence is open to Frege. This claim is based on a reconsideration of Frege's notion of the marks (*Merkmale*) of a concept, — a notion which is generally treated rather cavalierly in the literature on Frege. In section 4 I shall present a problem that Bolzano and Frege share because they both think of complex senses in part-whole terms. Finally, in part 5, I shall briefly celebrate what I deem to be Bolzano's victorious attack on the other part of the Canon of Reciprocity (CR)." (p. 211)
(...)
Here is Kant's formulation of CR: (4)
(CR) Content and extension of a concept stand in an inverse relation. The more objects fall under a concept, the fewer conceptual components are contained within the concept, and vice versa.
Bolzano attacks CR in § 120 of his monumental *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837; henceforth '*WL*' for short). (5)

(4) ‘Inhalt und Umfang eines Begriffs stehen gegen cinander in umgekehrtem Verhältnisse. Je mehr namlich ein Begriffunter sich enthalt, desto weniger enthalt er in sich und umgekehrt’ (Kant (10), 148). Bolzano’s contention in WL I 294, 570, repeated by many authors, that (CR) is to be found already in the Logic of Port Royal (Arnauld/Nicole) is not tenable (Schmauks 14f.). An early (if not the earliest) formulation of (CR) is given in Wolff (l), 138.
(5) Bolzano quotes (CR) in WL I 292.
[Another definition of CR: "Every concept, as partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; *as ground of cognition, i.e., as mark*, these things are contained under it. In the former respect every concept has a content, in the other an extension.
The content and extension of a concept stand in inverse relation to one another. The more a concept contains under itself, namely, the less it contains in itself, and conversely.
Note. The universality or universal validity of a concept does not rest on the fact that the concept is a partial concept, but rather on the fact that it is a ground of cognition." (I. Kant, *The Jäsche Logic*, § 7, *Content and extension of concepts*, in: *Lecture on Logic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 96]

24. ———. 2003. "Bernard Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* and Polish Analytical Philosophy Between 1894 and 1935." In *Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition: Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, 179-192. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"In this paper I want to examine some of the many Polish contributions to a critical discussion of Bolzano 's masterpiece.
Twardowski praised Bolzano for clearly distinguishing, under the headings [1] *subjektive Vorstellung*, [2] *Vorstellung an sich or objektive Vorstellung*, and [3] *Gegenstand*, what ought to be distinguished, namely [1] the mental act of representing an object, [2] the content of this act, and [3] its object. Twardowski's book [Twardowski 1892] voiced a fundamental disagreement with Bolzano,

which, some would say, was to become rather fruitful, and it is marred by a fundamental misunderstanding.
The disagreement concerns the question whether all representings are objectual (*gegenständlich*) or whether some representings lack an object. For Bolzano this was a matter of course: The act of representing I give voice to when uttering the definite description 'the present King of Poland' has no object.
Twardowski disagreed: my representation does have an object, but it is a non-existent one,(4) This move paved the way for Meinong (as weIl as for Routley and Parsons)(5). Meinong's *Theory of Objects* is based upon the 'principle of the independence of being from being-so (*Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein*)' : an object can be thus-and-so even if it has no being (i.e, even if it neither 'exists' nor 'subsists'). Bolzano was strongly opposed to this: 'as the old canon has it (*wie schon der alte Kanon besagt*) - *nonentis nullae sunt offectiones*.(6) In 1894 another pupil of Brentano's, Edmund Husserl, who had already come across Bolzano as a mathematician, forcefully defended the claim that some representings have no object whatsoever against Twardowski's criticism.(7) (In some respects this controversy foreshadows that between Meinong and post-'On Denoting-Russell.)" (p. 179-180)
(4) Twardowski (1982), p. 24.
(5) Meinong 'Über Gegenstandstheorie'. On Meinong's reading of Bolzano cp. Künne (1997), §11.
(6) Bolzano, *Athanasia*; pp. 292 f. As to the Canon cp. Descartes, *Principia* I § 52.
(7) Husserl (1894), p. 303.
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Bolzano, Bemard: 1837, Dr. B. Bolzanos *Wissenschaftslehre*, Seidel, Sulzbach; reprint, edited by Wolfgang Schultz, Leipzig, 1929/1931.
Bolzano, Bernard: 1838, Dr. Bolzano's *Athanasia* [. . .]. Zweite verbesserte Ausgabe, Seidel, Sulzbach.
Husserl, Edmund: 1894, 'Immanenter und wirklicher Gegenstand', Husserliana XXII, Nijhoff, TheHague,1979, pp. 303-338.

Künne, Wolfgang: 1997, ' "Die Ernte wird erscheinen", Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption', in: H. Ganthaler and O. Neumaier (eds.), *Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte*, Academia, Sankt Augustin, pp. 9-82.
Meinong, Alexius: 1904, 'Über Gegenstandstheorie' , reprinted in *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. VII, Graz 1968, pp. 483-535.
Twardowski, Kazimierz: 1982, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, 1894, Philosophia, München.

25. ———. 2003. "Are Questions Propositions?" *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 57:157-168
Reprinted in: W. Künne, *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2008, pp. 197-210.
"In the Prolegomena to his *Logische Untersuchungen* (LU) Edmund Husserl praised the first two volumes of Bernard Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL) as 'far surpassing everything else world literature has to offer as systematic exposition of logic'. Eleven years later the key is a bit lower: These volumes, he now says, occupy 'the highest rank in the logical world literature of the 19th century'.(2)
To the best of my knowledge, the most extensive and most thorough discussion of a single contention in Bolzano's philosophy of logic that can be found in any of Husserl's books and articles published during his lifetime is contained in the last chapter of his LU.(3) The topic of this discussion is a courageous if not outrageous Bolzanian contention which, at least on the face of it, flatly contradicts what most philosophers since Aristotle took for granted. *Questions*, Bolzano claims, *are a special kind of propositions and hence truth-evaluable*. Let me call this Bolzano's *Tenet*.
In my little exercise I shall reconstruct and evaluate both Bolzano's *Tenet* and Husserl's criticism thereof. I shall argue that the latter is largely correct, but that in the end Husserl and Bolzano are both wrong. Somebody else got it right: a philosopher and mathematician for whom one would also claim a very high rank indeed in the logical world literature of the 19th, and of any, century. But this is to anticipate.

What exactly is it that Bolzano maintains when he says that questions are a kind of propositions? By ‘proposition (Satz an sich)’ he means something that is neither mental nor linguistic. Propositions are thinkables and sayables which can be singled out by that-clauses. Such thinkables and sayables are truth-evaluable, hence, assuming bivalence as Bolzano does, they are either true or false. If Bolzano’s Tenet is to make any sense at all, by ‘questions’ he cannot mean anything mental or linguistic. Now the term ‘question’ is multiply ambiguous, and for our inquiry it is most important not to get entangled in this ambiguity. We must distinguish
Questions 1: mental acts of asking oneself a question,
Questions 2: illocutionary acts of asking a question,
Questions 3: interrogative sentences, and
Questions 4: askables.
Wonderings, i. e. sense-1-questions, are voiced by sense-2-questions. Husserl occasionally labels the former '*innerliche Fragen*' and the latter ‘*Anfragen*’. The second term (which in ordinary German has a far narrower application) is meant to register the fact that sense-2-questions are essentially addressed to someone. Sense-3-questions are linguistic vehicles of sense-2-questions; unsurprisingly Husserl calls them ‘*Fragesatze*’. Sense-4-questions, finally, are possible contents of sense-1- and of sense-2-questions, and sometimes they coincide with the conventional linguistic meaning of sense-3-questions. (They do so only if the latter are free of context-sensitive elements.) In Husserl’s language, an askable is a ‘*Frageinhalt*’, and he identifies it with the ‘*Bedeutung*' (meaning) des *Fragesatzes'*. (4) Askables are those thinkables and sayables which can be singled out by indirect sense-3-questions (for example, by the clauses in ‘He asked whether the conference had started’ or ‘She asks when the conference will end’). So let us reformulate Bolzano’s Tenet: *Askables are a proper sub-set of propositions*." (pp. 197-198).
(...)
"At the point we have now reached we can recognize that the following stance has a chance of being coherent: conceding

that English yes/no interrogatives are not true or false (sc. in English) any more than any other interrogatives are, while maintaining that yes/no interrogatives, in contradistinction to search interrogatives, express propositions which are true or false (*simpliciter*). This is coherent if we take yes/no interrogatives to be an exception to the right-to-left half of a bridge-principle that is unexceptionable as regards *declarative* sentences: Sentence S is true in language L at context c if and only if what is expressed by S in L at c is true. This move would mitigate the tension between Aristotle's and Bolzano's views about questions, which Husserl emphasized at the outset of his discussion of Bolzano's Tenet." (pp. 209-210).
(2) Husserl (3), I 225; letter to Friedjung, in Husserl (14), VII 97.
(3) In 1920 Husserl emphasized that he had refrained from modifying the text of the 1st edition only because in the meantime his views had changed too drastically (preface to the 2nd edition of Husserl(3), II/2 vii). I shall concentrate exclusively on his 1901 position, more precisely: on those aspects of that position which are relevant for an evaluation of Bolzano's thesis about questions. (Page references are always to the 2nd edition.)
(4) Husserl (3), II/2 211-212.

26. ———. 2006. "Analyticity and Logical Truth: from Bolzano to Quine." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, Mark, 184-249. New York: Routledge
Reprinted in: W. Künne, *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2008, pp. 233-303.
"Truth-value bearers and the concept of truth
For Bolzano analyticity, like truth and falsity, is a property of propositions (*Sätze an sich*). He takes the concept of a proposition to resist analysis or conceptual decomposition (*Erklärung*), but there are other ways of 'achieving an understanding (*Verständigung*)' of a concept.(3)
Consider a report of the following type: 'Johanna said that copper conducts electricity, Jeanne said the same thing,

though in different words, and Joan believes what they said.' Here a that-clause is used to single out something that is [1] said by different speakers, [2] distinct from the linguistic vehicles used for saying it, and [3] believed by somebody. 'Now, this is the sort of thing I mean by *proposition*,' Bolzano would say, 'propositions are sayables and thinkables, possible contents of sayings and thinkings, that can be singled out by that-clauses.'(4)"
(3) 3 Cf. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* (henceforth: WL, quoted by volume and page number) IV 243–5, 488–90, 542–5, 547. The manuscript of *WL* was published only seven years after Bolzano had begun to search for a publisher (outside the borders of the Austrian Empire). The book was as unsuccessful as can be. It was only several decades after Bolzano's death that some philosophers in Vienna, Halle and Lemberg recognized some of the gold mines it contains. See Künne (2) and (5).
(4) Bolzano's views on propositions are examined, and compared with Frege's, in Künne (3).
References
Künne, W.:
(2) ' "*Die Ernte wird erscheinen*", *Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption*' [I], in H. Ganthaler and O. Neumaier (eds) *Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte*, St Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1997: 9–82.
(3) 'Propositions in Bolzano and Frege', in (4): 203–40.
(4) with M. Siebel and M. Textor (eds) *Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy*, Grazer Philosophische Studien 53, 1997.
(5) '*Die Geschichte der philosophischen Bolzano-Rezeption*' [II], in H. Rumpler (ed.) *Bernard Bolzano und die Politik*, Wien: Böhlau, 2000: 311–52.
27. ———. 2007. "Some Varieties of Deception." In *Explaining the Mental. Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes*, edited by Penco, Carlo, Beaney, Michael and Vignolo, Massimiliano, 106-122. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
"Members of the family of concepts to which the title of this paper alludes play important roles in various areas of

theoretical and practical philosophy. I want to throw some light on these concepts and their interrelations, and in doing so I also want to make Bernard Bolzano's analytical work in this area better available. The great-grandfather of analytical philosophy, a contemporary of Hegel's, was a great mathematician, and he held the chair of Philosophy of Religion at Prague University until the Emperor sacked him. It was part of his job to deliver a sermon, a so-called *Erbauungsrede* or exhortation. on each and every Sunday and on church holidays. These sermons contain most of the material I shall exploit in this paper.(1) None of my definitions literally coincides with Bolzano's, but most of them are substantially due to him.
Bolzano never put his accounts of various kinds of *deceiving* and of various kinds of *trying to deceive* together. but if one attempts to arrange them systematically it runs out that for the most part they harmonize very well with each other. Whenever they don't I shall take the liberty of making adjustments that are meant lo enhance their plausibility." (p. 106)
(1) The pertinent sermons will be quoted as 'I', 'II', 'III ' and 'IV', followed by page number. I. deception & cheating, 13. 04.1817, in Bolzano. *ER4*, pp 306-313: II. self-deception, 15. 07.1810. in Bolzano. *ER4*, pp. 36-45: lll. Hypocrisy 16.02.1812. in Bolzano. *ER2*,. pp. 289-300. IV *Lying* 18. 03.1810, in Bolzano, *ER*2, pp. 73-81. Abbreviated references to Bolzano's works are spell out in the bibliography to this paper Quotations from Bolzano are always in italics.

28. ———. 2008. *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag
Essays in English: Propositions in Bolzano and Frege 157; Are Questions Propositions? 197; Constituents of Concepts 211; Analyticity and Logical Truth: From Bolzano to Quine 233-304
29. ———. 2009. "Bolzano and (Early) Husserl on Intentionality." In *Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic, Essays Dedicated to Göran Sundholm*, edited by Primiero, Giuseppe and Rahman, Shahid, 95-140. London: College Publications.

30. ———. 2011. "On Liars, ‘Liars’ and Harmless Self-Reference." In *Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. Volume 2*, edited by Reboul, Anne, 355-429. Dordrecht: Springer
Abstract: "The topics of this chapter are (1) the history of a mislabelled antinomy and of a pseudo-paradox and (2) some logico-semantical peculiarities of self-referential sentences that do not give rise to a paradox. My points of departure will be Bernard Bolzano’s discussions of a plain fallacy he called The Liar and of an antinomy that we unfortunately got used to calling The Liar. He found a pointer to the fallacy in Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations*. In a logic manual of the early renaissance, he came across a source of the antinomy in the form of a sentence that declares itself to be false. In Sect. 24.1, I shall praise Bolzano’s reaction to the fallacy and discuss his analysis of the concept of lying. I will present some ancient expositions of the antinomy and go on to criticize, along Moorean lines, Russell’s rather sloppy account. Finally, I will defend the author of the ‘Letter to Titus’ against the charge of being paradox-blind when he invoked a Cretan denigrator of all Cretans. (Some twentieth century logicians and analytic philosophers are the villains of this part of my chapter: I shall criticize their carelessness with respect to a well-entrenched concept, and I shall complain that they keep on alluding to ancient texts without bothering to read them closely.) In Sect. 24.2, I shall reconstruct Girolamo Savonarola’s excellent exposition of the antinomy [*], examine Bolzano’s criticism of the Florentine diagnosis and reject his own attempt to defuse the paradox. (I shall not try to improve on his attempt.) In this context, Bolzano makes a point concerning self-referential sentences that is not affected by the failure of his alleged dissolution of the antinomy. He rightly takes it to be a matter of course that there are ever so many harmlessly self-referential sentences. But he shows that some care is needed when one wants to formulate their negation. In Sect. 24.3, I will expound this point.

It turns out that similar problems arise when one uses harmlessly self-referential sentences in deductive arguments. Such sentences also enforce a revision of certain intuitively plausible constraints on translation."
[*] Girolamo Savonarola's Compendium logicae (Bolzano, WL I 78–80; Savonarola, CL 151, lines 6–24).
References
Savonarola G. (1492) *Compendium logicae*. In: Savonarola G. (1982) Opere, vol 22, *Scritti filosofici*, 1 (Garfagnini G. Garin E. (eds)). Roma 3–208.

31. ———. 2015. "On Having a Property: Corrigenda in Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 91:365-408.
32. ———. 2018. "Truth, Ascriptions of Truth, and Grounds of Truth Ascriptions: Reflections on Bolzano and Frege." In *Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History*, edited by Coliva, Annalisa, Leonardi, Paolo and Moruzzi, Sebastiano, 31-66. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan
"In Sect. 1 of this chapter, I shall discuss Bolzano's attempt to give a definition of the concept of truth, in Sect. 2 I shall ask whether Frege succeeds in showing that all such endeavours are doomed to failure. In this chapter I shall remain neutral as to the question of definability, but the key premise of his alleged proof of indefinability. The equivalence schema 'The thought that things are thus and so is true if, and only if, things are that way' captures an important feature of the concept of truth.
Frege went beyond this *true-iff* principle when he claimed that the two halves of such biconditionals do not only stand and fall together,—they even express one and the same thought. It is doubtful whether Frege has any good argument for this Identity Thesis. In Sect. 3 of this chapter I will give reasons for this doubt. In Sect. 4 I shall show that, and why, Bolzano rejects the Identity Thesis. Bolzano emphasizes an important feature of our concept of truth that is not captured by the equivalence schema. One can hint at this additional feature by saying, 'If the thought that things are thus and so is true, then it is true because of things' being that way, and not vice versa'. In Sect. 5 I shall

locate this true because-of principle in the theory of grounding (*Abfolge*) that Bolzano outlined in the second volume of his monumental *Wissenschaftslehre* (henceforth: *WL*). In Sect. 6 I shall explore whether the Identity Thesis can be refuted by appealing to (the Bolzanian reformulation of) the true-because-of principle. On the following pages, I shall not try to argue for the true-because-of principle. Like Aristotle and Bolzano I shall accept it as a basic intuition concerning truth.(1) The brief Appendix points to a use of the notion of grounding that has been neglected in recent literature although Bolzano deemed it to be of great importance." (pp. 31-32)
(1) Any attempt at a proof of this principle from a definition of truth presupposes, of course, that pace Frege such a definition is to be had.

33. Lange, Marc. 2022. "Bolzano, the Parallelogram of Forces, and Scientific Explanation." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 394-417. New York: Oxford University Press
"Marc Lange turns to Bolzano's philosophy of physics and discusses his explanatory proof of the parallelogram law for the composition of forces. Lange argues that this proof is neither clearly causal nor clearly non-causal. In order to illuminate its explanatory potential, Lange compares it with Bolzano's explanation of the intermediate value theorem: Bolzano takes the latter to have a unified explanation covering all functions, and in a similar spirit he regards an explanation of the parallelogram law as unifying it with analogous laws regarding various other quantities that are potential causes." (p. 38)
34. Lapointe, Sandra. 2002. "Bolzano's Hidden Theory of Universal Quantification." In *The Logica Yearbook 2001*, edited by Childer, Timothy and Ondrej, Majer, 37-48. Prague: Filosofia. Publishing House of Prague Institut of Philosophy.
35. ———. 2004. "Why Frege Never Read Bolzano." In *The Logica Yearbook 2003*, edited by Behounek, Libor, 183-194.

Prague: Filosofia. Publishing House of Prague Institute of Philosophy.
36. ———. 2006. "Bolzano on Grounding or Why Is Logic Synthetic." In *The Logica Yearbook 2005*, 113-126. Prague: Filosofia.
37. ———. 2007. "Bolzano Semantics and His Critique of the Decompositional Conception of Analysis." In *The Analytic Turn*, edited by Beaney, Michael, 219-234. London: Routledge
"When asked to explain what conceptual analysis is, philosophers often resort to the idea of decomposition: to analyse an expression or a concept is to break it down into its (simpler) components. Although the notion of decomposition is a convenient figure of speech, without qualifications it can hardly be said to provide an informative description of what is involved in conceptual analysis. It could be argued, however, that this was not always the case. In Kant's theory, for instance, the conception of analysis is literally decompositional: notions such as *Zergliederung, Auflösung', `Inhalt'* and *enthalten sein'* are meant to provide a relatively straightforward description of the mereological conception of the formal features of and relations between concepts he had inherited from his predecessors, contrary to what influential interpretations such as Quine (1953: 21) suggest.(2) In what follows, I'll use the expression `decompositional conception of analysis' to refer to the conception of analysis that underlies Kantian semantics and, most notoriously, the Kantian definition of analyticity. My concern, though, is not primarily with Kant nor with analyticity but with Bernard Bolzano's conception of analysis. A superficial reading of Bolzano's *Theory of Science - Wissenschaftslehre* (Bolzano 1837; hereafter *WL)* - could lead one to think that Bolzano also subscribed to the decompositional conception of analysis. Yet, while Bolzano sanctions Kant's account in his earlier work (cf. Bolzano 1810: §5; 1812: §30) he came explicitly to reject it. Contrary to what is often assumed, Bolzano's understanding of what it means for a concept to be 'included' in another concept or for a given concept to have a particular content is radically

different from Kant's and from that of Bolzano's other immediate predecessors. In fact, Bolzano anticipated some of the most important developments of twentieth-century semantics.(3)
I begin the paper with a brief sketch of the decompositional conception of analysis in section 1, and then in section 2 I present Bolzano's criticism of this conception. In section 3, I explain the main lines of Bolzano's reductive programme of analysis. Section 3, I hope, will go some way towards establishing the continued interest of Bolzano's semantic analyses. One of the main consequences of Bolzano's rejection of the decompositional conception of analysis is the need to find a new way to define semantic notions such as analyticity or validity. For that purpose, Bolzano developed a new and ingenious substitutional method. I sketch this method in section 4. I conclude by pointing out some important aspects of Bolzano's historical impact." (pp. 219-220)
(2) I deal in more length with this question in Lapointe *Qu'est-ce que l'analyse?*, Paris, Vrin, 2008.
(3) Superficial knowledge of medieval semantics suffices to convince that similarities are not scarce but this, unfortunately, remains to be studied.

38. ———. 2010. "Bolzano *a priori* Knowledge, and the Classical Model of Science." *Synthese* no. 174:263-281
Abstract: "This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano's views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano's views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano's theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead

one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano's antagonistic relationship to Kant directly shaped his own views."

39. ———. 2011. *Bolzano's Theoretical Philosophy. An Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Contents: Michael Beaney: Foreword VIII; Acknowledgements XI; Introduction 1; 1. Kant and German Philosophy 11; 2. Decomposition 18; 3. Meaning and Analysis 29; 4. A Substitutional Theory 43; 5. Analyticity 59; 6. *Ableitbarkeit* and *Abfolge* 72; 7. Justification and Proof 91; 8. *A priori* Knowledge 102; 9. Things, Collections and Numbers 116; 10. Frege, Meaning and Communication 128; 11. Husserl, Logical Psychologism and the Theory of Knowledge 139; Notes 158; Bibliography 170; Index 180-183.
"Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) occupies a unique place in the history of modern philosophy. Born in the year in which Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was published and dying in the year in which Frege was born, his philosophy - like his life - can be seen as offering a bridge between Kant's seminal work and the birth of analytic philosophy. In Bolzano's writings, one finds many of the characteristic themes of analytic philosophy anticipated. Like Frege and Russell after him, Bolzano was dissatisfied with Kant's account of mathematics and realised that a better conception of logic was required to do justice to mathematics. Bolzano's conception of logic was not Frege's or Russell's, but he did criticise traditional subject-predicate analysis, suggested that there was a fundamental form underlying all types of proposition and was insistent on the need to keep psychology out of logic. Like Frege, Bolzano construed existential statements as being concerned with the non-emptiness of appropriate 'ideas' *('Vorstellungen an sich'* in Bolzano's terms) or 'concepts' *(Begrime'* in Frege's terms), and his conception of 'propositions' *(Satze an sich')* is similar in many respects to Frege's conception of 'thoughts' *('Gedanken')*. Like Frege, too, Bolzano emphasised that there is a class of entities, including both

'ideas'/'concepts' and 'propositions'/'thoughts', which are objective but not actual *('wirklich'),* in the sense of not existing in the spatio-temporal realm.
Despite these similarities, however, Bolzano had no direct influence on any of the acknowledged founders of analytic philosophy. He had an influence on other German-speaking philosophers such as Franz Brentano, Benno Kerry, Edmund Husserl, Alwin Korselt and Kazimierz Twardowski, who themselves had an influence on the early analytic philosophers, both through correspondence and in their own publications (even if, often, mainly as a target of criticism). Through Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw school, he also had an influence on a whole generation of Polish logicians and philosophers, including Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski and Alfred Tarski, who played an important role in the development of analytic philosophy. So a full account of the history of analytic philosophy must certainly pay attention to Bolzano's work.
His significance, however, lies not just in these patterns of influence. The similarities and differences between his views and those of Frege, in particular, reveal much about the nature of analytic philosophy: the conceptions of analysis and logical form involved, for example, and key debates such as those about analyticity and other modal notions. These influences and connections are explored and elucidated by Sandra Lapointe in this book.
At the heart of Bolzano's logic - logic being understood in the traditional broad sense as including both methodology and theory of science (hence the title of Bolzano's major work, the *Wissenschaftslehre)* - lies his critique of Kant. As Lapointe explains in the first three chapters, Bolzano criticises Kant's theory of intuition and his decompositional conception of analysis. In doing so, Bolzano develops his own positive doctrines, concerning analyticity and logical consequence, in particular, based on a method of substitution, as Lapointe elaborates in Chapters 4-6. In the remaining chapters, further clarifying his semantic theory, she discusses his epistemological and ontological views and

his connection with Frege and Husserl." (from the Foreword by Micharl Beaney).

40. ———. 2012. "Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:11-32
Abstract: "In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately con ates the two notions. I argue further that Kant's views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano's criticism of the Kantian position and his redefinition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian philosophers generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important differences between the two positions."
41. ———. 2012. "Bolzano and Kant: Introduction." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:1-10.
42. ———. 2014. "Bolzano, Quine and Logical Truth." In *A Companion to W.V.O. Quine*, edited by Harman, Gilbert and Lepore, Ernie, 296-312. Malden: Wiley Blackwell
"In this paper, I compare Quine's discussion of logical truth to Bolzano's theory of "logical analyticity". It is by now a received view that Bolzano largely anticipated Quine's views on logical truth, a conclusion Quine himself was retroactively prompted to draw:
"[M]y much cited definition of logical truth was meant only as an improved exposition of a long-current idea. So I was not taken aback at Bar-Hillel's finding the idea in Bolzano [...]" (Quine 1960, 65; see also 1966b, 110)."
According to the standard interpretation, the similarity between Bolzano and Quine comes from the fact that they are both "demarcating logic [...] with the help of a set of logical particles which are held constant, while the other non-logical expressions are freely substituted for each

other".(3) This interpretation assumes that Bolzano and Quine share at least some substantial views about what makes a term a "logical" term. I think that this interpretation is largely mistaken. My paper has four parts. In the first part, I give some background to Bolzano's theory, focusing on his views on syntax and form. In the second part, I show why it is mistaken to assume that Bolzano and Quine mean the same when they speak of logical concepts/words. In the third part of the paper I discuss Bolzano's views on logical truth and sentences that can be turned into logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. I conclude by asking whether Bolzano's position allows him to fulfil the epistemic requirement (and answer, with a twist, in the affirmative)." (p.297).
(3) “Comments on Quine” (Føllesdal 1980, p. 29, my emphasis).
References
Føllesdal, Dagfinn (1980). Comments on Quine. In S. Kanger and S. Öhman (eds.). *Philosophy and Grammar* (29–35). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Quine, W.v.O. (1960). *Word and Object*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W.v.O. (1966b). Carnap and Logical Truth. In *The Ways of Paradox* (107–132). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

43. ———. 2014. "Bolzano and the Analytical Tradition." *Philosophy Compass* no. 9:96-111
Abstract: "In the course of the last few decades, Bolzano has emerged as an important player in accounts of the history of philosophy. This should be no surprise. Few authors stand at a more central junction in the development of modern thought. Bolzano's contributions to logic and the theory of knowledge alone straddle three of the most important philosophical traditions of the 19th and 20th centuries: the Kantian school, the early phenomenological movement and what has come to be known as analytical philosophy. This paper identifies three Bolzanian theoretical innovations that warrant his inclusion in the analytical tradition: the commitment to ‘logical realism’, the adoption of a

substitutional procedure for the purpose of defining logical properties and a new theory of a priori cognition that presents itself as an alternative to Kant's. All three innovations concur to deliver what counts as the most important development of logic and its philosophy between Aristotle and Frege. In the final part of the paper, I defend Bolzano against a common objection and explain that these theoretical innovations are also supported by views on syntax, which though marginal are both workable and philosophically interesting."

44. ———. 2014. "Bolzano's Logical Realism." In *The Metaphysics of Logic*, edited by Rush, Penelope, 189-208. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
"Bolzano's *Theory of Science* (1837) presents the first explicit and methodical espousal of internal logical realism. It also contains a formidable number of theoretical innovations. They include (i) the first account of the distinction between "sense" (*Sinn, Bedeutung*) and "reference" (or "objectuality": *Gegenständlichkeit*), (ii) definitions of analyticity and consequence, i.e. "deducibility" (*Ableitbarkeit*) based on a new substitutional procedure that anticipates Quine's and Tarski's, respectively, and (iii) an account of mathematical knowledge that excludes, *contra* Kant, recourse to extraconceptual inferential steps and that is rooted in one of the earliest systematic reflections on the nature of deductive knowledge. (i)–(iii) all assume the existence of mind - and language-independent entities Bolzano calls "propositions and ideas in themselves" (*Sätze an sich*). Take (i) for instance. Appeal to propositions in themselves in this context serves Bolzano's antipsychologism in logic: according to Bolzano, the sense (*Sinn*) of a sentence – the proposition it expresses – is to be distinguished from the mental act in which it is grasped. Just like what is the case in Frege, a sentence has the semantic properties it has (e.g. truth) on Bolzano's account derivatively, by virtue of its relation to mind-independent entities: the primary bearers of semantic properties are the propositions that constitute their *Sinne*." (p. 195)

45. ———. 2017. "Bernard Bolzano." In *Sourcebook in the History of Philosophy of Language: Primary source texts from the Pre-Socratics to Mill*, edited by Cameron, Margare, Hill, Benjamin and Stainton, Robert J., 1029-1032. Dordrecht: Springer
"The views on language of Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) overlap with two traditions. On the one hand, Bolzano tries to make sense of the idea that the signs we use designate ideas. On the other hand, Bolzano's theory is underpinned by a series of semantic and epistemological analyses that yield the first philosophical treatment of linguistic signs as endowed with both meaning and reference, understood in the contemporary sense. The resulting theory is an interesting combination of elements of post-Lockean epistemologies with a clear anticipation of post-Fregean semantics." (p. 1029)
46. ———. 2018. "Bolzano's Philosophy of Mind and Action." In *Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra, 42-59. New York: Routledge
"In spite of the overwhelmingly sympathetic consensus on the significance of Bolzano's contribution to theoretical philosophy, little attention has to this date been paid to his views on mind."
(...)
"The present chapter is an attempt to go some way toward such an understanding.
The first part of the chapter offers a brief comparison of Bolzanian and Brentanian views on representation and judgement. A brief survey of Brentano's main positions is informative as a theoretical point of comparison for Bolzano's own views. At the very least, it is helpful to have the Brentanian theory in mind when gauging the impact - however humble - Bolzano effectively had on the theories of mind of some of Brentano's students.(4) The comparison however does not fully do justice to Bolzano's views. This is mainly because Bolzano's approach to the philosophy of mind and action has more to share with contemporary theorists than with any of his predecessors or successors in the 19th century. This claim is likely to arouse perplexity.

Bolzano puts forward his views on mind in *Athanasia* (1827), a treatise in which a hefty metaphysics of substance is put to work for the purpose of proving the immortality of the soul, a context which *prima facie* is unlikely to afford much relevance. Those who have discussed Bolzano's views on mind, with few exceptions, have however consistently missed what is most remarkably interesting about them. First, the framework within which Bolzano develops his metaphysics of mind and agency is not dualistic and presents some anticipation of what will later be known as "neutral monism".(5) Second, the conceptual resources that are deployed to make sense of the way in which "body" and "soul" interact in living beings presuppose an understanding of organisms that goes against - or far beyond - much of what Bolzano's contemporaries and successors in the the 19th century wrote on the topic, especially the Idealists. More importantly, Bolzano puts forward an account of rational agency based on a theory of mind that anticipates crucial aspects of contemporary discussions on the role of intentions as "reasons" or "causes" for action. In the second and more substantive part of the paper, I focus on Bolzano's views on the ontology of mind and rational agency." (pp. 42-43)

(4) For a more detailed presentation of Brentano's views on mind, see Rollinger *infra*; see also Kriegel (forthcoming). [2017]

(5) For a discussion of Mach's view on neutral monism, for instance, see Banks, *infra*.

References

Erik C. Banks, *Ernst Mach' Contributions to the Philosophy of Mind*, same volume, pp. 77-95.

Robin D. Rollinger, *Brentano's Early Philosophy of Mind*, same volume, pp. 168-185.

Uriah Kriegel, "Brentano Concept of Mind" in *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy*, Sandra Lapointe and Chris Pincock (eds.), Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

47. ———. 2019. "Bolzano on Logic in Mathematics and Beyond." In *Logic from Kant to Russell: Laying the*

Foundations for Analytic Philosophy, edited by Lapointe, Sandra, 101-122. New York: Routledge
"According to standard narratives, the origins of formal logic as we know it are to be found within the push toward logicism, axiomatisation and the foundations of set theory for which Frege's foundational project in mathematics often serves as muster. Frege, however, was by no means the first logician of the 19th century to seek to provide a new logical foundation to mathematical knowledge. At least one other author was driven by concerns, insights, ambitions and philosophical acumen that were as remarkable as Frege's. This author's efforts too resulted in a fullscale logical system whose conceptual resources, while they do not have the elegance and simplicity of Frege's "concept-script", are nonetheless as rich as those of first-order predicate calculus and powerful enough to generate Russell's paradox.(2) This author is Bernard Bolzano." (p. 101)
(2) Cf. Simons (1997) and Lapointe (2011, Chapter 3).
References
Lapointe, Sandra (2011) *Bolzano's Theoretical Philosophy*, Houndmills, Palgrave.
Simons, Peter (1997) "Bolzano on Collections," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 53, 87–108.

48. ———. 2022. "Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich." In *The Routledge Handbook of Propositions*, edited by Tillman, Chris and Murray, Adam Russell. New York: Routledge
To be published March 2022.
49. Lapointe, Sandra, and Armstrong, Chloe. 2014. "Bolzano, Kant, and Leibniz." In *New Anti-Kant*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra and Tolley, Clinton, 272-290. London: Palgrave Macmillan
"Both historically and philosophically Bolzano's contribution to philosophy is to be understood within the context of the reception of Kant's critical philosophy, or so we will argue. This claim is also likely to be controversial. Bolzano's contribution to philosophy, and in particular his contribution to the epistemology of logic and mathematics, is more often than not positioned in stark opposition to Kant's, in the intellectual lineage of Leibniz. What we are

proposing is deliberately meant to upset this picture. Bolzano's relationship to critical philosophy is far more complex than what is generally assumed. For one thing, Bolzano's relationship to Kantian philosophy is not exhausted by his relationship to Kant. Bolzano paid close attention to the logical theories of those who followed in Kant's stride, the "new logicians" (Bolzano's term), and he discussed their views in at least as much depth as he did Kant's. What's more, Bolzano sought to determine what is distinctive of the "new logic" and thus offered a philosophical reflexion that is still, even today, enlightening when it comes to understanding this aspect of the reception of Kant's first *Critique*." (pp. 273-274)
(...)
"Of course, there are connections between Bolzano and Leibniz. But Bolzano discusses Leibniz's work in fact comparatively rarely. We find over the some 2400 pages of the *Theory of Science* (1837) a mere 30 references to Leibniz, mostly to the *Nouveaux essais* (1704) – compare this with the some 150 references to Kant, and some 200 to Kiesewetter.[*] It is not only that the number of references is small, but also that many references are in footnotes, even in the sections entirely devoted to discussion of the views of other philosophers." (p. 275)
[*] Kiesewetter, Johann Gottfired Karl Christian. (1806). *Grundriss einer allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen*. Berlin: Lagarde.

50. Lapointe, Sandra, and Tolley, Clinton, eds. 2014. *New Anti-Kant*. London: Palgrave Macmillan
Contents: Michael Beaney: Series Editor's Foreword VI; Acknowledgements IX; Notes on Contributors X; PART I: 1. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley: Introduction 3; 2. Translators' Note 15; 3. František Přihonský: New Anti-Kant, or examination of the *Critique of Pure Reason* According to the Concepts Laid Down in Bolzano's *Theory of Science* (translated by Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley) 18;
PART II: 4. Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on Space and Outer Intuition 157; 5. Nicholas F. Stang: Kant, Bolzano,

and the Formality of Logic 192; 6. Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant, Bolzano, and Moore on the Value of Good Willing 235; 7. Sandra Lapointe and Chloe Armstrong: Bolzano, Kant and Leibniz 272; Index 291-295.

"A unique philosophical dialogue

The present volume contains an altogether remarkable document in the history of nineteenth-century philosophy: a critical commentary on he most influential systematic work (the *Critique of Pure Reason*) of one major philosopher (Kant), written from the point of view of another major systematic philosopher (Bolzano), just decades after the former's publication. Bolzano, at the height of his powers, and with his mature philosophical views having fully taken shape with the publication of his Theory of Science (1837), undertakes the project of engaging, key point by key point, with Kant's masterwork. In collaboration with Bolzano, Frantisek Prihonsky (who would ultimately publish the final record of this work in 1850, shortly after Bolzano's death) both compiles a comprehensive and thorough summary of the main definitions, theses, and arguments in Kant's book, and then proceeds to bring to light the most important unclarities, confusions, and fallacies that he finds each step along the way. The result, *New Anti-Kant*, is not only an extremely useful and even-handed overview of the entire first *Critique* itself - including parts often neglected by even Kant's most sympathetic readers - but also a catalogue of philosophically insightful and textually well-grounded challenges to signature Kantian doctrines. This work helps us to see anew the overarching contours of Kant’s philosophy, and brings a fresh focus onto deep points of tension within Kant's system - all the while serving to introduce us, through instructive contrast, to the powerful alternative perspective that Bolzano develops in his own systematic philosophy." (pp. 3-4).

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Studies on Bolzano's Logic and Ontology

1. Malink, Marko. 2022. "Aristotle and Bolzano on Grounding." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 221-243. New York: Oxford University Press
   "Marko Malink examines Aristotle's conception of scientific proofs as the historical roots of Bolzano's conception of grounding and compares the two philosophers' views on infinite grounding chains, on the role that generality plays in ground-revealing proofs, and on scientific knowledge." (p. 37)
2. Mancosu, Paolo. 1999. "Bolzano and Cournot on Mathematical Explanation." *Revue d'histoire des sciences* no. 52:429-456
   Abstract: "Recent discussions on the topic of « mathematical explanation » have focused on the distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. The former proofs are supposed to differ from the latter in that they not only establish that a result is true but also show why it is true. This opposition is at the core of the philosophies of mathematics of Bolzano and Cournot. The paper analyzes Bolzano's theory of Grund and Folge, and Cournot' s opposition between the logical and the rational order, emphasizing their relevance to the issue of

mathematical explanation. The final part of the paper investigates the shortcomings of Bolzano's and Coumot's theories as explications of mathematical explanation."

3. Mates, Benson. 1992. "Bolzano and Ancient Pyrrhonism." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 121-139. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"Bolzano's attempt to refute so-called "radical" or "complete" skepticism is carefully described in Professor Berg's introduction to his edition of the *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL). Two forms of such skepticism are there distinguished. The thesis of the *ontological* form is
(1) No propositions (*Sätz an sich*) is true and that of the *epistemological* form is
(2) No judgment (*Urteil*) is true.
Bolzano's principle arguments against these are roughly as follows. Against (1) he argues that, for any proposition S, either S is true or the proposition that S is false is true. Therefore, at least one proposition is true. The argument against (2) is less clear. Bolzano (WL 40) takes the problem to be that of convincing a radical skeptic that, after all, he must recognize the truth of at least one proposition. After considering various possibilities, he concludes that the skeptic will have to accept as true at least the proposition that he has ideas (*Vorstellungen*), for obviously he confirms this proposition the moment he doubts or denies it. The point, I suppose, is that, just as one cannot doubt that there are men on the moon if one has no idea of what it is to be a man or to be on the moon, so the skeptic, if he has no ideas, is in no position to doubt anything, not even that he has ideas. Bolzano thinks that while the skeptic might refuse publicly to admit the proposition in question, "nevertheless he will surely feel in his innards that it is true... and if he feels this, we have won".
Whatever one may think of these arguments, in this paper I am not concerned to evaluate them but only to consider whether they refute Pyrrhonism, as Bolzano seems to suppose." (pp. 121-122)
(...)

The root of Bolzano's failure to appreciate the force of Pyrrhonism is, in my opinion, that he does not realize that its self-referential aspect is essential. This aspect is not something that Sextus is reluctant to admit but is rather a feature that he emphasizes over and over again and that he obviously regards as crucial to the consistency of the skeptic's position. Bolzano's failure to understand this is especially evident at WL 40, where he quotes and discusses one of the many passages in which Sextus points out the self-reference of the skeptic's slogans (*phonai*), i.e., pronouncements like "contrary claims are equal", "no more this than that", "I decide nothing", etc. Bolzano says:

In setting forth the various formulae with which the skeptic is accustomed to express his state of doubt, Sextus Empiricus tries to employ maximal caution so as to protect it from the charge of self-contradiction, but nevertheless he finds himself compelled at the end to admit

"As concerns all the skeptic slogans the following must be understood in advance, namely that we do not maintain their truth in any absolute way, since we say that they themselves are included among the things to which they apply -- just as cathartic drugs do not merely eliminate humor from the body but also expel themselves along with the humors" (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I 206).

"This amounts to the reluctant admission", says Bolzano, that the skeptic ceases to be a skeptic as soon as he declares himself to be a skeptic. Only if he keeps silent and makes no judgment, not only in words but also internally, is he a complete doubter; and as long as this condition exists we *others* can say of him truly that he doesn't know a single truth. But as soon as he *himself* says it, the condition ceases and his judgment is therefore false.

But there is no "reluctant admission" here, and the Pyrrhonist doesn't have to be silent if he is to remain a Pyrrhonist. He will say "*It seems to me now that* contrary claims are equal" and "*It seems to me now that* there is no more reason for this than that", and so on. What he refrains from are flat out categorical statements, whether concerning his own skepticism or anything else.

It will be evident that this form of skepticism is not easily refuted. Since the Pyrrhonist agrees only to propositions expressing what *seems* to him at the moment to be the case, it is even unclear what a refutation would be like. But that is a topic for another day". (pp. 138-139).

4. Morscher, Edgar. 1986. "Was Existence Ever a Predicate?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:269-284
   Abstract: "The question "Was 'existence' ever a predicate?" in a way already suggests its own answer, that this is really the wrong question to ask, because 'existence' has always been a predicate. Even those, such as Kant, who supposedly opposed this view, in fact held it. They merely denied that 'existence' is a "normal" first-order predicate. Not only Kant, but also Bolzano, Frege and Russell claimed that it is a second-order predicate. There is substantive disagreement between Kant and Bolzano on the one hand and Frege and Russell on the other over two issues: the former claim that this second-order predicate applies to no concept analytically and that it can be properly ascribed to a singular concept, whereas the latter deny both of these claims."
5. ———. 1986. "Propositions and States of Affairs in Austrian Philosophy before Wittgenstein." In *From Bolzano to Wittgenstein. The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Nyiri, Janoc Cristof, 75-85. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
6. ———. 1987. "Propositions and All That: Ontological and Epistemological Reflections." In *Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriël Nuchelmans*, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 241-257. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers
   "Bernard Bolzano was one of the first philosophers in modern times to develop explicitly a complete theory for entities like propositions, statements and states of affairs. I will first describe and clarify the main features of his theory, and then sketch the subsequent development to our day." (p. 243)
   (...)

"Let me now complete my historical sketch. Up to now I have only discussed Bolzano's doctrine of propositions. I concentrated on Bolzano's doctrine because I think that he gave the clearest account, the clearest description of propositions available in his time, and that none of the philosophers who followed, including Frege, has made an essential improvement in this respect. Although Bolzano's doctrine, his description of the propositions and the ontological status he ascribes to them, is far from being satisfactory, because it is insufficiently clear, no other philosopher up to our time has done any better. I have therefore explained Bolzano's doctrine in more detail in order to have one representative traditional doctrine to which I can refer in what follows.
What seems very interesting to me and what I have always been very impressed by is the fact that philosophers with completely different backgrounds and from different schools developed, at the same time as Bolzano and afterwards, quite similar views, sometimes using almost the same words as Bolzano, without being familiar with his work. Although this is far from being a proof for the truth of his doctrine, it is nevertheless a fact a philosopher cannot pass by because it indicates that this is not the doctrine of an eccentric outsider. On the contrary, it has attracted many philosophers, including such prominent ones as Frege, Wittgenstein and Russell, Husser! and Meinong, Windelband and Rickert. (I have described the views of some of these philosophers and compared them in another paper: Morscher (1972 [*Von Balzano zu Meinong: zur Geschichte des logischen realismus*])." (p. 248)

7. ———. 1997. "Bolzano's Method of Variation: Three Puzzles." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:139-165
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano's most fruitful invention was his method of variation. He used it in defining such fundamental logical concepts as logical consequence, analyticity and probability. The following three puzzles concerning this method of variation seem particularly worth considering. (i) How can we define the range of variation of an idea or the categorial conformity of two ideas without

already using the concept of variation? This question was raised by Mark Siebel in his M.A. thesis. (ii) Why must we define analyticity by means of (simultaneous or successive) variation of several ideas rather than by means of replacing a single idea? This problem is suggested by an example due to W.V.O. Quine, John R. MyhiII and Benson Mates. (iii) Must every 'there is ...' sentence be synthetic for Bolzano, as his pupil Franz Prihonsky claims in his booklet *Neuer Anti-Kant,* or can a `there is...' sentence be logically analytic?"

8. ———. 2006. "The Great Divide within Austrian Philosophy. The Synthetic a Priori." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, Mark, 250-263. New York: Routledge
"In this chapter I will try to show that the divergent Austrian ways of being anti-Kantian do not vanish even when we focus on this single topic. To illustrate this view, I will take as my examples Bernard Bolzano and Rudolf Carnap, who both belong – for different reasons – to the so-called Austrian tradition in philosophy.
Both are fully conversant with Kant's work, and both have a critical attitude toward it and are in this sense anti-Kantian. This is also true when it comes to the question of the synthetic a priori: both refute strongly Kant's treatment of the synthetic a priori. However, whereas Carnap denies synthetic sentences a priori altogether, Bolzano does not deny their existence but only the way in which Kant justifies their truth.
What is even more important is that Bolzano not only – contrary to Carnap – accepts Kant's synthetic a priori, but even extends it to the realm of logic. In clear opposition to Kant and Carnap, who take all logical truths to be analytic, there are synthetic truths for Bolzano even in the area of logic. I will try to argue for this claim in the following sections." (p. 250)
9. ———. 2008. *Bernard Bolzano's Life and Work*. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag
Table of Contents: Preface 9; Introduction 13; 1. Bolzano's Life and Scientific Career 17; 2. Bolzano's Removal from Office and the "Bolzano Trial" 23; 3. A Short Survey of

Bolzano's Work 29; 4. Logic 33; 5. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 75; 6. Ethics 89; 7. Aesthetics 107; 8. Political and Social Philosophy 113; 9. Philosophy of Religion and Theology 125; 10. Metaphysics 135; 11. Philosophy of Nature and of Physics 139; 12. Philosophy of Mathematics 141; 13. Metaphilosophy and History of Philosophy 149; 14. The So-called Bolzano Circle and Bolzano's Influence on the Development of the Sciences and on Intellectual History 151; Appendix: A Formal Reconstruction of Bolzano's Method of Idea-Variation and of his Definitions of Logical Truth and of Logical Consequence 159; Bibliography 169; Index of Names 207-211.

"Despite the enormous increase of interest in Bolzano's philosophy during the last decades, an up-to-date monograph on Bolzano's philosophy is still a desideratum. The last book that might be called a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy dates from almost 100 years ago; it is Shmuel Hugo Bergmann's *Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos* (Halle/S. 1909), written in the spirit of the Brentano school, in particular of Bergmann's teacher Anton Marty.

When I was invited by the Editors of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* to contribute the entry on Bernard Bolzano, I took it as a challenge for starting my long-standing plan to write a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy. The present book is, to be clear, merely the first step toward this end." (from the *Preface*)

(...)

"Bolzano's uncommonly versatile work culminated in three extensive main writings in three different areas of knowledge: 1) in theology his four volume *Textbook of the Science of Religion* (Bolzano 1834b), 2) in philosophy the four volume *Theory of Science* (Bolzano 1837a), which provides a new foundation for logic and is at the same time an extensive manual of logic, and 3) in mathematics the *Theory of Quantities*, conceived of as a monumental work, but not completed.

Bolzano's teaching was concerned exclusively with fundamental topics of theology, in addition he worked mainly in logic. Nevertheless, his scientific development began in mathematics. It was mathematics that was the starting point for his scientific work and to which he ultimately returned in order to create a new foundation on which mathematics as a whole could be built; he succeeded in doing this, however, only in bits and pieces." (p. 29)

10. ———. 2022. "The Grounds of Moral 'Truths'." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 343-363. New York: Oxford University Press
"Central to Bolzano's ethics is his Supreme Moral Law, i.e. an ethical truth that grounds all other ethical truths. While Bolzano considers this law to be fundamental in the realm of ethics, he also claims that it is not
an ungrounded, basic truth. Edgaqr Morscher discusses this view in the context of a succinct reconstruction of Bolzano's views on grounding, his ethics, and his deontic logic." (p. 38)
11. Morscher, Edgar, and Simons, Peter. 2014. "From Bolzano via Quine to Fine." In *Joint Ventures in Philosophy*, edited by Morscher, Edgar and Simons, Peter, 137-156. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
12. Mugnai, Massimo. 1992. "Leibniz and Bolzano on the "Realm of Truths"." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 207-220. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"In his article *Propositions and Sentences* (1956) Alonzo Church pointed out -- on the basis of a suggestion made by Joseph Maria Bochenski -- that strong analogies exist between Bolzano's theory of *Satz an sich* and Gregory of Rimini's doctrine of complexe significabile.' In the same essay, Church also pointed out that Bolzano appealed to Leibniz as to a logician who plainly recognized propositions in the abstract sense. After Church's essay, it became very usual to mention Gregory of Rimini in reference to Bolzano's ontological conceptions. Nevertheless, we do not have any evidence of a direct influence of Gregory of

Rimini's ideas on Bolzano's philosophy of logic. Bolzano seems to have only a limited acquaintance with the logic of the late medieval period: the credit accorded to Savonarola's Compendium logicae - a standard work which is absolutely lacking in originality - corroborates, I think, this view.2 Yet Bolzano may have benefited by late scholastic inheritance through the intermediation of later works, like those of Campanella, Clauberg, Fonseca, Keckermann, Leibniz and Wolf.' In fact, as already mentioned, Leibniz is the first author whom Bolzano explicitly refers to, in paragraph 21 of the Wissenschaftslehre, as a forerunner of the Satz an sich theory:

"Thus Leibniz uses as equivalent the expressions *proposition* and *cogitatio possibilis (Dial. de Connexion inter Verba a Res* [C. I. Gerhardt, ed. *Philos. Schriften, vol.* VII, p. 190]. This obviously presupposes that by propositions he meant propositions in themselves." (*)

The Leibniz's work on which Bolzano explicitly bases this conviction is the *Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba*, first published by Raspe in 1765 -- a work whose content paradoxically seems to partly disprove Bolzano's interpretation.' Thus Church considers it «

"an exaggeration or a misunderstanding" on Bolzano's part to have attributed to Leibniz's D*ialogus* "the use of the word propositio for proposition in the abstract sense" or *Satz an sich*.(6) The same remarks are repeated by Prof. Berg in his monograph on Bolzano's logic: after having identified Bolzano's *Satz an sich* with Frege's *Gedanke*, Prof. Berg writes:

According to Leibniz a proposition (*propositio*) is a possible thought (*cogitatio possibilis*), which is capable of being true or false... But no thought or reasoning is possible without words or some other kind of signs. And under transformation of a proposition into a different language a certain relationship (*proportio*) among the signs and between the signs and the objective reality is transformed into a similar relationship. The last two conditions fit Aristotle's and Peter of Spain's but not Frege's notion of proposition. Therefore... it must have been a

misunderstanding on Bolzano's part to have attributed to Leibniz the use of the world "propositio" for *Satz an sich*.(7) In what follows, I intend to take up the problem of the correcteness of the interpretation given by Bolzano and then to develop a comparison between the positions of Leibniz and those of Bolzano relative to the notions of idea, proposition and truth.
In the notes I have employed the following abbreviations: WL = B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, in B. Bolzano, Gesamtausgabe, Reihe I, Schriften, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1985 ff; GP = G. W Leibniz, *Die philosophische Schriften*, Hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt, Berlin, Akademie, 1857-90, vol. I-VII; VE = G. W. Leibniz, *Vorausedition zur Reihe VI - Philosophische Schriften* - Munster, Akademie, 1982 ff.
(1) A. Church, *Propositions and Sentences*, in I. M. Bochenski, A. Church, N. Goodman, *The Problem of the Universals*, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press, 1956, p. 3.
(2) WL 1, 11/1, pp. 105 ff.
(3) WL 1, 11/1, pp. 234 ff.
(4) WL 1, 11/1, p. 111.
(5) Cfr. *Oeuvres philosophiques latines et francoises de feu Mr. de Leibnitz* ... publiees par Mr. Rud. Eric Raspe, Leipzig, 1765, pp. 505-512.
(6) A. Church, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
(7) J. Berg, *Bolzano's Logic*, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1962, pp. 51-52.
(*) [cited in German in the original; I cite from the translation of *Wissenschaftslehre* by Rolf George, p. 24]

13. Mulligan, Kevin. 2022. "Logic, Logical Norms, and (Normative) Grounding." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 244-275. New York: Oxford University Press
"While Bolzano's writings were largely ignored by the philosophical community of his time, they later aroused the attention of Franz Brentano and his students, in particular that of Edmund Husserl. Kevin Mulligan examines a range of Husserl's views on grounding and their relation to

Bolzano's views. A particular emphasis is laid on Husserl's conception of logic: is logic a normative or a theoretical discipline? Relatedly:
what is the connection between logical norms and logical truths? Husserl argues that logic is a theoretical discipline and that logical truths ground logical norms. In order to understand and evaluate this view, it is compared with Bolzano's account of the grounds of moral truths." (p. 37)

14. Neeman, Ursula. 1970. "Analytic and Synthetic Propositions in Kant and Bolzano." *Ratio* no. 12:1-25
"Whereas Kant regards the structure of being and knowing as identical, Bolzano interprets the Kantian true synthetic propositions as true propositions, in which the predicate is a characteristic of the subject and not a component of the notion of the subject (characteristic =df. a property of the object, which falls under the concept; component =df. ingredient of the concept). These propositions are analytic in a wider sense, because they render possible an analysis of an object, whereas the logico-analytic propositions render possible only an analysis of their concept. Therefore Bolzano also distinguishes between deductibility (ordo cognoscendi) and ground-consequence relation (ordo essendi) and grounds the latter on the principle of simplicity. A discovery of an objective connection in mathematics is only possible by a strict determination of the basic concepts and by axiomatization, because in opposition to Kant, Bolzano thinks mathematical laws to be discoveries and not creations of the human mind."
15. Otte, Michael. 2008. "Proof and Explanation from a Semiotical Point of View." *Relime*:23-43
Abstract: "A distinction between proofs that prove and proofs that explain has over and again played an important role within recent discussions in epistemology and mathematics education.
The distinction goes back to scholars who, like Bolzano or Dedekind, have tried to reestablish pure mathematics as a purely conceptual and analytical science. These endeavors did in particular argue in favor of a complete elimination of intuitive or perceptual aspects from mathematical activity,

arguing that one has to rigorously distinguish between a concept and its representations. Using a semiotical approach which negates such a separation between idea and symbol, we shall argue that mathematics has no explanations in a foundational sense. To explain amounts to exhibiting the meaning of something.
Mathematics has, however, as we shall try to show, no definite meanings, neither in the structural intra-theoretical sense nor with respect to intuitive objectivity. Signs and meanings are processes, as we shall argue along with Peirce."
"Before we can address the issue of proof and explanation we have to get rid of traditional *Bewusstseinsphilosophie* (philosophy of consciousness), that is, popularly speaking, the belief that "meanings are in the head" and knowledge is some sort of mental experience. After Kant epistemology began to ramify and various new philosophies of mathematicsarose in which meaning, rather than mind played the central role. But the view that there exists an epistemologically autarkic or self-sufficient epistemic subject, which serves itself from external sensations and internal experiences or representations (Vorstellungen) to thereby constitute true knowledge, is a myth and should also be abandoned.
In Part I of this paper we try to provide some pertinent arguments to this end, based on Peirce's semiotics. "Consciousness is used to denote the I think, the unity of thought; but the unity of thought is nothing but the unity of symbolization" (Peirce CP 7.585). Part II treats the questions of proof and explanation with respect to the ideas of Bolzano on the one hand and Peirce on the other. Part III presents some examples and tries to make a connection with current debates about the issue in mathematical education and cognitive psychology." (p. 25)

16. ———. 2009. "The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in Kant and Bolzano." In *Relatively and Philosophically E^{a}rnest. Festschrift in Honor of Paul Ernest's 65 Birthday*, edited by Sriraman, Bharath and Goodchild, Simon, 39-56. Missoula: Information Age Publishing.

17. Parsons, Charles. 2012. "Two Studies in the Reception of Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic." In *From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays*, 80-99. Harvard: Harvard University Press
"The present essay takes its point of departure from a thought I have had at various times in thinking about interpretations of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in the literature, in particular that offered by Jaakko Hintikka. That was that if the interpretation is correct, shouldn't one expect that to show in the way that Kant's views were understood by others in the early period after the publication of the first *Critique*? That reflection suggests a research program that might be of some interest, to investigate how Kant's philosophy of mathematics was read in, say, the first generation from 1781. I have not undertaken such a project. However, I will make some comments about two examples of this kind. In doing so I haven't always kept my eye 0n Kant, because the figures involved are of interest in their own right. The first is Johann Schultz (1739-1805), the disciple of Kant who was professor of mathematics in Köinigsberg.Thc second is Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), who in an early essay of 1810 (*)
offered a highly critical discussion of Kant's theory of construction of concepts in intuition. In one way, I think the result of this little experiment is negative, in that it does little toward settling disputed questions about the interpretation of Kant. On the other hand, I think it brings out some problems of Kant's views that could be seen either at the time he wrote or not long after." (p. 80)
(*) [*Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik = Contributions to a Better Grounded Presentation of Mathematics*]
18. Poggiolesi, Francesca. 2022. "Bolzano, (the Appropriate) Relevant Logic, and Grounding Rules for Implication." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 319-342. New York: Oxford University Press
"While Bolzano sharply distinguishes grounding from logical deducibility {in modern terminology: entailment), he

also regards the two notions as importantly connected. He sees a particularly close connection
between grounding and exact deducibility (a special case of deducibility). Francesca Poggiolesi examines this latter notion and compares it to notions of relevant entailment. She argues that Neil Tennant's system CR is the best model for Bolzano's ideas, and can in turn also serve as a framework for developing grounding rules for conditionals." (p. 37)

19. Proust, Joëlle. 1981. "Bolzano's Analytic Revisited." *The Monist. An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry*:214-230
"What I propose is to reconsider the interpretation of Bolzano's concept of analytic propositions which was offered thirty years ago by Bar-Hillel.(1) The claim of Bar-Hillel was that, in a late addition to his book, *The Theory of Science*,(2) Bolzano actually had been radically improving his concept of analyticity, thus creating some inconsistencies with the previous, uncorrected version. This allows us to equate the new Bolzanian definition of analytic with what was to be defined, a century later, as logical truth by W. V. Quine. Bar Hillel's interpretation has been uncritically accepted by commentators, although the historical issue has been rightly challenged by J. Berg. What I want to show is that, in spite of a surface analogy between Bolzano's phrasing of the definition of 'logical analytic' and Quine's definition, certain considerations should lead us to call that parallel into question. Attractive as it may be for a Quinian, such a view of Bolzano's analytic can be shown as incompatible with the leading ideas of his philosophy of logic. Furthermore, there is enough evidence in other sections of the *Theory of Science* to show that Bolzano's criterion of analyticity is grounded on purely semantical properties and is part of a general account of logical properties in terms of the mapping of propositions to corresponding models." (p. 214)
(1) "Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions," *Theoria* 16 (1950): 91-117 and *Methodos* 2, (1950): 32-55; reprinted in *Aspects of Language* Magnes Press 1970, pp. 3-32.

(2) Bernard Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* (Sulzbach 1837, Leipzig 1914); partly translated by Rolf George: *Theory of Science*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972). We shall quote this translation whenever available.

20. ———. 1989. *Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition from Kant to Carnap*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner from the original French: *Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap* - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
Section Two: *Bolzano's Renovation of Analiticity,* pp. 49-108.
"The specifically Bolzanian concept of analyticity is brought in at an advanced life, as the maturely formulated answer to a problem that never ceased to appear under different aspects. Only in the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837 does what we might call a "revolution" in analyticity occur. Earlier texts strive to adapt the Kantian definition so that it satisfies the new requirements of the anticritical mathematicians. But this definition, often revised, gives rise to growing difficulties. There were so many reasons for abandoning it, but also so many constraints working to shape the new definition. "Revolution," we said; but until the *Wissenschaftslehre*, analyticity was a marginal theme. Its main function was, as in Kant, to reveal the problematic existence of the synthetic a priori. From a theme of preliminary exposition, analyticity becomes in the work of 1837 an "integrated" concept: henceforth it is part of a philosophy and becomes inseparable from a method of identifying logical objects, variation. But this was a "Ptolemaic," not a "Copernican," revolution: instead of statically emphasizing the synthetic a priori, it becomes a notable property of certain propositions whose definition now requires a preliminary examination of other properties such as truth and validity. This definition, however, does not have a purely descriptive interest; the theses of Volume 3 must be taken seriously in order to portray with perfect clarity the deep interest that Bolzano had in his new definition of analyticity." (p. 49)

21. ———. 1999. "Bolzano's Theory of Representation." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:363-383
Abstract: "Bolzano's theory of representation is one of the most radically intensionalist approaches to representation. It is based on the following three claims: A). A representation is essentially independent of thought and of linguistic expression; B). A representation is structured; C). Such a structure is independent of the objects represented. These claims are both tools and constraints relative to Bolzano's substantive goals. Bolzano ultimately aimed to carry out a deep transformation of mathematical and scientific practice, thanks to a more accurate conception of logic and of the role of logic in scientific exposition. I examine some of the consequences of Bolzano's claims in regard to his conception of mathematical treatises."
22. Roberts, Mark. 1994. "The Bearer of Truth and Falsity." *Southwest Philosophy Review* no. 10:59-67
Abstract: "Until Bolzano nearly all philosophers believed that truth and falsity are predicated of judgments of beliefs. Bolzano and other philosophers after him argue that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity and that propositions have a timeless ideal existence: a position which seems to discredit completely their view that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity. Yet, several arguments can be offered which show that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity without introducing as a premise the timeless existence of propositions."
23. Rohloff, Waldemar. 2012. "From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:131-149
Abstract: "In this paper I discuss Kant's and Bolzano's differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls 'propositions in themselves'. This contrast in views is used to explain

Bolzano's criticism of Kant's belief that definition is impossible for philosophical concepts. It is also used to explain Bolzano's criticism of Kant's methods of exposition of philosophical concepts."

24. Rojszczak, Artur. 2005. *From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski*. Dordrecht: Springer
Edited by Jan Wolenski.
Chapter 7.1: *Bernard Bolzano (I): Sentences in Themselves*, pp. 111-115.
"I shall not go into the details of the multiplicity of Bolzano's ideas and their particular influence on the history of semantics. I shall, as I have tried to do with respect to every issue in this study, concentrate on his ideas within the theory of science as it is related to the problem of the truth bearer. In the context of the theory of truth, it is worth noting that Bolzano's position during his times, i.e. in the first half of the nineteenth century, was quite unusual. Bolzano's influence on this century was provided by his notion of the objectivity of truth in a way that also remained standard for the next century. Furthermore, the theory which should guarantee the objectivity of truth was, for Bolzano, his theory of sentences in themselves. Only the semantics of the twentieth century sees Bolzano's theory of sentences in themselves as an anticipation of the contemporary notion of proposition. I shall, however, refer to his *Fundamentallehre* [Theory of Fundamentals], i.e. to the first sections of his *Theory of Science*, which deals with the existence of objective truth and with the possibility of its cognition. I shall omit some elements of this theory that are irrelevant to my purposes; for example, Bolzano's proof of the existence of truth, his proof of the existence of infinitely many truths or the argument for the cognition of truths. In this part of Bolzano's argumentation, he focuses on the problem of skepticism, making an attempt to prove the fundamentalist position in epistemology.(1) I shall take the liberty of presenting Bolzano's ideas as far as truth bearers are concerned as contrasted with the views of Brentano and

Twardowski on the objectivity of truth which I shall present in the next sections." (p. 111)
(1) Bolzano 1837, par. 40–43.

25. Rojszczak, Artur, and Smith, Barry. 2003. "Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth." In *Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition: Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, 229-268. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski 's 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, formed part of the background of views that led to standard current accounts of the objectivity of truth. It thus lends support to speculations on the role of Brentano and his heirs in contemporary logical pbilosophy advanced by Jan Woleński in his masterpiece on the *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School* of 1989." (p. 229)
26. Rollinger, Robin D. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In *Phenomenology & Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2009, pp. 233-262.
"Introduction
In nineteenth century German philosophy it was among the prevailing views that mental phenomena were to be divided into three classes: thinking, feeling, and willing. In Austria, however, two of the towering philosophers, Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano, held that presentations (*Vorstellungen*) and judgments (Urteile) make up two

distinct classes of mental phenomena. Moreover, both of these philosophers saw it as an important task to work out a theory of judgment in particular. It is accordingly no surprise that Brentano's two most outstanding pupils, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, developed theories of judgment, though their results were markedly different from those of their predecessors and from each other's. In the following the line of Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to Husserl will be traced by presenting an overview of the four theories indicated in the title. The topic under consideration in these theories, though apparently little more than a chapter in descriptive psychology, is of great significance because it gives us an intersection for issues in epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of logic." (p. 257)

27. Rootselaar, Bob van. 1970. "Bernard Bolzano." In *Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 2*, edited by Gillispie, Charles Coulston, 273-279. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons
"Bolzano planned to elaborate the methodology begun in his *Beyträge* and to develop it into a complete lheory of science, of which a treatise on logic was to form the cornerstone. From 1820 on, he worked steadily on it, and his four-volume treatise *Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1837. The plan of the W*issenschaftslehre* appears clearly from the following subdivision (see Kambartel, *Bernard Bolzano's Grundlegung der Logik*, pp. 14-17):
(I) Fundamental theory: proof of the existence of abstract truths and of the human ability to judge.
(2) Elementary theory: theory of abstract ideas, propositions, true propositions, and deductions.
(3) Theory of knowledge: condition of the human faculty of judgment.
(4) Heuristics: rules to be observed in human thought in the search for truths,
(5) Proper theory of science: rules to be observed in the division of the set of truths into separate sciences and in their exposition in truly scientific treatises.
The work did not induce a complete revision of science, as Bolzano hoped, but, on the contrary, remained unnoticed

and did not exercise perceptible influence on the development of logic. Some of the
innovations in logic contained in the first two volumes did attract attention, as well as excessive praisenotably from Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Scholz (see Berg. op. cit.; Kambanel, op. cit.; and the literature
cited in them).
The rise of logical semantics, initiated by Alfred Tarski in the l 930's, has led to a revival of the study of Bolzano's logic in the light or modem logic (see Berg, op. cit.) and of his theory of an ideal language.
The heart of Bolzano's logic is formed by his concepts of (abstract) proposition (*Satz an sich*), abstract idea (*Vorstellung an sich*), truth, and the notions of derivability (*Ab!eirbarkei*t) and entailment (*Abfolge*)." (pp. 277-278)

28. ———. 1992. "Axiomatics in Bolzano's Logico-Mathematical Research." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 221-230. Florence: Leo S. Olschki
"A discussion of Bolzano's axiomatical considerations requires some care, because his idea of axiomatization differs considerably from axiomatics as it is currently understood.
His *Wissenschaftslehre* is testimony of his concern for the foundation of science in general and in particular of the theoretical sciences. Among the theoretical sciences mathematics is of special interest.
According to Bolzano, the mathematics of his time was based on shaky foundations, and one of his activities was directed toward correction of this situation.
On the other hand he certainly had the intention to recapture essentially the entire body of existing mathematics and present it in full accordance with his newly laid foundations. This is the reason why on several occasions he revised existing proofs of known mathematical theorems." (p. 221)

29. Rosenkoetter, Timothy. 2012. "Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:89-129

Abstract: "Kant and Bolzano agree that intuitions are non-accidentally singular, but each offers more than one explanation of why this is the case. One model, exemplified by Bolzano's explication of intuitions as “this”-representations, posits a type of representation which is such that it can only have one object. A very different explanation, prominent in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, has recourse to the fact that certain classes of objects (spaces and times) can have only one instance, and argues on this basis that some representations with those contents are singular. This paper surveys various versions of these two explanations and uses each philosopher's answers to shed light on the other's."

30. Roski, Stefan. 2013. "A priori Knowledge in Bolzano: Conceptual Truths and Judgements." In *Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic*, edited by Schaar, Maria van der, 101-132. Dordrecht: Springer
"According to Kant, a true judgement can be called a priori in case it can take place absolutely (*schlechterdings*) independent of experience. Propositions that are knowable in this way are called a priori propositions by him (Kant, [*Critique of Pure Reason*], 1787 B, 3–4)." (p. 101)
(...)
"[Bolzano] tried to *give* a satisfactory theoretical account of the notion of synthetic *a priori* proposition. Roughly speaking, he located Kant’s mistake in the attempt to introduce a distinction among propositions by means of a distinction among judgements. Bolzano reversed this order and aimed instead to explicate the valid core of what Kant tried to capture in epistemic terms entirely in objective, logical ones." (p. 101)
(...)
"Bolzano’s explication has two aspects, a logical and an epistemological one.
The logical aspect consists in drawing a precise and workable distinction in terms of non-epistemic notions. The epistemological aspect concerns the way in which Bolzano’s suggestion might work: What is his account of how one can come to know synthetic truths a priori?

While there have been investigations of Bolzano's objective explication of the notion of a priori proposition (see Textor 1996, chapter 4), the epistemological details have never been examined in great detail.(2) The task of this chapter is thus to tell the epistemological story behind Bolzano's objective explication.
I should note right from the beginning that the aim of the chapter is descriptive and historical. Primarily, I want to make sense of what Bolzano plausibly had in mind, rather than assess its intrinsic plausibility." (p. 102)
(2) An exception is Lapointe (2010).
References
Lapointe, S. 2010. Bolzano, a priori knowledge and the classical model of science. *Synthese* 174:263–281.
Textor, M. 1996. *Bolzanos propositionalismus*. Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter.

31. ———. 2017. *Bolzano's Conception of Grounding*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann
Contents: Preface IX; I. Introduction 1; 2. Objective truth, variation & truth-preservation 19; 3. Explanatory priority: Bolzano's pure logic of grounding 55; 4. Simplicity and economy: Bolzano's impure logic of grounding 109; 5. Bolzano's logic of grounding and the logic of metaphysical grounding 215; 6. Conclusion 233; l ist of abbreviations 251; List of symbols, definitions, and principles 253; Bibliography 257; Index 267-269.
"Overview of the book
As each of the following chapters will be accompanied by a detailed overview of its content and line of argumentation, I will confine myself here to a brief overview of the main line of argumentation of the book.
At the core of Bolzano's theory of grounding lies a set of general principles that express properties the relation exhibits according to him. An analysis of these principles, their interrelation, and their role in Bolzano's methodology will form the main bulk of the book. It is heuristically useful to divide these principles into two classes. The first class contains principles that hold for every case of grounding, irrespective of any specific properties of the relata. These

principles capture, as it were, minimal conditions an explanatory relation has to satisfy according to Bolzano. The second class consists of more specific principles that mostly apply only to truths from deductive or a priori sciences. Adapting a distinction by Kit Fine, I will call the former Bolzano's *pure logic of grounding* and the latter his *impure logic of groundin*g.(52) Before we can dive into the details of Bolzano's theory, we will have to gain some familiarity with the nuts and bolts of his logical framework. This will be done in Chapter Two. Chapter Three then discusses Bolzano's pure logic of grounding, while Chapter Four is concerned with the impure logic of grounding. Chapter Five wraps up and draws some connections to the recent debate on grounding. In what follows I will sketch the content of each of these chapters in a little more detail." (p. 16)
(52) Cf. (Fine [The Pure Logic of Ground. *Review of Symbolic Logic* 5(1) 1-25] 2012b). The justification for employing this distinction will be given further below.

32. ———. 2019. "Bolzano and Kim on Grounding and Unification." *Synthese* no. 196:2971-2999
Abstract: "It is sometimes mentioned that Bernard Bolzano's work on grounding anticipates many insights of the current debate on metaphysical grounding. The present paper discusses a certain part of Bolzano's theory of grounding that has thus far not been discussed in the literature. This part does not so much anticipate what are nowadays common assumptions about grounding, but rather goes beyond them. Central to the discussion will be a thesis of Bolzano's by which he tries to establish a connectionbetween grounding and (deductive) unification. The paper spells out this thesis in detail and discusses the assumptions on which it rests. Next to this mainly historical aim, the paper also presents reasons why philosophers who are not interested in the historical Bolzano should find the thesis interesting by relating it to a certain view on unification and explanation that has been put forward by Kim. A final part of the paper provides a critical evaluation of the thesis against the background of current accounts of grounding."

Reference
Kim Jaegwon (1994) Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence. *Philosophical Issues* 5:51–69-

33. ———. 2020. "Bolzano." In *The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding*, edited by Raven, Michael J., 76-89. New York: Routledge
"This chapter provides an overview of Bernard Bolzano's views about grounding. On Bolzano's account, grounding is an objective priority relation among true propositions that has certain explanatory features.The chapter briefly highlights historical influences on Bolzano's account of grounding and subsequently provides an overview of the most important aspects of it. As we shall see, Bolzano's account resembles current accounts of metaphysical grounding in many respects and can thus easily be related to many positions in the current debate.This is going to be a main focus of this chapter. Apart from that, we shall investigate some Bolzanian ideas about grounding that differ from the current orthodoxy but may constitute interesting additions, challenges or inspirations for those working in the current debate." (p. 76)
34. Roski, Stefan, and Rumberg, Antje. 2016. "Simplicity and Economy in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 54:469-496
Abstract: This paper is devoted to Bolzano's theory of grounding (*Abfolge*) in his *Wissenschaftslehre*. Bolzanian grounding is an explanatory consequence relation that is frequently considered an ancestor of the notion of metaphysical grounding. The paper focuses on two principles that concern grounding in the realm of conceptual sciences and relate to traditionally widespread ideas on explanations: the principles, namely, that grounding orders conceptual truths from simple to more complex ones (Simplicity), and that it comes along with a certain theoretical economy among them (Economy). Being spelled out on the basis of Bolzano's notion of deducibility (*Ableitbarkeit*), these principles are revealing for the question to what extent grounding can be considered a formal relation."

35. Roski, Stefan, and Rusnock, Paul. 2014. "Bolzano on Necessary Existence." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 96:320-359
Abstract: "This paper is devoted to an examination of Bolzano's notion of necessary existence, which has so far received relatively little attention in the literature.
We situate Bolzano's ideas in their historical context and show how he proposed to correct various flaws of his predecessors' definitions. Further, we relate Bolzano's conception to his metaphysical and theological assumptions, arguing that some consequences of his definition which have been deemed counterintuitive by some of his interpreters turn out to be more reasonable given the broadly Leibnizian background of his metaphysics. Finally, we consider some difficulties that arise from Bolzano's evolving views on freedom, which, at least in his early thought, was intimately linked with contingency. In an appendix, we discuss a recent debate on Bolzano's notion of necessary truth between Textor and Rusnock that has some bearing on our overall line of interpretation of Bolzano's notion of *necessary existence*."
References
Rusnock, P. 2012. "On Bolzano's Conception of Necessary Truth". *British Journal of the History of Philosophy* 20, 817-837.
Textor, M. 2013. "Bolzano on the Source of Necessity: A Reply to Rusnock". *British Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21, 381-392.
36. Roski, Stefan, and Schnieder, Benjamin. 2019. "Fundamental Truths and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 57:675-706
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano developed his theory of grounding in opposition to the rationalists' Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR). He argued that the PSR fails because there are fundamental, that is, ungrounded truths. The current paper examines Bolzano's views on fundamentality, relating them to ongoing debates about grounding and fundamentality."

37. ———. 2022. "Introdfuction: A Survey of Bolzano's Theory of Grounding." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 4-34. New York: Oxford University Press
"In this survey paper, we pursue three aims:
- First, we briefly sketch the origins of Bolzano's views on grounding and the role that grounding plays in his philosophy.
- Second, we give an overview of Bolzano's mature conception of grounding, focussing on its most detailed exposition, which can be found in his *Theory of Science*.
- Third, we introduce elements and terminology from Bolzano's conceptual framework that are required to understand his theory of grounding." (p. 4)
38. ———, eds. 2022. *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press
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Being: Bolzano's Cosmological Argument and Its Leibnizian Roots 418; Glossary of German Terms 445; Name Index 447; Subject Index 450-458.

39. Rumberg, Antje. 2013. "Bolzano's Concept of Grounding (*Abfolge*) Against the Background of Normal Proofs." *Review of Symbolic Logic* no. 6:424-459
Abstract: "In this paper, I provide a thorough discussion and reconstruction of Bernard Bolzano's theory of grounding and a detailed investigation into the parallels between his concept of grounding and current notions of normal proofs. Grounding (*Abfolge*) is an objective ground-consequence relation among true propositions that is explanatory in nature. The grounding relation plays a crucial role in Bolzano's proof-theory, and it is essential for his views on the ideal buildup of scientific theories. Occasionally, similarities have been pointed out between Bolzano's ideas on grounding and cut-free proofs in Gentzen's sequent calculus. My thesis is, however, that they bear an even stronger resemblance to the normal natural deduction proofs employed in proof-theoretic semantics in the tradition of Dummett and Prawitz."

40. Rusnock, Paul. 1997. "Bolzano and the Traditions of Analysis." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:61-85
Abstract: "Russell, in his *History of Western Philosophy,* wrote that modern analytical philosophy had its origins in the construction of modern functional analysis by Weierstrass and others. As it turns out, Bolzano, in the first four decades of the nineteenth century, had already made important contributions 'to the creation of "Weierstrassian" analysis, some of which were well known to Weierstrass and his circle. In addition, his mathematical research was guided by a methodology which articulated many of the central principles of modern philosophical analysis. That Russell was able to discover philosophical content within mathematical analysis was thus not surprising, for it had been carefully put there in the first place. Bolzano can and should, accordingly, be viewed as a founder of modern analytical philosophy, and not necessarily as an uninfluential one. This paper considers his work in

mathematical and philosophical analysis against some of the relevant historical background."

41. ———. 1997. "Remaking Mathematics: Bolzano reads Lagrange." *Acta Analytica* no. 18:51-72
"With Cauchy, Bolzano was among the most thorough and acute of Lagrange's readers, and it is clear that Bolzano had a good deal of respect for him as a mathematician, going through his treatises pencil in hand as soon as they were published, and occupying himself with many of the same questions. Like Lagrange, Bolzano was dissatisfied with the state of the foundations of analysis; like him he sought to provide an autonomous foundation for this branch of mathematics, one free from appeals to infinitesimals, geometry, and motion. Bolzano also appears to have respected Lagrange's opinion on the contents of analysis.
(...)
This broad agreement on content, however, was accompanied by sharp disagreements concerning method. Indeed, Bolzano chose his early subjects in part precisely in order to accentuate these differences. For Lagrange's entire approach to analysis was out of harmony with Bolzano's philosophy of science. And as Lagrange's work was in many ways the highest expression of analysis around the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bolzano's criticisms applied quite generally to the state of mathematics at the time. The difficulties which he found were not of the kind that one could hope to resolve by small changes of detail. They were, rather, systemic. What was required, according to Bolzano, was no less than a "complete transformation" of mathematics, at least of those parts which are not to be rejected as completely incorrect.(3) Not one to make such a statement idly, Bolzano had already been working on the task for over a decade, and would spend a good part of the rest of his life attempting to finish the work, rebuilding mathematics from the ground up in line with his methodology. This led to a detailed confrontation with eighteenth-century and notably Lagrangian mathematics; and it is here, in Bolzano's criticisms, and the alternatives he

proposes, that we find the unmistakable imprint of his philosophy." (pp. 2-3)
(3) *Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, daß zwischen je zwey Werthe, die eine entgegengesetzes Resultat gewähren, mindestens eine reele Würzel der Gleichung liege* (Prague, 1817), Preface; English translation by S. B. Russ, *Historia Mathematica* 7 (1980) 156-185.

42. ———. 1999. "Philosophy of Mathematics: Bolzano's Responses to Kant and Lagrange." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52 (3-4):399-428
Summary: "Bolzano's philosophy of mathematics is presented through a consideration of his critical responses to Kant and Lagrange."
"In a late essay, Bolzano describes the philosophy of mathematics as an activity aimed at discovering the objective grounds of propositions which we already know with the greatest certainty and evidence (1). For him, philosophy of mathematics was simply what we would now call foundational research in the broadest sense - that is, it was not just a matter of « ultimate » foundations (for instance set theory, logic, or the like), but also of the foundations of particular mathematical theories (for instance geometry, the calculus, combinatorics...). Bolzano was certainly committed to dealing with questions of ultimate foundations, with developing a unified system of mathematics from first principles - his detailed investigations of set theory and logic bear ample witness to this. He also understood, however, that foundational inquiries could be, at least provisionally, local. One could, as he explained in the *Contributions to a better-founded presentation of mathematics* of 1810, assume certain propositions as locally primitive, deferring until a later date their proof from more basic principles (2). No sharp line can be drawn to separate such local questions from those of ultimate foundations. Searching for underlying principles, in whatever domain and at whatever level, was an activity he quite plausibly and in line with tradition regarded as philosophical." (pp. 399-400)
(1) Bernard Bolzano, *Was ist Philosophie?* (Wien, 1849), 23.

(2) Bernard Bolzano, *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (Prag, 1810), part II, § 11 (hereafter: *Beyträge*).

43. ———. 2000. *Bolzano's Philosophy and the Emergence of Modern Mathematics*. Amsterdam: Rodopi
"In his own time, Bolzano was known primarily for his highly public life as a social and religious reformer, one of the leading figures of the Bohemian Enlightenment. In mathematics and logic - the concerns of this book - Bolzano was no less a reformer, developing strikingly modem views on logic, and attempting to recast mathematics in line with the methods set out in this new logic. He pursued this project doggedly,
attempting to carry it through to the last details. The results, although incomplete, are impressive, and worthy of our attention.
I have tried in this book to give an adequate sketch of Bolzano as a philosopher of mathematics and as a philosophical mathematician.
Within his mathematical work, I have chosen to focus on his research in the foundations of real analysis, as it is here where he had the greatest success, and where the positive imprint of his philosophical views is most apparent. Of his vast writings on logic, I have confined my attention mainly to those parts which bear most directly on mathematical method. Much of Bolzano's mathematics and logic will no doubt appear quite familiar, and it is easy to forget just how new and strange this territory was when Bolzano - often on his own - first moved into it. For this reason, I have attempted also to convey something of the historical context of his work." (pp. 4-5)

44. ———. 2011. "Kant and Bolzano on Logical Form." *Kant-Studien* no. 102
Abstract: "In the works of Kant and his followers, the notion of form plays an important role in explaining the apriority, necessity and certainty of logic. Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), an important early critic of Kant, found the Kantians' definitions of form imprecise and their explanations of the special status of logic deeply unsatisfying. Proposing his

own conception of form, Bolzano developed radically different views on logic, truth in virtue of form, and other matters. This essay presents Bolzano's views in the light of his criticisms of the Kantian logicians."

45. ———. 2012. "Remarks on Bolzano's Conception of Necessary Truth." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 20:817-837
Abstract: "This essay presents a new interpretation of Bolzano's account of necessary truth as set out in §182 of the *Theory of Science*. According to this interpretation, Bolzano's conception is closely related to that of Leibniz, with some important differences. In the first place, Bolzano's conception of necessary truth embraces not only what Leibniz called metaphysical or brute necessities but also moral necessities (truths grounded in God's choice of the best among all metaphysical possibilities). Second, in marked contrast to Leibniz, Bolzano maintains that there is still plenty of room for contingency even on this broader conception of necessity."

46. ———. 2013. "On Bolzano's Concept of a Sum." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 34:155-169
Abstract: "Alongside his groundbreaking work in logic, Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) made important contributions to ontology, notably with his theory of collections. Recent work has done much to elucidate Bolzano's conceptions, but his notion of a sum has proved stubbornly resistant to complete understanding. This paper offers a new interpretation of Bolzano's concept of a sum. I argue that, although Bolzano's presentation is defective, his conception is unexceptionable, and has important applications, notably in his work on the foundations of arithmetic."

47. ———. 2013. "Kant and Bolzano on Analyticity." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 95:298-335
Abstract: "The history of speculation on a notion or notions called analyticity, now usually characterized as truth in virtue of meanings and independently of fact, is often viewed from the perspective of the Quine-Carnap dispute. Previous characterizations, due to Kant, Frege and others,

are then seen as being of a piece with Carnap's various definitions of analyticity, and thus open to Quine's objections. Seen from this point of view, Bolzano's claims about analyticity appear downright bizarre: for on his conception, analyticity is not only non-linguistic, but also independent of both apriority and necessity. In this paper, it is argued that the problem lies not with Bolzano, but rather with the received historical account, especially its interpretation of Kant."

48. ———. 2022. "Grounding in Practice: Bolzano's Purely Analytic Proof in Light of the *Contributions*." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 364-393. New York: Oxford University Press
"Bolzano's best-known mathematical work, the *Rein analytischer Beweis* of 1817, promises to deliver a ground-revealing proof of an important theorem from the theory of equations, which Bolzano shows to follow from (a generalization of) the intermediate value theorem. In his paper Paul Rusnock explains and assesses this promise against the background of Bolzano's early account of mathematical method, in which the idea of grounding plays a central role."
49. Rusnock, Paul, and Burke, Mark. 2010. "Etchemendy and Bolzano on Logical Consequence." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 31:3-29
Abstract: "In a series of publications beginning in the 1980s, John Etchemendy has argued that the standard semantical account of logical consequence, due in its essentials to Alfred Tarski, is fundamentally mistaken. He argues that, while Tarski's definition requires us to classify the terms of a language as logical or non-logical, no such division is guaranteed to deliver the correct extension of our pre-theoretical or intuitive consequence relation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Tarski's account is claimed to be incapable of explaining an essential modal/epistemological feature of consequence, namely, its necessity and apriority.

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) is widely recognized as having anticipated Tarski's definition in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (or *Theory of Science*) of 1837. Because of the similarities between his account and Tarski's, Etchemendy's arguments have also been extended to cover Bolzano. The purpose of this article is to consider Bolzano's theory in the light of these criticisms. We argue that, due to important differences between Bolzano's and Tarski's theories, Etchemendy's objections do not apply immediately to Bolzano's account of consequence. Moreover, Bolzano's writings contain the elements of a detailed philosophical response to Etchemendy."

50. Rusnock, Paul, and George, Rolf. 2004. "Bolzano as Logician." In *The Rise of Modern Logic: from Leibniz to Frege*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, Jean, 177-205. Amsterdam: North-Holland
Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 3.
"Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) stands out with Frege as one of the great logicians of the nineteenth century. His approach to logic, set out in the *Theory of Science* [WL] of 1837, marks a fundamental reorientation of the subject on many fronts, one which is as radical as any in the history of the field. In sharp contrast to many of his contemporaries, Bolzano insisted upon a rigorous separation of logic from psychology. It should be possible, he thought, to characterize propositions, ideas, inferences, and the axiomatic organization of sciences without reference to a thinking subject. Consistently pursuing this approach to logic and methodology, Bolzano developed important accounts of formal semantics and formal axiomatics.
A talented mathematician, Bolzano developed his logic in conjunction with his mathematical research. Among the first to work on the foundations of mathematics in the modern sense of the term, he made a number of key discoveries in analysis, topology, and set theory, and had a significant influence on the development of mathematics in the nineteenth century. In logic, Bolzano is best remembered for his variation logic (section 4.2 below), a surprisingly subtle and rigorous development of formal

semantics. In this article, we discuss Bolzano's logic along with some of his work in the foundations of mathematics which has some bearing on logic." (p. 177)

51. Rusnock, Paul, and Šebestik, Jan. 2013. "The *Beyträge* at 200: Bolzano's Quiet Revolution in the Philosophy of Mathematics." *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* no. 1:1-14
Abstract: "This paper surveys Bolzano's *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (Contributions to a better-grounded presentation of mathematics) on the 200th anniversary of its publication. The first and only published issue presents a definition of mathematics, a classification of its subdisciplines, and an essay on mathematical method, or logic. Though underdeveloped in some areas (including, somewhat surprisingly, in logic), it is nonetheless a radically innovative work, where Bolzano presents a remarkably modern account of axiomatics and the epistemology of the formal sciences. We also discuss the second, unfinished and unpublished issue, where Bolzano develops his views on universal mathematics. Here we find the beginnings of his theory of collections, for him the most fundamental of the mathematical disciplines. Though not exactly the same as the later Cantorian set theory, Bolzano's theory of collections was used in very similar ways in mathematics, notably in analysis. In retrospect, Bolzano's debut in philosophy was a remarkably successful one, though its fruits would only become generally known much later."

52. ———. 2019. *Bernard Bolzano: His Life and Work*. New York: Oxford University Press
"Yet interest in Bolzano’s theoretical work has rarely extended farther than mere curiosity. Where Frege, for instance, has been the subject of many studies, few English-speaking philosophers have felt moved to look into the details of Bolzano’s work. This is more than a pity, since Bolzano did not simply anticipate what others later developed, but has original things to say that are of enduring interest. One of the most remarkable philosophers of the nineteenth century, his works are still very much

worth studying today, so solid is their foundation, so meticulous their detail. Quine might have done well, for instance, to have considered what Bolzano had to say about the analytic/synthetic distinction, or about the *a priori*, Putnam and Kripke to what Bolzano had to contribute to their discussions of indexicals and natural kind terms. Frege himself, as Alwin Korselt [*] pointed out in a none-too-friendly exchange over the foundations of geometry, might have learned a few things about logical consequence from him.
(...)
In the English-speaking world, Bolzano is best known for his work in logic and mathematics. There are certainly things of great importance and beauty in these parts of his work. We have already written, each of us, on these matters, and will have more to say about them in this book. But a faithful portrait of Bolzano cannot limit itself to this, for until he was 40 years old, he was only able to pursue these subjects in his spare time. With his considerable gifts in these non-controversial areas, he certainly might have led a distinguished life of speculation as a mathematician or philosopher. Instead he chose quite deliberately to plunge into the turbulent political life of his homeland, applying his formidable intelligence, energy, and determination to the reform of his society and its institutions. It is here that we shall begin." (pp. 2-3)
[*] Korselt, Alwin. "Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie." *Jahresberiehte der Deutschen Mathematikervereinigung*, 12 (1903): 402-407.

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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Selected Bibliography on Bernard Bolzano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Fifth Part: S - Z

Studies on Bolzano's Logic and Ontology

1. Schnieder, Benjamin. 2007. "Mere Possibilities: a Bolzanian Approach to Non-Actual Objects." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 45:525-550
"The paper is a detailed reconstruction of Bernard Bolzano's account of merely possible objects, which is a part of his ontology that has been widely ignored in the literature so far. According to Bolzano, there are some objects which are merely possible. While they are neither denizens of space and time nor members of the causal order, they could have been so. Thus, on Bolzano's view there are, for example, merely possible persons, i.e., objects which are neither actual nor persons but which could have been both. In course of the development of Bolzano's views, they are contrasted with the better known theory of his compatriot Alexius Meinong, and it is shown that they have a modern counterpart in the accounts of merely possible objects that were developed by Bernard Linsky and Ed Zalta, and by Timothy Williamson."
"Here is a brief outline of my paper. The first section is dedicated to the clarification of some basic Bolzanian notions, an understanding of which is needed for what follows. In the second section, I set out to establish that Bolzano in fact had the ontological view I attribute to him. That is, he accepted that there are merely possible objects.

The third and final section is concerned with the exposition and reconstruction of Bolzano's account of mere possibilities." (p. 526)

2. ———. 2014. "Bolzano on Causation and Grounding." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 52:309-337
"This paper is an exploration of Bolzano's views on causation, which have not been thoroughly examined yet. The paper reconstructs Bolzano's position, with a focus on his analysis of the concept of causation, on its ontological presuppositions, and on how he relates causation to his theory of grounding.(1) A comparison with standard positions from the contemporary debate on causation will prove his views to be quite original. Moreover, they are a valuable addition to the more recent debate on metaphysical grounding,(2) in which grounding is sometimes informally described as something like metaphysical causation with the exact connection of the two notions seldom being elaborated. Bolzano's theory explicitly addresses the issue and takes an innovative stance. However, it will also be revealed that his account is beset with problems. But even if his position should ultimately not be tenable, discussing it can deepen our understanding of problems raised in the current debates about causation and grounding and shed new light on them." (p. 309)
(1) The paper concentrates on general conceptual and metaphysical issues of causation. It will not discuss Bolzano's views on the epistemology of causation, nor his views on detailed matters of fact perhaps better to be treated in physics and its philosophy (such as the question of how causal powers are actually distributed in the world, what kind of basic causal powers there are, etc.).
(2) See e.g. Rosen, "Metaphysical Dependence"; Schaffer, "What Grounds"; and Fine, "Guide to Ground."
References
Fine, Kit. "Guide to Ground." In *Metaphysical Grounding*, edited by F. Correia and B. Schnieder, 37–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Rosen, Gideon. "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction." In *Modality*, edited by Bob Hale and Avrid

Hoffmann, 109–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Schaffer, Jonathan. “On What Grounds What.” In *Metametaphysics*, edited by David Chalmers et al., 347–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

3. ———. 2022. "A Fundamental Being: Bolzano's Cosmological Argument and Its Leibnizian Roots." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 418-443. New York: Oxford University Press
"In his ontology, Bolzano uses the notion of grounding to make claims about the dependent and independent existence of entities. In particular, he argues that there must be a fundamental object (in Bolzano's terminology: an *unconditioned* object), whose existence is not grounded in the existence of any other object. In his paper, Benjamin Schnieder reconstructs Bolzano's argument, explains its historical context, and puts the argument under scrutiny." (p. 38)
4. Scholz, Heinrich. 1961. *Concise History of Logic*. New York: Philosophical Library
On Bolzano see pp. 44-48.
"Modern logic interprets syllogisms as deduction of judgments from other judgments. Obviously, this interpretation is meaningless so long as we do not know what is meant by deducing one judgment from another. Bolzano did find the relevant interpretation which, it must be owned, *also* does not satisfy us all around but is, nevertheless, epoch-making solely because in pursuing his objective Bolzano turned away from statements and returned to the "forms."(154)
These "forms" now appear for the first time explicitly in formal logic so that with their aid Bolzano was able to obtain the most interesting interpretations not only for the derivation but also for the rest of the logically basic relations of compatibility, incompatibility, etc.(155) His charming *Philosophische Grammatik*(156) we have already mentioned. A luminous chapter all by itself contains magnificent discussions of earlier treatments of every topic of logic with special reference to Aristotle and Kant.(157) In

these discussions there is invaluable material for any *critical history of logic*." (pp. 46-47)
(154) See above, p. 3-4.
(155) Cf. especially WL, II, paragraph 154 ff., 198ff.; I, paragraph 95 ff.
(156) See above, p. 40.
(157) Cf. the little book of Bolzano's keenly critical pupil which I brought out in 1931 in a new edition together with W. Dubislav and which appeared in the Felix Meiner Verlag in Leipzig. It is F. Prikonsky: *Neuer Anti-Kant oder Prülfung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nach den in Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre niedergelegten Begriffen*. Here we also get acquainted with Augustine's anticipation of Bolzano's principles and ideas, a fact hardly commented on to this day.

5. Schubring, Gert. 1993. "Bernard Bolzano -- Not as Unknown to His Contemporaries as Is Commonly Believed?" *Historia Mathematica*:45-53
Abstract: "An unknown review of Bolzano's three important papers from the years 1816 to 1817 written in 1821 by J. J. I. Hoffmann, a mathematician from Southern Germany, is edited and commented."
"According to common historiography, Bolzano's pioneer publications, in particular his contributions to a new rigor in analysis in 1816 to 1817, remained almost unknown to the mathematical community. Only one piece of evidence contradicting the general impression that nobody read Bolzano in his own day is frequently quoted: N. H. Abel's remark in one of his *Paris notebooks*. Having read some of Bolzano's publications during the time he spent in Berlin 1825/1826, he noted enthusiastically "Bolzano is a clever man" (1). Abel's appreciation is taken, however, as an isolated instance, and Hermann Hankel is credited with having been the first to bring Bolzano to the general attention of the mathematical community in 1871 (see [Grattan--Guinness 1970, 51-52]).
(...)
With regard to this desideratum concerning the history of reception of Bolzano's work in his own time, an essay review

of Bolzano's three key papers of 1816/1817 in one of the leading German review journals, the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur--Zeitung* (JALZ), is a most welcome find. I came across it when analyzing the *JALZ* for its numerous mathematical reviews. As a first contribution to the study of Bolzano's contemporary reception, the essay review is examined in order to explore the reviewer's reading and understanding of Bolzano's work. Moreover, the mathematical education and practice of the reviewer is analyzed, and the role of the transmitting journal is briefly discussed. The essay review itself is also presented, or more precisely, those parts of it that are in the reviewer's own words." (pp. 45-46)

References

Grattan-Guinness, I. 1970. *The development of the foundations of mathematical analysis from Euler to Riemann*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

6. Šebestik, Jan. 1990. "The Archaeology of the Tractatus: Bolzano and Wittgenstein." In *Wittgenstein, eine Neubewertung / Wittgenstein, Towards a Re-Evaluation. Akten des 14. Intemationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums*, edited by Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes L., 112-118. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky

   "In the case of Bolzano, a comparison with Wittgenstein covers not only some specific points, but also the style of their philosophies and the roJe of logic in the construction of the system. I see three main points of comparison:

   1. For Bolzano, formal logic is the central discipline of philosophy: a logical system once set up becomes an instrument for all philosophical analysis.

   2. Bolzano refutes Kant's transeendental argument the function of which is assumed by a logico-semantical theory which is developed in two different ways:

   a) a theory of meaning or sense based on abstract intensional entities, propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and ideas-in-themselves (*Vorstellungen an sich*). The grammatical forms of ordinary language have to be elucidated and amended in order to comply with canonic forms obtained by the logical analysis of language.

b) a theory of reference or denotation, more precisely the logic of classes and the logic of extensional relations between propositions (extensional because defined solely in terms of the truth values of the propositions considered). Particularly important in this respect is the elucidation of fundamentallogical notions: validity, contravalidity, logical consequence (deducibility) and its link with probability.
3. Bolzano' s theory of representation (*Vorstellung*) is not properly speaking a picture theory. According to Bolzano, pictures (*Bilder*) are not ideas; they can at most accompany some ideas. No properly functional relationship, no *Abbildung*, is established between propositions and the world. On the one hand, *Sätze an sich* are not *Sachverhalte*, because no *Sachverhalte* correspond to false propositions. On the other hand, the structure of the propositions, which is derived from the structure of the statements of ordinary language, does not correspond exactly to the structure of objects. The system of all true propositions yields a complete description an sich of the world and of the properties of things within it, but Bolzano refutes the idea of morphism between the propositions and the world. It is nevertheless on the grounds of Bolzanian theories that the first (Polish-)Austrian picture theory was born. In Twardowski 's *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894), where the author attemps a synthesis between Bolzano 's logic and Brentano 's descriptive psychology, a functional relationship (*Abbildung*) is established between objects and ideas." (p. 113)

7. ———. 1992. "The Construction of Bolzano's Logical System." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 163-177. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
"Several reconstructions of Bolzano's logical system have been proposed until now, some of them at the present workshop. They exploit systematically different aspects of Bolzano's logic and interpret it in terms of different XXth century systems. Such an approach has its own rights, as the full force of Bolzano's logic can be measured only by the standards of our contemporary logic. This is precisely the

mark of great authors: each important discovery in their field brings to the light some hitherto unnoticed aspects of their work. That such reinterpretations are possible in the case of Bolzano, that his system can be represented in a quite different conceptual frame and translated into modern symbolic notation simply shows how rich and far reaching are his theories. Another argument favours this approach: a XXth century logician can read Bolzano and other logicians of the past only against the background of modern theories. It is in this way that the body of scientific knowledge is continuously being transmitted: by adapting and translating incessantly old theories into the present language. Moreover, the very meaning of past theories can often be understood only in the light of our systems. Already Husserl noticed that he would not have been able to grasp the significance of Bolzano's logic if he had not previously studied the most advanced contemporary logical theories - which in his case mainly meant the logic of Schroder! Nevertheless, this modernizing approach does not yield full justice to Bolzano. Even if some of his doctrines are definitively obsolete, they have their function in the construction of his system. Like his mathematics, his philosophy and his theology, Bolzano's logic was conceived in a specific historical context and its complete understanding requires a close attention to the logical and philosophical theories of his time. This is why a complementary approach seems necessary, namely a historical analysis which would trace the links between his system and the logical doctrines of his contemporaries as well as with great logical theories of the past.

My intention is to explain the formation and the structure of his logical system whose core is propositional logic. Bolzano's system of extensional relations between propositions represents one of the decisive innovations in the history of logic. It has no historical antecedents. It is nevertheless connected with logical theories of the late XVIIIth and early XIXth century and my paper tries to elucidate the genesis of Bolzano's system against this historical background. This approach will not only show the

originality of Bolzano's achievement in full light, but also give a perhaps unexpected insight into the structure of his logical system.
In my reconstruction, I intend to remain *within* Bolzano's logic, using only conceptual tools which he himself has designed. Therefore, I shall neither attempt to translate his definitions into some XXth century notation, nor confront his logic with our systems. One of the advantages of this approach is to give a presentation of Bolzano's logic which is as simple as possible and has no recourse either to symbolic language (except for elementary set-theoretical notational devices) or to sophisticated semantic framework. Those who have tried to explain Bolzano's logical theories to non-specialists or even to students of modern logic may test the advantage of such an approach." (pp.163-164).

8. ———. 1997. "Bolzano, Exner and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:33-59
Abstract: "Analytical philosophy begins with the first mathematical and philosophical works of Bolzano published between 1804 and 1817. There, Bolzano set out a project for the global reform of mathematics by means of the axiomatic method. Having completed the *Wissenschaftslehre,* Bolzano wrote a summary of his logic for the *Grossenlehre,* which he sent to Exner in 1833. The correspondence between Bolzano and Exner covered some of the main subjects treated by analytical philosophy: the status of abstract objects (propositions and objective ideas), intuitions, objectless ideas, the concept of object and many others. While Bolzano argued in favor of abstract entities independent of mind and of language, Exner considered them as abstractions obtained from the subjective judgments and representations. During the XIXth century, Bolzano's philosophy spread over Bohemia and Austria through manuscripts and through the first edition of Zimmermann's textbook of philosophy. The most important Brenta-n ians, Kerry, Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, discussed his doctrines which may also have influenced Wittgenstein and the Polish school."

9. ———. 2003. "Husserl Reader of Bolzano." In *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*, edited by Fisette, Denis. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"The incredible soundness of Husserl's judgment in the matter of logic is unique among his contemporaries - only Frege's insight is on par with it, if not superior. This is due to the lesson of Bolzano whose logic is the truth itself. Husserl adapted his logical system so that it became the logical basis of phenomenology. He adopted Bolzano's main ideas: the extension of logic to the theory of science, the theory of ideal meanings, the distinction between mental act, linguistic expression, meaning and denoted object, the concept of analyticity. Independently of Bolzano and consonant with later mathematical theories, Husserl developed his formal analytics along two lines, apophantic and formal ontology.
Bolzano, however, had articulated the domain of conceptual truths in the same manner: he constructed his logical system as a theory of meaning and his mathematics as a theory of object in general or *Etwas überhaupt*. Both set theory and mereology have their origin here. By his theory of science, Bolzano gave a new impetus to philosophy and logic. For the first time in modern thought, such questions as the nature of logical objects, the problems of meaning and reference, the relation between logic and language became central issues of philosophy." (p. 80)
10. ———. 2014. "Bolzano's Lehrjahre." In *Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. Vol. 1*, edited by Reboul, Anne, 289-293. Dordrecht: Springer
Abstract: "The paper will discuss some changes in Bolzano's definition of mathematics attested in several quotations from the *Beyträge, Wissenschaftslehre* and *Grössenlehre*: is mathematics a theory of forms or a theory of quantities? Several issues that are maintained throughout Bolzano's works will be distinguished from others that were accepted in the *Beyträge* and abandoned in the *Grössenlehre*. Changes will be interpreted as a consequence of the new logical theory of truth introduced in the *Wissenschaftslehre*,

but also as a consequence of the overcome of Kant's terminology, and of the radicalization of Bolzano's anti-Kantianism. It will be argued that Bolzano's evolution can be understood as a coherent move, if one compares the criticism expressed in the *Beyträge* on the notion of quantity with a different and larger notion of quantity that Bolzano developed already in 1816. This discussion is based on the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by Bolzano can be identified with works by von Spaun and Vieth respectively. Bolzano's evolution will be interpreted as a radicalization of the criticism of the Kantian definition of mathematics and as an effect of Bolzano's unaltered interest in the Leibnizian notion of *mathesis universalis*. As a conclusion, it will be argued that Bolzano never abandoned his original idea of considering mathematics as a *scientia universalis*, i.e. as the science of quantities in general, and it will be suggested that the question of ideal elements in mathematics, which has been interpreted as a main reason for the development of a new logical theory, can also be considered as a main reason for developing a different definition of quantity. "

11. Shapiro, Stewart. 2011. "Varieties of Pluralism and Relativism for Logic." In *A Companion to Relativism*, edited by Hales, Steven D., 526-552. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell Abstract: "My purpose is to articulate a number of different senses in which one can be a pluralist and/or a relativist concerning logical consequence. I propose, first, that logical consequence is either polysemous or it denotes a cluster concept. In other words, there are a number of different notions that go by that name, often run together, or else there are several aspects of the notions, with varying weights. The different notions, or aspects, of consequence, turn on matters of modality, semantics, effectiveness, justification, rationality, and form. Second, most of the articulations of the pre - theoretic notions(s) of logical consequence make essential use of a boundary between logical and non - logical terminology. This suggests a sort of relativism/pluralism explicitly noted by Bernard Bolzano and Alfred Tarski: logical consequence is relative to the

logical/non - logical boundary. An argument may be valid on one collection of logical terms, invalid on another. Third, it is possible that at least some aspects of the notion of logical consequence are vague: there may be borderline cases of valid arguments. If so, we have to turn to what the correct account of vagueness is. On some theories of vagueness, consequence ends up as relative to something, such as a sharpening or a conversational context, and on others, we end up with a kind of pluralism. Finally, there are a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that employ a non - classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent if classical logic is imposed. This suggests a fourth kind of relativism/pluralism: relativity to structure." (p. 526)

12. Siebel, Mark. 1997. "Variation, Derivability, and Necessity." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:117-137
Abstract: "In Bolzano's view, a proposition is necessarily true iff it is derivable from true propositions that include no intuition (Anschauung). This analysis is historically important because it displays close similarities to Quine's and Kripke's ideas. Its systematic significance, however, is reduced by the fact that derivability is defined with recourse to the method of variation, which we are allowed to apply even to propositions containing none of the respective variables. This liberality leads to the result that, according to Bolzano's analysis, every truth is necessarily true. Even by introducing his condition of relevance (shared variables), Bolzano cannot avoid that some propositions come out as necessarily true which are merely contingently true."
13. ———. 2002. "Bolzano's Concept of Consequence." *The Monist. An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry* no. 85:581-601
"In the second volume of his *Wissenschaftslehre* (2) from 1837, the Bohemian philosopher, theologian, and mathematician Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) introduced his concept of consequence, named *derivability* (*Ableitbarkeit*), together with a variety of theorems and further considerations. Derivability is an implication relation between *sentences in themselves* (*Sätze an sich*), which are

not meant to be linguistic symbols but the *contents* of declarative sentences as well as of certain mental episodes. When Schmidt utters the sentence 'Schnee ist weiss', and Jones judges that snow is white, the sentence in itself expressed by Schmidt is the same as the one to which Jones agrees in thought. This sentence in itself is an abstract entity: in some sense, it exists; but it is unreal insofar as it lacks a position in space and time, does not stand in causal relationships, and is independent of the existence of thinking beings and languages. (3)" (p. 581)
(*) On the whole, this contribution is a summary of my book *Der Begriff der Ableitbarkeit bei Bolzano* (Siebel 1996).
(2) I refer to it by 'WL' plus number of volume, section, and page. It is partly translated by Rolf George: *Theory of Science*, Oxford 1972; but here translations are mine.
(3) Cf. WL I, § 19, pp. 77f.; § 22, p. 90; § 25, p. 112; § 28, p. 121; WL II, § 122, 4.

14. ———. 2011. "“It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision.” Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 82:91-127
"Kant's famous definition of analyticity states that a judgement is analytic if its subject contains its predicate. Bolzano objects that (i) Kant's definiens permits an interpretation too wide, (ii) the definiens is too narrow, (iii) the definiendum is too limited, and (iv) the definition does not capture the proper essence of analyticity. Objections (i), (iii) and (iv) can be countered. Objection (ii) remains because, among other things, the Kantian definition has an eye only for an analysis of the subject within a judgement."
15. ———. 2019. "Bolzano’s Theory of Judgment." In *The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Ball, Brian and Schuringa, Christoph, 110-128. New York: Routledge
"Section 2 presents one of the many places where Bolzano anticipates Frege’s anti-psychologistic notion of a third realm, which complements the inner realm of mental appearances and the outer realm of perceivable objects. In particular, Bolzano strictly distinguishes between judgments as mental acts and the contents of such acts. In section 3, it

is shown how he tries to draw the line between judgments and acts of merely entertaining a thought. Section 4 focuses on the formation of judgments. Of prime importance is the distinction between mediated and unmediated judgments because it is intimately connected with epistemic issues. Section 5 deals with intrinsic qualities of judgments, such as vividness, degree of confi dence, clarity vs obscurity, and distinctness vs confusedness.(1)

The notion of judgment occupies centre stage in Bolzano's analyses of epistemic concepts. It is not only crucial to his explication of belief (*Meinung*) as a disposition to judge but also to his explications of cognition (*Erkenntnis*) as true judgment and conviction (*Überzeugung*) and knowledge (*Wissen*) as attitudes towards judgments. In the interest of brevity, I will not go into this conceptual enterprise. Instead, it will be pointed out that Bolzano's theory of judgment includes ingredients one would hardly expect when being told that he anticipated Frege's antipsychologistic views." (pp. 110-111)

(1) Some of the following considerations may also be found in Siebel (1999) and Siebel (2004).

References

Siebel, M. (1999), "Bolzanos Erkenntnistheorie", in E. Morscher (ed.), *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert*. Sankt Augustin: Academia.

Siebel, M. (2004), "Bolzanos Urteilslehre", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86: 56–87.

16. Simons, Peter. 1987. "Bolzano, Tarski, and the Limits of Logic." *Philosophia Naturalis*:378-405

    Reprinted in: Peter Simons, *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays,* Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992, pp. 13-40.

    Abstract: "Both Bolzano and Tarski were unsure what counts as logic. This means that Bolzano's concept of logical analyticity, like Tarski's of logical consequence, is not completely determinate.

    In a posthumously published paper, Tarski offers a proposal for demarcating the logical objects in a type-hierarchy, based on the idea of invariance under arbitrary

permutations of the domain of individuals. In this paper I comment on and extend Tarski's proposal and show how to combine it with Bolzano's procedure of variation among concepts, to obtain a definition of logical constants in a logically significant fragment of a purported Bolzanian realm of meanings in themselves. I conclude with doubts about the propriety and utility of such a realm."

17. ———. 1997. "Bolzano on Collections." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:87-108
Abstract: "Bolzano's theory of Collections (*Inbegriffe*) has usually been taken as a rudimentary set theory. More recently, Frank Krickel has claimed it is a mereology.[*] I find both interpretations wanting. Bolzano's theory is, as I show, extremely broad in scope; it is in fact a general theory of collective entities, including the concrete wholes of mereology, classes-as-many, and many empirical collections. By extending Bolzano's ideas to embrace the three factors of kind, components and mode of combination, one may develop a coherent general account of collections. But it is most difficult to take Bolzano's view to fit modern set theory. So while Krickel's positive thesis is rejected, his negative thesis is confirmed."
F. Krickel, *Teil und Inbegriff. Bernard Bolzanos Mereologie*, 1995.

18. ———. 1999. "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists." In *German Philosophy Since Kant*, edited by O'Hear, Anthony, 109-136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
"Bolzano's work will in due course be wholly accessible in print and should present relatively few problems of interpretation. I foresee a steadily growing reputation, but whether he comes to his just recognition will depend on attracting sufficiently many interested and talented commentators. The most promising centre of Bolzano studies is currently Hamburg, where a number of young enthusiasts have gathered around Wolfgang Künne.
Of the three philosophers I have mentioned, Bolzano is without doubt the most considerable. Meinong's theories are in the end unacceptably extreme and Brentano's work is

often unclear in its implications, though both say things which are of much value to present-day discussions. On the other hand, whether one agrees with his semantic Platonism or not, Bolzano's views are up to the highest standards of contemporary discussion and in their clarity above much of it. His correspondence with Ferdinand Exner has been called the first text of modern analytical philosophy. Most work has to date concentrated on his logic and semantics, but his ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion and philosophy of mathematics all deserve greater exposure. The Complete Edition will serve as a definitive textual basis, but it is very expensive, and we badly need cheap study texts in English and German to complement it, and a good introduction to Bolzano in English. We also need to revise our histories of nineteenth-century philosophy to take adequate account of its greatest representative." (p. 126)

19. ———. 2006. "Austrian Philosophers on Truth." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, Mark, 159-183. New York: Routledge
"In this chapter, I shall consider what the principal Austrian philosophers from Bolzano to Popper have had to say on the subject of truth. Since I shall cover a fair number of philosophers and theories, my considerations will be mainly confined to two linked questions:
What – according to the philosopher in question – is the nature of truth?
What ontology is required to explicate truth according to their account?
Further questions concerned with our access to and knowledge of the truth will only be considered as necessary, since they lead into a tangle of issues for which I shall not have the space here. Neither shall I justify my selection of this or that philosopher as 'Austrian', but simply press on." (p. 159)
20. ———. 2011. "Bolzano's Logic."1-19
Available on the website academia.edu
Original translated by Giorgio Volpe and published in Italian as "Bolzano e la logica" in S. Besoli, L. Guidetti and

V. Raspa, eds., Bernard *Bolzano e la tradizione filosofica*. Macerata: Quodlibet. = *Discipline filosofiche* XXI, 2, 2011, 321–342.
Abstract: "Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre (1837) is one of the two most important works in logic between Leibniz and Frege. In it, Bolzano revolutionised logic by placing it for the first time on a firm semantic footing, employing the concepts of objective, abstract propositions and ideas. The chief instrument in his account of logic is the variation of ideas, which enabled him to define a wide range of logical concepts, and further allowed him to merge deductive logic with a logical conception of probability. This article summarizes the main points of Bolzano's logic and indicates ways in which they relate to post-Fregean logic."

21. ———. 2015. "Bolzano's Monadology." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 23:1074-1084
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), known in his lifetime as 'the Bohemian Leibniz', is best known as a logician and mathematician, but he also developed a monadology in which the monads, which he called 'atoms', have spatial location and physical properties. This essay summarizes and assesses his monadology."
22. Smart, Harold R. 1944. "Bolzano's Logic." *The Philosophical Review* no. 53:513-533
"Contemporary advocates of Husserl's phenomenological approach to the problems of philosophy tend, consciously or unconsciously, to convey the impression that there is only slight connection between Bernard Bolzano's logical theories and those of their Master. Unfortunately their attitude on this matter encourages the common belief that Bolzano may be safely ignored by students of logic-that his work in this field is of little consequence at the present time. Yet in Husserl's own estimation Bolzano was one of the greatest logicians of all times, and historians of philosophy have called him a "Leibniz auf b6hmischen Boden".
He was at all events one of the staunchest opponents of the metaphysical logicians following Kant, as well as of Kant himself.

His *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), a compendious work in four volumes totalling nearly 2500 pages, draws much of its inspiration from Augustinian and Leibnizian sources, and in turn has served as a basis for certain theories of Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and others. Like Leibniz he zealously occupied himself with both mathematics and philosophy from early youth, and again like Leibniz he is rightly famous for his distinguished work in both fields. Indeed his *Paradoxien der Unendlichen* (posth. 1850) is said to have started the great Cantor on his researches in the realm of the mathematical infinite. And he is another of the few thinkers whose chief philosophical writings are in the field of logic. For the rest, his writings are shot through with references to his predecessors, both ancient and modern, and with critical remarks on their doctrines." (p. 513)

23. Stang, Nicholas F. 2013. "A Kantian Reply to Bolzano's Critique of Kant's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:33-61
Summary: "One of Bolzano's objections to Kant's way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible.
I argue that, correctly understood, Kant's conception of analyticity allows for analytic judgments of a wider range of syntactic forms."
24. ———. 2014. "Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic." In *New Anti-Kant*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra and Tolley, Clinton, 192-234. London: Palgrave Macmillan
"In §12 of his 1837 *magnum opus*, the *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano remarks that "In the new logic textbooks one reads almost constantly that 'in logic one must consider not the material of thought but the mere form of thought, for which reason logic deserves the title of a purely formal science'" (*WL* §12, 46).(1) The sentence Bolzano quotes is his own

summary of others' philosophical views; he goes on to cite Jakob, Hoffbauer, Metz, and Krug as examples of thinkers who held that logic abstracts from thematter of thought and considers only its form. Although Bolzano does not mention Kant by name here, Kant does of course hold that "pure general logic", what Bolzano would consider logic in the traditional sense (the theory of propositions, representations, inferences, etc.), is formal.
(...)
In recent work, both John MacFarlane and Sandra Lapointe have argued that this 'formality thesis' is original to Kant; according to them, no one in the pre-Kantian, Leibnizian logical tradition held that logic
is about the form of thinking.(3) As MacFarlane points out, the claim that logic is formal is now so widespread that it is often simply asserted without argument. So in criticizing the formality thesis in these post-Kantian figures (whom Lapointe aptly dubs 'Kantian logicians') Bolzano is really targeting one of Kant's most influential ideas in the philosophy of logic." (pp. 192-193)
(1) References to the *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL) are to Bolzano (1837); it is cited by section number and page.
(3) MacFarlane (2002) and Lapointe (2012).
References
Lapointe, S. (2012). 'Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 85, 11–32.
MacFarlane, J. (2002). 'Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism', *The Philosophical Review*, 111, 25–65.

25. Stelzner, Werner. 2002. "Compatibility and Relevance: Bolzano and Orlov." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 10:137-171
"Ivan Orlov (1886 - not later 1936) is the author of "The Logic of Compatibility of Propositions", *Matematicheskii Sbornik* 35, 1928, pp. 263-86 (in Russian), "the first precisely elaborated modern system of relevance logic" (p. 137)
"In Bernard Bolzano Orlov had a great predecessor in the attempt of deriving the concept of logical consequence, and

indeed of relevant consequence, from the concept of compatibility of sentences. It is appropriate, therefore, to turn to Bolzano in order to check out parallels and divergences in the treatment and role of the compatibility of sentences in Bolzano's and Orlov's logical projects." (p. 142)

26. Sundholm, Göran. 1994. "Ontologic versus Epistemologic: some Strands in the Development of Logic 1837-1957." In *Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala*, edited by Prawitz, dag and Westerstähl, Dag, 373-384. Dodrecht: Kluwer
"Inferences, that is, acts of passage in which a certain judgement, the conclusion of the inference, is drawn on the basis of certain already made judgements, the premisses of the inference, have yielded their central place at the hard core of logic to relations of logical consequence between propositions that serve as contents of the judgements involved, or even more commonly, between well-formed formulae, that is, between meta-mathematical objects of an uninterpreted formal language. In the present paper I intend to review some of the steps in the process whereby this came about, as well as mention a couple of philosophical corollaries.
Quine, in 1952, held that 'logic is an old subject and since 1879 it has been a great one'.(1) No one reasonably informed concerning the development of logic could possibly object to the first part of this statement, but I want to take mild exception to the second: logic was great also prior to to the appearance of Frege's *Begriffsschrift*.(2) From the perspective I am concerned to develop here, 1837 is as important a year as 1879. In that year Bernhard Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* made its appearance in four mighty tomes.(3)" (pp. 373-374)
(1) *Methods of Logic*, Holt and Co., N.Y. 1950, p. vii.
(2) Louis Nebert, Halle, Jena 1879.
(3) J. von Seidel, Sulzbach.

27. ———. 1998. "MacColl on Judgement and Inference." *Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 3:119-132
"The theme of our conference is that of Hugh MacColl and the logical tradition. From any point of view, surely,

judgement and inference are (possibly *the*) central components of the logical tradition. However, they do not occur as such in MacColl's Symbolical reasoning(s).
(...).
Accordingly, I begin with a rational reconstruction of what I see as the pivotal moment in the 19th century logical tradition, namely Bolzano's introduction of a novel form of judgement, which will be used to take the measure of the early MacColl with respect to judgement and inference." (p. 119)
(...)
!Why does this Bohemian priest [Bolzano] deserve pride of place over and above such luminaries as Boole, Peirce and Frege? For more than two thousand years, logic has been concerned with how to effect valid acts of inference from judgements known to other judgements that become known through the inference in question. Basically, these judgements take the subject/copula/predicate form [S is P]. Bolzano now has the courage to break with this traditional pattern and uses instead the unary form
(1) A is true;
where A is a *Satz an sich*, or a *Gedanke*, in the later alternative terminology of Frege. The latter term was translated into English as *proposition* by Moore and Russell, with an unusually confusing ambiguity as a result: prior to 1900 a "proposition" stood for a judgement (made), whereas later it came to stand for the propositional content of such a judgement." (p. 120)

28. ———. 1999. "When, and Why, did Frege read Bolzano?" In *Logica Yearbook 1999*, 164-174
"Michael Dummett wrote:
The only nineteenth-century philosopher of whom it would be reasonable to guess, just from the content of his writings and those of Frege, that he had influenced Frege, is Bernhard Bolzano, who died in the year Frege was born; but there is no evidence whatever that Frege ever read Bolzano(1)
Subsequently he was taken to task by Wolfgang Künne for having made the 'grave mistake' of misspelling 'Bernard',

the first name of Bolzano.
However, in my opinion, this is not the only mistake in the quote from Dummett. In the present note I wish to dispute that 'there is no evidence whatever that Frege ever read Bolzano'. On the contrary, by combining two well-known sets of facts, I shall argue, one obtains strong evidence that Frege did read Bolzano late 1905 or early 1906." (p. 164, a note omitted)
(...)
"On the strength of internal evidence I have argued that Frege did read Bolzano.
Was it in fact possible for him to do so? It certainly was, as Dr. Uwe Dathe, of the Philosophical Institute at Jena University, has been kind enough to check.(26) The University Library at Jena owns a set of Bolzano's collected works from 1882. The acquisition is not dated, but from the library stamp and binding it is clear that the set must have been obtained shortly after its appearance.
Unfortunately, the library ledgers for the years 1821-1899, which have miraculously been retained, are in too bad a state to allow for any conclusion whether Frege actually borrowed the work during that period.(27)
Finally, if, as I aver, Frege did read Bolzano, why does he not simply say so? The answer here surely lies in his character: throughout his career Frege *never* acknowledges, but always disagrees.(28) His sprit seems to have been essentially adversarial. He is the typical *Gegner* who only attacks, but who cannot be bothered to agree." (p. 172)
(1) *Frege and Other Philosophers*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. VII.
(2) 'Propositions in Bolzano and in Frege', in: *Grazer Philosophische Studien* (Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy; edited by Wolfgang KUnne, Mark Siebel and Mark Textor) 53 (1997), pp. 202-240, at p. 203.
(26) Private letter, November 26,1998.
(27) Of course, if I am right, a later loan, in 1905 or 1906, outside the period of the ledgers, would be more likely.

29. ———. 2002. "A Century of Inference: 1837-1936." In *In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.*

Vol. II, edited by Gardenfors, Peter, Wolenski, Jan and Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, 565-580. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"The first serious breach in the traditional logical fortress was broached by one thoroughly steeped in the Scholastic patrimony, namely Bernard Bolzano, in another *Wissenschaftslehre* from 1837. This, however, is no puny pamphlet,but a monumental four-volume tome.(5) Like all good ideas the basic idea behind Bolzano's magisterial change is essentially simple: Bolzano revolutionizes logical theory by "objectivizing" the middle column of the traditional diagram. This objectivization consists in severing the left - and right-hand links to mind and language, thereby obtaining objective "Platonist" logical notions, for which Bolzano ironically adopts the Kantian 'an sich' idiom. Thus, the (mental) terms become objective "ideas-in-themselves" (*Vorstellungen an sich*). (6) The judgements made, that is, the mental propositions, become propositions-in-themselves (*Satze an sich*), that is, propositions in the modem, post-Russellian sense.(7) Finally, the mental inferences are replaced by *Ableitbarkeiten*, that is, relations of (logical) consequence between propositions-inthemselves.
The resulting change with respect to the form of judgement is particularly interesting. In place of the traditional bipartite Subject/copula/Predicate form Bolzano uses the unary form
C is true,
where *C* is a *Satz an sich*, that is, a proposition that serves as content of the judgement in question (WL §34). The form of the proposition *C*, on the other hand, stays close to the traditional [*S* is *P*]. Bolzano uses [*A* has *b*], where *A* and *b* are *Vorstellungen an sich*, that is, (what corresponds to) objectivizations of the mental products of simple apprehensions, as canonical form for the objective propositions. Thus, he converts the traditional form of judgement into a form of content:
The proposition that the rose has redness is true
instead of
The rose is red." (pp. 567-568. a note omitted)

(7) Russell ([*Principles of Mathematics*] 1903, Appendix A) might be responsible for sanctioning the unfortunate use of the term Russell (1903, Appendix A) might be responsible for sanctioning the unfortunate use of the term *proposition* for the Fregean *Gedanken*.

30. ———. 2009. "A Century of Judgement and Inference: 1837-1936. Some Strands in the Development of Logic." In *The Development of Modern Logic*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 263-318. New York: Oxford University Press
§ 3. Revolution: Bolzano's *Annus Mirabilis*, pp. 269-273.
"My office in the present chapter is to tell how, within a century, the notions of judgment and inference were driven out of logical theory and replaced by propositions and (logical) consequence. Systematic considerations guide the treatment. My history is unashamedly Whiggish: A current position will be shown as the outcome, or even culmination, of a historical development. No apology is offered, nor, in my opinion, is one needed." (p. 263)
(...)
"Bolzano's revolution with respect to the traditional picture is threefold.
First, the middle ("product") column of the traditional schema is objectified.
The mental links are severed, and thus, in particular, the traditional notions mental term (concept, idea) and mental proposition (judgment) are turned into their ideal, or Platonist, counterparts idea-in-itself (*Vorstellung an sich*) and proposition-in-itself (*Satz an sich*).(23) Second, the pivotal middle square of the diagram is altered: The judgment made no longer takes the traditional (*S* is *P*) form. Logic is no longer term logic. Instead Bolzano uses the propositional, unary form of judgment that was canvassed above, with his *Sätze an sich* taking the role of judgable contents:
The *Satz an sich S* is true.(24)
Third, Bolzano bases his logical theory, not on inference (from judgments known to judgment made), but on (logical) consequence between propositions.(25)

Judgment is dethroned and its content now holds pride of place in logical theory." (pp. 269-270)
(23) The English rendering of Bolzano's *Satz an sich* is a matter of some delicacy.
The modern, Moore-Russell notion of proposition, being an English counterpart of the Fregean Thought (German *Gedanke*), really is an *an sich* notion, and, for our purposes, essentially the same as Bolzano's *Satz an sich*. Thus, proposition-in-itself is pleonastic: The in-itself component is already included in the proposition.
Furthermore, the mental propositions and their linguistic signs, that is, written or spoken propositions, as explained, carry assertoric force, whereas Bolzano's *Sätze an sich* manifestly do not, serving, as they do, in the role of judgmental content. (...)
(24) WL, §34.
(25) Occasionally I shall permit myself to drop the "in-itself" idiom in the interest of perspicuity and readability and speak just of "propositions."

31. Świętorzecka, Kordula. 2017. "Bolzano's Argument for the Existence of Substances: a Formalization with Two Types of Predication." *Acta Analytica* no. 32:411-426
Abstract: "The topic of our analysis is the argument for the existence of substances given by Bernard Bolzano in *Athanasia* (1827), where he essentially employs two ontological categories: substance and adherence. Bolzano considers the real and conditioned *Inbegriff* of all adherences, which are *wirklich* and *nicht selbst bestehen*. He claims that the formed collection is dependent on something external and nonadherential, which therefore is a substance. Bolzano's argumentation turns out to be structurally similar to his argument for the existence of God from *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* (1834), but in each of these reasonings, we find different plausible interpretations of the key concept "Inbegriff". The latter argumentation refers to the mereological totality of existentially conditioned objects. We propose the explication of the Bolzanian *Inbegriff* of all adherences

using two types of predication: we consider its extension as composed of certain intensional counterparts of adherences. In our approach, we use a fragment of the theory of abstract objects formulated by E. Zalta (1983), describing two different relations between individuals and properties: extensional exemplification and intensional encoding. We put our reconstruction in a wider context of Bolzano's ontology, formulating the needed axioms with two primitive predicates of second order ... is an adherence, ... is conditioned by something real as well as the conditionally introduced first order predicate constant *In* for *Inbegriff of all adherential ideas*. Finally, we sketch a model for our theory."

References

Zalta, E. (1983). *Abstract object: an introduction to axiomatic metaphysics*, D. Dordrecht: Reidel.

32. ———. 2019. "Two Formal Interpretations of Bolzano's Theory of Substances and Adherences." *Axiomathes* no. 29:265-284

Abstract: "Our research concerns a formal representation of Bolzano's original concepts of *Substanz* and *Adhärenz*. The formalized intensional theory enables to articulate a question about the consistency of a part of Bolzano's metaphysics and to suggest an answer to it in terms of contemporary model theory. The formalism is built as an extension of Zalta's theory of abstract objects, describing two types of predication, viz. attribution and representation. Bolzano was aware about this distinction.

We focus on the consistency of this formalism and the description of its semantics.

Firstly, we explore the possibility to reconstruct a Russellian antinomy based on the concept of the Bolzano's *Inbegriff* of all adherences. (Bolzano's theory of ideas is often suspected of antinomial consequences.) Our aim is to show limitations of his theory that prevent a contradiction when the *Inbegriff* consists of non-selfreferential adherences. Next, we discuss two competing semantics for the proposed theory: Scott's and Aczel's semantics. The first one yields a problematic result, that there are no models for the considered theory,

containing a non-empty collection of all adherences. This is due to the fact that Scott's structures verify the formula on reloading abstracts in extensional contexts. We show that Aczel's semantics does not contain this difficulty. There are described Aczel's models with a non-empty set of all adherences. The self-referentiality of such a collection becomes irrelevant here.
Finally, we show that there are Aczel's structures verifying the formula on reloading abstracts and we exclude them from the class of models intended for our theory."
References
Zalta, E. (1983). *Abstract object: an introduction to axiomatic metaphysics*, D. Dordrecht: Reidel

33. Tarski, Adam. 2002. "On the Concept of Following Logically." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 23:155-196
Translated from the Polish and German by Magda Stroinka and David Hitchcock.
"We provide for the first time an exact translation into English of the Polish version of Alfred Tarski's classic 1936 paper, whose title we translate as 'On the concept of following logically'.
We also provide in footnotes an exact translation of all respects in which the German version, used as the basis of the previously published and rather inexact English translation, differs from the Polish. Although the two versions are basically identical, to an extent that is even uncanny, we note more than 400 differences. Several dozen of these are substantive differences due to revisions by Tarski to the Polish version which he did not incorporate in the German version.
With respect to these revisions the Polish version should be regarded as more authoritative than the German. Hence scholars limited to an English translation should use ours." (p. 1)
"After the original of this paper had appeared in print, H. Scholz in his article 'Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos, Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung', Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule, new series, vol. 6, pp. 399-472 (see in particular p. 472, footnote 58) pointed out a far-reaching analogy

between this definition of consequence and the one suggested by B. Bolzano about a hundred years earlier." [Note added by Tarski in English in Tarski (1956, 1983).] (p. 67).

34. Tatzel, Armin. 2002. "Bolzano's Theory of Ground and Consequence." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 43:1-25
Abstract: "The aim of the paper is to present and evaluate Bolzano's theory of grounding, that is, his theory of the concept expressed and the relation brought into play by 'because'. In the first part of the paper (Sections 1-4) the concept of grounding is distinguished from and related to three other concepts: the concept of an epistemic reason}, the concept of causality, and the concept of deducibility (i.e., logical consequence). In its second part (Sections 5-7) Bolzano's positive account of grounding is reconstructed in axiomatic form and critically discussed."
35. Textor, Mark. 1997. "Bolzano's Sententialism." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 53:181-202
Abstract: "Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds that the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence must be equipollent ("*gleichgeltend*"). It is shown that even this modest view of paraphrase does not help Bolzano in sustaining his claim that all sentences have the form "A has b"."
36. ———. 2001. "Logically Analytic Propositions *A Posteriori*?" *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 18:91-113
"In this paper I will be concerned with Bolzano's explication of logical analyticity or I-analyticity for short. Nowadays Balzano is often seen as a forerunner of the so-called substitutionalist account (Etchemendy) of I-analyticity for

sentences, the property that distinguishes logical truths (falsehoods) from "ordinary" truths (falsehoods). I will argue that Bolzano's explication does not correspond closely to the modern account. My reason for this heterodox view is not that Balzano tries to define what makes a *proposition*, roughly, the meaning of a sentence, I-analytic. The problem I am interested in will also arise for an account of I-analyticity for sentences that follows Bolzano's lead. My reason is an epistemological one: Bolzano's account does not allow him to say that I-analytic propositions can be known *a priori*. But according to most philosophers' understanding of I-analyticity this epistemological feature is central to the notion of logical truth. Hence, Bolzano's account does not capture an important feature of the concept of a logical truth or the broader concept of an I-analytic proposition." (p. 91)

37. ———. 2003. ""Caius-at-Noon" or Bolzano on Tense and Persistence." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 20:81-102
Translated in French as: "Bolzano sur le temps et la persistence", *Philosophiques*, 30, 2003, pp. 105-125.
"Bolzano's fame among contemporary analytic philosophers is mainly due to his achievements in the philosophy of logic. (...)
What is less well known is that Bolzano also uses histheory of propositions to define a variety of epistemological and metaphysical notions. Among the metaphysical notions so defined is the notion of time. Crucial for his definition of time is Bolzano 's thesis that
a tensed natural language sentence attributing a substantial property to an actual thing expresses only a complete proposition if it contains an expression like "in (at) t" as part of its *subject-term*.
Bolzano consequently rejects the Aristotelian idea that tense attaches to predicables.(1) Bolzano's proposal is of interest for contemporary philosophers, because it bears a striking resemblance to contemporary theories in which expressions like "Caius at noon" refer to temporal parts. This paper is primarily concerned with a reconstruction and evaluation of

the part of Bolzano's doctrine of propositions that is the basis of his definition of time. The definition itself will be a topic for another occasion. First things first. The following sketch of Bolzano's definitional strategy and its rationale shall introduce the reader to Bolzano's general project, which connects tense and time." (pp. 81-82)
(1) Aristotle puts his view forward in De Interpretalione 16^b6 and 16^b8.
For recent defenses see P. T. Geach, *Reference and Generality* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), §27, and D. Wiggins "Substance," in *Philosophy*, ed. A. C. Grayling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 232.

38. ———. 2013. "Bolzano on the Source of Necessity: A Reply to Rusnock." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 21:381-392
Abstract: "According to Bolzano, an object has necessary being if, and only if, there is a conceptual truth that ascribes being to it. I (Textor, 1996, chapter 5) proposed that the notion of conceptual truth bears the explanatory weight in Bolzano's theory of necessity because, ultimately, the truth of such a proposition depends only on the nature of the concepts it contains. Rusnock (2012) argues against this interpretation and proposes, in turn, that for Bolzano necessity and contingency are tied to free choice. In this article I will provide conceptual and historical background for Bolzano's view of necessity and use it to motivate my interpretation as well as to rebut Rusnock's criticism."
References
Rusnock, P. ‘Remarks on Bolzano’s Conception of Necessary Truth’, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20, 817-837, (2012).
Textor, M. *Bolzanos Propositionalismus* (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1996.

39. ———. 2013. "Bolzano’s Anti-Kantianism: From a Priori Cognitions to Conceptual Truths." In *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Beaney, Michael, 227-250. New York: Oxford University Press
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano was born in 1781, the year of the publication of the first edition of Kant’s *Critique of Pure*

Reason; he died in 1848, the year of Gottlob Frege's birth. These dates are symbolic. Bolzano's work is a link between Kant's philosophy and early analytic philosophy of which Frege is a key exponent. In this chapter I will discuss how Bolzano's criticism of Kant shapes Bolzano's theory of propositions. In connection with this I will outline how Bolzano discovered the method of variation and give an overview of his results in employing this method."

40. ———. 2013. "Bolzano on Conceptual and Intuitive Truth: the Point and Purpose of the Distinction." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 43:13-36
Abstract: "Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (*Begriffssätze an sich*) and intuitive propositions (*Anschauungssätze an sich*). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of the distinction lies in the fact that conceptual and intuitive truths have different objective grounds: if a conceptual truth is grounded at all, its ground is a conceptual truth. The difference in grounds between conceptual and intuitive truths motivates Bolzano's criticism of Kant's view that intuition plays the fundamental role in mathematics, a conceptual science by Bolzano's lights."

41. ———. 2022. "Grounding, Simplicity, and Repetition." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies*, edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 301-318. New York: Oxford University Press
"For Bolzano, grounding often goes along with a reduction of *propositional complexity*, where he takes the complexity of a proposition to depend not only on *how many* ideas occur in it, but also by how *often* each of them occurs (so that the proposition *that Ann is wise* is less complex than the proposition *that Ann isn't unwise*). But this raises the

Repetition Problem, which Mark Textor explores in his paper: how can a whole contain one and the same entity more than once?" (p. 37)

42. Thompson, Paul B. 1981. "Bolzano's Deducibility and Tarski's Logical Consequence." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 2:11-20
Abstract: "In this paper I argue that Bolzano's concept of deducibility and Tarski's concept of logical consequence differ with respect to their philosophical intent. I distinguish between epistemic and ontic approaches to logic, and argue that Bolzano's deducibility presupposes an epistemic approach, while Tarski's logical consequence presupposes an ontic approach."
43. Tolley, Clinton. 2012. "Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a *Wissenschaftslehre*." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 85:63-88
Summary: "Throughout his career, Bolzano presents his account of knowledge and science as an alternative to 'the Critical philosophy' of Kant and his followers. The aim of this essay is to evaluate the success of Bolzano's own account—and especially, its heavy emphasis on the objectivity of cognitive content—in enabling him to escape what he takes to be the chief shortcomings of the 'subjective idealist philosophy'. I argue that, because Bolzano's own position can be seen to be beset by problems that are both recognizably similar to, and possibly even worse than, those that he takes to afflict Kant's account of the elements of our knowledge, Bolzano's attempt to fully overcome the alleged vices of Kant's idealism by 'extruding' semantic content from the mind must be judged to be less than satisfactory."
44. ———. 2013. "Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 33:307-327
Abstract: "Here I revisit Bolzano's criticisms of Kant on the nature of logic. I argue that while Bolzano is correct in taking Kant to conceive of the traditional logic as a science of the activity of thinking rather than the content of thought, he is wrong to charge Kant with a failure to identify and examine this content itself within logic as such. This neglects Kant's own insistence that traditional logic does not

exhaust logic as such, since it must be supplemented by a transcendental logic that will in fact study nothing other than thought's content. Once this feature of Kant's views is brought to light, a much deeper accord emerges between the two thinkers than has hitherto been appreciated, on both the nature of the content that is at issue in logic and the sense of logic's generality and formality."

45. ———. 2014. "Bolzano and Kant on Space and Outer Intuition." In *New Anti-Kant*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra and Tolley, Clinton, 157-191. London: Palgrave Macmillan "Challenges to Kant's account of geometry appear already in some of Bolzano's earliest publications (cf. Bolzano 1810), and are developed more sustainedly in his later discussions of Kant in the 1837 *Wissenschaftslehre* (' *WL* ') and those recorded by Příhonský in the 1850 *New Anti-Kant* (' NAK '). Bolzano argues, against Kant, that it is possible to define the representation of space through mere concepts alone, without this definition including any representations whatsoever drawn from intuition (cf. WL §79.6, I.366; §79 *Anm*, I. 369–370; NAK 74). In this respect, Bolzano thereby puts forward a form of geometrical 'logicism' *avant la lettre*. (4) In fact, Bolzano's criticisms go considerably further, insofar as he argues that the very idea of a pure intuition is essentially incoherent (as we will see below, cf. §§4–5).
Yet while existing treatments of Bolzano's criticism of Kant on space have focused primarily on Bolzano's contrasting account of knowledge in geometry and mathematics more broadly, much less attention has been paid to the consequences that Bolzano's rejection of pure intuition has for Bolzano's own account of our intuitions of external objects – representations that Bolzano himself also calls 'outer intuitions'.(5) This will be my focus in what follows." (p. 158)
(4) Cf. Coffa 1991, 27f.; Sebestik 2003, 54f.; cf. Palagyi 1902, iii.
(5) An early start on this topic can be found in Palagyi 1902, chapter VI (esp.
§18). Some more recent helpful treatments of related topics can be found in George 2003 and Rosenkoetter 2012. For a

discussion of Bolzano's rejection of Kant's doctrine of the pure intuition of time that is in key ways complementary to what follows, see George 1987.

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46. Trlifajová, Katerina. 2018. "Bolzano's Infinite Quantities." *Foundations of Science* no. 23:681-704

Abstract: "In his *Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds,* Georg Cantor praised Bernard Bolzano as a clear defender of actual infinity who had the courage to work with infinite numbers. At the same time, he sharply criticized the way Bolzano dealt with them.

Cantor's concept was based on the existence of a one-to-one correspondence, while Bolzano insisted on Euclid's Axiom of the whole being greater than a part. Cantor's set theory has eventually prevailed, and became a formal basis of contemporary mathematics, while Bolzano's approach is generally considered a step in the wrong direction. In the present paper, we demonstrate that a fragment of Bolzano's theory of infinite quantities retaining the part-whole principle can be extended to a consistent mathematical structure.

It can be interpreted in several possible ways. We obtain either a linearly ordered ring of finite and infinitely great quantities, or a partially ordered ring containing infinitely

small, finite and infinitely great quantities. These structures can be used as a basis of the infinitesimal calculus similarly as in non-standard analysis, whether in its full version employing ultrafilters due to Abraham Robinson, or in the recent "cheap version" avoiding ultrafilters due to Terence Tao."

47. van der Schaar, Maria. 2007. "Bolzano on Judgement and Error." In *The Logica Yearbook 2006*, edited by Tomala, O and Honzi, R., 211-221. Prague: Filosofia
"Keeler (1934) ends his history of the problem of error with Kant, and Balduin Schwarz, in his article on 'Irrtum' in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, only mentions 'the important analysis' of error given by Bolzano. In the less known third part of the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), the 'Erkenntnislehre', there are several chapters on judgement, knowledge and truth, with a special section on error. Besides the logical / conceptual question how error is possible, Bolzano also asks the epistemological / psychological question what the causes of error are, how error arises in us.
With respect to the concept of error, one has to distinguish between act and product. 'Error' and the German term 'Irrtum' stand for the product, resulting from an act of erring ('das Irren'). The distinction is a special case of the distinction between the act of judgement and the judgement product. Both act and product need to be distinguished from the proposition, which Bolzano also calls an error, if it is false but held true.
Because Bolzano explains error primarily as incorrect judgement (WL, I, § 36), the question what judgement is comes first (section 2). To understand the concept of error, one also needs to understand what knowledge is (section 3). In my analysis of Bolzano's notions of judgement and knowledge I have profited from Mark Siebel's two recent articles on these topics (Siebel, 1999 and 2004). In section 4 Bolzano's concept of error will be dealt with." (p. 212)
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Siebel, M. (2004). Bolzanos Urteilslehre. In *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 86, 56–87.

48. Waldegg, Guillermina. 2001. "Ontological Convictions and Epistemological Obstacles in Bolzano's Elementary Geometry." *Science and Education* no. 10:409-418
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was a contemporary of the founders of non-Euclidean geometry and of the renovation of projective geometry. However, he did not participate in the movement transforming concepts and methods which crystallized in a new order of geometry at the beginning of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, throughout his life Bolzano tried to demonstrate Euclid's postulate of parallel lines.
Two ontological convictions played the role of epistemological obstacle for Bolzano and prevented him even from imagining the possibility that non-Euclidean geometries might exist. In the first place, Bolzano thought that Euclidean geometry had an intrinsic structure and thus geometrical space must be intrinsically Euclidean. Secondly, the description of this structure contained the existence of an “objective” connection between geometrical truths; a basic truth was, by its nature, “simple and general”.
This article forms part of the body of work aimed at identifying obstacles in the history of mathematics in order to confront them with obstacles to learning and to establish their epistemological character."
49. ———. 2005. "Bolzano’s Approach to the Paradoxes of Infinity: Implications for Teaching." *Science & Education* no. 14:559-577
Abstract.: "In this paper we analyze excerpts of *Paradoxes of the Infinite*, the posthumous work of Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), in order to show that Georg Cantor’s (1845–1918) approach to the problem of defining actual mathematical infinity is not the most natural. In fact, Bolzano’s approach to the paradoxes of infinity is more intuitive, while remaining internally coherent. Bolzano’s

approach, however, had limitations. We discuss implications for teaching, which include a better understanding of the responses of students to situations involving actual mathematical infinity, for it is possible to draw a kind of parallel between these responses and Bolzano's reasoning."

50. Wedberg, Anders. 1984. "Perfection and Innovation: Bernard Bolzano." In *A History of Philosophy. Vol. 3: From Bolzano to Wittgenstein*, 51-85. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
51. Winner, Thomas G. 1994. "Peirce and Bolzano." In *Living Doubt. Essays Concerning the Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Debrock, Guy and Hulswit, Menno, 157-169. Dordrecht: Reidel
"Like Peirce, whom he preceded by roughly half a century, Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), the brilliant mathematician, logician and semiotician who taught and wrote in Prague, was little recognized in his lifetime. Like Peirce, he endured persecution for his uncompromising attitudes, in his case both in science and political-religious life: also Bolzano's teaching career, like Peirce's, was cut short, in Bolzano's case because of official displeasure of the Vatican and the Vienna court over his resolute and unwavering liberalism in religious, social and political matters and towards the relation of Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian crownlands of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Bolzano's principal scientific contribution was, like Peirce's, in the area of mathematics and logic; and Bolzano's logic, like Peirce's, contained major contributions to semiotics, which Bolzano called the theory of signs (*Zeichenlehre*) and *Semiotik*, though Bolzano's *Zeichenlehre* was certainly not as comprehensive and systematic as Peirce's semeiotic. Unlike Peirce, Bolzano is known primarily to logicians and to specialists in Catholic theology, while his semiotics has received relatively little attention." (p. 157)
52. Wrinch, Dorothy Maud. 1917. "Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848)." *The Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry* no. 27:83-107

"In Bolzano we find the virtues of human sympathy and insight coupled with the austerer virtues of the metaphysician and logician. He was a man of action as well as a man of ideas. He was well known for his kindly disposition and his broadmindedness. He possessed not only the sympathy with the poor necessary for a social reformer, but the ability to develop his ideas of social reconstruction on practical lines. Not only did he elaborate a theory of an ideal state, but he also introduced numerous reforms in the actual state of which he was a member. He studied theology very earnestly as a young man and later wrote a great deal on the subject. Even though his liberal views brought him into collision with those on whom his livelihood depended, yet he courageously continued his teaching and writing, always making it his aim to seek for truth. He was a metaphysician of some importance and his treatises on metaphysics are valuable, not only for the original thought which they contain, but also for his important criticisms of Kant. In esthetics his work is by no means without interest, and to the psychology and ethics of his day he made very valuable contributions. But preeminently he was a mathematician and logician." (p. 83)

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Bernard Bolzano: bibliography of the English translations

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   Translation by Steve Russ, (abbreviated: *BD*) revised reprint in *The Mathematical Works of Bernard Bolzano*, pp. 87-137.
   "The work *BD* must be one of the first books devoted to what we would now call foundations of mathematics, or philosophy of mathematics. (Indeed, this latter phrase was the title given to it by Fels for the second edition.) After a short Preface the first main part is devoted to the nature of mathematics and its proper classification. The second part deals with definitions, axioms, proofs, and theorems. It is here that the ground-consequence relation is introduced: in the realm of truth . . . a certain objective connection prevails . . . . some of these judgements are the grounds of others and the latter are the consequences of the former. (*BD* II § 2)
   He goes on to explain that the proper purpose to pursue in a scientific exposition is to arrange the judgements so as to reflect this objective connection. (p. 21-22)
   (...)

An important contribution Bolzano makes here is a solution to the problem of how to define, or come to agreement, on the basic or simple concepts of a system. He says we should do so in the same way as we first learn terms in our mother tongue by considering several propositions containing the term (see *BD* II § 8). This is akin to what we would call implicit definition and, of course, is closely related to axiomatic systems. However, this is hindsight; there is no suggestion that Bolzano did, or could, consider axiom systems with the degree of formality familiar since the work of Hilbert.

Any such book as BD could hardly ignore Kant and his thinking aboutmathematics and accordingly there is an Appendix devoted to a criticism of Kant's theory of the construction of mathematical concepts through pure intuition. The central point of Bolzano's criticism was that the very notion of pure intuition was incoherent containing, he believed, internal contradictions. An excellent account of this, and indeed the whole methodology outlined in *BD*, is contained in Rusnock *Bolzano's Philosophy and the Emergence of Modern Mathematics* (2000), Ch. 2. For a more extended and philosophical discussion of Bolzano's views of proof and their relationship to Kant see Lapointe (forthcoming) [*Bolzano's Semantics and his Criticism of the Decompositional Conception of Analysis*" in *The Analytic Turn*, Michael Beaney (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2007, pp.219-234].

Steve Russ, from the reprint in *The Mathematical Works of Bernard Bolzano*, pp. 22-23.

2. ———. 1972. *Theory of Science, Attempt at a Detailed and in the Main Novel Exposition of Logic with Constant Attention to Earlier Authors*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

   Translation of selected section of *Wissenschaftslehre* edited by Rolf George.

   The Index lists the complete contents of the first three books of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.

   Cited as: George 1972.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Editor's Introduction XXIII; Bibliography XLVIII; Introduction 1; Book One: Theory of Fundamentals 19; Book Two: Theory of Elements 59; Book Three: Theory of Knowledge 303; Book Four: Heuretic 373; Book Five: Theory of Science Proper 385; Index of Special Symbols, phrases and Sentence Forms 393; Index of Subjects 393; Index of Persons 396; (*) Names Omitted (list of persons to whom reference had to be omitted in the present edition) 398; Translation of Key Terms 399.
"During the earliest stages of my work on this translation, I enjoyed the co-operation and advice of my teacher, the late Henry S. Leonard. A preliminary draft of the first volume was finished in 1958, but at that time I was still thinking of a complete translation of all four volumes. I was eventually persuaded that early complaints about the unnecessary bulk of the work had their point. Kambartel's very successful attempt at shortening the first two volumes *(Bernard Bolzano's Grundlegung der Logik,* Hamburg, 1963) finally convinced me that an abbreviated version was not only feasible, but desirable." (p. VII).
(*) Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* is an admirable source book for, and commentary upon, the history of logical theory. The following is the list of persons to whom references had to be omitted in the present edition." (p. 398)

3. ———. 1973. *Theory of Science*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Edited, with an introduction, by Jan Berg. Translated from the German by Burnham Terrell.
Part A: Selections from the *Wissenschaftslehre* pp. 35-367; Part B: Excerpts from Bolzano's Correspondence pp. 371-383; Bibliography pp. 385-389.
Cited as: Berg 1973.
Table of Contents: Preface XV; Editor's Intreoduction 1; Part A. A selection from the *Wissenschaftslehre* (Sulzbach 1837, Leipzig 1914-31) Volume One 35; Volume Two: 167; Volume Three 305; Volume Four 357; Part B. Excerpts from Bolzano's Correspondence 371; Bibliography 385; Name Index 391; Subject Index 393-398.

"The present selection from the *Wissenschaftslehre* of Bernard Bolzano aims at giving a compact view of his main ideas in logic, semantics, epistemology and the methodology of science. These ideas are analyzed from a modern point of view in the Introduction. Furthermore, excerpts from Bolzano's correspondence are included which yield important remarks on his own work.
The translation of the sections from the *Wissenschaftslehre* are based on a German text, which I have located in the Manuscript Department of the University Library in Prague (signature: 75 B 459). It was one of Bolzano's own copies of his printed work and contains a vast number of corrections made by Bolzano himself, thus representing the final stage of his thought, which has gone unnoticed in previous editions." (from the Preface).

4. ———. 2014. *Theory of Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
First complete translation by Rolf George and Paul Rusnock.
Volume One: Theory of Fundamentals and Theory of Elements (part I): Introduction; Book One: Theory Of Fundamentals; Part I: Of The Existence of Truths in Themselves; Part II: Of the Recognizability of Truth; Book Two: Theory of Elements: Part I: Of Ideas in Themselves.
Volume Two: Theory of Elements (part II): Book Two: Theory of Elements (continued); Part II: Of Propositions in Themselves; Part III: Of True Propositions; Part IV: Of Inferences.
Volume Three: Theory of Knowledge and the Art of Discovery; Book Three: Theory of Knowledge; Part I: Of Ideas; Part II: Of Judgements; Part III: Of the Relation Between our Judgements and Truth; Part IV: Of Certainty, Probability, and Confidence in Judgements; Book Four: The Art of Discovery; Part I: General Rules; Part II: Particular Rules.
Volume Four: Theory Of Science Proper; Book Five: Theory Of Science Proper; Part I: General Rules; Part II: On the Determination of the Extensions of the Sciences; Part III: On the Choice of a Class of Readers for a Treatise; Part IV:

On the Propositions Which Should Appear in a Treatise; Part V: On the Divisions of a Treatise; Part VI: On the Order to Which the Propositions Belonging to a Treatise Should Appear; Part VII: Theory of Signs or, On the Signs Used in Or Recommended by a Treatise; Part VIII: How the Author of a Treatise Should Behave; Part IX: On Scientific Books That Are Not Genuine Treatises.

5. ———. 2007. *Selected Writings on Ethics and Politics*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
   Translated by Paul Rusnock and Rolf Georg.
   Contents: Introduction 1; I. Selected Exhortations 43; II. On Rights, Civil Disobedience, and Resistance to Authority 141; III. Ethics and Philosophy of Religion 169; IV. Political Philosophy 241; V. Index 359-368.
   "In his own day, few appreciated Bolzano's contributions to theoretical philosophy and mathematics: only a small number were *even* aware that he had done this work. He was renowned. rather, for his work as "catechist". professor of religious science (*Religionswissenschaft*) at the Charles University in Prague from 1805 to 1819. In this highly visible position, Bolzano had become one of the most prominent advocates of social justice and reform in his homeland, a national philosopher who was the "social and political conscience of Bohemia" (4)
   (4) W. Künne, "Bernard Bolzano über Nationalismus und Rassismus in Böhmen," p. 97-139 in E. Morscher and O. Neumaier ed. *Bolzanos Kampf gegen Nationalismus und Rassismus*. Beitrage zur Bolzano-Forschung 4, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. 1996, p. 97.
6. ———. 2015. "On the Concept of the Beautiful: A Philosophical Essay (§§1–25)." *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* no. 52:229-266.
   Partial translation by Adam Bresnahan of *Über den Begriff des Schönen. Eine philosophische Abhandlung* [On the concept of the beautiful. A philosophical treatise] (Prague, 1843).
   "Preface
   The fact that I have decided to fill so many pages with the analysis of a single concept may for some seem to demand

explanation. I can only reply that this concept seems to me to be of particular importance; and further, that the analysis of concepts is a matter that always demands expansive inquiries if one is to go beyond merely saying that the concept is reducible to its parts and actually convince the reader, thus also taking care to demonstrate that the attempts at explicating the concept that have been made thus far are lacking in one way or another. After I have completed this essay on the fundamental concept of aesthetics, I will not deem it necessary to proceed with such thoroughness in the essays that follow." (p. 229)

7. ———. 2004. *The Mathematical Works of Bernard Bolzano*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Preface XII, Introduction 1; Part I: Geometry and Foundations 11. 1.1: Elementary Geometry (1804) 25; 1.2: Contribution to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics (1810 83); Part II: Early Analysis 139. 2.1: The Binomial Theorem (1816) 155; 2.2: A Purely Analytic Proof (1817) 255; 2.3: Three Problems of Rectification, Complanation and Cubature (1817) 279; Part III: Later Analysis and the Infinite 345. 3.1: Infinite Quantity Concepts (1830s) 355; 3.2: Theory of Functions (1830s) 429; 3.3: Improvements and Additionsd to the Theory of Functions (F+) 573; 3.4: Paradoxes of the Infinite (posthumous 1851) 591; Selected Works of Bernard Bolzano 679; Bibliography 685; Name Index 691; Subject Index 693.
"The main goal of this volume is to present a representative selection of the mathematical work and thought of Bolzano to those who read English much better than they could read the original German sources. It is my hope that the publication of these translations may encourage potential research students, and supervisors, to see that there are numerous significant and interesting research problems, issues, and themes in the work of Bolzano and his contemporaries that would reward further study. Such research would be no small undertaking.
Bolzano's thoughtwas all of a piece and to understand his mathematical achievements properly it is necessary to study his work on logic and philosophy, as well as, to some extent,

on theology and ethics. Of course, it would also be necessary to acquire the linguistic, historical, and technical skills fit for the purpose. But the period of Bolzano's work is one of the most exciting periods in the history of Europe, from intellectual, political, and cultural points of view. And with over half of the projected 120 volumes of Bolzano's complete works (*BGA*) available, the resources for such research have never been better. Thework on mathematics and logic has been particularly well-served through the volumes already published." (p. XII).

8. Ewald, William. 1996. *From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics. Vol. I*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Contents: 6. Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848): A. Preface to Considerations on some objects of elementary geometry 172 (Bolzano 1804); B. Contributions to a better-grounded presentation of mathematics 174 (Bolzano 1810); C. Purely analytic proof of the theorem that between any two values which give results of opposite sign there lies at least one real root of the equation 225 (Bolzano 1817a); D. From Paradoxes of the infinite 249-292 (Bolzano 1851).
9. Bolzano, Bernard. 1950. *Paradoxes of the Infinite*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   The *Paradoxien* originally appeared in 1851, were reprinted in facsimile in 1889 and edited afresh in 1921 by A. Höfler, with annotations by H. Hahn.
   Translated from the German of the posthumous edition by Franz Prihonský and furnished with a historical introduction by Donald A. Steele.
   New translation in *The Mathematical Works of Bernard Bolzano,* pp. 591-678.
   Contents: Short title key to Bolzano references IX; Donald A. Steele: Historical Introduction 1; Translation 59; Selected bibliography 176; Index of Persons and Place 185; Index of Topics 188-189.
   "The *Paradoxien* are the work of Bolzano's old age. Indeed, the modern mathematical reader who takes the text as it stands will be occasionally disappointed, and may misjudge Bolzano if he has not also read his earlier work. The

qualification of taking the text 'as it stands' is not otiose. Our received version, here translated from the 1851 Leipzig edition, is a posthumous one by a friend with whom Bolzano discussed the topics in question for the last few years of his life. The competence of Prihosnky, as an editor of mathematical matter and the trustworthiness of the received version of the *Paradoxien* have recently been placed in doubt by Martin Jasek, the discoverer of the counter-example.

The antecedents of the *Paradoxien* go back at least as far as 9 June 1842, when Bolzano read 'that part of his paper on the march of ideas to be followed in a truly scientific exposition of mathematics which deals with the finite and infinite.' The next traces are three instalments of papers read as follows: on 9 January 1845 about 'a solution of sundry paradoxes occurring in the mathematical sciences' ; on to December 1846 about 'calculations with infinite numerical expressions'; and on 24 February 1848 about 'the paradoxes occasioned in mathematics by the idea of the infinite.' The gradual crystallisation of the eventual title is manifest. Between the first and second paper, on 3 February 1845, Bolzano wrote to Prihonsky that he was busy with sundry paradoxes in mathematics; between the second and third, he wrote twice to Fesl: on 26 February 1848 that he now realised more than ever the importance of the topics of the *Paradoxien* for mathematics and its philosophy, and on 24 June 1848 that the matter for the *Paradoxien* is constantly expanding under his pen. Finally, on 30 November 1848, only eighteen days before his death, Bolzano read a final instalment under the final title of *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*.

Unlike the manuscript of the *Funktionenlehre*, that of the *Paradoxien* was never made ready for the press by the author himself. That task fell to his devoted but none too mathematical friend Prihonsky. In fact, Bolzano himself had entertained doubts about the posthumous treatment of his mathematical papers, for he wrote to Fesl as early as 12 June 1842 that he was convinced 'that his mathematical ideas, in their present form, could not be really well edited

by any of his friends.' This premonition on Bolzano's part comes to corroborate the suspicions of Jasek.
Those suspicions were aroused by a palpable contradiction between the *Funktionenlehre* and the *Paradoxien*.
The received text of §37, pages 65-66, as distinguished from the footnote, makes no actual assertion as to the universal existence of derivates of continuous functions; Bolzano simply intends to choose such as are differentiable for a certain purpose: '*Ich begehre nichts anderes, als dass*.' But a footnote says it can be shown that 'all well defined functions' are bound to be differentiable 'save possibly for a set of arguments which may indeed be infinite, but whose members must be individually isolated.' No proof is attempted. Jasek ('Aus dem handschriften Nachlass Bernhard Bolzanos', *Vestnik Kralovske Ceske Spolecnosti Nau, Trida matematicko-prirodovedeckd* (1923), pp. 29-32) claims to possess evidence that the footnote is interpolated. He suspects Slivka von Slivitz, another pupil and friend of Bolzano, of being Prihonsky necessary but not sufficient mathematical counsellor, and of having timorously desired to shield Bolzano from the appearance of mathematical heresy which his counterexample may well have borne to contemporaries.
A fresh critical study of the manuscript is indicated, and external obstacles stand in the way for the present. The difficulty does not, however, reside solely in the passage noticed by Jasek. It recurs in §45, page 88. Strictly speaking, again, there is even here no actual assertion that all continuous functions are differentiable, and the question is further complicated by the admitted fact that the posthumous editor found the manuscript in places rather illegible, in spite of his acquaintance with Bolzano's peculiar abbreviation practices. The presumption of guilt on the part of von Slivitz is slightly enhanced, in Jasek's eyes, by a study of his marginal annotations to a copy of the *Funktionenlehre*. With baffling contrariety, it is also slightly alleviated by the fact that the *Zusammensetzung der Krafte*, published in 1842 by Bolzano himself -- and embodying with acknowledgement some suggestions by von Slivitz --

proceeds (§52, page 29) to differentiate a function of which only the continuity is known, together with its satisfaction of conditions which are not quoted as if they established the otherwise uncertain differentiability. The hypothesis that Bolzano's mathematical discrimination had become dulled between 1830 and 1848 on this point at least is simple and not to be rejected *a priori*; but neither is it to be accepted easily until renewed and exact archivial research compels us to do so." (pp. 53-55).

10. ———. 2004. *On the Mathematical Method and Correspondence with Exner*. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Translated by Paul Rusnock and Rolf George.
Contents: Acknowledgements 4; Introduction 5; A note on the translation 37; I. On the Mathematical Method 39; II. Selections from the Bolzano-Exner Correspondence 83; III. Bolzano and Exner on Ideas and their objects: an exchange from 1843 175; IV. Indices 185; Index of Names 186; Index of Subjects 188-191.
There are thee version of the essay on mathematical method; the translation if from the latest version (pp. 23-78 of the original edition).
"It is clear that Bolzano was not satisfied with the logic set out in the *Contributions* [1810]. Already in 1812 he had resolved to write another treatise on logic,(4) a project he worked on for close to a decade following his dismissal. The result was one of the great works of nineteenth-century philosophy, the *Theory of Science*.(5) The *Theory of Science* was ready for the press by 1830, at which time Bolzano started writing the *Theory of Magnitudes* [*Grossenlehre*], a treatise intended to supply a unified foundation for all of contemporary mathematics.(6) Although he wrote several hundred pages, many of them all but ready for the press, but died before finishing his work. Some elements of his mathematical system were published after his death in the *Paradoxes of the Infinite*,(7) edited by his friend and student F. Prihonsky, but the bulk remained all but unknown until well into the twentieth century. The essay "On the Mathematical Method", translated here, formed part of the introductory matter of the *Theory of*

Magnitudes, and was intended to present the essentials of Bolzano's logic to a mathematical audience.
Due in large part to his troubles with the Austrian authorities, the *Theory of Science* remained unpublished for almost a decade (it was finally published outside Austria, in Bavaria, in 1837). This did not mean, however, that Bolzano's logic remained unknown. Long accustomed to an invasive and often arbitrary censorship, Bohemian intellectuals had developed unofficial channels for communicating their ideas, a precursor of the *Samizdat* system which was later to flourish in that land. Bolzano's mature logic received its first airing in this way, when, in 1833, he had a copy made of the essay on mathematical method and sent it to Franz Exner, the newly appointed professor of philosophy in Prague.(8)
Exner (1802-1853) was born and educated in Vienna, where he studied philosophy with Rembold, who like Bolzano (and for similar political reasons) had been removed from his university chair in 1825. In 1830, Exner was put in the uncomfortable position of taking his teacher's place, being called upon to fill the vacant chair on a temporary basis. In 1832 he moved to Prague, where he was named to the chair of philosophy. Outside of his official duties, in good Austrian fashion, he organized a "circle" of intellectuals which met regularly at his house. Although a born and bred Viennese, he was sensitive to the special circumstances of Bohemia, particularly to the disadvantaged situation of the Czech majority. Politically, though not always philosophically, he was very much on Bolzano's side: with the Bohemian enlightenment and opposed to the conservative reaction in both church and state. Exner was a follower of Herbart, who had a substantial following in Austria at the time, and whose doctrines were to become in effect the official philosophy of the Empire, in part due to Exner's influence when he worked for the Ministry of Education from 1845 until his death.(9)
Exner responded to Bolzano in June of 1833, beginning a correspondence that would continue for the rest of Bolzano's life. The most intense philosophical exchanges

occurred during 1833 and 1834, when the letters translated here were written. The two continued their discussion in person in 1834, when Bolzano returned to Prague from June to November. There would also be a later exchange of views in a pair of papers read at the Royal Bohemian Academy of Sciences in the early 1840s. We have translated Bolzano's contribution, which contains the relevant passages from Exner's, in this volume." (pp. 6-8)
(4) *Philosophische Tagebucher* 1811-1817, in J. Berg, F. Kambartel, J. Louzil, B. van Rootselaar, and E. Winter ed., Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe (hereafter BBGA) (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1969-) Series 2B Vol. 16/1, p. 34-36.
(5) *Wissenschaftslehre* (Sulzbach, 1837). New edition by Jan Berg in the BBGA. Hereafter WL.
(6) BBGA IIA, Vols. 7-10; Volumes 7, 8 and 10/1 have already been published.
(7) *Paradoxien des Unendlichen* (Leipzig, 1851), English translation by D. Steele (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950).
(8) Three versions of the essay on mathematical method survive. Our translation is based upon the latest version. Most likely, however, the version that Exner received differed somewhat from this one. A Czech translation of an earlier work on logic, "O logice" (= "Etwas über Logik" BBGA 2A5, p. 139-168), was actually published somewhat earlier (1831).
(9) Cf. *Biographisches Lexicon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, part 4 (Vienna, I 858); *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1877).

11. Russ, S. B. 1980. "A translation of Bolzano's paper on the intermediate value theorem." *Historia Mathematica* no. 7:156-185.
Summary: "This is the first English translation of Bolzano's paper, *Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass zwischen je zwey Werthen, die ein entgegengesetzes Resultat gewahren, wenigstens eine reelle Wurzel der Gleichung liege* (Prague 1817). It has already appeared in French, Russian, and Czechoslovakian translations.

The paper represents an important stage in the rigorous foundation of analysis and is one of the earliest occasions when the continuity of a function and the convergence of an infinite series are both defined and used correctly."

Note: The content of the two anthologies from the *Wissenschaftslehre* is different, so the books are complementary.

Excerpts from the Theory of Science

The main work of Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, (1837) was published n four volumes: *Wissenschaftslehre: Versuch einer ausführlichen und grösstetheils neuen Darstellung der Logik, mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter*.
Herausgegeben von mehren seiner Freunde. Mit einer Vorrede von Dr. J. Cr. Heinroth. - Sulzbach.
Critical edition edited by Jan Berg: *Gesamtausgabe* - Voll.11-14 (1985-2000).
Vol. I XVI+571 [3], vol. II VIII+568+[2], vol. III VIII+575 and vol. IV XX+683 pages; the work is composed of five book in 718 paragraphs.

Summary (from the translations of Rolf George [George 1972] and Jan Berg [Berg 1973]; the citations by Bolzano are from the *Introduction*, 15):

Introduction (1-16). Logic as a theory of science
Book One: Theory of Fundamentals Truths (17-45) "including the proof that there are truths in themselves and that we humans also have the capacity to know them"
Purpose, Contents and Divisions of this Book (17)
Refutation of some Objections (18)
Part One: Of the Existence of Truths in Themselves (19-33)
Part Two: Of the Recognizability of Truth (34-45)
Book Two: Theory of Elements "or the theory of ideas, propositions, true propositions and inferences in and of themselves"

Purpose, Contents, and Sections of this Book (46)
Part One: Of Ideas in Themselves (47-114)
Appendix: Earlier Treatment of the Subject Matter of this Part (115-120)
Part Two: Of Propositions in Themselves (121-184)
Appendix: Earlier Treatment of the Subject Matter of this Part (185-194)
Part Third: Of True Propositions (195-222)
Part Fourth: Of Arguments (223-253)
Appendix: Earlier Treatment of the Subject Matter of this Part (254-268)
Book Three: Theory of Knowledge "or concerning the conditions underlying the possibility of knowing the truth, particularly among us humans"
Purpose, Content, and Divisions of this Book (269)
Part One: Of Ideas (270-289)
Part Two: Of Judgments (290-306)
Part Third: Of the Relation between Judgments and Truth (307-316)
Part Fourth: Of Certainty, Probability and Confidence in Judgments (317-321)
Book Four: The Art of Invention (322-391) "or rules to be observed in the enterprise of thought when it is aimed at discovering the truth"
Book Five: Theory of Science proper (392-718) "or rules that must be observed in dividing up the domain of truth generally into particular sciences and in presenting those sciences in specialized scholarly treatises."
1. *What the Author Understands by Theory of Science*
Suppose that all truths which are now, or eve were, known to any man were somehow collected together, e.g. compiled in a single book; I would call such an aggregate the sum of all human knowledge. Compared to the immense domain of truths in themselves, most of which are altogether unknown, this sum is very small; but it is large, ever too large a sum for the mental capacity of any man.(...)4. It should be possible through some reflection t find the rules which we must follow in dividing the total domain of truth into individual sciences and which must govern the writing of the respective treatises. There can also be no

doubt that the sum of these rules itself deserves to be called a science, since it is clearly worth while to collect the most important part of the in a special book, and to order the and provide proofs for them so that everyone can understand and accept them with conviction. I allow myself to call it the theory of science [*Wissenschaftslehre*], since it is the science which teaches us to represent other sciences (actually only their treatises) (...) [Berg 1973]

§ 15. *General Outline of this Treatise*

It is desirable that the theory of science proper should be preceded by a discussion of rules to be followed in the discovery of truths: heuretic. Heuretic seems to require an antecedent discussion of the general conditions of human knowledge: epistemology. Epistemology can be fruitfully developed only if it is preceded by the theory of ideas, propositions and deductions: the theory of elements. The latter will be preceded by a theory of fundamentals in which it is proved that there are truths and propositions in themselves. [George 1972].

§ 19. *What the author Means by a Proposition in Itself*

In order to indicate as clearly as possible to my readers what I mean by a proposition in itself (*Satz an sich*), I shall begin by explaining first what I call as assertion or a proposition expressed in words. I use this term to designate a verbal statement (most often consisting f several, but at times of just a single word) if it is an instrument of asserting or maintaining something, if it is therefore always either true or false, on of the two, in the ordinary sense of these words, if it (as can also say) must be either correct or incorrect (...) But I also call the following sequence of words a proposition: 'Squares are round'. For through this form of words something is also stated or asserted, although something false and incorrect. On the other hand, I do not call the following expressions propositions: 'The omnipresent God', 'A round square'. For though these expressions something is indeed represented but nothing is stated or asserted. Consequently one can, strictly speaking, neither say that there is anything thru, nor that is anything false in them. [Berg 1973].

Related pages

The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

Selected Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Bernard Bolzano:

Studies in English (First Part: A - B)

Studies in English (Second Part: C - Geo)

Studies in English (Third Part: Gie - L)

Studies in English (Fourth Part: M - R)

Studies in English (Fifth Part: S - Z)

Bibliography of the English translations (Current page)

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Bernard Bolzano: Bibliographie des Traductions et des Études en Français

TRADUCTIONS

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   "La théorie des nombres réels (T.N.R.) de Bernard Bolzano fait partie de sa *Grössenlehre* (Théorie des quantités), laissée en manuscrit et restée inachevée. C'est principalement au cours des années 1830 à 1835, après avoir terminé son oeuvre importante sur la logique, *Wissenschaftslehre* (Théorie de la science), que Bolzano travaillait à cette vaste oeuvre.
   (...)
   Dans sa T.N.R., Bolzano tâche tout d'abord d'effectuer l'arithmétisation de la T.N.R., qui fut développée beaucoup plus tard de trois manières différentes par K. Weierstrass (1860), C. Méray (1869), et G. Cantor (1872), et finalement par R. Dedekind (1872). Bolzano peut être considéré à bon droit comme précurseur de ces mathématiciens: l'idée du fondement purement arithmétique des nombres réels se dessine chez lui tout à fait nettement, bien que ses considérations concernant ce sujet ne soient pas tout à fait irréprochables.
   Bolzano donne ensuite le « développement de Cantor » des nombres réels; il le prend pour point de départ pour déduire les propositions ultérieures concernant les nombres réels; la

trichotomie des relations « plus grand » et « plus petit », le théorème d'Archimède (Eudoxe), le théorème de Cauchy-Bolzano, le théorème de Bolzano-Weierstrass et finalement un théorème qui rappelle le théorème de Dedekind. Ces considérations pourraient, sans grands changements, être amenées à la précision requise de nos jours. Ce manuscrit de Bolzano publié, même en son état actuel, aurait pu accélérer considérablement le progrès des mathématiques.
La Ire Partie du présent article contient un Abrégé du manuscrit de la T.N.R.
Dans la IIe Partie intitulée « Conclusion », je tâche de corriger et de compléter l'oeuvre de Bolzano.
La IIIe Partie comprend la Bibliographie." (pp. 313-314).

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4. ———. 1987. "De la mathématique universelle ou arithmétique." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:403-411.
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5. ———. 1990. "Sur la doctrine kantienne de la construction des concepts par les intuitions." *Philosophie* no. 27:3-12.
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Numéro spécial consacré à la mathématique et à la logique chez Bolzano, rassemblant les contributions suivantes en Français :
Hourya Sinaceur: Introduction 339-341; Hourya Sinaceur: Réalisme mathématique, réalisme logique chez Bolzano

457-477; Jan Sebestik: Forme, variation et déductibilité dans la logique de Bolzano 479-506.

2. "Bernard Bolzano." 2000. *Études Philosophiques* no. 4:433-534.
   Sous la direction de Jocelyn Benoist.
   Table des matières: Jocelyn Benoist: Présentation 433; Mark Textor: Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité 435; Sandra Lapointe: Analyticité, universalité et quantification chez Bernard Bolzano 455; Claudio Majolino: Variation(s) I. Bolzano et l'équivocité de la variation 471; Ali Benmakhlouf: La proto-sémantique de Bolzano 489; Jocelyn Benoist: Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano 505; Jacques Bouveresse: Sur les représentations sans objet 519-534.
3. "Bernard Bolzano. Philosophie de la logique et théorie de la connaissance." 2003. *Philosophiques* no. 30.
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   Index: Sandra Lapointe: Introduction: Bernard Bolzano: contexte et actualité 3; Rolf George; Intuitions 19; Jan Sebestik: La dispute de Bolzano avec Kant: fragment d'un dialogue sur la connaissance mathématique 47; Paul Rusnock: Qu'est-ce que la représentation? Bolzano et la philosophie autrichienne 67; Benjamin Schnieder: Bolzano sur la structure des propositions et le rôle sémantique des propriétés 83; Mark Textor: Bolzano sur le temps et la persistance 105; Peter Simons: Bolzano sur les nombres 127; Jocelyn Benoist: Propriété et détermination: Sémantique et ontologie chez Bernard Bolzano 137; Edgar Morscher: La définition bolzanienne de l'analyticité logique: 149; Mark Siebel: La notion bolzanienne de déductibilité 171; Armin Tatzel: La théorie bolzanienne du fondement et de la conséquence 191; Jacques Dubucs et Sandra Lapointe: Preuves par excellence 219; Sandra Lapointe: Bibliographie 235-243.
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   "Le projet de B. Bolzano, « le Leibniz de la Bohême », est de considérer comme une des tâches de sa vie le fait d'« endiguer l'épouvantable désordre que Kant, sans le

présumer lui-même, a occasionné par ses philosophâmes en Allemagne »(2). Husserl lui rend hommage dans les Prolégomènes à la logique pure : « C'est sur l'ouvrage de Bolzano [la *Wissenschaftslehre*], que la logique doit s'édifier comme science »(3), car ce nouveau Leibniz a su mettre la philosophie sur le chemin d'un «savoir théorique analytique universel» sans l'obstruer de « vision du monde ou de sagesse universelle », équivoque préjudiciable au progrès philosophique. Deux perspectives vont retenir ici notre attention :

1 / Dans les Contributions à une exposition des mathématiques sur de meilleurs fondements, texte de 1810, Bolzano invalide l'existence de l'intuition pure en nous montrant que c'est là une notion contradictoire. Kant était parti des mathématiques pour élaborer cette notion, c'est des mathématiques que vient aussi la critique. Les propositions arithmétiques n'empruntent rien à l'intuition et sur cette base minent le fondement épistémologique kantien.

2 / Autre chantier ouvert : la distinction entre ordre en soi de la vérité et ordre pour nous ; seul le premier ordre est objet de la science. Il faut rompre avec l'idée d'une connexion étroite entre l'indémontrabilité et l'immédiateté. L'immédiat pour nous, donné par l'intuition ou l'évidence ne relève pas de l'indémontrable, qui est toujours en soi et indépendant de nous. Les critères de l'indémontrable sont la simplicité et la justification, ceux de l'immédiateté sont l'intuition et l'évidence, nous avons là deux régimes totalement différents de la connaissance. Par là même la coïncidence kantienne entre l'acte de conscience et le formel auto fondateur de l'accord de la connaissance avec elle-même est non seulement inutile mais nuisible, comme l'a montré J. Cavaillès (4)." (p. 491)

2. Testament de Bolzano, cité, in Laz, Bolzano critique de Kant, Vrin 1991, p. XIII.

3. Husserl, Prolégomènes à la logique pure, tr. fr., PDF, p. 248-259.

4. Kant avait souligné le fait que la logique générale faisait abstraction de tout contenu de la connaissance, c'est-à-dire

de toute relation de celle-ci à un objet, nous sommes en droit de nous demander si cette abstraction est possible, si, comme le note J. Cavaillès, l' « abstraction qui donne le logique étant radicale », nous ne tombons pas finalement dans le « vide »; «ni du côté matière, puisqu'elle porte sur l'indéfini "tout objet", ni du côté forme, elle ne s'accroche à une qualification positive ». La question de Cavaillès à Kant est alors la suivante: «Que tirer de l'exigence d'accord de la pensée avec elle-même sinon l'éternelle répétition » ? (...) « Pour que l'accord revêtit un sens plein, il faudrait qu'il y eut au moins une différenciation à l'intérieur de la pensée, que l'occasion du désaccord possédât déjà un contenu, mais la logique serait alors logique transcendantale ou dialectique » (in *Sur la logique et la théorie de la science*, p. 6, Hermann, 1994).

5. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1997. "De Kant à Bolzano: Husserl et l'analyticité." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:217-238. Repris dans: J. Benoist: *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*, Paris: P.U.F., 1997, avec le titre: *L'héritage de Bolzano: l'analytique formel*, pp. 59-81.
   "Dans les *Recherches Logiques*, Husserl a recours à un concept d'analyticité qui s'écarte des définitions kantiennes. En fait, pour le comprendre, il faut se plonger dans la tradition d'analyse logique autrichienne qui remonte à Bolzano. L'analyticité est ici une propriété formelle, qui s'illustre par la possibilité de la mise en variables de propositions, leur vérité étant maintenue. Husserl ne laisse toutefois pas la question dans l'état dans lequel Bolzano l'avait laissée: surgit la question propre aux Recherches Logiques, qui est celle du sens et du statut du logique comme tel."
6. ———. 1999. *L'a priori conceptuel. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick*. Paris: Vrin.
   "Ce livre poursuit, sur un autre terrain, le travail entrepris dans notre *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*. Il répond à un triple objectif.
   1) Avancer le chantier, ouvert par le livre précédent, d'une investigation documentée des origines de la

phénoménologie, des influences qui ont pu s'exercer sur elle et du contexte dans lequel elle s'est développée, encore encore aujourd'hui très mal connu, spécialement en France, ce qui fait encore peser sur elle un certain nombre de malentendus.

2) Faire un pas de plus dans le sens d'une confrontation entre phénoménologie et philosophie analytique, contribuant ainsi à un éclaircissement de ce qui demeure sans aucun doute la contradiction philosophique majeure de notre époque, et créant les conditions d'un regard rétrospectif sur l'histoire de la philosophie du XXe siècle, qui devrait commencer aujourd'hui à être possible. La méthode adoptée ici, plutôt que de se réfugier dans des généralités sur la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique et de formuler des vœux pieux en ce qui concerne leur réconciliation annoncée, consistera à interroger leur clivage au niveau même des décisions adverses qui ont pu être prises dans l'histoire respective des deux courants de pensée, et cela en se fixant sur un problème très précis qui a pu, dans cette fracture, jouer un rôle décisif, jusqu'à la matérialiser.

Accessoirement, ce travail devrait permettre de donner un certain écho, en France, à certains aspects, si mal connus dans ce pays2, de l'histoire de la philosophie analytique et de ses origines. Ainsi, on trouvera dans ce livre des exposés substantiels consacrés à Bolzano et à Schlick qui devraient contribuer à une meilleure connaissance de l'histoire (et de la préhistoire) du mouvement analytique et à une appréciation plus exacte des thèses qu'il a pu mettre au centre de ses discussions.

3) Construire, précisément, un problème déterminé présent à l'état latent dans la philosophie contemporaine au moyen de certaines références prises dans l'histoire de la philosophie des deux derniers siècles. Ce livre est thématiquement consacré au problème du synthétique a priori, tel que nous l'héritons apparemment de Kant - et on remontera effectivement jusqu'à cette origine kantienne pour en cerner les enjeux, - tel qu'il fut une pomme de discorde entre l'empirisme logique, père officiel de ladite «

philosophie analytique », et la phénoménologie, et tel qu' il conserve une indiscutable actualité. La question est celle de savoir comment on peut - et s'il faut-se représenter certaines propriétés comme constitutivement liées à tel ou tel type de choses et comme faisant partie de leur définition pour ainsi dire de droit. Y a-t-il des conditions de possibilité des choses qui excèdent celles, purement formelles, de définition de l'objet en général comme objet logique, pris en dehors de son inclusion dans tel ou tel domaine d'être et de sens? Telle est la question - intrinsèquement phénoménologique1 - que nous voudrions rouvrir pour notre compte ici, non sans quelque défi lancé à une pensée contemporaine à dominante anti-essentialiste qui paraît en règle générale peu favorable au concept de synthétique a priori." (pp. 7-8, notes omises)

7. ———. 1999. "Bolzano, Husserl et l'idée de grammaire." *Études Philosophiques*:521-534.
   Repris dans: J. Benoist, *Entre acte et sens. Recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*, Paris: Vrin, 2002, avec le titre: *Grammaire ou méréologie des représentations*, pp. 33-48.
   "Au paragraphe 56 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano avance un principe de compositionnalité (*Zusammengesetztheit*) des représentations en soi, principe à l'appui duquel il invoque l'expérience phénoménologique de la «représentation pensée », que d'autres textes spécifient comme le corrélat subjectif de la représentation en soi (1): « notre conscience nous enseigne en effet que nous distinguons presque dans chacune des représentations pensées certaines parties, dans la liaison desquelles elle consiste » (2).
   L'articulation du langage en mots porte également témoignage d'une telle composition : la simple pluralité des mots employés pour restituer la signification de telle ou telle expression peut renvoyer à la complexité de la représentation, même s'il n'est pas dit, contrairement à ce que pourraient suggérer certaines analyses de Bolzano, qu'elle la réfléchisse exactement (3).

Bolzano a un mot pour désigner la teneur méréologique de la représentation, c'est-à-dire la « somme » de ses parties : le contenu (*Inhalt*) de la représentation, le mot que Kant utilisait pour désigner son intension (par opposition à son extension). « Somme » (*Summe*) doit ici être entendu en un sens bien particulier: la somme n'est rien d'autre qu'un ensemble dans lequel une sous-partie d'une partie est encore une partie de l'ensemble (4), et nullement une opération. Cette définition ne comprend aucune contrainte d'ordre: on a en quelque sorte ici affaire aux constituants de la représentation « en vrac ». C'est ce qui constitue son « contenu », autant dire son matériau méréologique. On est donc très loin de la teneur intensionnelle de l' *Inhalt* au sens kantien du terme.
Bolzano le souligne lui-même :
Comme, par ce contenu, on n'entend que la somme des constituants dont est constituée la représentation, mais non la faon que ces parties ont d'être liées ensemble, une représentation n'est donc pas encore entièrement déterminée par l'indication de son contenu, mais, à partir d'un contenu univoquement donné, on peut parfois obtenir deux (ou plus) représentations différentes (5)." (pp. 35-36)
(1) Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837, § 48, l'opposition entre la « représentation eue » ou « pensée » et la « représentation en soi ». Le même paragraphe, Bd. I, p. 217, précise qu'à toute représentation subjective correspond une représentation en soi, qui constitue sa matière (*Stoff*) et pour ainsi dire sa teneur sémantique. Le § 52, p. 228 sq., nous met toutefois en garde contre l'idée d'une corrélation nécessaire de l'une à l'autre, car elle reviendrait à prendre la représentation en soi au piège d'un rapport qui lui demeure extrinsèque.
(2) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 56, Bd. I, p. 243. En fait, les deux « remarques » jointes à ce paragraphe, p. 244-246, apportent immédiatement des restrictions à cette transposition du plan subjectif de la représentation au plan objectif: il peut y avoir dans la représentation en soi des parties qui ne sont pas représentées distinctement dans la représentation subjective, voire qui n'y sont pas

représentées du tout, de même qu'une partie peut très bien être représentée dans la représentation subjective sans que rien lui corresponde dans la représentation en soi. Il n'y a pas d'isomorphie de l'une à l'autre, mais juste extension d'un seul et même principe de compositionnalité.
(3) La bonne articulation de la représentation serait à trouver au niveau du sens de l'expression, dont la forme linguistique apparente ne reproduit pas forcément la structure. Nous renverrons ici aux réflexions de notre amie Sandra Lapointe sur la notion de paraphrase à introduire chez Bolzano.
(4) Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 84, Bd. I, p. 400.
(5) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 56, Bd. I, p. 244.

8. ———. 2000. "Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano." *Études Philosophiques* 505-518.
Repris dans: J. Benoist, *Entre acte et sens. Recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*, Paris: Vrin, 2002, pp. 49-65.
"Pourtant, y a-t-il une véritable « ontologie formelle » chez Bolzano? Cette notion même peut-elle avoir un sens dans le contexte de pensée qui est le sien?
On peut rappeler ici la mise en garde de Husserl dans Logique formelle et logique transcendantale. Bolzano n'aurait « pas vu la distinction entre la forme vide du quelque chose en général prise comme genre suprême qui se différencie en tant que forme formelle vide et la région universelle de l'existant (Daseiendes) possible (du réel [des Realen] au sens le plus large), région qui se différencie en régions particulières »(2).
Dans son livre sur l'ontologie formelle, Frédéric Nef écrit qu'un tel reproche est « plus intéressant pour la conception qu'il trahit de l'ontologie formelle que pour ce qu'il dit de Bolzano »(3). Et il est vrai qu'une telle critique réfléchit certainement la conception que Husserl se fait de l'ontologie formelle. Pour autant est-elle injustifiée, et ne nous dit-elle rien sur Bolzano? Nous n'en sommes pas sûr. Tout à la fois nous ne sommes pas certains, quant à nous, que Husserl ait raison dans le débat qui l'oppose ici à Bolzano: c'est-à-dire sur le point de savoir s'il faut une ontologie formelle, ou en

tout cas si celle-ci peut avoir une portée autre que locale (et rendre compte, par exemple, d'autre chose que des seuls mathematica). Mais nous pensons qu'en revanche Husserl a raison sur un point historique : le diagnostic de l'absence d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano précisément, et cela en tout sens - et non seulement au sens de Husserl. Sur ce point, Husserl, fin historien de la philosophie à ses heures, nous apprend plus sur Bolzano que les reconstructions modernes. Tout le problème est alors de ré-apprécier la position de Bolzano, dans son originalité bien détectée par Husserl, avec d'autres yeux que ceux de Husserl." (pp. 505-506).
(2) *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*, tr. fr. Suzanne Bachelard, Paris, PUF, 1957, §26d p. 117.
(3) *L'objet quelconque. Recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet*, Paris, Vrin, 1998, p. 124.

9. ———. 2001. *Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Voir le Chapitre 1: *Bolzano et le paradoxe des objets inexistants,* pp. 17-41.
"Il faut rappeler ici brièvement les présupposés qui sont ceux de la *Wissenschaftslehre* en ce qui concerne la notion de « représentation ». Lorsque, dans la *Doctrine des éléments* de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano parle de « représentations en soi », il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la teneur sémantique de la représentation, et dont le modèle est clairement celui, linguistique, d'unités de sens correspondant aux différents mots, même s'il demeure extrinsèque à ce sens d'être effectivement proféré ou non, et d'apparaître dans un éventuel discours — il lui est en tout cas, si c'est possible, encore plus extrinsèque d'être effectivement représenté ou non (en un sens psychologique) par un sujet. Il s'agit en premier lieu d'une dépsychologisation de la représentation — dont la détermination traditionnelle, mentale, est ravalée au rang de seule représentation « subjective », la « représentation en soi » se voyant aussi, par contraste, qualifiée de « représentation objective». Toute représentation subjective

contient comme son sens (sa « matière » : *Stoff)* une représentation en soi ou objective, qui, en raison même de son statut sémantique, a une dimension d'idéalité, et est indépendante des fluctuations de la subjectivité représentante. Inversement, il n'est pas dit qu'à toute représentation objective doive correspondre une représentation subjective dans laquelle elle viendrait s'incorporer et qui, en quelque sorte, la supporterait. Bolzano dit même très expressément le contraire, et il faut faire droit (ratification ultime de la thèse d'idéalité de la représentation objective) à la possibilité de représentations en soi qui n'auraient pas de manifestation subjective, c'est-à-dire ne seraient représentées ni énoncées par qui que ce soit (1).
Or, parmi les représentations entendues en ce sens-là, sémantique et objectif, il en est qui sont sans objet. C'est l'objet du célèbre § 67 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*." (pp. 17-18)
(1) Cf. la très importante mise au point n° 2 du § 52 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bd. I, p. 228 (contre *Briefwechsel mit Exner*, lettre à Exner du 23 août 1833, p. 86-87: « A chaque représentation objective correspond une représentation subjective qui lui appartient, qui est sa conception (*Auffassung*). »). Là sans doute on trouverait la limite du rapprochement de la doctrine bolzanienne de la représentation subjective et de la représentation objective et de la doctrine husserlienne de la corrélation noético-noématique — ou plus exactement phansio-ontique, sur le terrain de la doctrine de la signification (cf. Husserl, *Sur la théorie de la signification*, § 8 b, p. 62). On notera par ailleurs que l'entendement divin sert toutefois alors à Bolzano, de faon traditionnelle, à supporter dans sa pensée les « représentations en soi »: cf. la réserve de la fin du § 48 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bd. I, p. 218 : «Il peut y avoir des représentations objectives qui ne sont reues dans la conscience d'aucun être pensant — *à l'exception de Dieu* » (nous soulignons). Mais Bolzano précisera aussi qu'une telle incarnation est inessentielle à ladite représentation.

10. ———. 2002. *Entre acte et sens: recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*. Paris: Vrin.

Première partie: *L'univers du sens: Bolzano* Chapitre I: *Grammaire, ou méréologie des représentations* 33; Chapitre II: *Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano* 49; Chapitre III: *Sens et non-sens* 67-86 [inédit].
"De fait, il y a bien une théorie des *impossibilia* dans la *Wissenschaftslehre* de Bolzano. Et cette théorie témoigne d'intéressantes similarités, aussi bien que des différences, avec la théorie supposée de Wittgenstein.
Du point de vue de Bolzano, ce problème relève de ce cercle de problèmes connu sous le nom de: représentations sans objet *(gegenstandlose Vorstellungen*).
Qu'est-ce qu'une représentation sans objet? Et, en premier lieu, qu'est-ce qu'une représentation?
Sous les termes «représentations en soi » et «propositions en soi », Bolzano vise ce qu'on pourrait appeler des entités sémantiques, qui relèvent d'une théorie de la signification. La seconde classe de ces entités, les propositions en soi, est construite sur la première. Les propositions en soi sont des combinaisons de représentations en soi.
Pourtant, jusqu'à un certain point, dans l'œuvre de Bolzano, les représentations en soi sont déterminées exclusivement en référence aux propositions en soi, qui semblent avoir une sorte de priorité logique. La seule caractérisation que Bolzano semble être capable de donner des dites représentations en soi est que ce sont des parties de propositions en soi (les parties de ces entités porteuses de valeur de vérité que sont les propositions qui ne sont pas encore elles-mêmes porteuses de valeur de vérité).
Les propositions en soi étant définies comme des combinaisons de représentations en soi qui, en tant que combinaisons, ont une valeur de vérité, il semble qu'il y ait là comme un cercle vicieux.
Remarquons cependant que Bolzano, au paragraphe 52-1 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, insiste sur le fait que la caractérisation (il s'agit tout au plus d'une explication élucidatrice, ce que Bolzano appellerait une *Verstândigun*g, qui aide à cerner le sens d'un terme, et aucunement d'une définition) de la représentation en soi comme partie de la proposition en soi, partie qui n'a pas encore elle-même de

valeur de vérité, est seulement extrinsèque, et nullement essentielle. En réalité, le réalisme sémantique strict qui est le sien conduit Bolzano à considérer que les représentations en soi précèdent leur possible combinaison, et sont, dans leur sens (dans le fait d'avoir un sens pour elles, et dans le contenu de celui-ci), indépendantes de celle-ci. Tout comme les combinaisons dont il est question (id est les propositions en soi, dans le cas où ces combinaisons ont une valeur de vérité) consistent également en elles-mêmes, dans une sorte d'objectivité, indépendamment de tout acte subjectif de combiner." (pp. 68-69)

11. ———. 2002. "La réécriture par Bolzano de l' *Esthétique transcendantale*." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:287-303.
"L' *Elementarlehre* de la *Wissenschaftslehre* de Bolzano peut être lue comme une sorte de réécriture de l' *Elementarlehre* de la *Critique de la raison pure*. Bien sûr, on pourrait avoir l'impression que toute Esthétique Transcendantale fait ici défaut. Des déterminations qui sont supposées intuitives chez Kant sont réinterprétées par Bolzano comme purement conceptuelles. Pourtant, en fait, développant sa propre Esthétique Transcendantale du point de vue d'une sémantique objective, Bolzano invente une nouvelle sorte d'a priori pour la sensibilité - précisément un a priori purement conceptuel."
12. ———. 2002. "Bolzano et l'idée de *Wissenschaftslehre*." In *Les philosophes et la science*, edited by Wagner, Pierre, 659-678. Paris: Gallimard.
13. ———. 2003. "Propriété et détermination: sémantique et ontologie chez Bernard Bolzano." *Philosophiques* no. 30:137-148.
"L'auteur essaie de circonscrire la sphère du «métaphysique » dans la pensée de Bolzano. Il montre comment la métaphysique de la réalité (*Wirklichkeit*), avec ses deux ingrédients: les substances et les propriétés (*Beschaffenheiten*), doit être distinguée de la doctrine du règne « sémantique » (celui des représentations et des propositions en soi). Ces dernières entités n'appartiennent pas à la sphère de l'ontologie, et il est impossible de trouver

quelque chose comme une « ontologie formelle » chez Bolzano qui serait en
charge de s'occuper d'elles, c'est-à-dire une doctrine qui les traiterait comme des « êtres ». L'auteur s'intéresse, de ce point de vue, à la distinction importante faite par Bolzano, entre les propriétés (*Beschaffenheiten*), qui doivent être prises en un sens ontologique, et les déterminations (*Bestimmungen*) qui, bien que rapportées à des objets et éventuellement des êtres, n'ont pas de sens indépendamment d'un discours tenu sur ces objets, et ne sont pas des entités ontologiques à proprement parler. Ainsi, l'auteur essaie de mettre en lumière la complexité des relations entre le plan sémantique et le plan ontologique chez Bolzano: les deux plans doivent être soigneusement distingués, et pourtant demeurent aussi corrélés en un sens complexe."

14. Bouveresse, Jacques. 2000. "Sur les représentations sans objet." *Études Philosophiques* no. 4:519-534.
"Jacques Bouveresse réinscrit l'œuvre de Bolzano dans le contexte de l'histoire de la philosophie autrichienne. Il montre comment le fameux problème des « représentations sans objet », dont l'école de Brentano s'est tant occupée, trouve sa source dans l'œuvre du philosophe tchèque. Il compare le traitement bolzanien du problème et les traitements variés essayés dans l'école de Brentano. En définitive, il met en lumière l'originalité de la position wittgensteinienne sur cette question: comme Bolzano (mais contre Brentano), Wittgenstein rejette une interprétation psychologique du problème; mais il refuse aussi (comme Brentano) l'objectivisme sémantique de Bolzano."
15. Brisart, Robert. 2002. "Husserl et Bolzano: le lien sémantique." *Recherches Husserliennes* no. 18:3-29.
16. Cantù, Paola. 2006. "Bolzano et les propositions en soi: une théorie objective des vérités." In *Propositions et états de choses. Entre être et sens*, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn, 51-66. Paris: Vrin.
"Bernard Bolzano présente sa théorie logique des propositions en soi dans les deux premières parties de sa *Wissenschaftslehre*, publiée en 1837, mais quelques aspects

sont déjà traités dans un échange épistolaire avec Exner daté de 1834 et dans les *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* de 1810: ce dernier texte montre que l'intérêt de Bolzano à la connaissance scientifique et à l'étude de la logique est étroitement lié à la recherche mathématique (1).

Avant d'exposer les différences entre propositions en soi et états des choses et avant d'expliquer les raisons et les conséquences de cette opposition, j'esquisserai quatre traits fondamentaux de la logique bolzanienne: la définition et la fonction des propositions en soi et des représentations en soi, le propositionalisme, qui dans la théorie de la signification attribue le rôle le plus important aux propositions, la nature des relations entre représentations subjectives, objectives et objets, la conception sémantique de la vérité (2).

Parallèlement je mentionnerai quatre conceptions que Bolzano critique vigoureusement: le psychologisme, l'interprétation intentionnelle des représentations en soi, le concept traditionnel de adequatio entendu comme ressemblance entre concepts et objets, l'idée que tous les concepts doués de sens ont un objet, soit réel soit irréel.

L'analyse des fondements de la théorie logique de Bolzano nous permet de remarquer:

– que la théorie de la vérité n'est pas une théorie de la correspondance en tant que adequatio entre idées et objets;

– que les propositions en soi sont ce qui porte la valeur de vérité (*truthbearers*) et donc ne jouent pas le rôle d'état de choses, de quelque faon qu'on l'entende;

– que la logique bolzanienne peut être définie un platonisme logique, seulement dans la mesure où elle refuse une conception épistémique de la vérité, et qu'il est de toute faon préférable qu'elle soit considérée un objectivisme sémantique, car elle ne distingue pas deux niveaux différents de l'être.

(1) Cf. B. Bolzano, [BY] : *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974 ; [WL] : *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837, in *Gesamtausgabe*, I. *Schriften*,

spécialement t. 11-12, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1985-88 ; [BfW] : *Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano's mit F. Exner*, in *Bernard Bolzanos Schriften* (Spisy=Schriften), éd. E. Winter, t. 4, Prag, Königliche Böhmische Gesellschaft, 1935.
(2) Sur la logique de Bolzano voir J. Sebestik, *Logique et Mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano*, Paris, Vrin, 1992 et J. Berg, *Bolzano's Logic*, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1962.

17. Cavaillès, Jean. 1946. "La théorie de la science selon Bolzano." *Deucalion* no. I:195-202.
Repris dans: J. Cavaillés, *Sur la logique et la théorie de la science*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1947; nouvelle édition avec une postface de Jan Sebestik, Paris: Vrin, 1997 et dans J. Cavaillès, *Œuvres complètes de philosophie des sciences*, Paris: Hermann, 1994, pp. 653-658.
18. Danek, Jaromir. 1971. "La méthodologie de Bolzano. Un thème dans la genèse de la pensée phénoménologique et de l'humanisme de notre temps." *Dialogue* no. 10:504-516.
"Le point de départ est logique. Et la logique signifie pour Bolzano une théorie et une méthodologie des sciences. Son œuvre maîtresse, la *Doctrine de la Science* (WL) est ainsi un livre de logique. Lorsqu'il examine les fondements de toute science, c'est-à-dire, lorsqu'il les définit comme un ensemble de lois analytiques et universelles qui, à leur tour, constituent une science en soi, Bolzano fait bien une analyse de type spécifiquement logique, mais dans le même moment, c'est véritablement sa philosophie qu'il réalise, à savoir, la philosophie des fondements objectifs et a priori de la réalité concrète."
19. ———. 1975. *Les projets de Leibniz et de Bolzano. Deux sources de la logique contemporaine*. Québec: Presse de l'Université de Laval.
20. Dubucs, Jacques, and Lapointe, Sandra. 2003. "Preuves par excellence." *Philosophiques* no. 30:219-234.
21. Duhn, Anita von. 2003. "Les remarques de Bolzano sur les couleurs." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:463-488.
"Les remarques de Bolzano sur les couleurs n'ont pas fait l'objet de recherches jusqu'à présent. Le but de cet article

est de montrer que ses investigations sur les couleurs constituent une contribution intéressante à la théorie de la connaissance du XIXe siècle. Selon Bolzano, les couleurs sont des qualités secondes ainsi que des propriétés physiques et, par conséquent, elles sont des quantités mesurables. Il soutient que la perception des couleurs est réglée par des lois empiriques et il argumente que les couleurs que nous voyons sont déterminables par des concepts de grandeur."

22. Fréchette, Guillaume. 2011. "De la proposition à l'état de choses: Husserl lecteur de Bolzano." In *Catégories ontologiques et catégories logiques*, edited by Seron, Denis, 45-68. Liège: Presses de l'Université de Liège.
23. Gallerand, Alain. 2012. "Les apories du concept de redondance logique chez Bolzano." *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* no. 8:1-27.
"Le concept de redondance logique chez Bolzano soulève plusieurs difficultés. Il ne s'accorde ni avec la notion de représentation simple qu'il est censé expliquer, puisque Bolzano définit les individus comme des unités composées de plusieurs caractères et décrit les représentations singulières (noms propres et indexicaux) comme l'abréviation de descriptions définies, ni avec la distinction entre jugements synthétiques et analytiques, car il suppose que l'analyse d'un sujet individuel permet d'en dévoiler un à un les prédicats, comme si l'expérience ne jouait aucun rôle dans la connaissance des individus. Pourquoi Bolzano reste-t-il donc attaché à un concept aussi problématique ? Est-ce le seul moyen d'expliquer comment nous nous représentons des individus ? Nous montrerons que les apories de la notion de redondance logique témoignent de l'influence de la théorie leibnizienne du jugement, et qu'une version phénoménologiquement améliorée de la sémantique objective est néanmoins capable de les surmonter et de rétablir la simplicité de la représentation et la synthèse du jugement dans leurs droits."
24. ———. 2013. "Bolzano et le problème du rapport intension/extension: La redondance logique vs. le principe

de proportionnalité inverse." *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* no. 9:1-25.
"Cet article, qui fait suite à une publication précédente («Les apories du concept de redondance logique chez Bolzano»), poursuit un double objectif : (I) démontrer que les apories que nous avions relevées peuvent être surmontées par l'analyse des rapports extensionnels entre représentations; (II) évaluer la contribution de Bolzano à la question classique des rapports intension/extension telle qu'elle a été posée par Port-Royal. La logique des classes, dont Bolzano pose les fondements (*Théorie de la science*, 2e partie, 3e section), permet en effet de dégager les lois de la redondance logique — auxquelles Bolzano ne cesse de faire implicitement référence sans en donner la formule — et de délimiter le champ d'application du principe classique de proportionnalité inverse entre intension et extension auquel déroge précisément la redondance. La critique bolzanienne de la logique de Port-Royal prend alors tout son sens."

25. George, Rolf. 2003. "Intuitions." *Philosophiques* no. 30:19-46.
26. Granger, Gaston-Gilles. 1969. "Le concept de continu chez Aristote et Bolzano." *Études Philosophiques*:513-523.
27. Gyemant, Maria. 2013. "Bolzano et le psychologisme. Sur la possibilité des représentations sans objet." *Philosophie*:45-66.
"Ce texte met face à face la position bolzanienne sur la représentation, qui est essentiellement antipsychologiste, et les critiques qu'il a reu de la part de deux auteurs partisans d'une position d'inspiration brentanienne. Le premier de ces auteurs, Franz Exner, a eu un dialogue prolongé avec Bolzano sur le thème de l'objet des représentations. Twardowski a, de son côté, conu sa thèse d'habilitation comme une réponse à la thèse bolzanienne des représentations sans objet. dans ce texte j'essaie d'une part de comparer ces deux critiques entre elles et d'autre part de tirer les conclusions quant à leur succès contre Bolzano."
28. Haller, Rudolf. 1987. "Remarques sur la tradition sémantique." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:359-369.

29. Künne, Wolfgang. 2009. "Bolzano et (le jeune) Husserl sur l'intentionnalité." *Philosophiques* no. 36:307-354.
30. Lapointe, Sandra. 2000. "Analyticité, universalité et quantification chez Bernard Bolzano." *Études Philosophiques* 455-470.
31. ———. 2002. "Bolzano et la réception de Kant en Autriche." In *Années 1781-1801. Kant. Critique de la raison pure. Vingt ans de réception*, edited by Piché, Claude, 263-271. Paris: Vrin.
32. ———. 2003. "Principe de priorité et principe du contexte chez Bolzano et Husserl." In *Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques*, edited by Fisette, Denis, 93-110. Paris: Vrin.
33. ———. 2003. "Bernard Bolzano: Œuvres." *Philosophiques* no. 30:235-243.
34. ———. 2003. "Bibliographie." *Philosophiques* no. 30:235-243.
"Cette bibliographie a pour but de faire le point sur les études bolzaniennes de langue Français e et d'orienter le lecteur à travers la littérature sur le sujet.
Nous y faisons l'inventaire des articles et monographies francophones portant sur Bolzano — dont le nombre, comme on aura tôt fait de le constater, reste regrettablement marginal. Le lecteur y trouvera également la liste des traductions Français es publiées ou projetées des œuvres de Bolzano. Nous incluons les monographies et les traductions anglophones les plus importantes et nous fournissons le descriptif du projet d'édition des Ouvres complètes (Bernard Bolzano- *Gesamtausgabe*) de même que la liste des ouvrages parus en allemand et en anglais dans la série *Contributions aux recherches bolzaniennes* (*Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung*). Pour un complément à cette bibliographie, on consultera Sebestik, *Logique et Mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano* (1992). Le nombre de publications en allemand et en anglais est plus considérable. On consultera à ce sujet les volumes 2 et 10 des *Beiträge zur Bolzano Forschung*."
35. ———. 2003. "Introduction: Bernard Bolzano. Contexte et actualité." *Philosophiques* no. 30:3-17.

"Le présent numéro est consacré principalement aux aspects de l'œuvre de Bolzano qui concernent sa philosophie de la logique et sa théorie de la connaissance. Ce thème a semblé, d'entrée de jeu, être celui le plus susceptible de susciter l'intérêt du lecteur et ce pour plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, Bolzano s'est fait, dans ces domaines, le brillant précurseur de plusieurs découvertes importantes et l'étude de ses théories fournit un prétexte opportun pour faire le point sur les conceptions contemporaines, par exemple, de l'analyticité, de la conséquence, de la preuve, du nombre, etc. Deuxièmement, les liens qui se dessinent entre Bolzano et des auteurs aussi importants que Kant, Husserl et Twardowski, mais aussi Frege, Carnap et Tarski, marquent la nécessité de réévaluer certaines idées reues en ce qui concerne l'histoire de la philosophie analytique. À cet égard, on se doit de mentionner que l'intérêt suscité depuis quelques années par la connexion historique étroite — connexion dont une certaine phénoménologie a longtemps fait fi — entre Bolzano et le fondateur de la phénoménologie a motivé un renouvellement des études husserliennes et a permis de mieux comprendre les origines communes de la philosophie analytique et de la phénoménologie. Enfin, les thèmes autour desquels gravitent les articles réunis ici témoignent d'un aspect essentiel de la contribution de Bolzano à la philosophie. Notre intention est de fournir au lecteur francophone un moyen de se familiariser avec un aspect incontournable d'une œuvre d'une richesse immense tout en montrant sa saisissante actualité.
Dans le reste de cette introduction, je présente les éléments qui permettront au lecteur de s'initier aux grandes lignes de la philosophie bolzanienne et, en le référent aux articles pertinents, de s'orienter dans ce qui suit.

36. ———. 2008. *Qu'est-ce que l'analyse?* Paris: Vrin.
Sur Bolzano voir la traduction Français e partielle de *Théorie de la Science* § 147-148 (pp. 91-96) avec commentaire (pp. 97-126).
37. Laz, Jacques. 1990. "Un platonicien débridé? Bolzano, critique de l'intuitionnisme kantien." *Philosophie* no. 27:13-29.

38. ———. 1993. *Bolzano critique de Kant. Suivi de Bernard Bolzano Sur la doctrine kantienne de la construction des concepts par les intuitions*. Paris: Vrin.
39. Majolino, Claudio. 2000. "Variation(s) I. Bolzano et l'équivocité de la variation." *Études Philosophiques* 471-488.
40. Mansour, Goufrane. 2008. "Bolzano: objectivité sémantique et subjectivité de la perception." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 60:551-569.
"De la pensée de Bolzano, l'objectivisme sémantique est certainement l'aspect le plus largement commenté. Mais son œuvre maîtresse, la *Wissenschaftslehre*, comprend aussi bien la version la plus aboutie de cet objectivisme qu'une partie proprement épistémologique, la « Théorie de la Connaissance ». Si l'épistémologie bolzanienne repose sur la désubjectivation des éléments de la connaissance, la théorie de la perception présente dans cette Wissenschaftslehre prête au sujet connaissant un rôle actif dans l'élaboration du réel perceptif."
41. Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2004. ""L'affaire Zimmermann". À propos des influences bolzaniennes dans l'École de Lvov et de Varsovie." In *Aristote au XIXème siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 377-394. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
42. Morscher, Edgar. 2003. "La définition bolzanienne de l'analyticité logique." *Philosophiques* no. 30:149-169. Traduction de: *Logische Allgemeingültigkeit*, dans: *Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung* 11, 1999, pp. 179-206.
43. Mulligan, Kevin. 1997. "Sur l'histoire de l'approche analytique de l'histoire de la philosophie: de Bolzano et Brentano à Bennett et Barnes." In *Philosophie analytique et histoire de la philosophie*, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel, 61-103. Paris: Vrin.
44. Pégny, Gaëtan. 2013. "Bolzano et Hegel." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 78:215-243.
"L'allergie de Bolzano à l'œuvre de Hegel est un fait souligné dans presque toutes les présentations de sa pensée. Pourtant, conformément à son éthique intellectuelle, il a tenté de se familiariser avec cette philosophie qu'il rejetait plus que toute autre. Il a même, tardivement, reconnu qu'il

pouvait s'y trouver des propositions justes. Afin d'affiner la compréhension de la relation de Bolzano à Hegel, on se propose ici de reconstruire la polémique des *Trois essais sur Hegel* en montrant qu'elle recoupe bien des formes d'anti-hégélianisme devenues canoniques (la critique de la philosophie de l'histoire notamment), mais dans un contexte qui lui est propre et la spécifie. Dans un second temps, on reviendra sur les divergences philosophiques à l'origine de la nécessité pour Bolzano de critiquer un auteur et ses disciples, dans lesquels il voit une forme de régression intellectuelle et sociale, divergences qui imposent et orientent une lecture. Ces divergences sur la compréhension du rôle du langage et de la philosophie, du rapport des représentations au réel, ou sur la définition de l'infini, sont sous-jacentes à la polémique des *Trois essais*, mais on doit en chercher la formulation dans le reste du corpus bolzanien."

45. Proust, Joëlle. 1992. "L'intensionnalisme sans le réel: de Bolzano à Katz." *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* no. 14:245-257.
"On s'intéresse ici à la perspective sémantique consistant à maintenir strictement disjoints la définition réelle (ayant trait à l'objet et à ses propriétés) et la définition nominale (concernant la représentation ou le sens et ses constituants). Ainsi Bolzano montre-t-il que des paradoxes surgissent quand on donne une interprétation « réelle » de la composition « nominale ».
Cependant Putnam dans une série d'articles célèbres donne des arguments tendant à démontrer qu'il n'existe pas de classes de vérités qui soient d'ordre purement sémantique ou nominal: les usages linguistiques dépendent toujours d'un état du monde. Les
arguments de Putnam peuvent toutefois être efficacement combattus en abandonnant certaines exigences propres à la sémantique frégéenne. On montre les affinités entre la stratégie suggérée par Katz dans une série de travaux récents et celle de
Bolzano."

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48. ———. 2003. "La théorie des intuitions chez Bolzano." In *Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Lapointe, Sandra, 111-123. Paris: Vrin.
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51. Sebestik, Jan. 1984. "Bolzano et Brentano. Deux sources autrichiennes du Cercle de Vienne." *Fundamenta Scientiae* no. 5:219-235.
52. ———. 1987. "Premiers paradoxes bolzaniens de l'infini avec un texte inédit de B. Bolzano." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:403-411.
53. ———. 1992. *Logique et sémantique chez Bernard Bolzano*. Paris: Vrin.
54. ———. 1996. "Études bolzaniennes." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:437-448.
55. ———. 1999. "Forme, variation et déductibilité dans la logique de Bolzano." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:479-506.
56. ———. 2003. "La dispute de Bolzano avec Kant. Fragment d'un dialogue sur la connaissance mathématique." *Philosophiques* no. 30:47-66.
57. Seron, Denis. 2006. "La controverse sur la négation de Bolzano à Windelband." *Philosophie*:58-78.
"Il y a certainement lieu d'évoquer, du point de vue de l'histoire de la philosophie de langue allemande du dix-neuvième et de la première moitié du vingtième siècle, un *problème de la négation*. Ce problème de la négation se ramène à un petit nombre de questions fondamentales. En particulier : l'affirmation et la négation se situent-elles strictement sur le même plan et sont-elles « coordonnées » (*koordiniert*) ? La négation est-elle une propriété du contenu de l'acte judicatif, ou une propriété de l'acte judicatif lui-même? Si la négation est simplement la qualité de rejet, qu'est-ce qui est rejeté dans le jugement négatif? Le jugement négatif est-il pour autant un « jugement de valeur »? Existe-t-il des représentations négatives? Le jugement négatif est-il synonyme de séparation, ou réclame-t-il encore, comme le jugement affirmatif, une liaison entre des contenus représentatifs? « S n'est pas p » est-il une forme primitive du jugement au même titre que « S est p », comme le pensait Kant par exemple? Ou bien est-il, comme le pense Husserl, le résultat d'une modification de la forme primitive de tout jugement « S est p »? Quel est le lieu de la négation? Est-ce la copule, le

prédicat, ou ni l'un ni l'autre? Je me propose ici d'indiquer schématiquement en quels termes ces questions ont été posées et de retracer quelques étapes de ce questionnement depuis Lotze et Bolzano, en m'arrêtant avant Frege et Husserl et en n'évoquant qu'occasionnellement les conceptions de Brentano et des brentaniens."

58. Siebel, Mark. 2003. "La notion bolzanienne de déductibilité." *Philosophiques* no. 30:171-189.
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I. La recherche des premières raisons au royaume de la vérité: Les sciences a priori et les autres; Concept et intuition, analytique et synthétique; La théorie des sciences purement a priori ou théorie du sens objectif. – II. La reconstruction axiomatique et l'arithmétisation des mathématiques: La connexion objective des vérités; Concepts primitifs; L'arithmétisation. – III. Les ensembles infinis: Le concept d'infini actuel; Les grandeurs et les nombres; Les divers infinis. – IV. Les nombres de l'arithmétique pure. – Conclusion.
62. ———. 1999. "Réalisme mathématique, réalisme logique chez Bolzano." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:457-477.
63. Tatzel, Armin. 2003. "La théorie bolzanienne du fondement et de la conséquence." *Philosophiques* no. 30:191-217.
"Le but de cet article est de présenter et d'évaluer la théorie de la fondation de Bernard Bolzano, c'est-à-dire sa théorie du concept exprimé et de la relation mise en jeu par « parce que ». Dans la première partie (§§1-4), le concept de fondation est distingué et mis en relation avec trois autres concepts: le concept de raison épistémique, le concept de causalité et le concept de déductibilité (c'est-à-dire de conséquence logique). Dans la seconde partie (§§5-7), je

reconstruis la théorie bolzanienne de la fondation sous forme axiomatique et j'en offre une discussion critique."
64. Textor, Mark. 2000. "Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité." *Études Philosophiques* 435-454.

Bernard Bolzano: Bibliographie des Traductions et des Études en Français

Traductions

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"La théorie des nombres réels (T.N.R.) de Bernard Bolzano fait partie de sa *Grössenlehre* (Théorie des quantités), laissée en manuscrit et restée inachevée. C'est principalement au cours des années 1830 à 1835, après avoir terminé son oeuvre importante sur la logique, *Wissenschaftslehre* (Théorie de la science), que Bolzano travaillait à cette vaste oeuvre.
(...)
Dans sa T.N.R., Bolzano tâche tout d'abord d'effectuer l'arithmétisation de la T.N.R., qui fut développée beaucoup plus tard de trois manières différentes par K. Weierstrass (1860), C. Méray (1869), et G. Cantor (1872), et finalement par R. Dedekind (1872). Bolzano peut être considéré à bon droit comme précurseur de ces mathématiciens: l'idée du fondement purement arithmétique des nombres réels se dessine chez lui tout à fait nettement, bien que ses considérations concernant ce sujet ne soient pas tout à fait irréprochables.
Bolzano donne ensuite le « développement de Cantor » des nombres réels; il le prend pour point de départ pour déduire les propositions ultérieures concernant les nombres réels; la trichotomie des relations « plus grand » et « plus petit », le

théorème d'Archimède (Eudoxe), le théorème de Cauchy-Bolzano, le théorème de Bolzano-Weierstrass et finalement un théorème qui rappelle le théorème de Dedekind. Ces considérations pourraient, sans grands changements, être amenées à la précision requise de nos jours. Ce manuscrit de Bolzano publié, même en son état actuel, aurait pu accélérer considérablement le progrès des mathématiques.
La Ire Partie du présent article contient un Abrégé du manuscrit de la T.N.R.
Dans la IIe Partie intitulée « Conclusion », je tâche de corriger et de compléter l'oeuvre de Bolzano.
La IIIe Partie comprend la Bibliographie." (pp. 313-314).

2. Sebestik, Jan. 1964. "Bernard Bolzano et son mémoire sur le théorème fondamental de l'Analyse." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 17.
Traduction de *Rein analystischer Beweis der Lehrsatzes* (1817) avec le titre: *Démonstration purement analytique* (pp. 136-164).
Repris dans B. Bolzano, *Premiers écrits. Philosophie, logique, mathématique*, pp. 209-243.
3. Bolzano, Bernard. 1975. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* Québec: Presses de l'Université de Laval.
Rédigé en 1839; traduction et commentaire par Denis Macabrey.
4. ———. 1987. "De la mathématique universelle ou arithmétique." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:403-411.
Traduction et commentaire de Jan Sebestik.
Repris dans B. Bolzano, *Premiers écrits. Philosophie, logique, mathématique*, pp. 259-261.
5. ———. 1990. "Sur la doctrine kantienne de la construction des concepts par les intuitions." *Philosophie* no. 27:3-12.
Traduction de l'Appendice à *Contributions zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (1810) par Jacques Laz; repris dans: J. Laz, *Bolzano critique de Kant*, Paris, Vrin, 1993, p. 161-82.
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mathématiques. *Anthologie (1850-1914)*, edited by Rivenc, François and de Roulhan, Philippe, 15-28. Paris: Payot.
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7. ———. 1993. *Le paradoxes de l'infini*. Paris: Seul.
Traduction de Hourya Sinaceur.
8. Prihonski, Franz. 2006. *Bolzano contre Kant*. *Le Nouvel Anti-Kant*. Paris: Vrin.
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Traduit et présenté par Alain Gallerand.

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"Cette bibliographie a pour but de faire le point sur les études bolzaniennes de langue française et d'orienter le lecteur à travers la littérature sur le sujet.
Nous y faisons l'inventaire des articles et monographies francophones portant sur Bolzano — dont le nombre, comme on aura tôt fait de le constater, reste regrettablement marginal. Le lecteur y trouvera également la liste des traductions françaises publiées ou projetées des oeuvres de Bolzano. Nous incluons les monographies et les traductions anglophones les plus importantes et nous fournissons le descriptif du projet d'édition des *OEuvres complètes* (*Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgable*) de même que la liste des ouvrages parus en allemand et en anglais dans la série *Contributions aux recherches bolzaniennes* (*Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung*). Pour un complément à cette bibliographie, on consultera Sebestik (1992). Le nombre de publications en allemand et en anglais est plus considérable. On consultera à ce sujet les volumes 2 et 10 des *Beiträge zur Bolzano Forschung*." (p. 235)
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Études

1. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1999. *L'a priori conceptuel. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick*. Paris: Vrin.
"Pour Bolzano, toute proposition est essentiellement composition (*Zusammensetzung*) de représentations(2), qui sont pour elles de véritables parties(3). À partir de là, on peut envisager la variation (*Veränderung*) de certaines de ces parties. Est analytique une proposition qui conserve la même valeur de vérité quelque représentation que l'on substitue à un ou plusieurs éléments représentationnels

distingués en elle (*i, j*, ...)(4). Cette définition, qui se rattache aux recherches leibniziennes sur la substituabilité plus qu'à Kant, est extraordinairement souple : il suffit qu'un seul élément représentationnel (sémantique) de la proposition soit librement modulable *salva veritate* pour la proposition pour qu'elle soit tenue pour analytique. De ce point de vue la définition bolzanienne, tout à la fois objective (sémantique) et pragmatique (elle est adossée à la simple possibilité d'une transformation opérée sur la proposition) déborde largement le cas de la seule analyticité logique - celui qui intéressera Husserl aussi bien. Il est vrai que Bolzano admet aussi une analyticité au sens strict, qu'il nomme « analyticité logique »(5) : celle-ci se caractérise par le fait que dans la proposition qui est analytique en ce sens-là, tout peut faire l'objet de substitution, sauf des concepts «qui appartiennent à la logique ». On aboutit alors à une entente de l'analyticité en son sens radical qui est celle où la valeur de vérité de la proposition n'est plus tributaire que de son armature logique, de ce que Husserl appellera les «concepts formels»(6) qui y interviennent. Cette analyticité bolzanienne fixe, à quelques réserves près sur lesquelles nous reviendrons, le cadre de l'analyticité husserlienne." (pp. 98-99)

(2) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 123, Bd. Il, p.4 sq. Nous entendons évidemment ici par « représentation » (*Vorstellung*), la « représentation en soi » en son sens d'unité sémantique de base (cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 48, Bd. I, p. 215 sq.).

(3) Sur le sens de cette méréologie, qui constitue une extension de celle constitutive de la représentation elle-même, voir le § 56, Bd. l, p. 243 sq. On notera l'absence de distinction méréologique entre la logique qui gouverne la composition, à base de représentation» simples, des «représentations composées » et celle qui gouverne la composition, à partir d'elles, de «propositions » (qui sont essentiellement constituées de représentations), Elle aura une certaine importance pour notre propos ultérieur.

(4) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 148, Bd. II, p. 83. Sur ce qui suit, voir notre exposé dans *Phénoménologie, sémantique,*

ontologie, chap. II, p. 65 sq.
(5) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 148, Bd. II, p. 84.
(6) *Recherches logiques* III, § 11, tr. fr. p. 35.

2. ———. 2001. *Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Chapitre 1: *Bolzano et le paradoxe des objets inexistants,* pp. 17-41.
"Il faut rappeler ici brièvement les présupposés qui sont ceux de la *Wissenschaftslehre* en ce qui concerne la notion de « représentation ». Lorsque, dans la *Doctrine des éléments* de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano parle de « représentations en soi », il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la teneur sémantique de la représentation, et dont le modèle est clairement celui, linguistique, d'unités de sens correspondant aux différents mots, même s'il demeure extrinsèque à ce sens d'être effectivement proféré ou non, et d'apparaître dans un éventuel discours — il lui est en tout cas, si c'est possible, encore plus extrinsèque d'être effectivement représenté ou non (en un sens psychologique) par un sujet. Il s'agit en premier lieu d'une dépsychologisation de la représentation — dont la détermination traditionnelle, mentale, est ravalée au rang de seule représentation « subjective », la « représentation en soi » se voyant aussi, par contraste, qualifiée de « représentation objective». Toute représentation subjective contient comme son sens (sa « matière » : *Stoff)* une représentation en soi ou objective, qui, en raison même de son statut sémantique, a une dimension d'idéalité, et est indépendante des fluctuations de la subjectivité représentante. Inversement, il n'est pas dit qu'à toute représentation objective doive correspondre une représentation subjective dans laquelle elle viendrait s'incorporer et qui, en quelque sorte, la supporterait. Bolzano dit même très expressément le contraire, et il faut faire droit (ratification ultime de la thèse d'idéalité de la représentation objective) à la possibilité de représentations en soi qui n'auraient pas de manifestation subjective, c'est-

à-dire ne seraient représentées ni énoncées par qui que ce soit (1).
Or, parmi les représentations entendues en ce sens-là, sémantique et objectif, il en est qui sont sans objet. C'est l'objet du célèbre § 67 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*." (pp. 17-18)
(1) Cf. la très importante mise au point n° 2 du § 52 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bd. I, p. 228 (contre *Briefwechsel mit Exner*, lettre à Exner du 23 août 1833, p. 86-87: « A chaque représentation objective correspond une représentation subjective qui lui appartient, qui est sa conception (*Auffassung*). »). Là sans doute on trouverait la limite du rapprochement de la doctrine bolzanienne de la représentation subjective et de la représentation objective et de la doctrine husserlienne de la corrélation noético-noématique — ou plus exactement phansio-ontique, sur le terrain de la doctrine de la signification (cf. Husserl, *Sur la théorie de la signification*, § 8 b, p. 62). On notera par ailleurs que l'entendement divin sert toutefois alors à Bolzano, de façon traditionnelle, à supporter dans sa pensée les « représentations en soi »: cf. la réserve de la fin du § 48 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bd. I, p. 218 : «Il peut y avoir des représentations objectives qui ne sont reçues dans la conscience d'aucun être pensant — *à l'exception de Dieu* » (nous soulignons). Mais Bolzano précisera aussi qu'une telle incarnation est inessentielle à ladite représentation.

3. ———. 2002. *Entre acte et sens : recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*. Paris: Vrin.
Première partie : *L'univers du sens: Bolzano*; Chapitre I: *Grammaire, ou méréologie des représentations* 33; Chapitre II: *Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano* 49; Chapitre III: *Sens et non-sens* 67-86 [inédit].
"De fait, il y a bien une théorie des *impossibilia* dans la *Wissenschaftslehre* de Bolzano. Et cette théorie témoigne d'intéressantes similarités, aussi bien que des différences, avec la théorie supposée de Wittgenstein.
Du point de vue de Bolzano, ce problème relève de ce cercle de problèmes connu sous le nom de: représentations sans objet *(gegenstandlose Vorstellungen*).

Qu'est-ce qu'une représentation sans objet? Et, en premier lieu, qu'est-ce qu'une représentation?
Sous les termes «représentations en soi » et «propositions en soi », Bolzano vise ce qu'on pourrait appeler des entités sémantiques, qui relèvent d'une théorie de la signification. La seconde classe de ces entités, les propositions en soi, est construite sur la première. Les propositions en soi sont des combinaisons de représentations en soi.
Pourtant, jusqu'à un certain point, dans l'œuvre de Bolzano, les représentations en soi sont déterminées exclusivement en référence aux propositions en soi, qui semblent avoir une sorte de priorité logique. La seule caractérisation que Bolzano semble être capable de donner des dites représentations en soi est que ce sont des parties de propositions en soi (les parties de ces entités porteuses de valeur de vérité que sont les propositions qui ne sont pas encore elles-mêmes porteuses de valeur de vérité).
Les propositions en soi étant définies comme des combinaisons de représentations en soi qui, en tant que combinaisons, ont une valeur de vérité, il semble qu'il y ait là comme un cercle vicieux.
Remarquons cependant que Bolzano, au paragraphe 52-1 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, insiste sur le fait que la caractérisation (il s'agit tout au plus d'une explication élucidatrice, ce que Bolzano appellerait une *Verstândigun*g, qui aide à cerner le sens d'un terme, et aucunement d'une définition) de la représentation en soi comme partie de la proposition en soi, partie qui n'a pas encore elle-même de valeur de vérité, est seulement extrinsèque, et nullement essentielle. En réalité, le réalisme sémantique strict qui est le sien conduit Bolzano à considérer que les représentations en soi précèdent leur possible combinaison, et sont, dans leur sens (dans le fait d'avoir un sens pour elles, et dans le contenu de celui-ci), indépendantes de celle-ci. Tout comme les combinaisons dont il est question (id est les propositions en soi, dans le cas où ces combinaisons ont une valeur de vérité) consistent également en elles-mêmes, dans une sorte d'objectivité, indépendamment de tout acte subjectif de combiner." (pp. 68-69)

4. Danek, Jaromir. 1975. *Les projets de Leibniz et de Bolzano. Deux sources de la logique contemporaine*. Québec: Presse de l'Université de Laval.
"L'idéal leibnizien d'unification des sciences commence à se concrétiser dans la *Doctrine de la Science* de Bolzano, théorie conçue comme une logique générale. Cette première tentative, fidèle au contenu éthique et humaniste du projet leibnizien, annonce le système qui l'exprimera d'une façon beaucoup plus large : celui d'une logique transcendantale des vérités, logique dont Husserl élargira la portée.
La critique du panlogisme dialectique de Hegel (ou, plutôt, de ses interprétations unilatérales) souligne l'importance méthodologique de l'anhistorisme apriorique des points de départ de la philosophie bolzanienne.
Décrit dans la « partie fondamentale » de la *Doctrine de la Science*, le monde idéal de l'en soi devient une base objective pour des analyses effectuées avec une précision mathématique. Même s'il est loin d'être achevé, le système de Bolzano apparaît ainsi comme une introduction à la méthode phénoménologique devant permettre de s'élever à une vision la plus objective possible du monde.
Un penseur comme Husserl s'efforcera de dépasser les limites du système bolzanien, pour mettre davantage à jour les fondements de laconnaissance scientifique, d'une science en soi. Or, une telle recherche soulève le problème leibnizien des vérités éternelles. Existe-t-il, comme le soutenait l'auteur de la *Monadologie*, deux mondes radicalement distincts : le domaine des vérités éternelles et celui d'infinie variété des réalités contingentes ? Par ailleurs, la réconciliation de ces deux mondes pourrait-elle permettre de dégager des valeurs applicables à la vie quotidienne ?
La logique n'est qu'une forme de l'effort tendant à découvrir les vérités par une méthode universelle. Les systèmes de Leibniz et de Bolzano ont été établis, thématisés et appliqués comme une logique authentique des vérités. L'explicitation contemporaine de cette thématisation se trouve dans la *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale* de Husserl. Cet ouvrage marque une nouvelle étape dans le développement de la logique des vérités comme fondement

unifié des sciences. Cette étude n aurait-elle donc pas de fin ? Chaque époque se doit de la reprendre. À des besoins pratiques nouveaux correspondent toujours de nouvelles études théoriques.
Le problème de la logique est donc situé dans un cadre très général.
Le coeur de la logique leibnizienne et bolzanienne nous livre non seulement un contenu qui vise les futurs projets d'une logique transcendantale en tant que *mathesis universalis* de toutes les sciences, mais aussi un contenu pragmatique et éthique qui permettent notamment de nourrir une réflexion particulièrement riche sur un thème se posant avec plus de force que jamais à notre époque troublée : celui de la liberté humaine. (pp. 1-2)

5. Lapointe, Sandra. 2008. *Qu'est-ce que l'analyse?* Paris: Vrin.
   Sur Bolzano voir la traduction française partielle de *Théorie de la Science* § 147-148 (pp. 91-96) avec commentaire (pp. 97-126).
6. Laz, Jacques. 1993. *Bolzano critique de Kant*. Paris: Vrin.
   Suivi de Bernard Bolzano, *Sur la doctrine kantienne de la construction des concepts par les intuitions*, (pp. 169-182). [Appendice aux *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik*]
   "La présente étude poursuit deux objectifs : introduire à l'œuvre philosophique, trop méconnue, de Bolzano et montrer comment cette œuvre s'est constituée en s'opposant à la philosophie de Kant.
   Nous avons délibérément limité cette entreprise à l'examen de la prise de position précoce du jeune Bolzano contre Kant, formulée dès 1810 dans l'Appendice des *Contributions*, qui inaugure sa critique de l'intuitionnisme. Après l'analyse des critiques formulées dans ce texte - critiques que Bolzano maintiendra toute sa vie -, nous nous contenterons d'indiquer brièvement les grands principes qui fondent cet antikantisme, maintenu dans l'œuvre magistrale de la maturité : la *Théorie de la Science*(4).
   (...)

"L'Appendice des *Contributions*, comme son titre l'indique, n'examine en principe que la théorie kantienne de la « construction des concepts », c'est-à-dire la théorie kantienne des mathématiques. Mais si l'on sait que c'est pour Kant la réflexion sur les mathématiques et sur la géométrie tout particulièrement, qui rendit nécessaire d'affirmer l'existence d'une intuition pure en nous, base de tout l'édifice critique, l'invalidation par Bolzano de cette notion, qu'il juge logiquement contradictoire, entraîne une mise en cause de l'ensemble du kantisme.
Ce texte résume une critique, déjà longuement mûrie, de la philosophie de Kant. Y sont fermement dénoncés les dogmes de l'intuitionnisme kantien : la philosophie des mathématiques requiert des principes que la philosophie de la subjectivité, inaugurée par le criticisme, ne saurait se concilier. Ce refus de l'idéalisme est d'abord la critique des principes d'une « esthétique» qui prétendrait fonder la science. A l'intuitionnisme aussi bien mathématique que philosophique, Bolzano oppose une philosophie des vérités en soi et de leur connexion, dont il fait le socle de toutes les régions du savoir. Les principes de cette théorie de l'objectivité scientifique - on l'a appelé le platonisme moderne - seront à la base des philosophies du XXe siècle dans leur dialogue avec la science : des penseurs aussi différents que Husserl, les membres du cercle de Vienne, Popper, Wittgenstein ou Gödel, en recevront l'héritage. Ils sont, dès 1837, définitivement exposés dans la *Wissenschaftslehre* de Bolzano." (pp. 10-11)
(4) Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837.

7. Proust, Joëlle. 1986. *Questions de forme : logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap*. Paris: Fayard. Chapitre 3 : *La théorie de la proposition analytique de Bolzano*.
8. Scholz, Heinrich. 1968. *Esquisse d'une histoire de la logique*. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.
9. Šebestik, Jan. 1992. *Logique et mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano*. Paris: Vrin.
"Exposer la logique de Bolzano pose des problèmes plus délicats. Son système est peut-être le plus vaste et le plus

complet qui ait jamais été construit; même la logique contemporaine, comparée à la théorie bolzanienne de la science, apparaît comme une élaboration, certes, incomparablement plus fine et plus puissante, mais limitée à une seule province du vaste empire bolzanien.
Je me suis limité à la logique au sens strict qui est exposée dans les deux premiers tomes de la WL et je me suis efforcé d'en analyser les concepts principaux plutôt que de reproduire et encore moins de traduire les théorèmes dans une langue symbolique. En cela, j'ai voulu non seulement m'inspirer de la méthode de Bolzano, qui est une analyse conceptuelle d'une rigueur exemplaire encore aujourd'hui, mais aussi répondre à ses vœux de voir appliquée cette méthode à ses propres concepts. La logique de Bolzano est séparée de la nôtre par la grande coupure que représente la formalisation de la logique, laquelle a radicalement transformé ce champ de recherches et permis de donner aux concepts logiques une précision impossible à atteindre par le moyen de la langue naturelle. De ce fait, les concepts logiques de Bolzano sont marqués par l'imprécision et les ambiguïtés de la langue naturelle : pour la même raison, son système logique reste trop complexe et peu maniable. Néanmoins, l'analyse des mécanismes logiques l'a conduit à définir un certain nombre de concepts fondamentaux, ceux de forme propositionnelle ou de déduction par exemple, que les logiciens du XXe siècle ont mis en évidence par d'autres voies, et même à en formuler d'autres que la logique issue de Frege et de Russell ne s'est pas encore appropriée." (p. 18)

10. Lapointe, Sandra. 2002. "Bolzano et l'anti-kantisme autrichien." In *Années 1781-1801. Kant: Critique de la Raison Pure. Vingt ans de réception*, edited by Piché, Claude, 263-272. Paris: Vrin.
"Selon certains historiens de la philosophie, il y aurait une tradition philosophique distincte de la tradition philosophique allemande qui naîtrait en Autriche au xixe siècle (1). Quoiqu'il n'y ait pas consensus sur l'ensemble des paramètres qui définissent cette tradition, on s'entend pour dire que tous ses protagonistes nourrissent un anti-

kantisme atypique par rapport aux différents courants philosophiques dans le reste du St-Empire-Romain-Germanique. Le but de cette étude est de contribuer à la documentation de la thèse de l'antikantisme autrichien.
Le point de départ se situe dans le paradoxe suivant : Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) est, de tous les philosophes autrichiens, celui qui a critiqué Kant avec le plus d'acharnement et de rigueur. Néanmoins, en 1806, il fut accusé de défendre des thèses kantiennes, une accusation assez compromettante pour qu'elle risque de lui faire perdre la chaire de sciences religieuses qu'il avait obtenue à l'Université de Prague un an plus tôt. Indépendamment de la question de savoir si cette accusation était justifiée, et selon l'avis de Bolzano lui-même elle ne l'était pas, on voudra faire lumière sur les traits du contexte culturel et politique de l'époque qui peuvent expliquer la signification et la portée de telles accusations." (p. 264)
(1) Par exemple, Rudolf Haller, « Zur Historiographie der osterreichischen Philosophie », dans *Von Bolzano zu Wittgenstein : zur Tradition der ôsterreichischen Philosophie,* Vienne, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986, p. 41-53.

11. Sinaceur, Hourya. 1975. "Bolzano est-il le précurseur de Frege?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 57:286-303.
"L'histoire des sciences entretient avec la philosophie des rapports privilrgiés. En clarifier les problèmes peut constituer, de manière tout ä fait spécifique, un travail de critique philosophique, puisqu'il contribue à élucider les situations intellectuelles oü viennent à se former certains des concepts fondamentaux de notre savoir, et par suite, des formes et des figures de la rationalité. Mais cela s'accompagne inévitablement d'une révision de l'historiographie usuelle, révision souvent malaisée en ce qu'elle doit assumer le risque d'avoir ä nier des évidences historiques, ce qui est bien plus difficile que d'illustrer, inversement, par l'histoire, des thèses affirmatives, positives et peremptoires. En l'espece, s'agissant de verifier si Bolzano a été le précurseur de Frege, il suffit, semble-t-il, de noter

les allusions de Bolzano aux concepts elaborés par Frege pour y lire une étape de cette élaboration. Mais si découvre que cette étape figure davantage les obstacles rencontrés par Frege que la voie qui le mena aux fondements de l'arithmétique, comment etablir que Bolzano *n'est pas* le précurseur de Frege ? C'est ä cette question que nous nous attachons pour ce qui est de la définition du nombre entier." (p. 286)

12. Haller, Rudolf. 1987. "Remarques sur la tradition sémantique." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:359-369.
Résumé : "L'auteur exprime son accord avec la thèse d' Alberto Coffa selon laquelle une tradition sémantique, inspirée par l'oeuvre de Bolzano, précède l'apparition de la conception sémantique dans le Cercle de Vienne, et en particulier celle de Carnap. La question principale qui se pose concerne d'une part l'antagonisme entre cette tradition et Kant et d'autre part l'opposition entre les empiristes logiques et Kant. Il semble que Carnap n'a pu se débarrasser de certains présupposés kantiens et néo-kantiens, même une fois sa base ontologique rendue physicaliste. Cette dernière position étant étrangère à Wittgenstein, on ne peut pas suivre Coffa lorsqu'il soutient que la sémantique de Carnap au milieu des années trente est voisine de la « vision du langage » de Wittgenstein."
13. Šebestik, Jan. 1987. "Premiers paradoxes bolzaniens de l'infini avec un texte inédit de B. Bolzano." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 50:403-411.
Résumé : "L'article présente une note inédite de Bolzano, qui recense les principales difficultés de l'infini. Cette note, qui date de 1813-1814, est extraite de son journal, *Miscellanea mathematica*. La question de savoir si de l'existence d'une bijection entre deux ensembles, on peut conclure à leur équipotence, aboutit à une impasse : quelle que soit la réponse donnée, ses conséquences sont absurdes."
14. Novy, Luboš. 2008. "Les relations entre la logique et la mathématique dans l'oeuvre de Bernard Bolzano." *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 58:327-341.

"Le but de cet article consiste à indiquer avec concision comment s'est formée la relation de la logique et de la mathématique dans la pensée de Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) et quel caractère avaient ces disciplines dans toute sa vie.
La relation de la logique et de la mathématique a joué en général un rôle important dans l'évolution moderne de ces sciences. Beaucoup de résultats de Bolzano sont appréciés du point de vue du développement subséquent, mais leur conception malgré son originalité évidente restait étroitement liée avec des idées plus anciennes, surtout avec celles du 18e siècle. Pour cette raison nous ne voulons pas chercher les signes des tendances dans la relation de ces branches chez Bolzano, mais nous allons nous contenter de leur position dans la vie de l'auteur." (p. 325)

15. Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2004. ""L'affaire Zimmermann". À propos des influences bolzaniennes dans l'École de Lvov et de Varsovie." In *Aristote au XIXème siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 377-394. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
"Nous allons exposer ici le récit de la constitution d'un manuel de philosophie qui a joué un rôle particulièrement intéressant dans l'histoire de la philosophie et de la logique moderne, car c'est probablement par son biais qu'un nouveau style logique, emprunté à Bolzano, à savoir la logique des propositions en place de la logique des termes, fut introduit de façon quasi clandestine dans les gymnases de la monarchie des Habsbourgs. Le livre en question, *Philosophische Propaedeutik für Obergymnasien*(8) de Robert Zimmermann, fut aussi le manuel qu'étudia au Theresianum, prestigieux gymnase viennois, Kazimierz Twardowski, futur professeur à Lvov et père d'une école philosophique qui a donné plusieurs générations de remarquables logiciens et mathématiciens polonais - dont Lukasiewicz (9)." (p. 379)
(8) Zimmermann, Robert, *Philosophische Propaedeutik für Obergymnasien. Erste Abteilung : Empirische Psychologie,* Vienne, 1852. Zimmermann, Robert, *Philosophische Propaedeutik für Obergymnasien. Zweite Abteilung :*

Formale Logik, Vienne, 1853 ; désormais cité : *Propaedeutik*.
(9) En procédant ainsi nous nous situons d'une certaine façon dans l'esprit de Bolzano pour qui la question des traités et des manuels scolaires est de toute première importance pour la détermination d'une discipline scientifique. Tout en renouant avec l'idée de l'*Organon* (il s'agit d'indiquer les règles qui permettent le partage du domaine des vérités dans les sciences particulières), Bolzano fait montre d'un grand pragmatisme dans la détermination des disciplines scientifiques : est science une discipline qui mérite d'être exposée dans un traité. Ce qui lui vaudra une critique virulente de la part de Husserl (en 1913) et l'accusation d'« empirisme radical » illustrée par une citation de la *Wissenschaftslehre* : « Nous ne sommes aussi certains de la justesse des règles : *Barbara, Celarent,* etc., que parce que mille sortes d'essais les confirment dans les raisonnements que nous avons établis d'après elles » ; « *Préface* aux Recherches Logiques », dans Husserl, E., *Articles sur la logique* (1890 - 1913), trad. J. English, Paris, PUF, 1975, p. 392.

16. Lapointe, Sandra. 2003. "Principe de priorité et principe du contexte chez Bolzano et Husserl." In *Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques*, edited by Fisette, Denis, 93-110. Paris: Vrin.
"La proposition bolzanienne est une entité dont la fonction première est d'être « porteur de vérité». Elle se distingue, du point de vue ontologique, de l'énoncé et du jugement (conçu comme épisode mental) en ceci que tout en étant quelque chose, elle n'est pas réelle. En d'autres termes, les propositions en soi (*Sätze an sich*) ou, pour adopter la terminologie suggérée par Bolzano, les propositions (*Sätze*) ne sont situables ni dans le temps, ni dans l'espace et, par conséquent, ne font pas partie des chaînes de transactions causales. Elles doivent bien plutôt être conçues comme appartenant à un « troisième monde» (1)" p. 93)
(1) Bolzano ne défend toutefois pas un platonisme naïf, mais bien plutôt ce qu'on pourrait appeler un platonisme instrumental. Il écrit par exemple: «L"utilité de la

distinction [entre jugements et propositions] se manifeste de la manière la plus surprenante en ceci qu'elle permet à l'auteur de déterminer objectivement un nombre de concept qui n'avaient jusqu'à maintenant pas été expliqués ou qui l'avaient été incorrectement. Par exemple, les concepts d'expérience, d'apriori, de possible, de nécessaire, de contingen, de probable, etc ... à travers lesquels les disputes philosophiques les plus importantes pourront être menées à terme» (Bolzano 1839, p. 128).

Bibliographie

Bolzano, Bernard 1839. Dr. Bolzano und seine Gegner; Sulzbach: Seidel. (cité d'après: Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe ; Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog, série 1, vol.16.1, 1989.)

17. Rusnock, Paul. 2003. "La théorie des intuitions chez Bolzano." In *Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Lapointe, Sandra, 111-123. Paris: Vrin.

"On sait que Bolzano était l'ennemi acharné de l'intuition en mathématique.

Il est donc surprenant de constater que les «intuitions» jouent néanmoins un rôle fondamental dans sa logique, et que, de surcroît, Bolzano concède qu'en attirant l'attention sur la distinction entre intuition

et concept, *Kant* a fait une contribution de taille à la philosophie.

Ceux qui ignorent ce que Bolzano a écrit à ce sujet seront peut-être encore plus étonnés de découvrir ce que sont les intuitions bolzaniennes(2)."

(2) Bolzano présente sa théorie des intuitions dans la *Théorie de la science* (1837, §§ 72-79), mais les paragraphes §§ 59.3, 133, 182.4, 278, et 303-305 sont tout aussi importants. Il en discute également aux paragraphes §§ 6-7 de *Von der mathematischen Lehrart* et dans un essai qui date des années 1833-1834 et qui constitue l'introduction à la grande oeuvre mathématique de Bolzano, la *Théorie de la quantité* (*Grossenlehre*). Cette dernière resta inédite jusqu'en 1975. En 1833, peu avant la publication de la *Théorie de la science*, Bolzano fit parvenir un exemplaire de

son ouvrage (1975) à F. Exner, professeur de philosophie à Prague. Les deux philosophes pragois discutèrent longuement Je problème de l'intuition, en particulier dans leur correspondance (Cf. Bolzano 1935), dont une nouvelle édition paraîtra sous peu dans la BBGA et dont on prépare présentement les éditions françaises (éd. Sebestik et alii) et anglaises (P. Rusnock/R George). Enfin, le *Nouvel anti-Kant* (Bautzen: Hiecke, 1850) de F. Pnnonsky, un ami et disciple de Bolzano, contient une discussion détaillée des intuitions de même qu'une critique des doctrines kantiennes. On trouve une version préliminaire de cette critique dans l'annexe aux *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (Bolzano 1810; voir Laz 1993, p. 169-182 pour la traduction française) de même que dans le *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* (Bolzano, 1834, §§ 61-62).

Bibliographie

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--- 1935. *Briefwechsel mit F. Exner*; E. Winter (éd.), Prague: koniglich bohmisch Akademie der Wissenschaften.

--- 1837. *Wissenschaftslehre*; 4 volumes, Sulzbach: Seidel.

--- 1834. *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft;* Sulzbach: Seidel.

--- 1810. *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik*; Prague.

Laz, Jacques 1993. *Bolzano critique de Kant*; Paris: Vrin.

18. Gallerand, Alain. 2012. "Les apories du concept de redondance logique chez Bolzano." *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* no. 8:1-27.

Résumé : "Le concept de *redondance logique* chez Bolzano soulève plusieurs difficultés. Il ne s'accorde ni avec la notion de représentation simple qu'il est censé expliquer, puisque Bolzano définit les individus comme des unités composées de plusieurs caractères et décrit les représentations singulières (noms propres et indexicaux) comme l'abréviation de descriptions définies, ni avec la distinction entre jugements synthétiques et analytiques, car il suppose

que l'analyse d'un sujet individuel permet d'en dévoiler un à un les prédicats, comme si l'expérience ne jouait aucun rôle dans la connaissance des individus. Pourquoi Bolzano reste-t-il donc attaché à un concept aussi problématique ? Est-ce le seul moyen d'expliquer comment nous nous représentons des individus ? Nous montrerons que les apories de la notion de redondance logique témoignent de l'influence de la théorie leibnizienne du jugement, et qu'une version phénoménologiquement améliorée de la sémantique objective est néanmoins capable de les surmonter et de rétablir la simplicité de la représentation et la synthèse du jugement dans leurs droits."

19. ———. 2013. "Bolzano et le problème du rapport intension/extension : La redondance logique vs. le principe de proportionnalité inverse." *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* no. 9:1-25.
Résumé : "Cet article, qui fait suite à une publication précédente (« Les apories du concept de redondance logique chez Bolzano »), poursuit un double objectif : (I) démontrer que les apories que nous avions relevées peuvent être surmontées par l'analyse des rapports extensionnels entre représentations ; (II) évaluer la contribution de Bolzano à la question classique des rapports intension/extension telle qu'elle a été posée par Port-Royal. La logique des classes, dont Bolzano pose les fondements (*Théorie de la science*, 2e partie, 3e section), permet en effet de dégager les lois de la redondance logique — auxquelles Bolzano ne cesse de faire implicitement référence sans en donner la formule — et de délimiter le champ d'application du principe classique de proportionnalité inverse entre intension et extension auquel déroge précisément la redondance. La critique bolzanienne de la logique de Port-Royal prend alors tout son sens."
20. Šebestik, Jan. 1994. "Twardowski entre Bolzano et Husserl : la théorie de la représentation." *Cahiers de la Philosophie Ancienne et du Langage de l'Université de Paris XII* no. 1:61-85.
"Résumons :
A la triade bolzanienne : représentation subjective, représentation en soi, objet de la représentation,

Twardowski répond par la triple distinction entre l'acte, le contenu et l'objet de la représentation, et l'étend aux jugements. Dans les deux cas, on doit distinguer *l'acte* (acte de représenter ; acte de juger), *l'objet,* indépendant de la pensée, appelé par Brentano également objet primaire (ce qui est représenté par une représentation ou nommé par un nom; ce qui est jugé), et *le contenu*, à savoir l'objet immanent, objet secondaire ou le "signe" de l'objet, dépendant de la pensée (image psychique de l'objet représenté, ce qui est représenté dans la représentation ; ce qui est reconnu ou rejeté par un jugement, à savoir l'existence d'un objet)." (p. 64)

21. Fréchette, Guillaume. 2011. "De la proposition à l'état de choses : Husserl lecteur de Bolzano." In *Catégories ontologiques et catégories logiques*, edited by Seron, Denis, 45-68. Liège: Presses de l'Université de Liège.
22. Cavaillès, Jean. 1946. "La théorie de la science selon Bolzano." *Deucalion* no. 1:195-202.
    Repris dans : J. Cavaillès, *Sur la logique et la théorie de la science*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1947; nouvelle édition avec une postface de Jan Sebestik, Paris: Vrin, 1997 et dans J. Cavaillès, *Œuvres complètes de philosophie des sciences*, Paris: Hermann, 1994, pp. 653-658.
    "Bolzano considère - et manque résoudre - les mêmes problèmes de la légitimité mathématique : après les difficultés de principes auxquelless'embarrasse le dix-huitième siècle pour le calcul infinitésimal, c'est lui qui, le premier, définit correctement la limite, introduit la notion d'ensemble. D'où philosophiquement un double enrichissement de la veine leibnizienne. D'abord, l'être même de la science est soumis à critique : il s'agit à la fois de déterminer ce qui constitue une science comme telle et le moteur de son développemenL Mises à part les imperfections dues à l'époque, l'idée est décisive pour notre problème. Pour la première fois peut-être, la science n'est plus considérée comme simple intermédiaire entre l'esprit humain et l'être en soi, dépendant autant de l'un que de l'autre et n'ayant pas de réalité propre, mais comme un objet

sui generis, original dans son essence, autonome dans son mouvement." (p. 654)

23. Danek, Jaromir. 1971. "La méthodologie de Bolzano. Un thème dans la genèse de la pensée phénoménologique et de l'humanisme de notre temps." *Dialogue* no. 10:504-516.
"Dans son ensemble, la WL [*Wissenschaftslehre*] s'articule de la maniere suivante.
D'abord, la Doctrine fondamentale établit qu'il y a une infinité de vérités en soi, a la suite de quoi s'édifie la construction logique de la *Doctrine élementaire*. Les parties suivantes, consacrés a la *Théorie de la connaissance*, analysent les facultés qui permettent d'atteindre des vérités dans l'acte de transcendance, acte par lequel on parvient a une compréhension de certaines des vérités en soi, et dont les règles peuvent être clairement definies. C'est ce qui fait l'objet de la quatrième partie : *L'Art d'inventer*. Ce plan, dicté par des preoccupations logiques, suit l'ordre inverse de la gènese réelle de la connaissance, laquelle commence d'abord par l'art d'inventer, dont les règles présupposent d'ailleurs une structure a priori du monde. Mais le système logique doit être compris comme une reproduction des actes de la connaissance, ordonnés de telle sorte qu'ils menent a une synthèse méthodologique que Bolzano développe dans la *Doctrine de la science proprement dite*. Cette cinquième partie doit, elle-même, être une science, puisque l'examen de la structure objective de la science est aussi une objectivation rigoureuse, une synthèse de ce qui constitue le développement des diverses parties intégrantes de la connaissance." (pp. 504-505)

24. Sebestik, Jan. 1989. "Bolzano (Bernard)." In *Encyclopaedia Universalis. Vol. 4*, 328-330.
"Théologien, philosophe, surtout logicien et mathématicien, Bolzano a laissé une œuvre très étendue et très importante que ses contemporains ont presque entièrement ignorée. D'une part, la nature de ses préoccupations, toutes centrées sur les questions des fondements, a éloigné de lui les mathématiciens tournés davantage vers les théories avancées et vers les applications. D'autre part, son style archaïque et lourd, plein de détours difficiles à suivre, a

découragé les logiciens, dont la plupart étaient incapables de comprendre l'intérêt même de ses recherches qui dépassaient de très loin la syllogistique et tout ce qu'on faisait entrer à l'époque dans la logique.
Dans l'histoire de la logique, Bolzano mérite une place à côté des plus grands, Aristote, Leibniz et Frege. Avec ces deux derniers, il partage le destin ingrat de ceux qui ont voulu reconstruire la logique pour l'assurer dans ses fondements et pour qu'elle puisse servir de base aux mathématiques. En effet, l'histoire de la logique nous montre que les découvertes les plus novatrices n'exercent aucune influence et ne sont vraiment comprises que beaucoup plus tard, lorsque la communauté scientifique dispose d'outils simplifiés et accessibles permettant enfin de comprendre l'œuvre des pionniers. Il en fut ainsi pour l'œuvre de Leibniz et pour celle de Frege ; il en va de même de nos jours pour l'œuvre de Bolzano.
Bolzano a créé un vaste système logique conçu dans une perspective sémantique, qu'il a intégré dans un projet global de théorie de la science. Les innovations les plus importantes concernent la logique des relations propositionnelles, articulée autour du concept de forme propositionnelle et de l'opération de substitution. Il expose sa logique dans une langue naturelle mais technique, avec des particularités parfois très déconcertantes." (p. 328)

25. Candiotto, Maurizio. 2012. "Représentations sans relation : Bolzano et Frege." *Esercizi filosofici* no. 7:20-32.
English abstract: "In comparing Frege's sense (Sinn) with Bolzano's representations in themselves (Vorstellungen an sich) pivotal is the role of variation, a procedure which both philosophers use to define their respective notions of the objective content (or, rather, the direct object) of thought. The uses they make of such procedure, however, are utterly different : for Bolzano resistance to variation is essential to all representations in themselves, simply as such, while for Frege it is the hallmark of (both the reference and) the sense of unsaturated expressions only, the saturated ones being rather extraneous than resistant to variation. However, the two notions they respectively define by means of variation

are not barely incommensurable: there is a matter between them. Moreover, in each of the two philosophers variation – and therefore thought – implies drawing a profile of the entire world. Be it by predicating or even simply by representing, thinking implies outlining nothing less than the entire world. Both in Frege and Bolzano variation can be traced forward to what will be, in the XX century, one of the roots of transcendental philosophy."

26. Šebestik, Jan. 1984. "Bolzano et Brentano. Deux sources autrichiennes du Cercle de Vienne." *Fundamenta Scientiae* no. 5:219-235.
27. Proust, Joëlle. 1992. "L'intensionnalisme sans le réel: de Bolzano à Katz." *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* no. 14:245-257.
Résumé : "On s'intéresse ici à la perspective sémantique consistant à maintenir strictement disjoints la définition réelle (ayant trait à l'objet et à ses propriétés) et la définition nominale (concernant la représentation ou le sens et ses constituants). Ainsi Bolzano montre-t-il que des paradoxes surgissent quand on donne une interprétation « réelle » de la composition « nominale ».
Cependant Putnam dans une série d'articles célèbres donne des arguments tendant à démontrer qu'il n'existe pas de classes de vérités qui soient d'ordre purement sémantique ou nominal: les usages linguistiques dépendent toujours d'un état du monde. Les arguments de Putnam peuvent toutefois être efficacement combattus en abandonnant certaines exigences propres à la sémantique frégéenne. On montre les affinités entre la stratégie suggérée par Katz dans une série de travaux récents et celle de Bolzano."
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Katz, J. J. (1992) « The new intensionalism », *Unpublished manuscript*, 1992.
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Putnam, H. (1970) « Is semantics possible ? », *Metaphilosophy* , I, 187-201 ; reproduit dans *Mind, Language and Reality*. *Philosophical Papers,* t. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Putnam, H. (1975). « The meaning of meaning » in K. Gunderson éd., *Language, Mind and Knowledge*, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII ; reproduit dans *Mind, Language and Reality*. *Philosophical papers*, t. II, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

28. Rusnock, Paul. 2001. "Refaire les mathématiques : Bolzano lecteur de Lagrange." In *La Philosophie autrichienne de Bolzano à Musil*, edited by Cometti, Jean-Pierre and Mulligan, Kevin, 121-138. Paris: Vrin.
"Les rapports ayant existé entre Bolzano et des philosophes tels que Kant furent assez importants. Plus intéressants encore furent, à mon avis, ses rapports avec les mathématiciens - ce que je tenterai d'illustrer par un examen de sa lecture de Lagrange, un des plus éminents analystes des années formatrices de Bolzano. Avec Cauchy, Bolzano était un des lecteurs les plus pénétrants et les plus minutieux des œuvres de Lagrange. Il est évident qu'il avait beaucoup de respect pour ce dernier, parcourant ses traités crayon en main, et s'occupupant souvent des mêmes problèmes que lui. Tout comme Lagrange, Bolzano n'était pas satisfait de l'état des fondements de l'analyse ; comme lui il s'efforçait de construire une fondation autonome, sans infinitésimaux et sans appel à la géométrie ou au mouvement. Il est également patent qu'il estimait les opinions de Lagrange concernant le contenu de l'analyse. Ses premiers ouvrages d'analyse sur la série du binôme et le théorème des valeurs intermédiaires abordent des problèmes qui étaient importants pour Lagrange également. Et la *Théorie des fonctions* (*Functionenlehre*) de Bolzano(1), rédigée dans les années 1830, dont le titre même rappelle les trités de Lagrange, incorpore beaucoup de

caractéristiques de l'analyse lagrangienne, notamment la primauté du concept de fonction et l'importance du théorème de Taylor." (pp. 122-123)
(1) Bolzano, *Functionenlehre*, Königliche böhmische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1930.

29. Schmutz, Jacob. 2009. "Quand le langage a-t-il cessé d'être mental? Remarques sur les sources scolastiques de Bolzano." In *Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique*, edited by Biard, Joël, 307-337. Paris: Vrin.
"Jacob Schmutz s'interroge lui aussi sur la fin du langage mental, mais en parcourant une séquence historique différente. Son point de départ est fourni par Bernard Bolzano, connu pour avoir au XIX" siècle soutenu la thèse de « propositions en soi », dotées d'une subsistance qui n'est ni le mode d'être des qualités de l'intellect ni celui des choses. Si Brentano a pu être rapproché de certains auteurs médiévaux tels que Grégoire de Rimini ou Gautier Burley, toute transmission proprement historique restait problématique. Jacob Schmutz nous révèle ici une voie inédite de transmission. Les « lumières catholiques » d'Europe centrale, dont les positions sont diffusées par certains manuels du XVIIIe siècle connus de Bolzano, sont elles-mêmes fortement dépendantes de la scolastique espagnole des XVIe et XVIIe siècles. On peut ainsi suivre l'émergence de l'idée de proposition objective, sur le modèle de la dualité entre concept formel et concept objectif, et conjointement avec la notion de vérité objective.
Le vrai n'est plus vrai par dénomination extrinsèque à partir d'un intellect, fût-ce l'intellect divin. Les débats sur le statut de cette proposition objective conduisent certains auteurs comme Sébastien Izquierdo, au XVIIe siècle, à en faire le premier porteur de la vérité objective. Le dispositif conceptuel qui, du XIV" au XVIe siècle, mettait le langage mental au premier plan s'est bien dissout, ainsi qu'on l'a vu, mais un certain nombre de problèmes posés et de concepts qui ont surgi à cette occasion continuent à travailler l'histoire des théories de la proposition et de la vérité." (Joël Biard, *Introduction*, p. XIV)

30. Šebestik, Jan. 2012. "La logique comme théorie de la science selon Bernard Bolzano." *Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg* no. 32:227-251.
"En écoutant les diférentes contributions à ce colloque, je me suis retrouvé sur un terrain familier. Presque tous les noms des auteurs des xviie et xviiie siècles m'étaient bien connus : ceux de La Ramée, de Zabarella, Goclenius, Clauberg, Geulincx, Jungius, Baumgarten, et bien d'autres, sans parler des grands. De même leurs questions : qu'est-ce que la logique ? quel est son objet ? est-elle une doctrine ou un organon, une méthode ? est-elle une méthode de disposition des résultats connus, de démonstration, d'invention ou de purification ? Comme l'a dit Sophie Roux, le brouillage logique-méthode a encore été accentué au cours du xviie siècle. quel est l'usage de la logique, à supposer qu'elle soit utile ? est-elle superlue, vide et stérile comme le disent les premiers critiques de l'aristotélisme et ensuite descartes et Locke ?
Un grand auteur a remis l'ordre dans ce foisonnement d'idées disparates, en intégrant tous ces éléments dans son système de logique : le théologien, mathématicien et philosophe Bernard Bolzano. Il a commenté et critiqué tous ces auteurs, traité toutes ces questions." (p. 227)
31. "Bernard Bolzano." 2000. *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 4:433-534.
Sous la direction de Jocelyn Benoist.
Table des matières: Jocelyn Benoist: Présentation 433; Mark Textor: Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité 435; Sandra Lapointe: Analyticité, universalité et quantification chez Bernard Bolzano 455; Claudio Majolino: Variation(s) I. Bolzano et l'équivocité de la variation 471; Ali Benmakhlouf: La proto-sémantique de Bolzano 489; Jocelyn Benoist: Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano 505; Jacques Bouveresse: Sur les représentations sans objet 519-534.
32. Benmakhlouf, Ali. 2000. "La proto-sémantique de Bolzano." *Les Études Philosophiques* 489-504.
"Le projet de B. Bolzano, « le Leibniz de la Bohême », est de considérer comme une des tâches de sa vie le fait d'«

endiguer l'épouvantable désordre que Kant, sans le présumer lui-même, a occasionné par ses philosophèmes en Allemagne »(2). Husserl lui rend hommage dans les *Prolégomènes à la logique pure* : « C'est sur l'ouvrage de Bolzano [la *Wissenschaftslehre*], que la logique doit s'édifier comme science »(3), car ce nouveau Leibniz a su mettre la philosophie sur le chemin d'un « savoir théorique analytique universel » sans l'obstruer de « vision du monde ou de sagesse universelle », équivoque préjudiciable au progrès philosophique. Deux perspectives vont retenir ici notre attention :

1 / Dans les *Contributions à une exposition des mathématiques sur de meilleurs fondements*, texte de 1810, Bolzano invalide l'existence de l'intuition pure en nous montrant que c'est là une notion contradictoire. Kant était parti des mathématiques pour élaborer cette notion, c'est des mathématiques que vient aussi la critique. Les propositions arithmétiques n'empruntent rien à l'intuition et sur cette base minent le fondement épistémologique kantien.

2 / Autre chantier ouvert : la distinction entre ordre en soi de la vérité et ordre pour nous ; seul le premier ordre est objet de la science. Il faut rompre avec l'idée d'une connexion étroite entre l'indémontrabilité et l'immédiateté. L'immédiat pour nous, donné par l'intuition ou l'évidence ne relève pas de l'indémontrable, qui est toujours en soi et indépendant de nous. Les critères de l'indémontrable sont la simplicité et la justification, ceux de l'immédiateté sont l'intuition et l'évidence, nous avons là deux régimes totalement différents de la connaissance. Par là même la coïncidence kantienne entre l'acte de conscience et le formel auto fondateur de l'accord de la connaissance avec elle-même est non seulement inutile mais nuisible, comme l'a montré J. Cavaillès (4)." (p. 491)

(2) Testament de Bolzano, cité, in Laz, *Bolzano critique de Kant*, Vrin 1991, p. XIII.

(3) Husserl, *Prolégomènes à la logique pure*, tr. fr., PUF, p. 248-259.

(4) Kant avait souligné le fait que la logique générale faisait abstraction de tout contenu de la connaissance, c'est-à-dire de toute relation de celle-ci à un objet, nous sommes en droit de nous demander si cette abstraction est possible, si, comme le note J. Cavaillès, l' « abstraction qui donne le logique étant radicale », nous ne tombons pas finalement dans le « vide »; «ni du côté matière, puisqu'elle porte sur l'indéfini "tout objet", ni du côté forme, elle ne s'accroche à une qualification positive ». La question de Cavaillès à Kant est alors la suivante: «Que tirer de l'exigence d'accord de la pensée avec elle-même sinon l'éternelle répétition » ? (...) « Pour que l'accord revêtit un sens plein, il faudrait qu'il y eut au moins une différenciation à l'intérieur de la pensée, que l'occasion du désaccord possédât déjà un contenu, mais la logique serait alors logique transcendantale ou dialectique » (in *Sur la logique et la théorie de la science*, p. 6, Hermann, 1994).

33. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1999. "Bolzano, Husserl et l'idée de grammaire." *Les Études Philosophiques*:521-534.
Repris dans : J. Benoist, *Entre acte et sens. Recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*, Paris: Vrin, 2002, avec le titre : *Grammaire ou méréologie des représentations*, pp. 33-48.
"Au paragraphe 56 de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bolzano avance un principe de compositionnalité (*Zusammengesetztheit*) des représentations en soi, principe à l'appui duquel il invoque l'expérience phénoménologique de la «représentation pensée », que d'autres textes spécifient comme le corrélat subjectif de la représentation en soi (1): « notre conscience nous enseigne en effet que nous distinguons presque dans chacune des représentations pensées certaines parties, dans la liaison desquelles elle consiste » (2).
L'articulation du langage en mots porte également témoignage d'une telle composition : la simple pluralité des mots employés pour restituer la signification de telle ou telle expression peut renvoyer à la complexité de la représentation, même s'il n'est pas dit, contrairement à ce

que pourraient suggérer certaines analyses de Bolzano, qu'elle la réfléchisse exactement (3).
Bolzano a un mot pour désigner la teneur méréologique de la représentation, c'est-à-dire la « somme » de ses parties : le contenu (*Inhalt*) de la représentation, le mot que Kant utilisait pour désigner son intension (par opposition à son extension). « Somme » (*Summe*) doit ici être entendu en un sens bien particulier: la somme n'est rien d'autre qu'un ensemble dans lequel une sous-partie d'une partie est encore une partie de l'ensemble (4), et nullement une opération. Cette définition ne comprend aucune contrainte d'ordre: on a en quelque sorte ici affaire aux constituants de la représentation « en vrac ». C'est ce qui constitue son « contenu », autant dire son matériau méréologique. On est donc très loin de la teneur intensionnelle de l' *Inhalt* au sens kantien du terme.
Bolzano le souligne lui-même :
Comme, par ce contenu, on n'entend que la somme des constituants dont est constituée la représentation, mais non la façon que ces parties ont d'être liées ensemble, une représentation n'est donc pas encore entièrement déterminée par l'indication de son contenu, mais, à partir d'un contenu univoquement donné, on peut parfois obtenir deux (ou plus) représentations différentes (5)." (pp. 35-36)
(1) Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837, § 48, l'opposition entre la « représentation eue » ou « pensée » et la « représentation en soi ». Le même paragraphe, Bd. I, p. 217, précise qu'à toute représentation subjective correspond une représentation en soi, qui constitue sa matière (*Stoff*) et pour ainsi dire sa teneur sémantique. Le § 52, p. 228 sq., nous met toutefois en garde contre l'idée d'une corrélation nécessaire de l'une à l'autre, car elle reviendrait à prendre la représentation en soi au piège d'un rapport qui lui demeure extrinsèque.
(2) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 56, Bd. I, p. 243. En fait, les deux « remarques » jointes à ce paragraphe, p. 244-246, apportent immédiatement des restrictions à cette transposition du plan subjectif de la représentation au plan objectif: il peut y avoir dans la représentation en soi des

parties qui ne sont pas représentées distinctement dans la représentation subjective, voire qui n'y sont pas représentées du tout, de même qu'une partie peut très bien être représentée dans la représentation subjective sans que rien lui corresponde dans la représentation en soi. Il n'y a pas d'isomorphie de l'une à l'autre, mais juste extension d'un seul et même principe de compositionnalité.
(3) La bonne articulation de la représentation serait à trouver au niveau du sens de l'expression, dont la forme linguistique apparente ne reproduit pas forcément la structure. Nous renverrons ici aux réflexions de notre amie Sandra Lapointe sur la notion de paraphrase à introduire chez Bolzano.
(4) Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 84, Bd. I, p. 400.
(5) *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 56, Bd. I, p. 244.

34. ———. 2000. "Pourquoi il n'y a pas d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano." *Les Études Philosophiques* 505-518.
Repris dans : J. Benoist, *Entre acte et sens. Recherches sur la théorie phénoménologique de la signification*, Paris: Vrin, 2002, pp. 49-65.
"Pourtant, y a-t-il une véritable « ontologie formelle » chez Bolzano? Cette notion même peut-elle avoir un sens dans le contexte de pensée qui est le sien?
On peut rappeler ici la mise en garde de Husserl dans *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*. Bolzano n'aurait « pas vu la distinction entre la forme vide du quelque chose en général prise comme genre suprême qui se différencie en tant que forme formelle vide et la région universelle de l'existant (*Daseiendes*) possible (du réel [d*es Realen*] au sens le plus large), région qui se différencie en régions particulières »(2).
Dans son livre sur l'ontologie formelle, Frédéric Nef écrit qu'un tel reproche est « plus intéressant pour la conception qu'il trahit de l'ontologie formelle que pour ce qu'il dit de Bolzano »(3). Et il est vrai qu'une telle critique réfléchit certainement la conception que Husserl se fait de l'ontologie formelle. Pour autant est-elle injustifiée, et ne nous dit-elle rien sur Bolzano? Nous n'en sommes pas sûr. Tout à la fois nous ne sommes pas certains, quant à nous, que Husserl ait

raison dans le débat qui l'oppose ici à Bolzano: c'est-à-dire sur le point de savoir s'il faut une ontologie formelle, ou en tout cas si celle-ci peut avoir une portée autre que locale (et rendre compte, par exemple, d'autre chose que des seuls *mathematica*). Mais nous pensons qu'en revanche Husserl a raison sur un point historique : le diagnostic de l'absence d'ontologie formelle chez Bolzano précisément, et cela en tout sens - et non seulement au sens de Husserl. Sur ce point, Husserl, fin historien de la philosophie à ses heures, nous apprend plus sur Bolzano que les reconstructions modernes. Tout le problème est alors de ré-apprécier la position de Bolzano, dans son originalité bien détectée par Husserl, avec d'autres yeux que ceux de Husserl." (pp. 505-506).
(2) *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*, tr. fr. Suzanne Bachelard, Paris, PUF, 1957, § 26d p. 117.
(3) *L'objet quelconque. Recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet*, Paris, Vrin, 1998, p. 124.

35. Bouveresse, Jacques. 2000. "Sur les représentations sans objet." *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 4:519-534.
"Un point crucial de la théorie bolzanienne de la représentation est qu'une représentation doit avoir dans tous les cas un contenu ou plus exactement, pour respecter la terminologie de Bolzano, une matière, mais pas necessairement un objet. Quand on dit d'une représentation subjective qu'elle a un contenu, on veut dire qu'une représentation objective lui est coordonnée. Une représentation contradictoire ne peut pas avoir d'objet; mais il n'en resulte pas que nous ne puissions pas la penser; et, lorsque nous la pensons, nous appréhendons nécessairement une représentation objective. Nous avons des représentations de cette sorte toutes les fois que nous entendons des représentations verbales comme *un carré rond, un pentaèdre regulier,* etc. «Car sans cela, remarque Bolzano, on devrait dire que ce que nous pensons avec des représentations de cette sorte est ou bien rien du tout ou bien pas plus que ce que nous pensons avec le mot entièrement denue de sens "abracadabra". Mais le fait que nous formulions des propositions comme: "II ne peut pas y

avoir un pentaèdre regulier, un carré negatif' comme des verités et qu'acquerir une compréhension de ces verités exige que nous considerions en chacune d'elle son propre objet, celui de la première etant entièrement différent de celui de la deuxième, nous démontre déjaàqu'il n'en est pas ainsi.» (*Wissenschaftslehre*, § 70)." (p. 519)

36. Granger, Gaston-Gilles. 1969. "Le concept de continu chez Aristote et Bolzano: étude stylistique." *Les Études Philosophiques*:513-523.
"Ėtude stylistique
La définition topologique d'un << continu >>, telle qu'elle s'est constituée dans le premier tiers du siècle [4], fournit, confrontée à la notion intuitive confuse qu'elle met en forme, un exemple excellent de structuration mathématique. Nous nous proposons seulement ici un commentaire succinct de deux tentatives antérieures de formation du concept, toutes deux insatisfaisantes, quoique profondes, et propres à montrer l'importance, jusque dans une création aussi abstraite, de l'orientation stylistique.
Au § 38 des *Paradoxes de l'infini* [2], Bolzano se propose<< d'amener à une conscience claire le concept que nous désignons par l'expression << une extension continue, ou un continu>> (p. 73). Il pose alors comme conditions décisives d'une conceptualisation du continu : 1° Qu'il s'agisse d'un ensemble << d'objets simples>> (points ou << substances >>) ; 2° Qu'aucun de ces éléments ne soit << isolé >>, en un sens précis sur lequel nous aurons à revenir. En réfutant les objections que le sens commun peut invoquer, il rencontre l'idée aristotélicienne de contiguïté : << Tout point d'un continu doit avoir un autre point qu'il touche immédiatement. >> Idée dont il montre naturellement l'inconsistance dès qu'on l'applique à des éléments sans parties. Mais c'est ce qu'Aristote avait déjà vu ([1], VI, 231 a 26), dont l'analyse n'était nullement aussi naïve. Nous comparerons donc le texte de Bolzano et celui de *Physique*, V, 3,226 b 21 - 227 a 30 - où Aristote analyse le continu, en essayant ainsi de mettre en lumière la mise en place d'une structure dans son double rapport à l'intuition perceptive et au contexte opératoire, insistant sur la

différence du choix des traits considérés comme pertinents pour la définition du concept." (p. 513)
Bibliographie
[1] Aristote, *Physique*, Oxford, éd. Ross, 1936.
[2] Bolzano (B.), *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, Leipzig, 1851 ; réédition F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1921.
[3] Bolzano (B.), *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837; réédition Leipzig, 1914-1931.
[4] BOURBAKI (N.), *Topologie générale*, chap. X : «Dictionnaire», Paris, A.S.I., 1949.

37. Lapointe, Sandra. 2000. "Analyticité, universalité et quantification chez Bernard Bolzano." *Les Études Philosophiques* 455-470.
"Introduction
Bolzano entretient avec la tradition analytique une relation des plus intéressantes.
Contrairement au cas de Husserl, il n'y a pas de filiation proprement dite. Outre certains passages que l'on peut trouver chez Wittgenstein et Tarski, les points d'incidence de la pensée bolzanienne sur la tradition anglo-américaine sont rares et sans conséquences considérables (1). Toutefois, la philosophie analytique partage avec Bolzano tant l'idée fondamentale que la logique habite au coeur de l'investigation philosophique, qu'un intérêt marqué pour les problèmes liés à la théorie de la signification et de la vérité.
Il est donc étonnant de constater le peu d'attention qu'a reçu Bolzano jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Cette lacune dans le savoir contemporain s'explique non seulement par le destin tragique de l'oeuvre bolzanienne mais aussi par l'anhistoricisme, ou plus précisément par l' « anti-historicisme » inhérent à la philosophie analytique. Cet anti-historicisme est pourtant problématique et, depuis quelques années, des philosophes cherchent à trouver un compromis entre un philosopher purement « analytique » et un philosopher où l'histoire est la mesure de toute chose, même de la vérité(2). Mon étude qui se situe dans cette perspective se veut une contribution tant à la diffusion de

l'oeuvre de Bolzano qu'à l'histoire de la philosophie analytique." (p. 455)
(1) 1. Cf. Sebestik, 1990 ; Künne, 1997, p. 7 4 s.
(2) Cf. Beaney, 1996, p. 2-5.
Bibliographie
Beaney Michael (1996), *Frege : Making Sense*, London, Duckworth.
Künne Wolfgang (1997), «Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1849-1939) », dans *Bolzano und die Ôsterreichische Geistesgeschichte*. Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung, vol. 6, Akademia Verlag, Sankt Augustin.
Sebestik Jan (1990), « The archeology of the Tractatus : Bolzano and Wittgenstein», dans *Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation*. Proceedings ef the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium August 1989 Kirchberg (Austria), Wien, Hôlder-Pichler-Tempsky.

38. Majolino, Claudio. 2000. "Variation(s) I. Bolzano et l'équivocité de la variation." *Les Études Philosophiques* 471-488.
"D'une certaine façon, la notion de variation représente la clé de voûte de la construction conceptuelle bolzanienne. Mais que faut-il entendre par là ?
Tout d'abord, l'expression « *Veranderung* » ne va pas de soi : d'une part, elle signifie changement, transformation; d'autre part, elle désigne aussi cette opération formelle qui est à l'arrière-plan de la variable, c'est-à-dire de cette place vide que, depuis l'analytique d'Aristote et surtout l'algèbre de Diophante, en logique et en mathématiques on peut remplir par des étants quelconques. Ainsi au sens large du terme à la notion de variation appartiennent *à la fois* un *sens de modification* et un *sens de multiplicité*.
Mais chez Bolzano, le double sens de la variation relève aussi d'un dédoublement ontologique, de la différence entre le domaine de l'effectivité et celui de l'objectivité. En effet, la thèse du platonisme bolzanien impliquerait un dédoublement de la variation parallèle à celui des « *Ur-regionen* » de l' « *es gibt* »: non seulement les étants du monde *sont* selon un mode d'être tout à fait différent de celui des objets idéaux, mais à chaque domaine correspond

une variation propre et à part entière. Cela veut dire aussi qu'à chaque domaine appartient un sens de variation prescrit par la constitution ontologique des objets de ce domaine même, selon la thèse de la priorité de l'être (l'être de l'effectivité *vs*. l'être de l'en soi) sur le devenir (le sens de modification vs. le sens de multiplicité)." (p. 471)
"Cet article est une partie d'un travail plus vaste consacré aux énoncés de la variation dans la philosophie du XIX' siècle. Il sera suivi par deux autres textes (Variation(s) II et Ill) consacrés à la variation chez Lotze et chez Husserl." (p. 471)

39. Textor, Mark. 2000. "Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité." *Les Études Philosophiques* 435-454.
"Bolzano est connu parmi les philosophes de la logique surtout pour deux définitions de concepts logiques importants.
(A) On parle souvent aujourd'hui de la définition de Bolzano-Tarski de la conséquence logique, suivant laquelle un énoncé X s'ensuit logiquement des énoncés de la classe K si tout modèle de la classe K est aussi un modèle de X.
(...)
Siebel montre dans son livre *Der Begriff der Ableitbarkeit bei Bolzano* que cette image courante doit être révisée.
(B) Tout comme on parle de la définition de Bolzano-Tarski de la conséquence logique, on pourrait parler de la définition de Bolzano-Quine de l'analyticité logique ou de la vérité logique. Quine définit une vérité
logique comme une proposition vraie qui ne contient essentiellement que des mots logiques, et il remarque dans une note de bas de page : « En substance Bar Hillel a retrouvé cette formulation chez Bolzano, il y a plus de 125 ans» (Quirie, 1954, p. 110).
Dans mon exposé, je me concentrerai sur le second point : la définition que Bolzano donne de l'analyticité logique, ou, pour privilégier le sousgroupe des propositions logiquement analytiques qui tient aujourd'hui le devant de la scène, la définition donnée par Bolzano de la vérité logique. Or l'expression« vérité logique» est un terme technique de la philosophie. Que faut-il entendre par là ?" (pp. 435-436)

Bibliographie
Willard Orman Van Quine (1954), « Carnap and Logical Truth », repris dans W. V. O. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox,* Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

40. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2002. "Bolzano et l'idée de *Wissenschaftslehre*." In *Les philosophes et la science*, edited by Wagner, Pierre, 659-678. Paris: Gallimard.
41. Sinaceur, Hourya. 1996. "Bolzano et les mathématiques." In *Les philosophes et les mathématiques*, edited by Barbin, Évelyne and Caveing, Maurice, 150-173. Paris: Ellipses.
I. La recherche des premières raisons au royaume de la vérité: Les sciences a priori et les autres; Concept et intuition, analytique et synthétique; La théorie des sciences purement a priori ou théorie du sens objectif. – II. La reconstruction axiomatique et l'arithmétisation des mathématiques: La connexion objective des vérités; Concepts primitifs; L'arithmétisation. – III. Les ensembles infinis: Le concept d'infini actuel; Les grandeurs et les nombres; Les divers infinis. – IV. Les nombres de l'arithmétique pure. – Conclusion.
42. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2000. "Husserl entre Brentano et Bolzano : jugement et proposition." *Manuscrito* no. 23:11-39.
Résumé : "Il est bien connu que, dans la Ve *Recherche Logique*, Husserl critique la théorie brentanienne du jugement. Son problème est de définir le "porteur" de vérité auquel le jugement donne une valeur de vérité. Un tel projet le conduit très près du propositionalisme bolzanien. Alors la théorie phénoménologique du jugement apparaît comme une sorte de compromis entre la psychologie brentanienne de l'acte
et un point de vue purement sémantique hérité de Bolzano. La question demeure de savoir si une telle conciliation est possible sans un tournant transcendantal."
43. Fréchette, Guillaume. 2014. "L'intentionnalité dans la *Théorie de la science* de Bolzano. Éléments d'une reconstruction." *Methodos* no. 14:1-20.
Résumé : "Dans la réception de Bolzano, et probablement depuis les *Prolégomènes* de Husserl, on insiste généralement sur le fait que la Théorie de la science (1837)

de Bolzano vise à développer une théorie des représentations et des propositions qui fait de celles-ci des entités logiques de plein droit, indépendantes des actes de pensée, et seules porteuses des propriétés dont traite la logique (vérité, fausseté, objectualité, etc.) L'importance accordée à cette position, souvent appelée réalisme logique (Morscher), tend toutefois à masquer d'autres aspects de l'ouvrage de Bolzano qui, sans contredire ce réalisme logique, montrent toutefois que la perspective développée par le philosophe de Prague visait aussi à rendre compte de la relation intentionnelle entre l'agent et ces entités logiques.
Dans le présent article, je me penche sur les moyens mis en branle par Bolzano pour élucider cette relation. Dans un premier temps, j'examine le cas des représentations sans objet en soulignant le caractère intentionnel de certaines de leurs caractérisations. Dans un deuxième temps, je me penche sur le traitement réservé au jugement en relation à la proposition en soi. Dans la dernière partie de l'article, j'expose les grandes lignes de sa conception des intentions de signification sous-jacente à sa sémiotique. Pris comme un tout, ces trois cas montrent que le thème de l'intentionnalité n'est pas un épiphénomène dans la *Théorie de la science*, comme on pourrait le croire en partant de l'interprétation de Bolzano par Husserl, mais bien une partie constituante de l'entreprise du philosophe de Prague."

44. Gyemant, Maria. 2013. "Bolzano et le psychologisme. Sur la possibilité des représentations sans objet." *Philosophie*:45-66.
"Mon but, dans ce texte, sera de montrer que le débat autour des représentations sans objet est en réalité fondé sur une mécompréhension. Les adeptes d'une psychologie brentanienne (en l'occurrence Franz Exner et Kasimir Twardowski, dont je traiterai ici) utilisent le concept de représentation en un sens qui n'est pas celui de Bolzano. Pour le dire rapidement, ils entendent par représentation essentiellement l'acte psychologique de représenter, alors que ce que Bolzano nomme « représentation en soi » est de

l'ordre de la signification. Les présupposés psychologistes des auteurs mentionnés sont en réalité précisément ceux auxquels Bolzano avait essayé d'échapper par sa théorie des représentations en soi. Ce qui mobilise la démarche tout entière de la *Wissenschaftslehre*, c'est l'idée que les propositions vraies existent en soi, que la vérité ne dépend pas du fait d'être pensée par quelqu'un, c'est-à-dire de ses occurrences psychologiques concrètes.
Ainsi, nous voyons que le problème des représentations sans objet ne peut se poser de façon positive, non critique, que si nous nous plaçons à l'intérieur de la théorie bolzanienne en assumant les thèses qu'elle présuppose." (p. 46)

45. Laz, Jacques. 1990. "Un platonicien débridé? Bolzano, critique de l'intuitionnisme kantien." *Philosophie* no. 27:13-29.
46. Seron, Denis. 2006. "La controverse sur la négation de Bolzano à Windelband." *Philosophie*:58-78.
"Il y a certainement lieu d'évoquer, du point de vue de l'histoire de la philosophie de langue allemande du dix-neuvième et de la première moitié du vingtième siècle, un problème de la négation. Ce problème de la négation se ramène à un petit nombre de questions fondamentales. En particulier : l'affirmation et la négation se situent-elles strictement sur le même plan et sont-elles « coordonnées » ? La négation est-elle une propriété du contenu de l'acte judicatif, ou une propriété de l'acte judicatif lui-même ? Si la négation est simplement la qualité de rejet, qu'est-ce qui est rejeté dans le jugement négatif ? Le jugement négatif est-il pour autant un « jugement de valeur » ? Existe-t-il des représentations négatives ? Le jugement négatif est-il synonyme de séparation, ou réclame-t-il encore, comme le jugement affirmatif, une liaison entre des contenus représentatifs ? « S n'est pas p » est-il une forme primitive du jugement au même titre que « S est p », comme le pensait Kant par exemple ? Ou bien est-il, comme le pense Husserl, le résultat d'une modification de la forme primitive de tout jugement « S est p » ? Quel est le lieu de la négation ? Est-ce la copule, le prédicat, ou ni l'un ni l'autre ?

Je me propose ici d'indiquer schématiquement en quels termes ces questions ont été posées et de retracer quelques étapes de ce questionnement depuis Lotze et Bolzano, en m'arrêtant avant Frege et Husserl et en n'évoquant qu'occasionnellement les conceptions de Brentano et des brentaniens." (p. 58)

47. Mulligan, Kevin. 1997. "Sur l'histoire de l'approche analytique de l'histoire de la philosophie : de Bolzano et Brentano à Bennett et Barnes." In *Philosophie analytique et histoire de la philosophie*, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel, 61-103. Paris: Vrin.
"La nature, le but et la méthode de l'histoire de la philosophie sont exposés par Brentano dans ses Histoires de la philosophie antique et moderne. Bolzano s'occupe de manière beaucoup moins détaillée de ces questions dans "De la conception de Hegel et de ses partisans de l'histoire en général et de l'histoire de la philosophie en particulier". Sa conception de l'histoire de la philosophie est néanmoins très claire dans ses propres contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie, ainsi que dans celles de ses élèves. On comprendra mieux l'importance pour notre sujet des avis programmatiques de Bolzano et de Brentano quand on aura examiné ce contre quoi ils réagissent au dix-neuvième siècle (§ 2.2) ainsi qu'une thèse substantielle sur l'histoire de la philosophie due à Brentano (§ 3) et finalement le rapport entre ces programmes et l'énorme quantité d'histoire de la philosophie qui en constitue la réalisation plus ou moins fidèle et consciente (§ 4)." (p. 5)

48. "Bernard Bolzano : Philosophie de la logique et théorie de la connaissance." 2003. *Philosophiques* no. 30.
Sous la direction de Sandra Lapointe.
Index: Sandra Lapointe: Introduction: Bernard Bolzano: contexte et actualité 3; Rolf George; Intuitions 19; Jan Sebestik: La dispute de Bolzano avec Kant: fragment d'un dialogue sur la connaissance mathématique 47; Paul Rusnock: Qu'est-ce que la représentation? Bolzano et la philosophie autrichienne 67; Benjamin Schnieder: Bolzano sur la structure des propositions et le rôle sémantique des propriétés 83; Mark Textor: Bolzano sur le temps et la

persistance 105; Peter Simons: Bolzano sur les nombres 127; Jocelyn Benoist: Propriété et détermination: Sémantique et ontologie chez Bernard Bolzano 137; Edgar Morscher: La définition bolzanienne de l'analyticité logique: 149; Mark Siebel: La notion bolzanienne de déductibilité 171; Armin Tatzel: La théorie bolzanienne du fondement et de la conséquence 191; Jacques Dubucs et Sandra Lapointe: Preuves par excellence 219; Sandra Lapointe: Bibliographie 235-243.

49. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2003. "Propriété et détermination: sémantique et ontologie chez Bernard Bolzano." *Philosophiques* no. 30:137-148.
Résumé : "L'auteur essaie de circonscrire la sphère du «métaphysique » dans la pensée de Bolzano. Il montre comment la métaphysique de la réalité (*Wirklichkeit*), avec ses deux ingrédients: les substances et les propriétés (*Beschaffenheiten*), doit être distinguée de la doctrine du règne « sémantique » (celui des représentations et des propositions en soi). Ces dernières entités n'appartiennent pas à la sphère de l'ontologie, et il est impossible de trouver quelque chose comme une « ontologie formelle » chez Bolzano qui serait en charge de s'occuper d'elles, c'est-à-dire une doctrine qui les traiterait comme des « êtres ». L'auteur s'intéresse, de ce point de vue, à la distinction importante faite par Bolzano, entre les propriétés (*Beschaffenheiten*), qui doivent être prises en un sens ontologique, et les déterminations (*Bestimmungen*) qui, bien que rapportées à des objets et éventuellement des êtres, n'ont pas de sens indépendamment d'un discours tenu sur ces objets, et ne sont pas des entités ontologiques à proprement parler. Ainsi, l'auteur essaie de mettre en lumière la complexité des relations entre le plan sémantique et le plan ontologique chez Bolzano: les deux plans doivent être soigneusement distingués, et pourtant demeurent aussi corrélés en un sens complexe."
50. Dubucs, Jacques, and Lapointe, Sandra. 2003. "Preuves par excellence." *Philosophiques* no. 30:219-234.
Résumé : "Bolzano fut le premier philosophe à établir une distinction explicite entre les procédés déductifs qui nous

permettent de parvenir à la certitude d'une vérité et ceux qui fournissent son fondement objectif. La conception que Bolzano se fait du rapport entre ce que nous appelons ici, d'une part, « conséquence subjective », à savoir la relation de raison à conséquence épistémique et, d'autre part, la « conséquence objective », c'est-à-dire la fondation (*Abfolge*), suggère toutefois que Bolzano défendait une conception « explicativiste » de la preuve : les preuves par excellence sont celles qui reflètent l'ordre de la fondation objective.
Dans cet article nous faisons état des problèmes liés à une telle conception et argumentons en faveur d'une démarcation plus stricte entre la préoccupation ontologique et la préoccupation épistémologique dans l'élaboration d'une théorie de la preuve."

51. George, Rolf. 2003. "Intuitions." *Philosophiques* no. 30:19-46.
Résumé : "Kant imposa au public philosophique la distinction entre sensations, intuitions et concepts. Bolzano reprit la terminologie, mais pas la substance de cette dernière. Cet article examine la critique astucieuse et détaillée qu'adresse Bolzano à Kant et présente les grandes lignes de sa théorie. Tandis que ses célèbres propositions « en soi » lui permirent de traiter avec précision des notions de conséquence, d'équivalence, d'analyticité, etc., en évitant le psychologisme logique si commun à l'époque, les intuitions font figure d'exception. Elles sont introduites en rapport direct avec l'activité mentale : les intuitions sont des pensées — les épisodes qui représentent notre conscience empirique directe — et constituent en fait la porte étroite de la philosophie de l'esprit bolzanienne."
52. Künne, Wolfgang. 2009. "Bolzano et (le jeune) Husserl sur l'intentionnalité." *Philosophiques* no. 36:307-354.
Résumé : "Dans les « Prolégomènes à la logique pure » de ses *Recherches logiques* (LU), Husserl rend hommage aux deux premiers volumes de la *Wissenschaftslehre* (*WL*) de 1837 de Bernard Bolzano comme un « ouvrage qui [...] surpasse de loin tout ce que la littérature mondiale a à offrir en termes de contributions systématiques à la logique ». Cet article porte sur le jeune Husserl comme lecteur du chef-

d'oeuvre de Bolzano, visant ainsi à contribuer à une compréhension adéquate de certains aspects des théories de Bolzano et de Husserl et de ce sur quoi portent ces théories. Je me concentrerai sur la question de savoir comment Bolzano en 1837 et Husserl autour de 1900 ont conçu les contenus des actes et états mentaux.
Dans les sections 1 et 2, je fais état de la redécouverte de la WL de Bolzano au sein de l'École de Brentano, et en ce qui concerne le problème des représentations sans objets, j'endosse la défense de Bolzano par Husserl contre Twardowski. Dans les sections 3 et 4, je présente un aperçu de la théorie des propositions *(Sätze an sich*) et des notions (*Vorstellungen an sich*), et montre comment Husserl assimile le cadre conceptuel bolzanien dans ses *RL*. Tandis que Bolzano considère les propositions et les notions comme étant des objets abstraits *sui generis*, le jeune Husserl développe une conception des notions et des propositions en termes d'espèces. J'explique cette conception dans la section 5 et je la défends contre le dernier Husserl. La discussion la plus extensive et la plus détaillée d'une seule et unique thèse de la philosophie de la logique de Bolzano qu'on puisse trouver dans les livres et les articles publiés par Husserl de son vivant se trouve dans le dernier chapitre de ses *RL*. Le sujet de discussion, et la dernière section de cet article, est une affirmation courageuse, pour ne pas dire outrageuse de Bolzano qui, du moins pris au pied de la lettre, contredit tout simplement ce que la plupart des philosophes ont tenu pour acquis depuis Aristote. Les questions, soutient Bolzano, sont une espèce particulière de propositions, et donc leur vérité est susceptible d'être évaluée."

53. Lapointe, Sandra. 2003. "Introduction : Bernard Bolzano : Contexte et actualité." *Philosophiques* no. 30:3-17.
"Le présent numéro est consacré principalement aux aspects de l'œuvre de Bolzano qui concernent sa philosophie de la logique et sa théorie de la connaissance. Ce thème a semblé, d'entrée de jeu, être celui le plus susceptible de susciter l'intérêt du lecteur et ce pour plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, Bolzano s'est fait, dans ces domaines, le

brillant précurseur de plusieurs découvertes importantes et l'étude de ses théories fournit un prétexte opportun pour faire le point sur les conceptions contemporaines, par exemple, de l'analyticité, de la conséquence, de la preuve, du nombre, etc. Deuxièmement, les liens qui se dessinent entre Bolzano et des auteurs aussi importants que Kant, Husserl et Twardowski, mais aussi Frege, Carnap et Tarski, marquent la nécessité de réévaluer certaines idées reçues en ce qui concerne l'histoire de la philosophie analytique. À cet égard, on se doit de mentionner que l'intérêt suscité depuis quelques années par la connexion historique étroite — connexion dont une certaine phénoménologie a longtemps fait fi — entre Bolzano et le fondateur de la phénoménologie a motivé un renouvellement des études husserliennes et a permis de mieux comprendre les origines communes de la philosophie analytique et de la phénoménologie. Enfin, les thèmes autour desquels gravitent les articles réunis ici témoignent d'un aspect essentiel de la contribution de Bolzano à la philosophie. Notre intention est de fournir au lecteur francophone un moyen de se familiariser avec un aspect incontournable d'une œuvre d'une richesse immense tout en montrant sa saisissante actualité.
Dans le reste de cette introduction, je présente les éléments qui permettront au lecteur de s'initier aux grandes lignes de la philosophie bolzanienne et, en le référent aux articles pertinents, de s'orienter dans ce qui suit." (p. 3)

54. Morscher, Edgar. 2003. "La définition bolzanienne de l'analyticité logique." *Philosophiques* no. 30:149-169. Traduction de: *Logische Allgemeingültigkeit*, dans: *Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung* 11, 1999, pp. 179-206. Résumé . "D'après Bolzano, une proposition est logiquement analytique si et seulement si elle est soit logiquement valide, soit logiquement non valide. Bolzano dit aussi parfois qu'une proposition est logiquement valide si et seulement si elle est et reste vraie sous toute variation simultanée et uniforme de ses parties non logiques. C'est essentiellement la même définition que donne Quine dans son article «Carnap and Logical Truth » où il attribue à ce dernier (et dans une note également à Bolzano) l'idée qu'un

énoncé logiquement vrai est un énoncé au sein duquel seuls les termes logiques sont essentiels. Mais qu'en est-il des propositions et des énoncés vrais qui sont composés exclusivement de parties logiques ? Selon la définition précédente, elles s'avèreraient toutes logiquement valides ou logiquement vraies. Une proposition telle que « Il y a quelque chose» n'est toutefois manifestement pas logiquement valide selon Bolzano. La définition courante de la validité logique doit être modifiée de manière à répondre aux intuitions bolzaniennes. Dans cet article, je propose une telle modification."

55. Rusnock, Paul. 2003. "Qu'est-ce que la représentation? Bolzano et la philosophie autrichienne." *Philosophiques* no. 30:67-81.
Résumé . "Largement inconnu en Allemagne au xixe siècle, Bolzano connut un meilleur sort en Autriche, surtout auprès des étudiants de Brentano, qui étudièrent avidement sa *Théorie de la science*. Cependant, un examen attentif de la réception des idées de Bolzano chez les brentaniens nous montrent qu'il fut souvent mal compris. Cet article discute d'un cas particulier de ce phénomène,
la réaction de K. Twardowski à la théorie de la représentation de Bolzano."
56. Schnieder, Benjamin. 2003. "Bolzano sur la structure des propositions et le rôle sémantique des propriétés." *Philosophiques* no. 30:83-103.
Résumé : "Bernard Bolzano développe une théorie exhaustive et très élaborée des propositions comme entités structurées et composées de concepts. L'une de ses thèses principales consiste à dire que toutes les propositions ont en commun la même structure : «A – a – (la propriété) b ». Cet article examine le rôle que jouent les propriétés eu égard à cette thèse. Lorsque les propriétés figurent dans les théories sémantiques standards, elles sont généralement conçues comme des entités *partageables*, en d'autres mots, comme des *universaux*. Je montre que (contrairement à ce qui fait consensus dans la littérature) Bolzano croyait que ce sont bien plutôt des *propriétés particularisées* qui tombent sous la représentation-prédicat d'une proposition. De là émerge

une sémantique plutôt inhabituelle : une proposition de la forme [A – a – (la propriété) b] est vraie ssi une des propriétés particularisées qui se tiennent sous la représentation-prédicat [b] inhère au sujet de la proposition, c'est-à-dire l'entité dénotée par la représentation-sujet [A]."

57. Šebestik, Jan. 2003. "La dispute de Bolzano avec Kant. Fragment d'un dialogue sur la connaissance mathématique." *Philosophiques* no. 30:47-66.
Résumé : "Ce dialogue confronte deux conceptions qui dominent jusqu'à nos jours la philosophie des mathématiques : d'un côté la conception kantienne qui souligne l'irréductible apport de l'intuition dans la formulation des axiomes, ainsi que l'effectivité des procédés de construction ; de l'autre côté la conception bolzanienne qui s'efforce d'éliminer toute intervention de l'intuition au profit des démonstrations et des procédés purement conceptuels."
58. Siebel, Mark. 2003. "La notion bolzanienne de déductibilité." *Philosophiques* no. 30:171-189.
Résumé : "L'article (i) présente le concept de déductibilité que Bolzano introduit dans sa *Wissenscahftslehre,* (ii) indique quelques traits caractéristiques en vertu desquels ce concept diffère de plusieurs conceptions contemporaines de la conséquence et (iii) examine l'affirmation selon laquelle il présente une forte similarité avec la conception de Tarski et la logique de la pertinence."
59. Simons, Peter. 2003. "Bolzano sur les nombres." *Philosophiques* no. 30:127-135.
Résumé : "Dans cet article, l'auteur présente la théorie bolzanienne du nombre.
Il établit, sur la base d'une comparaison avec Frege, que la conception bolzanienne rencontre toutes les exigences d'une telle théorie tout en présentant plusieurs traits originaux, comme par exemple le fait qu'elle s'articule sur la base d'une théorie des « collections » (Inbegriffe), qui lui confèrent un intérêt philosophique certain. Tout en indiquant au passage un problème inhérent à la notion bolzanienne de Reihe, l'auteur présente la conception bolzanienne des nombres

naturels, reconstruit sa théorie des nombres abstraits et montre comment Bolzano est en mesure d'établir le lien entre ces derniers et leur application aux ensembles concrets d'objets."

60. Tatzel, Armin. 2003. "La théorie bolzanienne du fondement et de la conséquence." *Philosophiques* no. 30:191-217.
Résumé : "Le but de cet article est de présenter et d'évaluer la théorie de la fondation de Bernard Bolzano, c'est-à-dire sa théorie du concept exprimé et de la relation mise en jeu par « parce que ». Dans la première partie (§§1-4), le concept de fondation est distingué et mis en relation avec trois autres concepts: le concept de raison épistémique, le concept de causalité et le concept de déductibilité (c'est-à-dire de conséquence logique). Dans la seconde partie (§§5-7), je reconstruis la théorie bolzanienne de la fondation sous forme axiomatique et j'en offre une discussion critique."
61. Textor, Mark. 2003. "Bolzano sur le temps et la persistance." *Philosophiques* no. 30:105-125.
Résumé : "Comment une proposition qui affirme que *a* est fatigué le matin et n'est pas fatigué le midi peut-elle être vraie ? Bolzano soutient que toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient, dans la composante-sujet, la représentation d'un temps. Dans cet article, je reconstruis et évalue les arguments de Bolzano en les comparant à ceux de son adversaire principal, le tenant de la position selon laquelle toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient une copule renfermant la représentation du temps auquel l'objet représenté par la composante-sujet a la propriété représentée par la composante-prédicat (la conception de la modification de la copule). La conception bolzanienne de la modification du sujet ne peut résoudre le problème logique de la persistance qu'en assumant que des représentations-sujets qui contiennent différentes représentations de temps représentent différents individus dotés de déterminations temporelles. Mais ceci engendre une nouvelle question : comment un objet peut-il avoir différentes déterminations temporelles sans pour autant changer ?"

Note: Cet article paraîtra en version originale dans *History of Philosophy Quarterly*.

62. Cantù, Paola. 2006. "Bolzano et les propositions en soi : une théorie objective des vérités." In *Propositions et états de choses. Entre être et sens*, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn, 51-66. Paris: Vrin.

"Bernard Bolzano présente sa théorie logique des propositions en soi dans les deux premières parties de sa *Wissenschaftslehre*, publiée en 1837, mais quelques aspects sont déjà traités dans un échange épistolaire avec Exner daté de 1834 et dans les *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* de 1810: ce dernier texte montre que l'intérêt de Bolzano à la connaissance scientifique et à l'étude de la logique est étroitement lié à la recherche mathématique (1).

Avant d'exposer les différences entre propositions en soi et états des choses et avant d'expliquer les raisons et les conséquences de cette opposition, j'esquisserai quatre traits fondamentaux de la logique bolzanienne: la définition et la fonction des propositions en soi et des représentations en soi, le propositionalisme, qui dans la théorie de la signification attribue le rôle le plus important aux propositions, la nature des relations entre représentations subjectives, objectives et objets, la conception sémantique de la vérité (2).

Parallèlement je mentionnerai quatre conceptions que Bolzano critique vigoureusement: le psychologisme, l'interprétation intentionnelle des représentations en soi, le concept traditionnel de adequatio entendu comme ressemblance entre concepts et objets, l'idée que tous les concepts doués de sens ont un objet, soit réel soit irréel.

L'analyse des fondements de la théorie logique de Bolzano nous permet de remarquer:

– que la théorie de la vérité n'est pas une théorie de la correspondance en tant que adequatio entre idées et objets;

– que les propositions en soi sont ce qui porte la valeur de vérité (*truthbearers*) et donc ne jouent pas le rôle d'état de choses, de quelque façon qu'on l'entende;

– que la logique bolzanienne peut être définie un platonisme logique, seulement dans la mesure où elle refuse une conception épistémique de la vérité, et qu'il est de toute façon préférable qu'elle soit considérée un objectivisme sémantique, car elle ne distingue pas deux niveaux différents de l'être." (pp. 51-52)
(1) Cf. B. Bolzano, [BY] : *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974 ; [WL] : *Wissenschaftslehre*, Sulzbach, 1837, in *Gesamtausgabe*, I. *Schriften*, spécialement t. 11-12, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1985-88 ; [BfW] : *Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano's mit F. Exner*, in *Bernard Bolzanos Schriften* (Spisy=Schriften), éd. E. Winter, t. 4, Prag, Königliche Böhmische Gesellschaft, 1935.
(2) Sur la logique de Bolzano voir J. Sebestik, *Logique et Mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano*, Paris, Vrin, 1992 et J. Berg, *Bolzano's Logic*, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1962.

63. Brisart, Robert. 2002. "Husserl et Bolzano : le lien sémantique." *Recherches Husserliennes* no. 18:3-29.
64. "Bernard Bolzano." 1999. *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:339-506.
Numéro spécial consacré à la mathématique et à la logique chez Bolzano, rassemblant les contributions suivantes en français :
Hourya Sinaceur: Mathématique et logique chez Bolzano. Introduction 339-341; Hourya Sinaceur: Réalisme mathématique, réalisme logique chez Bolzano 457-477; Jan Sebestik: Forme, variation et déductibilité dans la logique de Bolzano 479-506.
65. Šebestik, Jan. 1999. "Forme, variation et déductibilité dans la logique de Bolzano." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:479-506.
Résumé - "Les innovations principales de Bolzano en logique résultent de l'introduction et de l'usage systématique de la méthode de la variation qui correspond à la méthode substitutionnelle de la logique contemporaine. Cette méthode fournit les concepts logiques fondamentaux de validité, d'analyticité et de déductibilité. Je propose

également une liste des concepts logiques de Bolzano. La comparaison de la déductibilité avec la notion de conséquence logique de Tarski met en évidence les caractères spécifiques de la logique de Bolzano dont le plus important consiste dans la nature de ses objets : bien que Bolzano
travaille aussi avec les formes propositionnelles, l'objet de sa logique est constitué des propositions en soi et des représentations en soi."

66. Sinaceur, Hourya. 1999. "Réalisme mathématique, réalisme logique chez Bolzano." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences* no. 52:457-477.
Résumé : "La plupart des spécialistes de Bolzano présentent sa doctrine des propositions et représentations en soi, doctrine du sens objectif, comme une pièce maîtresse de son réalisme philosophique. Le but de cet article est de montrer les difficultés d'une interprétation trop monolithique de ce réalisme. La théorie logique de Bolzano est en fait plus nuancée qu'on ne le reconnaît généralement. Certes, les propositions en soi constituent un univers de significations objectives, douées d'une réalité propre, distincte à la fois de la réalité psychique et de la réalité physique. Mais les propositions en soi ne sont pas, à strictement parler, des objets logiques ; elles sont matière, et non objet, de pensée. Quant au réalisme mathématique de notre auteur, il ne laisse pas d'être affecté par un certain empirisme manifeste surtout dans le statut accordé aux nombres entiers."
67. Šebestik, Jan. 1964. "Bernard Bolzano et son Mémoire sur le théorème fondamental de l'Analyse." *Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications* no. 17:129-135.
"L'auteur du mémoire dont nous présentons ici une traduction française n'est pas inconnu aux lecteurs de la *Revue d' Histoire des Sciences*. En 1961, M. Rychlik y exposa les tentatives de Bolzano pour construire une théorie des nombres réels selon les manuscrits de la *Grôssenlehre* (« Théorie de la Grandeur ») (1). Le nom lui-même de Bolzano est indissociabiement lié à un théorème fondamental de l'analyse — l'un de ceux qu'il démontre dans ce mémoire — mais nous voulons profiter de l'occasion pour esquisser un

portrait, ou tout au moins une silhouette, d'un grand mathématicien qui fut en même temps un grand logicien et un grand philosophe."
(1) La théorie des nombres réels dans un ouvrage posthume manuscrit de Bernard Bolzano, *Rev. Hist. Sci.*, t. XIV, n°8 3-t (juil.-déc. 1961), pp. 313-27.

68. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1997. "De Kant à Bolzano : Husserl et l'analyticité." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:217-238. Repris dans : J. Benoist : *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*, Paris: P.U.F., 1997 avec le titre : *L'héritage de Bolzano : l'analytique formel*, pp. 59-81.
"Donner une définition correcte de l'analyticité exige d'abord l'abandon de l'approche« subjective»(1) de ce phénomène induite par les formulations kantiennes. Tant qu'on en reste à la question de savoir si le prédicat était ou non« pensé dans le sujet», il est malaisé de séparer le fait et le droit et de donner une détermination précise au problème.
Qu'est-ce en effet qu'être pensé ou non dans un concept? A l'analyse il devient évident que le problème ne peut pas se réduire à celui de savoir si la représentation avancée comme prédicat était ou non contenue dans ma représentation du sujet. L'analyticité, si elle a un sens, est un fait objectif, qui concerne la structure même de ce à quoi je suis confronté dans mon jugement, la vérité de ce jugement, et non le« contenu» de mes représentations. Distinguer l'analytique et le synthétique, c'est départager des conformations de jugement, en tant que celles-ci définissent des formes différentes pour les objets eux-mêmes (des types d'« objectivité» différents). D'une certaine façon, par là même, l'analyticité (ou son contraire) n'est plus à chercher nulle part ailleurs que dans la proposition elle-même, fût-elle idéalisée - comme c'est le cas chez Bolzano - et non dans les« représentations» (au sens de représentations du sujet) qui y sont associées.
La percée décisive est accomplie par Bolzano lorsqu'il développe au § 148 de la *Wissenschaftslehre* une théorie

originale de l'analyticité, fondée sur le concept leibnizien de substituabilité." (pp. 64-65, une note omise)
(1) Comme c'est le reproche général adressé à Kant par Bolzano. Cf. la présentation de Jacques Laz, *Bolzano critique de Kant*, Paris, Vrin, 1993.

69. ———. 2002. "La réécriture par Bolzano de l'*Esthétique transcendantale*." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:287-303.
Résumé : "L' *Elementarlehre* de la *Wissenschaftslehre* de Bolzano peut être lue comme une sorte de réécriture de l' *Elementarlehre* de la *Critique de la raison pure*. Bien sûr, on pourrait avoir l'impression que toute Esthétique Transcendantale fait ici défaut. Des déterminations qui sont supposées intuitives chez Kant sont réinterprétées par Bolzano comme purement conceptuelles. Pourtant, en fait, développant sa propre Esthétique Transcendantale du point de vue d'une sémantique objective, Bolzano invente une nouvelle sorte d'a priori pour la sensibilité - précisément un a priori purement conceptuel."

70. Duhn, Anita von. 2003. "Les remarques de Bolzano sur les couleurs." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:463-488.
Résumé : "Les remarques de Bolzano sur les couleurs n'ont pas fait l'objet de recherches jusqu'à présent. Le but de cet article est de montrer que ses investigations sur les couleurs constituent une contribution intéressante à la théorie de la connaissance du XIXe siècle. Selon Bolzano, les couleurs sont des qualités secondes ainsi que des propriétés physiques et, par conséquent, elles sont des quantités mesurables. Il soutient que la perception des couleurs est réglée par des lois empiriques et il argumente que les couleurs que nous voyons sont déterminables par des concepts de grandeur."

71. Mansour, Goufrane. 2008. "Bolzano: objectivité sémantique et subjectivité de la perception." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 60:551-569.
Résumé : "De la pensée de Bolzano, l'objectivisme sémantique est certainement l'aspect le plus largement commenté. Mais son œuvre maîtresse, la *Wissenschaftslehre*, comprend aussi bien la version la plus

aboutie de cet objectivisme qu'une partie proprement épistémologique, la « Théorie de la Connaissance ». Si l'épistémologie bolzanienne repose sur la désubjectivation des éléments de la connaissance, la théorie de la perception présente dans cette *Wissenschaftslehre* prête au sujet connaissant un rôle actif dans l'élaboration du réel perceptif."

72. Pégny, Gaëtan. 2013. "Bolzano et Hegel." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 78:215-243.
Résumé : "L'allergie de Bolzano à l'œuvre de Hegel est un fait souligné dans presque toutes les présentations de sa pensée. Pourtant, conformément à son éthique intellectuelle, il a tenté de se familiariser avec cette philosophie qu'il rejetait plus que toute autre. Il a même, tardivement, reconnu qu'il pouvait s'y trouver des propositions justes. Afin d'affiner la compréhension de la relation de Bolzano à Hegel, on se propose ici de reconstruire la polémique des *Trois essais sur Hegel* en montrant qu'elle recoupe bien des formes d'anti-hégélianisme devenues canoniques (la critique de la philosophie de l'histoire notamment), mais dans un contexte qui lui est propre et la spécifie. Dans un second temps, on reviendra sur les divergences philosophiques à l'origine de la nécessité pour Bolzano de critiquer un auteur et ses disciples, dans lesquels il voit une forme de régression intellectuelle et sociale, divergences qui imposent et orientent une lecture. Ces divergences sur la compréhension du rôle du langage et de la philosophie, du rapport des représentations au réel, ou sur la définition de l'infini, sont sous-jacentes à la polémique des *Trois essais*, mais on doit en chercher la formulation dans le reste du corpus bolzanien."

73. Šebestik, Jan. 1996. "Études bolzaniennes." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:437-448.
"Cet aperçu de la littérature bolzanienne récente peut donner l'idée de la vitalité de cette recherche qui a pris, ces dernières années, un nouvel élan. La plupart des ouvrages dont j'ai parlé sont d'une qualité exceptionnelle (je recommande tout particulièrement les ouvrages de Berg, de

Laz et l'atelier de Florence[*]) et devraient inciter les philosophes français à étudier celui qui, comme le dit Jacques Bouveresse, doit enfin « être reconnu comme un des plus grands philosophes de langue allemande »(5). Le climat philosophique actuel semble enfin lui être favorable."

(5) Préface à l'ouvrage de J. Laz, *Bolzano critique de Kant,* p. VI.

[*] *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987*, International Workshop (Firenze, 16-19/9/1987), coll. Biblioteca di Storia della scienza, Firenze, L. Olschki, voi. 31, 1992, VI-231 p.

VOIR AUSSI

The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

Selected Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Bernard Bolzano:

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Theory and History of Ontology

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3. ———. 1985. *Del metodo matematico*. Torino: Boringhieri.
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5. ———. 2011. "Proposizione ed espressione." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:13-26.
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6. ———. 2014. *Dottrina fondamentale. §§ 1-45 dalla Dottrina della scienza* Milano: Bompiani.
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2. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2009. "Perché non c'é un'ontologia formale in Bolzano." *Giornaledifilosofia.net*:2-14.
"Spesso oggi il pensiero di Bolzano si vede chiamato in causa a fondamento del progetto, propriamente moderno, di un'ontologia formale(1), al quale lo sviluppo della matematica formale (liberata dal giogo del riferimento alle figure o alle grandezze) e della logica matematizzata ha

fornito un nuovo inizio. Il fatto che l'autore non abbia contribuito di poco a questo duplice sviluppo nutre certamente un tale tentativo di avvicinamento. Alcuni dei suoi enunciati sulla matematica e la concezione che Bolzano ha potuto farsene col tempo, nella continuità con Leibniz, a un certo punto del suo pensiero, possono anche confortarlo. C'è tuttavia una vera "ontologia formale" in Bolzano? Questa stessa nozione può avere un senso nel contesto del suo pensiero?" (p. 2)
(1) Cfr. ad esempio F. Nef, *L'objet quelconque. Recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet*, Paris, Vrin, 1998.

3. Besoli, Stefano. 2011. "Bolzano e Kant." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:109-152.
"L'autonoma prospettiva dall'anti-kantismo bolzaniano, che si manifesta a partire dai *Beyträge* del 1810 (6) - in un continuo ampliamento di orizzonti tematici che sollecitano un incremento di analisi concettuale in ordine a problemi che, non avendo mai cessato di apparire in maniera diversa, richledevano soluzioni all'altezza di una loro rinnovata configurazione, culmina in quella sintesi di scuola, largamente autorizzata da Bolzano, che è il *Neuer Anti-Kant* (1850) (7), nel quale si condensano, in un quadro unitario, le novità espresse da un fronte di opposizione al soggettivismo trascendentale, che aspirava a una qualche visibilità in un'epoca in cui si avvertiva che un certo numero di filosofi erano ancora legati a Kant o erano comunque in procinto di volgersi di nuovo a lui, delusi dall'esito inconcludente della più recente speculazione(8). Pur non essendo quindi del tutto inaspettata la fonte da cui proviene questa forma di radicale *Kant-Kritik*, essa non attua una semplice regressione realistica, consona a riproporre i contorni di quel *realismo trascendentale* tanto deprecato da Kant, ma individua nella dottrina dell'*inseità* degli oggetti logici lo strumento più idoneo per rincarare in senso assolutistico una nozione di a priori che in Kant appariva in fondo ancora largamente «acritica»(9)
(6) Cfr. B. Bolzano, *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik. Erste Lieferung*, Widmann, Prag, 1810, neu hrsg. mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen von

H. Fels, Schöningh, Paderborn, 1926, Nachdruck hrsg. von H. Wussing, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1975.
(7) Sulla rilevanza attribuita all'aggettivazione che compare nel titolo di quest'opera, il cui significato è da un lato indicare la «natura dei fondamenti» con i quali si è inteso contestare Kant per sole esigenze di verità, ma dall'altro distinguere il contenuto di tale critica da quella formulata da B. Stattler in una sua requisitoria peraltro non memorabile {*Anti-Kant,* 2 Bde., Lentner, München, 1788), o forse ad es. anche da quella di A. Bolliger (*Anti-Kant oder Elemente der Logik, der Physik und der Ethik*, Schneider, Basel, 1882), cfr. F. Prihonsky, op. cit., P 19.
(8) Cfr. B. Bolzano, *Was ist Philosophie?*, Braumüller, Wien, 1849, ora in Id., *Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. von E. Winter, J. Berg, F. Kambartel, J. Louzil, B. van Rootselaar, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1969 sgg. (d'ora in poi GA), GA 2 A, 12/3 (*Vermischte philosophische und physikalische Schriften* 1832-1848, hrsg. von J. Berg und J. Loužil), p. 13.)"
(9) Cfr. J. Patocka, *Il posto di Bolzano nella storia della filosofia*, supra, p. 40 sg., dove l'autore critica però Bolzano per non essere riuscito a cogliere il «carattere più positivo della dottrina kantiana, richiamandosi a «mitiche verità in sé», invece di avvalersi di una «dotttrina critica della conoscenza» di natura processuale.

4. Bucci, Paolo. 1989. "Bernard Bolzano e la logica kantiana." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 80:241-260.
"La discussione di Bolzano si volge innanzitutto a considerare i termini particolari in cui, all'interno della manualistica kantiana, era stato affermato il carattere formale della logica. Agli studiosi d'impostazione kantiana, autori dei «nuovi manuali», Bolzano rimprovera in particolare di aver voluto individuare - come condizione della formalità della logica e della sua possibilità di porsi in una dimensione rigorosamente a priori - il fatto che essa debba fare astrazione «da ogni diversità degli oggetti», per limitarsi a una considerazione del modo in cui l'intelletto «pensa e deve pensare gli oggetti» (15)

• Mostrando di tenere presente la concezione kantiana della «logica generale pura», Bolzano rileva che le trattazioni di Krug, Hoffbauer, Kiesewetter avevano in definitiva condotto a un vero e proprio
«fraintendimento» del carattere formale della logica, secondo il quale essa non dovrebbe contenere al suo interno «alcuna materia, ossia nessuna proposizione determinata » e di conseguenza, «poiché verità possono essere soltantoproposizioni determinate, neppure verità»." (p. 247)
(15) *Wissenschaftslehre*, vol. I, p. 46. Definizioni di questo tipo sono in effetti rintracciabili ad esempio in J. G. K. Kiesewetter, Grundriss einer allgemeinen Logik, Leipzig, Röchly, 1824 , § 2, e in J. Chr. Hoffbauer, *Anfangsgründe der Logik*, Halle, s.i.e., 1794 § 11, e si richiamano direttamente ad analoghe affermazioni kantiane. Cfr. infatti *Kritzk der reinen Vernunft*, Riga, Hartknoch, 1781, pp. 52-54, e 2ª ed. 1787, pp. 76-78, trad. it. a cura di G. Gentile e G. Lombardo-Radice con il titolo *Critica della ragion pura*, Bari, Laterza, 6ª ed. 1977, pp. 94-95; *Logik*, in *Gesammelte Schriften* (a cura della Königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften), Berlin-Leipzig, Reimer-De Gruyter & Co., 1902-23 , voi. IX, pp. 12-13, trad. it. a cura di L. Amoroso con il titolo *Logica*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1984, pp. 6-7 .

5. ———. 1994. "Logica e organizzazione del sapere nella dottrina della scienza di Bernard Bolzano." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 85:241-259.
"Confrontata con il progetto fichtiano della *Wissenschaftslehre*, l'impostazione bolzaniana presenta differenze spesso rilevanti. Fondamentale tra queste differenze è il fatto che la *Wissenschaftslehre* bolzaniana, nel momento in cui affronta il problema dell'organizzazion del sapere, non mtende porsi al di fuori dell'ambito della logica: la «dottrina della scienza in senso stretto» coincide infatti con una particolare accezione del termine «logica», secondo cui essa si configura appunto ome la disciplina che ha il compito di determinare Ie regole e i criteri del processo di organizzazione deIle conoscenze." (pp. 243-244)
6. ———. 1995. "La teoria bolzaniana delle spazio e del tempo." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 86:217-237.

"A una indagine che si proponga di ricostruirne l'interna articolazione la teoria bolzaniana dello spazio e del tempo si presenta come un insieme di analisi che, per quanto scarsamente sistematizzate, si possono ordinare secondo tre distinti «livelli», in dipendenza dei differenti contesti teorici ai quali appartengono i problemi sollevati da Bolzano nel corso della sua discussione(1). I tre livelli della teoria possono essere denominati rispettivamente *ontologico, lektologico-semantico* e *gnoseologico*.
Appartiene all'ambito di una «ontologia» dello spazio e del tempo la questione se ad essi debba essere attribuito lo statuto di oggetto (*Gegenstand*) oppure quello di qualità (*Beschaffenheit*), e se abbiano o no la proprietà di esistere (*Wirklichkeit haben*) (2)." (p. 217)
(1) La presente ricostruzione terrà conto essenzialmente della *Wissenschaftslehre*, che non è tuttavia l'unico fra i testi di Bolzano a documentare il suo interesse per la tematica dello spazio e del tempo. Di essa si trova traccia, ad esempio, nella terza sezione della incompiuta *Grossenlehre*, il progetto di fondazione e di ordinamento delle conoscenze matematiche che Bolzano intraprese a partire dal 1830. Sull'articolazione dell'opera cfr. J. Berg, *Bolzano's Logic*, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1962, pp. 17-25.
Della seconda parte dell'Introduzione alla Grossenlehre esiste una traduzione italiana a cura di L. Giotti con il titolo *Del metodo matematico*, Torino, Boringhieri, 1985.
(2) Su queste «nozioni ontologiche» si veda E. Casari, *An lnterpretation of Some Ontologica! and Semantica! Notions in Bolzano's Logic,* nel volume *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987* (Atti del workshop internazionale), Firenze, Olschki, 1992, pp. 55-56.
L'«ontologia» bolzaniana ammette sia «cose» (oggetti o qualità) esistenti, sia «cose» non-esistenti come le entità lektologiche (idee e proposizioni in sé). Si veda in proposito B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1981, vol. I, pp. 218-20.

7. ———. 2000. *Husserl e Bolzano. Alle origini della fenomenologia*. Milano: Edizioni Unicopli.

8. Bussotti, Paolo. 1998. "Il problema dei fondamenti della matematica negli scritti giovanili di Bernard Bolzano." *Epistemologia* no. 21:225-243.
9. Cantù, Paola. 2003. "Bernard Bolzano e le rappresentazioni anoggettuali." In *Forma dat esse rei*, edited by Valore, Paolo, 125-166. Milano: LED Edizioni Universitarie.
Abstract: "L'analisi della questione del riferimento e del significato dei termini linguistici è strettamente correlata al rapporto tra le parole con cui descriviamo il mondo e i concetti con cui lo categorizziamo. In che modo le espressioni linguistiche permettono di parlare del mondo? C'è una corrispondenza biunivoca tra parole e cose? E se non c'è, cosa significano i termini vuoti? Denotano concetti? E in che modo potremmo avere un concetto senza un oggetto che corrisponda ad esso? E a che scopo dovremmo servirci di concetti vuoti per descrivere il mondo?
Nel 1834 Bernard Bolzano elabora una teoria delle rappresentazioni anoggettuali in risposta a simili domande e riconosce in molte pratiche linguistiche l'uso di espressioni prive di riferimento oggettuale ma tuttavia significanti; perfino la congiunzione di termini contraddittori ha per Bolzano un significato, benché non solo non denoti ma neppure possa denotare un oggetto. Per comprendere quale sia il significato di tali espressioni riassumeremo brevemente nell'Introduzione la teoria logica di Bolzano, quindi offriremo una catalogazione degli esempi di rappresentazioni senza oggetto, suddividendole in negative, contraddittorie, semplicemente vuote e non referenziali; infine vedremo in che senso le rappresentazioni senza oggetto possono essere considerate immaginarie. Mostreremo la funzione logica delle rappresentazioni anoggettuali e scopriremo anche una ragione matematica per l'analisi delle rappresentazioni contraddittorie. Nell'ultimo paragrafo analizzeremo le implicazioni ontologiche della teoria delle rappresentazioni distinguendo due livelli (esserci e esistere) e argomentando che la concezione di Bolzano è un oggettivismo semantico piuttosto che un platonismo logico. Attraverso il confronto con Frege, Russell, Meinong e Quine tratteggeremo infine la

questione della portata esistenziale delle proposizioni mostrando il rapporto tra due aspetti del problema ontologico: semantico e metafisico."

10. Capone-Braga, Gaetano. 1916. "L' "Athanasia" di Bernardo Bolzano." *La Cultura Filosofica* no. 10:116-145.
11. Casari, Ettore. 1985. "L'universo logico bolzaniano." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 76:339-366.
12. ———. 1985. "Logica e unità del sapere." In *L'unità della cultura. In memoria di Lucio Lombardo Radice*, edited by Barra, Mario. Bari: Edizioni Dedalo.
13. ———. 1990. "Una fonte dimenticata? La teoria bolzaniana del significato." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 80:319-349.
14. ———. 1997. "Sull'origine dell' "oggettivo" in Bolzano." In *Logica e teologia. Studi in onore di Vittorio Sainati*, edited by Fabris, Adriano, Fioravanti, Gianfranco and Moriconi, Enrico, 93-115. Pisa: ETS.
15. Cataldi Madonna, Luigi. 1989. "Wolff, Bolzano e la probabilità." *Il Cannocchiale.Rivista di Studi Filosofici*:107-130.
    Reprinted in: S. Carboncini, L. Cataldi Madonna (eds.), *Nuovi studi sul pensiero di Christian Wolff*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1989.
16. Colantuono, Donatella. 2012. "Conoscenza della realtà e realtà come conoscenza. Il punto di vista di Bernard Bolzano." *Quaestio. Annuario di Storia della Metafisica* no. 12:153-170.
    "Quando si sente parlare di Bernard Bolzano (Praga 1781-1848) si è spesso indotti ad associarne il nome al cosiddetto platonismo logico(1). Il perché è facilmente rintracciabile in quella che è probabilmente la dottrina più nota tra le molte esposte nella sua *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), ovvero la teoria delle proposizioni in sé (*Sätze an sich*) e delle idee in sé (V*orstellungen an sich)*. L'espressione"essere in sé" è infatti utilizzata proprio per connotare le nozioni logiche basilari come entità non-mentali e non-linguistiche, totalmente indipendenti dall'essere pensate o pronunciate da qualcuno. In tal senso – si potrebbe dire – Bolzano è un realista, poiché pare non contemplare la possibilità di una determinazione della realtà in senso noetico.

(,,,)
Ciò che però qui vorrei mostrare è proprio come la legittimità di tali interpretazioni possa essere messa in questione attraverso il chiarimento della nozione bolzaniana di esistenza (*Existenz*) o avere realtà (*Wirklichkeit haben*). Seguendo questa direttrice, il percorso che intendo delineare si articolerà su un duplice binario. Il primo consiste nel mostrare che la realtà propriamente intesa non è un predicato attribuibile agli enti logici, se non nella misura in cui questi diventano l'oggetto di un atto intenzionale del pensiero. Il secondo è l'indagine del ruolo che Bolzano attribuisce alla mente nella logica applicata, che sarà svolta verificando se l'accadere delle verità nella realtà si imponga semplicemente alla mente come un dato oggettivo o se non sia anche condizionata dalle modalità di accesso alle proposizioni da parte degli esseri pensanti." (pp. 153-154)
(1) Cf. ad esempio in E. Morscher, *Das logische An-sich bei Bernard Bolzano*, Anton Pustet, Salzburg-München 1973.

17. Costantini, Filippo. 2016. *Pensare l'infnito. Filosofia e Matematica dell'Infinito in Bernard Bolzano e Georg Cantor*. Milano - Udine: Mimesis Edizioni.
"Ecco il tema del libro: il transfinito. Ovvero la teoria degli insiemi. Mostreremo la genesi di questa teoria, il suo farsi largo nelle analisi di uno degli autori più interessanti dell'Ottocento, nonostante sia stato pressoché dimenticato: Bernard Bolzano. La prima parte del libro è dedicata a lui: tenteremo di capire che cosa Bolzano intende con il termine *Menge* (insieme) e il ruolo che tale concetto assume nella sua filosofia. Questo ci permetterà di riflettere sul rapporto tra logica, matematica e filosofia (ontologia e metafisica) e su questioni di alto interesse speculativo: dalla riflessione sull'assoluto alla trattazione matematica dei paradossi di Zenone. La seconda parte è dedicata a Cantor, padre indiscusso dell'insiemistica. Mostreremo come l'idea di trattare con quantità infinite sia sorta da problemi squisitamente tecnici e che però, fin dai primi vagiti della teoria, Cantor abbia sempre considerato di fondamentale

importanza l'aspetto filosofico del suo lavoro matematico." (p. 20)

18. Di Bella, Stefano. 2006. "L' "Anti-Kant" di Franz Príhonsky e la critica bolzaniana alla teoria kantiana del giudizio." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 97:233-250.
19. Fossati, Lorenzo. 2005. "Bolzano su sapere e credere." In *La misura dell'uomo. Filosofia, teologia, scienza nel dibattito antropologico in Germania (1760-1915)*, edited by Mori, Massimo and Poggi, Stefano, 289-316. Bologna: Il Mulino.
"Bolzano è come un lago, sulla superficie del quale, dopo avervi gettato un sasso, si disegnano i cerchi concentrici delle onde: il discorso si amplia necessariamente e naturalmente, e il singolo argomento acquista la sua portata solo se gli si permette di increspare l'intera superficie, se cioè si è disposti a seguire la trama dei rimandi interni ed esterni dell'opera. In un certo senso, addirittura, è possibile partire da un qualsiasi punto per avere una via d'accesso all'intero sistema del pensiero bolzaniano.
Il sasso che vorremmo gettare è quello dell'analisi dei concetti di sapere e di credere, ma, per riuscire nel lancio, dovremo necessariamente anteporre ad essa l'esame delle linee fondamentali della teoria della conoscenza bolzaniana." (p. 289)
20. ———. 2006. *Il concetto della filosofia in Bernard Bolzano*. Milano: I.S.U. Università Cattolica.
Contiene in appendice la traduzione di B. Bolzano, *Was ist Philosophie?* (1838), *Che cos'è la filosofia?*, pp. 175-201.
"Per Bolzano il problema della scarsa diffusione del suo pensiero nel mondo dei dotti era di primaria importanza: da un lato egli era ben consapevole della novità e della profondità dei suoi lavori, dall'altro non poteva non constatare come essi rimanessero ai margini del dibattito filosofico e scientifico del suo tempo. La causa gli pareva che dovesse essere ricercata in aspetti esteriori e contingenti, come la «pesantezza» del suo modo di scrivere e del suo stile, o la sorte toccata ad alcuni dei suoi allievi, che talvolta venivano marginalizzati, talaltra abbandonavano le concezioni del maestro elaborandone di proprie o avvicinandosi ad altre impostazioni.

Ma per cogliere la portata di tali considerazioni è bene interrogarsi se l'isolamento sia stata una caratteristica costante del Bolzano-Kreis e se e quanto sia stata radicale. Dovremo allora innanzitutto ripercorrere la vita del Nostro, cercando di mettere in luce il clima culturale in cui si formò e in cui successivamente operò.
In appendice viene presentata la traduzione di *Was ist Philosophie?*, il saggio che costituirà il filo rosso della nostra ricerca." (p. 7)

21. ———. 2006. "La "Weltweisheit" da Wolff a Bolzano." In *Tradurre e comprendere. Pluralità dei linguaggi e delle culture*, edited by Pititto, Rocco and Venezia, Simona, 201-217. Roma: Aracne.
"Nel saggio *Was ist Philosophie?* del 1849, mirando a una definizione della filosofia e dovendosi districare tra le molte alternative disponibili, Bolzano individua il punto ideale di partenza dell'indagine nella considerazione del significato comunemente attribuito al termine, affermando che
trotz den so mannigfach lautenden Erklärungen, welche die Philosophen bisher den Begriffe ihrer Wissenschaft gegeben, bloß durch den steten Gebrauch des Wortes allmählich eine Bedeutung desselben gebildet, die, wenn auch nicht scharf begrenzt, doch immer bestimmt genug ist, um es von jedem anderen zu unterscheiden(1).
Infatti,
muß [...] jeder Weltweise, der uns ein philosophisches System darbietet, einen bestimmten Begriff der Philosophie demselben zu Grunde gelegt haben(2).
La parola che qui egli utilizza, "Weltweise", e che ricorre spesso in Bolzano, è quella su cui vorremmo soffermarci in questo contributo.
Nel tedesco corrente la parola "Weltweisheit" viene usata come sinonimo di "Philosophie" e "Weltweise" di "Philosoph"; Bolzano, però, ritiene di poter giocare sui due termini e attribuisce una grande importanza al modo in cui essi vengono applicati, e quindi ci sembra valer la pena cercare di approfondire il significato della parola più "insolita", nell'assunzione che dietro ogni sinonimia ci sia qualcosa da scoprire.

Essendo la parola la via d'accesso al concetto per lo stesso Bolzano, una simile questione non dovrebbe essere né troppo peregrina né esclusivamente terminologica." (p. 201)
(1) Bolzano (1849), p. 15: «nonostante le spiegazioni apparentemente così disparate che i filosofi hanno dato finora del concetto della loro scienza, si è formato in modo graduale, semplicemente attraverso l'uso costante della parola, un suo significato che, anche se non nettamente delimitato, è pur sempre abbastanza determinato da distinguerlo da ogni altro».
(2) *Ibid.*: «ogni sapiente che ci presenta un sistema filosofico deve aver posto a suo fondamento un determinato concetto di filosofia». Rendiamo qui "Weltweise" con "sapiente" e "philosophisch" con "filosofico" per rendere il gioco tra i due termini: la ragione di tale scelta emergerà dalle pagine che seguono."

22. ———. 2010. "Il fondazionismo è superato? La versione di Bolzano." In *Mondo Uomo Dio. Le ragioni della metafisica nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo*, edited by Ghisalberti, Alessandro, 177-196. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
"L'idea che la conoscenza umana debba essere fondata o giustificata pare oggi il mero retaggio di un'impostazione superata del problema. Tuttavia si tratta di un progetto che è stato perseguito lungamente, e che in quanto tale ha subito torsioni e ripensamenti non secondari nel corso della storia della filosofia, al punto che forse non sarebbe eccessivo considerare il termine fondazione come equivoco. Prima ancora di stabilire se sia possibile o necessario un fondamento della conoscenza, bisogna allora cercare di chiarire che cosa propriamente ci proponiamo di fare ed eventualmente specificare se riteniamo tale tentativo votato in quanto tale al fallimento, o se invece lo siano solo alcune delle sue varianti.
In effetti, almeno secondo un certo modo di intendere la storia della filosofia, si sarebbe tentati di rispondere alla domanda se il fondazionismo sia superato con un secco no, a) perché in generale il concetto di superamento, per cui vi sarebbero problemi e soprattutto soluzioni superati da altri, non avrebbe senso, essendo invece sempre concreti e singoli

tanto i primi quanto le seconde(1); b) perché per motivi analoghi sarebbe ugualmente discutibile parlare di fondazionismo al singolare, invece che dei diversi fondamenti escogitati dai singoli filosofi.
Nonostante questo caveat, si cercherà di discutere il fondazionismo dando prima un quadro generale della crisi in cui sembra essere incorso, in tal modo specificando i suoi stessi tratti, per poi presentare il fondazionismo di Bernard Bolzano, interessante per alcuni aspetti che si spera di riuscire a far emergere." (p. 177)
(1) Cfr. l'oramai classico saggio di M. Dal Pra, *Del «superamento» in storiografia filosofica*, «Rivista critica di storia della filosofia», 11 (1956), pp. 218-226.

23. ———. 2010. *La tela del sapere. Studi su Bernard Bolzano*. Milano: Educatt.
"Nelle pagine che seguono vorremmo provare allora a gettare tre sassi, saggiando tre diversi punti dei suoi scritti e tentando tre differenti approcci. Nel primo caso verrà considerata la *Fundamentallehre*, la prima parte della *Wissenschaftslehre* (§§ 17-45), che affronta il tema capitale della fondazione della conoscenza, cercando di stabilire un ponte tra l'impostazione bolzaniana e l'approccio più recente al problema, e di valutarne in tale contesto la praticabilità teorica.
Successivamente, si focalizzerà l'attenzione sulla *Erkenntnislehre* (§§ 269-321) e in particolare si tenterà un'analisi approfondita del § 321, in relazione ai concetti di conoscenza, sapere e credere, esplicitando i punti di polemica nei confronti della trattazione kantiana dello stesso tema, secondo un intento più strettamente storico e ricostruttivo.
Infine, si cercherà di fare emergere la concezione generale della filosofia di Bolzano, a partire da un singolo termine, quello di *Weltweisheit*, rintracciando i luoghi dello «scontro» che in tedesco si ebbe tra esso e quello che poi avrebbe prevalso, *Philosophie*.
Si tratta insomma di tentativi di amplificare e assecondare gli stimoli che provengono dalla pagina bolzaniana, e di seguire le tracce che collegano il pensiero di Bolzano al

pensiero del suo tempo ed eventualmente del nostro. Evidentemente, non può trattarsi che di piste che conducono lontano, e di cui solo una parte può essere qui percorsa, ma sarebbe già sufficiente per chi scrive riuscire a far emergere la proficuità e l'interesse di tale complessa «tela»." (pp. 6-7)

24. Ganthaler, Heinrich, Berg, Jan, and Morscher, Edgar. 1993. "Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848)." In *La filosofia cristiana nei secoli XIX e XX. Vol. 1*, edited by Coreth, Emerich, Neidl, Walter M. and Pfligersdorffer, Georg, 272-298. Roma: Città Nuova.
Edizione originale: *Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*. Band 1. *Neue Ansätze im 19. Jahrhundert*, Graz-Wien-Köln: Styria Premium, 1987, pp. 242-265, traduzione italiana a cura di Gaspare Mura e Giorgio Penzo.
25. Guidetti, Luca. 2011. "Lo spazio logico dell'espressione. Intorno a B. Bolzano, *Proposizione ed espressione*." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:7-12.
"1. La struttura della Dottrina della scienza
Nella sua Introduzione alla *Dottrina della scienza*, Bolzano sostiene che il fine dell'opera è quello di offrire «l'insieme delle regole secondo cui procedere per suddividere l'intero ambito della verità nelle singole scienze e per la loro esposizione in specifici manuali». Infatti, «dal momento che è possibile esporre adeguatamente una scienza solo quando i suoi confini sono stati adeguatamente determinati [...] la dottrina della scienza è quella scienza che ci mostra come possiamo esporre le scienze in manuali adatti a tale scopo»(1). Com'è stato osservato(2), quest'intento ricognitivo sembra nascondere una ben più ampia e profonda ambizione, ossia quella di battere in breccia tutte le precedenti riflessioni sulla "scienza", in quanto viziate da confusione tra il piano del pensiero (che comprende il concettuale, il conoscitivo, il mentale, il percettivo, in breve tutto ciò che "accade" in un soggetto di conoscenza e in relazione ad esso, quindi anche l'esistenza e ogni esperienza) e quello logico-oggettivo, comprendente tutto ciò che, nella scienza, non appartiene per definizione

all’accadimento reale del pensiero, quindi tutto il suo contenuto denotativo." (p. 7)
(1) WL, I, p. 7
(2) Cfr., ad esempio, R. George, *Editor's Introduction*, in B. Bolzano, *Theory of Science*, edited and translated by R. George, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1972, pp. XXVII-XXIX.

26. ———. 2011. "Bolzano e gli stoici." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:61-92.
"Com’è noto, uno dei maggiori contributi forniti dagli stoici allo sviluppo della logica è la cosiddetta “semantica delle proposizioni”. Nella nostra discussione, volta a un confronto tra Bolzano e gli stoici riguardo alla semantica proposizionale, prescinderemo dalle questioni di fatto o sistematiche -ad esempio che le fonti stoiche siano scarse, spesso incoerenti e per lo più indirette; che la logica stoica abbia subito un processo di riabilitazione relativamente recente, oppure che Bolzano citi raramente gli stoici e che, dove lo fa, non dia molto peso alle loro nozioni logiche fondamentali, come ai concetti di *lekton* o di *semainon* (3), per concentrarci invece sulle questioni tematiche o *di principio*, il cui scopo è quello di evidenziare i paradigmi e-splicativi, non sempre direttamente verificabili, che sottendono le rispettive posizioni. A tal proposito, adotteremo un procedimento d’indagine circolare-regressivo che va da Bolzano agli stoici e da questi di nuovo a Bolzano, in modo da cogliere adeguatamente il sistema a partire dal tema, così come si addice ad ogni formazione analitica che voglia dirsi paradigmatica." (pp. 61-62, due note omesse)
' Cfr. B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausführlichen und großenteils neuen / Erstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter,* in der J.E. von Seidelschen Buchhandlung, Sulzbach, 1837 (d’ora in poi: WL), Bd. I, § 23, dove gli stoici vengono menzionati riguardo al problema del valore di verità della proposizione, ma senza accennare all'importanza che in essi assume la semantica proposizionale. Nel medesimo passo, Bolzano fa riferimento a Sesto Empirico, *Contro i logici*, II, 12 (ed. it. a

cura di A. Russo, Laterza, Roma/Bari, 1975, p. 140), in cui il filosofo scettico parla del *lekton* stoico; anche in questo caso, tuttavia, egli non dà rilievo a tale concetto, sebbene ciò possa giustificarsi per il fatto che sta introducendo la forma generale della proposizione (cfr. a tal riguardo, W.C. Kneale, M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962, ed. it. a cura di A.G. Conte, *Storia della logica*, Einaudi, Torino, 1972, p. 411).

27. Krause, Andrej. 2011. "Bolzano e Aristotele." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:43-60.
"Nel presente saggio tratteremo aspetti del rapporto tra Bolzano e Aristotele, limitandoci però ad alcune riflessioni di principio dei due autori sulla metafisica. Benché Bolzano non abbia mai composto alcuno scritto sulla metafisica, aveva in progetto di farlo e lo aveva in parte anche già cominciato(1). Inoltre, in molti passi delle sue opere si trovano dettagliate discussioni di problemi metafisici. Invero, diversamente da Bolzano, Aristotele ha scritto una *Metafisica*, solo che egli non ha né impiegato a tal proposito il termine "metafisica", né il titolo di quest'opera proviene da lui. Quest'ultimo si deve infatti all'ordinamento dei libri nell'edizione aristotelica di Andronico di Rodi, il quale collocò la *Metafisica* dopo la *Fisica(*2). Aristotele stesso non chiama metafisica la disciplina praticata in questo scritto, bensì sapienza, filosofia prima o anche teologia. Essa si occupa di temi che anche oggi vengono assegnati alla metafisica, ad esempio del concetto di sostanza, di anima e di Dio. In ciò che segue, metteremo in relazione alcune riflessioni di Bolzano e Aristotele su questi concetti metafisici; a tal proposito verrà anzitutto indicato in breve il posto della metafisica nei rispettivi sistemi delle scienze." (p. 43)
(1) Cfr. le lettere a Prihonsky del 29.3., 4.5., 26.5. e 20.12.1847, in B. Bolzano, Briefe an F. Prihonsky (d'ora in poi: BAP), in Id., *Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. von E. Winter, J. Berg, F. Kambartel, J. Louzil, B. van Rootselaar, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1969 sgg. (d'ora in poi: GA), III, 3/3, pp. 673, 675, 681 sgg., 700.

(2) Cfr. M. Bordt, Aristoteles' „*Metaphysik XII*“, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 2006, p. 11.

28. Künne, Wolfgang. 2011. "Bolzano e Frege." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:179-202.
"Nella Prefazione al suo libro *Frege and Other Philosophers* Michael Dummett scrive:
[1] L'unico filosofo del diciannovesimo secolo del quale sarebbe ragionevole supporre, solo dal contenuto dei suoi scritti e di quelli di Frege, che abbia influenzato Frege, è Bernard Bolzano, il quale morì l'anno in cui nacque Frege; ma [2] non c'è nessuna evidenza che Frege abbia letto Bolzano(1).
Che nessun filosofo del diciannovesimo secolo sia così vicino a Frege come Bolzano, ho cercato di provarlo quindici anni fa in relazione al concetto bolzaniano di proposizione (*Satz an sich*)(2) e a quello fregeano di pensiero (*Gedanke*) (3). Nella prima parte di questo saggio, ribadirò nuovamente l'affermazione [1] di Dummett in relazione alle concezioni di dimostrazione e di assioma. Nella seconda parte esaminerò, in relazione all'unica escursione di Frege nella metalogica e alla valutazione sua e di Bolzano della dimostrazione indiretta, se Dummett abbia ragione riguardo all'affermazione [2]." (p. 179)
(1) M. Dummett, *Frege and Other Philosophers*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. vii. L'inserzione dei numeri fra parentesi quadre è mia (W. K).
2 D'ora in poi, il termine "proposizione" sta per *Satz an sich*.
3 Cfr. W. Künne, *Propositions in Bolzano and Frege* (1997), rist. in M. Beaney, E. Reck, ed. by, *Frege's Philosophy in Context*, Routledge, London/New York, 2005, pp. 124-153 (con "Commenti" di Dummett), e in Id., *Versuche über Bolzano/Essays on Bolzano*, Academia, Sankt Augustin, 2008, pp. 157-194.

29. Lapointe, Sandra. 2011. "Bolzano e Husserl." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:227-242.
"Secondo una tradizione ampiamente consolidata, Frege è stato colui che ha spinto il «primo» Husserl a rigettare il suo presunto psicologismo(1). Mentre sono però accertate interazioni dal punto di vista intellettuale tra Husserl e

l'rege, al tempo in cui Husserl cominciava a venire alle prese con tale questione nei primi anni Novanta dell'Ottocento2, non è possibile affermare con certezza se sia stato Frege a suscitare le critiche di Husserl nei confronti dello psicologismo presenti nelle *Ricerche Logiche*, laddove ci sono invece molte prove a sostegno del fatto che la vera spinta dietro la critica di Husserl sia provenuta dalla *Wissenschaftslehre* di Bolzano.
(...)
Mentre la connessione tra Husserl e Bolzano non è più ignorata del tutto dal punto di vista storico, essa tuttavia resta ancora non adeguatamente documentata. In particolare, la maggior parte degli studi si focalizza oggi sul ruolo che Bolzano potrebbe aver giocato nell'adozione in logica, da parte di Husserl, di una posizione simile al realismo semantico. Ma l'influenza di Bolzano dev'essere cercata nelle *Ricerche Logiche* di Husserl - e specialmente nel primo libro, in maniera molto più sostanziale - e questo è ciò che argomenterò nel prosieguo di questo saggio."
(1) Cfr. D. Bell, *Reference, Experience, and Intentionality*, in L. Haaparanta, ed., *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1994, pp. 185-209; D. Follesdal, *Bolzano, Frege, and Husserl on Reference and Object*, in J. Floyd, S. Shieh, eds., *Future Pasts,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 67-79.
(2) Si veda per esempio la corrispondenza tra Frege e Husserl in R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota, eds., *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, Routlege, London, 2005, pp. 20-31.

30. Mangiagalli, Maurizio. 2006. "Bernard Bolzano e l'idea di una logica pura." *Sapienza* no. 59:459-466.
31. Mariani, Mauro. 2011. "Bolzano e Cantor." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:203-226.
Riassunto: "Per molti secoli l'opinione predominante di filosofi e matematici è stata che l'infinito è solo potenziale (nel senso che "potenza" ha in Aristotele) e che l'infinito attuale è, al contrario, intrinsecamente inconsistente. Tra i primi, Bolzano ha "dimostrato" che l'infinito attuale esiste e che nessuna contraddizione sorge se c'è una corrispondenza

biunivoca tra un insieme infinito e molti dei suoi sottoinsiemi propri. A dire il vero, i *Paradossi dell'infinito* di Bolzano hanno avuto una potente influenza sulle opinioni di Cantor sull'infinito attuale, ma le loro teorie sono per molti aspetti in contrasto. Infatti, secondo Bolzano, se esiste una corrispondenza biunivoca tra gli insiemi *A* e *B* ciò non implica che *A* sia grande quanto *B*, quindi non possiamo definire i numeri cardinali attraverso la nozione di corrispondenza biunivoca. Inoltre sostiene che un tutto è maggiore delle sue parti. Bolzano sostiene che gli insiemi infiniti possono essere di dimensioni diverse e che esistono infiniti numeri: ma, secondo il suo punto di vista, li caratterizza in modo per nulla compatibile con quello di Cantor. In conclusione, le intuizioni di Bolzano sull'infinito non prefigurano le teorie di Cantor, ma costituiscono un approccio alternativo all'infinito a cui prestano attenzione alcuni matematici moderni."

32. Melandri, Enzo. 1960. "I paradossi dell'infinito nell'orizzonte fenomenologico." In *Omaggio a Husserl*, edited by Paci, Enzo, 83-120. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
33. Mugnai, Massimo. 2011. "Bolzano e Leibniz." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:93-108.
"Per Bernard Bolzano, la filosofia di Leibniz costituisce un punto di rifeimento costante: se ciò risulta palese da un'opera come *Athanasia*, non lo è meno se leggiamo le pagine della *Wissenschaftslehre* dedicate all'ontologia logica, alla semantica e al calcolo logico in senso proprio (2). Rinviando a un'altra occasione un raffronto più ampio e sistematico tra le posizioni dei due filosofi (soprattutto per quel che riguarda la teoria logica), mi occuperò in questa sede della teoria delle idee e delle proposizioni in sé, che lo stesso Bolzano, com'è noto, considera affine a quanto sostenuto da Leibniz in opere e che, al tempo, gli erano accessibili. Prenderò dapprima in considerazione le posizioni di Leibniz e poi quelle di Bolzano, cercando quindi di sviluppare un confronto, che metta in luce identità di vedute, analogie e differenze tra i due filosofi." (p. 93)
(2) Un raffronto tra la logica di Leibniz e quella di Bolzano è tentato in J. Danek, *Les projets de Leibniz et de Bolzano,*

deux sources de la logique contemporaine, Les Presses de l'Université Lavai, Quebec, 1975, prima però della pubblicazione di ulteriori testi leibniziani in edizione critica. Per un'analisi puntuale dei rapporti tra Bolzano e Leibniz riguardo alla teoria della conoscenza, si veda: S. Centrone, *Bolzano und Leibniz über Klarheit und Deutlichkeit*, in «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 92, 2011, pp. 256-289.

34. Palágyi, Melchior. 1993. *Kant e Bolzano. Un confronto critico*. Ferrara: Spazio Libri.
Traduzione di *Kant und Bolzano. Eine kritische Parallele*, Halle: Niemeyer, 1902 a cura e con un'introduzione di Luca Guidetti, prefazione di Enzo Melandri.
35. Patočka, Jan. 2011. "Il posto di Bolzano nella storia della filosofia." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:27-42.
"Ho cercato di trattare il problema della filosofia di Bolzano nei suoi rapporti sia storici sia sistematici, al fine di mostrare che la dottrina delle verità in sé, benché logicamente nasca dalla modalità in cui Bolzano, di fronte alla filosofia della sua epoca, ha compreso il problema della scienza, non è né il senso complessivo, né in ultima analisi il centro della sua filosofia della scienza. Il problema che Bolzano voleva risolvere è la struttura della scienza come realtà *sui generis*. Questo problema, con la sua soluzione, non sta e non cade così come cade ad esempio la teoria kantiana della ragione con la sua concezione della sintesi a priori. Il problema di Bolzano è da sempre legittimato: la filosofia come dimensione della logica è un'idea che non è superata, la teoria della costruzione della scienza sarà un giorno formulata; l'epistemologia moderna e la logica accumulano materiale per la costruzione, di cui Bolzano ha intravisto per primo i tratti; egli lavora così sulle sue parti, sulle sue tracce, e ciò è come un miracolo, quando vediamo come Frege, Whitehead e Russell, Brentano e Husserl, i logici e i semantici polacchi e molti altri scoprono nuovamente, dopo molti anni, particolari aspetti del suo problema, dei suoi singoli concetti e delle sue soluzioni; e tuttavia ciò non è in realtà un miracolo, ma la logica della cosa, la logica del suo grande problema, il quale d'altra parte

è rimasto da lui non risolto ma che rimarrà per sempre legato a lui, al suo nome e al suo lavoro." (p. 40)

36. Pégny, Gaëtan 2011. "Bolzano e Hegel." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:153-178.
"Non si discuterà qui della pertinenza di fare di Bolzano un "precursore", né della questione di sapere se il suo desiderio di correzione logica della folta macchia hegeliana basti a fare di Bolzano un "analitico" e un "moderno"; ancor meno si discuterà della questione di accertare se tutta la letteratura analitica si riduca a un rifiuto in blocco, indignato o ironico, dello hegelismo e dei suoi prodotti derivati. Ci si contenterà di mostrare quel che ha permesso di fondare un simile giudizio, prima di sfumarlo, mostrando che c'è effettivamente stata sia una lettura sia un'argomentazione. C'è sempre qualche paradosso nel tentare di circoscrivere il rapporto di un filosofo nei confronti del suo più acerrimo nemico. Si cercherà qui di mostrare che c'è davvero stata la formulazione di una critica, e non un semplice atteggiamento di rifiuto che semplificherebbe la scrittura di manuali di storia della filosofia divisa in categorie prive di sfumature. Non si tratta tuttavia di negare l'intensità dell'opposizione, ma di comprenderne le ragioni strutturali, e in cosa essa implichi e allo stesso tempo impedisca la lettura. Si comincerà dunque con l'esporre l'essenziale dell'argomentazione dei saggi polemici su Hegel, contestualizzando un'argomentazione che, se destoricizzata, è troppo spesso ripiegata sia verso la passione irrazionale sia verso un antihegelismo con il quale si sarà, a seconda dei casi, sempre in accordo, o che si troverà sempre non pertinente. Si esamineranno poi, in maniera più sistematica, le posizioni filosofiche che hanno condizionato la lettura bolzaniana." (p. 154)

37. Preti, Giulio. 1935. "I fondamenti della logica formale pura nella "Wissenschaftslehre" di B. Bolzano e nelle "Logische Unturschungen" di E. Husserl." *Sophia* no. II-IV:187-194. Seconda parte: 361-376.
Ristampato in: Giulio Preti, *Saggi filosofici*, Vol. I, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1976, pp. 11-31.

"Il Bolzano concepisce la logica come « dottrina della scienza » ; il territorio della verità si divide in territori unitarii, le singole scienze. La scienza è definita(11) il complesso di verità di una data specie, da esporsi in un libro di testo.
La dottrina della scienza sarà quindi(12) il complesso di quelle regole secondo le quali dobbiamo procedere nella partizione del territorio della verità in singole scienze e nell'esporle in testi acconci, se vogliamo procedere in modo conforme allo scopo.
Per quanto strana possa sembrare la definizione, orientata in senso assolutamente pratico, essa include già la posizione oggettivistica del Bolzano. Infatti il manuale d'una scienza implica già tutto un complesso di verità d'una data specie ordinate e collegate(13) secondo rapporti che non saranno arbitrarii, ma necessariamente regolati da principii, che fanno si che la scienza sia scienza e non un complesso caotico di proposizioni. La dottrina della scienza non è quindi semplicemente l'arte di fissare per iscritto i teoremi d'unascienza, ma comprende: (a) la teoria della divisione della verità in singoli territori; (b) l'arte di trovare le verità d'un dato territorio; (c) l'arte di disporre queste verità secondo i loro rapporti. È ovvio che le parti piu importanti dal punto di vista della logica saranno la prima, cui però Bolzano non dà adeguato sviluppo, e la terza, che si presenta come una teoria dei rapporti logici fra proposizioni; è appunto questa, che Bolzano chiama « dottrina elementare », la vera e propria teoria della scienza in senso husserliano, cioè la ricerca di ciò che fa scienza la scienza(14)" (p 17 della ristampa)
11 *Wissenschaftslehre*, I, p. 4.
12 *Wissenschaftslehre*, I, p. 7.
13 *ivi,* p. 5.
14 *Logische Untersuchungen*², I, p. 11.

38. Raspa, Venanzio. 1996. "Su ciò che non esiste. Da Bolzano a Meinong: un *excursus* nella filosofia austriaca." *Studi Urbinati.B: Scienze Umane e Sociali* no. 67:115-201
1. Ci sono oggetti che non esistono. - 2. Rappresentazioni in sé e rappresentazioni senza oggetto .in B. Bolzano. - 3. La

mediazione storica di R. Zimmermann. - 4. Il capovolgimento delle rappresentazioni senza oggetto in K. Twardowski. - 5. · Oggetti non esistenti nella Gegentstandstheorie di A. Meinong. - 6. Aspetti della controversia fra Russell e Meinong.
"L'apparato concettuale di base che, per successivi sviluppi, ci porterà ad una messa a fuoco del nostro discorso, e maturerà nella *Gegenstandstheorie* di Meinong, ci viene offerto da Bernard Bolzano, il primo autore di questa storia. Bolzano assume all'interno del suo universo, in cui si danno anche oggetti non esistenti, una classe di oggetti logici, le cosiddette rappresentazioni senza oggetto [*gegenstandslose Vorstellungen*], vale a dire - nel suo linguaggio - rappresentazioni in sé [*Vorstellungen an sich*] cui non corrisponde nessun oggetto, in quanto gli attribuiscono proprietà fra loro contraddittorie, oppure che non si ritrovano nell'esperienza. Nell'ambiente filosofico austriaco a cavallo fra la seconda metà del XIX e l'inizio del XX sec., le rappresentazioni senza oggetto non vengono accolte nei termini in cui erano state elaborate da Bolzano, ma vengono, in un certo senso, capovolte; al loro posto compaiono gli oggetti non esistenti contraddittori oppure non fattuali. Dalle rappresentazioni senza oggetto di Bolzano si giunge, attraverso una duplice mediazione, quella di Robert Zimmermann e quella ben più determinante di Kazimierz Twardowski, il vero artefice del capovolgimento, agli oggetti non esistenti di Alexius Meinong. Quel che vorrei cercare di ricostruire è la maniera in cui avviene il capovolgimento e gli sviluppi teorici cui esso dà luogo. Procediamo dunque col chiederci: cosa intende specificamente Bolzano per 'rappresentazione in sé' e, quindi, per 'rappresentazione senza oggetto'? Le rappresentazioni in sé possono anche essere denominate concetti (4); se questo può dare un idea del tipo di nozione con cui abbiamo a che fare, restano tuttavia ancora da spiegare le due caratteristiche essenziali corrispondenti alle espressioni di 'in sé [*an sich*]' e 'senza oggetto [*gegenstands los*]'.." (pp. 118-119)

(4) Sulla scelta del termine 'rappresentazione' preferito a quello di 'concetto', cfr._ B. Bolzano, *Wzssenschaftslehre*. Versuch einer ausführlichen und grossentheils neuen Darstellurzg der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter, 4 Bde., Sulzbach, J. E. v. Seidelschen Buchhandlung 1837, Bd. I, § 50, p. 222-223 (d'ora in avanti *WL*). Per le citazioni si è tenuta presente l'edizione critica della *Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe*, Reihe I: Schriften, Bde. 11-14: Wissenschaftslehre, hrsg. von J. Berg, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt, Frommann/Holzboog 1985 sgg.

39. Raspa, Venanzio. 2011. "Bolzano e la filosofia austriaca." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:245-285.
"Nel trattare di Bolzano e la filosofia austriaca non si può non parlare di un terzo termine che li lega indissolubilmente: la censura. L'azione censoria dell'autorità politica interviene in maniera preponderante non solo nel determinare le sorti e i modi della difficoltosa e relativamente tarda diffusione del pensiero bolzaniano all'interno della Monarchia asburgica, ma anche nella definizione di filosofia austriaca quale categoria storiografica. È un fatto che, dal 20 gennaio 1820, Bolzano fu sospeso dall'insegnamento e gli fu proibito sia di predicare, sia di pubblicare entro i confini austriaci, così che la maggior parte dei suoi libri uscirono all'estero e spesso anonimi. Successivamente, alla condanna viennese si aggiunse quella romana, con la messa all'indice di due suoi libri, le Erhauungsreden für Akademiker (nel 1828) e il *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* (nel 1839). Ed è altresì un fatto che, se si vuole caratterizzare la filosofia austriaca, non si può non farlo attraverso la sua opposizione a Kant e agli idealisti tedeschi, le cui opere furono ugualmente censurate nell'Austria di allora." (p. 245, nota omessa)

40. ———. 2018. "Le vicende del contenuto attraverso Bolzano, Twardowski e Meinong." *Paradigmi* no. 36:31-48.
Abstract: "Distinguishing between mental act and content of representations and propositions in themselves, Bolzano offers a logico-semantical notion of content. Twardowski opposes to it a psychological conception of the content of representations and identifies the content of the judgment,

in the case of existential judgments, with the existence of the object, in the case of judgments about a relation, with the subsistence of the relation. In opposition to Twardowski, Meinong does not confound logical and psychological content and shows, by means of the notion of presentation, that a content is present in all experiences, including emotions."

41. Scholz, Heinrich. 1983. *Storia della logica*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
    Edizione originale 1931. Traduzione di Enzo Melandri. Introduzione e aggiornamento blbliografico di Carlo Ce!lucci.
    "Ma a questo punto tutto quanto precede viene talmente messo in ombra dall'opera di Bolzano, che il confronto stesso lo fa scomparire; poiché il grande Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) nei primi tre volumi della sua *Dottrina della scienza* (in quattro volumi) del 1837 (ristampa Felix Meiner, Leipzig 1929-1931) ci ha dato un'introduzione alla logica da cui c'è tanto da imparare che non si può fare a meno di esclamare: prendi e leggi! Parliamo di un'introduzione alla logica, a malgrado della vastissima mole, per accennare al fatto che il centro di gravità dell'opera non va ricercato nella teoria della deduzione in quanto tale - al livello cui Bolzano elevò le esigenze che la logica deve soddisfare, una nuova teoria poteva fornirla solo la logistica - ma bensì nelle tante considerazioni particolari così acute e istruttive che conducono dentro i problemi di questa logica in modo più profondo e brillante di tutto ciò cbe non si trova, nel senso del calcolo logico, sulla linea del grande Leibniz. E in un modo tale da rendere queste illuminanti considerazioni in grandissima parte (parte che andrebbe precisata almeno una volta con esattezza!) indipendenti dalla teoria augustiniana delle verità e idee in sé, su cui Bolzano le imbastì." (p. 58)
42. Šebestik, Jan. 2011. "Bolzano e la matematica." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:287-320.
    "Bolzano pratica la matematica con spirito filosofico, concettuale, e benché si trovino nei suoi lavori, e in particolare nella *Functionenlehre*, centinaia di teoremi

originali ed essenziali, gli capita spesso di concentrarsi nell'elaborazione di nuove definizioni che vertono su concetti in apparenza ben noti, come quelli di numero naturale, di numero reale, di limite, di dimensione, di retta o di curva o, come dice il titolo di un testo manoscritto, *Geometrische Begriffe, die Jeder kennt und nicht kennt*. Reciprocamente, in logica, la matematica gli serve non solo come serbatoio inesauribile di esempi, ma soprattutto come strumento che permette di provare una tesi essenziale della sua logica, la sussistenza dell'insieme infinito delle verità in sé. La maggior parte delle sue molteplici dimostrazioni si basa in effetti sulle proprietà della serie dei numeri naturali, come afferma Bolzano nel paragrafo 13 dei *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*.
In primo luogo, quattro cose lo interessano in materia di filosofia della matematica: *lo statuto degli oggetti matematici in sé,* l'ordine dei teoremi, o, come dice lui stesso, l*a connessione oggettiva delle verità,* la scelta o, più esattamente, la *ricerca* degli assiomi - poiché il matematico non deve sceglierli, ma trovarli - e il concetto di prova." (pp. 287-288)

43. Simons, Peter. 2011. "Bolzano e la logica." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 21:321-342.
Traduzione di Giorgio Volpe.
La versione originale in inglese *Bolzano's Logic* è disponibile sul sito academia.edu.
"Introduzione
Nel periodo della storia della logica compreso fra la morte di Leibniz (1716) e la pubblicazione della *Begriffsschrift* di Frege (1879) spiccano due date. Una è il 1847, anno in cui la *Mathematical Analysis of Logic* di George Boole introdusse nello studio del ragionamento i metodi algebrici. L altra, assai meno sbandierata sul momento e per lungo tempo dopo l'evento, fu la pubblicazione nel 1837 della *Wissenschaftslehre* (*Dottrina della scienza*, d'ora in poi WL) di Bolzano. I due tentativi, separati da un solo decennio e indipendenti uno dall altro, sono complementari. Mentre Boole si applicò a introdurre il rigore e il metodo matematico nel ragionamento logico, Bolzano si sforzò di

iniettare il rigore logico nel metodo della matematica, oltre che di altre discipline. La logica algebrica di Boole introdusse un approccio simbolico e algoritmico che condusse infine ai metodi logici dell'informatica, mentre la trattazione bolzaniana dei concetti logici anticipò di un secolo le definizioni semantiche moderne di alcuni concetti logici chiave. Entrambi gli aspetti, quello algoritmico e quello semantico, informano la logica moderna. Ma Bolzano è il padre della semantica logica. Questo articolo espone gli elementi chiave della sua rivoluzione logica." (p. 121, note omesse)

44. van Wierst, Pauline. 2016. "Profili: Bernard Bolzano." *AphEx. Portale Italiano di Filosofia Analitica* no. 14.
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano (1781?1848) `e probabilmente il pensatore pi`u sottovalutato dell'Ottocento.
Ha anticipato di cent'anni la definizione semantica di verit`a e di conseguenza logica di Tarski, ha dato alla logica e alla matematica una nuova e rigorosa fondazione, e ha fornito la prima analisi dettagliata di spiegazione scientifica. In matematica ha ottenuto risultati che vengono insegnati ancora oggi in ogni classe di matematica delle scuole superiori, come il teorema di Bolzano-Weierstrass e la prima prova rigorosa del teorema dei valori intermedi.
A causa dell'isolamento dalla communità accademica, del divieto di pubblicare e delle premature anticipazioni, le sue opere (in particolare quelle filosofiche) non ottennero ai suoi tempi l'attenzione che avrebbero invece meritato. In questo profilo ci proponiamo principalmente di presentare i suoi contributi in merito alla metodologia scientifica. Considereremo sia le sue riflessioni in proposito, sia le idee innovative che in tali riflessioni trovarono la loro origine. In particolare, vedremo in che modo tali riflessioni lo hanno portato a sviluppare diverse nozioni di conseguenza logica, una nozione altamente originale della distinzione analitico/sintetico, una caratterizzazione della spiegazione scientifica, nonché una teoria dei numeri fondata su una teoria degli insiemi e delle parti. A tal fine, verrà presentata una selezione delle sue idee metafisiche, logiche e matematiche che, lungi dal potersi considerare esaustiva,

risulta tuttavia indispensabile all’esposizione e comprensione di questi contenuti in chiave sistematica."

45. Voltaggio, Franco. 1974. *Bernard Bolzano e la dottrina della scienza*. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.
Premessa 7; Introduzione 9; Parte prima: Logica come Dottrina della Scienza; 1. L'idea generale della logica 27; 2. La concezione generale della verità (Presupposti) 55; 3. La concezione generale della verità (Le verità in sé) 79; Parte seconda: L'Infinito come criterio di verità. 1. Dell'esistenza di un numero infinito di verità in sé 89; 2. Infinito e totalità 119; Parte terza: La critica della filosofia trascendentale. 1. Critica della prospettiva trascendentale kantiana 159; 2. Critica della dialettica hegeliana 209; 3. L'ontologia bolzaniana come fondamento della moderna teoria dell'intenzionalità 239; Postilla 263; Bibliografia 265-275.

Related pages

The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

Selected Bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Bernard Bolzano:

- Studies in English (First Part: A - B)
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- Studies in English (Third Part: Gie - L)
- Studies in English (Fourth Part: M - R)
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- Bibliography of the English translations
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- Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Studien
- Vollständige Liste der Bände der Reihe Beiträge zur Bolzano Forschung

Theory and History of Ontology

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Bernard Bolzano: Bibliographie philosophische Schriften

Bolzano's Writings

"A comprehensive Bolzano bibliography up to 1999, compiled by Jan Berg, Edgar Morscher, and Anneliese Müller, has recently appeared as Vol. E2/3 of the Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe (BBGA). Vol. E 2/1, which was prepared by Berg, Morscher, and Marie Pavlíková, contains a bibliography spanning 1824–1970; two supplements to this volume (prepared by Berg and Morscher) extend this to the beginning of 1987. Three further installments by Berg and Morscher entitled Bolzano-Forschung (Salzburg, 1989; St Augustin, 1992, 2000) cover the years 1987–98. (...) Bolzano's manuscripts are divided between the National Library in Vienna, the NationalMuseum, and theMuseum of National Literature in Prague. For catalogues of these collections, see Vols. E 2/1 and E 2/2 of the BBGA. A considerable part of Bolzano's personal library was incorporated into the collection of the National and University Library in Prague. For details, see P. M. Schenkel. *Bernard Bolzanos Bibliothek*, 2 Vols (St Augustin, 2002). Our bibliography begins with a chronologically ordered list of Bolzano's published works, followed by the plan for the Gesamtausgabe (with facing page English translation), translations of Bolzano's works, and selected secondary literature. We aim to be nearly comprehensive with respect to Bolzano's own writings, in the original and in translation,

but not, for reasons of space, with respect to the secondary literature."

Paul Rusnock, Jan Šebestík, "Bernard Bolzano: His Life and Work", New York: Oxford University Press, p. 599.

Biografien in deutscher Sprache

Abkürzungen:
BBGA = Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe
WL = Wissenschaftslehre

1. Fels, Heinrich. 1929. *Bernard Bolzano. Sein Leben und sein Werk*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.
2. Winter, Eduard. 1949. *Leben und geistige Entwicklung des Sozialethikers und Mathematikers Bernard Bolzano*. Halle: Niemeyer.
3. ———. 1969. *Bernard Bolzano. Ein Lebensbild*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
   BGA I.1.
4. Christian, Curt, ed. 1981. *Bernard Bolzano, Leben und Wirkung*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
   Inhalt: Jaromir Louzil: Bernard Bolzanos Sitten- und Gesellschaftslehre 5; Marie Pavlikova: Bernard Bolzanos Lehrjahre 29; Pavel Krivsky: Das Entstehen, die Herausgabe und das Projekt der 2. Ausgabe von Bolzanos Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft 62; Eduard Winter: Das doppelte Gesicht der Religionswissenschaft Bernard Bolzanos 85; Edgar Morscher: Bolzanos *Wissenschaftslehre* 99; Curt Christian: Bemerkungen zu drei Einwänden gegen Bolzano 127-147.
5. Zeithammer, Gregor. 1997. *Bolzano-Biographie*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
   Gesamtausgabe Reihe IV: Dokumente. Band 2. Edited by Gerhard Zwerschke.
   English summary: "The Bolzano biography written by Gregor Zeithammer (1800-1881) has up to now only been

cited in excerpts. The text-critical, annotated edition of the manuscript from Zeithammers literary estate, which is preserved at the literary archives in Prague, makes this important source for research on Bolzano completely accessible."
German summary: "German description: Die Bolzano-Biographie von Gregor Zeithammer (1800-1881) wurde bisher nur in Auszugen zitiert. Die textkritische, kommentierte Edition des Manuskripts aus dem Zeithammer-Nachlass des Literaturarchivs in Prag macht diese wichtige Quelle der Bolzano-Forschung nun vollstandig zuganglich."

6. Morscher, Edgar, and Müller, Anneliese, eds. 2016. *Beiträge zu Bolzanos Biographie von Josef Hoffmann und Anton Wißhaupt sowie vier weiteren Zeitzeugen*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
   Gesamtausgabe Reihe IV: Dokumente. Band 3.

Bibliographien in deutscher Sprache

Abkürzungen:
BBGA = Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe
WL = Wissenschaftslehre

1. Berg, Jan, Morscher, Edgar, and Pavlíková, Marie, eds. 1972. *Bolzano-Bibliographie und Editionsprinzipien der Gesamtausgabe. Bibliographie - Erste Abteilung*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
   BGA 2.1.
   Inhaltverzeichnis: Editionsprinzipien der Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe 7; Katalog des Bolzano-Nachlasses in der österreichischen Nationalbibliothek von Jan Berg 17; Katalog des Nachlasses 19; Personenverzeichnis 78; Bolzano - Bibliographie von Jan Berg, Edgar Morscher und Marie Pavlíková 81; Bolzanos veröffentlichte Schriften 85; Literatur über Bolzano 98; Chronologisches Register 157; Übersicht nach Sachgebieten 162; Anhang: Gliederung der Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe 171-180.

"Allegemeine Prinzipien
Die Bernard Bolzano - Gesamtausgabe wird in folgende vier Reihen gegliedert:
I. Schriften
Darunter werden alle zu Lebzeiten Bolzanos veröffentlichten Schriften verstanden.
II. Nachlaß
Die Nachlaßreihe soll alle erst nach dem Tode Bolzanos veröffentlichten Schriften enthalten. Auch vollendete Manuskripte oder Abschriften solcher Manuskripte Bolzanos werden wiedergegeben. Über die Aufnahme fragmentarisch erhaltener oder unvollendeter Werke, sowie von Bolzano regelmäßig gemachter Aufzeichnungen, vereinzelter Notizen und Glossen zu fremden Werken wird von Fall zu Fall entschieden. Glossen zu eigenen Werken werden bei der Wiedergabe berücksichtigt.
Nicht wiedergegeben werden aus Gründen des ungeheuren Umfangs Vorstufen aufgenommener Letztfassungen sowie im allgemeinen Abschriften, Exzerpte und Übersetzungen Bolzanos von Werken anderer Autoren.
III. Briefwechsel
Es werden alle Briefe Bolzanos mit den entsprechenden Schreiben der Briefpartner aufgenommen. Die Briefe werden zunächst nach Partnern und innerhalb der so entstandenen Gruppen dann chronologisch geordnet. Über die verlorengegangenen Briefe von und an Bolzano wird nach Möglichkeit berichtet.
IV. Dokumente
Als Ergänzung zur Gesamtausgabe bietet diese Reihe ausgewählte Dokumente und Bilder zur Lebensgeschichte Bolzanos." (S. 9)

2. Berg, Jan, and Morscher, Edgar, eds. 1982. *Supplement I: Ergänzungen und Korrekturen zur Bolzano-Bibliographie (Stand: Ende 1981)*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
BGA 2.1. Supplement I.
"Die Ergänzungen und Korrekturen beziehen sich auf die erste Abteilung des zweiten Einleitungsbandes der Bernard

Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe, der vor genau zehn Jahren erschien.
Die mit einem Sternchen (*) versehenen Nummern sind bereits in der ursprünglichen Bibliographie enthalten. Es wird hier nur eine Korrektur vorgenommen oder eine Ergänzung hinzugefügt.
Bei Ergänzung einer Nummer, die aus chronologischen Gründen zwischen zwei Nummern der ursprünglichen Bibliographie einzufügen ist, wird eine Dezimalnumerierung verwendet.
Es kommt hier gegenüber der ursprünglichen Bibliographie ein Abschnitt neu hinzu, in dem die anonymen Schriften verzeichnet sind. In diesem Abschnitt wird auch auf diejenigen anonym erschienenen Schriften verwiesen, deren Verfasser identifiziert werden konnte." (S. 7)

3. ———, eds. 1988. *Supplement II: Ergänzungen zur Bolzano-Bibliographie (Stand: Anfang 1987)*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
BGA 2.1. Supplement II.
"Bolzanos veröffentlichte Schriften sowie die bisher erschienenen Bände der Gesamtausgabe werden vollständig registriert, während bei der Literatur über Bolzano und bei den anonymen Schriften nur Ergänzungen angeführt werden. Diese Ergänzungen beziehen sich auf die erste Abteilung des zweiten Einleitungsbandes der Bernard-Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe (Bolzano (E2/1)), der vor sechzehn Jahren erschien, und auf das erste Supplement zur Bolzano-Bibliographie (Bolzano (E2/1, Suppl.I)), das vor sechs Jahren erschien.
Die mit einem Sternchen (*) versehenen Nummern sind bereits in der ursprünglichen Bibliographie bzw. im ersten Supplement enthalten. Es wird hier nur eine Korrektur vorgenommen oder eine Ergänzung hinzugefügt.
Bei Ergänzung einer Nummer, die aus chronologischen Gründen zwischen zwei Nummern der ursprünglichen Bibliographie bzw. des ersten Supplements einzufügen ist, wird eine Dezimalnumerierung verwendet." (S. 7)

4. Krivsky, Pavel, and Pavlíková, Marie, eds. 2006. *Katalog des Bolzano-Nachlasses im Literaturarchiv des Museums*

der Nationalen Literatur in Prag – a. Einleitung – b. Katalog des Nachlasses – c. Personenregister. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
BGA 2.2.

5. Berg, Jan, Morscher, Edgar, and Müller, Anneliese, eds. 2015. *Bolzano-Gesamtbibliographie 1804–1999*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
BGA 2.1.3.
English summary: "This bibliography documents all of the works written by Bolzano and published up to December 31, 1999 (some of them anonymously), in chronological order, including all reprints, new editions and translations. In addition all those books and essays published up to this time whose titles establish a connection to Bolzano as well as further books, essays, reviews and articles in lexicons which are relevant for Bolzano research are registered here. Since many of Bolzano's works as well as those of his students and friends and his adversaries were published anonymously, these have been noted and put in chronological order in a section of their own (in many cases it was possible to identify the authors)."
6. Gombocz, Wolfgang L., Haller, Rudolf, and Henrichs, Norbert, eds. 1986. *International Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy / Internationale Bibliographie zur Österreichen Philosophie (IBÖP) 1974/1975*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Teil 1: Seiten 1* - 73*.
1. W.L. Gombocz, R. Haller, N. Henrichs: Vorwort 7*; Literaturhinweise zur IBÖP 12*; 2. Bildnis: Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) 14*; 3. Aufsatz: (Jan Berg, Edgard Morscher: Bernard Bolzano -- Der österreichische Philosoph 15*; 4. Hinweise für den Gebrauch der Bibliographie und Register 66*; 5. How to Use Bibliography and Index 70*;
Teil 2: Seiten 1-98.
6. Bibliographie 1-51; Dokumente 1-999; Sachregister 53-83; Namenregister 85-98.
Bibliographe zu Bolzano: pp. 54* - 63*.
7. Berg, Jan, and Morscher, Edgar, eds. 1989. *Bolzano-Forschung 1987-1988*. Salzburg: Forschungsinstitut Philosophie/Technik/Wirtschaft der Universität Salzburg.

8. ———, eds. 1992. *Bolzano-Forschung 1989-1991*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
   Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe: Gliederung 11; Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe: Bisher erschienene Bände 25; Bolzano-Bibliographie: Ergänzungen 37; Akademische Schriften, Publikationen und Projekte 109; Eine neue Auswahlausgabe der *Wissenschaftslehre* 111; Bolzano-Stiftung in Prag: Gründung 117; Bolzano-Gasse in Wien 118; Internationales Bolzano-Symposium in Salzburg 119; Internationale Bolzano-Gesellschaft: Gründung 121; Internationale Bolzano-Gesellschaft: Statuten 123.
9. ———, eds. 1999. *Bolzano-Forschung 1992-1998*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
   Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe: Gliederung 11; Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe: Bisherige Bände 25; Bolzano-Bibliographie: Ergänzungen 43; Dissertationen und Diplomarbeiten über Bolzano 157; Wissenschaftliche Tagungen über Bolzano 159; Die Internationale Bernard-Bölzano-Gesellschaft (Salzburg) 161; Die Stiftung Bemard Bolzano (Prag) 163; Forschungsprojekte zu Leben und Werk Bolzanos 167; Anita von Duhn: Bolzanos Kritik an Kants theoretischer Philosophie 169; Sandra Lapointe: Husserl - von Bolzano zu Kant 181; Jane Regenfelder: Die Bolzano-Frage im Spiegel der Wiener Polizeiakten 189; Peter Michael Schenkel: Bolzanos Bibliothek als Schlüssel zur Interpretation seines Systems 197; Edgar Morscher, Kurt Strasser: Die wissenschaftliche Erfassung von Bolzanos Erbauungsreden 205; Miszellen. Jan Berg: Nichts 209; Edgar Morscher: Robert Zimmermann - Begründer der Gegenstandstheorie? 213; Edgar Morscher: Chisholms Bolzano 221; Edgar Morscher: Bolzano und die Freimaurerei 231; Personenregister 249.

Studien auf Ihre Logik und Ontologie

1. *Bolzano als Logiker. Bolzano-Symposion am 17 und 18 Dezember 1973*. 1974. Wien: Verlag der Österreichische

Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Anlässlich des 125. Todestages Bernard Bolzanos (+ 18 Dezember 1848).
Inhalt: Eduard Winter: Religionsphilosophie und Logik bei B. Bolzano 5; Jan Berg: Was ist ein Satz nach Bolzano? 21; Marie Pavlikova: Bolzanos wissenschaftlicher Nachlass in Prag, seine Neuordnung und Bolzanos Manuskripte zur Logik 31; Christian Curt: Ableitbarkeit und Abfolge bei Bolzano 47; Jaromír Louzil: Bolzanos Begriff der Anschauung 63; Edgar Morscher: "Philosophische Logik" bei Bernard Bolzano 77-105.

2. "Bolzano Studien." 1987. *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:351-499.
Inhalt (Essays in Deutsch): Edgar Morscher: Vorwort des Herausgegebers 351-352;
I. Zur Biographie Bolzanos.
Jan Berg, Heinrich Ganthaler, Edgar Morscher: Bolzanos Biographie in tabellarischer Übersicht 353-372;
III. Zur Problematik der Paradoxien.
Edgar Morscher: "Hintertürln" für Paradoxien in Bolzanos Logik 414-422;
IV: Wahrscheinlichkeit, Induktion und Syllogistik.
G. Dorn: Zu Bolzanos Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre 423-441; Morscher Edgar: Bolzanos Syllogistik 447-451;
V. Beiträge zur Metaphyk Bolzanos.
Heinrich von Ganthaler, Peter Simons: Bernard Bolzanos Kosmologischer Gottesbeweis 469-475; A. Süssbauer: Propositionen und Sachverhalte in der österreichen Philosophie von Bolzano bis Popper 476-498.
3. Behnoud, Ali. 2000. *Bolzanos Beiträge zur Mathematik und ihrer Philosophie*. Bern: Gerd Grassoff.
4. Berg, Jan. 1967. "Bolzano als Logiker." *Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse*:95-120.
Band 252, Teil IV.
Bernard Bolzano. Ein Denker und Erzieher im österreichischen Vormärz. [Von] Eduard Winter in Verbindung mit Paul Funk und Jan Berg.

5. ———. 1974. "Was ist ein Satz nach Bolzano?" In *Bolzano als Logiker. Bolzano-Symposion*, 21-30. Wien: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
6. ———. 1976. "Bolzanos Metaphysik." In *West-Begegnung in Österreich: Festschrift für E. Winter*, edited by Oberkofler, G. and Zablinger, E., 27-33. Wien: Hermann Böhlau.
7. ———. 1983. "Bernard Bolzano: Die Überwindung des Skeptizismus." In *Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit III*, edited by Speck, Josef, 46-97. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
8. ———. 1990. "Zur logischen und mathematischen Ontologie. Geneseologie und Resultatismus in der Analyse der Grundlagen der Bolzanoschen Zahlenlehre." In *Rechnung mit dem Unendlichen*, edited by Spalt, Detlef D., 123-155. Basel.
   Abstrakt: "Im Einklang mit den allgemeinen Richtlinien dieser Tagung werde ich anhand des konkreten Beispiels der Zahlenlehre von Bernard Bolzano Stellung nehmen zur Frage, ob die Nichtstandard-Analysis für die moderne Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung von Bedeutung ist. Dabei müssen zunächst die ontologischen Grundlagen der Bolzanoschen Zahlenlehre dargestellt werden."
9. ———. 1992. "Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848)." In *Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language / La philosophie du langage*, edited by Steger, Hugo and Wiegand, Herbert Stern, 381-393. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft. Band 7.1
   Inhalt: 1. Wahrheit; 1.1 Sätze an sich; 1.2 Vorstellungen an sich; 1.3 Sprachliche Sätze; 1.4 Begriffssätze; 2. Logische Wahrheit; 2.1 Variationslogik; 2.2 Analytische Sätze; 2.3 Logische Konsequenz; 2.4 Bewertungssemantik; 3. Literatur in Auswahl.
10. ———. 1999. "Kant über analytische und synthetische Urteile mit Berûcksichtigung der Lehren Bolzanos." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 97-128. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

11. ———. 1999. "Naturphilosophie, Physik und Mathematik bei Bolzano." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 257-265. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
12. Berg, Jan, and Morscher, Edgar. 1987. "Bolzanos Biographie in tabellarischer Übersicht." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:353-372.
13. Bergmann, Hugo. 1909. *Das philosophisches Werk Bernard Bolzano mit Benutzung ungedruckter Quellen kritisch untersucht*. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
Nebst einen Anhange: *Bolzanos Beiträge zur philosophischen Grundlegung der Mathematik*.
Nachdruck: Hildesheim, Georg Olms 1970.
"Der in Prag geborene Autor [Hugo Bergmann] dieses immer noch sehr lesenswerten Buches war zwölf Jahre lang Klassenkamerad Franz Kafkas; zusammen mit Kafka hörte er Martys Vorlesungen über "Deskriptive und genetische Psychologie", bestand im Unterschied zu seinem Freund die anschließende Prüfung (155) und promovierte bei Marty über "Die Atomtheorie im 19. Jahrhundert" ("ein Beitrag zur Problemgeschichte der Philosophie"). Im zionistischen Studentenverein Bar-Kochba war er eines der literarisch produktivsten Mitglieder.(156)
Bergmann stellt in der ersten Hälfte seiner Bolzano-Monographie auf 100 Seiten Bolzanos "Logik" dar, dann jeweils sehr komprimiert seine Psychologie, seine Ästhetik, seine praktische Philosophie, seine Metaphysik und schließlich in einem 50-seitigen Anhang seine Philosophie der Mathematik. Anders als Marty verkennt Bergmann nicht, daß von Bolzanos Sätzen an sich manche wahr und manche falsch sind, aber er stimmt der Sache nach mit seinem Lehrer überein, wenn er dann die Annahme falscher Sätze an sich als haltlos darzutun sucht.(157) Bergmann vermißt bei Bolzano eine angemessene Deskription der Beziehung zwischen urteilendem Subjekt und Sätzen an sich, und er kritisiert, wie andere Brentanisten vor ihm, daß Bolzano auch synkategorematischen Satzteilen eine (Vorstellung an sich als) Bedeutung zuspricht.(158)

1911 verhandelte Hugo Bergmann in Halle mit dem Geschäftsführer der Kant-Gesellschaft wegen der Herausgabe der Werke Bolzanos. Was dieses Ziel seiner Deutschland-Reise anging, war Bergmann optimistisch: “Die Ausgabe hängt jetzt wohl nur noch davon ab, ob sie nicht schon von anderer Seite gemacht wird. Ich hätte zunächst die 4 Bde Wissenschaftslehre herauszugeben, jedes Jahr einen Band. Wegen Habilitation ist hier nichts zu machen, wegen der zu auffallenden Konfession”.(159) Bergmann lehnte es ab, sich um des Erwerbs der venia legendi willen taufen zu lassen (wie Brentano ihm riet) oder aus der Zionistischen Organisation auszutreten (wie Stumpf verlangte).(160) Und auch seine editorischen Pläne scheiterten - Alois Höfler gewann das Rennen." (S. 58-60)

(155) Vgl. Bergmanns “Erinnerungen an Franz Kafka”, in: Universitas 27 (1972), S.739-750.

(156) In einem von diesem Verein herausgegebenen Sammelband erschien 1913 in Leipzig Hugo Bergmanns religionsphilosophischer Aufsatz “Die Heiligung des Namens” [wiederabgedruckt in: Kurt Wilhelm (Hrsg.), Jüdischer Glaube, Bremen o.J., S. 396-409], über den Max Brod schreibt: “kaum jemals hat in der Folgezeit ein Schriftwerk einen so erleuchtenden Eindruck auf mich gemacht” (Brod, S.228).

(157) H.Bergmann 1909, V (zu §8), S.12f„ 15,27; vgl. Selbstanzeige, S.561.

(158) Vgl. A.Marty, Untersuchungen, S.337f.; K.Twardowski, Vorstellungen, S. 23. Husserl nimmt hier eine vermittelnde Position ein: TV. Logische Untersuchung, §§4-5.

(159) Schmuel Hugo Bergman, Tagebücher und Briefe 1901-1975, 2 Bde., hrsg.v.Miriam Sambursky, Jüdischer Verlag/Athenäum, Frankfurt 1985, Bd.l, S.40.

(160) Vgl. Bergmanns Briefwechsel mit Brentano und Stumpf: op.cit., S. 42-44, 49-53, 542; und “Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Beigmann”, S. 130-136. Bolzano hätte Bergmann gerade in diesem Punkte seinen Respekt erwiesen: “[D]aß die Nation der Juden [...] bei allem dem im Ganzen noch immer viel zu gewissenhaft ist, als daß sie [...],

nur um ihre Lage zu verbessern, das Christenthum annehmen wollte, gereicht noch zu ihrem Lobe” (Bolzano, Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, Bd. II, S. 18 f.).
Wolfgang Künne, *"Die Ernte wird erscheinen.." Die Geschichte de Bolzano-Rezeption (1849-1939)*, im: Heinrich Ganthaler und Otto Neumaier (Hrsg.), *Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1997, S. 9-82.

14. ———. 1966. "Bolzano und Brentano." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 48:306-311.
"Als vor einigen Jahren in Ostberlin ein Symposion über Bernhard Bolzano abgehalten wurde, wendete sich Prof. Eduard Winter an mich und forderte mich auf, „als ältesten lebenden Bolzano-Forscher", wie er sich ausdrückte, meine Erinnerungen über die Beziehungen zwischen Brentano und Bolzano niederzuschreiben, insbesondere die Frage zu beantworten: Wie stand Brentano zu Bolzano?
Dieser Aufforderung entstammt die nachfolgende Veröffentlichung.
Ich bin in der angenehmen Lage, hier Brentano selbst zu Wort kommen zu lassen. Im Nachstehenden drucke ich drei Brentano-Texte ab, welche die Antwort auf die an mich gestellte Frage geben." (S. 306)
15. Berka, Karel. 1980. "Christian Wolff und Bernard Bolzano." In *Christian Wolff als Philosoph der Aufklärung in Deutschland*, edited by Gerlach, Hans-Martin, Schenk, Günter and Thaler, Burchard, 57-62. Halle-Wittenberg: Wissenschaftspublizistik der Martin-Luther-Universität. Hallesches Wolff-Kolloquium 1979 anlässlich der 300. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages.
16. ———. 1992. "Bolzanos Lehre vom natürlichen Schliessen." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 141-161. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
"In meinem Aufsatz beabsichtige ich zu zeigen, dass Bolzanos’ Lehre vom Schluss einen relevanten Beitrag zum natürlichen Schliessen beinhaltet, aus den man eher auf eine positive Einschätzung dieses Bestandteiles seiner Logik schliessen kann. Meine Interpretation will dabei die Schwächen seiner Auffassung, wie sie besonders vom

heutigen Standpunkt ersichtlich sind, in keinen Falle verschweigen. Da Bolzano in seiner spezifischen Erweiterung der Syllogistik sowie in seinem Ansatz zum definiten Klassenkalkül die Methode des natürlichen Schliessens nur ganz intuitiv angewendet hat, werde ich in meiner Rekonstruktion keine systematische und streng formale Darstellung anstreben. Ich werde mich deswegen nur auf solche - natürlich nicht alle - Stellen beschränken, in denen diese Methode in einer hinreichenden Weise im Texte dargelegt ist. Ein solcher Zutritt entspricht der historischen Entwicklung der Logik, in der das natürliche Schliessen - obzwar es bereits schon von Aristoteles benutzt wurde - in einer systematischen Art und Weise erst in den dreissiger Jahren unseres Jahrhundert unabhängig von G. Gentzen und St. Jaskowski herausgearbeitet wurde." (S. 142)

17. Beyer, Christian. 1996. *Von Bolzano zu Husserl. Eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre*. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Inhalt: lnhaltsverzeichnis 1; Einleitung 3; Erstes Kapitel. Die Phänomenoiogie der logischen Erlebnisse 7; Zweites Kapitel. Boizano pur: Die wesentlichen Unterscheidungen 53; Drittes Kapitel. Bolzano, Lotze, Husser!: Die Spezies-Konzeption der Bedeutung 131; Literatur 187; Index 193-203.
"Ich werde im zweiten Kapitel zunachst einige zentrale Bestandstücke der in den ersten beiden Banden der 'Wissenschaftslehre' dargestellten Urteils- und v.a. *Vorstellungslehre*, die fur Husserl wichtig geworden sind, in möglichst *unmodijizierter* Form prasentieren. Dieses Kapitel wirft ein ganz neues Licht auf Bolzanos Beitrag zur Philosophie der Sprache und des Geistes. Im dritten Kapitel werde ich dann Husserls Lotze- inspirierte 'Interpretation' dieser Lehre vorstellen, was u.a. ein naheres Eingehen auf Lotzes Erkenntnis- und Ideenlehre (wie sie sich insbesondere im genannten Kapitel Uber die "Ideenwelt" manifestiert) erfordert. Lotzes ldeenlehre erweist sich dabei als auBerordentlich wichtige lnspirationsquelle der Phänomenologie Uberhaupt. Am Ende dieses Kapitels

werden wir, so hoffe ich, Husserls *Platonische Spezies-Konzeption der Bedeutung* vor dem analytisch-phanomenologischen Blick haben. AbschlieBend gebe ich einen Ausblick auf die weitere Entwicklung von Husserls Bedeutungslehre zwischen 1900-1913. Mein besonderes Augenmerk gilt dabei dem Phanomen der Indexikalitat und Husserls auch im Zusammenhang mit der gegenwiirtigen 'lntemalismus / Externalismus'- Debatte hochinteressanten Konzeption des 'noematischen X'." (S. 6)

18. ———. 2001. "Logik, Semantik und Ontologie: neuere Literatur zu Bolzano." *Philosophische Rundschau* no. 48:231-262.
"Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) kann mit einigem Recht als der erste moderne sprachanalytisch Philosoph bezeichnet werden. Sein Hauptwerk, die 1837 erschienene monumentale *Wissenschaftslehre*, zeichnet sich methodisch durch eine nie zuvor dagewesene Kombination aus Problembewußtsein logischen und begriffsanalytischen Feingefühl argumentativer Klarheit und Stringenz aus. Thematisch behandelt Bolzano darin Hauptgebiete der heutigen analytischen Philosophie: Logik, Semantik, Ontologie, Philosophie des Geistes, Erkenntnis-und Wissenschaftstheorie.
Auf vielen dieser Gebiete vollbringt er (wie auch in der Mathematik, Philosophie der Mathematik, Ethik und Religionslehre) bedeutsame wissenschaftlich Pei oniertaten. Bolzano ist ein durch und durch systematisch orientierte Denker, der aber gleichwohl wichtige traditionelle Positionen und (zumeist weniger wichtige) Meinungen seiner zeitgenössischen Kollegen ausfuhrlich berücksichtigt (wenngleich er sie nicht immer pünktlich wiedergibt)." (S. 231)
19. Brandl, Johannes L. 2003. "Die Objektivität der Anschauung: ein Problem in Bolzanos Vorstellungstheorie." In *Philosophie im Geiste Bolzanos*, edited by Hieke, Alexander and Neumaier, Otto, 87-108. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
20. Buhl, Günter. 1961. *Ableitbarkeit und Abfolge in der Wissenschaftstheorie Bolzanos*. Köln: Universitäts Verlag.

Kantstudien, Ergänzungsheft 83.
21. ———. 1968. "Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei Bolzano." In *Beiträge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert*, 63-70. Meisenheim: Anton Hain.
22. Casari, Ettore. 1986. "Bemerkungen über die Bolzanosche *Wissenschafstlehre*." In *Logik und Grundlagenforschung. Festkolloquium zum 100. Geburstag von Heinrich Scholz*, 53-66. Münster: Aschendorff.
23. Centrone, Stefania. 2010. "Bolzano und Leibniz über Klarheit und Deutlichkeit." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 92.
English abstract: "At a time when they had largely fallen into disrepute Bolzano reactivated the distinctions between ‚clear' and ‚obscure', ‚distinct' and ‚confused' ideas. In the central sections of this paper I offer a critical reconstruction of the explanations of these pairs of opposita which are to be found in vol. III of Bolzano's monumental *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837). I then provide a detailed account of its Leibnizian counterparts that were well known to the ‚Bohemian Leibniz', and finally I evaluate Bolzano's criticism thereof."
24. ———. 2010. "Der Reziprozitätskanon in den Beyträgen und in der Wissenschaftslehre." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 64:310-330.
25. ———. 2011. "Begründungen bei Bolzano und beim frühen Husserl." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 65:1-23.
"Vor genau zweihundert Jahren erschien ein Büchlein mit dem Titel *Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik, verfasst von Bernard Bolzano, Weltpriester, Doctor der Philosophie und königlich-kaiserlicher Professor der Religionswissenschaft an der Carl-Ferdinandeischen Universität zu Prag*. Edmund Husserl kannte das Büchlein: in seiner *Formale und Transzendentalen Logik* erzählt er von der „verdienstlichen Neuausgabe der früher so gut wie unzugänglichen Jugendschrift Bolzanos, (*Philosophie der Mathematik oder Beiträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik* (sic!)) die wir H. Fals (sic!) verdanken".(1)

(Leider ist es dem Herausgeber der *Husserliana*-Edition dieses Buchs weder gelungen, den Titel von Bolzanos Opusculum noch den Namen des Herausgebers der Auflage von 1926, der Heinrich Fels hieß, korrekt anzugeben).(2)"
(1) *Formale und transzendentale Logik* [Aufl. 1929] § 26 d).
(2) Vgl. Künne 2010, [*Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges*, Frankfurt/M.] 327.

26. ———. 2012. "Strenge Beweise und das Verbot der *metábasis eis állo génos*. Eine Untersuchung zu Bernard Bolzanos *Beyträgen zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik*." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 33:1-31.
English abstract: "In his booklet 'Contributions to a better founded presentation of mathematics' of 1810 Bernard Bolzano made his first serious attempt to explain the notion of a rigorous proof. Although the system of logic he employed at that stage is in various respects far below the level of the achievements in his later *Wissenschaftslehre*, there is a striking continuity between his earlier and later work as regards the methodological constraints on rigorous proofs. This paper tries to give a perspicuous and critical account of the fragmentary logic of *Beyträge*, and it shows that there is a tension between that logic and Bolzano's methodological ban on 'kind crossing'."
27. ———. 2012. "Das Problem der Apagogischen Beweise in Bolzanos *Beyträgen* und seiner *Wissenschaftslehre*." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 33:127-157.
English abstract: "This paper analyzes and evaluates Bolzano's remarks on the apagogic method of proof with reference to his juvenile booklet 'Contributions to a better founded presentation of mathematics' of 1810 and to his 'Theory of science' (1837). I shall try to defend the following contentions: (1) Bolzanos' vain attempt to transform all indirect proofs into direct proofs becomes comprehensible as soon as one recognizes the following facts: (1.1) his attitude towards indirect proofs with an affirmative conclusion differs from his stance to indirect proofs with a negative conclusion; (1.2) by Bolzano's lights arguments via *consequentia mirabili*s only seem to be indirect. (2) Bolzano

does not deny that indirect proofs can be perfect certifications (*Gewissmachungen*) of their conclusion; what he denies is rather that they can provide grounds for their conclusions. (2.1) They cannot do the latter, since they start from false premises and (2.2) since they make an unnecessary detour. (3) The far-reaching agreement between his early and late assessment of apagogical proofs (in the *Beyträge* of 1810 and the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837) is partly due to the fact that he develops his own position always against the background of Wolff's and Lambert's views."

28. ———. 2012. "Consequentia Mirabilis, Antiskeptizismus und Antinomien. Über Bolzanos Beweis, daß es wenigsten eine Wahrheit an sich; daß es der Wahrheiten mehre, ja unendlich viele gebe." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 66:539-565.
"In seinem Aufsatz *The Structure of Logic and Its Relation to Other Systems* (1920) kritisiert der amerikanische Pragmatist und Logiker Clarence Irving Lewis die „traditionelle rationalistische Auffassung", weil sie logische Gesetze für den Beweis grundlegender metaphysischer Wahrheiten verwendet. Er schreibt:
[T]he attempt to establish incontrovertible truth by deductive procedures is nugatory.
The traditional rationalistic conception that metaphysical first principles can be shown to be logically necessary, or that what is logically prior is more certain or self-evident, is a conception to which the actual structure of logical systems lends no support.(1)
Strenggenommen schreibt Lewis hier der traditionellen rationalistischen Auffassung zwei Thesen zu. Kann man nicht die logische Notwendigkeit metaphysischer Prinzipien akzeptieren und zugleich (mit Bolzano)(2)
bestreiten, dass sie in jedem Fall unmittelbar einleuchtend sind?" (S. 539)
(1) Lewis 1920, [The Structure of Logic and its Relation to Other Systems, in: *The Journal of Philosophy* 18 – 19, 505 – 516], 506.

(2) *BM* [*Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik. Erste Lieferung*] 59 – 60; *WL* [*Wissenschaftslehre*] IV, 191 – 192.

29. Centrone, Stefania, and Künne, Wolfgang. 2011. "Bolzanos Zeichentheorie. Eine Untersuchung zu § 285 der *Wissenschaftslehre*." *Grazer philosophische Studien* no. 83:171-198.
30. Dähnhardt, Simon. 1992. *Wahrheit und Satz an sich. Zum Verhältnis des Logischen zum Psychischen und Sprachlichen in Bernard Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre*. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft.
31. Danek, Jaromir. 1970. *Weiterentwicklung der Leibnizschen Logik bei Bolzano*. Meisenheim a Glan: A. Hain.
32. Dapunt, Inge. 1967. "Macht Bolzanos Logik Existenzvoraussetzungen?" *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 15:1513-1515.
33. ———. 1968. "Zwei Typen von Systemen der traditionellen Logik." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 50:275-281.
    Dieser Essay von Inge Dapunt-Morscher ist nachgedruckt in: Edgar Morscher, *Studien zur Logik Bernard Bolzanos*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2007, pp. 113-120.
34. ———. 1969. "Zur Klarstellung einiger Lehren Bernard Bolzanos." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:63-73.
    "Seiner Abhandlung uber "Frege's Ontology"(1) schickt Reinhardt Grossmann eine Erörterung voraus von "some features of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, for much of what I [i.e., Grossmann] shall have to say about Frege can best be understood against the background of Bolzano's view";(2) und so erfolgen die einleitenden Bemerkungen über Bolzano gerade in der Absicht, "to review some of his [i.e., Frege's] ideas in the light of Bolzano's distinctions."(3) Diese Absicht mag Grossmann dazu veranlasst haben, seine Darstellung der Lehren Bolzanos--im Hinblick auf ihre späitere Brauchbarkeit bei den Ausfiihrungen tiber Frege---ein wenig zu modifizieren; da jodoch Grossmann sich dabei nicht nur auf Bolzano beruft, sondern das Dargelegte ausdrücklich für Bolzanos Ansichten ausgibt mad dies auch

dutch zahlreiche Hinweise auf die *Wissenschaftslehre* Bolzanos zu belegen versucht, scheint er im guten Glauben gewesen zu sein, Bolzanos Gedanken unverändert und getreu wiederzugeben. Ich möchte nun hier nichts anderes zeigen, als dass die Lehren, welche in diesem Aufsatz von Grossmann Bolzano zugeschrieben werden, in vielen Punkten von dem abweichen, was Bolzano tatsächlich behauptet hat, ja teilweise sogar im Widerspruch dazu stehen." (S. 73)

35. ———. 1970. "Zur Frage der Existenzvoraussetzungen in der Logik." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 11:89-96. Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 125-134.
"Auf Grund dieser Aristotelischen Existenzvoraussetzung (wenn auch nicht deswegen allein) ist in der Aristotelischen Logik der Schluss von "*Alle F sind G*" auf "*Einige F sind G*" gültig(2) und—was gleichbedeutend damit ist—die Aussageform "*Wenn: Alle F sind G, dann: Einige F sind G*" allgemeingültig. Man kδnnte nun aber auch ein logisches System ausarbeiten, in dem zwar jene Schlussregel gilt, welche den Ubergang von "*Alle F sind G*" auf "*Einige F sind G*" gestattet, in dem also "*Wenn: Alle F sind G, dann: Einige F sind G*" allgemeingültig ist, nicht aber "*Einige F sind F*". Ein System dieser Art haben wir in der Logik Bernard Bolzanos vor uns. Nach Bolzano gibt es namlich auch gegenstandlose Vorstellungen ansich(3), die wir hier als Korrelat der leeren Klasse auffassen können, mit der sie—bei alien sonstigen Unterschieden—zumindest in dem für uns hier relevanten Punkt ubereinstimmen. Wird nun in "*Einige F sind F*" fur "*F*" der sprachliche Ausdruck einer solchen gegenstandlosen Vorstellung an sich eingesetzt (und dies ist in der Logik Bolzanos durchaus erlaubt), so entsteht daraus eine falsche Aussage. In der Logik Bolzanos ist also "*Einige F sind F*" nicht allgemeingütig, weil hier im Gegensatz zur Aristotelischen Logik fur die Prädikatvariablen "*F*", "*G*" , . . . auch leere Prädikate einsetzbar sind. Trotzdem ist aber in Bolzanos Logik ebenso wie in der Aristotelischen der Schluss von "*Alle F sind G*" auf "*Einige F sind G*" gültig, die Aussageform "*Wenn: Alle F sind G, dann: Einige F sind G*" somit allgemeingültig, und

zwar deshalb, weil Bolzano von jedem Satz an sich, wenn er wahr sein soil, verlangt, dass seine Subjektvorstellung nicht gegenstandlos bzw. leer sein darf, sondern gegenständlich (d. i. nicht - gegenstandlos bzw. nicht-leer) sein muss(4); demnach kann eine Aussage der Form "*Alle F sind G*" nur dann wahr sein, wenn an Stelle von "*F*" der sprachliche Ausdruck einer gegenständlichen Vorstellung an sich und somit ein nicht-leeres Prädikat steht, wenn es daher mindestens ein F gibt, welches dann selbstverständlich auch ein *G* sein muss, weil ja—laut Voraussetzung—jedes *F* ein *G* ist. Immer dann, wenn eine Aussage von der Form "*Alle F sind G*" wahr ist, muss daher auch die entsprechende Aussage "*Einige F sind G*" wahr sein." (. 90-91)
(2) In der traditionellen Logik ist bekanntlich der Schluss von einer universellen Aussage auf die entsprechende partikuläre Aussage gestattet; dadurch wird]a in der Aristotelischen Syllogistik die Güiltigkeit der modi obliqui gewäirleistet. Ich habe hier einen Sonderfall davon herausgegriffen, nämlich den Schluss von einem *A*-Satz (d. i. eine universell affirmative Aussage) auf den dazugehörigen *I*-Satz (d. i. eine partikulä affirmative Aussage).
(3) Bernard Bolzano, Wissenschaflslehre, Sulzbach (1837), Bd. I, S. 304 ff.
(4) Bernard Bolzano, Wissenschaflslehre, Sulzbach (1837), Bd. II, S. 328 ff.

36. Dörn, Georg. 1987. "Zu Bolzanos Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:423-441.
37. Dubislav, Walter. 1929. "Über Bolzano als Kritiker Kants." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*:357-368.
38. ———. 1931. "Bolzano als Vorläufer der mathematischen Logik." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 44:448-456.
39. Duhn, Anita von. 1999. "Bolzanos Kritik an Kants theoretischer Philosophie." In *Bolzano-Forschung 1992-1998*, edited by Berg, Jan and Morscher, Edgar, 169-180. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
40. Fels, Heinrich. 1926. "Bernard Bolzano." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 39:384-418.

41. ———. 1927. "Die Philosophie Bolzanos (I)." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 40:319-336.
42. ———. 1927. "Die Philosophie Bolzanos (II)." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 40:423-448.
43. ———. 1928. "Das apriorische und das empirische Element in der Philosophie Bernard Bolzanos." *Jahrbuch der philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn* no. 3:39-42.
44. Føllesdal, Dagfin. 2004. "Bolzanos bleibende Leistungen." In *Phenomenology & Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*., edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 57-68. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Bolzanos ganze Diskussion von Sätzen und Vorstellungen an sich ist eine Manifestation seines Problembewusstseins: er sah die Probleme des Psychologismus fünfzig Jahre vor Frege und Husserl, er zeigt durch einfache und überzeugende Beispiele die Unhaltbarkeit vieler populärer Ansichten über Vorstellungen und Begriffe, wie etwa die Reziprozität von Umfang und Inhalt, die unkritisch angenommene Korrelation zwischen Teilen einer Vorstellung und *Teilen* ihres Gegenstandes oder zwischen Teilen einer Vorstellung und *Eigenschaften* ihres Gegenstandes. Bolzano ist sich auch des Problems der Identitätskriterien für Begriffe sehr bewusst und schlägt vor, dass Begriffe identisch sind, wenn sie in derselben Weise aus denselben Teilen aufgebaut sind, und dass einfache, nicht-leere Begriffe gleich sind, dann und nur dann wenn sie den gleichen Umfang haben.
Diese Definitionen sind sicherlich nicht ganz ohne Probleme, Bolzanos Versuch ist aber besser als (soweit sie mir bekannt sind) die von anderen Philosophen, die über Begriffe sprechen, und das sind die meisten Philosophen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts." (S. 62)
45. Ganthaler, Heinrich von, and Neumaier, Otto, eds. 1997. *Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Wolfgang Künne: "Die Ernte wird erscheinen ..." Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1849-1939) 9; Peter Stachel: Die Bedeutung von Bolzanos

"Wissenschaftslehre" für die österreichische Philosophiegeschichte. Ein Baustein zu einer Geschichte der pluralistischen Tradition österreichischer Philosophie 83; Edgar Morscher: Robert Zimmermann -- der Vermittler von Bolzanos Gedankengut? Zerstörung einer Legende 145; Kurt Blaukopf: Im Geiste Bolzanos und Herbarts. Ansätze empiristischer Musikforschung in Wien und Prag 237; Kurt F. Strasser: Bewegung und Verwandlung. Arnold Schönberg 265-277.

46. George, Rolf. 1999. "Anschauungen bei Kant und Bolzano." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 129-144. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
47. Gieske, Carsten Uwe. 2001. "Bolzano über den Sinn von "Wahrheit". Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu den Paragraphen 24, 25 und 28 der "Wissenschaftslehre"." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 55:556-570. "Einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Bernard Bolzanos ist der Begriff der Wahrheit an sich. Er ist auch einer der dem Publikum gëlaufigeren Begriffe Bolzanos - so dass eine exegetische Untersuchung, die die Wahrheitsdefinition der *Wissenschaftslehre* zum Thema hat, über flüssig erscheinen könnte. Doch wie lautet *die* Wahrheitsdefinition der *Wissenschaftslehre*? Allein im ersten Teil der *Wissenschaftslehre*, in der F*undamentallehre*, finden sich mindestens sechs verschiedene Formulierungen. Die Definition des Paragraphen 28 zum Beispiel, die Bolzano als die ,,richtige Erklärung" kennzeichnet (I I24)(1), wird seltener zitiert, während eine andere - sie steht im prominenten, aber hermeneutisch heiklen Paragraphen 25 - zu Recht oder zu Unrecht bevorzugt wird.(2) Sie ist wiederum die einzige, bei der Bolzano auf den Ausdruck ,,aussagen" verzichtet; in den anderen Wahrheitsdefinitionen kommt dieser Ausdruck - grammatisch uneinheitlich verwendet - vor. Schon diese Beobachtungen machen deutlich, dass es durchaus von Interesse sein kann, diese Formulierungen einmal im Hinblick auf Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zu untersuchen. Dabei wird die Frage, wie ,,aussagen" jeweils

zu verstehen ist, eine Hauptfrage dieses Aufsatzes sein, an dessen Ende *die* Wahrheitsdefinition der *Wissenschaftslehre* präsentiert werden soll." (S. 556)
(1) I 124 =: Bolzano, Band I, S. 124.
(2) Wenn nur dem Gegenstande, von dem der Satz handelt, das wirklich zukommt, was er ihm beilegt..." dann "... soll mir der Satz doch immer den Namen einer Wahrheit an sich erhalten..." (I 112; hier "Def. (iv)", vgl. Morscher S. 66f., Künne S. 226f.; eng verwandt mit (iv) ist Bergs Extrakt aus 1108 ff., s. Berg S. 61 f.).
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Bolzano, Bernard: *Wissenschaftslehre*, hrsg. von Wolfgang Schultz, Band I und II, Leipzig 1929, Band III und IV, Leipzig 1931; ND Aalen 1981.
Berg, Jan: Bernard Bolzano. Die Überwindung des Skeptizismus, in: J. Speck (Hg.): Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit Jfl Göttingen/Zürich 1983.
Künne, Wolfgang: Bolzanos blühender Baum. Plädoyer for eine nicht-epistemische Wahrheitsauffassung, in: Forum für Philosophie, Bad Homburg (Hg.): Realismus und Antirealismus, Frankfi.m/Main 1992.
Morscher, Edgar: Das logische An-sich bei Bernard Bolzano, Salzburg/München 1973.

48. Gil, Thomas. 1997. "Die Bedeutung der Skeptizismuskritik für die Grundlegung der Semiotik. Bernhard Bolzanos Wider!egung des radikalen Zweifels in der .,Fundamentallehre" (Wissenschafts/ehre, §§ 17 -45) als Voraussetzung seiner Semiotik." *Semiosis. Internationale Zeitschrift für Semiotik und Ästhetik* no. 83/44:3-13.
"ln den Paragraphen der "Fundamentallehre" der *Wissenschaftslehre* kritisiert Bernard Bolzano die Position des radikalen Skeptizismus, nachdem er sie genau definiert hat. Nach dem radikalen Skeptizismus, so wie Bolzano ihn bestimmt, kann es keine Wahrheit geben. Bolzanos Widerlegung des so definierten radikalen Skeptizismus, welche von Heinrich Scholz als "eine völlig originale Gedankenleistung" gewürdigt wird, besteht in der Hauptsache aus zwei Argumentationen, die zwei Sätze

beweisen: aJ daß es wenigstens eine Wahrheit gibt; b) daß es unendlich viele Wahrheiten gibt.
Die Bolzanosche Widerlegung des Skeptizismus steht im Zentrum der folgenden Ausführungen, allerdings sofern eine solche Widerlegung für Bolzanos Grundlegung der Logik und der Zeichenlehre von Relevanz ist. Daß diese Relevanz basaler oder fundamentaler Art ist, .geht aus der Funktion und Stellung der Paragraphen der "Fundamentallehre" im Gesamtsystem der Bolzanoschen *Wissenschaftslehre* hervor. Die Skeptizismuskritik ist in der Tat ein Unumgängliches für das konstruktive System von Erkenntnis-, Wissens- und Wissenschaftsmöglichkeiten, das die *Wissenschaftslehre* darstellt, im allgemeinen und für die Semiotik Bolzanos (sowohl für die Grundlegung der Zeichenlehre in den Paragraphen 285 und 334 bis 345 als auch für die angewandte .,Semiotik" in den Paragraphen 637 bis 699 des vierten Bandes der *Wissenschaftslehre*) im besonderen." (S. 3)

49. Heesch, Elli. 1935. "Grundzüge der Bolzanoschen Wissenschaftslehre." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* no. 48:313-341.
"Mit den jetzt angedeuteten Voraussetzungen an Charakter und Methode und mit seinem scharfen Verstand schreibt Bolzano sein größtes philosophisches Werk: Wissenscliaftslehre, das uns in 4 Bänden ein umfassendes Lehrbuch der Logik liefert. Der Hauptteil, die eigentliche Wissenschaftslehre, macht den vierten Band aus. Die drei ersten Bände stellen einen ausführlichen Unterbau zum vierten dar uud sind auch heute noch eine ergiebige Fundstelle für die Lehre von den Vorstellungen, Sätzen und Urteilen, für Wahrscheinlichkeitsbetrachtungen u.s.w. Ich werde aus ihnen nur das herausheben, was im Sinne Bolzanos für den vierten Band unbedingt Voraussetzung ist. . Die drei ersten Bände umfassen vier Hauptteile : die Fundamental-, die Elementar-, die Erkenntnislehre und die Erfindungskunst. Der Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre im engeren Sinne läßt die Notwendigkeit dieser Teile erkennen. Die Wissenschaftslehre im engeren Sinne wird von Bolzano gleichgesetzt einer Methodenlehre, d. h. sie enthält die

Regeln, die bei der Zerlegung des gesamten Gebietes der Wahrheit in einzelne Wissenschaften und bei der Darstellung der letzteren in besonderen Lehrbüchern befolgt werden müssen.
Um eine so definierte Wissenschaftslehre sinnvoll aufzubauen, muß das Material sichergestellt sein: das Vorhandensein einer Gesamtheit von wahren Sätzen, die für den menschlichen Verstand erkennbar sind, und die Möglichkeit, die Beziehungen einzelner Wahrheiten zu anderen festzulegen, zunächst formal und wenn möglich auch material.
Damit ist die Aufgabe der ersten drei Bände umrissen, und zwar in rückwärtiger Reihenfolge, d. h. die Notwendigkeit des vorhergehenden Teiles ist gegeben durch einen Ausspruch des nachfolgenden Teiles." (S. 316)

50. Hieke, Alexander, and Neumaier, Otto, eds. 2003. *Philosophie im Geiste Bolzanos, anlässlich des 222.Geburtstages von Bernard Bolzano Edgar Morscher gewidmet*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
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51. Kambartel, Friedrich. 1978. "Der philosophische Standpunkt der Bolzanoschen Wissenschaftslehre." In *Bernard Bolzano's Grundlegung der Logik: Ausgewählte Paragraphen aus der Wissensmaftslehre, Band I und II*, VII-LIV. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
52. Konzelmann, Ziv Anita. 2010. *Kräfte, Wahrscheinlichkeit und "Zuversicht," Bernard Bolzanos Erkenntnislehre*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
53. Kraus, Lukas Benedikt. 2014. *Der Begriff des Kontinuums bei Bernard Bolzano*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

54. Krause, Andrej. 2004. *Bolzanos Metaphysik*. München: Alber.
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"II. Bolzanos Ontologie
Die Metaphysik Bolzanos ist eine Wissenschaft, die es mit *wirklichen* Gegenständen zu tun haben soll und nur mit solchen Gegenständen. Im folgenden wird *der* Teil der Metaphysik Bolzanos dargestellt und erörtert, der sich den wirklichen Gegenständen möglichst *allgemein* zuwendet. Ich nenne diesen Teil die *allgemeine Metaphysik* oder auch die *Ontologie* Bolzanos, verwende also den Terminus »Ontologie« in einer engeren Bedeutung als etwa Berg in seiner Abhandlung *Ontology Without Ultrafilters* ... Wenn er dort von »Bolzano's Ontology« spricht, so meint er die Gegenstände Bolzanos im allgemeinen, nicht nur die *wirklichen* Gegenstände.(1)
Im Verlauf der Untersuchung wird sich zeigen, daß Bolzano zufolge jeder wirkliche Gegenstand entweder eine Substanz oder eine Adhärenz oder - nach manchen Texten Bolzanos - ein Inbegriff von Substanzen ist und daß jede Substanz, jede Adhärenz und jeder Inbegriff von Substanzen ein wirklicher Gegenstand ist. Daher kann man auch sagen, daß sich die Ontologie Bolzanos vor jeder weiteren Differenzierung mit Substanzen, insofern sie Substanzen sind, mit Adhärenzen, insofern sie Adhärenzen sind, und mit Inbegriffen von Substanzen, insofern sie Inbegriffe von Substanzen sind, befaßt. Die Besonderheit der einzelnen Substanz, der einzelnen Adhärenz oder des einzelnen Inbegriffs von Substanzen soll hierbei noch keine Rolle spielen. Es interessiert an dieser Stelle also noch nicht, ob die betrachteten Substanzen bedingt oder unbedingt, veränderlich oder unveränderlich, geistig oder materiell, vollkommener oder weniger vollkommen sind usw. oder ob die betrachteten Adhärenzen dieser oder jener Art sind.

Alles das wird erst später, für eine speziellere Metaphysik, wichtig werden.
Die Darlegung und Diskussion der Positionen Bolzanos hinsichtlich der Ontologie erfolgt in sieben Kapiteln. In den ersten beiden Kapiteln untersuche ich die Definitionsvorschläge Bolzanos für die Begriffe »Substanz« und »Adhärenz« und seine Argumente für die Gegenständlichkeit der entsprechenden Vorstellungen an sich. In den darauffolgenden beiden Kapiteln bespreche ich einige wichtige Beschaffenheiten, die jeder Substanz zukommen sollen, nämlich deren Einfachheit und deren Anfangslosigkeit und Unvergänglichkeit. Danach erörtere ich die von Bolzano vorgenommene Unterscheidung zwischen äußeren und inneren Beschaffenheiten und seinen Begriff der Veränderung. Schließlich diskutiere ich den ontologischen Status, den Bolzano den Inbegriffen von Substanzen zuweist. Hierbei wird sich heraussteilen, daß sich bei einer entsprechenden Modifikation Bolzanos Konzept vom Verhältnis »Substanz - Inbegriff von Substanzen« in eine ganz bestimmte moderne Substanzontologie gleichsam einbetten läßt." (S. 42-43)
(1) Vgl. ebd., 32. Dennoch ist diese Arbeit natürlich eine sehr bedeutungsvolle Untersuchung zu Bolzanos Ontologie, denn sie fragt auch nach den *wirklichen* Gegenständen. Für die Ontologie Bolzanos sehr wichtig sind außerdem Künne, *Substanzen und Adhärenzen* ..., u. Schnieder, *Substanz und Adhärenz* ... Man vgl. ferner Berg, *Bolzanos Metaphysik*, ders., Einleitung ... [GA 2A, 12/3,107-112], Chisholm, *The Self* ..., ders., B*olzano on the Simplicity* ..., ders., *Bernard Bolzano's Philosophy of Mind*, Herrmann, *Der religionsphilosophische Standpunkt* ..., 137-141, Huonder, *Das Unsterblichkeitsproblem* ..., 86-88, Krickel, *Teil und Inbegriff*..., 22-27, Künne, *Bolzanos Philosophie der Religion* ..., 319f., Louzil, *Bernard Bolzanos Materiebegriff,* Pnhonsky, *Atomlehre* ..., Ryschawy, *Die Unsterblichkeitslehre* ..., Schrödter, *Philosophie und Religion* ..., 50-55, Textor, *Bolzanos Propositionalismus*, 56-73.

55. Künne, Wolfgang. 1992. "Bolzanos blühender Baum: Plädoyer für eine nicht-epistemische Wahrheitsauffassung." In *Realismus und Antirealismus*, 224-244. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
56. ———. 1998. "Substanzen und Adhärenzen—Zur Ontologie in Bolzanos *Athanasia*." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 1:233-250.
57. ———. 1998. "Bolzanos oberstes Sittengesetz." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert : Beiträge zum Bolzano-Symposium der Österreichischen Forschungsgemeinschaft im Dezember 1998 in Wien*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 371-391. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
58. ———. 1999. "Über Lug und Trug." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 29-58. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Nachdruck: W. Künne, *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2008, S. 121-156.
59. ———. 2008. *Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
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60. ———. 2013. "Intentionalität: Bolzano und Husserl." In *Versuche über Husserl*, edited by Centrone, Stefania, 97-144. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
"»Der Problemtitel, der die ganze Phänomenologie umspannt, heißt Intentionalität.« Da es der Vater der Phänomenologie ist, der dies behauptet,[1] können wir uns wohl darauf verlassen. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich, Edmund Husserls (ursprüngliche) Theorie der

Intentionalität vor dem Hintergrund einer ihrer wichtigsten Inspirationsquellen, Bernard Bolzanos Theorie der »Sätze und Vorstellungen an sich«, zu rekonstruieren und in einem Punkt zu korrigieren. Im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes erörtere ich das Problem (zumindest *prima facie*) gegenstandsloser intentionaler Akte und Zustände, das im Zentrum von Husserls Metakritik an Twardowskis Bolzano-Kritik stand. Thema des zweiten Teils dieses Aufsatzes ist Husserls ursprüngliche Auffassung des ontologischen Status der Gehalte intentionaler Akte und Zustände, mit der er (für eine Weile) auf Distanz zu Bolzano ging." (S. 97)

61. Lapointe, Sandra. 2010. "Sprache – Symbol – Beweismethode in der Mathematik und Bolzanos Kant-Kritik." In *Methodenreflexionen in der Philosophie*, edited by Kremberg, Bettina, 35-48. Leipzig: University of Leipzig Press.
62. Menne, Albert. 1981. "Extension und comprehension bei Peirce und Bolzano." In *Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce bicentennial International Congress*, edited by Ketner, Kenneth L., 359-361. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press.
"Noch erstaunlicher aber ist es, dass Peirce die einschlagigen Theorien von Bernard Bolzano nicht kennt, die für ihn sicherlich sehr wichtig gewesen waren. Bolzano ist es, der wie Peirce unter dem Umfang des Begriffes bereits die individuellen Objekte versteht, auf die der Begriff zutrifft, und nicht die Unter-Arten, die er umfasst. Ausserdem unterscheidet Bolzano sehr scharf zwischen "Merkrnal" und "Bestandteil":
Merkmale sind Eigenschaften der Dinge, Bestandteile aber sind die Terme, aus denen der Begriff zusammengesetzt ist. Bolzano weist darauf hin, dass zwei bedeutungsverschiedene Begriffe die gleichen Bestandteile haben konnen; so hatten z.B. die heiden Begriffe "gelehrter Sohn eines ungelehrten Vaters" und "ungelehrter Sohn eines gelehrten Vaters" die gleichen Bestandteile.
Der Inhalt eines Begriffes sollte also nicht nur aus der Summe seiner Bestandteile, sondern auch aus deren strukturellem Gefüge bestehen.

Desgleichen ist Bolzano der erste, der eine sehr gründliche, durch Beispiele belegte Kritik an dem Reziprozitatsgesetz bietet. Zur Zeit der Abfassung seiner Untersuchung "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension", also im Jahre 1867, scheint Peirce überhaupt nichts von Bolzano gewusst zu haben. Aber auch in dem "Supplement" von 1893 erwahnt er ihn nicht.
Wohl finden sich in zwei anderen Werken von Peirce Hinweise auf Bolzano, seine *Wissenschaftslehre* und seine *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, die zeigen, daB er Bolzano sehr geschatzt hat, aber auch zugleich verraten, daB er nur aus sekundaren Quellen Kenntnisse iiber seine Bedeutung fiir die Grundlegung der Mengenlehre und des Begriffes der Machtigkeit hatte, dass er aber im übrigen nur durch abstruse Gerüiche etwas von Bolzano wusste." (S. 360)

63. Morscher, Edgar. 1967. "Inwiefern enthält Bolzanos Logik Existenzvoraussetzungen?" *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 15:1513-1515.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 107-111.
"Das logische System, das Bemard Bolzano in seiner Wissenschaftslehre ausführlich dargestellt hat, ist teilweise noch stark der traditionellen Iogik verhaftet, weist aher anderseits auch schon verblüffende Übereinstimmungen mit der modernen Logik auf. In diesem Zusammenhang wird gelegentlich die Frage aufgeworfen (2), ob und inwiefern Bolzanos Iogik Existenzvoraussetzungen enthalte. Die Redeweise, daß ein logisches System eine Existenzvoraussetzung enthält, ist mehrdeutig. Dementsprechend kann man denn auch die Frage, ob Bolzanos Logik eine Existenzvoraussetzung enthalte oder nicht, verschieden verstehen; fünf verschiedene Fragen, die man alle unter den gemeinsamen Titel “Existenzvoraussetzung in Bolzanos Logik” subsumieren könnte, will ich hier kurz besprechen.
(2) Diese Frage wird zwar in der Bolzano-Literatur öfter kurz gestreift, aber — soweit ich sehe — nirgends näher diskutiert." (S. 107)

64. ———. 1969. "Was heißt es, daß ein logisches System “Existential Import” besitzt oder eine

Existenzvoraussetzung macht?" *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 11:204-206.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 121-123.

65. ———. 1972. "Von Bolzano zu Meinong. Zur Geschichte des logischen Realismus." In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 69-102. Graz: Akademische Druck - und Verlagsanstalt.

66. ———. 1973. *Das logische An-Sich bei Bernard Bolzano*. Salzburg, München: Anton Pustet.
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67. ———. 1974. "Ist Existenz ein Prädikat? Historische Bemerkungen zu einer philosophischen Frage." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 28:120-132.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 135-147.
"Für eine ganze Reihe von philosophischen Aufsätzen dient die Frage, ob Existenz ein Prädikat ist, oder auch eine bejahende oder verneinende Antwort auf diese Frage als Überschrift. Es wird dabei nicht nur diskutiert, welche der beiden Auffassungen (die Bejahung oder die Verneinung der Frage) richtig ist, sondern es wird auch das Problem aufgeworfen, ob die Frage überhaupt sinnvoll gestellt ist oder doch sinnvoll gestellt werden könnte, wie sie sinnvollerweise formuliert werden müßte und was sie, falls sie sinnvoll gestellt wird, zu bedeuten hat (1).
Die Stellungnahmen großer Philosophen (angefangen von Kant) zu dieser Frage sind zwar — zumindest „oberflächlich“ — weitgehend bekannt, aber mir scheint

doch, daß ein wesentlicher Aspekt an diesen Stellungnahmen vielfach übersehen wurde und unbeachtet geblieben ist; diesen Aspekt möchte ich hier herausarbeiten, weil dadurch die Problemstellung selbst klarer wird und exakter gefaßt werden kann und weil dann auch wesentlich differenziertere Antworten auf diese Frage gegeben werden können. Ich möchte mit einer Analyse jener Antworten beginnen, die Kant und Bolzano auf die im Titel gestellte Frage gegeben haben. Zunächst aber seien noch zur Vereinfachung zwei Abkürzungen eingeführt: Jene Auffassung, welche die im Titel gestellte Frage bejaht, wollen wir mit einem ‚J' bezeichnen, während wir den gegenteiligen Standpunkt, der die Titelfrage verneint, mit einem ‚N' abkürzen werden. Ein Ziel meiner Ausführungen besteht darin zu zeigen, daß diese Zweiteilung der Standpunkte (in J und N) viel zu undifferenziert ist und nicht einmal dazu ausreicht, den Standpunkt Kants in dieser Frage treffend zu charakterisieren." (S. 135)
(1) Vgl. z.B. den Aufsatz von George Edward Moore,"Is Exlstence a Predicate", in: The Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 15 (1936), pp. 175—188, abgedruckt u. a. in Moore, Philosophical Papers (London & New York 1959, Nachdruck: London & New York 1963), pp. 115—126.

68. ———. 1974. ""Philosophische Logik" bei Bernard Bolzano." In *Bolzano als Logiker. Bolzano-Symposion am 17 und 18 Dezember 1973*, 77-105. Wien: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 169-197.
69. ———. 1981. "Bolzanos *Wissenschaftslehre*." In *Bernard Bolzano. Leben und Wirkung*, edited by Christian, Curt, 99-126. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 19-46.
"Bolzanos vielseitiges Schaffen auf den verschiedensten Wissensgebieten krönen drei Hauptwerke: Sein unvollendet gebliebenes mathematisches Hauptwerk Größenlehre, sein religionswissenschaftlich-theologisches Hauptwerk Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft und sein philosophisches Hauptwerk Wissenschaftslehre. Trotz der

intensiven Bemühungen Bolzanos und seiner Schüler blieb die Wissenschaftslehre aus verschiedenen Gründen lange fast völlig unbekannt, und kaum ein bedeutender Philosoph nahm Notiz von ihr; und auch heute noch, wo die große Bedeutsamkeit dieses Werkes längst erkannt wurde und unter Fachleuten außer Zweifel steht, gibt es nur wenige, die sich mit dem Werk als Ganzem näher befaßt haben. Man begnügt sich meist damit, einzelne Rosinen aus dem Kuchen der Wissenschaftslehre heräuszupicken. Schuld daran ist sicherlich neben dem enormen Umfang des Werkes auch die Tatsache, daß die von Bolzano entwickelte Zusammenstellung der Probleme auf den ersten Blick eher eigenartig und vielleicht in manchen Punkten sogar fast skurril anmutet und auf weitgehendes Unverständnis stößt. Bolzano behandelt nämlich in seiner Wissenschaftslehre nicht nur so tiefgehende philosophische Themen wie etwa die Frage, ob es überhaupt Wahrheit gibt und ob wir sie erkennen können, ob es mehrere oder gar unendlich viele Wahrheiten gibt, was eine Vorstellung und ein Satz an sich ist, wie zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Sätzen unterschieden werden kann, was es heißt, daß ein Satz an sich aus anderen Sätzen ableitbar ist, wie das Verhältnis von Grund und Folge bestimmt werden kann, usw. Er beschäftigt sich vielmehr daneben auch mit so banalen und seichten praktischen Fragen wie etwa den folgenden: Ob der Verfasser eines Lehrbuchs seinen Namen und auch wohl einige seiner Lebensumstände angeben soll (WL IV, § 478); ob es zweckmäßig ist, in einem Lehrbuch, da ja Bücher bekanntlich auch eine Waare sind, den Druckort, den Namen des Verlegers, den Preis u. m. A. zu bemerken (§ 480); Ob in einem Lehrbuche auch Gleichnisse Vorkommen dürfen (§ 497); Wie Beispiele die Aufmerksamkeit befördern können (§ 647); Ob auch der Liebe zum Gewöhnlichen oder zum Neuen zuweilen ein Einfluß auf die Anordnung unserer Sätze gestattet werden dürfe (§ 619); Wiefern uoir in einem, Lehrbuche Kunstwörter meiden sollen (§ 661); Was zu geschehen habe, bevor man noch die Abfassung des Buches anfängt (§ 702); Welche besondere Sorgfalt selbst die sprachliche Darstellung in einem Lehrbuche verdiene (§

708), usw. Da überrascht es dann wohl gar nicht mehr, daß Bolzano in seiner Wissenschaftslehre auch noch etwa die Frage mit einschließt, Wie Sittlichkeit auch bei Abfassung eines Lehrbuches zu Statten komme (§ 700). Neben den zuerst genannten Themen wirken solche Fragestellungen fast lächerlich oder peinlich, und Bolzanos mitunter pedantische Abschweifungen in diese Gebiete muten manchmal fast ein wenig schrullenhaft an. Dadurch aber werden gerade die wichtigen philosophischen Leistungen Bolzanos, die sich in der Wissenschaftslehre niedergeschlagen haben,- verdeckt.
Aus diesem Grund möchte ich zunächst (I) Bolzanos Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre und vorher noch die damit zusammenhängenden Begriffe einer Wissenschaft und eines Lehrbuchs erläutern, um Verständnis für Bolzanos doch eher ungewöhnliche Konzeption der Wissenschaftslehre zu wecken; dann werde ich den Inhalt der fünf Hauptteile der Wissenschaftslehre jeweils kurz umreißen (II) und einige wichtige Lehren herausgreifen und rekonstruieren (III)."(S. 19-20)

70. ———. 1987. "Bolzanos Syllogistik." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24 (4):447-451.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 101-105.
"Einordnung der Syllogistik in Bolzanos Logik.
Bolzano hat nicht ein eigenes System für die Syllogistik entwickelt, sondern er hat sie in eine allgemeinere Theorie eingebaut, ähnlich wie auch etwa in der modernen Logik die Syllogistik als Teil des Prädikatenkalküls aufgefaßt werden kann. Zu Bolzanos Syllogistik (BS) vgl. besonders WL II 413-415, 441-443 und 534-565." (S. 102)

71. ———. 1987. ""Hintertürln" für Paradoxien in Bolzanos Logik." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:414-422.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 159-167.
"Paradoxien können in einem logischen System an verschiedenen Stellen auftreten: Wenn man sie an einem Punkt ausgemerzt hat, bietet dies noch lange keine Gewähr dafür, daß sie sich nicht anderswo einschleichen. Dies umso mehr, wenn die Grenzen eines Systems nicht streng bewacht, ja nicht einmal klar markiert und genau angebbar

sind, wie dies bei Bolzanos „System“ (und übrigens auch bei den meisten anderen “Systemen” der traditionellen Logik) der Fall ist.
Ich möchte hier zeigen, daß (zumindest) an drei Stellen in Bolzanos Logik die Gefahr von Paradoxien auftritt. Damit soll gar kein Vorwurf gegen Bolzano erhoben werden (dazu übrigens noch Näheres im dritten Abschnitt), sondern ich möchte nur aus heutiger Sicht (mit unserem heutigen Wissen um Paradoxien) mögliche Gefahrenquellen in Bolzanos Logik aufspüren, denn: nur wer die Gefahr kennt, kommt in ihr nicht um ... Ich werde mich darauf beschränken, drei Paradoxien bzw. Paradoxie-Gefahren herauszuarbeiten, die sich bei Verwendung des elementaren Instrumentariums von Bolzanos Logik ergeben. Danach werde ich zu diesen angeblichen oder echten Gefahren Stellung nehmen.“ (S. 159)

72. ———. 1989. "Zu Bolzanos Lösung der Lügner-Paradoxie." In *Traditionen und Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift für Rudolf Haller*, edited by Gombocz, Wolfgang L., Rutte, Heiner and Sauer, Werner, 89-96. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 149-157.
"In einer kurzen Studie (1) rekonstruiert Bochenski eine Lösung der Lügner-Paradoxie von Paulus Venetus. Ich werde hier zunächst Bochenskis Rekonstruktion wiedergeben und dann mit Hilfe des von ihm entwickelten Instrumentariums Bolzanos Lösungsvorschlag für die Lügner-Paradoxie analysieren." (S. 149)
(1) J.M. Bochenski, “Formalisierung einer scholastischen Lösung der Paradoxie des ‘Lügners’”, in J.M. Bochenski, *Logisch-philosophische Studien mit Aufsätzen von P. Banks, A. Menne und I. Thomas* (Freiburg/Br.-München 1959), pp. 71—73. Vgl. auch J.M. Bochenski, *Formale Logik* (Freiburg/Br.-München (2) 1962), pp. 291-292 (die 14 von Paulus Venetus verworfenen Lösungen werden auf pp. 280-288 wiedergegeben).

73. ———. 1999. "Logische Allgemeingültigkeit." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by

Morscher, Edgar, 179-206. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung, 11.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 47-74 mit dem Titel: *Bolzanos Definition der logische Analytizität*, französische Übersetzung in *Philosophiques* 30, 2003, S. 149-169.

74. ———. 2003. "Sind alle wahren logischen Sätze logisch wahr?" In *Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 57-82. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Nachdruck: E. Morscher (2007), S. 75-99.

75. ———. 2004. "Die Geburt der Gegenstandstheorie aus einem Missverständnis?" In *Phenomenology & Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 89-104. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Bolzano unterscheidet immer wieder mit aller Schärfe und Deutlichkeit zwischen einer Vorstellung und ihrem Gegenstand: Nicht nur die subjektive Vorstellung, d.i. der psychische Vorstellungsakt, sondern auch deren objektiver Gehalt oder "Stoff", d.i. die Vorstellung an sich, unterscheidet sich wesentlich von ihrem jeweiligen Gegenstand. Das geht schon daraus hervor, dass ein und dieselbe Vorstellung mehrere Gegenstände haben kann (wie z.B. die Vorstellung [weißes Pferd][2]) oder auch gar keinen (wie z.B. die Vorstellung [geflügeltes Pferd]) (*WL* I 218–20). Allerdings geht Bolzano nicht so weit zu behaupten, dass jeder Gegenstand einer Vorstellung von dieser selbst verschieden sein muss, denn es gibt nach ihm auch sogenannte symbolische Vorstellungen oder Vorstellungsvorstellungen (*WL* I 426–9, §90), von denen einige (wie z.B. die Vorstellungen [Vorstellung], [Nicht-Wirkliches] und [Etwas]) Gegenstände von sich selbst sind." (S. 93)
(2) Für Vorstellungen und Sätze an sich verwende ich die Quinesche Notation mit eckigen Klammern, von der ich schon bisher eingeschränkten Gebrauch gemacht habe: [Pferd] ist demnach die Vorstellung an sich von einem Pferd

bzw. die durch das Wort ‘Pferd’ ausgedrückte Vorstellung an sich.
76. ———. 2016. *Bernard Bolzanos Lehre von Grund und Folge. Eine axiomatische Rekonstruktion*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
77. Morscher, Edgar, and Simons, Peter. 2014. "Objektivität und Evidenz." In *Joint Ventures in Philosophy*, 11-42. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
1.1. *Objektivität der Wahrheitswerte und ihrer Träger bei Bernard Bolzano*, S. 12-20.
78. Mourany, Antoun-Hamid. 1978. *Logik und Wahrheit an Sich bei Bolzano*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Inhalt: Der Logizismus als hermeneutisches Prinzip im Denken Bolzanos; Genese und Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre; Die Wahrheit an sich; Die Elementarlehre als reine Logik; Kant, Bolzano und Husserl; Der metaphysische Logizismus.
79. Neeman, Ursula. 1972. "Kausalität und Determinismus bei Bernard Bolzano." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 13:353-370.
80. ———. 1972. *Bernard Bolzanos Lehre von Anschauung und Begriff in ihrer Bedeutung für erkenntnistheoretische und pädagogische Probleme*. München: F. Schöningh.
81. ———. 1974. "Bolzanos Kantkritik." In *Akten des Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz 6.-10. April1974*, edited by Fuhnke, Gerhard, 842-847. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
82. ———. 1977. "Husserl und Bolzano." *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 2:52-66.
83. ———. 1978. "Der Begriff der Möglichkeit bei Bernard Bolzano." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 17:70-89.
84. ———. 2001. "Zeichen in Sprache und Denken nach Ockham, Lambert und Bolzano." *Zeitschrift für Semiotik* (23).
"Zeichen sind nach B. Bolzano wirkliche Gegenstände oder Prozesse, die nicht als etwas Für-sich-selbst-Stehendes, sondern als Hinweise auf ein Anderes verstanden werden. Das durch sprachliche Zeichen Bezeichnete ist das, was den Benutzern einer Sprache als einheitliche semantische Basis dient, was als Bereich von Vorstellungen und Sätzen an sich

vorgegeben ist, also das, was unter der Intension von Zeichen verstanden wird. Extensionaler Bezug, also Referenz auf außermentale Objekte, ist nur indirekt auf dem Umweg über die Intensionen möglich. Im weiteren Verlauf der Darstellung wird Bolzanos Gebrauch der Ausdrücke „Sinn" und „Bedeutung" erklärt. Ferner werden die mit seiner Betonung des intensionalen Aspekts verbundenen erkenntnistheoretischen Probleme angesprochen und im Vergleich mit den Zeichentheorien von W. von Ockham, von J. H. Lambert und von G. W. Leibniz verdeutlicht. Dabei geht es um die Frage, ob die durch sprachliche Zeichen bezeichneten Inhalte Abbilder der außermentalen Objektwelt sind oder ihre Funktion sich darin erschöpft, auf die Welt des Außermentalen nur zu verweisen, ohne dieser selbst ähnlich zu sein."

85. Palágyi, Melchior. 1902. *Kant und Bolzano. Eine kritische Parallele*. Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer.
Inhalts -Verzeichnis: Einleitung; I. Abschnitt. Der Gegensatz der beiden Denker 1; II. Abschnitt. Bolzano's Lehre von den Sälzen an sich. 22; III. Abschnitt. Der Apriorlsmus bei Kant, Leibniz und Bolzano 44; IV. Abschnitt. Die Vorstellungstheorie Bolzano's 68; V. Abschnitt. Der Einfluss Kant's auf Bolzano 87; VI. Abschnitt. Bolzano's Abwendung von Kant 97-124.
86. Runggaldier, Edmund. 2003. "Die "Einfachheit" der Substanz bei Bolzano." In *Philosophie im Geiste Bolzanos*, edited by Hieke, Alexander and Neumaier, Otto, 69-86. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
87. Rychlik, Karel. 1958. "Betrachtungen aus der Logik in Bolzanos Handschriftlichem Nachlasse." *Czechoslovak Mathematical Journal* no. 8:197-202.
Abstrakt: "Der Verfasser bringt in diesem Aufsatze den Inhalt von Bolzanos Arbeit „Von der mathematischen Lehrart" und den § 8 dieser Arbeit, einen Auszug, der für die mathematische Logik von besonderer Bedeutung ist."
88. Schmit, Roger. 1994. "Über Bolzanos Begriff der Auslegung." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 47:1-29.

"Die Frage der Beziehungen zwischen Logik und Umgangssprache beschaftigt Bolzano in der 1837 erschienenen *Wissenschaftslehre*.
Von besonderer Wichtigkeit filr diese Problematik erweist sich der Begriff der Auslegung sprachlicher Ausdrücke.(8) Unter einer Auslegung versteht Bolzano ganz allgemein einen "Satz endlich, in welchem ausgesagt wird, dass der Sinn gewisser Zeichen dieser oder jener sey", wobei die Auslegung entweder bloss gedacht oder aber durch Zeichen ausgedrilckt werden kann. In dem letzteren FaIle handelt es sich dann urn eine sprachliche Auslegung.(9) So gesehen stellt die Auslegung des Sinnes sprachlicher Zeichen eine ebenso natürliche wie notwendige Leistung dar, ohne die zwischenmenschliche Kommunikation berhaupt nicht denkbar ware." (S. 4)
(8) Die Umgangssprache bezeichnet Bolzano auch noch als die "Sprache des gemeinen Lebens", dies im Gegensatz zur Sprache der Wissenschaft (Vgl. z.B.: § 169). Bemerkenswerterweise begegnen wir dem Begriff der Sprache des Lebens ebenfalls bei Frege. Vgl. [18]: Vorwort, XI, wo es heisst: "Das VerhaItnis meiner Begriffsschrift zu der Sprache des Lebens ... ". Fur Bolzano gilt aber, dass nicht nur die Gebrauchssprache, sondem auch die Sprache der Wissenschaft klarungsbedurftige Ausdriicke enthalt. Ob diese terminologische Ubereinstimmung eine rein zufallige Parallele darstellt oder als Hinweis für eine Beeinflussung Freges durch Bolzano zu werten ist, bleibt ungeklart, weil Frege sich nirgends explizit auf Bolzano bezieht. Eine Liste weiterer begrifflicher ParalIeIen zwischen Frege und Bolzano findet sich in [22]: pp. 21-41. Vgl. auch [23]: pp. 263-280.
(9) *Wissenschaftslehre*, hrsg. von Wolfgang Schultz, Leipzig^2 1929-1931 (fotomechanischer Nachdruck: Aalen 1970). § 285.
Literaturvezeichnis
22. Eike Henner W. Kluge, "Bolzano and Frege: Some conceptual parallels", in: *Grazer philosophische Studien* 10 (1980), pp. 21-41.

23. -, *The Metaphysics of Gottlob Frege. An Essay in Ontological Reconstruction*, The Hague-Boston-London 1980

89. Schnieder, Benjamin. 2008. "Bolzanos zwei Substanzbegriffe. Anmerkungen zu Krauses Bolzano-Interpretation." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 62:97-108.

90. ———. 2009. "Bolzanos Erklärung des Zeitbegriffs." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 91:42-69.
Abstract: Bernard Bolzano repeatedly tried to provide an analysis of the concept of time. This paper develops a detailed reconstruction of Bolzano's analysis. Thereby it clarifies the logical formof the analysis and thus discovers its principal problem: While the analysis may well incorporate an important insight on our conception of time, it cannot succeed *as an analysis*."

91. Scholz, Heinrich. 1937. "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzano's: Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung." *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule* no. 6:399-472.
Nachdruck in: H. Scholz, *Mathesis universalis. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft,* (eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & J. Ritter), Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1961, pp. 219-267.

92. ———. 1969. *Abriß der Geschichte der Logik*. Freiburg im Breisgau: K. Alber.

93. Schuffenhauer, Werner, Winter, Eduard, and Pautsch, Hildegard, eds. 1981. *Bernard Bolzano 1781-1848. Studien und Quellen*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Inhalt: Studien. Herausgegeben von Werner Schuffenhauser. Zum Geleit 3-8; Karel Berka: Bernard Bolzano (5. Oktober 1781 - 18. Dezember 1848) 9-29; Von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft. Zu einigen Problemen der philosophischen Entwicklung in böhmischen Ländern in der 1. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (mit besonderer Rücksicht auf A. Smetana und B. Bolzano) 30-37; Jaromir Louzil: Bernard Bolzanos Materiebegriff 38-48; Boris Ivanovic Fedorov: Logisch-methodologische und philosophische Ideen Bernard Bolzanos 49-55; Helmut Metzler: Bolzanos Lehre vom Gegensatz in ihrem produktiven Kritikverhältnis

zur Hegelschen Widerspruchsdialektik 56-80; Henryk Moese: Systemaufbau in Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre und ihre Kantischen Quellen. Entwicklungsfragen der Logik in nachkantischer Zeit 81-92; Gerhard Terton: Bemerkungen zu Bolzanos Vorstellungsbegriff unter besonderer Beachtung sprachanalytischer Aspekte 93-98; Lothar Kreiser, Anita Steube: Bernard Bolzanos sprachlogische Untersuchungen 99-118; Günter Schenk: Über Bolzanos Theorie der Beziehungen zwischen "Vorstellungen an sich" 119-145; Anatoli Alexandrovic Starcenko, Olga Stefanovna Tjagnibedina: Besonderheiten der wahrscheinlichkeitslogischen Forschungen B. Bolzanos 146-160; Hans-Jürgen Trrder: Bolzanos Ansichten und Arbeiten zur Physik 161-167; Edward Winter: Der Wissenschaftspädagoge Bernard Bolzano in Briefen an den Salonphilosophen Eduard von Badenfeld (Silesius) 1845-1847 168-184.
Quellen. Herausgegeben von Eduard Winter und Hildegard Pautsch. *Bolzano's Begriffe 1821* 187-277; Eduard Winter: Bolzano in Techobuz-"Friedenstal". Ein vormärzliches Idyll unter Polizieiaufsicht 279-302; Anna Hoffmann, Josef Hoffmann: Briefe an M. Fesl, 1834-1841 304-315; Michael Josef Fesl: Arbeitsprogramm, angenommen von dem Bolzaninstenkozil in Techobuz von Schriftführer M. J. Fesl 316-321; Bolzano: *Stoffe* 321-322; Anton Wisshaupt: Briefe a M. J. Fesl, 1842-1843 323-329; Bolzano: *Briefe an Gregor Zeithammer, 1841-1842* 330-335; Anton Wisshaupt: Abgeänderter Nachdruck 338-357.

94. Šebestik, Jan. 1999. "Bolzanos Paradoxien des Unendlichen." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 231-256. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
95. Sedmak, Clemens. 2003. "Die Bedeutung "wichtiger Sätze" für die Philosophie." In *Philosophie im Geiste Bolzanos*, edited by Hieke, Alexander and Neumaier, Otto, 127-142. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
96. Siebel, Mark. 1996. *Der Begriff der Ableitbarkeit bei Bolzano*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

97. ———. 1997. "Bolzanos Ableitbarkeit und Tarskis Logische Folgerung." In *Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the Second Conference "Perspectives in analytical philosophy". Vol. I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science*, 148-156. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Bernard Bolzanos Definition der Ableitbarkeit (aus seiner *Wissenschaftslehre* von 1837) ist häufig mit Alfred Tarskis Definition der logischen Folgerung verglichen worden. Die Resultate eines solchen Vergleichs sind sehr einhellig ausgefallen: Die meisten der Autoren sehen eine frappierende Ubereinstimmung.
Wilfrid Hodges z. B. verwendet im *Handbook of Philosophical Logic* den Terminus „Bolzano-Tarski definition" - so als ob ihre Definitionen identisch wären. Heinrich Scholz schreibt, daß Tarski Bolzanos Begriff der Implikation „wiederentdeckt" habe. Tarski selbst stimmt ihm hier zu. In einer Fußnote zu der englischen Übersetzung seines Folgerungs-Textes heißt es, daß Scholz „far-reaching analogies" zwischen seinem und Bolzanos Ansatz gefunden habe. - In den Worten von Peter Simons und Johan van Benthem: Es ist mittlerweile zu einem philosophischen Allgemeinplatz geworden, daß Bolzano Tarskis Definition antizipiert hat.(1)
Ich möchte im weiteren Verlauf detailliert auflisten, welche Eigenschaften sich die definierten Implikations-Relationen teilen und welche nicht. In den bisherigen Texten findet man zwar verstreute Bemerkungen zu diesem Thema, aber keinen ausfuhrlichen Vergleich, der eine größere Menge von Eigenschaften miteinbezieht, die für Implikations-Relationen relevant sind. Bolzanos Definition soll dabei in einer Weise modifiziert werden, die in Ubereinstimmung mit seinen Ideen zur Logik ist. Auf diesem Weg werde ich zu einer Definition kommen, die Tarskis in der Tat sehr nahe kommt. Am Ende werden wir allerdings sehen, daß Unterschiede bleiben, die für Logiker sehr wichtig sind: nämlich Unterschiede in der Extension." (p. 148)
(1) Hodges 1983, 56; Scholz 1952, 121; Tarski 1956, 417; Simons 1987, 378; van Benthem 1985, 389. Vgl. auch

Corcoran 1975, 71; Kneale/Kneale 1962, 640f.; Schröter 1955, 39.

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Kneale William, Kneale Martha: *The Development of Logic*, Oxford 1962.

Scholz Heinrich: Rezension von Bar-Hillel 1951. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 17 (1952), 119-122.

Schröter, Karl: Theorie des logischen Schließens I . *Zeitschriftfiir mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 1 (1955), 37-86.

Simons, Peter: Bolzano, Tarski, and the Limits of Logic. *Philosophia naturalis* 24 (1987), 378-405.

Tarski, Alfred: *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938,* hrsg. J. H. Woodger, Oxford 1956.

Van Benthem, Johan: The Variety of Consequence, According to Bolzano. *Studia Logica* 44 (1985), 389-403.

98. ———. 1999. "Bolzanos Erkenntnistheorie." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 59-95. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. "Es geht mir in diesem Beitrag darum, den analytisch-deskriptiven Teil von Bolzanos Erkenntnistheorie darzustellen, indem ich zeige, auf welche Weise er solche Begriffe wie Erkenntnis, Wissen, Meinung und Urteil in der Wissenschaftslehre erläutert. Mehr praktisch orientierte Fragen, wie die nach den Möglichkeiten oder dem Umfang unserer Erkenntnis, werden nur eine Nebenrolle spielen. Da der Begriff einer Meinung und der eines Urteils auch psychologische Grundbegriffe sind, handelt es sich zugleich um eine Einführung in einen Teilbereich von Bolzanos Philosophie des Geistes. Dabei wird immer wieder auf Parallelen zu heutigen Ansichten und auf Schwierigkeiten hingewiesen, die sich aus Bolzanos Explikationen ergeben.

Trotz aller Detailprobleme stehen sie jedoch gegenüber den Erklärungen seiner Vorgänger und Zeitgenossen, mit denen er sich beschäftigt hat, sehr viel besser da." (p. 59)

99. ———. 1999. "Bolzano über Ableitbakeit." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 147-178. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

100. ———. 2004. "Bolzanos Urteilslehre." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 86:56-87.
"Die 1837 erschienene *Wissenschaftslehre* des böhmischen Philosophen, Theologen und Mathematikers Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) ist in erster Linie durch ihre Untersuchungen zu (in einem weiten Sinn) logischen Begriffen ins philosophische Bewusstsein gerückt. Bolzano erläutert dort, wann Aussagen auseinander folgen, unter welchen Bedingungen sie analytisch oder synthetisch sind, was sie zu notwendigen oder kontingenten Wahrheiten macht, was Anschauungen und was Begriffe sind ... Weniger bekannt ist, dass dieses Werk eine eigenständige Urteilslehre enthält, die sich insbesondere im zweiten Hauptstück des Bandes III (§§ 290–306) verbirgt. Wie diese aussieht, wird im Folgenden kritisch rekonstruiert." (S. 56)

101. Siitonen, Arto. 2007. "Zu Bolzanos Kritik der Kantischen Antinomien." *Kriterion* no. 21:84-97.
Abstract: "Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will (i) schematize Kant's antinomies (to see what Bolzano really criticised on them) and (ii) summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's work. At the beginning we will work out the (more fundamental) theoretical differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies."

102. Simons, Peter. 1999. "Bolzano über Wahrheit." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by

Morscher, Edgar, 13-28. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
"1. Bolzanos Theorie, kurz gefaßt
Bolzanos Theorie der Wahrheit ist schlicht und einfach. Zuerst unterscheidet er in § 24 der *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL) verschiedene Bedeutungen der Wörter 'wahr' und 'Wahrheit':
(1) Wahrheit als Beschaffenheit von Sätzen an sich, vermöge deren sie etwas so, wie es ist, aussagen.
(2) Wahrheit, verstanden als ein Satz, dem Wahrheit im Sinne von (1) zukommt.
(3) Wahrheit als Urteil, das eine Wahrheit im Sinne von (2) zum Inhalt hat (Bolzano sagt: richtiges Urteil), oder auch als die Beschaffenheit eines solchen Urteils.
(4) Wahrheit als der Inbegriff sämtlicher wahren Sätze an sich.
(5) Wahr im Sinne von echt oder wirklich.
Bolzano zieht die Bedeutungen (1) und (2) vor. Bezüglich (2) sagt er: "ich verstehe also, um es nochmals zu sagen, unter einer Wahrheit an sich jeden beliebigen Satz, der etwas so, wie es ist, aussagt, wobei ich unbestimmt lasse, ob dieser Satz von irgend jemand wirklich gedacht und ausgesprochen worden sei oder nicht". (S. 13).

103. ———. 1999. "Bolzano über Zahlen." In *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für da 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, 217-229. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

104. Spalt, Detlef D. 1992. "Bolzano's Zahlbegriffe. Bislang Ubersehene Marksteine Feudal-absolutischer Mathematik." In *Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop*, 27-54. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
"Nach Bolzanos Amtsenthebung und dem über ihn verhängten Publikationsverbot erschien ab 1820 seine Arithmetik nur noch in zwei Werken:
(1) in seinem philosophischen Hauptwerk *Wissenschaftslehre* (= WL), verfaßt 1812-30, gedruckt im Ausland 1837, danach 1882, 1914/15 - 1929/31, 1970, 1981;
(2) in seiner nachgelassenen Spätschrift *Paradoxien des Unendlichen* (= PdU) aus den Jahren 1847/48, gedruckt nach seinem Tod 1851, 1899, (1911), 1920, (1950), 1955,

(1963), 1964, (1965), (1966), 1975 (in Klammern Daten von Übersetzungen).
Ich beschränke mich im folgenden ausschließlich auf diese beiden Werke - denn sie sind seit langem zugänglich, ohne jedoch (so meine Sicht) bislang angemessen rezipiert worden zu sein." (S. 27)

105. Stachel, Peter. 2004. "Der logische Realismus Bernard Bolzanos." In *Geschichte der Österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol 6.1: Philosophie und Religion: Erleben, Wissen, Erkennen*, edited by Acham, Karl, 53-63. Wien: Passagen Verlag.
106. Strasser, Kurt, ed. 2003. *Die Bedeutung Bernard Bolzanos für die Gegenwart. Akten des Internationalen Symposiums 30. Oktober-1. November 2001 in Prag*. Praha: Filosofia.
Inhalt: Kurt F. Strasser: Vorbemerkungen des Herausgebers 9; Manfred Poiger: Vorwort des Leiters des Österreichischen Kulturforums in Prag (1996-2002) 11; Vilém Herold: Vorwort des Direktors des Instituts für Philosophie der Akademie der Wissenschaften der Tschechischen Republik 13;
Das wissenschaftliche Vermächtnis Bolzanos.
Jan Berg: Bolzanos wissenschaftliche Bedeutung 19; Edgar Morscher: Bolzanos Ethik 37; Markus Textor: Bolzanos Ontologie - Eine Übersicht 79;
Bolzanos Lehr- und Forschuncstätickeit.
Winfried Löffler: Bolzanos Religionsphilosophie und Theologie 109; Kurt F. Strasser: Bernard Bolzanos pädagogische Sendung 143;
Bolzano in der Tschechischen Philosophiegeschichte.
Vlastimil Hála: Zu Patočkas Interpretation von B.Bolzano 175; Miroslav Pauza: B.Bolzano als Forschungsobjekt tschechischer Theoretiker 195;
Personenregister 211.
107. Süssbauer, Alfons. 1987. "Propositionen und Sachverhalte in der Österreichischen Philosophie von Bolzano bis Popper." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 24:476-498.
108. Textor, Mark. 1996. *Bolzanos Propositionalismus*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Nach dieser Übersicht über die Zielsetzung meiner Arbeit mag man sich fragen, warum ich zwei auf den ersten Blick sehr verschiedene Fragen in einer Arbeit behandle. Meine Antwort lautet: Die beiden Ziele meiner Arbeit sind durch den Begriff der Anschauung an sich bzw. des Anschauungssatzesan sich miteinander verknüpft. Sowohl in Bolzanos Theorie des Inhalts indexikalischer Denkepisoden als auch in seinen Analysen der eben aufgezählten Begriffe spielt dieser Begriff die zentrale Rolle. Meine Arbeit hat also eine Grundfrage, die man wie folgt formulieren könnte: „Welchen philosophischen Nutzen hat Bolzanos Unterscheidung zwischen Anschauungs- und Begriffssätzen an sich?" (S. 2-3)

109. ———. 2004. "Bolzanos Ontologie—eine Übersicht." In *Die Bedeutung Bernard Bolzanos für die Gegenwart*, edited by Strasser, Kurt, 79-106. Prague: Filosofia.
110. Winter, Eduard. 1933. *Bernard Bolzano und sein Kreis. Dargestellt mit erstmaliger Heranziehung der Nachlässe Bolzanos und seiner Freunde*. Leipzig: J. Hegner.
111. ———. 1956. "Zur Geschichte und zum Stand der Bolzano-Forschung." *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* no. 6:440-448.
112. ———. 1964. *Die historische Bedeutung der Frühbegriffe B. Bolzanos*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Mit einem Anhang *Bolzano's Begriffe 1821*, mit Anmerkungen zu den logischen und mathematischen Begriffen von Jan Berg.
113. ———. 1975. "Robert Zimmermanns Philosophische Propädeutik und die Vorlagen aus der *Wissenschaftslehre* Bernard Bolzanos." *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse*.
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Franz Brentano's Ontology and His Immanent Realism

INTRODUCTION: BRENTANO PHILOSOPHER AND PSYCHOLOGIST

"Brentano was a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna. He made significant contributions to almost every branch of philosophy, notably psychology and philosophy of mind, ontology, ethics and the philosophy of language. He also published several books on the history of philosophy, especially Aristotle, and contented that philosophy proceeds in cycles of advance and decline. He is best known for reintroducing the scholastic concept of intentionality into philosophy and proclaiming it as the characteristic mark of the mental. His teachings, especially those on what he called descriptive psychology, influenced the phenomenological movement in the twentieth century, but because of his concern for precise statement and his sensitivity to the dangers of the undisciplined use of philosophical language, his work also bears affinities to analytic philosophy." (p. 12)

From: Roderick M. Chisholm and Peter Simons, "Brentano, Franz Clemens" in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London: Routledge 1998, vol. 2, pp. 12-17.

"Brentano never presented his philosophy in completed form. Most of his doctrines are known to us from writings published after his death, and these do not contain any rounded out

statement of his views. Brentano was not among those who in a moment of intuition sketch the architectonics of a system, leaving the relevant details to be fitted into it later. His research, always problem-oriented, began with individual questions, then went on to seek an absolutely certain, or if this could not be obtained, at least a probable, solution for the difficulties encountered along the way. Nor did he hesitate to revise his previous conceptions on the basis of advances in knowledge. The 'will to truth' checked the growth of a 'will to construct', and prevented the congealing of earlier ideas.

Brentano's significance for contemporary philosophy is still singularly underestimated. There is a striking disparity between the very great effect he has had on present-day philosophy and the relatively meager attention paid his teachings in current philosophical instruction and research. For Brentano is a center from which threads extend in the most varied directions. In the first place, the entire philosophy of phenomenology would be inconceivable without him. He was the teacher of Husserl (on whom he had an influence that should not be underestimated) and was thus the spiritual grandfather, so to speak, of Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger. Secondly, his work in ontology and metaphysics, notably his analysis of categories and his penetrating studies of Aristotle, decisively influenced the contemporary philosophies of Being (even if very indirectly in part). Finally, his method - especially in the study of the logic of language, which he considers the starting-point in philosophy bears a remarkable resemblance in many respects to the procedure of present day empiricism, and particularly to that of analytic philosophy in Britain and the U.S.A. It is difficult to say how much the investigations conducted in these countries owe to his stimulating ideas." (p. 24)

From: Wolfgang Stegmüller, *Main Currents in Contemporary German, British, and American Philosophy*, Dordrecht: Reidel 1969.

"Franz Brentano did not like to publish books; as he once said, he hated the "secondary work" that was connected with proof-reading, referencing of quotations, etc. He thus left the

publication of his literary remains to his disciples. Indeed, after his death (1917) Alfred Kastil and Oskar Kraus undertook the publication of his literary remains and, in the time permitted to them, carried it out with great loyalty and dedication. In the years 1922 through 1934, there appeared in Felix Meiner's Philosophische Bibliothek ten volumes of Brentano's works; the editor's rich annotations are invaluable for understanding Brentano's lectures and the development of his thoughts. After Kastil's death the work of publication was taken over by Franziska Meyer-Hillebrand, his disciple." (p. 94)

From: Hugo Bergmann, "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 27, 1967, pp. 94-99.

THE THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

"Brentano's first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic which separates psychological from non-psychological or 'physical' phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term 'intentionality' is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (*Beziehun*g) to a content, the directedness (*Richtung*) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (*immanente Gegenständlichkeit*). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (*Vorstellung*) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to

psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to a content.' It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. 'Intentional inexistence,' which literally implies the existence of an 'intentio' inside the intending being, as if imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term 'intentionality.' Thus, the second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, 'reference to an object,' is the more important and the only permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to Aristotle for its 'first germs' in a rather minor passage of the Metaphysics (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of 'intentionality.' Reference to an object is thus the decisive and indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano's psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time

uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis." (pp. 36-37)

Notes

(1) *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* I, Buch II, Kapitel I 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).

From: Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963 (Third Edition).

"Of great importance is Brentano's classification of psychic phenomena. There are three classes: presentations, judgments, and emotive acts. Of the first Brentano claims that all psychic phenomena are either presentations or involve presentations (a statement accepted by Husserl in an interpretation of presentations as "objectivating acts"). Judgments are conceived by Brentano as acts of affirmation or negation; thus he rejects a propositional theory of judgment. The third class (*Akte der Gemütsbewegung*) contains acts of volition as well as emotions, feelings, etc. These acts are conceived in analogy to judgments; they are either positive or negative (love vs. hate) and they are correct or incorrect (love is correct if its object is intrinsically worthy of being loved). This led Brentano to a conception of ETHICS as a discipline parallel to LOGIC. His basic ideas in ethics were first published as a paper he delivered in Vienna in 1889 (*Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*; an English translation, *Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, already appeared in 1902). His ethics had a strong influence on Max Scheler and on G. E. Moore (1873-1958). In his later writings Brentano became more and more interested in developing his own ontology and theory of categories. He developed a position called "reism" according to which the basic category is that of res, which comprehends both concrete things and immaterial souls. This strict objectivistic attitude was initially not influential within the phenomenological movement, but it did become important for logic and ontology in Poland. In recent years these ideas have

had great influence on philosophers such as Roderick Chisholm and Barry Smith.
Of great influence on Husserl was Brentano's theory of wholes and parts, which he introduced in his "ontology," the second part of his Würzburg lectures (in the 1870s Brentano inserted a descriptive part that he called "phenomenology" between the abovementioned "transcendental philosophy" and the "ontology"). Ontology has as its basic distinction that between *collectiva* and *divisiva*, which dichotomy is in turn classified as physical, logical, and metaphysical. The influence on Husserl's formal and material ontology as developed in the third of his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1901) is obvious, and it is likely that Husserl knew about these lectures via Stumpf, to whom he refers in this context and who had an extensive copy of these lectures.
The concept of Intentionality is only a problematic link between Brentano and phenomenology. This is already indicated by the fact that Brentano later gave up the term "intentional" because he thought that his views in this connection had been misunderstood. As a matter of fact Brentano does not talk about intention or intentionality, but rather uses expressions like "intentional inexistence" or "intentionally contain" that he introduced in order to distinguish psychic phenomena from physical phenomena. An isolated quality such as red is a physical phenomenon; red as belonging to consciousness is on the other hand a psychic phenomenon.
Intentional inexistence can be regarded as a mereological concept on two different levels. On the descriptive level, a psychic phenomenon is part of a complex consciousness to which belong, for instance, inner perception, acts of judgment, and emotive acts; on the metaphysical level, which also embraces entities that are not immediately given but inferred, it is conceived as part of a soul. In contexts like "intentional inexistence," the term "intentional" does not determine the related expression "inexistence" (or "containment") but modifies it, i.e., it changes its original meaning. If these words were used in this original meaning, the following conclusions would be valid: if something exists in something else, then both things exist; if something is contained in something other than it, there is a spatial relation

between them. In the modified context of "intentional inexistence" and "intentional containment," however, both conclusions are invalid. The intentional relation is thus, as Brentano explains in later writings, only "something relation-like" (*etwas Relativliches*). It is not, as in Husserl's intentional acts, a matter of directedness toward an object transcendent to consciousness but, in contrast, something immanent to consciousness." (pp. 74-75)

From: Dieter Münch, "Franz Brentano" in: Lester Embree et alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997, pp. 71-75.

THE SCHOOL OF BRENTANO

"The standards of rigour and descriptive adequacy of Scholasticism were re-established above all by Franz Brentano and his school. Brentano, a pupil of Adolf Trendelenburg, one of the few Aristotelians in the 19th century in Germany, created a philosophical system which was a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, and the empiricism of The British School. This system was modified in different and often highly original ways by his pupils, the most important of whom were Kazimierz Twardowski, Edmund Husserl, Carl Stumpf, Christian von Ehrenfels, Anton Marty, and Alexius Meinong.
In contradistinction to Hegel and his fellow idealists, the Brentano School was very successful in associating its philosophical work in fruitful ways with modern developments in the sciences, above all in psychology and linguistics. Brentano's pupils were responsible for founding not only new philosophical movements such as phenomenology, but also new programmes of scientific research such as the Gestalt theories of the Graz and Berlin Schools. Brentano's pupils contributed in important ways to modern logic, above all through Twardowski and his students in Poland. And they contributed also to ontology, for example through Meinong and the members of The Graz School, who

established the so-called theory of objects. Husserl, following in some respects in Meinong's footsteps, founded in turn the discipline of formal ontology and was the first to analyse in formal manner the ontological concepts of dependence, part and whole. Husserl's work in this field was then continued in philosophy above all by Adolf Reinach and Roman Ingarden, and in its application to linguistic parts and wholes by Stanislaw Leśniewski and others in Poland. Husserl's philosophical ideas on formal and material ontology gave rise further to a new understanding of synthetic or material a priori truths. From the perspective of Husserl, Reinach, and Ingarden such truths are not, as for Kant, the products of a forming or shaping activity on the side of the subject. Rather, as for Aristotle, they represent intelligible strictures on the side of the objects of experience, structures which are not invented but discovered, and which serve, again, as a pre-empirical basis for science and philosophy." (pp. XXI-XXII)

From: "Introduction" to: Barry Smith Barry and Hans Burkhardt (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991.

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Franz Brentano: Editions, Translations, Bibliographical Resources and Selected Texts

INTRODUCTION

"An edition of Brentano's literary production in its entirety is not yet available. At present the available works by Brentano divide between the following two types:

1. Works published during his lifetime.
2. Works in his *Nachlass*.

The works which Brentano published during his lifetime, in the form of both books and essays, represent only a small part of his total output. The books published from the *Nachlass* divide between:

1. Books edited by orthodox pupils, for instance 0. Kraus, A. Kastil and F. Mayer-Hillebrand, which afford numerous personal insights.
2. Books published since the 1970s.

(See F. Mayer-Hillebrand, "Franz Brentanos wissenschaftlicher Nachlass", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 6, 1951-52, 599-603, and by the same author, "Rückblick auf die bisherigen Bestrebungen zur Erhaltung und Verbreitung von Fr. Brentanos philosophischen Lehre und kurze Darstellung dieser Lehren", *Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung* 17, 1963, 146-169; also "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano. A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 23, 1962-3, 438-44; see also J.C.M.

Brentano, "The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano", *Revue internationale de philosophie* 78, 1966, 477-482).
The books belonging to the first category were compiled according to debatable philological criteria, with additions and collages of writings produced in different periods. The considerable arbitrariness of these constructs and the interpretative interpolations made by the editors have not generally benefited the understanding and diffusion of Brentano's thought. In particular, collections of the posthumously-published essays and dictations have often adopted the method of interpreting earlier texts as anticipations of later ones.
Moreover, one should read a huge body of correspondence (1400 letters with Marty alone) which has been published only in part, while some of the corpus, including letters from Brentano's period in Italy (1895-1916), is entirely unpublished. Brentano's philosophical correspondence is of great interest, not least because a letter sent to one scholar was then passed on to others, who read it, commented on it, and then sent it back, in a sort of epistolary colloquium. Only a tiny part of Brentano's correspondence has been published from the *Nachlass*.
Apropos the *Nachlass*, its first classification was produced by T. Masaryk, who founded a Brentano Archive in Prague for the purpose of organizing and publishing items. In 1939, at the beginning of the Second World War, the Archive was transferred first to Manchester, then to Oxford (the Bodleian Library), and finally to the United States.
Brentano's unpublished writings and dictations have undergone successive cataloguing by F. Mayer-Hillebrand, W. Baumgartner and T. Binder. They can currently be consulted at diverse universities. In the USA at the University of California (Berkeley), Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island), Cornell University (Ithaca, New York), Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), University of Minnesota (Minneapolis); Northwestern University (Evanston, Ill.), and at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. In Australia they can be consulted at Melbourne University (Victoria); in Europe at the Bodleian Library of Oxford, the Staatsbibliotek of Munich, the University of Innsbruck, the University of Vienna, and the Goethemuseum of Frankfurt; in France at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; in Latin America at

the University of Mexico City (Mexico D.F.) and the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The Brentano Archive originally deposited at Brown University included Brentano's personal library. It can now be consulted at the Forschungsstelle and Dokumentationszentrum far österreichische Philosophie of Graz."
From: Liliana Albertazzi, *Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, pp. 341-342.

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Franz Brentano: *Sämtliche veröffentlichte Schriften in zehn Bänden* (Herausgegeben von Arkadiusz Chrudzimski und Thomas Binder).

I. *Abteilung: Schriften zur Psychologie*.

1. Band: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874/1911) [2008]

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IV. *Abteilung: Vermischtes*

9. Band: Vermischtes

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"Being is a homonym. Its several senses fit into the fourfold distinction of accidental being, being in the sense of being true, being of the categories, and potential and actual being.
'Being is said in various ways', says Aristotle in the beginning of the fourth book of his Metaphysics [IV, 2, 1003a33]. He repeats this in Books VI and VII and several more times in other places. In these passages he enumerates a number of concepts, each of which, in different ways, is called a being. In Met. IV. 2. 1003b6 he says 'one thing is said to be because it is substance, another because it is an attribute of substance, still another because it is a process toward substance, or corruption of substance, or privation of substantial forms or quality of substance, or because it produces or generates substance or that which is predicated of substance, or because it is a negation of such a thing or of substance itself. For this reason we also say that non-being is nonbeing." The various sorts of being which are here enumerated can be reduced to four kinds: (1) Being which has no existence whatever outside the understanding (privation, negation); (2) The being of movement and of generation and corruption (process toward substance, destruction); for though these are

outside the mind, they do not have complete and perfect existence (cf. Physics III 1. 201a9); (3) Being which has complete but dependent existence (affections of substance, qualities, things productive and generative) (4) The being of the substances (*ousia*)." (p. 3).

"Thesis I: The categories are not merely a framework for concepts, but they are themselves real concepts, extramental independent being.

This is Aristotle's opinion which he states clearly and repeatedly, so much so that, as I said, I cannot believe that there are more than verbal differences between his interpreters. If, to begin with, there is no doubt that being itself, of which the metaphysician must treat, is a concept, indeed a real concept, since what merely exists objectively in the mind was previously set aside, there can also be no doubt with respect to the categories." (p. 57)

"Thesis II: The categories are several senses of being which is asserted of the analogically, indeed in a twofold manner, i.e. as analogy of proportionality, and as analogy to the same terminus.

This sentence contains a further confirmation of the preceding one. It contains three assertions: (1) that being which is divided according the schema of the categories is divided not like a univocal concept, i.e., as a genus into species, but rather in the manner of a homonym which is differentiated according to its various senses; (2) that the use of 'being' for the different categories, even though an a homonym, is not a mere accidental likeness of names,; rather, that there is among them a unity of analogy; and, finally, (3) that the analogy among them is a twofold one, namely, not only an analogy of proportionality, but also an analogy to the same terminus. We hope to secure this result fully by establishing it, point by point, from the various utterances of our philosopher." (pp. 58-59).

"Thesis III. The categories are the highest univocal general concepts, the highest genera of being.

In the previous section we have considered the categories in relation to being, which is superordinate to them and designates them jointly, though it is not, properly speaking, common to them. Their unity was a unity of analogy; nothing applied to them in one and the same way (Met. VII 4 1030a32), i.e., univocally. It has already been shown that there is no higher univocal concept.

We now turn to a consideration of the relation between the categories and the things subordinate to them, and here we find, by contrast, that all things belonging to the same category are things univocally named. The categories are general concepts in the proper sense, and genera of things." (p. 66).
"These XIV. There is a harmony between the categories of Aristotle and the grammatical differences of noun and adjective, verb and adverb.
When Trendelenburg (1) advanced his now famous hypothesis about the grammatical origin of Aristotle's categories he wanted to find, to begin with, something which could have guided Aristotle in the determination of the highest genera. He was concerned with rejecting the objection of Kant and Hegel that Aristotle haphazardly raked together a round number of general concepts. We hope to have met this objection in a different way. It must be admitted that a procedure which lacks an ontological principle and thus has to rely on mere agreement with grammatical relations as a guarantee for the validity of this important division cannot escape being reproached for its superficiality.
Still it is a phenomenon welcome to sound philosophy to find itself in agreement with common sense and with the general consciousness which is exhibited particularly also in language. Thus it is a recommendation for Aristotle's categories that there is a considerable kinship between his categories and certain linguistic forms. It seems to me that Trendelenburg has shown that this is undeniable, no matter how many objections have been raised. He has also shown that Aristotle was well aware of this agreement with grammar. Here as everywhere he knew how to make use of the speculations of earlier thinkers and the speculative content of common opinions. He noticed, above all, that if one thing is essentially predicated of another so that name and concept of the predicate applies to it, the this occurs in a grammatically different form than if the predicate merely give its name to the subject without being of the essence of the subject." (pp. 123-124).
(1) Adolf Trendelenburg - *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* (History of the theory of Categories) - Berlin, 1846 [Note added]

"Thesis XV. The preceding investigation concerning the principle and meaning of the categories resolves objection raised from various quarters against the division of the categories.
Aristotle's division of categories has withstood the passage of time in an admirable way. If one follows the history of the doctrine of categories he can see that even its opponents pay unconscious tribute to it, an one is often inclined to smile on discovering that those who consider themselves its decided opponents are essentially guided by it.
The present era no longer has an Aristotelian doctrine of categories. When we now speak of categories we do not think of the what, how, how much, in relation to what. But none of the more recent systems has been able to establish a lasting reputation. More recent theories which investigate categories non longer pursue the same goal as Aristotle, and one cannot possibly claim that they have put anything into the place of the old categories.
The question if now whether one can suppose that something with has lived so long can lack all vitality, or whether it is rather the case that it meet its purpose, the thru purpose of the table of categories. We hardly need to say that our opinion inclines toward a favourable judgment, and in out investigation we have generally attempted to let the doctrine of categories develop with a kind of internal necessity -- presupposing the correctness of other Aristotelian doctrines." (p. 130).
"This now complete the domain of our inquiry, Step by step we have ascended from what has been called being in a lesser sense to proper being. Of the four senses into which being is initially divided, being in figures of the categories was the most distinguished. The course of this chapter has shown that the categories bear the name of 'being' all with respect to one being, namely, with respect to their being of the first category.
It would be more proper to say of every other category that it is of a being than it is a being. Hence it is substance which has being in the preeminent sense, i.e. which is not only something, but simply is. There are many sense in which something ca be first, but substance is among all being the first in every sense, in concept, in cognition, as well as in time. Its being in the terminus to which all stand in analogy, just as health is the terminus with

respect to which everything that is healthful is called healthful, either because it has it, or because it bring about it, or shows it, etc. If now metaphysics is the science of being as such, the it is clear that its main objects is substance. For in all cases of such analogies science treats mainly of the first, upon which the others depend, and form which they receive their name. Hence the first philosopher must research the principles and grounds of substance. His primary, most distinguished, and in a sense only, task is to consider what it is." (p. 148).

From: Franz Brentano - *On the several senses of Being in Aristotle* - Berkeley: University of California Press 1975 (Greek words and notes omitted).

Related pages

Pages on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano:

Franz Brentano's Ontology and His Immanent Realism

Selected Bibliography: First Part : A - K

Selected Bibliography: Second Part : L - Z

The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic

Theory and History of Ontology

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   "Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies, empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks the point of significant convergence: Brentano's emphasis of reism and nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of language as a logical doctrine of the

categories, and (2) his critique of language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lenghts that and how the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner's *Sprachkritik* due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language."

7. ———. 1990. "Nominalismo E Critica Delle Idee in Brentano." *Idee*:217-235.

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   "Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl's version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano's (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl's investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion."

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    "In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:
    1. Brentano's metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua -- and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils -- are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences express the need for a scientifically -- even neurophysiologically -- founded theory of intentionality."

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    "The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of

thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.
The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brentanism.
The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano's thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.
We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.
In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with." (Foreword by the Editors).

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    Indice: Giovanni Piana: Presentazione 9; Liliana Albertazzi, Roberto Poli: Introduzione. Brentano: il *puzzle* incompleto 11; I Pragmatisti 19. Antonio Santucci: Franz Brentano e i pragmatisti italiani 21; Francesca Modenato: Conoscere e volere. L'incontro di Vailati e Calderoni con Brentano 47; Roberto Poli: Le credenze fra logica e mondo. Reismo, pragmatismo e *common-sense philosophy*: alle soglie del

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18. Anasvili, Valerij. 2000. "Rezeption Franz Brentanos in Russland (Eileitende Materialen)." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 8:219-231.

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20. ———. 1991. "Auf Der Suche Nach Der Substanz. Zu Brentano Stellung in Der Rezeption Der Aristotelischen Ontologie Im 19. Jahrundert." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:19-46.

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22. ———. 1996. *Franz Brentano Psicologo. Dalla 'Psicologia Dal Punto Di Vista Empirico' Alla 'Psicologia Descrittiva'*. Bologna: Pitagora.

23. ———. 2000. "Franz Brentano Und Die Wiederentdeckung Der Intentionalitat. Richtigstellung Herkömmlicher Missverständnisse Und Missdeutungen." *Grazer Philosophische Studien*no. 58-59:93-117.

24. ———. 2001. *Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Im Frühwerk Von Franz Brentano*. Freiburg: K. Alber.

25. ———. 2006. "La Conception De La Vérité Du Jeune Brentano: De La Dissertation Sur *Les Significations Multiples De L'être* Aux *Leons De Mètaphysique*." In *Propositions Et États De Choses. Entre Être Et Sens*, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn, 67-86. Paris: Vrin.

26. ———. 2009. "Franz Brentano Et L' "Inexistence Intentionnelle"." *Philosophiques* no. 36:467-487.

27. Aquila, Richard. 1971. "The Status of Intentional Objects." *New Scholasticism* no. 45:427-456.

28. ———. 1977. *Intentionality. A Study of Mental Acts*. University Park: Pnnsylvania State University Press.

29. ———. 1982. "Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances." *Philosophical Topics* no. 12:9-37.

30. Bartok, Philip J. 2005. "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings." *Journal of History of Philosophy* no. 43:437-460.

"Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis,

and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely "on the way" to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project."

31. ———. 2005. "Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of Ther Mental." In *Intentionality. Past and Future*, edited by Forrai, Gabor and Kampis, George, 15-24. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

32. Baumgartner, Elisabeth. 1985. *Intentionalität. Begriffsgeschichte Und Begriffsanwendung in Der Psychologie*. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann.

33. Baumgartner, Elisabeth, and Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 1997. "Von Brentano Zu Kulpe: Die Deskriptive Psychologie Brentanos Und Die 'Urzburger Schule' Der Denkpsychologie." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 7:31-52.

34. Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 1987. "Die Begründung Von Wahrheit Durch Evidenz: Der Beitrag Brentanos." In *Geiwssheit Und Gewissen. Festschrift Für Franz Wiedmann Zum 60. Geburstag*, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm, 93-116. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

35. ———. 1989. "Objects Analysed. Brentano's Way toward the Identity of Objects." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:20-30.

36. ———. 1989. "Brentanos Und Mills Methode Der Beschreibenden Analyse." *Brentano*

Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 2:63-78.

37. ———. 2004. "Brentano Un Die Österreischische Philosophie." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 131-158. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

38. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Burkard, Franz-Peter. 1990. "Franz Brentano: Eine Skizze Seines Lebens Und Seiner Werke." In *International Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy 1982/83 - Internationale Bibliographie Zur Osterreichischen Philosophie*, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm and Burkard, Franz-Peter. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

39. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Simons, Peter M. 1992. "Brentanos Mereologie." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 4:53-77.

40. ———. 1994. "Brentano's Mereology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 1:55-76.

41. Bausola, Adriano. 1968. *Conoscenza E Moralità in Franz Brentano*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

42. ———. 2000. "La Dottrina Sul Giudizio Di Esistenza E La Critica Ad Alcuni Argomenti Per L'esistenza Di Dio in Franz Brentano." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 92:282-294.

43. Bell, John L. 2000. "Continuity and the Logic of Perception." *Transcendent Philosophy* no. 1:1-7.

44. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1998. "Qu'est-Ce Qu'un Jugement? Brentano, Frege, Husserl." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 14 (27-28):169-192.

45. Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. *Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004

46. Bergmann, Hugo. 1945. "Brentano's Theory of Induction." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 5:281-292.

Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.): - *The philosophy of Brentano* - pp. 213-223.

47. ———. 1965. "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 26:94-99.

48. ———. 1966. "Franz Brentano." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:349-372.

49. Berti, Enrico. 2001. "Brentano and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." In *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 135-149. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Franz Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was found in his book on *Aristotle's Psychology* (1867); and b) because of the influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger's thought. However, Brentano's attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been almost completely rejected.
The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji, (1) but Brentano's interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at the centre of the debate on the "Mind-Body Problem", which involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R. Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on *Aristotle's Psychology* was included in the recent collection of Essays on Aristotle's "De anima".(3) The

second point, to which Heidegger himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself. (5)
The interpretation of Aristotle's theology expounded by Brentano in an additional essay to *Aristotle's Psychology*, was criticised by Eduard Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy (1878). This criticism induced Brentano to write an essay on *Aristotle's Creationism* (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with some additions, in the volume *Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der menschlichen Geistes* (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a monograph, *Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung*, where he repeated the main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross's introduction to his edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where the famous English Aristotelian refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle's God as a creator, explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)
On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality, even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary, to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation of Aristotle's theology, developed in his later writings, had for the modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano's Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers' judgements of Aristotle's metaphysics." pp. 135-137
(1) Cf. R. George, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in R.M. Chisholm and R. Haller (eds.), *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.), *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, Oxford

Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
(2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, 'Aristotele e il "Mind-Body Problem', Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica 11, 1998, 43-62.
(3) *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos*, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
The first chapter, ' *Nous poietikos*: Survey of earlier interpretations', was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De anima,*Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.
(4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in his lecture 'Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie' (1963), in id., *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Tubingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.
(5) Cf. F. Volpi, *Heidegger e Brentano*, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell'Università di Padova), and *Heidegger e Aristotele*, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminiaux, L *e regard et l'excédent*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, *Aristotele nel Novecento*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
(6) F. Brentano, 'Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles', S.-B. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller, 'Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes', S.-B. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller's *Kleine Schriften*, Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, *Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard Zeller,* Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, *Deutsche Literaturanzeigung*, 1883.
(7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E. Berti, 'Zeller e Aristotele', Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore

di Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos., s. III, vol. XIX.3, Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.
(8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until after his death: cf. F. Brentano, *Uber Aristoteles. Nachgelassene Aufsatze*, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.
(9) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I, cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E. Berti, 'Da chi è amato it motore immobile? Su Aristotele, *Metaph*. XII 6-7', *Methexis* 10, 1997, 59-82.

50. Besoli, Stefano. 1986. "Brevi Cenni Intorno Alla Recezione Brentaniana Della Filosofia Di Thomas Reid." *Annali di discipline fisosofiche dell'Università di Bologna*:25-30.

51. Binder, Thomas. 2000. "Die Brentano Gesellschaft Und Das Brentano-Archiv in Prag." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 58-59:533-565.

52. ———. 2000. "Die Prager Brentano Gesellschaft." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 8:259-286.

53. Blackmore, John. 1995. *Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906. Book Two: The Philosopher*. Dordrecht: Kuwer.

    See Chapter Six: *Franz Brentano* pp. 135-153 and Seven: *Critical Realism* pp. 155-180.

54. ———. 1998. "Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 73-92. Brookfiled: Ashgate.

55. Brandl, Johannes. 1987. *Brentanos Urteilslehre. Eine Studie Über Die Logische Form Von Akt Und Inhalt*. Graz: Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für Österreichische Philosophie.

56. ———. 1996. "Intentionality." In, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 261-284. Kluwer: Dordrecht.

57. Brentano, J.C.M. 1966. "The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:477-482.

58. Brown, Deborah. 2000. "Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars." *Monist* no. 83:22-46.

59. Buzzoni, Marco. 1988. "Brentano, Sprache, Ontologie Und Person." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:153-187.

60. Campos, Eliam. 1979. *Die Kantkritik Brentanos*. Bonn: Bouvier.

61. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1957. "Intentional Inexistence." In *Perceiving*, 168-185. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - *The philosophy of Brentano* - pp. 140-150

62. ———, ed. 1960. *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

    Contents: Preface V; Editor's Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2. Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129; 7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding: Introduction to 'The New Realism' 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The basis of realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell:

The ultimate constituents of matter 223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore: A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.
"The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation of Husserl ("Phenomenology and Anthropology") have not previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his kind permission, from his translation of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*.Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" was translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl's "Phenomenology" was translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his "Phenomenology and Anthropology" by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University." (from the Preface)

63. ———. 1966. "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:395-415.

    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister - *The philosophy of Brentano* - pp. 160-175

64. ———. 1967. *Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional*. Vol. Phenomenology and existentialism. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

65. ———. 1972. "Beyond Being and Nonbeing. Beiträge Zur Meinong-Forschung." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

    Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th - October, 4th 1970

66. ———. 1978. "Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:197-210.

"Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. "a thinker" in place of "thinks") and characterizes the "is" of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in "inner perception". He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries."

67. ———. 1981. "Brentano's Analysis of the Consciousness of Time." In *Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume Vi. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr, Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard K., 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

"Franz Brentano's conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated by his aanalysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort. Hence the analysis might be called "phenomenological," but Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of "descriptive psychology."
An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, or course, an analysis of time. Hence Brentano's analysis is consistent with a number of different conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to which distinctions of tense are merely "subjective" or otherwise "illusory." Nor does he believe that all truths can he expressed in untensed sentences.
I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental problem of descriptive psychology -- that of accurately describing our awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development of his views with respect to this problem."

68. ———. 1982. *Brentano and Meinong Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
"I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident" was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the *Grazer Philosophische Studien,* Vol. V (1978). The second paper - "Brentano's Theory of Judgment" - has not been published before; but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled "Brentano's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment," appeared in the *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.* I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano's *Kategorienlehre,* to which many references are made in these two papers, has now been translated into English as *The Theory of Categories,*The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.
(...)
The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. "Correct and Incorrect Emotion" and "The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure" are both adapted from "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion," which first appeared in the Brentano issue of the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie,* Vol. 20 (1966).
(...)

The final paper - "Beginnings and Endings" - is a revision of a paper entitled "Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker," which first appeared in the special volume of *Conceptus* entitled *Österreichische Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart,* Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared in *Time and Cause,* edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume.
I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the *Foreword*)

69. ———. 1986. *Brentano and Intrinsic Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

70. ———. 1989. "The Object of Sensation: A Brentano Study." *Topoi* no. 8:3-8.

71. ———. 1991. "The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical Study." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 3:11-18.

"What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological.
It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that

judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.)
If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing - namely, the one who makes the judgment. Arid I, of course, am the one who makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of my other intentional activities - such activities as wondering, fearing, hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking."

72. ———. 1993. "Spatial Continuity and the Theory of Part and Whole. A Brentano Study." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 4:11-24.

    "The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial dimension and of spatial boundary are here "analyzed out" of the concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents of spatial substances."

73. ———. 1993. "Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness"." In *Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 153-160. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

74. ———. 1994. "Ontologically Dependent Entities." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 54:499-

507.

75. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. "Die Theorie Der Intentionalität Bei Franz Brentano." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 57:45-66.

76. ———. 2000. "Die Theorie Des Zeitbewusstseins Franz Brentano Im Licht Der Unpublizierten Manuskripte." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*no. 8:149-161.

77. ———. 2001. *Intentionalitätstheorie Beim Frühen Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

78. ———. 2001. "Die Wahrheitstheorie Franz Brentanos." In *Philosophie - Wissenschaft - Wirtschaft. Miteinander Denken, Voneinander Lernen. Vorträge Des Vi. Kongresses Der Österreichischen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie, Linz 1.-4. Juni 2000*, edited by Neumaier, Otto and Born, Rainer, 456-461. Wien: Verlag Hõlder-Pichler-Tempsky.

79. ———. 2002. "Von Brentano Zu Ingarden: Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre." *Husserl Studies* no. 18:185-208.

80. ———. 2002. "Brentano Und Meinong. Zur Ontologie Der Denkobjekte." In *Substanz Und Identität. Beiträge Zur Ontologie*, edited by Löffler, Winfried, 155-166. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag.

81. ———. 2003. "Brentano's Late Ontology." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 10:221-236.

"In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano's late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano's *Theory of Categories*

and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano's definition of truth."

82. ———. 2004. *Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

83. ———. 2005. *Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein Und Intersubjektivität. Studien Zur Phänomenologie Von Brentano Bis Ingarden*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

84. ———. 2005. "Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Die Intentionale Gegenstände." In *Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden.*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.

85. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, and Łukasiewicz, Dariusz, eds. 2006. *Actions, Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano's dilemma, and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski's distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought 55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz Łukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski's conception of existence 183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes on contributors 233; Index of names 235.

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Alexius Meinong: Sur les objets d'ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne 261; Kazimierz Twardowski: Fonctions et formations 343; Anton Marty: Sur le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique 385; Références bibliographiques 423; Index des noms propres 441-446

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"The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of *hyle*, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched."

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"The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano's immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler's *Logik*, Twardowski's *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, and Meinong's mature *Gegenstandstheorie*, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano's thesis of immanent intentionality as the mark of the mental is reinterpreted to imply that only content is the immanently intentional component of presentations. Brentano's thought from the early immanence thesis through the so-called *Immanenzkrise* and his later reism is explored against the background of his students' reactions to the original 1874 intentionality thesis and its idealist implications, in the emergence of Meinong's object theory and Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Finally, Brentano's reism in the later ontology is critically examined, as his solution to ontic problems of immanent intentionality, limiting intentional objects to transcendent concrete particulars."

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Contents: List of contributors XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; List of abbreviations XVIII; Chronology XX-XXII; 1. Introduction: Brentano's philosophy by Dale Jacquette 1; 2. Brentano's relation to Aristotle by Rolf George and Glen Koehn 20; 3. Judging correctly: Brentano and the reform of elementary logic by Peter Simons 45; 4. Brentano on the mind 66; 5. Brentano's concept of intentionality 98; 6. Reflections on intentionality 131; 7. Brentano's epistemology 149; 8. Brentano on judgment and truth by Charles Parsons 168; 9. Brentano's ontology: from conceptualism to reism by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith 197; 10. Brentano's value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion by Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella 220; 11. Brentano on religion and natural theology by Susan F. Krantz Gabriel 237; 12. Brentano and Husserl by Robin D. Rollinger 255; 13. Brentano's impact on twentieth-century philosophy by Karl Schuhmann 277; Bibliography 298; Index 316-322.

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"The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul's corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semi-materialistic conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul from Brentano's reistic point of view which and that it is an immaterial substance. Finally there follows a presentation of what is taken to be Brentano's conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentanos's psychology."

143. ———. 1993. "Brentano's Revision of the Correspondence Theory." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 3:79-88.

"Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the light they shed on Brentano's view of the relation between the thinker and the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes the adaequatio thesis word by word in order to demonstrate what he takes to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the adaequatio thesis, that Brentano's revision of it in the direction of a phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of the nature of the thinker or knower.

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"Brentano's thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness, and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness, one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of Brentano's subjectivism in psychology."

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   "Brentano saw his task as giving a classification of cognitive acts. He categorized such 'thoughts' into three main groups: presentations, judgments, and love. By this unexpected latter term, he meant affectual attitudes.
   The notion of 'presentation' in his system is both fundamental and difficult to grasp. Its essence is the idea that a cognitive agent can have a presentation of an object without it being the presentation of any particular object. One can entertain presentations of objects which do not nor could not have any real existence, like unicorns, golden mountains, and I suppose round squares. Achieving a presentation of something is the first step toward the other two types of acts, of which judgments concern us most. Judgments (and affectual attitudes or reactions) come in contrary pairs of affirmation and denial, the two modes of judgment. The basis for a judgment is a simple or compound presentation, so the root of the thetic/categorical

distinction is in the definition of possible bases for judgments.
The basis for a thetic judgment is a presentation of an object: an entity or eventuality. An affirmation of such a presentation commits the judger to the existence of something which satisfies the presentation; a denial by contrast expresses a negative existence judgment.
The basis for a categorical judgment is compound: first a presentation which is clarified into a particular object satisfying the description, and then a property to be affirmed or denied of the object.
Despite the conceptualist foundation of this system, I think we can model it with some familiar objects. Let us equate the notion of a presentation of an object for a description of an object. A description is something which can be satisfied by an object. Take object to range over both individuals and eventualities, and we have two sorts of descriptions: descriptions of an individual and descriptions of an eventuality. Properties we can take as basic, but crucially not as descriptions of an individual or an eventuality. The modified ontology then is summarized in (12):
12. Modified Brentanan Ontology
objects: individuals, eventualities
descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities
properties
The assumptions about the forms of judgment can be summarized in (13):
13. Judgment structure
a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description
b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property.
c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the basis. (Existential commitment)
d. A categorical judgment is an affirmation or denial of the basis property to the object in the basis. (Predication)
Note that (13c) and (13d) contain a theory of negation which recognizes both a relational and a unary notion of negative mode of judgment. The utility of this distinction has been argued for eloquently in precisely the same tradition by

Laurence Horn *The natural history of negation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989, which put me onto this line of thinking."

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   "It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such

a legacy, and that Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of Frege's Begriffschrift, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had insisted in the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, and which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the framework provided by Kant's general logic. But thetic judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a long-standing logical tradition.
In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four sections. I begin with a review of Fichte's most explicit call for logical revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant's logical commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this anomaly among Fichte's philosophical progeny, in particular Johann Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores Brentano's position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the logical agenda Fichte had projected."

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"A particular subject-matter in Franz Brentano's philosophy is his approach to the history of philosophy. I shall consider the evolution of his concept of the history of philosophy, the sources of this concept, and, finally, its relationship to Edmund Husserl's understanding of the history of philosophy. Brentano's scheme of the four phases of the history of philosophy can serve as a principle of evaluation of what comes after Brentano's era in the history of philosophy."

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25. Moore, George Edward. 1903. "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong." *International Journal of Ethics* no. 14:115-123.

    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The philosophy of Brentano,* pp. 176-181.

26. Moran, Dermot. 1996. "Brentano's Thesis." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* no. 70:1-27.

27. ———. 2000. "Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality." *Inquiry* no. 43:39-65.

    "Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano's conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness

(phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl's assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in *Being and Time* (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is *developing* Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, *not reversing or abandoning* his account. Heidegger's criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl's. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl's account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged."

28. ———. 2000. "Franz Brentano: Descriptive Psychology and Intentionality." In *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 23-59. New York: Roultdge.

29. Morrison, James C. 1971. "Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 31:27-46.

30. Morscher, Edgar. 1978. "Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:1-10.

    "The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano's philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term 'Austrian philosophy'. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano's place in Austrian philosophy -- whatever that may be --, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression 'Austrian philosophy' could mean."

31. Mulligan, Kevin. 1988. "Judgings: Their Parts and Counterparts." *Topoi Supplement* no. 2:117-148.

32. ———. 1997. "Sur L'histoire De L'approche Analytique De L'histoire De La Philosophie: De Bolzano Et Brentano À Bennett Et Barnes." In *Philosophie Analytique Et Histoire De La Philosophie*, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel, 61-103. Paris: Vrin.

33. Mulligan, Kevin, and Smith, Barry. 1985. "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 45:627-644.

34. Münch, Dieter. 1986. "Brentanos Lehre Von Der Intentionalen Inexistenz." In *Von Bolzano Zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition Der Österreichischen Philosophie*, edited by Nyiri, Janós, 119-127. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

35. ———. 1989. "Brentano and Comte." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 36:33-54.

36. ———. 1993. *Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk*. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp.

37. ———. 1996. "Die Einheit Von Geist Und Leib: Brentanos Habilitationsschrift Über Die Psychologie Des Aristoteles Als Antwort Auf Zeller." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 6:125-144.

38. ———. 2004. "Neues Zum Frühen Brentano." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 67:209-225.

39. ———. 2004. "Franz Brentano Et La Réception Catholique D'aristote Au Xix Siècle." In *Aristote Au Xix Siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 231-248. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

40. Orth, Ernst-Wolfgang. 1997. "Metaphysische Implikationen Der Intentionalität: Trendelenburg, Lotze, Brentano."

Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung no. 7:15-30.

41. Parsons, Charles. 2004. "Brentano on Judgement and Truth." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 168-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

42. Pasquerella, Lynn. 1987. "Intensional Logic and Brentano's Non-Propositional Theory of Judgement." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 29:117-119.

43. ———. 1988. "Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:189-197.

    "According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion in Brentano's writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano's final theory of sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm's Direct Attribution theory as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of self-reference involved in reflective consciousness."

44. ———. 1989. "Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:98-106.

45. ———. 1993. "Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 4:235-249.

"Brentano's philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, *Grundzuge der Ästhetik*, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano's philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano's aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano's analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system."

46. ———. 2002. "Intentionality, Phenomenology and Sensation in Brentano." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 40 (Supplement):269-279.

47. Pavlik, Jan. 1991. "Brentano's Theory of Intentionality." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 3:63-70.

    "Brentano's intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano's theory enables empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations."

48. Pietersma, Henry. 1978. "Brentano's Concept of the Evident." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 7:235-244.

49. Poli, Roberto. 1993. "Towards a Non-Symbolic Semantics." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 4:221-234.

"Starting from some ideas proposed by Suszko, Brentano's non-propositional theory of judgement is considered. In order to clarify (some of) the formal and ontological aspects of his theory, the distinction between external (symbolic) and internal (non-symbolic) semantics is introduced and discussed."

50. ———. 1993. "Ontologia E Logica in Franz Brentano: Giudizi Categorici E Giudizi Tetici." *Epistemologia* no. 16:39-76.

"The various attempts to clarify and interpret Brentano's logical analysis have merely provided a paraphrase of Brentano own words. We will analyse Brentano's proposals against the background of traditional logic. In his *Formale Logik,* Bochenski explicitly warns us that logic not only "does not give proof of a linear continuity of evolution", but that the logic which follows a long period of decadence "departs, for the most part, from different presuppositions and points of view, uses a different technique, and develops previously neglected aspects of the problematic. It is a different *form* of logic". I shall bear these remarks of Bochenski's carefully in mind and I shall argue that mathematically-based modern formal logic and syllogistic theory of the past exemplify two distinct formal paradigms. My reference to two different paradigms, and not just to two different calculuses, implies that most of the syllogistic reformulations of this century are, broadly speaking, suspect; and specifically because they take the syllogistic to be a part or a fragment of first-order predicative calculus. Careful study of traditional logic immediately shows that traditional logic expresses specific ontological perspectives which are deeply embedded in its formal structures. From this point of view, Brentano's theory is a brilliant attempt to escape from some of the most difficult impasses of traditional logic and offers tools for new developments.

Unfortunately, it arrived too late, just as the Fregean paradigm was about to burst on the scene."

51. ———. 1993. "Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Brentano: The Dispute About Reism." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

52. ———. 1993. "The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski - Ajdukiewicz - Brentano." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lwow-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

53. ———. 1994. "At the Origins of Analytic Philosophy." *Aletheia* no. 6:218-231.

54. ———, ed. 1998. *The Brentano Puzzle*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the *Schubladenexperiment* 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225.
"The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference "The Brentano Puzzle," organized in Bolzano /

Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.
The conference's aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility.'
It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.
This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty,

Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master's thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.
One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl's phenomenology, Twardowski's Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong's Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The sub–)`;Ýësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano's thought then fell.
Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered." (Foreword by Roberto Poli)

55. ———. 2000. "Brentano in Italy." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 8:233-257.

56. ———. 2004. "Approaching Brentano's Theory of Categories." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

57. Potrc, Matjaz. 1993. "Grades of Intentionality." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 3:71-78.

"Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible - contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to delimit his project of "Psychognosie" from the physical and from the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directedness to the singular.
As human organisms only are able to entertain directedness to the singular, brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might then lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms."

58. Prechtl, Peter. 1989. "Die Struktur Der Intentionalität Bei Brentano Und Husserl." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 2:117-130.

59. Rancurello, Antos. 1968. *A Study of Franz Brentano. His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology*. New York: Academic Press.

60. Richardson, Robert. 1983. "Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 65:250-282.

61. Rojszczack, Artur. 1994. "Wharheit Und Urteilsevidenz Bei Franz Brentano." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 5:187-218.

62. ———. 2005. *From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Edited by Jan Wolenski

63. Rollinger, Robin D. 1993. "Husserl and Brentano on Imagination." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 75:195-210.

Reprinted with the title: *Brentano and Husserl on Imagination* in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.

64. ———. 1999. *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

65. ———. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.

66. ———. 2005. "Meinong and Brentano." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:159-198.

"Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct

classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."

67. ———. 2006. "Brentano's Logic and Marty's Early Philosophy of Language." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 12:77-98.

68. ———. 2009. "Brentano's Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations." *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication*:1-23.

69. Rossi, Guido. 1926. *Giudizio E Raziocinio. Studi Sulla Logica Dei Brentaniani*. Milano: Sodalitas.

70. Rothenberg, Beno. 1962. *Studien Zur Logik Franz Brentano's*.

    Inaugural Dissertation. University Frankfurt am Main.

71. Runggaldier, Edmund. 1989. "On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of 'Intentionality' in Brentano." *Topoi* no. 8:97-103.

    "The early Brentano identifies intentionality with "intentional inexistence", i.e., with a kind of indwelling of

the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of Being (*to on legetai pollachos*). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano."

72. Russo, Antonio. 2003. "Franz Brentano E Heinrich Denifle: Un Carteggio Inedito." *Studium*:333-356.

73. ———. 2003. *La Scuola Cattolica Di Franz Brentano: Heinrich Suso Denifle*. Trieste: EUT.

    Con un carteggio inedito F. Brentano - H. Denifle.

74. Sanford, David. 1997. "Chisholm on Brentano's Thesis." In *The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm*, edited by Hahn, Lewis. Chicago: Open-Court Publishing Co.

75. Sauer, Werner. 2000. "Erneuerung Der Philosophia Perennis: Über Die Ersten Vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 58/59:119-150.

76. ———. 2006. "Die Einheit Der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 73:1-26.

    "The objective of this paper is to refute the widely held view that in the wake of his so-called reistic turn Brentano subjected his notion of intentionality to a deep-going revision, viz., that he turned from an ontological account of the intentional object by way of identifying it with the thought-of-thing, i.e., the intentional correlate, or by way of attributing to it a peculiar sort of existence, to a non-ontological account thereof. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that he both

distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence, and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of Brentano's thinking about relations."

77. Schaar, Maria van der. 1999. "Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle: Brentano on Truth." In *The Logica Yearbook 1998*, 110-120. Prague: Filosofia.

78. ———. 2003. "Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 10:119-150.

    "In this paper it will be argued that Brentano's later writings about this topic can be understood better if one describes it as a result partly of his immanent development and partly of Brentano's reactions to his contemporaries."

79. Schmit, Roger. 1985. "Allgemeinheit Und Existenz. Zur Analyse Der Kategorischen Urteils Bei Herbart, Sigwart, Brentano Und Frege." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 23:58-78.

80. Schuhmann, Karl. 1988. "Die Einwirkung Brentanos Auf Die Mûnchener Phänomenologen." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:97-107.

81. ———. 1994. "Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos 'Psychognosie'." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 5:167-176.

82. Sebestik, Jan. 1984. "Bolzano Et Brentano. Deux Sources Autrichiennes Du Cercle De Vienne." *Fundamenta Scientiae* no. 5:219-235.

83. Simons, Peter M. 1984. "A Brentanian Basis for Lesniewskian Logic." *Logiquet et Analyse* no. 27:297-307.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 259-269.

84. ———. 1986. "Brentano's Reform of Logic." *Topoi* no. 6:25-38.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 41-69

85. ———. 1988. "Brentano's Theory of Categories: A Critical Reappraisal." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:47-61.

"In his doctoral dissertation *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* Brentano tried to show that (against criticism of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle's table of categories as a coherent system. In later texts Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle's mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident.
It is argued that Brentano hadn't observed that Aristotle's belief that there are as many predicative senses of 'be' as there are categories of being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition. Overlooking this Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological consequences."

86. ———. 1999. "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists." In *German Philosophy since Kant*, edited by O'Hear, Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the *Psychology*. He is rightly celebrated

as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of *intentio* back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in *De anima,* though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the *Psychology* is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano's main interest lay. Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano's shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller's translation of *Descriptive Psychology,* a work from the transitional 1890s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an *a priori,* philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl's notion of phenomenology, and Brentano's Comtean methodological *epoche* of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl's more ponderous phenomenological reductions.

Brentano's other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of *a priori* intuitionism much admired by G. E. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written

assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement *All men are mortal* becomes the negative existential *There are no immortal men*. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic's traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton's confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day." (pp. 118-119)

87. ———. 2000. "The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano's Theory and Austria's History." *Monist* no. 83:68-88.

88. ———. 2004. "Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 45-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

89. Simons, Peter M., and Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "*De Veritate*: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski." In *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

90. Smith, Barry. 1981. "Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive Psychology." In *Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States*, edited by Smith, Barry, 113-160. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

91. ———. 1987. "The Substance of Brentano's Ontology." *Topoi* no. 6:39-49.

92. ———. 1988. "The Soul and Its Parts. A Study in Aristotle and Brentano." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 1:75-88.

"The attempt is made to show that the key for a correct interpretation of Brentano's writings can be derived from an examination of his very early dissertations. The overarching context of all Brentano's writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. The present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle's conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his *Psychology of Aristotle*, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and *Descriptive Psychology*."

93. ———. 1989. "The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology." *Topoi* no. 8:43-51.

94. ———. 1990. "On the Phases of Reism." In *Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 137-184. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

95. ———. 1993. "The Soul and Its Parts Ii: Varieties of Inexistence." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 4:35-52.

"A Brentanian might criticize contemporary philosophy of mind on at least the following counts:
i. its taxonomy of types of mental act and state is too narrow (thus its repertoire consists, on many standard accounts, in little more than 'beliefs' and `desires');
ii. its treatment of mental acts and states is too slavishly oriented around linguistic factors (thus for example it is standardly suggested that the philosophy of mind is most properly concerned with the so-called 'propositional attitudes');
iii. its treatment of the temporal structures of mental acts and states is overly crude (thus in many standard accounts

punctual and episodic acts are not distinguished from enduring states and dispositions);
iv. it presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts and unity.
It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what follows, and more precisely with Brentano's own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere."

96. ———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.

97. ———. 2000. "Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 8:107-114.

    "According to Brentano's theory of boundaries, no boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum. But there is no specifiable part of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary. - An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that boundaries be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. This leads to consequences in other areas, too."

98. Sorabji, Richard. 1991. "From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. Supplementary volume:227-259.

99. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1936. "Der Begriff Der Intentionalität in Der Scholastik Bei Brentano Und Bei Husserl." *Philosophische Hefte* no. 5:75-91.

    Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - *The philosophy of Brentano* - pp. 108-127

100. ———. 1960. *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Second revised edition 1978; Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann 1982.
Chapter I. *Franz Brentano (1838-1917) forerunner of the phenomenological movement* - pp. 27-50.
"Brentano's first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic which separates psychological from non-psychological or 'physical' phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term 'intentionality' is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (Beziehung) to a content, the directedness (Richtung) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (immanente Gegenständlichkeit). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (Vorstellung) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to a content.' It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. 'Intentional inexistence,' which literally implies the existence of an 'intentio' inside the intending being, as if

imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term 'intentionality.' Thus, the second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, 'reference to an object,' is the more important and the only permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to Aristotle for its 'first germs' in a rather minor passage of the Metaphysics (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of 'intentionality.' Reference to an object is thus the decisive and indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano's psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis." pp. 36-37
(1) *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I,* Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).

101. ———. 1978. "On the Significance of the Correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:95-116.

"This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over fourty years. Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano's tolerant

friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl's unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl's departure from Brentano in the *Logical Investigations* by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl's new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified."

102. Spinicci, Paolo. 1985. "Realtà E Rappresentazione. Saggio Sulla Genesi Della Filosofia Dell'esperienza Nel Pensiero Di Franz Brentano." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*:229-254.

103. Srzednicki, Jan. 1962. "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:308-316.

104. ———. 1963. "A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 23:445-446.

105. ———. 1965. *Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

106. ———. 1966. "Some Elements of Brentano's Analysis of Language and Their Ramifications." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:434-445.

107. Tanasescu, Ion. 2003. "Das Seiende Als Wahres Und Das Sein Der Kopula in Der Dissertation Brentanos." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*no. 10:175-192.

108. Tassone, Biagio G. 2012. *From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano's 'Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint' and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

109. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1989. "Individuation, Identity and Sameness. A Comparison of Aristotle and Brentano." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:117-126.

110. Terrell, Dailey Burnham. 1966. "Brentano's Argument for Reismus." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:446-459.

Reprinted with revisions, in: Linda McAlister - *The philosophy of Brentano* - pp. 204-212

111. ———. 1976. "Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 1:81-91.

112. ———. 1978. "Quantification and Brentano's Logic." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:45-66.

"Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between *Urteil* and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the *Urteil* as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range."

113. ———. 1983. "Brentano's Philosophy of Mind." In *Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey - Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm. The Hague: Nijhoff.

114. Textor, Mark. 2006. "Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness." *Dialectica*:411-432.

"Brentano's theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to

Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition ('Erkenntnis') of x. If one understands Brentano's theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness."

115. Thomasson, Amie. 2000. "After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness." *European Journal of Philosophy* no. 8:190-209.

116. Tomasi, Pietro. 2007. "The Unpublished "History of Philosophy" (1866-1867) by Franz Brentano." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 17:99-108.

"There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of Brentano's works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano's works, letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered. Moreover some Brentano's scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher's works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher's final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo's recent discovery (*), they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano's own theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano's main intention was to develop a scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his mind until his death.
It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano's works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed."
(*) [See: Russo Antonio (2003)]

117. ———. 2009. *Una Nuova Lettura Dell'aristotele Di Franz Brentano Alla Luce Di Alcuni Inediti*. Trento: Uni Service.

118. Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1999. "Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy." In *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, edited by Brandl, Johannes and Wolenski, Jan, 243-253. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand* (1895) published in: *Przelom*, 11 (II) August 3 1895, Vienna, pp. 335-346.

119. Valentine, Elizabeth. 2003. "The Relation of Brentano to British Philosophy." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 10:263-268.

"Brentano's work has had, and has, its greatest influence in Austria, Germany, Poland and Italy, but its importance for an understanding of British analytical philosophy is increasingly being recognised."

120. Vallicella, William. 2001. "Brentano on Existence." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 18:311-327.

121. Vasyukov, Vladimir L. 1993. "Antidiodorean Logics and the Brentano-Husserl's Conception of Time." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 4:373-388.

122. Velarde-Mayol, Victor. 2002. *On Brentano*. Belmont: Wadsworth.

123. Vinogradov, Evgeni G. 1998. "The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

124. Volpi, Franco. 1976. *Heidegger E Brentano. L'aristotelismo E Il Problema Dell'univocità Dell'essere Nella Formazione Filosofica Del Giovane Martin Heidegger*. Padova: Cedam.

125. ———. 1989. "The Experience of Temporal Objects and the Constitution of Time-Consciousness by Brentano." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:127-140.

126. ———. 1989. "War Franz Brentano Ein Aristoteliker? Zu Brentanos Und Aristoteles' Auffassung Der Psychologie Als Wissenschaft." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 2:13-29.

127. ———. 2004. "La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L'être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger." In *Aristote Au Xix Siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 277-293. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

128. ———. 2004. "La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L'être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger." In *Aristote Au Xix Siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 277-293. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

129. Weingartner, Paul. 1978. "Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Principle '*Ens Et Verum Convertuntur*'." *Grazer Philosophische Studien*no. 5:183-196.

"This paper investigates Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano's interpretation of the formula *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus* and of the principle *ens et verum convertuntur* is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski."

130. Werle, Josef. 1982. "Zur Edition Der Vorlseungen Franz Brentanos Über Geschichte Der Philosophie." *Phänomenologische Forschungen* no. 12:178-187.

131. ———. 1989. *Franz Brentano Und Die Zukunft Der Philosophie. Studien Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte Und Wissenschaftssystematik Im 19. Jahrhundert*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

132. Werner, Alfons. 1930. *Die Psychologisch-Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen Der Metaphysik Franz Brentanos*. Hildesheim: Borgmeyer.

133. Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory." *Topoi* no. 8:105-110.

"This paper is a sequel to Simons and Wolenski [*De Veritate*: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski, 1989], which contains a short discussion of Brentano's arguments against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence between truth-bearers and reality (or its appropriate portions). In that paper we attempt to show that Tarski's conception successfully meets Brentano's objections. l Here I should like to extend as well as, in some points, improve what we said in Simons and Wolenski [1989]. There are several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano's own philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore.
Thirdly, Tarski's semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski's theory of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition, independent of Tarski's own philosophical consciousness.
It is further interesting to see how, if at all, his definition of truth is affected by critical arguments of his philosophical great-grandfather *(via* Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Kotarbinski)." (notes omitted)

134. ———. 1994. "Brentano, the Univocality of Thinking, 'Something', and 'Reism'." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 5:149-166.

"Brentano's argument for Reism from the univocality of 'thinking' is examined. Firstly, Brentano's original formulation is given. Secondly, comments on the argument made by Marty, Kamitz, Teller and Farias are summarized and briefly discussed. The univocality argument is then embedded into the frameworks of two logical systems: predicate calculus and Lesniewskian ontology; the latter system is shown as a more effective basis for reism than the former. Finally, it is argued that a distinction between formal-ontological reism and metaphysical reism should be made."

135. ———. 1996. "Reism in the Brentanist Tradition." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 357-375. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

136. Wüstenburg, Klaus. 2004. *Die Konsequenz Des Phänomenalismus. Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen in Kritischer Auseinandersetzung Mit Hume, Brentano Und Husserl*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

137. Zahavi, Dan. 2004. "Back to Brentano?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* no. 11:66-87.

"For a couple of decades, higher-order theories of consciousness have enjoyed great popularity, but they have recently been met with growing dissatisfaction. Many have started to look elsewhere for viable alternatives, and within the last few years, quite a few have rediscovered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of consciousness will be outlined and discussed. It will be argued that it can contribute important insights to our understanding of the relation between consciousness and self- awareness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some problems, and that it will ultimately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the lookout for

promising alternatives to the higher-order theories, than to return all the way to Brentano."

138. Zelaniec, Wojciech. 1996. "Franz Brentano and the Principle of Individuation." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 6:145-164.

"In this article I discuss a view on individuation exposed by Brentano in his *Theory of Categories*. According to this view, it is the spatial location of a physical thing that is its principle of individuation. I put forward hypotheses concerning the assumptions on the force of which Brentano might have arrived at this view. I also assess the `price' that has to be paid for making such assumptions."

139. ———. 1997. "Disentanling Brentano: Why Did He Get Individuation Wrong?" *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 7:455-463.

140. Zimmer, Alf. 1993. "On Agents and Objects: Some Remarks on Brentanian Perception." In *Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 93-112. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

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[Theory and History of Ontology]

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Selected Bibliography on the Theory of Categories of Charles S. Peirce

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   Contents: Introduction to the Paperback Edition; Author's Preface to the English Edition VII; Translator's Preface XIII; Introduction by Richard . Bernstein XIX;
   Part I. The philosophical background of the rise of Pragmatism in the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce.
   1. Peirce and the contemporary function of Pragmatism; 2. The problem of an introduction to Peirce's work as a whole: the four periods of the development of his thought 14; 3. The first period: Peirce and the Tradition, or, from the critique of knowledge to the critique of meaning 19; 4. The second period: The genesis of meaning-critical Pragmatism (1871-78);

Part II. Peirce's development from Pragmatism to Pragmaticism.

6. The later Peirce: the last two periods in the development of his thought 80; 6. Peirce's late conception of his system 84; 7. The third period: From Pragmatism to the metaphysics of Evolution (ca. 1885-98) 134; 8. The fourth period: from Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (ca. 1898-1914) 158; 9. Conclusion: Peirce and the future of the philosophy of science 191;
Notes 197; Bibliography 249; Index 251-253.

"We can derive a division of the development of Peirce's philosophy into four periods from the above characterization of the development of his thought. These four periods are also distinctly discernible in the history of his publications: a series of essays in a particular journal is found in the middle of each. In addition, the four periods correspond to the decisive turns of events in Peirce's life. The first period (from 1855 to 1871) embraces Peirce's early years, from the beginning of his study of Kant, undertaken when he was sixteen years old, to the temporary conclusion of his critical study of the philosophical tradition. Besides a series of five essays on formal logic and the doctrine of the categories in the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* in 1867, publications falling into this period include three essays on the theory of cognition in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1868-69 and the Berkeley review in the *North American Review* in 1871, where the pragmatic maxim for making meanings clear is anticipated. I have chosen to unite this first period under the heading "From the Critique of Knowledge to the Critique of Meaning."

The second period (from 1871 to 1883) encompasses the time of Peirce's public success, from the founding of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge to the tragic turn of his life, which is signified by his dismissal from his teaching post at Johns Hopkins University." Numerous geodetic and astronomic investigations, expeditions, and participation in congresses in the service of the United States Coast Survey, and the Photometric Researches at the Harvard

Observatory, fall into this period, as well as the series of six "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" in Popular Science Monthly in 1877-78. The first two articles in this series, "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," are considered the birth certificates of "Pragmatism." The fruits of Peirce's teaching at Johns Hopkins from '1879 to 1883 appeared in 1883 in the volume Studies in Logic, which contains works by Peirce and his students of mathematical logic." This period may be termed the classic epoch of the development of Pragmatism and "American philosophy."
The third period (from 1883 to 1893 or 1902) spans the time in which Peirce -- particularly after moving to Milford, Pennsylvania -- worked alone on studies in logic and metaphysics and, circa 1901-2, achieved the final architectonic of his philosophical system. The central philosophical publication of this period is the series of six essays on metaphysics in *The Monist* between 1891 and 1893 , in which the aspects of evolutionary cosmology, "Tychism," "Synechism," and "Agapism," are presented. During this period Peirce also made repeated attempts to put a large philosophical work up for subscription, all of which failed (the last attempt was his application to the Carnegie Foundation, which was unsuccessful because his work dealt with "logic" and not with "natural science")." As a result, Peirce was forced after his discharge from the Coast Survey in *1891* to earn his income through miscellaneous work for journals and dictionaries.
The fourth period (from 1898 or 1902 to 1914) embraces the time in which Pragmatism was discussed internationally, following William James's "California Address," which gave Peirce a last chance to win an audience for his philosophy. This period ends in 1914 with the death of the philosopher, who had been supported by a fund from his friends since 1906 and who had suffered from cancer since 1909. At the center of this period stand, first, the difficult but significant ("architectonic") Harvard lectures of 1903 on Pragmatism, in which Peirce made the first attempt to connect all aspects of his "system" of 1901-2 with the concept of Pragmatism, and second, the series of three essays on Pragmatism in *The*

Monist in 1905-6, as well as numerous additions to this series that remained unpublished in his lifetime. Here Peirce attained the completion of *his* conception of Pragmatism." pp. 17-18 (Notes omitted).

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   Reprinted: New York, Octagon Books, Inc. 1966

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9. Colapietro, Vincent M. 1989. *Peirce's Approach to the Self. A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

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History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 241-256. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"The issue of realism in its most general form concerns the question whether and how we know whatever it is that we call reality. In this form, the issue of realism touches upon virtually every area of contemporary philosophical discussion. And because the question regarding the possibility of knowing reality has traditionally been linked to the problem of truth, clearly the problem of truth is and remains a burning question.

More specifically, the relevance of the problem of truth is related to two painful dilemmas that face anyone who raises a philosophical question. The first dilemma concerns the status of knowledge and may be stated as follows: Either, whatever it is that knows is *different* from whatever it is that is known, or whatever it is that knows is *not* different from whatever it is that is known. If the knower differs from the known, the question arises how the knower can possibly have access to the known. In this form, the dilemma may be called the dilemma of dualism, provided it be understood that the dilemma does not limit itself to the Cartesian duality of matter and mind. Whatever one's conception of the knower and of the known may be, one is faced with the question of the relationship between the two.

The second dilemma may be called the dilemma of evolution. Indeed, if we do accept the concept of evolution, then: either whatever it is that we call reality is part of an ongoing process of change, or nothing changes. If everything changes, what can it possibly mean to say that we have *real* knowledge? If nothing *really* changes, what possible meaning can be given to the term 'evolution'?

The two dilemma's have an immediate impact on the question of truth, since, so we are told, *real* knowledge is knowledge of the truth.

In this respect, the philosophy of C. S. Peirce (1837-1914), who both held an explicitly *philosophical* theory of

evolution and a *theory* of truth may provide us with interesting insights.
The immediate purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of Peirce's conception of truth within the perspective of his conception of Logic. It will be shown that, although there is every indication that this conception was born from his keen awareness of the two dilemma's stated above, he paradoxically failed to see that his theory implied the impossibility of a meaningful conception of truth." pp. 241-242

12. Deledalle, Gérard. 1979. *Théorie Et Pratique Du Signe: Introduction Á La Sémiotique De Charles S. Peirce*. Paris: Payot.

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From the Foreword: "To trace the development of Peirce's phenomenology from a doctrine of Categories to the ground on which philosophy and science rest is the purpose of this book. Although parallels with Husserl's thought are inevitable, it has seemed proper to this writer to emphasize the growth of Peirce's own ideas and the scientific-philosophical background out of which they emerged. Thus Peirce's most original contributions, viz., a set of universal categories appearing in thought, nature and experience, the method of their discovery, and Phaneroscopy, the science that describes the *phaneron,* or the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, are shown in the context of a single, evolving body of thought - a comprehensive philosophy shaped by Peirce's lifelong interest in logic, the sciences, ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics."

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"Writing that "no sign of a thing or kind of thing . . . can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of propositions" (4.583; cf. 4.56, 4.551), (1) Peirce seems to define, after Bentham, (2) a principle of contextuality (similar to Frege's) which tends to see the proposition, if not as the *"measure"* (to use C. Chauviré's expression (3)), at least as the horizon of any sign. This proves the importance, for the logician, of the elucidation of the concept of proposition, especially if one remembers that, for Peirce, logic principally seeks to describe the behavior of what he calls *"scientific intelligence"* (2.227), that is to say, a type of intelligence incapable of intuition and which has no other means of operating except inferentially (cf. 2.444, n.1) and therefore propositionally. (4) In the context of a pragmatist philosophy of knowledge defining the meaning of a sign by its practical effects (cf. 5.402), one can expect to find, in the articulation of saying and doing, one of the essential features of any proposition. That is what we should like to attempt to verify in this study in which, after distinguishing

proposition as "saying" and assertion as "doing" and characterizing the latter, we shall try to outline some consequences of a theory of assertion conceived as that towards which any proposition tends." p. 257
(1) The decimal notation n.m will refer to paragraph m of volume n of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Peirce 1931-35 and 1958); NEM, X, p. y in which X represents the volume and y the page will refer to Eisele's edition of *The New Elements of Mathematics by C. S. Peirce* (Peirce 1956); MS x in which x refers to the number of the manuscript will refer to Robin's edition of manuscripts in Harvard Houghton Library.
(2) Bentham *Works,* 1843, vol. VIII, p. 188.
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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Frege's Ontology: Being, Existence, and Truth

BEING

"One of Frege's main semantic principles, is however, missing in Dummett's book, [*Frege: philosophy of language*] and it is has been ignored by most Frege scholars. That principle is the thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'is'. Angelelli come close to attending to it when he makes some remarks on identity and predication, and Matthias Schirn puts special emphasis on the role of the thesis in Frege's work. However, the great majority of Frege scholars have neglected the ambiguity doctrine, even when they have commented on each of the allegedly different meanings of 'is' separately. This is strange in view of the fact that it was Frege and Russell who proposed the thesis and established it as one of the basic ingredients of modern logic. They have in fact been followed by most philosophers. For instance, in the *Tractatus* Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasizes the ambiguity of the verb 'to be' and stresses the importance of constructing a language which prevents confusions between the different meanings of 'is'. Wittgenstein also remarks that Frege's and Russell's conceptual notation: is such a language although it does not succeed in excluding all mistakes (*Tractatus*, 3.323 - 3.325). This work sets out to show that a large part of Frege's philosophy is an attempt to make us realize the importance of keeping the different meanings of 'is' apart and to catch the philosophical mistakes brought about our failure to see the ambiguity.
But how is the verb 'is' ambiguous in Fregean logic? Frege distinguishes between the following meaning of 'is':

1) the 'is' of identity (e.g., Phosphorus is Hesperus; a=b),
2) the 'is' of predication, i.e., the copula (e.g., 'Plato is blond'; P(a)),
3) the 'is' of existence,
(i) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for identity (e.g., 'God is'; (∃ x) (G=x)),
or
(ii) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for predication (e.g., 'There are human beings' / 'There is at least one human being'; (∃ x) H (x)),
and
4) the 'is' of class-inclusion, i.e., generic implication (e.g., 'A horse is a four-legged animal'; (x) (P(x) Q(x)))." (pp. 13-14)

From: Leila Haaparanta, *Frege's Doctrine of Being*, Helsinki: *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, vol. 39, 1985.

EXISTENCE

"If you want to assign a content to the verb 'to be', so that the sentence 'A is' is not pleonastic and self-evident, you will have to allow circumstances which the negation of 'A is' is possible; that is to say, that there are subjects of which being must be denied. But in that case the concept 'being' will no longer be suitable for providing a general explanation of 'there are' under which 'there are B's' means the same as 'something that has being falls under the concept B'; for if we apply this explanation to 'There are subjects of which being must be denied', then we get 'Something that has being falls under the concept of not-being' or 'Something that has being is not'. There is no way of getting over this once a content of some kind -- it doesn't matter what it is -- is agreed to the concept of being. If the explanation of 'there are Bs' as meaning the same as 'Something that has being is B' is to work, we just have to understand by being something that goes entirely without saying.

For this reason the contradiction still remains if we say 'A exists' means 'The idea of the A has been caused by something affecting the ego'. (...)
We can say that the meanings of the word 'exist' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse exists' and 'Some men exist' display no more difference than does the meanings of 'is a German' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse is a German' and 'Some men are Germans'. But then the sentence 'Some men exist' or 'Something existing is a man' only means the same as 'There are men' if the concept 'existing thing' is superordinate to the concept man. So if such forms of expression are to have the same meaning in general, the concept 'existing thing' must be superordinate to every concept. This is only possible if the word 'exist' means something that goes entirely without saying, and if therefore nothing at all is predicated in the sentence 'Leo Sachse exists', and if in the sentence 'Some men exist' the content of what is predicated does not lie in the word 'exist'. The existence expressed by 'there is' is not contained in the word 'exist' but in the form of the particular judgement. 'Some men are Germans' is just as good an existential judgement as 'Some men exist'. But once the word 'exist' is given a content, which is predicated of an individual thing, this content can be made into the characteristic mark of a concept-a concept under which there falls the individual thing of which existence is being predicated. E.g. if one divides everything into two classes:
1. What is in my mind, ideas, feelings etc.

and

2. What is outside myself, and says of the latter that it exists, then one can construe existence as a characteristic mark of the concept 'centaur', although there are no centaurs. I would not acknowledge anything as a centaur that was not outside my mind; this means that I shall not call mere ideas or feelings centaurs. The existence expressed by 'there is' cannot be a characteristic mark of a concept whose property it is, just because it is a property of it. In the sentence 'There are men' we seem to be speaking of individuals that fall under the concept 'man', whereas it is only the concept 'man' we are talking about. The content of the word 'exist' cannot well be taken as the characteristic mark of

a concept, because 'exists', as it is used in the sentence 'Men exist',,has no content.
We can see from all this how easily we can be led by language to see 'things in the wrong perspective, and what value it must therefore have for philosophy to free ourselves from the dominion of language. If one makes the attempt to construct a system of signs on quite other foundations and 'with quite other means, as I have tried to do in creating my concept-script,,we shall have, so to speak, our very noses rubbed into the false analogies in language." (pp. 65-67)

From: Gottlob Frege, *Dialogue with Punjer on Existence* (written before 1884), in: Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach (eds.) *Posthumous Writings*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1979, pp. 53-67.

TRUTH

"When entering upon the study of a science, we need to have some idea, if only a provisional one, of its nature. We want to have in sight a goal to strive towards; we want some point to aim at that will guide our steps in the right direction. The word 'true' can be used to indicate such a goal for logic, just as can 'good' for ethics and 'beautiful' for aesthetics. Of course all the sciences have truth as their goal, but logic is concerned with the predicate 'true' in a quite special way, namely in a way analogous to that in which physics has to do with the predicates 'heavy' and 'warm' or chemistry with the predicates 'acid' and 'alkaline'. There is, however, the difference that these sciences have to take into account other properties besides these we have mentioned, and that there is no one property by which their nature is so completely characterized as logic is by the word 'true'. (...) Now it would be futile to employ a definition in order to make it clearer what is to be understood by 'true'. If, for example, we wished to say 'an idea is true if it agrees with reality' nothing would have been achieved, since in order to apply this definition we should

have to decide whether some idea or other did agree with reality. Thus we should have to presuppose the very thing that is being defined. The same would hold of any definition of the form 'A is true if and only if it has such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing'. In each case in hand it would always come back to the question whether it is true that A has such-and-such properties, or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing. Truth is obviously something so primitive and simple that it is not possible to reduce it to anything still simpler. Consequently we have no alternative but to bring out the peculiarity of our predicate by comparing it with others. What, in the first place, distinguishes it from all other predicates is that predicating it is always included in predicating anything whatever." (pp. 128-129)

From: Gottlob Frege, *Logic* (1897), in: Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach (eds.) *Posthumous Writings*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1979, pp. 126-151.

"7. What true is, I hold to be indefinable.
8. The expression in language for a thought is a sentence. We also speak in an extended sense of the truth of a sentence. 12. Logic only becomes possible with the conviction that there is a difference between truth and untruth.
13. We justify a judgement either by going back to truths that have been recognized already or without having recourse to other judgements. Only the first case, inference, is the concern of Logic.
14. The theory of concepts and of judgement is only preparatory to the theory of inference.
15. The task of logic is to set up laws according to which a judgement is justified by others, irrespective of whether these are themselves true.
16. Following the laws of logic can guarantee the truth of a judgement only insofar as our original grounds for making it, reside in judgements that are true.
17. No psychological investigation can justify the laws of logic." (pp. 174-175)

From: Gottlob Frege, "17 Key Sentences on Logic" (1906 or earlier), in: Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach*Posthumous Writings*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1979, pp. 174-175.

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Selected Bibliography on Frege's Ontology

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   From the Introduction: "The present work is not intended to be a presentation of or an introduction to Frege's doctrines (though it may be so in some respects). It presupposes a general knowledge of Frege's main doctrines and terminology, as well as of the main recent discussions on Frege.
   Fregean terminology or doctrines are explained only so far as is necessary for each single discussion. (For instance, from an explanatory point of view, Frege's ideas on number should have been presented at the beginning, and not in the last chapter.)
   As has been said, Frege's different aspects are distributed according to a hierarchy, in which his insight into *number*

has the central place.
Nevertheless, in looking for an answer to our primary question, the *method* used has been analytical rather than synthetical; thereby, of course, the deep unity of Frege's thought has continually been taken into account.
Some of the philosophically relevant aspects of Frege's philosophy have been, so to speak, isolated, and the general question of his significance in the context of the philosophical tradition has been reiterated in reference to each single aspect. Thus the general question has split into a set of particular investigations, which is reflected in the title of the present work.
(...)
Each one of these 'Studies on G. Frege and Traditional Philosophy' is intended to satisfy simultaneously, at least in some degree, the following three conditions:
(1) that they be a critical discussion of some fragment of Frege's thought;
(2) that they be an application of Fregean doctrines to the philosophical past;
(3) that they be a study of some feature of the philosophical tradition which seems *necessary* for a better understanding of Frege's doctrines, and this in two ways: (a) intrinsically (i.e., a Fregean doctrine is confusing or not easily intelligible unless it is situated in the whole context of Western philosophy), (b) extrinsically (i.e., a Fregean doctrine, clear enough in itself, may be better appreciated in its full significance by comparing it with some similar doctrine of the philosophical tradition)." pp. 2-4

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   I list, and quote from Frege's texts on abstraction (section 1). Their content falls under three rubrics: ordinary abstraction, magical abstraction and definitions by abstraction. Frege's remarks on each of these types of abstraction are examined (sections 2, 3, 4). The result (section 5) is negative: Frege was not interested in abstraction; in fact, he even recommended that the term 'abstraction' be avoided.
   The phrase 'definition by abstraction' is mentioned by Frege just once, in a letter to Russell. Although Frege has hardly anything to say about it, that Peanonian phrase leads to a wider historical discussion (section 6) in which two methods are contrasted: the abstraction method (Peano, Weyl, Lorenzen) and the looking-around method (Frege, Carnap et al.). The phrase 'definition by abstraction', originally designed by Peano to refer to the abstraction method, ended up being used, quite inappropriately, as a designation of the looking-around procedure.
   Peano's abstraction method may be referred to as "modern abstraction", insofar as it improves upon the traditional theories of abstraction. In section 7 it is argued that modern abstraction rescues the pre-Fregean persistent attempts to define number as product of abstraction. These pre-Fregean attempts, right in their purpose, went astray in their application of abstraction, basically because of lacking a logico-linguistically well defined theory of abstraction. If reconstructed by means of modern abstraction, the pre-Fregean attempts appear (1) to be immune to Frege's

criticisms, (2) to yield a better notion of number than Frege's own, "logistic", looking-around inspired definition. Also in section 7, modern abstraction is shown to establish a "bridge" between the traditional and Fregean theories of predication."

Note: I am grateful to CAMLS (Committee for attendance to meetings of learned societies) as well as to the Liberal Arts Foundations, The University of Texas at Austin, for helping me to attend the VII International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Salzburg, July 1983, where this paper was presented. An abstract of the paper, published at the time of the meeting, needs the following two qualifications: a) "Frege refers to abstraction on several occasions, always negatively": this is wrong to the extent that in Frege's references to ordinary abstraction there is no criticism. (b) "Numbers as set of units" is not a traditional notion "vindicated" by modern abstraction except in the queer sense that the predicate "x is a set of units" might be shown to be invariant with respect to underlying equivalence relation of one-one correspondence among the sets from which number is abstracted.

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23. ———. 1984. "The Concept of Truth in Frege's Program." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 21:507-512.

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    From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In his paper, entitled 'Frege on Truth', Tyler Burge suggests that Frege's odd-sounding conclusion about truth and falsity should be taken seriously. In the first section of his article he claims that too little attention has ben paid to the pragmatic basis of Frege's view that truth values are objects. According to Burge, Frege is committed to the doctrine that logic is primarily concerned with the normative notion of truth. The second section of Burge's paper consists mainly of the criticism of Dummett's interpretation of Frege's theses on truth values. In section III Burge purports to show how Frege's identification of the truth values with particular objects has its sources in 'some of his deepest philosophical conceptions'. He holds the view that 'in particular, it proceeds from a theory about the nature of logical objects, from a thesis about the aim and ordering of logic, and from his conceptions of assertion and truth.'" p. 6

25. ———. 1992. "Frege on Knowing the Third Realm." *Mind* no. 101:633-650.

26. ———. 2005. *Truth, Thought, Reason. Essays on Frege*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

27. Carl, Wolfgang. 1994. *Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference. Its Origins and Scope*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

28. Currie, Gregory. 1980. "Frege on Thoughts." *Mind* no. 89:234-248.

29. ———. 1982. *Frege. An Introduction to His Philosophy*. Sussex: The Harvester Press.

30. Dejnožka, Jan. 1996. *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books.

    Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
    "While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider how the thought of all four thinkers bears on the fundamental questions of twentieth century philosophy. This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. The thesis of the book is that there is a general form of ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great philosophers in the Western tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real identities and conceptual (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus in modified realism, there are *some* real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or objectual identities' 'shifting' as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnožka also holds that the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which imply various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and

Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,' offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."

31. ———. 2007. "Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism." In *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. The Library of Living Philosophers*, edited by Auxier, Randall E., 55-113. La Salle: Open Court.

    "This paper is on Michael Dummett's paper, "The Context Principle: Centre of Frege's Philosophy" (read in 1993, published in 1995), in which Dummett revises his thinking on Frege. But it is really on Frege. I argue that Dummett's semantic program for Frege rests on a scholarly and philosophical mistake. Namely, it takes what Russell calls the backward road from reference to sense. Since Dummett endorses the backward road, I must show that the mistake is genuine. But I need not enter the murky waters of "On Denoting" to do so, since I make the mistake independently clear. After arguing that no senses are objects or functions, I show how we can keep Frege's context principle from bifurcating into one principle for senses and another for references. I conclude by showing that intuitionism is a form of the backward road and shares in the mistake." (Jan Dejnožka)
    "Thus, I recant my earlier view and am now in full agreement with Jan Dejnožka that senses - even thoughts - cannot be objects. He deserves credit for perceiving this....The whole apparatus of objects, concepts, and functions is inapplicable in the realm of sense. Dr. Dejnožka perceives this too....I think now that Frege ought to have held that view, and I applaud Dr. Dejnožka's recognition of this." Michael Dummett, "Reply to Jan Dejnožka," in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, 122-23.

32. ———. 2010. "Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism." *Diametros* no. 25:118-131.

"This paper continues my discussion of Frege with Michael Dummett in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett* (2007). Most of it is about Dummett's adopting my view that Frege's senses cannot be objects. The issues include: the cognitive order versus the ontological order for the forward road; the nature and identity of senses; the different senses of "intension;" the nature of saturation; whether special quantifiers are now needed for senses; and Frege's earlier and later permutation arguments. I also continue our discussion of the implications of the forward road for intuitionism."

33. Dummett, Michael. 1973. *Frege: Philosophy of Language*. London: Duckworth.

    Second edition 1981

34. ———. 1979. "Was Frege a Philosopher of Language?" *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 33:786-810.

35. ———. 1981. *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

36. ———. 1995. *Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

37. ———. 1996. *Frege and Other Philosophers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

38. Falkenberg, Gabriel. 1998. *Sinn, Bedeutung, Intensionalität: Der Fregesche Weg*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

39. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1994. "Husserl and Frege: A Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy." In *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 3-50. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Originally published in German as: *Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Enstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Oslo, Aschehoug, 1958.

40. ———. 2001. "Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on Reference and Object." In *Future Pasts. The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy*, edited by Floyd, Julet and Shieh, Sanford, 67-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

41. Forgie, William. 2000. "Kant and Frege: Existence as a Second Level Property." *Kant Studien* no. 91:165-177.

42. Gabriel, Gottfried. 1984. "Fregean Connection: *Bedeutung*, Value and Truth-Value." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 34:372-376.

43. Gabriel, Gottfried, and Dathe, Uwe, eds. 2000. *Gottlob Frege: Werk Und Wirkung. Mit Den Unveröffentlichten Vorschlägen Für Ein Wahlgesetz Von Gottlob Frege*. Paderborn: Mentis.

44. Geach, Peter Thomas, and Anscombe, Gertrud Elisabeth. 1961. *Three Philosophers*. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Contents: Analytical Table of Contents VI-XX; G. E. M. Anscombe: Aristotle: The Search for Substance 1; P. T. Geach: Aquinas 65; P. T. Geach: Frege 127-162.

45. Goldfarb, Warren. 2001. "Frege's Conception of Logic." In *Future Pasts. The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy*, edited by Floyd, Julet and Shieh, Sanford, 25-42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

46. Greimann, Dirk. 2003. *Freges Konzeption Der Wahrheit*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

47. ———, ed. 2003. *Das Wahre Und Das Falsche*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

48. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1961. "Frege's Ontology." *Philosophical Review* no. 70:23-40.

Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 106-120; reprinted also in: D. E. Klemke (ed.), *Essays on Frege*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1974, pp. 79-98.

49. ———. 1969. *Reflections on Frege's Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

50. Guenthner, Franz. 1984. "Comments on Hintikka's ' *a Hundred Years Later*'." *Synthese* no. 59:51-58.

51. Haaparanta, Leila. 1985. *Frege's Doctrine of Being*. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica.

Contents: Preface 3; A note on the textual references and the bibliography 5; I. Introduction 9; II. The interpretational framework 27; III. The origin of the thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'Is' 47; IV. Identity and predication 59; V. Existence 128; VI. Concluding remarks 159; Bibliography 162; Index of names 179. "The purpose of this work is to clarify the philosophical basis of Frege's doctrine concerning the word 'is'. Frege's doctrine of being is partly considered in its historical setting, formed mainly by Leibniz and Kant. Since the ambiguity thesis is one of the cornerstones of Frege's new logic, this work will, to some extent, help to indicate how Frege arrived at his great logical innovation. I shall proceed by first presenting a short survey of the different approaches to Frege's philosophy and thereafter outlining Frege's historical setting (Chapter II.1.). Then I shall present the main features of Frege's view of logic (Chapter II.2.). After that, I shall say a few words of the history of the word 'being' in philosophical and philological literature and study Frege's texts concerning the ambiguity doctrine (Chapter III). In Chapter IV there is a discussion on Frege's distinction between identity and predication with reference to Leibniz's and Kant's thought and some remarks are also

made on class-inclusion. In Chapter V there are comments on Frege's doctrine of existence with reference to Kant's ideas. Finally, I shall make some concluding remarks on Frege in a wider historical context (Chapter VI). Chapter II will give the interpretational framework for considering Frege's doctrine of being. Chapters IV and V are meant to show how this general hypothesis works in the textual material and thereby to yield a detailed interpretation of Frege's view." pp. 16-17.

52. ———. 1986. "Frege on Existence." In *Frege Synthesized*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila and Hintikka, Jaakko, 155-174. Dordrecht: Reidel.

From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In her article 'Frege on Existence' Leila Haaparanta emphasizes that Frege's greatest insight was the idea of first-order language, which, to a large extent, motivated the rest of his innovations. Haaparanta focuses her attention on Frege's concept of existence, which receives special attention in Frege's thought in connection with the thesis concerning the ambiguity of such words for being as the English 'is'. The ambiguity thesis was an important part of the Fregean paradigm of first-order logic. Haaparanta argues that Frege does not only assume the word 'is' to be ambiguous but that he considers 'exists', or the 'is' of existence, to be an equivocal word. She suggests that the equivocity view has a metaphysical and epistemological background in Frege's thought. Her paper thus pushes a great deal further the suggestions of Jaakko Hintikka mentioned earlier in this Introduction." p. 6

53. ———. 1986. "On Frege's Concept of Being." In *The Logic of Being. Historical Studies*, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko and Knuuttila, Simo, 269-289. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.

54. ———, ed. 1994. *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

55. ———. 2001. "Existence and Propositional Attitudes: A Fregean Analysis." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:75-86.

56. Haaparanta, Leila, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1986. *Frege Synthesized. Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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From the General Introduction: "In recent literature [about Frege], one can also find a wealth of new and sometimes controversial viewpoints. For instance, Jean van Heijenoort has called our attention to an important but neglected aspect of Frege's attitude to logic and language that he calls 'logic as language'. Hans Slugs has challenged on a large scale the received view of Frege as a lonely figure in nineteenth-century philosophy whose ancestry goes to medieval objectivists rather than his German predecessors. Sluga wants to place Frege firmly in the middle of the German philosophical tradition of his day. It is indeed

unmistakable that there are, for instance, Kantian elements in his thinking that had earlier been overlooked. Indeed, the idea of logic as language is likely to be one of them. Another one is the sharp contrast between the realm of thinking and understanding and the realm of sense and intuition. Sluga's influence is illustrated amply in several papers in this volume. In an attempt to reverse the traditional priorities, Jaakko Hintikka has suggested, relying partly on van Heijenoort's interpretation, that the crucial part of Frege's work in semantics lies in his ideas about the semantics of the familiar elementary logic (truth-functions and quantification) rather than in Frege's theory of sense and reference, which is merely intensional frosting on a more important extensional cake, even though it is typically given the pride of place in expositions in Frege's semantics. As a part of this attempted reversal of emphasis, Jaakko Hintikka has also called attention to the role Frege played in convincing almost everyone that verbs for being had to be treated as multiply ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence, and the 'is' of class-inclusion -- a view that had been embraced by few major figures (if any) before Frege, with the exception of John Stuart Mill and Augustus De Morgan. Hintikka has gone on to challenge this ambiguity thesis. At the same time, Frege's role in the genesis of another major twentieth-century philosophical movement, the phenomenological one, has become an important issue. Even the translation of Frege's key term ' *Bedeutung*' as 'reference' has become controversial.

The interpretation of Frege is thus thrown largely back in the melting pot. In editing this volume, we have not tried to publish the last word on Frege. Even though we may harbor such ambitions ourselves, they are not what has led to the present editorial enterprise. What we have tried to do is to bring together some of the best ongoing work on Frege. Even though the ultimate judgment on our success lies with out readers, we want to register our satisfaction with all the contributions."

57. Hale, Bob. 1984. "Frege's Platonism." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 34:224-241.

58. Heijenoort, Jean van. 1977. "Sense in Frege." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 6:93-102.

    Reprinted in: J. Van Heijenoort - *Selected essays* - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1985, pp. 55-63

59. ———. 1977. "Frege on Sense Identity." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 6:93-102.

    Reprinted in: J. Van Heijenoort - S *elected essays* - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1985, pp. 65-69.

60. Hill, Claire Ortiz. 1991. *Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

    Reprinted 2001.
    Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
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    From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic is* both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of*

Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.

This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.

This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)

61. Hill, Claire Ortiz, and Rosado Haddock, Guillermo. 2000. *Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics*. Chicago: Open Court.

62. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1979. "Frege's Hidden Semantics." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 33:716-722.

63. ———. 1981. "Semantics: A Revolt against Frege." In *Contemporary Philosophy. Vol. I*, edited by Floistad, Guttorm, 57-82. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

64. ———. 1984. "A Hundred Years Later: The Rise and Fall of Frege's Influence in Language Theory." *Synthese* no. 59:27-50.

65. Holenstein, Elmar. 1983. "The Meaning of "Bedeutung" in Frege. A Philological Inquiry." In *History of Semiotics*, edited by Eschbach, Achim and Jürgen, Trabant, 311-321. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

66. Imbert, Claude. 1992. *Phénoménologies Et Langues Formulaires*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

67. Kemp, Gary. 1995. "Truth in Frege's 'Law of Truth'." *Synthese* no. 105:31-51.

68. Kenny, Anthony P. 2000. *Frege. An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

69. Kleemeier, Ulrike. 1997. *Gottlob Frege: Kontext-Prinzip Und Ontologie*. Freiburg: Verlag K. Alber.

70. Klement, Kevin. 2002. *Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference*. London: Routledge.

71. Klemke, Elmer D., ed. 1968. *Essays on Frege*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

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"As Frege's writings became more widely read, a number of articles were written about various aspects of Frege's work- his ontology, semantics, logic. Many of these papers are of great value for the study of Frege, and it was thought desirable to assemble some of them in a single volume. I

have divided these essays into three main categories: (1) Frege's ontology, (2) his semantics, and (3) his logic and philosophy of mathematics. To some extent, these labels are not quite accurate. Thus a paper included in the section on semantics may have something to say regarding Frege's ontology as well. The categorization is a matter of emphasis; if a paper is chiefly about, say, Frege's ontology, then it appears in that section.
Two of the papers that are included in the volume have not been previously published. These are "Frege, Concepts, and Ontology," by Prof. Moltke S. Gram of Northwestern University (who so generously offered to write it for its appearance here), and my essay, "Frege's Ontology: Realism."
I have included as appendices three important essays by Frege, none of which were included in the excellent collection of translations by Geach and Black, but which are valuable for the study of Frege's thought." (from the Preface).

72. ———. 1979. "Frege's Philosophy of Logic." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 33:666-693.

73. Kluge Eike-Henner, W. 1977. "Frege, Leibniz *Et Alii*." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 9:266-274.

74. ———. 1980. "Bolzano and Frege: Some Conceptual Parallels." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 10:21-42.

75. ———. 1980. *The Metaphysics of Gottlob Frege. An Essay in Ontological Reconstruction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

76. ———. 1980. "Frege, Leibniz and the Notion of an Ideal Language." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 12:140-154.

77. Kotatko, Peter, and Biro, John. 1995. *Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

78. Kreiser, Lothar. 2001. *Gottlob Frege: Leben, Werk, Zeit*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

79. Kremer, Michael. 2000. "Judgment and Truth in Frege." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 38:549-581.

80. Kutschera, Franz von. 1989. *Gottlob Frege: Eine Einführung in Sein Werk*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

81. Landini, Gregory. 2012. *Frege's Notations: What They Are and How They Mean*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

82. Largeault, Jean. 1970. *Logique Et Philosophie Chez Frege*. Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts.

83. Levine, James. 1996. "Logic and Truth in Frege." *Aristotelian Society.Supplementary volume* no. 70:141-175.

84. Long, P., and White, R. 1980. "On the Translation of Frege's *Bedeutung*: A Reply to Bell." *Analysis* no. 40:196-202.

85. Makin, Gideon. 2000. *The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation*. London: Routledge.

86. Mendelsohn, Richard. 1981. "Frege on Predication." In *Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume Vi. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by French, Peter, Uehling, Jr.Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard, 69-82. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

87. ———. 1987. "Frege's Two Senses of 'Is'." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 28:139-160.

88. ———. 2004. *The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

89. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1974. "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 4:51-62.

Reprinted in: J. N. Mohanty (ed.) - R *eadings on Husserl's Logical Investigations* - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 pp. 22-32.

90. ———. 1982. *Husserl and Frege*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

91. Moravcsik, Julius M. 1981. "Frege and Chomsky on Thought and Language." In *Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume Vi. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by French, Peter, Uehling, Jr.Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard, 105-123. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

92. Newen, Albert, Nortmann, Ulrich, and Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer, eds. 2001. *Building on Frege: New Essays on Sense, Content, and Concept*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

93. Noonan, Harold W. 2001. *Frege: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

94. Pardey, Ulrich. 2012. *Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

95. Parsons, Terence. 1996. "Fregean Theories of Truth and Meaning." In *Frege: Importance and Legacy*, edited by Schirn, Matthias, 371-409. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

96. Picardi, Eva. 1989. "Assertion and Assertion Sign." In *Le Teorie Delle Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica*, edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 139-154. Bologna: CLUEB.

"In spite of the fact that a number of semantic notions currently used in modal logic go back to the work of Gottlob Frege as it was interpreted by Carnap in 1947 (1) Frege's rare remarks on the subject of modality show that he considered modal distinctions of little relevance to logic. And this may strike one as rather odd: for was it not one of

Frege's aims to show that arithmetical propositions are analytic, if they are derivable as theorems in a sufficiently strong logic, on the basis of impeccable definitions and purely logical axioms? Moreover -- the objector may continue -- analytical propositions are knowable a priori (actually, necessarily so) and whatever is knowable a priori is a necessary truth (though, perhaps, not viceversa). Since in *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (2) Frege did appeal to some of these notions, the question arises how we are to interpret his statements on the subject of modality. This may at first seem a rather roundabout way of approaching the subject of assertion and assertion sign, and perhaps it is. But if we are to appreciate the profoundly innovative character of Frege's doctrine of truth and assertion it may prove a good strategy to touch briefly on the way in which Frege addressed the subject of analyticity and modality. Accordingly, after my having advanced some tentative suggestions as to the grounds of Frege's disparaging remarks about modality, I shall concentrate on the issue of Frege's recasting certain traditional distinctions in the theory of judgement, epitomized as it were in the introduction of a new sign into his logical notation -- a truly "momentous event" (to borrow a phrase of Wittgenstein's [TLP 5.452]), who, however, emphatically denied that this was a case in point (TLP 4.442) (3). I shall also mention a number of reinterpretations of Frege's judgement stroke proposed by later authors, so that the peculiarity of Frege's symbolic notation can be better appreciated." p. 139

(1) R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, 1947 (2nd ed. 1956), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
(2) G. Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung Über den Begriff der Zahl*. 1884, Breslau: W. Koebner. 1986, Centenarausgabe (C. Thiel ed), Hamburg: F.Meiner. 1986, Stuttgart: Reclam. (=GLA). 1950 Engl. transl. by J. L. Austin, 2nd rev. ed. 1953, Oxford: Blackwell.
(3) L. Wittgenstein, *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (1921) = *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (1922). 1961, Engl.

transl. by D. Pears and B. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (=TLP).

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"Frege had not one but two different notions of sense, namely, that of 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' and one implicit in a letter to Husserl of 1906 and elsewhere. This last one originates in Frege's notion of conceptual content. The distinction is used to clarify some obscurities in Frege's thought. In the last section a sort of 'explicans' of Frege's notion of conceptual content is introduced and applied to the semantic analysis of mathematics."

105. ———. 2006. *A Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Gottlob Frege*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

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108. Sainsbury, Richard Mark. 2002. *Departing from Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language*. London: Routledge.

109. Salmon, Nathan. 1991. *Frege's Puzzle*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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"The present collection of articles, mainly consisting of new publications, is a critical appreciation of the work of the logician, mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege. Volume I opens the collection with a programmatic contribution determining critically the historical position of Frege's philosophy. The main part of the volume contains papers on logic and philosophy of mathematics. Among other things it is argued that Frege's introduction of the universal quantifier in the *Begriffsschrift* enabled an integration of the statement- and predicate- calculus, going far beyond Boole's logic. Besides textual analyses of special problems concerning Frege's logical system and an elucidation of the 'logistic thesis' in the context of modern investigations in the foundations of mathematics, Frege's discussion of Hilbert's axiomatic method is subjected to critical analysis. One point made is that, contrary to a

prejudice in the recent history of mathematics, Frege's understanding of the axiomatic method is tenable." Contents: Vorwort 11; Einleitung des Herausgebers. Einige Bemerkungen zum Zusammenhang von Logik, Mathematik und Sprachphilosophie bei Frege 13; Zur historisch-kritischen Standortbestimmung der Philosophie Freges; 1. Hans D. Sluga. Frege as a Rationalist 27; Zum wissenschaftlichen Nachlass Freges; 2. Albert Veraart. Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Nachlasses Gottolob Frege und seiner Edition. Mit einem Katalog des ursprünglichen Bestands der nachgelassenen Schriften Freges 49; Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik. 3. Victor H. Dudman. From Boole to Frege 109; 4. Robert Sternfeld. The logistic thesis 139; 5. W. D. Hart. Imagination, necessity and abstract objects 161; 6. Michael D. Resnik. Die Frege-Hilbert Kontroverse 193; 7. Friedrich Kambartel. Frege und die axiomatische Methode. Zur Kritik mathematik-historischer Legitimationsversuche der formalistichen Ideologie 215; 8. Michael Dummett. Frege on the consistency of mathematical theories 229; 9. Christian Thiel. Gottlob Frege: Die Abstraktion 243; 10. Charles Parsons. Some remarks on Frege's conception of extension 265; 11. Terrell Ward Bynum. The evolution of Frege's Logicism 279; 12. Christian Thiel. Wahreitswert und Wertverlauf. Zu Freges Argumentation im § 10 de ' *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*' 287; 13. Franz Kutschera. Freges Begründung der Analysis 301; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 313; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 315.

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"The first papers of volume II deal, in a critical way, with Frege's theory of functions and his concept of logic. An account showing the development of his doctrine of judgment, is followed by two papers on the theory of quantification. The first discusses Frege's change from a substitutional to an objectual definition of quantification,

while the second compares Frege's approach with corresponding reflections of Russell and Quine. Finally, several articles discuss problems of identity in Frege under comparative and analytical aspects."
Contents: 14. Reinhardt Grossmann. Structures, functions and forms 11; 15. Wolfgang Carl. Freges Unterscheidung von Gegenstand und Begriff 33; 16. Eike-Henner W. Kluge. Freges Begriff des Logischeinfachen 51; 17. Gottfried Gabriel. Einige Eiseitigkeiten des Fregeschen Logiksbegriffs 67; 18. Hans-Ulrich Hoche. Vom 'Inhaltsstrich' zum 'Waagerechten'. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Fregeschen Uteilslehre 87;19. Leslie Stevenson. Frege zwei Definitionen der Quantifikation 103; 20. Robert Sternfeld. The mathematization of logic: quantified sentences 125; 21. Ignacio Angelellli. Friends and opponents of the substitutivity of Identical in the history of logic 141; 22. Charles E. Caton. 'The idea of sameness challenges reflection' 167; 23. Matthias Schirn. Identität und Identitätsaussage bei Frege 181; 24. Bertram Kienzle. Notiz zu Freges Theorien der Identität 217; 25. David Wiggins. Frege's problem of the Morning Star and the Evening Star 221; 26. Ronald Suter. Frege und Russell über das 'Paradox der Identität' 257; 27. Haig Khatchadourian. Kripke and Frege on identity statements 271; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 299; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 301.

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"Volume III chiefly contains studies on Frege's theory of sense and reference, generally regarded as the beginning of modern extensional and intensional semantics. Included is an attempt to provide a uniform explanation of the concept '*Bedeutung*' and to delimit the scope of the context principle in Frege's philosophy. Further articles deal with special problems of the theory of sense and reference. A fully comprehensive bibliography is appended to the collection."

28. Fred Sommers. Frege or Leibniz? 11; 29. Michael D. Resnik. Frege's Context Principle revisiterd 35; 30. Ernst Tugendhat. Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks 'Bedeutung' bei Frege. Postskirpt 1975 51; 31. Victor H. Dudman. *Bedeutung* for predicates 71; 32. David S. Shwayder. On the determination of reference by sense 85; 33. Leonard Linsky. Frege and Russell on vacuous singular terms 97; 34. Howard Jackson / Malcolm Acock. Sense and sense data 117; 35. Richard M. Martin. Some comments of Frege's pragmatic concerms 139; 36. *Anhang*. Peter Janich. Trägheitsgesetz und Inertialsystem. Zur Kritik G. Freges and der Definition L. Langes 146; Bibliographie 157; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 198; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 200.

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Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

INTRODUCTION: THE INFLUENCE OF MEINONG

"Nowadays, a need for formal tools is strongly felt in the treatment of two special areas of ontological inquiry. One area is concerned with intentional objects, an area which seems to contain difficulties on the level of things, but also on the level of states of affairs, facts and other "propositional" entities. An intentional relation holds between either persons (more generally experiencing subjects) or acts of consciousness on the one hand, and the intentional objects on the other. The latter are what people see, fear, expect, look for; and the problem, naturally, consists in the fact that – contrary to usual predication – the predicates in question truly apply to intentional objects which do not exist in the same sense as my cat in "My cat is on the mat". In short: "We are thinking about Sherlock Holmes" may be true (and in fact is true while we are writing the sentence) in a real-world-context, but "Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street" can be true only inside the fictive context of the novels. Nevertheless, intuitively everybody can think about Sherlock Holmes in just the same sense as he can think about Baker Street, which "really" exists in London. Historically, this problem of intentional objects forms one of the roots of formal ontology, as well as of the philosophy of mind.
One of the most influential thinkers of ontology at the beginning of our century was the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong, Ritter von Handschuchsheim. His best known conception deals, among other things, with objects that do not exist. This doctrine

is part of Meinong's Object Theory (*Gegenstandstheorie*) which is based on certain assumptions concerning the correspondence of various types of mental states to objects. Thus, there are objects of higher order, founded on the so-called objects of passive perception. Such founded objects are said to subsist (*bestehen*) rather than exist. According to Meinong, the entities we assume or infer are very complex objects called objectives. Objectives are built from other objects. They do not exist either; they may either be or not be a fact (*tatsächlich*). They can be expressed, for example by a that-clause, although their being an objective does obviously not depend on their being expressed by a sentence. "Objectives" are the "propositions" of Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore who were, by the way, heavily influenced in many ways by Meinong. On that basis, non-existing objects or objectives, which are not facts, turn out to be genuine objects or objectives nevertheless – their status does not depend on thought or expression. The non-existence of a huge golden sphere is very different from the nonexistence of a huge uranium sphere, a difference which provides them with an objective status. Yet Meinong never claims that non-existing objects subsist, or have any other form of being (*Sein*). What he assumes them to have is a certain nature (*Sosein*), unaffected by their existence or nonexistence. To say that a huge uranium sphere is heavy and round is not to say that there is such a thing. Contrary to Russell's opinion, "there is a P" does not follow from "something is a P". Meinong's incompletely determined objects, which violate the law of excluded middle, play an extremely important role in his theory of knowledge; they are the "pointers" through which the human mind refers to the completely determinate, existing objects. " (pp. 12-13)

From: Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs (eds.), *Things, Facts and Events*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000.

MEINONG'S MAIN WORKS

"Of his two profound and sympathetic *Hume-Studien,* done under Brentano's supervision, the first (1877), on Hume's theory of abstraction, secured his 'habilitation', the second, on Hume's theory of relations, appeared in 1882: both were published in the Proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences at Vienna, of which Meinong was later to be a Fellow. That Meinong should have served his first serious philosophical apprenticeship with Hume, places him in the Anglo-Saxon rather than the Germanic philosophical tradition, and it was in this tradition that he continued mainly to work. It was in the Anglo-Saxon world, likewise, that his philosophical reputation and influence were at their greatest.

Meinong spent four years (1878-82) as a *Privatdozent* at Vienna, and then moved on to Graz, where he remained for the rest of his life, first as Professor Extraordinarius (1882-9), and then as Ordinary Professor (1889-1920).

(...)

Apart from the foundation of an Institute of Experimental Psychology in 1894, the first in Austria, there seem to have been few events during Meinong's professorship. His history was the history of his publications and of the academic activities of his small school of pupils.

Among these publications the most notable were the *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur W erttheorie* (1894), which almost succeeds in formalizing ordinary morality; the composite school-publication *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (1904), to which Meinong contributed an article ' *Über Gegenstandstheorie*'; the valuable (...) epistemological essay *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1906); the programmatic *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften* (1906-7); the brilliant *Über Annahmen* (1910), with its manifold contributions to psychology, value-theory, etc., and its important introduction of 'objectives', the *Sätze-an-sich* of Bolzano, as peculiar *entia rationis*; the long treatise *Über Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit* (1915), with its important doctrine of 'incomplete objects'; the treatise *Über emotionale Presentation* (1917), a uniquely original essay in the epistemology of valuation;

and the somewhat unpersuasive *Zum Erweise des allgemeinen Kausalgesetzes* (1918). Meinong wrote many important articles which were collected by his pupils in the two volumes of *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, one volume devoted to psychology, the other to epistemology and object-theory: a third, to be devoted to value-theory, was never issued. Several important articles on value-theory, as well as the unreprinted *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen,* are therefore practically inaccessible [written in 1962; Meinong's works are now published in the *Gesamtausgabe:* see the Bibliography]. The *Grundlegung zur allgemeinen Werttheorie* was published posthumously in 1923, and a work entitled *Ethische Bausteine* is still in manuscript in the Library at Graz. [now published in the third volume of the *Gesamtausgabe*, pp. 657-724]." (*Preface*, pp. V-VII)

From: John N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995 (Reprint of the Second edition of 1963).

AN OVERVIEW OF MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS (GEGENSTANDSTHEORIE)

"The two basic theses of Meinong's theory of objects (*Gegenstandstheorie*) are (1) there are objects that do not exist and (2) every object that does not exist is yet constituted in some way or other and thus may be made the subject of true predication. Traditional metaphysics treats of objects that exist as well as of those that merely subsist (*bestehen*) but, having "a prejudice in favor of the real," tends to neglect those objects that have no kind of being at all; hence, according to Meinong, there is need for a more general theory of objects.
Everything is an object, whether or not it is thinkable (if an object happens to be unthinkable then it is something having at least the property of being unthinkable) and whether or not it exists or has any other kind of being. Every object has the characteristics it has whether or not it has any kind of being; in short, the *Sosein*

(character) of every object is independent of its *Sein* (being). A round square, for example, has a *Sosein*, since it is both round and square; but it is an impossible object, since it has a contradictory *Sosein* that precludes its *Sein*.

Of possible objects -- objects not having a contradictory *Sosein* -- some exist and others (for example, golden mountains) do not exist. If existence is thought of as implying a spatio-temporal locus, then there are certain subsistent objects that do not exist; among these are the being of various objects and the nonbeing of various other objects. Since there are horses, there is also the being of horses, the being of the being of horses, the nonbeing of the nonbeing of horses, and the being of the nonbeing of the nonbeing of horses. And since there is no Pegasus, there is the nonbeing of Pegasus, as well as the being of the nonbeing of Pegasus and the nonbeing of the being of Pegasus.

Meinong's theory must be distinguished from both Platonic realism, as this term is ordinarily interpreted, and the reism, or concretism, of Brentano and Tadeusz Kotarbinski. (Meinong noted that since his view is broader than realism, it might properly be called objectivism.) Thus, the Platonic realist could be said to argue: "(P) Certain objects that do not exist have certain properties; but (Q) an object has properties if and only if it is real; hence (R) there are real objects that do not exist." The reist, or concretist, on the other hand, reasons from not-R and Q to not-P; that is, he derives the contradictory of Plato's first premise by taking Plato's second premise along with the contradictory of Plato's conclusion. But Meinong, like Plato and unlike the reist, accepted both P and R; unlike both Plato and the reist, he rejected Q by asserting the independence of *Sosein* from *Sein*; and therefore, again unlike both Plato and the reist, he said that the totality of objects extends far beyond the confines of what is merely real .

This doctrine of *Aussersein* -- of the independence of *Sosein* from *Sein*-- is sometimes misinterpreted by saying that it involves recourse to a third type of being in addition to existence and subsistence. Meinong's point, however, is that such objects as the round square have no type of being at all; they are "homeless objects," to be found not even in Plato's heaven. Bertrand Russell objected that if we say round squares are objects, we violate the

law of contradiction. Meinong replied that the law of contradiction holds only for what is real and can hardly be expected to hold for any object, such as a round square, that has a contradictory *Sosein*.

Russell's theory of descriptions is often thought to constitute a refutation of the doctrine of *Aussersein;* actually, however, his theory merely presupposes that Meinong's doctrine is false. According to Meinong, the two statements "The round square is round" and "The mountain I am thinking of is golden" are true statements about nonexistent objects; they are *Sosein* and not Sein statements. The distinction between the two types of statements is most clearly put by saying that a *Sein* statement (for example, "John is angry") is an affirmative statement that can be existentially generalized upon (we may infer "There exists an x such that x is angry") and a *Sosein* statement is an affirmative statement that cannot be existentially generalized upon; despite the truth of "The mountain I am thinking of is golden," we may not infer "There exists an x such that I am thinking about x and x is golden." Russell's theory of descriptions, however, presupposes that every statement is either a *Sein* statement or the negation of a *Sein* statement and hence that there are no *Sosein* statements. According to Russell, a statement of the form "The thing that is F is G" may be paraphrased as "There exists an x such that x is F and x is G, and it is false that there exists a y such that y is F and y is not identical with x." If Meinong's true *Sosein* statements, above, are rewritten in this form, the result will be two false statements; hence Meinong could say that Russell's theory does not provide an adequate paraphrase.

An impossible object, as indicated above, is an object having a *Sosein* that violates the law of contradiction. An incomplete object, analogously, is one having a *Sosein* that violates the law of the excluded middle. Of the golden mountains, which most readers will think of on reading the paragraph above, it will be neither true nor false to say that they are higher than Mount Monadnock. And some objects are even more poorly endowed. For example, if I wish that your wish will come true, then the object of my wish is whatever it is that you happen to wish; but if, unknown to me, what you wish is that my wish will come true, then this object would seem to have very little *Sosein* beyond that

of being our mutual object. Meinong said that such an object is a defective object and suggested that the concept may throw light upon some of the logical paradoxes.
The theory of complexes -- that is, the theory of wholes and other such "objects of higher order" -- upon which Meinong wrote at length, also falls within the theory of objects.
None of the objects discussed above is created by us, nor does any of them depend in any way upon our thinking. Had no one ever thought of the round square, it would still be true of the round square that it does not exist; the round square need not be thought of in order not to exist. We draw these objects, so to speak, from the infinite depths of the *Ausserseienden*, beyond being and not-being." (pp. 115-116)

From: Roderick M. Chisholm, *Meinong, Alexius* in: Paul Edwards (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* New York: Macmillan The Free Press, 1967; Second edition: Donald M. Borchert (ed.), New York: Thomson Gale 2006, Volume VI, pp. 114-119.

"Meinong accepted Brentano's thesis of the intentionality of the mental but modified it in a realistic direction, distinguishing, like Twardowski, between the content and object of a mental act; indeed this distinction had been pointed out in 1890 by Meinong and Höfler as an ambiguity in the notion of object. Like Twardowski and unlike Husserl, Meinong regarded it as necessary that a mental act of whatever kind always have an object as well as a content, and in those cases where nothing exists which is targeted by the act, Meinong followed Twardowski in accepting a non-existent item as the object. It is from this use of the accusative term 'object [sc. of an act]' that Meinong derives the term 'theory of objects' which he preferred to such -- as he thought, existentially loaded -- terms as 'metaphysics' and 'ontology'. Both of these, and especially the former, suffered from a prejudice, rampant among materialists and nominalists, but present to some degree in most philosophers, the 'prejudice in favour of the actual', i.e., an unsupported preference for the spatiotemporally situated or real object. Ontological questions always interested Meinong, from his early preoccupation with universals, especially relations, through his interest in Gestalt or

higher-order objects and complexes. But object theory as a distinct discipline and forming the nucleus of his philosophical endeavour dominate only late in his career, from about 1899 until his death in 1920.

The first major work in object theory, initially prompted by considerations of the psychology of play and make-believe, is On Assumptions of 1902. What Meinong calls an assumption is roughly any intellectual act regarding what might be the case (nowadays called a 'propositional attitude') that falls short of a firm conviction or judgement. Only while working on this area did Meinong realise that he needed an ontology of the objects of assumptions and judgements, which objects he called objectives, preferring not to use Stumpfs term Sachverhalt (state of affairs), which he thought was loaded in favour of the true. Objectives combine some of the behaviour of propositions and other characteristics of states of affairs. Like propositions, they are there for all judgements and assumptions, including false ones, but like states of affairs their existential status is different for truth than for falsity: the objective of a true judgement or assumption, while not spatiotemporally real, still subsists or obtains (besteht), while the objective of a false judgement or assumption does not even have this kind of being.

The property of objectives corresponding to the truth of judgements Meinong calls factuality, the property corresponding to falsity unfactuality. He reserves 'true' for objectives which are both factual and apprehended by someone; 'false' is similarly restricted. For an objective, to be factual is to subsist, to be unfactual is to not subsist: there is an existential distinction between them. Objectives about an object do not have that entity as part, for an objective can at best subsist, whereas many objects can also be spatiotemporally actual or real. If Graz is in Austria had Graz as part, then it would be a subsistent with a real part, and if Sherlock Holmes is not real had Sherlock Holmes as part, it would have an object as part which does not exist at all. Both cases are absurd, thinks Meinong, so what an objective is about is not part of it.

Object theory received its programmatic statement in the 1904 essay 'The Theory of Objects'. This appeared in a volume by the Graz School commemorating ten years of the Psychology

Laboratory and contained essays on object theory by Rudolf Ameseder and Ernst Mally. Meinong's earlier work was enthusiastically reviewed by Russell in a three-part article for Mind, a journal which Meinong himself had regularly reviewed for German speakers in the 1880s. Russell had presumably hoped that Meinong's theory of impossible objects would offer some help on the solution of the logical paradoxes, but he was disappointed there. It was Meinong's painstaking method that Russell admired. Russell could not accept non-existent objects like the round square, or unfactual objectives: he avoided them initially by adopting Frege's distinction between sense and reference for definite descriptions, and saying that false propositions do exist. (Russell wrongly identified Meinong's objectives with his and Moore's propositions.) In 1905 Russell rejected Frege too: 'On denoting' is a battle on two fronts, one against non-existent objects, one against sense. Russell's initial sympathy gave way to increasing criticism of Meinong, whom he accused (wrongly) of believing in contradictions. Although the dismissal of Meinong in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy is curt and unfair, in the unpublished 1913 manuscript Theory of Knowledge Russell still discussed Meinong's views extensively, accurately and with some sympathy." (pp. 122-124)

From: Peter Simons, *Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realist*s, in: Anthony O'Hear (ed.), *German Philosophy Since Kant*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 109-136.

BERTRAND RUSSELL APPRECIATION OF MEINONG

"Before entering upon details, I wish to emphasise the admirable method of Meinong's researches, which, in a brief epitome, it is quite impossible to preserve. Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every

subject-matter. This is possessed in a very perfect form by the works we are considering. A frank recognition of the data, as inspection reveals them, precedes all theorising; when a theory is propounded, the greatest skill is shown in the selection of facts favourable or unfavourable, and in eliciting all relevant consequences of the facts adduced. There is thus a rare combination of acute inference with capacity for observation. The method of philosophy is not fundamentally unlike that of other sciences : the differences seem to be only in degree. The data are fewer, but are harder to apprehend; and the inferences required are probably more difficult than in any other subject except mathematics. But the important point is that, in philosophy as elsewhere, there are self-evident truths from which we must start, and that these are discoverable by the process of inspection or observation, although the material to be observed is not, for the most part, composed of existent things. Whatever may ultimately prove to be the value of Meinong's particular contentions, the value of his method is undoubtedly very great; and on this account if on no other, he deserves careful study." (pp. 205-206)

From: Bertrand Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", *Mind*, 1904, reprinted in: Bertrand Russell, *Essays in Analysis*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1973, pp. 204-219.

"Presentations, judgments and assumptions, Meinong points out, always have objects; and these objects are independent of the states of mind in which they are apprehended. This independence has been obscured hitherto by the 'prejudice in favour of the existent' (*des Wirklichen*), which has led people to suppose that, when a thought has a non-existent object, there is really no object distinct from the thought. But this is an error: existents are only an infinitesimal part of the objects of knowledge. This is illustrated by mathematics, which never deals with anything to which existence is essential, and deals in the main with objects which cannot exist, such as numbers. Now we do not need first to study the knowledge of objects before we study the objects themselves; hence the study of objects is essentially independent of both psychology and theory of knowledge. It may be objected

that the study of objects must be coextensive with all knowledge; but we may consider separately the more general properties and kinds of objects, and this is an essential part of philosophy. It is this that Meinong calls *Gegenstandstheorie*.
This subject is not identical with metaphysics, but is wider in its scope; for metaphysics deals only with the real, whereas the theory of objects has no such limitations. The theory of objects deals with whatever can be known a priori about objects, but knowledge of reality can only be obtained by experience. The theory of objects is not psychology, since objects are independent of our apprehension of them. It is also not theory of knowledge; for knowledge has two sides, the cognition, which belongs to psychology, and the object, which is independent. The theory of objects, Meinong contends, is also not to be identified with pure logic, since logic, in his opinion, is essentially practical in its aim, being concerned with right reasoning. (On this point, opinions will differ; but the question is in any case only one of nomenclature.) The conclusion is, that the theory of objects is an independent subject, and the most general of all philosophical subjects. Mathematics is essentially part of it, and thus at last finds a proper place; for the traditional division of sciences into natural and mental left no room for mathematics, because it took account only of the existent. Grammar may be a guide in the general theory of objects, as mathematics in more special parts of the theory." (pp. 77-78)

From: Bertrand Russell, "Review of: A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenständstheorie und Psychologie", *Mind*, 1905, reprinted in: Bertrand Russell, *Essays in Analysis*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1973, pp. 77-88.

GILBERT RYLE: "OBJECT THEORY IS DEAD"

"What differences did Alexius Meinong make to philosophy? Are there any big lessons, especially about the nature of thinking, of

which we, in 1970, must say either that we did learn them or, repentantly, that we could and should have learned them from Meinong?

Let us frankly concede from the start that *Gegenstandstheorie* itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected. Nobody is going to argue again that, for example, 'there are objects concerning which it is the case that there are no such objects.' Nobody is going to argue again that the possibility of ethical and aesthetic judgments being true requires that values be objects of a special sort.

As Professor Findlay suggests in his fine book *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, we have to allow in candid retrospect that one important part of Meinong's contribution to twentieth-century thought is precisely the anti- *Gegenstandstheorie* with which he vaccinated Brentano, Russell and Wittgenstein. We in 1970 do not merely suspect that *Gegenstandstheorie* will not do; we have learned just why it will not do; and to have learned this is to have learned from Meinong, via Russell and Wittgenstein, an important and new lesson about thinking, though not the one intended by Meinong.

a) Within a year of his famous articles in Mind on *Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions* (1904) Russell had written his even more famous and more influential Mind article '*On Denoting*', in which he assembled logicians' arguments against the pretensions of various ostensibly entity-designating nominative-phrases, including several that Meinong had championed and that Russell had himself championed in his own Principles of Mathematics of 1903. It was the Platonising Meinong who, in effect but of course not wittingly, spurred the newly Occamising Russell to leapfrog over his back on to a terra firma that he himself was never to reach or even to wish to reach. Though not everything, much was both new and true in Russell's Theory of Descriptions, in his account of Incomplete Symbols and Logical Constructions, in his doctrine of illegitimate totalities and thence in his Theory of Types. In all of these there were working conscious recoils against Meinong's Theory of Objects, as well as against his own and Moore's recent analogue to it. In the hands of Frege, in the differently moving hands of Russell and in the again differently moving hands of Wittgenstein, Meaning-theory

expanded just when and just in so far as it was released from that "Fido"-Fido box, the lid of which was never even lifted by Meinong.
b) Wittgenstein had, via Russell, some second-hand knowledge of Meinong, but apparently he also had a little first-hand knowledge of the thoughts both of Meinong and of Husserl. The opening pages of his Tractatus are unqualified *Gegenstandstheorie* and their German often echoes Meinong's German. Yet by Tractatus 4.126-4.1274 Wittgenstein has correctly located concepts like object, thing, fact and complex among formal concepts, i.e. category-concepts, as distinct from proper, i.e. genus-concepts or species-concepts. He has thereby disqualified in principle *Gegenstandstheorie*, including that in his own opening pages, from being informative or even mis-informative about what there is in the world. Moreover he has thereby identified for us just that disquieting but previously elusive feature of Meinong's Higher-Order Objects which had made us all along hanker to protest to Meinong: 'Yes, but notwithstanding all your rigorous arguments, these *entia rationis* of yours are only the verbalised simulacra of genuine entities.'
For though of course we can think, talk and say true things 1) about Socrates; 2) about the fact that Socrates was snub-nosed; 3) about the snubness of his nose, none the less, when we have done so, we still cannot enumerate three *somethings*, three members of any one genus or species, that we have thought or talked about -- unless we like to speak vacuously of all three as 'subject-matters', or 'remark-topics'; and if we do this, we see at once that the important-sounding word 'object' never did have any other positive function than to be a synonym for 'subject-matter' or 'remark-topic'. The three phrases carry the same ontological burdens --namely none. To parody Kant, ' .... is an object' is not a predicate. 'Is so and so an it? ' is not a proper question. About what can we significantly ask 'Is it an object or not? ' If asked 'How many Objects, i.e. how many its, are mentioned in this newspaper-article? ' we could no more even begin to make a count than we could even begin to make a count of the Events that took place in the course of the Battle of Waterloo; or than we could even begin to make a count of the Actions that someone had performed or the Experiences that he had between 10 a.m.

and 11 a.m. Category-words do not list countables -- not because they list too many to count, but because they do not provide qualifications for, or disqualifications from being on any list. 'It' does not describe; 'object' does not distinguish." (p. 7)

From: Gilbert Ryle, *Intentionality-Theory and the Nature of Thinking*, in: Rudolf Haller (ed.), *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung*, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972, pp. 7-14.

MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS IN RECENT RESEARCH

"Alexius Meinong and his circle of students and collaborators at the Philosophisches Institut der Universität Graz formulated the basic principles for a general theory of objects.(1) They developed branches and applications of the theory, outlined programs for further research, and answered objections from within and outside their group, revising concepts and sharpening distinctions as they proceeded. The object theory that emerged as the result of their efforts combines important advances over traditional systems of logic, psychology, and semantics.
The fate of object theory in the analytic philosophical community has been unfortunate in many ways. With few exceptions, the theory has not been sympathetically interpreted. It has often met with unfounded resistance and misunderstanding under the banner of what Meinong called "The prejudice in favor of the actual". (2) The idea of nonexistent objects has wrongly been thought to be incoherent or confused, and there are still those who mistakenly believe that the theory inflates ontology with metaphysically objectionable quasi-existent entities.' These criticisms are dealt with elsewhere by object theory adherents, and are not considered here. In what follows, the intelligibility of an object theory such as Meinong envisioned is assumed, and ultimately vindicated by the construction of a logically consistent version. The inadequacies of extensionalist theories of ontological

commitment and definite description, hallmarks of the Russell-Quine axis in recent analytic philosophy, justify an alternative intentional Meinongian object theory logic. Analytic philosophy survives the rejection of extensionalist treatments of definite description and ontological commitment, since analytic methods are not inherently limited to any particular set of extensional or intentional assumptions.

A comprehensive historical treatment of Meinong's philosophy is not attempted in these chapters, though some historical issues are addressed. Some of Meinong's most important philosophical writings have now been translated or are expected to appear in the near future, and there are several recent commentaries on Meinong's work, including Richard Routley's *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Terence Parsons' *Nonexistent Objects*, and Karel Lambert's *Meinong and the Principle of Independence*. These studies have contributed to renewed interest in and unprejudiced reappraisal of object theory. Analyses of the subtle turnings in Meinong's thought over several decades may be found in J. N. Findlay's *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, Reinhardt Grossmann's *Meinong*, Robin Rollinger's *Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals*, and Janet Farrell Smith's essay "The Russell-Meinong Debate". These works trace the complex development of Meinong's early nominalism or moderate Aristotelian realism in the *Hume-Studien* to his mature realistic interpretation of relations and factual objectives or states of affairs as subsistent entities, the theory of objects of higher order, and the doctrine of the *Aussersein* of the pure object. I have relied on these among other sources, I cannot hope to improve on them in some respects, and my topic in any case is somewhat different. I am concerned exclusively with the logic, semantics, and metaphysics or ontology and extraontology of Meinong's theory. Accordingly, I shall not discuss Meinong's epistemology, theory of perception, or value theory, which I nevertheless regard as essential to an understanding of his philosophy as a whole. The logic, semantics, and metaphysics of object theory are in a sense the most fundamental aspects of Meinong's thought, and therefore require the most careful preliminary investigation."

(1) I refer to Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* as a theory of objects, but alternative English equivalents have been proposed which should also be considered. Reinhardt Grossmann argues that the theory must be called a theory of entities because it includes not merely objects (*Objekte*), but objectives or states of affairs (*Objektive*). Grossmann, Meinong [1974], pp. 111-12: "If we keep in mind that Meinong will eventually divide all entities (other than so-called dignitatives and desideratives) into objects on the one hand and objectives on the other, we cannot speak of a theory of objects as the all-embracing enterprise, but must speak -- as I have done and shall continue to do -- of a theory of entities." This argument is inconclusive, since objectives are also objects of a kind, which Meinong describes as objects of higher order *(höherer Ordnung*), *superiora* founded on *inferiora* or lower order objects. An objective in any case can be as much an object of thought as any other nonobjective object, as when someone thinks about the fact that Graz is in Austria, and thereby makes that state of affairs an object of thought. In this sense, the theory of objects, of lower and higher order, is already all-embracing in the way Grossmann thinks Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* is meant to be. Nicholas Griffin identifies a further difficulty in Grossmann's terminological recommendation. In "The Independence of Sosein from Sein" [1979], p. 23, n. 2, Griffin writes: "Grossmann standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's ' *Gegenstand*', which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I have switched back either to 'object' or to the even more neutral term 'item'." Griffin's choice of translation agrees with Richard Routley's in *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* [1981], where Routley refers to a theory of items distinct in some respects from but directly inspired by Meinong's theory of objects. Routley's 'theory of item" is perhaps better used to designate his own special version of object theory, which he also denotes 'noneism'. Neither Grossmann's nor Routley's terminology carries the intentional force of 'Gegenstand', which as Meinong explains is etymologically related to 'gegenstehen', to stand against or confront, as objects of thought are supposed to confront and present themselves to the mind.

Notes

(2) Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects" ("*Uber Gegenstandstheorie*") [1904], pp. 78-81.
(3) In his early work, Meinong expressed the belief that nonexistent objects have what he then called *Quasisein*. "The Theory of Objects", pp. 84-5. Meinong here refers to the first edition of his *Über Annahmen* [1902], p. 95. See J. N. Findlay, Meinong's *Theory of Objects and Values* [1963], pp. 47-8. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* [1981], pp. 442, 854. Routley reports that Meinong renounced the theory of *Quasisein* in favor of the *Aussersein* thesis by 1899 (presumably with the publication in that year of his essay "*Uber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung*"). As a statement of the frequent misinterpretations of Meinong's object theory that persist today, see P.M. S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, revised edition [1986], p. 8: "The Theory of Descriptions ... enabled Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entities (such as the square circle) which, it had appeared, must in some sense subsist in order to be talked about ..." (pp. 1-3)

From: Dale Jacquette, *Meinongian Logic: the Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.

Related pages

Editions, Translations, Bibliographic Resources and Selected Texts

Selected bibliography on Meinong's Theory of Objects:

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Meinong: Editions, Translations and Bibliographic Resources

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SELECTED TEXTS: MEINONG'S LAST VIEWS ON THE THEORY OF OBJECTS

" *Meinong's Ontology*. (1)
I. We must turn, in the first place, to a philosophical discipline which is not as yet part of the tradition, which is therefore in a certain sense new, and about which I have said some things which were intended to be of a fundamental nature. To begin with, it is impossible to give a regular definition of entity [Gegenstand]; for genus and differentia are lacking, since everything is an entity. However, the etymology of the word '

gegenstehen' yields at least an indirect characteristic, since it points to the experiences which apprehend entities; but these experiences must not be thought of as somehow constituting the entities. Every inner experience, at least every sufficiently elementary one, has such an entity; and insofar as the experience finds an expression – hence first of all in the words and sentences of language – this expression has a meaning[*Bedeutung*], and this meaning is always an entity. All knowledge, too, deals therefore with entities.

But large and important groups of entities have found no home in the traditional sciences; these sciences, moreover, are for the most part exclusively concerned with a knowledge of reality [*Wirklichen*], while even unreal things with being, things without being, possibilities, and even impossibilities can be objects of knowledge, namely, of a knowledge which is of interest to the as yet theoretically naive person only, as it were, when it promises to serve as a means for knowledge of reality. In contrast to such a preference for reality, which, in fact, has been overcome so far in no science, there exists the obvious need for a science which deals with entities without any restriction, especially without restriction to the special case of existence, so that it can be called existence-free [*daseinsfrei*]. This science about entities as such, or about pure entities, I have called the theory of entities.

Much of what belongs to this theory has already been studied under the title 'Logic' (especially: 'Pure Logic'); and that modern mathematical logic belongs completely to the realm of the theory of entities is only concealed by its goal of being a calculus, which seems to favor an extensive externalization [*Veräusserlichung*] in the sense of the logic of extensions, while it is just a complete internalization [*Verinnerlichung*] which the theory of entities strives for and makes possible. People have dealt with topics from the theory of entities since antiquity under the heading of 'Metaphysics', and especially, under the heading of 'Ontology' as part of metaphysics; and they have not always failed to recognize the characteristic feature of freedom from existence. But as a goal in itself, the concept of a theory of what is free from existence has, so far as I can see, never been espoused. According to this concept, there belongs to the theory of entities everything that can be made out about entities irrespective of their existence (for

example, whatever it is that holds for the class of all colors which make up the 'color space,' as distinguished from the 'color body' which is restricted to the psychologically given); hence, everything that is a matter of a priori knowledge, so that the a priori can be treated as a defining characteristic of the kind of knowledge of which the theory of entities consists.

What belongs to the theory of entities is thus what is rational. Insofar [as it is that], it is therefore anything but a newly discovered country, but rather, in regard to one of its most important parts, mathematics, the justly admired standard of scientific precision. What is new is, perhaps, an insight into the peculiarity of this country and into the nature of its boundaries – unless one should rather speak of its boundlessness. In this respect, it is a kind of companion piece to metaphysics which tries to comprehend the totality of reality, while the theory of entities, because of its freedom from existence, tries to encompass also everything that is not real. Naturally, this freedom from existence does not mean that entities as such cannot have existence in the true sense. The fact that the kind of consideration and knowledge peculiar to the theory of entities therefore also appears where it can be applied to existents, constitutes one of the main values of the postulation of the new science.

Just as the concept of an entity in general is to be determined, at least *cum grano salis*, with an eye on apprehension, so are the main groups of entities characterized in regard to the main groups of apprehending experiences; and apprehensions are, as mentioned, all elementary experiences. Corresponding to the four main groups of the latter – to presentation [*Vorstellen*], thought [*Denken*], emotion [*Fühlen*], and desire [Begehren] – there are, therefore, four main groups of entities: objects [*Objekte*], objectives [*Objektive*], dignitatives [*Dignitative*], and desideratives [*Desiderative*]. However, the characteristics of the latter are not derived from the characteristics of the apprehending experiences. For this reason, nothing stands in the way of assigning to the immeasurable realm of objects, for example, also the inner experiences, even though these inner experiences cannot be given through presentations, but can only be apprehended through self-presentation or with the help of imagination."

(1) This is a translation of a part of Meinong's contribution to the book *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (Leipzig, 1923). The part is entitled *'Zur Gegenstandstheorie'*. Meinong's contribution to the book was written at the beginning of 1920, shortly before his death on November 27, 1920. Meinong's terminology is at times rather idiosyncratic. I have, therefore, sometimes used his own Latin terms.

From: Reinhardt Grossmann - *Meinong* - London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 224-229.

Related pages

Pages on Meinong:

First Part of the Bibliography: A - L

Second Part of the Bibliography: M - Z

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

The Philosophy of Bernard Bolzano: Logic and Ontology

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Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

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Meinong 's Theory of Objects. A Selected Bibliography (First Part: A - L)

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Stock Mechthild and Stock Wolfgang G. *Psychologie und Philosophie der Grazer Schule. Eine Dokumentation und Wirkungsgeschichte von Alexius Meinong, Stephan Witasek, Rudolf Ameseder, Vittorio Benussi, Ernst Schwarz, Wilhelm M. Frankl und France Veber*. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1990.

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   Contents: John Niemeyer Findlay: The influence of Meinong in Anglo-Saxon countries, 9; Rudolf Freundlich: Die beiden Aspekte der Meinongschen Gegenstandstheorie, 21; Rudolf Kindinger: Das Problem der unvollkommenen Erkenntnisleistung in der Meinongschen Wahrnehmungslehre, 41; Franz Kröner: Zu Meinongs "unmöglichen" Gegenständen, 67; Johann Mokre: Zu den logischen Paradoxien, 81; Kostantin Radakovic: Meinongs Beziehungen zu den Grundlagen unserer Erkenntnistheorie und Weltanschauung, 91; Mila Radakovic: Metaphysische Konsequenzen aus dem Persistenzgedanken Meinongs.

Persönliches und Sachliches, 103; Amadeo Silva Tarouca: Die Erkenntnistheorie Meinongs in der Grazer Schultradition, 113; Ferdinand Weinhandl: Das Aussenweltproblem bei A. Meinong, 127; Karl Wolf: Die Entwicklung der Wertphilosophie in der Schule Meinongs, 157-171.

2. "Alexius Meinong." 1973. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27.

3. "Meinong and the Theory of Objects." 1995. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50.

   Edited by Rudolf Haller; Papers presented at an "Internationale Meinong-Konferenz" held September, 28-30, 1995 in Graz.

4. "The Philosophy of Alexius Meinong." 1996. *Axiomathes* no. 7.

   Edited by Liliana Albertazzi

5. "Il Pregiudizio a Favore Del Reale. La Teoria Dell'oggetto Di Alexius Meinong Fra Ontologia E Epistemologia." 2005. *Rivista di Estetica* no. 30.

   A cura di Carola Barbero e Venanzio Raspa.

6. Alai, Mario. 2006. "Speaking of Nonexistent Objects." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:119-159.

7. Albertazzi, Liliana. 1996. "A Cubist State of Mind: Meinong's Ontology." *Axiomathes* no. 1996:5-16.

8. ———. 1996. "Come Tails, Fleeting Objects and Temporal Inversions." *Axiomathes*:111-136.

9. Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale, and Poli, Roberto, eds. 2001. *The School of Alexius Meinong*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

10. Aquila, Richard. 1976. *Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts*. Park: Pennsylvania University Press.

11. Armstrong, David Malet. 1995. "Reacting to Meinong." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:615-627.

    "1. Some reasons are given for rejecting the view that there are entities that do not exist. 2. It is suggested, nevertheless, that this view has some plausibility when we consider unrealized empirical possibilities. 3. Even if nonexistent entities are rejected, there remains Meinong's distinction between object and objectives, roughly: things and facts. The author would analyze objects in terms of objectives, yielding a world of facts."

12. Barber, Kenneth. 1970. "Meinong's Hume Studies Part I: Meinong's Nominalism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 30:550-567.

13. ———. 1971. "Meinong's Hume Studies Part Ii: Meinong's Analysis of Relations." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 31:564-584.

14. Barbero, Carola. 2006. " *Cry for a Shadow*. Emotions and Object Theory." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:181-211.

15. Baumgartner, Wolfgang, and Zelaniec, W. 1996. "Meinong Values." *Axiomathes*:233-240.

16. Bencivenga, Ermanno. 1986. "Meinong: A Critique from the Left." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:359-374.

    "Meinong justifies the need of his *Gegenstandstheorie* by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really

proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full import of this revolution. This is what the present paper attempts to do."

17. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2001. *Représentations Sans Objet: Aux Origines De La Phénoménologie Et De La Philosophie Analytique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Contents: Introduction. La question des objets inexistants et les "origines communes" de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique 5; Chapitre I. Bolzano et le paradoxe des objets inexistants 17; Chapitre II. Un détour frégéen: la présuppostion de référence 43; Chapitre III. Une première solution intentionnaliste: Twardowski (en passant par Brentano) 67; Chapitre IV: L'objectivation de l'inexistence: Meinong 99; Chapitre V. Le dispositif onto-logique et les deux critiques possibles de Meinong 131; Appendice: Brentano sur les "quelque chose" 169; Chapitre Vi. Husserl critique de Twardowski 173; Index nominum 217-219.

18. Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. *Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004

19. Berto, Francesco. 2012. *Existence as a Real Property. The Ontology of Meinongianism*. Dordrecht: Springer.

20. Beyer, Christian. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgement : Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

21. Bonino, Guido. 2006. "Why There Are Non Facts in Meinong's World (According to Gustav Bergmann)." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:239-266.

22. ———. 2007. "Why There Are No Facts in Meinong's World (According to Gustav Bergmann)." *Meinong Studies /*

Meinong Studien no. 2:239-275.

"The paper deals with Gustav Bergmann's analysis of Meinong's ontology, carried out in *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (1967); more specifically it aims at making it clear in what sense Meinong can be regarded as a "reist". Reism is characterized by Bergmann as a position -- largely dominant in the philosophical tradition -- which
(i) neglects the ontological category of facts;
(ii) neglects or downplays nexus (and more in general subsistents);
(iii) tends to consider all entities as things or thing-like.
As a by-product, some light will be thrown on the sense of Bergmann's ontological enterprise."

23. Bottani, Andrea. 2006. "Three Kind of Incompleteness." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:99-117.

24. Bourgeois, Warren V. 1981. "Beyond Russell and Meinong." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 16:653-666.

25. Bradford, Dennis. 1980. *The Concept of Existence. A Study of Nonexistent Particulars*. Lanham: University Press of America.

26. Brigati, Roberto. 1993. *Il Linguaggio Dell'oggettività. Saggio Su Meinong*. Torino: Thema.

27. Burkhardt, Hans. 1989. "Das Vorurteil Zugunsten Des Aktualen: Die Philosophischen Systeme Von Leibniz and Meinong." In *Le Teorie Delle Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica*, edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 155-182. Bologna: CLUEB.

28. Butchvarov, Panayot. 1985. "Our Robust Sense of Reality." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:501-531.

"Anti-Meinongian philosophers, such as Russell, do not explain what they mean by existence when they deny that

there are nonexistent objects - they just sense robustly. I argue that any plausible explanation of what they mean tends to undermine their view and to support the Meinongian view. But why are they so strongly convinced that they are right? I argue that the reason is to be found in the special character of the concept of existence, which has been insufficiently examined by anti-Meinongian as well as by Meinongian philosophers."

29. Calan, Ronan de. 2006. "L'objectif De L' *Objektiv*: De L'objet Du Jugement À La Théorie De L'objet." In *Propositions Et États De Choses. Entre Être Et Sens*, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn, 51-66. Paris: Vrin.

30. Campbell, Richard. 1972. "Did Meinong Plant a Jungle?" *Philosophical Papers* no. 1:89-102.

    "This article presents a detailed analysis of Meinong's paper on "Thetheory of objects" in order to untangle the complex dialectic of his argument. It is argued that Meinong's position has been grossly misunderstood; far from maintaining that all objects of reference must have some kind of logical being, Meinong explicitly denies such a 'solution' to the problem of how reference is to be understood when the expression which occurs referentially in a linguistic context fails to refer to an existing object. He is not ontologising the logic of our ordinary use of referring expressions. Rather, Meinong's position is that being is not intrinsic to having the logical status of an object, But rather is only relevant when we come to determine whether the existential proposition concerning some object is true. The question of being does not arise when an object is considered as such. Just what this is to be taken as meaning is developed through a discussion of intentionality. It is proposed that Meinong can be understood as holding that the meta-Remark 'reference is there being made to x' does not entail the existence, nor the non-existence of x."

31. Cantens, Bernardo J. 1999. *Suarez and Meinong on Beings of Reason and Non-Existent Objects*, University of Miami.

Available at UMI Dissertation Express: reference number 9938315.

32. Capone Braga, Gaetano. 1914. "La Teoria Degli Oggetti E L'ontologia." *Cultura Filosofica* no. VIII (1914): 197-231; 290-318; IX (1915) 72-85.

33. Capozzi, Mirella. 2006. "Biangoli Rettilinei E Centauri: L'ontologia Di Wolff E Meinong." In *Le Ragioni Del Conoscere E Dell'agire. Scritti in Onore Di Rosaria Egidi*, edited by Calcaterra, Rosa, 44-56. Milano: Franco Angeli.

34. Cappio, James John. 1981. *Meinong and Reference*, Princeton University.

    Available at UMI Dissertation Express (reference number 8119111).

35. Cattaruzza, Serena. 1996. "Meinong and Bühler." *Axiomathes*:103-110.

36. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1963. "Supererogation and Offence." *Ratio* no. 5.

    Reprinted in: *Brentano and Meinong studies* - pp. 98-113

37. ———. 1972. "Beyond Being and Nonbeing." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 245-255. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

    Reprinted in: *Brentano and Meinong Studies* - pp. 53-67. "Meinong wrote: "There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects." (1) But he was well aware that this statement of his doctrine of Aussersein was needlessly paradoxical. Other statements were: "The non-real" is not "a mere nothing" and "The object as such ... stands 'beyond being and non-being." (2) Perhaps the clearest statement was provided by Meinong's follower, Ernst Mally: " *Sosein* is independent of *Sein*." (3) We could paraphrase Mally's statement by saying: "An object may have a set of

characteristics whether or not it exists and whether or not it has any other kind of being."
It is commonly supposed that this doctrine of Aussersein is absurd and that whatever grounds Meinong may have had for affirming it were demolished by Russell's theory of descriptions. I believe, however, that this supposition is false. I shall attempt here to set forth the doctrine in its most extreme form and I shall then consider what may be said in its favor."

38. ———. 1972. "Objectives and Intrinsic Value." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

    Reprinted in: *Brentano and Meinong studies* - pp. 80-91

39. ———. 1972. "Einige Hauptpunkte in Meinongs Philosophischer Psychologie." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, 25-36. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

40. ———. 1973. "Homeless Objects." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:207-223.

    Reprinted in: Brentano and Meinong studies - pp. 37-52.
    "In 1907 Meinong introduced the expression 'homeless object' (*Heimatlose Gegenständ*) to refer to certain objects which, he said, did not fall within the subject-matter of any of the generally accepted branches of knowledge. One might also characterize such objects by saying that they are neither 'concreta' nor 'abstracta'.
    Three such objects are discussed in the present paper: (1) certain 'intentionalia', or objects of thought; (2) what Meinong called 'Objecktive' and what might also be called 'states of affairs'; and (3) 'incomplete objects', or objects that are not completely determinate. Meinong's position with respect to these types of object is here assessed and to a certain extent defended."

41. ———. 1982. *Brentano and Meinong Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
"I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
(...)
The third and fourth papers are concerned with Meinong's theory of objects, a theory that grows out of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Homeless Objects" first appeared in the Meinong issue of *Revue Internationale de Philosophie,* Vol. 22 (1973). "Beyond Being and Nonbeing" was presented to the Colloquium on Meinong that took place at the University of Graz in September and October, 1970. It first appeared in *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein,* edited by Rudolf Haller (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1972). The paper makes clear, I think, that Russell's theory of descriptions - despite its great philosophical merit - does not provide a refutation of Meinong's theory.
The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong.
(...)
"Objectives and Intrinsic Value" is a revised version of a second paper that I presented to the Meinong Colloquium in 1970; the original version appears in *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein.*
"Supererogation and Offence" first appeared in *Ratio,* Vol. V (1963). In this work I make use, not only of certain insights

of Meinong, but also those of one of his followers, Dr. Ernst Schwarz. Schwarz's excellent book, *Uber den Wert, das Soll, und das richtige Werthalten,* has been almost entirely neglected. It was first brought to my attention by Hofrat Dr. Rudolf Kindinger who first introduced me to Graz.
I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the *Foreword*)

42. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2001. "Die Theorie Der Intentionalität Meinongs." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy of Knowledge* no. 51:119-143.

    "The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference-object beyond being and non being . This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object-theory of intentionality, as it introduces special postulated entities in the target-position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator-theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated between the subject and the object of reference and mediating the intentional access to the (complete) reference-object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities (objectives). In the paper we attempt to give a set-theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures."

43. ———. 2002. "Brentano Und Meinong. Zur Ontologie Der Denkobjekte." In *Substanz Und Identität. Beiträge Zur Ontologie*, edited by Löffler, Winfried, 155-166. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag.

44. ———. 2004. "Meinong Und Supervaluation." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European*

Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 105-130. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

"Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to Meinongian ideas are accused of planting an ontological jungle. However in the paper it is shown that a significant part of Meinong's philosophy can be interpreted within the framework of an astonishingly sparse ontology.
The proposed interpretation does not introduce any nonexistent entities but instead uses supervaluational techniques and substitutional interpretation of quantifiers."

45. ———. 2005. "Abstraktion Und Relationen Beim Jungen Meinong." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:7-62.

46. ———. 2005. "Drei Versionen Der Meinongschen Logik." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 59:49-70.

"The most striking part of Meinong's theory of objects is his thesis that the 'pure objects' should be considered as ontologically neutral.
Meinong says that they are 'beyond of being and non-being'. There are three *prima facie* plausible ways how this ontological neutrality could be analyzed. It can be construed as (i) an expansion of ontology; (ii) an introduction of an ontologically non-committing quantification; or as (iii) a version of free logic."

47. ———. 2007. *Gegenstandstheorie Und Theorie Der Intentionalität Bei Alexius Meinong*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Inhaltverzeichnis: Einführung IX-XII; 1. Intentionalität und immanente Objekte. Die Lehre Franz Brentanos 1; 2. Abstraktion und Relationen. Der junge Meinong 53; 3. Inhalt und Gegenständ. Meinongs Lehre um 1900 103; 4. Die Lehre von den Objektiven (1902) 149; 5. Gegenstandstheorie (1904-1920) 179; 6. Meinongs Gegenstände und die intentionale Beziehung 251; 7. Meinong'sche "Konstitutionssysteme" 307; 8. Die Logik des Ausserseins 353; Schlusswort 371; Bibliographie 373; Namenverzeichnis 385-386

48. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1982. "Meinong Reconstructed Versus Early Russell Reconstructed." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 11:183-214.

Reprinted in *Logical studies in Early Analytic Philosophy* pp. 119-151.
"A reconstruction of Bertrand Russell's pre-1905 theory of nonexisting individuals is contrasted with terry parsons' reconstruction of Meinong's theory in this book "nonexistent objects". Meinongian objects, complete and incomplete, possible and impossible, are shown to be parasitic upon Russellian individuals, and Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties and relations is explained in terms of the distinction between those properties and relations which can hold only of existing individuals and those which can hold of nonexisting individuals as well."

49. Dappiano, Luigi. 1994. "L'idealismo Di Oxbridge Tra Lotze E Meinong. A Proposito Delle Origini Della Filosofia Analitica." *Axiomathes*:279.

50. Dejnožka, Jan. 1988. "Russell's Robust Sense of Reality: A Reply to Butchvarov." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 32:155-164.

This paper is now superseded by the chapter 4. "Russell's robust sense of reality" of "The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins" (1996). (Personal communication by Jan Dejnožka).

51. ———. 1996. *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*. Lanham, Maryland: Littefield Adams.

Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.

52. Dölling, Evelyn. 1995. "Alexius Meinong: "Der Blinde Seher Theiresias"." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:1-27.

53. ———. 1997. "On Alexius Meinong's Theory of Signs." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 199-214. Aldershot: Ashgate.

54. ———. 1999. *"Wahrheit Suchen Und Wharheit Bekennen." Alexius Meinong: Skizze Seines Lebens*, *Studien Zur Österreichischen Philosophie*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

55. ———. 2001. "Meinong in His and Our Times." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 3-48. Aldershot: Ashgate.

56. ———. 2001. "Alexius Meinong's Life and Work." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 49-76. Aldershot: Ashgate.

57. ———. 2005. ""...Dieser Umweg Führt Über Sprachliche Ausdrücke, Durch Die Sich Annahmen Verraten"

    Eine Semiotsche Sicht Auf Meinongs Annahmenlehre." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:129-158.

58. Eames, Elizabeth Ramsden. 1971. "Russell's Study of Meinong." *Russell.The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* no. 4:3-7.

    "Some commentators have found Russell's treatment of Meinong to be a 'travesty,' but it is argued that the letters between Meinong and Russell and Russell's reading notes (all in the Bertrand Russell archives at McMaster) show Russell to have been a careful student whose interpretation was welcomed by Meinong."

59. Eaton, Howard O. 1930. *The Austrian Philosophy of Values*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

60. Elie, Hubert. 1936. *Le Complexe Significabile*. Paris: Vrin.

    Reprinted with the title: *Le Signifiable par complexe. La proposition et son objet. Grégoire de Rimini, Meinong,*

Russell - Paris, Vrin 2000

61. Englebretsen, George. 1973. "Meinong on Existence." *Man and World* no. 6:80-82.

"I argue here that on one plausible reading Meinong's theory of objects, far from being mistaken in the way Russell thought it was, shows considerable insight into the notion of existence. In particular, Meinong can be seen as making an important distinction between what can be significantly referred to and what exists. This distinction is very close to one made recently by Fred Sommers."
"I argue here that on one plausible reading Meinong's theory of objects, far from being mistaken in the way Russell thought it was, shows considerable insight into the notion of existence. In particular, Meinong can be seen as making an important distinction between what can be significantly referred to and what exists. This distinction is very close to one made recently by Fred Sommers."
"For several years I was told, and believed, that while Russell's theory of descriptions might he flawed (viz. in the way Strawson showed), his rejection of Meinong's theory of objects, which led to the theory of descriptions, was undoubtedly correct. Now I doubt very much if this is so. The "official" view is that Meinong had made the mistake of multiplying the senses of "exists" unnecessarily. According to this view, Meinong, since he held that the descriptive components of any meaningful sentence must refer to something, was forced to provide a special kind of existence, subsistence, for entities which are nonexistent but referred to meaningfully. Russell avoided this position by claiming that statements referring to nonexistent entities are meaningful but false (since they logically entail the existence of the entity referred to). I think the official view underestimates Meinong's philosophical abilities. Indeed, I think, rather than engaging in the philosophically dangerous task of multiplying kinds of existence, Meinong was expressing a keen insight into the nature of existential commitment." p. 80

62. Findlay, John Niemeyer. 1933. *Meinong's Theory of Objects*. London: Oxford University Press.

Contents of the Second Edition: Preface to the Second Edition V-XV; I. The Doctrine of Content and Object 1; II. The Pure Object and Its Indifference to Being 42; III. The Theory of Objectives 59; IV: The Modal Moment 102; V. Objects of Higher Order 113; VI. The Theory of Incomplete Objects 152; VII. The Modal Properties of Objectives 185; VIII.The Apprehension of Objects 218; IX. Valuation and Values 264; X. Dignitatives and Desideratives 303; XI. Appraisal of Meinong 322; Index 349-353.
Second edition in 1963 (Gregg Revivals Reprint); the chapters IX and X were added in this edition.
Reprinted with the title: *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values* and a new *Introduction. Findlay and Meinong* by Dale Jacquette (pp. XXV-LIV), Aldershot, Ashgate, 1995.

63. ———. 1970. *Axiological Ethics*. London: Macmillan.

64. ———. 1973. "Meinong the Phenomenologist." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:161-177.

65. ———. 1995. *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values. Secon Edition*. Aldershot: Gregg revivals.

Reprint of the second edition with a new introduction by Dale Jacquette pp. XXV-LIV

66. Gellman, Jerome I. 1969. "Suter on Russell on Meinong." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 29:441-445.

"The author replies to Ronald Suter's "Russell's 'refutation' of Meinong in 'On denoting'," "Philosophy and phenomenological research," June, 1967. Suter's interpretation of one of Russell's arguments is criticized on exegetical grounds, And his defense of another argument is rebutted on logical grounds. Meinong's thesis is presented as the thesis that all statements of a certain form are true. It is argued that all of Russell's arguments are attempts to

pose counter-examples to this single view. Meinong is defended against Russell's counter-examples."

67. Griffin, Nicholas. 1977. "Russell's "Horrible Travesty" of Meinong." *Russell.The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*:39-51.

"For a long time it was widely believed that Meinong held that every object of reference had being. This has since come to be recognized as a 'horrible travesty' (Findlay's phrase) of Meinong's position.
However, A new horrible travesty has grown up: namely, that the original misinterpretation of Meinong was due to Russell's early discussions of his work. While it is conceded that Russell's later writings contained travesties of Meinong, it is shown (using unpublished documents in the Bertrand Russell archives as well as Russell's published writings) that, in his early critical discussions of Meinong, Russell was fully aware that for Meinong some objects had no kind of being at all."

68. ———. 1979. "The Independence of *Sosein* from *Sein*." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 9:27-34.

"Meinong's theory of objects is at last getting some of the attention it deserves, and it now seems that the time has passed when the theory could be dismissed as merely a source of philosophical amusement. But, despite the fact that Meinong's position is now taken much more seriously than it used to be, the theory is, for the most part, still rejected, and even Meinong's more careful critics still fail to do justice to the plausibility of his theory of objects.
Recently Reinhardt Grossmann (1) has presented a series of arguments designed to show that the greater part of the theory of objects is mistaken, although he concedes that `Meinong's doctrine is neither too obscure to be understood nor too wrongheaded to be enlightening' (p. 67). In this paper 1 shall be concerned with showing how Meinong's theory can be defended against Grossmann's arguments.

Grossmann usefully lists the four central theses of Meinong's theory of objects (p. 67):
(1) Nonexistent objects (2) have no form of being whatsoever.
(2) Such objects are, nevertheless, constituents of certain states of affairs.
(3) They even have a number of quite ordinary properties - the golden mountain, for example, is golden.
(4) Being is not a part of any object.
He then argues that, of the four, only the first is true. My own view is that all four are true." p. 27
(1) See R. Grosmmann - *Meinong's doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object* - Noûs, 8 (1974) pp. 67-82. All references, except where otherwise indicated, are to this paper.
(2) Grossmann standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's `Gegenstand', which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I have switched back either to 'object' or to the even more neutral term 'item'.

69. ———. 1986. "Russell's Critique of Meinong's Theory of Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:375-401.

"Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unlimited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions."

70. Griffin, Nicholas, and Jacquette, Dale, eds. 2009. *Russell Vs. Meinong. The Legacy of "on Denoting"*. New York: Routledge.

Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XIII; Dale Jacquette and Nicholas Griffin: Introduction 1; 1. Alasdair Urquhart: Logic and denotation 10; 2. Graham Stevens: Antirealism and the theory of descriptions 26; 3. Francis Jeffrey Pelletier and Bernard Linsky: Russell vs. Frege on definite descriptions as singular terms 40; 4. Kevin C. Klement: A Cantorian argument against's Frege and early Russell's theories of descriptions 65; 5. Gideon Makin: 'On denoting' appearance and reality 78; 6. Omar W. Nasim: Explaining G. F. Stout's reaction to Russell's 'On denoting' 101; 7. David Bostock: Russell on 'the' in plural 113; 8. Johann Christian Marek: Psychological content and indeterminacy with respect to Being: two notes on the Russell-Meinong Debate 144; 9. Dale Jacquette: Meditations on Meinong's Golden Mountain 169; 10. Nicholas Griffin: Rethinking Item Theory 204; 11. Peter Loftson: Contra Meinong 233; 12. Gabriele Contessa: Who is afraid of imaginary objects? 248; 13. Gregory Landini: Russell's definite descriptions *de re* 266; 14. Michael Nelson: Quantifying in and Anti-Essentialism 297; 15. Nathan Salmon: Points, complexes, complex points, and a yacht 343; Contributors 365; Index 369.

71. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1969. "Non-Existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 6:17-32.

72. ———. 1974. *Meinong*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Contents: Preface IX-X; I. Individuals and Properties 1; II. Ideal and Real Relations 21; III. Ideas and Their Intentions 48; IV. Objects of Higher Order 57; V. Assumptions and Objectives 78; VI. Being and *Aussersein* 106; VII. Empirical Knowledge: Perception and Introspection 121; VIII. Relational Knowledge: The Theory of Entities 156; IX. The Apprehension of Objects 182; X. Modalities 199; Appendix

I. Meinong's Ontology (by Meinong) 224; Appendix II. Meinong's Life and Work (by Meinong) 230; Notes 237; Index 255.
"This book on Meinong is primarily concerned with his arguments for the positions for which he is famous among some philosophers and infamous among others. But philosophical contentions carry little weight when they are viewed in isolation. Matters are too complex, too difficult, to be settled in an isolated way. Every argument must be evaluated against a background which includes a philosopher's other arguments and some of his basic assumptions or -- if you wish -- prejudices. I therefore discuss Meinong's arguments within the context in which they appear, but with an eye on his earlier positions as well as on his later changes of mind. There are at least two further reasons for adopting this particular approach in Meinong's case.
Findlay, in his classic study of Meinong's philosophy, compares him with G. E. Moore.(1) Although this comparison is apt, there is one respect in which Meinong differs greatly from Moore. Meinong's philosophy develops over the years from a sparse ontology into an ample one. Every new idea is built upon an old one; new problems arise in the wake of earlier solutions; certain questions are raised time and again, but their answers are more and more refined. In short, there is a definite development, with a definite trend, definite stages, and a distinct final view.
I also wished to impress on the reader how misleading the prevalent view is that Meinong was a spendthrift metaphysician who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and needlessly. If one becomes aware of how Meinong's full ontology develops very slowly over many years from very austere beginnings, how he resists the temptation to solve a problem by admitting a new kind of entity, and how he gives in only after a whole series of arguments for the new kind of entity has accumulated, one will, hopefully, be less inclined in future to think of Meinong as the 'supreme entity multiplier in the history of philosophy'.(2)" (from the Preface).

(1) J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), p. 348.
(2) This phrase if from Gilbert Ryle's article in the *Oxford Magazine* 26 October 1933.

73. ———. 1974. "Meinong's Doctrine of the "Aussersein" of the Pure Object." *Noûs* no. 8:67-82.

"Meinong's doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object consists, in my view, of the following four main theses: (1) Nonexistent entities, like the golden mountain and the round square, have no form of being whatsoever. (2) Such entities are, nevertheless, constituents of certain states of affairs. (3) They even have a number of quite ordinary properties-the golden mountain, for example, is golden. (4) Being is not a part of any object. I shall try to explain and evaluate these four theses, and I shall claim that only the first one is true. However, even if my arguments fail to convince, they may at least show that Meinong's doctrine is neither too obscure to be understood nor too wrongheaded to be enlightening."

74. ———. 1984. "Non-Existent Objects Vs. Definite Descriptions." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 62:363-377.

"Some years ago, I published an article about Meinong's theory of objects. (1) I listed there four main theses of Meinong's view:
(1) The golden mountain (and other nonexistents) has no being at all.
(2) Nevertheless, it is a constituent of the fact that the golden mountain does not exist.
(3) Furthermore, it has such ordinary properties as being made from gold.
(4) Existence is not a constituent of any object.
And I argued in that paper that only thesis (1) is true. In particular, I insisted that (3), which I consider to be the most characteristic feature of Meinong's view, is false.

Since then, there have been quite a few discussions of Meinong's view. I would like, in response to some of these works, to reiterate my earlier criticism of Meinong. My purpose is threefold. Firstly, I would like to state once more my own view, which is a version of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, as clearly as possible. Secondly, I shall defend my past contention that the golden mountain is not golden against some recent objections. And thirdly and most importantly, I want to describe the dialectic of the philosophical problem as I perceive it. It seems to me to be an exasperating shortcoming of the discussion that most participants do not clearly state the basic options and their reasons for preferring some to others."
(1) 'Meinong's Doctrine of the *Aussersein of* the Pure Object', *Noüs,* 8 (1974, pp. 67-81. See also my *Meinong* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974).

75. ———. 2000. "Reid, Meinong and the Argument from Physics." *Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics* no. 1:69-82.

76. ———. 2001. "Meinong's Main Mistake." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 477-488. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Seldom has a modern philosopher become as famous for a view which he does not hold as Alexius Meinong. One generally attributes to him the belief that there are, not just such ordinary things as mountains and relations, but even such things as the golden mountain and the round square. He is therefore often viewed as a spendthrift ontologist who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and needlessly. But this conception, I shall try to show, is mistaken. Anyone who has studied Meinong's philosophy carefully will come to the conclusion that he is not the 'supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy' as Gilbert Ryle claims.(1)
But even though Meinong never embraced the rather extreme view that there are, in addition to existing things in

space and time and subsisting things (ideal things) outside of space and time, also such things as the golden mountain, and even such contradictory things as the round square, he nevertheless insisted on another ontological principle not any less mistaken than what I just called the 'extreme' view. It is this insistence, and not his ontological inventory, which I consider to be Meinong's main mistake. I shall, therefore, first defend Meinong against the kind of accusation implied in Ryle's description of Meinong. And then I shall, secondly, show where Meinong really went wrong in his ontology." (p. 477)
(1) See Ryle's article in the *Oxford Magazine* 26 October 1933.

77. Guigon, Ghislain. 2005. "Meinong on Magnitudes and Measurement." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:255-296.

"The paper comprises a presentation and defence of Meinong's discussion on magnitudes and measurement found in his *Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes*. The first and longer part of the presentation examines Meinong's analysis of magnitudes. According to Meinong, we must distinguish between divisible magnitudes and indivisible ones. He argues that relations of distance, or dissimilarity, are indivisible magnitudes that coincide with divisible magnitudes called stretches. The second part of the presentation is concerned with Meinong's account of measurement as a comparison of parts. Meinong holds that measuring is comparing parts and, thus, only divisible magnitudes are directly measurable. When indivisible magnitudes like distances are indirectly measured, they are measured by means of divisible magnitudes like stretches. Meinong's account allows us to reject important objections against measurement of similarity and to reconsider the logical form of the sentences involving comparative similarity."

78. Haller, Rudolf. 1966. "Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie Und Ontologie." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 4:313-324.

Reprinted in: Rudolf Haller (ed.) - *Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie* -Vol. I - Amsterdam, Rodopi 1979 pp. 49-65

79. ———, ed. 1972. *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein. Beiträge Zur Meinong-Forschung*. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th - October, 4th 1970.

80. ———. 1972. "Über Annahmen." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 223-228. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

81. ———. 1973. "Über Meinong." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:148-160.

82. ———. 1986. *Facta Und Ficta*. Stuttgart: Reclam.

83. ———. 1989. "Incompleteness and Fictionality in Meinong's Objects Theory." *Topoi* no. 8:63-70.

"In Meinong's object theory the object is by its nature indifferent to being. Incomplete objects are distinguished from complete = existing objects which are objects completely determined, That is, Objects to which one of all possible predicates is predicable. To grasp complete objects we are relying on incomplete ones, Which are objects not determined in every respect. Functional objects are a subclass of incomplete objects, In some cases related -- But never identical -- ith existing (complete) objects."

84. ———. 1995. "Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:491-505.

85. ———. 1995. "From Archives to Edition." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:207-220.

86. ———. 1996. "Psychologische Grundlagen Der Gegenstandstheorie Meinongs." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 6:31-41.

87. Heanue, James. 1972. "The Replacement of Dependent Clauses by Infinitive Expressions." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 179-186. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

88. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1972. "Knowledge by Acquaintance - Individuation by Acquaintance." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 205-222. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

89. ———. 1995. "Meinong in a Long Perspective." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:29-45.

"This essay is an attempt to place Meinong on the map of the history of the certain central philosophical assumptions and concepts. This task is different from placing a thinker like Meinong on the map of overt philosophical movements and schools. The reason is that the assumptions and concepts I am interested in have often remained tacit, and they have frequently been shared by members of entirely different-looking traditions.
In the case of Meinong, a vantage point is offered by the most distinctive part of his philosophy, which is his treatment of existence and of other varieties of being. I believe strongly that his views on existence and being cannot be fully appreciated and evaluated without knowing their historical background (and also their topical foreground). And, perhaps surprisingly, this background -- that is to say, the earlier history of the notions of existence and being -- is not at all well understood. I must therefore present here a brief history of the concept of being in order to put Meinong's ideas into perspective. An examination of

this history will eventually lead us to other notions crucial for the purpose of understanding Meinong." p. 29

90. Hochberg, Herbert. 1995. "Abstracts, Functions, Existence and Relations in the Russell-Meinong Dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism Controversy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:273-291.

    "The paper begins by considering Russell's criticism of Meinong's theory of objects and *Sosein* that center on the notions of negation and existence. The discussion raises issues about functions, properties, predication, the "concept" of existence and relations.
    These lead to a consideration of recent revivals of moderate nominalism in the form of trope theories. An argument against such theories suggests a fundamental principle of ontology and a reformulation of the nominalism-realism dispute."

91. ———. 2005. " *Being* and *Nothingness, Nichtsein* and *Aussersein, Facts* and *Negation*: Meinongian Reflections in Sartre and Russell." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:199-232.

    "The paper explores connections among and problems related to (1) Sartre's notions of *Being* and *Nothingness*, (2) Meinong's concerns with non-being, *Aussersein*, objectives and negation, (3) Russell's diverse views of negative facts, and (4) the respective rejections (and sometimes purported refutations) of idealism stemming from considerations of the act-object distinction and the focus on "intentionality" that characterized the Brentanist turn in philosophy. Alternative ontological analyses of negation and their connections to the "relations" of *diversity* and *identity* are also considered, along with Sartre's attempt to place consciousness outside of any causal framework and to found an "ethic of existentialism" on his accounts of *consciousness*, *being* and *negation*."

92. Hodges, Michael. 1971. "On "Being About"." *Mind* no. 80:1-16.

"Interest in the concept 'about' has often centered around Meinong's argument: I.) the golden mountain does not exist. II.) sentence (1) is about the golden mountain. III.) if sentence (1) is a sentence about a golden mountain, then there is golden mountain which it is about. IV.) there is a golden mountain. This argument, Which is formally valid, depends on two assumptions: 1) that it is generally correct to say, if a sentence has "x" as its grammatical subject then it is about 'x'; 2) that to say that a sentence is about something is to say the sentence stands in some relation to some object. Most attacks on Meinong's argument deal with the first of these assumptions while I argue that in the relevant sense the second assumption is false. Goodman has developed formal definitions of two senses of "about" which would forestall the argument a step IIIand I show that his definitions are inadequate. Having shown that (2) above is false I examine a number of attacks on Meinong's argument including those of Ryle, Linsky, Strawson and Cartwright. Each of these attacks in the transition from (i) to (ii) above and in so doing runs counter to our intuitions concerning the concept of 'being about'."

93. Höfer, Ulf. 2009. "Defekte Gegenstände Und Andere Aspekte Der Ontologie Meinongs." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 3:241-267.

94. Hunter, Daniel. 1981. "Reference and Meinongian Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 14:23-36.

"Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formalization of Meinong's theory of objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, The theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be established if Parsons' theory is correct.

This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities."

95. Ierna, Carlo. 2009. "Relations in the Early Works of Meinong and Husserl." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 3:7-36.

96. Jacques, Francis. 1973. "Référence Et Description Chez Meinong. De La Phénoménologie À L'analyse." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:266-287.

97. Jacquette, Dale. 1982. "Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 15:1-19.

    "In his difficult work On Emotional Presentation, Meinong introduces the concept of defective objects. These are meant to provide part of the solution to Mally's paradox about self-referential thought. But the discussion of defective objects is ambiguous in ways which give rise to a dilemma.
    It is not clear whether defective objects are supposed to be a special kind of intentional object on Meinong's theory, or whether they are not really supposed to be intentional objects at all. If defective objects are a special kind of intentional object, then it is possible to put forward a strengthened version of Mally's paradox which cannot be solved by the theory of defective objects. The strengthened paradox represents a counter-example to the intentionality thesis, according to which every psychological experience is directed toward an object of intention. But if defective 'objects' are not really intentional objects at all, then psychological experiences which have defective objects will themselves constitute counter-examples to the intentionality thesis. In either case, the thesis cannot be consistently maintained." p. 1

98. ———. 1986. "Meinong's Doctrine of the Modal Moment." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:423-438.

"Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment and the watering-down of extranuclear properties to surrogate nuclear counterparts was offered in response to Russell's problem of the existent round square. To avoid an infinite regress of successively watered-down factualities, Meinong stipulates that the modal moment itself cannot be watered-down. This limits free assumption, since it means that the idea of the existent-cum-modal-moment round square cannot be entertained in thought. It is possible to eliminate the modal moment and watering-down from Meinongian semantics in favor of a strict enforcement of the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. This provides a simpler, more economical Meinongian object theory, and regains unrestricted free assumption."

99. ———. 1989. "Mally's Heresy and the Logic of Meinong's Object Theory." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 10:1-14.

"The consistent formalization of Meinong's object theory in recent mathematical logic requires either plural modes of predication, Or distinct categories of nuclear or constitutive and extranuclear or nonconstitutive properties. The plural modes of predication approach is rejected because it is reducible to the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction, But not conversely, And because the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction offers a more satisfactory solution to object theory paradoxes."

100. ———. 1989. "Modal Meinongian Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 125-126:110-130.

"A formalization of four distinct quantificational modal Mcinongian logics is given, with nonstandard model set theoretical semantics. The derivation of Barcan and converse Barcan theorems prompts revision of two systems of modal Meinongian logic to restore congruence of semantic and inferential structures of Mcinongian systems with identical uniform domain distributions of existent and nonexistent objects. The problem of transworld identity of

incomplete and impossible objects is examined, and world-indexing of nuclear properties is recommended as a solution."

101. ———. 1990. "The Origins of *Gegenstandstheorie*. Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 3:177-202.

102. ———. 1992. "Meinongian Models of Scientific Law." In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 86-104. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.

103. ———. 1994. "A Meinongian Theory of Definite Description." *Axiomathes*:345-360.

104. ———. 1994. "Meinongian Logic and Anselm's Ontological Proof for the Existence of God." *Philosophical Forum* no. 25:231-240.

"The key assumption of Anselm-inspired ontological proofs for the existence of God, that existence is part of God's essence or greatness, is submitted to a Meinongian criticism. Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties disallows existence to be included as a constitutive property of any existent or nonexistent object. The unsolved problem of evil suggests instead that to be omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly benevolent, and the author of an actual world in which there is natural evil, is tantamount to being a round square, Meinongian logic implies that even if God exists, an existent God could not possibly be greater or more perfect than an impossible necessarily nonexistent Meinongian object God."

105. ———. 1994. "Tarski's Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* no. 75:88-107.

106. ———. 1995. "Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:233-271.

"Meinong introduces the concept of implexive being and nonbeing to explain the metaphysics of universals and as a contribution to the theory of reference and perception. Meinong accounts for Aristotle's doctrine of the inherence of secondary substances in primary substances in object theory terms as the implection of incomplete universals in complete existent or subsistent objects. The derivative notion of implexive so-being is developed by Meinong to advance an intuitive modal semantics that admits degrees of possibility. A set theoretical interpretation of Meinong's mereological concept of the implection of incomplete beingless objects in existent or subsistent complete objects is proposed. The implications of Meinong's concept of implection are exploited to answer extensionalist objections about "Meinong's jungle," defending the ontic economy of an extraontological neo-Meinongian semantic domain that supports individual reference and true predication of constitutive properties to beingless objects."

107. ———. 1995. "Object Theory Foundations for Intensional Logic." *Acta Analytica* no. 13:33-63.

"The logic of existent and nonexistent objects provides a formal theory of reference and true predication for ordinary discourse, the semantics of ontological commitment, and logic of fiction. The intensional logic proposed in what follows offers a rigorous object theory semantics with nonstandard propositional and predicate inference machinery. The system is distinguished from previous formalizations of object theory by formal criteria for nuclear (constitutive) and extranuclear (nonconstitutive) properties, three-valued propositional semantics for predications of nuclear properties to incomplete nonexistent objects for which the objects ostensibly are undetermined, nonstandard set theory semantics with unrestricted comprehension for object theory predicate semantics (licensed by existence restrictions on abstraction

equivalence), demonstrations of internal determinacy, consistency, and Henkin completeness, nonstandard deduction theorem, and consistency considerations in light of free assumption and unrestricted comprehension."

108. ———. 1996. *Meinongian Logic: The Semantic of Existence and Nonexistence*. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.

Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1;
Part One: Meinong's theory of Objects.
I. Elements of Object theory 7; II. Formal semantic paradox in Meinong's Object theory 12; III. Meinong's theory of Defective Objects 37; IV. The Object theory intentionality of ontological committment 56; V. Logic, mind and Meinong 70; VI. Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment 80;
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Part Three: Philosophical problems and applications.
I. Twardowski on Content and Object 193; II: Private language and private mental objects 200; III. God an impossible Meinongian Object 230; IV. Meinongian models of scientific law 238; V. Aesthetics and Meinongian Logic of Fiction 256; VI. The Paradox of Analysis 265;
Bibliography 269; Index 285.

109. ———. 1996. "On Defoliating Meinong's Jungle." *Axiomathes*:17-42.

110. ———. 1996. "Alexius Meinong (1853-1920)." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Masssimo and Poli, Roberto, 131-159. Dordrecht: Kuwer.

111. ———. 2000. "Confessions of a Meinongian Logician." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 58/59.

112. ———. 2001. " *Aussersein* of the Pure Object." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 373-396. Aldershot: Ashgate.

113. ———. 2001. "Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 397-426. Aldershot: Ashgate.

114. ———. 2003. "Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption." *Studia Phaenomenologica.Romanian Journal of Phenomenology* no. 3:155-177.

"This essay offers a detailed critical exposition of Alexius Meinong's theory of free assumption in its relation to inner perception in his book, *On Assumptions*. I argue that the concept of free assumption is key to understanding the basic principles of Meinong's bject theory, and his extra-ontology of nonexistent objects, including the golden mountain and round square. I situate Meinong's object theory in the context of Brentano's descriptive psychology, and consider the phenomenological foundations of the Meinongian domain.
Meinong's theory of assumption introduces a fourth category of assumptions to supplement Brentano's tripartite division between presentations, judgments, and emotions, on the grounds that assumptions are phenomenologically distinct from and in some sense stronger than presentations, and also distinct from and in some sense weaker than judgments."

115. ———. 2009. "Logic for Meinongian Object Theory Semantics." In *Logic from Russell to Church. Vol. 5 of Handbook of the History of Logic*, edited by Dov, Gabbay and Woods, John, 29-76. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

116. Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz. 1996. "Alexius Meinong and Polish Philosophy." *Axiomathes*:

241-266.

117. Jorgensen, Andrew Kenneth. 2002. "Meinong's Much Maligned Modal Moment." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 64:95-118.

"Russell's objections to object-theory have been refuted by the proofs of the consistency of Meinong's system given by various writers. These proofs exploit technical distinctions that Meinong apparently uses very little if at all. Instead, Meinong introduces a theoretical postulate called the modal moment. I describe this postulate and its place in Meinong's system, and I argue that it has been much under-rated by Meinong's logician expositors."

118. ———. 2004. "Types of Negation in Logical Reconstructions of Meinong." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 67:21-36.

"Russell's criticisms force Meinong to adopt a distinction between two types of negation. Logical expositions of Meinong's theory show the distinction is easily drawn in formal terms, but that alone does not justify the distinction intuitively. I criticise Routley's treatment of the distinction and argue that only Terence Parsons' theory retains and preserves the tight network of conceptual connections between the notions of negation, contradiction and impossibility. Hence, Parsons' approach best expresses the Meinongian perspective."

119. Kerner, George C. 1972. "Urteil Und Gefühl; Glaube Und Absicht." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 229-244. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

120. Koehn, Glen R. 1996. *Fictional Objects (Terence Parsons, Richard Routley, Edward Zalta, Alexius Meinong)*, University of Waterloo.

Available at UMI Dissertation Express: reference number NN09353.

121. Kroon, Frederick W. 1992. "Was Meinong Only Pretending?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 52:499-527.

"In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of Meinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an

interpretation according to which Meinong imported nonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account directly for the truth of statements like the golden mountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from Meinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really involves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense. This appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that he could do without nonexistent objects. The reason, I argue, why he nonetheless embraced an ontology of nonexistents has to do with the phenomenology of representation, and not with semantics."

122. ———. 2006. "Russell's Descriptions and Meinong's Assumptions." In *Modes of Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic*, edited by Bottani, Andrea and Davies, Richard, 81-104. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

"The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe a problem for Russell's account of the logical form of negative existentials involving descriptions, and suggest a Russellian solution. This solution is one that no one will care to adopt -- it seems to turn negative existentials into self-contradictions -- but I later argue that, properly interpreted, it constitutes a promising way of reconciling some of Meinong's views about negative existentials with the kind of "robust sense of reality" that informed Russell's own analysis. In section 3 I begin the task of articulating this reading of Meinong by describing Meinong's Assumption View as articulated in the second edition of his *On Assumptions* (Meinong 1910). Because this view presupposes Meinong's infamous commitment to non-existent objects, it would still offend Russell's "robust sense of reality", and so section 4 considers a weakened version of the view, one that retains the appeal to assumptions while giving up the appeal to non-existent objects. (Meinong defends a similar view in the 1902 edition of *On Assumptions,* which predates his discovery of non-existents.) Section 5 offers the finale: it shows how Meinong had himself tried to apply such a weakened Assumption

View to the case of negative existentials, that Russell had known about the attempt (this arguably solves the first, hermeneutic puzzle), and that, properly interpreted, this way of understanding negative existentials provides Russell with a solution to the problem facing his theory of negative existentials." (pp. 82-83)

123. Küng, Guido. 1972. "Noema Und Gegenständ." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 55-62. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

124. ———. 1984. "The Intentional and the Real Object." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy of Knowledge* no. 38:143-156.

"Starting from examples of genuine perception and naive hallucination, Different theories concerning the relation between the intentional and the real object are being discussed. It is shown that Meinong's theory is the most natural one, But it is argued against Meinong that the notion of "converse intentional property" should play a greater role."

125. Künne, Wolfgang. 1983. *Abstrakte Gegenstände. Semantik Und Ontologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

126. ———. 1995. "Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:365-395.

"The first half of the paper reflects on a couple of folk-psychological notions. "Belief" and "judgement" are selected for special attention.
They cover two varieties of thinking, a mental state and a mental act. Both lay claim to truth, and thereby stand in marked contrast to their nowadays sadly neglected non-committal counterparts. Meinong, of course, did not neglect them, and his notions of *"Annehmen* (merely entertaining a thought)" and *"Denken* (entertaining a thought)" play a decisive role in the paper. The Lingua Mentis Hypothesis is

a bold contribution to cognitive subpersonal psychology. The second half of the paper tries to show that careful reflection on the conceptual resources of folk psychology makes certain arguments for this Hypothesis as well as certain philosophical arguments against it look rather feeble. The paper culminates in a discussion of Jerry Fodor's Systematicity Argument for the Language of Thought Hypothesis. In this discussion critical use is made of certain Meinongian insights."

127. Lambert, Karel. 1972. "Being and Being So." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, 37-46. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

128. ———. 1973. "The Theory of Objects. A Review Discussion of J. N. Findaly's *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Value*." *Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* no. 16:221-244.

129. ———. 1974. "Impossible Objects." *Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* no. 17:303-314.

"This paper deals with the Meinong-Russell controversy on non-subsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinong's theory of non-subsistent objects.
Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter-objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well-known argument fails. However, It is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects."

130. ———. 1976. "On "the Durability of Impossible Objects"." *Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* no. 19:251-254.

This is a reply to Richard Routley's critique of my original essay, "Impossible objects."

131. ———. 1982. "A Logical Interpretation of Meinong's Principle of Independence." *Topoi* no. 1:87-96.

"Meinong's principle that being is independent from being so, Borrowed from his disciple Mally, is reconstructed as a claim that a certain traditional informal pattern is invalid. The place of the principle thus reconstructed in Meinong's world picture is outlined."

132. ———. 1983. *Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

133. Landini, Gregory. 1986. *Meinong Reconstructed Versus Early Russell Reconstructed: A Study in the Formal Ontology of Fiction*, Indiana University.

Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 8617784.

134. Lejewski, Ceslaw. 1985. "Logic and Non-Existence." *Grazer Philosophische Studien*:209-234.

135. Lenoci, Michele. 1970. "Bibliografia Degli Studi Su Alexius Meinong." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 62:437-473.

136. ———. 1972. *La Teoria Della Conoscenza in Alexius Meinong. Oggetto, Giudizio, Assunzioni*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

137. ———. 1995. "Meinongs Unvollständige Gegenstände Und Der Universalienproblem." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:203-215.

138. Libera, Alain de. 1997. "Subsistance Et Existence: Porphyre Et Meinong." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 100:167-192.

"According to K. Perszyk, (*) Meinong's description of homeless objects is a novelty: it does not trace back to any traditional ontological assumption, neither avicennian nor scolastic. While discussing this claim, one focuses on two key-notions in ancient and medieval ontology: subsistence and existence, which seem to be akin to the meinongian *bestehen*, *Sosein* vs. *Sein* and *existieren*. In this respect, one comments on Porphyry's, Proclus', Abaelard's, Aquinas' and Bacon's theory of general objects, fictitious entities and non-existing particulars."
(*) K. Perszyk, *Nonexistent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy* (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 49), Dordrecht-Boston-Londres, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.

139. Lindenfeld, David. 1972. "Meinong, the Würzburg School, and the Role of Experience in Thinking." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 117-126. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

140. ———. 1980. *The Transformation of Positivism. Alexius Meinong and European Thought 1880-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

141. Linsky, Leonard. 1967. *Referring*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

142. Mally, Ernst. 1912. *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen Der Logik Und Logistik*. Leipzig: Barth.

143. ———. 1913. "Über Den Begriff Des Gegenständes in Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie." *Jahrbuch der Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien*.

144. ———. 1926. *Grundgesetze Des Sollens: Elemente Der Logik Des Willens*. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky.

Reprinted in: Logische Schriften. Grosses Logikfragment - Grundgesetze des Sollen - Dordrecht, Reidel 1971

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2. Marek, Johann Christian. 1995. "Zwei Gegenstände Und Ein Inhalt: Zur Intentionalität Bei Meinong." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:341-364.

3. Mari, Laura. 2009. "Frege *Contra* Meinong: A New Possible Outlook." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 3:37-72.

4. Marotta, Marina. 1997. "L'obiettivo Di Meinong Fra Proposizione E Stati Di Cose." *Discipline Filosofiche* no. 7:211-237.

5. ———. 2002. "Universali E Particolari, Concetti E Intuizioni. Un Capitolo Della Riflessione Di Alexius Meinong." In *Studi Di Storia Del Pensiero Moderno (Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Meinong9*, edited by Cubeddu, Italo and Raspa, Venanzio, 171-196. Urbino: Montefeltro.

6. ———. 2005. "Sprache, Wahrheit Und Rechtfertigung. Alexius Meinong Frühe Schaffensperioden Zur

Erkenntnislehere." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:63-94.

7. ———. 2007. *La Fondazione Dell'oggettività. Studio Su Alexius Meinong*. Macerata: Quodlibet.

8. Martinelli, Riccardo. 2006. "Meinong and Music. On Musical Objects of Higher Order." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:39-71.

   "Music represents a crucial issue in nineteenth-century philosophy and science. Scholars generally possessed a good musical competence and contributed to the explanation of sound perception and aesthetic enjoyment in music. Reflexions on musical psychology, in turn, influenced general theories of mind, sometimes in an impressive way. Meinong plays a remarkable role within this context. Together with Mach, Ehrenfels and Stumpf, Meinong contributed to overtake Helmholtz' physical-physiological theory, supporting a more comprehensive approach. He was repeatedly concerned with problems such as tonal fusion, tone quality *(Klangfarbe)* and melodic perception. Although Meinong did not develop musical problems systematically, he assumed a quite original and interesting position. His ideas have been developed by some of his followers in the School of Graz."

9. Marty, Anton. 1906. "Über Annahmen." *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* no. 40:1-54.

10. Michaelis, Anne. 1942. "The Conception of Possibility in Meinong's " *Gegenstandstheorie*"." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 2:394-403.

11. Miscevic, Nenad. 2001. "L'à Priori Intuitionnel: Meinong Contre Kant." In *La Philosophie Autrichienne De Bolzano À Musil*, edited by Cometti, Jean-Pierre and Mulligan, Kevin, 171-188. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.

12. Modenato, Francesca. 1992. "Alexius Meinong: The Theory of Relation as a Theory of Knowledge." In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 9-25. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.

13. ———. 1994. "A. Meinong: Fenomeno, Noumeno E Percezione Esteriore." *Axiomathes*:361.

14. ———. 1995. "Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:87-112.

    "I intend to take into account Meinong's theory of objects from a point of view allowed by the author himself, when he agrees that the proper "place" for such a doctrine is the theory of knowledge. According to this suggestion, I think it convenient to explain the doctrine at issue in the light of the definition of knowing as a "double" act, in which the object known is "in front of" the knowing act itself as something comparatively autonomous. From this point of view a comparison with Husserl's "pure logic" - as Meinong again suggests - as well as a valuation of the part played by our philosopher in their common opposition to psychologism seem to be of interest.
    Pure logic seems to answer in the most adequate way the demands that induce Meinong to elaborate a theory of pure objects: such objects are taken into consideration as to their positivity and possibility founded on equally pure operations of a subject. At the same time pure logic provides us with a clue to the ambiguity of *Aussersein:* as a matter of fact, Meinong, freeing himself from the prejudice in favor of what is actual, remains involved in what I would call a prejudice "in favor of what has being"; he thinks it necessary to resort to an assumption, that is to a simulation of being in order to explain our thinking of a non-being object. Furthermore according to him an assumpion is in general demanded in order to think of an object as to his so-being, that is of the outside-being object.

There are two orders of questions: the first one regards the "formal" generality of the fundamental gnosiological problems, leaving out of consideration every "matter" of knowledge, the second refers to the gnosiological-phenomenological foundation of the concepts and of the laws of pure logic. They are absolutely inseparable, and yet strictly distinct. The first order should be the right place for the *Aussersein* of pure objects."

15. ———. 1996. "A. Meinong: How to Get into Touch with Things." *Axiomathes*:61-74.

16. ———. 1997. "Meinong and Husserl on Objects and Meaning of Expressions." *Axiomathes*:143.

17. ———. 1999. "L'obiettivo E La Fattualità Secondo Meinong." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* no. 56:437-464.

18. ———. 2001. "Gli Oggetti Incompleti E Il Principio Del Terzo Escluso Secondo Meinong." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* no. 56:63-90.

19. ———. 2006. *La Conoscenza E L'oggetto in Alexius Meinong*. Padova: Il Poligrafo.

20. ———. 2006. "Alexius Meinong on Ontology and Object Theory." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:73-98.

21. Morscher, Edgar. 1972. "Von Bolzano Zu Meinong: Zur Geschichte Des Logischen Realismus." In, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 69-102. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

22. ———. 1973. "Meinongs Bedeutungslehre." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:178-206.

23. ———. 2004. "Die Geburt Der Gegenstandstheorie Aus Einem Missverständnis?" In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by

Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 89-104. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

24. Mulligan, Kevin. 2003. "Dispositions, Their Bases and Correlates. Meinong Analysis." In *Philosophy and Logic. In Search of the Polish Tradition*.

    Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, 193-212. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

25. ———. 2006. "Facts, Formal Objects and Ontology." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:31-46.

26. Nef, Frédéric. 1998. *L'objet Quelconque. Recherches Sur L'ontologie De L'objet*. Paris: Vrin.

27. ———. 2001. "La Théorie Modale De Meinong." In *La Philosophie Autrichienne De Bolzano À Musil*, edited by Cometti, Jean-Pierre and Mulligan, Kevin, 81-100. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.

28. Oliver, Alex. 1999. "A Few Remarks on Logical Form." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 99:247-272.

    "Grammar (and the bad old traditional logic) says that quantifier phrases such as 'nobody', 'everyone', 'all women', 'some men' and 'a man' are in the same category as names such as 'Milly', 'Molly' and 'Mandy'. So, prior to their first corrective lessons, students are awfully muddled, the first and fundamental problem being the Woozle hunt for somebody called 'nobody'. Hoorah for modern logic and logic teachers!
    The story used to justify our current logics is entirely fictional. The claims about names and quantifier phrases in English are wildly false. Two of the heroes of modern logic, Russell and Hilbert, make the very mistakes which are falsely blamed on traditional logic. The villain, Meinong, turns out to have been working a different patch. Ideas ascribed to traditional grammar are modern inventions.

Neither logicians nor grammarians can be trusted to tell the history of either grammar or logic."

29. Orilia, Francesco. 1984. *Il Dibattito Meinong-Russell E L'influenza Di Meinong Sulla Filosofia Analititca Contemporanea*. Palermo: Mazzone.

30. ———. 1991. "Type-Free Property Theory, Bradley's Regress and Meinong and Russell Reconceiled." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 39:103-125.

31. ———. 2006. "States of Affairs: Brdley Vs. Meinong." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:213-238.

32. Parsons, Terence. 1974. "A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 71:561-580.

    "Meinong's philosophy is at present mostly unknown; where it is known it is mostly regarded as unacceptable. This is partly due to its obscurity, and partly to the apparently devastating criticisms directed at it by Bertrand Russell in 1905. In the present paper I attempt to provide a reconstruction of some of Meinong's philosophy which is simultaneously clear, faithful to the original, and immune from Russell's criticisms. Sections 1, 2 and 4 concentrate on his theory of objects; section 3 sketches how to relate such objects to a canonical symbolism."

33. ———. 1975. "A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 1:73-76.

    "Meinong is best known as the loser of the Russell-Meinong debate of 1905. Russell had the last word then, and (unfortunately) most of us know only his version of Meinong's views.' But there is more to be said on Meinong's side. In an earlier paper I tried to develop a version of Meinong's ontology which is clear, consistent, and immune to Russell's attacks. Most importantly, that theory preserves - rather than analyses away - Meinong's radical and exciting

ontological views: that there are non-existent objects; that there are impossible objects; etc.
So what? We want more of a theory than clarity and consistency; we also want reason to believe that it's true. How might we offer evidence in favor of such a theory? I think that the only evidence that we ever have in favor of a general metaphysical theory is that it has many interesting applications. The Meinongian theory agrees with more orthodox theories in its treatment of existing objects, so any evidence in its favor will consist of applications to issues concerning non-existent objects. The present paper contains one of these; it's an application of the Meinongian theory to an analysis of fictional objects.
By "fictional" I do not mean "non-existent", but rather "occurring in fiction". Many fictional objects are indeed non-existent, and it is their non-existence that in some sense causes all the problems, but fictional works also abound in reference to real objects, and this fact must be taken into account.
I will begin by giving an exposition of the Meinongian ontology." p. 73

34. ———. 1978. "Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties, Meinong and Leibniz." *Noûs* no. 12:137-151.

"In A *Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics* (1974) and in *A Meinongian analysis of fictional objects* (1975) I attempted to develop a theory of objects for a Meinongian ontology. That theory presupposed an account of two sorts of properties, called "nuclear" and "extranuclear" properties. This paper is an attempt to provide such an account. The theory developed here is a rich and parochial one, based on the notion of "possible world." In the last section I will show how, relative to this account of properties, Leibniz's ontology of monads (on one construal, anyway) corresponds to a fragment of Meinong's ontology of objects.
Since most of this paper utilizes the controversial notion of a "possible world," the Editor has requested that I include a

defense of this line of approach. Is it really useful to base a theory of properties on such a notion?
I don't believe that this question can be answered with any degree of certainty by anyone right now. In my view, "possible worlds" are theoretical entities, and as such they are as useful or useless as the theories within which they appear. At present, theories using possible worlds are both varied and controversial. Some have a long tradition; for example, probability theory, where possible worlds typically appear under the title "possible cases". More recently they have been used in theories dealing with necessity, possibility, essence, belief, knowledge, proposition, intension, freedom, etc. This is a fruitful tradition, and I don't believe that we know at present whether it will last, or whether it is a blind alley which will eventually be seen as an historical aberation. But even in the latter case there is hope for theories based on possible worlds. For even when scientific or philosophical progress leads to the abandonment of an earlier tradition, many of the "results" of that earlier tradition tend to be preserved in some new guise. So in spite of the controversial nature of possible worlds, I think we have learned enough of lasting value from their employment to justify not terminating their tradition yet."

35. ———. 1979. "The Methodology of Nonexistence." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 76:649-662.

"There is apparent evidence that some objects do not exist; i. e., that there are objects that do not exist. "Naive object theory" (sometimes attributed to Meinong) takes this evidence at face value, but leads to contradiction. Several ideas about how to develop a more sophisticated account have been proposed, but not worked out in detail. The paper discusses some issues that will be encountered by any theory of nonexistent objects, using the theory of my forthcoming book, *Nonexistent objects*, as an example."

36. ———. 1980. *Nonexistent Objects*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

37. ———. 1982. "Are There Nonexistent Objects?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 19:365-371.

38. ———. 1995. "Meinongian Semantics Generalized." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:145-161.

    "It is tempting to think that Meinong overlooked the "specific/nonspecific" distinction. For example, "I am looking for a grey horse" may either mean that there is a specific horse I am looking for (e.g., one I lost), or just that I am grey-horse-seeking.
    The former reading, and not the latter, requires for its truth that there be a grey horse. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether it is defensible to maintain Meinong's theory here: to take nonspecific reading of *any* verb concerning a possibly nonexistent but incomplete object. This requires essential appeal to the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. Included is a discussion of criticisms of Meinong's own theory and of the Medieval theory of ampliation, according to which psychological discourse can "ampliate" a term such as 'chimera' so as to stand for one or more things that cannot exist, yet are chimeras. The paper concludes inconclusively."

39. Pasniczek, Jacek. 1992. "The Meinongian Logic Vs. The Classical Logic." In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 105-112. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.

40. ———, ed. 1992. *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.

    Contents: Jacek Pasniczek: Preface 7; Francesca Modenato: Alexius Meinong: the theory of relation as a theory of knowledge 9; Liliana Albertazzi: Is there a transcendental object? 26; Roberto Poli: Twardowski and Wolff 45; Jacek

Juliusz Jadacki: The metaphysical basis of Kazimierz Twardowski's descriptive semiotics 57; Jan Wolenski: 'Being' as a syncategorematic word: a completion (?) of Twardowski's analysis of 'nothing' 75; Dale Jacquette: Meinongian models of scientific law 86; Jacek Pasniczek: The Meinongian logic vs. the Classical logic 105-112.
This volume contains a selection of papers from the conference "The Theory of Objects in Central Europe. The Austrian-Polish Connection: Meinong and Twardowski" held in December 1989 in Kraków. It was supported and sponsored by the Jagiellonian University, Centro Studi per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea, The National Research Project "Sign-Language-Reality", and The Institute of Austrian Culture in Warsaw. The conference was organized by Prof. Jan Wolenski with dr. Georg Jankovic's generous assistance.
Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski studied philosophy at the University of Vienna at the end of XIX century. Both were under a great influence of Franz Brentano, who is considered the father of contemporary theory of intentionality. He viewed intentionality as the crucial feature of consciousness consisting in „directness to an object". Such conception should presuppose some general theory of objects of consciousness. Meinong and Twardowski adopted Brentano's idea of intentionality subsequently elaborating their own ontologies of objects. What is common in the views of the two philosophers, barring many differences, is that they assume an extensive sphere of non-existent objects that can be possibly objects of intentional acts.
Nowadays there is a growing interest in theories of intentionality and intentional objects on the part of analytic philosophy as well as phenomenology. That is why there is also a renaissance of Meinong's and Twardowski's philosophical thought, although the former philosopher is much better known, more popular, and, what follows, more inspiring. The main purpose of the conference that took place in Kraków was to investigate, from various historical and theoretical perspectives, theories of objects created by the two of Brentano's followers. It is to be regretted that the

present volume does not fill a serious gap in philosophical literature: no paper is devoted to direct comparison of Meinong and Twardowski. Nevertheless we hope that the papers collected in the volume may contribute to better understanding of the two philosophers and prepare the ground for such a comparative study.

F. Modenato, in her essay, traces the development of Meinong's idea of relations while linking his views with the views of Hume and Locke. She is concentrating on epistemological relevance of the idea. Relations are treated by Meinong as some complexities and both relations and complexities are higher-order objects. Higher-order objects play the central role in Meinong's theory of knowledge and are of great importance to his ontology.

L. Albertazzi points to some Kantian motives in Twardowski's ontology. The Polish philosopher distinguishes several categories of objects which, according to Albertazzi's interpretation, correspond closely to that distinguished by Kant. In particular, 'the object in general' may be taken as Kant's transcendental object, and 'the general object' as a universal presented individually in the subject of proposition.

R. Poli argues in his paper that many elements of Wolff's ontology can be found in Twardowski's theory of objects. Both philosophers conceive objects as possible wholes. For Twardowski, being an object is ontologically prior to having existence and it is enough for being an object to be representable in an act of presentation.

J.J. Jadacki presents a comprehensive survey of Twardowski's ontological (metaphysical) and epistemological views. On this basis he reconstructs the philosopher's descriptive semiotics focusing his attention on the theory of judgment.

Additionally, Jadacki carries out a formal semantic analysis of Twardowski's semiotics.

J. Wolenski considers the main traditional views of 'being' and wonders if 'being' could be situated somewhere in the formal hierarchy of concepts. He comes to the conclusion that "being" expresses no concept at all and, what follows, it

has the syncategorematic character as Twardowski claimed. Wolenski proposes a completion of Twardowski's claim by appealing to modern logic and Lesniewski's ontology.
D. Jacquette sketches informally the principles of Meinongian semantics and shows how the semantics can be applied in formalisation of scientific laws. By contrast to extensionalist models of scientific discourse which admit only existent objects, in Meinongian semantics the reference to ideal and non-existent objects is possible. Many problems of contemporary philosophy of science such as, for example, the justification of induction and confirmation can be uniformely treated and solved on the ground of Meinong's theory.
J. Pasniczek proposes quite a simple logic which obeys the main theses of Meinong's theory of objects. This logic resembles closely the classical predicate logic with respect to syntax and semantics (it is basically extensional). Despite that resemblance, the proposed logic is associated with very rich ontology of objects including various kinds of non-existent objects.
I am deeply indebted to Prof. Jan Wolenski for encouragement and assistance in editing this book."
(Preface, pp-7-8)

41. ———. 1993. "The Simplest Meinongian Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 143-144:329-342.

"The Meinongian logic is a logic which accommodates main principles of Meinong's theory of objects. This principles give rise to a very extensive ontology which contains various kind of nonexistent entities (e.g., incomplete and impossible ones). In the paper quite a simple Meinongian logic is developed. This logic has the following features: 1) it is extensional, 2) it differs slightly from the classical first-order logic, 3) it is a first-order system, 4) it is closer to the natural language than classical logic, 5) it is much more simple than Meinongian systems created by T. Parsons and E. Zalta."

42. ———. 1994. "Ways of Reference to Meinongian Objects: Ontological Commitments of Meinongian Theories." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 2:69-86.

"Meinong's views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong's views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong's ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology. However there still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories.
Meinong's ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of *possible intentional objects*, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality."

43. ———. 1995. "Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:293-303.

"Contemporary formalizations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid.
However, in the same formalizations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these

axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properties are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuitive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratification of formulas). We need, however, to look for phenomenologically well-grounded protections against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects."

44. ———. 1996. "Meinong's Ontology Vs. Lesniewski's Ontology (toward a Meinongian Calculus of Names)." *Axiomathes*:279.

45. ———. 1997. *The Logic of Intentional Objects: A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

46. ———. 2001. "The Meinongian Logic of Fiction." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 457-476. Aldershot: Ashgate.

47. Pelletier, Francis Jeffry, and Zalta, Edward. 2000. "How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man." *Noûs* no. 34:165-202.

48. Perszyk, Kenneth J. 1989. "What's Wrong with Impossible Objects?" *Philosophical Papers* no. 18:241-251.

    "Meinongians claim that in addition to objects which exist (at some time), there are possible and impossible objects. With the developments of various versions of possible-worlds semantics and modal logics, one might say that hostility to possible objects has abated somewhat, though Meinongian claims that they do not exist or have being in any sense and that some of them are concrete individuals or particulars are highly contentious. Hostility to impossible

objects, on the other hand, remains undiminished, if it has not intensified."

49. ———. 1993. *Nonexistent Objects. Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Contents: Preface XI-XIX; 1. Introductory Considerations 1; 2. Meinong's Theoy of Objects 39; 3. The Nature of Meinong's Objects: Existent and Nonexistent 92; 4. Two Main Arguments for Nonexistents 151; 5. Main Arguments Against Nonexistents 224; Bibliography 286-303.

50. Pichler, Hans. 1910. *Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie*. Leipzig: Dürr.

    The first contribution to the history of the theory of objects.

51. Poli, Roberto. 1996. "Object and Measurement in Mally's Untersuchungen." *Axiomathes*:173-186.

52. ———. 2005. "General Theses of the Theory of Objects." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 347-372. Aldershot: Ashgate.

53. Poser, Hans. 1972. "Der Möglichkeitsbegriff Meinongs." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 187-204. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

54. Potrc, Matjaz, and Strahovnik, Vojko. 2005. "Meinongian Scorekeeping." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:309-330.

    "Some commitments at the interface of semantics and ontology, such as numbers, symphonies, incomplete objects, values, oughts or possibilities tend to appear problematic. The scorekeeping approach to semantics introduces contextually shifting parameters that allow for construal of truth as indirect correspondence.
    Meinong did recognize diversity and richness that is made possible by the non-reductionist engagement of the

scorekeeping approach. Because of his commitment to the deep presupposition of direct correspondence construal of truth though, Meinong had to interpret richness of normative discursive scorekeeping commitments as richness of ontological strata, features and engagements. Once as Meinong's theory is adapted to the construal of truth as indirect correspondence, many problems related to his objects dissolve, naturally placing his scorekeeping discovery into discursive normative setting. A translation of Meinongian objects into discursive scores confirms that his discovery aims at these indeed, which is obscured by his sticking to the construal
of truth as direct correspondence."

55. Potrc, Matjaz, and Vospernik, Miklavz. 1996. "Meinong on Psychophysical Measurement." *Axiomathes*:187-202.

56. Pouivet, Roger. 1999. "Łukasiewicz: De L'aristotélisme Autrichien À L'aristotélisme Polonais." *Philosophiques* no. 26:263-277.

    "En 1910, Jan Łukasiewicz publiait *Du principe de contradiction chez Aristote* (1). Dans cet article, on explique les points principaux du livre de Łukasiewicz. Ce dernier affirme qu'Aristote n'a pas réussi dans sa tentative pour justifier le principe de contradiction. En fait, ce principe est moins logique qu'éthique, selon Łukasiewicz, et cela explique bien des difficultés posées par la théorie d'Aristote. On discute également de la faon dont Łukasiewicz utilise la notion d'« objets contradictoires », empruntée à la Théorie des Objets de Meinong; on montre que Łukasiewicz se situe dans le cadre d'une version brentanienne de l'aristotélisme. Certaines connexions entre Łukasiewicz et la conception wittgensteinienne de la nécessité ou le conservatisme logique de Quine sont indiquées. Le but de mon article est essentiellement d'encourager une lecture attentive du livre qui n'a pas reu l'attention qu'il mérite parce qu'il a été écrit à l'origine en polonais. Souvent, les philosophes croient connaître son contenu à travers le résumé que Łukasiewicz

écrivit en allemand en 1910, et qui a été traduit en anglais. Mais, en fait, il y a bien des choses importantes dans le livre qui n'apparaissent nullement dans le résumé."
(1) Traduction Français e par Dorota Sikora: Paris, Editions de l'éclat, 2000, avec une préface de R. Pouivet.

57. Priest, Graham. 2003. "Meinongianism and the Philosophy of Mathematics." *Philosophia Mathematica* no. 11:3-15.

"If meinongianism isn't dead, nothing is', Gilbert Ryle is reputed to have said, in the heyday of Oxford Philosophy. (1) I think that Ryle was exactly right. No idea in philosophy is ever past its use-by date, at least, no idea of any substance. We may always come back and find new depths in it, new applications for it, new answers to objections that were taken to be decisive. Thus, for example, platonism has re-emerged many times in the history of Western philosophy, most recently in a perhaps unexpected place: in connection with technical results in the foundations of mathematics. Aristotelian virtue ethics has reappeared recently after a long period in which ethics has been dominated by kantianism and utilitarianism. And so the list goes on.
Of course, this is not how Ryle intended his words to be understood. What he meant was that meinongianism was dead for all time. It would perform no Lazarus-like return. For many years I shared Ryle's view. Educated about thirty years ago in Britain, I took it for granted that Russell had shown that meinongianism was little more than superstition (though one that he himself had subscribed to for quite a long time), and that Quine had shown that it was all just simple obfuscation. That which exists is that over which one can quantify; and that's that.
Thus it was that I was outraged when I met Richard Routley (Sylvan as he later became) in the mid-1970s, and found him stoutly defending a version of meinongianism. (Richard never defended a view in any other way!) I could not understand how the view could possibly be taken seriously. It was my good fortune not just to have met Richard, but to have been able to 4

talk with him about the matter over many years. He persuaded me that all the knock-down arguments that I thought I had were lame or just begged the question. He persuaded me that meinongianism is a very simple, natural, and common-sense view. He persuaded me that the theory has many applications to areas of philosophy where more orthodox views creak at the seams. I am still not sure whether or not I believe it.; but I certainly lean towards it in certain areas."
(1) I have not been able to track down the source of this quote; so it may just be hearsay. [Note added by Raul Corazzon: "Let us frankly concede from the start that *Gegenstandstheorie* itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected." Gilbert Ryle - *Intentionality-theory and the nature of thinking* (1972) - p. 7]

58. Priest, Graham, and Read, Stephen. 2004. "Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 82:421-442.

"Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of nonexistence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity.
Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing nonexistent objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements.
The evidence seems to favor the Meinongian approach. Faced with the third problem, Ockham argued bluntly for substitutivity when the intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham's approach is closer to the Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan's seems to raise difficulties for a referential semantics. The comparison between the Meinongian and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls of each."

59. Purtill, Richard. 1973. "Meinongian Deontic Logic." *Philosophical Forum* no. 4:585-592.

"In modal logic we can think of ourselves as dealing with four "truth values": 1) necessarily true, 2) factually true, 3) factually false, and 4) necessarily false. It turns out that it is not possible to regard modal logic merely as a four-valued logic; what we need in fact is an infinite number of values. But to a limited extend, a four-valued interpretation of modal logic is useful and suggestive. (1) This being so, it is tempting to look for a four-valued interpretation of deontic logic, which has so many parallels with modal logic. But what four values are we to take, and how are they to be related? In this paper I would like to develop a suggestion made by Meinong, and relate it to some modern problems, giving at least the beginnings of a "Meinongian" deontic logic."
(1) For a fuller discussion of these points, se my *Four valued tables and modal logic*, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic [11, 1970 pp. 505-511].

60. Rapaport, William J. 1976. *Intentionality and the Structure of Existence*, Indiana University, Bloomington.

61. ———. 1978. "Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox." *Noûs* no. 12:153-180.

"This essay presents a re-examination of Alexius Meinong's article *Über Gegenstandstheorie* (*On the Theory of Objects*) and undertakes a clarification and revision of it which, I hope, is both faithful to Meinong and capable of overcoming the various objections to his theory that have appeared in the literature. (1) I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons, using the modified theory as a sharper tool for investigating their worth than that provided by unaided intuitions or less comprehensive, ad-hoc theory fragments.

As with all theories, many of my claims are not susceptible of proof but, rather, gain their plausibility and value from their ability to deal with data and to provide solutions to various problems. The two main problems which, I believe, a properly constructed Meinongian theory ought to be capable of handling are, first, a linguistic problem of long-standing philosophical concern: that of providing a foundation for a semantics of natural languages, and, second, the problem of intentionality and the analysis of the structure of psychological discourse. Even Quine, ordinarily no friend of intentional language, attests to the importance of the latter problem, considering such discourse to be "less clearly dispensable" than other modalities (*Replies* [to Follesdal] in: D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.) - *Words and objections* - Dordrech, Reidel, 1969, p. 336).
For this problem, the theory must embody a characterization of the objects of thought (in the sense of that which is thought about). In order to account for the psychological phenomenon illustrated by puzzles concerning objects
considered under different descriptions (e.g., the morning star and the evening star), the objects of thought must be "non-substitutable"; i.e., it must be possible for a person to believe that an entity, a, has a property, F, without believing (or being committed to the belief) that an entity, b, has F, even when a and b are said to be the same entity.
To serve as a foundation for a natural-language semantics, the theory must account for the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction, i.e., our ability to think and talk about anything. This observation, incidentally, is common to all philosophers who countenance non-existing objects. The theory ought also to provide for a total semantic interpretation function by supplying "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions. By means of such a function, the theory can account for the truth values, taken as part of the initial data, of sentences containing "non-referring" expressions (e.g., 'The golden mountain is golden'). To do this, properties must be meaningfully (i.e., truly and falsely) predicable, in some

sense, of non-existents. Finally, a means of quantifying over the "referents" of "non-referring" terms will require an underlying "free" logic in which 'exists' will be an informative predicate not embodied in the quantificational machinery of the theory."
(1) Gustav Bergmann - *Meaning and existence* - Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1959.

62. ———. 1979. "An Adverbial Meinongian Theory." *Analysis* no. 39:75-81.

    "A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects (1904) is the act-content-object (ACO) analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory *need not* be based on this analysis, but that an *adverbial* theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against a recent objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark."

63. ———. 1981. "How to Make the World Fit Our Language: An Essay in Meinongian Semantics." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 14:1-21.

    "Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. the usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform.
    The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretation function to make it total. a specific ontology based on Meinong's theory of objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castañeda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott."

64. ———. 1982. "Meinong, Defective Objects and (Psycho)-Logical Paradox." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 18:17-40.

"Alexius Meinong developed a notion of "defective objects" in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for.
However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects (W. J. Rapaport *Meinongian theories and a Russellian Paradox* - Noûs, 12, 1978 pp. 153-180; Errata Noûs, 13, 1979 p. 125). One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless."

65. ———. 1985. "To Be and Not to Be." *Noûs* no. 19:255-271.

66. ———. 1986. "Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:61-95.

"This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" - the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of *Quasisein* and *Aufiersein* are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented."

67. Raspa, Venanzio. 1996. "Su Ciò Che Non Esiste. Da Bolzano a Meinong: Un *Excursus* Nella Filosofia Austriaca." *Studi Urbinati.B: Scienze Umane e Sociali* no. 67:115-201.

68. ———. 2001. "Signs, Shadow-Like Expression and Fictional Objects: Meinong's Observations of a Semiotics of Fiction." *Zeitschrift für Semiotik* no. 23.

69. ———. 2005. "Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse Und Vorstellungsproduktion Bei Meinong." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:95-128.

70. ———. 2006. "Fictional and Aesthetic Objects. Meinong's Point of View." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:47-80.

71. ———. 2006. "Thinking with and on Meinong in Italy." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:7-38.

    Introduction to Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien vol. 2: *Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy*.

72. Reibenschuch, Gernot. 1972. "Über Den Begriff Des Wertes Bei Meinong." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 245-260. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

73. Reicher, Maria Elisabeth. 1996. "Gibt Es Unvollständige Gegenstände? Unvollständigkeit, Möglichkeit Und Der Satz Vom Ausgeschlossenen Dritten Bei Meinong." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:217-232.

74. ———. 2000. "Gibt Es Gegenstände, Die Nicht Existieren?" *Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics* no. 1:135-162.

    "Those who are -- in the tradition of Meinong -- willing to accept the claim that there are objects that do not exist usually argue that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects allows to resolve a variety of problems of reference and intentionality. The aim of this paper is to show that the commitment to nonexistents does not resolve any of these problems and that, consequently, problems of reference and intentionality do not provide a reason for the assumption that there are objects that do not exist."

75. ———. 2001. "Die Logik Der Intentionalität: Meinongs Eigenschaftsarten Und Mallys Duale Kopula." In *Bausteine Zu Einer Geschichte Der Philosophie an Der Universität Graz*, edited by Binder, Thomas, 219-234. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The paper deals with Alexius Meinong's theory of "auxiliary objects", which, according to Meinong, provide us with a link between our thoughts and the (extramental) reality our thoughts are directed upon.
In its original form, this theory is contradictory. There are two strategies to free the theory from contradictions: (1) a distinction between "nuclear" and "extranuclear" properties (adopted by Meinong); (2) a distinction between "satisfying" a property and "being determined by" a property (adopted by Mally). It is argued that Meinong's strategy works only if it is interpreted in such a way that it can be reduced to Mally's strategy."

76. ———. 2005. "Russell, Meinong, and the Problem of Existent Nonexistents." In *On Denoting 1905-2005*, edited by Imaguire, Guido and Linsky, Bernard, 167-193. München: Philosophia Verlag.

    "In "On Denoting" Russell attacked Alexius Meinong's so-called "theory of objects" (*Gegenstandstheorie*), arguing, among other things, that according to Meinong's theory both the sentence "The existent present King of France exists" and "The existent present King of France does not exist" is true, which would render Meinong's theory inconsistent. Some Neo-Meinongians have claimed that one could avoid this consequence by making use of a distinction between two kinds of properties ("nuclear" and "extranuclear" ones), which Meinong worked into his theory several years after "On Denoting". My aim in this paper is to re-evaluate this contemporary attempt to defend Meinong's theory against Russell's attack and to offer an alternative solution."

77. ———. 2006. "Alexius Von Meinong: Über Gegenstände, Annahmen Und Werte." In *Geschichte Der Österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol 6.2: Philosophie Und Religion: Gott, Sein Und Solle*, edited by Acham, Karl von, 187-205. Wien: Passagen.

    Vol. 6.2:

78. ———. 2007. "Die Grazer Schule Der Gegenstandstheorie." In *Bausteine Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie an Der Universität Graz*, edited by Binder, Thomas, 173-207. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

79. Rescher, Nicholas, and Brandom, Robert. 1980. *The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible Worlds Semantics and Ontology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

80. Rollinger, Robin D. 1993. *Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals. From Hume Studies I to Logical Investigations Ii*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

81. ———. 1995. "Meinong on Perception: Two-Questions Concerning Propositional Seeing." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:445-455.

    "While Meinong makes scattered remarks about perception in various writings, the one text in which he makes a concentrated effort to work out a theory of perception is *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1905). This paper is a critical examination of the theory which is presented there, hut also some other terxts are taken into account. Special attention will be given to Meinong's views on the object (Gegenstand) of perception, both the propositional object (Objektiv) and the non-propositional object (Objekt) which is allegedly "part" of the propositional object. Also, some contrasts and parallels between these views and those of other members of the Brentano School, e.g. Husserl's notion of categorial perception are discussed."

82. ———. 1996. "Meinong and Husserl on Assumptions." *Axiomathes* no. 7:89-102.

83. ———. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.

84. ———. 2005. "Meinong and Brentano." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:159-198.

"Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."

85. Routley, Richard. 1974. "Another "Fatal" Objection to Meinongian Objects." *Philosophical Studies.An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* no. 25:131-134.

86. ———. 1976. "The Durability of Impossible Objects." *Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* no. 19:247-250.

"Meinong's theory of impossible objects is defended against a number of objections, In particular against Karel Lambert's argument (see "Impossible objects," "Inquiry", Volume 17, 1974, pages 303-14) that no objects are impossible."

87. ———. 1979. "The Theory of Objects as Commonsense." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 9:1-22.

"Meinong's theory of objects offers an alternative to entrenched logical theory which is non-reductionist, anti-verificationist and commonsense. A beginning is made on proving that the theory is a commonsense one. This involves characterizing refined commonsense and commonsense philosophy, upon sharpening the theses of the theory of objects, And indicating how these theses can, and do, fit into a commonsense position."

88. ———. 1979. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items*. Canberra: Australian National University.

89. ———. 1979. "The (Logical) Inportance of Not Existing." *Dialogue* no. 18:129-165.

90. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Valerie. 1973. "Rehabilitating Meinong's Theory of Objects." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:224-254.

91. Russell, Bertrand. 1904. "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions." *Mind* no. 13:204-219; 336-354; 509-524.

Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 21-76

92. ———. 1905. "Review Of: A. Meinong, Untersuchungen Zur Gegenstandstheorie Und Psychologie." *Mind* no. 14:530-

538.

Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 77-88

93. ———. 1905. "On Denoting." *Mind* no. 14:479-493.

Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 103-119

94. ———. 1907. "Review Of: A. Meinong, Uber Die Stellung Der Gegestandstheorie Im System Der Wissenschaften." *Mind* no. 16:436-439.

Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 89-93

95. Ryle, Gilbert. 1972. "Intentionality Theory and the Nature of Thinking." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 7-14. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

Reprinted in: *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* - 27, 1973 pp. 255-265

96. Sajama, Seppo. 1988. "Meinong on the Foundations of Deontic Logic." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 32:69-81.

"Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e., Duty and Value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, One emphasises the independence of the two realms, Whereas mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's law of omission which offers, In my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views."

97. Salice, Alessandro. 2002. *Il Concetto Di Aussersein Nella Teoria Degli Oggetti Di Alexius Meinong*.

Tesi di Laurea ineedita sostenuta all'Università di Torino, Anno Accademico 2001-2002, Relatore: Maurzio Ferraris.

98. ———. 2004. "Alexius Meinong: Oggetto E Aussersein." *Rivista di Estetica* no. 44:201-214.

99. ———. 2009. *Urteile Und Sachverhalte. Ein Vergleich Zwischen Alexius Meinong Und Adolf Reinach*. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

    "The judgment constitutes a fundamental notion for several disciplines such as descriptive psychology, ontology and logic, and hence its investigation represents a pivotal area of research within theoretical philosophy. Inside the Brentano-School, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) made significant contributions to this topic, separating and exploring both the subjective side of judgment (the intentional experience of judging) as well as its objective side (the “state of affairs” or the “objective”). In this publication Meinong’s and Reinach’s lore regarding the psychological and object-theoretical aspects of judgment are explicated, compared and evaluated."

100. Santambrogio, Marco. 1990. "Meinongian Theories of Generality." *Noûs*:647-673.

    "It is not widely appreciated that Meinong's non-existent objects are closely related with Twardowski's general objects and Locke's general abstract triangle. The latter is usually thought to be an incoherent notion. In order to disprove that, a formal semantics for such objects is outlined. The adequacy conditions it satisfies are discussed in detail. It is argued that general objects are needed e.g., in order to account for such uses of definite descriptions as in 'The whale is a mammal'. The central section of the paper is devoted to discussing which notion of reference is appropriate for general objects."

101. Schermann, Hans. 1972. "Husserl Ii Logische Untersuchung Und Meinongs Hume-Studien I." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und*

Nichtsein, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 103-116. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

102. Schock, Rolf. 1968. *Logics without Existence Assumptions*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

103. Schubert Kalsi, Marie-Luise. 1980. "On Meinong's Pseudo-Objects." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* no. 11:115-124.

"Consequences of Meinong's theory of pseudo-objects are discussed, in the context of *On emotional presentation* chapter 2, they are essential for Meinong's theory of knowledge and for the solving of paradoxes pertaining to self-referential thoughts or expressions. Pseudo-objects are mental entities corresponding directly to presentational experiences. The relationship of pseudo-objects to perceptual and conceptual objects is discussed and also their relationship to idea (contents) and language."

104. ———. 1982. "Meinong's Criticism of Husserl's "Ideas I"." In *Phenomenology Dialogues and Bridges*, edited by Bruzina, Ronald and Wilshire, Bruce, 213-227. Albany: State University of New York Press.

105. ———. 1985. "On Evidence According to Meinong and Chisholm." *Philosophical Topics* no. 13:77-86.

"The concept of 'evident' (and 'evidence') in Meinong's and Chisholm's writings are investigated. Meinong's term is studied in only one of its several meanings. It was found that 'evident' is a relation holding between a proposition and a person. Its presence is indicated and known by the person by a feeling of justification (Meinong) and sensibly taking (Chisholm). 'evident' is a psychologic epistemological concept and the presence of the relation cannot be objectively ascertained. The relationship between evident and its mark is pre-given and unexplained."

106. ———. 1987. *Meinong's Theory of Knowledge*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

107. ———. 1994. "Incompleteness and *Tertium Non Datur*." *Conceptus.Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 27:203-218.

"The article investigates Meinong's claim that the *tertium non datur* does not hold for objects which he calls "incompletely determined" and for objects which have a peculiar kind of deficient or pseudo-being which he calls "Aussersein" as e.g., inherently contradictory objects. Both, objects and kinds of being are examined: first, existence; second, subsistence and Aussersein; third, completely versus incompletely determined objects. They will be discussed on the basis of Meinong's theory of presentation together with the completeness of fictional objects. It is shown that incomplete determination is not ontologically pregiven. An object is incompletely determined if it is intended to be so. The tertium non datur fails to apply as a consequence of our intentional attitude. Finally, the exceptional status of objectives in respect to incompleteness is acknowledged."

108. Schuhmann, Karl. 1995. "Der Wertbegriff Beim Frühen Meinong." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:521-535.

109. ———. 1996. "Daubert and Meinong." *Axiomathes*:75-88.

110. Sierszulska, Anna. 2005. *Meinong on Meaning and Truth*. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag.

Introduction: "Most studies of Meinong's philosophy concentrate on ontological issues and they are often accompanied by providing a logical system of so called Meinongian logic. The epistemological problems are raised rarely and primarily in the light of historical considerations. The purpose of this study is to provide a presentation of the views of Alexius Meinong upon truth and related issues, in such a way as to expose the points which may be interesting for analytic philosophers.

Part I contains an outline of Meinong's theory of objects and his account of intentionality. The subjective "contents" of mental acts are contrasted with "objects" of different kinds. Chapter 2 focuses upon objects of higher order and the notion of an objective. Meinong's notion of Aussersein is introduced and it is claimed that objectives are abstract entities belonging to Aussersein.

Part II presents Meinong's theory of meaning and his views related to truth and cognition. The conception of meaning is discussed especially in relation to the views of Husserl and Frege upon this issue. Meinong's theory of truth is shown to be a version of logical realism, where identity of logical structure between an objective intended and reality is the basic idea but no facts as entities in reality are postulated. A Fregean interpretation of Meinong's theory of objectives as function-like entities, and not as states of affairs, is proposed. Factuality of objectives is interpreted non-objectually as the "obtaining" of objectives. The notion of self-evidence of judgments is presented in the role of Meinong's substitute criterion of truth. The problem with subjectivity of the experience of self-evidence is solved in Meinong's conception by means of probability attribution in uncertain epistemic contexts.

Part III contains a discussion of the reception of Meinong's ideas related to truth, since Russell until the present time. This part contains a chapter concerning Russell's interpretation of Meinong's objectives as complexes, in agreement with Russell's early theory of singular propositions. It is shown why this is not a correct interpretation. The issues addressed are the accusations of psychologism directed at Meinong and the mutual misunderstandings about ontological questions between these philosophers. Meinong's reaction to these criticisms is presented, mainly as expressed in the second edition of On Assumptions. Next, there is a polemical discussion with these critics who regard Meinong's objectives either as complexes or as states of affairs. And finally, some objections related to Meinong's understanding of truth and cognition are attended to. These objections concern mainly

the traces of Kantian idealism in Meinong's epistemological views. In the case of empirical judgments, there is no certainty whether they are true in the objective sense, but such uncertainty in the process of cognition does not imply that we have no possibility to acquire objective knowledge. Scepticism is overcome, because we know that many of our judgments are highly probable.
Part IV is devoted to an analysis of some typical features of Meinongian-style semantics. Chapters 8 and 9 present Meinong's original views by way of comparing his ideas to later developments within Meinongian semantic theories. It is observed that if a semantic domain is understood in the characteristic Meinongian way, it contains both real and meaning-objects of different kinds. This feature of a Meinongian-style semantics is responsible for what is proposed to be called a "double theoretical approach" to objects. It is shown that two senses of being, of quantification, of predication, of extension and of linguistic reference are required, in order to provide a theoretical framework which applies both to real objects and to abstract sense-entities. The main questions discussed in this part are related to the consequences of introducing "merely semantic" objects into a semantic theory.
The study ends with a conclusion which sums up the results of the discussions with respect to their relevance for the issue of epistemological realism. Meinong's suggestion for developing a probabilistic semantics for undetermined contexts is considered to be a positive way to counterweight scepticism in scientific discourse."

111. ———. 2005. "Meinongian Extensions of Predicates." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 14:145-163.

112. Simons, Peter M. 1989. "Łukasiewicz, Meinong and Many Valued Logic." In *The Veinna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 249-292. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 193-225

113. ———. 1992. "On What There Isn't: The Meinong-Russell Dispute." In *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski*, 159-191. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Translated from: *Über das, was es nicht gibt: Die Meinong-Russell Kontroverse* - Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 10, 1988 pp. 399-426

114. ———. 1994. "Meinong's Contribution to the Development of Non-Classical Logic." *Conceptus.Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 27:187-202.

"Though himself no logician, Meinong, by his iconoclastic philosophical views, indirectly contributed significantly to the development of nonclassical logic, notably modal, many-valued, probability, deontic, free, paraconsistent and dialectical logics. After outlining Meinong's mature object theory, emphasizing his views on existence, modality and probability, I show how he influenced the younger logical pioneers Łukasiewicz and Mally, as well as more recent logicians such as Parsons, Routley and Lambert."

115. ———. 1995. "Meinong's Theory of Sense and Reference." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:171-186.

"Gilbert Ryle wrote that "Meaning-theory expanded just when and just in so far as it was released from that 'Fido'-Fido box, the lid of which was never even lifted by Meinong." This paper sets out to relieve Ryle's oversimplification about Meinong and the role of meaning theory in his thought. One step away from canine simplicity about meaning is the recognition of a distinction between sense and reference, such as we find in Frege, Husserl, and the early Russell. In *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit* (1915) Meinong seems to corroborate Ryle when he writes, "Word-meanings are objects," but

immediately after this, he qualifies it: "Word-meanings are very often auxiliary objects." The distinction between auxiliary and target objects in Meinong's later work allows us to attribute to him a theory of sense and reference which shows him to have indeed lifted the box-lid."

116. ———. 1999. "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists." In *German Philosophy since Kant*, edited by O'Hear, Anthony, 109-136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

117. ———. 2001. "Meinong Und Modalität." In *Bausteine Zu Einer Geschichte Der Philosophie an Der Universität Graz*, edited by Binder, Thomas, 209-217. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Meinong's theory of modality (which is also a theory of probability) is an unexplored alternative to standard views. Meinong's ontology allows him a rich and arguably modernizable account which eschews the notion of possible worlds. It is based on his concepts of *Objective* (state of affairs) and incomplete object. An *Objective* ascribing a property to an incomplete object is possible if some actual completion of the object has the relevant property, and is possible to degree w, where 0 3/4 w 3/4 1, if the proportion of actual completions having the property to all actual completions is w."

118. ———. 2005. "Meinong, Consistency and the Absolute Totality." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:233-254.

"Since Russell, Meinong's ontology has often been accused of inconsistency.
By accepting impossible objects, Meinong appears to play into the hands of his opponents. But his distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties enables him to avoid Russell's criticism, and can be employed to deflect other charges of inconsistency. Meinong accepts a single, absolute totality of objects, including a totality of all truths. This seems also to commit him to paradoxical conclusions, but I

show he can avoid these. Within the absolute totality, there should be numerous subcollections constituting alternative possible worlds.
The problem is that we can have no way to construct or evaluate the consistency of such collections, which means we have at best inductive assurance that Meinong's ontology is consistent."

119. Simons, Peter M., and Morscher, Edgar. 2001. "Meinong's Theory of Meaning." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 427-455. Aldershot: Ashgate.

120. Smith, Barry. 1980. "Ingarden Vs. Meinong on the Logic of Fiction." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 41:93-105.

121. ———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.

    See Chapter Five: *Alexius Meinong and Stephan Witasek: on art and its objects* - pp. 125-154.

122. ———. 1995. "More Things in Heaven and Earth." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:187-201.

    "Philosophers in the field of analytic metaphysics have begun gradually to come to terms with the fact that there are entities in a range of categories not dreamt of in the set-theory and predicate-logic-based ontologies of their forefathers. Examples of such *entia minora* would include: boundaries, places, events, states holes, shadows, individual colour- and tone-instances (tropes), together with combinations of these and associated simple and complex universal species or essences, states of affairs, judgment-contents, and myriad abstract structures of the sorts which are studied by the mathematical sciences. How, as hunter-gatherer ontologists, are we to bring order into this vast array? How are we to gauge the ontological merits of given candidate entities, and how are we to understand their

relation to entities of more humdrum sorts? Meinong, it turns out, offers a very simple answer to all of these questions."

123. Smith, David Woodruff. 1975. "Meinongian Objects." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 1:43-71.

This is a study of Meinongian "objects" - specifically, individual objects - and their motivations in intentionality theory. Others have dwelt on their "indifference to being" (*Aussersein*). Principally, I shall argue that, contrary to what we might have hoped for them, Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as objects of thought in an appropriately Meinongian, "object-theoretic" account of intentionality. Briefly, the argument is as follows. (The roman numerals mark off roughly the content of parts I through V of the paper.)
I. Meinong's theory of objects can in general be seen as motivated by the theory of intentionality, for "objects" are assumed to serve as the objects of thought or "intention". What seems largely to distinguish a Meinongian approach to intentionality is the attempt to account for the peculiarities of intention in terms of peculiarities of the objects "intended".
II. One class of objects Meinong propounded are "incomplete", or "incompletely determined", objects. An example is the golden mountain, which is golden and mountainous but otherwise "undetermined".
III. For Meinong, incomplete objects serve to mediate the intention (or apprehension) of complete objects. Meinong believed we cannot properly "intend" complete objects. We intend them only indirectly insofar as we intend incomplete objects which are "embedded" in than. This is Meinong's account of how, as best he thought we can, we intend everyday existing physical individuals, which are complete. (As stated, this is not quite gospel Meinong, which treats of "Soseinsmeinen".)
IV. This theory of the indirect intention of complete objects via incomplete objects also explains another familiar fact

about intention, though Meinong himself probably did not put it to this use. It explains in a straightforward way the distinction between, for instance, one's conceiving the morning star and one's conceiving the evening star - and hence, in the "formal mode" the failure of the logical law of substitutivity of identity for terms in intentional contexts. For, on Meinongian lines these intentions would be indirect intentions of the same complete object (Venus, we would say) but intentions proper of distinct incomplete objects ("The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star", as we shall call them), and so they would be distinct intentions.

V. Different sorts of entities have been considered intensional, including Frege's "senses" and Carnap's "intensions". What seems to qualify them as intensional is their role vis a vis, specifically, ordinary physical individuals in a Frege like semantics. Further, it is intensional entities that determine the "directedness" or intentionality of mental acts. Meinong's incomplete objects fill these bills and so, I argue, are intensional. However, since complete objects are continuous in kind with incomplete objects, complete objects too - including ordinary physical individuals - must be intensional.

Generalizing, the genre of Meinongian intentionality theory is characteristically "extensionalist", treating intention straightforwardly as a relation and thus accounting for its peculiarities in terms of the objects intended. We may conclude that any such approach to intentionality must render the objects of intention intensional.

I conclude (in part VI) that such a Meinongian view of intentionality leaves the intensional playing the wrong role in intention. This can be remedied by replacing incomplete objects with something like individual concepts or senses (which are not themselves incomplete) and making them the mediators rather than the objects of intention.

I should stress that this essay is not an historical study in the interpretation of Meinong's writings. It is rather a critical study of the genre of Meinongian object-cum-intentionality theory, of what happens if we make certain assumptions apparently fundamental to Meinong's

program. I shall here largely rely on Findlay's lovely book' as a convenient and well-received gathering of Meinong's views. At a few indicated points I shall extend, to some extent modify, or reconstruct Meinong's views as I know them." pp. 43-44.

124. Smith, Janet Farrell. 1982. "Meinong's Theory of Objects and Assumptions." In *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, edited by Bruzina, Ronald and Wilshire, Bruce, 205-212. Albany: State University of New York Press.

125. ———. 1985. "The Russell-Meinong Debate." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 45:305-350.

"The debates between Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong from 1904 to 192.0 dealt with some fundamental issues in philosophy: reference, nonexistent objects, intentionality. Along with the enduring influence of Russell's philosophy, sonic misapprehensions about these exchanges have persisted. One is that Russell's objections to Meinong were definitive. The other stems from taking too seriously Russell's casual remark in 1918 that Meinong's theories evidenced a deficient "sense of reality." Contrary to the impression left by this comment, Russell, during the most intensive years of the debate (1904-1907), felt a real respect for Meinong's theories,' and his main concern lay elsewhere. The exchange did not center on "reality" or "realism," as is often believed, but on the classical laws of logic (noncontradiction, excluded middle) and the correct analysis of logical form, for instance, of existence statements. Russell also took a dim view of the modal concepts Meinong used to support the canons of object theory, but his main concern was that Meinong's overall analysis appeared to threaten the foundation of Russell's philosophical logic. Russell and Meinong's disagreement thus came down to competing logical frameworks tied to different notions of what it is to he an object.
In claiming that Russell's main objection to Meinong's theory was logical, I do not mean to deny that ontology and

metaphysics were in the forefront of Russell's concerns up to 1910 or that for him a correct foundational view of logic would tell us much about the way the world is. Russell's motivation for criticizing Meinong may well have been a concern with what is 'real', but his philosophical reasons for rejecting Meinong's object theory in 1905-1907 had to do which logical principles and their reputed violations. Interestingly, during the years Russell was debating with Meinong most intensively (1904-1907) he was also struggling to find the solution to his paradox of classes. With his 1905 invention of the theory of descriptions, Russell believed he had simultaneously found a way to deal with apparent reference to nonexistents in ordinary grammar and a new analysis of classes. It seems that the two difficulties of paradoxical classes and nonexistent objects plagued Russell's sense of consistency in a parallel manner.

In this paper I focus on giving an internal analysis of the objections and replies exchanged by Russell and Meinong to show that Russell's objections failed to be decisive and that the standoff between them came down to fundamentally different frameworks. Some scholarly evidence supports this interpretation as well. Russell's 1904 letter to Meinong emphasizes that what Meinong called "Theory of Objects" Russell had been accustomed to calling "Logic." [See Appendix]' In pressing his contradiction charge, Russell continued to evaluate Meinong's object theory by the standards of his own view of "logic." Lastly, evidence of a more circumstantial nature points to the parallelism of Russell's worries over nonexistent objects and classes."

(1) See the newly published *Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript*, Vol. 7 of Russell's Collected papers, edited by Elizabeth Eames and Kenneth Blackwell (Allen and Unwin, 1983). This manuscript, which contains many accurate references to Meinong's theories, was never published by Russell. He was apparently discouraged by Wittgenstein's criticism of his theory of judgment.

(2) The Appendix contains translations of Russell's three letters to Meinong. See also the chronological Bibliography

at the end of this paper.
(3) See Roderick Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.), and *The First Person, An Essay on Reference and Intentionality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
(4) Some issues are treated in my "Meinong's Theory of Objects and Assumptions," in *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982). In a longer study of book length I explore these and other issues in greater depth.

126. ———. 1988. "Russell's Re-Evaluation of Meinong, 1913-14: An Analysis of Acquaintance." *Russell.The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* no. 8:179-194.

127. ———. 2005. "Russell's "on Denoting", the Laws of Logic and the Refutation of Meinong." In *On Denoting 1905-2005*, edited by Imaguire, Guido and Linsky, Bernard, 137-166. München: Philosophia Verlag.

128. Stepanians, Markus S. 1995. "Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff Des Annahmenschlusses." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:415-432.

129. Stock, Wolfgang G. 1996. "Wissenschaftstheorie Der Grazer Schule: Meinong Und Frankl." *Axiomathes*:61-74.

130. Suter, Ronald. 1967. "Russell's 'Refutation' of Meinong in ' *on Denoting*'." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:512-516.

131. Swanson, Carolyn. 2011. *Reburial of Nonexistents. Reconsidering the Meinong-Russell Debate*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore,

deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent "facts" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them.
The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims – one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities."

132. Sweet, Dennis J. 1993. "The *Gestalt* Controversy: The Development of Objects of Higher Order in Meinong's Ontology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 53:553-575.

"To show how Meinong's ontology developed from the stark "Hume Studies" to the richness of his mature thought, I

trace his analysis of complexes in light of the views of Ehrenfels, Cornelius, and Twardowski. Through their influences Meinong was compelled to modify his ontology in two ways. First, he developed a variety of reism that acknowledged ontological heterogeneity within perceptual complexes.
Second, he endorsed the view of perceptual realism. With these modifications Meinong was able to introduce objects of higher order'."

133. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 2000. "Meinong's Complexes." *Monist* no. 83:89-100.

" The ontological problem of complexity is a most difficult one and has not been solved satisfactorily until the 20th century. Meinong came as close as any philosopher in the 19th century to a solution. Meinong's view of complexes changed. He kept to the principle that there is a relation where there is a complex. But only in his later view does the relation have the role of connector of the complex. The article argues (also against Bergmann and Grossmann) that relational connectors would not be sufficient without facts, that facts connect without connectors though and that facts are the only genuine complexes. Meinong's Objektive are very similar to facts, yet in a crucial respect more like things than like facts."

134. ———. 2005. "Object-Theoretic Foundations of Logic." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 1:297-308.

"Logical semantics is not ontology. Meinong's and Mally's application of their object theory to logic must not be understood as a contribution to logical semantics but as an ontological grounding of logic. The object-theoretical grounding relates logic to the world though it is accompanied by a rationalist interpretation of logical laws. Meinong's and Mally's realist analysis of logic
has been revived and continued by Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann. Both adopt Meinong's category of

objective in a more or less modified version. This category is pivotal for Meinong's view of logic."

135. Thrush, Michael. 2001. "Do Meinong's Impossible Objects Entail Contradictions?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 62:157-173.

Abstract: "Meinong's theory of objects commits him to impossiblia: objects which have contradictory properties. Russell famously objected that these impossiblia were apt to infringe the law of noncontradiction. Meinong's defenders have often relied upon the distinction between internal and external negation, a defense that only works against less exotic impossiblia. The more exotic impossibilia fall victim to an argument that uses an intuitively attractive logical principle similar to the abstraction principle, but which is not subject to Russell's paradox. The upshot is that things are not as bad as Russell claims. Some impossiblia don't entail contradictions. Nevertheless, things are still disastrous for Meinong. Some of his impossiblia do entail contradictions."

136. Vasyukov, Vladimir. 1993. "A Lesniewskian Guide to Husserl's and Meinong's Jungles." *Axiomathes*:59.

137. Vax, Louis. 2000. "Meinong Et Les *Impossibilia:* Avec Une Appendice De Gaston Thoma." *Philosophia Scientiae* no. 4:1-66.

138. Velarde-Mayol, Victor. 1989. "La Teoria De Los Objetos En Alexius Meinong." *Pensamiento* no. 45:461-475.

139. ———. 1989. *La Teoria Del Objeto En Alexius Meinong*, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 9323758.

140. Voltolini, Alberto. 1995. "Is Meaning without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable?" *Grazer Philosophische*

Studien no. 50:397-414.

"According to Jerry Fodor, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity, like "unicorn", do not constitute an exception to his project of semantic naturalization based on the notion of asymmetrical dependence between causal relations. But Fodor does not give any principled reason in order to show that, say, a non-unicorn caused "unicorn"-token means Unicorn, as he on the contrary does regarding a non-X caused "X"-token for any existing X. Nevertheless, his claim that one such expression has a mere denotational meaning can be accounted for, though in a non-naturalistic way. Suffice it that one appeals to the weak Meinongianism contained in the thesis that one can directly refer to possible entities by means of suitable fixing reference description."

141. ———. 2001. "What Is Alive and What Is Dead in Russell's Critique of Meinong." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 489-516. Aldershot: Ashgate.

142. ———. 2006. "Being, Existence, and Having Instances." *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* no. 2:161-180.

143. Weiberger, Ota. 1972. "Ideen Zur Logischen Normesemantik." In *Jeinseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 295-312. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

144. Weingartner, Paul. 1972. "Die Fraglichkeit Der Extensionalitätsthese Und Die Probleme Einer Intensionalen Logik." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 127-178. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

145. Witherall, Arthur. 1998. "Meinongian Metaphysics and Subjectivity." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 23:29-49.

146. Wolf, Karl. 1968. "Die Grazer Schule. Gegenstandstheorie Und Wertlehre." *Wissenschaft und Weltbild.Zeitschrift für grundfragen der forschung und weltanschauung* no. 21:31-56.

147. ———. 1971. "Ernst Mallys Destruktion Des Meinongschen "Gegenständes"." In *Akten Des Xiv. Internationalen Kongresses Für Philosophie, Wien, 2-9 Sept. 1968*, 584-591. Wien: Herder.

148. ———. 1972. "Der Bedeutungswandel Von 'Gegenständ' in Der Schule Meinongs." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 63-68. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

149. Zalta, Edward. 1982. "Meinongian Type Theory and Its Applications." *Studia Logica* no. 41:297-307.

"In this paper I propose a fundamental modification of standard type theory, produce a new kind of type theoretic language, and couch in this language a comprehensive theory of abstract individuals and abstract properties and relations of every type. I then suggest how to employ the theory to solve the four following philosophical problems: (a) the identification and ontological status of Frege's senses; (b) the deviant behavior of terms in propositional attitude contexts; c) the non-identity of necessarily equivalent propositions, and (d) the "paradox" of analysis."

150. ———. 1986. "Lambert, Mally, and the Principle of Independence." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:447-459.

151. ———. 1992. "On Mally's Alleged Heresy: A Reply." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 13:59-68.

152. Zecha, Gerhard. 1972. "Meinongs Moralische Wertklassen Und Die Deontischen Operatoren." In *Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 271-286. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

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Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic

INTRODUCTION

"Husserl's work include lengthy treatment of universals, categories, meanings, numbers, manifolds, etc. from an ontological perspective. Here, however, we shall concentrate almost exclusively on the *Logical Investigations,* which contain in a clear form the ontological ideas which provided the terminological and theoretical basis both for much of the detailed phenomenological description and for many of the metaphysical theses presented in Husserl's later works.

The ontology of the *Logical Investigations* is of interest first of all because of its clear conception of a formal discipline of ontology analogous to formal logic. (Here Husserl's thinking parallels Meinong's development of ontology as a general 'theory of objects.). Formal disciplines are set apart from 'regional' or 'material' disciplines in that they apply to all domains of objects whatsoever, so that they are independent of the peculiarities of any given field of knowledge.

Logic, as Husserl sees it, is concerned in the first place with meanings (propositions, concepts) and with associated meaning-instantiating acts. Most importantly, it is concerned with that sort of deductively closed collection of meanings which constitutes a scientific theory. For Husserl, as for Bolzano, logic is a theory of science. Only where we have an appropriate unity and organization also on the side of the objects (states of affairs, properties) to which the relevant acts refer, however, will we have a scientific theory, so that the unity which is characteristic of the

latter must involve both (1) an interconnection of truths (or of propositional meanings in general), and (2) an interconnection of the things to which these truths (and the associated cognitive acts) are directed.
Where formal logic relates in the first place to meaning categories such as proposition, concept, subject and predicate, its sister discipline of formal ontology relates to object categories such as object and property, relation and relatum, manifold, part, whole, state of affairs, existence and so on. Logic in a broader sense therefore seeks to delimit the concepts which belong to the idea of a unity of theory in relation to both meanings and objects, and the truths of logic are all the necessary truths relating to those categories of constituents, on the side of both meanings and objects, from out of which science as such is necessarily constituted (including what we might think of as bridge-categories such as identity and truth which span the division between meanings and objects).
Husserl's conception of the science of logic is not an arbitrary one.
For formal-ontological concepts are like the concepts of formal logic in forming complex structures in non-arbitrary, law-governed ("recursive") ways. And because they are independent of any peculiar material of knowledge, we are able to grasp the properties of the given structures in such a way as to establish in one go the properties of all formally similar structures." (pp. 27-29)

From: Barry Smith Barry & David Woodruff Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.

"The term 'formal ontology' has been given two different interpretations. The first of these, entirely in keeping with the mainstream of contemporary philosophy, has been what I shall call analytic: formal ontology is that branch of ontology which is analysed within the framework of formal logic. The leading exponent of this approach has undoubtedly been Nino Cocchiarella.' On the premise that each particular science has its own 'mode of being', Cocchiarella has written that 'metaphysics

[...] -- or what we might instead call formal ontology --is concerned with the study and development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic co-ordination of all the 'modes' or 'categories of being' under the most general laws' (1). From this point of view, formal ontology studies the logical characteristics of predication and the various theories of universals.
The other interpretation, which I shall call phenomenological, developed from Husserl's early works, in particular *Logical Investigations*. As a first approximation, we may say that this approach mainly addresses the problems of parts and wholes and of dependence. Despite their differences, these two varieties of formal ontology quite frequently overlap each other, although to date there has been no systematic study of the categories and layers that constitute formal ontology and no systematic analysis of the issues addressed by it.
(...)
The best way to deal with Husserl's theory of formal ontology, therefore, is to explicate both the connections between the formal and material, and those between the ontological and the logical. In introducing his distinction between formal and material ontology, Husserl asserts that the former is descriptive and involves analytic a priori judgements, and that the latter involves synthetic a priori judgements. In its most general sense formal ontology concerns itself with characterizing the simple 'something'. Depending on how this 'something' is conceived, Husserl adds, the 'field of formal ontology should be the "formal region" of the object in general' (*Formale und transzendentale Logik* 1929, art. 38).
Characterizing material ontology is a more complicated matter, because the term can be interpreted in either of two ways. In the genetic interpretation it relates to the field of perception and its foundations (Husserl *Krisis* 1954, art. 6, sec. 1). In the descriptive interpretation, material ontology is instead ontic and concerns the highest material genera, i.e. the material categories in which single ontologies are rooted (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phenomenologie* 1913, vol. 1, art. 75). The sphere of material ontology in this sense are the laws of non-independence (2) which delimit the ontological regions. For the genetic

interpretation, material ontology precedes formal ontology; for the descriptive interpretation it is the other way round (1913, art. 10). Here emerges 'the fundamental distinction between formal and material ontology': namely, the distinction between analytic a priori and synthetic a priori (Introduction to *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, 1929).
Detailed treatment has never been given to the stratified connections between material ontology in the genetic sense, formal ontology, and material ontology in the regional sense. It would, however, go beyond my present brief to investigate this question in detail, even though one should have at least a general topographical outline in mind.
The second opposition distinguishes the 'formal' into ontological and logical. In this sense, we must not confuse or superimpose that which pertains to formal logic and that which pertains to formal ontology. Likewise, we should not superimpose or mix the formal and material meanings of the concepts used." (pp. 1-2)

Notes

(1) "Formal Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics", in: G. Nakhnikian (ed.), *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, Duckworth: London 1974, pp. 29-30.

From: Roberto Poli, "Husserl's Conception of Formal Ontology", *History and Philosophy of Logic*, vol. 14, 1993 pp. 1-14.

"THE CONCEPTION OF A PURE LOGIC - Husserl himself freely admitted that this was anything but a new idea. He mentions Kant, Herbart, Lotze, and Leibniz among its proponents and gives special credit for the nearly forgotten Bernhard Bolzano, 'one of the greatest logicians of all times.' But Husserl's own blueprint shows several original features, among which I shall mention merely what one might call the two-level structure of pure logic. The first level is that of the propositions or 'truths' studied by the logic of statements ('apophantics') as composed of meanings and their various combinations. The second level consists of the 'things' to which these statements refer, i.e., of the states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*) which they assert, the relations, complexes, and

other configurations which they can enter and which are to be investigated by what Husserl calls a formal ontology.
Actually, this two-level pattern incorporates two one-level conceptions of pure logic, formulated most impressively by Bolzano and by Meinong respectively. Bolzano had organized his pure logic on the propositional level around representational ideas, propositions, and truths (*Vorstellung an sich, Satz an sich, Wahrheit an sich*). Meinong knew only of the 'state of affairs,' which he had named "Objektiv", and of other categories of formal ontology. Husserl's conception incorporated both these levels, that of the propositions, which are valid or invalid, and that of the states of affairs, which do or do not 'subsist,' as Bertrand Russell rendered Meinong's term. ('To be the case' might be a less hypostatizing equivalent of the rather harmless German word 'bestehen'.)However, the development of this pure logic in Husserl's own published writings, originally planned for a third volume '(1) is rather sketchy, although the mathematician Husserl continued to show interest in its mathematical formalization. He even seems to have taken notice of Bertrand Russell's work, but remained sceptical toward the value of a merely symbolic logic and of logical calculus, in which he took no active share. His *Formale and transzendentale Logik* (1929) contains some important additions to the conception of pure logic. Among them is that of a third level of logic, likewise of ideal structure, namely, that of speech, which consists of the identical sentences that express our propositional meanings: ideal, since, even when uttered at different times and places and by different speakers, they remain identically the same sentences.
(...)Husserl's major interest, once he had established the possibility of a pure logic, turned immediately to different problems. He left its more systematic development to works like Alexander Pfänder's *Logik* (1921), which investigated the logic of concepts, of propositions, and of inferences, and to studies undertaken by some of his students based on this work, which dealt with the logic of questions, of assumptions, and of laws and commands. Roman Ingarden, one of Husserl's Polish students, gave a particularly impressive application of this type of analysis to the literary work of art, in which he explored separately and in considerable detail its main strata such as that of the sounds, that

of the meanings, and that of the objects meant, without neglecting additional aspects and the total structure of the work." (pp. 152-153)

Notes

(1) Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Kronik*, Husserliana Documente I. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 pp. 63-64. (some notes omitted)

From: Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963 (third edition).

"Husserl's conception of formal ontology is intimately involved with his conceptions both of logic and of what comprises possible objects of theoretical inquiry. He inherited an Aristotelian metaphysical perspective from the school of Franz Brentano; his conception of logic was informed by an ontology that included both universals and particulars of ontologically dependent and independent types. The elucidation of his conception of logic as formal ontology therefore requires a consideration of his ontology of universal essences and his eidetic method. He distinguishes various types of universal essences (*eide*) in terms of the relations of generalization and formalization.
Husserl assumes that each thing is an instance of some eidos or essence, and that essences may not only have, but be instances (e.g., he holds that every essence is an instance of the universals "object in general" and "essence'). Besides the relation of instance to essence, he held that there is a second relation (of generalization) defined on essences. In *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I (1913), the essence "red" is a specification (but not an instance) of the more general essence, "color." Specification and generalization are inverses: for any two essences x and y, x is a generalization of y just in case y is a specification of x.
But the genus "essence" is not a generalization of the essence "red" or the essence "triangle." These are instances (not specifications) of the genus "essence." A (rough) guide for understanding this distinction: the instancing relation is to the

generalization relation as the membership relation is to the subset relation; similar and easily confused but different. Husserl provides a part-whole characterization of the difference between the relations of instance to essence and specification to generalization (which he treats under the topics "formalization" and "generalization," respectively). If y is a generalization of x, then y is a part of x (at least in some "comprehensive" use of the term "part" that Husserl is willing to accept). But if y is a part of x (even in the comprehensive use of the term "part"), then y is not a formalization of x.

From this it follows that no formalization is a generalization and vice versa. The relation of specification to generalization enables the definition of some important types of essences. Any essence x is a genus iff there is some different essence y such that x is a generalization of y. Similarly, any essence x is a species *iff* there is some different essence y such that y is a generalization of x. Any essence x is a highest genus iff it is a genus and not a species, and a lowest species iff it is a species and not a genus. Every essence either is a lowest (*infima*) species or is specifiable to an infima species, and is either a highest genus, or is generalizable to a highest genus.

Husserl distinguishes between the extension and the empirical extension of an essence. For any essence x, there exists an extension of instances of x. Any y is the extension of an essence x iff y is the class of all possible instances of x. Any y is the empirical extension of an essence x iffy is the class of all actual (i.e., real) instances of x. If both the empirical extension and the extension of a given essence are non-empty, then the former is a proper subclass of the latter.

But Husserl distinguishes further types of extensions relevant to his conception of formal ontology. For any essence x, there exists an eidetic extension of x. The eidetic extension of any essence x is the class of lowest species that are specifications of x. Husserl then distinguishes between two types of eidetic extensions of universals: "material" and "mathematical." Any eidetic extension is mathematical just in case it is a subset of the eidetic extension of the essence "object in general" (*etwas überhaupt*); otherwise, it is a material eidetic extension.

A second set of distinctions regarding *eide* are developed by Husserl in terms of his notions of ontological dependence and independence. He calls things that require nothing else (other than the essences they instance) in order to exist ontologically independent (example: the nose of Socrates), and things that require something else (besides the essences they instance) in order to exist ontologically dependent (example: the pugness of the nose of Socrates). He refers to dependent individuals as moments of the things they require in order to exist." (pp. 238-239)

From: Gilbert T. Null, "Formal and Material Ontology", in: Lester Embree et alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology,* Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.

BOLZANO AND HUSSERL

"Though Bolzano's propositions in themselves had originally seemed to Husserl to be metaphysical abstrusities, it then became clear to him that what Bolzano had in mind was basically something quite obvious. By proposition in itself, Husserl now understood what people ordinarily called the sense of a statement, what is explained as one and the same when, for example, different persons are said to have asserted the same thing. Or, again. propositions in themselves were simply what scientists called a theorem, for example, the theorem about the sum of the angles in a triangle, which no one would think of considering the product of anyone's subjective experience of judging. This realization demystified Bolzano's teachings for Husserl (Husserl, *Early writings in the philosophy of logic and mathematics,* 1994, 201-02; Husserl, *Briefwechsel. Die Brentanoschule, I* (Husserl to Brentano, 27.III. 1905 *)* 1994, 37). It then further became clear to Husserl that this identical sense could be nothing other than the universal, the species, which belongs to a certain moment present in all actual assertions with the same sense and makes that very identification possible, even

when the descriptive content of the individual lived experiences of asserting varies considerably otherwise. Interpreted in this way, he found Bolzano's idea that propositions are objects that nonetheless have no existence quite intelligible. They had the ideal being or validity of objects which are universals, the being which is established, for example, M the existence proofs of mathematics (Husserl, *Early writings*, cit. 1994, 201-02).
So, although Husserl had come to Halle free of Platonic idealism, he was to leave a committed Platonic idealist, who had come to believe that idealistic systems were of "the highest value", that entirely new and totally radical dimensions of philosophical problems were illuminated in them, that "the ultimate and highest goals of philosophy were opened up only when the philosophical method which these particular systems require is clarified and developed" (Husserl, "Recollections of Franz Brentano" (1919) in: *Husserl: Shorter works,* 1981, 345). Every possible effort, Husserl would write, had been made in the *Logical Investigations* "to dispose the reader to the recognition of this ideal sphere of being and knowledge ... to side with 'the ideal in this truly Platonistic sense', 'to declare oneself for idealism' with the author" (Husserl, *Introduction to the Logical Investigations* 1975, 20). Phenomenology would be an "eidetic" discipline. The "whole approach whereby the overcoming of psychologism is phenomenologically accomplished", Husserl explained, "shows that what ... was given as analyses of immanent consciousness must be considered as a pure a priori analysis of essence" (Husserl, *Introduction* cit. 1975, 42).
This transformation had been prepared, Husserl said, by the study of Leibniz and reflections on his distinction between *verités de raison* and *verités de fait* and on Hume's ideas about knowledge about matters of fact and relations of ideas. Husserl had become keenly aware of the contrast between Hume's distinction and Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments and this became crucial for the positions that he later adopted (Husserl, *Introduction* cit. 1975, 36).
The early 1890s thus found Husserl striving to develop the true concept of analyticity and to discover the basic philosophical line separating genuine analytical ontology from material, synthetic a priori, ontology, which he believed must be fundamentally

distinct from it (Husserl, *Introduction* cit. 1975, 42-43). In the *Logical Investigations*, he would condemn Kant's logic as being utterly defective (Husserl, 1900-01, *Prolegomena*, 58). Kant, Husserl maintained, had not understood the nature and role of formal mathematics and the way in which he had defined the concept of analyticity was totally inadequate and even utterly wrong (Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* 1906-07, 23). "Not only", Husserl complained, did Kant "never see how little the laws of logic are all analytic propositions in the sense laid down by his own definition, but he failed to see how little his dragging in of an evident principle for analytic propositions really helped to clear up the achievements of analytic thinking" (Husserl, 1900-01, *Sixth Investigation*, 66). Persuaded of the inadequacy of Kant's analytic- synthetic distinction, Husserl came to believe that Bolzano's more Leibnizian approach to analyticity and meaning harbored the insights logicians needed to prove their propositions by purely logical means. However, in Husserl's opinion, Bolzano never saw the internal equivalence between the analytic nature of both formal logic and formal mathematics made possible by developments in the field of mathematics that had only taken place after his death (Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* 1929, 26; Husserl, *Introduction* cit. 1975, 36-38).

By drawing the boundary line existing a priori between mathematics and natural sciences like psychology, Husserl believed that he was drawing the line of demarcation and expanding the domain of the analytical in keeping with the most recent discoveries in mathematics. Analytic logic, Husserl would ultimately explain in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, is first of all valid as an absolute norm presupposed by any rational knowledge. His "war against logical psychologism, was in fact meant to serve no other end than the supremely important one of making the specific province of analytic logic visible in its purity and ideal particularity, freeing it from the psychologizing confusions and misinterpretations in which it had remained enmeshed with from the beginning". The value of his criticisms of logical psychologism lie, he believed, precisely in his drawing attention to a pure, analytic logic, distinct from any psychology, as being an independent field, like geometry or the natural

sciences. Epistemological questions may well arise regarding this pure logic, he considered, but this must not interfere with its independent course, or involve delving into the concrete aspects of the logical life of consciousness. For that would be psychology (Husserl, *Formal* cit. 1929, 67).
No psychologistic empiricism, Husserl had come to believe, "can change the fact that pure mathematics is a strictly self-contained system of doctrines which is to be cultivated using methods that are essentially different from those of natural science" (Husserl, *Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* 1913, 29).
"The empirical sciences--natural sciences", Husserl wrote to Brentano in 1905, "-- are sciences of 'matters of fact' ... . Pure Mathematics, the whole sphere of the genuine Apriori in general, is free of all matter of fact suppositions .... We stand not within the realm of nature, but within that of Ideas, not within the realm of empirical ... generalities, but within that of the ideal, apodictic, general system of laws, not within the realm of causality, but within that of rationality .... Pure logical, mathematical laws are laws of essence ... " (Husserl, cit. 1905, 37).
Husserl did, though, realize that not all the sciences are theoretical disciplines that, like mathematical physics, pure geometry or pure arithmetic, are characterized by the fact that their systemic principle is a purely analytical one. Sciences like psychology, history, the critique of reason and, notably, phenomenology, he believed, require that one go beyond the analytico-logical model. When they are formalized and one asks what it is that binds the propositional forms into a single system form, one finds oneself facing, Husserl maintained, nothing more than the empty general truth that there is an infinite number of propositions connected in objective ways that are compatible with one another in that they do not contradict each other analytically (Husserl, *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie* 1917/18, 54)." (pp. 83-84)

From: Claire Ortiz Hill, "On Husserl's Mathematical Apprenticeship and Philosophy of Mathematics", in: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study,* Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, pp. 78-94.

"An aspect of Bolzano's influence on Husserl which is well known is the Husserlian definition of analyticity (Simons, 1992, Ch. 15; Benoist, 1997, Ch. 2). In the Third Logical Investigation, 12, Husserl gives a definition by substitutivity: an analytic proposition is a proposition that keeps its truth-value by substitution of its extra- logical constituents. That definition seems evidently Bolzanian (Bolzano, 1837, 148), and not Kantian. However, concerning that point, there are also differences. Bolzano's definition of analyticity is not only a logical one (Proust, 1986). According to Bolzano, there is logical analyticity, but also a more general kind of analyticity (defined by the possibility of substituting a determinate representation of the proposition by any other one, without changing the truth value of the proposition). Bolzano is aware of the difficulty of defining the logical constituents of a proposition as opposed to the other constituents (Simons, 1992, Ch. 2). In that sense, he is very far from the contrast between "formal" and "material" constituents that Husserl defends. Husserl was aware of this because he says that Bolzano completely missed the very idea of a "formal ontology".

A remaining point may not be as well known: the Bolzanian idea of "synthetic a priori" may also have had a great influence on Husserl's thought. Bolzano had the idea of synthetic a priori ("internal") relations between concepts, especially (in his early work: cf. Laz, 1993) concepts related to perception. According to him, there was an a priori of color, as well as of spatial extension, etc. Such ideas (of a "conceptual a priori", but one concerning intuition) may have played a decisive role in the invention of a phenomenological a priori (Benoist, 1999).

There are, in fact, numerous similarities between Bolzano's and Husserl's thoughts, and one may say that, along with Brentano, Bolzano was the author who had the greatest influence on Husserl. We are not, however, to forget the fundamental differences which also separate their ways of thinking. Bolzano was above all a realist. He did not care for constitution problems, and Husserl was right when he wrote in Ideas 94 that Bolzano had no idea of what phenomenology actually was. Certainly, the first stage of Husserl's thought, which can be called a "realist"

one, was much closer to Bolzano's thought than what came afterward. However, Husserl, who inherited a way of thinking in terms of "acts" from his mentor Brentano, was at that time already of the opinion that consciousness may determine the real, and give an intentional sense to it. The very idea of intentionality is, however, very far removed from Bolzano's thought, which holds to an absolute realism. Such a position can also explain the fact that Bolzano had no idea of the Husserlian concept of "formal object", which is bound up in the concept of categorial operations on the object. Consequently, Husserl remarks, not without reason, that Bolzano was much more of an empiricist than he himself was (Husserl, 1913, 9). In Bolzano's work, a form of semantical realism (and, in another sense, of idealism) is to be found, but no sense of ontological (Platonic) idealities, because Bolzano had no way of constituting them.
The Bolzano-Husserl relation therefore provides an interesting example of a very close relationship, both historical and conceptual, between two ways of thinking founded on very different, even quite opposite presuppositions. Such a paradoxical synthesis may actually constitute the originality of phenomenology, in its unification of both branches (the psychological and the semantical) of the Austrian philosophical tradition." (p. 99)

From: Jocelyn Benoist, "Husserl and Bolzano", in: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, pp. 98-100.

FREGE AND HUSSERL

"There is a historiographical myth or tale in analytic circles according to .which in his youth Husserl was a very naive philosopher who in his *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1) of 1891 not only propounded an extreme form of psychologism but also dared to criticize the almighty Frege's views as presented in *Die*

Grundlagen der Arithmetik (2) of 1884. According to the tale, it was Frege's 'devastating' critique of Husserl's book in 1894 and the study by Husserl of other of Frege's writings which were responsible for Husserl's abandonment of psychologism in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen* (3) of 1900/1901 and his embracing of Frege's views on logic, mathematics and their relationship, and of Frege's distinction between sense and reference of expressions in the First Logical Investigation. Husserl, however, so says the tale, fell once more out of grace into psychologism in the second volume of *Logische Untersuchungen* and never freed himself from such a pernicious addiction. To this historiographical myth have adhered many influential scholars in the analytic tradition, e.g., Evert W. Beth in *The Foundations of Mathematics*, (4) Michael Dummett in *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, (5) Dagfinn Follesdal in *Husserl and Frege,* (6) and, of course, almost every Fregean scholar that has ever mentioned issue, e.g., Hans Sluga (7) and Christian Thiel, (8) to name just two of the most distinguished. It is then no mystery that Husserl's views on logic and mathematics have been completely ignored in the analytic tradition.

The historiographical myth has been challenged in my dissertation of 1973 and especially in my paper "Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl," (10) and also by J. N. Mohanty in various writings, (11) and more recently and forcefully by Claire Ortiz Hill in her *Word and Object in Frege and Russell* (12) and in other writings. The result of such investigations is essentially the following: (1) *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, although published in 1891, represents Husserl's views at most up to 1890; (2) Husserl made the distinction between the sense and reference of expressions around 1890, and it is present in his review of the first volume of Ernst Schroder's *Vorlesungen ber die Algebra der Logik* also published in 1891, as Frege himself acknowledged in a letter to Husserl of May of that same year; (13) (3) Husserl's views on logic and mathematics as presented in *Logische Untersuchungen* and other later writings were developed from 1890 to 1895 with total independence of Frege, but under the influence of Bolzano, Lotze, and others, and of the mathematical work of Riemann, Cantor, and others, and are clearly distinct from Frege's; (4) there was no conversion to

psychologism in the second volume of *Logische Untersuchungen* and later writings. By the way, as Claire Ortiz Hill has shown, (14) Husserl was not the propounder of a naive extreme psychologism in *Philosophie der Arithmetik* as Frege and his uncritical followers would like us to believe. But even if that were the case, it is a very unusual piece of scholarship to consider only a philosopher's early views on a subject while completely ignoring his mature views. If Kantian scholars from the very beginning had examined only Kant's pre-critical writings, we would very probably never had learnt about his duly famous views on space and time in his critical philosophy." (pp. 199-200)

Notes

(1) E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik, mit ergänzenden Texten*, Husserliana, vol. XII (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970 [1891]).
(2) G. Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (Hamburg: Centenarausgabe, Meiner, 1986 [1884]), introduction by C. Thiel.
(3) E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserliana, vols. XVIII and XIX (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1975 and 1984 [1900/01,2nd ed. rev.,1913]).
(4) E. W. Beth, T *he Foundations of Mathematics*, 2nd ed. rev. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1965 [1959]), p. 353.
(5) M. Dummett, *Frege, Philosophy of Language* (London: Duckworth, 1973), XLII-XLIII and p. 158.
(6) D. Follesdal, "Husserl and Frege,"*Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, ed. L. Haaparanta (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 3-47, translation of his 1958 Norwegian Masters thesis.
(7) E.g., in H. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p..2, and especially pp. 39-40 and his "Semantic Content and Cognitive Sense,"*Frege Synthesized*, ed. L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 3-47.
(8) E. g. in C. Thiel's Editor's Introduction to the Centenarausgabe edition of Frege's *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,* p. LI.
(9) “Edmund Husserls Philosophie der Logik und Mathematik im Lichte der genwärtigen Logik und Grundlagenforschung," Ph.D.

diss., Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 1973.
(10) “Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl," Kant-Studien 73, no. 4 (1982): 425-39, chapter 2 of the present book. Although published in 1982, this paper was accepted for publication in 1979.
(11) E. g. in J. N. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982).
(12) C. O. Hill, *Word and Object in Husserl, Frege and Russell* (Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press, 1991). See also her "Frege's Attack on Husserl and Cantor" (chapter 6 of the present book), "Husserl and Frege on Substitutivity” (chapter 1 of the present book), and "Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness" (chapter 10 of the present book).
(13) See Frege's *Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel,* ed. G. Gabriel et. al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976), pp. 94-98.
(14) See Hill's "Frege' Attack on Husserl and Cantor," chapter 6 of the present book.

From: Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, "To Be a Fregean or To Be a Husserlian: That is the Question for Platonists", in: Claire Ortiz Hill and F. E. Rosado Haddock, *Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics*, La Salle: Open Court 2000, pp. 199-220.

HUSSERL'S FORMAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC (1929)

"In 1929 Husserl published *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which was the product of decades of reflection upon the relationship between logic and mathematics, between mathematical logic and philosophical logic, between logic and psychology, and between psychologism and his own transcendental phenomenology. One of the stated goals of the book was to redraw the boundary line between logic and mathematics in light of the new investigations into the foundations of mathematics. A second goal was to examine the

logical and epistemological issues such developments have raised (Husserl, 1929, 10-17).

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl expressed his conviction that the formalization of large tracts of mathematics in the nineteenth century had laid bare the deep, significant connections obtaining between formal mathematics and formal logic, and had thus raised profound new questions about the deep underlying connections existing between the two fields. Logic and mathematics, he believed, had originally developed as separate fields because it had taken so long to elevate any particular branch of mathematics to the status of a purely formal discipline free of any reference to particular objects. Until that had been accomplished the important internal connections obtaining between the two fields were destined to remain hidden. However, once large tracts of mathematics had been formalized, the parallels existing between its structures and those of logic became apparent, and the abstract, ideal, objective dimension of logic could then be properly recognized, as it traditionally had been in mathematics. Developments in formalization had thus unmasked the close relationships between the propositions of logic and number statements, making it possible for logicians to develop a genuine logical calculus which would enable them to calculate with propositions in the way mathematicians did with numbers, quantities and the like (Husserl, 1929, Chapter 2).

Mathematics, Husserl deemed, has its own purity and legitimacy. Mathematicians are free to create arbitrary structures. They need not be concerned with questions regarding the actual existence of their formal constructs, nor with any application or relationship their constructs might have to possible experience, or to any transcendent reality. They are free to do ingenious things with thoughts or symbols that receive their meaning merely from the way in which they are combined, to pursue the necessary consequences of arbitrary axioms about meaningless things, restricted only by the need to be non-contradictory and in coordination with concepts previously introduced by precise definition. And the same, Husserl contended, was true for formal logic when it was actually developed with the radical purity that is necessary for its philosophical usefulness and gives it the highest philosophical importance. Severed from the physical world, it

lacks everything that makes possible a differentiation of truths or, correlatively of evidences (Husserl, 1929, 138, 23, 40, 51). However, as theoreticians of science in general, philosophical logicians are obliged to contend with the question of basic truths about a universe of objects existing outside of formal systems. They are called upon to seek solutions to the problems that come up when scientific discourse steps outside the purely formal domain and makes reference to specific objects or domains of objects. They are not free to sever their ties with nature and science, to accept a logic that tears itself entirely away from the idea of any possible application and becomes a mere ingenious playing with thoughts, or symbols that mere rules or conventions have invested with meaning. They must step out of the abstract world of pure analytic logic, with its ideal, abstract entities, and confront those more tangible objects that make up the material world of things. In addition, they are obliged to step back and investigate the theory of formal languages and systems themselves, and their interpretations (ex. Husserl, 1929, 40, 52).
So, Husserl believed that formal logic required a complement. Once liberated from things and psychologizing subjectivity, pure logic had to find its necessary complement in a transcendental logic that would take into account the connections that philosophical logic inevitably maintains with both knowing subjects and the concrete world. For Husserl, true philosophical logic could only develop in connection with a transcendental phenomenology by which logicians penetrate an objective realm which is entirely different from them (ex. Husserl, 1929, 40, 42).
However, Husserl always insisted on the primacy of the objective side of logic. He insisted that the subjective order could not be properly examined until the objective order had been, and until the objectivity of the structures girding scientific knowledge had been established and demonstrated. He maintained that pure logic with its abstract ideal structures had to be clearly seen and definitely apprehended as dealing with ideal objects before transcendental questions about them could be asked (Husserl, 1929, 8, 9, 11, 26, 42-44, 92, 98, 100).
It is knowledge of formal logic, he reminded readers in Formal and Transcendental Logic, that supplies the standards by which to measure the extent to which any presumed science meets the

criteria of being a genuine science, the extent to which the particular findings of that science constitute genuine knowledge, the extent to which the methods it uses are genuine ones (Husserl, 1929, 7). The world constituted by transcendental subjectivity is a pre-given world, Husserl explained in Experience and Judgement. It is not a pure world of experience, but a world that is determined and determinable in itself with exactitude, a world within which any individual entity is given beforehand in a perfectly obvious way as being in principle determinable in accordance with the methods of exact science and as being a world in itself in a sense originally deriving from the achievements of the physico-mathematical sciences of nature (ex. Husserl, *Experience and Judgement*, 1939, 11; Husserl, 1929, 26b).

Husserl was perfectly conscious of the extraordinary difficulties that this dual orientation of logic involved. Since, according to his theories, the ideal, objective, dimension of logic and the actively constituting, subjective dimension interrelate and overlap, or exist side by side, logical phenomena thus seem to be suspended between subjectivity and objectivity in a confused way. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, he suggested that almost all that concerns the fundamental meaning of logic, the problems it deals with, its method, is laden with misunderstandings owing to the very fact that objectivity arises out of subjective activity. He even considered that it was due to these difficulties that, after centuries and centuries, logic had not attained the secure path of rational development (ex. Husserl 1929, 8)." pp. 90-94

From: Claire Ortiz Hill, "On Husserl's Mathematical Apprenticeship and Philosophy of Mathematics", in: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study,* Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, pp. 78-94.

ONTOLOGY IN HUSSERL'S FORMAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

"In his work *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* with its significant subheading "*An Attempted Critique of the Logic Reason*", Husserl formulates his final conception of logic.
We shall deal here only with the principal theses set forth in this work which, we feel, may introduce us into the core of Husserl's conception.
The formal character of logic. What specifically characterizes logic is the generality of its principles (its applicability to all the fields) an aprioristic or essential generality which is formal in nature. Moreover, according to Husserl, the mind itself is a formal concept. In order to define the most general of all concepts, i.e. that of form, which is extremely important in his system, he makes the following remarks: in a certain sense, any essential knowledge is a formation of "pure" reason, i.e. free from any empirical process, but in a second sense, that of principle form, any principle knowledge is not pure. An aprioristic sentence about sounds in general, thought of, hence, in "pure" generality, is pure in the first sense but it is an a priori contingent (*Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, p. 26). This sentence has in the eidos "sound" its concrete kernel, which transcends the realm of principle generalities and connects the sentence with the "contingent field of ideally possible sounds".
"Pure" reason exceeds not only what is empirical fact, but also any essential sphere related to hylé (the matter), to the concrete. Pure reason - writes Husserl - designates the system of pure principles closed in itself, which principles precede any a priori relating to the hylé (*ibidem*).
These two aspects of the general induce Husserl to accept two notions of formal: (1) the a priori formal, analytical in nature; (2) the a priori formal, material and contingent in nature.
Summing up, logic is formal for it is but the development of pure reason, which is a formal concept. Logic is thus the self-interpretation of pure reason (*die Selbstauslegung der reinen Vernunft*) which is a formal activity.
Formal logic is conceived as apophantic analytics. According to Husserl, Aristotle's logic was a formal logic in the above sense, but this was a specific sense. Aristotle was the first, he writes, to have fully brought out the concept of form meant to determine

the fundamental sense of a "formal logic", such as we understand it at present and such as Leibniz understood in his synthesis of formal logic (as apophantic logic) and in his formal analysis of a unique *mathesis universalis*.
(...)
Formal logic, conceived in this way, will have a triple "stratification". Although Aristotle, says Husserl, foresaw this formal logic as an apophantic analytics, he still failed to discriminate all its strata or levels. Here are the three formal levels as conceived by Husserl:(a) Pure morphology of judgements, which is the first logical-formal discipline or the first formal level. It is concerned with the simple possibility of judgements as such without questioning their truth or falsehood. It deals with the generality of judgement forms, the fundamental forms and their variants.
Morphology will also be concerned with the concept of operation as the directing idea in the search for forms.
(b) Logic of consequences (logic of non-contradiction) is the second level of formal logic... This new level, which is one step higher than the first, is the science of the possible forms of true judgements. About these forms Husserl writes: "Particularly as regards the forms of deduction (complex forms of sentences in which correct as well as false deductions are to be found), it is clear that they are not arbitrary forms of sentences which may be associated in order to constitute forms of authentical deductions, of effectively consistent deductions" (op. cit., p. 47).
Thus it is obvious that some forms of deduction have at the same time the value of essential formal laws, especially of general truths relating to judgement consequences.
(c) Formal logic of truth. The third level of formal logic, superior to the other two, is the research of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities.
Let us now see how logic proceeds from simple forms of the meaning of enunciations, i.e. from the forms of judgement, to become a logic of truth. It is clear that non-contradiction is the essential condition of possible truth. But it is equally obvious, that only by connecting concepts different in themselves can analytics become a logic of truth (op. cit., 49). "This stratification, writes Husserl, has remained alien to the usage of logic so far. It

stands to reason that the separation of the formal logic of non-contradiction from the formal logic of truth is something essentially and fundamentally new, no matter how well this separation might have been known, if we only refer to words. For these expressions were themselves aiming at something else, namely at the distinction between the problems of formal logic, taken generally, and in this way leaving out all the material contents of knowledge, and those problems which have to he posed in a wider sense through a logic which, however, is such that it brings into play this material content. This last logic raises questions relating to the possibility of knowing natural reality and to the configuration of truths concerning the real world" (op. cit., p. 63). (...)

Formal apophantic and formal ontology. Examining the relation between formal apophantics (which is concerned with true or false judgements) and formal ontology, Husserl makes an essential distinction. In formal analytics the object is regarded solely as an object of possible judgements, as an object of the forms of judgement attributed to it by analytics. This may also be the case in mathematics. In other words, a formal analytics, as well as a formal mathematics, may be conceived of as a game in itself, with an autonomous aim which does not consider any field whatever where it might be applied. This is formal analytics as a pure play of thought. "Consequently, writes Husserl, mathematics (formal) may remain indifferent to the fact that all these formations are intended to appear within any sort of judgement aimed at knowledge (remaining undetermined in their substance).

(...)

It is therefore necessary to make a clear distinction between these two formal ways of conceiving logic: one aimed at the possibility of sentences being true or false - a domain of apophantics - and another, the domain of formal ontology, which includes knowledge. The first distinction Husserl's makes is the following: formal apophantics is thematically directed towards judgement (which also implies a tendency toward syntactic configurations which appear as constituents in the judgement which has become a theme; formal ontology is directed towards objects and their syntactic forms which are taken as themes in the activity of the

judgement, though they are taken in such a way that the judgements and their elements are not themes. The solution of this problem is given by Husserl in this way: the judging act is not directed towards judgement but towards the thematic object. However, when we are considering our own judgements, their constitutive elements, their connections and their relations, this takes place within a new to-judge-act, of a second degree, a judgement about judgements, in which judgements become thematic objects.

Analytics as formal ontology. Since every science has its own field, scientific knowledge is directed towards a thematic object and in this case analytics, being a formal doctrine of science, has, as all sciences have, a real direction, and because of its a priori generality, it may be said to have an ontological direction. It is a formal ontology (op. cit., p. 107). Its a priori truths enunciate what is valid and therefore endowed with formal generality for objects-in-general, for domains of objects in general. They enunciate in what form these objects in general exist or may exist; these enunciations are themselves judgements, for it is in judgements alone that objects-in-general "exist" in the form of categories." (pp. 362-366)

From: Anton Dumitriu, *History of Logic*, Volume III, Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press 1977.

Related pages

Selected bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology:

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Second Part: K - Z

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Selected Bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology (First Part: A - J)

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The most complete bibliography is: *Edmund Husserl. Bibliography,* Compiled by Steven Spileers, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999, VI + 450 pages.
From the *General Introduction*: "This bibliography contains the publications of Husserl and the main secondary literature on Husserl, from Husserl's earliest publication (1887) till today (1997), As the collection of material was concluded in June 1997, the list of publications for the year 1997 if of course incomplete. In this bibliography publications in the following languages have been included: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch - for both primary and secondary literature. Since this bibliography has been base primarily on the consultation of the included documents (and not restricted to copying already existing Bibliographies), it was not possible to include publications in languages other than those mentioned."

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3. Ameriks, Karl. 1977. "Husserl's Realism." *Philosophical Review* no. 86:498-519.

4. Angelelli, Ignacio. 1989. "Husserl-Frege: Filosofia Del Numero." *Analisis Filosofico* no. 9:139-145.

   After pointing out some of the coincidence between Frege and Husserl about the philosophy of numbers and paying less attention to the subject of psychologism, in order to understand the differences between the authors, the analysis that each one made on the nature of number are described, showing the most evident divergencies.

Immediately afterwards, three objections are examined regarding Husserl's position and a crucial criticism is formulated against Frege's method, related to the one discussed by Husserl. Lastly, it is assumed that it is possible to offer a method of analysis that gathers together the most important aspects of both authors points of view and leaving out the most noticeable defects."

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   Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an example of a larger body of theories dubbed `language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment,

his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus."

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   Reprinted in: Aspects of language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics - Jerusalem - The Magnes Press - The Hebrew University, 1970 pp. 89-97.
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    Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal.
    Ce travail s'attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive entre dans le

projet général de Husserl d'asseoir la phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde."

11. ———. 2001. "La Réverbération Logique: La Phénoménologie Des "Prolégomènes À La Logique Pure" De Husserl." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 99:564-592.

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    The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, and the lectures on *Descriptive Psychology* belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."

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In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl uses a concept of "analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the logical rule, what does "logical" mean?"

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    Chacune des études rasssemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés qui, jusqu'ici, ont detérminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure, orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concours également à apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la philosophie contemporaine."

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47. Caputo, Anselmo. 2000. "Gli "Studi Psicologici Per Una Logica Elementare" Di Husserl." *Aquinas* no. 43:31-62.

48. Carvalho, Vargas Carlos Eduardo de. 2007. *A Teoria Das Multiplicidades (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) Na Lógica Pura Dos Prolegômenos Às Investigaões Lógicas De Edmund Husserl*.

    This research aims to explain the Theory of Manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) since its mathematical genesis until its meaning in the pure logic (reine Logik) as theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre), reaching its philosophical consequences relating to phenomenology. The manifold (Mannigfaltigkeiten) are analysed in the Husserl's development on the view of the elements of the philosophical theory described in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik), first volume of the Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen). After a description of the psychologism's problematic on the debate about objectivity in the fields of logics, mathematics and general knowledge, the work presents the division of the

issues concerneds to the theory of manifolds considering the categories of meaning and objects investigateds by logics, mathematicians and philosophers. "

49. Casadio, Claudia. 1990. "Husserl E Il Pradigma Mereologico." *Lingua e Stile* no. 25:405-423.

50. Casari, Ettore. 2005. "On Husserl's Theory of Wholes and Parts." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 21:1-43.

    The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl in his *Third logical Investigation*-to which he attributed a basic value for his entire phenomenology-has recently attracted a renewed interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially by Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim *Husserlian universes* are introduced. These are lower bounded distributive lattices endowed with a unary operation of *defect* and a binary relation of *isogeneity*. Husserl"s contents are identified with nonzero elements of a *Husserlian universe* and the *dependence relations among contents* are defined and studied starting from the idea that the defect of *x* is what *x* needs in order to "exist" i.e., in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of *x* and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous *Husserl"s Satze*) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: *species*) are identified with equivalence classes of contents *modulo isogeneity*, and species in general (for short: *genera*) are identified with arbitrary unions of *species*. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl"s theory of the *dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori*

laws. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of *rigid Husserlian universe*, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers ; the second one identifies contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally "rigid") identifies contents with positive integers."

51. Cavallin, Jens. 1997. *Content and Object. Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    See in particular: Chapter 3. Husserl and Twardowski: a philosophical encounter pp. 21-42
    Appendix I: References to Twardowski in Husserl's published works 241
    Appendix III: Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass 243-248.

52. Celis, Raphael. 1996. "Le Problème De La Mathématisation Du Savoir Dans L'œuvre Tardive De Husserl." *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 128:1-24.

    The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology to mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern physics. Through its reformulation. Husserl tried to imagine the foundational range of an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in the "Lebenswelt"."

53. Centrone, Stefania. 2009. *Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

54. Cobb-Stevens, Richard. 1990. *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

55. ———. 1994. "The Beginnings of Phenomenology: Husserl and His Predecessors." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Viii: Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy*, edited by Kearney, Richard, 5-37. New York: Routledge.

56. ———. 1998. "Two Stages in Husserl's Critique of Brentano's Theory of Judgment." *Études Phénomenologiques* no. 14 (27-28):193-212.

57. ———. 2002. ""Aristotelian" Themes in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." In *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 79-92. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

58. Cortois, Paul. 1996. "From Apophantics to Manifolds: The Structure of Husserl's Formal Logic." *Philosophia Scientiae* no. 1:15-50.

    A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view got its fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (1929). It is shown how Husserl's understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First, there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic) interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Moreover, it is shown how, in Husserl's view, the virtual identity of apophantic and ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds) is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not philosophical) warrant for the unity of formal science."

59. Courtine, Jean-Franois. 1996. "L'objet De La Logique." In *Phénomenologie Et Logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-Franois, 9-31. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure.

60. ———, ed. 1996. *Phénomenologie Et Logique*. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure.

61. Crosson, Frederick James. 1962. "Formal Logic and Formal Ontology in Husserl's Phenomenology." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 3:259-269.

62. Cunningham, Suzanne. 1976. *Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

63. Da Silva, Jairo José. 1999. "Husserl Conception of Logic." *Manuscrito* no. 22:367-397.

    This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege's."

64. ———. 2000. "Husserl's Two Notions of Completeness. Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness and Imaginary Elements in Mathematics." *Synthese* no. 125:417-438.

    In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891).
    In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl's terminology) for a

formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions of completeness."

65. Dahlstrom, Daniel O., ed. 2003. *Husserl's Logical Investigations*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

66. De Oliveira, Nythamar Fernandes. 2000. "Husserl's Phenomenology of Meaning in the "Logical Investigations"." *Veritas* no. 45:117-134.

    This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the fulfillment of "meaning" ("Bedeutung")."

67. Dougherty, Charles J. 1979. "The Significance of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Philosophy Today* no. 23:217-225.

    The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism and his positive theory of mind against both its historical background and the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic in a realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of non-reductive analysis, phenomenology. Phenomenological analysis itself is shown to be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active participant in the constitution of reality."

68. Dreyfus, Hubert L., ed. 1982. *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

69. Drummond, John J. 1991. "Willard and Husserl on Logical Form." In *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, edited

by Seebohm, Thomas, Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

70. ———. 1998. "From Intentionality to Intensionality and Back." *Études Phénomenologiques* no. 27-28:89-126.

71. ———. 2002. "The *Logical Investigations*: Paving the Way to a Transcendental Logic." In *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 31-40. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

72. ———. 2007. *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

73. Ducat, Philippe. 1996. "Que Veut La "Grammaire Purement Logique" De Husserl?" In *Phénomenologie Et Logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-Franois, 65-81. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.

74. Dufourcq, Annabelle. 2011. *La Dimension Imaginaire Du Réel Dans La Philosophie De Husserl*. Dordrecht: Springer.

75. Dupré, Louis. 1964. "The Concept of Truth in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 24:345-354.

    It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. when Husserl attacked psychological interpretations of truth, a logicism seemed to be predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, where truth is constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in an eternal order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given. Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact."

76. Edie, James M. 1987. *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. A Critical Commentary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

77. Eley, Lothar. 1969. *Metatrik Der Formalen Logik. Sinnliche Gewissheit Als Horizont Der Aussagenlogik Und Elementaren Prädikatenlogik*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

78. Elliston, Frederick A., and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1977. *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

79. Elveton, Roy O., ed. 1970. *The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical Readings*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

    Second edition with a new introduction: Seattle, Noesis Press, 2000.

80. English, Jacques. 1996. "Husserl Et Hilbert: La Phénoménologie Est-Elle Axiomatisable?" In *Phénomenologie Et Logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-Franois, 83-107. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.

81. ———. 1998. "Pourquoi Et Comment Husserl En Est Venu À Critiquer Brentano." *Études Phénomenologiques* no. 14 (27-28):51-88.

82. ———. 2002. *Le Vocabulaire De Husserl*. Paris: Ellipses.

83. Farber, Marvin. 1943. *The Foundations of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Reprinted with a new introduction, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1968.
    Reprint of the 1968 edition: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006.

84. Fine, Kit. 1995. "Part-Whole." In *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, edited by Smith, Barry and Smith, David Woodruff, 463-485. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

85. Fink, Eugen. 1995. *Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Method*. Boomington: Indian University Press.

    With textual notations by Edmund Husserl.
    Translated with an introduction by Ronald Bruzina.

86. Fisette, Denis. 1994. *Lecture Frégéenne De La Phénoménologie*. Combas: Éclat.

87. ———, ed. 2003. *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

88. Fisette, Denis, and Lapointe, Sandra, eds. 2003. *Aux Origines De La Phénoménologie. Husserl Et Le Contexte Des Recherches Logiques*. Paris: Vrin.

    Douze étude ont été réunies dans ce volume afin de souligner le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie. Fidèles à la vocation que lui assigne le père de la phénoménologie d'être une œuvre de percée, ces études ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives sur ce monumental *Grundwerk*. Elles se penchent sur les différents aspects des *Recherches logiques* en portant une attention particulière à son contexte historique, à ses sources (bolzaniennes et brentaniennes) dans la philosophie du XIXe siècle et à sa réception, du Cercle de Munich jusque dans la philosophie britannique."

89. Flores, Luis. 2002. "Husserl's Concept of Pure Logical Grammar." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 100-103. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

90. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1972. "An Introduction to Phenomenology for Analytic Philosophers." In *Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia*, edited by Paul, Anthony, Olson, Raymond and Wright, Georg Henrik von, 417-429. Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins Press.

Phenomenology is a science of noemata.
An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for example, numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics.
Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in addition to possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of noemata.
Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can be made the object of another act.
Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed. We do not deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is there, as if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. We perform an epoché, Husserl said, borrowing a word which the skeptics of antiquity used to denote abstinence from any judgment.
The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our acts have objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts. These are the phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left, purified of all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental. The phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the transcendental.

Phenomenological analysis-
The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes that he expects a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for a moment, and so forth. He studies the structure of the noemata of his acts. He elucidates how his expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an 'explosion' of the noemata and make him reject his original supposition about the direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different.
It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers, especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings of acts in general."

91. ———. 1976. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 20:680-687.

Reprinted in: Hunert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.) - *Husserl. Intentionality and cognitive science* - Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1982, pp. 73-80

92. ———. 1991. "The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology." In *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, edited by Seebohm, Thomas, Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 25-34. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence.
Husserl is particularly interested in *perfect* evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious first premisses, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for.
However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in logic and mathematics,- the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman and some other "holists". (p. 25)

93. ———. 1994. "Husserl and Frege. A Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy." In *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 3-47. Kluwer: Dordrecht.

Translated from German by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Original edition: *Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Entstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie* - Oslo, I kommisjon hos Aschehoug, 1958.

94. ———. 1995. "Gödel and Husserl." In *From Dedekind to Gödel*, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 427-446. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

95. ———. 1998. "La Notion D'objet Intentionnel Chez Husserl." In *Jaakko Hintikka: Questions De Logique Et De*

Phénoménologie, edited by Rigal, Élisabeth, 223-233. Paris: Vrin.

96. ———. 2001. "Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on Reference and Object." In *Future Pasts. The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy*, edited by Floyd, Juliet and Shieh, Sanford, 67-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

97. ———. 2004. "Husserl and the Categories." In *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, edited by Gorman, Michael. Washington: Catholic University. of America Press.

98. Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. *Rational Grammar*. München: Philosophia Verlag.

    Translated from the original French: *Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure* - Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan. "This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975 provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar, as it was sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena (names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.)."

99. Ginev, Dimitri. 1992. "Fundamental Ontology and Regional Ontology of Humanities." *Epistemologia* no. 15:87-100.

100. Gobber, Giovanni. 1985. "Alle Origini Della Grammatica Categoriale. Husserl, Lesniewski, Ajdukiewicz." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 77:258-295.

101. Haaparanta, Leila. 1988. "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl." *Synthese* no. 77:73-97.

This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logics. Frege regards the problem of discovering logical laws as a psychological problem but takes the interest in the method of discovering the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to construct a new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how Husserl proceeds in his studies of the origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely on the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their logical studies."

102. ———, ed. 1994. *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

103. ———. 1998. "L'analyse Comme Méthode De Justification: Quelques Remarques Sur Les Études Logiques De Husserl." In *Jaakko Hintikka: Questions De Logique Et De Phénoménologie*, 234-246. Paris: Vrin.

104. ———. 2006. "Husserl's Argument against Naturalism and His Own Foundation of Pure Philosophy." In *Foundations of the Formal Sciences Iv. The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences*, edited by Löwe, Benedikt, Peckhaus, Volker and Rasch, Thomas, 69-79. London: College Publications.

105. Hamacher, Hermes Adelheid. 1992. "Debate between Husserl and Voigt Concerning the Logic of Content and Extensional Logic." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 34.

106. Hanna, Robert. 1984. "The Relation of Form and Stuff in Husserl's Grammar of Pure Logic." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 44:323-342.

107. ———. 1993. "Logical Cognition: Husserl's "Prolegomena" and the Truth in Psychologism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 53:251-275.

Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a) logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b) those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism."

108. Hart, James G. 2004. "Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*. Lectures on Transcendental Logic." *Husserl Studies* no. 20:135-159.

109. Harvey, Charles W., and Shelton, Jim D. 1992. "Husserl's Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Natural Sciences." In *Phenomenology of Natural Science*, edited by Hardy, Lee and Embree, Lester. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

110. Heffernan, George. 1983. *Bedeutung Und Evidenz Bei Edmund Husserl*. Bonn: Bouvier.

Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bedeutungs- und der Evidenztheorie in den "Logischen Untersuchungen" und der "Formalen und transzendentalen Logik" : ein Vergleich anhand der Identitätsproblematik

111. ———. 1989. *Isagoge in Die Phänomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einführung in Die Phänomenologische Urteilslogik Durch Die Auslegung Des Textes Der Formalen Und Transzendentalen Logik Von Edmund Husserl*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

112. ———. 1989. "In the Beginning Was the "Logos": Hermeneutical Remarks on the Starting-Point of Edmund

Husserl's "Formal and Transcendental Logic"." *Man and World* no. 22:185-213.

According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in continental philosophy."

113. ———. 1989. *Am Anfang War Die Logik. Hermeneutische Abhandlungen Zum Ansatz Der Formalen Und Transzendentalen Logik Von Edmund Husserl*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

114. ———. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question "Was Die Evidenz Sei": A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasione of the Publication of Husserliana Volume Xxx." *Husserl Studies* no. 15:1-75.

115. ———. 2002. "Language, Logic, and Logocentrism in Transcendental Phenomenology: Critical Reflections on the *Sprachvergessenheit* of the Later Husserl." *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 2:205-247.

116. Hill, Claire Ortiz. 1991. *Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy*.

Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Reprinted 2001.
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
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1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analyticity 91.
Part Two: Conceptual clarity
Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way *things* are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic is* both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of

Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)

117. ———. 1994. "Frege's Attack on Husserl and Cantor." *Monist* no. 77:345-357.

118. ———. 1997. "Did Georg Cantor Influence Edmund Husserl?" *Synthese* no. 113:145-170.

Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds."

119. ———. 2002. "On Husserl's Mathematical Apprenticeship and Philosophy of Mathematics." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 74-94. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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121. Hill, Claire Ortiz, and Rosado Haddock, Guillermo. 2000. *Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics*. Chicago: Open Court.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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    This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of).
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"The concept of formal ontology was first developed by Husserl. It concerns problems relating to the notions of object, substance, property, part, whole, predication, nominalization, etc. The idea of formal ontology is present in many of Husserl's works, with minor changes. This paper provides a reconstruction of such an idea. Husserl's proposal is faced with contemporary logical orthodoxy and it is presented also an interpretative hypothesis, namely that the original difference between the general perspective of usual model theory and formal ontology is grounded in the fact that this latter starts from an *intended* interpretation and not from the set of all the possible interpretations."
"1. Introduction
The term 'formal ontology' has been given two different interpretations. The first of these, entirely in keeping with the mainstream of contemporary philosophy, has been what I shall call analytic: formal ontology is that branch of ontology which is analysed within the framework of formal logic. The leading exponent of this approach has undoubtedly been Nino Cocchiarella. (1) On the premise that each particular science has its own 'mode of being', Cocchiarella has written that `metaphysics [...] - or what we might instead call formal ontology - is concerned with the study and development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic co-ordination of all the "modes" or "categories of being" under the most general laws' (1974, 29-30). From this point of view, formal ontology studies the

logical characteristics of predication and the various theories of universals.
The other interpretation, which I shall call phenomenological, developed from Husserl's early works, in particular Logical investigations. As a first approximation, we may say that this approach mainly addresses the problems of parts and wholes and of dependence. Despite their differences, these two varieties of formal ontology quite frequently overlap each other, although to date there has been no systematic study of the categories and layers that constitute formal ontology and no systematic analysis of the issues addressed by it." p. 1.
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logic can also be defined as the science of objects taken in their most general sense. Indications were given how this general science of objects includes various mathematical disciplines."

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    Reprinted as Chapter 14 in: C. Ortiz Hill and G. Rosado Haddock, *Husserl Or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics*, Chicago, Open Court, 2000, pp. 253-262. "In his influential paper 'Mathematical Truth' (1) Paul Benacerraf states two requirements for any account of mathematical truth to be worth considering, namely: (i) that the semantic treatment of mathematical statements does not differ essentially from the semantic treatment of non-mathematical statements, and (ii) that the account of mathematical truth harmonize with what he calls a reasonable epistemology. According to him, combinatorial accounts of mathematical truth, which tend to identify mathematical truth with derivability in a formal system, violate the first requirement, whereas, platonist philosophies of mathematics (like Gödel's) violate the second requirement. Such a violation of the second requirement, however, depends on Benacerraf s

understanding of, 'reasonable epistemology'. It should be clear that if one identifies 'reasonable epistemology' with empiricist theory of knowledge (causal or not), platonist philosophies of mathematics are not easy to reconcile with reasonable epistemologies. But such an identification need not be taken for granted.

In this paper, however, we are not interested in discussing the merits of Benacerraf's sketch of a causal theory of mathematical truth, but would like to state a third requirement (i. e. a third necessary condition) for a semantics plus epistemology of mathematics, which in our opinion is not satisfied by any causal account. (iii) A semantics plus epistemology of mathematics must give a satisfactory account of the equivalence -- in the sense of interderivability -- of apparently unrelated mathematical statements -- like the Axiom of Choice and its many mathematical equivalents.

The best known representatives of platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, i. e. Cantor, Frege and Gödel, did not develop enough -- so far as we know -- an epistemology of mathematics. Husserl, however, whose philosophy of mathematics (as developed in *Logische Untersuchungen* (2) and *Formate und transzendentale Logik* (3) can also be considered as a sort of platonism, tried to develop in his *Sixth Logical Investigation* and in *Erfahrung und Urteil* (4) such an epistemology of mathematics. It is our opinion that Husserl's sketchy epistemology of mathematics plus his somewhat scattered remarks of a semantical nature can be elaborated further to produce a semantics plus epistemology that satisfies all three requirements stated above. In this paper, however, we will limit our consideration to some of Husserl's semantical insights and will try to show rather sketchily how some of these insights can be fruitfuly applied in a semantics of mathematics that satisfies the first and third of the above requirements (i. e. those which are more properly of a semantic nature, since the second is rather a requirement on epistemologies of mathematics).

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(2) See *Logische Untersuchungen*, I, Ch. XI.
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"Philosophy as Universal Science

Husserl insisted from the very beginning that the concept of philosophy involves two different, yet equally essential elements. Philosophical knowledge is both absolutely valid and *completely universal*. The first aspect concerns the way in which philosophical truths are known, i.e. the quality of philosophical cognition. Philosophy, Husserl says, is apodictic, evident and radical; it yields absolutely legitimized knowledge whose evidence flows from ultimate sources of cognition and is founded upon definitive fundaments. Philosophy, in short, is a rigorous science. The second aspect concerns the object of philosophical knowledge, i.e. the quantity of its field. The range of philosophy, as Husserl conceives it, is the universe of whatever can be known. Philosophy is all comprehensive knowledge or "universal knowledge of what is". Husserl thereby takes up the traditional definition of philosophy as the science of being qua being. But he also goes along with the traditional division of philosophy into a number of special disciplines, which together constitute philosophy as such.

Two main divisions of philosophical disciplines are to be found in Husserl's writings, which at first sight seem to have no connection with one another. On the one hand, he divides philosophy into a *theoretical* and a *practical* branch. Philosophy is, first of all, theoretical because it defends the idea of absolute knowledge and is to issue forth in 'pure theory'. The philosopher is from this perspective an uninterested spectator watching over subjective acts and their objective correlates. On the one hand, however, philosophy is practical also because its *goal* is absolute ethical life and rational practice, and from this perspective philosophy aims at a revolution in our life and habits in order to make us perfect personalities. Its purpose is to bring about a philosophical culture in which reason alone will determine the will and decisions of mankind.

In addition to this however Husserl also, and indeed more frequently, adopts a tripartite division into *theoretical, axiological* and *practical* philosophy. This division agrees with the three main areas of reason - cognitive (logical) reason, evaluative and practical. Since the phenomenological elucidation of reason is at the same time a critique of the possibilities of reason, Husserl also says that phenomenology aims at a critique of knowledge, of value and of practice.

Let us first turn to theoretical philosophy. According to Husserl, it is natural that philosophy should "set out from what is most general and from there pass over to the particulars contained under it". Correspondingly he introduces into theoretical philosophy a distinction between a discipline of general forms and the doctrine of their material specifications. The first he calls 'formal ontology'; it deals with the forms of objects. The second he divides into a number of different 'material ontologies', each one of which relates to a region of objects circumscribed by certain features they have in common.

Formal ontology - or, as he also sometimes calls it, *mathesis universalis* - is, Husserl says, the science of the pure forms of something-in-general and of its modalities or derivations. It treats formal categories such as state of affairs, genus and species, identity and difference, number, whole and part. This shows that formal ontology is the sphere to which Husserl devoted most of his work in the period ranging from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) to the *Logical Investigations* (1901). He distinguishes between several sub-disciplines of formal ontology, reflecting diverse formal aspects of the object-as-such. Thus as parts of formal ontology he mentions logic (i.e. the formal doctrine of meanings), pure arithmetic and the pure theory of manifolds or sets.

Only in later years did Husserl turn to material ontologies, e.g., in his lectures on nature (1907), on intersubjectivity (1910/11) or in *Ideas* II (1912ff.), as well as in his various lectures and seminars on *Natur* and *Geist*. Nowhere does he give an exhaustive list of disciplines which together would

make up the realm of material ontology in its entirety. He does, though, repeatedly mention *nature, soul* and *society* as delimiting three corresponding material ontologies." pp. 274-275 (Notes omitted).

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"It is sometimes said that questions of form are questions of logic or language. In his "Logical Investigations" Husserl, however, clearly distinguished formal ontology from formal grammar and formal logic. The article attempts to explain Husserl's notion of formal ontology. It investigates the relation between formal and material ontology as well as the relation between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. The article provides an interpretation of Husserl's claim that there are metaphysical necessities which are necessarily recognized by the human mind on the basis of Husserl's well-known
distinction between the meanings of mental acts and their objective correlates."

104. ———. 2004. "Abstraction and Abstract Concepts: On Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*." In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 215-232. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

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"I have the highest admiration for this effort and its result, much higher than for all other Husserl translations known to me. But it would be too bad if the users of this translation were denied the chance of minor emendations which I would like to suggest as a result of an intensive reading of the translation in a seminar at Washington University along with the German text. I shall therefore select some of the more important ones as follows:

1. On page 218 line 20 read "quantitative" for "qualitative," (pointed out by Robert Sokolowski in Inquiry 14 (1971), 347).
2. On page 225 in the first line of paragraph 62 the phrase "unified item in anthropology" (as a characterization of science) for " *anthropologische Einheit*" might better be rendered as "cultural system". In Husserl's framework anthropology, as introduced in Chapter VII ("Anthropologismus") has no relation to the science of anthropology, at the time mostly physical, but to the emphasis on human factors.
3. In the title of Chapter I in Investigation II (p. 535) the rendition of the German *Bestand* (" *Bewusstsein als phaenomenologischer Bestand des Ich . . .*") by "Subsistence" ("Consciousness as Phenomenological Subsistence of the Ego") is misleading, since here the German word (of many meanings) clearly refers to the composition or content of the ego, rather than to any mode of its existence in the sense of Meinong's *Bestand* of his *Objektive* (states of affairs).
4. In the title and text of Chapter IV in Investigation VI the rendition of the German *Verträglichkeit* and *Unverträglichkeit* by "Consistency and Inconsistency" seems to me debatable, since their German equivalents are *Widerspuchsfreiheit* and *Widerspruchlichkeit*. Closer English equivalents of the words in the German title are "Compatibility" and "Incompatibility".
5. On p. 804 line 17 from the bottom the word "own" (repeated in the following line) ought to be dropped.
6. On p. 812 line 10 the proper translation of the idiomatic *Mit nichten, wurden wir einwenden* would be "By no

means, we would object" (rather than "Binding them with nothing . . .").
I have only one serious regret about these two volumes. The distribution of the two very unequal German volumes of the first and even of the second edition (subdividing volume II) may be technically defensible, provided that it does not conceal the fact that the German volumes appeared separately in two subsequent years (1900 and 1901 respectively). It is also only a minor incongruency that volume II begins on the back page of volume I, thus minimizing the break by not even inserting a new page; whereas each of the six Investigations within volume II is preceded by a special title page. But what is really unfortunate is that the title of volume II (*Untersuchungen zur Phaenomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*) is missing both on p. 248 and in the Table of Contents, this all the more since the title of volume I ("Prolegomena to Pure Logic") appears correctly in both places. Among other things this conceals the important historical fact that it was in the title of the second volume that Husserl for the first time used the term "phenomenology," still absent from volume I, explicitly and conspicuously. While it is controversial whether the undeniable historical impression was correct that Volume II meant a new departure in Husserl's development, as it was certainly interpreted at the time, the fact that there was definite reason for this impression must not be forgotten." p. 196.

106. Spinicci, Paolo. 1985. *I Pensieri Dell'esperienza. Interpretazione Di 'Esperienza E Giudizio' Di Edmund Husserl*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

107. Stapleton, Timothy. 1982. "The "Logic" of Husserl's Transcendental Reduction." *Man and World* no. 15:369-382.

"This article is an attempt to displace many of the traditional, overly Cartesian (epistemological) interpretations of Husserl's transcendental turn, and to

replace them with an interpretation based on Husserl's formal ontology as developed in the "Logical Investigations". In particular, the theory of wholes and parts in conjunction with Husserl's principle of intuitive, eidetic rationality, it is argued, lead directly to transcendental idealism. And as a consequence, the fundamental unity of Husserl's entire philosophical project, from the pre-transcendental through the transcendental period, is established."

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112. Tieszen, Richard l. 1998. "Gödel's Path from the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) to Phenomenology." *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* no. 4:181-203.

"In a lecture manuscript written around 1961 Gödel describes a philosophical path from the incompleteness theorems to Husserl's phenomenology. Using this manuscript as a basis, I present and discuss the arguments in Gödel's recently published papers that led him to the work of Husserl. In particular, I focus on arguments concerning Hilbert's program and an early version of Carnap's program."

113. ———. 2004. "Husserl's Logic." In *Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. Iii. The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 207-321. Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland.

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121. Welton, Donn. 1983. *The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

122. Willard, Dallas. 1980. "Husserl on a Logic That Failed." *Philosophical Review* no. 89:46-64.

"In this paper I try to identify the deficiency of logic which Husserl refers to in the "Forward" to his "Logical Investigations" of 1900. Logics known to him were unable to explain how formal systems of signs function to advance knowledge, as in the case of formal arithmetic.

Simultaneous efforts to elucidate the procedures of general arithmetic (in the last part of his "Philosophy of arithmetic") and to write a review of Schroder's "lectures on the algebra of logic", made Husserl (by 1891) forsake Weierstrass's program of reconstructing mathematics from the concept of number alone, which
he had hoped to carry out with tools drawn from Brentano's psychology."

123. ———. 1984. *Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge. Studies in Husserl's Early Philosophy*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

" This book attempts to explain the path by which Husserl's concern for an elucidation of mathematical, chiefly arithmetical, knowledge led to an analysis of the mental act which allows for a realist interpretation of science and ordinary perceptual experience. It attempts to go more thoroughly than has been done into the content and significance of his first book, "The philosophy of arithmetic". It provides discussion of many Husserlian texts not available in English and little discussed in the English literature. Its aim is not merely historical, but systematic as well."

124. ———. 2003. "The Theory of Wholes and Parts and Husserl's Explication of the Possibility of Knowledge in the *Logical Investigations*." In *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*, edited by Fisette, Denis. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

125. Winance, Eleuthère. 1965. "Intention and Nature of Husserl's Logic." *Philosophia Mathematica* no. 2:69-85.

126. ———. 1966. "Logique, Mathématique Et Ontologie Comme ' *Mathesis Universalis*' Chez Edmund Husserl." *Revue Thomiste* no. 66:410-434.

127. Wojciech, Krysztofiak. 1995. "Noemata and Their Formalization." *Synthese* no. 105:53-86.

"The presentation of the formal conception of noemata is the main aim of the article. In the first section, three informal approaches to noemata are discussed. The goal of this chapter is specifying main controversies and their sources concerned with different ways of the understanding of noemata. In the second section, basic assumptions determining the proposed way of understanding noemata are presented. The third section is devoted to the formal set-theoretic construction needed for the formal comprehension of neomata. In the fourth section, definitions of neomata and their various kinds, as well as definitions of other phenomenological notions are formulated. In the last section, possibilities of further developing the proposed formal conception are indicated."

128. Wolenski, Jan. 1997. "Husserl and the Development of Semantics." *Philosophia Scientiae* no. 2:151-158.

"This paper investigates the role of Edmund Husserl in the development of formal or model-theoretic semantics through glasses of the distinction of language as calculus vs. language as universal medium, introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch. In particular, the paper raises the question of possible Husserl's influence on the conception of language accepted in Polish philosophy, in particular by Lesniewski and Tarski."

129. Zahavi, Dan. 1992. "Constitution and Ontology: Some Remarks on Husserl's Ontological Position in the *Logical Investigations*." *Husserl Studies* no. 9:111-124.

"One of the major exegetical difficulties in connection with Husserl's Logical Investigations has always been the clarification of his ontological position and the closely related concept of constitution. Ever since the publication of the first edition - which will be the point of departure - in 1900-1, there has been an ongoing discussion as to which concept of reality Husserl had committed himself, initiated with a realistic interpretation by his Gottingen students. My aim in the following paper will be a critical evaluation and

interpretation of this relationship, thereby also taking Husserl's philosophical development - especially as concerns his idea of phenomenology - into consideration."

130. ———. 2001. "A Propos De La Neutralité Métaphysique Des "Recherches Logiques"." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 99:715-736.

131. ———. 2002. "Metaphysical Neutrality in *Logical Investigations*." In *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 93-108. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

132. Zahavi, Dan, and Stjernfelt, Frederik, eds. 2002. *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

133. Zalta, Edward N. 1998. "Mally's Determinates and Husserl's Noemata." In *Ernst Mally. Versuch Einer Neubewertung*, edited by Hieke, Alexander, 9-28. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

"In this paper, the author compares passages from two philosophically important texts and concludes that they have fundamental ideas in common. What makes this comparison and conclusion interesting is that the texts come from two different traditions in philosophy, the analytic and the phenomenological. In 1912, Ernst Mally published *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik,* an analytic work containing a combination of formal logic and metaphysics. In 1913, Edmund Husserl published *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, a seminal work in phenomenology in which noemata are defined and given a crucial role in directing our mental states. In the passages from these two texts reproduced below, the author shows that the abstract `determinates' postulated by Mally in 1912 are assigned much the same role that Husserl assigned to noemata in 1913. Though Mally's determinates are not as

highly structured as Husserl's noemata, they have a feature that explains how they manage to play the role assigned to them. The corresponding feature is missing, or at least, not emphasized in Husserl's account of noemata. Therefore, insights from both philosophers, and thus from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions, are needed to give a more complete account of directed mental states."

Related pages

Second Part of the Bibliography: A - J

Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic

Theory and History of Ontology

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Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

INTRODUCTION

"It is not easy to characterize Twardowski's place in the history of Polish philosophy. This is always difficult with regard to those persons who sacrifice their own creativeness to initiate a school or a movement which may reach a culminating point in the next generation. Twardowski was not so original a thinker, or at any rate not so accomplished as some of his pupils. He gave rise to the analytical movement in Poland, but himself belonged to the period of transition. His original contributions were in the philosophy of mind, which later was developed by Meinong as the theory of object, and which inspired Husserl to create a new branch of philosophy-phenomenology. Twardowski's merit was to advocate effectively the classical (correspondence) concept of truth, the extensive discussion of which accelerated the emergence of semantics in the narrower sense as contrasted with syntax. His greatness lay in his teaching, which led to the creation of a school of philosophy of international reputation. His importance for Poland goes beyond philosophy. One might say about him what John Stuart Mill said about his father: 'He did not revolutionize or create one of the great departments of human thought. But in the power of influencing by mere force of mind and character the convictions and purposes of others, he left few equals among men.' " (p. 55)

From: Henryk Sklolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*.

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1967.

"Twardowski's little book (...) is one of the most remarkable works in the history of modern philosophy. It is concise, clear, and -- in Findlay's words -- "amazingly rich in ideas." (1) It is therefore a paradigm of what some contemporary philosophers approvingly call 'analytic philosophy.' But Twardowski's book is also of considerable historical significance. His views reflect Brentano's earlier position and thus shed some light on this stage of Brentano's philosophy. Furthermore, they form a link between this stage, on the one hand, and those two grandiose attempts to propagate rationalism in an age of science, on the other hand, which are known as Meinong's theory of entities and Husserl's phenomenology. Twardowski's views thus point to the future and introduce many of the problems which, through the influence of Meinong, Husserl, Russell, and Moore, have become standard fare in contemporary philosophy." (p. VII)

From: Reinhardt Grossmann, "Introduction" to: Kasimir Twardowski, *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1997.

TWARDOWSKI'S ONTOLOGY

"1. One of the characteristic features of modern ontology relates to the distinction between a *Dasein* and a *Sosein* of objects -- that is, between the existence of objects and their properties. Most of modern ontology is *Daseinsfrei*: it is an ontology of the nature of objects in general as they are given to thought. And it is this feature that distinguishes modern ontology from traditional metaphysics, since this ontology concerns objects as things (*res*) and not their existence. (1) This was already to be seen in the school of Brentano, but its origins are in effect even older and can be traced back to the Middle Ages and to the Stoic interpretation of Aristotle, which passed on to Wolff. Starting from Kant the role

played by the acts of consciousness has become a fundamental component of ontology.
2. As regards Twardowski's ontology, I shall try to specify its Kantian commitment. Since this analysis is somewhat pioneering, I shall present it in the form of a proposal. Moreover, I shall confine myself to his book of 1894, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*.
The following features will be of service to my proposal:
a) Its descriptive basis stemming from Brentanian psychology. Twardowski's ontology, like Brentano's, is grounded in inner perception: it is concerned not with the genesis but with the description of the elements of consciousness. (2)
b) The distinction between act, content and object in presentation (*Vorstellung*). (3)
c) The primacy of the act over the contents of consciousness. In fact every presentation is an act which possesses an intentional object. In the case of Twardowski the intentional object is the content of the act, which pictures an image (*Bild*) the external object of presentation. (4)
d) The consequent distinction concerning the act of presentation of two different directions:1. towards the object, which is presented in a modified way by consciousness, and 2. towards the content, which is presented in a determinate way. (5)
e) The presence of Kantianism, as Twardowski points out on several occasions in his text, especially at the outset of his ontological analysis (i.e. the description of the object of presentation), in the concept of characteristic, and in its conclusion, concerning the nature of general objects. (6)" (pp. 26-27)

Notes

(1) According to this ontology, existence is a mode or an attribute, not an essential property of all objects. The objects of ontology, therefore, are possible objects.
(2) As we shall see, certain basic concepts in Twardowski' ontology like the object in general, a the outcome of genetic research in the phenomenological sense.

(3) We translate the German word *Vorstellung* as presentation rather than representation, pointing out the Brentanian meaning of this term: presentation, in fact, refers to the intentional character of the consciousness, directed towards an intentional object. It is worth noting that the term *Vorstellung* has Kantian origin. Also in the case of Kant, then, we shall adopt presentation instead of representation, even if we are conscious that also in Kant the term is not univocal. Put briefly, we could speak of the representation only at the level of concepts.
(4) The intentional object is the secondary object of presentation and coincides with the content, by means of which the object is presented. On this see Husserl's criticism: Twardowski, according to Husserl, does not distinguish between the mental picture (*Bild*) proper of content, which has a psychological root, and ideal meaning (*Bedeutung*). See *Logische Untersuchungen* (Hua XVII), E. Holestein ed., 1975, *First Investigation*. Content may vary in relation to different presentations of an object, says Husserl, however meaning remains identical. Meaning is not a constitutive part of the act, it is not psychological but logical. Moreover picture is only a special case of intentional consciousness, related to imagination: in literature or science, in fact, presentations do not occur by means of pictures. What matters, according to Husserl, is the individual capacity to refer to the object on the basis of mental picture. On this see K. Schuhmann, "Husserl and Twardowski", forthcoming. [published in: Coniglione, Francesco, Poli, Roberto, Wolenski, Jan (eds.) - *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School* - Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1993, pp. 41-58]
(5)There is still a way in which aldso the object is given in a determinate way, which is opposed to all others, as *etwas überhaupt* in presentation.
(6) K. Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuschung,* 7 and 15.

From: Liliana Albertazzi, "Is there a transcendental Object?"," in: *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Jacek Pasniczek, Lublin: Wydawnictvo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodoskiej 1992, p. 26-44.

Related pages

Annotated Bibliography of and about Twardowski

POLISH ONTOLOGISTS

Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

Stanislaw Lesniewski's Logical Systems: Protothetic, Ontology, Mereology

Tadeusz Kotarbinski from Ontological Reism to Semantical Concretism

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Works available only in Polish are not enclosed

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II. On truth and knowledge.
On so-called relative truths (1900) 147; *A priori*, or rational (deductive) sciences and *a posteriori*, or empirical (inductive) sciences (1923) 171; Theory of knowledge. A lecture course (1925/75) 181;
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K. Twardowski: *Sur la théore du contenu et de l'objet des représentations*
E. Husserl: *Intuition et re-présentation, Intuition et remplissement, Objets intentionnels* et divers extes annexes
Présentation, traduction, notes, remarques et index pat Jacques English.
"Avertissement. Le présent ouvrage est la traduction, d'une part, de l'ouvrage de Kasimir Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* et, d'autre part, de toute une série de textes d'Edmund Husserl, s'échelonnant de 1893 à 1901, qui se rattachent, de près ou de loin, à la question des objets intentionnels, telle que l'avait posée Twardowski, et qui ont tous été publiés (sauf un) par Bernhard Rang en 1979 chez Martinus Nijhoff dans le *Tome XXII* des *Husserliana, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910)*."

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   "I have previously discussed in several papers specific Bolzanian elements present in the Polish tradition. This

paper will not, for the most part, add anything in particular to that. The new - and rather blunt hypothesis to be put forward here is that, despite appearances, Twardowski also contributed *de facto* to slowing down the reception of Bolzano's most modem logical discoveries. For in Poland Bolzano was to remain one logician among many for rather long. It was chiefly thanks to two factors that Bolzano's star could, slowly, begin to rise in Poland, or, at least, that the fundamental achievements of his logic could be known. One factor is antipsychologistic (more precisely Platonistic) influence coming from Husserl and from Twardowski's student Łukasiewicz. The other factor is the change in the conception of logic which took Polish logic from, say, Sigwart, to Tarski through Lesniewski and Łukasiewicz," p. 55

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   "In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgment with two types of judgment: existential and relational judgments. In *Zur Lehre* he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgment. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano's theory. His changes concerned judgments about relations and about nonpresent objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgments. The existential judgments are analyzed in a Brentanian way."
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Argument Against It." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 43:461-480.

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Contetns: Acknowledgements IX; Introduction 1; 1. What was Brentano's problem? Physical phenomena in *Psychology from empirical standpoint* 21; 2. Getting the quasi-picture: Twardowski's *On the content and object of representations* 45; 3. Not getting the quasi-picture: Husserl critique of Twardowski 57; 4. Phenomenology without phenomena: Husserl's break with Brentano 65; 5. Husserl's riddle and the 'real' content of consciousness: a Jamesian reading of *Logical Investigations V* 83; Conclusion 109; Appendix: The text and reception of the *Logical Investigations* 121; Notes 125; Bibliography 159; Index 169.
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"Kasimir Twardowski's reduction of psychological experience to an act, Content, and Object had a decided impact on the development of modern phenomenology and the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, Ernst Mally, And the Graz school of philosophical semantics and psychology. Twardowski offers four arguments to show that the content and object of a presentation can never be same. These conclusions are challenged by a formal diagonal counterexample in which it is possible for the content and object of a thought to be precisely identical. Twardowski's reduction and the act-Content-Object structure of psychological experience may nevertheless be upheld in somewhat different form not as an exclusive but as a nonexclusive kind of distinction."
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25. ———. 1993. "Kazimierz Twardowski's Descriptive Semiotics." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy: the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Francesco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 191-206. Amsterdam: Rodopi. " Kazimierz Twardowski's contribution to semiotics has been fourfold: as a "critic" of others conceptions, a "constructor" of his own analyses, distinctions, and theses, a "precursor" of new ideas and methods, and an "inspirer" of posterior polemics (especially in Lvov-Warsaw School). The work bears the detail presentation of Twardowski's semiotic views, showing that his theory consists in the psycho-physical conception of signs, the functional conception of expression, the noematic conception of sense, and the discrepant conception of language. The reach bibliography contains the list of 21 Twardowski's works on semiotics, and of 43 works on his views."
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This volume contains a selection of papers from the conference "The Theory of Objects in Central Europe. The Austrian-Polish Connection: Meinong and Twardowski" held in December 1989 in Kraków. It was supported and sponsored by the Jagiellonian University, Centro Studi per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea, The National Research Project "Sign-Language-Reality", and The Institute of Austrian Culture in Warsaw. The conference was organized by Prof. Jan Wolenski with dr. Georg Jankovic's generous assistance.
Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski studied philosophy at the University of Vienna at the end of XIX century. Both were under a great influence of Franz Brentano, who is considered the father of contemporary theory of intentionality. He viewed intentionality as the crucial feature of consciousness consisting in „directness to an object". Such conception should presuppose some general theory of objects of consciousness. Meinong and Twardowski adopted Brentano's idea of intentionality subsequently elaborating their own ontologies of objects. What is common in the views of the two philosophers, barring many differences, is that they assume an extensive sphere of non-existent objects that can be possibly objects of intentional acts.

Nowadays there is a growing interest in theories of intentionality and intentional objects on the part of analytic philosophy as well as phenomenology. That is why there is also a renaissance of Meinong's and Twardowski's philosophical thought, although the former philosopher is much better known, more popular, and, what follows, more inspiring. The main purpose of the conference that took place in Kraków was to investigate, from various historical and theoretical perspectives, theories of objects created by the two of Brentano's followers. It is to be regretted that the present volume does not fill a serious gap in philosophical literature: no paper is devoted to direct comparison of Meinong and Twardowski. Nevertheless we hope that the papers collected in the volume may contribute to better understanding of the two philosophers and prepare the ground for such a comparative study.

F. Modenato, in her essay, traces the development of Meinong's idea of relations while linking his views with the views of Hume and Locke. She is concentrating on epistemological relevance of the idea. Relations are treated by Meinong as some complexities and both relations and complexities are higher-order objects. Higher-order objects play the central role in Meinong's theory of knowledge and are of great importance to his ontology.

L. Albertazzi points to some Kantian motives in Twardowski's ontology. The Polish philosopher distinguishes several categories of objects which, according to Albertazzi's interpretation, correspond closely to that distinguished by Kant. In particular, 'the object in general' may be taken as Kant's transcendental object, and 'the general object' as a universal presented individually in the subject of proposition.

R. Poli argues in his paper that many elements of Wolff's ontology can be found in Twardowski's theory of objects. Both philosophers conceive objects as possible wholes. For Twardowski, being an object is ontologically prior to having existence and it is enough for being an object to be representable in an act of presentation.

J.J. Jadacki presents a comprehensive survey of Twardowski's ontological (metaphysical) and epistemological views. On this basis he reconstructs the philosopher's descriptive semiotics focusing his attention on the theory of judgment.
Additionally, Jadacki carries out a formal semantic analysis of Twardowski's semiotics.
J. Wolenski considers the main traditional views of 'being' and wonders if 'being' could be situated somewhere in the formal hierarchy of concepts. He comes to the conclusion that "being" expresses no concept at all and, what follows, it has the syncategorematic character as Twardowski claimed. Wolenski proposes a completion of Twardowski's claim by appealing to modern logic and Lesniewski's ontology.
D. Jacquette sketches informally the principles of Meinongian semantics and shows how the semantics can be applied in formalisation of scientific laws. By contrast to extensionalist models of scientific discourse which admit only existent objects, in Meinongian semantics the reference to ideal and non-existent objects is possible. Many problems of contemporary philosophy of science such as, for example, the justification of induction and confirmation can be uniformely treated and solved on the ground of Meinong's theory.
J. Pasniczek proposes quite a simple logic which obeys the main theses of Meinong's theory of objects. This logic resembles closely the classical predicate logic with respect to syntax and semantics (it is basically extensional). Despite that resemblance, the proposed logic is associated with very rich ontology of objects including various kinds of non-existent objects.
I am deeply indebted to Prof. Jan Wolenski for encouragement and assistance in editing this book."
(Preface, pp. 7-8)

33. Placek, Tomasz. 1996. "Thought as a Product of Thinking." *Conceptus.Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 24:191-203.
"This paper advocates the view that thoughts which are qualitatively the same are also numerically identical. The point of departure is the puzzle: if thoughts are unchanging

and eternal inhabitants of a "third realm", then it is mysterious how we grasp them, whereas, the assumption that they are outputs of some mental processes casts doubt on the possibility of communicating thoughts. To solve the puzzle Twardowski's teaching on actions and their products is applied and further elaborated."

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    See Chapter 5: *Husserl and Twardowski*, pp. 139-154.
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41. Rosiak, Marek. 1998. "Twardowski and Husserl on Wholes and Parts." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 85-100. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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46. Simons, Peter M. 2009. "Twardowski on Truth." *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* no. 4:1-14.
47. Simons, Peter M., and Wolenski, Jan. 1989. " *De Veritate*: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski." In *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
48. Skolimowski, Henryk. 1967. *Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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49. Smith, Barry. 1989. "Kazimir Twardowski: An Essay on the Borderlines of ontology, Psychology and logic." In *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 313-373. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
50. ———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.
See the Chapter: K *asimir Twardowski: On content and object*, pp. 160-195.
51. ———. 2006. "Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School. The New Generation*, edited by Jadacki, Jacek Jusliuz and Pasniczek, Jacek, 19-40. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Why have Polish philosophers fared so badly as concerns their admission into the pantheon of "Continental philosophers?" Why, for example, should Heidegger and

Derrida be included in this pantheon, but not Ingarden or Tarski? Why, to put the question from another side, should there be so close an association in Poland between philosophy and logic, and between philosophy and science? We distinguish a series of answers to this question, which are dealt with under the following headings: (a) the role of socialism; (b) the disciplinary association between philosophy and mathematics; (c) the influence of Austrian philosophy in general and of Brentanian philosophy in particular; (d) the serendipitous role of Twardowski; (e) the role of Catholicism. The conclusion of the paper is that there is no such thing as 'Polish philosophy' because philosophy in Poland is philosophy per se, it is part and parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy -- simply because, in contrast to French or German philosophy, it meets international standards of training, rigour, professionalism and specialization."

52. Vasyukov, Vladimir L. 1998. "Non-Elementary Exegesis of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 153-167. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"In spite of the historical proximity of S. Lesniewski to K. Twardowski, ari attempt to look at Twardowski's heritage through Lesniewski's eyes leads to striking results. Firstly, it results in a wider framework than Lesniewski's Elementary Ontology and secondly, it involves a transition from Formal Ontology to Formai Phenomenology. In this paper an extension of Leíniewskis's Non-Elementary Ontology is presented which is suitable for investìgating Twardowski's Theory of Presentation."
53. Vinogradov, Evgeni G. 1998. "The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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55. ———. 1992. "'Being' as a Syncategorematic Word: A Completion (?) of Twardowski's Analysis of 'Nothing'." In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 75-85. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej.
56. ———. 1999. "Twardowski and the Distinction between Content and Object." *Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 8:15-36. "The content/object distinction was the main philosophical result achieved by Twardowski. However, he had predecessors. This paper discusses the development of the mentioned distinction from Bolzano to Twardowski. Views of Zimmermann, Brentano, Meinong, Höfler are taken into account; also some objections of Husserl against Twardowski are discussed and evaluated. The paper also stresses the general philosophical significance of Twardowski's work."
57. ———. 2002. "From Intentionality to Formal Semantics (From Twardowski To Tarski)." *Erkenntnis* no. 56:9-27. "This paper intends to show that the rise of semantics in Poland was related to Kazimierz Twardowski and his understanding of mental acts as intentional (in Brentano's understanding plus the principally realistic conception of intentional objects). Twardowski's theory of language was consequently semantic considering words as products of mental acts and as referring to the world. This view was then refined by Twardowski's students, in particular Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbinski. Both were teachers of Alfred Tarski, the founder of modern formal semantics. These facts suggest that the intentional conception of language was an important philosophical context of Tarski's work."
58. ———. 2009. "The Rise and Sevelopment of Logical Semantics in Poland." In *The Golden Age of Polish philosophy. Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra, Wolenski, Jan, Marion, Mathieu and Miskiewicz, Wioletta, 43-59. New York: Springer.

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   "Among the unpublished writings of Kazimierz Twardowski so far there is an essay in which Twardowski tries to embed the concept of an intentional object' within a theory that comprises at the same time psychological, logical and grammatical aspects. This theory of actions' and products' is presented here and several applications of the theory are discussed. The central question thereby is whether the distinction between actions and products enables Twardowski to counter the objection of psychologism raised against him. Having explained Twardowski's position we describe from an editorial point of view the text in which his theory is transmitted. The text itself is published according to the given editorial principles after this introduction."
   [The text is: *Funktionen und Gelbilde* pp. 157-189]
2. Brożek, Anna. 2012. *Kazimierz Twardowski: die Wiener Jahre*. Berlin: Springer.
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"Largely ignored in Germany during the nineteenth century, Bolzano was certainly better known in Austria, in particular among Brentano's students, who enthusiastically studied his *Theory of Science*. In this respect it makes sense to speak of Bolzano as belonging to a tradition of Austrian philosophy. Yet an examination of the reception of Bolzano's ideas among Brentano's students indicates that he was not always well understood. This article discusses a particular case, Twardowski's reaction to Bolzano's theory of representation."

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"La plus importante des possibilités ainsi ouvertes consiste sans doute dans le réalisme de Twardowski, dans son orientation en direction de l'objet. L' "étude psychologique" qui porte sur la représentation finit pas se constituer en une ontologie relationnelle de l'objet. Par delà les analyses psychologiques de l'objet intentionnel, Twardowski a intégré dans sa théorie deux doctrines essentielles de Bolzano : la méréologie, qui forme la base de son système mathématique, et la théorie de l'objet, le noyau de sa sémantique logique.
Malgré la critique husserlienne des "deux faces qui donneraient à l'expression, l'une la signification, et l'autre la détermination de son orientation vers l'objet", la séparation méthodique et le traitement indépendant du contenu et de l'objet de la représentation, ont permis à Twardowski d'accorder aux objets l'autonomie et l'indépendance nécessaires pour permettre à Tarski, disciple de Łukasiewicz, lui-même disciple de Twardowski, d'établir la sémantique logique."

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"The Scholar, who at the start of this century has indicated the direction towards philosophy not only of the School of Leopoli but, in a certain sense, of the whole Poland, was Kazimierz Twardowski. This study presents briefly his biography and his activity as teacher and as organiser. The knowledge of the setting in which he was formed in the intellectual attitude of the founder of the Philosophical School of Leopoli-Warsaw can facilitate a brief exposition of the theories of Twardowski. He was an excellent Brentanist, and in the development of this doctrine he stands midway between F. Brantano and E. Husserl. K. Tardowski is the founder of the School which represents a relevant trend in modern analytical philosophy."

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Bertrand Russell's Logic and His Ontological Development (1900-1919)

INTRODUCTION

"It was Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein or Quine, who began what may be called the ontology of the analytic tradition."

Jan Dejnožka, *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins,* (p. 149)

"Russell, in Principles of Mathematics, may seem to be a radical relativist. I quote this text again:

Numbers cannot be asserted of objects, because the same set of objects may have different numbers assigned to them...; for example, one army is so many regiments and such another number of soldiers. This view seems to me to involve too physical a view of objects: I do not consider the army to be the same object as the regiments. (*Principles of Mathematics* [*POM*] 519).
Alternatively, in that every application of a concept 'presupposes numerical diversity', in that every entity has its own immediate identity, Principles suggests a radical realism. The one thing Principles seems to not to be is modified realism, since Russell expressly denies the distinction between real distinction and conceptual distinction (*POM* 466). But this denial seems quite disingenuous in light of his own distinction between empirical (or actual) existence and mathematical (or logical) existence.
Surely the truth is that Principles indulges in a rich and complex modified realism. Spatial, temporal, and material points are kinds

of terms which differ only immediately. (...)
Consider also Russell's distinction in Principles between actual existence, existence, and mere nonexistent being, in order of progressively muted substance substitutes. Empirical existents are much like Frege's concrete objects, existents are much like Frege's abstract objects. Logical existents seem real than empirical existents, but more real than nonexistent beings. Spatiotemporal reals (points and instants) seem to be in between empirical existents and logical existents, since empirical evidence determines the geometry actual world. Being is the general status of which the foregoing are kinds. Objects roughly include both terms and classes as many (*POM* 55n). Terms are simply beings. Classes as many have mathematical existence, or better, logical existence. Properties and relations are probably hybrid classifications, since some are empirically given and others are logico-mathematical. Possibly there are similar gradations of ontological status among nonexistent chairs, nonexistent material points, nonexistent colors, and so on, though possibly they are all just nonexistent entities. Russell does not address that question. (...)
Russell rejects substances and essences in the traditional sense. But he admits six sorts of beings or substances, or substance substitutes: (1) All entities, including both being and existence, have timeless being in 1903. (2) Universals' have being in 1912. (3) Being is general timelessness in 1914. (4) Being is logical atoms in 1918. (5) Being is object words in 1940. (6) Being is qualities (particulars, not universals) in 1940-59. 1 described these six sorts of being in my *Erkenntnis* paper (Dejnožka 1990). In addition, Russell admits two substitutes for material substances: (7) Ordinary physical things are causal lines in 1927-59 (The analysis of matter [AMA] 285; Human Knowledge: its scopes and limits [HK] 453-60, 489-90; My Philosophical development [MPD] 146-47). 'Thus the persistence of substance is replaced by the persistence of causal laws" (AMA 285). (8) Space-time structures are what are probably real in 1927-59 (AMA 249-57; HK 250-66, 460-75, 491-92; MPD 147-48). Russell speaks of 'substantial structures' which replace 'pieces of matter' and also of structures of events (HK 461). Of course, (7) and (8) overlap; a causal line is an instantiated structure.

In his 1914-18 philosophy of logical fictions, in which particulars (sense-data) or perhaps simples are alone real, Russell may seem a radical realist. Bodies, numbers, and minds (except one's own mind) are logical fictions with fictitious identities. And 'there is no such thing as a fiction' (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [PLA] 189). In 1919 this virtually becomes Hume's neutral monist distinction between impressions and fictions. Like Hume's impressions, Russell's particulars are real beings. Each can logically happen to be the whole universe. But instead of admitting distinctions of reason within lone sense-data, as Hume does within impressions, Russell admits "parts" which, if you attend to them, become 'new' data (new real beings) in their own right (PLA 203; see On the relation of universals and particulars [RUP] 114 and An inquiry into meaning and truth [IMT] 334). Much as with Frege, this is a shifting of phenomenological real identities over time sans any shifting of concepts. Russell assigns particulars the 'logical position' of substances (PLA 204). Particulars are mind-independent (1a), essentially complete (1b), ultimate logical subjects of predication (1c), logically independent (1d), given in acquaintance (l1), the unchanging building blocks in the logical construction of changes (1f), and have phenomenologically real identities as opposed to the conceptual identities of logical fictions (1g). Criterion (1) seems fulfilled-but for radical realism, since logical fictions are said to exist only in a purely nominal sense.

Nonetheless, I classify the 1914-18 Russell as a modified realist. For there is that exception to logical fictions, one's own mind, which ought to be in some sense more substantival than sense-data, despite everything Russell says about sense-data as being as real as anything can be. Only the 1921 Russell's neutral monism, in which even one's own mind is a construction, seems a truly radical realism. It is also worth noting that as series of classes of sensibilia, two constructed bodies are really distinct in sense (2) just in case they have no sensibilium in common.

The 1914-21 Russell's constructionism (this includes neutral monism), in sting unsensed sensibilia to account for perception and physical lawfulness, a scientific explanatory realism. It is also a phenomenological realism in that se-data are physically real

events. And third, it is a methodological realism. Analyses end with sensed entities, if not with entities known to be simple. Russell's 1927-59 representational realism meets criterion (3) of explanatory modified realism. It is a kind of scientific realism. In The Analysis of Matter, Russell defends realism against radical reductionism. He says, "There are many possible ways of turning some things hitherto regarded as 'real' into mere laws concerning the other things. Obviously there must be a limit to this process, or else all the things in the world will merely be each other's washing" ([AMA] 325). Russell says, "We must find some reality for the electron, or else the physical world will run through our fingers like a jelly-fish" (AMA 319). Thus physical structures such as electrons are not mere logical fictions. Indeed, two electrons are really distinct in sense (2) if they have no constituent event in common (AMA 288). Yet Russell reserves metaphysical status for the events which compose electrons, and ultimately for whatever entities may comprise the final interpretation of physics (AMA 2, 9). This suggests a modified realism in which instantiated physical structures are real facts, but are less real than any ultimate, i.e. simple, constituents they may have." (pp. 244-247)

From: Jan Dejnožka, *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*, Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books 1996. (Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003).

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Abstract. "My purpose here is purely historical. It is not an attempt to resolve the question as to whether Russell did or did not countenance nonclassical logics, and if so, which nonclassical logics, and still less to demonstrate whether he himself contributed, in any manner, to the development of nonclassical logic. Rather, I want merely to explore and insofar as possible document, whether, and to what extent, if any, Russell interacted with the various, either the various candidates or their, ideas that Dejnožka and others have proposed as potentially influential in Russell's intellectual reactions to nonclassical logic or to the philosophical concepts that might contribute to his reactions to nonclassical logics."
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"Russell's account of existence as satisfaction of a propositional function presupposes a more fundamental notion of existence, which we would employ in deciding what to allow as arguments satisfying a function, a notion he never elucidates. Jan Dejnožka has distinguished three ways Russell used the term "exists," one being the phenomenalist's, in which it refers to correlations of sense-data. I argue that this phenomenalist notion cannot be the one Russell needs, since he explicitly held that existence be understood broadly, so that, e.g., the nonexistence of God would not follow by definition."
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"Russell's paradox has two forms or versions, one in regard to the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, the other in regard to "the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself."(1) The first version is formulable in the ideography of Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* and shows this system to be inconsistent. The second version, however, is not formulable in this ideography, as Frege himself pointed out in his reply to Russell. (2) Nevertheless, it is essentially the second version of his paradox that leads Russell to avoid it (and others of its ilk) through his theory of types.
The first version is of course the relevant version with respect to any formulation of the theory of types in which membership in a class is the fundamental notion, that is, a formulation utilizing 'ε' as a primitive binary predicate constant.(3) However, Russell's theory of types (even ignoring its ramification) is essentially concerned with the notion of predication, and only indirectly through the (philosophically questionable) interpretation of predication

as the membership relation is the first version of his paradox relevant to this formulation.
Apparently, Russell saw his paradox as generating an aporetic situation in regard to two fundamental “notions,” namely, the notion of membership (in a class) and the notion of predication (of an attribute).(4) In regard to the notion of membership, the application of Russell’s paradox is not here brought into question. However, in regard to the notion of predication, the applicability of the reasoning grounding Russell’s paradox will here be very much brought into question. Indeed, I shall claim that in this case the paradox fails.(5)" (pp. 133-135)
(1) “Letter to Frege,” reprinted in [10], p. 125.
(2) “Letter to Russell,” ibid., p. 128.
(3) Cf. [5], p. 140 for a specific formulation of this kind of type theory.
(4) Gödel (cf. [6], p. 131f.) distinguishes these two forms of Russell’s paradox by referring to them as the “extensional” and the “intensional” forms, respectively. For the purposes of the present paper, this distinction is preferable to Ramsey’s different but better known distinction between “logical” and “semantical” paradoxes.
(5) With this failure of course goes a primary if not sole motivation for the simple theory of ontological types of third and higher order. The ontological scheme of second-order logic remains unaffected, having as it does a natural motivation of its own. Ramification also has its own motivation, and it may be appended to second-order logic (cf. [2], §58.) even though historically it was first appended to the simple theory of types.
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Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 244-275.
"Logical atomism, through its theory of logical form, provides one of the most coherent formal ontologies in the history of philosophy. It is a coherence which, whether we agree with the ontology or not, renders the framework important and useful as a paradigm by which to compare and better evaluate the coherence of alternative systems based upon alternative theories of logical form and especially alternative theories of predication.
As the basis of a formal ontology, logical atomism, aside from the differences between its realist and nominalist variants, specifies not only a 'deep structure' ontological grammar within which all analysis must ultimately be resolved, but determines as well a logistic for that grammar. Both together constitute the formal ontology and serve to indicate how logical atomism views the fundamental structure of reality. Thus, for example, the grammar serves to indicate the formal as well as the material categories of being acknowledged by the ontology, while the logistic, by regulating the proper 'logico-syntactical employment' ([TR], 3.327) of the expressions of that grammar serves to indicate not only the logical 'scaffolding of the world' ([TR], 6.124) but supplements the grammar in its presentation of the ontological structure of reality.
The distinction between logical scaffolding and ontological structure is fundamental to atomism and pertains to a distinction between material and formal content that grammar alone is insufficient to represent. It is a distinction that any proposed formalization of logical atomism must account for (through the Doctrine of Showing) in order to be an adequate formal representative of that ontology. It is a distinction, however, or so it will be argued here, that cannot be made without the introduction of modal operators for logical necessity and possibility.

The argument for this last claim was already given in chapter 6, but it was there restricted to the level of logical analysis dealing solely with propositional connectives."
(...)
"In what follows we shall be concerned with the problematic extension of these results to the level of analysis involving quantifiers for objects as concrete particulars along with some means for expressing their self-identity and mutual difference. On this level, logical atomism's theory of predication enters our considerations in a fundamental way. For according to that theory, only elementary predications represent or 'picture' a structure with material content, and that content is in all cases external to the constituents of the structure. Such a structure is an atomic situation (*Sachlage*) and the externality of its content to its constituents consists in both it and its complement being logically possible. The difficulty here is that since objects are quantified over, they are part of the world and therefore contribute to the ontological content of the world (cf. [TR] 5.5561); and in that regard their self-identity and mutual difference or nonidentity, and thereby their total number, would prima facie seem to involve material content. Yet, in atomism, an object's self-identity or nonidentity with any other object is not an external condition of that object, (3) and, as a consequence of the dependence of logical space on reality, it is logically impossible for the totality of objects, no less the number of that totality, to differ from world to world. In other words, in logical atomism, if not in other ontologies, identity and difference, as well as objectual quantification, are formal and not material aspects of reality. Here already we begin to see the paradigmatic role of logical atomism, for in most other systems identity and difference, as well as objectual quantification, are also said to be formal in content, though propositions regarding that content are not also said to be either logically necessary or logically impossible.
Because our considerations will be restricted to quantifying over objects as concrete particulars and not, for example, over material properties and relations as well, the variant of

logical atomism we shall discuss here is nominalistic. Several realist alternatives are sketched in order to highlight the significant theses and/or difficulties of nominalism, though it should be noted that not all forms of nominalism need agree with the special ontological theses of nominalist logical atomism.

Finally, it should also be noted that our concern in this chapter is with an adequate formal representation of the ontology of logical atomism and not with its theory of thought, meaning, or philosophy of language. We wish to leave open how these might or must be developed with respect to the system constructed here, especially with regard to how they might or must pertain to the question of its logistic completeness." (pp. 244-247 of the reprint)

(1) The convention adopted here is to use scare-quotes when speaking of what connectives represent as ‘properties’ or ‘relations’. This is done to mark a special philosophical use which is convenient in our informal discussion but which strictly speaking is ontologically misleading. A similar convention applies throughout when we refer to existence (being-the-case) and nonexistence (being-not-the-case) as material ‘properties’ of atomic situations.

(3) That is, an object’s self-identity or nonidentity with any other object is invariant through all the possible worlds of a logical space containing that object. We must distinguish this ontological invariance from the varying semantical relation of denotation (*Bedeutung*) between an object and a (non-Tractarian) name or definite description of that object. The former must be accounted for within the formal ontology, the latter only within its applications.

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"The development of the theory of logical types in Russell's early philosophy proceeds along a difficult and rather involuted path; and even the final product, the theory as adumbrated in [*Principia Mathematica* = PM], remains unclear in its syntax and problematic in its semantics. Indeed, one might well be left with the impression that Russell himself, in the end, remained unsure of which parts of the different views he had held along the way are finally to be adopted.
In what follows, we shall attempt to describe and explain the development of Russell's early views, at least to the extent to which they are available in published form today, from the perspective of the development in those views of the notion of a logical subject. It is the development of this notion in Russell's early philosophy, we believe, that holds the key to many of the problems confronting Russell in the development of his theory of logical types and that led to the various, and sometimes conflicting, proposals that he made along the way.
It should be noted, however, that in referring to the development of the theory of logical types in Russell's early philosophy we have in mind only the views developed by Russell up to, but not subsequent to, the 1910—13 publication of the first edition of [PM]. The subsequent views developed by Russell from 1913—25, that is, between the first and second editions of [PM], and summarized to some extent in his introduction (and added appendices) to the second edition, constitute Russell's version of logical atomism. Except for some concluding remarks in the final section of this chapter, we delay our discussion of those views until chapter 5." (pp. 19-20 of the reprint)

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"Contemporary philosophy is in a rut, according to Terence Parsons in his recent book *Nonexistent Objects*, ([NO]), and it is one that stems from the (post-1905) work of Bertrand

Russell. The main characteristic of this “Russellian rut” ([NO], 1) is strict adherence to the thesis that being, or being something, amounts to being something that exists—or equivalently that ‘there is’ is to be equated with ‘there exists’ ([NO], 6). This view is now so well entrenched, according to Parsons, that it is a main stay of what he also calls the orthodox tradition.

Now the orthodox view is in a rut, according to Parsons, “because it’s a view in which most of us are so entrenched that it’s hard to see over the edges” ([NO], 1). Naturally, if we want “to look over the edge and see how things might be different” ([NO], 8), as any objective seeker of truth would, then “we need to encounter an actual theory about nonexistent objects” (ibid.). It is the construction and presentation of such a theory that is Parsons’s concern in *Nonexistent Objects*.

(...)

"Now we do not object to Parsons’s choice of Meinong’s theory here, nor for that matter to his elegant reconstruction and presentation of that theory. We do think, however, that a more balanced recognition of Russell’s overall view is called for and that perhaps the best way to make the Meinongian notion of a concrete object understandable to the orthodox tradition is to compare it with the general Russellian notion of a concrete individual, i.e., the Russellian notion of an individual that can exist but which might in fact not exist. Indeed, on the basis of the analysis and comparison we shall give here, it is our position that the Meinongian notion of a concrete object, at least as reconstructed by Parsons, is parasitic upon, though in a beneficent way, the Russellian notion of a concrete individual, existent or otherwise." (pp. 119-121)

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Reprinted as Chapter 2 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 64-118.

"Logicism by the end of the nineteenth century was a philosophical doctrine whose time had come, and it is Gottlob Frege to whom we owe its arrival. “Often,” Frege once wrote, “it is only after immense intellectual effort, which may have continued over centuries, that humanity at last succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it from the eyes of the mind” (Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* [Fd], xix). Prior to Frege logicism was just such a concept whose pure form was obscured by irrelevant accretions; and in his life’s work it was Frege who first presented this concept to humanity in its pure form and developed it as a doctrine of the first rank.

That form, unfortunately, has become obscured once again. For today, as we approach the end of the twentieth century, logicism, as a philosophical doctrine, is said to be dead, and even worse, to be impossible. Frege’s logicism, or the specific presentation he gave of it in *Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, ([Gg]), fell to Russell’s paradox, and, we are told, it cannot be resurrected. Russell’s own subsequent form of logicism presented in [PM], moreover, in effect gives up the doctrine; for in overcoming his paradox, Russell was unable to reduce classical mathematics to logic without making at least two assumptions that are not logically true; namely, his assumption of the axiom of reducibility and his assumption of an axiom of infinity regarding the existence of infinitely many concrete or nonabstract individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, logicism is not dead beyond redemption; that is, if logicism is dead, then it can be easily resurrected. This is not to say that as philosophical doctrines go logicism is true, but only that it can be logically reconstructed and defended or advocated in essentially the same philosophical context in which it was originally formulated. This is true especially of Frege’s form of

logicism, as we shall see, and in fact, by turning to his correspondence with Russell and his discussion of Russell's paradox, we are able to formulate not only one but two alternative reconstructions of his form of logicism, both of which are consistent (relative to weak Zermelo set theory). In regard to Russell's form of logicism, on the other hand, our resurrection will not apply directly to the form he adopted in [PM] but rather to the form he was implicitly advocating in his correspondence with Frege shortly after the completion of [POM]. In this regard, though we shall have occasion to refer to certain features of his later form of logicism, especially in our concluding section where a counterpart to the axiom of reducibility comes into the picture, it is Russell's early form of logicism that we shall reconstruct and be concerned with here.

Though Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism are not the same, incidentally, they are closely related; and one of our goals will be to reconstruct or resurrect these forms with their similarity in mind. In particular, it is our contention that both are to be reconstructed as second order predicate logics in which nominalized predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms. Their important differences, as we shall see, will then consist in the sort of object each takes nominalized predicates to denote and in whether the theory of predication upon which the laws of logic are to be based is to be extensional or intensional." (pp. 64-65 of the reprint)

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Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 193-221.
"Russell's philosophical views underwent a number of changes throughout his life, and it is not always well-appreciated that views he held at one time came later to be rejected; nor, similarly, that views he rejected at one time came later to be accepted. It is not well-known, for example, that the theory of logical types Russell described in his later or post-[PM] philosophy is not the same as the theory originally described in [PM] in 1910-13; nor that some of the more important applications that Russell made of the theory at the earlier time cannot be validated or even significantly made in the framework of his later theory. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that Russell himself seems not to have realized that he was describing a new theory of logical types in his later philosophy, and that as a result of the change some of his earlier logical constructions, including especially his construction of the different kinds of numbers, were no longer available to him.
In the original framework, for example, propositional functions are independently real properties and relations that can themselves have properties and relations of a higher order/type, and all talk of classes, and thereby ultimately of numbers, can be reduced to extensional talk of properties and relations as "single entities," or what Russell in [POM] had called "logical subjects." The Platonic reality of classes and numbers was replaced in this way by a more fundamental Platonic reality of propositional functions as properties and relations. In Russell's later philosophy, however, "a propositional function is nothing but an expression. It does not, by itself, represent anything. But it can form part of a sentence which does say something, true or false" (Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, ([MPD]), 69). Surprisingly. Russell even insists that this was what he meant by a propositional function in [PM]. "Whitehead and I thought of a propositional function as an expression containing an undetermined variable and becoming an

ordinary sentence as soon as a value is assigned to the variable: 'x is human', for example, becomes an ordinary sentence as soon as we substitute a proper name for V. In this view . . . the propositional function is a method of making a bundle of such sentences" ([MPD], 124). Russell does realize that some sort of change has come about, however, for he admits, "I no longer think that the laws of logic are laws of things; on the contrary, I now regard them as purely linguistic" (ibid., 102).
(...)
Now it is not whether [PM] can sustain a nominalistic interpretation that is our concern in this essay, as we have said, but rather how it is that Russell came to be committed in his later philosophy to the atomistic hierarchy and the nominalistic interpretation of propositional functions as expressions generated in a ramified second order hierarchy of languages based on the atomistic hierarchy. We shall pursue this question by beginning with a discussion of the difference between Russell's 1908 theory of types and that presented in [PM] in 1910. This will be followed by a brief summary of the ontology that Russell took to be implicit in [PM], and that he described in various publications between 1910 and 1913. The central notion in this initial discussion is what Russell in his early philosophy called the notion of a logical subject, or equivalently that of a "term" or "single entity". (In [PM], this notion was redescribed as the systematically ambiguous notion of an "object.") As explained in chapter 1 this notion provides the key to the various problems that led Russell in his early philosophy to the development of his different theories of types, including that presented in [PM]. This remains true, moreover, even when we turn to Russell's later philosophy, i.e., to his post-[PM] views, only then it is described as the notion of what can and cannot be named in a logically perfect language. The ontology of these later views is what Russell called logical atomism, and it is this ontology that determines what Russell described as the atomistic hierarchy of sentences. In other words, it is the notion of what can and cannot be named in the atomistic hierarchy that explains how Russell,

however unwittingly, came to replace his earlier theory of logical types by the theory underlying the atomistic hierarchy of sentences as the basis of a logically perfect language." (pp. 193-195 of the reprint)

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"In Appendix B of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM), Russell described a "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" that his "doctrine of types" (as described in Appendix B) was unable to avoid. (1)

In recent years this "new contradiction" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes, some purporting to show that there cannot be a totality of true propositions, (2) or that even the idea of quantifying over the totality of propositions leads to contradiction. (3) A number of these claims have been discussed recently by Mika Oksanen and shown to be spurious relative to the set theory known as NFU. (4) In other words, if NFU is used instead of ZF as the semantical metalanguage for modal logic, the various "paradoxes" about the totality of propositions (usually construed as the totality of sets of possible worlds) can be seen to fail (generally because of the existence of a universal

set and the failure of the general form of Cantor's power-set theorem in NFU). It is not clear, however, how Russell's own paradox about the totality of propositions is resolved on this analysis, and although Oksanen quoted Russell's description of the paradox in detail, he did not show how it is explained in NFU after his resolution of the other related modal paradoxes; in fact, it is not at all clear how this might be done in NFU.

One reason why Russell's argument is difficult to reconstruct in NFU is that it is based on the logic of propositions, and implicitly in that regard on a theory of predication rather than a theory of membership. A more appropriate medium for the resolution of these paradoxes, in other words, would be a formal theory of predication that is a counterpart to NFU.

Fortunately, there are two such theories, λHST* and HST*λ, that are equiconsistent with NFU and that share with it many of the features that make it a useful framework within which to resolve a number of paradoxes, modal or otherwise. (5)" (pp. 25-26)

(1) PoM, p. 527.

(2) See, e.g., Grim 1991, pp. 92f.

(3) See, e.g., Grim 1991, p. 119 and Jubien 1988, p. 307.

(4) See Oksanen 1999. NFU is a modified version of Quine's system NF. It was first described in Jensen 1968 and recently has been extensively developed in Holmes 1999.

(5) See Cocchiarella 1986, chapters IV and VI for proofs of the connection of NFU with these systems. Also, see Cocchiarella 1985 for how these systems are related to Quine's systems NF and ML. For a discussion of the refutation of Cantor's power-set theorem in these systems, see Cocchiarella 1992.

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"What is logical relevance? Anderson and Belnap say that the "modern classical tradition [,] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance." But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds, less deeply with the containment of classes, and least of all with variable sharing in the Anderson-Belnap manner. Thus modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine are implicit relevantists on the deepest level. In showing this, I reunite two fields of logic which, strangely from the traditional point of view, have become basically separated from each other: relevance logic and diagram logic. I argue that there are two main concepts of relevance, intensional and extensional. The first is that of the relevantists, who overlook the presence of the second in modern classical logic. The second is the concept of truth-ground

containment as following from in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. I show that this second concept belongs to the diagram tradition of showing that the premisses contain the conclusion by the fact that the conclusion is diagrammed in the very act of diagramming the premisses. I argue that the extensional concept is primary, with at least five usable modern classical filters or constraints and indefinitely many secondary intensional filters or constraints. For the extensional concept is the genus of deductive relevance, and the filters define species. Also following the *Tractatus*, deductive relevance, or full truth-ground containment, is the limit of inductive relevance, or partial truth-ground containment. Purely extensional inductive or partial relevance has its filters or species too.
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From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic is* both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues.

The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)

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"Bertrand Russell is generally recognized as one of the most important English speaking philosophers, logicians and essayists of the twentieth century. Often cited along with G.E. Moore as one of the founders of modern analytic philosophy and along with Kurt Gödel as one of the most influential logicians of his time, Russell is also widely recognized for his sustained public contributions to many of the most controversial social, political and educational issues of his day. Even so, more than anything else, it is Russell's work in logic and the foundations of mathematics that serves as his core contribution to intellectual history and that makes Russell the seminal thinker he is. His most significant achievements include
1. his refining and popularizing of Giuseppe Peano's and Gottlob Frege's first attempts at developing a modern mathematical logic,
2. his discovery of the paradox that bears his name,
3. his introduction of the theory of types (his way of avoiding the paradox),
4. his defense of logicism, the view that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic, and his many detailed derivations supporting this view,
5. his ground-breaking advances in technical philosophy, including both his theory of definite descriptions and his theory of logical constructions,
6. his theory of logical relations, including his impressively general theory of relation arithmetic,
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"The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe a problem for Russell's account of the logical form of negative existentials involving descriptions, and suggest a Russellian solution. This solution is one that no one will care to adopt -- it seems to turn negative existentials into self-contradictions -- but I later argue that, properly interpreted, it constitutes a promising way of reconciling

some of Meinong's views about negative existentials with the kind of "robust sense of reality" that informed Russell's own analysis. In section 3 I begin the task of articulating this reading of Meinong by describing Meinong's Assumption View as articulated in the second edition of his *On Assumptions* (Meinong 1910). Because this view presupposes Meinong's infamous commitment to non-existent objects, it would still offend Russell's "robust sense of reality", and so section 4 considers a weakened version of the view, one that retains the appeal to assumptions while giving up the appeal to non-existent objects. (Meinong defends a similar view in the 1902 edition of *On Assumptions,* which predates his discovery of non-existents.) Section 5 offers the finale: it shows how Meinong had himself tried to apply such a weakened Assumption View to the case of negative existentials, that Russell had known about the attempt (this arguably solves the first, hermeneutic puzzle), and that, properly interpreted, this way of understanding negative existentials provides Russell with a solution to the problem facing his theory of negative existentials." (pp. 82-83)

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"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of

inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaboration by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the Ideal Language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."

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"In "On Denoting" Russell attacked Alexius Meinong's so-called "theory of objects" (*Gegenstandstheorie*), arguing, among other things, that according to Meinong's theory both the sentence "The existent present King of France exists" and "The existent present King of France does not exist" is true, which would render Meinong's theory inconsistent. Some Neo-Meinongians have claimed that one could avoid this consequence by making use of a distinction between two kinds of properties ("nuclear" and "extranuclear" ones), which Meinong worked into his theory several years after "On Denoting". My aim in this paper is to re-evaluate this contemporary attempt to defend Meinong's theory against Russell's attack and to offer an alternative solution."
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"The debates between Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong from 1904 to 192.0 dealt with some fundamental issues in philosophy: reference, nonexistent objects, intentionality. Along with the enduring influence of Russell's philosophy, sonic misapprehensions about these exchanges have persisted. One is that Russell's objections to Meinong were definitive. The other stems from taking too

seriously Russell's casual remark in 1918 that Meinong's theories evidenced a deficient "sense of reality." Contrary to the impression left by this comment, Russell, during the most intensive years of the debate (1904-1907), felt a real respect for Meinong's theories,' and his main concern lay elsewhere. The exchange did not center on "reality" or "realism," as is often believed, but on the classical laws of logic (noncontradiction, excluded middle) and the correct analysis of logical form, for instance, of existence statements. Russell also took a dim view of the modal concepts Meinong used to support the canons of object theory, but his main concern was that Meinong's overall analysis appeared to threaten the foundation of Russell's philosophical logic. Russell and Meinong's disagreement thus came down to competing logical frameworks tied to different notions of what it is to he an object.

In claiming that Russell's main objection to Meinong's theory was logical, I do not mean to deny that ontology and metaphysics were in the forefront of Russell's concerns up to 1910 or that for him a correct foundational view of logic would tell us much about the way the world is. Russell's motivation for criticizing Meinong may well have been a concern with what is 'real', but his philosophical reasons for rejecting Meinong's object theory in 1905-1907 had to do which logical principles and their reputed violations. Interestingly, during the years Russell was debating with Meinong most intensively (1904-1907) he was also struggling to find the solution to his paradox of classes. With his 1905 invention of the theory of descriptions, Russell believed he had simultaneously found a way to deal with apparent reference to nonexistents in ordinary grammar and a new analysis of classes. It seems that the two difficulties of paradoxical classes and nonexistent objects plagued Russell's sense of consistency in a parallel manner.

In this paper I focus on giving an internal analysis of the objections and replies exchanged by Russell and Meinong to show that Russell's objections failed to be decisive and that the standoff between them came down to fundamentally

different frameworks. Some scholarly evidence supports this interpretation as well. Russell's 1904 letter to Meinong emphasizes that what Meinong called "Theory of Objects" Russell had been accustomed to calling "Logic." [See Appendix]' In pressing his contradiction charge, Russell continued to evaluate Meinong's object theory by the standards of his own view of "logic." Lastly, evidence of a more circumstantial nature points to the parallelism of Russell's worries over nonexistent objects and classes."
(1) See the newly published *Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript*, Vol. 7 of Russell's Collected papers, edited by Elizabeth Eames and Kenneth Blackwell (Allen and Unwin, 1983). This manuscript, which contains many accurate references to Meinong's theories, was never published by Russell. He was apparently discouraged by Wittgenstein's criticism of his theory of judgment.
(2) The Appendix contains translations of Russell's three letters to Meinong. See also the chronological Bibliography at the end of this paper.
(3) See Roderick Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.), and *The First Person, An Essay on Reference and Intentionality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
(4) Some issues are treated in my "Meinong's Theory of Objects and Assumptions," in *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982). In a longer study of book length I explore these and other issues in greater depth.

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"Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent "facts" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them.
The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation,

can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims - one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities."

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Levels of Reality in Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology

INTRODUCTION: HARTMANN'S NEW ONTOLOGY

"With the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann we once again enter a world of sober, objective and impartial inquiry, which presses beyond man's self and seeks to grasp the universe of being so far as it is revealed to our limited capacity to know. The basic mood of Existence philosophy, as might be expected, is altogether missing from this universal way of viewing matters. (...).
The true concern of his philosophy is to discover the structural laws of the real world, of the world of being, not of some 'world of mere appearances' set out in front of the real world. Traditional philosophy, according to Hartmann, has sinned a great deal in this connection and in a double manner. First, it has always believed that it faced two basic alternatives - to accept an absolute knowledge of being, or else to assume the total unknowability of the 'things in themselves'. The latter course means rejecting the possibility altogether of objective knowledge of being, the former results in closed metaphysical systems that dismiss the irrational aspects of being and hold that the whole of being may in principle be grasped rationally. What has been overlooked is the middle possibility, namely, that being may be partially comprehensible conceptually despite the irrationality of the infinite portion that remains.
The second error of traditional philosophy is the propensity, stemming from the monistic need for unity, to transfer the categories or principles of one province to another that differs

from it in kind. Illustrations are the application of mechanistic principles to the sphere of the organic, of organic relationships to social and political life, and, conversely, of mental and spiritual structures to the inanimate world. This infringement of categorial boundaries, as Hartmann calls the theoretical encroachment of one province of being upon another, must be eliminated by rigorous critical analysis; yet the categories must preserve their relative validity for the domain from which they were taken originally. From the standpoint of a critical ontology, the totality of beings then turns out to be a far more complicated structure than finds expression in the traditional metaphysical formulas of unity.

Knowledge belongs to the highest stratum with which we are acquainted, that of spirit or culture. Consequently only an ontology of spiritual being (*geistiges Sein*) can comprehend the essence of knowledge. At the same time, however, the problem of cognition must already have obtained at least a partial solution if ontological inquiry is to be admissible at all. For to begin with we do not even know whether there is any such thing as objective knowledge of being or a transcendent object independent of the subject of cognition. This fact necessarily places epistemology in a dual position. On the one hand, it must create the foundation for all ontological inquiry; but at the same time it can reach its goal only within the framework of an ontology of spiritual being. Hartmann attempts to do justice to this twofold aspect of knowledge by prefacing his works in ethics and ontology with an investigation of knowledge, by including in this investigation the ontological viewpoint, and by discussing in his ontology the consequences of his findings for the phenomenon of cognition." (pp. 220-221)

From: Wolfgang Stegmüller, *Main Currents in Contemporary German, British, and American Philosophy*, Dordrecht; Reidel 1969.

"It is not easy to tell what exactly Hartmann understood by his 'ontology,' which he wanted to oppose to the old Pre-Kantian form of ontology. He certainly did not identify it

with metaphysics. In this respect Hartmann's enterprise differed fundamentally from the many more or less fashionable attempts to resurrect metaphysics, attempts which have rarely led to more than tentative and precarious results. Superficially Hartmann's 'ontology' may seem to be nothing but what it meant to Aristotle: the science of being qua being in its most general characteristics. In order to determine its actual content, however, it will be best to look first at the type of topics and problems which Hartmann took up under the time-honored name. They comprise not only being qua being, i.e., the most general concept of what is (*das Seiende*), but existence (*Dasein*) and essence (*Sosein*), which he calls *Seinsmomente*, and the types of being designated by the adjectives 'real' and 'ideal,' named *Seinsweisen*, all of which are discussed in the first volume of the ontological tetralogy. The second volume deals with the modes of being (*Seinsmodi*) such as possibility and actuality, necessity and contingency, impossibility and unreality -- particularly impressive and perhaps the most original part of the set. The next major theme is the categories, first the general ones applying to all the strata (*Schichten*) of the real world and explored in the third volume (*Der Aufbau der realen Welt*), then the special categories pertaining only to limited areas, such as nature, which Hartmann takes op in the final work. Finally, there are the categories peculiar to the realm of cultural entities (*geistiges Sein*) which he discussed in a work whose publication actually preceded the ontological tetralogy.

The mere mention of these topics will make it clear that such an ontology differs considerably from what had passed as ontology before Hartmann. It covers more and less. It adds the spheres of being which have been opened up by the sciences and the new cultural studies as well as by the theory of values. But it omits the traditional metaphysical problems, i.e., the ultimate questions dealing with God and immortality, which were the prize pieces of speculative metaphysics. The fact that Hartmann abandoned this earlier metaphysics did not mean that he denied its problems. Their insolubility even provides the very background for his new ontology. Hence we have no right to simply ignore them.

Ontology thus conceived constitutes really a segment of a metaphysics which is no longer simply a field for speculative treatment by a priori methods. To Hartmann metaphysical problems are those which form the horizon of scientific knowledge, and which are inescapable because of their connection with what we can know scientifically, yet which cannot be solved by the methods of science alone. Some of these problems he considered to be impenetrable and 'irrational' on principle, even though they too contain an ingredient (*Einschlag*) which can be explored by the rational methods of critical ontology. This 'least metaphysical part' of metaphysics is the proper field of the new ontology." (pp. 309-310)

From: Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963 (third edition).

THE RELEVANCE OF HARTMANN'S WORK FOR CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

The philosophical debate of the past decades has shown no interest in Hartmann's ideas and contribution to philosophy. Judging from current discussion, the only available conclusion that one can draw is that Hartmann left no legacy behind. Though this is a rather unwelcome conclusion, it seems difficult to deny its validity. How, then, could *Axiomathes*' readers possibly be interested in Hartmann's ideas? We are not archaeologists concerned with dead fragments of the past. We are scientists and philosophers closely involved in contemporary debate.
One of *Axiomathes*'s fundamental beliefs is that real advances in science may sometimes depend on consideration of the origins and intellectual history of certain key ideas at the forefront of current research. I believe that this applies to Hartmann. He developed ideas and tools that may stimulate a real advancement of contemporary science. I would therefore claim that one of the tasks of those few well acquainted with Hartmann's thought is to

reorganize and represent his ideas so that they can be understood by most contemporary researchers.
Hartmann is only one of the many great figures of the past that have lapsed into oblivion, as witnessed by the well-known cases of Brentano, Peirce and Whitehead.
It is well known that the idea of ontology is grounded in the definition put forward by Aristotle at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics: "there is a science which studies being qua being [...]". The problem is this: why does not Aristotle simply say that ontology is the theory of being? The main reason for distinguishing between theory of being and theory of being qua being rests on Aristotle's contention that the analysis of being *simpliciter* cannot be developed scientifically. Aristotle's intention to submit being to scientific analysis was therefore the principal reason why he adopted a reduplicative form of analysis. His position derived from the thesis that being is not a genus, whereas scientific analysis can only be developed if there is a common genus for the items under examination. If being does not have a common genus, the study of being cannot be a science. Aristotle stated very clearly that when one moves from the study of being to the study of being qua being, some of the ways in which one can talk about being are no longer valid. Metaphysics VI, 2 tells us that being *simpliciter* can be talked about in various ways. On passing from being to being qua being, only two of them remain valid: analysis according to the categories, and analysis according to potentiality and actuality (the latter can be rephrased as what is nowadays called dynamics).
The two main underpinnings of a properly understood Aristotelian ontology are therefore the idea that metaphysics comes after physics that is, the idea that ontology requires science -- and that the theory of being should be replaced by the theory of being qua being (that is, by a categorical framework plus a dynamics).
Hartmann followed the same line of thought: he explicitly claimed that ontology comes after science, that the proper ontological viewpoint is the categorical one and that reality is thoroughly dynamic. Considering that ontology has been a pejorative label for twentieth-century mainstream philosophy,

this may help explain why it has been so difficult for Hartmann's achievements to gain recognition.
This issue of *Axiomathe*s is based on the papers presented at the conference *The Legacy of Nicolai Hartmann*, organized by the recently established MITTELEUROPA FOUNDATION for the fiftieth anniversary of Hartmann's death (Bolzano, June 21-22, 2001).

From Roberto Poli, "Foreword" to *Axiomathes*, Vol. 12, 2001, Nos. 3-4, Special Issue: *The Legacy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)*.

HARTMANN AUTO-PRESENTATION

"The projects in ontology constitute a special chapter, although only one of these was actually brought to completion in our period. The famous work of Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit,* which had evoked great interest both in and out of Germany, was never finished. But its influence has been great even up to the present. (...) On the other hand, Nikolai Hartmann, after *Grundlegung der Ontologie* (1935) had opened up a new line of development, proceeded to publish two larger works -- *Möglichkeit and Wirklichkeit* (1938) and *Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre* (1940). The third volume of this set, the *Spezielle Kategorienlehre* (philosophy of nature), could not be published. Nevertheless, the two published writings contain the gist of the scheme, which is further elaborated in a smaller writing, *Neue Wege der Ontologie* (in *Systematische Philosophie*, 1942. 2nd ed., 1947). The first of these books presents a new analysis of the modal categories. The main thesis is that the essence of reality, which is so difficult to conceive, if it is understood as the kind of being possessed by the world in which we live, can actually be so conceived in terms of the relation of the modes which govern it. The study shows that the traditional conception of these modes cannot account for the kind of being which reality possesses, and so the modes

themselves must be interpreted in a completely new manner. The new interpretation consists of a thorough analysis of their mutual relations -- the " intermodal relations "; and the conclusions lead directly to new determinations of the nature of becoming, obligation, the puzzling character of aesthetic objects, etc. Also a new formulation and justification of the principle of sufficient reason is developed. Consequences are also found for the problem of ideal being, the realm of logic and knowledge, the general conclusion being that these modes and their interrelations vary with each of these realms. The second work develops the new ontological conception of the categories, and applies it to the group of " basic categories " (*Fundamental kategorien*) -- that is, those categories which are common to all levels, spheres and realms of being, and which are articulated even in the highest levels of being. In this connexion we find a great many " categorial laws ", which underly the stratification of the real world and determine its inner structure. As a result we are led to the so called " laws of dependence ", and eventually to the controversial problem of moral freedom -- for which a new solution is proposed." (pp. 421-422)

From: Nicolai Hartmann, "German Philosophy in the Last Ten Years", translated by John Ladd, *Mind*, 58, 1949, pp. 413-433.

METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY

"In opposition to almost the whole of modern philosophy, Hartmann asserts the ontological nature of all fundamental problems which philosophy attempts to solve. Even idealism or the most extreme subjectivism have, somehow or other, to explain at least the "illusion" of being, no matter how they try to avoid it; there is no form of theoretical thought which can refuse to be basically ontological, that is, does not propose questions about "being as such." It is obviously the essence of thought that one cannot think "nothing," one must think "something," and that "something" immediately raises the problem of being.

Furthermore, the natural sciences are in no position to cut themselves off from a metaphysical background. Metaphysics is born of wonder at the fact of life, which cannot be explained either mechanically or teleologically. Psychology, the philosophy of history, logic, aesthetics, and above all epistemology and ethics, are faced with the same problems.

The older metaphysics had made two mistakes. First, it undertook to solve the insoluble. Metaphysics signifies the irrational, and the irrational is the unintelligible. But being has also an intelligible side. The persistence of numerous problems is proof of this, for example in the recurrent contradictions between freedom and determinism, immanence and transcendence, life and mechanism. We cannot hope for a solution of these problems, but with appropriate methods we can advance their elucidation and confine to smaller and smaller compass the unintelligible remainder.

Second, the older metaphysics made the mistake of erecting closed systems and of forcing reality into these molds. The time for such systems is past, says Hartmann. What has weight in the works of the great philosophers is not their systems but the problems which they work out. All systems celebrate triumphs in the empty breeze of speculation. A few principles are laid down and then one proceeds forward by deduction. But even if the unity of the world is to be considered as given we yet do not know what in fact is its ultimate principle. The method that is called for is precisely the opposite. The *philosophia prima* which is to be evolved can be a p *hilosophia ultima* for our cognitive capacities only because the *ratio cognoscendi* moves toward the *ratio essendi*.

In this critique of the older metaphysics we begin to see how Hartmann wishes the concepts, metaphysics and ontology, to be construed. In contrast to the classical usage of the term he does not regard metaphysics as a science but as a tissue of questions to which there are no answers. The intelligible aspect of being, on the other hand, falls into the domain of ontology.

Ontology in this sense is a science, but it is not identical with phenomenology which has great propaedeutic value but cannot constitute the whole of ontology. Phenomenology glides dangerously over the surface of problems, and on the basis of its

very definition it does not reach beyond the external appearance of the real. It remains bound to mere matter of fact and cannot get beyond this.
Hartmann's magnificent and original investigations into the nature of problems as such have shown that even when an intelligible object is under discussion one always discovers it to be a mixture of the known and the unknown. The fact that problems may be distinguished from each other proves that something is known of the matter in hand, just as the fact of inquiring into it shows that it is not known. To state problems is the chief task of philosophy." (pp. 213-216)

From: I. M. (Józef Maria) Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, translated from the German by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, Berkeley: University of California Press 1957. (Original German published in 1947).

THE DIMENSIONS AND FORMS OF BEING

"It is now clear that Hartmann's statement of fundamental problems and his theory of knowledge turn first of all on the issue of being qua being (*Seiendes als Seiendes*). His propositions about being and its properties may now be examined.

Here are encountered the comprehensive investigations of his main four-volume work of which only the most important ideas can be mentioned. The basic principle of Hartmann's doctrine of being is that being develops in two dimensions, namely (1) the four completely distinct spheres of being and (2) the levels of being (*Seinsstufen*) within these spheres.
In the spheres of being Hartmann distinguishes two primary ones, of real and of ideal being, which may also be designated as modes of being (*Seinsweisen*) and two secondary, the cognitive and the logical spheres. Real being must not be confused with actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) for there is both real possibility and ideal possibility, though this distinction is really part of modal analysis.

As to the relation between the primary and secondary spheres, there is an intimate cross-relationship between the cognitive and the real modes of being, and between the logical and the ideal. Propositions about the latter are especially important, for Hartmann holds that ideal being is similar to real being in itself in that it can be known, and knowing is always by its very nature the grasp of what has being in itself. The most familiar types of ideal being are the realms of essences and values and of mathematical being. The first of these appears in reality as basic structure but without being exhausted in that context. There are entities in ideal being which do not become real, for example, spaces with more than three dimensions. On the other hand, there is real being which is not subject to the laws of ideal being; for example, the alogical, the value-negating, the real contradiction. All ideal being is general, and is either forms, conformity to law or relations. Compared with the real, the ideal is lesser being. We must reject Plato's view that it is something "higher, more sublime". Ideal being is not identical with the rational for in its domain there is also to be found the irrational, and this incidentally is a proof of its having independent being for the transintelligible is exempt from idealistic criticism.
Hartmann analyzes the other spheres in similar fashion. He then proceeds to specify the character of the second dimension of being, that of the strata or levels of being (*Seinsstufen*). In real being we find four levels, matter, life, consciousness, and spirit. Being known (*Erkenntnissein*), by a certain analogy to these, involves perception, intuition, knowledge, and comprehension (*Wahrnehmung*, *Anschauung, Erkenntnis, Wissen*). Logical being finally divides, as the tradition has it, into concept, judgment, and inference. These separate levels are determined through the categories, the principles of a given level. Hartmann distinguishes two kinds of categories: modal categories which are accorded a special investigation, and fundamental categories which can be arranged in opposing pairs. In contrast to Kant and Alexander, the latter are not arranged in a definite system but are only loosely strung together in a table of existential opposites (*Seinsgegensätze*). The twelve pairs involved here include form-matter, inner-outer, determination-dependence, quality-quantity.

Hartmann has devoted extensive study to the question of the categories in his comprehensive work *Der Aufbau der realen Welt: Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre*, the third volume of his *Ontologie*. After thorough survey of earlier views his theory culminates in the formulation of many categorial laws. Some of the most important are these: the law of strength (the lower is the stronger), and its counterpart, the law of freedom (the higher level is autonomous, for in respect to the lower level it is the richer). While therefore every higher level is borne by a lower one, still their relations are not always the same. The organic, the level of life, is only an over-forming (*U berformung*) of the spatio-physical aspect of matter, while the levels of consciousness and spirit rise in a ;more independent process of over-building (*Überbauung*) above life; that is, in this case not all the lower categories reappear.

The second great categorial group, the theory of the modalities of being (*Seinsmodi*) represents one of the most significant parts of Hartmann's metaphysics. What is notably original is that modal analysis leads to quite different results in the four spheres of being. Thus in each sphere there are distinguishable modalities of being. Of these, however, the laws which hold of real being are the most important. The modalities divide into the absolute modalities (reality and unreality) and the relative (possibility, impossibility, necessity). There is also a negative counter-modality to necessity, namely contingency, of which the rule holds that absolute necessity is likewise absolute contingency. One should further emphasize Hartmann's theory of possibility according to which in real being only that is possible whose conditions are all real. Hence all that is possible is likewise real and necessary, and all that is negatively possible is likewise unreal and impossible. This does not mean of course that the modalities themselves are identical. Implication is not identity. The distinction between positive and negative possibility rests on the law of division of disjunctive possibility which is valid in real being though not in logical being.

In his ontology Hartmann has also addressed himself to the traditional distinction between essence and existence. These he calls "moments of being" (*Seinsmomente*): the "what" (*Sosein*) and the "that" (*Dasein*). It is noteworthy that these moments of

being appear differently in both of the primary spheres of being. Thus the ideal "what" and "that" can be known a priori, but the real "that" only a posteriori. One cannot simply equate the "what" with the ideal and the "that" with real being. Actually there is no absolute difference between "what" and "that" in the existential relationships that obtain in the world for it is a question altogether of relative moments. The "that" of the leaf belongs to the "what" of the tree, and the "that" of the latter to the "what" of the forest. The distinction holds only for the whole of the universe and for particular beings." (pp. 217-221)

From: I. M. (Józef Maria) Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, translated from the German by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, Berkeley: University of California Press 1957. (Original German published in 1947).

HARTMANN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

"How to get at the basis of Hartmann's ontology? Let us sketch the superstructure, and then descend into the depths of the foundation. Besides the two primary spheres, there are two secondary spheres of being -- the spheres of 'logic' and 'knowledge'. These are mid-way spheres inasmuch as they share the categories of both the primary spheres. (Compare Whitehead's 'hybrid' entities.)
Following the Aristotelian tradition, Hartmann takes ontology as the science of beings as beings. Ontology is concerned with what first makes beings beings. The word "Sein" gives rise to the illusion, as if there is some entity or attribute corresponding to it, something over and above, may be, underlying or pervading the various beings. Hartmann rejects this thought. A science of beings as beings is not a science of any such entity or attribute as *Sein*. On the other hand, it can only be a science which lays bare the various spheres of being along with their general and special categories and inter-categorial (hence, inter-sphere) relations.

Hence, ontology becomes a doctrine of categories, a "Kategorienlehre". To keep these primary and secondary spheres along with their general and special categories before the mind, in their distinctions as well as in their interrelations, is essential for an understanding of Hartmann's ontology. Hartmann displays great acumen in drawing these distinctions and in keeping clearly apart what he considers to be distinct. Through these distinctions, he claims to have the clue in hand for avoiding many of the errors of the traditional ontologies.
There are two primary spheres of being: the real and the ideal. The real consists of the chain of temporal events. The structure of the real sphere is a stratification of various levels: the material, vital, psychical and spiritual. The stratification consists in the relation of "founding". The higher level is "founded" on the lower. The lower provides the basis for the higher. The real sphere has its general categories, those which determine the entire sphere, irrespective of the differences of strata. Such categories are, for example, the modal categories. But each stratum of reality has also its own special categories. The relation in which two levels of reality stand to each other is concretely illustrated in the relation in which the categories of the The key to this entire discussion lies in the formulation of the nature of the ideal sphere. In setting aside what he calls the errors of tradition, Hartmann shows here his capacity at its best." (pp. 116-117)

From: Jitendra Nath Mohanty, *Phenomenology and Ontology*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970, Chapter XI. *A Recent Criticism of the Foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology*, pp. 115-128.

"... Hartmann regards ontology to be concerned with: (1) the two aspects ("moments") of being: *Dasein* and *Sosein*, or *that* and *what*; (2) the two spheres of being: real and ideal; and (3) the modalities of being: *actuality, possibility*, and *necessity*.
One of the errors of phenomenology -- including both Husserl's and Scheler's -- is that when it regards itself as investigation into essences, as distinguished from existence (as a consequence of eidetic reduction), it forgets that essences also have their *Dasein* (existence) and their *Sosein*, that *Dasein* is not as such real

existence. There is also, as with essences and mathematical idealities such as numbers, and values, ideal *Dasein*. Husserl does sometimes insist that essences are a kind of objects *sui generis*, so it may be just right to interpret eidetic reduction not as abstracting from existence, but as abstracting from real existence. But, then there is the curious consequence that essences have both real and ideal existence (when they are taken in their purity). Hartmann seems to have wavered on this question. In his early work *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, he denied existence and individuality to ideal entities, but still ascribed to them A *nsichsein*, intrinsic being. In *Die Grundlegung der Ontologie*, he ascribed existence to them, but that only means he was taking "existence" and "*Ansichsein*" as being the same. So, for Hartmann, the *Dasein-Sosein* distinction is not quite the same as real-ideal distinction. In addition, Hartmann insisted that some *Soseins* are "neutral" as against both real and ideal existence: "roundness" belongs to a real spherical ball as well as a geometrical circle.

If concerns (1) and (2) do not coincide, it is also a mistake to collapse (2) with (3). The latter mistake is committed by those who hold that reality is the domain of all that is actual, while essences are pure possibilities. A corollary of this view is that truths about reality (i.e., about what is actual) are contingent, whereas truths about essences (i.e., about pure possibilities) are necessary. This is a widely held view, and one of Hartmann's important theses is that this view is based on an inadequate analysis of modal concepts.

Hence the importance of modal concepts in Hartmann's thinking. It is only the modal concepts as pertaining to a sphere of being, which explicate the precise mode of being of that sphere. In other words, Hartmann held that while in an important sense we cannot say much about what "real existence" (or "ideal existence") consists in, the best we can do in this regard is to look at how the concepts of "possibility" "actuality," and "necessity" (and their opposites) behave with regard to the domain of reality (or, with regard to the domain of ideality). So we shall turn to his modal theory, but before I do that, perhaps a quick sketch of what he counts as belonging to the two domains would be in order.

The real world is a stratified structure, on Hartmann's view, with nonliving matter at the base, living organisms founded on it, mental reality founded on organic life, and spirit or *Geist* (including society and all social formations) at the apex. Each of these strata has its own categorial structure, and the entire domain of reality also has certain common structures.
The domain of idealities consists of: mathematical entities (such as numbers), essences, and values. None of the idealities is spatiotemporally individuated. An ideality maybe instantiated or be an ingredient in many real individuals, without surrendering its own identity.
Besides these two primary spheres of being, Hartmann also recognized two intermediate (or hybrid) spheres: those of logic and cognition. With this brief sketch, let us look at his modal theory worked out in *Möglichkeit and Wirklichkeit*." (pp. 26-27)

From: Jitendra Nath Mohanty, *Phenomenology. Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy*, Chapter 3: *Nicolai Hartmann's Phenomenological Ontology*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1997.

HARTMANN'S THEORY OF MODALITY

"In his *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (Berlin 1937, 2nd. ed. 1949), Hartmann gives us an ontological theory of the modes. He starts from a distinction between the modes of the various spheres of being, primary and secondary. The two primary spheres of being, according to his ontology, are the real and the ideal. The two secondary spheres are those of logic and knowledge. The modes of the real world are accordingly contrasted with those of the ideal realm; the modes of the realm of logic are again different from those of knowledge. The modal doctrine is thereby divided into four parts. But there must be also a part on the relations between these different spheres.
Traditional discussion of the problem of modality did not see clearly through these distinctions. This gives to Hartmann's

treatment of the problem its originality. Further, these modes of the various spheres are distinguished from the naive day to day consciousness of modality.

The ontological point of view requires specification. For this purpose, we are to distinguish between three different approaches to the problem of modality:

First, it is possible to consider the modalities as criteria for classifying all objects in the three groups, those that are merely possible, those that are both possible and actual, and those that are possible, actual and also necessary.

Secondly, it is possible to consider the modes as if they were different stages of a process. Thus, it may be said that a thing first becomes possible, then is made actual, and further may or may not be necessary. The process however may not be carried to the end; what is possible may never be actualised.

Thirdly, the modes may be taken neither as criteria nor as stages of a process, but as the constituent aspects of the existent or the subsistent, as the case may be. This is the point of view which we may call the critical point of view, because we may trace it to Kant. Kant starts from the given object of experience and then asks how the same is possible, actual and necessary.

Hartmann rejects the first two approaches. Modes are for him neither criteria nor stages, but the most primary characteristics of the being of anything. As such, given an object of experience, we can ask: what makes it possible? What makes it actual? What makes it necessary?

Thus in an important sense, Hartmann's treatment of the problem is similar to Kant's, even though Kant's own solutions are rejected by Hartmann. For Kant, the given is possible when considered in relation to its form and actual when considered in relation to its matter. Hartmann finds this not only inadequate but also misleading; to this however we shall turn later on.

The second approach is attributed to Aristotle. Both the first and the second approaches attribute to the merely possible which is not 'or has not yet become actual' a sort of ghostly existence -- a position in between being and non-being. Aristotle's doctrine of *dynamis* and *energia* is further criticised as an illegitimate extension of the categories of the sphere of organic being to the entire domain of being. Further, if a prior stage of mere

possibility is admitted, the question arises as to what must be added to it in order to render it actual. Kant had shown that any answer to this question is absurd. For, that which must be so added, argued Kant, must be other than the possible, that is to say, must be impossible! (1)
As such, we come back to the *critical* formulation of the question. This is one of the points where we begin to see the influence of Kant on Hartmann's ontology which claims the name of critical ontology." (pp. 181-182)

Notes

(1) I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, WW III p. 206, hg. v. Ernst Cassirer.

From: Jitendra Nath Mohanty, "Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine", *Kant-Studien*, 54, 1963, pp. 181-187.

ON THE EXTANT AS EXTANT IN GENERAL

"The first one of the four treatises included in the *Grundlegung* [*der Ontologie*] is entitled "*Vom Seienden als Seienden überhaupt*" (On the Extant as Extant at all). It comprises three sections, consisting of ten chapters. The following is a summary of its contents.

Section I. The Concept of the Extant and its Aporia. Chapter 1. The Fundamental Question of Ontology.

A departure can be made from this side of realism and idealism. It only seems to be different because of the habit of understanding Being (Sein) as Being per se (*Ansichsein*). But the phenomenon must be viewed first without interpretation. One must not form any arbitrarily speculative prejudgment. He who tries to do so, is not yet on realistic grounds.
A careful distinction must be made between Being (*Sein*) and the Extant, that-which-is (*Seiendes*). The interrelationship of the two

is the same as that of Truth and the True, of Reality and the Real, of Factuality and the Factual -- of *esse* and *ens*. Unfortunately, these pairs of concepts have always been confused with each other. Being (*Sein*) is the *One* the identical in the manifoldness of the Extant. Naturally, the two must not be separated from each other, but the lack of distinction has led to viewing Being as a substance.

The Aristotelian version of the question is helpful today still. Its chosen task is to explain Being as Extant, or the Extant as such. This clearly points up Being as such as something general, although the wording uses the term "Extant." Aristotle, too, failed to overcome the peril of substantialism, but the latter can be avoided by adhering faithfully to his wording. It is a wonderful formula. Just how wonderful it is can best be recognized by seeing how much it wards off. If Being is regarded as appearance or as something in the state of becoming, the formula is violated. Such a cognition does not involve a cognition of the Extant as Extant. Likewise in the case of the Extant as something posited, meant, imagined and subject-referred. For Being is not absorbed in the objecthood (*Gegenstandsein*). This is the supreme meaning of the Aristotelian formula which hits well the formal meaning of the fundamental question. Heidegger tried in vain to defend himself against it.

Chapter 2.

It is worth our while to take a closer look at Heidegger's abortive attempt. He abandoned Aristotle's formula for the other one which queries for the sense and meaning of Being. Heidegger's concept of hereness (*Dasein*) remains completely man-bound. Hereness (*Dasein*) is Being (*Sein*) that understands its own Being (*). This is why the Extant (*Seiendes*), the world, Truth, are the ever-mine. This prejudges everything, and such an analysis of Being ends up as the analysis of givenness. The modes of givenness are the modalities of Being. The objective spirit is de-powered, the stratum of Being (*Seinsschicht*) of the historical spirit become impalpable. The personal decision of the individual alone is proven right.

It is wrong to twist the question of Being into a question of meaning. It is as proper to inquire about the Being of meaning as about the Meaning of Being. Yet, this is not the general question of Being. Meaning exists always only for somebody. There is no meaning in-itself. The Being of the Extant stands indifferent to whatever the Extant might be "for somebody."

Chapter 3. The Attitude of Ontological Cognition.

> Being (*Sein*) is the ultimate and therefore cannot be defined. It is impalpable, the out-and-out universal. It cannot even be delimited against something else, such as some other universal. Only the contentual element of a mode of Being can be indicated, not the mode of Being itself.

But this irrationality is merely partial. Therefore, it cannot be defined and cannot be typed by characteristics, but the way from the general to the special is open, and this circumstance makes it necessary to bring in certain specific questions. This is the path which we take in this treatise.

There is a circumstance which proves useful in this reflection on the aporia of generality and indeterminacy of the Extant as Extant, of the Extant as such, of Being at all -- ontology is a re-approach to the natural. This makes one ponder the difference between natural and reflected attitude. Cognition is directed at its object, at that which it perceives, and not at that which constitutes the cognition. If we want to reach some conclusion on it, we must go into the attitude called reflection, which is a bending-back (re-flexion), whereas cognition stands for the natural. This bending-back becomes a source of aporias in epistemology. The same thing occurs in psychology. Acts are not given, like objects. The hardest task in this respect is that of logic, if it wants to make its object not the contentual element of the concepts, but the concepts themselves. This is why it has so often slipped from its own plane onto those of psychology, epistemology or ontology. We have thus found three fields in which the natural attitude must be replaced be a reflected one, involving diverse complications.

Borrowing certain concepts from scholasticism, from Wilhelm von Occam in particular, let us call the natural attitude *intentio*

recta, and the reflected bending-back *intentio obliqua*. Then we can say that ontology is the restoration of the *intentio recta*.

Chapter 4. Position and Roots of the Problem of Being.

> Three principal fields are present in the *intentio recta*: the natural, the scientific, and the ontological relationships to the world. Moreover, however, we classify epistemology, psychology and logic under the heading "Philosophy," not under "Science." Ontology continues the natural trend which starts in the pre-scientific, and which is taken over by natural science and also by the science of the mind. The recognition of the right, for instance, represents an unreflected mental attitude, and the same holds true for the other fields of objective spirit, in strong contradistinction to epistemology, psychology and logic. Ontology is, therefore, in this respect, a continuation. In the case of the *intentio recta* of natural science, the external material form of the givenness (*Gegebenheit*) is still predominant. Thus, all these fields, in contradistinction to the other three, show a common relationship to the Extant, the essential trend of a natural realism which knows that taking something for an object is not the same as taking something for an Extant.

As contrasted with the naive world-awareness, however, enormous contentual differences are involved here, but the unity of the object range remains intact in the four fields. The object is the same, but the view of the object changes. Something of the prescientific naive view is preserved in the theory. The word theory means view.

The *intentio obliqua* misses the given aspect of the Extant. Reflection gets always only as far as the objects and does not reach the Extant. It is therefore all too likely to wander into the blind alley of the immanence of the awareness.) .Thus, gnosiology wants to hold fast in the reflectedness of the awareness of it. Without gaining a firm footing ontologically, gnosiology here misses it own object -- cognition.

Phenomenology does not get as far as the things (as it so strongly emphasizes), but merely as far as the phenomenon of the thing. It becomes tuned to things through *intentio recta* -- to the

phenomena by *intentio obliqua*. That which is given is grasped mentally in the reflected attitude. This casts a light on what the phenomenological methods calls "bracketing" (*Einklammerung*), "reduction" (*Reduktion*), and raising before the bracket" (*Vor-die-Klammer-Heben*)." (pp. 15-19)

Notes

(*) It is Being concerned by its own Being, and which thus is Being-in-the-World.

From: Otto Samuel, *A Foundation of Ontology. A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann*, New York: Philosophical Library 1953.

LEVELS OF REALITY AND LEVELS OF BEING

"In his architectural ontology, Hartmann distinguishes between levels of reality and levels of being.(1)
As to levels of reality, he distinguishes at least four ontological strata of the real world: the material, the psychological and the social, among which specific forms of categorical and existential dependence exist. Reality, however, is only a section of being.
As to the levels of being, Hartmann distinguishes among ontology, ontics and metaphysics. In particular:
1. Ontology concerns the categorical analysis of entities by means of the knowledge categories able to classify them.
2. Ontics refers to a pre-categorical and pre-objectual connection which is best expressed in the relation to transcendent acts.
3. Metaphysics is that part of ontics or that part of ontology which concerns the residue of being that cannot be rationalized further according to categories.
On the basis of this last distinction, the psychological stratum is of crucial importance in Hartmann's ontology, and for various reasons.

Firstly, because it provides direct access to the ontic. This access is problematic, however, because certain layers of the psychological stratum, due to the lack of adequate knowledge categories, at first sight seem to be excluded from ontological categorization.
Secondly, because the psychological stratum is one of the levels of beginning of new series of categories. It is well known that in Hartmann's ontology the psychic level stands in a twofold relation, as follows:
1 . The relation of overforming (*Überformung*), which holds among ontological layers. According to this relation every category can constitute the matter of a higher category.
2. The relation of building above (*Überbauen*), which holds among ontological strata. According to this relation the higher stratum requires the lower one only as its external basis of existential support, but not as matter to be overformed.
Consequently, the psychological level assumes a fundamental role also as regards the problem of the categorical ontological dependences.
Hartmann describes the complexity of the psychological levels in *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, affirming that psychology could deem itself extraneous to the problem of metaphysics as long as reality was considered to be a characteristic of the external world (things, physical being). But the psychic world is as real as the physical world. Psychology must understand of what psychic reality consists from an ontological point of view and then shed light on a complex series of states and acts that are not immediately experienced and are unconscious. Given in immediate experience are not elements but wholes, organized connections, which relate to whatever is not experienced immediately.
How can one explain be shed on the genesis of psychological wholes and organized connections whose components seem inextricable and therefore destined to constitute the nucleus of the non-rationalizable residue of metaphysics?" (pp. 299-300)

Notes

(1) Following Poli we use (i) *level* as a general term, (ii) s *tratum* to refer to the relams of being characterized by categorical diverse groups, and (iii) *layer* to refer to the segmentation internal to each stratum. See Roberto Poli, *Alwis: Ontology for Knowledge Engineers*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utrecht 2001, ch. 8, 124-126.

From: Liliana Albertazzi, "The Roots of Ontics,"*Axiomathes* 12, 2001, pp. 299-315.

HARMANN'S CONCEPT OF CATEGORIES

"All ontology has to do with fundamental assertions about being as such. Assertions of this sort are precisely what we call categories of being. Like the Kantian categories -- which, as far as content is concerned, are also precisely this: fundamental assertions about being -- they have the character of universal constitutive principles comprising all more specialized ontological assertions. Hence, the new ontology might be expected to provide a transcendental deduction also of these ontological assertions. Otherwise, it is argued, it could not guarantee their objective validity. That, however, would mean that this ontology in its turn was in need of an epistemological foundation which would have to provide the justification of a priori principles of an even wider scope.
Thereby a way for ontology is traced, and this way once more follows the scheme of the old deductivity. But it is here that the roads of the old and the new ontology part. Just as in regard to the problem of being it is today no longer a question of substantial forms and of the teleological determination of actual processes by these forms, so also the problem at issue is no longer that of a *post factum* justification of a priori principles. The categories with which the new ontology deals are won neither by a definition of the universal nor through derivation from a formal table of judgments. They are rather gleaned step by step from an observation of existing realities. And since, of course, this method

of their discovery does not allow for an absolute criterion of truth, here no more than in any other field of knowledge, it must be added that the procedure of finding and rechecking is a laborious and cumbersome one. Under the limited conditions of human research it requires manifold detours, demands constant corrections, and, like all genuine scholarly work, never comes to an end.

Here one may truly and literally speak of new ways of ontology. The basic thesis can possibly be formulated like this: The categories of being are not a priori principles. Only such things as insights, cognitions, and judgments can be a priori. In fact the whole contrast between a priori and a posteriori is only an epistemological one. But ontology is not concerned with knowledge, much less with mere judgments, but with the object of knowledge in so far as this object is at the same time "transobjective", that is, independent of whether or to what extent being is actually transformed into an object of knowledge. The principles of the object in its very being are in no way *eo ipso* also cognitive principles. In some fields they can be quite heterogeneous, as the manifold admixtures of the unknowable in nearly all basic problems of philosophy amply prove. From this alone it follows that the principles of being cannot be a priori principles of our intellect, that they, as a matter of fact, are just as indifferent to the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable as the being whose principles they are.

At this point it is incumbent upon us radically to unlearn the old and start to learn the new, not only if our approach be from the old ontology, but also if it be from the standpoint of transcendental epistemology. Of course, as far as their content goes, ontological categories can occasionally coincide with cognitive categories; and within certain limits this must be the case wherever an objectively valid knowledge of objects takes place a priori. But it must not be supposed that this occurs everywhere and without limits. The apriorism in our knowledge is subject to a very fundamental limitation, because our categories of understanding coincide at best only in part with the principles of being. This coincidence reaches farthest where it is a question of insights that are practically relevant and indispensable to the business of life -- in other words, in that field of objects to which

our understanding is best suited. And correspondingly, it fails most signally where we are confronted with broad theoretical questions concerning our total world picture and its philosophical interpretation. For it is manifest that with our rational principles we can grasps priori only that aspect of the real world which in itself is framed in accordance with those same principles.

One further step must here be taken. The statement that ontological categories are not a priori principles means simply that they cannot be immediately recognized a priori. Inasmuch as they are at all accessible to knowledge, they must be grasped by other methods. For this, a point of departure seems to offer itself in the relation between cognitive and ontological categories. We already know why this relation must involve at least a partial identity. It might then be concluded: In so far as the ontological categories are the same as the cognitive categories, it should be possible to discover the former as included in the latter. In this way one might at least be able to grasp a priori a sector of the ontological principles.

Even this hope proves deceptive. In the first place, we have no criterion to measure the extent of that categorial identity. And precisely where on practical grounds we are more or less certain of this identity-- in everyday life and for our natural orientation in the world -- this identity is philosophically worthless because it does not bear upon the problems of philosophy. But where these begin, it becomes extraordinarily questionable and soon fails us completely. In the second place, in our cognitive apparatus there is lacking one fundamental prerequisite for so exploiting this identity: an immediate knowledge of our own cognitive categories.

It lies in the nature of all knowledge to be directed not toward itself but toward its object. What, in the process of knowing, the knower becomes conscious of are traits of the object only, not traits of his own action. Least of all do the inner conditions of his action fall within his consciousness; but cognitive categories are counted among these. So, philosophy had to pass through a long historical process before it finally began to become aware of a few of the cognitive categories as such. This awareness requires a reversal of the natural cognitive direction, a turning around, as it were, from the object to the knower. And in fact with this

reversal, knowledge of a second order sets in where knowledge itself is made the object of knowledge. This epistemological reflection is "secondary" and must be carried through "against" the natural attitude. When it sets in, it does not lead immediately to the categories of understanding but by a special method must be directed toward them.

This is why not only the ontological categories but even our own cognitive categories on which all knowledge a priori rests are not themselves known a priori. In fact, it must be added that generally they remain unknown in the knowledge of the object. They function in our knowledge but do not in turn become an object of knowledge. Only through the intervention of epistemological reflection are they brought to the light of consciousness. But that is a phase of knowledge reached only late in the historical process. Were the functioning of these categories in our knowledge dependent upon our knowledge of them, all human knowledge, even the most naïve, would have to await a philosophy to make them conscious. But since philosophy actually presupposes naive knowledge, philosophy, on this hypothesis, could never have arrived at the simple understanding of objects.

Actually, the reverse order prevails: Although cognitive categories are the first condition of our knowledge -- especially of the a priori elements in it, which are nowhere absent, not even in the naive world view -- they are not the first to be recognized in it. They are not unknowable, but can be known only indirectly, namely as mediated through the simple knowledge of the objects which is based upon their functioning. If they are known at all, they are, we might say, rather the thing known last. And this order is irreversible. That explains why they are hardest to know. The many detours and blind alleys by which epistemology tries to arrive at them provide an unambiguous demonstration of this fact.

Thus the possibility of making ontological categories comprehensible by a detour through the cognitive categories must be considered altogether negligible. One might believe that in the last analysis it is rather the cognitive categories which can be made intelligible by a detour through the ontological categories. The latter, at any rate, lie in the natural direction of

cognition--in the background of objects--albeit the simple knowledge of objects may not penetrate to them. But since all knowledge of objects has in it the tendency toward progressive advance, it may very well, by dint of a progressive deepening, lead directly to ontological categories." (pp. 13-17)

From: Nicolai Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1953.

"As Hartmann sees it, categories are "the silent presuppositions" that we accept in our interpretations, explanations, and evaluations of objects. Kant had specifically identified twelve. Hegel had many more. But it can readily be shown that there is an as yet undetermined number, for every field of inquiry has its own categories. And this means that the analysis of categories must be concerned with the structure of Being -- not simply with our modes of thinking.

What makes the analysis of categories possible is the basic principle of all a priori cognition, which, as we have seen, asserts that the conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. Since the world consists of integrated structures at different levels of Being, it has always been tempting to look for its basic categories either at the lowest or at the highest level. The result has been the development of speculative forms of materialism, idealism, rationalism, and theism. But in their one-sided orientations, all of these have been distortions of reality. The *new* ontology, Hartmann insists, must break with all this, and it must also break with the tradition of constructing speculative systems. Its first task must be to clarify the essential character of each of the interrelated strata, and then to deal with their interrelations. For this purpose the traditional categories of form-matter, potency-act, idea-thing, *essentia-ens*, and others are hardly adequate. To realize that the unity of the world is a specific order of interrelated strata is but the beginning of an understanding of the whole.

It is tempting to regard the stratification of reality as the result of a development -- as a genesis. But the riddle of the origin of the world -- of this universe of galaxies and cosmic interrelations, of

plants and animals and human beings -- is shrouded in a mystery that is far removed from what is actually given. It is and remains one of the unsolvable metaphysical problems.
The stratification of Being itself, however, is a fact, and is observable in the world around us. The order of rank from the merely material to the spiritual is undeniable, and an analysis of categories must clarify the relationships involved. Hartmann's attempt to do so is developed in great detail in *Der Aufbau der Realen Welt*, which, in effect, is the development of a new type of ontology -- of an ontology whose first task is to clarify whatsoever exists as existing; and whose second task is to deal with the modes of Being of the existent and with their interrelations. We must keep in mind, however, that the categories pertain not to *Dasein* -- not to existence as such; but to the *Sosein* of what exists -- to the forms, structures, and contexts that are characteristic of what is real (*Aufbau,*)." (pp. 33-34)

From: William Henry Werkmeister, *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology*, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1990.

"A theory of categories that does justice to the phenomena must at least recognize the distinctions -- but must also recognize the interrelations of Being that transcend them.
For Hartmann there are only three 'cuts' (*Einschnitte*) in the real world. The most obvious one is that between nature and spirit. The great riddle here is how this 'cut' can go through the center of the human being without destroying it (*Aufbau,* 196).
A second 'cut' is that between lifeless matter and living organic nature.
The third 'cut' is that between spiritual Being and mental acts.
We thus find four main levels of what is real, and understanding the unity of the world can but mean to understand the world in its structure and stratification. What makes this possible is that, from structure to structure, we find the same relation of the higher stratum resting upon, and being conditioned by, the next lower. Despite this fact, however, the higher stratum has in each case its own mode of Being and its own type of laws. This relation of the strata characterizes the basic unity of the real world. In other words, the structure of the real world is a sequence of

supportive strata -- each stratum having its own laws and its specific categorial structure.
There are, however, also categories of such generality that they are common to all strata. Their ontological significance lies in the fact that they are the unitary basis of the real world as a whole. They are the "fundamental categories" that are basic to both the real and the ideal worlds. And these categories are the special concern of a universal theory of categories.
The categorial manifoldness of the world is evident in two respects: in the distinctness of the various strata and in their rank. In this structure, cognition is ontologically secondary. It presupposes the *Seiende* that is its object; but it is itself also a *Seiendes* sui generis and can occur only in strata of a specific height -- i.e., only where there is a consciousness which transcends mere mental associations. After all, cognition is a specific function of spiritual Being, and must be understood as included in that specific stratum of the world." (pp. 38-39)

From: William Henry Werkmeister, *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology*, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1990.

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categories 63; VIII. The strata laws of the real world 73; IX. Dependence and autonomy in the hierarchy of strata 84; X. Objections and prospects 99; XI. The stratification of the human being 114; XII. Determination and freedom 123; XIII. A new approach to the problem of knowledge 134-145.

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"Nota del Traductor.
La cuarta parte de la *Ontología* de Hartmann abarca en la edición original toda la "Filosofía de la Naturaleza" o "Teoría Especial de las Categorías" en un solo volumen de 700 páginas; y en uno solo de 136 se publicó en alemán "El Pensar Teleológico", que es en realidad una quinta y última parte de la *Ontología,* por la razón que se encontrará en el prólogo de ella, a pesar de la dada allí mismo para publicarla aparte. Para esta traducción española de la *Ontología* pareció mejor equilibrar los volúmenes, publicando como cuarto la primera mitad de la "Filosofía de la Naturaleza", a saber, "Las categorías dimensionales" y "Las categorías cosmológicas", y como quinto la segunda mitad, o sea, "Las categorías organológicas", y "El pensar teleológico", que es un desarrollo del estudio de estas últimas categorías. (...)"

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STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORK

The best introduction in English to Hartmann's thought are: W. H. Werkmeister, *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology* (1990) and R. Poli, C. Scognamiglio, F. Tremblay (eds.), *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann* (2011).

1. Albertazzi, Liliana. 2001. "The Roots of Ontics." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:299-315.

According to Hartmann's analysis, the psychological level concerns the following aspects of psychic acts:
(i) The mode of being of psychic acts.
(ii) The nature of the correlates of these acts.
(iii) The relationship of psychic acts with the structures of the physical and/or biological world that underlie them.
(iv) The non-rationalizable residue which makes it a paradigm example of fundamental ontic connection.
Some of these aspects are highly problematic. As Hartmann points out, the difficulty of understanding what types of entities psychic acts are is twofold, because:
(i) They do not appear to us objectively and they are not given to us as objects unless modified in reflection and memory once their presence is no longer actual, with all the `objectual' modifications that the situation brings about.
(ii) Sometimes they are states that are not experienced immediately and are unconscious.
Because of the framework in which it is inserted, Hartmann's ontology of psychic acts can be considered a further development of Brentanian descriptive psychology." p. 300-301.

2. Allen, Michael. 1981. "Nicolai Hartmann's Anthropology of Knowledge." *Journal of the British Society for Phenemenology* no. 12:41-54.

   The article is an analysis of Hartmann's efforts to argue for the relevance of anthropological considerations in the context of epistemological realism. It concludes that Hartmann's arguments against Husserl's refusal to admit anthropological considerations into phenomenology are successful; but that realism must be redefined differently than Hartmann would define it. The article also concludes that the factor of "human interest" (Habermas) does not undermine the realist position."

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    This article is a historical narrative and philosophical evaluation of Nicolai Hartmann's articles and book *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1925) in which he gradually distanced himself from Kant and from Marburg neo-Kantianism."
    Revised and shortened version in: Alois Joh. Buch (ed.) - *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982* - pp. 46-58.

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Research no. 4:592-594.

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19. ———. 1962. *L'être Spirituel. Recherches Sur La Philosophie De Nicolai Hartmann* . Lyon: Vitte.

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Translated from German by Geneviève de Pesloüan.
Suivi de ' *Principes philosophiques des mathématiques* ' d'apres le Commentaire de Proclus aux deux premiers livres des Eléments d'Euclide par Nicolai Hartmann.

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    Mit einer Einleitung von Josef Stallmach und einer Bibliographie der seit 1964 uber Hartmann erschienenen Arbeiten.

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    This critique and defense of an updated value Platonism argues that Hartmann's ethics has been undeservedly neglected because of "guilt by association" with discredited positions it only superficially resembles. After examining Plato's motives for his value Platonism, and discussing G. E. Moore, the author argues that Hartmann's theory rejects both naive value Platonism and dogmatic absolutism while also avoiding vicious Skepticism. Pluralism, fallibilism, and pragmatism are invoked in defending an updated version of "revised value Platonism"."

24. ———. 1984. "The Continuing Relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's Theory of Value." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 18:113-121.

    This paper argues that Hartmann's much-neglected value theory has practical relevance for understanding the current American value polarization. First, ten of Hartmann's most permanent
    contributions to axiology are outlined. next, these are related to work by psychologists and others (Horney, Maslow, Kohlberg, Benedict, Fromm, Jung, Yankelovich). Third, the heuristic value of
    Hartmann's key notion of "the bi-polarity of ethics" is proposed as useful for understanding today's clash between

"the moral majority" and "the new morality"."

25. Cantoni, Remo. 1972. *Che Cosa Ha Veramente Detto Hartmann* . Roma: Ubaldini.

26. Cicovacki, Predrag. 2001. "New Ways of Ontology - the Ways of Interaction." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:159-170.

    Although Nicolai Hartmann made significant contributions to virtually all areas and disciplines of philosophy, his first and deepest love was ontology. Part of Hartmann's fascination with ontology was due to the fact that at his time the previously considered *philosophia prima* was practically non-existent. As he remarked, ontology fell in a deep sleep after Christian Wolff. (*) Hartmann certainly tried to awake the sleeping giant and restore its faded glory. Despite his ingenious efforts, ontology is still mostly absent from the philosophical scene. My paper will address some of the questions that this state of affairs gives rise to: Why did Hartmann's prodigious efforts to rebuild ontology not have lasting effects? Why was it that his "new ways of ontology" did not revitalize the old discipline? Could it be that Hartmann's own way of presenting what is new about his ontology made a confusing impression about the real relationship of the old and the new?
    Since I have the highest regard for Hartmann's work and nevertheless believe that his own presentation is - at least partially - responsible for possible misunderstandings, I will here attempt to explain his novel contribution in a way different from that employed by him. My strategy will be as follows. In section I, I will present Hartmann's criticism of the old ontology. Section II will bring a brief sketch of his main contributions to ontology. Finally, in section III, I will attempt to clarify Hartmann's "new ways of ontology" by using the model of interaction. If this conception of reality as
    an interactive process is indeed useful and illuminating, it will both highlight the novelty of his approach and indicate

the direction in which this new ontology should be further developed."
(*) *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1948, 4th ed.), p. XI.

27. ———. 2014. *The Analysis of Wonder. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann* . London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

    Contents: Chronological Table; Introduction: Does Hartmann Matter?; Part I: Being. I.1 Philosophical Method; I.2 Being as Being; I.3 Modifications of Being; I.4 Strata of Real Being; I.5 Categories of Real Being; I.6 Categories of Being and Categories of Cognition; I.7. Ontology of Cognition; I.8 Critique of Intellectualism; Part II: Values. II.1 Nature of Values; II.2 Moral Values in General; II.3 Four Fundamental Moral Values; II.4 Four Forms of Love; II.5 Aesthetic Object and Aesthetic Act; II.6 Aesthetic Values; II.7 Truth in Art;
    II.8 Sublime; II.9 Critique of Moralism; Part III: Personality. III.1 The Realm of Real Being and the Realm of Values; III.2 Personality as a Value; III.3 Pseudo, Spurious and Genuine Personality; III.4 Fulfillment of Personality; Conclusion: Hartmann's New Ways of Philosophy; Bibliography of Hartmann's Works; Index.

28. Collins, James. 1945. "The Neo-Scholastic Critique of Nicolai Hartmann." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 6:109-132.

    This is a report on the reception of Hartmann's epistemology and ontology by German and Italian Scholastics (1920-40). They appreciated his central attraction to the problem of being, his opening of human cognition to being, and his effort to transcend both idealism and naive realism. But realism can include a critical recognition of the transcendence factor in knowing and valuing, as well as a constant striving with the limits and perspectives of man's study of being. These are marks of human finitude rather than of irrationality in being."

29. Corradini, Antonella. 1985. "La Struttura Logica Delle Modalità Nel Pensiero Di N. Hartmann." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 77:118-144.

30. Csepregi, Gabor. 2001. "The Relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's Musical Aesthetics." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:339-354.

31. Da Re, Antonio. 2001. "Objective Spirit and Personal Spirit in Hartmann's Philosophy." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:317-326.

In order to discuss the theme of the relation between the personal and objective spirit in Hartmann's work appropriately, it is necessary at the outset to place his reflections within the context of the wide debate which developed within German philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. As is well known, the Hegelian concept of the objective spirit was taken up and reformulated by historicism, in particular by Wilhelm Dilthey, apart from other writers who in various forms had drawn it towards neo-Kantianism (Georg Simmel, Ernst Cassirer). In this paper I hope to be able to highlight the characteristic traits of Hartmann's philosophy of the spirit through a critical comparison with the thoughts of Hegel and those of Dilthey. For this reason, the first part of this paper will be in the form of a brief presentation of the theory of the objective spirit, as is found in the writings of Hegel and Dilthey. In the second part I will summarise the main traits of Hartmann's theory. In the third and last part, I will highlight the critical elements proposed by Hartmann in comparison to Dilthey and above all to Hegel; in so doing Hartmann's innovative contribution to humanist and personalistic thought and philosophy will emerge. This can be summarised thus: (1) the refusal of individualism and the recognition of the existence of super-personal relations of the objective spirit and of the objectivated spirit, (2) the

vindication of the autonomy and freedom of the human person."

32. Dahlberg, Wolfgang. 1983. *Sein Und Zeit Bei Nicolai Hartmann* . Frankfurt am Main: Verlag A.V.I.V.A.

33. D'Anna, Giuseppe. 2009. *Nicolai Hartmann. Dal Conoscere All'essere* . Brescia: Morcelliana.

34. ———. 2013. *Realismi. Nicolai Hartmann «Al Di Là» Di Realismo E Idealismo* . Brescia: Morcelliana.

35. Djeong-Uk, Seo. 1993. *Logik Und Metaphysik Der Erkenntnis: Kritischer Vergleich Von Hermann Cohens Und Nicolai Hartmanns Philosophischen Grundpositionen* . Frankfurt am Main: Haag & Herchen.

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    Inhalt: U.a. Ontologische Bestimmung des Geistes in Schichten- und Sphärenlehre N. Hartmanns; Grundformen des geistigen Seins; Ontische Struktur der Objektivation; Seinsweise des objektivierten Geistes.

37. Feucht, Roland. 1992. *Die Neoontologie Nicolai Hartmanns Im Licht Der Evolutuonären Erkenntnistheorie* . Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag.

38. Feyerabend, Paul K. 1963. "Professor Hartmann's Philosophy of Nature." *Ratio* no. 5:91-106.

39. Forsche, Joachim Bernhard. 1965. *Zur Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns. Die Problematik Von Kategorialer Schichtung Und Realdetermination* . Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.

40. Gamba, Alessandro. 2001. "A Cinquant'anni Dalla 'Nuova Ontologia' Di Nicolai Hartman." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-*

Scolastica no. 93:74-94.

41. ———. 2004. *In Principio Era Il Fine. Ontologia E Teleologia in Nicolai Hartmann* . Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

42. Gamp, Rainer. 1973. *Die Interkategoriale Relation Und Die Dialektische Methode in Der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns* . Bonn: Bouvier.

43. Guidetti, Luca. 1999. *La Realtà E La Coscienza. Studio Sulla Metafisica Della Conoscenza Di Nicolai Hartmann* . Macerata: Quodlibet.

44. Harich, Wolfgang. 2000. *Nicolai Hartmann. Leben, Werk, Wirkung* . Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

45. ———. 2004. *Nicolai Hartmann - Grösse Und Grenzen: Versuch Einer Marxistischen Selbstverständigung* . Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

46. Heimsoeth, Heinz. 1952. "Zur Geschichte Der Kategorienlehre." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker Und Sein Weik*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 144-172. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

47. Heimsoeth, Heinz, and Hein, Robert, eds. 1952. *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker Und Sein Werk* . Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

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48. Hein, Robert. 1961. "Nicolai Hartmann: A Personal Sketch." *Personalist* no. 42:469-486.

49. Hülsmann, Heinz. 1959. *Die Methode in Der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns* . Düsseldorf: L. Schwann.

50. Hüntelmann, Rafael. 2000. *Möglich Ist Nur Das Wirkliche: Nicolai Hartmanns Modalontologie Des Realen Seins* .

Dettelbach: J.H. Röll.

51. James, Helen. 1960. "Nicolai Hartmann's Study of Human Personality." *New Scholasticism* no. 34:204-233.

52. Johansson, Ingvar. 2001. "Hartmann's Nondeductive Materalism, Superimposition, and Supervenience." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:195-215.

    Nicolai Hartmann's approach to philosophy was both aporetic and systematic. He stressed that philosophy contains genuine but probably insoluble problems at the same time as he was working on an ontological system. Also, he meant that philosophical-ontological systems always have to take the knowledge progress of science into account. In philosophy, this has been, and still is, an unusual combination of views. Hartmann might seem to be completely at odds with a lot of different philosophical traditions; analytic philosophy being one of them. However, today, that is not really the case. In relation to analytic metaphysics there are several overlapping problem areas. This paper is concerned with one such area, the mind- body problem. Iii particular, I will relate Hartmann's view that mind is *superimposed* on matter to the view of some analytic philosophers that mind is *supervenient* on matter. Both sides, and many other philosophers interested in the mind-body problem, have something to learn from such a confrontation."

53. Kanthack, Katharina. 1962. *Nicolai Hartmann Und Das Ende Der Ontologie* . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

54. Kraenzel, Frederick. 1984. "Nicolai Hartmann's Doctrine of Ideal Values: An Examination." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 18:299-306.

    This article evaluates Hartmann's claims that values are independent of our judgment of value, that they are

independent of the real world, and that they are a multiplicity of ideal forms. By
examining our moral consciousness, the article concludes that some values have ideal necessity. However, it is only a conditioned, hypothetical necessity, and the number of different ideal values is very limited."

55. Kuhn, Helmut. 1951. "Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 1:289-318.

56. Landmann, Michael. 1943. "Nicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 3:393-423.

57. Larsen, Allan W. 1982. "The Problem of Freedom in the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 184-195. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.

58. Lörcher, Wolfgang. 1972. *Ästhetik Als Ausfaltung Der Ontologie* . Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain.

59. Lotz, Johannes B. 1982. "Zwei Wege Der Ontologie. Nicolai Hartmann Und Martin Heidegger." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 208-222. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.

60. Lukács, Gyorgy. 1984. *Zur Ontologie Des Gesellchaftlichen Seins* . Darmstadt: Luchterhand.

    Vol. I, Chapter II. *Nicolai Hartmanns Vorstoss zu einer echten Ontologie* - pp. 421-467, in: *Werke* - Vol. 13, edited by Frank Benseler.
    The first edition of this volume was the Italian translation: G. Lukács - *Per l'ontologia dell'essere sociale* - Vol. I - a cura di Alberto Scarponi. Milano, Editori Riuniti, 1976 (Capitolo II. *L'impulso di N. Hartmann i direzione di una vera ontologia* - pp. 111-162).

61. Makota, Janina. 1986. "Nicolai Hartmann's and Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." *Reports on Philosohy* no. 10:69-79.

62. Maliandi, Ricardo-Gulielmo. 1966. *Wertobjektivität Und Realitatserfahrung Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns* . Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag.

63. Matteo, Armando. 2000. "Il Cammino Speculativo Del Giovane Hartmann: Dalla Logica Dell'essere All'ontologia Della Logica." *Sapienza* no. 53:161-184.

64. Mayer, Emmanuel. 1952. *Die Objektivität Der Werterkenntis Bei Nicolai Hartmann* . Meisenheim/Glan: Westkulturverlag A. Hain.

65. Meyer, Gerbert. 1962. *Modalanalyse Und Determinationsproblem. Zur Kritik Nicolai Hartmanns an Der Aristotelischen Physis* . Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain.

66. Millán Puelles, Antonio. 1947. *El Problema Del Ente Ideal. Un Examen a Través De Husserl Y Hartmann* . Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.

    Segunda Parte Ontología de la idealidad: Sección segunda. La teoría de la idealidad en Hartmann. Capítulo 7 La idealidad en el ámbito matemático; Capítulo 8 El ser en sí de los objetos ideales.

67. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1957. *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead. A Study in Recent Platonism* . Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

    Contents: Preface V; Hermann Wein: Foreword IX; Introduction XV-XL; Chapter I: Nicolai Hartmann's Philosophy of Ideal Being 1; Appendix: Nicolai Hartmann on the Ontological Status of Logic 41; Chapter II: A. N. Whitehead's Doctrine of Eternal Objects 45; Appendix I: Whitehead's Theory of Propositions 102; Appendix II:

George Santayana on the Nature of 'Essences' 108; Chapter III: Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead: a Critical and Comparative study 112; Appendix: On the Ontological Status of Logic: The Problem 190; Chapter IV: Conclusions 194; Bibliography 211-214.

"The present work proposes to institute a critical comparison between the philosophies of `ideal being' of two distinguished contemporary philosophers who come from very different philosophical traditions and had, in their lifetime, little to do with each other. Owing to the fact that the philosophers are eminently interested in the nature of the real actual world, we hope that the proposed study may make a contribution towards an evaluation of the meaning, nature, and role of the so-called 'ideal being'. We may even say that it may contribute towards an understanding of the *surviving* function of the so-called Platonic Ideas today. `Platonism' is an expression that is often used to name the most diverse currents of thought and which, therefore, has contributed towards much confusion. But, if it is not the name but the content of a philosophy that matters, we may as well name the aspect of philosophy which comes up for consideration in this work as 'Platonic'. The name need not lead to any prejudgment; but sometimes by its historical associations, it helps us to isolate an area of problem. We do not intend to insist on this name except for the sake of such convenience.

The very fact that today such a problem is considered as living requires justification. Positivism and pragmatism, analysis and logical empiricism, philosophies of `change' and existentialism, all these diverse currents of thought agree in having declared all sorts of Platonism dead for ever. But, is it really so? Are the problems which Plato tried to tackle solved once for ever? Or, have they been declared, once for ever, as pseudo-problems? We grant that much illusion has been removed, that quite a lot of problems might have been shown to be only pseudo-problems. But making allowance for such modern developments in philosophy, is it not still possible to ask: how best can we understand Plato today?

When we find two contemporary thinkers, alive to the currents of modern thought, still, in some sense or other, recognising the importance of many of Plato's thoughts today, the presumption is that the question can be asked." (pp. XV-XVI).

68. ———. 1963. "Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine." *Kant Studien* no. 54:181-187.

    Reprinted as Chapter XII in: J. M. Mohanty - *Phenomenology and ontology* - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970 pp. 129-137.

69. ———. 1970. *Phenomenology and Ontology* . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Chapter XI. *A recent criticism of the foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology* pp. 115-128; Chapter XII. *Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's modal doctrine* pp. 129-137.

70. ———. 1997. "Nicolai Hartmann's Phenomenological Ontology." In *Phenomenology. Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy*, 25-31. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

71. Morgenstern, Martin. 1992. *Nicolai Hartmann: Grundlinien Einer Wissenschaftlich Orientierten Philosophie* . Tübingen: Francke Verlag.

72. ———. 1997. *Nicolai Hartmann Zur Einführung* . Hamburg: Junius Verlag.

73. Möslang, Alois. 1964. *Finalität. Ihre Problematik in Der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns* . Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag.

74. Münzhuber, Joseph. 1943. "Nicolai Hartmann Kategorienlehre." *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Philosophie* no. 9:187-216.

75. Nosbüsch, Johannes. 1982. "Nicolai Hartmanns Lehre Vom Idealen Sein." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 238-251. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.

76. Oakeley, Hilda. 1935. "Professor Nicolai Hartmann's Concept of Objective Spirit." *Mind* no. 44:39-57.

77. Oberer, Ariolf. 1965. *Vom Problem Des Objektivierten Geistes. Ein Beitrag Zur Theorie Der Konkreten Subjektivität Im Ausgang Von Nicolai Hartmann* . Köln: Kölner Universitätsverlag.

78. Patzig, Günther, ed. 1982. *Symposium Zum Gedanken an Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)* . Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

79. Peruzzi, Alberto. 2001. "Hartmann's Stratified Reality." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:227-260.

    Which aspects of `critical ontology' can provide effective orientation when confronted by the difficulties inherent to the opposition of logic- inspired philosophy *vs* phenomenology? Given the cyclical swing between the metaphysical realism of all-embracing Systems and the anti-realistic biases of relativism, does Hartmann offer a really satisfactory equilibrium-point? Is it still possible to construct a philosophical cosmology consistent with the natural sciences, while avoiding positivistic reduction of philosophy to analysis of language? How can we assign philosophy a task that goes beyond the meta-theoretical and the epistemological, while renouncing the temptation to adopt the view-from-nowhere? What about the project of a `new' realism that refrains from positing Absolutes and yet admits the existence of perennially open problems, on which the advances of scientific knowledge seem to have little or no effect at all? How to anchor categorial analysis if not by connecting it to the advances of social, cognitive and natural sciences?"

80. Peterson, Keith R. 2012. "An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann's Critical Ontology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 22:291-314.

    Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology 'this side' of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann's approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay 'How is Critical Ontology Possible?' (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the 'old' ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work."

81. Philipse, Herman. 2001. "What Is a Natural Conception of the World?" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 9:385-399.

    Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson."

82. Pichler, Hans. 1952. "Die Wiedergeburt Der Ontologie." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker Und Sein Weik*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 144-172. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

83. Poli, Roberto. 1998. "Levels." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 9:197-211.

It is plain that the problem of the levels or layers of a work of art is an important part of any theory of the aesthetic object. In other words, what I wish to state clearly from the outset is that of the two components that select the field of interest - that of the object, and that of its aesthetic valence - reference to the object arranges reference to its aesthetic valence. Put otherwise, the theme of the aesthetic object is a particular subdivision of ontology - a subdivision, moreover, which may prove fundamental, shedding light on several aspects of the overall framework of ontology. This was pointed by Nicolai Hartmann, when in the introduction to *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* - one of his main ontological works - he asserted that "the problematic [of art] belongs to the area
of problems in which the ontological problem is rooted." Evidently, when matters are viewed from this point of view, that part of aesthetics which addresses the problem of the aesthetic object may yield results of relevance to more general ontological reflection as well.
Complementary to investigation by objects is investigation by acts. In this case, however, it becomes more difficult to develop the theme that I wish to discuss here, namely that of levels or layers. Hartmann again points out: "the aesthetics of today still concentrates mainly on analysis of the act, and this is why the stratification relationship, although it has often been noted, is not yet familiar to it" ([Hartmann *Das Problem des Geistingen Seins* 1933], p. 565). The perspective to which I allude was first outlined by the phenomenologist Geiger, who not coincidentally sought to develop a form of phenomenological reduction which mainly involved objects and their structures. This, as we

know, was a form of reduction different from the, so to speak, more classically phenomenological ones elaborated by Husserl in order to bring out the structures and operations of consciousness. Moreover, for the purposes of this paper, the decision to give priority to the perspective of the object becomes well-nigh obligatory.
That said, and before I develop with my theme in detail, I must present at least two presuppositions to the arguments that follow. These are two presuppositions that I shall present from perhaps an unusual point of view, but which are of central importance nonetheless."

84. ———. 2001. "The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:261-283.

    Two essential aspects of Hartmann's thought are its categorial perspective and the theory of the levels of reality. They are also aspects which have exerted significant influence on Hartmann's intellectual legacy, however limited that may be. Here I wish to point out their importance for Bertalanffy (see his *General Systems Theory,* 1968) and Lorenz (see his *Behind the mirror: a search for a natural history of human knowledge*, 1978). The latter notes the close similarity between his own ideas and those of Hartmann, and he recalls that for Hartmann the world possesses the unity of a system, but it is a system made up of layers. Some pages earlier he writes that he once asked Roberto Corti, who was closely acquainted with Hartmann, how he thought Hartmann would have reacted to a philogenetic interpretation of his thought. Corti replied that Hartmann would undoubtedly have rejected such an interpretation, but then added "And yet this is the only way to do anything with it"." (p. 261)

85. Poli, Roberto, Scognamiglio, Carlo, and Tremblay, Frederic, eds. 2011. *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann* . Berlin: de Gruyter.

Nicolai Hartmann was one of the most prolific and original, yet sober, clear and rigorous, 20th century German philosophers. Hartmann was brought up as a Neo-Kantian, but soon turned his back on Kantianism to become one of the most important proponents of ontological realism. He developed what he calls the "new ontology", on which relies a systematic opus dealing with all the main areas of philosophy. His work had major influences both in philosophy and in various scientific disciplines. The contributions collected in this volume from an international group of Hartmann scholars and philosophers explore subjects such as Hartmann's philosophical development from Neo-Kantianism to ontological realism, the difference between the way he and Heidegger overcame Neo-Kantianism, his Platonism concerning eternal objects and his interpretation of Plato, his Aristotelianism, his theoretical relation to Wolff's ontology and Meinong's theory of objects, his treatment and use of the aporematic method, his metaphysics, his ethics and theory of values, his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of mathematics, as well as the influence he had on 20th century philosophical anthropology and biology".

86. Ruttkowski, Wolfgang. 2007. *Essays on Aesthetics, Poetics and Terminology of Literary Studies* . München: Grin Verlag.

    Essay I: *Stratum, structure, and genre* (1973) pp. 4-30. "The concept of *genre* can be satisfactorily explained only in comparison with the concepts of *stratum* and *structure*. Proceeding from this conviction we shall try here to establish a demarcation of these often used terms and at the same time prove their interdependence."
    Essay III: *The main differences between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata systems* (1990) pp. 31-48. "Although both designed strata-models for various kinds of art and especially for literature, the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden never entered into any

kind of dialogue. Also in secondary literature there is no exact comparison of their systems to be found.
For that reason, the two strata systems are compared here for the first time and their respective advantages and deficiencies are being pointed out.
Amongst other things. the following topics are being discussed: 1. In what way Hartmann's "Real Foreground" ("Realer Vordergrund") is more specifically subdivided in Ingarden's system. - 2. How, on the other hand. Ingarden's "Stratum of Depicted Objects" ("Schicht der dargestellten Gegenstãndlichkeiten") was more thoroughly subdivided by Hartmann. 3. Why there cannot be found in Hartmann's system a corresponding stratum for Ingarden's "Stratum of Schematized Aspects" ("Schicht der schematischen Ansichten") - and 4. Why Hartmann's two strata of the Treat Background" ("Irrealer Hintergrund") are consolidated by Ingarden and expressly not seen as a stratum."

87. Sajama, Seppo. 1985. "Supererogation and High Values." *Theoria* no. 51:77-88.

    Nicolai Hartmann's value-theory can be used to generate a five-fold classification of actions: "duties" are actions whose omission is blameworthy and performance not praiseworthy, whereas the performance of "supererogatory" actions is praiseworthy and their omission not blameworthy.
    Moreover, the contrary of a duty is a "forbidden" action, that of an supererogatory action is an "excusable" action. Besides these four, there are also "indifferent" actions."

88. Samuel, Otto. 1953. *A Foundation of Ontology. A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann* . New York: Philosophical Library.

    Contents: Introduction IX-XV; 1. Why must we return to ontology? 1; 2. The incomplete approach of Hartmann 7; 3. On the Extant as Extant in general 15; 4. On the difference betweein Being (*Sein*) and Extant (*Seiendes*) 29; 5. The relationship of Hereness (*Dasein*) and Suchness (*Sosein*)

45; 6. Modes and modalities of Being 57; 7. The Givenness of Real Being 74; 8. The certainty of Reality 90; 9. The problem and position of Ideal Being 115; 10. The transition to meontology 128; Index 151-155.
Note: Chapters 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 are the outilemes of the teachings of Hartmann. Chapters 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 contain the critical analysis of his views.
"Hartmann's literary accomplishments in life consist of three parts. The first one comprises the new foundations of ontology. It is composed of three books: " *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie"* (On the Foundations of Ontology), *"Möglichkeit and Wirklichkeit"* (Possibility and Factuality), and *"Der Aufbau der realen Welt"* (The Structure of the Real World). The last of the three presents the general theory of categories (*). The second part covers natural philosophy, an introduction to the special theory of categories, furthermore *"Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis"* (Outlines of a Metaphysics of Knowledge), and *"Das Problem des geistigen Seins"* (The Problem of Spiritual Being). The third part is his *"Ethik"* (Ethics).
The present dissertation will be limited primarily to the first of these books, *"Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie."* This book consists of a thirty-eight-page introduction (the reader will find here a condensed, five-page summary) and four individual papers - *"Das Seiende* als *Seiendes"* (The Extant as Extant), *"Dasein and Sosein"* (Hereness and Suchness), *"Die Realitätsgegebenheit"* (The Givenness of Reality), and *"Das ideale Sein"* (Ideal Being)." pp. X-XI.
(*) [The fourth and last book, " *Philosophie der Natur. Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre* " (Philosophy of Nature. Sketch of Special Theory of Categories) was published in 1950].

89. Schaar, Maria van der. 2001. "Hartmann's Rejection of the Notion of Evidence." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:285-297.

    Any one fascinated by the problem of evidence, does well to read Günther Patzig's formulation of the problem given in

an article on Husserl (Patzig 'Husserl on Truth and Evidence', in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), *Readings in Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 179-196) (1). Either evidence is accessible to consciousness, in which case the evidence of our judgement can give no guarantee for (absolute) truth; or evidence is a guarantee for (absolute) truth, but then it cannot be accessible to consciousness. Possibly Patzig's attention was drawn to the problem of evidence by his teacher at Göttingen, Nicolai Hartmann. Although Hartmann was not alone in criticizing the concept of evidence at the first half of the twentieth century, he must be credited for having given a clear formulation of the problem of evidence. This paper attempts an evaluation of Hartmann's criticism of the concept of evidence. Any epistemological theory of evidence has to answer Hartmann's criticism on the notion of evidence. Hartmann's epistemology, and his criticism of the concept of evidence, will be dealt with in the first half of the paper. An outline of an epistemology that meets Hartmann's challenge, in terms of an evidence theory of truth, is presented in the second half of the paper."
(1) 'Evidence not in the sense of piece of evidence *for* something, but as a characteristic of certain judgements, evidence *of* .

90. Schaper, Eva. 1956. "The Aesthetics of Hartmann and Bense." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 10:289-307.

91. Schilling, Kurt. 1951. "Bemergkungen Zu Nicolai Hartmanns Ontologie." *Archiv für Recht- und Sozialphilosophie* no. 39:533-555.

92. Schlittmaier, Anton. 1999. *Zur Methodik Und Systematik Von Aporien: Untersuchungen Zur Aporetik Bei Nicolai Hartmann Und Gottfried Martin* . Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

93. Schuetzinger, Caroline. 1966. "The Gnoseological Transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's Metaphysics of Cognition (First Part)." *Thomist* no. 30:1-37.

94. ———. 1966. "The Gnoseological Transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's Metaphysics of Cognition (Second Part)." *Thomist* no. 30:136-196.

95. Scognamiglio, Carlo. 2003. La Teoria Ontologica Di Nicolai Hartmann E La Processualità Del Reale, 2003.

96. ———. 2007. "Il Problema Del Soggetto Nell'ontologia Critica Di Nicolai Hartmann." In *Perspectives Sur Le Sujet / Prospettive Filosofiche Sul Soggetto*, edited by Trincia, Francesco and Bancalari, Stefano, 126-145. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

97. ———. 2010. *La Persona. Etica E Ontologia in Nicolai Hartmann* . Lecce: Pensa Multimedia.

98. Seel, Gerhard. 1982. *Die Aristotelische Modaltheorie* . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Ertse Kapitel: *N. Hartmanns generelle Modaltheorie; seine Theorie der Realmodi; seine Interpretation der Aristotelischen Modaltheorie* - pp. 1-132.

99. Siitonen, Arto. 1989. *Problems of Aporetics* . Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.

100. Sirchia, Francesco. 1969. *Nicolai Hartmann Dal Neokantismo All'ontologia. La Filosofia Degli Scritti Giovanili (1909-1919)* . Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

101. Smith, John E. 1954. "Hartmann's New Ontology." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 7:583-601.

102. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Third revised edition; first edition 1960; second edition 1965.
Chapter VI: *Phenomenology in the critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)* - pp. 305-357.

103. Stallmach, Josef. 1987. *Ansichsein Und Seinsverstehen. Neue Wege Der Ontologie Bei Nicolai Hartmann Und Martin Heidegger* . Bonn: Bouvier.

104. Taubes, Jacob. 1953. "The Development of the Ontological Question in Recent German Philosophy." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 6:651-664.

105. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 2001. "Hartmann's General Ontology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:217-225.

It is striking how many different word combinations containing "being" you find in Hartmann: ways of being (Seinsweisen), modes of being (Seinsmodi), elements of being (Seinsmomente), degrees of being (Seinsstufen), grades of being (Seinsgrade), factors of being (Seinsfaktoren), regions of being (Seinsregionen), spheres of being (Seinssphären), layers of being (Seinsschichten), weight of being (Seinsgewicht), presentation of being (Seinsgegebenheit). I happen to have claimed at several places' that existence does neither allow for differentiation nor for gradation. However, the Phenomenologists, Hartmann's contemporaries, like such verbal combinations, too. And there is, of course, a long tradition of this. The founder of ontology, Aristotle, founded this subject before all on the term "being" and its ambiguities. He distinguishes between the use of "to be" with a substantial and with an accidental predicate, also between its use in actuality and potentiality predication. On the face of it, Aristotle distinguishes between kinds of predicative connection. However, he does not admit genuine connections but only natured things. Thus, he can be taken to claim that substances, things with accidents, actual and potential things exist in different ways. He distinguishes in

Hartmann's terms between two ways of existence (Existenzweisen), namely substantial and accidental existence, and two modes of existence (Modi der Existenz), namely actuality and potentiality. Following Plato who granted full existence only to forms and mere half-existence to perceptual things, Aristotle also assumes degrees of existence, accidents, e.g., have a lower degree of existence than substances and relational accidents a lower degree than qualitative accidents. In Aristotle categories are distinguished as different ways of being. Hartmann holds that different ways of being do not already found categories or only in a wide sense. On the whole Hartmann understands the distinction between ways of being as formal and that between categories as material (inhaltlich)."

106. Tertulian, Nicolas. 1984. "La Rinascita Dell' Ontologia: Hartmann, Heidegger E Lukács." *Critica Marxista* :125-150.

107. ———. 2003. "Nicolai Hartmann Et Georg Lukács. Une Alliance Féconde." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 46:663-698.

The encounter between Lukács'philosophy and ontological thought of Nicolai Hartmann is a seldom tackled topic in philosophical historiography. The contact with Hartmann's great ontological works played a key role in the genesis of *Ontology of Social Being*, the work which has crowned the intellectual and political course of Lukács. This paper aims to clear up the deep affinity between two historical thoughts that all seemed to separate. Hartmann cultivated a *philosophia perennis* above socio-historical contingences, while Lukács, an engaged philosopher in the battles of the century, built a work which was saturated with Marxian thought. There are nevertheless significant links between them: a critique of Husserlian phenomenology, a critique of neo-positivist currents and, above all, strong reservation with regard to Heidegger."

108. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1957. *Essence Et Existence. Étude À Propos De La Philosophie De Roman Ingarden Et Nicolai Hartmann* . Paris: Aubier Editions Montaigne.

109. Vossenberg, Ewald van den. 1963. *Die Letzten Gründe Der Innerweltlichkeit in Nicolai Hartmanns Philosophie* . Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana.

110. Wahl, Jean. 1953. *La Structure Du Monde Réel D'aprés N. Hartmann* . Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire.

Cours de la Sorbonne (1952).

111. ———. 1954. *La Théorie Des Catégories Fondamentales Dans Nicolai Hartmann* . Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire.

Cours de la Sorbonne (1953).

112. ———. 1955. *Les Aspects Qualitatifs Du Réel. I. Introduction, La Philosophie Del'existence; Ii. Début D'une Étude Sur Husserl; Iii. La Philosophi De La Nature De N. Hartmann* . Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire.

Cours de la Sorbonne (1954).

113. Wein, Hermann. 1952. "Nicolai Hartmanns Kategorialanalyse Und Die Idee Einer Strukturlogik." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker Und Sein Weik*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 173-185. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

114. ———. 1959. "Der Streit Und Die Ordnung Und Einheit Der Realwelt. Für Und Wider Nicolai Hartmann." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 5:174-220.

115. Welsh, Jordan Robert. 2001. "Hartmann, Schutz, and the Hermeneutics of Action." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:327-338.

116. Werkmeister, William Henry. 1970. *Historical Spectrum of Value Theories. I. The German-Language Group* . Lincoln: Ne-Johnsen.

117. ———. 1981. "Kant, Nicolai Hartmann, and the Great Chain of Being." In *The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology*, edited by Bello, Angela Ales, 69-97. Dordrecht: Reidel.

At first glance it may seem that relating the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Nicolai Hartmann to Alexander Pope's conception of the Great Chain of Being is arbitrary to the point of absurdity. However, a closer book at the facts will soon show that it is by no means absurd or even arbitrary, for both Kant and Hartmann are concerned with an interpretation of the Great Chain of Being -- albeit from radically different points of view. This difference Nicolai Hartmann has stressed in his formidable *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* . (1) There he quotes Kant's "highest principle of all synthetic judgments": "The conditions of the possibility of experience as such are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and therefore have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a *priori.* " (2)

Kant had argued, quite correctly, that synthetic judgments a *priori* could not validly apply to objects if the conditions of the possibility of experience were imposed upon the subject by the objects of experience. The failure of empiricism in all its forms is proof of this fact. Not one of them can justify the *a priori* employment of synthetic propositions. Kant had therefore assigned to the subject the role of imposing the conditions of possible experience upon the object. But in doing so, he had overlooked a "third possibility", namely, that the conditions of the possibility of experience are imposed neither by the subject nor by the object; that they are simply metaphysical conditions "this side of idealism and realism" which are equally binding for subject and object.

It is Hartmann's contention that this "highest principle" is obvious to all who understand it, and that it finds its validation in the actual analysis of experience. In what sense, then, does it help us to understand Hartmann's

conception of the Great Chain of Being? And how does this differ from Kant's commitment to Pope's idea?" (p. 69)
(1) Second edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1925), p. 340
(2) A158 / B197

118. ———. 1990. *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology* . Tallahassee: Florida State University Press.

Contents: Introduction XI-XVII; Chapter I: The epistemological basis of Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology 1; Chapter II: The structure of the real world 32; Chapter III: An analysis of modalities 69; Chapter IV: Philosophy of Nature 88: Chapter V: The realm of Spiritual Being 134; Chapter VI: Ethics 192; Chapter VII: Aesthetics 223; Bibliography 241; Index 245-252.
"This is an integrative study of "all" of Nicolai Hartmann's publications, with special attention to his epistemology, his categorial analyses of the structure of the real world, of modalities, and the realm of spiritual reality. In all of his works Hartmann begins with the phenomena, not with metaphysical speculation, and carries his analyses out in great detail. There is nothing like it in the philosophy of the early twentieth century."

119. Wildgen, Wolfgang. 2001. "Natural Ontologies and Semantic Roles in Sentences." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:171-193.

My central concern in the treatment of Hartmann's "New Ontology" will be the role of language and other "symbolic forms" (in the terms of Cassirer's "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen", 1923-1929)."

120. Wirth, Ingeborg. 1965. *Realismus Und Apriorismus in Nicolai Hartmanns Erkenntnistheorie. Mit Einer Bibliographie Der Seit 1952 Uber Hartmann Erschienenen Arbeiten* . Berlin: De Gruyter & Co.

121. Wolandt, Gerd. 1963. "Hartmanns Weg Zur Ontologie." *Kant Studien* no. 54:304-316.

122. ———. 1982. "Nicolai Hartmanns Systematik." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 290-305. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.

Related pages

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Adolf Reinach on States of Affairs (*Sachverhalt*) and Negative Judgments

INTRODUCTION: THE WORK OF REINACH AND THE EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY

"Reinach's importance for the development of early phenomenology is particularly remarkable considering the brief life span of 34 years granted him for the development of his ideas and his influence. It was his death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl's going to Freiburg which cut short not only his own promise but that of the Gottingen phenomenological Circle. It is therefore not surprising that Reinach never found the time to formulate a comprehensive plan of a philosophy in which the place of phenomenology was clearly defined." One can only extrapolate such a plan from his essays and fragments - for he never published a book. His conception would have incorporated a formal and material ontology on realistic lines." (p. 192)
(...)
His examples of the new method, which ranged all the way from mathematics to psychological science, displayed the following major features:I. The phenomenological method is to teach us how to see things which we have a tendency to overlook in our everyday practical attitude, and to see them in their unique whatness or essence without the customary attempts to reduce them to the smallest possible number, an attempt which can lead only to impoverishment and falsification of the phenomena. The

prime objective of phenomenology is thus to lead us toward the phenomena and to clarify our conceptions of them.
II. Phenomenology does not restrict itself to making inventories of facts. It wants to explore their essences while disregarding their existence. This actually involves two attitudes, actually not yet sharply distinguished by Reinach: (a) disinterest in reality in the sense of independence of the observer, in contrast to the approach of a natural science, like physics; in Reinach's version this change in attitude did not require the adoption of a special method after the manner of Husserl's phenomenological reduction; (b) interest in pure models, as in geometry, which considers merely ideal types, even where no example can be produced in actual experience; this involves a theoretical idealization, though not Husserl's ideating abstraction or 'eidetic reduction,' which Reinach does not mention in this context.
III. Besides the intuiting of the phenomena and their essences, Reinach stressed one additional step: the study of the essential connections among these phenomena (Wesenszusammenhänge) and their laws (Wesensgesetze). These relations among the phenomena are determined by their essential nature and are expressed, for instance, in such phrases as 'it lies in the nature of movement to have a substratum,' 'it follows from its very nature.' According to Reinach, such essential connections occur not only among the formal structures of logic and general ontology, but also in the structures of concrete 'material' phenomena, for instance among colors in their similarities. They are of two basic types: essential necessities and essential possibilities. To be sure, these are usually so obvious that no one pays attention to them. But it is precisely these neglected 'trivialities' to which phenomenology has to give their due.
In this connection Reinach developed his theory of the phenomenological a priori, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature in his philosophizing. It differed radically from earlier conceptions of the a priori. To begin with, Reinach's a priori was not a property of propositions or acts of judging or knowing, but of states of affairs (Sachverhalte) judged or recognized. It is these ontological states of affairs or, more properly speaking, the connections between the elements of these states of affairs (the object judged about and its property judged),

which by virtue of these connections are the carriers of the a priori property. 35 The a priori is thus primarily an ontological, not an epistemological category.
But what does it mean that a state of affairs is a priori? Obviously not that we have an innate idea about it. In fact, Reinach agreed with the Kantian conception of the a priori to the extent of interpreting it as knowledge not grounded in experience, but not as knowledge without experience either. He also concurred with Kant that necessity and universality are important aspects of the a priori: A priori states of affairs are universal for all possible examples, and they are necessary in the sense that the a priori property contained in the Sachverhalt belongs to its carrier by an essential necessity. However, any implication that this necessity is really only a necessity of thought to be derived from the organization of our understanding must be avoided. This, to Reinach, would have meant sheer psychologism. His necessity was an ontological necessity grounded in the things, not an epistemological one based on our reason. Universality and necessity were for Reinach only secondary characteristics of the a priori; they followed from the more basic fact that there are essential connections (Wesenszusammenhänge) which are immediately intuitable and which can be given with complete adequacy. Thus 'a priori' means at bottom nothing but the fact that a certain property is necessarily entailed by the essential structure of an object and can hence be understood as such." (pp. 193-194)

"From: Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963 (third edition).

"Only one of Reinach's treatises is historical in character: "Kant's Understanding of the Humean Problem" (Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 141; 1908). It deserves the most careful attention. Reinach's insights into "relations of ideas" and his discovery that Kant wrongly interpreted these as analytical judgments, were, as I studied them at the time, of decisive importance for me on the way to pure phenomenology. Reinach for his part, as an accomplished phenomenologist

turning to the study of Kant, detected Kant's misunderstanding and treated of it in a rich and instructive article.
The first of Reinach's systematic-phenomenological essays, "Towards the Philosophy of the Negative Judgment" (in the *Festschrift* for his earlier teacher in philosophy, "*Munchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Th. Lipps zu seinem 60. Geburtstage gewidmet von fruheren Schulern*," Leipzig, 1911) deals in an extraordinarily penetrating way with difficult questions belonging to the general theory of the judgment. It is original in attempting to develop a phenomenological difference between "conviction" and "assertion" and in this way to enrich the theory of the negative judgment by making various phenomenological distinctions. Very important but apparently neglected is Reinach's study, "Deliberation in Its Ethical and Legal Significance" (*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 148 and 149; 1912, 13). The pure phenomenological analysis of the essence of theoretical ("intellectual") and practical ("voluntary") deliberation leads Reinach to fine and significant distinctions in the area of intellectual and practical-emotional acts and states of mind; he then applies his results to questions of ethics and penal law. The most significant and the longest work of Reinach's is also a mature and thoroughly finished work, "On the Apriori Foundations of Civil Law," which appeared in the first volume (1913) of my *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, of which Reinach was a co-editor. This work attempts something completely new with respect to all present and past philosophies of law: on the basis of pure phenomenology it attempts to develop the idea, long held in suspicion, of an apriori theory of right. With inimitable analytic power Reinach brings to light a whole array of "apriori" truths which underlies any real or possible legal code; and these truths, as he shows, are apriori in exactly the sense of the basic axioms of arithmetic and logic, that is, they are truths which are grasped in intellectual insight as being valid without any possible exception, and they are prior to all experience. These apriori truths in the sphere of right, such as that a claim is dissolved by its being fulfilled, or that property, through the act of transfer, passes from one person to another, have nothing to do with the "enactments" (arbitrary

determinations that something ought to be) of the positive law. For all positive enactments presuppose concepts such as claim, obligation, property, transfer, etc.; these concepts are thus apriori with respect to positive law. Reinach's apriori principles are simply expressions of absolutely valid truths which are grounded in the essential meaning of these concepts. What is utterly original in this essay of Reinach's, which is in every respect masterful, is the idea that we have to distinguish this apriori, which belongs to the proper nature of any legal order, from the other apriori which is related to positive law as something normative and as a principle of evaluation: for all law can and must be subjected to the idea of "right law"-- "right" from the point of view of morality or of some objective purpose. The development of this idea would lead to a completely different apriori discipline, which however does not, just as Reinach's apriori theory of right does not, go in the direction of realizing the fundamentally mistaken idea of a "natural law." For this apriori discipline (of "right law") can only bring out formal norms of right, and from these one can no more extract a positive law than one can get definite truths in the natural sciences out of formal logic. No one who is interested in a strictly scientific philosophy of right, in a definitive clarification of the basic concepts which are constitutive for the idea of any possible positive law (a clarification which, it is clear, can be achieved only by phenomenologically penetrating into the pure essence of our consciousness of right) can afford to overlook this work of Reinach's which breaks so much new ground. It is for me beyond any doubt that it will secure for its author a permanent place in the history of the philosophy of right."

From: Edmund Husserl, "Obituary notice", *Kant-Studien*, 13 1919, pp. 147-149, translated by John F. Crosby, *Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, 1983, pp. XI-XIII.

"It is characteristic for Reinach that in each of these studies, even if they treat of rather particular problems, Reinach achieves and formulates, often for the first time, general foundational insights. And these insights are at the same time in most instances so precisely formulated that nothing more is needed for us to build

on them. Thus the short study entitled, "The Most General Principles of the Inference according to Kant," which is on one level only a critical study of Kant, clarifies one of the basic problems of logic, the problem of the so-called general object, by distinguishing between essence and the indeterminate individual object which participates in the essence. In the same way his paper, "Kant's Understanding of Hume's Problem," in its aim apparently so very specialized, clarifies the nature of authentic causality by distinguishing between modal and material necessity. And in the same way his paper, "Towards the Theory of the Negative Judgment," clarifies the nature of presentation (*Vorstellung*) and intuition (*Anschauung*), and makes the foundational distinction within the sphere of theoretical acts between acts in which a position or stance is taken, and acts in which something is grasped or apprehended. This distinction, made in connection with the distinction between presentation and judgment (both in the sense of conviction as well as of assertion), has a fundamental importance which not only far surpasses the sphere of the negative judgment, the subject of this paper, but also surpasses the sphere of the judgment in general and is fundamental for every ontology of acts of the person. This characteristic of Reinach's mind comes out most clearly in his most perfect work, "The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law." His theme here is one belonging to the philosophy of law, but what he deals with is not just anyone but rather the problem of legal philosophy. The so ambiguous concept of the apriori finds here its definite and classical formulation. The idea of the social acts, with their characteristic need of being heard by the addressee, or of the constitutive importance of certain acts through the performance of which are constituted real, objectively valid relations, withdrawn from our arbitrariness, all this and other ideas as well have an importance which goes far beyond the scope of Reinach's legal theme. We have here insights which are fundamental for the whole ontology of the sphere of personal acts as well as of the sphere of those objectively valid structures which are constituted by the performance of certain acts."

From: Dietrich von Hillebrand, "Written as an Introduction to Reinach' *Gesammelte Schriften*" (1921), but not published. Translated by John F. Crosby, *Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, 1983, pp. XX-XXI.

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Annotated Bibliography on Adolf Reinach

PUBLICATIONS IN GERMAN

Abbreviations: (GS = Gesammelte Schriften; SW = Sämtliche Werke)

1. Reinach Adolf. *Über Den Ursachenbegriff Im Geltenden Strafrecht*. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1905.

   (SW pp. 1-43).
   "Psychology, Reinach argues, is capable of assisting in the clarification of the legal meaning of the concept of cause via appeal to the notion of a *psychic regularity*. This same notion can help also in the clarification of the probable intent of specific laws. From the point of view of Reinach's later philosophy, the work may be seen as a study of the legal determinations *[Bestimmungen]* of positive law and of the development of aids for their practical interpretation. There is as yet however no suggestion of his doctrine of the *a priori* structures underlying legal formations."
   Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 300.

2. ———. "William James Und Der Pragmatismus." *Welt und Wissen.Hannoversche Blätter für Kunst, Literatur und Leben* (1910).

   (SW pp. 45-50)

3. ———. "Die Obersten Regeln Der Vernunftschlüsse Bei Kant." *Kant Studien* 16 (1911): 214-233.

(GS pp. 36-55; SW pp. 51-65)

4. ———. "Kants Auffassung Des Humeschen Problems." *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 141 (1911): 176-209.

   (GS pp. 1-35; SW pp. 67-93)

5. ———. "Zur Theorie Des Negativen Urteils." In *Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Festschrift Für Theodor Lipps*, edited by Pfänder, Alexander. 196-254. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911.

   (GS pp. 56-116; SW pp. 95-140).
   Revised edition in: *Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics*, Vol. 0, no. 0, pp. 37-103, April 1999.

6. ———. "Die Apriorischen Grundlagen Des Bürgerlichen Rechtes." *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 1 (1913): 685-847.

   New edition with the title " *Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts*" and a preface by Anna Reinach, München, Kösel, 1953.
   (GS pp. 166-350; SW pp. 141-278)

7. ———. "Die Überlegung: Ihre Ethische Und Rechtliche Bedeutung." *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (1913).

   First part Vol. 148 (1912) pp. 181-196; second part Vol. 149 (1913) pp. 30-58.
   (GS pp. 121-165; SW pp. 279-311)

8. ———. "Paul Natorps ' *Allgemeine Psychologie Nach Kritischer Methode*'." *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* 4 (1914): 193-214.

   (GS pp. 351-376; SW pp. 313-331).

"Natorp had claimed that the I can never be an object of consciousness and thus it cannot form part of the subject-matter of psychology. The latter is restricted to the contents of consciousness, i.e. to all of that of which one is conscious. Reinach argues that it is grounded in the essence of *cogitationes* that they can exist only as experiences of an I. Thus he defends the Cartesian view according to which the *cogito* is the starting poing of our knowing, and he insists that the I is present in each and every experience. However, the pure I - as distinct from the empirical person - is not a thing with characteristics; Natorp may therefore be correct in his view that it 'does not admit of any explanation'. But this does not rule out the clarification of the ways in which it interrelates with other elements in essential structures.
In grasping itself the I is both bearer and end-point of a grasping act. Unlike Natorp, who insisted that each relation must have two terms, Reinach sees no difficulty here, since intentionality is not a relation in the usual sense."
Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 300-301.

9. ———. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921.

   Edited from his students. With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (XXVI+461 ppages).
   (This edition is now superseded by *Sämtliche Werke*).

10. ———. "Über Das Wesen Der Bewegung." In *Gesammelte Schriften*. 406-461. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921.

    Prepared by Edith Stein fromseminar notes in Reinach's *Nachlass*.
    (SW pp. 551-588).
    "Contains an analysis of continuity and of the essence of traversing of space, the results *of* which are then applied to Zeno's paradoxes. A motion is a continuous process, it should not be thought of as a series of single part-processes somehow combined together.
    Reinach asserts that it is self-evident that all real motion requires a bearer, but denies that this implies that all perception of motion involves the perception of a bearer. I

can speak of motion and intend motion without at the same intending something that moves."
Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 301.

11. ———. *Was Ist Phänomenologie?* München: Kõsel, 1951.

    With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-Martius
    Lesson held at Marburg in 1914 with the title *Über Phänomenologie* and first published in GS pp. 379-405 (SW pp. 531-550).

12. ———. *Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in 2 Bänden*. Mûnchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.

    Critical edition by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith in two volumes.
    Band I. Die Werke
    I. Teil
    Kritische Neausgabe (1905-1914)
    Geleitwort von Eberhard Avé-Lallement XI; Vorwort der Herausgegeber XIV-XVIII;
    1. (1905) 1-43; 2. William James und der Pragmatismus (1910) 45-50; 3. Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant (1911) 51-65; 4. Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems (1911) 67-93; 5. Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils (1911) 95-140; 6. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (1913) 141-278; 7. Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung (1912/13) 279-311; 8. Paul Natorps "Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode" (1914) 313-331;
    II. Teil
    Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917)
    9. Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik (1906) 335-337; 10. Wesen und Systematik des Urteils (1908) 339-345; 11. Über impersonale Urteile (1908?) 347-350; 12. Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt (1910) 351-354; 13. Nichtsoziale und Soziale Akte (1911) 355-360; 14. Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs (1912) 361-363; 15. Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung (1913) 365-367; 16. Einleitung in die Philosophie (1913) 369-513; 17. Zum Begriff der Zahl

(1913/1914) 515-529; Über Phänomenologie (1914) 531-550; Über das Wesen der Bewegung (1914) 551-588; Aufzeichnungen (1916/17): A. Zur Phänomenologie der Ahnungen 589-591; B. Notizen auf losen Zetteln 592-604; C. Bruchstück einer religionsphilosophischen Ausführung 605-611.
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Zu Band I, II. Teil
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13. ———. "Platons Philosophie [Vorlesung] Summer Semester 1910." In *Josef Seifert. Ritornare a Platone. La Fenomenologia Realista Come Riforma Critica Della Dottrina Platonica Delle Idee. In Appendice Un Testo Inedito Su Platone Di Adolf Reinach*. 224-237. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000.

    German text and Italian translation by Giuseppe Girgenti.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

1. Reinach, Adolf. 1968. "What Is Phenomenology." *The Philosophical Forum* no. 1:231-256.

   Translation and introduction by Derek Kelly.
   "Reinach's essay is a brief introduction to applied phenomenology. The first part of the essay is exegetical: Reinachexplains the philosophic limitations and problems of the sciences of psychology and of mathematics, and discusses in particular the work of Hilbert and Kronecker. In the second part of the paper, Reinach develops ths concept of the 'a priori.' He rejects both the positivist conception of solely analytic 'a priori,' and also the Kantian notion of necessary conditions for thought. Reinach argues that the 'a priori' is legitimately seen not as subjective or as necessary for thought, but as a necessity of being."

2. ———. 1969. "Concerning Phenomenology." *The Personalist* no. 50:194-221.

   Translation by Dallas Willard.
   "This paper attempts to illustrate how phenomenological research is done. For Reinach, phenomenology is an attitude or way of seeing, not a set of truths. It is the examination of essences, or universals, and their interconnections. Reinach discusses and illustrates how such examination is required in descriptive psychology, and how it is essentially dispensed with in mathematics, as understood by Hilbert. There follows a critique of Frege's view of number, and a phenomenological elucidation of the distinction between cardinal and ordinal numbers. Reinach's final remarks are devoted to misinterpretations of the "a priori" and to its correct analysis."

3. ———. 1976. "Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem." In *David Hume. Many-Sided Genius*, edited by Merrill,

Kenneth and Shahan, Robert, 161-168. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Translated by Jitendra Nath Mohanty.
Published also in: Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1976), pp. 161-188.

4. ———. 1981. "A Contribution toward the Theory of the Negative Judgement." *Aletheia* no. 2:15-64.

   Translated by Don Ferrari.

5. ———. 1982. "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment." In *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry, 315-377. München: Philosophia Verlag.

   Translated by Barry Smith.

6. ———. 1983. "The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law." *Aletheia* no. 3:1-142.

7. ———. 1987. "William James and Pragmatism." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 291-298. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

   Translated by Barry Smith.

8. ———. 1994. "The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant." *Aletheia* no. 6:81-97.

   Translated by James Dubois.

9. ———. 2013. *The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law. Along with the Lecture, "Concerning Phenomenology"*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

   Edited by John F. Crosby. With a Foreword by Alasdair MacIntyre.
   Translator of *The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law*: John F. Crosby.

Translator of “Concerning Phenomenology”: Dallas Willard.

ITALIAN TRANSLATIONS

1. Reinach Adolf. *I Fondamenti a Priori Del Diritto Civile*. Milano: Giuffré, 1990.

   Traduzione di Daniela Falcioni, presentazione di Bruno Romano.

2. ———. " *Platons Philosophie* [Vorlesung] Sommer Semester 1910 - *La Filosofia Di Platone* (Lezioni Del Semestre Estivo 1910)." In *Ritornare a Platone. La Fenomenologia Realista Come Riforma Critica Della Dottrina Platonica Delle Idee*, edited by Seifert, Josef. 224-237. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000.

   Appendice al volume di Seifert. Appunti delle lezioni raccolti da Alexandre Koyré.

3. ———. *La Visione Delle Idee*. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2008.

   A cura di Alessandro Besoli e Stefano Salice.
   Sommario: Introduzione di Stefano Besoli; Profilo della vita e delle opere; 1. William James e il pragmatismo; 2. Le regole supreme delle inferenze razionali in Kant; 3. L'interpretazione kantiana del problema di Hume; 4. Sulla teoria del giudizio negativo; 5. La riflessione: il suo significato etico e giuridico; 6. Sull' *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* di Paul Natorp; 7. Sulla fenomenologia; Agganciarsi a un'anima. Il domandare e i vissuti sociali della coscienza in Adolf Reinach di Alessandro Salice; Nota terminologica; Indice degli argomenti; Indice dei nomi.

FRENCH TRANSLATIONS

1. Reinach, Adolf. 1996. "Théorie Du Jugement Négatif." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*:384-436.

   Traduction et présentation de Marc B. de Launay.

2. ———. 2004. *Les Fondements À Priori Du Droit Civil*. Paris: Vrin.

   Traduction de Ronan de Calan.

3. ———. 2012. *Phénoménologie Réaliste*. Paris: Vrin.

   Le présent volume est un recueil visant à rendre accessible aux lecteurs Français le versant théorétique de la pensée de Reinach et se compose à la fois de textes publiés et posthumes – présentés ici dans un ordre thématique, et non chronologique.
   Traduit de l'allemand sous la direction de D. Pradelle, par J.-F. Courtine, M. de Launay, A. Dewalque, J. Farges, D. Pradelle, P.-J. Renaudie et D. Seron.

STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORK

1. "Adolf Reinach: Philosophie Du Langage, Droit, Ontologie." 2005. *Les Études Philosophiques*.

   Index: Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach: philosophie du langage, droit, ontologie (avant-propos) 1; Philipp Mayrhofer: Réalisme et fondation chez Adolf Reinach 3; Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach et la visée (*das Meinen*): décliner l'intentionalité 19; Ronan de Calan: Causalité et nécessité matérielle: Reinach lecteur de Hume 39; Bruno Ambroise: Le problème de l'ontologie des actes sociaux: Searle héritier de Reinach? 55; Sandra Laugier: Actes de langage et états de choses: Austin et Reinach 73; Julien Cantegreil: D'une voie

phénoménologique en théorie du droit. Remarques sur le réalisme d'Adolf Reinach 99-112.

2. Ales Bello, Angela. 2004. "The Controversy About the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological School A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein." *Analecta Husserliana.The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* no. 79:97-116.

   "The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."

3. Ambroise, Bruno. 2005. "Le Problème De L'ontologie Des Actes Sociaux: Searle Héritier De Reinach?" *Les Études Philosophiques*:55-72.

4. Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberly. 2011. *Doorway to the World of Essences. Adolf Reinach and the Early Phenomenological Movement*. Düsseldorf: VDM Publishing.

5. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2005. "Reinach Et La Visée *(Das Meinen*): Décliner L'intentionalité." *Les Études Philosophiques*:19-37.

6. Benoist, Jocelyn, and Kervégan, Jean-Franois, eds. 2008. *Adolf Reinach, Entre Droit Et Phénoménologie. De L'ontologie Normative À La Théorie Du Droit*. Paris: CNRS Éditions.

7. Brown, James. 1987. "Reinach on Representative Acts." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations*

of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 119-131. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

"Austin is certainly the founding father of speech act theory as we have known it in recent decades, and one reason why Reinach's views on social acts are worthy of attention is the extent of their anticipation of Austin's work and their contribution to the understanding of human communicative action. Mother is their bearing on the thesis that fundamental concepts of civil law are found, and not introduced, by positive law. A further reason is that, apart from anticipating the work of others, Reinach explores a kind of social act which appears to have been neglected by subsequent speech act theorists. I refer to representative acts, where one person acts for or on behalf of or in the name of another! I shall first try to set out Reinach's views (sections 1 and 2), and then discuss some issues which they raise, in particular that of sincerity (sections 3 and 4) then that of prior empowerment for representative acts (section 5)." (p. 119)

8. Burkhardt, Armin. 1986. *Soziale Akte, Sprechakte Und Textillokutionen: A. Reinachs Rechtsphilosophie Und Die Moderne Linguistik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

   "A detailed comparison of Reinach on social acts with the accounts of Searle and Austin who are criticized for committing the 'ontological fallacy': they find forces in utterances."
   Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 307.

9. ———. 1986. "Il Filosofo Del Diritto Adolf Reinach, Lo Sconosciuto Fondatore Della Teoria Degli Atti Linguistici." *Teoria.Rivista di Filosofia* no. 6:45-62.

10. ———. 1987. "Verplflichtung Und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in Der Rechtphilosophie Adolf Reinachs." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 155-174. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

11. Calan, Ronan de. 2005. "Causalité Et Nécessité Matérielle: Reinach Lecteur De Hume." *Les Études Philosophiques*:39-54.

12. Cantegreil, Julien. 2005. "D'une Voie Phénoménologique En Théorie Du Droit. Remarques Sur Le Réalisme D'adolf Reinach." *Les Études Philosophiques*:99-112.

    "Écartant les questions traditionnelles de savoir comment il s'est singularisé dans l'histoire de la doctrine allemande du droit et les raisons qui font de lui l'un des précurseurs de la théorie des actes de langages, la présente étude évalue l'intérêt juridique de l'approche « intuitionniste » de Reinach. L'utilisation conjointe de sa définition de la promesse et des travaux de Jean-Louis Gardies devraient montrer l'impasse théorique et le faible intérêt pratique de son intuitionnisme, et ce faisant contribuer à diriger les recherches phénoménologiques en théorie du droit vers les travaux du Husserl des Idées directrices."

13. ———. 2006. "Adolf Reinach Théoricien Du Droit: Sur La Causalité." *Archives de Philosophie du Droit* no. 49:401-416.

    "Bien qu'il ait été commenté par les plus illustres (Husserl, Kantorowicz, Radbruch, Villey...) et que l'on ait récemment pris la mesure de son importance en philosophie, Reinach n'a toujours pas su trouver sa place en théorie du droit. Comprendre l'impasse théorique et le faible intérêt pratique de son approche intuitionniste avait seulement suggéré de rediriger les recherches phénoménologiques en droit vers les œuvres tardives de Husserl. La présente analyse propose de relire Reinach à partir d'un texte de jeunesse quasi inconnu, sa Dissertation de 1905 *Sur le Concept de cause en droit pénal*. Reinach y apparait alors non seulement un représentant exemplaire des contradictions du positivisme de la fin du XIXe siècle, mais aussi une aide précieuse pour conceptualiser la cause en droit. Précurseur en ce qui concerne les actes de langages, Reinach l'est aussi en ce qui

concerne le concept de causalité. Reinach théoricien du droit gagne ainsi pertinence, profondeur et actualité.

14. Crosby, John. 1983. "Reinach's Discovery of the Social Acts." *Aletheia* no. 3:143-194.

    Contents: 1. The significance of Reinach's monograph; 2. Reinach as phenomenologist; 3. Reinach's discovery of the "social acts"; 4. Reinach in dialogue with the speech act philosophers: promising as a social act; 5. Continuation of the dialogue between Reinach and the speech act philosophers: the uninventable essence of promising; 6. Towards developing and deepening Reinach's analysis of the social acts; Reinach and Wojtyla; Reinach and Husserl; 7. Reinach's apriori sphere of right and the natural moral law; 8. Legal obligation and moral duty; 9. Some consequences of Reinach's discovery for political, legal, and moral philosophy; conclusion of the dialogue with the speech act philosophers.

15. Davie, George. 1987. "Husserl and Reinach on Hume's "Treatise"." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 257-274. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    "In 1929 Husserl wrote that Hume's real greatness was still unrecognised in its most important aspect. Now I believe that the contribution to Hume studies by Husserl - as conveyed by Jean Laporte in France and Kemp Smith in Britain - and by his pupil Reinach, have gone a long way towards changing this state of affairs, because of a new way of reading Hume's *Treatise* that they introduced. I first set out Husserl's early views on Hume and then turn to Reinach's paper on Hume, which builds on this work, but also goes a long way beyond it and isolates the most important aspect of Hume's achievement." (p. 257)

16. De Vecchi, Francesca, ed. 2012. *Eidetica Del Diritto E Ontologia Sociale. Il Realismo Di Adolf Reinach. / Eidetics*

of Law and Social Ontology. *Adolf Reinach, the Realist*. Milano: Mimesis.

17. DuBois, James. 1994. "An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's *'the Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant'*." *Aletheia* no. 6:70-80.

    "In 1911, the same year that he published his work *On the theory of the negative judgment*, Adolf Reinach published two articles on Kant's philosophy: *Kant's understanding of the humean problem* and *The supreme rules of rational inference according to Kant*. More than mere historical studies, these articles extend Reinach's contribution to the fields of ontology and what might be broadly construed as the field of logic."

18. ———. 1995. *Judgment and Sachverhalt*. *An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenomenological Realism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. Judgments and states of affairs 7; 2. Negation and correspondence 47; 3. Insight and the *a priori* 77; 4. Logic and arithmetic 115; 5. The discovery of social acts 129; 6. Reinach as phenomenologist 145; Bibliography 159; Index 167-168.
    "The outline of our study is as follows.
    Chapter One explores Reinach's conception of the judgment in terms of a state of belief, an act of assertion, and an ideal meaning-unit. *We* examine his understanding of states of affairs, the objectual-correlates to judgments of all kinds. We further investigate how it is that the mind becomes directed towards states of affairs, and this involves us in a study of Reinach's understanding of the relationships between intentionality, presentation, and intuitive fullness. Particularly here we see Reinach's indebtedness to Husserl. Towards the end of the chapter we consider briefly the concepts of evidence and knowledge -- for a judgment cannot be considered rational unless it is somehow related to objective being through evidence or direct knowledge.

In Chapter Two, we examine Reinach's claim that negative states of affairs subsist or obtain just as do positive states of affairs. Here a confrontation with Ingarden's ontological investigations is particularly helpful, and something of a compromise position is defended. Reinach's discussion of negation provides us with the opportunity to better understand the nature of concepts and properties, and the peculiar sort of existence espoused by these. Chisholm's view of negative properties and states of affairs is compared to Reinach's, and here too we argue for modifications of both views.

In Chapter Three we examine how Reinach's ontology of states of affairs is seen to lie at the basis of most traditional epistemological distinctions. Thus, distinctions between states of affairs give rise to the differences between necessary and contingent, synthetic and analytic, and formal and material judgments. We investigate further why philosophical insight is possible with regard to the states of affairs grounded in some essences, but not others. At this point we turn to the work of Reinach's student, Dietrich von Hildebrand, where he distinguishes between accidental essential unities, morphic essential unities, and necessary essential unities, only the last of which can be known through insight or essential intuition. We close the chapter with a defense of insight, and a discussion of its place in philosophical argumentation.

By the time we reach Chapter Four, we have already investigated the nature of many logically relevant concepts, such as proposition, truth and falsity, implication, ontological modality, analycity and syntheticity. However, it seems worthwhile to present Reinach's overall conception of logic, a conception which is at the same time classical and original. In connection with his work on logic we discuss briefly Reinach's conception of numbers. Interestingly, Reinach rejects the existence of ordinal numbers, and he argues that cardinal numbers cannot be predicated. As one might expect, his explanation of the ontological correlates to the truths of arithmetic involves a fascinating application of his philosophy of states of affairs.

In Chapter Five we examine his "Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law". Particularly here we are forced to prescind from many interesting and worthwhile ideas. Our interest in this work is restricted to his discovery of social acts (better known today as speech acts), and in particular the nonasserting or nonjudging character of these acts. These acts are neither correct nor incorrect, for they are not "conforming" acts, or acts of "fit". They are rather "grounded" or "ungrounded" and "effective" or "ineffective". A confrontation of his analysis of promising with that of Searle allows us to test the soundness of Reinach's ontology of essences and his recognition of synthetic *a priori* states of affairs and truths. Finally, we examine Reinach's claim that he has discovered a new sort of object: real, temporal objects, which are neither physical nor mental.
In Chapter Six, our concluding chapter, we look at Reinach as *a* phenomenologist. By the time we reach this last chapter, many will understand why we call Reinach a realist, but they will wonder what characterizes him as a phenomenologist. We present a few key ideas from his lecture "Concerning Phenomenology" and defend an interpretation of the phenomenological attitude as characterized above all by a rigorous fidelity to what is given. While we refuse to take up a confrontation of Reinach's phenomenological realism with the motives for Husserl's transcendental idealism, we do briefly suggest some philosophical reasons which make intelligible Reinach's unwillingness to espouse the "new developments". We conclude the book by suggesting one sense in which Reinach's analysis of human acts stands in need of *a* "subjective" grounding, though not of the sort Husserl suggests." (pp. 3-5).

19. ———. 2002. "Adolf Reinach's Contributions to Meta-Ethics and the Philosophy of Law." In *The Phenomenological Tradition in Moral Philosophy*, edited by Embree, Lester and Drummond, John, 327-346. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

20. Falcioni, Daniela. 1991. *Le Regole Della Relazionalità: Una Interpretazione Della Fenomenologia Di Adolf Reinach*. Milano: Giuffré Editore.

21. ———. 2002. "Immanuel Kant Und Adolf Reinach: Zwei Linien Des Widerstandes Im Vergleich." *Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft* no. 93:351-370.

22. Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1987. "Adolf Reinach and the Analytic Foundations of Social Acts." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 107-117. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

"One of the most interesting contributions to philosophy in Adolf Reinach's work *The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law* is the analysis the author puts forward of what he generally calls social acts. This analysis is extended to deal with such specific types of social acts as promises, orders, prayers, requests, communications *(mitteilen),* questions, the particulars of which are all gone into by Reinach.
When, much later, Anglo-Saxon authors such as Austin and Searle discovered the quite special character of speech-acts it is almost certain that Reinach could have had no influence on them, for they knew nothing of his work. Even if they had had some indirect acquaintance with the work it is by no means certain that they could have profited from its analyses. The intuitionist style that marks the work, which appeared in 1913 as part of the first large wave of the phenomenological movement removes it almost totally from the purview of the analytic approach of the Anglo-Saxon tradition within which the new theory of speech-acts was to find its natural home. Since the two philosophies use quite different languages it would have been difficult to see that there was a shared subject matter and that some at least of the conclusions were the same." (p. 107)
(...)

"Reinach's merit is to have given superb demonstrations of the a priori character of the pure science of law. He has annihilated psychologism, sociologism andhistoricism in the legal sphere as surely as Frege had annihilated them in the realm of mathematics. It remains to provide each of his remarkable analyses with its theoretical explanation in order to establish that, in the last instance, the *a priori* judgements whose existence at the basis of civil law he *has* revealed, are themselves analytic." (p. 117).

23. Habbel, Irmingard. 1959. *Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in Der Phänomenologie Und Bei Thomas Von Aquin*. Regensburg: Josef Habbel.

24. Hillebrand, Dietrich von. 1955. "Die Rechtliche Und Sittliche Sphäre in Ihrem Eigenwert Und in Ihrem Zusammenhang." In *Die Menschheit Am Scheideweg. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Und Vorträge*, 86-106. Regensburg: Josef Habbel.

    Contains an exposition and development of Reinach's philosophy of law.

25. Hoffmann, Klaus. 1987. "Reinach and Searle in Promising. A Comparison." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 91-106. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    "If one is to believe Mephistopheles, even the devil seems to be bound to keep a promise and the explanation of this state of affairs requires more than just a few words.
    In the twentieth century various well-known philosophers have gone into great detail in order to clear up the question why promises can give rise to obligations. The works of Adolf Reinach and John Searle are two outstanding examples of attempts to analyse promising. In what follows I shall compare their accounts as precisely as possible in order to provide arguments for and against the view that the

famous analysis by John Searle was already anticipated by Adolf Reinach in 1913.
I begin with an examination of the relation between Reinach's (category of) social acts and Searle's (category of) speech acts in which I concentrate on the relations between entities and laws on the one hand and institutional facts and rules on the other. Finally, I scrutinize the different conception of `obligation' in the two accounts." (p. 91)

26. Hübener, Wolfgang. 1975. "Die Logik Der Negation Als Ontologisches Erkenntnismaterial." In *Positionen Der Negativität*, edited by Weinrich, Harald, 105-140. Munich: Fink.

    "pp. 134f. is a discussion of reinach and Sigwart pn the locus of negation."
    Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 314.

27. Husserl, Edmund. 1975. "Adolf Reinach (in Memoriam)." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 35:571-574.

    Originally published in *Kantstudien,* 23, 1919 pp. 147-149.

28. Ingarden, Roman. 1964. *Der Streit Um Die Existenz Der Welt*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

    "See esp. chapter XI of vol. II/1, *Die Form des Sachverhalts. Sachverhalt und Gegenstand* (includes extensive critique of Reinach *Zur Theorie des Negativen Urteils*) and § 62 of vol. II/2, which contains a criticism of Reinach on movement."
    Barry Smith, *An Annotated Bibliography,* p. 316.

29. Kujundzic, Nebojsa. 1997. "Reinach, Material Necessity, and Free Variation." *Dialogue* no. 36:721-739.

30. Künne, Wolfgang. 1987. "The Intentionality of Thinking: The Difference between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 175-187. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

"For Reinach as for Russell, the state of affairs called "the being snub-nosed of Socrates" contains as "objectual elements" (gegenstiindliche Elemente, gegenstandliche Glieder)37 a "real" as well as an "ideal object"," Socrates and the property of being snub-nosed. Reinach clearly recognizes, what some analytical philosophers do not, that "states of affairs cannot be simply stuck together (*zusammengestoppelt*), as it were, out of arbitrary elements"? Only if somebody (rightly or wrongly) can judge or believe that a is P, is there such a thing as the (obtaining or not obtaining) state of affairs, the being P of a (See § 3 above).
Reflecting on attributes like possibility and necessity, Reinach stresses "that it is ... states of affairs and only states of affairs, which can adopt such modalities". I shall try now to clarify the relevance of this Reinachian observation in the final section of this paper." (p. 185 - notes omitted).

31. Laugier, Sandra. 2005. "Actes De Langage Et États De Choses: Austin Et Reinach." *Les Études Philosophiques*:73-98.

32. Lohmar, Dieter. 1992. "Beiträge Zu Einer Phänomenologischen Theorie Des Negativen Urteils." *Husserl Studies* no. 8:173-204.

33. Mayrhofer, Philipp. 2005. "Réalisme Et Fondation Chez Adolf Reinach." *Les Études Philosophiques*:3-18.

34. Mulligan, Kevin, ed. 1987. *Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations employed in the text XIII; Adolf Reinach: an intellectual biography by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith 3; Promisings and other social acts: their constituents and structure by Kevin Mulligan 29; Reinach and Searle on promising. A comparison by Klaus Hoffmann 91; Adolf Reinach and the analytic foundations of social acts by Jean-Louis Gardies 107; Reinach on

representative acts by James Brown 119; Demystifying Reinach's legal theory by Stanley L. Paulson 133; Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtphilosophie Adolf Reinachs by Armin Burkhardt 155; The intentionality of thinking: the difference between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter by Wolfgang Künne 175; On the cognition of Sates of Affairs by Barry Smith 189; Johannes Daubert Kritik der "Theorie des negativen Urteils" von Adolf Reinach by Karl Schuhmann 227; Husserl und Reinach by Karl Schuhmann 239; Husserl and Reinach on Hume's "Treatise" 257; Adolf Reinachs Vortrag über die Grundbegriffe der Ethik by Karl Schuhmann 275; William James and Pragmatism by Adolf Reinach 291; Adolf Reinach: an annotated bibliography by Barry Smith 299-332; Index 333-344.

From the Preface: "Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) in his all too brief philosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. It is sober, concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in a philosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stone on the way to his later Phenomenology, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributions to exact philosophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote most illuminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs *(Sachverhalte), as* well as his realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions of exact philosophy. Like my fellow-contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some way towards correcting this unfortunate historical accident.

Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell and Wittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinterpretation of Hume and aspects of his legal philosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberation as well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention."

35. ———. 1987. "Promising and Other Social Acts: Their Constituents and Structure." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 29-90. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

"The discovery of what Reinach called *social acts* (in 1913) and Austin *speech acts* (in 1962) was first and foremost the discovery of a type of linguistic action which, Reinach and Austin are convinced, had simply not been noticed hitherto. It is true that both authors present their discovery within a theoretical framework and that they hoped that their accounts of the phenomenon discovered would be taken as representative of new ways of doing philosophy. It is also true that there are great differences between the frameworks and the hopes of the two philosophers. But both are emphatic that their primary objective is to bring into focus, and fully *describe,* a phenomenon of which promising is their favourite example. Other social acts dealt with in some detail by Reinach are requesting, questioning, ordering, imparting information, accepting a promise and legal enactment, which - except for the last two - are all at least touched on by Austin. (*)" (p. 29)
(*) Reinach's theory is set out in his monograph *The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,* in particular in § 2 *Claim and Obligation, § 3 The Social Acts, § 4 The Act of Promising as the Origin of Claim and Obligation,* § 7 *Representation,* § 8 *Enactments and the Propositions which Express Enactments*.

36. Paulson, Stanley L. 1987. "Demystifying Reinach's Legal Theory." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 133-154. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

37. Salice, Alessandro. 2009. *Urteile Und Sachverhalte. Ein Vergleich Zwischen Alexius Meinong Und Adolf Reinach*. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

"The judgment constitutes a fundamental notion for several disciplines such as descriptive psychology, ontology and logic, and hence its investigation represents a pivotal area of research within theoretical philosophy. Inside the Brentano-School, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) made significant contributions to this topic, separating and exploring both the subjective side of judgment (the intentional experience of judging) as well as its objective side (the “state of affairs” or the “objective”). In this publication Meinong’s and Reinach’s lore regarding the psychological and object-theoretical aspects of judgment are explicated, compared and evaluated."

38. Schuhmann, Karl. 1987. "Johannes Dauberts Kritik Der "Theorie Des Negativen Urteils"." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 227-238. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

39. ———. 1987. "Hussserl Und Reinach." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 239-256. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

40. ———. 1987. "Adolf Reinachs Vortrag Über Die Grundbegriffe Der Ethik." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 275-289. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

41. ———. 1990. "Elements of Speech Act Theory in the Work of Thomas Reid." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 7:47-66.

"The account of social acts sketched by Thomas Reid is shown to constitute an anticipation of the theory of speech acts standardly associated with Austin and Searle. Reid's ideas are compared also with that other (and in many ways more important) pre-Austinian speech act theory worked

out by the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach in his monograph on the act of promising of 1913."

42. ———. 1993. "Edith Stein Und Adolf Reinach." In *Studien Zur Philosophie Von Edith Stein.Internationales Edith Stein-Symposion Eichstätt 1991*, edited by Fetz Reto, Luzius, Rath, Matthias and Schulz, Peter, 53-88. München: K. Alber.

    Reprinted in: K. Schuhmann - *Selected papers on phenomenology* - Dordrecht, Springer,, 2004, pp. 163-184

43. Seifert, Josef. 1983. "Is Reinach's "Apriorische Rechtslehre" More Important for Positive Law Than Reinach Himself Thinks." *Aletheia* no. 3:197-230.

44. ———. 1992. "Die Philosophie Adolf Reinachs: Bemerkungen Anl?Sslich Der Veroffentlichung Einer Neuen Kritischen Ausgabe Der Schriften Reinachs." *Aletheia.An International Yearbook of Philosophy* no. 5:432-438.

45. Smith, Barry. 1978. "An Essay in Formal Ontology." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 6:39-62.

    "On the controversy between Reinach and Ingarden concerning negative states of affairs."
    Barry Smith - *An annotated bibliography* - p. 328.

46. ———. 1978. "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy." In *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium*, 31-35. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

    "On early *Sachverhalt* ontologies."

47. ———. 1978. "Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought." *Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* no. 21:425-441.

"The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth-century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the *Tractatus*: in each case it is actual and possible *Sachverhalte* which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the States of Affairs depicted, e.g., in the sentences of a legal trial and prior fact-complexes to which these may correspond suggests one possible connecting link between the logical and ontological sections of the *Tractatus* and the ethical reflections appearing at the end. It is argued that the latter can best be understood in terms of the idea of a "Last judgment" (with its associated ethical rewards and punishments) which would relate to the world as a whole as a penal trial relates to individual complexes of facts."

48. ———. 1982. "Introduction to Adolf Reinach *'on the Theory of Negative Judgment'*." In *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry, 289-314. München: Philosophia Verlag.

49. ———. 1987. "On the Cognition of State of Affairs." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 189-225. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

50. ———. 1987. "Adolf Reinach: An Annotated Bibliography." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 299-332. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    "When the present volume was first conceived, it was confidently believed that a survey of the literature on Reinach's thought could be kept within comfortable limits. It rapidly became clear, however, that this was not the case. Reinach's discoveries in the sphere of speech act theory

have, it is true, gone almost unnoticed. Reinach has nevertheless enjoyed an enduring notoriety among those working in the philosophy of law, and ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechtes" has served as the principal representative of phenomenological, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches in this discipline. His name accordingly appears in the majority of the more substantial general treatises in the discipline (or at least in those treatises and reference works published in countries whose law and philosophy have been influenced by the Germanic tradition: Edwards' great *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* does not contain even a mention of Reinach). The goal of completeness has therefore been abandoned in what follows, and items containing merely passing references to Reinach's work have been listed only where they are of particular historical importance or bear evidence of some more substantial influence. The list has been compiled with the assistance of N. Bokhove, A.G. Conte and M.-E. Conte, J. Crosby, N. Duxbury, J. Joerden, S. Paulson, H. Spiegelberg and the indefatigable librarians of the University of Erlangen."

51. ———. 1989. "Logic and the Sachverhalt." *The Monist* no. 72:52-69.

    "Logic is often conceived as a science of propositions, or of relations between propositions. There is an alternativeview, however, defended by Meinong, Pfänder, Reinach and others, which sees logic as a science of *Sachverhalte* or States of Affairs. A consideration of this view, which was defended especially by thinkers within the tradition of Brentano, throws new light on the problems of intentionality and of mental content. It throws light also on the development of logic in Poland. Here the influence of Brentano's student Kasimir Twardowski is especially important, and the paper concludes with a new interpretation of Tarski's work on truth against the background of Twardowski's thinking."

52. ———. 1993. "An Essay on Material Necessity." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 18:301-322.

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53. Smith, Barry, and Schuhmann, Karl. 1987. "Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography." In *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 1-27. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

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Third revised edition (First edition 1960).
About Reinach see pp. 191-200.

55. Stella, Giuliana. 1986. "L' "a Priori" Della Promessa in Adolf Reinach." *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto* no. 63:392-408.

56. Zelaniec, Wojciech. 1992. "Fathers, Kings, and Promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a Priori." *Husserl Studies* no. 9:147-177.

"The author examines several examples (given by Husserl and his pupil, Adolf Reinach, and pertaining mainly to the social sphere) of allegedly analytic and synthetic a priori propositions. In a detailed line of argument -- drawing among others on the theory of speech acts -- the author shows difficulties with classifying some of those examples as analytic."

Related pages

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Stanislaw Leśniewski's Logical Systems: Protothetic, Ontology, Mereology

INTRODUCTION

"Leśniewski defined ontology, one of his three foundational systems, as 'a certain kind of modernized 'traditional logic' [On the Foundations of Mathematics (FM), p. 176]. In this respect it is worth bearing in mind that in the 1937-38 academic year Leśniewski taught a course called "Traditional 'formal logic' and traditional 'set theory' on the ground of ontology"; cf. Srzednicki and Stachniak, *Leśniewski's Systems: Protothetic*, 1988, p. 180. On this see Kotarbinski *Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, 1966, pp. 253-54 [the Polish original was published in 1929], which Leśniewski praised in [FM]: see in particular pp. 373 ff. Kotarbinski noted that Leśniewski "calls his system 'ontology' in harmony with certain terms used earlier (as in the 'ontological principle of contradiction')", and in strict relation to the Greek root of 'ontology' as the participle of the verb 'to be'. Leśniewski's 'ontology' is therefore "closely connected with traditional Aristotelian formal logic, of which it is an extension and an improvement, while on the other hand it is a terminal point in the attempt to construct a calculus of names in the area of logistic ... If in spite of these reasons we do not use the word 'ontology' here as a name for the calculus of names, this is only because of the fear of a misunderstanding. Misunderstanding could arise from the fact that this name has its roots already in another role, i.e., it has been long agreed to call 'ontology' the enquiry 'on the general principles of existence' conducted in the spirit of certain parts of Aristotelian 'metaphysical' books. It has

to be admitted however, that if the Aristotelian definition of the main theory (*prote filosofia*) discussed in those books is interpreted in the spirit of a 'general theory of objects', then both the word and its meaning, can be applied to the calculus of names of Leśniewski", Kotarbinski 1966, pp. 373-374. Leśniewski commented on Kotarbinski's remarks thus: "I used the name 'Ontology' to characterize the theory I was developing, without offence to my 'linguistic instincts' because I was formulating in that theory a certain kind of 'general principles of existence'" [FM, 374].
Given these premises, we gain clearer understanding of his interest in the principles of non-contradiction [PC] and excluded middle [EM], as well as his references to the theory of conversion (p. 68 ff), of the *suppositio* (p. 18) and of the validity of the syllogism (p. 71 ff). This inquiry was encouraged by his interest in the history of logic and in the formal treatment of the problems of classical philosophy by the Lvov-Warsaw school. Jan Łukasiewicz's (1886-1939) research into the history of propositional calculus, the Aristotelian syllogistic and the principle of non-contradiction are well known. (...) Twardowski, the founder of the school, was also interested in traditional logic. As a lecturer at the University of Lvov, for many years he taught a course on Attempts to reform traditional logic, in which he outlined the theories of Bolzano, Brentano, Boole and Schröder; cf. Dambska *François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École*, Grazer philosophischen Studien, 5, 1978, p. 123." (pp. 187-188)

From: Roberto Poli and Massimo Libardi, "Logic, Theory of Science, and Metaphysics According to Stanislaw Leśniewski", *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 57, 1999, pp. 183-219.

"In the period between the two world wars, Stanislaw Leśniewski (1886-1939), one of the founders and a prominent member of the Warsaw School of Logic, created a system of the foundations of mathematics comprising three deductive theories: Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. The point of departure for the construction of this system was his study of logical paradoxes and, in this context, a distinction between the distributive and

collective interpretations of a class. This distinction between the two interpretations was reflected in the development of two deductive theories, the theory of collective classes, which he eventually called Mereology, and the theory of distributive classes, called Ontology. Finally, in order to combine Mereology and Ontology into a logically rigorous system, he constructed Protothetic -- the system of "First principles." Leśniewski's ambition was "not to add one more calculus to the variety already invented, nor even to prove general metatheorems about alternative formal calculi, in the interests of "comparative logic"; it was instead to perfect a universally valid classical system of logic and foundations of mathematics, in which he could rigorously formulate generalizations expressible only in the metalanguages of systems poorer in means of expression, [...] and on which he could rely as a true instrument of deduction and scientific investigation (Luschei, *The logical systems of Leśniewski,* 1962, p. 24)."This program was initiated by Leśniewski in 1914 with his studies on a general theory of sets (later to be named 'Mereology'). The first version of Mereology appeared in print in 1916 under the title Foundations of a General Theory of Sets. I (in Polish).

In 1919, Leśniewski joined the University of Warsaw as a professor of the philosophy of mathematics. He met a group of gifted mathematicians, Zygmunt Janiszewski, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, Waclaw Sierpidski, whose research interests, like those of Leśniewski, were focused on the foundations of mathematics. In 1920 this group, joined by Jan Łukasiewicz, founded the mathematical journal *Fundamenta Mathematicae* with Mazurkiewicz and Sierpiriski as editors, and Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz as members of the editorial board. The name, scope, and membership of the editorial board of the journal adequately reflected the research activities of the Warsaw schools of mathematics and logic during the first decade of the journal's existence.

The construction of Ontology in the period between 1919-1921, marked the next step in the formation of Leśniewski's system of the foundations of mathematics, although it was not until 1930 that Ontology appeared in print (cf. Leśniewski, 1930).

The construction of Protothetic began in 1922 and went quickly through numerous improvements and modifications, to be concluded in 1923. By then, Leśniewski's system of the foundations of mathematics was formally ready and, to quote Jordan, it was "the most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics" (cf. Jordan, 1945).
Even such a critic of the importance of Leśniewski's contribution to modern logic as Grzegorczyk admitted that "Leśniewski's treatment of logic was in his times the most exact; it was simpler than *Principia* [*Mathematica*] and had it been published simultaneously with the second edition of the *Principia*, it would have played a considerable part in the development of logic" (Grzegorczyk, 1955, p. 78)."
The roots of Protothetic can already be found in Leśniewski's early writings between 1912 and 1914. The "deductions" in his 1916 work on the general theory of sets are based on his logical intuitions which eventually were captured in the axioms and directives of Protothetic and Ontology." (pp. VII-VIII)

From: "Editor's Foreword" to Jan Srzednicki, and Zbigniew Stachniak (eds.), *Leśniewski's Systems: Protothetic*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998.

APPLICATIONS OF Leśniewski'S ONTOLOGY

Tadeusz Kotarbinski (1) made the following comment on Leśniewski's ontology: " It must be however admitted if the Aristotelian definition of the supreme theory... be interpreted in the spirit of a "general theory of objects", then both the word ["Ontology" -- C. W.] and its meaning are applicable to the calculus of terms as expounded by Leśniewski".
Leśniewski (2) himself fully shared this opinion: "I used the name "ontology" to characterize the theory which I was developing without offence to my "linguistic instincts" because I was

formulating in that theory a certain kind of "general principles of existence" (3).
Both quotations suggest looking at Leśniewski's ontology (hereafter LO) for insights for philosophical ontology. This is precisely what I would like to do in this paper (4).
That Leśniewski's logical systems have interesting applications in philosophy has already been pointed out by several authors. For example:
-- Lejewski's (5) works about multicategorial and unicategorial languages and ontologies. In particular, Lejewski shows how Leśniewski's ideas help in speaking on non- existents without falling into Platonism or Meinongianism;
-- Simon's (6) study on parts and wholes ;
-- Lejewski's and Wolenski's (7) attempts to interpret Kotarbinski's reism by means of LO (8) ;
-- Waragai's (9) formalization of fundamental ontological principles in the framework of LO ;
-- Henry's (10) uses of LO in his reconstructions of medieval logic and semantics.
My concern here is more general. I will try to show how to attack the concept of being by means of Leśniewski's logic. Before going on to do this, however, I would like to make some comments on the relation of Leśniewski's logic to nominalism. The first impression is that mereology is particularly important in this respect. Certainly, this is correct, because mereology formalizes the part/whole relation which is crucial for nominalism. The usual interpretation of mereology provides a formalization of the theory of physical parts in Brentano's sense. Simons (11) shows that one can also obtain a nice mereological interpretation of "being a part in the metaphysical sense". Now there remains the problem of mereology which would be suitable for a theory of logical parts. This is probably equivalent to finding a mereology similar in its expressive power to set theory.
At first glance, both first-order logic and Lo seem to be equally good as logical bases for nominalism. However, this is not the case because, although first-order quantifiers range over individuals, the standard semantics for elementary quantification theory must appeal to sets and relations Leśniewski's Logic and the Concept of Being as referents of predicates. On the other

hand, if we take Lejewski's (12) ontological tables as semantic models of nominal phrases in LO, we easily see that all nominal expressions exclusively refer to individual things. Moreover, the identity predicate is definable in elementary ontology, though it must be added as a new primitive to elementary logic or defined by second-order means. Finally, looking at nominalism through "Leśniewskian glasses" we can see that the metaphysical nature of individuals is not especially important for nominalism. Now it is not especially surprising that Quine's ontology is sometimes qualified as nominalistic Platonism. It is only strange for anybody who thinks about nominalism as a kind of materialism. What Lo shows is that nominalism consists in abandoning general objects, essences common to many individuals and the like. I am not claiming that the marriage of nominalism and Lo secures victory for the former. My intention rather, is to show that Lo helps nominalists much more than does first-order logic." (pp. 94-96)

Notes

1. T. Kotarbinski, *Gniosology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, tr. by O. Wojtasiewicz, Pergamon Press Ossolineum, Oxford-Wroclaw, pp. 210-211.
2. S. Leśniewski, "O podstawach matematyki" [On the Foundations of Mathematics], *Przeglad filozoficzny* 34, 142-170 ; Eng. tr. in Leśniewski, *Collected Works*, ed. by S. J. Surma, J. T. Srzednicki, D. I. Barnett and V. F. Rickey, Kluwer: Dordrecht 1992, p. 374.
3. This translation seems inadequate. It should rather be "general principles of being" (in the Polish original, we have "*ogolne zasady bytu*", not "*ogolne zasady istnienia*"). Leśniewski clearly distinguished "being" [*byt*] from "existence" [*istnienie*].
4. The same also concerns Leśniewski's mereology.
5. Czeslaw Lejewski "A System of Logic, for Bicategorial Ontology", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 3, 1976, 99-117, "Ontology and Logic", in *Philosophy of Logic*, ed. by S. Korner, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, pp. 1-28.
6. Peter Simons, *Parts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.

7. Czelsaw Lejewski, "Outline of Ontology", *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester*, v. 59, n° 1, pp. 127-147, 1976, "On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbinski's Pansomatism", in *Ontologie und Logik / Ontology and Logic*, ed. by P. Weingartner and E. Morscher, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, pp. 197-214, 1979. J. Wolenski, "Reism and Leśniewski's Ontology", History and Philosophy of Logic, 7, pp. 167-172, 1986.
8. Of course, Kotarbinski himself applied LO to his ontology.
9. "Ontological Law of Contradiction and its Logical Structure", *The Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science*, v. 6, n° 1, pp. 43-58, 1980.
10. D. Henry, *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, Hutchinson, London, 1958. î.
11. P. Simons, *Parts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
12. "On Leśniewski's Ontology", *Ratio*, 1, pp. 150-176, 1958.

From: Jan Wolenski, "Leśniewski's Logic and the Concept of Being", *Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage*, Cahier n. 15, *Stanislaw Leśniewski aujourd'hui*, (1995) pp. 93-101.

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   "This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of Tarski's semantic background in the light of the ideas of his master, Stanislaw Lesniewski. Although in his 1933 monograph Tarski credits Lesniewski with crucial negative results on the semantics of natural language, the conceptual relationship between the two logicians has never been investigated in a thorough manner. This paper shows that it was not Tarski, but Lesniewski who first avowed the impossibility of giving a satisfactory theory of truth for ordinary language, and the necessity of sanitation of the latter for scientific purposes. In an early article (1913) Lesniewski gave an interesting solution to the Liar Paradox, which, although different from Tarski's in detail, is nevertheless important to Tarski's semantic background. To illustrate this I give an analysis of Lesniewski's solution and of some related aspects of Lesniewski's later thought."

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   "The terminological concepts for the system of Ontology extended by the axiom of infinity are shown to be definable within that system. in 1929 Lesniewski first published terminological explanations for his system of logic, where he used certain concepts from his system of Mereology along

with others such as equiformity. In this paper the terminological concepts are given entirely within the system of Ontology extended by the axiom of infinity. Since the definitions given are recursive, the incompleteness of this extension of Ontology is readily established."

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    "In the issue of this journal dated October 1966 (Vol. VII, No. 4, pp. 361-364) Professor John Trentman suggested limitations on my claim that Lesniewski's Ontology is of use in furnishing formal analyses of medieval logical theories, his grounds being that certain medieval theories deny what is called the "two-name theory of predication" allegedly common to Ockham and Ontology. Hence while the work of Ockhamists would be analysable with reference to Ontology, that of those "Thomists" who deny the two-name theory would not. Professor Trentman then goes on to suggest that for such "Thomist" analyses to take place, "something like Frege's functional analysis of predication", is needed to show the "disparity of semantic category that holds between the subject and the predicate", thereby implying that no such form is available in Ontology, and that the allegations about the inadequacy of the two-name theory could have escaped my notice.
    Neither of these implications is tenable. Ignoring the second of them, I can deal with the first by exemplifying the manner in which the Ontology in question deals with the relations between names and verbs (i.e. functors which

when completed with nominal arguments form propositions)."

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    "The paper deals with the axiomatic Calculus of Names (S sub 2) which is an extension of the system S sub 1 presented in my paper "Remarks about syllogistic with negative terms" (Studia logica, vol. XXIV). The primitive terms of S sub 2 are the function of a categorical universal-affirmative proposition, the complement of a set, and the empty set. In S sub 2 one is given the definitions of addition and multiplication of sets, the universal set and the relation epsilon (... is ...) which corresponds semantically to the primitive term of Lesniewski's Ontology. It is proved that the elementary ontology and the elementary algebra of classes are fragments of s sub 2."

25. ———. 1969. "Remarks About Syllogistic with Negative Terms." *Studia Logica* no. 24:131-137.

    "The article presents a system S of syllogistic based on three axioms. The functor "a" / every...is.../ and the sign of

nominal negation are primitive terms of system S. The known axiomatic systems of syllogistic with negative terms constructed by I. Thomas, A. Wedberg and C. A. Meredith are fragments of system S. It seems that the axioms of system S better characterize the categorical propositions containing negative terms since this characterization excludes some non-intuitive interpretations of such propositions, admissible in the above mentioned systems. It is also mentioned that there exists an extension of system S containing the elementary algebra of classes and the elementary Ontology of Lesniewski."

26. Jacquette, Dale. 2006. "Bochenski on Property Identity and the Refutation of Universals." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 35:293-316.

    "An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox."

27. Kearns, John. 1967. "The Contribution of Lesniewski." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 8:61-93.

28. ———. 1969. "Two Views of Variables." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 10:163-180.

    "This paper argues that there are two fundamental ways to regard variables in formalized languages. One way, associated with Russell and Quine, regards variables as autonomous referential expressions. On this view, quantification is the fundamental device for indicating

ontological commitments. The second way to regard variables is linked to Frege and Lesniewski; variables are regarded as replacements for constant expressions. Such a view leads to an understanding of quantifiers in terms of substitution instances of the quantified expressions. It is argued that the second way of regarding variables is preferable to the first way, and that no logical results need be given up if this way is adopted."

29. Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1966. *Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

    Original Polish edition 1929; second revised edition 1961. Translated from the Polish by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz; translation edited by G. Bidwell and C. Pinder

30. Küng, Guido. 1977. "The Meaning of Quantifiers in the Logic of Lesniewski." *Studia Logica* no. 26:309-322.

31. ———. 1985. "La Logique Est-Elle Une Discipline Des Mathématiques out Fait-Elle Partie De L'ontologie?" *Dialectica* no. 39:243-258.

    "Heinrich Scholz and J. M. Bochenski have claimed that the laws of formal logic are the most general laws about things, properties, relations, states-of-affairs, etc. Others have mixed up logic and set theory. But Lesniewski's interpretation of the quantifiers shows that properly speaking logic belongs neither to ontology nor to mathematics."

32. Lejewski, Czeslaw. 1954. "Logic and Existence." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* no. 5:104-119.

    "I wish to conclude with a brief summary of the results. The aim of the paper was to analyse rather than criticize. I started by examining two inferences which appeared to disprove the validity of the rules of universal instantiation and existential generalization in application to reasoning with empty noun-expressions. Then I distinguished two

different interpretations of the quantifiers and argued that under what I called the unrestricted interpretation the two inferences were correct. Further arguments in favour of the unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers were brought in, and in particular it was found that by adopting the unrestricted interpretation it was possible to separate the notion of existence from the idea of quantification. With the aid of the functor of inclusion two functors were defined of which one expressed the notion of existence as underlying the theory of restricted quantification while the other approximated the term exist(s) as used in ordinary language.
It may be useful to supplement this summary by indicating some aspects of the problem of existence which have not been included in the discussion. I analyzed the theory of quantification so far as it was applied in connection with variables for which noun-expressions could be substituted and my enquiry into the meaning of exist (s) ' was limited to cases where this functor was used with noun-expressions designating concrete objects or with noun-expressions that were empty. It remains to explore, among other things, in what sense the quantifiers can be used to bind predicate variables and what we mean when we say that colours exist or that numbers exist. These are far more difficult problems, which may call for a separate paper or rather for a number of separate papers." (p. 119)

33. ———. 1958. "On Implicational Definitions." *Studia Logica* no. 8:189-206.

34. ———. 1958. "On Lesniewski's Ontology." *Ratio* no. 1:150-176.

35. ———. 1960. "A Re-Examination of the Russellian Theory of Descriptions." *Philosophy* no. 35:14-29.

36. ———. 1967. "A Single Axiom for the Mereological Notion of Proper Part." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 4:279-285.

37. ———. 1969. "Consistency of Lesniewski's Mereology." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 34:321-328.

"Lesniewski's Mereology presupposes his Ontology, which in turn presupposes his Protothetic. A proof is outlined to show that if we interpret name-variables as proposition-variables and if at the same time we interpret the ontological 'epsilon' as the functor of conjunction and the mereological 'el' as the functor of assertion then the axioms and directives of Ontology and Mereology become repectively theses and directives of Protothetic."

38. ———. 1974. "A System of Logic for Bicategorial Ontology." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 3:265-283.

39. ———. 1976. "Outline of Ontology." *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* no. 59:127-147.

40. ———. 1979. "On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbisnki's Pansomatism." In *Ontologie Und Logik. Ontology and Logic.*, 197-214. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Proceedings of an International Colloquium (Salzburg, 21-24 September 1976)
Discussion pp. 215-218

41. ———. 1981. "Logic and Ontology." In *Modern Logic. A Survey*, edited by Evandro, Agazzi, 379-398. Dordrecht: Reidel.

42. ———. 1983. "A Note on Lesniewski's Axiom System for the Mereological Notion of Ingredient or Element." *Topoi* no. 3:63-72.

43. ———. 1985. "Accomodating the Informal Notion of Class within the Framework of Lesniewski's Ontology." *Dialectica* no. 39:217-241.

"Interpreted distributively the sentence 'Indiana is a member of the class of American federal states' means the same as 'Indiana is an American federal state'. In

accordance with the *collective* sense of class expressions the sentence can be understood as implying that Indiana is a part of the country whose capital city is Washington. Neither interpretation appears to accommodate all the intuitions connected with the informal notion of class. A closer accommodation can be achieved, it seems, if class expressions are interpreted as verb-like expressions of a certain kind as available within the framework of Lesniewski's Ontology."

44. ———. 1986. "Logic and Non-Existence." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:209-234.

    "An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and of that of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on `semantics' of fiction conclude the essay."

45. ———. 1989. "Ricordando Stanislaw Lesniewski." *Quaderni del Centro Studi per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea* no. 1989 (1):5-47.

    Edited by Massimo Libardi

46. ———. 1989. "Formalization of Functionally Complete Propositional Calculus with the Functor of Implication as the Only Primitive Term." *Studia Logica* no. 48:479-494.

    "The most difficult problem that Lesniewski came across in constructing his system of the foundations of mathematics was the problem of 'defining definitions', as he used to put it. He solved it to his satisfaction only when he had completed the formalization of his protothetic and ontology. By formalization of a deductive system one ought to

understand in this context the statement, as precise and unambiguous as possible, of the conditions an expression has to satisfy if it is added to the system as a new thesis. Now, some protothetical theses, and some ontological ones, included in the respective systems, happen to be definitions. In the present essay I employ Lesniewski's method of terminological explanations for the purpose of formalizing Łukasiewicz's system of implicational calculus of propositions, which system, without having recourse to quantification, I first extended some time ago into a functionally complete system. This I achieved by allowing for a rule of 'implicational definition', which enabled me to define any proposition forming functor for any finite number of propositional arguments."

47. Lepage, Franois. 2000. "Partial Monotonic Protothetics." *Studia Logica* no. 66:147-163.

    "This paper has four parts. In the first part, I present Lesniewski's protothetics and the complete system provided for that logic by Henkin. The second part presents a generalized notion of partial functions in propositional type theory. In the third part, these partial functions are used to define partial interpretations for protothetics. Finally, I present in the fourth part a complete system for partial protothetics. Completeness is proved by Henkin's method using saturated sets instead of maximally saturated sets. This technique provides a canonical representation of a partial semantic space and it is suggested that this space can be interpreted as an epistemic state of a non-omniscient agent."

48. Luschei, Eugene. 1962. *The Logical Ssystems of Lesniewski*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

49. Miéville, Denis. 1984. *Un Développement Des Systèmes Logiques De Stanislaw Lesniewski: Protothétique, Ontologie, Méréologie*. Berne: Peter Lang.

50. ———. 1985. "Un Aperu Des Caractéristiques Et De L'esprit Des Systèmes Logiques De Stanislaw Lesniewski." *Dialectica* no. 39:166-179.

"This article provides an introduction to the deductive theories, which are so little known, of S. Lesniewski. The reasons that led this Polish logician to develop a theory of collective classes as well as the logical theories that underlie it are set forth here, and the main characteristics of Lesniewski's three systems -- mereology, protothetics and ontology -- are presented. Some epistemological considerations are included in this study."

51. ———. 1987. "Axiomes Et Définitions Chez Leśniewski: Une Manière Génétique De Développer Les Systèmes Formels." *Theoria* no. 2:285-307.

"The logical theories of Stanislaw Leśniewski differ profoundly form classical formal systems. Unlike the latter, they do not have an entirely predetermined vocabulary. Nor do they have a determined list of functors of syntactical-semantical categories. Due to formalized directives for definitions, the logics of Leśniewski are constructed progressively, making new theses and consequently functors of new syntactical-semantical categories accesible. In this article we present the genetic aspect associated with these theses-definitions. We also show that the property of creativity makes it possible to bridge some of the fundamental gaps in contemporary classical logics."

52. ———. 2001. "Introduction À L'œuvre De S. Lesniewski. Fascicule I - La Protothétique." *Travaux de Logique (Neuchâtel)*.

53. ———. 2004. "Introduction À L'œuvre De S. Lesniewski. Fascicule Ii - L'ontologie." *Travaux de Logique (Neuchâtel)*.

54. ———. 2006. "Logique, Ontologie Et Ontologie." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 61:149-162.

55. ———. 2009. "Introduction À L'œuvre De S. Lesniewski. Fascicule Vi - La Métalangue D'une Syntaxe Inscriptionnelle." *Travaux de Logique (Neuchâtel)*.

56. ———. 2009. "Leśniewski, Negation, and the Art of Logical Subtlety." In *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy. Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, 113-120. Dordrecht: Springer.

57. Peeters, Marc. 2006. "Introduction À L'œuvre De S. Lesniewski. Fascicule Iv - L'œuvre De Jeunesse." *Travaux de Logique (Neuchâtel)*.

58. Poli, Roberto, and Libardi, Massimo. 1999. "Logic, Theory of Science, and Metaphysics According to Stanislaw Lesniewski." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 57:183-219.

    "Due to the current availability of the English translation of almost all of Lesniewski's works it is now possible to give a clear and detailed picture of his ideas. Lesniewski's system of the foundation of mathematics is discussed. In a brief outline of his three systems Mereology, Ontology and Protothetics his positions concerning the problems of the forms of expression, proper names, synonymity, analytic and synthetic propositions, existential propositions, the concept of logic, and his views of theory of science and metaphysics are sketched. The influence of Mill, Łukasiewicz, Austrian philosophy and especially Petrazycki on his thinking is evaluated and an interpretation is suggested setting him squarely in a tradition of classical Aristotelian logic."

59. Prakel, Judith. 1983. "A Lesniewskian Re-Examination of Goodman's Nominalistic Rejection of Classes." *Topoi* no. 2:87-98.

60. Prior, Arthur Norman. 1965. "Existence in Lesniewski and in Russell." In *Formal Systems and Recursive Functions*, edited by Crossley, John N. and Dummett, Michael, 149-155. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.

Proceedings of the Eighth Logic Colloquium. Oxford, July 1963

61. Rickey, Frederick V. 1977. "A Survey of Lesniewski's Logic." *Studia Logica* no. 36:407-426.

62. ———. 1985. "Interpretations of Lesniewski's Ontology." *Dialectica* no. 39:181-192.

    "This article proposes to clarity the problem of interpreting Lesniewski's ontology. A distinction is made between two kinds of interpretation: substitutional and "natural". Substitutional interpretation is shown to involve difficulties and limitations. A "natural" ontology, the major principles of which are presented here, is shown to be of considerable interest."

63. Sanders, John T. 1996. "Stanislaw Lesniewski's Logical Systems." *Axiomathes* no. 3:407-415.

64. Schumann, Andrew. 2013. "On Two Squares of Opposition: The Leśniewski's Style Formalization of Synthetic Propositions." *Acta Analytica* no. 28:71-93.

    "In the paper we build up the ontology of Leśniewski's type for formalizing synthetic propositions. We claim that for these propositions an unconventional square of opposition holds, where a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation. Further, we construct a non-Archimedean extension of Boolean algebra and show that in this algebra just two squares of opposition are formalized: conventional and the square that we invented. As a result, we can claim that there are only two basic squares of opposition. All basic constructions of the paper (the new square of opposition, the formalization of synthetic propositions within ontology of Leśniewski's type, the non-Archimedean explanation of square of opposition) are introduced for the first time."

65. Simons, Peter M. 1982. "On Understanding Lesniewski." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 3:165-191.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 227-258.
"This paper assesses those features of Lesniewski's ontology which make it difficult to understand for logicians accustomed to more orthodox systems of logic. It is seen that certain general features of presentation and content can, by selective acceptance or modification, be accommodated with a fairly orthodox viewpoint. The chief difficulty lies in the interpretation of Lesniewski's names, and the constant '"?"'. Four interpretations are suggested in turn: Lesniewski's names as monadic predicates; as class terms; as common nouns; and as empty singular or plural terms. This last and least orthodox interpretation is argued to be the most suitable, but it is shown how it can be made to live in harmony with either the common noun or the class interpretation."

66. ———. 1983. "A Lesniewskian Language for the Nominalistic Theory of Substance and Accident." *Topoi* no. 2:99-110.

67. ———. 1984. "A Brentanian Basis for Lesniewskian Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 27:297-398.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 259-269

68. ———. 1985. "Lesniewski's Logic and Its Relation to Classical and Free Logics." In *Foundations of Logic and Linguistic. Problems and Their Solutions: A Selection of Contributed Papers from the Viith International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Held in Salzburg from the 11th-16th July, 1983*, edited by Dorn, Georg and Weingartner, Paul, 369-402. New York: Plenum Press.

Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 271-293

69. ———. 1985. "A Semantics for Ontology." *Dialectica* no. 39:193-216.

    "This article proposes to clarify the problem of interpreting Lesniewski's Ontology. A distinction is made between the two kinds of interpretation: substitutional and "natural". Substitutional interpretation is shown to involve difficulties and limitations. A "natural" Ontology, the major principles of which are presented here, is shown to be of considerable interest."

70. ———. 1987. *Parts*. Oxford: Clarendons Press.

71. ———. 1992. "Lesniewskian Term Logic." *Lingua e Stile* no. 27:25-45.

    "Students of traditional logic, by which I mean the central core of categorical syllogistic with whatever further forms were studied at the time, were drilled in putting the sentences occurring in arguments into «correct logical form», and present-day students do no different when replacing their natural language sentences by the formulas or semiformulas of predicate logic. Both procedures involve doing some violence to natural modes of expression. A sentence like *Whoever flies saves time* must be replaced by something like *Every flier is a time-saver* by traditional logicians and by *For all x: if x flies then x saves time* by modern logicians. As this makes clear, different logical systems may compete in offering prepared forms proximate to a natural specimen, so there may be a real choice as to which system is preferable for a given purpose. This is familiar to observers of modern logic since there are competing logics of definite descriptions, modality, and so on. Of course, if we confine attention just to the opposition between categorical syllogistic and predicate logic, there seems to be no contest. Predicate logic is expressively much

the more powerful system, and as these two are the only two logical systems to have enjoyed widespread acceptance as tools for analysing validity of natural arguments, it might seem that only predicate logic remains as a general vehicle for workaday argument assessment. But the large number of introductory logic textbooks which still contain material on categorical syllogistic bears witness to the fact that, within its more limited sphere, the traditional logic of terms is widely felt to be a more natural and useful alternative to monadic predicate logic. Historical interest alone could not compensate for the inconveniences of introducing two quite different systems, with their different sentential analyses, laws, and terminology, to cover the same ground.

It is apparent that one disadvantage of predicate logic for these purposes is its use of bound individual variables, which natural languages do not have, and which they can simulate and match only by rather tortuous use of pronouns and pronominal phases. Of course this helps to account for the greater perspicuity of predicate logic once we leave the simplest sentences behind, but at the most elementary level it is a hindrance. The singular term/predicate analysis of simple predications compels common noun phrases and adjectives used attributively to appear as syntactically inseparable parts of predicates, which correspond most closely to verb phrases in natural language. Again, this is not a huge sacrifice, but it is pervasive, is felt to be unnatural, and contributes to beginners' difficulties in learning logic. So it is worth considering from a practical and pedagogical point of view whether, in order to gain the considerable benefits conferred by predicate logic - quantification, multiple generality, relational predicates - it is necessary to put up with the disagreeable features of standard predicate logic. I shall argue that it is not, and that a more natural and flexible medium for which to prepare natural language sentences and arguments is provided by the term logic invented around 1920 by Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) and usually known as Ontology. (*)"

(*) The possible confusion of the system of logic with the branch of metaphysics of the same name is not a danger in

this context, and in any case I will write the name of the system with a capital letter. Sometimes Ontology is called the Calculus of Names, but this is misleading, since much more than names are involved. It would be nice to have a better name for Ontology.

72. ———. 1994. "Discovering Lesniewski: *Collected Works*." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 15:227-235.

    "This discussion review examines the English edition of Lesniewski's collected works. Points emphasized include: the early (pre-symbolic) period, the quality of translation and typesettings, and the scandalously outdated bibliography."

73. ———. 2002. "Reasoning on a Tight Budget: Lesniewski's Nominalistic Metalogic." *Erkenntnis* no. 56:99-122.

74. ———. 2006. "Things and Truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, Ontology and Logic." In *Actions, Products, and Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Łukasiewicz, Dariusz, 83-106. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

75. Sinisi, Vito. 1961. "Nominalism and Common Names." *Philosophical Review* no. 71:230-235.

    "Edwin Allaire, Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann have objected to the nominalistic analysis of "this is red and that is red" which treats "red" as a common name. Such an analysis, they argued, must assimilate the copula in this sentence to the "is" of identity. sinisi claims that this objection is mistaken. Using a logical system developed by Stanislaw Lesniewski, he shows that it is possible to construe "red" as a common name without taking the copula as the "is" of identity."

76. ———. 1966. "Lesniewski's Analysis of Whitehead's Theory of Events." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 7:323-327.

77. ———. 1969. "Lesniewski and Frege on Collective Classes." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 10:239-246.

"Between 1927 and 1931 Lesniewski published a series of articles on the foundations of mathematics in the Polish journal *Przeglad Filozoficzny*.
65% of the work is devoted to various axiomatizations of Lesniewski's mereology (a theory of collective classes) while the remainder takes up various related issues. In the third part of this series Lesniewski informally sets forth his notion of a collective class, criticizes certain descriptions of distributive classes, and argues that there is no justification in Frege's statement that the conception of a class as consisting of individuals, so that the individual thing coincides with the unit class, cannot in any case be supported.
Lesniewski's refutation of Frege's statement appears to be unknown to western logicians and philosophers. None of the recent books on Frege (e.g., Angelelli, Egidi, Sternfeld, Thiel, Walker) mentions it. Luschei, in his *The Logical Systems of Lesniewski,* mentions it but does not present it. My purpose here is to state and explain Lesniewski's refutation in the hope that it will help stimulate interest in his work."

78. ———. 1976. "Lesniewski's Analysis of Russell's Antinomy." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 17:19-34.

79. ———. 1983. "The Development of Ontology." *Topoi* no. 2:53-62.

80. Slupecki, Jerzy. 1953. "St Lesniewski's Protothetics." *Studia Logica* no. 1:44-111.

81. ———. 1955. "Lesniewsjki's Calculus of Names." *Studia Logica* no. 3:7-70.

82. ———. 1958. "Towards a Generalized Mereology of Lesniewski." *Studia Logica* no. 8:131-154.

83. Sobocinski, Boleslaw. 1949. "L'analyse De L'antinomie Russellienne Par Lesniewski." *Methodos*.

Published in four parts: I - II - III: vol. 1. (1949) pp. 94-107; 220-228; 308-316; IV: vol. 2 (1950) pp. 237-257.

84. ———. 1960. "On the Single Axioms of Protothetic, I." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 1:52-73.

85. ———. 1961. "On the Single Axioms of Protothetic, Ii." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 2:111-126.

86. ———. 1961. "On the Single Axioms of Protothetic, Iii." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 2:129-148.

87. ———. 1967. "Successive Simplifications of the Axiom-System of Lesniewski's Ontology." In *Polish Logic 1920-1939*, edited by McCall, Storrs, 188-200. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

88. Srzednicki, Jan, Rickey, Frederick V., and Czelakowski, Janusz, eds. 1984. *S. Lesniewski's Systems. Ontology and Mereology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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89. Srzednicki, Jan, and Stachniak, Zbigniew, eds. 1998. *S. Lesniewski's Systems. Protothetic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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90. Stachniak, Zbigniew. 1981. *Introduction to Model Theory for Lesniewski's Ontology*. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclaskiego.

91. Strawson, Peter Frederick, and Lejewski, Czeslaw. 1957. "Symposium: Proper Names." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. Supplementary vol. 31:191-236.

92. Surma, Stanislaw. 1977. "On the Work and Influence of Stanislaw Lesniewski." In *Logic Colloquium 76*, edited by Gandy, Robin and Hyland, John Martin, 191-220. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.

93. Takano, Mitio. 1985. "A Semantical Investigation into Lesniewski's Axiom of His Ontology." *Studia Logica* no. 44:71-77.

94. Trentman, John. 1966. "Lesniewski's Ontology and Some Medieval Logicians." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 7:361-364.

95. Urbaniak, Rafal. 2008. "Lesniewski and Russell's Paradox: Some Problems." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 29:115-146.

"Sobocinski in his paper on Lesniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (*L'analyse de l'antinomie russellienne par Lesniewski*, 1949) argued that Lesniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Lesniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated."

96. ———. 2013. *Leśniewski's Systems of Logic and Foundations of Mathematics*. Dordrecht: Springer.

"The Lvov-Warsaw school of logic and analytic philosophy was one of the most important schools of philosophical thought in twentieth century. In early 1910s its members already discussed the validity of the principles of excluded middle and contradiction. Among ideas developed in this school one might count Łukasiewicz's view that one can believe a contradiction and that certain sentences can be neither true nor false. This led to the construction of his three-valued logic. Another example is Ajdukiewicz's conventionalism about meaning and his formal work on definitions (it seems that it was Ajdukiewicz and Łukasiewicz who first focused on the consistency, translatability and non-creativity conditions on definitions, at least on the Polish ground). Other examples include Jaśkowski's approach to natural deduction and his work on discussive logics, Lindenbaum's lemma on maximally consistent sets of formulas, Presburger's work on arithmetic, Kotarbiński's semantical reism, and Tarski's work on formal semantics and truth.

One of the representatives of this school was Stanisław Leśniewski (1886–1939) (Alfred Tarski, whose importance in twentieth century logic it is hard to overestimate, was his only PhD student). Leśniewski developed his system of foundations of mathematics as an alternative to the system of *Principia Mathematica*. He constructed three systems: *Protothetic*, which is his version of a generalized propositional calculus, his own (higher-order) logic of predication called *Ontology*, and a theory of parthood called *Mereology*.
This book is devoted to a presentation of Leśniewski's achievements and their critical evaluation. I discuss his philosophical views, describe his systems and evaluate the role they can play in the foundations of mathematics. It was my purpose to focus on primary sources and present Leśniewski's own views and results rather than those present in secondary literature. For this reason, later developments are not treated in detail but rather either mentioned in passing, or described in sections devoted to secondary literature included in some chapters. The intended audience of this book includes philosophy majors, graduate students and professional philosophers interested in logic, mathematics and their philosophy and history."

97. Urbaniak, Rafal, and Severi Hämäri, K. 2012. "Busting a Myth About Leśniewski and Definitions." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 33:159-189.

"A theory of definitions which places the eliminability and conservativeness requirements on definitions is usually called the standard theory. We examine a persistent myth which credits this theory to Leśniewski, a Polish logician. After a brief survey of its origins, we show that the myth is highly dubious. First, no place in Leśniewski's published or unpublished work is known where the standard conditions are discussed. Second, Leśniewski's own logical theories allow for creative definitions. Third, Leśniewski's celebrated 'rules of definition' lay merely syntactical restrictions on the form of definitions: they do not provide definitions with

such meta-theoretical requirements as eliminability or conservativeness. On the positive side, we point out that among the Polish logicians, in the 1920s and 1930s, a study of these meta-theoretical conditions is more readily found in the works of Łukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz."

98. Vasyukov, Vladimir. 1993. "A Lesniewskian Guide to Husserl's and Meinong's Jungles." *Axiomathes* no. 4 (1):59-74.

99. Wojciechowski, Eugeniusz. 1994. "Zwischen Der Syllogistik Und Den Systemen Von Lesniewski: Eine Rekonstruktion Der Idee Der Quantifizierung Der Pradikate." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 48:165-200.

100. Wolenski, Jan. 1986. "Reism and Lesniewski's Ontology." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 7:167-176.

    "This paper examines relations between Reism, the metaphysical theory invented by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and Lesniewski's calculus of names. It is shown that Kotarbinski's interpretation of common nouns as genuine names, i.e., names of things is essentially based on Lesniewski's logical ideas. It is pointed out that Lesniewskian semantics offers better prospects for Nominalism than does semantics of the standard first-order predicate calculus."

101. ———. 1989. *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

102. ———. 1995. "Lesniewski's Logic and the Concept of Being." *Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage*:93-101.

    This paper applies Lesniewski's logical ideas to an analysis of the concept of being. The analysis follows the classical ontology which is based on a distinction of two concepts of being : being in the distributive sense and being in the collective sense. Now it is argued that Lesniewski's ontology (calculus of names) is a much better device for analysizing

being in the distributive sense than the standard first-order predicate logic. Moreover, basic intuition connected with the being in the collective sense are nicely captured by mereology.

103. Zanasi, Fausto. 1980. "Su Alcuni Aspetti Della Teoria Della Definizione Nei Sistemi Logici Di S. Lesniewski." *Annali dell'Istituto di Discipline Filosofiche dell'Università di Bologna*:219-232.

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Tadeusz Kotarbinski from Ontological Reism to Semantical Concretism

INTRODUCTION

"I reached the chair of philosophy via logic. Teaching logic became the field of my activity as a university professor of philosophy, a member of other humanistic faculties. Emphasis is here placed on the words 'teaching' and 'humanistic'. For my lectures and classes were conceived as an organon in the classical sense of the term, for philosophers as well as for those who, having completed their course of study, would espouse the cause of disseminating humanistic knowledge and thinking, particularly future secondary school teachers. Somewhat later my activity embraced also law students. My linguistic equipment proved to, be very helpful in this respect. For it seems especially important when the problems of an organon of this kind are conceived historically and is quite crucial when pondering the original Organon of Aristotle (or to be more cautious, of the peripatetic school) and its continuators. Conceived in this manner logic was by no means confined to formal logic, but came to comprise the problems of epistemology, semantics and methodology. It is precisely the latter problems - not those of formal logic - that were of particular interest to my mind. Nevertheless, I felt bound to contribute to the study of formal logic. The feeling was encouraged both by my colleagues at Warsaw University and by my awareness of the precise phase that logic had reached in its historical development. It was precisely the moment when mathematical logic was triumphantly entering the scene. The

names of Frege, Bertrand Russell, Peano, Burali-Forti, Couturat and many others were on everybody's minds.
Mathematical logic was closely allied with the rapidly developing set theory. The international periodical devoted to the latter, Fundamenta Mathematicae was, and still is, published in Warsaw. The distinguished philosophic-mathematical logicians: Jan Łukasiewicz and his disciple and my colleague, Stanislaw Leśniewski among many others, were active here.
I only mention the names of those persons to whom my studies in mathematically oriented formal logic are particularly indebted. In this respect I owe a lot to my close alliance with Professor Leśniewski. I simply took over his original system of formal logic to suit my own purposes. (1)Relieved thus from the necessity to contribute to formal logic itself, I could concentrate on the problems I faced as a teacher of logic to be used by humanists. These centered around the problem of overcoming the hypostasis of linguistic origin, what Francis Bacon referred to as *idola fori*. Both our everyday language and the language of the sciences as well are teeming with nouns or noun-like forms. Hence the tendency to perceive an object behind them even when the noun is an abstract one, like for example, 'roundness', 'equality', etc. Once the existence of the alleged objects of such names is admitted, once we agree to the existence of such qualities or relations, human thought is made to wade through a mire of apparent ontological problems. They in turn impose a literal interpretation of the expressions like 'a quality inheres' in an object in the same way as a nail is embedded in a wall: whereas, in point of fact, their meaning is only metaphorical. Leibniz himself was of the opinion (which he expressed in *Nouveaux essais* 2, XXII, 1) that problems bristling with difficulties can be dispelled as soon as we stick only to the names of concretes in our discourse. Unaware both of these words and equally ignorant of Franz Brentano's similar ideal I formulated in 1929 the principles of the so called reism 2, XXII, 1) that problems bristling with difficulties can be dispelled as soon as we stick only to the names of concretes in our discourse. Unaware both of these words and equally ignorant of Franz Brentano's similar ideal I formulated in 1929 the principles of the so called reism. In its most mature formula it declares war against the hypostasis of linguistic origin

on the following lines: inasmuch as it is possible try to formulate statements in a way that would eliminate all names other than the names of objects, that is, physical bodies or parts thereof. Persons ought to be regarded as objects, i.e. sentient objects. Sentences may contain words that are not names, e.g. verbs or conjunctions, etc. The point is, however, to eliminate names other than the names of objects. Let me hasten with an example of a reistic interpretation of sentences. 'Prudence inheres in wisdom' simply means: 'Every man who is possessed of wisdom is prudent.' 'Bonds of brotherhood related Orestes to Electra' simply means: 'Orestes was Electra's-brother.' A reist by no means demands that the use of sentences with abstract expressions like the names of qualities or relations be completely abandoned. Quite the contrary, the necessity of applying them is fully recognized just because their presence may often reduce the length of the statement. The only thing he insists upon is to try to be able to do without names which are not the names of things. I may add, by the way, that at present I prefer to use the term 'concretism' instead of the term 'reism' as my readers were prone to identify 'reism' with 'realism' while the meanings of the two are totally different.

Thus, reism, that is concretism (or somatism - as I identify all objects with bodies and in Greek 'soma' means 'body') proves to be a certain innovation of my organon. It is however, highly debatable as a conception since a number of difficulties inhering in an attempt to interpret reistically theorems of set theory have not yet been overcome." (pp. 3-5)

Notes

(1) Those interested in the system are referred to E. C. Luschei, *The Logical Systems of Leśniewski*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company 1962.

From: Tadeusz Kotarbinski, "Philosophical Self-Portrait", in: Jan Wolenski (ed.), *Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990.

"I feel obliged to begin with an explanation of the term "reism", which I introduced in 1929 into my book on gnosiology, logic, and methodology. Although the book, which had its revised second edition in 1961, also appeared in English in 1966 as Gnosiology, the Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, I have no reasons to believe that the term in question is well known to my colleagues philosophers outside Poland. As I know that it has already caused misunderstandings, by being identified with the term "realism", which is completely at variance with my intentions, I have been trying for a couple of years to replace it by the term "concretism", to which I impart the same meaning. But what that meaning is ? Whom do I intend to call a reist or a concretist ? Here is my reply which I make as concise as possible. He, and only he, is a reist, or concretist, who goes to the utmost in putting into effect the following intention: for every declarative sentence (statement) that includes abstract terms he tries to find an equisignificant statement including no such terms. By abstract terms I mean here all those which are not concrete, and by concrete I mean all, and only those, terms which are names of things. Thus, the name of a thing is a proper name of a single individual that is a thing, for instance "Vesuvius", or a description that has only one designatum, e.g., "the volcano near Naples", or a general term that has more than one designatum, but on the condition that each of them is a thing, e.g., "a stone", "an overcoat", or a term that has no designatum but has such a meaning that its analytic definition could be: "N is such and such a thing"; for instance, the term "Pegasus" could be defined as "Pegasus is a winged horse". I do not hesitate to give this example, since by a thing I mean any physical body, living organisms included (which automatically includes human beings), or a totality consisting of physical bodies, or any component part of a physical body, or any micro-physical particle or any totality consisting of such particles. Thus it is obvious that reism, or concretism, is a variation of nominalism. The explanations to follow will show in what it differs from its other better known forms. But even now, on the strength of what has been said so far, it can be seen that we have to do here with an ontological approach, and that this approach is physical in nature or, to use a slightly different terminology, materialistic. And

perhaps the most pertinent formulation would be to use the term "somatism" in order to bring out the predilection, inherent in reism, i.e., concretism, to single out and to describe bodies: in Greek "soma" means "a (physical) body". I would not feel surprised if some one expressed his astonishment at the fact that a person has come upon the idea of engaging in analyses concerned with a description of reism. In statements and theorems belonging to the various disciplines reference is made incessantly to abstract ideas by means of abstract terms, and people are inclined to believe that this belongs to the very essence of scholarship. Those statements and theorems abound in such terms as property, relation, dependence, point, number, function, etc. Can we do without them without at the same time renouncing the pursuit of scientific activity ? And if so, what induces reasonable people to reformulate statements including abstract terms as equivalent statements devoid of such abstract terms ? Several fairly weighty arguments can be adduced in favour of such a programme. First of all, it seems almost natural to resort to such a reformulation in those simple cases when a statement comprising an abstract term proves to be a metaphorical paraphrase, which can be comprehended only indirectly, of a directly comprehensible statement free from an abstract term. If we say that "the diamond has the property of extraordinary hardness", does it not mean just that "the diamond is extraordinarily hard" ? We have here successfully eliminated the terms "property" and "hardness". The former has disappeared completely, and the latter has been replaced by the term "hard". But whereas "hardness" is an abstract term, "hard" is a concrete term since it names things: it is certain things, including the diamonds, that are hard, and not the properties. Likewise, if we have the statement "the goat belongs to the class of horned ruminants", we are right in interpreting it as a learned equivalent of the simpler formulation, devoid of abstract terms, which is "the goat is a horned ruminant". In this way we have smoothly eliminated the abstract term "class". The same term can also be eliminated from the statement "the class of joiners is included in the class of artisans" if we say simply "every joiner is an artisan". But there is one reason more why we accept the reistic programme, namely the very reflection on the essence of

cognition as expressed by declarative sentences (statements). What is human' knowledge, if not a continuation of animal knowledge, improved by the use of language ? And does not animal knowledge reduce to responding perceptively to stimuli in forms of things? We, human beings, also respond perceptively to things, and all our knowledge possibly is nothing else but an intricate structure of fragments of ourselves as beings that respond perceptively to stimuli in the form of things, with the only essential difference in comparison with the animals that in our case the world of the stimuli is accompanied by language signs shaped not only phylogenetically, but mostly historically, by an imitative transmission of language signs that had developed in human communities. But it seems obvious that when we perceive something we always respond to a stimulus in the form of a thing: a thing struck or moved in some way acts on our ears by air waves which result from the fact that the said thing had been struck or moved, and then we hear somehow. It is likewise in other cases, with the difference that it is a vibrating electromagnetic field, and not vibrating air, that is the intermediary between the stimulus, which is the thing perceived, and the eye. Then we see somehow. This applies to all sensory perceptions (introspective perceptions will be discussed later); the simplest case is that of tactile perception, when a stimulus in the form of a thing directly presses the receptor organs of the perceiving individual. From the empirical standpoint adopted here, a standpoint suggested by man's situation in nature and in history, the tentative reduction of all statements to those which do not include abstract terms become a tentative satisfaction of an urge which reaches very far, but is not devoid of rational justification." (pp. 441-443)

From: Tadeusz Kotarbinski, "Reism: Issues and Prospects", *Logique et Analyse*, 11, 1968, pp. 441-458.

THE "CONCRETISM" OF KOTARBINSKI

"In an autobiographical remark, Kotarbinski himself defined 'three ideas which constituted his contribution to philosophy: concretism (both ontological and semantical), praxiology or general theory of efficient action, and the ideal of reliable friend as the guiding rule in ethics. I shall now proceed to discuss them in more detail.

Concretism was first conceived as an ontological doctrine. It was originally meant to be an answer to the problem of reduction of Aristotelian categories. The solution advocated by Kotarbinski is probably the most radical. He maintains that all the categories can be reduced to just one: that of things. The first formulation of this thesis appeared in Kotarbinski's fundamental work, *Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge* (1929, English translation: Pergamon Press, 1966). It runs as follows.

> That reduction (of Aristotelian categories -- K. S.) completed, it turns out that there remains only that category of objects -- that is, there are no objects other than things, in other words, every object is a thing, whatever exists is a thing. When metaphorical, abbreviated, picturesque, in a word, substitutive, formulations are eliminated and replaced by the basic formulations, interpreted literally, the latter will include no phrases which would appear to be names of something other than things. They will be statements about things only. But it must be emphasized here that by things we do not mean only inorganic solids. Things are inorganic and organic, inanimate and animate, and "endowed with psychic life" -- that is, they are both things in the narrower sense of the word, and persons, too. So much for the reduction of categories of objects to the category of things. The stand taken here by those In favour of such a reduction might be called *reism*.
>
> The name 'reism' was intended to stress the unique position of the category of things; it was later replaced by 'concretism' or 'pansomatism', the last word indicating that the concrete objects are bodies, i. e. are of a physical, not spiritual, nature.

Even this first formulation reveals two non-equivalent variants of the thesis of concretism. One of them is a statement about the world. The fundamental philosophical question "What exists?" is answered by: "Things and only things". The other deals with language; it says that all statements made in a descriptive language are reducible to such sentences which refer directly to things alone, i.e. that the only names they contain are individual and general names of things.

The evolution of concretism consisted mainly in replacing the ontological thesis by the semantical one and in substantial weakening of the latter: the statement about has been transformed into a prescription for its users; a doctrine became a programme.

The ontological variant has been put in abeyance (which does not mean rejected) mainly because of certain difficulties involved in attempts to find a consistent formulation for it. Briefly speaking, the point was that statements denying existence of properties, relations, etc., and ascribing it to things alone; violated concretistic criteria of meaningfulness. They contain, in the subject-place, some expressions that are not names of things ('property', 'relation', etc.), which is inadmissible in a concretist's language, provided the sentences are to be interpreted literally. The thesis to the effect that whatever exists, is a thing, remains true; but trivially true, since it results from a decision concerning language. According to this decision, we must construct the language in such a way that literally interpreted sentences should admit, as substitution instances of individual and predicate variables, only names of things.

Two questions immediately arise: Is the programme of semantical concretism workable ? If it is, why should we adopt it ?

The first question amounts to asking whether it is possible to impose the above mentioned restriction upon the descriptive language, without impairing the sense of what is said: Or to put it another way, are the statements of science reducible, in principle, to concretistic formulations?

There is, so far, no definite answer. Two serious difficulties have, however, been pointed out since the time concretism was born.

Kotarbinski admitted their seriousness while expressing the hope that they will in time be overcome.
The first difficulty originates in mathematics. In the language of mathematics, the fundamental role is played by the concept of class or set. Now it seems doubtful that this concept can be given concretistic interpretation.
A set of material objects can, of course, be regarded as a thing, viz. material aggregate of its elements (which, in this case, are more properly called its parts). Stanislaw Leśniewski (1886-1939) was among the first to develop this idea; theory of sets so interpreted was called by him mereology.
Leśniewski's thought had a deep influence on Kotarbinski and there is hardly any doubt that, during the initial phase of concretism, he saw in mereology a support of the idea that abstract entities can be dispensed with.
The difficulty that appeared later on consists in the fact that sets in mereological sense of the word have no fixed cardinality. The number of parts in such a set depends on the way the parts are defined: As W. V. O. Quine pointed out in his well known essay “Logic and the Reification. of Universals”, the same heap of stones can be said to consist of, say, a hundred stones and of trillions of molecules. In mathematics, however, the number of elements in a set must be an absolute property of that set; two sets having different members cannot be identical. It follows that sets, as they are understood in mathematics, are abstract.
Kotarbinski was, of course, well aware of this difficulty. He expressed the hope that sets in the abstract, non-mereological sense of the word could, in principle, be eliminated from mathematics by a suitable translation of sentences which ostensibly refer to them. Since the rules of such a translation have, so far, not been found, Kotarbinski's latest standpoints was to suspend judgment as to the (theoretical) possibility of practicing semantical concretism in an absolutely rigorous way.
An additional reason was provided by modern physical theory which throws some doubts on the concept of thing as "an object located in time and space and having certain physical characteristics". This concept is modelled on our perception of objects from the macroworld. Is it, however, compatible with the conceptual apparatus of contemporary physics? Does it; for

instance, apply to electromagnetic field? Or to a wave? Or to a meson?

Kotarbinski himself considered this objection less serious than the previous one, based on the concept of set. His reply was that is was up to the physicist to provide a satisfactory explication of concepts that, so far, remain somewhat enigmatic and susceptible to various interpretations. Until this happens, attempts to translate statements in physics into concretistic language must be postponed.

But why should there be such attempts at all? What is the reason for accepting the postulate of semantical concretism? Obviously, belief in ontological concretism would constitute a sufficient justification. If one believes that there is nothing but concrete things (which, according to somatistic interpretation, are bodies) then to refer to objects of other kinds, in particular to abstracts, in such a way as if they really existed, is to indulge in fiction. What, however, if such belief is suspended?

Kotarbinski's answer is that to accept the programme of semantical concretism would be a sound policy for someone who adopts a less restrictive ontology. The point is that concretistic attitude in discourse is the most radical weapon against uncritical speculation, against *idola fori* Francis Bacon complained of. It acts like Occam's razor, sharpened to the extreme.

To avoid possible misunderstandings, let me stress that what Kotarbinski had in mind was not the actual elimination of abstract names from the discourse (which would result in long and cumbersome circumlocutions) but eliminability in principle. This, in itself, would be a sufficient condition for genuine understanding in verbal communication. As Kotarbinski himself pointed out, the idea goes as far back as Leibniz's *New Essays on Human Understanding* (Book II, Ch. XXIII, 1). It was Leibniz who said that "most intricate speculations, (of scholastics -- K. S.) fall at one blow if we will banish abstract entities and resolve not to speak ordinarily except by concretes, and not to admit any other terms in the demonstrations but those which represent substantial entities".

This philosophical attitude was in harmony with the spirit of the time. Logical empiricism was then the most influential trend in philosophy, while Polish philosophical thought was dominated by

the school founded by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) whose ideas were very similar. He advocated the necessity of a critical reappraisal of the classical problems of philosophy, with the intention of dismissing those which would not conform to rather rigorous standards. Kotarbinski was one of the most prominent members of this school and semantical concretism is his answer to the question, how to reform the language of philosophy and, more generally, of the humanities.
Viewed in this light, concretism is an attempt to draw a demarcation line between genuine statements and such utterances which only apparently can be qualified in terms of truth and falsehood. It is somewhat paradoxical that the possibility of a consistent realization of concretistic programme has been called in question by results of analysis of the language of mathematics and physics, sciences of the highest rigour. After all, it is not those sciences that are in urgent need of a criterion which would enable them to get rid of some more or less evident nonsense. And yet, owing to a veto put by those sciences (to be, annulated in future?), the original version of concretism, attractive because of its radicalism, has been abandoned. What remained, was a prescription to use expressions translatable into concretistic language, whenever possible." (pp. 25-28)

From: Klemens Szaniawski, "Philosophical ideas of Tadeusz Kotarbinski", *Reports on Philosophy*, 8, 1984, pp. 25-32.

Preassumpted Theories:

1. Calculus of Prepositions;
2. Lesniewski's Calculus of Names with the only Axiom:

(1) $\Pi a,b{:}(a\ \varepsilon\ b)\equiv\Sigma c(c\ \varepsilon\ a)\wedge\Pi c,d[(c\ \varepsilon\ a)\wedge(d\ \varepsilon\ a)\rightarrow(c\ \varepsilon\ d)]\wedge\Pi c[(c\ \varepsilon\ a)\rightarrow(c\ \varepsilon\ b)]$

Primitive Terms:

a) 'spatial' - '*Space*(*x*)';
b) 'temporal' - '*Time*(*x*)';
c) 'sensual' - '*Sense*(*x*).

Theses of Reism as Axioms:

(2) $\Sigma a,b{:}\ (a\ \varepsilon\ b)$;
(3) $\Pi a,b{:}\ ((a\ \varepsilon\ b)\rightarrow\{\{[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}\vee[a\ \varepsilon\ Sense(x)]\})$;
(4) $\Pi a{:}\ \{[a\ \varepsilon\ Sense(x)]\rightarrow\{[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}\}$.

Definitions of Reism:

(5) $\Pi a{:}[\mathbf{ob}(a)\equiv\Sigma b\ (a\ \varepsilon\ b)]$;
(6) $\Pi a{:}[\boldsymbol{res}_1(a)\equiv\Sigma b\ (a\varepsilon\ b)]$;
(7) $\Pi a{:}(\boldsymbol{res}_2(a)\equiv\mathbf{ob}(a)\wedge\{\{[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}\vee[a\ \varepsilon\ Sense(x)]\})$;
(8) $\Pi a{:}\{\boldsymbol{res}_3(a)\equiv[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}$

Theses of Reism following from Definitions and Axioms:

(9) $\Sigma a{:}\ \mathbf{ob}(a)$ (what follows from (2) and (5));
(10) $\Pi a{:}[\mathbf{ob}(a)\rightarrow\boldsymbol{res}_1(a)]$ (...from (5) and (6));
(11) $\Pi a{:}[\mathbf{ob}(a)\rightarrow\boldsymbol{res}_2(a)]$ (...from (3) and (7));
(12) $\Pi a,b{:}\{(a\ \varepsilon\ b)\rightarrow[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}$ (...from (3) and (4));
(13) $\Pi a{:}\{\mathbf{ob}(a)\rightarrow[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}$ (...from (3),(4) and (5));
(14) $\Pi a{:}[\mathbf{ob}(a)\rightarrow\boldsymbol{res}_3(a)]$ (...from (13) and (8));
(15) $\Pi a{:}(\mathbf{ob}(a)\equiv\{\{[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\}\vee[a\ \varepsilon\ Sense(x)]\})$ (...from (3) and (5));
(16) $\Pi a{:}(\mathbf{ob}(a)\equiv\{[a\ \varepsilon\ Space(x)]\wedge[a\ \varepsilon\ Time(x)]\})$ (...from (3),(4) and (5));

On the Basis of: **Cz. Lejewski, *On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbiński's Pansomatism* (published in: Weingartner/Morscher, eds., *Ontologie und Logik*, Dunker&Humblot, Berlin 1979).**

Kotarbinski, *Ontological Reism*, by: Mariusz Grygianiec, Institute of Philosophy, Warsaw University, Poland.

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   "This monograph answers the question concerning the philosophical outlook and the intellectual heritage of the Polish thinker Tadeusz Kotarbinski.Kotarbinski called his own system praxiology. This book has also a wider aim, namely, to describe the "phenomenon of Tadeusz Kotarbinski in the Polish philosophy of the twentieth century". The reader can see how the whole intellectual period full of new methodological and philosophical ideas emerges and changes due to the influence of Kotarbinski during those eighty years that have passed since the publication of his first, seminal essays. The Polish methodology of science has been wonderfully fruitful and the same can be said of the methodology of practical endeavors, as Professor Gasparski shows in this book."

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   "Tadeusz Kotarbinski is widely recognized as a major philosopher of the Lvov-Warsaw school. His reism, which is a contribution to semantics and ontology, is still discussed and debated, and his most original creation, praxiology, has grown into an entire research field. However, Kotarbinski's philosophy of science has not received much attention by later commentators. This paper attempts to correct this situation by considering the hypothesis that Kotarbinski succeeded already in 1929 in formulating a position that can be regarded as an early version of scientific realism. Unlike most other "scientific philosophers" before the mid-thirties, he was able to combine ontological realism (by defending a form of physicalism and nominalism) and semantical realism (by defending the classical correspondence theory of truth). He was also a critical epistemological realist. Further, in spite of the instrumentalist flavour of his

reductionist programme in eliminating terms apparently referring to abstract entities, Kotarbinski accepted theories as statements with truth values and theoretical entities as long as they can be understood as physical bodies."

6. Poli, Roberto. 1993. "The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski - Ajdukiewicz - Brentano." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Francesco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

   "Kotarbinski's ontology (called reism) maintains that there are only things. According to this theory, all genuine names refer to things and all the terms that refer to non-things (properties, qualities, events, etc.) are pseudo-names or onomatoids. After the criticisms of Ajdukiewicz, reism turned into a semantic theory stating that onomatoids should be used only in paraphrasable by other expressions containing only terms. I shall try to restate the ontological reading of reism resorting to the theory of substance and accident advanced by Brentano in his last philosophical analysis."

7. Simons, Peter M. 1993. "Nominalism in Poland." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy*, edited by Coniglione, Francesco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 207-231. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

   "The principal defenders of nominalism in Poland were Lesniewski and Kotarbinski. Several senses of nominalism' are distinguished. Lesniewski attacked Twardowski's theory of general objects, rejected set theory, and proposed an ontologically neutral, nominalistically acceptable logic. I examine how this neutrality is to be attained despite higher-order quantificationKotarbinski denied that there is anything except bodies (reism) and attempted to eliminate statements apparently about other things, but reism is inadequate for explaining true predications. Their student Tarski was also a nominalist, but he did not argue for his views in print."

8. Sinisi, Vito. 1964. "Kotarbinski's Theory of Genuine Names." *Theoria* no. 30:80-95.

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    "This is a brief appreciation of the philosophical ideas of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, written on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday. The discussion is limited to his doctrine of Reism, asserting the existence of things only. The evolution of Reism is sketched and some difficulties concerning its tenets are pointed out. Finally, the author stresses the role of Kotarbinski's teaching in the development of philosophy in Poland."

16. ———. 1984. "Philosophical Ideas of Tadeusz Kotarbinski." *Reports on Philosophy* no. 8:25-32.

17. Wolenski, Jan. 1986. "Reism and Lesniewski's Ontology." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 7:167-176.

"This paper examines relations between Reism, the metaphysical theory invented by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and Lesniewski's calculus of names. It is shown that Kotarbinski's interpretation of common nouns as genuine names, i.e., names of things is essentially based on Lesniewski's logical ideas. It is pointed out that Lesniewskian semantics offers better prospects for Nominalism than does semantics of the standard first-order predicate calculus."

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    Preface VII; Notes on Contributors IX; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Philosophical self-portrait 1; Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz: Review-article: T. Kotarbinski's *Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of the Sciences* 7; Alfred Gawronski: Psychologism and the principle of relevance in semantics 23; Peter Geach: Names in Kotarbinski's *Elementy* 31; Andrzej Grzegorczyk: Consistent reism 39; Henryk Hiz: A note about reism 47; Janina Kotarbinska: Puzzles of existence 53; Czeslaw Lejewski: On the dramatic stage in the development of Kotarbinski's pansomatism 69; Marian Przelecki: Semantic reasons for ontological statements: the argumentation of a reist 85; Tadeusz Pszczolowski: Philosophical and methodological foundations of Kotarbinski's praxiology 97; Vito F Sinisi: Kotarbinski's theory of genuine names 107; Vito F Sinisi: Kotarbinski's theory of pseudo-names 119; Barry Smith: On the phases of reism 137; Klemens Szaniawski: Philosophy of the concrete 185; Jan Wolenski: Kotarbinski, many-valued logic, and truth 191; Bogusław Wolniewicz: Concerning reism 199; Ewa Zarnecka-Bialy: The voice of the past in Kotarbinski's writings 205; References 213; Index of names: 225; Index of subjects 229.

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The Ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

INTRODUCTION

This page use the font Lucida Sans Unicode for logical symbols.

"The *Tractatus* comprises four parts, which correspond to stages of its rocky development: the theory of logic (1912-14), the picture theory (1914), the discussion of science and mathematics (1915-17), and the discussion of the mystical (1916-17). The structure of the book is as follows:
Ontology (1-2.063): although the Tractatus is concerned with symbolic representation (*Preface*), it starts with ontology, since the nature of representation, and of what represents (thought/language), is isomorphic with the nature of what is represented (reality).
Depiction (2.1-3.5): having claimed that the world is the totality of facts, the Tractatus proceeds to investigate a subset of that totality, namely pictures, in particular PROPOSITIONS, that is, facts which are capable of representing other facts.
Philosophy (4-4.2): unlike science, philosophy does not consist of propositions, since the logical form shared by language and reality cannot be expressed in meaningful propositions, but shows itself in empirical propositions (see SAYING/SHOWING).
Theory of logic (4.21-5.641, 6.1-6.13): Wittgenstein uses truth-functional operations to explain the construction of molecular propositions out of elementary ones -- thereby providing an account of the GENERAL PROPOSITIONAL FORM -- and to establish that logical propositions are tautologies.
Mathematics (6-6.031, 6.2-6.241): mathematics is also explained as an aspect of the logical operations by which propositions are

derived from each other.
Science (6.3-6.372): science is treated along Hertzian lines as containing a priori elements, the network of our description of the world. Mysticism (6.373-6.522): ETHICAL and AESTHETICAL value is ineffable. Kicking away the ladder (6.53f.): the Tractatus aims to indicate the limits of the sayable, but acknowledges that its own pronouncements are on the far side of the limit. They should be used as a ladder which can be kicked away once climbed. 'Whereof one cannot speck, thereof one must be silent' (7)." (p. 364)

From: Hans-Johann Glock, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell 1996.

FREGE AND WITTGENSTEIN

"For Frege there is some kind of connection between the categories of ontology and the categories of signs. The two primary ontological categories, namely object and function, (39) are in fact linked to the two principal categories of signs, namely saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions. All the different types of objects are linked to saturated expressions and all the types of functions are linked to unsaturated expressions. In what follows we will consider the two main kind of saturated expressions: names and propositions. As we all know, they have both sense and reference. The sense of the name is its *Sinn*, the mode in which reference is given to us, while reference itself, the *Bedeutung*, is the object denoted by the name. As regards propositions, their sense is the *Gedanke*, while their reference is their logical value. It is immediately apparent, therefore, that both categories of signs are articulated into an object (respectively the *Bedeutung* and the logical value) and into the mode whereby this object is presented to us (respectively the *Sinn* and the *Gedanke*). (40) The most debatable aspect of this position concerns propositions.

To understand Frege's account we have to distinguish between 'true' and 'false' as properties (that is as unsaturated expressions) from 'the True' and 'the False' as objects (that is as saturated expressions). When speaking of a logical value as the object referred to by a proposition, we are considering the True and the False as objects and not true and false as properties.
Using a suggestion coming from the last works by Suszko we can distinguish two different kinds of valuation: logical valuation and algebraic valuation. Logical valuations involve what are conventionally called the values of truth and falsity (as unsatured expressions), while those that Suszko termed algebraic valuations assign a referent. (41) By admitting the existence of only two referents, Frege's position collapses logical and algebraic valuations together and thus renders them indistinguishable. (42)
Wittgenstein took up a completely different position, where he rejected –this being the difference whence most of his subsequent distinctions stemmed –what Perzanowski called the principle of semantic homogeneity. According to this principle, the problem of the reference of names and the problem of the reference of propositions are both resolved using similar structures. This is Frege's case, therefore. For Wittgenstein, however, the solution to the nominal reference problem is different from that of the propositional reference problem. For names, the semiotic triangle (name-sense-reference) is reduced by eliminating sense, so that names refer directly to objects and do not require the intermediation of sense. This gives rise to an extremely simple one-to-one correlation. It also means that both names and objects are simple, the one in language the other in reality. By contrast, the simplicity of the name-object semantic relation generates an extremely complex semantic representation for propositions that involves the concepts of 'proposition', 'propositional sign' (preceivable sign of the proposition), 'sense of the proposition' (situation in the logical space connected to the proposition), 'thought' (logical picture of the fact related to the proposition) and 'fact depicted by the proposition'. (43)
It seems, therefore, that there are at least two main different strategies to adopt: if we accept Frege's position that names and propositions are semantically homogeneous entities, we can represent their structures by using the relative semiotic triangles.

In this case the procedure is straightforward, and we encounter no major obstacles as long as we accept the idea that Truth and Falsity are in every respect objects of our ontology. If, instead, we follow Wittgenstein and reject the principle of semantic homogeneity, we are stressing that there is an univocal relationship between name and object. On the basis of this relationship each entity is an atom of its universe (the ontological universe in the case of objects, the universe of signs in the case of names). This absolute simplicity as regards names, however, generates major complexity among propositions.
The problem addressed by Wittgenstein was certainly not a new one. The basic issue was whether it was possible to construct an ontologically neutral language. Before Wittgenstein the problem had exercised several other thinkers: Brentano, for example, particularly during his so-called 'reist phase.' The fundamental theoretical problem was how to use language without being trapped by the symbolic features of language itself." (pp. 19-21)

Notes

(39) Note that function make up a number of other categories (1st level concepts, 2nd level concepts, ..., 1st level dyadic relations, etc.).
(40) I follow Perzanowski's 1993 exposition here. See also Perzanowski 1984 and 1990.
(41) See Suszko 1975.
(42) The principle according to which there are only two referents for propositions I shall call, following Suszko, Frege's axiom. It is interesting to note that the independence of Frege's axiom was demonstrated by Tarski in his doctoral dissertation (1923), where he explicitly compared it with Euclid's Fifth postulate. For a brief treatment see Suszko 1977. If all true propositions denote exactly one and the same entity, this means that the real philosophical position underlying the theory is an absolute monism of facts. Suszko's rejection of Frege's axiom prompted him to elaborate his so-called non-Fregean logic. See Suszko 1975 and the paper by Omyla in this volume. [*Formal ontology of situations*, pp. 173-187]
(43) For details see Perzanowski 1993.

[For the complete bibliographical references, see the pages about Perzanowski, Suszko and Wolniewicz].

From: Roberto Poli, "Res, Ens and Aliquid", in: Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996, pp. 1-26.

POLISH PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT THE ONTOLOGY OF THE TRACTATUS: Bogusław WOLNIEWICZ

"The present set of studies was started long ago in an effort to grasp more clearly the metaphysical system sketched out in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", and to evaluate its implications. The basic tenets of that system are the theses:
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.2 The world splits into facts."
Thesis 1.1 propounds an ontology of facts; thesis 1.2 propounds a variant of it, known as Logical Atomism.
The studies are based on two concepts. One is that of an "elementary situation", intended as an intermediary between Wittgenstein's "*Sachverhalt*" and "*Sachlage*". ("*Sachverhalte*" are those elementary situations which are atomic and "*Sachlagen*" are certain sets of the former.) The other is that of a proposition being "verified" by an elementary situation. It has soon turned out that the key to the former concept is lattice theory; and that the latter has to be characterized via the meta-logical concept of a complete set of propositions. The link between them is the concept of a "realization" (or a "possible world"), generalizing Wittgenstein's "*Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten der Elementarsätze*": realizations are maximal sets of elementary situations, and complete sets of propositions are their images.
In all of the following our point of departure is a universe SE of elementary situations. We consider it at three levels of generality, corresponding to the course our investigations have taken in

time. At the first level the universe SE is a lattice, conditionally distributive and of finite length. (Conditional distributivity means here that the identity x Ù (y Ú z) = (x Ù y) Ú (x Ù z) holds only under the proviso that y Ú z ¹ 1.) At the second it appears as an arbitrary join-semilattice with unit. And at the third one it forms merely a quasi-ordering induced by a closure system." (p. 11)

From: Bogusław Wolniewicz, *Logic and Metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's Ontology of Facts*. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne 1999.

"The Tractatus is a masterpiece of rare power and ravishing beauty. Its content is a profound and highly coherent philosophy of language, based upon a radically new kind of metaphysics: the metaphysics of facts and situations. (Meinong, with his notion of the 'objective' of a proposition, apparently was moving in the same direction. But he never came near asking himself any of the two crucial questions: (1) When, if ever, are the objectives of different propositions identical? (2) What, if any, is the relation of the objective of a compound proposition to the objectives of its components?) Moreover, the *Tractatus* anticipated many of the later developments of logical semantics, especially those commencing around 1950 and connected with its algebraization. The kernel of its message may be put down as follows.
The fundamental problem of the *Tractatus*, as of all philosophy, concerns the relationship of thought and reality. This relationship is mediated by language, and so it may be decomposed into the relative product of two relations: one between thought and language, the other between language and reality. Let us mark the latter by 'φ', the former by 'ψ'.
It has been maintained that according to the Tractatus the projective relation φ between language and reality has to be an isomorphism. This, however, is not borne out by the text. To satisfy the conditions laid down by Wittgenstein it is enough for φ to be a *homomorphism*, and this already makes a lot of a difference. In the first place, we are confronted now with two delicate questions: (1) Which is the direction of that homomorphism: from language to reality, or the other way round? (2) Is it a homomorphism *onto*, or merely one *into*?

Neither of these questions has a trivial answer in the context of the *Tractatus*.
We assume here that the relation φis a homomorphism on the language *L* onto the reality *R*, i.e., that φ: *L* → *R*.. Thus reality is a homomorphic image of language. But language is the totality of propositions, and the reference of meaningful propositions are possible *situations*. Consequently, reality is not the world, but the logical space; i.e., it is not the totality of facts, but the totality of possibilities. Thus language is more capacious than the world, and the number of propositions is greater than even that of situations.
The simplest non-trivial homomorphism of that kind is the well-known Fregean one. Language is mapped under it onto the set of the two classic truth-values, and the corresponding two-element Boolean algebra is then the logical space. Thus for Frege there are just two possible situations: the True and the False. This is so because his only stipulation with regard to the reference of propositions is that *contradictory* propositions cannot have the same reference. In the *Tractatus*, however, it is stipulated further that logically independent propositions cannot have the same reference either. This move is the gist of its logical atomism, transforming the Fregean homomorphism φ *: L* { 1, 0 } into the composition of two other ones: φ' on *L* onto logical space, and φ" on logical space onto the set of truth-values.(1)
The aim of the *Tractatus* was to stake out the boundaries of clear thought:

> Philosophy (...) should trace the unthinkable from within by means of the thinkable. By presenting clearly what may be expressed it will point to the inexpressible. (2)

The positivistically-minded members of the Vienna Circle deemed to recognize in these words their own 'demarcation problem', together with their own hostility towards 'metaphysics' and their cult of 'science'. It was a monumental misunderstanding. To Wittgenstein the metaphysical is indeed the inexpressible, but this is not to mean that it is regarded as some kind of delusion or hoax. On the contrary, the hoax is the idea of a 'scientific philosophy'.

In the *Tractatus* the tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible was to be accomplished at one stroke. Logical space *R* fills the realm of the expressible *E* completely, i.e., we have *E* = *R*. Consequently, the homomorphism φ' is onto the expressible, and what is left, evidently, is only the inexpressible. This grandiose project, however, was soon to encounter grave technical difficulties, and then Wittgenstein simply dropped it. This was rash. Not all the difficulties were quite as insuperable as they might have seemed, and the *Tractatus* left room for manœuvre. It might have been helpful, for instance, to weaken the homomorphism φ' to one into the expressible. Then instead of the one language *L* we could consider a whole series of languages L_0, L_1,;..., and a corresponding series of logical spaces R_0, R_1,.... The realm of the inexpressible would be approximated by the latter 'from within' starting from what is expressible in the language L_0 at hand. Certainly, the series of logical spaces need not be monotonic, and in advance there would be no telling whether what is inexpressible at a given stage L_1 is absolutely or only relatively so. Thus the final tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible would recede to infinity, but for theory this could hardly count as an objection." (pp. 13-15)

Notes

(1) For details cfr. B. Wolniewicz, "A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions", in: Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman (eds.), *Intention and intentionality. Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe.*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979, pp. 165-178.
(2) L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* 4.113-4.114.

From: Bogusław Wolniewicz, *Logic and Metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's Ontology of Facts*. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne 1999.

Part I.
More than once Professor Anscombe has expressed doubt concerning the semantic efficacy of the idea of an 'elementary proposition' as conceived in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself eventually discarded it, together with the whole philosophy of

language of which it had been an essential part. None the less the idea is still with us, and it seems to cover theoretical potentialities yet to be explored. This paper is a tentative move in that direction.

According to Professor Anscombe, Wittgenstein's 'elementary propositions' may be characterized by the following five theses:

(1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.

(2) They are essentially positive.

(3) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.

(4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.

(5) They are concatenations of names, which are absolutely simple signs.

We shall not investigate whether this is an adequate axiomatic for the notion under consideration. We suppose it is. In any case it is possible to modify it in one way or another, and for the resulting notion still to preserve a family resemblance with the original idea. One such modification is sketched out below.

Part II

Let us assume the reference of contingent propositions to be possible situations. This fundamental notion is really an offshoot of the correspondence theory of truth. For let a be any true proposition, and let the line *R* represent all *reality* in Wittgenstein's sense (i.e., the totality of facts) as shown in Fig. 1:



Fig. 1

Being true, a corresponds to reality, but not all reality is relevant to that. Consequently, *R* splits up into the segment *A* referred to by a, and into the vague remainder indifferent to it. Thus *A* represents here the smallest fragment of reality warranting the

truth of a. This is the reference of a, but obviously its truth is warranted also by any fragment *A'* greater than *A*. In that case we shall say: a is verified by *A'*. And any fragment of reality fit to verify a proposition is to be called a situation.
This much is just common sense. The next step, however, is an extremely controversial one, for we expand now the notion of reference so as to cover false propositions as well. Since there are no facts (i.e., real situations), to correspond to them, we postulate to that purpose imaginary ones. Both are possible, and so the totality of facts is embedded in the totality of possibilities. This consists of' all the situations which can be described in the language considered. In a Pickwickian sense we shall still say that a proposition a is verified by a possible situation *A*, but now that only means that if *A* were real, a would be true.
An imaginary situation is a non-being. Hence to admit them as the reference of false propositions is to infringe what Plato had called 'the ban of the great Parmenides' : 'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that non-being is'. (2) In this, however, we follow in the steps of the great Frege, whose minimal semantics for propositions still admits of two situations: (3) the one real (*das Wahre*), the other one imaginary (*das Falsche*). The former corresponds to 'the One' of Parmenides and to the totality of facts' of Wittgenstein; the latter obviously has no counterpart in Parmenides, and no clear-cut counterpart in Wittgenstein." (pp. 165-166)

From: Bogulasw Woloniewicz, "A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions", in: Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman (eds.), *Intention and intentionality. Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe.*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979, pp. 165-178.

ROMAN SUSZKO

"Ludwig Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to build a theory of the epistemological opposition:
Mind (language) - Reality (being)

One may distinguish in the Tractatus the three following components:
1. Ontology, i.e., a theory of being,
2. Syntax, i.e., a theory of the structure of language (mind),
3. Semantics, i.e., a theory of the epistemological relations between linguistic expressions and reality.
I present below the formalized version of Wittgenstein's ontology. The syntax and semantics contained in Tractatus will be not considered here.
Wittgenstein's ontology is general and a formal theory of being. It may be called here shortly: ontology. It concerns (independently of time and space) (*), situations (facts, negative facts, atomic and compound situations) and objects. Thus, the ontology is composed of two parts:
1. s-ontology, i.e., the ontology of situations (*Sachlagen*),
2. o-ontology, i.e., the ontology of objects (*Gegenstände*).
The link between the two parts of ontology consists in the somewhat mysterious concept of a state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) and that of a configuration of objects. The s-ontology is an original theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
It is related in a sense to certain conceptions of G. Frege and to the formalized system of protothetics of St. Leśniewski. The theories of Frege and Leśniewski make use of sentential variables and of operators (e.g. quantifiers) binding them. The s-ontology is also to be formalized by means of sentential variables and corresponding operators binding them.
This is the cause of a certain strangeness of s-ontology and, consequently, of the whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Firstly, most formalized languages of contemporary mathematical logic do not use bound sentential variables. On the other hand, the Tractatus essentially uses natural language and the notions and statements of s-ontology formulated in this language may seem to be produced by hypostatising thinking. Certainly, thinking in natural language is much more appropriate to the o-ontology than to s-ontology. Consequently, mathematical thinking in its historical development up to today is concerned with (abstract) objects and not situations." (p. 8)

Notes

(*) There is an opinion that mereology, a formal theory built by St. Leśniewski, is a suitable basis for the theory of spatiotemporal relations.

From: Roman Suszko, "Ontology in the *Tractatus* of L. Wittgenstein", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 9, 1968, pp. 7-33.

JERZY PERZANOWSKI

"The main aim of my paper is to supply evidence that ontology and semantics of the Tractatus (as well as further philosophical theories which are to be found therein) are much more coherent and interconnected than it is usually believed.
2. One evidence comes from the history of Wittgenstein's working on the Tractatus which is now well-known due, mainly, to the efforts of Professors G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Wittgenstein started with the basic question of the philosophy of logic: Why does logic (4) work? The study of this problem led him to questions concerning the nature of language and next to ontological considerations. In Wittgenstein's own words ". . . Yes, my work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world. . . " (*Tractatus* 2.8; *Notebooks 1914-1916* p. 79). The final text of the Tractatus is logically ordered, i.e. from ontology via theory of language to philosophy of logic, which is the reverse of the historical order of Wittgenstein's investigations.
It may be interesting to add that the conversion of the first philosophy of Wittgenstein into the second one may be outlined as passing from basing philosophy of language and philosophy of logic upon ontology to grounding it on pragmatics and/or epistemology.
3. Surely, essential evidence would be more welcome than a historical one. It may come from a careful, point-by-point reading of the Tractatus, with emphasis put on, let's say; the "deductive closure" of it: on the logical connections between particular Tractarian theses, on their consequences, on looking for

arguments and interpretations which eliminate apparent inconsistencies of the Tractatus. For such a method of reading it is really important to solve "puzzles" found in the text. But before discussing several puzzles I wish to present, the most important data concerning the Tractatus ontology should be recalled.
4. The ontological part of the Tractatus occupying its first few pages consists of 49 theses:
1-2063 and concerns 65 notions --from "the world" and "what is the case" in 1 to the "independent" in 2.061 -- introduced with the frequency vrying from 21 uses of one notion (object -- Gegenstand and state of affairs--Sachverhalt) to notions mentioned only once. From the frequency point of view the ontology of the Tractatus is the ontology of objects and states of affairs, but understanding it as the ontology of objects, states of affairs and facts is more common and reasonable.
A very brief account of the Tractatus ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts, facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of objects standing in relations to each other. Objects are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts, situations, the world): What is complex has a structure, i.e. the way objects hang together in the item and the stuff (or substance), i.e. a collection of objects included in the item: The object is the item which is constant; fixed and necessary, whereas the configuration of objects (complex item!) is the item which is changeable and contingent. Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of objects entering into a given configuration, by their nature. Let me recall 2.012: In logic nothing is accidental, if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself." (p. 224-225)
(...)
"10. Now let me pass to the most discussed question of the Tractatus ontology: What are Tractarian objects? Universals? Particulars? Objects of acquaintance? Colours? Geometrical points? and so on.
Many authors, basing their opinion on very few examples, and rather cryptic Tractarian, comments, try to state a general view on Tractatus objects. This seems to be rather hopeless, mainly because the ontology of the Tractatus is indeed a purely "logical"

construction, what, according to Wittgenstein's opinion from the time of Tractatus' writing (12), relieve him from a duty to decide a purely empirical question--whether this thing or that is a simple thing or a complex thing.

Therefore, I do not look for concrete examples of objects and I won't hazard establishing a general view on Tractarian objects. Instead, I should like to write a few words of warning, listed in five points below.

(i) Tractarian objects are simples, items which are opposed to complex ones. These two notions: simple--complex are conjugate. Hence any theory of objects must at the same time be a theory of complexes, and any family of concrete objects generates a family of connected complexes. To say which items are objects means to solve the analogous question for complexes.

(ii) The opposition "simple-complex" is relative to a given analysis (See *Notebooks 1914-1916*), i.e. to a given language of analysis and to some methods of decomposition. Hence, any fruitful discussion of this opposition has to start with description of the language of analysis, particularly with, delimitation and classification of its names, and with indicating the methods of analysis. Let me recall that no language of analysis is described in the Tractatus in a satisfactory way!

(iii) By choosing appropriate language and method(s) of analysis we, in fact, determine its results. This two-parameter relativeness is the most important facet we should take into account when discussing the problem of objects. Several options, all of them in accordance with Tractatus ontology, are left open therein.

(iv) Particularly, taking appropriate "part-whole" methods of analysis (and, of course, an appropriate language) we obtain a very popular option that objects are individuals (or atoms), whereas complexes are some--combinatorial or mereological, etc.--combinations of atoms.

However, if we use method of logical analysis, i.e. when we ask which names of a given language are undefinable, we conclude that category of simples consists of, on the one hand,
all names ostensibly defined (i.e. by indication of examples. as for instance colours), and, on the other hand, the most general notions of the language (i.e. universals), which --according to the classical theory of definition -- are undefinable. To indicate

complexes is much more difficult task in the case considered. For instance, some of them must be items equivalent to combinations of universals, f.ex. individuals if we accept the "bundle" theory of individuals (an individual is equivalent to the bundle of all its properties!).

Of course, choosing appropriate language and methods we may obtain also the phenomenalistic option: objects are Russellian objects of acquaintance (sense data). In this case complexes would be like Machian bundles of sensations.

All these conceptions, if only in accordance with Tractatus main claims, are only particularizations of more general Tractatus ontology; they are rather metaphysical than ontological theories.

(v) Bearing in mind how heavily Tractarian ontology depends on objects, esp. on their internal properties, we must, in any option, answer carefully not only what complexes are, but also we should decide what their internal properties are. This important question is very frequently overlooked, perhaps because it is not possible to discuss this question in the original language of analysis. For such a discussion we must introduce a stronger (meta-) language!

11. To sum up, according to the outlined interpretation the *Tractatus* ontology is, very modal indeed. Not only because many fundamental notions are modal ones, including the notion of "form" which, as I try to show, is the central notion of the *Tractatus* ontology; but also because the Tractatus ontological machinery works according to rules taking into account both what is done and what can be done--all what is possible (remember--the logical space!). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the crux of the interpretation lies not exactly in emphasizing the role played by "form" in the T *ractatus* (What was observed previously by several observant authors), but in its explication (II) with subsequent comments which makes clear how heavily Tractarian ontology is based on objects, esp. on their internal properties (*) -- much more heavily than it is usually recognized.

Is my interpretation right? I am offering the following four arguments to support it:

FIRST, I was trying to be so close to Wittgenstein's own words as possible;

SECOND, The interpretation solves in the uniform way several notorious puzzles of the *Tractatus*;
THIRD, It gives insights into the coherent construction of the main body of the Tractatus, particularly--through the outlined ontological solutions to the semantical puzzles discussed previously--into the way in which Tractarian semantics is based on ontology.
Let me also recall--and this is meant to be an addition to all three first arguments--Wittgenstein's well-known dissatisfaction with early interpretations of the *Tractatus*, which later on have become standard. The *Tractatus* ontology seems to be much more close to continental tradition of objects' ontology than it was recognized i.e. by B. Russell and F. Ramsey.
And--last but not least--
FOURTH, When we compare the text of the *Tractatus* with the text of the *Prototractatus* we note that Wittgenstein's amendments are, in fact, responsible for the second and the third puzzle. Namely, both 2.033 as well as the theses defining (in the spirit of 2.033) the form of objects, and--in the course--the second definition of the form of representation are not to be found in the *Prototractatus*, all of them were introduced into the text in the last period of Wittgenstein's working on the Tractatus. I don't believe that Wittgenstein's intention was to spoil the *Tractatus*, on the contrary--I do believe--that he introduced these amendments to point out the intended meaning of the text." (pp. 229-230)

Notes

(*) Both Wittgenstein's terminology (internal--external) and his claims about the nature of objects, particularly 2.012-2.0141, confronts us with the following questions: Either the structure of a given configuration consists only of one relation or it may be factorized into relations: Such "structure" relation, in turn, is determined by the nature of objects (i.e. internal properties) standing in it. The relations of a given structure, using the terminology of F. H. Bradley as presented in B. Russell *My philosophical development* (1959), are internal relations. Hence any relation is the internal one (the axiom of internal relations),

provided, that to be a relation is to be a relation in some structure. However, in Russell's opinion the axiom of internal relations implies monism, whereas Tractarian ontology is a pluralistic one. Therefore, the problem of connections between monism and the axiom of internal relations should be reexamined." (pp. 229-230)"

From: "Some Ontological and Semantical Puzzles of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*", in: Rudolf Haller (ed.), *Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg am Wessel (Österreich)*, Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1984, pp. 224-230.

"*Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology*. 1. Surely the above title is rather dark. Therefore, let me start with a few words of clarification. "Post-Tractatus" means either after "Tractatus" or a natural prolongation of the books' sequence: "Proto-Tractatus", "Tractatus",... . Hence the title of this paper means either the task of developing ontology built up after "Tractatus" clues, by taking its claims and lesson seriously, or clarification of the "Tractatus" text, by explaining notions and providing its claims with well-grounded arguments, trying thus to develop, step by step, a more advanced and better argumented version of Wittgenstein's treatise. As regards Tractarian ontology realizations of the first task are still rather rare. Instead, most of investigators try to adapt ontology of the "Tractatus" to more common and advanced frameworks, looking for its reconstruction. Quite a lot of people, however, have been involved in realization of the second task (1), producing jointly quite convincing explication of Wittgenstein's text and thus opening a way to the proper post-Tractatus investigations.

(...)

Tractarian Ontology. 3. A brief account of the *Tractatus* ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts. Facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of things (2) connected together, hence standing in relations to each other. Things are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts,

situations, the world). Every complex has a structure, i.e. the way things hang together in the item, and the substance – formed by complex's things, usually treated as the collection of simples included in the item. It also has a form, intermediary between the substance and the structure, defined as the possibility of the structure. As regards things, they have no structure; they have, however, both the substance and the form. The substance of a thing includes the thing itself, whereas the form of a thing is the possibility of its occurring in appropriate states of affairs (complexes). In addition, things are unalterable, subsistent, necessary and stable; whereas complexes are changeable, accidental and unstable. Things constitute the foundation of the (onto)logical space – the space of all possible states of affairs (more generally – complexes or configurations). Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of things entering into a given configuration. Indeed, by 2.012 the possibility of a thing's occurrence in a state of affairs (configuration) must be written into the thing itself.
This formal substance-determination is basic and necessary. It produces (determines) all basic (or atomic) complexes and, further, the rest of complexes. Synthesis of atomic configurations is thereby no accidental, for things are mutually dependent, but, on the contrary, synthesis of non-atomic complexes is, to some extent, accidental, for states of affairs (complexes) are independent of one another (2.061)." (pp. 185-186)

Notes

(1) Let me mention a few: pioneer works of R. Carnap [1934], A. Maslow [1961], G. E. M. Anscombe [1959] and E. Stenius [1960]; books by J. Griffin [1964], B. Wolniewicz [1968], [1985], M. and J. Hintikka [1968], D. Pears [1987]; and the series of papers representing respectively: Warsaw lattice-theoretical approach – R. Suszko [1968a], [1968b], [1975], B. Wolniewicz [1982], [1983], [1985], M. Omyla [1982], [1986]; its Boolean version – G. J. Lockhorst [1988]; set-theoretical approach – J. Czermak [1978], [1979], K. Mudershach [1978] and others; its combinatorial version – B. Skyrms [1981] and D. Armstrong [1986]; mereological approach – P. Simons [1986]; geometrical

interpretation – L. Goddard and B. Judge [1982], etc. Papers dealing with Tractarian modalities should also be mentioned. Most of them look for appropriate modal logics of the "Tractatus", e. g. R. Carnap's [1946], D. Kaplan's [1964], B. Wolniewicz's [1969], [1972], G. H. von Wright's [1972], [1982], N. B. Cocchiarella's [1974], [1975], G. J. Lockhorst's [1988], and mine [1985], [1989]. [Complete references are given in the *Selected Bibliography*.]
(2) From two Wittgenstein's names for simples: things or objects I prefer the former, as the latter by its extreme generality is very useful to denote any item under consideration. Therefore, in combination ontology we change terminology a bit: simple item is called "element", complex - "combination" or still "complex", whereas "object" means both.

From: "Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology", in: Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein. Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Centenary Celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989cKirchberg am Wechsel (Austria)*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990.

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23. Both the Tractarian ontology and its semantics are based on two fundamental oppositions: simple - complex, actual - possible. The first opposition is defined with respect to a given analysis. Notice double relativeness of this opposition - with respect to the language of analysis and its methods.
Actual means: real or existing. Remember that Tractarian possibilities are necessary, whereas facts are contingent.
24. As regards principles, let me note first that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein has accepted Frege's function-paradigm principle. Trying to find solid foundations to logic and language he was using, it seems, at least four additional principles:
The Principle of Grounding, or *Actuality*: What is possible must be, ontologically, grounded on what is real; the realm of possibilities has to be based on the realm of facts, the world. This is a very old and fashionable philosophical rule used explicitely, inter alia, by Leibniz.
The Principle of Uniformity: All possibilities (possible worlds) are ontologically equivalent. In other words, the (onto)logical

space - the space of all possibilities - is uniform in the sense in which in physics we speak about uniformity of the physical space. i.e., no possibility (possible world) is ontologically distinguished; spaces generated seperately by two possible worlds are the same, they are ontologically indistinguishable.
The principle has several applications in the Tractatus, inter alia, direct - in mysterious theses 2.022, 2.023 and 2.025 claiming jointly that any possible world has the same form (=unum formae), probably substance too, as the real one; and indirect - in claim of simple facts' independence.
While the first principle is very Leibnizian in spirit, the last is strongly anti-Leibnizian.
The Principle of Concreteness: A priori (purely formal) components should be eliminated.
The principle expresses an anti-Russellian move of Wittgenstein against Russell's theory of judgements as claiming that any judgement contains an apriori component, its logical form. This move implies that the notion of form should be defined in a way connecting it with ontological concrets - things. And indeed such a definition was provided by Wittgenstein in 2.033.
Once again the principle is very traditional. It motivates, for instance, Leibniz's nominalism or Bradley's critique of relations.
Chance and Necessity Principle: Everything is a fruit of chance and necessity; to be possible is necessary, to exist - contingent.
The principle is stated explicitly in the Tractatus: in thesis 2.012 - In logic nothing is contingent, and in 1.21 - Each item (in the world - J. P.) can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.
It is a very old principle of Democritus, having many occurrences both in philosophy and in science." (pp. 366-367)

From: Jerzy Perzanowski, "What Is Non-Fregean in the Semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Why?", *Axiomathes*, 1993, 4, pp. 357-372.

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Abstract: "Frege's notion of concept – the reference (vs. the sense) of a predicate – is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn examined comparatively, with regard to the conflicts and the alliances taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of truth-function: saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous models. Hints for a way out suggested."
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"Universals such as red are plausible examples of *Tractatus* objects, despite 6.3751. This view is linked to the *Tractatus*' conception of analysis and to its phenomenalism. Facts are composed of universals bound together. The totality of facts forms the solipsistic universe; the universe as it appears. There is no subject to whom it appears; there are only the constituent atomic facts. Appearances change; what was the case is no longer the case. What does not change are the eternally subsisting universals whose changing combinations constitute reality."
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"The problem of the relations between the orders of signification, truth and logical consequence is central to logic. The way in which these relationships are established goes some way towards determining the logical theory to which the writer subscribes. This problem has been a major issue in the history of logic. In this essay, I propose to show that the problem of these relations is present in the course of the historical development of logic, and that there is no one solution to it. My aim is thus not to offer an answer to the question posed, but to highlight the contrast between different solutions, approaching this issue from the standpoint defended by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.2 Nor do I intend to provide a detailed explanation of Wittgenstein's view, but only to outline it and bring out the contrasts with other possible solutions, solutions which predate it by some considerable time." (Notes omitted)
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"Raymond Bradley, in his book *The Nature of All Being*, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are

implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley's interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of *name* and the Kripkean concept of *rigid designator* in *Naming and Necessity*, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning."

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"In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the notion of *Sachverhalt* in the *Tractatus*, with a view to show the complexity of the tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the notions of *Tatsache* and *Sachlage*, and in its relation to the two main theories of the *Tractatus*, the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light on a possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and Husserl's views and I point out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper."
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proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis and the independence thesis which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies."

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36. ———. 1979. "Ein Mengentheoretisches Modell der *Tractatus* Ontologie." In *Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and critical rationalism. Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Berghel, Hal, Hübner, Adolf and Eckehart, Köhler, 162-164. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
37. Daniels, Charles B., and Davison, John. 1973. "Ontology and method in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*." *Noûs* no. 7:233-247.
"Wittgenstein's method is that of showing the categories of being through a perspicuous language that mirrors the world. For Wittgenstein there are two categories of being, the category of objects and the category of facts. These categories are radically disjoint: no object is a fact, no fact an object. n a perspicuous language facts cannot be named and objects cannot be asserted. A perspicuous language has one and only one name for each object and one and only one proposition for each possible (and in addition one not-so-possible) fact. Material properties and generality are shown to be analyzable; formal properties are seen as not expressible. The unity of reality shows in the general form of a proposition that is given in a manner far clearer and much less ambiguous than Wittgenstein's own version. The Tractarian view of logic and mathematics is developed, and questions are raised concerning it that can be seen to occupy Wittgenstein in his later writings."
38. Dayton, Eric. 1976. "*Tractatus* 5.54 - 5.5422." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 6:275-285.
39. Dejnožka, Jan. 1996. *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books.
Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
"While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider

how the thought of all four thinkers bears on the fundamental questions of twentieth century philosophy. This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. The thesis of the book is that there is a general form of ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great philosophers in the Western tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real identities and conceptual (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus in modified realism, there are *some* real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or objectual identities' 'shifting' as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnožka also holds that the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which imply various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,' offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."

40. Elgin, Catherine. 1978. "The impossibility of saying what is shown." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 16:617-627.
41. Favrholdt, David. 1964. *An interpretation and critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
42. Finch, Henry Le Roy. 1971. *Wittgenstein. The early philosophy. An exposition of the Tractatus*. New York: Humanities Press.
43. Fogelin, Robert J. 1976. *Wittgenstein*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    Second revised edition 1987.
44. Frascolla, Pasquale. 2004. "On the nature of *Tractatus* objects." *Dialectica* no. 58:369-382.

"A conjecture on the metaphysical nature of Tractatus objects is put forward and its interpretative adequacy is tested. The clarification of the true import of the metaphor of logical space and the recognition of the theoretical role played by Wittgenstein's explicit claim that the emptiness of logical space is conceivable enable us to account for the thesis that objects are the substance of the world. Once objects are identified with those universal abstract entities which are qualia, and complexes or states of affairs with their concrete instances, some statements of the Tractatus become liable to a consistent reading: that objects are colourless (TLP 2.0232); that space, time and colour are forms of objects (TLP 2.0251); that Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, though still holding for complexes, does not apply to objects (TLP 2.0233). Lastly, it is shown how the interpretation of objects as qualia sheds a vivid light on the theme of the relation between objects and time."
Italian version: *Sulla natura degli oggetti nel Tractatus* - Rivista di estetics. 44, 2004, pp. 61-73.

45. Friedlander, Eli. 2001. *Signs of sense: reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
46. Gale, Richard M. 1976. "Could logical space be empty?" In *Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright*, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 85-104. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
47. García Suárez, Alfonso. 1996. "Are the objects of the *Tractatus* phenomenological objects?" In *Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the history of logic*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 343-355. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
48. Geach, Peter Thomas. 1976. "Saying and showing in Frege and Wittgenstein." In *Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright*, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 54-70. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
49. ———. 1981. "Wittgenstein's operator *N*." *Analysis* no. 41:168-171.

50. Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*. London: Blackwell.
51. ———. 2006. "Truth in the *Tractatus*." *Synthese* no. 148:345-368.
52. Goddard, Leonard, and Judge, Brenda. 1982. *The metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Bundoora (Victoria): Australasian Association of Philosophy.
"The ontology of the *Tractatus*, in terms of which objects are characterized as property-less simples, is coherent provided Wittgenstein is not mistakenly taken to be a constructive atomist building complexes from simples. A geometrical model is given to illustrate this. It is also shown that an ontology like that of the *Tractatus* removes much of the conceptual puzzlement of modern particle physics and has implications for current debates about realism, possible worlds and rigid designators."
53. Granger, Gilles-Gaston. 1968. "Le problème de l'espace logique dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein." *L'Age de la Science*:181-195.
54. Griffin, James Patrick. 1964. *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
55. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1998. "Wittgenstein and the problem of non-existent states of affairs." *Acta Analytica*:139-146.
"The history of philosophy is full of amazing quirks. One of them is the fact that just two basic ontologies have ruled the roost for the last two thousand years, namely, the Platonic system and the Aristotelian system. But it is even more peculiar that neither system contains the category of state of affairs. The main reason for this neglect seems to be a consideration which has plagued philosophy to this day. There can be no such things as states of affairs, because there simply are no states of affairs for false sentences. Russell, influenced by Wittgenstein's criticism, tried to escape from this conclusion with his so-called multiple relation theory of judgment. But he does not succeed. Wittgenstein claimed to have avoided Russell's mistake and to have presented a correct view about the nature of judgment in the Tractatus. But a study of the few references

in the Tractatus to the ontological status of states of affairs represented by false sentences does not show this."
56. Hadot, Pierre. 2004. "Réflexions sur les limites du langage. A propos du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." *Europe* no. 905:12-30.
57. ———. 2004. *Wittgenstein et les limites du langage*. Paris: Vrin.
58. Haller, Rudolf. 1981. "Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy." In *Austrian Philosophy. Studies and Texts*, edited by Nyiri, J.C., 91-112. München: Philosophia Verlag.
59. Hamilton, Kelly Ann. 2002. "Darstellungen in the *Principles of Mechanics* and the *Tractatus*: the representation of objects in relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein." *Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social* no. 10:28-68. "Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the role of objects in our philosophical understanding of the logic of our language is critical for his early philosophy in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. While the important connections between Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics and Wittgenstein's Tractatus have long been recognized, recent work by Jed Buchwald has deepened our knowledge of the importance of the object-orientation of Hertz's scientific work in a manner that should also deepen our understanding of the nature of objects in the Tractatus. I will argue that there are important ontological links, involving "a certain physical scheme, one that had powerful implications for thinking as well as doing," between Hertz's work and Wittgenstein's early philosophy."
60. Hieke, Alexander, and Maier, Maria. 1990. "A formal approach to the ontology and the picture-theory of the *Tractatus*." In *Wittgenstein. Towards a re-evaluation. Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
61. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1969. "Quantification and the picture theory of language." *The Monist* no. 53:204-230.

Reprinted in: Jaakko Hintikka - *Logic, language-games and information. Kantian themes in the philosophy of logic* - Oxford, Clarendon Press
62. Hintikka, Merrill B., and Hintikka, Jaakko. 1986. *Investigating Wittgenstein*. Oxford: Blackwell.
63. Hochberg, Herbert. 1969. "Negation and generality." *Noûs* no. 3:325-343.
Reprinted in: Elmer D. Klemke (ed.) - *Essays on Wittgenstein* - Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971
64. ———. 1971. "Facts, possibilities and essences in the *Tractatus*." In *Essays on Wittgenstein*, edited by Klemke, Elmer D., 485-533. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
65. ———. 1978. *Thought, fact and reference: The origins and ontology of Logical Atomism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
66. ———. 2001. *Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein: the revival of realism*. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
67. Horn, Patrick Rogers. 2005. *Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the unity of language. Reality and discourse without metaphysics*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
68. Hyder, David Jalal. 2002. *The mechanics of meaning. Propositional content and the logical space of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
69. Ishiguro, Hide. 2001. "The so-called Picture Theory: language and the world in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." In *Wittgenstein: a critical reader*, edited by Glock, Hans-Johann, 26-46. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
70. Jacquette, Dale. 2001. "Analysis of Quantifiers in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: A Critical Survey." *Logic Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:191-202.
"In the*Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and cannot be said in any language by the general form of propositions. I explain Wittgenstein's method and discuss Robert J. Fogelin's criticism of what he takes to be the incompleteness of Wittgenstein's general form of propositions in his exposition of the '*Naive Constructivism of the Tractatus*.' [Chapter 6 of: Robert J. Fogelin - *Wittgenstein* pp. 78-85]. I argue that Fogelin's objection is mistaken, and that, contrary to

Fogelin's claim, Wittgenstein's method when properly applied produces all of the well-formed formulas with mixed multiple quantification that Fogelin maintains it cannot provide. I conclude by offering a critical comparison of similar solutions proposed, among others, by P.T. Geach, Scott Soames, and Matthias Varga von Kibéd."

71. ———. 2004. "Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the logic of fiction." In *Wittgenstein and philsophy of literature*, edited by Gibson, John and Huemer, Wolfgang, 305-317. London: Routledge.
"Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* articulates a logic and semantics for all possible languages in which states of affairs (*Sachverhalten, Tatsachen)* as truth-makers are pictured in sentences under analysis. Wittgenstein considers both existent and nonexistent states of affairs as pictured, respectively, by true and false sentences. This raises the question as to whether the *Tractatus* constitutes or provides the formal basis for a logic of fiction. I identify four criteria for a logic of fiction, and argue that the *Tractatus* satisfies only the first three. The remaining criterion has to do with logical analysis of a fictional character's psychology internal narration. These are excluded by Wittgenstein's application of Occam's razor in defense of the general form of proposition in the case of fiction just as they are in nonfictional discourse."
72. Kannisto, Heikki. 1986. *Thoughts and their subject. A study of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica.
73. Kaplan, David. 1964. *Foundations of Intensional Logic*. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis; available at UMI Dissertation Express, reference number: 6408563.
74. Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. 1973. *Wittgenstein*. London: Allen Lane.
Second revised edition: Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
75. Klement, Kevin C. 2004. "Putting form before function: logical grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein." *Philosopher's Imprint* no. 4:1-47.
"The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are

sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered" aspects of the *Tractatus* to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed.
Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and universals, are exposed. Wittgenstein's and Russell's views on logical grammar are shown to be very similar. Russell's type theory does not countenance types of genuine entities nor metaphysical truths that cannot be put into words, contrary to conventional wisdom. I relate this to the debate over "inexpressible truths" in the *Tractatus*. I lastly comment on the changes to Russell's views brought about by Wittgenstein's influence."

76. Klemke, Elmer D., ed. 1971. *Essays on Wittgenstein*. Urbana: University Of Illinois Press.
77. ———. 1971. "The ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*." In *Essays on Wittgenstein*, edited by Klemke, Elmer D., 104-119. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
78. Kluge, Eike Henner. 1973. "Objects as universals: a re-appraisal of the *Tractatus*." *Dialogue* no. 12:64-77.
79. Küng, Guido. 1967. *Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. an enquiry Into the contemporary views on universals*. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company. Translated from German by E. C. M. Mays, and revised by the author]
80. ———. 1983. "The difficulty with the well-formedness of ontological statements." *Topoi* no. 2:111-119.
81. Landini, Gregory. 2009. *Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
82. Latraverse, François. 2002. "Signe, proposition, situation: éléments pour une lecture du *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 56:125-140.
83. Levvis, Gary. 1998. "The so-called (and actual!) Realism of the *Tractatus*." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 54:45-

70.
"David Pears's contention that the *Tractatus* [in: *The false prison* - vol. 1 - Chapter 6: *The basic Realism of the Tractatus*] is to be understood as advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended against McGuinness's view that *Tractatus* 1-2.063 is to be treated just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring into prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does, in fact, provide an argument for the existence of simple objects, (2) what this object is, and (3) what role the existence of simple objects plays within the Picture Theory of the Proposition, Wittgenstein's argument for the existence of simple objects is reconstructed, augmenting Pears's existing account by providing further details of why Wittgenstein held that determinacy of sense requires the existence of simple objects."

84. Lokhorst, Gert-Jan C. 1988. "Ontology, semantics, and philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. A formal reconstruction." *Erkenntnis* no. 29:35-75.
"The paper presents a formal explication of the early Wittgenstein's views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It will be shown that Wittgenstein gave a 'language of thought' analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics will be given."

85. Lombardi, Olimpia Iris. 1999. "¿Qué son los objetos del Tractatus?" *Revista de Filosofia (Spain)* no. 12:55-76.
"In this paper we provide an interpretation of the concept "object", in the context of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. We argue that (1) "objects" are logical entities, the nodes of the logical net which is common to all possible worlds; (2) general words are not "names" and, therefore, "objects" are particulars."

86. Ludwig, Jan. 1976. "'Substance' and 'simple objects' in Tractatus 2.02ff." *Philosophical Studies* no. 29:307-318. Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic and ontology.
87. Marion, Mathieu. 2004. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Introduction au Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
88. Maslow, Alexander. 1961. *A study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
From the Preface: "This study in Wittgenstein *Tractatus* is substantially as it was written in 1933".
Reprinted by Thoemmes Press in 1997.
89. ———. 1961. *A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Berkely: University of California Press.
90. Maury, André. 1977. *The concepts of "Sinn" and "Gegenstand" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
" It is argued that the *Tractatus* notion of propositional sense contains an irreducible modal element. An interpretation of Wittgenstein's early notion of "bipolarity" is given. It is further argued that explicit recognition of the modal element helps us to understand the particular form of the *Tractatus* ontology. Wittgenstein's early views on sense and modality are contrasted with Frege's and Russell's views. Part II is a defense of the view that the *Tractatus* objects include predicates. The argument is backed up by reference to later unpublished writings by Wittgenstein. The development of his views on names and predicates are examined."
91. McDonough, Richard. 1986. *The argument of the Tractatus. Its relevance to contemporary theories of logic, language, mind, and philosophical truth*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
92. McGinn, Marie. 2006. *Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic and language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
93. McGuinness, Brian. 1972. "Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein' "Notes on logic"." *Revue Internationale de*

Philosophie no. 26:440-460.
94. ———. 1981. "The so-called realism of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*." In *Perspectives on the philosophy of Wittgenstein*, edited by Block, I., 60-73. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in: B. F. McGuinness - *Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers* - pp. 82-94.
95. ———. 2002. *Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers*. London: Routledge.
96. McManus, Denis. 2006. *The enchantment of words. Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
97. Milkov, Nikolay. 2001. "Tractarian scaffoldings." *Prima Philosophia* no. 14:399-414.
"Wittgenstein's Tractarian ontology has its historical roots in Russell's programme for constructionalism. There is an essential difference between the constructionalism of Russell and that of Wittgenstein though. Whereas Tractarian ontology is approximately Aristotelian, Russell's logical atomism accepts a Platonic penetration of the autonomous world of logical forms into the autonomous world of facts. Russell's logical constructionalism, more precisely, uses the metaphor of a 'logical skeleton' on which the data of experience are fleshed out. In opposition, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein doesn't speak of a skeleton but introduces the concept of 'logical scaffolding' and also of the 'scaffolding of the world' instead. This terminology reflects a new type of ontology, as well as a new type of logic, radically different from that of Russell. Its most important concepts are that of 'object' and 'state of affairs', both of them used in new, idiosyncratic sense."
98. Miller III, Hugh. 1995. "Tractarian Semantics for Predicate Logic." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 16:197-215.
"It is a little understood fact that the system of formal logic presented in Wittgenstein's' Tractano provides the basis for an alternative general semantics for a predicate calculus that is consistent and coherent. essentially independent of the metaphysics of logical atomism. and philosophieall illuminating in its own right. The purpose of this paper is threefold: to describe the general characteristics of a

Tractarian-style semantics, to defend the 'Fulcrums system against the charge of expressive incompleteness as levelled by Robert Fogelin, and to give a semantics for a formal language that is the Tractarian equivalent of a first-order predicate calculus. Of note in regard to the latter is the fact that a Trachuus-style truth-definition makes no appeal to the technical trick of defining truth in terms of the satisfaction of predicates by infinite sequences of objects, yet is materially equivalent to the usual Tarski-style truth-definitions."

99. Morrison, James C. 1968. *Meaning and truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. The Hague: Mouton.
100. Mounce, Howard O. 1981. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction*. London: Basil Blackwell.
101. ———. 2001. "The logical system of the *Tractatus*." In *Wittgenstein: a critical reader*, edited by Glock, Hans-Johann, 59-93. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
102. Mudersbach, Klaus. 1978. "A tentative axiomatization of the ontology of the *Tractatus*." In *Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Leinfellner, Elisabeth, 159-161. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
103. Müller, Anselm Winfried. 1967. *Ontologie in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Bonn: Bouvier.
104. Newen, Albert. 1991. "Interpretation und Rekonstruktion der Ontologie in Wittgensteins *Tractatus*." *Grazer Philososphiche Studien* no. 41:33-65.
105. Noonan, H.W. 1975. "*Tractatus* 2.0211 - 2.0212." *Analysis* no. 36:147-149.
"The existence of objects as substances. *Tractatus's* relationship to the theory of the proposition in Frege."
106. Nordmann, Alfred. 2005. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
107. Oaklander, Nathan L., and Miracchi, Silvano. 1980. "Russell, negative facts, and ontology." *Philosophy of Science* no. 47:434-455.

"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the ideal language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the ideal language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the ideal language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."

108. Omyla, Mieczyslaw. 1986. *Zarys logiki niefregowskiej (An outline of non-Fregean logic)*. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe.
Book written in Polish.
109. Ostrow, Matthew B. 2002. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A dialectical interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
110. Page, James. 1997. "Unconfigured Tractarian objects." *Philosophical Investigations* no. 20:39-50.
"According to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the world consists of atomic objects arranged in various configurations and the ways the world might be are determined by the ways these objects can be configured. I question whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well. Black and Fogelin are nearly alone in their attention to this issue but reach opposite conclusions. Black asserts, essentially without argument, that atomic objects can be configured, while Fogelin is committed to the view that they cannot. I think Black is right and my aim is to show why."
111. Pears, David Francis. 1970. *Wittgenstein*. New York: Viking Press.

112. ———. 1972. "The ontology of the *Tractatus*." *Teorema*:49-58.
"The article is concerned with the status of the ontology of the *Tractatus*. In it I argue 1) that, although the ontology of the *Tractatus* is a metaphysic of language like Kant's metaphysic of experience, it is supposed to set the standard of objectivity, and to yield the firmest conclusions about reality; 2) that Wittgenstein abandoned this ontology when he abandoned the theory of language from which it had been deduced, because it expressed too narrow a view of the possible forms that language may take. The article is an attempt to establish in what way Wittgenstein's later philosophy is more anthropocentric than his early philosophy."
113. ———. 1977. "The relation between Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositions and Russell's theories of judgement." *The Philosophical Review* no. 86:177-196.
Reprinted in: S. G. Shanker (ed.) - *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assessments - Vol. 1 - From the Notebooks to Philosophical grammar: the construction and dismantling of the Tractatus* (1986) - pp. 92-107.
114. ———. 1987. *The false prison. A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Two volumes.
Contents of the first volume: Abreviations XI; Part I: Introduction 1; 1. Wide-angle view 3; 2. Close-up: the early system 20; 3. Close-up: the late system 34; Part II: Inside the early system 61; 4. Logical Atomism 63; 5. The basic realism of the *Tractatus* 88; 6. Sentences as pictures 115; 7. Solipsism 153; 8. Review and prospect 192; Bibliography 197; Index 201.
115. Perszyk, Kenneth. 1988. "The ontology of the *Tractatus*." *Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* no. 18:39-59.
" Reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as an extended answer to the question "what must the world be like for the symbolic logic developed by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead to apply to it?" helps elucidate the connection between its theory of language and its ontology. My main argument is to show that the ontology is derived from the logic of *Principia*

mathematica taken to its completion. throughout the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein takes a stance on a number of traditional problems in the history of philosophy, and my aim in discussing some of these is to place the *Tractatus* in broader historical perspective."

116. Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1984. "Some ontological and semantical puzzles of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*." In *Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg am Wessel (Österreich)*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, 224-230. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
117. ———. 1985. "Some observations on modal logics and the *Tractatus*." In *Philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology. Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 19th-26th August 1984, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Österreich)*, edited by Roderick, Chisholm, 544-550. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
118. ———. 1989. *Logiki modalne a filozofia*. Krakow: Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego.
119. ———. 1990. "Towards post-Tractatus ontology." In *Wittgenstein. Towards a re-evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes, 185-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
120. ———. 1992. "Ce qu'il y a de non Fregéen dans la sémantique du Tractatus de Wittgenstein et pourquoi?" In *Wittgenstein et la philosophie aujourd'hui: Journées internationales Créteil-Paris, 16-21 juin 1989 à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)*, edited by Sebestik, Jan and Soulez, Antonia, 163-177. Paris: Klincksieck.
Translated in English as: *What is non-Fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and why?* - Axiomathes, 1993, 4, pp. 357-372.
121. Piana, Giovanni. 1973. *Interpretazione del Tractatus di Wittgenstein*. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
122. Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and not-being in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Plato's *Sophist*." *Kant Studien*

no. 70:179-196.
123. Plochmann, George Kimball, and Lawson, Jack B. 1962. *Terms in their propositional contexts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An index*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
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"First Analogy" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely, the concept of some stuff that exists at all times and such that all existence changes are alterations of it. Tractarian substance is the
modal analogue of Kantian substance. It is that which "endures," not literally through time, but figuratively through a "space" of possible worlds. To argue for substance is therefore to argue for necessary existents. From this starting point, a detailed reconstruction of the argument for substance is developed and its coherence (if not soundness) defended."
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"The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of the Tractatus is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic doctrines: the tractarian world is the world as it appears in language and thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the Tractatus can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we interact with reality."

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"This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the *Tractatus*. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analyzable."
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"In this paper I will try to show the following two things. First, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* semantically exiges that Tractarian objects be conceived of as possibilia in the sense of Russell (1903), namely as objects that may exist as well not exist. Second, the *Tractatus's* general ontological framework suggests to integrate this onto-semantical conception with a view of such objects not as *qualia* but rather as *sensibilia* in the sense of Russell (1914), namely as *possible* sense-data."
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"A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only."
Contents:
0. Preliminaries;
1. Elementary Situations
1.1.The Axioms; 1.2.Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4.States of Affairs;
2. Sets of Elementary Situations
2.1.The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2.The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets; 2.3.Q-Spaces and V-Sets; 2.4.V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4.V-Classes and V-Sets;
3. Objectives of Propositions
3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of Compound Propositions 3.5. The Boolean Algebra of Situations;
4. References
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"The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations" (Studia Logica, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations.
Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the

relation of that theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry and Barwise is discussed."

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Contents: Preface 11; Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy 13; 1. Elementary situations as a lattice of finite length 19; Elementary situations as a semilattice 73; 3. Independence 127; 4. Elementary situations generalized 137; 5. Auxiliary studies 193; 5.1 The Logical Atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein 193; 5.2 A parallelism between Wittgenstein and Aristotle 198; 5.3 Frege's semantics 207; 5.4. The notion of fact as a modal operator 218; 5.5 "Tractatus" 5.541 - 5.542 224; 5.6 History of the concept of a Situation 229; 6. Offshoots 243 6.1 Languages and codes 243; 6.2 Logic and hermeneutics 254; 6.3 Kotarbinski's Reism 265; 6.4 On Bayle's critique of theodicy 271; 6.5 Elzenberg's axiology 286; 6.6 Needs and values 293; 6.7 Suszko: a reminiscence 302; Supplements 307; Indices: Index of subjects 317; Index of names 326; Index of *Tractatus* references 329.

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"In this paper I approach some central problems concerning the Tractarian objects, e.g., the picture theory, the internal and external properties of objects, and the debate whether properties and relations should be included as the Tractarian objects, from a study of configurations of objects. I argue that a detailed study of configurations of objects offers us new insights and helps us reach solutions to some of the important disputes concerning the characteristics of objects, e.g., the dispute whether the Tractarian objects include properties and relations."

Related pages

The Ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

Frege's Ontology: Being, Existence, and Truth

Bertrand Russell's Ontological Development

Roman Suszko and the Non-Fregean Logics

Bogusław Wolniewicz on the Formal Ontology of Situations

Jerzy Perzanowski: Modal Logics, Ontology and Ontologics

Theory and History of Ontology

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Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works Edition)

PRELIMINARY NOTE

In its initial form this section will offer five pages:

1) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the Greek word for Truth (*Aletheia*) as Unconcealment and to the history of his translation in Latin as *Veritas*;

2) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on *Aletheia* and a selection of critical studies;

3) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology;

4) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology and a selection of critical studies;

5) A complete list of Heidegger's German works published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works Edition).

INTRODUCTION

The edition of Heidegger's Collected Works (*Gesamtausgabe*) is published from 1975 by Vittorio Klostrmann, Frankfurt am Main; this is an updated list of the published volumes.

Abbreviations: SS = Summer semester (from May to July); WS = Winter semester (from November to February); n. p. = not yet published.

The first date is that of composition; the date of publication in the *Gesamtausgabe* is in square brackets.

I. Published writings 1910-1976

1. Frühe Schriften (1912-16) [1978]

2. Sein und Zeit (1927) [1977]

3. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929) [1991]

4. Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1936-1968) [1981]

5. Holzwege (1935-1946) [1977]

6.1 Nietzsche 1 (1936-1939) [1996]

6.2 Nietzsche 2 (1939-1946) [1997]

7. Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-1953) [2000]

8. Was heisst Denken? (1951-1952) [2002]

9. Wegmarken (1919-1958) [1976]

10. Der Satz vom Grund (1955-1956) [1997]

11. Identität und Differenz (1955-1957) [2006]

12. Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959) [1985]

13. Aus der Erfahrung Denkens (1910-1976) [1983]

14.Zur Sache Denkens (1962-1964) [2007]

15. Seminare (1951-1973): Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink: Heraklit - Vier Seminare - Anhang: Züricher Seminar [1986]

16. Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910-1976) [2000]

II. Lectures (1923-1944)

a) Marburg Lectures (1923-1928)

17. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (WS 1923-1924) [1994]

18. Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen philosophie (SS 1924) [2002]

19. Platon: Sophistes (WS 1924-1925) [1992]

20. Prolegomena zur Geschichte Zeitbegriffs (SS 1925) [1979]

21. Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (WS 1925-1926) [1976]

22. Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (SS 1926) [1993]

23. Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant (WS 1926-1927) [2006]

24. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (SS 1927) [1975]

25. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (WS 1927-1928) [1977]

26. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (SS 1928) [1978]

b) Freiburg Lectures (1928-1944)

27. Einleitung in die Philosophie (WS 1928-1929) [1996]

28. Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (SS 1929) [1997]

29/30. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit (WS 1929-1930) [1983]

31. Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (SS 1930) [1982]

32. Hegels Phänomenologie Geistes (WS 1930-1931) [1980]

33. Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX 1-3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (SS 1931) [1981]

34. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet (WS 1931-1932) [1988]

35. Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) (SS 1932) [2012]

36/37. Sein und Wahrheit. 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie (SS 1933). 2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (WS 1933-1934) [2001]

38. Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (SS 1934) [1998]

39. Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (WS 1934-1935) [1980]

40. Einführung in die Metaphysik. (SS 1935) [1983]

41. Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen (WS 1935) [1984]

42. Schelling: Vom das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (SS 1936) [1988]

43. Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (WS 1936-1937) [1985]

44. Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken. Die ewige Wiederkehr Gleichen (SS 1937) [1986]

45. Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik" (WS 1937-1938) [1984]

46. Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches. II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil Historie für das Leben" (WS 1938-1939) [2003]

47. Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis (SS 1939) [1989]

48. Nietzsche. Der Europäische Nihilismus (1940) [1986]

49. Die Metaphysik deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (1809) (1941) [1991]

50. Nietzsches Metaphysik 1. (1941-1942).Einleitung in die Philosophie - Denken und Dichten 2. (WS 1944-1945) [1990]

51.Grundbegriffe (SS 1941) [1981]

52. Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken" (WS 1941-1942) [1982]

53. Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (SS 1942) [1984]

54. Parmenides (WS 1942-1943) [1982]

55. Heraklit. 1. Der Anfang abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit) (1943) 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos (SS 1944) [1979]

c) Early Freiburg Lectures (1919-1923)

56/57. Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. 1. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (post war semester 1919); 2. Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie (SS 1919); 3. Anhang: Über das Wesen der Universität und akademischen Studiums (SS 1919) [1987]

58. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (WS 1919-1920) [1992]

59. Phänomenologie der Anschauung und Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung (SS 1920) Phänomenologie religiösen Lebens [1993]

60. Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion 1. (WS 1920-1921); Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus 2. (SS 1921); Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik 3. (WS 1918-1919) [1995]

61. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (WS 1921-1922) [1985]

62. Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]

63. Ontologie. (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) (SS 1923) [1988]

III. Private monographs and letters

64. Der Begriff der Zeit. (I. Die Fragestellung Diltheys und Yorcks Grundtendenz; II. Die ursprünglichen Seinscharaktere Daseins; III. Dasein und Zeitlichkeit; IV. Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit). im Anhang der gleichnamige Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft Juli 1924. [2004]

65. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) [1989]

66. Besinnung (1938-1939) [1997]

67.Metaphysik und Nihilismus. 1. Die Überwindung der Metaphysik (1938-1939); 2. Das Wesen Nihilismus (1946-1948) [1999]

68. Hegel. 1. Die Negativität. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz in der Negativität (1938-1939); 2. Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie Geistes" (1942) [1993]

69. Die Geschichte Seyns - Die Geschichte Seyns (1938-1940) - Koinon. Aus der Geschichte Seyns (1939) [1998]

70. Über den Anfang (1941) [2005]

71. Das Ereignis (1941-1942) -Vorworte - Der erste Anfang - Der Anklang - Der Unterschied - Die Verwindung - Das Ereignis. Der Wortschatz seines Wesens - Das Ereignis - Das Ereignis und das Menschenwesen - Das Daseyn - Der andere Anfang - Weisungen in das Ereignis - as seynsgeschichtliche Denken (Dichten und Denken) [2009]

72. Die Stege Anfangs (1944) [n. p.]

73. Zum Ereignis-Denken [2013]

74. Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst [2010]

75. Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen [2000]

76. Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik, der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und der modernen Technik [2009]

77. Feldweg-Gespräche. (1944-1945) [1995]

78. Der Spruch Anaximander (1946) [2010]

79. Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge. 1. Einblick in das was ist. Bremer Vorträge (1949) 2. Grundsätze Denkens. Freiburger Vorträge (1957) [1994]

80. Vorträge (1915-1967) [n. p.]

81. Gedachtes [2007]

IV. Notes and recording

82. Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen - Anmerkungen zu "Vom Wesen Grun" (1936) - Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" (1936) -Laufende Anmerkungen zu "Sein und Zeit (1936) [n.p.]

83. Seminare: Platon - Aristoteles - Augustinus [2012]

84. Seminare: Kant - Leibniz - Schiller [2013]

85. Vom Wesen der Sprache. Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung Wortes. Zu Herders Abhandlung "Uber den Ursprung der Sprache" [1999]

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91. Ergänzungen und Denksplitter [n. p.]

92. Ausgewählte Briefe I [n. p.]

93. Ausgewählte Briefe II [n. p.]

94. Überlegungen A [n. p.]

95. Überlegungen B [n. p.]

96. Überlegungen C [n. p.]

97. Anmerkungen A [n. p.]

98. Anmerkungen B [n. p.]

99. Vier Hefte I - Der Feldweg; Vier Hefte II - Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt [n. p.]

100. Vigiliae I, II [n. p.]

101. Winke I, II [n. p.]

102. Vorläufiges I-IV [n. p.]

THE NATORP-BERICHT (REPORT FOR NAPORT)

"In the midst of this linked pair of courses on 'Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle,' in January of 1922, word came from Marburg that Paul Natorp would be retiring shortly, that Nicolai Hartmann would be taking his place, and that as a result the junior position in philosophy would once again be vacant. Natorp had been impressed by Heidegger's book on Duns Scotus and, on the strength of this one publication, had considered Heidegger for this position in both 1917 and 1920. By 1922, Heidegger was renowned in university circles throughout Germany as an outstanding teacher. But he had published nothing since the Scotus book and, moreover, remarks Husserl in a letter to Natorp on February 1, 1922, 'does not want to publish yet,' audibly that this 'highly original personality' is still 'struggling, searching for himself and laboriously shaping his own unique style.' (We have

already noted the 'turmoil of transition' evident in WS 1921-22.) But apparently in response not only to Natorp's interest in Heidegger for the chair at Marburg but also to a similar query from Georg Misch regarding Husserl's old chair at Göttingen, plans were soon initiated for Heidegger to publish a work on 'Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle' in a forthcoming issue of Husserl's Jahrbuch (vol. 7, 1924/1925). Even so, when Natorp wrote Husserl again in late September for at least a 'publishable manuscript' from Heidegger in support of his candidacy for associate professor (Extraordinarius) at Marburg, Heidegger was still struggling with the problem of how to introduce such a work. For the next three weeks, into mid-October, Heidegger labored over the manuscripts of his Aristotle courses in order to extract and distill from them an Introduction serving to found and develop the 'hermeneutic situation' in which Aristotle's texts were to be interpreted. To this Einleitung (28 pages of typescript), he added an Overview (Übersicht: 22 pages) of Part One of the projected book. On the strength of this typescript, essentially a 'private communication' addressed to his older peers at the two universities, Heidegger was appointed to the post at Marburg in the following year."

From: Theodore Kisiel - *The genesis of Being and Time* - Berkeley, University of Califormia Press, 1993 pp. 248-249.

First edition of the manuscript: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation* in: Dilthey-Jahrbruch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 237-274.

New edition: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Fakultät (1922)*, Stuttgart, Reclam, 2003.

First English translation: *Phenomenological interpretations with respect to Aristotle. Indication of the hermeneutical situation* - Preface to and translation by Michael Baur, Man and World 25, 1992, pp. 355-393.

New English translation: *Phenomenological interpretations in connection with Aristotle. An indication of the hermeneutical situation* - in: Martin Heidegger - *Supplements. From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond* - Edited by John van Buren - New York, State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 111-145.

Italian translation: *Interpretazioni fenomenologiche di Aristotele. Prospetto della situazione ermeneutica* - translated by Vincenzo Vitiello e Gian Paolo Cammarota - in: Filosofia e teologia, 4, 1990 pp. 496-532.

French translation: *Interprétations phénoménologiques d'Aristote (Tableau de la situation herméneutique)* - Translated by Jean-Franois Courtine, Mauvezin, TER bilingue, 1992.

Related pages

Martin Heidegger on *Aletheia* (Truth) as Unconcealment

A selected Bibliography on Heidegger's Interpretation of *Aletheia* as Unconcealment

Martin Heidegger on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology

A Selected Bibliography on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology

Theory and History of Ontology

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Martin Heidegger on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology

PRELIMINARY NOTE

In its initial form this section will offer five pages:

1) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the Greek word for Truth (*Aletheia*) as Unconcealment and to the history of his translation in Latin as *Veritas*;

2) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on *Aletheia* and a selection of critical studies;

3) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology;

4) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology and a selection of critical studies;

5) A complete list of Heidegger's German works published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works Edition).

INTRODUCTION

"Heidegger's way of understanding the originary phenomenon of truth is to "make clear the mode of being of the cognition itself." His starting point is a proposition that is not based on intuition. Someone says with his or her back to the wall: this picture hangs askew. The proposition embodies the claim to have discovered the picture (as a being) in the "how" (the mode) of its being. The proposition displays this "how" of being in language. In the attempt to verify the proposition by sensuous experience, the recognition, according to Heidegger, is directed only to the intended being (the picture) and not to the proposition. It is directed to the being itself (which is to be verified by perception) in its mode of uncoveredness (Entdeckt-heir), i.e., in its showing-itself. Confirmation (Bewährung) means this showing-itself of the being in the same way in which it is intended in the proposition. A true proposition shows the being in its mode of uncoveredness. The phenomenon of "originary truth" does not have the character of correspondence. It is the ground of the concept of truth in the sense of correspondence and propositional truth. By unfolding the meaning of alétheia Heidegger shows us a more originary sense of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). He wants to show that this concept coincides with the first and originary concept of truth in Greek thinking. In this primary sense only the discovering human Dasein can be "true" while it is Being-discovering (Entdeckend-Sein). On the other hand, beings (Seiendes) that we can find in the world can only "be" in a secondary mode, i.e., as being-discovered (Entdecktsein). They can only make a claim to uncoveredness. Their fundament is the Being-discovering of the human Dasein. The being-true of a discovered being is only possible as being discovered by human Dasein as being-in-the-world.
The authentic Being of Dasein, the being-in-the truth, presupposes disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the world in states-of-mind (Befindlichkeiten), understanding, and discourse, i.e., the constitution of the being (Seinsverfassung) of human Dasein as thrownness (Geworfenheit) and project (Entwurf). The mode of being of Dasein is characterized equiprimordially (gleichursprünglich) by the possibility of both authenticity (being-in-the-truth) and the deficient mode (Verfallsform) of

inauthenticity. In the mode of the "they" (das Man), of obstruction (Verstelltheit), of gossip (Gerede), Dasein is in untruth. Thus the being-in-the-world of human Dasein is determined at the same time by truth and untruth. We must always fight anew for the truth of Dasein (Being-discovering). Following Heidegger, the negative expression "a-létheia" expresses the fact that hiding itself is a main characteristic of Being. In the hiding-itself of Being, human Dasein is hidden for itself in the mode of untruth.

Heidegger wants to make evident how the transition from the originary concept of truth as alétheia to "correspondence" came about. He wants to make clear that correspondence is only a derived form of truth: in a proposition Being should be displayed in the mode of its uncoveredness. In the inauthentic forms of mere reproducing and hearsay, the proposition becomes itself something ready-to-hand (Zuhandenes). Thus we have to engage in the demonstration of the uncoveredness that is preserved in the proposition. In this way the relation between proposition and discovered being then itself becomes something present-at-hand (Vorhandenes) and can be understood as a correspondence of proposition and being (intellectus and res). The fact that we are used to disregarding the originary dimension of truth is an aspect of our forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit).

The originary dimension of truth in human Dasein "is given" (gibt es) only as long as there is Dasein. All truth is relative to the being of Dasein. Thus the claim that there could be "eternal truth" seems to Heidegger to be "fantastic." Against the background of this relativity of truth to the being of Dasein, Heidegger asks anew: why must we presuppose that truth "is given"? His answer is that the possibility of truth (authenticity) and untruth (inauthenticity) belongs to the facticity of human Dasein. From the point of view of existential ontology, the being of human Dasein (its disclosedness) and truth are synonims." (pp. 711-712)

From: Dieter Lohmar, *Truth*, in: Lester Embree et alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.

HEIDEGGER'S MAIN TEXTS ON THE History OF METAPHYSICS AS ONTOTHEOLOGY

"Ontotheology: Ontologie is the 'study [logos] of beings [onta]', Theologie the 'study of God [theos]'. Heidegger combines these Greek-derived words to form Onto-Theologie or Onto-Theo-Logie. The idea, but not the words, stem from Aristotle, whose 'first philosophy' considers both beings as such and the highest being (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 220 / 150; *Einleitung zu 'Was ist metaphysik?'*, 373 / 75). Thus ontotheology asks two distinct questions: 1. What are beings as such in general? 2. What is the highest being, and what is its nature? (Kant These über das Sein, 443). The questions are easily conflated in German, since Was ist das Seiende?', 'What are beings?', is literally 'What is the being?' or 'What is that which is?', which might be either question 1 or question 2. Sometimes Heidegger gives a different account of the two questions. Question 1 is 'about beings as such [nach dem Seienden als einem solchen]', question 2 is 'about beings as a whole [nach dem Seienden im Ganzen]' (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 220 / 150). He imputes this conflation to his earlier self: in Was ist Metaphysik?, 'metaphysics is defined as the question about beings as such and as a whole [nach dem Seienden als solchem and im Ganzen]. The wholeness of this whole [Die Ganzheit dieses Ganzes] is the unity of beings, the ground that brings them forth and unifies them. To anyone who can read, this means: metaphysics is Onto-Theo-Logie' (Identität und Differenz, 51 / 54. Elsewhere he locates the confusion in the whole phrase das Ganze des Seienden als solchen, 'the whole of beings as such', which might mean: 1. 'the most general features of beings', or 2. 'the highest and thus divine being' (*Einleitung zu 'Was ist metaphysik?*, 373 / 275). (Aristotle is innocent of this confusion: his god is one being among others, not the whole of beings. But in Identität und Differenz Heidegger is dealing with Hegel, whose god is the overall structure of beings, not an individual being.) Biologie is the 'study' or 'science' of living creatures. But in

OntoTheologie, -logie plays a grander role. Logos, from legein, 'to lay out, arrange, gather, say, etc.', means 'ground [Grund], letting (things) lie before (us) [Vorliegenlassen]', and also 'gathering [Versammlung], uniting' (Identität und Differenz, 54f. / 57; 67 / 69). Metaphysics does both. It gathers beings together to consider them 'as a whole'. It regards being as the 'ground' of beings: 'Ontology and theology are '-logies' because they get to the bottom [ergründen] of beings as such and ground [begründen] them as a whole [im Ganzen, lit. 'in the whole']' (Identität und Differenz, 56 / 59). Hence Hegel called metaphysics 'logic'; it is Onto-Theo-Logik.
How does God become a being, the highest entity, rather than simply Sein, 'being'? Being and beings are distinct but inseparable. Being 'grounds [gründet]' beings, and conversely beings 'beground [begründen]' being. But beings can beground being only in the form of a single supreme being, a cause that is causa sui, 'cause of itself': 'This is the appropriate name for the god of philosophy. Man cannot pray to this god, nor offer sacrifices to him. Man cannot fall to his knees in awe before the causa sui, nor dance and play music before this god' Identität und Differenz, 70 / 72). Heidegger thinks that 'god-less thinking', in rejecting this god of philosophy, is 'perhaps closer to the divine god' (*Identität und Differenz*, 71 / 72): 'the ontotheological character of metaphysics has become questionable for thinking, not on the basis of any atheism, but from the experience of a thinking which has seen in onto-theo-logy the still unthought unity of the essence of metaphysics' (*Identität und Differenz*, 51 / 55). In thinking about this unity, and about the DIFFERENCE that metaphysics discerns only hazily, Heidegger goes beyond metaphysics." (pp. 149-150)

From: Michael Inwoord, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell 1999.

Frequency of the terms "onto-theology" and "onto-theological" in the Heideggerian *corpus* (p. 62)

ANNEXE

Occurrences des termes « onto-théologie » et « onto-théologique » dans le *corpus* heideggérien

Texte	Année	Texte original	Traduction
Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes	1930/31	*GA* 32, 140-144, 183, 193 et 209.	* [100]
Die Grundfrage der Philosophie	1933	*GA* 36/37, 281.	– [101]
Schelling. Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)	1936	*GA* 42, 84-89 et 112-114 (= *SA*, 61-62 et 78-80 ; voir aussi 83).	*
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)	1936/38	*GA* 65, 206.	–
Besinnung	1938/39	*GA* 66, 374.	–
Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik	1941	*GA* 6.2, 428.	*Nietzsche II*, 379.
Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling : ...	1941	*GA* 49, 94 (= *SA*, 212).	*
Nietzsches Metaphysik	1941/42	*GA* 50, 69.	*Nietzsche II*, 257
Hegel – Erläuterung der « Einleitung » zu Hegels « Phänomenologie des Geistes »	1942	*GA* 68, 80-82, 97 et 141.	–
Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung	1942/43	*GA* 5, 195 et 199-203.	*Chemins*, 236-237 et 242-246.
Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmug des Nihilismus	1944/46	*GA* 6.2, 313-315.	*Nietzsche II*, 279-283.
Das Wesen des Nihilismus	1946/48	*GA* 67, 214-219.	–
Einleitung zu « Was ist Metaphysik ? »	1949	*GA* 9, 378-380.	*QI&II*, 39-41.
Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik	1957	*I. u. D.*, 45-47, 49-52 et 61-66.	*QI&II*, 289-291, 292-295 et 302-308.
Kants These über das Sein	1961	*GA* 9, 449-450.	*QI&II*, 382-383.
Zur Sache des Denkens	1962/64	76.	*QIII&IV*, 300.

100. Les références en français ne sont indiquées que lorsque la pagination de l'original allemand n'est pas reprise en marge de la traduction.

101. Ce symbole (–) indique qu'aucune traduction française n'est disponible.

From: François Jaran, "L'onto-théologie dans l'œuvre de Martin Heidegger. Récit d'une confrontation avec la pensée Occidentale", *Philosophie* 91, 2006, pp. 37-62.

Related pages

Martin Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works Edition)

A Selected Bibliography on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology

Martin Heidegger on *Aletheia* (Truth) as Unconcealment

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Theory and History of Ontology

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HEIDEGGER'S MAIN TEXTS ON ONTOTHEOLOGY

Abbreviations: GA = Gesamtausgabe (Collected works); SS = Summer semester (from May to July); WS = Winter semester (from November to February)

1. Heidegger, Martin. 2007. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe Der Logik Im Ausgang Von Leibniz*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

   GA Vol. 26, Lecture course SS 1928. First edition 1978. Translated by Michael R. Heim as: *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984.

2. ———. 1991. *Kant Und Das Problem Der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

   GA Vol. 3. First edition Bonn, F. Cohen, 1929, Fourth revised edition 1973.
   Translated by Richard Taft as: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990; Fifth edition enlarged 1997.

3. ———. 1980. *Hegels Phänomenologie Des Geistes*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

GA Vol. 32, Lecture course SS 1930-31.
Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly as: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988.

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   GA Vol. 42. Sommersemester 1936.
   Translated by Joan Stambaugh as: Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1984.

5. ———. 2000. "Überwindung Der Metaphysik." In *Vortrage Und Aufsätze. I*, 67-97. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

   GA Vol. 7. First edition Pfullingen, Neske, 1954 (Essays 1936-1953).
   See: *Overcoming Metaphysics* translated by Joan Stambaugh in: Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1973. pp. 84-110.

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   GA Vol. 6.1 and 6.2. First edition *Nietsche,* Pfullingen, Neske, 1961 (two volumes).
   Translated as *Nietzsche* by David Farrell Krell, San Francisco, Harper & Row 1979-1987 (four volumes).
   Reprinted 1991 in two volumes:
   1-2: *The Will to Power as Art; The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*.
   3-4: *The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics; Nihilism*.
   See: *Metaphysics as History of Being; Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics; Recollection in Metaphysics*.
   These three essays (with the addition of: *Overcoming Metaphysics*) are also translated by Joan Stambaugh in: Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, San Francisco,

Harper & Row, 1973 (respectively pp. 1-54; 55-74; 75-83; 84-110).

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   GA Vol. 6.2.
   Written in 1941, First edition in: Nietzsche, Pfullingen, Neske, 1961.
   Translated by Joan Stambaugh as: *Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics* in: Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1973, pp. 55-74.

8. ———. 1997. "Die Erinnerung in Die Metaphysik." In *Nietzsche. Ii*, 481-490. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

   GA Vol. 6.2.
   Written in 1941. First edition Pfullingen, Neske, 1961.
   Translated by Joan Stambaugh as: *Recollections in Metaphysics* in: Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1973, pp. 75-83.

9. ———. 1997. "Die Seinsgechichtliche Bestimmung Des Nihilismus." In *Nietzsche. Ii*, 335-398. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

   GA Vol. 6.2.
   Written in 1944-46, First edition in: Nietzsche (1961).
   Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi and edited by David Farrell Krell as: *Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being* in: Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. Vol. IV: Nihilism - New York, Harper & Row, 1982.

10. ———. 1967. "Einleitung Zu "Was Ist Metaphysik?"." In *Wegmarken*, 365-383. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

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Contents: Introduction by Joan Stambaugh 7; Identity and Difference 19; Preface 21; The principle of identity 23; The Onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics 42; Notes 75; Appendix: The German text: Identität und Differenz p. 77-146.

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2. "Saint Thomas Et L'onto-Théologie." 2002. *Revue Thomiste* no. 95.

3. Aubenque, Pierre. 2005. "La Question De L'ontothéologie Chez Aristotle Et Heidegger." In *La Question De Dieu Selon Aristote Et Hegel*, edited by Konninck, Thomas de and Planty-Bonjour, Guy, 259-283. Paris: Press Universitaires de France.

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12. ———. 2005. *Heidegger and Aristotle. The Twofoldness of Being*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

13. Capobianco, Richard. 2010. *Engaging Heidegger*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Foreword by William J. Richardson.
    "In his long lifetime of thinking, Heidegger safeguarded the originary word of Western philosophical thinking: Being. Several of the essays in this volume are intended to bring our attention back to this defining feature of his thought. The contemporary analytic and postmodern resistance and even hostility to the very word 'being' has no doubt contributed to the current tendency in Heidegger studies to shuffle the name of Being to the background, if not erase it altogether. Nevertheless, a careful consideration of the texts -- a primary concern of the studies in this volume -- reaffirms that Heidegger, right to the end of his life, continued to reserve and preserve in his thinking the ancient word 'Being' as the name for the fundamental matter for thought *(die Sache selbst)*. The originary, fundamental, and unifying meaning of Being, the *Erfragte* from the outset of his *Denkweg,*was properly named by Heidegger as Beyng *(Seyn),* Being itself *(Sein selbst),* Being as such *(Sein als solches),* and Being as Being *(Sein als Sein)* in distinction from being as *beingness (Seiendheit),* which he always maintained to be the proper concern of the metaphysical tradition of thinking. The important but often neglected task of carefully parsing Heidegger's language of Being, beingness, and beings is taken up in a number of the essays." (p. 3).

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    "The basic aim of Heidegger's thought is often stated in the following way: to uncover the meaning of Being, in its history, beginning with the first thinkers in Greece. Western history, we are told, begins with the philosophical question What are beings?, the question concerning beings as such, beings as a whole. Although this view of history is, of course, appropriate for Heidegger's enterprise, it is a limited view because of a restricted historical sense that I submit even Heidegger does not intend. Before the advent of philosophy in Greece, a fully constituted world was in place, a world disclosed through myth and poetry. Furthermore, there was an historical relation between Greek myth and philosophy, regardless of whether this relation is seen as an evolutionary development, a devolutionary decline or a contest between different modes of disclosure. Consequently one might ask: What role does pre-philosophical myth play in the "history of Being"?

Moreover, since the history of philosophy, for Heidegger, is at once a disclosure of Being and a concealing of that which "grants" disclosure by withdrawing itself (and the history of this concealment includes the great Presocratic thinkers) then one might further ask: Since philosophy to a certain extent displaced myth in Greek history, was there any connection between that displacement and concealment? That is to say, did pre-philosophical myth express a kind of openness that philosophy closed off? Put another way: Was Greek myth in any sense a prefiguration of Heidegger's alternative to philosophy, namely poetical thinking, that which seeks an openness to what is concealed in the disclosure of Being? Finally then: In what sense can Heidegger's later thought be called mythical?
My paper will explore these questions in the following way. Part One will examine myth in relation to Heidegger's thought by selecting certain Heideggerian themes and showing how Greek myth presents a pre-philosophical expression of these themes. Part Two will examine Heidegger's thought in relation to myth by first focusing on references to mythical disclosure in Heidegger's early thought, and then sketching the ways in which Heidegger's later thought itself approached a mythical form. In general, by relating Heidegger's thought and myth, I want to suggest a broader scope and somewhat looping shape for the history of Being, because of certain pre-philosophical echoes in Heidegger's post-philosophical thought."

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33. Jaran, Franois. 2003. "Heidegger Et La Constitution onto-Théologique De La Métaphysique Cartésienne." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 19:65-80.

34. ———. 2006. "L'onto-Théologie Dans L'œuvre De Martin Heidegger. Récit D'une Confrontation Avec La Pensée Occidentale." *Philosophie* no. 91:37-62.

"F. Jaran examine la thèse de la constitution onto-théologique de la métaphysique, qui s'est transformée ces dernières années en un outil exégétique que les historiens de la philosophie n'hésitent plus à reprendre, fût-ce en le critiquant. Il s'attache à en retracer l'élaboration silencieuse dans les textes du début des années 1920, offrant ainsi un éclairage nouveau à la " métaphysique du Dasein " que Heidegger déploie immédiatement après la publication d'Être et temps."

35. Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1988. "' *Der Brauch*' Als Der Älteste Name Für Das Sein Des Seienden: Heidegger Über Den Spruch Des Anaximander." In *Philosophie Und Poesie. Band 2. Otto Pöggeler Zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Annemarie, Gethmann-Siefert, 77-103. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.

36. Laffoucrière, Odette. 1968. *Le Destin De La Pensée Et "La Mort De Dieu" Selon Heidegger*. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff.

"Le travail de Mademoiselle Laffoucrière, *Le destin de la pensée et la mort de Dieu* se distingue par un exposé clair et pertinent de ma pensée, Il écarte des malentendus nombreux et répandus. Du même coup, il fournit une bonne introduction à la droite intelligence de l'interrogation sur l'essence de la métaphysique.
Je recommande donc vivement la publication de ce travail; à bien des égards, il peut servir de commentaire aux traductions de mon œuvre jusqu'alors parues en France. Martin Heidegger, 9 novembre 1964." p. IV.

37. Lefebvre, René. 1990. "L'image onto-Théologique De La *Métaphysique* D'Aristote." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 8:123-173.

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"Although a few excellent studies of Heidegger's thought have appeared in English in the last decade, they tend to focus on *Being and Time* and, secondarily, on the relationship of the later works to it. To my knowledge, only one book has appeared to-date [1970] in English which treats an aspect of Heidegger's understanding of the history of philosophy, and not a single critical study. This book endeavors to begin to remedy that deficiency.
It is not the case that Heidegger's understanding of the history of philosophy is merely a theme in his works. It is *the* theme of his later works in my view. If *Being and Time* is correctly characterized as a phenomenological description of *Dasein*, of the human way of being, then Heidegger's subsequent works, in the main, attempt to show how the question of Being (*Sein*) has been (mis)understood from Plato to Nietzsche. Presumably, the tradition's failure to grasp the human way of being is grounded in its more fundamental failure to articulate clearly the sense of Being, "to be," in general. It is not at all accidental, in short, that the projected second volume of *Being and Time* was to take as its subject-matter a recapitulation and destruction of the history of ontology. (1)
This book, then, is not intended as still another introduction to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It is a critical analysis and exposition of the second phase of his thought. Heidegger's provocative interpretations of the pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, are all conditioned by his inquiry into the meaning of Being. That inquiry determines the character of his historical studies. And although there have been frequent grumblings about the "validity" of such an

approach, no sustained efforts have hitherto been made to come to grips with the methodological questions which Heidegger's hermeneutic occasions.
I do not want to suggest that this study covers the full range of problems raised by Heidegger's metahistorical interpretation of the history of philosophy. It does not. I have been forced to circumscribe the range of analysis very sharply. Nietzsche is the center of gravity, point of focus, and, finally, the touchstone for Heidegger's interpretations, in this study. A number of considerations dictated this choice. First, Heidegger has devoted more attention to Nietzsche than he has to all other philosophers combined. His interpretation of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the West helps to account for the inordinate amount of material Heidegger has produced concerning Nietzsche. Second, as a consequence of the first, we have a more adequate basis for judging the value of Heidegger's approach to Nietzsche. Third, it is my opinion that Nietzsche's philosophy is inherently more susceptible of conflicting interpretations than is, say, Kant's or Aristotle's. Rather than serving as a deterrent in explicating and critically assessing Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I found this to be an asset. It forces one to make difficult decisions and to be painstakingly careful in advancing an interpretation of Nietzsche, rather than merely passing on accepted, allegedly "standard" interpretations. At the same time it affords the reader a point of reference from which to compare methods of historical-textual criticism." pp. IX-XI.
(1) *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: 7. Aufl., 1953. Cf. Introduction.

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"Heidegger's thought on Suarez has been studied for the most part by scholastic philosophers with a particular doctrinal intent, in the context of Heidegger's views on the history of ontology, and on the narrow basis of a few passing remarks in some of Heidegger's works.(a) The 1975 publication of Heidegger's (Summer Semester, 1927) lectures on *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, and their recent translation into English by Professor Hofstadter, make possible a better documented and more conclusive analysis of the subject. (b) Unfortunately, other relevant sources still remain unpublished, such as Heidegger's lectures and seminars on the history of philosophy from St. Thomas to Kant, medieval mysticism, St. Augustine, and Renaissance scholasticism. All of them, however, give a clear indication of Brentano's influence upon Heidegger's early thought and demonstrate an interest in medieval philosophy which one seldom finds among contemporary thinkers. In this essay we intend (1) to summarize Heidegger's views on medieval scholastic philosophy in general and those of Suarez in particular, and (2) attempt to retrieve from the Marburg lectures what Heidegger left unsaid and unthought on the scholastic distinction between essence and existence."
(a) Some scholars have argued that Heidegger's criticism of medieval ontology was fully justified when directed against Suarez, but radically unfair to St. Thomas. To this group belong: G. Siewerth, *Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger* (Einsideln, 1959); R. Echauri,

Heidegger y la Metafisica Tomista (Buenos Aires, 1970); B. Rioux, *L'étre et la verité chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal-Paris, 1963); C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, 1961); J. P. Doyle, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics", The Modern Schoolrnan, 49 (1972), 201-221; 0. N. Derisi, "Approximaciones y diferencias entre la fenomenologia existencialista de Martin Heidegger y la ontologia de Santo Tomás," Sapientia, 22 (1967), 185-192; W. R. Korn. "La question de l'être chez Martin Heidegger," Revue Thomiste, 71 (1971), 33-58.
More favorable to Suarez were H. Meyer, *Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin* (Munich. 1968); and M. Schneider. "Der angebliche Essentialismus des Suarez." Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 24 (1961), 40-68. Finally, there are those philosophers who think that both St. Thomas and Suarez fully deserve Heidegger's criticism. See. e.g., H. Siegfried, *Die Wahrheit und Metaphysik bei Suarez* (Bonn, 1967). Heidegger's references to Suarez can be found in *Seitz und Zeit* (Gesamtausgabe, ed. by F. W. von Herrmann, vol. 2. Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 30; *Die Frage nach der Ding* (Tübingen. 1962), 77; and *Nietzsche* (Pfüllingen, 1961), 11.418.
(b) *The lectures Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* were published in 1975 as vol. 24 of the Gesamtausgabe. They were reviewed by M. E. Zimmermann in the International Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (1977). 235-237, and in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39 (1979), 537-550. Professor A. Hofstadter's excellent translation was published in 1981 by Indiana University Press under the title *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

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Roman Ingarden and the Realism/Idealism Debate

INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

"Ingarden held that philosophy divides into ontology and metaphysics. Ontology is an autonomous discipline in which we discover and establish the necessary connections between pure ideal qualities by intuitive analysis of the contents of ideas. This is an indispensable preparation for metaphysics, which aims to elucidate the necessary truths of factual existence. Each section of philosophy - theory of knowledge, philosophy of man, philosophy of nature and so on - has ontological and metaphysical aspects. Ingarden argues that every being is a triple unity of matter (contents), form (of the matter) and existence (in a certain mode). Accordingly, ontology as a whole is divided into material, formal and existential ontology. Existence is neither a property nor one of the material or formal moments of an object; it is always the existence of something and what exists determines by its essence a mode of being which belongs to it. Modes of being are constituted from existential 'moments', of which Ingarden distinguishes the following opposite pairs: originality-derivativity, autonomy-heteronomy, distinctiveness-connectiveness and independence-dependence. Taking into account the modes of being thus constituted, there are four basic spheres of being: absolute (supratemporal), ideal (timeless), real (temporal - it has the most numerous forms) and purely intentional (atemporal, sometimes seemingly in time). Ingarden also draws a distinction between three domains: pure ideal

qualities, ideas and individual objects. Each individual object is formally a subject of properties whose identity is determined by its constitutive nature. Individual objects of higher order, such as organisms, may be superstructured on autonomous individual objects. Ideas and purely intentional beings have a two-sided formal constitution - besides their own structure they also have contents (in the case of ideas it is constituted by constants and variables, and in the case of purely intentional beings by places of indeterminateness).

Analyses of being in time, of the stream of consciousness and of the world show that their existence is derivative and depends on their relation to original (absolute) being. The foundation of being is placed either in its essence (and ultimately in the content of some idea) or is purely factual in its character. In his analysis of the controversy over the existence of the world, Ingarden first formulates Husserl's transcendental starting point, and then demonstrates and states precisely its assumptions concerning the two elements of initial relation: the real world and the stream of consciousness, together with a subject which belongs to it (pure ego). These considerations lead Ingarden to reject both Husserl's solution and his way of setting the question.

What is real appears in three temporal phases: the future, the present and the past. Objects determined in time include objects enduring in time, processes and events. A human being is an object enduring in time and constituted by a soul, which comprises an ego together with a stream of consciousness, and a body (with a subsystem constituting 'the gate of consciousness'). Living on the border of two spheres, the real (nature, animality), and the ideal (values), human beings create a third sphere of culture. Thus their need to transcend this fragility by a process of self-formation that is subordinated to values makes them prone to tragedy."From: Ingarden, Roman Witold (1893-1970) - by Antoni B. Stepien - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy p. 790.

"Ontology, in Ingarden's sense, analyses the necessary structures of possible objects: it seeks to establish alternative possible structures of the world, where metaphysics would establish which of these alternatives is in fact realized. Ingarden distinguishes further between existential ontology. which investigates the modes of existence of different kinds of objects; formal ontology,

which investigates the forms of objects (as contrasted with their material or qualitative aspects); and material ontology, which deals with these qualitative aspects themselves. The Controversy is divided up accordingly: Volume 1 deals with existential ontology, Volumes 2 and 3 with formal ontology.

The Controversy contains extensive analyses of the modes of existence especially of temporal objects (events, processes. states). of the forms of individual objects, of ideas, states of affairs, relations, regions of being, worlds, and consciousness. Volume 3 contains an analysis of the causal nexus (cause and effect are regarded as simultaneous), of relatively isolated systems and of the problem of determinism.

The metaphysical (and concomitant epistemological) parts of the work were not written, but Ingarden's analyses of temporal existence (cf. 1983) and his stress on the reality of free human actions realizing values, seem to imply the possibility of a metaphysical investigation of man, and the final considerations of Volume 3 may be held to imply a certain priority of at least some metaphysical investigations to material ontology. Ingarden's last work (English translation 1983) is devoted to the ontological foundations of responsibility.

Ingarden is principally known, however, not for his investigations in general ontology and metaphysics but for his writings in aesthetics, and especially for his classic work on the ontology of literature (1931, English translation 1973). Even this, however, was undertaken in order to establish a radical difference of structure as between 'intentional objects' -- objects created by and dependent on acts of consciousness - and objects in reality.

Epistemology, for Ingarden, is divided into 'pure' epistemology - which investigates the ideas or essences of cognitive acts as revealed in "immanent eidetic intuition" and establishes ultimate principles of cognition - and 'applied' epistemology, which is partly empirical, and applies these principles to actual cases. In his epistemology, therefore, Ingarden initially embraces Husserl's notion of pure consciousness as the area where structures of mental acts may be indubitably cognized. Ingarden, however, rejects the necessity of any sort of transcendental reduction in philosophy and his analyses lead to a conception of consciousness not as something independent but as a merely abstract stratum in

the real self. Ingarden thereby denies all the ontological features - irreality, self-sufficiency, and separateness - that had been ascribed to consciousness by Husserl. And he thereby undermines, in fact, the very notion of a 'pure' consciousness in the Husserlian mould." (pp. 396-397)

From: Andrzej Poliawski, "Ingarden, Roman" in: Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991.

"For Ingarden, as for the other earlier phenomenologists, the decisive characteristic of phenomenology consisted in its program of an intuitive study of essences; as a matter of fact he devoted his habilitation thesis, *Essentiale Fragen*, to a careful analysis of the questions concerning the essence of a thing. To the resulting theory of 'aprioric' necessary truths he gave the name 'ontology.' Husserl himself had been talking in a similar vein of the different regional ontologies (i.e., of the apriori theories of different domains or regions of objects) and of a general formal ontology (i.e., of the apriori theory of the formal structure of any object whatsoever). But Ingarden admitted that he used the term 'ontology' in a somewhat wider sense, because for him ontology included the study of the essence of pure consciousness (*die Wesensanalyse des reinen Bewusstseins*). Husserl had once defined phenomenology as the study of the essence of pure consciousness, but he had never thought to call this investigation 'ontological.' For him phenomenology could not be a proper part of ontology, since on the contrary he conceived of ontology, the study of the objects of consciousness, as a proper part of phenomenology, the study of consciousness.
There was thus more than merely a terminological disagreement between them. What was at issue was the question whether ontology or phenomenology, namely the transcendental phenomenology of the process of constitution, had to come first. Ingarden was of the opinion that an analysis and evaluation of the constitutive processes involved in our knowledge of things presupposed as a 'guiding thread' the prior possession of a clarified notion of those things, while Husserl maintained that a clarified notion of the things could only be obtained on the basis

of a prior understanding of the process of constitution .This difference between Ingarden and Husserl is, in fact, the one which separates the realistic from an idealistic approach to this problem.

However, Ingarden did not reject the program of a transcendental phenomenology as such. Already in his account of 1919 he had devoted a special section to the presentation of the phenomenological reduction and the immanent self-knowledge of pure consciousness, and, unlike most other members of the Göttingen and Munich groups, Ingarden had always accepted the transcendental reduction as meaningful and even necessary, namely necessary for the development of epistemology. To understand Ingarden's position one most know that in his Ph.D. dissertation, in his efforts to criticize the relativist and subjectivist claims made by Bergson, and in his struggle to clarify the issues involved in the idealism-realism controversy, he had been led to make a sharp distinction between epistemological and metaphysical assertions, which, together with his conception of ontology, resulted in a three-fold division of all systematic philosophy. The tasks of the three divisions are as follows: ontology investigates the necessary troths, i.e., delimits the bounds of sense, namely the range of the apriori possible (it covers what in Analytic Philosophy is the realm of conceptual analysis); metaphysics makes existence claims, i.e., it tries to decide what is the nature of that which in fact is the case;'* finally epistemology, which for Ingarden emphatically is not first philosophy, has the task of certifying the validity of the results already obtained by scientific and philosophical investigations. Ingarden's conception of transcendental phenomenology can now be understood. For him the *raison d'être* of the transcendental reduction is epistemological, it has its rightful place in the program of a non-circular certification of all knowledge. And once the reduction is performed, then a new realm for ontological analysis is opened up (cf. the above mentioned study of the essence of pure consciousness). Furthermore, there are the facts of transcendental consciousness and other facts which might be inferred from them, all of which are part of the domain of metaphysics. Thus transcendental phenomenology is for

Ingarden a mixture of epistemological, ontological and metaphysical questions." (pp. 1224-1226)

From: Guido Küng, "Roman Ingarden (1893-1970): Ontological Phenomenology", in: Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963 (Third edition).

"The ontological analyses of works of art affected Ingarden's entire ontology. Its best elaboration is contained in *Spór o istnienie swiata* (*The controversy over the existence of the world*, 1947-48). A being, i.e., an object, can be considered in three different respects: (1) the material one, (2) the formal one, and (3) the existential one (modes of being). Ingarden understands ontology as based on eidetic insight and intuitive analyses of the contents of ideas, i.e., upon the eidetic method, which enables one to discover the necessary and purely possible relations between the pure ideal qualities. Ontology is for him the most general theory of objects. He distinguishes it from metaphysics, which fulfills the role of an applied theory of objects and which, being based on ontology, considers the nature and essence of factual beings. The eidetic character distinguishes metaphysics from the so-called real sciences.
Ontology aims at obtaining a general spectrum of eidetic possibilities and necessities with reference to any objects whatever. In the frame of an existential ontology, which has nothing to do with Martin Heidegger's fundamental ontology, Ingarden distinguishes and clearly defines four mutually exclusive pairs of moments of being: something can be (1) existentially autonomous or heteronomous, (2) existentially original or derivative, (3) existentially separate or not separate, and (4) existentially self-dependent or contingent. Considerations connected with the analysis of the second pair has led Ingarden to an original interpretation of the relation of causality. His analysis of time has brought some additional pairs of existential moments, such as actuality and non-actuality; persistence and fragility; and fissuration and non-fissuration. These differentiations enables him to distinguish and describe four basic modes of being (consisting of noncontradictory combinations of existential

moments). These are: (I) absolute being (autonomous, original, separate, self-dependent); (2) temporal (real) being; (3) ideal (extratemporal) being; and (4) purely intentional (quasitemporal) being. We cannot experience any existing object without its mode of being.
In epistemology Ingarden distinguishes: (1) the pure theory of knowledge, which is actually a part of ontology, because he describes it as an a priori analysis of the general idea "knowledge"; (2) criteriology, which researches such epistemic values as objectivity and adequacy; and (3) the critique of knowledge, which evaluates factually obtained results of scientific and philosophical cognition." (p. 349)

From: Andrzej Przylebski, "Roman Ingarden" in: Lester Embree et alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.

ONTOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF PURE POSSIBILITIES

"Ingarden begins with a purely formal ontological analysis, and builds towards an analysis of human being, and the possibility of human meaning. By examining existence in its various modes, he comes to consider the matter and form most readily accessible to cognition: ourselves. Plotting the multiple axes of our existence leads him to an understanding of the nature of our essence. So far, so good, Ingarden appears to be undertaking a classical phenomenological inquiry. But there are several surprises in store for the unsuspecting reader, particularly regarding a few key terms from both phenomenology and existentialism to which Ingarden gives entirely new meaning.
For example, each of his central concerns, essence and existence, turn out to be just the opposite of what we might expect. So too with his fields of inquiry; Tymieniecka's dissertation, *Essence and Existence* could just as easily have been entitled *Ontology and Metaphysics*, for from the outset, Ingarden begins to play with

seemingly familiar terms. In his view, ontology is neither "a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being" nor "a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of existents." Rather, for Ingarden, ontology precedes metaphysics, and metaphysics is (and must be) grounded in ontology. Ingarden declares that ontology proposes to answer the question: "What is the essence of this thing which exists?" According to Ingarden, three fundamental groups of questions form the basis for the distinction between ontology and metaphysics, corresponding to three distinct types of knowledge, and three distinct modes of inquiry:

l) Scientific knowledge focuses on facts contained within the limits of the real world, including the existence of the world as such, and all the objects found within it. This is the purview of the "particular sciences": chemistry, physics, and so on. Such sciences do not study the essences of things, but rather only the quality and quantity of the constituent elements of their factual existence.

2) Ontology entertains questions regarding what is "purely possible": ideas. Ontological questions establish the linkages between things, the constitutive structural network underlying the possibility of the existence of the world (for example, "if p, then necessarily q..."). In themselves, ontological questions do not study essences as such, but rather inquire into the conditions that must obtain in order for essences to result, as well as the links between essences.

3) Metaphysical questions, by contrast, study the essences of things. It is here that Ingarden reveals his existentialist side. Metaphysics explores the essential characteristics of things in their "pure incomprehensible facticity." Metaphysics also studies the effects of things on one another. Simply put, both the particular sciences and ontology are empty outlines of existence, which are, respectively, entirely composed of content or form. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the vibrant canvas stretched on the frame of ontology and painted all over with data waiting to be interpreted. Metaphysics, Ingarden asserts, is dependent on ontology to supply a conceptual framework, but surpasses ontology in claiming to know the essences of things, beyond their constitutive physical elements, in knowing what constitutes the

unique individual existence of any object." (pp. 185-186 notes omitted)

From: Nancy Mardas, "Essence and Existence in Phenomenological Ontology: Roman Ingarden", in: A. T. Tymieniecka (ed.), The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003, pp. 183-198.

"While it is difficult to find any radical turning points in the philosophy of Roman Ingarden, an inner tension can be detected. Ontology as a science of pure possibilities is set against metaphysics as a science of the essence of actually existing being. The philosopher did not build his metaphysics, he stopped at outlining its conception, as he believed that metaphysical considerations should be preceded by ontological investigations. Ingarden carried out ontological investigations on various levels: the meta- philosophical level (conception of ontology), systematic existential and formal-ontological investigations; the epistemological level (ontology of cognition); the aesthetic level (the ontology of the work of art and aesthetic object); the axiological level (the ontology of value); the level of the philosophy of language (meanings of words as inter- subjective intentional creations). The ontological perspective pervades almost all Ingarden's philosophical thinking, inclining his interpreters to ask the following question: is there a chance of leaving this magic circle of pure possibilities? Let us take into consideration whether the philosopher closed to himself the path leading to actually existing being. Why did Ingarden insist on the necessity of ontological investigations even though they were moving the metaphysical horizon away from him? For metaphysics was, aging the aim and ontology just an introduction to it. What is more, Ingarden's temperament and nature made him a metaphysician (he was interested in being) rather than a phenomenologist (he did not want to confine himself to how being was given to him). On the level of ontological considerations we observe the tension between intuition and discourse (direct and indirect cognition).

The *Controversy about the Existence of the World* is a systematic presentation of Ingarden's ontology. His earlier works constituted an introduction to it: *Essentiale Fragen* (1925), which offered the differentiation between an idea (*eidos*) and essence (*Wesen*) and an outline of the theory of ideas; *Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus* (1929), in which Ingarden distinguished three groups of philosophical issues (ontological, metaphysical and epistemological) and distinguished the modes of existence and existential moments as fundamental notions of existential ontology. The philosopher discussed more specific ontological questions in his other works: -- *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931, the ontology of a purely intentional object); -- *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuaellen Gegenstandes* (1935, the formal ontology of an autonomous individual object).
Ontology approached as a science on the possible ways of existence occupies a distinguished position in Ingarden's studies. It does not comprise existential assertions (it does not assert what actually exists). Ingarden distinguishes the following domains of existence: a domain of individual objects, a domain of ideas, a domain of ideal qualities. He refers the notion of essence to individual objects (autonomous and non-autonomous). In various individual objects we observe the identity of certain moments which determine their range. This selection of identical moments, to which correspond many individual exemplifications, Ingarden calls an idea. We think about the existence of an idea only because in the world, which is experienced by us, we come across necessary connections between qualities. What is necessary speaks for the rationality of being and this rationality can be explained through the relations between ideal qualities in the content of ideas. Purely factual dependencies (for example, causal dependencies) or phenomenal dependencies are not enough to acknowledge the rationality of being. Therefore Ingarden presents the following argumentation: starting from the data of experience he asks a question on the conditions of the possibility of what is given in experience. He does not mean subjective conditions (what cognitive powers a subject should be equipped with in order to experience in the way he experiences) but objective, ontic conditions (what has being to be like in order to appear in such a way and not another way in experience). Thus

experience suggests assuming a certain theoretical hypothesis--a hypothesis on the existence of an idea.
Ideas are characterized by their dual formal structure:--as ideas they have a characteristic structure which differentiates them from individual objects as well as ideal qualities; --they are ideas of something, i.e., they differ from each other by their content, determining the range of individual objects "subjected to them". This dual structure makes it possible to differentiate between the cognitive competence of ontology and metaphysics. Ontology investigates the content of ideas only (that they are ideas of something) and necessary connections between ideal qualities. It is only metaphysics that can formulate statements on the actual existence of ideas.
In the sphere of facts nothing can exist that would be contradictory to pure possibilities. Thus ontological investigations should constitute the beginning of all philosophical considerations. Theoretically they precede individual sciences and they are more general. Ontology eliminates problems and conclusions that are inconsistent with an idea of the investigated objects. Ideal qualities occur in the content of an idea in the shape of constants and variables--existential, formal and material. An ontologist employs an a priori analysis of the content idea (a prioric laws of connection and exclusion), but he does not lose the connection with experience broadly approached. The a priori cognition of ideal qualities is understood by Ingarden intuitively and this enables ontology to establish a wide range of studies." (pp. 186-187, notes omitted).

From: Zofia Majewska, "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden", in: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.) *Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002 pp. 184-199.

THE CONTROVERSY WITH HUSSERL

"Husserl was convinced that rigorous philosophy i.e., phenomenology must begin with a thoroughly elaborated epistemology and eventually develop from that starting point an ontology and metaphysics. Ingarden was equally convinced that any ontology or metaphysics that originated from an idealist epistemology was itself bound and determined to be idealist. His criticisms of Husserl's position bear witness to the legitimacy of that conviction: To attempt to 'defend' Husserl against the charge that his idealism is 'committed to' metaphysical idealism is vain, if for no other reason than that Husserl appears to have felt justified in making metaphysical assertions that he apparently considered to be sufficiently well grounded in his idealist epistemology (although he never explicated this foundational relationship). In the light of Ingarden's criticisms, it seems equally wrongheaded to suggest, as does Farber, that Husserl was committing some kind of transgression against the program of phenomenology as he initially conceived and described it. It appears, rather, that the 'subjectivism' Farber sees winning the day in Husserl's 'system of thought' is not at all the result of any fundamental change in the direction of his thinking but is instead the inevitable conclusion of a development of thought proceeding from his starting point of epistemological idealism. As we have seen, Ingarden found the position of metaphysical idealism impossible to maintain-indeed he appears to have been dissatisfied with idealism per se. Ingarden was convinced it was the very starting point of Husserl's phenomenology in epistemology that directed him toward the ontological solution of metaphysical idealism, and by restricting his own initial approach to the problems regarding the existence of the world to exclusively ontological investigations he hoped to avoid a similar predetermination of the metaphysical position he would later proceed to establish. Ingarden systematically elaborated these ontological investigations in his magnum opus, Controversy Over the Existence of the World." (p. 65)

From: Jeff Mitscherling, *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1997.

THE DEBATE REALISM vs. IDEALISM

"...the idealism/realism controversy was a central philosophical topic in the early decades of this century. With the subsequent reshaping of phenomenology along existentialist lines, primarily as a result of the work of Heidegger and Sartre, and with the increasing popularity of the 'analytic' concern with problems of logic, epistemology, and language, the interest in the ontological dimension of the idealism/realism controversy had greatly subsided before Ingarden finally published the first volumes of Controversy. Throughout his life, however, Ingarden remained committed to working out the ontological problems he had addressed so early in his career, sincerely believing that the idealism/realism debate concerning the existence of the world was of primary philosophical importance. The detailed analyses he presents in Controversy support his belief, and they do so in two respects. First, while his innumerable treatments of major historical figures, from Plato to Husserl, are generally offered for the purpose of either dispelling already existing confusion or clarifying his own use of terms-for example, he devotes the first section of the opening chapter of volume I simply to a detailed description of the manner and sense in which the term "idealism" has been variously employed over the centuries-these treatments at the same time indicate the central position the idealism/realism controversy has occupied throughout the history of Western philosophy, and thereby argue for the necessity of understanding this controversy and appreciating its centrality. But secondly, and more importantly, the excruciating rigour and thoroughness that he brings to his analyses render them compelling: the reader is indeed forced to grant Ingarden his claim that the problems he is dealing with do indeed warrant further investigation, and that our philosophical integrity demands of us that we pursue them further." (p. 80)

From: Jeff Mitscherling, *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1997.

EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS (in progress)

TIME AND MODES OF BEING

From the Author's Preface:

"In 1946/47 my two volume work, The controversy over the existence of the World (Spór o istnienie Å?wiata Vol. I, 297 pages, Vol II 848 pages) was published under the inprint of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters.
The present volume contains the English translation of parts selected from volume I of this work: the Introduction, Chapter III (with its introduction), Chapter VI, and section 31 from Chapter VII.
This selection covers my most important ontological analyses of modes of being and of time, as it is involved with these, which lead to the establishment of fundamental concepts of modes of existence. These investigations constitute the existential-ontological preparation for Volume II, which contains formal-ontological studies clarifying a number of basic formal concepts that are indispensable to an adumbration of prospective possible solutions of the controversy between idealism and realism.
Volume II is in preparation.(...) I wish to express my great and sincere appreciation to Mrs. Michejda for her careful preparation of this excellent translation, which completely satisfies every demand of the author."

CONTENTS: Author's Preface V; Translator's Preface VII;

Chapter I. Preliminary considerations 3;
Introduction 3; The foundation and the tentative formulation of the question at issue 8; Different groups of problems requiring delimitation 17;
Chapter II. Introduction 22;
Three main groups of ontological problems 22;
Chapter III. Basic existential concepts 28;

The problem of the possibility of analyzing existence 28; Modes of Being and moments of existence 32; Autonomy and heteronomy 43; Existential originality and existential derivation 52; Existential separateness and inseparateness 82; Existential self-dependence and existential contingency 89; Absolute Being - Relative Being 92;
Chapter IV. Time and modes of Being 99;
Preliminary observations regarding concrete time 99; The mode of Being of events 102; The mode of Being of processes 107; The mode of Being of objects enduring in time 124;
Chapter V. The consequences for the possible solutions of the controversy over the existence of the world when time is taken into account 157; New concepts of modes of Being 157;
Name Index 165; Subject Index 167.

Related pages

Annotated Bibliography on the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden

POLISH ONTOLOGISTS

Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

Stanislaw Lesniewski's Logical Systems: Protothetic, Ontology, Mereology

Tadeusz Kotarbinski from Ontological Reism to Semantical Concretism

Roman Suszko and the Non-Fregean Logics

Bogusław Wolniewicz on the Formal Ontology of Situations

Jerzy Perzanowski: Modal Logics, Ontology and Ontologics

Theory and History of Ontology

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Roman Ingarden: Ontology and Metaphysics. Selected Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

A bibliography of Roman Ingarden's works for the years 1915-1989 is published in: *Analecta Husserliana* - The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research - vol. 30: *Ingardeniana II. New studies in the philosophy of Roman Ingarden*. With a new international Ingarden bibliography, edited by Hans Rudnik and Jolanta Wawrzycka; the bibliography (pp. 225-296) contains in the first part ("primary sources") 368 items, inclusively of translations and reprints; the second part ("secondary sources") contains 821 references (many in Polish) concerning Ingarden.
I will give an updated bibliography of the most relevant references for Ingarden's ontology.

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22. ———. 1989. *Qu'est Ce Qu'une œuvre Musicale?* Paris: Christian Bourgois Éditeur.

23. ———. 1997. *De La Responsabilité: Ses Fondements Ontiques*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

24. ———. 1999. "Lettre À Husserl Sur La Vième Recherche Logique Et L'idéalisme." *Alter.Revue de Phénoménologie* no. 7:309-329.

25. ———. 2002. *Husserl, La Controverse Idéalisme-Réalisme (1918-1969)*. Paris: Vrin.

26. ———. 2011. *Esthétique Et Ontologie De L'œuvre D'art. Choix De Textes 1937-1969*. Paris: Vrin.

    Présentation, tradution et notes de Patricia Limido-Heulot.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

1. Ingarden, Roman. 1948. "The scientific activity of Kazimierz Twardowski." *Studia Philosophica 1939-1946* no. 3:17-30.
2. ———. 1958. "The Hypothetical Proposition." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 18:435-450.
   "It is well known that the proper meaning and function of the hypothetical proposition became a problem as early as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Since that time numerous conceptions and interpretations have been propounded. Fundamentally, however, the problem has never been solved.
   It is characteristic that the interpretation which is perhaps the best known and most widely recognized one, that of contemporary symbolic logic, is at the same time the one that says least of all about the structure of this type of judgment. At bottom, it abandons any attempt to clarify its meaning - and prides itself on this renunciation even as its greatest merit. Nonetheless, this interpretation plays an extremely important role in the way systems of symbolic logic are constructed. In close connection with the concept of the so-called "material implication," it leads to a number of propositions which are considered "paradoxical," as, for

instance, by C. I. Lewis, one of the leading symbolic logicians.
Both this result and the fact of a large variety of interpretations which differ from it as well as amongst each other, suggest a new attempt to understand the meaning and function of the hypothetical proposition in a more adequate way." (p. 435)

3. ———. 1960. "Reflections on the subject-matter of the history of philosophy." *Diogènes* no. 7:111-121.
Also in French as: *Notes sur l'objet de l'histoire de la philosophie* - pp. 130-140
4. ———. 1960. "The General Question of the Essence of Form and Content." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 57:222-233.
5. ———. 1961. "A marginal commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. Part 1." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 20:163-173.
6. ———. 1961. "Aesthetic experience and aesthetic object." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 21:289-313.
7. ———. 1962. "A marginal commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. Part 2." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 20:273-285.
8. ———. 1962. "Edith Stein on her activity as an assistant of Edmund Husserl. Extracts from the letters of Edith Stein with a commentary and introductory remarks." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*:155-175.
9. ———. 1964. *Time and Modes of Being*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
Translated by Helen Michejda.
Selected part of the first volume of the Polish edition of: *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt* (1947).
10. ———. 1964. "Artistic and aesthetic values." *British Journal of Aesthetics* no. 4:198-213.
11. ———. 1967. "Jean Hering 1890-1966." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:308-309.
12. ———. 1969. "The physicalistic theory of language and the world of literature." *Yearbook of Compartive Criticism* no. 2:80-98.
Translated by Maria Pelikan

13. ———. 1970. "Letters Pro and Con." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 28:541-542.
Letter to Professor Fizer on 'Schematism'
14. ———. 1972. "What is New in Husserl's 'Crisis'?" *Analecta Husserliana* no. 2:23-47.
15. ———. 1973. *The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
With an Appendix on the Functions of Language in the Theatre
Translated and with an introduction by George G. Grabowicz
16. ———. 1973. *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Translated by Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson.
17. ———. 1973. "On so-called truth in literature." In *Aesthetics in Twentieth-Century Poland. Selected Essays*, edited by Harrel, Jean and Wierzbianska, Alina, 164-204. Lewsiburg: Bucknell University Press.
18. ———. 1973. "About the motives that led Husserl to transcendental idealism." In *Phenomenology and natural science*, edited by Riepe, Dale. New York.
Partial translation; for the full translation see: *On the Motives which Led Edmund Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*.
19. ———. 1973. "A priori knowledge in Kant versus a priori knowledge in Husserl." *Dialectics and Humanism*:5-18.
20. ———. 1974. "Main directions in Polish philosophy." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 1:91-103.
Originally written in German in 1936
21. ———. 1974. "Psychologism and psychology in literary scholarship." *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation* no. 5:215-223.
22. ———. 1975. *On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Translated from Arnór Hannibalsson.
Contents: Translator's Preface VII; Introduction 1; Part I: Husserl's Position 4; Part II. Critical Remarks 34; Index 72.

"In this essay Roman Ingarden examines the essence of Husserl's idealism and delves into the question whether idealism follows necessarily from the basic tenets of phenomenology. Ingarden maintains that Husserl based his theory in the period of the Logical Investigations on a realist foundation and that only later, in the period of Ideas I and, especially in his last works, he turned to the view that phenomenology was a philosophy of the idealist type.
The book is divided into two parts. The first half contains an exposition of Husserl's views and an analysis of his development from the original realist standpoint until the ultimate idealist position was reached.
The second half contains Ingarden's critical remarks concerning Husserl's idealism in which he substantiates the view that transcendental idealism follows from certain decisions taken by Husserl in his theory of constitution and in the application of the method of the reduction. As a disciple of Husserl Ingarden adheres to some basic ideas of phenomenology such as the contention that cognition based on outer perception must necessarily be inadequate and onesided. But Husserl concludes from this that the real world is nothing but a constituted noematic unity existing for the pure transcendental Ego. The constitution of the world is reduced to the primary subjectivity of the Ego. The world becomes intentional correlates of sets of cognitive acts. Material things cease to be an autonomous sphere of being and are created as a system of object senses. Beyond that they are nothing. In this book Ingarden takes a critical view of these ideas of his teacher. In his opinion Husserl went too far in his assumptions and made some metaphysical decisions e.g. in the field of epistemology and in his application of the phenomenological reduction which led him ultimately to idealism. Ingarden thinks that this conclusion - or in general the solution of the controversy between idealism and realism - can be arrived at only after a careful and exhaustive examination. He himself tried to do this in his *Spar o istnienie hviata* (Controversy about the Existence of the World). Although this essay does not explain in any detail Ingarden's realism the reader is

nevertheless able to get an idea about his stand in philosophy and about his attitude to some central problems in Husserl's phenomenology on which Ingarden worked all his life. It is, therefore, a good introduction to Ingarden's work in this field which led him in a different direction than that taken by other members of the phenomenological movement."

23. ———. 1975. "On the Ontology of Relations." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:75-80.
24. ———. 1975. "Remarks Concerning the Relativity of Values." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:102-108.
25. ———. 1975. "Phenomenological aesthetics: an attempt at defining its range." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 33:257-269.
    Reprinted in: Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (eds.) - *Critical theory since 1965* - Tallahassee, University Press of Florida, pp. 185-197.
26. ———. 1976. "The letter to Husserl about the *VI Logical Investigation* and idealism." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 4:419-438.
27. ———. 1978. "On moral action." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 7:151-162.
28. ———. 1981. "Psychologism and psychology." In *Psychologism and psychoaesthetics: a historical and critical view of their relations*, edited by Fizer, John, 202-216. Amsterdam: Benjamin Press.
29. ———. 1983. *Man and Value*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
    Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of: *Über die Verantwortung*.
    Index: 1. Man and nature; 2. On human nature; 3. Man and his reality; 4. Man and time; 5. On responsibility -- Its ontic foundations; 6. Remarks on the relativity of values; 7. What we do not know about values; 8. An analysis of moral values; 9. Some words concerning fruitful discussion.
30. ———. 1983. "On philosophical aesthetics." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 10:55-59.

31. ———. 1983. "Lectures on aesthetics." *Literary Studies in Poland* no. 11:15-37.
32. ———. 1985. *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Edited by Peter J. McCormick.
33. ———. 1985. "Reminiscences of Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 12:53-59.
34. ———. 1986. *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*. London: Macmillan.
Translated by Adam Czerniawski.
35. ———. 1988. "Theory of knowledge as phenomenology of the 'essence' of cognitive experiences and their correlates." *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy* no. 4:1-106.
Translation of chapter IV from *Foundations of epistemology*. *Part I* (published in Polish in 1971).
36. ———. 1989. *Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Translated by Raymond Meyer with John T. Goldthwait.
37. ———. 1991. "On translations." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 30:139-192.
Vol. 33: Ingardeniana III; translated from the Polish by Jolanta Wawrzycka.
38. Szylewicz, Arthur. 1993. "Roman Ingarden's Review of the Second Edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Husserl Studies* no. 10:1-12.
Contains the English translation of Ingarden's *Review* at pp. 4-12.
"The review of the Second Edition of E. Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* was Roman Ingarden's very first publication. At the time of its appearance, 1915, Ingarden was still studying in Freiburg, working on his Ph.D. under Husserl. What could have prompted the youthful Ingarden to write such a review? The fact that the review was written in Polish suggests that Ingarden may simply have grasped an opportunity to arouse the Polish philosophical community's interest in a work that he regarded as monumental and, perhaps more generally, to stir its

awareness of phenomenology as a movement. It may be no accident that the review appears in a section of the journal entitled "Survey of Contemporary Systems". More compelling evidence for this occasional motive is the fact that Ingarden's first major publication was an extensive "introduction" to phenomenology. It was meant to remedy the deplorable state of almost total ignorance of phenomenology that Ingarden encountered on his return to Poland following the completion of his studies with Husserl." (p. 1)

39. Ingarden, Roman. 2013. *Controversy over the Existence of the World. Volume I*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz.
Table of Contents: Translator's Note 7; Jan Woleński: Introduction 11; Preface 19; Addendum to the German Edition 25;
Chapter I: Preliminary Relections 27; Chapter II: Partition of the Three Major Problem Groups 47;
Part I. Existential-Ontological Problems of the Controversy over the Existence of the World 93;
Chapter III: Basic Existential Concepts 95; Chapter IV: Provisional Survey of the Currently Feasible Variants of a Solution to the Controversy 167; Chapter V: Time and Mode of Being 227; Chapter VI: Consequences of the Time Analysis for the Solution Possibilities of the Idealism / Realism Problem 279;
Appendix A - K 301-320.
"Ingarden intended to give a systematic account of realist phenomenology in a work with the general title *Spór o istnienie świata* (*Controversy over the Existence of the World*). He projected five volumes, but completed only three.
Volumes I and II appeared in 1947-48. The 2nd, corrected (and supplemented by additional notes) edition of both volumes was published in 1960-61. In 1964-65, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Ingarden's life-long publisher, issued a German "translation" (by Ingarden himself) as *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Vol. I: *Existentialontologie* and Vol. II: *Formalontologie, Welt und Bewusstein*. On

Ingarden's own admission, it was not a straightforward translation, but involved considerable revision – especially in Vol. I. The same house published Vol. 3 (*Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt: Über die die kausale Struktur der realen Welt)* in 1974; this volume deals with the causal structure of the real world. The last Polish edition of Vols. I and II of *Spór* appeared in 1987 in an edition that represents a splicing by Danuta Gierulanka, Ingarden's assistant, of the Polish and German versions; her Polish translation of Vol. III of *Streit* appeared in 1981." (pp. 13-14)

40. ———. 2016. *Controversy over the Existence of the World. Volume II*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz.
Table of Contents: Translators's Note 6;
Part II/1. VII: The Problem Pertaining to the Essence of Form and its Foundational Concepts 19; VIII. The Form of the Existentially Autonomous Object 71; IX: The Form of purely Intentional Object 171 ; X. The Form of the Idea 225 ; XI: The Form of the State of Affairs. State of Affairs and Object 267; XII: The Form of the Relation. The Relative and non-Relative (Absolute) Characteristics of the Individual Object 311; XIII: The Essence of the Existentially Selfsuffcient Object 357;
Part II/2. XIV. The Problem of the Identity of an Individual Temporally Conditioned Object 425; XV. The Form of a Existential Domain and the Form of the World 507; XVI. The Problem of the Form of Pure Consciousness 645; XVII. Application of the Formal-Ontological Results to the Problem of the Existence of the World 743; Index of Names 773-775.

ITALIAN TRANSLATIONS

41. Ingarden, Roman. 1867. "La 'Vita' dell'opera Letteraria." *Il Verri* no. 23:3-28.

42. ———. 1957. "I Compiti Attuali Della Fenomenologia." *Archivio di Filosofia* no. 1-2:169-170.

43. ———. 1958. "Osservazioni Sul Problema Del Giudizio Di Valore Estetico." In *Il Giudizio Estetico. Atti Del Simposio Di Estetica. Venezia 1958*, 41-50. Padova: Edizioni della Rivista di Estetica.

44. ———. 1961. "La Pittura Astratta." *Rivista di Estetica* no. 6:165-190.

45. ———. 1968. *Fenomenologia Dell'opera D'arte Letteraria*. Milano: Silva.

    Traduzione parziale di *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* by Guliana Brozich-Lipszer and Sergio Checconi.

46. ———. 1982. *Sulla Responsabilità*. Bologna: CSEO Biblioteca.

47. ———. 1989. *L'opera Musicale E Il Problema Della Sua Identità*. Palermo: Flaccovio.

48. ———. 2011. *L'opera D'arte Letteraria*. Verona: Edizioni Fondazione Centro Studi Campostrini.

    Traduzione di Lidia Gasperoni con la collaborazione di Giuseppe di Salvatore.
    Postfazione di Daniela Angelucci.

STUDIES ABOUT INGARDEN'S PHILOSOPHY

1. Ales Bello, Angela. 2004. "The Controversy about the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological School: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein." In *Does the World Exist? Plurisignificant Ciphering of Reality*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 97-116. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 79.

"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."

"The above outline sought to show very briefly how the discussion about the existence of the world came into being within the phenomenological school. We noted that Husserl's cited disciples are convinced that, as far as the maestro is concerned, the world - understood as external reality that comprises ourselves as human beings - does exist. but doubt that he succeeded in justifying this view moving from his theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the objections are more or less mellow and indistinct and all of them are made within the school, that is to say. within a common style of search.

The great common terrain is constituted by essential analysis, which nobody wants to do without. but precisely because the philosophical tradition regards the theme of the essence as related to that of existence, there arises the fear that this latter aspect might he pushed into the background. Furthermore, because for Husserl essential analysis concentrates on subjectivity and opens the road to the transcendental perspective, what is feared is becoming enclosed in subjectivity and concentrating all of reality in it. as in the great lesson of German idealism.

As can be seen. I have endeavored to defend Flossed against his own disciples, trying to delve into his profound intentions, re-balancing - wherever this proves possible - the results of his analysis. comforted in this by the observations of Edith Stein, who was probably closest to the maestro and therefore managed to grasp the principal lines

of his position more accurately. The theoretical core always remains the relationship between idealism and realism. with respect to which Husserl's attitude, at least in my opinion, is very balanced, notwithstanding its peculiarity. On the other hand, it is quite readily understandable that his disciples should have committed the "great parricide," to use the expression that Plato used in connection with Parmenides: it may well he that without it one does not achieve theoretical autonomy. All the same, one also has to hear in mind a saying that once again involves Plato: *amicus Plato. sell magis amica veritas*. which should help us understand the intentions of the other before we raise objections." (p. 113)

2. Bartoszynski, Kazimierz. 1989. "The Ontology of Objects in Ingarden's Aesthetics." In *Man within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 369-383. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
   Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
3. Blaszczyk, Piotr. 2005. "On the Mode of Existence of Real Numbers." In *Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos, Book 1*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 137-155. Dordrecht: Springer.
   Analaecta Husserliana. Volume 88.
   "Ingarden's ontology is an ontology of an object. An object, as conceived by Ingarden, is, first of all, something which is a unity of matter (referred to by Ingarden as material endowment), form (formal structure) and existence (mode of existence). As examples of objects in this meaning one may offer: a physical object, a process, an event, a Platonic idea, a property of a thing, a negative state of affairs. Yet, not everything is an object. Non-objects are: matter, form and mode of existence as such. The *Controversy over the Existence of the World* was divided by Ingarden into Existential Ontology and Formal Ontology in order to deal with existential and formal aspects of objects." (p. 137)
4. Bostar, Leo. 1994. "Reading Ingarden Read Husserl: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Phenomenological Method." *Husserl Studies* no. 10:211-236.

5. Brogowski, Leszeck. 1999. "Phenomenology and the Aesthetic Experience: ontological reflections on Roman Ingarden's *Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*." *Revue d'Esthétique* no. 36:59-73.
6. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. *Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
7. ———. 1999. "Are Meanings in the Head? Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 30:306-326.
   "The question in the title should be construed as an epistemological and not an ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask if all what is needed to explain the phenomenon of the meaningful use of words, could be found "in our private head" interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or non-public.
   There are many "mentalistic" theories of meaning that force us to the answer: "yes". According to these theories our words are meaningful in virtue of certain intentions of the speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who claim to have evidence to the contrary. They argue that the meanings of our words could not be "in the head", because of two important reasons. (I) Very often we don't know exactly the meanings of the words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our "semantical self-knowledge" is principally corrigible by other people, and hence our access to the meanings we use could be by no means privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same word with the very different meanings.
   We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden's philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting sense: "yes and no"."
8. ———. 2002. "Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre." *Husserl Studies* no.

18:185-208.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in: A. Chrudzimski - *Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden* - Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2005, pp. 135-160.

9. ———. 2004. "Roman Ingarden: Ontology from a phenomenological point of view." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 22:121-142.
10. ———, ed. 2005. *Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Contents: Introduction 7; Gregor Haefliger, Guido Küng: Substances, States, Processes, Events. Ingarden and the Analytic Theory of Objects 9; Peter Simons: Ingarden and the Ontology of Dependence 39; Daniel von Wachter: Roman Ingarden's Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas,
and Other Things Empiricists Do not Like 55; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die intentionalen Gegenstände 83; Amie L. Thomasson: Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects 115; Jeff Mitscherling: Concretization, Literary Criticism, and the Life of the Literary Work of Art 137; Edward Swiderski: Ingarden: From Phenomenological Realism to Moral Realism 159; Andrzej Póltawski: Roman Ingardens Ontologie und die Welt 191; Notes on Contributors 221; Index of Names 225.
"Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden's work valuable and inspiring belong to the growing community of "naïve" or "straight" realists who typically don't even consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical option. Ironically, the main goal of Ingarden's philosophical struggle - the refutation of idealism - remained something that very few of his reader are really interested in.
Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden's reception. The first three articles concern the basic ontological categories and distinctions. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories

of substance, state, process, and event, and compare Ingarden's solutions with some contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several concepts of ontological dependence that are central for the especially Ingardenian branch of ontology that Ingarden called "existential ontology". Daniel von Wachter proposes "a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology" (p. 55 in this volume). The next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden's philosophy that happened to become the best known of his achievements: the philosophy of fiction and of cultural objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional objects and argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson presents an Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags.
Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the "life" of a literary work of art.
The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden's work. Edward Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective that occurred in Ingarden's late work, which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is a tension between the hypothetical scientific and phenomenological sides of his philosophy. Andrzej Póltawski tries to answer the question of what Ingarden's ontology would look like if he developed it according to his deeply personalist picture of the world." (pp. 7-8)

11. ———. 2005. *Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden*. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos verlag. Contents: Einführung 7; 1. Franz Brentano über die Intentionalität 17; 2. Franz Brentano über die Zeitbewusstsein 39; 3. Anton Marty 53; 4. Wozu brauchte Carl Stumpf Sachverhalte? 89; 5. Alexius Meinong 107; 6. Von Brentaon zu Ingarden 135; 7. Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität 161; Bibliographie 203; Namenregister 211.
12. ———. 2005. "Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die intentionale Gegenstände." In *Existence, Culture, and*

Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
13. Dziemidok, Bohdan, and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1989. *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: interpretations and Assessments*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
14. Falk, Eugen. 1981. *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*. Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
15. Farber, Marvin. 1973. "On Subjectivism and the World Problem. In Memory of Roman Ingarden." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 7:1-7.
16. Fiedler, Theodore. 1975. "Taking Ingarden Seriously: Critical Reflections on "The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art" Part I." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:131-140.
17. Fizer, John. 1976. "Ingarden's Phases, Bergson's *Durée Réelle* and James' Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive Concepts on the Theme of Time." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 121-139. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
18. Galewicz, Wlodzimierz. 1994. "Das Problem des Seinsstatus der gegenständlichen Sinne und Ingardens Ontologie der rein intentionalen Gegenstände." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 5-20. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
19. Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth, and Strózewski, Wladylasw, eds. 1994. *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburtstag*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
20. Gierulanka, Danuta. 1977. "The Philosophical Work of Roman Ingarden." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 4:117-128.
21. ———. 1989. "Ingarden's Philosophical Work: A Systematic Outline." In *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assesments*, edited by Dziemidok, Bohdan and McCormick, Peter, 1-20. Dordrecht: Kluwer. "Ingarden's philosophical output does not form a closed system in the sense of a set of statements derived from apriori accepted general assumptions. Following the basic

methodological principle of Husserl's phenomenology, Ingarden obtained results in all areas of his philosophy by referring directly to the "things given in experiences" corresponding to the type of object being investigated (in direct intuitive cognition). In spite of the great breadth of topics studied his results constitute a lucidly organized whole, as I shall presently try to demonstrate.
Ingarden's writings (over two hundred items including twenty-seven large books) belong primarily to three areas of philosophy: epistemology, ontology, and aesthetics (including the theory of the work of art). This does not, however, comprise all of his work, as I shall show later.
The first decade of Ingarden's philosophic work already included basic results which set the direction and paths of development of his thought.
I shall discuss the main core of Ingarden's philosophy in several sections, indicating the thought processes leading from one to another. Epistemology, being the least known chapter of his thought, and ontology, which dominates Ingarden's philosophy, will be discussed more extensively." (p. 2).

22. Golaszewska, Maria. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Moral Philosophy." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 73-103. Dordrecht: Reidel. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
23. Górniak-Kocokowska, Krystyna. 1989. "Controversy About Actual Existence: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka Contribution to the Study of Roman Ingarden's Philosophy." In *Man Within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 165-192. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
24. Gumpel, Liselotte. 1994. "Language as Bearer of Meaning: the Phenomenology of Roman Ingarden." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 21-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

25. Haefliger, Gregor. 1990. "Ingarden und Husserls transzendentaler Idealismus." *Husserl Studies* no. 7:103-121.
26. ———. 1994. *Über Existenz: die Ontologie Roman Ingardens*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"This book is a monograph study of Ingarden's investigations into existence. Its aim is to give a clear and formally precise account, as well as a critical evaluation, of his contributions. In the first chapter the basic principles of Ingarden's ontology are reformulated and, contrary to Ingarden, a nominalistic point of view is adopted. Chapters 2 to 4 give a reconstruction of the arguments for the following Ingardenian theses: (1) Existence is not a property; (2) The concept of existence is a principle *sui generis* of classification; (3) "exist(s)"is an equivocal word. On the basis of this critical doxography Chapters 5 and 6 provide a systematic examination of the Ingardenian position, by confronting it with the results of analytic philosophy (such as early Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong, Bergmann, Hochberg, Castaneda)."
27. ———. 1994. "Ens multipliciter dicitur. The Ingardian Variant of an Old Thesis." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 59-78. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Now, one important thesis of Ingarden *Das literarische Kuntswerk* (1931) is that a literal work exists in a "purely intentional" way. This thesis was later refined in Ingarden (1964), where a theory of the different ways of being is elaborated. Even today, however, his theory has not yet received widespread attention. This is so despite the originality and conceptual transparency of the programme he developed for his theory. And more importantly, his position contains novel viewpoints for an answer to the question of the equivocity of 'to be' - a question that has long been one of the fundamental questions of ontology.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate Ingarden's answer to this "old" question. To this end we must first acquaint ourselves with the fundamentals of his theory of the

different ways or modes of existence. Then we shall consider the unique position that Ingarden's thesis of the equivocity of 'to be' occupies in the history of philosophy. Finally some suggestions towards a systematic evaluation of Ingarden's position will be made."

28. Hanneborg, Knut. 1966. "New Concepts in Ontology. A Review Discussion of Roman Ingarden: *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*." *Inquiry* no. 9:401-409.
"In his *Contemporary European Philosophy* Bochenski declared Ingarden's work, *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* to be one of the most important philosophical publications of our time. The work had then been published only in Polish, a fact which occasioned Bochenski to deplore the widespread habit of publishing professional philosophy in languages other than the main European ones.
Now *Spór o istnienie swiata* has become *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, and the decisive language barrier has been broken. Other obstacles may remain: the 1100 pages do offer, even in non-Polish, a certain resistance. Not that the author has not done his share of the work, for he expresses himself with exemplary precision and by no means leaves the reader with the task of reducing confusion to clarity. But his perseverance in analysis and the wealth of rigorously differentiated concepts give us a complicated whole to survey. It is the limited purpose of the present paper to give a short outline of this comprehensive system, and some hints of its place in a larger context." (p. 401)
29. Heffernan, George. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'was die Evidenz sei': A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana volume XXX." *Husserl Studies* no. 15:1-75.
30. Hempolinski, Michal. 1975. "On Ingarden's Conception of 'Pure' Epistemology as a Starting Point to His Criticism of So-Called Psychophysiological Epistemology." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 2:49-54.
31. Jadacki, Jacek. 1989. "On Roman Ingarden's Semiotic Views: A Contribution to the History of Polish Semiotics." In

Man within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 523-540. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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32. Johansson, Ingvar. 2009. "Roman Ingarden and the Problem of Universals." *Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics* no. 10:65-87.
"The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden's notions of "existential moments" and "modes (ways) of being" are presented; and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: Multiplicity-Monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals, too."
33. Kalinowski, Georges. 1968. "Ontologie et esthétique chez Roman Ingarden." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 31:281-287.
34. Kersten, Fred. 1972. "On Understanding Idea and Essence in Husserl and Ingarden." In *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 55-63. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
35. Kocay, Victor. 1996. *Forme et référence: le langage de Roman Ingarden*. Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga.
36. Küng, Guido. 1972. "Ingarden on Language and Ontology." In *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 204-217. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
37. ———. 1972. "The World as Noema and as Referent." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 3:15-26.
38. ———. 1975. "Zum Lebenswerk von Roman Ingarden: Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik." In *Die Münchener Phänomenologie: Vorträge des Internationalen*

Kongresses in München, 13.-18. April 1971, edited by Kuhn, Helmuth, 159-173. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
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39. ———. 1982. "Roman Ingarden: (1893-1970) Ontological Phenomenology." In *The Phenomenological Movement*, edited by Spiegelberg, Herbert, 223-233. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Third revised edition
40. ———. 1986. "Brentano and Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of Values." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:57-67.
41. Laskey, Dallas. 1972. "Ingarden's Criticism of Husserl." In *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 48-54. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
42. Majewska, Zofia. 2002. "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 184-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
43. Makota, Janina. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:126-130.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of E. M. Swiderski.
"Ingarden's views concerning man are scattered throughout his writings. But the bulk of them is contained in the chapter entitled "The problem of the form of pure consciousness" in the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World (1) and in the posthumous *A Booklet on Man*, (2) which is a collection of previously published articles, lectures, etc. The most advanced considerations on this subject are contained in the essay *On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations*. (3) What is new in this essay and what proves to be theoretically fruitful is the application, not only to man as a whole, but to his body and to the psychic side of his being as well, of the conception of relatively isolated systems. This notion had been previously

employed by Ingarden to explain various types of connections within the world as a whole. (4)"
(1) *Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt,* vol. 11/2, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1965, chap. 16: "Das Problem der Form des reinen Bewusstseins".
(2) *Ksiazecka o czlowieku* (A booklet on Man), Krakow; Wydownictwo Literackie 1972, 2.ed. 1973.
(3) *Ueber die Verantwortung*. *Ihre ontischen Fundamente*, Stuttgart: Reclam 1970.
(4) Cf. *Der Streit* . . . vol. I, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1964, p. 104, and especially *Der Streit* . . . vol. III *Ueber die Kausale Struktur der realen Welt,* Tubingen: Niemeyer 1974.

44. ———. 1986. "Nicolai Hartmann's and Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:69-79.
45. Mardas, Nancy. 2003. "Essence and Existence in Phenomenological Ontology: Roman Ingarden." In *The passions of the soul in the metamorphosis of becoming*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 183-198. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
46. McCormick, Peter. 1975. "On Ingarden's Account of the Existence of Aesthetic Objects." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 4:31-38.
47. Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2003. "Réalisme gnoseologique contre réalisme sceptique: Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne." *Études Philosophiques* no. 64:83-97.
48. Mitscherling, Jeff. 1985. "Roman Ingarden's "The Literary Work of Art": Exposition and Analyses." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 45:351-382.
"In the Preface to the second edition of *The Literary Work of Art*, Roman Ingarden calls attention to one of the unfortunate but unavoidable shortcomings of his book: “I am quite conscious of the fact that for literary critics this book would be much more accessible and plastic if I had devoted a series of concrete analyses to individual works of art. But I had to abandon this from the first, since the book would have become unmanageable.” In this paper I present, as briefly as possible, two such concrete analyses. Throughout my analyses, I employ Ingarden’s terminology.

For the reader who is unfamiliar with this terminology, and perhaps with Ingarden's work in general, these analyses must prove difficult to follow, if not entirely incomprehensible. For this reader, I have added, as Part I of this paper, a preliminary exposition of *The Literary Work of Art*. The reader who is already acquainted with Ingarden's work may wish to skip this and turn immediately to Part II, in which I present my analyses. In Part III, I conclude with a few remarks on the material presented in both the previous parts." (p. 351)

49. ———. 1997. *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Foreword by Raymond Klibansky.

50. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1997. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." In *Phenomenology. Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy*, 32-45. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"Roman Ingarden was Husserl's pupil, and remained in lifelong contact with him, continuously questioning Husserl's positions, especially his transcendental idealism. Whereas the members of the Munich and Göttingen schools simply abandoned the master as having deviated from the path of philosophy as a rigorous science, Ingarden continued his efforts to understand the motives and the arguments which led Husserl in that direction. In this relentless effort, he seems to have gone a long way toward understanding, and even agreeing with, Husserl's transcendental-constitutive phenomenology, but he would nevertheless draw a line that he did not want to cross-thereby preserving his own realistic intuitions from being overtaken by what he took to be an idealistic philosophy. While thus seeking to understand Husserl, Ingarden also undertook first his famous work *Das Literarische Kunstwerk,* and then the large, carefully argued work on the controversy regarding the existence of the world, *Die Streit um die Existenz der Welt*. One could say that Ingarden's central interest lay in the realism-idealism dispute, and it may also be safely said that no one in the history of

philosophy has more carefully analyzed that issue than he. While *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* is deservedly more famous, Ingarden undertook it as much out of his interest in the subject matter of art as out of the desire to advance the discussion of the realism-idealism issue." p. 32

51. Motroshilova, N.V. 1975. "The Problem of the Cognitive Subject as viewed by Husserl and Ingarden." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 2:17-31.
52. Póltawski, Andrzej. 1972. "Constitutive Phenomenology and Intentional Objects." In *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 90-95. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 2.
53. ———. 1974. "Consciousness and Action in Ingarden's Thought." In *The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 124-137. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 3.
54. ———. 1975. "Ingarden's Way to Realism and His Idea of Man." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 2:65-76.
55. ———. 1978. "The Idea and the Place of Human Creativity in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 5:129-140.
56. ———. 1986. "Roman Ingarden. Ein Metaphysiker der Freiheit." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:43-56.
57. Przybysz, Piotr. 1993. "Polish Discussions about Reism." In *Possible Ontologies*, edited by Augustynek, Zdzislaw and Jacek, Jadacki, 179-193. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
58. Reese, William. 1965. "Phenomenology and Metaphysics." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 19:103-114.
59. Richard, Sébastien, and Malherbe, Olivier, eds. 2016. *Forme(s) et modes d'être. L'ontologie de Roman Ingarden / Form(s) and Modes of Being. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*. Bern: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
60. Riska, Augustin. 1974. "The 'a priori' in Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." In *The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 138-146. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Analecta Husserliana. Volume 3.
61. ———. 1976. "Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 187-217. Dordrecht: Reidel. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
62. Rosiak, Marek. 2009. "Formal and Existential Analysis of Subject and Properties." In *Essays in Logic and Ontology*, edited by Malinowski, Jacek and Pietrsuzczack, Andrzej, 285-299. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"The paper is a contribution to the object ontology. The general approach assumed in the investigation is that of Roman Ingarden's *The Controversy Over the Existence of the World* where an object is the subject-of-properties. The analysis of the form and the mode of existence of properties leads to the rejection of both negative and general properties. Each property is an individual qualitative moment of a particular object. Its form reveals existential heteronomy: the quality of the property is not immanent but refers to the object. The subject of properties has not its own qualitative content: its form is just the internal causality establishing the unity of an object. An object is not causally isolated from other objects, but external causation differs from internal either by being ramified in case of the composition and destruction of an object or reciprocal in case of interaction between coexisting objects."
63. Rudnick, Hans H., ed. 1990. *Ingardeniana II: New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden*. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 30.
64. Ruttkowski, Wolfgang. 2007. *Essays on Aesthetics, Poetics and Terminology of Literary Studies*. München: Grin Verlag.
Essay I: *Stratum, structure, and genre* (1973) pp. 4-30.
"The concept of *genre* can be satisfactorily explained only in comparison with the concepts of *stratum* and *structure*. Proceeding from this conviction we shall try here to establish a demarcation of these often used terms and at the same time prove their interdependence."

Essay III: *The main differences between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata systems* (1990) pp. 31-48. "Although both designed strata-models for various kinds of art and especially for literature, the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden never entered into any kind of dialogue. Also in secondary literature there is no exact comparison of their systems to be found.
For that reason, the two strata systems are compared here for the first time and their respective advantages and deficiencies are being pointed out.
Amongst other things. the following topics are being discussed: 1. In what way Hartmann's "Real Foreground" ("Realer Vordergrund") is more specifically subdivided in Ingarden's system. - 2. How, on the other hand. Ingarden's "Stratum of Depicted Objects" ("Schicht der dargestellten Gegenstãndlichkeiten") was more thoroughly subdivided by Hartmann. 3. Why there cannot be found in Hartmann's system a corresponding stratum for Ingarden's "Stratum of Schematized Aspects" ("Schicht der schematischen Ansichten") - and 4. Why Hartmann's two strata of the Treat Background" ("Irrealer Hintergrund") are consolidated by Ingarden and expressly not seen as a stratum."

65. Ryle, Gilbert. 1927. "Review of: *Essentiale Fragen* by Roman Ingarden." *Mind* no. 36:366-370.
Reprinted in: *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 4, 1973, pp. 72-75.
66. Rynkiewicz, Kazimierz. 2008. *Zwischen Realismus und Idealismus. Ingardens Überwindung des transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
67. Sancipriano, Mario. 1976. "Ingarden et le 'vrai' Bergsonisme." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 141-148. Dordrecht: Reidel. Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
68. Schaeffer, Jean-Marie, and Potocki, Christophe, eds. 2013. *Roman Ingarden: ontologie, esthétique, fiction*. Paris: Archives Contemporaines Editions.
69. Schopper, Werner. 1974. *Das Seiende und der Gegenstand: zur Ontologie Roman Ingardens*. München:

Berchmanskolleg Verlag.
70. Seifert, Joseph. 1986. "Roman Ingarden' Realism and the motives that led Husserl to adopt Transcendental Idealism: critical reflections on the importance and limits of Roman Ingarden's critique of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:27-42.
71. Seifert, Joseph, and Smith, Barry. 1994. "The Truth about Fiction." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 97-118. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
72. Shusterman, Richard. 1987. "Ingarden, Inscription and Literary Ontology." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 2:103-119.
Reprinted in: *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments*.
73. Simons, Peter M. 1986. "Categories and Ways of Being." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:89-104.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons, *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays,* Dodrecht: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 377-394.
"Ingarden's most substantial contribution to philosophy was his ontology. Ontology, the science of being as being, was conceived in Plato's wrestling with the Eleatics' *to on*. Its birth to Aristotle was not without complications for it seemed a single science should have a single genus as object, yet Aristotle denied that *to on* formed a genus. Given the role Aristotle gives to genera in definition, this is not surprising, but the outcome is that 'to be' is not said according to one genus, and hence has several meanings. Can there then be a science of being as being? Aristotle's solution lay in the idea that all these meanings revolved around the central one of to be said of substances. However, not all philosophers shared Aristotle's denial of a single all-embracing class of objects. Plotinus regarded `*ti*', 'something', as denoting a highest genus. Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and Husserl all used univocal term: like

'*etwas*' and '*Gegenstand'* to mark such a class, while Quine has insisted that 'there are' is univocally rendered by the existential quantifier. Ingarden on the other hand follows Aristotle.
The question of the univocity or multivocity of be is still one of the first questions of ontology. In this paper I use historical comparisons to point to where a solution to the problem may lie. Ingarden's account of the different ways or modes of being (*Seinsweisen, modi essendi*) is a most important philosophical contribution to the problem. By chance 1985 marks not only the fifteenth anniversary of Ingarden's death but also the official 700th anniversary of the birth of the greatest of the late scholastics, William of Ockham, who is also celebrated here. My motive is however primarily systematic: I think be is indeed analogically ambiguous, though for different reasons than Aristotle or Ingarden. (1) But to be precise about what this mean involves comparisons in which one looks for help and enlightenment to the great minds of the past."
(1) Cf. my *Class, Mass and Mereology*, "History and Philosophy of Logic" 4 (1983, 157-80, also Ch. 4 of my book *Parts. A Study in Ontology*, 1987).

74. ———. 1994. "Strata in Ingarden's Ontology." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"This paper examines the concept of stratum as employed by Ingarden in his ontological investigations of works of art. Attention is focussed on literary works, which are said to have four strata, two belonging to language itself. I find Ingarden's stratified account of language correct in principle but defective in execution. In the ontology of literary works, the stratum of schematized aspects is particularly problematic, and I interpret these as complex meanings, correlated with another element of the work not given sufficient recognition by Ingarden: the Reader. I suggest the terminology of strata for anworks in general is dispensable."

75. Skolimowski, Henryk. 1967. *Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical*

Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
76. Smith, Barry. 1975. "The Ontogenesis of Mathematical Objects." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:91-101.
77. ———. 1976. "Historicity, Value and Mathematics." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 219-239. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 4.
78. ———. 1978. "An Essay in Formal Ontology." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 6:39-62.
"The present paper may be conceived both as a working introduction to certain aspects of the ontological theory put forward by the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden in his mammoth treatise Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, (1) and also as a development of Ingarden's views in the light of current tendencies in analytic philosophical logic. The central theme of the paper – though one which does not become apparent until very near the end – is the ontological analysis of states of affairs, and in particular of negative states of affairs, a topic which is of some specific nterest in forming a connecting link between the Brentano-Meinong-Husserl tradition to which Ingarden belonged, and the (Frege)-Russell-Wittgenstein tradition which gave rise to modern philosophical logic." (p. 39)
(1) (Hereafter referred to as StEW.) Ingarden completed two volumes of this work before his death in 1970, and a further volume has since been compiled from manuscripts. Vol. I, Existentialontologie 1964; Vol. II, Formalontologie, Part 1, Form und Wesen, Part 2,
Welt und Bewußtsein, 1965; Vol. III, Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt, 1974; all published by Niemeyer, Tübingen. For a more general account of Ingarden's project see G. Küng, "Zum Lebenswerk von Roman Ingarden. Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik", in Die Münchener Phänomenologie, ed. H. Kuhn et al., Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 158–73.
79. ———. 1979. "Roman Ingarden: Ontological Foundations for Literary Theory." In *Language, literature and meaning*,

edited by Odmark, John, 373-390. Amsterdam: Benjamins Press.
80. ———. 1980. "Ingarden versus Meinong on the Logic of Fiction." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 41:93-105.
81. ———. 1987. "The Ontology of Epistemology." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 11:57-66.
82. Sodeika, Thomas. 1989. "The Ingarden-Husserl Controversy: the Methodological Status of Consciousness in Phenomenology and the Limits of the Human Condition." In *Man Within His Life-World: Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 209-221. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 27.
83. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Third revised edition; first edition 1960; second edition 1965.
84. Steinbach, Heribert. 1968. "Ist Ontologie als Phänemonologie möglich? Kritische Betrachtungen zu Ingardens Existentialontologie." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 22:78-100.
85. Strózewski, Wladylasw. 1963. "Gli studi di estetica di Roman Ingarden." *Rivista di Estetica* no. 8:131-142.
86. ———. 1976. "Man and Value in Ingarden's Thought." In *The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the Phenomenological Investigation of Man*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 109-123. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Analecta Husserliana. Volume 5.
87. ———. 1988. "Roman Ingarden's Aesthetic Program." *Aletheia: an Internation Journal of Philosophy* no. 4:226-234.
88. Swiderski, Edward. 1975. "Some Salient Features of Ingarden's Ontology." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 2:81-90.
"Ingarden conceived and developed his ontology on the basis of the assumed existence of certain ideal entities,

namely pure ideal qualities and Ideas. An examination of these entities provides, according to him, a knowledge of the corresponding individual essences of individual objects. Although his starting point in this matter reproduces Husserl's original conceptions, what he found in Husserl's writings on the subject proved finally to be neither sufficient nor clear. For example, with respect to the problem of the existence and nature of Ideas, Ingarden wrote in the second volume of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*: "Actually, what he gave us, his students, in this matter was solely the conviction that a rejection of the existence of Ideas-in some special manner-must lead to contradictions". (1) At the same time, the associated problem of the essences of individual objects was felt, not only by Ingarden, but Hering and Spiegelberg as well, (2) to have been inadequately dealt with by Husserl in Ideas I, and it became, consequently, a subject of their own extensive investigations. But what was certainly of value in Husserl, as far as the foundations of ontology were concerned, was his discussion in the Logical Investigations of the a priori, i.e., of the ideal necessities governing the formal and material aspects of objects. (3) It is rather this side of Husserl's work which prompted Ingarden to inquire further into the nature of ideal entities, for they, according to him, are the foundations of the ideal necessities regulating the determinations and the structures of objects.
Accordingly, there are several related subjects to be considered. First, it should be seen how Ingarden conceives objects and their structures in general. This discussion will help clarify the problem whether Ingarden's theory of objects owes its content to the theory of ideal entities, or whether the reverse is true, that the theory of Ideas, etc., is fashioned after the requirements of the theory of objects. The possibility that they might be independent theories is excluded because Ideas, etc., are supposed to furnish a certain kind of knowledge about all sorts of entities whose structures, on the other hand, are already described, in a preliminary general way, by the theory of objects. Second, it should be clarified whether, and if so in what sense, the

structures of objects themselves reflect or indeed embody necessary connections of an ideal character. This calls for an analysis of the notions of "concretion" and "moment" and of their relation to ideal entities. Finally, after these discussions, it will be possible to deal with the central task of ontology according to Ingarden, namely with the analysis of Ideas as the proper field of investigations in ontology."
(1) Ingarden, Roman: *Spór o istnienie swiata* (The Controversy over the Existence of the World) vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed., Warsaw: PWN 1961, p. 63; German ed.: *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, vol. II/1, Tubingen; Niemeyer, 1965, p. 229.
(2) Hering, Jean: "*Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee*", Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 4, Halle 1921; Spiegelberg, Herbert: "*Uber das Wesen der Ideen*", op. cit., vol. 11, Halle, 1930.
(3) Cf. especially Investigation III: "On the theory of wholes and parts" in Logical Investigations, trans.: J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970.

89. ———. 1987. "Ingarden's Puzzling Ontology - Metaphysics Distinction." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 11:67-85.
"In this paper I will examine the distinction as well as the connection Ingarden drew between ontology and metaphysics. I want to show that the distinction is problematic and that therefore the connection remains nebulous. The reason Ingarden gives for the distinction is that a philosopher needs to be clear about what in general, for example, a world is and what sorts of things can in general "furnish" the world before he can claim that the factual world, as apprehended in ordinary and scientific experience, is "really" thus and so. Now Ingarden had comparatively little to say about the connection of ontology to metaphysics. However, speaking in his name it seems plausible to envisage a negative and a positive connection. On the negative side, as it cannot be merely assumed that ontology has some special purchase on the factual world, it may be that no, so to speak, "metaphysical commitment" to

what is "really real" would be justifiable on ontological grounds. On the positive side, if metaphysical statements are grounded in the same evidence that sustains ontological statements, arid the latter do have purchase on the facts, then it follows that ontology has a *prima facie* metaphysical import to start with." (p.67)

90. ———. 1994. "Individual Essence in Ingarden's Ontology." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 183-206. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
91. ———. 1995. "The Problematic Unity of Culture in Ingarden." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 26:171-188.
92. Swiecimski, Jerzy. 1974. "Scientific Information Function and Ingarden's Theory of Forms in the Constitution of the Real World." In *The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 165-186. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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93. Szczepanska, Anita. 1975. "Perspectives of the Axiological Investigations of the Work of Roman Ingarden." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:116-125.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of G. Kung and E. Swiderski. The Polish version of this paper appeared in Studia Estetyczyne, Warsaw, vol. 10 (1973), 239-254.
"It is not my concern here to repeat Ingarden's well-known theses on the aesthetic quality-structure of a work of art. I want, instead, to do the following: (1) to examine the relationship between Ingarden's axiological investigations and his earlier inquiry into the general "anatomy" of works of art - literature, painting, music, etc., (2) to attempt a more detailed characterization of the system of aesthetically significant qualities and, in particular, to state what the system is not, (3) to show the wide field of investigations opened up by the concept of the system of qualities, (4) to show possible directions and make certain suggestions concerning further study of the system of qualities, together

with an account of previous attempts and of the difficulties thus brought to light."

94. Tarnowski, Karol. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Transcendental Constitution." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 3:111-119.

95. Thomasson, Amie L. 2005. "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects." In *Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 115-136. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
"While Roman Ingarden is well known for his work in aesthetics and studies in ontology, one of his most important and lasting contributions has been largely overlooked: his approach to a general ontology of social and cultural objects. Ingarden himself discusses cultural objects other than works of art directly in the first section of "The Architectural Work", where he develops a particularly penetrating view of the ontology of buildings, flags, and churches. This text provides the core insight into how his more lengthy studies of the ontology of works of art in *The Literary*
Work of Art and the rest of *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, combined with the ontological distinctions of *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt,* may be used to understand social and cultural objects. The view that results, I will argue, is based in foreseeing problems with the reductivist and projectivist views that remain popular, and is capable of resolving central problems still thought to plague those who would offer a theory of cultural objects.
Social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags present a puzzle since they seem, on the one hand, to be entities that clearly -- in some sense -- depend on minds, and yet, on the other hand, seem to be objective parts of our world, things of which we may acquire knowledge (both in daily life and in the social sciences), and which we cannot merely modify at will. But it is hard to see how any entity could exhibit both of those characteristics - if, on the one hand, we take their objectivity and mind-externality seriously, and consider them to be identifiable with physical objects, we find ourselves saddled with absurd conclusions

about the conditions under which such entities would exist and persist, and neglect their symbolic and normative features. If, on the other hand, we treat them as mere creations of the mind, they seem either reduced to phantasms that could not have the recalcitrance and impact on our lives cultural objects apparently exhibit, or we seem to be positing 'magical' modes of creation whereby the mind can generate real, mind-external objects.
Ingarden, I will argue, foresees the problems with each of these alternatives and diagnoses of the root of the problem as lying in too narrow an understanding of the senses in which an entity may be mind-dependent, and too narrow a set of ontological categories for entities there may be.
Once we can make evident the different senses in which something may be mind-dependent, and the different kinds of object there may be, we can find room for cultural objects considered as entities that are neither mere physical objects nor projections of the mind, but instead depend in complex ways on both foundations. Such a moderate realist view, I will argue, can provide the means to overcome the problems thought to plague social ontology and show the way to a more comprehensive ontology."

96. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1955. *Essence et existence. Étude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et de Nicolai Hartmann*. Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
Second edition 1957
97. ———. 1955. "Un dessin de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 60:32-57.
98. ———, ed. 1959. *For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
99. ———. 1965. "Existence Vindicated or the Hundred Real Dollars." *The Personalist* no. 46:211-221.
100. ———. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophical Legacy and Beyond: the Creative Freedom of the Possible Worlds." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 2:71-87.
101. ———, ed. 1976. *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

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102. ———. 1976. "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism-Realism controversy with Husserl: the new contextual phase of phenomenology." In *Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 241-418. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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104. Urchs, Max. 1994. "On Causality. Ingarden's Aanalysis vs. Jaskwski Logic." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 2:55-68.
105. Wachter, Daniel von. 2005. "Roman Ingarden's Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists do not Like." In *Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 55-82. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Ingarden's ontology is an impressive biotope. It takes Ingarden 1840 pages to set it up. His style is not cryptic, but he writes down not only how he thinks things are and his arguments for his views, but all his thoughts about the matter, in good phenomenological tradition. The editors of this book have asked me to move on a bit more swiftly. As life is short, let us take a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology. Preparing the travel we need to clarify what *ontology* is for Ingarden, how it relates to semantics, and how it relates to metaphysics. Then we shall turn to different kinds of *existential dependence* and to the distinction between *form and matter*. Having considered these preliminaries we shall consider Ingarden's conception of a substance and, more briefly, his other categories. While my main aim is to guide you through Ingarden's ontology I shall also indicate where I think the actual world is not as Ingarden describes it."
106. Wallner, Ingrid. 1987. "In Defense of Husserl's Transcendental Idealism: Roman Ingarden's Critique Re-

Examined." *Husserl Studies* no. 4:3-43.
107. Wegrzecki, Adam. 1975. "On the Absoluteness of Values." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:109-115.
Translated from the Polish by E. M. Swiderski.
"In his axiological considerations, undertaken with increasing intensity in the last years of his life, Roman Ingarden devoted much attention to the problem of the relativity of values. Above all, he attempted to determine what it is that we have in mind when we talk about this particular aspect of values. He also pointed out in a more or less decided way whether and how it is possible to ascribe "relativity" to a given type of values. He himself was reluctant to accept an axiological relativism, especially in its extreme form according to which all values would be relative in every possible way. He felt that such a radical view on values leads inevitably to subjectivism, to a denial of various axiological qualifications for various spheres of being. Though he was indeed opposed to this view it was not only because of its theoretical and practical consequences, but above all because of the far-reaching simplifications it entailed, the superficiality of the argumentation as well as its disregard for the factual state of affairs accessible to the unprejudiced researcher of value-phenomena. Nevertheless, Ingarden's opposition to a radical axiological relativism does not mean that he spoke out for a radical axiological absolutism. Such an inference would be too hasty since, as I shall try to show, it would impute to Ingarden a point of view which has no foundation in his investigations of values. In order to ascertain whether Ingarden's theory of values eventually does allow for some conception of an axiological absolutism, a closer analysis must be carried out of those of its assertions which directly or indirectly touch upon the absoluteness of values. In this regard Ingarden's significant methodological postulate must be kept in mind, namely that in axiological considerations the essential differences among types of values are not to be obscured. This means, in the first place, that a mechanical transference of assertions that apply to one type of values to

some other type or types is invalid; and, in the second place, that a mechanical extension to various types of values of the validity of a series of general axiological theses having the character of pure theoretical possibilities is also invalid. Hence to determine in what sense Ingarden would be willing to admit an axiological absolutism is not at all the same thing as resolving the question of what kind of absoluteness belongs, according to him, to the given types of values. Most of the remarks in Ingarden's axiology refer to ethical and aesthetic values which makes it possible to determine more exactly their "absoluteness-character" and, at the same time, to indicate which purely theoretical possibilities are "realized" in the case of these types of values.

It is possible to infer from certain of Ingarden's statements that he excludes certain forms of the absoluteness of values encountered in axiological thought. Thus he rejects the view which was once current that values are autonomous objects of a particular kind existing independently of everything and having in themselves the foundation of their continued existence. According to this view, values are simply ideal objects. Ingarden rejects this form of a radically conceived absoluteness of values if only because he considers that a value is always a value of something, or in something, or for something. Moreover, it does not possess the form of an object, whether or not it exists ideally or otherwise, and it always requires the appropriate foundation for its existence. This conviction applies to all values." p. 109.

108. ———. 1994. "The Function of Ontology and Experience in Roman Ingarden's Axiological Investigations." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 219-228. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

109. Wolenski, Jan. 1986. "Remarks on Primitivity and Secondarity as Moments of Existence." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:81-87.

"In the summary I should like to say that various problems of Ingarden's existential ontology can be profitably analysed by means of contemporary modal logic. On the other hand,

it is highly probable that some elements of Ingardenian ontology may be helpful for modal logicians. In spite of the known Ingarden's very critical assesment of formal logic, there is a need for close cooperation between logicians and philosophers in Ingarden's style. I hope that my considerations justify such an opinion."

110. ———. 1994. "Sentences, Propositions and Quasi-Propositions." In *Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag*, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 229-235. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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112. ———. 1996. "Meinong and Ingarden on Negative Judgments." *Axiomathes*:267-278.

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The Ontological Realism of Gustav Bergmann

INTRODUCTION

"An ontology may be described as consisting of three kinds of statements: those that set the problems; those that list the kinds of entities that exist; those that show how the existents solve the problems. Ontologies may thus differ in different ways. The most decisive way concerns the kinds of entities deemed to exist. With respect to this way, there are but two types of ontology. One is lavish, cluttered; the other, frugal, sparse. The ontologies of Plato, Meinong, and Frege are lavish; those of Hume, Brentano, and Wittgenstein are frugal.
Gustav Bergmann has propounded both types of ontology in the course of his thirty years of philosophizing. The Bergmann of *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (1954) and *Meaning and Existence* (1959) propounds a frugal ontology. The Bergmann of *Logic and Reality* (1964) and *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (1967) propounds a lavish ontology. In a way of speaking that Bergmann himself has used, the world of the early Bergmann is a desert, the world of the later Bergmann a jungle. In a way of speaking that is suggestive, speculative, had the early Bergmann written Realism, he would have dedicated it to Brentano rather than to Meinong, as did the later Bergmann.
The difference between the ontologies of the two Bergmanns is great, though it does not greatly strike one in reading Bergmann's essays. One is rather struck, on the one hand, by his unswerving commitment to the so called ideal language method of philosophizing and, on the other, by his persistent concern with

the solutions to, and dialectical connections amongst a seemingly limited number of problems-individuation, universals, necessity, and intentionality. Bergmann's essays thus appear to be a set of variations on several ontological themes. And at first glance the variations are slight enough to cause one to overlook the amazing difference between the ontologies struck by the early and later Bergmanns. Furthermore, Bergmann himself tends to minimize the difference. He does so, I suspect, first, because he naturally stresses how his later views evolve naturally from 'his earlier ones and, second, because he tries to mediate between the two Bergmanns, telling the early one that the later's ontology is less cluttered than one might initially think. The later Bergmann seems somewhat uncomfortable in the jungle into which he has led himself. Be that as it may, in Bergmann's essays the difference between the two Bergmanns is muted, obscured, by Bergmann's constant and conspicuous use of the ideal language method, his persistent preoccupation with the same problems, and his reluctance to dwell on and dramatize his evolution from frugality to lavishness.

The emergence of the later Bergmann is ironic. The lavishness is the outgrowth of his method, the very method developed by the early Wittgenstein as a device for solving frugally the problems Frege solved lavishly. The emergence of the later Bergmann is also, and more significantly, inevitable. The ideal language method dictates a lavish ontology. Upon realizing that, Bergmann abandoned frugality and clung to the method. In contrast, Wittgenstein, upon realizing the same thing, abandoned the method and clung to frugality." (pp. 38-39)

From: Edwin B. Allaire, *Bergmann's Ontologies* in: Moltke S. Gram, Elmer D. Klemke (eds.), *The Ontological Turn. Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann*, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A complete and updated bibliography of Gustav Bergmann (128 titles) and the studies about him (107 titles) is available in *Rivista di Estetica*, 25, 2004 pp. 113-126; I give only the most relevant publications.

1. Bergmann, Gustav. 1954. *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

   Second edition: Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
   Contents: Preface V; Preface to the Second edition IX-X; 1. Logical Positivism (1950) 1; 2. Semantics (1950) 17; 3. Logical Positivism, language, and the reconstruction of metaphysics (1953) 30; 4. Two cornerstones of Empiricism (1953) 78; 5. Two types of linguistic philosophy (1952) 106; 6. Bodies, minds, and acts (1952) 132; 7. Remarks on Realism (1946) 153; 8. Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence (1947) 176; 9. Russell on particulars (1947) 197; 10. Professor Ayer's analysis of knowing (1949) 215; 11. On nonperceptual intuition (1949) 228; 12. Conditions for an extensional elementaristic language (1948) 232; 13. A note on ontology (1950) 238; 14. Logical Atomism, elementarism, and the analysis of value (1951) 243; 15. Comments on Professor Hempel's "The concept of cognitive significance" (1951) 255; 16. The identity of indiscernibles and the formalist definition of "identity (1953) 268; 17. The problem of relations in classical psychology (1952) 277; 18. Ideology (1951) 300; Author's note 326; Index 328-340.
   From the Preface: "This is not a collection of my papers on first philosophy but a selection from them. Nor is the order in which they are arranged chronological. This requires some comment. The papers fall into three groups. Taken together, the first six, of most recent origin, provide an outline of the views I now hold. The second group consists of the next three, which are the earliest included in this volume. Together with three other still earlier ones which I have excluded, they form a unit centered around the realism phenomenalism issue. The excluded papers are "Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions" (*Mind,* 53, 1944),

"A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness" (*Mind,* 54, 1945), "Undefined Descriptive Predicates" (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 8, 1947) . *I* omit them because for the most part they merely say very badly what I have since said again, a little less badly, in the six essays of the first group. I mention them because there I first struck out on my own, trying to free myself from the influence of Carnapian positivism though not yet, alas, from its apparatus. Having said that much, as I believe I should, I wish to add, as I believe I also should, that this by now radical dissent has not at all affected either my gratitude or my admiration for Carnap. I still think of him as the outstanding figure in a major phase of the positivistic movement. The third group consists of all the remaining essays, some of them very short. These are in the main elaborations of themes struck in the first nine pieces. The arrangement within this last group represents a compromise between their subject matter and the order in which I remember having written them. The concluding essay differs from the rest. Quite nontechnical, it touches at least indirectly on my philosophy in that broader sense in which everyone who is not himself an analytical philosopher speaks of a man's philosophy. Thus it is, perhaps, not out of place at the end of a volume that is otherwise rather technical.

Aside from a few editorial changes I have left the papers as they were originally written."

From the Preface to the Second edition: "The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle were my first teachers. Thus I was faced with an unpalatable choice. Dialectically, metaphysical materialism always seemed and still seems to me the greater evil. (Scientific materialism is but common sense.) So I began my philosophical career as a reluctant phenomenalist in the style of the Circle. Now I am, and have been for some time, a realist of the phenomenological variety. The break occurred in the early fifties, when I proposed an analysis of the act. This book, my first, a collection of essays originally published in 1954, reflects the struggles which led to that break. Much of it I now reject.

Yet there are also many analyses, of issues and of movements, including pragmatism, logical positivism, and the so-called linguistic philosophy, which I still think are right.
Two of the essays introduce the act. Another, about semantics, mentions the meaning nexus which has come to play so great a role in my thought. The essay on the problem of relations in classical psychology first manifests what has since become one of my major concerns. The concluding piece, on ideology, has been well received by many social scientists.
By now logical positivism belongs to history. Yet it was a vigorous movement; some of its members were brilliant; its contribution to the philosophy of science remains most valuable. From the record of such a movement much can be learned. This book, in its own peculiar way, is part of the record. Thus, since it is still in demand although it has been out of print for some time, a new edition seems justified."

2. ———. 1957. *Philosophy of Science*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

3. ———. 1959. *Meaning and Existence*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

   Contents: Preface V-X; 1. Intentionality (1955) 3; 2. The revolt against Logical Atomism (1958) 39; 3. Analiticity (1958) 73; 4. Particularity and the new nominalism (1954) 91; 5. (with Herbert Hochberg) Concepts (1957) 106; 6. Elementarism (1957) 115; 7. Individuals (1958) 124; 8. Sameness, meaning, and identity (1958) 132; 9. Professor Quine on analiticity (1955) 139; 10. Some remarks on the ontology of Ockham (1954) 144; 11. Russell's examination of Leibniz examined (1956) 155; 12. Some remarks on the philosophy of Malebranche (1956) 189; 13. Frege's hidden nominalism (1958) 205; 14. Some reflections on time (1958) 225; Author's note 265; Index 267-274.
   From the Preface: "The main theme of this book is the analysis of mind. But even the basic problems fall into each

other's scopes. Thus other themes had to be sounded, some of them rather fully. Foremost among these is the basic problem of ontology, that is, the search for a complete inventory of the several kinds of existent. An analysis which denies mind the status of an existent, in the full ontological sense of 'existent', is patently inadequate. That shows the connection. Yet, all attempts to place mind in any of the less extravagant ontological schemes available led to consequences which flaw the over-all pattern. That shows the difficulty. The book propounds how I propose to conquer it.

The characteristic feature of minds is their intentionality. That makes "Intentionality and Ontology" an accurate two-word title. "Meaning and Existence" sounds less formidable. Ontology asks what exists. This justifies the substitution of 'existence' for 'ontology'. That of 'meaning' for 'intentionality' will be justified in a moment.

What a philosopher takes a question to be as well as the sort of answer (rather than, which specific answer) he considers a (possible) solution depends on his conception of the philosophical enterprise. Or, what amounts virtually to the same thing, it depends on his method. That is why philosophers always were method conscious. At the beginning of this century analytical philosophy took what has been called the linguistic turn. The issue, and it still is an issue, is one of method. That is why our generation is even more method conscious than some of its predecessors. My work is in the linguistic stream. Inevitably, therefore, the basic theme of method runs through the whole book. One essay develops it in considerable detail.

The linguistic stream has several currents. I philosophize by means of one of the schemes known as ideal languages. My being in this current in part determines the content of the book. Analyticity, every one agrees, is a very fundamental problem. For a practitioner of my method it is basic. (I am even prepared to grant that the adequate explication of analyticity is the one and only major task for which the method is indispensable.) Moreover, there is a very close

connection between the problem of analyticity and the analysis of mind.
To whatever current a linguistic philosopher may belong, the analysis of mind is for him virtually indistinguishable from that of the various ontological and logical aspects of meaning. (This justifies the substitution of 'meaning' for 'intentionality' in the two-word title.) If he belongs to my current, then the core of the problem is to construct an ideal language into which the relevant uses of 'to mean' can be adequately transcribed. I propose such an ideal language. Not surprisingly, for anyone familiar with the course of analytical philosophy in this century, it turns out that this proposal requires radical re-examination and eventual modification of the classical analysts' explicit or implicit notions of analyticity. The connection of my main theme with this major subtheme is thus close indeed.
(...)
This is the second essay collection I publish. *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (1954) was the first. Since the public for anything of this sort is rather limited, quite a few prospective readers of the second will have either read or at least heard of the first. I shall therefore answer a question which is likely to occur to such readers. What, if any, is the connection between the two books? The central thesis of this book is the proposed analysis of the act (I use the classical term). Its central idea is clearly stated in the first book. However, there is an important difference between a full statement and its central idea, just as there is such a difference between even a full statement and the exploration of its consequences. (Remember what was said about the scopes of philosophical problems.) In the Preface to the first book I promised to apply myself to the tasks I had thus set myself. This book fulfills that promise. In this respect, and I believe also in some others, the first book stands to the second as flower stands to fruit. Whether the fruit was worth gathering is not for me to say."

4. ———. 1964. *Logic and Reality*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Acts (1960) 3; 2. Ineffability, ontology, and method (1960) 45; 3. Generality and existence (1962) 64; 4. Meaning (1962) 85; 5. Duration and the specious present (1960) 98; 6. Physics and ontology (1961) 108; 7. Ontological alternatives (1963) 124; 8. Inclusion, exemplification, and inherence in G. E. Moore (1962) 158; 9. Strawson's ontology (1960) 171 10. The ontology of Edmund Husserl (1960) 193; 11. The glory and misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961) 225; 12. Stenius on the *Tractatus* (1963) 242; 13. Synthetic *a priori* (1963) 272; 14. Realistic postscript 302; Author's note 341; Index 343-355.
From the Preface: "Some philosophers never change their minds. Those who do are of two kinds. One kind vacillates, often abruptly, between two extremes such as, say, phenomenalism and materialism. With the other kind the changes are gradual and show a direction. I belong to the latter kind.
This is my third book in first philosophy. In *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (1954) the major concern is with epistemology; the implicit ontology is a reluctant phenomenalism. Since the act is recognized, the phenomenalism is atypical. Recognition, though, is not enough; it merely opens the way. The task is to find a dialectically adequate ontological assay of the act. If this decisive step has been made, then, structurally, realism has been achieved. In *Meaning and Existence* (1960) ontology has come to the fore; structurally, realism is achieved; much of the phenomenalist debris is cleared away. In this book the realism is explicit and fully articulated. In the concluding essay the last piece of debris is buried. That leaves no doubt about the direction of the several changes. They took me over twenty years. The reprieve, even if only conditional, is welcome.
One who has struck out on his own, either ignoring or challenging the fashions of the day, will not, if he is sober, be certain that everything he has gradually come to believe is true. I am very sober. Yet there is one belief I have come to hold very firmly. One cannot arrive at a dialectically adequate realism without recognizing that the world's form

exists. Logic is but a reflection of the world's form. Hence, one cannot fully articulate one's realism without ontologizing logic. That accounts for the title of this book and, more importantly, for its thematic unity. The belief I so firmly hold is the theme. The fourteen essays are fourteen variations on it."

5. ———. 1967. *Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

   Contents: Preface VII-VIII;
   Book One: Facts, things, ideas
   Part I: General ontology
   One: Facts and things 3; Two: Two fundamental ties 22; Three: Connections 42; Four: Parts 71; Five: Perfect particulars and universals 85; Six: Substances
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   Book Two: Brentano and Meinong
   Part III: Brentano
   Twelve: Introduction 221; Thirteen: The truncated world 238; Fourteen: Minds 264; Fifteen: Double judgments 284; Sixteen: Existence, truth, evidence 302; Seventeen: Places, moments, selves 320;
   Part IV: Meinong
   Eighteen: The truncated world 335; Nineteen: Minds 374; Twenty: Earlier stages 399; Twenty-one: Flaws and gaps 399; Bibliographical note 445; Index 447-458.
   From the Preface: "Freud said of *The Interpretation of Dreams* that it was the sort of book a man writes only once in his life. This book is of that sort. It is also very long. Such a book ought to speak for itself. So I send it into the world without any introduction except for one remark about the way it is written.
   There are two kinds of philosophical criticism, and, perhaps, only two kinds of writing in philosophy. The inductive critics try at the same time to make the cross and nail their

intended victim onto it. Those who write deductively first make the cross and, while making it, affect, except for an occasional glance, an almost studied unconcern for the victim. I am virtually incapable of writing inductively. The best I can do, therefore, is to do without disguise, pretext, or apology, the one thing which I may hope not to do too badly. This book has four parts. The first is a short treatise on general ontology. The second expounds the dialectics of representationalism. The third deals critically with Brentano; the fourth, with Meinong. The criticism in the last two parts requires a minimum of exposition. But both criticism and exposition are highly selective."

6. ———. 1992. *New Foundations of Ontology*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

   Edited by William Heald.
   Contents: Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire IX-XII; Editor's Note XIII-XX; Editor's introduction 3; 1. Simples and canons 43; 2. Facts and modes 61; 3. Diversity and order 101; 4. Functions and analiticity 134; 5. Thought and language 201; 6. Classes 239; 7. The Linguistic Turn contained 317; Glossary 357; Index 369-372.
   From the Foreword: "During the last two decades of his life-from the publication of *Realism* in 1967 until his death in 1987 - Gustav Bergmann published only five essays. One, 'Diversity,' his presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, appeared in 1968; the other four, between 1977 and 1981.
   In those decades Bergmann worked as hard and as steadily as he ever had; and he was a hard worker indeed. In the twenty-five years prior to *Realism,* Bergmann published over a hundred essays, many of which are contained in four essay collections, and *Philosophy of Science*.
   In his presidential address Bergmann made known his dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his ontology, in particular his assays of the facts expressed by universal and existential statements. (See 'Generality and Existence,'

Theoria, 28, 1962.) He thus set about to rethink his system. *New Foundations of Ontology is* the result.
The manuscript seems to have been begun sometime in 1974 and completed in late 1975. Bergmann decided to delay its publication: he had reservations about the penultimate chapter, which deals with classes and arithmetic. He never returned to the manuscript per se. Instead, he led himself into the depths of set theory, a subject he had once known well. (Bergmann earned a PhD in mathematics and from 1928 to 1935 published eight papers in mathematics proper.) "

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145; The glory and misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein 177; Stenius on the Tractatus 195; Synthetic a priori 225; Realistic postscript 255; Diversity (1968) 295; Sketch of an ontological inventory (1978) 309; Notes on ontology (1981) 321; Notes on the ontology of minds (1981) 345-370.

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(i) neglects the ontological category of facts;
(ii) neglects or downplays nexus (and more in general subsistents);
(iii) tends to consider all entities as things or thing-like.
As a by-product, some light will be thrown on the sense of Bergmann's ontological enterprise."

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   II: Ontological problems
   Bergmann's ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance by Reinhardt Grossmann 89; Consciousness by Timothy L. Sprigge 114; Time, substance, and analysis by Laird Addis 148; Intentions, facts, and propositions by Hebert Hochberg 168;
   III. Language, logic, and the philosophy of science
   Seeing, seeming, and sensing by Wilfrid Sellars 195; Belief and error by Keith Lehrer 216; Bergmann on the analytic-synthetic distinction by Alan Hausman 230; The problem of color incompatibility by Erik Stenius 245; Perspicuous languages by Robert Ackermann 264; Why I am not aware of your pain by Fred Wilson 276;
   Bibliography: Works by Gustav Bergmann 301
   Index 311-314.
   "The initial plans for this volume in honor of one of the world's most distinguished philosophers were conceived four years ago. After much labor, and with the patience and assistance of all who participated, we are happy to have brought it at last to birth.
   It may seem premature to some, at this time, to publish a volume of essays on Professor Bergmann's philosophy, since

his recent work has not yet been published. But the widespread interest in many countries in his work, and the growing number of philosophers -- even those who disagree with him --who have followed his philosophical pursuits and have written extensively about them, makes it fitting to present a collection of critical studies now." (from the Preface).

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   "The development of the systematic ontology of Bergmann's posthumous 1992 work *New Foundations of Ontology* from its roots in his early criticisms of R. Carnap's work on semantics to his acceptance of fundamental Meinongian ideas, is traced, critically examined and compared to views of others, such as G.E. Moore, B. Russell, W.V. Quine, and J. Searle. The discussion, focusing on main themes of his final metaphysical system, deals with problems posed by universals and particulars, predication and the Bradley "paradox", facts, truth, intentionality and non-existent objectives, classes and the membership relation, logic and the analytic-synthetic distinction, arithmetic and logicism, ontological categories and canons, modalities, internal relations, and the question of the phenomenological ground of ontological claims. Some of the critical analyses are developed into alternative analyses."

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Contents: Preface V-VI; 1. From Positivism to metaphysics: Bergmann's critique of Carnap's semantics 1; 2. Reism, ontological types and *Aufbau*-type ontological constructions 33; 3. Bergmann's *Realism* and the critique of Bundle and Trope ontologies 57; 4. Carnapian consequences: Realism and semantic refutation of Realism 105; 5. Bergmann's Reism: Brentano's and Carnap's revenge 147; 6. Relational order, the Russell-Wittgenstein dispute and Meinongian Realism 175; 7. Negation, quantification and intensional isomorphism 217; 8. The phenomenology and ontology of logic, classes and modality 233; 9. Dispositions and laws of nature: Hume, Husserl and the *New* Causal Realism 289; 10. Avoiding absurdity: Physical Realism, Phenomenalism and Mindless Materialism 319; 11. Extensions, intensions and Carnap's critique of reference 349; 12. Reference reconsidered 371; 13. Logical truth, logical paradoxes and Logical Realism 393-400.
Preface: "Gustav Bergmann's remarkable intellectual journey, beginning as one of the youngest members of the Vienna Circle, and ending, in Hector Castaneda's judgment, as 'the foremost ontologist of the decade' focused on three metaphysical issues that he continuously discussed for thirty years: the problems of individuation, of universals, and of intentionality. Bergmann's turn to metaphysics began with his 1947 paper 'Russell on Particulars,' though he had long insisted that his later concerns with the metaphysics of intentionality, expressed in a 1955 paper on intentionality, are already present in two criticisms of Carnap's semantics published in 1944 and 1945. But a careful reading of the earlier papers, which Carnap (in a letter to Bergmann in the Bergmann archives at the University of Iowa Library) found to be 'mostly Chinese,' show that Bergmann, in 1944 and 1945, is writing as an extreme early Carnapian positivist. In fact he is criticizing Carnap for moving away from positivism and towards a kind of metaphysical realism, by introducing a designation relation between linguistic items and non-linguistic reality. Irrespective of when his turn to metaphysics took place, it

was unique among the positivists that emigrated to the United States and England.

This book will trace lines in Bergmann's development from his early philosophical writings, in the mid 1940s, to what I have called, in one chapter, his 'middle phase,' epitomized in his long and complex book, *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* of 1967, and finally to its culmination in his last work in three final published papers and a book manuscript, *New Foundations of Ontology,* that was posthumously published in 1992 (and from which the final papers were obviously taken). It will also relate them to various themes in Carnap's work in semantics of the 1940s. But, as I am mainly concerned with the basic philosophical issues raised, the book is a study of various attempts to deal with questions posed by the relation between thought and language, on the one hand, and the objects of thought and the referents of linguistic items, on the other. Thus I will be setting out critical assessments of the work of philosophers other than Bergmann and Carnap, including a number of other major figures on the contemporary scene, and of the recent past, in attempting to arrive at a viable realistic ontology that I have called Logical Realism. The basic themes set forth owe much to Bergmann, Carnap, Moore, Russell and the 'early' Wittgenstein. It will also be clear that the analyses set forth owe much to what has come to be called the Austrian Tradition, and the "realism" many of its members espoused, especially Meinong. It is no accident that the early figures of the 'analytic' tradition, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, were heavily influenced by the Brentano school -with Russell and Moore reading the works of various members of that school at the turn of the century. Russell, as is well known, wrote extensive critical, but appreciative, studies of Meinong and other members of the Graz school and was influenced by what he read, in spite of being mostly known in that connection for his widely discussed criticisms of Meinong. Moore's development of his philosophy of mind, with its focus on 'mental acts,' clearly derived this theme from his reading of the Austrians, and he, in turn, influenced Russell, who did not abandon

mental acts until the years 1919-1921. One no longer needs to comment on Wittgenstein's connection to Austrian thought of the period.
Bergmann was a unique figure in being the only one of the positivists of the Vienna Circle to recombine, in a most fruitful way, the metaphysical themes set forth by Russell and Moore, in what Russell had termed the 'revolt against idealism,' with fundamental ideas derived from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, influenced by Wittgenstein and Russell, and important ideas from the Brentano school - particularly Brentano's philosophy of the act, Meinong's theory of objects, and Husserl's phenomenology. In this he would be a remarkable contemporary philosopher and, as Castaneda noted, play a distinctive role on the philosophical scene from the early 1950s thru the 1970s."

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"The essays collected in this volume were read at the *Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) International colloquium*, held in Aix-en-provence, from December 9th to December 11th 2006, for the centennial anniversary of Bergmann's birth. The conference was organized within the framework of the *Séminaire de Métaphysique* (SEMa), which is hosted by the IHP (*Institut d'Histoire de la Philosophie*). The (non-official) purpose was to promote some liberal exchanges and debates between some Bergmann's interpreters (American and European) focusing on the "actuality" of his thought; the official one was to greet the first meeting devoted to this philosopher in France, where he is still widely little-known. We publish some of these contributions in French, with the hope of a better understanding of the great influence his philosophy should exert in the next future." (p. 1).

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Justus Buchler and the Metaphysics of Natural Complexes

INTRODUCTION

"Justus Buchler is an American philosopher, long well known as a scholar and teacher and now becoming more widely recognized as the author of a new metaphysics. Utilizing his own system of categories, Buchler has given us an analysis of the basic traits of nature and man, experience and judgment, method and meaning, art, science, and philosophy that differs strikingly from the analyses provided or presupposed by other philosophers. There are others who share some of his commitments or take similar positions on particular topics, but Buchler's major categories are distinctively his own, and his systematic outlook (the position I have called "ordinal naturalism") is without precedent in the history of philosophy." (p. 11)
(...)
Buchler calls the ontology that determines his view of nature a 'metaphysics of natural complexes.' (I shall use the word 'ontology' to refer to metaphysical systems of the highest level of generality, as contrasted with metaphysical theories of lesser scope, such as a metaphysics of morals or Buchler's 'metaphysics of utterance.') His treatment of such topics as experience, knowledge, meaning, truth, inquiry, and art reflect the same metaphysical stance as his ontology and utilize some of the same generic concepts, and he sometimes refers to his entire system by the same name. The root concept of Buchler's ontology is the concept of 'natural complex.' While it retains something of its ordinary sense, within the framework of Buchler's metaphysics

this term takes on a special meaning and is his most general ontological category. Rather than seeing nature to be composed of substances, events, processes, matter, spirit, or any other specific type of entity or being, Buchler finds all such categories too narrow. Given the other categories and principles of his ontology, he maintains that there is nothing that cannot be accurately construed as a natural complex. The term is applied by him to attributes as well as entities, to ideas and terms of discourse as well as bodies, human individuals, and the constituents of human experience.

In the language of Buchler's metaphysics, every natural complex is an order. This word, too, has a technical sense for him, resting upon his systematic concepts of 'trait' and 'relation.' All of these will be discussed at length in the chapters of this book devoted to Buchler's ontology. The concept of an order, however, must be introduced here to convey some of the features of ''s version of naturalism. Roughly, an order is an organized multiplicity: a complex distinguishable as a unity in virtue of the pattern of relatedness among its components. In ''s systematic usage, the terms 'natural complex' and 'order' are not completely synonymous: a natural complex is also, in another respect, a trait. But the terms 'complex' and 'order' are coextensive, and Buchler calls the central principle of his metaphysics 'the principle of ordinality.' Thus his system may also be termed a 'metaphysics of orders' or 'metaphysics of ordinality,' or, as some have called it, an 'ordinal metaphysics,' and his outlook may be characterized as an 'ordinal naturalism.' The principle of ordinality that governs Buchler's system is inseparable from his concept of a natural complex, and is the fullest expression of what it means to be a natural complex. For reasons that will later be made clear, Buchler denies that complexes can be composed of simples. Briefly and, perforce, inadequately stated, the principle of ordinality asserts that every complex must be constituted by other complexes, and also that every complex must be a constituent of some other complex or complexes. The term 'order' refers to a complex viewed as having constituents. For a complex viewed as a constituent of an order, Buchler uses the term 'trait', giving to this term a generalized sense which makes words that might be

considered synonymous with it (such as 'characteristic' or 'attribute') only types of trait." (pp. 21-22)

From: Beth J. Singer, *Ordinal Naturalism. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler*, Lewisburg; Bucknell University Press 1983.

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Roman Suszko and the non-Fregean Logics

INTRODUCTION

"I. Roman Suszko (9.11.1919, Podobora – 3.06.1979, Warsaw) was one of the most fascinating personalities in Polish academic community after the Second World War and one of the most outstanding logicians of the time. He was above all a scientist but he also participated in academic life. He was Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at Warsaw University for two terms of office. He studied abstract problems of logic, but also played a part in the satirical film *Rejs* [The Cruise] directed by M. Piwowski.
Suszko was involved in various scientific problems, for example: logical syntax of natural language, liar antynomy, logical probability; but two of his achievements have the greatest value for philosophy of science, i.e., diachronic logic and non-Fregean logic.
Like Ferdinand de Saussure, who, in his monograph *Cours de Linguistique Générale* (Lausanne 1916), made a distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics, Suszko draws a distinction between synchronic and diachronic formal logic. Diachronic formal logic was for Suszko the application of the models theory to formalized languages in order to describe the abstract structure of the development of knowledge. Non-Fregean logic, on the other hand, was a term used by Suszko to refer to classical logic enriched by identity connective and quantifiers binding sentential variables. The identity connective joins two sentences into a true sentence when sentences describe the same situation. It turns out that nonFregean logic is such a general logical calculus that the classical predicate calculus, classical

sentential calculus, Łukasiewicz's finitely-many-valued logics and some modal systems are particular cases of non-Fregean logic. Because of some interpretational difficulties concerning the notion of situation, the logic has not gained among logicians the regard which it deserves.
(...)
In 1966, via Bogusław Wolniewicz's monograph *Things and Facts, Introduction to the First Philosophy of Wittgenstein* [written in Polish], Suszko became acquainted with Wittgenstein's metaphysical views included in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Since that moment, a new, so-called non-Fregean period in Suszko's work began. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein expressed his belief that names designate objects and sentences describe situations. According to Suszko, in order to formulate adequate statements concerning objects as well as situations in a formalized language, there must be two types of variables in that language: nominal variables running through the universe of objects and sentential variables running through the universe of situations.
Then, according to the famous principle No entity without identity, Suszko introduced into the language of classical logic the identity connective which is used to mark that two sentences describe the same situation. Such logical calculus was termed by Suszko non-Fregean logic. The name "non-Fregean logic" originates from the fact that it is not an assumption of this logic that the universe of sentential variables, i.e. the universe of situations is two-elements set. Non-Fregean logic is the most general extensional and logically two-valued logical calculus. Its logical two-valuation consists in that each sentence of the language for which this logic is valid, for all interpretations allowed by this logic, is either true or false. Particularly, the assumptions of this logic are classical laws: the law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. Extensionality, on the other hand, consists in that what any complex expression relates to is marked by the particular constituent expressions of this complex expression. The generality of this logic consists among others in that the principles of that logic do not put any limits on universes, and that the universe of nominal variables is not empty and the

universe of sentential variables has at least two elements. The principles of non-Fregean logic require only consequent application of symbols not leading to non-contradiction, while they do not require us to assume any equality which does not result from previously assumed identities.
This logic has interpretations by which it is entirely characterized from the formal point of view and which may be applied to constructing the models of the theory of situations.
In my opinion, the formalization of all ontologies assigning sentences semantic correlates that are different from their logical values and not changing, in any essential aspect, the intuition that they are the correlates of sentences and nit of names, requires non-Fregean logic or, at least, a theory based on it. However, non-Fregean logic is a logical calculus and - just as any logical calculus - it can be developed independently of its origins and philosophical motivations and without making any assumptions concerning reality. Non-Fregean logic does not establish univocal meanings of such terms as "situation" and "object", just as geometry does not establish univocal meanings of such terms as "point" or "straight" line and despite it geometry is applied to the description of the world. What is the universe of nominal and sentential values depends on the application. Similarly, in geometry or the standard models theory, it is the particular application that determines what the point or the object is.
The non-Fregean period was the most creative time in Suszko's life: during that period he wrote 36 scientific papers, all of which concerned non-Fregean logic (compared to the total of 85 publications which he wrote in his lifetime), he supervised 7 doctoral dissertations during that time, 5 of which concerned non-Fregean logic." (pp. 153)
(...)
In science, it happens that an accurate description of certain problems goes beyond the potentiality of natural language. For example, the notion of continuity could not be precisely expressed until the quantifiers were introduced. According to the standards of contemporary logic, in a given formalized language we consider as many categories of beings as many types of variables there are in a given language. In a language in which

there appear only various non-sentential variables, we cannot, in turn, formulate philosophical statements concerning the world as a whole. According to Suszko, the invention in the history of human thought of such conceptions as Fregean sentential logic, Leśniewski's Protothetics and Wittgenstein's Tractatus are important, among others, as their formalized versions require languages with sentential variables contrary to theories known from mathematics and other sciences, which require only various nominal variables. Suszko, while inventing non-Fregean logic, had apparent semantic and philosophical reasons, two of which are, in my opinion, most important:
(1) the conviction that reality should be regarded not only as a universe of objects possessing certain features and connected with certain relations, but, for more complete description of the world, reality should be also regarded as a universe of situations some of which at least are describable by the sentences of a certain language;
(2) ontological propositions can be divided into two types: a) those which are manifested in logical syntax and semantics of a language, particularly in relationships of logical consequence holding in a given language, b) those which are explicitly expressed in a object-language and which are ontological propositions that are not of metatheoretical nature.
According to Suszko, in the language of non-Fregean logic we can precisely formulate theorems concerning the world perceived after Wittgenstein as the whole of facts." (pp. 158-161)

From: Mieczyslaw Omyla, "Roman Suszko. From Diachronic Logic to Non-Fregean Logic", in: Wladyslaw Krajewski (ed.), *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2001, pp. 153-162.

AN OVERVIEW OF SUSZKO'S THOUGHT

"In Roman Suszko's logical writings there are to be found many remarks and reflections on the idea of logic which is closely

related to his work in formal logic. Though the scope of this paper makes it impossible to deal with them all, I would like nevertheless to draw the reader's attention to some of Suszko's views concerning the philosophy of logic. The aim of this study is to call the reader's attention to the most important of them. They may be presented in a knowing way:

1. The subject-matter of logical investigations are any conceptual structures emerging from the process of world cognition. The totality of such structures Suszko calls logical material. It is linguistic in nature and given in the shape of scholarly papers, philosophical treatises and, more loosely, in disputes and lectures of various sorts. The state of logical studies at any time is largely determined by the logical material available as well as the research tools at hand, for logical structures must be based upon the structures originating in direct world cognition. Among various research tools used for studying logical material Suszko -- in agreement with the trends of contemporary logic --clearly gives priority to mathematical instruments, especially to those of the set-theoretical and algebraic type.

Logic is for Suszko closely linked with epistemology and in [5], [6] he even calls it part of epistemology or even formal epistemology. In [1] Suszko writes: "Science, the progress of cognition and natural language which plays an important part in it are the points reference for investigations in formal logic."

2. The intersubjective sense of the expressions of any language L stems from the fact the expressions of this language refer to the same reality R and that they stead in semantic relations to certain appropriate fragments of R. The understanding of expressions by language users is therefore, according to Suszko, derivative with respect to semantic relations, which hold between language and its objective sphere R. In order to study semantic relations of a language one must formalize it, and the reality must be structured within a certain framework, which is, set-theoretical in character. In logic, theory of sets and relations is usually assumed as formal theory of reality.

Set theory was even called by Suszko formal ontology, although in [4] he allows for ontologies other than set-theoretical to be assumed in semantics. However, he considers set theory as the most natural ontology for investigations within formal logic.

Suszko thinks that in logical syntax two kinds of investigations can be distinguished: the classificatory-analytical and the constructive ones. The classificatory-analytical investigations are a preliminary phase for the construction of formalized languages. In [2] is presented a method of classificatory-analytical investigations, stressing the semantic aspect of the structural investigations conducted in logical syntax. In logical syntax only those kinds of expressions are distinguished whose syntactic role is closely connected with their semantic function. The simplest of such expressions are called-by Suszko "words in the logical sense". Words in the logical sense include according to Suszko: variables of all sorts-sentential as well as nominal-functors, operators and, possibly, simple names and simple sentences. From the syntactico-semantic point of view formalized languages studied in logic are more or less exact replicas of natural languages fragments or of languages of particular sciences or hypothetical assumptions about those languages. In logic we investigate some consequences of those assumptions. In [3] [4] Suszko maintains,that

(i) all languages investigated in logic so far may be represented by a one common syntactic scheme,

(ii) there is a scheme of the relation of semantic reference which is common to all those languages.

As a hypothesis which could explain these facts Suszko assumes in [6] that there is a structural syntactic frameworks, by means of which consciousness can grasp reality. This framework has been determined by "the surface of the world" as Suszko calls it in [6]. The surface of the world is anything, whatever has been an objective correlate of the discursive human consciousness, merging from the remotest past. In [6] Suszko writes: "It consists (the surface of the world) of a universe, whose elements are things, not too big and not too small, persisting in the spatio-temporal environment of the primitive man -- as well as of a characterization including simple external features of those things and the relations between them. Upon this model the primitive conceptual apparatus has been built,whose syntactic structure mirrors the ontological structure of the surface of the world".

The logical structure of a language paired with a certain fragment of reality is never arbitrary and purely linguistic but is determined by:

(a) the ontological structure of the fragment of reality to which the language refers.

(b) the semantic principles adopted.

3. The appearance in the logical material of Fregean sentential semantics, Leśniewski's protothetics and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has been important in the development of logico-philosophical reflection. The importance of it consists, in the fact, that contrary to theories known from mathematics and other sciences the formalized of these theories require languages with sentential variables. The sentential variables range over a universe of whatever is presentable in sentences. Suszko follows Wittgenstein in calling the denotations of sentences situations. According to Suszko situations are primitive with respect to events for the latter are objects abstracted from the former. In contemporary science only these theories are studied which are expressed in languages with nominal variables; theories of situations expressed in languages with sentential variables not being considered. In [7] is proved that:
(i) certain theories of situations are mutually translatable into theories of events,
(ii) certain algebras of situations are isomorphic with algebras of events,
and then Suszko asks:
"...What, then, makes our thinking and natural languages discriminate to some extent sentential variables, especially general and existential sentences about situations?
...however, what gives preference to theories of events over theories of situations?"
And in the same paper Suszko answers:
"This is probably due to some deep, historically motivated feature of our thinking and natural language -- a feature, whose investigation and explanation will certainly take much time and effort." These features of our thinking make us grasp world rather as a universe of objects possessing certain properties and

connected by certain relations and not like Wittgenstein did in *Tractatus* as the totality of facts taking place within the logical space.
One of the aspects of this bias in our thinking is, according to Suszko, tendency (originating from logical empiricism) of shifting philosophical problems from the object language to metalanguage. For Suszko, the sentence:

> (*) there is a real world
>
> is an extralogical, ontological statement, which Suszko formulates in W-languages (constructed by himself) and whose logical consequences he studies. Suszko maintains that languages which does not contain sentential variables ranging over a certain universe cannot formalise such statements as (*) or any propositions on situational ontology for that matter. W-language (W-from Wittgenstein) have been constructed by Suszko in order to formalise the ontology of the *Tractatus*. In W-languages both sentential and nominal variables are contained as well as quantifiers binding variables of both sorts, the identity predicate end the identity connective. In those languages a logical calculus called non-Fregean logic is defined.

Non-Fregean logic is a logical calculus created by Suszko in order to formalise a fragment of the ontology in Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*.
4. When we define a logical calculus in a formalised language, we specify the meaning of its logical constants. But this is not always all. It may happen that by assuming certain semantic principles we can impose some quantitative and structural conditions on the universe of sentential variables. According to Suszko logic should not impose any conditions upon the universes of situations and objects, that are correspondingly universes of sentential and nominal variable, except that the set of sentential denotations should consist of least two elements and that universe of nominal variables should be non-empty. This condition is satisfied by the non-Fregean logic in contrast with the truth-functional logic (the Fregean one), whose logical thesis is, under the assumptions adopted by Suszko, that the universe of sentential variables

(situations) is two elements. The non-Fregean logic is a bi-valued one, because for any admissible interpretation of a language every sentential formula is either true or false. This logic is extensional as well because the denotation of any expression is a function of denotations of its constituent expressions.
The construction of non-Fregean logic and its formal semantics seems to reveal quite a few of Suszko's views on language and logic. Some of these views might be summarised in a simplified form as follows:
The analysis of logical constructions reveals that there are least two kinds of ontological principles:
(i) those reflected in the syntax of a language and the principles of interpretation assumed,
(ii) philosophical theorems, which are explicitly expressible in the sentences of a given language and accepted as theses of that language.
Every logical thesis is an ontological theorem, there are however formal ontological theses which are not logical theorems. The rules of logical inference in a given language should not impose any conditions on the universe of situations and objects if these conditions are not theses of pure logic i.e. they are not consequences of the postulate of consistency. What is peculiar about the ontological principles formulated by Suszko is that no extralogical constant is needed in order to formulate them, for they are expressible in a language which includes logical constants and sentential and nominal variables only. Hence Suszko's ontology constitutes a general and formal theory." (pp. 175-179)

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NON-FREGEAN LOGIC

"14. (...) The story whose outcomes are described below began with a seminar on the Tractatus organized by Tadeusz Czezowski in Torun at the end of the 1950s. The seminar was attended by Bogusław Wolniewicz, who recast its contents in original form. The results of this re-elaboration were set out in *Rzeczy i facty* [Things and facts], 1968, and in *Ontologia sytuacij* [Ontology of situations], 1985 (some of Wolniewicz's works in English are cited in the references). During the 1960s, Roman Suszko met Wolniewicz and read the manuscript of the former book. Thereafter he developed the so-called W-languages (W for Wittgenstein) from which derive the non-Fregean logics outlined below (see the references for bibliographical details). Independently of the Polish logicians, Barwise and Perry developed a somewhat similar theory in *Situations and Attitudes*,

As far as I know, a systematic comparison between the two perspectives has not yet been conducted.

15. Semiotic preliminaries

As we know, for Frege there were only two ontological correlates of propositions: the True and the False. All true propositions denote the True, and all false prepositions denote the False. From an ontological point of view, if all true propositions denote exactly one and the same entity, then the underlying philosophical position is the absolute monism of facts.

In what follows I shall seek to disprove what Suszko called 'Frege's axiom': namely the assumption that there exist only two referents for propositions.

Frege's position on propositions was part of a more general view. Indeed, Frege adopted a principle of homogeneity (Perzanowski, 1992) according to which there are two fundamental categories of signs (*Bedeutungen* and truth-values) and two fundamental categories of senses (*Sinn* and *Gedanken*). Both categories of signs (names and propositions) have sense and reference. The sense of a name is its Sinn, that way in which its referent is given, while the referent itself, the *Bedeutung*, is the object named by the name." (201-202)

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Investigations Reconsidered, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003, pp. 183-210.

"Chapter 6. Fregean logics.
6.1. The Fregean Axiom.
The idea of distinguishing between Fregean and non-Fregean logic is mainly due to Roman Suszko [1968]. The main feature of non-Fregean logic is the distinction made between reference, or denotation, of a sentence and its truth-value. In the logical systems defined by Suszko the distinction between reference and truth-value is embodied in a new binary connective called identity. Connecting two sentences by identity expresses the fact that the two sentences refer to the same thing (they have the same semantic correlate) while the "ordinary" equivalence connective expresses the fact that the two sentences have the same logical value.
The origin of non-Fregean logics is strictly connected with the abolition of the so called Fregean Axiom by Suszko [1975].
(...)
In the Suszko's times the situational theory of meaning did not exist. Thus the principle that the meaning of a sentence coincides with the situation described by this sentence had a purely postulative character at that time - building a situational semantics was a task for future. This task was performed by Wojcicki [1984], [1986] who developed foundations of situational semantics for Suszko's non-Fregean logic with identity. (The restricted, purely sentential version of this logic is discussed below.) He also proved the completeness theorem for this logic with respect to situational semantics. The crucial point consists obviously in the explication of the notion of a situation. This problem gives rise to many questions: what are the components of a situation?; does every situation encompass pragmatical aspects, strictly connected with the process of communication, such as the time, the place, the addressee of an utterance?; are the truth-values situational components? There is no doubt that the situation described by the sentence
"Rome is the capital of Italy"

depends on the meanings of the words that make up this sentence but it also depends on the moment when the sentence was uttered (say, at the beginning of the 19th century or in the 20th century)". (pp. 373-374)

From: Janusz Czelakowski, *Protoalgebraic Logics*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001.

"The expression *non-Fregean logic* was introduced by Roman Suszko in the article *Non-Fregean Logic and Theories* (1968). Its cornerstone is the omission of the Fregean axiom. Recall that according to G. Frege, sentences are not only true or false, but they are also names of their truth values. Hence the Fregean axiom can be formulated as follows: all true statements (likewise, all false statements) have the same common referent, the truth (respectively, the falsehood). The Fregean axiom lies at the heart of classical logical calculi. In a model for a language based on classical logic there is no universe corresponding to the sentences of the language, but only a basis for an unambiguous division of the sentences into true and false ones. The Fregean axiom can be seen as the formal counterpart of a philosophical view on the meanings of sentences.
On the other hand, the philosophical foundation of the non-Fregean logic can be summarized as follows: a description of the world is incomplete (in the non-technical sense of the word) if it consists solely of a description of objects, their properties and their relations to each other. A full and adequate description of reality should reflect also the fact that reality is a collection of possibilities, some of which are realized and which can be described with sentences. While maintaining the view that a logical sentence is always either true or false, we should also be able to take into account the fact that reality, which we want to describe, contains denotations for expressions having more than merely syntactic content. Therefore, we should acknowledge the fact that the denotations of names are objects, that the denotations of predicates are sets or relations and that the denotations of sentences are the situations described by them. The above observations show that the basic philosophical assumption of non-Fregean logic is that the denotations of the

sentences of a given language are different from their truth values; the universe of the denotations is commonly called the universe of situations. In order to be able to speak about the situations, we add to the language a new connective, known as the identity connective, which links a pair of sentences to truth when their denotations are the same in a given model, that is, when the sentences describe the same situation. According to Suszko, the identity connective is more basic than other non-truth-functional operators, for instance, the various modal operators. It is basic in the sense that it cannot be eliminated from the logics that have been used and studied without trivializing it into another name for the equivalence connective. In the general case, the identity connective is different from the equivalence connective: two sentences with the same truth value can have different denotations. In other words, the truth value of a sentence is distinct from the situation described by the sentence. Adding the identity connective to classical logic does not, however, conflict with two-valuedness. Non-Fregean logic is two-valued as well as extensional, and it is the weakest logic with that property, while classical logic is the strongest one. Moreover, two-valuedness implies that the universe of situations must have at least two elements. That is the only limitation that non-Fregean logic imposes on the size of the universe of situations. On the other hand, if we add the condition that the universe of situations has at most two elements, we obtain the classical logical calculus, and the identity connective becomes indistinguishable from the equivalence connective. In fact, the Fregean axiom claims exactly this: that the two connectives are the same. Therefore Suszko called the classical logical calculus Fregean logic and the calculus without this axiom non-Fregean logic.

Thus, in a sense non-Fregean logic is an extension of classical logic: the language for building formulae is expanded. However, from another and perhaps more relevant point of view, classical logic is a strengthening of non-Fregean logic. On the other hand, the latter provides such a general logical calculus that most known logics -- classical first-order logic, classical sentential calculus, the many-valued logics of Łukasiewicz as well as some modal logics -- can be formulated in its general framework.

One should not forget about the philosophical applications of non-Fregean logic either. Most importantly, this logic provides excellent tools for the precise formulation of an ontology, for the formalization of the correspondence theory of truth and such concepts as fact, necessity, possible world, state of affairs and event. However, the value of non-Fregean logic does not derive solely from its applications. Non-Fregean logic constitutes an autonomic logical calculus, which can be studied in its own right, irrespectively of any connections with reality.
The sentential calculus based on the principles of non-Fregean logic is called the Sentential Calculus with Identity (SCI)." (pp. 193-194)

From: Joanna Golinska and Taneli Huuskonen, "Number of Extensions of non-Fregean Logics", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 34, 2005, pp. 193-206.

THE FREGEAN AXIOM (FA): "all true (and, similarly, all false) sentences describe the same, that is, have a common referent."

"1° How do we have to understand the abolition of the Fregean axiom in the sense of the paper? To answer this question we must follow Suszko's argumentation taken from the section 'Final remarks'. First, we have to remember that from the very beginning the author's intention was to follow essentially Frege's program without, however, accepting the axiom (FA). And pure logic, according to Frege, should be as weak and general as possible. Actually, the non-Fregean logic is very weak (cf. p. 192). On the other hand, there are in fact more important ontological reasons for abolishing the Fregean axiom. The author argues that "non-Fregean logic contains the exact theory of facts, i.e., situations described in true sentences or, in other words, situations which obtain. If one accepts the Fregean axiom one is compelled to be an absolute monist in the sense that there exists

only one and necessary fact" (p. 218). Subsequently, R. Suszko takes Wittgenstein, the great opposite of Frege, to task for advocating the non-Fregean approach discussed. Let us remember that the main ontological thesis of the famous Tractatus' is, that "The real world is a totality of facts and not objects". In contrast to the Fregean logic, NFL suits the ontology of the Tractatus and is the weakest and most general two-valued logic. This is the crucial argument against (FA).

A semi-abolition of (FA) is also discussed in the paper. The idea comes from the simple possible-worlds semantics (i.e. in which relational frames of type (W, R) are considered). In that semantics, models associated with frames have just one designated element. This is referred to as the semi-Fregean postulate. The ontological content of that postulate is that there exist plenty of distinct situations, but only one among them is distinguished. But the simple-worlds semantics works only for invariant Boolean G-theories. This means that this semantics is too narrow to comprise other SCI-theories; and it implies a very undesirable ontological assertion which says that there is only one distinguished situation described by true sentences.

2° The paper under review is a summary of a period of investigation of non-Fregean logic by the author and his collaborators. Incidentally, the paper contains general remarks on many logical areas and while reading it R. Suszko appears as a logician:

Suszko's theoretical framework is the general theory of entailment relations. By 'logic' is meant an entailment relation operating on the algebra of formulas. This is an extension of Tarski's methodological ideas, dating back to the thirties, connected with the notion of consequence operation. The author teaches us that in order to learn the properties of a given entailment one must investigate its theories, i.e. sets of formulas closed under the entailment. The smallest theory of a given entailment coincides with the set of all tautologies, that is, the formulas entailed by the empty set of formulas. It is obvious that distinct entailments may have a common set of tautologies. Consequently, given a logic $\vdash$ and an entailment $\vdash$. we ought to ask whether $\vdash$. equals $\vdash$ (strong completeness) or whether only the sets of tautologies of both entailments are identical (weak

completeness). Now, if we did not stop describing the general framework, we would have to discuss problems such as the importance of the so-called complete theories, the problem of adequacy and so on.... But the reader can easily find it in the paper. Actually, we just want to draw the reader's attention to the fact that he can also find there a lot of very deep and original remarks on the theory of entailment. As an example, let us quote the author's opinion about completeness theorems (pp. 216, 217). "Thus, we see that a completeness theorem for a logic is not a golden crown on semantics but just the beginning of it. Already the relativity of completeness theorems forces us to ask how far we can go in semantics beyond (!) the completeness theorem. To construct a logical calculus and prove a kind of completeness theorem for it (not to speak of a weak completeness theorem) appears very often as just a waste of time."
R. Suszko does not tolerate any intensional notions and contexts and he is strongly opposed to intensional formal logic. He is deeply convinced that there is no modal logic which cannot be demolished (by breaking its logical rules) by some intensional construction in natural language. Therefore, on page 200, we are warned that "the building of such logics is a kind of naiveté". On the other hand, we know that some systems of modal logic have appeared to be SCI-theories. This is the reason why the author is afraid of NFL being incorrectly understood as a kind of modal logic. If one has doubts about the non-intensional background of non-Fregean logic, one should carefully read Sections 10-14." (pp. 376-378)

From: Grzegorz Malinowski and Jan Zygmunt, Review of: "Roman Suszko. Abolition of the Fregean Axiom", *Erkenntnis*, 12, 1978 pp. 369-380.

"3. Abolition of Fregean Axiom.
According to Frege, denotations (*Bedeutung*) of sentences are logical values. Thus, each sentence denotes either Truth or Falsehood. Suszko, who sought support for his ideas in Wittgenstein, rejects this point of view. For him, the denotation of a sentence is what the sentence says about: a certain "situation". This term was chosen by Suszko to interpret Wittgenstein's

Sachlage -- the state of affairs. Situations which exist create positive facts, those which do not exist create negative facts. Sentences having the same logical value need not denote the same. It is a certain fact that Wittgenstein knew Frege just like it is a fact that Wittgenstein exchanged letters with Russell, but these two facts are quite different, and thus two sentences stating these two facts have different denotations although their truth value is the same.

Obviously, Frege was not of the opinion that all true (or false) sentences "say the same" either. In Suszko's apprehension the differences lay in the sense (*Sinn*) of sentences and not in their denotations. For comparison of Suszko's ideas with those of Frege it is essential that neither *Sinn* itself nor any of its components is an element of the objective world. *Sinn,* is a way in which sentences are assigned their logical values (one is tempted to repeat after Ajdukiewicz "the way of how the sentence is understood"), or -- which also can be found in Frege's works -- "the thought conveyed by the sentence". The thought, let me add, understood as a certain abstract object and not an individual mental experience. The differences between Suszko's and Frege's approaches are by no means of verbal character: among the concepts used by Frege there is no counterpart for the notion of situation.

As known, the predicate calculus may be employed only to non-empty domains; analogously, in order to apply SCI -- and more generally NFL -- one must accept certain ontological theses; namely the ones given by the following semantical postulates:

S1. Each sentence has its denotation.

S2. True sentences denote positive facts while false sentences denote negative facts.

S3. The classical truth conditions are satisfied; in particular, the truth value of sentences built by means of truth connectives is determined by the truth values of its components in the usual (i.e. accepted in the classical logic) way.

Observe that S1 stands in disagreement with Wittgenstein's ideas developed in *Tractatus*. According to Wittgenstein both logical tautologies and inconsistent logical sentences are "senseless" (*sinnlose*), which however does not mean they are "nonsensical" (*unsinnige*). With Wittgenstein, nonsense is an expression which

does not meet the requirements of grammar which amounts to the fact that nonsensical sentences are not sentences at all. The statement "Rome is Rome" is grammatically correct but it does not convey any information, is senseless, and consequently as it means nothing it denotes nothing.
In order for (S1) - (S3) to be satisfied, there have to exist at least two situations, one of which must be a positive fact and the other -- a negative one. This existential thesis is fundamental for the ontology of SCI. The set of ontological postulates for the entire non-Fregean logic is richer since the logic refers not only to situations but also to individual objects and sets built from them. Consequently, NFL inherits the ontological postulate of the predicate calculus stating that there must exist at least one object." (pp. 326-327)

From: Ryszard Wojcicki, "R. Suszko's Situational Semantics", *Studia Logica*, 43, 1984, pp. 323-340.

EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS: ABOLITION OF THE FREGEAN AXIOM

This paper is partly stimulated by a talk given by Dana Scott on Lewis' systems in the Symposium on Entailment, December 1971, [Scott 1971]. Any endeavour, however, to reconstruct Lewis' program or to defend it is far beyond my intention. What matters here is the following. Scott makes a great deal of propaganda on behalf of (a) the general theory of entailment relations (or consequence operations) and (b) truth-valuations. Furthermore, "a nagging doubt" in Scott's mind, concerned with possible-world semantics induces him to use both (a) and (b) and a trick of making inferences visible, to arrive eventually at the strong modal systems, S4 and S5.
There are, of course, plenty of ways to obtain modal-systems. Here, I want to call your attention in particular to the somewhat disquieting fact that the strong modal systems (but by no means all modal systems) are theories based on an extensional and

logically two-valued logic, labelled NFL, exactly in the same sense that axiomatic arithmetic is said to be based on (pure!) logic [created essentially by Frege, (hence labelled FL) and well-known from text-books of mathematical logic]. This paper is not, however, another exercise in so-called modal logic. I essentially agree by the way, with Quine's comments [Quine 1963] on that kind of logic. The main subject here is the construction of NFL and its basic properties. Also, the relation between NFL and FL will be discussed. The general theory of entailment will serve as a framework for three methods of building NFL. In fact, we will arrive at NFL using truth-valuations, models and logical axioms and rules of inference.

As an intelligent reader you instantly conjecture that there must be some hocus-pocus underlying NFL. Indeed, there is. It consists essentially in following Frege in building pure logic but only to certain decisive point. Of course, you need not use his archaic notation or terminology. Also, you may easily avoid his syntactic shortcomings. For example, you are naturally inclined to keep formulas (sentences) and terms (names) as disjoint syntactic categories. But, when you come to his assumption, called here the Fregean axiom, that all true (and, similarly, all false) sentences describe the same thing, that is, have a common referent, just forget it, please; at least until NFL is constructed. At that time, I am sure, you will better understand what the Fregean axiom is and you'll be free to accept it, if you still like it so much.

The trick underlying NFL is fairly easy and also quite innocent. It is true that it seduced me successfully and I am now addicted to it. I even reject the Fregean axiom. However, I do not insist that you go so far. But try NFL cautiously. I assure you that NFL offers you an intellectual experience, unexpected in its simplicity and beauty, far surpassing all "impossible worlds". But I am frank and fair, by my nature. So I tell you keep the Fregean axiom hidden in your pocket when entering the gate of NFL and be ready to use it at once, when you feel a confusing headache. Formally, you will be collapsing NFL into FL. Informally, you will be expelling yourself from a logical paradise into the rough, necessary world.

Surprisingly enough, logicians do not want NFL. I know it from five years of experience and this is the right way of putting it, believe me. Being even so close to NFL sometimes, Logicians

stubbornly strive after something else. When not satisfied with FL they choose to work with the powerset 2^I as exposed convincingly by Scott [Scott 1970]. They even can, I admit, work on it as hard as in a sweatshop. So mighty is, Gottlob, the magic of your axiom! Whatever (cheatingly) one calls elements of the index set I, the powerset 2^I remains a distinct shadow of the Fregean axiom.
If we want to follow Frege we must consent to his basic ideals of unambiguity and extensionality. To stress this point we start with his famous semantical scheme of *Sinn and Bedeutung*. It is obvious today that the abyss of thinking in a natural language does not fit into the Fregean scheme. But this is another story. Here, it must suffice to notice that we all live (and cannot completely get out of) that messy abyss with all its diffuse ghosts (in Hermann Weyl's [1940] phraseology) of ambiguity, vague flexibility, intensionality and modality. We really enjoy them. But not always. When forced to construct a theory, we try to make our ideas precise and climb to the heights of extensionality. Then, the structure of our theoretical thought corresponds sufficiently well to the syntax of the *Begriffschrift*, i.e., a formalized language which does fit into the Fregean semantical scheme." (pp.169-171)

From: "Abolition of the Fregean Axiom". In: Rohit Parikh (ed.), *Logic Colloquium. Symposium on Logic held at Boston, 1972-73*, Berlin: Springer-Verlag 1975, pp. 169-239.

"14. Final remarks.
The fight with intensional ghosts is boring, unprofitable and, may never end. But, I must finish this paper. So, I conclude with some unelaborated remarks.
1) Modal logicians think that NFL is a kind of modal logic and one badly done at that. Extensionally minded logicians consider FL as the only extensional logic. Thus, either intensional ghosts or the Fregean axiom and, everything else comes from the devil. I know this well. But, why is this so? This is a longer story. Indeed, you must first look at the history of modern logic and you will find there many relevant facts. Secondly, you must dig deeper and deeper in the nonFregean logic and its relationship to the Fregean one.

2) But, if you do that then you will certainly meet a fact which suggests that we may easily get rid of the identity connective and NFL. It is sufficient to translate NFL into FL as shown in [Cresswell 1966] by Cresswell, again. Now, this is something quite different from diffuse intensional ghosts. But things nevere are so simple as they seem. You know that translations may be better or worse and, the bad translations may not be translations at all. What always matters about translations is what are their invariants. If you ask for invariants of Cresswell's translation you will find only a few. It may be considered as a translation only if one wants to get rid of identity connective at any price. But, the real paradox is that it is impossible to get rid of the identity connective at all. What can be done is to equate it with material equivalence. Also, one cannot get rid of situations unless one agrees that thought is about nothing, or, rather, stops talking with sentences.
3) Stimulated by Cresswell's "translation" and some ad hoc construction by Slupecki I built a theory of *reification* of *situations* in [Suszko 1971]. It resembles, in a sense, what Quine called reification of universals and also the relationship between Fregean FUNKTIONEN and their WERTVERLAUFE. Reification of situations is performable within a theory in some W-language, based on non-Fregean logic, of course.
If based on a logic as strong as ⊢WB it automatically leads to what we are used to talking about in probability theory, viz., events being objects constituting a Boolean algebra in ordinary sense. Finally, this theory is the basis for a translation of Cresswell's type. This translation does not preserve entailment perfectly. But, equations are translatable exceptionally well, naturally.
4) Non-Fregean logic contains the exact theory of facts, i.e., situations described in true sentences or, in other words, situations which obtain. If one accepts the Fregean axiom then one is compelled to be an absolute monist in the sense that there exists only one and necessary fact. So, you see that Fregean axiom should be abolished. Also, only the non-Fregean logic allows us to repeat with full understanding Wittgenstein's thesis that the real world is a totality of facts and not objects. Indeed, what I tried to do in [Suszko 1968] was a formal recostruction of the Ontology of the *Tractatus*, OT for short, as interpreted by Dr. B. Wolniewicz.

(...) At that time, I only had a general idea of which logic OT has to be based on. Now, I may say that NFL suits OT and is the general and weakest extensional and two-valued logic.
(...)
6) Yet, this is not all. SCI-models are structures which may be considered as models of the Fregean logic which makes sentential variables trivially superflous. Thus, again, we may get rid of sentential variables and identity connective similarly as in the Cress-well translation. We may and we really do. This is the point. Of course, this fact does not discredit NFL at all but it hints to some tendency in our thinking which is codified, in a sense, by the Fregean axiom. Be it right or wrong, this tendency is certainly very strong and much older than modern logic. So it seriously calls for an explanation. This may not be easy. Why do we tend to describe the world as consisting of a single necessary fact? But, anyway, I feel
-suggested by the fact that Cresswell's translation is not so good. Moreover, one may say even that the conventional semantics which uses SCI-models is not adequate. Elements of these models are objects; but sentential variables do not actually run over any totality of objects. One cannot denote a situation by a name. It can only be described by a sentence. Thus, an adequate semantics of non-Fregean theories should use a W-language with non-Fregean entailment in it. Hence, we face the task of using(!) a new kind of language with a new entailment. I have shown to you how good this new logic is. Therefore, I think we should try to use it and I hope we will be successful. Frankly, however, I am not sure if we are able to do that." (pp. 217-220)

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   "The syntactical and semantical investigations in contemporary formal logic refer always to the languages with specified syntactic structure, as with respect to such languages one can formulate exactly and, subsequently examine with mathematical tools 1) the rules of transformation (axioms, rules of inference) and the systems based on these rules (formalized theories), 2) the relations of semantical reference which occur between linguistic expressions and elements of objective sphere.
   Our considerations belong to that part of logical syntax and semantics which is independent of any assumptions concerning the rules of transformation.
   The syntactic structure of some language *L* is determined 1° by the *vocabulary* of *L* i.e. by the list of simple (undecomposable) expressions in *L,* and 2° by the *rules of construction L* of which state how the expressions of *L*', especially the sentences in *L* are built of simple expressions.
   In the first part of this paper we consider the general principles of the syntactic structure of languages. Namely, we shall formulate a scheme of the syntactic structure of language. This scheme will he called the *standard formalization* and the languages which fall under this scheme will be called the *standard formalized languages* (1).
   The scheme of standard formalization is based on a purely syntactical classification of expressions into so called *semantical categories*.
   The standard formalization is an abstract from the concrete material of artificial symbolic languages which are considered in formal logic. It is general in the following sense: every symbolic language known in formal logic - after

carrying some modifications in its calligraphy -- falls directly under the scheme of standard formalization.
In the second part of this paper we consider the fundamental properties of semantic reference. First, we introduce a classification of objects into so called *ontological categories*. Further making use of some simple and quite natural connexion of conformity between semantical categories of simple expressions and ontological categories of corresponding objects, we can introduce the general notion of a *model* of any standard formalized language. Namely, for every standard formalized language *L* we define the family M(*L*) of all models of *L* . Every model of *L* is a totality to which the expressions of *L can* refer semantically and, conversely, every totality to which the expressions of *L can* refer semantically, belongs to the family M(*L*). Thus, we obtain a general scheme of the relations of semantical reference which is quite closely connected with the scheme of standard formalization. This shows the ideographic character of standard formalized languages.
It may be a reasonable conjecture the content of this paper to be connected with the structural inquires in linguistcs and with some problems of the philosophy of language and of thinking. But, we do not discuss here these connexions." pp. 213-214.
(1) These terms are borrowed from A. Tarski (in collaboration with A. Mostowski and R. M. Robinson) - *Undecidable Theories,* Amsterdam, 1953 p. 5.

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   "§ 9. *Introductory remarks concerning the relation of semantical reference.*
   We begin the considerations about semantics of standard formalized languages with some general remarks belonging

to the theory of signs or semiotic in the sense of Ch. Morris [1938].
We consider the languages as systems of signs participating in the process of communication between persons belonging to some human group (speech community). Communicative employment of linguistic signs in some group is intertwisted into the whole of activity of members of this group and of their relations to the environment, and the connection between the employment of linguistic signs and the activity of persons of the given speech community grants an intersubjective meaning to the employed signs.
The considerations about signs and languages may be conducted from a historical and descriptive point of view as well from systematical and theoretical one. On the other hand one can distinguish in these considerations three following ranges: syntax, semantics and pragmatics [Morris 1938]. The syntax deals with the relations which do occur between the signs alone. The principles of combination of simple signs into the composite signs are considered by it. Generally speaking with the syntax it is investigated the syntactic structure of languages. Semantics deals with the relations of semantical reference of signs to objects belonging to the objective sphere. These relations bind the signs with that *about what the signs in the process of communication are speaking*. Finally, pragmatics take into account the role of persons employing the signs.
One may say that the division of the science of signs and languages into syntax, semantics and pragmatics is made from the point of view of formal logic. Namely, pragmatics is strictly connected with the psychology, sociology, history of culture and other sciences dealing with members of speech communities. On the contrary the considerations about linguistic expressions conducted in formal logic are included in the syntax and semantics.
If a language L of some syntactic structure is meaningful in some circumstances (i. e. the expressions of L are participating in the process of communication in some human group) then the language L - as a system of expressions - semantically refers to some complex R of

objects which may be called the referent of the whole language *L* in the given circumstances of meaningfulness of *L*. I think that the existence of this referent *R* and the occurence of the relations of semantical reference between the language *L* and the referent *R* (and between the expressions of *L* and fragments of *R*) is a basis of the intersubjective meaning of expressions of *L*. On the other hand the syntactic structure of the language *L* depends 1°) on the referent *R* and 2°) on the members of the given speech community; *the principle of the dual control of linguistic structure,* [1938] p. 12.

In the case of formalized languages the situation is much more simple. Firstly, in formal logic we abstract from pragmatical properties and relations of linguistic expressions. In formal logic we consider only the syntactic structure of languages and the relations of semantical reference. Therefore, instead of the referent of a given formalized language *L* (in the given circumstances of its meaningfulness) we consider here the family of all possible referents of *L* which are called *models* of *L* and the principle of dual control mentioned above is reduced to the connection between the syntactic structure and the common structure of all models of *L*. This is *the connection of conformity of semantical categories with the ontological categories*. It will be explained later.

We do not intend here to prove the connection of conformity of categories. It will be enough to remark that this connection is fulfilled in all semantical interpretations of artificial symbolic languages considered in formal logic. We take in our paper the connection of conformity of categories as a fundamental principle by which are characterized the formal properties of relation of semantical reference and, consequently, it is possible to determine the family of all models of any given standard formalized language." pp. 63-64.

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"The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a very unclear and ambiguous metaphysical work. Previously, like many formal logicians, I was not interested in the metaphysics of the Tractatus. However, I read in 1966 the text of a monograph by Dr. B. Wolniewicz of the University of Warsaw2 and I changed my mind. I see now that the conceptual scheme of Tractatus and the metaphysical theory contained in it may be reconstructed by formal means. The aim of this paper* is to sketch a formal system or formalized theory which may be considered as a clear, although not complete, reconstruction of the ontology contained in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
It is not easy to say how much I am indebted to Dr. Wolniewicz. I do not know whether he will agree with all theorems and definitions of the formal system presented here. Nevertheless, I must declare that I could not write the present paper without being acquainted with the work of Dr. Wolniewicz. I learned very much from his monograph and from conversations with him. However, when presenting in this paper the formal system of Wittgenstein's ontology I will not refer mostly either to the monograph of Dr. Wolniewicz or to the Tractatus. Also, I will not discuss here the problem of adequacy between my formal construction and Tractatus. I think that the Wittgenstein was somewhat confused and wrong in certain points. For example, he did not see the clear-cut distinction between language (theory) and metalanguage (metatheory): a confusion between use and mention of expressions."
*Presented in Polish at the Conference on History of Logic, April 28-29, 1967, Cracow, Poland.

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    Co-authors: Stephen L. Bloom and Donald J. Brown
    "An abstract logic consists of a pair <a, cn< where a is an algebra and cn is a consequence (alias 'closure') operation on the carrier of a. In this paper several theorems are given characterizing 'structural' and 'invariant' logics by their completeness properties. the method is a generalization of the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction."

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    "The notion of quasi-completeness (or O-completeness) has been introduced by J. Los [1], [2] into the semantics of theories in open languages with nominal variables. An analogous notion known as Hallden-completeness [3], [4] is applicable to sentential logics. Both notions are of the same

formal nature and can be uniformly treated when formulated with respect to W-languages which contain two kinds of variables, sentential and nominal, as well. W-languages considered here are open, that is, not containing bound variables. The aim of this paper is to show that the main theorems of Los concerning the quasi-completeness also hold in non-Fregean logic and semantics.
The author is indebted to Dr. Stephen L. Bloom from Stevens Institute of Technology for comments on the first draft of this paper."
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Co-author: Stephen L. Bloom.
"The SCI (Sentential Calculus with Identity) is obtained from the classical sentential calculus by the addition of 1° a new binary connective, the identity connective (denoted by =) and 2° axioms which 'say' that = means "p is identical to q" (also: "the situation p is the same as the situation q"). The new axioms are the weakest possible; no presuppositious about the meaning of "is identical to" are included (other than p = p). We do not attempt to say what the range of the sentential variables p, q, r, ... is. (In the classical propositional calculus, they are intended to range over a two element set.) In this paper, a number of results about the semantics of the SCI are given without proof. The proofs of these and other results are contained in the much longer Investigations into the Sentential Calculus with Identity."

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    Abstract

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    Co-author: Stephen L. Bloom
    "The sentential calculus with identity (SCI) is obtained from the classical sentential calculus by the addition of a binary 'identity connective' = and axioms which 'say' that p = q means p is identical to q. the study of the semantics of the resulting consequence operation using Tarski's matrix method yields insights into consequence operations in general and the classical and modal consequence operations in particular. One finitely axiomatizable SCI theory is studied. It is shown that this theory consists of those formulas valid in all topological boolean algebras."
    See also the *Errata* - in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, volume 17, 1976) p. 640.

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    Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla

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    Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla

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    English translation by Oligierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1957.
    "The antinomy of the liar has been discussed many times in formal logic. It is associated with remarkable advances in logic: the formulation of the semantic theory of truth [4] and the discovery of undecidable statements and the impossibility of proofs of consistency under specified conditions ([2]; see also [3], Vol. II, pp. 256ff).
    All those results make fundamental use of *self-referential expressions,* which were first used, in the history of logic, in the antinomy of the liar. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate, by quite elementary methods; something that has been known since the birth of semantics, namely, that the concept of truth and other semantic concepts are relative in nature [5] and that using relative semantic concepts, including the construction of self-referential expressions, does not result in antinomies in natural language.
    Semantics, and in particular the semantic theory of truth, presupposes syntax. The wealth of semantic analysis thus depends on the wealth of syntactic information about those expressions to which semantic analyses refer. Since in this paper no systematic syntactic studies on the structure of expressions are made, except for the construction of self-

referential expressions, the set of concepts used in the semantic theory of truth discussed here is very modest.
(...)
The semantic theory of truth does not result in the antinomy of the liar if we use concepts restricted to a set of statements which does not include statements from the theory of truth which we are studying in a given case.
It can be shown that the same applies to other parts of semantics, namely those in which the other semantic concepts (denoting, satisfying, etc.) are used [4], [5], [6]. To do this it suffices to analyse other antinomies constructed with the aid of semantic concepts, and to modify them in a manner analogical to that applied above in the case of the antinomy of the liar.
The semantic concepts which we can use in semantic research without being involved in antinomies are relative (restricted). They have a certain reference to a type *L* of expressions, which includes neither those semantic terms which have a reference to *L,* nor statements containing those semantic terms. Within those semantic analyses in which we use semantic concepts restricted to type *L* of expressions we can construct, in accordance with general syntactic rules, an expression which can be proved not to be of type *L*. The proof consists in a reasoning which changes into an appropriate antinomy if the restrictive reference to *L,* applied to the semantic concepts used in that case, is disregarded."
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Co-author: Zdzislaw Kraszewski.
English translation by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1966.
"Russell's antinomy of the class of normal classes, i.e., the class of those classes which are not their own elements, emerged when the current concept of class was being given more precision. It is this current concept of class which is blamed for Russell's antinomy.
The task of the present paper is to offer a fairly precise definition of the current concept of class, which has subsequently come to be split into the collective (concretistic) concept of class and the distributive (mathematical) concept of class or set. S..Lesniewski's mereology, to which T. Kotarbinski's concretism refers, is a theory of classes in the collective sense. The theory of classes in the distributive sense has taken the form of mathematical set theory, which originated with E. Zermelo; other versions of the theory of classes in the distributive sense are provided by B. Russell's type theory and S. Lesniewski's Ontology.
After making the current concept of class more precise, which will consist in a systematization of the assumptions concerning that concept, we shall define normal and non-normal classes as well as the class of normal classes and the class of non-normal classes. Several variations of these definitions are possible, and Russell's antinomy can be reconstructed in each case. We shall see, however, that his antinomy cannot be reconstructed in current language, since the corresponding reasonings do not yield a

contradiction. The thesis of this paper is that the current concept of class, as described below, is not self-contradictory."

54. ———. 1979. "Normal and Non-Normal Classes Versus the Set-Theoretical and the Mereological Concept of Class. Studies in the Concept of Class. Ii." In *Semiotics in Poland 1894-1969*, edited by Pelc, Jerzy, 273-283. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Co-author: Zdzislaw Kraszewski.
    English translation by Oligierd Wojtasiewicz of an article published in Polish in 1968.
    °We shall concern ourselves here with the transition from the current concept of class to the distributive (set-theoretical) and the collective (mereological) concept of class. This transition is linked to the concepts of normal and non-normal class. Preliminary remarks on that issue have already been made in Sec. 8.
    We assume here a non-existential axiom system for the current concepts of class and element, as described in Secs. 2 and 3. Consequence and equivalence are interpreted, as before, as consequence and equivalence in the light of that axiom system."

55. ———. 1979. "Filters and Natural Extensions of Closure Systems." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 8:130-132.

    Co-author: T. Weinfeld

56. ———. 1994. "The Reification of Situations." In *Philosophical Logic in Poland*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 247-270. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    English translation by Theodore Stazeski of an article published in Polish in 1971.
    "The great task of the theory of reification is to show in what way the so-called ontological assumptions of the structure of the universe of situations are transferred to events by reifications, and to impose an algebraic structure on them. Such an approach to the theory of reification flows from the

earlier expressed opinion that situations are primary and events are derived. One should not confuse this point of view with the false opinion, I believe, that situations are primary in relation to all objects. It is an altogether different and difficult matter, and in this case a certain consultation of Wittgenstein would be very useful. But the fact that situations are primary in relation to their reification is rather natural. The abstract process, of which the formal expression is the reification of a situations, finds - I think - its fragmentary expression in ordinary language; I write `I think' since I enter into the competence of linguists. These examples given by Slupecki are an illustration. Thus, forest fire = reification of the situation that the forest is burning, and Matt's death = reification of the situation that Matt died. These examples do not give evidence that an explicit symbol of the reification of situations, corresponding to the star of Slupecki of our T, exists in natural language. They are examples giving evidence that the grammatical apparatus of a natural language can often, though certainly not always, transform sentences *p* (describing situations) into names *x* (designating particular events) such that *x* = T *(p),* and sentences containing those names. The opposite transformation is something unnatural, and is hardly taken into consideration by grammarians.

This observation obviously does not remove the most serious difficulties which appear in connection with situations. The principal difficulty appears at the moment of incorporation of non-trivial theories written in natural language with help of (bound) sentence variables. Reading formulas appearing in this theory in natural language immediately raises serious doubts for many logicians with regard to sense or correctness. There are no such difficulties, or they are considerably less, in the reading of formulas with name variables (not sentential. It is probably the symptom of some deep, historical attribute of our thought and natural language, whose examination and explication will certainly be prolonged and arduous.

From the rather narrow point of view of formal logic the following considerations are suggested. The difference

between a sentence and a name is not exhausted in their syntactical properties. A certain syntactic analogy even exists between the category of sentences and the category of names, which can stretch very far (for example the rules of operations for quantifiers are formally similar in the case of sentential and name variables). The difference between sentences and names appears first of all in that sentences, and not names, are subject to assertion, as well as that sentences are premises and conclusions in reasoning. These distinctions on the language level are transferred in some manner to that to which the sentences and names semantically refer. Semantical relation (reference), however, of sentences and names are also - formally - to a certain degree analogical.

Names designate and sentences describe. The difference in terminology (designate, describe) is not essential. The essential point is that we attribute reference to something both to names and to sentences, and that this, in the case of a given name and a given sentences, is exactly one; with the assumption, obviously, of a univocal sense of expression and with exclusion of mythological terms.

This analogy, however, is not complete, just like the analogy between sentences and names, with result that a categorial gap exists between that which a sentence describes (a situation) and that which a name designates (an object). The fact that the expressions $p = x$ and p x, where on the left we have a sentence and on the right a name, are not well formed formulas, shows this profound gap.

The analogies between situation and objects as well as that between sentences and names are not complete. But it does not stop at the level of the formation of sentences and names, not at the level of the formal operation on them in accordance with logic. What, therefore, is the cause that our thought and natural language discriminate sentence variables to a certain degree, and particularly, general and existential sentences about situations?

The above considerations about the reification of situations show that the theory of situations and the theory of events are, in certain manner, equivalent. Why, therefore, prefer

the theory of events to the theory of situations?" pp. 249-250.

STUDIES ABOUT THE WORK OF ROMAN SUSZKO

1. Babyonyshev, Sergei V. 2003. "Fully Fregean Logics." *Reports on Mathematical Logic* no. 37:59-77.

2. Beziau, Jean-Yves. 1999. "A Sequent Calculus for Łukasiewicz's Three-Valued Logic Based on Suszko's Bivalent Semantics." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 28:89-97.

   "A sequent calculus S3 for Łukasiewicz's logic L3 is presented. The completeness theorem is proved relatively to a bivalent semantics equivalent to the nontruthfunctional bivalent semantics for L3 proposed by Suszko in 1975. A distinguishing property of the approach proposed here is that we are keeping the format of the classical sequent calculus as much as possible."

3. Bloom, Stephen L. 1971. "Completeness Theorem." *Studia Logica* no. 27:43-55.

4. ———. 1971. "A Completeness Theorem of 'Theories of Kind W'." *Studia Logica* no. 27:43-56.

5. ———. 1974. "On 'Generalized Logics'." *Studia Logica* no. 33:65-68.

6. Caleiro, C., Carnielli, W., Coniglio, M.E., and Marcos, J. 2003. Suszko Thesis and Dyadic Semantics.

   Research report, CLC, Department of Mathematics, Instituto Superior Técnico, 1049-001 Lisboa, Portugal, 2003.

Presented at III World Congress on Paraconsistency, Toulouse, France, July 28-31, 2003.
"A well-known result by Wojcicki-Lindenbaum shows that any tarskian logic is many-valued, and another result by Suszko shows how to provide 2-valued semantics to these very same logics. This paper investigates the question of obtaining 2-valued semantics for many-valued logics, including paraconsistent logics, in the lines of the so-called "Suszko's Thesis". We set up the bases for developing a general algorithmic method to transform any truth-functional finite-valued semantics satisfying reasonable conditions into a computable quasi tabular 2-valued semantics, that we call dyadic. We also discuss how "Suszko's Thesis" relates to such a method, in the light of truth-functionality, while at the same time we reject an endorsement of Suszko's philosophical views about the misconception of many-valued logics."

7. Czelakowski, Janusz, and Pigozzi, Don. 2004. "Fregean Logics." *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* no. 127:17-76.

   "The main results of the paper: Fregean deductive systems that either have the deduction theorem, or are protoalgebraic and have conjunction, are completely characterized.
   They are essentially the intermediate logics, possibly with additional connectives.
   All the full matrix models of a protoalgebraic Fregean deductive system are Fregean, and, conversely, the deductive system determined by any class of Fregean 2nd-order matrices is Fregean. The latter result is used to construct an example of a protoalgebraic Fregean deductive system that is not strongly algebraizable."

8. Diankov, Bogdan. 1987. "On the Main Principle Underlying Roman Suszko's Semanic Conception." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko*.

Cracow, October 19-21, 1984, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 191-196. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

9. Golinska, Joanna, and Huuskonen, Taneli. 2005. "Number of Extensions of Non-Fregean Logics." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 34:193-206.

   "We show that there are continuum many different extensions of SCI [sentential calculus with identity] (the basic theory of non-Fregean propositional logic) that lie below WF (the Fregean extension) and are closed under substitution. Moreover, continuum many of them are independent from WB (the Boolean extension), continuum many lie above WB and are independent from WH (the Boolean extension with only two values for the equality relation), and only countably many lie between WH and WF."

10. Lukowski, Piotr. 1990. "Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus with Identity." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic*:92-99.

    "The paper concerns the intuitionistic sentential calculus with identity IISCID, mentioned by professor R Suszko in his several papers. The work presents a semantics for ISCI, which combines the ideas of the matrix semantics for sentential calculi with the well-known Kripke-Grzegorczyk for the intuitionistic logic. Besides sketching a proof of the strong completeness theorem for ISCI, there are some straightforward connections between the new semantical construction and the modeling of SCI, i.e., the ordinary calculus with identity. The end of the work deals with a simplified version of the frame-matrix semantics for the intuitionistic logic without sentential identity."

11. ———. 1990. "Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus with Classical Identity." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic*:147-151.

    "Sentential calculus with identity /SCI/ has been created by Professor R Suszko. The discussion on SCI was a subject of many works. The intuitionistic weaking of this calculus /ISCI/ is presented in Pslukowski's "Intuitionistic sentential

calculus with identity", Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 19, 3. In fact SCI is a classical propositional calculus with classical identity, while ISCI an intuitionistic propositional calculus with intuitionistic identity. Thus in the present paper two strengthenings of ISCI, i.e., intuitionistic propositional calculus with classical identity /ISCI CI/ and classical propositional calculus with intuitionistic identity /SCI II/ are considered. There are also presented adequate semantics for both calculi."

12. Malinowski, Grzegorz. 1984. "Roman Suszko: A Sketch of a Portrait in Logic." *Studia Logica* no. 43:315.

13. ———. 1987. "Non-Fregean Logic and Other Formalizations of Propositional Identity." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 159-166. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

    The aim of the paper "is to present Sentential Calculus with Identity in comparison with other formalizations of propositional identity."
    "Final remarks. It is evident that any comparative question concerning the logic of propositional identity may be posed either in reference to a particular language or to a special feature of a formalisation. Among several current requirements the three following seem to be of it particular importance:
    (1) Extensionality in the sense at Leibniz Law of indiscernibility of identicals.
    (2) Formal character of identity: nothing except general properties such as e.g. reflexivity, symmetry or transitivity has either be assumed or proved
    (3) Purely sentential character of formalisation: the language has to contain only sentential variables.
    (...)
    If one agreed that all the properties (1)-(3) are basic for the logic of propositional identity, SCI would be considered as

the only genuine logic of this kind. [The property that logics of identity corresponding to S4 and S5 proved to be axiomatic strengthenings of SCI, cf. [Bloom & Suszko 1972] and [Suszko 1971] supports the conclusion.]
References
S. L. Bloom, R. Suszko, Investigations into the Sentential Calculus with Identity, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 13 (1972), pp. 289-308.
R. Suszko, Identity connective and modality, Studia Logica, 27 (1971), pp. 7-39.

14. ———. 1991. "Sur Les Principes Sémantiques De Frege Et Sur Une Définition Non-Fregéenne De La Notion D'identité Propositionnelle." *Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines* no. 116:57-62.

    " *On semantic principles of Frege and non-fregean definition of the concept of propositional identity*. A non-fregean realization of the semantic programme of G. Frege elaborated by R. Suszko is one of the most interesting recent logical constructions. The aim of the paper is to present formal and philosophical aspects of the sentential calculus with identity, SCI, constituting the base of that realization."

15. Malinowski, Grzegorz, and Zygmunt, Jan. 1978. " *Review Of*: Roman Suszko - Abolition of the Fregean Axiom (1975)." *Erkenntnis* no. 12:369-380.

    "According to Professor Suszko's declaration on page 169, the main subject of his paper is the construction of non-Fregean logic (NFL) and its basic properties. To satisfy the reader's curiosity, we may say that NFL is generally speaking a result of the rejection of the Fregean axiom. This amounts to the following:
    (FA) *all true (and, similarly, all false) sentences describe the same, that is, have a common referent*.
    Before describing the content of the paper in some detail, we would like to draw the reader's attention to the facts that (1) the paper is concerned with the philosophy of logical constructions and the properties of logic but not with the

proofs of theorems; (2) the paper is a survey in which the author presents his own results as well as those of his colleagues. The presentation is against the broad background of the historical development of modern logic and recent research in possible world semantics, modal logics, intensionality and entailment, and all this is in order to strongly criticize 'that messy abyss with all its diffuse ghosts of ambiguity, vague flexibility, intensionality and modality' (cf. p. 171).
The paper under review consists of an introduction, 14 main sections, a supplement and a bibliography. The supplement contains 53 notes which provide us with deeper elaboration of some of the networks, comments, complements, sketches of proofs, etc. presented earlier. The bibliography, also containing 53 items, is not arranged alphabetically but in order of their citation in the main text, and includes the titles of almost all the important works by R. Suszko and his colleagues on non-Fregean logic - and in particular, sentential calculus with identity."

16. Metzler, Helmut. 1987. "Some Remarks on Roman Suszko's Discussion of the Frege-Axiom from the Point of View of Philosophy and Methodology." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 167-174. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

    "Roman Suszko writes: "The semantical assumption that all true (and, similarly, all false) sentences describe the same, i.e. have a common referent (Bedeutung) is called the Fregean Axiom" (Suszko 1977, p. 377). He himself distinguishes in a strict way between logical and algebraic valuations of expressions of languages and speaks of an amalgamation into an inseparable unity of logical valuations (truth and falsity) end algebraic valuations (reference assignments) in Frege's thinking which he rejects (Suszko 1977, p. 378).

From the point of view of the history of logic it is of interest to know something about the reasons why Frege used this amalgamation of two kinds of valuations. The main theses of this talk are the following
(1) The amalgamation is based on epistemological. assumptions.
(2) Analysing semantical aspects of his general scientific problem of the foundation of mathematics Frege treated a similar subject as the two kinds of valuations, distinguishing referent (truth and falsity) and sense ("Gedanke") of sentences.
(3) The difference between Frege's approach in solving his problem and other authors' approaches is based on different epistemologies.
(4) Distinguishing between the two kinds of valuation of sentences is of interest not only with respect to philosophical aspects of logic but also from the point of view of methodology." p. 167
"The distinction between the two different dimensions of valuation of sentences or logical formulae claimed by Suszko seems to me relevant especially from the point of view of methodology but also for the philosophical dispute over logic. For the second aspect the discussion of so called "paradoxes of material implication" provided an example.
I shall exemplify at this special case how the distinction of the two kinds of valuation can help us to come to a deeper understanding of logical expressions. From the philosophical point of view we can't discuss tautologies only as truth-value functions as they work in inferences, or with other words, we can't discuss them only with respect to inference relation. We have also to ask, which kind of reality will be represented by logical tautologies? What is the ontological aspect of logical tautologies? To find some understanding in this topic we will take attention to the so called paradoxes of material implication.
In so far as formulations like "from the False anything follows" or "the True follows from anything" are regarded only with respect to transformation of truth-values, they have the appearance of paradox. But if we assume that there

are other reference assignments besides those of truth-values, then the two logical tautologies can stimulate us to seek them. Then we can reflect that tautologies relate not only to inferences but also to conditions of being. With respect to such reference assignments the two tautologies above lose their paradoxical character. Their interpretation as theorems on being of truth says nothing more then "truth exists by itself" ("truth needs no assumptions") and "falsity is no basis of inference". A methodological value of the claimed distinction is given by a twofold sharpening of scientific research; controlling simultaneously methodical aspects of thinking and the association of content of thoughts. By this I mean: Suszko's criticism has it that logicians should think about the objects of scientific research the way other, practically minded scientists do in their research, because scientists in individual or teamwork control their procedures with concern both for the content of their ideas and the logical validity of their inferences. When we focus logical analysis of scientific labour more strongly on the unity and distinction of the two dimensions of valuation, I think we shall obtain new information for the automation of scientific work, and promote the development of applied logic. Comparing the intention behind, and the results of Frege's distinction between sense and referent may, on the one hand, help to describe scientific work; and, on the other hand, Suszko's distinction between the two kinds of valuation may give new insight in modelling scientific research-processes and help us to increase the efficiency of scientific labour."

17. Omyla, Mieczyslaw. 1976. "Translatability in Non-Fregean Theories." *Studia Logica* no. 35:127-138.

18. ———. 1978. "Boolean Theories with Quantifiers." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 7:76-83.

19. ———. 1982. "The Logic of Situations." In *Language and Ontology. Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 23rd to 30th August 1981*

Kirchber Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Leinfellner, Werner, Kraemer, Eric and Schamk, Jeffrey, 195-198. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

"Professor Roman Suszko introduced a broad class of languages into the literature of logic. In honour of Wittgenstein Suszko named these languages W-languages. Syntax, semantics and consequence operations in these languages are based on the famous ontological principle: whatever exists is either a situation, or an object, or a function. The distinguishing property of W-languages is that they contain sentential and nominal variables, identity connectives and identity predicates. The intended interpretation of W-languages is such that sentential variables range over the universum of situations, nominal variables range over the universum of objects. All other symbols in these languages except sentential and nominal variables are interpreted as symbols of some functions both defined over the universum of situations and the universum of objects. Identity connectives correspond to identity relations between situations, and identity predicates correspond to identity relations between objects. It is obvious that the ordinary predicate calculus with identity is a part W-language excluding sentential variables, but the most often used sentential languages are the part of W-languages without nominal variables and identity predicates. In this paper, I will discuss only W-languages containing sentential variables, connectives and possibly quantifiers binding sentential variables." p. 195

20. ———. 1982. "Basic Intuitions of Non-Fregean Logic." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 11:40-47.

21. ———. 1987. "Roman Suszko's Philosophy of Logic." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 175-179. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

"In Roman Suszko's logical writings there are to be found many remarks and reflections on the idea of logic which is closely related to his work in formal logic. Though the scope of this paper makes it impossible to deal with them all, I would like nevertheless to draw the reader's attention to some of Suszko's views concerning the philosophy of logic. The aim of this study is to call the reader's attention to the most important of them."

22. ———. 1989. "Non-Fregean Logic and Ontology of Situations." *Ruch Filozoficzny* no. 47:27-30.

23. ———. 1990. "The Principles of Non-Fregean Semantics for Sentences." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 55:422-423.

24. ———. 1994. "Non-Fregean Semantics for Sentences." In *Philosophical Logic in Poland*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 153-165. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    "In this paper I intend to present the general and formal principles of non-Fregean semantics for sentences and to derive the simplest consequences of these principles. The semantic principles constitute foundation of non-Fregean sentential calculus and its formal semantics and the philosophical interpretations of it. Non-Fregean sentential calculus is the basic part of non-Fregean logic. Non-Fregean logic is a generalization of classical logic. It was conceived by Roman Suszko under the influence of Wittgensteinian's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The term "non-Fregean" indicates that the set of semantic correlate of sentences need not contain of just two elements, as it assumed by Frege in *Über Sinn und Bedeuting* (1892). Frege accepted the following semantic principle:
    (A.F.) all true sentences have the same common referent, and similarly all false sentences also have the one common referent.
    J. Łukasiewicz interpreted the common referent of true sentences as "Being" and analogically the common referent of all false sentences as "Unbeing". Suszko called the

principle (A.F) the "semantical version of the Frege an axiom".
In *Abolition of the Fregean Axiom* (1975) Suszko wrote: "If one accepts the Fregean Axiom then one is compelled to be an absolute monist in the sense that there exists only one and necessary fact".
According to Suszko (A. F.) has a counterpart in the language of classical logic which is a formula asserting that the universe of sentential variables is a two-element set. This formula is not expressed that fact in the language of non-Fregean logic.
In *SCI and modal systems* (1972) Suszko presents the properties of his logic as follows: "... non-Fregean logic is the realization of the Fregean program in pure logic, logically bivalent and extensional with two modifications: (1) keep formulas (sentences) and terms (names) as disjoint syntactic categories, having sense and denotations,as well, and (2) drop the desperate assumption that all true or false sentences have the same denotation (not sense that is proposition)"." pp. 153-154.

25. ———. 1996. "A Formal Ontology of Situations." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter M., 173-187. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

"The theoretical foundation for this paper is the system of a non-Fregean logic created by Roman Suszko under the influence of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In fact, we use just a fragment of it called here a non-Fregean sentential logic.
Our basic term is that of a 'situation'. We do not answer the question what situations are. We simply assume that sentences present situations, and we provide a criterion determining when two sentences of some fixed language present the same situation.
The lay-out of this paper is the following. First we set out certain philosophical consequences of the assumption adopted in classical logic that the only connectives of the language in question are the truth-functional ones. Then we

sketch out briefly the axiomatics of non-Fregean sentential logic, and of a formal semantics of the algebraic type for it. Next, for an arbitrary model for a non-Fregean sentential logic, we pick out from the formulae true in that model a theory to be called the 'ontology of situations determined by the model in question' - in contradistinction to all sentences holding contingently in that model, i.e. not determined by its algebra. In the ontology of situations determined by a model we point out those propositions which pertain to possible worlds." p. 173

3. Philosophical Interpretations of non-Fregean Sentential Logic

According to the principles of non-Fregean semantics as presented in Omyla 1975, all sentences of an interpreted language have their references. However, not in every such language are we in a position to put forward universal and existential theorems with regard to the structure of the universe of those references. To be in such position the language in question must contain as its sublanguage the language of non-Fregean sentential logic, or at least a significant part of it. As we are not interested here in the universe of any particular language, but only in that of a quite arbitrary one, let us consider now some philosophical aspects of arbitrary models of that kind. Let M = (U, F) be such a model. The elements of the universe of U do not generally answer to the intuitions we have about the reference of sentences, and about situations in particular. However, the algebraic structure imposed on U by the theory TR(M) is the same as that of a possible universe of situations, with regard to the operations corresponding to logical constants. Moreover, the set F has the formal properties of a possible (or 'admissible') set of situations obtaining in that universe. This is so because sentential variables are at the same time sentential formulae, and because the logical constants get in the model M their intended interpretation. Thus for any model M = (U, F) its algebra U is a formal representation of some universe of situations, and the set F is a formal representation of some admissible set of facts obtaining in some universe of

situations. Not all the generalized SCI-algebras represent some algebra of situations; for not all of them contain a set F representing the facts, i.e. such that the couple (U, F) is a model. This depends on how the operations in the algebra U are defined. For the sake of simplicity the algebra of any model M = (U, F) for the language of a non-Fregean sentential logic will be called the *algebra of situations* occurring in the model M, and the designated set F will be called the set of *facts* obtaining in M. Such a terminology is appropriate here for we are interested only in the formal properties of those universe of situations which in view of our semantic principles find expression in the logical syntax of the language in question, and in consequence operation holding in it. By the completeness theorem for non-Fregean logic it follows that for any consistent theory T in L there is a model M such that T e TR(M). Hence any theory in the language of non-Fregean sentential logic will be called a *theory of situations*.

The term 'ontology of situations' we take over from the title of Wolniewicz 1985 [*Ontologia sytuacji: Ontology of situations* in Polish], but we understand it a bit differently. By an *ontology of situations* we mean a theory describing the necessary facts of universe of situations fixed beforehand. I.e. an ontology of situations is a set of formulae holding in some fixed universe of situations, independently of which situations there are facts. To be more accurate, by an ontology of situations we mean a set of formulae with the following three properties:

(1) An ontology of situations is a theory having in its vocabulary just one kind of variable - e. the sentential one. Under the intended interpretation they range over a universe of situations. (Like in modem set theory there are variables of just one kind, i.e. those ranging over sets.)

(2) An ontology of situations is formulated in a language containing logical symbols only, i. e. logical constants and variables. To justify that postulate let us note that such a basic theory should not presuppose any other terminology except the logical one. At most it might adopt some specific ontological terms as primitive, characterizing them

axiomatically. However, we shall deal here only with such ontologies of situations which are expressed exclusively in logical terms." pp. 180-181.

26. ———. 2001. "Roman Suszko. From Diachronic Logic to Non-Fregean Logic." In *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century*, edited by Krajewski, Wladyslaw, 153-161. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

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27. ———. 2003. "Possible Worlds in the Language of Non-Fregean Logic." *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric* no. 6:7-15.

    "The term "possible world" is used usually in the metalanguage of modal logic, and it is applied to the interpretation of modal connectives. Surprisingly, as it has been shown in Suszko *Ontology in the Tractatus L. Wittgenstein* (1968) certain versions of that notion can be defined in the language of non-Fregean logic exclusively, by means of sentential variables and logical constants. This is so, because some of the non-Fregean theories contain theories of modality, as shown in Suszko *Identity Connective and Modality* (1971).
    Intuitively, possible worlds are maximal (with respect to an order of situations) and consistent situations, while the real world may be understand as a situation, which is a possible world and the fact.
    Non-Fregean theories are theories based on the non-Fregean logic. Non-Fregean logic is the logical calculus created by Polish logician Roman Suszko in the sixties. The idea of that calculus was conceived under the influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, declarative sentences of any language describe situations."

28. ———. 2007. "Remarks on Non-Fregean Logics." *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric* no. 23:21-31.

29. Omyla, Mieczyslaw, and Zygmunt, Jan. 1984. "Roman Suszko (1919-1979): A Bibliography of the Published Work with an Outline of His Logical Investigations." *Studia Logica* no. 43:421-441.

    Reprinted in Jerzy Perzanowski (ed.) - *Essays on philosophy and logic* - Cracow 1987 pp. 203-217

30. Sayward, Charles. 2004. "Roman Suszko and Situational Identity." *Sorites.An International Electronic Magazine of Analytical Philosophy* no. 15:42-49.

    "This paper gives a semantical account for the (i) ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identity-function with sentences
    as arguments; (ii) the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifier; and (iii) ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*."

31. Slavkov-Ristov, S. 1987. "Prof. Dr. Roman Suszko's Views on Some Philoosphical and Methodological Problems of Mathematics." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 196-201. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

32. Tsuji, Marcelo, and Lippel, David. 1998. "Many-Valued Logics and Suszko's Thesis Revisited." *Studia Logica* no. 60:299-309.

    "Suszko's thesis maintains that many-valued logics do not exist at all. In order to support it, R. Suszko offered a method for providing any "structural" abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. G. Malinowski challenged Suszko's thesis by constructing a new class of logics (called "q"-logics by him) for which Suszko's method fails. He argued that the key for logical two-valuedness was the

"bivalent" partition of the Lindenbaum bundle associated with all structural abstract logics, while his "q"-logics were generated by "trivalent" matrices. This paper will show that contrary to these intuitions, logical two-valuedness has more to do with the geometrical properties of the deduction relation of a logical structure than with the algebraic properties embedded on it."

33. Voutsadakis, George. 2007. "Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: The Categorical Suszko Operator." *53* no. Mathematical Logic Quarterly:616-635.

34. Wasilewska, Anita. 21984. "Dfc-Algorithms for Suszko, Logic Sci and One-to-One Gentzen Type." *Studia Logica* no. 43:395-404.

    " We use here the notions and results from algebraic theory of programs in order to give a new proof of the decidability theorem for Suszko logic SCI (Theorem 3).
    We generalize the method used in the proof of that theorem in order to prove a more general fact that any prepositional logic which admits a cut-free Gentzen type formalization is decidable (Theorem 6).
    We establish also the relationship between the Suszko Logic SCI, one-to-one Gentzen type formalizations and deterministic and algorithmic regular languages (Remark 2 and Theorem 7, respectively)."

35. Wojcicki, Ryszard. 1984. "R. Suszko's Situational Semantics." *Studia Logica* no. 43:323-340.

36. ———. 1986. "Situation Semantics for Non-Fregean Logic." *Journal of Non-Classical Logic* no. 3:33-67.

37. ———. 1987. "Situation Sematics for Non-Fregean Logic." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 187-190. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

38. Wolenski, Jan. 1987. "Suszko's Analysis of the Development of Knowledge." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 181-185. Cracow: Jagiellonian University.

39. ———. 2003. "The Reception of Frege in Poland." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 25:37-51.

    "This paper examines how the work of Frege was known and received in Poland in the period 1910-1935 (with one exception concerning the later work of Suszko). The main thesis is that Frege's reception in Poland was perhaps faster and deeper than in other countries, except England, due to works of Russell and Jourdain. The works of Łukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Czezowski are described."

40. Wolniewicz, Bogusław. 1971. "Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non-Fregean Logic." In *Contemporary East European Philosophy. Vol. 3*, edited by D'Angelo, Edward, DeGrood, David and Riepe, Dale, 231-243. Bridgeport: Spartacus Books.

41. Zachorowski, Stanislaw. 1975. "Proof of a Conjecture of Roman Suszko." *Studia Logica* no. 34:254-256.

    "It is shown that there is no countable matrix adequate for the consequence operation determined by the theorems of S4 and *modus ponens* for material implication."

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INTRODUCTION

"The Treatise encompasses what the author takes to be the nucleus of contemporary philosophy, namely semantics (theories of meaning and truth), epistemology (theories of knowledge), metaphysics (general theories of the world), and ethics (theories of value and of right action).
Social philosophy, political philosophy, legal philosophy, the philosophy of education, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and other branches of philosophy have been excluded from the above quadrivium either because they have been absorbed by the sciences of man or because they may be regarded as applications of both fundamental philosophy and logic. Nor has logic been included in the Treatise although it is as much a part of philosophy as it is of mathematics. The reason for this exclusion is that logic has become a subject so technical that only mathematicians can hope to make original contributions to it. We have just borrowed whatever logic we use.
The philosophy expounded in the Treatise is systematic and, to some extent, also exact and scientific. That is, the philosophical theories formulated in these volumes are (a) formulated in certain exact (mathematical) languages and (b) hoped to be consistent with contemporary science.
Now a word of apology for attempting to build a system of basic philosophy. As we are supposed to live in the age of analysis, it may well be wondered whether there is any room left, except in the cemeteries of ideas, for philosophical syntheses. The author's

opinion is that analysis, though necessary, is insufficient - except of course for destruction. The ultimate goal of theoretical research, be it in philosophy, science, or mathematics, is the construction of systems, i.e. theories. Moreover these theories should be articulated into systems rather than being disjoint, let alone mutually at odds.
Once we have got a system we may proceed to taking it apart. First the tree, then the sawdust. And having attained the sawdust stage we should move on to the next, namely the building of further systems. And this for three reasons : because the world itself is systemic, because no idea can become fully clear unless it is embedded in some system or other, and because sawdust philosophy is rather boring." (vol. I pp. V-VI)

From: Mario Bunge, *General Preface to the Treatise*, in: *Treatise on Basic Philosophy*, Dordrecht: Reidel 1974.

MAIN PUBLICATIONS

1. Bunge, Mario. 1959. *Causality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

   Third revised edition in 1979 with the title: *Causality and modern science* - New York, Dover Publications.
   From the preface to the first edition:
   "This is an essay on determinism, with special emphasis on causal determinism -- or causality, for short. To some, causation and determination -- and consequently causalism and determinism -- are synonymous. But to most people, determinism is a special, extreme form of causality -- and even a particularly displeasing one, for it is wrongly supposed to deny man the possibility of changing the course of events. I take sides with the minority that regards causal determinism as a special form of determinism, namely, that kind of theory that holds the unrestricted validity of the

causal principle to the exclusion of every other principle of determination. The rational ground for regarding causality as a form of determinism, and not conversely, is that modern science employs many noncausal categories of determination or lawful production, such as statistical, structural, and dialectical, though they are often couched in causal language.

In this book, the causal principle is neither entirely accepted nor altogether rejected. My aim has been to analyze the meaning of the law of causation, and to make a critical examination of the extreme claims that it applies without restriction (causalism), and that it is an outmoded fetish (acausalism). I have tried to do this by studying how the causal principle actually works in various departments of modern science. However, I hope I have succeeded in avoiding technicalities -- save in a few isolable passages. The book is, in fact, addressed to the general scientific and philosophic reader.

The chief result of the above-mentioned examination is that the causal principle is neither a panacea nor a superstition, that the law of causation is a philosophical hypothesis employed in science and enjoying an approximate validity in certain fields, where it applies in competition with other principles of determination. a by-product of this analysis is a fresh examination of various topics in metascience, ranging from the status of mathematical objects to the nature and function of scientific law, explanation and prediction." (pp. V-VI).

Index: Part I. A clarification of meaning. 1. Causation and determination, causalism and determinism; 2. Formulations of the causal principle; Part II. What causal determinism does not assert. 3. An examination of the empiricist critique of causality; 4. An examination of the romantic critique of causality; Part III. 5. What causal determinism assert. 5. The linearity of causation; 6. The unidirectionality of causation; 7. The externality of causation; 8. Causality and novelty; Part IV: The function of the causal principle in science. 9. Causality and rational knowledge; 10. Causality and scientific law; 11. Causality and scientific explanation; 12.

Causality and scientific prediction; 13. The place of the causal principle in modern science; Bibliography; Index.

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6. ———. 1961. "Kinds and Criteria of Scientific Law." *Philosophy of Science* no. 28:260-281.

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8. ———. 1961. "Ethics as a Science." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:139-152.

9. ———. 1961. "Analiticy Redefined." *Mind* no. 70:239-245.

10. ———. 1962. *Intuition and Science*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

11. ———. 1962. "Causality: A Rejoinder." *Philosophy of Science* no. 29:306-317.

12. ———. 1963. *The Myth of Simplicity*. *Problems of Scientific Philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

    From the Preface:
    "The aims of this book are two. First, to contribute to the elucidation of some key concepts of both philosophy and science, such as those of conceptual analysis, analyticity,

truth, law, level, and simplicity. Second, to show the complexity, i.e., the richness, of those very concepts, thereby exploding the myth that simplicity is always either a fact or a desideratum of research. To the extent to which the book succeeds in attaining both goals it should discourage the concoction of naive, oversimplified pictures of knowledge. The method employed is a kind of philosophic procedure that may be called metascientific elucidation. This kind of clarification may be analytic or synthetic: it may consist either in the analysis or reduction of conceptual entities (concepts, propositions, theories), or in the construction of such entities. In either case, whether in the phase of analysis or in the phase of synthesis, I call this work metascientific if the objects of elucidation are relevant to science and if the task is performed in a way congenial to science and with the help of some of the tools of contemporary scientific philosophy, such as formal logic, semantics, and theory formalization.
To the extent to which the ideas dealt with in this book are relevant to science and therefore of interest to both scientists and philosophers of science, and to the extent to which the analyses and syntheses proposed do take advantage of the tools of scientific philosophy, this is a work on metascientific elucidation." (p. V).
Index: Preface; Acknowledgments; Part I. Analysis. 1. Metascientific elucidation; 2. Analyticity; 3. Levels; Part II. Simplicity and truth. 4. Logical simplicity; 5. Extralogical simplicity; 6. Simplicity and truth, 7. Simplicity in theory construction; 8. Partial truth; Part III. Scientific law. 9. Induction in science; 10. Kinds of criteria of scientific law; 11. Causality, chance, and law. 12. Laws of laws; Index.

13. ———. 1963. "A General Black Box Theory." *Philosophy of Science* no. 30:346-358.

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15. ———. 1965. "Physics and Reality." *Dialectica* no. 19:195-222.

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Klibansky, 167-199. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

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25. ———. 1968. "Conjunction, Succession, Determination and Causation." *Journal of Theoretical Physics* no. 1:299-315.

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42. ———. 1973. "The Role of Forecast in Planning." *Theory and Decision* no. 3:207-221.

43. ———. 1974. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. I: Sense and Reference*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    "This is a study of the concepts of reference, representation, sense, truth, and their kin. These semantic concepts are

prominent in the following sample statements: 'The field tensor refers to the field', 'A field theory represents the field it refers to', 'The sense of the field tensor is sketched by the field equations', and 'Experiment indicates that the field theory is approximately true'. Ours is, then, a work in philosophical semantics and moreover one centered on the semantics of factual (natural or social) science rather than on the semantics of either pure mathematics or of the natural languages. The semantics of science is, in a nutshell, the study of the symbol-construct-fact triangle whenever the construct of interest belongs to science. Thus conceived our discipline is closer to epistemology than to mathematics, linguistics, or the philosophy of language. The central aim of this work is to constitute a semantics of science -- not any theory but one capable of bringing some clarity to certain burning issues in contemporary science, that can be settled neither by computation nor by measurement. To illustrate: What are the genuine referents of quantum mechanics or of the theory of evolution?, and Which is the best way to endow a mathematical formalism with a precise factual sense and a definite factual reference -- quite apart from questions of truth? A consequence of the restriction of our field of inquiry is that entire topics, such as the theory of quotation marks, the semantics of proper names, the paradoxes of self-reference, the norms of linguistic felicity, and even modal logic have been discarded as irrelevant to our concern. Likewise most model theoretic concepts, notably those of satisfaction, formal truth, and consequence, have been treated cursorily for not being directly relevant to factual science and for being in good hands anyway. We have focused our attention upon the semantic notions that are usually neglected or ill treated, mainly those of factual meaning and factual truth, and have tried to keep close to live science. The treatment of the various subjects is systematic or nearly so: every basic concept has been the object of a theory, and the various theories have been articulated into a single framework." pp. XI-XII.
Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XIII; Special symbols XV; Introduction 1; 1. Designation 8; 2. Reference

32; 3. Representation 83; 4. Intension 115; 5. Gist and content 142; Bibliography 173; Index of names 181; Index of subjects 183-185.

44. ———. 1974. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Ii: Interpretation and Truth*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"The present volume start with the problem of interpretation. Interpretation is construed as the assignment of constructs (e.g. predicates) to symbols. It can be purely mathematical, as when the dummy *x* is interpreted as an arbitrary natural number, or also factual, as when such a number is interpreted as the population of a town. Now, as we saw a while ago, predicated and propositions have both a sense and a reference -- and nothing else as far as meaning is concerned. These, then, are taken to be the meaning components. That is, the meaning of a construct is defined as the ordered couple constituted by its sense and its reference class. Once the meaning of a proposition has been established we can proceed to finding out its truth value -- provided it has one. If the proposition happens to be factual, i.e. to have factual referents, then it may be only partially true -- if true at all. Hence we must clarify the concept of partial truth of fact. This we do by building a theory that combines features of both the correspondence and the coherence theories of truth. The remaining semantical notions, notably those of extension, vagueness, and definite description, are made to depend on the concepts of meaning and truth and are therefore treated towards the end of this work. The last chapter explores the relations between philosophical semantics and other branches of scholarship, in particular logic and metaphysics. This volume, like its predecessor, has been conceived with a definite goal, namely that of producing a system of philosophical semantics capable of shedding some light on our knowledge of fact, whether ordinary or scientific. We leave the semantics of natural languages to linguists, psycholinguists and sociolinguists, and the semantics of logic and mathematics (i.e. model theory) to logicians and

mathematicians. Our central concern has been, in other words, to clarify and systematize the notions of meaning and truth as they occur in relation to factual knowledge. For this reason our semantics borders on our epistemology." pp. Xi-XII.
Contents: Preface XI; Special symbols XIII; 6. Interpretations 1; 7. Meaning 42; 8. Truth 81; 9. Offshoots 133; 10. Neighbors 166; Bibliography 198; index of names 206; Index of subjects 208-210.

45. ———. 1974. "The Relations of Logic and Semantics to Ontology." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 3:195-219.

"Philosophers have argued untiringly, over many centuries, about the ties of logic with ontology. While some have followed Parmenides in identifying the two, others - particularly since Abelard - have asserted the ontological neutrality of logic and, finally, a third party has oscillated between those two extremes.
Unfortunately it has seldom been clear exactly what is meant by the 'ontological commitment' of logic: mere reference to extralogical objects, the presupposition of definite ontological theses, or the ontological interpretation of logical formulas? Nor has an adequate tool for investigating this problem - namely a full-fledged semantical theory - been available. (Recall that the only existing semantical theory proper, i.e. model theory, is not competent to handle this problem because it is solely concerned with the relations between an abstract theory and its models, as well as with the relations among the latter.)
Much the same holds for semantics, though with a remarkable difference. If semantics presupposes logic, and the latter is ontologically committed, so must be semantics. But of course semantics could be tied to ontology even if logic were ontologically neutral. Therefore we need an independent investigation of the ontological commitment, if any, of semantics.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relations of logic and mathematics to ontology and to do it with the help

of a theory of meaning. This theory has been sketched elsewhere (Bunge 1972, 1973) and will be fully expanded in a forthcoming book. We assign meanings to constructs, in particular predicates and propositions, and distinguish two meaning components : sense and reference. The sense of a construct *p* in a context **C** is the totality of logical relatives of *p* in **C**. If *p* belongs to a theoretical context then the sense of *p* is the collection of statements within the theory that either entail *p* or are entailed by *p*. And the reference class of a construct *p* is the totality of individuals "mentioned" (truthfully or not) by *p*. Finally the meaning of *p* is the ordered pair constituted by the sense of *p* and the reference of *p*. We shall apply these ideas to find out the meaning of the typical constructs of logic and semantics. But before doing so we must formulate those ideas somewhat more carefully. An before we tackle this task we must explain what we mean by a predicate and by a context."

46. ———. 1974. "The Concept of Social Structure." In *Developments in the Methodology of Social Science*, edited by Werner, Leinfllner and Eckehart, Köhler, 175-215. Dordrecht: Reidel.

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49. ———. 1975. "Meaning in Science." *Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and Humanities* no. 1:56-64.

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Ontario, London, Canada, 10-13 May, 1973, edited by Leonard, Harper William and Alan, Hooker Clifford, 17-33. Dordrecht: Reidel.

51. ———. 1976. "The Relevance of Philosophy to Social Science." In *Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by William, Shea, 136-155. New York: Science History Publications.

52. ———. 1976. "El Ser No Tiene Sentido Y El Sentido No Tiene Ser: Notas Para Una Conceptologia." *Teorema* no. 6:201-212.

53. ———. 1977. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Iii: Ontology: The Furniture of the World*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"This book and its companion, namely Volume 4 of our *Treatise,* concern the basic traits and patterns of the real world. Their joint title could well be *The Structure of Reality*. They constitute then a work in ontology, metaphysics, philosophical cosmology, or general theory of systems. Our work is in line with an old and noble if maligned tradition: that of the pre-Socratic philosophers, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Helvetius, d'Holbach, Lotze, Engels, Peirce, Russell, and Whitehead. But at the same time it departs from tradition in the matter of method. In fact our aim is to take the rich legacy of ontological problems and hints bequeathed us by traditional metaphysics, add to it the ontological presuppositions of contemporary scientific research, top it with new hypotheses compatible with the science of the day, and elaborate the whole with the help of some mathematical tools.
The end result of our research is, like that of many a metaphysical venture in the past, a conceptual system. It is hoped that this system will not be ridiculously at variance with reason and experience. It is intended moreover to be both exact and scientific: exact in the sense that the theories composing it have a definite mathematical structure, and scientific in that these theories be consistent with and

moreover rather close to science - or rather the bulk of science. Furthermore, to the extent that we succeed in our attempt, science and ontology will emerge not as disjoint but as overlapping. The sciences are regional ontologies and ontology is general science. After all, every substantive scientific problem is a subproblem of the problem of ontology, to wit, *What is the world like?*
After a long period underground, talk about metaphysics has again become respectable. However, we shall not be talking at length about ontology except in the Introduction. We shall instead do ontology. In the process we shall attempt to exhibit the mathematical structure of our concepts and we shall make the most of science. Being systematic our ontology may disappoint the historian. Being largely mathematical in form it will be pushed aside by the lover of grand verbal (but sometimes deep and fascinating) systems - not to speak of the lover of petty verbal matters. And being science-oriented it will fail to appeal to the friend of the esoteric. Indeed we shall be concerned with concrete objects such as atoms, fields, organisms, and societies. We shall abstain from talking about items that are neither concrete things nor properties, states or changes thereof. Any fictions entering our system will be devices useful in accounting for the structure of reality. (Constructs were dealt with in Volumes 1 and 2 of this work.)" pp. XIII-XIV.
Contents: Preface to *Ontology I* XIII; Acknowledgements XV; Special symbols XVI; Introduction 1; 1. Substance 26; 2. Assembly 39; 3. Thing 108; 4. Possibility 164; 5. Change 215; 6. Spacetime 276; 7. Concluding remarks 330; Bibliography 334; Index of names 344; Index of subjects 348-352.

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58. ———. 1978. "The Limits of Science." *Epistemologia* no. 1:11-32.

59. ———. 1979. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Iv: Ontology: A World of Systems*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"This volume continues and concludes the task begun in Part 1, titled *The Furniture of the World* - namely the building of an exact and systematic ontology consistent with contemporary science. However, it can be read independently by anyone willing to take for granted the basic notions analyzed and systematized in the companion volume, namely those of substance, property, thing, possibility, change, space, and time.
The three main themes of this book are wholeness (or systemicity), variety, and change. These three notions are analyzed and systematized, and they occur in some of the main assumptions of our ontology. One of these hypotheses is that the universe is not a heap of things but a thing composed of interconnected things - i.e. a system. This supersystem is composed of subsystems of various kinds: physical, biological, social, etc. Only physical systems may be composed of things that are not themselves systems, such as elementary particles and field quanta. However, even nonsystems are components of some system or other, and every system but the universe is a subsystem of some system: there are no strays. Ours is, in sum, a world of interconnected systems. Moreover it is the only one. Another postulate of this system of ontology is that concrete systems are not all alike except insofar as they are systems

and therefore tractable with the help of a unifying systems-theoretic framework. There are different kinds of system and each is characterized by its own peculiar properties and laws. Surely we sometimes succeed in accounting for the emergence and the history of a system in terms of its composition, environment, and structure. Nevertheless, explaining need not be explaining away: explained systems are not heaps, explained emergence is no mere resultant, and explained novelty is not old. Systemicity, emergence, and qualitative novelty and variety are as genuine as they are capable of being explained. Far from being incompatible with reason, wholeness and emergence can be understood. A third major thesis of this work is that no system, except for the world as a whole, lasts forever. Systems get assembled, change, and break down. If natural, systems emerge as a result of self-assembly processes - often from debris of former systems. Even modest accretion processes can ensue in systems possessing emergent properties. Order can thus emerge from randomness, systems from physical precursors, living systems from nonliving ones, and so on. (Entropy need not increase in open systems.)
All three theses are by now common knowledge or nearly so. Now they - jointly with many others - have become part and parcel of a science oriented ontological system couched in a fairly exact language. Thus the novelty of this system resides sometimes in its components, and at other times in their organization." pp. XIII-XIV
Contents: Preface to *Ontology II* XIII; Acknowledgments XV; Special symbols XVI; 1. System 1; 2. Chemism 45; 3. Life 75; 4. Mind 124; 5. Society 186; 6. A systemic world 245; Appendix a. System models 253; Appendix B. Change models 273; Bibliography 292; Index of names 301; Index of subjects 305-308.

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Index: Preface; 1. The mind-body problem; 2. The organ; 3. The functions, 4. Sensation and perception; 5. Behavior and motivation; 6. Memory and learning; 7. Thinking and knowing; 8. Consciousness and personality; 9. Sociality; 10. Conclusion: towards understanding mind; Epilogue: a behavioral approach by Donald O. Hebb; Glossary of technical terms; Bibliography; index of names; Index of subjects.

From the Introduction: "This book deals with one of the oldest, most intriguing, and most difficult of all the problems belonging in the intersection of science and philosophy, namely the so-called *mind-body problem*. This is the system of ancient questions about the nature of the mental and its relations to the bodily.

Here are some of the problems belonging to the mind-body problem circle. Are mind and body two separate entities? If so, how are they held together in the living organism? How do they get in touch in the beginning, how do they fly asunder at the end, and what becomes of the mind after the breakdown of the body? How do the two entities manage to function synchronically: what does it mean to say that mental states have neural correlates? Do these entities interact, and if so how? And which if any has the upper hand?

If, on the other hand, mind and body are not different entities, is the mind corporeal? Or is it the other way around, namely is the body a form of the mind? Or is each a manifestation of a single (neutral) underlying inaccessible substance? In either case: what is mind? A thing, a collection of states of a thing, a set of events in the thing-or nothing at all? And whatever it is, is it just physical or is it something more? And in the latter case -- i.e. if mind is emergent relative to the physical level can it be explained in a scientific manner or can it be described only in ordinary language?

The mind-body problem is notoriously a hard nut to crack -- surely even more so than the problem of matter -- so much so that some scientists and philosophers despair of it being soluble at all. We submit that the problem, though tough, is soluble, and shall outline a solution to it in this work. But before doing so we shall have to do some philosophical scouting and conceptual cleansing, because part of the problem is that it is usually formulated in inadequate terms -- namely in those of ordinary language. These are inadequate not only because ordinary language is imprecise and poor but also because the European languages are loaded with a preconceived solution to the problem, namely psychophysical dualism, or the doctrine that mind and body are separate entities." (pp. XIII-XIV).

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    Table of Contents: Preface IX; Part I: Being; Chapter 1: Matter today 3; Chapter 2: Materialism today 17; Part II: Becoming; Chapter 3: Modes of becoming 35; Chapter 4: A critique of dialectics 41; Part III: Mind; Chapter 5: A materialist theory of mind 67; Chapter 6: Mind evolving 91; Part IV: Culture; Chapter 7: A materialist concept of culture 109; Chapter 8: Popper's unworldly World 3 137; Part V: Concept; Chapter 9: The status of concepts 161; Chapter 10: Logic, semantics, and ontology 175; Appendix: New dialogues between Hylas and Philonous 195; Sources 207

63. ———. 1981. "Conceptual Existence." In *Transparencies : Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. Ferrater Mora*, edited by Priscilla, Cohn, 5-14. Atlantics Highlands: Humanities Press.

64. ———. 1982. "The Revival of Causality." In *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey (Vol. Ii)*, edited by Guttorm, Floistad, 133-155. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

65. ———. 1983. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. V: Epistemology and Methodology I: Exploring the World*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"This volume is devoted to general epistemology and methodology; the next, to some epistemological and methodological problems arising in contemporary science and technology. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge (French *gnoséologie,* German *Erkenntnistheorie),* is the field of research concerned with human knowledge in general-ordinary and scientific, intuitive and formal, pure and action-oriented. And methodology -- not to be mistaken for methodics, or a set of methods or techniques - -is the discipline that studies the principles of successful inquiry, whether in ordinary life, science, technology, or the humanities.

In this work epistemology is conceived as a merger of philosophy, psychology, and sociology: it describes and analyzes the various facets of human cognitive processes, whether successful or not, and whether or not they bear on everyday matters. Methodology too is descriptive and analytical, but in addition it is prescriptive or normative: it attempts to find out not only how people actually get to know but also how they ought to proceed in order to attain their cognitive goals. Thus both the epistemologist and the methodologist are supposed to describe and analyze experiment, but the methodologist is primarily interested in well designed experiment. In short, whereas epistemology is concerned with inquiry in general, the task of methodology is to find or perfect optimal inquiry strategies. (...)

This book continues an old tradition or, rather, a whole fan of traditions started in ancient Greece and India. But at the same time this work departs from tradition with regard to method. It is hoped that our inquiry into inquiry will be closer to the cognitive sciences and, in general, closer to contemporary research, than to obsolete dogma. More particularly, we shall proceed as follows. We shall pick up the rich legacy of epistemological problems and hints (often optimistically called 'theories') bequeathed to us by the epistemological tradition. We shall enrich it with some of the problems and findings of contemporary scientific, technological and humanistic research, topping it with new hypotheses compatible with the science of the day-in

particular neuroscience, psychology, and social science. And we shall elaborate and systematize the whole with the help of a few modest tools such as the concepts of set and function. However, in contradistinction with the former volumes in this *Treatise,* here we shall adopt a far more modest level of formalization. The result is a greater intelligibility-and length. (The formalizations have been put in parentheses and in the Appendices.)"
Contents: Preface to *Epistemology I & II* V; Acknowledgements XVII; Special symbols XIX; Introduction 1; Part I. Cognition and communication 19; 1. Cognition 21, 2. Knowledge 61; 3. Communication 97; Part II. Perceiving and thinking 127; 4. Perceiving 129; 5. Conceiving 159; 6. Inferring 199; Part III. Exploring and theorizing 231; 7. Exploring 233; 8. Conjecturing 286; 9. Systematizing 323; Appendices 377; 1. The power of mathematics in theory construction: a simple model of evolution 377; 2. The prose identifying the variables 380; Bibliography 383; Index of names 396; Index of subjects 401-403.

66. ———. 1983. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Vi: Epistemology and Methodology Ii: Understanding the World*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"This is the sequel to *Epistemology I: Exploring the World*. In that work we studied cognition as a brain process, and communication as a social transaction. In particular, we studied perception and conception, the formation of propositions and proposals, exploration and systematization, discovery and invention. We regarded knowledge as an outcome of processes occurring in animals that learn by themselves and from one another. We took concepts and propositions, problems and proposals, to be equivalence classes of brain processes rather than ideal objects detached from brains and from society. However, we also stressed the need for studying such abstractions as well as the corresponding real processes.

In other words, we admitted that cognition ought to be studied both concretely (as a biopsychosocial process) and abstractly (with disregard for personal and social idiosyncrasies). We hoped in this way to favor the merger of the various hitherto separate approaches to the study of knowledge and knowledge-directed action: the neurophysiological and the psychological, the sociological and the historical, the epistemological and the methodological ones. After all, these various approaches have a single aim, namely to improve our understanding of the ways we get to know reality, and the ways knowledge can be utilized to alter reality.

In this volume we will study the ways theories and proposals (e.g. technological designs) are put to the test and used to understand or alter reality. We will stress the difference between belief and inquiry. We will study the kinds of knowledge and the ways human knowledge grows, declines, or alters course. We will distinguish basic science from applied science, and both from technology and ideology, and we will seek to demarcate genuine knowledge from bogus. We will analyze the two mechanisms for enhancing the cross-fertilization and the unity of the various branches of knowledge: reduction and integration. We will stipulate the conceptual and empirical conditions a proposition has to fulfill in order to be valued as (sufficiently) true, and a proposal to be regarded as (suitably) efficient. (We shall do so in the light of real cases drawn from contemporary research rather than in obedience to a priori philosophical principles.) We will analyze a number of important yet vague notions, such as those of truth and efficiency, background and framework, paradigm and revolution. And we will explore the possible limits to our exploration of the world, as well as the limitations of the classical philosophies of knowledge.

The upshot of our study is a descriptive and normative epistemology that cannot be compressed into a couple of slogans, although it combines some features of rationalism with others of empiricism. This synthesis may be called *scientific realism* because the criterion for adopting or

rejecting any given thesis is its compatibility or incompatibility with the practice of research in contemporary science (basic or applied), technology, or the humanities. We find no use for a theory of knowledge, however exact or ingenious it may be, that is divorced from knowledge." pp. XI-XII
Contents: Preface to *Epistemology II* XI; Special symbols XIII; Part IV. Understanding and checking 1; 10. Understanding 3; 11. Producing evidence 59; 12. Evaluating 114; Part V. Variety and unity 155; 13. Epistemic change 157; 14. Kinds of knowledge 194; 15. Upshot 240; Appendices 272; 3. partial truth 272; 4. predictive power 276; 5. Formal structure of experiment 278; 6. Degree of confirmation of a theory 281; Bibliography 283; Index of names 291; Index of subjects 294-296.

67. ———. 1983. "Demarcating Science from Pseudoscience." *Fundamenta Scientiae* no. 3:369-388.

68. ———. 1984. "Philosophical Problems in Linguistics." *Erkenntnis* no. 21:107-174.

69. ———. 1985. *Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Vii: Epistemology and Methodology Iii: Philosophy of Science and Technology. Part I. Formal and Physical Sciences*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    "This is a systematic study in the philosophy of science and technology, or PS & T for short. It struggles with some of the so-called Big Questions in and about contemporary S & T, i.e. questions supposed to be general, deep, hard, and still *sub judice*. Here is a random sample of such problematics. Is verbal psychotherapy scientific? Is political economy ideologically neutral? Are computers creative? What is the ontological status of machines? Is engineering just an application of basic science? What is language? Are there laws of history? Which are the driving forces of history? Which is the most fruitful approach to the study of mind? Are genes omnipotent? Are species collections or concrete systems? Do the earth sciences have laws of their own? Is

chemistry nothing but a chapter of physics? Does contemporary cosmology confirm theology? Has the quantum theory refuted scientific realism? Is there a viable philosophy of mathematics? How are we to choose among alternative logics? What is the ontological status of concepts?

These and other questions of interest to philosophy, as well as to science or technology, are tackled in this book from a viewpoint that is somewhat different from the dominant PS & T. An instant history of our discipline should help place our viewpoint. Modem PS & T began together with modern science and it was cultivated by scientists and philosophers until it became professionalized in the 1920s. At this time it took *a logical* turn: it was equated with the logical analysis and orderly reconstruction of scientific theories. Experimental and field work were deemed to be ancillary to theorizing, and technology was praised or deprecated, but hardly analyzed. Later on PS & T took *a linguistic* turn: only the languages of S & T seemed to matter. Facts, problems, theories, experiments, methods, designs and plans were overlooked. More recently, PS & T took *a historical* turn: everything was seen from a historical viewpoint. The logic, semantics, epistemology, ontology and ethics of S & T were declared subservient to its history or even irrelevant. Even more recently there have been attempts to force PS & T to take *a sociological* turn. Facts are said to be the creation of researchers, who would act only in response to social stimuli or inhibitors; there would be neither norms nor objective truth.

I believe the time has come for PS & T to take, or rather retake, a *philosophical* turn: to investigate the logical and semantical, epistemological and ontological, axiological and ethical problems raised by contemporary S & T, leaving the sociological and historical studies to social scientists. The time has also come to approach the problematics of PS & T in *a scientific* fashion, by paying close attention to current developments in S & T and checking philosophical hypotheses against the findings of S & T. At least this is the approach adopted in the present volume.

Although this book is part of an eight-volume treatise, it is self-contained: it can be read independently of the others. Moreover, each chapter can be read independently of the others. The book is addressed to philosophers, scientists, technologists, and culture watchers. It may be used as a textbook in a one year advanced course in PS & T. Each chapter may also be used in a course in the corresponding branch of PS & T.
To facilitate its use as a textbook, the present volume has been divided into two parts. Part I is devoted to the philosophy of the formal and physical sciences, whereas Part II covers the philosophy of the biological and social sciences as well as of the technologies." p. IX-X.
Contents: Preface to *Philosophy of science & technology* IX; Acknowledgements XI; Introduction 1; I. Formal science: from logic to mathematics 9; 1. Generalities 9; 2. Mathematics and reality 26; 3. Logic 40; 4. Pure and applied mathematics 75; 5. Foundations and philosophy 95; 6. Concluding remarks 121; II. Physical science: from physics to earth science 124; 1. Preliminaries 124; 2. Two classics 140; 3. Two relativities 155; 4. Quantons 165; 5. Chance 178; 6. Realism and classicism 191; 7. Chemistry 219; 8. Megaphysics 231; 9. Concluding remarks 241; Bibliography 243; Index of names 255; index of subjects 260-262.

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    "This book is about values, morals, and human actions. It is also about axiology (the study of value systems), ethics (the study of moral codes), and action theory. It is concerned with both private and public values, morals, and actions. In particular, it seeks to uncover the roots and functions (biological and social) of valuation and morality. As well, it attempts to sketch a value system, a moral code and a general plan of action that may help us tackle the dreadful problems of our time.
    (...)
    The revival of value theory and ethics can be attested to by anyone who bothers to peruse the philosophical journals published in the course of the latest few years. This revival is particularly welcome at a time when philosophy as a whole is at a low ebb - so much so that some philosophers have proclaimed its death while others have taken leave of

reason. But the current flourishing of ethics may be an indicator of the general crisis of modern civilization, for people do not usually reflect on problems about values and morals until they face them, and nowadays most of us face them daily by the dozen.
This is the last volume of my *Treatise on Basic Philosophy,* on which I started to work two decades ago. It is consistent with the previous volumes, in particular with the naturalistic, dynamicist, emergentist and systemist ontology, as well as with the realistic and ratioempiricist semantics and epistemology formulated therein. However, the present book may be read independently of its companions." p. XIV-XV.
Contents: Preface to *Ethics* XIII; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction 1; Part I. Values 11; 1. Roots of values 11; 2. Welfare 41; 3. Value theory 61; Part II. Morals 93; 4. Roots of morals 93; 5. Morality changes 133; 6. Some moral issues 158; Part III. Ethics 197; 7. Types of ethical theory 197; 8. Ethics et *alia* 243; 9. Metaethics 285; Part IV: Action theory 319; 10. Action 319; 11. Social philosophy 354; 12. Values and morals for a viable future 390; Bibliography 400; Index of names 416; Index of subjects 421-424.

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81. ———. 1993. "Realism and Anti-Realism in Social Science." *Theory and Decision* no. 35:207-235.

82. ———. 1996. *Finding Philosophy in Social Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

From the preface: "This book has been written for social scientists curious about philosophy, as well as for philosophers interested in social studies. As suggested by its title, it focuses on the philosophy involved in social studies -

- albeit, usually in a tacit manner. I will argue that all social studies,
whether scientific or literary, are crammed with philosophical concepts, such as those of fact, system, process, theory, test, and truth. They also contain or presuppose some philosophical assumptions, such as that societies are (or are not) mere aggregates of individuals, that people can (or cannot) choose and act rationally, and that social facts can (or cannot) be studied scientifically. Regrettably, most students of society rarely pause to examine the philosophical ideas they adopt. When they do, they often fall under the influence of philosophies that do not match the practice of contemporary social science research. Most of the philosophers who have paid attention to the philosophy in or about social science have held some or all of the following three theses: that there is a clear divide between the social and the natural sciences, there being no mixed or socio-natural sciences; that science and philosophy are mutually disjoint, so cannot learn from one another; that the philosophy of social science is the same as that of the natural sciences -- or else that the two are utterly disjoint. I will argue that all three, and many more received opinions, are false. I will examine some of the key philosophical ideas inherent in the social (and socio-natural) sciences, as well as some of the topical philosophical problems raised by them. Thus I will elucidate the ontological notions of event and causation, the semantic concepts of meaning and truth, the epistemological ideas of hypothesis and indicator, the axiological notions of value and utility, and the ethical concepts of right and duty, I will also wrestle with such classical controversies as individualism versus holism, rationalism versus empiricism, explanation versus understanding, and nomothetic versus idiographic science."
From the Introduction: "The *ontology* of social science examines the nature of society, the kinds of social process, the difference between law and rule, the roles of causation and chance, and the nature of planning. Hence it is concerned with questions such as: Are there social systems,

or only aggregates of individuals? Are cultures systems of values and norms, or concrete social systems? What is a micro-macro link? What are the engines of history: the environment, biological factors, the economy, politics, culture, or all of these? Are there occasionally leaps in social evolution, or was Marshall right in inscribing the maxim *Natura non facit saltum* on the title page of his classic *Principles of Economics*? Is society a text to be deciphered by hermeneutics or semiotics? Is human history analogous to biological evolution?" (p. 7).

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    From the Preface:
    Index: Part I. Philosophical fundamentals. 1. Ontological fundamentals; 2. Semantical and logical fundamentals; 3. Epistemological fundamentals; Part II. Fundamental issues in biophilosophy; 4. Life; 5. Ecology; 6. Psychobiology; 7. Systematics; 8. Developmental biology; 9. Evolutionary theory;10. Teleology; 11. Concluding remarks; References; Name Index; Subject index.

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Fred Sommers on the Logic of Natural Language

INTRODUCTION

"The essay before you is the fruit of some fifteen years of investigation into the logical syntax of natural language. In the summer of 1965 I read a paper to the Congress on Logic and Scientific Method at Bedford College, London, that presented an algorithm for the algebraic treatment of syllogistic arguments in which categorical propositions were transcribed as fractions and reciprocals.(1) I spent the next two years looking for a more general algorithm with greater expressive power, one that could transcribe relational, multi-general propositions as well as simple categoricals. (...)The first article on the more general calculus was published in Mind, January 1970, as The Calculus of Terms. Unfortunately its message had little effect although I followed it by a series of articles that exploited the new notation and exposed some important consequences for the philosophy of language. It became clear that the current Fregean logic had fully replaced the more traditional logic of terms and that articles could not do justice to the neo-classical alternative that I was advocating.
I had for some years been planning to write a book on the logic of categories but the lack of response to my more recent interests, the logic of terms and its relation to natural syntax, strongly suggested that I must first do book-length justice to these latter topics. I began writing this essay in 1975 and, after several long interruptions and two revisions, completed it in the summer of 1980. I still hope to write the book on category theory. In the present work chapter 13) I do little more than indicate how

traditional logic's way with contrariety leads to the conception of categories that is at the basis of Ryle's seminal work in the forties and my own more formal treatment of categories in the early sixties. Indeed it was my recognition of the need for a notion of contrariety that would allow for saying, for example, that Saturday is neither fed nor unfed (which renders both 'Saturday is fed' and 'Saturday is unfed' 'category mistakes') that prompted me to re-examine traditional Aristotelian logic with its characteristic distinction between contrary terms or predicates and contradictory propositions. This distinction is absent in modern logic which uses the forms 'Px' and '-Px' to represent contrary predicates thereby conflating the two oppositions of contrariety and contradiction so fundamental to the classical term-theoretic standpoint. (2) The current use of propositional negation as the sole form of opposition 'precludes the kind of internal term and predicate structure that makes it possible to treat negation as a means of changing around concepts inside the meanings of terms and predicates'. The quoted words are Jerrold Katz's but they are typical of the sort of reaction one gets from linguists who find the restricted grammar of 'standard' logical languages to be at odds with their intuitions into the logical grammar of empirical languages.
More generally the theory of logical form that has its source in the formation rules for standard languages poses severe problems for the linguist. The older subject-predicate logic with its classical binary noun-phrase verb-phrase analysis of sentences has been discredited and while some linguists appear prepared to abandon the classical analysis in favour of analyses that conform more closely to the syntax of modern predicate logic others may welcome a rehabilitated classical logic of 'categorical' sentences that leaves the fundamental binary structure in place." (pp. VII-VIII)

Notes

(1) 'On a Fregean Dogma'. Apparently I was not alone in representing categorical propositions as fractions. Charles Merchant, a mathematician at the University of Arizona,

subsequently wrote me of his independent work on this algorithm.
(2) Early treatments of the distinction between negating a sentence and denying predicate may be found in my 'Predicability' (1963) and 'Truth Functional counterfactuals' (1964).

From: Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982.

"Today's orthodox logic came into existence about a hundred years ago when it replaced the traditional syllogistic logic, which itself had been the orthodoxy for many centuries. The arguments for abandoning the old logic were not conclusive. Once entrenched, the new logic felt no need for supporting arguments. Today logic students are given at best some bad old arguments against the old logic, and then are simply presented with the new logic to be learned. No one asks 'Why?'. But Sommers has. He has challenged the deeply entrenched presumption that no syllogistic logic can measure up to the great power and beauty of the predicate calculus. What is more, not only has Sommers shown the emperor to have no clothes, he has produced a fine new suit. He has returned to the venerable but forgotten logic of Aristotle, Ockham, and Leibniz, and has shown that it does have hidden assets which make it more than adequate as an alternative to the orthodox system. So I think this rebellion is well worth joining. And, of course, there's that pleasure I referred to earlier. Sommers speaks of "the perverse pleasure of advocacy-in this day and age-of Aristotle over Frege."I have put this collection together for several reasons. As a supplement to Sommers' own work it illustrates the broad scope of Sommers' challenge to modern orthodox views about logic and language. Not all of those whose work is represented here fully endorse Sommers' programme. Some may explicitly reject parts of it. But all recognize its importance." (Preface by the Editor, pp. X-XI)

From: George Englebretsen (ed.), *The New Syllogistic*, New York: Peter Lang 1987.

"Frederic Sommers was born on 1 January 1923 in New York City. He was educated at Columbia University, where he received his BA and then his PhD in philosophy in 1955, writing a dissertation on "An Empiricist Ontology: A Study in the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead." Sommers began his academic career at Columbia University, where he was assistant professor of philosophy from 1955 to 1963. He moved to Brandeis University in 1964 as associate professor of philosophy, was promoted to full professor in 1966, and held the Harry Austryn Wolfson Chair of Philosophy from 1965 until his retirement in 1993.

Sommers was a staunch proponent of a traditionalist view of logic, albeit in a "modern" guise. He has consistently expressed the view that progress in logic should have stopped, if not with Leibniz, than at least before Frege, devising a variant of syllogistic very close to that undertaken by Leibniz. His "Calculus of Terms" applies a system of pluses and minuses to the subjects and predicates of categorical syllogisms, to indicate inclusion and exclusion, the copula and the negation of the copula, as well as for affirmation and denial, with a universal statement having the form + (–...) or – (+...) for the subject term and a particular statement having the form + (+...) or – (–...) for the subject term. His system is essentially that of Leibniz's, with Leibniz's "=" and "±" replaced in Sommers's notation by "+" and "–" respectively. In *Logic of Natural Language* Sommers developed the system in more detail together with a consideration of its purported philosophical implications. He argued that his calculus of terms is significantly different from the predicate logic; but Gregory MCCulloch [1984] argued that there really is no such difference. Sommers claims that his calculus of terms is an elaboration of Leibniz's proposal.

Sommers argued that the subject–predicate semantic analysis of syllogistic propositions with the proper treatment, retains as much deductive power as Frege's calculus, and in a important sense is more expressively powerful than Frege's function-theoretic quantification theory, because it is closer to natural language while being able to handle polyadic relations.

In Sommers's calculus, relational terms are represented in the form ' $R \pm A \pm B \pm .... \pm K$', where R is the relation and some/all A, some/all B, ..., some/all K are objects of R. Thus Sommers is able

to analyze such propositions as "All censors withhold some books from minors" as "$W + B - M$."
Sommers's "Ordinary Language Tree" for mapping relations among Aristotelian categories was based upon his efforts to arithmeticize Aristotelian syllogistic as a calculus of terms. In Sommers's tree, genera and species give way to subjects and predicates, treated as classes. His book *The Logic of Natural Language* (1982) provides a detailed, systematic and unified elaboration of the Ordinary Language Tree and the Calculus of Terms and explores the philosophical import of this logical system. His *Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of Terms* (2000) provides a textbook elaboration of the logic of terms."

From: Irving H. Anellis, "SOMMERS, Frederic Tamler", in: John R. Shook (ed.), *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, Bristol: Thoemmes 2005.

EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS (in progress)

"The thesis I will be arguing for belongs to the premodern -- which is to say, pre-Fregean-tradition of logical theory whose major figures from Aristotle to Leibniz never doubted that the sentences of a natural language like Greek or English that entered into deductive reasoning could, for logical purposes, be parsed in ways familiar to the grammarian. Implicit in the program of traditional formal logic is the idea of a logical syntax of natural language in which the grammarians' nounphrase/verb-phrase analysis is the fundamental pattern. (...)The idea of a logical syntax of natural language stands opposed to what the Fregean believes about logical form. Frege himself held that an adequate account of inferences expressed in natural language requires translation into a new idiom, the idiom of a language expressly constructed for use by logicians.
This new logical language is no mere convenience: Frege believed that the syntax of natural language was logically useless,

misleading, and incoherent. Being convinced of this, Frege did not criticize the grammarian for misconstruing natural language. On the contrary, from Frege's standpoint the grammarian could well be right in his description of the syntax of natural language. If so the inadequacy is not in the grammarian but in his subject-matter. Michael Dummett aptly sums up Frege's reaction to the phenomenon that the natural languages lack a perspicuous logical grammar with the words 'so much the worse for natural language'." (pp. 1-2)

From: Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982.

EXTENSIONS OF SOMMERS' TERM LOGIC

"Conclusion.
NTL [*Numerical Term Logic*] works within the assumption that all logical statements are affirmations as to the quantity of members of a set (or subset). Sommers' logical system and Modem Predicate Logic, although opposed in many ways, have at least one thing in common: they may each formulate statements that affirm only either that a set is empty, or that it is not. In Sommers' system's primary scheme, whether a subset is non-empty is indicated by the copulation of two terms (with a primary "+"), each of which represents one of the intersecting sets; and whether a set is empty is indicated by the denial of such a copulation (with a primary "- "). Despite its quantificational difficulties, Sommers' system is remarkably expressive, deductively powerful, theoretically well founded (as well as relatively faithful to the structure of natural language); indeed, it surpasses MPL [*Modern Predicate Logic*] in each of these respects. In building upon the notational foundation of Sommers' system, NTL not only retains these important advantages, but, in fact, amplifies them enormously. In NTL, variable numerical quantity is incorporated as a formal element of logical copulation; thus, in an NTL primary scheme analogous to Sommers', to what

degree a subset is non-empty would be indicated by the copulation of two terms (with a binary "+x"), each of which represents one of the intersecting sets; and to what degree a subset is empty would be indicated by the denial of a copulation of this kind. NTL therefore becomes infinitely more expressive than Sommers' system-not merely in the fact that it may formulate statements with quantities of infinite magnitude, but also in the fact that it accounts for various types of quantification (fractional, subjective natural language quantification, etc.); it also becomes far more powerful than Sommers' system in its deductive scope (for it handles inferences involving different kinds of numerically quantified statements uniformly), is theoretically stronger (for example, in its accounts of "wild quantity", vacuosity, and subalternation), and is more loyal than Sommers' system to the structure of natural language (for it requires no contortionism in its expression)." (pp. 103-104)

From: Lorne Szabolcsi, *Numerical Term Logic,* Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 2008.

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4. ———. 1959. "The Ordinary Language Tree." *Mind* no. 68:160-185.

   "An important part of any investigation into the meaning of an expression E consists of finding what may be called its sense location. This is done by noting which expressions may be conjoined with E and which may not. "E is that expression which goes well with A, C, or G in a sentence but E fails to make sense when used with B, D, F or H, etc." When the mutual sense relations of A, B, C, D, E, F, G . . . are known, then we have a map in which each expression has a sense location with respect to the other expressions under consideration. The question we shall consider is

whether the natural language provides any rules for the construction of such a map, whether there is, as it were, an invariant structure to "linguistic cartography" in terms of which it would be possible to give the sense location of any of the expressions in the language. To this question we shall eventually offer an affirmative answer.

The theory of meaning adopted here is a current one. It is the theory of meaning-in-use. Employing a convenient distinction of Ryle's between two kinds of knowing, we may say that a knowledge of meaning is a "knowing how" rather than a "knowing that": to know the meaning of an expression is to know how to use it. Such knowledge includes an ability to formulate a piece of non-absurd discourse containing the expression. Thus to know the meaning of a word is to know how to formulate some sentences containing the word, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know how to formulate some coherent discourse containing the sentence. It is almost true to say that the meaning is this use, i.e. the meaning of E (if "E" is a word or phrase) is the set of sentences containing E and that my knowledge of the meaning of E grows (though not in direct proportion) with my ability to formulate more and more sentences in which E has a proper use. A complete knowledge of E would then be represented by the set of all such sentences. The trouble with this view is that even such a set would not specify uniquely the meaning of any one expression since the set would also specify the meaning of all those expressions which have the same use-at this level of use. For example, the word " short " might be specified by the sentences in which it has a non-absurd occurrence from a purely semantic point of view, but those sentences may also specify the word "tall". We must therefore keep in mind that a map of sense relations giving the locations of a group of expressions does not tell the whole story of "their use in the language", i.e., their meanings. Nevertheless, we shall see that such a map removes ambiguity, ensuring univocity for the expressions located on it. For this reason we shall identify the sense of an expression with its location on a map. This entails a distinction between sense and meaning,

a distinction which we shall enforce rather than justify. The sense of an expression will be its location with respect to other expressions, its semantic range. It is what it "makes sense" with as contrasted with what it fails to make sense with. Its meaning is governed only in part by sense rules. " Tall " and " short " may have the same " sense " ; it is because of other rules governing their use that they diverge in meaning. Thus, giving the sense of an expression is not yet the same as giving its meaning. One who wishes to know more about the meaning of a given located expression will enquire at that address." pp. 160-161.

5. ———. 1963. "Types and Ontology." *Philosophical Review* no. 72:327-363.

   Reprinted, with minor corrections, in: Peter Frederick Strawson (ed.) - *Philosophical logic* - Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967 pp. 138-169 and in Dale Jacquette (ed.) - Philosophy of logic. An anthology - Oxford, Basil Blackwell 2002 pp. 103-119.
   "In this paper (*) I shall be examining several notions of types which have important application in natural languages. I shall show that one of Russell's definitions of a type can be combined with one of Ryle's to give us two other and more powerful type conceptions which are free of the criticisms advanced against each of the former. The results cast considerable light on the relation of `a language' to the sorts of things one can use the language to make statements about; for example, it becomes clear that the number of `sorts of things' discriminated by any natural language is always finite. But far more important, the new type concepts enable us to exhibit formally the type structure of any natural language. It is this structure which determines the way the language discriminates different sorts of things. Since the question of ontology is `What sorts of things are there?' the results may be construed as a formal ontology. The old Russell programme for an ontology which is defined by a logically correct (or corrected) language is thereby reinstated, though in a revised form. That programme has

foundered on the type problem for natural languages. Black, for example, has brought out grave difficulties in Russell's type theory as it applies to natural languages, and he used those difficulties to promote scepticism about the Russell programme. But if I am right, a simple and adequate theory of types governs natural language and dictates its ontological commitments to different sorts of things."
(*) There are four sections to the paper. Section I isolates the problem of types for natural language and develops four type concepts appropriate to it. Section II reformulates these concepts syntactically and reconsiders Black's general criticism of a formal theory of types for natural language. In Section III the relation of types to ambiguity, and a problem raised by Black, is examined in detail. Section IV is constructive; the type-structural principle is stated and proved. The ontological meaning of the principle is discussed and the principle is illustratively applied.

6. ———. 1963. "Meaning Relations and the Analytic." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 60:524-534.

   "In his critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction Quine distinguishes two classes of analytic statements: (a1) those that are logically true and (a2) those that lean on extralogical meaning relations. In this paper the same critique that Quine applies against a2 statements is used against a1 statements. By showing that both suffer the same fate at Quine's hands, it is shown that Quine's vital contrast is not a contrast at all and that his criticism goes further than he wants it to go. The paper concludes that the "flight from intension" can become a flight away from the grounds presupposed for any application of logical and linguistic rules."

7. ———. 1964. "A Program for Coherence." *Philosophical Review* no. 73:522-527.

   "The following are some points made in reply to criticism of the author's *Types and ontology*: (1) if p is a property, define the category of p (cp) as the set of individuals that

can "significantly" be said to have p. (2) if any "individual" belongs both to cp and cq, then either cp includes cq or cq includes cp or cp=cq. (3) an ontology is coherent only if it satisfies (2) for all individuals.
Suppose that spirits cannot be characterized as colored or colorless, i.e., they are not in c-colored. Assume also that chairs are not in c-sad. Then neither category includes the other. yet persons are in both. To avoid incoherence we must deny that persons are individuals.
Coherent alternatives to Cartesianism put chairs in c-sad (panpsychism) or spirits in c-colored. The thesis supports Russell's general idea than any coherent ontology is formally isomorphic to linguistic type structure."

8. ———. 1964. "Truth-Functional Counterfactuals." *Analysis* no. 24:120-126.

9. ———. 1965. "Predicability." In *Philosophy in America*, edited by Black, Max, 262-281. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

10. ———. 1965. "A Reply to Mr. Odegard's "on Closing the Truth-Value Gap"." *Analysis* no. 25:66-68.

11. ———. 1966. "Why Is There Something and Not Nothing?" *Analysis* no. 26:177-181.

    "The question is not why it is possible there is something but (granting that something is possible) *why is* there something? Why not nothing?
    This can be answered by way of an ontological proof. For this purpose we define a neglected but important kind of possibility which we call categorial. We say for example that things older than the square root of 2 are not possible things or that unfed theorems are 'categorially' impossible. A thing older than the square root of 2 is not a possible thing because while there is nothing that is older than the square root of 2, neither is there anything that fails to be. Again the statement `some theorems are fed' is a category mistake. There is nothing that is an unfed theorem and nothing that

fails to be one since what failed to be one would be a fed theorem or an unfed non-theorem, or a fed non-theorem and there are no such things. So understood, categorial impossibility is existentially definable. More generally, if D is a monadic descriptive term and D is its logical contrary (2) (applicable to all those D-less things that are 'privative' to the state of being D) then D-things are categorially impossible, if and only if there is nothing that is D and nothing that is -D.

By this definition things that are red and blue (all over)-though presumably impossible in some other way-are categorially possible since any table is either red (failing to be blue) or blue (failing to be red) or it fails to be red and also fails to be blue. The logical contrary of the term `red and blue' is truly affirmable of all material objects of whatever colour and also of those that are colourless.

Without having defined possibility in any general way, we are accepting as a premiss of our argument that something is possible. We assume further that whatever is not a categorially possible thing is not a possible thing.

Now suppose there were nothing. It is then true for every predicate term P, that nothing is P. It is also true that there is nothing that fails to be P so that P-things are categorially impossible. If P-things are categorially impossible, they are not possible things. Since this holds for every P, nothing at all is possible. But we have assumed that something is possible and this is incompatible with the nihilist hypothesis. We see then that if something is possible, something is actual.

The same argument can be viewed another way. If something is possible it is categorially possible. For something to be possible there must be some terms predicable of some things. But if there were nothing at all, all terms would be like 'older than the square root of 2'. That some terms are predicable can be argued from the fact that-as matters actually stand-there are many things and many terms truly applicable to those things. But if there were nothing at all, not only would terms like `old' not be truly applicable, they would be altogether impredicable. Nothing

would then be possible. But we recall that our question was not `why is anything even possible?' And we see again that if anything is possible, something is actual." pp. 177-178.
(1) Heidegger considers this the crucial question for the philosophy of existence. What is given here is the traditional or "essentialist" reply.
(2) The relation of contrariety holding between a pair of terms (or attributes) does not force us to consider either one of the pair to be negative. Just as being D is a privation of D, so (equally) is being D (or -D) a privation of D. Coloured objects, for instance, fail to be colourless.

12. ———. 1966. "On a Fregean Dogma." In *Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics*, edited by Lakatos, Imre, 47-62. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science (Bedford College, 1965).
Discussion: L. Kalmár: *Not Fregean and not a Dogma* 63; M. Dummett: *A Comment on 'On a Fregean Dogma'* 63; C. Lejewski: *The Logical Form of Singular and General Statements* 68; W. V. Quine: *Three Remarks* 70; F. Sommers: *Reply* 71-81.
"In the following passage Russell states an accepted and familiar thesis :
The first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks was made independently by Peano and Frege -- both mathematicians. Traditional logic regarded the two propositions 'Socrates is mortal' and 'All men are mortal' as being of the same form; Peano and Frege showed that they are utterly different in form. The philosophical importance of logic may be illustrated by the fact that this confusion - which is still committed by most writers -- obscured not only the whole study of the forms of judgment and inference, but also the relation of things to their qualities, of concrete existence to abstract concepts, and to the world of Platonic ideas . Peano and Frege, who pointed out the error did so for technical reasons ... but the philosophical

importance of the advance which they made is impossible to exaggerate.(*)
In what follows I wish to be understood as criticising the quantificational "translation" of general categoricals like 'All men are mortal' only insofar as this is represented as exhibiting such statements to have a different logical form from singular predications. I am not criticising quantification theory as an indispensable logical tool, especially for inference involving statements of more than one variable. The standard general categoricals however are not of this type ; it is for example well-known that quantification is not needed for syllogistic inference. What is not known is that we can treat the categoricals as simple subject-predicate statements on an exact par with singular predications. There is therefore no good logical reason for saying that general and singular statements must differ in logical form.
The doctrine that (1) 'Socrates is mortal' and (2) 'Men are mortal' differ in logical form assumes that the following is the corect account of what these statements say: (a) Both say that 'is mortal' is true of some, thing or things; the first says it is true of Socrates; the second that it is true of whatever 'is a man' is true. It follows (b) that the logical form of the second statement differs from that of the first. For while the first is a simple predication, the second is a "quantified" statement." pp. 48-48.
(*) [*Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, Lecture II, (1914)]

13. ———. 1966. "What We Can Say About God." *Judaism* no. 15:61-73.

14. ———. 1969. "On Concepts of Truth in Natural Languages." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 23:259-286.

    "Remarking on alternatives to his conception of truth Tarski rejects a formulation associated with correspondence theories:

If we should decide to extend the popular usage of the term "designate" by applying it not only to names, but also to sentences, and if we agreed to speak of the designata of sentences as "slates of affairs" we could possibly use for the same purpose the following phrase:
(C) A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs. However [this] formulation can lead to various misunderstandings for [it is not] sufficiently precise and clear . . . . It is up to us to look for a more precise expression of our intuitions. (1)
The purpose Tarski speaks of is "to do justice to our intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth." Tarski takes this to be some form of correspondence theory. He has earlier considered and rejected an even less satisfactory formula of this sort: 'a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality'. His own semantic conception of truth is meant to be a more precise variant doing justice to the correspondence standpoint. In this spirit I shall presently suggest a revised version of (C).
(1) A. Tarski, "The Semantic, Conception of Truth," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1944). Reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York, 1945), p. 54. (Page reference is to this reprinting.)

15. ———. 1969. "Do We Need Identity?" *Journal of Philosophy* no. 66:499-504.

"Identity is shown to be definable within traditional syllogistic logic. the idea is to treat singular terms as general terms syntactically. this means we allow singular terms in predicate positions and also allow them to be prefixed by 'every', 'some' and 'no' when in subject position.
However universal and particular singular statements are logically equivalent: if K is a singular term then K is p every K is p some K is p. This equivalence is called the law of wild quantity.
Identity is defined thus: J is identical with K df. some J is K. This definition together with the law of wild quantities gives

all the formal properties of the identity relation."

16. ———. 1970. "The Calculus of Terms." *Mind* no. 79:1-39.

    Reprinted in: George Englebretsen (ed.) *The new syllogistic* - New York, Peter Lang, 1987

17. ———. 1970. "Confirmation and the Natural Subject." *Philosophical Forum* no. 2:245-250.

18. ———. 1971. "Structural Ontology." *Philosophia.Philosophical quarterly of Israel* no. 1:21-42.

    "Whether a certain sort of things exists is commonly disputed in philosophy. I argue that in some important classical instances the dispute is grounded in another more fundamental one: whether certain entities are individuals or composite. Disputes over individuality or compositeness are generated when certain accepted conditions for individuality seem not to be satisfied. In the last part of the paper I examine the formal condition for non-compositeness (it is not yet a criterion for individuality) tracing it to its logical source. The condition is shown to provide the structural constraints for coherent ontologies."

19. ———. 1973. "Existence and Predication." In *Logic and Ontology*, edited by Munitz, Milton K., 159-174. New York: New York University Press.

    "To contemporary philosophers the question whether 'exists' is a predicate is a syntactical question. Using an older terminology, it is the question whether 'exists' is an autocategorematic or a syncategorematic expression. In more recent parlance it is the question whether 'exists' belongs among the formative-logical signs or among the descriptive-extralogical signs of a logically adequate language.
    Those who give canonical status to the idioms of quantification theory have a ready answer to this question. In the syntax of modern logic 'exists' is a syncategorematic expression. In canonical translations 'exists' is never a

predicate. To accept this popular view is to assume that the formative expressions enumerated in the formation rules for predicate logic constitute a definitive list. But this overlooks the fact that the line distinguishing certain signs as formative, logical, or syncategorematic from other signs that are descriptive, extralogical, or autocategorematic has been arbitrarily drawn. How, indeed, do we decide whether a sign is syncategorematic or autocategorematic?

There is, of course, the indirect appeal to the power of a logic with this or that list of formatives. For example, if identity is added to the list of logical signs of the lower functional calculus, there is a significant increase in inference power. This, however, is an argument for adding identity to a system whose logical syntax has already been determined by an arbitrarily enumerated list of formatives. It can, for example, be shown that identity is not needed in a logical language whose syntax differs radically from that of the standard first-order functional calculus.(1) The point is that the question whether a certain sign is formative or descriptive cannot be fruitfully answered by considering how an already-constituted logical language will fare with this sign or without it. This retail approach begs the more fundamental question raised by the distinction between logical and extra-logical signs: What principle governs the distinction; what distinguishes the logical signs from the extralogical signs?

The problem in this general form has been raised by Tarski and since discussed by many other writers, most notably by Pap, Popper and Quine. However, the state of the problem has not been significantly advanced beyond the conclusion tentatively offered by Tarski:

Perhaps it will be possible to find important objective arguments which enable us to justify the traditional boundary between logical and extralogical expressions. But I also consider it quite possible that investigation will bring no positive results in this direction so that we shall be compelled to regard such concepts as `logical consequence', 'analytic statement' and 'tautology' as relative concepts which must, on each occasion be related to a definite,

although in greater or less degree, arbitrary division of terms into logical and extra-logical.(2)
In this larger perspective the syntactic status of existence can only be determined within some general theory of logical syntax that "justifies" and sharpens the boundary between logical and extralogical signs. As Tarski noted, such a theory will have important bearing on such fundamental notions of logical theory as tautology and validity. But it should also, and, as it were, incidentally, answer our own question, namely, whether 'exists' is a syncategorematic or autocategorematic expression." (pp. 159-160).
(1) See my paper "Do We Need Identity?" The Journal of Philosophy (August 7, 1969).
(2) Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, (Oxford, 1956), p. 420.

20. ———. 1973. "The Logical and the Extra-Logical." In *Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences*, edited by Cohen, Robert and Wartofsky, Marx, 235-252. Dordrecht: Reidel.

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29. ———. 1982. *The Logic of Natural Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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50. ———. 2009. "Ratiocination: An Empirical Account." *Ratio* no. 21:115-133.

    "Modern thinkers regard logic as a purely formal discipline like number theory, and not to be confused with any empirical discipline such as cognitive psychology, which

may seek to characterize how people actually reason. Opposed to this is the traditional view that even a formal logic can be cognitively veridical -- descriptive of procedures people actually follow in arriving at their deductive judgments (logic as Laws of Thought). In a cognitively veridical logic, any formal proof that a deductive judgment, intuitively arrived at, is valid should ideally conform to the method the reasoning subject has used to arrive at that judgment. More specifically, it should reveal the actual reckoning process that the reasoning subject more or less consciously carries out when they make a deductive inference. That the common logical words used in everyday reasoning -- words such as 'and', 'if,''some', 'is''not,' and 'all -'- have fixed positive and negative charges has escaped the notice of modern logic. The present paper shows how, by unconsciously recognizing 'not' and 'all' as 'minus-words', while recognizing 'and', 'some', and 'is' as 'plus words', a child can intuitively reckon, for example, 'not (-) all (-) dogs are (+) friendly' as equivalent to 'some (+) dogs aren't (-) friendly': -(-D+F) = +D-F."

51. ———. 2009. "Dissonant Beliefs." *Analysis* no. 69:269-274.

52. ———. 2013. *The Mondial and the Ontological*.

Forthcoming.
"In 2006 I began working on a book that was to consist of two parts: (1) an account of the tree theory, including a historical background and an appraisal of reactions to the theory, and (2) a summary of Sommers' newer ideas regarding metaphysical issues, with an attempt to integrate the older and newer ideas. By 2009 I had nearly completed part (1), but then, as so often happens with the best laid plans, things changed. Assuming, no doubt based on my sketchy account of what I was up to, that my new book would be primarily about the tree theory, Sommers wrote to me that he was hard at work on a new book of his own, a book in which he was laying out, once and for all, in detail his new metaphysical theory ("mondialism").

Needless to say, that theory and its relation to the tree theory was to be the subject of my part (2). He asked me to help him with his book and I was both eager and happy to do so. Anything I had to say could wait - not so for Sommers (then well into his ninth decade). Sommers' book, *The Mondial and the Ontological* is forthcoming. As it turned out, much of the work of tying together the tree theory, the term logic, the truth theory and mondialism still needs to be done. So I returned once again to that task."
From: George Englebretsen, *Robust Reality. An Essay in Formal Ontology*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2011, pp. XII-XIII.

53. Sommers, Fred, and Englebretsen, George. 2000. *An Invitation to Formal Reasoning. The Logic of Terms*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Co-author: George Englebretsen.
    The book "introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is, its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogistic, Scholastic logicians, Leibniz, and the 19th century British algebraists.
    Term logic takes its syntax directly from natural language, construing statements as combinations of pairs of terms, where complex terms are taken to have the same syntax as statements. Whereas standard logic requires extensive 'translation' from natural language to symbolic language, term logic requires only 'transcription' into the symbolic language. Its naturalness is the result of its ability to stay close to the forms of sentences usually found in every day discourse. Written by the founders of the term logic approach, An Invitation to Formal Reasoning is a unique introduction and exploration of this new system, offering

numerous exercises and examples throughout the text. Summarising the standard system of mathematical logic to set term logic in context, and showing how the two systems compare, this book presents an alternative approach to standard modern logic for those studying formal logic, philosophy of language or computer theory."

54. Sommers, Fred, and Hoff Sommers, Christina, eds. 1989. *Virtue and Vice in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

    Sixth edition: Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 2004.

55. Sommers, Fred, and Jarvis, J. 1961. "Review Of: *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* by G. E. M. Anscombe." *Philosophy* no. 36:374-377.

    With J. Jarvis

STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORK

For the bibliography of George Englebretsen see the page about him.

1. Altham, J.E.J. 1971. "Ambiguity and Predication." *Mind* no. 80:253-257.

   "Recommends abandoning Sommers' rule about ambiguity, in his *Predictability*. The rule enforces many implausible judgments. Three arguments for it are defective. One involves confusions over negation of a universal conditional, one rests on a seemingly arbitrary definition, the third rests on an unrealistic assumption about universes of discourse."

2. Brody, B.A. 1972. "Sommers on Predicability." *Philosophical Studies* no. 23:138-140.

"Sommers has proposed a principle as to when cross-categorial predication is univocal. In this note, I offer some counterexamples, both to his principle and to the premises from which he derives it."

3. Cogan, Robert. 1976. "A Criticism of Sommers' Language Tree." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 17:308-310.

   "In *The Ordinary Language Tree* and three later papers, Fred Sommers has made a number of valuable contributions to formal type theory. Anyone familiar with this work of Sommers understands why it is philosophically attractive: the logical ingenuity shown by Sommers is admirable. However, presuming such familiarity I shall argue that Sommers' restriction to ordinary language is a necessary yet counterformal way of securing mapping applicability for his work, and that it obscures a major obstacle to such application: the fact that genuine doubt about sense-value is systematic in a way rendering it unresolvable by his formal methods. I shall first distinguish between "doubt" in the ordinary sense, and genuine doubt. Next I will show that Sommers' examples of sense arguments are not ones in which genuine doubt is resolved and then define the sense in which genuine doubt is systematic, using his own symbolism. Fourth, I will explain how his restriction to ordinary language tends to obscure this fact, and fifth, in what way the restriction is both necessary and counter-formal."

4. De Sousa, Ronald Bon. 1966. "The Tree of English Bears Bitter Fruit." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 63:37-46.

   6. "A discussion of Fred Sommers' proposal for a new "test of coherence" for ontologies based on a revised theory of types. The theory leads to intolerably counterintuitive proliferations of senses of terms in natural languages. Its "proof" is shown to rest on the very propositions which the theory is supposed to establish. It presupposes the existence of a well defined set of grammatical but absurd sentence

types. This assumption takes two forms. on the first interpretation, it prohibits an individual from turning up in two different categories; on the second interpretation, it amounts to the principle of transitivity of predication. But the first is supposed to be a "consequence" of the theory, ruling out Strawsonian persons; and the second turns up as a "theorem"."

5. Elgood, A.G. 1970. "Sommers's Rules of Sense." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 20:166-169.

   "There has recently been some discussion on Sommers's rules of sense. Dan Passel (1969) has drawn attention to the incompleteness of one of these rules (R (U)) but is prepared to accept it as " correct ", meaning "that no mistakes about terms having a use with one another follow from its use". Mrs. Susan Haack (1967) has produced what she considers counter-examples to another rule, that for enforcing ambiguity, and R. Van Straaten has alleged that these examples are not well-formed and therefore are not counterexamples. He doubts "for strictly logical reasons" whether anyone *can* produce a counter-example. Since he does not give any such reasons, and since I find the foundations for Sommers's own derivations unsatisfactory, I offer apparent counter-examples of my own. One counter-example can be used to invalidate several of Sommers's important sense rules. This is so because they have a common logical structure. This logical structure I shall now display."

6. Englebretsen, George, ed. 1987. *The New Syllogistic*. New York: Peter Lang.

   Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. Fred Sommers: The calculus of terms (reprinted from *Mind,* 89, (1970) 11; 2. Peter Swiggart: De Morgan and Sommers p. 57; 3. B. H. Slater: Back to Leibniz or on from Frege? 87; 4. Peter Frederick Strawson: Review: *The logic of natural language* (reprinted from *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79, (1982) 99; 5. Richard M. Martin: On the semantics of Sommers' 'Some *S*'

(reprinted from *Mind, modality, meaning and method* (1983) 105; 6. John Bacon: Sommers and modern logic 121; 7. Michael Lockwood: Proofs and pronouns: extending the system 161; 8. W. H. Friedman: Algebraic rules for syllogisms and antilogisms 213; 9. Aris Noah: The two term theory of predication 223; 10. George Englebretsen: Natural syntax and Sommers' theory of logical form 245; 11. Richard Purtill: Some practical and theoretical features of Sommers' cancellation method 273; 12. Charles Sayward: Some problems with TFL [Traditional Formal Logic] 283; 13. Fred Sommers: Truth and existence 299; 14. George Englebretsen: Logical polarity 305; Notes on the contributors p. 313; Bibliography p. 315-322

7. Fjeld, Jon. 1974. "Sommers' Ontological Programme." *Philosophical Studies* no. 25:411-416.

8. Greenberg, Robert S. 1972. "Individuals and the Theory of Predication." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 69:435-448.

   "As is known, Fred Sommers has provided rules of sense (*) which can be used to determine: (a) whether certain terms can occur together in a significant subject-predicate sentence, (b) whether things covered by certain terms belong to the same type of thing, and (c) whether certain terms of a theory must be construed as being ambiguous, if the theory is to be coherent. Problems such as these fall within the area of philosophy sometimes called *theory of predication, type theory,* or, more generally, *ontology,* and hence the purpose of a large part of Sommers' program is to provide methods for distinguishing and placing in a coherent structure what are generally called categories." (*) "Predicability" (1965) and "Types and ontology" (1963).

9. Griffin, Nicholas. 1977. "Do We Need Predication?" *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 16:653-663.

   "The paper is concerned with the standard distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. It deals, in particular with attempts by Fred Sommers

("Journal of Philosophy", 1969) and Michael Lockwood ("Philosophical Review", 1975) to show that the distinction is ill-founded since identity statements are predications of singular terms. This proposal is criticized mainly on the grounds that the notion of a singular term depends upon identity and thus can't be used in a program to eliminate identity. An alternative means of removing the distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication, by eliminating predication in favour of relative identities using Geach's suggestion that "x" is "F" is equivalent to "x" is the same "F" as something, is briefly sketched."

10. Guerry, Herbert. 1967. "Sommers' Ontological Proof." *Analysis* no. 28:60-61.

11. Haack, Susan. 1967. "Equivocality: A Discussion of Sommers' Views." *Analysis* no. 28:159-165.

12. Hacking, Ian. 2001. "Aristotelian Categories and Cognitive Domains." *Synthese* no. 126:473-515.

    "This paper puts together an ancient and a recent approach to classificatory language, thought, and ontology. It includes on the one hand an interpretation of Aristotle's ten categories,with remarks on his first category, called (or translated as) substance in the Categories or What a thing is in the Topics. On the other hand is the idea of domain-specific cognitive abilities urged in contemporary developmental psychology. Each family of ideas can be used to understand the other. Neither the metaphysical nor the psychological approach is intrinsically more fundamental; they complement each other. The paper incidentally clarifies distinct uses of the word "category" in different disciplines, and also attempts to make explicit several notions of "domain". It also examines Aristotle's most exotic and least discussed categories, being-in-a-position (e.g., sitting) and having-(on) (e.g., armour). Finally the paper suggests a tentative connection between Fred Sommers' theory of types and Aristotle's first category."

13. Kasher, Asa. 1972. "Sommers' Concept of Natural Syntax." *Philosophical Studies (Ireland)* no. 20:139-143.

    "It is shown that syntactic principles are not sufficient for the solution of semantic paradoxes. Light is shed on Sommers' conception of natural syntax in *On concepts of truth in natural languages* (1969), by showing that his solution is also semantic in nature."

14. Keating, B.F. 1979. "Lockwood and Mill on Connotation and Predication." *Analysis* no. 4:183-188.

15. Kelley, David. 1994. *The Art of Reasoning*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

    See Chapter 9: Categorical syllogisms pp. 233-280.

16. Lockwood, Michael. 1975. "On Predicating Proper Names." *The Philosophical Review* no. 84:471-498.

    "Mill's account of proper names presupposes -- contrary to current logical theory -- that in an identity sentence such as 'Cicero is Tully', 'is' has the same meaning as in sentences which are unquestionably of the 'S is P' form. The purpose of this article is to defend Mill's assumption and explore its implications. It is argued that Mill is inconsistent in holding both that, in the above sentence, 'Tully' is a genuine predicate and that proper names lack connotation. This tension may be removed, however, if we allow that proper names do connote, but that what they connote is merely the having of a certain identity."

17. ———. 1979. "A Question of Connotation: An Answer to Keating." *Analysis* no. 39:189-194.

18. Martin, Robert L. 1969. "Sommers on Denial and Negation." *Noûs* no. 3:219-226.

    "Sommers' arguments in *Predicability* (1965) for a distinction between denial and negation (the former applying primarily to predicates, the latter to sentences) are

criticized and found not to sustain the distinction. In response to his claim that the distinction permits a simple formal resolution of the predication paradoxes, I present a strengthened version of these paradoxes for which, apparently, the suggested resolution fails."

19. Massie, David. 1967. "Sommers' Tree Theory: A Reply to De Sousa." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 64:185-193.

    "In a recent article in this Journal Ronald Bon de Sousa attempts to criticize Fred Sommers' category theory, the"tree" theory, as described in "Types and Ontology." Sommers' paper is an important and brilliant contribution to formal linguistic analysis, and deserves critical attention. De Sousa, however, seems to have failed to understand it, in general and in detail; thus his remarks, which tend to be abusive in tone, are unilluminating and largely irrelevant. Since de Sousa may give the impression of having been as careful as he ought to have been, he can easily be misleading on some elementary but essential points in Sommers' theory, and for that reason his comments call for an answer."

20. McCulloch, Gregory. 1984. "Frege, Sommers, Singular Reference." In *Frege: Tradition and Influence*, edited by Crispin, Wright, 110-125. Oxford: Blackwell.

    "In his provocative recent book [*The logic of natural language*, 1982] Fred Sommers sets out to formulate a traditional term logic (hereafter TFL) that is a genuine and significant alternative to the Fregean type of logic (MPL) currently accepted as standard. (1) Broadly speaking, his procedure has two components. On the one hand, he tries to develop a logical syntax, based on the TFL model, that is roughly the equal of MPL in terms of expressive and inferential power. On the other, he engages in a sustained effort to show how such a logic would be free of certain logical and semantic commitments, allegedly typical of MPL, that are, according to Sommers, implausible or otherwise unsatisfactory.

In the present paper I do not question the extent of Sommers's success in the first task; nor do I try directly to defend MPL against his strictures. My concern is with one fundamental difference between the two logical frameworks as Sommers sees them. This supposed difference concerns expressions like proper names that appear to make straightforward singular reference to particular objects. Sommers argues at length that many of the significant differences alleged to hold between the two logics can be traced to the way that they handle such expressions. This contention he links to his claim that whereas the basic propositions of MPL are singular, those of TFL are general; and this in turn he links to his view that the two logics are based upon significantly different accounts of the first-order generality expressed by words like 'all' and `some' (Sommers, Ch. 1-5, 11-12). I try to show that these claims are greatly exaggerated.

Even if one grants that Sommers succeeds in giving a novel, TFL-style account of first-order generality, it is a mistake to think, as Sommers does, that this novelty consists in an interesting avoidance of commitment to the idea of singular reference. This is, furthermore, an entirely distinct issue from that of the semantic treatment of proper names. Sommers's claims gain a spurious' plausibility because of his failure to keep these distinct questions apart. And finally, anyway, we see that one's adoption of logical framework - TFL or MPL - does not materially affect one's options when dealing with proper names: both logics can accommodate any of the usual alternatives. If I am right in all this, the appearance of deep differences over singular reference just dissolves.

Sommers's book deserves careful and extended attention. Both in the effort to reinstate TFL as a worthwhile approach, and in the claim to have succeeded, Sommers finds himself in opposition to much received `Fregean' opinion in logic, semantics, and the philosophy of language. Illumination is to be had from a piecemeal treatment of the many issues raised here. This paper is just one restricted contribution to that enterprise."

(1) 'MPL' and `TFL' are Sommers's own abbreviations for 'Modern Predicate Logic' and `Traditional Formal Logic' respectively. He attempts no precise definition of what a logic must be like if it is to count as MPL-type, but seems to have in mind logics that employ quantifier/variable notations in a more or less orthodox manner. Similarly, his use of 'logic' is quite flexible, and is used to apply not merely to a given calculus but to this plus the concepts, notions, and presuppositions that a standard semantic interpretation would employ. I follow him in this, although certain dangers in this are highlighted in §§ II and III.

21. Mendelsohn, Richard L. 1987. "Frege Two Senses of 'Is'." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 28:139-160.

24. "It is widely believed that there are two senses of 'is', the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication, and that this distinction was clearly drawn by Frege in On Concept and Object, although it was anticipated by others, perhaps, e.g., by Plato in the Sophist. As opposed to this received view, I will argue that Frege had not successfully distinguished two senses of 'is', indeed that his argument leads to precisely the opposite conclusion; on the other hand, the distinction Plato had supposedly drawn in the Sophist, which seems to rest on a semantics Frege was explicitly rejecting, is, given that semantic framework, viable.
Frege had introduced this distinction in order to buttress his view that proper names could not serve as genuine predicates: a proper name occupying ostensible predicate position could not be functioning as a predicate because the 'is' in such a statement would have to be the 'is' of identity, not the 'is' of predication.
I will argue that Frege had been mistaken on this point as well. More generally, I will argue that Frege's theoretical analysis of language is not, as he had thought, incompatible with proper names being allowed to play a genuinely predicative role.
My remarks are prompted by Michael Lockwood's stimulating article, On Predicating Proper Names (1975),

which contains an extensive and detailed criticism of Frege's position."

22. Murphree, Wallace A. 1998. "Numerical Term Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 39:346-362.

    "This paper is an attempt to show that my work to establish numerically flexible quantifiers for the syllogism can be aptly combined with the term logic advanced by Sommers, Englebretsen, and others."

23. Nelson, John D. 1964. "On Sommers' Reinstatement of Russell's Ontological Program." *The Philosophical Review* no. 73:517-521.

    "In this discussion-paper I question four theses that I took Sommers to be advancing, among others, in *Types and ontology*: (1) that types are indifferent to predicate denial; (2) that a formal method of type discrimination can establish as correct a specific ontology; (3) that subjects of sentences can be located by certain described formal methods; and (4) that there must be one category that includes all others.
    See the reply by Sommers: *A program for coherence* - Philosophical Review, 1964, pp. 522-527.

24. ———. 1965. "An Examination of Sommers' Truth-Functional Counterfactuals." *Theoria* no. 31:61-63.

25. Noah, Aris. 1980. "Predicate Functors and the Limits of Decidability in Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 21:701-707.

26. Odegard, Douglas. 1964. "On Closing the Truth-Value Gap." *Analysis* no. 25:10-12.

27. Oderberg, David S. 2005. *The Old New Logic. Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Contents: Preface and acknowledgments VII; Foreword by P. F. Strawson XI-XII; 1. Fred Sommers: Intellectual

autobiography 1; 2. George Englebretsen: Trees, terms, and truth: the philosophy of Fred Sommers 25; 3. E. J. Lowe: Syntax and ontology: reflections on three logical systems 49; 4. Frank C. Keil: Exploring boundary conditions on the structure of knowledge: some nonobvious influences of philosophy on psychology 67; 5. Alan Berger: General terms, anaphora, and rigid designation 85; 6. Patrick Suppes: The syntax and semantics of English prepositional phrases 101; 7. William C. Purdy: Modeling anaphora in TFL 111; 8. Steven Lindell: An elementary term logic for physically realizable models of information 135; 9. Aris Noah: Sommers's cancellations technique and the method of resolution 169; 10. David S. Odeberg: Predicate logic and bare particulars 183; 11. Comments and replies 211; Works by Fred Sommers 233; Contributors 237; Index 239

28. Passell, Dan. 1969. "On Sommers' Logic of Sense and Nonsense." *Mind*:132-133.

    "Sommers' rule, R(U), for testing sense arguments, taken as an assertion about what makes sense, fails to state a necessary condition of what makes sense. Counterexamples to that assertion occur with terms taken from the same node of his ordinary language tree. For one example, the color terms, alabaster, blue, cream, dun, which obviously do make sense together, cannot be classified as making sense together by the rule. This is because the condition required by the rule for determining that two terms make sense cannot be met for terms at the same node."

29. Peterson, Philip L. 1995. "Contraries and the Cubes and Disks of Opposition." *Metaphilosophy* no. 26:107-137.

    "Prior, Sommers, and McIntosh hold that propositional contrariety is derivative, based on term contrariety. I argue that propositional contrariety is basic. In a proper Aristotelian square, one proposition is contrary to another if and only if the one properly entails the denial of the other. Term contrariness produces a "cube" of opposition. Contrariety can be further elaborated on "bare" cubes and

disks. Geach's analyses involving multiple quantifiers give no support for term-contrariness-as-basic, and there is little hope for developing H. W. B. Joseph's vague idea about "furtherest apart" on a quantitative scale."

30. Purdy, William C. 1992. "On the Question: 'Do We Need Identity?'." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 33:593-603.

31. "This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on identity. This formalization is compared with MPL to define precisely the difference in expressive power. The formal language defined for this investigation is similar to the language of MPL (modern predicate logic). The similarity will not only facilitate comparison, but perhaps will also make this formal language more palatable to readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL."

31. Reinhardt, L.R. 1965. "Dualism and Categories." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 66:71-92.

32. Richmond, Samuel A. 1971. "Sommers on Predicability." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 68:138-142.

"Sommers has introduced a rule for enforcing ambiguity which indicates the conditions under which a term cannot univocally bridge a type difference. I argue that the theory of predication from which the rule follows is either false or ambiguous in one of its crucial concepts. Sommers suggests the theory of predication may better set the bounds of metaphysics than the theory of knowledge. But the theory of predication itself needs to be justified by showing its epistemic utilities."

33. ———. 1975. "A Possible Empirical Violation of Sommers' Rule for Enforcing Ambiguity." *Philosophical Studies* no. 28:363-366.

"In an article entitled "Predicability," Fred Sommers has introduced a rule for enforcing ambiguity which indicates

the logical conditions under which a predicate cannot univocally bridge a type difference. the rule places unacceptable a priori restrictions on future empirical discoveries.
The plausibility of the rule can be explained by the fact that violation of it in constructing empirical universal generalizations results in dualism and detracts from the unity of science.
Dualism exists when there are two sets of predicates such that members of each set enter into universally general statements only with members of the same set."

34. Routley, Richard. 1969. "Categories. Expressions or Things?" *Theoria* no. 35:215-238.

    "Rival views on the composition of categories hold that categories are categories of things, that they are categories of expressions, or that they are both simultaneously. In view of the significance paradoxes-analogues of the modal paradoxes - here introduced, all these positions must be rejected, and two different sorts of meaninglessness distinguished. This distinction leads to the formulation of two distinct category theories, one apparently concerned with things, the other with descriptions. A case is made out for inclusive categories and against exclusive categories. Systematic ambiguity is attacked and shown to be tantamount to exclusiveness of categories. To allow for inclusive categories the usual notion of 'in the same category as' must be abandoned and replaced by a relative notion, except for certain sorts of categories - minimal categories. A definition of 'in the same category as' is proposed for minimal categories; and some aspects of Ryle's theory and Sommers's theory are examined in the light of these results."

35. Sayward, Charles. 1976. "A Defense of Sommers." *Philosophical Studies* no. 29:343-347.

    "Among the theses of Sommers' type theory are these: every individual belongs to some type; every category is a union of

types. A recent criticism of Sommers is directed at these two theses. I argue that the criticism is mistaken."

36. ———. 1978. "Are There Infinitely Many Sorts of Things?" *Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* no. 8:17-30.

37. ———. 1981. "The Tree Theory and Isomorphism." *Analysis* no. 41:6-11.

    "A main thesis of Fred Sommers' type theory, is that an isomorphism exists between any natural language and the categories discriminated by that language. Here I give an explanation of what this claim comes to. And then I argue that, so understood, the claim is incompatible with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Finally, I argue against trying to salvage the isomorphism thesis by appealing to some other set theory."

38. Sayward, Charles, and Voss, Stephen H. 1972. "Absurdity and Spanning." *Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* no. 2:227-238.

    "On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'the seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in general. The argument suggests that further clarification of the concepts of spanning and category mistakenness should be sought in reflection upon the more familiar concepts of a sort of thing and a predicate category."

39. Shearson, W.A. 1977. "Speaking of Philosophy: A Reply to Paul Churchland." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 16:502-506.

"In his critique of George Englebretsen's *Speaking of persons* (1975), Paul Churchland has failed, on several accounts, to grasp the intent of Englebretsen's work. Most importantly, he has not seen that the main task there was to defend a particular theory of persons (videlicet attributism). Much of Churchland's confusion is shown to follow from his inability to connect Englebretsen's work with the logico-linguistic studies of F. Sommers on the one hand and the metaphysical studies of P. F. Strawson on the other."

40. Straaten, R.van. 1968. "Sommers' Rule and Equivocity." *Analysis* no. 29:58-61.

41. ———. 1971. "A Modification of Sommers' Rule." *Philosophical Studies* no. 22:16-20.

42. ———. 1971. "Sommers on Strawson's and Descartes' Ontology." *Mind* no. 80:148-149.

43. Suzman, Jonathan. 1972. "The Ordinary Language Lattice." *Mind* no. 81:434-436.

    "F. Sommers ("Mind" 1959, "Philosophical Review" 1963) claims the predicates (monadic) of natural languages, if grouped by a relation u, or cosignificance, generate topological trees. if true, this would have wide philosophical significance; Sommers' ontology rests on this claim about trees. but it is false, in that the u-relation can be shown not to generate trees but lattices. if any natural languages do have the tree, rather than the lattice structure this would need empirical demonstration. this is proved with the help of two notions, that of the significance range of a term, and that of a constructible predicate true of all items in a terms significance range. it is also shown that u is in fact a vacuous tie, in that all terms are so related."

44. Swiggart, Peter. 1972. "The Limits of Statement Denial." *Mind* no. 81:437-442.

"This paper discusses Fred Sommers' distinction between statement negation and statement denial, as outlined in 'Predicability' and other papers. First I show that the formal nature of the distinction requires us to regard a given statement as having only a single denial. This point dissipates Sommers' proposed solution to the counterfactual problem, since that solution depends upon the existence of multiple denials of a given statement. Sommers' difficulty is traced to the assumption that an ordinary language sentence like 'S is unclean' can be recognized as a statement denial. But such recognition proves to be inherently ambiguous. Sommers' terminology can be an effective means of introducing the results of type analysis into standard logical notation, but strict and possibly intolerable limits must be placed upon its use in formulating basic type theory or as a help in solving traditional philosophical problems."

45. Szabolcsi, Lorne. 2008. *Numerical Term Logic*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Edited by George Englebretsen.
Contents: Preface by George Englebretsen I; Foreword by Fred Sommers V-XII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Numerical Term Logic 11; 2.1 Logical Notation 11; 2.1.1. Rudiments of the Notational Extension 11; 2.1.2. Non-exceptive Occurrences of "At least" and "Fewer than" 16; 2.1.3. Exact Quantification 20;
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Thompson 82; 3.2. Philip Peterson 92; 3.3. Wallace Murphree 99; 3.4. A Note on Generalized Quantifiers 101; 4. Conclusion 103; 5. Notes 105; 6. Bibliography 115; 7. Index 117-119.
"The ability to reason with numerically quantified propositions is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Lorne's Szabolcsi's valuable unpublished writings should be studied and edited for publication. His pioneering contributions to numerical logic deserve to be recognized and well-known. I know of no better method than his for dealing with numerical arguments." (Fred Sommers, p. XII).

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D. M. (David Malet) Armstrong's Moderate Realism

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   Volume One: Nominalism and Realism
   Contents: Acknowledgments VI; Index VII-XI; Introduction XIII-XV; Part One: Preliminaries; 1. Predicates 1; Part Two: Theories of Universals; 2. Predicate Nominalism 11; 3. Concept Nominalism 25; 4. Class Nominalism 28; 5. Resemblance Nominalism 44; 6. Arguments for realism 58; 7. Transcendent universals 64; 8. Properties and relations as particulars 77; Part Three: Particulars; 9. Are particulars reducible to universals? 89; 10. The Lockean account of particulars 102; Particulars and universals 108; 12. A world-hypothesis 126; The argument of volume II 133; Glossary of terms and principles formulated 136; Works cited 141; Index to volume I 145.
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Five: Properties and relations; 18. Properties 61; 19. Relations 75; Part six: The analysis of resemblance 95; 21. The resemblance of universals (I) 101; 22. The resemblance of universals (II): a new account 116; Part Seven: Higher-order universals; 23. Higher-order properties 133; 24. Higher-order relations 148; In conclusion 167; Glossary of terms and principles formulated 169; Works cited 177; Index to volume I and II 183.

"It is argued in this work, first, that there are universals, both monadic and polyadic, that is, properties and relations, which exist independently of the classifying mind. Realism is thus accepted, Nominalism rejected. Second, it is argued that no monadic universal is found except as a property of some particular, and no polyadic universal except as a relation holding between particulars. Transcendent or Platonic Realism is thus rejected. Third, it is argued that what universals there are is not to be determined simply by considering what predicates can be applied to particulars. Instead, it is the task of total science, conceived of as total enquiry, to determine what universals there are. The view defended is therefore a scientific Realism about universals. It might also be called a posteriori Realism. The working out of a scientific Realism about universals is intended to be the special contribution of these volumes.

Contemporary philosophy recognizes two main lines of argument for the existence of objective universals. The first is, or is a descendant of, Plato's One over Many argument. Its premiss is that many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature. In the terms used by C. S. Peirce, different tokens may all be of the same type. The conclusion of the argument is simply that in general this appearance cannot be explained away, but must be accepted. There is such a thing as identity of nature.

I take this argument to be sound. But the argument is sometimes presented as an argument from genera words. It is asked how a general term can be applied to an indefinite multiplicity of particulars. It is answered that these particulars must be identical in some respect. There are two disadvantages in presenting the argument in this linguistic

fashion. First, it obscures the fact that the same term may apply in virtue of different natures of the different particulars. As a result, where Realism is embraced, it is likely to be a priori rather than scientific Realism. Second, presenting the argument linguistically encourages confusion with an unsound argument to universals from meaning. This second argument moves from the existence of meaningful general words to the existence of universals which are the meanings of those words. Universals are postulated as the second term of the meaning relation. The argument from ideal cases, such as Plato's perfect circle, is perhaps a special case of this semantic argument to universals.

I regard this second line of argument as completely unsound. Furthermore, I believe that the identification of universals with meanings (connotations, intensions), which this argument presupposes, has been a 'disaster for the theory of universals. A thoroughgoing separation of the theory of universals from the theory of the semantics of general terms is in fact required. Only if we first develop a satisfactory theory of universals can we expect to develop fruitfully the further topic of the semantics of general terms. Philosophers have all too often tried to proceed in the opposite way.

In this first volume, Nominalism and Realism, I criticize at length and reject various versions of Nominalism, together with Platonic Realism. I also examine and reject the view that properties and relations are as particular as the objects which have properties and relations. I conclude that we must admit objective universals which, however, cannot exist independently of particulars. I go on to examine the notion of a particular and reject the view that we can give an account of particulars as "bundles of universals". The conclusion drawn is that particularity and universality, irreducible to each other, are both involved in all existence. I end the first book by sketching a world-hypothesis which admits nothing but particulars having (universal) properties and relations.

The position reached at that point, though contested by many, is, at least in general outline, familiar enough. But in the second volume a detailed attempt is made to work out a theory of universals which is based upon natural science. In making this attempt, I enter relatively unexplored territory. For with the exception of a suggestive paper by Hilary Putnam (1970a) contemporary philosophers, at least, have largely ignored the possibility of developing a theory of objective universals, where the particular universals admitted are determined cm the basis of scientific rather than semantic considerations. It might perhaps be argued that Plato in his later works, Aristotle and the Scholastic Realists were ahead of contemporary philosophy in this matter, although handicapped by the relative backwardness of the science and the scientific methodology of their day. My contention is that, by accepting this a posteriori Realism, the theory of universals, arguably the central problem of ontology, can be placed on a securer and more intelligible foundation than anything previously available. In particular, such a doctrine makes possible the reconciliation of an empiricist epistemology, which I wish to retain, with ontological realism about universals.

Not all particulars are first-order particulars. Universals themselves fall under universals. That is to say, universals have certain properties and stand in certain relations to each other. In the final part of the second book an attempt is made to work out a theory of higher-order universals, but, again, one which is compatible with an empiricist epistemology. Of quite particular importance is the topic of relations between universals. For this topic may hold the key to an account of the nature of causation and of nomic necessity. By this means, it may prove possible to answer Hume without sacrificing Empiricism.

Finally, a word on the phrase "a posteriori Realism". The phrase may suggest that the theory advanced in this work is supported to be supported by a posteriori reasonings of the sort with which natural science has made us familiar. This is far from being the case. The reasoning will have the characteristically a priori flavour which philosophical

reasonings, especially when they concern first philosophy, seem inevitably, if distressingly, to have. What is maintained is the proposition that what universals there are is to be determined a posteriori. The status of this proposition is, however, a further question. It may have to be established, if it can be established, by a priori or relatively a priori reasoning." (Introduction to the First volume).

2. ———. 1989. *Universals. An Opinionated Introduction*. Boulder: Westview Press.

   Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. The problem 1; 2. Primitive natural classes 21; 3. Resemblance nominalism 39; 4. Particulars as bundles of universals 59; 5. Universals as attributes 75; 6. Tropes 113; 7. Summing up 135; References 141; Index 145.
   "This book is intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergraduate student and should also be suitable for graduate seminars. However, I hope that it will also be of interest to professional philosophers, particularly those who are sympathetic to the project of an empirical metaphysics. Since the publication of my book *Universals and Scientific Realism* in 1978, although my views have remained the same in broad outline, I have become aware of various mistakes and omissions in what I said then. The present work, therefore, besides introducing the topic, tries to push the subject further ahead.
   I now think that a particular type of moderate Nominalism, moderate because it admits properties and relations, but a Nominalism because it takes the properties and relations to be particulars rather than universals, can be developed as an important and quite plausible rival to a moderate Realism about universals. In the earlier book I gave such a Nominalism only brief consideration. By contrast, in this work a battle between Nominalists and Realists over the status of properties and relations becomes one main theme. In general, I have largely confined myself to moderate Nominalisms and moderate Realisms. That host of

contemporary philosophers who unreflectively substitute classes of particulars for properties and relations I take to be immoderate Nominalists. However, many of the arguments that I bring against the more moderate Natural Class theory are also arguments against this orthodoxy. I would also classify Quine as an extreme Nominalist (although he himself would not, on the grounds that he recognizes classes and that these are "abstract" or "platonic" entities)." From the Preface.

"Brushing aside the uneconomical view that admits both tropes and universals, we have a choice in Trope theory between natural class and resemblance views. The same sort of consideration that favors resemblances rather than natural classes of "regular" particulars seems to me to favor a Trope theory with resemblance. And although it is orthodox to bundle the tropes, I doubt if they are really well suited to be the substance of the world. We do better, with Locke and C. B. Martin, to hold the trope view in a substance-attribute form.

Our final two contenders, then, I suggest, are a Universals theory and a Trope Resemblance theory, each held in a substance-attribute form. How do we adjudicate between these two?

The Trope theory in its resemblance and substance-attribute form seems to me to face two unpleasantnesses. The first is relatively minor. It is the possibility of swapping exactly resembling tropes, to which attention was drawn in Section IX of Chapter 6. It is a somewhat implausible 'possibility', and is excluded by the substitution of universals for tropes. The second difficulty is more serious, I think. It is the fact that the features of resemblance, what we have called the Axioms of Resemblance, would be explained with the greatest naturalness, simplicity, and economy if resemblance of nature was always identity of nature, either partial or complete identity. The difficulty, it will be remembered, is that the Axioms of Resemblance can be derived from the properties of identity provided that it is allowed that resemblance can be analyzed in terms of identity, that is, in terms of universals (Chapter 5, Section

X). A Resemblance theory must treat this as a mere metaphysical coincidence between the properties of resemblance and the properties of identity. It is a serious difficulty for any resemblance analysis that the irreducibility of resemblance is so implausible an irreducibility.

What of the difficulties faced by the Universals theory? It might be thought that a great difficulty lies in its strange primitive: the cross-categorial and fundamental tie or nexus of instantiation. The Resemblance theory has no such problem because its tie of resemblance is an internal relation, supervening upon the particularized natures of the resembling things.

I do not think that instantiation involves any special difficulty for the Universals theory. Barring the postulation of a special nontransferability for tropes, we have seen the need for states of affairs for all layer-cake theories, including those involving tropes. If tropes are the attributes of substances, which I have argued is the best view of the matter, then a fundamental tie or nexus is involved, that is, there will be states of affairs involving substances, which are particulars, having properties, and also substances standing in relation to each other. If the bundle conception is correct, then a bundling tie (compresence) is still involved, and relations hold between bundles. Instantiations are just states of affairs involving universals and seem to involve no more paradox or difficulty than states of affairs involving tropes.

Where I do see trouble for a Universals theory is the question of the resemblance of universals. Once universals are admitted, it must also be admitted that universals themselves can be ordered and grouped by resemblance relations. These relations, however, involve less than exact resemblance. (Two universals could not resemble exactly!) The vital question, then, is whether this less than exact resemblance of universals is or is not analyzable. My idea is that it is analyzable, analyzable in terms of a partial, an incomplete, identity of constituents of the universals involved, where these constituents are themselves universals. (In a Trope Resemblance theory, it would be a

matter of exact resemblance of some, but only some, constituents of the inexactly resembling tropes.)
If this analysis of the inexact resemblance of universals can be carried through, then the Universals theory is considerably strengthened. But if it cannot be carried through, the theory is weakened, because the inexact resemblances will presumably have to be taken as unanalyzable primitives, strengthening the notion that exact resemblance is no more than the highest degree of this primitive.
So, a great deal turns on whether the analysis of the inexact resemblance of universals can be carried through. I think that it can be carried through, but it faces some formidable ontological and epistemological difficulties. A key question here is the nature of quantities. A quantity is for me a family of property universals bound together by inexact but systematic resemblances, but resemblances that involve identical constituents of the universals involved (see Armstrong - *Are quantities relations?* 1988). Here is an important area for further work." pp. 136-138.

3. ———. 1989. *A Combinatorialist Theory of Possibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   Contents: Preface IX-XII; Part I: Non-naturalist theories of possibility. 1. The causal argument Part II: A combinatorial and naturalist account of possibility. 3; 2. Non-naturalist theories of possibility 14; 3. Possibility in a simple world 37; 4. Expanding and contracting the world 54; 5. Relative atoms 66; 6. Are there *de re* incompatibilities and necessities? 77; 7. Higher-order entities, negation and causation 87; 8. Supervenience 103; 9. Mathematics 119; 10. Final question: logic 138; Works cited 141; Appendix: Tractarian nominalism by Brian Skyrms 145; Index 153.
   "What is put forward in this essay is a new version of the metaphysic of Logical Atomism. It is a Logical Atomism completely purged of semantic and epistemic atomism. The idea that one can reach the atoms by analysing meanings is utterly rejected. In general, it is not for philosophers to say

what the fundamental constituents of the world are. That question is to be settled a posteriori. It is a question for total science.
The version of Logical Atomism put forward here even abstracts from the question of whether there are any atoms at all at the bottom of the world. That too is a question to be decided a posteriori, if it can be decided at all. In Chapter 5 I argue that Logical Atomism can still be sustained even if we never get past merely relative atoms.
But if there may be no genuine atoms, why continue to speak of Logical! Atomism? I do so because, with a little qualification, the scheme presented cleaves to the fundamental idea that the states of affairs into which the world divides (Wittgenstein's and Russell's atomic facts) are logically independent of each other. Each one is, as I will say, distinct from every other.
This becomes the basis of what I think is a simple (and naturalistic) Combinatorial theory of possibility. In his article 'Tractarian Nominalism' (*) Brian Skyrms sketches a metaphysics of facts (states of affairs, as I put it), facts having as constituents individuals and universals (the latter divided into properties and relations). I had already argued for such a position in my book Universals and Scientific Realism (1978). What I had not noticed was what Skyrms pointed out: that this could become the basis for a theory of possibility. The present work is an attempt to develop Skyrms's insight. With his approval, and the permission of the D. Reidel Publishing Company, his article is reprinted at the end of this volume as an appendix." (From the Preface)
(*) [*Philosophical Studies*, vol. 40, 1981, pp. 199-206]

4. Armstrong, David Malet, Martin, Charles Burton, and Place, Ullin Thomas. 1996. *Dispositions. A Debate*. New York: Routledge.

   Edited and with an introduction by Tim Crane.
   Contents: List of authors VII-VIII; Part I. The Armstrong-Place debate; 1. D. M. Armstrong: Dispositions as categorical states 15; 2. U. T. Place: Dispositions as

intentional states 19; 3. D. M. Armstrong: Place's and Armstrong's views compared and contrasted 33; 4. U. T. Place A conceptualist ontology 49; Part Ii. The Martin-Armstrong-Place debate; 5. C. B. Martin: Properties and dispositions 71; 6. D. M. Armstrong: Reply to Martin 88; U. T. Place: Structural properties: categorical, dispositional or both? 105; 8. C. B. Martin: Replies to Armstrong and Place 126; D. M. Armstrong: Second reply to Martin 147; 10. U. T. Place: Conceptualism and the ontological independence of cause and effect 153; 11. C. B. Martin: Final replies to Place and Armstrong 163; Index 193.
"This book is about the nature of dispositional properties, or dispositions.
is hard to give an uncontroversial definition of the notion of a disposition, since its very definition is one of the matters under dispute. But we can make a start with the following preliminary definition: a disposition is a property (such as solubility, fragility, elasticity) whose instantiation entails that the thing which has the property would change, or bring about some change, under certain conditions. For instance, to say that some object is soluble is to say that it would dissolve if put in water, to say that something is fragile is to say that it would break if «or instance) dropped in suitable circumstances; to say that something is elastic is to say that it would stretch when pulled. The fragility elasticity) is a disposition; the breaking (dissolving, stretching is the manifestation of the disposition.
The contemporary philosophical controversy over dispositions is the descendant of earlier disputes - for example, Aristotle's view of actualities and potentialities, and Locke's view of secondary qualities as 'powers'. The recent interest in dispositions arose in two main areas of philosophy: the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind. The interest in dispositions in the philosophy of science resulted from the logical empiricists' worries about unobservables - how could the whole of physics be expressed in terms of propositions about sense-experiences if physics requires attribution of dispositional qualities, which need have no manifestation in sense-experience?' The

interest in dispositions in the philosophy of mind largely arose through behaviourist definitions of belief and other mental states, according to which belief is a disposition to act and/or to speak. Among the questions with which the philosophy of mind grappled were: how should such dispositions be defined, and what explains the possession of such dispositions?

The three participants in the present Debate have all made substantial contributions to the philosophy of mind in the last fifty years. U.T. Place is well-known as one of the originators (with Herbert Feigl) of the mind-brain identity theory - and his work influenced other pioneers such as J.J.C. Smart. D.M. Armstrong was one of the first to develop in detail a causal theory of the mind. C.B. Martin had already been an early proponent of the causal theory of mind, and played a crucial role in the development of the philosophy of mind in Australia, which then spread throughout the rest of analytic philosophy's world. Part of Martin's role in influencing the shift from behaviourism to physicalism and functionalism was to insist on the importance of what carne to be called the 'Truthmaker Principle': the principle that when a statement is true, there must be something (some fact or event or property) that makes it true?

Each of these three philosophers has developed a distinct conception of the nature of dispositions, conceptions which are central in their thought on mind, matter and causation. In this Introduction I shall give a brief guide to the difference between them. In order to do this I need to say something (not wholly impartial) about the recent background to the debate about dispositions, and a little about how to characterize dispositional and categorical properties." (From the Introdcution by Tim Crane, pp. 1-2).

5. Armstrong, David Malet. 1997. *A World of State of Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   Contents: Preface XI; -XIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Some preliminary doctrines 11; 3. Properties I 19; 4. Properties II

47; 5. Powers and dispositions 69; 6. Relations 85; 7. Particulars 95; 8. States of affairs 113; 9. Independence 139; 10. Modality 148; 11. Number 175; 12. Classes 185; 13. Totality states of affairs 196; 14. Singular causation 202; 15. Laws I 220; 16. Laws Ii 242; 17. The unity of the world 263; References 270; Index 277.

"During the past twenty years or so, I have been working on ontological questions. What are universals, laws of nature, dispositions and powers, possibilities and necessities, classes, numbers? The present essay tries to bring all these topics together in a unified metaphysical scheme, an ontology. As a result, there is a certain amount of recapitulation of earlier writing. But putting the pieces together turned out to be quite difficult. A good deal of further work was necessary. Many mistakes, as I now think of them, had to be corrected. So what follows is not a mere sum of past thinking." (From the Preface)

"The hypothesis of this work is that the world, all that there is, is a world of states of affairs. Others, Wittgenstein in particular, have said that the world is a world of facts and not a world of things. These theses are substantially the same, though differently expressed.

The general structure of states of affairs will be argued to be this. A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular (at a later point to be dubbed a *thin* particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds between two or more particulars. Each state of affairs, and each constituent of each state of affairs, meaning by their constituents the particulars, properties, relations and, in the case of higher-order states of affairs, lower-order states of affairs, is a contingent existent. The properties and the relations are universals, not particulars. The relations are all external relations.

It is useful to admit *molecular* states of affairs. These, however, are mere conjunctions (never negations or disjunctions) of the original states of affairs. Molecular states of affairs constitute no ontological addition to their conjuncts. But in one special case, to be mentioned in a moment, they become very important.

For first-order states of affairs, that is, states of affairs that do not have states of affairs as constituents, the Tractarian thesis of Independence is somewhat speculatively, but nevertheless hopefully, advanced. No such state of affairs entails or excludes the existence of any other wholly distinct state of affairs. Given Independence, a rather simple and straightforward Combinatorial theory of what possibilities there are, can be put forward. If Independence fails, things get more complicated.
The present theory is not biased towards Atomism nor is it biased against Atomism. An *epistemic* possibility that requires to be noted is the possibility that every (first-order) state of affairs is molecular, that is, analysable into a conjunction of states of affairs. (A simple if to a degree controversial example: *a*' being F may be equivalent to *a*'s being G & a' being H, with F=G & H. The pattern may be repeated for G and H, and so for ever.) Every first-order state of affairs may be a nest of first-order states of affairs: states of affairs all the way down. To allow for this epistemic possibility, a Combinatorial theory of what possibilities there are requires further elaboration." pp. 1-2.

6. ———. 2004. *Truth and Truthmakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. An introduction to truthmakers 1; 2. The general theory of truthmaking 4; 3. Epistemology and methodology 26; 4. Properties, relations and states of affairs 39; 5. Negative truths 53; 6. General truths 68; 7. Truthmakers for modal truths, part 1: possibility 83; 8. Truthmakers for modal truths, part 2: necessity 95; 9. Numbers and classes 112; 10. Causes, laws and dispositions 125; 11. Time 145; References 151; Index 155.
   "To postulate certain truthmakers for certain truths is to admit those truthmakers to one's ontology. The complete range of truthmakers admitted constitutes a metaphysics, which alerts us to the important point, stressed already but bearing much repetition, that the hunt for truthmakers is as controversial and difficult as the enterprise of metaphysics.

I think that proceeding by looking for truthmakers is an illuminating and useful regimentation of the metaphysical enterprise, or at least the enterprise of a realist metaphysics. But it is no easy and automatic road to the truth in such matters.

But this raises the question of Quine, and the signalling of ontological commitment by what we are prepared to 'quantify over'. Why should we desert Quine's procedure for some other method? The great advantage, as I see it, of the search for truthmakers is that it focuses us not merely on the metaphysical implications of the subject terms of propositions but also on their *predicates*. Quine has told us that the predicate gives us 'ideology' rather than ontology. (*) This saying is rather dark, but it is clear that, to some degree, he has stacked the ontological deck against predicates as opposed to subject terms. But when we look to truthmakers for truths, subject and predicate start as equals, and we can consider the ontological implications of both in an unbiased way.

The doing of ontological justice to the predicate leads us to consider whether we do not require at least selected properties and relations in our ontology. If properties and relations are admitted, we may think that some ontological connection between subjects and predicates is further required, and thus, perhaps, be led to postulate facts or states of affairs among our truthmakers. The propositional nature of truths will in any case push us in the same direction. The existence of negative truths and general truths raises the question whether negative and general facts are required as truthmakers. Ali these difficult metaphysical issues (which will receive discussion in chs. 5 and 6) tend to be swept under the carpet by correlating one's ontology with the subject term only of truths (what one takes to be truths).

Some may argue that what I see here as advantages of thinking in terms of truthmakers are actually disadvantages. The world is a world of things not of facts, it may be said, and so we do not want facts, and the nightmare of such entities as negative facts, in our ontology. This is an

arguable position, of course, but, conceding it true for the sake of argument, it can still be accommodated by a doctrine of truthmakers. Let the world be a world of things. The fundamental truths (those that have unique minimal truthmakers) will then have the form 'X exists' and the Xs, whatever they may be, will be truthmakers for these truths." pp. 23-24
(*) Quine writes: 'In science all is tentative, all admits of revision . But ontology is, pending revision, more clearly in hand than what rnay be called *ideology* - the question of admissible predicates' (Quine, *The way of paradox and other essay,* New York, Random House, 1966, p. 232).

Essays

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   "How are contingent identifications ('heat is mean kinetic energy') possible? It is argued, first, that we require a realistic (but not Platonistic) theory of properties. second, that we must reject the common assumption that to each distinct predicate there corresponds its own peculiar property. Contingent identification occurs where two distinct predicates apply to the same object or objects in virtue of just one property of that object."

2. Armstrong, David Malet, and Forrest, Peter. 1984. "An Argument against David Lewis' Theory of Possible Worlds." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 62:164-168.

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5. ———. 1991. "Classes Are States of Affairs." *Mind*:189-200.

"David Lewis argues, and this article accepts, that many-membered classes are nothing more than mereological wholes composed of their unit sub-classes. What, then, is a unit-class? It is a state of affairs, the possession by its member of the property of unithood. These states of affairs are complex, having constituents. But the complexity is non-mereological. Lewis cannot accept this account, since he holds that all composition is mereological."

6. ———. 1992. "Properties." In *Language, Truth, and Ontology*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 15-27. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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   "Should properties be thought of as having a "categorical" nature or should they be thought of as having a "dispositional" nature? The author presents arguments for and against dispositionalism and discusses a middle way between dispositionalism and categoricalism. He defends the position according to which all true properties are nondispositional, they do not have a nature that is exhausted by their possible manifestations. The difficulties for dispositionalism are more serious disadvantage than any facing categoricalism."

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Bogusław Wolniewicz on the Formal Ontology of Situations

INTRODUCTION

"The theory presented below was developed in an effort to clarify the metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The result obtained, however, is not strictly the formal twin of his variant of Logical Atomism. but something more, general, of which the latter is lust a special case. One might call it an ontology of situations. Some basic ideas of that ontology stern from Stenius Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Oxford, 1968 and Suszko Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1968.
Let L be a classic propositional language. Propositions of L are supposed to have their semantic counterparts in the realm of possibility, or as Wittgenstein put it: in logical space. These counterparts are situations, and S is to be the totality of them. The situation described by a proposition a is S(a). With Meinong we call it the objective of a." (pp. 381-382)

From: Bogusław Wolniewicz, "A Formal Ontology of Situations", *Studia Logica* 41, 1982, pp. 381-413.

"Different ontologies adopt different notions of existence as basic. Aristotle's paradigm of existence is given by the equivalence:

(A) to be = to be a substance.

On the other hand, the paradigm of existence adopted in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is given by the parallel equivalence:

(W) to be = to be a fact.

Now, an Aristotelian substance is the denotation of an individual name, whereas a Wittgensteinian fact is the denotation of a true proposition. It seems therefore that the notions of existence derived from these two paradigms should be quite different, and one might readily expect that the metaphysical systems erected upon them will display wide structural discrepancies.
It turns out, however, that in spite of this basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper. The vocabulary mentioned is based on the following four fundamental correlations:

Aristotle
1) primary substances *(substantiae primae*)
2) prime matter (*materia prima*)
3) form (*forma*)
4) self-subsistence of primary substances (*esse per se*)

Wittgenstein
1) atomic facts
2) objects
3) configuration
4) independence of atomic facts
Aristotle's ontology is an ontology of substances, Wittgenstein's ontology is an ontology of facts. But concerning the respective items of each of the pairs (1)-(4) both ontologies lay down conditions which in view of our vocabulary appear to be identical. To show this let us confront, to begin with, the items of pair (1): substances and facts.
(The interpretation of Aristotle adopted in this paper is the standard one, to be found in any competent textbook of the history of philosophy. Therefore, with but one exception, no references to Aristotle's works will be given here.)Relatively to the system involved substances and facts are of the same ontological

status. Aristotle's world is the totality of substances (summa rerum), Wittgenstein's world is the totality of facts (die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen). For Aristotle whatever exists in the basic sense of the word is a primary substance, for Wittgenstein - an atomic fact. Moreover, both ontologies are MODAL ones, allowing for different modes of being (modi essendi); and both take as basic the notion of 'contingent being' (esse contingens), opposed to necessary being on the one hand, and to the possibility of being on the other. Both substances and facts are entities which actually exist, but might have not existed. The equality of ontological status between substances and facts is corroborated by the circumstance that both are PARTICULARS, there being - as the saying goes - no multiplicity of entities which FALL UNDER them.

Substances and facts stand also in the same relation to the ontological categories of pairs (2) and (3). Both are always COMPOUND entities, a substance consisting of matter and form, and a fact consisting of objects and the way of their configuration. But in neither of the two systems is this compoundness to be understood literally as composition of physically separable parts or pieces. The compoundness (compositio) of a substance consists in its being formed stuff (materia informata), and the compoundness of a fact in its being a configuration of objects.

In view of correlation (4) we have also an equality of relation which a substance bears to other substances, and a fact to other facts. Self-subsistence is the characteristic attribute of primary substances: substantia prima = ens per se. If we take this to mean that each substance exists independently of the existence or non-existence of any other substance we get immediately the exact counterpart of Wittgenstein's principle of logical atomism stating the mutual independence of atomic facts. It should be noted that thus understood the attribute of self-subsistence or independence is a relative one, belonging to a substance - or to a fact - only in virtue of its relation to other substances - or facts.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view Aristotle's substances are not things, but hypostases of facts, and thus their names are not logically proper names, but name-like equivalents of propositions. (By that term we mean roughly either a noun clause of the form 'that p', or any symbol which might be regarded as a

definitional abbreviation of such clause.) Surely, from the Aristotelian point of view it might be easily retorted here that just the opposite is the case: substances are not 'reified' facts, but on the contrary - facts are 'dereified' substances. Without passing judgement on these mutual objections let us note in passing that their symmetric character seems to be itself an additional manifestation of the parallelism discussed." (pp. 208-210, notes omitted)

From: Bogusław Wolniewicz, "A Parallelism Between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian Ontologies", in: Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky (eds.), *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. IV, Dordrecht: Reidel 1969, pp. 208-217.

WOLNIEWICZ ON WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

"The *Tractatus* is a masterpiece of rare power and ravishing beauty. Its content is a profound and highly coherent philosophy of language, based upon a radically new kind of metaphysics: the metaphysics of facts and situations. (Meinong, with his notion of the 'objective' of a proposition, apparently was moving in the same direction. But he never came near asking himself any of the two crucial questions: (1) When, if ever, are the objectives of different propositions identical? (2) What, if any, is the relation of the objective of a compound proposition to the objectives of its components?) Moreover, the *Tractatus* anticipated many of the later developments of logical semantics, especially those commencing around 1950 and connected with its algebraization. The kernel of its message may be put down as follows. The fundamental problem of the *Tractatus*, as of all philosophy, concerns the relationship of thought and reality. This relationship is mediated by language, and so it may be decomposed into the relative product of two relations: one between thought and language, the other between language and reality. Let us mark the latter by 'f', the former by '?'.

It has been maintained that according to the *Tractatus* the projective relation f between language and reality has to be an isomorphism. This, however, is not borne out by the text. To satisfy the conditions laid down by Wittgenstein it is enough for to be a *homomorphism*, and this already makes a lot of a difference. In the first place, we are confronted now with two delicate questions: (1) Which is the direction of that homomorphism: from language to reality, or the other way round? (2) Is it a homomorphism *onto*, or merely one *into*? Neither of these questions has a trivial answer in the context of the *Tractatus*.

We assume here that the relation f is a homomorphism on the language *L* onto the reality *R*, i.e., that f: *L* ? R. Thus reality is a homomorphic image of language. But language is the totality of propositions, and the reference of meaningful propositions are possible situations. Consequently, reality is not the world, but the logical space; i.e., it is not the totality of facts, but the totality of possibilities. Thus language is more capacious than the world, and the number of propositions is greater than even that of situations.

The simplest non-trivial homomorphism of that kind is the well-known Fregean one. Language is mapped under it onto the set of the two classic truth-values, and the corresponding two-element Boolean algebra is then the logical space. Thus for Frege there are just two possible situations: the True and the False. This is so because his only stipulation with regard to the reference of propositions is that *contradictory* propositions cannot have the same reference. In the *Tractatu*s, however, it is stipulated further that logically *independent* propositions cannot have the same reference either. This move is the gist of its logical atomism, transforming the Fregean homomorphism f: *L* ? {1,0} into the composition of two other ones: f' on *L* onto logical space, and f' ' on logical space onto the set of truth-values. (1)

The aim of the *Tractatus* was to trace the boundaries of clear thought:

> *Philosophy... should trace the unthinkable from within by means of the thinkable. By presenting clearly what may be expressed it will point to the inexpressible*. (2)

> The positivistically-minded members of the Vienna Circle deemed to recognize in these words their own 'demarcation problem', together with their own hostility towards 'metaphysics' and their cult of 'science'. It was a monumental misunderstanding. To Wittgenstein the metaphysical is indeed the inexpressible, but this is not to mean that it is regarded as some kind of delusion or hoax. On the contrary, the hoax is the idea of a 'scientific philosophy'.

In the *Tractatus* the tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible was to be accomplished at one stroke. Logical space *R* fills the realm of the expressible *E* completely, i.e., we have *E* = *R*. Consequently, the homomorphism f' is onto the expressible, and what is left, evidently, is only the inexpressible. This grandiose project, however, was soon to encounter grave technical difficulties, and then Wittgenstein simply dropped it. This was rash. Not all the difficulties were quite as insuperable as they might have seemed, and the *Tractatus* left room for manœuvre. It might have been helpful, for instance, to weaken the homomorphism f' to one *into* the expressible. Then instead of the one language *L* we could consider a whole series of languages *L0, L1*, ..., and a corresponding series of logical spaces *R0, R1*, ... The realm of the inexpressible would be approximated by the latter 'from within', starting from what is expressible in the language *L*0 at hand. Certainly, the series of logical spaces need not be monotonic, and in advance there would be no telling whether what is inexpressible at a given stage *L1* is absolutely or only relatively so. Thus the final tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible would recede to infinity, but for theory this could hardly count as an objection." (pp. 77-79)

Notes

(1) For details cf. Wolniewicz, B. 1979, 'A Wittgensteinian Sematics for Propositions', in Diamond C. (ed.) *Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of Professor G E M Anscombe*, Harvester Press, Brighton.
(2) Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logoco-Philosophicus*, 4.113-4.114.

From: Bogusław Wolniewicz, "On the Discontinuity of Wittgensteins' Philosophy" in: Harry A. Lewis (ed.), *Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991, pp. 77-81.

RELATED STUDIES

Annotated Bibliography of Wolniewicz

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   Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 193-197

2. ———. 1969. "A Note on Black's 'Companion'." *Mind* no. 78:141.

   Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - p. 229.
   "It is a mistake to suppose that in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" the meaning of *Urbild* has any connexion with that of *picture*. "

3. ———. 1969. "A Parallelism between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian Ontologies." In *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. Iv*, edited by Cohen, Robert S. and Wartofsky, Marx W., 208-217. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.

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Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 198-207

4. ———. 1970. "Four Notion of Independence." *Theoria* no. 36:161-164.

   Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 127-130. WFour (binary) relations of independence I(p,q) between propositions are distinguished: the Wittgensteinian I sub-w, the statistical I sub-s, the modal I sub-m, and the deductive I sub-d. The validity of the following theorem is argued for: I sub-w(p,q) implies I sub-s(p,q) implies I sub-m(p,q) implies Isub-d(p,q). "

5. ———. 1971. "Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non-Fregean Logic." In *Contemporary East European Philosophy. Vol. 3*, edited by D'Angelo, Edward, DeGrood, David and Riepe, Dale, 231-243. Bridgeport: Spartacus Books.

6. ———. 1972. "The Notion of Fact as a Modal Operator." *Teorema*:59-66.

   Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 218-224 "The notion of fact /fp = "it is a fact that p"/ is characterized axiomatically, and the ensuing modal systems shown to be equivalent to tT, S4 and S5 respectively."

7. ———. 1973. "Zur Semantik Des Satzkalküls: Frege Und Wittgenstein." In *Der Mensch - Subjekt Und Objekt (Festchrift Für Adam Schaff)*, edited by Borbé, Tasso. Wien: Europaverl.

8. ———. 1977. "Sachlage Und Elementarsätz." In *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Leinfellner, Elisabeth, 174-176. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

9. ———. 1978. "Situations as the Reference of Propositions." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 5:171-182.

"The reference of propositions is determined for a class of languages to be called the "Wittgensteinian" ones. A meaningful proposition presents a possible situation. Every consistent conjunction of elementary propositions presents an elementary situation. The smallest elementary situations are the "Sachverhalte"; the greatest are possible worlds. The situation presented by a proposition is to be distinguished from that verifying it, but the greatest situation presented is identical with the smallest verifying. The reference of compound propositions is then determined as a function of their components."

10. ———. 1978. "Objectives of Propositions." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 7:143-147.

"The paper sketches out a semantics for propositions based upon the Wittgensteinian notion of a possible situation. The objective of a proposition is defined as the smallest situation verifying it. Two propositions are assumed to have the same objective iff they are strictly equivalent. Formulas are given which determine the objectives of conjunction and disjunction as functions of the objectives of their components. finally a link with possible-world semantics is established."

11. ———. 1978. "Wittgenstein Und Der Positivismus." In *Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism. Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Bergehel, Hal, Hübner, Adolf and Eckehart, Köhler, 75-77. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

12. ———. 1978. "Les Situations Comme Corrélats Semantiques Des Enoncés." *Studia Filozoficzne* no. 2:27-41.

13. ———. 1979. "A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions." In *Intention and Intentionality. Essay in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe*, edited by Diamond, Cora and Teichman, Jenny, 165-178. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

"More than once Professor Anscombe has expressed doubt concerning the semantic efficacy of the idea of an 'elementary proposition' as conceived in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein himself eventually discarded it, together with the whole philosophy of language of which it had been an essential part. None the less the idea is still with us, and it seems to cover theoretical potentialities yet to be explored. This paper is a tentative move in that direction.
According to Professor Anscombe, (*) Wittgenstein's 'elementary propositions' may be characterized by the following five theses:
(1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.
(2) They are essentially positive.
(2) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.
(4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.
(5) They are concatenations of names, which are absolutely simple signs.
We shall not investigate whether this is an adequate axiomatic for the notion under consideration. We suppose it is. In any case it is possible to modify it in one way or another, and for the resulting notion still to preserve a family resemblance with the original idea. One such modification is sketched out below."

14. ———. 1979. "Some Formal Properties of Objectives." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 8:16-20.

"The objectives of propositions as defined in an earlier paper are shown here to form a distributive lattice."

15. ———. 1980. "On the Lattice of Elementary Situations." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 9:115-121.

16. ———. 1980. "On the Verifiers of Disjunction." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 9:57-59.

17. ———. 1981. "The Boolean Algebra of Objectives." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 10:17-23.

    "This concludes a series of papers constructing a semantics for propositional languages based on the notion of a possible "situation". Objectives of propositions are the situations described by them. The set of objectives is defined and shown to be a boolean algebra isomorphic to that formed by sets of possible worlds."

18. ———. 1982. "A Formal Ontology of Situations." *Studia Logica* no. 41:381-413.

    "A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only."
    Contents:
    0. Preliminaries;
    1. Elementary Situations
    1.1.The Axioms; 1.2.Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4.States of Affairs;
    2. Sets of Elementary Situations
    2.1.The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2.The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets; 2.3.Q-Spaces and V-Sets; 2.4.V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4.V-Classes and V-Sets;
    3. Objectives of Propositions
    3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of

Compound Propositions 3.5. The Boolean Algebra of Situations;
4. References

19. ———. 1982. "Ludwig Fleck and Polish Philosophy." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 9:25-28.

20. ———. 1982. "A Closure System for Elementary Situations." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 11:134-139.

21. ———. 1982. "On Logical Space." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 11:84-88.

22. ———. 1983. "Logical Space and Metaphysical Systems." *Studia Logica* no. 42:269-284.

    "The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations" (Studia Logica, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations.
    Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry and Barwise is discussed."

23. ———. 1983. "Truth Arguments and Independence." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 12:21-28.

24. ———. 1984. "An Algebra of Subsets for Join-Semilatttices with Unit." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 13:21-24.

25. ———. 1984. "A Topology for Logical Space." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 13:255-259.

26. ———. 1984. "Suszko: A Reminiscence." *Studia Logica* no. 43:317-321.

    Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 302-306

27. ———. 1985. "Die Grundwerte Einer Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassaung." *Conceptus* no. 19:3-8.

"The scientific world-view is one of the fundamentals of our culture. It can be characterized in part by its specific system of values. A world-view is regarded as a scientific one if "truth" is one of its primary values, that is, as a value which is not a means, but an end in itself. Truth is served in particular by the two instrumental values of conceptual clarity and openness to critique. Their standing is (at present) low, for two reasons. (1) Unclear thinking not only promotes social idols; its consequences are also often difficult to see clearly and immediately. (2) In any case truth is of no interest (in a biological sense) to human beings; therefore, critique can at best be a socially tolerated activity. On the other hand, truth is not only a value, but also a force which in the long run cannot be held back; this fact gives some hope to adherents of the scientific world-view. "

28. ———. 1986. "Discreteness of Logical Space." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 15:132-136.

29. ———. 1989. "Entailments and Independence in Join-Semilattices." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 18:2-5.

"The paper generalizes Wittgenstein's notion of independence. in a join-semilattice of elementary situations the atoms are the *Sachverhalte*, and maximal ideals are possible worlds. A subset of that semilattice is independent iff it is free of "ontic ties". This is shown to be equivalent to independence in von Neumann's sense."

30. ———. 1989. "On Atomic Join-Semilattices." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 18:105-111.

Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 307-312.

31. ———. 1990. "A Question About Join-Semilattices." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic*:108.

32. ———. 1990. "Concerning Reism in Kotarbinski." In *Kotarbinski: Logic. Semantics and Ontology*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 199-204. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 265-271

33. ———. 1990. "Elzenberg's Logic of Values." In *Logic Counts*, edited by Ewa, Zarnecka-Bialy, 63-70. Dordrecht: Kluwe.

    Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 286-292 (with the title: *Elzenberg's axiology*"
    "1. Values are what our value-Judgements refer to, and the passing of Judgements is one of our vital activities, like sleeping and breathing. We constantly appraise things as good or bad, pretty or ugly, as noble or base, well-made or misshapen. No wonder that both the act of appraisal and that which it refers to - i.e. the real or spurious values - have been always the source of philosophical reflexion. In systematic form such reflexion is what we call *axiology*.
    In Polish philosophy it was Henryk Elzenberg (1887-1967) who reflected upon matters of axiology most deeply and incisively.
    (...)
    3. Leibniz had said somewhere: "There are two mazes in which the human mind is most likely to get lost: one is the concept of continuity, the other is that of liberty". This admits of generalization: all concepts are mazes, *viz* mazes of logical relations between the propositions that involve them.
    One such maze is the concept of 'value'. Possibly, it is even the same as one of the two mentioned by Leibniz, only entered - so to say - by another door. For it would be in full accord with Elzenberg's position - and with that of Kant too - to adopt the following characteristic: values are what controls the actions of free agents. Thus the concepts of value and of liberty should constitute one conceptual maze, or - which comes to the same - two mazes communicating with each other.
    To get a survey of such logical maze the first thing is to fix the ontological category of the concept in question. Thus, in

our case, we ask what kind of entities are those 'values' supposed to be. (Ontological categories are the most general classes of entities, the *summa genera* A term even more general has to cover literally everything: like 'entity' or 'something'. For everything is an entity, just as everything is a something.)
Different ontologies admit different sets of categories. The categories most frequently referred to are those of 'objects', 'properties', and 'relations'; the more exotic ones are those of an 'event', a 'set', a 'function', or a 'situation'. One point, however, is of paramount importance: the categories admitted *In* one ontology have to be mutually disjoint". p. 63; 66.

34. ———. 1990. "The Essence of Logical Atomism: Hume and Wittgenstein." In *Wittgenstein. Eine Neubewertung. Akten 14. Internationale Wittgenstein-Symposium. Vol. 1*, 106-111. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

35. ———. 1991. "Needs and Value." In *Logic and Ethics*, edited by Geach, Peter Thomas, 289-302. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

36. ———. 1991. "A Sequel to Hawranek/Zygmunt." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 20:143-144.

37. ———. 1991. "On the Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy." In *Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters*, edited by Lewis, Harry A., 77-81. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Reprinted in: *Logic and metaphysics* (1999) - pp. 13-17.
    "How is Wittgenstein's later philosophy related to his earlier one?
    Despite much discussion there is little clarity on that. So let us give it again some consideration.
    (...)
    Philosophy of language oscillates between the two poles of metaphysics and psychologism; (...) . The main representative of the former trend is Frege, and the *Tractatus* follows closely in his wake. The *Philosophical Investigations,* on the other hand, are the expression of a

dramatic departure from Frege and towards psychologism. Language is now viewed by Wittgenstein not in its logical capacity as the medium of thought and the bearer of truth-value, but instrumentally as a means of communication. Its relation to reality fades out, and its connexion with feeling, thinking, and doing comes massively to the fore. Psychologism and positivism go hand in hand. Metaphysics, though not condemned as a vice as in pure positivism, is viewed as a malaise to be cured. Thus Wittgenstein's later philosophy turns into a kind of psychotherapy, exerting itself to bring metaphysics to a stop. What for? This is never made clear, as if it were a matter of course. But it is not." (pp. 80-81)

38. ———. 1993. "A Question of Logic in the Philosophy of Religion." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 22:33-36.

39. ———. 1994. "On the Synthetic a Priori." In *Philosophical Logic in Poland*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 327-336. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

40. ———. 1999. *Logic and Metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's Ontology of Facts*. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne.

    Contents: Preface 11; Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy 13; 1. Elementary situations as a lattice of finite length 19; Elementary situations as a semilattice 73; 3. Independence 127; 4. Elementary situations generalized 137; 5. Auxiliary studies 193; 5.1 The Logical Atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein 193; 5.2 A parallelism between Wittgenstein and Aristotle 198; 5.3 Frege's semantics 207; 5.4. The notion of fact as a modal operator 218; 5.5 "Tractatus" 5.541 - 5.542 224; 5.6 History of the concept of a Situation 229; 6. Offshoots 243 6.1 Languages and codes 243; 6.2 Logic and hermeneutics 254; 6.3 Kotarbinski's Reism 265; 6.4 On Bayle's critique of theodicy 271; 6.5 Elzenberg's axiology 286; 6.6 Needs and values 293; 6.7 Suszko: a reminiscence 302; Supplements 307; Indices:

Index of subjects 317; Index of names 326; Index of *Tractatus* references 329.

41. ———. 2000. "Atoms in Semantic Frames." *Logica Trianguli* no. 4:69-86.

    "Elaborating on Wittgenstein's ontology of facts, semantic frames are described axiomatically as based on the notion of an elementary situation being the verifier of a proposition. Conditions are investigated then for suchframes to be atomic, i.e. to have lattice-theoretic counterparts of his "Sachverhalte"."

42. ———. 2001. "Extending Atomistic Frames." *Logica Trianguli* no. 5.

    "A "semantic frame" is bounded join-semilattice of *elementary situations*, with its maximal ideals to represent possible worlds and mapped into the complete sets of propositions determined by a given abstract logic (*L*, *Cn*). A frame is *Humean* if the elementary situations are separated by its possible worlds, and it is *atomistic* if the semilattice is so. One frame is the *extension* of another if the latter is an {0,1}-subsemilattice of the former satisfying certain conditions discussed."

43. ———. 2001. "Tractatus 5.541 - 5.542." In *Satz Un Sachverhalt*, edited by Neumaier, Otto, 185-190. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

    "In Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", thesis 5 is the Principle of Extensionality: all propositions are truth-functions of their clauses. This, however, has been often thrown into doubt. There are - it is said - compound propositions whose truth-value does not depend on that of their clauses. The usual example given are the so-called intensional contexts, like "John thinks that p", or "John says that p". And indeed, the truth-value of "p" is patently immaterial here to that of the whole proposition which it is part of.
    Wittgenstein's retort are the following much discussed theses, adduced here in a translation of our own:

5.54 In the general propositional form, propositions occur in one another only as bases of truth-operations.
5.541 At first sight it seems that a proposition might occur in another also in a different way.
Particularly in certain propositional forms of psychology, like "A believes that p is the case", "A thinks p", etc.
For taken superficially, proposition p seems here to stand to the object A in some sort of relation.
(And in modem epistemology - Russell, Moore, etc. - these have actually been construed that way.)
5.542 However, "A believes that p", "A thinks p", "A says p" are clearly of the form " 'p' says p "; and this is not correlating a fact with an object, but a correlation of facts by correlating their objects.
The objection is met here in two steps. Firstly, it is pointed out that a proposition of the form "John says that p" is actually of the form "'p' says that p". The idea is this: the proposition "John says that Jill has a cat" means: John produces the sentence "Jill has a cat", the latter saying by itself *that* Jill has a cat. In such a way propositions get independent of the persons producing them, and communicate some objective content. It is surely not by John's looks that we come to know about Jill's cat, but merely by his words. Whom they stem from, is irrelevant.
In his second step Wittgenstein follows Frege's interpretation of indirect speech, but with modifications. He points out that the formula " 'p' says that p " is equivalent to some compound proposition in which neither the proposition *"p" as a* syntactic unit, nor anything equivalent to it, does occur although there occur all the logically relevant constituents of *"p"* separately.
(...)
The distinction between abstract and concrete states of affairs is not drawn explicitly in the "Tractatus". But it fits well thesis 5.156, if we expand that thesis by a few words of comment, added here in brackets:
5.156(d) A proposition may well be en incomplete image of a particular (concrete) situation, but it is always *the* complete image (of an abstract one).

The circumstance that in 5.156 not "states of affairs", but "situations" are mentioned, is of no consequence in our context. We assume that states of affairs are just atomic situations, and so the distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" applies to both."

44. ———. 2003. "Extending Atomistic Frames: Part Ii." *Logica Trianguli* no. 6:69-88.

    "The paper concludes an earlier one (Logica Trianguli, 5) on extensions of atomistic semantic frames. Three kinds of extension are considered: the adjunctive, the conjunctive, and the disjunctive one. Some theorems are proved on extending "Humean" frames, i.e. such that the elementary situations constituting their universa are separated by the maximally coherent sets of them ("realizations")."

45. ———. 2005. "On a Minimality Condition." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 34:227-228.

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Reinhardt Grossmann and the Ontology of Categories

INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY, CATEGORIES AND THE WORLD

"Ontology, I said at the beginning, asks what the categories of the world are. What is a category? It is a kind of entity. What kind of kind? In answer to this question, we can only give examples. It is that sort of kind, as we have seen, that distinguishes between individuals, on the one hand, and properties on the other. It is that sort of kind, as we have noted, which obeys a certain kind of law, namely, categorial laws. But this reply does not really help much either. We must therefore rest content, as on so many other occasions, with examples rather than definitions. In these most fundamental matters of metaphysics, definitions are impossible." (p. 5)

"The world, I said earlier, is the ultimate object of ontological analysis. But this world must be distinguished from the physical universe. The universe is a complicated spatio-temporal structure. Facts, on the other hand, do not form such a structure. It follows, as Armstrong fails to realize, that a world consisting of facts cannot be identical with the universe. (D. M. Armstrong, *Universals and Scientific Realism,* 1978, vol. 1, pp. 126-135.) But if the world is not the same as the universe, to what category does it belong? There are a number of plausible answers. It may be said that the world is the totality of entities. Or it may be claimed that it is the totality of facts. (Compare L. Wittgenstein, *Tractaus Logico-philosophicus* 1961, p. 7.) If these answers imply that the world belongs to the category of class, then I think that they are

wrong. But I must admit that I do not know how to argue for my view. I believe that the world is a fact; that it belongs to the category of fact. If this is the correct view, then we can distinguish between two levels of ontological analysis. On the first level, the world can be analyzed into its constituent facts. On this level, we do not arrive at new categories, but discover the kinds of fact there are. We discover, in other words, the subcategories of the category fact. On the second level, we analyze facts which do not consist of further facts into their constituents. It is on this second level of analysis that we encounter the traditional categories of individual, property, relation, etc." (p. 8)
"Ontology asks what are the categories of the world. So far, I have tried to elucidate the crucial terms 'category' and 'world'. But I could have begun instead by saying that ontology attempts to categorize everything there is, and this alternative introduction would have led us earlier to a number of questions which we must now consider.There is an old and hallowed tradition, according to which being comes in many modes. One distinguishes, for example, between the existence of individual things and the mere subsistence of facts. Concrete things are said to exist, while abstract entities are held to subsist. But even though this view has been maintained by some of the recent philosophers I most admire -- by Bolzano, Frege, and Meinong, among others -- I do not think that it is correct. I do not believe that there are modes of being. Existence is the only kind of being there is. I shall later defend this belief. What is of primary interest to us right now is how the possibility of modes of being affects our conception of ontology. It seems to me clear that if there are modes of being, then it is the task of ontology to categorize all entities, irrespective of their particular modes of being. The field of ontology is as wide as the realm of being itself. But it is not any wider: What has no being cannot be categorized. What has no being cannot be the subject of ontology. Meinong, as we all know, would demur. According to him, there is an enterprise that deals, not only with existents and subsistents, but also with objects that have no being whatsoever; with objects like the golden mountain and the round square. And he claims that we are merely prejudiced if we exclude such objects from categorization. (A. Meinong, [*On the Theory of Objects*] 1904.) But Meinong's

defense of a general theory of objects rests on an important assumption which I do not share. He maintains that objects without being may nevertheless have properties and stand in relations. He holds that the golden mountain is golden, that the round square is both round and square. Now, if it were true that objects without being bristle with properties, then it would make sense to attempt to classify them, according to these properties. But if Meinong's assumption is mistaken, as I shall contend in a later chapter, then there simply can be no such classification; for one can only classify what has properties and stands in relations; what has, in short, attributes. My conviction that ontology cannot be extended beyond the realm of being thus rests on my rejection of the view that beingless objects can have attributes." (pp. 9-10)

From: Reinhardt Grossmann, *The Categorial Structure of the World*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1983.

Related pages

Annotated Bibliography of Reinhardt Grossmann

Frege's Ontology: Being, Existence, and Truth

Bertrand Russell's Ontological Development

The Ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Reinhardt Grossmann

A complete bibliography of the published writings of Reinhardt Grossmann and of the studies about his philosophy has been compiled by Javier Cumpa in the volume edited by him: *Studies in the Ontology of Reinhardt Grossmann* (2009), pp. 284-289; I give the list of the books and a selection of the most important articles.

Books

1. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1965. *The Structure of Mind*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

   Contents: 1. Introspection. Inspection of phenomenal objects - Awareness of mental acts - Sensing and perceiving 3; 2. Mental Acts. The relational view - Nonexistent objects - Brentano's idealism 39; 3. Presentation and Judgment: Universals - Concepts - Frege's conceptualism - Abstraction 60; 4. Meaning. Mental contents - Intentional contexts - The behavioristic approach 104; 5. Intentionality. Possible particulars - Possible states of affairs - The intentional nexus 144; 6. Realism. Direct and indirect knowledge - Perceptual and phenomenal objects - Delusive perceptual situations 180; Index 238-248.
   "This book avoids a number of traditional problems from the philosophy of mind. Emotions and volitions are hardly mentioned; and very little is said about imagination and memory. I am concerned in the main with only one topic:

the realism-Idealism controversy. This concern explains why I limited the discussion to thought and perception. It also explains why at times I had to go rather deeply into the problems of general ontology; for if my analysis is correct, the realism-idealism controversy arises from certain disagreements in general ontology.
Nor does this book deal with a number of currently fashionable topics. I say nothing on whether or not mental states are after all nothing but brain states. I do not discuss this point because I am convinced that there is nothing to be discussed. The correct answer to the question seems to me so obvious that I simply took it for granted in writing this book. The problem of our knowledge of other minds is of quite a different sort: it is, philosophically speaking, interesting and difficult. Since I do not discuss the problem, I may mention here that I consider all solutions in terms of so-called criteria for the application of expressions unsatisfactory. The one fashionable topic which I do discuss, though not under a separate heading and not in the movement's jargon, is the so-called private language argument. I am sure that the attentive reader can construct my position on this matter from the first chapter." (from the Preface).
Translated in Spanish as: *La estructura de la mente*. Barcelona, Labor, 1969.

2. ———. 1969. *Reflections on Frege's Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

   Contents: Editorial Foreword VII; Preface IX; Note XV-XVI; Chapter I. *Begriffschrift:* Three Confusions 3. Act and Content 5; Subject and Predicate 13; Identity and Description 19; Function and Argument 23; Chapter II. *Grundlagen*: Two Distinctions 28; Ideas 29; Concepts 50; Objects 83; Reduction 108; Chapter III. *Sinn und Bedeutung*: A Solution 153; Identity 154; Truth 181; Chapter IV. Later Papers: Second Thoughts 224; About Sense and Reference 226; About Definitions 248; Index 255-261.

"I chose the title "Reflections on Frege's Philosophy" rather than, say, "An Outline of Frege's Philosophy" because I wanted to indicate that this book is not a systematic treatise on all or even most of Frege's views. I did not set out to write an exposition of Frege's philosophy, nor did I intend to provide a detailed commentary on his most important works.

My goal was rather modest in regard to Frege. I hoped to be able to discuss a few selected ontological problems within a very narrow setting. Frege's philosophy, as I found out, most conveniently provides such a setting. Not only does it center around the very questions which I wanted to take up, but it also deals with them in a manner which I find most congenial. Even though the ontological problems were foremost in my mind, however, I would be very pleased if my efforts contribute to a better understanding of Frege's philosophy as a whole.

(...)

It was clear to me from the beginning that Frege's views would have to be discussed with an eye on their gradual development. There are several definite stages in Frege's advancement, I believe, and his later views grow out of earlier ones. This conviction explains the structure of the present book. The first chapter is about the *Begriffschrift*. I tr *y* to uncover the origins of the main themes of Frege's philosophy. These themes have their roots, I think, in three basic confusions: subjective and objective entities are not sharply distinguished; objects are not clearly separated from concepts; and identity is conceived of at times as a relation between signs, and at other times as a relation between entities. In the second chapter, the emphasis is on two cornerstones of Frege's mature philosophy, namely, his distinction between objective and subjective entities, and his notion of the difference between objects and concepts. But his attempt to reduce Arithmetic to logic raises the unsolved problem of identity. These topics are discussed against the background of the *Grundlagen*. Frege's philosophical development reaches a second peak with the three classical papers published in 1891 and 1892. These articles, especially

"Über Sinn and Bedeutung," explain Frege's views on identity and truth. Both of these views rest on his distinction between sense and reference. The third chapter is about that distinction and its consequences. Frege's later published and unpublished manuscripts contain modifications, qualifications, and second thoughts about his earlier solutions. In Chapter Four I deal with some of these later ideas but this is rather an epilogue; the real drama occurs in the second and third chapter." (from the Preface).
(...)
"If, in conclusion, we look back at Frege's system, we see that another of its main flaws has been eliminated. What remains as before is Frege's conviction that there are senses -- both senses of proper names and Thoughts. I have argued that a correct ontology contains states of affairs instead of Fregean senses. What descriptions represent -- as distinguished from what they describe -- are states of affairs, not senses. What sentences represent are states of affairs, not Thoughts. The sense-reference distinction, Frege's most original and most famous metaphysical innovation, must be rejected. Some metaphysical mistakes are so profound that generations of philosophers continue to discuss and learn from them. This is such a mistake." (p. 253).

3. ———. 1973. *Ontological Reduction*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

   Contents: Preface 1; Introduction. A Principle of Acquaintance 3; Part One: Numbers and Quantifiers 29; Part Two: Properties and Classes 109; Part Three: Individuals and Structures 141; Conclusion: A List of Categories 177; Notes 191; Index 207-215.
   "The structure of this book requires a brief explanation. The philosophical inquiry proceeds simultaneously, as it were, on three different levels. First and foremost, there is the problem of the nature of a ()logical reduction. What reduction devices and methods have been proposed? How does one go about showing that a given ontological kind can

be reduced to another? What kinds of definitions are important from a strictly ontological point of view? These and similar questions arise in connection with the main topic of this book I shall contend that most kinds of definitions have no reductive power whatsoever. On the positive side, I maintain that there are only two ways of showing that what is alleged to be an ontological kind reduces In reality to another kind. First, it may be discovered that two expressions which apparently represent different entities or different kinds of entities refer in truth to the very same entity or kind of entity. In most instances, one of the two expressions will then be an abbreviation of the other. Second, it may be discovered that a certain informative identity statement is true. In this case, either a description describes the same entity or kind of entity for which there is also a label, or two different descriptions describe the very same entity or kind of entity.

On the second level there are comments about the status and nature of a selected group of categories. Here the main topics are indicated by the five main parts of this book. The first part consists of some introductory remarks about the so-called principle of acquaintance. The second part deals with numbers and quantifiers in general. In I he third part, the discussion turns to properties and classes. The fourth part is concerned with individuals and structures. The fifth part contains a summary of the most important results and a list of categories.

A discussion of the nature of ontological reduction has to be illustrated by examples. Numbers (and quantifiers in general), properties, classes, individuals, and structures are the five categories selected here as examples. In regard to numbers, it is argued (1) that they cannot be reduced to properties or classes, (2) that they form a subcategory of their own, and (3) that they belong to the main category of quantifiers. In regard to properties, the main contentions are (1) that there are no complex properties-that is, no properties represented by complex propositional forms-and (2) that there are properties which do not determine classes. Classes, I shall affirm, need not be determined by

properties. The fourth section consists of essays about four particular problems which arise because there are structures and, in particular, spatio-temporal structures.
On the third and last level of inquiry, an attempt is made to formulate a complete list of the main categories. But while the problem of ontological reduction is rather thoroughly discussed, and while there is also a fair amount of talk about particular categories, discussion of the hierarchy of categories is admittedly rather sketchy. Nevertheless, a glimpse at the whole system of ontology seemed to me better than no glimpse at all.
Thus, with the three levels of inquiry in mind, you may think of this book in rather old-fashioned terms, as "A discussion of ontological reduction, with special reference to the status of selected categories and culminating in the outline of a list of categories"." (from the Preface)

4. ———. 1974. *Meinong*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Contents: Preface IX-X; I. Individuals and Properties 1; II. Ideal and Real Relations 21; III. Ideas and Their Intentions 48; IV. Objects of Higher Order 57; V. Assumptions and Objectives 78; VI. Being and *Aussersein* 106; VII. Empirical Knowledge: Perception and Introspection 121; VIII. Relational Knowledge: The Theory of Entities 156; IX. The Apprehension of Objects 182; X. Modalities 199; Appendix I. Meinong's Ontology (by Meinong) 224; Appendix II. Meinong's Life and Work (by Meinong) 230; Notes 237; Index 255.
"This book on Meinong is primarily concerned with his arguments for the positions for which he is famous among some philosophers and infamous among others. But philosophical contentions carry little weight when they are viewed in isolation. Matters are too complex, too difficult, to be settled in an isolated way. Every argument must be evaluated against a background which includes a philosopher's other arguments and some of his basic assumptions or -- if you wish -- prejudices. I therefore discuss Meinong's arguments within the context in which

they appear, but with an eye on his earlier positions as well as on his later changes of mind. There are at least two further reasons for adopting this particular approach in Meinong's case.
Findlay, in his classic study of Meinong's philosophy, compares him with G. E. Moore.(1) Although this comparison is apt, there is one respect in which Meinong differs greatly from Moore. Meinong's philosophy develops over the years from a sparse ontology into an ample one. Every new idea is built upon an old one; new problems arise in the wake of earlier solutions; certain questions are raised time and again, but their answers are more and more refined. In short, there is a definite development, with a definite trend, definite stages, and a distinct final view.
I also wished to impress on the reader how misleading the prevalent view is that Meinong was a spendthrift metaphysician who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and needlessly. If one becomes aware of how Meinong's full ontology develops very slowly over many years from very austere beginnings, how he resists the temptation to solve a problem by admitting a new kind of entity, and how he gives in only after a whole series of arguments for the new kind of entity has accumulated, one will, hopefully, be less inclined in future to think of Meinong as the 'supreme entity multiplier in the history of philosophy'.(2)" (from the Preface).
(1) J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), p. 348.
(2) This phrase if from Gilbert Ryle's article in the *Oxford Magazine* 26 October 1933.

5. ———. 1983. *The Categorial Structure of the World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

   For the Table of Contents, see the link at the end of the page.
   "This book attempts to give a complete and accurate list of the categories of the world. In other words, it tries to bring Aristotle's *Categories* up-to-date.

My investigation into the categorial structure of the world was guided by two main ideas, one systematic, the other, historical in nature. The systematic idea is that most ontological disputes concern, all appearances to the contrary, not the existence of certain entities, but rather their nature. In each one of the chapters which deal with distinct categories, I have therefore discussed the main alternative categorizations of the kind of entity in question. Individual things, for example, have been classified either as particulars (as substances, in the traditional sense) or else as bundles of properties. For properties, too, there are two important views: they are categorized either as particulars (located in space and/or time) or as universals. Numbers, to give a third example, have been conceived of as multitudes of units, or as properties of properties, or as classes of properties or of classes. In regard to these three kinds of entity, I come to the conclusions that individuals are particulars rather than bundles, that properties are universals rather than particulars, and that numbers are neither multitudes, nor properties, nor classes, but belong to an entirely different category of quantifier.

The historical idea is that until very recently, an Aristotelian ontology of substance and accidence formed the basis of almost all philosophizing. Descartes, for example, is still a member of this tradition. However, in the 17th century there occurred a decisive break with that ontology. The notion of substance was attacked from the left by empiricists (Berkeley) and from the right by rationalists (Leibniz). As a result, a bundle view of individuals was widely accepted, and the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental properties was abandoned. But the acceptance of an ontology of bundles and properties raised a series of new questions. How do bundles of properties differ from mere classes? What role do relations play in the formation of bundles? What is the ontological status of relations? What kind of complex entity is a fact? And so on. The 19th century sees the final destruction of the Aristotelian ontology. Not just one, but several new categories appear on the ontological stage: relations, structures, classes, and facts. In

this work, I try to take stock of these ontological innovations of the last hundred years or so.
The manuscript for my book was substantially finished several years ago. I mention this fact because it explains why I have not been able to do two things which I would like to do. Firstly, I would like to discuss in greater detail some of the important contributions to ontology which have recently been published. As it was, I could only insert brief references to the works of Armstrong, Butchvarov, Castañeda, Hochberg, and other philosophers. Secondly, I would now devote a separate chapter to negation, in order to emphasize that it is just as much a fundamental category of the world as, say, the category of property. I think that there are precisely eight categories (not counting existence), namely, individuals, properties, relations, classes, structures, quantifiers, facts, and negation. On second thought, negation really deserves, not just a chapter of its own, but, like existence, a whole separate part; for it is clear that, like existence and unlike the categories, it is not a property. I shall have to write another book called "Negation and Existence"!" (from the Preface).

6. ———. 1984. *Phenomenology and Existentialism: An Introduction*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

   Contents: Preface IX-X; Part I. The background. 1. Descartes: a new conception of the mind 1; 2. Brentano: the thesis of intentionality 29; 3. Kierkegaard: a different conception of man 68; Part Ii. Edmund Husserl: the problem of knowledge 77; 4. The distinction between particulars and universals 79; 5. Husserl's early views on numbers 89; 6. Husserl's distinction between essences and their existences 101; 7. Husserl's distinction between individuals and their aspects 115; 8. The phenomenological method 136; Pat III. Martin Heidegger: the meaning of being 147; 9. Heidegger's project 149, 10. Modes of being 163; 11. The nature of existence 178; Part IV: Jean-Paul Sartre: the question for freedom 199; 12. The structure of

the mind 201; 13. The origin of nothingness 226; 14. The pliancy of the past 251; Index 275-278.
"This book is based on lectures which I have given for the last ten years or so. This explains its style. Some other features, I think, require a little more explanation.
Different philosophers have quite different conceptions of what philosophy is all about. I am no exception, and my particular conception of philosophy has shaped my treatment of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. In brief, I believe that all important philosophers-whether they know it or not and
whether they admit it or not-deal with certain traditional problems. There is a, sometimes hidden, continuity to philosophy.
No matter how revolutionary a philosophical movement may at first appear to be, and Phenomenology and Existentialism certainly claimed to be revolutionary, a closer look reveals that the same old problems are merely discussed in a new way. I selected three such problems-the problem of knowledge, the problem of existence, and the problem of freedom-in order to provide some focus to the discussion, and because I believe that they were of major concern to Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, respectively.
But philosophical books are written, not only with a definite conception of philosophy in mind, but also from a particular point of philosophical view. My philosophical view is not easily described in contemporary terms. Although I was schooled in what is now called the 'analytic' tradition, I was also taught to appreciate Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Scotus, Descartes and Berkeley. I hope to show with this book that one so schooled can appreciate Heidegger and Sartre as well. It is surely silly to assume that only an Existentialist, say, can understand another Existentialist; as silly, I might add, as to believe that all Existentialists talk nonsense.
Finally, there is the fact that I argue, rather vehemently at times, for my own philosophical views. This will undoubtedly offend those who believe that an introductory text should present an unbiased picture. In defense of my

polemical style, I can only plead that I find it very difficult to develop the dialectic of a particular problem -- the arguments and counter-arguments, the choices and limits -- without taking a definite stand myself. I assure the reader that I sound much more dogmatic than I am.
And I invite him to develop the arguments further than I have done, refuting my contentions in the process. This is the very stuff of which philosophy is made.
It goes without saying that Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre have thought and written about things other than knowledge, existence and freedom. Just as it is obvious that there are other Phenomenologists and Existentialists. After all, this is merely an introduction to, not a survey of, Phenomenology and Existentialism. My main criticism of most of the introductions and anthologies in this field is that they contain bits and pieces from numerous sources from Dostojewski to Marcel, without ever following up on any one topic, with the result that the student cannot possibly appreciate the complexity of the issues, or be impressed by the manner in which philosophical problems grow out of each other." (from the Preface)

7. ———. 1990. *The Fourth Way: A Theory of Knowledge*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

   Reprinted with an Introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier: *Grossmann's Radical Empiricism* (pp. I-IV) in: *Reprint Philosophy: Modern Classics of Analytical Philosophy Series*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006.
   Contents: Preface VII-VIII; One: Knowledge of the External Wold: Perception 1; Two: Knowledge of Our Minds: Introspection 89; Thee: Mathematical Knowledge: Perception Again 127; Bibliography 299; Index 304-311.
   "In his commentary on *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* Vaihinger considers the four possible views which result if one combines the epistemological distinction between rationalism and empiricism with the ontological distinction between realism and idealism. He claims that until Kant, rationalism was always connected with realism, empiricism

always with idealism. But Kant discovered a new combination: The marriage of rationalism with idealism. And then Vaihinger mentions in parentheses that the fourth possible combination, empiricism with realism, has always been considered to be impossible (see H. Vaihinger, *Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* vol. I, p. 52). It is this "impossible" view which I shall defend. That is why I called this book "The Fourth Way."

Empiricism means different things to different people. I have in mind the view that our knowledge of the external world rests entirely on perception, and that knowledge of our own minds is solely based on introspection. I hold that there is no special faculty of the mind, no Platonic "contemplation," no Cartesian "understanding," no Husserlian "eidetic intuition," by means of which we know external objects. My version of empiricism may be called "radical," for it insists, not only that we know the familiar objects around us by perception, but also that we know numbers and other abstract entities by means of perception. I hold that the truths of arithmetic ultimately rest just as much on perception as the truths of physics.

It is in regard to this contention that my view differs most profoundly from other theories of knowledge. While many contemporary philosophers accept empiricism in regard to the "natural sciences," hardly anyone agrees with me that logic, set theory, and arithmetic are a matter of empirical knowledge. But empiricism cannot stand on one leg. An empiricism that claims exception for logic, set theory, and arithmetic is no empiricism at all. Arithmetic, in particular, is the touchstone for any serious attempt to defend empiricism. I shall therefore have to discuss arithmetic knowledge in great detail.

Realism, too, has many meanings. I mean the view that there are such perceptual objects as apples, that these things consist of smaller things like molecules, and that these in turn consist of even smaller objects like elementary particles (or of whatever else the physicist may discover). None of these things is mental. Nor do they depend for their existence or nature on there being minds. But my realism,

too, is of a radical sort, for I also hold that there are sets and numbers, and that these things as well do not depend for their existence or nature on minds. Just as an empiricism in regard to science alone can be no more than a paltry evasion of the rationalist's challenge, so realism only in regard to ordinary perceptual objects can be nothing but a worthless response to the idealist's taunt. The realist's work is only half done after he has refuted Berkeley. That an apple is not a collection of ideas is fairly obvious. "That number is entirely the creature of the mind," however, seems to be an unshakable conviction of even the most realistic philosophers.

But even if we rid ourselves of this idealistic bias, even if we accept numbers and sets as part of the furniture of the world, there remains the formidable task of placing these entities somewhere in the hierarchy of categories. Granted that numbers are nonmental, to what category do they belong'? Are they sets? Or are they perhaps properties of properties? This task, I believe, has been so futile up to now because the proper category for numbers was simply not a part of standard ontologies. Philosophers have for generations tried in vain to squeeze numbers into one of the familiar and traditional categories. Until very recently, there was very little to choose from: Numbers had to be either individual things or else properties of individual things. For an idealist, they could only be either intuitions or concepts. A third possibility finally appeared with the reluctant acceptance of the category of set. But this acceptance posed a new challenge: How to reconcile the existence of sets with empiricism.

Vaihinger, as I said, claims that Kant discovered a new combination: the compatibility of rationalism with idealism. I do not think highly either of Kant's rationalism or of his idealism. But Kant discovered -- and proudly insisted on -- one crucial truth: arithmetic is necessary and yet synthetic. With this discovery, he challenged all empiricists as well as all rationalists. Empiricists have to explain how arithmetic can possibly be necessary; rationalists, how it can possibly

be synthetic. This challenge, I believe, has not been met." (from the Preface)

8. ———. 1992. *The Existence of the World. An Introduction to Ontology*. New York: Routledge.

   Contents: I. The Discovery of the World: Timeless Being 1; II. The Battle Over the World: Universals 14; III. The Structure of the World: The Categories 46; IV. The Substratum of the World: Existence 91; V. The Enigma of the World: Negation 120: Bibliography 134; Index 137-139.
   " *The nature of classification*.
   Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the *categories* of the world? And what are the *laws* that govern these categories? In chemistry, for comparison, we search for the chemical elements and the laws of chemistry; in physics, for elementary particles and their laws. Categories are for ontology what these basic building blocks of the universe are for the natural sciences. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is vastly larger than that of any science. And its point of view is totally different from that of the sciences. To see how ontology differs from science, we must first of all understand the notion of a category. Our first question therefore is: what is a category?
   (...)
   The *principle* of the classification of the elements, however, is the same as at Empedocles's time: *Things are distinguished from each other by means of the properties which they have*. Let us call this 'the principle of classification'.
   (...)
   Someone must have realized that the foundation of all classifications of individual things, namely, the distinction between these things and their properties, is itself a classification. But it is a classification, not of *individual things* - individual amounts of water or earth, or individual bits of gold or iron, or individual whales or carps - but of *entities* in general. It is a classification of *any kind* of

existent. It divides up everything there is into two large groups of existents, namely, into individual things, on the one hand, and their properties, on the other. Every 'ordinary' classification rests on this most fundamental classification of things into individuals and their properties. In order to distinguish this classification from all others, we shall speak of a 'categorization'. *Entities,* we shall say, *are categorized*. The kinds of thing which the categorization distinguishes are then called 'categories'. We know that there are at least two categories, that is, two kinds of entity (existent), namely, *individual things* and *properties* of individual things." (pp. 1-3).
Translated in German as: *Die Existenz der Welt. Eine Einführung in die Ontologie*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004 and in Spanish as : *La Existencia del Mundo. Introduccion a la Ontologia*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2007.

9. ———. 2009. *Phenomenological Realism Versus Scientific Realism. Reinhardt Grossmann - David M. Armstrong Metaphysical Correspondence*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

   "We choose the title "Phenomenological Realism vs. Scientific Realism" because these two terms indicate what is common and what is different in their respective metaphysical positions. The realism common to them involves the ontological acknowledgement of concrete as well as of abstract entities such as universals and numbers which are taken as independent of mind. The attributes "phenomenological" and "scientific" which differentiate between Armstrong and Grossmann refer to the way they support their ontological realism. Armstrong uses evidences of the natural sciences, Grossmann evidences of perception and introspection. The epistemological differences explain part of the disputes between Armstrong and Grossmann, e.g., over the simplicity of universals.
   We have divided this work into four parts distributed in thirty two letters from 1976 until 1987, and three isolated commentaries on three works from 1984 until 1992. Thus, the structure of the book includes an important stretch of

the intellectual development of both philosophers from the preparation of their cardinal works, Armstrong with "Universals and Scientific Realism" (Cambridge University Press, 1978) and Grossmann with "The Categorial Structure of the World" (Indiana University Press, 1983), until the publication of Grossmann's "The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology" (Routledge, 1992) and Armstrong's "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility" (Cambridge University Press, 1989)." (from the Introduction, p. 9)

10. Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1977. *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    English translation and introduction (pp. VII-XXXIV) by Reinhardt Grossmann of: *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894).
    "Twardowski's little book - of which I here offer a translation - is one of the most remarkable works in the history of modern philosophy. It is concise, clear, and - in Findlay's words - "amazingly rich in ideas."(1)
    It is therefore a paradigm of what some contemporary philosophers approvingly call "analytic philosophy." But Twardowski's book is also of considerable historical significance. His views reflect Brentano's earlier position and thus shed some light on this stage of Brentano's philosophy. Furthermore, they form a link between this stage, on the one hand, and those two grandiose attempts to propagate rationalism in an age of science, on the other hand, which are known as Meinong's theory of entities and Husserl's phenomenology. Twardowski's views thus point to the future and introduce many of the problems which, through the influence of Meinong, Husserl. Russell, and Moore, have become standard fare in contemporary philosophy. In this introduction, I shall call attention to the close connection between some of Twardowski's main ideas and the corresponding thoughts of these four philosophers." (from the Introduction, p. 1)

(1) Findlay, John N., 1963, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 8

Translation

1. Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1977. *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

   English translation and introduction (pp. VII-XXXIV) by Reinhardt Grossmann of: *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894).
   "Twardowski's little book - of which I here offer a translation - is one of the most remarkable works in the history of modern philosophy. It is concise, clear, and - in Findlay's words - "amazingly rich in ideas."(1)
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   (1) Findlay, John N., 1963, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 8

A Selection of Papers

1. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1960. "Acts and Relations in Brentano." *Analysis* no. 21:1-5.

2. ———. 1960. "Conceptualism." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 14:243-254.

   Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 40-49.
   "There can be no doubt that one is acquainted in perception with red things rather than redness alone. Nor can there be any doubt that one can name things with which one is acquainted. Each of these two facts forms the commonsensical background for an ontological criterion. According to the first criterion, what exists is what can be presented in perception independently of other things. Call this the *independence-criterion*.(1) According to the second, what exists is what can be named. Call this the *naming-criterion*. (p. 40 of the reprint)
   (...)
   Let us ask, finally, what, if anything, the conceptualist has committed himself to with regard to the "existence" of concepts. It seems that he still has a number of alternatives.
   First. The conceptualist could adopt the naming-criterion. Since concepts are named, they would then be said to exist along with the referents of "this" and "that."
   Second. He could reject the naming-criterion and instead accept the independence-criterion. From the fact that concepts are named, it would then not follow that they exist. But notice that the independence-criterion was originally tailored to perception alone, not to thought. This shows that there is a third possibility.
   Third. The conceptualist could introduce a new criterion of existence which replaces the old independence-criterion for perception. According to this new criterion, *what exists is what can be presented either in perception or in thought independently of other things*. To grasp that this is a real alternative, consider that according to many philosophers, although one cannot perceive red (or redness) in isolation, one can so think (of) it. If this be true, then upon the new criterion, concepts exist -- not because they are named, but because they can be thought (of) independently.

In the history of philosophy, conceptualism is closely linked with nominalism. More often than not, conceptualists held that concepts subsist rather than exist. Nor is this surprising. Remember the so-called localization-criterion: what exists is what is localized in space and time. This criterion and the conceptualist doctrine that one can in perception be presented only with a particular *this* are just two sides of the same coin. More precisely, the things that are localized upon the one criterion are often held to be exactly those with which one can be presented upon the other. (Time and space have been called " *Formen der Anschauung*.") This makes it plausible, to say the least, that the conceptualist, however unwittingly, may also be guided by the localization-criterion. If so, he will deny that concepts exist.

Comparing all three, realist, nominalist, and conceptualist, we note these similarities. All three admit that there are two ontological modes, namely, existents and subsistents. All three are forced to make this distinction because they accept one of several criteria, naming, independence, or localization, as the most significant criterion of existence. The conceptualist, however, stands with the nominalist when it comes to separating existents from subsistents. To one who explicates different ontological uses of "exist" rather than adopting one himself, this is of little consequence. The deepest issue, I submit, is not whether universals are called "properties," or "concepts"; whether, perhaps, they are "parts" of something else; or whether, finally, they should be said to exist rather than merely being called subsistents. What then is this deepest issue? To state it, I avail myself of a metaphor I used a while ago. According to the conceptualist we have,.as it were, two eyes; the eye of perception and the eye of the mind. With the latter we "see" the universal. This fundamental dualism both realist and nominalist reject." (pp. 48-49 of the reprint).

(1) For an excellent analysis of the independence-criterion and its importance for the realism- nominalism issue see Edwin B. Allaire, "Existence, Independence, and

Universals," The Philosophical Review, 69,1960, 485-496 and also pp. 3-53 of this book.

3. ———. 1961. "Frege's Ontology." *Philosophical Review* no. 70:23-40.

   Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 106-120; reprinted also in: D. E. Klemke (ed.), *Essays on Frege*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1974, pp. 79-98.
   "Frege's system has two rather puzzling parts: (1) he insists on the sense-denotation distinction for names but makes no such distinction for concept words; (2) he describes concepts and concept words as being unsaturated. (1) raises the problem whether concept words either denote or express concepts. This problem has been discussed by W. Marshall Dummett.(a) (2) raises a number of different problems, for it led Frege to introduce so-called value ranges and concept correlates. These problems have been discussed by Peter Geach, R. S. Wells, and Gustav Bergmann.(b) Since both kinds of problems arise from Frege's notion of concept, it is plausible, as Bergmann tries to show, that they have their roots in a hidden nominalism. E. D. Klemke, however, has recently argued against Bergmann that Frege was clearly not a nominalist.(c)
   In this paper I shall first suggest the structural reasons for Frege's insistence on (1) and (2). Then I shall make some comments about the issue whether or not Frege was a nominalist. But of course a complete discussion of Frege's philosophy must not be expected in this paper."
   (a) W. Marshall, "Frege's Theory of Functions and Objects," *Philosophical Review*, LXII (1953), 374-390; and M. Dummett, "Frege on Functions, a Reply," ibid., LXIV (1955), 96-107.
   (b) P. T. Geach, "Class and Concept," Philosophical Review, LXIV (1955), 561-570; R. S. Wells, "Frege's Ontology," Review of Metaphysics, IV (1951), 537-573; and G. Bergmann, "Frege's Hidden Nominalism," Philosophical

Review, LXVII (1958), 437-459 (reprinted in Bergmann's Meaning and Existence, Madison, Wis., 1960).
(c) E.D. Klemke, "Professor Bergmann and Frege's 'Hidden Nominalism'," *Philosophical Review*, LXVIII (1959), 507-514.

4. ———. 1962. "Brentano's Ontology: A Reply to Mr. Kamitz." *Analysis* no. 23:20-24.

   Reply to Reinhard Kamitz, *A reply to Professor Grossman's "Acts and Relations in Brentano"*, Analysis, 22, 1962, pp. 73-78; followed by: R. Kamitz, *Acts and Relations in Brentano: A Second Reply to Professor Grossmann*, Analysis, 23, 1963, pp. 36-41.

5. ———. 1962. "Sensory Intuition and the Dogma of Localization." *Inquiry* no. 5:238-251.

   Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 50-63.
   "Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism.(1) At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time.(2) In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis. (p. 50 of the reprint).
   (...)
   To sum up. The problem of predication forces the conceptualist to part with the dogma of isolation and the dogma of localization. It forces him to admit that there is at least one way in which one is acquainted with things in connection rather than in isolation. And it forces him also to admit that there is at least one way in which one is acquainted with the localized together with the unlocalized. Being aware of these consequences, the conceptualist could retreat to a simplified form of conceptualism." (p. 61 of the reprint).

(1) I have discussed the ontological ramifications and possibilities of conceptualism elsewhere. See "Conceptualism," The Review of Metaphysics, 14,1960,243-54 and also pp. 40-49 of this book.
(2) I shall distinguish between sensory intuition and presentation as two distinct ways in which one might be acquainted with particular things and universals, respectively.

6. ———. 1963. "Particulars and Time." In *Essays in Ontology*, edited by Allaire, Edwin B., 30-39. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

   "Some philosophers agree that there is a connection between particularity and time: Particulars are in time; universals are not. However, they disagree among themselves about the precise nature of this connection. I wish to discuss some of the problems which give rise to their disagreement.
   Perceptual objects are *continuants*. Phenomenal objects, e.g. sensa, mental acts, and the like, are *momentary* entities. A certain perceptual object A, being a continuant, may change its color from green to red and hence be green at one time and not green at another. Obviously, this situation cannot be described by the sentence 'A is green and A is not green.' The only satisfactory description introduces time in the form of moments: 'A is green at t1 and A is not green at t2'.(1) If one starts the philosophical analysis with continuants, one must introduce moments in order to describe a changing thing. Put differently, a philosopher who starts out with continuants, commits himself to *absolute time*. But time is *relational*. It follows that one must start not with perceptual objects (continuants), but rather with phenomenal objects, that is, with momentary things.(2)
   This argument for phenomenalism is not sound. The ontological analysis of *things* shows quite conclusively and on its own ground that (logically) proper names must name *particulars*, rather than things,(3) According to this

analysis, a perceptual object A, say, a colored disk, consists of a particular a which exemplifies certain universals. The same holds for a so-called phenomenal object, say, a colored spot in a visual field. What we ordinarily call a (perceptual or phenomenal) thing, turns out to be a complex entity, only part of which is named by the proper name 'a'. Irregardless, therefore, of whether or not perceptual and phenomenal objects are continuants, philosophical analysis starts with neither. The argument could therefore not possibly establish that it must start with phenomenal rather than perceptual objects.4 Our criticism shows, though, that we need not consider the distinction between perceptual and phenomenal objects, in order to discuss the connection between particulars and time.

But even though it fails, the argument contains a very important point. It seems to prove conclusively that particulars must be momentary entities, if time is relational rather than absolute. To be momentary means in this connection to be changeless. Hence there is a connection between particularity and *change*: If time is relational, then particulars must be changeless. Yet, a perceptual or phenomenal object may change, even though it consists of nothing else but a particular which exemplifies certain universals. We confront here an apparent inconsistency which ontological analysis must resolve."

(1) Of course, time may be introduced through tenses. But this creates ontological problems of a different sort.

(2) Compare, for example, G. Bergmann: *Meaning and Existence* (Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1960), pp. 182-188 and pp. 230-239.

(3) Compare Essays II [*Bare Particulars* by Edwin B. Allaire] and V [*Conceptualism* by R. Grossmann] of this book.

7. ———. 1963. "Common Names." In *Essays in Ontology*, edited by Allaire, Edwin B., 64-75. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

"The doctrine of common names has a long history. It always finds proponents who think that it is a way out of the classical nominalistic difficulties. I wish to show that this doctrine does not even make sense when considered apart from the nominalism which it supposedly vindicates, and that it could be of no help to the nominalist, even if it made sense. (p. 64)
(...)
To sum up. Even if the common name doctrine were acceptable, it could be of no help to a nominalist. For, even if he could explain what it means for a word to name commonly, he cannot explain what there is in or about individual things that collects them under one common name. It is indeed one of the most curious facts in the history of philosophy that a certain type of nominalism should derive from the doctrine of common names. Perhaps the only explanation is that the spurious doctrine of particularized essences and the spurious doctrine of common names tended to reinforce each other." (pp. 74-75).

8. ———. 1969. "Non-Existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 6:17-32.

9. ———. 1972. "Russell's Paradox and Complex Predicates." *Noûs* no. 6:153-164.

10. ———. 1974. "Bergmann's Ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance." In *The Ontological Turn. Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann*, edited by Graham, Moltke S. and Klemke, Elmer D., 89-113. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

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Bibliography: Works by Gustav Bergmann 301; Index 311-314.

11. ———. 1974. "Meinong's Doctrine of the "Aussersein" of the Pure Object." *Noûs* no. 8:67-82.

    "Meinong's doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object consists, in my view, of the following four main theses: (1) Nonexistent entities, like the golden mountain and the round square, have no form of being whatsoever. (2) Such entities are, nevertheless, constituents of certain states of affairs. (3) They even have a number of quite ordinary properties-the golden mountain, for example, is golden. (4) Being is not a part of any object. I shall try to explain and evaluate these four theses, and I shall claim that only the first one is true. However, even if my arguments fail to convince, they may at least show that Meinong's doctrine is neither too obscure to be understood nor too wrongheaded to be enlightening."

12. ———. 1975. "Definite Descriptions." *Philosophical Studies* no. 27:127-144.

13. ———. 1975. "Perceptual Objects, Elementary Particles, and Emergent Properties." In *Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Critical Studies in Honour of Wilfrid Sellars*, edited by Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 129-146. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

14. ———. 1976. "The Factuality of Facts." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 2:85-103.

15. ———. 1976. "Structures, Functions and Forms." In *Studien Zu Frege Ii. Logik Und Sprachphilosophie / Studies on Frege Ii. Logic and Philosophy of Language*, edited by Schirn, Matthias, 11-32. Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog.

    Contents of the volume: 14. Reinhardt Grossmann. Structures, functions and forms 11; 15. Wolfgang Carl. Freges Unterscheidung von Gegenstand und Begriff 33; 16. Eike-Henner W. Kluge. Freges Begriff des Logischeinfachen 51; 17. Gottfried Gabriel. Einige Eiseitigkeiten des Fregeschen Logiksbegriffs 67; 18. Hans-Ulrich Hoche. Vom 'Inhaltsstrich' zum 'Waagerechten'. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Fregeschen Uteilslehre 87;19. Leslie Stevenson. Frege zwei Definitionen der Quantifikation 103; 20. Robert Sternfeld. The mathematization of logic: quantified sentences 125; 21. Ignacio Angelellli. Friends and opponents of the substitutivity of Identical in the history of logic 141; 22. Charles E. Caton. 'The idea of sameness challenges reflection' 167; 23. Matthias Schirn. Identität und Identitätsaussage bei Frege 181; 24. Bertram Kienzle. Notiz zu Freges Theorien der Identität 217; 25. David Wiggins. Frege's problem of the Morning Star and the Evening Star 221; 26. Ronald Suter. Frege und Russell über das 'Paradox der Identität' 257; 27. Haig Khatchadourian. Kripke and Frege on identity statements 271; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 299; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 301.

16. ———. 1984. "Non-Existent Objects Vs. Definite Descriptions." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 62:363-377.

    "Some years ago, I published an article about Meinong's theory of objects. (1) I listed there four main theses of Meinong's view:
    (1) The golden mountain (and other nonexistents) has no being at all.
    (2) Nevertheless, it is a constituent of the fact that the golden mountain does not exist.
    (3) Furthermore, it has such ordinary properties as being made from gold.

(4) Existence is not a constituent of any object.
And I argued in that paper that only thesis (1) is true. In particular, I insisted that (3), which I consider to be the most characteristic feature of Meinong's view, is false. Since then, there have been quite a few discussions of Meinong's view. I would like, in response to some of these works, to reiterate my earlier criticism of Meinong. My purpose is threefold. Firstly, I would like to state once more my own view, which is a version of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, as clearly as possible. Secondly, I shall defend my past contention that the golden mountain is not golden against some recent objections. And thirdly and most importantly, I want to describe the dialectic of the philosophical problem as I perceive it. It seems to me to be an exasperating shortcoming of the discussion that most participants do not clearly state the basic options and their reasons for preferring some to others."
(1) 'Meinong's Doctrine of the *Aussersein of* the Pure Object', *Noüs,* 8 (1974, pp. 67-81. See also my *Meinong* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974).

17. ———. 1995. "Frege's Fundamental Philosophical Mistakes." In *Logik Und Mathematik. Frege-Kolloquium Jena 1993*, edited by Ingolf, Max and Stelzner, Werner, 226-231. Berlin: de Gruyter.

    "It is one of the most surprising features of Frege's philosophy that he, who correctly analyzed the structures of quantified states of affairs, insisted on treating definite description expressions ('the birthplace of Mozart') like names ('Salzburg') and names like definite description expressions.' I shall argue that Frege's original mistake leads to a string of further mistakes. It leads him to hold that names, like definite description expressions, have both a sense and a reference and, eventually, to the view that sentences name truth-values. In short, it results in his much admired sense-reference theory of meaning." (p. 226).

18. ———. 1995. "Thoughts, Objectives and States of Affairs." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 49:163-169.

"The notion of state of affairs was introduced as the complexly signifiable in the Late Scholasticism and rediscovered by Logicians like Bolzano and Frege. While Bolzano and Frege were primarily interested in the nature of objective truths students of Brentano, among others Meinong, Twardowski and Husserl, developed similar concepts starting out with an interest in the nature of mental acts and judgement. Both Frege's and Meinong's conceptions face similar problems concerning complex referents which are diagnosed to stem from confusions of complexes of properties with complex properties."

19. ———. 1996. "Logic and Ontology." In *Logica '95. Proceedings of the 9th Symposium*, edited by Childers, Timothy, Kolåi, Petr and Svoboda, Vladimir, 77-83. Prague: Filosofia.

20. ———. 1998. "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Non-Existent States of Affairs." In *The Logica Yearbook 1997*, 139-146. Prague: Filosofia.

Reprinted in *Acta Analytica*, 23, 1998, pp. 139/146.

21. ———. 2000. "Reid, Meinong and the Argument from Physics." *Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics* no. 1:69-82.

22. ———. 2001. "Meinong's Main Mistake." In *The School of Alexius Meinong*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Jacquette, Dale and Poli, Roberto, 477-488. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Seldom has a modern philosopher become as famous for a view which he does not hold as Alexius Meinong. One generally attributes to him the belief that there are, not just such ordinary things as mountains and relations, but even such things as the golden mountain and the round square. He is therefore often viewed as a spendthrift ontologist who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and

needlessly. But this conception, I shall try to show, is mistaken. Anyone who has studied Meinong's philosophy carefully will come to the conclusion that he is not the 'supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy' as Gilbert Ryle claims.(1)
But even though Meinong never embraced the rather extreme view that there are, in addition to existing things in space and time and subsisting things (ideal things) outside of space and time, also such things as the golden mountain, and even such contradictory things as the round square, he nevertheless insisted on another ontological principle not any less mistaken than what I just called the 'extreme' view. It is this insistence, and not his ontological inventory, which I consider to be Meinong's main mistake. I shall, therefore, first defend Meinong against the kind of accusation implied in Ryle's description of Meinong. And then I shall, secondly, show where Meinong really went wrong in his ontology." (p. 477)
(1) See Ryle's article in the *Oxford Magazine* 26 October 1933.

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1. Armstrong, David Malet. 1984. "Reinhardt Grossmann's Ontology." *Critical Philosophy*:63-76.

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2. Butchvarov, Panayot. 1987. "Review of *the Categorial Structure of the World* by R. Grossmann." *International Studies in Philosophy* no. 19:81-82.

3. Cumpa, Javier, ed. 2009. *Studies in the Ontology of Reinhardt Grossmann*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

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   11. Peter Simons: Why Categories Matter: Grossmann and Beyond 191; 12. Erwin Tegtmeier: Three Ontologies of the Iowa School: Categories and Composition 211; 13. Fred Wilson: Some Reflections on Grossmann on the Entity Existence 229; APPENDIXES. Appendix I: An Unpublished Manuscript on Philosophy of Mind (1993): Reinhardt Grossmann: Materialism and the New Folk Philosophy 269; Appendix II: A List of the Published Works of R. Grossmann 284; Appendix III: A Bibliography on R. Grossmann's Philosophy 288; Bibliography 291-297.

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The Ontological Realism of Panayot Butchvarov

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1. Butchvarov, Panayot. 1966. *Resemblance and Identity. An Examination of the Problem of Universals*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

   Contents: Preface IX-XIV; Introduction 3; 1. The nominalist theory 16, 2. The identity and the resemblance theories 56; 3. The relation of resemblance 101; 4. Generic identity 135; Conclusion 173; Bibliography 199; Index 205.
   "The first task of this essay, therefore, is the development of a distinctive and philosophically useful notion of universal, and of a corresponding statement of the problem of universals as a separate philosophical issue. Its second task is the solution of the so-stated problem of universals. Roughly, I shall identify the notion of universal with that of universal quality, in a very wide sense of the word "quality" to be explained in section 1. And I shall offer an explanation of the notion of universal quality that does not depend on the employment of the technical philosophical terms "universal," "particular," or "abstract." I shall identify the problem of universals with the question whether there are universal qualities, i.e., whether the qualities of individual things are universal or particular, or, as I shall actually state it without the use of the terms "universal" and "particular,"

whether certain qualities of individual things should be described as being one and the same quality or distinct qualities related by a relation of resemblance. Other questions concerning universals, I believe, are either consequences or under modifications of this primary problem, or else independent philosophical issues having no special relation to the puzzles concerning universals. That this is so will become evident, I hope, in the course of our inquiry, especially in sections 1, 2, 5, 13, 17, and 18. But I shall not engage in the historical and exegetic investigations necessary for an actual proof of this claim. My statement of the problem of universals, in particular the identification of the notion of universal with that of universal quality, accords well with important traditional conceptions, such as "the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing" (Aristotle), and "the universal is that which is in many and of many" (Albert the Great). But does it not fail to take account of the second part of the equally important traditional question "whether genera and species really exist or are bare notions only; and if they exist whether they are corporeal things, or incorporeal and rather separated, or whether they exist in things perceived by the senses and in relation to them," (Porphyry)? For it seems to exclude from consideration one of the major theories of universals: that "genera and species exist not in sensibles but in separation from sensibles," and that universals may exist even if they have no instances. Now if this theory amounts to the claim that qualities, whether particular or universal, need not be qualities of individual things, that the notions of genus and species can be explained independently of those of instantiation or participation, then indeed we need not consider it, since, in virtue of the very notions of quality, genus, and species, it is obviously false. But the theory need not be interpreted so crudely as to become obviously false. It can be interpreted as claiming that there is an enormous, categorial difference between individual things and universal qualities and that because of this difference the senses in which universal qualities can be said to exist and

to be in space and time, and the senses in which individual things can be said to exist and to be in space and time are so different that one can assert the existence of a quality on the ground that it can have instances, even if in fact it has not. I shall consider this claim at the end of the book. But the logically prior questions are, "What is a universal quality?" and "Are there universal qualities?" It is mainly to these questions that I shall address myself in this essay. In many ways the problem of universals is the paradigm of a philosophical problem. It bears virtually no resemblance to any issue of experimental science. It is supremely general, in the sense that it concerns a certain fact about all qualities, in any actual or possible world, in complete abstraction from circumstances and contexts. And it is neither overtly nor disguisedly a problem about philosophy, one which is of interest to philosophers only because of their self-consciousness about the status and possibility of their discipline. Perhaps this is why writers on the problem of universals are especially tempted to connect their inquiries with considerations about philosophical method. I have succumbed to this temptation, mainly in Chapter Three. In content, if not in style, this essay is intended to be metaphysical. Part of its purpose is to demonstrate, in the context of a specific philosophical topic, that at least one branch of philosophy is a legitimate cognitive discipline that has as its subject matter, not certain features of language or of mathematics, but the essential and most general characteristics of the world."

2. ———. 1970. *The Concept of Knowledge*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

   Contents: Part One: Primary knowledge 3; Part Two: The objects of a priori knowledge 99; Part Three: Primary Perceptual knowledge 185; Part Four: Derivative knowledge 267; Index 321-325.
   "Part One of this book attempts an account of the general concept of knowledge, especially as it is employed in what I shall call primary epistemic judgments, that is, judgments of

the form "A knows that p" which would not typically be in need of justification by appeal to other epistemic judgments. (Epistemic judgments that are in need of such justification I shall call derivative, and I shall make a corresponding distinction between primary and derivative knowledge.) We shall find that this account leads to, indeed demands and at the same time illuminates, the division of all knowledge into a priori and a posteriori. But unless then a detailed elucidation of this division is provided, the general account of the concept of knowledge would remain skeletal. There are two questions in particular that such an elucidation must answer. First, what are the objects of a priori knowledge? Second, what is the nature of primary a posteriori knowledge? Our account of the concept of knowledge, like most such accounts, requires that the object of knowledge be a certain truth or fact. But what, if anything, could be an a priori (or necessary) truth or fact? Our account, again in common with most, requires the distinction between primary and derivative knowledge. But can this distinction be made good with respect to our sense-perceptual knowledge of the "external" world of bodies, which is the paradigm and most extensive segment of a posteriori knowledge? That the answers to these questions are not at all settled should be obvious. Yet, unless it includes such answers, an account of the general concept of knowledge cannot be accepted as satisfactory. Part Two of this book will attempt to provide an answer to the first question, and Part Three an answer to the second.

The consideration of a posteriori knowledge in Part Three raises with particular urgency the question of the possibility and nature of derivative knowledge. This is not surprising. That question concerns chiefly derivative a posteriori knowledge, the nature of derivative a priori knowledge being largely the concern of formal logic and its possibility generally unquestioned. The crucial issue regarding derivative a posteriori knowledge is the legitimacy of nondemonstrative inference. In Part Four we return to our inquiry into the general concept of knowledge, but this time with special attention to the issue of nondemonstrative

inference and to the nature of derivative knowledge in general, and provide further reasons in support of the chief thesis of Part One.
I shall not, however, discuss the usual philosophical problems about the validity of certain particular kinds of derivative knowledge (e.g., of the future, of bodies, of other minds). Each of these requires careful, detailed treatment in its own right; nothing is gained by sweeping proclamations or refutations of skepticism. And since these problems constitute the familiar subject matter of the theory of knowledge, I offer here only an introduction to that branch of philosophy and not a theory of knowledge as such. Indeed, as is well known, the sort of theory of knowledge one proposes, and most of its tenets, are largely determined by the account one offers of the fundamental epistemic concepts. It is important, however, that such an account be given first and that it be uninfluenced by one's epistemological convictions. For, true or false, these convictions have philosophical value only insofar as they are justified, and their justification cannot be attempted without an account of the key concepts involved. Thus the reader may come to think that our inquiry leads to skepticism. In this, as I shall explain, he would be mistaken. But even if he were not, I would regard such a consequence as acceptable, as long as the rejection of skepticism is not itself grounded in investigations such as ours. Our respect for common sense must not be confused with the possession of a philosophical answer to skepticism. In philosophy, as in any other purely theoretical discipline, it is better to be wrong as the result of inquiry and argument than to be right as the result of mere conviction. The layman who takes the existence of an external world for granted may be right, and the philosophical skeptic whose inquiries lead him to deny the existence of an external world may be wrong. But the skeptic is the philosopher, and the layman is not." pp. 4-5

3. ———. 1979. *Being Qua Being. A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. The apparent distinctness of Identicals 9; 2. Objects and entities 39; 3. Indiscernibility 64; 4. Existence 82; 5. essence 122; 6. Substances 154; 7. qualities 184; 8. Accidental connections 212; Appendix A. Relations 239; Appendix B. Idealism 248; Notes 256; Index 267.

"The inquiry into being qua being has been identified with metaphysics. But it would be better to use the term "metaphysics" more broadly, namely, for the branch of philosophy that has as its subject matter the nature of the world, or of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge, or of our language, or of our sciences about the world. We may then distinguish several levels of metaphysical inquiry. On the least fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the most general description of the actual world, with the most general kinds of things there are and with the way they fit together. It asks such questions as whether God exists, whether there are both minds and bodies or only minds or only bodies, and if there are both minds and bodies, how they are related. On this level it is closely connected with epistemology, since the main philosophical difficulties such questions pose for us are epistemological in character.

On a more fundamental level, presupposed by the first, metaphysics inquires into the nature of all possible, or at least all conceivable, comprehensible worlds, and thus only indirectly into the nature of the actual world. Can there be a world that consists only of individuals and not also of properties and relations? Or a world that consists only of properties and relations? Can there be nonidentical but indiscernible things? Questions related to those on the previous level can now be asked in complete independence from the usual epistemological considerations. Can there be a world unless there is God? Can there be a world without bodies? Without minds? On this level metaphysics is closely connected with logic. (Immediately following his introduction of the notion of a science of being qua being Aristotle offers a defense of the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle.) But this connection is no more

limited to formal logic than the notion of necessary truth is limited to the truths of forma logic. The criterion of possibility on which it would rely can hardly be mere forma consistency; it must be conceivability or comprehensibility (not of propositions, but of what propositions purport to describe), for, whether we like it or not, we have no other general and ultimate criterion of possibility.

This is why, on this level, metaphysics is also connected with phenomenology, i.e., with the philosophical description of the most genera character of the objects of consciousness qua objects of consciousness.

On the third and most fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the concepts and principles on the basis of which the questions belonging to the other two levels, i.e., the questions about what things there are or at least there can be, must be answered. Instead of there questions, it asks, what is it for something to be in a world, or for something to be a world? It is on this level, I suggest, that metaphysics is best described as the inquiry into being qua being, or, we might also say, as protometaphysics. Any conception of a world presupposes the conception of what it is for something to exist in that world. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be the subject of predication, both accidental and essential. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be identifiable, not in the sense of being merely singled out but also in the sense of being singled out again or in a different way, of being recognized, of being the subject of a true informative identity judgment.

It follows that the concepts of existence, identity, essential predication, and accidental predication cannot be understood as standing for constituents of the world, presumably for certain properties or relations. They are the concepts in terms of which we must understand what it is for something to be in the world, what it is for something to have a property or be related to another thing, and what it is for something to be a property or a relation. Yet they apply to any possible world; indeed nothing would be a world were it not for their applicability to it. We may call such

concepts, which apply without standing for anything, transcendental. The inquiry into being qua being, or protometaphysics, may then be called a transcendental inquiry.
Now the central thesis of this book is that the concepts of existence, identity, accidental predication, and essential predication are intimately related, and moreover that the concept of identity is basic and the other three are to be understood in terms of it. I shall argue that the four puzzles with which we began admit of a common solution, the key to which is to be found in a careful study of the second puzzle, that regarding identity. It is a solution based on a distinction between what I shall call objects and entities. A similar, but not the same, distinction has often been made, most notably by Meinong but also by recent possible-worlds semanticists, in treatments of the first puzzle, that regarding existence. But there it rests on the proposition that there are things of which it is true that there are no such things, a proposition that, I suggest, cannot be made coherent, let alone plausible, except on the basis of considerations external to the topic of existence. A similar, but again not the same, distinction has also been made, e.g., by Carnap and Sellars, in treatments of an aspect of the second puzzle, namely, the seeming failure of the principle of the Indiscernibility of identicals in intentional and modal contexts; I have in mind the distinction between individuals and individual concepts. But if an individual concept is indeed a concept, or at all like a concept, then it is not the object of the propositional attitude, or the subject of the modal property, with respect to which the principle seems to fail, and therefore its relevance is obscure. If it is not really a concept, then how does it differ from the individual with which it is associated? Again, I believe that these questions can be answered only on the basis of considerations both far more general and much deeper than the seeming discernibility of identicals in intentional and modal contexts." pp. 3-5 (notes omitted).

4. ———. 1998. *Skepticism About the External World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Introduction 3; 1. Direct realism 12; 2. The Adverbial theory 35; 3. The skeptic's argument 56; 4. A first answer to the skeptic 89; 5. Our concept of reality 111; 6. The untruth and the truth of skepticism 133; Notes 159; Index 179.

"We are now ready to attempt another answer to the skeptic, one based on the preceding considerations regarding the concept of reality. Can what I have called the particular (nonmodal epistemic) question, namely, Do we know or at least have evidence, in some particular perceptual situation, that what we perceive is a real material object? be given a nonskeptical answer, just as in chapter 4 I gave a non skeptical answer to the general (non-modal epistemic) question, namely, Do we know or at least have evidence that material objects exist? If it can, then we would also have a second nonskeptical answer to the general question, since a nonskeptical answer to the particular question entails a nonskeptical answer to the general question, though not vice versa. Thus my argument in chapter 4 in favor of the latter would receive welcome supplementation. But, as we shall see, we would still need that argument at a crucial point in our search in this chapter for a complete nonskeptical answer to the particular question. The fact is that both answers are needed. There is no circularity here, since the argument in chapter 4 is independent of the argument to be offered in this chapter, It's just that the converse is not quite the case.

Clearly. the question whether a certain perceptual object exists, is real, cannot be answered unless an account of the concept of existence, reality, is offered, even though this fact has been generally ignored by recent Anglo-American philosophers of perception (in striking contrast with continental philosophers). I have already said why Russell's account in terms of the satisfaction of a propositional function is unacceptable; it presupposes a more fundamental concept of existence, which would allow us to decide what to count as admissible arguments of the function and what not to so count. And the familiar proposal that the reality of an object consists in its fitting in the

spatiotemporal causal system of the world is conceptually circular; it presupposes the concept of reality, for of course the system in question must be a system of real objects, and the causal relations in it must also be real, rather than imaginary, if the "fitting in" is to be even relevant. For similar reasons. also conceptually circular is the Kantian-phenomenalist account, as I argued in chapter 5.
The failures of those accounts should not be surprising if the existence, the reality, of an object cannot be thought of as one of its properties, relational or nonrelational. It certainly is not observable, and we would he indulging in mere fantasy if we suppose that it is somehow hidden in or behind the object that exists. I have argued that we should think of existence as the indefinite identifiability of the object to which it is attributed, in the sense that there is an indefinite number of objects with each of which it is identical. But their identity is not something in reality. Rather it is imposed on them by our decisions to apply the concept of identity, The same can be said about the concept of existence, reality, since it is to be understood in terms of the concept of identity. Both are transcendental concepts." pp. 133-134

Essays

1. ———. 1974. "The Limits of Ontological Analysis." In *The Ontological Turn. Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann*, edited by Gram, Moltke and Klemke, Elmer, 3-37. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

2. ———. 1977. "Identity." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 2:70-89.

   "A novel account is offered of the nature of informative identity statements. Special attention is accorded to the intimate connection between the concept of identity and the concept of existence, and to their fundamental role in any intelligible conceptual framework."
   Reprinted in: Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - *Contemporary perspectives in*

the philosophy of language - Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1979

3. ———. 1981. "The Ontology of Philosophical Analysis." *Noûs* no. 15:3-14.

   "The most striking fact about recent analytic philosophy has been its return to metaphysics. But it is characteristic of most recent analytic ontologies that they do not face the ontological issues directly, but rather consist in the search for definitions that would capture ordinary usage or in paraphrasing ordinary statements supposed to be ontologically problematic. Gustav Bergmann, whose recent work is reviewed here, is an exception. His recent ontology constitutes a genuine and unabashed turn to the things themselves. However, it involves excesses which seem due to insufficient attention to the peculiarities of the ontologically crucial concept of identity."

4. ———. 1986. "Our Robust Sense of Reality." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:403-421.

   "Anti-Meinongian philosophers, such as Russell, do not explain what they mean by existence when they deny that there are nonexistent objects - they just sense robustly. I argue that any plausible explanation of what they mean tends to undermine their view and to support the Meinongian view. But why are they so strongly convinced that they are right? I argue that the reason is to be found in the special character of the concept of existence, which has been insufficiently examined by anti-Meinongian as well as by Meinongian philosophers."

5. ———. 1988. "Russell's Views on Reality." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 32:165-167.

   "Russell's account of existence as satisfaction of a propositional function presupposes a more fundamental notion of existence, which we would employ in deciding what to allow as arguments satisfying a function, a notion he never elucidates. Jan Dejnožka has distinguished three ways

Russell used the term "exists," one being the phenomenalist's, in which it refers to correlations of sense-data. I argue that this phenomenalist notion cannot be the one Russell needs, since he explicitly held that existence be understood broadly, so that, e.g., the nonexistence of God would not follow by definition."

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Bertrand Russell's Ontological Development

[Theory and History of Ontology]

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The Conceptual Realism of Nino Cocchiarella

INTRODUCTION

I wish to thank Professor Cocchiarella for helping me to complete this bibliography.

"Research Profile: Cocchiarella proved the first completeness theorems in tense logic and second-order modal logic. He was the first to develop several second-order logics with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms and then to use those systems in a consistent logical reconstruction of both Frege's and Russell's early logics and in the application of those reconstructions to the semantic analysis of natural language. This work also led to Cocchiarella's development of formal theories of predication and comparative formal ontology, including especially logical reconstructions of nominalism, conceptualism, logical realism, and the logic of natural kinds. Cocchiarella also showed how logical atomism is compatible with logical necessity as a modality, and that it is the only ontology in which logical necessity, as opposed to other kinds of modalities, makes sense. Cocchiarella's own preferred ontological framework is conceptual realism, which he has been formally developing for many years, and which contains a logic of both actualism and possibilism in terms of a distinction between concepts that entail concrete existence and those that do not. It also contains a logic of classes as many as plural objects, which is the basis of Cocchiarella's semantics for plurals and mass nouns in natural language, and in

which the Leonard-Goodman calculus of individuals (and therefore Leśniewski's mereology as well) is reducible. Cocchiarella has also shown that Leśniewski's ontology, which is also called a logic of names, is reducible to his theory of reference in conceptual realism, and that the medieval supposition theories of Ockham, Buridan, and other medieval logicians can be logically reconstructed in terms of this theory of reference. Cocchiarella is currently continuing his work on different subsystems of conceptual realism, including in particular a logic of events as truth-makers.

Teaching: Cocchiarella has taught introductory, intermediate, and advanced courses in logic, semantics, set theory and Montague Grammar, as well as seminars on some of the most recent areas of research in logic. He has placed an emphasis in his teaching on the logical analysis of natural language and the ontological interpretations of both scientific and mathematical language.

Vision Statement: Cocchiarella sees logic as a powerful tool for the analysis of our scientific theories and the structures that underlie natural language and our commonsense understanding of the world. The study of logical categories in particular provides an important way to study the semantic and ontological categories underlying our scientific and commonsense world views." (pp. 52-53)

From: Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods (eds.), *The International Directory of Logicians. Who's Who in Logic*, London: College Publications 2009.

FORMAL ONTOLOGY

"Formal ontology is the result of combining the intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal,

mathematical method of modern symbolic logic, and ultimately identifying them as different aspects of one and the same science. That is, where the method of ontology is the intuitive study of the fundamental properties. modes, and aspects of being, or of entities in general, and the method of modern symbolic logic is the rigorous construction of formal, axiomatic systems, formal ontology, the result of combining these two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all forms and modes of being. As such, formal ontology is a science prior to all others in which particular forms, modes, or kinds of being are studied.

Logic can be distinguished from formal ontology, but only in the sense of logic as an uninterpreted calculus, Le. as the method of constructing abstract formal systems subject to varying interpretations over varying domains. A formal system in which logical (or syncategorematic) constants can be distinguished from non-logical (or categorematic) constants and in which the axioms and rules are assumed to be logically valid is not an uninterpreted calculus, however, but a logistic system in which logic is a language with content in its own right. The defining characteristic of a logistic system is that it propounds a theory of logical form. which comprises both a pure logical grammar, i.e. a system of categories and rules for generating meaningful expressions, and a system of logical axioms and rules that determine the deductive relations between different sets of expressions of that grammar. The purely formal or non-descriptive content of the existence of any and all physically real individuals or of the natural properties and relations that such individuals might have in nature, is not independent of the different modes of being of such entities, and in fact presupposes such modes in its very articulation."
Edmund Husserl was among the first to characterize a logistic system in this way, and it was he who also first introduced the notion of a formal ontology. For Husserl, logic has both an apophantic (assertional) aspect, which he called formal apophantics (and which amounts to a theory of logical form as characterized above), and an ontological aspect, which he called formal ontology. The switch from a formal-apophantic attitude to an ontological one is achieved primarily through a process of

nominalization, and the underlying unity of the two aspects is given through a 'Law of Denominative Equivalence', according to which the well-formed expressions of any given category may be transformed into corresponding nominal forms. It is in this way, for example, that propositional forms and their predicative components (as generated in the theory of logical forms) are transformed into nominal forms that stand for states of affairs and properties and relations, respectively. The 'categorial objectivities' or 'correlates' that originate from such 'denominative reductions' (or nominalizations) of the pure forms of apophantic logic are then claimed to make up the fundamental conceptual material of formal ontology (cf. *Logical Investigations*, Volume I, §§67—8, *Ideas*, §119, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Chapter 2, §25). The important connection of ontology with a logistic system is that the logico-grammatical distinctions made in the latter are based ultimately on a distinction between different modes of being, even if that distinction is initially described in terms of different modes of significance. More is required by way of comprehensive grasp, however, before a logistic system can be taken as a system of logic or a formal ontology in its fullest sense. In particular, such a logistic system must be rich enough to contain, when suitable non-logical constants, axioms, and meaning postulates (regarding such constants) are added to it, every scientific theory and the logical analysis of every meaningful declarative sentence of any natural language. In that case such a logistic system can be taken as a lingua philosophica, or what Leibniz also called a characteristica universalis, and as such it is also none other than a comprehensive system of formal ontology.
(...)
Beginning with Aristotle, the standard assumption in (pre-formal) ontology has been that being is not a genus, i.e. that being is multivalent, and that the principal method of ontology is categorial analysis. This raises the problem of how the different categories or modes of being fit together, and of whether one of the senses or modes of being is preeminent and the others somehow dependent on that sense or mode of being. The differential categorial analyses that have been pro-posed as a resolution of this problem have all turned in one way or another

on a theory of predication, i.e. on how the different categories fit together in the nexus of predication, and they have differed from one another primarily on whether the analysis of the fundamental forms of predication is to be directed upon the structure of reality or the structure of thought. In formal ontology, the resolution of this problem involves the construction of a formal theory of predication. Aristotle's categorial analysis, for example, is directed upon the structure of reality and not upon the structure of thought, and the pre-eminent mode of being is that of concrete individual things (or primary substances). Predication, moreover, is explained in terms of two ontological configurations that together characterize the essence-accident distinction of Aristotle's ontology, viz. the relation between an individual and its species or genera on the one hand, and the inherence of a universal in an individual on the other. Aristotle's moderate realism regarding species, genera, and universals is a form of natural realism and not of logical realism, and a formal theory of predication constructed as an Aristotelian formal ontology must respect that distinction as well as give an adequate representation of the two ontological con-figurations underlying the Aristotelian analysis of predication. In particular, such a theory must contain a logic of natural kinds and must impose the constraint of moderate realism that every natural property or relation is instantiated (i.e. that every natural property or relation exists only in rebus). This constraint leads to Aristotle's problem of the fixity of species (according to which members of a species cannot come to be except from earlier members of that species, and that therefore there can be no evolution of new species); but, given the modal category of natural necessity and possibility as part of a revised Aristotelian formal ontology of modal natural realism, this problem can be resolved by requiring of every natural property or relation not that it actually be instantiated (at any given time) but only that such an instantiation be within the realm of natural possibility. Such a formal ontology, needless to say, will contain a modal logic for natural necessity and possibility, as well as a logic of natural kinds that is to be described in terms of that modal logic. (Cf. Cocchiarella 1976.) Plato's ontology is also directed upon the structure of reality, but the pre-eminent mode of being in this framework is not that of

concrete or sensible objects but of the Ideas. This leads to the problem of μέθεξις, or of how and in what sense concrete objects participate in Ideas, and also to the problem of χορισμός, or of how and in what sense Ideas are 'things' or abstract individuals separate from the concrete individuals that participate in them. A Platonist theory of predication in contemporary formal ontology is the basis of logical realism (where it is assumed that a property or relation exists corresponding to each well-formed predicate expression of logical grammar, regardless of whether or not it is even logically possible that such a property or relation has an instance). When applied as a foundation for mathematics (as was Plato's own original intent), logical realism is also called ontological logicism. The best-known form of logical realism today is Bertrand Russell's theory of logical types, which Russell developed as a way to avoid his famous paradox of predication (upon which his paradox of membership is based), a paradox not un-related to Plato's problem of χορισμός. Whether and to what extent Russell's theory of logical types can satisfactorily resolve either of Plato's problems and be the basis of an adequate realist formal ontology is an issue that belongs to what we have called comparative formal ontology. (pp. 640-643)
(...)
Comparative formal ontology, as our remarks have indicated throughout, is the proper domain of many issues and disputes in metaphysics, epistemology, and the methodology of the deductive sciences. Just as the construction of a particular formal ontology lends clarity and precision to our informal categorial analyses and serves as a guide to our intuitions, so too comparative formal ontology can be developed so as to provide clear and precise criteria by which to judge the adequacy of a particular system of formal ontology and by which we might be guided in our comparison and evaluation of different proposals for such systems. It is only by constructing and comparing different formal ontologies that we can make a rational decision about which such system we should ourselves ultimately adopt, and that is a decision that can be made only in comparative formal ontology. (p. 647)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "Ontology II: Formal Ontology" in: Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1991, pp. 640-647.

MATHEMATICAL LOGIC AS FORMAL ONTOLOGY

"Gödel has remarked that mathematical logic “has two quite different aspects. On the one hand, it is a section of Mathematics treating of classes, relations, combinations of symbols, etc., instead of numbers, functions, geometric figures, etc. On the other hand, it is a science prior to all others, which contains the ideas and principles underlying all sciences" (1) In the former case, mathematical logic is principally, though not only, a *calculus ratiocinator*. Under that aspect, beyond consistency, no special heed need be paid a formal system regarding the philosophical significance of its grammatical forms and the viability of the primitive concepts and assumptions expressed by means of these forms. In the latter case, however, it is quite otherwise. As a science prior to all others, Gödel’s description of mathematical logic is comparable to Aristotle’s description of metaphysics. Only, as a science which is prior to all others, metaphysics, according to Aristotle, is therefore the science of the “modes” or “categories of being”. Where the particular, specialized sciences, including mathematics, are concerned with but their own special “modes of being”, metaphysics and now mathematical logic under its second aspect — or what we might instead call formal ontology — is concerned with the study and development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic co-ordination of all the “modes” or “categories of being” under the most general laws. Usually, and perhaps most appropriately since this is where ontological commitment comes in, each “mode of being” within a particular formal ontology is represented by a type of bindable variable whose syntactical role

is intended to reflect in some philosophically coherent way the ontological role of that “mode of being”. Under this second aspect, mathematical logic, or formal ontology, is concerned with the adequacy of formal systems as alternative formulations of the deepest structural maps of reality.(2)

Viewed in this way, each feature of a proposed formal system is to be evaluated in terms of its purported philosophical significance, how well, for example, it functions as a proposed metaphysical map of reality. Different metaphysical schools, of course, will be interested in different ways of understanding a formal system as a map of reality. Conceptualists, for example, would view the grammar of a formal system together with its logistic behaviour as a proposed formal map of the structuring powers of human cognition, a proposed map, that is, of the structure of constructive cognitive processes of the human mind. Operations of the system must then be devised with limitations built into them that reflect in an appropriate manner the limitations of these same constructive powers of the mind. It is much in this sort of way that the constructivist attitude in the philosophy of mathematics must be understood. Realists, on the other hand, would construe the operations and elements of the formal map as having ontological significance independently of the constructive power of the human mind. Limitations built into the system, whether they apply to the notion of grammatical well-formedness or to the logistic behaviour of the ontological grammar, are evaluated then on grounds other than the nature of thought and its inherent limitations. Some of the most obvious of such grounds for limitation pertain to the way the implicit metaphysical scheme underlying the system proposes to resolve the known antinomies. Leibniz, as Gödel has pointed out, was one of the first expositors of this view of mathematical logic. Leibniz himself referred to such a formal system as a *characteristica universalis*. But it was not until Frege and Peano that any significant attempt at the construction of a formal ontology was made. Frege called his system a *Begriffsschrift*, indicating, as Gödel remarks, that “Frege was chiefly interested in the analysis of thought”.(3) Frege himself in a response to Schroder's criticisms of his *Begriffsschrift* stated “that, unlike Boole's, his logic is not a

calculus ratiocinator, or not merely a *calculus ratiocinator*, but a *lingua characteristica*.(4)

Now this Fregean emphasis on concepts (*Begriffe*) and the nature of thought is significant. For although it would seem, because of this emphasis, that Frege is a conceptualist and that therefore his logic would reflect certain limitations in the nature of human concept formation, it turns out that Fregean concepts are real, objective entities of a "mode of being" which is independent of minds and the subjective ideas by means of which minds think. To be sure, Fregean concepts are not self-subsistent entities, but their ontological dependence is upon the individual objects "falling under" them and not, apparently, upon the nature of thought. Their ontological dependence consists only in their being "unsaturated". They are nevertheless "real" entities in so far as Frege takes quantification over them as having ontological significance.(5) In this regard, Frege's ontology is realistic, though somehow it is also an analysis of thought.(6)

I shall not try to account here for this apparent ambiguity in the Fregean enterprise. I mention it in part because it is an ambiguity which Russell apparently shared (or perhaps even inherited from Frege) in the construction of his own formal ontology, the ramified theory of types, and which he never himself adequately resolved. As a formal embodiment of the Russell-Poincaré "vicious circle principle", the ramified theory of types purports to represent a limitation in the powers of human concept formation, specifically a limitation regarding impredicative concept formation. Adjoining the axiom of reducibility to this formal ontology, however, can be justified only by taking a realistic attitude, an attitude which Russell clearly accepted in at least some of his writings.(7) The two attitudes taken together: the attitude, on the one hand, that the limitations imposed on both the ontological grammar and the logical constructions based upon that grammar are dictated by one's conceptualist views regarding at least the "higher-order" portion of one's ontology; and the attitude, on the other hand, that the reality represented by one's ontological grammar and the operations on that grammar is independent of mind and the nature of thought; these two attitudes though apparently not formally inconsistent, seem not to result in a philosophically coherent formal ontology. It is

within this sort of context that I understand Myhill's concluding remark that "the ramified *Principia* itself falls uncomfortably between these two positions, and apparently does not correspond to any coherent philosophy of mathematics..." (p. 27).
Let us note that where Myhill speaks to the question of a coherent philosophy of mathematics, I have referred instead to the problem of a philosophically coherent formal ontology. The distinction is minor or not depending on how broad one's criteria are for the coherence of a philosophy of mathematics. Certainly, since the problem of the nature of mathematical existence is an ontological problem par excellence, every philosophically coherent formal ontology must contain a coherent philosophy of mathematics.(9) Tolerance forbids, I would suppose, maintaining the converse." (pp. 29-32)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "Formal Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics" in George Nakhnikian (ed.), *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, London: Duckworth 1974, pp. 29-46 (notes renumbered.)

Notes

(1) K. Gödel, "Russell's Mathematical Logic", in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Evanston, Ill., 1944.
(2) cf. G. Bergmann, "Ontological Alternatives", in E. D. Klemke (ed.), *Essays on Frege*, Urbana, Ill., 1968, p. 148: "Logic without ontology is merely a calculus. A calculus acquires philosophical import only if its author claims that it is an ideal language (*Begriffsschrift*), i.e. that it perspicuously reflects an adequate ontology."
(3) Gödel, *op. cit.*
(4) J. van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language", *Synthese* 17, 3 (1967), p. 324.
(5) Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 135, construes Frege's concepts as syncategorematic entities, but his only reason for this seems to be their ontological dependence on objects. We shall here understand a primitive symbol of a formal ontology to be a syncategorematic sign—and the entity, if any, it represents to be a syncategorematic entity — if it is not a substituend for (and the

entity is not “indicated” by) any type of variable in the grammar of the system.
(6) cf. R. Grossman, “Frege’s Ontology”, in Klemke (ed.), *Essays on Frege*, for a discussion of this issue in regard to Frege’s ontology.
(7) For example, in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, he says that “logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features” (p. 169). We might note that the realism implicit in the reducibility axiom is one in regard to classes and not properties (or, in Russell’s terminology, propositional functions). Indeed, Russell first referred to the axiom as “the axiom of classes”. What is peculiar about this is that Russell took his formal ontology to be a “no class” ontology.
(8) Most proposals regarding the construction of a philosophically coherent formal ontology are programmatic and fragmentary and do not purport to constitute a completed metaphysical system. The importance of formally constructing such partial or fragmentary ontologies is not at issue here. Nor is it being suggested that a fragmentary ontology which defers the question of mathematical existence is for that reason incoherent. Of course, if such a fragmentary ontology cannot be extended so as to contain a coherent account of the nature of mathematical existence, especially vis-à-vis that of concrete or physical existence, then it does indeed represent a philosophically incoherent ontology, even if only fragmentarily. For this reason, metaphysical programmes should not long defer the question of containing a coherent philosophy of mathematics.

PREDICATION THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

"Predication theory has been a subject of philosophical concern since at least the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It is in its way the locus of a number of philosophical issues both in metaphysics and

epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals. The latter problem, sometimes all too simply put as the question of whether there are universals or not, is especially germane to the notion of predication since a theory of universals is at least in part a semantic theory of predication; and it is just to such a theory that we must turn in any philosophical investigation of the notion of predication. In doing so, however, we need not assume the truth or superiority of any one theory of universals over another. Indeed, an appropriate preliminary to any such assumption might well consist of a comparative analysis of some of the different formal theories of predication that can be semantically associated with these different theories of universals: for just as the latter provide a semantics for the former, it is only through the logical syntax of a formal theory of predication that the logical structure of a theory of universals can be rendered perspicuous. That, in any case, is the principal methodological assumption for the approach to the problem of universals we shall undertake in the present monograph where we will be more concerned with the construction and comparison of the abstract logical systems that may be associated with different theories of universals than with the metaphysical or epistemological issues for which they were originally designed. It is our hope and expectation, however, that these comparative formal analyses will be instrumental toward any philosophical decision as to whether to adopt a given theory of universals or not."

1. The problem of the predicable nature of universals

The original use of the term 'universal" goes back to Aristotle according to whom a universal is that which can be predicated of things (*De Interpretatione* 17 a 39). We shall retain the core of this notion throughout this essay and assume that whatever else it may be a universal has a predicable nature and that it is this predicable nature which is what constitutes its universality. Nothing follows from that assumption, however, regarding whether a universal is (1) merely a predicate expression (nominalism) of some language or other; (2) a concept (conceptualism) in the sense of a socio-biologically based

cognitive ability or capacity to identify, collect or classify, and characterize or relate things in various ways; or (3) a real property or relation existing independently of both language and the natural capacity humans have for thought and representation (realism). We propose to take each of these interpretations or theories of universals seriously in what follows at least to the extent that we are able to associate each with a formal theory of predication. Our particular concern in this regard, moreover, will be with the explanation each provides of the predicable nature of universals, i.e., of that in which the universality of universals consists. Our discussion and comparison of nominalism, conceptualism and realism, accordingly, will not deal with the variety of arguments that have been given for or against each of them, but with how each as a theory of universals may be semantically associated with a formal theory of predication. Our assumption here, as indicated above, is that insofar as such an associated formal theory of predication provides a logically perspicuous medium for the articulation of the predicable nature of universals as understood by the theory of universals in question, then to that extent the formal theory may itself be identified with the explanation which that theory of universals provides of the predicable nature of universals. It is in the sense of this assumption, moreover, that we understand a philosophical theory of predication to be a formal theory of predication together with its semantically associated theory of universals. (pp. 11-12)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "*Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1986.

THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS: A) NOMINALISM

“Traditionally, there have been three general types of approach to the problem of universals: nominalism, conceptualism, and realism, with nominalism being the most restrictive. Some forms

of nominalism, more-over, are even more restrictive in this regard than others. We shall not concern ourselves with these variations here, however, but shall identify (generic) nominalism with three general semantical theses instead. The first general thesis of nominalism is that universals have only a formal mode of existence, i.e., that beyond the predicate expressions that occur or can occur in language there are no universals. Predicate expressions, in other words, do not designate any universals beyond themselves; and therefore predicate expressions are the only entities according to nominalism that have a predicable nature. For this reason, we shall occasionally refer to predicate expressions as nominalistic universals.

We do not dispute here, it will be noted, that there are universals. That is, the problem of universals as we understand it here is not the problem whether there are universals; for indeed all theories of universals acknowledge that there are at least nominalistic universals, though some will assert that there are other universals as well. The problem of universals, as we have already said, is the problem of providing a philosophically coherent explanation of the predicable nature of universals, i.e., of that in which their universality consists. And in nominalism, this problem concerns the sense in which predicate expressions may be predicated of individuals.

The second general thesis of nominalism is the thesis of extensionality, i.e., the thesis that, semantically, predicate expressions may make no finer distinction of content than can be generated by co-extensive predicate expressions; and therefore the thesis that co-extensive predicate expressions are to be interchangeable *salva veritate* in any applied formal theory of predication suitable for nominalism. This means in particular that only an extensional logic is appropriate to nominalism, a corollary of which is anti-essentialism, i.e., the thesis that no nominalistic universal is necessarily true of some of the things of which it may be predicated without being necessarily true of all. It is sometimes claimed, we should note, that only the latter thesis, or a suitable reconstruction of it, is really necessary to nominalism and that in fact a nominalistic formal theory of predication may contain a modal, and therefore non-extensional,

logic after all. We shall evaluate, and reject, this claim at a later section of this chapter. For now, however, we simply assume that nominalism requires the stronger thesis of extensionality.

The third general thesis of nominalism is that there are only individuals (in the logical sense), i.e., that quantificational reference is univocal and applies only to the individual things of which our various predicate expressions may be said to be either true or false. Whether, in addition, all and only concrete particulars are individuals, as has been maintained in more traditional variants of nominalism, we shall leave unspecified. Certainly some contemporary variants of nominalism, such as that of Quine's, include, e.g., sets as part of their ontology; and no doubt others may include other types of abstract individuals as well.

The third general thesis, it should be noted, does not follow from the first. E.g., one may consistently maintain that there are no universals other than predicate expressions but that the latter in their logico-grammatical role as predicate expressions are unsaturated linguistic structures; and therefore that there is a mode of quantificational reference, viz., that to possible predicate expressions, which is not a form of quantificational reference to individuals. Nevertheless, while it is consistent to maintain this, i.e., to affirm the first and deny the third general thesis of nominalism, we remain unsure that the result can he developed into a philosophically coherent theory of universals. (1) We, in any case, shall not attempt to associate such a combination with any formal theory of predication here. (2) As is well-known, the theory of predication which is commonly associated with nominalism today is standard first-order predicate logic (with identity). Indeed, standard articulation of the predicable nature of universals as understood by the theory of universals in question. Thus the association of nominalism with standard first-order predicate logic is intended not only as a validation of nominalism's three general semantical theses but also as an explanatory or clarifying thesis to the effect that the predicable nature of nominalistic universals, i.e., of possible predicate expressions, is the logico-grammatical role they are represented as having in the logical forms of standard first- order predicate logic (with identity).

We are in almost complete agreement with this association of nominalism with standard first-order predicate logic (with identity). Our one reservation concerns the fact that the latter, strictly speaking, occurs properly only as the logical component of applied first-order theories. That is, except for the possible use of dummy schema predicate letters, first- order predicate logic cannot be described as a pure formal theory of predication. Dummy schema predicate letters can of course be transformed into predicate variables and quantifiers can be applied to these, resulting thereby in a pure second-order theory of predication. Typically, however, this move has been seen as a violation of nominalism's first general thesis in that it would appear to commit us to universals other than predicate expressions themselves. The move to a second-order logic, in other words, exceeds the limits of nominalism insofar as predicate quantifiers may be given a referential interpretation.

Fortunately, however, there is another interpretation of predicate quantifiers which does not transcend nominalism and the ontological framework of standard first-order predicate logic (with identity). This is the non-referential or so-called substitutional interpretation of predicate quantifiers whereby the significance of such a quantifier in the context of an applied first-order theory is exhausted by the totality of its substituends, i.e., predicate expressions in the form of the open propositional forms of that theory, rather than by a reference to either real or conceptual universals existing independently of the language of the theory and supplemental to its domain of discourse. By utilizing substitutionally interpreted predicate quantifiers, nominalism can of course be developed as a pure second-order theory of predication.

There will, however, be certain constraints which such an interpretation of predicate quantifiers imposes upon the specification of nominalistic universals; and these constraints are in fact precisely those involved first-order predicate logic is typically taken by nominalists precisely as we are recommending any formal theory of predication should be taken: viz., as a logically perspicuous medium for the in the comprehension principle of standard predicative second-order logic. In this regard we agree with the growing consensus that standard

predicative second-order logic is an appropriate medium for the representation of a nominalist theory of predication. (3)" (pp. 29-32)

Notes

(1) Cf. the theory of universals represented by the logically perspicuous language described by Wilfrid Sellars in "Naming and Saying", «Philosophy of Science», vol. 29, 1962, pp. 7-26. We believe this is really a conceptualist, and not a nominalist, theory of predication, however, albeit it is a form of conceptualism which is very close to nominalism.
(2) Cf. Cocchiarella, N., "Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic", «Synthese», vol. 31, 1975, pp. 23-62, where such an attempt is made, but with doubtful success, as is suggested in the article itself.
(3) Cf. "A Plea for Substitutional Quantification", by Charles Parson, «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXVIII, no. 8, 1971, pp. 231-237.

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "*Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1986.

THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS: B) CONCEPTUALISM VS. NOMINALISM

"As cognitive capacities which may or may not be exercized on a given occasion, concepts are neither mental images nor ideas in the sense of particular mental occurrences. Concepts, in other words, and predicable concepts in particular, do not have an individual nature but are rather unsaturated cognitive structures whose realization or saturation in thought is what informs particular mental acts with a predicable nature.

Conceptualism, accordingly, rejects the third general thesis of nominalism, i.e., the thesis that there are only individuals, and

therefore the sense in which there are concepts is not a restricted form of the sense in which there are individuals. Quantificational reference is not a univocal semantical notion in conceptualism, in other words, but is rather (at least) doubly aspected, depending on whether the reference is through the logico-grammatical role of a subject expression, and is therefore to individuals (in the logical sense), or whether it is through the role of an (n- place) predicate expression, and is therefore to (n-ary) concepts. (We shall also speak of «-ary concepts as *relational concepts* if $n > 1$.) Conceptualism, of course, also rejects the first general thesis of nominalism, i.e., the thesis that there are no universals other than predicate χ expressions. Indeed, according to conceptualism, a genuine predicate expression is precisely such only through having a concept as the semantic ground for its correct or incorrect application. This is not to say, on the other hand, that the possession of a concept will not come to be behaviorally equivalent to the possession of a linguistic ability to correctly apply a predicate expression having that concept as its semantic ground. Nor is it to deny that the possession of such a linguistic ability will naturally come to serve as a criterion for possession of the concept. Nevertheless, all questions of behavioral equivalence aside, being a criterion for the possession of a concept, according to conceptualism, is not the same as being that concept.
Despite their distinctness, however, concepts and predicate expressions do have analogous roles in their respective mediums, and to some ^ extent the development of concepts in the medium of thought is determined by the development of predicate expressions in the medium of language — just as the development of language is determined in part by the development of thought. In holistic conceptualism especially, as we shall see, impredicative concept-formation is a generalized capacity which is achieved only through the capacity for language, and in particular through the capacity to systematically use language for the expression of constructive or predicative concepts. In this regard, impredicative concept- formation is a mediated process, and language and the linguistic ability to use predicate expressions to express predicative concepts is the means used to master and direct such a process. Aside from this meditation, however, the laws of compositionality for systematic concept-

formation in holistic conceptualism, and in particular the impredicative comprehension principle (CP) for predicable concepts, greatly exceed the principle of compositionality in nominalism, viz., the comprehension principle (CP!). In this regard, in other words, there can be no question of reducing or otherwise explaining only in terms of nominalistic universals the formal theory of predication we shall come to associate with holistic conceptualism. The prospects are better, no doubt, for a reduction of constructive conceptualism to nominalism; and indeed, in a sense, the formal theory of predication we shall associate with constructive conceptualism is contained in the formal theory determined by nominalism, viz., standard predicative second-order logic.

Nevertheless, whereas it is predicativity in the purely grammatical sense which is the basis of nominalism's formal theory of predication, it is predicativity in the logico-grammatical sense which is the basis of constructive conceptualism's formal theory of predication; for, as we shall see (in §2), it is only in this sense that we are to understand the closure conditions of the comprehension principle (CCP!) of constructive conceptualism's formal theory of predication. Unlike the situation in nominalism, in other words, where wffs that are predicative in the purely grammatical sense are ipso facto predicative in the logico-grammatical sense, in constructive conceptualism not all wffs (of an applied context) that are predicative in nominalism's purely grammatical sense need also be predicative in the logico-grammatical sense.

One of the consequences of this difference, as we shall see (in §3), is a corresponding difference in the notion of a possible {explicit) definition of a predicate constant. For whereas predicate constants are the paradigms of predicative expressions in nominalism, in constructive conceptualism not all predicate constants of an applied context need themselves be predicative, i.e., they need not all stand in that context for the value of a bound predicate variable. Thus, unlike the situation in nominalism, predicate constants can be definitionally introduced in an applied context of constructive conceptualism with definiens that are impredicative in either or both the purely grammatical and the logico-grammatical sense. That is, whereas

such definitions can be proved to be both non-creative and eliminable in constructive conceptualism, they will be both creative and non- eliminable in nominalism, i.e., in standard predicative second-order logic.
These are not trivial or unimportant differences, needless to say, and they indicate the radically different philosophical perspectives involved in a conceptualist as opposed to a nominalist theory of predication. Differences not mentioned here, such as the reducibility or irreducibility of identity in an applied context (cf. §4), and the typical rejection of nominalism's second general thesis, i.e., the thesis of extensionality, only add to the picture of the important philosophical differences between nominalism and conceptualism. Their only point of real similarity in fact is their common denial — or commitment to denial — of there being anything at all like the so-called logical modalities, since the same argument that proves the essential incompleteness of first-order modal logic described in Chapter I also proves the essential incompleteness of any higher order framework such as those we shall consider here (cf. §9)." (pp. 71-73)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "*Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1986.

THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS: C) REALISM

"Realism, like conceptualism, goes beyond nominalism in positing the existence of universals other than predicate expressions. Unlike conceptualism, however, the existence of a real universal does not depend upon the existence of the intellect. That is, real universals exist independently of both language and the natural capacity humans have for thought and representation. In keeping with tradition, we shall refer to real universals as properties and relations.

Now the sense in which properties and relations are said to exist is not the same in all forms of realism. We assume, however, that

despite their differences all forms of realism fall under two general and exclusive types which we shall call natural and logical realism, respectively. We agree of course that the differences between two variants of a given type may affect the sense in which each claims that there are real universals; but we maintain nevertheless that there is a common core of agreement between these variants which distinguishes them in a radical way from all variants of the other type. It is this agreement and distinction, respectively, which is the basis for our classification of realism into what we will call natural and logical realism.

In all variants of natural realism, for example, properties and relations are said to exist only within nature and that in particular they are integral components of the causal structure of the world. Such universals may exist independently of what is not determined by the causal structure of the world, and in that sense they may be said to exist independently of the world itself (considered as a whole); but, on the other hand, they cannot also exist independently of the causal structure of the world, and in that regard they cannot exist independently of all causal alternatives to the actual world where the same laws of nature hold as hold in the actual world. Traditionally, these universals have been called material properties and relations; but this did not always mean that they were the properties and relations posited in one or another form of materialism — and in particular it did not mean that the only universals in question are physical properties and relations, i.e., the fundamental properties and relations posited in physics. The terminology rather harks back to a distinction between concepts which were said to have a material as opposed to a merely formal significance (as constructions of the intellect), which is only to say that it is a distinction between concepts to which such real universals correspond as opposed to those to which no such real universals correspond. We shall not adopt this terminology here ourselves however, since we wish not to suggest, even inadvertently, that natural realism is committed to one or another form of materialism. Materialism, to be sure, is committed to one or another variant of natural realism (to the extent that it admits properties and relations at all); but not all variants of natural realism, it must be emphasized, need be committed to materialism. What is assumed in natural realism as

a general type is only that somehow nature contains within its causal matrix all the properties and relations there are, regardless of whether these properties and relations are those only of physics, or also of chemistry, or also of biology, or also of any other natural science whatsoever.

Now all variants of logical realism, it should be noted, take a completely opposite stand on this issue. That is, all variants of logical realism maintain that real properties and relations exist independently not only of what is not determined by the causal structure of the world but also of that causal structure itself — and, indeed, even of whether there is a world at all! Logically real universals, in other words, exist independently of all forms of concrete existence and the causal grounds for such. They do not exist independently of one another, to be sure, but that dependence obtains only in a timeless, transcendent realm of being which, according to all variants of logical realism, is in fact the semantico-ontological ground for the logical truths we express in thought and language — and it is for this reason, needless to say, that we refer to such a theory of universals as a variant of logical realism. Thus, unlike the situation in natural realism, it is assumed in all variants of logical realism that there is a real universal corresponding to every fully applied wff $\varphi(x_1,\ldots, x_n)$, including those which are logically determinate, i.e., those which are logically true or logically false of any individuals whatsoever.

Traditionally, because of their independent and transcendent mode of being, logically real universals have been called Platonic forms. However, because Platonism in general also assumes that universals are individuals, we shall avoid that label here, since there are also variants of logical realism (e.g. Gottlob Frege's) in which properties and relations are assumed to have only a predicable and not also an individual nature; i.e., variants in which logically real universals are in some sense only unsaturated structures.

It is not clear, incidentally, that natural realism can also allow for variants in which natural properties and relations have an individual as well as a predicable nature. In modal natural realism, for example, we argue that natural properties and relations can only be causally determinate unsaturated structures

(the saturation of which results in the facts or states of affairs that obtain in the world). We believe a similar argument can be given with respect to the actual world alone, i.e., independently of modal considerations, if it is allowed that the same natural property or relation need have no instantiations at all during an interval of time between two or more of its instantiations. This argument, however, depends on temporal considerations (where moments, of time play the role of possible worlds) which we shall not go into here (since it requires a formulation of relativity theory as well); and for this reason we shall leave open the question whether all variants of natural realism are committed to natural properties and relations being only causally determinate unsaturated structures; i.e., whether in some variants of natural realism natural properties and relations have an individual as well as a predicable nature.
Finally, it should be noted that there are variants of both natural and logical realism which are committed to the thesis of extensionality as well as those which are committed to its denial and which we shall refer to here as modal natural and modal logical realism, respectively." (pp. 105-107)

From: Nino Cocchiarella, "*Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*", Napoli: Bibliopolis 1986.

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Annotated Bibliography of Nino Cocchiarella 1966 - 1985

BOOKS

1. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1966. *Tense Logic: A Study of Temporal Reference*.
   Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, available at ProQuest Dissertation, reference number 6609326.
   University of California - Los Angeles, January 7, 1966).
   Committee in charge: Richard Montague, Charmain, Alfred Horn, Donald Kalish, Abraham Robinson, Robert Stockwell (VI, 251 pages).
   N.B. *the unpublished Ph. D. thesis can be ordered to ProQuest Dissertation Express*.
   Abstract: "This work is concerned with the logical analysis of topological or non-metrical temporal reference. The specific problem with which it successfully deals is a precise formalization of (first-order) quantificational tense logic wherein both an appropriate formal semantics is developed and a meta-mathematically consistent and complete axiomatization for that semantics given.
   The formalization of quantificational tense logic herein presented adheres to all the canons of logical rigor by being carried out entirely as a definitional extension of (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory. Model-theoretical techniques are utilized in the semantics given and the notion of a history is formally developed as the tense-logical analogue of the notion of a model for standard first-order logic with identity. Corresponding to the key semantical concept of

satisfaction (and consequently of truth) in a model, by means of which the central standard notion of logical truth is defined, the notion of satisfaction (and consequently of truth) in a history at a given moment of that history is developed, from which development, in turn, the central notion of tense-logical truth is defined. An axiomatic characterization of derivability within tense logic, or t-derivability, is then presented and proved to be both consistent and complete, i.e., it is shown that an arbitrary tensed formula is tense-logically true if and only if it is t-derivable from zero premises, i.e., if and only if it is a theorem of the given axiomatic system.
Quantification within tense logic introduces issues in no manner confronted on the sentential level. Recognition is made that quantification over objects existing prior to the time of assertion is to be distinguished from quantification over objects existing at the time of assertion, both of which in turn are to be distinguished from quantifying over objects existing at the time of assertion. Such distinct kinds of quantification are readily distinguishable within tense logic by means of incorporation of what is here called the logic of actual and possible objects. Precise semantical and syntactical formalization of this double quantification is presented prior to its use within tense logic, and completeness theorems are given for both the full system. and the restricted logic of actual objects, the latter of which may separately be taken as a formalization of a logic which can accommodate denotationless names. These several kinds of quantificational logic lead to separate completeness theorems stated and established for tense logic, depending on the several kinds of quantificational bases possible for this logic."
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2. Cocchiarella, Nino, Epstein, George, Dunn, J.Michael, and Shapiro, S.C., eds. 1975. *Proceedings of the 1975 International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic. Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, May 13-16, 1975*. Long Beach: IEEE Computer Society.
3. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1986. *Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals*. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
   Table of Contents: Preface 9; Introduction 11; Chapter 1. Nominalism 29; Chapter 2. Conceptualism 65; Chapter 3. Realism 105; Chapter 4. On The Logic of Nominalized Predicates and Its Philosophical Interpretations 165; Chapter 5. Complex Predicates and The Lambda - Operator 215; Chapter 6. Two Fregean Semantics For Nominalized Complex Predicates 243-265.
   "Beginning with Aristotle's notion of a universal as that which can be predicated of things, I provide in this monograph separate logical analyses of what nominalism, conceptualism and realism take to be the predicable nature

of universals. My position throughout is that such an analysis proceeds through the construction of a formal theory of predication on the one hand and a logical semantics on the other. I adopt and apply in this regard the formal and semantical techniques of my former teachers Rudolf Carnap and Richard Montague.
One important way in which I differ from Carnap and Montague, however, is in our respective analyses of so-called “higher order” sentences - that is, sentences in which nominalized predicates, whether simple or complex, occur as the logico-grammatical subjects of other predicates. In this regard, whereas Carnap and Montague formulate and adopt one or another version of a theory of simple logical types as the framework within which to analyze such sentences, I formulate instead, relative to nominalism, conceptualism and realism, systems which do not require any grammatical type distinctions beyond those already found in standard second order predicate logic. All of the theories of predication formulated in this monograph, in other words, are second order theories, including those which contain a logic of nominalized predicates. Russell’s paradox of predication, it turns out, can be resolved without resorting to a theory of types." (From the *Preface* p. 9)

4. ———. 1987. *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*. Columbus: Ohio University Press.
Table of Contents: Preface XI-XII; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. The Development of the Theory of Logical Types and the Notion of a Logical Subject in Russell's Early Philosophy 19; Chapter 2. Frege, Russell, and Logicism: A Logical Reconstruction 64; Chapter 3. Meinong Reconstructed versus Early Russell Reconstructed 119; Chapter 4. Frege's Double Correlation Thesis and Quine's Set Theories NF and ML 152; Chapter 5. Russell's Theory of Logical Types and the Atomistic Hierarchy of Sentences 193; Chapter 6. Logical Atomism and Modal Logic 222; Chapter 7. Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic 244; Index 285-293.
"The essays collected here deal with the development of analytic philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth

century. In addition to providing a historical account of early analytic philosophy, these essays also contain logical reconstructions of Frege's, Russell's, Meinong's, and Wittgenstein's views during the period in question. Several of these reconstructions can and have been used in the new logico-linguistic developments in pragmatics and intensional logic that make up the vanguard of contemporary analytic philosophy. Others, such as the interpretation of the logical modalities in logical atomism, or the determination of the objects of fiction and dreams in Meinong's theory of objects or Russell's early logic, provide a useful introduction, if not also a solution, to a number of problems confronting analytic philosophy today. Indeed, for that matter, all of the essays collected here provide a useful propaedeutic to much of the research now going on in the study of logic and language.

A number of small changes have been made in all of the essays reprinted here, mainly for stylistic purposes. Their histories are briefly indicated as follows. Chapter 1 first appeared in *Synthese*, vol. 45, no. 1 (September I980):71—115, Copyright © 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. A somewhat longer version of chapter 2 first appeared in *Frege Synthesized*, L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), 1986, pp. 197-252, Copyright © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. The present version was given as a lecture in a seminar on 13 March 1985, for the Bertrand Russell Editorial Project at McMaster University. Chapters 3 and 4 first appeared in *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 11, no. 2 (May, 1982): 183-214, and vol. 14, no. 1 (February 1985): 1-39, respectively, Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidei Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. Chapter 3 was originally given as a lecture to the Société Belge de Logique et de Philosophie des Sciences, Brussels, in December 1981. Chapter 4 was my contribution to An Interdisciplinary Conference on Logic, Truth and Type Theory, given in memory of Alfred Tarski, 6-7 April 1984. Chapter 5 first appeared in *Essays in Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, C. Wade Savage and C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), 1987,

Copyright © by University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Chapter 6 first appeared in *Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel*, vol. 4, no. 1 (January 1974):41-66. It is reprinted here with the permission of the editor. Chapter 6 was given as a lecture to the Victoria Conference on Formal Ontology at the University of Victoria on 15 October 1972. Chapter 7 first appeared in *Synthese*, vol. 31, no. 1 (June 1975):23-62, Copyright © 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. It was originally given as a lecture to the University of North Carolina Fall Philosophy Colloquium in October 1973." (*Preface*, pp. XI-XII)

5. ———. 2007. *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism*. New York: Springer.
   Table of Contents: Preface XI; Introduction XIII-XXIII;
   I. Formal Ontology.
   1. Formal ontology and conceptual realism 3; 2. Time, Being and Existence 25; 3. Logical necessity and logical atomism 59; 4. Formal theories of predication 81; 5. Formal theories of predication part II 101; 6. Intensional possible worlds 121;
   II. Conceptual Realism.
   7. The nexus of predication 139;
   8. Medieval logic and conceptual realism 169; 9. On Geach against general reference 195; 10. Lesniewski's Ontology 215; 11. Plurals and the logic of classes as many 235; 12. The logic of natural kinds 273; Afterword on Truth-Makers 295; Bibliography 297; Index 307-316.
   "The history of philosophy is replete with different metaphysical schemes of the ontological structure of the world. These schemes have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms, and the arguments for and against them, including their consistency and adequacy as explanatory frameworks, have generally been given in even more informal terms. The goal of formal ontology is to correct for these deficiencies. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme; and then by comparing different reconstructed schemes with one another as formal ontologies we can

better evaluate the arguments for and against them, and come to a decision as to which system it is best to adopt. This book is divided into two parts. The first part is on formal ontology and how different informal ontological systems can be formally developed and compared with one another. An abstract set-theoretic framework, which we call comparative formal ontology, can be used for this purpose without assuming that set theory is itself a superseding ontological system. The second part of this book is on the formal construction and defense of a particular ontological scheme called conceptual realism. Conceptual realism is to be preferred to alternative formal ontologies for the reasons briefly described below, and for others as well that are given in more detail in various parts of the book. Conceptual realism, in other words, is put forward here as the best ontological system to adopt." (From the *Introduction*, p. XIII)

6. Cocchiarella, Nino, and Freund, Max A. 2008. *Modal Logic. An Introduction to its Syntax and Semantics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Table of Contents: 1. Introduction 1; 2. The syntax of modal sentential calculi 15; 3. Matrix semantics 45; 4. Semantics for logical necessity 61; 5. Semantics for S 5 71; 6. Relational world systems 81; 7. Quantified modal logic 119; 8. The semantics of quantified modal logic 153; 9. Second-order modal logic 183; 10. Semantics of second-order modal logic 215; Afterword 253; Bibliography 257; Index 263-268.
   "Modal logic is a theoretical field that is important not only in philosophy, where logic in general is commonly studied, but in mathematics, linguistics, and computer and information sciences as well. This book will be useful for students, researchers, and professionals in all of these and related disciplines. The only requirement is some familiarity with first-order logic and elementary set-theory.
   The main outline of this book is a development of the logical syntax and semantics of modal logic in three stages of increasing logical complexity. The first stage is a comprehensive development of sentential modal logic, which is followed by a similarly comprehensive

development of first-order modal predicate logic. The final stage is a development of second-order modal predicate logic. These stages are introduced gradually, with increasing difficulty at each stage. Most of the important results in modal logic are described and proved in each of their respective stages.

This book is based on a series of lectures given over a number of years at Indiana University by the first author. A draft of the book has also been used by the second author in Costa Rica and Mexico. The book is organized as follows. We begin in chapter 1 with concatenation theory and the logistic method. By means of this theory and method we describe the construction of expressions, formal languages, and formal systems or calculi. Different modal calculi are then constructed in chapter 2. These cover all of the well-known systems, S1–S5, of Lewis and Langford's 1932 classic *Symbolic Logic*. As already indicated, these systems are constructed first on the level of sentential (or propositional) logic and then later in chapter 7 on the level of first-order predicate logic, where we distinguish the quantified modal logic of actualism from that of possibilism.

The systems are then extended yet again to the level of second-order modal predicate logic in chapter 9, where the notion of existence that is central to the actualism-possibilism distinction is given a deeper and finer-grained analysis in terms of existence-entailing concepts, as opposed to concepts that do not entail existence." (From the *Introduction*, p. 1)

ESSAYS

1. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1966. "A Logic of Actual and Possible Objects." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 31:688.
   See note in 1966c.
2. ———. 1966. "A Completeness Theorem for Tense Logic." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 31:689.
   See note in 1966c.

3. ———. 1966. "Modality within Tense Logic." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 31:690.
Note to the reprint of these three items in Karel Lambert (ed.) *Philosophical Applications of Free Logic*, New York: Oxford University Press 1991): " The abstracts are summaries of lectures given at the December, 1965 meetings of the Association for Symbolic Logic.
(A preliminary version of those lectures was given at UCLA in 1963, and a final version was given at UCLA in the spring of 1965 at a public lecture constituting the defense of my doctoral dissertation.)"
4. ———. 1968. "Some Remarks on Second Order Logic with Existence Attributes." *Noûs* no. 2:163-175.
"In *Past, Present and Future* A. N. Prior bas suggested an approach towards the concept of existence where, following medieval logicians, we are to distinguish "between predicates (like 'is red', 'is hard', etc.) which entail existence, and predicates (like 'is thought to be red, 'is thought of', etc.) which do not" (p. 161). Let us refer to attributes (including relational attributes) which are designated by the former kind of predicate as existence attributes, or for brevity, e-attributes. It is suggested then that "x exists" is to be defined as "there is some e-attribute which x possesses". A formalization of this (at least) second order logic of existence was recently brought about and reported on by the present author in [6]. The formalization was shown to be complete in the sense corresponding to the completeness of standard second order logic, i.e. in the sense which encompasses normal, non-standard as well standard models. (Cfr. A. Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* (1956) - § 54). I should like in the present paper to discuss some of the philosophical issues involved in this formalization as well as some issues concerning the general notion of e-attribute." (p. 163)
5. ———. 1969. "A Substitution Free Axiom Set for Second Order Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 10:18-30.
"In what follows we present an adequate formulation of second order logic by means of an axiom set whose

characterization does not require the notion of proper substitution either of a term for an individual variable or of a formula for a predicate variable. The axiom set is adequate in the sense of being equivalent to standard formulations of second order logic, e.g., that of Church [1]. It is clear and need not be shown here that every theorem of the present formulation is a theorem of the formulation given by Church. It of course will be shown here, however, that each of Church's axioms are theorems of the present system and that each of his primitive inference rules is either a primitive (and only modus ponens is taken as a primitive rule here) or a derived rule of the present system.

The importance of obtaining an axiomatic formulation such as herein described lies partly in the significance of reducing any axiom set to an equivalent one which involves fewer metalogical notions, especially such a one as proper substitution. However, of somewhat greater importance, it is highly desirable that we possess a formulation of both first and second order logic which can be extended without qualification to such areas as tense, epistemic, deontic, modal and logics of the like. Now proper substitution especially has been the main obstacle to such unqualified extensions of standard logic, and we take it to be of no little significance that at least for first order logic (with identity) a substitution free axiomatic formulation has been provided. (1) The present system extends this earlier result to the level of second order logic. (2)

A second difficulty in unqualified extensions of standard logic concerns the form which Leibniz' law, i.e., the law regarding interchangeability *salva veritate*, is to take. Generally, in the extensions of standard logic to modal logic, this law has been formulated in an unqualified form applicable to all contexts, thereby lending credence to the questionable view that only "intensions" or the like can serve adequately as values of the variables for such systems. In the substitution free formulations of first order logic cited, however, Leibniz' law is axiomatically formulated only for atomic contexts, and the qualified form or forms the law takes for contexts involving non-standard formula operators

is given in the statement of metatheorems. (3) But again, it is a far different matter having such qualifications stipulated in the form of metatheorems as opposed to having them built directly into the characterization of the logical axioms. As we have said, it is desirable that the standard logical axioms for either first or second order logic be so that axiomatic extensions of standard logic can be made without qualification.4 This desirable feature of the substitution free formulations of first order logic mentioned is retained in our present second order system." (pp. 18-19)

(1) Such a formulation is given by A. Tarski in [2] and developed byD. Kalish and R. Montague in [3]. The present author in [4] and [5] has also formulated a substitution free axiomatization of first order logic without "existential presuppositions."

(2) Of course, when extending either first or second order logic to tense, epistemic, deontic, or modal logic, qualifications in metatheorems regarding principles of proper substitution will be required. Nevertheless, it is a far different matter having such qualifications stipulated in the form of metatheorems than it is having them built directly into the characterization of the logical axioms themselves.

(3) cf. [4], lemma 4.27 (p. 108) and the discussion on page 106. The objections against an unqualified, general version of Leibniz' principle (or interchangeability *salva veritate*) are applicable when certain special 'Opaque" contexts are involved, be they modal or otherwise. But all such contexts are—or should be when properly formalized—other than atomic, their "opacity" being generated within the scope of special formula operators. Atomic formulas, because they are atomic, will contain no occurrences of such operators and consequently will uphold par excellence the Leibnizian principle unqualifiedly."

References

[1] Church, A., *Introduction to Mathematical* Logic, Vol. I, Princeton, 1956.

[2] Tarski, A., "A Simplified Formalization of Predicate Logic with Identity," *Arch. f. Math. Logik u. Grundl.*, 7 (1965), 61-79.

[3] Kalish, D., and Montague, R., 'On Tarski's Formalization of Predicate Logic with Identity," *Arch. f. Math. Logik u. Grundl.*, 7 (1965), 81-101.
[4] Cocchiarella, N., Tense Logic: A Study of Temporal Reference, Doctoral Thesis, UCLA, 1966.
[5] Cocchiarella, N., "A Logic of Actual and Possible Objects," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 31 (1966), 688f.

6. ———. 1969. "A Second Order Logic of Existence." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 34:57-69.
"A. N. Prior in [9] has suggested an approach towards a second order logic of existence where, following medieval logicians, we distinguish "between predicates (like 'is red', 'is hard', etc.) which entail existence, and predicates (like 'is thought to be red', 'is thought of', etc.) which do not."(2) Let us refer to attributes (including relational attributes) which are designated by the former kind of predicate as existence attributes, or for brevity, e-attributes. It is suggested then that *x exists' be defined as 'there is some e-attribute which x possesses'. In what follows, this approach regarding the concept of existence is formalized semantically as well as syntactically, and a completeness theorem is established corresponding to the completeness (in a secondary sense, i.e., as including normal, nonstandard models) of standard second order logic (as formulated, for example, in Church [1])."
[For a more philosophical discussion of the present system, especially of the substitution free form of its axiom set, cf. *Some Remarks on Second Order Logic with Existence Attributes*].
(2) p. 161
References
[1] A. Church, *Introduction to mathematical logic*, vol. I, Princeton, N.J., 1956.
[9] A. N. Prior, *Past, present and future*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1967.

7. ———. 1969. "Existence Entailing Attributes, Modes of Copulation, and Modes of Being in Second Order Logic." *Noûs* no. 3:33-48.

"Recently, in [5], I formulated a second order logic of existence which centered around the distinction between those attributes that entail existence and those that do not. (1) The distinction provides
an especially apt explication of the concept of existence and is for this reason especially pertinent to pragmatics and intensional logic, encompassing as they do such areas as tense, epistemic, deontic and modal logic.(2) For example, apropos of tense logic some attributes, such as being red, being round, being hard, etc., cannot be possessed at a time except by objects existing at that time. Other attributes, especially relational attributes between objects whose "lifespans" need not overlap, such as being an ancestor of everyone (someone) now existing, being remembered by someone now existing, (3) etc., may very well be possessed by objects which no longer exist; others, e.g., being a future descendant of everyone (someone) now existing, may be possessed by objects which have yet to exist. Still other attributes such as being believed to be a flying horse may be possessed by objects which never exist. Those attributes which entail existence (at the time of their possession) I shall call existence attributes, or for brevity, e-attributes. By a relational e-attribute I mean an attribute which entails existence with respect to each of its argument places.
In the present paper I shall discuss some of the motivation for distinguishing e-attributes from attributes in general. As indicated, this motivation depends essentially on the desire to use logistic systems in which we are allowed to recognize modes of being other than that of actual existence, e.g., such modes in tense logic as past and future existence, or, in the logic of belief, the mode of "intentional inexistence". As also indicated, the concept of existence is central to this discussion and I shall here examine informally its explication in terms of e-attributes. In a sequel to the present paper I shall present and discuss a formal analysis of this explication in the context of a semantics for standard second order logic, with quantification over e-attributes distinguished from quantification over attributes in general. The focal point of the formal discussion will be the issue of

the logical priority of the notion of e-attribution over that of being an existing object, a priority which exemplifies that of the intensional over the extensional and which, for its clarification, requires some observations on the class-attribute distinction." (pp. 33-34)

(1) For a more philosophical discussion of the axiom set for this formalization, see [4]. I follow Carnap [1], p. 5, in using attribute' to comprehend both properties and relations (in-intension). Properties are 1-place or unary attributes and are designated by 1-place predicate expressions. Extending Carnap's terminology, propositions are understood to be designated by 0-place predicate expressions and are therefore construed as 0-place attributes (whose extensions are truth-values).

(2) Cf. R. M. Montague [9] and [10] for an elegant and philosophically stimulating formulation of pragmatics and intensional logic. Montague's formulation of intensional logic, supplemented by the distinction between existence entailing and other kinds of attributes, is perhaps the most appropriate general logical framework to which the discussion and observations of the present paper lead.

(3) This example is given by R. M. Montague in [9] and [10].

References

[1] Carnap, R., *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications* (New York: Dover Press, 1958).

[4] Cocchiarella, N., “Some Remarks on Second Order Logic with Existence Attributes,” Noûs, II, 2 (1968): 165-175.

[5] Cocchiarella, N., “A Second Order Logic of Existence,” JSL, forthcoming [1969].

[9] Montague, R. M., “Pragmatics and Intensional Logic,” forthcoming in *Dialectica*. [published in *Synthese,* Vol. 22, No. 1/2, Semantics of Natural Language, II (Dec., 1970), pp. 68-94]

[10] Montague, R. M., “Pragmatics,” in Raymond Klibansky (ed.), *Contemporary Philosophy—La Philosophie Contemporaine* (Florence: 1968).

8. ———. 1969. "A Completeness Theorem in Second Order Modal Logic." *Theoria.A Swedish Journal of Philosophy* no. 35:81-103.

"In what follows we present a second order formulation of S5 which is shown to be complete relative to a secondary sense of validity corresponding to that relative to which standard second order logic is known to be complete.(1) In our semantical metalanguage we consider various indexed sets of possible worlds and allow that not all objects existing in one indexed world need exist in another. However, as we have therefore confessed in the metalanguage our ontological commitment to all the objects that exist in one world or another, we acknowledge and formalize this confession in our object languages through allowing for quantification over *possibilia*.
Our means for distinguishing the existent from the mere possible is through a distinction between those attributes that entail existence (with respect to each of their argument places), referred to hereafter as e-attributes, and those attributes that do not.2 Accordingly, we understand 'x exists" to mean There is some e-attribute which x possesses", thus rendering existence essentially impredicative. An alternative and equivalent route—but which we shall not follow here—is possible through taking existence as primitive in the form of quantification over existing objects and defining e-attributes as those attributes which necessarily are possessed only by existing objects." (p. 81)
(1) Cf. Henkin [9].
(2) For a modal free complete (in a secondary sense) formulation of second order logic with existence attributes, see Cocchiarella [5]. For a more philosophical discussion of this approach toward existence, see Cocchiarella [6] and [7].
References
[1] Church, A., *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Vol. I, Princeton, 1956.
[5] Cocchiarella, N., "A Second Order Logic of Existence", Journal of Symbolic Logic., vol. 34 (1969).
[6] Cocchiarella, N., "Some Remarks on Second Order Logic with Existence Attributes", *Noûs*, 2, 1968, 165-175.
[7] Cocchiarella, N., "Existence Entailing Attributes, Modes of Copulation and Modes of Being in Second Order Logic",

Noûs, 3, 1969, 33-48.
[9] Henkin, L., "Completeness in the Theory of Types", *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 15 (1950), 81-91.

9. ———. 1972. "Properties as Individuals in Formal Ontology." *Noûs* no. 6:165-187.
"Russell's supposed paradox of predication has occasionally been cited as a source for lessons in ontology. So, for example, Grossmann in [6] has argued that one of the lessons of Russell's paradox is that there are no complex properties. A recent re-evaluation of the supposed paradox, however, has led me to the conclusion that there is no paradox (cf. [3]). And of course where there is no paradox, there are no lessons of paradox.
There may, however, be lessons of non-paradox, especially if instead of contradiction what results is a highly instructive ontological oddity. In what follows I shall briefly review the considerations that led me to conclude that there is no paradox but instead only this ontological oddity with instructive lessons of its own, relative of course to the ontological framework within which it occurs. I shall then briefly consider several ways of responding to this oddity, where each response presupposes an alternative ontological framework relative to which the response accounts for the oddity by either showing it to rest on an ontological error, as with Grossmann's response, or by mitigating its effect through what purports to be a deeper or wider framework than the original one in which the oddity occurs." (p. 165)
References
[3] Cocchiarella, N., "Whither Russell's Paradox of Predication," forthcoming in *Logic and Ontology*, vol. 2 of *Studies in Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by M. K. Munitz and to be published by New York University Press [1973].
[6] Grossmann, R., "Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties," Noûs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May, 1972), pp. 153-164.

10. ———. 1973. "Whither Russell's Paradox of Predication?" In *Logic and Ontology*, edited by Munitz, Milton K., 133-158. New York University Press.

Contributions to a seminar on ontology held under the auspices of the New York University Institute of Philosophy for the year 1970-1971.

"Russell's paradox has two forms or versions, one in regard to the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, the other in regard to "the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself."(1) The first version is formulable in the ideography of Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* and shows this system to be inconsistent. The second version, however, is not formulable in this ideography, as Frege himself pointed out in his reply to Russell. (2) Nevertheless, it is essentially the second version of his paradox that leads Russell to avoid it (and others of its ilk) through his theory of types.

The first version is of course the relevant version with respect to any formulation of the theory of types in which membership in a class is the fundamental notion, that is, a formulation utilizing 'ε' as a primitive binary predicate constant.(3) However, Russell's theory of types (even ignoring its ramification) is essentially concerned with the notion of predication, and only indirectly through the (philosophically questionable) interpretation of predication as the membership relation is the first version of his paradox relevant to this formulation.

Apparently, Russell saw his paradox as generating an aporetic situation in regard to two fundamental "notions," namely, the notion of membership (in a class) and the notion of predication (of an attribute).(4) In regard to the notion of membership, the application of Russell's paradox is not here brought into question. However, in regard to the notion of predication, the applicability of the reasoning grounding Russell's paradox will here be very much brought into question. Indeed, I shall claim that in this case the paradox fails.(5)" (pp. 133-135)

(1) "Letter to Frege," reprinted in [10], p. 125.

(2) "Letter to Russell," ibid., p. 128.

(3) Cf. [5], p. 140 for a specific formulation of this kind of type theory.

(4) Gödel (cf. [6], p. 131f.) distinguishes these two forms of Russell's paradox by referring to them as the "extensional" and the "intensional" forms, respectively. For the purposes of the present paper, this distinction is preferable to Ramsey's different but better known distinction between "logical" and "semantical" paradoxes.
(5) With this failure of course goes a primary if not sole motivation for the simple theory of ontological types of third and higher order. The ontological scheme of second-order logic remains unaffected, having as it does a natural motivation of its own. Ramification also has its own motivation, and it may be appended to second-order logic (cf. [2], §58.) even though historically it was first appended to the simple theory of types.
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[6] Gödel, K., "Russell's Mathematical Logic," *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. P. A. Schilpp (ed.). Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1944.
[10] Van Heijenoort, J., *From Frege to Gödel*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

11. ———. 1974. "Fregean Semantics for a Realist Ontology." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 15:552-568.
"T* is a logistic system1 designed to represent the original ontological context behind Russel's paradox of predication. It encompasses standard second order logic, hereafter referred to as T, but goes beyond it by allowing predicate variables to occupy subject positions in its formulas. Because of a violation of the restrictions imposed for the proper substitution of a formula for a predicate variable, RusselΓs argument fails in T*. Indeed, not only is T* consistent but it is also a conservative extension of T.
It has been suggested that one way of understanding this result is to construe occurrences of predicates in subject positions as referring, not to the properties which

occurrences of the same predicates in predicate positions designate, but instead, to individual objects associated with these properties.4 Such a suggestion of course is reminiscent of Frege's ontology. And were it not that Frege is quite insistent in viewing predicates as "unsaturated" expressions and therefore not qualified as substituends for subject positions which can be occupied only by "saturated" expressions, it might be tempting to construe T* as representative of Frege's ontology. Be that as it may, the disproof of the principle that indiscernible properties are co-extensive, which is all that RusselΓs paradox comes to in T*, is reinterpreted according to this suggestion so as to show merely a variant of Cantor's theorem. And that after all is rather appropriate, since Russell's argument for his supposed paradox is really but a variant of Cantor's argument for his theorem.

In what follows we formulate the suggestion semantically and show that although the semantics thus provided does not characterize T*, it does characterize a certain rather interesting subsystem T** of T* supplemented by the extensionality principle that co-extensive properties are indiscernible.(5) The supplemented system, T**+(Ext*), no doubt appears bizarre from the point of view of the original ontological background represented by T*—since in this ontology not all indiscernible properties are co-extensive whereas, according to the supplement, all co-extensive properties are indiscernible, thus suggesting co-extensiveness to be a stronger connection between properties than is the indiscernibility relation.

On the other hand, from the point of view of its quasi-Fregean semantics, the supplement seems rather natural—for according to this semantics the supplement amounts to the stipulation that the same individual object is to be associated with co-extensive properties. Fregean naturalness aside, it should perhaps be noted that the existence of a model-set-theoretic semantics characteristic for T*—or of T* supplemented with principles natural to the ontology of T*—remains yet an open problem." (pp. 552-553)

(2) Cf. [2], §6.
(3) Ibid., §5. We should avoid using 'identical' in place of indiscernible' here. In [3], Meyer has shown that according to T* there exists no relation which satisfies full substitutivity, and, accordingly, insofar as full substitutivity is taken to be a necessary feature of identity, there is and can be no identity relation in the ontology of T*.
(4) This suggestion is implicit, though only in a partial way, in the argument independently arrived at by Zorn and Meyer that T* is a conservative extension of T. It is explicit in the type of model defined below as quasi-Fregean and first recommended to the author as characteristic of T* by N. Belnap.
(5) It is easily seen from the proof in [2] that T* is a conservative extension of T, that this extensionality principle is not a theorem of T*—nor for that matter is its negation.
References
[2] Cocchiarella, N., "Whither Russell's Paradox of Predication?," in *Logic and Ontology*, edited by Milton K. Munitz, New York University Press (1973), pp. 133-158.
[3] Meyer, R., "Identity in Cocchiarella's T*" *Nous*, vol. VI (1972), pp. 189-197.

12. ———. 1974. "Formal Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics." In *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, edited by Nakhnikian, George, 29-46. London: Duckworth.
"In his paper, 'The Undefinability of the Set of Natural Numbers in the Ramified *Principia'*, [*] Myhill has shown that the general concept of a natural number or finite cardinal - general enough, that is, to yield the induction schema - is not definable in terms of ramified type theory in essentially its original form and without the axiom of reducibility. In my commentary I shall examine Myhill's concluding philosophical remarks within the context of general metaphysics or what below I call formal ontology. I shall especially be concerned with the sense in which ramified type theory (without the axiom of reducibility) purports to represent a constructive philosophy of mathematics. In addition, I shall sketch several forms of

realism according to which the claim that "impredicativity is present in mathematics from the beginning" is true in an especially apt and interesting sense that goes beyond that intended by Myhill." (p. 29)
[*] In George Nakhnikian (ed.), *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, pp. 19-27.

13. ———. 1974. "Logical Atomism and Modal Logic." *Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* no. 4:41-66. Reprinted as Chapter 6 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 222-243.
"Logical atomism has been construed as both a realist and a nominalist ontology. Despite their different ontological commitments, proponents of both types of atomism have tended to agree that modal operators for necessity and possibility, and thereby strict entailment too, are totally alien to the ontological grammar of logical atomism. The reason for this, apparently, is that any inclusion of modal operators in the ontological grammar of logical atomism, whether that grammar be of the nominalist or realist variants, would represent a commitment to internal properties and relations with material content. And in logical atomism, of course, all internal properties and relations, be they of objects or of situations, are formal and not material in nature. (Cf. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, ([TR]), 4.122).
However, to the contrary, we shall argue that not only are propositional connectives for logical necessity and possibility, and thereby strict entailment too, no more alien to the ontological grammar of logical atomism than are connectives for conjunction and disjunction, but, moreover, that the formal or internal properties and relations of objects and situations in the ontology cannot be adequately represented by the propositional forms of that grammar unless connectives for logical necessity and possibility are included (or definable by others so included) therein.
That is, we shall argue that connectives for logical necessity and possibility, together with their proper “logico-syntactical employment” ([TR], 3.327), represent formal, and not material, internal “properties,” and, moreover, that

these formal, internal "properties" are part of the ontology of logical atomism and cannot be adequately represented without the inclusion of such connectives in the ontological grammar of any formal system purporting to represent that ontology.(1)

Our position and argument, incidentally, applies only to modal operators for logical necessity and possibility. All other modal operators, we agree, because they purport to represent internal "properties" or "relations" with real material content (e.g., causality, and even temporality via tense logic), are strictly prohibited within the metaphysical framework of logical atomism. "Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus" ([TR], 5.1361). "The only necessity that exists is logical necessity" ([TR], 6.37). Moreover, our concern here shall be with logical atomism as the metaphysical framework for a type of formal ontology. Our concern will not be with logical atomism as the framework for either a theory of meaning or a theory of knowledge. Accordingly, neither the Carnapian theory of *Protokolsätze* nor the Tractarian picture theory of meaning are essential to our present purely ontological considerations. We should note, however, that the Tractarian theory of elementary propositions as pictures contains both a theory of predication and a theory of meaning. It is the theory of predication that is an essential part of the ontology of logical atomism.

In the present chapter we shall limit our formal developments to the level of analysis dealing solely with propositional connectives. Our next chapter will deal with nominalist logical atomism where only individual variables are bindable but where atomism's theory of predication enters the ontological grammar in a fundamental way. That chapter will also contain a description of several variants of realist logical atomism, one in which material properties and relations of objects are themselves objects, and another where material properties and relations of objects, though indicated by bound predicate variables (as in the first variant of realism), are not themselves objects (values of individual variables) but are nexuses or modes of

configurations of objects (as they are in nominalism where they are not indicated by bound predicate variables)." (pp. 222-223 of the reprint)

14. ———. 1974. "A New Formulation of Predicative Second Order Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 65-66:61-87.
"In what follows, a predicative second order logic is formulated and shown to be complete with respect to the proposed model theoretic semantics. The logic differs in certain fundamental ways from the system formulated by Church in [1] § 58. The more important differences are noted and discussed throughout the present paper. A more specialized motivation for the new formulation is outlined in § 2.
In regard to the motivation for Church's formulation, this will be found in its natural extension to ramified type theory (without the axiom of reducibility). Within this larger framework, the theory of predication represented by such a formulation can be seen to be constructive: higher order entities are constructible from entities of lower order, with real, non-constructed individuals as the entities of lowest order. Set theory, to whatever extent it is representable in the framework, appears in the ramified hierarchy only after propositional functions are allowed to be arguments of third and higher order predicates. To introduce sets as real, non-constructed individuals of lowest order would be antithetical to the framework's constructive theory of predication and in violation of its philosophical motivation." (...)
"Essential to this proposal, however, is a view of the predicative/impredicative distinction radically different from that found in ramified type theory — and hence in Church's formulation of predicative second order logic. The latter framework (barring the axiom of reducibility) represents a constructive theory of predication that rules out all manner of categorial content (indicated by bound predicate variables) or logistic efficacy for impredicative contexts. In the proposed, modified Fregean theory, however, impredicative contexts (wffs) are allowed to have logistic efficacy — and perhaps even categorial content if

standard quantifiers ranging over all properties and relations are retained as well.
If, on the one hand, only quantifiers for predicatively specifiable properties and relations are allowed, then in this new formulation of predicative second order logic impredicative contexts — which in general will contain free (schematic) predicate variables or certain predicate constants — will be syncategorematic expressions, since they will not then be permissible substituends of generalized predicate variables. This does not mean that they must then be accorded null content. They may instead represent logical or formal content variant to what Frege calls second and third level "concepts". (4)
This logical content would in effect be the basis of their logistic efficacy. (5)
If, on the other hand, these impredicative contexts are to be given categorial content by retaining standard quantifiers, then care must be made to distinguish these quantifiers from those ranging over only predicatively specifiable properties and relations. Both kinds of quantifiers will bind the same variables, but impredicative wffs will be permissible substituends only of variables bound by the one quantifier. (6)
They remain impermissible substituends of variables bound by the quantifiers for predicative properties and relations. In the system to be formulated here we are concerned only with the first of the above alternatives, although once formulated it is easily extended to the richer framework. (7)" (pp. 61-64)
(4) We should distinguish at least two kinds of content that expressions of a formal system might have. The first is generally called descriptive, but historically has been called categorial, which we prefer here since even without (applied) descriptive constants the content is still indicated by bound variables, (Hence our reference to categorial content.) The second is generally called logical or formal, or, traditionally, syncategorematic and is understood to be immanent to the logistic system in question. This latter content is usually said to be null or non-existent because it

is not denoted or designated by corresponding constants, or, equivalently, because it is not indicated by any type of bound variable. (It may however be «indicated» in a secondary sense by free or schematic variables, and therefore also by constants that are substituends of these free or schematic variables.)
This rather standard view is untenable, however; for if the corresponding or associated expressions have logistic efficacy in the system, that fact can be accounted for only in terms of their representing content of some sort.
On the other hand, because of its immanency, this content need not be therefore accorded categorial existence, i.e., it need not be indicated by bound variables. Our point here, however, is that categorial existence is not the only philosophically viable notion of existence. In ramified type theory (without the axiom of reducibility), impredicativity has neither categorial nor syncategorial existence. In the new predicative second order logic, impredicativity has syncategorial but not categorial existence. In standard second order logic, impredicativity has categorial existence.
(5) A perspicuous representation of this logistic efficacy is the rule (S) of substitution of wffs for free (schematic) predicate variables or constants occurring in theorems. (Cf. 4 below for a description and derivation of (S).) This rule, though derivable in the predicative second order logic formulated here, is not derivable in Church formulation. Indeed, its addition there as a new rule results in standard, and not predicative, second order logic. This is not the case in the new formulation given here.
(6) The principle of universal instantiation, (UI), of wffs those containing as well as those not containing bound predicate variables — for a generalized predicate variable is now both formulable and valid when the generalized predicate variable is bound by the standard quantifier. This principle implies the weaker rule (S) and therefore contains, and goes beyond, the logistic efficacy of that rule. (7)" (pp. 61-64)
References

[1] Church, A., *Introduction to Mathematical* Logic, Princeton University Press, 1956.

15. ———. 1975. "On the Primary and Secondary Semantics of Logical Necessity." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 4:13-27.

"The semantical development of modal logic over the past fifteen years has incorporated a particular model-theoretic artifice which has received little or no critical attention. It is our contention that this artifice introduces, at least within conceptual frameworks typified by logical atomism, a subtle form of descriptive as opposed to merely formal content into the semantics of modal operators. This is particularly noteworthy at least for systems containing operators for the so-called logical modalities, e.g., logical necessity or possibility, or their cognate binary modality, strict implication; for, if any modal operators or connectives had ever been conceptually ordained to represent merely logical or formal operations with no material or descriptive content, it is such as these. Yet, as a result of this model-theoretic artifice, that is precisely what they fail to do. Relative to a given non-empty universe of objects and a set of predicates of arbitrary (finite) addicity (representing the nexuses of atomic or basic states of affairs), the artifice in question concerns allowing modal operators to range (in their semantical clauses) over arbitrary non-empty subsets of the set of all the possible worlds (models) based upon the given universe of objects and the set of predicates in question. The intuitive and natural interpretation of modal operators for logical modalities, however, is that they range over all the possible worlds (models) of a logical space (as determined by a universe of objects and a set of predicate-nexuses) and not some arbitrary non-empty subset of that totality. The latter interpretation, by allowing the exclusion of some of the worlds (models) of a logical space, imports material conditions into the semantics of modal operators. This exclusion, however appropriate for the representation of non-logical (e.g., causal or temporal) modalities, is quite inappropriate for the representation of what are purported to be merely formal or logical modalities.

This model-theoretic artifice of allowing the exclusion of some of the worlds (models) of a logical Space goes back to Kripke [5] where the notion of universal validity is used instead of the intuitive and primary notion of logical truth. Later semantical developments, by Kripke and others, retained the artifice and supplemented it with additional model-theoretic features, e.g., special accessibility relations between the non-excluded worlds, or semantical clauses allowing objectual quantifiers to range over arbitrary subsets of the universe of objects (thereby importing material content into the semantics of these operators as well). Such additions only deepened and supplemented the type and variability of the material content already induced by modal operators as a result of the artifice in its simplest form. And in that regard, however appropriate these additions may be for the representation of particular non-logical modalities, they only mark a further departure from the supposed purely formal content of operators for logical modalities. For this reason we shall ignore these later developments here and restrict our observations to some of the implications of the artifice in its original and simplest form. It should be kept in mind, however, that our discussion pertains only to operators for the so-called logical modalities." (pp. 13-14)
(...)
"Concluding remarks.
It is not our contention that we should eschew either the model-theoretic artifice of allowing modal operators to range over only some and not all of the worlds (models) of a given logical space or the related artifice of allowing («-place) predicate quantifiers to range over only some and not all of the sets (of «-tuples) of objects in the universe of that space. Indeed, we agree that such artifices are quite appropriate and may in fact be required for operators purportedly representing non-logical modalities (e.g., temporal or causal modalities) or for quantifiers which purportedly range over attributes of a restricted form of content (e.g., perceptual content, or existence-entailing

content where past- and future-existence are distinguished from present-existence).
It is our contention, however, that the employment of such an artifice is inappropriate in the semantics of what one considers to be a purely formal or syncategorematic sign. The fact that a secondary semantics which includes such an artifice yields a proof of completeness where the primary semantics showed incompleteness instead does not itself justify employment of the artifice. Rather, to adopt a secondary semantics for this sort of reason is, in our view, to already call into question the sense in which the sign is said to be syncategorematic or the sense in which the content purportedly represented is said to be of a purely formal nature. That of course may in the end be the appropriate question to raise in regard to all our so-called syncategorematic or logical constants. But to raise the question and to answer it adequately are two entirely different enterprises." (p. 28)
References
[5] Kripke, S., 'A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 24 (1959), 1-14.

16. ———. 1975. "Second Order Theories of Predication: Old and New Foundations." *Noûs* no. 9:33-53.
"Second-order theories of predication are based on the assumption that a semantical or ontological interpretation of the forms of predication found in first-order languages will be philosophically adequate only if within the framework of the interpretation there exist entities corresponding to (some if not all of) the predicates occurring in these forms. These entities, depending on the theory in question, may or may not be projected as existing in reality independently of the structure of thought. For convenience, however, we shall refer to them in either case as properties when they are projected as corresponding to monadic predicates and as n-ary relations when they are projected as corresponding to n-place predicates, for n > 1. Now the nature of the correspondence in which properties and relations are purported to stand to predicates in second-order theories is such that it cannot be identified

with or reduced to the relation of denotation between singular terms, e.g., individual constants or variables, and the individuals or objects which they are understood to denote. In some second-order theories it cannot be understood as a relation at all, though in others it will (properly) include the singular-term denotation relation (in the sense that properties and relations can also be denoted therein by singular terms) while still going beyond it in ways that are peculiar to predicates. For this reason, quantification over the theoretically projected or posited properties and relations is primarily effected through quantified predicate variables and not, as it were, through a form of restricted quantification over one or another kind of individual. Informally, we say that properties and relations have in this regard a *predicative nature*, though in some theories they may have a *nominative* nature as well.

In what follows we shall be concerned, though somewhat unevenly, with this distinction between second-order theories in which properties and relations have only a predicative nature as opposed to those in which they are purported to have a nominative nature as well. The two general types of second-order theory we have in mind, then, are distinguished according to (1) whether the nature of the correspondence between predicates on the one hand and properties and relations on the other is to (properly) include the singular-term denotation relation so that predicates, within the framework of the theory, are allowable substituends of individual variables; or (2) whether the purported mode of being of properties and relations is strictly of a predicative nature which excludes their being arguments or logical subjects of predication in any sense which is logically similar to that in which individuals in general are. In the first type of theory, properties and relations are themselves individuals, i.e., have a nominative as well as a predicative nature, whereas in the second the categories or modes of being purportedly indicated by quantified predicate and individual variables are ontologically disjoint. Following Frege, we shall speak of properties and relations as *unsaturated* entities when they

are projected entities of a theory of the latter sort." (pp. 33-34)

17. ———. 1975. "Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic." *Synthese* no. 31:23-62.
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 244-275.
"Logical atomism, through its theory of logical form, provides one of the most coherent formal ontologies in the history of philosophy. It is a coherence which, whether we agree with the ontology or not, renders the framework important and useful as a paradigm by which to compare and better evaluate the coherence of alternative systems based upon alternative theories of logical form and especially alternative theories of predication.
As the basis of a formal ontology, logical atomism, aside from the differences between its realist and nominalist variants, specifies not only a 'deep structure' ontological grammar within which all analysis must ultimately be resolved, but determines as well a logistic for that grammar. Both together constitute the formal ontology and serve to indicate how logical atomism views the fundamental structure of reality. Thus, for example, the grammar serves to indicate the formal as well as the material categories of being acknowledged by the ontology, while the logistic, by regulating the proper 'logico-syntactical employment' ([TR], 3.327) of the expressions of that grammar serves to indicate not only the logical 'scaffolding of the world' ([TR], 6.124) but supplements the grammar in its presentation of the ontological structure of reality.
The distinction between logical scaffolding and ontological structure is fundamental to atomism and pertains to a distinction between material and formal content that grammar alone is insufficient to represent. It is a distinction that any proposed formalization of logical atomism must account for (through the Doctrine of Showing) in order to be an adequate formal representative of that ontology. It is a distinction, however, or so it will be argued here, that cannot be made without the introduction of modal operators for logical necessity and possibility.

The argument for this last claim was already given in chapter 6, but it was there restricted to the level of logical analysis dealing solely with propositional connectives."
(...)
"In what follows we shall be concerned with the problematic extension of these results to the level of analysis involving quantifiers for objects as concrete particulars along with some means for expressing their self-identity and mutual difference. On this level, logical atomism's theory of predication enters our considerations in a fundamental way. For according to that theory, only elementary predications represent or 'picture' a structure with material content, and that content is in all cases external to the constituents of the structure. Such a structure is an atomic situation (*Sachlage*) and the externality of its content to its constituents consists in both it and its complement being logically possible. The difficulty here is that since objects are quantified over, they are part of the world and therefore contribute to the ontological content of the world (cf. [TR] 5.5561); and in that regard their self-identity and mutual difference or nonidentity, and thereby their total number, would prima facie seem to involve material content. Yet, in atomism, an object's self-identity or nonidentity with any other object is not an external condition of that object, (3) and, as a consequence of the dependence of logical space on reality, it is logically impossible for the totality of objects, no less the number of that totality, to differ from world to world. In other words, in logical atomism, if not in other ontologies, identity and difference, as well as objectual quantification, are formal and not material aspects of reality. Here already we begin to see the paradigmatic role of logical atomism, for in most other systems identity and difference, as well as objectual quantification, are also said to be formal in content, though propositions regarding that content are not also said to be either logically necessary or logically impossible.
Because our considerations will be restricted to quantifying over objects as concrete particulars and not, for example, over material properties and relations as well, the variant of

logical atomism we shall discuss here is nominalistic. Several realist alternatives are sketched in order to highlight the significant theses and/or difficulties of nominalism, though it should be noted that not all forms of nominalism need agree with the special ontological theses of nominalist logical atomism.

Finally, it should also be noted that our concern in this chapter is with an adequate formal representation of the ontology of logical atomism and not with its theory of thought, meaning, or philosophy of language. We wish to leave open how these might or must be developed with respect to the system constructed here, especially with regard to how they might or must pertain to the question of its logistic completeness." (pp. 244-247 of the reprint)

(1) The convention adopted here is to use scare-quotes when speaking of what connectives represent as ‘properties’ or ‘relations’. This is done to mark a special philosophical use which is convenient in our informal discussion but which strictly speaking is ontologically misleading. A similar convention applies throughout when we refer to existence (being-the-case) and nonexistence (being-not-the-case) as material ‘properties’ of atomic situations.

(3) That is, an object’s self-identity or nonidentity with any other object is invariant through all the possible worlds of a logical space containing that object. We must distinguish this ontological invariance from the varying semantical relation of denotation (*Bedeutung*) between an object and a (non-Tractarian) name or definite description of that object. The former must be accounted for within the formal ontology, the latter only within its applications.

References

[TR] Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, trans., 2d. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. first ed. 1921).

18. ———. 1975. "A Second Order Logic of Variable-Binding Operators." *Reports on Mathematical Logic* no. 5:13-18.

"It is well-known that Prego distinguished between first- and second-level concepts or functions. First-level concepts he associated with properties and relations between objects.

These concepts Frege characterized as functions which assigned truth-values (the true or the false) to (n-tuples of) object(s) (1). An (n-tuple of) object(s) was said to fall under such a concept if it was assigned the true by that concept. In his *Begriffsschrift* these concepts were indicated by predicate variables.

Second-level concepts or functions, on the other hand, correspond to variable binding operators, e.g., the universal quantifier or, as in Frege's later development of the Begriffsschrift, the course-of-values abstraction operator. The latter assigns to a monadic concept the class which is its extension while the former assigns a truth-value. Second-level concepts, i.e., second-level functions corresponding to variable-binding operators of the quantifier type, accordingly, can be associated with properties or relations between properties and relations of objects in a sense analogous to (but also different from) that in which first-level concepts are associated with properties or relations between objects. In Frege's terminology, while an (w-tuple of) object(s) is said to fall under a first-level concept, the latter is said to fall within, not under, a second-level concept if it is assigned the true by that concept.

Third-level concepts corresponding to quantifiers binding predicate variables were also introduced into the *Begriffsschrift*, but Frege seems to have had some doubts regarding their ontological or objective significance. Indeed, Frege's attitude toward third-level concepts seems in general to resemble the nominalists' attitude toward second-level concepts, viz., that they are merely formal or syncategorematic concepts which are immanent to the *Begriffsschrift* and correspond to nothing objective in reality.

The objectivity of first- and second-level concepts, however, was said by Frege to be "founded deep in the nature of things" (2). These concepts, in other words, have an objective and not merely a formal or syncategorematic content according to Frege. Accordingly, from the point of view of rendering one's ontological commitments explicit by means of appropriate quantifiers, this indicates that in a

framework such as the *Begriffsschrift* we should allow not only for third-level quantifiers binding predicate-variables (having first-level concepts as their values), as Frege explicitly did allow, but also for fourth-level quantifiers binding second-level quantifier variables (having second-level concepts as their values), as Frege only implicitly allowed. This he did in effect by allowing free or schematic occurrences of second-level quantifier variables (as affixed to schematic individual variables)."
(...)
"Finally, we should perhaps point out that not all second-level concepts need be quantifier concepts. E.g., Frege himself took the "property" of being a property of the number 2 to be a second-level concept ([4], p. 75), and no doubt he intended there to be such a second-level concept corresponding to each and every object. In the present system we remain faithful to Frege's intentions. Indeed, by (CP-2), it is valid here that for each object x there exists a second-level concept within which fall all and only those first-level concepts under which x falls.
Our approach to the semantics of variable-binding formula operators differs in this regard from that of Mostowski [8], Thomason and Johnson [9], and Issel [5], [6], [7], all of whom, aside from restricting their considerations to first order languages (and, generally, to 1-ary 1-place quantifiers), interpret such operators as designating "quantities" of first-level concepts, i.e., they restrict their considerations to quantifier concepts.
The present system includes these sorts of second-level concepts but goes beyond them to include others as well. However, since the 'quantifier' terminology is simpler and more convenient than referring to variable-binding formula operators, we shall hereafter conflate the latter with the former and speak only of "quantifiers", though of course now quantifiers do not in all cases represent "quantities" (6)." (pp. 13-15)
(1) Frege apparently allowed only for binary relations. We extend his framework to include n-ary relations for arbitrary finite n ^ 2. In addition, we refer to all these relations as (n-

ary) concepts. (Frege referred only to properties as concepts.)
(2) *Function and Concept*, p. 41 of [3].
(6) So-called branched quantifiers represent second-level concepts that are somewhat anomalous to quantifier concepts in general, i.e., to “quantities”. It is well-known, however, that the semantic content of these quantifiers is representable in second order logic, and, accordingly, these concepts too are included among those represented in the system formulated below.

References

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[2] Cocchiarella N.: *Second Order Theories of Predication: Old and New Foundations*, Noûs IX (1975), 33-53.
[3] Geach P. and Black M.: *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,* Blackwell, Oxford, 1952.
[4] Frege G.: *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, trs. and edited by Furth, M., U.C.L.A. Press, 1964.
[5] Issel W.: *Semantische Untersuchungen über Quantoren*, I, *Zeitsclir. f. math. Logik und Grundlagen d. Math*., Bd. 15, 1969, 353-358.
[6] Issel W.: S *emantische Untersuchungen über Quantoren*, II, Zeitschr. f. math. Logik und Grundlagen d. Math., Bd. 16, 1970, 281-296.
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19. ———. 1976. "A Note on the Definition of Identity in Quine's New Foundations." *Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* no. 22:195-197.
20. ———. 1976. "On the Logic of Natural Kinds." *Philosophy of Science* no. 43:202-222.

"A minimal second order modal logic of natural kinds is formulated. Concepts are distinguished from properties and relations in the conceptual-logistic background of the logic through a distinction between free and bound predicate variables. Not all concepts (as indicated by free predicate variables) need have a property or relation corresponding to them (as values of bound predicate variables). Issues pertaining to identity and existence as impredicative concepts are examined and an analysis of mass terms as nominalized predicates for kinds of stuff is proposed. The minimal logic is extendible through a *summum genus*, an infima species or a partition principle for natural kinds."
"A standard objection to quantified modal logic is that it breeds such reptiles of the mind as Aristotelian essentialism, “the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental” ([5], p. 173f.). This objection has been criticized on one front by pointing out that none of the standard systems of quantified modal logic commit us to more than the meaningfulness of the non-trivial versions of the doctrine and that indeed we can, if we so choose, actually deny such versions in these systems (cf. [4]). A more heroic response, however, accepts these versions of the doctrine, at least when properly stated, and finds quantified modal logic the appropriate medium for its formulation. In what follows I shall attempt to formulate one such response, at least for the purpose of clarifying the general sort of logistic framework it presupposes if not also for exposing some of the more fascinating serpents that breed therein." (p. 202)
(...)
"Concluding Remarks. The above are only some of the more obvious principles that come to mind in the development and application of a logic of natural kinds. My objection to including them within the minimal system is based solely upon the rather strong sense of independence from the structure of thought (and therefore of “logic”) which I assume natural kinds to have. Of course, in certain

restricted contexts or for specialized applications these principles, and perhaps others as well, may be fully justified and used accordingly.
There are of course other developments and applications which I have not touched upon at all in this paper, e.g., the analysis of causal counterfactuals as based upon natural kinds or of a comparative similarity relation between individuals in terms of the natural kinds they share, etc. Our interests in these sorts of developments or applications should, it is hoped, vindicate at least to some extent the ontology of natural kinds as causal or nomological essences. In any case, such reptiles of the mind as these are taken to be by some philosophers seem hardly poisonous or deadly at all.
Finally, there is the sort of application suggested in section 4 for extending the logic of natural kinds to include nominalized predicates so as to provide a general analysis of the logic and ontology of mass terms. I have only hinted throughout this essay at how this richer framework might be developed, and though I do have some further suggestions which I have not gone into here, it is hoped that perhaps others will also take up the clarion call to defend this rather fascinating serpent of the mind." (. 220)
References
[4] Parsons, T. “Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic.” *Philosophical Review* 78 (1969): 35-52.
[5] Quine, W. “Three Grades of Modal Involvement.” *Proc. XIth International Congress of Philosophy,* Brussells, 1953, vol. 14. Reprinted in *Ways of Paradox*. New York: Random House, 1966. Pages 156-174.

21. ———. 1977. "Sortals, Natural Kinds and Re-Identification." *Logique et Analyse* no. 80:439-474.
Reprinted in Lennart Aqvist and Franz Guenthner (eds.), *Tense Logic,* Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1978.
Abstract: "There are different ways in which we might investigate and represent the successive stages of the development of our common-sense and scientific conceptual frameworks. Jean Piaget’s “fundamental hypothesis” regarding this development is that there is a

parallelism between the progress made in the logical and rational organization of knowledge and the corresponding formative psychological processes" ([9], p.13). Piaget's approach has been a general inquiry into our formative psychological processes, a type of inquiry that requires us "to take psychology seriously" (ibid., p.9). There is an alternative for philosophical logicians, however. For while it is not within our expertise to investigate formative psychological processes, we can nevertheless contribute to the study and representation of "the logical and rational organization of knowledge" through the construction of theories of logical form that are characteristic of at least some of the more important stages in the development of our common-sense and scientific frameworks. We adopt the methodology of such a construction in this paper where our primary concern will be the logical structure of our referential devices for quantifying, identifying and classifying things.

We will be concerned in particular with how this structure is to bear upon the problem of cross-world and cross-time re-identification."

"Investigations into the logical structure underlying ordinary language and our common-sense framework have tended to support the hypothesis that there are different stages of conceptual development and that while the structures elaborated at a later stage are in general not explicitly definable or reducible to those at the earlier they nevertheless presuppose them as conceptually prior bases for their own construction and elaboration— even when the conceptually prior structures are somehow eliminated or completely reconstructed at the later stages. This applies, moreover, not just to the conceptual structures underlying our common-sense framework but to those underlying the development of logic, mathematics and the different sciences as well.

Jean Piaget, for example, as a result of his investigations into genetic epistemology has found that our knowledge of logico-mathematical structures is obtained through a process of "constructive" or "reflective" abstraction that

proceeds through a hierarchy of successive stages at which the structures acquired at a previous stage are reconstructed before they are integrated into the new structures elaborated at later stages (cp. [10], p.159). But, as Piaget has also shown, it is not just in logic and mathematics that cognitive activity develops through successive stages of progressive structuration; for the development of intelligence and knowledge in general, whether as represented in our common-sense or our scientific framework, proceeds in essentially the same way. Indeed, the construction of our scientific framework on the basis of our common-sense framework is itself a prime example not only of how conceptual structures acquired at a previous stage are completely reconstructed before they are integrated into those elaborated at a later stage but also of how the later structures, though built upon the earlier, cannot be reduced to or defined in terms of them (cf. Sellars [11]).

Now there are different ways in which we might investigate and represent the successive stages of the development of our commonsense conceptual framework. E.g., because of his "fundamental hypothesis" that there is a parallelism between the progress made in the logical and rational organization of knowledge and the corresponding formative psychological processes" ([9], p.13), Piaget's approach has been a general inquiry into our formative psychological processes. The first principle of genetic epistemology, according
to Piaget, is "to take psychology seriously" (ibid., p. 9).

There is an alternative for philosophical logicians, however. For while it is not within our expertise to investigate our formative psychological processes, we can nevertheless contribute to the study and representation of "the logical and rational organization of knowledge" through the construction of theories of logical form that are characteristic of at least some of the more important stages in the development of our common-sense and scientific frameworks.

One thing in particular that the construction of such a theory would help explain is the sense in which the operations and co-ordinations of concepts that characterize a given stage of conceptual involvement constitute a self-sufficient structured whole which purports to have limits beyond which there is nothing for thought. It would also help explain how the formalization of these operations and the clarification of their limits can be the basis for new and more elaborate operations whose structuration transcends those same limits and leads to a new stage of conceptual involvement.

It is this methodology that we shall adopt in what follows where our primary concern will be the logical structure of our referential devices for quantifying, identifying and classifying things. We shall particularly be concerned with how this structure is to bear upon the problem of cross-world and cross-time re-identification." (pp. 439-441)

References

[9] Piaget, Jean, *Genetic Epistemology*, translated. by E. Duckworth, Columbia University Press, New York, 1930.

[11] Sellars, Wilfrid, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in *Science, Perception and Reality*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.

22. ———. 1978. "On the Logic of Nominalized Predicates and Its Philosophical Interpretations." *Erkenntnis* no. 13:339-369.

Errata, *Erkenntnis*, 14, 103-104, pp. 103-104.

"Predicate nominalizations are transformations of predicates and predicate phrases into nouns or noun phrases. Thus, e.g., ‘pious’ is transformed into ‘piety’, ‘wise’ into ‘wisdom’, ‘triangular’ into ‘triangularity’, and ‘human’ into ‘humanity’. We call these types of derivative nouns abstract singular terms. Some relational predicates are also transformed into abstract singular terms: e.g., ‘identity’ for ‘is identical with’ and ‘indiscernibility’ for‘is indiscernible from’.

There are other forms which predicate nominalizations take as well. E.g., the noun phrase ‘the concept Horse’, especially as used by Frege, amounts to a nominalization of the

predicate ‘horse’, and others of a related sort are ‘the property red’ and ‘the relation of being taller than’. These nominalizations have stylistic variations, e.g., ‘redness’ or ‘red’ simpliciter (when used as a singular term rather than as a predicate) and ‘the taller-than relation’ or simply ‘being taller than’.

There are no doubt a number of distinctions relevant to linguistics that should be drawn between these different types of nominalizations. We, however, shall not pursue them here but shall concern ourselves instead with the more formal question of a logic of nominalized predicates in the context of some of its philosophical interpretations. We shall assume in this regard that the occurrences of nominalized predicates in ordinary discourse for which the logic is designed are all singular termsin the modern sense, i.e., that they purport to have singular reference in the same sense in which proper names and (unreduced) definite descriptions are said to have such reference." (p. 339)

23. ———. 1979. "The Theory of Homogeneous Simple Types as a Second Order Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 3:505-524.

"In its original form the theory of simple types, hereafter called ST, is a theory of predication and not, or at least not primarily, a theory of membership. With that original form in mind we construct in this paper a second order counterpart of ST which we call ST*. We briefly compare ST* with an alternative extension of second order logic, viz., the author's system T*(*) of [1], which was proposed as characterizing the original (and yet consistent!) logistic background of Russell's paradox of predication.

In [2], the author showed the completeness of T**, plus an extensionality axiom (Ext*), relative to a Fregean interpretation of subject-position occurrences of predicates, viz., that such occurrences of predicates denote individuals correlated with the properties (or "classes") designated by predicate-position occurrences of the same predicates. It is observed here that when the semantical Fregean frames characterized satisfy ST*'s stratified comprehension principle instead of T**'s general comprehension principle,

then the same Fregean interpretation yields a completeness theorem for monadic ST* + (Ext*) as well. It has been found convenient, on the other hand, to consider (monadic) ST as a theory of membership rather than a theory of predication when axioms of extensionality are
included in its characterization. So considered, Quine proposed his system NF as a first order counterpart of ST, though of course, as is well-known, NF far exceeds ST in deductive powers. We show here per contra that while (monadic) ST* + (Ext*) is motivated in its construction along lines followed by Quine in the construction of his first order counterpart NF, viz., the reduction of ST's metatheoretic feature of typical ambiguity to a stratified comprehension principle, our system, unlike NF, is equiconsistent with ST. This, along with the fact that the non-abstract individuals (or "urelements") of ST are retained unmodified in ST*, indicates that ST*, as a theory of predication, is to be preferred to NF, as a theory of membership, in the interpretation which each gives to STPs metatheoretic feature of typical ambiguity. We show in addition that if to (monadic) ST* +(Ext*) we add the assumption that whatever is a value of an individual variable is also (or, on the Fregean interpretation, is correlated with) a value of a (monadic) predicate variable, i.e., the assumption that every individual is a "class", then the resulting system is equiconsistent with NF. We refer to monadic ST* +(Ext*) as NFU* and show that it contains Jensen's system NFU as well." (pp. 505-506)

References

[1] Cocchiarella, N., "Whither Russell's paradox of predication?" in *Logic and Ontology*, M. K. Munitz, ed., New York University Press, New York (1973), pp. 133-158.

[2] Cocchiarella, N., "Fregean semantics for a realist ontology?" *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. XV (1974), pp. 552-568.

24. ———. 1980. "Nominalism and Conceptualism as Predicative Second Order Theories of Predication." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 21:481-500.

"There appears to be a growing consensus, even if not unanimity, that standard predicative second-order logic is the appropriate logical medium for the representation of a nominalist theory of predication. We agree that this is indeed the case and formulate in this paper a model-theoretic approach which justifies that claim. (1) Because it is model-theoretic, our approach differs from the truth-value semantics approach of Leblanc and Weaver. (2) Amongst other reasons, we prefer our model-theoretic approach so as to accommodate those nominalists for whom the assumption that there are potentially as many names as there are individuals is not acceptable.

The models involved in our semantics, moreover, are precisely the same models as are already involved in standard first-order logic. Assignments of values (drawn from the domain of a given model) to the individual variables are extended, however, to what, relative to a given first-order language, we call *nominalistic assignments* to the n-place predicate variables (for each positive integer n) these assign first-order formulas (wffs) of the language in question, relative to the free occurrences of n distinct individual variables occurring in those wffs, to the H-place predicate variables. The satisfaction by such an assignment of a second-order wff in a model is then defined by a double recursion on the logical structure of the wff and on the number of nested predicate quantifiers occurring therein.

It is natural of course that a first-order wff, relative to n individual variables occurring therein as argument indicators, should be understood as representing an n-place predicate expression of the language in question; and in fact in an applied first-order theory based upon that language such a first order wff would constitute the definiens of a possible definition for an n-place predicate constant not already belonging to that language or occurring in that theory. Potentially, of course, there are infinitely many predicate constants that might be introduced into a first-order theory in this way; and it is just over such a potential infinity, and no more, that our predicate quantifiers, nominalistically interpreted, are understood to range when

we turn to the predicative second-order counterpart of a given first-order theory.
Finally, in order to better understand the implicit background of our nominalistic semantics, we include in a final section of this paper a brief comparison of nominalism, as represented by standard predicative second-order logic, with a closely related form of conceptualism, represented by a certain nonstandard predicative second-order logic formulated by the author in an earlier paper." (pp. 481-482)
(1) For the consensus view, see Parsons [9], For the dissenting view, at least in regard to the extension of predicative second-order logic to ramified type theory, see Church [2].
It is possible of course that Church intends his demurral to apply only after predicates are ramified and allowed to occur as subjects of higher-order predicates. If so, then we believe that his demurral may have some merit (see Note 10).
(2) For reasons indicated in Note 10, we suspect that ramification may presuppose a linguistic capacity for introducing predicates that exceeds the proper limits of a nominalist theory of predication. Such a capacity does not exceed the limits of a closely related form of conceptualism (briefly discussed in Section 6) which may be represented by the nonstandard predicative second-order logic formulated in [3].
References
[2] Church, A., "Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 41 (1976), pp. 747-760.
[3] Cocchiarella, N., "A new formulation of predicative second order logic," *Logique et Analyse*, vol. 17, no. 65-66 (1974), pp. 61-88.
[9] Parsons, C, "A plea for substitutional quantification," *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 68 (1971), pp. 231-237.
25. ———. 1980. "The Development of the Theory of Logical Types and the Notion of a Logical Subject in Russell's Early Philosophy." *Synthese* no. 45:71-115.

Reprinted as Chapter 1 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 19-63.
"The development of the theory of logical types in Russell's early philosophy proceeds along a difficult and rather involuted path; and even the final product, the theory as adumbrated in [*Principia Mathematica* = PM], remains unclear in its syntax and problematic in its semantics. Indeed, one might well be left with the impression that Russell himself, in the end, remained unsure of which parts of the different views he had held along the way are finally to be adopted.
In what follows, we shall attempt to describe and explain the development of Russell's early views, at least to the extent to which they are available in published form today, from the perspective of the development in those views of the notion of a logical subject. It is the development of this notion in Russell's early philosophy, we believe, that holds the key to many of the problems confronting Russell in the development of his theory of logical types and that led to the various, and sometimes conflicting, proposals that he made along the way.
It should be noted, however, that in referring to the development of the theory of logical types in Russell's early philosophy we have in mind only the views developed by Russell up to, but not subsequent to, the 1910—13 publication of the first edition of [PM]. The subsequent views developed by Russell from 1913—25, that is, between the first and second editions of [PM], and summarized to some extent in his introduction (and added appendices) to the second edition, constitute Russell's version of logical atomism. Except for some concluding remarks in the final section of this chapter, we delay our discussion of those views until chapter 5." (pp. 19-20 of the reprint)

26. ———. 1981. "Richard Montague and the Logical Analysis of Language." In *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Vol. 2: Philosophy of Language*, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm, 113-155. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
"Richard Montague was an exceptionally gifted logician who made important contributions in every field of inquiry upon

which he wrote. His professional career was not only marked with brilliance and insight but it has become a classic example of the changing and developing philosophical views of logicians in general, especially during the 1960s and 70s, in regard to the form and content of natural language. We shall, in what follows, attempt to characterize the general pattern of that development, at least to the extent that it is exemplified in the articles Montague wrote during the period in question.

The articles to which we shall especially direct our attention are: 'Pragmatics' [1]; 'Pragmatics and Intensional Logic' [2]; 'On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities' [3]; 'English as a Formal Language' [4]; 'Universal Grammar' [5]; and 'The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English' [7].

Needless to say, but many of the ideas and insights developed in these papers Montague shared with other philosophers and logicians, some of whom were his own students at the times in question. Montague himself was meticulous in crediting others where credit was due, but for convenience we shall avoid duplicating such references here." (p. 113)

(...)

"Concluding Remarks

There are many other important features of Montague's grammar for English and of his translation of English by means of that grammar into intensional logic that we cannot go into here. The highly intensional nature of his semantics, for example, provides not only a more direct analysis of the opacity of intensional verbs but also a more direct analysis of the opacity of infinitive phrases as well. And then there is his treatment of relative clauses and of attributive adjectives, which we have not touched upon at all.

In closing then, it will no doubt have crossed the reader's mind that there may be some irony in the fact that Montague began his philosophical career as an extensionalist who took set theory as the proper theoretical framework for philosophy and as a formal-language philosopher who viewed the formalization of ordinary

language as either impossible or extremely laborious, and in any case as certainly not philosophically rewarding. For the fact is that Montague has made important and philosophically innovative contributions toward a fully formalized syntax and semantics for natural language and that the semantics in question is most perspicuously described in terms of an intensional logic that transcends set theory and that in effect constitutes a new theoretical framework for philosophy. If this is not a revolution, it is at least a form of progress in the logical analysis of language." (p. 155)

References

[I] Works by Richard Montague

(The first 9 articles are reprinted in *Formal Philosophy, Selected Papers of Richard Montague*, edited and with an introduction by R.H. Thomason, Yale University Press, New Haven 1974. All page references here are to this volume. The dates listed are not the dates of publication but of when Montague first presented each paper to a philosophical audience.)

[1] “Pragmatics,”1964.

[2] “Pragmatics and Intensional Logic,”1967.

[3] “On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities,”1967.

[4] “English as a Formal Language,”1968.

[5] “Universal Grammar,”1969.

[6] “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English,”1970.

[7] “Syntactical Treatments of Modality,”1963.

[8] Montague and D. Kalish, “That,”1959.

[9] Montague and D. Kaplan, “A Paradox Regained,”1960.

[10] Montague and D. Kalish, *Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.

27. ———. 1982. "Meinong Reconstructed versus Early Russell Reconstructed." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 11:183-214.

Reprinted as Chapter 3 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 119-151.

"Contemporary philosophy is in a rut, according to Terence Parsons in his recent book *Nonexistent Objects*, ([NO]), and

it is one that stems from the (post-1905) work of Bertrand Russell. The main characteristic of this “Russellian rut” ([NO], 1) is strict adherence to the thesis that being, or being something, amounts to being something that exists—or equivalently that ‘there is’ is to be equated with ‘there exists’ ([NO], 6). This view is now so well entrenched, according to Parsons, that it is a main stay of what he also calls the orthodox tradition.

Now the orthodox view is in a rut, according to Parsons, “because it’s a view in which most of us are so entrenched that it’s hard to see over the edges” ([NO], 1). Naturally, if we want “to look over the edge and see how things might be different” ([NO], 8), as any objective seeker of truth would, then “we need to encounter an actual theory about nonexistent objects” (ibid.). It is the construction and presentation of such a theory that is Parsons’s concern in *Nonexistent Objects*.

(...)

"Now we do not object to Parsons’s choice of Meinong’s theory here, nor for that matter to his elegant reconstruction and presentation of that theory. We do think, however, that a more balanced recognition of Russell’s overall view is called for and that perhaps the best way to make the Meinongian notion of a concrete object understandable to the orthodox tradition is to compare it with the general Russellian notion of a concrete individual, i.e., the Russellian notion of an individual that can exist but which might in fact not exist. Indeed, on the basis of the analysis and comparison we shall give here, it is our position that the Meinongian notion of a concrete object, at least as reconstructed by Parsons, is parasitic upon, though in a beneficent way, the Russellian notion of a concrete individual, existent or otherwise." (pp. 119-121)

References

[NO] Parsons, Terence, *Nonexistent Objects*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980.)

28. ———. 1983. "Philosophical Perspectives on Quantification in Tense and Modal Logic." In *Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. 2. Extensions of Classical Logic*, edited by

Gabbay, Dov and Guenthner, Franz, 309-353. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted in Dov M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, *Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Second Edition*, Vol. 7, Dordrecht: Springer 2002, pp. 235-275.
Contents: Introduction 235; 1. The Primary Semantics of Logical Necessity 236; 2. Logical Atomism and Quantified Modal Logic 237; 3. The Secondary Semantics of Metaphysical Necessity 240; 4. Proper Names as Rigid Designators 242; 5. Non-Contingent Identity and the Carnap-Barcan Formula 243; 6. Existence in the Primary and Secondary Semantics 245; 7. Metaphysical Necessity and Relational Model Structures 247; 8. Quantification with Respect to Individual Concepts 250; 9. Individual Concepts and the Elimination of *de re* Modalities 253; 10. Contingent Identity 2586; 11. Quantifiers as Referential Concepts 258; 12. Singular Reference 259; 13. Conceptualism and Tense Logic 262; 14. The Problem of Reference to Past and Future Objects 266; 15. Time and Modality 268; Bibliography 274-275.
"The trouble with modal logic, according to its critics, is quantification into modal contexts - i.e. *de re* modality. For on the basis of such quantification, it is claimed, essentialism ensues, and perhaps a bloated universe of *possibilia* as well. The essentialism is avoidable, these critics will agree, but only by turning to a Platonic realm of individual concepts whose existence is no less dubious or problematic than mere *possibilia*. Moreover, basing one's semantics on individual concepts, it is claimed, would in effect render all identity statements containing only proper names either necessarily true or necessarily false - i.e. there would then be no contingent identity statements containing only proper names.
None of these claims is true quite as it stands, however; and in what follows we shall attempt to separate the chaff from the grain by examining the semantics of (first-order) quantified modal logic in the context of different philosophical theories. Beginning with the primary semantics of logical necessity and the philosophical context

of logical atomism, for example, we will see that essentialism not only does not ensue but is actually rejected in that context by the validation of the modal thesis of anti-essentialism, and that in consequence all *de re* modalities are reducible to *de dicto* modalities.
(...)
Besides the Platonic view of intensionality, on the other hand, there is also a socio-biologically based conceptualist view according to which concepts are not independently existing Platonic forms but cognitive capacities or related structures of the human mind whose realization in thought is what informs a mental act with a predicable or referential nature. This view, it will be seen, provides an account in which there can be contingent identity statements, but not such as to depend on the coincidence of individual concepts in the platonic sense. Such a conceptualist view will also provide a philosophical foundation for quantified tense logic and paradigmatic analyses thereby of metaphysical modalities in terms of time and causation. The problem of the objective significance of the secondary semantics for the analyzed modalities, in other words, is completely resolved on the basis of the nature of time, local or cosmic. The related problem of a possible ontological commitment to *possibilia*, moreover, is in that case only the problem of how conceptualism can account for direct references to past or future objects." (pp. 235-236)

29. ———. 1985. "Two Lambda-Extensions of the Theory of Homogeneous Simple Types as a Second Order Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 26:377-407.
Contents:
0. Introduction 377; 1. HST* revisited 379; 2. An improved axiom set for HST* 380; 3. The grammar of HST* with lambda-abstracts 383; 4. The system lambda-HST* 384; 5. The system HST*lambda 386; 6. An extensional Fregean semantics for nominalized predicates 390; 7. The relative consistency of HST*-lambda + (Ext*) to lambda-HST* + (Ext*) 393; 8. An intensional Fregean semantics for nominalized predicates 395; 9. Identity versus

indiscernibility in HST*-lambda 402; Notes 406; References 407.
Abstract: "Two second order logics with lambda-abstracts are formulated as counterparts to the theory of homogeneous simple types. Predicates can be nominalized and occur as abstract singular terms in these logics so that self-predication is meaningful in general and, in certain special cases, even provable. Extensional and intensional Fregean semantics in which nominalized predicates are assigned individuals as concept-correlates are formulated and the extensional and intensional versions of these logics are shown to be complete with respect to their corresponding semantics. The logics are also shown to be consistent relative to weak Zermelo set theory."
"In the theory of simple logical types as originally conceived, it is meaningless for one predicate expression to occur in one of the subject or argument positions of another unless the latter is assigned a higher logical type than the former within the grammar of the object language; and therefore it is meaningless in particular for any predicate expression to apply to itself, i.e., to occur in one of its own subject positions. Russell's paradox of predication is thereby avoided, of course, but the price is high, for the resulting theory is not an accurate representation of the role of predicates in natural language where predicate expressions can apply not only to the nominalizations of other predicates but to their own nominalizations as well -- and without regard at all for the notion of a logical type. In the theory of logical types as a second-order logic, on the other hand, predicate expressions are typed within the grammar of the object language only in the way they are typed in standard second-order logic, i.e., only with respect to their degree or number of subject positions, and they are allowed otherwise to meaningfully occur in the subject or argument positions of other predicates, and of themselves as well, without regard to the notion of a logical type. Russell's paradox of predication can be avoided, it turns out, not by resorting to the notion of a logical type as a part of the grammar of the object language but rather only as a part of

the metalinguistic description of the conditions under which properties and relations are to be posited by means of the grammar of the object language. The difference is crucial, needless to say, since it allows for a more accurate representation of the role of predicates and predication in natural language. The resulting theory is not, to be sure, a second-order logic in the "standard" sense used today (though it does contain the latter), but it is a second-order logic in the traditional or pre-type-theoretical sense in which quantifier expressions are allowed to reach into both subject and predicate positions without obliterating the logical and conceptually important distinctions between the two." (pp. 377-378)

30. ———. 1985. "Frege's Double Correlation Thesis and Quine's Set Theories NF and ML." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 14:1-39.
Reprinted as Chapter 4 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 152-192.
"There are two fundamentally different notions of a class, which, following tradition, we might call the mathematical and the logical notions, respectively. The logical notion is essentially the notion of a class as the extension of a concept, and, following Frege, we shall assume that a class in this sense “simply has its being in the concept, not in the objects which belong to it” (Frege, [PW], 183)—regardless of whether or not concepts themselves differ, as Frege assumed, “only so far as their extensions are different” (ibid., 118). The mathematical notion of a class, on the other hand, is essentially the notion of a class as composed of its members, i.e., of a class that has its being in the objects that belong to it. This notion of a class, we claim, is none other than the iterative concept of set—or at least that is what it comes to upon analysis. Note that although what accounts for the being of a class under the one notion is not the same as what accounts for the being of a class under the other, nevertheless the axiom of extensionality applies equally to both notions. This means that the axiom of extensionality does not of itself account for the being of a class. (1)

Of course the logical notion of a class, especially as developed in Frege's form of logicism, is usually thought to be bankrupt as a result of Russell's paradox. This assessment, however, is erroneous. In particular, in "Frege, Russell, and Logicism: A Logical Reconstruction," ([FRL]), I have explained how Frege's view of classes in the logical sense can be reconstructed without paradox by modifying in either of two ways what I there referred to as Frege's double correlation thesis. The two systems that result from these modifications, it turns out, have certain structural similarities with Quine's two set theories NF and ML, especially when the latter are themselves modified so as to include urelements other than the empty set. This is significant because both NF and ML are commonly said to "lack a motivation" (cf. Boolos's "The Iterative Concept of Set" ([ICS]), 219). But that is because as theories of sets in the sense of classes that are composed of their members, which is really the only sense to which Quine is willing to commit himself, both NF and ML are incompatible with the iterative concept of set. As theories of classes in the logical sense, however, and in particular of the classes that Frege took to be the correlates of concepts, both NF and ML can be given a very natural motivation, especially when modified to include urelements. In what follows we shall defend this motivation by examining the structural similarities in question." (pp. 152-153 of the reprint)

(1) In an intensional language, the mathematical notion of a class might well assume a stronger axiom of extensionality, viz. one in which classes that are composed of their members are necessarily identical when they have the same members. Such an axiom would not in general hold for classes in the logical sense, since co-extensive concepts are not in general necessarily co-extensive. (It would of course hold for those classes in the logical sense that are the extensions of "rigid" concepts, i.e., concepts that have the same extension in every possible world.)

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[ICS] G. Boolos, "The Iterative Conception of Set," *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971):215—31.

|PW| G. Frege, *Posthumous Writings*, eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach; translated by P. Long and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).

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ESSAYS

1. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1986. "Frege, Russell and Logicism: A Logical Reconstruction." In *Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila and Hintikka, Jaakko, 197-252. Dordrecht: Reidel.
   Reprinted as Chapter 2 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 64-118.
   "Logicism by the end of the nineteenth century was a philosophical doctrine whose time had come, and it is Gottlob Frege to whom we owe its arrival. “Often,” Frege once wrote, “it is only after immense intellectual effort, which may have continued over centuries, that humanity at last succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it from the eyes of the mind” (Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* [Fd], xix). Prior to Frege logicism was just such a concept whose pure form was obscured by irrelevant accretions; and in his life’s work it was Frege who first presented this concept to humanity in its pure form and developed it as a doctrine of the first rank.
   That form, unfortunately, has become obscured once again. For today, as we approach the end of the twentieth century, logicism, as a philosophical doctrine, is said to be dead, and even worse, to be impossible. Frege’s logicism, or the specific presentation he gave of it in *Die Grundgesetze der*

Arithmetik, ([Gg]), fell to Russell's paradox, and, we are told, it cannot be resurrected. Russell's own subsequent form of logicism presented in [PM], moreover, in effect gives up the doctrine; for in overcoming his paradox, Russell was unable to reduce classical mathematics to logic without making at least two assumptions that are not logically true; namely, his assumption of the axiom of reducibility and his assumption of an axiom of infinity regarding the existence of infinitely many concrete or nonabstract individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, logicism is not dead beyond redemption; that is, if logicism is dead, then it can be easily resurrected. This is not to say that as philosophical doctrines go logicism is true, but only that it can be logically reconstructed and defended or advocated in essentially the same philosophical context in which it was originally formulated. This is true especially of Frege's form of logicism, as we shall see, and in fact, by turning to his correspondence with Russell and his discussion of Russell's paradox, we are able to formulate not only one but two alternative reconstructions of his form of logicism, both of which are consistent (relative to weak Zermelo set theory). In regard to Russell's form of logicism, on the other hand, our resurrection will not apply directly to the form he adopted in [PM] but rather to the form he was implicitly advocating in his correspondence with Frege shortly after the completion of [POM]. In this regard, though we shall have occasion to refer to certain features of his later form of logicism, especially in our concluding section where a counterpart to the axiom of reducibility comes into the picture, it is Russell's early form of logicism that we shall reconstruct and be concerned with here.

Though Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism are not the same, incidentally, they are closely related; and one of our goals will be to reconstruct or resurrect these forms with their similarity in mind. In particular, it is our contention that both are to be reconstructed as second order predicate logics in which nominalized predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms. Their important differences, as

we shall see, will then consist in the sort of object each takes nominalized predicates to denote and in whether the theory of predication upon which the laws of logic are to be based is to be extensional or intensional." (pp. 64-65 of the reprint)

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2. ———. 1986. "Conceptualism, Ramified Logic, and Nominalized Predicates." *Topoi.An International Review of Philosophy* no. 5:75-87.

   "The problem of universals as the problem of what predicates stand for in meaningful assertions is discussed in contemporary philosophy mainly in terms of the opposing theories of nominalism and logical realism. Conceptualism, when it is mentioned, is usually identified with intuitionism, which is not a theory of predication but a theory of the activity of constructing proofs in mathematics. Both intuitionism and conceptualism are concerned with the notion of a mental construction, to be sure, and both maintain that there can only be a potentially infinite number of such constructions. But whereas the focus of concern in intuitionism is with the construction of proofs, in conceptualism our concern is with the construction of concepts. This difference sets the two frameworks apart and in pursuit of different goals, and in fact it is not at all clear how the notion of a mental construction in the one framework is related to that in the other. This is especially true insofar as mathematical objects, according to intuitionism, are nothing but mental constructions, whereas in conceptualism concepts are anything but objects. In any case, whatever the relation between the two, our concern in this paper is with conceptualism as a philosophical theory of

predication and not with intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics.

Now conceptualism differs from nominalism insofar as it posits universals, namely, concepts, as the semantic grounds for the correct or incorrect application of predicate expressions. Conceptualism differs from logical realism, on the other hand, insofar as the universals it posits are not assumed to exist independently of the human capacity for thought and representation. Concepts, in other words, are neither predicate expressions nor independently real properties and relations. But then, at least for the kind of conceptualism we have in mind here, neither are they mental images or ideas in the sense of particular mental occurrences. That is, concepts are not objects (saturated individuals) but are rather cognitive capacities, or cognitive structures otherwise based upon such capacities, to identify and classify or characterize and relate objects in various ways. Concepts, in other words, are intersubjectively realizable cognitive abilities which may be exercized by different persons at the same time as well as by the same person at different times. And it is for this reason that we speak of concepts as objective universals, even though they are not independently real properties and relations.

As cognitive structures, however, concepts in the sense intended here are not Fregean concepts (which for Frege are independently real unsaturated functions from objects to truth values). But they may be modeled by the latter (assuming that there are Fregean concepts to begin with) - especially since as cognitive capacities which need not be exercized at any given time (or even ever for that matter), concepts in the sense intended here also have an unsaturated nature corresponding to, albeit different from, the unsaturated nature of Fregean concepts. Thus, in particular, the saturation (or exercise) of a concept in the sense intended here results not in a truth value but a mental act, and, if overtly expressed, a speech act as well. The un-saturatedness of a concept consists in this regard in its non-occurrent or purely dispositional status as a cognitive capacity, and it is the exercise (or saturation) of this capacity

as a cognitive structure which informs particular mental acts with a predicable nature (or with a referential nature in the case of concepts corresponding to quantifier expressions)." (pp. 75-76)

3. ———. 1987. "Rigid Designation." In *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol. 2*, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 834. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
4. ———. 1987. "Russell, Bertrand." In *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol. 2*, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 840-841. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
5. ———. 1988. "Predication Versus Membership in the Distinction between Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus." *Synthese* no. 75:37-72.
   Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. The problem with a set-theoretic semantics of natural language; 2. Intensional logic as a new theoretical framework for philosophy; 3.The incompleteness of intensional logic when based on membership; 4. Predication versus membership in type theory; 5. Second order predicate logic with nominalized predicates; 6. A set theoretic semantics with predication as fundamental; 7. Concluding remarks.
   "There are two major doctrines regarding the nature of logic today. The first is the view of logic as the laws of valid inference, or logic as calculus. This view began with Aristotle's theory of the syllogism, or syllogistic logic, and in time evolved first into Boole's algebra of logic and then into quantificational logic. On this view, logic is an abstract calculus capable of various interpretations over domains of varying cardinality. Because these interpretations are given in terms of a set-theoretic semantics where one can vary the universe at will and consider the effect this, has on the validity of formulas, this view is sometimes described as the set-theoretic approach to logic (see van Heijenoort ["Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus", *Synthese* 17,] 1967, p. 327).
   The second view of logic does not eschew set-theoretic semantics, it should be noted, and it may in fact utilize such a semantics as a guide in the determination of validity. But to use such a semantics as a guide, on this view, is not the

same as to take that semantics as an essential characterization of validity. Indeed, unlike the view of logic as calculus, this view of logic rejects the claim that a set-theoretic definition of validity has anything other than an extrinsic significance that may be exploited for certain purposes (such as proving a completeness theorem). Instead, on this view, logic has content in its own right and validity is determined by what are called the laws of logic, which may be stated either as principles or as rules. Because one of the goals of this view is a specification of the basic laws of logic from which the others may be derived, this view is sometimes called the axiomatic approach to logic." (p. 37)
(...)
"Concluding Remarks. The account we have given here of the view of logic as language should not be taken as a rejection of the set-theoretical approach or as defense of the metaphysics of possibilist logical realism. Rather, our view is that there are really two types of conceptual framework corresponding to our two doctrines of the nature of logic. The first type of framework is based on membership in the sense of the iterative concept of set; although extensionality is its most natural context (since sets have their being in their members), it may nevertheless be extended to include intensional contexts by way of a theory of senses (as in Montague's sense-denotation intensional logic). The second type of framework is based on predication, and in particular developments it is associated with one or another theory of universals. Extensionality is not the most natural context in this theory, but where it does hold and extensions are posited, the extensions are classes in the logical and not in the mathematical sense.
Russell's paradox, as we have explained, has no real bearing on set-formation in a theory of membership based on the iterative concept of set, but it does bear directly on concept-formation or the positing or universals in a theory based on predication. As a result, our second type of framework has usually been thought to be incoherent or philosophically bankrupt, leaving us with the set-theoretical approach as,

the only viable alternative. This is why so much of analytic philosophy in the 20th Century has been dominated by the set-theoretical approach. Set theory, after all, does seem to serve the purposes of a *mathesis universalis*.
What is adequate as a *mathesis universalis*, however, need not also therefore be adequate as a l *ingua philosophica* or *characteristica universalis*. In particular, the set-theoretic approach does not seem to provide a philosophically satisfying semantics for natural language; this is because it is predication and not membership that is fundamental to natural language. An adequate semantics for natural language, in other words, seems to demand a conceptual framework based on predication and not on membership.
(...)
We do not maintain, accordingly, that we should give up the set-theoretic approach, especially when dealing with the philosophy and foundations of mathematics, or that only a theory of predication associated with possibilist logical realism will provide an adequate semantics for natural language. In both cases we may find a principle of tolerance, if not outright pluralism, the more appropriate attitude to take." (pp. 69-70)

6. ———. 1989. "Philosophical Perspectives on Formal Theories of Predication." In *Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. 4. Topics in the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Guenthner, Franz, 253-326. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Contents: 1. Predication and the problem of universal 254; 2. Nominalism 256; 3. A nominalistic semantics for predicative second order logic 261; 4. Nominalism and modal logic 266; 5 . Conceptualism vs . nominalism 270; 6. Constructive conceptualism 273; 7. Ramification of constructive conceptualism 280; 8. Holistic conceptualism 286; 9. Logical realism vs holistic conceptualism 289; 10. Possibilism and actualism in modal logical realism 292; 11. Logical realism and cssentialism 301; 12. Possibilism and actualism within conceptualism 306; 13. Natural realism and conceptualism 313; 14. Aristotelian essentialism and the logic of natural kinds 318; References 325-326.

"Predication has been a central, if not the central, issue in philosophy since at least the lime of Plato and Aristotle. Different theories of predication have in fact been the basis of a number of philosophical controversies in both metaphysics and epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals. In what follows we shall be concerned with what traditionally have been the three most important types of theories of universals. namely, nominalism, conceptualism, and realism, and with the theories of predication which these theories might be said to determine or characterize.
Though each of these three types of theories of universals may be said to have many variants, we shall ignore their differences here to the extent that they do not characterize different theories of predication. This will apply especially to nominalism where but one formal theory of predication is involved. In both conceptualism and realism, however, the different variants of each type do not all agree and form two distinct subtypes each with its own theory of predication. For this reason we shall distinguish between a constructive and a holistic form of conceptualism on the one hand, and a logical and a natural realism on the other. Constructive conceptualism, as we shall see, has affinities with nominalism with which it is sometimes confused, and holistic conceptualism has affinities with logical realism with which it is also sometimes confused. Both forms of conceptualism may assume some form of natural realism as their causal ground; and natural realism in turn must presuppose some form of conceptualism as its background theory of predication. Both forms of realism may be further divided into their essentialist and non-essentialist variants (and in logical realism even a form of anti-essentialism), and though an essentialist logical realism is sometimes confused with Aristotelian essentialism, the latter is really a form of natural realism with natural kinds as the only essential properties objects can have." (pp. 253-254)

7. ———. 1989. "Russell's Theory of Logical Types and the Atomistic Hierarchy of Sentences." In *Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and*

Epistemology, edited by Savage, C.Wade and Anderson, C.Anthony, 41-62. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 193-221.
"Russell's philosophical views underwent a number of changes throughout his life, and it is not always well-appreciated that views he held at one time came later to be rejected; nor, similarly, that views he rejected at one time came later to be accepted. It is not well-known, for example, that the theory of logical types Russell described in his later or post-[PM] philosophy is not the same as the theory originally described in [PM] in 1910-13; nor that some of the more important applications that Russell made of the theory at the earlier time cannot be validated or even significantly made in the framework of his later theory. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that Russell himself seems not to have realized that he was describing a new theory of logical types in his later philosophy, and that as a result of the change some of his earlier logical constructions, including especially his construction of the different kinds of numbers, were no longer available to him.
In the original framework, for example, propositional functions are independently real properties and relations that can themselves have properties and relations of a higher order/type, and all talk of classes, and thereby ultimately of numbers, can be reduced to extensional talk of properties and relations as "single entities," or what Russell in [POM] had called "logical subjects." The Platonic reality of classes and numbers was replaced in this way by a more fundamental Platonic reality of propositional functions as properties and relations. In Russell's later philosophy, however, "a propositional function is nothing but an expression. It does not, by itself, represent anything. But it can form part of a sentence which does say something, true or false" (Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, ([MPD]), 69). Surprisingly. Russell even insists that this was what he meant by a propositional function in [PM]. "Whitehead and I thought of a propositional function as an expression

containing an undetermined variable and becoming an ordinary sentence as soon as a value is assigned to the variable: 'x is human', for example, becomes an ordinary sentence as soon as we substitute a proper name for V. In this view . . . the propositional function is a method of making a bundle of such sentences" ([MPD], 124). Russell does realize that some sort of change has come about, however, for he admits, "I no longer think that the laws of logic are laws of things; on the contrary, I now regard them as purely linguistic" (ibid., 102).
(...)
Now it is not whether [PM] can sustain a nominalistic interpretation that is our concern in this essay, as we have said, but rather how it is that Russell came to be committed in his later philosophy to the atomistic hierarchy and the nominalistic interpretation of propositional functions as expressions generated in a ramified second order hierarchy of languages based on the atomistic hierarchy. We shall pursue this question by beginning with a discussion of the difference between Russell's 1908 theory of types and that presented in [PM] in 1910. This will be followed by a brief summary of the ontology that Russell took to be implicit in [PM], and that he described in various publications between 1910 and 1913. The central notion in this initial discussion is what Russell in his early philosophy called the notion of a logical subject, or equivalently that of a "term" or "single entity". (In [PM], this notion was redescribed as the systematically ambiguous notion of an "object.") As explained in chapter 1 this notion provides the key to the various problems that led Russell in his early philosophy to the development of his different theories of types, including that presented in [PM]. This remains true, moreover, even when we turn to Russell's later philosophy, i.e., to his post-[PM] views, only then it is described as the notion of what can and cannot be named in a logically perfect language. The ontology of these later views is what Russell called logical atomism, and it is this ontology that determines what Russell described as the atomistic hierarchy of sentences. In other words, it is the notion of what can and cannot be

named in the atomistic hierarchy that explains how Russell, however unwittingly, came to replace his earlier theory of logical types by the theory underlying the atomistic hierarchy of sentences as the basis of a logically perfect language." (pp. 193-195 of the reprint)

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POM] Russell, Bertrand, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2d ed. (NY., Norton & Co., 1938).

[PM] Russell, Bertrand and Alfred Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, vol. 1 (1910), vol. 2 (1912), and vol. 3 (1913) (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,).

8. ———. 1989. "Conceptualism, Realism and Intensional Logic." *Topoi.An International Review of Philosophy* no. 7:15-34.

   Contents: 0. Introduction 15; 1. A conceptual analysis of predication 16; 2. Concept-correlates and Frege's double correlations thesis 17; 3. Russell's paradox in conceptual realism 18: 4. What are the natural numbers and where do they come from? 22; 5. Referential concepts and quantifier phrases 24; 5. Singular reference 24; 7. The intensions of refrential concepts as components of applied predicable concepts 26; 8. Intensional versus extensional predicable concepts 28; 9. The intentional identity of intensional objects 29; Notes 31; Reference 33-35.

   "0. Introduction

   Linguists and philosophers are sometimes at odds in the semantical analysis of language. This is because linguists tend to assume that language must be semantically analyzed in terms of mental constructs, whereas philosophers tend to assume that only a platonic realm of intensional entities will suffice. The problem for the linguist in this conflict is how to explain the apparent realist posits we seem to be committed to in our use of language, and in particular in our use of infinitives, gerunds and other forms of nominalized predicates. The problem for the philosopher is the old and familiar one of how we can have knowledge of independently real abstract entities if all knowledge must ultimately be grounded in psychological states and processes. In the case of numbers, for example, this is the

problem of how mathematical knowledge is possible. In the case of the intensional entities assumed in the semantical analysis of language, it is the problem of how knowledge of even our own native language is possible, and in particular of how we can think and talk to one another in all the ways that language makes possible.

I believe that the most natural framework in which this conflict is to be resolved and which is to serve as the semantical basis of natural language is an intensional logic that is based upon a conceptual analysis of predication in which what a predicate stands for in its role as a predicate is distinguished from what its nominalization denotes in its role as a singular term. Predicates in such a framework stand for concepts as cognitive capacities to characterize and relate objects in various ways, i.e. for dispositional cognitive structures that do not themselves have an individual nature, and which therefore cannot be the objects denoted by predicate nominalizations as abstract singular terms. The objects purportedly denoted by nominalized predicates, on the other hand, are intensional entities, e.g. properties and relations (and propositions in the case of zero-place predicates), which have their own abstract form of individuality, which, though real, is posited only through the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. That is, intensional objects are represented in this logic as concept-correlates, where the correlation is based on a logical projection of the content of the concepts whose correlates they are.

(...)

Before proceeding, however, there is an important distinction regarding the notion of a logical form that needs to be made when joining conceptualism and realism in this way. This is that logical forms can be perspicuous in either of two senses, one stronger than the other. The first is the usual sense that applies to all theories of logical form, conceptualist or otherwise; namely, that logical forms are perspicuous in the way they specify the truth conditions of assertions in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax. In this sense, fully applied logical forms are said to

be semantic structures in their own right. In the second and stronger sense, logical forms may be perspicuous not only in the way they specify the truth conditions of an assertion, but in the way they specify the cognitive structure of that assertion as well. To be perspicuous in this sense, a logical form must provide an appropriate representation of both the referential and the predicable concepts that underlie an assertion.

Our basic hypothesis in this regard will be that every basic assertion is the result of applying just one referential concept and one predicable concept, and that such an applied predicable concept is always fully intensionalized (in a sense to be explained). This will place certain constraints on the conditions for when a complex predicate expression is perspicuous in the stronger sense — such as that a referential expression can occur in such a predicate expression only in its nominalized form. (A similar constraint will also apply to a defining or restricting relative clause of a referential expression.) In the cases where a relational predicable concept is applied, the assumption that there is still but one referential concept involved leads to the notion of a conjunctive referential concept, a notion that requires the introduction in intensional logic of special quantifiers that bind more than one individual variable. Except for briefly noting the need for their development, we shall not deal with conjunctive quantifiers in this essay." (pp. 15-16)

9. ———. 1991. "Conceptualism." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 168-174. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

   Conceptualism is one of the three types of theories regarding the nature of universals described by Porphyry in his introduction to Aristotle's Categories. The other two are nominalism and realism. Because a universal, according to Aristotle, is that which can be predicated of things (De Int. 17a39), the difference between these three types of theories lies in what it is that each takes to be predicable of things. In this regard we should distinguish predication in language from predication in thought, and both from predication in

reality, where there is no presumption that one kind of predication precludes the others.
All three types of theories agree that there is predication in language, in particular that predicates can be predicated of things in the sense of being true or false of them. Nominalism goes further in maintaining that only predicates can be predicated of things, that is, that there are no universals other than the predicate expressions of some language or other. Conceptualism opposes nominalism in this regard and maintains that predicates can be true or false of things only because they stand for concepts, where concepts are the universals that are the basis of predication in thought. Realism also opposes nominalism in maintaining that there are real universals, viz. properties and relations, that are the basis of predication in reality." (p. 168)
(...)
"Conceptualism is by no means a monolithic theory, but has many forms, some more restrictive than others, depending on the mechanisms assumed as the basis for concept-formation. None of these forms, in themselves, precludes being combined with a realist theory, whether Aristotelian (as in conceptual natural realism) or Platonist (as in conceptual intensional realism), or both. Some conceptualists, such as Sellars, have made it a point to disassociate conceptualism from any form of realism regarding abstract entities, but that disassociation has nothing to do with conceptualism as a theory about the nature of predication in thought. Conceptualism's shift in emphasis from metaphysics to psychology, in other words, while important in determining what kind of theory is needed to explain predication in thought, should not be taken as justifying a restrictive form of conceptualism that precludes both a natural and an intensional realism." (p. 174)

10. ———. 1991. "Logic V: Higher Order Logics." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 466-470. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

"Higher-order logic goes beyond first-order logic in allowing quantifiers to reach into the predicate as as well as the subject positions of the logical forms it generates. A second feature, usually excluded in standard formulations of second-order logic, allows nominal-ized forms of predicate expressions (simple or complex) to occur in its logical forms as abstract singular terms. (E.g., 'Socrates is wise', in symbols W(s), contains 'is wise' as a predicate, whereas 'Wisdom is a virtue', in symbols V(W), contains 'wisdom' as a nominalized form of that predicate. 'Being a property is a property', in symbols P(P), or with λ-abstracts, PλxP(x)), where λχP(χ) is read 'to be an x such that x is a property', contains both the predicate 'is a property' and a nominalized form of that predicate, viz. 'being a property'. Frege's well-known example, 'The concept Horse is not a concept', contains 'the concept Horse' as a nominalized form of the predicate phrase 'is a horse'.)" (p. 466)

11. ———. 1991. "Ontology, Fomal." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 640-647. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. "Formal ontology is the result of combining the intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal, mathematical method of modern symbolic logic, and ultimately identifying them as different aspects of one and the same science. That is, where the method of ontology is the intuitive study of the fundamental properties. modes, and aspects of being, or of entities in general, and the method of modern symbolic logic is the rigorous construction of formal, axiomatic systems, formal ontology, the result of combining these two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all forms and modes of being. As such, formal ontology is a science prior to all others in which particular forms, modes, or kinds of being are studied." (p. 641)
12. ———. 1991. "Russell, Bertrand." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 796-798. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. "Russell held a number of different metaphysical positions throughout his career, with the idea of logic as a logically

perfect language being a common theme that ran through each.
(...)
"A fundamental notion of Russell's logical realism, sometimes also called ontological logicism, was that of a propositional function, the extension of which Russell took to be a class as many. Initially, as part of his response to the problem of the One and the Many, Russell had assumed that each propositional function was a single and separate entity over and above the many propositions that were its values, and, similarly, that to each class as many there corresponded a class as one. Upon discovering his paradox, Russell maintained that we must distinguish a class as many from a class as one, and that a class as one might not exist corresponding to a class as many. He also concluded that a propositional function cannot survive analysis after all, but 'lives' only in the propositions that are its values, i.e. that propositional functions are nonentities."
(...)
"As a result of arguments given by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1913, Russell, from 1914 on, gave up the Platonistic view that properties and relations could be logical subjects. Predicates were still taken as standing for properties and relations, but only in their role as predicates; i.e., nominalized predicates were no longer allowed as abstract singular terms in Russell's new version of his logically perfect language. Only particulars could be named in Russell's new metaphysical theory, which he called logical atomism, but which, unlike his earlier 1910-13 theory, is a form of natural realism, and not of logical realism, since now the only real properties and relations of his ontology are the simple material properties and relations that are the components of the atomic facts that make up the world. Complex properties and relations in this framework are simply propositional functions, which, along with propositions, are now merely linguistic expressions. (Russell remained unaware that as a result of the change in his metaphysical views from logical to natural realism his original theory of types was restricted to the much weaker

sub-theory of ramified second-order logic, and that he could no longer carry through his logicist programme. This reinforced the confusion of nominalists into thinking that Russell's earlier theory of types could be given a nominalistic interpretation, since such an interpretation is possible for ramified second-order logic.)" (pp. 797-798)

13. ———. 1991. "Quantification, Time and Necessity." In *Philosophical Applications of Free Logic*, edited by Lambert, Karel, 242-256. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. A Logic a Actual and Possible Objects; 2. A Completeness Theorem for Tense Logic; 3. Modality Within Tense Logic; 4. Some Observations on Quantifiers in Modal and Tense Logic; 5. Concluding Remarks.
Abstract: "A logic of actual and possible objects is formulated in which "existence" and "being", as second-level concepts represented by first-order (objectual) quantifiers, are distinguished. A free logic of actual objects is then distinguished as a subsystem of the logic of actual and possible object. Several complete first-order tense logics are then formulated in which temporal versions of possibilism and actualism are characterized in terms of the free logic of actual objects and the wide logic of actual and possible objects. It is then shown how a number of different modal logics can be interpreted within quantified tense logic, with the latter providing a paradigmatic framework in which to distinguish the interplay between quantifiers, tenses and modal operators and within which we can formulate different temporal versions of actualism and possibilism."
"The fundamental assumption of a logic of actual and possible objects is that the concept of existence is not the same as the concept of being. Thus, even though necessarily whatever exists has being, it is not necessary in such a logic that whatever has being exists; that is, it can be the case that there be something that does not exist. No occult doctrine is needed to explain the distinction between existence and being, for an obvious explanation is already at hand in a framework of tense logic in which being encompasses past,

present, and future objects (or even just past and present objects) while existence encompasses only those objects that presently exist. We can interpret modality in such a framework, in other words, whereby it can be true to say that some things do not exist. Indeed, as indicated in Section 3, infinitely many different modal logics can be interpreted in the framework of tense logic. In this regard, we maintain, tense logic provides a paradigmatic framework in which possibilism (i.e., the view that existence is not the same as being, and that therefore there can be some things that do not exist) can be given a logically perspicuous representation.

Tense logic also provides a paradigmatic framework for actualism as the view that is opposed to possibilism; that is, the view that denies that the concept of existence is different from the concept of being. Indeed, as we understand it here, actualism does not deny that there can be names that have had denotations in the past but that are now denotationless, and hence that the statement that some things do not exist can be true in a semantic metalinguistic sense (as a statement about the denotations, or lack of denotations, of singular terms). What is needed, according to actualism, is not that we should distinguish the concept of existence from the concept of being, but only that we should modify the way that the concept of existence (being) is represented in standard first-order predicate logic (with identity). A first-order logic of existence should allow for the possibility that some of our singular terms might fail to denote an existent object, which, according to actualism, is only to say that those singular terms are denotationless rather than what they denote are objects (beings) that do not exist. Such a logic for actualism amounts to what nowadays is called free logic." (pp. 242-243)

14. ———. 1992. "Conceptual Realism Versus Quine on Classes and Higher-Order Logic." *Synthese* no. 90:379-436. Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. Predication versus Membership; 2. Old versus New Foundations; 3. Concepts versus ultimate Classes; 4. Frege versus Quine on Higher-Order Logic; 5. Conceptualism versus Nominalism as

Formal Theories of predication; 6. Conceptualism Ramified versus Nominalism Ramified; 7. Constructive Conceptual Realism versus Quine's view of Conceptualism as a Ramified Theory of Classes; 8. Holistic Conceptual Realism versus Quine's Class Platonism.

Abstract: "The problematic features of Quine's 'set' theories NF and ML are a result of his replacing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory by a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by returning to a second-order logic of predication with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. We adopt a modified Fregean position called conceptual realism in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as singular terms. We argue against Quine's view that predicate quantifiers can be given a referential interpretation only if the entities predicates stand for on such an interpretation are the same as the classes (assuming extensionality) that nominalized predicates denote as singular terms. Quine's alternative of giving predicate quantifiers only a substitutional interpretation is compared with a constructive version of conceptual realism, which with a logic of nominalized predicates is compared with Quine's description of conceptualism as a ramified theory of classes. We argue against Quine's implicit assumption that conceptualism cannot account for impredicative concept-formation and compare holistic conceptual realism with Quine's class Platonism."

"According to Quine, in one of his later works, the pioneers in modern logic, such as Frege and Russell, overestimated the kinship between membership and predication and in that way came to view set theory as logic (Quine 1970, p. 65). Such a claim, we maintain, is both false and misleading. Frege and Russell did assume a logical kinship between predication and membership, but what they meant by membership was membership in a class as the extension of a concept (where a concept is a predicable entity, i.e., a universal in the traditional sense) and not membership in a

set. Sets, unlike classes, as we have said, have their being in their members, and in that regard there need be no kinship at all between predication and membership in a set. Classes in the logical sense, on the other hand, have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are, which means that any theory of membership in a class presupposes a superseding theory of predication. (3) Frege and Russell did not view set theory as logic, but they each did develop a theory
of classes and they each did so based on a superseding higher-order theory of predication." (p. 382)

15. ———. 1992. "Cantor's Power-Set Theorem Versus Frege's Double-Correlation Thesis." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 13:179-201.
Abstract: "Frege's thesis that second-level concepts can be correlated with first-level concepts and that the latter can be correlated with their value-ranges is in direct conflict with Cantor's power-set theorem, which is a necessary part of the iterative, but not of the logical, concept of class. Two consistent second-order logics with nominalised predicates as abstract singular terms are described in which Frege's thesis and the logical notion of a class are defended and Cantor's theorem is rejected. Cantor's theorem is not incompatible with the logical notion of class, however. Two alternative similar kinds of logics are also described in which Cantor's theorem and the logical notion of a class are retained and Frege's thesis is rejected."
"There is another problem with Russell's solution, however, in addition to that of the relativisation of classes to each logical type. This problem has to do with the fact that the particular theory of types that Russell adopted is a theory of ramified types, which, unlike the theory of simple types, is based on a constructive (i.e. 'predicative') comprehension principle. Such a constructive approach is not without merit, but it does affect the logical notion of a class in a fundamental way. In particular, because of the kind of constructive constraints imposed by the theory on the comprehension principle, Cantor's theorem, which involves objects of different types, cannot be proved in such a

framework (cf. Quine 1963, 265). That is not objectionable in itself, but it does not get at the root of the matter of the real conflict between Cantor's power-set theorem and the logical notion of class as represented by an impredicative comprehension principle.

An impredicative comprehension principle is provable in the theory of simple types. But in this framework, as in the theory of ramified types as well, Russell's paradox cannot even be stated (because of the gramatical constraints on the conditions of well-formedness), which means that the description of the class upon which Russell's paradox is based is meaningless. Thus, not only must the universal class be relativised and duplicated, potentially, infinitely many times in order to avoid Russell's paradox on this approach, but the paradox must itself be ruled as meaningless. The theory of types, whether simple or ramified, is not really a solution of the problem so much as a way of avoiding it altogether.

There is another way in which we can preserve our logical intuitions and not give up the logical notion of a class in favor of the mathematical (i.e. in favor of set theory), and yet in which not only is Cantor's theorem formulable but so is Russell's paradox—though, of course, the latter will no longer be provable. Indeed, there is not just one such way, but at least two (both of which themselves have two alternatives). On the first, it is not the logical notion of a class that must be rejected as the way of resolving Russell's paradox, but Cantor's theorem instead. This rejection is not ad hoc or arbitrary on this approach, but is based on a more general principle, which we refer to as Frege's double-correlation thesis. It is this approach that we shall turn to first. On the second and alternative approach, which we shall turn to later, the trouble lies in neither Cantor's theorem nor in the assumption that there is a universal class (both of which can be retained without contradiction on this approach), but rather in how the logic of identity is to be applied in certain contexts. On this approach, the claim that a contradiction results by combining Cantor's theorem with

the assumption that the universal class exists is not a 'truism' after all but is outright false."

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16. ———. 1993. "On Classes and Higher-Order Logic: A Critique of W.V.O. Quine." *Philosophy and the History of Science.A Taiwanese Journal* no. 2:23-50.
Abstract: "The problematic features of Quine's set theories NF and ML result from compressing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory into a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by turning to a second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. A modified Fregean position, called conceptual realism, is described in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as abstract singular terms. Quine's view that conceptualism cannot account for impredicative concept-formation is rejected, and a holistic conceptual realism is compared with Quine's class Platonism."
17. ———. 1995. "Knowledge Representation in Conceptual Realism." *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* no. 43:697-721.
"Knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence (AI) involves more than the representation of a large number of facts or beliefs regarding a given domain, i.e. more than a mere listing of those facts or beliefs as data structures. It may involve, for example, an account of the way the properties and relations that are known or believed to hold of the objects in that domain are organized into a theoretical whole - such as the way different branches of mathematics, or of physics and chemistry, or of biology and psychology, etc., are organized, and even the way different parts of our commonsense knowledge or beliefs about the world can be organized. But different theoretical accounts will apply to different domains, and one of the questions that arises here is whether or not there are categorial principles of

representation and organization that apply across all domains regardless of the specific nature of the objects in those domains. If there are such principles, then they can serve as a basis for a general framework of knowledge representation independently of its application to particular domains. In what follows I will give a brief outline of some of the categorial structures of conceptual realism as a formal ontology. It is this system that I propose we adopt as the basis of a categorial framework for knowledge representation." (p. 697)
(...)
" Concluding remarks. We have given here only an overview or sketch of conceptual realism as a formal ontology, i.e. as a theory of logical form having both conceptual and ontological categories - but in which the latter are represented in terms of the former. The categories of natural kinds and of natural properties and relations, for example, are represented in terms of the categories of sortals and predicable concepts, respectively, and the category of abstract objects is represented in terms of the process of conceptual nominalization (reification) as a subcategory of objects. Not all of these categories or parts of this formal ontology will be relevant in every domain of knowledge representation, but each is relevant at least to some domains and is needed in a comprehensive framework for knowledge representation. In those domains where certain categorial distinctions are not needed - such as that between predicative and impredicative concepts, or that between predicable concepts and natural properties and relations, or between sortal concepts and natural kinds, etc. - we can simply ignore or delete the logical forms in question. What must remain as the core of the system is the intensional logic around which all of the other categories are built - namely, the second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms that we call HST*-lambda. It is this core, I believe, that can serve as a universal standard by which to evaluate other representational systems." (p. 721)

18. ———. 1996. "Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontology." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter, 27-60. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Substitutional versus Ontological Interpretations of Quantifiers; 3. The Importance of the Notion of Unsaturedness in Formal Ontology; 4. Referential and Predicable Concepts Versus Immanent Objects of Reference; 5. Conceptual Natural Realism and the Analogy of Being Between Natural and Intelligible Universals; 6. Conceptual Natural Realism and Aristotelian Essentialism; 7. Conceptual Intensional Realism versus Conceptual Platonism and the Logic of Nominalized Predicates
8. Concluding Remarks.
Abstract: "Conceptualism *simpliciter*, wheter constructive or holistic, provides an account of predication only in thought and language, and represents in that regard only a truncated formal ontology. But conceptualism can be extended to an Aristotelian conceptual natural realism in which natural properties and relations (and natural kinds as well) can be analogically posited corresponding to some of Our concepts, thereby providing an account of predication in the space-time causal Order as well. In addition, through a pattern of reflexive abstraction corresponding to the process of nominalization in language (and in which abstract objects are hypostatized corresponding to our concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures), conceptualism can also be extended to a conceptual Platonism or intensional realism that can provide an account of both the intensional objects of fiction and the extensional objects of mathematics. Conceptual realism is thus shown to be a paradigm formal ontology in which the distinctions between abstract reality, natural reality, and thought and language are properly represented, and in which the traditional opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism is finally overcome by properly locating their different functions, and the way each should be rep resented, in formal ontology."

"Concluding Remarks. As this informal sketch indicates, conceptual realism, by which we mean conceptual natural realism and conceptual intensional realism together, provides the basis of a general conceptual-ontological framework, within which, beginning with thought and language, a comprehensive formal ontology can be developed. Not only does conceptual realism explain how, in naturalistic terms, predication in thought and language is possible, but, in addition, it provides a theory of the nature of predication in reality through an analogical theory of properties and relations. In this way, conceptual realism can be developed into a reconstructed version of Aristotelian realism, including a version of Aristotelian essentialism. In addition, through the process of nominalization, which corresponds to a reflexive abstraction in which we attempt to represent our concepts as if they were objects, conceptualism can be developed into a conceptual intensional realism that can provide an account not only of the abstract reality of numbers and other mathematical objects, but of the intensional objects of fiction and stories of all kinds, both true and false, and including those stories that we systematically develop into theories about the world. In this way, conceptual realism provides a framework not only for the conceptual and natural order, but for the mathematical and intensional order as well. Also, in this way, conceptual realism is able to reconcile and provide a unified account both of Platonism and Aristotelian realism, including Aristotelian essentialism - and it does so by showing how the ontological categories, or modes of being, of each of these ontologies can be explained in terms a conceptualist theory of predication and its analogical extensions." (p. 60)

19. ———. 1997. "Formally Oriented Work in the Philosophy of Language." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. X - The Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the 20th Century*, edited by Canfield, John, 39-75. New York: Routledge.
Contents: 1. The notion of a Characteristica Universalis as a philosophical language; 2. The notion a a logically perfect

language as a regulating ideal; 3. The theory of logical types; 4. Radical empiricism and the logical construction of the world; 5. The logical empiricist theory of meaning; 6. Semiotic and the trinity of syntax, semantics and pragmatics; 7. Pragmatics from a logical point of view; 8. Intensional logic; 9. Universal Montague grammar; 10. Speech-act theory and the return to pragmatics.
Abstract: "One of the perennial issues in philosophy is the nature of the various relationships between language and reality, language and thought, and language and knowledge. Part of this issue is the question of the kind of methodology that is to be brought to bear on the study of these relationships. The methodology that we shall discuss here is based on a formally oriented approach to the philosophy of language, and specifically on the notion of a logically ideal language as the basis of a theory of meaning and a theory of knowledge."

20. ———. 1997. "Conceptual Realism as a Theory of Logical Form." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*:175-199.
"The central notion in the philosophy of logic is the notion of a logical form, and the central issue is which theory of logical form best represents our scientific (including our mathematical) and commonsense understanding of the world. Here, by a theory of logical
form, we mean not only a logical grammar in the sense of a system of formation rules characterizing the well-formed expressions of the theory, but also a logical calculus characterizing what is valid (i.e., provable or derivable) in the theory. The representational role of the logical forms of such a theory consists in the fact that they are perspicuous in the way they specify the truth conditions, and thereby the validity, of formulas in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax. In conceptualism we also require that logical forms be perspicuous in the way they represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts, including in particular the referential and predicable concepts underlying those acts.
The purpose of a theory of logical form, accordingly, is that it is to serve as a general semantical framework by which we

can represent in a logically perspicuous way our commonsense and scientific understanding of the world, including our understanding of ourselves
and the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts. So understood, the logical forms of such a theory are taken to be semantic structures in their own right, relative to which the words, phrases, and (declarative) sentences of a (fragment of) natural language, or of a scientific or mathematical theory, are to be represented and interpreted. The process by which the expressions of a natural language or scientific theory are represented and interpreted in such a theory — relative to the aims, purposes and pragmatic considerations regarding a given context or domain of discourse — amounts to a logical analysis of those expressions. (A different group of aims, purposes, etc., might give a finer- or a coarser-grained analysis of the domain.)
Ideally, where the syntax of a target language or theory has been recursively characterized, such an analysis can be given in terms of a precisely characterized theory of translation (1). Usually, however, the analysis is given informally.
In what follows I will briefly describe and attempt to motivate some (but not all) aspects of a theory of logical form that I associate with the philosophical system I call conceptual realism. The realism involved here is really of two types, one a natural realism (amounting to a modem form of Aristotelian essentialism) and the other an intensional realism (amounting to a modem, but also mitigated, form of Platonism). The core of the theory is a second-order logic in which predicate expressions (both simple and complex) can be nominalized and treated as abstract singular terms (in the sense of being substituends of individual variables). In this respect the core is really a form of conceptual intensional realism, which is the only part of the system we will discuss here (2)." (pp. 175-176)
(1) See Montague (1969) for a description of such a theory of translation (for Montague's type-theoretical intensional logic).

(2) See Cocchiarella (1996), §§ 5-6, for a description of conceptual natural realism as a modem form of Aristotelian Essentialism.

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21. ———. 1998. "Property Theory." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Vol. 7*, edited by Craig, Edward, 761-767. New York: Routledge.

Abstract: "Traditionally, a property theory is a theory of abstract entities that can be predicated of things. A theory of properties in this sense is a theory of predication -just as a theory of classes or sets is a theory of membership. In a formal theory of predication, properties are taken to correspond to some (or all) one-place predicate expressions. In addition to properties, it is usually assumed that there are n-ary relations that correspond to some (or all) n-place predicate expressions (for n > 2). A theory of properties is then also a theory of relations.

In this entry we shall use the traditional labels 'realism' and 'conceptualism' as a convenient way to classify theories. In natural realism, where properties and relations are the physical, or natural, causal structures involved in the laws of nature, properties and relations correspond to only some predicate expressions, whereas in logical realism properties and relations are generally assumed to correspond to all predicate expressions.

Not all theories of predication take properties and relations to be the universals that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. The universals of conceptual ism, for example. are unsaturated concepts in the sense of cognitive capacities that are exercised (saturated) in thought and speech. Properties and relations in the sense of intensional Platonic objects may still correspond to predicate expressions, as they do in conceptual intensional realism, but only

indirectly as the intensional contents of the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. In that case, instead of properties and relations being what predicates stand for directly, they are what nominalized predicates denote as abstract singular terms. It is in this way that concepts - such as those that the predicate phrases 'is wise', 'is triangular' and 'is identical with' stand for - are distinguished from the properties and relations that are their intensional contents - such as those that are denoted by the abstract singular terms 'wisdom', 'triangularity' and 'identity, respectively. Once properties are represented by abstract singular terms, concepts can be predicated of them, and, in particular, a concept can be predicated of the property that is its intensional content. For example, the concept represented by 'is a property' can be predicated of the property denoted by the abstract noun phrase 'being a property', so that 'being a property is a property' (or, 'The property of being a property is a property') becomes well-formed. In this way, however, we are confronted with Russell's paradox of (the property of) being a non-self-predicable property, which is the intensional content of the concept represented by ' is a non-self-predicable property'. That is, the property of being a non-self- predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property (and therefore both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable)." (p. 761)

22. ———. 1998. "The Theory of Types (Simple and Ramified)." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Vol. 9*, edited by Craig, Edward, 359-362. New York: Routledge.
Abstract: "The theory of types was first described by Bertrand Russell in 1908. He was seeking a logical theory that could serve as a framework for mathematics and, in particular, a theory that would avoid the so-called 'vicious-circle' antinomies, such as his own paradox of the property of those properties that are not properties of themselves - or, similarly, of the class of those classes that are not members of themselves. Such paradoxes can be thought of as resulting when logical distinctions are not made between

different types of entities and, in particular, between different types of properties and relations that might be predicated of entities, such as the distinction between concrete objects and their properties, and the properties of those properties, and so on. In 'ramified' type theory, the hierarchy of properties and relations is, as it were, two-dimensional, where properties and relations are distinguished first by their order, and the by their level within each order. In 'simple' type theory properties and relations are distinguished only by their orders." (p. 359)

23. ———. 1998. "Reference in Conceptual Realism." *Synthese* no. 114:169-202.
Contents: 1. The core of Conceptual Intensional Realism; 2. Referential concepts, simple and complex; 3. Geach's negation and complex predicate arguments; 4. Active versus deactivated referential concepts; 5. Deactivation and Geach's arguments; 6. Relative pronouns and referential concepts; 7. Relative pronouns as referential expressions; 8. Concluding remarks.
Abstract: "A conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts is described in which singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and non-pronominal, referential concepts are given a uniform account. The theory includes an intensional realism in which the intensional contents of predicable and referential concepts are represented through nominalized forms of the predicate and quantifier phrases that stand for those concepts. A central part of the theory distinguishes between active and deactivated referential concepts, where the latter are represented by nominalized quantifier phrases that occur as parts of complex predicates. Peter Geach's arguments against theories of general reference in "Reference and Generality" are used as a foil to test the adequacy of the theory. Geach's arguments are shown to either beg the question of general as opposed to singular reference or to be inapplicable because of the distinction between active and deactivated referential concepts."

"Concluding Remarks. We do not claim that the theory of relative pronouns as referential expressions proposed in Section 7 is unproblematic, it should be noted. If it should turn out that it cannot be sustained, then we still have the theory proposed in Section 6, where relative pronouns are taken as anaphoric proxies for non-pronominal referential expressions. In other words, whether the proposal of Section 7 is sustained or not, we maintain that Geach's arguments against complex names and general reference do not work against the kind of conceptualist theory we have presented here.
We also do not claim to have proved that our conceptualist theory of reference resolves all problems about reference, but only that it has passed an initial test of adequacy as far as Geach's arguments in (Geach Reference and Generality third edition, 1980) are concerned. It is our view that a conceptualist theory is what is needed to account for reference and predication in our speech and mental acts, and that only a theory of the referential and predicable concepts that underlie the basic forms of such acts will suffice. Such a theory, we maintain, must provide a uniform account of general as well as singular reference, and, in terms of the referential and predicable concepts involved in a speech or mental act, it must distinguish the logical forms that represent the cognitive structure of that act from the logical forms that only represent its truth conditions. That, in any case, is the kind of conceptualist theory we have attempted to describe and defend here." (p. 198)

24. ———. 2000. "Russell's Paradox of the Totality of Propositions." *Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 5:25-37.
Abstract: "Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different

notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics."

"In Appendix B of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM), Russell described a “new contradiction” about “the totality of propositions” that his “doctrine of types” (as described in Appendix B) was unable to avoid. (1)

In recent years this “new contradiction” has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes, some purporting to show that there cannot be a totality of true propositions, (2) or that even the idea of quantifying over the totality of propositions leads to contradiction. (3) A number of these claims have been discussed recently by Mika Oksanen and shown to be spurious relative to the set theory known as NFU. (4) In other words, if NFU is used instead of ZF as the semantical metalanguage for modal logic, the various “paradoxes” about the totality of propositions (usually construed as the totality of sets of possible worlds) can be seen to fail (generally because of the existence of a universal set and the failure of the general form of Cantor’s power-set theorem in NFU). It is not clear, however, how Russell’s own paradox about the totality of propositions is resolved on this analysis, and although Oksanen quoted Russell’s description of the paradox in detail, he did not show how it is explained in NFU after his resolution of the other related modal paradoxes; in fact, it is not at all clear how this might be done in NFU.

One reason why Russell’s argument is difficult to reconstruct in NFU is that it is based on the logic of propositions, and implicitly in that regard on a theory of predication rather than a theory of membership. A more appropriate medium for the resolution of these paradoxes, in other words, would be a formal theory of predication that is a counterpart to NFU.

Fortunately, there are two such theories, λHST* and HST*λ, that are equiconsistent with NFU and that share with it many of the features that make it a useful framework within which to resolve a number of paradoxes, modal or otherwise. (5)" (pp. 25-26)

(1) PoM, p. 527.

(2) See, e.g., Grim 1991, pp. 92f.
(3) See, e.g., Grim 1991, p. 119 and Jubien 1988, p. 307.
(4) See Oksanen 1999. NFU is a modified version of Quine's system NF. It was first described in Jensen 1968 and recently has been extensively developed in Holmes 1999.
(5) See Cocchiarella 1986, chapters IV and VI for proofs of the connection of NFU with these systems. Also, see Cocchiarella 1985 for how these systems are related to Quine's systems NF and ML. For a discussion of the refutation of Cantor's power-set theorem in these systems, see Cocchiarella 1992.

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25. ———. 2001. "A Logical Reconstruction of Medieval Terminist Logic in Conceptual Realism." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:35-72.
Abstract: "The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the

medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the *fitcum* theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the *intellectio* theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures. Intentional objects (*ficta*) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objetified intensional contents of concepts. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this theory that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of personal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference."

"Conclusion. The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the f *ictum* theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the *intellectio* theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the notion of a concept as an unsaturated cognitive structure. Referential and predicable concepts in particular are unsaturated cognitive structures that mutually saturate each other in mental acts, analogous to the way that quantifier phrases and predicate expressions mutually saturate each other in language. Intentional objects (*ficta*) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectified intensional contents of concepts, i.e., as intentional objects obtained through the process of nominalization — and in that sense as products of the evolution of language and thought. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. In particular, the truth conditions determined by predicable concepts based on relations — including the relation the

copula stands for — are characterized in part in terms of these objectified intensional contents. It is by means of this conceptualist theory of predication that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism, based on the exercise and mutual saturation of referential and predicable concepts, is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" or types of personal supposition are accounted for in a natural and intuitive way in terms of the theory of reference of conceptual realism. Ockham's application of merely confused supposition to common names occurring within the scope of an intensional verb is rejected, as it should be, but its rejection is grounded on the notion of a deactivated referential concept—a deactification that, because of the intensionality of the context in question, cannot be "activated," the way it can be in extensional contexts." (p. 71)

26. ———. 2001. "Logic and Ontology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:127-150.
Contents: 1. Logic as Language versus Logic as Calculus; 2. Predication versus Membership; 3. The vagaries of Nominalism; 4. The Vindication (Almost) of Logical Realism; 5. Conceptualism Without a Transcendental Subject; 6. Conceptual Natural realism and the Analogy of being Between Natural and Conceptual Universals; 7. Conceptual Intensional Realism; 8. Concluding Remarks.
Abstract: "A brief review of the historical relation between logic and ontology and of the opposition between the views of logic as language and logic as calculus is given. We argue that predication is more fundamental than membership and that different theories of
predication are based on different theories of universals, the three most important being nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. These theories can be formulated as formal ontologies, each with its own logic, and compared with one another in terms of their respective explanatory powers. After a brief survey of such a comparison, we argue that an

extended form of conceptual realism provides the most coherent formal ontology and, as such, can be used to defend the view of logic as language."

"Concluding Remarks: Despite our extended discussion and defense of conceptual realism, the fact remains that this is a formal ontology that can be described and compared with other formal ontologies in the set-theoretic framework of comparative formal ontology. Set theory, as we have said, provides a convenient mathematical medium in which both the syntax and an extrinsic semantics of different formal ontologies can be formulated, which then can be compared and contrasted with one another in their logical and descriptive powers. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as calculus. But membership is at best a pale shadow of predication, which underlies thought, language and the different categories of reality. Set theory is not itself an adequate framework for general ontology, in other words, unless based on a theory of predication (as in Quine's nominalist-platonism). Only a formal theory of predication based on a theory of universals can be the basis of a general ontology. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as language. But there are alternative theories of universals, and therefore alternative formal theories of predication, each with its own logic and theory of logical form. A rational choice can be made only by formulating and comparing these alternatives in comparative formal ontology, a program that can best be carried out in set theory. Among the various alternatives that have been formulated and investigated over the years, the choice we have made here, for the reasons given, is what we have briefly described above as conceptual realism, which includes both a conceptual natural realism and a conceptual intensional realism. Others may make a different choice. As Rudolf Carnap once said: "Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes." But then, at least in the construction of a formal ontology, we all have an obligation to defend our choice and to give reasons why we think one system is better than another. In this regard,

we do not accept Carnap's additional injunction that in logic, there are no morals." (pp. 145-146)
Translated in Italian by Flavia Marcacci with revision by Gianfranco Basti, as: *Logica e Ontologia* in *Aquinas. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia*, 52, 2009.

27. ———. 2001. "A Conceptualist Interpretation of Leśniewski's Ontology." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 22:29-43.
Contents: 1. Introduction 29; 2. Leśniewski's Ontology as a First-Order Theory 29; 3. The Logic of Names in Conceptual Realism 31; 4. A Conceptualist Interpretation of Leśniewski's System 35; 5. Reduction of Leśniewski's Theory of Definitions 39; 6. Consistency and Decidability 40; References 43.
Abstract: "A first-order formulation of Leśniewski's ontology is formulated and shown to be interpretable within a free first-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantification over proper and common-name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the first-order part of Leśniewski's ontology is decidable."
"Introduction. One of the important applications of Leśniewski's system of ontology, sometimes also called *the logic of (proper and common) names*, (1) has been as a logistic framework that can be used in the reconstruction of medieval terminist logic. (2) This is especially so because the basic relation of Leśniewski's system, singular inclusion, amounts to a version of the two-name theory of the copula. (3) An alternative reconstruction of medieval terminist logic can also be given within the logistic framework of conceptual

28. ———. 1986. "Frege, Russell and Logicism: A Logical Reconstruction." In *Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila and Hintikka, Jaakko, 197-252. Dordrecht: Reidel
Reprinted as Chapter 2 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 64-118.
"Logicism by the end of the nineteenth century was a philosophical doctrine whose time had come, and it is

Gottlob Frege to whom we owe its arrival. “Often,” Frege once wrote, “it is only after immense intellectual effort, which may have continued over centuries, that humanity at last succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it from the eyes of the mind” (Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* [Fd], xix). Prior to Frege logicism was just such a concept whose pure form was obscured by irrelevant accretions; and in his life’s work it was Frege who first presented this concept to humanity in its pure form and developed it as a doctrine of the first rank.

That form, unfortunately, has become obscured once again. For today, as we approach the end of the twentieth century, logicism, as a philosophical doctrine, is said to be dead, and even worse, to be impossible. Frege’s logicism, or the specific presentation he gave of it in *Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, ([Gg]), fell to Russell’s paradox, and, we are told, it cannot be resurrected. Russell’s own subsequent form of logicism presented in [PM], moreover, in effect gives up the doctrine; for in overcoming his paradox, Russell was unable to reduce classical mathematics to logic without making at least two assumptions that are not logically true; namely, his assumption of the axiom of reducibility and his assumption of an axiom of infinity regarding the existence of infinitely many concrete or nonabstract individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, logicism is not dead beyond redemption; that is, if logicism is dead, then it can be easily resurrected. This is not to say that as philosophical doctrines go logicism is true, but only that it can be logically reconstructed and defended or advocated in essentially the same philosophical context in which it was originally formulated. This is true especially of Frege’s form of logicism, as we shall see, and in fact, by turning to his correspondence with Russell and his discussion of Russell’s paradox, we are able to formulate not only one but two alternative reconstructions of his form of logicism, both of which are consistent (relative to weak Zermelo set theory).

In regard to Russell's form of logicism, on the other hand, our resurrection will not apply directly to the form he adopted in [PM] but rather to the form he was implicitly advocating in his correspondence with Frege shortly after the completion of [POM]. In this regard, though we shall have occasion to refer to certain features of his later form of logicism, especially in our concluding section where a counterpart to the axiom of reducibility comes into the picture, it is Russell's early form of logicism that we shall reconstruct and be concerned with here.

Though Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism are not the same, incidentally, they are closely related; and one of our goals will be to reconstruct or resurrect these forms with their similarity in mind. In particular, it is our contention that both are to be reconstructed as second order predicate logics in which nominalized predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms. Their important differences, as we shall see, will then consist in the sort of object each takes nominalized predicates to denote and in whether the theory of predication upon which the laws of logic are to be based is to be extensional or intensional." (pp. 64-65 of the reprint)

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Russell, Bertrand, [POM] *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2nd ed., W. W. Norton & Co., N.Y., 1937.

29. ———. 1986. "Conceptualism, Ramified Logic, and Nominalized Predicates." *Topoi.An International Review of Philosophy* no. 5:75-87.

The problem of universals as the problem of what predicates stand for in meaningful assertions is discussed in contemporary philosophy mainly in terms of the opposing theories of nominalism and logical realism. Conceptualism, when it is mentioned, is usually identified with intuitionism, which is not a theory of predication but a theory of the

activity of constructing proofs in mathematics. Both intuitionism and conceptualism are concerned with the notion of a mental construction, to be sure, and both maintain that there can only be a potentially infinite number of such constructions. But whereas the focus of concern in intuitionism is with the construction of proofs, in conceptualism our concern is with the construction of concepts. This difference sets the two frameworks apart and in pursuit of different goals, and in fact it is not at all clear how the notion of a mental construction in the one framework is related to that in the other. This is especially true insofar as mathematical objects, according to intuitionism, are nothing but mental constructions, whereas in conceptualism concepts are anything but objects. In any case, whatever the relation between the two, our concern in this paper is with conceptualism as a philosophical theory of predication and not with intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics.

Now conceptualism differs from nominalism insofar as it posits universals, namely, concepts, as the semantic grounds for the correct or incorrect application of predicate expressions. Conceptualism differs from logical realism, on the other hand, insofar as the universals it posits are not assumed to exist independently of the human capacity for thought and representation. Concepts, in other words, are neither predicate expressions nor independently real properties and relations. But then, at least for the kind of conceptualism we have in mind here, neither are they mental images or ideas in the sense of particular mental occurrences. That is, concepts are not objects (saturated individuals) but are rather cognitive capacities, or cognitive structures otherwise based upon such capacities, to identify and classify or characterize and relate objects in various ways. Concepts, in other words, are intersubjectively realizable cognitive abilities which may be exercized by different persons at the same time as well as by the same person at different times. And it is for this reason that we speak of concepts as objective universals, even though they are not independently real properties and relations.

As cognitive structures, however, concepts in the sense intended here are not Fregean concepts (which for Frege are independently real unsaturated functions from objects to truth values). But they may be modeled by the latter (assuming that there are Fregean concepts to begin with) - especially since as cognitive capacities which need not be exercized at any given time (or even ever for that matter), concepts in the sense intended here also have an unsaturated nature corresponding to, albeit different from, the unsaturated nature of Fregean concepts. Thus, in particular, the saturation (or exercise) of a concept in the sense intended here results not in a truth value but a mental act, and, if overtly expressed, a speech act as well. The un-saturatedness of a concept consists in this regard in its non-occurrent or purely dispositional status as a cognitive capacity, and it is the exercise (or saturation) of this capacity as a cognitive structure which informs particular mental acts with a predicable nature (or with a referential nature in the case of concepts corresponding to quantifier expressions)." (pp. 75-76)

30. ———. 1987. "Rigid Designation." In *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol. 2*, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 834. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
31. ———. 1987. "Russell, Bertrand." In *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol. 2*, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 840-841. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
32. ———. 1988. "Predication Versus Membership in the Distinction between Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus." *Synthese* no. 75:37-72
Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. The problem with a set-theoretic semantics of natural language; 2. Intensional logic as a new theoretical framework for philosophy; 3.The incompleteness of intensional logic when based on membership; 4. Predication versus membership in type theory; 5. Second order predicate logic with nominalized predicates; 6. A set theoretic semantics with predication as fundamental; 7. Concluding remarks.
"There are two major doctrines regarding the nature of logic today. The first is the view of logic as the laws of valid

inference, or logic as calculus. This view began with Aristotle's theory of the syllogism, or syllogistic logic, and in time evolved first into Boole's algebra of logic and then into quantificational logic. On this view, logic is an abstract calculus capable of various interpretations over domains of varying cardinality. Because these interpretations are given in terms of a set-theoretic semantics where one can vary the universe at will and consider the effect this, has on the validity of formulas, this view is sometimes described as the set-theoretic approach to logic (see van Heijenoort ["Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus", *Synthese* 17,] 1967, p. 327).
The second view of logic does not eschew set-theoretic semantics, it should be noted, and it may in fact utilize such a semantics as a guide in the determination of validity. But to use such a semantics as a guide, on this view, is not the same as to take that semantics as an essential characterization of validity. Indeed, unlike the view of logic as calculus, this view of logic rejects the claim that a set-theoretic definition of validity has anything other than an extrinsic significance that may be exploited for certain purposes (such as proving a completeness theorem). Instead, on this view, logic has content in its own right and validity is determined by what are called the laws of logic, which may be stated either as principles or as rules. Because one of the goals of this view is a specification of the basic laws of logic from which the others may be derived, this view is sometimes called the axiomatic approach to logic." (p. 37)
(...)
"Concluding Remarks. The account we have given here of the view of logic as language should not be taken as a rejection of the set-theoretical approach or as defense of the metaphysics of possibilist logical realism. Rather, our view is that there are really two types of conceptual framework corresponding to our two doctrines of the nature of logic. The first type of framework is based on membership in the sense of the iterative concept of set; although extensionality is its most natural context (since sets have their being in

their members), it may nevertheless be extended to include intensional contexts by way of a theory of senses (as in Montague's sense-denotation intensional logic). The second type of framework is based on predication, and in particular developments it is associated with one or another theory of universals. Extensionality is not the most natural context in this theory, but where it does hold and extensions are posited, the extensions are classes in the logical and not in the mathematical sense.

Russell's paradox, as we have explained, has no real bearing on set-formation in a theory of membership based on the iterative concept of set, but it does bear directly on concept-formation or the positing or universals in a theory based on predication. As a result, our second type of framework has usually been thought to be incoherent or philosophically bankrupt, leaving us with the set-theoretical approach as, the only viable alternative. This is why so much of analytic philosophy in the 20th Century has been dominated by the set-theoretical approach. Set theory, after all, does seem to serve the purposes of a *mathesis universalis*.

What is adequate as a *mathesis universalis*, however, need not also therefore be adequate as a l*ingua philosophica* or *characteristica universalis*. In particular, the set-theoretic approach does not seem to provide a philosophically satisfying semantics for natural language; this is because it is predication and not membership that is fundamental to natural language. An adequate semantics for natural language, in other words, seems to demand a conceptual framework based on predication and not on membership.

(...)

We do not maintain, accordingly, that we should give up the set-theoretic approach, especially when dealing with the philosophy and foundations of mathematics, or that only a theory of predication associated with possibilist logical realism will provide an adequate semantics for natural language. In both cases we may find a principle of tolerance, if not outright pluralism, the more appropriate attitude to take." (pp. 69-70)

33. ———. 1989. "Philosophical Perspectives on Formal Theories of Predication." In *Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. 4. Topics in the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Guenthner, Franz, 253-326. Dordrecht: Reidel

Contents: 1. Predication and the problem of universal 254; 2. Nominalism 256; 3. A nominalistic semantics for predicative second order logic 261; 4. Nominalism and modal logic 266; 5 . Conceptualism vs . nominalism 270; 6. Constructive conceptualism 273; 7. Ramification of constructive conceptualism 280; 8. Holistic conceptualism 286; 9. Logical realism vs holistic conceptualism 289; 10. Possibilism and actualism in modal logical realism 292; 11. Logical realism and cssentialism 301; 12. Possibilism and actualism within conceptualism 306; 13. Natural realism and conceptualism 313; 14. Aristotelian essentialism and the logic of natural kinds 318; References 325-326.

"Predication has been a central, if not the central, issue in philosophy since at least the lime of Plato and Aristotle. Different theories of predication have in fact been the basis of a number of philosophical controversies in both metaphysics and epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals. In what follows we shall be concerned with what traditionally have been the three most important types of theories of universals. namely, nominalism, conceptualism, and realism, and with the theories of predication which these theories might be said to determine or characterize.

Though each of these three types of theories of universals may be said to have many variants, we shall ignore their differences here to the extent that they do not characterize different theories of predication. This will apply especially to nominalism where but one formal theory of predication is involved. In both conceptualism and realism, however, the different variants of each type do not all agree and form two distinct subtypes each with its own theory of predication. For this reason we shall distinguish between a constructive and a holistic form of conceptualism on the one hand, and a logical and a natural realism on the other. Constructive

conceptualism, as we shall see, has affinities with nominalism with which it is sometimes confused, and holistic conceptualism has affinities with logical realism with which it is also sometimes confused. Both forms of conceptualism may assume some form of natural realism as their causal ground; and natural realism in turn must presuppose some form of conceptualism as its background theory of predication. Both forms of realism may be further divided into their essentialist and non-essentialist variants (and in logical realism even a form of anti-essentialism), and though an essentialist logical realism is sometimes confused with Aristotelian essentialism, the latter is really a form of natural realism with natural kinds as the only essential properties objects can have." (pp. 253-254)

34. ———. 1989. "Russell's Theory of Logical Types and the Atomistic Hierarchy of Sentences." In *Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology*, edited by Savage, C.Wade and Anderson, C.Anthony, 41-62. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in *Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 193-221.
"Russell's philosophical views underwent a number of changes throughout his life, and it is not always well-appreciated that views he held at one time came later to be rejected; nor, similarly, that views he rejected at one time came later to be accepted. It is not well-known, for example, that the theory of logical types Russell described in his later or post-[PM] philosophy is not the same as the theory originally described in [PM] in 1910-13; nor that some of the more important applications that Russell made of the theory at the earlier time cannot be validated or even significantly made in the framework of his later theory. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that Russell himself seems not to have realized that he was describing a new theory of logical types in his later philosophy, and that as a result of the change some of his earlier logical constructions, including especially his construction of the different kinds of numbers, were no longer available to him.

In the original framework, for example, propositional functions are independently real properties and relations that can themselves have properties and relations of a higher order/type, and all talk of classes, and thereby ultimately of numbers, can be reduced to extensional talk of properties and relations as “single entities,” or what Russell in [POM] had called “logical subjects.” The Platonic reality of classes and numbers was replaced in this way by a more fundamental Platonic reality of propositional functions as properties and relations. In Russell's later philosophy, however, “a propositional function is nothing but an expression. It does not, by itself, represent anything. But it can form part of a sentence which does say something, true or false” (Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, ([MPD]), 69). Surprisingly. Russell even insists that this was what he meant by a propositional function in [PM]. “Whitehead and I thought of a propositional function as an expression containing an undetermined variable and becoming an ordinary sentence as soon as a value is assigned to the variable: ‘x is human’, for example, becomes an ordinary sentence as soon as we substitute a proper name for V. In this view . . . the propositional function is a method of making a bundle of such sentences” ([MPD], 124). Russell does realize that some sort of change has come about, however, for he admits, “I no longer think that the laws of logic are laws of things; on the contrary, I now regard them as purely linguistic” (ibid., 102).
(...)
Now it is not whether [PM] can sustain a nominalistic interpretation that is our concern in this essay, as we have said, but rather how it is that Russell came to be committed in his later philosophy to the atomistic hierarchy and the nominalistic interpretation of propositional functions as expressions generated in a ramified second order hierarchy of languages based on the atomistic hierarchy. We shall pursue this question by beginning with a discussion of the difference between Russell’s 1908 theory of types and that presented in [PM] in 1910. This will be followed by a brief summary of the ontology that Russell took to be implicit in

[PM], and that he described in various publications between 1910 and 1913. The central notion in this initial discussion is what Russell in his early philosophy called the notion of a logical subject, or equivalently that of a “term” or “single entity”. (In [PM], this notion was redescribed as the systematically ambiguous notion of an “object.”) As explained in chapter 1 this notion provides the key to the various problems that led Russell in his early philosophy to the development of his different theories of types, including that presented in [PM]. This remains true, moreover, even when we turn to Russell’s later philosophy, i.e., to his post-[PM] views, only then it is described as the notion of what can and cannot be named in a logically perfect language. The ontology of these later views is what Russell called logical atomism, and it is this ontology that determines what Russell described as the atomistic hierarchy of sentences. In other words, it is the notion of what can and cannot be named in the atomistic hierarchy that explains how Russell, however unwittingly, came to replace his earlier theory of logical types by the theory underlying the atomistic hierarchy of sentences as the basis of a logically perfect language." (pp. 193-195 of the reprint)

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POM] Russell, Bertrand, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2d ed. (NY., Norton & Co., 1938).

[PM] Russell, Bertrand and Alfred Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, vol. 1 (1910), vol. 2 (1912), and vol. 3 (1913) (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,).

35. ———. 1989. "Conceptualism, Realism and Intensional Logic." *Topoi.An International Review of Philosophy* no. 7:15-34

Contents: 0. Introduction 15; 1. A conceptual analysis of predication 16; 2. Concept-correlates and Frege's double correlations thesis 17; 3. Russell's paradox in conceptual realism 18: 4. What are the natural numbers and where do they come from? 22; 5. Referential concepts and quantifier phrases 24; 5. Singular reference 24; 7. The intensions of refrential concepts as components of applied predicable concepts 26; 8. Intensional versus extensional predicable

concepts 28; 9. The intentional identity of intensional objects 29; Notes 31; Reference 33-35.

"0. Introduction

Linguists and philosophers are sometimes at odds in the semantical analysis of language. This is because linguists tend to assume that language must be semantically analyzed in terms of mental constructs, whereas philosophers tend to assume that only a platonic realm of intensional entities will suffice. The problem for the linguist in this conflict is how to explain the apparent realist posits we seem to be committed to in our use of language, and in particular in our use of infinitives, gerunds and other forms of nominalized predicates. The problem for the philosopher is the old and familiar one of how we can have knowledge of independently real abstract entities if all knowledge must ultimately be grounded in psychological states and processes. In the case of numbers, for example, this is the problem of how mathematical knowledge is possible. In the case of the intensional entities assumed in the semantical analysis of language, it is the problem of how knowledge of even our own native language is possible, and in particular of how we can think and talk to one another in all the ways that language makes possible.

I believe that the most natural framework in which this conflict is to be resolved and which is to serve as the semantical basis of natural language is an intensional logic that is based upon a conceptual analysis of predication in which what a predicate stands for in its role as a predicate is distinguished from what its nominalization denotes in its role as a singular term. Predicates in such a framework stand for concepts as cognitive capacities to characterize and relate objects in various ways, i.e. for dispositional cognitive structures that do not themselves have an individual nature, and which therefore cannot be the objects denoted by predicate nominalizations as abstract singular terms. The objects purportedly denoted by nominalized predicates, on the other hand, are intensional entities, e.g. properties and relations (and propositions in the case of zero-place predicates), which have their own abstract form

of individuality, which, though real, is posited only through the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. That is, intensional objects are represented in this logic as concept-correlates, where the correlation is based on a logical projection of the content of the concepts whose correlates they are.

(...)

Before proceeding, however, there is an important distinction regarding the notion of a logical form that needs to be made when joining conceptualism and realism in this way. This is that logical forms can be perspicuous in either of two senses, one stronger than the other. The first is the usual sense that applies to all theories of logical form, conceptualist or otherwise; namely, that logical forms are perspicuous in the way they specify the truth conditions of assertions in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax. In this sense, fully applied logical forms are said to be semantic structures in their own right. In the second and stronger sense, logical forms may be perspicuous not only in the way they specify the truth conditions of an assertion, but in the way they specify the cognitive structure of that assertion as well. To be perspicuous in this sense, a logical form must provide an appropriate representation of both the referential and the predicable concepts that underlie an assertion.

Our basic hypothesis in this regard will be that every basic assertion is the result of applying just one referential concept and one predicable concept, and that such an applied predicable concept is always fully intensionalized (in a sense to be explained). This will place certain constraints on the conditions for when a complex predicate expression is perspicuous in the stronger sense — such as that a referential expression can occur in such a predicate expression only in its nominalized form. (A similar constraint will also apply to a defining or restricting relative clause of a referential expression.) In the cases where a relational predicable concept is applied, the assumption that there is still but one referential concept involved leads to the notion of a conjunctive referential concept, a notion that

requires the introduction in intensional logic of special quantifiers that bind more than one individual variable. Except for briefly noting the need for their development, we shall not deal with conjunctive quantifiers in this essay." (pp. 15-16)

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Annotated bibliography of Nino Cocchiarella 1991 - 2019

ESSAYS

1. Cocchiarella, Nino. 1991. "Conceptualism." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 168-174. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
   Conceptualism is one of the three types of theories regarding the nature of universals described by Porphyry in his introduction to Aristotle's Categories. The other two are nominalism and realism. Because a universal, according to Aristotle, is that which can be predicated of things (De Int. 17a39), the difference between these three types of theories lies in what it is that each takes to be predicable of things. In this regard we should distinguish predication in language from predication in thought, and both from predication in reality, where there is no presumption that one kind of predication precludes the others.
   All three types of theories agree that there is predication in language, in particular that predicates can be predicated of things in the sense of being true or false of them. Nominalism goes further in maintaining that only predicates can be predicated of things, that is, that there are no universals other than the predicate expressions of some language or other. Conceptualism opposes nominalism in this regard and maintains that predicates can be true or false of things only because they stand for concepts, where concepts are the universals that are the basis of predication in thought. Realism also opposes nominalism in

maintaining that there are real universals, viz. properties and relations, that are the basis of predication in reality." (p. 168)
(...)
"Conceptualism is by no means a monolithic theory, but has many forms, some more restrictive than others, depending on the mechanisms assumed as the basis for concept-formation. None of these forms, in themselves, precludes being combined with a realist theory, whether Aristotelian (as in conceptual natural realism) or Platonist (as in conceptual intensional realism), or both. Some conceptualists, such as Sellars, have made it a point to disassociate conceptualism from any form of realism regarding abstract entities, but that disassociation has nothing to do with conceptualism as a theory about the nature of predication in thought. Conceptualism's shift in emphasis from metaphysics to psychology, in other words, while important in determining what kind of theory is needed to explain predication in thought, should not be taken as justifying a restrictive form of conceptualism that precludes both a natural and an intensional realism." (p. 174)

2. ———. 1991. "Logic V: Higher Order Logics." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 466-470. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
"Higher-order logic goes beyond first-order logic in allowing quantifiers to reach into the predicate as as well as the subject positions of the logical forms it generates. A second feature, usually excluded in standard formulations of second-order logic, allows nominal-ized forms of predicate expressions (simple or complex) to occur in its logical forms as abstract singular terms. (E.g., 'Socrates is wise', in symbols W(s), contains 'is wise' as a predicate, whereas 'Wisdom is a virtue', in symbols V(W), contains 'wisdom' as a nominalized form of that predicate. 'Being a property is a property', in symbols P(P), or with λ-abstracts, PλxP(x)), where λχP(χ) is read 'to be an x such that x is a property', contains both the predicate 'is a property' and a nominalized form of that predicate, viz. 'being a property'. Frege's well-

known example, ‘The concept Horse is not a concept’, contains ‘the concept Horse’ as a nominalized form of the predicate phrase ‘is a horse’.)" (p. 466)

3. ———. 1991. "Ontology, Fomal." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 640-647. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. "Formal ontology is the result of combining the intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal, mathematical method of modern symbolic logic, and ultimately identifying them as different aspects of one and the same science. That is, where the method of ontology is the intuitive study of the fundamental properties. modes, and aspects of being, or of entities in general, and the method of modern symbolic logic is the rigorous construction of formal, axiomatic systems, formal ontology, the result of combining these two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all forms and modes of being. As such, formal ontology is a science prior to all others in which particular forms, modes, or kinds of being are studied." (p. 641)
4. ———. 1991. "Russell, Bertrand." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Smith, Barry and Burkhardt, Hans, 796-798. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. "Russell held a number of different metaphysical positions throughout his career, with the idea of logic as a logically perfect language being a common theme that ran through each.
(...)
"A fundamental notion of Russell’s logical realism, sometimes also called ontological logicism, was that of a propositional function, the extension of which Russell took to be a class as many. Initially, as part of his response to the problem of the One and the Many, Russell had assumed that each propositional function was a single and separate entity over and above the many propositions that were its values, and, similarly, that to each class as many there corresponded a class as one. Upon discovering his paradox, Russell maintained that we must distinguish a class as many from a class as one, and that a class as one might not exist

corresponding to a class as many. He also concluded that a propositional function cannot survive analysis after all, but 'lives' only in the propositions that are its values, i.e. that propositional functions are nonentities."
(...)
"As a result of arguments given by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1913, Russell, from 1914 on, gave up the Platonistic view that properties and relations could be logical subjects. Predicates were still taken as standing for properties and relations, but only in their role as predicates; i.e., nominalized predicates were no longer allowed as abstract singular terms in Russell's new version of his logically perfect language. Only particulars could be named in Russell's new metaphysical theory, which he called logical atomism, but which, unlike his earlier 1910-13 theory, is a form of natural realism, and not of logical realism, since now the only real properties and relations of his ontology are the simple material properties and relations that are the components of the atomic facts that make up the world. Complex properties and relations in this framework are simply propositional functions, which, along with propositions, are now merely linguistic expressions. (Russell remained unaware that as a result of the change in his metaphysical views from logical to natural realism his original theory of types was restricted to the much weaker sub-theory of ramified second-order logic, and that he could no longer carry through his logicist programme. This reinforced the confusion of nominalists into thinking that Russell's earlier theory of types could be given a nominalistic interpretation, since such an interpretation is possible for ramified second-order logic.)" (pp. 797-798)

5. ———. 1991. "Quantification, Time and Necessity." In *Philosophical Applications of Free Logic*, edited by Lambert, Karel, 242-256. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. A Logic a Actual and Possible Objects; 2. A Completeness Theorem for Tense Logic; 3. Modality Within Tense Logic; 4. Some Observations on

Quantifiers in Modal and Tense Logic; 5. Concluding Remarks.

Abstract: "A logic of actual and possible objects is formulated in which "existence" and "being", as second-level concepts represented by first-order (objectual) quantifiers, are distinguished. A free logic of actual objects is then distinguished as a subsystem of the logic of actual and possible object. Several complete first-order tense logics are then formulated in which temporal versions of possibilism and actualism are characterized in terms of the free logic of actual objects and the wide logic of actual and possible objects. It is then shown how a number of different modal logics can be interpreted within quantified tense logic, with the latter providing a paradigmatic framework in which to distinguish the interplay between quantifiers, tenses and modal operators and within which we can formulate different temporal versions of actualism and possibilism."

"The fundamental assumption of a logic of actual and possible objects is that the concept of existence is not the same as the concept of being. Thus, even though necessarily whatever exists has being, it is not necessary in such a logic that whatever has being exists; that is, it can be the case that there be something that does not exist. No occult doctrine is needed to explain the distinction between existence and being, for an obvious explanation is already at hand in a framework of tense logic in which being encompasses past, present, and future objects (or even just past and present objects) while existence encompasses only those objects that presently exist. We can interpret modality in such a framework, in other words, whereby it can be true to say that some things do not exist. Indeed, as indicated in Section 3, infinitely many different modal logics can be interpreted in the framework of tense logic. In this regard, we maintain, tense logic provides a paradigmatic framework in which possibilism (i.e., the view that existence is not the same as being, and that therefore there can be some things that do not exist) can be given a logically perspicuous representation.

Tense logic also provides a paradigmatic framework for actualism as the view that is opposed to possibilism; that is, the view that denies that the concept of existence is different from the concept of being. Indeed, as we understand it here, actualism does not deny that there can be names that have had denotations in the past but that are now denotationless, and hence that the statement that some things do not exist can be true in a semantic metalinguistic sense (as a statement about the denotations, or lack of denotations, of singular terms). What is needed, according to actualism, is not that we should distinguish the concept of existence from the concept of being, but only that we should modify the way that the concept of existence (being) is represented in standard first-order predicate logic (with identity). A first-order logic of existence should allow for the possibility that some of our singular terms might fail to denote an existent object, which, according to actualism, is only to say that those singular terms are denotationless rather than what they denote are objects (beings) that do not exist. Such a logic for actualism amounts to what nowadays is called free logic." (pp. 242-243)

6. ———. 1992. "Conceptual Realism Versus Quine on Classes and Higher-Order Logic." *Synthese* no. 90:379-436.
   Contents: 0. Introduction; 1. Predication versus Membership; 2. Old versus New Foundations; 3. Concepts versus ultimate Classes; 4. Frege versus Quine on Higher-Order Logic; 5. Conceptualism versus Nominalism as Formal Theories of predication; 6. Conceptualism Ramified versus Nominalism Ramified; 7. Constructive Conceptual Realism versus Quine's view of Conceptualism as a Ramified Theory of Classes; 8. Holistic Conceptual Realism versus Quine's Class Platonism.
   Abstract: "The problematic features of Quine's 'set' theories NF and ML are a result of his replacing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory by a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by returning to a second-order logic of predication with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. We adopt a modified Fregean position called conceptual realism in which the concepts

(unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as singular terms. We argue against Quine's view that predicate quantifiers can be given a referential interpretation only if the entities predicates stand for on such an interpretation are the same as the classes (assuming extensionality) that nominalized predicates denote as singular terms. Quine's alternative of giving predicate quantifiers only a substitutional interpretation is compared with a constructive version of conceptual realism, which with a logic of nominalized predicates is compared with Quine's description of conceptualism as a ramified theory of classes. We argue against Quine's implicit assumption that conceptualism cannot account for impredicative concept-formation and compare holistic conceptual realism with Quine's class Platonism."

"According to Quine, in one of his later works, the pioneers in modern logic, such as Frege and Russell, overestimated the kinship between membership and predication and in that way came to view set theory as logic (Quine 1970, p. 65). Such a claim, we maintain, is both false and misleading. Frege and Russell did assume a logical kinship between predication and membership, but what they meant by membership was membership in a class as the extension of a concept (where a concept is a predicable entity, i.e., a universal in the traditional sense) and not membership in a set. Sets, unlike classes, as we have said, have their being in their members, and in that regard there need be no kinship at all between predication and membership in a set. Classes in the logical sense, on the other hand, have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are, which means that any theory of membership in a class presupposes a superseding theory of predication. (3) Frege and Russell did not view set theory as logic, but they each did develop a theory
of classes and they each did so based on a superseding higher-order theory of predication." (p. 382)

7. ———. 1992. "Cantor's Power-Set Theorem Versus Frege's Double-Correlation Thesis." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 13:179-201.
Abstract: "Frege's thesis that second-level concepts can be correlated with first-level concepts and that the latter can be correlated with their value-ranges is in direct conflict with Cantor's power-set theorem, which is a necessary part of the iterative, but not of the logical, concept of class. Two consistent second-order logics with nominalised predicates as abstract singular terms are described in which Frege's thesis and the logical notion of a class are defended and Cantor's theorem is rejected. Cantor's theorem is not incompatible with the logical notion of class, however. Two alternative similar kinds of logics are also described in which Cantor's theorem and the logical notion of a class are retained and Frege's thesis is rejected."
"There is another problem with Russell's solution, however, in addition to that of the relativisation of classes to each logical type. This problem has to do with the fact that the particular theory of types that Russell adopted is a theory of ramified types, which, unlike the theory of simple types, is based on a constructive (i.e. 'predicative') comprehension principle. Such a constructive approach is not without merit, but it does affect the logical notion of a class in a fundamental way. In particular, because of the kind of constructive constraints imposed by the theory on the comprehension principle, Cantor's theorem, which involves objects of different types, cannot be proved in such a framework (cf. Quine 1963, 265). That is not objectionable in itself, but it does not get at the root of the matter of the real conflict between Cantor's power-set theorem and the logical notion of class as represented by an impredicative comprehension principle.
An impredicative comprehension principle is provable in the theory of simple types. But in this framework, as in the theory of ramified types as well, Russell's paradox cannot even be stated (because of the gramatical constraints on the conditions of well-formedness), which means that the description of the class upon which Russell's paradox is

based is meaningless. Thus, not only must the universal class be relativised and duplicated, potentially, infinitely many times in order to avoid Russell's paradox on this approach, but the paradox must itself be ruled as meaningless. The theory of types, whether simple or ramified, is not really a solution of the problem so much as a way of avoiding it altogether.

There is another way in which we can preserve our logical intuitions and not give up the logical notion of a class in favor of the mathematical (i.e. in favor of set theory), and yet in which not only is Cantor's theorem formulable but so is Russell's paradox—though, of course, the latter will no longer be provable. Indeed, there is not just one such way, but at least two (both of which themselves have two alternatives). On the first, it is not the logical notion of a class that must be rejected as the way of resolving Russell's paradox, but Cantor's theorem instead. This rejection is not ad hoc or arbitrary on this approach, but is based on a more general principle, which we refer to as Frege's double-correlation thesis. It is this approach that we shall turn to first. On the second and alternative approach, which we shall turn to later, the trouble lies in neither Cantor's theorem nor in the assumption that there is a universal class (both of which can be retained without contradiction on this approach), but rather in how the logic of identity is to be applied in certain contexts. On this approach, the claim that a contradiction results by combining Cantor's theorem with the assumption that the universal class exists is not a 'truism' after all but is outright false."

References

Quine, W. V. 1963 Set theory and its logic, Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press).

8. ———. 1993. "On Classes and Higher-Order Logic: A Critique of W.V.O. Quine." *Philosophy and the History of Science.A Taiwanese Journal* no. 2:23-50.

Abstract: "The problematic features of Quine's set theories NF and ML result from compressing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory into a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by turning to a second-

order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. A modified Fregean position, called conceptual realism, is described in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as abstract singular terms. Quine's view that conceptualism cannot account for impredicative concept-formation is rejected, and a holistic conceptual realism is compared with Quine's class Platonism."

9. ———. 1995. "Knowledge Representation in Conceptual Realism." *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* no. 43:697-721.
"Knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence (AI) involves more than the representation of a large number of facts or beliefs regarding a given domain, i.e. more than a mere listing of those facts or beliefs as data structures. It may involve, for example, an account of the way the properties and relations that are known or believed to hold of the objects in that domain are organized into a theoretical whole - such as the way different branches of mathematics, or of physics and chemistry, or of biology and psychology, etc., are organized, and even the way different parts of our commonsense knowledge or beliefs about the world can be organized. But different theoretical accounts will apply to different domains, and one of the questions that arises here is whether or not there are categorial principles of representation and organization that apply across all domains regardless of the specific nature of the objects in those domains. If there are such principles, then they can serve as a basis for a general framework of knowledge representation independently of its application to particular domains. In what follows I will give a brief outline of some of the categorial structures of conceptual realism as a formal ontology. It is this system that I propose we adopt as the basis of a categorial framework for knowledge representation." (p. 697)
(...)

" Concluding remarks. We have given here only an overview or sketch of conceptual realism as a formal ontology, i.e. as a theory of logical form having both conceptual and ontological categories - but in which the latter are represented in terms of the former. The categories of natural kinds and of natural properties and relations, for example, are represented in terms of the categories of sortals and predicable concepts, respectively, and the category of abstract objects is represented in terms of the process of conceptual nominalization (reification) as a subcategory of objects. Not all of these categories or parts of this formal ontology will be relevant in every domain of knowledge representation, but each is relevant at least to some domains and is needed in a comprehensive framework for knowledge representation. In those domains where certain categorial distinctions are not needed - such as that between predicative and impredicative concepts, or that between predicable concepts and natural properties and relations, or between sortal concepts and natural kinds, etc. - we can simply ignore or delete the logical forms in question. What must remain as the core of the system is the intensional logic around which all of the other categories are built - namely, the second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms that we call HST*-lambda. It is this core, I believe, that can serve as a universal standard by which to evaluate other representational systems." (p. 721)

10. ———. 1996. "Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontology." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter, 27-60. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Substitutional versus Ontological Interpretations of Quantifiers; 3. The Importance of the Notion of Unsaturedness in Formal Ontology; 4. Referential and Predicable Concepts Versus Immanent Objects of Reference; 5. Conceptual Natural Realism and the Analogy of Being Between Natural and Intelligible Universals; 6. Conceptual Natural Realism and Aristotelian Essentialism; 7. Conceptual Intensional

Realism versus Conceptual Platonism and the Logic of Nominalized Predicates
8. Concluding Remarks.
Abstract: "Conceptualism *simpliciter*, wheter constructive or holistic, provides an account of predication only in thought and language, and represents in that regard only a truncated formal ontology. But conceptualism can be extended to an Aristotelian conceptual natural realism in which natural properties and relations (and natural kinds as well) can be analogically posited corresponding to some of Our concepts, thereby providing an account of predication in the space-time causal Order as well. In addition, through a pattern of reflexive abstraction corresponding to the process of nominalization in language (and in which abstract objects are hypostatized corresponding to our concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures), conceptualism can also be extended to a conceptual Platonism or intensional realism that can provide an account of both the intensional objects of fiction and the extensional objects of mathematics. Conceptual realism is thus shown to be a paradigm formal ontology in which the distinctions between abstract reality, natural reality, and thought and language are properly represented, and in which the traditional opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism is finally overcome by properly locating their different functions, and the way each should be rep resented, in formal ontology."
"Concluding Remarks. As this informal sketch indicates, conceptual realism, by which we mean conceptual natural realism and conceptual intensional realism together, provides the basis of a general conceptual-ontological framework, within which, beginning with thought and language, a comprehensive formal ontology can be developed. Not only does conceptual realism explain how, in naturalistic terms, predication in thought and language is possible, but, in addition, it provides a theory of the nature of predication in reality through an analogical theory of properties and relations. In this way, conceptual realism can be developed into a reconstructed version of Aristotelian

realism, including a version of Aristotelian essentialism. In addition, through the process of nominalization, which corresponds to a reflexive abstraction in which we attempt to represent our concepts as if they were objects, conceptualism can be developed into a conceptual intensional realism that can provide an account not only of the abstract reality of numbers and other mathematical objects, but of the intensional objects of fiction and stories of all kinds, both true and false, and including those stories that we systematically develop into theories about the world. In this way, conceptual realism provides a framework not only for the conceptual and natural order, but for the mathematical and intensional order as well. Also, in this way, conceptual realism is able to reconcile and provide a unified account both of Platonism and Aristotelian realism, including Aristotelian essentialism - and it does so by showing how the ontological categories, or modes of being, of each of these ontologies can be explained in terms a conceptualist theory of predication and its analogical extensions." (p. 60)

11. ———. 1997. "Formally Oriented Work in the Philosophy of Language." In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. X - The Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the 20th Century*, edited by Canfield, John, 39-75. New York: Routledge.
    Contents: 1. The notion of a Characteristica Universalis as a philosophical language; 2. The notion a a logically perfect language as a regulating ideal; 3. The theory of logical types; 4. Radical empiricism and the logical construction of the world; 5. The logical empiricist theory of meaning; 6. Semiotic and the trinity of syntax, semantics and pragmatics; 7. Pragmatics from a logical point of view; 8. Intensional logic; 9. Universal Montague grammar; 10. Speech-act theory and the return to pragmatics.
    Abstract: "One of the perennial issues in philosophy is the nature of the various relationships between language and reality, language and thought, and language and knowledge. Part of this issue is the question of the kind of methodology that is to be brought to bear on the study of these

relationships. The methodology that we shall discuss here is based on a formally oriented approach to the philosophy of language, and specifically on the notion of a logically ideal language as the basis of a theory of meaning and a theory of knowledge."

12. ———. 1997. "Conceptual Realism as a Theory of Logical Form." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*:175-199.
"The central notion in the philosophy of logic is the notion of a logical form, and the central issue is which theory of logical form best represents our scientific (including our mathematical) and commonsense understanding of the world. Here, by a theory of logical
form, we mean not only a logical grammar in the sense of a system of formation rules characterizing the well-formed expressions of the theory, but also a logical calculus characterizing what is valid (i.e., provable or derivable) in the theory. The representational role of the logical forms of such a theory consists in the fact that they are perspicuous in the way they specify the truth conditions, and thereby the validity, of formulas in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax. In conceptualism we also require that logical forms be perspicuous in the way they represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts, including in particular the referential and predicable concepts underlying those acts.
The purpose of a theory of logical form, accordingly, is that it is to serve as a general semantical framework by which we can represent in a logically perspicuous way our commonsense and scientific understanding of the world, including our understanding of ourselves
and the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts. So understood, the logical forms of such a theory are taken to be semantic structures in their own right, relative to which the words, phrases, and (declarative) sentences of a (fragment of) natural language, or of a scientific or mathematical theory, are to be represented and interpreted. The process by which the expressions of a natural language or scientific theory are represented and interpreted in such a theory — relative to the aims, purposes and pragmatic

considerations regarding a given context or domain of discourse — amounts to a logical analysis of those expressions. (A different group of aims, purposes, etc., might give a finer- or a coarser-grained analysis of the domain.)

Ideally, where the syntax of a target language or theory has been recursively characterized, such an analysis can be given in terms of a precisely characterized theory of translation (1). Usually, however, the analysis is given informally.

In what follows I will briefly describe and attempt to motivate some (but not all) aspects of a theory of logical form that I associate with the philosophical system I call conceptual realism. The realism involved here is really of two types, one a natural realism (amounting to a modem form of Aristotelian essentialism) and the other an intensional realism (amounting to a modem, but also mitigated, form of Platonism). The core of the theory is a second-order logic in which predicate expressions (both simple and complex) can be nominalized and treated as abstract singular terms (in the sense of being substituends of individual variables). In this respect the core is really a form of conceptual intensional realism, which is the only part of the system we will discuss here (2)." (pp. 175-176)

(1) See Montague (1969) for a description of such a theory of translation (for Montague's type-theoretical intensional logic).

(2) See Cocchiarella (1996), §§ 5-6, for a description of conceptual natural realism as a modem form of Aristotelian Essentialism.

References

Cocchiarella, N.B. (1996), " Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontology", in Formal Ontology, R. Poli and P. Simons, eds., Kluwer Academic press, Dordrecht, pp. 27-60.

Montague, R.M. (1969), " Universal Grammar", in Formal Philosophy, Selected papers of Richard Montague, edited by R.H. Thomason, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974.

13. ———. 1998. "Property Theory." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Vol. 7*, edited by Craig, Edward, 761-767.

New York: Routledge.

Abstract: "Traditionally, a property theory is a theory of abstract entities that can be predicated of things. A theory of properties in this sense is a theory of predication -just as a theory of classes or sets is a theory of membership. In a formal theory of predication, properties are taken to correspond to some (or all) one-place predicate expressions. In addition to properties, it is usually assumed that there are n-ary relations that correspond to some (or all) n-place predicate expressions (for n > 2). A theory of properties is then also a theory of relations.

In this entry we shall use the traditional labels 'realism' and 'conceptualism' as a convenient way to classify theories. In natural realism, where properties and relations are the physical, or natural, causal structures involved in the laws of nature, properties and relations correspond to only some predicate expressions, whereas in logical realism properties and relations are generally assumed to correspond to all predicate expressions.

Not all theories of predication take properties and relations to be the universals that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. The universals of conceptual ism, for example. are unsaturated concepts in the sense of cognitive capacities that are exercised (saturated) in thought and speech. Properties and relations in the sense of intensional Platonic objects may still correspond to predicate expressions, as they do in conceptual intensional realism, but only indirectly as the intensional contents of the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. In that case, instead of properties and relations being what predicates stand for directly, they are what nominalized predicates denote as abstract singular terms. It is in this way that concepts - such as those that the predicate phrases 'is wise', 'is triangular' and 'is identical with' stand for - are distinguished from the properties and relations that are their intensional contents - such as those that are denoted by the abstract singular terms 'wisdom', 'triangularity' and 'identity, respectively. Once properties are represented by abstract singular terms, concepts can be predicated of them,

and, in particular, a concept can be predicated of the property that is its intensional content. For example, the concept represented by 'is a property' can be predicated of the property denoted by the abstract noun phrase 'being a property', so that 'being a property is a property' (or, 'The property of being a property is a property') becomes well-formed. In this way, however, we are confronted with Russell's paradox of (the property of) being a non-self-predicable property, which is the intensional content of the concept represented by ' is a non-self-predicable property'. That is, the property of being a non-self- predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property (and therefore both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable)." (p. 761)

14. ———. 1998. "The Theory of Types (Simple and Ramified)." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Vol. 9*, edited by Craig, Edward, 359-362. New York: Routledge.
Abstract: "The theory of types was first described by Bertrand Russell in 1908. He was seeking a logical theory that could serve as a framework for mathematics and, in particular, a theory that would avoid the so-called 'vicious-circle' antinomies, such as his own paradox of the property of those properties that are not properties of themselves - or, similarly, of the class of those classes that are not members of themselves. Such paradoxes can be thought of as resulting when logical distinctions are not made between different types of entities and, in particular, between different types of properties and relations that might be predicated of entities, such as the distinction between concrete objects and their properties, and the properties of those properties, and so on. In 'ramified' type theory, the hierarchy of properties and relations is, as it were, two-dimensional, where properties and relations are distinguished first by their order, and the by their level within each order. In 'simple' type theory properties and relations are distinguished only by their orders." (p. 359)
15. ———. 1998. "Reference in Conceptual Realism." *Synthese* no. 114:169-202.

Contents: 1. The core of Conceptual Intensional Realism; 2. Referential concepts, simple and complex; 3. Geach's negation and complex predicate arguments; 4. Active versus deactivated referential concepts; 5. Deactivation and Geach's arguments; 6. Relative pronouns and referential concepts; 7. Relative pronouns as referential expressions; 8. Concluding remarks.

Abstract: "A conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts is described in which singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and non-pronominal, referential concepts are given a uniform account. The theory includes an intensional realism in which the intensional contents of predicable and referential concepts are represented through nominalized forms of the predicate and quantifier phrases that stand for those concepts. A central part of the theory distinguishes between active and deactivated referential concepts, where the latter are represented by nominalized quantifier phrases that occur as parts of complex predicates. Peter Geach's arguments against theories of general reference in "Reference and Generality" are used as a foil to test the adequacy of the theory. Geach's arguments are shown to either beg the question of general as opposed to singular reference or to be inapplicable because of the distinction between active and deactivated referential concepts."

"Concluding Remarks. We do not claim that the theory of relative pronouns as referential expressions proposed in Section 7 is unproblematic, it should be noted. If it should turn out that it cannot be sustained, then we still have the theory proposed in Section 6, where relative pronouns are taken as anaphoric proxies for non-pronominal referential expressions. In other words, whether the proposal of Section 7 is sustained or not, we maintain that Geach's arguments against complex names and general reference do not work against the kind of conceptualist theory we have presented here.

We also do not claim to have proved that our conceptualist theory of reference resolves all problems about reference,

but only that it has passed an initial test of adequacy as far as Geach's arguments in (Geach Reference and Generality third edition, 1980) are concerned. It is our view that a conceptualist theory is what is needed to account for reference and predication in our speech and mental acts, and that only a theory of the referential and predicable concepts that underlie the basic forms of such acts will suffice. Such a theory, we maintain, must provide a uniform account of general as well as singular reference, and, in terms of the referential and predicable concepts involved in a speech or mental act, it must distinguish the logical forms that represent the cognitive structure of that act from the logical forms that only represent its truth conditions. That, in any case, is the kind of conceptualist theory we have attempted to describe and defend here." (p. 198)

16. ———. 2000. "Russell's Paradox of the Totality of Propositions." *Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 5:25-37.
Abstract: "Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics."
"In Appendix B of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM), Russell described a "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" that his "doctrine of types" (as described in Appendix B) was unable to avoid. (1)
In recent years this "new contradiction" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes, some purporting to show that there cannot be a totality of true propositions, (2) or that even the idea of quantifying over the totality of propositions leads to contradiction. (3) A number of these claims have been discussed recently by Mika Oksanen and shown to be spurious relative to the set theory known as

NFU. (4) In other words, if NFU is used instead of ZF as the semantical metalanguage for modal logic, the various "paradoxes" about the totality of propositions (usually construed as the totality of sets of possible worlds) can be seen to fail (generally because of the existence of a universal set and the failure of the general form of Cantor's power-set theorem in NFU). It is not clear, however, how Russell's own paradox about the totality of propositions is resolved on this analysis, and although Oksanen quoted Russell's description of the paradox in detail, he did not show how it is explained in NFU after his resolution of the other related modal paradoxes; in fact, it is not at all clear how this might be done in NFU.

One reason why Russell's argument is difficult to reconstruct in NFU is that it is based on the logic of propositions, and implicitly in that regard on a theory of predication rather than a theory of membership. A more appropriate medium for the resolution of these paradoxes, in other words, would be a formal theory of predication that is a counterpart to NFU.

Fortunately, there are two such theories, λHST* and HST*λ, that are equiconsistent with NFU and that share with it many of the features that make it a useful framework within which to resolve a number of paradoxes, modal or otherwise. (5)" (pp. 25-26)

(1) PoM, p. 527.

(2) See, e.g., Grim 1991, pp. 92f.

(3) See, e.g., Grim 1991, p. 119 and Jubien 1988, p. 307.

(4) See Oksanen 1999. NFU is a modified version of Quine's system NF. It was first described in Jensen 1968 and recently has been extensively developed in Holmes 1999.

(5) See Cocchiarella 1986, chapters IV and VI for proofs of the connection of NFU with these systems. Also, see Cocchiarella 1985 for how these systems are related to Quine's systems NF and ML. For a discussion of the refutation of Cantor's power-set theorem in these systems, see Cocchiarella 1992.

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17. ———. 2001. "A Logical Reconstruction of Medieval Terminist Logic in Conceptual Realism." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:35-72.
Abstract: "The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the *fitcum* theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the *intellectio* theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures. Intentional objects (*ficta*) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objetified intensional contents of concepts. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this theory that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was

basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of personal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference."

"Conclusion. The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the f *ictum* theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the *intellectio* theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the notion of a concept as an unsaturated cognitive structure. Referential and predicable concepts in particular are unsaturated cognitive structures that mutually saturate each other in mental acts, analogous to the way that quantifier phrases and predicate expressions mutually saturate each other in language. Intentional objects (*ficta*) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectified intensional contents of concepts, i.e., as intentional objects obtained through the process of nominalization — and in that sense as products of the evolution of language and thought. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. In particular, the truth conditions determined by predicable concepts based on relations — including the relation the copula stands for — are characterized in part in terms of these objectified intensional contents. It is by means of this conceptualist theory of predication that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism, based on the exercise and mutual saturation of referential and predicable concepts, is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" or types of personal supposition are accounted for in a natural and intuitive way in terms of the theory of reference of conceptual realism. Ockham's application of merely confused supposition to common

names occurring within the scope of an intensional verb is rejected, as it should be, but its rejection is grounded on the notion of a deactivated referential concept—a deactification that, because of the intensionality of the context in question, cannot be “activated,” the way it can be in extensional contexts." (p. 71)

18. ———. 2001. "Logic and Ontology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:127-150.
Contents: 1. Logic as Language versus Logic as Calculus; 2. Predication versus Membership; 3. The vagaries of Nominalism; 4. The Vindication (Almost) of Logical Realism; 5. Conceptualism Without a Transcendental Subject; 6. Conceptual Natural realism and the Analogy of being Between Natural and Conceptual Universals; 7. Conceptual Intensional Realism; 8. Concluding Remarks.
Abstract: "A brief review of the historical relation between logic and ontology and of the opposition between the views of logic as language and logic as calculus is given. We argue that predication is more fundamental than membership and that different theories of
predication are based on different theories of universals, the three most important being nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. These theories can be formulated as formal ontologies, each with its own logic, and compared with one another in terms of their respective explanatory powers. After a brief survey of such a comparison, we argue that an extended form of conceptual realism provides the most coherent formal ontology and, as such, can be used to defend the view of logic as language."
"Concluding Remarks: Despite our extended discussion and defense of conceptual realism, the fact remains that this is a formal ontology that can be described and compared with other formal ontologies in the set-theoretic framework of comparative formal ontology. Set theory, as we have said, provides a convenient mathematical medium in which both the syntax and an extrinsic semantics of different formal ontologies can be formulated, which then can be compared and contrasted with one another in their logical and

descriptive powers. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as calculus. But membership is at best a pale shadow of predication, which underlies thought, language and the different categories of reality. Set theory is not itself an adequate framework for general ontology, in other words, unless based on a theory of predication (as in Quine's nominalist-platonism). Only a formal theory of predication based on a theory of universals can be the basis of a general ontology. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as language. But there are alternative theories of universals, and therefore alternative formal theories of predication, each with its own logic and theory of logical form. A rational choice can be made only by formulating and comparing these alternatives in comparative formal ontology, a program that can best be carried out in set theory. Among the various alternatives that have been formulated and investigated over the years, the choice we have made here, for the reasons given, is what we have briefly described above as conceptual realism, which includes both a conceptual natural realism and a conceptual intensional realism. Others may make a different choice. As Rudolf Carnap once said: "Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes." But then, at least in the construction of a formal ontology, we all have an obligation to defend our choice and to give reasons why we think one system is better than another. In this regard, we do not accept Carnap's additional injunction that in logic, there are no morals." (pp. 145-146)
Translated in Italian by Flavia Marcacci with revision by Gianfranco Basti, as: *Logica e Ontologia* in *Aquinas. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia*, 52, 2009.

19. ———. 2001. "A Conceptualist Interpretation of Leśniewski's Ontology." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 22:29-43.
Contents: 1. Introduction 29; 2. Leśniewski's Ontology as a First-Order Theory 29; 3. The Logic of Names in Conceptual Realism 31; 4. A Conceptualist Interpretation of Leśniewski's System 35; 5. Reduction of Leśniewski's Theory of Definitions 39; 6. Consistency and Decidability 40; References 43.

Abstract: "A first-order formulation of Leśniewski's ontology is formulated and shown to be interpretable within a free first-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantification over proper and common-name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the first-order part of Leśniewski's ontology is decidable." "Introduction. One of the important applications of Leśniewski's system of ontology, sometimes also called *the logic of (proper and common) names*, (1) has been as a logistic framework that can be used in the reconstruction of medieval terminist logic. (2) This is especially so because the basic relation of Leśniewski's system, singular inclusion, amounts to a version of the two-name theory of the copula. (3) An alternative reconstruction of medieval terminist logic can also be given within the logistic framework of conceptual

20. ———. 2001. "Logic and Ontology." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:127-150
Contents: 1. Logic as Language versus Logic as Calculus; 2. Predication versus Membership; 3. The vagaries of Nominalism; 4. The Vindication (Almost) of Logical Realism; 5. Conceptualism Without a Transcendental Subject; 6. Conceptual Natural realism and the Analogy of being Between Natural and Conceptual Universals; 7. Conceptual Intensional Realism; 8. Concluding Remarks.
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predication are based on different theories of universals, the three most important being nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. These theories can be formulated as formal ontologies, each with its own logic, and compared with one another in terms of their respective explanatory powers. After a brief survey of such a comparison, we argue that an extended form of conceptual realism provides the most

coherent formal ontology and, as such, can be used to defend the view of logic as language."

"Concluding Remarks: Despite our extended discussion and defense of conceptual realism, the fact remains that this is a formal ontology that can be described and compared with other formal ontologies in the set-theoretic framework of comparative formal ontology. Set theory, as we have said, provides a convenient mathematical medium in which both the syntax and an extrinsic semantics of different formal ontologies can be formulated, which then can be compared and contrasted with one another in their logical and descriptive powers. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as calculus. But membership is at best a pale shadow of predication, which underlies thought, language and the different categories of reality. Set theory is not itself an adequate framework for general ontology, in other words, unless based on a theory of predication (as in Quine's nominalist-platonism). Only a formal theory of predication based on a theory of universals can be the basis of a general ontology. This is the real insight behind the view of logic as language. But there are alternative theories of universals, and therefore alternative formal theories of predication, each with its own logic and theory of logical form. A rational choice can be made only by formulating and comparing these alternatives in comparative formal ontology, a program that can best be carried out in set theory. Among the various alternatives that have been formulated and investigated over the years, the choice we have made here, for the reasons given, is what we have briefly described above as conceptual realism, which includes both a conceptual natural realism and a conceptual intensional realism. Others may make a different choice. As Rudolf Carnap once said: "Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes." But then, at least in the construction of a formal ontology, we all have an obligation to defend our choice and to give reasons why we think one system is better than another. In this regard, we do not accept Carnap's additional injunction that in logic, there are no morals." (pp. 145-146)

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"Introduction. One of the important applications of Leśniewski's system of ontology, sometimes also called *the logic of (proper and common) names*, (1) has been as a logistic framework that can be used in the reconstruction of medieval terminist logic. (2) This is especially so because the basic relation of Leśniewski's system, singular inclusion, amounts to a version of the two-name theory of the copula. (3) An alternative reconstruction of medieval terminist logic can also be given within the logistic framework of conceptual
realism, however.(4) This system is preferable in part because, unlike Leśniewski's ontology, it is not committed to an extensional framework, which is important in the logical analysis of the tensed and modal modification (ampliation) of the terms (names) of medieval logic. (5) It is also possible, as we show below, to reduce or reconstruct Leśniewski's ontology within the logistic framework of conceptual realism."
(1) See, e.g. Lejewski 1958, p. 152, Slupecki 1955 and Iwanuś 1973.
(2) See, e.g. Henry 1972.

(3) Singular inclusion, as represented by e in the formula 'a e b', read as 'a is b', was the only undefined constant of Leśniewski's original system of ontology. The system could also be based either on partial, weak of strong inclusion as the only primitive as well. See Lejewski 1958, pp. 154-156.
(4) See Cocchiarella 2001. For an account of conceptual realism as a formal ontology see Cocchiarella 1996.
(5) One might, of course, add tense and modal operators to Leśniewski's ontology, even though he himself was against such a move.

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22. ———. 2002. "On the Logic of Classes as Many." *Studia Logica* no. 70:303-338

Abstract: "The notion of a "class as many" was central to Bertrand Russell's early form of logicism in his 1903 *Foundations of Mathematics*. There is no empty class in this sense, and the singleton of an urelement (or atom in our reconstruction) is identical with that urelement. Also, classes with more than one member are merely pluralities— or what are sometimes called "plural objects"— and cannot as such be themselves members of classes. Russell did not formally develop this notion of a class but used it only

informally. In what follows, we give a formal, logical reconstruction of the logic of classes as many as pluralities (or plural objects) within a fragment of the framework of conceptual realism. We also take groups to be classes as many with two or more members and show how groups provide a semantics for plural quantifier phrases."
"There is a notion of a class that has been ignored by most, but not all, philosophers. (4) This is the notion of a " class as many," as described, e.g., by Bertrand Russell in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics. (5) A class in this sense is the extension of a common count noun, i.e., the extension of what traditionally has been called a common name. (6) The three important features of this notion are, first, that a vacuous common name, i.e., a common name that names nothing, has no extension, which is not the same as having an
empty class as its extension. Thus, according to Russell, "there is no such thing as the null class, though there are null class-concepts," i.e., commonname concepts that have no extension. (7) Secondly, the extension of a common name that names just one thing (in the sense of an urelement) is just that one thing. In other words, unlike the singleton sets of set theory, which are not identical with their single member, the class that is the extension of a common name that names just one thing (urelement) is none other than that one thing."
(...)
"We believe that this notion of a class, or of a group, can be usefully developed as part of the broader framework of conceptual realism that we have described elsewhere. (11)"
(pp. 304-305)
(4) See, e.g., Simons 1982 for one proposed formulation of this notion. Simons's formulation is different from the one we give here. Simons doubts that there can be "an exact logic for the quantificatory uses" of common names, which is what the present system is
based on. Also, whereas the present system relies on only one type of "objectual" variable (having both "atoms" and classes as many as values), Simons has three: one for

“individuals,” another for “pluralities,” and a third for “neutrals.” There are a number of other differences as well, but we will not go into them here.
(5) See Russell 1903, chapter VI. Russell’s view in this book precedes his later no-classes doctrine.
(6) Strictly speaking, Russell distinguishes between a common name, e.g., ‘man’, and its plural form, ‘men’, and then takes the latter to denote the class as many of men (§67). We do not distinguish common names from their plural forms here, and we describe the class as many simply as the extension of the common name (and the concept it stands for).
(7) Russell 1903, §69
(11) See, e.g., Cocchiarella 1996 for a description of conceptual realism as a formal ontology.
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23. ———. 2002. "Logical Necessity Based on Carnap's Criterion of Adequacy." *Korean Journal of Logic* no. 5:1-21
Abstract: "A semantics for logical necessity, based on Carnap’s criterion of adequacy, is given with respect to the ontology of logical atomism. A calculus for sentential (propositional) modal logic is described and shown to be complete with respect to this semantics. The semantics is then modified in terms of a restricted notion of ‘all possible worlds’in the interpretation of necessity and shown to yield a completeness theorem for the modal logic S5. Such a restricted notion introduces material content into the meaning of necessity so that, in addition to atomic facts, there are "modal facts" that distinguish one world from another."

"...in what follows we will construct a semantics for logical necessity based on Rudolf Carnap's criterion of adequacy and the metaphysical framework of logical atomism, a semantics, we maintain, that provides a clear and precise account of the connection between logical truth and logical necessity— at least with respect to this kind of metaphysical framework. (4)" (p. 2)
(4) There are reasons to think that no other sort of metaphysical framework can succeed in adequately explaining the connection between logical truth and logical necessity. This is not to say, however, that other frameworks cannot account for notions of necessity other than logical necessity.

24. ———. 2003. "Conceptual Realism and the Nexus of Predication." *Metalogicon* no. 16:45-70
Abstract: "The nexus of predication is accounted for in different ways in different theories of universals. We briefly review the account given in nominalism, logical realism (modern Platonism), and natural realism. Our main goal is to describe the account given in a modern form of conceptualism extended to include a theory of intensional objects as the contents of our predicable and referential concepts."
"Introduction. A universal, according to Aristotle, is what can be predicated of things. (1) But what exactly do we mean in saying that a universal can be predicated of things? How, or in what way, do universals function in the nexus of predication?
In the history of philosophy, there are three major types of theories that deal with the problem of universals and that purport to answer these questions: (2)
(1) Nominalism: According to this theory there are no universals, and there is predication only in language; that is, only predicates can be predicated of things, and the only nexus of predication is the linguistic nexus between subject and predicate expressions.
(2) Realism: There are real universals, i.e., universals in reality, that are predicated of things, and the function of predication in language is to represent predication in

reality. Different versions of realism explain the nexus of predication in reality in different ways.
(3) Conceptualism: There are conceptual universals, e.g., predicable concepts, that underlie predication in thought, and the nexus of predication in thought underlies the nexus of predication in language.
All three theories agree that there is predication in language though each has a different account of how that kind of predication is possible and what it represents. The theory we will describe here in some detail is a modern form of conceptualism.
Unlike traditional conceptualism (e.g., British empiricism), the conceptualism we describe here is not based on a theory of "ideas" (*Vorstellungen*), and it includes an intensional realism based on an evolutionary account of concept-formation. In this paper, our main
purpose is to describe the conceptualist account of the nexus of predication.
Before turning to conceptualism, we will make some brief observations about nominalism and realism and our methodology." (pp. 45-46)
(1) *De Interpretatione*, 17 a 39.
2 These three theories were first described by Porphyry in his [*Isagoge* or] *Introduction to Aristotle's Categories*.

25. ———. 2005. "Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups and Plurals." *Linguistics and Philosophy* no. 28:135-179
Abstract: "Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter complex as well as simple common names. Names, proper or common, and simple or complex, occur as parts of quantifier phrases, which in conceptual realism stand for referential concepts, i.e., cognitive capacities that inform

our speech and mental acts with a referential nature and account for the intentionality, or directedness, of those acts. In Russell's theory, quantifier phrases express denoting concepts (which do not include proper names). In conceptual realism, names, as well as predicates, can be nominalized and allowed to occur as "singular terms", i.e., as arguments of predicates. Occurring as a singular term, a name denotes, if it denotes at all, a class as many, where, as in Russell's theory, a class as many of one object is identical with that one object, and a class as many of more than one object is a plurality, i.e., a plural object that we call a group. Also, as in Russell's theory, there is no empty class as many. When nominalized, proper names function as "singular terms" just the way they do in so-called free logic. Leśniewski's ontology, which is also called a logic of names can be completely interpreted within this conceptualist framework, and the well-known oddities of Leśniewski's system are shown not to be odd at all when his system is so interpreted. Finally, we show how the pluralities, or groups, of the logic of classes as many can be used as the semantic basis of plural reference and predication. We explain in this way Russell's "fundamental doctrine upon which all rests," i.e., "the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is meant by classes [as many] which have more than one term" ([*Principles of Mathematics*], p. 517)."

"Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* [PoM] that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. Russell explicitly rejected denoting concepts in his 1905 paper, "On Denoting". Although his reasons for doing so are still a matter of some debate, they depend in part on his assumption that all concepts, including denoting concepts, are objects and can be denoted as such. (1) Classes of any kind were later eliminated as part of Russell's "no-classes" doctrine, according to which all mention of classes was to be contextually analyzed in terms of reference to either propositions, as in Russell's 1905 substitution theory,

or propositional functions as in *Principia Mathematica* [PM]. The problem with classes, as Russell and Whitehead described it in [PM], is that "if there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object. Yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible" (p. 72). Both notions are worthy of reconsideration, however, even if only in a somewhat different, alternative form in a conceptualist framework that Russell did not himself adopt. In such a framework, which we will briefly describe here, Russell's assumption that all concepts are objects will be rejected in favor of a conceptualist counterpart to Frege's notion of unsaturatedness, and we will reconsider the idea of a class as many somehow being both one and many." (pp. 135-136)

26. ———. 2008. "Infinity in Ontology and Mind." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 18:1-24
Abstract: "Two fundamental categories of any ontology are the category of objects and the category of universals. We discuss the question whether either of these categories can be infinite or not. In the category of objects, the subcategory of physical objects is examined within the context of different cosmological theories regarding the different kinds of fundamental objects in the universe.
objects are discussed in terms of sets and the intensional objects of conceptual realism. The category of universals is discussed in terms of the three major theories of universals: nominalism, realism, and conceptualism. The finitude of mind pertains only to conceptualism. We consider the question of whether or not this finitude precludes impredicative concept formation. An explication of potential infinity, especially as applied to concepts and expressions, is given. We also briefly discuss a logic of plural objects, or groups of single objects (individuals), which is based on Bertrand Russell's (1903, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2nd edn. (1938). Norton & Co, NY) notion of a class as many. The universal class as many does not exist in this

logic if there are two or more single objects; but the issue is undecided if there is just one individual. We note that adding plural objects (groups) to an ontology with a countable infinity of individuals (single objects) does not generate an uncountable infinity of classes as many."

"Introduction.

Ontology, as originally described by Aristotle, is the study of being qua being, where being is not univocal but is divided into different categories. The two most fundamental categories are those of universals and objects respectively. Here, by a universal, and again we follow Aristotle, we mean that which can be predicated of things.1 Predication, of course, is what connects universals with objects. One important aspect of the role, or significance, of infinity in ontology, accordingly, is whether or not either of these categories, i.e., the category of objects or the category of universals, is, or can be, infinite. How infinity applies to mind in this regard is the question of whether or not there are, or can be, infinitely many concepts as intelligible universals, and whether or not the finitude of the human mind places limitations on the concepts that can be constructed.

The methodology of ontology, which, as we have said, is divided into different categories, is the analysis of those categories and the laws connecting them with one another, including in particular the nature of predication. The clearest and most precise way to analyze these categories is through the development of what is known as formal ontology, where the logico-grammatical forms and principles of a logistic system are formulated for the purpose of representing the different categories and the laws connecting them.2 A formal ontology in which ontological and logical categories are combined in a unified framework will then amount to a comprehensive deductive framework that is prior to all others in both logical and ontological structure. By proving the consistency of such a logistic system we can thereby show that the intuitive ontological framework associated with it is consistent as well.

One important role of infinity in ontology, accordingly, can be understood as the determination of whether or not any of the categories of being, and in particular the categories of objects and universals, are, or can be, infinite as part of such a formal framework. In what follows we will consider some possible answers to this question." (p. 2)

References

(1) Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 17a39.

(2) For a more detailed account of formal ontology, see Cocchiarella (2007, Chap. 1).

27. ———. 2009. "Mass Nouns in a Logic of Classes as Many." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 38:343-361

Abstract: "A semantic analysis of mass nouns is given in terms of a logic of classes as many. In previous work it was shown that plural reference and predication for count nouns can be interpreted within this logic of classes as many in terms of the subclasses of the classes that are the extensions of those count nouns. A brief review of that account of plurals is given here and it is then shown how the same kind of interpretation can also be given for mass nouns."

"Why is the semantics of mass nouns so problematic? One reason, apparently, is that unlike count nouns, which have determinate extensions, mass nouns have extensions that in some cases are said to be indeterminate. The objects in the extension of a count noun are unproblematic because those objects are generally discrete and well-delineated, and hence can be individuated. The objects in the extension of a mass noun, especially mass nouns for different kinds of stuff, are said to be “diffuse” and indeterminate, on the other hand, because there are often an indefinite number of ways to refer them separately as well as together as wholes. (1)

A number of proposals have been made and criticized about the extensions of mass nouns. (2) We will not review those proposals and criticisms here but instead will present a proposal of our own based on what has been called “the simplest plan” of all. (3) We will defend this “plan” in terms of a logical framework designed to represent a form of conceptualism in which the logical forms that represent the

cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts are distinguished from the logical forms that represent the truth conditions and deductive relations of those acts." (pp. 343-344)
(1) Cp. Bunt [1], p. 53.
(2) See Pelletier [8] for a review and discussion of some of these proposals.
(3) Pelletier 74, p. 94 f.
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28. ———. 2009. "Reply to Gregory Landini's Review of *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism*." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems*:143-153.
1. Some Initial Ontological Distinctions.
In our discussion of Greg Landini's review, we should distinguish how the logical systems *lHST** and *HST*l* that I have developed are to be understood in my reconstructions of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's *Principles of mathematics* (1903) ontologies as opposed to how *HST*l* is understood as a (proper) part of my ontology of conceptual realism. Both of these systems are type-free second-order predicate logics that allow predicate expressions (complex or simple) and formulas (propositional forms) to be nominalized and occur in formulas as abstract singular terms.(1)
The main logical difference between these systems, as Landini notes, is that whereas *lHST** contains standard

first-order logic (with identity) as a proper part, the system *HST*l* is free of existential presuppositions regarding singular terms, including nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms, which is essential to any argument for Russell's paradox of predication. In particular, nominalization of the Russell predicate that is not predicable of itself turns out to be denotationless in *HST*l* as an abstract singular term.

The main ontological difference between Russell's and Frege's ontologies is that one is intensional and the other is extensional. Russell's (1903) ontology is based on predication as the ontological nexus of propositions, whereas Frege's is based on predication as a function from properties and relations to truth values. (2) In conceptual realism, predication is based on the mutual saturation of referential and predicable concepts as unsaturated complementary cognitive structures, the result being a speech or mental act. (3)

In Russell's ontology, a nominalized predicate denotes, as an abstract singular term, the very same property or relation (in-intension) that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate. In Frege's ontology, a nominalized predicate denotes the extension (value range, *Wertverläufe*) of the concept or relation (*qua* function from objects to truth values) that the predicate stands for in predicate position; and in conceptual realism, a nominalized predicate denotes the intension of the concept (*qua* cognitive structure) that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate. Because what a predicate stands for and what its nominalization denotes are not the same type of entity in either Frege's ontology or my conceptual realism, the fact that a nominalized predicate, on pain of contradiction, might fail to denote as an abstract singular term does not affect the objective reality of what that predicate stands for in its role as a predicate.

That is why the system *HST*l* can be used in a reconstruction of Frege's ontology as well as in my conceptual realism. The system *lHST** will also suffice for a reconstruction of Frege's ontology, but a free first-order

predicate logic is essential to my analysis of plurals and mass nouns in terms of the logic of classes as many developed in my book, which means that only *HST*l* is appropriate for conceptual realism.
On the other hand, for a reconstruction of Russell's ontology, where nominalized predicates denote the same property or relation they stand for in their role as predicates, only the system *lHST** is appropriate. That is, because it is the same entity involved in both roles in Russell's ontology, we cannot in that framework both affirm the being of what a predicate stands for in its role as a predicate, and also deny that being in the nominalization of the predicate as an abstract singular term." (p. 143)
(1) There is of course a type distinction between object terms and predicates in these systems; but unlike the situation in type theory there is no hierarchy of predicates of different types.
(2) Frege's *Begriffe* are really *Eigenshaften*, and in our in present context where we want to distinguish concepts as cognitive capacities from Frege's *Begriffe*, it is better to speak of his B*egriffe* as properties instead.
(3) We assume in this discussion a distinction between predication in language, predication in our speech and mental acts, and predication as the nexus of propositions or of states of affairs, or, in Frege's case, as functional application.

29. ———. 2009. "Reply to Andriy Vasylchenko's Review of *Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism*." *Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems*:167-178.
Adriy Vasylchenko makes the interesting observation that our references are frequently emotionally charged. A comprehensive theory of reference, Vasylchenko suggests, should include an account of this phenomenon. We agree. Indeed, as we will see, the theory of reference in conceptual realism can be used to explain an important feature of our emotional states when we read a novel, or watch a play, a movie, or even when viewing a painting. This feature, which in aesthetics is called psychical distance, is connected in

part with the difference between active and deactivated reference in conceptual realism. We will take up that issue at the end this reply.
There is, however, an important misunderstanding in Vasylchenko's review of how the notion of existential presupposition applies -- or, as he claims, fails to apply -- to fictional objects and more generally to the abstract intensional objects of conceptual realism. We will discuss this latter issue first, and then turn to the issue of our emotional states and psychical distance when reading fiction or watching a play or a film, and perhaps even when having an aesthetic experience in general." (p. 167)

30. ———. 2009. "Logica E Ontologia." *Aquinas.Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia* no. 52:7-50
Italian translation by Flavia Marcacci, revised by Gianfranco Basti of *Logic and Ontology* (2001).

31. ———. 2010. "Actualism Versus Possibilism in Formal Ontology." In *Theory and Applications of Ontology. Vol. 1: Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Seibt, Johanna, 105-118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Comparative formal ontology is the study of how different informal ontologies can be formalized and compared with one another in their overall adequacy as explanatory frameworks. One important criterion of adequacy of course is consistency, a condition that can be satisfied only by formalization. Formalization also makes explicit the commitments of an ontology.
There are other important criteria of adequacy as well, however, in addition to consistency and transparency of ontological commitment. One major such criterion is that a formal ontology must explain and provide an ontological ground for the distinction between being and existence, or, if the distinction is rejected, an adequate account of why it is rejected. Put simply, the problem is: Can there be things that do not exist? Or is being the same as existence? Different formal ontologies will answer these questions in different ways.
The simplest account of the distinction between being and existence is that between actualism and possibilism, where

by existence we mean physical existence, i.e., existence as some type of physical object; and by being we mean possible physical existence, i.e., physical existence in some possible world. According to possibilism, there are objects that do not now exist but could exist in the physical universe, and hence being is not the same as existence. In actualism being is the same as existence.

Possibilism: There are objects (i.e., objects that have being or) that possibly exist but that do not in fact exist.

Therefore: Existence ≠ Being.

Actualism: Everything that is (has being) exists.

Therefore: Existence = Being.

Now the implicit understanding in formal ontology of both possibilism and actualism is that the objects that the quantifier phrases in these statements range over are values of the variables bound by the first-order quantifiers ∀and ∃(for the universal and existential quantifiers, respectively), and hence that what has being (on the level of objects) is a value of the (object) variables bound by these quantifiers. In other words, to be (an object, or thing) in both actualism and possibilism is to be a value of the bound object variables of first-order logic. This means that in possibilism, where being is not the same as existence, existence must be represented either by different quantifiers or by a predicate, e.g., E!, which is the predicate usually chosen for this purpose.

Another criterion of adequacy for a formal ontology is that it must explain the ontological grounds, or nature, of modality, i.e., of such modal notions as necessity and possibility, and in particular the meaning of possible physical existence. If the modalities in question are strictly formal, on the other hand, as is the case with logical necessity and possibility, then it must explain the basis of that formality.

This criterion cannot be satisfied by a set-theoretic semantics alone, especially one that allows for arbitrary sets of possible worlds (models) and so-called accessibility relations between those worlds. Such a semantics may be useful for showing the consistency of a modal logic, or

perhaps even as a guide to our intuitions in showing its completeness; but it does not of itself provide an ontological ground for modality, or, in the case of logical modalities, explain why those modalities are strictly formal.
We restrict our considerations here to how physical existence, both actual and possible, is represented in a formal ontology. This does not mean that the formal ontologies considered here cannot be extended so as to include an account of how abstract objects might be represented as well, if allowed at all." (pp. 105-106)

32. ———. 2010. "Predication in Conceptual Realism." *Axiomathes* no. 20:1-21
Abstract: "Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are "object"-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through a second nominalization of the common names that are part of conceptual realism's theory of reference (*via* quantifier phrases), the theory also accounts for both plural reference and predication and mass noun reference and predication. Finally, a separate nexus of predication based on natural kinds and the natural properties and relations nomologically related to those natural kinds, is also an integral part of the framework of conceptual realism."

33. ———. 2013. "Representing Intentional Objects in Conceptual Realism." *Humana.Mente* no. 25:1-24
Special number edited by Laura Mari (Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa) and Michele Paolini Paoletti (University of Macerata): *Meinong Strikes Again. Return to Impossible Objects 100 Years Later*.
Abstract: "In this paper we explain how the intentional objects of our mental states can be represented by the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We first briefly examine and show how Brentano's actualist theory of

judgment and his notion of an immanent object have a clear and natural representation in our conceptualist logic of names. We then briefly critically examine Meinong's theory of objects before turning finally to our own representation of intentional objects in terms of the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We conclude by explaining why existence-entailing concepts are so basic to our commonsense framework and how these concepts and their intensions can be used to model Meinong's ontology."

34. ———. 2015. "Two Views of the Logic of Plurals and a Reduction of One to the Other." *Studia Logica* no. 103:757-780

Abstract: "There are different views of the logic of plurals that are now in circulation, two of which we will compare in this paper. One of these is based on a two-place relation of *being among*, as in 'Peter is among the juveniles arrested'. This approach seems to be the one that is discussed the most in philosophical journals today. The other is based on Bertrand Russell's early notion of a class as many, by which is meant not a class as one, i.e., as a single entity, but merely a plurality of things. It was this notion that Russell used to explain plurals in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics*; and it was this notion that I was able to develop as a consistent system that contains not only a logic of plurals but also a logic of mass nouns as well.

We compare these two logics here and then show that the logic of the *Among* relation is reducible to the logic of classes as many."

"There are di¤erent views of the logic of plurals that are now in circulation. (1)

One of these is based on a two-place relation of being among, as in 'Peter is among the juveniles arrested'. This approach seems to be the one that is discussed the most in philosophical journals today. The other is based on Bertrand Russell's early notion of a class as many, by which is meant not a class as one, i.e., as a single entity, but a mere plurality of things. It was this notion that I developed in 2002 as a provably consistent system that contains not only a logic of plurals but also a logic of mass nouns as well. (2) It also

contains, as we show in this paper, the plural logic based on the Among relation. We will first compare these two logics here and then show that the logic of the *Among* relation in Linnebo [2004] is reducible to the logic of classes as many. We will first briefly discuss the plural logic based on the *Among* relation as described by Linnebo. Then we will brie‡y explain the basics of the logic of classes as many, and finally we will show how the logic of the *Among* relation is reducible to the logic of classes as many." (p. 757)
(1) See, e.g., Boolos [1984], Schein [1993], Cocchiarella [2002], McKay [2006], and Linnebo [2004].
(2) See Cocchiarella [2002], [2007] chapter 11, and [2009].
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35. ———. 2016. "On Predication, a Conceptualist View." In *Philosophy and Logic of Predication*, edited by Stalmaszczyk, Piotr, 53-92. Bern: Peter Lang
Abstract:"Predication, as the nexus between a subject and a predicate expression, is the basis of the unity of a speech act, including speech acts in the plural and speech acts that

involve mass nouns. A speech act, of course, is an overt expression of a mental act, e.g., a judgment; and therefore the unity of a speech act such as an assertion is really the unity of the judgment that underlies that act. Such a mental act, and therefore the speech act as well, has a unity based on how the referential and predicable roles of the subject and predicate expressions combine and function together respectively. What we propose here is to explain this unity of predication in terms of a conceptualist theory of logical forms that we claim underlies at least some important aspects of thought and natural language. Our conceptualist logic also contains an account of the medieval identity (two-name) theory of the copula, as well as an account of plural and mass noun reference and predication, the truth conditions of which are based on a logic of plurals and mass nouns."

36. ———. 2017. Epistemological Ontology and Logical Form in Russell's Logical Atomism
Not yet published.
Unpublished paper; preprint available on academia.edu.
Abstract: "Logical analysis, according to Bertrand Russell, leads to and ends with logical atomism, an ontology of atomic facts that is epistemologically founded on sense-data, which Russell claimed are mind-independent physical objects. We first explain how Russell's 1914–1918 epistemological version of logical atomism is to be understood, and then, because constructing logical forms is a fundamental part of the process of logical analysis, we briefly look at what has happened to Russell's type theory in this ontology. We then turn to the problem of explaining how the logical forms of Russell's new logic can explain both the forms of atomic facts and yet also the sentences of natural language. The main problem is to explain the logical forms for belief and desire sentences and how those forms correspond to the logical forms of the facts of logical atomism."
37. ———. 2017. Russell's Logical Atomism 1914-1918: Epistemological Ontology and Logical Form.
Unpublished paper, available on this site.

Abstract:"Logical analysis, according to Bertrand Russell, leads to and ends with logical atomism, an ontology of atomic facts that is epistemologically founded on sense-data, which Russell claimed are mind-independent physical objects. We first explain how Russell's 1914-1918 epistemological version of logical atomism is to be understood, and then, because constructing logical forms is a fundamental part of the process of logical analysis, we briefly look at what has happened to Russell's type theory in this ontology. We then turn to the problem of explaining whether or not the logical forms of Russell's new logic can explain both the forms of atomic facts and yet also the sentences of natural language, especially those about beliefs. The main problem is to explain the logical forms for belief and desire sentences and how those forms do not correspond to the logical forms of the facts of logical atomism.""

38. ———. 2019. Can an AI System Think? Functionalism and the Nature of Mentality.
Unpublished paper, available on this site.
Abstract: "In this paper we consider the philosophical question of whether or not an AI system can think and be self-conscious. We note that in order to take this question seriously, we must reject metaphysical dualism. Then, because Functionalism gives an affirmative answer to our question, we turn to an account of Functionalism as a philosophical theory of the mind and the nature of thought. The basic assumption of Functionalism is that mentality consists essentially of functionality, and that as functional states and processes, mental states and processes can be structurally duplicated in the functionality of the electronic hardware of a suitably programmed AI system. According to Functionalism's basic assumption, structural duplication can be achieved if a functional isomorphism can be achieved between such an AI system and the human mind. We also describe three kinds or levels of self-consciousness and discuss the claim that all three levels can in principle be achieved in an AI system. The first kind, which all animals with a central nervous system have, is expressed in an

animal's self-regarding behavior. The second is based on self-reference and reflexive abstraction on the content of thought. This is done in language by means of nominalization where a predicate or declarative sentence is transformed into an abstract noun that denotes the content of that predicate or sentence. The third is based on a double reflexive abstraction on the intentional content of the self by means of a double nominalization. The first nominalization is a transformation of the referential use of the personal pronoun 'I' into a second order predicate true of all and only the properties of the self. The second is a nominalization of that second-order predicate into an abstract noun that denotes the intentional content of the self. In Functionalism, the goal is to achieve a functional isomorphism between the mental states and processes of humans and the electronic states of a suitably programmed AI. Given Functionalism's assumption that the essential nature of mentality is its functionality, such a functional isomorphism would suffice, according to Functionalism, for an AI system to be structurally duplicating, and not merely simulating, the mental states and processes that humans have. And hence an AI system can think and be self-conscious, according to Functionalism, in just the way that humans can."

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"Arthur N. Prior, in the Preface of Past, Present and Future, made clear his indebtedness to “the very lively tense-logicians of California for many discussions”. Strangely,with a notable exception of Copeland (Logic and reality: essays on the legacy of Arthur Prior, 1996), there is no extensive discussion of these scholars (as a group, if not a school) in the literature on the history of tense logic. In this paper, I propose to study how Nino B. Cocchiarella, as one of the Californian tense-logicians, interacted with Prior in the late 1960s. By gathering clues from their correspondence available at Virtual Lab for Prior Studies, I will highlight some of the differences between their views on tense-logic, which might still have far-reaching philosophical implications. I will conclude with a sketchof how to study in

what ways Prior and Cocchiarella influenced some other Californian tense-logicians."

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    "This article is a critical review of Cocchiarella's theory of reference. In conceptual realism, there are two central distinctions regarding reference: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Cocchiarella's normative restrictions on the existential presuppositions of reference lead to postulating two fundamentally different kinds of objects in conceptual realism: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or nonexistents, on the other. According to Cocchiarella, nonexistents can be referred to only without existential presuppositions. However, referring to nonexistents with existential presuppositions is an ordinary human practice. To account for this fact, Cocchiarella's normative theory of reference should be supplemented by a descriptive account of referring."
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Richard Sylvan [*born* Richard Routley] on Nonexistent Objects

INTRODUCTION

"On the June 16th, 1996, Richard Sylvan died of a sudden and unexpected heart attack. His death, at the relatively young age of 60, robbed Australasia of one of its greatest philosophers, arguably the most original that it has ever produced.
Richard was born Francis Richard Routley at Levin, New Zealand, on 13 December, 1935. He changed his name to Sylvan -- much to the confusion of a number of people -- when he remarried in 1983. After studying at the Victoria University of Wellington, he took a job at the University of Sydney, in Australia, where he lived for the rest of his life. He had several other jobs in Australia, including one at the University of New England, where, with Len Goddard, he trained a generation of Australian logicians. In 1971, he took up a position at the Australian National University, in Canberra, where he worked until his untimely death.
Richard was a most unusual person -- by any standards. He would rise at dawn, write philosophy till lunch, then pursue his hobbies, like building houses or tending the forests that he owned, till the sun went down, when he would open a bottle of wine and relax. To those who did not know him well, he could appear blunt, aggressive, and he could certainly be a difficult person for university administrators to get on with. But those who got to know Richard well knew that he was a shy, caring, and warm person. For this he was loved by his many friends and

students (not disjoint collections). One day, a biography will be written; but this is not it.
Richard made major contributions to many areas of philosophy: relevant and paraconsistent logic, Meinongianism and metaphysics, environmental ethics, to name but the most important. To others, these might seem a rather disparate collection, but for Richard they were all part of one seamless whole; solutions to (and the generation of) many philosophical problems presupposed particular solutions in areas others viewed as far a field. Many philosophical areas, he thought, suffer from the narrow scope of their authors' concerns.
Another of Richard's philosophical trademarks-in fact, perhaps the major one-was taking up grossly unpopular views and defending them doggedly. If relatively few people were ultimately persuaded by him, all had to admit that the views were not as silly and easily disposed of as they had hitherto thought." (p. 1)

From: Dominic Hyde & Graham Priest, "Editors' Introduction" to: *Sociative Logic and Their Applications*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2000.

"Richard Sylvan (né Routley) was undoubtedly one of Australasia's most wide-ranging and systematic philosophers. The astonishing breadth of his philosophical work includes writings on logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, environmental philosophy, social philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, philosophy of science. philosophy of mind and computation theory. A major reason for this intellectual diversity was his view that 'received logical theory and mainstream philosophical thinking involve ... fundamentally mistaken assumptions'(1) These mistaken assumptions were, in fact, seen as so fundamental that nothing less than 'logical revolution' and the abandonment of 'the main philosophical positions of our times' was called for. 'The same mistaken philosophical moves ... appear over and over again in different philosophical arenas ... in metaphysics, in epistemology, in the philosophy of science, ... in ethics. in political theory, and elsewhere, in each case with serious philosophical costs.' (2) This view, coupled with Sylvan's desire to set things straight, led him

to work in all these areas and more. His usual method of work was to rise at dawn and write until lunch. This philosophical writing (decipherable to only a select few until typed by one such) amounted to a considerable body of work. By my reckoning at the time of his death in June 1996 he had published as sole author, joint author or editor, 10 books, 16 booklets and nearly 200 articles in academic philosophy -- as well as numerous unpublished articles and articles contributing to general intellectual debate on social policy and environmental matters. In addition to the wide-ranging nature of this profile outpouring of philosophy, Sylvan's work was also distinctive in character. As noted, he thought that mainstream philosophical thinking was doomed to failure and the theories he argued for were accordingly unorthodox and often highly innovative. (3) Moreover he took the view that philosophy ought to strive for uniformity in its resolution of problems.

'Virtually every philosophical problem has a range of potential resolutions. A coherent philosophy selects and develops its resolutions uniformly, with connected solutions for related problems, not a different sort of solution for every (sort of) problem. (4)

Accordingly, his work is characterized by the attempt to develop and apply these unorthodox theories in a wide range of contexts. Thus his work represents a broad, uniform and unorthodox approach to philosophical problems. Though making a contribution to philosophy (and intellectual life more broadly) well beyond his writings in logic and metaphysics, a survey of Sylvan's work will show that the majority of it concentrates directly on issues in these two areas, and where it does not hear directly on them it typically presents them as having central underlying import. One reason, of course, was his acceptance of the idea of the centrality of logic to philosophy (see Routley 1980, iii) and one has only to look at the essays gathered together in Sylvan (2000) to see just how seriously he took this idea. (...). However he was also keen to emphasize the importance of metaphysics to all reaches of philosophy and, with the possibilities opened up by research in non-classical logic, substantial developments in metaphysics were there to pursue and pursue them he did." (pp. 181-182)

Notes

(1) Routley, 1980, III.
(2) Routley, 1980, II-III.
(3) He himself wrote in Routley 1980, VII, that it is pleasant to record that much of the material [of Routley 1980] is now regarded as far less crazy and disreputable than it was in the mid-sixties, when it was taken as a sign of early mental deterioration and of philosophical irresponsibility."
(4) Sylvan and Hyde 1993, 1.

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Routley, Richard. 1980. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items*. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
Sylvan, Richard. 2000. *Sociative Logics and Their Applications. Essays by the Late Richard Sylvan*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
(4) Sylvan, Richard and Hyde, Dominic. 1993. "Ubiquitous Vagueness without Embarrassment". *Acta Analytica* 10 (1): 7-29.

From: Dominic Hyde, "Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics", *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 22, 2001, pp. 181-205.

ROUTLEY'S NONEISM

" Noneism was created by Richard Routley. According to him the universe is a realm that comprises nonexistent objects. In this universe are included, beside real objects, sets that are contradictory or even absurd, and objects that we can think about, or imagine, but that are beyond the limits of reality. For instance, propositions like "the Squond is square" and "the Squond is round", in which Squond is an object that is square and round, are quite legitimate. Of course the Squond does not exist but - and this is the important point - it can be thought. Examples

of less aggressive insolence, are more than abundant. For instance "the fairy Wandolina is very gentle" or "Zeus is the most powerful of the Olympian gods" are expressions fully understandable. The noneist system complies the three conditions to be metaphysical theory.

1. It encompasses the whole world, physical and mental,
2. it offers explications of meaning, and explanations of facts, and
3. it is not empirically corroborable.

That it contains objects with certain properties that are described by unverifiable propositions, is essential in an noneist universe. We have just shown two of them. This unverifiability is quite different from the one we find in physical theories. In these theories, when a new fact is discovered, its corresponding proposition must be deduced from the premises that are valid in the system. (*) This means that it must be explained, and to explain a proposition P, means that P must be logically deduced from previous theorems of the system (every axiom is a theorem). (**) This deduction is ordinarily done utilizing classical logic. Some physicists pretend that the only way to deduce quantum propositions, is by means of a "quantum logic". But this is a farfetched methodology, because the reasons they expose to justify their claim, are based on the fact that the De Morgan laws are not valid. But these laws are invalid, because they are identified with the addition of certain states that have nothing to do with logic.

I dare to qualify noneism as a metaphysical theory, because it complies with conditions 1, 2, and 3. That it complies with the first, is evident. Condition 2 is also complied with because noneist theory explains many facts. For instance, how is it possible that a child of five or six years, understands perfectly well a fairy tale. The only explanation of this miraculous fact is that, as the tale advances, the child is apprehending objects that do not exist. This apprehension must not be confounded with imaginative objects. The objects the child imagines do not exist, but they are viewed as subject dependable. On the other hand, the objects we apprehend listening to the story are not subject dependent. The child does not invent them, he (or she) sees the images that the story is suggesting. Different children can "see" different images, but the images that a child has will have a certain structure, and the

structure will be the same for all children (and, of course, for all adults). Moreover, if a child "sees" that color *Ci* is adjacent to color *Ck*, the other child will "see" other colors *Di* and *Dk* but in the same order, that is *Di* and *Dk*, will be adjacent.
The third condition is also complied by the system: non-verifiability with respect to sensory objects, and this non-verifiability is absolute. It is assured by definition. We qualify it as "metaphysical", applying a frequent procedure in pure mathematics. If we define a complicated concept having definite properties, say, {A, B, C, D}, then, on behalf of easiness, we devise another concept that includes the first one, but has a note E, (there can be more than one) present in {A, B, C, D, E}. A classical example is the concept of zero. We can develop set theory without employing it. But as the theory advances, it becomes frightfully complicated." (pp. 33-35)

Notes

(*) The word "system" is used in its usual meaning. This meaning is quite different from the way it is employed in physics, in which it means an object.
(**) We say "axioms" because, in mathematical physics, the propositions from which all others must be deduced, play the role of axioms. With the exception of constructive mathematics, some axioms of geometry (for instance, the axioms of "betweenness", and finite set theory, all the axioms are hypothetical propositions. The truth probability of a theory increases through corroborations of its explanations, or through the verification of its predictions.

From: Francisco Miró, "Does Metaphysics Need a Non-Classical Logic?", in: Paul Weingartner (ed.), "Alternative Logics. Do Sciences Need Them?", New York: Springer 2004, pp. 27-39.

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Annotated bibliography of the logical works of Richard Sylvan [*né* Routley] (1960-1977)

Bibliography

N. B. *In 1983 Richard Routley changed is name in Richard Sylvan and Val Routley changed is name in Val Plumwood.*

1. Routley, Richard, and Gunderson, K. 1960. "Mr. Rescher's Reformulation of the Ontological Proof." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 38:246-252.
   "In the midst of revived philosophical interest in theological issues, we wish to record our objections to one recent attempt at reformulating the ontological proof for the existence of God. x In trying to navigate around what he calls the three "traditional objections" to the proof viz.: (1) that it "rests upon an explicit definition per genus et differentiam" which in turn "depends upon the thesis that existence has the status of a predicate", (2) that it invokes "the procedure of defining into existence", and (3) that if the "proof were logically sound, its theological serviceability would be insignificant'--Mr. Rescher, we believe, runs aground on the following criticisms."(p. 246)
   (1) "The Ontological Proof Revisited", this Journal, August, 1959.
2. Routley, Richard. 1963. "Review of *Abstract Sets and Finite Ordinals*, by G. B. Keene." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 41:279-284.
3. ———. 1965. "What Numbers Are." *Logique et Analyse* no. 8:196-208.

Abstract: "Cardinal numbers are non-distributive properties of certain manifolds. This thesis, the P-C thesis, though often (in effect) proposed, does not seem to have been fully worked out, and has in fact been subject to repeated attacks. Recently the thesis that numbers properties of classes has been criticised by Professor Benacerraf (*). My main aim here is to elaborate the initially plausible P-C thesis and to defend it against criticisms."
(*) In his stimulating article 'What numbers could not be', *Philosophical Review* LXXIV (1945), 47-73.

4. ———. 1966. "On a Significance Theory." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 44:172-209.
"Not all declarative sentences are statement-capable. A declarative sentence P is *statement-capable* in context c if and only if P yields a statement in c. Given that all statements are either true or false, P is statement-capable in c if and only if P is *truth-valued* in c., i.e., yields a truth or falsehood in c." (p. 172)
(...)
"Motivation for developing a significance theory arises from several connected sources: firstly, from the role of significance in the solution of a whole range of philosophical paradoxes and puzzles; secondly, from the fact that philosophers repeatedly appeal to significance considerations and principles; and thirdly, from the fact that many idiolects, both ordinary and technical, distinguish some sentences as non-significant and satisfy some significance principles. The importance of the first source is illustrated by the role significance and category theories have played in epistemology and particularly in the philosophy of mind. With respect to the second source, a significance logic has a similar role to play in assessing the correctness of philosophical arguments and moves as Aristotelian and classical logic have had. Given the third source, a significance theory is a vital ingredient in attempts to further formalise discourse, and to take further account of both everyday and technical usage." (p. 177)
5. ———. 1966. "Some Things Do Not Exist." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 7:251-276.

"The main objects of this paper are to suggest a definition of 'exists', to propose solutions to difficulties raised within restricted predicate logic with identity by failures of existential presuppositions of purportedly referring expressions such as individual constants and definite descriptions, to develop within a semantical system R*, with the syntax of a restricted applied predicate calculus, the logic of 'exists', and to unify within =R*, i.e. R* with identity, several hitherto distinct logical theories, to construct theories of definite descriptions, and to criticize certain widely accepted criteria for the ontological commitment of a theory. The logical developments in this paper are limited almost entirely to those that can be carried out in a first-order predicate logic with identity but without modal or intensional functors." (p. 251)

6. Routley, Richard, and Goddard, Lenn. 1966. "Use, Mention and Quotation." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 44:1-49.
"It is the thesis of this paper that an extensive revision of those ways of talking about expressions which are usually recognized by logicians is of paramount importance if we are to escape the absurd conclusions and purely technical restrictions which arise from a confusion of the kinds of distinctions which it is often necessary to make both in logical and non-logical contexts. We propose, therefore, to consider in detail the commonly recognized distinction between types and tokens, and secondly between use and mention, in order both to emphasize the deficiencies of the standard account and to indicate the steps which are required for the development of a special and systematic vocabulary for talking about linguistic expressions. It is necessary, however, for the purposes of exposition before new conventions are introduced
to adopt the ordinary practice of using single quotes to indicate the fact that a linguistic expression is being mentioned, and double quotes to indicate reported speech (and other *quasi*-mentionings);
sometimes, too we set off an expression which is to be mentioned on a line by itself." (p. 2)

7. Routley, Richard, and Montgomery, Hugh. 1966. "Contingency and Non-Contingency Bases for Normal Modal Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 9:318-328.
"Contingency and non-contingency bases for modal logics provide direct bases for various logical investigations of philosophical interest. For example: for logics of causation and causal implication, for certain theories of entailment, for syllogistic systems with only contingent propositions, and for theories of future contingents. Furthermore by taking contingency as primitive various new extensions of weak modal logics - extensions which include systems S6-S8 and provide interpretations of philosophical interest for these neglected systems - are suggested. Contingency and non-contingency bases are also of some formal interest; for instance S5 has a very simple and elegant formulation in terms of non-contingency. In this paper we present contingency and non-contingency bases for familiar normal modal logics, specifically for T, S4 and S5." (p. 318)
8. Routley, Richard. 1968. "Decision Procedures and Semantics for C1, E1 and S0.5." *Logique et Analyse* no. 11:468-471.
9. ———. 1968. "The Decidability and Semantical Incompleteness of Lemmon's System S0.5." *Logique et Analyse* no. 12:413-421.
"Two decision procedures are given for the modal system SO.5, a Gentzen style decision procedure and a von Wright-Anderson type decision procedure. The second procedure leads easily, as Cresswell has indicated in [2] using Kripke semantics, to a completeness result for SO.5. However under the intended interpretation for SO.5 proposed by Lemmon in [6] and [7] and adopted by Cresswell, namely that the necessity connective is interpreted as 'it is tautologous (by truth-table) that', the system is incomplete. To complete the system under the intended interpretation conventionalistic theses like ∇ □p (contingently necessarily p) must be added to SO.5. But this augmented SO.5 is under its intended interpretation a formalised metalogic of classical sentential logic {see [7]). Hence the (usual)

metalogic of classical sentential logic is conventionalistic about modality. (p. 413)

10. Routley, Richard, and Montgomeery, Hugh. 1968. "Non-Contingency Axioms for S4 and S5." *Logique et Analyse* no. 11:422-424.
"In [3] some contingency and non-contingency bases were developed for normal modal logics. Some of the axioms presented there for extending T to S4 and S5 are sufficiently strong to give these latter systems when added to the non-normal system S3." (p. 422)
References
[3] H. Montgomery and R. Routley, Contingency and non-contingency bases for normal modal logics, *Logique et Analyse*, n.s. vol. 9 (1966), pp. 318-328
11. ———. 1968. "The Inadequacy of Kripke's Semantical Analyses of D2 and D3." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 33:568.
12. Routley, Richard, and Montgomery, Hugh. 1968. "On Systems Containing Aristotle's Thesis." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 33:82-96.
"Apart from merits or defects of P_{A1} however, its existence demonstrates the feasibility of a new approach to the logic of propositions involving the principle of subjunctive contrariety. We thus have good reason to investigate the effect this principle, and a concept of conditionality compatible with it, might exert if intro- duced into standard quantification theory, into set theory, into modal logic and into epistemology and the philosophy of science." R. B. Angell(1)
"Introduction. The thesis $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow \sim (p \rightarrow \sim q)$, Angell's *principle of subjunctive contrariety*, here called *Boethius' thesis*(2) or *Boethius*, has as a consequence *Aristotle's thesis*(2) $\sim (\sim p \rightarrow p)$. The effect of *Boethius* or even of *Aristotle* alone, in quite weak sentential logics, is sufficient to cast serious doubt both on the merit of proceeding in the directions Angell suggests and on the value of connexive logics.(3) To show this we examine the consequences of adding to a basic system Z1 which we describe as *strong normal implication*, the axiom *Aristotle*. This augmented

system Z1a is inconsistent with a number of principles of implication which it is very difficult to reject on semantic grounds. Further semantic problems arise when Z1a is augmented by *Fact* to give Z1b, and when Z1b is augmented by *Antilogism* and *Mat Taut* to give Z1c or by *Boethius* to give Z1d. As these five systems are all sublogics of both Angell's P_{A1}, and McCall's CCl (see [6]) tlfe'consequent interpretational problems for P_{A1}, and CC1 are immediate. In the *Analytica priora* (57b-3 f) Aristotle argues that ... it is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being and by the not-being of the same thing"'.
(1) [R. B. Angell, A propositional logic with subjunctive conditionals, this JOURNAL, vol. 27 (1962), pp. 327-343, p. 342].
(2) Following McCall [Storrs MCall, Connexive implication, this JOURNAL, vol. 31 (1966), pp. 415-433, p. 415].
(3) 'Connexive logics' are characterised by McCall in [Connexive implication, pp. 415-416].
Fact p → q → . p . r → q . r Principle of the factor
Antil p.q → r -→. p. ~ r → ~ q Antilogism.
*Mat Tau*t p ⊃ p . p Material tautology.

13. ———. 1968. "Modal Reduction Axioms in Extensions of S1." *Logique et Analyse* no. 11:492-501.
"Modal logics are commonly formulated with a primitive necessity or possibility operator, though often they may equally well have non-contingency or contingency as the sole modal primitive, necessity and possibility being introduced by definition (1). Examples of normal modal logics with such bases are given in [2], and similar foundations can easily be constructed for the weaker classical systems such as S1, S2 and S3. One attraction of these formulations is that non-contingency extension axioms often provide very simple and illuminating relationships between different modal systems, and another is that iterated modalities are seen from a different aspect (2)." (p. 492)
(1) Sufficient conditions for this to be possible are that SSE is derivable and that p.(□p v □~p) = □p is provable. Example

of systems for which these conditions fail are SO.5. S1°. S2°.
(2) By an 'iterated modality' we mean a sequence of zero or more symbols each of which is either a negation symbol or a primitive monadic modal symbol.
References
[2] Montgomery, H. and Routley, R., Contingency and non-contingency Bases for normal modal logics, *Logique et Analyse*, vol. 9 (1966), 318-328.

14. Routley, Richard. 1969. "The Need for Nonsense." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 47:367-383.
"It *is* important to have a distinct category of nonsense into which to bundle grammatical indicative sentences which do not express truths or falsehoods.
For, on the one hand, a high redefinition of 'grammar" which brings nonsignificant sentences out as ungrammatical, not only eliminates the valuable distinction between sentences with textbook grammatical defects and nonsignificant sentences; it also makes the quite unwarranted assumption that all non-significance is recursively generated non-significance. But not all nonsense is obvious, or recursive nonsense. Still more damaging, nonsignificant sentences, unlike seriously ungrammatical sentences, can figure in valid arguments and can occur as unquoted components of grammatical sentences. Yet, on the other hand, theories which eschew non-significance as a further sentence-value beyond truth and falsehood are not only bound to be less comprehensive than, and mere special cases of significance theories (see [15]); they are in fact inadequate to deal with the logical and linguistic data--linguistic data which the grammatical theory does acknowledge--which significance theories are designed to handle. (For a sketch of some of the relevant data, see [15], p. 177)." (p. 367)
(...)
"Significance logics are richer than classical logic; for they include all theses of classical logic for suitably restricted significant sentences; but even the fundamental predicate 'S' of significance theory cannot be explicitly defined in classical predicate logic. Now where two theories are not

equivalent theories there are two cases to consider. Either the theories cover (roughly) the same data and one or the other contains false or defective sentences.
Then the one that does is false or defective, and the other, if true, is to that extent preferable. Or both theories are true. Then they must cover different fields and so are not distinguishable through simplicity; in particular one theory may be more comprehensive than the other, so overriding simpficity.
Simplicity then is not an adequate ground for deciding against significance theories." (p. 383)
References
[15] R. Routley, 'On a Significance Theory', *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*,
Vol. 44 (1966), pp. 172-209.

15. ———. 1969. "A Simple Natural Deduction System." *Logique et Analyse* no. 12:129-152.
"A natural deduction system ND is introduced and proofs in it illustrated. This system is much simpler and more flexible than familiar natural deduction systems: it avoids completely such complicating devices as subscripting, flagging, ordering of vari- ables, and distinctions of several sorts of variables or parameters. Furthermore proofs are valid line by line. ND is presented as a formal system. It still needs emphasizing that natural deduction systems can be made just as. formal as Hilbert-type systems. The precise conditions on substitution - quite important for natural deduction but often suppressed - are made explicit in the rules of ND." (p. 129)
16. ———. 1969. "Existence and Identity in Quantified Modal Logics." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 10:113-149.
"The aim of this paper is to present a way in which philosophical objections to the development of a combined quantification and modal logic based on S5 can be overcome. In more detail, the objectives are to show that S5 is immune to criticisms directed at those theorems which distinguish it from S4 and T; that problematic theorems(1) of modalised predicate logic like the Barcan formulae

[$\Diamond(\exists x) f(x) \supset (\exists x) \Diamond f(x)$] and [$\Diamond(\exists t)\, g\,(x, t) \supset (\exists t) \Diamond g(x, t)$] can be appropriately qualified once existence is explicitly treated; that puzzles over identity can be escaped by a more elaborate treatment of identity than the standard treatment; and that difficulties associated with quantification into modal sentence contexts can be cleared away given these treatments of existence and identity. A combination of these moves suffice, so it will be argued, to meet standard objections, most forcefully presented by Quine(2), to quantified modal logics. Admittedly a full elaboration of these moves calls for some sentence/statement distinction, some analytic/synthetic (or necessary/contingent) distinction, and some sense/designation (or connotation/denotation) distinction: but although, consequently, it is not to be expected that a combination of these moves will satisfy Quine, they may satisfy some who have been disturbed by the objections Quine raises." (p. 113)
(1) On the defects and difficulties of such theorems see, e.g., W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford (1962), and A. N. Prior, *Time and Modality*, Oxford (1957).
(2) See, especially, W. V. Quine: "The problem of interpreting modal logic," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 12 (1947), pp. 43-48; *From a Logical Point of View*, Revised edition, Cambridge, Mass. (1961); *Word and Object*, New York (1960).

17. Routley, Richard, and Montgomeery, Hugh. 1969. "Modalities in a Sequence of Normal Noncontingency Modal Systems." *Logique et Analyse* no. 12:225-227.
"Some properties of sequences of systems lying between T and S4, and T and S5, having added axioms of the form $\Box^n p \supset \Box^{n+1} p$ have been investigated in [4] and elsewhere (1). These systems have infinitely many modalities for $n > 1$. Here we consider an analogous sequence of noncontingency based systems, the *i*-th member of the sequence being denoted by $T_\Delta{}^i$ where *i* is any positive integer. The primitive basis of $T_\Delta{}^i$ is given by adding the axiom $\Delta^i p$ (where ' Δ^i denotes *i* iterations of the noncontingency modal connective

'Δ', and 'Δ° *p* denotes '*p*') to either $S1_{\Delta}$ (see [3]) or to one of the noncontingency based formulations of T given in [2]. The equivalence of these bases follows from Theorem 5. of [3]. The first member of this sequence, T_{Δ}^{1}, is deductively equivalent to the Trivial System, the second, T_{Δ}^{2}, to S5, and the remaining members of the infinite sequence lie between S5 and T. Each system T_{Δ}^{i} has 2 (*i* + 1) distinct modalities" (p. 225)

(1) See remarks and footnotes in [1], pp. 259-260.

References

[1] Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell. M. *An Introduction to Modal Logic*, Methuen, London (1968).

[2] Montgomery, H. and Routley, R. 'Contingency and non-contingency bases for normal modal logics', *Logique et Analyse*, vol. 9 (1966), pp. 318-328.

[3] Montgomery, H. and Routley, R., 'Modal reduction axioms in extensions of S1', *Logique et Analyse*, vol. 11 (1968), pp. 492-501.

[4] Thomas, I., 'Modal systems in the neighbourhood of T', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. 5 (1964), pp. 59-

18. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 1969. "Categories - Expressions or Things?" *Theoria* no. 35:215-238.

"Is significance a matter of things or of descriptions of things?

That is to say, is it the couplings of certain individuals and certain properties or relations that are properly said to be significant or non-significant, or is it the couplings of descriptions and predicates?

A common answer is that it is either or both, or that it doesn't matter which we say. For it is assumed that to any non-significant coupling of an individual and a property there corresponds a nonsignificant

coupling of expressions, and vice versa. This isomorphism thesis(1) can be stated more generally as follows: there is a one-one correspondence between things-relations couplings and description-predicate couplings preserving significance. Another answer to the main question is that significance is a matter of things and their relations, and not really a

question of description at all. There is a strong temptation, supported by tradition and by some ordinary speech, to adopt such a thing or essentialist thesis of significance, to say that significance is concerned with things irrespective of how they are referred to or even whether they are referred to, and that, furthermore, things fall into logical kinds or categories as they do into natural kinds." (p. 215)
(...)
"The distinction between significance and absurdity resolves the initial puzzles, which arose from incompatible ways of looking at significance. Category theories based on both significance and absurdity are viable. Because, however, one theory is not the isomorphic image of the other the isomorphism thesis is false; and since the theories cannot be confused without disastrous consequences, it does matter what we say." (p. 238)
(1) An isomorphism thesis is stated explicitly by F. Sommers 'Types and Ontology' *Philosophical Review*, vol. 72 (1963), pp. 327-363; e.g. pp. 350-1: 'linguistic structures and ontological structures are isomorphic'.

19. ———. 1969. "A Fallacy of Modality." *Noûs* no. 3:129-153.
"The ancient principle of distributivity of necessity (DN for short), that necessary propositions only entail necessary propositions, has acquired an upstart companion, the distributivity of contingency (DC), which threatens to borrow some plausibility from DN; violations of these principles are sometimes lumped together as "fallacies of modality". The DC principle, according to which contingent statements only entail contingent statements, has played a specially important role in the discussion of entailment; and in particular it has taken a central part in Anderson and Belnap's important theory of entailment E. The DC principle has also had a major part in attacks on linguistic theories of logical necessity. We contend, however, that the principle and minor modifications of it, are false. We argue that the principle provides an example of a strong false thesis drawing its plausibility from its association with a weak but trivial counterpart which cannot however perform the task of the strong principle. We also explain in detail why no

version of the principle can fulfill the role for which it is needed in E.
It is our contention that the real fallacy concerning DC is that of taking violations of DC as fallacious. For DC itself is a modal fallacy." (pp. 129-130, a note omitted)

20. Routley, Richard. 1970. "Non-Existence Does Not Exist." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 11:289-320.
"The main aims of this paper are to explain criteria for the identity of individuals, to compare various criteria for the existence of properties and for the existence of propositions, and to present certain theses concerning the existence and identity of individuals, of propositions, and of properties. Several other topics are, however, treated incidentally; for example an extended sentential logic designed to take care of certain semantical paradoxes and truth-value gaps by allowing for statement-incapable sentences is sketched.
In order to attack in a formal way the question of the existence of properties and relations and to formalise widely employed criteria for the existence of attributes, i.e. of properties and relations, an extended predicate calculus must first be introduced. As a first move it is valuable to determine how much can be done in the simplest and most accessible of higher order functional calculi, viz. second-order functional calculus. Now this logic has to be so designed that it can express such propositions as "Some properties do not exist" and "All properties, whether possible or impossible,... .(e.g. exist)". At first this suggests that a system like R*, which allows for quantification over all possible individual items, be extended to second order. (1)" (p. 289)
(1) The system R* is presented in R. Routley, "Some things do not exist," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Vol. 7 (1966), pp. 251-276.

21. ———. 1970. "Decision Procedures and Semantics for Fey's System $S2^0$ and Surrounding Systems." *Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* no. 16:165-174.
"The systems investigated in detail are Feys system $S2^0$ (of [3]), $S2^e$, S2, C2 and E2. The same methods as are used in

studying these systems extend to a much larger class of modal logics; some extensions are outlined in section IV. For the systems studied three decisions are provided; in section I by Gentzen methods; in section II by extended truth-table methods; and in section III, as a corollary to completeness results, by the finite model property." (p. 165)

References

[3] R. Feys, Modal Logics. Louvain 1965.

22. ———. 1970. "Extensions of Makinson's Completeness Theorems in Modal Logic." *Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* no. 16:239-256.

"Completeness theorems are derived, using the maximal consistent set construction, for a large class of sentential modal logics. The paper extends MAKINSON's[1)]method (of [6]) to systems based on the modal logic C2 (cf LEMMON[4]), on the system $C2^a$ (of FEYS[1]), on system C2" for each *n*, and on the weak system C1 (of LEMMON[3]) and S0.5". The systems considered include, among others, all systems treated in MAKINSON[6], all modal systems treated in LEMMON[4] and [5], various systems introduced in [7], all E systems, all C systems, D1 and D2, S0.5, $S2^o$, $S2^e$, $S3^o$, $S3^e$, $S4^o$, T*, Parry's system $S3 + \Box \Diamond \Box A \rightarrow \Box A$, S3.5, S6, S7, S8 and S8.5. (For details of many of these systems see FEYS [1].)

The methods are readily extended to various other systems, e.g. to the conventionalist systems of [7] and, as is well-known, to extensions of 54, and they can be extended to quantified modal logics. For certain systems considered the completeness results are combined with a solution of the decision problem by the finite model property." (p. 239)

References

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[7] H. MONTGOMERY and R. ROUTLEY Conventionalist and contingency-oriented modal logics (1971).

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"The standard semantics for quantification logics have serious limitations; they are more complicated than they need be and more set theoretical than they should be. In support of this evaluation alternative simpler and leas set-theoretical semantics are provided for quantification and free quantification logics both without and with identity, and for second-order significance logic. These semantics, domainless semantics, are defended against objections as to their intelligibility and satisfactoriness, and appropriate consistency and completeness theorems are proved in order to show the comparative adequacy of the semantics. Domainless semantics, by assigning values en bloc to atomic wff, eliminates the otiose notion of a domain of interpretation and n-place relations on this domain of entities, and thereby eliminates the associated correspondance theory of truth which is built into the reference selections and truth evaluations of standard semantics. It does this without introducing names in the style of, what is similar, the substitution interpretation of quantifiers, and so it avoids legitimate objections that have been made to substitution semantics (1)."

(1) (*) For these objections, and for answers to many objections to substi- tution semantics, see Dunn and Belnap [3].

References

[3] J. M. Dunn and N. D. Belnap, 'The Substitution Interpretation of the Quantifiers', Noûs, vol. 2 (1968), pp. 177-185

24. ———. 1971. "Conventionalist and Contingency-Oriented Modal Logics." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 12:131-152.
"No modal logic so far presented adequately represents radical conventionalism. Yet conventionalism about modalities is a very pervasive doctrine. In this paper we make a start on filling this serious gap in the literature.
Radical conventionalism is distinguished by the thesis:
(R). *All assertions of modalities are contingent*.
(...)
Radical conventionalism is inconsistent with *all* Lewis modal logics, as we shall show. It does not follow, however, that radical conventionalism is, as has often been assumed, inconsistent. One of our main aims is to exhibit a class of consistent modal logics in which thesis (R) is satisfied. This is a major step towards showing that radical conventionalism is a consistent doctrine.
We distinguish radical conventionalism from two other main positions regarding modality which have also been called conventionalisms. For radical conventionalism has frequently been confused with these other doctrines, to the detriment of each position since each pair of positions entails mutually inconsistent principles." (p. 131)
25. ———. 1971. "Review of A. Trew's 'Incompleteness of a Logic of Routley's." *Mathematical Reviews* no. 41:1507.
26. ———. 1972. "A Semantical Analysis of Implication System *I*, and of the First Degree of Entailment." *Mathematische Annalen* no. 196:58-84.
Abstract: "A semantics for the implicational system *I* is described, and the completeness and decidability of *I* and related systems established.
lt is shown that *I* has the same first-degree logic as Anderson-Belnap system *E* and Ackermann system π and the same positive logic as Lewis system S3. A detailed semantical investigation is made or the first degree of entailment systems, and important matrices and algebras are derived and thereby interpreted."

27. ———. 1972. "Vredenduin's System of Strict Implication." *Logique et Analyse* no. 15:435-437.
About P. G. J. Vredenduin, "A system of strict implication", *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 4, 1939, pp. 73-76.
28. Routley, Richard, and Meyer, Robert K. 1972. "The Semantics of Entailment II." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 1:53-73.
Abstract: "In the first part of this paper, we developed a semantics for the system R of relevant implication, which is the non-modal part of Anderson-Belnap style systems of entailment. In the present paper, which we have endeavored so far as possible to render self-contained, we add an S4-style theory of necessity, getting the system NR of [1]. This enables us to introduce an entailment connective on the definition. (1) $A \Rightarrow B =_{df} N(A \rightarrow B)$, where $\rightarrow$, is relevant implication, and accordingly to adapt the semantics for relevant logics developed in [2] to a theory of entailment proper.' We note that although the question whether the NR-theory of entailment coincides exactly with that of E remains open, both the results of [1] and the motivation provided for the pure theory of entailment in [3] suffice to settle it for all practical purposes - every motivating condition ever put forth for E is satisfied in NR, and in all known cases of interest involving formulas built up from entailment and the truth-functions, E and NR coincide exactly with respect to provability. Indeed, although we should like very much to see the remaining open question definitively solved, we hazard here the guess that if E and NR should happen to diverge on some formula, it will be E which turns out thereby to be semantically deficient; we do not think that will happen. In any event, we present with confidence the present results as the semantics for Anderson-Belnap style entailment." (p 53, a note omitted)
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[1] Meyer, R. K., 'Entailment and Relevant Implication', *Logique et Analyse*, No. 44 (1968), 472-9.
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H. Leblanc), North-Holland, Amsterdam, forthcoming. [1973]
[3] Anderson, A. R. and N. D. Belnap, Jr., 'The Pure Calculus of Entailment', *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 27 (1962), 19-52.

29. ———. 1972. "The Semantics of Entailment III." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 1:192-208.
"In [1] and [2], we developed Kripke-style semantical postulates for the system R of relevant implication and the system NR of relevant implication with modality. The latter suffices for a theory of entailment as well, though we left the question open in [2] whether that theory is precisely the Anderson-Belnap system E of entailment. The time has come to extend our semantical methods to other systems of relevant logic besides the system R. We shall do so in two stages. The present paper deals only with positive systems of entailment, since these may be handled quite simply along previous lines; complications arising from negation are put off until the sequel. We do not consider quantified entailment logics explicitly, though quantifiers may be handled in the style of [1] (or differently, if the reader prefers). Accordingly, we present here a semantical analysis of the Anderson-Belnap systems R+ of positive relevant implication, E+ of positive entailment, and T+ of positive ticket entailment; by ringing the changes on the axiomatizations of these particular systems, we include as well related relevant logics; there is, on our approach, a natural minimal one, which we can call B+." (p. 192)
References
[1] R. Routley and R. K. Meyer, 'The Semantics of Entailment' (I), in H. Leblanc (ed.), *Truth, Syntax, Modality*, North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, forthcoming [1973].
[2] R. Routley and R. K. Meyer, 'The Semantics of Entailment' (II), *The Journal of Philosophical Logic 1* (1972), 53-73.

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"In [1]-[4], the authors have developed a semantical analysis of Ackermann-Anderson-Belnap style systems of entailment similar to the well-known analyses of Lewis style strict implication due to Kripke, Hintikka, Lemmon, and others. The present paper uses these semantic insights - in particular those of [3] - to develop a general algebraic analysis of entailment logics. Such an analysis has already been furnished by Dunn in [5] for the system R of relevant implication, who interpreted the system R in a certain class of partially ordered algebraic structures, namely the DeMorgan monoids (1). A similar analysis, as we report, will do for entailment logics generally. This present analysis, as it remarkably turns out, is strongly reminiscent of the very differently motivated connections drawn between the theory of combinators and certain theorems of intuitionist logic by H. B. Curry in [6] and [7]. The present paper will analyze chiefly negation-free entailment logics, which are the most natural algebraically; some remarks, however, will be inserted to show where the enterprise tends when negation too is added. Our key algebraic notion will be that of an Ackermann groupoid, defined below, which serves to explicate algebraically the minimal relevant logic B+ of [3] and which comes on the addition of postulates to explicate also more familiar relevant, modal, and intuitionist logics, such as T+, E+, R+, S4+, and the intuitionist sentential calculus J." (p. 407)

(1) The theory of residuation, on which Dunn's and the present work rests, was developed by Ward and Dilworth; cf. [7] for references.

References

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[7] Curry, H. B., *Foundations of mathematical logic*, McGraw-Hill, N. Y., 1963.

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32. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 1972. "The Semantics of First Degree Entailment." *Noûs* no. 6:335-358.
"We concentrate on first degree semantics because this sharpens and simplifies the choice among rival systems. For different systems may have a common first degree theory. In particular a large class of strict implication systems (including all Lewis systems) have the same first degree; and the system FD coincides with the f.d. theory of the system E of Anderson and Belnap (presented in [1] and [2]) and also of a number of rival entailment systems both included in, including, and only intersecting E (see [11]). Thus the divergence of entailment from strict implication, and from other implications such as connexive implication, is already clear at the first degree. Most of the traditional and current disputes come up and can be settled at the first degree level, for example, disputes about the paradoxes and their effects, and as to the adequacy of principles such as Disjunctive Syllogism. Thus choice of a first degree system already fixes in large measure one's position on entailment. Furthermore, for a number of important notions the higher degree structure is either peripheral, as with inclusion of logical content, or, as with causal sufficiency, not well defined.
Finally the first degree has much simpler semantics than the full systems; it is not complicated by questions as to which setups or structures implications are in or what relations hold between set-ups, which determine the fate of higher degree laws." (pp. 335-336)

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Contents of Volume 1 (the only published): Introduction 1; Part I: Context logic. 1. The semantic theory 21; 2. Elements of the sentential theory 44; 3. Elements of the predicate and quantification theory 120; Part II. The principles of significance. 4. Toward a logic of significance 219; 5. Sentential significance logics I: The matrix approach 256; 6. Sentential significance logics II: The axiomatic approach 368; 7. Intensional and quantified significance logics 431; Bibliography 637-641.
"In spite of the central role which the concept of significance has played in recent philosophy, very little has been done to produce a general theory in terms of which the various claims can be evaluated. Both Russell and Ryle go some way towards the development of particular significance theories which they then apply to the examination of philosophical theses, and Russell's theory of types is expressed partly in terms of formal criteria. But the two theories, though similar, are inconsistent with each other, and each is seriously incomplete. Both depend crucially on the acceptance of intuitive and unstated principles.
It is our purpose to develop a general formal theory of significance in terms of which significance claims, and arguments by means of which they are made, can be assessed. Thus we aim, eventually, to provide a logic, not previously developed, for much of modern philosophy.
This aim might be challenged in one of three ways. First, even though it is accepted that some sentences are nonsignificant, it might be thought that there is no need of a

special logic to take account of them since the ordinary principles of classical two-valued logic can be applied to arguments in which they occur. Secondly, it might be said, given that there is a need for a special logic, the peculiar features of nonsignificant sentences make its development impossible. Thirdly, it has sometimes been suggested, nonsignificance can be wholly explained in terms of other well-understood concepts: in particular, it can either be identified with the ungrammatical, in which case nonsignificant sentences should be excluded from all arguments and the only logic which is necessary is the classical two-valued logic over significant sentences; or it can be identified with the necessarily false, and in this case significance claims and arguments can be handled within classical modal logic.

Consider the first objection. The point of and need for a general formal theory of significance can be justified on general grounds by appealing to the usual reasons for underpinning philosophical investigations by logical studies: namely the clarity and systematisation which result, and the fact that the philosophical theory can be tested for consistency and is generally more readily assessed and open to falsification. But it can also be justified on special grounds since, without it, the assessment of particular significance theories, if not impossible, is at best intuitive. Unless general principles are formulated and justified, it remains obscure which critical arguments are valid within and against a particular theory. Thus, without some systematisation of significance principles, many philosophical arguments, such as those of Ryle and Strawson on the philosophy of mind, are impossible to assess.

As one example of the need to make explicit the principles which are assumed, and the need to evaluate them, consider Russell's assumption, which is nowhere justified, that the paradox argument evaporates and the conclusion no longer follows once it has been shown that the premisses are meaningless. This amounts to saying, in general, that a nonsignificant sentence has no implications. But if this is so,

then Ryle's *reductio ad absurdum* technique, and Wittgenstein's declared aim, seem to be illogical. For here, the intention is to show that a given sentence is nonsignificant because it has implications which are nonsignificant. But if it is indeed nonsignificant, then it was so before the actual implications were drawn, and in terms of Russell's principle it cannot have these implications because it has none at all.

In order to resolve problems such as this, it is necessary to construct associated significance logics for particular theories of significance and to ask whether there is an internal inconsistency in either theory, whether there are general principles incompatible with either or both, and whether there is a general theory which can consistently include both. It may be, for example, that the apparent incompatibility of Russell's principle and Ryle's is not real. This would be so if they were adopting different implication connectives; in this case, both principles could consistently appear in the same general theory.

None of these questions can be settled using only a classical two-valued logic, however, since what is in issue is just which relations hold between truth-valued sentences, on the one hand, and nonsignificant sentences, on the other. Similarly, it is inadmissible to evaluate positivist criteria of significance using principles of two-valued logic alone since, given that some sentences are nonsignificant, such a logic cannot hold generally. But the mere recognition that at least a three-valued logic is necessary is of itself inadequate. For unless the *relevant* three-valued logic is specified, the criteria are still not fully assessable." (pp. 5-7)

34. Routley, Richard, and Brady, Ross. 1973. "Don't Care was Made to Care." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 51:211-225.

"We believe that the deep structure of natural languages, and hence of the languages in which philosophical problems are characteristically formulated, will have to be based on an enriched significance logic which has a third value -- nonsense or non-significance -- and not on a classical two-valued logic which only has truth and falsity as its values.

Such logics will be required not just in providing a semantics for natural language but also, for what is even more important, in the assessment of informal reasoning and in determining the scope of valid argument. But our view that there is a need for nonsense as a value has been challenged, most recently by Haack(1) who thinks that a variation on Quine's position can be sustained, that central examples of non-significant sentences are 'Don't Cares' which can be brought within the scope of classical logic by some fairly arbitrary assignments of truth-values to them. Though we shall concentrate on Haack's case against nonsense as a further value, our criticism has more than merely local interest, for many of the defective moves that Haack makes in defence of classical logic have wide currency." (p. 211)

(1) R. J. Haack: 'No Need for Nonsense': this journal, 49 (1971) pp. 71-7. Page references in the text are to this article. Overlapping criticisms may be found in E. Erwin: *The Concept of Meaninglessness* (1970).

35. Routley, Richard, and Meyer, Robert K. 1973. "Classical Relevant Logics I." *Studia Logica* no. 32:51-68.

"In a number of papers, the authors have offered semantic and algebraic analyses of the relevant logics of Ackermann, Anderson, and Belnap, and of logics akin thereto. The most interesting of these logics, in our opinion, are the Anderson-Belnap system R, which we analyzed in [1], and our own system B, studied in [5] and [6]. These are respectively the strongest and the weakest relevant logics, others being intermediate. Now one of the chief features of the relevant logics -- indeed, the chief feature on the motivational lines of [7], [8], and [1] -- lies in their blocking the so-called paradoxes of material and strict implication. The paradox which has drawn the most ink, particularly in Meyer's remarks, is the old saw that from a contradiction anything follows: i.e.,

(1) $A \& \neg A \rightarrow B$.

One would have thought, accordingly, that addition of (1), with other classical negation principles, to positive relevant logics would result in their breakdown, just as intuitionist

logic fails to accomodate, on pain of breakdown, (1) together with excluded middle. Like so many things one would have thought, this is false. In fact, on a semantical analysis akin to that of [1] and [5] but in certain respect more natural as regards negation, the positive insights emerge unscathed. The purpose of this paper is to present that semantics and the *classical relevant logics* to which it gives rise. Arising out of this analysis are new algebraic insights as well; classical relevant logics are Boolean and so the algebras of these logics -- sufficing in particular for the positive parts of the relevant logics studied to date and in distinction to the algebras developed by Dunn in [9] and by us in [6] -- are just Boolean algebras with an additional binary operation. Indeed, as we show, we may limit our considerations to *set algebras* -- i.e., algebras whose domain is the power set of some set. This leads to considerable simplification of some outstanding problems for positive relevant logics -- in particular, for the long-open decision question for R^{+--} and we suggest lines along which we believe a successful solution of this question can be obtained." (p. 51)

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36. ———. 1973. "The Semantics of Entailment." In *Truth, Syntax and Modality: Proceedings of the Temple*

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"Word that Anderson & Belnap had made a logic without semantics leaked out. Some thought it wondrous and rejoiced, that the One True Logic should make its appearance among us in the Form of Pure Syntax, unencumbered by all that set-theoretical garbage. Others said that relevant logics were Mere Syntax. Surveying the situation Routley, and quite independently Urquhart, found an explication of the key concept of relevant implication. Building on Routley [1972] , and with a little help from our friends - Dunn and Urquhart in particular, with thanks also due to Anderson, Belnap, V. Routley, and Woodruff - we use these insights to present here a formal semantics for the system R of relevant implication, and to provide it with proofs of consistency and completeness relative to that semantics." (pp. 199-200)
(...)
"Our introductory remarks conclude with the observation that, as a result of this paper and of Urquhart's [1972] related work, the relevant logics now have a formal semantics; but relating such a semantics to the informal claim that a system of logic has captured one's intuitions is ever a matter of private judgment, and that judgment we leave, as his rightful due, to the reader." (p. 204)
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37. ———. 1973. "An Undecidable Relevant Logic." *Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* no. 19:389-397.
"The purpose of this paper is to exhibit a simple, undecidable sentential calculus in the ANDERSON-BELNAP family of relevant logics. We call this system Q^+. We use the semantical methods of [1] and [3] to show that if Q^+ is decidable then the word problem for semigroups is

solvable, contradicting POST's [2] and establishing our main result. Q^+, we add, is not our favorite sentential logic, but it is closely
related to the viable ANDERSON-BELNAP system R of relevant implication. Accordingly we believe to it be the best approximation yet to HARROP's request in [4] for a philosophically interesting undecidable sentential logic." (p. 389)

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38. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 1973. "Ryle's *Reductio ad Absurdum* Argument." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 51:125-138.

"According to Gilbert Ryle (in his *Collected Papers*) a certain sort of *reductio ad absurdum* argument, distinct from Euclid's argument, has a central place in philosophical argument. This *reductio ad absurdum* argument is applied in the following way: if it can be shown that an apparently meaningful thesis, such as that the mind is in the body, implies indisputable cases of absurdity, then the thesis itself is absurd (nonsense). Thus the argument is of the form: If q follows from p and q is absurd then p is absurd,
i.e., using some symbols,
if $p > q$ and $-Sq$ then $-Sp$ (1)
Throughout $p > q$ reads '(that) p entails (that) q' and $-Sq$ reads '(that) q is not significant (is absurd)'. But the notation may alternatively (by trading 'that' in for quasi-quotes) be read metalinguistically.
(...)
We want to argue here that there are grave difficulties in maintaining the correctness of the *reductio* argument (1),

but that, fortunately for the project in *The Concept of Mind*, it is doubtful that the arguments used
there are in fact of this form or have to depend for their correctness on the correctness of (1). Once again the case for a special philosophical argument appears to fall down." (p. 125)

39. ———. 1973. "Rehabilitating Meinong's Theory of Objects." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 27:224-254. "Meinong's theory of objects makes an important contribution to the logical theory and semantics of that large and indispensable part of discourse which is intensional. Despite this, his theory has been, and continues to be, the target for a barrage of supposedly devastating criticism and ridicule, which is without much parallel in modern philosophy, so that even to mention Meinong's theory gives rise to amusement, and practically any theory can be condemned by being associated with Meinong (e.g. 'shades of Meinong!' Ryle [1] p. 234; 'Meinong's jungle of subsistence,' 'the horrors of Meinong's jungle' [2] pp. 12, 32, 'the unspeakable Meinong', James cited in [3], p. 187. The effects of this have not merely been an historical injustice to a courageous and original thinker; it has also had the effect of blocking off, or at least inordinately delaying, a whole avenue of research, especially of non existential logic and of alternatives to the entrenched Russellian theory and its modern variations and simplifications. For the fact is that many of the more general objections which are supposed to destroy Meinong's theory would, if correct, be equally effective against non-existential logic, with which Meinong's theory shares important features. Our project of considering these objections has then wider importance than just that of clearing Meinong's name and rehabilitating his theory. In this paper we want to defend Meinong's theory of objects, or rather a modern logical reconstruction of a substantial part of it, against some of the common general objections which are taken to have completely discredited it. (Thus, e.g. Ryle [4]: *'Gegenstandtheorie* itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected'). We shall argue that these criticisms do not stand up to examination, and that it is not Meinong but

his critics who are involved in a naive and mistaken theory of meaning, the Reference Theory." (p. 224)

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40. ———. 1973. "Ideal Objects on a Meinongian Theory of Universals." In *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy Varna; 17th to 22nd September, 1973, Varna, Bulgaria. Vol. 5*, 581-584. Sofia: Sofia Press.

"The rejection of the Ontological Assumption (hereafter OA), according to which one cannot make true statement about what does not exist, together with the further step of admitting that non entities, i.e. items which do not exist, have determinate properties, makes it possible for a theory of items, such as Meinong's theory of objects, to avoid the standard positions on universal and many of their difficulties.

(...)

The rejection of the OA does not give a Meinongian position a merely terminological advantage or claim to novelty, nor does the position differ merely terminologically from Platonism (as the official positions are inclined to claim). The distinction is not merely terminological because the question of what exists is not completely uncontrolled by conditions: one cannot say what one likes about what exists. For to exist is to be in the actual world, and the logical properties of entities are controlled by those of the actual world. Hence these conditions which derive from the logical features of the actual world: - *first*, what exists is consistent; *second*, what exists is complete or determinate; and *third*,

what exists is unqualifiedly assumptible, e.g. if the x which fs exists then the x which fs does f. In short, in the case of an entity we do not require further guarantees about the suitability of its description: the guarantee is provided by its existence." (p. 581)
(...)
"Terms like ‘the Triangle’ and ‘triangularity’, and also mass terms, are irregular subjects. Accordingly there is nothing to be lost and much to be gained by admitting such subjects within the formal framework of quantification logic (see [3]). But once such subjects are admitted, and the domain of items in the semantical frame correspondingly widened, it is decidedly preferable to switch to a quantified significance logic to cope with the very large class of non significant sentences that result in typical applications of the logic. Then special postulates, each as part of (F), governing the new universal terms can be adjoined, but their exact form has still to be worked or argued out. Likewise a semantical rule for form terms, non trivial enough to verify the admissible half of requirement (F) (though not its converse, except under appropriately restricted conditions) remains, so far as we know, an open problem." (p. 584)
References
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"Professor Bernard Williams' arguments that "fatal difficulties beset the account of Meinongian 'pure objects'" ([1]), p. 55; my rearrangement) are, I try to show, simply invalid: the main argument effectively distributes a universal quantifier across a disjunction." (p. 131)
(...)
"Meinong's theory of incomplete objects is a going enterprise; but it has yet to be shown so far as I can see, if it

can be shown at all, that statements about Universals can always be eliminated, preserving relevant properties, in favour of hypothetical statements about 'ordinary' objects. All we have been offered by those who would eliminate 'systematically misleading' statements about Universals (e.g. Ryle [3]) are sample eliminations, which however exemplify schemes such as (Q), which break down if applied generally. And it would appear to be an outcome of Ackermann's demonstration of the unsolvability of the elimination problem for second-order predicate logic (see [4], p. 304) that a general elimination of polyadic Universals in the proposed style is impossible." (p. 135)

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"The purpose of this note is to extend the simplifications of [1] to the system R of relevent implication analyzed semantically in [2]. In [1], it was established that the system R +, which is the negation-free fragment of R, could be furnished with a negation ¬ more classical in most respects than the preferred negation — of [3].

This was rather astonishing, since an important motivating condition on relevant logics had been absence of the classical paradoxes of implication (1). It turned out, however, that one could have the most objectionable of the paradoxes anyway, namely $A \& — A \rightarrow B$ and $A \rightarrow B \vee 7B$, without the least interference with the positive ideas." (p. 182)

(1) Other scholars, notably Urquhart and Gabbay, have thought independently about classical negation in relevant logics. But [1], so far as we know, contained the first demonstration that the system R + does not collapse under the admission of such negation." (p.183)

Referencs

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Philosophia no. 4:223-249.

"The purpose of the present note is to solve the most recalcitrant of the conservative extension questions presented by Anderson for E in [1], by showing that E is a conservative extension of the system E_i, formulated as in [2]. The proof proceeds by reducing this question to the analogous question for the system NR introduced by the first author [Meyer](1) I in [3] and which was studied by us semantically in [4]. By showing that NR is a conservative extension of an appropriate system NR_i,, we complete the proof. The result is of interest, as was noted in [1], in that E_i is under more firm control that E, having been Gentzenized and furnished with a decision procedure in [2].(2) The method of proof, too, is of some interest, the most important part of the argument (in II below) lying in the replacement of truth-functional &, V with their intensional analogues -, + in adapting the characterization of [4] of theory and of prime theory in an appropriate completeness proof. One concludes that the point of view of [4], and of related papers, is less dependent on properties of &, V - in particular, their general lattice properties - than one might have thought. Hopefully this will yield further insight into the semantics of E, which though in a sense completed in

[6] and [7], remains too formally cluttered to be completely satisfactory.(3)." (p. 223)
(1) Bacon had the idea earlier, and independently. In principle it's due to Anderson and Belnap. And accordingly to Ackermann. And accordingly ... to Adam.
(2) We suppose, too, that E_i and NR_i have appropriate finite model properties on the present semantics, given the result of [10] that R_i has the finite model property.
For E and NR and R, on the other hand, these questions are open.
(3) In contrast, e.g., to R.
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[31 R.K. Meyer, "Entailment and relevant implication," *Logique et Analyse* 11 (1968), 472-9.
[41 R. Routley and R.K. Meyer, "The semantics of entailment II" *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 1 (1972), 53-73.
[51 A.R. Anderson, and N.D. Belnap, Jr., *Entailment,* Princeton, 1974.
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Reprinted in: Edgar Morscher, Johannes Czermak, Paul Weingartner (eds.). *Problems in Logic and Ontology*, Graz: Akademische Druk-u Verlaganstalt 1977, pp. 147-172.
"Many intensional logicians have not abandoned, as unrealisable, the dream of something like Leibniz's *characteristica universalis*, of an almost universal logical language, with simple components, and with a precise and acceptable semantics, within which the whole of (English) discourse can be expressed, and whose semantics provides theories of truth, consequence and meaning for the discourse expressed. Admittedly things did seem rather desperate when, after the initial successes of the pioneering days of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and Camap's *The Logical Syntax of Language* had faded, it was shown that the theories of these texts fail at point after point. However, most of the objections which were taken as winning the day against these theories - for example the inability of the theories to cope at all adequately with intensional discourse, with context dependence, with non-significance and other discourse failures - are now seen to rest on the paucity of the logical, and especially semantical, equipment then available, not in inherent limits to logic and semantical analysis.(1) make the dream a little more real then, both the logical syntax and the semantical framework will have to be much enriched.(2)
Realising the dream involves however a very ambitious program. We don't pretend to know whether it can be brought off, or how exactly.
But we do believe that if the program is to stand a chance of succeeding its logical theory will have to include enrichments like those we go on to discuss. These enrichments in turn however lead to many new problems, several of them philosophical (and the regress in philosophical problems set up by technical solutions to earlier philosophical problems may well be vicious). We opt, in later sections of the paper, to concentrate on one important set of these problems, one which has a special bearing on the shape the grand semantics should take, the

general admission of descriptions into intensional discourse, and of a choice descriptor in particular." (p. 291)
(1) This point is elaborated in [1], Chapter 4.
(2) Ideally these developments would be carried out in combination since, as Montague has emphasized (e.g. [2] p. 212), 'there will often be many ways of syntactically generating a given set of sentences, but only a few of them have semantic relevance'. Ideally - but there is a danger, in the current rudimentary state of semantical and context theory, that important notions, as well as discourse that cannot be properly digested by the theory, will be inadequately or roughly treated, if investigated at all.
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"It is a vogue idea that semantical analyses of natural languages such as English can be accomplished within the framework of a λ-categorial or type-theoretical language,(1) or of a language which can be included in such a λ-categorial language (e.g. Montague [7], Lewis [6], Parsons [8], Tichy [17], Cresswell[3]).

The leading assumption are (1) that the surface structure or grammar of a given language can be transformed, or translated, by a series of reductions into a canonical form, commonly called 'deep structure', which is appropriately λ-categorial or as a special case thereof, categorial), and (2) that the semantic, which it is enough of course to furnish for the deep structure, is (some complication of) a two-valued possible worlds semantics. The assumed procedures is exhibited in a rudimentary way in the pedagogical practice of transforming English arguments into quantified modal logic as a preliminary to assessing validity, etc." (p. 327)
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"Much fresh light is cast on traditional metaphysical proposals, and on associated philosophical programmes designed to indicate or explain these proposals, by recent rapid advances in the areas of discourse which succumb to semantical analysis. Indeed, through semantical analysis various pervasive metaphysical proposals--which lie behind and thus propel modern philosophical programmes--can be conclusively demonstrated in appropriately qualified form, and the strength, limitations, and inadequacies of the more traditional forms can be revealed." (p. 187)
(...)
"The main thesis to be argued on this point is simply that *many philosophically influential reductive positions, when generously construed, furnish semantical analyses whose correctness can be demonstratively established*. In short, the *wide* reductions, taken as semantic analyses, are necessarily true, and thus reconcilable with transcendental positions.
Where this is so the reductions furnished are not paradoxical, or wrong, but demonstrably correct, and not trivial, though sometimes virtually platitudinous. So results the promised synthesis.
What has generally happened, however, is that the reductions adopted are intended to work with a narrower reduction base which fits in with some cherished programme, such as empiricism. Under this contraction of the base, the reductions cease to be demonstrable, and succumb to formal counter-examples and their more familiar intuitive analogues; and it is under these narrow construals that the reductions are paradoxical in Wisdom's sense.[*] But one important reason why the reductions are so appealing, a reason which Wisdom neglects, is that they rely on widened, correct, versions of the reductions where further situations are admitted into the analysis." (p. 193)
[*] See John Wisdom, *Paradox and Discovery*, Oxford Blackwell, 1965.

55. ———. 1976. "The Durability of Impossible Objects." *Inquiry* no. 19:247-250.
See the Reply by Karel Lambert (pp. 251-253).

"Meinong's theory of impossible objects, though an enduring contribution to semantics, has been subject to much misrepresentation and to repeated criticism, much of it based on Russell's criticism of the theory. Lambert, in an unusually sympathetic discussion of Meinong's theory argues that:
Russell's well-known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against
Meinong's theory of impossible objects.(1)
The object of this note is to show that Lambert's 'augmentation of Russell's argument to show that there are at any rate no impossible objects' (p. 310) fails, and fails for essentially the reasons that Russell's well-known argument fails." (p. 247)
(1) K. Lambert, 'Impossible Objects', *Inquiry*, 17 (1974), pp. 303-14; quotation from abstract, p. 303. All page references in the text are to this article.

56. Routley, Richard, and Meyer, Robert K. 1976. "Dialectical Logic, Classical Logic and the Consistency of the World." *Studies in Soviet Thought* no. 16:1-25.
Italian Translation: "Logica Dialettica, Logica Classica e Non-Contraddittorietà del Mondo", in Diego Marconi (a cura di), *La formalizzazione della dialettica*, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier 1979, pp. 324-353.
"Dialectical logic, especially Soviet logic, has customarily received sharp and summary treatment at the hands of Western critics.
(...)
To date classical logic - which is Western mainstream logic - has been strongly on the offensive in the ideological logical warfare between East and West, with many supporters in fact among the Soviets, and dialectical logic has been very much on the defensive. The object of this paper is to try to upset this ideological power structure by furnishing dialectical logic with the framework at least of a viable semantics, and at the same time to shatter the imperviousness of mainstream Western logic, and thereby

to assist the cause of that newer, less orthodox and so far minor, logical theory - relevance logic.
It will emerge that the differences between the orthodox Western and Soviet positions cannot be satisfactorily represented as logic, or formal or classical logic, on the one side, and anti-logic or the rejection of formal logic on the other; each position can furnish viable, equally formal, but competing logical theories, and the differences between these positions will come down to philosophical differences about such highly debatable and empirically untestable matters as the consistency of the world." (p. 1)

57. ———. 1976. "Every Sentential Logic has a Two-Valued Worlds Semantics." *Logique et Analyse* no. 19:345-365.
"No one anywhere will design a sentential logic without a quite familiar kind of semantics, and no one can now scorn any such logic just because it lacks a semantics. For just as every sentential logic has a characteristic Lindenbaum algebra, so, and less trivially, every such logic has a bivalent relational (and also an operational) semantics." (p. 345)
(...)
"But even if the models the method generates are sometimes skew, or even inconsistent, the method promises a big payoff not only in logic, but also for linguistics and philosophy. This payoff will be increased still further when the methods are extended to logics and languages far richer than sentential ones, as they can be (see [8]). Indeed the method presented below already suffices for all zero-order logics under a truth-valued interpretation; but for an objectual semantics further features have to be included in the models (see [10]). We conjecture that every logic has a two-valued worlds semantics ; but there remain some conspicuous problems in the way of proving such a result, e.g. the problem of characterising logics and logical languages generally. The logical payoff comes through the theories and results semantical analyses of logics and languages open up, for example, theories of truth, reference, meaning and consequence, and, less generally, results such as compactness, separation and decidability. The philosophical and linguistic pay-off derives from this logical

payoff: it is that any area of language that can be supplied with an exact logical syntax and set of principles can automatically be furnished with an extensional semantics, and so provided with associated logical theories of truth, meaning, consequence and so on. If, for example, the theory of propositional attitudes or notions such as belief or perception have a logic, or a structure, then they have a worlds semantics." (p. 347)

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[10] R. Routley, «General model theory I. Every quantificational logic is complete». [typescript, Canberra 1974]

58. Routley, Richard, and Montgomery, Hugh. 1976. "Algebraic Semantics for S2° and Necessitated Extensions." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 17:44-58.

"Algebraic techniques are used to show that Feys' system S2°(cf. [1]) and certain necessitated extensions of S2°, such as Lewis' systems S2 and S3, have the finite model property, and accordingly are decidable.

Representation theorems are then used to establish set-theoretical semantics for the modal systems studied. Where the results obtained are not new they improve on earlier results (such as those of Lemmon in [3]) in two respects; first they provide direct algebraic treatments of the systems, and second they furnish better semantical results (see the discussion of theorem J for S2). The techniques used however follow those of McKinsey (in [4]) and Lemmon (in [2] and [3]). Since it is now known that these techniques do not work for all necessitated extensions of S2°, a somewhat piecemeal approach is inevitable. Weak results are also obtained for Feys' system Sl° and Lewis' system SI (for details of these systems see [1])." (p. 44)

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[4] McKinsey, J. J. C., "A solution of the decision problem for the Lewis systems S2 and S4, with an application to topology," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 6 (1941), pp. 117-134.

59. Routley, Richard. 1977. "Meaning as Semantical Superstructure: A Universal Theory of Meaning, Truth and Denotation?" *Philosophica (Belgium)* no. 19:33-67.
"It is one thing to give a general theory of or semantics for truth, or even for truth and significance, and thereby provide for the main ingredients of a full theory of referential (or denotation style) notions. It is quite another, so it is commonly enough claimed (following Quine [1]), to characterise any of the notions of the full theory of meaning - synonymy, sense, entailment, and so forth. The extent to which this popular dogma - one of the newer dogmas of empiricism - is correct, is an issue even within empiricist semantics." (p. 33)
(...)
"Because intensional discourse has to be encompassed in the theory of truth, the general semantical framework of a satisfactory theory has to include worlds far beyond the actual, or the like. But in including these - especially impossible worlds, which are essential for example, for the semantical analysis of propositional attitudes such as belief (see [14]) - it far exceeds what is empirically admissible. By including these
worlds, however, the *full* theory of truth offers a framework for definitions of central intensional notions, such as meaning: but a less extensive modelling, with worlds restricted to the actual or to those of modal logics, would *not* suffice." (p. 36)
References
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[14] R. and V. Routley, 'The role of inconsistent and incomplete theories in the logic of belief', *Communication*

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"Weak strict modal logics, strict modal logics which are weaker than systems which contain the rule of necessitation (that where *A* is a theorem so is its necessitation, □A), form an important, but somewhat neglected and under-rated, class of modal logics. They have, however, attractive semantics which form an integral part of general semantics for modal logics. A sentential *modal* logic is a system which includes as well as classical sentential logic *SL*-taken to hold at *every* world-at least one oneplace non-truth-functional connective, □ say. Semantics for sentential modal logics are a special case of the universal semantics of [4], with the rules for classical connectives reducing to classical evaluation rules (such as Iii) and Iiii) below). With just one further modelling condition, a natural semantics for weak strict modal systems emerges. Semantics for such systems are, of course, far from uniquely determined." p. 497)
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and Weingartner, Paul, 223-227. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

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66. ———. 1977. "Extensional Reduction I." *The Monist* no. 60:355-369.
"Philosophers of modern logic have cherished no project more dearly than that of extensional reduction. Despite occasional protests that this project was ill-conceived from the start, or that it fails to account for important areas of experience and thought, the extensionalist mills have been grinding away anyhow. Their grinding has brought with it a number of important technical successes, replete with philosophical claims that light has finally been shed on areas hitherto buried in incomprehensible darkness.
There has, frankly, always been something self-serving about these claims. A man who understands no language but French will find nothing comprehensible until it has been translated into French. This does not mean, surely, that Shakespeare reads better in French than in English. It means rather that those who are unwilling to make the effort to comprehend Shakespeare in his native linguistic habitat will have to make do with what can be preserved of him in a foreign language.
Nevertheless, the fruits of the project have been impressive. Nor is there any doubt that some areas?e.g., Lewis-style modal logics?have been rendered, if not necessarily more intelligible, at least simpler and closer to what one took to be an underlying philosophical motivation?e.g., by Kripke-style possible world analysis.

So, in short, it seems good to us to have another look at the entire program of extensional reduction. We shall ask in particular whether successful extensional reduction should be taken as a touchstone of good semantical analysis. Relevant to this question will be certain technical results to be newly presented here." (p. 355)

Related pages

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Annotated bibliography of the logical works of Richard Sylvan [*né* Routley] (1978-1988)

Bibliography

1. Routley, Richard. 1978. "Semantics for Connexive Logics I." *Studia Logica* no. 37:393-412.
   "According to the third view in the ancient debate on the nature of conditionals,[*] a sound conditional requires a connexion between antecedent and consequent. Both material implication (the first ancient view} and strict implication (the second ancient view) were rejected by the third view as satisfactory accounts of the conditional relation because they deliver conditionals such as those of the paradoxes of implication which are unsound, presumably on the ground that they fail to meet the requirement of connexion. We do not know what conditionals were said to meet this requirement, other than Identity, A → A (a principle that was explicitly rejected under the fourth ancient view).
   The third ancient view has reappeared in the modern debate as to the nature of entailment, implication and conditionality, where the connexion requirement is commonly imposed as a requirement of meaning or content connexion between antecedent and consequent of valid implications. This requirement coincides with the broad requirement of relevance: for if antecedent and consequent enjoy a meaning connexion then they are relevant in meaning to one another, and if they are relevant

in meaning to one another then they have through the relevance relation a connexion in meaning." (p. 393)
(...)
"Although the semantical analysis resolves many problems concerning connexive logics and provides new means of attacking other problems, it leaves many problems - perhaps too many - open." (p. 410)
[*] *Note added*: See Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200, II, 110–11 (pp. 95-96).

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"The semantics for intuitionistic quantificational logic, that have come to be known as Kripke-semantics (see, e.g., [2], p. 246) after the influential presentation of Kripke [1], turn out to be unsound. Since a large body of theory concerning intuitionistic logics and mathematics is now based on these semantics the matter is of more than merely local significance.
Although the points made apply equally against many other presentations of Kripke-semantics for intuitionist logic (e.g. those of Thomason [3], Aczel [4], Gabbay [5] and elsewhere), it is convenient to focus on Kripke [1], and to borrow his terminology and notation. Kripke in turn adopts (see [1], p. 93) the formulation of intuitionistic predicate logic of Kleene [6], and it is advantageous to follow suit. It is worth noting that Kleene's formulation allows both for free variables and for constants (and so also do the formulations adopted by some others: e.g. Thomason [3], p. 1 and Aczel [4], p. 2)." (p. 61)
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Gabbay's earlier papers on the representative decidability and undecidability of various intuitionistic theories are cited in this paper.

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5. ———. 1978. ""Dialectical Set Theory (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 43:363.
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"In his original presentation of The System of Strict Implication ([1], chapter V) Lewis considers a `partial system contained in Strict Implication' to which he believes some interest attaches.
If our aim be to create a workable calculus of deductive inference, we shall need to retain the relation of logical product, p & q, but material implication, $p \supset q$, and probably also material sum, $p \vee q$, may be rejected as not suffciently useful to be worth complicating the system with. The ideas of possibility and impossibility also are unnecessary complications. Such a system may be called the

Calculus of Ordinary Inference ([1], p. 318; with modern notation for connectives." (p. 4)

References

[1] C. I. Lewis, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1918.

7. ———. 1978. "Ultramodal Logic as Universal (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 43:355-356.
8. Routley, Richard, and Loparić, Andréa. 1978. "Semantical Analysis of Arruda da Costa *P* Systems and Adjacent Non-Replacement Relevant Systems." *Studia Logica* no. 37:301-320.

   "Systems in the vicinity of the ***P*** systems, first formulated by Arruda and da Costa [1] (1) are logically important, for several reasons. Firstly, it is evident that a naive set theory with an unrestricted comprehension axiom, designed with certain of these systems as underlying logic, will prove to be a non-trivial though inconsistent theory (2). Thus, as remarked in effect in [1], these systems offer important initial bases on which to endeavour to erect mathematically adequate paraconsistent set theories." (p. 301)

   (1) Da Costa's use of ***P*** systems, and also of other systems than his *C* systems, was quite unfairly neglected in [8], where it was suggested that da Costa, though having the fine vision of a general theory of inconsistent or (as they are now called) paraconsistent systems, had concentrated on much too narrow a range of systems.

   But a theory of sufficient generality of paraconsistent systems -- as distinct from the investigation of just a few systems of the class -- has yet to be worked out.

   (2) Inconsistency is readily established by paradox arguments, e.g. by the standard argument for the Russell paradox. The intuitive argument which makes non-triviality evident is as follows: - - It is known from [2] that an extensional comprehension axiom can be added to quantified ***P*** systems without trivialising them, that is one can non-trivially adjoin a comprehension axiom limited only by the requirement that set determining wff contain but extensional connectives and quantffiers, i.e. in this context, contain no occurrences of the implicational

connective →. But, as the semantics will show in the case of appropriate ***P*** systems such as ***BH***, no reduction of nested implication can be effected in these ***P*** systems; thus even if implicational connectives should occur in set determining wff they cannot be utilised, they are effectively locked away in the set determining wff. Hence, intuitively at least, an unrestricted comprehension axiom can be added to appropriate ***P*** systems without trivializing them.
A proper demonstration of the non-triviality of naive set theory based on appropriate ***P*** systems can, it appears, be obtained enlarging on the persistence methods of [2], by adding world by world variation to the modelling that establishes the non-triviality of extensional dialectical set theory. Such a proof is made easier by the simplicity, surprising in view of [3], of the semantics for appropriate ***P*** systems. Da Costa and
Arruda have apparently devised a different demonstration of the non-triviality of ***P*** with unrestricted comprehension.
References
[1] A. I. ARRUDA and N. C. A. DA COSTA, O paradoxo de Vurry-Moh-Shaw-Kwei, *Boletim da Sociedade de Matemática de São Paulo*, vol. 18 (1963).
[2] R. T. BRADY and R. ROUTLEY, The non-triviality of extensional dialectical set theory, to appear. [G. Priest, R. Routley, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent Logic, essays on the Inconsistent,* Munich: Philosophia Verlag 1989, pp. 415–436.]
[3] R. ROUTLEY and R. K. MEYEIR, Towards a general theory of implication and conditionals II, *Reports on Mathematical Logic*, vol. 9 (1977), pp. 47-62.
[8] R. ROUTLEY and R. K. MEYER, Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world, *Studies in Soviet Thought*, vol. 16 (1976), pp. 1-25.

9. Routley, Richard. 1979. "The Theory of Objects as Commonsense." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 9:1-22.
"It is beginning to be appreciated that the Meinong of the mainstream philosophical literature is a mythological figure, that Meinong's philosophy has in fact been presented in an unfair fashion (perhaps even by largely sympathetic

expositors such as Findlay [2]), and that the theory of objects in particular has been either widely misunderstood or else deliberately misrepresented. What has not been much appreciated is that Meinong's theory of objects represents an important alternative to standard (Russellian) logical theory.(1) Whereas the entrenched theory is both reductionist and logico-empiricist in spirit, the alternative is nonreductionist, antiverificationist, and commonsense. Since the theory of objects has often - there are, however, important exceptions - been taken to be the very antithesis of commonsense, there is some explaining to be done. The problems are compounded by the fact that it is not at all easy to say what commonsense amounts to, and even more difficult to show that a philosophical theory is a commonsense one." (p. 1)

(1) There need be no apology for calling modem, standard, orthodox, "nondeviant", "classical" logic 'Russellian'. The orthodox logic of the textbooks consists essentially of variations and improvements (or sometimes the reverse) on the logical theory devised in large measure by Russell, building on the work of Peano and others, and worked out in collaboration with Whitehead in *Principia Mathematic*a [5]. Certainly there have been important additions by Hilbert, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Gentzen and others but these do not affect the general claim. In these terms influential modem logical theories, such as those of Quine [15], are but variations on a theme of Russell's. And they share the reductionist empiricist assumptions of Russell's logical theory.

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[2] J.N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values,* Second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963.

[5] A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950.

[15] W.V. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View,* Second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961.

10. ———. 1979. "Some Bad Arguments for and Against Conventionalism." *International Logic Review* no. 10:84-90.
11. ———. 1979. "Dialectical Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics." *Erkenntnis* no. 14:301-331.
"As with the thesis that God exists, so with the Consistency Hypothesis that the world is consistent, there are three main positions that can be taken; namely, a theistic or classical position which accepts the hypothesis, an agnostic or relevant position which suspends judgement, and an atheistic or dialectical position which rejects the hypothesis. (1) Here the world is Wittgenstein's world, the real or actual world of intensional semantics, that is the class T of all truths, and the Consistency Hypothesis, CH, is the thesis that T is simply consistent, that it contains no contradictory pairs of the form A and ~ A, where ~ A is the negation of A. T, whether consistent or not, by no means exhausts the class of statements; for it is an empirical truth that the world is not trivial, that not all statements are true. Neither relevantly nor dialectically, however, does inconsistency lead to triviality; to assume, as classically, that it does is to assume the matter at issue, for the assumption is tantamount to CH (as [1]) explains)." (p. 301)
(...)
"The remainder of this paper endeavours to contribute something further to the discernment of such a dialectical theory, to circumscribing its underlying static logic and furnishing its semantics, to establishing its adequacy, and to outlining certain of its applications in mathematical and foundational studies." (pp. 302-303)
(1) 1 Whereas in [1] adoption of the relevant position was argued for as the rational course of action, in [3] and [11] the dialectical position is defended. The case for the shift from the agnosticism of 1973-1974 to atheism is explained in [3]. [1] and [11] are desirable background reading for the present paper.
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[1] Routley, R., and Meyer, R. K., 'Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world', *Studies in Soviet*

Thought 16 (1976), 1-25.
[3] Routley, R., Routley, V., and Meyer, R. K., *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals*. Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
[11] Routley, R., Ultralogic as Universal, in the *Relevance Logic Newsletter,* 2 (1977), 50-90 and 138-175.

12. ———. 1979. "Alternative Semantics for Quantified First Degree Relevant Logic." *Studia Logica* no. 38:211-231.
Abstract: "A system ***FDQ*** of first degree entailment with quantification, extending classical quantification logic ***Q*** by an entailment connective, is axiomatised, and the choice of axioms defended and also, from another viewpoint, criticized. The system proves to be the equivalent to the first degree part of the quantified entailment system ***EQ*** studied by Anderson and Belnap; accordingly the semantics furnished are alternative to those provided for the first degree of ***EQ*** by Belnap. a worlds semantics for ***FDQ*** is presented, and the soundness and completeness of ***FDQ*** proved, the main work of the paper going into the proof of completeness. The adequacy result is applied to yield, as well as the usual corollaries, weak relevance of ***FDQ*** and the fact that ***FDQ*** is the common first degree of a wide variety of (constant domain) quantified relevant logics. Finally much unfinished business at the first degree is discussed."
References
Alan R. Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity*, Vol. I, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

13. ———. 1979. "The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse." *Poetics* no. 8:3-30.
"An attempt is made to account for the evident truths supplied by fictional discourse, and to vindicate the ordinary naive theory of fictions, within the single framework of universal semantics and the theory of objects. The theory offered is an elaboration of a contextual theory (which tits easily into universal semantics) according to which the context supplies base-shifting functions which alter the world where truth is assessed. The elaboration consists, firstly, of expansion of the theory of contexts to

meet various objections, and, secondly, of deployment of the theory of objects to account for truths concerning fictional objects in non-fictional contexts (as regards the second, various options open on the contextual theory are sketched; but an important option the author now prefers is omitted). An account is given of fiction and its distinctive semantical features. A work of fiction is regarded as portraying part of a world, so a work of fiction is semantically like a theory. Since there is little restriction on the worlds of fiction, any modal theory of fiction is bound to be inadequate; there is in fact no general uniform logic of fiction. (This corresponds to the unrestricted imagination thesis, fundamental to a comprehensive theory of fiction, to the effect that there are no restrictions on what is imaginable.) Also criticised and rejected are other theories of fiction such as elliptical and dimensional theories.
Not only the statements of fiction but the objects of fiction are considered. The worst logical difficulties concerning the objects of fiction are resolved, so it is argued, by adopting a neutral quantificational framework and by sharply qualifying the Leibniz identity principle.
That the same object, e.g. London, occurs in a given fictional world as in the actual world is a matter of qualified author say so; transworld identity is *here* stipulative. The final points concern the incompleteness and fictionality of the theory developed." (p. 3)

14. Routley, Richard, and Griffin, Nicholas. 1979. "Towards a Logic of Relative Identity." *Loguique et Analyse* no. 22:65-83.
"Identity statements in natural language come in two syntactic varieties. Some are of the form 'a is the same as b' or 'a is identical with b' and may be symbolized, after the manner of classical identity theory, as '$a = b$'. These will be called absolute identity statements. Others have the form 'a is the same Φ as b' where 'Φ' is some general noun. Statements of this form will be called relative identity statements and will be formalized (following Wiggins [1], p. 2) as '$a =_{\Phi} b$'. In such statements 'Φ' is called the covering concept of the identity statement." (p. 65)

(...)
"Two theses are of central concern in considering relative identity. The first is the claim (R) that two items may be the same with respect to one general noun but distinct with respect to another; the second is the claim (D) that absolute identity statements are semantically incomplete." (p. 66)
(...)
"In this paper we propose (roughly in order of increasing plausibility) a variety of logics for relative identity theories of the first and second types, that is, theories with both (D) and (R) and theories with (R) but not (D). In doing this we refute two claims about relative identity which have gained currency: firstly, the claim made by Nelson [1] and Ayers [1] that identity theories in which (R) is satisfiable are incoherent; secondly, the claim, implied by Wiggins [1], p. 27, that (R) entails (D). In the case of each theory proposed, the satisfiability of (R) can be demonstrated by adding to the theory appropriate constants which can be used to form an example of (R)." (p. 67)
References
Ayers, Michael R. [1], 'Individuals Without Sortals', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 4 (1974), pp. 113-148.
Nelson, Jack [1], 'Relative Identity', *Noûs*, 4 (1970), pp. 241-260.
Wiggins, David [1], *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967).

15. Routley, Richard, Meyer, Robert K., and Dunn, Jon Michael. 1979. "Curry's Paradox." *Analysis* no. 39:124-128.
"In short, the conclusion of our examination of Curry's paradox is discouraging in the extreme for the hopeful naive set theorist. One sought to avoid the problems posed by Russell by weakening logic, in order to save the abstraction principle. We were willing to give up the usual aversion to contradiction. We faced with equanimity the sacrifice of the deduction theorem. To continue with the project, a minimal, decent respect even for *modus ponens* must be given up as well.
We have always held that, in these permissive days, no rule is sacrosanct--except *modus ponens*. And one may, of

course, still cleave to the *rule* of *modus ponens* without the *modus ponens* axiom; indeed, Routley
has conjectured that a naive set theory based on a very weak relevant logic is absolutely consistent. One might look for other escapes, too; e.g., the role of the '↔' in the abstraction principle above might be
reexamined. But the conclusion is none the less clear; unless we are prepared to give up a great deal of logic--not only of classical logic but of intuitionist and even relevant logic as well-a naive set theory is
untenable." (p. 128)

16. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 1979. "The (Logical) Importance of not Existing." *Dialogue* no. 18:129-165.
"An adequate theory of meaning and truth is semantically important. Such a theory necessarily includes in its analysis nonentities, items that do not exist. So what is semantically, and hence logically, important is bound to include nonentities. In virtue of the modifier 'semantically', the first premiss is analytic (what is semantically important may not be important), and it is comparatively uncontroversial. By contrast the second premise of the syllogism, which we want to stick to, is decidedly controversial. So too is the thesis (advanced in [2] and [3] and in Chisholm [15]) - which implies the inadequacy of classical logical theories - that there are a great many natural language statements, statements an adequate theory should be able to treat of, which cannot be analysed logically, and semantically, without the equivalent of an appeal to nonentities. Defence of the thesis has been somewhat piecemeal, taking the form that all the theories so far offered which try to dispense with nonentities break down or run into insuperable difficulties, difficulties which are readily surmounted given appropriate talk about nonentities. In what follows we shall outline more general sorts of argument for the thesis, designed to show that no theory which dispenses with nonentities as objects of discourse can do justice to the data.
The thesis of the inadequacy of classical logical theory, basically one of Meinong's theses expanded and dressed up in more modern attire, has not exactly won widespread

acclaim, but it has gained some notoriety and has encountered much opposition.
Much of what follows is an attempt to counter some of that opposition; to reinforce the claim that classical theories break down irreparably over the analysis of intensional discourse concerning nonentities; to meet the objection that objectual semantics for Meinongian-style theories of objects have themselves serious flaws; to refute the view that Meinongian theories have no philosophical advantages, only drawbacks; and to show, by way of illustration of the importance of nonentities in solving traditional philosophical problems, how the theory of objects, and only such a theory, can resolve many problems in epistemology, problems in fact generated by the classical theory." (pp. 129-130)
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[15] R.M. Chisholm, 'Beyond being and nonbeing', *Philosophical Studies*, 24 (I973)> 245-57; also in *Jenseits von Sein and Nichtsein* (edited R. Haller), Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1972.

17. Routley, Richard. 1980. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items* Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
Revised edition in four volumes 2018-2020.
Contents: Preface and acknowledgements I-VIII;
Part I. Older essays revised.
1. Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond. I Items and descriptions 1; 2. Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond. Existence and identity when time change 361;
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3. On what there isn't 411; 4. Further objections to the theory of items disarmed 427; 5. Three Meinongs 489; 6. The theory of objects as commonsense 519; 7. The problems of fiction and fictions 537 8. The importance of not existing 607; 9. The meaning of existence 697; 10. The importance of nonexistent objects and of intensionality in mathematics and the theoretical sciences 769; 11. Rudiments of noneist philosophies of mathematics and science 791; 12. How the theory elaborated differs from other theories of objects in its these and objectives 833;
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Appendix I: Ultralogic as universal? 893;
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Supplementary bibliography: On Meinong and the Theory of Objects 983;
Index 991-1035.
"A fundamental error is seldom expelled from philosophy by a single victory. It retreats slowly, defends every inch of ground, and often, after it has been driven from the open country, retains a footing in some remote fastness (Mill *A system of logic*, pp. 73-4).
The fundamental philosophical error, common to empiricism and idealism and materialism and incorporated in orthodox (classical) logic, is the Reference Theory and its elaborations. It is this theory (according to which truth and meaning are functions just of reference), and its damaging consequences, such as the Theory of Ideas (as Reid explained it), that noneism - in effect, the theory of objects - aims to combat and supplant. But like Wittgenstein (in *Philosophical Investigations*, and unlike Mill, noneists expect no victories against such a pervasive and treacherous enemy as the Reference Theory. Though noneists take it for granted that 'Truth is on their side', and reason too, the evidence that 'Truth and reason will out' is exceedingly disappointing. Nor do they expect the enemy to vanish, even from open country: fundamental error will no doubt persist, to the detriment of philosophy, and of every theoretical and practical subject it touches. For there is great resistance to changing the framework (to amending the paradigm); so

there is an attempt to handle everything within the prevailing philosophical frame. There is no need, it is thought, to change the framework, all problems can eventually be solved within the basic referential scheme - at worst by some concessions (1) which absorb some nonreferential fragments, and thereby decrease both the level of dissatisfaction with the going frame, and the prospects for perception of its real character.

The faith that the Reference Theory (and its forms such as extensionalism and empiricism) will find a way out of its impasses, a way to deal adequately with nonexistence and intensionality, is like the faith that technology will find *a way* to deal with social problems, especially with all the problems it creates (the faith is deeply embedded in the Technocratic Ideology). As with the Technocratic Ideology so with the Reference Theory, the Great Breakthrough which will resolve these problems, (patently) not soluble within the technological or referential framework, is always just around the corner, no matter how discouraging the record of failures in the past. The problems, difficulties, and failings of the Theory are not recognised as reasons for rejecting it and adopting a different theoretical-and ideological framework, but are presented as 'challenges', which further work and technology will doubtless find a way to resolve. And as with Technocracy the 'solution' of a problem in one area is liable to create a rash of new problems in other areas (e.g. increasing energy supply at the expense of increased pollution, forest destruction, etc.), which can, however, for a time at least, be conveniently overlooked in the presentation of the 'solution' as yet another triumph for the theory and its ideology. That is, the procedure is to trade in one problem for another, and hope that nobody notices.

The basic failings of the Reference Theory are at the logical level. The Reference Theory yields classical logic, and directly only classical.

An example of theoretical cooption is the (somewhat grudging) toleration of lower grades of modality and

intensionality - which can however be referentially accounted for, more or less.

The basic failings of the Reference Theory at the logical level.

The Reference Theory yields classical logic, and directly only classical logic: in this sense classical logic is the logic of the Reference Theory. An important group of elaborations of the Reference Theory correspond in the same way to logics in the Fregean mode. Accordingly with the breakdown of the Reference Theory and its elaborations all these logics fail; and so, as with the breakdown of modern energy supplies, substantial adjustment and reconstruction is required. In fact no less than the effects of a logical revolution are called for (see *Relevant logics and their rivals*), though the aim of these essays is to achieve such results in a more evolutionary way, to take advantage of the classical superstructure, to build the new logic in part on what there is. The logical areas where change and improved treatment are especially, and desperately, needed are these:

nonexistence and impossibility;

intensionality;

conditionality, implication and deducibility;

significance; and context.

It is on the first two overlapping areas, the very shabby treatment of which is a direct outcome of the Reference Theory, that the essays which follow concentrate. (The remaining areas - which are, as will become quite evident, far from independent - are treated, still in a preliminary way, in two companion volumes to this work, *Relevant logics and their rivals* and *The logic of significance and context,* and in other essays.) When the Reference Theory and its elaborations (such as Multiple Reference Theories) are abandoned the role of logic changes - its importance need not however diminish." (Preface, I)

(1) An example of theoretical cooption is the (somewhat grudging) toleration of lower grades of modality and intensionality - which can however be referentially accounted for, more or less.

18. ———. 1980. "Problems and Solutions in the Semantics of Quantified Relevant Logics. I." In *Mathematical Logic in Latin America: Proceedings of the IV Latin American Symposium on Mathematical Logic held in Santiago, December 1978*, edited by Arruda, Ayda Ignez, Newton da Costa, Carneiro Affonso and Chaqui, Rolando Basim da, 305-340. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Abstract: "The main problem investigated is the adequacy of constant domain relational world semantics for quantified relevant logics. The problem is solved, though in a disagreeably circuitous way, for many weaker relevant logics, and an outline of how the solution may be extended to stronger logics such as RQ is given.
Alternative necessity and intensional conjunction style rules for the evaluation of quantifiers are studied and shown to simply force the main problems above with the usual (extensional conjunction style) quantifier- rule to reappear, unmitigated, at alternative outlets. Finally some philosophical problems allegedly engendered by constant domain world semantics are examined briefly: it is argued that the "problems" are no problems."
19. ———. 1980. "The Choice of Logical Foundations: Non-Classical Choices and the Ultralogical Choice." *Studia Logica* no. 39:77-98.
Abstract: "A multiple factor model for choice of best objective (which generalises on the modellings of optimisation theory, and so enables the unification of much decision theory) is developed. Essentially the recipe is to maximize a given function of expected values of the factors subject to a set of constraining relations on the factors and to overriding constraints (the constraining relations are not restricted to certain relations of equality and inequality). The model, which was designed to apply in environmental decision-making situations, has an important role in value theory and in the theory of choice of theories, and it specialises to the matter of choice of logical foundations.
It is argued by way of a series of actual examples that the limited quantifiability or nonquantifiability of the factors does not count against realistic applicability of the model.

The factors and constraints in the special case of best choice of logical foundations (for the full range of logical purposes) are sketched and discussed. Important factors are those of scope and applicability to the data. other nonnegligible factors
are such pragmatic factors as simplicity, economy, power, intelligibility, fruitfulness.
In addition to constraints between the factors there is a major overriding constraint, namely that of conformity to the facts.
The theoretical model is applied. First a criticism of other accounts of choice, especially pragmatism, and consistency criteria, is mounted. It is then argued, applying the account of best choice el logical foundations for discourse (including philosophical discourse) that has emerged, and making heavy use of factual constraints, that the choice to make is not a choice of classical logic, not a choice of some extension of
classical logic, but choice of a paraconsistent logic, and among such essentially nonclassical logics, of an ultralogic, i.e. of a relevant inexistential highly intensional logic."

20. ———. 1980. "Review of *Entailment* by A.R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 58:405-408.
21. Routley, Richard, and Loparić, Andréa. 1980. "Semantics for Quantified Relevant Logics Without Replacement." In *Proceedings of the Third Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic*, edited by Arruda, Ayda I., DaCosta, Newton C. A. and Sette, Antonio Mario, 263-280. Sao Paulo: Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica.
22. Routley, Richard. 1981. "Necessary Limits to Knowledge: Unknowable Truths." In *Essays in Scientific Philosophy. Dedicated to Paul Weingartner / Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Paul Weingartner gewidmet*, edited by Morscher, Edgar, Neumaier, Otto and Zecha, Gerhard, 97-118. Bad Reichenhall: Comes Verlag.
Reprinted in *Synthese*, vol. 173, 2010, pp. 107-122.
Abstract: "The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the noncontingent limits to any (human or non-

human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch's proof, [*] which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch's premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance."
[*] Fitch, F. B. (1963). A logical analysis of some value concepts. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 28, 135–142.

23. ———. 1982. "On What There Is Not." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 43:151-177.
Reprinted in Michael C. Rea, *Arguing about Metaphysics*, New York: Routledge 2009, pp. 59-77.
"Consider some thing, d say, that does not exist, for example d is Meinong's round square. Then what does not exist is in this case d; but it in no way follows from "d is non-existent" that "d exists". Such nonentities as d need have no being in any sense. It is basically because whatness and thinghood have been illicitly restricted to what exists or has being, that a puzzle seems to have arisen: for certainly we contradict ourselves if we say that what has being does not have being. There is no contradiction however in saying that what is a thing or object, e.g. d, may have no being in any sense; and this dissolves what Quine nicknames *Plato's beard*, without using or blunting, Occam's razor. For Occam's razor to remain sharp requires only that entities not be multiplied beyond necessity; but no multiplication of entities has been made, no bloating of the universe (of what exists) has occurred. Indeed the theory of objects enables a very substantial reduction in what is said to exist, so that what is said to exist can coincide with what really does exist, namely only certain individual objects now located in space.(4) But, more to the point, Occam's razor embodies various muddles of the very sort that it is important to remove. In particular, Occam's dictum that entities [or differently, objects] should not be multiplied beyond necessity supposes that it is in our power to increase or decrease the number of entities [or objects]: but of course in *that* sense - as opposed to the destruction or creation of objects by one's activity - it is not.

What we can increase or decrease is not what exists but what we *say* exists, what we (choose to) *talk about*, and what our theories commit us to in one way or another. So the dictum, and a use like Quine's of it, confuses what exists with what we (choose to) talk about or what we, or our theories, *say* exists - a confusion that runs through into recent criteria for ontological commitment, themes of ontological relativity, and programs for ontological reduction." (pp. 152-153)
(4) It was Meinong's thesis that any existing object has a more or less definite location in space and time. It is a corollary that abstract objects do not exist (see further [2], chapter 9).
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24. ———. 1982. "How Disjunctive Syllogism can be Seen as a Fallacy of Relevance." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 10:144-151.
25. Routley, Richard, Meyer, Robert K., Plumwood, Val, and Brady, Ross. 1982. *Relevant Logics and their Rivals. Vol. 1: The Basic Philosophical and Semantical Theory*. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
Contents: Introduction X; 1. The implication connection, and the ensuing inadequacy of irrelevant logics such as classical and modal logics 1; 2. Derivability, deducibility, and the core of entailment 69; 3. The shape of the first degree logical and semantical theory, and competing profiles for higher degree logics 170; 3. The semantics of entailment and sufficiency conditionals, relevant affixing systems with normal conjunction, disjunction and negation, and their extensions 284; 5. Further investigation of relevant affixing systems and their parts 348; Appendix 1. The semantics of entailment IV: E, II' and II" 407; Appendix 2. The pure calculus of entailment is the pure calculus of entailment 425; Postscript to the Appendices 430; References 435 Index (by Jean Norman) 452-460.

"This volume is primarily a logical and semantical investigation of an extensive class of zero-order intensional logics, i.e. of intensional logics which do not include variable binding devices such as abstraction operators, descriptors, quantifiers or their equivalents. The effect of adding variable binding devices will have to be reserved for another volume. Many of the philosophical investigations and issues which are presupposed by or arise from this predominantly formal study will, we still hope, appear in yet other publications (e.g. *Beyond the Possible,* long in preparation). The separation of these matters is admittedly deplorable (whether the proposed multiplication of book-entities is also deplorable will be left for readers to decide). The exclusion of quantifiers and descriptors deprives the logics of some of their interest and usefulness in the analysis of natural languages and philosophical and other argumentation, and the partial exclusion of intimately connected and motivating philosophical issues is artificial and weakens the case for such a detailed study of particular intensional logics. However this volume is evidently long enough already. *Relevant and irrelevant logics.* We focus on those intensional logics that, satisfying weak relevance principles, have become known as relevant logics. The class of sentential logics that satisfy weak principles of relevance is however wide and includes many logics which are, in principle, rivals to the position(s) we shall be advancing. We want it to emerge with stark clarity, however, that our main concern is not really relevance at all - the appropriate sort of relevance is a byproduct of any good implication relation, which comes out in the wash. Only one weak necessary condition for relevance features in what follows: that is all'. A study of relevance, of the sorts of relevance, of sufficient conditions for relevance, ... - all these matters are philosophically interesting, and some of them are important, especially for the logics of evidence and probability - but they are not our present concern. For this reason the name 'relevant logics', or 'relevance logic', is not entirely satisfactory - perhaps even, to lodge a much stronger claim, unfortunate - since the name tends to

suggest, wrongly, that relevance is of the essence, instead of being a peripheral concern. Nonetheless the name has a point, and it is a little late to change it.
What our concern is with is implication and its varieties, and in particular with genuine implication in the sense that amounts to total sufficiency. Thus our concern is, in the first place, with sufficiency, or, as it is otherwise equivalently put in the logical case, with complete logical dependence, with total inclusion of logical content, and so on. Implication is not confined however to logical implication or deducibility; we are very much interested in having our systems apply to other sorts of sufficiency, physical or law-like sufficiency in particular, and to provide the bases, in enthymematic ways, for analyses of partial sufficiency, for instance for insufficiency conditionals - for conditionals, for example, which are obtained from genuine sufficiency conditionals by suppression of true or necessary antecedents (or, symmetrically, of false or impossible consequents). This will take us back through the usual logics of the textbooks, to intuitionistic logic and modal logics, and, in the extreme case, to classical two-valued logic. (p. X)

26. Routley, Richard, and Plumwood, Val. 1982. "Negation and Contradiction in Wittgenstein." In *Sprache und Ontologie. Akten des 6. internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums 23. bis 30. August 1981, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Österreich)*, edited by Leinfellner, Werner, Kraemer, Eric and Schank, Jeffrey, 471-474. Wien: Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
"In the earlier work, especially the Tractatus, the classical explosion model of negation is adopted; negation is represented as total exclusion. There has, of course, to be more to the account of negation than this. In particular, logical constants such as negation, since they would otherwise raise serious difficulties for the picture theory of meaning, call for special treatment, which they obtain through the theory of math-functions. Negation is simply such a classical function; nothing in reality corresponds to it." (p. 471)
(...)

"A cancellation view, incompatible with the classical model of the Tractatus, is infiltrated in subsequent work. A cancellation picture is already deployed in transitional work, e.g. ‘the rules of Euclidean geometry don't contradict one another, i.e. no rule occurs which cancels out an earlier one (p and ~ p), , ,’ (*PG*, p. 345). It is a cancellation picture, where contradictions have no content and say nothing (and so are useless), that lies behind Wittgenstein’s assumption that one should not draw any conclusions from a contradiction (*LFM*, p. 220), or better, that a way should be found of not proceeding from a contradiction (*LFM*, p. 223).10 Furthermore, many of the pictures and images of negation Wittgenstein later considers are of a cancellation type or can be adjusted to fit a cancellation model. Although Wittgenstein repeatedly alludes to such images, at the same time he depreciates them (e.g. all attempts to explain why a contradiction “won't work” are spurious, *LFM*, p. xviii): they are all said to convert to no more than substitution of one symbolism for 'another. Even so, such things can have an explanatory and modelling role. Wittgenstein suggests not, because all that is offered is symbolism and figure, so the question of ‘how one is going to use it?’ (*LFM*, p. 181) remains, since any picture can be used in several ways. He goes on to advance the even more dubious description theme that ‘anything which we give and conceive to be an explanation of why a contradiction does not work is always just another way of saying that we do not want it to work’ (*LFM*, p. 187).

The assumption that contradictions don't, or won't, work and associated themes, e.g. that contradictions are useless, and associated images, e.g. the jamming picture (*LFM*, p. 178—9, ascribed to Moore, p. 190), are 'all connexivist in cast. With a contradiction, as when the cogs join, nothing emerges, ‘we cannot do anything with it’ (*LFM*, p. 191). It is from the same cancellation model that the no-content thesis, which jamming depicts, derives, that contradictions do not say anything, a thesis also equivalently (but misleadingly) expressed in ‘contradictions don’t make sense’.

The cancellation view can be included in the relevant synthesis by appeal to abnormal worlds or language-games, games where contradictions do stop proceedings, and where A & ~A may have no content. But in assuming, as he often appears to, that games are restricted to those that are classical (effectively, in P) or those that are of a cancellation type (in a subclass of W-K), Wittgenstein much too drastically delimits the games, or worlds, needed in giving a full account of negation. And in assuming that abnormal cancellationtype games are characteristic—*'that* we exclude the contradiction and don't normally give it a meaning is characteristic of our whole use of language' *(LFM*, p. 179)—Wittgenstein goes curiously astray. Commonly we do not treat contradictions in this way. We reason on the basis of them (e.g. in reductio arguments), we act on the basis of inconsistent information (cf. the general who acts, and succeeds, on the basis of contradictory reports, *LFM*, p. 105), and we exploit paradoxes when we can." (p. 474)

References

LFM = *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*
PG = *Philosophische Grammatik / Philosophical Grammar*

27. ———. 1982. "The Inadequacy of the Actual and the Real: Beyond Empiricism, Idealism and Mysticism." In *Sprache und Ontologie. Akten des 6. internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums 23. bis 30. August 1981, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Österreich)*, edited by Leinfellner, Werner, Kraemer, Eric and Schank, Jeffrey, 49-67. Wien: Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

"In contrast to empiricism the historical alternatives of (traditional) rationalism, Meinongian rationalism, mysticism and idealism are alike in their rejection of what we have selected as the most important characterising thesis of empiricism, that the world can be adequately accounted for or explained just in terms of what exists, in terms of the actual (referential) world *G*.

Meinongian rationalism has a modern logical expression in noneism, the theory of items elaborated elsewhere (especially in Routley (1979)). The core theses of noneism include the following:—Every (significant) singular term

signifies an object, i.e. (in earlier terminology) is about an object. Everything whatsoever—whether it is possible or not, complete or not, paradoxical or not, thinkable or not—is an object. Most objects do not exist, in any way at all, or have any form of being (or other ontological status) at all. Nonexistent objects, nonentities, are constituted in one way or another, and have more or less determinate natures. An object, whether it exists or not, has those properties which characterise it, e.g. the object which fs does f, where f is a characterising property. But existence, and many other properties (especially "higher-order" properties) are not characterising properties.(8)

Additional theses, presupposed in and of some importance for what follows are these: Universals are objects which do not exist (hence also they are something). Objects are not reducible to entities; for instance, nonexistent objects are not in some way constructs from what does exist, and discourse about nonentities is not translatable, without residue, into discourse about entities.(9) Running in tandem with this is a nonreductionist theme (with something of the ring of the later Wittgenstein): Nonentities are mostly perfectly in order as they are, without reduction. With intensionality as with nonexistence, noneism is committed to commonsense theses (again of a later Wittgenstein cast): Very many intensional statements are perfectly in order as they are, without reductive analysis, and are about the objects they appear to be about. For example, 'Bacon looked for Atlantis' is about Bacon and Atlantis. There is just one object sought, Atlantis; there is no need to try to resolve the statement into one concerning concepts, or complex set-theoretic constructs, or such like; whether or not Atlantis ever existed.

The foregoing themes lead naturally (once the semantical theory is introduced) to further theses,(10) theses that go to the heart of philosophy (as many have seen it), theses stating conditions on the truth and explanation of things in the world: the truth conditions for the factual world T, and also for its actual subworld *G*, involve nonentities, essentially. This thesis, that truth depends on nonexistence,

derives in part from the earlier theme that there are irreducible truths about what does not exist. Further, the explanation of what exists, and so of the actual world G, involves essential appeal to what does not exist, to other worlds beyond *G*. It is themes like these that render noneism a transcendental position,(11) and align it with idealism.

Contrary to empiricism, then, we do need to go beyond the factual world and to consider possible and impossible worlds, and beyond entities of the factual world to consider a wide range of other objects, including impossible and merely possible ones. In particular, according to noneism, we cannot adequately understand or explain the actual world, its entities and its phenomena, without going beyond to other worlds, without adverting, in essential ways, to the non-actual. *The actual is not sufficient*, on its own, *to account either for truth or for explanation*." (pp. 51-52)

(8) The emerging big theory, noneism, is a kind of amalgam of Meinong with the later Wittgenstein; so however strange the combination may seem, it can claim a good Austrian ancestry.

(9) While a semantical analysis of discourse about nonentities can be given, e.g. through a universal semantics (cf. Routley (1979), 1.24), in terms of what Platonists are pleased to call ‘entities’, the objects involved in the analysis do not exist.

(10) So far only nonepistemic themes have been assembled. For subsequent comparisons, especially with ways of knowing and interworld access of idealism, mysticism, primitivism, etc., it will however be important to introduce epistemic and limitative theses.

(11) In the standard sense of ‘transcendental’, of being other-worldly, necessary for (the explanation of) experience, and not reducible to it.

References

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28. Routley, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1982. "Lessons from Pseudo Scotus." *Philosophical Studies* no. 42:189-199.

"Medieval logicians have a great deal to teach their modern descendants.(1)
They discussed issues that are of contemporary importance with an ingenuity and sophistication lost till this century. We will illustrate this by considering an argument produced by a medieval logician, fated to become known as 'Pseudo-Scotus'. It was rescued from oblivion by Bocheński in 1938 and has been commented on more recently, particularly by Benson Mates and Stephen Read.(2) However, a good deal more can be learnt from Scotus' argument as we will show. Specifically we will formulate separate lessons in Sections 2, 4 and 6." (p. 189)
(1) This claim was made at the end of Priest and Read (forthcoming).The present paper goes some way towards bearing it out.
(2) See Mates (1965), which gives details of Bocheński's work and Read (1979) which gives details of other modern commentators.
References
Mates, B. 1965, 'Psuedo Scotus on the soundness of "Consequentiae" in Logic and Methodology, ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka (North Holland).
Priest, G. (forthcoming) [1989], 'Classical logic aufgehoben', in *Paraconsistent Logic*, ed. by G. Priest and R. Routley.
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Routley, R.: 1977, 'Ultralogic as universal?', Relevance Logic Newsletter 2 , pp. 50-90, 187-205. Reprinted as Appendix 1 in *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, RSSS (Australian National University 1979).
Routley, R. and Meyer, R. K. (forthcoming) [1982], *Relevant Logics and their Rivals*, [Atascadero: Rdgeview].
Routley, R. and Routley, V. 1972, 'Semantics of first degree entailment', *Noûs* 6, pp. 335-59.
29. Routley, Richard, Routley, Val, Meyer, Robert K., and Martin, E.P. 1982. "On the Philosophical Bases of Relevant

Logic Semantics." *Journal of Non-Classical Logic* no. 1:71-105.

"Criticisms of semantics for relevant logics, Commonly enough encountered in discussion, are beginning to appear in print. For example, such criticism has come from Scott who asserts, without any supporting argument, that 'the recent semantical interpretations [of relevance logics) have as yet no adequate philosophical justification'· (74, p. 154). A rather similar criticism 'of model-theoretical interpretations of existing relevant logics' is implied by Hintikka (81, p. 80). Analogous criticisms are part of Lewis's recent attack on relevant and paraconsistent logics (in 82). But the bulkiest "case", which includes most of the criticisms commonly indicated, has been presented by Copeland:

And the Routley-Meyer semantics, it will be urged, fails to satisfy those requirements which distinguish an illuminating and philosophically significant semantics from a merely formal model theory (Copeland 400)

Although Copeland reiterates this now familiar claim, that the Routley Meyer semantics for relevant logic is a mere formal model theory as distinct from "a semantics" (see also pp. 406, 408, 412), like others he

omits to specify the requirements upon 'an illuminating and philosophically significant semantics': so urging does not give way to arguing in any rigorous way for the theme (thus too the promise of his short title 'When a semantics is not a semantics' is never fulfilled). Furthermore, the supporting considerations offered for the theme are based, like several of the incidental remarks concerning relevant logics, upon faulty but often unstated assumptions and mistaken data. Although the unfavourable conclusions are stated clearly enough, the structure of the argument by which they are reached is often decidedly unclear, and indeed the case relies upon obscurjty and lack of precision. Consequently meeting this often nebulous set of objections requires proceeding beyond what is directly stated to examination of what the case requires if the considerations actually

presented are to show anything damaging against relevant semantics in the way declared." (p. 71)

References

[4] COPELAND. B.J., 'On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic'. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 8 (1979) 339-413.

[29] SCOTT, 0., 'Rules and derived ru es' in *Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis* (ed. S. Stenland), Reidel, Dordrecht. 1974.

[32I HINTIKKA, J., 'Intuitions and philosophical method', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 35 (1981) 74-90

[33] LEWIS, D., 'Logic for equivocators', *Noûs* (1982), to appear. [16, 1982, pp. 431-441]

30. Routley, Richard. 1983. "Introduction: Nonclassical Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 102/103:121, 253.
31. ———. 1983. "Relevantism and the Problem as to When Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism can be Correctly Used." *Research Papers in Logic* no. 12. Reprinted in: *Ruch Filozoficzny,* 41, 1984, pp-: 127-162.
32. Routley, Richard, and Meyer, Robert K. 1983. "Relevant Logics and their Semantics Remain Viable and Undamaged by Lewis's Equivocation Charge." *Topoi* no. 2:205-216.

"Is relevant logic but a logic for equivocators? Such Lewis's provocatively entitled 'Logic for equivocators', directed against relevant logic, certainly seems to imply. But the ambiguity interpretation which he proposes he is unable to get to work for relevant logic, so he falls back on the first degree implication (fde) parts(4) of the irrelevant logics *LP* and *RM*: in these "we have two logics for ambiguous sentences

- and lo, they are partly relevant" (p. 439). Not only is Lewis well off the relevant target(5) ; but the argument for the conclusion that relevant or cryptorelevant logics are logics of ambiguity, or, for equivocators, is a decidedly poor one. For what we are offered are three-valued interpretations of fde *LP* and *RM* through the values: true osd only, i.e. true on all its disambiguations; false osd only, i.e.

false on all its disambiguations; and both true osd and false osd, i.e. true on some disambiguations and false on others (pp. 438-9). The Lewis interpretation is evidently a simple variation on the truth-valued interpretation obtained by, in effect, omitting 'osd', an interpretation - the intended interpretation for *LP* and *RM3* -- which Lewis tries to rule out as "not making sense". (p. 206)

(4) There is a logical howler running systematically through Lewis's paper. He has 'first degree' where he should have 'fde', unless nonstandard names are adopted. But as 'first degree' is nowhere explained, it must be assumed to have its standard sense. It follows, e.g., from what Lewis asserts that the first degree part of E has a four-valued semantics (see p. 433). This is false.

Since everything in the discussion that follows is restricted to the first degree, talk of 'relevant logic' in the singular is (perfectly) in order.

(5) And Io, also, they axe substantially irrelevant. While RM has long been associated with the relevant enterprise, though not as an acceptable explication of the key notions under investigation, LP has not, and, at the time of design and development of *LP*, Priest explicitly disassociated himself from the relevant enterprise.

(23)

References

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33. Routley, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1983. *On Paraconsistency*. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
Reprinted as *Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics* #1, 1984, 235 pages.
Also reprinted with some modifications in the Introductory chapters of Graham Priest, Richard Routley, Jean Norman (eds.), *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent* (1989): see note 2, p. XIX.
34. Sylvan, Richard, Brady, Ross, Meyer, Robert K., and Mortensen, Chris. 1983. "Algebraic Analyses of Relevant Affixing Logics, and Other Polish Connections." *Research Papers in Logic* no. 16:56 pages.

35. Sylvan, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1983. "An Impressionistic Survey of Paraconsistent Positions and Theories." In *Collected Papers of the 1982 Foundations of Logic Conference*. Waterloo: University of Waterloo.
36. Routley, Richard. 1984. "The American Plan Completed: Alternative Classical-Style Semantics Without Stars, for Relevant and Paraconsistent Logics." *Studia Logica* no. 43:131-158.
Abstract: "American-plan semantics with 4 values 1, 0, {1, 0} { }, interpretable as True, False, Both and Neither, are furnished for a range of logics, including relevant affixing systems. The evaluation rules for extensional connectives take a classical form: in particular, those for negation assume the form 1 ε *t* (~ *A*, *a*) iff 0 ε *t A*, *a*) and 0 ε *t* (~ *A*, *a*) ifI 1 ε *t* (*A, a*), so eliminating the star function *, on which much
criticism of relevant logic semantics has focussed. The cost of these classical features is a further relation (or operation), required in evaluating falsity assignments of implication formulae.
Two styles of 4 valued relational semantics are developed; firstly a semantics using notions of double truth and double validity for basic relevant system ***B*** and some extensions of it; and secondly, since the first semantics makes heavy weather of validating negation principles such as Contraposition, a reduced semantics using more complex implication M rules for relevant system ***C*** and various of its extensions.
To deal satisfactorily with elite systems ***R***, ***E*** and ***T***, however, further complication is inevitable; and a relation of mateship (suggested by the Australian plan) is introduced to permit cross-over from 1 to 0 values and vice versa."
37. ———. 1984. "Relevantism, Material Detachment, and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 14:167-188.
"Relevantism, as a matter of definition, rejects classical logic as incorrect and adopts instead a relevant logic as encapsulating correct inference. It rejects classical logic on the grounds that the rule of Material Detachment, from A

and not A or B to infer B, (that is, Disjunctive Syllogism considered as an inferential principle), sometimes leads from truth to falsity. Relevantism - although promoted by some relevant logicians (Routley and Routley), and an integral part of ultralogic (i.e. universal, all purpose, ultramodallogic; cf. [1], [8]) - has recently encountered heavy, but interesting, criticism from relevance logicians themselves (from Belnap, Dunn, and Meyer). Though the discussion that follows accordingly involves some reporting of internal wrangling among relevance logicians, it is feuding of major importance as regards the question of choice of logical theory. For, firstly, if relevantism is right, then orthodox choices of logic, such as classical or intuitionist choices, are wrong. Secondly, the issue is by no means as parochial as relevant logic, but concerns the matter of serious choice of paraconsistent logic as correct, and as working logic (on paraconsistent logics see Arruda [7]). For Material Detachment is inferentially equivalent in a relevant setting to the Duns Scotus principle (A, ~ A → B, from A and not A to infer B), the rejection of which separates paraconsistent logic from classical (and intuitionistic) logic. The wider issue generated is then: to what extent, and when, can a *paraconsistent theory correctly, or legitimately, make use of classical reasoning?*" (pp. 167-168)

References

[1] R. Routley, 'Ultralogic as Universal?' *Relevance Logic Newsletter*, 2 (1977) 50-89 and 138-75; reprinted in [5].

(5] R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* (Interim edition, RSSS, Australian National University 1980).

[7] A.l. Arruda, 'A survey of paraconsistent logic,' in A. Arruda, R. Chaqui, N. da Costa, eds., *Mathematical Logic in Latin America* (North-Holland 1980) 1-41.

(8] R. Routley, 'The choice of logical foundations: nonclassical choices and the ultralogical choice,' *Studia Logica*, (1979) 76-96.

38. ———. 1984. "Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania: Its brief history and its present state." *Ruch*

Filozoficzny no. 41:127-162.
Reprinted from Research Papers in Logic #14, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra: Australian National University, 1983.

39. Routley, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1984. "Introduction: Paraconsistent Logics." *Studia Logica* no. 43:3-16.
Introduction to a special number dedicated to the paraconsistent logics.
"The papers in this volume are all on the subject of paraconsistency.
This introduction locates the papers in their context and also provides a survey of the general area." (p. 3)
(...)
"The important fact about paraconsistent logics is that they provide the basis for inconsistent but non-trivial theories. In other words, there are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence which are inconsistent but non-trivial. This fact is sometimes taken as an alternative definition of 'paraconsistent' and, given that logical consequence is transitive, it is equivalent to our definition. For this reason we call inconsistent but non-trivial theories *paraconsistent* . The equivalence indicates one reason why paraconsistent logics are worthy of study. For there are important inconsistent theories which are non-trivial. Any analysis of their logical structure must therefore be done using a paraconsistent logic. Clearly, to adopt an explosive logic such as Frege/Russell or intuitionist logic would trivialise them." (p. 3)

40. ———. 1984. "Paraconsistent Logics." *Studia Logica* no. 43.
Special number dedicated to the paraconsistent logics edited by Routley and Priest.
Contents: Graham Priest; Richard Routley: Introduction: paraconsistent logics 3; Elias H. Alves Paraconsistent logic and model theory 17; Ayda I. Arruda, Newton C. A. da Costa: On the relevant systems $\boldsymbol{P}$ and $\boldsymbol{P}^*$ and some related systems 33; Jerzy Blaszczuk: Some paraconsistent sentential calculi 51; Ross T. Brady: Depth relevance of some paraconsistent logics 63; M. W. Bunder Some definitions of negation leading to paraconsistent logics 75; Walter A. Carnielli:

Paraconsistent algebras 79; Luiz P. de Alcantara, R. E. Jennings, P. K. Schotch: The preservation of coherence 89; Chris Mortensen: Aristotle's thesis in consistent and inconsistent logics 107; Graham Priest: Semantic closure 117; Richard Routley: The American Plan Completed: alternative classical-style semantics, without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics 131; John K. Slaney: A metacompleteness theorem for contraction-free relevant logics 159; Hristo Smolenov: Zeno's paradoxes and temporal becoming in dialectical atomism 169; Neil Tennant: Perfect validity, entailment and paraconsistency 181-200.

41. Sylvan, Richard. 1984. "How Science and Myth and Fiction Step Beyond the Actual and Sometimes Beyond the Possible." *Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy* no. 1:1-33.

Abstract: "Sistology, the general Investigation of all items, Is explained. It Is contrasted with its dwarf subtheory, ontology, which is restricted to existent objects. Sistology cannot be recovered from ontology. Sistology, unlike ontology, assigns nonexistent and Impossible objects standing. How this is accomplished logically is outlined; and resulting advantages for linguistics, language and literature are indicated. The theory is then applied to a comparison, in depth, of (failed) science with fiction.

Science and fiction are much more alike than generally supposed. Indeed they do not differ essentially In syntactical ways, and overlap significantly in content. (While they do differ more significantly on technological applications, that is frequently not to sciences credit.) To force what differences there are, a detailed characterisation of *science* is presented, which is then compared point by point with fiction. What emerges Is that science and fiction form merging families, with deductive closure and qualified confrontation with experience affording main separation features.

What remains of the gap between science and fiction Is bridged by myth, which often provides other cultures versions of science. Leading features of myth are explained

and two styles of myth roughly delineated, anthropic myths and naturalistic myths. The latter merge with failed science. The resemblances are exploited both In criticising fashionable accounts of scientific theories and scientific explanation, and in offering new accounts. A scientific theory is a story, which is closed, in particular under deduction, and which suffers qualified exposure to experience, that Is", which meets reality requirements. Scientific explanation also fits within the story setting, a covering story replacing the orthodox "covering law" model. The account accommodates what Is crucial in much explanation, explanation of what exists by way of what does not exist.
Science is Integrally Involved not merely with what does not exist, but also with what is impossible. The role of Inconsistent theories and other inconsistent objects is Indicated, and the emerging theory is applied to certain psychological puzzles concerning thinking the impossible." This paper Is to appear In German, In an issue of *Zeitschrlft fur Semlotik* entitled *Zeichen und Fiktlon* . [Vol. 9, 1987, with the title: "Wissenschaft, Mythos, Fiktion: Sie alle überschreiten die Grenzen des Wirklichen und manchmal gar die des Möglichen".]

42. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 1985. "Negation and Contradiction." *Revista Colombiana de Matematicas* :201-231.
Abstract: "The problems of the meaning and function of negation are disentangled from ontological issues with which they have been long entangled. The question of the function of negation is the crucial issue separating relevant and paraconsistent logics from classical theories. The function is illuminated by considering the inferential role of contradictions, contradiction being parasitic on negation. Three basic modellings emerge: a cancellation model, which leads towards connexivism, an explosion model, appropriate to classical and intuitionistic theories, and a constraint model, which includes relevant theories. These three modellings have been seriously confused in the modern literature: untangling them helps motivate the main

themes advanced concerning traditional negation and natural negation. Firstly, the dominant traditional view, except around scholastic times when the explosion view was in ascendency, has been the cancellation view, so that the mainstream negation of much of traditional logic is distinctively nonclassical. Secondly, the primary negation determinable of natural negation is relevant negation. In order to picture relevant negation the traditional idea of negation as otherthanness is progressively refined, to nonexclusive restricted otherthanness. Several pictures result, a reversal picture, a debate model, a record cabinet (or files of the universe) model which help explain relevant negation. Two appendices are attached, one on negation in Hegel and the marxist tradition, the other on Wittgensein's treatment of negation and contradiction."

43. Sylvan, Richard. 1986. "Toward an Improved Cosmo-Logical Synthesis." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 25/26:135-179.
Originally published as "Towards a CosmoLogical Synthesis", *Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy,* 2, 1985, 42 pages.
"There is a persistent tradition implying simple and unassailable logical foundations - as yet undiscovered - for the whole of cosmology. The tradition, which peaked in modern rationalism, continues strong in contemporary cosmological speculation. Thus, for example, recent rationalistic theories of the universe, ambitiously aimed at mathematico-logical expression and capture of nature." (p. 135)
(...)
"Logic reassumes its ancient role as the fundamental science; the Word expresses a logic recipe.
(...)
The synthesis outlined in what follows fits into this more modest setting. It is achieved by suitably relocating cosmology as a part of semantics (generously construed, for example, to admit contextual
elements)." (pp. 135-136)
(...)

"The underlying idea of the synthesis is simply this: a subspace of neutral worlds semantics is also a suitable framework for cosmology, for an interpretation of the logical theory of the universe as a whole." (p. 136)
(...)
"The setting in terms of objects which do not exist, other worlds especially, is essential. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation (for UQ) of what is normally taken to be a philosophical question, indeed by some such as Heidegger as the fundamental question of metaphysics, namely 'Why does anything at all exist?'. Reset in world terms this becomes a question of the selection of a world such as that we find ourselves in which contains something existent (us among other existent things) as opposed to an alternative world, which contains nothing- a much more tractable question. But the recasting loses explanatory merit should all the worlds involved be taken to exist. For then the old objectionable circle is simply reentered, explaining existence in terms of more existents." (p. 137)
Reference
N. Griffin and R. Sylvan, *Provisional Answers to Ultimate Questions* , typescript, Canberra, 1984; referred to as UQ.

44. ———. 1987. "A Generous Jainist Interpretation of Core Relevant Logics." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 16:58-66.
Both of the 'principal philosophical theories' by which Jainism is commonly distinguished(2), relative pluralism (*anekantarada*) and qualified scepticism (*syavada*) involve 7-fold lists. In the first there is a categorization of 7 perspectives, while, under the second, more important here, 7 modes of predication are marked out. 'About a given object, we may assert [with respect to a given feature, or existentially] (1) "Maybe it is"; (2) "Maybe it is not"; (3) "Maybe it both is and is not"; (4) "Maybe it is inexpressible"; (5) "Maybe it both is and is inexpressible"; (6) "Maybe it is not and is inexpressible"; and (7) "Maybe it both is and is not, and is inexpressible".
The maybe's here are intended to show that dogmatic assertions are out of place ... (Smart, p. 160). Often the

maybe's are omitted from lists of the modes of predication, and other variations are found e.g. 'inexpressible' is alternatively translated as 'indescribable', etc.
Thus, given Jainism apparently entailed a correspondence theory of truth (Smart p. 160), for every statement p – (inevitably) or subject predicate form – there are the following assignments of values, all of which may be attained: (1) true, i.e. t, where (maybe) it is; (2) false, i.e. f, where (maybe) it is not; (3) t and f; (4) inexpressible, i.e. i, where (maybe) it is inexpressible; etc." (p. 62)
(2) To be a little more precise than Smart, those are the main epistemological theories which distinguish Jainism. For Jainist bio-conativism, which anticipates Schweitzer and a reverence-for-life position in contemporary environmental philosophy, is certainly a philosophical theory, and apparently that for which Jains are best Known.
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[7] N. Smart, 'Indian Philosophy', *Encyclopaedia ot Philosophy* (ed. P. Edwards), Macmilllan, New York, 1967.
45. ———. 1987. "A Relevant Invalidity in Curry's Foundations." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 16:51-53.
Reply by Jonathan P. Seldin, "A Relevant Invalidity in Curry's Foundations: A Reply to Richard Sylvan", Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 16, 1987, pp. 68-70.
"Curry claims that the positive paradox principle, ⊢ A ⊃ (B ⊃ A) (33) in his elementary statement presentation, 'is valid in any normal interpretation' ([1], p.173). By previous definition, 'an interpretation of a system
S is a normal interpretation just when the proposition A is true when and only when ⊢ A' (p.172). But his argument to normal validity (and so truth) is interestingly, and relevantly, invalid." (p. 51)
(...)
"This may seem to make, obscurely at that, no more the familiar concession that the positive paradox (33) does not hold for logical (or strict) implication. But given Curry's identification of ⊃ as the propositional analogue of a conditional, it says much more than that: it says, correctly,

that the positive paradox principle does not hold for the conditional.
Nor do matters end there. There are relevant consequences, to be looked at elsewhere, for illative combinatory logic and type-free λ-theory." (p. 53)
References
[1] H. B. Curry, *Foundations of Mathematical Logic* , McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963.

46. ———. 1987. "Establishing the Correspondence Theory of Truth and Rendering it Coherent." In *Stephan Körner - Philosophical Analysis and Reconstruction* , edited by Srzednicki, J. T. J., 75-83. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
"In his rewarding book, *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* , Stephen Körner introduces the correspondence theory of truth as seemingly 'the most natural analysis of truth', explains what the theory tries to do, and what it does not attempt, defends the theory against some standard objections, and advances difficulties for rival theories of truth (see p. 101ff.). What follows removes the limitations Körner claims to find on the correspondence theory; it also elaborates upon what Körner has explained, but at the same time makes one or two significant variations, as will appear." (p. 75)
(...)
"Certainly any idealist who finds classical logic the right medium in which to logically set his or her verificationist proclivities - as the logical positivists thought that this was the right medium for verification, with none of this new-fangled intuitionism - should not be displeased. As for us, well, we can have both correspondence and coherence along with Tarski-Bolzano theory duly generalised.(8) And no doubt other theories of truth can be worked into the synthesis too; but that's a task diverging from KBrner and for another day." (p. 80)
(8) Tarski not only saw the semantic theory as complementing a correspondence theory but also was one of the first to explicate maximal consistent sets; he, if anyone, is behind this whole conspiracy.
References

S. Körner, *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* , (Harvester Press, Sussex, 1979).

47. Sylvan, Richard, Pettit, Philip, and Norman, Jean, eds. 1987. *Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart* . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Contents: D.M. Armstrong: Smart and the secondary qualities; L. Jonathan Cohen: Laws, coincidences, and relations between universals; Donald Davidson: Problems in the explanation of action; Brian Ellis: The ontology of scientific realism; R.M. Hare: Why moral language?; Frank Jackson: Group morality; D.H. Mellor: The singularly affecting facts of causation; Hilary Putnam: The diversity of the sciences; Peter Singer: Life's uncertain voyage; J.J.C. Smart: Replies.

48. Sylvan, Richard. 1988. "Intuitionistic Logic - Subsystem of, Extension of, or Rival to, Classical Logic?" *Philosophical Studies* no. 53:147-151.
"The short well-known answer to the title question is, yes, all of those. It depends, in large measure, on how we formulate the systems, compare them, and apply them. Formulated as a system in connectives {→, V, &, ~}, Lewis modal system S3 is a subsystem of classical logic S, similarly formulated, which results (for instance) by adjoining Peirce's implausible law. But with S recast as a system in connectives {&, ~} (or {V, &, ~), S3 reappears as extension of S, got by adding a modal connective →, (interdefinable with □) and appropriate postulates.
With relevance logics, such as *R* and *E,* which are in many respects like modal logics (S3 is tantamount to *E* + Antilogism), it is similar: these logics are both subsystems of S and extensions of it. But there is a most significant difference from the modal situation, which concerns applications. The difference, important for applications to inconsistent and also incomplete theories, turns primarily on the scope of the rule of Material Detachment MD. A, ~(A & ~B) / B." (p. 147)
(...)

"It is of passing interest, then, that intuitionist logics and some of their neighbours can be construed as maintaining classical, truth-functional, behaviour for connectives 'and' and 'not' (or, to start with, absurdity),
while diverging as regards behaviour of 'or' and 'only if'. From this perspective of course, intuitionism and minimalism become, like modal logics, extensions of classical logic, adding to it intensional connectives
of disjunction and implication -- not rivals to it, though not rulepreserving extensions. Thus are many claims in the standard literature upset, not only those of Fitting, but, for instance, scene-setting assumptions
of Haack concerning intuitionisfic deviance." (p. 150)

References

M. Fitting, *Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics,* D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983.

S. Haack, *Deviant Logic* , Cambridge University Press, 1974.

49. ———. 1988. "Assorted Semantics." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 53:334.

50. ———. 1988. "Radical Pluralism - an Alternative to Realism, Anti-Realism and Relativism." In *Relativism and Realism in Science* , edited by Nola, Robert, 253-291. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"Realism, the dominant 20th century position in Anglo-American thought, is, in the relevant sense, a one world position. There exists a unique actual world, or reality, external to "us", which not only determines
how things are locally and globally, but determines as well truth, and thus also uniquely fixes correctness in science, the correct theory being that which corresponds to reality. Anti-realisms such as idealism
and phenomenalism reject, in one way or another, the tricky externality requirement. Relativism and pluralism, by contrast, reject one of the uniqueness requirements, but in significantly different ways. Relativism
resists, in one fashion or another, the imposition of any ranking better than "equally good" and of any rankings warranting differential choice, on the multiple interpretations or, very differently, multiple realities or

worlds disclosed. Pluralism, however, to set down at once the crucial contrast, permits and typically makes rankings, which enable choice (including realist and idealist and theist choices, among many others).
Pluralism thus comes in two distinct forms: theory or meta-pluralism, according to which there are many correct theories (especially larger philosophical positions) but at most one actual world; and radical or
deep pluralism which goes to the root of these differences in correctness, to be found in things, and discerns a plurality of actual worlds as well as of theories." (p. 253)
(...)
"Why select sistological pluralism, that is, a pluralism based upon object-theory? A first reason is that some selection is practically inevitable.
(...)
Partly to reduce complexity, then, but also partly because of severe limitations of space and energy, only one main form of pluralism has been outlined, sistological pluralism. It is but one style of pluralism, an apparently novel, radical form. It does not, like wishy-washy orientational or entrepreneurial pluralism operate only at the theory level (or meta-level), somehow abandoning the hard-to-separate world level (or object-level) level to realism and its more puritan rivals. There is excellent reason not to do so. For one, sistological pluralism does not need to rely on an implausible sharp cut-off between levels. For another, it does not simply give a pluralistic veneer to orthodoxy and dogma, such as accompanying object-level "realism" may underwrite." (p. 278)
(...)
"Justification for looking at, studying, presenting or showing off a pretty logic, or an unusual radical theory, does not have to be of pragmatic cast, that it does something, succeeds somewhere, works well. It may just be a fine enough thing in its own right - somewhat as a tract of rainforest may be valuable in itself, and, though rather rich and complex, not particularly well-organised, or useful for humans, or good for this or that, or unique. Sistological

pluralism is a fine and rich theory, fun to work and play with, and to contemplate, irrespective of whether it is good for much - which, as it fortunately happens, it is. (p. 285)

51. ———. 1988. "Relevant Containment Logics and Certain Frame Problems of AI." *Logique et Analyse* no. 121-122:11-25.
Abstract: "Relevant containment logics, which combine relevant logics with content containment requirements, are motivated and explained. Semantics for some of these logics are introduced and shown to be adequate. In the light of the semantics the logical theory is improved, and other directions for elaboration are indicated. Finally, the logics are applied to one significant part of the vexatious frame problems of AI , and a route to implementation is suggested."

52. ———. 1988. "Relevant Containment Logics and Frame Problems." In *Artificial Intelligence: Developments and Applications* , edited by Gero, John S. and Stanton, Robin Barrington, 169-181. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

53. Sylvan, Richard, da Costa, Newton, and Carneiro, Alfonso. 1988. "Cause as an Implication." *Studia Logica* no. 47:413-427.
Abstract: "An appropriately unprejudiced logical investigation of causation as a type of implication relation is undertaken. The implication delineated is bounded syntactically. The developing argument then leads to a very natural process analysis, which demonstrably captures the established syntactical features. Next relevantly-based semantics for the resulting logical theory are adduced, and requisite adequacy results delivered. At the end of the tour, further improvements are pointed out, and the attractive terrain beyond present developments is glimpsed."
"The notion of cause, having fallen from favour in the heydays of logical positivism, has enjoyed a contemporary resurgence. But despite its fashionability now, especially as a major foundational element in epistemology, the logical and structural properties of causation remain quite insufficiently examined. In this situation, who knows whether the foundations will carry the philosophical castles

being built (they are never complete, and invariably ramshackle)? Our preliminary investigation of causal implication suggests they will not; like structurally and materially short-supplied high-rise buildings, they will come tumbling down." (p. 413)

54. Sylvan, Richard, and Goddard, Lenn. 1988. "Reasoning I. Reason for, and also Against." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 53:334.
Reprinted in: *Artificial Intelligence in Australia* , 1988, p. 37.

55. Sylvan, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1988. "Answering Another Alleged Dilemma Destroying Dialetheism." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 17:42-52.
"To leave matters in no doubt, we obligingly assert that the Russell class R , i.e. $\{x : x \notin x\}$, both belongs to itself and also does not belong to itself; in short, we assert $R \in R \ \& \sim (R \in R)$. To be quite explicit, we assert the contradiction $r \ \& \sim r$, where r abbreviates $R \in R$. Thus, in convenient symbols, `$\vdash_{\delta} r \ \& \sim r$ where δ is the group of dialethicians comprising (at least) Priest and Routley. Now Goldstein asserts not, or not just, that we should not do what we have naughtily done, but that we cannot; it “is not that people should not assert contradictions, but that they cannot, even though they may purport to do so” ([1], p. 11).
Goldstein offers a neat, but nontheless fallacious, argument to support his assertion that we, along with distinguished dead dialetheicians (Fichte, Hegel and Peirce are cited), cannot do what we purport to have done, asserted a contradiction." (p. 42)
(...)
"The problem with contradictions, on mainstream perceptions, is not that they cannot be asserted, but that they lead, not nowhere, but everywhere.
But no one with a modicum of logical sophistication, not just dialetheicians, would accept this idea, would grant ex falso quodlibet and its scruffy mates." (p. 47)
References

[1] L. Goldstein, *A problem for the dialetheist,* Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences 15/1 (1986), pp. 10–14.

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Bibliography

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"A uniform dialectical resolution of both the logical and the semantical paradoxes was argued for in earlier work (notably in [9]). But the adequacy of that resolution was by no means established. This paper, which shows the non-triviality of extensional dialectical set theory with a general comprehension axiom, represents a further step in the direction of proving the adequacy of the resolution. The methods of proof used - at the core persistence arguments - extend the methods of [2] and [3]. As pointed out in [5], these methods apply equally in the case of the semantic paradoxes.
It should also be noted that these systemic methods almost exactly resemble the meta-linguistic strategies more recently investigated by Kripke in [6]." (p. 415)
References
[2] Brady R. T.1971 "The consistency of the axioms of abstraction and extensionality in a three-valued logic", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 12, pp. 447-453.
[3] - 1972 "The relative consistency of the class axioms of abstraction and extensionality and the axioms of NBG in a

three-valued logic, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 13, pp. 161-176.
[6] Kripke, S. A., 1975, "An outline of a theory of truth", *Journal of Philosophy* 72, pp. 690-716.
[9] R. Routley, 1977, "Ultralogic as Universal?", *Relevance Logic Newsletter* 2, pp. 50-89 and pp. 138-175, and in: *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, 1980, Canberra: Australian National University.

2. Routley, Richard, and Plumwood, Val. 1989. "Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 653-690. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"1. The paradoxes of deontic logic and the consistency and modal requirements
Especially since mid-century many systems of deontic logic have been advanced, which attempt to explore the logic of such deontic notions as obligation, permission and prohibition, right and wrong. Almost all these systems have been modal systems, which treat deontic notions as modal, i.e. as if strict or provable equivalents are intersubstitutable within them preserving truth(2). All such systems are mistaken in a quite fundamental way. For deontic functors such as obligation and prohibition are not modal functors, but are more highly intensional than modal functors, and so demand a greater degree of propositional discrimination than modal logics can provide.
The damage caused by the mistaken treatment of deontic notions as modal shows up in various ways, but we shall be primarily concerned with only one of these, the consistency requirements and the exclusion thereby of moral dilemmas. Another way in which the modal damage appears is through a series of related paradoxes, such as, directly, the paradoxes of derived obligation, and, less directly, the paradoxes of the Robber and the Good Samaritan.(3)" (p. 653)
(2) This was true even of Mally's pioneering system of 1926 which permitted replacement of logical equivalents within the scope of obligation function a (see F & H, p. 3). Von

Wright's seminal work (in 1951), which set the pattern for mainstream deontic logic, was explicitly based on the modal comparison of deontic functors with modal functors, and built modal assumptions in at the bottom of the theory. The exceptional systems, that break the modal connection, are deontic systems based on relevant logics; on such systems see RLR, chapter 8. (3) These paradoxes are explained, and their modal bases exposed, in 5. On the paradoxes of derived obligation, see further Prior 62, p. 224; and for some of the considerable literature on paradoxes like those of the Robber and Good Samaritan, see the Hilpinen anthologies and especially Vermazen. A detailed uniform treatment of all these and other deontic paradoxes in the framework of relevant logic is given in RLR II.

References

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Mally, E. *Grundgesetze des Sollens*. *Elemente der Logik des Willens*. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky.

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Vermazen B,. , 1977 , "The logic of practical 'ought'-sentences", *Philosophical Studies* 32, pp. 1-71.

von Wright, G. H., 1951, *An Essay in Modal Logic*, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

3. Routley, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1989. "Contradiction, Assertion and 'Frege's Point'." *Analysis* no. 49:23-26.

"The liar sentence ('This sentence is not true') is both true and not true. The Russell set ($\{x: x \notin x\}$) is both a member of itself and not a member of itself. These and many other contradictions we, the authors, are prepared to assert. Most people would disagree with us - and disagree fairly violently.

But there is a minority of people who would refrain from disagreeing on the ground that we have said nothing to disagree with. Though we may have uttered words, no statement is made by them. Explicit contradictions cannot be used to make a statement. This line, though hardly orthodox, has, of course, a distinguished pedigree. It was argued by Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ 3,' and since then has resurfaced from time to time in the cancellation view of negation. (See Routley and Routley [5].) Most recently, it has been advocated by Laurence Goldstein [2], who has produced a novel argument for it. The purpose of this note is to refute the argument. As we shall see, this is not difficult; the dis- cussion, however, raises some points of independent interest." (p. 23)
(...)
"In general, and normally, to assert a conditional is not to assert its consequent; in particular cases, however, it may be.(6) This is, we think, a main lesson of Goldstein's argument." (p. 26)
(6) Similarly for disjunctions. Normally, to assert $\alpha \vee \beta$ is not to assert α or β. But for certain instances of $\alpha \vee \beta$ (e.g. $\alpha \vee \alpha$) it may be.
References
[2] L. Goldstein, 'A Problem for the Dialetheist', *Bulletin of the Section of Logic*, Polish Academy of Sciences 15.1 (1986), 10-14.
[5] R. Routley and V. Routley, 'Negation and Contradiction', *Revista Columbiana de Mathematicas* 19 (1985), 201-31.

4. ———. 1989. "First Historical Introduction: A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 3-75. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"Although the notion of system was brought into prominence by Leibniz,(1) it is only in contemporary times that a clear conception of a formal or semantical system has developed. Thus recent definitions of paraconsistency(2) through such systems-in terms of systems which can tolerate some inconsistency without trivializing-are not

strictly or directly applicable in a historical quest. Evidence of paraconsistent approaches in earlier times has accordingly to be more circumstantial.
There are however several good indicators of paraconsistent approaches of one sort or another which can be reliably used. For example, admission, or insistence, that some statement is both true and false, in a context where not everything is accepted or some things are rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach-in fact of a dialethic approach. It involves not merely recognition of a non-trivial inconsistent theory, as with a (weaker) paraconsistent position, but the assumption that that is how things are, that, in effect, the world is inconsistent. A concession that both a statement, A say, and its negation, ~A, hold, works in a similar way, clearly revealing a strong paraconsistent approach. So does the concession that some statements A and ~A hold in a nontrivial theory or position, thereby revealing a weaker paraconsistent approach.
But often evidence is less direct. For instance, an author may not explicitly say that both A and ~A hold, or hold in a given theory, but what is said obviously implies that they do, and the author can be assumed to be aware that they do, or a case can be made that the author is aware of this. In such cases the approach is still explicitly paraconsistent. But an author may not be (clearly) apprised of what his or her position (obviously) implies, in which event the position will be either implicitly paraconsistent or else trivial, depending on the underlying logic adopted." (p. 3)
(1) According to Rescher, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, 1967, chapter 2. [See also Nicholas Rescher, "Leibniz and the Concept of a System", *Studia Leibnitiana*,13, 1981, pp. 114-122.]
(2) Such as are given in the Introduction to Part Two.

5. ———. 1989. "An Outline of the History of (Logical) Dialectic." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 76-98. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"7. Summary and prospects

It will be clear that dialectic, as befits a theory of development, has developed markedly over two and a half thousand years of philosophy. We have isolated two major phases: Classical Greek philosophy and Modem German philosophy. Although they are very different, one is the development of the other, and there is an important parallel between the phases. Both started off concentrating precisely on contradiction within the setting of (perplexing) arguments. Both then developed into a theory of development in which contradiction plays the central role. Finally, both went into a period of decline when the specific essence of dialectic, literal contradiction, was forgotten, and consequently dialectic became a subject of high generality but little content. All this we have documented.

Of course the evolution of dialectic will continue and we think that we are at the start of a new phase of growth, during which symbolic logic will play a fundamental role. It will again start with a concentration on contradiction itself within the framework of argument procedures, especially convincing arguments which lead to contradiction. To an extent this has already happened with the matter of logical paradoxes and of paraconsistent logic.

However it is also evident that a correct understanding of the history of dialectic is essential for further progress. To this end an analysis of the history of dialectic, and particularly Hegel's dialectic, using the techniques of modem logic is essential. From what has been said it is obvious that such an analysis will have to accommodate the notion of a true contradiction.

Thus paraconsistent logic will be essential here too.(94) This analysis has already started, but remains in its earliest stages.(95) Where the whole modem study will take us, we can only speculate." (p. 92)

(94) It follows that the few attempted formalizations that have appeared which use classical logic are doomed to failure. Some of these can be found in Marconi, 1977.

(95) See, for example, Routley and Meyer, 1976; da Costa and Wolf, 1980; Priest, 1982; and Pena, 1980.

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6. ———. 1989. "Systems of Paraconsistent Logic." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 151-186. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"Let $\vDash$ be a relation of logical consequence. $\vDash$ may be defined either semantically ($\Sigma \vDash A$ holds iff for some specified set of valuations, whenever all the formulas in Σ are true under an evaluation, so is A) or proof theoretically ($\Sigma \vDash A$ holds iff for some specified set of rules, there is a derivation of A, all of whose (undischarged) premisses are in Σ), or in some other way. $\vDash$ is explosive iff for all A and B, $\{A, \sim A\} \vDash B$. It is *paraconsistent* iff it is not explosive. A logic is *paraconsistent* iff its logical consequence relation is. If a logic is defined in terms of a set of theses it may have more than one associated consequence relation. For example, $\{A_1 \ldots A_n\} \vDash B$ iff $\vdash A_j \ldots \wedge A_n) \rightarrow B$ or $\vdash A_j \rightarrow (\ldots \rightarrow (A_n \rightarrow B) \ldots)$ or $A_1 \ldots A_n \vDash B$ (the last representing the theorem-preserving or weak inferential connection). In this case all its associated consequence relations should be paraconsistent.
Let Σ be a set of statements. Σ is *inconsistent* iff, for some A, $\{A, \sim A\} \subseteq \Sigma$.
Σ is *trivial* iff for all **B**, B ε Σ. The important fact about paraconsistent logics is that they provide the basis for inconsistent but non-trivial theories. In other words, there are sets of statements closed under logical consequence

which are inconsistent but non-trivial. This fact is sometimes taken as an alternative definition of 'paraconsistent' and, given that logical consequence is transitive, it is equivalent to the original definition. The proof is this: If Σ is an inconsistent but non-trivial theory then obviously the consequence relation is paraconsistent. Conversely, suppose that {A, ~A}≠ B. Let Σ be the transitive closure of {A, ~A} under logical consequence. Then Σ is inconsistent but B ∉ Σ. Because of the equivalence we also call any inconsistent but non-trivial theory *paraconsistent*, and derivatively, any position whose deductive closure provides a paraconsistent theory.
Why should one be interested in paraconsistent logics? Among the many reasons are proof theoretic and semantic ones." (p. 151)

7. ———. 1989. "Applications of Paraconsistent Logic." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 367-393. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"1. Introduction: the variety and types of applications
The most important application of paraconsistent logics is their application to possibly inconsistent theories. However one needs to interpret "theories" here fairly liberally, as any body of doctrine, statements, axioms etc. which can be thought of as inferentially closed. The theories can be historical, current, embryonic or merely entertained. Of course the formalization of such theories often requires much wider logical apparatus than the mere first order deductive logic discussed in the introduction to Part Two of the book. This may include probability, inductive logic, the logic of various modalities and other intentional notions such as belief, and so on. Such things, or at least some of them, have been considered by logicians. But, by and large, the logical theories produced have been tuned to classical or at least intuitionist logic. This is singularly inappropriate since as often as not, the material to which the logical apparatus is applied is inconsistent, as we shall see. Accordingly the ideas of paraconsistency need to be applied to the logical theories of modality, probability, etc.

themselves to produce adequate logical machinery. In this essay we will consider first some interesting inconsistent theories, some of them in some detail, and then move on to consider the remodelling of various logical theories. It should be stressed that the studies of many applications mentioned are in their infancy, and we can often do no more than make suggestions for the directions of future research." (p. 367)

8. ———. 1989. "The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency." In *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, edited by Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham and Norman, Jean, 483-539. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"Paraconsistency strikes at the root of principles which are fundamental to, and entrenched in, much philosophy. It is therefore bound to be philosophically problematic and to have important philosophical ramifications. In this introduction we will try to chart and analyse some of these issues. By its nature, this will require us to deal with a number of separate and not otherwise connected issues. However, we will start by looking at some important points raised by the arguments for paraconsistency in chapter V [*], section 1 above.
We will then go on to investigate some of the philosophical consequences of paraconsistency." (p. 483)
[*] *Systems of Paraconsistent Logic* by G. Priest and R. Routley.
9. Routley, Richard, Priest, Graham, and Norman, Jean. 1989. *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*. München: Philosophia.
Contents: Essays by Richard Routley: I. First Historical Introduction: A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches (with Graham Priest) 3-75; II. An Outline of the History of (Logical) Dialectic (with Graham Priest) 76-98; V. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic (with Graham Priest) 151-186; XIII. Applications of Paraconsistent Logic (with Graham Priest) 367-393; XV. The Non Triviality of Extensional Dialectical Set of Paraconsistency Theory (with Ross T. Brady) 415-436);

XVIII. The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency (with Graham Priest) 483-539; XXIII. Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions (with V. Plumwood) 653-690.
"This book had its conception in a bar in about 1978, though the exact date escapes our collective memory. We had both been working in the field of paraconsistent logic for some years and were aware the subject was gradually gaining momentum. Yet the movement was still a diffuse one. This was, and still is, for two reasons. First, though many people were involved, they were spread fairly thinly over the globe, and communication was not particularly good. Secondly, the major papers that had been published on the subject were published in a variety of journals, some of them fairly inaccessible. It seemed to us that a focal point for work in paraconsistency was necessary, and would be provided by a suitable book.
We could have published a collection of already published essays but decided against it. Instead we wrote to those whom we knew to be working in the area who in turn informed those whom they knew: the book comprises papers that were sent to us in response. (We obtained however more papers than we could use: a number of the others have been published in an issue of *Studia Logica* devoted to paraconsistency and edited by us. (1)
All the papers in this collection are published here for the first time and some of them are undoubtedly of the first importance for the future of the subject.
Researchers should also find the bibliography of paraconsistency helpful.
Paraconsistency will still be an unfamiliar and fairly esoteric topic to most people. We therefore decided to write a number of introductory essays on various aspects of paraconsistency, and these can be found at the beginning of each section of the book.(2)" (p. XIX)
(...)
"The word "paraconsistent" (meaning "beyond the consistent") was coined by Mira Quesada [*] to apply to the study of theories that are inconsistent but not trivial. In

working on this book, however, we found that another piece of terminology was desirable. This was to express the idea that some paraconsistent theories are true. After exhausting all the dictionaries at our disposal (including Greek, Russian and Gaelic), we decided that no extant word would express this idea. So we were forced to coin one. A true contradiction is a Janus-faced creature which faces both truth and falsity.
The word 'dialetheia' ("two-way truth") seemed a fairly appropriate way of expressing this idea. Correspondingly dialethism is the view that there are dialetheias, true contradictions. We use these terms (with a little embarrassment) throughout our essays.
As with the variant spelling of "dialeth(e)ic" and its cognates, so even more with variant notation and referencing, and more still with the spread of heterodox ideas, there is in this book no stifling uniformity." (p. XX)
(1) *Studia Logica*, volume 43, 1984.
(2) These introductory chapters first appeared in *On Paraconsistency*, Research Papers of the Logic Group, No. 13, Philosophy Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. A few changes have been made due to comments by Newton da Costa, Charles Daniels and Lorenzo Perra, to whom we are grateful.
[*] in a letter to Newton da Costa, Lima, September 29, 1975 (Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre, "A name for the logics of inconsistent systems. Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias (1918-2019)" *South American Journal of Logic*, 6, 2020, pp. 3-9 (note added by Raul Corazzon)

10. Sylvan, Richard. 1989. "Relational semantics for all Lewis, Lemmon and Feys' modal logics, most notably for systems between S0.3° and S1." *Journal of Non-Classical Logic*:19-40.
A main object of the present exercise is to provide relational semantics for weak strict modal logics strictly between S0.5 and S2, relational semantics for other systems of the great system pioneers being textbook stuff. A relational semantics evaluates modal functors in terms of a (two-place) relation

between situations or worlds: not, as in the much less revealing "neighbourhood" semantics, in terms of a relations between worlds and sets of worlds (thus relational semantics are in a sense "first order", by contrast with such neighbourhood semantics). The relational semantics for S1 and S1", in particular, are markedly superior to earlier neighbourhood semantics; they fit the systems better, and are more informative and they directly supply interpretable matrices for the logics and attractive algebraic analyses. With the provision of these semantics, furthermore, the supplying of such relational semantics for all the modal sentential logics presented and studied by the great pioneers, Lewis, Lemmon and Feys, is completed(2).
(2) Of course Lewis, Feys and Lemmon were by no means the only important pioneers of modal systems - von Wright and Prior were among others - or always the earliest. Leibniz is now said, in Germany, to have outlined system S2, and MacColl, whose modal systematisation remains neglected, delineated a system in the vicinity of S2. But the cited pioneers did much systematisation and taxonomy of systems; to them primarily we owe present main galaxy of modal systems.

11. ———. 1989. "Philosophical and Linguistic Inroads: Multiply Intensional Relevant Logics." In *Directions in Relevant Logic*, edited by Sylvan, Richard and Norman, Jean, 269-304. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Many English sentences contain not just one intensional connective but several.
Philosophical discourse and argument contain a particularly high concentration of intensional connectives, indeed of ultramodal connectives, those beyond the reach of modal logics. For it is not just that the fundamental argument relations of deducibility, implication and conditionality are intensional, indeed themselves ultramodal. So furthermore are central topics of philosophical investigation, such as: knowledge and belief; evidence, confirmation, and explanation; pastness and futurity, and the notions of tense, change and action; value, right and obligation; to begin with a listing. They are one and all intensional, and generally

more highly intensional than the modal notions of possibility, necessity and contingency, or of provability and classical probability. The upshot is that any logical theory fit to pass initial adequacy conditions for the formalisation of associated discourse - and especially of philosophical arguments - will have to consider intensional connectives, indeed highly intensional connectives, and not just one at a time, but multiply. But virtually all previous theories fail to accommodate ultramodal notions. This is enough to motivate the present enterprise, that of adding many further, appropriately controlled, connectives to the implicational systems so far studied in relevant logic investigations (e.g. in the studies surveyed in RLR). Not too surprisingly, however, the further connectives singled out for special study are those that have attracted much philosophical discussion and have, for the most part, already been investigated, much less than satisfactorily, in applications of modal logic." (p. 269)

References

RLR = Routley, R., Plumwood, V., Meyer, R. K. and Brady, R. 1982, *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I*, Ridgeview, Atascadero, Ca.

12. ———. 1989. "Semantics unlimited I: A Synthesis of Relevant Implication and Entailment with Non-Transmissable Functions Such as Belief, Assertion and Perception." In *Directions in Relevant Logic*, edited by Sylvan, Richard and Norman, Jean, 327-376. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"The thesis that philosophy is the logical syntax and semantics of language, that, more comprehensively, the task of philosophy is semiotical analysis, though sponsored especially by Carnap, was adopted by Russell before him and Montague and many others after him. The thesis foundered, so it came to be thought, like "Montague semantics" and "illocutionary logic" after it, on various immovable rocks, a major one being the inadequacy of the semantical framework in terms of which the thesis was to be made good, an inadequacy which left it unable to

accommodate and account for much intensional discourse. A chief deficiency
of the framework was, in fact, the restriction to the possible - to possible worlds and possible individuals, in short to possible items, worlds being a sort of item. An important by-product of general semantics for relevant logics is that they have shown how to remove, in a nontrivial way, the restriction to possible worlds (and thereby too that the restriction to possible individuals can be lifted and with it associated restrictions militating against incomplete, vague, and other supposedly recalcitrant items: see JB p.348ff.). We can move out of the modal dark ages." (p. 328)

References

JB = Routley, R. 1979, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.

13. ———. 1989. "Conclusion: Further Directions in Relevant Logics." In *Directions in Relevant Logic*, edited by Sylvan, Richard and Norman, Jean, 399-437. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"There is a great deal to be done, as always. For one thing, research papers commonly open at least as many questions as they resolve. Moreover, as has always been the way with minority research interests, there are few doing the work, especially compared with the numbers defending or propagating dominant "classical" logic and its complex epicycling.
Early in its rise to ascendency classical theory encountered a heavy variety of paradoxes and anomalies quite sufficient to have grounded it, had workable alternatives been available. There were none with comparable scope. Alternatives have been slow to emerge, dominant positions blinkering discernment of rivals; these alternatives are still few, and none yet has wide appeal. Meanwhile classical theory has been able to fortify its position, to assemble a ring of defences, to pretend, for example, that the paradoxes and anomalies that come with it are inevitable or facts of life. Now with the advent of the two-valued Boolean computer age, it appears that limited skirmishes have been decisively won for the time being by the classical hordes, with the fair

and the true roundly defeated by the tough and the crude. All of which is bad news for all subjects, like philosophy, involving reasoning, where two-valued classical logic has done much more harm than good.(1)" (p. 399)
(1) The points are documented in several places; see especially UU, or JB p. 898 ff.; also RLR.
From this angle, the various schools who have refused the enticements of classical logic and tried to persist with an expanded traditional logic (e.g. J. Anderson and the Sydney school) were not entirely wrong. But in avoiding propositional logic, for example, except as distorted through dubious reductions, they gave themselves a severe handicap.
References
JB = Routley, R. 1979, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.
RLR = Routley, R., Plumwood, V., Meyer, R. K. and Brady, R. 1982, *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I,* Ridgeview, Atascadero, Ca.
UU = Routley, R. 1977, "Ultralogic as universal?", Newsletter 2, "Ultralogic as Relevance Logic 50-90 and 138-175; reprinted in JB.

14. ———. 1989. *Bystander's Guide to Sociative Logics: A short interim edition*. Canberra: Department of Philosophy. Research School of Social Sciences. Australian National University.
"In a *sociative* logic, premisses and conclusion of an argument, or correspondingly antecedents and consequent of a valid implication, are associated; they characteristically have enough to do with one another. To that extent any such logic is broadly relevant. But what have become known as relevant logics, the best known of which are the relevance logics largely forged in dirty Pittsburgh, comprise only a quite proper subclass of the broader class of sociative logics, many kinds of which have a much longer and more substantial history than relevant logics. If the story elaborated in this guide is correct early sociative logics did not arise in reaction to noxious irrelevant products; these logics were the original logics. The oversimplification and

excessive power of irrelevant systematisation only came later; and then especially in the later middle ages and contemporary times when such systematisation came to dominate, there was a due, though substantially ineffectual, reaction against it.
What the later sociative logics that developed in reaction have in common is primarily the aim to avoid the most obvious paradoxes of dominant logical theorising. The plurality of logical theories and sketches that now make up sociative logics share little else however. There is no common commitment, for instance, to supply an account of entailment, or a theory of relevance, or a technical story of the use of premisses in argument, though there are bound to be commitments to some more central logical enterprises or other, such as elaboration of a theory of argument or inference, an account of reasoning, explication of conditionals, and so on.
What these different commitments were and are, and ought to be, will begin to unfold as the story proceeds." (Preface, p. II)

15. ———. 1989. "Uniform Relational Logics for all Lewis, Lemmon and Feys Modal Logics - With More on the Virtues of Weakness and Nonnormality." *Journal of Non-classical Logic* no. 6:19-40.
16. Sylvan, Richard, Goddard, Lenn, and Da Costa, N. C. A. 1989. "Reason, Cause, and Relevant Containment with an Application to Frame Problems." *Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics* no. 3:81 pages.
17. Sylvan, Richard, and Norman, Jean. 1989. "Introduction: Routes in Relevant Logic." In *Directions in Relevant Logic*, edited by Sylvan, Richard and Norman, Jean, 1-24. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"In relevant logic, a main revolutionary force in contemporary logical unrest, there are many extremely interesting directions to take. The essays included here indicate some significant and exciting directions, and give out widely conflicting opinions and advice on progress and directions - including such advice as: avoid these dangerous paths and byways, and get back on safe and established

highways! This introduction and the conclusion, which ignore such well-meaning advice, try to give a wider impression of directions and unmapped regions (the survey is further extended and given historical dimension in the companion
volume BG)." (p. 1)
References
BG = Sylvan, R. 1988, *A Bystanders' Guide To Sociative Logics*, typescript, Canberra.

18. ———, eds. 1989. *Directions in Relevant Logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Chapter by Richard Sylvan: Preface (with Jean Norman) VII-VIII; Introduction: Routes in Relevant Logic 1-21; Chapter 19: Philosophical and Linguistic Inroads: Multiply Intensional Relevant Logics 269-304: Chapter 22: Semantics Unlimited I: A Relevant Synthcsis of Implication with Higher Intensionality 327-376; Chapter 24: Conclusion: Further Directions in Relevant Logics 399-437.
"Relevance logics came of age with the one and only International Conference on relevant logics in 1974.
(..)
We thought that the collection of essays was still (even after more than six years in the publishing trade limbo) well worth publishing, that the subject would remain undeservedly esoteric in North America while work on it could not find publishers (it is not so esoteric in academic circles in Continental Europe, Latin America and the Antipodes) and, quite important, that we could get the collection published, and furthermore, by resorting to local means, published comparatively cheaply. It is indeed no ordinary collection. It contains work by pioneers of the main types of broadly relevant systems, and by several of the most innovative non-classical logicians of the present flourishing logical period.
We have slowly re-edited and reorganised the collection and made it camera-ready.
While we have retained all the completed essays from the Conference sent to us with the exception of essays that have, in the interval, been published elsewhere, we have not

limited ourselves to these essays but have, so far as space permitted, invited newer essays. As well we have included overviews, which provide introductions to current directions of research on broadly relevant logics and to many general problems in the area." (Preface, P. VII)

19. Sylvan, Richard, and Urbas, Igor. 1989. "Factorisation Logics." *Research series in Logic and Metaphysics* no. 5:50 pages.
20. ———. 1989. "Prospects for Decent Relevant Factorization Logics." *Journal of Non-classical Logic* no. 6:63-79.
21. Sylvan, Richard. 1990. "On Making a Coherence Theory of Truth True." *Philosophica (Belgium)*:77-105.
"In the last half century the coherence theory of truth has largely fallen into disuse and disrepute. While there is now some flirting with coherence approaches, as each approved version of the majority position, the correspondence theory, duly founders, and holism gains in fashionability, still coherence has but few committed friends. Granted, it has had friends of a sort: most notably Rescher, who has made significant contributions, on which others may profitably build. But Rescher, while advocating what he calls a 'coherence theory' has twisted the theory into what it is not, a modified "self-evidence" theory, and has also warped it into a methodological pragmatism that would have made straight old-timers like Bradley and Blanshard blanch. As well the major virtues of the theory - if only it could be got to work, which unfortunately it can't - have been appreciated by isolated explorers of the wide truth terrain, such as Blackburn (see esp. his pp. 237-8). The present exercise supplies one way of enabling the theory to work, without undue warping. That way does not pretend to be an authentic historical way, only an historically controlled and informed way. For the primary purpose here is not historical explication; it lies rather in the development of coherence theory *beyond* its previous and varied historical settings, to render it somewhat more adequate and more coherent, and to begin to display some of its further virtues." (p. 77, notes omitted)
References

S. Blackburn, *Spreading the Word*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1984.
B. Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, London, 1939.
F.H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914.
N. Rescher, *The Coherence Theory of Truth*, University Press of America, Washington, 1973.

22. ———. 1990. "Variations on da Costa *C* Systems and Dual-Intuitionistic Logics: I. Analyses of C_w and CC_w." *Studia Logica* no. 49:47-65.
Abstract: "Da Costa's *C* systems are surveyed and motivated, and significant failings of the systems are indicated. Variations are then made on these systems in an attempt to surmount their defects and limitations. The main system to emerge from this effort, system *CCω*), is investigated in some detail, and "dual-intuitionistic" semantical analyses are developed for it and surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted for the original *C* systems, first in a rather unilluminating relational fashion, subsequently in a more illuminating way through the introduction of impossible situations where and and or change roles. Finally other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded *C* systems, by going inside them, are looked at, and further research directions suggested."
23. ———. 1990. "Relevant Conditionals: Integrating Semantics for One and Two Place Theories and Elaborating the Theories (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 55.
24. Sylvan, Richard, Fuhrmann, André, and Los, J. 1990. "Assertion and Commitment and Conditional Obligation." *Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics*:60 pages.
25. Sylvan, Richard. 1991. "Existence II: Existence and Nonexistence." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 261-263. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
"While the topic of existence ought to be a central concern of philosophy, the fundamental notion of ontology, the notion in fact remains remarkably underinvestigated because of certain ancient prejudices, such as referential assumptions embedded deep in mainstream philosophy. Most important among these is the ontological assumption,

according to which whatever is a (logical) subject, whatever is genuinely talked about, exists. (The assumption appears in various different guises, e.g. as narrowed to what is truly talked about, and also in derived forms, e.g. as restricted to quantifiable talk, a form sloganized as 'to exist is to admit of construal as a value of a bound variable' and the like.) Accordingly, then, discourse that is apparently about what does not exist must be reduced, in one way or another, to proper (logical) form, namely that conforming to the above assumption.

The mainstream result is a grand (but misguided) reduction programme for many types of problematic language, especially that about fictions, i.e. fictional items generally, and that about universals, abstractions, and theoretical items. The so-called 'riddle of existence' (or 'Plato's beard') derives from the same assumption. The puzzle is: how is it possible to make true statements, such as 'Pegasus does not exist', about the nonexistent, since the statement yields both that the subject (Pegasus in the example) exists, by the assumption, and that it does not, because that statement is true? The received resolution involves both an analysis, or removal of 'Pegasus' from the class of genuine names and logical subjects, and circumscription of the 'predicate' 'exists' (and of course its associated negation) under the dogma that existence is not a predicate.

Under the alternative object-theory approach, still a minor philosophical stream but one systematizing much traditional philosophical and everyday practice, all this analytic and reductive activity is avoided. For example, 'Pegasus does not exist' is admitted to be what it appears to be, a grammatically satisfactory subject-predicate statement, without existential commitment; it is a statement about (or signifying) a non-existent object, Pegasus, and ascribing to it the property of non-existence. So existence, too, is a predicate, indeed a rather distinguished one, of which it would be reasonable to expect some suitable philosophical characterization. Neither it nor non-existence is especially puzzling, or beyond characterization and

therefore discussion; nor is it without criteria because it is not a feature of everything nor is it distributed everywhere.
(...)
The assumption-undermining object-theory alternative does not carry any commitment to traditional doctrines concerning essence, long entangled (in priority and other disputes) with questions of existence. For characterization is a wider, less loaded notion than essence. Characterizations may be fuzzy, not tied to necessary and sufficient conditions but to looser specifications; they themselves are further non-existent items. Nor do they 'precede' existence, though elements of them are needed in order to ascertain whether something exists or not.
(...)
Although defining existence is a controversial affair, the notion is not entirely uncontrolled; there are fairly uncontroversial) bounds. It is generally taken that such material things as sticks and stones, which can hurt, do exist, but that mere names, as distinct from sounds and marks on surfaces, do not; nor do impossible objects or the characters of pure fiction or imagination or speculation. But in between are extensive controversial areas. As policy in arriving at an account of existence we could do worse than to heed Ockham's razor, not to multiply what exists beyond necessity, which translates into: begin with those items which obviously exist, not-controversially, such as medium-size material objects, and close under enlargements produced by unavoidable extensions thereof, such as compounding or summation and dissection or analysis. But exclude unnecessary items, such as illusions, imaginary items, dream characters, and unnecessary operations, such as abstraction, idealization, fictional variation, and so forth. The route to an appropriately minimalist definition of existence is now evident. An item exists if it stands in suitable physical relations to the paradigm existents. (Such a definition is refined and synthesized with other accounts of existence in Routley 1980, Chapter 9.)" (pp. 261-263)

26. ———. 1991. "Nature, Ontology of." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 599-602. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
27. ———. 1991. "Relativism." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 783-785. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
28. ———. 1991. "Relevant Logics." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 787-789. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
"Relevant logics are both philosophically and mathematically motivated: but in both cases, a prime objective is to avoid paradoxes or incoherence, of one sort or another, a feat accomplished through restored or improved connections, especially relevant connection in implicational and inferential linkages. Relevant implications, the focus of most research, are those whose components (A and B in implication A → B) are relevant to one another, i.e. have enough to do with one another. Broadly relevant, or sociative logics assert none but relevant implications; all implicational theses of such logics are relevant implications. Under a technical explication (of weak relevance), relevant implications and logics are explained in the following way: a logic or logical system is relevant if its propositional part contains no theorems of the form A→ B where A and B fail to share a parameter. So any system which includes or validates paradoxes of implication - such as that contradictions imply everything and anything implies what is necessary (e.g. in standard symbols of the literature):
A & ~ A → B, B →. C. v ~ C. A &~ A →. C & ~ C, etc.
is irrelevant. Mainstream logics, such as classical and intuitionistic systems, are irrelevant.
(...)
"All these types of sociative logics have historical roots, most reaching back at least to medieval times. For example, semantical reasons for the serious qualification of Disjunctive Syllogism were anticipated in the 15th century by the Cologne School and Domingo de Soto; for they realized that where both A and ~ A hold (as in non-trivial inconsistent theories and many kinds of intensional

situations), A does not exclude ~A, A's negation, so B's holding is in no way guaranteed. Generally, however, the historical connections were rediscovered later, after contemporary investigations had begun. In particular, technical studies of the best known of these sociative types, relevant logics proper, were well advanced before it was realized that some of the ideas (e.g. that relevant implication explicated genuine deducibility) were not quite so new, and that popular arguments against the theory appealing to the logical tradition could be matched by rival traditional arguments from dissenting schools. But certain recently neglected features of logical tradition - notably the requirements of preservation of relevance and necessity in an implication - were early seized upon by Anderson and Belnap (1975), who made these requirements central to their elaboration of entailment, as encapsulated in the system *E* (of 'entailment'). To them we owe both the title 'relevance logic' and the main systems of relevance logics, a subclass of properly relevant logics in the vicinity of *E*, a system itself adapted from the (theorem-wise equivalent) system of 'rigorous implication' of W. Ackermann (1896-1962), who really initiated contemporary technical studies in 1956." (pp. 787-788)

References

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29. ———. 1991. "Sistology." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 837-840. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
30. ———. 1991. "On Interpreting Truth Tables and Relevant Truth Table Logic (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 56:381.
31. ———. 1991. "On the Foundations of Process Theory (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 56:113.
32. Sylvan, Richard, and Nola, Robert. 1991. "Much Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 56:381-382.

33. ———. 1991. "Paraconsistent Classical Logic (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 56:382.
34. ———. 1991. "Confirmation Without Paradoxes." In *Advances in Scientific Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of His Birthday*, edited by Schurz, Gerhard and Dorn, Georg J. W., 5-44. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Our modest aim is to show how, within a suitable relevant logical framework, all the paradoxes of confirmation vanish - not merely those Hempel and Carnap adduced, but those uncovered by Good, Goodman. Glymour, and others. But, naturally, even removing these paradoxes wholesale still leaves much logical work to be done, work we shall not try to complete here. What we shall indicate however, in the final section, is convergent work undertaken independently by Paul Weingartner and collaborators, which resolves paradoxes in an analogous fashion." (p. 5)

(...)

"To arrive at relevant logic and accompanying semantics of confirmation, we shall try to proceed from what is more secure (such as intersubstitutivity principles) to what is less (such as converse consequence conditions discussed by Hempel). In brief, we build up from weakness (as was the main Taoist-Cartesian methodological stratagem of RLR) rather than adopting the more difficult, if theorem wise intertwining, classical procedure of cutting down from damaging strength. The goal is, of course, a relevant logical theory free from paradoxes. Nonetheless, a subsidiary aim is to achieve substantially a *logical* theory, to accomplish as much as we reasonably can with logic alone, without undue appeal to outside distinctions or information (which may however enter in applications): in particular, without undue appeal to types of samples, or classes of conditionals or hypotheses, or "theoretically barren contexts" with no illicit background information, or "total available information.". (p. 6)

References

Routley, R., and Others (1982), *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals*, California: Ridgeview, referred to as RLR.

35. Sylvan, Richard. 1992. "On Interpreting Truth Tables and Relevant Truth Table Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 33:207-215.
Abstract: "Contrary to common mythology, the two-valued truth tables do not yield classical logic. *Many* contestable assumptions are required to reach classical logic. Indeed *some* assumptions are required to get anywhere logically. In between, and in other directions, lie several other logics. For, even logically, there are many ways in which the truth tables can themselves be interpreted.
In particular, they can be variously read inferentially, in one direction or two, or they may be variously read semantically. Along inferential lines, Tennant's one-way reading is reconsidered. It is argued that the tables
do not lead to the logics Tennant claims to reach but can lead to various other decidedly weak logics. Along more orthodox semantical lines, it is shown how the truth tables themselves do not exclude nonclassical situations but can allow for incomplete and inconsistent set-ups. So considered, they provide the framework for a four-valued relevant logic. A four-valued implication is grafted onto this framework, simply by generalising upon two-valued material implication artifice, to deliver the familiar system *FDE* of tautological entailment. Finally, for comparison, a less contrived semantics than pure truth tabular, a semantics due to Dunn, which now admits of ready higher degree extension, is supplied for *FDE*."
FDE = First Degree Entailment
References
Dunn, J. M., "Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and 'coupled trees'," *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 29 (1976), pp. 149-168.
Tennant, N., "Truth table logic," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. 30 (1989), pp. 459-484.
36. ———. 1992. "Significant Moments in the Development of Australian Logic: in Critical Appreciation of Leonard Goddard's Major Contribution." *Logique et Analyse* no. 45:5-44.

"Len Goddard not only initiated wider logical research in Australia, but further he had a major influence on the character and ethos of that investigation; for example, its easy, free-wheeling, unauthoritarian, undogmatic character. He encouraged features of what would now be regarded as logical pluralism of a relaxed and far-reaching kind. Not only were there many logical systems and frameworks worth investigating, some of course of more philosophical or technical merit than others; but more, he freely conceded that there may not be a unique correct one, or absolutely right way, among them. Nor, by contrast with common practice elsewhere, did he discourage heterodox logical work, even such unorthodox thought as that prevailing classical ways might be seriously defective, even downright wrong. To the contrary, he early thought that satisfactory resolutions of a range of paradoxes and puzzles should be sought outside entrenched ways; but he did not try to impose his own ideas or interests. In his own research at the time, which was (rather un-Australianly) nonconfrontational, he was certainly looking for resolutions of logical and semantical paradoxes outside formal classical logic -though by way of what had long stood at the peripheries of British logical investigations (from Mill through Russell and Ryle), namely significance theory and its contextual enlargements. More generally, there was no attempt, with Goddard as guide and director, to pull or push researchers into some standard line; on the contrary, they were encouraged to roam." (pp. 6-7)

37. ———. 1992. "Process and Action: Relevant Theory and Logics." *Studia Logica* no. 51:379-437.
Abstract: "While *process* and *action* are fundamental notions, in ubiquitous use, they lack satisfactory logical treatment in two critical respects: in analyses of the fundamentals themselves and in logical development. For what treatment they have so far received, under classical systematisation, leaves significant lacunae and induces much paradox. A relevant logical relocation, carried through in detail here, removes such problems, and provides solid ground-work for a satisfactory treatment.

Firstly, as to fundamentals: processes should be explicated, so it is argued, as certain sorts of (time) directed functions (from inputs to outputs); thus they can be represented through certain ordered pairs of relations. Significant logical structures they can enter into axe investigated: notably, process lattice and coupled logics, and a generalized category theory (tolerating nonassociativity of composition). Actions are types of processes, agent-ascribed process. As stock analyses of the differentia, operators and agency, through intentionality, rationality and so on, demonstrably fail, new causal analyses are proposed.
Secondly, as to logical developments: for the most part, the apparently diverse offering of process and action logics to be encountered in the literature are but multiple modal logics: modal logics enriched with further functors of interesting modal sorts. Some, for example, like advertised "process logics" are dynamic logics (themselves basically multiple modal logics) enriched by tense logical functors, themselves modal in character. In a way that is now becoming nonstandardly standard, these modal enterprises can be reworked on relevant logical bases. A main point to such exercises resembles that of other relevant reworklngs: namely, the search for correctness, for adequacy to pre-analytic and linguistic data, and therewith removal of paradoxes and anomalies that accumulate under modal analyses.
Logical components from a properly expanded Humean model of action are supplied with relevant logics and semantics, in particular doing, trying and striving, intention and motivation. The difficult question of formalising practical inference is then addressed.
Relevant dynamic logics, paralleling modal developments, are built up piece by piece, relevant theory change is considered within a dynamic framework, and work on relevant temporal and process logics of programming cast, including functors such as before, during and throughout, is initiated. The present state of logical play is assessed."

38. ———. 1992. "Grim Tales Retold: How to Maintain Ordinary Discourse About - and Despite - Logical Embarrassing

Notions and Totalities." *Logique et Analyse* no. 35:349-374.

39. ———. 1992. "Blending Semantics for IF as a One-Place Assertive With Semantics for the Conditional." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 21:67-71.
"According to the interesting theory of Miguel de Castro [2], the word `if' is not - what conventional logical theory sees it as - a two-place connective coupling a pair of sentences (e.g. even mildy deviant logicians like Belnap and Anderson take this line; see [1], p. 481). It is rather - what it often seems to be { a one-place functor, like its near relative *suppose* and like *would that, one wonders whether,* and many *wh*-expressions. Let us restrict consideration to the one-place *connective*, i.e. where *if* is sentence forming, so that, like ~ (for *not*), where *A* is a sentence so is *if A*.
Under the one-place theory, the conventional form *if A (then) B*, symbolized *A* > *B*, plainly derives by compounding, through the two-place connective, ;,or *,then*. To make reading more straightforward, we shall assume then insertion (as argued for, in a distinguishing role, in [4] chapter). The formation rule for *,then i*s accordingly: where *A* and *B* are sentences (or wff) then so is *A,* then *B*. Thus *A* > *B* admits of syntactical analysis as: (if *A*), then *B*.
What is demonstrated here is that this analysis can be extended smoothly to the semantical theory." (p. 67)
References
[1] A.R. Anderson and N.D. Belnap Jr., *Entailment,* Volume 1, Princeton University Press, 1975.
[2] M. de Castro, *if-Strings in English: a new syntactic and semantic analysis*, Doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 1990.

40. Sylvan, Richard, and Priest, Graham. 1992. "Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logic." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 21:217-232.
"When Anderson and Belnap pioneered relevant logic, they proposed a number of systems (*E, R*, etc.) in proofs theoretic form. When suitable world-semantics for these systems were produced, it became clear that these systems were but the tip of an iceberg.

Moreover, in the light of the semantics, it became clear that the basic (affixing) logic was none of those that Anderson and Belndp had suggested, but the system now called *B* (or *BM* if we drop all constraints
on *). This had the most general semantics: other (affixing) systems being obtained by adding extra conditions on the ternary relation, *R*." (p. 217)
(...)
"In the first part of the paper we will consider the basic positive logic, B^+. In the second half we will consider negation-extensions of B^+. There are two strategies for handling negation in relevant logic: one uses the Routley *-operation; the other uses four-valued semantics (Routley *et al., loc. cit.*). We consider both approaches. The extant four-valued semantics for relevant logics contain a complication over and above constraints on R: they require two ternary relations (one to state truth conditions; the other to state falsity conditions). A feature of the present semantics is that only a single ternary relation is needed. Thus, the four-valued semantics are doubly simplified. Moreover, an interesting divergence emerges here. All negative systems add De Morgan laws to B^+. The basic negative system with the Routley * adds, in addition, contraposition; that for the four-valued semantics adds, instead, double negation. (*B* itself, adds both.)
We concentrate in this paper on the semantics of the basic affixing relevant systems. It is clear that simplified semantics for all (affixing) relevant logics, along the lines given here, are to be expected. But since details are not as straightforward as might be expected, we leave this topic for another occasion." (pp. 217-218)

41. Sylvan, Richard, and Hyde, Dominic. 1993. "Ubiquitous Vagueness Without Embarrassment: Logic Liberated and Fuzziness Defuzzed(i.e. Respectibilized)." *Acta Analytica*:7-29.
Abstract: "Although puzzles surrounding vagueness are ancient, they have been much intensified since the rise of standard "classical" logic. A main trouble is that standard

logic proceeds to "validate" both ancient defective arguments (sorites paradoxes) and modern defective arguments (modal paradox analogues). But much evidence has recently accumulated as to the severe philosophical inadequacy of standard logic. Plausibly then ways out of such logic-induced puzzles which work elsewhere, relevant ways which work well, will succeed with puzzles of vagueness also. So it proves, by letting the puzzles constrain the logic, so producing their own demise, we reach elegant logical resolutions with the "very" logics adopted elsewhere for removing other logic-induced problems."

42. Sylvan, Richard, and Urbas, Igor. 1993. "Paraconsistent Classical Logic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 36:3-24.
Abstract: "The objective is to reformulate classical (prepositional) logic, preserving all theses, so that the spread rule A, ~ A / B, is avoided. There are many ways of doing this - some less, some more satisfactory, all exact formulations no doubt an improvement on standard classical logic. So results a cluster of paraconsistent classical logics. These systems are surveyed and rudimentarily classified, several of them separated, and some exhibited and discussed in more detail. Among the pure systems of the cluster are Hiz' s logic *H*, a Hilbert-style reformulation of Arruda-da Costa logic J_3, a cut-free formulation of Schütte's system K_1 and various normal-forming logics. Some of these pure systems fit Brasilian and Belgian criteria for paraconsistency very neatly, and significantly better than any Brasilian or Belgian systems."
43. Sylvan, Richard, and Nola, Robert. 1994. "The Irrelevance of Grue." *Explorations in Knowledge* no. 11:1-11.
44. Sylvan, Richard. 1995. "Re-Exploring Item-Theory. Object-Theory Liberalized, Pluralized and Simplified but Comprehensivized." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:47-85.
Reprinted in R. Routley (Author), M. Eckert (ed.), *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 1 with Supplementary Essays*, (2018), pp. 546-561.

Abstract: "Re-explored are certain item-theory theses, major problem zones, and newer puzzles and, together therewith, prospects for liberalizing and pluralizing item-theory. Undoubtedly item-theory may be further liberalized, partly by further dissociation from object-theory and the restrictions *object* imposes, but primarily through substantial deregulation of the styles of characterisations permitted. Then almost anything goes; nonetheless what results is a sufficiently well-organised smooth-running sistological anarchism.
Characterisation is dispersed through a federation of regions: only in old central city regions do the characterisation postulates of older object-theory regularly hold; in the expanding suburbs characterisation by local assumption and postulation (as in neutral postulate-theory) is a distinctive mode, while out in the country implicit intentional characterisation (including ostension and perception, dreaming and imagining) is a common mode. Put differently, there is a rich variety of sources yielding item specifications; only in places like the old city do structural descriptions of items enjoy formerly-imagined priority, but elsewhere alternative characterization principles may operate.
However what holds in situations as a result of such local or regional characterisation may be far removed from what is actual. Characters may be only make-believe or suppositional presented character may differ from more genuine articles, and so on. Bringing the items involved into central evaluation markets, where truth value is assessed, may require preparation of the items, with pruning or regularisation of their properties. Here, at this semantical stage, full pluralization offers further freedom, that is pluralization of truth, with a plurality of actual worlds. A single assignment of truth, *the* truth at the actual world, is no longer *de rigueur*; a truth net may be differently cast, different assignments may be adopted, and a selection among alternatives perhaps made. Within this liberalized pluralized setting, resolutions of puzzles induced by certain problem-making items are ventured."

45. ———. 1995. "Freedom Without Determinism: Decent Logics of Relevance and Necessity Applied to Problems of Free Will." *Acta Analytica*:7-32.
Abstract: "Arguments for determinism do not enjoy the sound logical health that has been attributed to them. The main older argument is fallacious, indeed classically invalid, while a new "rectified" form is relevantly invalid (relying on modally covered form of disjunctive syllogism). What is more, there is no satisfactory way of repairing this form of argument so that it does yield a credible determinism. Other arguments for (non-vacuous) determinism are also dispatched, through a divide-and-dissolve technique, which operates by distinguishing types of determinism (such as logical determinism, which depends on another modal fallacy) and kinds of arguments for determinism (such as rational choice arguments, which inadmissibly assume maximization, and reductionistic arguments, which inadmissibly assume full reduction of choice and deliberation succeeds). In the largest of three appendices (the other two concern logical developments), a reasonable libertarianism is discerned and defended."
46. Sylvan, Richard, and Goddard, Lenn. 1995. "Relevance and Reasoning. Part I: Relevance in Discourse and logic." *Dialogue and Universalism* no. 5:37-63.
47. Sylvan, Richard. 1996. "Meinong." In *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, edited by Mautner, Thomas, 261-263. Cambridge: Blackwell.
48. ———. 1996. "Paraconsistent Logic." In *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, edited by Mautner, Thomas, 309. Cambridge: Blackwell.
49. ———. 1996. "Relevance." In *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, edited by Mautner, Thomas, 364. Cambridge: Blackwell.
50. ———. 1996. "Relevant Logic." In *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, edited by Mautner, Thomas, 364-365. Cambridge: Blackwell.
51. ———. 1996. "What Limits to Thought, Inquiry and Philosophy?" *Manuscrito*.

52. ———. 1996. "Other Withered Stumps to Time." In *Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior*, edited by Copeland, Jack, 111-130. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
53. Sylvan, Richard, and Copeland, Jack. 1996. "Heresies of Computability (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 61:20.
54. ———. 1996. "General Annotated Logics, With an Introduction to Full Accounting Logic (Abstract)." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 61.
55. Sylvan, Richard. 1997. *Transcendental Metaphysics: From Radical to Deep Plurallism [sic]*. Cambridge: The White Horse Press.
From the Note by Nicholas Griffin:
"When Richard Sylvan died in June 1996 the manuscript of this book was already complete. It is true, to take up one of the themes put forward in its pages, that `complete' in this context is not an absolute term: while one typescript was with his publisher at the time of his death, another, bearing further revisions, was with his typist. The changes he made at this time, however, were minor and only the bibliography and references have required much attention from me." (p. XIV)
Contents:
Prologue: Complaints and Acknowledgements XI; Note by Nicholas Griffin XIV; General description and synopsis XV;
I. Basic theory
1. Introducing and placing Full and Deep Plurallisms 3; 2. Explaining full metaphysical Plurallisms: their features, their differences 18;
II. Arguments
3. Paths and arguments leading to Deep Plurallism: *Vias Negationis* 39; 4. More arguments to Deep Plurallism: *Via Positivas* 61; 5. Still more positive arguments to Plurallism 93;
III. Theory elaborations
6. Worlds and Wholes: their natures and relevant features 141; 7. Talking and thinking Plurallese as well as more ordinarily: modellings and discourse for and under Plurallism 175; 8. Making a wider metaphysical sweep:

traditional notions. Traditional pluralism. Traditional objections 227;
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9. Distancing Plurallism from Realism, Anti-Realism and Relativism, and those other isms 259; 10. Plurallistic investigation of Relevant philosophers and philosophical Schools 299;
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11. Impacts upon philosophy: harmonious applications and further problem-solving 351; 12. What Deep Plurallism does, its intellectual impact, and where it leads 409; Epilogue. Beyond Intellectual Plurallism -- to Liberating Practice 455; Endnotes 467; Bibliography 507; Index 519-525.
"General description of Form and Content of *Transcendental Metaphysics*.
There is not merely a plurality of correct theories and of more or less satisfactory world-views: there is a corresponding plurality of actual worlds. Plurality penetrates deeper in full plurallism than linguistic surface or than conceptual or theoretical structure, to worlds. There is no unique actual world such as realism postulates, but many worlds; there is no single fact of the matter, there are facts and matters. Full plurallism itself bifurcates, into two main forms; radical pluralism, which rests with multiple actual worlds, and *deep* plurallism, which `completes' this multiplicity with a unifying ultimate item, the Wholle, of which the multiplicity comprises various worldifications. Much of the text is devoted to the theoretical elaboration and defence of deep plurallism, both directly and by comparison with past positions.
Overall structure of the book (which is as shown by its short content) is, in brief, as follows: The basic theory is introduced and explained, and several confusions offset. Arguments against the radical theory are deflected and then many arguments for it are advanced. Following that detailed stage, deep plurallism and other pluralisms are further elaborated, in part through a detailed investigation of key notions, both of full plurallisms and also from traditional

and religious pluralisms. Next the full theory is set in place through a series of comparisons: firstly with the other standard philosophical positions in realist-idealist-relativist and related debates, and secondly with connected development of many worlds theories and transcendental metaphysics of other philosophers. There too it is demonstrated that deep plurallism is not merely a metaphysics, but one that is transcendental, and various arguments against transcendental metaphysics are repelled. Finally full plurallism is put through its paces, in showing its power in resolving or relocating major philosophical problems, and further in dislodging powerful prevailing ideologies. In a brief epilogue, full plurallism is linked to practice. For instance, its decided merits as regards liberality and tolerance are explained.

Considered one way, the basic theory defended and developed can be seen as a plural realism, with central thesis that actuality is plural, more concretely that there are many actual worlds, not a unique one. Radical plurallism, which is pluralism at this actual world stage, not merely at a theoretical or conceptual scheme level, thus resembles realism, simply as (what is strictly impossible) pluralized. Deep plurallism does more, as it includes at least a nonworldy nondescript transcendental item in addition. From such world pluralism, however augmented, plurality of many other critical notions follows, notably of truth and evidence, truth for instance amounting to what holds at an actual world (of which there are very many).

However the basic theory can be alternatively seen not as a realism at all, because many apparently central themes of both ordinary realism and scientific realism are repudiated (e.g. respectively, uniqueness of the external world, and that that world is substantially as dominant science asserts, with all the existential trappings it alleges and none other). Alternatively again, it may be viewed as an antirealism, because for instance of its rejection, along with contemporary anti-realism, of the stock realist theme that there is a unique recognition-independent reality (or, on a lesser count, because of its questioning of classical bivalence

and other truth-value principles). Nonetheless such an assimilation has, like others, limited plausibility, because full plurallism acknowledges many recognition-independent (perceiver and mind transcendent) actual worlds.
Alternatively again, full plurallism may be regarded as mere relativism, because of its commitment to - what is less than relativism - relativity principles, for instance that truth is relative to actual world, and therefore is structurally relative. Whereupon it may be wrongly supposed that plurallism, like undiscriminating relativism, is self-refuting. Again, however, such a relativistic comparison is seriously defective - unless quite atypical, much more discriminating relativisms are envisaged. For by no means all positions are admissible, still less equally good. In plurallism there remain both internal and external checks upon adequacy and correctness: but, checks and balances that do not effect unique semantical selections.
Central to pluralistic enterprise (as opposed to fashionable relativism) are arguments, and therefore matters of logic and rival logics. Main arguments for full plurallism begin from plural logical theory, which is pivotal to all rational inquiry. Several different arguments are advanced for the plurality of correct theories; and it is argued from there through correspondence, or directly, to the plurality of actual worlds. Several coupled arguments from methodology are also developed. Stock arguments from rival one (actual) world positions are duly disabled.
Deep plurallism has large corollaries, for intellectual theory and practice, both inside and outside philosophy. To take one example: as it affords a comparatively easy way between the rocks of realism and relativism, so it affords a way between acceptation and rejection of science, of rationality, and more generally of the Enlightenment Project. There is no unique correct Science such as that the Enlightment postulated; but there are various sciences, where not everything goes.
In place of certified logic stands not no logic, but a plurality of logics, including more than one correct logic. Similarly in place of reason and rationality stands not nothing, not a

rejection of reason and rational methods, but a pluralization of them (with prominent correct methods rejecting received modern maximization and consistency imperatives). In place of the truth stands not nothing, nihilism, no court of appeal regarding correctness, but several: pluralistic truth. In place of the Enlightenment stands not a return to earlier (and subsequent) dark ages, but a plurallistic flowering, into enlightenments." (pp. XV-XVI)

56. ———. 1997. "Relevant Conditionals, and Relevant Application Thereof." In *Logic, Language and Computation*, edited by Akama, Seiki, 191-244. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"All that is required for validity of an implication in classical logic is that it be impossible for all the antecedents to be true and the consequent false. (Similarly, with terminology adapted, for validity of inferences.)
This requirement makes all implications with inconsistent antecedents valid. According to relevant logic, more should be required. That more can be explained in various equivalent ways. One is a classical look-alike; that the antecedents be genuinely inconsistent with the negation of the consequent. According to another look-like, truth should be preserved everywhere (including in impossible situations), that is, in whatever situation the antecedents hold so should the consequent. Another, perhaps more revealing, is as follows: not only should it be impossible for the antecedents to be true and the consequent false in a valid implication, but the antecedents and the consequent should also have something in common, or, in other words, the antecedents should be in some way relevant to the consequent. Whence the name relevant or relevance logic. Relevance itself means, firstly: bearing upon the matter in hand or the point at issue. A statement, a consideration, or the like, that is said to be relevant, must be understood to be relevant to something, i.e.
relevance is always relational. Relevance matters in a wide variety of settings: in statistics (where a defective explication of relevance in terms of alteration of probability is regularly advanced); wherever evidence

is assessed, as in law; in rules of relevance for conduct of meetings; in procedures for selection, as in organisation, where what is selected should enjoy relevant features. As well, relevance has recently assumed
importance in linguistic and pragmatic investigations as to discourse and communication, owing partly to the Grice's widely accepted directive for admissible discourse, Be relevant!, and partly to the associated
theme that most, even all, connectives of ordinary discourse exhibit relevance (i.e. for connector C, where pCq then q is relevant to p)." (p. 192)

57. Routley, Richard, and Copeland, Jack. 1999. "Beyond the Universal Turing Machine." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 77:46-66.
Two of our heresies--in the dictionary sense of 'opinions contrary to the accepted
doctrine on any subject'--are these)(1)
Proposition 1. The so-called Church-Turing thesis is false.
The so-called Church-Turing thesis purports to draw a borderline between computability and non-computability and is, it seems, pretty well universally accepted among computer scientists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of mind. In point of fact neither Turing nor Church endorses, or even states, this thesis. Their theses, proved equivalent by Turing, concerned the functions that are in principle computable by an
idealised human being unaided by machinery. Careful authors do use the term 'Church-Turing thesis' to refer to one or other of the various equivalent forms of the theses that Church and Turing themselves put forward.
Proposition 1. concerns not that equivalence class of theses but a claim lying outside the class and widely but improperly termed 'the Church-Turing thesis'. We distinguish this thesis from members of the
equivalence class by the use of riders such as 'so-called'. The so-called Church-Turing thesis is the claim that the class of well-defined computations is exhausted by the computations that can be carried out by Turing machines.

Proposition 2. Computability is a relative notion, not an absolute one.
There is no such thing as the class of well-defined computations. The extent of the computable functions is resource-relative." (p. 46)
(...)
"In the present paper we focus largely on proposition 1. although much of what we say also bears intimately on proposition 2. Proposition 2. receives further discussion elsewhere (Sylvan and Copeland 199-)." (p. 47)
(1) Richard Sylvan did not live to see this paper written. He contributed a draft of section VIII and fragments of sections I, II and IX. Our collaboration began in August 1994, when Richard became interested in my descriptions of machines forbidden by the so-called Church-Turing thesis, and I in his ideas concerning the extent to which one's notion of computability is relative to one's logic (the topic of Sylvan and Copeland 199-).
References
Sylvan, R. and Copeland, B.J. 'Computability is Logic-Relative', forthcoming in D. Hyde and G. Priest (eds.), *Applications of Relevant Logics* (199-) [Chapter 8 in Dominc Hyde, Graham Priest (eds.), *Sociative Logics and Their Applications: Essays by the Late Richard Sylvan*, (2000)]

58. Sylvan, Richard. 1999. "What is that Item Designated Negation?" In *What Is Negation?*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Wansing, Heinrich, 299-324. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Regrettably current logical orthodoxy is astray on negation, perhaps more seriously astray about negation than elsewhere. Unfortunately most of the advertised logical and linguistic alternatives to or elaborations upon classical orthodoxy are wrong also. A more engaging story needs to be told, upon which what follows represents some sort of bumbling beginning.
Negation is an item, an operation which is both one (one determinable which, though widely used, is far from orthodox) and many (having many determinates).

A prime determinate (which proves adequate on its own) is a relevant negation which applies both to sentences and to their unsaturated parts such as predicates.
By contrast, the classical sentence negation of orthodoxy represents but a degenerate determinate, not widely used in normal discourse (for such discourse does not sustain irrelevant inferences, such as from a pair A and not-A to any statement whatsoever, etc.)." (p. 299)

59. Hyde, Dominic, and Priest, Graham, eds. 2000. *Sociative Logics and Their Applications: Essays by the Late Richard Sylvan*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
On the title: "Much searching went into trying to find a satisfactory term to distinguish these logics. The eventually adopted term, *sociative,* derived through French from the Latin *sociare*: 'to combine, unite, etc.' and *socius* 'companion'. It now means 'expressing or denoting association, conjunction, union': see *Oxford English Dictionary*. Occasionally, the now obsolete English noun, verb and participle, *sociare,* will also be deployed." (Note 31, p. 29)
"Chapter 5. A Preliminary Western History of Sociative Logics
This essay originally appeared in 1989 as chapter 4 of BG. [Editors]
Contemporary logical investigations enjoy the advantage of vastly improved logical technology as compared with all earlier terrestrial times. Yet, by comparison with earlier periods of high logical activity, the twentieth century is anomalous in its heavy mainline concentration upon classical logic, and, as a result, appears stodgy and unadventurous. For the deadening effect of the wide educational imposition of a narrow and intellectually disastrous dominant logical paradigm, classical logical theory, has (again) destroyed much logical expression and adventure. Rival logics have become very much a minority and esoteric activity, not even incidental to the serious affairs of life; no longer do even the city crows converse over logical issues. The full flourishing of sociative logics, in their rich variety, has yet to occur.

So far as we know, there have been three main periods in the long history of Western logic when the central issues of logic, as to what makes an argument valid, when deducibility obtains, and whether these connections can be captured in true or necessary conditionals, have been vigorously discussed. The periods are these: around the third century BC when Stoic logic flourished, in the medieval period, especially the twelfth century AD, and in the present century.

The logical investigations carried out in these three significant periods are, thus far, substantially independent. The Stoic enterprise of the third century exerted little or no influence on medieval thought, and indeed details (such as they are in Sextus Empiricus) were not available until after the seminal work of Abaelard's school and rival schools had already been accomplished. Of the main contemporary strands of sociative logic, only connexive and nontransitive logics have clear historical representation, and even there main investigations have proceeded substantially independently of historical inputs. When history has been appealed to in support of relevance logics, for example, it has been rather peripheral and, too often, historically dubious.

Though the main historical settings for sociative logic presupposed a heavy consistency assumption (in particular throughout medieval times), and though paraconsistent logics tend to be missing in expected areas of application (such as treatment of semantical paradoxes), nonetheless the history of sociative logics is deeply interwoven with that of paraconsistent logics. One major reason for the intertwining is of course that a crucial issue for sociative logics is what-by contrast with strict and classical spread and collapse-happens with impossible premisses and assumptions. How is loss of connections to be avoided there? A special section of the theory of obligationes (or suppositional reasoning and commitment) was devoted to this issue in the Middle Ages; and a similar division of research, plainly parasitic on classical logic however, can be seen in contemporary North American research (such as

that of Rescher and Brandom and of Woods and Walton). These pretty unsatisfactory ways of shunting off, and sidetracking, significant logical problems fortunately by no means exhaust feasible lines of approach, as the rich history of paraconsistent logics helps disclose. That history has already been documented, admittedly also in a very preliminary fashion, elsewhere (especially in PL *[Paraconsistent Logic*, 1989] and its extract OP [*On Paraconsistency,* 1983]*,* which should be read in conjunction with this material - conversely, this material enriches *Paraconsistent Logic,* which is scanty on several topics of relevant interest). The entertaining story, which overlaps and complements the history of sociative logics, will not be repeated, but elements of it will be drawn upon where appropriate (and readers who seek a fuller picture to begin upon their own investigations should consult that story, as well as, of course, but cautiously, standard texts)." (pp. 53-54)

60. Brady, Ross, ed. 2003. *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
With contributions by Martin Bunder, André Fuhrmann, Andéa Loparic, Edwin Mares, Chris Mortensen, Alasdair Urquhart.
Contents: List of Contributors VIII; List of Figures IX; Preface XI; Prologue by Ross Brady 1; 6. Non-normal relevant systems by Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood 10; 7. Multiplying connectives and multiply intensional logics by Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer and Val Plumwood 17; 8. Operational semantics by Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood 38; 9. The algebraic analysis of relevant affixing systems by Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Ross Brady, Chris Mortensen and Val Plumwood 72; 10. The more general semantical theory of implication and conditionality 141; 11. Recent developments I by Ross Brady 192; 12. Recent developments II by Ross Brady 231; 13. On quantified relevant logics by Ross Brady 309; Appendix:

Extensional reduction II by Robert Meyer and Richard Sylvan 352; Bibliography 408; Index 421-425.
"The main writing work, for the two volumes, was done by Richard Routley, making essential use of work of Meyer, Plumwood and Brady in the process. The second volume was also to include Chris Mortensen at least for his work on the algebraic analysis of relevant affixing logics. Moreover, Richard remained the driving force behind the Relevant Logics and their Rivals volumes, providing the layout and material for an integrated work. During the time of writing, Richard had sent most of the chapters to a number of people for comment. However, some of these chapters, earmarked for the second volume, were more complete than others, and four of the tentative chapters (i.e. chapters 10 and 13-15), being fairly incomplete, were not sent out at all. However, subsequent to the publication of the first volume, there was quite some delay in getting the second volume together, mainly because Richard Sylvan was heavily involved in environmental philosophy and had other interests, both academic and non-academic. Richard made a number of attempts to restart the book, usually by contacting the other authors, but these contacts did not reap much progress. In 1985, he had more or less given up on the chapters of the tentative contents. Richard had subsequently persisted with the idea of rewriting the second volume to bring it more into line with his recent thinking, since the early work of the 1970's was starting to date in relation to more recent advances. He made a start on this revision around 1988-9, producing a number of short separate pieces, which were hard to connect to the chapters previously sent round for comment. Thus, it would be hard to make much use of these pieces in this book, if one relied on the chapters of the tentative contents for guidance. Unfortunately, Richard died unexpectedly in 1996, at the age of 60, leaving a plethora of unfinished work.
(...)
Upon initial examination of Richard's chapters 6-15, including his relevant archival material, I found that while a lot of it was in good shape for publication, much of the

remainder was incomplete, sketchy or inaccurate. This is not entirely unexpected, given the circumstances. Nevertheless, I was put into the dilemma of either trying to complete it as best as I could, in accordance with the tentative contents, or inserting more up-to-date material. The main difficulty about the first approach is the age of the material, since it was done during a period of greater logical experimentation than seems appropriate nowadays, together with the advent of newer developments in the relevant logic area.

So, I have generally proceeded with the second approach by extending Richard's material into some new directions which cover the period from the time of publication of the first volume to the present. Given that Richard was interested in updating the original chapters 6-15 anyway, I feel this second approach is not entirely inappropriate nor against his wishes. I have also been ably assisted in this task by Martin Bunder, Ed Mares, Andre' Fuhrmann, Chris Mortensen and Alasdair Urquhart, who have given me some accounts of their recent work for inclusion.

In this way, much of Richard's work and that of his co-workers, whose Work was interwoven into Richard's material, will be maintained for posterity as an important contribution to logic, upon which others may choose to build." (pp. XI-XIII)

61. Sylvan, Richard. 2003. "The Importance of Nonexistent Objects and of Intensionality in Mathematics." *Philosophia Mathematica* no. 11:20-52.

With a foreword by Nicholas Griffin (pp. 16-19).

This "is a reprinting, with as little change as feasible from the original typescript, of most of Chapter 10 and the introduction and first section of Chapter 11 of Richard Routley (who changed his name to Sylvan in 1985), *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items*, published by the Philosophy Department of the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University, Canberra, 1980, and still available from it (ISBN 0-909596-36-0)."

"The more comprehensive case for the importance of nonentities includes, as especially significant, their role in mathematics and their roles in the theoretical explanations of science-the whole business, that is, of appealing to ideal simplified objects, which suitably approximate real objects, in problem solving and theoretical explanation. More generally, the theoretical sciences are seriously nonreferential, both in having as their primary subject matter nonentities, and in being ineradicably intensional. This thesis runs entirely counter to empiricist philosophies of science, which have long dominated the subject (to its detriment), according to which the language of science is, or ought to be, referential. Empiricist thinkers have, until very recently,' regarded the citadel of science as exclusively theirs: and the main goals of philosophy, as they conceive them, have been determined by the defense and extensions of the citadel to increase its power over the intellectual landscape. Thus they have taken the language of science, properly refined referentially of course, as the ideal of language, to which much ordinary language is at best a shabby first approximation; and they have characteristically seen philosophy as the handmaiden of science, as like a servant clearing away rubbish in the way of scientific progress or questioning scientific practice and values, or as a subsidiary scientific activity of conceptual analysis and reconstruction aiding the defense or advance of total science. A basic assumption in all this, without which much of the superstructure collapses, is that both the language of science and scientific theories conform to empiricist canons: the assumption is false-so at least it is now argued. The case begins by considering mathematics, which forms an integral part of much theoretical science."

62. Sylvan, Richard, Loparić, Andréa, and Plumwood, Val. 2003. "The More General Semantical Theory of Implication and Conditionality." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 141-191. Aldershot: Ashgate.

63. ———. 2003. "Appendix: Existentional Reduction II." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 352-406. Aldershot: Ashgate.
64. Sylvan, Richard, Meyer, Robert K., and Plumwood, Val. 2003. "Multiplying Connectives and Multiply Intensional Logics." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 17-37. Aldershot: Ashgate.
65. Sylvan, Richard, and Plumwood, Val. 2003. "Non-Normal Relevant Systems." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 10-16. Aldershot: Ashgate.
66. ———. 2003. "Operational Semantics." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 38-71. Aldershot: Ashgate.
67. ———. 2003. "The Algebraic Analysis of Relevant Affixing Systems." In *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Volume II. A Continuation of the Work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady*, edited by Brady, Ross, 72-140. Aldershot: Ashgate.
68. Beall, Jc, Brady, Ross, Dunn, J. Michael, Hazen, A. P., Mares, Edwin, Meyer, Robert K., Priest, Graham, Restall, Greg, Ripley, David, Slaney, John, and Sylvan, Richard. 2012. "On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 41:595-612.
Abstract: "One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley–Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of

conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions."
"This paper emerged from some working sessions at the University of Melbourne in 2009.
Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest, Restall, Ripley, and Slaney were involved *on the ground*. The work of Dunn and Mares kept coming up during the sessions, and the paper greatly benefited from their joining the effort after the event. Looming even larger in the initial discussions were two others: despite their deaths, much of the early work of Sylvan and Meyer was heavily represented. While we can't speak for the current views of Bob (Meyer) or Richard (Sylvan), we wanted to honor them for their starting this ternary-relation idea in the first place. Hence, we include them as authors. While not all of us (authors) agree on all ideas herein, we do agree with the main thrust of this paper: namely, that, despite first appearances, the ternary-relation approach to conditionality is very much philosophically plausible as capturing an important aspect of conditionality." (p. 595)

69. Routley, Richard. 2018. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 1 with Supplementary Essays*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer. Edited by Maureen Eckert.
"Thus Sylvan argues that his neo-Meinongian, so-called "noneist" (pronounced *none-ist*), theory at the heart of the Jungle Book casts new light on supposed long-standing problems like the problem of universals, perception, intentionality, substance, self, and values. Chapters are devoted to metaphysical and associated epistemological problemsthat emerge in the philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science, to developing a satisfactory epistemology more generally, to providing an adequate semantic account of fictional discourse, to an analysis and rejection of Russell's theory of descriptions and of Quine's objections to broadly-Meinongian approaches, and so on. The book's size matches its ambitions. And the book's

author was a man of considerable intellectual ambition. (pp-XIII-XIV, Introduction by Dominic Hyde)
"The future perfect of *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* by Filippo Casati" pp. 583-599-

70. ———. 2018. "Semantic Analysis of Entailment and Relevant Implication: I (1970/1)." *Australasian Journal of Logic* no. 15:211-279.
Transcription by Nicholas Ferenz of an unpublished manuscript.
"Semantical analyses are provided for several intensional logics, in particular for (substantial parts of) the systems R of relevant implication, □R of relevant implication with necessity, P of ticket entailment, and E of entailment, and what is the same theory as E the system Π of rigorous implication. The analyses provided are used to provide semantical completeness results and decidability results for the main systems discussed, and are applied to settle some of the open questions concerning E and R and their fragments." (p. 212)

71. ———. 2019. *Ultralogic as Universal? The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 4 with notes and commentaries*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Edited by Zach Weber.
"Ultralogic is important not least because it boldly advances the value of inconsistent theories, especially in mathematics. Routley urges that consistency is not always the ultimate arbiter of correctness, that some contradictions can be true, a thesis now known as dialetheism. While Priest's works have become the canonical texts for dialetheism, without Routley, dialetheism would not be what it now is. It was the happy meeting of Priest and Routley in the 1970s that looks to have been the spark." (*Editor's Introductio*n, p. XIII)
Supplementary Essays:
Ross T. Brady: *On The Law of Excluded Middle*, pp. 161-183;
Chris Mortensen: *Implication Principles in Routley Arithmetic*, pp. 185-194.

72. Routley, Richard, and Routley, Val. 2019. *Noneist Explorations I: The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 2 with Supplementary Essays*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Edited by Domini Hyde.
"With the perspective afforded by time, Richard Sylvan, nè Routley (1935-1996), will, I believe, come to be seen as the most important Australasian philosopher of the 20th Century. This is not at all to denigrate his currently better known compatriot contemporaries: a number of these made highly significant contributions to philosophy. But what set Richard apart was the originality he deployed and the scope of his vision. He made original contributions to logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, value theory, environmental philosophy, political philosophy. Moreover, though he never wrote anything that integrated all of these, it is clear to those who know his work that his views on all these matters formed part of an overall and systematic philosophical picture." (*Introduction: some personal reflections* by Graham Priest, p. XIII)
Supplementary Essays:
Jack Smart: *A critique of Meinongian semantics*, pp. 343-350:
Maria Elisabeth Reicher: *Routley's theory of fictions*, pp. 353-381;
Fred Kroon: *Routley's second thoughts*, pp. 383-403.
73. ———. 2020. *Noneist Explorations II: The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 3 with Supplementary Essays*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Edited by Dominic Hyde.
"This volume continues the reprinting of a new edition of Richard Routley's 1980 monograph *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An investigation of noneism and the theory of items*.
As in Volume 2, some of the work reprinted in this third volume contains material co-authored with Val Plumwood (formerly Val Routley), in particular, chapters 8 and 9.
For this reason, she is listed as co-author." (Editor's Preface)
Supplementary Essays:

Naoya Fujikawa: *Hallucination as perceiving nonexistent objects: noneist direct realism of perception*, pp. 391-420; Maureen Eckert and Charlie Donahue: *Towards a feminist logic: Val Plumwood's legacy and beyond*, pp. 421-446.

Publications available on line

Articles published in the *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* (PDF format) available at Project Euclid:

Author to search: Routley

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5. Algebraic semantics for S2° and necessitated extensions (1976)
6. Repairing proofs of Arrow's general impossibility theorem and enlarging the scope of the theorem (1979)

Author to search: Sylvan

1. On interpreting truth tables and relevant truth tables logic (1992)

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1. Besoli, Stefano. 1984. "Convergences and Diversities between Noneism and Gegenstandstheorie." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 21:133-153.
"The problems that give rise to the conceptual system developed by Routley(1) are largely those suggested by the proposals contained in Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* . By taking up these themes again Routley wishes to legitimate an ideal resumption, a radicalization and an expansion of a number of theses peculiar to Meinongian doctrine. Starting from this remark, he is then led to deal explicitly with the limits of the internal presupposition of classical logic, putting forward, by contrast, the advantages of a recomprehension which attempts to bring to light the logical/ontological topics generally neglected or, rat her, reductionalistically interpreted within the framework of a Russellian theory of logic. The author's constant appeal to a neutral ontology which is close, but not identical, to Meinong's range of *Außersein* permeates his entire work and supports the emergence of an idoneous theory of items. The *Leitfaden* is the refutation of Standard Reference Theory (RT) which is the paradigmatic core common empiricism, idealism and materialism, but which also underlies extensionally quantified orthodox logic. Reference Theory (RT) requires, as an essential condition, that truth and meaning are rigid functions of reference. The

original aim of Routley's analysis is to eliminate the prejudice in favour of immediate actuality which is inherent in every referential view. Accordingly, it must be possible to make semantically relevant the occurrence of non-referential statements.
Meinong's philosophical work, together with the influential theories of Th. Reid, suggests the inescapable clauses for a gnosiological alternative which will not relapse into platonism." (p. 133)
(1) We refer mainly to Routley's *Exploring Meinong's Jungle* , Canberra, 1980, where he gives an enlarged draft of conceptual trends established long ago.

2. Brady, Ross T. 1980. "Two Remarks on *The Logic of Significance and Context* ." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 21:263-272.
"I wish to make two remarks on two points that Goddard and Routley made in Chapter 5 of their book, *The Logic of Significance and Context* [6].
The first remark is that the Brady disjunction, 'V',(1) does have applications in ordinary discourse, in answer to the doubts about this expressed by them on pp. 344-5 of [6]. I will defend this position, which I originally made in [1] on p. 30, and also in [2], pp. 172-3, by showing that each of four examples can be interpreted in a way which requires 'V to be used in its formalization. The second remark is that the need for a functionally complete significance logic such as their system $\mathbf{S}_5$ (or $\mathbf{S}_6$) seems very limited. I show this by examining each of their five arguments for a functionally complete system on pp. 348-351 of [6] and by showing how their weaker significance-complete (for definition, see [6], p. 326) system $\mathbf{S}_3$ (or $\mathbf{S}_4$) will suffice, except in exceptional circumstances, to express what they suppose a functionally complete system is needed for." (p. 263)
(1) The symbols and terminology for this paper are taken from Goddard and Routley [6].
References
[1] Brady, R. T., "A 4-valued theory of classes and individuals," Ph.D. thesis, 1971, deposited in the University

Library, St. Andrews.
[2] Brady, R. T., "Significance logics," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* , vol. XVII (1976), pp. 161-183.
[6] Goddard, L. and R. Routley, *The Logic of Significance and Context,* Vol. 1, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1973.

3. Bradley, Michael. 1978. "On the alleged need for nonsense." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 56:203-218.
"The theory, stemming from Russell, that there are grammatical sentences of English, containing only recognised English vocabulary, which are nevertheless meaningless is a familiar landmark of contemporary Philosophy.
(...)
In recent years, however, the case for the non-significant has been taken up again. In a series of closely argued papers Ross Brady, Leonard Goddard and Richard Routley have urged the necessity for nonsense, and the latter two authors have developed (in [3]) a logic of significance whose justification is largely the supposed need for nonsense. In this paper I examine their reasons for alleging the need, and conclude that they have not established a case.
Because of the extent of the collaboration and agreement between the authors cited it as often pointless to refer a view to one rather than another. In such cases I use the phrase 'our authors'. In other cases where more accuracy seems called for, one or two of them are referred to by name.
Our authors call 'falsidal' those theories which treat sentences such as 'Virtue is square' and 'I likes dancing' as faIse ([1], p. 213; [11], p. 368). They describe and criticise various versions of the falsidal approach, and find all of them deficient. What I wish to propose is a non-arbitrary and epistemologically satisfactory falsidal theory which escapes the difficulties of other versions. I shall only try to assess the arguments given by our authors so far as they seem or are claimed to bear on the falsidal theory which I am
going to propose. These arguments are scattered through a number of places and often conjoined with material not

germane to the present task. I have tried to abstract the strongest and clearest exposition of all ma (pp. 203-204)terial I think relevant. Not all the relevant writings by our three authors are mentioned in my bibliography, but only those drawn on. Others will be found detailed in the bibliography to [11], and further relevant material in the notes to [1] and [10]." (pp. 203-204)

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1. Brady, Ross and Routley, Richard: 'Don't Care Was Made to Care', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 51 (1973) pp. 211-225.

3. Goddard, L. and Routley, Richard: *The Logic of Significance and Context* Volume I (1973).

10. Routley, Richard: 'On a Significance Theory', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 44 (1966) pp. 172-209.

11. Routley, Richard: 'The Need for Nonsense', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 47 (1969) pp. 367-383.

4. Hyde, Dominic. 2001. "Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 22:181-205.

   Abstract: "Richard Sylvan (né Routley) was one of Australasia's most prolific and systematic philosophers. Though known for his innovative work in logic and metaphysics. the astonishing breadth of his philosophical endeavours included almost all reaches of philosophy. Taking the view that very basic assumptions of mainstream philosophy were fundamentally mistaken, he sought radical change across a wide range of theories. However, his view of the centrality of logic and recognition of the possibilities opened up by logical innovation in the fundamental areas of metaphysics resulted in his working primarily in these two, closely connected fields. It is this work in logic and metaphysics that is the main focus of what follows."

5. Kielkopf, Charles. 1974. "Critique of the Routley's First Degree Semantics." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 52:105-120.

   "R. and V. Routley's 'The Semantics of First Degree Entailment '(1) is a clear, careful, but relatively non-technical presentation of a semantics for Anderson and

Belnap's so-called tautological entailments. Their paper is a valuable introduction to a treatment of negation in semantics for relevant logics and entailment systems. However, the Routleys' paper is primarily an attempt to build a case for accepting as valid only the first degree inferences warranted by the tautological entailments instead of the much larger class warranted by the tautologies of classical propositional logic. I adapt terminology of the Routleys' to call the tautological entailments, and the first degree inferences warranted by them, *FD* logic. The Routleys' semantics for *FD* logic is a special case of semantics for relevant logics(2) whose first degree fragment is the
tautological entailments. In my argument, I shall only sketch the basic idea of their semantics for *FD* logic since I shall not be concerned with technical uses of the semantics for results Such as completeness. I shall argue that the Routleys' semantics for *FD* logic does not justify switching from classical to *FD* logic. However, I shall recommend using their semantics for uncovering tautologies needed, in a special sense of 'needed', in classically valid inferences." (p. 105)
(...)
"Indeed, I hope that I have shown that the Routleys, despite their intriguing semantics and illuminating discussion of suppression, have given no good reasons for switching from classical to *FD* logic." (p. 120)
(1) *Noûs* 6 (1972) pp. 335-59. All references, unless otherwise specified are to this paper.
(2) See R. Routley and R. K. Meyer's 'The Semantics of Entailment, in H. Leblanc (ed.): *Truth, Syntax and Modality* , (1973) pp. 192-243; 'The Semantics of Entailment-lI,' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (1972) pp. 53-73; 'The Semantics of Entailment-III,' ibid. pp. 192-203. Section 5 of R. Routley's 'A Semantical Analysis of Implicational System I and of the First Degree of Entailment', *Mathematische Annalen* 196 (1972) pp. 58-84, is especially helpful for showing that the set-up semantics to

be considered here are semantics for the tautological entailments.

6. Lewis, David K. 1990. "Noneim or Allism?" *Mind* no. 99:23-31.
   Reprinted in: D. Lewis, *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 152-163.
   "Some few entities - present, actual, particular, spatiotemporal, material, well-bounded things - exist uncontroversially. Scarcely any philosopher denies them. Other alleged entities are controversial: some say they exist, some say they do not. These controversial entities include past and future things, the dead who have ceased to be and those who are not yet even conceived; unactualized possibilia; universals, numbers, and classes; and Meinongian objects, incomplete or inconsistent or both. An expansive friend of the entities who says that all these entities exist may be called an *allist* . A tough desert-dweller who says that none of them exist may be called a *noneist* . In between come most of us, the pickers and choosers, *some-but-only-someists* .
   Richard Routley declares himself a noneist.(1)1 If we may take him at his word, he holds that none of the controversial entities exist. But ay we take him at his word?" (p. 23)
   "In short: we dispense with existence - but heed what this means and what it does not. Of course we do not dispense with the word 'exist' as one of our pronunciations for the quantifier. Neither do we dispense with a trivially universal predicate of existence, automatically satisfied by absolutely everything. But if 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist - or, for that matter, so that it can be a substantive thesis that everying exists - we will have none of it." (p. 31, a note omitted)
   (1) Richard Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory ef Items* (Australian National University, 1980). For short: *Jungle* . Routley, as he then was, is now Richard Sylvan, but

I shall refer to him by the name under which the book was written.

7. Meyer, Robert K. 1998. "In Memoriam: Richar (Routley) Sylvan 1935-1996)." *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* no. 4:338-340.
   "Besides free logic and his work on Meinong, Sylvan was an important contributor to the development of paraconsistent ideas, already in the first degree semantical work with Val Plumwood cited above. This work led him into important collaborations with other logicians, as did his work on relevant logics and on a number of other subjects. Besides those mentioned elsewhere in this note, among Sylvan's important logical collaborators were Nicholas Griffin, Graham Priest, Ayda Arruda, Dominic Hyde and Jean Norman.
   Richard continually applied (and was continually turned down) for promotion to full Professor at ANU [Australian National University]. It is probably not irrelevant that, in all his enterprises, he almost never chose the easy or popular course. His enthusiasms–logical, intellectual and political–were for the alternative. To get the counter-suggestible Sylvan to defend some view, a good move was to remark that the view was now utterly discredited.
   So Richard Sylvan is gone. It's hard to believe; it would be in character for him to be fooling us, spreading the rumour of his death for some deep Sylvanesque purpose. I personally miss him very, very much. When my own career was in ashes, it was Sylvan's invitation to come Down Under in 1974 that brought it back to life. And now logic and philosophy have suffered a great, great loss. Greater than they know." (p. 340)
8. Paolini Paoletti, Michele. 2013. "Commentary: Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: an Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items by R. Routley." *Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 25:275-292.
   "I cannot give here an exhaustive account of Routley's whole investigation of noneism (i.e., the theory according to which, roughly, there are items that do not exist, or, in other words, that not all the items exist). Considering the

structure of the book, it is possible to individuate: a brief presentation and defense of noneist theses (pp. 1–73); a critique of classical logic and the introduction of a revised, neutral (i.e., not existentially committed) logic grounded on the theory of items (this long part includes, among other things, some important remarks on the Characterisation Postulate, on identity, existence, possible worlds, inconsistency, definite descriptions, intensional contexts) (pp. 73–360); a defense of a Meinongian and presentist metaphysical theory of time (pp. 361–409); some replies to Quine's article *On what there is* (in the short paper *On what there isn't*) and to other objections (pp. 411–488); the contiguity between noneism and common sense (pp. 519–536); noneist theories of fiction (pp. 537–606), of existence (pp. 697–768), of mathematical and theoretical knowledge (pp. 769–832) and of other topics (e.g., universals and perception) (pp. 607–696); Routley's interpretation of Meinong's work (pp. 489–518) and the differences between Routley's noneism and other theories of items (pp. 833–890); the paper Ultralogic as universal in the Appendix (pp. 892–959).
In this brief commentary, I shall focus on Routley's denial of the Ontological Assumption and on some theses, such as the Characterisation Postulate and the distinction between characterising and non-characterising properties. Furthermore, I shall present and discuss Routley's Meinongian Presentism and his theory of fictional items." (pp. 275-276)

9. Parsons, Terence. 1983. "Review of Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. by Richard Routley." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 80:173-179.
"This book is an anthology of interconnected papers by the au- thor. Some have been previously published, but some, including the title essay (Chapter 1, 259 pages), have not previously appeared in print. The theme of the book is a development and defense of a Meinongian theory of objects (called "items" by Routley), coupled with attacks on the "empiricist, reductionist, anti-Meinongian" world view that is now a prevalent theme in Anglo-American phil- osophy.

Routley's views are in many ways closer to Meinong's than are those of any other current writer, and this alone would make the work of interest. The book is highly programmatic; in this review I will not try to forecast the ultimate fate of the pro- gram, but instead will try to indicate what I take to be its major themes." (pp. 173-174)
(...)
"This book touches on scores of topics that have not been men- tioned here, including the definition of existence, existing at a time, relations, fictional objects, common-sense philosophy, second- order logic, mathematics, and scientific theories, plus an appendix on what the author calls "ultralogic," which is a logic that applies correctly in all situations, even impossible ones. The discussion is often provocative and almost always highly programmatic. Routley has explored portions of Meinong's jungle, and this edition is a fascinating diary of his journey. We still await a detailed map of the terrain." (p. 179)

10. Priest, Graham. 1997. "Sylvan's Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 38:573-582.
Abstract: "The paper contains a short story which is inconsistent, essentially so, but perfectly intelligible. The existence of such a story is used to establish various views about truth in fiction and impossible worlds-"
"Fictions are certainly not the only context in which impossible worlds—in whatever sense one takes to be correct—arise. Such worlds are also required to evaluate the truth of counterlogical conditionals.
(...)
Another possible place in which impossible worlds may turn up is in an analysis of belief. Suppose that you were naıve enough to have believed my story, as a child might have done. You would then have believed that Sylvan had possessed a box that was both empty and nonempty, but you would not have believed that he had a cow that both did and did not lay eggs. If we parse ‘x believes that s’ as a relation between a

believer and a proposition, we may then take a proposition, in very orthodox fashion, to be the set of worlds/situations in which s is true. This gives the required result.
(Despite this, I doubt that impossible worlds are of much use in an analysis of belief; actual belief seems to have no determinate logical structure at all.)
The final point is less of a moral, more of an observation.
(10) An impossible world, as characterized above, is one where a logical truth is false, that is, its negation is true. There is nothing in this definition that precludes the actual world from being logically impossible. (All the logical truths may still hold there.) And once one agrees that there are impossible worlds, the question obviously arises as to how one can be so sure that the actual world is not one of them. There are, it seems to me, no good a priori reasons to suppose that it is not." (p. 581)

11. ———. 2003. "Meinongianism and the Philosophy of Mathematics." *Philosophia Mathematica* no. 11:3-15.
"Part of the beauty of meinongianism—or at least of Richard's approach to it, spelled out at length in *Exploring Meinong's Jungle* [1980]—is its technical simplicity. To do the idea full justice you need to have inconsistent and incomplete worlds, but these you have anyway, at least if you subscribe to some version of relevant logic. But the main technical trick is just thinking of one's quantifiers as existentially neutral. '∀ is understood as 'for every'; '∃' is understood as 'for some'. Existential commitment, when required, has to be provided explicitly, by way of an existence predicate, *E* , which, pace the way that Kant is often—and erroneously—interpreted, is a perfectly normal predicate. Thus, 'there exists something such that' is '3x(*E* x ∧ ... *x* ..)'; and 'all existing things are such that' is '∀x(*E* x → ...x ...)'. The action of the theory is mainly, therefore, not at the technical level, but at the philosophical level." (p. 4)

12. Rapaport, William J. 1984. "Critical Notice of *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* , by Richard Routley." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 44:539-552.

"*Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* is a lengthy work (over 1000 pages) of wide scope, its cast of characters ranging from Abelard to Zeno. The nominal star is Meinong, of course, yet the real hero is Reid.(2) Topically, Richard Routley presents us with a virtual encyclopedia of contemporary philosophy, containing original philosophical and logical analyses, as well as a valuable historical critique of Meinong's work." (p. 539)
(...)
"If Meinong and Reid are the heroes of this work, then the "Reference Theory" (RT) - the theory that "truth and meaning are functions just of reference" (i) - is the villain. Routley sees his task as offering a different paradigm, noneism, which "aims at . . . a very general theory of all items whatsoever.(5). Where RT and its classical logic fail to provide solutions to problems of non-existence, intensionality, deducibility, significance, and context (ii), the noneist Theory of Items will - it is claimed - not only solve all of these, but also enable philosophers to treat adequately for the first time problems from the history of philosophy (including Reid's philosophy, Epicureanism, nihilism, sophism, fatalism, the Third Man), the philosophy of religion, the logic of perception, quantified tense logic, the problem of universals, and more (8-11). Noneism is Routley's patent medicine for all philosophical ills." (p. 540)
(...)
"Conclusion
There is much to admire in Routley's compilation, as well as much to ponder, to question, and to criticize. The book would have been better had it been more coherent (in all sense of that word), but the effort required to plow through it is often rewarded." (p. 551)
(2) Cf., e.g., chap. 6, "The Theory of Objects as Commonsense," especially pp. 529 ff., and chap. 12, sec. i.
(3) See, *inter alia,* chap. 5, "Three Meinongs."

13. Seldin, Jonathan P. 1987. "A Relevant Validity in Curry's Foundations: A Reply to Richard Sylvan." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 16:68-70.

"Thus, in terms of Curry's definitions, the positive paradox principle is valid in terms of the metatheory of elementary formal systems (which is what Curry is talking about on p. 173 of [1]). Curry's claim about the
positive paradox principle is thus that it is valid in a particular context in the formal metatheory of elementary formal systems (as he has defined it).
As the last paragraph on p. 173 of [1] shows, he is not claiming that it is true generally." (p. 70)
References
[1] H. B. Curry, *Foundations of Mathematical Logic* , McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963.

14. Slater, B.H. 1992. "Routley's Formulation of Transparency." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 13:215-224.
Abstract: "Routley's Formula says, for instance, that if it is believed there is a man then there is something which is believed to be a man. In this paper I defend the formula: first directly, hut then by looking at work by Gensler and Hintikka against it, and at the original work of Routley, Meyer and Goddard for it. The argument ultimately reduces to a central point about the extensionality of objects in Routley, Meyer and
Goddard's intensional system, i.e. in its formulation of transparency."
"In 'Routley's Formula'
$O(Ex)Mx \supset (Ex)OMx$
'O' is an intensional operator on (Ex)Mx, such as 'it is believed that', and 'M' is an ordinary predicate, such as 'is a man'. So the formula says that if it is necessary, permitted . . . known, or supposed that there is a man, it follows that for something it is necessary . . . or supposed that it is a man. Now the formula has ground against many philosophers' intuitions. Indeed, it is invalid in all the standard systems of modal and general intensional logic, except the epsilon calcu!us system of Routley, Meyer and Goddard (Routley, Meyer and Goddard 1974 (hereafter referred to as Routley et alii), Routley 1977). On one view of 'intensional' objects they are world-bound or mentally private objects. On that view,

other minds and worlds are like other places and times. So what is there may bear little relation to what is here.
And yet, as we shall see, the formula is true. For, on another view of the matter, if anything is on one's mind, it is a public object, and anything in another world is bound to be in this. Certainly it need not be conceived as it is publicly, or actually, but it is definitely the same object. Indeed the behaviour of 'it', in that last sentence, substantiates the very point which is made in it.
But many systems of logic do not capture the behaviour of such pronouns. And so doubts about Routley's Formula quite often arise. In the full defence of the formula, therefore, it becomes especially important to consider it both formally and informally. Exactly which aspects of Routley et al's system allow the formula to be validated, when all the others invalidate it? And does its very exceptionality, and the range of intuitions against it, not reduce its plausibility entirely?
I shall conciude, in the end, that Routley's Formii!a survives the current arguments against it, and can be given an increased rationale from that provided when it was first defended." (p.215)
References
Routley. R. Meyer. R. K. and Goddard. L. 1974 'Choice and descriptions in enriched intensional languages-I'. *Journal of philosophical logic* . 3, 291-316.
Routley, R. 1977 'Choice and descriptions in enriched intentional languages, II,III'. in *Problems in logic and ontology* (ed. E. Morscher. J. Czermak. and P. Weingartner). Graz (Akademische Druck-und Velagsanstalt), 173-222.

15. Trew, A. 1968. "Incompleteness of a Logic of Routley's." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 9:385-387.
"In 'Some things do not exist', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* , v. VII (1966), pp. 251-276, Routley examines the relations between certain predicate logics. His system **R*** differs from the usual restricted predicate logic only in having added to it individual constants and a predicate constant *'E* ' read 'exist(s)', and in having assigned to its

individual variables, a domain consisting of all possible things, in place of the usual domain consisting of all existing things. **R*** has a standard theory for its quantifiers, (π, Σ)." (p. 385)
(...)

16. von Solodkoff, Tatjana, and Woodward, Richard. 2013. "Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 87:558-583.
Abstract: "In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's "translate-and-deflate" methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one."
References
Priest, Graham. 2005. *Towards Non-Being* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Routley, Richard. 1980. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle* . Canberra: Philosophy Department Monographs, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

17. Witherall, Arthur. 2000. "Lewis and Sylvan on Noneism." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 58-59:181-202.
"Several years ago David Lewis wrote a paper titled "Noneism or Allism?"(1) in which he attacked the idea that Richard Sylvan's (alias Richard Routley) rehabilitation of Meinong's theory of objects was truly what it was supposed to be. Lewis argued that Sylvan was not really a noneist, and that he should be interpreted as claiming that all of the objects that philosophers consider controversial actually exist (rather than none of them, as the name "noneism" implies). This is a drastic re-interpretation of Sylvan's work, and if it were true it would mean that he did not successfully rehabilitate the theory of objects at all.
(...)
Unfortunately, Richard Sylvan died in 1996, without having constructed a reply to Lewis. Although it is therefore difficult to say what kind of a reply he would have made, I believe that I can offer some significant criticisms of my own. I do not claim to represent Sylvan as such, but I claim to be sympathetic to his project, and in this respect I can do something towards refuting Lewis' claims. This is an important defensive task to perform for a Meinongian, because although Lewis' argument does not assail the details of Sylvan's philosophy, it threatens to restore the old orthodox view of Meinongian metaphysics as 'committed' to an unreasonably bloated ontology, and thus to re-instate a serious misinterpretation of the whole enterprise. In assessing Lewis' paper, it must be kept in mind that *he does not address any of Sylvan's arguments* . He is only concerned with whether Sylvan should be seen as a true noneist or as an allist, with respect to the question of which controversial items exist. Nevertheless, in neglecting Sylvan's arguments, Lewis is deflecting
attention away from the substance of his position, and casting him as the defender of something unintelligible. I will show why this attack ultimately fails." (pp. 181-182)
(1) D. Lewis "Noneism or Allism?" in Mind Vol. 99, January 1990, pp. 23-31.

Related pages

Selected bibliography of Richard Sylvan:

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

Theory and History of Ontology

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George Englebretsen's Contribution to the Rediscovery of Traditional Formal Logic

INTRODUCTION

"In two important senses, Englebretsen is not the inventor of the logic of which he writes, though he no doubt deserves the title of the most dedicated and meticulous expositor of it today. In the first place the logic in question is none other than the so-called 'term logic' usually said to have been invented by Aristotle, taught throughout the middle ages, toyed with by Leibniz, forgotten in the enlightenment and surpassed at last by the great developments in mathematical logic associated with names like Boole, Frege, Russell, Quine. So at least runs the textbook history that the average student of logic would learn today. Term logic figures in the contemporary mind as one of the discarded fashions of science, much like the Ptolemaic system in astronomy. Englebretsen does not claim to invent but only to rehabilitate this logic. And such an effort obviously requires a reassessment of its history, of which the present work provides an outline.
But the logic is not Englebretsen's own in a second way. The book is a sustained and systematic exposition of the life work of Prof. Sommers of Brandeis University, whose efforts have revealed the continuity of term logic from Aristotle to Leibniz and also its character an uncompleted project, with unlimited promise in its application to logic of natural language. Sommers' work comes at a crucial moment, just as the problems in applying formal mathematical structures to ordinary language are coming to be recognized. Sommers' unconventional approach, however, has seemed to many to be moving quickly in the wrong direction,

toward the 'errors' of the past and he has thus acquired a reputation as the Ishmael of modern logic.
Professor Englebretsen's work is a systematic exposition and defense of Sommers' far-reaching contributions to logic, placing them in the context of a rectified history of the subject. Term logic is a project abandoned prematurely by logicians deceived by the appearance of security which the prestige of mathematics conferred upon mathematical logic. Recent logicians concluded too quickly that term logic was unformalizable, inadequate to reflect many of the actual inference structures of ordinary language, etc. The work of Sommers has demonstrated these claims to be false in the most appropriate way possible, by constructing a term logic of which they do not hold. Moreover Englebretsen has shown that Sommers' reply on behalf of term logic is not a mere riposte; it is a 'programme' of logic in the fullest sense. It contains a rigorously presented theory not just of the syntax, semantics and rules of inference for a term logic, but also a modal logic, a theory of predication, identity, singular terms, categories and ontology. In the reading of this book it is impossible not to get the idea that here is a vital programme for logic which is deserving of careful consideration and which is bound to lead to a re-evaluation of the traditional dogmas of mathematical logic." (pp. I-II)

From: Graeme Hunter, *Foreword* to: George Englebretsen, *Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers. In Logical Terms*, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

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For the bibliography of Fred Sommers see the page dedicated to him.

1. Englebretsen, George. 1969. "Knowledge, Negation and Incompatibility." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 66:581-585.

"When epistemologists attempt to establish a distinction between knowledge and belief, very often what they want is a distinction between knowledge and mere belief.
They are interested in the sense of belief that is incompatible with knowing: a sense in which if something is believed it is not known, and if known not believed. This sense of belief (mere belief) is obviously different from the usual notion of belief.
In what follows I want to make a start at analyzing the concept of knowing by outlining the relations between knowledge statements (e.g., x knows that y) and other closely related statements." (p. 581)

2. ———. 1971. "Sommers' Theory and the Paradox of Confirmation." *Philosophy of Science* no. 38:438-441.
"In order to confirm any statement of the form (a) A are B we consider a sufficiently large number of A in order to check them for having or failing to have property B.
But logic leads us to believe that A are B is equivalent to (b) non-B are non-A. If this is so then it seems reasonable to suppose that we confirm (a) and (b) in the same way. Whatever set of things we consider for confirming one must be the same set that we consider for the other. Yet in confirming (a) the set considered seems to be the set of A, while in confirming (b) the set considered seems to be the set of non-B. How can two logically equivalent statements be confirmable in different ways?
I think this paradox is only apparent. It results from a simple confusion concerning the set of things considered for the confirmation of a statement." (p. 438)

3. ———. 1971. "On the Nature of Sommers' Rule." *Mind* no. 80:608-611.
"The number of recent journal articles (1) concerning Fred Sommers' "rule for enforcing ambiguity "(2) gives witness to an increasing interest in Sommers' way of doing ontology. Some of these articles can be said to display, at best, an undisguised misunderstanding of
just what the rule says. Others show, at worst, an - unwillingness to say what the intent and nature of the rule is. In this paper I want to say clearly just what the nature of

the rule for enforcing ambiguity is and show what Sommers intends by its formulation and use.
In " Types and Ontology "(3) Sommers has established an isomorphism between the structure of ordinary language and the ontological structure. The structure of a language can be represented on a "language tree ". A language tree is a mapping of the " sense" relations which hold between the terms of the language. Two terms, P and Q, have the sense relation U (written " U(PQ) ") just in case they can " make sense " together in a subject predicate sentence. If they do not make sense together, then any subject-predicate sentence formed with them will be a category mistake. A language tree can be formed by writing all the terms of the language so that a solid line is drawn only between U-related terms.(4)" (p. 608)
(1) See: Susan Haack, " Equivocality: A. Discussion of Sommers' Views ", *Analysis* (April, 1968), L. R. Reinhardt, " Dualism and Categories ", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. lxvi (1965-66), Hugh S. Chandler, " Persons and Predicability ", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 46, no. 2 (August 1968), and R. van Straaten, " Sommers' Rule and Equivocity ", *Analysis* (December 1968).
(2) C Predicability ", *Philosophy in America*, Edited by Max Black (Ithaca New York, 1965).
(3) *Philosophical Review*, vol. 72 (1963).
(4) For a full account of how to form a language tree see Fred Sommers, " The Ordinary Language Tree ", *Mind* (1959).

4. ———. 1971. "Elgood on Sommers' Rules of Sense." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 21:71-73.
" Several discussions of Fred Sommers's rules of sense have appeared recently. I will examine here the one by A. G. Elgood (this journal, April 1970) because I believe it clearly exemplifies how Sommers's theory is being too often misinterpreted by his critics.' My two points of criticism against Elgood will be brief. First, his formulations for the criterion of type differ- ence are ill-formed. Second, his counter examples fail because they ignore a subtle, but

crucial, distinction which can, be extracted from Sommers's theory. " (p. 71)

References

Elgood, A. G. (1970), “Sommers' Rules of Sense,” *Philosophical Quarterly*, 20: 166-169.

5. ———. 1971. "J. O. Nelson on Logical Notation." *Ratio* no. 13:88-89.
6. ———. 1972. "True Sentences and True Propositions." *Mind* no. 81:451-452.

   R. J. [Robin J. Haack] and Susan Haack have argued recently that " true " and " false " are, while univocally predicable of both sentences (tokens) and propositions, primarily predicated of sentences.(1) I do not wish to take issue here with the thesis that sentences rather than propositions

   are the primary bearers of truth. What I do want to reject is the view that " true " and " false " can univocally be applied to both sentences and propositions." (p. 451)

   (1) " Token-Sentences, Translation and Truth-Value ", *Mind*, vol. lxxix, 1970.
7. ———. 1972. "Persons and Predicates." *Philosophical Studies* no. 23:393-399.

   "My main thesis in this short paper is that the attribute theory of persons is correct but often misunderstood by its critics. We might best begin by comparing our theory with other possible theories of persons. Let us consider three other general sorts of theories: materialism, idealism, and dualism.

   According to any materialist theory of persons, a person is nothing more than a material object. Talk about mental (i.e. nonmaterial activities) can be translated into talk about bodily (material) activities. Thus, for the behaviourist, the difference between a person and any other material object lies in the differences between the bodily activities of the two. To say that persons differ from stones in that they (persons) are intelligent is simply to say, on this view, that material objects which are persons often, in certain circumstances, act in ways in which material objects which

are stones do not act. This is the view of behaviourists who are materialists. A behaviourist need not be a materialist. Nor need a materialist be a behaviourist. A materialist might be an 'identity-theorist'. He would hold, then, that a person is nothing more than a material object. But, he distinguishes between persons and other material objects in a way other than that used by the behaviourist materialist. The identity-theorist argues that a person differs from other material objects in that a person has a mind while other material objects do not. He then goes on to guarantee his materialism by identifying a person's mind with his brain or central nervous system.
For the idealist, a person is simply a mind (or soul or spirit), and minds are immaterial. Here persons differ from material objects simply by not being material. How idealists distinguish persons from other immaterial objects is not always dear. One thing is clear: the idealist who fails to distinguish between immaterial objects which are persons from immaterial objects which are not persons runs the risk of conceiving of persons in terms of those other immaterial objects (e.g. ideas of impressions or sense data) and thus, like Hume, ending up without a concept of persons." (pp. 393-394)

8. ———. 1972. "Vacuosity." *Mind* no. 81:273-275.
"It is argued here that F. Sommers' notion of vacuousity must be expanded to allow for statements presupposing false statements which may not be existential. the result of this is the enforcement of a distinction between vacuousity and category mistakenness, and, more importantly, a distinction between the spanning and predicability relations which hold between terms and things."
9. ———. 1972. "Sommers on Empty Domains and Existence." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 13:350-358.
10. ———. 1972. "On van Straaten's Modification of Sommers' Rule." *Philosophical Studies* no. 23:216-219.
"I argue here that R. van Straaten's four modifications of F. Sommers' 'rule for enforcing ambiguity' are based upon a misunderstanding of the basis of the rule and a failure to see the spanning/predicability distinction. The effect is that

none of van Straaten's several counterexamples are telling against the rule. In place of van Straaten's modifications I offer the following simple but important changes in the rule: the restriction of things to individuals and the reading of 'makes sense to predicate' and similar phrases in terms of the spanning relation."

11. ———. 1972. "A Revised Category Mistake Argument." *Philosophical Studies* no. 23:421-423.
12. ———. 1972. "Armstrong on Disembodied Minds." *Dialogue* no. 11:576-579.
13. ———. 1973. "The Logic of Negative Theology." *The New Scholasticism* no. 67:226-232.
14. ———. 1973. "Meinong on Existence." *Man and World* no. 6:80-82.
    "For several years I was told, and believed, that while Russell's theory of descriptions might he flawed (viz. in the way Strawson showed), his rejection of Meinong's theory of objects, which led to the theory of descriptions, was undoubtedly correct. Now I doubt very much if this is so. The "official" view is that Meinong had made the mistake of multiplying the senses of "exists" unnecessarily. According to this view, Meinong, since he held that the descriptive components of any meaningful sentence must refer to something, was forced to provide a special kind of existence, subsistence, for entities which are nonexistent but referred to meaningfully. Russell avoided this position by claiming that statements referring to nonexistent entities are meaningful but false (since they logically entail the existence of the entity referred to). I think the official view underestimates Meinong's philosophical abilities. Indeed, I think, rather than engaging in the philosophically dangerous task of multiplying kinds of existence, Meinong was expressing a keen insight into the nature of existential commitment." (p. 80)
15. ———. 1973. "Presupposition, Truth and Existence." *Philosophical Papers* no. 2:39-40.
    "Ever since Strawson first introduced the notion of presupposition into logical matters, debate has continued over the nature of this operation.

Is presupposition a logical relation between statements? Formal logic or "informal" logic? Does it mean that there are truth-value gaps? Isn't it just material implication? According to Strawson, a statement which presupposes a true statement is either true or false but a statement which presupposes a false statement is neither true nor false. These latter kinds of statements are vacuous. Compare this notion of presupposition with that of material implication. A statement which materially implies a true statement is either true or false while a statement which materially implies a false statement is false. What is the relation between 'The present King of France is bald' and 'The present King of France exists'? Strawson says it is one of presupposition. Russell said it was material implication. The Russellian rejects the notions of presupposition and vacuousity in order to preserve crucial elements of formal logic (viz. truth-functionality and bivalence). The Strawsonian accepts the concepts of presupposition and vacuousity as reflective of important elements in ordinary discourse, and thus denies those parts of formal logic which his opponent treasures." (p. 39)

16. ———. 1973. "Persons, Predicates and Death." *Second Order* no. 2:67-70.
17. ———. 1973. "Locke's Language of Proper Names." *Locke Newsletter* no. 4:25-30.
"It is argued here that recent discussions concerning the compatibility of Locke's theory of nominal essences with Geach's thesis (that each use of a proper name must presuppose the ability to use some corresponding general term) fail to appreciate the important difference between the generation of Lockean general ideas (from ideas of individuals) and the generation of Lockean general terms (not from proper names)."
18. ———. 1973. "Epistemic Logic and Mere Belief." *Logique et Analyse* no. 63-64:374-378.
"In a previous article (1) I argued that the distinction which epistemologists look for between knowing and believing is actually the distinction between knowing and merely

believing, where, unlike belief, mere belief is incompatible with knowledge.
Using Fred Sommers' notion of predicate negation, (2) where the negation of a predicate is equivalent to the disjunction of all those predicates incompatible with it , I formulated several epistemic statements and drew out ten conditionals which should at least be theorems of any epistemic calculus.
In what follows I want to set up the axioms for an epistemic calculus. A few of these wi l come from my previous list of conditionals. I then want to show that in such a system the necessary conditions for mere belief can be adequately formulated." (p. 375)
(1) "Knowledge, Negation and Incompatibility", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 66 (1969).
(2) "Predicability," in Max Black, ed., *Philosophy in America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1965), and "On a Fregean Dogma," in *Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Amsterdam 1967).

19. ———. 1973. "Suggested Truth-Tables for a Three-Valued Sentential Logic." *International Logic Review* no. 8:255-259.
"Truth-tables for the normal sentential connectives are constructed on the basis of the concept of 'partial values'. On this view, every statement has a truth-value which is a function of an ordered pair of partial values. The first member is either T or non-T and the second is either F or non-F. The four combinations of partial values result in three possible truth-values: true, false, and empty."
20. ———. 1974. "Sommers on the Predicate 'Exists'." *Philosophical Studies* no. 26:419-423.
"In a series of recent journal articles F. Sommers has developed a logic of terms which differs greatly from the usual logic now taught in the schools. However, Sommers has commited himself to a thesis proper to that logic but not to his: everything exists. It is shown here that such a thesis cannot follow from Sommers' previous work. Using his logic proofs that something exists and that something does not exist are given."

21. ———. 1974. "A Note on Contrariety." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 15:613-614.
"It is shown here that S. McCall's proposal, that in addition to the normal sentential operation of negation there is another, more traditional, sentential operation of contrariety ("Contrariety," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 8, 1967) is misguided. There is indeed a contrariety operator. But, it is a predicate operator rather than a sentential operator. The ability to explicate contrariety is just one of the advantages which an Aristotelian logic of terms has over modern sentential logic."
22. ———. 1974. "Brody on Sommers." *Philosophical Studies* no. 26:149-150.
23. ———. 1974. "Erwin on the Category Mistake Argument." *Second Order* no. 3:47-53.
24. ———. 1974. "Behaviorism and Perception." *Man and World* no. 7:149-157.
"After distinguishing the ontological question concerning persons (what is the concept of a person?) from the epistemological question (on what grounds does my knowledge of persons rest?) three kinds of behaviorism are cited as responses to the Cartesian answer to the epistemological question. Unlike physicalism and dispositionism, restricted behaviorism denies that knowledge applies at all to myself and goes on to distinguish behavior from bodily activity. On this theory behavior is taken to be interpreted bodily activity -- bodily activity seen as personal behavior."
25. ———. 1974. "More on Disembodied Minds." *Philosophical Papers* no. 3:48-49.
26. ———. 1974. "Essentiality." *Journal of Critical Analysis* no. 5:112-117.
27. ———. 1975. *Speaking of Persons*. Halifax: Dalhousie University Press.
"This monograph is an attempt to defend an attributist theory of the concept of a person. It is held that our ordinary concept of a person is the concept of a noncomposite (contra dualism), material (contra idealism) object, to which both Strawsonian p- and m-predicates apply. Personal identity is

accounted for in terms of bodily continuity "and" sortal continuity. Finally, with the aid of F. Sommers' theory of linguistic-ontological ismorphism, it is argued that an ontological theory compatible with our theory, must reject any sort of spirit, including God."

28. ———. 1975. "Sommers' Proof That Something Exists." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 16:298-300.
"In the concluding remarks of [4] I mentioned that in [8] Sommers had given a proof to the effect that necessarily something exists and that later in [5] this proof was shown to be wrong in principle. Sommers' proof went like this:
1. Something is possible.
2. Whatever is not a categorially possible thing is not a possible thing.
3. Suppose there were nothing (i.e., nothing exists).
4. By definition D-things are categorially impossible if and only if nothing
is D and nothing is D.
5. For any D, nothing is D and nothing is D. (by 3)
6. For any D, D-things are categorially impossible, (by 4 and 5)
7. For any D, D-things are not possible things, (by 2 and 6)
Since 7 is inconsistent with 1, we must reject 1 or 2 or 3 or 4. 1, 2, and 4 seem certain. Thus we must reject 3. This gives us the negation of 3 (Something exists).
Q.E.D.
Guerry attacked Sommers' proof by showing that 4 allows counterexamples and must be rejected rather than 3. What bothered Guerry about 4 was that it allowed Sommers to "derive a necessity (the impossibility of D-things) from a contingency (the nonexistence of D- and D-things)." Nevertheless, a simple reformulation of this definition (4) can be used to render the proof immune to Guerry's attack. The reformulation is simply what I think Sommers had actually intended by 4. However, this reformulated argument can be shown to be simply invalid requiring Sommers to find a completely new argument for his purposes." (p. 298)
References

[4] Englebretsen, G., "Sommers on empty domains and existence," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. XIII (1972), pp. 350-358.
[5] Guerry, H., "Sommers' ontological proof," *Analysis*, vol. 27 (1967), pp. 60-61.
[8] Sommers, F., "Why is there something and not nothing?" *Analysis*, vol. 26 (1966), pp. 177-181.

29. ———. 1975. "Rescher on E!" *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 16:536-538.
"In "Definitions of 'existence'," *Philosophical Studies,* vol. 7 (1957), pp. 65-69, N. Rescher rejected the definition of 'E!' given by H. S. Leonard in "The Logic of existence", *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 7 (1956) pp. 49-64.
(...)
In this note I will first briefly show that Reseller's reason for rejecting (L) is unsatisfactory. Then I will show that (R2) must be rejected. Finally, I will make some remarks about the general attempt to formalize a definition of existence."
30. ———. 1975. "Sommers' Theory and Natural Theology." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*:111-116.
31. ———. 1975. "Trivalence and Absurdity." *Philosophical Papers* no. 4:221-227.
32. ———. 1976. "The Square of Opposition." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 17:531-541.
33. ———. 1976. "Sommers' Tree Theory and Possible Things." *Philosophical Studies (Ireland)* no. 24:131-139.
34. ———. 1978. "Aristotle on the Subject of Predication." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 19:614-616.
Reprinted in: A. Menne and G. Offenberger (eds.), *Zur Modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik,* vol. II, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1985, pp. 128-130.
"Aristotle's thesis that universals must always inhere in a primary substance, a particular, has been used recently as evidence that he, like many contemporary logicians, rejected the predication of terms to universal, i.e., nonsingular, subjects. Yet this would force Aristotle to treat quantifiers as ranging over bare, unsorted, particulars. But Aristotle took the notion of an unsorted particular as nonsense. His thesis about the status of universals can no more serve as evidence

that he took all subjects as particulars than can his thesis that every particular satisfies some universal serve as evidence that he took no subjects as particular."

35. ———. 1979. "Notes on the New Syllogistic." *Logique et Analyse* no. 85-86:111-120.
36. ———. 1980. "Singular Terms and the Syllogistic." *The New Scholasticism* no. 54:68-74.
"It is generally held that singular terms have no place in Aristotle's syllogistic. A variety of reasons have been given for holding this view. Nevertheless, Aristotle did offer examples of syllogisms containing singular terms. It is suggested here that the reasons for denying singulars a place in syllogistic are unacceptable. Thus, singular terms are on a logical par with general terms.
They can be subject terms (thus be quantified) and they can be predicate terms as well (thus be affirmed or denied of subjects). A proper understanding of how this is so comes only from a clear understanding of Aristotle's theory of logical syntax. Recently F. Sommers has provided a syllogistic logic ("the calculus of terms") which shows, among other things, how singulars can be treated syllogistically."
37. ———. 1980. "Noncategorical Syllogisms in the *Analytics*." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 21:602-608.
"It is a commonplace now among logicians that the logic of categorical syllogisms, first developed by Aristotle, presupposes the now-familiar logic of unanalyzed propositions. Aristotle, however, clearly took the syllogistic to be "basic logic", presupposing no other logic. Since he was not unaware of many important principles now constitutive of the calculus of propositions, it can only be argued that either: (i) Aristotle was blind to the import of such principles for formal logic in general, or (ii) he believed such principles could be accounted for by the syllogistic. In spite of the numerous and illustrious supporters of (i), we shall attempt here a brief defense of (ii).
The question, of course, is not whether Aristotle himself substantiated (ii), but rather: can any syllogistic substantiate (ii)? In answering this question affirmatively

we will first cite several arguments which are found in the *Analytics*, and which make use of well-known principles of the propositional calculus. We shall then make some historical remarks concerning the attempt to reduce the logic of unanalyzed propositions to the logic of analyzed propositions (the syllogistic). Finally, we hope to show how a recently developed syllogistic system offers a technique which can be used to successfully render the arguments cited from the *Analytics* as categorical syllogisms." (p. 602)

38. ———. 1980. "On Propositional Form." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 21:101-120.
Reprinted in: A. Menne and G. Offenberger (eds.), *Zur Modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik*, vol. II, Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1985 pp. 131-140.
39. ———. 1980. "Denotation and Reference." *Philosophical Studies (Ireland)* no. 27:229-236.
40. ———. 1980. "A Note on Predication." *Dialogue* no. 19:627-628.
Reply to: Nicholas Griffin, "Do we need predication?", *Dialogue*, 16, 1977, pp. 653-663.
41. ———. 1980. "Chandler on Change." *Critica* no. 7:81-85.
"Common sense, as Aristotle saw, demands an account of the world which admits both accidental and substantial change. In the first an object ceases to be how-it-is; in the second it ceases to be what-it-is. H. S. Chandler's recent critique of M. Loux's "Substance and attribute" suffers from a misunderstanding of this distinction. Chandler mistakenly concludes from the Aristotle-Loux theory that because an object is necessarily what-it-is, then it is eternally what-it-is."
42. ———. 1980. "Bryant on Sommers." *Critica* no. 7:87-92.
43. ———. 1981. "A Journey to Eden: Geach on Aristotle." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 14:133-141.
"Peter Geach has charged Aristotle with the sin of corrupting logic by initiating a process which led to the view that a sentence consists logically of just two names. This charge can only result from a clearly mistaken view of Aristotle's theory of logical syntax. Aristotle, unlike Geach,

was careful to distinguish subjects from subject-terms and predicates from predicate-terms.
He took both subjects and predicates as syntactical complexes. Geach, following Frege, holds a very different theory of logical syntax which takes predicates, but not subjects, as syntactically complex."

44. ———. 1981. *Logical Negation*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Introduction 1; Some historical remarks 3; Negation in mathematical logic 19; Sommers' term logic 28; The symbolism for a term logic 38; Negation and falsity 47; Concluding remarks on the nature of formal logic 56; Index 61-62.
"This monograph examines the notions of negation found in classical, Stoic, and contemporary mathematical logics and argues that for philosophical purposes, and consonant with ordinary discourse, the notions of predicate denial and term negation (Aristotle's) are to be preferred over the sentential negation now favored. Arguments supporting this atavism are drawn from or based upon the work of F. Sommers. A final result of this investigation is new light on falsity."

45. ———. 1981. *Three Logicians: Aristotle, Leibniz, and Sommers, and the Syllogistic*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Preface VII; Introduction 1; *Three logicians*; Aristotle 9; Leibniz 28; Sommers 42; *The syllogistic*; Contemporary mathematical logic 67; Syllogistic logic 77; Concluding remarks 109; Bibliography 113; Index 116-118.
"In his *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London, 1952) P.F. Strawson attempted to show that traditional syllogistic logic was more reflective of various features of ordinary language than was modern mathematical logic. P. Geach, the best modern critic of traditional logic, responded to Strawson in "Mr. Strawson on Symbolic and Traditional Logic", *Mind,* 72 (1963). His brief remarks there show that Strawson's defense of the old logic is, at best, naive. Geach clearly believes that there just can be no sound defense of traditional logic. He even suggests that those who would persist in their allegiance to the old logic are either irrational or lazy. He says:

Many readers will vaguely think Strawson has *proved* that the traditional system with all its faults is philosophically less misleading than the new-fangled one. Those Colleges of Unreason where the pseudo-Aristotelian logic is presented as the only genuine logic, and those lecturers who would like to teach the philosophy of logic without having to learn any modern logic, may well thus have been supplied with a pretext for supine ignorance.
We believe that syllogistic logic is philosophically defensible. What Geach sees as its faults are either not faults at all or can be remedied. The result of applying such remedies is a new syllogistic - a logic which is broader and stronger than Aristotle's original. It is a logic competitive with the "new fangled" logic of today. This new syllogistic was invisaged, but not built, by Leibniz. The hope for such a logic lay dormant during the period when mathematical logic was being born and nurtured through its rapid maturity. But recently that hope has been revitalized, and virtually fulfilled, in the work of F. Sommers. The best general answer to Geach's overall charge is simply a presentation of this new syllogistic.
While the primary motive in presenting this essay is the defense of syllogistic against its modern detractors, we also believe that it is time for a concise introduction to Sommers' logical work. This work is scattered throughout a wide variety of journals and anthologies; and there is now no available account of it. Given the great originality of Sommers' ideas, and the importance of the issues he has chosen to deal with in logic, this void must be filled. Part of this essay is intended as a modest start at that task." (From the Preface).

46. ———. 1981. "A Further Note on a Proof by Sommers." *Logique et Analyse* no. 94:271-272.
47. ———. 1981. "On the Terms of Truth." *Philosophical Papers* no. 10:89-92.
"Correspondence theories of truth require a special relation between sentences and the world.
Relying on suggestions first made by Leibniz, and later expanded by Sommers, it can be shown that the relation

called for is simply that of denotation. Since denotation is primarily a relation between a term and things, sentences must be construed as terms. The things denoted by sentences are (pace Sommers) states of affairs."

48. ———. 1981. "Predicates, Predicables and Names." *Critica* no. 8:105-108.
"It is a canon of modern predicate logic that general terms are predicates and subjects are singular. Traditional logic, by contrast, took all terms to be fit for either the subject or predicate roles. The thesis, recently defended by T. Burge, that names are predicates amounts (once the prejudices of modern logic are abandoned) to the much weaker claim that names can be used as general terms."
49. ———. 1981. "A Note on Identity, Reference and Logical Form." *Critica* no. 8:75-81.
50. ———. 1982. "Do We Need Relative Identity?" *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 23:91-93.
51. ———. 1982. "Aristotle and Quine on the Basic Combination." *The New Scholasticism* no. 56:244-249.
"Quine's 'basic combination' is a sentence joining a singular to a general term. The position as the singular is referential -- that of the general is predicational. Singulars and generals are unfit for each other's position. This contrasts with Aristotle's view, which takes such sentences to join a subject and a predicate. A subject is a quantified term -- a predicate is a qualified term. Yet the terms themselves are syntactically homogeneous -- fit for each other's position. One motive behind the Quinean view is the belief that: (i) subjects refer, (ii) singular refer to individuals, (iii) universals cannot be referred to. So, since generals cannot refer without referring to universals, generals are unfit for subjects. the Aristotelian account of logical syntax also avoids Platonic consequences, but not at the cost of an unsupported singular/general distinction."
52. ———. 1982. "Aristotle on the Oblique." *Philosophical Studies* no. 29:89-101.
53. ———. 1982. "Leibniz on Logical Syntax." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 14:119-126.

54. ———. 1982. "Natural Syntax, Logical Syntax and Translation." *Australian Logic Teachers Journal* no. 6:8-14.
55. ———. 1982. "What in the World is the Truth About Logical Space?" *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 4:52-61.
56. ———. 1982. "Predication Old and New." *Critica* no. 14:117-120.
57. ———. 1983. "Presupposition and Existence." *Philosophical Papers* no. 12:1-8.
58. ———. 1983. "Presumptions of Reference." *Philosophical Papers* no. 12:9-11.
59. ———. 1983. "Reference, Anaphora and Singular Quantity." *Dialogos* no. 41:67-72.
60. ———. 1984. "Opposition." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 25:79-85.
61. ———. 1984. "Quadratum Auctum." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 107:309-325.
Reprinted in: George Englebretsen (ed.), *Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers*, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 1990, pp. 133-147.
62. ———. 1984. "Feldman and Sommers on Leibniz's Law." *Dialogos* no. 43:91-96.
"Following suggestions made recently by F. Sommers it can be shown that Leibniz's law is in fact a principle of term substitutability. Terms are the same if and only if they are intersubstitutable for one another. More importantly for Leibniz's general program for syllogistic is the fact that this principle is but a special case of the *dictum de omni*."
63. ———. 1984. "Logical Structure and Natural Syntax." *Journal of Social and Biological Structures* no. 7:219-234.
64. ———. 1984. "Syntactical Complexity." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 6:119-126.
65. ———. 1984. "Notes on Quine's Syntactical Insights." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 22:149-157.
66. ———. 1984. "Anselm's Second Argument." *Sophia* no. 23:34-37.
67. ———. 1984. "Freeman on Induction/Deduction." *Informal Logic* no. 6:26-27.
68. ———. 1984. "Logical Form and Natural Syntax." *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* no. 11:229-254.

69. ———. 1985. "Geach on Logical Syntax." *The New Scholasticism* no. 59:177-184.
70. ———. 1985. "On the Proper Treatment of Negative Names." *Journal of Critical Analysis* no. 8:109-115.
71. ———. 1985. "Negative Names." *Philosophia* no. 15:133-136.
"E. M. Zemach's otherwise superb defense of the formal symmetry of names and general terms includes a mistaken view about the nature of negated names. While agreeing with his symmetry thesis I argue that he fails to appreciate (1) that the referents of negated names are not logically impossible, and (2) that the negation of a name is not a name."
72. ———. 1985. "Defending Distribution." *Dialogos* no. 45:157-159.
"At least one recent defender of the doctrine of distribution has conceded too much to the opposition. Friends of distribution must recognize the crucial distinction between denotation, a semantic feature of all terms, and reference, a semantic feature of quantified expressions. They must also be prepared to apply their doctrine to every kind of term -- including relationals."
73. ———. 1985. "Quine on Aristotle on Identity." *Critica* no. 17:65-68.
74. ———. 1985. "Zur philosophischen Interpretation der Logik: ein weiter aristotelischen Dialog." In *Zur Modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Vol. II*, edited by Menne, Albert and Öffenberger, Niels, 112-127. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
75. ———. 1985. "Logical Primitives." *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* no. 12:371-380.
76. ———. 1985. "Semantic Considerations for Sommers' Logic." *Philosophy Research Archives* no. 11:281-318.
"During the last twenty-five years Fred Sommers has developed a series of inter-related theories of language structure, ontological structure, logical syntax, and truth. Each theory has naturally contained valuable suggestions concerning semantic issues. But Sommers has not yet offered a specifically semantic theory. I attempt here to fill that gap by sketching a theory of semantics based upon his

logical theses. The theory holds that terms, as used in statement making sentences, have both denotation and signification. Terms denote objects and signify properties. Terms, when quantified, refer to some or all of their denotations, and, when quantified, characterize the subjects to which they are predicated as having or lacking the properties they signify. The semantic, syntactic, and ontological theses presented in this theory are contrasted with those found in classical, Scholastic, Leibnizian, Fregean, and Quinean theories."

77. ———. 1986. "On Some Alleged Semantic Correlations." *The New Scholasticism* no. 60:490-500.
"The Fregean replacement of the subject/predicate distinction with the argument/function distinction led to an emphasis on the singular/general distinction for logic. Only singulars could be subjects; only general terms could be predicates. Singulars refer; predicates are true of Ultimately the Fregean syntactic distinction is semantic. The old subject/predicate is not. A semantic theory based on the old logic of subjects and predicates can allow the semantic, syntactic and ontological distinctions their proper places."

78. ———. 1986. "Singular / General." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 27:104-107.
"Modern logic takes the difference between singular and general terms very seriously. It insists that sentences with general subjects have a much more complex logical syntax than sentences with singular subjects.
This is partly because modern logic always treats general terms as predicates and never treats singular terms as anything but subjects. The insistence that the logic of singulars is different from the logic of general propositions is also partly due to modern logic's demand that the logical form of any sentence be a reflection of its truth conditions. 'Socrates is wise' is true just in case Socrates is wise. But 'Some philosopher is wise' is true just in case there is at least one thing which is such that it is a philosopher and it is wise. So the modern logician requires a great deal of semantic information to be reflected in syntax. But how does a logician decide how much semantic information

should be so reflected? Surely not all. There's just too much. Just that which determines truth? 'John is a bachelor' has as one of its (necessary) truth conditions that John is a male. Yet the modern logician does not require this bit of semantic information to be revealed syntactically."

79. ———. 1986. "Czezowski on Wild Quantity." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 27:62-65.
"It is well known that if singular sentences are to be fully incorporated into a syllogistic logic, singular subjects must be quantified. Leibniz argued that such subjects are both universal and particular. Similar (but not identical) views have been advanced in this century by Copi, Sommers and Czezowski. but the latter has argued that singular quantity is unique, distinct from the two classical quantities. it is shown here that this is an illusion."

80. ———. 1986. "A Note on Truth and Existence in Leibniz." *Manuscrito.Revista Internacional de Filosofia* no. 9:7-9.
"Leibniz was able to connect the notion of truth for a sentence with the idea of existence for individuals. Words and sentences are taken to both denote individuals and signify concepts. iI a true sentence two conditions must hold. The concept signified by the subject and the word denoted by the sentence must be the actual word."

81. ———, ed. 1987. *The New Syllogistic*. New York: Peter Lang. Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. The calculus of terms by Fred Sommers p. 11 (reprinted from *Mind,* 89, (1970); 2. De Morgan and Sommers by Peter Swiggart p. 57; 3. Back to Leibniz or on from Frege? by B. H. Slater p. 87; 4. Review: *The logic of natural language* by Peter Frederick Strawson p. 99 (reprinted from *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79, (1982); 5. On the semantics of Sommers' 'Some *S*' p. 105 by Richard M. Martin p. 105 (reprinted from *Mind, modality, meaning and method* (1983); 6. Sommers and modern logic by John Bacon p. 121; 7. Proofs and pronouns: extending the system by Michael Lockwood p. 161; 8. Algebraic rules for syllogisms and antilogisms by W. H. Friedman p. 213; 9. The two term theory of predication by Aris Noah p. 223; 10. Natural syntax and Sommers' theory of logical form by George Englebretsen p. 245; 11. Some practical and

theoretical features of Sommers' cancellation method by Richard Purtill p. 273; 12. Some problems with TFL [Traditional Formal Logic] by Charles Sayward p. 283; 13. Truth and existence by Fred Sommers p. 299; 14. Logical polarity by George Englebretsen p. 305; Notes on the contributors p. 313; Bibliography p. 315-322.
"This anthology brings together essays by F. Sommers, his defenders and critics concerning his new system of logic based on a traditional logical syntax (the "new syllogistic"). The essays include presentations of the logic, explorations of some of its historical antecedents, examinations of the symbolic algorithm which accompanies it, and discussions of such key topics as pronominalization, truth, syllogistic inference, existence and term-negation."

82. ———. 1987. "Subjects." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 19:85-90.
83. ———. 1987. "Natural Syntax and Sommers' Theory of Logical Form." In *The New Syllogistic*, edited by Englebretsen, George, 245-272. New York: Peter Lang.
"F. Sommers has challenged the Fregean theory of logical syntax. In particular, he has denied the idea that natural language has no logic. It is possible to articulate a theory of logical syntax for natural language. it construes sentences as concatenations of subjects and predicates. A subject is a quantifier plus a term; a predicate is a qualifier plus a term. Surprisingly, such an analysis accounts not only for categoricals but singulars, identities, rationals and truth-functions."
84. ———. 1987. "Logical Polarity." In *The New Syllogistic*, edited by Englebretsen, George, 305-311. New York: Peter Lang.
"Both statements and terms can be negated. They come in positively/negatively charged pairs. This polarity is reversible for terms (for any negative term a semantically equivalent positive can be defined) but not for statements. An account of why this is so is offered here."
85. ———. 1987. "Morris on Identity." *Analysis* no. 47:92-93.
86. ———. 1987. "Truth and Existence." In *The New Syllogistic*, edited by Englebretsen, George, 299-304. New York: Peter Lang.

87. ———. 1988. "Preliminary Notes on a New Modal Syllogistic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 29:381-395.
Abstract: "This article consists of five parts. In Section 1 we introduce the topic of modal syllogistic by examining the case of the two Barbaras found in *Prior Analytics*.
In the second section we briefly review certain aspects of the "new syllogistic" developed in recent years by Fred Sommers. The next two sections examine some of the syntactic and semantic features of modal sentences *de dicto* and *de re* respectively. Our final section presents a preliminary sketch of what a syllogistic admitting both *de dicto* and *de re* modality would look like."
88. ———. 1988. "A Note on Leibniz's Wild Quantity Thesis." *Studia Leibnitiana* no. 20:87-89.
89. ———. 1988. "La théorie des catégories de Sommers: une nouvelle introduction." *Dialogue* no. 27:451-473.
90. ———. 1989. "Formatives." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 30:382-389.
Abstract: "An answer to the question of 'sentential unity' (What makes a sentence a single linguistic unit rather than just a string of words?) is one of the goals of any theory of logical syntax. A 'Fregean' theory claims that a sentence is a function (unsaturated expression, containing gaps) whose gaps are filled with either arguments (saturated, gap-less) or other functions which have already been saturated. A 'Leibnizian' theory construes a sentence as a syntactically complex subject (quantified term) plus a syntactically complex predicate (qualified term). Subjects and predicates just naturally fit one another to form sentences. An 'Aristotelian' theory takes a sentence to consist of a pair of terms connected by a binary formative expression (functor), whose only role is to connect terms to form more complex expressions (e.g., sentences). After an examination of the formal nature of such functors, it is argued that this third sort of theory not only answers better the question of sentential unity, but it also provides a better account of the nature of logical constants in general."

91. ———. 1990. *Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers: In Logical Terms*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
Contents;
Foreword by Graeme Hunter I; Introduction III; I. A reintroduction to Sommers' tree theory 1; II. Sommers on the subject of a sentence 33; III. On the philosophical interpretation of logic: another Aristotelian dialogue 43; IV. A introduction to (a Sommers-like) logic 63; V. Remarks on the semantics of terms and sentences 109; VI. Qadratum auctum 133; VII. On the logic of phrasal conjunctions 151; VIII. Compound terms 159; IX. Preliminary notes on a new modal syllogistic 169; X. Existing things 189; XI. A brief note on psychologism 197; Bibliography 205; Index of names 229; Index of terms 233.
92. ———. 1990. "A note on Copula and Qualifiers." *Linguistic Analysis* no. 20:82-86.
93. ———. 1990. "Cartesian Syntax." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 12:59-64.
"The "Cartesian" theory of logical syntax was most fully formulated by the Port-Royal logicians. A brief survey of their work, especially the Logique, shows that they took a statement to have a deep structure analyzable as a predication. It is a joining or separating of two terms by a positive or negative copula. Complex terms were also viewed as (implicit) predication. The logical syntax of predication requires no recourse to semantic distinctions among terms, nor does it distinguish atomic from molecular statements."
94. ———. 1990. "The Myth of Modern Logic." *Cogito* no. 4:150-158.
95. ———. 1992. "Linear Diagrams for Syllogisms (with Relationals)." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 33:37-69.
"A system for diagramming syllogisms is developed here. Unlike Venn, and other planar diagrams, these diagrams are linear. This allows one to diagram inferences which exceed the virtual four term limit onnonlinear systems. It also can be extended (by the use of vectors) to inferences involving all kinds of relational expressions."

96. ———. 1992. "An Algebra for Logic." *Canadian Journal of Rethorical Studies* no. 2:104-140.
97. ———. 1992. "Plus and Minus." *Critica* no. 24:73-116.
98. ———. 1992. "Laying the Cards on the Table: Negation Theory and Contradiction." *Linguistic Analysis* no. 22:96-99.
99. ———. 1994. "A Propos of Nothing." *Linguistic Analysis* no. 24:32-38.
100. ———. 1996. *Something to Reckon With: The Logic of Terms*. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press.
With a foreword by Fred Sommers; Preface; Introduction 1; 1. The good old days of the bad old logic (or, Adam's Fall); Aristotle's syllogistic 9; Scholastic additions 16; Cartesian interlude 23; Leibnizian insights 30; Nineteenth-century algebraists 41; 2. A modern success Story (or, Frege to the rescue); Frege 53; Bradley and Ramsey raise some doubts 64; Russell and Wittgenstein 69; Strawson, Geach, and Quine 78; 3. Coming to terms with Sommers 99; The Calculus of Terms 99; The logic of natural language 122; The truth 135; The laws of thought 142; 4. It all adds up 149; Plus/Minus 149; Truth and what 'there' is 185; A new system of diagrams 188; Conclusion 239; Bibliography 243; Index of names 269-274.
101. ———. 1997. "The Unifying Copula." *Logique et Analyse* no. 159:255-259.
102. ———. 1997. "Religious Discourse and Sommers' Theory of Truth: A Response to Hans H. Penner." *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion* no. 9:249-258.
103. ———. 1998. *Line Diagrams for Logic: Drawing Conclusions*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
Preface; Introduction 1; I. Reasoning with diagrams 7; II. Syntax and diagrams 13; III. A word about truth 17; IV. Diagramming categoricals and singulars 19; V. Compound terms and negative names 29; VI. Compound names 37; VII. Syllogistic inference 41; VIII. Relationals 47; IX. Reflexive and personal pronouns; 57; X. The dictum de omni 63; XI. Statement logic as a special part of term logic 67; XII. Diagramming unanalyzed statements 77; XIII. Final remarks 85; Appendix 87; References 99-105

104. ———. 2000. "Preliminaries for a Term-Functor Logic." In *Variable-Free Semantics*, edited by Böttner, M. and Thümmel, W., 90-99. Osnabrück: Secolo-Verlag.
105. ———. 2000. "Two Important Logical Insights by Lewis Carroll." In *Reflections on Lewis Carroll*, edited by Soto, Fernando J. Shelburne: The Lewis Carroll Society of Canada.
106. ———. 2002. "Syllogistic: Old Wine in New Bottles." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 23:31-35.
"In the late nineteenth century there were two very active lines of research in the field of formal logic. First, logicians (mostly in English-speaking countries) were engaged in formulating a generally traditional logic as an algebra, a part of mathematics; second, logicians (mostly on the Continent) were busy building a non-traditional logic that could serve, not as a part of, but as the foundation of, mathematics. By the end of the First World War the former line had been pretty well abandoned while the second continued to expand. However, that old abandoned line, stretching from Aristotle, through the Scholastics and then Leibniz to the nineteenth century algebraists, had not been completely forgotten. One of those logicians who has recently worked on the restoration (and, importantly, the extension) of that line is Fred Sommers. His Term Logic preserves a number of traditional insights (especially involving the theory of logical syntax), while also enjoying a power to account for formal inference at least comparable to that of the standard logic now in place."
107. ———. 2004. "Predicate Logic, Predicates, and Terms." In *First-Order Logic Revisited*, edited by Hendricks, Vincent, Neuhaus, Fabian, Pedersen, Stig Andur, Scheffler, Uwe and Wansing, Heinrich, 75-88. Berlin: Logos Verlag.
Abstract: "My primary aim here is to introduce in a very preliminary way a system of formal logic that has been built by Fred Sommers and myself over the past few years. This term logic matches the inferential power of the standard first-order predicate logic, but enjoys certain advantages in terms of simplicity and naturalness. What I hope this can offer is some insight into ideas concerning formal logic that

are extremely old but not often encountered today. I may rightly be accused of atavism for touting such antiques, but perhaps the contrast between these ideas and more contemporary ones will be of interest. So, some of my remarks will concern some central logical concepts (especially the concept of predication), while others will be a bit historical."

108. ———. 2005. "Trees, Terms, and Truth: The Philosophy of Fred Sommers." In *The Old New Logic. Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers*, edited by Oderberg, David S., 25-48. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
"During the past fifty years Fred Sommers has developed bold and original ideas concerning the sense structure of natural language and how it reveals ontological structure, a powerful and fully expressive version of term logic, and a revitalized theory of truth by correspondence. This essay shows how all these ideas are mutually related to one another. Together they amount to a unified, coherent theory of mind, language and the world. Sommers's work in these areas has influenced research in philosophy of language, logic, and cognitive psychology."

109. ———. 2006. *Bare Facts and Naked Truths: A New Correspondence Theory of Truth*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Contents: Preface IX. Part One: Introduction; 1. À la recherche du temps perdu 9; 2. The big MAC attack 37; Part Two: 3. Terminism 79; 4. Facing the facts 1070; 5. Giving the world Its due 141; 6. A nice derangement 153; Conclusion 167; Bibliography 171; Index 189.
"The aim of the present essay is to outline a theory about truth. Since a number of concepts are involved in the concept of truth this means that I shall has to offer clarification, of one sort or another, of a large number of concepts and conceptual clusters. Some of these involve what there is, existence, reality, and the like (so my project is partly metaphysical); some involve knowledge, belief, perception, and so forth (so my project is partly epistemological); others involve sentences, terms, propositions, statements, saying, and so on (so part of my project is in the philosophy of language -- semantics). To

illustrate briefly what I've been saying, consider some of the semantic concepts with which we shall be dealing. The terms of art needed to talk about such things as sentences, statements, facts, stating, saying, and what is stated are all plagued by ambiguity (and much else besides). To disambiguate them, trace out their different senses, is to analyze the multiple concepts they can express. Thus a sentence might be either a sentence-type or a sentence-token; a statement might be either a sentence or what is expressed by a sentence; a fact might be either a true sentence, a true statement, a truth expressed by a sentence (or by a statement), or what makes something (a sentence, statement, and so on) true; to state might be to utter, to express, to signify, or to do something else; to say might be to utter or to state; what is stated might be a sentence, a fact, or something else. So here we have just a portion of a large cluster of concepts that is implicated in any account of truth and is in serious need of clarification, analysis, disentanglement -- and I have yet to focus on the concept of a concept. An appropriate way to make progress here is to try to formulate a detailed, specific theory of truth. Along the way, the clarification of various concepts will help push along the development of the theory. Reciprocally, the theory, as it gets formulated, will help shed light on various key concepts and at least show the way to the clarification of others."

110. ———, ed. 2008. *Numerical Term Logic, by Lorne Szabolcsi*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
111. ———. 2008. "The Dodo and the DO: Lewis Carroll on the *Dictum de Omni*." *Proceedings of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics* no. 20:142-148. Reprinted in: *The Carrollian: The Lewis Carroll Journal,* 25 (2014), pp. 29-37.
112. ———. 2010. "Making Sense of Truth-Makers." *Topoi* no. 29:147-151.
113. ———. 2012. *Robust Reality: An Essay in Formal Ontology*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Because I owe so much to Fred Sommers, I offer the present book as a feeble attempt to fulfill his wish to provide

a full account of the tree theory, of the structure of language, its relation to ontology, and the many fruits that can be harvested from it - especially when watered by logic and ripened in the sunlight of truth." (p. XIII).

"In this essay, we have examined systems of formal ontology hinted at by Aristotle, attempted by Ryle, and one fully articulated by Sommers. Each took some formal aspect of language to provide a guide to the formal structure of the ontology. More particularly, each concentrated on semantic relations as key to that structure. This contrasts with more recent theories that take the syntactic forms dictated by modern mathematical logic as the proper guide to ontology. Sommers' semantic-ontological tree theory proved fruitful. For example, it highlighted the fact that term ambiguity, which requires different senses of a term to have different locations on the language tree, is most commonly the result of following rules - rules that "enforce ambiguity" on some terms. Moreover, the theory permitted a rational way to look at the order in which various rules governing language apply - "levels of rectitude".

Given the isomorphism of sense structures for the terms of ordinary language and the inclusion relations among categories of things, the notion of levels of rectitude could be extended to rules governing ontology as well. The key notion of spanning, which holds or fails to hold between a (sense of a) term and thing, helps enrich our understanding of how things can constitute not only sets but categories and types.

In examining the tree theory, with its focus on terms, one can't help noting that much depends on the idea that predication is essentially a relation between a predicable term and another term, which is also predicable. It was this idea, that statements could be parsed as pairs of terms standing in the relation of predication, that led Aristotle away from the view that statements consist of names and verbs. Giving up that grammar-based view freed Aristotle to view statements as consisting of pairs of terms joined together by a logical copula doing the work of predication.

Only then was he able to develop formal logic, a term logic, the syllogistic." (pp. 143-144).
114. ———. 2015. *Exploring Topics in the History and Philosophy of Logic*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
115. ———. 2016. "Fred Sommers' Contributions to Formal Logic." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 37:269-291. Abstract: "Fred Sommers passed away in October of 2014 in his 92nd year. Having begun his teaching at Columbia University, he eventually became the Harry A. Wolfson Chair in Philosophy at Brandeis University, where he taught from 1963 to 1993. During his long and productive career, Sommers authored or co-authored over 50 books, articles, reviews, etc., presenting his ideas on numerous occasions throughout North America and Europe. His work was characterized by a commitment (often implicit) to the preservation and application of historical insights and to the value of a well-articulated, coherent logical system. He was recognized for his independence and refusal to accept any view on the basis of authority alone. This made him a formidable critic but accounted in part for his many innovative and original ideas. In spite of his general contrariness in logic, Sommers earned the respect of the majority of his contemporaries, including Russell, Quine, van Benthem, Hacking, Suppes, and Strawson. In 2005, he was the subject of a *Festschrift* with contributions by a number of younger philosophers and logicians, just one indication of the continuing importance and influence of his work."
116. ———. 2016. "La Quadrature du Carré." In *Soyons Logiques / Let's be Logical*, edited by F. Schang, A. Moktefi, et A. Moretti, Moktefi, Amirouche, Moretti, Alessio and Schang, Fabien, 44-59. London: College Publications.
117. ———. 2016. "What Did Carroll Think the Tortoise Said to Achilles?" *The Carrollian: The Lewis Carroll Journal* no. 28:76-83.
118. ———. 2019. *Figuring It Out: Logic Diagrams*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
119. Englebretsen, George, and Sayward, Charles. 2011. *Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics*.

New York: Continuum.
Co-author Charles Sayward.
Contents: List of Symbols X; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Sentential Logic 13; 3. Quantificational Logic 52; 4. Sententia Modal Logic 74; 5. Quantification and Modality 93; 6. Set Theory 103; 7. Incompleteness 130; 8. An Introduction to Term Logic 139; 9. The Elements of a Modal term Logic 166; References 176; Rules, Axioms, and Principles 177; Glossary 184; Index 195-198.
"Post-Fregean mathematical logic began with a concern for foundational issues in mathematics. However, by the 1930s philosophers had not only contributed to the building and refinement of various formal systems, but they had also begun an exploitation of them for primarily philosophical ends. While many schools of philosophy today eschew any kind of technical, logical work, an ability to use (or at least a familiarity with) the tools provided by formal logic systems is still taken as essential by most of those who consider themselves analytic philosophers. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in formal logic among philosophers who stand on friendly terms with computer theory, cognitive psychology, game theory, linguistics, economics, law, and so on. At the same time, techniques developed in formal logic continue to shed light on both traditional and contemporary issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and so forth.
In what follows, students who have already learned something of classical mathematical logic are introduced to some other ways of doing formal logic: classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity, whereas constructivists logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation; classical logic usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models, whereas the alternative introduced here is based on the idea of truth sets; classical logic tends to interpret quantification objectually, whereas this alternative allows for a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. As well, a radically different approach, fundamentally different from any version of mathematical

logic, is also introduced. It is one that harkens back to the earliest stages in the history of formal logic but is equipped with the resources demanded of any formal logic today." (pp. 1-2)

120. Sommers, Fred, and Englebretsen, George. 2000. *An Invitation to Formal Reasoning*. *The Logic of Terms*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Preface X; 1. Reasoning 1; 2. Picturing propositions 25; 3. The language of logic (I) 49; 4. The language of logic (II) 77; 5. Syllogistic 109; 6. Relational syllogistic 139; 7. Statement logic 163; 8. Modern predicate logic 213; Rules, laws and principles 253; A note on further reading 259-260.
The book "introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is, its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogistic, Scholastic logicians, Leibniz, and the 19th century British algebraists.
Term logic takes its syntax directly from natural language, construing statements as combinations of pairs of terms, where complex terms are taken to have the same syntax as statements. Whereas standard logic requires extensive 'translation' from natural language to symbolic language, term logic requires only 'transcription' into the symbolic language. Its naturalness is the result of its ability to stay close to the forms of sentences usually found in every day discourse. Written by the founders of the term logic approach, An Invitation to Formal Reasoning is a unique introduction and exploration of this new system, offering numerous exercises and examples throughout the text. Summarising the standard system of mathematical logic to set term logic in context, and showing how the two systems compare, this book presents an alternative approach to standard modern logic for those studying formal logic, philosophy of language or computer theory."

Related pages

Fred Sommers on the Logic of Natural Language

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Jerzy Perzanowski: Modal Logics, Ontology and Ontologics

INTRODUCTION

This page use the font Lucida Sans Unicode for logical symbols.

An overview of Perzanowski's thought can be found in the *Preface* by Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertynsk to the volume *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2011, pp. 15-21.

"Jerzy Perzanowski's publications concerns mainly the problems of metaphysics and logic. His numerous unpublished works forms an important part of his total output, and actions are taken to arrange, edit and publish these works." (*ibid.*, p. 11.)

"1. Philosophy, taken from the point of view of its problems and methods is the collection of distinct philosophical disciplines. In fact meta-philosophical analysis leads to rather troublesome questions: Are philosophical disciplines methodologically and/or essentially related and connected? Are particular philosophical disciplines scientific? And, if the answer is not definite, to what extent is this so? Do philosophic disciplines form a uniform and organized (at least in its depth) system?
The most important factor in the characterization of any scientific discipline is its problematics. Hence, there are as many philosophical disciplines as there are different and autonomous families of philosophic problems.
Certainly, two philosophical disciplines are particularly distinguished: logic - for methodological reasons and ontology -

for essential ones.
Instead of considering the initial question in its full complexity, let us go to its kernel - ontology itself.
1. Philosophy, taken from the point of view of its problems and methods, is the collection of distinct philosophical disciplines. In fact, metaphilosophical analysis leads to rather troublesome questions: Are philosophical disciplines methodologically and/or essentially related and connected? Al-e particular philosophical disciplines scientific? And, if the answer is not definite, to what extent is this so? Do philosophical disciplines form a uniform and organized (at least in its depth) system? The most important factor in the characterization of any scientific discipline is its pl-oblematics. Hence, there are as many philosophical disciplines as there are different and autonomous families of philosophical problems. Certainly, two philosophical disciplines are particularly distinguished: logic - for methodological reasons and ontology - for essential ones. Instead of considering the initial question in its full complexity, let's go to its kernel - ontology itself.
Ontology and its parts.
2. Ontology is the theory of what there is, the theory of being. She considers the full ontological universe, all items that are possibles, describing and classifying them and searching for the principles of the universe, principles of taking together the plurality of ontic objects, particular beings, into one - the Being. Thus, two questions govern ontological investigations: what is possible and why? The second question, concerning the being's principles, may strengthened to the deepest - last in the logical order - question: how that which is given, or rather what there is, is possible? The question above principles of being, i.e., general laws of nature, plus the question: what makes possible what there is and renders impossible what there isn't?
Because of its matter and problematics ontology is the most general discursive discipline. It is the general theory of possibility. By the nature of its questions it is also very modal.
3. Ontology has two sides: descriptive - phenomenological, and theoretical - formal. Hence, it is divided into three parts: onto-ontics (in brief: ontics), ontomethodology and ontologic.
4. Ontics is devoted to the selection of ontological problems and notions, their differentiation, classification and analysis. Doing

ontics we construe the conceptual net of a given ontological theory, i.e. its categories. It is also one of the tasks of ontics to state ontological hypotheses, based on the previous analysis of concepts.
Ontics, being a part of ontology, is itself complex. Its further description depends on the general idea of ontology, on accepted classification of ontological concepts. For example, Ingarden has distinguished three parts of ontology: the material ontics, the formal ontics and the existential one. Notice that his ontology is, in our terms, ontics!
5. Ontomethodology concerns ways of doing ontology, methods and types of ontological constructions as well as principles of choice between ontological statements and theories. Examples of such ontomethodic principles are: the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and Ockham's razor.
Indication and discussion of the appropriate principles is necessary for sure for any critique of ontological theories, particularly the critique of the logical means used in ontology.
6. Ontologic is a logic of the ontic realm. It is an investigation of ontological connections, concerning particularly logical relations between pieces of ontic information. Also, it is a theory of the fundament of ontic relations.
Ontologic considers the organization of the ontological universe, trying to describe its mechanism. It describes the complexity of the Being, looking for its laws and base - the Logos.
7. Ontics is a purely descriptive and analytical discipline, ontologic is speculative and formal. They are, however, closely connected and interrelated disciplines, affecting one another. The product of ontics is a description, usually complex, of the ontological universe, whereas ontologic supplies different theories of this universe.
Certainly, at present ontic considerations are more common. In ontology we have many descriptions and claims, but not as many theories.
Among Polish ontologists, for instance, Ingarden may be regarded as typical ontics reasoner, while Leśniewski should be treated as a typical ontologician." (pp. 23-25)
(...)

"Comparison and conclusion.
42. We listed and commented on 18 variants of ontology, what certain doesn't exhaust the full spectrum of ontologies. On the other hand, the number of reasonably differentiated types of ontologies is undoubtedly smaller.
The classification of ontologies into types has certainly not to be arbitrary. It should both follow ontologies' goals and consider their contents.
We considered previously two such classifications:
First, following opposite descriptions of synthesis mechanism, into
STATIC vs. DYNAMIC ontologies;
and the second, according to three main planes of being, into
BEING vs. THOUGHT vs. LANGUAGE ontologies.
In addition, at least three more natural, self-explaining classifications should also be mentioned:
The third, according to the nature of ontologies' objects, into
MODAL vs. NON-MODAL ontologies.
It is easy to see that the proper ontologies of being are modal.
The fourth, taking into account the way of doing ontology, into
DESCRIPTIVIST vs. CONSTRUCTIVIST ontologies.
They either try to describe or try to construct the ontological universe.
Surely, the golden mean is the best. Particularly, ontologies of being should be - in proper proportion - both of this and that kind.
And, the fifth, regarding the role of the language in ontology: message vs medium, into
LINGUISTIC vs. EXTRALINGUISTIC ontologies.
Bringing a given ontology into one type we decide, in fact, to what extent the language, including the language of ontology itself, should be taken into account. Moderation is welcome. Certainly, the language is an important but not alone component of the world.
43. Plurality of ontologies is not without a reason.
Namely, we are interested in different aspects of being. Its full picture shows itself, however, only through comparison." (pp. 39-40)

From: Jerzy Perzanowski, "Ontologies and Ontologics", in: *Logic Counts*, edited by Ewa Zarnecka-Bialy, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990, pp. 23-42.

"Another string of investigations – which will he analyzed in closer details in 2.3 – involves quantification theory. Logical and linguistic theories of quantifiers try to solve the problem of intentional objects by quantifying over non-existing individuals (allowing, therefore, for empty singular terms), or by skipping the classical presupposition of a non-empty domain (allowing for empty general terms). In that sense, free logics and other quantification theories can and have to be conceived as contributions to formal ontology (...).
The other dominating area of formal ontology, besides the one about intentional objects, is that of complex or compound beings of all kinds. We have already mentioned set theory and mereology, but at least starting with Russell's facts and Davidson's events there is a growing awareness of the fact that several different philosophical entities can tie formed from (or built out of, or defined based on) sentences. The discrimination of these entities provides us not only with a rich, but controlled ontology. It further yields a better understanding of what the objects of intensional logic are: What is it that we believe, what is necessary or possible, what can be promised or forbidden (...) Again, it was a Polish logician, Jerzy Perzanowski, who first suggested the name "ontologic" for this area of research (see his foreword to Scheffler and Urchs (eds.) - *Ontologic. Essays in Formal Ontology* - Volume 2 of *Logic and Logical philosophy*, Torun: Copernicus University Press 1994). Perzanowski's "The Way of Truth" in Poli and Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology* 1996 is an example of that kind of investigation. In the framework of what he calls qualitative ontology he starts from the standard Parmenidean principle of identity: Being is and nonbeing is not. He defines five conjugate notions of a being (understood as a subject of qualities). Perzanowski's aim is to prove theorems concerning these notions. For that purpose he needs some appropriate formalism. The axiomatics of "Primitive Theory of Being" is a first, but useful, approximation. He considerably

improves the expressive power of this theory by assuming two additional abstract concepts of being: as a collection of all beings and as the unity or idea of all beings. By means of classical logic he thus achieves a substantial contribution to the ancient controversy between Plato and Parmenides concerning being and nonbeing: Beings are; Non beings are not; The being is; The nonbeing is; Being is; and Nonbeing is." (pp. 13-14)

From: Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs (eds.), *Things, Facts and Events*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000.

SOME DEFINITIONS BY JERZY PERZANOWSKI

"Ontologic, a part of ontology devoted to the systematic development of formal ontological theories.

0. The general question of Ontology, Leibnizian in spirit, is: *How what is possible is possible?*, whereas the general question of Metaphysics is: *How what is real, or exists, is possible?* Clearly, Metaphysics, by definition, is a particular Ontology.

1. *Ontology*, in its most general and traditional version, is the theory of what there is, the theory of being. It considers the full ontological universe, including all items that are possible.

Two basic questions govern ontological investigation: what is possible and why? Or in a more general and deep way: how that which is possible, is possible?
Because of its questions ontology is the most general discursive discipline. As a matter of fact, it is the general theory of possibility. From other points of view, it is the general theory of relations, the general theory of things and properties or the theory of situations, events and processes.

2. Ontology is divided into three parts: ontics, ontomethodology and ontologic.

Ontics is devoted to the selection of ontological problems and notions, their differentiation, classification and analysis; to construction of the conceptual net of a given ontological theory and to statement of reasonable ontological hypotheses. Ontomethodology concerns ways of doing ontology, their principles as well as methods and types of ontological constructions.

3. Ontologic is a logic of the ontic realm. It considers the organization of the ontological universe, trying to describe its mechanism.

Ontologic is a discipline of investigation of ontological connections, in particular logical relations between ontic statements.

4. Ontologic is therefore a discipline of logical philosophy. It is made after its receipt: Take an interesting (and real) ontological problem and try to answer it theoretically, i.e., by means of a theory.

To this end, we start with a conceptual analysis (which belongs to ontics), determining relevant primitive concepts and clarifying them enough to find reasonable axioms, which next are subject to logical deduction and appropriate semantical investigation. The method is sound if some theorems answer, or at least illuminate, the starting problem.

Ontologic is ontology done in this way, i.e., ontology produced by answering *ontological* question by means *logical* methods and procedures. In short, ontologic is ontology *modulo* logic: ontologic = ontology / logic."

From: *Ontologika* (a the text published in: www.filozofia.org.pl, but no more available)

EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS: ONTOLOGICAL MODALITIES

"Alethic modalities are modifiers of semantical and logical components of judgements. Their classification obviously depends on the ontology and semantics that is presupposed. Some modalities are theoretical – useful for reasoning; some are practical or pragmatic – useful for action. Taking the first, at least four kinds of alethic theoretical modalities should be distinguished:

1. *A priori*, concerning what can be thought, used to delineate the realm of reason. Examples are *thinkable, understandable, reasonable, controvertible*, etc.
2. Logical, used for collection and comparison: *possible, necessary, contingent*, etc.
3. Metaphysical, concerning facts, what is real or actual: *actual, factual, to be a fact, to be true, making true, making actual*, etc.
4. Ontological, useful for describing the general and basic conditions for some families of objects or complexes. They concern the possibility of what there is, or what is possible; hence they are used for delineation of the most general field we can deal with – the realm of all possibilities – the ontological space. Examples are: *possibility, necessity, contingency, and exclusion taken in the sense of a condition; compossibility, coexistence*, and *eminent existence* in the sense of Leibniz, *(formal) possibility* in the sense of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus; combinable, synthetizable and analysable; making possible, making impossible, being ontologically neutral;* and several common philosophical modalities de re: *by necessity, essentially, by its very nature,* etc.

The above classification has a clear counterpart in grammar: some modalities, mostly logical but also a priori and metaphysical ones, are adjective-like, some – chiefly ontological modalities – are noun-like. On the other hand, the logical modalities are quantifier-like modifiers (what is nowadays clarified by relational semantics).

There is a widely shared temptation to reduce some modalities to other ones, particularly ontological to logical modalities (and a fortiori noun- to adjective-modalities). Moreover, where such reduction is difficult or counterintuitive, it is usual to ignore the unmanageable cases.

According to the kind of modalities one prefers, we have several types of modal reductionism: modal apriorism, factualism, etc. The most popular is modal logicism which claims that any alethic modality can and ought to be treated as a logical modality. The extreme version of this position – modal extensionalism (cf. Quine 1953) is the conjunction of two theses: first, that any alethic modality is reducible to logical modality(ies); and second, that any essential use of logical modalities is eliminable, formally expressed as a claim in favour of the eliminability of *de re* modalities by modalities *de dicto*. Extensionalism not only reduces modalities; it also substitutes set-theoretical ontology for any intensional ontology.

Ontological modalities are the key to any non-reductionistic ontology. The most august family thereof is that of Leibniz: *compossibility, compatibility, coexistence, and eminent existence*. Leibniz himself was fully aware of the role they play in ontology, warning against the "confusion of possibles for compossibles" (*Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. L. E. Loemker, 1969, p. 661).

A very manageable family of ontological modalities consists of: *making possible* (MP), *making impossible* (MI), *being ontologically neutral* (ON), which are introduced to formalize the fundamental ontological connections: attraction, repulsion, and indifference.

They are useful especially for the development of the combination ontology dealing, *inter alia*, with relations *simpler than* or *being in* and *combinable from* (cf. Perzanowski 1989). In addition, they enable us to express the Leibnizian modalities mentioned above. There are two complementary approaches to the theoretical treatment of these modalities: the axiomatic and the semantic. From the semantic point of view, based on the description of the ontological space, MP is used to express formal conditions of synthesis.

Let $o(x)$ denote the collection of all objects synthetizable from the object x, i.e. objects which can be obtained from the objects connected with x (in the most natural case – from the substance of x), the relation *simpler than* or *being in*. The basic idea concerning making possible can now be expressed by:

$MP(x,Y) \leftrightarrow y \in \sigma(x)$;

x makes possible *y* iff *y* is synthetizable from *x*.
The outlined family of ontological modalities enables us to define most of the notions used in ontology. In particular, using MP we can define:

$Cons(x) := MP(x,x)$;

x is ontologically *coherent (consistent)* iff *x* makes itself possible.

$C(x,y) := MP(x,y) \,\&\, MP(y,x)$;

x and *y* are *compossible* iff each of them makes possible the other.

$E(x,y) := \exists\, z\, y\; MP(z,x)$;

x exists eminently in *y* iff there is something in *y* which makes *x* possible.

$R(x,y) := \forall zx\; MP(z,y)$;

y is (ontologically) alternative to *x* iff everything in *x* makes *y* possible.

> The first three notions were used by Leibniz, the last encodes the alternativity relation of the canonical models of relational semantics (cf. Chellas 1980). Using the chosen modalities we can therefore define relational semantics for modal logic, providing it with a solid ontological foundation. Note that the relation *R* closely connects with Leibniz's notion of eminent existence:

$R(x,y) \rightarrow E(y,x)$

y is alternative to *x* implies that *y* eminently exists in x.

> The axiomatic approach opens a rich field of research. Most of the axioms answer the basic questions of ontology. For example: Does making possible preserve ontological coherence?

A priori we have three positive answers, each of which yields a suitable axiom of preservation:

(*CR*) MP(x,y) & Cons(x) → Cons(y)

(*CL*) MP(x,y) & Cons(y) → Cons(x)

(*C*) MP(x,y) → (Cons(x) ↔ Cons(y))

Is making possible -monotonic? This yields, several axioms of (left/right) mono-tonicity, among others:

MP(↑) : MP(x,y) & x z → MP(z,y)

MP(↓) : MP(x,y) & z y → MP(x,z),

and so on.

Is the ontological universe uniform? I.e., does it include only coherent objects? Only compossible objects?

Again, positive answers to such questions yield the following axioms:

(Ucons) ∀ x Cons(x)

(UC) ∀ x,y C(x,y)

What interconnections hold between basic modalities?

Again, this yields a range of different axioms, for example:

The axiom of ontological trichotomy:

(OT) ∀ x,y (MP(x,y) ∨ MI(x,y) ∨ ON(x,y))

The axiom of full modalization:

(FM) ∀ x,y ON(x,y)

The contrary axiom of ontological extensionality:

(OE) ∀ x,y ON(x,y)

The axiom of ontological excluded middle, i.e., the ontological consistency axiom:

(OC) $\forall x,y$ (MP(x,y) $\leftrightarrow$ MI(x,y)).

By taking appropriate families of axioms a wide range of different ontological theories may be defined.

Finally, notice that the above picture, following Leibniz, is chiefly based on the positive ontological modality making possible (MP). If instead we prefer the negative modality making impossible (MI) this would yield a Hegelian path in ontology." (pp. 560-562)

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Quine, W. V. O., 1953, *From a Logical Point of View*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

From: "Modalities, ontological", in: Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith (eds.), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, München: Philosophia Verlag 1991.

PARMENIDES: THE WAY OF TRUTH

"1. Introduction
1.1 The Parmenidean 'way of truth' concerns what there is and what there is not: *estin te kai os ouk esti me einai*. (1) It concerns the basic ontological items: beings and nonbeings, as well as (the) being and (the) nonbeing. As we have learned from Parmenides, Zeno and Plato, (2) the way of Parmenides is the way of difficult truth, the way of metaphysical paradox.
1.2 Quite often the principal truth of Parmenides is formulated as the *ontological principle of identity: being is and nonbeing is*

not. Usually this principle is considered tautologous (3) or even trivial.
I disagree. Triviality presupposes clarity. The principle, however, is neither clear nor evident. Also it is not obvious.
Is it true?
1.3 Both 'being' and 'is' are immediate derivatives of the verb 'be'. The verb itself has several variants. Can all these derivatives and variants be presented in a uniform way? Is, for example, 'Being is' a more adequate expression of the thought of Parmenides than 'Whatever is, is'? Next, to which items does the Parmenidean statement refer: to particular beings - like me, you, a ship, this pencil; or to their totality - the being; or to their unity - Being? Should Parmenides' statement be understood as 'the being is and the nonbeing is not', or rather as 'a being is and a nonbeing is not', i.e., 'any being is and no nonbeing is' or 'beings are and nonbeings are not'?
1.4 The problem was pointed out and discussed by Plato in *Sophist* as the crux of his refutation of the sophistic claim that nothing is false. Parmenides' spokesman, the Eleatic Stranger, is arguing there for Plato's conclusion that 'nonbeing has an assured existence and a nature of its own', recalling at the same time the warning of Parmenides: 'For never shall this thought prevail, that non-beings are, but keep your mind from this path of inquiry'. (4)
1.5 The answer to Plato's problem clearly depends on an explication of the four notions involved: *being, nonbeing, is* and *is not*. From a metalogical point of view it is also determined by the related logics: the logic of our reasoning and an appropriate logic of being.
1.6 Hereafter, the ontological notions are explained according to the qualitative approach to the notion of being: *a being is a subject of some qualities the being is the totality of all beings; Being is the unity of all beings*.
These quite ancient but yet obscure formulas are crucial for traditional ontology and they therefore deserve clarification. Such a clarification requires an appropriate theory of qualities, as well as suitable theory of ontological connection connecting qualities with subjects. It is the latter, above all, which will be outlined in the present study.

1.7 Clarification comes, inter alia, through formalization. Formalization requires logic. In what follows I rely exclusively on classical logic. To be mor exact, standard classical logic is used as the logic of reasoning, whereas a suitable applied version of classical logic will serve as our logic of being.
1.8 In what follows a very general theory of ontological connection is provided.
In spite of its generality this theory enables us, as we shall see, to reconsider the classical ontological claims of Parmenides and to refute an anti-ontological claim that the notion of being is syncategorematic.
Also certain ontological theorems will be proved, including: Being is an Nonbeing is (sic!). *A being is, whereas a nonbeing is not*.
Also: *Whatever is, is* - which is shown to be equivalent to *Whatever is not, is not*.
1.9 The paper is organized as follows: I start with general remarks concerning ontology and different approaches to the notion of being. Next, several classical questions of traditional ontology are discussed. After making our problems clear, I will introduce a formalism enabling us to study them in the full generality. Finally, the results of the paper are discussed in a manner introducing perspectives for a subsequent theory of qualities." pp. 62-63.

Notes

(1) Cf. Diels 1906, Parmenides B2.3. Notice a rather subtle problem connected with the translation of this claim (see Bodnar 1988b). Inter alia, the following translations have been offered: Diels 1906: "dass [das Seiende] ist und dass es unmöglich nicht sein kann", Bormann 1971: "dass [das Seiende] ist und das Nicht-Seiende ist nicht", Kirk and Raven 1957: "that it is and that it cannot not-be", Burnet 1957: "It is, and... it is impossible for it not to be", Taran 1965: "it is and to not be is not", Mannheim [translator] in Heidegger 1961: "it is, and... nonbeing is impossible".
(2) For Parmenides and Zeno cf. Kirk and Raven 1957, for Plato cf. *Parmenides* and particularly the *Sophist* in Plato 1961.
(3) Cf. Tatarkiewicz 1958.

(4) Cf. *Sophist*, 258 b-d.

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Heidegger, M. 1961: *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. by R.Mannheim, Anchor Books, Doubley & Co. Inc., New York.
Kirk, O.S. and Raven, J.E. 1957: *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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From: "The Way of Truth", in: Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (eds.), *Formal Ontology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996, pp. 61-130.

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PUBLICATIONS IN ENGLISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN

1. Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1971. "The Deduction Theorems for the System T of Feys-Von Wright." *Prace z Logiki* no. 6:11-14.

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3. ———. 1971. "The First List of the Deduction Theorems Characteristic for Several Modal Calculi Formalized after the Manner of Lemmon." *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* no. 1:21-31.

4. ———. 1973. "A Linguistic Criterion of Structural Incompleteness." *Reports on Mathematical Logic* no. 1:13-14.

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   "The importance of the ontological component of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is generally recognized. And most of the contemporary philosophers (analytical at least) believe that the *Tractatus* is primarily a product of the first-rate metaphysical (*) thinker. Does it mean that Wittgenstein's ontology and the role it plays in the *Tractatus is* commonly and completely understood?
   Of course, we all know how rich in philosophical theories and insights *Tractatus* is. Let me mention a few of them: the picture theory of language (i.e. the theory of propositions, meaning and logical syntax), a semantical theory of logical truth (with a concept of "tautology", logical atomism, the principle of extensionality), new theory of identity, remarkable philosophy of logic, theory of philosophy as a "critique of language" as well as the *Tractatus* insights into ontology (which I am going to discuss below), epistemology (with the *Tractatus* solipsism and mysticism), religion and ethics. However, many people consider the *Tractatus* to be rather a bundle of theories and/or claims. The reason for that opinion is drawn from the *Tractatus* characteristic, aphoristical style and its lack of (fully developed)

arguments. For example, Professor Max Black underlines in *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* on the one hand the importance of the ontological component of the *Tractatus* but on the other hand he writes that Wittgenstein's great contributions to philosophical insights mentioned above are logically independent of his views about the nature of the world (p. 27)
The main aim of my paper is to supply evidence that ontology and semantics of the *Tractatus* (as well as further philosophical theories which are to be found therein) are much more coherent and interconnected than it is usually believed."
(*) or rather ontological, if we differentiate ontology -- a theory of what and why is possible from metaphysics -- a theory of what and why exists.

10. ———. 1985. "Some Observations on Modal Logics and the *Tractatus*." In *Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology. Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 19th-26th August 1984, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Österreich)*, edited by Chisholm, Roderick M., 544-550. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

    "[1] The modal character of the Tractarian ontology is now commonly recognized [2]. And it is clear that there must be some modal calculus (or, more carefully, calculi) implicit in the Tractatus. In the subjects' literature we may find several papers dealing with the question. Most of them point to Lewis' calculus S5 as the Tractarian modal logic. Is this answer right? Are arguments in its support convincing?
    I do believe that:
    (1°) the most popular answer mentioned above, even if true, should be argued for more thoroughly than it has been;
    (2°) the modality structure implicit in the Tractatus, even when restricted to purely ontological modalities, is more complex than it looks in its usual descriptions, including the best available at the moment. In particular, both the basic role played by the notion of form-fundamental modality of the Tractatus, as I tried to argue in my *Some ontological*

and semantical puzzles of Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1984) - and the question of its logic is simply omitted by the writers known to me.
However, truth is only one, and if not fully recognized, irrespective of how deeply it is hidden, it sends us words about itself, mainly indirectly, through some inaccuracies and/or inconsistencies in current opinion. This applies to the question under discussion, among others, in the following way: both necessity and possibility operators implicit in S5 or in any similar logic are symmetrical, whereas these two notions in its most frequent Tractarian occurrences are not. Characteristic are also incoherencies which are to be found in claims made by the authors arguing, in fact, along the same line (compare A. Maury 1977 and G. H. von Wright 1972).
In what follows, starting with brief comments concerning D. Kaplan's, G. H. von Wright's and A. Maury's works, I will try to reexamine the problem and to provide some new arguments for a corrected version of von Wright's solution and to extend that solution by basing it on more fundamental theory of the notion of form. This theory, as you will see, provides solid philosophical foundations for relational semantics of intensional logics, foundations which are grounded on the Tractarian ontology." p. 544
[1] The paper's title clearly paraphrases the title of G. H. von Wright's master essay *Modal logic and the Tractatus* [in G. H. von Wright - *Wittgenstein* 1982, pp. 185-200]. Its ambiguity is intended, two main claims of the paper are thus hinted at. The first one concerns complexity of the modality structure of the Tractatus and points out several modal logics inhering in it. The second one shows the way of basing modal logics on the Tractarian ontology. To do that one reduces the fundamental notions of modal philosophy and relational semantics of modal logics (compatibility, possible worlds and relation of alternativeness) to the notion of form-the basic ontological modality of the Tractatus (comp. J. Perzanowski - *Some ontological and semantical puzzles of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, 1984).

[2] The paper forms a third part of my bigger work in progress (comp. previous parts *Some ontological*..., cit. and *What is non-Fregean in the Tractarian semantics and why?* 1993) in which, after having articulated the proper place of ontology in the Tractatus, I am trying to formalize it. Due to the limitation of the paper's length it is still a sort of abstract. Its full text, with all arguments developed, is intended to be published elsewhere as *Modal logics and the Tractatus* - in preparation [the essay was never published].

11. ———. 1986. "Una Caratterizzazione Del Monismo." In *Il Foglio E L'albero*, edited by Verdiglione, Armando, 98-104. Milano: Spirali.

    Originally published in Italian.
    "Fin dall'inizio la filosofia europea si è confrontata con la controversia tra monismo e pluralismo concernente la questione: quante cose esistono realmente? la questione dell'uno e dei molti.
    Ovviamente la nostra esperienza ci dice -- Molti; ma tante false affermazioni sono basate sull'esperienza!
    Nella tradizione europea ci sono due grandi linee di pensatori. La prima è quella dei filosofi monisti che incomincia con Parmenide di Elea e comprende i filosofi che sostengono che esiste *un* solo ente, che è costante e a priori. Più tardi il monismo fu generalmente connesso con la pretesa che questo ente unico sia Dio, o la Natura di essenza puramente logica. La seconda linea comprende i filosofi pluralisti e incomincia con Eraclito. Il pluralismo sostiene che ci sono molti enti mutevoli nonché -- nella maggior parte dei casi -- fenomenici. L'opposizione Monismo-Pluralismo non è una questione isolata e puramente teoretica. Ha una sua propria tensione interna, espressa in un senso del mistero per cui Uno è Molti e Molti è Uno; questa sensazione e la principale fonte del misticismo filosofico. In quanto segue cercherò di portare la luce della logica sulla controversia basilare su esposta."

12. ———, ed. 1987. *Essays on Philosophy and Logic. Proceedings of the Xxxth Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko. Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press.

Preface: "This volume contains nearly all the papers presented at the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic which was held in Cracow, October 19th-21st, 1984.
The Conference was organized by the Department of Logic, Jagiellonian University and the Cracow Branch of the Polish academy of Sciences.
The papers published in the present Proceedings are published as preprints, whose copyright belongs to the authors. Their extended versions may be submitted elsewhere.
The potential reader should be warned that the traditional name of the Conference should be understood as 'Conference on Logic and Its History'. In fact, majority of papers published here deal with history of logic in a rather indirect way -- contributing directly to logic and/or philosophy.
This motivates the division of papers into three parts. Papers from the third part are devoted to logical and philosophical achievements of the late Professor Roman Suszko.
It is a good tradition of Cracow Conferences that -- since 1972 -- most of them have been devoted to achievements of the most eminent representatives of the Polish logical and philosophical school.
Dedication of the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic to scientific achievements of the late Professor Suszko as well as obvious to any participant success of the Conference prove that Roman Suszko, pupil and former assistant of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, is widely recognized as the member of the Polish logical school in the *very* sense of the word.
The Proceedings of the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic are dedicated to the memory of Professor Roman Suszko, outstanding philosopher and logician, who was greatly respected and admired by all of us. The Editor"

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23. A list of lectures given by Roman Suszko at Cracow Conferences of the History of Logic (compiled by J. K. Kabzinski) p. 219.

13. ———. 1987. "Remarks on Propositional Embeddings and Degrees." In *Essays on Philosophy and Logic: Proceedings of the 30th Conference on the History of Logic, Dedicated to Roman Suszko - Cracow, October 19-21, 1984*, edited by Perzanowski, Jerzy, 121-136. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press.

"This exploratory paper offers, to those familiar with studying logics as consequence relations, an intriguing system of problems along with suggestions for confronting them. The author raises two questions: What is the size and number of matrices needed to characterize a logic given by a consequence relation? He motivates the questions by reminding us that for logics given axiomatically the questions are simply answered by citing the Lindenbaum algebra for the language. The answers are not so simple when we consider consequence relations. He explores answering the question of how many matrices are needed to characterize a logic by determining the number of maximally consistent extensions of the logic." (Charles F. Kielkopf)
Abstract: "When, for a given propositional logic, we take semantics (say - matrix, algebraic or relational semantics) the most natural question is to estimate it. This means to answer the question: How many and how big matrices (algebras, frames, or - in general - structures) are necessary to characterise the logic?

In the case of matrix semantics, for logics understood traditionally - as sets of formulas closed under chosen rules and substitution - the general answer is easy and well-known: as was shown by A. Lindenbaum, it suffices to take exactly one matrix with the number of elements not exceeding the number of language's expressions.
However, when we consider consequence operators, or equivalently - sets of rules, the question is much more difficult and in many cases still open.
In what follows I will discuss the first part of it: How many structures are needed to characterise a given consequence operator? My general idea is to compare this number with the number of maximally consistent, i.e. Post-complete, logics of this consequence operator."

14. ———. 1988. "Elements of Monadologic (Abstract)." In *Leibniz, Tradition Und Aktualität: Vorträge. V. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress Hannover, 14.-19. November 1988*, 734-736. Hannover: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Gesellschaft.

15. ———. 1990. "Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology." In *Wittgenstein. Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Centenary Celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989 Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Haller, Rudolf, Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes, 185-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"1. Surely the above title is rather dark. Therefore, let me start with a few words of clarification. "Post-Tractatus" means either after "Tractatus" or a natural prolongation of the books' sequence: "Proto-Tractatus", "Tractatus",... . Hence the title of this paper means either the task of developing ontology built up after "Tractatus" clues, by taking its claims and lesson seriously, or clarification of the "Tractatus" text, by explaining notions and providing its claims with well-grounded arguments, trying thus to develop, step by step, a more advanced and better argumented version of Wittgenstein's treatise.

(...)
The paper is organized as follows: I start with a general review of the ontology of the Tractatus, putting emphasis on its modalities, particularly on its notion of the form. Semi-formalization of the thesis 2.033, in which the form is defined as the possibility of the structure, leads to isolation of the basic ontological modality - making possible. The formal theory of it, which is the crux of combination ontology, is outlined in the fourth chapter of the paper. Finally, several applications of this general ontology to the starting Tractarian ontology are given." p. 185.

16. ———. 1990. "Ontologies and Ontologics." In *Logic Counts*, edited by Zarnecka-Bialy, Ewa, 23-42. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

17. ———. 1991. "Modalities, Ontological." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 560-562. München: Philosophia Verlag.

18. ———. 1991. "Ontological Arguments Ii - Cartesian and Leibnizian." In *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, edited by Burkhardt, Hans and Smith, Barry, 625-633. München: Philosophia Verlag.

19. ———. 1992. "Ce Qu'il Y a De Non Fregéen Dans La Sémantique Du Tractatus De Wittgenstein Et Pourquoi?" In *Wittgenstein Et La Philosophie Aujourd'hui: Journées Internationales Créteil-Paris, 16-21 Juin 1989 À L'occasion Du Centenaire De La Naissance De Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)*, edited by Sebestik, Jan and Soulez, Antonia, 163-177. Paris: Klincksieck.

    Translated in English as: *What is non-Fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and why?* - Axiomathes, 1993, 4, pp. 357-372.

20. ———. 1992. "Combination Semantics: An Outline." In *Signs of Humanity. Proceedings of the Ivth International Congress, International Association for Semiotic Studies, Barcelona/Perpignan, March, 30th - April 6th 1989*, edited

by Balat, Michel and Deledalle-Rhodes, Janice, 437-442. Berlin, New York: Mouton De Gruyter.

21. ———. 1993. "What Is Non-Fregean in the Semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Why?" *Axiomathes* no. 4 (3):357-372.

"1. Certainly, of the two title questions the second - why? - is more challenging and important. But also much more difficult.
To answer it we must not only collect and evaluate non-Fregean components of the semantics of the *Tractatus*, thus comparing them with Frege's semantics - which is rather easy; but we must also go into depth on both semantics, looking at their fundamentals and trying to find their basic conceptual and methodological framework. Such research, however, is much more difficult, partly because it leads us out of semantics into the broader and more general field of ontology, and to very fundamental metaphilosophical questions: to metaphilosophical considerations - because we try to compare two general philosophical theories; to ontological investigations - because of the nature of semantics.
2. Semantics provides language with the objective interpretation establishing connections between linguistic expressions and pieces of the world. To this end, however, it must be, if not arbitrary, developed inside a framework common for a language and the world. Such a framework can be provided only by a discipline more general than a theory of language, including semantics, as well as a theory of the world, i.e. by ontology - the most general theory of being, the theory of all possibilities.
Any proper semantics is indeed based on ontology - Frege's and Wittgenstein's semantics as well.
3. Full and well-motivated discussion of the title questions requires a book rather than a short article. Therefore, I shall limit the discussion to differences in the key-schemes of both semantics, plus very brief and rather cryptic remarks concerning the general framework of this comparison.

I start with a few general remarks concerning the type of philosophy which, to my mind, is common to Frege and the young Wittgenstein. Next, I will proceed to a reconstruction of the semantic diagrams which are basic for the two semantics under investigation, emphasizing differences and trying to explain reasons for them." p. 357

22. ———. 1993. "Locative Ontology Part I-Iii." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 1:7-94.

    The First Part is reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 87-120.
    "To characterize his monograph-length essay, which is to be continued, the author writes: "The work has two aims: a philosophical one-to clarify one of the most important variants of verb-type ontologies, and a mathematical one-to enlarge the body of commonly known theories of order." A verb-type ontology is an axiomatization of the ordering relation of a use of a verb phrase based on the verb 'to be' if this axiomatization is developed for the philosophical purpose of understanding the structure of reality in so far as it is correctly represented with the use of 'to be' in question. Thus, set theory can be an ontology for 'to be a member of', while mereology is an ontology for 'to be a part of'. The author focuses on the locative use of 'to be' which means 'to be in'. Examples of such uses are 'She is in Schaan' and 'I am in her thoughts'.
    The author distinguishes the locative use from other uses, especially the mereological use. In general, the locative 'is' is not transitive. Most of the work is the mathematical work of characterizing and axiomatizing the (hitherto undeveloped) ordering relation for 'to be in'. The author explicitly requests readers to judge the mathematical work on its mathematical merits." (Charles F. Kielkopf - Karlsruhe)
    "The paper is organized as follows: I start with a general and brief overview of verb-type-ontologies, stressing the importance of the locative one. Next, three main relevant formal theories-of preorders, of mereologies as well as

Lesniewski's Ontology - are presented. They are shown to be inadequate to formalise location.
In this survey a special emphasis is put on premereologies intermediate between classical mereologies and preorders. Premereology seems to be very useful in the field of ontology and metaphysics as the first, purely logical, approximation of the idea of condensation, i.e. the internal strength of unifying connections.
Next, I will pass to a discussion of locative ontologies, introducing them as a generalization of preorders, which fill in certain gaps occurring in both mathematical and philosophical approaches to orders. The bulk of locative ontology is presented in the Parts II and III, where locative orders are introduced and related to more familiar structures outlined previously. At the end, the philosophical content of locative ontology is presented and, finally, several cases of location in some important domains are pointed out." p. 11

23. ———. 1994. "Towards Psychoontology." In *Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15-22 August 1993, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria)*, edited by Casati, Roberto, Smith, Barry and White, Graham, 287-296. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

    Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 135-146.
    "Psychoontology is *the ontology* of the psyche and of related matters. Hence, by definition, it is a case of *particular* and *applied* ontology.
    Here, following Leibniz's idea, ontology is defined (1) by its characteristic question: *How is possible?* More exactly: *How is x possible?*
    Now, the level of generality of a given ontology depends on the generality of its characteristic question, i.e. on the scope of the variable *x*. If it is the most general of all, we obtain the general ontology, which is the study of the following, most

general, version of the ontological question: *How is what is possible, possible?*
To answer it we must provide *a reason* for being possible as well as *a framework* for the study of *the ontological space* of all possibilities (2)." p. 287
(1) For a discussion of general ontology in comparison with particular ones cf. Perzanowski *Ontology and ontologics*.
(2) This is what Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* named the *logical* space.

24. ———. 1994. "Reasons and Causes." In *Logic and Causal Reasoning*, edited by Faye, Jan, Scheffler, Uwe and Urchs, Max, 169-189. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

    "Jerzy Perzanowski starts his considerations on *Reasons and Causes* with a few general remarks concerning the ontology of causality. Next, the basic family of relevant onto-logical operators, called *makers*, is introduced. Basic axioms are worked out for a formal setting of the mechanism of causal interactions in his 'Ontologic'. Perzanowski's paper concludes with the following deep truth: 'Anyway, one thing is clear. Determinism needs further, careful and subtle discussion' (188)."
    From the review of the book by Klaus Wuttich in: *Logic and Logical Philosophy,* Vol. 2 (1994), pp. 151-158.

25. ———. 1996. "The Way of Truth." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter M., 61-130. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Contents: Index 61; 1. Introduction 62; 2.Beings, the Being and Being 64; 3. Ontological connection 65; 4. Towards a theory of ontological connection 67; 5. Some classical ontological questions 73 ; 6. A linguistic intermezzo 76; 7. An outline of a Primitive Theory of Being - PTB 86; 8. Towards a Extended Theory of Being - ETB 102; 9. Parmenidean statements reconsidered and classical questions answered 122; 10. Summary 127; Acknowledgements 128; References 128-130.

26. ———. 1999. "Fifty Years of Parainconsistent Logics." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 7:21-24.

"One of the first logicians who questioned the status of the metaphysical and logical versions of the Principle of Consistency was Jan Łukasiewicz, the father of Polish logic and master of Stanislaw Jakowski. In his classic book *O zasadzie sprzecznosci u Arystotelesa* (On the Principle of Consistency in Aristotle) published in 1910 Łukasiewicz endorsed only the ethical version of the principle of non-contradiction, as the rule which defends us against permanent error and lie, and against madness.
The view of Łukasiewicz, later reintroduced and made popular by Ludwig Wittgenstein, gave rise the question of finding an interesting and sufficiently rich logic which accommodates inconsistencies, allowing for their consistent investigation.
The problem was first solved in the previously mentioned work of Łukasiewicz's student Stanislaw Jaskowski. Jaskowski's problem was fundamental, its solution profound and inspiring. His work could therefore be described as decisive, crucial for further investigation.
And that is precisely what happened.
Jaskowski's point of departure was a discourse, the situation of a discussion. When one asks: *Is it the case that A?*, and does not know the answer, one often considers both possibilities at once. Likewise, when defending A, one respects, at least during a honest discussion, an opponent who claims not-A. Which logic applies here?
Usually classical logic, though not in its full power and entirety. In this situation we are not ready to accept, for example, the rule of Duns Scotus, which from the contradiction: *A and not-A* allows us to infer any statement B, i.e., to conclude just everything. This is a little too much, however.
For, in real discussions between serious and honest opponents inconsistencies neither explode nor overfill the discourse.

Inconsistencies must be examined. Not prejudged. Nor worshipped as idols, as in the case of most Hegelians (excluding Graham Priest and other logical philosophers, I hope).
Quite the contrary. We examine them in order to find a remedy. In search of the understanding about their sources, reasons and real consequences.
From this perspective, the mastery of Jaskowski's solution is simply striking.
Firstly, he created a discursive calculus D2, which fulfilled all the formal criteria we tend to impose on interesting paraconsistent logics.
Secondly, his construction in its deep structure enables us to consider inconsistencies occurring in a theory *T* as contingent statements in a related modal theory M(*T*) playing the role of its metatheory.
Thirdly, it often allows for the consistent examination of a given inconsistency. Sometimes even for the understanding of its mechanism and sources." pp. 23-24

27. ———. 1999. "Combination Semantics for Intensional Logics I. Makings and Their Use in Making Combination Semantics." *Logique et Analyse* no. 42:181-203.

Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 165-174.
Abstract: A very general framework for intensional semantics is outlined. In ontological spaces endowed with suitable ontological modalities (making possible, making impossible, etc.) a formal semantics for logical modalities (possibly, necessary, etc.) is defined. Its very idea is that x realizes possibly A if x makes possible (the combination) A. Notice that sentences and their sets, as everything but simples, are combinations.
This idea is developed in three different ways generalizing the most common logical semantics and providing them with a natural metaphysical interpretation and foundation. A special attention is put on the soft combination semantics which is shown to be complete for all intensional logics.

A list of conditions characteristic for basic modal logics is also provided.
"Each proper semantics must be based on ontology.
1. The above statement is a truism. But an important one. It is often forgotten, for in our time it is rather a common (and quite doubtful) conviction, that the only valuable ontology for contemporary semantics is the set-theoretical ontology. In the past century set-theory indeed played the most important role in mathematics and logic and, in turn, in their philosophical applications. It is also true that the very paradigmatic case of a semantical analysis for formal languages, done by Alfred Tarski, is in fact a combination of set-theoretical and algebraic ideas.
Tarski - type semantics was extended in the sixties to the case of intensional languages providing us, as many believe, with a satisfactory method to deal with real philosophical problems.
2. In part, for sure, it is true. But only in part! If we distinguish, *inter alia*, between ontology of the being, including metaphysics (i.e., ontology of the world) on the one hand, and - on the other hand - the ontology of language and the ontology of mind (cf. *Ontologies and ontologics*, 1990), then by their close connection with formal investigations of concepts, set-theoretical and algebraic ontologies are closely connected with two later types of ontology, but not with the first!
Real philosophy, however, is about the being. Therefore, we are still in need of a more suitable and subtle semantics for it.
3. In what follows I will try to outline such a semantics, based on combination ontology, which is a part of a deeply modal version of a general theory of analysis and synthesis. To this end, I will start with rather general remarks concerning modalities, with particular emphasis put on ontological ones, passing next to a rather general description of a theory of analysis and synthesis." p. 181

28. ———. 2001. "Parainconsistency, or Inconsistency Tamed, Investigated and Exploited." *Logic and Logical Philosophy*

no. 9:5-24.

"In the paper, the notion of inconsistency is studied. The author proposes to use the term 'parainconsistency' rather than 'paraconsistency' with respect to inconsistent logics which contrive their inconsistency. Several illuminating examples of inconsistency are given. A brief history of the research related to the notion of (para)inconsistency is presented. Special attention is paid to the seminal contribution of Jaskowski. Ja´skowski's modal approach to parainconsistency is discussed. G¨odel's and Ja´skowski's interpretations of modalities and contingencies are compared." Anna Gomolinska (Bialystok)
"Any educated person knows, or at least should know (1), that most cases of incoherencies, impossibilities and -- in a theoretical framework -- inconsistencies are rather suspicious members of a domain.
In particular, being inconsistent is a rather bad property of a theory. But why?
Our aim in the paper is, firstly, to discuss several answers to the question, and secondly, and more importantly to provide a proper frames to explain and to exploit inconsistencies. The framework which will force inconsistencies to work in a positive way, i.e., to enlarge and to deep our understanding of problems involved." p. 5
(1) With exceptions of Hegel, Hegelians, etc.

29. ———. 2003. "A Profile of Masonic Synthesis." *Logic and Logical Philosophy* no. 11/12:167-189.

Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 199-222.
"Everything is a both a product of the decomposition (analysis) of a given object into simpler objects and of the synthesis (composition) of that which is composed of simpler components. In order to come to know a given object, it is necessary to reconstruct the process of analysis and synthesis, in the one and the other direction." p. 167
"Classical metaphysics has come back to life. Yet it has most definitely become a logical, hence scientific discipline not

aligned with the Kantians, but one set against them. Those who regenerated first philosophy as a discipline were above all the fathers of contemporary logic. Conceived in the latter half of the nineteenth century, classical logic has enjoyed a era rich in developments. In chronological order, we begin with Bolzano, Boole, Frege, Peirce, and Peano, followed by Russell, Whitehead and Wittengenstein, after whom the names worthy of mention are legion.
A second figure in the revitalisation of classical metaphysics as a live scientific philosophy was Franz Brentano, and beyond him his students and developers, amongst whom we find Kazimierz Twardowski, the father of Polish scientific philosophy.
Brentano united scientific philosophy with descriptive psychology and a resurrected descriptive metaphysics in the style of Aristotle. His pupils divided into schools following paths which, whilst differing from each other, always remained faithful to their source. In the case of phenomenology, special techniques of eidectic analysis were introduced into the Brentanian picture. A different case is that of Meinong and his co-workers, who worked Brentanian ideas into a general theory of objects and properties." pp. 170-171.

30. ———. 2004. "Towards Combination Metaphysics." *Reports on Mathematical Logic* no. 38:93-116.

Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 45-68.
"Ontology is the general theory of the possibility, i.e., the theory of the realm of all possibilities -- the ontological space. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the ontology of the world.
The world is the realm of existing items. After Wittgenstein's Tractatus: The world is all what is the case. In other words, all events taken as existing complexes (facts).
2. If we distinguish, *inter alia*, between the ontology of the being, including metaphysics (i.e., ontology of the world) on

the one hand, and -- on the other hand -- the ontology of language and the ontology of mind, then we see, by close connection the later two with formal investigations of concepts, that set-theoretical and algebraic ontologies are closely connected with them, but not with the ontology of being.
True philosophy, however, is about the being. Therefore, we are still in need of a metaphysics based on its background combination ontology with appropriate combination semantics. In need, by definition, of combination metaphysics.
3. In what follows, I will first try to outline such a semantics, based on combination ontology, which is a part of a deeply modal version of a general theory of analysis and synthesis. Next, I will try to apply it to the analysis of the most fundamental metaphysical notions.
To this end, I will start with general remarks concerning modalities, with particular emphasis put on ontological and metaphysical ones, passing next to a rather general description of a theory of analysis and synthesis." p. 93

31. ———. 2007. "In Praise of Philosophy." In *The Courage of Doing Philosophy. Essays Presented to Leszek Nowak*, edited by Brzezinski, Jerzy, Klawiter, Andrzej, Kuipers, Theo A.F., Lastowski, Krzysztof, Paprzycka, Katarzyna and Przybysz, Piotr, 375-394. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 25-40.
    The paper is an English translation by Matthew Carmody of en essay published in Polish in 2000.
    "Philosophy, in particular logic and ontology, occupy a key place in the structure of human knowledge.
    We conceive the world, one might say we grasp it, via concepts, that is mental pictures of the aspects of objects under consideration. Concepts in turn are connected according to the principles of an appropriate grammar, into propositions (logical judgments), that is, logical pictures of mentally-grasped fragments of the world.

Concepts are junctions of information: propositions -- its pieces.
From here comes the role of logic, being the basic theory of those pictures of the world, fragments of grasped information. The logic of names examines the relations between concepts expressed in a given language. The logic of sentences examines the relations between propositions. This leads to an examination of the recombinations of the initial group of pictures, that is, to an examination of possibilities.
Their totality in turn constitutes the ontological space, the space of all possibilities.
Ontology, the true first philosophy, in this way creates the most general conceptual framework for the varied and diverse fields of human knowledge and strives towards the complete working-out of that framework. As a matter of fact. we owe to Leibniz the idea of the above modal definition of ontology and the opportunity of carrying out ontological research by pointing out the proper form of ontological questions: what is possible? And why? And, how is it possible?
In turn, particular ontological questions, for a given x, sound as follows: how is x possible? We have amongst other: metaphysical questions - How is the world possible? How is existence possible? And what, why and how is it that exists?: epistemo-ontological questions - How is knowledge itself possible? In particular, How is mathematical a priori knowledge of that which is real possible? Also questions of *axio-ontology* and *antropo*-ontology: What are values? How are they possible? How is evil possible? Who are people so evil?
And many other questions of this form.
The problems of real philosophy are real and great. Therefore they will be with us for as long as will survive human curiosity. For *all people by nature strive for knowledge* (Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, I, 1). including the deepest one.
This is why it is so important that reflection on these questions be carried out by true philosophers. For if

philosophy, at the insistence of skeptics or under the pressure of positivists, were to give up concerning itself with its real problems, then they would fall into hands of charlatans, causing great mental and social damage. Therefore people should not forget about philosophical questions and the right way to deal with them." pp. 378-379.

32. ———. 2007. "Modal Logics of Truth and Falsity I. Conceptual and Logical Framework, and Logics of the Matrix Approach of Boole." In *Logik, Begriffe, Prinzipien Des Handelns / Logic, Concepts, Principles of Action*, edited by Müller, Thomas and Newen, Albert, 95-112. Paderborn: Mentis.

    Reprinted in: *Art of philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, pp. 147-164.
    Just as 'beautiful' points the way for aesthetics and 'good' for ethics, so do words like 'true' for logic.
    ...it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. (Gottlob Frege - *Der Gedanke (The Thought*) p. 58
    Logic stand guard at the border between Truth and False (Jan Łukasiewicz)
    INTRODUCTION. "1. The old but still bright and fresh wisdom, expressed in both mottos, says that the chief task of logic is to search for the laws of truth and for rules governing transformations preserving truth, and sometimes falsity. The theory of Truth and Falsity is therefore the true kernel of logic, and logicians duty is, as Łukasiewicz said, to guard the border between Truth and Falsity.
    2. In our poor, postmodern time quite a lot of people, including, unfortunately, a few logicians and many philosophers, are following rather Nietzsche than Frege trying to dissolve, at least in human beings' minds, this border together with other natural borders. They like to be happy on wanton vacation without any border, including the border between Truth and Falsity and the border between real and unreal.
    Are guardians still doing their job? Do logicians fulfill their duty?

3. The masters certainly do. Recall, for example, seminal work of Tarski clarifying in set theoretical terms the classical definition of truth in the case of an extensional language, or the work of Kripke and others which extend Tarski's analysis to the case of intensional operators.
One gap however is surprising. Despite efforts of G. H. von Wright (1) and his followers we still have no reasonable, easy to catch and use, logics of Truth and Falsity, or rather logics of fundamental logical modalities: T -- *is true* and F -- *is false*.(2) Why?
The reasons are mental, not essential. As you will see, they are mainly misunderstanding and propaganda due to a false understanding of Tarski's work and Ramsey's redundancy thesis.
4. In a series of papers, with the present one as the starting item, I will outline natural T&F-logics showing, to my surprise, that between them are most of the basic modal logics. In particular, in the present paper I will pick out T&F-logics connected with the matrix method for classical logic. T&F-logics obtained in such way are counterparts of logics implicit in the matrix (algebraic) way of Boole and the tableau method of Beth, Smullyan and Fitting (cf. Melvin Fitting, *Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory and Forcing,* North Holland, 1969).
In subsequent papers I will outline in turn T&F-logics of algebraic automorphisms, connections from the logical square of T and F, next iterations of T and F, cancellation, and deflation. Finally, I will compare logics from my list with T&F-logics pointed out in the literature of the subject.
5. A natural consequence of my list of T&F-logics is to use them to discuss several notorious problems concerning Truth and Falsity, including the most famous one -- the Liar Paradox. In "Modal Logics and the Liar" I will show that a modal approach to the Paradox by means of suitable T&Flogics is powerful and subtle enough to catch both its kernel and mechanism.
As a matter of fact, my interest in the Liar Paradox was the starting point for my investigation of T&F-logics. Since 1986 I have lectured several times in several places trying to

explain the power and usefulness of modal logic for a true discussion of the Liar Paradox and of similar obstacles to formal semantics based on the classical idea of *being true* and *being false*.(3)" (p. 95-96. N.B: *The mottos by Frege and Łukasiewicz in the original are in German and Polish*)
(1) Cfr. G. H. von Wright, *An Essay in Modal Logic*, Amsterdam, 1951.
(2) Called T&F-logics, in short.
(3) Special thanks should go to Jozef Misiek, who awoke me by his provocative claim that there are no proper T&F-logics and no reasons as well to consider the Liar Paradox to be a reasonable and genuine paradox. Read and see!

33. ———. 2011. *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

The volume contains 12 essays, (the 2, 4, 6, and 9 are previously unpublished).
"Jerzy Perzanowski, born en 23rd April 1943 in Aix-Les-Bains. An outstanding Polish philosopher of international renown, he passed away on 17th May 2009 in Bydgoszcz. His original philosophical ideas include informatic monadology", "protophysics", and a rather un-usual blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to "logical philosophy" (another of Perzanowski's coinages, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic). Later, his interests turned to cognitive science and finally even to mysticism, again of a particular, logically informed, kind." p. 9.
Contents: Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertynski: Biographical Note: Jerzy Perzanowski - Real Man and Real Philosopher 9; Preface: Jerzy Perzanowski's Way to the Monadology 15; 1. In Praise of Philosophy 25; 2. Reasons for Monodeism 41; 3. Towards Combination Metaphysics 45; 4. Onto\logical Melioration 69; 5. Locative Ontology 87; 6. In Search of Onto\logical Conditions for Emergence 121; 7. Towards

Psycho-ontology 135; 8. Modal Logics of Truth and Falsity 147; 9. Classical (Modal) Logics of the Square of Opositions 165; 10. Combination Semantics for Intensional Logics. Makings and Their use in Making Combination Semantics 175; 12. A Profile of Masonic Synthesis 199; Bibliography 223-225.

34. ———. 2011. "Reasons for Monodeism." In *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, edited by Sytnik-Czetwertynski, Janusz, 41-44. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

35. ———. 2011. "Onto\Logical Melioration." In *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, edited by Sytnik-Czetwertynski, Janusz, 69-86. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

36. ———. 2011. "In Search of onto\Logical Conditions for Emergence." In *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, edited by Sytnik-Czetwertynski, Janusz, 121-134. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

37. ———. 2011. "Classical (Modal) Logics of the Square of Opposition." In *Art of Philosophy. A Selection of Jerzy Perzanowski's Works*, edited by Sytnik-Czetwertynski, Janusz, 165-174. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

MAIN PUBLICATIONS IN POLISH

1. Perzanowski Jerzy. *Logiki Modalne a Filozofia*. Kraków: Nakladem Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 1989.

   Modal Logics and Philosophy. Ph.D thesis, Jagellonian University.
   Slightly modified version reprinted in *Jak filozofowac? Studia z metodologii filozofii,* pp. 262 - 346.

"The first part of the essay contains basic information concerning the author's analysis of modalities. It presents a construction of Perzanowski-cones (a three-dimensional topography of modal calculi) as well as an outline of his combination ontology. Within this framework he elaborates a new type of relational semantics, called "combination semantics of modal logics", which generalizes standard semantics of modal systems. In a second part the author illustrates his thesis, that modal logic is the main tool of exact philosophy, particularly with respect to ontological rationalism.
He presents general rules concerning formalization of the philosophical modal expressions. He uses a fragment of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* to demonstrate various methods which allow to obtain the categorial logic of a philosophical text. The following chapters on "modal fallacy" and contingency contain an extended discussion of his attempt to a modal analysis of "(onto)logical" rationalism. The chapter "Ontic primitivity and secondarity" presents four formalizations of Ingarden's conception of moments of existence. On the one hand, this serves as an exemplification of the previously developed formalities, on the other one it shows that logic has an active influence on philosophy, conducting systematic theoretical research in it. The author's very original and interesting essay ends with an English summary. However, it would be highly desirable to obtain a full version in English or German." Max Urchs (University of Leipzig).

2. ———, ed. *Jak Filozofowac? Studia Z Metodologii Filozofii*. Warszawa: PWN, 1989.

   How to Philosophize? Studies on the Methodology of Philosophy.

3. Perzanowski Jerzy, and Pietruszczak Andrzej, eds. *Byt, Logos, Matematyka*. Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 1989.

   Being, Logos, Mathematics.

4. Frankiewicz Malgorzata, and Perzanowski Jerzy, eds. *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Pisma Z Teologii Mistycznej*. Krakov: Znak, 1994.

   Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Writings on Mystical Theology*. With an Appendix by Jerzy Perzanowski: *Teofilozofia Leibniza* [Leibniz' s Theophilosophy], pp. 243-351).

5. Perzanowski Jerzy, Pietruszczak Andrzej, and Gorzka Cezary, eds. *Filozofia/Logika: Filozofia Logiczna 1994*. Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 1995.

   Philosophy/Logic: Logical Philosophy 1994.

6. Perzanowski Jerzy, and Pietruszczak Andrzej, eds. *Logika & Filozofia Logiczna. Flfl 1996–1998*. Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2000.

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7. Perzanowski Jerzy, ed. *Izydora Dambska 1904-1983. Materialy Z Sympozjum "Non Est Necesse Vivere, Necesse Est Philosophari". Kraków, 18-19.Xii.1998*. Kraków: PAU, 2001.

8. Perzanowski Jerzy, and Pietruszczak Andrzej, eds. *Od Teorii Literatury Do Ontologii Swiata*. Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2003.

   From Theory of Literature to Ontology of the World.

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Kit Fine: annotated bibliography. Books and Papers 1970-1981

Books

1. Prior, Arthur Norman, and Fine, Kit. 1977. *World, Times and Selves* . London: Duckworth.
   Contents: Preface by Kit Fine 7; 1. The Parallel between Modal Logic and Quantification Theory 9; 2. Egocentric Logic 28; 3. Supplement to 'Egocentric Logic' 46; 4. Worlds, Times and Selves 51; 5. Tensed Propositions as Predicates 67; 6. Modal Logic and the Logic of Applicability 84; 7. Supplement to 'Modal Logic and the Logic of Applicability' 102; 8. Postscript by Kit Fine: Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants 116; Technical Appendix 162; Index of Symbols 169; Index of Names 171; General Index 173-175.
   "Before he died, Prior was working on a book to be entitled 'Worlds, Times and Selves'. This book was to deal, in one way or another, with the interplay between modal or tense logic, on the one hand, and quantification theory on the other. One of its main concerns was to show that modal and tense logic could stand on their own, that talk of possible worlds or instants was to be reduced to them rather than the other way round.
   Unfortunately, only the first chapter was completed. There were jottings for other chapters, but they were far from complete. However, it is clear that some of Prior's recently published papers would have been incorporated into the book, though probably in considerably modified form. So

what I have tried to do is to collate the published and unpublished material in such a way that the result is as close as possible to the book he had in mind.

This should explain the distribution of the unpublished material. The completed chapter appears, as it should, as the first paper of the collection. However, the other passages of unpublished material appear as supplements, in 3 and 7, to already published papers. This is because they are quite obviously expansions or elaborations of those papers. In order to avoid repetition, I have omitted some initial sections from the supplementary papers; and this accounts for their abrupt beginnings. I have also not used some other unpublished material, either because it was expository or because it was too fragmentary to be of interest.

The first paper explains in very simple terms the parallel between modal logic and quantification theory. It is a good introduction to the technical and philosophical problems that arise in the later papers.

The next three papers deal with the egocentric counterpart to ordinary tense or modal logic. They introduce the operator Q that picks out those propositions that correspond to instants, worlds or selves, as the case may be. The last sections of 2 and 4 and most of the supplement 3 are concerned with the formal development of Q or cognate notions.

The last three of Prior's papers, 5-7, deal with the problem of embedding the theory of instants or possible worlds within orthodox tense and modal logic respectively. Chapter 5 attempts to see how far the opposite view can be maintained. Chapter 6 is a particularly rich paper. It deals, among other things, with a world-calculus for the system Q, the logic of significance, and the extension of embedding results to possibilist quantifiers. The supplement elaborates further on some of these topics.

In his book, Prior would certainly have said more on this question of embedding. In the postscript, I have tried to fill this gap by discussing in detail his proposal for explaining instants and possible worlds within tense or modal logic. I had intended to write on his whole philosophy of time and

modality; but, for reasons of space, I decided to stick to this more limited topic.
I should like to thank the editors of *Nous, L'Age de la Science, American Philosophical Quarterly* , and *Theoria* for permission to publish papers originally published by them. I should also like to thank Mary Prior, Anthony Kenny and Hans Kamp. They all, in their own ways, helped me to produce this collection. Tom Dimas and Mike Ferejohn prepared the indexes." (*Preface* , pp. 7-8)

2. Fine, Kit. 1985. *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Contents: Preface VII; Introduction 1; 1. The General Framework 5; 2. Some Standard Systems 61; 3. Systems in General 147; 4. Non-Standard Systems 177; Bibliography 210; General Index 215; Index of Symbols 219-220.
"This book deals with certain problems in understanding natural deduction and ordinary reasoning. As is well known, there exist certain informal procedures for arguing to a universal conclusion and from an existential premiss. We may establish that all objects of a certain kind have a given property by showing that an arbitrary object of that kind has that property; and having shown that there exists an object with a given property, we feel entitled to give it a name and declare that it has the property. So we may establish that all triangles have interior angles summing to 180° by showing of an arbitrary triangle that its interior angles sum to 180°; and having established that there exists a bisector to an angle, we feel entitled to give it a name and declare that it is a bisector to the angle.
These informal procedures correspond to certain of the quantificational rules in systems of natural deduction. Corresponding to the first is the rule of universal generalization, which allows us to infer $\forall x\, \phi(x)$ from $\phi(a)$ under suitable restrictions. Corresponding to the second is the rule of existential instantiation, which allows us to infer $\exists(a)$ from $\exists x\, \phi(x)$, again under suitable restrictions.
In these inferences, certain terms play a crucial role; and it is natural to ask how they are to be understood. What role is to be attributed to the term a in the inferences from natural

deduction? What is to be made of our talk of arbitrary triangles or indefinite bisectors in ordinary reasoning?
The present work is based upon the hypothesis that these critical terms refer to arbitrary or representative objects. The term a in the inferences from natural deduction functions as a name of a suitable arbitrary object. And our talk of arbitrary triangles or of indefinite bisectors is to be taken at its face value as also evincing reference to arbitrary objects.
The core of the work will be taken up with applying this hypothesis to two main systems of natural deduction: the one of Quine's *Methods of Logic* [52]; and the other of Copi [54], as amended by Kalish [67] and Prawitz [67]. In the case of each of these systems, we shall propose a generic semantics and then, by reference to that semantics, both establish soundness and motivate the restrictions on the rules.
We shall also be concerned to cover certain other topics. We develop the pure theory of arbitrary objects somewhat beyond the needs of the present application, partly because of its intrinsic interest and partly with a view to other applications. We embark on a general study of systems containing a rule of existential instantiation and prove some general results on what form satisfactory systems of this sort can take. Finally, on the basis of an alternative generic semantics, we develop certain presuppositional systems and relate them to existing systems in the literature. The book is divided into parts according to the topic treated, with the first part dealing with the pure theory, the second with the application to the systems of Copi and Quine, the third with systems in general that contain a rule of existential instantiation, and the last with the presuppositional systems.
The work here is part of a much larger project, one in which the theory of arbitrary objects is to be applied to the use of pronouns in natural language and to the use of variables in informal mathematics and programming languages. These other topics have been altogether ignored, although the perceptive reader may pick up on certain intended points of

contact. The closely related topic of developing a generic semantics for the ε- and η-calculi of Hilbert and Bernays [34] and Hailperin [57] has also not been considered; and my hope is that I shall be able to deal with it thoroughly elsewhere.
The book does not need to be read from beginning to end and the first part, in particular, may be consulted according to the demands from the other parts. The reader who is having difficulties may find my 'Natural Deduction and Arbitrary Objects' [85] helpful as a somewhat gentler introduction to the subject." (*Introduction* , pp. 1-2)
References
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Hailperin, T. 1957 'A Theory of Restricted Quantification', Part I, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* vol. 22, pp. 19-35, Part II, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* vol. 27, pp. 113-129.
Hilbert, D. and Bernays, P. 1934 *Grundlagen der Mathematik* Volume I, Berlin: Springer.
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3. ———. 2002. *The Limits of Abstraction* . New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Preface V-VI; Introduction IX-X; 1. Philosophical introduction 1; 2. The Context Principle 55; 3: The analysis of acceptability 101; 4. The general theory of abstraction 165, References 193; Main Index 197; Index of first occurrences of formal symbols and definitions 200-203.
"The present monograph has been written more from a sense of curiosity than commitment. I was fortunate enough to attend the Munich Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics in the summer of 94 and to overhear a discussion of recent work on Frege's approach to the foundations of mathematics. This led me to investigate certain technical problems connected with the approach;

and these led me, in their turn, to reflect on certain philosophical aspects of the subject. I was concerned to see to what extent a Fregean theory of abstraction could be developed and used as a foundation for mathematics and to place the development of such a theory within a general framework for dealing with questions of abstraction. To my surprise, l discovered that there was a very natural way to develop a Fregean theory of abstraction and that such a theory could be used: to provide a basis for both arithmetic and analysis. Given the context principle, the logicist might then arguing that the theory was capable of yielding a philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that could account both for our reference to various mathematical objects and for our knowledge of various mathematical truths. I myself am doubtful whether the theory can legitimately be put to this use. But, all the same, there is surely considerable intrinsic interest in seeing how the theory of abstraction might be developed and whether it might be capable of embedding a significant portion of mathematics, even if the theory itself is in need of further foundation.

The monograph is in four parts. The first is devoted to philosophical matters and serves to explain the motivation for the technical work and its significance. It is centred on thee main questions: What are the correct principles of abstraction? In what sense do they serve to define the abstract with which they deal? To what extent can they provide a foundation for mathematics? The second part (omitted from the original paper) discusses the context principle, both as a general basis for setting up contextual definitions and in its particular application to numbers. The third part proposes and investigates a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an abstraction principle to be acceptable. The acceptable principles, according to this criterion, are precisely determined and it is shown, in particular, that there is a strongest such principle. The fourth and final part attempts to develop a general theory of abstraction within the technical limitations set out by the third part; the theory is equipped with a natural class of

models; and it is shown to provide a foundation for both arithmetic and analysis." (*Introduction* , pp. IX-X)

4. ———. 2005. *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* . New York: Oxford University Press.
   Contents: Preface; Introduction 1;
   I. Issues in the Philosophy of Language.
   1. Reference, Essence, and Identity (previously unpublished) 19; 2. The Problem of *De Re* Modality (1989) 40; 3. Quine on Quantifying In (1990) 105;
   II. Issues in Ontology.
   4. Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants (1977) 133; 5. Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse (1985) 176; 6. The Problem of Possibilia (2002) 214;
   III. Issues in Metaphysics.
   7. The Varieties of Necessity (2002) 235; 8. Tense and Reality (2005) 261; 9. Necessity and Non-Existence (previously unpublished) 321;
   IV. Reviews.
   10. Review of *Conterfactuals* by David Lewis (1975) 357; 11. Review of *The Nature of Necessity* by Alvin Plantinga (1976) 366; References 371; Index 379-387.
   "This volume collects together my published papers on tense and modality up to the present time. It contains two reviews, since the issues they discuss are still of interest; and it also contains a much expanded version of my paper, 'The Reality of Tense', now under the title 'Tense and Reality', and two previously unpublished papers. I have not included my technical papers on modal logic, even when they have contained philosophical material or have had an obvious bearing on philosophical questions; and nor have I included any of my philosophical or technical papers on essence, even when they have dealt with the connection between essence and modality. I have added an introduction to the volume, outlining the central content of each paper and bringing out certain issues and themes that may not be evident from the papers themselves." (From the *Preface*)
5. ———. 2007. *Semantic Relationism* . Oxford: Blackwell.

Contents: Preface VII; Introduction 1; 1. Coordination among variables 6; 2. Coordination within language 33; 3. Coordination within thought 66; 4. Coordination between speakers 86; Postscript: further work 122; Notes 133; References 141; Index 143.
"The ideas behind these lectures had their origin in the early 1980s.
There was then a great deal of excitement over the “new” theory of direct reference, but many of those who were attracted to the theory were also worried about the challenge posed by Frege’s puzzle. How could they claim, as the theory seemed to require, that the meaning of “Cicero = Tully” was the same as “Cicero = Cicero,” when the one was plainly informative and the other not?
I myself faced a similar problem over the role of variables. I had previously attempted to develop a theory of variable or arbitrary objects. According to this theory, a variable should be taken to signify a variable object, something which we might loosely identify with the variable’s meaning or abstract role. However, even though the variables x and y, when considered on their own, should be taken to signify the same variable object, they should not be taken to signify the same variable object when considered together, since otherwise we would lose the relevant distinction between x = y and x = x. It seemed clear to me that the two problems were essentially the same and that there should be a common solution to them both, even though it was not then clear to me what the solution should be.
I worried about this issue on and off for the next 15 years until it dawned on me that it could only adequately be solved by making a fundamental break with semantics as it is usually conceived. One must take account of the meaning that expressions have, not only when considered on their own but also when they are considered together; the meaning relation between them is not simply to be regarded as a product of their individual meanings. Once we embrace this liberating thought, we can then see how the usual referential view of the meaning of variables and names can

be retained and yet the difficulties over Frege-type puzzles avoided.
It was, therefore, opportune when Ernie Sosa asked me to give the first Blackwell/Brown lecture for the Fall of 2002, since this provided me with an opportunity to develop these ideas, which were still in a very inchoate form, and to discuss them with a wonderful group of philosophers.
(...)
The present book is loosely based upon the lectures I gave at Brown and I have tried to keep to something like the original lecture format. This has meant that a number of topics have not been pursued, though I have given a brief account of some of the more important of these topics in the final chapter. It has also meant that scholarly allusions have been kept to a minimum. I have, in particular, made no attempt to compare my own work with the loosely related work of Almog (2006), Fiengo and May (2005), Lawlor (2005), and Lieb (1983). This is a "bare-bones" account, simply intended to convey the essential ideas; and I hope later to provide a fuller account that is both broader in its scope and much more thorough in its treatment of particular topics." (*Preface* pp. VII-VIII)
References
Almog, J. (2006) "Is A Unified Treatment of Language-and-Thought Possible?," *Journal of Philosophy* , vol. CII, no. 10, pp. 493–531.
Fiengo, R. and May, R. (2005) *De Lingua Belief,* Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lawlor, K. (2005) "Confused Thoughts and Modes of Presentation," *Philosophical Quarterly* , vol. 55, no. 218, pp. 137–48.
Lieb, H.-H. (1983) " *Integrational Linguistics, vol. 1: General Outline* ", Amsterdam; Philadelphia: Benjamins (= Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, 17).
6. ———. 2020. *Vagueness. A Global Approach* . New York: Oxford University Press.
"The material for the lectures has been extracted from a much longer booklength manuscript, which I hope to publish separately. I therefore hope that the reader will bear

in mind that many topics that are discussed perfunctorily or not at all in this monograph will be discussed at much greater length in the book. This is a bare bones account, without the usual qualifications or consideration of objections or discussion of alternative points of view.
The first lecture (Chapter 1) was intended as an introduction to a general audience with no special expertise in the topic. It is, for this reason, very sketchy and, except for the last part, not at all original. The subsequent two lectures are more substantive. The first of these (Chapter 2) presents my general account of vagueness and the second (Chapter 3) discusses its application to three topics: the sorites argument (or paradox of the “heap”); the question of luminosity (or whether we can know our own minds); and the problem of personal identity, especially in its connection to the possibility of fission." (from the Preface)

Papers 1970-1988

1. Fine, Kit. 1970. "Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logic." *Theoria* no. 36:336-346.
"In this paper Ï shall present some of the results I have obtained on modal theories which contain quantifiers for propositions. The paper is in two parts: in the first part I consider theories whose non-quantificational part is S5; in the second part I consider theories whose non-quantificational part is weaker than or not contained in S5. Unless otherwise stated, each theory has the same language L. This consists of a countable set V of propositional variables p1, p2,, the operators v (or), ~ (not) and □ (necessarily), the universal quantifier (p), p a propositional variable, and brackets (and), The formulas of L are then defined in the usual way." (p. 336)
2. ———. 1971. "The Logics Containing S4.3." *Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* no. 17:371-376.

"In this paper I prove some general results on logics containing S 4.3. In section 2 I prove that they all have the finite model property. Bull [1] has already proved thia result; but his proof is algebraic, whereas mine is semantic. In sections 3 and 4, I prove that they are all finitely axiomatizable. It follows from these results that they are all decidable. Finally, in section 5, I show that the lattice of S 4.3 logics is isomorphic to one on finite set of finite sequences of natural numbers. Needless to say, these results carry over to the extensions of the intermediate logic LC. In a paper on logics containing K4, I shall present another semantic proof that S4.3 logics have the finite model property and thereby also establish some results on compactness." (p. 371)

(1) R. A. Bull, "That All Normal Extensions of S4.3 Have the Finite Model Property", *Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* , 12, 1966, pp. 341-344.

3. ———. 1971. "Counting, Choice and Undecidability." *Manifold* no. 11:17-22.

Abbreviations: Continuum Hypothesis = CH; Axiom of Choice = AC.

"In 1900 Hilbert stated 23 problems which he considered to be of crucial iaportance. The first of these was ’prove Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis'. Gödel (1939) and Cohen (1963) have shown that the hypothesis can neither be proved nor disproved. Their proofs are expounded in:

P. J. Cohen, *Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis* , Benjamin 1966.

P. J. Cohen, "Independence results in set theory", in *Studies ln Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics* , North-Holland 1965, pp. 39-54.

K. Gödel, "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the axiom of set theory", 1939, 4th printing, Princeton 1966·" (p. 71)

(...)

"The question now remains: what attitude should the working mathematician take towards CH? It is important to

leave AC on one side at this point because it possesses a degree of self-evidence that CH certainly lacks.
There are, I think, two main attitudes. On the one hand, one could say there is no sense in which CH is true or false and give up looking for ways of settling the question. Instead, one would develop different set theories, with or without CH, somewhat in analogy to the alternative geometries of the 19th century. On the other hand, one could say that CH Is either true or false and look for new ways of determining which.
Two main ways suggest themselves. The first is to dispense with proof and to accept that hypothesis concerning transfinite cardinals which is most fruitful in consequences. The second is to search for new self-evident axioms that might settle CH.
These new axioms might be formulated in terms of set-theoretic notions or in terms of a new notion or new notions altogether.
The adoption of non-deductive procedures or the discovery of non-set-theoretic notions would conflict with two common views about mathematics, viz. that all mathematical knowledge is based upon proof and that all mathematical notions can be given a set-theoretic definition. Although it is too early to talk of feasibility, it is worth noting that these common views are based upon an analysis of extant mathematics. There seems to be no reason, in principle, why they should be true." (p. 82)

4. ———. 1972. "In So Many Possible Worlds." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 13:516-520.
"Ordinary modal logic deals with the notion of a proposition being true at least one possible world. This makes it natural to consider the notion of a proposition being true in *k* possible worlds for any non-negative integer *k*. Such a notion would stand to Tarski's numerical quantifiers as ordinary possibility stands to the existential quantifier.
In this paper (1) I present several logics for numerical possibility. First I give the syntax and semantics for a minimal such logic (sections 1 and 2); then I prove its

completeness (sections 3 and 4); and finally I show how to extend this result to other logics (section 5)." (p. 516)
(1) The results of this paper are contained in my doctorate thesis, submitted to the University of Warwick in 1969. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, the late Arthur Prior. Without his help and encouragement this paper would never have been written.

5. ———. 1972. "For So Many Individuals." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 13:569-572.
"In [2], Tarski introduces the numerical quantifiers.
(...)
Because of their definability, the numerical quantifiers have rarely been considered on their own account. However, in this paper I consider a predicate logic without identity which is enriched with numerical quantifiers as primitive. In section 1, I present the syntax and semantics for this logic; and in sections 2 and 3, I establish its completeness." (p. 569)
[2] Tarski, A., *Introduction to Logic,* Oxford University Press (1946).
6. ———. 1972. "Logics Containing S4 Without the Finite Model Property." In *Conference in Mathematical Logic, London '70* , edited by Hodges, Wifrid, 98-102. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
"In [1], Harrop asked whether there were logics containing the intuitionistic logic IL which lack the finite model property [=fmp]. Jankov gave examples of such logics, but they were not finitely axiomatizable. By the Tarski-McKlnsey translation, Harrop's problem relates to the question of whether there exist extensions of the modal logic S4 without fmp. Makinson [2] showed that there are extensions of the modal logic M without fmp, but he could not extend his results to S4. In this paper, I shall exhibit logics containing both IL and S4 which lack fmp, but are finitely axiomatized and decidable." (p. 98)
(...)
"Finally, it should be noted that we can add axioms to the logics described above so as to obtain logics which are

decidable, finitely axiomatized, complete for their intended interpretation, and yet without fmp." (p. 101)
[1] Harrop, R., On the existence of finite models and decision procedures, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society* , vol. 54 (1958), 1-16.
[2] Makinson, D., A Normal Modal Calculus Between T and S4 Without the Finite Model Property, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* , voi. 34, Number 1 (1969), 35-38.

7. ———. 1972. "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives." *Econometrica* no. 40:1083-1090.
"A social decision rule is one that produces a social decision for each configuration of individuals' decisions. Such a rule is representative if it produces a social decision that is the result of repeatedly applying the rule of simple majority decision to decisions obtained
by that rule. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a social decision rule for two alternatives to be representative." (p. 1083)
(...)
"The central problem of this paper is to find an alternative characterization of the representative functions. May in [1] gave an alternative characterization of the simple majority decision functions, and Murakami in [2 and 3] established that monotonicity and self-duality are necessary conditions for being a representative or indirect majority decision function. (In fact, Murakami deals with what he calls democratic functions, i.e., representative functions which are non-dictatorial; but this latter condition may be added or left out at will.) However, he was not able to establish any sufficient conditions. In this paper, I establish his conjecture that strong monotonicity with self-duality is a sufficient condition.
I use this result and a new property of not being "zigzag" to prove that monotonicity, self-duality, and not being zigzag are necessary and sufficient conditions. (2)
Finally, I show that the monotonic, self-dual, and positive functions are exactly those definable in terms of the voting and jury operators." (p. 1084)

(2) P. C. Fishburn independently solved this problem in his paper "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," *Econometrica* , 39 (1971), pp. 273-284. However, he uses a completely different method of proof and a slightly different condition in place of "not zigzag".

References

[1] MAY, K. O.: "A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica* , 20 (1952), 680-684.

[2] MURAKAMI, Y.: "Formal Structure of Majority Decisions," *Econometrica* , 34 (1966), 709-718.

[3] MURAKAMI, Y.: *Logic and Social Choice* . London: Macmillan, and New York: Dover, 1968.

8. ———. 1973. "Conditions for the Existence of Cycles under Majority and Non-Minority Rules." *Econometrica* no. 41:889-899.

   "This paper provides type I necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under simple majority rule. (2) For type II conditions, a master list of orderings is acceptable if the social rule generates a "rational" (e.g., transitive) social ordering whenever the individuals select their preference orderings from the list. A list ordering may be selected any number of times, and, in particular, it may not be selected at all. For type I conditions, on the other hand, each list ordering must be selected at least once, so that the list and the configuration of individual orderings must exactly match in the kind of orderings they contain. Thus for type II conditions it is the absence of certain kinds of orderings that blocks irrational social choice, whereas for type I conditions the presence of certain kinds of orderings may also contribute toward blockage.

   Type II conditions have been determined for a wide variety of rules and under several definitions of rationality. Our main interest in this paper is in type I conditions for simple majority rule with rationality defined in terms of transitivity or quasi-transitivity. However, our method of argument will yield simple alternative proofs of some standard results on

type I conditions and it will also yield the type I and type II conditions for transitivity under non-minority rule.
Section 1 lays down some relevant definitions. Section 2 proves the "min-midmax" theorem, which is the basis for all that follows. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, establish the conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under majority rule.
Finally, Section 5 proves the min-mid-max theorem for the non-minority rule and establishes the condition for transitivity under that rule." (p. 889)
(2) The terminology of type I and II conditions is Pattanaik's [6]. Type II conditions were first proposed by Inada [3] and type I conditions by Pattanaik [5].
References
[3] INADA, K.: "On the Simple Majority Decision Rule," *Econometrica* , 36 (1969), 490-506.
[5] PATTANAIK, P. K.: "SufficientConditions for the Existence of a Choice Set under Majority Voting," *Econometrica* , 38 (1970), 165-170.
[6] PATTANAIK, P. K.: *Voting and Collective Choice* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

9. ———. 1973. "Surveys on Deontic Logic, Mathematical Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics." In *UNESCO Survey of the Social Sciences* .
10. ———. 1974. "An Ascending Chain of S4 Logics." *Theoria* no. 40:110-116.
"This paper shows that there exists a continuum of logics containing the modal logic S4. (1) §1 contains preliminary definitions and results; §2 introduces the key notion of a frame formula; §3 establishes the main result and some consequences; and §4 establishes some further results." (p. 110)
(1) Jankov [5] has independently, and previously, proved the analogous result for intuitionistic sentential logic. His method of proof is algebraic, whereas mine is semantic.
References
[5] V. A. Jankov, On the Extension of the Intuitionist Propositional Calculus to the Classical Calculus, and the

Minimal Calculus to the Intuitionist Calculus, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 38, 1973, pp. 331-332.

11. ———. 1974. "Models for Entailment." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 3:347-372.
Reprinted in: Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., with contributions by J. Michael Dunn ... [et al.], *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992 vol. II, pp. 208-231.
"This paper gives a modelling for Ackermann's systems *Π'* and *Π"* , Anderson's and Belnap's system *E* and *R* , and several of their subsystems. The distinctive feature of this modelling is a point-shift in the evaluation of negation and entailment: the negation of a formula holds at a point if the formula itself fails to hold at a complementary point; and an entailment holds at a point if whenever its antecedent holds at a point its consequent holds at an appropriately associated point. These rules enable negations of valid formulas to hold at a point and valid formulas themselves to fail to hold at a point. They also provide a grip on certain axioms involving negation or nested entailment." (p. 347, notes omitted)
(...)
The first two sections present the deductive-semantic framework; §51.1 specifies the models, and §51.2 the logics. The following two sections establish completeness; §51.3 for a minimal logic B, and §51.4 for **Π', Π", E** and the several subsystems. §51.5 outlines various alternative versions of the modeling. The last two sections contain applications of the modeling: §51.6 to the admissibility of modus ponens; and §51.7 to the finite model property and decidability. Many of the systems considered are shown to have these properties; see §63 for a further survey on decidability, and §65 for fundamental undecidabilily results." (pp. 208-209 of the revised reprint)

12. ———. 1974. "An Incomplete Logic Containing S4." *Theoria* no. 40:23-29.
"This paper uses the standard terminology of modal logic. It should suffice to say that: all logics contain the minimal logic *K* and are closed under necessitation, substitution and

modus ponens; frames consist of a relation defined on a non-empty set of points; models consist of a frame with a valuation; and truth-at-a-point is defined and notated in an obvious way; with the formula □ *A* true at a point iff *A* is true at all accessible points. The formula *A* is true in (satisfied by) a model if it is true in all (some) points of the model; *A* is strongly verified in a model if all substitution-instances of *A* are true in the model; and *A* is valid in a frame if *A* is true in all models based upon the frame, *A* set of formulas is true, strongly verified, or valid if all of its members are. Unless otherwise stated, all logics contain S4 and all models and frames possess reflexive and transitive relations.

A logic is complete if any formula valid in all frames that validate the logic is in the logic. This paper exhibits a logic L containing S4 that is not complete." (p. 23)

13. ———. 1974. "Logics Containing K4. Part I." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 39:31-42.

"There are two main lacunae in recent work on modal logic: a lack of general results and a lack of negative results. This or that logic is shown to have such and such a desirable property, but very little is known about the scope or bounds of the property. Thus there are numerous particular results on completeness, decidability, finite model property, compactness, etc., but very few general or negative results. In these papers I hope to help fill these lacunae. This first part contains a very general completeness result. Let $I_n >$ be the axiom that says there are at most *n* incomparable points related to a given point. Then the result is that any logic containing K4 and $I_n >$ is complete.

The first three sections provide background material for the rest of the papers. The fourth section shows that certain models contain no infinite ascending chains, and the fifth section shows how certain elements can be dropped from the canonical model. The sixth section brings the previous results together to establish completeness, and the seventh and last section establishes compactness, though of a weak

kind. All of the results apply to the corresponding intermediate logics." (p. 31)

14. Fine, Kit, and Fine, Ben J. 1974a. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking I." *Review of Economic Studies* no. 41:303-322.
"This paper investigates social positional rules. The rules are social in that they produce a social output for any configuration of individual preference orderings. They are positional in that the output produced depends only upon the positions occupied by each alternative in the individual preference orderings. (3)
Social rules may be distinguished by the form of their output, be it a quasi-ordering, choice structure or complete ordering. For each form of output, we shall determine the class of social rules that satisfy certain desirable conditions. Part one deals with quasi ordering rules; part two will deal with the other types of rules.
Indeed, this part shows that certain desirable conditions are uniquely satisfied by the so-called positional rule. One alternative is as good as another by this rule if any individual's ranking of these cond alternative can be matched by as high a ranking of the first alternative by some possibly different individual. The individuals'rankings should be as good for the one alternative as for the other." (p. 303)
(*) Some of the results of this paper are contained in B. Fine's B.Phil. thesis, Oxford1971. We should like to thank the editor and a referee for many helpful suggestions.
(3) There have been several recent papers on positional rules. See [2], [3], [5] and [8]. However, most of the results of these papers overlap with the material of Part II (which is forthcoming in this journal) rather than Part I. Further details will be given there, but let us note that Smith [8] also has a variable number of individuals and a composition condition (his separability).
References
[1] Arrow, K. J. *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley, 1951; 2nd ed. 1963).

[2] Fisburn, P. C. "A Comparative Analysis of Group Decision Methods", *Behavioural Science* , 16 (1971).
[3] Fishburn, P. C. The Theory of Social Choice (Princeton UniversityPress, 1973).
[4] Gale, D. *The Theory of Linear Economic Models* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
[5] Gardenfors, P. "Positionalist Voting Functions", forthcoming in *Theory and Decision* . [September 1973, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 1-24]
[6] Hansson, B. "On Group Preferences", *Econometrica* , 37 (1969).
[7] Sen, A. K. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (Holden-Day, 1970).
[8] Smith, J. H. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate", forthcoming in *Econometrica* . [Vol. 41, No. 6 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1027-1041]

15. ———. 1974b. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking II." *Review of Economic Studies* no. 41:459-475.
"In Part I of this paper it was shown that certain appealing conditions forced any social quasi-ordering rule to include the positional rule, which is itself the intersection of all finite ranking (f.r.) rules. These conditions are slightly strengthened in the first three sections of this part, but this allows us to characterize in Section 3 the rules that also satisfy the additional properties as the intersection of some set of f.r. rules. In case a continuity property, which can be interpreted as a non-veto condition applied to groups, does not hold, the set of f.r. rules must be extended to include transfinite weightings. Section 1 finds sufficient conditions for a quasi-ordering rule to be positional. This is used in Section 2 to prove the results contained in Section 3 for the special case of a social ordering rule, when a single f.r. rule emerges. This special case is then generalized in Section 3. In Section 4, for the first time in the paper, we analyse conditions that recognize social decision depending upon the number of alternatives. Previously, only the number of individuals has been effectively allowed to vary. Again, simple and natural properties have powerful consequences, and it is thereby shown that the Borda rule is a compelling

choice for making social decision, given a veil of ignorance, that is no knowledge of the special features of the individuals and alternatives concerned. In case only a quasi-ordering rule is required, social decision is based on the intersection of a set of f.r. rules symmetrical about the Borda rule.

In Section 5 we turn to choice structureules. First a positional choice structure is defined. It is the strongest such rule containing all the f.r. rules, since an alternative in a set belongs to the choice from that set iff for some f.r. it is best in the set. This last condition is shown to be equivalent to demanding that the *HC* of that element does not belong to the convex hull of the *HC* of the other alternatives in the set. Then an outline is made for a conditions analysis of the rule: it is found to be the weakest rule satisfying certain conditions, in the sense that any other rule satisfying those conditions must be more decisive. In this, the method, results and analysis correspond to Part I's consideration of the positional quasi-ordering rule.

Section 6 is devoted to an examination of some questions concerned with the independence of conditions and Section 7 contains concluding remarks. The above only sketches the major results of thispaper. In addition,the analysis of normal social quasi ordering rules in Section 2 and Section 3 has obvious relevanceto the theory of production and utility under risk in the presence of indivisibility.

Finally, it should be noted that throughou this part, individual preferences are assumed to be antisymmetrical.Whilst the complications posed by individual indifference were overcome in Part I (Section6), a more general analysis becomes analytically cumbersome and presents more problems here. Nevertheless many of the results, especially analysis by conditions, do apply more generally, though possibly ith slight modifications." (pp. 459-460)

(*) The first part of the paper [1974a] was written up by K. Fine and the second by B. Fine. Both authors have contributed to all sections of the paper, though the first has contributed more to the material on the positional rule and

the second to the material on normal social rules. Some of the resultsfor ordering rules in this paper have been independently established by Smith [Smith, J. H. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate", *Econometrica* . Vol. 41, No. 6 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1027-1041].

16. Fine, Kit. 1975. "Vagueness, Truth and Logic." *Synthese* no. 30:265-300.
Reprinted in: Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith, *Vagueness: A Reader,* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 119-150.
"My investigation of this topic began with the question "What is the correct logic of vagueness?" This led to the further question "What are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?" And this led, in its turn, to a more general consideration of meaning and existence.
The contents of the paper are as follows. The first half contains the basic material. Section 1 expounds and criticizes one approach to the problem of specifying truth-conditions for a vague language. The approach is based upon an extension of the standard truth-tables and falls foul of something I call penumbral connection. Section 2 introduces an alternative framework, within which penumbral connection can be accommodated. The key idea is to consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually receive but also the truth-values that they might receive under different ways of making them more precise. Section 3 describes and defends the favoured account within this framework.
According to this account, as roughly stated, a vague sentence is true if and only if it is true for all ways of making it completely precise. The second half of the paper then deals with consequences, complications and comparisons of the preceding half. Section 4 considers the consequences that the rival approaches have for logic. The favoured account leads to a classical logic for vague sentences; and objections to this unpopular position are met. Section 5 studies the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness: first, in its bearing upon the truth-conditions for a language that contains a definitely-operator or a hierarchy of truth-

predicates; and second, in its relation to some puzzles concerning priority and eliminability.
Some of the topics tie in with technical material. I have tried to keep this at a minimum.
But the reader must excuse me if the technical undercurrent produces an occasional unintelligible ripple upon the surface. Many of the more technical passages can be omitted without serious loss in continuity." (p. 265)

17. ———. 1975. "Normal Forms in Modal Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 16:229-237.
"There are two main methods of completeness proof in modal logic.
One may use maximally consistent theories or their algebraic counterparts, on the one hand, or semantic tableaux and their variants, on the other hand. The former method is elegant but not constructive, the latter method is constructive but not elegant.
Normal forms have been comparatively neglected in the study of modal sentential logic. Their champions include Carnap [3], von Wright [10], Anderson [l] and Cresswell [4]. However, normal forms can provide elegant and constructive proofs of many standard results. They can also provide proofs of results that are not readily proved by standard means.
Section 1 presents preliminaries. Sections 2 and 3 establish a reduction to normal form and a consequent construction of models. Section 4 contains a general completeness result. Finally, section 5 provides normal formings for the logics T and K4." (p. 229)
[1] Anderson, A. R., "Improved decision procedures for Lewis's calculus S4 and Van Wright's calculus M," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic,* vol. 34 (1969), pp. 253-255.
[2] Bull, R. A., "On the extension of S4 with *CLMpMLp," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,* vol. VIII (1967), pp. 325-329.
[3] Carnap, R., "Modalities and quantification," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic,* vol. 11 (1946), pp. 33-64.
[4] Cresswell, M. J., "A conjunctive normal form for S3.5," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic,* vol. 34 (1969), pp. 253-255.

[10] Wright, G. H. von, *An Essay in Modal Logic,* Amsterdam (1951).

18. ———. 1975. "Review of David Lewis ' *Counterfactuals* '." *Mind* no. 84:451-458.
Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 10, pp. 357-365.
"This is an excellent book. It combines shrewd philosophical sense with fine technical expertise; the statement of views is concise and forthright; and the level of argument is high." (p. 451)
(...)
"Lewis suggests that merely possible worlds are like the actual world, 'differing not in kind but only in what goes on at them'. Indeed, for him there is no absolute difference between the actual world and the others: the difference is relative to a particular possible world as point of reference. A similar view has been held about the present time, but it is hard to accept for possible worlds. On the logical construction view, the actual world is distinguished by the property that all of its propositions are true. Here 'true' is an absolute term. It is not defined as truth in the actual world but, on the contrary, truth-in-a-world is defined as set-theoretic membership." (p. 455).

19. ———. 1975. "Some Connections between Elementary and Modal Logic." In *Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium* , edited by Kanger, Stig, 15-31. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
"A common way of proving completeness in modal logic is to look at the canonical frame. This paper shows that the method is applicable to any complete logic whose axioms express a XA-elementary condition or to any logic complete for a A-elementary class of frames. We also prove two mild converses to this result. (1) The first is that any finitely axiomatized logic has axioms expressing an elementary condition if it is complete for a certain class of natural subframes of the canonical frame. The second result is obtained from the first by dropping 'finitely axiomatized', and weakening 'elementary' to 'A-elementary'.

Classical logic is used in the formulation and proof of these results.
The proofs are not hard, but they do show that there may be a fruitful and non-superficial contact between modal and elementary logic. Hopefully, more work along these lines can be carried out.
§ 1 outlines some basic notions and results of modal logic. For simplicity, this is taken to be mono-modal. However, the results can be readily extended to multi-modal logics and, in particular, to tense logic.
§ 2 proves the first of the above results and a related result as well; § 3 proves the second of the above results; and finally, § 4 constructs counterexamples to some plausible looking converse results." (pp. 15-16)
(1) After writing this paper, I discovered that A.H. Lachlan had already proved the first of these 'mild converses' in [5]. His proof uses Craig's interpolation theorem, whereas mine uses the algebraic characterization of elementary classes. R.I. Goldblatt [4] independently hit upon this latter proof at about the same time as I did.
He also has a counter-example to the converse of this result. It is similar to the one in § 4.
I should like to thank Steve Thomason for the references above and for some helpful comments on the paper.
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[5] A.H. Lachlan, A note on Thomason's refined structures for tense logic, *Theoria* , [Vol. 40, No. 2 (Aug. 1974), pp. 117–120]

20. ———. 1976. "Review of *The Nature of Necessity* ' (A. Plantinga)." *The Philosophical Review* no. 86:562-566. Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 11, pp. 366-370.
"This book discusses several topics in the theory of modality: the *de re/de dicto* distinction, possible worlds, essences, names, possible objects, and existence. In the final two chapters, the preceding material is applied to the

problem of evil and the ontological argument. In its philosophical (though not theological) parts, the book is close to Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* .
There are similar accounts of the a priori/necessary distinction, proper names, transworld identity, and the identity theory." (p. 562)

21. ———. 1976. "Completeness for the Semi-Lattice Semantics. Abstract." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 41:560.
22. ———. 1976. "Completeness for the S5 analogue of E_i. Abstract." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 41:559-560.
23. ———. 1977. "Properties, Propositions and Sets." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 6:135-191.
"This paper presents a theory of cxtensional and intensional entities. The entities in question belong to a hierarchy that begins with individuals, sets, properties and propositions. The hierarchy extends to higher orders, both extensional and intensional. Thus it contains sets of propositions, properties of sets, properties of such properties, and, in general, it contains relations-in-intension and relations-in-extension over types of entities already in the hierarchy. The theory does not say what a proposition or property is. Rather, a possible worlds account of these entities is taken for granted. Thus a proposition is regarded as a set of possible worlds, a property as a set of world-individual pairs, and similarly for the other intensional entities. What the theory does is to characterize and investigate various properties of the entities in terms of possible worlds. These properties include existence, being purely general or qualitative, being logical, having an individual constituent, and being essentially modal. Thus the theory is ontological rather than linguistic. Its main concern is with the ontological status of the various entities and not with their relation to language." (p. 135)
24. ———. 1977. "Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants." In *Worlds, Times and Selves* , 116-168. London: Duckworth.
Postscript to ' *Worlds, Times and Selves* ', by Arthur Norman Prior, reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 4.

"Fundamental to Prior's conception of modality were two theses:
The ordinary modal idioms (necessarily, possibly) are primitive (1)
Only actual objects exist (2)
The first thesis might be called Modalism or Priority, in view of its nature and founder. The second thesis is sometimes called Actualism, and the two theses together I call Modal Actualism." (p. 116)
(...)
"My aim in this chapter is to carry out this programme of reconstruction, at least in outline. I have often followed the lead of Prior, much of whose later work (3) arose from this programme. However, I cannot be sure that he would have approved of all of the steps I take." (p. 118)
(1) Many references might be given. See e.g. 'Modal Logic and the Logic of Applicability' *Theoria* , 34 (1968), reprinted as Chapter 6 above.
(2) See *Papers on Time and Tense* , p. 143
(3) See the chapter of this book, Ch. XI of Papers on Time and Tense, and V of *Past, Present and Future*.

25. ———. 1978. "Model Theory for Modal Logic Part I: The ' *de re / de dicto'* Distinction." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 7:125-156.
"It is an oddity of recent work on modality that the philosopher's main concern has been with quantificational logic whereas the logician's has been with sentential logic. There have, perhaps, been several reasons for this divergence of interest. One is that the area of sentential modal logic is already rich in logical problems; and another is that the semantics for quantified modal logic has been in an unsettled state. But whatever the reasons have been in the past, the time would now seem ripe for a more fruitful interaction between these two approaches to the study of modality.
My aim in these papers has been to bring the methods of model theory closer to certain common philosophical concerns in modal logic. Indeed, most of the results answer questions that arise from some definite philosophical

position. In this respect, my approach differs from that of Bowen [1] and others, who attempt to extend the results of classical model theory to modal logic. Although this approach has its attractions, it also suffers from two drawbacks. The first is that most of its results are devoid of philosophical interest; and the second is that many standard results of classical model theory, such as the Interpolation Lemma, do not apply to some standard modal logics, such as quantified S5 (see my paper [5]).

The philosophical position that underlies the results of the first two parts of this paper may be called *de re* scepticism. It is the doctrine that quantification into modal contexts does not, as it stands, make sense. Call a sentence *de dicto* if, in it, the necessity operator never governs a formula that contains a free variable. Then for the *de re* sceptic, only *de dicto* sentences, or their equivalents, are legitimate." (p. 125)

References

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26. ———. 1978. "Model Theory for Modal Logic Part II: The Elimination of ' *de re'* Modality." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 7:277-306.

"In the first part of this paper, two philosophical positions were introduced: *de re* scepticism; and anti-Haecceitism. According to the first, quantification into modal contexts does not, as it stands, make sense; and according to the second, the identity or non-identity of individuals in distinct possible worlds is a matter of convention. It was shown that the two positions are equivalent in the sense that whatever first-order modal sentence is legitimate for the one is also legitimate for the other.

A soft and hard version of each of these positions may be distinguished. According to the soft *de re* sceptic, it is possible to make sense of *de re* modal discourse; and according to the soft anti-Haecceitist, it is possible to define coherent identity conditions for individuals across possible

worlds. Both of the soft positions, then, are compromising ones in that they allow that ordinary modal discourse may be reconstructed. The hard versions of the positions, on the other hand, deny that any such reconstruction is possible. The soft *de re* sceptic may reconstruct ordinary modal discourse in various ways. One way is to reinterpret either quantification or modality (or both) so that each *de re* sentence is equivalent to one that is *de dicto* . Although this method has been prominent in the literature, I shall deal with it only incidentally here. I hope to deal with it more fully elsewhere. Another way is to add axioms to the standard modal logic so that two conditions are satisfied. The first (eliminability) is that every *de re* sentence should have a *de dicto* equivalent relative to the resulting system. The second (conservativeness) is that no *dicto* sentence should be provable in the resulting system that is not already a theorem of standard modal logic." (p. 277)

27. ———. 1979. "Failures of the Interpolation Lemma in Quantified Modal Logic." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 44:201-206.
"Beth's Definability Theorem, and consequently the Interpolation Lemma, fail for the version of quantified S5 that is presented in Kripke's [7]. These failures persist when the constant domain axiom-scheme $\forall x \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \forall x \varphi$ is added to S5 or, indeed, to any weaker extension of quantificational *K* .
§1 reviews some standard material on quantificational modal logic. This is in contrast to quantified intermediate logics for, as Gabbay [5] has shown, the Interpolation Lemma holds for the logic CD with constant domains and for several of its extensions. §§2—4 establish the negative results for the systems based upon S5. §5 establishes a more general negative result and, finally, §6 considers some positive results and open problems. A basic knowledge of classical and modal quantificational logic is presupposed." (p. 201)
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28. ———. 1979. "Analytic Implication." In *Papers on Language and Logic* , edited by Dancy, Jonathan, 64-70. Keele: Keele University Library.
Reprinted in: *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* , 27, 1986, pp. 169-179.
"Parry presented a system of analytic implication in [7] and [8], Dunn [2] gave an algebraic completeness proof for an extension of this system and Urquhart [10] later gave a semantic completeness proof for Dunn's system with necessity. This paper establishes completeness for Parry's original system, (*) thereby answering a question of Gödel [6], and then, on the basis of the completeness result, derives decidability; it also deals with quantificational versions and other modifications of his system.
Section 1 contains some informal remarks on the notion of analytic implication.
They are not strictly relevant to the later analysis, although they may help to place it in perspective. Section 2 presents the semantics and Section 3 exhibits a system of analytic implication. Section 4 helps to demonstrate that the system is equivalent to Parry's, and Section 5 establishes completeness. Finally, Section 6 outlines the theory for some related systems." (p. 64)
(*) I mean the full system of [7] with adjunction, A14 and A15.
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29. ———. 1980. "First-Order Modal Theories. [II. Propositions]." *Studia Logica* no. 39:159-202.
Abstract. "This paper is part of a general programme of developing and investigating particular first-order modal theories. In the paper, a modal theory of propositions is constructed under the assumption that there are genuinely singular propositions, ie. ones that contain individuals as constituents. Various results on decidability, axiomatizability and definability are established."
"In some recent work ([7], [8], [9], [10]), I have attempted to carry out a dual programme of developing a general model-theoretic account of first-order modal theories, on the one hand, and of studying particular theories of this sort, on the other. The two parts of the programme are meant to interact, with the second providing both motivation and application for the first. The present paper belongs to the second part of the programme and deals with the question of giving a correct essentialist account of propositions.
My approach is distinctive in two main ways, one linguistic and the other metaphysical. On the linguistic side, I have let the variables for propositions be both nominal and objectual. That is to say, the variables occupy the same

position as names and are interpreted in terms of a range of objects, which, in the present case, turn out to be propositions. This approach stands in contrast to the earlier work of Prior [17], Bull [1], Fine [4], Kaplan [14] and Gabbay [12], [13], in which the variables are sentential (they occupy the same position as sentences) and are interpreted either substitutionally or in terms of a range of intensional values." (p. 159)

References

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30. ———. 1981. "First-Order Modal Theories. I: Sets." *Noûs* no. 15:177-205.

"The aim of this paper is to formalize various metaphysical theories within a first-order modal language. The first part deals with modal set theory. The later parts will deal with propositions, possible worlds, and facts.

Such an undertaking is relevant both to logic and to metaphysics.
Its relevance to logic lies mainly in its bearing on the model theory for first-order modal languages. I have begun to develop such a theory in [8]. The consideration of particular theories can then provide both an application of and motivation for general results in this field. There is already a fruitful interaction between the proof of general results and the consideration of particular first-order theories within classical model theory; and the hope is that there should be as beneficial an interaction within modal logic.
The relevance of the undertaking to metaphysics consists mainly in the general advantages that accrue from formalizing an intuitive theory. First of all, one thereby obtains a clearer view of its primitive notions and truths. This is no small thing in a subject, such as metaphysics, that is so conspicuously lacking in proper foundations.
But once a formalization is given, one can establish results about the theory as a whole and thereby obtain that overall view of a subject that philosophers often strive for but rarely obtain." (p. 177)
(...)
"The plan of this part of the paper is as follows. §1 contains an informal discussion and justification of our axioms for modal set theory. §2 then presents the formal theories. §3 develops a proof- and a model-theory for class abstracts in modal set theory and establishes a useful result on transferring abstracts from classical set theory into a modal context. In §4, it is shown that the formal theories are equivalent in that any two of them share the same theorems in their common language. The proof of equivalence contains general result on when the possible worlds semantics for a given modal theory can be represented within that theory itself. The next section discusses the adequacy of our formalizations and shows that, in a certain sense, they capture all of the essential truths about sets as such. The last section is concerned with the identity of sets and places the problem within a general account of the identity of objects." (p. 178)

[8] Fine, K., 'Model Theory for Modal Logic I, II, III', *The Journal of Philosophical Logic* , (1978) 125-56, (1978) 277-306, and to appear. [1981, 293-307]

31. ———. 1981. "Model Theory for Modal Logic. Part III: Existence and Predication." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 10:293-307.

"This paper is concerned with the technical implications of a certain view connecting existence to predication. This is the view that in no possible world is there a genuine relation among the nonexistents of that world or between the nonexistents and the existents. (1) The meaning of the term 'genuine' here may be variously explained. On an extreme interpretation, all relations are 'genuine', so that none of them are to relate non-existents.

On a milder interpretation, the genuine relations are those that are simple or primitive in some absolute sense. But even without appeal to an absolute concept of simplicity, we can require that all relations should be analyzable in terms of some suitable set of relations, relating only existents to existents.

In order to make our results applicable to the thesis, we shall suppose that the primitive non-logical predicates of our language correspond to the genuine relations, whatever they might be taken to be. Thus, the linguistic formulation of the thesis becomes that the primitive predicates of the language should only be true, in each world, of the existents of that world.

Of course, the thesis might have been given a linguistic formulation, without any reference to relations, in the first place.

The thesis is an instance of what has been called Actualism. This is the ontological doctrine that ascribes a special status to actual or existent objects. Another form of the doctrine, so-called World Actualism, says that the behaviour of nonexistents is supervenient upon the behaviour of the existents, that two possible worlds which agree in the latter respect cannot differ in the former respect. The present thesis, by contrast, might be called *Predicate Actualism* . It should be clear that Predicate Actualism implies World

Actualism, at least if the predicates used to describe the world are to express 'genuine' relations; for then there are no relationships involving nonexistents by which two worlds might be distinguished. On the other hand, World Actualism does not, as it stands, imply Predicate Actualism." (p. 293)

(*) This paper is the third and final part of a series (see the references below). It was completed and submitted to the *Journal of Philosophical Logic* in 1977, at about the same time as the other parts. But because of some mishap in the mail, its publication was delayed. The present part is independent from the other parts in its results, but draws upon the terminology of Section 2 of Part I.

I should like to thank the editor, R. Thomason, for many valuable remarks on the earlier version of the paper.

(1) I have briefly discussed this thesis elsewhere. The reader may like to consult Section 7 of [11], pp. 151 and 156-160 of [2], p. 564 of [3], and Section 8 of [7b].

There has been a fair amount of recent literature on the topic. I cannot give a complete survey, but the reader may like to consult Chapters IV-V of [9], p. 86 of [8], Chapters VII-VIII of [10], and pp. 333-336 of [11].

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[S] Fine, K., 'Model Theory for Modal Logic - Part II', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 7 (1978), 277-306.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Kit Fine: annotated bibliography. Papers 1982-1998

Papers 1982-1998

1. Fine, Kit. 1982. "The Problem of Non-Existents. I: Internalism." *Topoi* no. 1:97-140.
   Contents: A. Iintroduction. 1. Outline 97; 2. Methodology 99; B. Preliminaries, 1. Contexts and Objects 101; 2. Identity and Being 102; 3. The Identity of Non-existents 104; c. An Internalist Theory. 1. The Rudiments 106; 2. The Extended Theory 108; D. Refinements. 1. Implicit /Explicit Copula 110; 2. Diagonal Difficulties 115; 3. Dual Diagonal Difficulties 120; 4. Correlates 123; 5. Modal Matters 129; E. Criticisms. 1. Against Platonism 130; 2. Against Internalism 132; 3. Other Theories 136; Notes 137; References 139.
   "The main philosophical question about non-existents is whether there really are any. My own view is that there are none. But even if this is granted, we may still ask what they are like, just as the materialist may consider the nature of sensations or the nominalist the nature of numbers.
   On this further topic, there seem to be three main divisions of thought, which may be respectively labelled as:
   (i) platonism /empiricism;
   (ii) literalism /contextualism;
   (iii) internalism / externalism.
   Let me attempt a rough characterization of these divisions. More refined formulations will come later. On a platonic conception, the non-existent objects of fiction, perception, belief and the like do not depend for their being upon

human activity or upon any empirical conditions at all; they exist, or have being, necessarily.
Under an empirical conception, on the other hand, these objects are firmly rooted in empirical reality; they exist, or have being, contingently. On an extreme conception of this sort, these objects are literally created and are brought into being by the appropriate activity either of or within the agent.
(...)
All in all, the three divisions provide for 8 (= 2^3) combinations of positions. Each, I think, is coherent, but some are more natural than others. For example it is natural, though not necessary, for the 'platonist' to accept internalism and for the 'empiricist' to accept externalism; for the means by which the objects are individuated will naturally be taken to provide conditions for their existence or being.
My own view on these questions is given by empiricism, contextualism and extemalism, not that this is a common combination in the literature. This view will be defended in the second part of this paper. In the present part, I am concerned to discuss a view that combines internalism with contextualism and platonism; and in the third part, I shall discuss the literalist position, mainly in association with platonism and internalism. I have not attempted systematically to consider all of the possible combinations of position. I have only looked at the more prominent or plausible of the views, though what I say on them should throw light on what is to be said of the others.
The plan of the present part is as follows. In section A2, I discuss general methodological issues facing any philosophical study of nonexistents and, in particular, defend the claim that one can say what they are like without presupposing that there really are any. In section B, I try first to delineate more precisely the subjectmatter of our theories and then to describe the problems of providing identity and existence conditions with which any such theory should deal. In section C, I give an initial formulation of an internalist theory, which is successively refined in

section D. Finally, in section E, I give two major criticisms of the theory as thus developed. A more detailed account of each section is given in the list of contents.
It is of the greatest importance to note that the present part does not contain my own views on the subject. It is only in the last section of this part that the internalist position is criticized, and it is only in the second part of this paper that my own, more positive, views are developed." (pp. 97-99)

2. ———. 1982. "First-Order Modal Theories. III: Facts." *Synthese* no. 53:43-122.
"This paper forms the third part of a series on the development and study of first-order modal theories. It was not originally intended for this issue, but is relevant to Prior's work in two main ways. First, it does not treat modal logic as a mere technical exercise, but attempts to relate it to common philosophical concerns. This was an approach that Prior himself adopted and perhaps did more than anyone else to foster. Secondly, the paper deals with the more specific topic of facts.
This was a matter upon which Prior had definite views and upon which he had written extensively - in relation to the definition of necessity ([25]), the semantics for the modal system *Q* ([26]), and the correspondence theory of truth ([27] and [29]). I have found all of these writings useful and, although I have disagreed with him on several points, the influence of his views on my own should be evident.
It is therefore with respect and affection that I dedicate this paper to his memory.
The paper falls into two main parts, one philosophical and the other technical. Either may be read independently of the other, but both are required for an all-round view. The first part is in two sections. One attempts to show that a modal first-order theory of facts is viable, and the other discusses its principles and their bearing on various philosophical issues. The second part is in six sections, which fall into three groups. Those of the first group (§§3--4) deal with the modal theory of possible worlds, both in itself and in its application to other subject-matter. Since I regard worlds as very big facts, it is only natural that they should be

considered in this paper. The next section (§5) deals with the theory of facts under the anti-objectualist assumption that they contain no individual constituents. The sections of the last group (§§6-8) deal with facts under objectualist assumptions and include a statement of the appropriate objectualist conditions, a proof of their equivalence to the corresponding conditions for propositions, and an account of the resulting theories. It will be helpful, and sometimes essential, to have the earlier parts of the series ([15] and [16]) at hand.

In the technical part of this paper, I have concentrated on the question of finding a correct essentialist theory of facts. As far as I know, very little work has been done in this direction, although there is a start in [46]. On the other hand, there is now a fair amount of material on facts as a subject, not of object-theory, but of semantical metatheory (see [45], [21] and [43], for example). I do not wish to dispute the interest of this material, either for logic or the philosophy of language; but it will not fall within the purview of the paper." (pp. 43-44)

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3. ———. 1982. "Act, Events and Things." In *Sprache und Ontologie. Akten des sechsten Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 23. bis 30. August 1981, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Osterreich)* , edited by Leinfellner, Werner, Kraemer, Eric and Schank, Jeffrey, 97-105. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
"The purpose of my theory is not to provide a reference for ordinary uses of a *qua-phrase* but to account for the identity of certain olher objects — chairs, tables and the like— to which we clearly do refer.
Qua objects are governed by certain principles; and it is in terms of them that they are best understood.
Existence. The qua object X qua φ exists at a given time (world-time) if and only if x exists and has φ at the given time (world-time);
Identity . (i) Two qua objects are the same only if their bases and glosses are the same, (ii) A qua object is distinct from its basis (or from the basis of its basis, should that be a qua object, and so on).
Inheritance . At any time (world-time) at which a qua object exists, it has those normal properties possessed by its basis." (p. 100)
(...)
"The theory of qua- objects has some other applications worth mentioning. First, the qua objects are very like Aristotle's compounds of matter and form, with the matter corresponding to the basis and the form to the gloss. Aristotle's views, it seems to me, have not been taken seriously enough; many of his more distinctive doctrines have either been forgotten or fallen into disrepute. A modern version of the Aristotelian theory should give us the courage to embrace some of those doctrines and the means to articulate them more clearly.
Secondly, the theory of qua objects is able to throw light on the question of the ground ' for necessary truths." (p. 104)

4. ———. 1983. "The Permutation Principle in Quantificational Logic." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 12:33-37.
"The story goes back to 1940, with the publication of Quine's *Mathematical Logic* [5]. He there presents a system of quantificational logic in which only sentences or closed formulas are theorems."
(...)
"The story now goes to 1963, with the publication of papers by Kripke [2] and Lambert [3]. Kripke was concerned to block the derivation of the Barcan formula or its converse within a quantified version of the modal logic S5. He was able to do this by requiring, as in Quine [6], that only closed formulas be theorems. However, because he wished to dispense with the rule of necessitation and because he also wished to allow for the empty domain, he did not quite take Quine's revised system as the quantificational basis for his modal logic."
(...)
Quite independently, Lambert developed a similar system. Like Kripke, he was concerned to allow for the empty domain; but he also wished to allow for theorems with free variables."
(...)
"As later became clear, Lambert's full system (with identity) is complete for its intended interpretation. But it was then generally assumed that this system without its identity axioms and the corresponding quantificational part of Kripke's system (which had not been formulated with identity in the first place) were also complete. Indeed, in their paper [4] of 1970, Leblanc and Meyer gave a metalogical investigation of the Lambert fragment in which it was presupposed that Permutation and related principles were derivable; and, in [2], Kripke claimed completeness for his full modal system, which would have entailed completeness for its quantificational fragment. But then, Lambert pointed out, in a letter to Meyer of around 1968-9, the difficulty of deriving Permutation within the identity-free part of his system; and independently, in his paper of 1970 ([7], p. 286, fn. 6), Trew pointed to the related

difficulty of deriving Permutation within Kripke's system. The problem of deriving the principle became open and, at least within the world of free logicians, achieved some notoriety.
It now appears that Permutation is not derivable within these systems." (pp. 33-35)
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[5] Quine, W. V., *Mathematical Logic* (1st edn.), Harvard University Press, Boston, 1940.
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5. ———. 1983. "A Defence of Arbitrary Objects." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. Supplementary volume 57:55-77.
Reprinted in: Fred Landman, Frank Veltman (eds.), *Varieties of Formal Semantics. Proceedings of the Fourth Amsterdam Colloquium, September 1982,* Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1984, pp. 123-142.
"There is the following view. In addition to individual objects, there are arbitrary objects: in addition to individual numbers, arbitrary numbers; in addition to individual men, arbitrary men. With each arbitrary object is associated an appropriate range of individual objects, its values: with each arbitrary number, the range of individual numbers; with each arbitrary man, the range of individual men. An arbitrary object has those properties common to the individual objects in its range. So an arbitrary number is odd or even, an arbitrary man is mortal, since each

individual number is odd or even, each individual man is mortal. On the other hand, an arbitrary number fails to be prime, an arbitrary man fails to be a philosopher, since some individual number is not prime, some individual man is not a philosopher.
Such a view used to be quite common, but has now fallen into complete disrepute. As with so many things, Frege led the way." (p. 55)
(...)
"In the face of such united opposition, it might appear rash to defend any form of the theory of arbitrary objects. But that is precisely what I intend to do. Indeed, I would want to claim, not only that a form of the theory is defensible, but also that it is extremely valuable. In application to a wide variety of topics— the logic of generality, the use of variables in mathematics, the role of pronouns in natural language— the theory provides explanations that are as good as those of standard quantification theory, and sometimes better. Rather than present the finished theory at the outset, we may see it as the outgrowth of the criticisms that have been directed against its cruder formulations. Each criticism, if not deflected, will lead to an appropriate change of formulation. The finished form of the theory will then emerge as the cumulative result of these various criticisms; it will be, if you like, the prize that the proponent of the naive view can carry off with him in the contest with his critics. This is not how I myself came to the theory; but it is perhaps the most congenial approach for those who are already sceptical. (pp. 55-56)

6. ———. 1984. "Critical Review of Parsons' ' *Nonexistent Objects* '." *Philosophical Studies* no. 45:95-142.
Review of: Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
"There has recently been a rebellion within the ranks of analytic philosophy. It has come to be appreciated that, in the debate between Russell and Meinong, Russell was perhaps mistaken in his criticisms and Meinong was perhaps correct in his views. As a consequence, an attempt was made to rehabilitate the Meinongian position, to defend

it against the most obvious attacks and to develop it in the most plausible ways. T. Parsons was among the first of the contemporary philosophers to make this attempt, (1) and so it is especially appropriate that his views should now be set out in a book.

I should say, at the outset, that I thoroughly approve of the Meinongian project. As Parsons makes clear (pp. 32— 38), we refer to non-existents in much the same way as we refer to other objects. It is therefore incumbent upon the philosopher to work out the principles by which our discourse concerning such objects is governed. Not that this is necessarily to endorse a realist position towards the objects of the resulting theory. Nominalists and Platonists alike may attempt to set out the principles that govern arithmetical discourse; and it is in the same spirit that the realist or anti-realist may attempt to set out the principles of our fictional discourse.

Despite my approval of the project, I must admit to some misgivings as to how Parsons has carried it out. These misgivings are of two kinds. There are first some internal criticisms, requiring only change within Parsons' basic approach. There are then some external criticisms, requiring change to the basic approach.

These criticisms, though, should not be thought to detract from the merits of Parsons' book. It is, in many ways, an admirable contribution to the field.

It gives weight both to the interest and the legitimacy of the Meinongian enterprise; it pinpoints the difficulties which any satisfactory theory must deal with; and in its solution to those difficulties, it sets up a theory with a degree of rigour and systematicity that should serve as a model for years to come. As a well worked-out and accessible contribution to object theory, there is no better book." (pp. 95-96)

(1) Others include Castafieda [1], Rapaport [7], Routley [8] and Zalta [9].

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[7] Rapaport, W.: 1978, ‘Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox’, *Nous* 12, pp.153-180.
[8] Routley, R.: 1980, *Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond* (Australian National University, Canberra).
[9] Zalta, E. N.: 1980, ‘An introduction to a theory of abstract objects’, Ph.D. Thesis (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

7. Fine, Kit, and Mc Carthy, Timothy. 1984. "Truth without Satisfaction." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 13:397-421.
   "In his famous paper [7], Tarski gave a definition of truth for a formalized language. Unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself, he gave a definition in terms of satisfaction. This makes it natural to ask if such an indirect procedure is necessary or whether a definition of truth can be given without using or somehow invoking the concept of satisfaction.
   The question, as it stands, is vague; and later we shall be concerned to make it more precise. But even as it stands, it has an obvious technical interest. The situation that Tarski found himself in is common in mathematics. We wish to define a certain concept, but unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself we perform a recursion on a related concept of which the given concept is a special case. It would therefore be desirable to know when the related concept is necessary, both in the case of truth and in general.
   The question may also have some philosophical interest. There is a fundamental difference between the concepts of truth and of satisfaction. The former merely applies to certain linguistic units; the latter connects language to an ontology of objects, typically extra-linguistic. A negative result on defining truth without satisfaction may perhaps constrain formal attempts to implement non-referential conceptions of truth. In the present paper, however, we will not be concerned in detail with the philosophical aspects of our question, although we will from time to time mention some points of contact between our discussion and the philosophical literature.

Interest in our question dates back to Wallace [9]; and the topic was subsequently taken up by Tharp [8] and Kripke [3] (especially Section 10).
We have made our presentation self-contained, though the reader may consult the earlier work for general background and for elucidation of particular points.
The plan of our paper is as follows. Section 1 sets out the general framework in which our question and its cognates are posed. Section 2 solves the questions in case the meta-theory is not required to be finitely axiomatized; and Section 3 gives partial solutions in case finite axiomatizability is required, thereby answering a question of Kripke's [3] and of Tharp's [8].
Finally, Section 4 considers the question under other provisos on the metatheory." (pp. 397-398)
References
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[9] Wallace, J., 'On the frame of reference', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), *Semantics of Natural Language* , D. Reidel, 1972, pp. 219-252.

8. Fine, Kit. 1985. "Natural Deduction and Arbitrary Objects." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 14:57-107.
Reprinted in *Philosopher's Annual,* vol. 8, 1985.
"This paper is an abridged and simplified version of my monograph *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* [4]. It may be read by the diligent as a preparation for the longer work or by the indolent as a substitute for it. But the reader, in either case, may find it helpful to consult the paper, *A Defence of Arbitrary Objects* [3], for general philosophical orientation.

This paper deals with certain problems in understanding natural deduction and ordinary reasoning. As is well known, there exist in ordinary reasoning certain procedures for arguing to a universal conclusion and from an existential premiss.We may establish that all objects have a given property by showing that an arbitrary object has the property; and having shown that there exists an object with a given property, we feel entitled to give it a name and infer that it has the property." (p. 57).

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[3] Fine, K., 'A defence of arbitrary objects', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LVII, 55-77 (1983); also to appear in *Varieties of Formal Semantics* (eds. F. Landman and F. Veltman), GRASS III, Fovis Publications, Dordrecht Cinnaminson (1984).

[4] Fine, K., *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* , to appear in the Aristotelian Society Monograph Series (1984).

9. ———. 1985. "Logics Containing K4. Part II." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* no. 50:619-651.

   "The plan of this part is as follows. §1 presents some elementary results on pmorphisms. §2 introduces the logics to be proved complete and §3 the conditions for which they are complete. §4 contains the completeness proof. In §5 we show that there are a continuum of subframe logics, while in §6 we give various alternative characterizations of the subframe logics and extend our results on the finite model property from logics to theories. The final section, §7, gives a general characterization of those of the subframe logics that are compact and gives reasonably practicable methods for determining when a logic is compact and what condition its axioms express.

   I make free use of the material in the first five sections of Part I, and the reader is advised to have that part at hand." (p. 620)

10. ———. 1985. "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse." In *Alvin Plantinga* , edited by Tomberlin, James and Inwagen, Peter van, 145-186. Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 5, pp. 176-213.

"Plantinga is what I call a modal actualist. He believes that the idioms of necessity and possibility are to be taken as primitive in preference to talk of possible worlds and that only actuals, as opposed to possibles, are to be granted ontological status. On these two issues, he and I agree.
The modal actualist faces a challenge. Talk of possible worlds and of possible individuals appears to make perfectly good sense. There seems to be a clear meaning, for example, in the claim that some possible object does not exist. So the modal actualist, once he grants that possibilist discourse makes sense, must somehow give it sense. It is on this question of how such a challenge is to be met that Plantinga and I disagree.
He favours a reduction of possibilist discourse in which possible worlds and possible individuals give way to propositions and properties, respectively; I favour a reduction in which reference to possibles becomes a modal manner of reference to actuals. In this paper, I shall attempt to adjudicate between these rival positions.
In the first section, I shall set out the problem of reduction and Plantinga's favoured solution. In the second, I shall present my central criticism of the reduction, viz. that it is question-begging. In the next three sections, I shall consider the related question of whether properties and propositions exist necessarily, first presenting an argument against and then disposing of an argument for their necessary existence. In the final section, I shall present my own reduction and the reasons for preferring it to Plantinga's.
The central theme of this paper is the question of reduction; but it should have a broader significance than such a theme might suggest. Partly this is because other issues, of independent interest, are raised: the connection between existence and predication; the necessary existence of propositions; the Priorian stand on modality. But perhaps more important than this question of particular issues is the question of how the issues are to be approached, of what is to count as a plausible consideration one way or another. Even when I have found myself in agreement with Plantinga on a certain view, I have often also found myself unhappy

with the reasons he adduces in its favour. It is in this difference of approach, then, that the paper may also have a broader significance." (pp. 145-146)

11. ———. 1988. "Semantics for Quantified Relevance Logic." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 17:27-59.
Reprinted in: Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., with contributions by J. Michael Dunn ... [et al.], *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992 vol. II, pp. 235-262.
"This paper is a companion piece to my *Incompleteness for Quantified Relevance Logics* . In that earlier paper, I showed that RQ and other systems of quantified relevance logic were not complete for the standard semantics. In the present paper, I provide a semantics with respect to which they are complete." (p. 27)
(...)
"This section is divided into five subsections. The first two lay out the semantics, the third presents the logics, and the last two establish soundness and completeness. A basic knowledge of the semantics for propositional relevance logic is presupposed (see §51). It is conceivable that the methods of the present section might be used to simplify the proofs of incompleteness for the standard semantics; but this is not here investigated." (p. 239 of the reprint)

12. ———. 1989. "Incompleteness for Quantified Relevance Logics." In *Directions in Relevant Logic* , edited by Norman, Jean and Sylvan, Richard, 205-225. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Reprinted in: Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., with contributions by J. Michael Dunn ... [et al.], *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992 vol. II, pp. 235-261.
"In the early seventies, several logicians developed a semantics for propositional systems of relevance logic.
(...)
In the light of this work, it seemed reasonable to extend the completeness results to quantificational systems of relevance logic. But what systems should be chosen? One would like, in the first place, to deal with the systems that

already exist in the literature, such as quantified R (RQ) or quantified E (EQ). This, at least, is a debt that we owe to the history of the subject. But one would also like to prove completeness for the quantificational analogues of propositional systems that have already been proved to be complete. These analogues might be obtained from the propositional system by adding a standard quantificational component, consisting of such and such axioms and rules. Such a component might be chosen in terms of its intrinsic plausibility as a quantificational basis. Less arbitrarily, it might be chosen so as to yield a complete system when combined with the minimal propositional system (the one complete under no special conditions on o, R or *). Not surprisingly, the pre-existing systems turn out to be equivalent to the systems obtained by the other approach. The construction of the quantificational analogue is not, in fact, as straightforward as this description might suggest; for the extension of the propositional semantics to the quantificational case is not unique. It must be decided whether the domain I of individuals is to be constant or not. If it is not constant, then there are various ways of dealing with nonexistent individuals, individuals that do not belong to the domain of the world or point under consideration. But once these decisions are made, the choice of the quantificational component can be fixed." (p. 205)

13. ———. 1989. "The Problem of *De Re M* odality." In *Themes from Kaplan* , edited by Almog, Joseph, Perry, John and Wettstein, Howard, 197-272. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 2, pp. 40-104.
"I want now to evaluate Quine's objections to quantified modal logic, dealing first with the metaphysical and then with the logical argument.
I observed before that the metaphysical argument was operator-specific; for different operators it yields different problems. This observation applies as much to different notions of necessity as it does to notions other than necessity. There is not a single problem of essentialism, but

a range of problems, that vary according to the notion of necessity in question.
There are perhaps four principal notions of necessity for which the problem arises; these are, respectively, the logical, the analytic, the metaphysical, and the natural. Of these, the most important is undoubtedly the problem for the metaphysical notion. Indeed, not only is this problem of great importance in itself, but it is central, in my opinion, to any attempt to understand the nature of metaphysics. However, it is not my intention to discuss this problem here. I wish to follow Quine and concentrate my attention on the logical and semantic modalities." (p. 202)

14. ———. 1989. "The Justification of Negation as Failure." In *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, 1987* , edited by Fenstad, Jens Erik, Frolov, Ivan and Hilpinen, Risto, 263-301. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
"Prolog is a logic programming language; it is used to answer queries on the basis of information provided by the programmer. For the most part, the logic employed by Prolog is standard. But it uses a highly unorthodox rule for establishing negative facts. This rule, the so-called rule of negation as failure, allows us to deny a statement on the grounds that a certain attempt to prove it has failed.
The rule is not classically valid; and therefore the question arises as to how it is to be justified. There are basically three different kinds of justification that have been proposed in the literature. The first is to re-interpret negation to mean something like unprovability. The second is to assume that the program is complete with respect to truths; all truths are derivable. The third is to suppose that the program is complete with respect to conditions; all sufficient conditions for the application of the predicates have been specified.
My aim in this paper is to evaluate these various proposals and then to make a proposal of my own. I shall argue that the existing proposals all suffer from some defect or another: the first is unable to account for a classical reading of negation; the second delivers too much on programs

which employ negation; and the third delivers too little on programs which make no use of negation.
I shall then argue that my own proposal is able to avoid these difficulties. From one point of view, the proposal is not new; it is merely a form of the second proposal stated above, according to which all truths are derivable. However, the concept of derivability which is appealed to is quite novel; for the assumption that all truths are derivable, may itself be used in establishing that a given statement is derivable. The assumption has, in other words, a self-referential character.
The proposal has various other features of interest. It provides a natural way of interpreting inductive definitions in which the positive instances of a predicate are allowed to depend upon its negative instances. It sanctions an extension of the rule of negation of failure, under which not only the finite, but also the transfinite, failure of a statement may constitute a ground for its denial. It is capable of variation in the choice of which other assumptions or rules are used in defining the concept of derivability.
(...)
One feature of my exposition is worthy of special note. I have for the most part confined my attention to the sentential case, under which only truth-functional complexity is ever exposed. Such a case is usually regarded as trivial, since most of the interesting features of Prolog depend upon the use of variables. However, in this regard, the rule of negation as failure is an exception. Most of the problems in justifying the rule already arise at the sentential level; and to solve these problems at this level is to have gone a long way towards solving them altogether. There are, however, certain difficulties which are peculiar to the introduction of variables and terms; and these are considered at the end of the paper. It is argued, in particular, that the usual assumptions concerning an ontology of terms are needlessly strong and that an ordinary ontology of individuals can be countenanced in its place."
(pp. 263-264)

15. ———. 1990. "Quine on Quantifying In." In *Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind* , edited by Anderson, Anthony and Owens, Joseph, 1-26. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 3, pp. 105-130.
"It is my aim in this chapter to evaluate Quine's argument against quantifying into modal contexts, dealing first with the peculiarly modal considerations and then with the more general logical considerations." (p. 2)
16. ———. 1991. "The Study of Ontology." *Noûs* no. 25:263-294.
"A constructional ontology is one which serves to construct complexes from simples. The present paper is concerned with the nature and with the study of such ontologies. It attempts to say, in the first place, how they are constituted and by what principles they are governed. But it also attempts to say how their study may lead one to adopt certain positions and to make certain definitions.
The remarks on the study of ontology are meant to relate to the study of disciplines in general. I am interested in how the study of a discipline gets shaped by the positions which are adopted and the strategies which are pursued. These interact; for the pursuit of certain kinds of strategy will lead to the adoption of certain kinds of position, and the adoption of certain kinds of position will be required by the pursuit of certain kinds of strategy. One therefore needs to understand how they interact.
Certain subsidiary themes run through the paper, all interrelated in one way or another. One concerns a dialectical conception of modality, one that is determined by what is left open at a given stage of enquiry. Another involves a particular way of expressing modal claims, in terms of certain objects requiring others. Yet a third is an interest in a relativist conception of ontology, according to which no ontology stands out as being correct.
The paper concludes with a formal appendix, which attempts to make precise much of what can be made precise in the earlier informal part of the paper. Each part has been

designed to be read independently of the other, although a proper understanding of either part depends upon reading them both." (p. 263)

17. ———. 1991. "The Identity of Material Objects." In *Topics in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence* , edited by Albertazzi, Liliana and Poli, Roberto, 33-37. Bozen: Istituto Mitteleuropeo di Cultura.
Papers from the International Summer Schools in Bozen - 1989-1990.
"1. The Problem of Identity
What is a question of identity? Two responses to this meta-question of identity may be distinguished, which I call the *comparative* and the *intrinsic*. On the comparative conception, one answers a question of identity by saying when two objects of a given sort are the same. On the intrinsic conception, one answers a question of identity by saying what objects of a given sort are "in themselves".
The comparative conception goes back to Locke's famous chapter on identity. It was extended by Frege. Very roughly, we may say that Frege extended the application of the comparative conception from the identity of concrete objects to the identity of abstract objects. This conception is the dominant one of today; it informs the work of Strawson, Quine, Wiggins and of others.
The basic idea behind the comparative conception is to make the *what* of identity a *when:* to ask what an object of a given sort is is to ask when objects of that sort are the same. But to ask when two objects are the same invites the trivial answer: when they are the same. We need somehow to distinguish the intended answers to this question.
This can often be done by means of the concept of a *presentation*. I mean to use this term in a suitably abstract sense. Thus a sentence might be regarded as a presentation of a proposition; there is no need for a presentation to be something mental or even for it to be that by which we grasp the object.
An intended answer to an identity question then says when two presentations are presentations of the same object; and

it says this in terms which do not presuppose the identity of the objects at issue.
Different questions of identity - e.g. at a time, across time, across worlds - turn on different accounts of how the objects are to be presented.
There is a fundamental criticism to be made of the comparative conception. For it says what kind of "career" the object has, not what kind of object it is that has the career. For example, a transtemporal criterion of identity for material things is compatible with a material thing being (a) a primitive substance, (b) a mereological sum of time-slices, (c) the embodiment of a form, (d) an event, and so on. Similarly, the extensional criterion of identity for sets is compatible with a set being (a) constructive, (b) "exclusive", i.e. determined by its non-members rather than by its members, (c) logical, i.e. determined by a property with the required extension rather than by its members.
What is missing from the comparative conception? I would like to suggest that often what is missing is an account of how the objects of the given kind are generated or analysed. Thus primitive substances are not generated from anything else at all, mereological sums are generated by aggregation, embodiments are generated by a suitable embodiment operator, and so on. In each case, we need to say how (if at all) the object is to be analysed; we need to say what the object is in itself." pp. 33-34.

18. ———. 1992. "Aristotle on Matter." *Mind* no. 101:35-57.
"It is my belief that there is still a great deal to be learnt from Aristotle's views on the nature of substance; and it is my aim in a series of papers, of which this is the first, to make clear what these views are and what it is in them that is of value. (1)
A peculiarity of my approach, compared to current scholarly practice, is the attempt at rigour. I have tried to provide what is in effect a formalization of Aristotle's views. I have, that is to say, attempted to make clear which of his concepts are undefined and which of his claims underived; and I have attempted to show how the remaining concepts are to be defined and the remaining claims to be derived.

I can well understand a traditional scholar being suspicious of such an approach on the grounds that the various parts of Aristotle's thought are either too unclear to be capable of formalization or else are clear enough not to require it. Since the matter is not one for a priori dispute, I can only ask the scholar to put his suspicions at bay until the details of the case are examined. I then think that it will be found that the attempt at rigour provides a most valuable guide for the study of the text.

I have not tried to deal with all aspects of Aristotle's thought on substance. I have concentrated on those which centre on the concepts of matter, form, part, and change; and I have neglected those which concern the related concepts of predication, function, priority and power. It is to be hoped that the investigation will be rounded out at some later time to include all of the central aspects of his work.

It should also be mentioned that my treatment of the text has not been altogether scholarly. Partly this has been a matter of competence, and partly of inclination. I have been more concerned with the broad sweep of Aristotle's views than with exegetical detail; and this has led me to conjecture that he held a certain opinion, not because of direct textual evidence but because it is what his view most naturally requires. Thus the Aristotle I have presented here is much more consistent, definite and complete than the Aristotle of the texts." (p. 35)

(1) This paper is based upon the first two sections of my unpublished paper "Aristotle on Substance" . I should like to thank the members of a seminar I held at UCLA in the winter of 1991, and Frank Lewis in particular, for many helpful discussions on some of the topics of the paper. I am also grateful to Richard Sorabji for valuable remarks on an earlier version of the paper.

19. ———. 1992. "Transparent Grammars." In *Logic from Computer Science. Proceedings of a Workshop held November 13-17, 1989* , edited by Moschovachis, Yiannis N., 129-151. New York: Springer.

"1 . Introdution

‘Cat’ is a word which occurs in ‘cattle’, but it does not occur as a word; ‘1-1-2’ is a term which occurs in ‘1+ 2.3’, but it does not occur as a term. All such occurrences of expressions might be said to be accidental, since they are accidents of how the syntax of the language happens to be realized.

The notion of accidental occurrence is significant in various areas of thought. In logic, it greatly aids the formulation and proof of meta-logical results if it can be assumed that the underlying language contains no accidental occurrences. For example, a subformula can then simply be defined as a formula which occurs within a given formula rather than as an expression which is thrown up by a parsing of that formula. In philosophy, the issue of whether one can quantify into modal contexts has been seen to turn on such questions as to whether the occurrence of ‘9’ in ‘necessarily, 9 > 7’ is accidental or not; and the absence of accidental occurrence has been regarded as a condition on any “ ideal language” . In computer science and in linguistics, the presence of accidental occurrences has an obvious relevance to parsing, since they lead to the danger that a parser might mistake an apparent constituent of the expression to be parsed for a genuine constituent.

Let us say that a language or grammar is transparent if it permits no accidental occurrences. It is the main purpose of the present paper to investigate the conditions under which a context-free grammar is transparent.

It is shown how any accidental occurrence reduces to a certain “ primitive” case; and it is shown how such primitive occurrences might be detected.

On the basis of these results on reduction and detection, an effective test for transparency is then given.

The concept of transparency represents a strengthening of the more familiar concept of nonambiguity. Any transparent grammar, at least of a well-behaved sort, is unambiguous, though not every unambiguous grammar is transparent. Moreover, what is required for many purposes is not merely an unambiguous but a transparent grammar. It is therefore significant in this regard that there is an effective test for the

stronger property even though there is no effective test for the weaker one.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The first two sections introduce the relevant notions from the theory of context-free grammars. The third section explains the connection between nonambiguity and transparency.
The fourth section establishes the reduction of accidental occurrence to the primitive case. The next three sections deal with the question of detecting the primitive accidental occurrences: a more fully articulated or canonical version of the given grammar is introduced; it is shown how accidental occurrences in the given grammar correspond to certain kinds of expression in the canonical grammar; and a precedence analysis is given of those expressions in the canonical grammar which correspond to the primitive accidental occurrences in the given grammar. An effective test for transparency is then provided in the final section.
The treatment of transparency in this paper has been very brief. Many of the results can be extended; and I have given a much fuller account in Fine [1]." (pp. 129-130)
References
[1] Fine, K., *Transparency I and II* , submitted to Language and Control.

20. ———. 1994. "Essence and Modality." *Philosophical Perspectives* no. 8:1-16.
Reprinted in *The Philosopher's Annual for 1994* , volume 16, (edited by Patrick Grim, Gary Mar, Peter Williams), Stanford: CSLI 1996 and in J. Kim, D. Korman, E. Sosa (eds.), *Metaphysics: An Anthology* , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2011 (second edition).
"The concept of essence has played an important role in the history and development of philosophy; and in no branch of the discipline is its importance more manifest than in metaphysics.
Its significance for metaphysics is perhaps attributable to two main sources. In the first place, the concept may be used to characterize what the subject, or at least part of it, is about.

For one of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of things, with what they are.
But the metaphysician is not interested in every property of the objects under consideration. In asking 'What is a person?', for example, he does not want to be told that every person has a deep desire to be loved, even if this is in fact the case.
What then distinguishes the properties of interest to him? What is it about a property which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is?
It is in answer to this question that appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers." (p. 1)
(...)
"It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion. The one notion is, if I am right, a highly refined version of the other; it is like a sieve which performs a similar function but with a much finer mesh.
I shall also argue that the traditional assimilation of essence to definition is better suited to the task of explaining what essence is. It may not provide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide us with a good model of how the concept works. Thus my overall position is the reverse of the usual one. It sees real definition rather than de re modality as central to our understanding of the concept." (p. 3)

21. ———. 1994. "Compounds and Aggregates." *Noûs* no. 28:137-158.

"Some objects appear to be composed of parts: a quantity of sand of its grains, a throbbing pain of its throbs, a set of its members, and a proposition of its constituents.
There seem to be two fundamentally different ways in which an object can be composed of parts. One is nonstructural in character; the parts just merge. The other is structural; the parts hang together within a structure. Thus of the examples above, the first two, the sand and the pain, are composed from their parts in a nonstructural fashion, while the last two, the set and the proposition, are composed in a structural manner.
The notion of a nonstructural method of composition may be taken to be one which conforms to certain structure-obliterating identity conditions. These are as follows: order and repetition among the composing objects is irrelevant to the result; the composition of a single object is the object itself; and the composition of compositions of objects is the composition of those very objects'. Thus the first of these conditions excludes concatenation as a nonstructural method of composition; while each of the remaining conditions excludes the set-builder (the operation which composes a set from its members).
Let us agree to call any nonstructural method of composition a method of fusion. There is a particular such method, I call it aggregation, which has been very prominent in the literature on part-whole. It may be characterized as a method of composition which conforms to the identity conditions above and which also conforms to the following existence conditions: the aggregate of objects which exist in time exists at exactly those times at which one of the objects exists; and an aggregate of objects which are located in space occupies, at any given time at which it exists, exactly those places which are occupied by one of the objects.
It has often been supposed that aggregation is a legitimate method of composition, that objects may be composed from others in conformity with the conditions set forth above. What has made aggregation so attractive, apart from any intuitive appeal it may have, are two main factors (which

will be discussed in more detail later in the paper). The first, and most important, is the identification of a thing with the content of its spatio-temporal extension. The second is the identification of a thing with the fusion of its time-slices. Both of these forms of identification require that the objects fuse in the manner of aggregation.

It has also often been supposed that aggregation is the only legitimate method of fusion. Part of the appeal of this further position may arise from a general hostility to different methods of composition, whether they be methods of fusion or not. Under the form of nominalism championed by Goodman, for example, there can be no difference in objects without a difference in their parts; and this implies that the same parts cannot, through different methods of composition, yield different wholes.

However, I suspect that many of those who would be open to structural methods of composition would still not be open to distinct nonstructural methods of composition. For it is hard to see, especially given the identification of a thing with its spatio-temporal content, what other methods of fusion there might be; and it is hard to see how there could be alternative conceptions of a fusion, of a whole at the same level as its elements and formed without regard to their order or repetition.

Let us call the extreme position, that there is only one method of composition, mereological monism; let us call the less extreme position, that there is only one method of fusion, fusion monism; and let us call that particular version of fusion monism according to which aggregation is the sole method of fusion aggregation monism.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that the last of these three positions is mistaken. I want to show that there is a method of fusion which is not aggregative, i.e. which does not conform to the characteristic existence conditions for aggregates. However, my attack on this position may be relevant to the two other positions as well. For granted that aggregation is itself a legitimate method of fusion, it follows that fusion monism should be dropped in favour of a pluralist position. And to the extent that the adoption of

monism depended upon a general hostility to structural considerations, the way is then open to the admission of structural methods of composition.
It is also my intention to attack two related forms of monistic doctrine. For just as we can single out the aggregative method of nonstructural composition, so we can single out the aggregative way of being a nonstructural part and the aggregative kind of nonstructural whole. One might then maintain that not only does aggregation constitute the only nonstructural method of composition, but that it also constitutes the only nonstructural way of being a part and the only nonstructural way of being a whole. We therefore have three forms of monism, one with respect to composition, another with respect to part, and a third with respect to whole. As will later become clear, the two further forms of monism aresuccessively weaker than the original; and so their denials might be taken, in mimicry of Quine, to comprise three grades of mereological involvement.
From the discussion of monism will emerge objections to two other prominent doctrines: extensionalism and mereological atomism. According to the first of these, things are the same when their extensions (spatial, spatio-temporal, or modal-spatio-temporal) are the same; and according to the second, parts are prior to their wholes.
For the purposes of attacking the aggregation monist, I have assumed that aggregation is a legitimate method of fusion. Towards the end of the paper, I suggest that there is no such method and propose a form of fusion monism in which some other method of fusion takes the place of aggregation. However, my tentative endorsement of fusion monism is not meant in any way to lend support to a general monist position." (pp. 137-139)

22. ———. 1994. "A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form." In *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics* , edited by Scaltsas, Theodore, Charles, David and Gill, Mary Louise, 13-40. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"Montgomery Furth has written (1), "given a suitable pair of individuals ... there is no reason of Aristotelian metaphysics why the very fire and earth that this noon composes Callias

and distinguishes him from Socrates could not, by a set of utterly curious chances, twenty years from now compose Socrates ...". He does not specify what these "curious chances" might be. But we may suppose that Socrates eats Callias for his lunch and that, owing to the superiority of Callias' flesh and bone, it is the matter of this which remains in Socrates after the period of twenty years.

That such an exchange of matter is possible is a point on which many Aristotelian scholars could agree. However, I wish to argue that such a case gives rise to a fundamental difficulty; for its possibility runs into conflict with certain basic metaphysical principles which are commonly attributed to him and which would also be commonly accepted.

The problem consequently arises as to how this difficulty is to be resolved. This problem itself may be regarded in two somewhat different lights. On the one hand, it may be regarded as a difficulty for Aristotle. The question then is whether one can find a solution which would be acceptable to him, either in the sense that he would or that he could accept it. On the other hand, it may be regarded as a difficulty for a neo-Aristotelian, i.e. to someone who is sympathetic to the analysis of things into matter and form. The question then is to find a solution, regardless of whether or not it would be acceptable to Aristotle.

For the most part, my concern has been with the exegetical question; and even here, my purposes have been somewhat limited. For I have not attempted to settle on one solution as opposed to another. My aim has been to map out the exegetical space rather than to locate the views of Aristotle within it.

However, it should be mentioned that I count myself a neo-Aristotelian (and, indeed, it was my own commitment to hylomorphism which led me investigate Aristotle' views in the first place). It has therefore been of some importance for me to take the purely metaphysical question into account." (p. 13)

(1) Furth, M. *Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances* , Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978), 624-646;

reprinted in *Substance, Form, and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics* , Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988. (note abbreviated).

23. ———. 1995. "The Logic of Essence." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 24:241-273.
"Central to this paper is a certain distinction. This is the distinction between objects simply having a property and their having that property essentially or by their very nature. Also central to the paper is a certain claim. This is the claim that the notion of essence, of objects essentially having a property, is not to be understood in terms of the notion of necessity.
The claim is defended in my paper *Essence and Modality* . But the basic idea behind the defence can be given here. Consider Socrates and the singleton set containing him. Now although it is plausible to suppose that the singleton essentially contains the man, it is not plausible to suppose that the man essentially belongs to the singleton. There is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that there be any sets, let alone one that contains him. However, the standard accounts of essence in terms of necessity are unable to account for this asymmetry. For under such an account, the singleton essentially containing Socrates will consist in something like its being necessarily the case that the set contains Socrates if the set exists. But if this is true, then it will also be necessarily the case that Socrates belongs to the set if the man exists." (p. 241)

24. ———. 1995. "Part-Whole." In *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* , edited by Smith, Barry and Smith, David Woodruff, 463-485. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Husserl's third *Logical Investigation* is perhaps the most significant treatise on the concept of part to be found in the philosophical literature. (1) In it Husserl attempts to analyze the notion of dependent part, to lay down the principles governing its use, and to relate it to more general considerations concerning the nature of necessity and unity. He begins his study with the consideration of objects in the psychological sphere. A typical example of the kind of object

he has in mind is that of a visual datum, a red patch, let us say, and its various aspects or "moments"- its colour, say, or its extension. He takes each of these moments to be peculiar to the object in question; no other datum, no matter how great its resemblance to the original datum, will have the very same moments. He also takes the moments to be, in a suitably broad sense, part of the given object; they are thought to be actually present in it." (p. 463)
(...)
"My aim in the present essay is to clarify certain formal aspects of Husserl's thought. I have here and there, inserted some critical comments; but my main concern has been to say what the views are, and not to say whether or not they are right. Husserl himself took the formalization of his ideas to be not only possible, but highly desirable. He writes (§24, 484):
a proper working out of the pure theory we here have in mind would have to define all concepts with mathematical exactness and to deduce all theorems by argumenta in forma, i.e., mathematically. . . . That this end can be achieved has been shown by the small beginnings of a purely formal treatment in our present chapter. In any case, the progress from vaguely formed to mathematically exact concepts and theories is here, as everywhere, the precondition for full insight into a priori connections and an inescapable demand of science.
Thus the present paper can be regarded as an attempt to carry though the project that he began." (p. 464)

25. ———. 1995. "The Problem of Mixture." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* no. 76:266-369.
Reprinted in: Frank A. Lewis and Robert Bolton (eds.), *Form, Matter and Mixture in Aristotle,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 82-182.
"For Aristotle, the everyday world contains three main kinds of things: the elements, the homogeneous mixtures, and the heterogeneous substances. The topic of mixture was vigorously debated in medieval times (see Maier (1982): 142). But contemporary interest has focused on the objects at the extremes of his ontology -- the elements and the

substances -- while the topic of mixture has been relatively neglected. This is unfortunate. For not only is the topic of great interest in its own right, it is also important for a wider understanding of Aristotle's scientific and metaphysical views.

The intrinsic interest of the topic largely arises from the difficulty in seeing how a non-atomistic conception of matter is to be reconciled with a plausible view of mixture. The exegetical interest has perhaps two main sources. The first resides in the special position occupied by mixtures in Aristotle's ontology. For all substances are composed of mixtures; and all elements compose mixtures, in so far as they compose anything at all. Thus the mixtures provide the cushion, as it were, between the elements and the substances; and any account of the role of the elements or of the nature of the substances should deal with the relationship of each to the mixtures.

The other source of exegetical interest lies in the relevance of the topic of mixture to other, more general, topics -- principally, potentiality and change. Just as mixtures occupy a kind of midpoint between the elements and the substances, so mixing occupies a kind of midpoint between accidental and substantial change; and the potentiality of the ingredients in a mixture is one of the more important and problematic forms of potentiality for Aristotle. Thus no exegesis of his views on either change or potentiality can be considered complete unless it takes into account his views on mixture.

We now know that Aristotle's views on mixture are mistaken, and badly mistaken at that. In rejecting atomism he made a critical (though understandable) error; and when one combines the rejection of atomism with the antiquated belief in the four elements, it is easy to conclude that his views are purely of scholarly interest with no real relevance to contemporary concerns. But even though his views may be much further removed from reality than those of modern science, they are much closer in many ways to common sense. In the laboratory we do not suppose that every part of some butter is butter. But in the kitchen we do; and it is

convenient, though erroneous, assumptions of this sort that guide us in our everyday life. This therefore suggests that we treat these views of Aristotle as having their most direct bearing, not on the nature of reality, but on the structure of common sense.

There have been recent attempts in cognitive science to formalize the content of folk or naive physics; such a physics is meant to provide the principles that would enable one to construct a robot that could deal with the everyday world in much the same way as we do. If I am not mistaken, the contemporary interest of Aristotle's scientific views may lie as much in their connection with these developments within cognitive science as it does with the content of the established sciences. I might add that the recent attempt to rehabilitate the notion of capacity by Cartwright (1989) and others also gives a topical interest to Aristotle's general views on capacities and on the way they might compose or interact within a mixture.

The paper is in six sections. In the first, I state the problem with which Aristotle opens his discussion of mixture in *Generation and Corruption* : how is mixture possible? Aristotle thinks he has a solution; and our problem is to understand what that solution is. In the next section, I consider three interpretations of his views on mixture, those of Sharvy (1983), Gill (1989) and Bogen (1995), and find all of them wanting. The main defect with these proposals, from my own point of view, is that they do not take Aristotle's hylomorphic outlook sufficiently seriously. In the third section, I provide a sketch of that outlook and set out the two main accounts of mixture that are in conformity with it, Leveling and Ascent; one places mixture at the same level as the elements, the other at a higher level. The next two sections are the heart of the paper and constitute a sustained argument in favor of Leveling. It is shown how two doctrines -- the doctrines of intermediates and of derived parts -- enable Aristotle to avoid the apparently insuperable difficulties that lie in the way of its acceptance. The final section considers the problem of how mixing, as

opposed to mixture, is possible and argues that Aristotle is also in a position to solve this problem." (pp. 82-83).
References:
Bogen, 1995 "Fire in the belly: Aristotelian elements, organisms, and chemical compounds", this volume [pp. 183-216]
Gill, M. 1989 *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity,* New Jersey: Pennsylvania University Press
Maier, A. 1982 *On the Threshold of Exact Science,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
Sharvy, R. 1983 "Aristotle on Mixtures", *Journal of Philosophy* , 80, 439-457.

26. ———. 1995. "Ontological Dependence." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 95:269-290.
"T'here appears to be a distinctively ontological sense in which one thing may be said to depend upon another. What the one thing is will depend upon the other thing, upon what it is. It is in this sense that one is tempted to say that a set depends upon its members or that a particularized feature, such as a smile, upon the particular in which it is found. For what the set is will depend upon its members; and what the feature is will depend upon the particular that instantiates it. (1)
Granted that there is an intelligible notion of ontological dependence, it would appear to be of great importance to the study of metaphysics. Metaphysics has two main areas of concern: one is with the nature of things, with *what* they are; and the other is with the existence of things, with *whether* they are. Considerations of dependence are relevant to both. For central to the question of the nature of any item is the determination of what it depends upon; and if something is taken to exist, then so must any thing upon which it depends. Indeed, it has often been maintained that it is only those things which do not depend upon anything else that can properly be said to exist at all." (p. 269)
(...)
"But how is the notion of dependence itself to be understood? The idea of what something is, its *identity* or *being* , is notoriously obscure; and the idea of the being of

one thing *depending* upon that of another is doubly obscure. A natural suggestion at this point is to take the being of something simply to be its existence. Thus in saying that a set depends upon its members, or a feature upon its instantiator, we are taking the existence of the one to depend upon that of the other. Call this the *existential* construal of dependence. Another natural suggestion is to take the dependence between the beings of the two items, as opposed to the items themselves, to be modal in character. The being of the one will depend upon that of the other in the sense that it is necessary that if the one item has its 'being' then so does the other. Call this the *modal* construal of dependence." (p. 270)

(1) This paper derives from an earlier paper 'Dependent Objects' , that was written in 1982 but remained unpublished. Some of the issues raised are discussed at greater length in Fine [1995b]; and no attempt is here made to settle the methodological, as opposed to the conceptual, issues. I should like to thank Ruth Chang and the members of the Wednesday Group at Oxford for helpful comments.

References

Fine K. [1995b] 'Senses of Essence', to appear in Festschrift for Ruth Barcan Marcus.

27. ———. 1995. "Senses of Essence." In *Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus* , edited by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 53-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"One may distinguish between tbe essential and accidental properties of an object. A property of an object is essential if it must have the property to be what it is; otherwise the property is accidental.

But what exactly is meant by this account? It has been common to give a further explanation in modal terms. A property is taken to be essential when it is necessary that the object have the property or, alternatively, when it is necessary that it have tbe property if it exist. For reasons that I have already given in my paper "Essence and Modality," I doubt whether this or any other modal explanation of the notion can succeed. Indeed, I doubt

whether there exists any explanation of the notion in fundamentally different terms. But this is not to deny the possibility of further clarification; and it is the aim of the present paper to provide it.
What I shall do is to distinguish some of the closely related ways in which the notion may be understood. This will be important for getting clearer both on which claims can be made with its help and on which concepts can be defined with its help. In particular, we shall see that several different senses of ontological dependence correspond to the different senses of essence. The task is also important for the purpose of developing a logic of essentialist reasoning; for most of the different senses of essence that we distinguish will make a difference to the resulting logic. My main concern in this paper has been with making the distinctions, and not with drawing out their implications; but I hope it is clear from the examples what some of these implications are." (p. 53)

28. Fine, Kit, and Schurz, Gerhard. 1996. "Transfer Theorems for Multimodal Logics." In *Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior* , edited by Copeland, Jack, 169-214. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
"Many of the modal logics that have been developed contain two or more modal operators. A notable example is the tense logic of Prior, which contains operators for both the past and the future. A more recent example is the logic of programs, which contains infinitely many operators, one for each program.
A multimodal logic will have various monomodal fragments; and in the simplest case, it will be the join of these fragments -- there will be no interactive axioms. Our concern in the present chapter is to investigate the question of when certain properties of the monomodal logics transfer to their join. To answer this question, we develop a very general proof method, which allows us to piece together models for different logics. The resulting theorems provide very general answers to our question, which are positive in most cases, but not in all.

Our investigation is a natural continuation of those begun by Prior.
For he was interested both in the development of multimodal logics and in their relationship to monomodal logics. It is therefore, with a keen sense of his own contribution to the subject that we have pursued the present line of research." (p. 169)
[Note:] Some of the initial ideas behind this chapter were contained in a letter from Fine to Schurz in 1990. The subsequent work has been joint, with Fine writing up sections 1 and 6 and Schurz writing up the rest. The result on strong completeness transfer has been obtained independantly by Valentin Goranko and Solomon Passy; the results on transfer of strong and weak completeness, f.m.p., and of decidability (under the assumption of weak completeness) have 'been obtained independently by Marcus Kracht and Frank Wolter. Our own proof of decidability transfer is based upon ideas in their proof.

29. ———. 1998. "Cantorian Abstraction: A Reconstruction and Defense." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 95:599-634.
"In what follows I shall concentrate on the views of Cantor, though it should be clear how what I say will can be modifed to apply to the views of Dedekind. I have not attempted to capture all of the nuances or tensions in Cantor's thought but merely to develop what I take to be its spirit, or central idea. And in developing this idea, I have been guided more by what the idea itself requires than by Cantor's own writings.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin by setting out what appear to be decisive objections to the Cantorian account. I then show how these objections can be overcome by making use of the theory of arbitrary objects developed in my book ' *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* ' [Chapter VII. The relevant parts of the theory are outlined in section 2; and the application to Cantor's account of number is made in section 3. I show, in section 4, how the approach may be extended to order types and to structure types in general. In the final two sections, I first compare the Cantorian approach to abstraction with the standard

approaches of von Neumann and Zermelo, on the one side, and of Russell and Frege, on the other; and I then consider to what extent the Cantorian approach is capable of yielding a structuralist conception of number and order type. In a formal appendix, I briefly indicate how the present theory might be formalized within an extension of ZF [Zermelo-Frankel]." (p. 603)

30. ———. 1998. "The Limits of Abstraction." In *The Philosophy of Mathematics Today* , edited by Schirn, Matthias, 503-630. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted in expanded form as *The Limits of Abstraction* , New York: Oxford University Press 2002.
"This paper has been written more from a sense of curiosity than commitment. I was fortunate enough to attend the Munich Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics in the Summer of 1993 and to overhear a discussion of recent work on Frege's approach to the foundations of mathematics. This led me to investigate certain technical problems connected with the approach; and these led me, in their turn, to reflect on certain philosophical aspects of the subject. I was concerned to see to what extent a Fregean theory of abstraction could be developed and used as a foundation for mathematics and to place the development of such a theory within a general framework for dealing with questions of abstraction. My conclusions were somewhat mixed: a theory of abstraction could be developed somewhat along the lines that Frege has envisaged; and it could indeed be used as a basis for both arithmetic and analysis. When wedded to a suitable version of the context principle, the theory was capable of accounting for our reference to numbers and other abstract objects. But without the support of the principle, it was not clear that the theory had any great advantage over its rivals. Thus my results would be congenial to someone already committed to the Fregean approach though unconvincing to someone who was not. I therefore present them in somewhat the same spirit as someone who sends off a message in a bottle. I have no desire to announce my communication to the world; but if

someone stumbles across it and finds it to be of interest, I shall be pleased.

The paper is in three parts. The first is devoted to philosophical matters, which help explain the motivation for the subsequent technical work and also its significance. It is centred on three abstracts with which they deal? And to what extent can they provide a foundation for mathematics? The second part proposes and investigates a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an abstraction principle to be acceptable. The acceptable principles, according to this criterion, are precisely determined and it is shown, in particular, that there is a strongest such principle. The third part attempts to develop a general theory of abstraction within the technical limitations set out by the second part; the theory is equipped with a natural class of models; and it is shown to provide a foundation for both arithmetic and analysis.

The original version of the paper contained a lengthy section on the context principle. But this acquired a life of its own (just as reference does under the principle); and it has therefore been omitted. I hope to be able to present the material elsewhere." (pp. 503-504)

31. ———. 1998. "Mixing Matters." *Ratio* no. 11:278-288. Reprinted in: David Oderberg, *Form and Matter. Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics,* Oxford: Blackwell. 1999 pp. 65-75.

Abstract: "Aristotle raised a puzzle about the possibility of mixing whose solution is by no means obvious. I here explicate his solution to the puzzle and attempt to make it plausible within the context of his thought. Although we now know that his specific views on mixing were mistaken, his discussion of the topic raises questions concerning the role of capacities and the relationship of part to whole that are still of interest."

"The topic of mixture plays a central role in Aristotle's metaphysics (1). For every concrete substance is composed of mixtures and underlying every substantial change is a process of mixing.

Thus no understanding of substance or of substantial change is complete without an understanding of mixtures and mixing.

Aristotle's account of mixture may also be of some contemporary interest. For it depends upon a view, still worthy of attention, of how dispositions may conflict.

The main text in which mixture is discussed is chapter I.10 of *Generation and Corruption* . Aristotle there raises two puzzles that purport to show that mixing is impossible.

(1) The present paper is a much abridged version of Fine [95].

Many people have helped me develop the ideas in these two papers; and I am especially indebted to the work of Boguen [95] and Code [95].

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Bogen [95] J., 'Fire in the Belly; Aristotelian Elements, Organisms, and Chemical Compounds', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* , v. 76, nos 3&4, pp. 370-404.

Code A., [95] 'Potentiality in Aristotle's Science and Metaphysics', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* , v. 76, nos 3 & 4, pp. 405-418.

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Kit Fine: annotated bibliography. Papers 1999-2011

Papers 1999-2011

1. Fine, Kit. 1999. "Things and their Parts." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 23:61-74.
   "I wish to sketch a theory of the general nature of material things. It is a theory on which I have been working for some time; and what I present here is the merest sketch. Details are slid over, significant questions not raised, and controversial assumptions left undefended. But I hope, all the same, that enough is said to indicate the relevance of the theory to questions concerning the nature of material things and the plausibility of its answers.
   One way into the theory is through consideration of part-whole. Things have parts; and so we are led to consider how they are capable of having the parts that they do. What in their nature accounts for their division into parts? It has often been supposed that we may give an adequate answer to this question by conceiving of a material thing as the material content of a space-time region or as a successive stream of matter. But I believe that there are enormous difficulties with these positions and that, once they are taken into account, we are led to adopt a very different conception of a material thing and of its relationship to its parts.
   Central to the paper is a distinction between two different ways in which one thing can be part of another. It can, in the first place, be apart in a way that is relative to a time. It is in

this way, for example, that a newly installed carburetor is now apart of my car, whereas earlier it was not, or that certain molecules are now parts of my body though later, through the exercise of natural bodily functions, they no longer will be.
In the second place, one object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to a time. For something that is a part in this way, it is not appropriate to ask when, or for how long, it is a part; it just is a part. It is in such a way that the pants and the jacket, for example, are parts of a suit or various atoms are parts of a water molecule, or two particular pints of milk are parts of a quart of milk, or various time-slices, if there are such things, are parts of a persisting individual." (p. 61)

2. ———. 2000. "Semantics for the Logic of Essence." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 29:543-584.
"In a previous paper ' *The Logic of Essence* ', I presented a system for the logic of essence. In this paper, I present a semantics for a variant of the system and prove it complete with respect to that semantics.
(...)
The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects if it is true in any world compatible with the nature of those objects. We shall make the simplifying assumption that each world is compatible with the nature of all and only those objects that it contains. Thus the condition for a statement to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects is that it should be true in all those worlds that contain those objects. However, the presence of an object in a world is not taken to guarantee its existence but merely its possibility.
Thus each world will be taken to embody its own 'view' of which objects are possible and which are not.
(...)
The first two sections are devoted to the language of the logic (Section 1) and the system of proof (Section 2). The next section gives the semantics (Section 3). The remaining six sections develop the completeness proof. The first three

(Sections 4–6) provide lemmas crucial to the construction of the canonical model. The next two sections (Sections 7, 8) show how to build up a ‘diagram’ of the model; and the last section (Section 9) shows how to obtain the model itself.
The reader might find it helpful to have the previous paper ‘The Logic of Essence’ at hand (henceforth abbreviated to ‘LE’) and also to consult the papers ‘Essence and Modality’ and ‘Senses of Essence’ for further explanation of the notion of essence and for general philosophical motivation." (pp. 543-544)

3. ———. 2000. "Neutral Relations." *The Philosophical Review* no. 109:1-33.
"There is a standard view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, according to which we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order. Thus it is supposed that we may meaningfully - indeed, correctly - talk of the relation loves holding of Anthony and Cleopatra or of the relation between holding of New York, Washington, and Boston. But innocuous as this view might appear to be, it cannot be accepted as applying to all relations whatever. For there is an important class of metaphysical and linguistic contexts which call for an alternative conception of relation, one for which the order of the relata plays no role and in which the application of the relation to its relata is achieved by other means.
My argument for this conclusion will be roughly Hegelian in form (though not at all in content). I begin with a thesis, the standard view on relations, and consider various problems to which it gives rise (§ 1). After considering what is required of a solution to these problems (§ 2), I propose an antithesis, the positionalist view, according to which each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument-places, or positions, in no specified order (§ 3). But this view is beset with certain ontological and substantive problems; and I conclude with a synthesis, the antipositionalist view, which combines the virtues of the two previous accounts (§ 4) and is seen to lead to a distinctive conception of relations (§ 5).

I have largely confined my attention to metaphysical issues; and as a consequence, two important topics have not been pursued.
One is the logic of complex neutral relations; and the other is the role of neutral relations in the interpretation of language (and in our mental representation of reality). However, I hope enough has been said on the metaphysics of the issue to make clear why these topics are of interest and how they might be developed." (pp. 1-2)

4. ———. 2000. "A Counter-Exemple to Locke's Thesis." *The Monist* no. 83:357-361.
"Locke's thesis states that no two things of the same sort can be in the same place at the same time. The thesis has recently received extensive discussion, with some philosophers attempting to find arguments in its favour and others attempting to provide counter-examples.(1)
However, neither the arguments nor the counter-examples have been especially convincing;and it is my aim, in this short note, to present what I believe is a more convincing counter-example to the thesis." (p. 357)
(...)
"Many philosophers have thought that no two things can necessarily always coincide even if they are not of the same sort. But if this second example is correct, it shows that things may necessarily coincide even when they are of the same sort. (2)" (p. 361)
(1) The detractors include Hughes [97a, b, c], Shorter[77], and Simons ([85], [87], [97]).The defenders include Wiggins ([68], [75], [80]),Odergard [96] and also, of course, all those who hold that no two things can coincide,whether of the same sort or not.
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Hughes, C. [97a] "Same Kind Coincidents and the Ship of Theseus," *Mind* , vol. 106, 53-68.
_ [97b] "An IncredibleCoincidence," *Mind* , vol. 106,769-72.
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Rea, M. [97] "Material Constitution: A Reader," Boston, MA: Rowman & Littlefield.
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_[87] *Parts: A Study in Ontology* , Oxford: Clarendon.
_ [97] "On Being the Same Ship(s)? or Electron(s): Reply to Hughes," *Mind* 106, 761-68.
Wiggins, D. [68] "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," *Philosophical Review* 77: 90-95, reprintedin Rea [97].
_ [80] *Sameness and Substance* , Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

5. ———. 2001. "The Question of Realism." *Philosopher's Imprint* no. 1:1-30.
Reprinted in Andrea Bottani, Massimiliano Carrara, Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.) *, Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes of Analytic Metaphysics* , Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, pp. 3-48.
"My aim in this paper is to help lay the conceptual and methodological foundations for the study of realism. I come to two main conclusions: first, that there is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms; and second, that questions of what is real are to be settled upon the basis of considerations of *ground* . The two conclusions are somewhat in tension with one another, for the lack of a definition of the concept of reality would appear to stand in the way of developing a sound methodology for determining its application; and one of my main concerns has been to show how the tension between the two might be resolved. The paper is in two main parts. In the first, I point to the difficulties in making out a metaphysical conception of reality.

I begin by distinguishing this conception from the ordinary conception of reality (§ 1) and then show how the two leading contenders for the metaphysical conception -- the factual and the irreducible-both appear to resist formulation in other terms. This leads to the quietist challenge, that questions of realism are either meaningless or pointless (§ 4); and the second part of the paper (§§ 5-10) is largely devoted to showing how this challenge might be met. I begin by introducing the notion of ground (§ 5) and then show how it can be used as a basis for resolving questions both of factuality (§§ 6-7) and of irreducibility (§§ 8-9). I conclude with some remarks on the essential unity of these two questions and of the means by which they are to be answered (§ 10)." (pp. 3-4)

6. ———. 2002. "The Varieties of Necessity." In *Conceivability and Possibility* , edited by Gendler, Tamar Szabo and Hawthorne, John, 253-282. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 7, pp. 235-260.
   "Necessity abounds. There are the necessary truths of logic, mathematics and metaphysics, the necessary connections among events in the natural world, the necessary or unconditional principles of ethics, and many other forms of necessary truth or connection. But how much diversity is there to this abundance?
   Are all necessary truths and connections reducible to a single common form of necessity? And if not, then what are the different ways in which a truth might be necessary or a necessary connection might hold?
   It is the aim of this paper to show that diversity prevails.
   I shall argue that there are three main forms of necessity - the metaphysical, the natural and the normative - and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. Thus what it is for a necessity or possibility of any of these forms to obtain does not consist in the obtaining of some other form or forms of necessity or possibility.

Although the focus of the paper falls squarely within the philosophy of modality, some of my arguments may be of broader interest. For certain currently fashionable views on scientific essentialism and ethical naturalism entail the collapse of forms of necessity that I would wish to keep distinct. Thus I have found it essential to indicate what it is in these views that I take to be in error; and this has required consideration of questions from within the metaphysics of natural kinds and the epistemology of ethical belief." (p. 253)

7. ———. 2003. "The Problem of Possibilia." In *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics* , edited by Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean, 161-179. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Reprinted in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 6, pp. 214-231.
   "Are there, in addition to the various actual objects that make up the world, various possible objects? Are there merely possible people, for example, or merely possible electrons, or even merely possible kinds?
   We certainly talk as if there were such things. Given a particular sperm and egg, I may wonder whether that particular child which would result from their union would have blue eyes.
   But if the sperm and egg are never in fact brought together, then there is no actual object that my thought is about.(1) Or again, in the semantics for modal logic we presuppose an ontology of possibilia twice over.(2) For first, we coutenance various possible worlds, in addition to the actual world; and second, each of these worlds is taken to be endowed with its own domain of objects. These will be the actual objects of the world in question, but they need not be actual simpliciter, i.e., actual objects of *our* world. What are we to make of such discourse? There are four options:
   (i) the discourse is taken to be unintelligible; (ii) it is taken to be intelligible but nonfactual, i.e. as not in the business of stating facts; (iii) it is taken to be factual but reducible to discourse involving no reference to possibilia; (iv) it is taken to be both factual and irreducible.(3) These options range

from a fullblooded form of actualism at one extreme to a full-blooded form of possibilism at the other. The two intermediate positions are possibilist in that they accept the intelligibility of possibilist discourse but actualist in that they attempt to dispense with its prima facie commitment to possibilia. All four positions have found advocates in the literature. Quine, in his less irenic moments, favours option (i); Forbes ([85], p. 94) advocates option (ii), at least for certain parts of possibilist discourse; many philosophers, including Adams [74] and myself, opt for (iii); while Lewis [86] and Stalnaker [75] have endorsed versions of (iv), that differ in how full-blooded they take the possible objects to be.

My focus in the present article is on the third option. I wish to see to what extent reference to possibilia might be understood in other terms. Can we regard talk of possibilia as a mere facon de parler, perhaps somewhat in the same manner as talk of the average man or of infinitesimals? (4) I shall not be concerned to argue directly against any of the other options.

However, any argument for the viability of (iii) is indirectly an argument against the plausibility of these other options. For (iv), especially in its more extreme forms, offends against what Russell has called our 'robust sense of reality', (i) offends against our even more robust sense of what is intelligible, while (ii) offends against our somewhat less robust sense of what is factual. It is therefore preferable to go with the third option, if we possibly can." (pp. 161-162)

(1) Cf Gupta ([80], 20, n.15.

(2) See Kripke [63] for a standard exposition of the semantics.

(3) See Fine [01] for a general discussion of what these various options amount to.

(4) As should be clear from Fine [01], the viability of any reduction will also depend upon its success in accounting for our understanding of modal discourse and our knowledge of modal
truth. See Peacocke [01] for a broader discussion along these lines.

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Peacocke C., [01] 'Principles for Possibilia', to appear. [*Noûs* , vol. 36, 2002, pp. 486-508]

8. ———. 2003. "The Role of Variables." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 50:605-631.
Reprinted in the *Philosopher's Annual* 2003; revised in Joseph Almog, Paolo Leonardi (eds.), *The Philosophy of David Kaplan,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 109-133.
"It is generally supposed - by logicians and philosophers alike - that we now possess a perfectly good understanding of how variables work in the symbolism of logic and mathematics.
Once Gottlob Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Alfred Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of any significance to be said. It seems to me, however, that this common view is mistaken. There are deep problems concerning the role of variables that have never been properly recognized, let alone solved, and once we attempt to solve them we see that they have profound implications not only for our understanding of variables but also for our understanding of other forms of expression and for the general nature of semantics.
It is my aim here to say what these problems are and how they are to be solved, and to indicate the implications fo the rest of semantics. I begin with an antimony concerning the role of variables which I believe any satisfactory account of them should solve (section 1). I then argue that the three main semantical schemes currently on the market - the Tarskian, the instantial and the algebraic -- are unsuccessful

in solving the puzzle (sections II-III) or in providing a satisfactory semantics for first-order logic (Sections IV-V). Finally, I offer an alternative scheme that it is capable of solving the antimony (section VI) and of providing a more satisfactory semantics for first-order logic (section VII). It is based upon a new approach to representational semantics, which I call *semantic relationism* ; and I conclude by discussing the implications of this approach for the semantics of names and belief-reports." (p. 605)

9. ———. 2003. "The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter." *Mind* no. 112:195-234.
"Many philosophers have thought that a material thing is, or may be, one and the same as its matter - that a statue, for example, may be the same as the clay from which it is made or a river the same as the water which flows through it.
There appears to be a powerful argument against such views, for the thing in each of these cases would appear to have properties not possessed by its matter.
Thus the clay of a statue may exist even though the statue itself has ceased to exist and the river may be composed of different water at different times even though this cannot be true of the water that composes it at any given time.
However, these philosophers have responded to this argument by claiming that the apparent difference in properties represents, not a difference in the objects themselves, but a difference in the descriptions under which they may be conceived. We may conceive of a given thing as a statue or some clay or as a river or a body of water, for example, and, depending upon how the object is conceived, we will say one thing about it rather than another.
It is the aim of this paper to show that this counter-response cannot be sustained and that the original argument against identity should therefore be allowed to stand. This is no easy task since there would appear to be nothing in the immediate linguistic data to settle the question one way or the other.
However, by working through the consequences of the counter-response for the rest of our language, I think it may be shown to be extremely implausible. The paper is in two

main parts. The first (§§1-4) is largely concerned with setting up the problem. We characterize the different forms the identity theory can take (§1), explain how the argument in favor of non-identity might in principle break down (§2), present the most plausible versions of such arguments (§3), and then consider the most plausible counter-response to them (§4). The second part (§§5-8) embarks on a detailed investigation of the difficulties with the counter-response. It is shown to be unable to account for a wide variety of different linguistic data, that is loosely classified according as to how reference to a material thing might be achieved. Four main kinds of case will be considered: those in which a sort is explicitly invoked (§5); those in which it is implicitly invoked (§6); those in which the very notion of reference is itself used in securing reference(§7); and those in which there is reference to a plurality of things (§8)." (p. 195)

10. ———. 2005. "Replies [to Comments on 'Limits of Abstraction']." *Philosophical Studies* no. 122:367-395.
Replies to critics about *The Limits of Abstraction* .
"I am extremely grateful to the contributors for their careful, perceptive and sympathetic discussion of my book. For the most part, they have chosen not to criticize what I say but to see how the doctrines of the book might be developed or be used to throw light on other questions. A defense of the book is therefore out of place; and I can do no better than to continue the discussion of some of the questions that they raise. There is perhaps only one point on which there is a substantive disagreement; and this concerns the status of second-order logic. Weir takes it to be epistemologically problematic; I do not. This issue was not discussed in the book, and I have here attempted to explain the grounds upon which I think its epistemic innocence might be defended." (p. 367)

11. ———. 2005. "Précis [of " *The Limits of Abstraction"*]." *Philosophical Studies* no. 122:305-313.
Symposium on Kit' Fine's book *The Limits of Abstraction.*
" Before dealing with the contributors' comments, I would like to provide a selective summary of the book. I will focus on two main themes: the development of a general theory of

abstraction; and the critique of Hume's principle as a form of definition. There are several other topics from the book that I would have liked to have covered. They include the question of the identity of abstracts and the viability of the context principle, on the philosophical side (§1.5, §§11.3-5) and the analysis of invariance and the proofs of categoricity, on the technical side (§§6,7). But in the interests of brevity, I have had to exclude them.

The general idea of abstraction is one that has been discussed by philosophers throughout the ages but it was Frege who first showed how the idea could be put on a rigorous footing. For Frege, the idea of abstraction had two main components. The first related to the items upon which the abstraction was to be performed. These were to be taken to be related by an equivalence relation, i.e. by a relation that was reflexive, symmetric and transitive. As examples, we have the relation of parallelism on lines or the relation of equinumerosity on concepts. The second component related to the abstracts themselves. These were to be obtained from the items by means of a suitable operation of abstraction - the operation of forming directions in the case of parallel lines and of forming numbers in the case of equinumerous concepts. These two components, the equivalence relation and the operation of abstraction, were then to be connected by a principle relating the identity of the abstracts to the equivalence of the items from which they were formed." (p. 305)

12. ———. 2005. "Class and Membership." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 102:547-572.

Abstract: "I wish to describe a construction that is capable of yielding a new solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes. Perhaps what is most dis- tinctive about the construction is the reversal in the roles of the predicate of membership and the ontology of sets. On the usual conception of the cumulative hierarchy of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), we think of the membership predicate as given and of the ontology of sets or classes as something to be made out. Thus given an understanding ofmembership, we successively carve out the ontology of sets by using the

membership predicate to specify which further sets should be added to those that are already taken to exist. Under the present approach, by contrast, we think of the ontology of classes as given and of the membership predicate as something to be made out. Thus given an understanding of the ontology of classes, we successively carve out extensions of the membership predicate by using conditions on the domain of classes to specify which further membership relationships should obtain. What unfolds is not the ontology of sets or classes but the meaning of membership. This “Copernican revolution” in our conception of class membership, once properly implemented, is capable of yielding a theory of classes that is just as natural as the standard theory of ZF and yet far more powerful in the strength of its principles and the scope of its applications."

13. ———. 2005. "Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects." In *Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Vol. 1* , edited by Gendler, Tamar Szabo and Hawthorne, John, 89-110. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"I have recently been attempting to provide a new approach to the philosophy of mathematics, which I call ‘proceduralism’ or ‘procedural postulationism’.(1) It shares with traditional forms of postulationism, advocated by Hilbert (1930) and Poincaré (1952), the belief that the existence of mathematical objects and the truth of mathematical propositions are to be seen as the product of postulation. But it takes a very different view of what postulation is. For it takes the postulates from which mathematics is derived to be imperatival, rather than indicative, in form; what are postulated are not propositions true in a given mathematical domain, but procedures for the construction of that domain.
This difference over the status of the posulates has enormous repercussions for the development and significance of such a view. The philosophy of mathematics is faced with certain fundamental problems.
How are we capable of acquiring an understanding of mathematical terms? How do we secure reference to mathematical objects? What is the nature of these objects?

Do they exist independently of us or are they somehow the products of our minds? What accounts for the possibility of applying mathematics to the real world? And how are we able of acquire knowledge of mathematical truths? The procedural form of postulationism, in contrast to the propositional form, is capable of providing plausible answers to each of these questions. By going procedural, we convert a view that is beset with pitfalls to one that is worthy of serious consideration.

In what follows I shall focus on the last question concerning our knowledge of mathematics (although this will inevitably involve the other questions). I do this not because this question is the most interesting or even because it provides the most convincing illustration

of the value of our approach, but because it helps to bring out what is most distinctive—and also most problematic—about the approach. If one can go along with what it recommends in this particular case, then one is well on the way to accepting the view in its entirety.

As with the 'big three' traditional approaches to the philosophy of mathematics—logicism, formalism, and intuitionism—the present approach rests upon a certain technical program within the foundation of mathematics. It attempts to derive the whole of mathematics—or a significant part thereof—within the limitations imposed by its underlying philosophy. Since the viability of the underlying philosophical view largely depends upon the possibility of carrying out such a program, it will be helpful to give a sketch—if only in the barest form—of what the program is and of how it is to be executed. I hope elsewhere to provide a much more extensive development of the view in both its philosophical and technical aspects." (pp. 90-90)

(1) First broached in Fine (2002: 36, 56, 100).

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Poincaré, H. (1952) *Science and Method* (New York: Dover).

14. ———. 2005. "Reference, Essence, and Identity." In *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers* , 19-39. New

York: Oxford University Press.
Previously unpublished and written up in the spring of 1984 as a talk for the conference 'Themes from Kaplan'.
Chris Peacocke was the commentator.
"There are three main concerns within current thinking on modality. One relates to the problem of essentialism, of making sense of *de re* modal discourse. Another relates to the problem of transworld identification, of individuating objects across possible worlds. The third relates to the problem of direct reference, of whether any terms can refer to their bearers independently of how they are described.
It has commonly been supposed that these various problems are connected and that a solution to the one will push us in a certain direction in regard to another. But I shall argue that, once the problems are properly understood, it will be seen that they are quite distinct and that the supposed connections among them are illusory." (p. 19)

15. ———. 2005. "Necessity and Non-existence." In *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers* , 321-354. New York: Oxford University Press.
Previously unpublished.
"Is it possible for Socrates to be a man and yet not exist? This is the kind of question that is likely to strike someone from outside philosophy as preposterous and that may not be taken seriously even by philosophers themselves. But I believe that the answer to this question has profound implications for our understanding of the concepts of existence, identity, and modality and for how these concepts connect to one another and to the world.
It is my central contention that, just as there is a distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences, so there is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not. It is in terms of such a distinction that we should assess the possibility that Socrates might be a man and yet not exist, since his non-existence will be a matter of the circumstances while his being a man will not. But once the distinction is drawn, it will be seen to have consequences for a wide range of

further questions. It will lead us to distinguish, within the realm of what are normally regarded as necessary truths, between the necessary truths proper, those that hold whatever the circumstances, and the transcendent truths, those that hold regardless of the circumstances. It will also lead us to make an analogous distinction, within the realm of what are normally regarded as necessary existents, between the necessary existents proper, those that exist whatever the circumstances, and the transcendent objects, those that exist regardless of the circumstances. Thus some objects will not properly be in the world just as it has been supposed that some objects are not properly in time.
Finally, it will be suggested that the identity of an object—what it is—is not, at bottom, a worldly matter; essence will precede existence in the sense that the identity of an object may be fixed by its unworldly features even before any questionof its existence or other worldly features is considered." (p. 321)

16. ———. 2006. "The Reality of Tense." *Synthese* no. 150:399-414.
Expanded version in: *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers,* as chapter 8, pp. 261-320.
"Is reality somehow tensed? Or is tense a feature of how we represent reality and not properly a feature of reality itself? Although this question is often raised, it is very hard to say what it comes to. For both sides to the debate can agree to certain tensed claims. They can agree that I am sitting right now, for example, or that Queen Ann is dead. So in a clear and obvious sense there are tensed facts. And so how can it sensibly be denied that reality is tensed?
My own view is that the question can only be made clear by drawing a distinction between how things are (*mere* reality) and how things are in reality (*metaphysical* reality). Thus what the antirealist about tense wishes to dispute is not how things are, which should be common ground between him and his opponent, but how things are in reality. Of course, he will say, Queen Ann is dead but this representation of the facts is not faithful to how things are in reality; and this is so, not because of the reference to Queen Ann or to her

being dead, but because of the tense. In a faithful representation of how things are in reality, there will be nothing that corresponds to our use of tense. (1)"
(1) The more formal minded reader may suppose that there is a sentential operator 'in reality,_' by means of which the various realist claims are to be made (Fine 2000). I should add that this paper is a summary of views which are elaborated at much greater length in Fine (2005). In the interests of brevity, I have made no attempt to engage with the extensive literature on the topic.
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Fine. K.: 2000, 'The Question of Reality', Philosophers Imprint 1 (1).

17. ———. 2006. "Modal Logic and Its Application." *EOLSS Survey of Mathematical Logic* :1-25.
Summary; "Modal logic is a broad and rapidly expanding area of logic with applications to such diverse areas as computer science, linguistics and philosophy. It deals with the logical behavior of such modal locutions as ‘must’ and ‘might’, ‘was’ and ‘will’, ‘ought’, and ‘may’. It specifies formal languages within which such locutions may be encoded, it lays down axioms and rules by which the locutions are governed, it sets up an interpretation for the resulting symbolism, and it proves various general results concerning the system and its interpretation."
18. ———. 2006. "Arguing for Non-Identity: A Response to King and Frances." *Mind* no. 115:1059-1082.
"Jeffrey King and Bryan Frances are both critical of my paper, 'The Nonidentity of a Thing and its Matter' (Fine 2003), though in rather different ways. King engages in carpet bombing; his aim is to destroy every argument in sight, even to the extent of showing that the linguistic data cited by the paper favours the monist rather than the pluralist. Frances, by contrast, engages in strategic warfare; by 'taking out' certain key arguments, he attempts to demolish the paper as a whole.
I remain unmoved -- and, I hope, unscathed -- by their attacks.

King's carpet bombing may cause a great deal of collateral damage but not to its intended target; and Frances's strategic bombing may hit its target but without inflicting much harm. Still, their papers raise many interesting issues not discussed -- or, at least, not properly discussed -- in my original paper; and I am grateful to them for providing me with the opportunity to take these issues into account.
My response will be in three main parts: I begin by outlining the central line of argument of my original paper (Sect. 1); I then discuss King's criticisms of the paper (Sects 2, 3, 4); and finally I turn to Frances's criticisms (Sect. 5). I have tried to make my response reasonably self-contained and to bring out the independent significance of the issues under discussion but it would be helpful, all the same, if the reader had all three papers at hand." (p. 187)
Fine, K. 2003: 'The Non-identity of a Material Thing and its Matter' *Mind* 112, pp. 195-234.
Frances, Bryan 2006: 'The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism' *Mind* 115, pp. 1007-1022.
King, Jeffrey C. 2006: 'Semantics for Monists'. *Mind* 115, pp. 1023-1058.

19. ———. 2006. "In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 103:699-714.
Reprinted in: Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), *Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics* , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 1-16.
"Let us use the term 'present' in such a way that a material thing can be said to be present both in space and in time. Thus on this usage we can say that the desk in front of me is present at any moment at which it exists and also that it is present at any position within its spatial location at that moment. We might similarly talk of presence throughout a period of time or a region of space and of the presence of other categories of objects, such as states or events.
Some philosophers, the "three-dimensionalists," have thought that there is a distinctive way in which material things are present in time as opposed to space. They have thought that a thing is somehow "stretched out" through its location at a given time though not through the period of

during which it exists and that it is somehow present in its entirety at any moment at which it exists though not at any position at which it is located. Other philosophers, the "four dimensionalists," have denied that this was so; they have thought that a material thing is as equally "stretched out" in time as it is in space and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.

We might use the term 'existence' for the way in which 3D-ers have thought that a thing is present in time and 'extension' or 'location' for the way in which 4D-ers have thought that a thing is present in space. The 3D-ers have then held that things exist in time but are extended in space while the 4D-ers hold that things are extended both in space and in time. (1)" (p. 699)

(1) My terms 'presence', 'existence', and 'extension' (deriving from my paper, "Compounds and Aggregates," Nous, xxviii, 2 (1994): 137-58) correspond to the more familiar terminology of 'persistence', 'endurance', and 'perdurance'. I prefer my own terminology since it is somewhat more general, allowing one to talk of existence or extension at a moment when one cannot very well talk of endurance or perdurance at a moment and allowing one to talk of existence or extension in space when one cannot very well talk of endurance or perdurance in space.

20. ———. 2006. "Relatively Unrestricted Quantification." In *Absolute Generality* , edited by Rayo, Agustin and Uzquiano, Gabriel, 20-44. New York: Oxford University Press.

"There are four broad grounds upon which the intelligibility of quantification over absolutely everything has been questioned-one based upon the existence of semantic indeterminacy, another on the relativity of ontology to a conceptual scheme, a third upon the necessity of sortal restriction, and the last upon the possibility of indefinite extendibility. The argument from semantic indeterminacy derives from general philosophical considerations concerning our understanding of language. For the Skolem-Lowenheim Theorem appears to show that an

understanding of quantification over absolutely everything (assuming a suitably infinite domain) is semantically indistinguishable from the understanding of quantification over something less than absolutely everything; the same first-order sentences are true and even the same first-order conditions will be satisfied by objects from the narrower domain. From this it is then argued that the two kinds of understanding are indistinguishable tout court and that nothing could *count* as having the one kind of understanding as opposed to the other.

The second two arguments reject the bare idea of an object as unintelligible, one taking it to require supplementation by reference to a conceptual scheme and the other taking it to require supplementation by reference to a sort. Thus we cannot properly make sense of quantification over *mere* objects, but only over objects of such and such a conceptual scheme or of such and such a sort. The final argument, from indefinite extendibility, rejects the idea of a *completed* totality. For if we take ourselves to be quantifying over all objects, or even over all sets, then the reasoning of Russell's paradox can be exploited to demonstrate the possibility of quantifying over a more inclusive domain. The intelligibility of absolutely unrestricted quantification, which should be free from such incompleteness, must therefore be rejected.

The ways in which these arguments attempt to the undermine the intelligibility of absolutely unrestricted quantification are very different; and each calls for extensive discussion in its own right. However, my primary concern in the present paper is with the issue of indefinite extendibility; and I shall only touch upon the other arguments in so far as they bear upon this particular issue. I myself am not persuaded by the other arguments and I suspect that, at the end of day, it is only the final argument that will be seen to carry any real force. If there is a case to be made against absolutely unrestricted quantification, then it will rest here, upon logical considerations of extendibility, rather than upon the nature of understanding or the metaphysics of identity." (pp. 20-21)

21. ———. 2007. "Response to Correia." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:85-88.
"Correia's paper contains two highly novel and interesting suggestions. The first is to generalize the Priorian perspective so that all that is required for there to be a fact about an object is that there be something that is the object though not necessarily something that exists. The second, building on the first, is to see essence as a form of Priorian implication. There is no doubt that these suggestions help to illuminate the concept of essence, in regard to both its Priorian underpinnings and its connection with modality. But I do not think that they are in tension with the central claims of ' *Essence and Modality* ' and nor do I think that they should lead usto suppose that essentialist statements might be formulated more directly in terms of an 'arrow' rather than a 'box'." (p. 88)
22. ———. 2007. "Response to Garcia-Carpintero." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:191-194.
"I attempted to argue for a supervaluational account of vagueness in an early paper, 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' (VT&L) and Manuel García-Carpintero is concerned, in his rich and wide-ranging paper, to defend such an account against two objections from M. Andjelkovic and T. Williamson, 'Truth, Falsity and Borderline Cases', *Philosophical Topics* 28, 2000, pp. 211–244. I no longer hold a supervaluational view but am inclined to agree with García-Carpintero that the objections are not successful, though not quite for the reasons that he gives." (p. 191)
23. ———. 2007. "Response to Horwich." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:17-23.
"In a sustained series of articles and books, Horwich has attempted to deflate the pretensions of philosophy by showing how many of its problems are not problems at all and how many of its 'theories' are explanations of phenomena standing in no need of explanation and, in keeping with this general line of thought, he is concerned, in

the present highly interesting and provocative paper, to show how even the modest aims of ' *The Question of Realism* ' go too far in attempting to breathe some life into realist disputes. He is concerned to argue, in particular, that two of the principles that are meant to belong to the common ground between the realist and the antirealist might plausibly be questioned and that the strategy of the paper therefore fails (p. 11)." (p. 17)

24. ———. 2007. "Response to Koslicki." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:161-166.
"Koslicki's paper is an extraordinarily perceptive and comprehensive discussion of my published work on the nature of material things. Although she is sympathetic to my criticisms of the standard mereological approaches to this topic, she is not so happy with my positive views. She has three main objections in all, which shesummarizes as follows:
Fine's theory gives rise, first, to a proliferation of primitive sui generis relations of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be imposed on them stipulatively by means of distinct systems of postulates, tailored to the different domains of objects. Secondly, we noted that, given its 'superabundance' of objects, Fine's theory is committed to its very own population of 'monsters'. Thirdly, once rigid embodiments are abandoned, the explicitly mereological aspect of Fine's hylomorphic theory is preserved only at the cost of abandoning the Weak Supplementation Principle. This, in turn, along with the other formal properties of Fine's system, makes us wonder why one should consider the primitive sui generis operations introduced by Fine's theory to be genuinely mereological at all (pp. 157–158).
Let me briefly consider the first and third of these objections but devote most of my attention to the second." (p. 161)

25. ———. 2007. "Response to MacBride." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:57-62.
"Fraser MacBride's paper is a deep and searching treatment of the topic of neutral relations. He very clearly explains the

motivation for wanting a theory of neutral relations, providing much more than my own paper by way of philosophical and historical context, and he subjects the available theories to a number of interesting and difficult challenges. Although he is critical of my own antipositional line, he shows a keen appreciation of the problems it was meant to solve and of the considerations that led me to adopt it.
I should like to take up two main issues from his paper – one concerning the question of symmetric relations and of whether the positionalist can provide an adequate account of them and the other concerning the question of 'solitary' relational states and of whether the anti-positional can provide an adequate account of how their relata are related." (p. 58)

26. ———. 2007. "Response to Weir." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:117-125.
"In a recent paper, 'Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects' (KMO), I have outlined a new approach to the foundations of mathematics. I call it 'procedural postulationism' and it is based upon the idea that one may lay down procedures for the expansion of a given domain. The ontology of mathematics is taken to result from the execution of such procedures; and our knowledge of mathematics is to be attained by seeing what would true upon their execution.
Weir has raised some sharp and significant objections to this approach – one concerning the constraints by which postulation is governed, another concerning the ontological neutrality of second-order logic, upon which my approach is based, and a third concerned with my realist construal of the expanded domains.
Let me deal with each in turn." (p. 117)

27. ———. 2008. "Coincidence and Form." *Aristotelian Society.Supplementary Volume* no. 82:101-118.
Paper read at the Kit Fine Day: Ontology Talks, February 11, 2008, Paris.
Abstract. "How can a statue and a piece of alloy be coincident at any time at which they exist and yet differ in

their modal properties? I argue that this question demands an answer and that the only plausible answer is one that posits a difference in the form of the two objects."
"Many philosophers are pluralists about material things. They believe that distinct material things may coincide at a time, i.e. that they may occupy the very same spatial region and be constituted by the very same matter at that time. A familiar example is that of an alloy statue and the piece of alloy from which it is made. They are clearly coincident, and they would also appear to be distinct, given that the piece of alloy may exist before the statue is created or after it has been destroyed.
A number of these philosophers also believe that two distinct material things may coincide in a world, i.e. that they may exist at the same times in the world and coincide at each time at which they exist." (p. 101)
(...)
"The account of an object as a given rigid or variable embodiment may be regarded as a *fundamental* account of what the object is, one that itself stands in need of no further explanation. We may therefore claim, with some plausibility, to have traced the various features and differences of such objects to their source." (p. 116)

28. ———. 2008. "The Impossibility of Vagueness." *Philosophical Perspectives* no. 22:111-136.
"I wish to present a proof that vagueness is impossible. Of course, vagueness is possible; and so there must be something wrong with the proof. But it is far from clear where the error lies and, indeed, all of the assumptions upon which the proof depends are ones that have commonly been accepted. This suggests that we may have to radically alter our current conception of vagueness if we are to make proper sense of what it is.
The present investigation was largely motivated by an interest in what one might call the 'global' aspect of vagueness. We may distinguish between the indeterminacy of a predicate in its application to a single case (the local aspect) and in its application to a range of cases (the global aspect). In the first case, it is indeterminate how a predicate,

such as a bald, applies in a given case; and, in the second case, it is indeterminate how a predicate applies across a range of cases.
Given such a distinction, the question arises as to whether one might understand the indeterminacy of a predicate in its application to a range of cases in terms of its indeterminacy in application to a single case; and considered from this point of view, the result can be seen to show that there is no reasonable way in which this might be done." (p. 111)
(...)
"I begin by giving an informal presentation of the result and its proof and I then consider the various responses that might be made to the alleged impossibility. Most of these are found wanting; and my own view, which I hint at rather than argue for, is that it is only by giving up on the notion of singlecase indeterminacy, as it is usually conceived, and by modifying the principles of classical logic that one can evade the result and thereby account for the possibility of vagueness. There are two appendices, one providing a formal presentation and proof of the impossibility theorem and the other giving a counter-example to the theorem under a certain relaxation of its assumptions. The mathematics is not difficult but those solely interested in the philosophical implications of the results should be able to get by without it.
The general line of argument goes back to Wright [1987] and further discussion and developments are to be found in Sainsbury [1990, 1991], Wright [1992], Heck [1993], Edgington [1993], Gomez Torrente [1997, 2002], Graff-Fara [2002, 2004], and Williamson [1997, 2002]. It would be a nice question to discuss how these various arguments relate to one another and to the argument in this paper. I shall not go into this question, but let me observe that my own approach is in a number of ways more general. It relies, for the most part, on weaker assumptions concerning the underlying logic and the logic of definitely and on weaker constraints concerning the behavior of vague terms; and it

also provides a more flexible framework within which to develop arguments of this sort." (p. 112)

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29. ———. 2009. "The Question of Ontology." In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology* , edited by Chalmers, David J., Manley, David and Wassermann, Ryan, 157-177. New York: Oxford University Press.

"There are a number of difficulties with the standard quantificational view. They are for the most part familiar but it will be worth spelling them out, if only to make clear

how far removed our understanding of the ontological question is from our understanding of their quantificational counterparts. Philosophers may have learned to live with the disconnect between the two, but their tolerance of the situation should not lull us into thinking that it is tolerable." (p. 138)

"This account of our method for settling ontological dispute requires that we have a grasp not only of an absolute conception of reality, of there *being nothing more than ...*, but also of a relative conception, of *there being nothing more to ... than ...* , since it is through our assessment of the relative claims that we attempt to adjudicate the plausibility of the absolute claims. Many philosophers seem to have supposed that our having a good working grasp of such notions depends upon our being able to define them in other terms, so that questions of metaphysics or ontology thereby become questions of semantics or epistemology or total science. I consider this to be a serious methodological error: upon careful reflection we can see that our intuitive grasp of these notions is a sufficient guide in itself to their proper employment; and the attempt to define these notions in other terms has served merely to distort our understanding of the metaphysical questions and of the methods by which they are to be resolved." (p. 176)

30. ———. 2010. "Towards a Theory of Part." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 107:559-589.

Paper read at the *Kit Fine Day: Ontology Talks,* Paris, February 11, 2008.

"My aim in this paper is to outline a general framework for dealing with questions of partwhole. Familiar as this topic may be, my treatment of it is very different from more conventional approaches. For instead of dealing with the single notion of mereological part or sum, I have attempted to provide a comprehensive and unified account of the different ways in which one object can be a part of another. Thus mereology, as it is usually conceived, becomes a small branch of a much larger subject. (1)

My discussion has been intentionally restricted in a number of ways. In the first place, my principal concern has been

with the notion of absolute rather than relative part. We may talk of one object being a part of another relative to a time or circumstances (as when we say that the tire was once a part of the car or that or that the execution of Marie Antoinette was as a matter of contingent fact a part of the French Revolution) or in a way that is not relative to a time or the circumstances (as when we say that this pint of milk is a part of the quart or that the letter 'c' is part of the word 'cat'). Many philosophers have supposed that the two notions are broadly analogous and that what goes for one will tend to go for the other. (2) I believe this view to be mistaken and a source of endless error. But it is not my aim to discuss either the notion of relative part or its connection with the absolute notion. (3)

In the second place, I have focused on the 'pure' theory of part-whole rather than its application to our actual ontology. Once given a theory of part-whole, there arises the question of how it applies to the objects with which we are already familiar. This question becomes especially delicate and intricate on my own approach since, although we may recognize that such and such a familiar object is a part or whole, it may not be clear, according to the theory, what kind of whole or part it is. But despite the considerable interest of this question, my focus has been on the abstract development of the theory itself and not on its application to ontology.

Finally, I have only provided the merest sketch of the framework (on which I hope say more elsewhere). Many points are not developed and some not even stated. I have, in particular, said relatively little about the technical foundations of the subject, which are mathematically quite distinctive, or about some of the broader philosophical issues to which they give rise. I have given a rough map of the terrain rather than a guided tour, but I hope I have done enough to bring out the interest of the approach and to make clear how a more systematic and philosophically informed account might proceed." (pp. 559-560)

(1) The material outlined in this paper has been developed over a period of thirty years. It was most recently presented

in a seminar at Princeton in 2000; and I am grateful to Cian Dorr, Michael Fara, Gail Harman, Mark Johnston, David Lewis and Gideon Rosen for their comments.
I am also grateful for some comments I received from Ted Sider and two anonymous referees for the journal; and I owe a special debt of thanks to Achille Varzi for his encouragement.
(2) As in T. Sider, *Four Dimensionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), for example.
(3) The matter is briefly discussed in K. Fine, Things and Their Parts, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* XXIII (1999), 61-74.

31. ———. 2010. "Some Puzzles of Ground." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 51:97-118.
"In recent years there has been a growing interest in the concept of ground—of one thing holding in virtue of another, and, in developing an account of ground, a number of philosophers have laid down principles which they regard as unquestionably true of the concept. (1) The purpose of this note is to show that these principles are in conflict with seemingly impeccable principles of logic. Thus a choice must be made; either one or more of the metaphysical principles or one or more of the logical principles should be given up.
Some philosophers—and especially those already unsympathetic to ground—may think that the conflict reveals some underlying defect in the concept. For if acceptance of the concept of ground has such untoward consequences, then this can only be because the concept was no good in the first place. My own view—which I suggest toward the end of the paper—is quite different. It is not that considerations of ground should be ignored or even that the principles of ground should be given up in the light of their conflict with the principles of logic. Rather we need to achieve some kind of reflective equilibrium between the two sets of principles, one that does justice both to our logical intuitions and to our need for some account of their ground. Thus the conflict, far from serving to undermine the concept of ground, serves to show how important it is to

arriving at a satisfactory view of what in logic, as in other areas of thought, can properly be taken to hold.
The puzzle to which the conflict of principles gives rise bears some resemblance to the paradoxes of self-reference. It is not itself a paradox of self-reference: the puzzle, on the one side, makes no direct use of self-reference; the paradox, on the other side, makes no direct appeal to the notion of ground. But considerations of ground are often used to motivate certain solutions to the paradoxes, and the puzzle makes clear the reasoning behind these considerations and brings out the critical role played by the notion of ground. (2)" (pp. 97-98)
(1) They include Audi [1], Batchelor [2], Correia [3], Correia [4], Rosen [10], Schneider [11], and Schneider [12].
(2) I especially have in mind the kind of solution to the semantic paradoxes to be found in Kripke [8].
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[2] Batchelor, R., “Grounds and consequences,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* , vol. 80 (2010), pp. 65–77.
[3] Correia, F., *Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions* , Philosophia Verlag GmbH, München, 2005.
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[12] Schneider, B., “A logic of ‘because’,” in progress, 2010.

32. ———. 2010. "Semantic Necessity." In *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology* , edited by Hale, Bob and Hoffmann, Aviv, 65-80. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In the recent monograph ‘Semantic Relationism’, I made use of a certain notion of what was semantically necessary, or required, in arguing that it might be a semantic requirement that two names were coreferential even though there were no intrinsic semantic features of the names in virtue of which this was so. In the present paper, I wish to consider the bearing of the notion on the nature and content of semantic enquiry. I shall argue that a semantics for a given language is most perspicuously taken to be a body of semantic requirements and that the notion of a semantic requirement should itself be employed in articulating the content of those requirements. There are two main alternatives to this conception to be found in the literature. According to one, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; and according to the other, a semantics for a given language is taken to be a theory of truth for that language. I attempt to show how these alternatives do not provide us with the most perspicuous way of representing the semantic facts and that it is only in terms of our conception that one can properly appreciate what these facts are.
The importance of the notion of metaphysical necessity for metaphysics has long been appreciated, in regard to both explicating the nature of the subject and articulating the content of its claims. If the argument of this paper is correct, then it will help to show that the notion of semantic necessity has a similar and equally important role to play in understanding the nature and content of semantics." (p. 65)

33. ———. 2010. "Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:475-484.
"A major theme of ‘Semantic Relationism’ was that many of the familiar worries over the substitutivity of names in belief contexts may be resolved by going relational. But Soames, in his interesting and actionpacked paper, has argued that even if the more familiar worries are removed there are variants of them that will remain." (p. 475)
(...)

"So we see that the relationist does have a response to the worry that Soames raises. However, the way relationism comes in is not through embedding the speaker's report in a larger context of belief attributions, as Soames had supposed, but through seeing the speaker's report and the agent's belief as forming a single context, in which relationships of coordination relevant to the truth of the report may then be discerned."(p. 476)

34. ———. 2010. "Reply to Lawlor's 'Varieties of Coreference'." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:496-501.
"The focus of Krista Lawlor's challenging paper [*] is on cases of confused reference. By way of illustration, she asks us to suppose that 'Wally says of Udo, " He needs a haircut" , and Zach, thinking to agree, but looking at another person, says, 'he sure does" (p. 4). Zach is confused, since he takes the person he is looking at to be the same as the person Wally was referring to. This might not be a semantic confusion, which is what I think Lawlor is after, but a straight confusion over the facts.
For Zach's primary intention may be to refer to the same person as Wally or, alternatively, to the person he is looking at and he may mistakenly believe that these two people are the same. But let us suppose that Zach means to use use 'he' indifferently as a pronoun anaphoric on Wally's original use of 'he' and as a pronoun that is deictic on the person he is looking at. We would then have a case of confused reference of the kind Lawlor has in mind." (p. 496)
[* Krista Lawlor, "Varieties of Coreference", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81, 2010, pp. 485-495.]

35. ———. 2010. "Comments on Paul Hovda's 'Semantics as Information About Semantics Values'." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:511-518.
"In SR [*Semantic Relationism*] (7-9), I posed the 'antimony of the variable'. How can the pair of variables x, y have a different semantic role from the pair x, x when x has the same semantic role as y? In attempting to solve this antimony, I suggested that we appeal to the idea of the

values that are taken, not merely by a single variable, but by a sequence of variables (SR, 23-4).
The semantic role of the two pairs of variables can then be distinguished, since the first pair will take a distinct pair of objects from the domain as values (assuming that the domain contains at least two objects) while the second pair will not.
Hovda's makes a marvelous alternative suggestion. [*] 'The basic idea', he writes (pp. 4-5) 'is that a variable can refer to anything and must refer to exactly one thing.' The more usual idea is that a variable actually takes all of the objects in the domain as values (or 'referents'). My own relational account of variables is an instance of this approach, but with the modification that variables can now take their values simultaneously and not merely singly." (p. 511)
[* Paul Hovda "Semantics as Information About Semantics Values", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81, 2010, pp. 485-495.]

36. ———. 2011. "Aristotle's Megarian Manoeuvres." *Mind* no. 120:993-1034.
Abstract: "Towards the end of *Theta* 4 of the *Metaphysics* , Aristotle appears to endorse the obviously invalid modal principle that the truth of A will entail the truth of B if the possibility of A entails the possibility of B. I attempt to show how Aristotle's endorsement of the principle can be seen to arise from his accepting a non-standard interpretation of the modal operators and I indicate how the principle and its interpretation are of independent interest, quite apart from their role in understanding Aristotle."
"I begin by considering the different ways in which Aristotle's two principles might be formalized within the framework of propositional modal logic (Sect. 1). I then consider the deductive and semantic consequences of the different ways in which these principles might be formalized, using the apparatus of contemporary modal logic (Sect. 2). It is shown that the difficulties confronting Aristotle are even greater than might have been thought, since the second principle leads to 'modal collapse', the

collapse of possibility to actuality, which is something that Aristotle had previously argued explicitly against.
Three recent attempts to get Aristotle 'off the hook' — those of Brennan (1994), Makin (1999 and 2006), and Nortmann (2006) — are considered and found wanting (Sect. 3). I then propose an alternative solution, which rests upon distinguishing between a world as the locus and as the witness of possibilities (Sect. 4). Once the semantics for Aristotle's use of the modalities is understood in this way, it becomes perfectly explicable why he would have wanted to endorse the converse principle and how he can avoid modal collapse. I defend this interpretation of Aristotle against some objections and try to indicate why it is of independent interest (Sect. 5). I conclude with an attempt to vindicate Aristotle's argument for the first principle (Sect. 6)." (pp. 994-995)
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37. ———. 2011. "An Abstract Characterization of the Determinate/Determinable Distinction." *Philosophical Perspectives* no. 25:161-187.
"My aim in this paper is to provide an account of what it is for the world to have a determinate/determinable structure. Patches have colors, people have heights, particles have mass. These are all instances of the determinate/determinable structure, with a given state of the world consisting in something's possessing a determinate (be it a given color or height or mass) from within a given determinable (color, height or mass). But what is it for the world as a whole to possess such a structure?

In the *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein took the atomic propositions, by which the world is to be described, to be completely independent of one another. But he later revised his view (Wittgenstein [1929]) and allowed that the atomic propositions might exhibit the kind of dependence that is characteristic of the way in which different determinants of a given determinable are exclusive of one another. Our question might therefore be put in the form: how in the most abstract terms should we conceive of the post-Tractarian world?" (p. 161)

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38. ———. 2011. "The Silence of the Lambdas." *The Philosophers's Magazine* no. 55:19-27.

James Garvey interview Kit Fine.

"We come finally to Fine's influential views on vagueness and the so-called "sorites" paradox.

The name comes from the Greek word for heap, "soros". Eubulides, an ancient Greek philosopher with a thing for paradoxes, asked, roughly, when do you go from a few grains of wheat to a heap? One grain doesn't count, neither do two or three or four, but keep adding grains and, eventually, you'd say that you do have a heap. The trouble is that for a range of borderline cases, we don't know what to do with the predicate "is a heap". There are a number of instances in which "This is a heap" is neither true nor false, but how could that be? When I ask Fine about his views on vagueness, he thinks for a very long minute, noticeably brightening as he does so, and finally tells me he's found an entirely new way to think about vague predicates.

"I can briefly outline my new view, which is very radical." He goes on, half smiling, "If I'm right almost everyone else is wrong." I lean in.

"Predicates can be vague. Take a predicate like bald. It's vague. Perhaps one way of expressing that is that the predicate is not completely determined in its application. Many people have thought that the phenomenon of

vagueness is to be understood though borderline cases: what it is for a predicate to be vague is for there to be borderline cases. My view is that this approach to the problem of vagueness is fundamentally misguided. There is no intelligible notion of borderline case which is relevant to the phenomenon of vagueness. We have to achieve an understanding of vagueness in some other way.
(...)
The new thought is that that's a mistake, that the indeterminacy cannot be localised in that way.
We cannot point our finger at any one case.
"It means everyone else has been wrong. It leads to a very different conception of vagueness, the logic of vagueness, how you handle various problems. It leads to a completely new logic. It's something I've been thinking about." (p. 27)

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Kit Fine: annotated bibliography. Papers 2012-2022

Papers 2012-2022

1. Fine, Kit. 2012. "What is Metaphysics?" In *Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics* , edited by Tahko, Tuomas E., 8-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   "There are, I believe, five main features that serve to distinguish traditional metaphysics from other forms of enquiry. These are: the aprioricity of its methods; the generality of its subject-matter; the transparency or `non-opacity' of its concepts; its eidicity or concern with the nature of things; and its role as a foundation for what there is. In claiming that these are distinguishing features, I do not mean to suggest that no other forms of enquiry possess any of them. Rather, in metaphysics these features come together in a single package and it is the package as a whole rather than any of the individual features that serves to distinguish metaphysics from other forms of enquiry.
   It is the aim of this chapter to give an account of these individual features and to explain how they might come together to form a single reasonably unified form of enquiry. I shall begin by giving a rough and ready description of the various features and then go into more detail about what they are and how they are related." (p. 8).
2. ———. 2012. "Guide to Ground." In *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality* edited by Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin, 37-80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or "ontological ground"; and it is the aim of the present chapter to help put the idea on a firmer footing – to explain how it is to be understood, how it relates to other ideas, and how it might be of use in philosophy. (1)" (p. 37)

(1) A number of other philosophers (they include Audi [forthcoming], Batchelor [2010], Schaffer [2009b], Correia [2005, 2010], Raven [2009], Rosen [2010], Schnieder [2011]) have done related work in defense of the notion; and I have not attempted to make a detailed comparison between their ideas and my own.

I am grateful to the participants at the Boulder conference on dependence and to Neil Tennant for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of the chapter. I should add that, for reasons of space, some of the material in the chapter originally submitted to the volume had been abridged.

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Schaffer, J. 2009b. 'On What Grounds What', in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009 (eds.), 2009. *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology* . Oxford University Press 347–83
Schnieder, B. 2011. 'A Logic for "Because"', *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 4: 445–65

3. ———. 2012. "A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals." *Synthese* no. 189:29-57.
"A number of different accounts of counterfactual statements have been proposed in the literature. It has been thought that they should be understood in terms of the closeness of possible worlds, for example, with the counterfactual from A to C being true if all sufficiently close worlds in which A is true are worlds in which C is true or that they should be understood in terms of some notion of cotenability, with the counterfactual from A to B being true if A in conjunction with truths cotenable with A entails C. But a common presupposition of almost all of these accounts is that counterfactual claims should be intensional. If the sentences A and AN or C and CN are necessarily equivalent then the substitution of AN for A or CN for C in the antecedent or consequent of a counterfactual should preserve its truth-value. Thus, under the usual form of the possible worlds account, the truth-value of a counterfactual will simply turn on the possible worlds in which the antecedent and the consequent are true and so the account will be unable to distinguish between the truth-values of counterfactuals whose antecedents or consequents are true in the same possible worlds and hence are necessarily equivalent while, under the entailment-based accounts, the entailments will remain the same under the substitution of necessary equivalents and so the truth-values of the counterfactuals will also remain the same. (1)
It is the aim of this paper to show that no plausible account of counterfactuals should take them to be intensional and that if we are to describe the different kinds of counterfactual scenarios in the way we want and to reason

about them in the way we would like, then the assumption of intensionality should be abandoned. Indeed, it is not merely the assumption of 'modal' intensionality that will fail but also the weaker assumption of'logical' or 'classical' intensionality. For the cases we shall consider are ones in which the substitution of AN for A or CN for C should not be permitted, even though they are logical and not merely necessary equivalents." (pp. 29-30)
(1) The present paper expands on material in the first part of Fine, 'Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds', to appear in Journal of Philosophy [2012].

4. ———. 2012. "Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 109:221-246.
"Ever since the pioneering work of Stalnaker and Lewis (1), it has been customary to provide a semantics for counterfactuals statements in terms of possible worlds. Roughly speaking, the idea is that the counterfactual from A to C should be taken to be true just in case all of the closest worlds in which A is true are worlds in which C is true. Such a semantics is subject to some familiar difficulties - counterfactuals involving impossible antecedents, for example, or counterfactuals involving big changes consequential upon small changes. But it is not clear how seriously to take these difficulties - either because they might be met through some modification in the notion of closeness or because the intuitions on which the cases depend might be challenged or because the cases themselves might be dismissed as peripheral to the central use of the counterfactual construction; and nor has it been clear what a more satisfactory alternative to the possible world semantics might be put in its place." (p. 221)
References
(1) Stalnaker, 'A Theory of Conditionals' in N. Rescher (ed.) *Studies in Logical Theory* , American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series , No. 2' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 98-112 and Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).

5. ———. 2012. "Modal Logic and its Applications to the Philosophy of Language." In *The Routledge Companion to*

Philosophy of Language , edited by Russell, Gilliam and Graff Fara, Delia 609-623. New York: Routledge.
"Modal logic is the logic of possibility and necessity and of other such notions. It began, as did logic in general, with Aristotle, in his theory of the 'modal syllogism'; and various notions and principles of modal logic were extensively discussed in the middle ages.
But the subject only came into its own at the beginning of the twentieth century (see Goldblatt 2005 for an account of its recent history).
I begin by presenting some basic material on the possible worlds' approach to modal logic and then show how it relates to certain key topics in the philosophy of language. For reasons of space, I have had to be very selective and, inevitably, a great deal of interesting material has not been covered." (p. 609)
(...)
"7.6 Limitations
The possible worlds approach to meaning is subject to some well-known limitations. It cannot distinguish, for example, between knowing one necessary truth from knowing another. Or again, it may be permitted that I post the letter but not permitted that I post the letter or post the letter and burn down the post office, even though the two embedded clauses are true in the same possible worlds.
There is a question of how seriously to take these difficulties. My own view is that they cannot properly be overcome or ignored and that the possible worlds approach, for all of its success, can only be regarded as the first step towards a more adequate account of meaning." (p. 622)
References
Goldblatt R. (2005) 'Mathematical Modal Logic: A View of its Evolution' in *Handbook of the History of Logic* : VII (eds. D. M. Gabbay and J. Woods), Amsterdam: Elsevier.

6. ———. 2012. "The Pure Logic of Ground." *The Review of Symbolic Logic* no. 5:1-25.
"Ground is the relation of one truth holding in virtue of others. This relation is like that of consequence in that a necessary connection must hold between the relata if the

relation is to obtain but it differs from consequence in so far as it required that there should also be an explanatory connection between the relata. The grounds must account for what is grounded. Thus even though P is a consequence of P & P, P & P is not a ground for P, since it does not account for the truth of P.
It is the aim of this paper to develop a semantics and proof theory for the pure logic of ground. The pure logic of ground stands to ground as Gentzen's structural rules stand to consequence. One prescinds from the internal structure of the propositions under consideration and simply asks what follows from what in virtue of the formal features of the underlying relation. Thus the claim that ground is transitive, that if P is a ground for Q and Q a ground for R then P should be a ground for R, is plausibly regarded as part of the pure logic of ground; but the claim that P is a ground for P & P will be part of the applied as opposed to the pure logic of ground, since it turns on the logical properties of &." (p. 1)

7. ———. 2012. "Mathematics: Discovery or Invention." *Think* no. 11:11-27.
Abstract: "Mathematics has been the most successful and is the most mature of the sciences. Its first great master work – Euclid's 'Elements' – which helped to establish the field and demonstrate the power of its methods, was written about 2400 years ago; and it served as a standard text in the mathematics curriculum well into the twentieth century. By contrast, the first comparable master work of physics – Newton's *Principia* – was written 300 odd years ago. And the juvenile science of biology only got its first master work – Darwin's 'On the Origin of Species' – a mere 150 years ago. The development of the subject has also been extraordinarily fertile, particularly in the last three centuries, and it is perhaps only in the last century that the other sciences have begun to approach mathematics in the steady accumulation of knowledge that it has been able to offer. There has, moreover, been almost universal agreement on its methods and how they are to be applied. What we require is proof; and, in practice, there is very little disagreement over whether or not we have it. The other

sciences, by contrast, tend to get mired in controversy over the significance of this or that experimental finding or over whether one theory is to be preferred to another."

8. ———. 2013. "A Note on Partial Content." *Analysis* no. 73:413-419.
"Some philosophers have looked for a notion of partial content for which the content of A is in general part of the content of A & B but the content of A v B is not in general part of the content of A. (1) But they have realized that these two requirements are in tension with one another. For A is logically equivalent to (A _ B) & A and so, if the content of (A _ B) is part of the content of (A v B) & A, it should also be part of the content of A.
There is a related difficulty for allied notions. Thus, one might want A & B to be partially true via A being true though not want A to be partially true via A v B being true (since A v B might be true through B being true, which has nothing to do with A). Or one might want A & B to have at least much truth in it as A even though A does not in general have at least much truth in it as A v B. Or one might want A to confirm A & B but not want A v B to confirm A (since A v B might in its turn be confirmed by B).
In this note, I show that this difficulty is of a quite general nature and does not simply arise from the desire to have the content of A be part of the content of A & B but not have the content of A v B be part of the content of A." (p. 413)
(1) As in Angell 1977, Gemes 1994 and Yablo 2013, for example.
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9. ———. 2013. "Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 87:725-732.
Comments on Siders' 'Writing the Book

of the World' [*]
"Ted Sider's 'Writing the Book of the World' is a bold and ambitious work, offering original and provocative answers to a wide range of questions within metaphysics and meta-metaphysics. The book is focused on the topic of fundamentality—of what is fundamental and of what it is to be fundamental and, although Sider is largely concerned to develop his own positive views on the topic, he does devote a couple of sections (§§8.1-2) to my views, as laid out in the paper, 'The Question of Realism'. (1) I hope I may therefore be forgiven for devoting my attention to some of the more critical points that he makes in these sections." (p. 725)
[*] New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
(1) Imprint, vol. 1, no. 1, 2001, reprinted in ' *Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Philosophy* ' (ed. A. Bottani, M Carrara, P. Giaretta), Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002, 3-41.

10. ———. 2014. "Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 43:549-577.
Abstract "I propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke. The new semantics shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world."
"I wish to propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is in some ways a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (as expounded in [8], for example) and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke [6]. The new semantics is of some philosophical interest, because it shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world. The new semantics is also of some technical interest; it gives rise to a framework, intermediate

between the frameworks of the two other approaches, within which several novel questions and approaches may be pursued.
I begin with a philosophical discussion and conclude with a long technical appendix. In principle, the two can be read independently of one another but it is preferable if the reader first gains a formal and informal understanding of the semantics and then goes back and forth between the philosophical and technical exposition. (1)" (pp. 549-550)
(1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on truthmakers in Paris, 2011, and at a conference on the philosophy of mathematics in Bucharest, 2012. I should like to thank the participants of these two conferences for helpful comments and also an anonymous referee for the journal. After completing the paper, I learned that Ciardelli's thesis [1] on inquisitive logic contains some related work.
In particular, the system HH of the appendix is similar to the system for inquisitive logic while lemma 22 corresponds to the disjunctive-negative normal form theorem for inquisitive logic. It would be worthwhile to explore the connections between the two approaches in more detail. I should like to thank Ivano Ciardelli for bringing his thesis to my attention and for helpful correspondence.
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8. Troelstra, A., & van Dalen, D. (1988). *'Constructivism in mathematics' (volumes 1 & 2)* . Amsterdam: North Holland.
11. ———. 2014. "A New Theory of Vagueness (Abstract)." In *Formal Ontology in Information Systems* , edited by Garbacz, Pawel and Kutz, Oliver, 4. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
"I propose a new theory of vagueness. It differs from previous theories in two main respects. First, it treats vagueness as a global rather than local phenomenon, i.e.

vagueness always relates to a number of cases rather than a single case. Second, it treats vagueness as a logical rather than a material matter, i.e. vagueness can be expressed by logical means alone without the help of additional vagueness-theoretic primitives. I shall criticize alternative views, develop a logic and semantics for my own view, and explain how it deals with the sorites."

12. ———. 2014. "Recurrence: A Rejoinder." *Philosophical Studies* no. 169:425-428.
"I am grateful to Nathan Salmon (in Salmon [2012]) for being willing to spill so much ink over my monograph on semantic relationism [2007], even if what he has to say is not altogether complimentary. There is a great deal in his criticisms to which I take exception but I wish to focus on one point, what he calls my 'formal disproof' of standard Millianism. He believes that 'the alleged hard result is nearly demonstrably false' (p. 420) and that the disproof contains a 'serious error' (p. 407). Neither claim is correct; and it is the aim of this short note to explain why." (p. 425)
References
Fine K., [2007] ' *Semantic Relationism* ', Oxford: Blackwell
Salmon N., [2012] 'Recurrence', *Philosophical Studies* 159, 407- 411.

13. ———. 2014. "Permission and Possible Worlds." *Dialectica* no. 68:317-336.
"It is often taken for granted, by philosophers and linguists alike, that one can give an account of the truth-conditions of statements of permission in terms of possible worlds, that it will be permissible to see to it that p just in case p is true in some permissible or 'deontically accessible' world. In this paper, I shall argue that if statements of permission are to serve their purpose as a guide to action then no possible worlds account of their truth-conditions can possibly be correct. In a previous paper, I presented a simple argument against the possible worlds account of counterfactuals (The author [2012a], p. 45); and the present paper arose from my seeing that a similar form of argument applied with even greater force against the possible worlds account of statements of permission.

The objection may be briefly and loosely stated as follows. Suppose God has placed infinitely many apples a1, a2, a3, ... in Alternative Eden and tells Eve (for some reason, this is not mentioned in the Bible) :
You may eat infinitely many of the apples a1, a2, a3, ...
What then is Eve permitted to do?
She might initially have thought that she is permitted to eat all of the apples, say, or all but one, or every other apple, and so on. But whatever her other failings, she is not lacking in logical acumen. She realizes that eating infinitely many of the apples a1, a2, a3, ... is logically equivalent to eating infinitely many of the apples a0, a1, a2, a3,..., where a0 happens to be the apple from the Tree of Knowledge in Original Eden and so, she reasons, if the truth of permission claims is preserved under the substitution of logical equivalents, as it should be under a possible worlds account, then God might just as well have said:
You may eat infinitely many of the applies a0, a1, a2, a3, ...
But if God has said this she would have been permitted to eat the Forbidden Fruit in combination with an infinite selection of the other apples; and so she goes ahead and eats the Forbidden Fruit.
Yet clearly, there is nothing in God's initial statement of permission that actually justifies Eve in eating the Forbidden Fruit, as she soon discovers to her dismay." (pp. 317-318)
References
Fine, Kit 2012a. "Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds", *Journal of Philosophy* 109, 221-246.

14. ———. 2015. "Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground." *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* no. 1:296-315.
"There are, I believe, two different kinds of explanation or determination to be found in metaphysics - one of identity, or of what something is, and the other of truth, or of why something is so. One may explain what singleton Socrates is, for example, by saying that it is the set whose sole member is Socrates and one may explain why, or that in virtue of which, singleton Socrates exists by appeal to the

existence of Socrates. One might talk, in connection with the first, of essence, of what singleton Socrates essentially is and, in connection with the second, of ground, of what grounds the existence of singleton Socrates. (1)
Of course, explanations of identity and of truth also occur outside of metaphysics, but what is characteristic of their occurrence within metaphysics is the especially tight connection between explanandum and explanans. Being a set whose sole member is Socrates is somehow constitutive of what Socrates is; and Socrates' existing is somehow constitutive of the existence of singleton Socrates. It is perhaps hard to say in general what constitutes a constitutive explanation but it is at least required, in any case of a constitutive explanation, that there should be metaphysically necessary connection between explanandum and explanans. Given that singleton Socrates is essentially a set whose sole member is Socrates, then it is metaphysically necessary that the set is one whose sole member is Socrates; and given that Socrates existence grounds the existence of singleton Socrates, it will be metaphysically necessary if Socrates exists that his singleton exists." (p. 296)
(...)
"My present view is that the relationship between the two kinds of explanation is much closer than I had originally taken it to be. The decisive step towards achieving the desired rapprochement is to see both kinds of explanation as having a generic, as well as a specific, bearing on the objects with which they deal; they must be allowed to have application to an arbitrary individual of a given kind and not just to specific individuals of that kind. Once this step is taken, the initial disparities between essence and ground disappear and we are able to provide a unified and uniform account of the two notions. I had previously referred to essence and ground as the pillars upon which the edifice of metaphysics rests (Fine [2012], p. 80], but we can now see more clearly how the two notions complement one another in providing support for the very same structure." (p. 297)
(1) I should like to thank the members of audiences at Birmingham, Oxford and Oslo for many helpful comments.

The present paper is a companion to my paper 'Identity Criteria and Ground' and the reader may find it helpful, if not essential, to have the other paper at hand. I should note that Correia [2014] attempts to provide unified foundations, of a very different sort, in terms of an underlying notion of factual identity.

There has been a growing literature on essence and ground in the recent philosophical literature. My own work on essence dates back to Fine [1994]; and a useful reference on ground is the anthology of Correia & Schnieder [2012].

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Fine K., [1994] 'Essence and Modality', in *Philosophical Perspectives* 8 (ed. J. Tomberlin) as the Nous Casteneda Memorial Lecture, pp. 1-16, (1994); reprinted in ' *The Philosopher's Annual'* for 1994, volume 16, (ed. P. Grim), Stanford: CSLI; and reprinted in ' *Metaphysics: An Anthology* ' (2nd edition), eds. J. Kim, D. Korman, E. Sosa, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (2011).

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Fine K., [2014] 'Identity Criteria and Ground', to appear in *Philosophical Studies* . [vol. 173, 2016, pp. 1-19]

15. ———. 2016. "Angellic Content." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 45:199-226.

"In a number of publications dating from 1977, Angell developed various systems of analytic entailment. The intended interpretation of a statement A → B of analytic entailment is that the content of B should be part of the content of A, and a guiding principle behind the understanding of partial content is that the content of A and of B should each be part of the content of A ∧ B but that the content of A ∨ B should not in general be part of the content

of either A or B. Thus partial content cannot be understood as classical consequence or even as relevant consequence under its more usual interpretation.
Quite independently of Angell's work, I had attempted to develop a semantics for partial content in terms of truthmakers. It was taken to be an intuitive requirement on a truthmaker, or verifier, for a given statement that the verifier should be relevant to the truth of the statement and I had thought that one might take the analytic entailment A → B to hold if every verifier for A contained a verifier for B and if every verifier for B was contained in a verifier for A. I was naturally interested in the resulting logic of entailment.
Much to my surprise, I discovered that the resulting logic coincided with the first degree fragment of Angell's system. Under the proposed account of partial content, his system exactly captures the logic of partial content, once the content of a statement is identified with a suitable set of verifiers."
(...)
"The paper has 10 sections in all. I detail the systems of analytic entailment to be considered (§1). I provide an outline of the truthmaker semantics (§2), give a definition of containment as a relation between contents (§3), and relate containment to the notion of subject-matter (§4). I establish soundness (§5) and then establish completeness by means of disjunctive normal forms (§§6-7). I consider two alternative semantics for the system, one in terms of falsifiers as well as verifiers (§8), and the other in terms of a many-valued logic (§9). I conclude by briefly considering some of the ways in which the system might be extended (§10)."
References
Angell R. B., [1977] 'Three Systems of First Degree Entailment', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* , v. 47, p. 147.
Angell R. B. [1989] 'Deducibility, Entailment and Analytic Containment', chapter 8 of Norman and Sylvan [1989], pp. 119 - 144.
Angell R. B. [2002] *A-Logic* , University Press of America.

Norman J., Sylvan R. (eds) [1989] ‘ *Directions in Relevant Logic* ’, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

16. ———. 2016. "Identity Criteria and Ground." *Philosophical Studies* no. 173:1-19.
"Philosophers often look for criteria of identity or think they are not to be found. They may ask for a criterion of identity for sets, for example, or for propositions, or for persons across time, or for individuals across possible worlds. And in response to such requests, they have said such things as: a criterion of identity for sets is their having the same members; or a criterion of identity for persons across time is their psychological continuity. (1)
But what are these philosophers asking for when they ask for such criteria? I shall argue that the usual way of construing these questions is seriously misguided. I shall also propose an alternative - and, I hope, preferable - way of construing these questions and shall briefly indicate its significance for our more general understanding of metaphysical explanation. In what follows, I shall often use the criteria of identity for sets and for persons as examples. But it is important to bear in mind that they are just that, examples, and that the points I make concerning them are meant to apply, across the board, to all identity criteria." (p. 1)
(1) 1I should like to thank Ted Sider, Fatema Amijee and Martin Glazier for their very helpful written comments and members of the audiences at Austin, Birmingham, CUNY, Oberlin, Oxford and Oslo for many helpful oral comments.
17. ———. 2016. "Williamson on Fine on Prior on the reduction of Possibilist Discourse." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 46:548-570.
"Timothy Williamson’s *Modal Logic as Metaphysics* (2013; MLM) is a tour de force — comprehensive in its scope, brilliant in its argumentation, and startling in its conclusions. It merits discussion on a wide range of different fronts, but I hope I can be forgiven for focusing on chapter 7 of the book, in which Williamson criticizes my attempt to carry out Prior’s project of reducing possibilist discourse to actualist discourse.

My response is in three main parts. I begin by discussing what the reductive project should be. Williamson and I disagree on this question and, although it is not important for the evaluation of my own reductive proposal, it is important for a broader understanding of the metaphysical issues at stake. I then discuss and evaluate Williamson's criticisms of my original reductive proposal. Although I believe that these criticisms can to some extent be met, they point to the need for a more satisfactory and less contentious form of reduction. Finally, I lay out the new proposed reduction; it is based on the idea of finding a general way of extending a reduction of first-order discourse to higher order discourse." (p. 548)

18. ———. 2017. "The Possibility of Vagueness." *Synthese* no. 194:3699-3725.
"I wish in this paper to propose a new approach to the topic of vagueness. It is different from the supervaluational approach, which I had previously advocated in Fine (1975), and from almost all other approaches in the literature of which I am aware.(1) There are two principal respects in which it differs from previous approaches: one concerns the global character of vagueness, of how vagueness relates to a whole range of cases and not merely to a single case; the other concerns the logical character of vagueness, of how it is capable of being conveyed by logical means alone. And so let me say a little more about these two features of the view before proceeding to the account itself." (p. 3699)
(1) The one exception appears to be Zardini (2014), although his view appears to be very different from mine in a number of fundamental respects.
References
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. *Synthese* 30, 265–300. Reprinted in Keefe & Smith (eds.). (1996). *Vagueness: A reader*. Boston: MIT University Press.
Zardini E. (2014). First-order tolerant logics. *Review of Symbolic Logic* (forthcoming).

19. ———. 2017. "A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 46:625-674.

Abstract: "I develop a basic theory of content within the framework of truthmaker semantics and, in the second part, consider some of the applications to subject matter, common content, logical subtraction and ground."
"The paper is in two parts - the present part dealing with the familiar concepts of conjunction, disjunction and negation and the subsequent part dealing with the less familiar concepts of subject-matter, common content, logical remainder and ground.
We shall provide an account of the quasi-structural notions of conjunctive and disjunctive part in the present part, but it is only in the second part that the approach will come into its own and its distinctive contribution to the theory of content become most apparent. Each of the two parts begins with an informal exposition of the material and concludes with a technical addendum. In principle, the exposition and addendum could be read independently of the other, though the reader may find it helpful to go back and forth between them." (p. 626)

20. ———. 2017. "A Theory of Truthmaker Content II: Subject-matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 46:675-702.
"We continue with the development of the theory of truthmaker content begun in part I, dealing with such 'non-standard' topics as subject matter, common content, logical remainder and ground. This is by no means an exhaustive list of topics that might have been considered but it does provide an indication of the nature and scope of the theory. As before, the paper is divided into an informal exposition and a technical addendum. Both can be read independently of the other but it would be helpful, in either case, to have the first part of the paper at hand." (p. 675)
21. ———. 2017. "Naive Metaphysiscs." *Philosophical Issues. A Supplement to NOÛS* no. 27:98-113.
"Metaphysics has two central concerns. One is with the nature of things, with what they are like; and the other is with reality, with what there is.
(...)

We therefore arrive at a traditional distinction within metaphysics between *ontology* , which is concerned with what there is, and what one might call *metaphysics proper* , which is concerned with the nature of what there is.(2) I wish, in this paper, to argue that this traditional division in the subject-matter of metaphysics is misguided and the connection between its two branches misconceived and that it should be replaced by a different division of the subject matter — into what I call *naive* and *foundational metaphysics* — and by a different conception of how the two branches are related. If I am right, then a good deal of metaphysical enquiry has labored under a false or unduly limited view of what the questions of metaphysics are and of how they are to be answered and it is only by reconfiguring the metaphysical landscape that we can obtain a proper view of how the subject should be pursued." (p. 98)
(2) I have in mind here a recent tradition within analytic philosophy, perhaps derived from Quine, and not the more historical tradition deriving from Aristotle.

22. ———. 2017. "Truthmaker Semantics." In *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Second Edition. Vol. II* , edited by Hale, Bob, Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander, 556-577. Malden: Wiley Blackwell.
"My aim in the present chapter is to explain the basic framework of truthmaker or 'exact' semantics, an approach to semantics that has recently received a growing amount of interest, and then to discuss a number of different applications within philosophy and linguistics." (p. 556)
23. ———. 2017. "Form." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 114:509-535.
"This paper is a belated sequel to my paper on Cantorian abstraction.(1) In that paper, I attempted to defend Cantor's account of cardinal numbers as sets of units, using a theory of arbitrary objects that I had previously developed to explain what the units were.(2) Of course, no one now adopts Cantor's own account of cardinal number, preferring instead von Neumann's elegant treatment of cardinal numbers as initial ordinals; this may have led some readers —or potential readers—of my earlier paper to dismiss it as

being of purely scholarly interest. But as I had already mentioned in the paper on Cantorian abstraction, “the Cantorian theory can be extended to provide a more general theory of types—covering not merely the abstract formal types of mathematics but also the more concrete types of ordinary and scientific discourse” [p. 602]; in the present paper, I wish to consider the extension of the account to these other kinds of types (or what I now also wish to call *forms*)." (p. 509)
(1) Kit Fine, “Cantorian Abstraction: A Reconstruction and Defense,” this journal, xcv, 12 (December 1998): 599–634.
(2) Kit Fine, *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

24. ———. 2018. "Compliance and Command I, Categorical imperative." *The Review of Symbolic Logic* :1-25.
"The main aim of this series of papers is to develop a truthmaker semantics for the logic of imperative and deontic sentences. The first part deals with categorical imperative sentences, the second with deontic sentences and their interplay with categorical imperative sentences, and the third part with the interplay between indicative, imperative and deontic sentences and with conditional imperative and deontic sentences in particular. It would be helpful, though not strictly necessary, to have some standard exposition of truthmaker semantics at hand (such as Fine [2015]). I have for the most part been content with informal exposition but the reader may consult the appendix for some technical detail." (p. 1)
References
Fine K. [2015] ‘Angellic Content’, to appear in *Journal of Philosophical Logic* , I-28 (2015).

25. ———. 2018. "Compliance and Command II, Imperatives and deontics." *The Review of Symbolic Logic* :1-25.
"In this part of the paper, I am interested in providing a semantics and logic for deontic sentences and working out their connection with the previous semantics and logic for imperatives.
(...)

The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin by making some distinctions and stipulations which will be useful in the rest of the paper (§1); I introduce and explain the key notion of a code of conduct, relative to which deontic formulas are to be be interpreted (§2); I give the clauses for when a deontic formula is true or false relative to a code of conduct (§3) and spell out some of the consequences of these clauses, especially in regard to the contrast with the standard possible worlds semantics for deontic logic (§4); I consider various ways of reformulating the criterion of validity for deontic formulas and point, in particular, to a very close connection between this criterion and the criterion of validity for imperative inference proposed in part I (§5); I consider some of the characteristic inferences that are or fail to be valid (§6) and outline a system of deontic logic within the truthmaker approach (§7); I show how one might deal with the problem of deontic updating within the truthmaker framework (§8); and I conclude with a brief formal appendix.

I assume the reader is familiar with the basic material from part I, including the truthmaker semantics for imperatives and the definition of validity for imperative inference; and it would also be helpful for her to have some knowledge of the standard possible worlds semantics for deontic logic." (p. 1)

26. ———. 2018. "The World of Truthmakers." In *Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale* , edited by Fred-Rivera, Ivette and Leech, Jessica, 36-59. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"It is a common idea that the full resources of possible worlds semantics are not required to provide an intensional semantics for classical logic. For these purposes, one need only appeal to partial possibilities, or what I shall call ‘states’, as long as one is willing to modify the usual clauses for the connectives or the definition of validity or perhaps both.

Humberstone (1981), Hale (2013), Rumfitt (2015), and Holliday (2015) are among those who have attempted to develop a semantics of this sort; and manifestations of the same idea are to be found within situation semantics and in

the more recent work on inquisitive semantics. It is an approach to semantics to which I myself have been attracted, both in earlier unpublished work and in some recent work on 'exact' truthmaking; and, indeed, it was from the attempt to relate 'exact' truth-maker semantics to the other semantical approaches that the present work arose." (p. 36, notes omitted)

References

Hale, B. (2013) *Necessary Beings: An Essay on Modality and Ontology and the Relations between Them* , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Holliday, W. (2015) 'Possibility Frames and Forcing for Modal Logic', Working paper series at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5462j5b6.

Humberstone, L. (1981) 'From Worlds to Possibilities', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 10, 313–39.

Rumfitt, I. (2015) 'The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic', Oxford: Oxford University Press.

27. ———. 2018. "Ignorance of Ignorance." *Synthese* no. 19:4031-4045.
Abstract: "I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible."
28. ———. 2019. "Verisimilitude and Truthmaking." *Erkenntnis* no. 86:1239-1276.
Abstract: "I provide and defend a hyper-intensional account of verisimilitude within the truthmaker framework."
"The main aim of this paper is to apply the recently developed framework of truthmaker semantics to the problem of verisimilitude, or likeness to the truth. Some important initial steps in this direction were taken by Gemes (2007); and some further steps have been taken by Yablo (2014, §6.7). My own thinking on the topic is somewhat different from theirs, however, both in its general conception of truthmaker semantics and in the specific application of the semantics to the concept of verisimilitude; and my hope is that these various accounts, when taken

together, will go some way towards demonstrating the general fruitfulness of the approach." (p. 1239, a note omitted)

References

Gemes, K. (2007). Verisimilitude and content. Synthese, 154(2), 293–306.

Yablo, S. (2014). *Aboutness* . New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

29. Fine, Kit, and Jago, Mark. 2019. "Logic for Exact Entailment." *The Review of Symbolic Logic* no. 12:536-556.
    Abstract: "An *exact truthmaker* for *A* is a state which, as well as guaranteeing *A* 's truth, is wholly relevant to it. States with parts irrelevant to whether *A* is true do not count as exact truthmakers for *A* .
    Giving semantics in this way produces a very unusual consequence relation, on which conjunctions do not entail their conjuncts. This feature makes the resulting logic highly unusual. In this paper, we set out formal semantics for exact truthmaking and characterise the resulting notion of entailment, showing that it is compact and decidable. We then investigate the effect of various restrictions on the semantics. We also formulate a sequent-style proof system for exact entailment and give soundness and completeness results."
30. Fine, Kit. 2020. "The Identity of Social Groups." *Metaphysics* no. 3:81-91.
    "I am of the opinion, along with a number of other philosophers, that social groups and organizations are of the same general nature as material things: the differences, insofar as they exist, are intra- rather than extra-categorical. Thus if we wish to understand what it is to be a member of a group, or to understand how a group can change its members while remaining the same, or to understand how two groups can have the very same members, then the answers we should give will be essentially the same as the answers we should give to the questions as to what it is to be a constituent of a material thing, or how a material thing can change its constitution over time, or how two material things can have the very same material constitution.

I have attempted to answer these questions in the case of material things in an earlier paper (Fine 1999). My view, roughly speaking, is that there are three basic operations by which material things may be formed from some underlying matter. One of these is the familiar operation of compounding or fusion, whereby two or more things may combine to form a sum. The other two operations are less familiar and their admission constitutes a fundamental departure from standard mereological doctrine. I call them rigid and variable embodiment. Rigid embodiment is an operation whereby various objects are combined into a whole whose component parts bear certain properties or stand in certain relations to one another. Thus the component parts are not merely fused but integrated into some kind of structured whole. Variable embodiment, on the other hand, is an operation whereby we may form an object that is manifested as different, more particular, objects at different times or in different counterfactual circumstances. The one operation accounts for the constitution of the object at a time, while the other accounts for the actual or possible changes in its constitution." (p. 81, notes omitted)

31. ———. 2020. "Semantics." In *The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding* , edited by Raven, Michael J., 501-509. New York: Routledge.
"It has often been supposed that there need only be a modal connection between a truth-maker and the sentence it makes true or that the truth-maker need only be partially relevant to the sentence it makes true, so that the fact that it is raining and windy, for example, would then be a truth-maker for the sentence 'it is raining or snowing'. It is therefore important to note that the notion of ground gives rise to a quite distinctive notion of truth-making, which requires not merely a modal connection but also a very strong relevant connection.
Truth-making has been used for two quite distinct ends, one metaphysical and the other semantical. By attempting to discern the truth-makers of sentences, it has been thought that we might achieve a better understanding of the world

via an understanding of *what* makes the sentences true and also that we might achieve a better understanding of language via an understanding of *how* the sentences are made true." (p. 502, note omitted)

32. ———. 2020. "Yablo on subject-matter." *Philosophical Studies* no. 177:129-171.
Abstract: "I discuss Yablo's approach to truthmaker semantics and compare it with my own, with special focus on the idea of a proposition being true of or being restricted to some subject-matter, the idea of propositional containment, and the development of an 'incremental' semantics for the conditional. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between truth-maker approach and the standard possible worlds approach to semantics."
References
Yablo, S. (2014). *Aboutness* . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Yablo, S. (2016). Ifs, ands, and buts: An incremental truthmaker semantics for indicative conditionals. *Analytic Philosophy* , 57(1), 175–213.
Yablo, S. (2018). Reply to Fine on aboutness. *Philosophical Studies* , 175(6), 1495–1512.

33. ———. 2020. "Indeterminate Identity, Personal Identity and Fission." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 141-163. New York: Oxford University Press.
"I have recently developed a new approach to vagueness and, in this chapter, I wish to show how this approach applies to ontic indeterminacy—or vagueness in the world. Although the supervaluational approach, which I previously endorsed in Fine (1975), is often associated with a representational conception of indeterminacy—vagueness in language or in thought, it is worth noting that I have always been sympathetic to the idea of ontic indeterminacy. Thus in footnote 10 of the earlier paper, I write "Philosophers have been unduly dismissive over intrinsically vague entities." I am therefore especially pleased that the present approach is not only able to rehabilitate the ontic conception of indeterminacy but to rehabilitate it in such a way as to make

it continuous with the more usual representational conception of indeterminacy.(1)" (p. 141)
(1) For recent discussion of the general topic, the reader might like to consult the collection of essays in Akiba and Abasnezhad (2014).
References
Akiba, K. and Abasnezhad A. (2014) “Vague Objects and Vague Identity,” Springer.
Fine, K. (1975) “Vagueness, Truth and Logic,” Synthese 30 (April–May 1975): 265-300; reprinted in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. Keefe and Smith, 1997.

34. ———. 2020. "Introduction." In *Essence and Existence: Selected Essays by Bob Hale* , edited by Leech, Jessica, 1-8. New York: Oxford University Press.
"It is, of course, impossible in a brief introduction to do justice to the full range of his work.What I would like to do instead is to discuss the two papers in the volume that are on truthmaking—chapter 6 on truthmakers for universal statements and chapter 7 on truthmakers for modal statements—which continue a line of work he began in chapter 10 of Hale (2013a). Bob’s treatment of this topic is tentative and exploratory in character yet well worthy, in my opinion, of further study; and, even though the topic is one of many that I might have profitably discussed, I hope my discussion of it will help bring out the extraordinary combination of flair and level-headedness that runs through everything he writes." (p. 1)
References
Chapter 6. *What Makes True Universal Statements True?* , pp. 104-123. (originally published as Bob Hale, ‘What makes true universal statements true?’ in: *The Logica Yearbook 2017* , edited by Pavel Arazim and Tomáš
Lávička, published by College Publications, 2018).
Chapter 7. *Exact Truthmakers, Modality, and Essence* , pp. 124-140. (first edition in thiv volume).
Hale, Bob. 2013a. *Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations between them* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

35. ———. 2020. "Critical notice of The Metaphysics and Mathematics of Arbitrary Objects, by Leon Horsten." *Mind* . First online.
36. ———. 2020. "Comments on Fred Kroon and Jonathan McKeown-Green's "Ontology: What's the (Real) Question?"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 397-402. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Kroon and McKeown-Green's (K/M) chapter is a careful and thoughtful discussion of my views on a number of issues concerning the nature of ontology. These include: the connection between what I say on the topic in three different, though related, papers—"What is Metaphysics?" (WM), "The Question of Ontology" (QO), and "The Question of Realism" (QR); my objection that standard quantificational accounts are unable to do justice to full ontological commitment; and the concerns I have against skeptical forms of anti-realism which run counter to received nonphilosophical opinion. In what follows, I shall, for reasons of space, focus on the first two of these issues, although the third is of great interest and importance in its own right." (p. 397)
37. ———. 2020. "Comment's on Philip Percival's "Beyond Reality?"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 403-411. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Percival is interested in what Kierland and Monton (2007: 487) call the "Reality Principle":
(RP) Reality consists, and only consists, in things and how things are.
He is interested in two different ways in which the all-encompassing conception of reality suggested by this principle may be challenged. We may, on the one hand, wish to restrict reality to only some of the things or to only some of the ways in which things are. This is how my reality predicate from QO and my reality operator from QR work; they effect a division within things or within how things are. We may, on the other hand, wish to allow for something beyond the things or how things are and hence beyond

reality itself if reality only consists in things and how things are. Percival considers a number of different ways in which each of these two restrictive conceptions of reality might play out and he considers a striking application of the second conception to the case of time: for under a certain restrictive version of presentism, one may wish to claim both that reality consists in present things or how things presently are and that the past is somehow beyond reality as so conceived.

In what follows, I shall simply focus on the application of the second restrictive conception of reality to the case of time, since I think the framework suggested by my RT and TR may help in providing a proper formulation of the view." (p. 403)

References

Kierland, B. and Monton, B. (2007) “Presentism and the Objection from Being-Supervenience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(3): 485-97.

Sigla

QO = Question of Ontology
QR = Question of Realism
RT = The Reality of Tense
TR = Tense and Reality (Chapter 8 of *Modality and Tense*)

38. ———. 2020. "Comments on Joseph Almog’s “One Absolutely Infinite Universe to Rule Them All: Reverse Reflection, Reverse Metaphysics”." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 412-417. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Joseph Almog’s chapter is a daring and dazzling investigation into the nature of the universe, situated within the grand tradition of absolutist metaphysics, but motivated more by the comparison of the absolute with the set-theoretic universe than with God. It is impossible for me to deal adequately with the deep and difficult issues which his chapter raises and so I hope I may be forgiven if I focus on a few remarks he makes in his Appendix on “the Nature versus Concept/Essence of BO and {BO}.”

Some of my comments are relatively minor and serve simply to clear up possible misunderstandings of my position, but others raise substantive and neglected issues concerning the possible “absolutist” source of necessary truth." (p. 412)

39. ———. 2020. "Comments on Alasdair Urquhart’s “Fine on Arbitrary Objects”." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 418-422. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Alasdair Urquhart’s chapter is a wonderful mix of observations on the theory of arbitrary objects, ranging over a number of historical, logical, and philosophical aspects of the theory. I was especially interested in what he had to say about the evolving conception of variables in the history of mathematics and, in the light of my own previous somewhat casual remarks on the topic, I would now like to follow up on his discussion." (p. 418)
40. ———. 2020. "Comments on Gabriel Sandu’s “Indefinites, Skolem Functions, and Arbitrary Objects." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 423-428. New York: Oxford University Press.
"The main focus of my monograph *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* (Fine 1985) was on the application of arbitrary objects to systems of natural deduction. But as Sandu points out, I also thought that appeal to arbitrary objects “would be useful for the semantic analysis of both mathematical and ordinary language.” Although I spent a great deal of effort at the time in working on these further applications, I did not write up my work. I therefore hope it may be helpful if I say a little more on how I intended these applications to proceed. However, I should warn the reader that my thoughts on the topic are still somewhat tentative and underdeveloped and that I have here made no attempt to defend the position or to compare it with any of the many other competing views on the topic." (p. 423)
41. ———. 2020. "Comments on Kathrin Koslicki’s “Essence and Identity”." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 429-434. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Kathrin Koslicki's chapter is a wonderfully bold and innovative attack on the question of crossworld-identity: Quine thought Aristotelian essentialism was the problem; and she takes Aristotelian hylomorphism to be the solution." (p. 429)

42. ———. 2020. "Comments on Graeme Forbes's "Fine's New Semantics of Vagueness"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 435-443. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Graeme Forbes is well known for his advocacy of a degree-theoretic approach to vagueness, especially in application to questions of identity; and I am grateful to him for casting his expert and critical eye over my own, very different, approach." (p. 435)
43. ———. 2020. "Comments on Steven T. Kuhn's "Necessary, Transcendental, and Universal Truth"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 444-449. New York: Oxford University Press.
"I should begin with an apology. In my paper "Necessity and Non-existence" (NN), I made no reference to the importantly related work of Prior in appendix C of Prior 1957 and to the importantly related work of Steven Kuhn in his superb thesis (Kuhn 1977). The oversight was doubly unfortunate in that Prior was my mentor and Kuhn my student; and my only excuse is that, in the haste to prepare my own paper for publication, I failed to take proper heed to the previous literature, even when it was already known to me.
In NN, I attempted to argue for a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, analogous to the distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences. Kuhn is willing to accept the distinction, but he does not like my argument for the distinction and thinks that I mischaracterize the connection between the necessary and the unworldly." (p. 444)
References
Kuhn, Steven. 1977. *Many-sorted Modal Logics (Vols I and II)* . Uppsala, Sweden: Filosofiska föreningen.

Prior, Arthur. 1957. *Time and Modality* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

44. ———. 2020. "Comments on Gideon Rosen's "What is Normative Necessity?"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 450-455. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Gideon Rosen supports the central theses of "Varieties of Necessity" (VN) concerning the distinction between metaphysical and normative necessity and the proper formulation of moral supervenience; and he takes the defense of these theses much further than I did in my own paper and makes the case for them especially vivid and compelling. I was especially impressed by his attempt to find out what might lie behind the distinction between metaphysical and normative necessity and the doctrine of supervenience and to show how the resulting metaphysical view might have significant implications for the epistemology of moral belief.
In what follows, I would like to draw a further distinction and to work through some of the consequences of this distinction for various of the issues that Rosen raises. Some of the points I make in this regard may be familiar, though not the general context in which they are made." (p. 450)

45. ———. 2020. "Comments on Bob Hale's "The Problem of *de re* Modality"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 456-460. New York: Oxford University Press.
"There is a great deal in Hale's chapter which I admire and with which I agree. In particular, I would go along with him in drawing a distinction between the syntactic and semantic *de re* , in finding no reasonable basis for modality *de re* within a linguistic conception of modality, and in diagnosing where Quines's argument (or what I would call his "logical" argument) goes wrong. However, in typical philosophical fashion, I shall focus on two points of disagreement, one concerning the problem of accounting for the *de re* form of modality within the linguistic conception, and the other concerning whether Quine should be regarded as having one

or two arguments against quantifying into modal contexts." (p. 456)

46. ———. 2020. "Comments on Penelope Mackie's "Can Metaphysical Modality Be Based on Essence?"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 461-465. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Penelope Mackie's chapter raises a serious challenge to the essentialist account of modality." (p. 461)
"I would like to think that in a properly systematic account of first-order metaphysical enquiry we could simply take the notion of necessitist essence as primitive and that nothing would be thereby lost, and something even gained, by defining the other notions in terms of it in the way I have explained. But I have to admit that, for certain—perhaps quite limited—purposes, this point of view may be unduly restrictive and that we should therefore be open to there being independently given notions of neutral essence or metaphysical necessity." (p. 465)
47. ———. 2020. "Comments on Fabrice Correia's "More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 466-470. New York: Oxford University Press.
"I have long admired Fabrice Correia's work on the conceptual foundations of metaphysics and his present chapter is a characteristically judicious and original contribution to the subject.
He is principally concerned with certain reductive theses that I propounded in "Essence and Modality" (EM; 1994). These are that a metaphysical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all objects, that a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and that a logical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. Given that there are different notions of what it is for a proposition to be true in virtue of the nature of some objects, Correia's interest is in what notion or notions of this sort might underwrite these various reductive claims and, to this end, he is

prepared in principle to relinquish any other desiderata one might wish to impose upon these notions." (p. 466)

48. ———. 2020. "Comments on Jessica Wilson's "Essence and Dependence"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 471-475. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Jessica Wilson's paper is a wonderfully sympathetic account of my general approach to metaphysics; and there is a special satisfaction to be had in being, not merely understood, but understood so well.
(...)
But her paper is not all praise. For she wishes to criticize my account of ontological dependence in terms of essence - perhaps as part of a larger critique of the use of a general notion of dependence in etaphysics (§ 4). In a number of papers, I have suggested that an object x will depend upon an object y if and only y figures in the essence of x, i.e., if and only if, in giving an account of what x is, reference must be made
y. But she thinks that this equivalencemay fail in the right to left direction, that an object y may figure in the essence of x without x depending upon y (she may be perfectly happy with the left to right direction, though this is not something that she discusses)." (p. 471)

49. ———. 2020. "Comments on Scott Shalkowski's "Essence and Nominalism"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 476-481. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Scott Shalkowski and I share a distaste for the ontological extravagance of modal realism and it is a delight to read him write with such eloquence and passion on the need for "sober metaphysics."
However, there is a point on which we appear to disagree and this has to do with the formulation and defense of nominalism; and it will perhaps help to illuminate the general doctrines of QR and QO by drawing out the contrast between our different views in this particular case." (p. 476)
Sigla
QR = Question of Realism

QU = Question of Ontology

50. ———. 2020. "Comments on Robert Goldblatt's "Fine's Theorem on First-Order Complete Modal Logics"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 482-484. New York: Oxford University Press.
"I am grateful to Robert Goldblatt for his lucid and masterly chapter on "canonicity" in modal logic.
(...)
I have nothing of a technical interest to add to what Goldblatt writes, but I did think that it might be helpful to say something more about the context in which I pursued some of these early enquiries into the mathematical foundations of modal logic. There is no doubt that the Lemmon Scott notes served as a great stimulus to those of us who were working in the area. Kripke's original completeness proofs in terms of semantic tableaux were inelegant and unwieldy (as pointed out by Kaplan in his review; 1966), and the Lemmon Scott method of canonical models held out the hope of providing a simple and uniform method of proving completeness for a wide range of modal logics." (p. 482)
References
Kaplan,David (1966). "Review: Saul A. Kripke, Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Modal Propositional Calculi". In: *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 31.1, pp. 120–122.

51. ———. 2020. "Comments on Gary Ostertag's "Fine on Frege's Puzzle"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 485-490. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Gary Ostertag's chapter is an intriguing and probing investigation into the concept of coordination, or *de jure* co-reference, in which he is concerned not only to criticize the views on coordination which I presented in "Semantic Relationism" (SR) but also to develop a view of his own, one in which coordination is not a feature of what we say, but of how we say it.

There are perhaps two main points on which Ostertag takes us to disagree: one concerns whether coordination is syntactic in nature; and the other concerns whether a coordinated sentence expresses a oordinated, as opposed to an uncoordinated, proposition. However, as I read through his chapter, it was hard for me to get a firm sense of where our disagreement lay; and I was inclined to think, at the end of the day, that there was perhaps no real disagreement between us at all." (p. 485)

52. ———. 2020. "Comments on Paolo Bonardi's "Coordination, Understanding, and Semantic Requirements"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 491-495. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Paolo Bonardi has written extensively and illuminatingly on direct reference theory, and I am grateful for his present comments on the conceptual foundations of semantic relationism.
Central to the doctrine of semantic relationism is the relation of coordination.
(...)
As I mention in *Semantic Relationism* (p. 40), "other philosophers can acknowledge the phenomenon [of coordination]"; and, indeed, I think that any reasonable view should recognize the distinction between the two kinds of co-reference. What is distinctive about semantic relationism is that the phenomenon of coordination is taken to be both semantic (as opposed to syntactic) and essentially relational (as opposed to supervening on the intrinsic meanings of the individual terms)." (p. 491)

53. ———. 2020. "Comments on Friederike Moltmann's "Variable Objects and Truth-Making"." In *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 496-502. New York: Oxford University Press.
"The present paper is a characteristically rich, original and thought-provoking contribution to the subject; and I am afraid that I can do no more than pick my way through one or two of the many interesting issues that she raises.

However, any criticisms I make on this score should not be seen to detract from my broad agreement with much of what she says." (p. 496, a note omitted)

54. ———. 2021. "Constructing the Impossible." In *Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington* , edited by Walters, Lee and Hawthorne, John, 141-163. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In recent years, I have been working on a version of situation semantics - one might call it 'truthmaker semantics'—which is meant to provide an alternative to possible worlds semantics. One of the things that has struck me about this alternative semantics is how easily it is able to accommodate the impossible. Rather than being an artificial addition to the possibilist semantics, the impossible emerges as a natural —one might almost say *inevitable* — extension of the possible, in much the same way in which the system of real numbers emerges as a natural extension of the rational number system or the system of complex numbers emerges as a natural extension of the real number system. It is the aim of this paper to show how this is so; and, if I am successful, then this will constitute an argument for the admission of the impossible into semantics— something which I myself have been slow to appreciate — but also for truthmaker semantics itself as a viable and valuable alternative to the possible worlds approach.

I begin with an exposition of a standard approach to truthmaker semantics, using possible states in place of possible worlds (Section 9.1). I go on to describe a key construction, analogous to the extension of the rationals to the reals, for extending a space of possible states to one that also contains impossible states (Section 9.2). This has a number of advantages — mathematically and in theory and application — over the more usual approaches (Section 9.3-9.4). I then describe another construction, somewhat analogous to the extension of the reals to the complex numbers, which provides further resources for countenancing the impossible and further applications (Section 9.5).

I conclude with a lengthy formal appendix." (pp. 143-144)

55. ———. 2021. "Truthmaking and the is–ought gap." *Synthese* no. 198:887–914.
Abstract: "This paper is an attempt to apply the truthmaker approach, recently developed by a number of authors, to the problem of providing an adequate formulation of the is–ought gap. I begin by setting up the problem and criticizing some other accounts of how the problem should be stated; I then introduce the basic apparatus of truth-making and show how it may be extended to include both descriptive and normative truth-makers; I next consider how the gap principle should be formulated, attempting to deal as systematically as possible with the 'harmless' counter-examples; I also consider the relationship between the gap principle and various other doctrines concerning the separation between the normative and descriptive realms; and I conclude this part of the paper with some general remarks in favor of adopting the truth-maker approach over some of the alternative approaches. The paper concludes with a formal appendix, which gives precise expression to some of claims made in the previous informal part of the paper."

56. ———. 2021. "Some Remarks on the Role of Essence in Kripke's "Naming and Necessity"." *Theoria* :1-3.
First on line.
Abstract: discuss the use Kripke makes of the concept of essence in "Naming and Necessity"."
"So much has already been written about *Naming and Necessity* ; and all that I would like to do in what follows is to make a few brief remarks about the relationship between the notions of essence and de re necessity in that work. Now, it might be thought that these remarks could be very brief indeed." (p. 1)

57. ———. 2021. "Critical Notice. The Metaphysics and Mathematics of Arbitrary Objects, by Leon Horsten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019." *Mind* :1-16.
First online.
"This book is an attempt to develop a metaphysical and mathematical account of arbitrary objects. It is focused on

two main applications: structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics; and the concept of a random variable in probability theory. However, the book deals with a host of other topics along the way.
(...)
"Clearly, I cannot deal with all of these topics in a single review.(1)
But what I would like to do is to focus on certain central issues over which there is room for reasonable disagreement, even for those of us who are already willing to accept arbitrary objects." (pp. 1-2)
(1) hope to deal with some of these topics, and especially the issue of how the theory of arbitrary objects should be axiomatized, in a new introduction to the re-issue of 'Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects' (Fine (1985)), to be published by OUP.

58. Fine, Kit, Boghossian, Paul, and Peacocke, Christopher. 2021. "The Live Concert Experience: Its Nature and Value." In *Classical Music* , 7-13. Open Edition Books.
"Virgil Thomson, the composer and music critic, wrote thatwe never enjoy a recorded performance in the same way aswe enjoy a live performance (2014: 251). The same applies to live performance in the theatre and to attendance at a sports event, as opposed to seeing a performance or game on DVD or a TV recording. This difference is of great value to us. But why?" (p. 8)
References
Thomson, Virgil. 2014. "Processed Music", in *Music Chronicles 1940-1954* , ed. by T. Page (New York: Library of America, Penguin Random House), pp. 249–252.
59. Fine, Kit. 2022. "Some Remarks on Bolzano on Ground." In *Bolzano's Philosophy of Grounding: Translations and Studies* , edited by Roski, Stefan and Schnieder, Benjamin, 276-300. New York: Oxford University Press.
"When I developed my own ideas on ground in the 1990s I was oblivious to Bolzano's work on the topic in his *Theory of Science* (henceforth *WL*). It was almost a couple of decades later that I became aware of his work and I was then astonished both by its level of sophistication and by the

extent to which he had anticipated many of our contemporary concerns. Although the topic has had a long history, going all the way back to the ancients, there is little doubt in my mind that Bolzano deserves a special place as the first person to embark upon a systematic study of the topic; and I believe his contributions in this area to be as great an intellectual achievement, in their own way, as his contributions to logic or real analysis." (p. 276, a note omitted)

60. ———. 2022. "Some Remarks on Poppers' Qualitative Account of Verisimilitude." *Erkenntnis* no. 87:213-236.
Abstract: "The paper sets up a general framework for defining the notion of verisimilitude.
Popper's own account of verisimilitude is then located within this framework; and his account is defended on the grounds that it can be seen to provide a reasonable structural or Pareto criterion, rather than a substantive criterion, of verisimilitude.
Some other criteria of verisimilitude that may be located within the framework are also considered and their relative merits compared."

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Kit Fine: bibliography of the unpublished papers available on line

Unpublished papers

1. Fine, Kit. 1969. *For some Proposition and so many Possible Worlds*, University of Warwick.
   Available at: For some Proposition and so many Possible Worlds
   "In this thesis, I deal with the notions of a condition holding for some proposition and a proposition being true in a certain number of possible worlds. These notions are called propositional quantifiers and numerical modalizers respectively.
   In each chapter, I attempt to dispose of a system. A system consists of: a language; axioms and rules of inference; and an interpretation. To dispose of a system is to prove its decidability and its consistency and completeness for the given interpretation. I shall, in passing, make applications to de finability, translatability and other topics." (From the Abstract)
2. ———. 2010. "The Structure of Joint Intention (Draft)."1-50.
   Available at The Structure of Joint Intention (Draft)
   "The topics of joint intention and response dependence are not normally thought to be connected. But it is my belief that that there are problems concerning the very possibility of joint intention that can only be satisfactorily resolved by providing a response dependent account of what it is. Our having a joint intention will in part be realized by our responding to it as a joint intention.

I shall begin by outlining the problems and then consider various attempted solutions to them. None of them turns out to be satisfactory. I shall then outline a theory of response dependent concepts and show how it is able to solve the problems and provide a satisfactory account of joint attention. I conclude by briefly considering the application of the theory of response dependence to other topics in social philosophy, including the prisoners' dilemma and the concept of law.
The paper was hurriedly written and very rough. Many important topics are barely discussed and some are not even mentioned. But I hope I have said enough to make clear how a number of issues concerning joint intention can be put on a firmer footing and how a theory of response dependence can be of help in resolving them." (p. 1)

3. ———. 2012. "The Essential Glossary of Ground."1.
Available at The Essential Glossary of Ground
"ground - a philosophical foodstuff, considered by some to be the elixir of life and by others to be
a deadly poison." (p. 1)
4. ———. 2015. "Mathematics and the Method of Abstraction."1-10.
Available at Mathematics and the Method of Abstraction
Public Lecture.
"It is a familiar thought that mathematics derives from abstraction.
(...)
Abstraction may be a familiar idea but it is also vague. What exactly is abstraction?
From what do we abstract? To what do we abstract? And how do we get from the one to the other?
These are questions which have been discussed since the beginning of mathematics and philosophy. But what I want to consider is the discussion of the questions in a particular period and by a particular group of people. The period was the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. And the people in question were mathematicians who had a strong interest in foundational issues. They were not only concerned to do mathematics but also to put the

subject on a firm foundation. All of the mathematicians involved - with one or two exceptions - were German. I do not know whether or not this was accidental, though it does speak to the great contribution that German mathematicians were then making to their subject." (p. 1)

5. ———. 2015. "A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation."1-40.
Available at A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation
"The semantic content of a statement is often taken to be its truth-conditional content, as constituted by the conditions under which it is true. But there are somewhat different ways to understand what these truth-conditions are. On the clausal approach, especially associated with the name of Davidson, the truth-conditions of a statement are not entities as such but the clauses by which a truth-theory specifies when a statement is true. On the objectual approach, by contrast, the truth-conditions are objects, rather than clauses, which stand in a relation of truthmaking to the statements they make true.
Under the most familiar version of the objectual approach, the truth-conditions of a statement are taken to be possible worlds and the content of a statement may, accordingly, be identified with the set of possible worlds in which it is true. Under a somewhat less familiar version of the entity-based approach, the truth-conditions are not - or not, in general - possible worlds but possible states or situations - fact-like entities that make up a world rather than the worlds themselves; and the content of a statement may, in this case, be identified with the set of verifying states or situations in which it is true.
In this paper I pursue the last of these options. However, my understanding of what it is for a state to verify a statement is somewhat unusual. It is often supposed that verification is monotonic; if a state verifies a statement then so does any more comprehensive state. But on the account that I wish to adopt, this will not be generally true. For it is to be a general requirement on verification that a verifier should be relevant as a whole to the statement that it verifies; and in

extending a verifier with additional material, this holistic relevance of the verifier to the statement may be lost." (p. 1)

6. ———. 2015. "A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content II: Subject-matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground."1-25.
   Available at A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content II: Subject-matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground
   "We continue with the development of the theory of truth-conditional content begun in part I, dealing with such 'non-standard' topics as subject matter, common content, logical remainder and ground. This is by no means an exhaustive list of topics that might have been considered but it does provide an indication of the nature and scope of the theory. As before, the paper is divided into an informal exposition and a technical addendum. Both can be read independently of the other but it would be helpful, in either case, to have the first part at hand.
   One feature of great interest in the present account is that it deals with a number of the topics that lack an adequate treatment either within the possible worlds account or under a structural conception of propositions. The notion of common content, for example, can be readily handled within the present framework but cannot be properly handled in the other two frameworks without either introducing or deriving something like the present conception of verification. Thus we should not simply regard the present 'extensional' conception of content as a mere approximation to a structural conception but as an important conception in its own right." (p. 1)
7. ———. 2015. "The Sorites."
   Available at The Sorites
   "No treatment of vagueness is complete without an account of the sorites argument. This argument, in a familiar form, starts with the premiss that a given man (with no hairs on his head) is bald, it proceeds to the intermediate conclusion that a man with very slightly fewer hairs on his head is bald, given the assumption that a slight difference in the number of cranial hairs can make no difference to whether someone is bald, and it then proceeds, by a large number of further

steps of this sort, to the final conclusion that a man with a full head of hair is bald, which is clearly absurd." (p. 1)

8. ———. 2016. "Acts and Embodiment." In, 1-17.
   Available at Acts and Embodiment
   "I wish in this paper to consider how the theory of embodiment outlined in some of my earlier papers (Fine [1982], [1999]) [2006]) can be applied to questions concerning the identity of acts. This will involve going over some old ground. But I also hope to elaborate on what I previously said and to relate it to some of the more recent literature on the topic." (p. 1)
   References
   Fine K., [1982] "Acts, Events and Things," *Language and Ontology* Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky (1982), 97-105 as part of the proceedings of the Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium 23rd to 30th August 1981, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria).
   Fine K., [1999] "Things and Their Parts", *Mid-west Studies XXIII* (ed. French & Wettstein), 61-74.
   Fine K., [2006] 'In Defense of Three-dimensionalism', *Journal of Philosophy* , CIII.12, 699-714.
9. ———. 2017. "Mathematical Existence."1-10.
   Available at Mathematical Existence
   "Anyone who has thought about the nature of mathematics has probably been puzzled over the status of its objects. Are the objects with which mathematics deals - numbers, sets, functions and the like - created or are they discovered? Should we think of them in the manner of the stars and the planets, whose character and existence is entirely independent of our investigations and activities? Or should we think of them in the manner of the objects of fiction, whose existence and character is entirely dependent upon what their authors make of them?" (p. 1)
10. ———. 2019. "Chisholm's Puzzle and Unconditional Obligation."1-19.
    Available at Chisholm's Puzzle and Unconditional Obligation
    "In this paper, I would like to suggest a new angle on Chisholm's puzzle concerning contrary-to-duty obligations.

It differs from previous approaches in its conception of what the problem is and how it is to be solved. I shall argue that the problem is, in no small part, about unconditional, rather than conditional, obligation and that, once it is viewed in this light, we obtain a somewhat different perspective on how the puzzle might be solved." (p. 1)

11. Fine, Kit, and Martin, Errol. 2020. "Progressive Logic." In, 1-45.
    Available at Progressive Logic
    "An argument is commonly taken to be circular when the truth of its conclusion is presupposed by its premisses. But exactly what is meant by such an account is not at all clear. For there is a sense in which the truth of the conclusion of any deductively valid argument is presupposed by its premisses. Thus if there is to be a significant distinction between those valid arguments that are circular and those that are not, then some basis must be found for distinguishing between the trivial kind of presupposition and one that is more substantive." (p. 1)
12. Fine, Kit. 2021. "A Theory of Partial Truth." In.
    Available at A Theory of Partial Truth
    "I develop a theory of partial truth within the framework of truth-conditional content developed in two earlier papers (Fine [2015a] and [2015b]). It will be helpful, though not essential, to have these two other papers at hand, and especially the first, while reading the present paper. The paper should have interest both as an account of partial truth and as a partial vindication of the truth-conditional framework within which it is developed. For without something like the present framework, it is hard to see how a reasonable alternative account of partial truth might be developed. The concept of partial truth is intimately related to the concept of partial content, since we naturally suppose that a proposition is partially true when some part of it is true. The connection between the two concepts can also be put to work in the opposite direction, since we may provide a semantics for the logic of partial content by appeal to partial truth (as in §9 of Fine [2015]).

There is also a close connection with the concept of verisimilitude. For a proposition will be partially true when it has 'more truth' than a proposition that is not partially true; and the investigation of the concept of partial truth may, in fact, serve as a useful prolegomena to the investigation of the more complicated concept of verisimilitude.
(...)
I begin with an informal introduction to some of the main ideas and conclude with a formal appendix. The introduction and appendix can in principle be read in isolation from the other though they are best read together. The most extensive previous treatment of the topic that I know of is in Humbersone [2003]; and a related account of partial truth is given in §1.3 of [2014]. The major difference from Humberstone is that he stipulates the truth-tables for a logic of partial truth while I derive them from an underlying account of partial truth; and the major difference from Yablo is that I provide an account of partial truth directly in terms of truthmakers and not indirectly through the notion of partial content." (p. 1)
References
Fine K. [2014] 'Truthmaker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 43.2, pp. 549-77 (2014); reprinted in *Philosophers' Annual* for 2014.
Fine K., [2015a] 'A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content - I', to appear
Fine K., [2015b] 'A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content - II', to appear
Fine K., [2015c] 'Angellic Content', to appear
Humberstone L., [2003] 'False Though Partly True - An Experiment in Logic', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 32: 613-665.
Yablo S., [2014] ' *Aboutness* ', Princeton: Princeton University Press.

13. ———. 2021. "Quine on Essence." In, 1-11.
Available at Quine on Essence
"There are already many excellent detailed accounts of Quine's views on *de re* and *de dicto* modality, and my

principal concern in the present chapter is not to add to them or to survey the field but to point to certain general features of Quine's views which, in the fog of detail, may easily be overlooked." (p. 1, a note omitted)

14. Fine, Kit, and de Rosseet, Louis. 2021. "A Semantics for the Impure Logic of Ground."
    Avalaible at A Semantics for the Impure Logic of Ground
    "This paper establishes a sound and complete semantics for the impure logic of ground. Fine [2012a] sets out a system for the pure logic of ground, one in which the formulas between which ground-theoretic claims hold have no internal logical complexity; and it provides a sound and complete semantics for the system.
    Fine [2012b, §§6-8] sets out a system for an impure logic of ground, one that extends the rules of the original pure system with rules for the truth-functional connectives, the first-order quantiers, and λ-abstraction. However, it does not provide a semantics for this system. The present paper partly fills this lacuna by providing a sound and complete semantics for a system GG containing the truth-functional operators that is closely related to the truth-functional part of the system of [Fine, 2012b].(1)" (p. 1)
    (1) The main differences between the two systems are that we now only allow finitely many formulas to occur to the left of the ground-theoretic operator and that we have added the Irreversibility Rule, which should have been part of the original system.
    References
    K. Fine. Guide to Ground. In Benjamin Schnieder and Fabrice Correia, editors, *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality* , pages 37-80. Cambridge University Press, 2012b. reprinted online in `Philosophers Annual' for 2012 (eds. P. Grim, C. Armstrong, P. Shirre, N-H Stear).
15. Fine, Kit, and Bacon, Andrew. 2022. "The Logic of Logical Necessity." In *Saul Kripke on Modal Logic* , edited by Weiss, Yale and Padró, Romina, 1-43. Dordrecht: Springer. Volume not yet published.
    Available at The Logic of Logical Necessity

Abstract: "Prior to Kripke's seminal work on the semantics of modal logic, McKinsey offered an alternative interpretation of the necessity operator, inspired by the Bolzano-Tarski notion of logical truth. According to this interpretation, `it is necessary that A' is true just in case every sentence with the same logical form as A is true. In our paper, we investigate this interpretation of the modal operator, resolving some technical questions, and relating it to the logical interpretation of modality and some views in modal metaphysics. In particular, we present an hitherto unpublished solution to problems 41 and 42 from Friedman's *102 problems* , which uses a different method of proof from the solution presented in the paper of Tadeusz Prucnal."

References

Harvey Friedman. One hundred and two problems in mathematical logic. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* , 40(2):113-129, 1975.

Tadeusz Prucnal. On two problems of Harvey Friedman. *Studia Logica* , 38(3):247-262, 1979

Theory and History of Ontology

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Kit Fine. Annotated bibliography of the studies on His philosophy

Studies on the Philosophy of Kit Fine

1. Correia, Fabrice. 2005. *Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions* . München: Philosophia Verlag. Contents: Preface 3; Introduction 7; 1. Preamble; 13; Introductory Break 35; 2. Simple Dependence: Presentation, and Rejection of Some Accounts 39; 3. Metaphysical Grounding 53; 4. Simple Dependence: The Foundational Approach 65, 5. Some Other Notions of Existential Dependence 89; 6. A Cognate Notion: Supervenience 131; Appendix 151; Bibliography 151; List of Figures 165; List of Symbols and Notations 167; List of Named Propositions, Conditions and Rules 169; Index 171. "This is a work in analytic metaphysics. Its main purpose is to clarify a notion of central importance in metaphysics since Aristotle, to wit the notion of existential dependence. All currently available analyses of the notion are examined and then rejected, and a new account is defended. This work is the first comprehensive one on the topic. The first chapter is devoted to introducing and explaining some notions which are crucial for the central parts of the work, namely the notions of existence, necessity, (individual and plural) quantification and essence. In chapters 2 and 4 focus is made on the relation of " simple" existential dependence, the relation which holds between two objects when the first cannot exist without the other. Three accounts of simple dependence - each endorsed by some contemporary

philosophers, among them Kit Fine, E. Jonathan Lowe, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith - are presented and then rejected. A new account, inspired by suggestions by Fine and Lowe, is defended. According to that account - the " foundational" account - simple dependence is to be defined in terms of a relation called *grounding* , which is presented in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with relations belonging to the family of simple dependence, among others (i) generic dependence, (ii) various forms of temporal dependence, and (iii) supervenience, a complex dependence relation largely invoked in current debates on the philosophy of mind. It is shown that foundationalist accounts of these notions - i.e. accounts framed in terms of grounding - are superior to other existing accounts. These chapters also contain some applications of the foundational conception of dependence, in particular a characterization of substances and a formulation of the distinction between two well known conceptions of universals, the Aristotelian and the Platonician conception. The last part of the work is a technical appendix where one can find, among other things, a system for the logic of essence, which is proved to be sound and complete with respect to a possible world semantics."

"The notion of metaphysical grounding is close to a notion Fine introduces in [Fine, 2001] (§5) and which he calls ‘ground’. In Fine’s sense, the proposition that A is grounded in the propositions that B, C,... iff its being the case that A consists in nothing more than its being the case that B, C,... According to Fine, grounding propositions explain what they ground. Fine’s notion of ground is strictly stronger than metaphysical grounding: I wish to leave room for the view that the existence of a set is explained by, but does not merely consist in, the existence of its members. And it is likewise strictly stronger than logical grounding.

It is also close to Bolzano’s notion of grounding. (2) One difference is that Bolzano takes this notion to express a relation between propositions or pluralities of propositions, construed as genuine, mind-independent entities. (3) For

my part, as I previously stressed, I leave aside the question as to whether statements of ground point to propositions, facts or states of affairs. A second difference lies in that Bolzano takes it that causal connections give rise to facts of grounding: for every causal fact, a proposition describing some relevant features of the effect is grounded in a proposition describing some relevant features of the cause. (4) This presumably does not hold of metaphysical grounding. Bolzano's notion of grounding is perhaps equivalent to the "logical sum" of all qualified notions of grounding." (p. 56)
(2) [Bolzano, 1973], §§ 168-177 and §§ 198-221.
(3) §§ 19ff. and §§ 168-177.
(4) § 201.3.
References
[Bolzano, 1973] B. Bolzano. *Theory of Science,* Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
{Fine, K, 2001] K. Fine, "The Question o Realism", *Philosophers Imprint* , 1(1): 1-30.

2. Dumitru, Mircea, ed. 2020. *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* . New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; List of Contributors XI; Mircea Dumitru: Introduction: Kit Fine—A Philosopher's Philosopher 1;
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Bibliography of the Publications of Kit Fine 503;
Index 509-519.

3. Rieber, Steven. 2002. "A Defense of Indeterminism." *Acta Analytica* no. 17:75-82.
Abstract: "My goal is to defend the indeterminist approach to vagueness, according to which a borderline vague utterance is neither true nor false. Indeterminism appears to contradict bivalence and the disquotational schema for truth. I agree that indeterminism compels us to modify each of these principles. Kit Fine has defended indeterminism by claiming that ordinary ambiguous sentences are neither true nor false when one disambiguation is true and the other is false. But even if Fine is right about sentences, his point does not seem to generalize the utterances. What the indeterminist needs -- and what ordinary ambiguity does not provide -- is an ambiguous utterance where what is being said is indeterminate between two different propositions. I will show that such cases exist. These cases imply that the modifications that indeterminism makes to bivalence and the disquotational schema are required independently of indeterminism, in fact independently of vagueness."
4. Suster, Danilo. 2005. "The Modality Principle and Work-relativity of Modality." *Acta Analytica* no. 20:41-52.
"If we accept Fine's theory then modal properties, contrary to the modal principle, are not an independent guide to constitutive properties of an artwork. Rather, they depend on a prior decision on the identity of a work. Of course, all essential properties are necessary, so those modal intuitions that track the nature of the object in question still remain a guide to essentiality. But in the first part of my comment I expressed a fear that even those modal intuitions are not a reliable guide, they do not fix something objective and unique. Individual essences are murky properties and I am afraid that our appreciative engagement with a work of art cannot offer objective answers about them. My scruples could be read as scruples about contextualism in general and not directed specifically to Davies' proposal. (*)

Anyway, maybe this is the price we have to pay when we evaluate ontological proposals on the basis of their fit with a more comprehensive philosophical framework that makes sense of our artistic practice as that practice is 'codified' upon rational reflection." (p. 52)
[David Davies, *Art as Performance* , Oxford, Blackwell 2004.]

5. Sosa, David. 2010. "The Fine Line." *Analysis* no. 70:347-358.
Critical notice of Kit Fine, *Semantic Relationism* (2007).
"The purpose of Fine's book is to show how the guiding idea, the 'semantic relationism' of the title, helps with deep puzzles in philosophy of language and mind. Russell's antinomy of the variable, Frege's puzzle in both a linguistic and a cognitive version, and Kripke's puzzle about belief are said to be solved adequately only by adopting his relationism. But the book is also a defence of 'referentialism' in philosophy of language. Fine holds that the fundamental semantic relations that need to be added to the assigned intrinsic values in our overall semantic theory, especially the relation he calls 'coordination', can do much of the work of sense. A relationist referentialism 'can secure many of the advantages of the Fregean position without being committed to the existence of sense'.
In this selective review, I will not evaluate how Fine's line on these matters fares overall. There's a risk of unfairness in that, since part of any view's success can be measured only holistically, by balancing whatever disadvantages it might have with such emergent features as its unifying power and generality, and the consistency of its successes (as against its failures). Having signalled this, however, I will focus on just a few specific passages, and raise some corresponding issues and concerns." (p. 347)
6. deRosset, Louis. 2015. "Better Semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground." *Analytic Philosophy* no. 56:229-252.
Abstract: Philosophers have spilled a lot of ink over the past few years exploring the nature and significance of grounding. Kit Fine has made several seminal contributions to this discussion, including an exact treatment of the

formal features of grounding [Fine, 2012a]. He has specified a language in which grounding claims may be expressed, proposed a system of axioms which capture the relevant formal features, and offered a semantics which interprets the language. Unfortunately, the semantics Fine offers faces a number of problems. In this paper, I review the problems and offer an alternative that avoids them. I offer a semantics for the pure logic of ground that is motivated by ideas already present in the grounding literature, and for which a natural axiomatization capturing central formal features of grounding is sound and complete. I also show how the semantics I offer avoids the problems faced by Fine's semantics."

References

Kit Fine. The Pure Logic of Ground. Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(1):1–25, March 2012a.

7. Correia, Fabrice, and Rosenkranz, Sven. 2012. "Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 90:307-320.
   Abstract: "In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification is not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory in some detail and argue that it is a serious alternative to the positions identified by Fine."
8. Simons, Peter M. 2008. "Modes of Extension: Comments on Kit Fine's 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism'." In *Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics* , edited by Le Poidevin, Robin, 17-22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   "The debate between 3- and 4-dimensionalists is one of the most lively and pervasive in current metaphysics. At stake is a glittering prize: the correct metaphysical analysis of

material things and other objects commonly thought to persist in time by enduring. Since we count ourselves among such objects the outcome of the debate is of more than merely academic interest to us. Obviously the ramifications of the debate, even of the points raised by Kit Fine, go far beyond what I can discuss here, so I shall simply select some salient issues and comment on them from my own somewhat heterodox point of view." (p. 17)

9. Cook, Roy T., and Ebert, Philip. 2004. "Discussion Note: Kit Fine's *Limits of Abstraction* ." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* no. 55:791-800.
   "Kit Fine's recent *The Limits of Abstraction* , an extended version of his [1998] paper, contains four chapters. The first two deal with philosophical aspects of abstraction, while the latter two provide the formal framework for a general theory of abstraction. Here we focus on the philosophical material, and, given the depth and complexity of the material, cannot attempt even a superficial summary of the entirety of the philosophical material. Thus, we content ourselves with sketching the contents. Two particular issues will then be examined in greater detail."
10. Evnine, Simon J. 2009. "Constitution and Qua Objects in the Ontology of Music." *British Journal of Aesthetics* no. 49:203-217.
   Abstract: "Musical Platonists identify musical works with abstract sound structures but this implies that they are not created but only discovered. Jerrold Levinson adapts Platonism to allow for creation by identifying musical works with indicated sound structures. In this paper I explore the similarities between Levinson's view and Kit Fine's theory of qua objects. Fine offers the theory of qua objects as an account of constitution, as it obtains, for example, between a statue and the clay the statue is made out of. I argue that Fine's theory does not adequately characterize the constitution relation and that the problems it faces extend to Levinson's account of musical works as indicated structures. I develop an alternative theory of constitution, based on the notion of being made out of. This approach to constitution enables me to offer an account of musical

works as abstract objects that are constituted by sound structures. I argue that my account has several advantages over the Levinson/Fine approach."
References
Jerrold Levinson, ‘ What a Musical Work Is ’ , *Journal of Philosophy* , vol. 77 (1980), pp. 5 – 28.
Kit Fine, ‘ Acts, Events and Things ’ , in *Sprache und Ontologie* (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1982) (for the theory of qua objects in general)
Kit Fine, ‘ The Problem of Non-Existents. I. Internalism ’ , *Topoi,* vol. 1 (1982) pp. 97 – 140 (for its application to literary works and, as he notes in passing, to musical works as well.)

11. "The Philosophy of Kit Fine." 2007. *Dialectica. International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:3-200.
The papers in this special volume were presented at a conference entitled ‘Fine Philosophy – the Philosophy of Kit Fine’ which took place at the University of Geneva on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of July 2005.
Guest editor: Kevin Mulligan.
Contents: Kit Fine: Introduction 3; Paul Horwich: The Quest for Reality 5; Kit Fine: Response to Paul Horwich 17; Fraser MacBride: Neutral Relations Revisited 25; Kit Fine: Response to Fraser MacBride 57; Fabrice Correia: (Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality 63; Kit Fine: Response to Fabrice Correia 85; Alan Weir: Honest Toil or Sheer Magic? 89; Kit Fine: Response to Alan Weir 117; Kathrin Koslicki: Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology 127; Kit Fine: Response to Kathrin Koslicki 161; Manuel García-Carpintero: Bivalence and What Is Said 167; Kit Fine: Response to Manuel García-Carpintero 191; Bibliography of Kit Fine 195–200.
12. Correia, Fabrice. 2007. "(Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:63-84.
Abstract: "In Fine 1994, Kit Fine challenges the (widespread) view that the notion of essence is to be understood in terms of the metaphysical modalities, and he argues that it is not essence which reduces to metaphysical

modality, but rather metaphysical modality which reduces to essence.
In this paper I put forward a modal account of essence and argue that it is immune from Fine's objections. The account presupposes a non-standard, independently motivated conception of the metaphysical modalities which I dub Priorean. Arthur Prior never endorsed that very conception, but in some respects his own views on the topic are so close to it, and different from all (most?) currently accepted views, that the label 'Priorean' is perfectly appropriate."
References
Fine, K. 1994, 'Essence and Modality', *Philosophical Perspectives* 8, pp. 1–16.

13. García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2007. "Bivalence and What Is Said." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:167-190.
Abstract: "On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: 'The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme'. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T-scheme, and suggest acceptable approximations."
References
Williamson, T. 1994, *Vagueness* , London: Routledge.
Williamson, T. 1999, 'Schiffer on the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness', in: J. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives* vol. 13, *Epistemology* , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 505–517.
Wright, C. 2004, 'Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach', in J. C. Beall, *Liars and Heaps* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 84–105.

14. Horwich, Paul. 2007. "The Quest for Reality." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:5-16.
Abstract: "A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not-merely-deflationary

facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern (together with the claims provoked by it) is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards 'robust reality'. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine's attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that there is no good answer to it, that (as the 'quietists' maintain) the notion of 'robust reality' is defective and ought to be abandoned."

15. Koslicki, Kathrin. 2007. "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:127-159.
Abstract: "This paper provides a detailed examination of Kit Fine's sizeable contribution to the development of a neo-Aristotelian alternative to standard mereology; I focus especially on the theory of 'rigid' and 'variable embodiments', as defended in Fine 1999. Section 2 briefly describes the system I call 'standard mereology'. Section 3 lays out some of the main principles and consequences of Aristotle's own mereology, in order to be able to compare Fine's system with its historical precursor. Section 4 gives an exposition of Fine's theory of embodiments and goes on to isolate a number of potential concerns to which this account gives rise. In particular, I argue that (i) Fine's theory threatens to proliferate primitive sui generis relations of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be stipulatively imposed on them, relative to particular domains; (ii) given its 'superabundance' of objects, Fine's system far outstrips the (arguably) already inflated ontological commitments of standard mereology; and (iii) there is a legitimate question as to why we should consider Fine's primitive and sui generis relations of parthood and composition to be genuinely mereological at all, given their formal profile. These three objections lead me to conclude that we ought to explore other avenues that preserve the highly desirable, hylomorphic, features of Fine's mereology, while avoiding its methodological and ontological excesses."

References
Fine, K. 1999, ‘Things and Their Parts’, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23, pp. 61–74.

16. MacBride, Fraser. 2007. "Neutral Relations Revisited." *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:25-56.
Abstract: "Do non-symmetric relations apply to the objects they relate in an order? According to the standard view of relations, the difference between aRb and bRa obtaining, where R is nonsymmetric, corresponds to a difference in the order in which the non-symmetric relation R applies to a and b. Recently Kit Fine has challenged the standard view in his important paper ‘Neutral Relations’ arguing that non-symmetric relations are neutral, lacking direction or order. In this paper I argue that Fine cannot account for the application of non-symmetric relations to their relata; so far from being neutral, these relations are inherently directional."
17. Weir, Alan. 2007. "Honest Toil or Sheer Magic?" *Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy* no. 61:89-115.
Abstract: "In this article I discuss the ‘procedural postulationist’ view of mathematics advanced by Kit Fine in a recent paper [*]. I argue that he has not shown that this view provides an avenue to knowledge of mathematical truths, at least if such truths are objective truths. In particular, more needs to be said about the criteria which constrain which types of entities can be postulated. I also argue that his reliance on second-order quantification means that his background logic is not free of ontological commitment and that his doctrine of ‘creative expansion’ only makes sense from a radically anti-realist perspective." {* Fine, K. 2005, ‘Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects’, in: T. Z. Gendler and J. Hawthorne eds., *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 89–109.]
18. Hinzen, Wolfram. 2003. "Constructive versus Ontological Construals of Cantorian Ordinals." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 24:45-63.

Abstract: "In a recent paper, Kit Fine offers a reconstruction of Cantor's theory of ordinals. It avoids certain mentalistic overtones in it through both a non-standard ontology and a non-standard notion of abstraction. I argue that this reconstruction misses an essential constructive and computational content of Cantor's theory, which I in turn reconstruct using Martin-Löf's theory of types. Throughout, I emphasize Kantian themes in Cantor's epistemology, and I also argue, as against Michael Hallett's interpretation, for the need for a constructive understanding of Cantorian 'existence principles'."

19. Kuhn, Steven T. 2006. "Review of *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* , by Kit Fine." *International Philosophical Review* no. 46:492-502.
"Fine sees himself as defending two very plausible views--that the distinction between the necessary and the contingent is intelligible and that merely possible worlds are not real in the same sense as the actual world–against pervasive philosophical orthodoxies that deny them. I can't resist noting that his own theories occasionally lead him to views that seem implausible: Ordinary objects (or at least sequences of them) have logical form, abstract objects may exist contingently. A formula of the form [A if and only if the proposition expressed by A is true] may be false. "Being" should to be distinguished from existence and (as was noted above) there is a sense in which the fountain of youth exists. There are good reasons to embrace the view that reality contains contradictory facts. It is a testament to Fine's meticulous examination of the issues involved and his skill in communicating it that many of these positions seem quite plausible, and all of them far less implausible, after the book is read." (p. 502)
20. Correia, Fabrice. 2000. "Propositional Logic of Essence." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 29:295-313.
Abstract: "This paper presents a propositional version of Kit Fine's (quantified) logic for essentialist statements, provides it with a semantics, and proves the former adequate (i.e. sound and complete) with respect to the latter."

"The present paper can be considered as a companion to Kit Fine's papers 'The Logic of Essence' and 'Semantics for the Logic of Essence'. (1) In the first paper Fine presents a logical system for quantified essentialist statements, E5. (2) In the second he presents a semantics for a variant of the system, and proves this system adequate (i.e. sound and complete) with respect to that semantics. I propose here a Kripke-style semantics for E5π, a propositional counterpart of E5, and prove the adequacy of the latter with respect to the former.
There are many, more or less natural, more or less interesting, ways to extend E5π (or one of its cousins) to a system of quantified logic of essence. E5π, together with its semantics, is intended to constitute the core of subsequent, more expressive, logics of essence. So, the study of E5π per se, regardless of possible quantificational extensions, is of great interest.
Another interesting point about the present study lies in the fact that the completeness proof given here is much simpler than the one Fine gives for his quantificational system.
The reader is strongly urged to take a look at Fine's papers on the logic of essence, if only because no detailed comparison between Fine's material and mine will be offred." (p. 295)
(1) At the time I worked on the present paper only the first of Fine's papers was available to me. I became acquainted with 'Semantics for the Logic of Essence' after obtaining the results presented here.
(2) Fine aims at developing such a system in response to his own objections to the standard modal contruals of essence. See his 'Essence and Modality'.

21. Kremer, Philip. 1989. "Relevant Predication: Grammatical Characterisations." *Journal of Philosophical Logic* no. 18:349-382.
Abstract: "This paper reformulates and decides a certain conjecture in Dunn's *Relevant Predication 1: The Formal Theory* (Journal of Philosophical Logic 16, 347-381, 1987). This conjecture of Dunn's relates his object-language characterisation of a property's being relevant in a variable x

to certain grammatical characterisations of relevance, analogous to some given by Helman, in *Relevant Implication and Relevant Functions* (in *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity* , vol. 2, by Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel Belnap, and J. Michael Dunn et al.) In the course of the investigation this paper also investigates Kit Fine's semantics for quantified relevance logics, which appears in his appropriately titled *Semantics for Quantified Relevance Logic* ."

22. Mares, Edwin D., and Goldblatt, Robert. 2006. "An Alternative Semantics for Quantified Relevant Logic." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* .
Abstract: "The quantified relevant logic RQ is given a new semantics in which a formula ∀x *A* is true when there is some true proposition that implies all x-instantiations of *A* . Formulae are modelled as functions from variable-assignments to propositions, where a proposition is a set of worlds in a relevant model structure. A completeness proof is given for a basic quantificational system QR from which RQ is obtained by adding the axiom EC of 'extensional confinement': ∀x(A ∨ B) → (A ∨ ∀xB), with x not free in A. Validity of EC requires an additional model condition involving the boolean difference of propositions. A QR-model falsifying EC is constructed by forming the disjoint union of two natural arithmetical structures in which negation is interpreted by the minus operation."
"Kit Fine [10] showed that the quantified relevant logic RQ is incomplete over Routley and Meyer's relational semantics with constant domains. In its place he developed [9] an increasing domain semantics over which RQ is complete, and for which a model includes a set of frames which are related to one another by a number of relations and operators. This semantics is powerful and ingenious.
But Fine's semantics is very complicated. Since it was produced it in the mid-1980s relevant logicians have wanted to simplify it. J. Michael Dunn and Greg Restall say [7, p 83]:
[I]t must be said that while the semantic structure pins down the behaviour of RQ and related systems exactly, it is

not altogether clear whether the rich and complex structure of Fine's semantics is necessary to give a semantics for quantified relevance logics.(1)
To those of us who have seriously attempted to simplify Fine's semantics, it is becoming clear that the "rich and complex structure" is in a certain sense necessary.
The elements of the theory seem to work in concert with one another and eliminating even one operator or relation seems to make the entire structure collapse. Thus, in order to create a simpler semantics for quantified relevant logic we need to take an alternative approach.
In this paper, we take an alternative approach. (2)" (pp. 163-164)
(1) Restall also says [14, p 5]: "The groundbreaking work of [9] is formally astounding but philosophically opaque".
(2) After seventeen years of trying to modify Fine's semantics, Mares in particular is glad that an alternative has suggested itself.

23. Savitt, Steven. 2016. "Kit Fine on Tense and Reality." *Manuscrito* no. 39:75-96.
Abstract: "Kit Fine (2005, 2006) recently described and defended a novel position in the philosophy of time, fragmentalism. It is not often that a new (and even perhaps a radically new) option appears in this old field, and for that reason alone these two essays merit serious attention. I will try to present briefly but fairly some of the considerations that Fine thinks favour fragmentalism. I will also weigh the merits of fragmentalism against the view that Fine presents as its chief rival, relativism, as well as the merits of both against the view that he calls anti-realism. Along the way, we should pick up a clearer picture of fragmentalism itself."
References
Fine, K. "Tense and Reality" in his *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
_____ "The Reality of Tense," *Synthese* 150: 399-414, 2006.
24. Almog, Joseph. 2020. "One Absolutely Infinite Universe to Rule Them All. Reverse Reflection, Reverse Metaphysics."

In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 52-86. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Three questions are to guide us. They are about the three segments in the title: the nature of the universe proper, reflection (up-to and down-from) the universe and the method with which to describe the metaphysics (as opposed to constructive justification epistemology) of the universe." (p. 52, a note omitted)

25. Bonardi, Paolo. 2020. "Coordination, Understanding, and Semantic Requirements." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 360-367. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Coordination is the central notion of Kit Fine's (1007) theory of meaning called *semantic relationism* .
(...)
The present manuscript attempts to answer the following question: What is coordination between proper names? Fine proposes two characterizations of this sort of coordination, which he also labels *representing as the same:* an intuitive test; and a technical definition. On the basis of the intuitive characterization, I will maintain that coordination (viz. representing as the same) is grounded in a notion of understanding
distinct from the notion of linguistic competence. Whereas —as I will argue—we need a characterization of understanding in order to elucidate Fine's coordination, it is unclear how to provide one: three *prima facie* appealing proposals to characterize it will be examined and then dismissed as intrinsically implausible or as incompatible with Fine's relational semantics. Not even his technical characterization of coordination, involving the notion of semantic requirement, will enable us to escape the impasse. Ultimately, the problem of determining what exactly coordination between names is will remain open." (p. 360)
26. Correia, Fabrice. 2020. "More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 265-282. New York: Oxford University Press.

“Essence and Modality” has had a considerable impact on subsequent philosophical thinking about essence and modality. The paper argues that the traditional view that essence reduces to metaphysical modality is wrong. Many have found these arguments convincing and have accordingly abandoned the view. The paper also argues that the reduction goes the other way around, that is, that it is metaphysical modality which reduces to essence. Twenty years after the publication of “Essence and Modality,” Kit Fine’s reductive view has become widely recognized as one of the main contenders for a reductive account of metaphysical modality.

There are several ways in which such a reductive account can be spelled out. In Correia 2012, I raised objections against one natural way of doing so, and developed an alternative account—the “rule-based” account—which relies on a brief suggestion Fine makes in Fine 1995a. The aim of the present chapter is twofold: first, I wish to strengthen the case for the rule-based account by criticizing alternative accounts,

including some accounts based on other suggestions made by Fine, or inspired by material one can find in his work; and second, I wish to discuss certain objections to the rule-based account and suggest how they can be met." (p. 265)

References

Correia, F. 2012. “On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84: 639-53.

Fine, K. 1995a. “Senses of Essence,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), *Modality, Morality and Belief* , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–73.

27. Dumitru, Mircea. 2020. "Introduction: Kit Fine—A Philosopher’s Philosopher." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 1-9. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This book is the first edited volume on the philosophy of one of the most seminal and profound contemporary philosophers. Over the last forty-odd years, Kit Fine has been one of the most influential and original analytic

philosophers. He has made provocative and innovative contributions to several areas of systematic philosophy, including philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics,
as well as a number of topics in philosophical logic, such as modal logic, relevance logic, the logic of essence, and the logic of vagueness. These contributions have helped reshape the agendas of those fields and have given fresh impetus to a number of perennial debates." (p. 1)

28. Forbes, Graeme. 2020. "Fine's New Semantics of Vagueness." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 164-179. New York: Oxford University Press.
"My conclusion about Fine's discussion of the three formulations of Sorites reasoning, then, is that it is a very great strength of compatibilist semantics that it diagnoses a problem in each of the three, using the same formal apparatus, and other approaches which cannot do something like this are at an immediate disadvantage. However, I also think that the fuzzy logic analysis of the three formulations is overall equally as effective, in particular because it is independently plausible that embedding fixed-point negation in "it is the case" produces an operator expressing semantic negation. So the seductiveness of apparent ¬∧-formulations is explained by revealing them to be ~∧-formulations." (p. 178, note omitted)
29. Godeon, Rosen. 2020. "What is Normative Necessity?" In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 205-233. New York: Oxford University Press.
"If the account I have sketched is cogent, you can now entertain an alternative to Strong Supervenience: the view that the normative supervenes on the natural as a matter of normative necessity. (This follows from the normative necessity of pure moral principles, together with the further assumption that all normative facts are ultimately grounded in pure principles plus nonnormative facts.) These views disagree about the modal classification of remote worlds—

worlds in which act utilitarianism is true and the natural facts are just as they are, for example. Everyone agrees that such worlds are impossible in a sense. The open question concerns the interpretation of the modal word in this formulation.
Having seen the alternative, are you confident that these remote worlds must be metaphysically impossible—ruled out by the *natures* of the moral properties and relations? If so, you see more deeply into these natures than I do." (p. 228)

30. Goldblatt, Robert. 2020. "Fine's Theorem on First-Order Complete Modal Logics." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 316-334. New York: Oxford University Press.
"In his PhD research, completed in 1969, and over the next half-dozen years, Kit Fine made a series of fundamental contributions to the semantic analysis and metatheory of propositional modal logic, proving general theorems about notable classes of logics and providing examples of failure of some significant properties." (p. 316)
(...)
"My interest here is in what was arguably the most influential contribution: the paper "Some Connections between Elementary and Modal Logic" (1975b), and in particular its Theorem 3, which will be referred to as *Fine's Canonicity Theorem* . It states that
any logic that is complete with respect to a first-order definable class of Kripke frames must be valid in its canonical frames ." (p. 317)
31. Hale, Bob. 2020. "The Problem of Modality." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 234-246. New York: Oxford University Press.
"There is no doubt that one major reason why *de re* modality has seemed especially problematic lies in the broadly linguistic conception of the source of necessary truth which was widely accepted by analytic philosophers throughout the middle decades of last century, in spite of Quine's major onslaught on the notion of analytic truth or

truth in virtue of meaning. Indeed, Quine himself—somewhat surprisingly, given his
misgivings about analyticity—finds the essentialism to which he thinks acceptance of *de re* modalities commits us unpalatable precisely because it clashes with the logical empiricist orthodoxy that all necessity is rooted in meanings." (p. 235)

32. Koslicki, Kathrin. 2020. "Essence and Identity." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 113-140. New York: Oxford University Press.
"4 Conclusion
My primary focus in this chapter has been on the question of how essentialists should attempt to meet Quine's demand for necessary and sufficient conditions for the crossworld identity of individuals. I examined six contenders for the role of crossworld identity principles: (i) an object's qualitative character; (ii) matter; (iii) origins; (iv) haecceities; (v) world-indexed properties; and (vi) form.
(...)
On balance, then, the sixth option deserves to be taken very seriously as a possible response to Quine's challenge, especially by neo-Aristotelians who are already motivated for other reasons to take on board a
hylomorphic conception of unified wholes. Many of these hylomorphists also accept a non-modal conception of essence and thus face the further difficult task, over and above what is required to meet Quine's challenge, of having to explain an object's *de re* modal profile in terms of facts about its essence. Haecceities and world-indexed properties are unlikely to be of much help with respect to this second challenge, while the forms of hylomorphic compounds are in fact well suited for this purpose." (p. 136)

33. Kroon, Fred, and McKeown-Green, Jonathan. 2020. "Ontology: What's the (Real) Question?" In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 13-37. New York: Oxford University Press.
"One way to philosophize is to ontologize: about physical objects, moral properties, properties, possibilia, numbers,

sets, and much else. For Kit Fine, ontologizing differs from what happens in ordinary life when I affirm that there are chairs and from what happens at school when I explain that there is a prime number less than three.
(...)
Fine's most extensive treatment is to be found "The Question of Ontology" (Fine 2009) and related considerations are advanced in "The Question of Realism" (Fine 2001). In the first three, expository, sections of this chapter, we present Fine's ideas in the context of broader views that he elaborates in "What is Metaphysics?" (Fine 2012). Then we offer our responses." (p. 13)

34. Kuhn, Steven T. 2020. "Necessary, Transcendental, and Universal Truth." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 183-204. New York: Oxford University Press.
"The argument that Fine's puzzle, as originally formulated, provides evidence that Socrates' humanness is a transcendental, rather than a worldly, fact assumes that we are more reluctant to attribute necessity to propositions true because of the nature of individuals than to propositions true because of worldly circumstances, and that we find it still more difficult to attribute necessity to "hybrid" sentences. A simpler
version of the argument, however, reaches the same conclusion under a more plausible understanding of the relation between necessary and transcendental truth. We may question Fine's emphasis on his two-premise puzzle and even, perhaps, his principal example of a transcendental truth. It is difficulty to deny, however, the interest and importance of the worldly–unworldly distinction and Fine's thought about it. We should be grateful to him for bringing this, as many other neglected topics in metaphysics, into focus." (p. 203)

35. Mackie, Penelope. 2020. "Can Metaphysical Modality Be Based on Essence?" In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 247-264. New York: Oxford University Press.
"1 Introduction

In his hugely influential paper “Essence and Modality” (1994), Kit Fine argued that the then orthodox view that essence can be understood in terms of metaphysical modality is fundamentally flawed. He proposed, in its place, the view that all metaphysical modality has its source in the essences or natures of things, where the notion of a thing’s essence or nature can be understood in terms of a broadly Aristotelian notion of real definition.
(...)
In spite of the attention that it has received, however, one aspect of Fine’s revolutionary theory seems to me to have been surprisingly neglected. The theory appears to require that the relevant conception of real definition can itself be isolated without appeal to metaphysical modality. And I do not see how this requirement can be met. Hence I am genuinely puzzled about how an “essence-based” theory of metaphysical modality is possible. In this chapter, I explain my reasons for skepticism about this issue. I then briefly consider the implications of my argument for the relation between essence and metaphysical modality." (p. 247)

36. Moltmann, Friederike. 2020. "Variable Objects and Truthmaking." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 368-394. New York: Oxford University Press.
"This chapter will focus on a philosophically significant construction whose semantics brings together two important notions in Kit Fine’s philosophy: the notion of truthmaking and the notion of a variable embodiment, or its extension, namely what I call a “variable object.”
The analysis of the construction this paper will develop will be based on an account of clausal complements of intensional verbs that is of more general interest, based on truthmaking and the notion of a cognitive product, such as a promise or a belief, rather than that of a proposition. On that account, the clausal complement of, for example, promise will characterize satisfaction situations of the reported promise,
and the clausal complement of believe will characterize the truthmakers of the reported belief." (p. 368)

37. Ostertag, Gary. 2020. "Fine on Frege's Puzzle." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 337-359. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Kit Fine's *Semantic Relationism* (SR) provides a novel defense of referentialism—novel, in part, because of the specific challenge to referentialism it addresses and in part because of the techniques it introduces in its defense. SR takes on a number of interrelated concerns, involving, principally, the interpretation of variables and the phenomenon of strict, or de jure, coreference. The purpose of the current chapter is to clarify, and place in a broader context, the problem of strict coreference and to provide a framework for understanding the proposed solution." (p. 337, a note omitted)
38. Percival, Philip. 2020. "Beyond Reality?" In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 38-51. New York: Oxford University Press.
"My focus is the divide between reality and that which is beyond reality. On what I call an "all-encompassing" view of reality, this is the divide between everything and nothing: reality encompasses everything, and beyond it there is nothing at all.
Opposed to the all-encompassing view is what I call a "restriction" view of reality: reality is coincident with some kind of restriction on, or partition of, what there is; it is not the case that what resides beyond reality is nothing.
I have two main aims: to first classify restriction views of reality (§ 1), and then to assess a species of the restriction view that pertains to time and modality (§ 2)." (p. 38)
39. Sandu, Gabriel. 2020. "Indefinites, Skolem Functions, and Arbitrary Objects." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 98-112. New York: Oxford University Press.
"1 Introduction: Indefinites
Indefinites can occur in a nested sequence of quantificational phrases like
1. Every student read every paper that a professor recommended and also in combination with anaphoric

pronouns as in
2. A man smiles. He is happy.
The nesting, on one side, and the anaphoric link, on the other, create an interpretational tension. The nesting favors a quantificational interpretation of the indefinites according to which they behave more like any other quantificational NP, for example they enter into scopal (dependency) relations with other quantificational phrases. But the presence of discourse anaphora creates some pressure to interpret the indefinites referentially in a way which makes their semantical behavior resemble more that of proper names." (p. 98)

40. Shalkowski, Scott A. 2020. "Essence and Nominalism." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 301-315. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Kit Fine has produced an extensive and rich body of work bearing on the philosophy of modality.
(...)
"What is less than usual, though, I will also argue that essentialism can be made safe for nominalists. Not only should we be unimpressed with philosophy that expands our ontology for the sake of eliminating modality, we should also be unimpressed with philosophy that expands the domain to admit the abstract when it is in the business of being completely sober, serious, and aiming at non-modal truth-telling.
Abstraction involves not arriving at principled, well-justified beliefs about abstract objects. It simply involves the failure to regard as important more and more features of (concrete) reality. One can hardly discover new ontology by caring less about—or by paying less attention to—the old ontology. The end result will be essentialism that is safe for nominalists." (pp. 301-302, anote omitted)

41. Urquhart, Alasdair. 2020. "Fine on Arbitrary Objects." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 87-97. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Introduction

Fine's remarkable theory of arbitrary objects has attracted less attention than it deserves. He expounded his theory in two papers (Fine, 1983; Fine, 19858a), and a monograph (Fine, 1985b). The aim of the present chapter is to provide a brief introduction to the theory, to discuss some of the historical background, and finally to sketch some connections with other areas in logic and philosophy. In the historical section, I shall try to elucidate the extent to which earlier writers anticipated Fine's theory, while in the last section, I attempt to expand on some of Fine's brief but suggestive remarks in his monograph." (p. 87)

References

Fine, 1983. Kit Fine. A Defence of Arbitrary Objects. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* , 15:55-77.

Fine, 1985a. Kit Fine. Natural Deduction and Arbitrary Objects. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* , 14:57-107.

Fine, 1985b. Kit Fine. *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects*. Basil Blackwell. Aristotelian Society Monograph Series 3.

42. Wilson, Jessica. 2020. "Essence and Dependence." In *Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine* , edited by Dumitru, Mircea, 283-300. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "I have offered certain counterexamples to Fine's essence-based account of dependence, which more generally pose a difficulty for some of the principles (e.g., Localization) that he takes to characterize the connection between essence and dependence. Still, it will not have been lost on anyone that my criticisms here accept and aim to implement exactly the methodology that Fine took to show that modal accounts of essence and ontological dependence are incorrect, and for the same reason—namely, that it is of the first importance to characterize the key metaphysical notions in such a way that they do not inappropriately exclude any intelligible applications of those notions." (p. 299)

43. Frances, Bryan. 2006. "The New Leibniz' Law Arguments for Pluralism." *Mind* no. 115:1007-1022.

    "Ordinary macroscopic material objects A and B coincide at a time if at that time they share the very same spatial

regions and are made of the same underlying matter. Many philosophers hold that some easily possible or even actual material objects that coincide at a time are nonidentical, for example, a statue and the hunk of clay that it is materially coincident with. Following Kit Fine (2003), I will call those philosophers pluralists. Other philosophers, monists, think that there are no pairs of distinct coincident ordinary material objects.

Some of the paradoxes of material constitution are frightfully difficult to solve, and it is almost always agreed that any response to them will be at least somewhat counterintuitive, so the oddity of pluralism is not its refutation. (1) Fine (2003) has developed further than anyone else a new set of Leibniz's Law arguments for pluralism. Using Leibniz's Law to argue for pluralism is not new. Many find intuitive the idea that a statue but not the hunk of clay from which it is made cannot survive being flattened; by Leibniz's Law we can conclude that the statue is not the hunk of clay, or so it appears. The new arguments are intended to be superior to the familiar arguments in two ways: they do not rely on controversial modal and temporal intuitions, and they suggest serious errors in the monist's replies to the old Leibniz's Law arguments.

The new arguments are a welcome addition to the literature, as the traditional Leibniz's Law arguments for pluralism have already been very thoroughly examined. However, it seems to me that the monist has plausible responses to the new arguments. I agree with Fine that monism is probably false, but I do not see how the new arguments mount a good case against it." (pp. 1007-1008)

(1) I do not mean to imply that the problems of coincidence are the only problems of material composition. Even more serious composition problems are found when investigating the questions 'Under what conditions does composition happen?' and 'When taking atoms away from a pumpkin, when does one no longer have a pumpkin?' Indeed, without a satisfactory solution to the latter problems, I do not see how we can be confident regarding our responses to the material coincidence problems.

References
Fine, Kit 2003: ‘The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter’. *Mind* , 112, pp. 195–234.
44. King, Jeffrey C. 2006. "Semantics for Monists." *Mind* no. 115:1023-1058.
Abstract: "Assume that the only thing before you is a statue made of some alloy. Call those who think that there is one thing before you in such a case monists. Call those who think there are at least two things before you in such a case pluralists. The most common arguments for pluralism run as follows. The statue is claimed to have some property P that the piece of alloy lacks (or vice versa), and hence it is concluded that they are distinct. Most often, the predicates employed in such arguments to express the crucial property are predicates expressing `temporal properties', such as existing at a certain time; or `modal properties', such as possibly being spherical; or `constitution properties', such as being made of a certain sort of material. In a recent paper, Kit Fine has noted that such predicates suffer from various defects that make it possible for the monist to plausibly resist the relevant versions of the pluralist's arguments. For this reason, Fine considers a number of predicates that do not suffer from these defects, and constructs new versions of the above argument using them. Fine argues that any attempt on the monist's part to resist his versions of the argument force the monist to adopt implausible positions in the philosophy of language. As against this, I argue that the monist has perfectly plausible responses to Fine's arguments that require the monist to adopt only quite reasonable positions in the philosophy of language."
45. Tallant, Jonathan. 2013. "A Heterodox Presentism: Kit Fine’s Theory." In *New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism* , edited by Ciuni, Roberto, Miller, Kristie and Torrengo, Giuliano, 281-306. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
Abstract: "Kit Fine ([Fine 2005]) has articulated a position according to which reality is fragmented. In this paper I will refer to this view as ‘Heterodox Presentism’. I want to try and do two things. First, I want to try and undermine the

arguments presented by Fine in favour of Heterodox Presentism and show that the view is unmotivated—in part by the fact that it fails to meet some of the standards that Fine sets for it. The second target aim is to offer some very informal and sketchy remarks as to how we might better construe the 'standard' view of realism, or 'presentism' to which Fine objects—the view that I will define here as 'only present objects exist'. As we shall see, my own view of presentism differs quite substantially from this pithy slogan.

46. Burgess, John P. 2004. "Book Review: Kit Fine. *The Limits of Abstraction* . Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* :227-251.
"Kit Fine's long article [13], introducing his distinctive take on neo-Fregeanism, has now been expanded into a short book of the same title. (For those familiar with the article version, the philosophical material from it appears as chapter 1 in the book, and the echnical material as chapters 3 and 4. According to the book's preface, "The major change is the addition of a new part on the context principle." This addition constitutes chapter 2 of the book. There is also an index of technical terms, which would have been more useful if it had been arranged alphabetically.)
The present review of that book is divided into three parts of unequal length.
The long introduction Section 2 surveys recent neo-Fregeanism. Then Section 3 summarizes Fine's technical contributions, which presumably are what is of primary interest for readers of the present journal. The brief conclusion Section 4 touches on more purely philosophical issues.
References
[13] Fine, K., "The limits of abstraction," pp. 503–629 in *The Philosophy of Mathematics Today (Munich, 1993)* , edited by M. Schirn, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.

47. Correia, Fabrice. 2006. "Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, and Modality." *Noûs* no. 40:753-767.
Abstract: When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I

will call the notion of objectual essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some of my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine's compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulating his view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence—a view I myself find appealing.
Finally, I will end up with suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some sympathy."
References
Fine, K. (1994) "Essence and Modality", Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1-16.

48. Asay, Jamin. 2017. "Run Aground: Kit Fine's Critique of Truthmaker Theory." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 67:443-463.
Abstract: "Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper, I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine's objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theorists may respond to them. I then showcase

the positive contribution that truthmaker theory can make to metaphysics, including its ability to speak to a core metaphysical topic (the ontological grounds for truths) that Fine's approach to grounding must ultimately remain silent on. I conclude by exploring what I take to be the best option when it comes to understanding how truthmaking and grounding fit together."

49. Shapiro, Stewart. 2004. "The Nature and Limits of Abstraction." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 54:166-174.
"To what extent can abstraction principles serve as a foundation for a branch of mathematics? Like logicism, neo-logicism is an epistemological enterprise. The neo-logicist claims that basic arithmetic principles can become known on the basis of a derivation from Hume's principle. But of course the epistemic status of the conclusion of a deduction is closely tied to the status of its premises. Thus one key batch of philosophical issues concerns the epistemic status of acceptable abstraction principles, like Hume's principle. Are they analytic, or otherwise knowable a priori? Fine explores a number of options, and finds them wanting, some more so than others.
One natural possibility is to think of Hume's principle as a definition. But definitions come in many flavours. An 'orthodox' definition is a linguistic device to identify an item - object, property, function, etc. - which is already in the range of the bound variables of the language or theory in use. There are two types of orthodox definitions. An explicit definition stipulates that a new linguistic term is to be equivalent to a given expression. Abstraction principles do not have the form of explicit definitions. For example, Hume's principle does not provide a single expression that is equivalent to the 'number of' operator." (p. 168)
(...)
"There is gold in these pages, but it is often difficult to mine. The book contains a number of annoying typographical and other minor errors. In most (but not all) cases, I was able to figure out what was meant, sometimes with effort. Part of the difficulty in reading this book can be traced to the fertile mind of its author. Fine explores many highways, byways

and alleyways. For example, the philosophical material deals with intensional and extensional equivalence and with abstractions whose relations are contingent as well as necessary. On several occasions, distinctions are made and discussed for a while, and then dropped, sometimes with a remark that it does not matter. On the technical side, the book deals with both standard models and non-standard Henkin models. The play with predominantly logical abstractions is a result of Fine's admirable desire for his results to be as strong as possible, but the extra detail required for this introduces a wealth of intricacy that will challenge all but a diligent reader. The second half of the book is full of new technical terms and abbreviations, and it is easy to get lost in the linguistic jungle. The only help the reader gets in this regard is an 'index of first occurrence of formal symbols and definitions'. Unfortunately, this is arranged in the order in which these terms occur in the book, not in alphabetical order. So the reader who needs to look up a forgotten notion or symbol must look through seven entire columns of terms.

That said, this is a deep and penetrating book. It should be required reading for anyone with more than a casual interest in neo-logicism, or abstraction principles generally. No one can claim to be an expert on these philosophical and logical matters until they have mastered the arguments and ideas contained in this work." (pp. 173-174)

50. Wildman, Nathan. 2013. "Modality, Sparsity, and Essence." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 63:760-782.

Abstract: "Rather infamously, Kit Fine provided a series of counter-examples which purport to show that attempts to understand essence in terms of metaphysical necessity are 'fundamentally misguided'. Here, my aim is to put forward a new version of modalism that is, I argue, immune to Fine's counter-examples. The core of this new modalist account is a sparseness restriction, such that an object's essential properties are those sparse properties it has in every world in which it exists. After first motivating this sparseness restriction, I proceed to show how the resulting sparse modalism circumvents Fine's original counter-examples.

After dismissing a potential problem concerning the membership relation, I conclude that, as at least one form of modalism is viable, the project of understanding essence in terms of metaphysical necessity is not so fundamentally misguided after all."

51. Forbes, Graeme. 2008. "Critical Review of Kit Fine's ' *Modality and Tense* '." *The Philosophical Review* no. 117:275-287.
"In this critical review I discuss the main themes of the papers in Kit Fine's *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* . These themes are that modal operators are intelligible in their own right and that actualist quantifiers are to be taken as basic with respect to possibilist quantifiers. I also discuss a previously unpublished paper of Fine's on modality and existence."
52. "Symposium on Kit Fine's book *The Limits of Abstraction* ." 2005. *Philosophical Studies* .
Contents: Kit Fine: Précis [of " *The Limits of Abstraction"*] 305; Stewart Shapiro: Sets and Abstracts – Discussion 315; Alan Weir: On Kit Fine's ' *The Limits of Abstraction'* – Discussion 333; Jamie Tappenden: On Kit Fine's ' *The Limits of Abstraction'* – Discussion 349; Kit Fine: Replies 347-395.
53. King, Jeffrey C. 1991. "Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects." *Philosophical Studies* :239-265.
In recent work, Kit Fine has sought to resurrect the view that variables in mathematics refer to indefinite or, as he calls them, arbitrary objects. (3) Indeed Fine holds that instantial terms figuring in universal generalization and existential instantiation in systems of natural deduction, and some anaphoric pronouns in natural languages, refer to arbitrary objects as well. As against this, I intend to argue that the arbitrary objects account, like the theories of indefinite numbers that preceded it, obscures rather than highlights the distinctive features of the various expressions it claims to handle; and that there is another view of the semantics of these expressions which is preferable to the arbitrary objects account. (4)

The plan of the present essay is first, to sketch Fine's theory of arbitrary objects; second, to sketch an alternative to Fine's account; third, to argue that Fine's arguments in support of arbitrary object theory also support the alternative; and finally, to argue that this alternative is preferable to arbitrary object theory." (p. 240)

(3) See 'A Defence of Arbitrary Objects' (henceforth, DAO), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary Volume 57, 1983, pp. 55-77; 'Natural Deduction and Arbitrary Objects' (henceforth, NDAO), *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 14 (1985) 57-107; and *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* Aristotelian Society Series Volume 3 (henceforth, RAO), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.

It may seem provincial of me to limit my attention to Fine s view and the alternative I intend to discuss, given the existence of sophisticated theories of anaphoric pronouns such as that outlined in Hans Kamp's 'A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation' (in *Formal Methods in the Study of Language* , J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen, M. Stockhof (eds.), Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 277-322). But Kamp's theory is incapable of handling much of the data that is at issue here. For example, that theory is incapable of handling the anaphoric pronoun in the following discourse

Every female professor has a computer. She is financially responsible for it.

(I intend 'a computer' to have narrow scope with respect to 'Every female professor').

Kamp's rules of DRS [Discourse Representation Theory] construction prevent the construction of what Kamp calls a complete DRS for this discourse; and one must construct a complete DRS for a discourse for Kamp's semantics to handle the discourse. (In particular, Kamp's rule CR3 (p. 311) prevents substituting the "discourse referent" introduced by the processing of 'a computer' for 'it' in the second sentence, in effect preventing anaphoric connection between 'it' and 'a computer'; similarly for 'Every female professor' and' 'she'.) More importantly, even if the rules were changed in order to allow the construction of a

complete DRS for this discourse, the semantics would not come out right. For the value of the pronoun 'it' in the second sentence depends on the value of the pronoun 'She' in the sense that the truth of the sentence requires that for any female professor we choose (value of 'She') there must be a computer (value of 'it') such that the professor is financially responsible for the computer. Kamp's semantics does not include a device for keeping track of such dependence between the values of pronouns.
This lack prevents Kamp's theory from handling instantial terms in natural deduction and English arguments, and variables in mathematics as well. But this is just the sort of data that is the subject of this essay.

54. Shapiro, Stewart. 2005. "Sets and Abstracts – Discussion." *Philosophical Studies* no. 122:315-322.
"Kit Fine's *The Limits of Abstraction* (2002) is loaded with interesting and important model-theoretic results about abstraction principles. I propose to explore the bearing of these and related results on the philosophical goals of neo-logicism. I presuppose familiarity with the main themes of the book, at least as outlined in the précis published here.(1) Section 1 below analyzes particular results concerning abstraction principles, indicating consequences for acceptability of the neo-logicist program, at least as that program is articulated in the Fine study. Section 2 explores the role of set-theoretic meta-theory generally in foundational programs like that of neo-logicism (and logicism). What is an advocate of neo-logicism, or a neutral outsider, to make of the whole enterprise of model theory as based on set theory? What is a mathematician watching the neo-logicist development from the outside to make of neo-logicism?" (p. 315)
(1) K. Fine, Precis [of " *The Limits of Abstraction"*], *Philosophical Studies* , 122, 2005, pp. 305-313.

55. Tappenden, Jamie. 2005. "On Kit Fine's ' *The Limits of Abstraction'* – Discussion." *Philosophical Studies* no. 122:349-366.
"The best place to begin these comments is to say that I found this to be a wonderful book - genuinely thrilling to

read. It is a challenge for me to find a contribution that hasn't been already advanced many times, since the core topics - reference to abstract objects, say, or impredicativity, to choose two among many - have received so much intense attention in recent decades. I'll try not to just repeat arguments that I already know are in the literature. Also, since many other people are in a better position than I am to comment on the technical side of the general theory of abstraction. I will refrain from comment, except to indicate my enthusiasm. Looking to a general account rather than remaining content with *ad hoc* justifications of this or that abstraction principle is clearly a crucial step to understanding the issues. Finally. I will have little that is critical to say, because I'm in broad agreement with those of the central reflections in *The Limits of Abstraction* on which I may have something novel to contribute. (1)" (p. 349)
(1) This is not to say I agree across the board, only that those disagreements I have – on impredicativity, for example – are for reasons that are completely unoriginal.

56. Weir, Alan. 2005. "On Kit Fine's ' *The Limits of Abstraction'* – Discussion." *Philosophical Studies* no. 122:333-348.
"Kit Fine's *The Limits of Abstraction* is a magisterial study of the philosophical and technical issues raised by the neo-Fregean or neo-logicist project of founding mathematics on abstraction principles. The current interest in neo-logicism was largely generated by Crispin Wright, in his *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects* , and carried forward by Wright and others such as Bob Hale and Neil Tennant. Whatever one thinks of the philosophical plausibility of the project, it has been fortunate to attract the attention of superb logicians such as George Boolos and now Kit Fine, who have unearthed a wealth of interesting mathematical logic from its technical foundations.
Fine writes not as a committed, card-carrying neo-Fregean (see, for example, p. 46) but more as a sympathetic bystander concernedt o see how much light can be cast on mathematics from that perspective. This discussion, then, is not a critical review of Fine's book; rather I want to ask whether his work, in particular his 'General Theory of

Abstraction', can be used by neo-Fregeans to rescue themselves from objections which have been made to their position." (p. 333)

57. Forbes, Graeme. 1993. "But *a* Was Arbitrary...." *Philosophical Topics* no. 21:21-34.
"I offer a philosophical defense of Gentzen-style quantifier rules which explains why they are sound without employing any such notion as "arbitrary name" or "arbitrary choice". I argue that while Fine's arbitrary object semantics directly justifies reasoning in which we seem to appeal to arbitrary objects, a parallel with standard vs. non-standard analysis, in which arbitrary objects are like infinitesimals, suggests that the Gentzen approach is more fundamental."
58. "Book Symposium - Kit Fine, *Semantic Relationism* ." 2010. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81.
Scott Soames: Coordination problems 464; Kit Fine: Comments on Scott Soames "Coordination Problems' 475; Krista Lawlor: Varieties of Coreference 485; Kit Fine: Reply to Lawlor's 'Varieties of Coreference' 496; Paul Hovda: Semantics as Information about Semantic Values 502; Kit Fine: Comments on Paul Hovda's 'Semantics as Information About Semantics Values' 511-518.
59. Hovda, Paul. 2010. "Semantics as Information about Semantic Values." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:502-510.
Abstract: "I suggest that the core ideas of Kit Fine's *Semantic Relationism* are the notion of semantic requirement and the notion of manifest consequence, the non-classical logical relation associated with semantic requirement.
Surrounding this core are novel "relational" systems of coordinated sequences of expressions, relational (as opposed to intrinsic) semantic values, coordinated propositions, and coordinated content. I take Fine to take the periphery to be reducible to the core (but see below). I will make some primarily exegetical remarks about the two core ideas, and then make more critical remarks about the periphery. I should say that I find the book, as a whole, illuminating and, for the most part, convincing. I hesitantly

suggest that the core constitutes an important and novel model for thinking about semantics (and representation in general), while the periphery might result from an attempt to force the new model into the old mold."

60. Lawlor, Krista. 2010. "Varieties of Coreference." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:485-495.
Conclusion: "Does a comprehensive theory of language and cognition require primitive semantic relations? Fine thinks so, and I agree. Will incorporating primitive semantic relations have the result that traditional semantics will need to be dramatically re-written? Again, plausibly Yes—our understanding of compositionality, to take one instance, may have to be more subtle. Is strict coreference the right primitive in such a comprehensive theory? No, I think not—the semantic pro-form is a better primitive, because it affords a more general theory.
Naturally I've pressed criticisms here, but I greatly appreciate this book. We have Fine's work to thank for turning a powerful spotlight on coreference phenomena, illuminating how central they are in thought and language, and forcing us to think harder about how to understand them." (p. 495)
61. Sider, Ted. 2013. "Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 87:733-754.
Reply to Kit Fine, *Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms* , (2013).
"Kit Fine's paper raises important and difficult issues about my approach to the metaphysics of fundamentality. In chapters 7 and 8 (*) I examined certain subtle differences between my approach and his. Our approaches are kindred because they share the assumption that fundamentality-theoretic concepts are not to be defined modally, and that some such concepts are themselves to be adopted as conceptually primitive. (1) But they differ over which concepts are to be adopted, and over how those concepts behave."
(*) of Ted Sider, *Writing the Book of the World* , New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

(1) This is not to say that all the approaches regard the concepts as *metaphysically* primitive.

62. Soames, Scott. 2010. "Coordination problems." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 81:465-474.
"Although 'Rxx' and 'Rxy' are both applications of a two-place predicate to a pair of terms, 'Rxx' resembles a one-place predicate in that all one needs to evaluate it is an assignment to 'x'. A similar point applies
to the sequences 'Fx', 'Gx' and 'Fx', 'Gy' – even though neither is a one-place predicate. Kit Fine's semantic relationism aims to extract a common idea uniting these comparisons, and to use it to provide a Millian solution to Frege's Puzzle." (p. 463)
63. Deng, Natalja. 2013. "Fine's Mctaggart, Temporal Passage, and the A versus B-Debate." *Ratio* no. 26:19-34.
Abstract: "I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's 'Argument from Passage', which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts not being 'oriented towards' one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart's paradox to indicate neither the need for a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not to be had: Fine's 'non-standard realism' amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender."
64. Gorman, Michael. 2005. "The Essential and the Accidental." *Ratio* no. 18:276-289.

Abstract: "The distinction between the essential and the accidental is nearly always understood in modal terms. After criticizing some recent writings by Kit Fine that question that understanding, I develop a theory according to which whether a given feature of a thing is essential turns on whether it is explained by other features of that thing. The theory differs from the modal view by leaving room for features that are accidental even though their bearers cannot exist without them. The theory has the additional advantage of being open to the results of scientific theory."
" Fine tries to explain essence in terms of definition but proceeds as if we already know the real definitions of things. I propose that we travel in the opposite direction and say that a good definition of something is a statement of its essence, i.e., a statement of its fundamental characteristic(s). In other words, we first inquire into a thing's essence, and then, once we know its essence, we can define it. If we do not yet know a thing's essence, then we are not able to state its real definition, although we might be able to formulate a substitute by invoking some necessary accident that all and only things of that type possess. Such substitutes can be extremely useful. For example, suppose we become convinced that a hydrogen atom's having exactly one proton is explained by some other fact about it, while being unsure what that other fact might be. In such a situation we would be unsure of the definition of hydrogen, but we would still be able to make a lot of progress investigating the characteristics of 'atoms with exactly one proton'.(22)" (p. 289)
(22) On substitutes for definitions see Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3. Oderberg connects essence with definition and also makes a point closely related to my remarks about substitutes, namely, that a grasp of proper accidents is the best means to grasping something's essence; see 'How to Win Essence Back', pp. 36-8, 40.
References
David S. Oderberg, 'How to Win Essence Back from Essentialists', *Philosophical Writings* , XVIII (Autumn 2001), 27-45.

65. deRosset, Louis. 2014. "On Weak Ground." *Review of Symbolic Logic* no. 7:713-744.
Abstract: "Though the study of grounding is still in the early stages, Kit Fine, in ”The Pure Logic of Ground”, has made a seminal attempt at formalization. Formalization of this sort is supposed to bring clarity and precision to our theorizing, as it has to the study of other metaphysically important phenomena, like modality and vagueness. Unfortunately, as I will argue, Fine ties the formal treatment of grounding to the obscure notion of a weak ground. The obscurity of weak ground, together with its centrality in Fine’s system, threatens to undermine the extent to which this formalization offers clarity and precision. In this paper, I show how to overcome this problem. I describe a system, the logic of strict ground (LSG) and demonstrate its adequacy; I specify a translation scheme for interpreting Fine’s weak grounding claims; I show that the interpretation verifies all of the principles of Fine’s system; and I show that derivability in Fine’s system can be exactly characterized in terms of derivability in LSG. I conclude that Fine’s system is reducible to LSG."
66. Bird, Alexander. 2009. "Essences and Natural Kinds." In *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* , edited by Le Poidevin, Robin, Simons, Peter, McGonigal, Andrew and Ross, P. Cameron, 497-506. New York: Routledge.
"Essentialism as applied to individuals is the claim that for at least some individuals there are properties that those individuals possess essentially. What it is to possess a property essentially is a matter of debate. To possess a property essentially is often taken to be akin to possessing a property necessarily, but stronger – although this is not a feature of Aristotle’s essentialism, according to which essential properties are those properties a thing could not lose without ceasing to exist. Kit Fine (1994) takes essential properties to be those that an object has in virtue of its identity, while other essentialists refer (as Fine also does) to the nature of an object as the source of its essential properties.

It is sometimes important to distinguish the essential properties of a thing and the “full” essence of a thing. The latter is the set of the essential properties of a thing, when that set necessarily suffi ces to determine the thing’s identity. One might hold that something has essential properties without agreeing that it has an identity-determining essence.
(...)
"In this chapter I shall fi rst outline certain claims and arguments concerning essentialism concerning individuals (second section). I shall then (third section) introduce the notion of a natural kind in more detail before discussing natural kind essentialism (fourth section)." (pp. 497-498)
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Fine, K. (1994) “Essence and Modality,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives,* vol. 8 of *Logic and Language* , Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 1–16.

67. San Ginés, Aránzazu. 2014. "On Skolem Functions, and Arbitrary Objects. An Analysis of a Kit Fine’s Mysterious Claim." *Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía* no. 33:137-150.
Abstract: "In 1985, i n his book *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* , Kit Fine observed and stressed three, in his opinion, important differences between A-objects and Skolem functions. The present paper rests on one of them. According to Fine, there is some kind of dependence relationship between objects that cannot properly be represented by any function. We will analyze this claim from the perspective of natural language, and discuss the improvement that the use of arbitrary objects seemingly provides over Skolem functions in dealing with dependence."

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Ontology and Psychology in the Work of Liliana Albertazzi

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   Contents: Liliana Albertazzi: Introduction: back to the origins 1; Liliana Albertazzi: The primitives of presentation. Wholes, parts and psychophysics 29; Martin Kusch: the politics of thought: a social history of the debate between Wundt and the Wurzburg School 61; Riccardo Luccio: Representation in psychophysics 89; Robin D. Rollinger: Lotze on the sensory representation of space 103; Jan Sebestik: Ernst Mach's evolutionary theory of representation 123; Gianni Zanarini: Hermann von Helmholtz and Ernst Mach on musical consonance 135; Salvo D'Agostino: The Bild conception of physical theories from Helmholtz to Hertz 151; Karl Schuhmann: Representation in early Husserl 167; Jens Cavallin:

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the future 335; Bibliographic notes 341; References 355; Index of names 373.

"This Introduction to Brentano' is primarily aimed at conceptual interpretation even though it has been written with scrupulous regard to the texts and sets out its topics according to their chronological development. I have concerned myself at length with historical questions on other occasion, as when editing the Italian versions of the three volumes of Brentano's Psychologies published by Laterza in 1997. Again for Laterza, and in accompaniment to the Psychologies I have written a short *Introduzione a Brentano* (Introduction to Brentano) of which this book is the development.

Before these publications, I have sought to outline the origin and influence of the theses put forward by the school of Brentano, and subsequently those of the school of Meinong with colleagues (L. Albertazzi et. al. ed., The School of Franz Brentano, Dordrecht, Kluwer 1996, and L. Albertazzi et. al. ed., *The School of Alexius Meinong*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001).

I have concentrated on these matters long enough to realize that it is still premature to attempt an exhaustive monograph on Brentano. Apart from the few texts published by Brentano during his lifetime, his writings -- and especially those published posthumously by his pupils -- are in a parlous state. And at the moment there seems to be no way out of the impasse." p. 1.

Essays

1. Albertazzi, Liliana. 1992. "Is There a Transcendental Object?" In *Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski*, edited by Pasniczek, Jacek, 26-44. Lublin: Wydawnictvo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodoskiej.

   "Twardowski's ontology is to be listed among the jungle of ontologies which seem to be in fashion in contemporary philosophy. It has in common with Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* the description and definition of

objects. But two are peculiar to Twardowski's ontology: the object in general and the general object. This stems from Twardowski's Kantian heritage and has to be related to a general Wolffian influence on the ontology of the Brentanists."

2. ———. 1995. "Forms of Completion." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 50:321-340.

   "The essay underlines the complementarity between theory and experimentation as a characteristic feature of the Meinong-school. In particular, it deals with the nucleus of a theory of presentation implicit in the theory of production. In fact, on the basis of Benussi's experimental results, I distinguish between presentation and representation, relatively to the various phases of the moment-now as the qualitative primitive of cognition. This result has various consequences which shed light on the act-side: it shows that the production relation relates to the act and not to the produced object, clarifying some difficulties concerning the nature of ideal objects in Meinong's ontology; that the psychological act granter the objects of knowing on the basis of cognitive determinants which are assimilative determinants and determinants of connection. These cognitive aspects of the act are indeed forms of completions of the known objects. Endly, the essay deals with the a-modal development of Benussi's theory of the cognitive aspects of the act as performed by the Italian Gestaltist Gaetano Kanizsa."

3. ———. 1996. "Anton Marty." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 83-109. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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   "We owe the concept of formal ontology to Husserl, who called it the 'formal theory' of objects. However, the concept of formal as used by Husserl in his definition should not be understood in the conventional sense, since in his thought 'formal' is equivalent to 'categorial'; it is closely connected with the structures of the intentional acts and, as we shall see, has morphodynamic implications.
   In contemporary philosophy, formal ontology has been developed in two principal ways. The first approach has been to study formal ontology as a part of ontology, and to analyse it using the tools and approach of formal logic: from this point of view formal ontology examines the logical features of predication and of the various theories of universals. The use of the specific paradigm of set theory applied to predication, moreover, conditions its interpretation. The second line of development returns to its Husserlian origins and analyses the fundamental categories of object, state of affairs, part, whole, and so forth, as well as the relations between parts and the whole and their laws of dependence - once all material concepts have been replaced by their correlative formal concepts relative to the pure 'something'. This kind of analysis does not deal with the problem of the relationship between formal ontology and material ontology." p. 199. (Notes omitted)

7. ———. 1997. "Continua, Adjectives and Tertiary Qualities." *Axiomathes* no. 8:7-30.

8. ———. 1998. "Perceptual Saliences and Nuclei of Meaning." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 113-138. Aldershot: Ashgate.

9. ———. 1999. "Form Metaphysics." In *Shapes of Forms. From Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenology to Ontology*

and Mathematics, 257-305. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"A not up-to-date premise.
Can metaphysics be a science? The question has long been dismissed as obscurantist and in bad taste, as well as being obfuscatory, impossible to frame and methodologically inadequate. And yet it is an entirely legitimate question when stated in the following simple terms:
(i) what *exists?*
(ii) what are the best methods with which to *describe it?*
and, subordinately, why do things sometimes *appear* differently from what they *are?*
Questions of this kind stem from an empirical and experimental vocation.
The first step to take in analysis of an "elementary doctrine of the components of experience", as Kant put it, is an apparently simple one. One asks oneself, in order to remain on certain ground, what it is that exists here and now in the present moment.
A first answer concerns those apparently indubitable situations in which *something* - that is, *objects* of some kind - are seen, felt, smelt or touched. Yet an immediate certainty based on sounds, colours and things that are experienced apparently without mediations and usually with an emotional connotation - the bold red of a dress, the strident sound of violently applied brakes, the glittering gold of the decoration on the facade of a Viennese building, the pale moon that fades with the morning - at once raises the problem of the *terms used to describe it,* since these are extremely difficult to manipulate. *Here, now, something, object,* and so on, but also and more simply *colour, sound, emotion,* etc., are all terms which are widely abused and apparently bankrupt if analysed on the basis of linguistic definitions. And as for *seeing, feeling, hearing,* etc., these are veritable speculative pitfalls for the unwary. Are they acts? If they are, on what do they rest? Do they have some sort of substratum or are they wholly unconnected? And then, what is their origin? Metaphysics thus seems to oscillate perilously between the mute *deixis ad oculos* of the

moment-now and the atemporality of abstract definitions of terms such as *be, exist, become,* and so on.
Not surprisingly, therefore, several philosophers have given up in the attempt and devoted themselves to the much more reassuring theories of epistemological *models* and logics of the existent, declaring metaphysics to be 'off limits'.
For those who persist in their empirical endeavour, the only option is to adopt a different approach: a minimalist one which analyses the *situation* to which these terms refer and their genesis in the duration. This is an essentially *descriptive* approach; it has close ties with psychology and it is, specifically, an *experimental phenomenology*." p. 257 (Notes omitted)

10. ———. 2000. "Which Semantics?" In *Meaning and Cognition. A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, 1-24. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

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Brian Cantwell Smith *On the Origins of Objects*

INTRODUCTION

Contents: Preface VIII-XII; Introduction 3; Part I. Analysis; 1. Computation 27; 2. Irreduction 77; 3. Realism 85; 4. Particularity 117; 5. Physics 137; Part II. Construction; 6. Flex & slop 191; 7. Registration -- I 213; 8. Registration -- II 243; 9. Middle distance 277; 10. Transition 315; 11. Metaphysics 317; 12. Conclusion 345; Indexes; Sections 379; Figures 383; Sidebars 385; Topics 387; Names 407; References 411.

From the back-cover: "*On the Origin of Objects* is the culmination of Brian Cantwell Smith's decade-long investigation into the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of computation, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. Based on a sustained critique of the formal tradition that underlies the reigning views, he presents an argument for an embedded, participatory, 'irreductionist,' metaphysical alternative. Smith seeks nothing less than to revise our understanding not only of the machines we build but also of the world with which they interact.

Smith's ambitious project begins as a search for a comprehensive theory of computation, able to do empirical justice to practice and conceptual justice to the computational theory of mind. A rigorous commitment to these two criteria ultimately leads him to recommend a radical overhaul of our traditional conception of metaphysics.

Along the way, Smith offers many fascinating ideas: the distinction between particularity and individuality, the methodological notion of an "inscription error," an argument that there are no individuals within physics, various deconstructions of the type-instance distinction, an analysis of formality as overly disconnected ("discreteness run amok"), a conception of the boundaries of objects as properties of unruly interactions between objects and subjects, an argument for the theoretical centrality of reference preservation, and a theatrical, acrobatic metaphor for the contortions involved in the preservation of reference and resultant stabilization of objects. Sidebars and diagrams throughout the book help clarify and guide Smith's highly original and compelling argument.".

From the Preface: "This is a book about metaphysics-one that attempts to do justice to the tundra, to gardening, to politics, to rock. As indicated, my path into these subjects has come through computer science, but that is mostly by the way. Although some technical material is reviewed in chapter i, computational considerations are largely set aside, in order to tell a tale about the territory into which that long exploration has led. The result is something of a metaphysical romp-occasionally riding rough-shod over turf already well explored (and well tilled) by generations of writers: from philosophy, feminism, theology, science studies, physics, poetry. Notwithstanding the germ of truth in the remark that "progress is made by stepping on the toes of giants," links with these literatures need to, and at some later point will, be forged. Nevertheless, my aim for the present text is simple: by presenting the story stripped of its computational heritage, to open up a conversation about perspectives, requirements, insights, and struggles-a conversation with others who have been led, via different routes, to this same metaphysical terrain.

To those inspired to take the trip-whether from explicit professional wrestling with such issues, or as the result of late night reservations about how to participate authentically in academic life-I hope to say two things. First: yes, it is possible to base uncompromising theoretical inquiry on alternative

foundations: messier foundations, contested foundations, foundations that run closer to the wry and weathered texture of ordinary life. No one, least of all God, has decreed that intellectual rigor must (or even can) be founded on a pristine foundational atomism. Second, though, I also want to make evident just how much such a transformation costs. Politics, creativity, ambiguity, irreverence-none of these can be grafted, at a later stage, onto a silent steel core, or even poured, like life-giving water, over inherently desiccated foundations. The whole story has to be turned upside down." p. IX-X.

From the Conclusion: "To say that this book has opened more doors than it has closed is not to say much, since anyway it is an argument against closed doors. Still, an attempt has been made to tell a coherent story, a story it will pay to review. For one thing, it is important to see how many of the desiderata laid down in the first few chapters have been met. Since I have barely scratched the surface of a positive proposal, it is also important to understand what work remains to be done. And a number of other loose ends need to be attended to, to bring even this much of an introduction to a close.

Overall, the project was to develop what I called a *successor metaphysics*, one that would honor the following pretheoretic requirements:
1. Do justice to what is right about:

> a. *Constructivism*: a form of humility, or so at least I characterized it, requiring that we acknowledge our presence in, and influence on, the world around us; and

b. *Realism:* the view that adds to constructivism's claim that "we are here" an equally profound recognition that we are not all that is here, and that as a result not all of our stories are equally good.
2. Make sense of *pluralism*: the fact that knowledge is partial, perspectival, and never wholly extricable from its (infinite) embedding historical, cultural, social, material, economic and every other kind of context. The account of pluralism must:
a. Avoid devolving into *nihilism* or other forms of vacuous relativism, and in particular not be purchased at the price of

(successors notions of) excellence, standards, virtue, truth, or significance; and
b. Not license radical *incommensurability*, provide an excuse to build walls, or in any other way stand in the way of interchange, communion, and struggle for common ends.
Two additional criteria were applied to how these intuitions are met:
3. Be *irreductionist* -- ideologically, scientifically, and in every other way. No category, from sociality to electron, from political power to brain, from origin myth to rationality to mathematics, including the category "human," may be given a priori pride of place, and thereby be allowed to elude contingency, struggle, and price.
4. Be nevertheless *foundational*, in such a way as to satisfy our undiminished yearning for metaphysical grounding. That is, or so at least I put it, the account must show how and what it is to be grounded *simpliciter* - without being grounded in a, for any category a.
Along the way, the account should:
5. *Reclaim* tenable, lived, work-a-day successor versions of many mainstay notions of the modernist tradition: *object, objective, true, formal, mathematical, logical, physical,* etc." (pp. 345-346)

From: Brian Cantwell Smith, *On the Origin of Objects*, Cambridge: The MIT Press 1996.

CRITICAL JUDGMENTS AND SMITH'S REPLIES

"Smith's work may be aligned with the situated cognition tradition due to Barwise and Perry (Situations and attitudes, 1983). This approach emphasizes the importance of context in determining meaning. The situated semanticist is inclined to begin her theory of meaning with indexicals and other radically context sensitive representations. Tokens of 'I' have very little meaning independent of how, when, where, and by whom they

are used. More generally, the situated approach to cognition places significant emphasis on the contribution of the situation of the organism to that organism's cognitive processes.
Smith argues that as soon as we register the world using a system of representation, we make a set of strong assumptions about the way the world is. His task has been to show the profound consequences of this insight for the study of systems of representation.
Smith makes use of an engaging imaginative strategy to draw attention to the theoretical moves required to explain the occurrence of representation using only the resources of a representation-free physical world. Smith urges us to consider whether we need to think in terms of objects at all. Might an ontology consisting only of Strawson's (Individuals, 1959) 'features' be sufficient? When we declare that 'It's raining' we are drawing attention to a feature (raining) without being committed to any particular object that has that feature. Smith suggests we begin by thinking of the physicist's world as populated not by objects but field-densities. This field-theoretic description can be comprehensive while admitting only of field-densities for a small range of properties (for example, gravitational fields, electromagnetic fields, etc.).
Smith suggests that the common-sense world of middle-sized objects is an achievement of our representational practices. Representation is achieved when one aspect of the mish-mash of fields is able to separate in a certain way from the rest of the mish-mash. This region, the 's-region', is (or is becoming) the subject-something that represents the world. Smith first emphasizes the distance required between the representation and the represented, and secondly the need for coordination between the two. This coordination is likened to the actions of an acrobat who dances around a stage, but keeps a torch beam focused on one spot. The torch must undergo dramatic changes in orientation to maintain its focus at one point. The intentional acrobat is similarly dynamic in keeping its intentional objects stably registered." (p. 220)

From: Hugh Clapin (ed.), *Philosophy of Mental Representation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.

"Why re-tool our ontology? If we don't, if we complacently (or opportunistically) cling to the standard inventory, we will commit what Smith calls inscription errors or pre-emptive registration: (1) a tendency for a theorist or observer, first, to write or project or impose or inscribe a set of ontological assumptions onto a computational system (onto the system itself, onto the task domain, onto the relation between the two, and so forth), and then, second, to read those assumptions or their consequences back off the system, as if that constituted an independent empirical discovery or theoretical result. (Smith, On the origin of objects 1996 p.50) Pre-emptive registration is a sort of metaphysical anachronism, back-projecting onto our vision of ultimate-or at any rate more fundamental reality a category or assumption that is in fact the effect or artefact of some later, higher-level, more 'expensive' development." (p. 224)

Notes

(1) The term 'inscription error' is from Smith (1996). Since writing the book, Smith has shifted to using the phrase 'pre-emptive registration,' on the grounds that it is more illuminating (based on 'pre-emptive representation', from Cussins, Constructions of thought, in preparation).

From: Daniel Dennett: "Brian Cantwell Smith on Evolution, Objectivity, and Intentionality", in: Hugh Clapin (ed.), *Philosophy of Mental Representation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.

"The first remark has to do with the project of naturalizing ontology. 'Why bother?' asks Dennett. The main reason, of course, is because I believe the subject matter demands it. What ends up as a methodological commitment is grounded in an empirical claim: that the theory of ontology and the theory of representation and intentionality are about intrinsically interconnected phenomena. To study one without studying the other would be like studying time without studying space. Time is not space, of course; no one thinks they are identical. But you

would not get an adequate account of either space or time by studying it on its own. So too, I believe, for representation and ontology. How things are and how we take them to be, though by no means identical, are co-constituted in intricate ways.
I might say that I haven't always believed this.(*) During the 1980s I spent a long time trying to develop a theory of representation independent of ontology. I was particularly interested in taxonomies of representational types (symbols, icons, descriptions, models, simulations, etc.)-a theory, I might say, in which isomorphisms figured. Now I didn't have the smarts to invent targets to do the work that representations couldn't do. But my fundamental problem was that I couldn't hold the ontology fixed -- couldn't stabilize it adequately-in order to develop satisfying accounts of the plethora of correspondences that held between them. I was unable to determine (except by fiat, which didn't satisfy me) which items were objects or basic elements, which were properties of those elements, and which were relations among them. Small variations in how I registered the basic domains wreaked havoc with how I ended up classifying the representations defined over those domains. In the end I was forced to admit that the (ontological) question of whether something was an object could not be answered except with reference to the (epistemological) question of whether it was being objectified by a representing or cognizing subject. That is: my independence assumption did not work. So there is a lot of failure behind this claim that representation and ontology are parts of the same subject matter. That really is the bottom line. So I started over, to reconstruct ontology and representation together. It is not just an exercise, at the end of which you end up with the same recognizable parts. The theory that comes out-the benefits it gives you -- are different."(*) That's not quite true. What's more accurate is that I haven't always approached the subject, in my intellectual work, from an integrated perspective. Even in graduate school, I believed that ultimately they would have to be understood together. In fact my doctoral dissertation (1982) started out as one chapter in an integrated but unwieldy metaphysical project that, at the time, I was hopelessly unprepared to complete. On the origins of objects is essentially what that project turned into." (p. 238)

From: Brian Cantwell Smith, "Reply to Dennett", in: Hugh Clapin (ed.), *Philosophy of Mental Representation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.

"The identification and re-identification of objects involves an epistemic process of abstraction over the infinitely rich (and often surpassingly messy) ur-structure of the world. Among other things, the normative character of the intentional projects that agents are engaged in, when they commit these acts of abstraction, figures in the resulting 'clumping' of the world's effectively infinite detail. To be an object is to be a region or patch of the world that is successfully abstracted -- where the issue of 'success' is tied into the normative conditions governing the dynamic project of which the act of abstraction is a constitutive part. The fundamental character of (what it is to be) an object is thus intrinsically hooked into the intentional life practices of the objectifying subject.

One more point on this topic. As a way to muster support for simply availing ourselves of 'common-sense ontology', Dennett says 'Look, why not just assume sub-atomic particles and tables and mountains and galaxies, in the way that science does?' This leads me to mention a radical thesis that I hold, although I can't give it much defence here: namely, that science may not be committed to objects at all. Consider: an amoeba splits. Biology doesn't care about the individuals in the situation: whether one amoeba died and two new ones were born; or whether we now have a spatial distribution of unitary amoeba-ness; or whether one of the two emerging amoebae is the original one, and the other one is new; or any other possibility. Another example: in California I own an ancient redwood tree that has clumps of very substantial shoots (some as much as 50 feet high) sprouting around its base. How many redwood trees are there? Science doesn't know, and science doesn't care. Similar conclusions hold for fog, for the units of selection, for a myriad other examples. What this leads me to believe is that scientific laws (like animals) may in fact deal only in features; and that the objects we think of as constitutive of science may merely be simplifying epistemic devices that allow humans to calculate. Objects in science, that is,

are in my view properly understood as part of the epistemic apparatus involved in the conduct of science as an intellectual activity (on a par with mathematical models); they are not ontological commitments of the theory as a whole.
Put it this way: ontology and abstraction need naturalizing as much as meaning, semantics, and content. Assuming a 'standard ontological inventory' for purposes of giving a naturalistic account of intentionality, as Dennett suggests, is thus a doomed project: it is viciously circular. Think about how appalled we would be (or anyway naturalistically unsatisfied) if someone were to propose a theory of representation that dined out on intentional notions, as if they were freely available. The naturalistic challenge is to explain intentionality without viciously presuming intentionality. A similar moral holds for ontology, in my view. Because ontological categories are in part intentionally constituted, attempting to explain representation while dining out on ontology is, for analogous reasons, fatally circular." (pp. 241-242, notes omitted)

From: Brian Cantwell Smith, "Reply to Dennett", in: Hugh Clapin (ed.), *Philosophy of Mental Representation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.

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1. Smith, Brian Cantwell. 1982. "Linguistic and Computational Semantics." In *Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Association for Computational Linguistics*, edited by Bates, Madeleine, 9-15. Cambridge: Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.

2. ———. 1986. "Varieties of Self-Reference." In *Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge*, edited by Halpern, Joseph Y., 19-43. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.

Abstract: "The significance of any system of explicit representation depends not only on the immediate properties of its representational structures, but also on two aspects of the attendant circumstances: implicit relations among, and processes defined over, those individual representations, and larger circumstances in the world in which the whole representational system is embedded. This relativity of representation to circumstance facilitates local inference, and enables representation to connect with action, but it also limits expressive power, blocks generalisation, and inhibits communication. Thus there seems to be an inherent tension between the effectiveness of located action and the detachment of general-purpose reasoning.
It is argued that various mechanisms of causally-connected self-reference enable a system to transcend the apparent tension, and partially escape the confines of circumstantial relativity. As well as examining self-reference in general, the paper shows how a variety of particular self-referential mechanisms --- autonymy, introspection, and reflection --- provide the means to overcome specific kinds of implicit relativity. These mechanisms are based on distinct notions of self: self as unity, self as complex system, self as independent agent. Their power derives from their ability to render explicit what would otherwise be implicit, and implicit what would otherwise be explicit, all the while maintaining causal connection between the two. Without this causal connection, a system would either be inexorably parochial, or else remain entirely disconnected from its subject matter. When appropriately connected, however, a self-referential system can move plastically back and forth between local effectiveness and detached generality."

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Theory and History of Ontology

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History of Truth: *Aletheia* and Related Terms in Ancient Greek

INTRODUCTION

"Aristotle defines truth for classical philosophy: 'to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.' (*Metaphysics* 1011b) This seems simple, but it is important to see that it is not. The formula synthesizes three distinct and in no way obvious or unobjectionable assumptions, assumptions which prove decisive for the career of truth in philosophy.

First, the priority of nature over language, culture, or the effects of historical experience. One can say of what is that it is just in case there exists a what which is there, present, with an identity, form, or nature of its own.

Second, the idea that truth is a kind of sameness, falsity a difference, between what is said and what there is. In another formula Aristotle says, 'he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to the objects is in error' (1051b). To be true, what you think separated must be what is separated-that is, they must be the same (the same form or *eidos*). To accommodate the priority of nature, however, truth has to be a secondary sort of sameness: according to the classical metaphor, the imitation of original by copy. It is up to us to copy Nature's originals, whose identity and existence are determined by causes prior to and independent of local convention. Thus a third feature of classical truth: the secondary and derivative character of the signs by which truth is symbolized and communicated. Classical truth subordinates the being (the

existence and identity) of signs (linguistic or otherwise) to the natural, physical, finally given presence of the non-signs they stand for." (pp. 9-10)

Heidegger remarks that 'in ontological problematic, being and truth have from time immemorial been brought together if not entirely identified (*Sein und Zeit*, 228). He thinks this is a kind of hint. There is, however, reason to think it is an originally meaningless accident of historical grammar. To be is spoken in many ways, but for Aristotle 'it is obvious that of these the what-something-is, which signifies the substance, is the first' (1028a). In a study of the Greek verb 'be' (*einai*), Charles Kahn shows the priority of its use as a predicating copula and the corresponding insignificance of the difference between existing and not existing. 'Both of them,' he writes of Plato and Aristotle, 'systematically subordinate the notion of existence to predication, and both tend to express the former by means of the latter. In their view to be is to be a definite kind of thing.' In contrast to what something is, the factor of existing, if it appears at all, appears secondary and of no distinct significance. For both, 'existence is always *einai ti*, being something or other, being something definite. There is no concept of existence as such.' This is not to say that Aristotle, for instance, is oblivious of the difference between what a thing is and its existence. Joseph Owens observes, 'Aristotle does not for an instant deny existence. He readily admits it in Being *per accidens*. But he does not seem even to suspect that it is an act worthy of any special consideration, or that it is capable of philosophical treatment.' (1) Kahn also describes a so-called veridical use of the Greek 'be' according to which it 'must be translated by 'is true,' 'is so,' 'is the case,' or by some equivalent phrase.' He remarks that 'instead of existence ... it was another use of to be that gave Parmenides and Plato their philosophical starting point: the veridical use of esti and on for 'the facts' that a true statement must convey. Thus the Greek concept of Being takes its rise from ... this notion of what is as whatever distinguishes truth from falsehood ... doctrines of Being first arose in Greece in connection with the question: what must reality be like for knowledge and informative discourse to be possible and for statements and beliefs of the form X is Y to be

true?' To ask what reality must be like for sentences to be true implies that truth in sentences is their being like what is. Kahn writes, 'the pre-philosophic conception of truth in Greek ... involves some kind of correlation or fit between what is said or thought, on one side, and what is or what is the case or the way things are on the other side.' As veridical, the Greek esti 'poses a relation between a given descriptive content and the world to which it refers or which it purports to describe ... truth depends on some point of similarity or agreement between the two.' Truth, in Greek, is the virtue of a discourse that subordinates itself to what is, assuming second hand the same form as the beings whose being makes the discourse true. 'If we bear in mind the structure of the veridical use of the verb, we will easily see how the philosophers' interest in knowledge and truth, taken together with this use of 'to be,' immediately leads to the concept of Being as ... the facts that make true statements true.' (2)" (pp. 14-15)

Notes

(1) Charles H. Kahn "*Retrospect on the Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being*," in Simo Knuuttila & Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), *The Logic of Being: Historical Studies*, Dordrecht: Reidel, (1986), pp. 21-22; and "*Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy*," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), 333. Joseph Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics*," 3d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), p. 309.

(2) Charles H. Kahn, "*Retrospect*," pp. 8, 22; "*Why Existence*," p. 329; and *The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek*, Dordrecht: Reidel, (1973), pp. 313, 363.
The idea of a veridical "be" has been questioned by Mohan Matthen, "*Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth*," Phronesis 28 (1983) pp. 113-135.

From: Allen Barry, *Truth in Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993 (notes abbreviated).

> "Our question is: how is truth related positively to historicity? Our guiding suggestion is that such an investigation itself needs to be conducted in a historical manner, by working through the generation of our present ways of thinking about truth. To propose this way of investigating the topic of truth and historicity is, however, to be brought face-to-face with a recurring problem. For straight away the topic of our investigation seems to pose a dilemma for us at the level of method.

On the one hand, if we are to take our own historicity seriously, it would seem that the investigation will have to be undertaken in a historical manner; in short, to be an inquiry into the history of the idea of truth and of the idea of historicity. Yet, on the other hand, the topic of the relation of truth to historicity seems, in itself, to be a philosophical issue which a historical survey could, at best, only illustrate. Thus philosophy and history, as two different kinds of inquiry, seem to exhibit just that same polar opposition as do the ideas of truth and historicity. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the enterprise of carrying out an inquiry which is at once historical and philosophical should seem impractical. This methodological stumbling-block warrants careful pondering. (p. 7)

The historian of philosophy is operating with a consciousness different from that of the historical philosopher. The directedness of the former's thinking remains focused upon the thinkers of the past; their thoughts are what the inquiry is about. Thus, there is an inevitable epistemological 'distance' between the historian as subject and the past as object. But whoever philosophizes historically is engaged essentially in a complex act of self-consciousness. One enters into the past only to return to oneself; indeed, one recognizes elements of one's own way of thinking there in the past, and recognizes them as one's own. The historian of philosophy may be struck by flashes of self-recognition too, just as contrariwise the inquiry might lead to the revision of beliefs held now. But from the point of view of the teleology of the discipline, those results are accidental side-effects. For the historical philosopher, such outcomes are essential to the kind of self-conscious reflection engaged upon. Again, unrealized

possibilities for thought forgone by past thinkers may be identified by historians of philosophy, especially by those whose procedure is hermeneutically sensitive. But for those who philosophize historically such identifications are only the first step towards the development of one's own position, in full self-consciousness, as both growing out of the inherited past and yet going beyond it." (p. 10)

From: Richard Campbell, *Truth and Historicity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

ALETHÉIA IN ANCIENT GREEK

"The study of early Greek notions of truth is still dominated, fifty years later, by Heidegger's influential restatement (1) of the view (2) that *to a-lêthes* is, originally and essentially, *to mê lanthanon* -- i.e., the "unhidden" or "unforgotten". If Heidegger and his followers are correct, *alêtheia* must be a quality inherent in objects perceived or information received: a certain self-evidence, abiding clarity or memorableness (3). Against this view (though also, by implication, against those who reject altogether the correctness or relevance of the derivation from the root *lath-* (4) Bruno Snell has recently suggested (5) that the *lêthê* excluded by *a-lêtheia* is something found in persons rather than things: forgetfulness rather than hiddenness or being forgotten. A-lethes is that which is retained in the memory without any of the gaps to which such *lêthê* would give rise. (p. 7)

In this "subjective" reformulation of the established, "objective" interpretation, aletheia becomes the result of the way an original apprehension remains in the perceiving subject's memory, not an aspect of objects or information as originally apprehended. But perception or apprehension continues to be of major, if no longer central, importance. The discussion which follows accepts Snell's subjective interpretation in the main but argues for further reformulation, this time in terms of the processes of

communication rather than perception: *alêtheia* is that which is involved in, or results from, a 'transmission of information that excludes *lêthê* ', whether in the form of forgetfulness, failure to notice, or ignoring (6). The semantic development thus posited, by which a word that originally meant something like "conscientious reporting" became a synonym for truth (*etymon* or *eteon* in the earliest attested Greek) has a close parallel in the transformation of Latin *accuratus* ("careful", usually of speech or writing) into English "accurate". The Greek counterpart to this development is more complex and harder to trace: *alêtheia* absorbs some of the original meaning of two other more specialized terms (*nêmertês, atrekês*) and transmits some of its own to a third (*akribês*) before finally becoming, in the mid-fifth century, the most general and important word for truth. Moreover, the initial and terminal stages of its history are much better documented than the intervening ones. But the development in all its phases is worth an attempt at reconstruction, even if the consequences for the history of Greek thought are less spectacular here than where the Heideggerian etymology serves as a point of departure.

Snell's subjective reformulation, whether as originally presented by him or in the revised version to be offered here, removes the most 'crucial ' problem posed by its objective alternative. Hiddenness (or failure to be remembered) and its opposite are conditions which should attach to things as well as to the content of statements. Yet it is almost, exclusively to the latter that *alêthes* refers in its first two and a half centuries of attestation. A Greek may, from the very beginning, speak the truth (or "true things"), but it is not until much later that he is able to hear it (Aesch. Ag. 680), or see it (Pind. N. 7,25), or be truly good (Simonides 542,1 Page), or believe in true gods (Herodotus 2, 174, 2). And it is later still that *alêtheia* comes to refer to the external reality of which discourse and art are imitations. Other *lanthanein* derivatives -- *lathra, lathraios* (and *alastos*, if it belongs to this group)--are applied freely, at all periods of their use, to persons, things and situations; why not *alêthes* as well (7). The question becomes fairly easy to answer if *alêtheia* is taken to be, in origin, a kind of "unforgettingness", a specifically human

quality and one which is most crucially and consistently important in the realm of human discourse. (p. 28)

Notes

(1) In *Sein und Zeit* 33 and 220-223. Cf., also, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, 26-33 and ' *Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)* ', 54-61.
(2) First stated by J. Classen, *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch*, Frankfurt 1867, 197 [reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977] (*)
(3) See, most briefly, the articles in the etymological dictionaries of Frisk (s.v. *'alethês'*) and Chantraine (s.v. *'lanthanô* '), and, most exhaustively, J.-P. Levet, *Le vrai at le faux dans la pensêe grecque archaique*, Paris 1976.
(4) E.g., A. W. H. Adkins, 'Truth, Kosmos and Arete in Homer', *Classical Quarterly* 66, 1972, 6-7. Cf., also, Friedländer's suggestion (P1ato (2nd edition) vol. 1, eng. transl. New York 1958, 221 -- modified and largely abandoned in Plato (3rd edition) vol. 1, Berlin 1964, 234-236) that the word may not even be Indo-European.
(5) In *ALETHEIA, Festschrift für Ernst Siegmann* (= Wurzbiirger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft 1, 1975), 1-18. See, especially, 14 "ἀλήθες ist das rm Gedächtnis lückenlos Festgehaltene (das in seiner Fülle hergezählt werden kann)", and 11, "... in einen bestimmten Wissens-Kontinuum nichts der Lethe anheimfallen lassen". Snell seems indebted to T. Krischer's study, ' *ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ*', Philologus 109, 1965, 161-174 for his notion of *aletheia* as the larger whole from all of whose parts the process or idea associated with the lath- root is excluded. For Krischer this idea is that of being "unnoticed" rather than "unhidden" or "forgetful", so that an alethes logos is "... der Bericht der die Dinge darstellt... ohne das dabei etwas unbemerkt bleibt" (op. cit. 167; cf. 165: "... so aussagen das nichts [dem Angeredeten] entgeht) ".
(6) As in the corresponding verbs lanthano and lethomai, the distinction between unintentional forgetting or failure to notice and intentional ignoring is not strictly observed. The meaning posited is broad enough to include both.

(7) Usage thus tells strongly against the relevance of W. Luther's contention (Wahrheit, Licht und Erkenntniss in der griechischen Philosophie bis Demokrit', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 10, 1966) that the Homeric world is one which knows "keinen Unterschied zwischen Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (31), and in which "die Dinge und die sie bezeichnenden Wörter noch in einem untrennbaren Wirkungszusammenhang stehen" (37). This may be true in general, and for *etymos* (text, p. 13), but not for *alêthes* . Cf. Snell (above, n. 5) 11, n. 4, and 17.

> (*) [*Note added by Raul Corazzon*: The text by Johannes Classen is: "Wahr ist den Griechen das Unverhüllte, ἀ-λήθες (von λήθω, λανθανω) und die Wahrheit, ἀλήθεια, kommt den Dingen und Worten zu, in so fern sie sich unsrer Einsicht nicht entziehen." in: *Über eine hervorstechende Eigentümlichkeit der griechischen Sprache* (1850), reprinted in *Beobachtungen*... cit.]

From: Thomas Cole, *Archaic Truth*, Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, Nuova Serie, 13, 1983.

SOME REMARKS ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF ALETHEIA

"*Aletheia* is the most important Greek counterpart of our 'truth'; *alethes* (true), *alethos* (truly) and *alethein* (to speak the truth) are related words. However, the Greek "truth-family" is much more comprehensive and consists of 14 words, among others (adjectives): *atrekes, nemertes, adolos, ortos, apseudos, etymos and etetymos*. It is characteristic that several words, including aletheia also, belonging to this variety begin with ' *a*'. The most common interpretation of this lexical phenomenon it to consider ' *a*' as a sign of privativum, that is, as a negative noun or adjective. This understanding of *aletheia* was proposed by Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, Ohimpiodoros and the so-called *Lexicon Gudianum* in antiquity (see [Wilhelm Luther, *"Wahrheit" und*

"Lüge" im ältesten Griechentum (1935), pp. 12-13; Paul Friedländer, *Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswrklichkeit,* (1954) pp. 222, 375]). In our times, it was recalled by Leo Myers in his influential *Handbuch der griechischen Etymologie* (1901) and popularized by Rudolf Bultmann (see *[Der griechische und hellenistische Sprachgebrauch von ἀλήθεια,* p. 239]): "aletheia - etymologisch das Nicht(s) - *verheimlichen* - bedeutet". According to this interpretation, we should consider such words as complexes of the following structure: *a-letheia, a-trekes, a-dolos or a-pseudos*; *nemertes* can be understood in a similar way, because ' *ne*' functions as ' *a*', that is, as an indicator of a privative character. As far as the matter concerns *aletheia*, its etymology is derived as *a* + *lethe* + suffix. *Aletheia* as a noun occurred with so-called *verba dicendi*, [verbs of saying] that is, verbs like Greek counterparts of "to tell" or "to hear". So much about matters of lexicology and a simple grammar. Of course, semantic matters are much more important. Very schematically, if *V (aletheia)*, where the letter *V* stands for a *verbum dicendi*, represents an *aletheia*-context, to *V* an *aletheia* consisted in issuing a concrete sentence in the present tense about something, usually supported by direct experience, particularly seeing (see [H. Boeder, *Der frügeschichte Wörtgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia* (1959) pp. 68-71]). Then, applications of *aletheia*-contexts were extended to past and future events. Finally, *aletheia* became an abstract noun, denoting a property of sentences (judgements, etc.)." (p. 341)

From: Jan Wolenski, *Aletheia* in Greek Thought Until Aristotle, *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, 127: 2005, pp. 339-360.

A SYNTHETIC OVERVIEW OF ALETHÉIA IN ANCIENT GREEK

1. For many years there has been a tendency in biblical studies to over-generalize about the uses of *alétheia* and *aléthes* in classical Greek. This has been done partly with a view to drawing a clear-cut contrast between Greek and Hebraic concepts of truth. It is

then argued that whilst some New Testament writers preserve the Hebraic concept, other writers, especially John, achieve a fusion of these two views. Thus R. Bultmann too readily speaks of "the Greek use" of *alétheia* as over against "the semitic use" (*Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* I 238). According to this theory, *alétheia* in classical Greek denotes truth in contrast to mere appearance, whilst in Hebrew the parallel word denotes stability or faithfulness. It is also urged that truth in Greek writers is timeless, raised above the temporal and material world. It relates only to extra-historical being. Most scholars also insist that the basic meaning of *alétheia* in classical Greek is that of unhiddenness or unveiling. These traditional claims of nineteenth- and twentieth-century biblical scholarship are valid up to a point, but can be misleading unless they are carefully qualified.

2. The traditional approach depends largely on three arguments.

(a) Much is made of the etymology of *alétheia* in ancient Greek. The word is said to derive from *letho* or *lanthano*, meaning to escape notice or to cause to forget, together with Alpha privative prefix, which negates the idea. The difficulty, however, is to show that the etymology of the word played a decisive part in determining its meaning in later Greek of the classical and Hellenistic periods. Indeed, even Homer shows little evidence that the word has this special nuance.

(b) *alétheia* does indeed mean truth in contrast to mere appearance in much Greek philosophy. But the vast majority of classical Greek writers and readers were not philosophers. J. B. Skemp observes, "There is one particular vice in the theological picture (or rather, caricature) of the Greeks. They are always represented as philosophical thinkers.... Such a description of the Greeks ignores the fact that many other Greeks at all the relevant times thought differently, and that a multitude of them did not think in this systematic way at all" (*The Greeks and the Gospel*, 1964, 3-4).

(c) The notion of truth as against mere appearance and as that which belongs only to the realm of timelessness and immateriality finds strong support in Parmenides and especially in Plato. This need not be denied. Nevertheless, even within Greek philosophy itself there are other views of truth besides

Plato's, for example, that of the Sophists, which Plato himself attacks, and also that of Aristotle. In these writers truth has a more positive relation to the material world.
3. (a) In Homer *alétheia* is most frequently used in contrast to the telling of a lie or to the withholding of information, e.g. "Tell me all the truth [*pasan alétheian*] whether my son is by the ship" (*Ilyad* 24, 407); "I will tell you all the truth" (*Odyssey* 11, 507). When Odysseus with cunning "spoke not the truth", he simply tells a lie (*Od*. 13, 254). Achilles set an umpire to tell the truth of a race, i.e. the state of affairs as it really was (*Il*. 23, 361). However, this is not the only meaning of *alétheia* or *alethes* in Homer. In *Il*. 12, 433 *gyne chernetis alethes* means a woman who is careful, honest, accurate, or even perhaps reliable. (b) *alétheia* usually stands in opposition to falsehood in Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophanes. For example, the cowherd in Herodotus "tells the truth" under threat of violence (l, 116). Thucydides speaks of "the actual truth" in contrast to mere empty boasts (2, 41, 2). An oracle provides true answers to enquiries (Herodotus., l, 55). (c) This usage also persists in later Hellenistic writers. Thus Epictetus contrasts telling the truth with deceiving flatteries (*Discourse* IV, l, 6, 7). Philo writes that Moses marvelled at the delusion (*pseudos*) which the multitude had bartered for the truth (*alétheia*) (*De Vita Moses* 2, 167). The evil spies sent out to view the land prefer deceit (*apate*) to truth (*Vit*. *Mos*. l, 235). Josephus uses *alétheia* in several different senses.
(i) Truth is that which corresponds to the facts of the matter. Thus Jonathan did not question the truth (veracity) of David's words (*Antiquities of the Jews* 6, 225).
(ii) Truth is also proved to be such by historical events. The words of a prophet are thus proved true (*Antiquities* 2, 209); whilst in the previous passage Jonathan does not wait to see David's words proved true (*Antiquities* 6, 225). (iii) Josephus also uses *alethes* in the sense of "genuine" or "real". Thus Ahab killed the real owner (*ton alethe despoten*) of the vineyard (*Antiquities* 8, 360).
4. The use of *alethes* in Greek philosophical texts is best seen in Parmenides, the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle. Some of Plato's uses also appear in Philo.
(a) Parmenides asks what is the nature of real being, and draws a contrast between the way of truth and the way of seeming.

Change belongs only to the material world, which is the realm of mere appearance. There can be no change in what really exists (Fragment 8, 29). "What is not" is unthinkable and unknowable, but change would be the supposed movement of what is to what is not, or of what is not to what is. Hence truth, in contrast to appearance, belongs to the extra-historical realm of the changeless. That such a view occurs in Greek philosophical literature is therefore clear. What is less certain is the extent to which ordinary Greek writers shared the view of Parmenides.
(b) The Sophists clearly held a different view. In particular Protagoras refused to view the material world as mere illusion. His famous dictum that "man is the measure of all things" was not intended merely, as Plato implied, as an extreme form of relativism. He cited the example of a wind which may seem warm to one person and cool to another. It is not necessary, he urged, to say that one view is true and the other false. Each may be true for the person concerned. In this way Protagoras comes near to the modern notion of existential truth.
(c) Plato rejects this view.
(i) He replied that if "true" and "false" are only relative to the individual thinker, then as soon as someone says that the philosophy of Protagoras is false for him, it is therefore false (*Theaetetus* 171 a). Falsehood, for Plato, is a matter of deception. It conceals reality (*ta onta*). False words, he believed, are merely a copy (*mimem*) of deception in the soul (*Republic* 2, 21, 382a-383b). Falsehood is the presentation of what is only appearance (*phantasma*). By contrast "the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood [*apseudes ... to theion*]". God is true in deed and word (*alethes en to ergo kai en logo*) and neither changes himself nor deceives others (382e). Plato thus returns to the view, earlier outlined in Parmenides, that truth stands in contrast to appearance and to change, although he goes further than Parmenides in locating it in the realm of eternal ideas.
(ii) At the same time Plato also uses *alétheia* and *alethes* in more ordinary and less metaphysical ways. Truth sometimes means simply "the facts of the matter" (*Epistles* 7, 330). *alétheia* stands in contrast to legend (*Timaeus* 22d). "Equal to equal ... because of truth" (*Legibus* 2, 668a).

(d) Aristotle takes us closest to the view of truth found in modern propositional logic. Firstly, Aristotle distinguishes between the genuine proposition, which is true-or-false, and sentences such as pleas or commands. "We call propositions only those (sentences) which have truth or falsity in them" (*On Interpretation* 4, 17a, 4). Secondly, he considers the logical conditions under which the truth of a proposition entails the denial of its contrary. If it is true to say "Socrates is well", it is therefore false to say "Socrates is ill" (*Categories* 10, 13b, 14-35). Thirdly, he argues that "the truth of a proposition consists in corresponding with facts" (*hoi logoi aletheis hosper ta pragmata*, *On Interpretation* 9, 19a, 33). The principle is said to include statements about future states of affairs (18a-b). Often, however, the actual word *alétheia* is used in its ordinary everyday sense without philosophical content. The philosopher seeks to discover "the truth" that is in the universe (*De Mundo* 4, 39la).
(e) Philo uses *alétheia* in ordinary ways, as we have seen. As a Jewish theologian he speaks of "true doctrine" (*alethes dogma*, *Legum Allegoriae* 3, 229). But as a speculative writer who has been influenced by Platonism he also contrasts truth with mere appearance: "Moses desired truth rather than appearance *[tou dokein*]" (*De Vita Moses* 1, 48). However, he also sees the truth of God manifested in historical events, as in a quick punishment for unbelief (*Vit. Mos*. 2, 284).” pp. 874-877

From: Anthony C. Thiselton, "Truth", in Colin Brown (ed.) *The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology*. Vol. III. Exeter: Paternoster Press 1978, pp. 874-902.

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PRE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF TRUTH IN ANCIENT GREECE

THE PRE-PHILOSOPHICAL USAGE OF ALETHÉIA

HOMER

Texts:

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"As scholars have often pointed out, the word *Aletheia* only occurs in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in connection with verbs of saying, and its opposite is a lie or deception. Someone always tells the truth to another. Of the seventeen occurrences, (a) this triadic pattern is explicit in all but six, and in those few cases the reference to a hearer is clearly implied. Truth has to do with the reliability of what is said by one person to another.
What is not so often pointed out are some quite distinctive features of the Homeric use of Aletheia. This is not the only word Homer uses to mean truth; he has a number of other words which mean 'true', 'genuine', 'accurate', and 'precise' (*atrekes, eteos, etetumos, etumos*). These words, as adjectives or adverbs, occur freely in the midst of stories and speeches. By contrast, Aletheia occurs almost always as a noun or neuter adjective (once the cognate adverb *alethes* is used). It is the word Homer uses when he wishes to signify 'the truth'.
Furthermore, it is very revealing that the sentence, 'Then verily, child, I will tell you the truth', occurs five times in the *Odyssey* with

but minor variations. (b) It is a high-sounding formula used to introduce a speech. The repetition of lines and formulaic phrases-sometimes, indeed, a number of lines-is a feature of the Homeric style. That Aletheia should occur in such a context suggests that the sentence is one that has come down in the tradition as a ready-made formula which Homer inherited.

Again, significantly, the word often occurs in the phrase 'the whole truth' (*pasan alétheien)*. (c) To tell the truth in this sense is not just to utter some sentence which is true-that is a much more modern conception. It is to give a whole account, to tell the entire narrative. So, for example, at *Iliad* 23.361, Achilles sets Phoenix as umpire to watch a chariot-race and to report back the truth. The same meaning underlies *Odyssey* 13.254, where Odysseus is about to address Athena, the daughter of Zeus, in a very fulsome account 'yet he spoke not the truth but checked the word ere it was uttered'. In many other occurrences one of the characters is entreated to tell the truth, or undertakes to do so, in relation to certain questions which have been asked. Here again, the notion is that the account given has to be complete and accurate, with nothing held back and with no deception. The Homeric notion of Aletheia which emerges from examining its uses is precisely the same, with the same force and flavour, as that enshrined in the traditional oath or solemn affirmation required of a witness in court proceedings: to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Given this use in Homer, it appears that Aletheia is a matter of being truthful and open in one person's dealings with another, so that what is said can be taken by hearers as reliable and trustworthy. That being so, the meaning discernible in its use coincides with the etymology of the word given by most scholars, both ancient and modern. The word is generally taken to be derived from a root meaning 'to escape notice, detection'. The same root, with much the same meaning, underlies the Latin *lateo*, 'am hidden', 'remain unnoticed', from which English derives 'latent'. The word *lethe* in Greek means 'forgetfulness'. How prominent the nuance of not forgetting is taken to be in Aletheia is debatable. But from the evidence it does appear that in Homer the nuance of not hiding is strong. People speak the truth if they hide or conceal nothing from their hearers. (d)" (pp. 32-33)

Notes

(a) That is, excluding the occurrence of *aléthes* at *Iliad* 12.433, which is probably a corruption of *aletis* -- see H. J. Mette, ' *Aléthes*', in Bruno Snell (ed.), *Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1955-).
(b) *Odyssey* 3.354, 16.61, 16.226, 17.108, 22.420.
(c) e.g. in the *Odyssey* 3.354 and 16.6, (already cited) and in 11.507, 17.297, and *Iliad* 24.407.
(d) See Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides*, 64 ff., and C. H. Kahn, *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek* (Foundations of language Suppl. Series, 16; Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973), 364 ff.

From: Richard Campbell, *Truth and Historicity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992.

"The result is that the epic texts entertain an endless dialogue and conversation on all the topics of archaic Greek thought. To begin with the notion of truth in relation to the language of poetry, the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and Hesiod eavesdrop on each other, the *Odyssey* teasing slightly the notion of *kleos* [glory] in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* providing the foil for Hesiod's attack on the poets, *gasteres oion*, "mere bellies." In the age of writers, a man as wise as Xenophanes is not content with attacking by name, author to author, the hexametric poetry of Homer and Hesiod: he goes on to quote, and he quotes by alluding to a line of the poet he is condemning. So Xenophanes fragment 36, which reads *tauta dedoxastho men eoikota tois elumoisin*, "let these things be considered to resemble truth," cannot be separated either from Hesiod *Theogony* 27 or from *Odyssey* 19.203. (10) The textual parallels between Parmenides and the *Odyssey*, as Alexander Mourelatos writes, "have been commonplace for almost a century," and several incorporations of Odyssean phrases by Parmenides' text have in recent years been shown to contain a specific set of allusive interactions. (11)
The perception that the poetic language maintains a difficult and problematic relation with truth belongs to all the texts in question, but the economy of this relation and the strategies that are devised to save the notion of truth from the contiguity of falsity are as different as are the texts.
The question of truth (*aletheia*) in relation to being (*to on*) and to language (*logos*) remains fundamental. Heidegger has elaborated

these questions in the Greek context beginning with *Iliad* 1.70, *ta t'eonta, ta t'essomena pro t'eonta*, in a famous essay, (12) where he defines being of *einai* as presencing and connects the Iliadic *ta eonta* with Anaximander's *ta eonta*. (pp. 242-243)"

Notes

(10) The resemblance between Xenophanes frag. 36 and Hesiod *Theogony* 27 is evident to some critics: see André Rivier, "*Rémarques sur les fragments 34 et 35 de Xénophane*," Revue de Philologie 30 (1956): 37-61.
(11) See Eric A. Havelock, "*Parmenides and Odysseus*,"*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958): 133-43; and Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1970), pp. 17-34.
(12) Martin Heidegger, "*The Anaximander Fragment*," in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 36 ff.

From: Pietro Pucci, *Odysseus Polutropos. Intertextual readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1987.

"*Truth* beginning with the presocratic Parmenides assumed some kind of at least proto-eidetic, non-immediate and reflected status in the Greek culture. This was not the case in Homer's texts, where how a statement "rang true" depended to a much greater extent on its traditional linguistic power than on the idiosyncratic, individual behavior of a specific character or some universalized sense of character that Aristotle was yet to create in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Homeric truth lay in a factual *mythos* ("myth'), not a fictive *logos* ("argument"). The archaic *mythos* was defined in its factual, even artifactual, relationship to an immediately recognizable "deed" (*ergon*), not to an *ergon* that Aristotle might wish to judge, through a problematically narrated *logos*, "certainly" (*akribes*), "decorously" (*to prepon*), and ultimately universally or "absolutely" (*haplos*). Consequently, as Vico perceived in his *De Antiquissima*, for Homer fact implied truth (*verum-factum*). Vico was to attribute to the ancient Latins the different Aristotelian notion that only certainty implies truth (*verum-certum)*. So arises yet another difference linked to a common source, in this instance '"truth. Again, it

suggests a shift or skew that is central to our rhetoric and its powers of interpretation, that is, its hermeneutics". (p. 64)
"*Der Weg* (*) is an important collection of those essays that most clearly reveal Snell's insights into the idiosyncratic properties of Homeric experience. Chapter 5 ("The Development of the Notion of Truth among the Greeks") was written specifically against Heidegger false notion of archaic "Truth" and, as such, succeeds in dismissing any putative "onto-theological" essence of "Truth" from the Homeric treasure house of nonrepresentational mental activity. The chapter is a shortened version of an earlier essay entitled "ALETHEIA" (*Festschrift Ernst Siegmann* [Würzburg: Schoning 1975], 9-17) which should be read by whose interested in more Homeric examples to bolster the argument. In both pieces, as is the case in Snell's most popular work, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 4th ed. (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), there lies an Aristotelian differentiation that too easily skews the cultural continuity of Homeric experience, with which we all must deal. If indeed, as Snell argues generally, mental activity moves from the concrete sense of Homeric experience to an abstract reflection of the philosophical sort, two reservations must always apply to any statement about how the Greeks or we 'think": (1) the opposition concrete/abstract is purely an Aristotelian formulation designed by him, along with his notion of particulars and universals to arrive at a "proper judgment", and (2) the philosophical penchant for an abstract lexis does not in any way minimize the continual operation of Homeric perception to the present day.
Snell defines "the three significant aspects, under which Homer sees what one later named the truth." Here, too, it is necessary to identify the Aristotelian, philosophical lexis that tends to creep into Snell's modern German prose:

alethes is that consistent, solid surety in memory (that in its fullness can be enumerated), ["Memory" in any functional sense is not found in the Homeric texts; *mnemosyne* appears as hapaxlegomenon at *Iliad* 8.181, with an imperative: *mneomosyne tis epeita pyros deioio genestho* ("then let some memory of blazing fire come about") "Fullness" and "enumeration" are, however, characteristically Homeric perceptions of experience, especially when linked to "cataloguing".]

eteon is the factual [*Tatsächliche*], an objective Being, [*ein objektiv Seiendes*] (that as such draws necessarily specific consequences, in sharp antithesis [*Gegensatz*] to Not-Being [*Nichtseienden*]. ["Objective Being" suggests too strongly the *De Anima*, and Snell's argument is not convincing that at *Iliad* 2.299-300, when Odysseus asks the host to wait *ophra daomen / e eteon Kalchas manteuetai, ee kai ouki* ("that we may learn whether what Calchas foretells is true, or whether indeed it is not"), there arises the question of Being and Not-Being (Snell, *Der Weg*, 95-96). "Antithesis" or "opposition," moreover, too easily falls into some Aristotelian readings of a pre-Socratic, not entirely Homeric structure of thought. It is the relationship between *eteon* and the factual that is the insight here.]

nemertes is the Not-Falling [*Nicht-Verfehlende*] in especially the replying word (the "*Ant-Wort*"), that something factual [*ein Tatsächliches*] (*eteon*), at last come about [*trifft*], when one make inquiries about him. (Snell, *Der Weg*, 100)

It is Snell's understanding of *nemertes* as "truth" that forms a common definition of all lexical choices in Homer that attempt to express the force of the human experience. Snell's attempt to color *alethés* with a "subjective" tone over an "objective" one (*Der Weg,* 109) is probably explained by a zeal to crush Heidegger's "objective" fiction. Unfortunately, the philosophical debate tends to blur the central issue of language and human discourse that the root sense of all "truth" in Homer suggests (Cole "Archaic Truth", 27). (For distinctions among *nemertes, atrekes,* and *alethes* that Snell is unwilling to draw [*Der Weg*, 98], see Cole "Archaic Truth", 17)." (pp. 79-80)

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Thomas Cole (1983). "Archaic Truth", *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica*, Nuova Serie, 13, pp. 7-28.
Bruno Snell (1978). *Der Weg zum Denker und zur Wahrheit. Studien zur frühgriechischen Sprache*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

From: Raymond A. Prier, *Achilles Rheter? Homer and proto-rhetorical truth* in: Brenda Deen Schildgen (ed.), *The Rhetoric Canon*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1997.

"As we look beyond Homeric diction, however, at later stages in the history of Greek poetics, we can find evidence for the emergence of yet another word that marks speech as special -- so special that it is set apart even from *múthos*, which in such contexts then becomes in its own turn "ordinary." I mean "ordinary" only to the extent that the given opposing word becomes even more special. The word in question is *alethés* 'true' or *alétheia* 'truth'. In the diction of a fifth-century poet like Pindar, for example, this word is used in explicit opposition to the word *múthos* in contexts where true speech is being contrasted to other forms of speech that are discredited, that cannot be trusted (αλαθῆ λόγον) versus μύθοι at *Olympian* 1.29-30, μύθοις versus αλαθειαν at *Nemean* 7.23-25)." (42)
There is, to be sure, nothing post-Homeric about the actual word *alethés* 'true' or *alétheia* 'truth', or even about the concept inherent in the formation of the word, which expresses an explicit denial, by way of the negative element *a-*, of forgetting, *leth-*, and thereby an implicit affirmation of remembering, *mné-*. (43) As Martin has shown convincingly, the Homeric word *múthos* is associated with narrating from memory, (44) which he describes as the rhetorical act of recollection. (45) This speech-act of recollection, which qualifies explicitly as a *múthos* (as at *Iliad* 1.273), is the act of *mné-* 'remembering'. An ideal example is the wording of Phoenix in *Iliad* 9.527 as he introduces the story of the hero Meleagros to Achilles and the rest of the audience: μέμνημαι 'I remember [*mné-*]'.(46)
The failure of any such speech-act is marked by the act of *léth-* 'forgetting' (as with λήθεαι at *Iliad* 9.259).(47)
The very concept of *aléthés* 'true' or *alétheia* 'truth' expresses the need to avoid such failure in the speech-act, the *múthos*, of recollection or narrating from memory, and Homeric diction can actually combine *aléthés* 'true' with a derivative of *múthos*, the verb *muthéomai* 'make a *múthos'*, as in the expression *alethéa muthésasthai* 'speak true things' at Iliad 6.382 (the whole speech in question is introduced as a *múthos* at 6.381). The Homeric meaning of *muthéomai* 'make a *múthos*' has all the force of *múthos* itself, as we see from this description by Martin: "When this word for speech occurs, the accompanying discourse has a formal nature, often religious or legal; full detail is laid out for the audience, or is expected by the interlocutor in the poem; at times, a character

comments on the formal qualities of the discourse labelled with this verb." (48)
Granted, then, that there is nothing post-Homeric about the actual word *aléthés* 'true' or *alétheia* 'truth'; also, that this word does not enter into opposition with *múthos* in Homeric diction. In post-Homeric traditions, however, as we have seen, for example, in the diction of Pindar, *múthos* has indeed become an opposite of *aléthés* 'true' or *alétheia* 'truth', which is now marked as being distinct from *múthos*. In the Pindaric examples that we have already considered, the word *múthos* has defaulted into a vague plural (μύθοι at *Olympian* 1.30, μύθοις at *Nemean* 7.23), representing a murky multiplicity of discredited versions against which backdrop the singular truth of *alétheia* is being highlighted in shining contrast. (49) In brief, as I have argued at length in my earlier work on such post-contexts, the meaning of *múthos* as a speech-act has thus become marginalized.(50)
There are traces of this marginalization at even earlier stages. Let us consider the expression *aléthea gerúsasthai* 'announce true things' in Hesiod *Theogony* 28, which is a formulaic variant of *aléthea muthésasthai* 'speak true things', as attested at Iliad 6.382. (51) It appears from such variations that *gerúomai* 'announce' has become the marked member in opposition to *muthéomai* 'speak', which then becomes unmarked.(52) Similarly with *aléthea muthé sasthai* 'speak true things', as attested at *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 121, as also at *Iliad* 6.382: this formula is in turn a variant of *etétuma muthésasthai* 'speak genuine things', as attested at *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 44. Just as *gerúomai* 'announce' has become the marked member in opposition to *muthéomai* 'speak', so also *aléthea* 'true things' has become the marked member in opposition to *etétuma* or *étuma* 'genuine things'.(53) The latter opposition is made explicit in the quoted words of the Muses themselves in Hesiod *Theogony* 27-28, where the unique truth-value of the *Theogony* itself is heralded by the goddesses as *alethéa* 'true things' (28) in opposition to a multiplicity of versions that look like *étuma* 'genuine things' but are in reality *pseúdea* 'fallacies' ('many fallacies that look like genuine things' 27).(54)
In my earlier work, I have argued at length that such variations result from a chain of differentiations setting off a single marked pan-Hellenic version from a multiplicity of unmarked versions that are perceived as local or at least more local.(55) For now I need only

emphasize that this newer concept is marked as distinct from earlier concepts that thereby default into an unmarked category. As the word *aléthes* ‘true’ or *alétheia* ‘truth’ becomes marked in opposition to mûthos, which in turn becomes unmarked in the context of such opposition, the meaning of mûthos becomes marginalized to mean something like ‘myth’ in the popular sense of the word as it is used today in referring to the opposite of ‘truth’. (pp. 122-124)
(...)
In short, the expression *aléthea gerúsasthai* ‘to herald true things’ in Theogony 28 designates not just the process of speaking something that is privileged: it explicitly marks a speech-act, an utterance with special authority. It seems to me not enough to establish that the adjective *aléthes*can be interpreted as ‘verifiable’, in the etymological sense that it negates the idea of “escape one’s consciousness,” as implicit in the root from which it is derived, *léth-* as in *léthe*‘oblivion’ and *lanthánō* ‘escape the consciousness of’. (57) Yes, *aléthes* conveys the idea of seeing something "for real," but there is more to it: the negation of *leth-* serves as the equivalent of the positive concept *mne-*, which as we have seen means not just 'remember' but something like 'narrate from memory'. We may recall the intuitive formulation of Jean-Pierre Vernant, who defines *mne-* as 'recover the essence of being'.(58) In ancient Greek mythical thought, such an essence is beyond sensible reality, beyond time.(59) Even more important, as Marcel Detienne has shown, ancient Greek tradition claims that this essence is controlled by the poet, master of "truth" or *alétheia*.(60)
A problem remains: *alethéa* in *Theogony* 28 is opposed not to *lethe* but to *pseúdea* 'fallacies' in the previous line. It has been argued that such an antithesis represents "a later, more rational way of thinking, where *alétheia* means 'truth'.(61) It is as if a new rationalistic opposition of *alethéa* 'true things' versus *pseúdea* 'fallacies' were superimposed on an older myth-centered opposition of *alétheia* in the sense of 'no lapse of consciousness' versus *lethe* 'lapse of consciousness', with the result that the two oppositions overlap and in fact coexist.(62) Further, it has been argued that there is overlap even between *alétheia* and *lethe*, as also between *aléthea* and *pseúdea*, to the extent that no act of remembering is free of some kind of forgetting, no telling of the truth is free of some deception.(63) I agree that there is a thought-pattern where *mne-* in the sense of 'remember' includes an aspect of *leth-* 'forget'.(64). I

disagree, however, with the notion that the adjective *alethés* and the noun *alétheia* are similarly inclusive; rather, as I have argued at length elsewhere, *alethés* and *alétheia* explicitly exclude a lapse of the mind.(65) The non-ambiguity or even absolutism of the words *alethés* and *alétheia* is a key to their denotation of a speech- act endowed with a distinctly authoritative and authorizing force." (pp. 125-127)

Notes

(42) See extensive discussion of the relevant passages in Nagy *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric possession of an Epic Past* Baltimore 1990 (revised paperback edition 1994): 65-68, 134, 203 n. 17, 423-424.
(43) There is a detailed discussion at Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 58-61.
(44) Richard P. Martin *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad* Ithaca, N.Y. 1989 44.
(45 Ibid., 80. Martin adds: "As a general rule, characters in the *Iliad* do not remember anything simply for the pleasure of memory. Recall has an exterior goal." (...)
(46) On the function of the myth of Meleagros as retold by Phoenix to Achilles and the rest of the audience, see Nagy *Pindar's Homer*:196-197, 205, 253, 310 n. 164 (...)
(47) See the extensive discussion in Martin *The Language of Heroes*: 77-88; of special interest is p. 78.
(48) Ibid., 40.
(49) Nagy *Pindar's Homer*: 65-66.
(50) Ibid., 66-68.
(51) In fact, *alethéa muthésasthai* 'speak true things' is attested as a *textual* variant of *alethéa gerúsasthai* 'announce true things' in Hesiod *Theogony* 28: see Nagy *Pindar's Homer*: 68 n. 84.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Ibid.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid., 52-81. (...)
(56) Nagy *Greek Mythology and Poetics* Ithaca, N.Y., 1990 66.
(57) There is an admirable survey of the semantics of *alethés*, and of various interpretations, in Cole *Archaic Truth* (1983), who resists Heidegger's formulation of an "objective" truth-value inherent in the word (the truth not "hidden" in what is perceived). Cole's own interpretation is a reformulation of earlier solutions insisting on a

"subjective" truth-value (the truth not "forgotten" by the one who perceives). He suggests (p. 12) that "the forgetting excluded by *alétheia* involves primarily the process of transmission -- not the mental apprehension on which the transmission is based." Thus *alétheia* refers "not simply to non-omission of pieces of information through forgetting or failure to take notice or ignoring, but also to not forgetting from one minute to the next what was said a few minutes before, and not letting anything, said or unsaid, slip by without being mindful of its consequences and implications" (ibid.).
(58) Vernant *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* Paris 1985:108-136 (from a chapter first published in 1965).
(59) Cf. Thalmann *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry,* Baltimore 1984:147, paraphrasing Vernant. I have adopted his translation of Vernant's "le fond de l' être" as "the essence of being," described as the reality that lies beyond the sensible world" (ibid.).
(60) Detienne *Les maître de vérité dans la Grèce archaique,* Paris 1973:9-27.
(61) Thalmann 1984:148 (also p. 230 n. 31), following Detienne 1973:75-79.
(62) Thalmann 1984: 148.
(63) Ibid., following Detienne 1973 and Pucci *Odyssseus Polyropos: Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and Iliad* Ithaca, N. Y. 1987.
(64) Nagy 1990:58, following Detienne 1973:22-27.
(65) Nagy 1990:59-61.

From: Gregory Nagy, *Homeric Questions*, Austin: University of Texas Press 1996.

HESIOD

Texts:

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλα᾽ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,

ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

"we [*the Muses*] know how to say many lies as if they where true, and when we want, we know how to speak the truth"
Hesiod's Theogony, 27-28 - Translated, with introduction, commentary, and interpretive essay by Richard S. Caldwell - Cambridge, Focus Information Group, 1987, p. 29.

Studies:

"It was customary for a Greek singer to preface his recitation with a hymn to a god, of the kind represented by the extant 'Homeric hymns'. When the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were written down, no introductory hymn was attached to them. This might indicate that they were not at that time intended for continuous recitation, though there might be other explanations. The *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, on the other hand, both had hymns attached from the first. The *Works and Days* is introduced by a short invocation of Zeus, the *Theogony* by a much fuller hymn to the Muses. Both types are paralleled in the Homeric collection.
(...)
The hymn to the Muses begins with a description of some of their characteristic activities (dancing and singing on Helicon by night) (1-21). This leads to an account of a particular occurrence in which they were involved -- their epiphany to Hesiod himself (22-34). Then we return to their habitual activities (singing to Zeus on Olympus) (35-52)."

From: Hesiod, *Theogony*, edited with Prolegomena and Commentary by Morris L. West, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966, p. 150.

"The cryptic words that follow have provoked floods of controversy:
We know how to compose many lies indistinguishable from things that are real;
And we know, when we wish, to pronounce things that are true.
(*Theogony* 27-28)
Commentators have traditionally interpreted these enigmatic lines as Hesiod's proclamation of the truth of his song as opposed to the songs of other poets who only pronounce *pseudea polla*. Accordingly, the Muses' declaration should be understood as a polemic directed at Homer or perhaps at heroic epic in general.(38)

Svenbro views Hesiod's polemic in social terms as an attack on those poets who depend on their aristocratic patrons, as opposed to Hesiod himself, who prides himself on his autonomy.(39) According to Nagy, on the other hand, Hesiod's targets are the poets who perform theogonies of only local interest, whereas his own is Panhellenic in its scope.(40) Recently, Arrighetti has proposed another interpretation of the Muses' mysterious statement: the object of Hesiod's polemics is not Homer, but his character, Odysseus, or indeed anyone like him, who may possess the ability to persuade and even enchant his audience, but who has not received from the Muses the gift of truthful song. (41)
To offer an exhaustive doxography of the Muses' enigmatic statement would lead too far afield.(42) Nevertheless, the importance of these verses for any reading of the *Theogony* requires us to grapple with their implications." (p. 58)
(...)
Aletheia, then, consists of "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".(50) The legal terminology readily springs to mind, since *aletheia* involves a complete and veracious account of what one has witnessed. If the archaic Greek conception *of aletheia* has a far narrower range than our "truth," then the *Greek pseudos* has a wider range of meaning -- to which the Muses' assertion of the multiplicity of lies *(pseudea polla)* draws attention -- in comparison to our notion of falsehood.(51) *Pseudea* embrace not only consciously misleading statements intended to deceive, but also unwitting errors, omissions, and inaccuracies, as well as additions, embroideries, and even figurative speech. While the Muses would seem to be immune from simple mistakes, they seem quite proud to lay claim to all other kinds of *pseudea*. (52)." (pp. 61-62)

Notes

(38) Cf Puelma (1989) 75.
(39) Svenbro (1976) 46-73. For a critique of Svenbro, see Judet de la Combe (1993) 26-28.
(40) Nagy (1990) 45 Neitzel (1980) believes lines 27 and 28 refer to other poets who composed competing but inferior accounts of the gods. Otto (1952) 51-52, while regarding the lines as Hesiod's claim for the veracity of his song, detects in the *pseudea polla* not polemic, but the "Bezauberung durch die lebensvollen Bilder der Phantasie" which are also part of the Muses domain.

(41) Arrighetti (1996) 53-60.
(42) For a summary of views, see Svenbro (1976) 46-49; Stroh (1976) 90-97; and Neitzel (1980).
(...)
(50) Cf. Cole (1983) 12: "What is involved is strict (or strict and scrupulous) rendering or reporting - something as exclusive of bluster, invention or irrelevance as it is of omission or understatement." Also Krischer (1965) 167 for the distinction between ἀληθής and ἐτνμος relevant to the Hesiodic passage: "der Anwendungsbereich von ἀληθής ist im wesentlichen auf den Augenzeugenbericht beschrankt, also den Fall, in dem der Sprecher aus genauer Kenntnis spricht und nut darauf zu achten braucht, doss ihm kein Lapsus unterlauft, wird hingegen eine Aussage als ἐτνμος bezeichnet, si ist es ganz gleichgültig, woher der Sprecher seine Information hat: er mag Vermutungen angestellt haben, geträumt haben, er mag Wahrheiten in eine Lüge streuen, was zutrifft, ist ἐτνμος. Cf. Pratt (1993) 96 defines *aletheia* as "an accurate account of what really happened provided to a reliable reporter by honest eyewitnesses."
(51) Cf. Luther (1935) 80-90 for the wider range of Greek *pseudos,* also Levet (1976) 201-14.
(52) For a clearly positive valuation of the ability to make ψεὐδεα ... ἐτὐμοισιν ὀμοϊα, see Theognis 713, where after listing various kinds of human excellence -- the *sophrosyne* of Rhadamanthus and the cleverness of Sisyphus -- Theognis ascribes this skill to Nestor.

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From: Jenny Strauss Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.

"The beginning of the *Works and Days* with its prayerful attitude clearly differs from the hymnic note struck at the opening of the *Theogony*. Hymns can be sung even on Olympus, but prayers originate on earth. The Muses further emphasize the distance separating gods and men in the *Works and Days* by concluding their celebration of their father with the phrase: "high-thundering Zeus, who inhabits the most exalted halls" (Ζώς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὁς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει, 8). Now suddenly, and even more abruptly, Hesiod breaks off a second time, without even the usual hymnic salutation (χαίρε) to Zeus:
δίκῃ δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας τύνη· ἐγω᾽ δέ κε, Πέρση, ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.
Yours to make straight the decrees with justice,
But, as for me, I would declare to Perses the way things are.
(*Works and Days* 9-10) (103)
Here again a significant difference between the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. In the former, Hesiod could indeed transmit the words of the Muses, but he could not guarantee the truth of those words, because of his inevitable mortal incapacity to distinguish *aletheia* from *pseudos,* that is, to ascertain the correspondence

between the words of the Muses and reality. But in the *Works and Days,* where he speaks of human things whose knowledge is granted to men through their own experience, Hesiod can declare to Perses his intention to tell him *etetuma,* "things as they are." (104) Hesiod will immediately offer an illustration of the differences between the human and divine perspectives that inform the two compositions. In speaking about Eris, he revises the earlier teaching of the Muses by telling us that "on earth, it turns out that there are two Erides" -- not one, as claimed in the *Theogony*. What this means is that from the point of view of the gods, there is only one Eris, whereas for mankind, there are two.

"To summarize the complex scenario of the proem to the *Works and Days:* the Muses are to celebrate, i.e. praise their father Zeus and his power over mankind, more specifically, his power to punish. Zeus is to listen, observe and act. Zeus's actions, it becomes clear, affect specifically those who would pronounce crooked decrees, i.e. the kings; Hesiod, for his part, will tell *etetuma* to his brother.(105) This cooperative undertaking and its division of labor, outlined in the proem, will structure the poem that follows. If in the *Theogony* Hesiod takes up the Muses' instructions to celebrate, i.e. praise the gods, here he pointedly does not praise; he tells things as they are."" "Both the formal elements and the contents of the opening lines of the two Hesiodic poems reveal their respective orientations. On the basis of our foregoing analysis of the two proems, we can now offer an admittedly schematic but perhaps still useful diagram that plots the coordinates of the two compositions and demonstrates their complementarities (see the table)." (pp. 77-78)

Poem	*Theogony*	*Works and Days*
Authorization	Super-human authorization	Authorized by human experience
Proem form	Hymnic	Prayer
Subject-matter	Genesis of the gods; Zeus's order	Human life within Zeus's order
Register	Celebratory	Non-celebratory (telling it like it is)
Truth claim	Mixture of lies and truth	Things as they are (*etetuma*)
Emblematic gift	*thespis aude*: Muse-inspired song	*skeptron daphnes*: Muse-inspired eloquence
Role of the poet	Servant of the Muses: *aoidos* (Hesiod in *Theog.*)	Muse-honored king – or his surrogate (Hesiod in *W&D*)
Function	Pleasure Diversion from human pain Forgetfulness of human condition	Resolving quarrels Alleviation of human pain Reminding of human condition

To conclude: from its beginning, the *Works and Days* characterizes itself in opposition to the *Theogony:* the latter, through the mediation of the Muses, offers an Olympian perspective on the cosmos; the *Works and Days,* by contrast, directly and without the need for a divine intermediary, presents the human viewpoint. The task these two poems set for us entails highlighting these two visions and, while respecting their differences, integrating their perspectives into a larger whole. The best way to accomplish this goal would appear to be to examine the presentation of human beings in the *Theogony* and, conversely, the role of the gods in the *Works and Days*. But we must admit right at the outset to a certain lack of symmetry between the two compositions. That the gods should play an important role in human affairs is not surprising; their crucial presence in the *Works and Days* is hence predictable. But given the announced subject-matter of the *Theogony,* to sing the immortal gods and the "race of those that are forever," the γένος αἰέν ἐόνι ων, seems rather to exclude mention of the mortal race of men, which is, by definition, ephemeral. But if mankind is doomed to die and inevitably evanescent, the human condition, as established by Zeus through his eternal decrees, is nevertheless eternal. Consequently, we may nevertheless discover within the confines of the *Theogony* an exploration of those eternal laws that determine the human condition." (p. 80)

Notes

(103) Rousseau (1996) 106-10 notes the urgent tone here and understands the phrase as "straighten the decrees which are crooked."
(104) Cf. Rousseau (1996) 113-13. Nagy (1990) 68, n. 84 and (1996) 50-52 conceives of ἐρήτυμαμυθήσασθαι as an earlier expression, which becomes an unmarked member as opposed to the newer, marked ἀληθέα γηρύσσθαι. This diachronic interpretation would blur the important distinction Hesiod makes between the contents of the two poems.
(105) Cf. Mazon (1914) 36.

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From: Jenny Strauss Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 58-62

"When the Muses come to the shepherds on Helicon and confer upon the intrepid Hesiod the letters patent for his poetic mission, they formally declare their authority by means of an opposition. They inform their audience (at *Theogony* 27-8) that they know how to say 'many false things that are like the genuine' (*pseudea polta etymoisin homoia*), but also, when they wish, how to 'speak true' (*alethea gerysasthai*). (2) Which said, they give Hesiod a sceptre of laurel and invest in him the power to celebrate the gods in song (29-34). Pietro Pucci finds in the Muses' declaration a general thesis about the medium of their power, language (or, as he puts it, 'the logos'): namely, that 'the logos signifies things by imitating them with some obliquity, distortion, and addition', because 'the "original" signified is always absent'; a thesis he explicitly labels as Derridean, comparing 'Derrida's insight that the . . . "signified" is always caught in the web of the differential, deferring, negative relationships that allow the emergence of meaning and can never appear as present hic et nunc'. (3) Pucci's Derridean interpretation has been followed as such and developed by Marilyn Arthur. Summarizing Pucci's position, she asserts that in Hesiod's formulation 'both the true discourse and the false one are "imitations", but the true logos ... imitates "things as they are", while "the concept of false discourse derives from the idea of imitation as difference from things, simulation of identity with things" '; and declares on her own account that 'in order to understand what Hesiod says' we must bring to bear 'the recognition that language itself -- the logos -- is a form of fiction, that representation itself is always, in some sense, a "lie" (4) Both interpretations of the Muses' words have the merit of appreciating that in so generally phrased a statement, and one put on the lips of poetry's presiding spirits at the moment when the poet

is confirmed in his craft, we would do well to look for an insight into how Hesiod conceived of the very workings of language -- the mastery of which he here accepts as the Muses' gift. Alternative interpretations of these much-contested lines, by contrast, have long sought to make the allusion more specific and locate the truth and falsehood to which the Muses refer in particular poems or bodies of poetry, Hesiodic and Homeric. Of course, the two lines of interpretation are not mutually exclusive; Hesiod could perfectly well be putting out a general statement about poetic language with particular targets in mind, or he could be conducting a special polemic which nevertheless through its phrasing reveals how he conceives of poetic languages as such. And any attempt to settle for one or the other of these latter alternatives would swiftly be reduced to mere speculation. The important point is that the possibility of these lines having a particular target should not be allowed to block exploration of what they reveal, directly or indirectly, about Hesiod's more general conception of language. (5)

That the line of interpretation inspired by Derrida has vaulted this block is a significant achievement. However, the actual thesis that it distils from this passage of Hesiod seems to me to miss what is special -- and especially interesting -- about Hesiod's view of language. What I find striking in these two lines of the *Theogony* is that only of falsehoods, and precisely not of language in general, do the Muses say that they are 'like the genuine'. In expressing their capacity for truth-saying, the Muses make no reference to a relation of likeness or a talent for imitation, but simply state that they know how to 'speak true' (or 'truths'). Pucci and Arthur, invoking Derrida, generalize the 'obliquity' of likeness or imitation to describe the metaphysical relation between words and world; but for Hesiod's Muses such indirectness seems to characterize only the false things we say about the world, not the true things.

In effect, Pucci and Arthur read the couplet as if the line in which the Muses mention their ability to imitate the genuine (or 'real' or 'true') were in fact a general statement of their mastery of language, of which the following line describes a special case: to wit, when the result of their imitation is itself something true. They treat the second line as subordinate to the first, rather than coordinate with it. This is no straightforward misreading on their part. I have reproduced in this section only their conclusions, and have not yet considered the steps by which they come to their opinion. Before I

do so, however, I will fill out what I take to be the widespread and philosophically intriguing pattern of archaic Greek thought which shows through this text on my reading of it, and which I feel their reliance on Derrida has led them to miss. I can then appeal to the distinctive character of this material in order to resist their attempted assimilation of it to the Derridean model." pp. 45-47.

Notes

(2) The use of polar opposition to express a god's power is frequent in archaic texts. A famous example is that of the two jars of Zeus at *Iliad* XXIV 527, one containing good, the other bad fortune; so too in Hesiod's *Works and Days* we read that a safe time for sailing is fifty days after the summer solstice, unless Poseidon or Zeus are set against it, 'for in them lies the determination of both good and evil' (669); and cf. *Theognidea* 157-8 (West -- to whose edition of the work I refer throughout this paper). These examples set a positive against a negative value; but this is not invariably the case: e.g. *Odyssey* v 47-8 (Hermes uses his staff both to put mortals to sleep and to wake them from sleep, as he chooses); and x 22 (Aelus has the power to calm and to stir the winds, whichever he wishes). Thus we cannot tell simply from their use of the motif whether Hesiod's Muses in the Theogony, by setting lies against truth, are opposing something bad to something good. I have tried to make my translation of their words broad enough to reflect the fact that the Greek terms rendered as 'true', 'false', 'genuine' do not distinguish 'truth' -- a linguistic property applicable only to propositions -- from 'reality', said of things in general.
(3) The quotations are from P. Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 12, 13 and 13-14 respectively.
(4) I take the quotations from M. Arthur, ' *The dream of a world without women: poetics and the circles of order in the Theogony prooemium*', Arethusa XVI 1, 2, p. 105 (citing Pucci, op. cit., p. 16) and p. 106. Henceforth in this chapter 1 will refer to these two articles simply by author's name and page number.
(5) The variety of non-Derridean interpretations of the Muses' message is considerable, and beyond my brief to consider here. A good conspectus of the range can be extracted from the following sources: W. Stroh, 'Hesiods lügende Musen', in H. Gorgemanns and E. A. Schmidt (eds.) *Studien zum antiken Epos*, Meisenheim am

Glan, Anton Hain, 1976; H. Neitzel, ' *Hesiod und die Lügenden Musen'*, Hermes CVIII, 5, 1980, pp. 387-401; G. Nagy, ' *Hesiod*', in T. J. Luce (ed.) *Ancient Writers*, vol. I, New York, Scribner's, 1982, pp. 43-73; E. Belfiore, ' *"Lies unlike the truth": Plato on Hesiod, Theogony 27',* Transactions of the American Philosophical Association CXV, 1985, pp. 47-57.

From: Giovanni Ferrari, *Hesiod's mimetic Muses and the strategies of deconstruction* - in: Andrew Benjamin (ed.), *Post-structuralist Classics*, New York: Routledge 1988, pp. 45-78.

"In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod seems to offer us not only a different model of narrative reference through the *ainos* and its relatives but, in the word *etetuma*, an entirely different model of poetic truth from that suggested by the *Iliad* 2 [484-87] and *Odyssey* 8 [487-91] passages, a notion compatible with fiction in a way that those passages are not. Like *alethes*, *etetumos* is normally translated 'true.' This has encouraged many interpreters to assimilate Hesiod's claim to speak *etetuma* to Homer's claim in *Iliad* 2 and to a larger conception of archaic poetry as committed to *aletheia*. Nonetheless, several scholars who have examined the archaic vocabulary of truth in detail have argued that *etetumos* actually represents a notion of truth distinct from that represented by *aletheia*.(a) I will not discuss that work in detail here, some of which I do not perfectly understand, but I will discuss a few distinctions I think most easily defined.
Aletheia has a subjective component that *etetumos* does not.(b) The speaker of *aletheia* has fully in mind what really happened and wishes to speak it forth honestly and fully; the speaker's knowledge and good intentions are equally essential. A speaker of *etetuma* (or of *etuma*, I do not believe the two are distinguishable) need have no such knowledge or intention. The word merely describes a correspondence between the speaker's words and the reality he or she describes. For example, one may speak *etumon* (singular form) in conjecture, as Nestor does at *Iliad* 10.534, when he wonders if the sounds of approaching horses might signal the return of Odysseus and Diomedes, or as Helen does at *Odyssey* 4.140, where she ventures to identify Telemachus as Odysseus' son. Both ask before they speak, 'Will I say something true (*etumon*), or will I speak a falsehood (*pseusomai*)?' Likewise, dreams may come 'true' (*etuma*).

In this case, truth has nothing to do with a knowledgeable or honest .speaker; *etuma* describes the correspondence between reality and the description of reality in the dream. The etymologies of the two words seem to bear this distinction out: *aletheia* entails an absence of deception (*lethe*) that could only be possible in an account given by a knowledgeable and well-intentioned speaker, *etuma* is related to the verb 'to be' and thus reflects only conformity with 'what is.' Though both words may be opposed to *pseudos* (falsehood), *etumos* is used when that falsehood is of an unintentional kind, and *aletheia* is used when the falsehood is a deliberate fiction.(c)There is a certain amount of overlap between the two concepts. Though all examples of *etetuma* are not *aletheia* -- some are not spoken by a knowledgeable speaker with the desire to reveal what he or she knows -- some clearly are. Moreover, I find it difficult to think of an example of *aletheia* that would not also be *etetuma*. Nonetheless, the two words have different emphases: *aletheia* places a much greater emphasis on the speaker's intentions. Thus, it is virtually always used in promises. In fact, Hesiod deviates rather strikingly from a familiar Homeric formula of promises (*alethea muthesthai*) when he uses the metrically equivalent expression *etetuma muthesaimen*."

Notes

(a) See Krischer 1965 and Levet 1976 on *etumos* and *alethes*.
(b) My conclusions are based on two sets of comparisons: between the use of the adjectives alethes and et(et)umos, and between the use of the neuter substantive et(et)uma and the neuter substantive *alethea* plus the noun *aletheia*. I can see no obvious distinction between *etetumos* and *etumos* or between *alethea* and *aletheia*. It should be noted that *etetuma* and *alethea* are metrically equivalent, so their differing uses can not be explained by metrical exigencies.
(c) See *Odyssey* 14.125, *Theogony* 27-28, and *Hymn to Hermes* 560-63 for the contrast *aletheia / pseudos*. All three passages explicitly mention desire as a necessary criterion for the speaking forth of *aletheia*.

References

Krischer, T. (1965). “ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ,” Philologus 109: 161–173.

Levet, J. P. (1976). *Le Vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque*. Paris.

From: Louise H. Pratt, *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar. Falsehood and Deception in Archaic Greek Poetics*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1993 pp. 100-101.

PINDAR

Texts:

Studies:

"Pindar makes only two overt claims to truth (*aletheia*). Both occur in association with oaths and therefore seem intended to vouch for the sincerity of the poet's claims and for his personal knowledge of their validity. In Olympian 2, Pindar introduces his praise of Theron with the line 'I will speak forth a sworn report with truthful [*alathei*] intention' (O. 2.92). With truthful (alathei), Pindar seems to state his intention to reveal fully and honestly what he knows. Pindar also juxtaposes truth and oaths at Olympian 13.98-100. Here the voice of the herald, which is said to be both true (alathes) and made under oath, 'vouches for' (Nisetich, Frank - *Pindar's Victory Songs* - Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1980) or 'lends weight to' (Slater, William J. *Lexicon to Pindar* - Berlin, Walter de Gruyter,1969) Pindar's claims that the victor's family has won sixty victories at the games. There can be little question that Pindar is here using a notion of truth that is both referential and non-fictional. Indeed, Pindar can not acknowledge that in transferring such information, he is making things up or lying. At Nemean 7.63, Pindar claims to speak true (*etetumon*) praise. Here the focus may be more on validity than on the speaker's intent. The net effect of all three claims is, however, the same: to suggest a correspondence between the victor's worth and the praise offered, to insist on the validity of the poet's praise. Again, all of these passages discuss a specific responsibility of the epinician poet and therefore tell us little about the poet's appreciation of fictional narrative.

In two related passages, Pindar not only demands *aletheia* of his poetry, but asks the goddess Truth, *Alatheia*, to fend off lies (*pseudea*; fr. 205). The characterization of Alatheia in this passage as the 'font of great excellence' suggests that we are again in a context where the correspondence between praise and true worth, the evaluation of character, is essential. In a similar way, when Pindar calls on Olympia as the mistress of truth (*alatheias*; *Olympian* 8.2), he seems to have in mind the Olympic games as a testing ground for a man's true worth (Slater 1969).
In the opening lines to Olympian 10, Pindar calls on the Muse and *Alatheia*:
Read out for me the Olympian victor, son of Archestratos, where he is written on my heart. For owing him a sweet song, I forgot [*epilelath*] O Muse, you and Alatheia, the daughter of Zeus, with straight hand, fend off the reproach that I mislead my friends with lies. (*Olympian* 10.1-6)
Here Pindar clearly plays on a notion of *aletheia* as a kind of unforgetting. (a) But this passage does not make truth synonymous with memory, for Pindar also opposes lies (*pseudea*) to truth here. Having made a promise, Pindar forgot; his promise thus turns out to be an invalid kind of speech. In Greek terms, because intentions are not an essential component of the *pseudos*, this makes the initial promise a falsehood (*pseudos*). (b)Pindar now wishes to bring his earlier promise to fulfillment and thereby to make it true. Consequently, he calls on Alatheia. (c) She may also be present to vouch for Pindar's original sincere intention."

Notes

(a) I tend to see this more as deliberate word play than as reflecting a mythical notion of truth.
(b) See also *Iliad* 19.107, 7.351, where the unintentional breaking of a promise and an oath makes the speakers of the oath / promise liar.
(c) The Muses probably represent the presence of memory that can counter Pindar's forgetfulness.

From: Louise H. Pratt, *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar. Falsehood and deception in Archaic Greek poetics*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1993 pp. 118-119.

"In portraying himself as an interpreter of the Muse's oracle, Pindar draws attention to himself as master of an ambiguous code that transmits some divinely certified truth. (5) But he does not mean to suggest, even in the most oblique way, that his interpretations constitute or "construct" a realm of truth. That would imply an interpreter who does not discover truth, but fashions it himself through the persuasive power of poetic language. His use of oracle imagery to set forth his poetics goes out of its way to discourage any view that credits the poet with constructing the truths he communicates. It promotes instead the suggestion that he discovers them. Oracles utter coded messages of which interpretations are either correct or incorrect; oracular utterances have a determinate meaning, a right interpretation. In likening the poet to the specially skilled interpreter of an oracle, then, Pindar claims that he is able to give the correct interpretation, one that discovers (does not construct) its true meaning. To suppose that Pindar's interpretations aim to provide merely a reading or a theory would be to neglect his model of poetry as interpretation that captures a divinely authoritative message." pp. 63-64 (notes abbreviated)
"We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about Pindar's place in place in the development of early Greek conceptions of literary fiction. Recent criticism emphasizes Pindar's role in a developing awareness of poetic language's persuasive power. Truth is not a matter that pits fact over fiction, but solely a matter of what poetry has the power to make appear convincing through its particular charm. According to this account, Hesiodic poetics began to question the Homeric assumption of poetry's truth by admitting the possibility that the Muses can fashion "lies similar to true things." Pindar pushes things a step closer to Simonides' more blatant claim that "appearance forces even truth." (fr. 598 *Poetae Melici Graeci*)Simonides' remark implies that there is no such thing as truth, but merely appearance; telling the "truth" is simply a matter of saying something persuasive. (25) Pindar is thought to move toward the Simonidean perspective by recognizing the "authenticating power of poetic language" in his own poetry. The power of language to create the appearance of truth is, according to this view, displayed not only by the poetry Pindar criticizes as "deceptive," but, together with a certain amount of self-consciousness, by his own poetry. In his highly self-conscious revision of the Tantalus story, for example, Pindar describes the

deceitful versions as "embellished" and "intricate. " (*Olympian* 1. 29) But elsewhere he applies the same terms to his own poetry with no negative connotation. (*Nemean* 8. 15 fr. 94b)
(...)
This account of the development of conceptions of truth confuses several issues and must be adjusted. Hesiod's poetics retains the idea of factual truth and holds to assumptions inconsistent with Simonides' radical view. In adopting the possibility that Muses deceive, Hesiod assumes that there is some reality about which the Muses are either truthful or deceptive. For the Muses to exercise their powers to deceive by conveying falsehoods, there must be some truths about which they can deceive mortals. Hesiod does not, then, question the idea of factual truth. Unlike Homer, however, he does deny that poetry provides men with knowledge of that truth. Hesiod's innovation is epistemological rather than metaphysical: the audience is no longer provided a knower's master of any truths that Hesiod's poetry may convey. That there are truths to be shared or deceived about remains beyond question for Hesiod. In contrast, Simonides' view leaves no room for Hesiod's deception because for him there is no falsehood of which an audience can be persuaded. Like Hesiod's, Pindar's poetics assumes that there are facts for poetry to convey. We have seen how, in his version of the Tantalus myth, Pindar promises to provide factual accuracy. Furthermore, in claiming that other versions of the tale are deceptive, he shares Hesiod's assumption that there is something about which to be truthful or deceptive. Pindar renders human access to truth problematic, but in a way very much milder than Hesiod. Pindar's Muse is not a potential deceiver like Hesiod's; in this respect Hesiod's is the more radical, and Pindar's the more traditional, view. But as the interpreter of the Muse's "oracle," Pindar admits the possibility that the poet may misinterpret the Muse. For example, in fragment 205 he prays to avoid stumbling into falsehood. For Pindar, then, human shortcomings rather than divine deception can break the audience's epistemological connection to the truth that poetry can convey. Although he admits the possibility of conveying falsehood, the focus in Pindar is on his poetry's truth.33 It is not the authenticating power of poetic language that lies at the root of that truth, although Pindar indeed advertises the nearly magical power of poetic language and suggests that the particular charm of that language contributes to the

persuasiveness of his poetry. But the truth his poetry conveys holds independently of charm or persuasion. As we have seen, the truths that are particularly of interest to Pindar praise his subjects. The Muse reveals such truths to him in a cryptic form that the poet must interpret. If Pindar interprets the Muse correctly and conveys such truths to his audience, then he conveys the moral reality behind the gods' evaluation of the victory, the victor, and his kinsmen. Provided that Pindar's poems interpret their inspiration accurately, they convey the god's evaluation, not the poet's or not only the poet's. From a Socratic perspective, Pindar's poetics command no authority. Pindar will be vulnerable to the charge of promoting moral authoritarianism, adhering to moral evaluations grounded only in avowed divine authority. Socrates will expose the poet's claim to enjoy a natural, god-given knowledge as more often than not efforts to allow Pindar and others to uphold conventional, aristocratic values without defending them on any grounds more substantial than an appeal to divine decree. pp. 72-74 (notes omitted)

Notes

(5) Pindar explicitly connects the Muse with Truth at Olympian 10. 1-6: ("Read me the name of the Olympic victor, / the son of Archestratos, where it is written / in my mind, for I owe him a sweet song and have forgotten. O Muse, but you and Zeus' daughter, / Truth, with a correcting hand / ward off from me the charge of harming a guest friend / with false promises.") See also *Olympian* 4. 17-18; 6. 20-21; 7. 20-21; 13. 52; 10. 3-4; *Pythian* 1. 86-87; fr. 205.

From: Grace M. Ledbetter, *Poetics before Plato. Interpretation and authority in early Greek theories of poetry*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003, p 63 n. 5.

"As Marcel Detienne has documented in his survey of Archaic Greek poetics, the poetic power of *mnemosune* 'remembering' is traditionally associated with light, which is in conflict with the darkness of *Léthé* 'forgetting'. (32) What is illuminated or obscured by poetry is what is respectively preserved or lost in the tradition. The concept of *léthé* 'forgetting', however, is not only negative. As Detienne points out, *léthé* is not only the opposite of *mnemosune*

'remembering': it can also be an aspect of *mnemosune*. (33) For example, the goddess Mnemosune is described in the *Theogony* of Hesiod as giving birth to the Muses, divine personifications of the poet's power, so that they, through their poetry, may provide *mnemosune* 'forgetting' of sadnesses and of worries for humankind (53-55); whoever hears the Muses no longer *memnetai* 'remembers' his own ills (*Theogony* 98-103). By implication the highlighting of the glory of poetry is achieved by shading over anything that detracts from it. A bright light needs a background of darkness. Such a concept of *mnemosune* can be achieved only through an ever-present awareness of its opposite, *léthé*. Without the obliteration of what need not be remembered, there cannot be memory -- at least, from the standpoint of Archaic Greek poetics. Let us reformulate these thought patterns in terms of an opposition between unmarked and marked categories. (34) In an opposition of *mne-* 'remember' vs. *leth-* 'forget', *mne-* would be the unmarked member and *leth-*, the marked, in that *leth-* can be included by *mne-* as an aspect of *mne-*. Besides the passage just considered from the *Theogony*, I cite another striking illustration, from a different source: in the ritual of incubation connected with the cult of Trophonios, the initiate drinks from the springs of both *Lethe* and *Mnemosune*; this way the undesired mental state can be shaded over while the desired mental state is highlighted (Pausanias 9.39.8). (35)

To pursue the subject of these thought patterns even further, I cite an example of unmarked and marked opposition in the English language. In an opposition of the pronouns he and she, he is the unmarked member and she, the marked, in that she is included by he as the feminine aspect of being he. The masculine aspect of being he, by contrast, has to be achieved through an ever-present negation of the feminine. We may say something like: this is not a she, this is a he. Otherwise he does not, of and by itself, convey a masculine aspect. In generalizing statements, for example, he can stand for both he and she, as in "everyone may interpret as he chooses." (36) Where the unmarked member excludes the marked member through a negation of the marked, the unmarked member receives a minus interpretation; where the unmarked member includes the marked, it receives a zero interpretation. (37) The minus interpretation of the unmarked member is ever- present in the context of a given Archaic Greek poem's references to itself as

absolute truth, conveyed by a specialized *mnemosune* 'remembering' that excludes lethe instead of including it. These relationships can be visualized as a larger circle of *mnemosune* 'remembering' that includes an inner area of *lethe* 'forgetting' surrounding a smaller circle of specialized *mnemosune* 'remembering' that excludes the outer area of *lethe* 'forgetting'. The area of forgetting is visualized as the ongoing erasure of things not worth remembering, erasure by way of *lethe* 'forgetting'; the smaller circle of remembering, within the larger circle, is highlighted by the area of darkness surrounding it, the area of forgetting. In fact, a special word in the diction of Archaic Greek poetry formalizes this specialized and exclusive kind of remembering: that word is the negation of *lethe* 'forgetting', namely *a-letheia*, normally glossed in English as 'truth'. A comparable case of minus interpretation in English can be seen in the word unforgettable. The aletheia 'truth' of the poet is the nonerasure of the poetic glory that is his to confer.38 The same concept is evident in the periphrastic expression *oude me/se/he lethei* 'it does not escape my/your/his-her mind', which conventionally reinforces injunctions to be *memnemenos* 'mindful, remembering'. (39)

Besides contrasting with negative thoughts about human ills, (40) or erroneous thoughts that lead to injustice, (41) the aletheia of Greek poetry tends to contrast with the divergence of local poetic versions in the overarching process of achieving a convergent version acceptable to all Hellenes. (42) This argument brings us back to the observation of Levi-Strauss that the latest performance of myth is in principle an occasion for selecting from and thereby potentially erasing versions available from countless previous performances. (43) In what survives of Archaic Greek poetry -- and now I am using the word poetry in the broadest sense -- what we keep finding is the ultimate extension of this principle, to the point where the latest version becomes the last version, a canonization that brings to a final state of crystallization what had been becoming an ever-less fluid state of variation in performance. (44) I attribute this canonization not so much to the phenomenon of incipient literacy as to the broader social phenomenon of Panhellenization. (45) I reiterate that this phenomenon is relative from the standpoint of an outsider to the tradition, in that some compositions are more Panhellenic in scope than others. From the standpoint of the insider to the tradition, however, in the here and now of performance, the

Panhellenic perspective is the absolutist perspective of *aletheia* 'truth' . (46)"

Notes

(32) Detienne *Les maître de vérité dans la Grèce archaique,* Paris 1973 22-27. For example, Léthé or 'Forgetting' personified is descended from Night in Hesiod *Theogony* 227/224; Mnemosune 'Remembering' is contrasted with darkness in Pindar *Nemean* 7.12-16.
(33) Detienne, pp. 69-80.
(34) For these terms, see the *Introduction*, p. 5: The second of the two basic concepts of linguistics that I use throughout this book is the distinction, from a synchronic perspective, between the marked and unmarked members of any opposition within the system of language. These terms are defined as follows by Roman Jakobson: "The general meaning of a marked category states the presence of a certain (whether positive or negative) property A; the general meaning of the corresponding unmarked category states nothing about the presence of A." (R. Jakobson *Shifters, Verbal categories, and the Russian verb* Cambridge, Mass. 1957; reprinted in *Selected writings* The Hague , Mouton, 1971 pp. 130-147). The unmarked category is the general category, which can include the marked category, whereas the reverse situation cannot hold.
(35) See the discussion by Detienne, p. 74.
(36) Waugh 1982 compares the French usage of the masculine gender as the unmarked member of an opposition with the feminine, in that the masculine can stand for the category as a whole: thus an adjective describing both masculine and feminine categories will be put into the masculine: *des hommes et des femmes intelligents*.
(37) (omitted)
(38) Given that the smaller circle within the larger circle symbolizes the specialized sort of *mné*, that is, *a-letheia*, I would say that the larger circle that contains *leth-* would correspond to the function of the Muses, who help humans forget some things so that they may remember others. The root * *mna-* of *mne-* 'remember' may in fact be related to the root * *mon-t-* (or * *mon-th-*) of Mousa 'Muse' (Hesiod *Theogony* 53-55, 98-103). The etymological connection is certain if Mousa is to be derived from the root * *men-*, expanded as * *mon-t-* (or * *mon-th-*), which is one of several possibilities

entertained by Chantraine *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque* 716. The relationship of the root * *men-* with the expanded form * *mna-*, as in *mne-,* is clear: Chantraine, p. 703.
(39) The pertinent passages are discussed in Nagy *Sema and Noesis: some illustrations* Arethusa (1983 16:35-55) 44. This expression *oude me/se/he lethei* 'it does not escape my/your/his-her mind' implies a synchronic understanding of the word *aletheia* as a compound consisting of privative a- and the root *leth-*. In the formulation of Cole 1983 12, the reference of *aletheia* is "not simply to non-omission of pieces of information ... but also to not forgetting from one minute to the next what was said a few minutes before, and not letting anything, said or unsaid, slip by without being mindful of its consequences and implications." (For a critique of Heidegger's celebrated explanation of *aletheia*, see Cole, pp. 7-8.) Cf. also Detienne 1973 48n107.
(40) I cite again Hesiod *Theogony* 53-55, 98-103.
(41) On this theme, see Detienne 1973, 29-50.
(42) This is not to say, of course, that the convergent version may not be complex, containing multiformities within its overarching uniformity.
(43) Cf. p. 57; cf. also p. 80.
(44) A. P. Royce *The anthropology of dance* Bloomington 1977 104 points out, with reference to traditions of dance, that various structures of performance, as they become progressively more rigid, can suffer "abrupt confrontation and loss."
(45) The threat of "abrupt confrontation and loss," to use the expression quoted immediately above, could help promote an impetus for recording by way of writing. But a critical attitude toward myth is caused not by the technology of writing but rather, more fundamentally, by the between variants of myth. See p. 57.
(46) We may well ask: how does the local perspective contribute to the Panhellenic, and to what degree does the Panhellenic perspective recognize the local? From the standpoint of the local tradition, the best chance for self-assertion is a process of self-selection that accommodates the Panhellenic tradition. Note the discussion by Royce 1977 164 of the repertory of some 90 *sones* (dances) among the Zapotec of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec: in asserting their identity to outsiders, the Zapotec tend to select just three of these 90 *sones*. Royce notes (ibid.) that "these three are the dances that any non-Zapotec would name if asked about 'typical'

dances of the Isthmus," and that it is these three dances that are synthesized by the Ballet Folklorico in its suite "Wedding in Tehuantepec."

From: Gregory Nagy, *Pindar's Homer. The lyric possession of an epic past*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990 pp. 58-61

Poets of Alexandrine Age: Callimachus, Theocritus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Herondas

Texts:

Studies:

"This study aims at identifying and clarifying the meaning carried by the noun ἀλήθεια, the adjectives ἀληθής, ἀληθίνός, and their synonyms in the works of the four most representative authors of the Alexandrine age: Callimachus, Theocritus, Apollonius of Rhodes, and Herondas.
The study breaks down into five chapters.
The first chapter analyses all passages of Callimachus' works featuring the adjectives ἀληθής and ἀληθινός.
Similarly, all excerpts including the lexemes ἀλάθεια, ἀλαθής, and ἀλαθινός in Theocritus, and the lexemes ἀληθείη, ἀληθής, ἀληθίνός in Herondas, are examined in the second and third chapters, respectively.
The fourth chapter is dedicated to Apollonius' *Argonautica*. As no record of either the noun ἀλήθεια or the adjectives ἀληθής and ἀληθινός is available in the four books of the *Argonautica*, the study concentrates on the synonyms of ἀληθής and ἀληθινός used by Apollonius: ἐτεός, ἐτήτνμος, νημερτής, ἀτρεκής.
The fifth chapter focuses on the synonyms of ἀληθής and ἀληθινός which can be found in the works of Callimachus: ἐτεός, ἐτήτνμος, ἐτυμος, ἀτρεκής; Theocritus: ἐτεός, ἐτήτνμος, ἐτυμος, ἀτρεκής; and Herondas: ἐτυμος.

An introductory essay provides a detailed account of the study's general objective and specific aims.
The results of the research are summarised in the conclusions, which offer an overview of the analogies and differences of the authors under consideration with respect to their specific understanding of the notion of 'truth'.
The study also contains a bibliography and an index."

Abstract of the Thesis by Barbara Giubilo: *L'Aletheia e i suoi sinonimi nella poesia alessandrina (Callimaco, Teocrito, Apollonio Rodio, Eronda)* Roma, Università "Tor Vergata", 2007.

THUCYDIDES

Texts:

Studies:

History of the Peloponnesian War: Chapter 1.1 - 1.23 ("Thucydides' Archaelogy")

"Because the means by which a world is disclosed are hidden and, indeed, withdraw from view, there are several issues in the key programmatic sections of 1.21-3 that I believe have been consistently misunderstood. There is no better way further to illustrate the subtle workings of Thucydides's Archaeology than to dissolve some of the errors that surround it. The issues I will discuss relate to "unconcealedness" (*aletheia*), "what is appropriate" (*ta deonta*), "pre-text" (*prophasis*), "compulsion" (*ananke*), and "kind" (*toioutos*).
Unconcealedness (*Aletheia*)
Thucydides does seem interested in aletheia, which is usually translated as "truth." Truth is understood conventionally as positing a correspondence between word and world, and so, this interpretation maintains, when Thucydides discusses the importance of *aletheia*, he is emphasizing the importance of matching up his language to events (*logos to ergon*). Yet

Thucydides uses neither *aletheia* nor *to alethes* particularly often in these opening sections (or generally, especially not in his own voice). He does, as we have seen, employ numerous visual words, such as to saphes, at crucial places. These words are in turn often translated in terms of "truth," even "historical truth," (1) but such translations put the cart before the horse. The converse seems far more apt; that is, *aletheia* should be understood in terms of *to saphes* and other visual terms rather than the other way around. In Thucydides's *Archaeology* visual metaphors dominate *vis-a-vis* truth claims. (2) Further, in specific contexts, Thucydides is quite able to assert that a claim or description is true in the sense that it corresponds to reality,3 but Thucydides does not do this often, and he does not do it in the Archaeology. And thus we should not efface the explicit visual language as somehow "primitive" (i.e., aspiring to real truth) or metaphorical, especially when there is a sophisticated philosophical tradition both before and after Thucydides that takes the priority of vision seriously -- see the preceding discussion of the Presocratics, *eros* in both Gorgias's Helen and Plato's Phaedrus (also the allegories in the Republic), and *sophia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. And it is not just the philosophical tradition, there is also the tragic tradition, which, as we have seen, relies upon and dramatizes the human situation as bounded by vision of a complex sort. Human vision is further complicated by its tendency not to see that which it has most need of seeing.

The word *aletheia* is generally, though not uniformly, believed to retain the visual force of its etymology -- "as that which is not concealed." (4) If this is true, then we have all the more reason for associating claims concerning *aletheia* with the dominant visual imagery. Thomas Cole has maintained (*contra* Friedlander) that *aletheia* does retain a connection with *lethe* (oblivion) and that this connection is exploited as late as Plato's Phaedrus. (5) Hence the significance of the words *a-letheia* and *a-kribeia* in the key sections of Thucydides's *Archaeology*. These two related alpha privative words convey the difficulty of using logos in a manner that does not cover up as much as, if not more than, it succeeds in bringing to light. (6) In fact, Cole observes that *akribeia* is a characteristic especially associated with written texts, and it is in Thucydides that for the first time *aletheia* too is claimed to be the product of the type of precise method seemingly possible only through writing. (7)

It can be argued that there is a prima facie distinction between "not-not-noticed" and "unconcealed." (8) I must admit that I have a hard time grasping this distinction because in both cases *aletheia* is a visual accomplishment related to *logos*. I presume that somehow not-not-noticed is more reasonable. (9) Heidegger's notion of unconcealedness sounds as if the objects of *aletheia* are glowing, demanding to be seen, (10) whereas what a *logos* can do is merely to keep a hero mentioned among human subjects again and again -- no glowing is required. Heidegger does employ visual vocabulary to illustrate his point about *aletheia*, but in so doing, he sees himself as following a tradition (which he is), and it appears dubious to object to his position merely on account of the violence with which he brings vision to the fore. After all, Heidegger plausibly rejects the whole subject-object distinction upon which Cole (following Snell) would seem to rely. If it is nonsense to say that truth lights up objects, it is, arguably, at least as nonsensical (though very modern) to claim that to be true is to be kept in the minds of human subjects. Finally, it is procrustean to read the bulk of Thucydides's narrative as something that corresponds to reality. Correspondence presupposes exactly that separation between logos and the world that I believe Thucydides's text is remarkable for constantly challenging. Indeed, Thucydides's success in opening a world through logos is a decisive argument against reifying this distinction." (pp. 155-157)

Notes

(1) Macleod (1983) in C. Macleod, *Collected Essays*, Oxford (1983), "Reason and Necessity," 64.
(2) See previous readings of 1.22.4 and of 1.23.6, as well as the general concern with clarity and vision (e.g., 1.1.3). There is also Thucydides's concern with the visual impression made by Athens and Sparta in connection with his thought experiment (1.10) and his general contempt for hearsay (1.20.1) and pleasing hearers (1.21.1, 1.22.4) .
(3) See, e.g., 3.20.3, 4.122.6.
(4) See, e.g., Heidegger (1962), 262/219.
(5) Cole (1983), 7-10. Cole's discussion is only one of many treatments. See also Bernasconi (1985), 15-27; Allison (1997), 232; Shrimpton (1997), 7. 24. 6.90 2-4.
(6) Cole (1983), 25-7; Heidegger (1997), 47. 25. 7.66.2.

(7) Cole (1983), 27 n.48.
(8) This has been argued by many, including not only Cole and Snell, but also Mark Griffith (in conversation).
(9) Cole (1983), 8-9.
(10) For an account of what it might mean for a phenomenon to demand to be seen, see Appendix III.

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Aletheia dans la Pensée Grecque d'Homère à l'Âge Hellénistique

INTRODUCTION : VRAI ET FAUX DANS LA PENSÉE GRECQUE

"Par l'effet d'une particularité tout à fait singulière, la langue grecque désigne cette notion de vérité par des termes négatifs : l'adjectif αληθής et le substantif αλήθεια. II y a là un mystère étonnant, qui n'est peut-être pas dépourvu de liens avec ce que l'en appelle le 'miracle grec'. Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu' ληθής et αλήθεια ne sont pas les seuls mots qui, à l'origine, s'appliquent à l'idée de vérité, bien que Platon et Aristote n'emploient pratiquement qu'eux pour la représenter, bien qu'ils traversent l'histoire du grec, d'Homère jusqu' aujourd'hui, bien qu'enfin, d'Homère à l'âge classique, ils connaissent un prodigieux développement, qui est contemporain de la disparition progressive de leurs anciens parents sémantiques. L'expression du vrai, en grec ancien, relève, en réalité, d'une terminologie complexe, composée de mots négatifs et positifs, que l'on se propose d'étudier ici, sans les séparer de leurs antonymes.
I. Les mots négatifs signifiant vrai.
A côté d'ἀληθής et d'ἀλήθεία, d'ἀληθώς, d'ἀληθεύειν, d'ἀληθίζεσθαι, d'ἀληθινός, d'αληθινώς et d'ἀληθοσύνη (ainsi que des composés dont le premier membre est ἀληθο- ou le second -αληθής), on remarque l'emploi d'ἀτρεκής, ἀτρεκεως, ατρεκείη, ἀτρεκειν (le substantif ἀτρεκότης est tardif) (1), de νημερτής (ναμερτής), νημέρτεια (ναμέρτεια), νημερτεως, d'ἀψευδής, ἀψευδεια, ἀψευδειν, ἀψευδέως (2).
II. Les mots positifs voulant dire vrai.

A époque ancienne, la représentation positive du vrai est assurée par la famille d'ἑτός. Outre ἑτός, qui est connu grâce à une glose d'Hésychius (3) et à des fragments de Callimaque (4) (il apparaît peut-être aussi dans quelques textes anciens) (5), elle comprend ἑτεός, 'τυμος, ἑτύμως, ἑτήτυμος, ἑτηύμως. 'Ετητυμία est tardif (6). 'Ετανός, ἑτυμώνιον, qui est éolien, ἑταυτώς, ἑτέωνια, ἑτεωνειν, ne figurent que dans des gloses d'Hésychius (7). Les composés en ἑτυμο- se laissent classer en deux groupes différents, puisque l'on peut séparer ἑτυμόδρυς, qui se lit chez Théophraste (8), et ετυμηγόρος (9) des termes dans lesquels ἑτυμο- désigne le vrai sens d'un mot, son sens étymologique. Cette dernière valeur d'ἑτυμος figure poiur Ia première fois chez Aristote (10). Les composés en ἑτέο/ω- sont peu nombreux. On doit citer 'Ετέοζουτάδης, ἑτεοδμώς (dont l'existence même est douteuse), 'Ετεόκρητες, ἑτεόκριθος (11), 'Ετέόκλέιος, 'Ετεοκληειη et différents anthroponimes.
Bien après l'époque de rédaction des textes homériques, apparaissent dans la langue (en particulier dans la prose classique) quelques formes bâties sur la racine du verbe ειναι (όντως, τω όντι, συσία) et l'adjectif ακριζής (dont sont issus le substantif ἀκιἰζεια, l'adverbe ακριζώς, le verbe ἀκριζουν et différents composés). Ces mots contribuent à I'expression de concepts voisins de celui de vrai : le concept de réel et celui d'exact." (pp. 1-3)

Notes

(1) Il apparait dans une scholie (Euripide, *Hyppolite*, 1114).
(2) Pour ἀλανές ἀληθές (Hésychius), mot difficile à classer dont l'étymo1ogie est mal connu, voir W. Prellwitz, *Glotta*, 19, 1930, p. 105 sq., et K. D. Georgoulis, *Platon*, 8, 1956, p. 228-229. Hésychius donne encore ἀλανέως ὁλοσχερως, Ταραντῖνοι et αλλανής ασφαλής, Αάχωνες ; W. Prellwitz hésite entre deux étymologies : ἀλανές peut-être apparenté à λανθάνω et αληθής ou à ἀλλανής, ἀλανέως, αλανέως (Elis).
(3) Cf. *infra*, § 39.
(4) Fragment 70 Pfeiffer ετά = "vraiment", "réellement" ὡς ετά Τημενίδος χρύσεον γένος fragment 75, 39 Pfeiffer ετως η δ ἀν

ἑτως πᾶν ἐχαλυψεν ἐπος fragment 202, 19 Pfeiffer ...ετης εὐχη[σι] "*avec des prières véritables, authentiques*."
(5) Cf. *infra* IIe partie.
6) Il apparaît chez Callimaque, Αἰτια, 3, 75-76 Pfeiffer.
7)) 'Ετανόν ληθώς, σφόδρα -- ἑταυτώς ἀληθώς -- ἑτυμώνιον ἀληθές -- ἑτεώνια ἀληθή -- ἑτεωνέω ἀληθεύώ.
8) *Histoire des Plantes*, 3, 8, 2.
9)) *Argonautiques d'Orphée*, 4, 1183.
10) *Du monde*, 399a, 400a, 401a (ἑτύμως).
11)) Théophraste, *Des Causes des Plantes*, 3, 22, 2.

Extrait de: Jean-Pierre Levet, *Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. Étude de vocabulaire.* Paris : Les Belles Lettres 1976. Tome I. *Présentation générale. Le vrai et le faux dans les épopées homériques*.

SUBJECTIVITÉ ET OBJECTIVITÉ EN GREC ANCIEN ET EN FRANÇAIS

"En fin de compte, les analyses proposées ici distinguent quatre niveaux différents dans un énoncé :
- Le niveau de l'énoncé proprement dit détermine un acte de parole avec des interlocuteurs dans une situation de discours.
- Le niveau de la source de l'énoncé détermine un point de vue, ou un énonciateur, ou les deux.
- Le niveau du contenu de l'énoncé détermine la représentation d'une situation événementielle qui a pour support référentiel le référent du sujet.
- Le niveau inférieur est d'ordre lexical. Il détermine un procès abstrait avec sa structure actancielle, mais sans représentation spatio-temporelle (avant la promotion d'un actant en sujet, c'est-à-dire en support référentiel).
On peut admettre que toutes les catégories verbales peuvent être définies par rapport à ces différents niveaux et à leurs éléments. Rien n'empêche donc d'observer des distinctions semblables dans une autre langue, par exemple en français moderne. Cependant,

en français moderne, certaines distinctions sont moins nettes, sans doute parce que la syntaxe en est moins subjective. C'est ce que semble confirmer un petit aperçu sur le vocabulaire du vrai et du réel.

1. Aperçu de syntaxe contrastive du grec et du français :

Le français moderne (comme le latin) ne connaît que deux types principaux de systèmes hypothétiques. Ils correspondent respectivement aux hypothèses d'addition et aux hypothèses de substitution du grec :

- Type I : *si* + indicatif quelconque (= I et II du grec).
- Type II : *si* + formes d'indicatif en *-ais* (= III et IV du grec).

Des subdivisions sont cependant possibles, qui correspondent aux divisions du grec, mais imparfaitement :

Dans le type I, l'indicatif futur, souvent exclu, est cependant parfois admis : - Type I, 1 : « Si vraiment tu viendras demain » I du grec) (14).

- Type I, 2 : « Si tu viens demain » II du grec).

Dans le type II, les formes composées sont parfois employées pour marquer une valeur d'irréel, sans considération temporelle :

- Type II, 1 : « Si tu venais demain » (= III du grec).
- Type II, 2 : « Si tu étais venu demain » (= IV du grec).

Voici comment on peut rendre compte des nuances entre I et II du grec et I, 1 et I, 2 du français.

- Le type I, 1 du français suppose une assertion objective, c'est-à-dire une assertion vraie pour tous. Le sens est exactement « s'il est reconnu par tous que » = « s'il est vrai que ». C'est une hypothèse de vérité, pas tout à fait identique à « si quelqu'un dit que », hypothèse d'assertion subjective du grec.
- Le type I, 2 du français suppose un fait objectif et ne correspond pas tout à fait au type II du grec, qui suppose non le fait lui-même, mais l'événement qui le manifeste, qui lui donne sa représentation subjective. En français le sens exact est « s'il arrive que », en grec, c'est « s'il se manifeste que ».

Si le grec distingue nettement hypothèse d'assertion et hypothèse de manifestation, le français distingue peu hypothèse de vérité et hypothèse de réalité, de même que vrai et réel sont peu distincts dans le vocabulaire (15).

Voici comment on peut rendre compte des nuances entre III et IV du grec et I, 1 et I, 2 du français.

- Le type I, 1 du français suppose une situation de vérité non actuelle, donc fictive. Le sens exact « s'il était vrai que » ne correspond pas tout à fait à « s'il apparaissait que », hypothèse de point de vue non actuel du grec (16).
- Or une situation de vérité, notion objective et générale, ne peut être qu'actuelle ou non actuelle, c'est-à-dire liée ou non à la situation de discours. En revanche un point de vue, qui est subjectif et particulier, peut en outre être actuel et non réel, c'est-à-dire être lié à la situation de discours mais en contredisant le point de vue réel du locuteur. C'est le type de point de vue que caractérise l'indicatif secondaire modal du grec.
Le système dominant du français n'a pas d'irréel analogue à celui du grec. Mais il a la possibilité de spécifier comme caduque et devenue impossible une situation de vérité non actuelle. Il a pour cela recours à la forme composée, celle-ci perdant alors sa valeur temporelle pour une valeur modale, comme dans « si tu étais venu demain » qui implique « tu ne viendras pas demain »(17). Il faut cependant pour cela que le contexte empêche toute interprétation temporelle. Ainsi « s'il avait plu hier » n'est pas ainsi spécifié, car on peut le dire sans savoir s'il a plu hier.
Il faut cependant se garder de trop figer les systèmes. Si, dans les protases hypothétiques, l'imparfait français correspond bien à l'optatif grec, il a des emplois différents qui en font un irréel. Dans « Un peu plus, le train partait sans moi », il correspond à un indicatif secondaire modal du grec. Ne serait-ce pas la marque d'une détermination plus subjective, l'expression d'un point de vue actuellement caduc ? Le plus-que-parfait du subjonctif dans « s'il eût été là » peut aussi déterminer un point de vue subjectif (18). Inversement le grec tend à rendre plus objectives ses déterminations syntaxiques, comme le montrent l'affaiblissement de l'opposition de ὀν et l'emploi devenant mécanique de ἄν, la généralisation de l'augment...
Néanmoins, on peut dire qu'en général grec ancien et français moderne s'opposent comme le plus subjectif au plus objectif, surtout sur les deux points suivants :
- Là où le français détermine un fait, le grec ancien déterminait la représentation d'un fait dans une conscience.
- Là où le français détermine une situation de vérité valable pour tous, le grec ancien déterminait un point de vue particulier.

Ce résultat est une confirmation de l'opinion exprimée par Guillaume, *Temps et Verbe*, Paris 1929, p. 48 : « L'hypothèse, primitivement élément intérieur de visée, est devenue en français moderne un élément extérieur objectivable sur la ligne d'actualité. »

2. Le vocabulaire du réel et du vrai en grec et en français :

Le français parle en principe d'un fait réel et d'une assertion vraie, c'est-à-dire conforme au réel. Mais la distinction n'est pas très tranchée. Réalité et vérité peuvent se confondre dans l'usage courant, et on a vu que réel n'a pas le même sens selon qu'il est opposé à éventuel ou à irréel. Confusion et ambiguïté tiennent sans doute à l'objectivité des termes. En effet la vérité repose directement sur la réalité des faits, vérité et réalité s'impliquent réciproquement.

Rien dans le grec homérique ne correspond exactement aux mots français réel et vrai, qui sont positifs et objectifs. Les deux mots homériques qui s'en rapprochent le plus, αληθής et νημερτής sont négatifs et subjectifs, comme l'a montré Levet, *Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. Étude de vocabulaire* (19). αληθής signifie étymologiquement « non voilé ». Ce mot qualifie le réel en tant qu'il est dévoilé à une conscience humaine. Ce n'est pas « le réel qui est », mais le réel qui se manifeste dans l'expérience. Pour un Grec donc, les faits objectifs en eux-mêmes ne suffisent pas à établir la réalité, et par suite la vérité ; encore faut-il qu'ils soient perçus comme tels. Cette conception subjective de la réalité, que révèle le vocabulaire, se trouve correspondre à ce que que nous avons dit du contenu de l'énoncé à partir de nos analyses syntaxiques : c'est un événement représenté, qui n'est pas ce qui arrive, mais ce qui se manifeste. Aussi peut-on dire que le mensonge hypothétique d'Euryclée à Pénélope doit être découvert pour exister comme événement. Νημερτή, quant à lui, qualifie étymologiquement l'absence d'erreur (ἁμαρτάνειν « se tromper »), c'est-à-dire « l'interprétation droite ». Pour un grec donc, la vérité ne découle pas simplement des faits, ni même de leur simple observation, mais d'une juste interprétation de ce qu'on observe. Cette conception de la vérité est illustrée par la notion de point de vue de vérité que nous avons tirée de l'analyse syntaxique de l'énoncé

assertif. L'énoncé assertif est fondamentalement senti comme résultant d'un traitement personnel de l'information.
Les termes grecs ne caractérisent donc pas le fait réel et la proposition vraie (au sens logique de cette expression), mais l'expérience révélatrice et le jugement correct. Ces deux notions subjectives sont relativement indépendantes l'une de l'autre, contrairement à celles de réalité et de vérité. En effet l'expérience révélatrice n'implique pas nécessairement un jugement correct, alors que la réalité d'un fait s'exprime automatiquement dans une proposition vraie.
On pourrait facilement poursuivre cet aperçu sur le vocabulaire grec. Ainsi le ψευδος n'est pas le contraire du vrai, c'est-à-dire le faux, mais l'invention subjective (20.
Dans l'ensemble, les termes grecs du vrai et du faux reposent sur des significations plus subjectives que leurs homologues français. Cette plus grande subjectivité se retrouve dans les significations des catégories verbales du grec. De ce fait, celles-ci distinguent plus nettement qu'en, français source énonciative et contenu de l'énoncé verbal. C'est pourquoi l'analyse syntaxique a abouti à distinguer trois sortes d'objets imaginaires qui déterminent les différents types de protases grecques : une assertion (type I, et chez Homère type IV), un événement (type II), un point de vue (type III, et après Homère type IV)." (pp. 246-250)

Notes

(14) Cf. Grévisse, *Le bon usage*, Paris: Ducoulot 1975, p.1034.
(15) L'emploi de l'indicatif dans « si tu viens demain » suggère que l'indicatif français est moins assertif que l'indicatif grec (en tant que mode non marqué ?). Aussi le français confond-il habituellement l'hypothèse à vérifier (« s'il est vrai que ») et l'hypothèse à réaliser (« s'il arrive que »).
(16) Il y a de même une correspondance imparfaite entre l'optatif oblique du grec (point de vue passé) et l'imparfait français de concordance des temps, qui est « un imparfait de récit » (situation de vérité passée, cf. Le Guern, *Notes sur le verbe français,* 1986, pp. 26-9).
(17) Le tour avec forme en *-ais* composée est apparu au XVIIe siècle, en concurrence avec le plus-que-parfait du subjonctif, qu'il

a presque supplanté (Robert Léon Wagner, *Les Phrases hypothétiques commençant par "si" dans la langue française, des origines à la fin du XVIe siècle*, Paris : Droz 1939).
(18) De façon analogue, la valeur parfois non temporelle, mais encore aspectuelle de « j'ai mangé » (= « je suis repu ») suggère une conception plus subjective du contenu verbal (non le fait en lui-même, mais tel qu'il est perçu).
(19) Voir *l.l.* pp. 78-105 pour ἀλεθηες et 141-60 pour νημερτής. Ετεόὁ, ἐτυμος, ἐτετυμος, signifient « verifié, véridique ». Un autre mot négatif, ἀτρεκής, qualifie l'énonciation sincère (ibid. pp. 124-40).
(20) Levet, 1976, pp. 201-214

Extrait de : Louis Basset, *La syntaxe de l'imaginaire. Étude des modes et des négations dans l'*Iliade *et l'*Odyssée, Lyon, Maison de l'Orient, 1989.

HOMÈRE

"Dans sa célèbre analyse de la *mimésis*, Éric Auerbach attrait déjà l'attention sur le "réalisme" singulier de l'épopée homérique. En se fondant sur l'étude d'un épisode bien connu de l' *Odyssée*, la "cicatrice d'Ulysse", il y montre l'existence d'une conception de la vérité située aux antipodes de celle que met en scène l'univers biblique : "On a souvent taxé Homère de mensonge ; mais ce reproche ne diminue en rien l'effet des poèmes homériques : il n'a pas besoin de fonder ses récits sur une vérité historique, sa réalité est suffisamment puissante (...). La Bible ne prétend pas seulement à la vérité de façon beaucoup plus expresse qu'Homère, elle y prétend tyranniquement (...) Le monde des histoires de l'Écriture sainte ne revendique pas seulement la vérité historique, il se donne pour vérité unique" (155) Ainsi, à la Vérité conçue comme valeur universelle l'épopée homérique préfèrerait une autre mesure de la vérité, la réalité.
(...)

Il semble, en effet, que l'homme iliadique soit plus vigilant à ne pas déformer ce qu'il rapporte ou conserve de la réalité, qu'à transmettre une vérité objective pour tous. J. P. Levet a bien mis en évidence l'importance des verbes de déclaration dans les conditions de manifestation du "vrai" : "c'est dans l'échange verbal, écrit-il, que se dessine la fonction première de la langue, traitée comme outil privilégié et irremplaçable de communication, entre deux ou plusieurs consciences, d'une science qui est, primitivement, uniquement sensorielle" (159) Car percevoir est toujours, dans les Poèmes Homériques, un acte concret, indépendant de toute réflexion au sens théorétique du terme (160) et c'est justement parce qu'elle est fondée sur l'observation fine et méticuleuse des phénomènes que la connaissance, qui chez Homère n'est jamais théorique (161), transgresse la démarcation entre les sensations et la raison (162). Or, cette manière sensorielle d'acquérir la connaissance (dont nous avons constaté le rôle essentiel dans la querelle opposant Ajax et Idoménée), et les contraintes liées à sa communication, interdisent à l'homme de raisonner directement sur la réalité en sortant de lui-même pour aller au-devant de ce qui est objectivement. Comme l'a exprimé justement L. Basset, "ce n'est pas le réel qui est, mais le réel qui se manifeste dans l'expérience, qui constitue le vrai" (163), ce qui revient à souligner l'importance structurelle de la focalisation dans la présentation des choses. L'individu est contraint de "travailler sur le donné installé en lui". Il ne peut transmettre la réalité telle qu'elle est et s'efforce de la rapporter telle qu'elle est reproduite en lui, sans la déformer (164). C'est pourquoi l'adverbe ἀτρεκέως, qui exprime la démarche de l'esprit dans son effort de passivité pour ne pas déformer ce qui est déposé en lui (165), convient bien à une énonciation qui doit à chaque instant capter avec acribie les fluctuations de la réalité en les nommant avec la plus grande précision, comme le fait l'aède dans l'épisode des jeux. Or, nous avons constaté que les locuteurs emploient fréquemment cet adverbe avec le verbe καταλέγειν, ce qui souligne à la fois que ce verbe désigne un mode d'expression bien connu des Grecs archaïques et que "l'on a pris au sérieux cette manière de donner des renseignements, en relation avec une manière de concevoir la réalité et limitée à la situation du donneur de renseignements"

(166). Lorsqu'un sujet ne peut pas accéder directement à la réalité ou y faire accéder son interlocuteur (soit parce qu'il ne dispose plus que d'un souvenir, soit qu'il soupçonne son interlocuteur de déloyauté, soit pour une autre raison) tout ce qu'il peut faire, dit J. P. Levet, c'est lui donner un aperçu fidèle "point par point" de la réalité telle qu'elle est conservée en lui.
Pour l'homme homérique, la réalité n'est donc inscrite ni dans les choses (167), ni dans leur seule observation, mais elle prend forme dans la présentation que l'observateur en fait pour son destinataire, c'est-à-dire dans l'interaction où se construit Ie sens. Et le discours en catalogue, dont nous avons observé le pouvoir interactif, se révèle le mode discursif adéquat pour communiquer cette réalité, comme l'illustre avec force l'épisode où Ulysse n'entre en réelle communi(cati)on avec son épouse qu'au moment où il lui décrit en catalogue la fabrication de leur lit (168).
C'est sans doute la célèbre analyse que le philosophe M. Heidegger a menée sur la Vérité comme ἀλήθεια (169), qui explique la fascination des commentateurs des Poèmes homériques pour ce concept, en dépit de la rareté de ses occurrences dans les Poèmes, surtout dans l' *Iliade* (170). Ainsi, tout en critiquant l'interprétation étymologique heideggerienne de l'alétheia comme "dés-occultation" ou "dé-voilement" et "ouverture", T. Krischer pense pouvoir mettre en relation ce terme avec le verbe καταλέγειν (171). Conformément au sens premier du verbe καταλέγειν que Krischer propose, à partir du sens de l'expression εμέ ἐλαθε, de traduire par "ne pas remarquer" (et non comme on le fait souvent, au prix de ce qu'il considère comme un " glissement sérieux ", par " être caché "), l'adjectif ἀληθής désigne en effet, si l'on tient compte de son préfixe privatif, le fait qu'un objet présent attire l'attention et est perçu par un témoin oculaire (172). T. Krischer préconise alors d'interpréter l'expression ἀλήθέα εἰπειν comme le fait de produire un énoncé qui présente l'objet de façon détaillée afin qu'il ne demeure pas "non remarqué". Or, ajoute-t-il, c'est le verbe καταλέγειν qui exprime en grec cette façon de dire précisément et concrètement quelque chose, d'en faire une "présentation réaliste et exacte qui la traverse point par point", sans rien laisser dans l'ombre, en considérant que chaque détail a son importance. Il conclut de ces remarques que "celui qui connaît la vérité sait la

dénombrer et celui qui dénombre bien prouve par là qu'il dit la vérité", établissant ainsi un rapport de contiguïté entre la vérité comme *alétheia* et l'énonciation catalogale qu'il considère comme le mode privilégié de dénombrement du Vrai (173).
Si l'on ne peut que souscrire aux remarques lumineuses de T. Krischer concernant d'une part le sens perceptif de l'adjectif ἀληθής, d'autre part l'exhaustivité inhérente à la démarche présentative du καταλέγειν, on peut toutefois lui objecter que l'adjectif ἀληθής n'est jamais employé avec le verbe καταλέγειν. On trouve en revanche, associé à ce verbe, le substantif ἀλήθεια, une fois dans l' *Iliade*, dans le passage controversé de l'entretien entre Priam et Hermès en XXIV 407 (174, et six fois dans l' *Odyssée*, le plus souvent dans un vers formulaire. Or, à la différence de l'adjectif ἀληθής dont le sens reste concret, le substantif ἀλήθεια recouvre un concept dont la signification abstraite (175) ne peut s'adapter à la valeur sémantique concrète de καταλέγειν, ce que T. Krischer semble d'ailleurs pressentir lorsqu'il rappelle que "le concept abstrait est un outil qui rend l'énumération concrète superflue (176)." (pp. 279-284)

Notes

(155) *Mimesis. La représentation de la réalité dans la littérature occidentale*, 1946, traduction française Gallimard, Paris 1984 pp. 22-23, je souligne.
(159) *Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque*, op. cit. p. 57.
(160) C'est ce qu'ont montré différentes analyses du mode de perception des anciens Grecs. En particulier K. von Fritz, dans un article éclairant ("Noos and Noein in the homeric poems", (Classical Philology XXXVIII, 1943, 79-93), explique comment, chez les Grecs d'Homère, la connaissance naît d'une perception (visuelle ou olfactive) et ne s'identifie jamais à in raisonnement. Certes, J. H. Lesher ("Perceiving and Knowing in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*", Phronesis XXVI 1981, 2-24) critique fortement ce pont de vue, alléguant que si connaissance et visualité étaient synonymes, l'illusion, qui abonde dans l' *Odyssée* comme l'a bien remarqué Aristote (*Poétique* 1459b) y serait impossible (p.14 sq.). En fait, von Fritz n'a jamais identifié sensation visuelle et

connaissance (p. 90). Il montre que dans l'acte de *noein*, se manifeste l'usage d'un "sixième sens", une faculté de pénétrer pleinement une situation afin d'en saisir toute la signification, comme le peut celui qui, par exemple, ayant beaucoup voyagé, dispose de l'horizon vaste d'une perception élargie du monde (comme en *Iliade* XV 80 sq. et I 508 où Zeus est présenté comme celui qui "voit loin" - *euruopa*-). Mais s'il y a bien une différence entre 1'apparence d'une chose et la saisie de toute la subtilité de sa réalité, cette saisie n'est jamais abstraite. Comme l'ont souligné M. Detienne et J. P. Vernant (*Les Ruses de l'Intelligence, la Métis des Grecs,* Paris, 1974), elle est redevable de la *métis,* cette capacité de l'intelligence à s'orienter et à agir dans une situation concrète et complexe (p. 28), qui suppose un sens aiguisé de l'observation et de l'opportunité correspondant à ce que von Fritz appelait le "sixième sens", capable d'anticiper une réalité soumise au hasard. Voir aussi les remarques convergentes de G. Nagy, "Sêma and Noèsis : some illustrations", *Arethusa* 16, 1983, p. 38.
(161) Voir Ch. Mugler (*Les Origines de la Science Grecque chez Homère*, Paris 1963 pp. 15-22, 46 et 158). B. Snell montre aussi qu'il n'existe pas d'abstraction chez Homère (*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, Hambourg 1948). Selon R. A. Prier ("Some thoughts on the archaic use of metron", *The Classical World* 1976, 161-169), la pensée archaïque est même en deçà de l'opposition *abstrait / concret* qui prévaudra à partir de l'irruption de la pensée philosophique et rationaliste du VIème siècle. Le *noûs* y est la faculté de *saisir la dynamique immanente* à une situation offerte naturellement (p. 167) et d'approprier le geste à la situation concernée.
(162) Ch. Mugler, *Les Origines*, op. cit. p. 215, et l'analyse de R. Brague ("Le récit du commencement. Une aporie de la raison grecque"*La Naissance de la Raison en Grèce*, Actes du Congrés de Nice, dir. J. F. Mattéi, Paris, PUF 1990, pp. 25-27) qui souligne le rôle essentiel de la vue dans le mode de connaissance archaïque.
(163) *La syntaxe de l'Imaginaire*, Paris 1989, p. 249.
(164) Ibid. p. 237.
(165) Voir supra pp. 28-29.
(166) J. P. Levet, *Le Vrai*, op. cit. p. 169.

(167) Comme le souligne M. Merleau-Ponty (*Le Visible et l'Invisible*, Paris 1964 p. 173), "nous ne voyons pas les choses toutes nues parce que le regard même les enveloppe, les habille de sa chair".
(168) Voir *supra* p. 189 sq.
(169) *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* 1943 ; *Alétheia* in *Vortrâge und Aufsätze* 1954. La question est bien résumée par J. P. Levet, *Le Vrai...*, op. cit. pp. 48-51.
(170) Le terme apparaît sept fois dans l' *Odyssée* (on trouvera le relevé des occurrences chez J. P. Levet, *ibid*. p. 59) et seulement deux fois dans l' *Iliade* : en XXIV 407 (avec καταλέζω), et dans un passage de la course de chars en XXIII 361.
(171) "ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ", Krischer, T. (1965) “ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ,” Philologus 109: 1965, p. 164.
(172) *Ibid*, p. 162. Ainsi, en *Iliade* XIII 272-273, le verbe καταλέγειν a pour antonyme ἰδμεναι dont le rapport sémantique avec la perception visuelle est bien connu. G. Nagy, dans un article où il s'intéresse précisément à certains passages du chant XXIII de l' *Iliade*, montre que l'expression ουδὲ με λησει y est souvent utilisée comme synonyme de νομσω), verbe de perception qui exprime simultanément "the noticing of signs and the recognition of what they mean" ("*Sêma and noesis...*", art. cit. 1983, p. 38).
(173) Cette interprétation inspire aussi les analyses de M. Finkelberg qui substitue à l'idée de dénombrement celle de succession narrative ("Homer's view of the epic narrative : some formulaic evidence", *Classical Philology* LXIII 1987, p. 138) : "The ordered succession was regarded as the form of a truthful narration and the truth as the content of a point-by-point narrative succession". Elle conclut son étude en affirmant que pour Homère, la "narration catalogale" constitue "le modèle formel de toute narration véridictive" (p. 138). Or nous avons pu établir au fil de cette étude que καταλέγειν ne désigne en toute rigueur ni un dénombrement, ni une narration, encore moins un modèle narratif de véridicité.
(174) Passage étudié supra p. 37.
(175) Voir P. Chantraine, *La formation des Noms en Grec Ancien*, Paris 1933, pp. 86-88, et J. P. Levet, *Le Vrai...*, op. cit. p. 78.
(176) Art. cit. 1965, p. 172.

Extrait de : Sylvie Perceau, *La parole vive. Communiquer en catalogue dans l'épopée homérique*, Louvain: Peters, 2002.

HÉSIODE

Théogonie. Les travaux et les jours. Le bouclier - Paris, Belles Lettres, 1928 (réédition 2002)

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλα᾽ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,

ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.
"si nous savons dire bien des mensonges qui ont tout l'air d'être réalité
nous savons, quand nous le voulons, faire entendre des vérités" (Hésiode, *Théogonie et autres poèmes suivi des Hymnes homériques*, Édition de Jean-Louis Backès, Paris : Gallimard, 2001, vv. 27-28)
"La Vérité et le Mensonge.
Le "vrai et le "faux" en tant que compléments de verbes énonciatifs, indiquent le conformité (ou la non-conformité d'un énoncé aux choses.
Pour dire qu'un énoncé est vrai, Hésiode dispose de deux termes. Le premier, employé deux fois, se présente sous les formes ἐτυμος et ἐτητυμος, cette dernière variante comportant, selon Chantraine, un redoublement expressif (204). Ces termes désignent des paroles conformes à la réalité (205), au point qu'on a supposé une origine commune du terme avec εἶναι et suggéré un type d'exactitude vérifiable dans la réalité sensible (206. On observe en effet cette conformité aux choses dans les développements des *Travaux* que le poète a annoncés comme des ἐτήτυμα destinés à instruire Perses de ses devoirs. Ces paroles exactes sont le fait du poète et des Muses, même si le vers 27 de la *Théogonie* les intègre au "savoir dire" des déesses au prix d'un détour par les mensonges "de même valeur que des paroles véridiques".

La valeur d'αληθής, "non caché", a fait l'objet de discussions. Pour certains, l'adjectif désigne une qualité des choses : dire des ἀληθέα signifie "reproduire dans un discours quelque chose qui existe sans se dissimuler (qui se révèle) au monde (207). Pour d'autres, il s'agit d'une qualité de la formulation, "dire la vérité de manière que l'objet qu'on a en vue ne demeure plus caché" (208). Je ne suis pas sûre qu'il y ait lieu de choisir : "dire le vrai nom" d'un jour, par exemple, suppose que ne soient cachés ni les actes auxquels il est propice ni sa désignation exacte. Pour Detienne, est ἀληθης ce qui n'est pas de l'ordre de l'oubli (λήθη) et relève de la mémoire (209). Cette valeur de l'adjectif est rendue particulièrement visible dans son emploi à propos de Nérée, dit à la fois "sincère" (ἀληθης) et "n'oubli(ant) pas" (ουδε λήθεται) la justice (210). Elle ne contredit pas celle de "non caché", mais la complète : l'une et l'autre répondent aux sens attestés chez Hésiode pour les verbes λανθάνω, λήθω et ἐπιλήθω qui signifient à l'actif "être caché, échapper à la connaissance" et peuvent prendre au moyen la valeur d' "oublier" (211). Dans les cas où ces "vérités" renvoient à un énoncé, elles sont compléments des verbes signifiant "dire le nom" et "faire connaître par la voix" (212), qui supposent un savoir préalable que la parole rappelle ou révèle ; il n'y a pas de dévoilement sans mémoire et, si Hésiode accorde à cette dernière une place de choix dans la révélation du vrai, cela tient à sa conception de la parole poétique dont il sera question plus loin (213).
Ces termes exprimant diversement 1a vérité sont employés dans le sens qu'ils ont déjà chez Homère, où, quand ils sont impliqués dans des situations d'énonciation, les mots ἀληθης et αληθείη supposent un exposé complet, un compte-rendu sans dissimulation (214) ; ἐτήτνμος s'applique à des paroles qui disent les choses comme elles sont (215) et s'oppose au non réalisé (216). Cependant la qualité de vrai, chez Homère, concerne des propos que l'on exige ou tient présentement. Elle ne prend jamais la valeur générale que les constructions hésiodiques lui assignent : les "paroles véridiques" que le poète va "dire" désignent le poème dans son ensemble ; les "vérités" que les Muses savent "proclamer" semblent n'avoir d'autre limite que leur bon vouloir. Il en va de même pour le faux, que les textes homériques appliquent au contexte étroit alors qu'Hésiode fait des Pseudéa

des divinités emblématiques. On relève en outre une différence sémantique entre les deux poètes. Chez Homère, ψευδεα peut désigner l'erreur de bonne foi (217) ou un acte (la violation d'un pacte) (218). Aucun de ces deux sens ne figure chez Hésiode : les contextes supposent toujours une situation verbale et une distorsion consciente de soi. Le mensonge caractérisé est néanmoins plus net dans le verbe que dans le nom : le faux témoignage et la vantardise auxquels le verbe est associé dans les *Travaux*, la sévérité de la punition à laquelle expose le mensonge divin appuyé d'un parjure, donnant lieu à un exposé de plus de vingt vers dans la *Théogonie*, sont l'objet d'une dénonciation claire (219). Le nom "mensonges", quant à lui, semble, comme les λόγοι auxquels il est associé trois fois sur quatre (220), constituer une catégorie de talents rhétoriques dont l'effectuation précise n'est pas véritablement prise en compte. C'est évidemment le cas pour les puissances emblématiques descendant de Nuit, les frères Pseudéa et Logoi. Chez la femme, les "mensonges et discours trompeurs" s'intègrent dans la liste des qualités qui lui sont conférées à titre permanent lors de sa création. L'homme né le sixième jour sera beau parleur en toutes catégories : railleries, mensonges, discours trompeurs et furtifs. Dans les deux cas où ψευδεα et λόγοι sont employés séparément, chez les Muses et chez Zeus, ce caractère de généralité s'estompe. Les "discours trompeurs" de Zeus à Métis s'intègrent dans un épisode précis où un but leur est assigné (221). Les distorsions constitutives du savoir des Muses sont limitées par la vérité à laquelle elles sont reliées syntaxiquement et sémantiquement.
Mis en situation, ψεύδεα et λόγοι s'en vont dans des sens divergents. Chez Zeus, la tromperie l'emporte sur le discours, réduit à l'état de moyen. Chez les Muses, sont mis au premier plan, avec l'expression ιδμεν...λέγειν, la parole et le savoir, mais aussi la valeur de vérité de ces ψευδεα ετυμοισιν όμοἰα. Contrairement aux ἀληθέα, indéterminés et ainsi absolus, les "mensonges" s'inscrivent dans l'horizon de la vérité et se définissent par rapport à elle. Il paraît raisonnable de leur attribuer la valeur de "fictions" mentionnée par Chantraine (222). Il serait en effet paradoxal de supposer qu'au moment même de son initiation, le poète prête aux Muses qui le légitiment une intention aussi manifestement contraire aux prétentions

véridiques qu'il affiche. D'autre part la notion de "mensonge" se définit par la convergence de deux champs de signification qui peuvent être indépendants : l'intention d'induire en erreur sur le fond et l'inexactitude des paroles. Plusieurs emplois homériques mentionnés plus haut ne retiennent que la seconde acception. Rien n'interdit à Hésiode de choisir le cas de figure inverse : des distorsions intentionnelles au plan du récit sans intention de tromper sur le fond, et comportant au contraire, sous le contrôle du savoir des Muses, l'intention de ramener à la vérité. Des fables, par exemple, que même des têtes dures peuvent comprendre. Nous y reviendrons.
Ainsi les deux noms qui, chez les hommes, nomment une qualité générale, présentant le double caractère de la tromperie et de l'habileté rhétorique, se spécialisent-ils chez les dieux dans l'un ou l'autre registre tout en conservant plus ou moins à l'amère-plan la deuxième partie de leur sens. Inversement, la proclamation des vérités par les Muses a toutes les apparences d'une qualité générale. Il semble donc y avoir au moins la trace d'une différence entre hommes et dieux dans l'aptitude à dire vrai ou faux." (pp. 67-72)

Notes

(203) En *Th*. 233, l'adjectif prend la valeur de "franc". Il s'agit d'une qualité de Nérée et non d'une énonciation. Il en va de même pour ἀψευδής (*ibid.*).
(204) Chantraine, 1968, s.v. ἐτόος. Lüther, 1935, p. 51 ss.
(205) Chantraine, ibid. ; Pucci, 1976, p. 12.
(206) Krischer, 1965, p.166. Verdenius, 1962, p. 119, estime que les "vérités", au vers 10 des *Travaux*, suggèrent que la *Théogonie* n'a pas dit toute la vérité.
(207) Heitsch, 1962, p. 24-33 ; 1966 b., p. 193-235. Voir les remarques de Detienne, 1967, p. 48, 147. Ultérieurement Hommel, 1969. C'est la notion heideggerienne de *Unverborgenheit* ; voir par exemple *Sein und Zeit*, 1927, trad. fr. Vezin p. 270-271, et la conférence intitulée *Aletheia* des *Vortrage und Aufsätze*, trad. fr. *Essais et Conférences*, Paris, 1958.
(208) Mette, *Lexicon*, 1955-, s.v. ἀληθής.

(209) Detienne, 1960, p. 27-35, et surtout 1967. Également Krischer, 1965, p. 165.
(210) *Th*. 233, 235-236. La mémoire et l'oubli constituent une antithèse appuyée aux vers 54-55 et 102-103 de la *Théogonie*. Léthé et les Pseudéa sont frères, *Th*. 227, 229.
(211) Exception : λςινθάνομαι au sens d' "être caché", *Th*. 471. λανθάνω : Op. 52 (actif), 264 (moyen) ; λήθω : Op. 268, 491 (actif) ; *Th*. 236, 547 (moyen) ; επιληθω : *Th*. 102, 560 ; Op. 275 (moyen).
(212) Voir Chantraine, *Dict*., s.v. γήυς. Au vers 768 des *Travaux*, la construction met l'accent sur la détermination du vrai et non sur sa formulation.
(213) Voir infra, p. 204-221.
(214) *Il*. 6.382 ; 23.361 ; 24.407 ; *Od*.3.247, 254 ; 7.297 ; 11.507 ; 13.254 ; 14.125 ; 16.61, 226 ; 17.15, 108, 122 ; 18.342 ; 21.212 ; 22.420. Cole, 1983, relève les connotations de précision et d'ordre d'άληθής.
(215) *Il*. 10.534 ; 18.128 ; 22.438 ; 23.440 ; *Od*.1.174 ; 4.140, 157, 645 ; 13.232 ; 14.186 ; 19.203 ; 23.62 ; 24.258, 259, 297, 403.
(216) *Od*. 19.567.
(217) *Il*. 10.534 ; *Od*. 4.140.
(218) *Il*. 4.235 ; 7.352.
(219) *Th*. 783-804.
(220) Theraios, 1974, p. 139 relève cette proximité. Boeder 1959, p. 90, 99, suggère que l'emploi du pluriel λόγοι a quelque rapport avec l'erreur ; l'emploi du terme au singulier ouvrirait au contraire la voie de la vérité.
(221) *Th*. 890.
(222) Chantraine, *Dict*., s.v. ψυυδομαι.

ἀληθής[203]: "vrai (non caché)"	- (les Muses) ἴδμεν... ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι	*Th.* 28
	- (peu de gens) ἀληθέα κικλήσκουσι (jour)	*Op.* 818
ἀληθείη:	- εὖτ' ἂν ἀληθείην λαοὶ κρίνοντες ἄγωσιν (jour)	*Op.* 768
ἔτυμος: "véridique"	- (les Muses) ἴδμεν ψεύδεα...λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα	*Th.* 27
	- (le poète à Persès) ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην	*Op.* 10
γηρύομαι: "révéler"	- (les Muses) ἴδμεν... ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι	*Th.* 28
	- (Dikè à Zeus) γυρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκων νόον	*Op.* 260
ψεῦδος: "mensonge, fiction"	- (les Muses) ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν	*Th.* 27
	- les #Ψεύδεα, fils d'Eris	*Th.* 229
	- (Hermès pour Pandora) ψεύδεα... τεῦξε	*Op.* 78
	- (l'homme né le sixième jour) φιλέοι ψεύδεα	*Op.* 789
ψεύδομαι:	- (un dieu) ψεύδεται	*Th.* 783
	- (conseil d'Hésiode) μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι γλώσσης χάριν	*Op.* 709

Termes pour le vrai et le faux dans l'œuvre d'Hésiode (Leclerc, 1993 p. 68) : Th. = *Théogonie,* Op. = (*Opera et Dies) Les travaux et les jours.*

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Extrait de : Marie-Christine Leclerc, *La parole chez Hésiode. À la recherche de l'harmonie perdue*. Paris : Les Belles Lettres 1993.

"Celui-ci [Hésiode] fait en effet précéder le proème traditionnel de la Théogonie (v. 104-115) d'un autre proème, plus développé (v. 1-103), qui indique l'horizon de préoccupation à partir duquel l'héritage épique se trouve à la fois assumé et dépassé. La logique de cette mise en perspective réfléchissante, dont la complexité et la virtuosité technique ont souvent été remarquées (3), est résumée dans l'adresse des Muses (v. 26-28) qui prélude au sacre du poète.
Hésiode y distingue les réalités fictives (*pseudéa*), qui naissent de l'imitation parfaite des réalités sensibles *(etuma)* dans l'élément du langage, des réalités vraies *(alétheia),* qui semblent relever d'un autre registre de la parole. Cette distinction n'instaure cependant pas, comme on l'a souvent soutenu, une opposition franche, voire polémique, entre la poésie didactique, que revendiquerait Hésiode, et la fiction traditionnelle, représentée par Homère. En effet, rien ne permet de penser que les Muses

réservent à Hésiode une moitié seulement de leur double pouvoir. Bien au contraire, le fait même qu'elles rappellent leur habileté à forger des fictions, avant de faire état de leur capacité de proférer, à leur gré), des vérités, suggère qu'il existe un rapport étroit entre les deux registres de l'invention pure et de la connaissance.
La qualité cognitive exprimée par l'adjectif αληθής [*aléthes*] a été cernée à partir de deux hypothèses diamétralement opposées. La première est parfaitement représentée par l'article d'E. Heitsch, qui s'inspire de l'interprétation heideggérienne du terme (4). Partant de l'étymologie probable (ἀ-ληθη), qui indique quelque chose comme la suppression (α-) de l'état de non-perception (ληθη), l'auteur donne à la notion d'ἀληθείᾳ le sens de "révélation" ou de "manifestation". Serait alors αληθής ce qui fait irruption dans l'univers des représentations familières pour y introduire une dimension méconnue du réel. La seconde hypothèse est défendue par H. J. Mette (5). Suivant son analyse, est ἀληθης ce qui est toujours déjà présent, mais échappe seulement à mon attention. En effet, le verbe λανθανω ne signifie pas que j'ignore ce qui va se révéler ou se manifester en surgissant d'un ailleurs absolu, mais plutôt que je n'ai pas conscience de quelque chose qui est déjà là, pour ainsi dire sous mes yeux, et qui m'échappe parce que je me trouve momentanément incapable d'y porter mon attention. L'enquête minutieuse que T. Krischer a consacrée à l'ensemble des occurrences d'αληθής et d'ἐτυμος dans Homère (6) étaie les conclusions de Mette. Si ἐτυμον désigne, en accord avec l'étymologie (cf. εταζο), une réalité susceptible d'être vérifiée par un critère objectif et quasiment "expérimental", αληθής, au contraire, évoque une réalité qui n'est pas vérifiable par un critère extérieur, mais qui s'impose immédiatement à la conscience. Ce qui frappe ainsi l'esprit ne saurait être confondu avec les données brutes de la sensation, même si la qualité particulière de la perception dite vraie prend appui sur une réalité d'abord présente dans les sens. De là s'explique que le terme d'ἀληθης ne sert pas tant à caractériser les faits eux-mêmes que le contenu du discours qui les rapporte. Dans la formule homérique "dire la vérité", l'accent est mis sur l'exactitude et l'exhaustivité du discours qui traite son objet sans rien ne déformer ni omettre. Les réalités dites vraies appartiennent à la réalité seconde du discours, par opposition aux

réalités sensibles auxquelles il se réfère. La parole devient le seul garant des choses qu'elle recense quand celles-ci échappent au contrôle direct, en raison de leur éloignement dans l'espacez ou de leur inscription éphémère dans le temps (8).
Ce dispositif conceptuel relativement simple, qui oppose les réalités appartenant à l'expérience sensible à leur restitution fidèle dans le discours, se trouve compliqué par l'existence d'un registre de la parole qui vient s'interposer entre l'un et l'autre type de certitude. Le caractère plausible des fictions mensongères d'Ulysse (9), qui permet au récit homérique tout entier de se refléter dans l'adresse inventive de son héros, fait découvrir une dimension du langage dont l'efficacité se confond avec l'essence même de la narration. Celle-ci est l'apanage premier des Muses, qui soumettent les ressources infinies de l'imagination au principe régulateur de la mémoire. Or l'univers ordonné de la fiction narrative creuse comme un écart avec le monde de l'expérience sensible et permet de redéfinir et d'approfondir la notion de la vérité.
C'est ce que fait Hésiode quand il prête aux Muses, outre le pouvoir d'imiter les réalités sensibles, la faculté de dire le vrai. En effet, les réalités dites vraies (ἀληθεα) se dégagent, à condition d'y prêter attention, du mouvement même de la fiction comme autant d'effets de signification dont l'évidence, purement intellectuelle, relève de l'ordre de la connaissance. Alors que les réalités sensibles (ετυμα) sont à la portée de tous les hommes, même des plus frustes, comme les bergers que vise l'invective du vers 26 et dont le ventre constitue la principale instance de vérification, l'appréhension des significations suppose l'acculturation à l'aide de la fiction, qui fournit le support nécessaire à leur élaboration. Ainsi, la *Théogonie* se trouve définie comme une œuvre qui, avec les moyens de la fiction, déploie des significations vraies que la philosophie continuera à travailler pour en tirer ses systèmes.
Si le discours philosophique s'éloigne progressivement de la fiction, en passant de la cosmogonie à la cosmologie, puis à l'ontologie, le récit théogonique reste attaché à l'évocation fictionnelle d'événements s'inscrivant dans l'expérience sensible du monde, tout en faisant apparaître un ensemble d'articulations noétiques qui ne sauraient être vérifiées par les sens. Ces choses

vraies, qui ne sont pas encore la vérité des philosophes mais qui l'annoncent, se présentent sous la forme d'un certain nombre d'implications conceptuelles (mises en relief par l'analogie et la répétition) qui confèrent aux événements relatés le statut réglé de la signification." (pp. 17-19)

Notes

(3) Voir notamment Pierre Judet de La Combe, "L'autobiographie comme mode d'universalisation. Hésiode et l'Hélicon", dans : G. Arrighetti-F. Montanari (éds.), *La Componente autobiografica nella poesia greca e latina fra realtà e artificio letterario*, Pise, 1993, p. 25-39.
(4) Hermes 90, 1962, p. 24-33.
(5) *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, s.v. αληθής, p. 477.
(6) *"ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ,"* Philologus 109: 1965, p. 161-173.
(7) Cf. *Iliade* XXIV, v. 407, où Priam demande à Hermès de l'informer fidèlement sur l'état du cadavre d'Hector.
(8) Voir *Iliade* XXIII, v. 361, où Phénix doit observer la course de chars et rendre compte avec précision de ce qui s'est passé.
(9) Cf. *Odyssée* XIX, v. 203
(10) Cf. *Iliade* I, v. 70

Extrait de : Heinz Wismann, "Propositions pour une lecture d'Hésiode". In *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Édité par Fabienne Blaise, Pierre Judet de la Combe, et Philippe Rousseau - Villeneuve-d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996.

"Il ne me semble pas suffisant d'établir que l'on peut interpréter l'adjectif *alèthés* comme signifiant "vérifiable" au sens étymologique où le mot nie l'idée d' "échapper à la conscience" implicite dans la racine dont il est dérivé, *lèth-*, de *léthé* "oubli" et *lanthánô* "échapper à la conscience de" (21). Il est vrai qu' *alèthés* exprime l'idée de voir quelque chose "pour de vrai" mais il y a plus que cela : nous devons examiner de quelle manière la négation de *léth-* sert d'équivalent au concept positif *me-*. La clé se trouve dans le fait que *mnè-* ne signifie pas seulement "se souvenir" mais très précisément "recouvrer l'essence de l'être" comme l'a montré Jean-Pierre Vernant (22). Dans l'ancienne

pensée mythique grecque une telle essence est au-delà de la réalité sensible, au-delà du temps (23). Et surtout, comme Marcel Detienne l'a montré, l'ancienne tradition grecque affirme que cette essence est contrôlée par le poète, maître de "vérité" ou *alétheia* (24).
Reste un problème : au vers 28 de la *Théogonie*, *alêthéa* n'est pas opposé à *léthè* mais à *pseûdea* "choses fallacieuses" dans le vers précédent. On a soutenu que cette antithèse représentait " une manière de pensée plus tardive, plus rationnelle, dans laquelle *alétheia* signifie 'vérité' " (25). Tout se passe comme si une opposition nouvelle, d'esprit rationaliste, entre *alêthéa* "choses vraies" et *pseûdea* "choses fallacieuses" se surimposait à une opposition plus ancienne, mythique, entre *alétheia* pris au sens de "non-défaillance de la conscience" et *léthé* "défaillance de la conscience", avec le résultat que les deux oppositions se chevauchent et coexistent en fait (26). Et l'on a soutenu de surcroît qu'il se produisait même un chevauchement entre *alétheia* et *léthê* aussi bien qu'entre *alêthéa* et *pseûdea* au point qu'aucun acte de mémoire n'est exempt d'une certaine mesure d'oubli, aucune expression de la vérité exempte d'une certaine tromperie (27). J'accorde qu'il existe bien un schème de pensée dans lequel *mnê-* au sens de "se souvenir" inclut un aspect de *léth-* "oublier " (28). Mais je ne suis pas d'accord pour autant avec l'idée que l'adjectif *alèthés* et le nom *alétheia* se comportent de même ; tout au contraire, comme je l'ai montré longuement ailleurs, *arêtes* et *alétheia* excluent explicitement une inadvertance de l'esprit (29).
L'absence d'ambiguïté, voire la valeur absolue, des mots *alèthés* et *alétheia* explique qu'ils dénotent un acte de parole et de fait, à son tour, explique l'autorité et le pouvoir d'autoriser qui s'attachent à leur force illocutoire." pp. 45-47
(21) Cole, "Archaic Truth", Quaderni Urbinati, n.s. 13, 1983, p. 7-28, donne un exposé admirable de la sémantique d' *aléthes* et des interprétations proposées dans lequel il rejette la thèse heideggérienne qu'une valeur "objective" de la vérité est inhérente au mot (la vérité non "cachée" dans ce qui est perçu). L'interprétation propre de Cole est une reformulation de solutions plus anciennes insistant sur une valeur de vérité "subjective" (la vérité non "oubliée" par celui qui perçoit). Il

suggère (p. 12) que " l'oubli exclu par *alétheia*a concerne au premier chef le processus de la transmission -- et non l'appréhension mentale sur laquelle repose la transmission". Par suite *alétheia* "ne désigne pas seulement la non-omission d'éléments d'information du fait de l'oubli, du manque d'attention ou de l'ignorance, mais aussi le fait de ne pas oublier d'une minute à l'autre ce qui a été dit quelques minutes auparavant et de ne pas laisser passer quoi que ce soit de dit ou de non-dit sans être conscient de ses conséquences et de ses implications " (p. 12).

Notes

(22) Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, 2ème éd., Paris, 1985, p. 108-136 (lère éd. : I, p. 80-107).
(23) Thalmann *Conventions of form and thought in early Greek poetry*, Baltimore/Londres, p. 147, paraphrasant Vernant. J'ai adopté sa traduction de l'expression de Vernant "le fond de l'être " (*Mythe et pensée* I, p. 86) par " l'essence de l'être "définie comme" la réalité qui s'étend au-delà du monde sensible " (Thalmann, ibid.).
(24) P. 9 à 27.
(25) Thalmann, p. 148 (et p. 230, n. 31), qui suit Detienne, p. 75 à 77.
(26) Thalmann, ibid.
(27) Thalmann, ibid., à la suite de Detienne et de Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry,* Baltimore/Londres, 1977.
(28) *Pindar's Homer : the lyric possession of an epic past*, Baltimore, 1990, p. 58, à la suite de Detienne, p. 22-27.
(29) *Pindar's Homer*, p. 59-61.

Extrait de : Gregory Nagy, "Autorité et auteur dans la *Théogonie* hésiodique". In *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode.* Édité par Fabienne Blaise, Pierre Judet de la Combe, et Philippe Rousseau -Villeneuve-d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 41-52.

"La profondeur et le sérieux de la réflexion à laquelle Hésiode soumet l'héritage épique traditionnel, tant en ce qui concerne le

patrimoine expressif que le réseau complexe des valeurs et des idéaux ou, encore, les principes de la poétique propre à l'épopée, sont désormais des réalités bien établies (1). Dans ces conditions, la reprise quasi littérale du vers 203 d' *Odyssée* XIX, "Il fit paraître de nombreux mensonges semblables aux réalités", par le vers 27 de la *Théogonie*, "Nous savons dire de nombreux mensonges semblables aux réalités" peut, je crois, trouver une explication convaincante (2). Il est en effet légitime de se demander encore une fois quelle intention définie sous-tend la référence au texte homérique, à ce texte homérique précis : la référence à *Odyssée* XIX, v. 203 -- qui intervient dans un contexte polémique et dont il est difficile de penser qu'elle ne soit pas polémique elle-même -- n'a-t-elle qu'une valeur indicative, c'est-à-dire ne sert-elle qu'à désigner toute la poésie homérique -- ou, pour le moins, la tradition de la poésie héroïque --, ou bien peut-on y déceler des objectifs plus précis et plus circonscrits, et si oui, lesquels ?
La possibilité ou l'impossibilité de saisir les intentions d'Hésiode constitue selon moi le nœud du problème. Renoncer à définir l'objet de la polémique contenue dans le vers 27 (l'épopée dans son ensemble ou une partie ou un élément de l'épopée) reviendrait en effet à admettre qu'Hésiode n'a indiqué aucun critère qui permette de définir la part de mensonge et la part de vérité qui entrent selon lui dans ce type de production poétique. Autrement dit, si l'on n'établit pas une référence précise, hors de l'œuvre d'Hésiode, pour Théogonie, v. 27, il faut alors accepter comme présupposé fondamental et contraignant pour toute interprétation de son œuvre qu'il lui est impossible de sortir d'une situation d'incertitude entre mensonge et vérité, puisque les Muses peuvent inspirer aussi bien l'un que l'autre. Ce serait une position parfaitement légitime si chez Hésiode pris dans sa totalité, c'est-à-dire du premier vers de la Théogonie au dernier vers des Travaux, ne se manifestait pas la conscience claire et sûre de connaître la vérité et de posséder les moyens de l'enseigner à autrui (3). Nier cela revient à méconnaître le trait caractéristique de la poésie d'Hésiode, à savoir son intention didactique." (pp. 53-54)

Notes

Il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que j'ai déjà discuté ailleurs plusieurs des problèmes présentés dans ce texte, notamment dans les soixante premières pages de mon livre *Poeti, eruditi e biografi. Momenti della riflessione dei Greci sulla letteratura*, Pise, 1987 (Biblioteca di studi antichi, 52). Mais si ce travail suppose les développements que j'ai présentés dans cet ouvrage, je ne cherche pas à donner ici un résumé ou une répétition de ces pages, mais plutôt un prolongement et une confirmation des hypothèses que j'y propose. Par ailleurs, j'aborde ici des textes et des problèmes parmi les plus discutés par la critique hésiodique, et la bibliographie qui les concerne est très abondante. Je n'ai donc pas cru nécessaire d'exposer tous les travaux des autres (ce que j'ai fait ailleurs) ; les indications bibliographiques que je donnerai seront donc limitées aux recherches qui m'ont paru les plus significatives pour les questions que j'aborde ici. Il vaut la peine de signaler qu'entre-temps est paru le livre important de Marie-Christine Leclerc, *La Parole chez Hésiode* (Collection d'Études Anciennes, 121, série grecque), Paris, 1993, qui traite beaucoup de problèmes analogues à ceux qui sont discutés ici. Je voudrais, enfin, exprimer ma gratitude à Pierre Judet de La Combe, qui a traduit mon texte (publié, avec quelques modifications, dans : *Athenaeum*, n.s. 80, 1992, p. 45-63)."

(1) Voir G. Arrighetti, *Poeti, eruditi e biografi*, 1ère partie, chap. 1, et également G. A. : "Notte e i suoi figli : tecnica catalogica ed uso dell'aggettivazione", dans : *Tradizione e innovazione nella cultura greca da Omero all'età ellenistica*, Scritti in onore di Bruno Gentili, vol. I, Rome, 1993, p. 101-114.

(2) Sur le rapport formel entre le vers 27 de la *Théogonie* et *Odyssée* XIX, V. 203, voir par exemple H. Neitzel, *Homer-Rezeption bei Hesiod* (Abhandl. Kunst-, Musik-, Literaturwissenschaft, 189), Bonn, 1975, p. 8-10, avec la bibliographie. Il ne fait maintenant plus de doute, je crois, qu'avec le vers 27 Hésiode fait allusion à la production poétique des autres, par opposition à la sienne, et qu'avec le vers 28 il attribue à sa propre poésie le mérite de la véridicité. C'est le sens le plus clair et le plus évident que suggèrent les vers 26-28, et que confirme l'ensemble des contenus de l'œuvre d' Hésiode. Cependant, pour établir cela encore une fois, il a fallu tout l'effort déployé par Neitzel dans son article d'Hermes 108, 1980 (p. 387-

401). Pour ce qui est de la polémique contre les autres poètes, je suis absolument convaincu qu'Hésiode suppose chez ses destinataires une connaissance précise de l'épopée homérique ; voir sur cette question, J. U. Schmidt, Würzburger Jahrbücher, n.s. 14, 1988, p. 41 s. Schmidt fait également remarquer (p. 44) que les termes employés par les Muses au vers 27 sont une mise en garde de caractère général concernant toute poésie composée en leur nom. C'est vrai, mais la cible de la polémique, au vers 27, se laisse plus précisément identifier et circonscrire.
(3) La tentative de K. Latte (*Kleine Schriften*, Munich, 1968, p. 71-73) de définir en quoi la vérité d'Hésiode s'oppose à l'épopée doit être prise au sérieux, même si elle ne satisfait pas entièrement. Cette vérité serait la conscience, permanente chez Hésiode, de la mission d'enseignement de sa poésie et se manifesterait dans l'attention qu'il prête à la réalité concrète de la vie humaine : "la vérité que la Muse sait transmettre... est... la relation à sa propre existence". C'est vrai, mais cela ne vaut quasiment que pour les Travaux.

Extrait de : Giovanni Arrighetti, "Hésiode et les Muses. Le don de la vérité et la conquête de la parole". In *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Edité par Fabienne Blaise, Pierre Judet de la Combe, et Philippe Rousseau, Villeneuve-d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 53-70.

HÉRODOTE

"Dans les Histoires, le champ lexical de l' *alêthéia* se compose de 81 occurrences : 28 du substantif lui-même, 17 de l'adverbe *alêthéôs*, 34 de l'adjectif *aléthês* et 2 du verbe *aléthizomai* (333). Or Hérodote n'emploie ce vocabulaire qu'à quinze reprises dans des déclarations d'une portée généralement limitée. Ces déclarations se répartissent en effet en quatre catégories : ce sont ou bien des réserves sur la réalité du fait discuté et cela par neuf fois ; ou des "opinions de vérité (334)", dans deux cas ; ou encore, et à deux reprises, des précisions érudites de pur détail qui

n'engagent nullement l'ensemble du développement dans lequel elles s'insèrent ; ce sont enfin des assertions hésitantes, dans deux cas seulement.
Examinons de plus près les passages ainsi répartis. Les réserves prennent parfois la forme de suppositions. Au lieu de s'interroger sur la réalité du fait, l'enquêteur adopte l'attitude surprenante qui consiste à faire l'hypothèse de son existence, afin de poursuivre une réflexion sur les modalités de sa réalisation ou sur ses conséquences. Il écarte ainsi une question qu'il ne peut ou ne veut résoudre -- celle de savoir si le fait s'est réellement produit -- et préfère examiner comment il s'est déroulé et ce qu'il a entraîné -- à supposer qu'il se soit produit.
La fondation conjointe de deux oracles de Zeus, l'un en Libye et l'autre à Dodone, en Grèce, fait, comme nous l'avons vu précédemment (335), l'objet de deux récits que l'enquêteur combine pour élaborer sa propre version des événements (11, 56). Et, de toute évidence, il est plus préoccupé de conduire cette synthèse que d'en prouver le fondement, entendons l'origine thébaine des oracles, et l'enlèvement perpétré par les Phéniciens, lorsqu'il déclare en introduction : "Quant à moi, je suis de l'opinion que voici. Si véritablement les Phéniciens enlevèrent les femmes consacrées et allèrent vendre l'une d'elles en Libye et l'autre en Grèce, je pense que cette dernière fut vendue..." Suit l'évocation du déroulement de cet événement dont l'existence même pose problème. Notons cependant que tout ce passage est placé sous le signe de l'opinion (*gnômé ; dokéei moi*). S'agit-il de la fontaine de jouvence des Éthiopiens "Longue-vie" ? Il suppose qu'elle existe réellement pour traiter de ce que produirait son éventuelle existence : la longévité du peuple qui utiliserait ses eaux. "Si cette eau est vraiment à leur disposition telle qu'on le dit, prend-il soin de déclarer, ce pourrait être grâce à elle que, s'en servant de façon constante, les Éthiopiens ont une longue vie" (111,23).
Il en va un peu différemment du chapitre IV,195, car, après avoir émis des réserves sur la réalité du fait, comme dans les cas précédents, l'enquêteur ne se résout pas à n'en rien pouvoir dire et à dévier sa recherche. C'est pourquoi il demande au raisonnement analogique de pallier les carences de son information et de le conduire, sinon à l' *alêthéia*, du moins sur la

voie de celle-ci. Ce passage offre l'exemple exceptionnel dans les Histoires d'une recherche dans laquelle l'enquêteur place l' *alêthéia* en point de mire, tout en avouant qu'elle reste hors de sa portée et qu'il n'établit que du vraisemblable. Il fait un effort analogue pour évaluer le récit qui veut que le plongeur Skyllias de Skionè ait déserté chez les Grecs en plongeant aux Aphètes pour ne refaire surface que quatre-vingts stades plus loin, à l'Artémision (VIII,8). Après l'avoir mis en doute : "Je me demande avec étonnement si ce que l'on dit est véritable", il essaie cette fois de montrer que ce récit est mensonger en alléguant les autres traditions qui courent sur le plongeur : "On raconte sur le compte de cet homme beaucoup de choses qui ont tout l'air de mensonges et quelques-unes qui sont vraies." Mais il n'arrive pas plus à démontrer qu'un fait et le récit qui le rapporte sont faux qu'il ne parvient à établir leur réalité/vérité ; aussi conclut-il sur un avis personnel montrant qu'à ses yeux l'histoire de Skyllias est une fable : "Pour cette fois, qu'il me soit permis de dire qu'à mon avis il gagna l'Artémision sur un esquif." Hérodote reste en deçà du mensonge comme de la vérité.
Ces quelques exemples donnent raison à W. Luther (336) pour qui l' *alêthéia* hérodotéenne a gardé le sens de celle que, dans l' *Iliade* (XXIII, v. 361), Achille attend de Phoenix, quand il place son compagnon à l'extrémité de la carrière de sorte qu'il puisse observer la course de chars, en graver le souvenir dans sa mémoire (337) et en faire plus tard le récit. Dans tous les cas, le mot renvoie à la réalité du fait considéré et à la fidélité du discours qui en rend compte. Mais, si ses autres occurrences ne nous apprennent rien de plus sur son sens, nous croyons en revanche qu'elles sont de nature à remettre en question l'idée, également soutenue par W. Luther, que toute la recherche hérodotéenne s'efforce d'atteindre l' *alêthéia* (338).
Ailleurs, le mot entre dans des formules qui mettent le fait étudié en doute, mais l'enquêteur ne tente plus de transformer en incertitude l'ignorance où il se trouve ou bien de détourner sa réflexion sur un thème annexe pour éviter l'aporie. Il s'en tient à une manifestation de scepticisme. Il en est ainsi pour les récits qui prétendent que l'île égyptienne de Chemmis flotte (11,156), ou que le Perse Mégabatès avait une fille que Pausanias aurait volontiers épousée (V,32).

Enfin, dans les deux derniers textes qu'il nous reste à examiner dans notre première rubrique (IV,18 et 187), Hérodote, qui a fait mine d'affirmer la réalité d'un phénomène, s'empresse de relativiser la portée de son assertion comme s'il voulait atténuer une audace : "Au-dessus des Androphages commence un désert véritable sans aucune population humaine, autant que nous Ie sachions" (IV,18). "En vérité, les Libyens sont, de tous les hommes que nous connaissions, les plus sains" (IV,187).
Le vocabulaire de l' *alêthéia*, en ce qu'il figure dans des formules permettant à l'enquêteur de poursuivre ses récits ou ses réflexions sans se laisser arrêter par des connaissances insuffisantes, et parce qu'il témoigne aussi que ce dernier n'est pas dupe de ses informateurs ou de la puissance de ses propres capacités de recherche, dessine en somme une notion de vérité aux fonctions contrastées. D'une part, cette notion autorise des pratiques qui d'emblée l'ont évincée et ont renoncé à l'atteindre et, de l'autre, elle constitue le but inaccessible de l'effort de recherche. Mais, facteur de libération et d'expansion de la recherche ou concept essentiel d'une critique négative de la connaissance qui tente de s'élaborer, la vérité se dérobe toujours et se place constamment hors de portée de l'enquêteur." (pp. 165-167)

Notes

(333) Cf. J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus*, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1977, s.v. "Alèthès", "Aléthéàs", "Alèthizomai".
(334) L'expression peut surprendre mais elle rend assez bien compte de tournures de phrases dans lesquelles l'enquêteur souligne l'écart entre la vérité et le sentiment personnel qu'il en a, autrement dit sa vérité.
(335) Cf. seconde partie, chap. 1,2, "La voix des autres".
(336) W. Luther, "Der frühgriechische Wahrheitzgedanke im Lichte der Sprache", *Gymnasium*, LXV, 1958, p. 75-107, en particulier p. 104 sq.
(337) On consultera G. Nenci ("Il *martus* nei poemi omerici", *La parola del passato*, XIII, 1958, p. 221-241, et " Il giudice nei poemi omerici ", *Giustizia e società*, septembre-octobre 1963, p. 1-6) et M. Détienne (*Les Maîtres de vérité en Grèce archaïque*, Paris, Maspero, 1967), sur les problèmes des rapports de la vérité

avec l'observation directe et la mémoire dans les poèmes homériques.
(338) W. Luther, "Der frühgriechische Wahreitzgedanke...", art. cité, p. 104 sq.

Extrait de : Catherine Darbo-Peschanski, *Le discours du particulier. Essai sur l'enquète hérodotéenne*, Paris, Seuil, 1987.

VOIR AUSSI (PAGES EN ANGLAIS)

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   See in particular *Part One. Historical introduction 1. Classical philosophy of truth* pp. 9-28 *; 2. Modern truth* pp. 29-37, for a brief sketch of the history of theories of truth. "I begin with a historical introduction. What I call the classical philosophy of truth is an ensemble of four interdependent ideas in ancient philosophy (Greek and Christian) concerning truth's relation to nature, language, being, and the good. Together they define the historical discourse on truth I call onto-logic. The first principle of onto-logic is that the "logical" possibility of sentential truth-value derives from the "ontological" possibility of beings that "are what they are," that have an identity of their own. For onto-logic, truth is true to such beings; it takes its measure from what is, whose nature truth discloses.

In Part One, I look at versions of onto-logic first in Greek and Christian sources, then in modern philosophy. But it is not my intention to write the history of Western truth. The historical studies in Part One merely establish some context for the discussion of six philosophers which follows: Nietzsche and William James (Part Two); and Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, and Foucault (Part Three)."

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    "Although truth belongs to the family of crucial philosophical categories, writing its general history still remains a serious challenge for historians of philosophy. Also historical accounts of particular truth-theories are rather fragmentary. Since the classical (also called 'the correspondence') theory of truth has become the most popular and influential among all hitherto proposed answers to the philosophical problem of truth, a lack of its written history is specially strange, more than in the case of

their various rivals; this theory maintains, roughly speaking, that truth consists in a relation of correspondence (agreement, adequacy or conformity) which holds between so-called bearers of truth (judgements, ideas, thoughts, propositions, statements or sentences) and reality.
This paper presents a sketch of how the gap could be filled with respect to the classical concept of truth *(CCT* for briefly). It is just a sketch which by no means pretends to any completeness. The history of the classical (as well as every other) theory of truth requires taking into account at least four points, namely:
(A) Statements which have been explicitly intended as definitions (or other explications) of *CCT*.
(B) Formulations which could be interpreted as definitions (or rather explications) of *CCT* independently of the intentions of their authors.
(C) The philosophical environment of formulations collected under (A) and (B); it is especially important for cases falling under (B).
(D) Criticism of *CCT* and its defenses against raised objections.
I would like to touch each of (A)-(D) but my principal goal is to contribute to (A) and (B)." p. 139 of the reprint.

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"Die folgenden Untersuchungen beabsichtigen eine Klärung des Wortgebrauchs von *Lógos* und *Alétheia* in den frühgriechischen Sprachwerken - die philosophischen ausgenommen. Gemäß der Eigenart der Zeugnisse und der entsprechenden zeitlichen Verteilung ist die Darstellung in zwei Abschnitte gegliedert, deren erster den Bereich des frühgriechischen Epos behandelt, der andere die Folgezeit bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts etwa. Dabei wird das Wort *Lógos* jeweils vor dein Wort *Alétheia* erörtert, weil es so der innere Zusammenhang beider nachleget." p. 82

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"The truth of the pre-Socratics is not the truth of integrity, of the monumental wholeness of the text of Homer and Plato. In fact, we now know the monumental Homeric corpus to have its own fragmentariness, not the fragmentation of the Analysts, who wanted to discard parts of the received text as interpolations, but a sedimentation, a complicated series of origins, an unevenness due to its oral composition that prevents it from being what was once considered the seamless, intentional production of an "author." So from the beginning, as we approach the pre-Socratics' work, their aphorisms, bits and pieces recorded in later philosophers, traces of their reputation shaping even in their absence the work of others, we cannot yet-perhaps we can never- achieve a sense of coherence, of systematic development of philosophical ideas, such as is perhaps possible with the works of Kant or Hegel.
I want to approach the notion of truth in the pre-Socratics fragmentarily, then, by looking at truth in the fragmentary remains of the work of Herakleitos and Parmenides, two radically different thinkers. I have not attempted here to present an encyclopedic survey of all occurrences of alêtheia in Homer, Hesiod, all the pre-Socratics. Rather, I want to give a sense of a cultural paradigm, of the ways in which the word alêtheia works within a semantic field, in its contrasts, for example, with other words for truth, and as it fits into a

cultural and social field of seeking out the genuine, the true. Herakleitos seems to offer a suggestive and idiosyncratic notion of truth that has certain affinities with the dialogical practices of the later democracy, while Parmenides' sense of truth is more compatible with the traditions of epic and of the consultation of oracles." p. 96
"Plato returns to the pre-classical notion of the *basanos* as a proof of loyalty and truth; but even more importantly, he presents both a paradigm of truth as recollection, the recalling of time -- buried truth -- and a paradigm of the production of truth through the *elegkhos,* the philosophical conversation, a version of truth as dialectic, as process, as the making of a truth in time, between people, not as the revelation of something lost in the past but as the production of something in the present. This latter element seems to me the trace of the democratic in Plato, a trace that may be represented only to be disavowed within the larger corpus of Plato's arguments." p. 107

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    "L'analyse lexicale de la conception et de l'expression du vrai et du faux fait apparaître, dans l *'Iliade* et dans l' *Odyssée*, l'existence d'un système ancien, qui repose sur des énoncés subjectifs se révélant conformes au réel objectif (familles d' *etéos, etmos,et etétumos, d'atrekéos et de ypertés*) ou procédant de l'invention de pures fictions (*pseudos, pseudomai)*.
    Indépendamment de lui, l' *alethein* ancienne correspond à une révélation véridique prenant la forme d'un *non-voilé-dévoilant*.
    Avec des prodromes déjà perceptibles chez Homère, la mutation de la psychologie de la connaissance tend progressivement à conduire à voir dans la vérité, dont le faux devient une déformation, le réel objectif connu,

convenablement interprété par l'intelligence et fidèlement transmis.
Les catégories du faux et du vrai qui apparaissent alors relèvent dans le lexique de *pseudos* et d' *aletheia,* le terme, compatible, dès l'origine, avec la démarche décrite (un contenu objectif est communiqué), étant pourvu de nouvelles valeurs sémantiques. L'évolution est lente et considérable. Elle se fait par une série d'étapes successives. D'Hésiode au Ve siècle, traits anciens et caractères nouveaux coexistent, mais petit à petit ceux-ci éliminent ceux-là. Un équilibre relatif est encore perceptible chez Hésiode, mais rapidement notions et mots archaïques s'effacent au profit de ce que représentent *alethés* et *aletheia*, *pseudos* et *pseudomai*, ainsi que les termes qui leur sont apparentés, tandis que se développent parallélement des concepts et des vocables nouveaux. Ils entrent dans les structures évoluées de la cognition et de la communication du *vrai* et du *faux* telles que *alethés* et *aletheia*, *pseudos* et *pseudomai* en montrent l'existence et la nature.
C'est l'histoire de cette évolution majeure, considérée comme formant un ensemble cohérent, que décrit le présent livre, dans la continuité de l'apport homérique, sur le fondement d'une étude sémantique menée à partir d'une analyse des textes littéraires, rédigés en vers ou non, d'Hésiode à la fin de l'âge archaique et avant la grande floraison de la prose classique.
Le critère permettant d'opposer *archaique* et *classique* est celui que fournit, au moins en ce qui concerne l'attique, la disparition de l'usage vivant des concepts les plus anciens et de leurs supports linguistiques." (Présentation Générale).

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On *Alethéia* see pp. 47-53.

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53. Prier, Raymond Adolph. 1989. *Thauma Idesthai. The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek*. Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press.

    "This work is a study of the archaic phenomenology of Homer. Particular attention is paid to linguistic and stylistic characteristics of signification. Comparisons are made between Homeric and Aristotelian thought.
    Also the author critically examines contemporary readings of Homer including those of Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida."

54. Puelma, Mario. 1989. "Der Dichter Und Die Wahrheit in Der Griechischen Poetik Von Homer Bis Aristoteles." *Museum Helveticum* no. 46:65-100.

55. Ruggenini, Mario. 2001. "Veritas E Aletheia. La Grecia, Roma E L'origine Della Metafisica Cristiano-Medioevale." *Quaestio.The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 1:83-212.

56. Santos, José Trinidade. 2004. "El Nacimiento De La Verdad." *Méthexis* no. 17:7-23.

    "This paper aims to outline the course of 'truth' in Plato's and Aristotle's works, where it begins as the veridical

reading of *einai*, and ends as a function of *logos*. In Plato's Socratic dialogues truth has no methodological implications. The dialogues on the theory of forms sustain the polysemy of being, using truth as a means of establishing the consistency of arguments *Phaedo* 100a). The difficult coexistence of truth with infallibility (*Theaetetus* 152a-179c) leads to its emergence as a *poion* of *logos* (*Sophist* 263b). Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 1-6 points to a correspondence theory of truth, showing that only by affirming or denying logos is true or false."

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    "II. In the context of the Bacchic mysteries, the bone tablets from Pontic Olbia open up space for theological meditation, documenting with direct sources from the mid-fifth century B.C. the belief in immortality seen darkly in the mania, the disembodiment of the concept of the soul, and an idea of truth so strong that it cannot be attributed only to a religion which defines itself in respect to others. Thus a new tessera can be added to the comprehension of the relation between Orphic thought and the initiation rites in which the first philosophy takes root."

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    Reprinted in: C. G. Starr, *Essays on Ancient History. A Selection of Articles and Reviews*, Edited by Arther Ferrill and Thomas Kelly, Leiden: Brill, 1979, pp. 163-174.
    "In the modern world truth is a fundamental intellectual and moral virtue. Courts of law demand, in a famous phrase, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; statesmen must appear to be devoted to the truth; scholarly work is judged first on its truth and only thereafter for other qualities. The historian, for example, seeks to say true things, and hopes to guarantee the reputation of his

work by amassing verified, precise detail, the hallmark of which is the learned footnote.

Recently I have been investigating the origins of this attitude along with other aspects of the incipient historical spirit, during the archaic period of Greek history (700-500 B.C.). (1) To my surprise there seems to have been only limited consideration of what the Greeks in this era generally meant by truth '. Correspondingly, the fact that their ideas of truth often differed markedly from modern concepts has not been stressed, even though early Greek views on the matter had a lasting influence not only on ancient historiography but also on classical thought. The following remarks are intended as a sketch of the evidence which may hopefully encourage more intensive discussion; my intent, let me be clear, is to suggest how varied were the meanings of truth at the time, not to analyze their relations to modern epistemological theories.

A cynic, indeed, might argue that here as elsewhere, the Greeks were simply more honest; for truth only slowly became a conscious, abstract virtue in Greek civilization, and never gained that unquestioned priority which we theoretically assign to it today. While Homer assessed the reality of events and distinguished' true statements from prevarications, the words which he and other early Greeks used to express these ideas initially lacked the absolute quality implicit in the modern truth ' and lie '. In time the verbal distinctions became theoretical and general; otherwise history and philosophy could scarcely have emerged. Yet thinkers had a cankering fear that only the gods could really know the truth, and rarely felt passionately the need for truth.

By 400 B.C. - the boundary of this essay - two modes of establishing verity, the speculative and the empirical, had emerged, but so. too had conscious intellectual scepticism; only thereafter did epistemological analysis begin to develop. Perhaps even more devastating in its effects, as regards the mastery of the ideal of truth, was the emphasis upon form as a mode of evaluating the truth of a work."

(1) Chester G. Starr, *The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit* (New York, 1968).

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    "Although this was originally written as a dictionary article, this work is neither merely didactic nor merely a lexicographical survey. With the editor's agreement it entirely replaced the German- language article that it was first designed only to supplement, The article in the German edition had presupposed the dichotomy between "Hebrew"

and "Greek" concepts of truth in ways that were open to question in the light of both semantic theory (not least in the work of James Barr), and actual lexicographical research, which invited fresh evaluation. The inclusion of the classical and Old Testament backgrounds makes the fallacies of the older approach clearer. (...)
The article, comes from Colin Brown (ed.), The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, volume 3 (Exeter Paternoster Press, 1978), pp. 874-902, but has been abbreviated in order to omit material that may not bear directly on the argument. The breadth of lexicographical data might seem at times to verge on the tedious, but the argument depends on covering a fair range of specific cases and evidence, The original article concluded with a substantial discussion of modern philosophical theories of truth. This is too lengthy to retain here, but a brief summary has been rewritten for this volume (2004) to demonstrate the role of the argument for the "second horizon" of hermeneutics."

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    "I. The Homeric formula 'to tell the truth' involves the idea of starting from beginning and proceeding, point by point, to the end. In the Orphic Pharsalos tablet, that epic formula occurs again but the meaning turns out to be completely modified. According to this religious context 'telling the truth' and 'drinking at the spring of Mnemosyne' are identical: the truth, associated with a cosmic Memory, becomes a fundamental religious virtue. The link between religious and logical truth arises here."

71. Wolenski, Jan. 2005. " *Aletheia* in Greek Thought until Aristotle." *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* no. 127:339-360.

    "This paper investigates the concept of *aletheia* (truth) in ancient philosophy from the pre-Socratics until Aristotle.

The meaning of *aletheia* in archaic Greek is taken as the starting point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and historians. A special section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion, influential views of Heidegger are examined. The paper is concluded by a review of various meanings of truth in Aristotle."

72. Yialoucas, Costantinos Savva. 1990. *The Conflict of Doxa and Aletheia in Euripides and His Predecessors*. Nicosia - Cyprus: The Cyprus Association of Greek Philologists "Stasinos".

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   Avant-Propos: "Ce livre est la première partie d'une thèse de doctorat d'État qui a été soutenue le 11 mai 1974 en Sorbonne".
   "A la description de l'état homérique de la langue et de la pensée succédera, dans une seconde partie, une étude du vocabulaire historique. Cet examen accompli, il restera à depeindre l'évolution de chaque élément lexical jusqu'à la fin du Ve siècle, à travers le *Hymnes Homériques*, la poésie

lyrique et élégiaque, les œuvres des poètes tragiques et comiques anciens, les écrits d'Hérodote, de Thucydide et d'Antyphon, les fragments des Présocratiques et les passages du *Corpus Hippocratiique* que l'on peut dater du Ve siècle. On composera enfin une dernière synthèse résumant l'ensemble de l'évolution constatée et présentant l'état de langue et de pensée dont hérite le IVe siècle." (p. 5, note omise).

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   See Chapter 4: *Myth as exemplum in Homer* - particularly pp. 122-128.

6. Prier, Raymond Adolph. 1997. "Achilles *Rheter*? Homer and Proto-Rhetorical Truth." In *The Rhetoric Canon*, edited by Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 63-81. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

7. Pucci, Pietro. 1987. *Odysseus Polutropos. Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Hesiod

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3. Buongiovanni, Angelo. 1987. "La Verità E Il Suo Doppio (Hes. *Theog*. 27-28)." In *Interpretazioni Antiche E Moderne Di Testi Greci*, 9-24. Pisa: Giardini editore.

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4. Daix, David-Artur. 2006. "Réalités Et Vérités Dans La *Théogonie* Et Les *Travaux Et Les Jours* D'Hésiode." *Métis.Anthropologie des Mondes Grecs Anciens* no. 4:139-164.

   "Et d'abord quelle est cette vérité que nous chante Hésiode ? Nous pourrions répondre qu'il s'agit à l'évidence d'une vérité "poétique", autrement dit d'une vérité qui s'exprime au sein d'une composition littéraire -- étant entendu que la nature orale de cette composition ne nuit en rien à son caractère littéraire --, d'un ensemble de récits auxquels nous donnons souvent le nom de "mythes", où l'imagination et la fiction tiennent une place prépondérante. Toutefois, cette réponse fait surtout ressortir l'écart entre la conception que pouvaient avoir Homère ou Hésiode d'un discours véridique et celle que développera un philosophe comme Platon ou, dans un autre registre, un historien comme Thucydide, qui l'un comme l'autre se méfient hautement des artifices poétiques, au point de souhaiter les censurer, voire les expurger. Mais elle ne nous apprend en rien ce qu'Hésiode lui-même entend par "vérité". p. 140
   (...)
   "Conclusion.

Ni le mythe de Prométhée et de Pandora - qui, tel qu'il apparaît dans la *Théogonie* précisément, servirait à merveille le projet des *Travaux et les Jours* - - ni l'Éris iliadique n'ont perdu leur sens quand ils apparaissent au milieu des "réalités" qu'Hésiode rappelle à Persès. Mais ils sont en décalage par rapport à la perspective qu'adopte le poète et au monde qu'il veut célébrer.
Hésiode redéfinit les notions de lutte et d'exploit, de querelle et d'envie. Et, de même, il modifie l'équilibre entre les récits sur lesquels s'appuie sa démonstration. Il n'échappe pas pour autant au poids de la tradition, mais il assure la pertinence de son chant et se montre ainsi fidèle à ses patronnes, les Muses, "les filles à la langue habile du puissant Zeus" (29), dont les paroles sont toujours ajustées à leur propos, et au pouvoir dont elles l'ont investi.
La vérité est au coeur des préoccupations d'Hésiode. Toujours ses compositions prétendent la dire. Reste que cette vérité même pose problème, tant il est vrai qu'elle offre, paradoxalement, elle aussi, deux visages, selon qu'elle habite le temps des dieux ou celui des hommes."

5. Ferrari, Giovanni. 1988. "Hesiod's Mimetic Muses and the Strategies of Deconstruction." In *Post-Structuralist Classics*, edited by Benjamin, Andrew E., 45-78. New York: Routledge.

   "This essay has a narrow focus but a large penumbra. My focus is a current interpretation of the couplet spoken by the Muses in the prologue to Hesiod's Theogony, an interpretation avowedly influenced by the work of Jacques Derrida. I think it not just mistaken, but mistaken in an exemplary fashion. That is, in considering how it goes wrong I hope to reveal something more general about the impact of Derrida's work, actual and potential, bad and good, on classical studies. (This will eventually involve me in a quite detailed analysis of an exemplary piece by Derrida himself.) (1) In addition, I will offer the beginnings of an account of a significant and general pattern of archaic Greek thought evinced by Hesiod's couplet (one which has

particular importance for the later development of Greek philosophy); a pattern which, I argue, is obscured by a certain pervasive anachronism that classicists engaged by Derrida have imported from his work."
(1) " *Signature, événement, contexte*" and its companion piece " *Limited, inc. a b c...*" which I come to in the fourth section [both essay reprinted in: J. Derrida - *Limited Inc.* - Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988]

6. Heiden, Bruce A. 2007. "The Muses' Uncanny Lies: Hesiod, *Theogony* 27 and Its Translators." *American Journal of Philology* no. 128:153-175.

7. Judet de la Combe, Pierre. 1993. "L'autobiographie Comme Mode D'universalisation. Hésiode Et Hélicon." In *La Componente Autobiografica Nella Poesia Greca E Latina Fra Realtà E Artificio Letterario*, edited by Arrighetti, Graziano and Montanari, Franco, 25-39. Pisa: Giardini.

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   "Strict attention to poetic truth, *aletheia*, as the 'recovered essence of being' and to the sharp contrast between *muthos* and *epos* (especially in diachronic perspective) reveals a pan-Hellenism in Hesiod's *Theogony* that confers authority on the poem and authorship on the poet."

10. ———. 1996. "Autorité Et Auteur Dans La *Théogonie Hésiodique*." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 41-52. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

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18. Svenbro, Jesper. 1976. "La Parole Et Le Marbre. Aux Origines De La Poétique Grecque." In. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

    Chapitre 1.2 *Hésiode: la vérité comme relation sociale* pp. 46-73.

"Au VIIe Chant [de l ' *Odyssée*], Alcinoos donne un banquet en l'honneur d'Ulysse. "Laissez-moi manger dans ma détresse, dit Ulysse, car il n'y a rien de plus chien que le ventre odieux (*ou gar ti stugeréi epl gastéri kúnteron allo épleto*)" ; sans nourriture, Ulysse ne pourrait raconter ses aventures car, dit-il, son ventre lui "commande de manger et de boire" et lui "fait oublier" (*ek... léthanei*) ce qu'il a éprouvé. Or, la signification de la notion archaique d'alétheia, étudiée entre autres par Detienne, nous permet de faire l'observation suivante: loin de correspondre à notre conception de "vérité", 1'alétheia archeíque tend à garder son sens "étymologique" et signifie le "non-oubli" (a-létheia), de sorte qu'on pourrait dire d'Ulysse qu'il ne saurait dire l'a-létheia qu'à condition de recevoir à manger. C'est aussi le cas des trois Vierges dans l'Hymne homérique à Hermès qui après avoir mangé du miel blond disent volontiers la vérité *(alétheién agoreúein*)" tandis qu'elles "deviennent menteuses (*pseúdontai*)" aussitôt qu'elles en sont privées. (*)" p. 54
(*) *Hymnes homériques* IV.560-3.

19. Wismann, Heinz. 1996. "Propositions Pour Une Lecture D'Hésiode." In *Le Métier Du Mythe. Lectures D'Hésiode*, edited by Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de la Combe, Pierre and Rousseau, Philippe, 15-22. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

Pindar

1. Hubbard, Thomas K. 1985. *The Pindaric Mind. A Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry*. Leiden: Brill.

   See Chapter II.3 *Alathea / Pseudos* pp. 100-106.

2. Komornicka, Anna Maria. 1972. "Quelques Rémarques Sur La Notion D' *Alétheia* Et De *Pseudos* Chez Pindare."

Eos.Commentarii Societatis Philologa Polonorum no. 60:235-253.

3. ———. 1979. *Studia Nad Pindarem I Archaiczna Liryka Grecka W Kregu Pojec Prawdy I Falszu*. Lodz: Uniwersytet Lodzki.

   In Polish: *Studies on Pindar and Archaic Greek lyric. Terms denoting true and false* (with a French summary, pp. 252-272).

4. ———. 1981. "Termes Déterminant Le Vrai Et Le Faux Chez Pindare." In *Aischylos Und Pindar. Studien Zu Werk Und Nachwirkung*, edited by Schmidt, Ernst Günther, 81-89. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

   "L'analyse de ces deux notions (le Vrai et le Faux) donne lieu à maintes conclusions. Citons, à titre d'exemple, deux réflexions. Or, contrairement au Faux -- sur le plan moral -- qui est toujours double *(diplóos)* ou même multiple, bariolé, sinueux, furtif, qui se tapit dans l'obscurité, la Vérité morale, elle, est toujours unique, simple *(aletós)*. Par ailleurs, ce qui m'a frappée au cours de mes recherches, c'est le fait que tandis que la vérité morale en tant que franchise, véracité, loyauté est claire, manifeste, ouverte à tous et dévoilée -- la vérité rationnelle-cognitive, elle, est cachée, difficile à trouver, invisible et insaisissable, résidant dans les profondeurs. Une autre observation -- que je partage avec M. Detienne (*) -- c'est le fait que le domaine du Vrai et du Faux se trouve gouverné -- dans toute la poésie archaïque grecque -- par deux lois fondamentales -- celle de la contradiction et celle de l'ambiguïté -- autrement dit, que ces notions résident dans un couple de contraires antithétiques et complémentaires." pp. 88-89
   (*) M. Detienne, Les maitres de vérité dans la Grèce archaique, Paris, 1967, p. 146.

5. Nagy, Gregory. 1990. *Pindar's Homer. The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

   The Mar Flexner Lectures, 1982 Bryn Mawr College.

On *Alétheia* see pp. 58-71.

6. Ortega, Alfonso. 1970. "Poesia Y Verdad En Pindaro." *Helmantica* no. 21:253-272.

Thucydides

1. Allison, June. 1997. *Word and Concept in Thucydides*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

   On *Alethéia* see pp. 206-237.

2. Moles, John L. 1993. "Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides." In *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, edited by Gill, Christopher and Wiseman, Timothy Peter, 122-146. Exeter: University of Exter Press.

   "In this discussion, I want to mediate between `literary' and 'historical' approaches to the question, primarily through a close reading of the prefaces of Herodotus and Thucydides (presented in my own very literal, and sometimes controversial, translations). What emerges, I think, from the content and form of these programmatic statements is the way in which 'literary' and 'historical' objectives are alike present and deeply interfused.
   On the one hand, both writers see themselves as inheritors of the tradition of epic narrative, especially as expressed in Homer's commemoration of a great war in the Iliad. Both writers also see themselves as developing the project built into Homer's poem (a project itself not without a certain `historical' concern), namely that of analysing the causation and process of war and conflict, and of doing so by the invention of significant speeches and by the selection and presentation of concrete events. On the other hand, both writers also see themselves as engaged in a project which is distinctive from that of the poetic tradition in its attempt to

establish factual truth and to distinguish this from factual 'untruth' or 'falsehood'.
Thucydides is more explicit about the nature and methodology of this project than Herodotus, and also about the kind of history (that is, primarily, recent history) in which this project can be pursued effectively. Indeed, in this respect especially, he presents himself as a critic, and rival, of Herodotus as well as a successor. But, in the prefaces of both historians, as in their full-scale narratives, we can recognize the combination of objectives (the perpetuation of epic narrative and interpretation and the innovative search for factual truth) that makes it so difficult to characterize their writings either in terms of 'literature' or 'history'. This combination also makes it difficult to characterize their work in terms of 'truth', 'falsehood' or 'fiction', though if we examine their own descriptions of their project, we have a better chance of seeing how these concepts match with theirs."

3. Romilly, Jacqueline de. 1990. *La Construction De La Vérité Chez Thucydide*. Paris: Juillard.

Heraclitus

Texts

Studies

1. O'Meara, Dominic. 2004. ""Dire Le Vrai" Chez Héraclite." In *La Verité. Antiquité - Modernité*, edited by Aenishanslin, Jean-Franois, O'Meara, Dominic and Schüssler, Ingeborg, 11-17. Lausanne: Payot.

Parmenides

Texts

Studies

1. Constantineau, Philippe. 1987. "La Question De La Vérité Chez Parménide." *Phoenix.Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 41:217-240.

   "This article proposes a new interpretation of Fragment 2 based on a reading of verses 3 and 5 as questions rather than as assertions, a reading which is supported by references to similar Homeric formulae. It is argued that this reading solves all the problems that have plagued all previous interpretations of this fragment. It also sheds new light on the starting point of Parmenides' ontology as set against the background of the traditions of epic poetry and of Ionian cosmology."

2. Germani, Gloria. 1988. " *Aletheie* in Parmenide." *La Parola del Passato* no. 43:177-206.

3. Mourelatos, Alexander. 1970. *The Route of Parmenides. A Study of Word, Image and Argument in the Fragments*. New Haven: New Haven University Press.

   New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos *Names of Being in Parmenides* - Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2008.

4. Papadis, Dimitris. 2005. "The Concept of Truth in Parmenides." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 23:77-96.

   "Studies Parmenides' tripartite cognitive scheme: a) *doxa*, true or false, b) *ta dokounta* = true doxai, primarily of universal reference, and c) *aletheia*. *Doxa* and *ta dokounta* refer to the perceptible aspect of the world, whereas *aletheia*

refers to the inner Being of the world. Although in the Poem access to the truth is reserved to Parmenides, it is understood that such access is also possible for everyone possessed of exceptional spirituality."

Sophists

Texts

Studies

1. Classen, Carl Joachim. 1989. "Protagoras' *Aletheia*." In *The Criterion of Truth*, edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal, Gordon, 13-38. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

2. Huby, Pamela, and Neal, Gordon, eds. 1989. *The Criterion of Truth*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

   Essays written in honour of George Kerferd together with a text and translation (with annotations) of Ptolemy's *On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon*.

Plato's Doctrine of Truth

Texts

Studies

1. Belfiore, Elizabeth. 1985. ""Lies Unlike the Truth": Plato on Hesiod, *Theogony*, 27." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 115:47-57.

   Plato's text is: *Republic* 2, 376-383.

2. Benardete, Seth. 1963. "The Right, the True and the Beautiful." *Glotta* no. 41:54-62.

3. Bury, Robert Gregg. 1973. *The Philebus of Plato*. New York: Arno Press.

   Edited with introduction, notes and appendices (first edition 1897).
   See Appendix F (on *aletheia*) pp. 201-211.

4. Casertano, Giovanni. 2007. *Paradigmi Della Verità in Platone*. Roma: Editori Riuniti.

5. Des Places, Édouard. 1961. "La Langue Philosophique De Platon: Le Vocabulare De L'accès Au Savoir Et De La Science." *Syculorum Gymnasium* no. 16:71-83.

   Repris dans: É. Des Places - *Études plationiciennes 1929-1979* - Leiden, Brill, 1981 pp. 36-48 (sur *alétheia* pp. 44-46).

6. Fiorentino, Fernando. 2002. "Il Problema Della Verità in Platone." *Sapienza* no. 55:3-38.

7. Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's *Sophist* on False Statements." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

8. Gill, Christopher. 1993. "Plato on Falsehood - Not Fiction." In *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, edited by Gill, Christopher and Wiseman, Timothy Peter, 88-121. Exeter: University of Exter Press.

   "I begin by drawing three types of distinction between kinds of discourse. The first relates to the speaker's intended form of communication with a listener. This distinction involves two aspects: that between factual and fictional discourse, and that between forms of factual discourse. Factual discourse is intended either to convey to the listener what the speaker takes to be true (`veracious'), or to convey what the speaker takes to be false (`lying'). Fictional discourse is different in kind from factual: its statements (and other

forms of expression) do not constitute truth- telling or lying, and in this sense fiction has no truth-status.
The second type of distinction differs from the first in that it characterizes discourse by reference to whether it is in fact true or false rather than whether the speaker intends to convey what he or she takes to be true or false.
The third type of distinction relates to the mode of expression. I have in mind such distinctions as that between analytic discourse and non-analytic (representative or narrative); between prosaic discourse (historical, philosophical) and poetic (epic, dramatic, lyric); between literal discourse and figurative (imagistic, musical); and between general and specific discourse. This type of distinction differs from the first two in several ways, notably in not designating truth-status in either of the senses involved in those distinctions. But I include this distinction here because the question of the truth-status of a given discourse is often connected closely with that of the mode of expression involved. Thus, for example, a given statement may be false (in intention or fact) on the literal level but true (in intention or fact) on the figurative level; or it may be false in a specific case but true in general. This is only the most obvious way in which the distinctions drawn in the first two types may be connected with those in the third type.
My claim is that these distinctions, while broadly intelligible to modern readers, do not correspond in one crucial respect to the conceptual framework presupposed by Plato. The distinction between factual and fictional discourse, which is familiar to us, has no obvious equivalent in Plato's framework." pp. 39-40

9. Guillamaud, Patrice. 1987. "La Doctrine De La Vérité Dans Le *Cratyle* De Platon." *Revue de l'Enseignement Philosophique* no. 38:1-9.

10. Hestir, Blake E. 2000. "A Conception of Truth in *Republic* V." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 17:311-332.

"Plato sometimes refers to truth (*aletheia*) as an object. The thesis of this paper is that Plato's "object" truth is being, an object of knowledge. I provide an examination of the difficult stretch of text at "Republic" V 476e-480a, where Plato argues for the separation of knowledge, belief, and ignorance with respect to their objects. Plato claims that knowledge is "set over" being, by which he means forms. Since philosophers are lovers of the sight of truth and Plato thinks that in one respect forms are truth, it follows that the being knowledge is set over is truth."

11. ———. 2003. "A Conception of Truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 41:1-24.

    " Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the *Sophist* is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's *Sophist*. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the *Sophist*. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* -- a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the *Sophist*. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that

Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in the *Sophist*."

12. ———. 2004. "Plato and the Split Personality of Ontological *Aletheia*." *Apeiron* no. 37:109-150.

    "I argue that Plato conceives of truth in at least two distinct and fundamentally important ways: (T1) truth is simply that being or substance which he identifies as forms, and (T2) truth is the ontological stability of the forms which is the precondition for the forms being what they are insofar as they are forms and for each form having the particular F-property it has by virtue of itself, and which guarantees that each form will satisfy the Parmenidean requirements for knowledge. Plato's ontological truth has a split personality, the latter of which (T2) I argue has been misunderstood."

13. Jenks, Rod. 2001. *The Contribution of Socratic Method and Plato's Theory of Truth to Plato Scholarship*. Levinston: Edwin Mellen Press.

    Contents: 1. The problem of the Socratic method; 2. The Coherence Theory of Truth; 3. The Coherence Theory within the Platonic corpus; 4. Coherence and anamnesis; 5. Socratic ignorance and the Coherence Theory of Truth; 6. The uniqueness of the world; conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

14. Knight, Thomas. 1993. "The Use of *"Alétheia*" for the "Truth of Unreason": Plato, the Septuagint, and Philo." *American Journal of Philology* no. 114:581-609.

    "Orthodoxy about the semantic evolution of Aletheia in the Hellenistic period represents Philo Judaeus and Plutarch as the non-Christian representatives of a line of development beginning in Plato (where Aletheia is said to denote

abstract, conceptual Truth, 'die Wahrheit') (1) and ending in the sense of absolute truth, specifically 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.' (2) The problem of such a stemma is that it fails to stand up to close inspection; the present study considers one of the circumstances under which 'truth' was equated with doctrinal content in the Hellenistic period. (3) Specifically, I undertake to demark the distinction between 'truth' as Philo Judaeus understands it from 'truth' as it is used by the philosophers who are his stylistic and intellectual models; I intend to show that Philo's notion of pure truth is not a natural semantic extension of Platonic (or even contemporary philosophic) usage, but is rather an expression of deeper cultural determinants." p. 581
(1) Bultmann, 'Alétheia.' The passages he cites here in support of this development (Plut. De Isid et Os. 351c, e, and Hierocles Carm. Aur. 21-23 Mullach) are far too late to represent the direct semantic development of Platonic usage of the term. The same objection holds for Bultmann's citation of Epictit. (Diss. 1.4, 31; 3.24, 40) for the extension of Alétheia into 'the sense of `correct learning.' From these observations he proceeds into his second major heading in the discussion of the Classical and Hellenistic evolution of the word, 'The Usage of Dualism.' In this section he again fails to make the crucial distinction between fourth- and third-century (and later) usage.
(2) Bauer,Arndt, and Gingrich, Lexicon, s.v. 'Alétheia', cite Plutarch (Is. and Os. 351e) and Philo (Spec. Leg. 4.178, 'the proselyte is a *metanastàs eis aletheian'*) as the non-Christian antecedents for Alétheia denoting 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.'

15. Marcos De Pinotti, Graciela. 1987. "La Distinción Platónica Entre Episteme Y Doxa Alethes a La Luz Del Tratamiento Del Error (*Teeteto* 188 a-C)." *Revista de Filosofia* no. 2:135-154.

16. Miller, Mitchell. 2010. "A More "Exact Grasp" of the Soul? Tripartition in the *Republic* and Dialectic in the *Philebus*."

In *Truth. Studies of a Robust Presence*, edited by Pritzl, Kurt, 40-101. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

17. Rankin, H.D. 1963. " *A-Letheia* in Plato." *Glotta* no. 41:51-54.

18. Szaif, Jan. 1996. *Platons Begriff Der Wahrheit*. Freiburg / München: Verlag Karl Alber.

    Revised paperback edition 1998.

19. ———. 2000. "Platon Über Wahrheit Und Kohärenz." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 82:119-148.

    "This article tries to explain how the concepts of truth and coherence feature in Plato's theory of knowledge. It sets out Plato's concept of coherence (*homologia, symphonia*) in connection with the methods of his dialectic, gives a critical assessment of the evidence for the foundationalist or intuitionist interpretations of his theory of knowledge, and tries to unearth the presuppositions that allow Plato to combine his specific criterion of coherence with the hard realism of his concept of truth."

20. ———. 2001. "Sprache, Bedeutung, Wahrheit. Überlegungen Zu Platon Und Seinem Dialog *Kratylos*." *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 26:45-60.

21. ———. 2004. "Die *Aletheia* in Platons Tugendlehre." In *La Verité. Antiquité - Modernité*, edited by Aenishanslin, Jean-Franois, O'Meara, Dominic and Schüssler, Ingeborg, 19-45. Lausanne: Payot.

22. Wolz, Henry G. 1966. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth: Orthótes or Aletheia?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:157-182.

Aristotle's Definition of Truth

Texts

Studies

1. Ademollo, Francesco. 2010. "The Principle of Bivalence in *De Interpretatione* 4." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:97-113.

   "Aristotle's definition of the declarative sentence in *De interpretatione* 4 appears to conflict with his denial of unrestricted bivalence in chapter 9 of the same treatise. The problem can be solved by interpreting chapter 4 to assign truth-value only to some declarative sentences rather than to all and only declarative sentences."

2. Ben-Zeev, A. 1984. "Aristotle on Perceptual Truth and Falsity." *Apeiron* no. 18:118-125.

3. Berti, Enrico. 1978. "The Intellection of "Indivisibles" According to Aristotle *De Anima* Iii 6." In *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by Lloyd, G.E.R. and Owen, G. E. L., 141-163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4. ———. 2000. "I Luoghi Della Verità Secondo Aristotele: Un Confronto Con Heidegger." In *I Luoghi Del Comprendere*, edited by Melchiorre, Virgilio, 3-27. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

5. Brentano, Franz. 1862. *Von Der Mannigfachen Bedeutung Des Seienden Nach Aristoteles*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder.

   New edition edited by Werner Sauer, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014.
   English translation by Rolf George: *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, Berkeley: University of California Press,

1975, Chapter III. *Being in the Sense of Being True*, pp. 15-26.

6. Brown, Montague. 1993. "Aristotle and Augustine on the Way to Truth: The Essential Agreement and Existential Difference." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* no. 67:253-267.

7. Busche, Hubertus. 2002. "Die Interpretierende Kraft Der Aisthesis : Wahrheit Und Irrtum Der Wahrnehmung Bei Aristoteles." In *Interpretationen Der Wahrheit*, edited by Figal, Günter, 112-142. Tübingen: Attempto.

8. Caston, Victor. 1998. "Commentary on Pritzl: Aristotle on the Conditions of Thought." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 14:202-211.

9. Cosci, Matteo. 2014. *Verità E Comparazione in Aristotele*. Venezia: Istituto veneto di lettere, scienze e arti.

   "This research aims to study the Aristotelian notion of truth (αλήθεια) in relation to the development of the so called logic of comparison from a historical and philosophical standpoint. The logic of comparison (or comparative logic) is defined as the proportioning way to make comparisons between different terms through major, minor or equal measure (Casari 1984; 1985). The main thesis of this research is that the Aristotelian notion of truth is not a gradable value, i. e. declinable by “more” or “less”, but, because of that, it could be considered as the ultimative reference of validity for comparative logic. This is argued through the analysis of three chosen key-concepts: gradationism, truth and comparison. Firstly, it is shown how some Aristotelian conceptions about “more” or “less” were unduly taken over with ontological (mis)understanding by later metaphisics, up to consider them as logical justification of existence for degrees of being and corresponding truths, despite Aristotle’s thought, from faulty sensibility to a highest level of absolute Truth. Some recent authoritative studies about the subject of the

Aristotelian theory of αλήθεια are been considered here and the result is that none of those allows to attribute such a gradable notion to Aristotle. Then it is proposed a critique evaluation about the problem of the origins of the ancient comparative logic, showing that presumed degrees of truth are not detectable at all in the Aristotelian dialectic, but only more or less sound arguments always based on the criterion of bivalence (truth/false) provided by the Principle of Excluded Middle. Finally, the research ends arguing the groundlessness for attributing to Aristotle the idea of an intuitive and pre-predicative truth as different, prior and superior to an alleged predicative truth through the contextual critique of the interpretations of A. Trendelenburg (1846), F. Brentano (1862) and M. Heidegger (1930) and their common Neo-Scholastic background. - From a theoretical point of view, the whole thesis can be read as a critique to the idea of «truer»."
References:
Ettore Casari, "Note sulla logica aristotelica della comparazione", Sileno, 10, 1984, pp. 131-146.
Ettore Casari, "Logica e comparativi", in Corrad Mangione (ed.), *Scienza e filosofia. Saggi in onore di Ludovico Geymonat*, Milano: Garzanti, 1985, pp. 392-418.
Adolf Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre I. Aristotle Kategorienlehre*, Berlin: Verlag von G. Bethge, 1846, (reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1979).
Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder Verlag, 1862 (new edition with an introduction by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014).
Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie* [lecture course held at Freiburg in the Summer Semester 1930], now in the Gesamtausgabe, XXXI, 1982.

10. Crivelli, Paolo. 1999. "Aristotle on the Truth of Utterances." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 17:37-56.

11. ———. 2004. *Aristotle on Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Notes on the text X; List of abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works XI; Introduction 1; Part I. Bearers of truth or falsehood 45; 1. States of affairs. thoughts. and sentences 45; 2. Truth conditions for predicative assertions 77; 3. Truth conditions for existential assertions 99; Part II. 'Empty' terms 129; 4. Truth as correspondence129; 5. 'Vacuous' terms and 'empty' terms 152; Par III. Truth and time 183; 6. Truth and change 183; 7. Truth and determinism in *De Interpretatione* 9 198; Appendix I. *Metaph*. Theta 10 1051b 1: the text 234; Appendix 2. *Metaph*. Theta 10 1051b 2-3: the text 238; Appendix 3. *Int*. 7, 17b 16-18: the text 239; Appendix 4. The two place relations in Aristotle's definition of truth 254; Appendix 5. Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions: formal presentation 258; Appendix 6. The failure of Bivalence for future-tense assertions formal presentation 266; References 284; Index of names 313; Index of subjects 319; Index of passages 321.
"Tbe study of truth is a central part of the philosophical tradition we have inherited from classical Greece. Aristotle played an important role in developing and sharpening the debate in this area and on many issues that are connected with it. I have two primary goals: to offer a precise reconstruction of all of Aristotle's most significant views on truth and falsehood and to gain a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I first offer an overview of Aristotle's theory of truth and then discuss the methodology I adopt in pursuing my primary goals.
I AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF TRUTH
Why an overview? Aristotle speaks about truth and falsehood in passages from several works, mainly the *Categories* (chapters 4, 5, 10, and 12), *de Interpretatione* (chapters 1-9), *Sophistici Elenchi* (chapter 25), *de Anima* (chapter 3.6), and the *Metaphysics* (chapters Γ 7, Δ 7, Δ 29, E 4, and Θ 10). Truth and falsehood are not the main topic of these works: their discussions of truth and falsehood are

asides. Reconstructing an Aristotelian theory of truth and falsehood on the basis of such asides poses complicated problems of various sorts. To help readers to keep their orientation through the many bifurcations of the arguments addressing these problems, I decided to offer a concise but precise map of the territory — an overview of Aristotle's theory of truth. References to the passages from Aristotle's works that substantiate the attribution of a certain view to him, and an examination of the relevant secondary literature, will be found in the chapters that follow this introduction." (p. 1)

12. Dougherty, M. V. 2004. "Aristotle's Four Truth Values." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 12:585-609.

13. Engmann, Joyce. 1976. "Imagination and Truth in Aristotle." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 14:259-265.

14. Ferejohn, Mchael T. 1981. "Aristotle on Necessary Truth and Logical Priority." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 18:285-293.

15. Fiorentino, Fernando. 2001. "Il Problema Della Verità in Aristotele." *Sapienza* no. 54:257-302.

16. Fleischer, Margot. 1984. *Wahrheit Und Wahrheitsgrund. Zum Wahrheitsproblem Und Zu Seiner Geschichte*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    II Kapitel. *Aristoteles*, pp. 14-28.

17. Harvey, Peter John. 1978. "Aristotle on Truth and Falsity in *De Anima* Iii,6." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 16:219-220.

18. Hestir, Blake. 2013. "Aristotle's Conception of Truth: An Alternative View." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 51:193-222.

19. Imbert, Claude. 1985. " La Vérité D'aristote Et La Vérité De Tarski." In *Histoire Et Structure. A La Mémoire De Victor Goldschmidt* edited by Brunschwig, Jacques and Imbert, Claude, 173-193. Paris: Vrin.

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    " Lorsque, en *Metaphysique* Δ, 29, Aristote parle de la « chose vraie », cela ne signifie pas que le Stagirite possède, outre sa conception de la vérité propositionnelle, une

conception de la vérité ontologique. Dans le texte en question, Aristote adopte, pour les besoins de la polémique, la conception antisthénienne de la proposition et de la vérité, selon laquelle il ne peut y avoir qu'un *logos* par objet, ce qui entraîne l'impossibilité de la contradiction. Cette conception donne lieu à des paradoxes, auxquels Platon se heurte notamment dans le *Sophiste*; mais qui n'ont été définitivement résolus que par la distinction analytique effectuée par Aristote entre sujet et prédicat, distinction qui marque la naissance de la notion de proposition proprement dite."

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History of Truth: *Veritas* in Latin Middle Ages from Augustine to Paul of Venice

INTRODUCTION

It is in the Middle Ages that for the first time were written treatises under the title of *De veritate* and the medieval definition of truth as "adequation of intellect to the thing" is well known; this page is about his history and the criticism made against it.
"The first medieval work on truth is the dialogue *De veritate* of Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1080-85). It is in many regards an original treatise. In Chapter One Anselm writes, "I do not recall ever having found a definition of truth; but if you wish, let us inquire as to what truth is by going through the various things in which we say there is truth." In the next chapters he examines not only what truth of the proposition and of thought is, but also that of the will, of action, of the senses and of things. In all these cases the analysis results in establishing truth as rightness or rectitude (*rectitudo*), denoting that something is as it ought to be, that it does that "for which it is made" (Ch. 2). Anselm's definition, then, is ultimately (Ch. 11), "rightness perceptible only to the mind" (*rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis*) - the addition is meant to exclude cases of a merely visible rectitude, e.g., that of a (straight) stick.
The definition rectitude reminds us of the rightness (*Richtigkeit*) of which Heidegger spoke. But Anselm's analysis is carried out on yet a different level. To be sure, Anselm too deals with the truth of the proposition (although as one of the areas in which truth can be found), and also for him an enunciation is true when it signifies that that which is, is. It is here, however - in the

"rightness", if one will - that truth manifests itself as rectitude, since in this way the statement fulfils the end contained in its nature. It is primarily this inner conformity which Anselm means by rightness, not the "correctness" of the proposition with respect to the outer world.
The adaequatio-formula is not mentioned by Anselm anywhere in the dialogue - another indication that, to quote De Rijk, the Middle Ages are not "typically medieval". Neither does the idea expressed in the formula play a crucial role. (...)
In the second medieval work on truth, the *Questiones disputatae De veritate* of Thomas Aquinas (1256-59), the matter is different, however In this writing the adaequatio-formula is to be found again and again. It is therefore especially owing to Thomas Aquinas that the formula has become so current.
In the first disputation he mentions a series of definitions of truth, derived from various traditions. Greek philosophy is represented by Aristotle, early Christian thought by Augustine, and pre- scholastic thought by the above-mentioned definition of Anselm, who was one of Thomas's main interlocutors in this disputation. Furthermore, Arabic philosophy is represented by Avicenna. Among the many determinations of truth is also the formula *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, ascribed by Thomas to a tenth-century Jewish philosopher, Isaac Israëli. No one, however, has been able to locate this definition in Israëli's works. Scholars suggest Avicenna and Averroës as possible sources." (pp. 5-6)

From: Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Reflections on Truth. Adaequatio ei et intellectus*. Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel 1984.

VERITAS IN ANCIENT LATIN

"*Verus* as an adjective was a very old Latin word that had several meanings. It could be used as a simple explicative or affirmative (*verum!*). Most often, in Plautus and Republican literature, it meant "true" in the sense of firm, capable of withstanding a test or trial. For example: "Farewell, ... continue conquering with true

[*vera,* stalwart] courage as you have done so far" (*Casina* 87-88). In this sense the Romans seem to have related *verus* to words with similar sounds and meanings: *assevere, persevere, severus*. Cicero's Laelius affirms that "a public meeting, though composed of very ignorant men, can, nevertheless, usually see the difference between a 'demagogue' (*popularis*), that is, a shallow, flattering citizen, and one who is *constans, verus*, and *gravis*. " (*De amicitia* 95).
Veritas seems to have begun its Latin life as the abstraction of a quality of human behavior, like *gravitas* or *simplicitas*. It appears in a few instances as early as Terence and has a meaning not far from *severitas* (rigor, sternness, austerity, integrity of judgment), as opposed to compliance or levity: "There was stern *veritas* in his face, *fides* in his words" (*Tristis veritas inest in voltu atque in verbis fides* [Andria 858]). "*Obsequium* secures friends, *veritas* only enemies" (*Obsequium amicos, veritas odium paret* [Andria 68-69]). Livy's Capitolinus declares, "I know that I could say other things that you would be happier to hear, but necessity compels me, even if my *ingenium* did not admonish me, to speak *vera pro gratis*, the *vera* rather than the *gratis*. h is not that I do not wish to please you, Quirites, but I wish, much more, for you to be safe" (Livy 3. 68.9). Cicero, the first to make frequent use of the word *veritas* to translate the abstract truth, the *aletheia* of Greek philosophers, still, on occasion, employed it with its ancient associations with selflessness, severity, and constancy. "Friendships are nurtured by veritas, alliances by fides, dose relationships by pietas" (*veritate amicitia, fide societas, pietate propinquitas colitur* [Pro Quinctio 6.26])." (p. 68, notes omitted)

From: Carlin A. Barton, *Roman Honor. The Fire in the Bones*, Berkeley: University of California Press 2001.

VERITAS: ORIGINS OF THE DEFINITION "ADAEQUATIO INTELLECTUS AD REM"

"Almost everyone knows that it was Aristotle who proposed the classical (or correspondence) theory of truth for the first time. However, the fact that his writings contain different and often mutually non-equivalent statements on truth is less recognized. This is a sample of Aristotelian explanations concerning the concept of truth (...):

3) To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true (*Metaphysics* 1011 b).

4) The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is; and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is, is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to be the cause of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact the man's being or not being (*Categories* 14 b).

5) But since that which is in the sense of being true or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements; for the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation (*Metaphysics* 1027 b).

6) he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error (*Metaphysics* 1051 b).

7) It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you *are* pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth (*Metaphysics* 1051 b).

8) Propositions correspond with facts (*Hermeneutics* [*De interpretatione*] 19 b).

The formulation 3) is usually taken as Aristotle's official definition of truth. Now 4) repeats the content of 3) but adds that being is in a sense more basic for truth than an assertion which is qualified as true. The two statements are not equivalent because neither does () follow from 3) nor does the reverse entailment

hold. Statements 5) and 6) introduce an explicit ontological parameter, namely combination and separation; these statements seem to be equivalent (or at least "nearly" equivalent). On the other hand, there is no direct entailment from 5) (or 6)) to 3) or 4), and back.

Perhaps one might say that "a is b" is true if and only if the relation which holds between referents of a and b is mapped by the relation holding between a and b, and false if the mapping is not in case. If we decide to label mapping as "combination" and not-mapping as "separation", we obtain something very close to 5) and 6). And if we look at combination as correspondence and separation as non-correspondence, 5) and 6) become popular formulations of the classical definitions of truth.

The statement 7) seems to exemplify previous explanations, particularly 3). Finally, 8) explicitly speaks about facts and correspondence but it is only a marginal remark made by Aristotle when he considered the celebrated sea-battle problem. Hence, there are no sufficient reasons to treat (8) as a serious proposal to define the concept of truth.

If we take 3) as Aristotle's official truth-definition (and, a fortiori, as the first mature explanation of CCT; [*Classical Concept of Truth*]), than other Aristotelian formulations should be understood rather as more or less auxiliary comments than proper definitions of truth. The point is very important because no idea of correspondence is directly involved in 3). Although, as my previous remarks show, "combination" can be replaced by "correspondence" but nothing forces us to dress Aristotle's truth-theory into "correspondence talk". In fact, 3)- 7) may be explained without any reference to such ideas as correspondence, agreement, adequacy or conformity; recall that 8) is only a marginal remark. I think that the best understanding of what is going on in Aristotle's theory of truth consists in looking at 3) as something which is very closely related to 1) and 2). Then if we think of Plato's philosophy of truth as a further step in the tradition beginning with old Greeks poems and continued by the Pre-Socratics, Aristotle should also be considered in the same way. Under this assumption, 3) schematically says how to answer the question: how is it? Although Aristotle supplements 3) with

considerable ontological equipment, his main intuition concerning the concept of truth seems very simple.
Various explanations by Pierre Abélard of the concept of truth offered in his *Logica Ingredientibus* lead to (see De Rijk [*Petrus Abaelardus Dialectica*, Assen 1956] p. LIV):

> (9) the sentence p is equivalent with "p is true" if and only if p is the case. Clearly, (9) anticipates the semantic definition of. truth but it was not properly understood in the Middle Ages (nor later).
>
> The most famous medieval explanation of the concept of truth comes from Thomas Aquinas. His formulation is this:
>
> 10) *Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est* (*De Veritate* 1,2).
>
> The passage which begins with the word *secundum*, is simply a repetition of Aristotle's main formulation (see (3) above). But the first part of 10) -- *veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei* -- is an obvious addition to Aristotle, actually related to (5) or (6). Usually, (10) is quoted in its simplified version limited to its first part: *veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei;* in fact, this shortened formula is the most popular wording of the classical truth-definition. However, everybody who employs this simplified record of CCT as "Aristotelian", must remember that it is certainly not Aristotelian to the letter. The question whether and to which extent it is Aristotelian in spirit requires special investigations that exceed the scope of this paper. So I restrict myself to some remarks on *adaequatio intellectus et rei*.

One can link the meaning of *adaequatio* in 10) with the second (Aristotelian) part of this formula. However, Aquinas also uses such terms as *conformitas, corresponde n tia* and *convenientia* to explain his understanding of CCT. It suggests his *adaequatio* expresses (or at least might express) a content which is not quite reducible to Aristotelian intuitions.
What is going on in the first part of 10)? There are several possible answers. Let me indicate three. Firstly, *veritas est*

adaequatio intellectus et rei may be regarded as a counterpart of 5) or 6). Secondly, the fact that the *adaequatio*-formula opens Thomas' definition seems to suggest that he changed the centre of gravity in the Aristotelian truth-theory in such a way that *adaequatio, correspondentia, conformitas* or *convenientia* became crucial ideas in defining truth. Thirdly, the *adaequatio*-formula was invented by the Schoolmen to capture intuitions concerning truth in a simple way; the Schoolmen very much liked brief formulations. It is very difficult to decide today which interpretation (I am very far from claiming that my three cases exhaust all possible interpretations of 10)) is correct with respect to Aquinas' original intentions. However, the next development of Thomism rather followed the second interpretation. For instance, Francisco Suárez says that *veritas transcendentalis significat entitatem rei, connotando cognitionem seu conceptum intellectus, cui talis entitas conformatur vel in quo talis res representatur* (*Disputationes metaphysicae,* 8, 2.9). The content of 3) is completely absent in Suárez. He proposes instead an analysis of truth with the help of the concept of *representati*o and seems to assume that a *conformitas (adaequatio, correspondentia)* holds between thoughts and their objects. That is what I mean by "changing the centre of gravity". Most post-medieval thinkers adopted this route in their thinking on truth and tried to explain how *adaequatio* should be understood.
It is now proper to introduce an important distinction (see Wolenski-Simons [1989]), namely that of weak and strong concept of correspondence. If the concept of correspondence is governed by 3) (or similar statements), we are dealing with correspondence in the weak sense. On the other hand, Suárez's approach employs correspondence in the strong sense. I am inclined to regard the distinction of the two concepts of correspondence as fairly crucial for the history of CCT. Thus, we must always ask which concept of correspondence is used in particular truth-theories because many difficulties with interpreting philosophers' views on truth are rooted in their view of the distinction in question. As far as the matter concerns the concept of correspondence, it has been explained by notions like sameness, similarity, model, picture, co-ordination, isomorphism or homomorphism (...).

Let me finish this section with some historical remarks (see Gilson [1955]). Aquinas notes that his definition of truth is derived from *Liber de definitionibus* by Izaak ben Salomon Israeli; Aquinas also refers to Avicenna in this context. However, *adaequatio* does not occur in Israeli's truth-definition which (in Latin version) is this: *Et sermo quidem dicentis: veritas est quod est, enuntiativus est nature veritatis et essentiae ejus, quonian illud sciendum quod es res, vera est; est veritas nonnisi quod est*; this formula is fairly Aristotelian. Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* says (in Latin translation) that *veritas [...] intelligitur dispositio in re exteriore cum est ei aequalitas*; the last word suggests the strong sense of correspondence. It was William of Auvergne who introduced the term *adaequatio* in philosophy for the first time. He refers (in *De universo*) to Avicenna in the following way: *et hoc [intentio veritas] ait Avicenna, est adaequalio orationis et rerum*. Then William adds that the truth is *intellectus ad rem*. In Albertus Magnus' treatise *De bono* we find that truth is *adaequalio rei cum intellectu*. Then comes 10)." (pp. 141-144 of the reprint).

From: Jan Wolenski, "Contributions to the History of the Classical Truth-Definition", in: *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* Vol. IX. Amsterdam: Elsevier 1994 pp. 481-495, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991. (Reprinted in: Jan Wolenski, *Essays in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy*, Cracov: Jagiellonian University Press 1999, pp. 139-149.

"In the *Summa Theologica* (I, q. 16; a. 2, ad 2) of St. Thomas Aquinas we read: "Praeterea, Isaac dicit in libro *De efinitionibus*, quod "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus"." Also in his De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, we find the statement: " Et sic dicit Isaac, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus ".
B. Geyer in his work, *Die Patristische and Scholastische Philosophie* (Berlin, 1928), p. 334, says " Bonaventura, Heinrich von Gent, Thomas von Aquin entnehmen die bekannte scholastische Wahrheitsdefinition: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus dem "Buch der Definitionen Isaaks. " He gives a

reference to St. Bonaventure's commentary on First Book of Sentences (d. 40, a. 2, q. 1) where the definition is found. It is not there attributed to Isaac by St. Bonaventure and the footnote referred to below. is repeated distinctly saying it does not occur in Isaac.
In the work S. Thomas d'Aquin by A.-D. Sertillanges (Paris, 1910) Tome I, p. 41, we read: "Quant à celle d'Isaac, que saint Thomas semble affectionner par-dessus les autres: "La vérité est l'adéquation des choses et de l'intelligence" (adaequatio rei et intellectus), c'est une définition à double entente." J. de Tonquédec, in his *La Critique de la Connaissance* (Paris, 1929, p. 512) says: " Le vrai, dit Isaac, est l'équation de la chose et de l'esprit ", and in a footnote it is stated: "La définition de la vérité se trouve dans le *Livre des Définitions*, comme le dit saint Thomas."
In the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (ed. IV, 1929, it is not in the 1910 edition) s. v. *Israeli, Isaac Ben Salomon* we read: " Through the labours of Gundissalinus he became very popular with the thirteenth century scholastics who took from his definitions the famous definition: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. (1)" (p. 5)
(...)
Several other references might be given to modern writers on mediaeval philosophy who attribute the definition to Isaac. Among mediaeval writers, St. Albertus Magnus attributes the following definition of truth to Aristotle: " Dicit enim Aristoteles in V primae philosophiae, quod "veritas est adaequatio rerum et intellectuum" " (*Summa Theologica*, P. II, Tr. 1; q. 1; m. 2; a. 1, Arg. 4.). Moreover he gives Isaac's definition of truth as follows: " Complexi autem sermonis veritas est secundum Isaac in libro de Definitionibus, affirmatio rei de qua vere praedicatur, vel negatio rei de qua vere negatur. " (I. Sum. Theol., Tr. VI, q. 25, m. 1). " Et hoc modo veritas, ut dicit Isaac in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas non est nisi quod est et quod res vere est. " (I. Sum. Theol., T. 6, q. 25, m. 1). " Dicit enim Isaac quod "veritas est id quod est res", vel secundum aliquos, "veritas est sermo quem confirmat demonstratio". " (I. Sum. Theol., T. 6; q. 25, m: 2.). " Secundum Isaac et secundum Augustinum, verum est id quod est. " (Ibid. No. 3.). " Et secu idum hoc dicit Isaac, quod "veritas est sermo

quem aff rmat demonstratio vel sensibiliter vel actualiter. " 1. Sum Theol., T. 6, q. 25, m. 1.
St. Bonaventure quotes the definition "adaequatio rei et intellectus" several times, (v. g. Sent., Lib. I, D. 40; Art. 2; q. 1. Sent., Lib. I, D. 46; Art. 1; q. 4. Sent., Lib. II, D. 37; Art. 2; q. 3. In Hex. Collationes, III. par. 8), but so far as I have discovered, he does not state where it is to be found.
In the Quaracchi Edition of his works (1882), Tom. I. p. 707, note 5, the editors call attention to the fact that they had read one ms. of Isaac (Monac. B. R. 8001, ff. 151v.-154r.) without finding the definition of truth which St. Thomas attributes to him. They quote from Isaac a definition which will be referred to later on. In several other places where St. Bonaventure quotes the definition veritas est sermo quem confirmat demonstratio, they refer the reader to this note or repeat it in full." (pp. 6-7)
(...)
I have just finished reading three mss. of Isaac *De definitionibus*, viz. (a) Paris B. N. 6443, ff. 187r-190r; (b) Paris B. N. 14700, ff. 153r-160v. Catalogued as belonging to the XIII. century, it bears the book-mark of the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris. (...) In none of these mss. did I find the definition of truth so persistently attributed to Isaac.
On f. 156v, 14700, there begins a long list of definitions which continue to the end of the work. This list is also in 6443, but the Vatican ms. lacks it. In these mss. Isaac gives the following definitions of truth: 1. "Diffinitio namque veritatis est quod est ; et diffinitio vani tatis est quod non est aliquid aut, narratio rei absque eo quod est." 14700, f. 155r. C. 1, 11. 12-13; 6443, f. 147v. C. 2, 11. 45. The Vatican ms. reads the same except that it has autem for namque, and falsitatis for vanitatis. (F. 47v. C. 2, 11. 25 sq.)2. Diffinitio veritatis; and there is written in the margin, by the same hand I think, veritas est quod est res. And then the text goes on: " et diffinierunt eam disertores. Dixerunt enim, veritas est sermo quem firmat demonstratio aut sensibiliter aut intellectualiter. ... hec diffinitio est assumpta ex qualitate veritatis, non ex eius quiditate. Et illud ideo, quoniam cum aliquis dicit quid est veritas, est responsio in eo est quod est res, et cum dicit qualis est, dicitur ei quod est sermo quem demonstratio firmat aut intellectualiter aut sensibiliter... et sermo quidem

dicentis veritas est quod est enuntiativus est nature veritatis et essentie eius, quoniam illud secundum quod est res, vere est veritas, non nisi quod est. ... falsitas est non quod est res, et dicitur falsitas, narratio rei cum diverso quod est ipsa et ipsius . contrario. " (14700, 158v, C. 2, 11. 30 sq.) Ms. 6443 is a very poor text. The above passage is faulty but the important parts relative to this question are the same. In the margin of 189r. C. 2, 1. 21 there is written in the first hand: " diffinitio veritatis; veritas est quod res est, " and in the same column 1. 39, we read: " sermo quidem dicentis: veritas est quod est essentiativum (sic) est nature veritatis et essencie eius quoniam illud secundum quod est res vera est; est veritas non nisi quod est. "3. " Verum est affirmare rem rei cui est secundum veritatem aut expellere rem a re a qua vere removetur. ... Falsum est affirmare rem rei que ab ea removetur vere et removere rem a re que ei affirmatur secundum veritatem. " (14700, 159 r. C. 1, 11. 22 sq. = 6443, 189r C. 2, 11. 48 sq.) Monacensis 3001 as quoted in the Quaracchi Edition varies somewhat in wording from the above, but the meaning is much the same.
The definition of verum (number 3) perhaps comes nearest to the definition ascribed to Isaac by St. Thomas, yet it is by no means the same either in meaning or language. Perhaps some reader may know of a different manuscript tradition of Isaac wherein the classic definition is found." (pp. 7-8)

Notes

(1) The statement in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* might lead one to believe that Gundissalinus quoted the definition from Isaac. I have also read recently a ms. of Gundissalinus *De anima*, Vat. Lat. 2186, f. 104r.-119v. I found there this definition of truth; veritas autem cuiusque rei est id quod ipsa est. f. 118 v., 1. 30

From: Joseph Thomas Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 8, 1933 pp. 5-8.

Related pages

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Selected Bibliography on the Theories of Truth in Latin Middle Ages

TRUTH IN THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES: GENERAL STUDIES

1. Aertsen, Jan A. 1984. *Medieval Reflections on Truth. Adaequatio Rei Et Intellectus*. Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel.

   Inaugural address on the occasion of his taking up the chair of Medieval philosophy of the Free University in Amsterdam on November 9, 1984.

2. ———. 2001. "Fröhliche Wissenschaft: Wahrheit Im Mittelalter." In *Ende Und Vollendung: Eschatologische Perspektiven Im Mittelalter*, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Pickavé, Martin, 48-65. Berlin: de Gruyter.

3. ———. 2010. "Truth in Middle Ages: Its Essence and Power in Christian Thought." In *Truth. Studies of a Robust Presence*, edited by Pritzl, Kurt, 127-146. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

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Bernhard Kotting, edited by Dassmann, Ernst and Frank, K.Suso, 15-29. Münster: Aschendorff.

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7. Colish, Marcia L. 1983. "The Stoic Theory of Verbal Signification and the Problem of Lies and False Statements from Antiquity to St. Anselm." In *Archéologie Du Signe*, edited by Brind'Amour, Lucie and Vance, Eugène, 17-43. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

8. Enders, Markus. 2006. "'Wahrheit' Von Augustinus Bis Zum Frühen Mittelalter: Stationen Einer Begriffsgeschichte." In *Die Geschichte Des Philosophischen Begriffs Der Wahrheit*, edited by Szaif, Jan and Enders, Markus, 65-102. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

9. Goris, Harm. 2006. "A Reinterpretation of Aquinas' Correspondence Definition of Truth." In *Intellect Et Imagination Dans La Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto E Imaginaão Na Filosofia Medieval*, edited by Pacheco, Maria Candida da Costa Reis M. and Meirinhos, José Francisco, 1431-1443. Turnhout: Brepols.

10. Kann, Christoph. 1999. "Wahrheit Als *Adaequatio*: Bedeutung, Deutung, Klassifikation." *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* no. 66:209-224.

11. Lotz, Johannes B. 1960. "Aletheia Und Orthotes. Versuch Einer Deutung Im Lichte Der Scholastik." *Philosophische Jahrbuch* no. 68:258-268.

    Reprinted in: Johannes B. Lotz - *Sein und Existenz. Kritische Studien in systematischer Absicht* - Freiburg, Herder, 1965, pp. 120-134

12. Marrone, Steven P. 2001. *The Light of Thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill.

    Two volumes.

13. Moody, Ernest Addison. 1953. *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Reprinted in 1976 Westport, Greenwood Press

14. Morse, Ruth. 1991. *Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages. Rhetoric, Representation, and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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18. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 2001. *La Question De La Vérité. Thomas D'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote, Heidegger*. Lausanne: Editions Payot.

    Table des matières: Introduction 5;
    Première partie: La questione de la vérité dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Thomas d'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote Chapitre I. La fondation du concept traditionnel de la vérité chez Thomas d'Aquin. *De Veritate, Quaestio I, Articuli I-II* 19; Chapitre II. L'expérience de la perte de la vérité chez Nietzsche *Fragments choisis* 43; Chapitre III. La fondation transcendentale de la vérité chez Kant. L'essence des concepts *a priori* de l'entendement ou des catégories. *Critique de la raison pure, § 9 e § 10* 80; Chapitre IV. La

double essence de la vérité chez Aristote. *Métaphysique, Livre VI, chapitre 4; Livre IX, chapitre 10* 119;
Seconde partie: La répétition de la question de la vérité dans la pensée postmétaphysique de Heidegger. *Textes choisis* 167
Indications bibliographiques 287-297.

19. Wülfing von Martitz, Peter. 1968. "Verus, Verum Und Veritas." *Glotta* no. 46:278-293.

    "Le latin ne connaissant pas la distinction moderne entre vérité et réalité, *verum*, de même que son équivalent dans la terminologie philosophique, *veritas*, peuvent se référer non seulement à ce qui est énoncé sur une chose, mais à la chose elle-même. Ainsi, *verum* désigne la vérité qui se révèle par la chose elle-même et s'oppose à *obscurum*. Toutefois, si *verum* exprime souvent un "état de fait", cela ne saurait être confondu avec l' "évidence" au sens extérieur; en effet, *verum* signifie aussi, notamment chez Varron et chez Cicéron: en principe, en théorie, contrairement aux apparences."

Related pages

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History of Truth. Selected Bibliography on Medieval Primary Authors

The Authors to which I will devote an entire page are marked with an asterisk (*).

1. Hilary of Poitiers
2. Augustine of Hippo (*)
3. Boethius (*)
4. Isidore of Seville
5. John Scottus Eriugena (*)
6. Isaac Israeli
7. Avicenna (*)
8. Anselm of Canterbury (*)
9. Peter Abelard (*)
10. Philip the Chancellor
11. Robert Grosseteste
12. William of Auvergne
13. Albert the Great
14. Bonaventure
15. Thomas Aquinas (*)
16. Henry of Ghent

17. Siger of Brabant
18. John Duns Scotus (*)
19. Hervaeus Natalis
20. Giles of Rome
21. Durandus of St. Pourain
22. Peter Auriol
23. Walter Burley
24. William of Ockham (*)
25. Robert Holkot
26. John Buridan (*)
27. Gregory of Rimini
28. William of Heytesbury
29. Peter of Mantua
30. Paul of Venice

Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 300 - 368)

Texts

1. Meijering, E.P. 1982. *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity. De Trinitate 1, 1-19, 2, 3*. Leiden: Brill.

   In close cooperation with J. C. M: van Winden.
   On truth see I, 1-14.

Studies

Augustine of Hippo (354 - 430)

Texts

Studies

1. Boyer, Charles. 1921. *L'idée De Vérité Dans La Philosophie De Saint Augustin*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne.

2. Kuntz, Paul G. 1982. "St. Augustine's Quest for Truth: The Adequacy of a Christian Philosophy." *Augustinian Studies* no. 13:1-21.

3. Vilalobos, José. 1982. *Ser Y Verdad En Agustín De Hipona*. Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla.

Boethius (ca. 480 - 524/5)

Texts

Studies

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2. Mignucci, Mario. 1989. "Truth and Modality in Late Antiquity: Boethius on Future Contingent Propositions." In *Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica. Le Teorie Della Modalità. San Gimignano, 5-8 Dicembre 1987*, edited by Corsi, Giovanna, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 47-78. Bologna: CLUEB.

3. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1981. "Boèce Logicien Et Philosophe: Ses Positions Sémantiques Et Sa Métaphysique

De L'être." In *Atti Del Congresso Internazionale Di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980)*, edited by Obertello, Luca, 141-156. Genova: Accademia Ligure di scienze e lettere.

"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos du problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et la plus féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son opuscule *Quomodo substantiae* l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-être). Il est évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être obtient une importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien. Aussi la solution du problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa métaphysique de l'être.
L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est, c'est une seule et même chose *d'être* et *d'être bon*. Mais si les choses sont *substantiellement* bonnes, en quoi diffèrent-elles du Bien en soi, qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du *Sophiste* de Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans cette dialogue Platon a essayé de resoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses périssables par une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (*tauton*)et «Autre» (*heteron*).
Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il commence (dans *De hebdomadibus* = *Quomodo substantiae* etc.; voir l'edition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion de l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le moyen âge: *diversum est esse et quit quod est* (II 28-30: «il ya diversité entr "être" et "ce qui est"»). Cette formule, qui est valable pour tout être composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément constitutif, ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose elle-même, ou le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son être à l'élément constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans laquelle il n'est pas du tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être resolue en désignant cette forme.
(...)

Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des commentateurs médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question du point de vue sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion de *qualitas* chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses idées sur le rôle (logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la signification exacte de sa notion de l'être (*esse*) sera discutée (6) et éclarcie en mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité *Quomodo substantiae* (7)." pp. 141-142 (Notes omitted).

Isidore of Seville (ca. 560 - 636)

Texts

Studies

1. Henderson, John. 2007. *The Medieval World of Isidore of Seville*. *Truth from Words*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John Scottus Eriugena (ca. 800 - 877)

Texts

Studies

1. Ansorge, Dirk. 1996. *Johannes Scottus Eriugena: Wahrheit Als Prozess. Eine Theologische Interpretation Von "Periphyseon"*. Wien: Tyrolia Verlag.

2. Moran, Dermot. 1989. *The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3. O'Meara, John Joseph. 1983. "The Problem of Speaking About God in John Scottus Eriugena." In *Carolingian Essays. Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in Early Christian Studies*, edited by Blumenthal, Ute-Renate, 151-167. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

Isaac Israeli (ca. 855 - ca. 955)

Texts

Studies

1. Muckle, Joseph Thomas. 1933. "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* no. 8:5-8.

Avicenna (980 - 1037)

Texts

Studies

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   Second edition, corrected and augmented 1984.
   English translation: *The philosophy of Avicenna and its influence on medieval Europe* - Translated from the French with notes, annotations, and a preface by M. S. Khan - Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1969.

Anselm of Canterbury (ca. 1033 - 1109)

Texts

Studies

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6. Goebel, Bernd Wilhelm. 2001. *Rectitudo, Wahrheit Und Freiheit Bei Anselm Von Canterbury. Eine Philosophische Untersuchung Seines Denkensatzes*. Münster: Aschendorff.

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Peter Abelard (1079 - 1142)

Texts

Studies

1. Lewis, Neil T. 1987. "Determinate Truth in Abelard." *Vivarium* no. 25:81-109.

2. Tweedale, Martin. 1967. "Abailard and Non-Things." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 5:329-342.

   "I explain how Abailard thinks he can justify saying that certain items, particularly what is said by a sentence, are not things. His grounds are that they are never referred to by any noun. He holds that nominalizations of sentences and of verbs, which appear to be nouns with such a reference, are not logically speaking nouns, and sentences which have a nominalization for a grammatical subject do not have any logical subject."

3. ———. 1976. *Abailard on Universals*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

   "This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication."

Philip the Chancellor (1165/86 - 1236)

Texts

Studies

1. Pouillon, Henri. 1939. "Le Premier Traité Des Propriétés Transcendentales." *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie* no. 42:40-77.

Robert Grosseteste (1168 - 1253)

Texts

Studies

1. Marrone, Steven P. 1983. *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste. New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

William of Auvergne (1180/90 - 1249)

Texts

Studies

1. Marrone, Steven P. 1983. *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste. New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Albert the Great (ca. 1200 - ca. 1280)

Texts

Studies

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Bonaventure (1217 - 1274)

Texts

Studies

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Thomas Aquinas (1125/6 - 1274)

Texts

Studies

1. Aertsen, Jan A. 1988. *Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought*. Leiden: Brill.

   Chapter 4: The Way of Truth (*Via veritatis*) pp. 141-190.

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   "Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals in De veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question "What is truth?". The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals.
   The first part of the paper (sections 1--4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that "truth is not in things but in the mind", leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as "adequation of thing and intellect" enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called "true" because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect.
   The second part of the paper (sections 5--7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If "truth" is transcendental, it must be convertible with "being". Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility.
   Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes

things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things."

3. ———. 1996. *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*. Leiden: Brill.

   Chapter Six: True as Transcendental pp. 243-289.

4. Bartel, Tomasz. 1990. "Nouvelle Interpretation De La Définition *Veritas Est Adaequatio Rei Et Intellectus* Chez St. Thomas D'aquin." In *Knowledge and the Science in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.) Vol. Ii*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo, Työrinoja, Reijo and Ebbesen, Sten, 119-126. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

5. Brouwer, Christian, and Peeters, Marc. 1997. "Thomas D'aquin. Première Question Disputée *De Veritate*. Analyse Méréologique, Constitution Historique Et Principes De Traduction." In *Éditer, Traduire, Interpréter. Essais De Méthodologie Philosophique*, edited by Lofts, Steve G. and Rosemann, Philip W., 105-141. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters.

6. Foucat, Yves. 2004. "La Vérité Comme Conformité Selon Saint Thomas D'aquin." *Revue Thomiste* no. 104:49-102.

7. Galluzzo, Gabriele. 2000. "Il Tema Della Verità Nell' " *Expositio Libri Peryermeneias*" Di Tommaso D'aquino." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 11:217-258.

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9. Vande Wiele, Jozef. 1954. "Le Problème De La Verité Ontologique Dans La Philosophie De Saint Thomas." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 52:521-571.

10. Waddell, MIchael M. 2003. "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's Intention at *De Veritate* 1.1?" *Thomist* no. 67:197-219.

11. Wippel, John F. 1989. "Truth in Thomas Aquinas I." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 43:295-326.

    Reprinted in: J. F. Wippel, *Metaphyscal Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, Vol. II, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2007, pp. 65-112.

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    Reprinted in: J. F. Wippel, *Metaphyscal Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, Vol. II, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2007, pp. 65-112.

Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217 - 1293)

Texts

Studies

1. Decorte, Jos. 2001. "Henri De Gand Et La Définition Classique De La Vérité." *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* no. 68:34-74.

2. Marrone, Steven P. 1985. *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*. Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America.

Siger of Brabant (ca. 1240 - after 1372)

Texts

Studies

1. Dodd, Tony. 1998. *The Life and Thought of Siger of Brabant, Thirteenth-Century Parisian Philosopher. An Examination of His Views on the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

2. Putallaz, Franois-Xavier, and Imbach, Ruedi. 1997. *Profession: Philosophe: Siger De Brabant*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266 - 1308)

Texts

Studies

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2. McGrath, Sean J. 2003. "Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language." *Review of Metaphysics*:339-358.

Hervaeus Natalis (1250/60 - 1308)

Texts

1. Hervaeus, Natalis. 2008. *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (D.1323) the Doctor Perspicacissimus on Second Intentions*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

   Volume One - An English translation and Volume Two - A Latin edition by John P. Doyle.
   "These volumes present a first critical Latin edition and an English translation of an important, but very difficult to read and understand, medieval treatise. As almost everyone knows, the notion of intentionality comes from the Middle Ages. What is less known is that Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) was the first one explicitly to consider it as such. Even less known is the fact that he carne to it not immediately from the Aristotelian *De Anima,* but rather from the division in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* between "being as being" and "being as true." Least of all known is the fact that Hervaeus, who uses the term"intentionality" in the present work 235 times, regards its significance as a relation of reason which runs in the direction of known or knowable to knower. Apart from its exceedingly obscure Latin style, what particularly makes this work difficult to understand is its multi-layered reflection on things and non-things, its reflection on Hervaeus thinking itself, and its reflection on his thinking about his thinking about things and non-things."

Studies

Giles of Rome (ca 1243 - 1316)

Texts

Studies

1. Conti, Alessandro D. 1992. "Conoscenza E Verità in Egidio Romano." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 3:305-361.

Durandus of St. Pourain (ca. 1270/5 - 1334)

Texts

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Robert Holkot (? - 1349)

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Related pages

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Martin Heidegger on *Aletheia* (Truth) as Unconcealment

PRELIMINARY NOTE

In its initial form this section will offer five pages on Martin Heidegger (the first two are contributions to the History of Truth):

1) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the Greek word for Truth (*Aletheia*) as Unconcealment and to the history of his translation in Latin as *Veritas*;

2) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on *Aletheia* and a selection of critical studies;

3) Heidegger's contributions to the interpretation of the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology;

4) An annotated bibliography of Heidegger's texts on the History of Metaphysics as Ontotheology and a selection of critical studies;

5) A complete list of Heidegger's German works published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works Edition).

INTRODUCTION

"We come now to a decisive point in Heidegger's development. The effort to ground metaphysics (fundamental ontology) began as a search to illuminate the intrinsic correlation between the Being-process as such and the finitude of the being that comprehends it, sc. There-being. The first step (*Sein und Zeit*) was to analyse There-being phenomenologically in order to find in the pre-ontic comprehension of Being some means of discerning the sense of Being. Subsequently the author has become more and more preoccupied with Being itself, but chiefly in terms of the problem of truth, since the sense of Being is its truth. The growing importance of the problematic of truth is discernible in all of the works that followed *SZ* and culminates now in the essay "On the Essence of Truth," where Heidegger thematizes the problem, retaining as intrinsic to it the problem of finitude, sc. the negativity of truth which he calls "un-truth." Although published late (1943), the text dates initially from 1930. The author admits to several subsequent revisions, which, however, left the point of departure, fundamental position and basic structure of the original work unchanged. Taking him at his word, we assume that the text represents his thought as of 1930, and, although the matter would be very illuminating, must leave to historians the task of disengaging what alterations were made when.

We are relatively well prepared for the study we are about to undertake and do not approach it in a vacuum. We know: that the truth of conformity (between judgement and judged) supposes a still more fundamental truth that resides in the being to-be-judged and enables us to discern whether or not the judgement is conformed to it; that this truth of the being-to-be judged is basically an un-hidden-ness, or open-ness, of that being to the knower; that beings become un-hidden to a finite knower because this knower has a comprehension of their Being- structure antecedent to his encounter with them; that this antecedent comprehension may be conceived as an open horizon, or domain of encounter, or the World (or, for that matter, Non- being), within which beings and There-being meet; that this sphere of open-ness is instituted by the transcendence of the finite There-being; that the transcendence of finite There-being is ontological

truth, which, since it renders possible the encounter that occurs in There-being's comportment with other beings, enables the beings-to-be-judged to become manifest (ontic truth); that this transcendence liberates the beings which it encounters from the obscurity that initially enshrouds them by letting them be (manifest), hence must be called freedom; that this transcendence (freedom) is the primary sense of truth; that this transcendence is profoundly finite, therefore negatived, so that truth comports non-truth; that one consequence of the negativity of There-being as transcendence (freedom, truth) is that it is prone to become absorbed in its preoccupation with the beings that measure the truth of its judgements, and forget its true self; that it re-collects its self in re-solve, which thus becomes the eminent mode of truth." (pp. 211-212, notes omitted)

From: William J. Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974.

HEIDEGGER'S READING OF PLATO

"For Heidegger, the de-volution of Western thought began with Plato, for it was with him that νοεῖν ceased to have the sense of containing the advance of over-powering φύσις and began to assume the special relation to ἰδέα, which evolved into what the tradition would call "reason" (*Vernunft*). We discern the transition best, however, by examining not Plato's use of νοεῖν but rather the implications of ἰδέα, for it was thus that he understood the Being which his predecessors had understood as φύσις. It was Plato's conception of Being rather than of thought which was decisive in the birth of metaphysics. If we recall that φύσις (emergent-abiding-Power) was for the pre-Socratics the process of truth, then the transformation of φύσιςinto ἰδέα may be discerned by examining what Plato understood by truth. This the author disengages by an essay upon the famous metaphor of the cave *(Politeia* VII, 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7)." (p. 301)
(...)

In Plato metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise, for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going "beyond" the beings of experience to their being-ness, which he conceives as their what-ness, their see-ableness, their Idea. Such a conception is possible only because a consequence of φύσις (process of shining-forth) is taken to be the essence of it. Hence φύσις itself becomes for him that-which-is-to-be-seen, a being (εἶδος). Being thus becomes conceived as a being. Likewise truth, no longer non-concealment, becomes correctness of view, conformity with the Ideas." (p. 308)

From: William J. Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974.

"*Plato's Doctrine of Truth*.(34) This text was composed, according to Heidegger's notes, in 1940 and first published in 1942. (*) Heidegger indicates in a note that the origin of this text is the 1931-32 lecture course on "The Essence of Truth," which contains a long interpretation, first, of the cave analogy in the *Republic*, then of a portion of the *Theaetetus*, principally the discussion of *Theaetetus*'s second (though Heidegger calls it the "first") answer to the question of what is episteme, "knowledge is perception." The relationship between the published text, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," and the lecture course is curious and deserves some initial comment. First, the lecture course contains the most careful, nuanced development of which I am aware of Heidegger's now well-known understanding of *aletheia* as "unhiddenness." Within its pages are careful, often rich reflections on certain implications both of the cave analogy and of the section of the *Theaetetus* that he treats." (p. 53)
(...)
Heidegger announces on the first page his guiding thesis: the "unsaid doctrine" that he will elicit in the cave analogy is "a change in what determines the essence of truth" (p. 155). That change, we discover, is from the more originary notion of truth as aletheia, "unhiddenness," to truth as "correctness of vision," a change which, as Heidegger tells us toward the end of the essay, puts us on the fateful path toward modern subjectivism. Let us trace the crucial steps of this change, as Heidegger develops it.

Heidegger's first point is to show, very convincingly, that aletheia in its originary sense of unhiddenness is still very much at work in the cave analogy. He notes that the deeply visual character of the analogy, the notion of moving from shadows to seeing the fire to moving outside the cave to see the things that are "more unhidden," makes sense only within a framework of truth as unhiddenness. As he puts it, "Only the essence of truth understood in the original Greek sense of aletheia--the unhiddenness that is related to the hidden (to something dissembled and disguised)--has an essential relation to this image of an underground cave. Wherever truth has another essence, wherever it is not unhiddenness or at least is not co-determined by unhiddenness, there an 'allegory of the cave' has no basis as an illustration" (p. 172). So truth as unhiddenness is still present in the cave analogy.
But no longer purely. Heidegger now announces that truth as unhiddenness is already infected, as it were, by another, different and more problematic conception of truth that is also at work here. "And yet, even though aletheia is properly experienced in the 'allegory of the cave' and is mentioned in it at important points, nonetheless in place of unhiddenness another essence of truth pushes to the fore. However, this also implies that unhiddenness still maintains a certain priority" (p. 172). This fateful other essence of truth is truth as "correctness of vision"." (pp. 57-58)

Notes

(34) Heidegger adds in a reference note that the “train of thought goes back to the Freiburg lecture course of winter semester 1930–31, “On the Essence of Truth.” It later was published as part of the collection, *Wegmerken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967). Available in English as *Pathmarks*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. The essay is pp. 155–182, the “reference” note on p. 380. The essay is translated by Thomas Sheehan, whose translation I shall usually follow.

From: Drew A. Hyland, *Questioning Platonism. Continental Interpretations of Plato*, Albany: State University of New York

Press, 2004.

"Heidegger's analysis of Plato attempts to show that a transformation occurs in the nature of truth in Plato's philosophy, as a consequence of which Being is subordinated to the correct perception of beings. This subordination, Heidegger maintains, characterizes the history of Western n philosophy as metaphysics. *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*(31) is an interpretation of Plato's *Republic*, 514A - 517A; an interpretation of the allegory of the cave. It is a reflection upon the relationship between education (*paideia*), truth (*alétheia*) and the good (*agathon*), with the transformation of *alétheia* as the principal concern.
The allegory of the cave is, for Heidegger, an illustration of the nature and process of *paideia*. At each level of ascent -- within the cave to the light, and out of the cave to the sun -- the individual experiences a painful blinding. Each stage requires an adjustment and transformation in vision. This transformation in vision expresses the turning of the soul from what is disclosed in one region to what is disclosed within another. This is *paideia*, according to Heidegger. The relationship of *paideia*, in this new sense, to *alétheia* is not apparent because, as Heidegger sees it, we have not only misunderstood the nature of education but, more importantly, have misconceived the nature of *alétheia* by conceiving it as "truth." If *paideia* is a transition from one abode to another, affected by the soul's receptivity to what is disclosed within each region, then *alétheia* is disclosure itself: "At first truth meant what was wrested from a concealment. Truth, then, is just such a perpetual wresting-away in this manner of uncovering." (*ibid*. p. 32)
Unlike the case of the two distinct senses in which Heidegger employs the term "metaphysics," the two senses in which he employs the term "truth" are made very explicit. Truth, conceived as *alétheia*, is the plenary mode; truth conceived as a correspondence between an idea and the thing it represents is a derivative mode. Because Heidegger invariably assigns the correspondence concept of truth to "metaphysics," understood in the restricted sense in which it designates the history of Western philosophy, we have called it the "epistemological" concept of

truth. "Ontological" truth, on the other hand, designates disclosure itself -- specifically, Heidegger's attempted disclosure of Being.

Heidegger's earliest systematic analysis of the epistemological concept of truth, as well as rejection of it, occurs in *Being and Time*.

Three theses characterize the way in which the essence of truth has 'been traditionally conceived and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the "locus" of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the "agreement" of the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus, but has set going the definition of "truth" as "agreement." *(Sein und Zeit*, 7 Aufl., Tübingen, 1953, p. 214).

In keeping with the original emphasis in *Being and Time*, Heidegger asserts the presence of this conception of truth in Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant, (rather than Plato and Nietzsche), before continuing with his explicit analysis of the "epistemological" concept of truth. In the course of his analysis several important points are raised. The problem underlying what we have called the "epistemological" concept of truth, Heidegger points out, is the nature of the agreement -- *adequatio, correspondentia, convenientia* -- between a judgment and its object: "Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement." (p. 215) Heidegger goes on to raise and answer in the negative the question whether the "agreement" can be conceived as a relation of equality. But "If it is impossible for *intellectus* and *res* to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar?"(p. 216) With reference to similarity as a possible basis for the relation called "agreement," Heidegger points out that within the judgment itself we must distinguish between the psychical process and the ideal content of judgment. Any "similarity" relation of a judgment to its object (truth) must refer to the ideal content, rather than the psychical processes of judgment. But such a distinction merely raises an additional problem: "*How is the relation between ideal being and real being to be grasped ontologically?*" (*ibid.*)

To this question, Heidegger maintains, the philosophic tradition has no meaningful answer: "Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years?" (pp. 216-217) In fact, Heidegger goes even further in the sentence which immediately follows the preceding one, by suggesting that this entire procedure -- trying to discern the nature of the *adequatio* which characterizes a truth relationship between *rei et intellectus* -- may be fruitless: "Does the perversion of the problem already lie in the approach, in the ontologically unclarified separation of Real and Ideal?" 38 It is of some importance to emphasize that Heidegger not only discussed and rejected the "epistemological" concept of truth, as early as Being and Time (1927), but that he regarded it the sustaining one to be found in Western ontology. And, of course he suggested an alternative as well. The alternative, which I have called "ontological" truth, remains in its essential features the basis for his later critique of Plato and the history of metaphysics. Heidegger indicates that what "truth" means is not so much a correspondence as it is a disclosure.
(...)
It may be instructive to remember once again that the duality of truth, epistemological and ontological, occupied Heidegger's thought almost from the period immediately after the publication of Being and Time, 1927, until 1947: "The publication [on Nietzsche] when reflected upon as a whole, ought to offer an insight into the path of thought which I have travelled from 1930 to the Letter on Humanism (1947). For the two small lectures, Plato's Theory of Truth (1942) and On the Essence of Truth (1943), which were published during the aforesaid period, were already conceived during the years 1930--'31." 42 Heidegger's early concern with "truth" apparently led to a step backward in the history of metaphysics, from Aristotle to Plato, in locating the "decisive" stages in man's forgetfulness of Being, through the transformation of ontological into epistemological truth." (pp. 69-73 som notes omitted)

Notes

(31) A. Francke, Bern, 1947.

From: Bern Magnus, *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor fati, Being and Truth*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970.

HEIDEGGER ON TRUTH

"Heidegger's way of understanding the originary phenomenon of truth is to "make clear the mode of being of the cognition itself." His starting point is a proposition that is not based on intuition. Someone says with his or her back to the wall: this picture hangs askew. The proposition embodies the claim to have discovered the picture (as a being) in the "how" (the mode) of its being. The proposition displays this "how" of being in language. In the attempt to verify the proposition by sensuous experience, the recognition, according to Heidegger, is directed only to the intended being (the picture) and not to the proposition. It is directed to the being itself (which is to be verified by perception) in its mode of uncoveredness (*Entdeckt-heir*), i.e., in its showing-itself. Confirmation (*Bewährung*) means this showing-itself of the being in the same way in which it is intended in the proposition.
A true proposition shows the being in its mode of uncoveredness. The phenomenon of "originary truth" does not have the character of correspondence. It is the ground of the concept of truth in the sense of correspondence and propositional truth. By unfolding the meaning of *alétheia* Heidegger shows us a more originary sense of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). He wants to show that this concept coincides with the first and originary concept of truth in Greek thinking. In this primary sense only the discovering human Dasein can be "true" while it is Being-discovering (*Entdeckend-Sein*). On the other hand, beings (*Seiendes*) that we can find in the world can only "be" in a secondary mode, i.e., as being-discovered *(Entdecktsein*). They can only make a claim to uncoveredness. Their fundament is the Being-discovering of the human Dasein. The being-true of a discovered being is only possible as being discovered by human Dasein as being-in-the-world.

The authentic Being of Dasein, the being-in-the truth, presupposes disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of the world in states-of-mind (*Befindlichkeiten*), understanding, and discourse, i.e., the constitution of the being *(Seinsverfassung*) of human Dasein as thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and project (*Entwurf*). The mode of being of Dasein is characterized equiprimordially (*gleichursprünglich*) by the possibility of both authenticity (being-in-the-truth) and the deficient mode (Verfallsform) of inauthenticity. In the mode of the "they" (das Man), of obstruction (*Verstelltheit*), of gossip (*Gerede*), Dasein is in untruth. Thus the being-in-the-world of human Dasein is determined at the same time by truth and untruth. We must always fight anew for the truth of Dasein (Being-discovering). Following Heidegger, the negative expression "a-létheia" expresses the fact that hiding itself is a main characteristic of Being. In the hiding-itself of Being, human Dasein is hidden for itself in the mode of untruth.

Heidegger wants to make evident how the transition from the originary concept of truth as *alétheia* to "correspondence" came about. He wants to make clear that correspondence is only a derived form of truth: in a proposition Being should be displayed in the mode of its uncoveredness. In the inauthentic forms of mere reproducing and hearsay, the proposition becomes itself something ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenes*). Thus we have to engage in the demonstration of the uncoveredness that is preserved in the proposition. In this way the relation between proposition and discovered being then itself becomes something present-at-hand (*Vorhandenes*) and can be understood as a correspondence of proposition and being (*intellectus and res*). The fact that we are used to disregarding the originary dimension of truth is an aspect of our forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

The originary dimension of truth in human Dasein "is given" (*gibt es*) only as long as there is Dasein. All truth is relative to the being of Dasein. Thus the claim that there could be "eternal truth" seems to Heidegger to be "fantastic." Against the background of this relativity of truth to the being of Dasein, Heidegger asks anew: why must we presuppose that truth "is given"? His answer is that the possibility of truth (authenticity) and untruth (inauthenticity) belongs to the facticity of human Dasein. From

the point of view of existential ontology, the being of human Dasein (its disclosedness) and truth are synonims." (pp. 711-712)

From: Dieter Lohmar, *Truth*, in: Lester Embree et alii (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.

HEIDEGGER ON ALETHEIA

"alétheia and truth: Alétheia is Greek for 'truth; truthfulness, frankness, sincerity'. Aléthés is 'true; sincere, frank; real, actual'. There is also a verb, alétheuein, 'to speak truly, etc' (cf. GA XIX, 21ff.). The words are related to lanthanein, with an older form léthein, 'to escape notice, be unseen, unnoticed', and lithe, 'forgetting, forgetfulness'. An initial a- in Greek is often privative, like the Latin in- or the Germanic un-. (The 'privative alpha' occurs in many Greek-derived words: 'anonymous', 'atheism', etc.) Aléthés, alétheia are generally accepted to be a-léthes, a-létheia, that which is 'not hidden or forgotten', or he who 'does not hide or forget'.
We reach the 'essence of truth', the 'openness of the open', from two directions: from 'reflection on the ground of the possibility of correctness (adaequatio)' and from 'recollection of the beginning (alétheia)' (GA LXV, 338). The first procedure is characteristic of *Being and Time* and early lectures, the second of later works. But early on Heidegger says that alétheuein is 'to take out of hiddenness [Verborgenheit], to uncover [entdecken]' (GA XXII, 25. Cf. GA XXI, 131; *Being and Time*, 33, 219); alétheia is 'uncovering' (GA XXI, 162); and aléthes is 'unhidden [Unverborgen(es)]' (BT, 33, 219). This has three implications: 1. Truth is not confined to explicit assertions and discrete mental, primarily theoretical, attitudes such as judgements, beliefs and representations. The world as a whole, not just entities within it, is unhidden - unhidden as much by moods as by understanding. 2. Truth is primarily a feature of reality - beings, being and world - not of thoughts and utterances. Beings, etc. are, of course, unhidden to us, and we disclose them. Heidegger later coins

entbergen; Entbergung; Entborgenheit, 'to unconceal; -ing; -ment', since unlike unverborgen, they can have an active sense: 'aléthes means: 1. unconcealed [entborgen], said of beings, 2. grasping the unconcealed as such, i.e. being unconcealing' (XXXI, 91). But beings, etc. are genuinely unconcealed; they do not just agree with an assertion or representation. 3. Truth explicitly presupposes concealment or hiddenness. DASEIN is in 'untruth [Unwahrheit]' as well as truth. In *Being and Time* (222, 256f.) this means that falling Dasein misinterprets things.
'Untruth' is not plain 'falsity', nor is it 'hiddenness': it is 'disguisedness [Verstelltheit]' of the truth (GA XXXI, 91). Later, 'untruth' is still not 'falsity', but 'hiding, concealing [Verbergung]' (GA LXV, 362). What conceals is no longer man, but being. There are two types of unconcealing: (a) of the open, the world or beings as a whole; (b) of particular beings within this open space. The first type (a) involves concealment: everything was hidden before the open was established, and concealment persists in that the open reveals only certain aspects of reality, not its whole nature. The second type (b) involves a concealment that we overcome 'partially and case by case' (GA LXV, 338f.). Plato errs in assimilating truth to light. We lose the idea of hiddenness and thus the privative force of a-létheia: the light is constant - never switched on or off - and reveals everything there is to anyone who looks. We lose the idea of the open, which must persist throughout our unconcealing of beings: a single light cannot account both for the openness of the open and for the unconcealing of particular entities (LXV, 339).
Plato's error was fateful. He - not Aristotle, who did his best to repair the damage (*Nietzsche* II, 228 / Nietzsche IV [English translation], 171) - initiated the decline of a-létheia into 'correctness' and truth as agreement (GA XXXIV, 21ff; *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, 201ff./ 215ff.). Alétheia was originally the basic feature of phusis (roughly, 'nature') and thus 'essentially rejects any question about its relation to something else, such as thinking' (LXV, 329). In Plato it 'comes under the yoke of the idea' (Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, 228). Idea, from the Greek idein, 'to see', refers, on Heidegger's account, to the visual 'aspect [Aussehen]' of entities. The ascent of the prisoners out of the cave is a progressive 'correction' of their vision of this idea and the

entity whose idea it is. Hence alétheia is no longer primarily a characteristic of beings: it is 'yoked' together with the soul, and consists in a homoiósis, a 'likeness', between them. Homoiósis has since become adaequatio and then 'agreement', and since Descartes, the relation between soul and beings has become the subject-object relation, mediated by a 'representation', the degenerate descendant of Plato's idea. Truth becomes correctness, and its 'elbow-room [Spielraum]', the open, is neglected (GA LXV, 198, 329ff.)." (pp. 13-14)

Notes

"In references to Heidegger's texts, a slash separates the pagination of the German work from the pagination of the published English translation".
Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1975ss. = GA

From: Michael Inwoord, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1999.

THE "ROMANIZATION" OF TRUTH: FROM ALETHEIA TO VERITAS

"As Heidegger puts it elsewhere, in Plato and Aristotle beings with the *gigantomachia*, the struggle between Being and beings, for Being is now understood as the highest or first being (GA [*Gesamtausgabe*] vol. 33, pp. 24, 43-44; cf. *The End of Philosophy*pp. 9-10). As he explains in his wartime Parmenides lectures, in and with the philosophical tradition's understanding of truth and falsehood, *aletheia* is opposed to *pseudos*, to falsehood in the sense of incorrectness, which displaces the inceptive Greek senses of unconcealing and concealing (GA Vol. 54, pp. 24-56). The translation of *aletheia* as *veritas* is related to the political-moral economy of ancient Rome, and therewith, Heidegger makes clear, to the manifold successors to Rome:

medieval Christianity, modernity, Nietzsche, and--I agree with William V. Spanos on this point--National Socialism (pp. 57-72). (14)
The Latin *falsum* has the sense of "bringing to a fall" or "downfall," which is "only a subsequent effect [*Wesensfolge*] within the essential domain [*Wesensbereiches*] of dissembling and concealing which makes up the essence of psuedos" (p. 58). (15) "Imperium" and the "imperial" constitute the "essential domain" decisive for the "experiential domain" (*Erfahrungsbereich*) in, from, and for which "bringing to a fall" acquires its status as the designation for the counter-essence of "what the Greeks experience as *alethes*, the 'unconcealing' and the 'unconcealed.' " The experience of *imperium* is that of "command," of the taking over of a territory, which is ruled by commandment. "Command," then, is the "essential ground of sovereignty" (*Wesensgrund der Herrschaft*) and, moreover, describes the characteristic actions of the god of the Old Testament and the gods of Rome, but not those of Greece (p. 59). In a further specification, "command" determines Roman law and right, *ius* and *iustum*; *iustitia* "has a wholly other [*ganz anderen*] essential ground than that of *dike*, which arises from *aletheia*." "Being superior" (*Obensein*) belongs to "command" and is the "constant surmounting [*Überhöhung*] of others, who are thereby the inferiors [*Unteren*]." Surmounting requires the power to "oversee" (*übersehen*), which means, therefore, to "dominate" (*beherrschen*) (59-60). The "overseeing" of *imperium* requires constant "action," by which enemies or rivals will be brought to fall through " 'direct' attack" (*Ansturm*) or "subterfuge" (*Hintergehen*) or "trick," which, "not accidentally," is an "English" word (p. 60). Those who fall are not destroyed but rather "raised up" (*aufgerichtet*) within the boundaries established by those who rule; this "fixing" (*Abstecken*) is Roman peace. Indeed, the greatness of the imperial, Heidegger writes, lies in the subterfuge by which it secures its dominion. The expansion of early Rome through treaties and treachery shows this (pp. 60-61).
The "Romanizing" of the Greeks conditions not only all subsequent understanding of them in the history of the West but also the historical and metaphysical *Auseinandersetzung* of the

modern world and antiquity. Even Nietzsche's metaphysics, as a modern attempt to recover antiquity, is conditioned by Rome and thus is ultimately "unGreek." The Roman experience of beings, encountered under the "Roman stamp" (*der Romisch Prägung*), reaches into Christianity and hence to the medieval and modern ages (pp. 64-72; cf. *The End of Philosophy* p. 13). "Romanization in the essential sense of the Greco-Roman historical domain," Heidegger writes, must be understood as a "change in the essence of truth and Being"; it is an "authentic event [*Ereignis*] in history" (p. 63). The transformations of *aletheia* and *pseudos* as correlates with the imperial experience mark an epochal boundary. "The imperial as a mode of Being of historical collectivities [Menschentums]," Heidegger explains, is not the ground for the essential change of *aletheia* into truth as correctness but is rather a following of the enfolding of truth into the meaning of correctness (pp. 62-63). Heidegger makes clear that there is something "make-shift" (*Notbehelf*) in the phrase "change in the essence of truth," which does not speak clearly enough of the way "in which it unfolds itself and history 'is' (wie sie selbst west and die Geschichte 'ist']" (p. 63). This process exhibits the inner connection of the coherent modes of action which ground Western history, and is not to be understood causally." (pp. 180-181)

Notes

(14) William V. Spanos, *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction*, pp. 148-49, 291 n. 22. Cf. Véronique M. Fóti, "Aletheia and Oblivion's Field: On Heidegger's Parmenides Lectures," and especially Éliane Escoubas, "Heidegger, la question romaine, la question impériale: Autour du 'Touruant.' "
(15) Heidegger agrees with the Brothers Grimm, who understood *falsch* as an "un-German" word. He goes on to add *verum* to this list (G54 57, pp. 67-73). For other such words, see *The Principle of Reason* (e.g., p. 29).

From: James F. Ward, *Heidegger's Political Thinking*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1995.

Related pages

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HEIDEGGER'S MAIN TEXTS ON Aletheia AND VERITAS

Abbreviations: GA = Gesamtausgabe (Collected works); SS = Summer semester (from May to July); WS = Winter semester (from November to February)

In his work *Besinnung* (GA 67 p. 107), Heidegger give a list of nine texts where he examines the question of truth (I cite from the English translation, *Mindfulness*, translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, New York, Continuum, 2006, pp. 89-90:

"Question of Truth: A directive.
1. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (lecture of 1930) (1); in addition, interpretation of the simile of the cave in the lecture-course of 1931/32 (2)
2. *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks* (Freiburg lecture of 1935) (3)
3. Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks (Frankfurt lectures of 1936) (4)
4. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (lecture of 1937/38) (5)
5. *Die Grundlegung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik* (lecture of 1938) (6)
6. *Anmerkungen zu Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, Abschnitt VI Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit,* lecture-seminar of 1938/39 (7)

7. Lecture course of summer semester of 1939 (Nietzsche, *Wille zur Macht*, III. Buch, Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis) (8)
8. *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, 1936, section: *Gründung* (9)
9. *Zu Aristoteles, Physik B 1 (physis), third term of 1940, pp. 22 ff. (10)"*
Notes:
(1) To appear in *Vorträge*, GA 80.
(2) See *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Hölengleichnis und Theätet*, lecture in the summer semester of 1931/32, GA 34, ed. Hermann Mörchen (Frankfurt am Main: 1988).
(3) To appear in *Vorträge*, GA 80.
(4) See *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 1-74.
(5) See *Grundfragen del Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*, lecture in the winter semester of 1937/38, GA 45 ed. F.-W. v. Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: 1984).
(6) Published under the title "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", in *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 75-113.
(7) See *Zu Auslegung von Nietzsches II: Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung*, lecture-seminar in Freiburg in the winter semester 1938/39, GA 46, ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich (Frankfurt am Main: 2003).
(8) See *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis*, lecture of the summer semester of 1939, GA 47 ed. Eberhard Hanser (Frankfurt am Main: 1989).
(9) See *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, ed. F.-W. v. Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: 1989) pp. 293-392.
(10) On the 'fore-concept' of 'metaphysics', elucidated out of Aristotle's concept of *physis* see *Metaphysik und Wissenschaft*, to appear in GA 76.
The following is a more complete list in chronological order; references are to the German edition of the complete works by Martin Heidegger.
The first date is that of the Gesamtausgabe volume, English translation are cited when available.

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Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle. An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation, in: Martin Heidegger, *Supplements. From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond,* edited by John van Buren, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 111-145.
On *Aletheia* see: *Eth. Nic. VI,* pp. 129-145.

2. ———. 1994. *Einführung in Die Phänomenologische Forschung*.

   Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1923-1924. GA 17, 1994.
   Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Bloomington: translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Indian University Press, 2005.
   See Chapter Four: *Going Back to Scholastic Ontology: the Verum esse in Thomas Aquinas,* pp. 120-147.

3. ———. 1992. *Platon, Sophistes*.

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   Plato's Sophist, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
   See in particular:
   Preliminary Considerations § 3. First Characteristic of *alétheia* pp. 10-13.
   Introductory Part: The Securing of *alétheia* as the Ground of Plato' s Research into Being. Interpretation of Aristotle: *Nichomachean Ethics* Book VI and Book X, Chapters 6-8; *Metaphysics* Book I, Chapters 1-2, pp. 15-155.

4. ———. 1976. *Logik. Die Frage Nach Der Wahrheit*.

   Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1925-1926. GA 21, 1976.
   Logic. The Question of Truth, translated by Thomas Sheehan, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010.

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   See § 44: *Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth*
   a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations;
   b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth;
   c) The kind of being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth.

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   See Chapter 3: *Wahrheit und Sein. Vom ursprunglichen Wesen der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit* pp. 68-124.

7. ———. 1967. *Vom Wesen Der Wahrheit*.

   Lecture given in 1930, first edition 1943.
   Reprinted in: *Wegmarken (Essays 1919-1961)*, 1967 pp. 177-202.
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8. ———. 1982. *Vom Wesen Der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in Die Philosophie*.

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   Ga 31, 1982.
   The Essence of Human Freedom. An Introduction to Philosophy, translated by Ted Sadler, New York: Continuum 2002.
   See: Chapter Two, § 9, d, *The Greek Understanding of Truth (alétheia) as Deconcealment. The Being which is True (aléthes on) as the Most Proper Being. The Most Proper Being as the Simple and Constantly Present*. pp. 65-74.

9. ———. 1988. *Vom Wesen Der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis Und Theätet*.

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   GA 34. 1988.
   The Essence of Truth. On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, translated by Ted Sadler, London, New York: Athlone Press, 2002.

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    Reprinted in: *Wegmarken* (Essays 1919-1961), 1967 pp. 203-238 (second edition 1978 pp. 421-438).
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    See Chapter Four: *The restriction of Being,* in particular pp. 107-122 and 201-210.

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    Written in 1935-36, first edition in: *Holzwege* pp. 1-72, 1950. GA 5. 1977.
    The Origin of the Work of Art, in: *Off the Beaten Track,* translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 1-56.
    Index: a) The thing and the work; b) The work and truth; c) Truth and art; d) Afterword; e) Appendix.
    This essay is also translated in *Basic Writings,* edited by David F. Krell, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, (second expanded edition 1993, pp. 139-212) and in: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 15-86.

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the Basis of the Beginning of the History of Truth, pp. 95-134.

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Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
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"Heidegger seeks to show the purely revelatory nature of the concept of truth when applied to the intellection of essences which, in 0 10. A. distinguishes this from the truth of judgements. In his 1925-6 course on logic *(Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit)* Heidegger follows Bonitz in adding a negation *(ouk)* at 1051 b 32-3 and thus reading the passage as saying, 'with respect to these things, we search for what a thing always is and not whether it has this nature or not'. This negation is not to be found in any manuscript and may derive from a comment by pseudo-Alexander, who wanted to see in this passage an allusion to the vision of God. But, for Aristotle the intellection of essences too is infallible in the sense that the only alternative is ignorance. It is expressed in a definition and so does require that we enquire into whether it has this nature or not."

7. ———. 1997. "Heideggers Auseinandersetzung Mit Dem Platonisch-Aristotelischen Wahrheitsverständnis." In *Die Frage Nach Der Wahrheit*, edited by Richter, Ewald, 89-106. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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    "The purpose of the article is a reassessment of Heidegger's central and dominating assertion on the role of *aletheia* in the origin of Occidental thought. It demands an epoché that allows for transcending resolutely his stance in the horizon of modernity -- as achieved by the distinction of the tasks of "reason" realized in its either "natural" or "mundane" or "conceptual" determination (cfr. H. Boeder, "Seditions", State University of New York Press 1997, ed. by Marcus Brainard). Only the latter has introduced the topic of aletheia into philosophy; contrary to Heidegger's assumption of an original concealment of physis. Not this, but the thematization of a primary logos and its divine revelation motivated the Parmenidean discussion of truth as distinct from human opinion. How then does Heidegger approach the truth in the first epoch of philosophy? Only seemingly. In truth -- *quod erat demonstrandum* --he deviates in each case and obliterates its motive thoroughly. He fulfills the modern destiny of thought not to recognise the achievement in conceptual thinking. His is an apocalyptic destiny, that he shares with Marx and Nietzsche -- not approaching to any fulfillment, but exhaustion. In this he is of admirable consequence: that of the "evil eye" (Nietzsche). It dooms necessarily, what was formerly

regarded as "metaphysics". What enables to dismiss this assessment properly? In one word: the epoché due to "logo-tectonics".

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17. Brancacci, Aldo. 1990. "Le Vrai Et Le Droit: La Notion D *'orthon* Chez Mélissos." In *La Naissance De La Raison En Grèce. Actes Du Congrès De Nice, Mai 1987*, edited by Mattéi, Jean-Franois, 197-206. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    "Dans sa *Platons Lehre* Heidegger a consacrè des pages fort intéressantes à la mise en évidence du concept d' *orthotés*, dont le philosophe allemand retrouve, à tort, la première formulation chez Platon. Il est bien connu que, pour Heidegger, l'instauration de la notion de *Richtigkeit* marquerait l'avènement d'une primauté de l' *idea* sur l' *alethéia*: donc la constitution d'un concept de "cohérence" qui se substituerait à la notion de vérité comme dévoilement (*Unverborgenheit*). Dans cette perspective, l *'orthotés* en viendrait à exprimer l'adéquation entre le percevoir et l'énoncer, le se diriger (*Sichrichten*) qui se conforme (*gleicht an*) à ce qui doit être vu (*was gesichtel sein soll*), condition préalable d'une conception de la vérité comme adaequatio (19). Les textes de Mélissos que j'ai examinés montrent combien cette interprétation -- qu'Heidegger lui-même a rétractée dans un écrit de 1964, sans pourtant mettre en question la compréhension du concept d'ortothés qu'elle suppose (20) -- doit être revue et repensée. En effet, si l'on peut admettre que la constitution de la notion d' *ôrthón* est liée à l'instauration d'une conception du vrai qui pose le Sujet par rapport à l'Objet, il n'en reste pas moins que cette notion apparaît comme la conséquence de la thèse ontologique elle-même, qui l'engendre nécessairement et dont elle continue de dépendre. En d'autres termes, c'est à

partir des thèses éléatico-mélissiennes qui posent l'être que s'élabore un concept d' *orthon* envisagé comme le critère qui rend possible la connaissance, ou qui la rendrait possible au cas où le *ghinoskein* aurait comme objet la réalité: *ta onta*. Dans les deux cas, la notion de relation est une notion centrale et désigne tantôt un lien positif, constitutif, entre le principe de la réalité et l'articulation de l'être en concepts, tantôt l'échec de la relation qui s'instaure, au sein d'un monde dépourvu de fondement ontologique, entre les facultés de la connaissance et leur objet, entre la réalité, toujours présupposée, et son apparaître. Dès lors, je crois être en mesure de conclure que le concept mélissien de rectitude exprime une notion éminemment catégoriale: *orthon*, entendu donc en tant qu' "orthogonalité", où Sujet et Objet sont à la fois unis et distincts." pp. 205-206
19. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,* Bern, 1954, p. 42.
20. Cf. M. Heidegger, *La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée*, in *Questions IV*, tr. fr. J. Beaufret et F. Fédier, Paris, 1976, p. 111-139.

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    See *The Sophist Course: Aristotle's recovery of truth after Plato* pp. 169-178 and *The 1925-1926* Logik *Course: Aristotle's twofold sense of truth* pp. 178-187.

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23. Courtine, Jean-Franois. 1990. "Le Platonisme De Heidegger." In *Heidegger Et La Phénomenologie*, 129-158. Paris: Vrin.

    "Conférence prononcée à Rome (Institut Goethe 1988)"; pp. 151-158.

24. ———. 1992. "Une Difficile Transaction: Heidegger, Entre Aristote Et Luther." In *Nos Grecs Et Leurs Modernes*, edited by Cassin, Barbara, 337-362. Paris: Seuil.

25. ———. 1992. "The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology and of the Problematic of Truth in *Being and Time*." In *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments. Vol I. Philosophy*, edited by Macann, Christopher, 68-93. New York: Routledge.

26. ———. 1996. "Les "Recherches Logiques" De Martin Heidegger: De La Théorie Du Jugement À La Vérité De L'être." In *Heidegger 1919-1929. De L'herméneutique De La Facticité À La Métaphysique Du Dasein*, edited by Courtine, Jean-Franois, 7-31. Paris: Vrin.

    Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-Franois Marquet (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994)

27. Dahlstrom, Daniel. 2001. *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

28. ———. 2003. "The Clearing and Its Truth: Reflections on Tugendhat's Criticisms and Heidegger's Concessions." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 37-38:3-25.

29. Dostal, Robert J. 1985. "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 23:71-98.

    Reprinted in: Christopher E. Macann (ed.) - *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments* - Vol. II. *History of philosophy* - New York, Routledge, 1992 pp. 61-89.
    "Heidegger's attack on metaphysics is equivalently an attack on Platonism. Brief comments about Plato are not uncommon in Heidegger's published works, but there is only one published essay devoted exclusively to a text of Plato: *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*.
    This essay's principal thesis is that Plato transformed the notion of truth from unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) to correctness. Though this was written at a time (1930/31) when Heidegger's thought was making the famed and controverted turn (*Kehre*), the critique of Plato remains essentially the same throughout Heidegger's work. There is, of course, the late concession in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinkin*g that "the assertion about the essential transformation of truth [in Plato] ... from unconcealment to correctness is... untenable." But, as we will see below, this does not alter Heidegger's unrelenting critique of Plato. Unlike other aspects of Heidegger's work, his Plato critique has not elicited widespread discussion, presumably because he himself wrote so little on Plato. The best responses to Heidegger's essay on Plato have come from those close to and sympathetic with Heidegger's work yet unsympathetic with his Plato interpretation."

30. Doz, André. 1990. "Heidegger, Aristote Et Le Thème De La Vérité." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 1:75-96.

31. Escoubas, Éliane. 1988. "Heidegger, La Question Romaine, La Question Impériale: Autour Du 'Tournant'." In *Heidegger: Question Ouvertes*, edited by Escoubas, Éliane, 173-188. Paris: Éditions Osiris.

32. ———. 1992. "Heidegger and the Imperial Question." In *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments - Vol. Iv*, edited by Macann, Christopher, 145-158. New York: Routledge.

33. Fóti, Véronique M. 1992. "Aletheia and Oblivion's Field: On Heidegger's *Parmenides* Lectures." In *Ethics and Danger. Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*, edited by Scott, Charles E., Dallery, Arleen B. and Holley, Roberts P., 71-82. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"Martin Heidegger insists, in his 1941-42 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin's "Andenken," that it is the poet who institutes (*stiftet*) history, whereas the thinker establishes its foundation (*grundet*). In his Parmenides lectures of the following year, Heidegger interlinks this poetico-philosophical understanding of historical origination with the problematic of *aletheia* which, by his own account, had preoccupied him intensely since the early 1930s, and which he then still understood in the sense of truth, rather than in the later sense of the pure opening (*Lichtung*). Although, as Jürgen Habermas points out, Heidegger "rigidly maintained the abstraction of historicity (as the condition of historical existence itself) from actual historical processes," his effort to think historicity as rooted in the aletheic "power to bring to word," which he pits against "a crude biological interpretation of history" (PL 83), carries historicopoliticaI import. This import and concern are not explicitly thematized; but they account for the fact that, as Manfred Frings notes, "long stretches of the lecture hardly deal with Parmenides himself" but seem to ramble over a bewildering plethora of topics. Frings advocates conjoining the text with Heidegger's 1943-44 lectures on Heraclitus which continue to develop a similar problematic. The present essay, however, will focus strictly on the Parmenides lectures. It will seek to show not only that this text is meaningfully organized and internally coherent, but also that it reveals certain important aspects of the historicopolitical dimension of Heidegger's thought." pp. 71-72 (notes omitted).

34. Franck, Didier. 2004. "De L' *aletheia* À L' *Ereignis*." In *Heidegger L'énigme De L'être*, edited by Mattéi, Jean-Franois, 105-130. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

35. Friedlander, Paul. 1969. *Plato. An Introduction*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958). Translated from the German *Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswrklichkeit,* 3 vols. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff: I. An introduction [2d edition with revisions]; II. The Dialogues, First Period; III. The Dialogues, Second and Third periods.
    First German edition 1928: Platon. I. Eidos, Paideia, Dialogos; II. Die platonischen schriften; second revised edition 1954; third revised edition Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1964: I. Seinswahrheit und Lebenswirklichkeit; II. Die platonischen Schriften, erste Periode; III. Die platonischen Schriften zweite und dritte Periode.
    See in the First volume the Chapter XI: *Alétheia*. A discussion with Martin Heidegger, pp. 221-229.

36. Frings, Manfred, ed. 1968. *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

37. ———. 1974. "Protagoras Re-Discovered: Heidegger's Explication of Protagoras' Fragment." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 8:112-123.

    "This paper is written against the background of Heidegger's grasp of the destruction of metaphysics and its end in Nietzsche's concept of world, history and values through absolute subjectivity (over-man). It traces pre-socratic thought in light of the absence of subjectivism in Protagoras by showing how his fragment deals with being and nothingness, not with subjective relativism (sophism). Heidegger's identification of 'aletheia' and 'chaos' (Hesiod) is complemented by a novel look at the origin of language and myth."

38. ———. 1988. "Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:15-33.

"In what follows, I wish to present a number of essentials of Heidegger's lecture, originally entitled, "Heraclitus and Parmenides," which he delivered at Freiburg University in the Winter Semester of 1942/1943. This was at a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply against the Nazi regime in Germany. Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to cross the Volga that winter. Talk of an impending "invasion" kept people in suspense. Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids. There wasn't much food left.
It is amazing that any thinker could have been able to concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time. In the lecture, there are no remarks made against the allies; nor are there any to be found that would even remotely support the then German cause. But Communism is hit hard once by Heidegger, who says that it represents an awesome organization-mind in our time.
There are two factors that somewhat impeded my endeavor of presenting the contents of this lecture:
1. Heidegger had originally entitled the lecture "Heraclitus and Parmenides." The 1942/43 lecture was followed in 1943 and 1944 by two more lectures on Heraclitus. When I read the manuscripts of the 1942/43 lecture for the first time, I was stunned that Heraclitus was mentioned just five times, and, even then, in more or less loose contexts. I decided that the title of the lecture should be reduced to just "Parmenides" in order to accommodate the initial expectations of the reader and his own thought pursuant to having read and studied it.
2. While reading the lecture-manuscripts for the first time, another troubling technicality came to my attention: long stretches of the lecture hardly even deal with Parmenides himself, and Heidegger seems to get lost in a number of areas that do, *prima facie*, appear to be irrelevant to Parmenides. And Heidegger was rather strongly criticized

for this in the prestigious literary section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to the effect that it was suggested that I could have done even better had I given the lecture an altogether different title and omitted the name Parmenides."
(Notes omitted).

39. ———. 1990. "Heraclitus: Heidegger's 1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 21:250-264.

"In what follows I wish to present the pivots of thought of the second of three lectures on Pre-Socratic thought Heidegger held during the period of 1942-1944. The content of the first, *Parmenides*, was covered in this Journal's Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 1988). When Heidegger delivered the second lecture that we are about to familiarize ourselves with, he was fifty-five years of age, and yet to live another thirty-three. During this remaining time of his life he gained global attention, albeit not always acceptance of his thought. The summer of 1943 during which the second Pre-Socratic lecture was delivered, entitled: *Heraclitus. The Inception of Occidental Thought*, was marked by the end of the African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the breakdown of the German-Italian axis, and Mussolini's downfall. As was the case with the 1942/43 Parmenides lecture, Heidegger appears to have secluded himself from the turmoil of the War. His thought appears to dwell near the Inception of Western thought, out of which his own time, too, must have grown.
As I indicated at the beginning of the transferring into English of the pivotal points of the Parmenides lecture, the three lectures - as can clearly be seen from what follows - must be studied, and comprehended, in conjunction with one another in order to fully comprehend his doubtless novel contribution to the study of the Pre-Socratics.
On Heidegger's own invitation in 1976, I edited this second, and the third (1944) Heraclitus lectures for Vol. 55 of the German *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Edition). Concerning

the general state of the manuscript involved, I wish to refer the reader to my technical remarks to the coverage of the *Parmenides* lecture.
The last of the three Pre-Socratic lectures by Heidegger, entitled: *Logic. Heraclitus' Doctrine of Logos* (1944), will also appear in this Journal."

40. ———. 1991. "Heraclitus: Heidegger's 1944 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:64-82.

"There are two crucial points to be made concerning our third pre-Socratic lecture:
(1) The main goal of the 1943 Heraclitus lecture had been to establish an arrangement of ten Heraclitian fragments in terms of "thinking proper" (*eigentliches Denken*). Heidegger thought through ten fragments of which the second through the tenth were "falling into", as I then put it, the first, namely, Diels fragment 16. This "first" fragment we showed to be not "first" in terms of a sequence; rather, it showed itself as both center for, and surrounding the other eight. Further, it was shown that Heidegger's first fragment (16) does not "contain" the rest, but that it is "nearest" the "inception" itself of thinking-proper. Thus, the arrangement of the nine fragments falling into the scope of 16 ensued from thinking-proper, and neither from logical nor speculative argument.
(2) By contrast, the present 1944 Heraclitus lecture does not continue on from what had in 1943 been achieved. Heidegger does not investigate further fragments in the light of the exceptional, and inceptional, significance of fragment 16. Surprisingly enough, in 1944 fragment 16 is mentioned only three times (320, 350, 391). Instead, he now tells us that he will check into fragments "chosen" because of their containing the word "logos". This very different, now objective procedure brings with it that the 1944 lecture is only loosely tethered to the preceding two lectures which, we saw, are much intertwined. One such loose tether was already hinted at in the coverage of the 1943 lecture when

we stated: "Logic, too, cannot match thinking proper. It cannot reach into the inception from which its own territory arises. The next 1944 Heraclitus lecture will have to say a lot more on this point." Some of the other links to the previous lectures will be shown in what follows.
The first 1943 Heraclitus lecture I divided into two parts in its German edition in Volume 55 of the Collected Works (Gesamtausgabe). I, on the other hand, divided the manuscripts of the 1944 lecture into three parts. Heidegger left it to the judgment of the editors that such divisions and other minor emendations be made to secure the maximum of clarity. My threefold division of the manuscripts will guide us in the following coverage of the lecture:
1. Logic: Its Name and Subject-Matter.
2. The Staying-Away of Original Logos and the Paths of its Access.
3. Regress into the Original Region of Logic."

41. ———. 1991. "Heidegger's Lectures on Parmenides and Heraclitus (1942-1944)." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:197-199.

    "This is a discussion of the coverage of three Lectures Heidegger held on Parmenides and Heraclitus from 1942 to 1944. It is designed on the background of his personal experience during the trip he made to Greece in 1962 as recorded in his diary. The question is raised whether his 1943 arrangement of 10 Heraclitus fragments could be extended by "refitting transformations" of other fragments. The three Lectures are seen as tethered to Heidegger's 1966/67 Heraclitus Seminar. Central to his trip was the island of Delos where he seemingly experienced the free region of Aletheia. A "fragment" in his diary is suggested as a motto for all three Lectures."

42. Fritsche, Johannes. 2005. "With Plato into the *Kairos* before the *Kehre*: On Heidegger's Different Interpretatons of Plato." In *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, edited

by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 140-177. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

43. Galston, William. 1982. "Heidegger's Plato: A Critique of Plato's Doctrine of Truth." *Philosophical Forum* no. 13:371-384.

44. Gattinara, Giulio. 1995. "Heidegger Interprete Di Platone Ovvero La Traduzione Errante." *Aufidus* no. 9:71-97.

45. Gethmann, Carl Friedrich. 1989. "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in Seinen Marburger Vorlesungen. Zur Vorgeschichte Von *Sein Und Zeit* (§ 44)." In *Martin Heidegger: Innen- Und Assenansichten*, 101-150. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

    Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.) - *Truth, realism and the history of Being* - Heidegger reexamined - vol. II - New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 21-52.
    Translated in Italian as: *La concezione della veritò nello Heidegger di Marburgo* - in: Stefano Poggi, Paolo Tomasello (eds.) - Martin Heidegger. Ontologia, fenomenologia, verità - Milano, LED, 1995, pp. 329-355.

46. Giordani, Alessandro. 2001. *Il Problema Della Verità. Heidegger Vs Aristotele*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

47. Gonzalez, Francisco J. 2007. "Plato's Question of Truth (Versus Heidegger's Doctrines)." In *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*. *Vol 23*, edited by Cleary, John J. and Gurtler, Gary M., 83-111. Leiden: Brill.

48. Greisch, Jean. 1983. "La Déesse Vérité. Histoire Du Plus Long Oubli." In *La Vérité*, edited by Greisch, Jean, 43-60. Paris: Beauchesne.

49. Greve, Jens. 2000. "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in "Sein Und Zeit": Die Interpretationen Von Ernst Tugendhat

Und Carl Friedrich Gethmann." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 54:256-273.

"First, it is shown that Gethmann has raised a convincing objection to Tugendhat's interpretation, according to which, Heidegger's definition of truth goes beyond that given by Husserl. Contrary to Tugendhat's view, Gethmann argues that Heidegger has not moved away from Husserl's definition of truth. Gethmann claims that Heidegger rather uses "truth" with two different meanings, one referring to the truth of assertions, whereas the second ("truth in a more primordial sense") describes the preconditions for the first. Secondly, with regard to this relationship, it is argued that Heidegger and Gethmann cannot provide an adequate analysis, primarily because truth in the primordial sense does not account for the difference between being true or false."

50. Grieder, Alfons. 1988. "What Did Heidegger Mean by "Essence"?" *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:64-89.

"The word `Wesen' (`Essence') frequently occurs in Heidegger's writings. It is indeed one of his key-words. Unless we understand what he means by it we are unlikely to understand his philosophy. After all, philosophy was for him essential thinking (*wesentliches Denken)*. Yet 'Wesen' is also one of his most enigmatic terms and greatly in need of elucidation, despite the fact that he commented on its meaning in many places, scattered throughout his writings, from the thirties right through to the seventies. It is not only tedious to collect these comments but, as we shall soon see, difficult to understand and adequately interpret them.
In the following I shall focus on the three periods 1925-30, 1934-38, and 1949-57. In all three periods Heidegger's meaning of `Wesen' is inseparable from that of 'Sein' (`Being') and `Wahrheit (`Truth'), and by the fifties its connection with 'Language', 'World' and 'Thing' assumes a new significance. From the mid-thirties he uses the word in an increasingly unfamiliar and puzzling manner. Its change

of meaning is closely associated with the famous 'turn' ('Kehre'). One has to come to grips with this metamorphosis, otherwise what the later Heidegger has to say, for instance on art and technology, will hardly be intelligible.
Unfortunately, few commentators have bothered to analyse this term 'Wesen', and to my knowledge none has done so in sufficient detail and in a way which makes sense to the uninitiated too. Obviously, little is achieved by simply repeating Heideggerian phrases and assertions as if they were crystal-clear. (As a rule they are not at all.) I am aware, of course, that the following remarks and analyses are still in some sense provisional and cannot fill this important gap in the Heidegger literature: they will almost certainly have to be complemented and revised in the light of the many still outstanding volumes of the Gesamtausgabe."

51. Grondin, Jean. 1982. "L' *Alétheia* Entre Platon Et Heidegger." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 87:551-556.

    "The aim of this article is to suggest the affinity of the Heideggerian and Platonic conception of truth. It is first shown that the etymology of the Greek word for truth, "a-Letheia", As "dis-closure" might have been familiar to Plato. This leads to a discussion of the philosophical implications of the concept of hypothesis in the theory of ideas. It is finally advanced that the Heideggerian concept of possibility might echo this insight in human "Dasein"."

52. Gurtler, Gary M. 2007. "Commentary on Gonzalez." In *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*. *Vol 23*, edited by Cleary, John J. and Gurtler, Gary M., 112-117. Leiden: Brill.

53. Hahn, Robert. 1979. "Truth (*Alétheia*) in the Context of Heidegger's Critique of Plato and the Tradition." *Southwest Philosophical Studies* no. 4:51-57.

"According to Heidegger, the Pre-Socratic experience of "truth" as "unconcealment" is transformed by Plato so that "truth" becomes "correctness of perception" -- this marks both the origin of the "western tradition" and its decline. The paper examines Heidegger's "fourfold", a twentieth century expression of truth as "unconcealment", as a constructive response to the shortcomings of the "Tradition". Finally it is suggested that one way of reading what I call the "fourfold" in Plato's "Philebus" and "Timaeus" is to see Plato's project as the very one which Heidegger sets out to accomplish and which he denies to Plato."

54. Haim, Gordon, and Rivca, Gordon. 2006. *Heidegger on Truth and Myth. A Rejection of Postmodernism*. New York: Peter Lang.

55. Harrison, Bernard. 1991. "Heidegger and the Analytic Tradition on Truth." *Topoi* no. 10:121-136.

56. Hatab, Lawrence. 1990. "Rejoining *Alétheia* and Truth: Or Truth Is a Five-Letter Word." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 30:431-447.

57. Heitsch, Ernst. 1970. "Platon Und Das Problem Der Wahrheit." In *Durchblicke. Martin Heidegger Zum 80. Geburstag*, edited by Klostermann, Vittorio, 207-234. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

58. Helting, Holger. 1997. " *A-Létheia* Etymologien Vor Heidegger Im Vergleich Mit Einigen Phasen Der *a-Létheia* Auslegung Bei Heidegger." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien*:93-107.

59. ———. 2006. " *Alétheia*." In *Hidegger Und Die Antike*, edited by Günther, Hans-Christian and Rengakos, Antonios, 47-70. München: Beck.

60. Herrmann, Fredrich-Wilhelm von. 2002. *Wahrheit, Freiheit, Geschichte. Eine Systematische Untersuchung Zu Heideggers Schrift 'Vom Wesen Der Wahrheit'*. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

61. Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 41:1-24.

62. Hyland, Drew. 1995. *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    See Chapter 6: *Truth and Finitude: On Heidegger's reading of Plato* pp. 139-163.

63. ———. 2004. *Questioning Platonism. Continental Interpretations of Plato*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    See Chapter One: *Heidegger's Plato* pp. 17-122.
    "I shall begin with Heidegger's early (winter semester, 1924-25) lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*, where Heidegger, still very strongly under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, interprets Plato (and Aristotle) largely from the standpoint of the exitent to which they prepare the way tor something like philosophy as scientific research in the phenomenological mode. From this vantage point, as we shall see in detail, Plato is to be criticized as falling far short of Aristotle. Since this is the only work of Heidegger's that engages in a thorough interpretation of an entire Platonic dialogue, I shall examine it in the greatest detail. The second text to be considered will be, significantly, Heidegger's only formally published work on Plato, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," from 1931 to 1932 (although I shall also consider briefly several lecture courses from the same time period). There, Plato will again be criticized, but this time more as the thinker who begins the fateful transformation of *aletheia*, truth as "unhiddenness," into truth as "correctness," and so the beginning of the "forgetting of Being" that becomes the Western metaphysical tradition. As

such, Plato's thinking is, so far as possible, to be got beyond, if not indeed overcome. Later, as Heidegger becomes more oriented toward the poetical and even mythic, both in his writing style and the matters he addresses, he becomes somewhat more sympathetic to Plato and to the dialogue form, while remaining in the end still profoundly suspicious of Plato's thought. I shall consider third, then, an example from this later, more poetic period in Heidegger's thinking, his 1943-44 lecture course on *Parmenides*. I shall there suggest that Heidegger's own movement away from philosophy as science and toward a more poetic way of thinking ought to make him much, much more sympathetic to Plato than he in fact becomes. Finally, I shall consider two works of Heidegger's in which Plato is never mentioned, but in which it might be argued that the influence of Plato is -- or ought to be -- most apparent: Heidegger's two later attempts at writing dialogues, the "Dialogue with a Japanese," and "Conversation on a Country Path." There, we shall evaluate Heidegger's engagement not so much with his assessment of Plato's so-called doctrines, but with the Greek's choice of writing format." pp. 17-18

64. Inwood, Michael. 2005. "Truth and Untruth in Plato and Heidegger." In *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 72-95. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

65. Izquierdo Labeaga, José Antonio. 1993. "Nove Definizioni Di Verità. L' "Alétheia" Nel Confronto Tra Heidegger E Tommaso." *Il Cannocchiale* no. 3:3-52.

66. Jeanmart, Gaelle. 1998. "Le Concept De Vérité Dans Les Interprétations Hégélienne Et Heideggérienne Et L'allégorie De La Caverne." *De Philosophia* no. 14:19-38.

    "This paper is devoted to the methodological concept of truth and that the discrepancy between Heidegger's *alètheia* and Hegel's absolute *Wahrheit* will induce opposite interpretations of a major philosophical text."

67. ———. 1999. " *Episteme* Et *Amathia*: Le Tournant Dans La Conception Platonicienne Du Langage: Lecture Heideggérienne Du *Cratyle*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 17:109-133.

68. Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    See in particular: Part II. *Confronting the ontological tradition*. Chapter 6. *Aristotle again: from Unconcealment to Presence* (1923-24) pp. 276-308.

69. Kisiel, Theodore, and Sheehan, Thomas, eds. 2007. *Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

70. Kockelmans, Joseph, ed. 1972. *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

71. Krell, David Farrell. 1975. "On the Manifold Meaning of *Alétheia*: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 5:77-94.

    Reprinted in D. F. Krell - *Intimations of mortality. Time, truth, and finitude in Heidegger's thinking of Being* - Penn State Press, 1986, pp. 67-79 with the title: The manifold meaning of *alétheia*.
    "The third chapter of Brentano's Dissertation on the manifold meaning of being according to Aristotle analyzes "being in the sense of the true." Because Heidegger has always related the question of being to the question of truth, and because he calls Brentano's work the "chief help and guide" of his first venture into philosophy, the question arises: does Brentano's account of "being in the sense of the true" have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to the principal matter of his thought, i.e., *alétheia* as the unconcealment of beings in presence? This article traces the parallels and divergences in Brentano's and Heidegger's accounts of the relation between being and truth."

72. Kusch, Martin. 1988. "Husserl and Heidegger on Meaning." *Synthese* no. 77:99-127.

73. Lafont, Cristina. 2000. *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Revised and updated edition translated from German by Graham Harman.
    Original edition: *Sprache und Welterschliessung* - Verlag am Main, Suhrkamp, 1994.
    See in particular Chapter 3: *World-Disclosure and Truth* pp. 109-175.

74. Maly, Kenneth. 1985. "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 1:5-23.

75. ———. 1990. "From Truth to *Alétheia* to Opening and Rapture." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 6:27-42.

76. Margolis, Joseph. 2005. "Heidegger on Truth and Being." In *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 121-139. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

77. Martel, Christoph. 2008. *Heideggers Wahrheiten*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

78. Marx, Werner. 1971. *Heidegger and the Tradition*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Translated from the German: *Heidegger und die Tradition: Eine problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die Grundbestimmungen de Seins* (1961) by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene.
    See Part III. *The basic traits of Being in the first beginning* - Chapter 4: *Alétheia* pp. 145-152.

79. McGaughey, Douglas R. 1976. "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: A Study in Philosophical Influence." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 16:331-348.

"A historical discussion of the intellectual relationship between Husserl and Heidegger and an analysis of articles on Plato's cave allegory by Heidegger and Fink demonstrates: (1) that Heidegger's project is true to (not contrary to) the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology by its being a more radical quest into "presuppositions" questioning the "givenness" of the structure of intentionality; (2) Fink's "what does the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl want to accomplish," throws light on the discussion of Bildung in Heidegger's "Plato's doctrine of truth." Fink and Husserl perceive the allegory as primarily concerned with "education;" Heidegger perceives the "unsaid" of the shift in the essence of truth from *aletheia* to *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, indicating a difference of focus for both projects rather than contradictions between them; and (3) essay concludes by suggesting that an adequate "phenomenological" description of the constituting of meaning in consciousness requires sensitivity to both moments: Husserl's description of intentionality and Heidegger's Seinfrage."

80. McGrath, Sean J. 2003. "Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 57:339-358.

81. Mikulic, Borislav. 1987. *Sein, Physis, Alétheia: Zur Vermittlung Und Unmittelbarkeit Im Ursprunglichen Seinsdenken Martin Heideggers*. Würzburg: Konigshausen Neumann.

In particular Chapter II. *Sein und Wahrheit* pp. 59-119.

82. Morrison, James C. 1969. "Heidegger's Criticism of Wittgenstein's Conception of Truth." *Mand and World* no. 2:551-573.

Reprinted in: Harold A. Durfee (ed.) - *Analytic philosophy and phenomenology* - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 125-146.
"In *Being and Time* Heidegger characterizes the traditional concept of truth, which comprises three theses:
(1) The 'place' of truth is the statement (the judgment).
(2) The essence of truth lies in the `correspondence' of the judgment with its object.
(3) Aristotle held theses (1) and (2).
In a later work, *On the Essence of Truth*, he gives the following account of the traditional concept of truth. "A statement is true if what it means and says corresponds with the thing about which it speaks. Also we say here : it agrees *(es stimmt*). But now, what agrees is not the thing but rather the proposition." (p. 7).
Heidegger goes on to say that this agreeing has a twofold character "... on the one hand the agreement of a thing with is meant in advance about it and on the other hand the correspondence of what is meant in the statement with the thing." *(ibid.*) That is, since the agreement or correspondence is a relation between two "terms" -- the statement and the thing
presupposes that both terms can enter into the relation, i.e., agree with one another. The two-fold character of this agreement is determined by these two "aspects" of the relation: the first is the "objective" aspect, where the thing corresponds to the statement or what is meant by the statement, the second is the "linguistic" aspect where the statement or what it means corresponds to the thing. The first is "objective truth," the second "propositional truth."
In this essay I propose to discuss Heidegger's first two theses about the traditional concept of truth (1) and (2) above in terms of Wittgenstein's own concept of truth as it is presented in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. My main purpose in doing so is to see to what extent Heidegger's criticism of this concept is relevant to Wittgenstein and what this criticism really is. That is, I wish to generate a philosophical "dialogue" between these two thinkers who, on the face of it, are worlds apart in their philosophical

methods, aims, interests, and conclusions. Many philosophers today, especially those in the English-speaking world, would seriously doubt the possibility of such a dialogue. Even if they admitted that Heidegger's views are meaningful and important they might suppose that what he says is not really relevant to the kinds of problems Wittgenstein, or any other philosopher sharing his philosophical tradition, is concerned with. Thus, my first task is to show what Heidegger says about the traditional concept of truth is relevant to Wittgenstein. Second, in order to show the force of his criticisms they must be presented in such a way that they can be seen to meet Wittgenstein on his own terms. To achieve this a mere confrontation of two opposing philosophical positions must be avoided, at least so far as this is possible. Such an arbitrary confrontation would simply beg the question and lead nowhere. Rather, it must be shown that Heidegger's criticisms point out the inadequacies of Wittgenstein's position from within, and that these inadequacies point to, and can only be overcome by, Heidegger's own position. Heidegger's criticism of the traditional ("correspondence") theory of truth is that it is ultimately inadequate, i.e., it is only a partial and hence dependent explication of the nature of truth, and thus requires a foundation in a radically different understanding of truth, which understanding Heidegger claims to provide. Thus, I must try to show the nature of, and reasons for, this partiality and dependence. In the end, I hope to have indicated why a radically new rethinking of the essence of truth is necessary, and that Heidegger himself has opened up the path for this rethinking. I have oI' this paper. I will begin by discussing thesis (2) (above) - that the essence of truth is a correspondence between judgment and object - and will then Inn) to thesis (I) -- that the "place" of truth is the judgment. However, I wish to emphasize that this division is adopted only for the purposes of exposition. It will be seen that they are both intimately related, and that this relationship is a necessary one." (Notes omitted). pp. 125-127 of the reprint.

83. Naas, Michael. 1999. "Keeping Homer's Word: Heidegger and the Epic of Truth." In *The Presocratics after Heidegger*, edited by Jacobs, David C., 73-99. Albany: State University of New York Press.

84. Nwodo, Christopher. 1979. "Friedlander *Versus* Heidegger: A-Létheia Controversy." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 10:84-93.

    "Professor Heidegger is certainly one of the leading philosophers, perhaps the leading philosopher of our time. He has influenced, and continues to influence, in a profound and far-reaching manner, the thinking of contemporary scholars in various fields. He has also given rise to many a controversy particularly in connection with the way he interprets other philosophers and the basic concepts of traditional philosophy. In this article (1) some attempt will be made to analyze one (2) such controversy, namely, Professor Friedlander's disagreement with Heidegger over the latter's interpretation of *a-letheia*. This paper is therefore divided into three parts. Part One deals with a brief analysis of Friedlander's criticism. Part Two attempts a short sketch of the development of the concept of *a-letheia* in the two works of Heidegger cited by Professor Friedlander. Part Three concludes with an evaluation of both views.
    Friedlander's criticism is limited to two works of Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927) (3) and *Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit* (1947), (4) where Heidegger deals with the concept of *aletheia*. In these works Heidegger reconstructs *alethes* and *aletheia* as *a-lethes* and *a-letheia* (with the *alpha* privative). Furthermore, he construes the Greek *a-letheia,* as truth not in the sense of a correspondence or correctness, but as unconcealment or unhiddenness.
    In PLW Heidegger claims that the primordial meaning of a-letheia was unconcealment and that the current interpretation of it as correspondence is a form of degeneration. More specifically, he situates the beginning of this degeneration in Plato's allegory of the cave (Chapter

Seven of the *Republic*). A reasonable thing to do as a contribution to philosophy and to truth would be to reverse this process of degeneration in order to retrieve the original and therefore authentic meaning." p. 84
1. This article developed out of a section of Christopher S. Nwodo: *A Study of Martin Heidegger's Thinking on Art: With Special Reference to "The Origin of the Work of Art."* Louvain University, unpublished doctoral thesis, 1974, pp. 252-257.
2. The word "one" is used in a double sense here. First of all, the *a-letheia* controversy is only one among many. There are others over *Logos* and *Physis*. See J. L. Mehta: *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 46 note 65. Secondly, Paul Friedlander's criticism is not the only one concerning *a-letheia*, G. Kruger is also involved. See Mehta, Ibid.
3. *Sein und Zeit,* Tubingen, Max Niemeyer, 1963 (1 Auflage 1927) (Hereafter SZ). English translation, Being and Time by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper & Row, 1962 (7th edition), (Hereafter BT)
4. *Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus",* Bern, Switzerland, Verlag A. Francke, 1954 (1 Auflage 1947), (Hereafter PLW). English translation, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" by John Barlow in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century edited by Barrett and Aiken, New York, Harper & Row paperback edition, 1971. Vol. III, pp. 173-192, (Hereafter ET).

85. Paredes, Mara del Carmen. 2005. " *Amicus Plato Magis Amica Veritas*: Reading Heidegger in Plato's Cave." In *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 108-120. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

86. Partenie, Catalin, and Rockmore, Tom, eds. 2005. *Heidegger and Plato. Toward Dialogue*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

87. Pellecchia, Fausto. 1990. "Martin Heidegger. Essenza E Verità." *Filosofia e Teologia* no. 4:119-132.

"The essay concerns two central themes of Heidegger's meditation on the essence of truth, which, intertwining and reacting on each other since the era of *Sein und Zeit*, lead to the *Kehre* of asking what implicitly underlies the lecture *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*:
1) the impossibility of the theory, as a genuine discourse on truth, which discounts within its own structure the essence of truth as an auto-presupposition and which inevitably removes the problem;
2) the radical non-identity and, at the same time, co-appendage of *aletheia* and "truth" (*adaequatio*), that obstructs all dialectical "overcoming", in which it still would act as the presupposition of *aletheia* as the truth of "truth"; rather it refers to impropriety and to intimate discarding, concealed in the very possibility (essence) of the *adaequatio*, which the intellect must assume positively as truth of essence (being)."

88. Peperzak, Adriaan T. 1993. "Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good." In *Reading Heidegger. Commemorations*, edited by Sallis, John, 258-285. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

"Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, as defended in his publications from 1927 until 1932 and in "Plato's doctrine of truth" (1942) is analyzed and criticized, especially with regard to "aletheia, paideia, idea" and "to agathon". Heidegger's characterization of Plato's thinking as "metaphysics" is challenged and some consequences of a different interpretation are indicated."

89. Philippousis, John. 1976. "Heidegger and Plato's Notion of Truth." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review*:502-504.

"This short discussion tries to re-examine Heidegger's famous interpretation of Plato's notion of "truth" ("Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit") and, proposing a new

interpretation of the Platonic idea in the myth of the cave, It reaches the conclusion that Plato himself understood the notion of *aletheia* not as exactitude (*orthotes*) but as the unfolding of the *ousia* itself."

90. Polt, Richard. 1996. "Heidegger's Topical Hermeneutics: The *Sophist* Lectures." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 27:53-76.

    Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.) - *Truth, realism and the history of Being* - Heidegger reexamined - vol. II - New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 53-76.

91. Power, Anne-Marie. 1998. "Truth and Aletheia in Heidegger's Thought." *De Philosophia* no. 14:109-120.

    "In response to the controversy in the tradition concerning Heidegger's treatment of truth, I argue that Heidegger's early approach to that concept parallels his later approach to language, both of which seek the broader foundation of our common notions. I show that Heidegger takes us behind "truth as adequation" towards a more primordial conceptualization which is rooted in the Greek term, *aletheia*. Time and translation have deprived that word of much of its original meaning, but Heidegger holds that a deeper understanding of truth requires our recapturing its lost sense."

92. Proimos, Constantinos. 2002. "Reading Platonic and Neoplatonic Notions of Mimesis with and against Martin Heidegger." In *Neoplatonism and the Arts*, edited by Cheney de Girolami, Liana and Hendrix, John, 65-80. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

    "Analyses some of the reasons for Heidegger's condemnation of the Platonic theory of mimesis, which goes hand in hand with the German philosopher's preference for *aletheia* (non-representational "unhiddenness") over *orthotes* (correctness of representation) in the theory of truth. Yet Heidegger underestimates such Neoplatonists as

Plotinus, who also criticizes and transforms Platonic mimesis."

93. Radloff, Bernhard. 2000. "Heidegger's Critique of Imperial Truth." *Existentia.An International Journal of Philosophy* no. 10:51-68.

    "With particular reference to Heidegger's Parmenides of 1942-43, and to the *Contributions to Philosophy*, the author argues that Heidegger offers a critique of imperialism as founded in the transformation of truth from aletheia to veritas. The "imperial" implicates the falseness and subjection of nature, and of a subject population, to the "imperial subject" of modernity. The argument of the essay is especially unfolded by reference to the political projects of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, and concludes that modern technology, and imperial, socio-technical discourses, are intimately linked."

94. ———. 2007. *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism. Disclosure and Gestalt*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    See in particular the *Conclusion: Imperial Truth and planetary order* pp. 411-428.

95. Richardson, William J. 1963. *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    With a preface by Martin Heidegger.

96. Riedel, Manfred. 1996. "Verwahrung Und Wahrheit Des Seins. Heideggers Ursprüngliche Deutung Der *Alétheia*." In *Denken Der Individualität. Festschrift Für Josef Simon Zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Majetschak, Stefan and Hoffmann, Thomas Sören, 275-293. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

97. Rioux, Bertrand. 1963. *L'être Et La Vérité Chez Heidegger Et Saint Thomas D'Aquin*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

98. Ruggenini, Mario. 2001. "Veritas E Aletheia. La Grecia, Roma E L'origine Della Metafisica Cristiano-Medioevale." *Quaestio.Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 1:83-212.

99. Sallis, John. 1994. "The Truth That Is Not of Knowledge." In *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, edited by Kisiel, Theodore and Buren, John van, 381-392. Albany: State University of New York Press.

100. Schuh, Franzjosef. 1957. *Aletheia, Vorläufige Untersuchungen Zu Einer Phänomenologischen Destruktion Der Seinsgeschichte Der Griechen Als Materiale Vorarbeiten Zu Einer Neuen Bestimmung Der Wahrheit Als Die Idee Des Menschen*.

    Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis.

101. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 2001. *La Question De La Vérité. Thomas D'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote, Heidegger*. Lausanne: Editions Payot.

    Table des matières: Introduction 5;
    Première partie: La questione de la vérité dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Thomas d'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote Chapitre I. La fondation du concept traditionnel de la vérité chez Thomas d'Aquin. *De Veritate, Quaestio I, Articuli I-II* 19; Chapitre II. L'expérience de la perte de la vérité chez Nietzsche *Fragments choisis* 43; Chapitre III. La fondation transcendentale de la vérité chez Kant. L'essence des concepts *a priori* de l'entendement ou des catégories. *Critique de la raison pure, § 9 e § 10* 80; Chapitre IV. La double essence de la vérité chez Aristote. *Métaphysique, Livre VI, chapitre 4; Livre IX, chapitre 10* 119;
    Seconde partie: La répétition de la question de la vérité dans la pensée postmétaphysique de Heidegger. *Textes choisis* 167
    Indications bibliographiques 287-297.

102. Segura Peraita, Carmen. 2002. "La Crítica De Heidegger a La Noción Tradicional De Verdad (Desde *Sein Und Zeit* Hasta Los *Beiträge Zur Philosophie*)." *Pensamiento* no. 58:255-272.

103. Shin, Sang-Hie. 1993. *Wahrheitsfrage Und Kehre Bei Martin Heidegge*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

104. Sousa, Rui de. 2000. *Martin Heidegger's Interpretation of Ancient Greek Alétheia and the Philological Response to It*, Mc Gill University, Montreal.

Available at UMI Dissertation Express.
Abstract: "This thesis tries to provide a critical review of Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth in the different stages of his career and it also examines the philological response that his work on this question elicited. The publication of *Sein and Zeit* made Heidegger's views on *alétheia* available to a wide public and thereby launched a heated debate on the meaning of this word. The introduction tries to give an account of the general intellectual background to Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth. It also looks at the kind of interpretative approach favored by the philologists responding to Heidegger's views on *alétheia*. The thesis first examines his arguments on ancient Greek truth and language in *Sein and Zeit* from the point of view of the larger philosophical project of Heidegger's seminal work. It then looks at some initial philological responses to Heidegger along with Heidegger's views on *alétheia* in a few works following the publication of *Sein and Zeit*. As a next step, the bulk of the philological work responding to Heidegger is carefully examined with a special focus on the interpretative approaches of the various authors. Heidegger's attempt to respond to some of these philologists is also reviewed. Finally, Heidegger's retraction of his earlier views on *alétheia* is examined in light of a growing critical consensus among philologists. The very latest philological responses to Heidegger are also considered. The conclusion

looks at the contributions made by Heidegger and his philological respondents to our knowledge of ancient Greek truth. Some suggestions are also made for future research on this topic."

105. Spanos, William V. 2001. "Heidegger's Parmenides: Greek Modernity and the Classical Legacy." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* no. 19:89-115.

One of Heidegger's most insistent assertions about the identity of modern Europe is that its origins are not Greek, as has been assumed in discourses of Western modernity since the Englightenment, but Roman, the epochal consequence of the Roman reduction of the classical Greek understanding of truth, as a-letheia (un-concealment), to veritas (the correspondence of mind and thing). In the Parmenides lectures of 1942-43, Heidegger amplifies this genealogy of European identity by showing that this Roman concept of truth--and thus the very idea of Europe--is also indissolubly imperial. Heidegger's genealogy has been virtually neglected by Western historical scholarship, including classical. Even though restricted to the generalized site of language, this genealogy is persuasive and bears significantly on the conflicted national identity of modern, post-Ottoman Greece. It suggests that the obsessive pursuit of the unitary cultural ideals of the European Enlightenment, in the name of this movement's assumed origins in classical Greece, constitutes a misguided effort to accommodate Greek identity to the polyvalent, imperial, Roman model of the polity that informs European colonial practice. Put positively, Heidegger's genealogy suggests a radically different way of dealing with the question of Greek national identity, one more consonant with the actual philosophical, cultural, ethnic, and political heterogeneity of ancient Greece (what Martin Bernal has called the "Ancient Model") and, thus, one less susceptible to colonization by *Europe*."

106. Stambaugh, Joan. 1992. *The Finitude of Being*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

107. Starr, David E. 1975. *Entity and Existence. An Ontological Investigation of Aristotle and Heidegger*. New York: Burt Franklin & Co. Inc.

See Chapter IV. *Truth and essence in Heidegger's thought* pp. 107-167.

108. Taminiaux, Jacques. 1995. "La Mise En œuvre De L' *Aletheia*. Platon, Les Présocratiques Et Sophocle Dans Les Leons De Heidegger (1935 Et 1942)." In *Le Théâtre Des Philosophes*, 167-237. Grenoble: Millon.

109. Tanzer, Mark Basil. 1999. "Heidegger on Being's Oldest Name: " *To Chreón*"." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 15:81-96.

110. Tugendhat, Ernst. 1970. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff Bei Husserl Und Heidegger*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

111. ———. 1993. "Heidegger's Idea of Truth." In *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, edited by Wolin, Richard, 245-263. London: The MIT Press.

English translation by Richard Wolin of: *Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit* - in: Otto Pöggeler (ed.) - Heidegger: *Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes* - Königstein, Athenäum, 1984 pp. 286-297
Reprinted also in: Christopher Macann (ed.) - *Critical Heidegger* - New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 227-240.

112. Versényi, Laszlo. 1965. *Heidegger, Being, and Truth*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

113. Vigo, Alejandro. 1994. "Wahrheit, Logos Und Praxis. Die Trasformation Der Aristotelischen Wahrheitskonzeption Durch Heidegger." *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 1:73-95.

114. Ward, James F. 1995. *Heidegger's Political Thinking*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

See Chapter 6: Politics at/of the Inception: Plato and the Polis pp. 169-204.

115. White, David A. 1974. "Truth and Being: A Critique of Heidegger on Plato." *Man and World* no. 7:118-134.

"Heidegger has carried on many thoughtful "conversations" with the central figures in the Western philosophical tradition. But one of the sources of this tradition - Plato - is an infrequent protagonist in these conversations. Although a quotation from the Sophist heads *Sein und Zeit* and Heidegger alludes to Plato in a variety of contexts, Plato's work as such is the explicit subject of just a single essay. But that essay expounds an especially important set of interpretations in light of Heidegger's conviction that subsequent philosophy has been a series of distorted variations on Platonic themes. Therefore, an evaluation of Heidegger on Plato is crucial for determining the legitimacy of what Heidegger takes as historically "given" when he attempts to rectify these distortions through his own work!' Heidegger's conversations with other philosophers are notorious for their apparently arbitrary stresses, omissions, and random divinations. For example, he has himself admitted that Kant must be handled "with violence" before the ultimate significance of his philosophy becomes evident. There is substantial evidence to indicate that a "violence" of sorts has been done to Plato as well. But in this case violence is not just wrenching Plato from the shapes which the standard interpreters claim to apprehend. If interpretive violence is required to establish new perspectives on honorable and ancient philosophy, let there be violence. The violence I wish to describe emerges when Heidegger draws inferences from his interpretations of Plato which he claims are incompatible with his own understanding of being (Sein), when in fact he has not given arguments to prove that these inferences must be incompatible. The violence is thus of a rather humble logical form. Plato may well be the

primary source of the distortions Heidegger finds in the history of Western philosophy. But Heidegger has not given us reasons to accept the subsidiary claim that these distortions necessarily imply that being is distorted for Plato himself.
My evaluation is divided into three parts. Part I is a summary of Heidegger's essay "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit," with references to other works introduced when relevant. Part II is a commentary on the key steps in Heidegger's argument. Part III is a defense of Plato against Heidegger in light of the "violence" just mentioned." p. 118.

116. Wiplinger, Fridolin. 1961. *Wahrheit Und Geschichtlichkeit. Ein Untersuchung Über Die Frage Nach Dem Wesen Der Wahrheit Im Deneken Martin Heideggers*. Freiburg / München: Verlag Karl Alber.

117. Wolenski, Jan. 2005. " *Aletheia* in Greek Thought until Aristotle." *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* no. 127:339-360.

"This paper investigates the concept of *aletheia* (truth) in ancient philosophy from the pre-Socratics until Aristotle. The meaning of *aletheia* in archaic Greek is taken as the starting point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and historians. A special section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion, influential views of Heidegger are examined. The paper is concluded by a review of various meanings of truth in Aristotle."

118. Wolz, Henry. 1966. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth: *Orthótes* or *Alétheia* ?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:157-182.

119. Wrathall, Mark. 1999. "Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 7:69-88.

Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.) - *Truth, realism and the history of Being* - Heidegger reexamined - vol. II - New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 1-20.
"I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth."

120. ———. 1999. "The Conditions of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson." *Monist* no. 82:304-323.

"In this paper I hope to demonstrate that, despite dramatic differences in approach, Analytic and Continental philosophers can be brought into a productive dialogue with one another on topics central to the philosophical agenda of both traditions. Their differences tend to obscure the fact that both traditions have as a fundamental project the critique of past accounts of language, intentionality, and mind. Moreover, writers within the two traditions are frequently in considerable agreement about the failings of

past accounts. Where they tend to differ is in the sorts of positive accounts they give. By exploring the important areas of disagreement against the background of agreement, however, it is possible to gain insights unavailable to those rooted in a single tradition.
I would like to illustrate this in the context of a comparison of Heidegger's and Davidson's accounts of the conditions of truth. I begin, however, with a brief discussion of some crucial differences between the Analytic and Continental ways of doing philosophy. An understanding of these differences provides the basis for seeing how Heidegger and Davidson, all appearances to the contrary, in fact follow a parallel course by resisting theoretical attempts at the redefinition or reduction of our pre-theoretical notion of truth. Indeed, both writers believe that truth is best illuminated by looking at the conditions of truth-that is, they both try to understand what makes truth as a property of language and thought possible in the first place. Both answer the question by exploring how, what we say or think can come to have content. I conclude by suggesting that Heidegger's "ontological foundations" of "the traditional conception of truth" can be seen as an attempt at solving a problem which Davidson recognizes but believes is incapable of solution-namely, the way the existence of language and thought presuppose our sharing a finely articulated structure which only language and thought seem capable of producing." p. 304

121. ———. 2004. "Heidegger on Plato, Truth, and Unconcealment. The 1931-32 Lecture on the Essence of Truth." *Inquiry* no. 47:443-463.

"This paper discusses Heidegger's 1931-32 lecture course on The Essence of Truth. It argues that Heidegger read Platonic ideas, not only as stage-setting for the western philosophical tradition's privileging of conceptualization over practice, and its correlative treatment of truth as correctness, but also as an early attempt to work through truth as the fundamental experience of unhiddenness. Wrathall shows

how several of Heidegger's more-famous claims about truth, e.g. that propositional truth is grounded in truth as world-disclosure, and including Heidegger's critique of the self-evidence of truth as correspondence, are first revealed in a powerful (if iconoclastic) reading of Plato."

122. ———. 2005. "Unconcealment." In *A Companion to Heidegger*, edited by Dreyfus, Hubert and Wrathall, Mark, 337-357. Oxford: Blackwell.

123. ———. 2006. "Truth and the Essence of Truth in Heidegger's Thought." In *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Second Edition)*, edited by Guignon, Charles, 241-267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

124. ———. 2010. *Heidegger and Unconcealment. Truth, Language, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

125. Zanatta, Marcello. 1990. *Identità, Logos E Verità. Saggio Su Heidegger*. L'Aquila: Japadre Editore.

126. Zarader, Marlène. 1986. "Le Miroir Au Trois Reflets. Histoire D'une Évolution." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 3:5-32.

    Translated as: *The mirror with the triple reflection* in: Christopher Macann (ed.) - *Critical Heidegger* - London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 7-26.

127. ———. 1990. *Heidegger Et Les Paroles De L'origine*. Paris: Vrin.

    Translated in Italian as: Heidegger e le parole dell'origine - Milano, Vita e Pensiero 1997

128. Ziegler, Susanne. 1991. *Heidegger, Hölderlin Und Die Alétheia. Martin Heideggers Geschichtsdenken in Seinen Vorlesungen 1934/35 Bis 1944*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

129. ———. 1994. "Hölderlin Unter Dem Auspruch Der *Alétheia*?" *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 10:163-182.

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INTRODUCTION

"Metaphysics, in its minimal form, is the activity of categorial description. Its subject matter is the most fundamental aspects of the way we think about and talk about reality, the most fundamental features of reality as it presents itself to us. We divide the world into horses and trains, people and mountains, battles and towns, and a whole complex structure of different kinds of things; our language is the repository of this enormously rich furnishing of the world. But we can discern within this richness some overall divisions, between things and their properties for example, or between events and the times and places in which they happen, and it is with the overall pattern of our categorising of elements of the world that metaphysics concerns itself. The basic divisions which our thought and talk about reality entail are the quarry of categorial describers.
(...)
Aristotle's categories are 'predicables' because (with reservations to be looked at later) they are things predicated of something: when we say, for example, that 'Socrates is a man' we are predicating being a man of Socrates, i.e. a certain kind of substance. Again, when we say that 'Aristotle is in the Lyceum', we are predicating being in the Lyceum of Aristotle, i.e. a certain place, physical location. The ten predicables listed are the ten kinds of things that can be said of something. Now 'thing' is used here intentionally to convey the fact that Aristotle is, in the first place, talking about the world and not about language. It is being

in the Lyceum as such that is predicated or said of Aristotle, not the expression 'in the Lyceum' which is (if at all, and certainly in a different sense of 'said of') said of 'Aristotle' the name.
But 'thing' is used also to convey another fact about Aristotle's ten predicables, namely that the list involves a division into ten types or kinds of what can be variously called 'things', 'entities', 'existents' or 'beings'. Socrates is one kind of thing, a substance, and so is Aristotle; in-the-Lyceum is another kind of entity, a place or location; four-foot is a quantity; white is a quality; yesterday is a time; and so on. Aristotle, in drawing up a list of the ten different kinds of things predicable of something else, is drawing up a list of the ten different kinds of beings, entities, existents, or things. According to Aristotle we have to distinguish the categories of substance, place, time, quality, action and so on. Now where does Aristotle get all this from, and is he right? (...)
How on earth could Aristotle have come up with this classification of things in existence in terms of ten categories? Clearly he did not engage in an empirical investigation of the things around him and arrive at his result as he would at a classification of species of animals or plants. The answer has to be that, insofar as the list is the product of investigation it was investigation of our thought and talk about the things which Aristotle could find around him. One commentator on Aristotle's list suggests that it was arrived at by distinguishing different questions which may be asked about something and noticing that ... only a limited range of answers can be appropriately given to any particular question. An answer to 'where?' could not serve as an answer to 'when?'. Greek has, as we have not, single-word interrogatives meaning 'of what quality?' and 'of what quantity?' ... and these, too, would normally collect answers from different ranges. (*)
Something along these lines has to be right, since Aristotle could not have investigated reality directly, and that for at least two reasons. One is that reality is not something which itself lies beyond or prior to our thought and talk about it in a way that allows of independent perusal, since reality is for us the very thing which our thought and talk concerns. If that looks tautological, let it be: a more substantial claim needs greater argument than I can offer now. The second reason is that any

perusal of reality would need to rest upon a way of classifying what is discovered in it: are we going to list places and times, qualities and numbers, relations and events? Well, that depends on the categories involved in our thought and talk. It is the very result of category division in our thinking and talking that the world divides up as it does. A way of putting this point is in terms of perception. To perceive the world is not, as a naive Lockean might think, to passively notice what is there; it is to conceptualise and hence pigeonhole what is there. And categories are the broadest, most fundamental and most general of our pigeonholing devices." (pp. 2-4)

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(*) J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione,* Oxford: Oxford University Press 1963, p. 78.

From: Brian Carr, *Metaphysics. An introduction*, London: Macmillan 1987.

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Semantics and Ontological Analysis in Aristotle's *Categories*

INTRODUCTION

"The *Categories*, ascribed to Aristotle, has played a unique role in our tradition. It is the only philosophical treatise that has been the object of scholarly and philosophical attention continuously since the first century B.C., when people first began writing commentaries on classical philosophical texts. From early late antiquity until the early modern period, one would begin the study of Aristotle and the study of philosophy quite generally with the *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*. For several centuries, these two treaties, and the *De Interpretatione*, formed the core of the philosophical corpus which was still being seriously studied. Thus, it is hardly surprising that our received view of Aristotle -- whether we are aware of this in all its details or not -- was colored substantially by the *Categories*.
Already in late antiquity, however, doubts were raised about its authenticity, (1) though we know of no ancient scholar who, on the basis of such doubts, declared the treatise to be spurious. On the contrary, Ammonius claims that everyone agreed that it was authentic. (2) The writers of the Middle Ages and the scholastics of the early modern period seem to have had no doubt about the authenticity of the treatise; (3) presumably, they were relying mainly on the authority of Boethius. (4) It is tempting to suppose that this acceptance of the treatise by the scholastics is precisely what led Renaissance scholars like Luis Vives (5) and Francesco Patrizi (6) to raise doubts about this very foundation of both scholasticism and traditional logic, though they did not attempt

to provide any detailed arguments for their conclusion. It remained for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to examine the *Categories* critically with the aid of the new philology. And soon enough, there was an impressive roster of those staunchly maintaining that the treatise was not genuine. (7) Even H. Bonitz considered it to be of doubtful authenticity. (8) During the present century, opinion has again shifted in favor of the view that it is a genuine work of Aristotle's, though, to be sure, the doubts have not been entirely silenced. I. M. Bochenski, writing in 1947, thought the treatise of doubtful authenticity; (9) and in 1949, S. Mansion tried to argue against its authenticity. (10) Doubts especially about the second part, the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*, have never really ceased. (11)

Given the enormous influence this treatise has had on our view of Aristotle and on our interpretation of his writings, it seems extremely important to me to try, as far as possible, to lay these doubts to rest. Yet, I hope this investigation will also be of interest to those already firmly convinced that the *Categories* is a genuine work of Aristotle's; for it raises questions that interpreters of the treatise, in general, do not address and whose answers might well alter the standard view of this text.

The question of authenticity, however, turns out to be crucially linked to the question of unity. Given that it seems highly questionable whether the *Postpraedicamenta* were originally part of the treatise or were appended by a later editor, (12) it might seem as if the question regarding the authenticity of the treatise needs to be asked as two questions, viz., questions regarding the authenticity of the first and second part individually. Many authors have indeed taken this for granted and have thus assumed that the first part was authentic, the second either probably or certainly not. (13) Since, however, interest traditionally has focused almost exclusively on the first part of this treatise, we also find the tendency to regard the question of authenticity as primarily the question of the authenticity of the first part and so to leave the question of unity and the problem of the authenticity of the second part to more or less take care of themselves. Buhle already exhibits this tendency characteristic of many modern interpreters.(14) After having called attention to the apparent lack of connection between the *Postpraedicamenta*

and the *Praedicamenta* and after briefly remarking (without providing any specifics) that some things in the *Postpraedicamenta* do not mesh well with other aspects of Aristotle's thought, he writes: "sed fac esse postpraedicamenta spuria, non idem tamen de *Categoriis* statuendum est." It is obvious -- as long as the authenticity of the first part is secure, it does not much matter to Buhle whether or not one considers the second part genuine. Such an approach, however, is methodologically highly suspect because the questions of unity and of authenticity cannot be separated without both prejudging the issue of unity and presupposing a certain interpretation of the Categories, especially since the lack of unity itself has been taken as providing strong prima fade grounds for judging the treatise to be spurious. (15) Therefore, in what follows, I will pay particular attention to the question of unity. The dangerous tendency to consider this treatise almost exclusively with reference to the first part and thus to jeopardize the status of the second part is, of course, reinforced considerably by the title. Hence. I will also discuss the title in connection with the question of unity." (pp. 11-12)

Notes

(1) Olymp., *Prol*. 22, 38ff.; *Schol*. 33a 28ff.; Brandis.
(2) Ammon., *In Cat*. 13, 25.
(3) The question of authenticity is either not discussed at all (cf. Ockham, *Expositio aurea*, Bologna 1469, f. gii) or discussed only very superficially and mechanically (cf. De Soto, *Absolutissima commentaria*, Venice 1574, 247ff.; Complutenses, *Disputationes in Arist*. *dialecticam*, Leiden 1668, 160; Gennadios, *œuvres*, VII, 119, 9, Paris 1936).
(4) Cf. Peter Abailard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, 116; Conimbricenses, *In universam dialecticam*, Cologne 1607, c. 297.
(5) *De causis corrupt*., art. 99 (according to Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr*., vol. II, 109).
(6) Discuss. *Peripat*., vol. I, Basle 1581, 20.
(7) C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, 1, 90; C. Prantl, in: *Zeitschrift für die Altherthumswissenschaft* IV (1846) 641-652; L. Spengel, in: *Gelehrte Anzeigen* (Munchen), 1845, c. 33-56; V. Rose, *De*

Aristotelis librorum ord., 234ff.; A. Gercke, in: *Arch. f G. d. Ph.* 4 (1891) 424-441; E. Dupréel, in: *Arch. f. G. d. Ph.* 22 (1909) 230-251.
(8) Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles, in: *Sitzungsber. Wien* 1853, 593.
(9) *La logique de Théophraste*, 32.
(10) "La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le Traité des Catégories" in: *Proc. 10th Internat. Congr. of Philosophy*, Amsterdam 1949, 1097-1100; cf. also her earlier paper, "La première doctrine de la substance: la substance selon Aristote" in: *Rev. Philos. de Louvain* 44 (1946) 349- 360.
(11) I. Düring says only that the authenticity of the Postpraedicamenta is likely (*Aristoteles*, 55); D. Ross thought that the *Postpraedicamenta* were generally regarded as spurious (*Aristotle*, 24 n. 2).
(12) See J. G. Buhle, *Aristotelis Opera*, vol. I, 1791, 436; Ch. A. Brandis in: *Abh. Berlin* 1811, 268ff.; E. Zeller. *Philos. d. Gr.*, II 2 (4th edition), 1921, 67 n. 1; Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, IV, 514; Überweg-Praechter, 379; D. Ross, *Aristotle*, 10; L. M. De Rijk, *The Authenticity*, in: *Mnemosyne*. 4 (1951), 159; I. Düring. *R E Suppl*, XI, s v. Aristoteles, 205, 61; J. L. Ackrill, 70; V. Sainati, *Storia*, 151ff. Some ancient authors took this line (Olymp., *In cat.* 133, 14), especially Andronicus (Simpl., *In cat.* 379, 8ff.).
(13) E.g. J. G. Buhle, 436; E. Zeller, II 2 (4 ed.) 24, 1921, 67; H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik*, II 2, 292 n. We hear of this view being taken by some in antiquity (Ammon., *In cat.* 14, 18ff.; Olymp., *In cat.* 133, 14ff.). Whether Andronicus was among these, as is often claimed, is doubtful; at any rate, we never hear that he argued against the authenticity of the *Postpraedicamenta*; we would assume, if this had been the case, that he would be referred to by name when their authenticity was being discussed.
(14) J. G. Buhle, 436.
(15) O. Hamelin, *Le systeme d'Aristote*, 27 and 131.

From: Michael Frede, The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian *Categories*. In *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987, pp. 11-28.

"There is a theory called the theory of categories which in a more or less developed form, with minor or major modifications, made its appearance first in a large number of Aristotelian writings and then, under the influence of these writings, came to be a standard part of traditional logic, a place it maintained with more or less success into the early part of this century, when it met the same fate as certain other parts of traditional logic.

There are lots of questions one may ask about this theory. Presumably not the most interesting question, but certainly one for which one would want to have an answer if one took an interest in the theory at all, is the following: What are categories? It turns out that this is a rather large and difficult question. And hence I want to restrict myself to the narrower and more modest question, What are categories in Aristotle?, hoping that a clarification of this question ultimately will help to clarify the more general questions. But even this narrower question turns out to be so complicated and controversial that I will be content if I can shed some light on the simple questions: What does the word "category" mean in Aristotle? What does Aristotle have in mind when he talks of "categories"?

Presumably it is generally agreed that Aristotle's doctrine of categories involves the assumption that there is some scheme of classification such that all there is, all entities, can be divided into a limited number of ultimate classes. But there is no agreement as to the basis and nature of this classification, nor is there an agreement as to how the categories themselves are related to these classes of entities. There is a general tendency among commentators to talk as if the categories just were these classes, but there is also the view that, though for each category there is a corresponding ultimate class of entities, the categories themselves are not to be identified with these classes. And there are various ways in which it could be true that the categories only correspond to, but are not identical with, these classes of entities. It might, e.g., be the case that the categories are not classes of entities but rather classes of expressions of a certain kind, expressions which we--following tradition--may call "categorematic." On this interpretation these categorematic expressions signify the various entities we classify under such headings as "substance," "quality," or "quantity." And in this case

we have to ask whether the entities are classified according to a classification of the categorematic expressions by which they are signified, or whether, the other way round, the expressions are classified according to the classification of the entities they signify. Or it might be thought that the categories are classes of only some categorematic expressions, namely, those which can occur as predicate-expressions. Or it might be the case that the categories themselves are not classes at all, neither of entities nor of expressions, but rather headings or labels or predicates which collect, or apply to, either entities or expressions, i.e., the category itself, strictly speaking would be a term like "substance" or "substance word." Or it might be the case that categories are neither classes nor terms but concepts. All these views have had their ardent supporters." (pp. 1-2)

From: Michael Frede, Categories in Aristotle. In Dominc O'Meara (ed.), *Studies in Aristotle*, Washington: Catholic University Press 1981, pp. 1-25. (Reprinted in: M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 29-48).

"The precise position to be assigned to the Categories in the Aristotelian system has always been somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, they seem to be worked into the warp of its texture, as in the classification of change, and Aristotle can argue from the premiss that they constitute an exhaustive division of the kinds of Being (*A. Pst*. I 22, 83b15). On the other hand, both in the completed scheme of his logic and in his constructive metaphysic they retire into the background, giving place to other notions, such as causation, change, actuality and potentiality. Investigation, has, moreover, been hampered, especially in Germany, by attempts to correlate them with the Kantian Categories, with which they have obvious points of contact. But Kant's formal a priori concepts by which the mind makes for itself a world, to use Mr Bosanquet's phrase, imply an attitude to knowledge and reality so utterly opposed to the Aristotelian that the comparison has tended to confusion rather than elucidation. Scholars now realise better that the Aristotelian Categories can

only be understood in connexion with the problems of Aristotle's own age.

The best general account of the Categories known to me is that given by Maier, who accepts the interpretation of Apelt in its main lines, correcting it in some important points. (1) It is the great merit of Apelt to have firmly grasped the principle that, whatever the applications to which Aristotle put the scheme of the Categories, it is primarily connected with the use of linguistic thought to make assertions about reality and hence with the proposition, the judgment as expressed in language. In details, I think, he is misled by the associations of post-Kantian logic, which prevent him from entering fully into the attitude adopted by the early Greek logic towards the fact of assertion.

In view of the undoubted fact that the scheme of the Categories follows the lines of Socratic-Platonic thought, Gercke's suggestion (2) is tempting that it originated in the Academy. Gercke, whose own view of the Categories is strongly coloured by Kantianism, relies almost entirely on the greater point given to the arguments in the Ethics against the Idea of the Good if we suppose them to accuse Plato of inconsistency with his own doctrine of the Categories. Except as supplementing strong independent evidence an argument of this kind carries no weight. The case is certainly weakened if it can be shown that Aristotle uses the Categories to solve a philosophical problem in explicit opposition to the solution offered by the Academy. This can be done, I think. In *Meta*. XIV 2, 1088b18 he sets the Categories against Platonist doctrine. He is criticising the indefinite dyad, and traces the origin of this conception to 'their old-fashioned way of setting problems': the Platonists found it necessary to attack the Parmenidean dictum and establish the existence of 'what is not' (cf. Plato, *Sophist* 237A, 256D). But how will this account for the plurality of being (for being means sometimes substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, and at other times the other categories: 1089a7)? In the corresponding passage of the *Physics* (I 2, 184b15 sqq.) Aristotle solves the Parmenidean difficulty through the multiplicity of the Categories (186a25), and alludes to the inadequacy of the Academic solution (187a1).

The inference to be drawn from these passages, in conjunction with the chapter in the Ethics on which Gercke relies, is the

negative one that Plato and his successors in the Academy did not apply the scheme of the Categories to the fundamental philosophical questions of Being and Good. Positive evidence must be sought in another aspect of the doctrine. Now the *Topics* exhibits the Categories in intimate association with dialectical logic. The work itself purports to codify methods in regular use but not hitherto systematically treated. That these methods were employed in the Academy is amply attested by the Platonic dialogues. (3) Further, as the *Topics* and particularly the *Sophistici Elenchi* show, they were developed in close connexion with the eristic logic of Antisthenes and the Megarians. This fact at once establishes a contact with the treatment of the problem 'one thing, many names' in Plato's *Sophist* (251A). This difficulty was removed by drawing a distinction between different kinds of being, and Aristotle himself regards it as finally disposed of by the doctrine of the Categories. That some of the kinds of being included in the scheme were already recognised in the Academy is plain. In the *Topics* relatives have a number of their own *topoi* and the varieties of relatives enumerated in the Categories follow closely on the lines of division in the *Charmides*. (4) Much of the matter of the *Topics* must have been common to Academy and Lyceum. But this is not to say that the Categories as a complete and exhaustive scheme belonged to the Academy. Eudemus tells us that Plato solved the difficulties of Lycophron and others by a dual distinction of being.

I shall accordingly assume in what follows that the scheme of the Categories was evolved in the course of efforts to establish a doctrine of judgment which should settle the difficulties raised by Megarian and other critics; that the application to the solution of the larger metaphysical problems was a later development; that the foundations of the scheme were laid in the Socratic tradition of the Academy; that the completed scheme is probably Aristotle's own; and that the original working out of the scheme did not contemplate extension beyond the metaphysics implied in predication to the more fundamental metaphysics of the First Philosophy. Hence we must look to the analysis of empirical propositions for the origin of the scheme.

Now if we examine the scheme itself, we find three aspects of it to have special significance:

(a) The first is the distinction between accidental predication (*kata sumbebékos*) and essential predication (*kath' hauto*). (5) What is musical may be literate, but only 'in virtue of something else' (*kat' allo*), viz.: qua Callias; Callias is literate essentially (*kath' hauton*). This distinction provides the first condition of scientific predication, and is regarded as of fundamental importance by Aristotle, who prefaces his accounts of such notions as unity and being with references to the accidental uses of these terms (*Meta*. V 6, 1015b16; 7, 1017a7).
(b) Closely connected with the previous distinction is the doctrine that all the Categories (including substance as predicate) imply a subject (*hupokeimenon*), which is the point of real connexion between the predicates, and provides the basis of their coexistence. The Categories classify the many 'names' which we apply to the individual (e.g. a man, *Sophist*251A), and give expression to the fact that he does not lose his unity in the process.
(c) Furthermore, all direct relations of implication and incompatibility lie within the Categories severally. They are, so to say, independent variables. The relation of genus to species is everywhere confined within the limits of a category and so is the relation of contrary opposition. This suggests a close connexion with the Platonic division, which, as we know from the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* and from Aristotle, was so prominent in the Platonic conception of scientific method." (pp. 75-77)

Notes

(1) Heinrich Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles,* 3 volumes, Tübingen, 1896-1900, vol. II, pp. 277 ff.; Otto Apelt, *Beitrage zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie,* Leipzig, 1891, pp. 106 ff.
(2) Alfred Gercke, Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorien, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 4, 1891, pp. 424 ff.
(3) Analysis of the arguments in the *Charmides* shows that nearly all make use of *topoi* dealt with by Aristotle in the *Topics*.
(4) Cf. with *Cat*. 6a36 sqq., *Charmides*, 168A. The list in *Rep*. 437B is the same and in the same order.
(5) See the distinction of 'being *kata sumbébekos*' and 'being *kath' hauto*' (*Meta*. V 7, 1017a7 ff.). Apelt's equation of 'being

kath' hauto' with 'being said in virtue of no combination' (op. cit. 117) is manifestly wrong. *Kath' ho* or *kath' hauto* means that the determination attaches to the subject in respect of the subject itself and not in respect of the determination. See *kath' ho* and *kath' hauto*, *Meta*. V 18, 1022a14 ff.
Charles Melville Gillespie, *The Aristotelian Categories*, The Classical Quarterly 19, 1925, pp. 79-84. Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle* - Vol. 3, *Metaphysics,* London: Duckworth, 1979, pp. 1-12

THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE CATEGORIES

"The little treatise of Aristotle which stands at the head of the Organon has caused a great deal of difficulty to students, both ancient and modern. The bulk of the discussion has centred about the question of its place in the Organon and in Aristotle's system, and the character of the ten categories to which the greater part of the book is devoted. But there have been found also critics who expressed a doubt as to the authenticity of all or part of the treatise in question. To say nothing of the ancient commentators of Aristotle, the earliest attempt in modern times to cast a doubt on the genuineness of the work seems to be that of Spengel in *Münchener Gelehrte Anzeigen* (Vol. XX [1845], No. 5, pp. 41 sq.). He was followed by Prantl in *Zeitschrift für Altertumswissenschaft* (1846, p. 646), and in his *Geschichte der Logik* (I, p. go, n. 5), also by Valentinus Rose in *De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate* (p. 234 et seq.). Zeller, on the other hand (*Philosophie den Griechen*, 2nd ed., II, pt. a, p. 67, n. 1), decides in favour of the genuineness of the first part of the work, the *Categories* proper, and against the so--called *Postpredicamenta* from Chapter X to the end.
(...)
When we pass over to matters of doctrine, it si surprising how many points of contact there are between the two works

[*Categories* and *Topics*]. I shall follow the *Categories* and point out the parallels in the *Topics*.
The homonyms, which are given a definition and an illustration in the beginning of the *Categories*, have a whole chapter devoted to them in the *Topics*, the fifteenth of the first book, where they are also called *pollachos legomena*. Of particular significance is 107a 18-20, for in 20 we seem to have a direct allusion to the definition in the *Categories*. We must see, Aristotle says, if the genera designated by the given name are different and not subordinate to one another, (...) (which is therefore a homonym), for the definition of these genera as connected by the name is different (...). The greater space given to homonyms in the *Topics* is not due so much to a development in doctrine as to the necessities of the subject. The object of the *Topics* is a purely practical one, to provide the disputant with ready arguments properly pigeon-holed, and a single general definition of homonyms is not adapted to such use. We must needs go farther and show in what different special ways homonyms can be detected. The *Categories* have more the appearance of materials gathered in the shape of preliminary definitions of necessary concepts.
Synonyms are referred to in the *Topics* 109b 7, 123a 27, 127b 5, 148a 24, and 162b 37. Of these, the first is the most important, since it states that the genera are predicated synonymously of their species; *for the latter admit both the name and the definition of the former* (...), assuming it as established that this condition constitutes synonymity. This is neither more nor less than a silent reference to the definition in the *Categories* (1a 6) [When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called *synonymous*]. Moreover we have almost the very words of the *Topics* in another place in the *Categories*, 3b 2, [And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.] 148a 24 also gives the same definition of synonyms merely in passing. Aristotle is dealing with the definition, and makes a statement that if the opponent makes use of one definition for homonyms it cannot be a correct definition, for it is synonyms and not homonyms that

have one definition connoted by the name (...). He speaks of the definition as already known. (...).
Paronyms also are made use of in the *Topics*, 109b 3-12, in a way which shows the definition in the *Categories* is not purely grammatical, as it may seem at first sight, but has a logical significance quite as important as that of the former two. Paronymous predication is predication *per accidens*, as contrasted with synonymous, which may be *per se* (cf. also Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p.27 et seq. and 30). Here also paronyms are not defined. It is assumed that the reader knows what they are. (...)
Categories 3, p. 1b 10-15 expresses very much the same thought as *Topics* IV, 1, p. 121a 20-6. The former states that whatever is true of the species is true of the individuals under the species (...), the latter that to whatever the species applies the genus does also (...). They both involve the logical hierarchy of genus, species and individual, and the two principles are: (1) The genus applies not only to the species but also to the individual ; (2) to the individual belongs not only the species but also the genus. What is especially important to notice is that, in the *Topics*, the principle is stated as already known and is applied to the particular case, thus assuming the existence of another treatise where these principles are stated and proved for the first time.
The treatment of the difference develops gradually in the *Topics* in the following passages: 107b 19 sq., 144b 12 sq., and 153b 6. The first of these is word for word the same with the statement in the *Categories,* 1b 16 sq., and they were both quoted above. Moreover the way in which the passage in the *Topics* is introduced, (...) makes it a direct reference to the *Categories*. Aristotle's doctrine concerning the difference so far is that of different genera which are not subordinated one to the other: the differences are different in species. In the second passage quoted above, 144b 12, Aristotle corrects this view by adding that the differences in the given case need not be different unless the different genera cannot be put under a common higher genus. In the third passage, 153b 6, Aristotle adds some more qualifications which make it clear that in the preceding statements the word *etéron*, in the phrase *etéron ghenon*, must be understood as including contrary genera (*enantía*). For there the case is

different. If the contrary genera belong to higher contrary genera, their differences may be all the same.
The preceding examination seems to show very clearly that the *Topics* build upon the basis laid down in the *Categories* and carry the structure higher and broader. It would be a very absurd alternative to suppose that a later writer, making use of the *Topics*, found nothing else on the subject of logical difference than the first passage, which he copied verbatim in his treatise, where,' besides, it has no particular reason for existence. As a thought tentatively suggested, with the view of further elaboration and insertion as a proper link in a chain, the passage in the *Categories* assumes a different meaning, and its lack of connection with the preceding and following ceases to cause us serious difficulty.
If the view of the *Categories* taken here is justified by the preceding arguments and by what is still to come, it might even be a legitimate procedure to make use of the *Topics* in determining a disputed reading in the *Categories*. And we have one at hand in the passage quoted above on the difference." (pp. 97-103)

From: Isaac Husik, *The Categories of Aristotle,* in: Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss (eds.), *Philosophical Essays, Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, pp. 96-112. (Greek text of the citations omitted).

The recent critical edition by Richard Bodéüs (Aristote. [*Catégories*], Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001) contains a detailed *status questionis* on the problem of authenticity at pp. XC-CX.

The conclusion is: "Malgré ses doutes sur l'authenticité de l'ouvrage, l'éditeur, nous semble-t-il, reste donc autorisé à imprimer celui-ci sous l'autorité traditionnelle d'Aristote." p. CX. (Despite his doubts about the authenticity of the book, the editor, seems to us, remains authorized to print it under the traditional authority of Aristotle.)

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   Translated with notes and glossary by John Lloyd Ackrill.
   Contents: Translations. *Categories* 3; *De Interpretatione* 43; Notes. Introductory Note 69; *Categories* 71; *De Interpretatione* 113; Note on Further Reading 156; Glossary 159; Index of Subjects 161-162.
   Chapter I-V are reprinted in: J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), *Aristotle. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City (NY): Doubleday, pp. 3-12 (translation) and 71-91 (notes).
   "The *Categories* divides into three parts. Chapters 1-3 make certain preliminary points and explanations. Chapters 4-9 treat of the doctrine of categories and discuss some categories at length. Chapters 10-15 deal with a variety of topics, such as opposites, priority, and change.
   The second part fades out in Chapter 9, and the passage serving as a transition to the third part (11b10-16) is certainly not genuine Aristotle. The third part itself (the *Postpraedicamenta*) has only a loose connexion with what precedes. There is no reason to doubt its authenticity, but probably it was not a part of the original *Categories* but was tacked on by an editor.
   The concept of categories plays an important part in many of Aristotle's works, specially the *Metaphysics*. But it undergoes developments and refinements as Aristotle's

thought develops. So the study of the *Categories* is only a first step in an investigation of Aristotle's ideas about categories." (pp. 69-70)

2. ———. 1972. "Aristotle on "Good" and the Categories." In *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday*, edited by Stern, S.M., Hourani, Albert and Brown, Vivian, 17-25. London: Bruno Cassirer
"in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6. 1096a23-29 Aristotle argues that goodness is not a single common universal: if it were it would be "said" in only one category, whereas in fact it is, like *being*, "said" in all the categories.
Aristotle discusses in many places the transcategorial character of ον and of εν, but most of his accounts of types of goodness or senses of "good" do not rest upon the point about categories — a point which is, however, taken up in the traditional treatment of *bonum* along with *ens* and *unum* as categorially unclassifiable. The *Ethics* passage is therefore of considerable interest, and it has not, I think, received sufficient attention or final elucidation from the commentators. The present discussion will be far from exhaustive, but it may raise some questions worth further examination." (p. 17)
3. Allen, Reginald E. 1969. "Individual Properties in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 14:31-39
"At Categories 1 a 23-29, (1) Aristotle marks off a set of items which are present in but not predicable of a subject. Thus, for example, a certain knowledge of grammar (ἡ τις γραμματική) is present in a subject, the soul, and a certain white (το τι λευκόν) present in a subject, the body; but neither is predicable of a subject." (p. 31)
(...)
What is present in a subject as individual and one in number is incapable of existing apart from the particular subject it is in; for at 1 a 24-25, Aristotle defines presence as follows: "By present in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, but as incapable of existing separately from what it is in." It would seem to follow from

this that an item present in an individual subject is itself individual, and numerically distinct from items present in other individual subjects.
Suppose this is so. Then if there are two pieces of chalk, A and B, and if they are of the same determinate shade of color, say, white, there will be a particular instance of white in A and a particular instance of white in B. Call those instances respectively s and t. Then s and t are the same in that they are instances of the same shade of color.
But they are different in that they are themselves numerically different individuals, and this difference is to be explained by the fact that they are present in numerically different subjects: s is the white of A, and t is the white of B. Thus s and t are different members of the same species, the given shade of white, in a way precisely analogous to the way in in which A and B are members of the same species, chalk. This situation will obtain generally in categories other than substance; that is, it will obtain, not only for qualities such as colors, but for sizes, shapes, places, times, and so on for any items present in but not predicable of a subject.
At least in outline, the foregoing interpretation of particular properties in the *Categories* has been widely accepted.4 But it has recently been challenged by Professor Owen.(5)" (p. 32)
(...)
"Professor Owen's interpretation has the virtue of simplifying the ontology of the *Categories* by doing away with the cloud of particulars that most readers have found in categories other than substance. A world which can dispense with these extraneous particulars is a neater, and therefore a better world than one which cannot: *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*. Supposing that Professor Owen's interpretation is mistaken, it remains worth asking why Aristotle should have been led to multiply particulars with so lavish a hand." (p. 38)
(1) 1 Line numbers cited from the Oxford text of L. Minio-Paluello.
See, for example: W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London, 1923, p. 24, n. 1; G. E. M. Anscombe, *Three Philosophers*, Oxford, 1963,

pp. 8-10; J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., [*Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford, 1963] pp. 74-75; K. von Fritz, Phronesis ii (1958), pp. 72-3.
6 G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence", *Phronesis* x (1965), pp. 97-105.

4. ———. 1973. "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:362-373
Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos,* Assen: Van Gorcum.
Abstract: "It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. And as for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Similarly, animal also is said of the individual man as subject but animal is not in the individual man. Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. But the definition of the secondary substance, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the individual man, and also that of animal. No substance, therefore, is in a subject.(1)"
(1) *Categories* 3a7-21, of. 2al9-34, la20-22, trans. J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963). I should like to acknowledge my debt in what follows to Professor Ackrill's admirable translation and notes; textual references to the *Categories* are to the edition of L. Minio-Paluello.

5. Angelelli, Ignacio. 1967. *Studies in Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Reidel
On Aristotle's *Categories* see: 1. Ontology 9; 1.1 Contemporary logic and ontology 10; 1.2 The ontological square (*Categoriae*, 1a, 20-1b, 10) 11; 1.3 Universal-singular, substance-accident in other works of Aristotle 15; 1.4

Universal-singular, substance-accident in the philosophical tradition 16; 1.41 Middle Ages and Renaissance 16; 1.42 Descartes, Port-Royal, Locke, Reid 18; 1.43 Leibniz-Russell 19; 1.44 'Parallelism' of singular-universal, substance-accident 21; 1.45 Husserl. Pseudo-properties of properties: Carnap, Ingarden, F. Kaufmann 22; 1.46 Frege 24; References 26-36.
"The ontological square ('*Categoriae*', 1a, 20-1b, 10).
This passage of *Categoriae* is traditionally understood as making a distinction between universal substances, particular substances, universal accidents and particular accidents. The history of commentaries on the *Organon* provides an extensive number of paraphrases and presentations of this text. Boethius' text and other ancient commentators illustrate our, quoted passage by means of a diagram similar to ours above: a square in each of whose vertices one of the four classes of entities is located. The Aristotelian text explicitly states that this is a classification of entities, but it is of course contrary to traditional Aristotelianism to call universals entities *simpliciter*. In fact, Ioannes a Sancto Thoma elegantly modifies the formulation(17). Still, universals do enjoy an objective being, and *ens rationis* falls under *ens communissime sumptum*.
The classification of entities into four classes is achieved by means of two relations: to be in a subject and to be said of a subject." (pp. 12-13)
(17) Ioannes a Sto. Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus. Tomus primus* (ed. Reiser), Marietti, Torino 1930, p. 476: "Atque ita in hoc tertio antepraedicamento distinguit Aristoteles duplex genus entium, scilicet substantiam et accidens, et duplex genus intentionum, scilicet universalitatis et singularitatis."

6. Annas, Julia. 1974. "Individuals in Aristotle's *Categories*: Two Queries." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:146-152
"Mr. Barrington Jones, in his recent article in *Phronesis*,(1) has suggested a new way of solving the standing debate about the nature of non-substance individuals in the

Categories. Mr. Jones' article suggests some exciting new approaches to the *Categories*, but I would like to put forward two difficulties I find with the way he proposes to cut through the main problem.
In the *Categories*, but nowhere else, there seem to be individuals in non-substance categories, corresponding to primary substances. What sort of thing are these non-substance individuals? According to Ackrill (2) they are non-repeatable individual instances of (for example) a property. An example would be the particular instance of white exhibited by this paper: it is peculiar to this piece of paper and will perish when it does. According to Owen (3) they are the most specific types of (for example) a property. The white exhibited by this piece of paper and all the paper in the same batch would be an example: it can continue to exist when this piece of paper perishes, as long as some other piece of paper from the batch continues to exhibit it.
I shall not go into the controversy that has arisen over these differing interpretations of Aristotle. I have the more limited objective of examining the way Jones proposes to restate the terms of the debate.
If Jones is right the alternatives just sketched represent a false dichotomy: the new solution supersedes them both. It is merely the proffered new solution that is my concern." (p. 146)
(1) "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories", *Phronesis* XVII (1972) 107-123.
(2) In his notes on the *Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford 1963.
(3) "Inherence", *Phronesis* X (1965) 97-105.

7. Anscombe, Elizabeth G. M. 1961. "Aristotle: The Search for Substance." In *Three Philosophers*, edited by Anscombe, Elizabeth G. M. and Geach, Peter Thomas, 1-63. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Contents: Analytical Table of Contents VI-XX; G. E. M. Anscombe: Aristotle: The Search for Substance 1; P. T. Geach: Aquinas 65; P. T. Geach: Frege 127-162.
"The doctrine of his *Categories* is very straightforward. First substance is introduced, and explained in the first place as

what neither is asserted of nor exists in a subject: the examples offered are ' such-and-such a man ‘ such-and-such a horse ’. A ' first substance ’ then is what is designated by a proper name such as the name of a man or of a horse, or again, if one cared to give it a proper name, of a cabbage. .A proper name is never, *qua* proper name, a predicate. Thus what a proper name stands for is not asserted of a subject. Aristotle explains the second point, that first substance does not exist in a subject, by giving as an example of what is ' in ' a subject: ‘ such-and-such grammarianship. He means that an individual occurrence of grammatical science, such as a particular man’s knowledge of grammar, while not being asserted of a subject, exists in a subject. The example is slightly obscure to us; ' such-and-such a surface ' would perhaps be a better one. If we think of a particular surface, such as the surface of my wedding ring, this is not something that is asserted of a subject, but it exists in a subject—namely, the ring. (He explains that when he speaks of things being in a subject, he is not speaking of parts, such as arms and legs which are parts of a man.) Thus, we can see that when he speaks of ‘ first substance ’ Aristotle is talking about what modern philosophers discuss under the name ' particulars ’ or ‘ individuals ’. But his doctrine has features not found in modern treatments. The most notable of these are, first the distinction we have just noticed between individuals that do, and individuals, or particulars, that do not, exist in subjects (though Aristotle rarely calls what exists in something else an individual, using that term mostly for substances); and second, that he speaks of ' first substance ' and ' second substance '. Second substances, he says, are the kinds to which belong the first substances, such as man, horse, cabbage.

It will help us to understand this if we remember, and see the mistake in, Locke’s doctrine that there is no ‘ nominal essence ’ of individuals. Locke said that if you take a proper name, ‘A’, you can only discover whether A is, say, a man or again a cassowary, by looking to see if A has the properties of man or a cassowary. This presupposes that, having grasped the assignment of the proper name ‘A you can know

when to use it again, without its being already determined whether ‘A’ is the proper name of, say, a man, or a cassowary: as if there were such a thing as being the same without being the same such-and-such. This is clearly false. Aristotle’s ‘ second substance ’ is indicated by the predicate, whatever it is, say ‘ X that is so associated with the proper name of an individual that the proper name has the same reference when it is used to refer to the same X: with the restriction that the individual is not such as to exist in a subject, like an individual surface." (pp. 7-8)

8. Anton, John Peter. 1957. *Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Contents: Preface VII; Acknowledgments IX; Chapter I. Approaching Aristotle 1; Chapter II: The Ontological foundations of Contrariety and Its Relation to Substance as Nature 19; Chapter III. From the Cosmological to the Ontological Use of the Principle of Contrariety 32; Chapter IV. Contrariety in the Locus of Process and in the Categories 49; Chapter V. The Prime Contrariety and the Ontological Analysis of Determinate or Linear Processes 69; Chapter VI. Contrariety in the Theory of Opposition in Language as as the Foundation for the Law of Non-Contradiction 85; Chapter VII. Process and the Principle of Soul 104; Chapter VIII. Being and the Range of Knowledge 136; Chapter IX. Contrariety and the Range of Conduct 171; Epilogue 200; Appendix 203; Bibliography 242; Index of Subjects; 247; Index of Names 253-253.
Preface: "The present volume is the result of several years of research in ancient philosophy. It began with the main purpose of elucidating the theme of contrariety and the role it played in the Aristotelian treatises. But the many vexing problems which made their appearance as my inquiry progressed led me to extend my studies of this theme and look into its pre-Aristotelian history. A number of valuable ideas came to light as a result of the investigations into the concept of contrariety and its place in the various types of philosophical thinking from the early pre-Socratics down to Aristotle. This work in no wise claims to be an exhaustive study of contrariety in all ancient Greek thought, for a task

of this kind would doubtlessly require the space of many volumes. The bulk of this work is centred around the philosophy of Aristotle with whom the principle of contrariety received, I believe, its most clear and classical formulation. The discussion on the pre-Aristotelian uses of this principle is so designed as to throw only what historical light was required for the full appreciation of the main theme. At the same time I have tried to avoid doing injustice to Aristotle's predecessors by paying as close attention as possible to their own original writings, fragmentary as they are."

"The very fact that contrariety is necessarily joined with process, change, and development imposes the demand that it cannot occur in all the categories. Thus, contrariety is present only in those genera of categoriae which imply *change*: (35) *substance, quantity, quality*, and *place*. Within each of these four categories, there are two distinguishable *termini* which form the extremities of a distinct and inclusive categorical contrariety: (36) (1) in substance it is form-privation; (2) in quantity it is completeness-incompleteness; 3) in place it is up-down; and (4) in quality it presents no exhaustive general extremities; instead it yields a variety of contrarieties, such as white-black, hot-cold, (37) etc.

Each categorical contrariety when developmentally conceived stands for two directions or types of change characteristic of each category, as subsequent analysis will show." (p. 61)

(36) *Phys*. 201a 3-9; *Phys*. I, ch. 6, 189a 13.

(37) The qualitative pairs of contraries were hypostatized by Anaxagoras, who made them the ultimate constituents of the universe. See Diels, *Die Frag. der Vors.*. (Anaxagoras), B 6; B 12.

9. ———. 1968. "The Aristotelian Doctrine of 'Homonyma' in the *Categories* and Its Platonic Antecedents." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 6:315-326

   Reprinted as Chapter 4 in: J. P. Anton, *Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes,* Oakdale, N.Y.: Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 87-114.

"The Aristotelian doctrine of *homonyma* is of particular historical interest at least for the following reasons: (1) It appears that the meaning of *homonyma* was seriously debated in Aristotle's times and that his own formulation was but one among many others. Evidently, there were other platonizing thinkers in the Academy who had formulated their own variants. According to ancient testimonies, the definition which Speusippus propounded proved to be quite influential in later times.(2) The fact that Aristotle chose to open the *Categories* with a discussion, brief as it is, on the meaning of *homonyma*, *synonyma*, and *paronyma*, attests to the significance he attached to this preliminary chapter. Furthermore, there is general agreement among all the commentators on the relevance of the first chapter of the *Categories* to the doctrine of the categories. (3) The corpus affords ample internal evidence that the doctrine of *homonyma* figures largely in Aristotle's various discussions on the nature of first principles and his method of metaphysical analysis. This being the case, it is clear that Aristotle considered this part of his logical theory to have applications beyond the limited scope of what is said in the *Categories*.

Since we do not know the actual order of Aristotle's writings it is next to the impossible to decide which formulation came first. It remains a fact that Aristotle discusses cases of *homonyma* and their causes as early as the *Sophistici Elenchi*. Special mention of the cause of *homonyma* is made in the very first chapter of this work. Wc find it again in the *Topics*, *de Interpretatione*, the *Analytics* and the other logical treatises. He opens the *Sophistici Elenchi* with a general distinction between genuine and apparent reasonings and refutations, and then proceeds to explain why some refutations fail to reach their goal, that is, establish the contradictory of the given conclusion.(3)" (pp. 87-88)

(2) See *De Speusippi Academici scriptis*, ed. P. Lang (Bonn, 1911), frag, 32. Simplicius comments that Speusippus defended this formulation and remarks that once the definition is granted, it could be shown that *homonyma* are

also *synonyma*, and vice versa (*In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, *Commentaria in Aristotelis Graeca*, VIII [Berlin, 1907] 29, 5-6).
(3) "It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and, therefore, we oppose that what follows in the names, follows in the things as well, just as people who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly just as, in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating theirs counters are taken in by the experts, in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real" (165a 5-20, Oxford trans.).

10. ———. 1968. "The Meaning of 'Ο λόγοσ τῆς οὐσίας in *Categories* 1a." *The Monist* no. 52:252-267
Reprinted as Chapter 3 in: J. P. Anton, *Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes,* Oakdale, N.Y.: Dowling College Press, 1996, 61-85.
"The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the meaning of the troublesome Aristotelian expression ὁ λόγοσ τῆς οὐσίας; as it occurs at the very opening of *Categories* 1a 1-2, 7. That the passage has presented serious difficulties to commentators and translators alike can be easily ascertained through a survey and comparison of the relevant literature. It would seem from the disagreements among translators that the passage is either vague in the original Greek or that Aristotle did not have a special doctrine to put across at the very opening such that would require technical formulations that would comply with the ontology presented in this treatise.
The main body of this paper is given to an examination of the diverse difficulties the passage raises in connection with

the doctrine of *homonymy* and the ontology which supports it. On the basis of this analysis, and after consideration of the available evidence, textual and historical, attention is given to the possibility of proving the thesis that ὁ λόγοσ τῆς οὐσίας; (hereafter abbreviated as *L of O*, L for *logos* and O for *ousia*) has is special doctrinal meaning and is, therefore, free from terminological imprecision. Accordingly, the interpretation defended in this paper advocates a definite reading for *logos* and for *ousia*, and one that forbids a strict identification of *ousia* with the variant meaning of *tode ti* (individual existents or particular substances),(2) let alone taking liberties with the notion so that it may include in its denotation the *symbebetkota* (accidental properties). More pointedly, an argument is presented in favor of interpreting *ousia* to mean substance in the sense of species, on the ground that only in this sense is *ousia* definable.(3)
The thesis that the expression *L of O* has a precise and technical meaning can be put as follows: if we admit that *ousia* can occur as both subject and predicate, and that as ultimate subject it denotes individual substances whereas as predicate it ranges in denotation from *infima species* to *summa genera*, it can be shown that Aristotle means to say in this context that *ousia* must be understood in the sense of being (a) definable and (b) predicable. If so, then, it can only mean secondary substance, with the added restriction that the highest genera be excluded on account of their undefinability. The context of the first chapter is unmistakably one in which *homonymy* is presented and explained as a topic highly requisite to the exposition of the ontology that undergirds the general doctrine presented in the *Categories*." (pp. 61-62)
(2) *Cat*. 3b 10; P*ost*. *An*. 73b 7, 87b 29.
(3) For *infima species*, *Post*. *An*. esp. *passim*; 73a 32. It must be remembered that unless *ousia* means species, *infima* or otherwise, it cannot be defined. *Post*. *An*. 83b 5.

11. ———. 1975. "Some Observations on Aristotle's Theory of Categories." *Diotima.Epitheoresis Philosophikes Ereunes* no. 3:66-81

Reprinted as Chapter 6 in: J. P. Anton, *Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes,* Oakdale, N.Y.: Dowling College Press, 1996, 153-174.
"This paper deals with what seems to be a rather small topic but one, as I hope to show, which has significant implications. At many interpreters before me have said, the treatise titled *Categories* brings together certain basic logical and ontological views of Aristotle. I find myself in agreement with this interpretation but I take it a step further to say that the treatise contains enough evidence to support the view that Aristotle intended and in fact did make a basic distinction between a theory of being and a theory of categories, and even more sharply than has been hitherto recognized.
I will argue that this distinction has been largely overlooked and even ignored by every major interpreter of Aristotle, with the subsequent result that these two basic doctrines as presented in the *Categories*, instead of being kept apart, have been treated as identical theories. One of the most serious consequences of the tendency to collapse the meanings of the key terms “being” and “category” is not so much that they have been used interchangeably, but more importantly, that their fusion obscures our understanding of that treatise. I propose to show that Aristotle's intent was to correlate the ultimate genera of being, *ta gene tou ontos*, and the logically fundamental modes of predication, *ta schemata tes kategorias*. I do not contend that scholars have been remiss to notice the fact that Aristotle has a theory which deals with these modes of predication but only that they have been misled by the prevailing tendency to overlook the difference between the two concepts, “being” and “category.” (pp. 153-154)

12. ———. 1990. "The Unity of Scientific Inquiry and Categorial Theory in Aristotle." In *Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science*, edited by Nicolacopoulos, Pantelis, 29-43. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"The concept of the unity of the sciences as interrelated domains ofinquiry, aside from its recent setting, had also an Aristotelian setting in antiquity. Its usefulness in the latter

period was not to serve as the logical basis to build a system of systems. Although there is much to recommend it as a solution to the communication of 'public' knowledge, it also seems to have functioned as the basis for the continuity between being and the perception of being, between fact and value. There is more to the concept of the unity of the scientific inquiries than the sharing of methodological principles; for instance, the pervasive axioms and the requirement for special theses and hypotheses, as Aristotelian terminology would have it in the concluding chapters of the *Posterior Analytics*, Book II. There is also the model of the ordered facts, i.e. the conceptual determination of the ultimate facts within a type of subjectmatter: the Aristotelian model of wholes qua *ousiai*, which constitute the ontological counterparts of the proper subjects of statements. These ontic wholes are the ultimate loci of the fundamental properties of typical facts, they are the irreducible wholes of parts. Thus the articulation of the mode of attribution of properties of facts to the facts as wholes, i.e. the connecting the symbebekota (co-incidentals) to their *ousiai*, is the function of scientific predication. Language, when it is canonical discourse covering the full span of all subject-matters, serves us well, both in announcing encountered facts and attributing propertiesto facts. Given that universal and near-universal statements can be made in each of the sciences, the explanation of phenomena, the securing of a conclusion in any demonstrative syllogism, is tied to the quest for middle terms, itself in line with the model of wholes and the rules of categorial theory." (p. 29)

13. ———. 1992. "On the Meaning of *kategoria* in Aristotle's *Categories*." In *Aristotle's Ontology*, edited by Preus, Anthony and Anton, John Peter, 3-18. Albany: State University of New York Press
Reprinted as Chapter 7 in: J. P. Anton, *Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes,* Oakdale, N.Y.: Dowling College Press, 1996, 175-201.
"In a paper written in 1974 and subsequently published in 1975, (1) I argued that the Aristotelian texts, particularly

that of the *Categories,* allow for a parallel yet distinct interpretation to the traditional and prevalent one that takes the categories to be terms, ultimate classes, types, and concepts. (2) My position there was that the primary use of *kategoria* refers to well-formed statements made according to canons and, to be more precise, to fundamental types of predication conforming to rules sustained by the ways of beings.

In trying to decide how Aristotle uses the term *kategoria* in the treatise that bears the same name, *Categories,* (3) provision must be made for the fact that there is nothing in the text to justify the meanings that ancient commentators and also modern writers assigned to it and that found their way both into translations of Aristotle's works and into the corpus of established terminology. (4) The present article is written in the hope that it will contribute in some small measure to understanding why certain distinctions in the treatise *Categories* should have prevented interpreters from assigning the traditional meaning of "genera of being" to the term *category,* hence giving it the meaning of "highest predicate" rather than "fundamental type of predication"."

(p. 175)

(1) Anton 1975, 67-81.

(2) The paper published here was presented at the December 28, 1983, meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Boston, MA.

(3) The title of the treatise was a subject of considerable dispute in antiquity. For a recent survey on this problem see M. Frede 1987b, 11- 28. According to Frede "the question of authenticity is crucially linked to the question of unity" (12). The problem of the unity covers the relation of the early part of the treatise to the part that discusses the postpredicamenta.

(4) There are many surveys of interpretations concerning the categories. I do not plan to offer another survey, for my main interest lies in the investigation into what we can learn about the theory of categories in the *Categories*. Nor am I concerned with reproducing and commenting on the table of enumeration of the "categories" in Aristotle's works. The

list can be readily found in Apelt 1891, conveniently reproduced in Elders 1961, 194-96. One can still raise the question about the intent of the list or lists. If a defense of objections can be made to the reading that makes the list of "categories" refer to classes of being, then we have an alternative before us, which has not been adequately explored, namely whether the list refers not to classes of being or classes of predicates, but to the types of statements that pertain to the attribution of genuine features present in the entity named in the subject position. It is the existence of the concrete individual qua subject that sets the context for the selective lists of relevant types of attribution.

14. ———. 1996. *Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes*. Oakdale: Dowling College Press
Table of Contents: 1. Introduction 7; 2. Aristotle's Principle of Contradiction: Its Ontological Foundations and Platonic Antecedents (1972) 35; 3. The Meaning of *o Logos tes Ousias* in *Categories* 1a (1968) 61; 4. The Aristotelian Doctrine of *Homonyma* (1968) 87; 5. Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's *Homonyma* (1969) 115; 6. Observations on Aristotle's Theory of Categories (1975) 153; 7. On the Meaning of *Kategoria* in Aristotle's *Categories* (1992) 175; 8. Aristotle's Theory of Categories and Post-Classical Ontologies (1981) 203; 9. The Unity of Scientific Inquiry: The Scope of *Ousia* (1989) 215; 10. Revolutions and Reforms (1988) 237; 11. *Politeia* and *Paideia:* The Structure of Constitutions (1988) 249; 12. Aristotle on Justice and Equity (1989) 279; 13. Ideal Values and Cultural Action (1991) 293; 14. Timely Observations on Aristotle's Architectonic of *Politike Techne* (1994) 307; Bibliography 325; Index 333; About the Author 337-338.

15. Asztalos, Monika. 2014. "Qualities in Aristotle's Categories." In *PARADEIGMATA. Studies in Honour of Øivind Andersen*, edited by Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar, Maravela, Anastasia and Skoie, Mathilde, 155-161. Athens: The Norwegian Institute at Athens
"It is commonly taken for granted that Aristotle's main concern in *Categories* is to propose a classification in which each thing occupies one, and only one, place in a hierarchy

consisting of genera that are divisible into species. Any passage in this work that seems to contradict this assumption is considered perplexing or even taken as evidence of 'a weakness in the foundations of Aristotle's theory of categories'.(1) So strong is this belief that the authenticity of 11a20–38, which comes at the end of the discussion of qualities in chapter 8, has been doubted.(2) The purpose of this contribution is to show that there is indeed a weakness, not, however, in Aristotle's theory but in the commonly held assumptions about it. A full investigation of all problems involved and of previous research requires much more space than is available on this occasion.

Thus, my main focus will be on chapter 8, and I will refer to the translation and commentary by J. L. Ackrill, a work that has been, and still is, hugely influential on determining how *Categories* is understood.(3)" (p. 155)

(1) This is the verdict of Ackrill 1963, 109.

(2) One important instance is in Frede 1987, 13.

(3) Günther Patzig's appreciation has in all likelihood contributed to the influence: 'Als eine Erklärung des Textes, die auch Sachfragen erörtet, hat Ackrill's knappes Buch einen neuen Standard für die Interpretation antiker philosophischer Text gesetzt.' Patzig 1996, 105.

References

Ackrill, John L. (1963) *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*. Translated with Notes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Frede, Michael. (1987) 'The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories'. In *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, 11–28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Patzig, Günther. (1996) 'Bemerkungen zu den 'Kategorien' des Aristoteles'. In *Gesammelte Schriften III. Aufsätze zur antiken Philosophie*, 93–114. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.

16. Aygun, Omer. 2017. *The Middle Included: Logos in Aristotle*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press "Outline

Our attempt to solve the question of logos in Aristotle's philosophy shall cross six chapters: the first two *on his logical works (Categories, On Interpretation), the third and fourth on his work of philosophy of nature (Physics and On the Soul), and the fifth and sixth on his ethical-political works (*Nicomachean Ethics and *Politics*).(93)
Let me give a more concrete outline of the book. In chapter 1, "Being," we will discuss the function of logos in Aristotle's *Categories*. At the very inception of the *Categories*, logos distinguishes homonymy and synonymy by providing an answer to the question: "What is it for this being to be?" (*Cat*. 1, 1a2ff.).
Through a discussion of the questions emerging from its context, I will argue that logos here must mean something like "standard." For, without this standard, the commonality between an ox and a human being as "animals" will be reduced to a relation between mere namesakes like a "spelling bee" and a "honey bee." Thus, logos in the sense of "standard" requires a relation between a being and "what it is for it to be." That a being has such a standard means that it holds on at once to its own being and to its claim concerning what it is for itself to be, without letting one yield, or remain indifferent, to the other. Yet what would such a standard mean if it is not truly inherent to the being in question, but arbitrarily imposed from without? How are we to warrant that a standard is in fact inherent to the being at hand?" (Introduction, p 27)
(93) The reader will notice that the use of *logos* in the *Metaphysics* (especially books VII and VIII) is scattered throughout the book.

17. Bäck, Allan. 2000. *Aristotle's Theory of Predication*. Leiden: Brill
Table of Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Preface XI, Notation and Conventions XIV; Introduction 1; Chapter One The Linguistic Evidence 11; Chapter Two Aristotle's Precursors 31; Chapter Three Aristotle on the Uses of 'Be' in Greek 59; Chapter Four The Statement 98; Chapter Five The Categories as Predicates 132; Chapter Six Type of Predication 166; Chapter Seven Negations 199; Chapter

Eight Inference 228; Chapter Nine Consequences 264; Bibliography 321; Index 339-346.
"In *Categories* 2 Aristotle presents a fourfold division of beings, known as the ontological square. There he distinguishes substance and accident, and the universal and the singular. The distinctions that he makes parallel distinctions that he makes elsewhere for types of predications: the essential versus the accidental, and, again, the singular versus the universal. Aristotle also uses these distinctions in his various discussions of the ten categories. In the next chapter I shall discuss the types of predication. Here I wish to investigate the relation between Aristotle's theory of the categories and his views on predication. After all, 'category' ('κατηγορία') means 'predication', and Aristotle has said that the categories are the different ways in which being per se may be said.(1) He even calls the ten ultimate sorts of being, substance (τί εστίν) quantity, relation, ..., "the figures of predication". [*Metaph*. 1017a23] Above I have claimed that whatever, S, has being per se is such that 'S is' is true, where 'is' means real presence, and can be specified further through certain additional predicates. The categories would then be the types, or figures, of such predicates. In this way, Aristotle's doctrines about being per se in the *Metaphysics* embody the aspect theory of predication, so I have claimed. Here I shall consider whether what Aristotle says about the various categories agrees with this interpretation. Now Aristotle says too that "being" is divided into the four divisions of the ontological square. So I shall also have to consider the relationship between these two classifications, the one into four, the other into ten divisions." (p. 132)
(1) 'Predication' in the sense that "the kinds of predication define classes or kinds of predicates, namely the classes of those predicates which occur in a statement of a given kind of predication,"[sc., of being per se], as Michael Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," p. 32, says.
He also notes that Aristotle is using 'κατηγορία' in a new way. L. M. De Rijk, "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics: 4. The Categories as Classes of Names,"

pp. 18-9; 21, notes that 'κατηγορία' here means 'predication', but originally 'accuse', or better 'reveal'.

18. Barnes, Jonathan. 1971. "Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus." *Classical Quarterly* no. 21:65-80
Reprinted with the title *Aristotle and Speusippus on Homonymy*, in J. Barnes, *Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient Philosophy II*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 284-311.
"1. 'There are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus and used the words "homonymous" and "synonymous" in their Speusippean senses.
These sentences are a rough expression of what I shall call the Hambruch thesis. The thesis was advanced by Ernst Hambruch in 1904 in his remarkable monograph on the relation between Academic and early Aristotelian logic. (*) Hambruch singled out *Topics* A 15 as peculiarly Speusippean, and he conjectured that it was based on some written work of Speusippus." (p. 65)
(*) Ernst Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik,* Berlin, 1904, pp. 28-29. [Reprinted with Curt Arpe, *Das ti en einai bei Aristoteles* (1938), New York: Arno Press, 1976].

19. ———. 2011. "Aristotelian Quantities." In *Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele*, edited by Bonelli, Maddalena and Guadalupe Masi, Francesca, 337-370. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert
"A quantity is usually conceived to be a kind of property. It is thought to be a kind of property that admits of degrees, and which is therefore to be contrasted with those properties which have an all-or-none character (for example being pregnant, or being crimson). According to this conception, objects possess quantities in much the same

way as they possess other properties, usually called ‘qualities’(1).
That conception of quantities is Aristotelian:
Of things said without any complexity, each signifies either a substance or a quantum or a quale (...) Roughly speaking, substances are, say, a man, a horse; quanta, say, two-foot, three-foot; qualia, say, white, cultivated [...](2).
(Arist. *Cat*. 4, lb25-29)
Quanta (or quantities, as they are usually called) form the second of the ten groups of items (or the ten categories, as they are usually called) which Aristotle discusses in the central part of his Categories and to which he not infrequently alludes in his other philosophical writings. The third group of items consists of qualia (or qualities, as they are usually called): quanta stand alongside qualia, and objects are supposed to possess them ‘in much the same way’ as they possess qualia.
Quanta have a chapter to themselves in the Categories, and another in Book Δ of the Metaphysics', and there are remarks scattered elsewhere in the corpus3. But all told, Aristotle says little about quanta (in part perhaps because much of his science was qualitative rather than quantitative); and what he says in the Categories does not always chime with what he says in the Metaphysics. Moreover, the whole business (or so I find) is curiously elusive." (p. 337)
(*) This is a revised version of a paper which I gave at a Colloquium held in Bergamo in December 2010. The paper excited a flurry of criticism, to my great advantage. I thank also, and in particular, Maddalena Bonelli, who both organized and animated the Colloquium.
(1) Cf. Ellis 1966, 24.
(2) Τών κατά μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν λεγομένων έκαστον ήτοι ουσίαν σημαίνει ή ποσύν ή ποιόν ή πρός τι ή ποΐ) ή ποτέ ή κείσθαι ή έχειν ή ποιεΐν ή πάσχειν. έστι δέ ούσία μέν ώς τυπφ είπεϊν οϊον άνθρωπος, ίππος· ποσόν δέ olov δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιόν δέ οϊον λευκόν, γραμματικόν [...]
(3) Notably in Book I of the *Metaphysics* and in the discussions of motion, place and time in the *Physics*. The

following pages largely restrict themselves to the chapters in *Cat*. and *Metaph*. Δ - and they touch on only some of the issues which those chapters raise."

References

B. Ellis, *Basic Concepts of Measurement,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1966.

20. ———. 2012. "Aristotle's *Categories* and Aristotle's 'categories'." In *Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient Philosophy II*, 187-265. New York: Oxford University Press Revised English translation of: Les *Catégories* et les catégories, in Otto Bruun, Lorenzo Corti (éds.), Les *Catégories* et leur histoire, Paris: Vrin, 2005, pp. 11-80, with an Appendix on the new critical edition by Richard Bodéüs, *Aristote*. *Catégories*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2001, pp. 258-265.

"The history of Aristotle's theory of categories is the history of a doctrine and the history of a text — or rather, of a small corpus of texts. For the text which Aristotle himself wrote — the *Categories* — was abridged and paraphrased and attacked and defended and commented upon and translated, so that its fifteen pages are accompanied by a vast library of secondary literature. The *Categories* had an extraordinary success, in late antiquity and after, and the doctrine of the categories had an immense influence on the history of philosophy — ancient, medieval, and modern. But if the theory was familiar in all parts of the republic of letters, knowledge of the Aristotelian doctrine did not always carry with it an acquaintance with Aristotle's text. Sometimes it is plain that an author who 'cites' the *Categories* has read no more than an epitome or a doxographer's report. Often enough, Aristotle's theory is exploited on the basis of a paraphrase or a commentary. And in any event — what ought to depress but not to astonish — an understanding of the doctrine was always filtered through the secondary literature, and the doctrine took some flavour from the particular filter it passed through.

With hindsight, the triumph of the doctrine may seem inevitable — after all, a glorious future presupposes a

distinguished past, and if the past is distinguished, then the future is likely to be rosy. But in reality things were otherwise. The birth of the doctrine (as I have just recalled) was difficult. Its adolescence was neither robust nor promising.
Aristotle's successors often worked on the same subjects and wrote under the same titles as he had done: they attempted to fill the gaps which he had left (and sometimes indicated), they tried to state more clearly what he had set out obscurely or approximatively, and they sometimes sought to mend his errors." (pp. 198-199)

21. Barnes, Kenneth T. 1977. "Aristotle on Identity and Its Problems." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:48-62
Abstract: "There are certain problematic arguments, collective reference to which is often compressed into the expression, "the problems of identity."
Strictly speaking, of course, there are no problems of identity. But there are problems, if only apparent, for a certain view about identity, namely, the view that identicals are indiscernible. In light of the seeming freshness of these philosophical problems, it is remarkable that we find in Aristotle's early writings what seems to be a formulation of the view that identicals are indiscernible, as well as a confrontation with certain arguments that raise apparent difficulties for that view. Philosophers have not always been clear about these arguments, and some have taken them to prove the need to qualify the view that identicals are indiscernible. Aristotle is among those who have drawn such a conclusion, but so are some contemporary philosophers. In this paper I examine Aristotle's solution to certain problems of identity. I attempt to state the solution clearly and indicate the mixture of insight and error that influenced it."
22. Baumer, Michael R. 1993. "Chasing Aristotle's Categories Down the Tree of Grammar." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 18:341-349
Abstract: "This paper addresses the problem of the origin and principle of Aristotle's distinctions among the

categories. It explores the possibilities of reformulating and reviving the 'grammatical' theory, generally ascribed first to Trendelenburg. the paper brings two new perspectives to the grammatical theory: that of Aristotle's own theory of syntax and that of contemporary linguistic syntax and semantics. I put forth a provisional theory of Aristotle's categories in which (1) I propose that the categories sets forth a theory of lexical structure, with the ten categories emerging as lexical or semantic categories, and (2) I suggest conceptual links, both in Aristotle's writings and in actuality, between these semantic categories and certain grammatical inflections."

23. Benson, Hugh. 1988. "Universals as Sortals in the Categories." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* no. 69:282-306
"In his essay *Individuals in Aristotle*,(1) Michael Frede suggests that in the *Categories* Aristotle attempts to maintain the independence of the Platonic distinction between universals and particulars on the one hand, and his new distinction between properties and objects, on the other. Thus, according to Frede, in the *Categories* there are universal objects and particular objects as well as universal properties and particular properties.
As a result, Frede thinks we must reject, at least in the context of the *Categories*, what might be called the traditional analysis of the universal.
In this essay I want to defend this suggestion at greater length.(2)"
(...)
"First, I will briefly explain the distinction between the traditional analysis of the universal, (TA), and what I will call the sortal system analysis, (SA). The former is traditional in that it is commonly accepted as Aristotle's analysis of the universal/particular distinction. The latter may be equivalent to Frede's subjective part analysis.(3) Second, I will defend the claim that in the *Categories* Aristotle is committed to the existence of particular properties, (A). This is a corollary of the suggestion that Aristotle took the universal/particular and property/object

distinctions to be independent. Third, I will explain why such a commitment leads us to reject the traditional analysis, and why the sortal analysis is an appropriate replacement. Finally, I will sketch how an appeal to such an analysis might solve one of the more traditional problems of the middle books of the *Metaphysics*." (pp. 282-283)
(1) Frede (1978), first appeared as 'Individuen bei Aristotles' in *Antike and Abendland*.
Anscombe (1967) also suggests the independence of these distinctions when she discusses the two 'most notable' features of Aristotle's doctrine not found in modern treatments (p. 8).
(2) As we will see, this should not be taken as suggesting that I agree with either his position concerning the trope controversy (cf. n. 24 below) nor with his position concerning his resolution to one of the traditional difficulties of the central books of *Metaphysics*.
(3) Cf. n. 15 below.
References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1967), "Aristotle" in G.E.M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, *Three Philosophers*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Frede, M. (1978), "Individuals in Aristotle" in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 49-71.

24. Benveniste, Émile. 1971. "Categories of Thought and Language." In *Problems in General Linguistics*, 55-64. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press
English translation by Mary E. Meek of *Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue* (1958).
"We must enter into a concrete historical situation, and study the categories of a specific thought and a specific language. Only on this condition will we avoid arbitrary stands and speculative solutions. Now, we are fortunate to have at our disposal data which one would say were ready for our examination, already worked out and stated objectively within a well-known system: the Aristotle's categories. In the examination of these categories, we may dispense with philosophical technicalities. We will consider

them simply as an inventory of properties which a Greek thinker thought could be predicated of a subject and, consequently, as the list of a priori concepts which, according to him, organize experience. It is a document of great value for our purpose.
Let us recall at first the fundamental text, which gives the most complete list of these properties, ten in all (*Categories* 4, 1)
(...)
Aristotle thus posits the totality of predications that may be made about a being, and he aims to define the logical status of each one of them. Now it seems to us-and we shall try to show-that these distinctions are primarily categories of language and that, in fact, Aristotle, reasoning in the absolute, is simply identifying certain fundamental categories of the language in which he thought. Even a cursory look at the statement of the categories and the examples that illustrate them, will easily verify this interpretation, which apparently has not been proposed before." (p. 57)
(...)
"In working out this table of "categories," Aristotle intended to list all the possible predications for a proposition, with the condition that each term be meaningful in isolation, not engaged in a συμπλοκή, or, as we would say, in a syntagm. Unconsciously he took as a criterion the empirical necessity of a distinct expression for each of his predications. He was thus bound to reflect unconsciously the distinctions which the language itself showed among the main classes of forms, since it is through their differences that these forms and these classes have a linguistic meaning. He thought he was defining the attributes of objects but he was really setting up linguistic entities; it is the language which, thanks to its own categories, makes them to be recognized and specified.
We have thus an answer to the question raised in the beginning which led us to this analysis. We asked ourselves what was the nature of the relationship between categories of thought and categories of language. No matter how much validity Aristotle's categories have as categories of thought,

they turn out to be transposed from categories of language. It is what one can say which delimits and organizes what one can think. Language provides the fundamental configuration of the properties of things as recognized by the mind. This table of predications informs us above all about the class structure of a particular language.
It follows that what Aristotle gave us as a table of general and permanent conditions is only a conceptual projection of a given linguistic state." (pp. 60-61)

25. Blackwell, Richard J. 1957. "The Methodological Function of the *Categories* in Aristotle." *The New Scholasticism* no. 31:526-537
"It is a curious fact that the ten categories are listed in only two places in the writings of Aristotle.(1) In the majority of cases only five or less categories are listed.(2) Furthermore Aristotle unlike St. Thomas does not designate the categories by the definite number" ten" but rather merely gives a listing, usually a partial one, of the individual categories.
This situation, plus the lack of any explicit statement by Aristotle as to how the individual categories are established, has led to a complicated controversy among modern scholars regarding the nature and origin of the doctrine of the categories.
Most of the literature on this problem centers around the question of how Aristotle arrived at the listing of the ten categories which have become a permanent part of the Aristotelian tradition. The results have by no means been conclusive.
The controversy began with F . A. Trendelenburg's position that the categories are derived from the distinction of the various grammatical parts of speech. H. Bonitz disagreed with this interpretation, claiming that the categories indicate the different determinations in which the notion of being is predicated.(4)" (p. 526)
(1) *Categories*, 1 b 26, and *Topics*, 103 b 22.
:(2) For a complete catalogue of the listing of the categories in Aristotle and the Greek terms used in each case, see Otto Apelt, "Kategorenlehre des Aristoteles," *Beiträge zur*

Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1891) pp. 140-41.
(3) Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, "Geschichte der Kategorienlehre," *Historischer Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1846) I, 23 ff., 194 ff.
(4) H. Bonitz, *Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles* (Wien, 1853).

26. Block, Irving. 1978. "Predication in Aristotle." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 1:53-57
Abstract: "This article traces briefly the development of Aristotle's thoughts on predication as this progressed from the Categories to the *Posterior Analytics* with the *Topics* coming somewhere in between. In the *Categories* predication is only of essential attributes and the subject of a predicating statement need not be a substance. In the *Posterior Analytics*, predication is the attribution of either essential or accidental attributes and the subject must be a substance, otherwise it is not predication in the true sense. The *Topics* represents a half-way house in between as it makes no mention of the predication-inherence distinction of the *Categories* on the one hand, and on the other gives no predominance to the notion of substance when discussing the subject of predication, as we find in *Posterior Analytics*."
27. Bolton, Robert. 2013. "Two Doctrines of Categories in Aristotle: *Topics*, *Categories*, and *Metaphysics*." In *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*, edited by Feser, Edward, 68-101. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
"Introduction. The aim of this chapter is to offer support for the view – one contrary to the main tradition represented by Alexander and most more recent commentators – that there are, in fact, two different sets and two different, and incompatible, doctrines of categories in Aristotle. I do not have in mind here any difference between the *Categories*, or the *Organon*, and the *Metaphysics*. Rather, both doctrines are present in the *Organon* and even in a single chapter of the *Organon*, *Topics* I.9. The proper explanation for this striking fact is not, as some would suggest, historical or developmental – that one doctrine came earlier in

Aristotle's thinking, the other later. Nor is it, as others have suggested, that both doctrines need to be mastered to adequately employ dialectic, so that both are present in the *Topics*. Instead, as we shall see, one doctrine, for Aristotle, is precisely suited to the needs of the art of reasoning *kata doxan*, i.e. to the practice of dialectic, the other to procedure *kat' aletheian*, or to the needs and the practice of science, indeed of metaphysical science. I go on to consider a main question for this result, one whose proper resolution helps us to understand better Aristotle's scientific method overall and the special, if limited, role of dialectic in it. I begin by developing a problem for the interpretation of *Topics* I.9." (p. 68)

28. Bostock, David. 2004. "An Aristotelian Theory of Predication?" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 27:141-175
"In Section I I briefly assemble some reminders of what Aristotle has to say about predication in his logical works (and I shall confine my attention to these works only). To keep my discussion within reasonable bounds I have here had to be somewhat dogmatic on some issues which are still controversial, and I apologize for this.
In Section 2 I outline a modern reconstruction of why Aristotle may have thought as he did, and sketch in modern terms the theory to which it gives rise. In Section 3 I ask whether there really is good reason to attribute this theory to Aristotle. In Section 4 I ask whether it has merit anyway as a philosophical account of predication, irrespective of whether we may call it Aristotle's theory." (p. 141)
29. Brakas, George. 1988. *Aristotle's Concept of the Universal*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Contents: Acknowledgments 1; Preface 3; I: Recent Views of Aristotle's Universal 11; II: The Definition of Aristotle's Early Concept of the Universal 17; III: Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of the Categories in Recent Times 21; Chapter IV: A Consideration of the Main Interpretations 31; V: The Categories and the Meaning of 'an Existent' at the Time of the *Prior Analytics* 55; VI: Fundamentals of Aristotle's Theory of the Simple Statement at the Time of

the *De Interpretatione* and *Prior Analytics* 65; VII: Interpretations of 'is Said of' in the Recent Literature 77; VIII: The Senses of 'Is Asserted of' 87; IX: Aristotle's Early, Middle and Late Views of the Universal 97; Selected Bibliography 111-113.

"The main interpretations. The fundamental question concerning Aristotle's doctrine of the categories is: Just what is it supposed to classify? Even on this most fundamental issue the chorus of voices arguing for one interpretation over another seems a virtual Tower of Babel — the literature, vast as it is, seems to encompass interpretations of every possible and impossible variety. This is to exaggerate, of course, but not by so very much. It is possible, however, to sort out what has been said on this question in recent times. In the last 150 years or so there have been mainly five interpretations of what the doctrine is supposed to classify. According to one, the categories are categories of existing things — that is, of that general domain, not some sub-category of it; according to a second, they are categories of concepts — either 'real' of 'in the mind'; according to a third, they are categories of subject and predicate expressions; according to a fourth, they are categories of the meanings of subject and predicate expressions; and according to a fifth, they are categories of the different senses of the copula. Most commentators, I would venture to say, have accepted one or another of these interpretations — either in these 'pure' forms or some approximation of them, either one singly or several in combination. To illustrate this, let us consider some of the major studies of Aristotle's doctrine that have appeared in recent times. (p. 21)

The views of Trendelenburg, Bonitz, Brentano, Apelt, and De Rijk.

"Let us sum up this discussion. Trendelenburg seemed to hold that Aristotle's doctrine classifies subject and predicate expressions; Bonitz held that it classifies beings; Brentano held that it classifies beings, concepts (that is, 'real concepts') and predicates; Apelt held that it classifies concepts, predicates and copulae; and De Rijk, it seems,

held that it classifies ‘reality’, the meanings of subjects and predicates, and the senses of the copula. These scholars, then, illustrate that most commentators have accepted one or another of the five interpretations indicated at the outset - either in their ‘pure’ forms or some approximation of them, either one singly or several in combination.
However, other prominent writers have expressed views on the nature of Aristotle’s categories, and we should consider at least some of these. For, even though they do not appear as the theses of major studies of the doctrine, these writers are prominent, and it therefore behooves us to consider whether what they have to say offers anything of interest that has not already been mentioned." (p. 26)
The views of H. W. B. Joseph (*), W. D. Ross, Ernst Kapp, Joseph Owens, Kneale and Kneale, J. L. Ackrill, and J. M. E. Moravcsik.
(*) [*An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1916), pp. 48-66. First edition published in 1906].
"We can see, then, that these additional interpretations offer little that is new. Except for Joseph’s view that the doctrine classifies universals and Owens’ that it classifies individuals, every one of these interpretations is a combination of two or more of those indicated at the outset, either in their ‘pure’ forms or in some approximation to them." (p. 29)

30. Brentano, Franz. 1975. *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. Berkeley: University of California Press
Translation of *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (1862) by Rolf George.
Contents: Editor's Preface XI; Preface XV; Introduction1; Chapter I. The Fourfold Distinction of Being 3; Chapter II. Accidental Being 6; Chapter III. Being in the Sense of Being True 15; Chapter IV. Potential and Actual Being 27; Chapter V. Being According to the Figures of the Categories 49; Notes 149-197.
"This is Brentano's doctoral dissertation and his first book. In it he contemplates the several senses of "being," using Aristotle as his guide. He finds that (in Aristotle's view) being in the sense of the categories, in particular substantial

being, is the most basic; all other modes, potential and actual being, being in the sense of the true, etc., stand to it in a relation of well-founded analogy. Many of his mature views are prepared in this work.
For example his discussion of being in the sense of being true appears to be the foundation of his later nonpropositional theory of judgment." (Editor's Preface XI)
"Thus the discussion of the several senses of being form the threshold of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This makes clear why these considerations must have had great importance for him, and this importance becomes even more obvious if one considers that in this context there is considerable danger of confounding several concepts which have the same name. For, as he remarks in the second book of the P*osterior Analytics* 10, it becomes more and more difficult to recognize equivocation the higher the degree of abstraction and generality of concepts. Thus the possibility of deception must be greatest with being itself since, as we have already seen, it is the most general predicate.
But we have not yet established the fact that, according to Aristotle, being is asserted with several significations, not only with one (*Categories* 1. 1a1. 6). To begin with we shall establish this through several passages of the *Metaphysics* and show, at the same time, how the various distinctions of the several senses of being can be initially subordinated to four senses of this name; subsequently we shall proceed to a special discussion of each of them." (p. 2)
"The modes of predication naturally correspond to the modes of being if one makes the subject [*hypokeimenon*] of all being into the subject of the sentence.
" 'To be' signifies as many different things as there are different ways of using it (*Met*. V. 7. 1017a23)." (p. 131)

31. Butler, Travis. 1997. "The Homonymy of Signification in Aristotle." In *Aristotle and After*, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 117-126. London: Institute of Classical Studies
"In using the notions of indication and announcement above, I have not intended to provide an ultimately illuminating analysis of Aristotle's concept of signification. Rather, I have tried only to sketch one way in which the

homonymy of signification might have been seen by Aristotle as more than chance homonymy. According to the sketch, the definitions of being corresponding to the name 'signifier' in the case of words and things differ importantly, but they share the element of indication or announcement, or some similar notion. Given the sketch, moreover, it is likely that for Aristotle, as for Grice, the · more fundamental notion of signification is the notion which has application to nonlinguistic items (e.g. primary substances), since this sort of signification depends not for its existence on the conventions of a linguistic community. Put the other way round, the way in which signification is said with respect to words is in some sense a descendant of the way in which it is said with respect to pieces of nonlinguistic reality. Drawing this conclusion together with the conclusion of Part I, it turns out that Aristotle's claim that nonlinguistic things signify is not only *not* a source of puzzlement for the semanticist interpreter, it is rather to be welcomed as a place from which analysis begins." (p. 126)

32. Carson, Scott. 2000. "Aristotle on Existential Import and Non Referring Subjects." *Synthese* no. 124:343-360
Abstract: "Much contemporary philosophy of language has shown considerable interest in the relation between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to influence work in the history of philosophy as well.(1) In his *Categories* and *De interpretatione,* Aristotle presents an analysis of language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism between the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding of language is at least in part dependent upon our understanding of the relationships that exist among the enduring πράγματα that we come across in our daily experience. Part of the foundations underlying Aristotle's doctrine of categories seems to have been a concern, going back to the Academy, about the problem of false propositions: language is supposed to be a tool for communicating the way things are, and writers in antiquity were often puzzled by the problem of how we are to understand propositions that claim that

reality is other than it is.(2) Aristotle's analysis of propositions raises a particular problem in this regard: if the subject of a proposition does not refer to anything, how can the proposition be useful for talking about a state of the world?

The problem falls into two separate but related parts: propositions whose subjects are singular terms and hence make claims about some particular thing, and propositions whose subjects are general terms and hence make claims about classes. In this paper I will explain Aristotle's treatment of each kind, focusing in particular on what has widely been perceived as a problem in his treatment of singular terms. My discussion of his treatment of general terms will be more brief, but will show that his treatment of them is consistent with his treatment of singular terms."

(1) An interesting treatment of this topic that illustrates how such concerns intersect with issues in the history of philosophy can be found in Diamond (1996), Introduction II (pp. 13–38). Whittaker (1996) also touches on these themes.

(2) On the treatment by ancient philosophers of the problem of falsehood see Denyer (1991).

References

Denyer, N.: 1991, *Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Routledge, London.

Diamond, C.: 1996, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind,* MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Whittaker, C.: 1996, *Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

33. ———. 2003. "Aristotle on Meaning and Reference." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 20:319-337

"I. Meaning: language and Reality.

This part of the paper is divided into two Sections. Section I examines a three-part relation among objects, thought, and language from the *De interpretatione* that shows how Aristotle conceived of the nature of mental representation. Section II has to do with a parallel three-part relation from the *Categories* that shows how this conception of mental representation also grounds a conception of linguistic representation that serves to link the natural and the

conventional aspects of psychosemantics in a unique account of meaning." (p. 320)
(...)
I.2 The *Categories* Scheme [pp. 326-332]
"The formal isomorphism that we have been examining in the *De interpretatione* lies in a three-place relation among things (*pragmata*), affections of the soul, and words (either spoken or written). There is a similar three-place relation described in the *Categories* that will serve to show how Aristotle conceives of the formal isomorphism between language and ontology that will complete our account of his representational scheme. The three-place relation that we find in the *Categories* is among things (here the phrase used is not *ta pragmata*, but *ta onta,* things that are), accounts (*logoi*) of what those things are, and names (*onomata*) that stand for those accounts. In this scheme *ta onta* and *onomata* play the same roles played by *ta pragmata* and the words (spoken and written signs) of the *De interpretatione* scheme. The middle place in the relation - the affections of the soul in the *De interpretatione* scheme - is held in the *Categories* scheme by "accounts" of the essences (*ousiai*) of the things being represented. It is not immediately clear that these "accounts" play the same role as that played by the affections of the soul in the *De interpretatione* scheme, but in what follows it will be seen that the roles are, indeed, the same. Showing the relation between the two schemes vis-a-vis this central part of the three-part relation will help to make clear how Aristotle conceived of the connection between the natural part of his scheme and the conventional." (p. 327)

34. Chen, Chung-Hwan. 1957. "On Aristotle's Two Expressions: καθ᾽ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐιναι: Their Meaning in *Cat*. 2, 1a20-b9 and the Extension of This Meaning." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:148-159
"In the second chapter of the *Categoriae* Aristotle deals chiefly with the division of entities; (I) καθ᾽ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι (II) ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐιναι serve here as two principles of division. By their combination, both in their

affirmative (Ia, IIa) and in their negative (Ib, IIb) forms, entities are divided into four groups: first group characterized by Ia and IIb, for instance, man; second group characterized by Ib and IIa, for instance, a certain grammatical knowledge, a certain whiteness; third group characterized by Ia and IIa, for instance, knowledge; fourth group characterized by Ib and IIb, for instance, a certain man.(1)

The meaning of these two principles is far from being clear; each of them needs some explanation. First of all, let us note at once that the term ὑποκειμένον is very equivocal. ὑποκειμένον means in (I) the subject of which something is predicated, and in (II) the substrate in which something is present. Thus the two principles are of quite different nature: the one is a logical, and the other a metaphysical principle. Whether a clear distinction between the logical and the metaphysical is really Aristotelian or not, the fact remains that these two principles set up here are meant to be different from each other. Otherwise their combination would not divide entities into four different groups. Hence each of these principles must have a distinct realm in which it has its application." (p. 149)

(1) 1, a 20-b 6.

35. ———. 1960. "Aristotle's Theory of Substance in the *Categoriae* as the Link between the Socratic-Platonic Dialectic and His Own Theory of Substance in Books Z and H of the *Metaphysics*." In *Aristotelismo padovano e filosofia aristotelica. Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia. Vol. IX*, 35-40

"In the *Sophist* Plato located the ultimate principles of individual things in the μέγιστα γένη. Aristotle is of a different opinion; for him the μάλιστα καθόλου are not ultimate principles. On the contrary, he holds in Books Z and H of the *Metaphysics* εἶδος, which is in fact the least universal, to be one of the constitutive principles of individual things. It seems the development of philosophy from Plato to Aristotle in respect of the location of principles is simply a lowering of ἀρχη from the most universal to the least universal. This may be true in general,

but in detail the matter is more complicated. Aristotle's theory of substance in the central books of the *Metaphysics* is the final result of a development which takes its start from Plato's theory of Ideas, or, more backward, from Socrates' searching for universals. But where does the middle-stage between these two extreme stages lie? If the right way of understanding a development is to follow its process step by step, then what else should we do in the present case than looking for this missing stage? Where does it really lie? It lies in the *Categoriae*. As a link its fifth chapter, the chapter on substance, connects these two extreme stages. How is it connected with the final stage we showed on another occasion [*]; we have to show here only how it is connected with the Socratic-Platonic dialectic." (p. 35)
[* See Chen, Chung-Hwan, "Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books Z and H of the *Metaphysics*", *Phronesis* 2, 1957, pp. 46-59.]

36. Chriti, Maria. 2019. "Aristotle's semiotic triangle in *On Interpretation* and in the *Categories*: language and thinking in the frame of logic." In *Proceedings of the World Congress Aristotle 2400 years*, edited by Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra, 489-495. Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Abstract: "In Aristotle's semantic passage in *On Interpretation*, the text "with the greatest influence in the history of semantics/semiotics", scholarship traces the first attempt to formulate a "structuralistic" theory on interpreting mental states by means of linguistic utterance. According to Aristotle's "semiotic triangle", conventional spoken sounds represent the data of reality via mental states and the intrinsic connection between mental states and language is declared by the philosopher.
The *Categories*, on the other hand, is considered to be a treatise where the philosopher classifies the data of reality into ten general classes, giving a name to each class. However, does the philosopher apply his own "semiotic triangle" when he suggests names for his categories? The controversial issue of whether the *Categories* constitute an ontological or a linguistic treatise, i.e., of whether things

were first and language followed in Aristotle's categorization or vice versa, has a long tradition in scholarship.
This paper aims at contributing to the above discussion by investigating whether Aristotle as a name-giver in the *Categories* applies what he describes as name-giving in *On Interpretation*: does Aristotle's semantic theory reveal — at least partly — the way he choses names/terms for his categories? For the specific purpose, two particular aspects of Aristotle's "semantic triangle" are basic: a) the priority and common character that Aristotle attributes to mental states in comparison to language and b) his concept of 'convention' when it comes to human linguistic communication. By using also evidence from Aristotle's other treatises concerning his name-giving policies, the significance of conceptual affinities in Aristotle's linguistic use is quite evident and also of vital importance for understanding his logic."

37. Cleary, John J. 1988. *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press
Contents: The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series XI; Preface XIII; Abbreviations XVI; Introduction 1; 1. Platonic Background of the Topics 7; 2. The Senses of Priority in the Categories 21; 3. The Senses of Priority in Metaphysics Delta 33; 4. The Focal Sense of Priority53; 5. Getting the Priorities Right 64; Conclision 93; Notes 97; Bibliography 122; Index 126-132.
"Aristotelian Commentators from all ages have usually acknowledged the thesis about the multiple senses of 'being' as a basic part of Aristotle's claim to have made significant progress over his philosophical predecessors. In contemporary scholarship, however, what is not adequately recognized is that this is closely related to an equally important thesis about the many senses of 'priority,' which itself is crucial for his break with Platonism. Therefore, in this monograph I intend to explore the significance of this latter thesis for the development of Aristotle's problematic about substance and the related question about the ontological status of mathematical objects. My point of departure will be a curious passage in the *Topics*,[*] where

he appears to accept a schema of priorities that would make mathematical entities more substantial than sensible things. Given his own categorical framework, such an implication represents a reversal of what are taken to be Aristotle's standard views on substance. In order to make sense of this, I will survey his treatment of priority in the *Categories*, while giving special attention to the criterion for natural priority. Through a comparison with the more expansive treatment of priority in *Metaphysics Delta*, I will try to show that at least some of the criteria are inherited from Plato. Even though this systematic treatment lists many of the "ways" of priority shared by his predecessors, it also facilitates Aristotle's basic claim that substance is prior in every important sense." (p. 1, notes omitted)
[*] Book VI, Chapter 4.

38. Code, Alan. 1985. "On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication." In *How Things Are. Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science*, edited by Bogen, James and McGuire, James E., 101-131. Dordrecht: Reidel
"To facilitate the discussion of the TMA [Third Man Argument] and the [*Metaphysics*] Z6 thesis, I begin by stating briefly how the notion of predication figures into Aristotle's thought. (5)
Taking the two-place relations *Being* and *Having* as primitive, we may define *essential* and *accidental predication* as follows:
DEF 1: Xis essentially predicable of Y iff Y Is X.
DEF2: Xis accidentally predicable of Y iff Y Has X.
Predication is defined in terms of the disjunction of essential and accidental predication; *identity* is simply two-way, or reciprocal, essential predication.
A *universal* is an item that can be truly predicated of something distinct from itself; a *particular* is an item that cannot be predicated, either essentially or accidentally, of anything distinct from itself; an *individual* is an item not essentially predicable of anything distinct from itself.
Ontological predication helps us to understand linguistic predication. A universal is essentially predicable of a logical

subject *X* if and only if both the name and the definition of that universal truly apply to *X*; otherwise, either the universal is not predicable of *X*, or it is accidentally predicable. One consequence of this, crucial to my assessment of the significance of the TMA is that, since the definition of man applies to particular men, the associated universal is an essential predicate of those particulars. Furthermore, since the definition applies to both the universal man and the particular men, the universal is essentially predicable of itself and those particulars in the same way.

According to Aristotelian doctrine, a particular is a logical subject, or subject for predication, in virtue of the fact that it Is something (definable) essentially. The species under which a particular falls is the definable something that it, the particular, must essentially Be if it is to be anything at all."

(...)

"Some linguistic predicates, such as 'man', signify universals that are essentially predicable of all the particulars of which they are predicable. These terms may be used to classify particulars according to their natural kinds. In the *Categories*, though not in the middle books of the *Metaphysics*, particulars are primary substances, the natural kinds that are essentially predicable of them (i.e. their species and genera) are secondary substances, and there are no other substances besides these." (pp. 103-104, some notes omitted)

(5) The ideas sketched in this section are given an extended treatment in my 'Aristotle: Essence and Accident', *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories and Ends*, ed. by R. Grandy and R. Warner (Oxford, 1985). The definitions are adapted from unpublished work by H. P. Grice.

39. ———. 1986. "Aristotle: Essence and Accident." In *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends*, edited by Grandy, Richard E. and Warner, Richard, 411-439. Oxford: Clarendon Press

"In order to make sense of the development of Aristotle's thought on predication and his debt to Plato, it is necessary to see his metaphysical investigations against a shared background of problems, principles, and concepts. It is important to see both the *Categories* and the middle books of the *Metaphysics* as rejecting some of, but continuous with, Platonic metaphysics." (p. 411)
"The main task of this paper is to show that the logic of Being and Having is a promising tool for the articulation of some of the basic ideas that Aristotle employs in his efforts to construct a sophisticated and flexible semantics together with a metaphysics of substance. Consequently, in what follows I offer the results of my own attempts to reconstruct Aristotle's understanding of Plato and the subsequent development of his own ideas on essence and accident. When characterizing and contrasting a 'Platonic' position and two Aristotelian positions (roughly, the *Cat*. and *Metaph*.), I present textual evidence and argument in order to make the main outline of my interpretation plausible, but still more detailed analysis of individual passages and arguments is required to sustain it. Often my interpretation is simply stated without adequate discussion of the alternatives." (p. 414)

40. Cohen, Sheldon M. 1973. "Predicable of' in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:69-70
"If Stonecutter is said of Socrates, so is philosopher, Greek, and troublemaker. What is "said of a thing" is usually understood to specify what that thing is, in the sense of what its essence or nature is.
If that is correct, Socrates will be essentially a philosopher, Greek, troublemaker, and stonecutter; a most unaristotelian conclusion.
We might say that though the definition of a stonecutter is predicable of Socrates, to classify Socrates as a stonecutter is not to classify him in an absolutely fundamental way. But then we need a criterion for whether ø is said of x over and beyond whether the definition of ø may be said of x. Is there such a criterion in the Categories?

I do not think that there is. But I think there is the beginning of such a criterion, in the first section of chapter two." (p. 69)

41. Cohen, S. Marc. 2008. "Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle's Ontology." *Metaphilosophy* no. 39:3-19
Abstract: "This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or "kooky objects," as Gareth Matthews has called them) -- entities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*."
42. Corkum, Phil. 2009. "Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 29:289-310
"As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years.
One source of textual evidence in the *Categories*, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle's claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in.
Here the point of contention is whether this commits Aristotle to holding that these properties are inseparable from individuals, since it is commonly held that a property is nonrecurrent, if it is inseparable from an individual. I argue that this evidence is neutral on the question whether there are nonrecurrent properties in Aristotle. One of my aims here is to disentangle the question of recurrence from local issues of individuality and universality in the *Categories*. But another aim is to turn from the textual considerations, which have dominated the debate, to

broader methodological considerations. It is a shared assumption among all those who look to textual evidence from the *Categories*, so to decide whether Aristotle believes there are nonrecurrent properties, that in this work Aristotle is engaged in a project where the question of recurrence is relevant. I argue that Aristotle's concerns in the *Categories* are disjoint from the question of recurrence, and so this shared assumption is false." (p. 289)

43. ———. 2013. "Aristotle on Predication." *European Journal of Philosophy*:793-813
Abstract: "A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize.
A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not *identity* but the weaker relation of *constitution*. For example, the predication 'All men are mortal' expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals."

44. Crivelli, Paolo. 2017. "Being-Said-Of in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*:531-556
Abstract: "The ontology of the Categories relies on several fundamental relations that obtain between beings. One of these is the relation of being-said-of. The most widespread view among commentators is that the relation of being-said-of amounts to essential predication.

After drawing attention to some relatively neglected textual evidence that tells against such an interpretation, I explore a different account of the relation of being-said-of.
On this alternative picture, while the relation of being-said-of is essential predication when it obtains between universals, it coincides with mere predication when it obtains between a universal and an individual. The relation of being-said-of turns out to be closely linked with paronymy: in most (but not all) cases where a property (e.g. generosity) is in an individual, a paronymous universal (e.g. generous) is said of that individual.
Also the alternative picture faces difficulties, however. In conclusion, it remains unclear what position, if any, can be coherently attributed to Aristotle."

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Bibliography

1. Dancy, Russell. 1975. "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances." *The Philosophical Review* no. 84:338-373
"But here I shall be concerned only indirectly with Aristotle's criticism of Platonism; my primary object is getting clear on Aristotle's way of answering the question "What are the substances?" (p. 338)
(...)
"V. *Conclusion*. There is a cloud on Aristotle's horizon; we have glanced at it before. It is worth another, very brief, look. Nothing in the *Categories* tells us how to describe such drastic changes as the death and cremation of Socrates, or Jago's becoming a baboon. We need the notion of matter for that, and if we introduce that as a subject for predicates on a level lower than that of Socrates and Jago, we are in trouble: we shall no longer be able to pick out the primary substances by looking for rock-bottom subjects. And that same trouble may threaten from another direction, only I have been suppressing it. Aristotle talks as if the real subject that underlies white and black (2. 1a27-28, 5. 2a31-34, b1-3, 4a3-4, 8. 4a34-35) and disease and health (10. 12a5-6, 11. 14a1I6) were the *body* of the man or animal, and as if the real subject that underlies literacy (2. 1a25-26), knowledge (1b1-2), insanity, irascibility (8. 9b33 ff.), justice and

injustice (11. 14a17-I8) were the soul of the man or animal. Only once (that I know of) does he make the man himself the underlying subject (compare 10. 12a13-14). But then, which are the primary substances ? What are the interrelationships between matter, form, and the compound? Aristotle owes us something here; elsewhere he tries to pay the debt. I shall leave the question whether his balance is enough to cover his check for another occasion." (pp. 372-373)

2. ———. 1978. "On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts About Substances: Matter " *The Philosophical Review* no. 87:372-413

   "In *Metaphysics* Z 3, Aristotle tells us (1029a3-4) that by "matter" he means, "for example, the bronze" of which a statue is made, and a few lines later, at a20-2 1, that by "matter" he means "what is not in its own right called either something or so big or any of the other things by which being is determined." But the bronze of which a statue is made is something in its own right, and in the *Meteorologica* (Γ 6 and elsewhere), Aristotle is prepared to tell us something about what it is in its own right.

   The explanation I shall try to provide for this apparent contradiction makes it a reflection of a larger apparent contradiction.

   Most of Metaphysics Z 3 is an examination of the claim of "subjects" ("things that underly," [ὑποκείμενα) to be substances (realities, οὐσίαι). It turns out that this claim at best demands clarification and at worst rejection, since people who take subjects to be substances might be forced into saying that matter is the ultimate subject, and so the chief substance - but matter isn't anything in its own right, and isn't knowable in its own right. So such people would be making substances, the ultimate realities, things about which there is no saying what they are. And that is no good. So the claim of subjects to be substances must either be clarified or rejected. But that claim was one Aristotle himself advanced, in the *Categories* especially, and it was fundamental in his rejection of Platonism. So Aristotle is attacking a view of his own.

What is needed is a sorting out of the various concepts: matter, subject, substance. That is what Z 3 is about, and that is what this paper is about. The job is not done at the end of Z 3: the notion of form remains foggy. So it does in this paper. And the problem does not arise only at the beginning of Z 3: the *Organon* and the physical works had set it up. So let us first go back to the *Categories* and the rest of the *Organon*." (P. 373)

3. De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1951. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Mnemosyne* no. 4:129-159
"Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of the Organon, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble. I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development, and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation into the following main divisions:
A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 1-9*;*
B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 1-9;
C. The authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 10-15." (p. 129)
[See also the following note to *Ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics* (Second part), *Vivarium*, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike some 30 years ago (see my papers published in *Mnemosyne* 1951), the present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the first treatise of the *Organon"* and the review by Kurt von Fritz (1954)].
4. ———. 1952. *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum
Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the *Metaphysics* 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the

Organon 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.
"It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modem logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).
I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." (pp. 6-7)

5. ———. 1978. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part II. The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Vivarium* no. 16:81-117
"3. *The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's Categories*
3.1. *Introduction*. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems

of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between *en hypokeimenôi* and *kath' hypokeimenou* Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the *methexis* (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." (pp. 81-82)

3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories =

predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.

6. ———. 1980. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part III. The Categories as Classes of Names." *Vivarium* no. 18:1-62
"4. *The Categories as Classes of Names*; *4.1. Status quaestionis*. The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying *`John is man'* (or *white*), *`Peter is man'* (or *white*), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable *etc.* Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to *in exactly the same manner,* namely WISDOM itself? And if *`John is wise', 'Peter is wise',* and *`William is wise'* are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name *'wise'?* The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (*chôrismos*) clearly appears from the fact that also the author of the *Categories,* who had entirely

abandoned all kind of *chôrismos,* could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are' (1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is *meant by* a term *qua* 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between *en hypokeimenôi* and *kath' hypokeimenou* could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the *Categories*, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." (pp. 1-2)
4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'; 4.3. Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, *The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy,* Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; *4.31. The categories as a classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of 'copulative being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4.5. Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation of* Categories, *chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives; 4.9. Conclusion*.

7. ———. 1988. "'Categorization' as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics." *Vivarium* no. 26:1-18
"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb '*katêgorein*' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b) 'non-statemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.
1. *Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle*

Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' *(katêgoria)* as a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean 'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential predicates'.(*)
(...)
1.3 *Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true substance*'
What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the central books of his *Metaphysics* (Z-Th) is to discover the proper candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of 'being' or 'being as such' *(to on hêi on)* can only be found in 'being-ness' *(ousia;* see esp. *Metaph*. 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to grasp the things' proper nature *qua* beings. In the search for an answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its 'beingness' is focussed upon.
(...)
2. *The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius*
The Greek phrase *katêgorein ti kata tinos is* usually rendered in Latin as *praedicare aliquid de aliquo*. The Latin formula primarily means 'to say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody'). Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to *predicate* something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'. However, the verb *praedicare,* just as its Greek counterpart *katêgorein,* is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name performs in a statement. In such cases *praedicare* stands for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure that we have labelled 'categorization'. (...)
Boethius' use of *praedicare* is quite in line with what is found in other authors. Along with the familiar use of the

verb for statemental predication, Boethius also frequently uses *praedicare* in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating something under a certain name' whereby the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly, ruled out." (pp. 1, 4, 9-10)
(*) See L. M. de Rijk, *The Categories as Classes of Names (= On Ancient and Medieval Semantics 3*), in: *Vivarium*, 18 (1980), 1-62, esp. 4-7

8. ———. 2002. *Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic*. Leiden: Brill
"In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the *Organon*. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.
In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of `be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of `be' to be the central one in Greek *(pace* Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle *hyparxis* is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and `assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).
In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the *Organon,* in particular the *Categories, De interpretatione* and *Posterior Analytics*. These tracts are dealt with *in extenso,* in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes." (pp. XV-XVI)

9. Derrida, Jacques. 1982. "The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy *Before* Linguistics." In *Margins of Philosophy*, 175-205. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Translation, with Additional Notes, by Alan Bass of *Le supplément de copule. La philosophie* devant *la linguistique* (1972).
Also translated by James S. Creech and Josué Harrani in *Georgia Review*, 30, 1976, pp. 527-564.
"We know that Benveniste, in "Categories of Thought and Language,"(6) analyzed the limiting constraints which the Greek language imposed upon the system of Aristotelian categories.
Benveniste's propositions are part of a stratified ensemble; nor does he restrict himself to the text which directly states the thesis of the ensemble. We will have to take this into account when the time comes. Moreover, this thesis already has encountered objections of the philosophical type;(7) together the thesis and the objections form a debate which in its development will be invaluable for us.

First, the thesis: "Now it seems to us—and we shall try to show—that these distinctions are primarily categories of language and that, in fact, Aristotle, reasoning in the absolute, is simply identifying certain fundamental categories of the language m which he thought" (p. 57)." (pp. 179-180)
(...)
"The concept or category of the category systematically comes into play in the history of philosophy and of science (in Aristotle's *Organon* and *Categories*) at the point where the opposition of language to thought is impossible, or has only a very derivative sense. Although Aristotle certainly did not reduce thought to language in the sense intended here by Benveniste, he did attempt to take the analysis back to the site of the emergence, that is to the common root, of the language/thought couple. This site is the site of "Being." Aristotle's categories are simultaneously of language and of thought: of language in that they are determined as answers to the question of knowing how Being is said (*legetai*); but also, how Being is said, how is said what is, in that it is, such as it is: a question of thought, thought itself, the word "thought" which Benveniste uses as if its signification and its history went without saying, in any case never having meant anything outside its relation to Being, its relation to the truth of Being such as it is and in that it is (said)." (p. 182)
(6) In Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary E. Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971). All further references are to this edition.
(7) See Pierre Aubenque, "Aristote et le langage, note annexe sur les catégories d'Aristote. A propos d'un article de M. Benveniste," *Annales de Ia faculté des Lettres d'Aix* 43 (1965); and J. Vuillemin, *De la logique a Ia théologie. Cinq études sur Aristote* (Paris: Flammarion, 1967), pp. 75ff.

10. Devereux, Daniel. 1992. "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:113-131
"In chapter 2 of the *Categories*, Aristotle makes use of two predication relations, *being said of* a subject and being *in* a subject, to distinguish four classes of entities. (i) Some

things are neither *said of* nor *in* a subject: (ii) some are *said of* but not *in* any subject; (iii) some are both *said of* and *in* a subject; and (iv) some are *in* but not. *said of* any subject. There is general agreement about the kinds of entities belonging to in the first class: in the first class are particular substances, e.g., a particular human being or a particular tree; in the second are the species and genera of these particular substances, e.g., Man, Animal, Tree; in the third class are the general kinds or types falling under non-substance categories, e.g. Color as a kind of quality, or Larger Than as a kind of relation. As one successively divides these non-substance kinds into species and sub-species, one arrives at entities such as 'this particular white' or 'this particular knowledge of grammar' which cannot be further subdivided. There has been a spirited debate in recent years over the exact nature of these entities belonging to the fourth class. Is the 'particular white' a specific shade of white that can be shared by a number of things? Or is it a particular instance of such a shade, belonging uniquely to one individual?

Entities in the fourth class have traditionally been regarded as instances or tokens of types, and it has been thought that this view is required by Aristotle's special notion of what it is to be *in* a subject. Recent opponents of the traditional view have argued that a correct understanding of 'being in a subject' does not support the claim that entities of the fourth class are particular instances of qualities, quantities, etc., and that the weight of the textual evidence in the *Categories*. supports the view that they can be shared by a number of subjects.

In the following discussion I shall try to show that there are passages in the *Categories* that clearly imply that type (iv) entities cannot be shared by a number of subjects - passages that have not been exploited by defenders of the traditional view. I will then turn to the question of what Aristotle means by 'being in a subject', and will argue for an interpretation that seems lo make better sense of the relevant texts than other views in the current literature." (p. 113)

11. ———. 1998. "Aristotle's *Categories* 3B10-21: A Reply to Sharma." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 18:341-352
"In an article published several years ago in this journal (Devereux 1992). I argued for a new way of understanding Aristotle's explanation of what he means by the expression 'in a subject' at *Categories* 1 a24-25. One of my contentions was that although this explanation does not imply that things that are *in* but not *said of* a subject are particulars, there are other passages in the Categories that do have this implication: i.e., there are passages besides1 a24-25 that clearly imply that 'first-order accidents' (things *in* but not *said of* a subject) are not universals but what are called 'tropes' in the contemporary literature. This latter claim is challenged by Ravi Sharma in a recent note in this journal (Sharma 1997).
Though his arguments have not persuaded me to give up my view, I have learned from Sharma's acute discussion." (p. 341)
References
Devereux, Daniel: "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's *Categories*", *Ancient Philosophy*, 12, 1992, pp. 113-131.
Sharma, Ravi K.: "A New Defense of Tropes? On *Categories* 3b10-18", *Ancient Philosophy*, 17, 1997, pp. 309-315.
12. Driscoll, John A. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:253-269
"Chapter Five of the *Categories* contains the earliest version of Aristotle's theory of substance. In spirit, the chapter is strongly anti-Platonic."
(...)
While attempts have been made to find Academic antecedents for the doctrine of categories as a whole,(4) the properties shared by primary substances and the Receptacle have, as far as I can determine, passed unnoticed in the literature.
(...)
In this paper I will not examine the three-sided relationship between the Receptacle, primary substance, and primary

matter. Such an examination would afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's theory of substance from the *Categories* to the *Metaphysics*, but it would raise many difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one important consequence of the link thereby established between *Timaeus* 49-52 and *Categories* V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold Cherniss over the dating of the *Timaeus* must be decided in favor of Owen, at least with respect to the relative dating of the *Timaeus* and the *Sophist*. I propose to show, in other words, that *Categories* V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not only of Anstotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later philosophy." (pp. 253-254, notes omitted)

13. ———. 1981. "ΕΙΔΗ in Aristotle's Earlier and Later Theories of Substance." In *Studies in Aristotle*, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 129-159. Washington: Catholic University Press
"My object in this paper is to cast doubt on the view of M. J. Woods (1) and G. E. L. Owen(2) that the species which is a secondary substance in the *Categories* is elevated to the status of primary substance in *Metaphysics* Z. Woods and Owen(3) commit themselves to this view in the course of very interesting discussions of the differences separating Aristotle's early *Categories* theory and his later *Metaphysics* ΖΗΘ theory of sensible substance.(4) However, serious objections have been raised against both writers on the basis of Aristotle's remarks in chapter 13 of Z. My strategy will be to show that these objections can be met and the most important of Woods' and Owen's insights on Aristotle's two theories of sensible substance maintained provided only that their view on the upgrading of *Categories* species is abandoned.
The εἶδος which is primary substance in Z, I will suggest, is neither the species of the *Categories*, as Woods and Owen hold, nor the particular form of a particular substance, as Wilfrid Sellars(5) Edward Harter,(6) and Edwin

Hartman(7) insist, but a third entity to be described below. (8)" (p. 129, notes abbreviated)
(1) M. J. Woods, "Problems in *Metaphysics* Z, Chapter 13," in *Aristotle: A Colleclion of Critical Essays,* ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), pp. 215-38.
(2) E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 51 (1965): 125- 50, esp. p. 137; reprinted in *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*, ed. P. F. Strawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 147-74. References below are to the British Academy pagination.
(3) My reasons for believing that Owen is committed to the thesis as stated will be given in section 2 below.
(4) I will follow Woods and Owen in assuming that the *Categories* is an early authentic work of Aristotle and that Books ZHΘ of the *Metaphysics* date from much later in his career.
(5) Wilfrid Sellars, "Substance and Form in Aristotle," *Journal of Philosophy*, 54 (1957): 688- 99, and "Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Interpretation," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Philosophical Perspectives* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1959), pp. 73- 124.
(6) Edward D. Harter, "Aristotle on Primary Ousia," *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie,* 57 (1975): 1- 20.
(7) Edwin Hartman, "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," *Philosophical Review*, 85 (1976): 545-61; reprinted with revisions as chapter two of Edwin Hartman, *Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian lnvestigations* (Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 57-87.
(8) See section 3 below, especially note 58. My aim here will not be to disprove the Sellars-Harter-Hartman position (a major undertaking which would require extended discussion of their complex arguments) but only to isolate a defensible alternative to it.

14. Duerlinger, James. 1970. "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 15:179-203

"In *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963), J. L. Ackrill has performed the notable task of clearly delineating a number of questions and alternative answers to these questions involved in the interpretation of Aristotle's discussions about predication and inherence in the *Categories*. As a result of Ackrill's excellent translation and penetrating analysis of the text of the *Categories*, we have arrived at a point at which Aristotle's early distinction between predication and inherence may be discussed with some degree of exactness and clarity. Although I do not agree with everything that Ackrill has said about predication and inherence, my disagreement is grounded in an account of the text which his translation and analysis have helped to make possible. In recent papers G. E. L. Owen ("Inherence," Phronesis, 1965) and J. M. E. Moravcsik ("Predication in Aristotle," Philosophical Review, 1967) have attempted to improve upon Ackrill's account of Aristotle's distinction between predication and inherence.
I shall use Ackrill's commentary and translation as a base from which to launch an investigation of predication and inherence in the *Categories*, but I shall find it convenient at times to refer to the comments of Owen and Moravcsik. I shall begin with a very rough summary of what I have to say about predication and inherence, and then discuss them in more exact terms." (p. 179)

15. Duncombe, Matthew. 2015. "Aristotle's Two Accounts of Relatives in *Categories* 7." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 60:436-461
Abstract: "At *Categories* 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle's attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not specify different sets

of relatives, but rather different ways to understand each relative."

16. ———. 2018. "Aristotle's *Categories* 7 Adopts Plato's View of Relativity." In *Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Bryan, Jenny, Wardy, Robert and Warren, James, 120-138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

"Since the 1960s, scholars have thought that the *Categories* is an anti- authoritarian work. Aristotle engages with Platonism, rather than straightforwardly rejecting or blindly adopting any element of it. In particular, Owen argued that the *Categories* evinces an anti- Platonic linguistic theory."

(...)

"On the micro-level of *Categories* 7, scholars take a similar anti-authoritarian attitude. After defining relatives at 6a36, Aristotle draws out some formal features of them: some relatives have a contrary (6b15– 19); some come in degrees (6b19– 27); all reciprocate with their correlatives (6b28– 7b14); some are simultaneous with their correlative (7b15– 8a12).

Aristotle then raises a worry: some substances are relatives (8a13– 28). A hand is a substance, since a hand is part of a secondary substance, but a hand is also a relative, since a hand is said of something. To address this worry Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (8a31– 2). He then describes a test for whether a relative falls under the second account (8a35– b21).

(...)

"In part I, I argue Plato and Aristotle share a view of relativity.

First, I give textual evidence that both share the 'intensional' view of relatives. Second, Aristotle's formal features have antecedents in Plato. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Aristotle draws directly on Plato's view. For relativity, there is neither a shared source nor an intermediate source. In the third part, I show that Aristotle retains the first account of relatives." (pp. 120-122, notes omitted)

17. ———. 2020. *Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics*. New York: Oxford University Press

Chapter 5: Relativity in *Categories* 7, *Topics,* and *Sophistical Refutations*, pp. 90-117; Chapter 6: Aristotle on the distinction between substances and relatives, pp. 188-139.
"Chapter 2 begins to argue that Plato has a constitutive view of relativity, with an inference to the best explanation: key formal features of constitutive relativity are exclusivity, reciprocity, aliorelativity, and existential symmetry; Plato's texts rely on such formal features; so, Plato at least tacitly endorses constitutive relativity. Chapter 3 begins to apply these results to look at constitutive relativity in the context of the separation of Forms and participants in the *Parmenides*' critique of the Forms. Chapter 4 continues to examine how constitutive relativity works, this time in the context of Plato's tripartite psychology. Chapter 5 shows that, although Aristotle is not the earliest thinker to have deep things to say about relativity, he gives a clear statement of constitutive relativity, and works out some of the language and formal features that constitutive relatives have. Chapter 6 shows why Aristotle introduces a nuance into his constitutive view of relativity, although he does not abandon the view. Chapter 7 continues to look at Aristotle's view of relativity, this time his account in the *Metaphysics*. Chapter 8, again, concerns relativity and the Forms, but this time looks at relativity and independence, driven by Aristotle's critique of the Forms, as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Chapters 9 and 10 argue for the presence of constitutive views of relativity in the Stoics. Chapter 11 looks at Sextus' brand of Pyrrhonian scepticism, again showing that he assumes a version of the constitutive view of relativity." (pp. 21-22)

18. Edel, Abraham. 1975. "Aristotle's Categories and the Nature of Categorial Theory." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 29:45-65
Abstract: "The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to propose a fresh approach to Aristotle's *Categories*. Second, I want to reflect, in the light of the outcome, on the expectations we can have for categories in metaphysics. No apology is needed for starting with Aristotle. Ever since the

Categories was placed at the head of the *Corpus*, the foundational character of categorial theory has been explicit. That is why a fresh way of looking at the *Categories* is at the same time a fresh way of looking at Aristotle's metaphysics, and suggests a mode of reckoning with categorial theory generally."

19. Edelhoff, Ana Laura. 2020. *Aristotle on Ontological Priority in the Categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Abstract: "The main objective of this Element is to reconstruct Aristotle's view on the nature of ontological priority in the *Categories*. Over the last three decades, investigations into ontological dependence and priority have become a major concern in contemporary metaphysics. Many see Aristotle as the originator of these discussions and, as a consequence, there is considerable interest in his own account of ontological dependence. In light of the renewed interest in Aristotelian metaphysics, it will be worthwhile - both historically and systematically - to return to Aristotle himself and to see how he conceived of ontological priority (what he calls "priority in substance" (*proteron kata ousian*) or "priority in nature" (*proteron tei phusei*), which is to be understood as a form of asymmetric ontological dependence."
20. Erginel, Mehmet. 2004. "Non-Substantial Individuals in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:185-212
    "Aristotle's *Categories* (1) classifies entities by using two predication relations, being 'said of' a subject and being 'in' a subject.(2)
    (...)
    The traditionally accepted view, which I shall call the 'traditional view', is that a non-substantial individual is a property that cannot be shared by (be 'in') more than one individual substance; thus, on this view, the individualwhite 'in' Socrates cannot also be 'in' Plato (or anyone else). This interpretation of the *Categories* as challenged by Owen, setting of the modern debate.(4)

Owen and Frede(5) have argued that non-substantial individuals are maximally determinate properties, which can be shared by more than one individual substance; on this view, an individual white would be a particular shade of white, which could be 'in' both Socrates and Plato. One way of putting the difference is that the latter view does, whereas the former view does not, allow the recurrence of non-substantial individuals.
In this paper I shall defend a version of the latter view, arguing that the non-substantial individuals of the Categories may be 'in' several individual substances. I shall proceed by first discussing, and o·ering an interpretation of, 1A24–5, the critical passage that the traditional view originates from. After defending an interpretation of 1A24–5 that allows recurrence, I shall argue, in Section 2, that the interpretation commonly held by proponents of the traditional view is inconsistent with various passages in the *Categories*. In my third section I shall challenge attempts to find other passages that support the traditional view, and I shall show that the traditional view does not enjoy the purported textual support." (pp. 185-186)
(1) In this paper I mostly rely on, but occasionally differ from, J. L. Ackrill's translation in *Aristotle: Categories and De interpretatione* [Categories], translation and notes (Oxford, 1963).
(2) I shall use the terms 'said of' and 'in' in quotation marks when they are meant in Aristotle's technical sense. Likewise, it is the technical sense of 'in' that is meant when I refer to the 'x is in y' relation.
(4) G. E. L. Owen, 'Inherence', *Phronesis*, 10 (1965), 97–105, repr. in id., *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. M. Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY, 1986), 252–8.
5 M. Frede, 'Individuals in Aristotle' ['Individuals'], in id., *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1987), 49–71.

21. Findlay, John N. 2007. "Aristotle and Eideticism II." *Philosophical Forum* no. 37:333-386
"This article continues our publication of lectures given by J. N. Findlay (1903–87) at Boston University in 1978. The

present article concludes Findlay's discussion of Aristotle, the first part of which was published in *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 2005)." (The Editors).
"The *Categories*, probably an early treatise of Aristotle's and very individualistic in doctrine, deals with the basic types of predication, substantial and definitory, quantitative, relational, qualitative etc., which leads up, though this is not so clearly stated as elsewhere, to various different genera of entities each of which can be said to have being in a different sense, some primary some derivative in various manners. The issue is complicated by the fact that secondary and derivative entities can have their own series of divergent predications, some substantial and definitory, others quantitative, relational, qualitative etc. There are not only entities parasitic on primary entities in various manners, but entities parasitic on the parasites in a corresponding variety of manners. All this renders the ontology very complex. Though Aristotle approaches many issues through language, what he is dealing with is always conceived of as ontic, not linguistic." (p. 334)
[Follows a description of *Categories* 1-9, pp. 334-339.]

22. Fine, Gail. 1983. "Relational Entities." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 65:225-249
"Aristotle's theory of universals is sometimes thought to differ from Plato's in being nonrelational; it does not hold that Socrates' being a man, or being rational, consists in or involves his standing in some relation to the universal man, or to the universal rationality." (p. 225)
(...)
"Why should a nonrelational account be preferred? Matthews and Cohen suggest that Plato's relational theory is vulnerable to an awkward dilemma: either particulars are "bare particulars", or else they are "mere relational entities" that owe their identity and continued existence to the relations they bear to other things. Aristotle's allegedly nonrelational theory is thought to go between the horns of this dilemma.(5)" (p. 226)
(...)

"I am sympathetic to some features of this general view. I agree that, on some accounts of relationality, Plato has a relational theory of universals. I also agree that Plato, but not Aristotle, separates universals.
I agree too that relational accounts are vulnerable to Matthews and Cohen's dilemma. But I do not agree that Aristotle's theory of universals is nonrelational. Or, at least, the arguments used to commit Plato to a relational account seem to me to commit Aristotle to one as well. Nor do I conclude that Plato's and Aristotle's theories are therefore both hopelessly misguided; for I do not find both horns of the dilemma unattractive. Although I reject bare particulars, I accept relational entities.(6) If it is a consequence of Plato's or Aristotle's theory that particulars are relational entities, that is a desirable consequence.
I ask first what a relational analysis is (I). I then turn to Matthews and Cohen's dilemma (II). In subsequent sections I ask whether Plato and Aristotle are vulnerable to their dilemma and, if so, whether that is an undesirable consequence of their views." (pp. 226-227)
(...)
"It is important to note, first of all, however, that nowhere in the *Categories*, at least, does Aristotle say that primary substances could exist if nothing else did; perhaps their privileged status does not consist in existential independence from everything else. Certainly that is not the only sort of priority Aristotle recognizes.(48)" (p. 247)
(5) See, e.g., pp. 634f., 643f. Matthews and Cohen also suggest another difficulty with relational accounts or, at least, with Plato's holding one; see p. 633f. It is also often objected that relational accounts are vulnerable to a regress. See, for example, Armstrong I, Part 2, passim; P.P. Strawson; *Individuals* (London, 1959), esp. pp. 168-181; F.H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1897), chapter 3.
Plato considers a regress argument, The Third Man Argument, at *Parm*. 132 ab. I do not discuss the TMA or regress arguments here ; but see my "Aristotle and the More Accurate Arguments, in *Language and Logos*, edd. M.

Nussbaum and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 1982), and my "Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man", *Phronesis* 27 (1982), pp. 13-33.
(6) As I shall use the phrase, a relational entity is an entity that possesses at least one essential property relationally. This is to be distinguished from Bradley's doctrine of internal relations, according to which all of a thing's relational properties are essential to it; I do not discuss Bradley's views in this paper. For Bradley, see esp. pp. 16-25.
(48) For some discussions of priority, see *Cat*., chapter 12; *Met*. Δ, chapter 11; Z 1.
Referenecs
D.M. Armstrong, *Universals and Scientific Realism*, 2 volumes (Cambridge, 1978),
G.B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many", *Review of Metaphysics* 21 (1968), pp. 630-655.

23. Finn, Collin. 1974. "The Concept of Substance in the *Categories* and the *Physics*." *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy* no. 11:72-119.
24. Franklin, James. 2014. "Quantity and Number." In *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics*, edited by Novotný, Daniel D. and Novák, Lukáš, 221-244. New York: Routledge
"Quantity is the first category that Aristotle lists after substance. More than any other category, it has an extraordinary epistemological clarity. “2 + 2 = 4” is the paradigm of objective and irrefutable knowledge, and “2 million + 2 million = 4 million” is not far behind in certainty, despite its distance from immediate perception. Indeed, certainties about quantity extend to the infinite—for example, we know that the counting numbers do not run out. Nor does this certainty come at the expense of application to reality. If we put two rabbits and two rabbits in a box and later find five rabbits in there, it is our absolute certainty that 2 + 2 = 4 that allows us to infer that the rabbits must have bred.
Continuous quantities are no less open to perfection of knowledge: The quantity π, the ratio of the circumference of

any circle to its diameter, is calculable to any degree of precision that computers can cope with (currently claimed to be ten trillion decimal places). The mathematics of quantity delivers certainty about reality, to the envy of other disciplines, including philosophy.
Despite its clarity, quantity is subject to some philosophical subtleties and unresolved puzzles. Let us start with two crucial distinctions that organize the types of quantity: extensive (or divisible) versus intensive quantity and continuous versus discrete quantity." (p. 221)

25. Fraser, Kyle. 2003. "Seriality and Demonstration in Aristotle's Ontology." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:131-158
"It is commonly thought that Aristotle distinguishes just two ways of classifying things: genus-species hierarchies; and pros hen or 'focally related' analogues. Fraser considers whether we might take Aristotle's mention, at *Met*. IV.2.1005a11, of classification "with reference to a serial ordering" (*tôi ephechês*), to be indicating a third. Aristotle's famous remarks in *De Anima*, about how types of soul form a sequence (414b20-415a3), presumably refer to just that sort of ordering. But the bulk of Fraser's paper is an examination of whether Aristotle regarded the categories, too, as displaying that sort of ordering -- especially, that some categories are related to substance through the mediation of other categories. It turns out that the evidence that Aristotle thought this is surprisingly good. Fraser's program in examining this evidence is to develop, ultimately, an account of the method of the Aristotelian metaphysics as being systematic and scientific; Fraser rejects the 'dialectical' interpretations of the last several decades as over-influenced by ordinary language philosophy." (From the review by Michael Pakaluk in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 06.18.2006)
26. Frede, Michael. 1981. "Categories in Aristotle." In *Studies in Aristotle*, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 1-25. Washington: Catholic University Press
Reprinted in: M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 29-

48.
"There is a theory called the theory of categories which in a more or less developed form, with minor or major modifications, made its appearance first in a large number of Aristotelian writings and then, under the influence of these writings, came to be a standard part of traditional logic, a place it maintained with more or less success into the early part of this century, when it met the same fate as certain other parts of traditional logic.
There are many questions one may ask about this theory." (p. 28)
(...)
"I will leave aside the fact that the present order of the writings of the *Organon* was only established in the second century A.D., that there is no good reason to think that Aristotle himself had meant these writings to be read in this order, that it is even far from clear whether Aristotle himself would have classified the Categories as a logical treatise, and that hence the position of the treatise in the *Organon* and the view of logic which goes with it should not have had any influence on what we take categories in Aristotle to be. More important, it seems to me, is that it is far from clear whether the treatise *Categories* in whole or even in part was meant to be a treatise on categories.
We cannot rely for this on the title *Categories*. For this is just one of a good number of titles the work had in antiquity and possibly not even the most common one. There is no good reason to think that the title is Aristotle's own. As to the content, it may have seemed obvious that the treatise is a treatise on categories.
But if it did seem obvious, this—apart from the title—was due to the fact that the second part of the treatise, the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*, was not taken seriously. Hence, one focused on the first part, and this part, of course, would seem to constitute a treatise on categories, if one made the additional assumption that the genera of entities distinguished in this part are just the categories or that the categories amount to a classification of expressions depending on the classification of entities given in this part

of the treatise. It is revealing that ancient supporters of the title *Categories* claimed that the *Postpraedicamenta* were material alien to the purpose of the treatise, added by somebody who wanted to turn the treatise into an introduction to the *Topics* and who gave it a corresponding title, namely, *Introduction to the Topics*, becoming thus responsible for the other title of the treatise common in antiquity(1) and for another ordering of the treatises in the collection." (pp. 30-31)
(1) Cf. Ammon. *In cat*. 14, 18ff.: Simpl. *In cat*. 379, 8ff.

27. ———. 1987. "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian *Categories*." In *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, 11-28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
English translation of: *Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift,* (1983).
"The *Categories,* ascribed to Aristotle, has played a unique role in our tradition.
(...)
Already in late antiquity, however, doubts were raised about its authenticity,(1) though we know of no ancient scholar who, on the basis of such doubts, declared the treatise to be spurious."
(...)
"The question of authenticity, however, turns out to be crucially linked to the question of unity. Given that it seems highly questionable whether the *Postpraedicamenta* were originally part of the treatise or were appended by a later editor,(12) it might seem as if the question regarding the authenticity of the treatise needs to be asked as two questions, viz., questions regarding the authenticity of the first and second part individually. Many authors have indeed taken this for granted and have thus assumed that the first part was authentic, the second either probably or certainly not.(13)"
(...)
"Therefore, in what follows, I will pay particular attention to the question of unity. The dangerous tendency to consider this treatise almost exclusively with reference to the first part and thus to jeopardize the status of the second part is,

of course, reinforced considerably by the title. Hence, I will also discuss the title in connection with the question of unity." (pp. 11-12)
(...)
"Thus, it is by no means the case that the incompatibility of the two theories of substance forces us to reject the *Categories* as spurious. On the contrary, it seems as if the theory of the *Categories* ought, rather, to be seen as a stage in a long development that proceeds from the forms of Plato's middle dialogues to the substantial forms of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.
Thus, we have met the objection against the authenticity of the *Categories* that has survived the longest; and so we can, indeed, follow the tradition and attribute the treatise to Aristotle. However, we have also seen that we have reason not to follow the tradition blindly in its understanding of the treatise. Unlike the tradition, which sought to gloss over the differences between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*, we ought to take care not to project the universals of the *Categories* into the ontology of the *Metaphysics*." (p. 28)
(1) Olymp., *Prol.* 22, 38ff.; *Schol.* 33a 28ff.; Brandis.
(12) 12. See J. G. Buhle, *Aristotelis Opera,* vol. I, 1791, 436; Ch. A. Brandis in: *Abh.* Berlin 1833, 268ff.; E. Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.*, II 24, 1921, 67 n. 1; Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, IV, 514; Uberweg-Praechter, 379; D. Ross, *Aristotle*, 10; L. M. De Rijk, *The Authenticity*, in: *Mnemos.* 4 (1951), 159; I. During, *R E Suppl.* XI, s.v. *Aristoteles*, 205, 61; J. L. Ackrill, 70; V. Sainati, *Storia*, 151ff. Some ancient authors took this line (Olymp., *In cat.* 133, 14), especially Andronicus (Simpl., *In cat.* 379, 8ff.).
(13) E.g., J. G. Buhle, 436; E. Zeller, II 24, 1921, 67; H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik*, II 2, 292 n.
We hear of this view being taken by some in antiquity (Ammon., *In cat.* 14, 18ff.; Olymp., *In cat.* 133, 14ff.). Whether Andronicus was among these, as is often claimed, is doubtful; at any rate, we never hear that he argued against the authenticity of the *Postpraedicamenta*; we would assume, if this had been the case, that he would be referred to by name when their authenticity was being discussed.

28. ———. 1987. "Individuals in Aristotle." In *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, 49-71. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
English translation of: "Individuen bei Aristoteles", *Antike und Abendland*, 24, 1978, pp. 16-39.
"By way of introduction, I offer a few remarks to give an overview of the subject of this paper. Aristotle assumes that, in addition to objects, there are properties of objects. This assumption is rather stronger than one might think, since it turns out that statements about properties are not just reducible to statements about objects; on the contrary, the truth of at least some statements about objects is to be explained by assuming that there are properties."
(...)
"Besides this division of things into objects and properties, Aristotle, in the Categories, makes use of the distinction between general and particular, between individuals and universals. Although Aristotle does not, in this treatise, use any term like 'universal' (*katholou*), he does speak of 'individuals', and he contrasts these with their kinds. These two divisions, into objects and properties, on the one hand, and into particular and general, on the other, do not turn out to be the same. For Aristotle counts as general not only properties but also the kinds, into which objects fall, i.e., the genera, species, and differentiae of substances; and these are to be differentiated strictly from properties."
(...)
"At this point, three difficulties arise. First of all, how is it possible to speak of individuals in the case of properties; second, how can there be a single notion of being an individual that can be applied to objects as well as properties; and third, what sorts of objects are these general objects, the genera and species, supposed to be? These difficulties, especially the first two, will be our concern in the first part of this paper, which deal with the *Categories*." (pp. 49-50)
29. Furth, Montgomery. 1988. *Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Contents: Preface XI; §0. A short discourse on method 1; I. Cross- and Intra-Categorial Predication in the *Categories* 9; II. Substance in the *Metaphysics*: A First Approximation 49; III. The Zoological Universe 67; Bibliography 285; Index 291-300.

"My aim in what follows is to explain and to motivate a theory of essence, existence and individuation that I think is to be found in the later and more advanced of the extant writings of Aristotle. The view to be explored has several features that are noteworthy from a scientific as well as a philosophical standpoint: it centers especially, though not exclusively, on a concept of what an individual material object is - a concept that has both intrinsic interest and (if some suggestions I shall advance as to its provenance and motivation are accepted) a historical significance that has not always been accurately appreciated." (p. 1)

(...)

"largely dispense with questions like what differentiates the various nonsubstantial categories from one another, the rationale (if there be one) for comprehending into a single category the monstrous motley horde yclept Quality, the justification (which seems to me quite hopeless) for a category, co-ordinate with the others, of Time, and other such. It will be seen that numerous particular points will emerge along the way in the course of the general discussion of Inherence. But enough has even now been fixed to allow statement of three general truths about the relationship between the tetrachotomy of "things that are" and the total categorial scheme. None of them is explicitly stated in the work, but all of them are in practice observed with great fidelity, and their controlling place in the theory will become more evident in what follows (were one to essay the project, conceivably worthwhile, of axiomatizing the theory, they would be plausible candidates for axioms):

(i) said-of is always intra-categorial, and conversely,

(ii) inherence is always cross-categorial, and conversely,

(iii) substances and only substances can be subjects of inherence." (p. 14)

30. Garver, Newton. 1974. "Notes for a Linguistic Reading of the *Categories*." In *Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations*, edited by Corcoran, John, 27-32. Dordrecht: Reidel

"1. If AristotIe's *Categories* provide a classification of things and not of sayings, as is traditionally insisted, the things classified are at any rate 'things that can be said'. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire whether the *Categories* may be regarded as containing, in rudimentary form, results that might be more appropriately and more completely presented in terms of current methods of linguistic analysis, applied to a level of language or discourse that linguists usually ignore.

2. Both the name 'categories', which signifies predications or sayings, and the position of the work at the beginning of the *Organon*, which deals with matters of logic and language, reinforce the temptation to interpret the *Categories* linguistically. Although neither the title nor the position of the work in the corpus is directly due to Aristotle, they do show that the inclination to treat the *Categories* as at least partially linguistic goes back to the very earliest tradition of Aristotelian scholarship.

3. The determination that the categories can be given a linguistic interpretation - even the conclusion that they are linguistic, AckriIl (1) and Benveniste (2) notwithstanding - would not suffice to show that they are not also (in some sense) metaphysical, nor that they are not universal.

4. The most useful linguistic method to employ in this inquiry is distinctive feature analysis, (3) which has been used in several kinds of linguistic analysis. Passages in the *Categories* can be interpreted as employing a related method, if not an early version of the method itself." (p. 27)

(1) J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle' s *'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione'*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 71. I have used Ackrill's translation. His notes, to which I refer here, are both helpful and stimulating.

(2) E. Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gabies; 1971, Chapter 6.

(3) This method of analysis is due to Roman Jakobson more than to anyone else. See R. Jakobson, C. G. M. Fant, and M. HalIe, *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; N. Chomsky and M. HalIe, *Sound Pattern of English*, Harper and Row, New York, 1968; and Fred W. Householder, *Linguistic Speculations* Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1971. Most recent linguistic textbooks have a discussion of features.

31. Georgiadis, Costantine. 1973. "Two Conceptions of Substance in Aristotle." *The New scholasticism* no. 47:157-167
"In Aristotle we find the view that an individual thing is a substance but we also find the view that form is substance. Is the meaning of substance (οὐσία) the same in the two cases? As the title of my paper suggests, I hold that it is not. I shall argue that there are two distinct, though related, conceptions of substance in Aristotle. These are what I call, on the one hand, the reistic conception of substance, according to which substance is an individual thing (res) (2) and, on the other hand, the archological (3) conception of substance, according to which substance is a principle (ἀρχή) of the individual thing." (p. 157)
(2) The use of the term 'reistic' here does not imply the narrowing of reality to individual objects alone as in T. Kotarbinski's philosophy of reism but only underlines the central position of the individual within reality.
(3) Giovanni Reale, in his book *Il Concetto di Filosofia Prima e l'unità della Metafisica di Aristotele*, wrongly uses the term *archeologia* in the sense of aitiologia. He should have used the term *archologia*.

32. Gill, Mary Louise. 1984. "Aristotle on the Individuation of Changes." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 4:9-22
Abstract: "In *Physics* V 4 Aristotle lists a set of conditions that must be met for a change to be an individual. This account should be viewed against the background of the Categories, where the problem of individuals is first addressed. In the *Categorie*s changes apparently fall into the two nonsubstance categories of doing and suffering. So one might expect that the characterization of individual

changes in *Physics* V 4 will fit the account of individual nonsubstances proposed in the *Categories*. I do not think it does.
This paper aims to show how the two treatments differ and why individual changes require a different analysis from other nonsubstances."

33. ———. 1995. "Aristotle on Substance and Predication." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 15:511-520
"Michael Loux and Frank Lewis share a perspective about Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, though they defend their positions in quite different ways. They agree that Aristotle revised his view from the *Categories*, where he treats individual physical objects as primary οὐσίαι, or substances, and that he defends instead the primacy of substantial forms. They also agree that he adapts his theory of predication from the *Categories* to the project of the *Metaphysics*. On their view Aristotelian forms are universals, and the ultimate subject of predication is prime matter, a stuff that has no character in its own right but is a subject for other things. Since Loux and Lewis defend a similar position, I shall treat their views together.
(...)
In this discussion I shall focus on Aristotle's treatment of predication (a relation between entities, not between liguistic items), which Loux and Lewis takeAristotle to adapt from the *Categories*. I shall argue that he replaces that account with a more flexible scheme, but one that still yields the result that Loux and Lewis want: form predicated accidentally of matter. It also yields some results that they do not want: form predicated of the composite, and the composite predicated of matter. Some of these results are also unacceptable to Aristotle, and to avoid them he introduces a new relation between form and matter: form as actuality, and matter as potentiality." (p. 511)

34. Gillespie, Charles Melville. 1925. "The Aristotelian *Categories*." *Classical Quarterly* no. 19:79-84
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle,* 3. *Metaphysics,* London: Duckworth, 1979, pp. 1-12.

"The precise position to be assigned to the *Categories* in the Aristotelian system has always been somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, they seem to be worked into the warp of its texture, as in the classification of change, and Aristotle can argue from the premiss that they constitute an exhaustive division of the kinds of Being (*An. Post*. I. 22, p. 83 b 15). On the other hand, both in the completed scheme of his logic and in his constructive metaphysic they retire into the background, giving place to other notions, such as causation, change, actuality and potentiality." (p. 75)
(...)
"I shall accordingly assume in what follows that the scheme of the *Categories* was evolved in the course of efforts to establish a doctrine of judgment which should settle the difficulties raised by Megarian and other critics; that the application to the solution of the larger metaphysical problems was a later development ;(3) that the foundations of the scheme were laid in the Socratic tradition of the Academy; that the completed scheme is probably Aristotle's own; and that the original working out of the scheme did not contemplate extension beyond the metaphysics implied in predication to the more fundamental metaphysics of the First Philosophy. Hence we must look to the analysis of empirical propositions for the origin of the scheme." (p. 76)
(3) a Here I follow Maier [*Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*, (3 voll., Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1896–1900)].

35. Grafton-Cardwell, Patrick. 2021. "Understanding Mediated Predication in Aristotle's Categories." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 41:443-462
Abstract: "I argue there are two ways predication relations can hold according to the Categories: they can hold directly or they can hold mediately. The distinction between direct and mediated predication is a distinction between whether or not a given prediction fact holds in virtue of another predication fact's holding. We can tell Aristotle endorses this distinction from multiple places in the text where he licenses an inference from one predication fact's holding to another predication fact's holding. The best explanation for each such inference is that he takes some predication facts

to be mediated by others. Once the distinction between direct and mediated predication has been explained and argued for, I show how it can help solve a persistent problem for the traditional view of non-substantial particulars in the Categories—that is, the view that non-substantial particulars are particular in the sense of being non-recurrent. Along with vindicating the traditional view, the direct/mediated predication distinction gives us a distinctive way of understanding what it is for something to be recurrent (or non-recurrent) as well as a better understanding of Aristotle's broader commitments in the Categories as a whole."

36. Graham, Daniel W. 1987. *Aristotle's Two Systems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Contents: "Preface VII; List of figures XIV; Abbreviations XV; 1. The Two Systems Hypothesis 1; 2. S1: Atomic Substantialism 20; 3. S2: Hylomorphic Substantialism 57; 4. The Incommensurability of the Systems 84; 5. The Hylomorphic Turn 119; 6. The Growth of S2: The Four Causes 156; 7. The Growth of S2: Potentiality and Actuality183; 8. The Paradoxes of Substance: Matter 207; 9. The Paradoxes of Substance: Form 233; 10. S2 Without S1: What Aristotle Should Have Said 263; 11. The Two Systems Theory as an Interpretation of Aristotle 290; References 333; Index Locorum 347; Subject Index 354-359.
"The idea for this study emerged while I was still working on my dissertation, which I wrote on a topic in Aristotle's philosophy of action. As I was researching the history of the potentiality- actuality distinction, I discovered that Aristotle did not use his word 'matter' anywhere in the logical works. The discovery was a discovery only to me; it had long been known. Yet it seemed amazing to me that a principle as important as that of matter should not appear in so large a body of work. Did this omission have important consequences for the interpretation of Aristotle? I found that interpreters saw the omission as at most a curiosity; after all, the subject-matter of the logical works was unique. Yet the same interpreters had long ago abandoned the assumption that the logical works were purely devoted to

logic. In particular, the *Categories* is commonly taken to be a prime source of information about Aristotle's early metaphysical theory. But how could Aristotle have formulated anything like this mature metaphysical theory without the matter-form distinction? Was the unity of Aristotle's thought not really an illusion? Were there not really two sets of theories, two metaphysical conceptions, two philosophical systems?" (p. VII)
(...)
"In what follows I have tried to give my vision of Aristotle's two systems concrete expression in an argument with historical, philological, but above all philosophical dimensions. If the argument is right, a fact about Aristotle's development that has been relegated to asides and footnotes should have a central place in interpretations of Aristotle--should be a point of departure for many studies and provide a limit of inquiry for others. At present few scholars would agree with such claims. To be sure, many would grant that the metaphysical assumptions of the *Categories* are different from those of the *Metaphysics*; but this fact does not seem to have any far-reaching implications for their interpretations of Aristotle, and so I infer that they do not subscribe to a dualistic interpretative theory. A mere handful of scholars have advocated a two-systems theory in some form or other, and I believe that there is only one person who holds the Two Systems Theory with all its ramifications. However, as Socrates has taught us, it does not matter what the many think, but what the expert in truth has to say--that is, what the outcome of the argument is." (p. IX)

37. Granger, Edgar Herbert. 1980. "A Defense of the Traditional Position Concerning Aristotle's Non-Substantial Particulars." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 10:593-606
"In this paper I shall defend the traditional claim that Aristotle's nonsubstantial particulars discussed in the second chapter of the *Categories* are unsharable particulars against G. E. L. Owen's claim that they are sharable universals. I shall proceed by presenting first a sketch of the traditional position that makes explicit why it holds that

non-substantial particulars are unsharable particulars. (1) Secondly, I shall sketch Owen's position and recount how it differs in certain important respects from the traditional position. (2) Thirdly, I shall present some of my own considerations that I believe support the traditional position at the expense of Owen's position. Finally, I shall offer what I take to be the primary reason Aristotle was committed to the existence of such odd items as non-substantial particulars." (pp. 593-594)
(1) My reconstruction of the traditional position is based on the following sources: W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1949): 23-24, 24, n. 1 (hereafter cited as *Arist*.); J. R. Jones, "Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" *Philosophical Review* 58 (1949): 152-156, 162-163; G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers: *Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961): 8-10; R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's *Categories*," *Phronesis* 14 (1969): 31-32; Ignacio Angelelli, *Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1967): 12-15. Angelelli's account is especially important because it reflects the opinion of scholars from late antiquity to the present.
(2) G. E. L. Owen, "lnherence," *Phronesis* 10 (1965): 97-105.

38. ———. 1984. "Aristotle on Genus and Differentia." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 22:1-23
Abstract: "In Aristotle's writings there are at least three accounts of the nature of genus and differentia. These accounts may be briefly described in these terms: (I) genus and differentia are radically distinct in character, and the genus is the more important element in the definition; (II) genus and differentia are very similar in character and importance; (III) genus and differentia are similar in character, but the differentia is the more important element in the definition. These accounts represent, I believe, three stages in the development of Aristotle's thought. In this paper I shall examine each account and explain, at least in part, why Aristotle adopts them."
39. Gregoric, Pavel. 2006. "Quantities and Contraries: Aristotle's *Categories* 6, 5b11-6a18." *Apeiron* no. 39:341-

"The immediate purpose of this paper is fairly modest. I would like to provide an analysis of Aristotle's three counterexamples to his claim that no quantity has a contrary in *Categories* 6. I will have something to say about Aristotle's discussion of the first two counterexamples, although the bulk of my paper will be devoted to his discussion of the third counterexample at 6a11-18,a passage which has not received due attention by modem commentators. My analysis will then provide a basis for some suggestions of wider significance.
In *Categories* 6, 5b11 Aristotle introduces one salient characteristic of quantities, namely that none of them has a contrary (*enantion*). Immediately following the statement of this characteristic, Aristotle takes on an anticipated objection. The objection consists of two counterexamples: to the many the contrary is the few, to something large the contrary is something small. Each pair of terms is supposed to present a counterexample to Aristotle's characteristic for one type of quantity: the former pair for discrete quantities, the latter for continuous quantities. Aristotle takes each pair of terms in turn,and shows that what they introduce are (a) neither quantities (b) nor contraries." (p. 341)

40. Hacking, Ian. 2001. "Aristotelian Categories and Cognitive Domains." *Synthese* no. 126:473-515
Abstract: "This paper puts together an ancient and a recent approach to classificatory language, thought, and ontology.It includes on the one hand an interpretation of Aristotle's ten categories, with remarks on his first category, called (or translated as) *substance* in the Categories or *What a thing is* in the *Topics*. On the other hand is the idea of domain-specific cognitive abilities urged in contemporary developmental psychology. Each family of ideas can be used to understand the other. Neither the metaphysical nor the psychological approach is intrinsically more fundamental; they complement each other. The paper incidentally clarifies distinct uses of the word 'category' in different disciplines, and also attempts to make explicit several notions of 'domain'. It also examines Aristotle's most exotic and least

discussed categories, *being-in-a-position* (e.g., sitting) and *having-(on)* (e.g., armour). Finally the paper suggests a tentative connection between Fred Sommers' theory of types and Aristotle's first category."

41. Hadgopoulos D. J. 1976. "The Definition of the Predicables in Aristotle." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:110-126
"It is a common belief among Aristotelian scholars that, according to Aristotle, *per se* accidents are properties in the following sense of the word:
Top. 102: a Property that which, while not showing the essence of its subject, belongs counterpredicated of thing.
But in 1970, Jonathan Barnes published a paper(1), where he defended the view that *per se* accidents are not properties. A consequence of this was that the 'predicables' were not well defined by Aristotle.
In this paper, I will try to show that Barnes is mistaken. The argument he offers in support of his view seems to be a very good one, but it involves a faulty move." (p. 110)
(1) Barnes, Jonathan, "Property in Aristotle's Topics", *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 136-155.
42. Hamlyn, David W. 1961. "Aristotle on Predication." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:110-126
"In dealing with the Greek Philosophers we tend to take the notion of predication for granted: we tend to assume that we have the right to use the term 'predicate' without question, in discussing the theories put forward by e.g. Plato and Aristotle. An example of this tendency is the common assertion that Plato held that the Forms were self-predicable. While this assertion may be in some sense true, it does assume that the notion of predication may be taken for granted. This assumption is, perhaps, partly due to a further assumption that the notion of predication is a logical or even grammatical notion, and that Plato and Aristotle must therefore have seen its importance and employed it accordingly. I wish to question that assumption in Aristotle's case.
I have already questioned it in connection with Plato,(1) saying that Plato was continually trying to account for what

we should call predication in terms of notions akin to that of identity. It is tempting to assume that because Aristotle had the term 'predicate' at his disposal, he must have known all about the notion. It is moreover, a feasible suggestion that in Aristotle 'κατηγορέιν' is a technical term the origins of which are obvious. The use of the phrase 'κατηγορέιν τι κατά τινος' stems from legal contexts; it thus comes to mean 'to maintain or assert something of something' and it perhaps retains something of an accusatorial aura.
But while the use of the phrase implies that Aristotle knew in some sense something about what it is to assert something of another thing, it does *not* imply that he could *ipso facto* provide the correct theory about it. What is true is that the trend of Aristotle's metaphysical thought led him towards a view of predication which involved treating it as something much more than a mere grammatical notion." (p. 110)
(1) See my "The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato's Logic" *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 5. No. 21, I9S5, pp. 289 ff.

43. ———. 1978. "Focal Meaning." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 78:1-18
"In recent years much philosophical scholarship has been devoted to the place in Aristotle's thinking of what G. E. L. Owen has called 'focal meaning'; and much is due to Professor Owen in particular in this connexion. Less attention has perhaps been given to the question whether Aristotle should be complimented on that idea - whether, that is, the concept is one that we should welcome and accept into our inherited philosophical treasury. It is this question with which I am mainly concerned in this paper; a full answer would no doubt
demand a broader conspectus of Aristotle's thought than I can take in the space available." (p. 1)
(...)
"I have pointed out that the explanation of the uses of 'healthy' by reference to health provides no true instances of primary and secondary uses or senses of a word, let alone cases. But when Aristotle says the substance is said to be in

the primary way while things in the other categories are said to be in a secondary way we may be provided with an instance of primary and secondary senses, or so it might appear. In fact we are not provided with this in a technical sense, since Aristotle does not operate with a sense and reference distinction. That is why I, as in effect Aristotle normally does, put the point in terms of something's being said to be in a primary or secondary way.
That homonymy is for Aristotle something that belongs to things in relation to words rather than to words *simpliciter* is notorious; hence he approaches the relation between words and things from the side of things, rather than from the side of words as we are perhaps inclined to do." (pp. 6-7)

44. Harari, Orna. 2011. "The Unity of Aristotle's Category of Relatives." *Classical Quarterly* no. 61:521-537
"In *Categories* 7 Aristotle discusses relative terms, which he defines in the opening paragraph of this chapter as 'things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else' (6a36–7).(1) In clarifying this definition, he presents two lists of examples; the first contains 'greater' and 'double' and the second contains 'states', 'conditions', 'perception', 'knowledge' and 'position' (6a38–b3). The terms of the second list seem to be foreign to this discussion. The definition of relatives and the terms presented in the first list suggest that relatives are incomplete predicates or relational attributes,(2) but states, conditions, perception, knowledge and position are complete predicates.
Linguistic usage does not require these terms to be followed by a preposition.
The difficulty involved in understanding the place of conditions and states in the category of relatives extends beyond linguistic considerations. Other linguistically complete predicates are included in Aristotle's category of relatives, but their categorial status seems pretty obvious. 'Slave', for instance, is a linguistically complete term, but it can easily be construed as implicitly referring to the correlative 'master': that is, the proposition 'x is a slave' may be construed as implying the proposition 'x is a slave of y

(when y stands for x's master). Similarly, the term 'large', though linguistically complete, implies (as Aristotle says in *Categories* 6) that its subject is larger than other things of its kind (5b15–20). By contrast, the categorial status of conditions and states remains uncertain, even if their correlatives are supplied, because they seem to be internal dispositions of their subjects rather than relational attributes." (p. 521)
(1) Ackrill's translation.
(2) For this interpretation see J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1962), 98; M. Mignucci, 'Aristotle's definition of relatives in Categories 7', *Phronesis* 31 (1986), 101–29, at 103–4.

45. Harter, Edward D. 1975. "Aristotle on Primary ΟΥΣΙΑ." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 57:1-20
"In *Categories* 1-5 Aristotle argues that the primary ουσία (the most fundamental sort of being there is) is the concrete individual and that the secondary ουσία (the second-most fundamental sort of being there is) is the εἶδος (species) or γένος (genus) of a concrete individual. In *Metaphysics* Z-H he argues that the primary ουσία is the εἶδος of a concrete individual, that the secondary ουσία is the concrete individual, and that the γένος is not ουσία at all.
This raises some serious questions concerning the *Categories*, the *Metaphysics*, and primary ουσία.
Some scholars have maintained that this difference between the two treatises is merely apparent (e. g., terminological) and that the doctrine in the Metaphysics does not conflict with the one in the Categories; others that it is real and that the doctrine in the *Metaphysics* is the precise contrary of the one in the *Categories*.
l believe that neither of these views is correct, and I shall argue that the difference is indeed real but that it does not consist in this simple *volte-face*. The difference consists in the fact that in the *Metaphysic*s εἴδος is conceived as the particular form, and not merely the universal species, of a concrete individual, whereas it is not so conceived in the *Categories*; this marks a radical development in Aristotle's metaphysical reasoning. I shall begin by developing briefly

each of the two doctrines of ουσία (Section I); I shall then examine the relations between them (Sections II—IV); and I shall conclude by making some general observations on the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* (Section -V)." (p. 1)

46. Hegarty, Seamus. 1969. "Aristotle's Notion of Quantity and Modern Mathematics." *Philosophical Studies (Dublin)* no. 18:25-35.
47. Heinaman, Robert. 1981. "Non-Substantial Individuals in the *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26 (295):307
Abstract: "There is a dispute as to what sort of entity non-substantial individuals are in Aristotle's *Categories*. The traditional interpretation holds that non-substantial individuals are individual qualities, quantities, etc. For example, Socrates' white is an individual quality belonging to him alone, numerically distinct from (though possibly specifically identical with) other individual colors. I will refer to these sorts of entities as 'individual instances.'
The new interpretation (1) suggests instead that non-substantial individuals are atomic species such as a specific shade of white that is indivisible into more specific shades. On this view, non-substantial individuals are what we would call universals (2) which can be present in different individual substances, but are labelled 'individuals' by Aristotle because, like individual substances, there is nothing they are *said of*. (3)
In this paper I will defend the traditional account by attempting to show that it is supported by the slender textual evidence that is available. I will begin by stating three serious objections to the traditional interpretation. Next I will show that in works later than the *Categories* Aristotle accepted individual instances of properties of the sort found in the *Categories* by the traditional interpretation. Finally, I will set out the evidence that supports the traditional interpretation and answer the three objections."
(1) G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," *Phronesis* (1965), pp. 97-105; Michael Frede, "Individuen bei Aristoteles," *Antike and Abendland* (1978), pp. 16-31. In fact, it is not clear to me

what Professor Frede considers non-substantial individuals to be. While he refers approvingly to Owen, Owen's account collapses the distinction between εἴδει εν and ἀριθμό εν in the case of non-substances whereas it appears that Frede wishes to retain this distinction (pp. 23-24). Since he does not explain what individual non-substances which are numerically different but specifically identical are supposed to be or in virtue of what they are numerically different, by the "new interpretation" I will mean solely that explained in the text.

(2) This is not, as Allen, Matthews and Cohen think, an objection to the new interpretation (R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis* (1969), p. 37; Gary Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many," *Review of Metaphysics* (1968), pp. 640-41). There is no justification for the presupposition that Aristotle must have used the terms 'individual' and 'universal' in the *Categories* in the same way as in later works or as they are used today. (Of course, the word καθόλου' does not appear in the *Categories*).

(3) That is, for any individual x there is no y such that the name and definition of x are predicable of y (2a19-27).

48. Hetherington, Stephen. 1984. "A Note on Inherence." *Ancient Philosophy*:218-223

"In Aristotle's *Categories* (2a34-b6: see also *Meta*. VII. 1), the category of substance is claimed to be prior in existence to the various categories of nonsubstance.

This priority is articulated in the *Categories* largely *via* Aristotle's relation of inherence. The latter is one of two relations whereby Aristotle purports to quarter the furniture of the world, the members of the categories. The other is that of 'being said of'. The quartering is effected thus (*Cat*. 1 a20-b9): some things are said of others but are not in anything: other things are said of a subject as well as being in a subject: still others are not said of anything, but are in a subject: the rest are neither said of nor in something; and these four combinations are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

Now, while the said-of relation is fairly straightforward, the inherence relation is not. According to *Cat*. 2a1 9-26, y is said of x if and only if y's name and y's definition, or account, are both predicated of x. And y is in x if and only if... what?

There are several competing interpretations of Aristotle's inherence relation, but it is not my aim in this paper to choose among them. I do want, however, to sharpen the terms of the debate by formulating a particularly important one of those interpretations, G .E.L. Owen's, much more clearly than it has hitherto been formulated.

We will then be in a better position to evaluate the various merits of Owen's interpretation, some of which, up to now, have not been clearly perceived. Aristotle's notion of inherence is a technical one, but it is one that relies on a comparatively *non*technical notion of inherence. We shall see that understanding the latter is the key to the former, and hence that once the technical notion is precisely understood, Owen's interpretation can itself be properly assessed." (p. 218, notes omitted)

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   "Chapter I is a revised and expanded version of a paper which appeared under the same title in *Inquiry*, 2 (1959), 137-51. In its present form it also incorporates most of my note, 'Different Kinds of Equivocation in Aristotle', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 9 (1971), 368-72." (*Time and Necessity*, Preface, VII).
   "*Homonymy v. synonymy*
   Aristotle explains his sense of homonymy (together with that of the contrary notion of synonymy) in the beginning of the *Categories*.
   According to these explanations, two things are synonymous if both the same name (i.e. term) and the same definition (λόγος) are applicable to them. They are homonymous if they share only the name, the definitions (λόγοι) being different in the two cases. (In these definitions, λόγος should perhaps be understood as an explanatory phrase or an account of the meaning of the name rather than as a definition.) I have already pointed out that Aristotle sometimes violates his own definition of homonymy.

Similarly, he violates the definition of synonymy at least once by calling a pair of objects synonyms although, according to his own considered judgement, they share only the name but not the definition. (6)
These violations are little more than occasional reversions to looser usage. But in another respect Aristotle violates the definitions of homonymy and synonymy given in *Categories* 1 almost systematically. In so far as the definitions are concerned, only *things* can be called homonymous or synonymous, not *words*. And two things can be called synonymous only if the *same* term is applied to them. Both these limitations are transgressed by Aristotle. A word is said to be homonymous in *De Gen. et Corr*. 1 6. 322b29 ff.; (7) and similar uses of the notion of synonymy are found in *Top*. VIII 13. 162b37, *Soph. El*. 5. 167a24 and in *Rhet*. III 2. 1404b37-1405a2. In many other passages, too, Aristotle is obviously interested exclusively in the word and not in the things to which it is applied. In fact, he sometimes seems to express synonymy and homonymy by such phrases as εν σεμαινειν and πολλά σεμαινειν (or πλείω σεμαινειν), respectively. In the sequel, we shall take the same liberty as Aristotle and talk about synonymy (homonymy) in connection both with certain terms and with the entities to which they are applied." (p. 9)
(6) See *Met. A* 6. 987b10; cf. 9. 990b6, 991a6, and *Met. I* 10. 1059a13.
(7) Cf. also *Top*. V 2. I 29b30 ff.

2. ———. 1983. "Semantical Games, the Alleged Ambiguity of 'Is' and Aristotelian Categories." *Synthese* no. 54:443-468 Reprinted in: J. Hintikka, *Analysis of Aristotle. Selected Papers, Vol. 6*, Dordrecht: Springer 2004, pp. 23-44.
"Our findings concerning the multiple relations between different semantical phenomena may thus be summed up in the form of a list of correlated distinctions. They amount to differences among the following:
(10) (i) Different wh-words (and phrases).
(ii) Different widest classes of entities over which English quantifiers can range.
(iii) Different uses of the existential is in English.

(iv) Different uses of the is of identity in English.
(v) Different uses of the predicative is in English.
(vi) Different classes (mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive) of simple predicates of English." (p. 35)
(..)
"Aristotelian categories reconstructed
At this point, a philosophical reader is likely to have a vivid *déjà vu* experience. For what seems to be emerging as a consequence of the basic assumptions of game-theoretical semantics is nothing but a modernized version of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, not in its details (after all, Aristotle was dealing with a different language), but in all of its leading theoretical ideas. Aristotelian scholars have found the combination of different ideas in Aristotle's distinction between different categories intensely puzzling. These different aspects of Aristotle's theory include the following:
(11) (i) Different questions one can ask about a given entity, and hence different question words (and certain related phrases) in a language. (Cf. Ockham (Loux), pp. 8–9; Ackrill, p. 79; Gomperz, p. 39; Kahn, passim.) Several scholars have argued on this basis that Aristotle's distinction is firmly based on the structure of Greek (Trendelenburg, Benveniste, Kahn).
(ii) Different highest predicates under one or other of which everything that is has to fall (Bonitz et al.).
(iii)–(v) Different senses of verbs for being in their different uses: (iii) existential, (iv) copulative (Apelt, etc.), (v) identifying.
(vi) Different widest classes of primitive predicates in the language in question. Indeed, (vi) is closest to Aristotle's explanation of the categories in his *Categoriae* (see 1b25–2a10)." (pp. 35-36)
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Benveniste, Emile: 1966, 'Categories de pensée et catégories de langue', in *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, Gallimard, Paris, pp. 63–74.

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Kahn, Charles: 1978, 'Questions and categories', in Henry Hiz (ed.), *Questions*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 227–78.
Loux, Michael J.: 1974, translator and editor, *Ockham's Theory of Terms*, Notre Dame.
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3. ———. 1986. "The Varieties of Being in Aristotle." In *The Logic of Being: Historical Studies*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo and Hinitkka, Jaakko, 81-114. Dodrecht: Kluwer
"In this paper, I shall try to enhance our understanding of Aristotle's thought by relating it to certain contemporary problems and insights of philosophical logicians. Now one of the most central current issues in philosophical logic is a challenge to a hundred-year old dogma. Almost all twentieth-century philosophers in English-speaking countries have followed Frege and Russell and claimed that the words for being in natural languages - "is", "ist", ἔστι, etc. - are ambiguous between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity, and the generic is. The significance of this ambiguity thesis has not been limited to topical discussions but has extended to historical studies, including studies of ancient Greek philosophy." (p. 81).
(...)
"One of the most fundamental and most perplexing questions concerning Aristotle's distinction between different categories is: What is being distinguished from each other? What is Aristotle classifying in separating the different categories from each other?"
(...)
"Scholars have debated intensively which of these different things Aristotle "reaJly" meant. For example, one persuasion maintains that the categories represent the different kinds of questions one can (according to Aristotle) ask of a given entity. This view is in different variants held

by among others Ockham, Charles Kahn, Benveniste, and Ackrill.
Other scholars hold that Aristotelian categories are what he says they are, predicables. Others, led by the formidable Hermann Bonitz, have held that categories were for Aristotle first and foremost the widest genera of entities." (p. 100)
(...)
"Still others have held that Aristotle's category distinction is primarily a differentiation between several senses of esti, a reminder of the "systematic ambiguity" of words for being in Aristotle. This view is found, e.g., in *Phys*. A 2, 185 b 25 - 32. Among commentators, it has
been represented by Heinrich Maier, and in a sense it can be maintained that G. E. L. Owen is another case in point. He has certainly been followed by a host of younger scholars." (pp. 100-101)

4. Hood, Pamela M. 2004. *Aristotle on the Category of Relation*. Washington: University Press of America
Contents: Preface IX; Acknowledgements XI; Part One: The Exegesis; Chapter 1: The Critics' Charges 1; Chapter 2: *Categories* 7 21; Chapter 3: *Metaphysics* V.15 55; Chapter 4: Interpreting Aristole's Relatives 85; Chapter 5: Epistemological Issues; Chapter 6: Conclusion 141; Notes 143; Bibliography 147; Index 151-154.
"Many philosophers believe that Aristotle does not have, and indeed could not have, a theory of relation, even one that accounts for relations involving two terms, i.e., dyadic relations. Aristotle's logical, metaphysical and ontological views, especially his substance-accident ontology, are seen as restricting Aristotle to only one-place or monadic relations, and prohibiting the logical space for a separate entity, relation, to exist. Hence, Aristotle's conception of relation is perceived to be so divergent from our own that it does not count as a theory of relation at all. I aim to show that the critics are wrong to speak so poorly of Aristotle's account of relation.
I argue that Aristotle's theory has some of the basic features that a theory of relation must have. I begin in Part One by

sketching out the critics' charges. I then outline the main features of Aristotle's philosophy that inform his treatment of the category of relation, and briefly survey Aristotle's discussion of relational issues scattered throughout the corpus. Next, I present an exegesis of Aristotle's two central texts on relation, *Categories* 7 and *Metaphysics* V 15, and discuss the various accounts of relational entities or relatives therein. In Part Two, I examine two problems. First, I address the problem of how best to interpret Aristotle's relatives. Second, I explore the epistemological difficulties stemming from Aristotle's view in the Categories that relation involves two relative items or terms and that if one relative item is known definitely the other item must also be known definitely.
I conclude that Aristotle's treatment of relatives reveals his commitment to the view that there be a dyad, i.e., at least two items, involved in a relation. Furthermore, I show that Aristotle includes in his theory something that accounts for the relation itself, i.e., something approaching a logical relational predicate. I do not suggest that Aristotle attempts to construct a relational theory comparable to our own. But I do suggest that given Aristotle's grasp of the dyadic nature of relation, we have good reason to believe Aristotle's theory of relation is more robust than many suspect." (Preface, p. IX)

5. Husik, Isaac. 1904. "On the *Categories* of Aristotle." *The Philosophical Review* no. 13:514-528
Reprinted (conjoined with Husik 1939) in: I. Husik, *The Categories of Aristotle* (1942).
"The little treatise of Aristotle which stands at the head of the *Organon* has caused a great deal of difficulty to students, both ancient and modern. The bulk of the discussion has centered about the question of its place in the *Organon* and in Aristotle's system, and the character of the ten categories to which the greater part of the book is devoted. But there have been found also critics who expressed a doubt as to the authenticity of all or part of the treatise in question. To say nothing of the ancient commentators of Aristotle, the earliest attempt in modern

times to cast a doubt on the genuineness of the work seems to be that of Spengel in *Münchener Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1845, Vol. XX, No. 5, pp. 41 sq. He was followed by Prantl in *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1846, p. 646, and in his *Geschichte der Logik*, I, p. 90, Note. 5, also by Valentinus Rose in *De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate*, p. 234 sq. Zeller, on the other hand (*Philos. d. Griechen*, second edition, II, pt. 2, p. 67, note i), decides in favor of the genuineness of the first part of the work, the *Categories* proper, and against the so-called *Postpraedicamenta* from ch. X to the end." (p. 514)
(...)
"I have shown, I trust, not only that the treatise of the *Categories* is closely related to that of the *Topics*, but also that it was written before the latter and serves as a basis for it upon which it builds, very often going beyond the *Categories*. This applies to the first nine chapters, properly called *Categories*, in the same measure as to the *Postpraedicamenta*. The unity of the book of the *Categories* as we now have it is also maintained by Valentinus Rose (*De Arist. libr. ord.*, etc., p. 235). Ergo, the whole work is genuine, and its peculiar character is to be explained on the ground of its being one of the earliest attempts of Aristotle." (p. 528)

6. ———. 1939. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 36:427-431
Reprinted (conjoined with Husik 1904) in: I. Husik, *The Categories of Aristotle* (1942).
"*Habent sua fata libelli*. Thirty-four years ago I published a paper, "On the *Categories* of Aristotle," in the *Philosophical Review*.(2) Like the case of the proverbial Irishman who desired to be buried in a Jewish cemetery because that was the last place the devil would look for an Irishman, so it seems that the *Philosophical Review* at that time was the last place where an Aristotelian scholar would look for a literary-historical article on the *Categories* of Aristotle. And so the article was stillborn. No European student of Aristotle knew about it and it did not find its way into the bibliographies of the subject. Dupréel, whose article on the

same subject appeared five years later,(3) does not refer to my article and shows no knowledge of it." (p. 427)
(...)
"There would be no point in reproducing here the arguments advanced in my article of long ago. All I need do here is to give the gist of the argument, which can be done in a few sentences.
An examination of the treatise of the *Categories* and a comparison thereof with the *Topics*, in respect of terminology, style, and doctrine, proves conclusively that they are either the work of one author or that one was a close and deliberate imitator of the other. The same examination shows that the *Categories* was written before the *Topics*. Hence, since no one doubts the genuineness of the *Topics*, the *Categories* must be equally genuine, for no one has suggested that some one before Aristotle wrote the *Categories*, which Aristotle imitated in the *Topics*.
Dupréel, as I said before, is the only one who has made a considerable contribution to the question since my article was published.
His argument has no point of contact with mine, for he compares the *Categories* not with the *Topics*, but with the *Metaphysics*, and finds that they do not agree in doctrine.
I have no reason to quarrel with Dupréel when he tries to show that the first nine chapters, the categories proper, and the last six chapters, the *Postpraedicamenta*, are a unit and the work of the same author, for my comparison of the treatise with the *Topics* has led me to the same conclusion." (p. 429)
(2) Vol. XIII (1904), pp. 514-528. "Differences" on page 517, line 10 from bottom, should read "diffuseness."

7. ———. 1942. "The Categories of Aristotle." In *Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar Arthur Singer Jr.*, edited by Clarke, F. P. and Nahm, C. M., 317-334. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
Two articles conjoined: "The Categories of Aristotle" (1930) and "On the Categores of Aristotle" (1904).
Reprinted in: I. Husik, *Philosophical Essays. Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern*, Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo

Strauss, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, pp. 96-112.
8. Irwin, Terence H. 1981. "Homonymy in Aristotle." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 34:523-544
"What, then, are Aristotle's conditions for homonymy and multivocity?
It is often assumed that the conditions are different, but that they both reflect differences in the senses of words. 1 I will argue" that each of these assumptions is less than the whole truth; homonymy and multivocity are often the same, and neither is intended to mark different senses of words." (pp. 523-524, note omitted)
(...)
[Aristotle] search for homonymy is not meant to encourage skepticism about the existence of essences for words to name, but to forestall skepticism that might result from the rejection of the Platonic attempt to see one essence for every name; Aristotle does not want to renounce the search for essences, but only to recognize different essences correlated with the same name. While the Wittgensteinian arguments about family resemblance are arguments against essentialism, Aristotle's arguments are a defence of essentialism. The difficulties in his doctrine of homonymy are difficulties in his general views about real essences." (p. 544)
9. Jacobs, William. 1979. "Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:282-300
"It is a widely accepted view amongst scholars that Aristotle believed that the subject of an assertion might fail to refer. Two texts, *De Interpretatione* xi 21 a 25-28 and *Categories* x 13 b 12-35, are generally cited as evidence for this belief. In this paper I will argue that both passages have previously been misunderstood and that Aristotle did not accept the possible referential failure of the subject of an assertion. In Section I, after first discussing the standard interpretations of both texts, I note the difficulties which result from these accounts. In Section II I offer a brief general argument showing that Aristotle's own account of what an assertion is implies that it is impossible for the subject of an assertion to

fail to refer. In Section III I present my own analysis of each passage and show that when properly understood neither is in any way concerned with the problem of referential failure." (p. 282)

10. Jacquette, Dale. 2012. "Brentano on Aristotle's Categories: First Philosophy and the Manifold Senses of Being." In *Franz Brentano's Psychology and Metaphysics*, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 53-94. Zeta
"Brentano's 1862 dissertation, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, is a scholarly historical study and philosophical consideration of Aristotle's theory of categories.
The categories in Aristotle's first philosophy, as Brentano interprets them, are the mutually independent predicates of being at the highest levels of generality, in the variety of ways in which we speak about being. If correctly identified, the categories should correspond exactly to the multiple modes of existence or ways of being that are available to primary substances in the actual world as Aristotle conceptualizes them. As such, they are the categories not only of our predicative thoughts, but of the real existence of primary substances.
Aristotle's categories accordingly constitute the rock bottom of his first philosophy. They are his ontology, built on the Greek word "ontos" for "being"; or, better, melding "ousia" as Aristotle's Greek term for 'substance', they are the fundamental concepts of his ousiology. The categories as the hierarchy of ways in which substance can have being are at the heart of Aristotle's metaphysics in his theory of pure being, of being as such or being qua being. To the extent that Aristotle's conceptual scheme for the being of substances captures the truth about the real objects whose multiple senses of being are thereby conceptualized, the categories of an Aristotelian first philosophy, as Brentano understands them, systematize the nature of being itself, of the most general ways and general senses in which anything can exist or be correctly said to exist. These not merely correspond to but are constitutive of the manifold ways in

which being can be intelligibly predicated of things." (pp. 53-54 a note omitted)

11. Jansen, Ludger. 2011. "Aristotle's *Categories*." *Topoi* no. 26:153-158
"We need reliable techniques of information retrieval: search engines, indices, and categorisation.
Faced with such an urgent need for categorisation, a book on categories is more than welcome.
Aristotle, a young philosopher from Athens in Greece with a Macedonian background, has now published a philosophical investigation on this topic.
Such could be the beginning of a review of Aristotle's *Categories*, were it published today. The aim of this essay as an "Untimely Review" is to speculate how such a review would continue. Such an exercise in counterfactual history is easier when we review some neglected and hitherto uninfluential text. For such a text can really have a fresh impact on contemporary philosophy, whereas a classic text, being neither neglected nor uninfluential, is, as a rule, already an active force that has shaped and continues to shape the philosophical landscape. This applies in particular in the case of Aristotle's *Categories*, which has been for more than two millennia one of the most influential textbooks in philosophy." (p. 353)
(...)
"How could such a review conclude? Maybe thus: Aristotle' Categories can help to find our way around the internet. The first question of any retrieval technique that is more than a search for strings of characters should be: To which category does the thing that I am searching for belong? Aristotle's little treatise suggests helpful changes in perspective that could benefit contemporary ontology, and especially the steadily growing field of applied ontology. They can give new impulses towards applications in biomedical, legal or business information sciences, but also inspire new work on the old question: What is being?" (p. 158)
12. Jones, Barrington. 1972. "Individuals in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:107-123

"With the publication of J. L. Ackrill's translation of the Categories(1) and G. E. L. Owen's paper "Inherence"(2) a dispute has arisen over what Aristotle means in that work by an individual where the individuals in question are not prime substances. The bulk of published opinion has favoured Ackrill's account of the matter,(3) an account which is also found in the writings of W. D. Ross and Miss Anscombe.(4) However, this account involves certain difficulties.
The major difficulty is an internal one, the question of the interpretation of 2 a 34-b 6. This passage is described by Ackrill as "compressed and careless,"(5) while Owen claims that the matter "is put beyond question" in favour of his own view by the lines, and that "by themselves they settle the issue."(6) A second immediate difficulty is that such non-substantial individuals do not seem to reappear elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus and are absent even from his discussion of the various categories in the *Categories* itself." (p. 107)
(...)
"Accordingly, I wish to re-examine the issue. I shall try to show that what Aristotle means by a non-substantial individual is fully captured by neither of the two current accounts, that 2 a 34-b 6 has been misconstrued by both parties, that Aristotle's account is entirely reasonable, relying simply on an accurate observation of what is presupposed by the activity of counting, and, finally, that the account offered in the present paper enables us to understand aright his distinction between synonymy, homonymy and paronymy.(9)" (p. 108)
(1) Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963).
(2) *Phronesis*, X (1965), pp. 97-105.
(3) v. J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle on Predication," *Philosophical Review*, LXXVI (1967), pp. 80-96; G. B. Matthews and S. M. Cohen, "The One and the Many," *Review of Metaphysics*, XXI (1968), pp. 630-655; R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis*, XIV (1969), pp. 31-39.

(4) W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1923), p. 24, n.1.; G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, *Three Philosophers* (New York, 1961), pp. 7-10.
(5) Ackrill, p. 83.
(6) "Inherence," p. 100.
(9) I shall suppose that the *Categories* is a genuine work of Aristotle's. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the *Categories* are those of Ackrill and all translations from elsewhere in the corpus are my own. The technical vocabulary of the *Categories* is used according to Ackrill's translation throughout.

13. ———. 1975. "An Introduction to the First Five Chapters of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:146-172
"In an earlier paper (1) I have argued that a satisfactory account of Aristotle's postulation of individuals, both substantial and nonsubstantial, in the *Categories* can be achieved by taking seriously his characterization of these individuals as things that are 'one in number' and by interpreting this characterization as 'a unit in a possible act of enumeration'. This approach to the *Categories* as important consequences for the interpretation of the remainder of the work.
In this essay I wish to present an account of the first five chapters (bar chapter 4 which lays out the categories themselves) based on the former paper.
In particular, I wish to examine the fourfold division of 'the things that are' in chapter 2 and the two relations of 'being said of' and 'being in' (or, rather, 'existing in') that are used to construct this fourfold division, and the nature of 'primary substance' (or, rather, 'primary being') and the basis for its distinction from 'secondary substance' (or, rather, 'secondary being'). The account that will be developed here is substantially and importantly different from any other that I am aware of, and, even if it does not secure conviction, its publication will hopefully make the dogma that the *Categories* is a 'common-sensical' work less readily tenable and force a re-thinking of the usual account of the work." (p. 146)

(1) "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis*, 17 (1972) 107-123.

14. Jones, J. R. 1949. "Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" *The Philosophical Review* no. 58:152-170

"There are some curious things in the opening chapters of Aristotle's *Categoriae*. One is the admission, which seems to justify Porphyry's inclusion of the species as a fifth predicable, that "man" can be predicated of "the individual man." Another is the hint of a sense in which the qualities of a particular thing share in its particularity.

A distinction drawn in the second chapter between "presence in a subject" and "assertability of a subject" yields a division of fundamental entities in which the opposition of "man" to "this individual man" is paralleled by a similar opposition of "white" to "this individual white." This doctrine is nowhere else repeated in Aristotle' and may have little relevance to a study of the development of the Peripatetic philosophy. But it does seem to me to provide a significant alternative to the view that all that is adjectival to a thing, that is, every quality of it, is universal. I have become increasingly dissatisfied with this view and would like, in what follows, to examine the alternative to it which seems to be implied in the passage of Aristotle's to which I am referring." [*Cat*. 1a, 16-1b, 9.] (p. 152)

(...)

"I submit that Aristotle pointed to the correct solution of his problem (but regrettably missed the significance of it) when he suggested that what is "present in" substance, namely, its accidents or attributes, can be "individual and one in number." For the moment it is thus recognized that characters may occur unrepeatably, the bare substantival "this" becomes clothed in the content of an adjectival or attributive "thisness" and its individual essence need no longer be sought in an empty material substratum.(34)

The view that characters are necessarily universals has been held by philosophers who have insisted that recognition presupposes acquaintance with a bare "this." But I should have thought it selfevident that an object which we may

know by merely confronting must have content, as well as an existence, that is irrecurrably its own." (p. 170)
(34) It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle redeemed his doctrine of individual essence by suggesting that the individual may possess a distinct form as well as distinct matter, that is, content, as well as a substrate, that is irrecurrably its own. But, as Cook Wilson has seen, it is only in terms of a doctrine of particular qualities that this suggestion can be made good. Speaking of Aristotle's description of particularity as "matter which has the form," he points out that "form" here must be "the particular quality of the thing and not the universal; it is the particular definiteness of the thing" (*S.I.* ii, 713).

15. Kahn, Charles H. 1978. "Questions and Categories. Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories in the Light of Modern Research." In *Questions*, edited by Hiz, Henry, 227-278. Dordrecht: Reidel
"The categories of Aristotle do not represent a complete logical inventory, a classification of all terms or concepts represented in language. They do attempt to classify all the terms of a basic object language, where these terms are specified by the questions that can be asked or answered concerning an individual subject. Hence the number of categories will be determined by the number of fundamentally distinct questions that can be raised concerning such a subject. As has often been pointed out, the full list of ten given in the *Categories* and in *Topics* 1.9 suggests that Aristotle must have taken a human being as his specimen subject, for only in this case would the two minor categories, Posture and Having (or Clothing) be natural topics of inquiry.
There is, then, a factual connection between Aristotle's list of categories and the linguistic forms of question or inquiry. But what is the philosophical significance of this connection? Reflection on this matter may proceed along two quite distinct lines of thought, each of which could provide material for a study devoted to questions and categories. On the one hand, we might consider Aristotle's doctrine simply as an early example of the genre, and widen

the concept of category to include modern theories of logical, conceptual, and grammatical categories. Our topic would then become: the connection between interrogative forms and categorial distinctions in general. On the other hand, we may keep our attention fixed on Aristotle's doctrine but generalize the remark about interrogative forms to include other grammatical or linguistic considerations. Our topic will then be: the significance of the connections between Aristotle's scheme of categories and certain facts of grammar, including the grammar of questions in Greek. It is this second topic that I propose to study here: I will discuss Aristotle's theory, not category theories in general." (pp. 227-228, notes omitted)
(...)
"The doctrine of categories is not, after all, the central thesis in Aristotle's ontology. It provides a kind of introduction to metaphysics and to theoretical philosophy in general, by sorting and circumscribing the domain of things that are beings per se, 'in their own right'. When the categorial scheme is applied in connection with the focal meaning of being, it effects a preliminary unification and ordering of this domain in its ontological dependence on substance or 'entity'. But in the final analysis the scheme does not tell us what is to count as an entity or how the structure of a substance is to be understood. The deeper analysis of substance itself and its relation to the dependent beings must be carried out by the use of different concepts, φυσικώς not λογικώς as Aristotle will sometimes say, concepts derived not from the theory of predication but designed specifically for the analysis of natural motion and change: concepts like mover and goal (τέλος), matter and form, potency and act. Both physics and metaphysics culminate in the theory of the Unmoved Mover, the entity (or entities) whose being is actuality, the final cause of all motion and change, the 'primary substance' on which all other substances depend (Λ.7, 1072b 14; cf. Γ.2, 1003b16—17, E.1, 1026a27-31). In this ultimate perspective for ontology, which Aristotle himself never worked out in full detail, the preliminary contribution of the categories in

distinguishing substance from the various kinds of dependent beings must seem quite modest and elementary. All the more reason, however, why the categorial scheme itself should be firmly rooted in humble, everyday questions like What is it? How big? Of what sort or quality? In relation to what? Where? and When?" (p. 266)

16. Kampa, Samuel, and Wilkins, Shane Maxwell. 2018. "Aristotle as a Non Classical Trope Theorist." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 35:117-136
"A common refrain in Aristotle scholarship is that Aristotle countenances tropes. Roughly, trope theory is the view that properties are abstract particulars. In contemporary metaphysics, trope theory is an alternative to realism—the view that properties are abstract universals—and to nominalism—the view that properties are neither abstract particulars nor abstract universals. While contemporary trope theorists sometimes cite Aristotle as an influence, Aristotle's trope theory has yet to be thoroughly cashed out in the language of contemporary metaphysics.
Contemporary trope theory is not monolithic, so the claim that "Aristotle is a trope theorist" only communicates so much about Aristotle's view. A more informative analysis would specify what kind of trope theorist Aristotle is. In this paper, we provide such an analysis.
We begin by describing realism, nominalism, and trope theory interms recognizable to both historians of philosophy and contemporary metaphysicians. We distinguish two species of trope theory: classical and
nonclassical. On the basis of critical passages from Aristotle's *Categories* and *Metaphysic*s, we argue that Aristotle's view of properties aligns most closely with nonclassical trope theory. We conclude with a call for further research on Aristotle's distinctive contribution to debates in contemporary trope theory." (p. 117)
17. Kapp, Ernst. 1942. *Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic*. New York: Columbia University Press
Contents: Preface V-VIII; I. The origin of logic as a science 5; II. Concepts, terms, definitions, ideas, categories 20; III. Judgments, subject and predicate 43; IV. Syllogisms 60; V.

Induction: ancient and modern logic 75; Books cited 89; Index 91-95.
On the categories see pp. 36-42.
"There is no doubt that the book *Categories* is partly responsible for the contents of this first part of traditional logic, because it professes to deal with the significance of unconnected parts of sentences; but the *Topics*, our earliest document, not only of Aristotle's treatment of syllogisms but also of categories, shows that the doctrine of categories was originally a doctrine of sentence-predicates and was only later transformed by Aristotle himself into some scheme for pigeonholing whatever carries a single word as its name." (p. 23)
(...)
"[*Categories*] contains, on the basis of a short but very interesting preparatory section (chaps. I-III), which one might call more·logical than ontological, a minute description of the first four categories (substance, quantity, relation, and quality), in which an ontological point of view seems to prevail. The doctrine here revealed is far from the flexible subtleties of Aristotle's fully developed metaphysics, but there are some striking coincidences with statements otherwise peculiar to the *Topics*; and the conclusion that the treatise *Categories* was a comparatively early work by Aris.totle himself is fairly safe.
In any case, even without reference to the question of authorship and chronology it can be stated that nowhere else in Aristotle's writings is the source of the difficulties which are inherent in the later form of the doctrine so transparent as here." (p. 40)

18. Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. 1983. "A Stylometric Comparison Between Five Disputed Works and the Remainder of the Aristotelian Corpus." In *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981*, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 345-366. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
[The five dubious works examined are: *Categoriae, Meteorologica IV, De Motu Animalium, Metaphysica* α,

Metaphysica K.]
"What can stylometric techniques tell us about the authenticity of the five possibly Aristotelian works which are the topic of this Symposion? In the present state of our knowledge it is not easy to give a precise answer to this question. There is no doubt, to my mind, that the statistical examination of literary style is a valuable auxiliary tool in the study of the questions which interest the philologist and the philosopher who approach an ancient text. But to decide whether a work is genuine or spurious is one of the most difficult tasks for stylometry." (p. 345)
(...)
"A firm stylometric conclusion about the authenticity of the works which are the topic of this symposion would have to be based on a truly gigantic amount of investigation: investigation which would take a very long time even now when machine-readable texts of Aristotle are available and when computers will produce concordances, word counts, and statistical analyses with a modicum of effort. The present essay offers only a minute contribution to such an investigation. It studies the use of twenty-four common particles and connectives in the dubious works, comparing the four commonest of them with virtually the whole Aristotelian corpus, and the other twenty with a large sample of some three hundred thousand words, which constitute about thirty per cent of the round million words of the entire corpus. The essay will provide only tentative indications of the genuineness or spuriousness of the works in dispute; but it will illustrate the difficulties and pitfalls of the use of stylometric methods in authorship attribution studies.
The four commonest particles in the Aristotelian corpus are καί, δέ, γάρ and μέν, in that order. Between them these four particles constitute around fourteen per cent of a typical Aristotelian text. Because of their frequency and topic-neutrality they provide suitable material for statistical study. We shall use them as a starting-point for a comparison between the dubious works and the rest of the Aristotelian corpus." (pp. 346-347)

(...)
"The overall conclusion, then, of this study is as follows. We have discovered in our examination of twenty four particles no real evidence suggesting the spuriousness of *Metaph*. K or of *Mot. Anim*. But the frequencies of ἀλλά, δή, διό, ὡσπερ and γε in *Cat*. and of καί, μέν, δέ, αν, γε, διό in *Mete*. IV are eccentric enough to be suspicious. And the overall picture of particle usage in *Metaph*. α appears to be quite different from that in other works of Aristotle." (pp. 365-366)

19. King, Colin Guthrie. 2018. "Aristotle's Categories in the 19th Century." In *Aristotelian Studies in 19th Century Philosophy*, edited by Hartung, Gerald, King, Colin Guthrie and Rapp, Christoph, 11-36. Berlin: de Gruyter
Abstract: "This chapter explores interpretive debates about Aristotle's *Categories* in the 19th century. The interpretation of this text became the locus to pursue the further philosophical aim of defending logic against an epistemological recalibration of concepts such as that found in the transcendental and metaphysical deductions of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. As Colin Guthrie King argues, this was the ultimate philosophical ambition of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, but perhaps more important than this project itself were its derivatives: a model for the proper philosophical interpretation of an ancient philosophical text, and an exemplary model of how to defend such a text against an influential anachronistic interpretation."
20. Kohl, Markus. 2008. "Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 53:172-179
Abstract: "I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the *Categories*. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance

universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, I argue that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the *Categories*."

21. Kosman, Louis Aryeh. 1967. "Aristotle's First Predicament." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 20:483-506
Reprinted in: Mary L. O'Hara (ed.), *Substances and Things. Aristotle's Doctrine of Physical Substance in Recent Essays,* Washington: University Press of America, 1982, pp. 19-42.
"Is the aristotelian list of categories, enigmatically entitled "κατηγορίαι-predicates," a list of terms classifying types of predicates, or a list of predicates classifying types of entities? Consider two ways in which a list of categories might be generated. Given some entity, we may distinguish different types of questions which we ask about it, such that each type determines a limited and exclusive range of appropriate answers."
(...)
"Alternatively, we might attend not to the different answers appropriate to different questions asked about the same entity, but to the different answers which result when, about *different* entities, the *same* question is asked repeatedly, the question "What is it?"
(...)
"Each ultimate answer will signify a supreme and irreducible genus of entity, not a *type* of predicate, but a predicate, effecting a classification of *things* into *their* ultimate types." (pp. 483-484)
22. Kung, Joan. 1986. "Aristotle on "Being Is Said in Many Ways"." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 3:3-18
"It is a well-known Aristotelian dictum that "that which is may be so called in many ways" (*Met*. 1003a33). He also says,"Such things as signify the schemata of predication are said to be *per se*. For to be signifies

in the same number of ways as these are spoken of' (*Met*. 1017a23), and he speaks of "categories of being" (e.g. at *Met*. 1045b28-29). Gareth B. Matthews(1) has raised the following question with regard to passages such as those just cited:

Is Aristotle supposing in such passages that (a) there are different senses of "being,"(2) or (b) there are different kinds of being, or (c) both?

Matthews has shown that the claims that a term has different senses and that it refers to different kinds are not two ways of saying the same thing. We should note also that his question is not the same question as whether the categories range over things or senses. I shall assume we may be confident that Aristotle takes himself to be talking about extra-linguistic and extra-conceptual entities, and I shall say a bit more about this in Section IV below. To answer the latter question, however, is not to answer the former." (p. 3)

(1) Gareth B. Matthews, "Senses and Kinds," *The Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 69 (1972), pp. 149-157.

(2) The presence of a neuter "the" before "being" at 1003a33 may provide some slight evidence that he is speaking of the word.

23. Kunkel, Joseph C. 1971. "A New Look at Non-Essential Predication in the “Categories”." *The New Scholasticism* no. 45:110-116

"Recent commentators appear in general agreement over the essential nature of the expression 'predicated of' in Aristotle's Categories(1) 'Predicated of' denominates the genus-species-individual or essence-singular relationship. Only the species, genus, or essence is predicable of the individual subject. Accidental predication is prohibited. Moreover, the species and genera can be subjects, but individuals can never be predicates.

My opposition is not to the expression 'predicated of' including the species, genera, or essences as predicable of individuals, but to this expression as only including, or being equivalent to, that type of predication. Does 'predicated of' exclude accident. as predicable of

substances? Reflecting the thinking or the other commentators, C.-H. Chen says, "What it is still more important to observe in this connection is that in the *Categoriae* no intergeneric predication and, therefore, also no intercategorical predication are conceived to be genuine predication.(2) I think the limitation of predication to essential, categorical lines is untenable for three reasons." (p. 110)

(1) Cf. S. Mansion, "La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le traité des *Categories*," P*roceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy*, I, pt. II (Amsterdam, 1949), pp. 1097-98; L. M. de Rijk, *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy* {Assen, 1952), p. 70; C.-H. Chen, "On Aristotle's Two Expressions: καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐιναι" *Phronesis*, 2 {1957), 149-50; J. Owens, "Aristotle on Categories," *Review of Metaphysics*, 14 (1960-61), 75-76; J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, l963), pp. 74-76 ; G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," *Phronesis*, 10 (1965). 97-98; and J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle on Predication," *Philosophical Review*, 16 (1967), 85-93.

(2) Chen, *Phronesis*, 2, 150.

24. Kuntz, Marion Leathers, and Grimley, Kuntz Paul. 1988. "Naming the Categories: Back to Aristotle by Way of Whitehead." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* no. 2:30-47

"Any one who looks at Aristotle's Categories in Greek must notice that the main category is expressed by a pronoun, and all the others are adverbs and verbs.(1) Without going through innumerable commentaries and translations one cannot have a full story; but the result in Latin and English is generally to edge out the pronoun 'τι' in the question τι εστὶ' and to use only Aristotle's noun οὐσία and from then on all adverbs and verbs are translated into Latin or English nouns. This may seem a trivial point of grammar and indeed the dullest and somewhat dubious aspect of grammar, parts-of-speech.

But if our language is to help us in ordering our activities and grouping our experiences into the structure of things and events, surely it makes a great difference whether we communicate in verbs or in nouns. If
we communicate with an emphasis on the verb, we go naturally to the adverb to distinguish more subtly. If we communicate in nouns, we go to adjectives to make distinctions. It is the latter that leads to classification." (p. 30)

25. Kwan, Tze-Wan. 2008. "The Doctrine of Categories and the Topology of Concern." In *The Logic of the Living Present (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 46)*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 243-301. Dordrecht: Kluwer
"Introduction. There is little doubt that the problem of categories has been among one of the most frequently discussed topics in philosophy ever since Aristotle. Important as it was, the problem of categories has however become in the eyes of todays' students of philosophy an old-fashioned or even out-dated problem. If philosophy itself is for most people a marginal discipline of little practical value, then the problem of categories would turn out to be the most abstract and most detached issue of all. But is the problem of categories really that abstract?
Compared with more sensuous problems such as "Life and Death", "Freedom" or "Justice", the problem of categories gives us the impression of being a matter of theoretical technicality that is of mere scholastic interest. However, we will see bit by bit in the following, that the problem of categories has in the last analysis a strong relevance to the basic concerns of philosophy as well as to the very world perspective of man.
We will also show that as man's basic concerns vary from culture to culture and from one age to another, the respective systems of categories will take up an utterly different structural outlook." (p. 243)
(...)
"If we examine the original Greek expressions of the ten categories, we discover that they are not at all abstract conceptual expressions, but rather a checklist of some very

commonly used everyday locutions. Take the categories 1t0'O and 1to't~ for example: if
it was Aristotle's wish to express what we now call Place and Time, he could have readily used expressions such as 't61to~ and Χρ6νο~ which were already very common in those days.
Taking this point into consideration, one can decide upon another principle of translation. Instead of rendering the ten categories as ten abstract conceptions, one might describe them as ten basic patterns of ordinary locution (or better, interrogation) arriving thus at the following table: (19)
Οὐσία [τί ἐστι] Substantive
Ποσόν Adjective (quantitative)
Ποιόν Adjective (qualitative)
Πρός τι Adjective (comparative)
Ποῦ Adverb of place
Πότε Adverb of time
Κεῖσθαι Verb - middle voice
Εχειν Verb - perfect
Ποιεῖν Verb - active voice
Πάσχειν Verb - passive voice
(19) See Aristotle's *Categories*, translated by Harold P. Cooke, *Aristotle in Twenty-three Volumes*, Vo!. 1; The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1938/1973), pp. 16-19.

26. Labuda, Pavol. 2019. "The Ontological Status of Human Speech in Aristotle‘s "Categories"." *Filosoficky Casopis* no. 67:877-894
Abstract: "The subject of this paper is the issue of human speech in Aristotle, especially in his work Categories. Its primary goal is to elaborate an interpretation of Aristotle’s statements about human speech as a quantity (Cat. 4b20–b39, 5a15–b2) that would allow them to fit reasonably into the whole of Aristotle’s theory of language. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part a certain approach to the question of the reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of language is proposed. The second part, by means of the introduction of the criteria of separability and ontological

priority of the first substance, creates a framework for the subsequent analysis of the two basic classifications, which constitute the main theme of Categories. The third part supplies its own interpretation of the ontological status of human speech in the context of the classification schemes in Categories, and this, in the fourth part, is inserted into the greater whole of Aristotle's theory of language."

27. Lang, Helen. 2004. "Aristotle's Categories "Where" and "When"." In *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, edited by Gorman, Michael and Sanford, Jonathan J., 21-32. Washington: Catholic University of America Press
"The word "category" itself comes from the verb κατηγορέω, meaning "to denounce," "to accuse," or, as we shall see in Aristotle, "to be predicated." In his entry "Categories" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Manley Thompson turns first to "Aristotelian Theory" and asserts:
The word "category" was first used as a technical term in philosophy by Aristotle. In his short treatise called *Categories*, he held that every uncombined expression signifies (denotes, refers to) one or more things falling in at least on of the following ten classes: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action, and passion.(1)
This list of categories is almost always attributed to Aristotle. But in fact it does not reflect Aristotle's language either in the *Categories*, which Thompson cites, or in the rest of the corpus. With the exception of the first category, substance, none of Aristotle's categories is a noun;(2) they are adjectives, adverbs, infinitives, and in one case ("relation") a prepositional phrase, made to stand as substantives. Although classical Greek certainly allows for the formation of substantives by means of a definite article, Aristotle does not always use an article when specifying categories, and even when he does, these expressions seem odd. Indeed, they are part of the reason why Aristotle's Greek is often thought of as Hellenistic rather than "classical," strictly speaking.
The question for a philosopher is not translation per se but what is at stake substantively in this apparently linguistic

matter. Here I shall consider two of Aristotle's categories. They appear above as "place" and "time," but I shall argue that they are more properly "where" and "when"—indefinite adverbs that are sometimes best translated as "somewhere" and "sometime." I shall conclude that the translations "place" and "time" obscure important substantive issues at stake in these categories. These issues appear clearly in both the historical origins of these categories in Plato and in the relation of these categories to Aristotle's physics." (pp. 21-22)

1. Manley Thompson, "Categories," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 2:46–47.

2. A good deal of work has been done on the etymology of Aristotle's word οὐσία. For example, see the excellent discussion in Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 137–54.

28. Leszl, Walter. 1970. *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle (Aristotle's Treatment of Types of Equivocity and Its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories)*. Padova: Antenore Contents: Preface 1; Introduction 7; Part I. Aristotle on Meaning and What Is Meant 23; Chapter I. The meaning of words 25; Chapter II. The unity of the components of definition 50; Chapter III. The structure of reality 60; Part II. Homonymy, Sinonymy and Related Concepts 81; Chapter I. Aristotle's classification of the uses of predicate words and expressions and of sentences 83; Chapter II. Generalities on focal meaning and on analogy 114; Part III. Some Intepreters Treatment of Focal Meaning and Analogy 133; Chapter I. The prevailing accounts of focal meaning and of analogy and of Aristotle's employment of them in the context of his metaphysics 135; Chapter II. The synonymy account of focal meaning as applied to the being of the categories 162; Chapter III. The synonymy account of focal meaning as applied to the model-copy situation 182; Part IV. Close Analysis of the Logical Mechanism of Focal Meaning and f Analogy According to the Various Competing Accounts 203; Chapter I. Criticism of the synonymy account

of focal meaning as applied to the being of the categories 205; Chapter II. Criticism of the synonymy account of focal meaning as applied to the model-copy situation 252; Chapter III. Introduction of some logical distinctions concerning relations and related terms and of some other accounts of focal meaning 285; Chapter IV. The homonymy account of focal meaning and of analogy 303; Part V. Evidence for and Againt each of the Competing Accounts of Focal Meaning and of Analogy 327; Chapter I. Examination of the evidence concerning Aristotle's alleged changes in his treatment of words with focal meaning and with analogy 329; Chapter II. Interpretation of the evidence concerning analogy 373; Chapter III. Interpretation of the evidence concerning focal meaning 387; Part VI. Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Metaphysics 451; Chapter I. Self-defeating character of Aristotle's objections to Plato on the traditional account of his metaphysical thought 453; Chapter II. Suggestions towards the elimination of the alleged contradictions in Aristotle's metaphysical thought 486; Chapter III. Aristotle's methodology as contrasted with the methodology of the Academics 539; Bibliography 553; Indexes 567; Index of Texts 569; Index of Greek terms 579; Index of Subjects 583; Index of Persons 595-601.

"The generality of the main title of the present work may be misleading as to its actual scope, which is more appropriately defined by its subtitle. It is an inquiry into Aristotle's treatment of ομωνυμία and of its species, considered in the background of his metaphysical theories, which both condition and are conditioned by that logical treatment. It is the prevalence of an interest in these two-way conditionings which is expressed by the main title.

Tn spite of misgivings, then, I have preserved it on this ground, and also because the work is meant to be a part of a more comprehensive treatment of logic and metaphysics in Aristotle, which should include a detailed examination of the way in which the logical distinctions here introduced are used in dealing with fundamental words like "being", "one" and "good". At least in the conclusive chapter I have actually gone beyond (he theme defined by the subtitle by showing

that Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity is only one instance, if probably the most important and interesting one, of his methodology of definition." (Preface, p. 1)

29. Lewis, Frank A. 1991. *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Part I: *Aristotle's Ealier Metaphysical Theory*, pp. 3-82.
"The book is organized into four parts, corresponding to what I take to be the different stages in Aristotle's metaphysical thinking. Part I offers a sketch of perhaps the earliest phase of Aristotle's thinking in the *Categories* and his reaction to the background in Plato's metaphysical theory. Part II examines Aristotle's notions of substance, accident, accidental compounds, and the two sameness relations 'x is accidentally the same asy ' and 'x is the same in being as y'. Part III extends the treatment of accidental compounds in Part II to form-matter compounds and to the notions of form and matter, which do not appear in Aristotle's earlier works but are central to the theories of the *Metaphysics*. Part IV, finally, addresses the special problems that Aristotle's new metaphysical theory brings. I set out some of the classic puzzles that bedevil Aristotle's later metaphysics - for example, the puzzle of how in the *Metaphysics* an Aristotelian form is apparently both a primary substance and a universal, while Aristotle also insists that "no universal is a substance," or again, the puzzle of how form is a primary substance and a universal, and hence predicated of many, while "primary substance is not predicated of any subject" - and argue that they result from Aristotle's attempt to adapt the various requirements on primary substance developed in his earlier works (the *Categories* and *Topics* especially) to the very different metaphysical picture - including a different choice of what to count as primary substance! - in the *Metaphysics*. I also show how the solutions I suggest to these puzzles fit within the overall theory, large parts of which have already been laid out in earlier chapters." (p. X)

30. ———. 2004. "Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 68:1-36

"The topic of homonymy, especially the variety of homonymy that has gone under the title, “focal meaning,” is of fundamental importance to large portions of Aristotle’s work-not to mention its central place in the ongoing controversies between Aristotle and Plato. It is quite astonishing, therefore, that the topic should have gone so long without a book-length treatment.
And it is all the more gratifying that the new book on homonymy by Christopher Shields should be so comprehensive, and of such uniformly high quality.(1) Everyone who cares about Aristotle will be in his debt. Shields’s book falls into two parts. In the first, he is concerned to lay out the basic structure of Aristotle’s views about homonymy; in the second part, we are led through the various applications of the idea, to the analysis of friendship, for example, the homonymy of the body, the account of goodness and, not least, the homonymy of being. Shields’s book brings out well how the topic of homonymy weaves in and out of the fabric of Aristotle’s thinking in a variety of areas. I will resist the temptation to follow Shields through these various subject-matters, and instead take up essentially two topics. First, (I), the basic outline of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, more or less independently of its different applications (here, I follow Shields’s example in the first half of his book). Thereafter, I discuss a single application: the homonymy of being (this is the subject of Shields’s last and longest chapter). Here, I will be interested (II) in how homonymy relates to the theory of the categories; and (III) in the application of homonymy to the analysis of substance in the *Metaphysics*." (p. 1)
(1) Shields, Christopher (1999), *Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle*, Oxford.

31. Lloyd, Antony C. 1962. "Genus, Species and Ordered Series in Aristotle." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 7:67-90
"Aristotle claims that when objects have an order of priority their common predicate or universal is not something apart from them.

It will be convenient from time to time to refer to such objects as terms, for they are terms of an ordered series; and for a similar convenience the groups containing them will be called P-series. Aristotle's claim is expressly used as the premiss of more than one argument in his works; and the Neoplatonists made very interesting comments on it.
I wish to ask and to suggest an answer to the questions what Aristotle meant by it and why he made it. The matter was expounded some fifty years ago by Cook Wilson, not for the first time but in a way of his own
which has been repeated (among others) by Sir David Ross. (1) Their interpretation is, I feel sure, quite misleading and I believe it to be just wrong. Apart from that there are more questions to be asked about the
Aristotelian passages than it was Cook Wilson's purpose to ask and perhaps more than he recognised. Thirdly the ancient commentators' arguments, which he ignored, are both to the point and worth considering
for their own development of Aristotelianism. Some of them are echoed in the criticisms of modern idealists. These arguments are concerned with the logical relationship of species to genus. I shall try to show that Aristotle's thesis about P-series raises the crucial problem how an "appropriate differentia" is to be distinguished from any apparently defining characteristic; and to solve this is to discover how the relation of a species like man or dog to the genus animal differs from the relation of a quasi-species like male or female." (p. 67)
(1) J. Cook Wilson, "On the Platonic doctrine of ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί", *Classical Review* XVIII (1904), pp. 247-60, esp. §§ i and 7; W. D. Ross *ad* Ar. *Met*. B 999a6-10. L. Robin, *Théorie pIatonicienne des idées et des nombres* ...., pp. 614-18 uses more material from A. but really says less that explains.

32. ———. 1966. "Aristotle's Categories Today." *Philosophical Quartely* no. 16:258-267
Review-article of: *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with notes, by J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

"The *Categories* have always had at least three centres of interest: the distinction of primary and secondary substances, the concept of homonymy and synonymy and its application to the concept of being, and the more or less formal properties discovered in the categories one by one. I shall be concerned mostly with the first.
To my judgement there is a comparatively simply way into the categories according to which the word translated ' substance ' means 'being ' and the primary notion of being is existence. (This is the είναι απλώς opposed to είναι επί μέρους, i.e.είναι τοδί ή τοδί (of *An. Post*. II 2 and *Met*. Z 1, 1028a31.) About existence we can ask (or so it seems) " what is it to exist? " and "what exists" The first question is given, though not in the *Categories*, the answer "to be active " (*energeia*). The second question could be a request to identify everything that there is, which would not even *prima facie* be a sensible request. Or it could be a request to identify the sorts of thing that exist: this is given two answers in the *Categories*, individuals and those genera and species which are composed of individuals. But so as to understand the ten categories we can distinguish these two kinds of things from all the kinds of things-or, what it is superfluous to add, all the kinds of things there are (*onta*), which are the ten categories. The individuals and the species and genera are then called 'beings', in the plural and in the usage which has regularly been translated 'substances'." (p. 258)

33. Loux, Michael. 1997. "Kinds and Predications: An Examination of Aristotle's Theory of Categories." *Philosophical Papers* no. 26:3-28
"The classificatory framework Aristotle calls the categories appears repeatedly throughout the corpus. The treatise that opens the corpus has come to be known as the *Categories* and is apparently concerned to delineate the central features of the most important and potentially most puzzling of the categories listed there.(1) The categories reappear in subsequent works of the *Organon*, where they are put to substantive philosophical use in the resolution of semantical, logical, and epistemological problems. In

numerous places in the *Physics*, we meet with the claim that there is a variety of different categories, each with its own distinct ontological properties, and the claim plays a significant role in delineating the general contours of the concept of change. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle's attempt to characterize the soul takes the classification provided by the categories as its theoretical backdrop.
Again, in the *Metaphysics,* there is regular reference to the framework of the categories, and the distinctions expressed by the framework prove crucial to the treatment of ontological problems about being, unity, and substance. Even in the ethical writings, Aristotle reminds us that there are different categories of being and uses the reminder as a vehicle for introducing us to central metaethical claims about the semantics of 'good'. It is not unreasonable, then, to conclude that Aristotle took the classification associated with the categories to be a fundamental feature of his own approach to philosophical issues." (p. 3)
(1) For doubts about the traditional reading of the *Categories,* see Michael Frede, 'Categories in Aristotle' in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1987, pp. 29-48.

34. Mahlan, John Robert. 2019. "Aristotle on Secondary Substance." *Apeiron* no. 52:167-197
Abstract: "At the beginning of *Categories* 5, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of substance: primary substance and secondary substance. Primary substances include particular living organisms, inanimate objects, and their parts.
Secondary substances are the species and genera of these. This distinction is unique to the *Categories,* which raises the question of why Aristotle treats species and genera as substances. I argue that Aristotle has two distinct reasons for doing so, and contrast my interpretation with recent alternatives. On my view, species and genera enjoy two kinds of fundamentality – ontological and epistemological – in virtue of which they warrant their status as substances."
35. Malcolm, John. 1981. "On the Generation and Corruption of the Categories." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 33:662-681

"It is tempting to assume that an obvious way in which Aristotle determined his list of categories was to take a primary substance as subject and classify its predicates. (1) The advantage of this suggestion is that it appears to give us the list of categories given at *Categories* 1 b25 ff. For example, if we take Socrates as subject, then, when we predicate man of him, we get a predicate which is a substance (*ousia*). When we consider "Socrates is grammatical" we get a predicate in quality or "how qualified" (*poion*). "Socrates is in the market place" gives us place or "where" (*pou*) and so on.
Although I shall propose that, in the case of the first category, *ousia*, this is not how Aristotle, in fact, proceeds in the *Categories* (see p. 674 below), the major shortcoming of this procedure is that it cannot account for individuals, and a fortiori individual substances, as items in the categories." (p. 662)
(...)
"My procedure, therefore, will not be to start with the SRPR [*subject restricted to substance predicate relative*] option and try to adjust it to harmonize with the doctrine of the work entitled *Categories*, nor indeed to take this work as my point of departure, for, somewhat paradoxically, I shall contend that the list of *Categories* 1b25 ff. was assembled in a rather haphazard fashion. I shall, in fact, begin with *Topics* 1.9 and, taking this as basic, endeavor to explain the other relevant passages in the Aristotelian corpus in the light of what is to be found there." (p. 663)
(1) See J. Ackrill, *Aristotle's* Categories *and* De Interpretatione (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 78-79, for this alternative.

36. Malink, Marko. 2007. "Categories in *Topics* I.9." *Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 4:271-294
"In the first sentence of *Topics* 1.9, Aristotle proposes to determine the γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν. These are the ten categories he is going to discuss in this chapter. He seems to think of them as genera classifying items which are referred to as κατηγορίαι. What are these items? Commentators tend to agree that they are either predications or predicates.(1) In

the first case, the categories would classify items such as ‘Socrates is white’ or ‘man is animal’. In the second case, they would classify terms such as ‘white’ or ‘animal’ which are able to serve as predicates of predications. The two options need not be incompatible with each other, for the categories might provide a classification both of predicates and of predications. At any rate, we should like to determine the criteria by which the categories manage to classify either predicates or predications or both." (p. 271)

37. Mann, Wolfgang-Rainer. 2000. *The Discovery of Things. Aristotle's Categories and Their Context*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; A Note on Citations XI; Introduction 3; Part I. Setting the stage: The "Antepraedicamenta" and the "Praedicamenta" 39; Part II: Plato's metaphysics and the status of things 75; PART III. The categories picture once more: an alternative to Platonism and late-learnerism 184; Epilogue 205; Select Bibliography 207; Index Locorum 219; Index Rerum 226-231.
"1. The Project
In two of his early works—in the Categories especially, but also in the Topics—Aristotle presents a revolutionary metaphysical picture. This picture has had a peculiar fate. Its revolutionary theses are so far from being recognized as such that they have often been taken to be statements of common sense, or expressions of an everyday, pretheoretical ontology.2 The most striking and far-reaching of those theses is the claim that, included among what there is, among the entities (τά δντα), there are things. Aristotle, famously, goes on to maintain that these things are ontologically fundamental. All the other entities are (whatever they are)3 by being appropriately connected to the things, for example, either as their features (their qualities, sizes, relations-to-each-other, locations, and so on), or as their genera and species, that is, the kinds under which the things fall.4 These further claims and their proper interpretation have received considerable discussion. Yet the fundamental one has gone virtually unnoticed. To

formulate it most starkly: before the Categories and Topics^ there were no things. Less starkly: things did not show up ^5 things, until Aristotle wrote those two works." (pp. 3-4)
(...)
"With a better understanding of Plato's metaphysical picture before us, we will be in a position to appreciate just how revolutionary and innovative Aristotle is being in the Categories and Topics. We will also be able to see how Aristotle set the stage for turning "the unaccustomed" into "longstanding custom" (Heidegger's phrase). The unique and central role which the Categories played in the philosophical curricula of late antiquity and the Latin middle ages obviously contributed enormously to this philosophical picture's successful ascendancy, to the point where it truly could appear to be nothing more than a reflection of common sense, precisely because it had become a part of common sense. And I am inclined to believe that this success, to a large extent, also explains why Plato is read in the ways he is commonly read: the mistake is neither one of simply overlooking something obvious—or not so obvious—nor one of inadvertently smuggling in Aristotelian notions. Rather, the ascent and dominance of the ontological picture of the Categories has so thoroughly eclipsed other pictures and interpretative possibilities that they cannot even come into view, much less be made to seem plausible, without considerable effort." (p. 6)

38. Matthen, Mohan. 1978. "The *Categories* and Aristotle's Ontology." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 17:228-243
Abstract: "What where Aristotle's aims in the *Categories*? We can probably all agree that he wanted to say something about different uses of the verb 'to be' - something relevant to ontology. The conventional interpretation goes further: it has Books Γ and Z of the *Metaphysics* superseding theories put forward in the *Categories*. We should expect then that the *Categories* and these books of the *Metaphysics* try to do the same sort of thing. Most exegetes do indeed ascribe to the earlier work fairly elaborate ontologies, though they are in disagreement as to what theory Aristotle held while

writing it. I shall argue in this paper that the whole enterprise of reconstructing the ontology of the *Categories* from its small stock of clues is misguided; that the business of the *Categories* is to set out data for which the *Metaphysics* tries to account. This view is not without consequences relevant to some widely held theses. I shall claim that the differences between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* cannot uncritically be used to trace the development of Aristotle's ontology, that the differences between the two doctrines has been greatly exaggerated. More of this later: let me first explain the distinction on which I shall depend."

39. Matthews, Gareth B. 1989. "The Enigma of Categories 1a20ff and Why it Matters." *Apeiron* no. 22:91-104
Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in a subject ... (b) some are in a subject but not said of any subject. (By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) ... (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject ... (d) some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, ...'(1)
Perhaps no passage in Aristotle has excited more attention in recent years, or aroused more controversy, than the second paragraph of Chapter 2 of the *Categories*, from which the above quotation is taken.
I want to offer a fresh assessment of this recent discussion, as well as some thoughts on why the controversy remains philosophically important.
Paradoxically, I shall offer my fresh assessment by presenting some of the discussion of an ancient commentator, Ammonius.(2) After we have learned what we can from Ammonius, I shall say a little about why it matters which interpretation of *Cat*. 1a20ff we accept." (p. 91)
(1) *Categories* 1a20ff. The translation is by J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963).
(2) I choose Ammonius, not because he is especially original, but because I am currently working with Marc Cohen on an English translation of his commentary on the

Categories and hence am most familiar with it. [Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Categories*, translated by
S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991]
Citations of Ammonius will give the page and line numbers in volume IV.4 of *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, Berlin Academy edition of 1895, edited by A. Busse.

40. ———. 2009. "Aristotelian Categories." In *A Companion to Aristotle*, edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 144-161. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell
"That which is there to be spoken of and thought of, must be.
Parmenides, *Fragment 6* (McKirahan trans.)
The short treatise entitled *Categories* enjoys pride of place in Aristotle's writings. It is the very first work in the standard edition of Aristotle's texts. Each line of the thirty columns that make up this treatise has been pored over by commentators, from the first century BCE down to the present. Moreover, its gnomic sentences still retain their fascination for both philosophers and scholars, even today. In the tradition of Aristotelian commentary, the first works of Aristotle are said to make up the *Organon,* which begins with the logic of terms (the *Categories*), then moves on to the logic of propositions (the *De Interpretatione*) and then to the logic of syllogistic argumentation (the *Prior Analytics*). But to say that the *Categories* presents the logic of terms may leave the misleading impression that it is about words rather than about things. That is not the case. This little treatise is certainly about words. But it is no less about things. It is about terms and the ways in which they can be combined; but this "logic" of terms is also meant to be a guide to what there is, that is, to ontology, and more generally, to metaphysics.
The *Categories* text was not given its title by Aristotle himself. Indeed, there has long been a controversy over whether the work was even written by Aristotle. Michael Frede's discussion of this issue in "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories"* (Frede 1987: 11-28) is as close to being definitive on this issue as is possible. Frede

concludes that the *Categories* can only be the work of Aristotle himself or one of his students.
The question of authenticity is often connected with the issue of whether the last part of the *Categories,* chapters 10-15, traditionally called the *"Postpraedicamenta,"* and the earlier chapters really belong to the same work. We shall have very little to say about the *Postpraedicamenta* here." (p. 144)

41. Matthews, Gareth B., and Cohen, S. Marc. 1968. "The One and the Many." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 21:630-655
The Platonic argument that Aristotle calls "The One Over Many" ([*Metaphysics*, Book 1] 990b13; 107B69) (1) doubtless had something like this as its key premiss:
Whenever two or more things can be properly said to be F, it is by virtue of some one thing, F-ness, that they are properly called F.
The following sentence from Plato's *Republic* suggests such a premiss:
We are in the habit of assuming one Form for each set of many things to which we give the same name.(2)
The pattern of reasoning is familiar. x and y are round. It must be in virtue of roundness (or in virtue of their participating in roundness) that they are properly said to be round. Exactly what is established by the reasoning -- for that matter, what is supposed to be established-is not obvious. Taken in one way, Plato's Theory of Forms presents us with nothing more than a manner of speaking.
(...)
But if we take Plato's theory this way, we ignore the perplexities that give rise to it. There are at least two distinguishable perplexities that lead to a doctrine like Plato's.(3) One perplexity is ontological: Why is it that things naturally fall into kinds? The other - -and it is this perplexity especially that gives life to the One-Over-Many Argument -- is linguistic.(4) The puzzle is this: How can it be that many things are properly called by one name? To take this puzzle seriously we must indulge (I) the inclination to take the case of one name for each thing named (i.e., the case of an ideal proper name) as the paradigm case of a

name, and also (II) the inclination to suppose that 'wise' in 'Pericles is wise' and 'a man' in 'Callias is a man' are names. If we go along with these inclinations, then the puzzle, How can it be that many things are properly called by one name?, becomes real.
(...)
We want to try to show that the *Categories*, on at least one plausible interpretation, offers a more general answer to Plato than has usually been thought to be the case. We shall then make some comments toward assessing the philosophical strengths and weaknesses of this Aristotelian answer." (pp. 631-632, some notes omitted)
(1) Line references, unless otherwise identified, are to the works of Aristotle.
(2) *Republic* 696A. Translations of passages from Plato and Aristotle are our own.
(3) Cf. David Pears's two questions, "Why are things as they are?" and "Why are we able to name things as we do?" in his article, "Universals," in *Logic and Language* (2nd series), ed. by A. Flew (Oxford, 1963), pp. 61-64.

42. Menn, Stephen. 1995. "Metaphysics, Dialectic and the *Categories*." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 100:311-337
Abstract: "I examine the status and function of the *Categories* in Aristotle's philosophy. The work does not belong to «first philosophy, » or indeed to philosophy at all, but to dialectic; not as a « dialectical discussion » of being, but in the strict sense that it is intended, together with the *Topics*, to help the dialectical disputant to decide whether a given term can fall under a proposed definition or a proposed genus. Although the *Categories*, like dialectic in general, has uses in philosophical argument, the supposed opposition between the accounts of substance in the *Categories* and in the *Metaphysics* depends on a misunderstanding of the different aims of the two works."
43. Mignucci, Mario. 1986. "Aristotle's Definitions of Relatives in *Categories* Chapter 7." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:101-127

Reprinted in Andrea Falcon, Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.), *Ancient Logic, Language, and Metaphysics: Selected Essays by Mario Mignucci*, New York: Routledge 2020, pp. 300-322.
"Chapter 7 of Aristotle's *Categories* is dedicated to a study of relatives, which are called "πρός τι". (p. 101)
(...)
"To sum up, I take Aristotle's definition of relatives to mean exactly that a property F is said to be a relative property if, and only if, it can be expanded into a relation that determines F univocally." (p. 104)
(...)
"Aristotle does not clarify the nature of the link that there is between a relative property and its constitutive relation. As we have seen, it is surely an intensional connection, which involves the senses both of the property and of the relation. But how senses are implied is not explicitly stated by him. Shall we leave the problem here? Perhaps an advance can be made if the definition of P1-relatives [*the class of relatives identified by Aristotle's definition*] at the beginning of Cat. 7 is compared with another definition of relatives which is discussed at the end of the same chapter." (p. 106)
(...)
"Many problems remain. One concerns the nature and meaning of stereotypes. Can they be conceived in the way in which Johnson-Leard has devised them, i.e. as frame systems in which default values are given?(26) And is this view consistent with Aristotle's doctrine about meanings and concepts?
I cannot try to answer these questions here. What my attempt to explain Aristotle's view aims at is to show that his position is far from being trivially false, as it is on the traditional interpretation, and that it can be credited with having some philosophical importance. Moreover, his attempt is stimulating because it approaches a modern problem from a different point of view. Nowadays we are accustomed to consider what is entailed by the fact that substitutivity does not hold in cognitive contexts, and we try to explain why it does not obtain. Aristotle is well aware of

these restrictions, (27) but he is more interested in isolating cases in which substitutivity can be safely applied. Perhaps this change of perspective may help to refresh our own patterns of analysis." (p. 126)
(26) Cf. Johnson-Laird, pp. 26-29.
(27) Cf. e.g. *SE* [*De Sophisticis Elenchis*] 24, 179a35-b5.
References
Johnson-Laird, P.N.: "Formal Semantics and the Psychology of Meaning", in Peters, S. and Saarinen, E. (eds.), *Processes, Beliefs, and Questions, Essays on Formal Semantics of Natural Language and Natural Language Processing*, Dordrecht 1982, pp. 1-68.

44. Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo. 1945. "The Text of the *Categoriae*: the Latin Tradition." *Classical Quarterly* no. 39:63-74
Reprinted in: L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscola: the Latin Aristotle,* Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert 1972, pp. 28-39.
Abstract: "The Latin versions of Aristotle's *Categoriae* have never received much attention from the editors of the Greek text. J. Th. Buhle (Arist. *Op. Omn.* I, Bipont. 1791) and Th. Waitz (Arist. *Organ.* I, Lpz., I844) availed themselves of Latin texts, but in a very unsatisfactory way; and since them the Latin field has remained unexplored throughout the last hundred years, in which both Hellenists and Orientalists have done much to increase our knowledge of the textual tradition of the *Categ*. It is the purpose of these pages to give a summary account of the Latin tradition and to contribute to a revision of the Greek text by a collation of Boethius' recently discovered translation with the best printed Greek and Oriental sources."
45. Moon, Kyungnam. 2021. "Aristotle's Disturbing Relatives." *Apeiron* no. 54:451-472
Abstract: "In *Categories* 7, Aristotle gives two different accounts of relatives, and presents the principle of cognitive symmetry, which seems to help distinguish between relatives and some secondary substances. I suggest that the longdisputed difference between the two accounts lies in a difference in the determination of the categorial status of the object in question, and I formulate the principle of cognitive symmetry such that it plays a crucial role in

making explicit how one conceptualizes the categorial status of the object. I then set out some consequences following from this understanding for certain interpretive issues, such as the unity of the *Categories*."

46. Morales, Fabio. 1994. "Relational Attributes in Aristotle." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 39:255-274
Abstract: "Aristotle's theory of relations involves serious difficulties of interpretation. By attempting to solve some of the problems posed by J. L. Ackrill in his famous commentary on the *Categories* (Ackrill, 1963), I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Aristotle's statements on the nature and status of relational attributes. In general, my procedure has been to analyze the criteria by which entities are supposed to fall under the category of 'the relative'. The following topics will be considered: i) Aristotle's two definitions of relatives in *Categories* 7, ii) the pseudo-relational character of the parts of substances, and iii) the threefold classification of relatives in *Metaphysics* chapter 15. A corollary of these discussions will be that relations may have played for Aristotle a far more conspicuous role in the 'definition' of substances and attributes than has been hitherto acknowledged."
47. Moravcsik, Julius M. E. 1967. "Aristotle's Theory of Categories." In *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 125-145. New York: Anchor Books
"In several of his writings Aristotle presents what came to be known as a "list of categories." The presentation of a list, by itself, is not a philosophic theory.
This paper attempts a few modest steps toward an understanding of the theory or theories in which the list of categories is embedded. To arrive at such understanding we shall have to deal with the following questions: What classes of expressions designate items each of which falls under only one category? What is the list a list of? and what gives it unity? To show this to be a worthwhile enterprise, let us consider a few passages in which the list of categories is introduced or mentioned." (p. 125)
(...)

"Conclusion. The theory of categories is partly a theory about language and partly a theory about reality.
With regard to language it states that certain elements of a language have key-designating roles, the full understanding of which requires that we understand the designata as falling within those classes which jointly form the set definitive of that to which a sensible particular must be related. We can see from this that Aristotle did not think of the structure of language as mirroring the structure of reality. But he did believe that there are specific items of language and reality the correlation of which forms the crucial link between the two." (p. 145)

48. ———. 1967. "Aristotle on Predication." *The Philosophical Review* no. 76:80-96
Erratum, *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 1967), p. 543.
49. Morrison, Donald. 1992. "The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*: A Criticism." In *Aristotle's Ontology*, edited by Preus, Anthony and Anton, John Peter, 19-46. Albany: State University of New York Press
"In the *Topics*, *Categories*, and *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle is struggling with a variety of problems that span the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Both the problems and the attempted solutions have much relevance to some of the main issues in contemporary British and American philosophy. Thus it is unfortunate that though there is a large number of ancient commentaries on these texts, little has been written on these matters in modern times that is of genuine philosophical significance. Professor Ackrill's new translation and notes (1) make a fine contribution toward remedying this deficiency."
(...)
"One of the reasons for selecting predication as the nest of problems to be discussed is that though much has been written on this during the past sixty years, we seem far from any adequate solution." (p. 80)
(...)
"The point of this review is not to show that Aristotle succeeded in answering the general question that

contemporary philosophers failed to answer. Aristotle did not attempt to answer that general question.
He discusses in the *Categories* -- to which we shall limit our attention several interesting features of predication, and then distinguishes between at least two different types of configuration that underlie predication. The suggestion of this review is that paying attention to these less sweeping problems of predication might be a useful way of adopting a fresh approach to this topic.
The following four claims will be discussed. (a) Ackrill interprets Aristotle as holding that general terms and the correlated abstract singular terms, whether in subject or predicate position, introduce the same entity. (b) Aristotle seems to be committed to the view that general terms have meaning both inside and outside of sentences. (c) Aristotle distinguishes at least two different ontological configurations underlying predication. (d) Aristotle takes predication to be showing the ontological dependence of the entity denoted by the predicate on the entity denoted by the subject." (p. 82)
(1) Aristotle's "Categories" and "De Interpretatione," trans. with notes by J. L. Ackrill (Oxford, i963), pp. VI, 162.

50. Novak, Michael. 1965. "Toward Understanding Aristotle's *Categories*." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 26:117-123
"There are three positions one must gain in order to interpret the first five chapters of the *Categories* and, specifically, the meaning and role therein of 'present in a subject'. The first of these positions is a rejection of univocity; the second is the dual conception of accident; the third is the principle of discrimination on which Aristotle (implicitly) relies in sorting out the strands of his description "of things," (1a20)." (p. 117)
(...)
"'Present in a subject' thus operates in *Categories* 1-5 as a definition of accident, inadequately distinguished from secondary substance. It is inadequately distinguished because its meaning (incapable of existence apart from a subject) applies just as well to secondary substance, though

for a different reason, and this reason is never stated by Aristotle. He says (3a8-10) that secondary substances are not present in a subject, while of course (1a24.1) accidents are. But neither accidents nor secondary substances are; capable of existence apart from primary substances (2b5-6). Some unspoken criterion is therefore operating to distinguish the exact natures of secondary substance, accident, and primary substance.

I have argued that the discriminating factor is the differing relation which each bears to the act of intelligence operating with imagination.

Secondary substances are universalizations of the necessity grasped in insight, are essences, apart from particulars, and yet arising exclusively from insight into concrete particulars. They are not 'present in a subject', yet are incapable of existence apart from a subject. Accidents are, on the one hand, incapable of science because, occurring neither always nor for the most part, they are not necessarily relevant to any particular thing; and, on the other hand, are not capable of being pointed to as a 'this'. They alone are properly 'present in a subject.' Primary substance can be pointed to as a 'this', a unity, grasped not, however, by mere sense knowledge, nor imagination, but by intelligence which distinguishes the inessential from the essential, the permanent and independent from the adventitious, in the presentations of sense and imagination. They are not 'present in a subject,' but are subjects." (pp. 122-123)

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"It is no exaggeration to say that the understanding of Aristotle's First Philosophy and hence of his philosophy as a whole depends largely on the interpretation one gives to his categories of being. For as far as they express the theme itself of First Philosophy - being as being - to their understanding can be justly applied Aristotle's oft quoted words: « The beginning is greater in potentiality than in magnitude and therefore a small mistake in the beginning becomes immense in the end» (1).
But though one must agree with Brentano when he writes « Aristotle's division of categories has in a wonderful way defied the change time brings. When one follows the history of the doctrine of the categories, one sees how even their adversaries unconsciously pay homage to them » (2). Yet in the course of the two thousand odd years since Aristotle formulated them they have met with very varied and opposed interpretations. These changing interpretations have acted as a sort of apriori, a kind of pre-judice for each succeeding age trying to reach Aristotle's thought. For they formed part of the history of being in the Heideggerian sense of the word (3), i.e. what has become the universal unquestioned foreknowledge according to which and in function of which in each epoch one encounters reality."

(...)
"Being for Aristotle is not a subsistent idea - *auto to on* - as it is for Plato, but it is the categories (162). And being is the categories because of the plurality implied by *hupokeimenon* in its to be. And *hupokeimenon* in its to be is being as being according to Aristotle's way of conceiving it. Because therefore Aristotle understands being itself as meaning the categories, being is perceived by the ways of necessary predication (163).
Hence it is not the modes of necessary predication which found the categories of being, as Aubenque seems to believe (164), but it is the categories of being which require these modes of predicating to bring themselves to view and to be known in their truth. « For as each thing is as regards to be so is it as regards truth» (165)"."
(1) *De Coelo*, 1.5. 271 b 13.
(2) Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862, 193.
(3) Cf. M. Heidegger, *Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins* (1941) and *Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik* (1941) in *Nietzsche*, Bd. 2, 399-457; 458-480.
(162) I. Düring, (*Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*, Heidelberg, 1966, 60) remarks appositely: « The word *Kategoria* in the sense of predication (*Aussage*) does not occur in Plato: we find it only once (*Theait*. 167 a) in this sense. The choice of this word shows that Aristotle wanted consciously to distance himself from his older contemporaries in the Academy».
(163) E. Tugendhat, *Ti kata tinos*, Freiburg-Miinchen, 1958, 23.
(164) P. Aubenque, *Le probleme de l'être chez Aristote*, Paris, 1962, 170.
(165) *Met*. α (2), 1, 993 b 32.

2. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1960. "Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle." In *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957*, edited by Düring, Ingemar and Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag

Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986, pp. 180-199.
"Much of Aristotle's early work in logic sprang from the practice and discussions of the Academy in Plato's lifetime. This is a commonplace, but I have tried to illustrate it here by evidence which throws an unfamiliar light on the development of some of Aristotle's most characteristic theories.The commonplace itself is not to be confused with a narrower thesis about the origins of the theory of syllogism: on that well-worn issue I have nothing to say here. I have confined myself to another part of Aristotle's logical studies, namely that part which shaped his views on the nature and possibility of any general science of *to on hêi on* ('being qua being'), any inquiry into the general nature of what there is. Here his major issues were problems of ambiguity, particularly the ambiguity that he claimed to find in 'being' or *to on* as that expression is used in the different categories. And his problems were shared by his contemporaries in the Academy. By opposition and by suggestion they helped to form the logic that underlay First Philosophy." (p. 180)
(...)
"In sum, then, the argument of *Metaphysics* IV, VI seems to record a new departure. It proclaims that 'being' should never have been assimilated to cases of simple ambiguity, and consequently that the old objection to any general metaphysics of being fails. The new treatment of *to on* and cognate expressions as *pros hen kai mian tina phusin legomena*, - or, as I shall henceforth say, as having *focal meaning* - has enabled Aristotle to convert a special science of substance into the universal science of being, 'universal just inasmuch as it is primary." (p. 184)
(...)
"Nor does focal meaning find formal recognition in the class of paronyms which is introduced in the *Categories* and recognized in the *Topics*, for the definition of paronyms is merely grammatical. It shows, not how subordinate senses

of a word may be logically affiliated to a primary sense, but how adjectives can be manufactured from abstract nouns by modifying the word-ending. Plainly the *Categories* does not and could not make any use of this idea to explain how the subordinate categories depend on the first. Nor does it use focal meaning for that purpose (2b4-6). If focal meaning can be seen in the *Categories* it is in the analysis of some one category - clearly enough in the definition of quantity (5a38-b10),) far more doubtfully in the account of the two uses of 'substance' (2b29-37, 3b18-21) - but not in that logical ordering of different categories and different senses of 'being' which lies at the root of the argument in *Metaphysics* IV." (pp. 188-189)

3. ———. 1965. "Inherence." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 10:97-105
   Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986, pp. 252-258.
   "Often in the *Categories* and once in the *Topics* Aristotle draws a distinction between *being in a subject* and *being said*, or *predicated*, *of a subject* (*Cat*. 1a20-b9, 2a11-14, 2a27-b6, 2b15-17, 3a7-32, 9b22-24; *Postpred*. 11 b38-12 a 17, 14a 16-18; *Top*. 127b 1-4). Elsewhere he makes no use of the distinction, at least in this form. Once in the *Categories* he blankets it under the formula belonging to something (11b38-12a17). But it has earned a good deal of attention, and there is a fashionable dogma about it that I should like to nail. Hints of the dogma can be seen in older writers such as Porphyry and Pacius. Its modern exponents are Ross, *Aristotle* p. 24 n. 1; Jones, *Phil. Rev*. 1949 pp. 152-170; and most recently Miss Anscombe in *Three Philosophers* pp. 7-10, and Mr. Ackrill in *Aristotle's 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione'* pp. 74-5, 83, 109." (p. 252)
   (...)
   "To say that if the Idea of man is a substance it cannot exist apart from that of which it is the substance is to say that its existence requires (indeed consists in) the existence of at least one individual falling under the classification human.

And to say that pink or a particular shade of pink cannot exist apart from what contains it is to say, as Aristotle always says against Plato, that something must contain it if it is to exist at all." (p. 258)

4. ———. 1965. "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology." In *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, edited by Bambrough, Renford, 69-95. New York: Humanities Press
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986, pp. 259-278.
"Aristotle's commonest complaint against other philosophers is that they oversimplify. One oversimplification to which he is especially attentive is the failure to see that the same expression may have many different senses. And among such expressions there is one arch-deceiver against which he often issues warnings: the verb 'to be', '*einai*'. I shall discuss part of his attempt to unmask this deceiver, namely his account of the verb in what is ordinarily, and too sweepingly, called its 'existential' use." (p. 259)
5. ———. 1965. "The Platonism of Aristotle." *Proceedings of the British Academy* no. 50:125-150
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. 1 (Duckworth, 1975), pp. 14-34 and in G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy,* Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986, pp. 200-220.
"Eight years ago, in a memorable Dawes Hicks Lecture to this Academy ,(1) David Ross spoke of Aristotle's development as a philosopher. One theory of that development he singled out as having established itself in the fifty years since it appeared. It was pioneered in this country by Thomas Case and in Germany, with great effect, by Werner Jaeger. It depicts Aristotle, in Sir David's words, as 'gradually emerging from Platonism into a system of his own'. Aristotle's philosophical career began in the twenty years that he spent learning and practising his trade in Plato's Academy, and it ended in the headship of his own

school. So it is tempting to picture him first as the devoted partisan, then as arguing his way free of that discipleship." (p. 200)
(...)
"Next, in saying that Aristotle's logic was bred of discussion in the Academy, I do not imply that it was a donation from his colleagues. There used to be a myth, promoted by Burnet and Taylor, that the theory of categories was a commonplace of the Academy, derived from scattered hints in Plato's writings. This myth was exposed, not simply by the obvious lack of system in the supposed hints, but by the fact that no other Academic known to us endorsed the theory and that Xenocrates, Plato's self-appointed exegete, denounced it as a pointless elaboration and went back to a simpler distinction derived from Plato's dialogues. Nor again do I mean that Aristotle's logic had come to full maturity before Plato's death. The division of the categories and probably the general theory of the syllogism, had been worked out by then; but Aristotle continued to review and develop these doctrines in his later work. The same is true of his theory of definition and, more generally of his theory of meaning. What is beyond question is that these theories wera developed in practice and not as an independent exercise. The theory of definition was modified to keep pace with the work of a biologist who had once held that a definition could be reduced to a single differentia and then found himself, when he set out to define any natural species, faced with a set of competing criteria. The theory of meaning, of synonymy and homonymy, was enlarged to allow a value to philosophical inquiries which had been earlier denounced as trading on an equivocation. At every stage Aristotle's logic had its roots in philosophical argument and scientific procedure: it would be an anachronism to think otherwise. So what arguments lie at the root of his early account of substance and the categories?" (p. 207)

6. Owens, Joseph. 1960. "Aristotle on Categories." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 14:73-90

Reprinted in J. Owens, *Aristotle, the Collected Papers of Joseph Owens*, Edited by John R. Catan, New York: State University of New York Press 1981, pp. 14-22.

"In particular, the present paper would inquire whether the notion of category construction was intended in its beginnings to be an arbitrary procedure, whether it was meant to categorize words, and how it stands up to later examples of category mistakes. The paper, accordingly, will first examine briefly the doctrine of categories in its original Aristotelian setting; secondly, it will try to determine the type of treatment found there; and finally it will confront the Aristotelian doctrine with some irritant instances of category mistakes." (p. 14)

(...)

"This brief glance at the Aristotelian doctrine of categories and its confrontation with instances of category mistakes will indicate, it is hoped, some pertinent features of the earliest explicit category construction. It was based upon the natures of things and not upon the use of language. Because it was concerned with natures and not primarily with words, it was not at all an arbitrary procedure. The natures of things resist the manipulations of human whims, and keep the universe from becoming a world where everything is nonsense. But these natures exist in two ways, in reality and in cognition. Some predicates will belong to the nature just of itself, no matter where it is found. Other predicates ·will belong to a nature only in real existence. They are those concerned with its real history in some individual. Still other predicates will belong to it only as it exists in intellectual cognition, for instance that it is a species or a genus. These considerations show why categories are the concern of both the metaphysician and the logician, and why confusion in the three ways in which predicates apply will necessarily give rise to category mistakes. The Aristotelian doctrine likewise shows why the intrinsic principles of things cannot be placed directly in a category.

Its basic grooves of category construction, along with this warning, still serve quite well as dissolvents for such category mistakes as the ghost in the machine, the elephant

with the baggage, or murder a relation. The category doctrine as found originally in the Stagirite's works is open to a great amount of development and elaboration, both to smooth out its own difficulties and to meet problems of current discussion. It offers a solid basis for profitable philosophic construction. It is far from complete, but what is there is very good." (pp. 21-22, notes omitted)

7. Perin, Casey Carlton. 2007. "Substantial Universals in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 33:125-144
"Aristotle in the *Categories*, but not elsewhere, presents the distinction between individual substances such as Socrates or Bucephalus and their species and genera as the distinction between primary (πρώται) and secondary (δευτέραι) substances (2A11–19).
The distinction between primary and secondary substances, in turn, is a distinction between substances that are particulars and substances that are universals.
(...)
"Therefore, according to the definitions of 'universal' and 'particular' Aristotle gives in De interpretatione, a primary substance is not a universal but a particular. In the *Categories* a secondary substance is the species or genus of a primary substance (2A14–19).The
species human being, for instance, is said of, and so predicated of, all individual human beings (Socrates, Callias, Coriscus, etc.). The genus animal is said of, and so predicated of, its species (human being, horse, dog, etc.) as well as all individual animals (Socrates,
Bucephalus the horse, Fido the dog, etc.). Since a secondary substance is predicated of more than one being or entity as its subject, it is not a particular but a universal.3 The question I want to try to answer here is why, according to Aristotle in the *Categories*, certain
universals such as the species human being or the genus animal are substances." (pp. 126-127, notes omitted)
(...)
"On Aristotle's view in the *Categories*, then, the species or genus of a primary substance is both a subject for inherence,

and for this reason a substance, and, being a universal, a predicable predicated of (said of) a plurality of subjects. The non-substantial items that
inhere in the species or genus of a primary substance are all of those non-substantial items that inhere in the primary substances of which that species or genus is predicated. As a result the species or genus of a primary substance, unlike a primary substance itself,
is a subject for inherence in which contraries can inhere at one and the same time. This view obviously invites a question that, as far as I know, no commentator has yet answered: what kind of being or entity could *this* be?" (pp. 142-143)

8. Polsky, Elliot. 2022. "Secondary Substance and Quod Quid Erat Esse: Aquinas on Reconciling the Divisions of "Substance" in the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 96:21-45
Abstract: "Modern commentators recognize the irony of Aristotle's Categories becoming a central text for Platonic schools. For similar reasons, these commentators would perhaps be surprised to see Aquinas's In VII Metaphysics, where he apparently identifies the secondary substance of Aristotle's Categories with a false Platonic sense of "substance" as if, for Aristotle, only Platonists would say secondary substances are substances. This passage in Aquinas's commentary has led Mgr. Wippel to claim that, for Aquinas, secondary substance and essence are not the same thing and that Aristotle's notion of essence is absent from the Categories. This paper—by closely analyzing the apparently contradictory divisions of "substance" in Aquinas's In V and VII Metaphysics—shows that essence and secondary substance are not altogether distinct for Aquinas. Moreover, when the Categories is viewed by Aquinas as a work of logic, it is found largely to cut across the disputes between Platonism and Aristotelianism."
9. Rohr, Michael D. 1978. "Aristotle on the Transitivity of *Being Said of*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 16:379-385

Aristotle, in several of his treatises, discusses or makes use of the ontological tie or relation' being said of (and its converse partaking of), whose importance to his thought has been recognized by many scholars. Its pervasiveness guarantees that there will be difficulties in its interpretation. (2) To isolate it as an object of Aristotelian exegesis, I shall tentatively identify it with the sortal tie and so take it as connecting (in Aristotelian terms) each genus to all the species and individuals falling under that genus and each species to all the individuals and subordinate species (if any) falling under that species." (p. 379), two notes omitted) (2) Some recent attempts at interpreting it may be found in Chung-Hwan Chen, "On Aristotle's Two Expressions," *Phronesis* 2 (1957):148-59; *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 75-90; R. E. Alien, "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M, Rorty (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 362-73; and Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts About Substances," *The Philosophical Review* 84 (1975): 338-73.

10. Ross, William David. 1939. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 36:431-433
"Professor Husik (*) has done a service to students of Aristotle by reminding them of his earlier article, which, buried in the decent obscurity of a learned journal, had escaped my attention, as well as that of many other students.
The authenticity of the *Categories* is well attested by external evidence. The work was accepted as genuine by almost all the ancient scholars (πάντες παρτυρώσι, says Philoponus). A succession of scholars wrote commentaries on it as on a genuine work of Aristotle, from the third century A.D. onwards -- Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, not to speak of the later commentators, Elias and David. Its genuineness was, however, probably doubted by some scholars, for several of the commentators devote themselves to refuting arguments

against its genuineness -- e.g., Philoponus 12.34-13.5, Simplicius 379.7-380.15, Olympiodorus 22.38-24.20. The arguments which they set themselves to meet-arguments derived from supposed contradictions between the *Categories* and certain works of Aristotle- are invariably weak, and the answers given by the commentators are convincing." (p. 431)
[* I. Husik, "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*", *Journal of Philosophy*, 1939]

11. ———. 1995. *Aristotle*. London and New York: Routledge Sixth edition. With an introduction by John L. Ackrill (First edition 1923, fifth revised edition 1953); on the *Categories* see pp. 22-26.
"Ross's book gives a concise and comprehensive account of Aristotle's philosophical works—and no better account exists.
In this Introduction I will say something about Ross and about his book, and I will then outline some of the ways in which the study of Aristotle has developed in the years since he wrote it." (From the *Introduction* by J. L. Ackrill, p. VII).
(...)
"It is highly probable that the doctrine [of categories] began as an attempt to solve certain difficulties about predication which had troubled the Megaric school and other earlier thinkers.(18) Aristotle's object seems to have been to clear up the question by distinguishing the main types of meaning of the words and phrases that can be combined to make a sentence. And in doing this he arrived at the earliest known classification of the main types of entity involved in the structure of reality.
Why are they called categories? The ordinary meaning of is 'predicate,' but the first category has for its primary members individual substances, which according to Aristotle's doctrine are never properly predicates but always subjects. It has sometimes, therefore, been thought that primary substances do not fit properly into the doctrine of the categories. But this is not the case. 'Socrates' is, indeed, on Aristotelian principles no proper predicate; but if we ask what Socrates is, the ultimate, i.e. the most general, answer

is ‘a substance,’ just as, if we ask what red is, the ultimate answer is ‘a quality.’ The categories are a list of the widest predicates which are predicable essentially of the various nameable entities, i.e. which tell us what kinds of entity at bottom they are." (pp. 23-24)
(18) This view is ably expressed in O. Apelt’s: *Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles* in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*. Leipzig, 1891

12. Sanford, Jonathan J. 2004. "*Categories* and *Metaphysics*: Aristotle's Science of Being." In *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, edited by Gorman, Michael and Sanford, Jonathan J., 3-20. Washington: Catholic University of America Press
"The relationship between Aristotle’s *Categories* and his *Metaphysics* is a matter of some debate. If one assumes that the *Categories* is fundamentally a metaphysical work, then there appear to be irreconcilable differences between the notion of substance presented in the *Categories* and that presented in *Metaphysics* Z (VII). The *Categories* account of substance does not present matter as a component of hylomorphic substance, nor does it consider substance as a formal cause of unity, both of which are key ideas of *Metaphysics* Z (VII). The *Metaphysics* therefore represents a break with Aristotle’s older metaphysical scheme. On the other hand, if one assumes that the *Categories* is fundamentally a logical work that makes no pretence to being a work of metaphysics, then the account of substance and the other categories in the *Categories* is at worst irrelevant to, and at best only obliquely related to, what Aristotle attempts to accomplish in the *Metaphysics*. I think that the truth lies somewhere between these two views. The *Categories* is best understood as both a logical and a metaphysical account. The metaphysics presented in the *Categories* is by no means complete, but Aristotle does not claim that it is. Aristotle does not, in the *Metaphysics*, break with his ideas in the *Categories*, but deepens them and works to fill out his metaphysics. In this essay I consider the relationship between Aristotle’s metaphysics and his theory of categories from the perspective of the requirements of

science. The *Metaphysics* presents Aristotle's science of being, but, as his logical works show, science depends on categories.
Thus the *Metaphysics* cannot be understood apart from the works—especially the *Categories*, the *Topics*, and the *Posterior Analytic*s—in which Aristotle explains what categories are, how they are used, and what their relationship to science is. There are indeed some difficulties in positing a close relationship between Aristotle's earlier and later works, especially in regard to what gives unity to a science and the importance of being in the sense of potentiality and actuality. Still, these problems are not so great as to constitute a disjunction between Aristotle's earlier and later works. Indeed, Aristotle's attempts to describe being in each of its four senses in the *Metaphysics* are possible only because of the close relationship between logic and metaphysics, a relationship that he elucidates in his *Categories* and some other earlier works." (pp. 3-4, notes omitted)

13. Scaltsas, Theodore. 1981. "Numerical versus qualitative Identity of Properties in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Philosophia* no. 10-11:328-345.
14. Scheu, Marina M. 1944. *The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas*. Washington: Catholic University of America Presss
Contents: List of tables VIII; Preface IX; List of abbreviations XIII; Part I. Categories in Aristotle. I. The history and general nature of the categories 3; II. The logical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 13; III. The metaphysical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 23; Part II. Categories in St. Thomas. IV. The history of the categories from Aristotle to St. Thomas 38; V. General nature of the categories in Thomistic philosophy 46; VI. The nature of substance 64; VII. The nature of accident 77; Summary and conclusion 96; Bibliography 98; Index 102-109.
""Knowledge to be of value must be founded on reality. Hence it follows that unless our ideas faithfully reflect reality, our judgments about it will be false. One of the most evident illustrations of this fact is found in the divergent

views philosophers have taken with regard to our widest universal concepts, the categories of being. It is, therefore, an important task of metaphysics to inquire into the modes which characterize the being that these concepts represent. Aristotle, the first philosopher known to have undertaken this task, presents a classification of categories in his logical treatise entitled *Categories*. Nor does he confine his doctrine to but this one of his works. Numerous references to the categories are found in practically all of his writings, especially in the *Metaphysics*.

To St. Thomas Aquinas, however, we owe the development and perfection of the theory of the categories. He, it is true, wrote no authentic logical treatise' on the subject as did Aristotle, but his doctrine of the categories can be culled from his numerous discussions of them throughout his more metaphysical works in particular, especially from the *Quaestiones Disputatae,* the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, and the *Summa Theologica*.

It is the purpose of this study, which is to be primarily metaphysical and Thomistic in character, to present the general teaching of St. Thomas on the categories. Our treatment of Aristotle, then, is to give the proper background, since obviously it is the Aristotelian plan that is the point of departure for all Thomistic study of the subject. Without this Aristotelian environment in which St. Thomas worked, his position would be much less clear. In a word, the Thomistic section of this study will reveal that St. Thomas developed and perfected Aristotelian thought.

The problem of the categories is twofold: logical, in so far as it involves a classification of our generic concepts ; metaphysical, in that it must necessarily regard and classify the objects of those concepts, that is, real beings Therefore, after considering the history and general nature of the categories in the first chapter of the Aristotelian section, we shall examine the logical and metaphysical aspect in the two chapters following. Chapter four will present the historical transition from Aristotle to St. Thomas. Since St. Thomas wrote no logical treatise on the categories, nor any commentary on Aristotle's logical treatment of them, it will

be necessary for us to proceed in a somewhat different manner in the Thomistic section of our work. In keeping with the primarily metaphysical trend in St. Thomas' thought, which is particularly evident in his treatment of the categories, we propose to present in the last three chapters respectively the general character of his teaching on the categories and a consideration of the nature of substance and the nature of accidents." (pp. IX-X notes omitted)

15. Scholz, Donald F. 1963. "The Category of Quantity." *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* no. 19:229-256
"Because quantity itself is relatively well known to us, an analysis of its genus is not too difficult. This fact alone makes it interesting to us. Further, an examination of this genus is useful in coming to an understanding of Aristotle's procedure in the *Categories* as a whole.
For these reasons it would seem appropriate to reflect a little upon Aristotle's treatment of quantity in the *Categories*." (p. 229)
(...)
"In reflecting upon the ways in which Aristotle determines the properties of quantity, we can see that he proceeds inductively in all cases, showing the properties of quantity from its species. This might be taken as a sign of what we said at the beginning of our examination of this category, the genus is so general, so potential, that it can be understood only by making reference to something more actual, its species.
We have now completed our treatment of the category of quantity. We have seen how it is made known and we have seen its properties. We have judged Aristotle's method in exposing this doctrine to have been the proper one. Perhaps, by analyzing the other categories in this way, one would be able to obtain a relatively distinct knowledge of all of them. This in itself -would be no small accomplishment." (p. 256)
16. Sedley, David. 2002. "Aristotelian relativities." In *Le style de la pensée. Recueil d'hommages à Jacques Brunschwig*, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique and Pellegrin, Pierre, 324-352. Paris: Les Belles Lettres

Originally published in Italian as: "Relatività aristoteliche", *Dianoia,* 2, 1997 pp. 11-15 (first part) and 1998, 3, 11-23 (second part).
"In chapter 7 of the *Categories*, devoted to the category of relativity (πρός τι), Aristotle starts with a definition of the relative (6a 36-b 8)" (p. 324)
(...)
"At the end of the chapter (8a 13ff.) he raises a worry about whether this definition will allow some substances to be relative, namely those which are themselves the organic parts of larger substances. We must recall that in the *Categories* he has none of his later qualms about allowing some substances to be composed of substances (1). Hence his question: won't those substances which are parts of larger substances be relative, namely to the wholes of which they are parts? The worry is a proper one, because he has already spoken of the parts of substances as falling into both categories: in chapter 5, at 3a 29-32, they were substances, yet in chapter 7, at 6b 36-7 a 22, relatives include «wing», «head» and «rudder»." (p. 325)
(...)
"Aristotle's point is metaphysical, not linguistic. It is important not to be misled into thinking that he is in any way appealing to what can and cannot be said in the Greek language. It is not even obvious that Greek usage would consider an expression like πρός τι χεὶρ unacceptable. His observation about primary and secondary substances is rather, I suppose, as follows. If a hand appears to be relative, namely to its owner, it is not in virtue being this particular hand that it is relative, but in virtue of being a hand- that is, not because of
its individuality, the hallmark of a primary substance, but because of its species, the hallmark of a secondary substance." (pp. 325-326)
(...)
"I hope that I have made a sufficient case, based on Aristotle's own text,. for attributing to him the distinction between what I have called soft and hard relativity. But now let me confess that my reading him this way was inspired by

a much more lucid version of the same distinction, attributed by Simplicius to the Stoics. The report comes from his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (166.15-29) (22)" (p. 339)
(22) SVF [*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*] II 403. The translation here is based on that at LS [A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley (eds.), A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, 1987] 29B.

17. Sharma, Ravi K. 1997. "A New Defense of Tropes? On *Categories* 3b10-18." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 17:309-315
"A long-standing debate among interpreters of the *Categories* concerns the nature of first-order accidents, the entities designated by expressions such as 'the particular white' (το τι. λευκόν). Some interpreters maintain that Aristotle takes them to be *universals*, entities that may be *present in* many substances; others, that Aristotle takes them to be *tropes*, each of which is peculiar to a single substance.(1)
In a recent issue of this journal, Daniel T. Devereux offers a new defense of the tropes-reading, one that is not based, as most others have been, on Aristotle's cryptic remark concerning the *present-in* relation at 1a24-25.(2) If Devereux is right, the debate has now been settled in favor of tropes. In this note, I shall maintain that Devereux misreads the passage crucial to his argument and that the proper reading undermines his proposed defense." (p. 309)
(1) 1 Throughout this discussion, I italicize 'present in' (ἐν) and 'said of (λέγεσται κατά) when those locutions are used technically, for relations between entities.
(2) See Devereux 1992 ['Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's *Categories*', *Ancient Philosophy* 12: 113-131]. The term 'trope' is my choice; Devereux expresses the same idea by speaking of tokens, or particular instances, of types.

18. Shields, Christopher. 1999. *Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Contents: Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1; Part I: Homonymy as Such. 1. The Varieties of Homonymy 9; 2. The Promises and Problems of Homonymy 43; 3.

Homonymy and Signification 75; 4. Core-Dependent Homonymy 103; Part II: Homonymy at Work. 5. The Body 131; 6. Oneness, Sameness, and Referentia Opacity 155; 7. The Meaning of Life 176; 8. Goodness 194; 9. The Homonymy of Being 217; Afterword: Homonymy's Promise Reconsidered 268; Bibligraphy 271; Index of Passages Cited 281; General Index 287-290.
"Aristotle's treatments of the homonymy of core philosophical concepts, including especially being and goodness, are sometimes highly abstract, and they must be understood as arising from the polemical contexts which motivate them.
For these reasons, I consider these topics only after recounting Aristotle's general framework for introducing homonymy. Accordingly, I divide the study into two parts. In Part I, I consider homonymy as such, mainly by reflecting on the uncontroversial cases upon which Aristotle himself relies when trying to explicate and motivate homonymy. I begin, in Chapter 1, by recounting Aristotle's introduction of homonymy in the *Categories*, settling some exegetical difficulties concerning his general conception of its nature."
(...)
In Part II, I investigate homonymy at work. I do not move through Aristotle's appeals to homonymy seriatim. Rather, I consider a very few cases, selected for their importance, interest, and representative character. In two cases, I urge that some of Aristotle's critics have failed to appreciate the power of homonymy in meeting objections to substantive Aristotelian theories.
(...)
Although I maintain that Aristotle cannot establish the homonymy of being, I do not infer that his commitment to homonymy as such is misguided. On the contrary, I maintain that outside this one application, Aristotle's commitment to homonymy is altogether well motivated; in particular, the method of definition it introduces is of genuine and lasting importance. At the very minimum, I argue,Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis. He has identified a

framework which has too often been overlooked by those disenchanted with the prospects for genuine philosophical progress. Accordingly, I end Part II with a concluding afterword in which I appraise in a fully general way homonymy's enduring value." (pp. 3-5)

19. Simons, Peter. 1988. "Aristotle's Concept of State of Affairs." In *Antike Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, edited by Gigon, Olof and Fischer, Michael W., 97-112. Bern: Peter Lang
"The concept of state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) is one which is of general interest in philosophy in connection with the theory of truth, but is also of special interest for legal philosophy.(1) Its heyday in philosophy was the late (2) nineteenth century and early twentieth century ; it is therefore tempting to regard the concept in its philosophical employment as a thoroughly modern invention. Nevertheless, a similar concept was known to medieval philosophy(3), and the medievals in question - as was usual then - referred back to the authority of Aristotle in support of their views. I claim that those medievals who ascribed something like a concept of state of affairs to Aristotle were right.(4) Discussing the identity of concepts, especially over a time-span of millennia, is fraught with difficulties, so I shall need first to establish what conditions a concept must satisfy to be a concept of state of affairs. This will occupy § 2. I shall then in § 3 endeavour to show that Aristotle's works employ a concept closely answering these conditions." (p. 97)
(...)
"The evidence from Aristotle
The texts supporting my interpretation come mainly from the logical works "Categories" and "De interpretatione". In particular, I claim that the term *pragma* is used on several occasions with a meaning corresponding closely to that of "state of affairs" as specified above. First, some preliminary remarks on interpreting these texts.
We must be clear from the start that in these works Aristotle's discussion is so compressed and so full of ambiguities that no interpretation can be uncontroversial. In discussing semantic matters, Aristotle uses no specially

developed terminology, and he is also sparing in his use of examples. It is no accident that medieval commentators on these writings of Aristotle, which were for a long time the chief source of information on his work, diverged widely in their interpretations. Having now got used to making distinctions and employing more specific semantic concepts than Aristotle, it would be futile for us to expect to find, sitting in his work, a concept of state of affairs which unambiguously coincides with the one specified in the previous section. The best we can expect, even using plausible interpolations and taking interpretative risks, is an anticipatory approximation. But while Aristotle does not have a fully-fledged modern concept of state of affairs, it is surprising, in view of the subsequent history of semantics, how close he comes to one. (pp. 101-102)

20. Stein, Nathanael. 2011. "Aristotle's Causal Pluralism." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 93:121-147
Abstract: "Central to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology is the claim that 'aitia' – 'cause' – is "said in many ways", i.e., multivocal. Though the importance of the four causes in Aristotle's system cannot be overstated, the nature of his pluralism about *aitiai* has not been addressed. It is not at all obvious how these modes of causation are related to one another, or why they all deserve a common term. Nor is it clear, in particular, whether the causes are related to one another as species under a single genus, such that there is a univocal definition of 'aitia' which applies to all of them, or whether Aristotle means to assert that the four causes are homonyms. It is argued here that although there are strong reasons to group the four causes together, there are also powerful considerations on the side of homonymy. It is further argued that the four causes are more closely tied to the ontological theory of categories and predication than is often recognized. As a result, we can reconcile the competing demands of unity and plurality by taking one mode of causation, the formal cause, as basic, and accounting for the other modes with reference to it, in the manner of so-called pros hen homonyms."

21. Stough, Charlotte L. 1972. "Language and Ontology in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 10:261-272
"Yet there is an attendant danger in reading the *Categories* freely in the light of later works such as the *Metaphysics*. It is altogether too easy to find in that early text the more sophisticated ideas of a maturer period of Aristotle's philosophical development and hence unwittingly to incorporate into our procedure the assumption, dubious at best, that Aristotle's views remained virtually unchanged throughout his philosophical career. Thus there would seem to be *prima facie* reason for raising some questions of a rather special sort about the body of the *Categories* as such --- about what can be said of Aristotle's notion of categories of being without going beyond that work (or at least the *Organon*) for support.
One question in particular deserves attention, because it strikes at the very center of the theory expounded in the *Categories*. Granted that Aristotle attached a privileged status to the category of substance -- a status importantly not enjoyed by the other nine categories -- we want to know what he conceived that special status to be. Our question concerns the relation between substance and the remaining categories. Aristotle had some important things to say on this subject in later works, (1) but how much of that was originally central to the theory of categories cannot be uncovered by his subsequent remarks. Very little can be said about the philosophical significance of the early doctrine of categories until we understand precisely how Aristotle ordered the category of substance in relation to the nine nonsubstantial forms of predication in the *Categories* itself. As might be expected, Aristotle offers no easy answer to this question, but his own words are suggestive in ways that are worth exploring and yet, at the same time, quite easily overlooked." (p. 261)
(1) For example, *Met*., Zeta 1 (cf. *Delta* 11); Aristotle's doctrine of τα πρός ἐν λεγόμενα set forth in central sections of the *Metaphysics* may represent his most finished thoughts on this subject.

22. Striker, Gisela. 2011. "A Note on the Ontology of Aristotle's *Categories*, chapter 2." In *Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes*, edited by Morison, Benjam and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 141-151. New York: Oxford University Press
Abstract: "This paper argues that the four-fold classification of entities in chapter 2 of Aristotle's *Categories,* with its unusual terminology, contains a criticism of Plato's metaphysics, showing that the term 'participation' covers two distinct relations. This criticism prepares the way for the reversal of priorities in chapter 5, in which Aristotle bestows the rank of primary substance on concrete individuals. However, the ontological status of the species of primary substances—universals that are not attributes—remains ambiguous. A possible solution of these difficulties may be found in *Metaphysics* Z.13, with the rejection of universals as substances from Aristotle's ontology."
23. Studtmann, Paul. 2003. "Aristotle's Category of Quality: A Regimented Interpretation." *Apeiron* no. 36:205-227
"In Chapter Eight of the *Categories*, Aristotle divides the genus, quality, into four species: (1) habits and dispositions; (2) natural capabilities and incapabilities; (3) affective qualities and affections; and (4) shape." (p. 205)
(,,,)
"in this paper, I argue that there is an alternative interpretation to the canonical interpretation, what I will call the regimented interpretation, that can go some way toward removing the dissatisfaction that he and others have had with it. I do not think that such an interpretation can entirely remove all the difficulties with Aristotle's discussion — some peculiarities will remain. Nonetheless, as I hope to show, there is a way to regiment the category that makes it vastly more systematic, and as a result, far more philosophically interesting than the canonical interpretation suggests.
My main argument for the regimented interpretation proceeds in two stages. First, I examine the details of Aristotle's discussion of the first three canonical species and conclude not only that they are subsumed under the single

genus of dispositions but also that the genus of dispositions admits of a more or less systematic and symmetrical differentiation.
As a result, the category of quality should be understood as being primarily divided into two species: shape and dispositions. And because the genus of dispositions is systematically differentiated and Aristotle does not differentiate shape at all, any arbitrariness in the category of quality must be located in the division of the genus, quality, into the two species, shapes and dispositions. In the second stage of the argument, I propose a hypothesis about the way Aristotle understands the nature of quality itself, a hypothesis that leads to a very plausible division of quality into shape and dispositions. Hence, the divisions in the category of quality can be understood as flowing systematically from the very nature of the genus being divided." (p. 207)

24. ———. 2004. "Aristotle's Category of Quantity: A Unified Interpretation." *Apeiron* no. 37:69-91
"Aristotle provides two different treatments of the category of quantity: one in *Categories* V and one in *Metaphysics* V 7. Interestingly (and perhaps not surprisingly) the treatments differ in important respects. In the *Categories*, Aristotle provides two different differentiations of quantity. According to the first, quantity divides into continuous and discrete quantity; the former then divides into line, surface, body and time, and the latter into number and speech. According to the second, quantity divides into quantities whose parts have a relative position with respect to one another and quantities whose parts do not (*Cat*. 4b20-2). Although the differences between these two differentiations are interesting, for the purposes of this paper I shall focus on the first. For, in the first instance, the differentiations appear to be compatible; and second, by presenting the division into continuous and discrete quantities before the other division, Aristotle, it would seem, gives priority to the former. In this paper, therefore, not only will I assume that the two differentiations do not need philosophical correction to make them compatible but I will also follow

Aristotle's lead and take the division into continuous and discrete quantities to be the more fundamental." (p. 69)

25. ———. 2008. *The Foundations of Aristotle's Categorial Scheme*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press
Contents: Chapter 1: Whence the Categories? 7; Chapter 2: The Body Problem in Aristotle 25; Chapter 3: Form 49; Chapter 4: Prime Matter 79; Chapter 5: Quality 101; Chapter 6: Quantity 125; Chapter 7: Substance 141; Index 173-175.
"Aristotle's categorial scheme had an unparalleled effect not only on his own philosophical system but also on the systems of many of the greatest philosophers in the western tradition.
The set of doctrines in the *Categories*, what I will henceforth call *categorialism*, play, for instance, a central role in Aristotle's discussion of change in the *Physics*, in the science of being qua being in the Metaphysics and in the rejection of Platonic ethics in the *Nicomachean Ethics*."
(...)
"Despite its influence, however, categorialism raises two fundamental questions that to this day remain open. The first concerns Aristotle's list of highest kinds." (p. 7)
(...)
"Unlike the first question, the second concerns the way in which categorialism relates to doctrines Aristotle articulates in other works. The question arises as a result of a rather common story that is told about the categories and its apparent deep tensions with hylomorphism." (p. 9)
(...)
"This book contains a series of interrelated chapters that collectively support an interpretation that provides answers to the two great questions concerning Aristotle's categories. According to the interpretation, Aristotle's categorial scheme is derivable from his hylomorphic ontology, which itself is derivable from very general theses about the nature of being." (p. 15)

26. ———. 2012. "Aristotle's Categorial Scheme." In *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, edited by Shields, Christopher, 63-80. New York: Oxford University Press

"In this chapter I shall discuss a tradition of interpretation that has for the most part been abandoned and shall do so by way of discussing two questions concerning Aristotle's categorialism that are not often treated together. By pointing out just how controversial any approach to Aristotle's *Categories* is bound to be, I hope to forestall any initial strong objections to the admittedly non-standard approach I shall take. And even if I fail to convince the reader of the cogency of the approach by the end of the chapter, I hope that the reader will have benefitted from seeing Aristotle's categorial scheme treated from a heterodoxical perspective. For what it is worth, it is my contention that Aristotle's categorial scheme, as is the case with many works in the history of philosophy, is best illuminated by opposing beams of interpretive light.
The following discussion is framed by two questions concerning Aristotle's categorialism: (1) How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories? and (2) What is the connection between Aristotle's categories and his hylomorphic ontology. These questions are not often treated together, which is not altogether surprising, since each question is extremely difficult to answer in its own right. Hence, treating them together piles difficulty upon difficulty. Moreover, owing to their difficulty scholars have given wildly different answers to each of the questions. So the amount of scholarly disagreement about the issues involved is rather daunting. Nonetheless there is an interpretively and philosophically interesting reason for discussing both questions in a single paper, namely the possibility of interestingly co-ordinated answers to the questions.The possibility stems from a tradition of interpretation that finds its origin in the Middle Ages. Because of its medieval origin, the interpretation is out of step with recent scholarly trends. Nonetheless, I hope at least to show the interest in the interpretation. Mygoial in this chapter is not to present anything like a definitive case for an interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* but rather to discuss what I take to be a provocative and interesting interpretation that has the resources to provide systematic

and co-ordinated answers to two very large questions concerning Aristotle's categorial scheme. In short, according to the interpretation, Aristotle's list of highest kinds can be derived a priori from his hylomorphic ontology. To understand the import of such a claim, however, first requires a discussion of the two questions I have just mentioned." (pp. 64-65)

27. Surdu, Alexandru. 2006. *Aristotelian Theory of Prejudicative Forms*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Contents: Vorwort des Herausgebers IX; Foreword XI; List of Signs XV; Part I. Hermeneutic Investigations 1; 1. Interpretation of the First Two Chapters of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 3; 2. Interpretation of the Third Chapter of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 19; 3. Interpretation of the Fifth Chapter of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 25; 4. The Problem of Prejudicative Relations in other Aristotelian Works 33; 5. 5. Commentaries and Interpretations 61; 6. Specificity of Prejudicative Relations 105; Part II. Logical Significance of Prejudicative Relations 125; 1. A Short Characterization 127; 2. Introducing the Symbolic Notation 129; 3. Classical-Traditional Analysis of Prejudicative Relations 133; 4. Logical-Mathematical Significance of Prejudicative Relations 167; Part III. General Philosophical Conclusions 209; 1. A Short Characterization 211; 2. Subsistence, Existence, and Being 213; 3. The Five Voices, Essence, and Quiddity 217; 4. The Problem of the Universal (General) 221; 5. Intellect, Reason, and Rational Intellect 223-228.
"The starting point of the present paper was the symbolic interpretation - of a logical-mathematical type - of the first chapters of Aristotle's work *Categoriae* - work which is usually not taken into account by the modems. Beginning with the first attempts I was surprised to notice that the mentioned texts are lending themselves -more than any other text - to a logical-mathematical formalisation, the difference being that they show, besides the currently interpretable forms, other ones that are not to be found either within symbolic logic, or within the classical-traditional one. We named them "prejudicative forms", since they have a certain resemblance with the classical

judgements, but precede them, without being judgements in their own right, that is affirmations or negations.
The prejudicative forms represent an unstudied field, so far. Their affinity with symbolic forms grants them a prejudicative character and complete these last ones in many respects, which leads to the conclusion that, although the symbolic logic is the most recent logic, its field is anterior - from a logical point of view - to the classical field. And certainly Aristotle and some ancient commentators of the *Organon* had this intuition.
By means of the entities they focus on, the prejudicative forms -the individual, the singular, the species, the genus and the supreme genus - contribute to the solving of some of the generally philosophical issues which are still debatable on, as the problem of universal, which also appeared in relation with Aristotle's logic and was pointed out by Porpyhrius Malchus in his famous *Isagoge*.
Coming back to Aristotle, one can indeed wonder whether it was possible for him to accomplish so many things in the field of logic and, moreover, to foresee - explicitly or not - problems which find a reasonable explanation just nowadays. One should not forget that subtle scholars preceded Aristotle, and that the problems of logic were so to say "floating" in the atmosphere of Greek philosophy. Moreover, once discovered, the field of logic could have been unrestrictedly covered, as these were no hindrances. Aristotle did cover it. Faced with a savage and hardly coverable field, he was often forced to clear it. Today, these soundings are astonishing, since the field is crossed by large railways and rapidly covered. Nevertheless, there are some moments when nobody can say "Dig here!"
Aristotle did not finish, but he gave a lot of suggestions, and, if we do not think in a different way, but we think something else, his logic will still be a precious source of hints and information." (Foreword, pp. XII-XIII)

28. Tarán, Leonardo. 1978. "Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie* no. 106:73-99

Reprinted in: Leonardo Tarán, *Collected Papers 1962-1999,* Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 421-454.
"Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (ὀνὁματά) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of *homonyma* and *synonyma* only in reference to words and their meanings; that is to say that for him *homonyma* and *synonyma* are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the *Categories*, they are properties of things." (p. 421)
(...)
"He [Jonathan Barnes, "Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus," *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. 21 (1971), pp. 65-80] contends, in the first place, that Speusippus's conception of *homonyma* and *synonyma* is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, the slight differences between their respective definitions of each being trivial, and, secondly, that even though in a few places Aristotle does use *homonyma* and *synonyma* as properties of linguistic terms, this is due to the fact that Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the *Categories* would lead one to believe; he could not have been influenced by Speusippus because the latter conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things and, in any case, if influence of one on the other be assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle that influenced Speusippus.
Though I believe that his two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of Barnes' thesis; for, if he were right in believing that for Speusippus *homonyma* and *synonyma* are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch's [*] notion that Speusippus did influence Aristotle when the latter uses *synonymon* as a property of names would be wrong, even though Barnes himself were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper. Whereas, on the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is really of

ὀνόματά, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle does sometimes use *homonyma* and *synonyma* as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible; and it becomes plausible and probable, regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works, when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases Aristotle is in fact acracking doctrines which presuppose a use of *homonyma* and *synonyma* such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words." (pp. 422-423)
(...)
"Our only source for Speusippus's classification of names is the three texts that Lang has assembled as frags. 32a, 32b, and 32c, (7) three passages from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*."
[*] E. Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik* (1904).
References
Margherita Isnardi Parente, *Speusippo: Frammenti; Edizione, traduzione e commento*, Naples: Bibliopolis 1980 (Greek text and Italian translation; see Fragments 13, 14, 15).
Paul Lang, *De Speusippi academici scriptis accedunt fragmenta*, Bonn 1911; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965.

29. Thorp, John. 1974. "Aristotle's Use of Categories. An Easing of the Oddness in "Metaphysica" Δ 7." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:238-256
"We are accustomed to think that when Aristotle introduces a list of categories into an argument he is effecting a *division* of the matter into ten separate kinds or predicates or senses. For example, at *de anima* 410 a 23 when he is wondering what sort of thing the soul is,
he gives a list of the categories to show what sorts of things there are and goes on to ask of each sort whether the soul belongs to it.
The list of categories divides up all that is into ten departments for easier handling. Again in the Categoriae he

divides up predicates into ten sorts by a list of categories, and goes on in the rest of the book to give the peculiar logical and grammatical features of the sorts - although the treatment of the later sorts is not extant. Here the list of categories serves almost as a table of contents, dividing up the matter for piecemeal treatment. Let us call this use of a list of categories to divide the matter into ten departments "use (a)". No doubt this is the most prevalent use in Aristotle: a philosopher of analytic temperament like the Master is always dividing things up." (pp. 244-245)
(...)
"Conclusion
The orthodox view of the mesh of four uses with ten senses - that only per se being has ten senses - can now be revised. There are five uses of εἶναι, not four, and only the fifth, the existential use (not mentioned in A 7) is divided into ten senses according to the categories.
Per se being is semantically unvarying. (p. 256)

30. Ushida, Noriko. 2003. "Before the *Topics*? Isaak Husik and Aristotle's *Categories* revisited." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:113-134
"I. Husik, in arguing for the authenticity of the *Categories* (in: *Philosophical Review* 13, 1904, pp. 514-528), substantially overstated the case for the similarity of that treatise to the *Topics*. The two works differ greatly in their treatment of the theory of substance (*Cat*. 5, 3 B 10-21; *SE* 22, 178 B 38ff.)."

31. van Polanen Petel, H. P., and Reed, K. 2021. "How to Derive Aristotle's Categories from First Principles." *Axiomathes* no. 41:1-35
First online: 5 September 2021.
Abstract: "We propose a model of cognition grounded in ancient Greek philosophy which encompasses Aristotle's categories. Taking for First Principles the brute facts of the mental actions of separation, aggregation and ordering, we derive Aristotle's categories as follows. First, Separation lets us see single entities, giving the simple concept of an individual. Next, Aggregation lets us see instances of some kind, giving the basic concept of a particular. Then,

Ordering lets us see both wholes-with-parts as well as parts-of-some-whole, giving the subtle concept of a relational or Gestalt. The basic and the subtle concept give us the major and minor categories. The categories constitute a top-level ontology and describe universal usage so that any other category necessarily describes particular or domain usage."

32. Verdenius, Willem Jacob. 1948. "Two Notes on the *Categories* of Aristotle " *Mnemosyne* no. 4:109-110
"Cat. 6 a, 19-22: Aristotle does not say: "A thing which is two cubits long does not possess its length to a higher degree than a thing of three cubits possesses its length of three cubits", but: "One thing cannot be two cubits long to a higher degree than another". That means: a thing of a certain length does not possess this length to a higher degree than things which are longer or shorter, for these things do not have this length at all. The same applies to numbers: "three is not three to a higher degree than five is three, nor is five five to a higher degree than three is five", i.e. a number does, or does not, possess a certain amount. This meaning is clearly expressed by the traditional text." (p. 109)
(...)
"Cat. 8 a, 31-32: Aristotle wants to say that the use of a wide definition should not induce us to suppose that the possession of a relation makes a thing essentially relative in the sense that its existence can only be explained in terms of a relation to another thing."(p. 110)

33. von Fritz, Kurt. 1954. "Review of: *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy* by L. M. De Rijk." *The Philosophical Review* no. 63:600-605
"The author of this book tries once more to solve the difficult problem of the meaning of Aristotle's theory of categories or, more specifically, the question of whether the categories are a system of grammatical, of logical, or of ontological distinctions. He rejects from the outset the explanation of the categories as grammatical distinctions though he does admit-which is very important-that Aristotle in his metaphysical and logical analyses is, generally speaking, guided by the structure of his native tongue.

Concerning the two other main explanations which have been offered, he points out in his introduction that "the later distinction between the logical and the ontological aspect qua a conscious opposition which is carried through rigorously" should not be applied to ancient thought, i.e., to that of Aristotle, and expresses the opinion that "the seeming difficulty of interpretation disappears" if this distinction is not made. He tries to show that the solutions offered by his predecessors are all wrong or insufficient because they did not follow this principle of interpretation. The author then elaborates his theory in six chapters and an appendix. The first three chapters deal with various aspects of the relation between logic and ontology in Aristotle's philosophy, namely: Aristotle's doctrine of truth, the distinction between "essential and accidental being" (κατ' αυτό and κατά συμβεβηκός), logical and ontological accident. The second series of three chapters deals with the problem of the categories directly, first the categories in the *Metaphysics*, then the categories in the special treatise devoted to that subject, the first treatise of the Organon, and finally the use which Aristotle makes of the categories in his philosophy in general. The appendix deals with the various expressions by which Aristotle designates the categories, with their origin and their relation to the logical and the ontological aspects of the categories. Each chapter, as well as the appendix, concludes with a convenient summary of the theses which the author has tried to prove." (pp. 600-601)

34. ———. 1958. "Once More καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 3:72-73

"On p. 148 ff. of the second volume of *Phronesis* Mr. Chung-Hwan Chen has published an article on the above subject taking his starting point from a review of a book by the Dutch scholar L. M. De Rijk which I had published some time ago in *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 53 (1954), p. 600 ff., but without knowledge of the book reviewed itself. As a consequence some special points have remained in the dark; and since this is in no way Mr. Chung-Hwan Cheng's fault,

who was unable to obtain a copy of the book reviewed, but to a large part my own fault and to a certain extent perhaps the fault of Mr. De Rijk, I would appear to be under some obligation to clear up the question." (p. 72)
(...)
"It is one of the main contentions of Mr. De Rijk in the book which I reviewed that it is wrong to make a sharp distinction between the ontological and the logical aspect of Aristotle's theory of the categories because the ontological aspect is always the essential one and the logical only its reflection. In contrast to this I had contended that Aristotle's theory has an ontological, a logical, and to some extent a grammatical aspect; and that to understand its philosophical meaning, as well as the difficulties with which Aristotle had to struggle in its elaboration fully, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between them." (p. 73)

35. Ward, Julie K. 2007. *Aristotle on Homonymy: Dialectic and Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abbreviations IX; Introduction 1; 1. Aristotle's theory of homonymy in *Categories* 1 and its precursors 9; 2. Homonymy in the *Topics* 43; 3. Systematic homonymy 77; 4. The homonymy of *Being* 103; 5. *Physis, Philia*, and homonymy 137; 6. Homonymy and science 168; Afterword 201; Bibliography 207; Index of passages 215; General index 219-220.
"The present book had its origin in many puzzles I encountered about p*ros hen* predication." (p. VII)
(...)
"This work examines homonymy, a topic that lies within Aristotle’s theories of language and predication. In Aristotle’s work, the idea of homonymy is paired with that of synonymy, and in fundamental ways, rests upon it. To English speakers, homonymy s known as a grammatical category referring to the case in which the same word has different meanings, and synonymy, the case in which different words have the same meaning. In contrast, Aristotle finds homonymy and synonymy to be concerned not merely with words, but also, and primarily, with things. As he explains in *Cat*. 1, synonymy refers to the situation in

which two or more things have the same name, or term, and the same defining character (cf. *Cat*. 1a6–7)." (p. 1)
(...)
"The present book on homonymy seeks to augment recent discussions, particularly aspects of Irwin's and Shields' work, by furthering the investigation in some areas and initiating study in others. In brief summary, the present chapters fall into three areas: (1) Aristotle's account of homonymy in *Cat*. 1 and its possible precursors, (2) the utility of homonymy for refining premises in scientific arguments, and (3) the application of homonymy to specific concepts." (p. 3)

36. Wardy, Robert. 2000. *Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Contents: Preface page IX; 1. The China syndrome: language, logical form, translation 1; 2. Aristotelian whispers 69; Epilogue 150; Glossary of technical terms 153; References 161; Index 166-170."
"Aristotle in China is about the relation between language and thought. That is, of course, a topic of absurdly ambitious scope: it is only slightly less absurd to say that it concerns the particular question of the relation between language and philosophical thought, or even the relation between the Chinese language and Chinese logic. Perhaps readers will concede at the outset that my decision to explore these huge issues through reading Aristotle's *Categories* in Chinese is mere wilful circuitousness, rather than outright absurdity; and I trust that, if they persevere, they will discover that indirection has its compensations. Chapter 1 introduces, defines and dissects varieties of linguistic relativism, with specific reference to the China question. Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to a reading of the (*ming li t'an*), 'The Investigation of the Theory of Names', a seventeenth century translation of Aristotle's *Categories* into Chinese; indeed, one of my goals is to reanimate an ancient tradition, both Chinese and Western, by producing a sort of metacommentary.

In principle, philosophers could read chapter 1 and dispense with chapter 2; and Sinologists could study chapter 2 and avoid philosophy: but of course my intention is to address philosophers, classicists, Sinologists, linguists, anthropologists and devotees of missionary studies throughout." (p. IX)

37. Warnock, Mary. 1950. "A Note on Aristotle: *Categories* 6 a 15." *Mind* no. 59:552-554
"In *Categories* 6a 11 Aristotle says that though it is a characteristic of quantities that they cannot have opposites, it looks as if they could in the case of spatial measurements. This lead him to make a general remark on the notion of opposition, namely that when people talk of opposites they are using a spatial metaphor; that they mean by " opposites " those things which, in the same class, are separated by *the greatest possible distance* from each other. There are two things to notice here. First that Aristotle aims to distinguish, at least roughly, between kinds of terms, by asking whether or not they have opposites. Secondly, that, while he talks about a spatial metaphor, his only attempt to elucidate this metaphor is by translating it into another spatial metaphor, that of " greatest distance between"." (p. 552)
38. Wedin, Michael. 1979. "*"Said of"* and "*predicated of"* in the *Categories*." *Philosophical Research Archives* no. 5:23-34
Abstract: "Anyone with more than casual interest in Aristotle's *Categories* knows the convention that "predicated of" ["κατηγορεῖται"] marks a general relation of predication while "said of" ["λέγεται"] is reserved for essential predication. By "convention" I simply mean to underscore that the view in question ranks as the conventional or received interpretation. Ackrill, for example, follows the received view in holding that only items within the same category (not arbitrarily, of course) can stand in the being-said-of relation and, thus, that only secondary substances can be said of primary substances. Despite its long received status the convention has never received a fully comprehensive examination and defense. In fact such an account is needed because, while enjoying considerable textual support, certain passages of the

Categories appear to clash with the convention. My aim in this paper is, first, to develop and defend the standard interpretation, as I shall call it. Since the standard interpretation has lately been challenged in a closely argued article by Russell Dancy, my defense will proceed partly with an eye to his criticisms. Having met these, I go on to raise some difficulties with the rather unorthodox reading Dancy gives the *Categories*. The crucial point here turns out to be what Aristotle understands by a paronym."

39. ———. 1993. "Non-Substantial Individuals." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:137-165
Abstract: "The rock bottom items of the *Categories* are individuals. Those neither present-in nor said-of a subject are unproblematic. They are primary substances such as Socrates and Secretariat. But the exact nature of those that are present-in but not said-of a subject is a matter of lively debate. Roughly, two schools of thought dominate discussion. For some, type-III individuals, as I call them, are nonrecurrent accident particulars; for others, they are fully determinate accident properties. I begin with Ackrill's version of nonrecurrence, the progenitor of the modern debate, and then turn to Owen's attack, which established what may be called the new orthodoxy. (1) After assaying Owen's arguments, I consider a kindred but improved version due to Frede. Finally, I argue for a revised version of the standard nonrecurrence view."
(1) Owen, G. E. L. 1965. "Inherence." *Phronesis* 10, 97-105.

40. ———. 1997. "The Strategy of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 79:1-26
"The *Categories* begins without fanfare. Missing is the promotional pitch customary in Aristotle's works, and even the obligatory announcement of subject matter is absent. Instead, we are given definitions of three technical notions: homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. That is all the first chapter contains. In particular, there is no hint as to why Aristotle begins with these notions or how they fit into the *Categories* as a whole. In fact, by most accounts it is not clear that much would be lost were the first fifteen lines simply omitted. Indeed, chapter two's discussion of τα οντά

or things that are is arguably a more natural starting place for what follows. For this reason, perhaps, most scholarship has focused on the three *onymies* themselves to the neglect of their wider role in the *Categories*. Some scholars would go so far as to maintain that the first four chapters are little more than a random assemblage of scraps. I shall argue, on the contrary, that the three *onymies* are part of a carefully drawn strategy that underwrites the unity of the first five chapters of the *Categories*. In particular, I propose that they are grouping principles, introduced to isolate the one relation that is able to provide the foundation for the system of categories, namely, synonymy." (p. 1, notes omitted)

41. ———. 2000. *Aristotle's Theory of Substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta*. New York: Oxford University Press
"This book offers a compatibilist account of the relation between the *Categories* and *Metaphysics* Z. The basic idea is a simple one. The incompatibilist is worried, for example, about the fact that each of these treatises makes a different proposal about the identity of primary substances. According to the first, primary substances are substance individuals—items such as Socrates, Secretariat, and Madame Curie. To avoid unwieldy tags, such as "*Categories*-primary-substances," I shall call these items c-substances. According to the second treatise, primary substances are the forms of c-substances. Because these proposals are deemed incompatible, so are the theories containing them, and likewise for the treatises themselves. However, this line of reasoning, a staple of incompatibilism, assumes that Aristotle meant the theories to occupy the same explanatory space. This seems to me to be false. The theory of *Metaphysics* Z is meant, rather, to explain central features of the standing theory of the *Categories* and so, in effect, it presupposes the essential truth of the early theory. This is the basic idea." (pp. 2-3)
42. Weidemann, Hermann. 1980. "In Defence of Aristotle's Theory of Predication." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:76-87

"One of the most characteristic features of Aristotle's theory of predication is the fact that he divides, as G. E. L. Owen puts it,
all the predicates of any individual into two groups: those which hold good essentially or *per se* of their subject, as *man* does of Socrates; and those which merely happen to be true of their subject, as *white* does of Socrates.(1)
(...)
The first part of present paper is intended to show that Aristotle's argument in 1007a20-33 relies on a way of distinguishing between essential and accidental predications which does not commit him at all to the alleged confusion of the former with statements of identity that has been ascribed to him not only by Kirwan, but also, as it seems, by Owen, to whom the second part of the present paper is intended to be a rejoinder." (p. 76)
(1) G. E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle," in: P. F. Strawson (ed.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*, London/Oxford/New York 1968, pp. 147-74 (originally printed in the Proceedings of the British Academy, 1965); p. 160.

43. Wheeler, Mark Richard. 1999. "The Possibility of Recurrent Individuals in Aristotle's *Organon*." *Gregorianum* no. 80:539-551
"In 1965, G.E.L. Owen's article "Inherence" sparked a contemporary debate concerning whether or not the nonsubstantial individuals posited by Aristotle in the *Organon* are universals.(1) Owen's antagonists claim that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent particulars. Owen's defenders claim that nonsubstantial individuals can recur and, hence, are universals.
In this paper, I present an analysis of Owen's position in "Inherence", arguing that Owen commits Aristotle to the possibility of recurrent nonsubstantial individuals which are one in number. The implications of Owen's position for Aristotle's theory of primary substance in the *Organon* are considered. I demonstrate that the modal status of recurring individuals cannot be determined by Aristotle's explication of being present in a subject at 1a24 of the *Categories*. I

then argue that, according to the sameness conditions laid down by Aristotle in the *Topics*, it is impossible for something which is one in number to recur and, hence, that it is impossible both for substantial individuals and for nonsubstantial individuals to be universals." (pp. 539-540, notes omitted)

(1) See, for examples of the early debate in the journal literature, Ackrill [1963], Owen [1965], Matthews and Cohen [1968], Allen [1969]. See Frede [1978], Devereux [1992], and Wedin [1993] for examples of how the debate has developed since.

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Wedin, Michael V. (1993). "Nonsubstantial Individuals," *Phronesis* 38, pp. 137-165.

44. ———. 2001. "κατηγορία in the *Topics* and the *Categories*." *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* no. 8:37-60

"The term *kategoria* in Aristotle's *Topics* and *Categories* denotes predicates. Hence the categories are best understood as classifying predicates and not predications. The equivocal use of the term in *Top*. 1, 9 is related to its use

in signifying either linguistic or non-linguistic entities, and not because it can be used to mean *predication*."

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   Résumé : "Un examen critique des indices externes mis de l'avant pour défendre l'authenticité des *Catégories* ne permet pas de conclure de façon positive. On trouvera ici un résumé de l'état de la question de ce point de vue externe, plutôt qu'une analyse du contenu du traité qui seule pourrait faire avancer le débat."
2. Aubenque, Pierre. 1962. *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Éssai sur la problématique aristotélicienne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France
   "Notre ambition est simple et se résume en peu de mots : nous ne prétendons pas apporter du nouveau sur Aristote, mais au contraire tenter de désapprendre tout ce que la tradition a ajouté à l 'aristotélisme primitif. On pourrait sourire de cette prétention et n' y voir que la fausse modestie de tout interprète, toujours préoccupé d 'annoncer qu'il va laisser parler son auteur. Mais cette volonté de dépouillement et de retour aux sources a, lorsqu 'il s' agit d'Aristote, un sens précis. Ce n 'est pas ici le lieu de rappeler dans quelles conditions, de mieux en mieux dégagées par l 'érudition contemporaine (3) , l 'oeuvre d 'Aristote a été transmise à la postérité.

Mais il n'est pas indifférent, même et surtout pour la compréhension philosophique, d'avoir touj ours présentes à l'esprit les circonstances particulières de cette transmission : l 'Aristote que ous connaissons n 'est pas celui qui vivait a u ive siècle av. J .-C., philosophe philosophant parmi les hommes, mais un Corpus plus ou moins anonyme édité au 1er siècle av. J .-C. Il n 'est pas surtout que, dans l'ignorance de la chronologie, nous ayons décidé d 'envisager ces écrits comme s' ils étaient contemporains les uns des autres et que nous ayons entrepris d ' en dégager une doctrine commune : il va de soi que notre compréhension du kantisme en eût été singulièrement altérée et probablement affadie. Une première conclusion s'impose, qui va à l 'encontre d'une erreur d'optique largement répandue : les commentateurs, même les plus anciens, et même s'ils avaient en leur possession des textes que nous avons perdus depuis lors, n'ont par rapport à nous aucun privilège historique. Commentant Aristote plus de quatre siècles après sa mort, séparés de lui non par une tradition continue, mais par une éclipse totale de son influence proprement philosophique, ils n'étaient pas mieux placés que nous pour le comprendre. Comprendre Aristote autrement que les commentateurs, même grecs, ce n'est donc pas nécessairement le moderniser, mais peut-être s'approcher davantage de !'Aristote historique." (pp. 3-4. deux notes omises)
(3) Cf. surtout P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1951.

3. ———. 1967. "Aristote et le langage." *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix* no. 43:85-105
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Repris dans: P. Aubenque, *Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique,* Paris, Vrin 2009, pp. 11-30.
"L'étude ci-dessus était entièrement rédigée lorsque nous avons pris connaissance d'un important article de M. E. Benveniste sur «Catégories de pensée et catégories de langage », qui nous avait échappé lors de sa première

publication (*Études philosophiques,* n° 4,1958) et qui vient d'être reproduit dans un ouvrage du même auteur, *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris, 1966, p. 63-74). Dans cette étude, l'éminent linguiste veut montrer, en prenant comme exemple la liste des dix catégories d'Aristote, que des catégories qui se donnent pour des « catégories de pensée », donc pour des «catégories universelles», sont, en réalité, quoique de façon «inconsciente» (p. 63), des «catégories linguistiques», lesquelles sont toujours « catégories d'une langue particulière» (p. 65): ainsi, «Aristote, raisonnant d'une manière absolue, retrouve simplement certaines des catégories fondamentales de la langue dans laquelle il pense » (p. 66)." (p. 26)
(...)
"Le langage est avant la lettre pour Aristote l'équivalent de ce que Kant appellera le « transcendantal » et quel' auteur de la *Critique de la Raison pure* aura peut-être le tort de vouloir chercher dans une pensée qui serait en deçà du langage - comme si une telle pensée existait. En tout cas, lorsque M. Benveniste dit des «penseurs grecs» que «les catégories [grammaticales] qu'ils ont instaurées (nom, verbe, genre grammatical, etc.) reposent toujours sur des bases logiques ou philosophiques» (p. 19), nous ne pouvons pas le suivre, dans l'exacte mesure où lui-même nous montre que la philosophie grecque des catégories et la logique grecque de l'attribution tirent leur substance de leur substrat linguistique. En fait, la grammaire grecque dérive bien de la logique et de la philosophie, mais d'une logique et d'une philosophie qui, chez Aristote du moins, sont une réflexion sur le langage. C'est ce mouvement qui, du langage spontané, conduit par la philosophie à son « administration » par la logique et la grammaire, que nous avons essayé de décrire chez Aristote." (p. 29)

4. ———, ed. 1980. *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*. Paris: Vrin
Table de matières : Pierre Aubenque : Preface VII-XIV; I. Denis O'Brien : Bibliographie annotée des études principales sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote (1794-1975) 1;

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"Les études ici rassemblées sont issues des travaux du Centre de recherches sur la Pensée antique de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Centre Léon-Robin), laboratoire associé au C.N.R.S. Elles s'inscrivent dans un projet d'ensemble, qui vise à dégager les interférences entre pensée et langage dans le monde antique. Il nous a semblé que la question devait être envisagée d'abord à propos des catégories, ces concepts généraux qui organisent la perception et la compréhension que nous avons des choses et du monde et dont on peut se demander s'ils sont des structures universelles de toute pensée ou s'ils sont liés aux particularités sémantiques ou syntaxiques d'un système linguistique déterminé." (Préface, VII)
(...)
"Dans le séminaire qui est à l'origine des contributions qu'on lira ci-dessous, nous avons pris pour base le texte du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories* et son commentaire par Simplicius, lequel nous a du reste amenés à étendre nos

recherches du côté du néoplatonisme. Après une bibliographie critique due à D. O'Brien et une étude de B. Dumoulin, qui s'interroge sur l'authenticité aristotélicienne du traité des *Catégories*, on trouvera dans ce recueil des études consacrées à chacune des principales catégories : l'essence et ses traductions latines (J. F. Courtine), la quantité (D. O'Brien), la relation (F. Zaslawsky), la qualité (M. Narcy), l'action et la passion (N. Vamvoukakis), le lieu et le temps (Ph. Hoffmann et L. Routila). Une étude qu'a bien voulu nous confier J. Pépin éclaire ensuite, sur un point particulier, la postérité des catégories aristotéliciennes.
A la façon dont le traité des *Catégories* se termine par des « Post-prédicaments », nous avons joint à ce recueil trois études portant sur des notions générales et difficilement définissables, liées d'une façon ou d'une autre à la problématique des catégories, et dont l'examen autorise d'intéressantes comparaisons entre l'aristotélisme et d'autres doctrines, notamment le stoïcisme : il s'agit des notions de *pragma* (P. Hadot), de *diathesis* (R. Brague) et de *ptôsis* (casus) (J. L. Delamarre)." (Préface, XIV)

5. ———. 1980. "Pensée et langage chez Aristote. À propos des *Catégories*." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, VII-XIV. Paris: Vrin Repris dans P. Aubenque, *Problèmes aristotéliciens. Philosophie théorique*, Paris: Vrin 2009, pp. 31-38.
"La question des rapports entre la pensée et le langage s'est cristallisée dans l'Antiquité autour de la notion de *catégorie*. Cette expression désigne à partir d'Aristote les concepts généraux qui organisent la perception et la compréhension que nous avons des choses et du monde. Certes, de tels concepts apparaissent à Aristote comme des catégories objectives de l'être et non comme des catégories subjectives de la pensée. Mais cette opposition n'est pas aussi tranchée qu'il y paraît, car les catégories sont d'abord et avant tout des catégories du langage. Or il est permis aujourd'hui de se demander, avec les progrès de la linguistique et de la philosophie comparée, si les catégories aristotéliciennes sont des structures universelles de toute pensée,

universelles parce que reflets objectifs de la réalité, ou si elles sont liées aux particularités contingentes, tant syntaxiques que sémantiques, d'un système linguistique déterminé.
Pour apporter quelques éléments de réponse à cette question, on voudrait ici, sinon esquisser une histoire de la doctrine des catégories, du moins indiquer quels problèmes d'interprétation ont été soulevés à leur propos dès l'Antiquité et montrer comment cette problématique traditionnelle s'est enrichie depuis le xixe siècle de perspectives nouvelles." (p. 31)

6. Barnes, Jonathan. 2005. "Les *Catégories* et les catégories." In *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, edited by Bruun, Otto and Corti, Lorenzo, 11-80. Paris: Vrin
"Bien que maintes préfaces affirment le contraire, les actes d'un colloque ne constituent jamais un livre. Les Actes du Colloque de Genève ne font pas exception: même si un thème commun les unifie, ils ne racontent pas une histoire linéaire. C'est pourquoi nous avons ajouté aux Actes une longue introduction. Ce chapitre, Les Catégories et les *Catégories*, de la plume de Jonathan Bames, vise à esquisser, dans ses grandes lignes, l'histoire des *Catégories* d'Aristote et de la théorie aristotélicienne des Catégories, et d'y encadrer les différents épisodes décrits par chacun des chapitres suivants. Un lecteur qui voudrait lire ce volume comme on parcourerait un livre pourrait donc suivre le texte de l'introduction, tout en y intercalant les chapitres là où une note en bas de page les mentionne. L'index nominum et rerum, l'index locorum et la bibliographie, qui se trouvent à la fin de ce volume et qui s'appliquent à tous les chapitres, lui permettront d'établir d'autres liens entre eux." (Préface, p. 7)
7. Benveniste, Émile. 1958. "Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue." *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 13:419-429
Repris dans: É. Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale,* Paris: Gallimard, 1966, pp. 63-74.
Translated in English as *Categories of Thought and Language*, by Mary E. Meek in: *Problems in General*

Linguistics, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971, pp. 55-64.
"Tout en admettant que la pensée ne peut être saisie que formée et actualisée dans la langue, avons-noue le moyen de reconnaître à la pensée des caractères qui lui soient propres et qui ne doivent rien à l'expression linguistique ? Nous pouvons décrire la langue our elle-même. Il faudrait de même atteindre directement la pensée. S'il était possible de définir celle-ci par des traits qu lui appartiennent exclusivement, on verrait du même coup comment elle s'ajuste à la langue et de quelle nature sont lrurs relations. Il semble utile d'aborder le problème par la voie des « catégories » qui apparaissent en médiatrices. Elles ne présentent le même aspect suivant qu'elles sont catégories de pensée ou catégories de langue. Cette discordance même pourrait nous éclairer sur leur nature respective.
(...)
"Or, nous avons la bonne fortune de disposer de données qu'on dirait prêtes pour notre examen, élaborées et présentées de manière objective, intégrées dans un ensemble connu : ce sont lea catégories d'Aristote."
(...)
"Aristote pose ainsi la totalité des prédicats que l'on peut affirmer de l'être, et il vise à définir le statut logique de chacun d'eux. Or, il nous semble - et nous essaierons de montrer - que ces .distinctions sont d'abord des catégories de langue, et qu'en fait Aristote, raisonnant d'une manière absolue, retrouve simplement certaines des catégories fondamentales de la langue dans laquelle il pense. Pour peu qu'on prête attention à l'énoncé des catëgories et aux exemples qui les illustrent, cette interprëtation, non encore proposée apparemment, se vérifie sans longs commentaires. Nous passons en revue successivement les dix termes." (pp. 65-66)

8. Bernier, Réjane. 1999. "La quantité chez Aristote : son rôle en physique, mathématique et métaphysique." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 62:595-637
Résumé : "L'article présente d'abord quelques considérations épistémologiques et rappelle que, pour

Aristote, le principe de connaissance de la quantité est le sens commun qui regroupe et unifie les données des sens propres relativement à chacun de leurs objets. Par la suite, l'étude analyse les différents modes de quantité : discrète et concrète et montre que, en physique, c'est surtout la quantité concrète qui joue un rôle dans l'être matériel en étant à l'origine des déterminations des espèces de qualités : 1) états - dispositions et aptitudes - inaptitudes ; 2) qualités sensibles ; 3) forme-figure. L'article soulève les difficultés du passage de la physique à la mathématique et recherche la nature de la quantité utilisée en géométrie. En dernier lieu, il propose une réflexion sur l'être de la quantité et signale les difficultés soulevées par la considération d'une part, de la quantité comme accident proposée dans les *Catégories* et d'autre part, de celle de la matière composante de la substance de la théorie hylémorphique. L'étendue au terme de l'abstraction des dimensions est-elle autre que la matière ?"

9. Bodéüs, Richard. 1984. "Aux origines de la doctrine aristotélicienne des Catégories." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 2:121-137
"Les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote avaient l'habitude de justifier le titre des ouvrages du Stagirite qu'ils se proposaient d'expliquer(1). Touchant le court traité des *Catégories*, certains ont eu soin de noter d'emblée que le terme Κατηγορία n'avait point, en l'occurrence, la signification ordinaire que lui confère la langue du droit ("accusation" ou "chef d'accusation") (2). Mais aucun ne s'est risqué à dire si la signification du même terme dans le langage spécialisé de la logique avait quelque rapport avec celle, d'ailleurs historiquement plus ancienne, que possède le mot dans le vocabulaire judiciaire. Aussi bien n'ont-ils pas, non plus que les modernes à notre connaissance, posé la question de savoir dans quelle mesure la notion aristotélicienne de "catégorie" et, plus généralement, la doctrine des figures de prédication pouvaient être héritées des réflexions que fit naître, en Grèce, la pratique des tribunaux et des cours de justice.

C'est cette question que nous voudrions ici tâcher d'éclairer." (p. 121, note 3 omise)
(1) A ce sujet, voir, en dernier lieu; P. Donini, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*, Turin, 1982, pp. 54 sqq.
2. Comparez, par exemple: Olympiodore dans CIAG, XII, p. 22; Philopon dans CIAG, XIII, l, p. 12 et Elias dans CIAG, XVIII, p. 127.
CIAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.

10. ———. 1995. "Sur l'unité stylistique du texte des *Catégories*." In *Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts a Christian Rutten*, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 141-154. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres
"Monsieur Christian Rutten a jadis proposé une chronologie relative de différents morceaux découpés dans le texte des Catégories(= C) (1). Mais il a naguère reconnucomme « non négligeables» les arguments de M. Frede en faveur de l'unité de ce texte sur le plan linguistique(2). Il acceptera donc, je l'espère, de considérer les observations que j'avance ici à l'appui de la même thèse.
L'enjeu de celle-ci est la question de savoir si le texte de C, comme on le croit traditionnellement, juxtapose artificiellement l'ébauche d'un traité des « catégories» (chap. 1-9 = CA) et les notes qui constituent les « postprédicaments » (chap. 10-15 = CB) ou bien s'il présente, au contraire, les pièces d'une enquête unitaire, d'abord intitulée *Avant les lieux*, où entrent, au même titre, les exposés de Ia première et ceux de la seconde partie, de la même façon que dans le répertoire analogue de *Métaphysique* Λ. En faveur de la seconde hypothèse, il y a précisément le parallélisme des matières principales traitées en C et en Λ 3. Ce parallélisme ne nie pas les différences de toutes sortes, spécialement doctrinales, entre les deux répertoires, mais il établit empiriquement la possibilité que C soit, lui aussi, comme Λ, un répertoire qui unit en série les distinctions de CA et de CB. L'unité stylistique de ces deux parties devrait offrir à cet égard un argument supplémentaire. On l'établira, ci-après, en relevant les

ressemblances significatives qu'on peut observer entre CA et CB et qui paraissent opposer leur style commun à celui, différent, de Λ." (pp. 141-142)
(1) Voir Chr. Rutten, *Stylométrie des Catégories*, in *Aristotelica. Mélanges offerts à Marcel De Cane*, Bruxelles-Liège, 1985, p. 315-336.
(2) *Introduction à Aristote. Categoriae. Index verborum. Listes de fréquence*, par B. Colin et Chr. Rutten, Liège, 1993, p. 11, qui renvoie à M. Frede, *Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrifts*, in *Zweifelhaftes lm Corpus Aristotelicum*, Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, herausgegeben von P. Moraux und J. Wiesner, Berlin-New York, 1983, p. 19-20; étude reprise en anglais dans M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Phylosophy*, Minneapolis, 1987, p. 11-28 (spécialement p. 22-23).
(3) Comparez CA, 5 et Λ, 8 ; CA, 6 et Λ, 13 ; CA, 7 et Λ, 15 ; CA, 8 et Λ, 14 ; CB, 10 et Λ, 10 ; CB, 12 et Λ, 11; CB, 15 et ÀΛ, 23.

11. ———. 1996. "En relisant le début des *Catégories*. L'expression λόγος τς οσίας." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 109:709-718
"Les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote avaient l'habitude de justifier le titre des ouvrages du Stagirite qu'ils se proposaient d'expliquer(1). Touchant le court traité des *Catégories*, certains ont eu soin de noter d'emblée que le terme κατηγορία n'avait point, en l'occurrence, la signification ordinaire que lui confère la langue du droit ("accusation" ou "chef d'accusation") (2). Mais aucun ne s'est risqué à dire si la signification du même terme dans le langage spécialisé de la logique avait quelque rapport avec celle, d'ailleurs historiquement plus ancienne, que possède le mot dans le vocabulaire judiciaire. Aussi bien n'ont-ils pas, non plus que les modernes à notre connaissance, posé la question de savoir dans quelle mesure la notion aristotélicienne de "catégorie" et, plus généralement, la doctrine des figures de prédication pouvaient être héritées des réflexions que fit naître, en Grèce, la pratique des tribunaux et des cours de justice.

C'est cette question que nous voudrions ici tâcher d'éclairer (3)." (p. 709)
(1) A ce sujet, voir, en dernier lieu; P. Donini, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*, Turin, 1982, pp. 54 sqq.
(2) Comparez, par exemple: Olympiodore dans CIAG, XII, p. 22; Philopon dans CIAG, XIII, l, p. 12 et Elias dans CIAG, XVIII, p. 127.
(3) Simplicius (*Comm. in Cat.*, 2, pp. 15 - 25), suivi par Ammonios (*Comm. in Cat.*, 14, 1 - 3; 54. 3), déclarait que l'inventeur des catégories n'était pas Aristote, mais Archytas de Tarente. Il ajoutait cependant que l'ordonnance des catégories en système était l'oeuvre d'Aristote. En l'absence de renseignements précis sur l'originalité d'Archytas, nous sommes exposés au risque de prêter au Stagirite des trouvailles dont il
n'a peut-être pas le mérite. Nous tâcherons ici d'éviter l'écueil en considérant principalement la systématisation des catégories en une doctrine et en nous demandant ce que pareille systématisation pourrait devoir à une réflexion sur les pratiques judiciaires.
CIAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca

12. ———. 1997. "Le texte grec des "Catégories" d'Aristote et le témoignage du *Commentaire* de Porphyre." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 8:121-141.
13. ———. 1997. "Sur un passage corrompu des *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Philologus* no. 141:39-45
"Je voudrais ici tâcher de résoudre un problème épineux que pose l'établissement du texte d'Aristote en *Catégories,* 5, 2b 3 - 6 et tirer les enseignements que suggère la solution de ce probleme.
Voici le contexte où prend place le passage litigieux que je considère. Ayant distingué la substance de ses accidents (qui sont dans un sujet) et la substance premiere de la substance seconde (qui se dit d'un sujet) , Aristote pose, en 2 a 34-35, la these suivante: «tout le reste ou bien se dit de sujets que sont les substances premieres ou bien se trouvent en elles comme sujets». Cette these étant posée, le philosophe passe ä son illustration ä l'aide de deux exemples, l'un de nature

substantielle, l'autre de nature accidentelle (1 a 35-b 3), puis, il conclut. C'est ici que se situe le passage controverse." (p. 39)

14. ———. 1997. "Une glose chrétienne fourvoyée dans le texte des *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 110:627-631
"Le texte intitulé traditionnellement *Catégories*, qui fait partie du *Corpus Aristotelicum*, n'a rien d'un texte théologique. Et s'il y est question de la «substance première» (2 A 11 et sqq.), cette appellation ne vise pas la substance divine ; elle est réservée à toutes les individualités substantielles, par opposition à leurs espèces et à leurs genres, réputés « substances secondes ».
En fait, l'époque hellénistique semble d'abord avoir reconnu dans ce texte un recueil de distinctions à l'usage de la dialectique. Il portait alors le titre Avant les lieux (Τα προ τών τοπών), attesté dans les plus anciens catalogues des oeuvres d'Aristote (Diogène-Laërce, V, 24; *Vita Menagiana*, n° 57 dans *Ar. opera*, III, Ed. O. Gigon, Berlin, 1987, p. 25 a 8). Encore défendu comme authentique au IIe siècle de notre ère, notamment par Adraste d'Aphrodise et Herminos, ce titre ancien paraît avoir été disqualifié très tôt au profit de l'appellation *Catégories*, peut-être déjà par Andronicos de Rhodes (Ier siècle avant J.-C.) et ses principaux successeurs, qui placèrent l'ouvrage en question en tête du *Corpus*.
Cette situation nouvelle entraîna plusieurs conséquences. Passant pour une introduction à la philosophie aristotélicienne, le traité reçut une avalanche de commentaires jusqu'à la fin de l'Antiquité et bien au-delà. D'autre part, l'attention des commentateurs se concentra sur la première partie du texte, la seule où il soit question des quatre principales « catégories » (substance, quantité, relation et qualité), et avec laquelle, selon certains manuscrits médiévaux, s'achève le traité des *Catégories* (τέλος τών 'Αριστοτέλους κατηγοριών, lit-on, après 11 b 15, dans le Vat. Urbinas 35, le Ven. Marcianus gr. 201 et le Flor. Laurentianus gr. 72,5). Quoique beaucoup plus maigres, des

commentaires anciens de la seconde partie sont néanmoins conservés.
Ceux de Dexippe, Ammonios, Simplicius, Philopon, Olympiodore et David (Elias) l'ont été dans des manuscrits indépendants. Certains alternent, dans d'autres manuscrits, avec le texte des *Catégories* lui-même; on en retrouve aussi la trace sous forme de gloses marginales, dans plusieurs manuscrits (à commencer par Y Urbinas 35), qui transmettent essentiellement le texte des *Catégories* et où se mêlent d'autres gloses de provenances diverses, que l'on n'a pas encore étudiées en profondeur. Je propose ici d'identifier l'une de ces dernières gloses, qui paraît d'origine chrétienne et qui s'est introduite dans le texte des *Catégories*, tel que rapporté dans plusieurs manuscrits importants, parce qu'anciens." (p. 627)

15. ———. 2005. "La substance première dès *Catégories* à la *Métaphysique*." In *La "Métaphysique"d'Aristote : Perspectives Contemporaines*, edited by Narcy, Michel and Tordesillas, Alonso, 131-144. Paris: Vrin
"L'opinion commune aujourd'hui veut que la *Métaphysique* (en tout cas. les livres centraux ZHΘ) modifie l'ontologie ancienne qu'Aristote aurait défendue dans le traité des *Catégories*. Cette opinion « génétiste » repose sur deux arguments. D'un côté, la *Métaphysique* transférerait sur la forme individuelle la primauté sustantielle reconnue par les *Catégories* au composé individuel ; de l'autre, elle refuserait désormais le statut de substance attribué à l'universel par les *Catégories*. La théorie des *Catégories* serait ancienne en ceci qu'elle témoignerait d'une époque où l'individu substantiel n'aurait pas encore été analysé de façon appropriée en forme et matière(2).
L'opinion commune et ses arguments perdent de leur crédit si l'on peut montrer d'abord que l'analyse de l'individu se présente, en fait, de manière identique dans tous les textes incriminés." (pp. 131-132)
(2) « L'analyse des *Catégories* est antérieure. [...] Aucun des ouvrages inclus dans l'*Organon* [...] ne mentionne la matière. La raison peut en être (i) qu'Aristote n'y avait pas , encore pensé (sic), ou (ii) qu'il pensait que cela n'avait rien à

voir avec les sujets étudiés dans l'*Organon*. La première explication est probablement (bien qu'elle n'ait rien d'incontestable) préférable » (T. Irwin & G. Fine, *Aristotle : Sélections,* Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, Indianapolis-Cambridge, 1995, p. xvi).

16. Brague, Rémi. 1980. "De la disposition. A propos de *DIATHESIS* chez Aristote." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 285-307. Paris: Vrin
"Le mot *diathesis* a connu dans l'histoire de la langue et de la pensée grecques, depuis son apparition, probablement chez Antiphon le Sophiste, jusqu'à l'explosion rhétorique, patristique, scientifique, un parcours long et mouvementé. Il ne s'est jamais fixé sur une seule acception technique, et il est resté toujours ouvert sur l'évolution vivante de la langue, dont il a sans cesse reçu de nouvelles spécialisations. S'il est difficile d'en isoler le sens ou les sens proprement philosophique(s) de ses autres acceptions, techniques ou non, il est facile de le traduire : le français « disposition » le décalque assez exactement, et en reprend à peu près tous les aspects. Chez Aristote également, le mot, ainsi que les verbes qui y correspondent, a de multiples sens. Plutôt que d'en rechercher une unité a priori ou que de classer ses différentes acceptions, nous essaierons de parcourir la série de celles-ci en suivant la logique interne du concept." (p. 285)
17. Brentano, Franz. 2000. *Aristote. Les significations de l'être*. Paris: Vrin
Traduction française par Pascal David de *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (1862).
18. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1969. "La proposition particulière et les preuves de non-concluance chez Aristote." *Cahiers pour l'Analyse* no. 10:3-26
Repris dans Albert Menne, Niels Öffenberger (Hrsg.), *Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik,* Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1982, pp. 182-205.
"Je me propose ici d' étudier une incidence particulière avec quelque détail: le problème que posent le sens et l'usage de

la proposition particulière, notamment en rapport avec le rôle qu'elle joue dans les procédures par lesquelles est démontrée la non-concluance des couples de prémisses autres que ceux des modes syllogistiques valides. J'espère en effet montrer que les textes relatifs à ces questions manifestent une modification significative de l'attitude d'Aristote, et qu'ils permettent de saisir sur le vif le travail du logicien, d'abord victime des équivoques du langage naturel, prenant ensuite de ces équivoques une conscience progressive, sous la poussée interne des problèmes eux-mêmes, et parvenant enfin à les maîtriser. Au terme de cette évolution, la proposition particulière abandonne celles de ses connotations usuelles qui perturbent son maniement logique, et n'est plus définie que par sa place dans un système d'oppositions, avec toutes les conséquences que cela comporte." (p. 5)

19. Caujolle-Zaslawsky, Françoise. 1980. "Les relatifs dans les *Catégories*." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 167-195. Paris: Vrin
"La présente étude des relatifs (τά προς τι) porte exclusivement sur les *Catégories*, notre intention étant de souligner que la recherche menée dans ce traité a un caractère propre et distinct, caractère dont l'originalité semble échapper aux commentateurs qui ont lu les *Catégories* à la lumière de la *Métaphysique*.
1. La question de l'ordre des catégories. Le point de vue logique.
Les relatifs n'occupent pas toujours la même place dans l'énumération des catégories : on les trouve — notamment — tantôt avant et tantôt après la qualité. Ainsi, par exemple, dans la liste du début des *Catégories* (1b 25 sqq.), ils sont précédés par la substance, la quantité et la qualité, alors que dans le corps de l'ouvrage ils sont étudiés avant la qualité, tout de suite après la quantité ; l'ordre initialement indiqué n'étant d'ailleurs pas mieux respecté pour les catégories restantes : en fin de compte, seules les deux premières catégories de la liste (substance et quantité) conserveront leur rang initial. Dans les autres ouvrages, les relatifs sont promenés de la cinquième place de la table jusqu'à la

première elle-même, suivant les circonstances. C'est en quatrième position, toutefois — après la substance, la quantité et la qualité (ou la qualité et la quantité), qu'ils figurent le plus souvent dans les textes (énumérations simples ou analyses de détail)." (p. 167)

20. Colin, Bernard, and Rutten, Christian. 1994. *Aristote. Categoriae. Index Verborum. Liste De Fréquence*. Liège: Centre Informatique de Philosophie et Lettres.
21. Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1986. "*Legomenon et Katégoroumenon* chez Aristote." In *Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l'Antiquité*, 219-238. Bruxelles: Ousia.
22. Courtine, Jean-François. 2004. "La question des catégories : le débat entre Trendelenburg et Bonitz." In *Aristote au XIX siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 63-80. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion
"La critique de Bonitz
Le petit traité de Hermann Bonitz (*Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles*,1853) trouve son point de départ dans une confrontation critique explicite avec Trendelenburg; «l'objet de la recherche et la nécessité d'un débat critique explicite avec Adolf Trendelenburg», telle est l'ouverture du traité où l'auteur déclarait d'emblée : « Je ne peux pas être d'accord, sur des points essentiels, avec les résultats que présente Trendelenburg». Ce que Bonitz se propose donc d'étudier, en «philologue», c'est le sens qu'avait la doctrine des catégories, «pour Aristote lui-même», ainsi que la place et lu fonction de cette doctrine dans la « structure globale » de sa pensée. C'est seulement après que ce point de départ aura été solidement assuré quil deviendra ensuite possible de s'interroger sur l'évolution de la problématique et ses transformations éventuelles à travers les époques (44).
Ainsi, même si Bonitz partage avec Trendelenburg certains présupposée communs : l'importance du «retour» à Aristote en particulier, et s'il peut faire siennes les déclarations de Trendelenburg dans les *Logische Untersuchungen*, que nous avons rappelées ; s'il est, lui aussi, soucieux de proposer une nouvelle articulation philosophique et philologique, anti-idéaliste (en sens postkantien), il entend

pourtant et d'emblée « défendre un point de vue différent », en s'attachant à ces deux questions directrices :
1) Quelle est la signification des catégories pour Aristote ?
2) Comment Aristote est-il parvenu à établir cette table des catégories ?" (p. 74)
(...)
"Et s'il faut accorder à H. Bonitz que les catégories aristotéliciennes sont bien des catégories de l'être, qu'elles renvoient au «tout de l'expérience», à «ce qui est», cette référence (*Bezug, Bedeutung*), parfaitement reconnue par Trendelenburg, n'est elle-même possible, dans le registre du traité *Catégories*, qu'en raison de l'entrelacement entre «dire et être», ou mieux encore rt plus précisément, parce que c*e qui se dit est* aussi et du même coup *ce qui est dit* des étants (conformément aux deux acceptions, indissociables, du verbe λέγεσθαι)." (p. 77)

23. Crubelllier, Michel. 2015. "Domestiquer l'excès de l'être. La catégorie des relatifs entre Platon et Aristote." *Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics* no. 13:3-15
"A l'intérieur du corpus aristotélicien, la notion des relatifs (*pros ti*) est présente dans deux types de contextes sensiblement différents :
(I) Des contextes dialectiques, et plus précisément topiques, c'est-à-dire des contextes qui concernent la pratique de l'argumentation : des prédicats sont examinés dans la perspective de leur utilité pour construire des arguments. J'appelle « propriétés topiques » les propriétés qui concernent la recherche des arguments ; ce sont des propriétés du prédicat en tant que prédicat. Par exemple, puisque les relatifs admettent des contraires(1) et qu'ils admettent le plus et le moins(2), ils pourront être utilisés pour argumenter a contrario ou a fortiori.
Les deux principaux passages pertinents sont le chapitre 7 et le chapitre 10 des *Catégories*. Dans ces occurrences, il est intéressant de noter que les relatifs posent manifestement des problèmes de délimitation : ils figurent notamment dans la plupart des « cas de catégorisation litigieuse », c'est-à-dire les cas où un même terme semble pouvoir être rangé dans (au moins) deux catégories différentes(3).

(...)
(II) Des contextes métaphysiques, dans lesquels Aristote souligne le peu de consistance ontologique et la position en quelque sorte marginale des objets qui relèvent de la catégorie des relatifs.
Outre la notice de *Métaphysique* Δ 15 spécifiquement consacrée à la notion du pros ti, les principaux passages pertinents se trouvent dans des discussions tournées contre Platon et l'ancienne Académie, et tendent à souligner le peu de consistance ontologique et la position en quelque sorte marginale des objets qui relèvent de la catégorie des relatifs(6)." (pp. 3-4)
(1) Aristote, *Catégories*, 7, 6b15-19.
(2) Aristote, *Catégories*, 7, 6b19-27.
(3) L'expression « catégorisation litigieuse » est de F. Ildefonse et J. Lallot, qui parlent aussi de « chevauchement de catégories ». Voir F. Ildefonse / J. Lallot, *Aristote : Catégories*, présentation, traduction et commentaires, Le Seuil, Paris 2002, pp. 162-178, pour un inventaire et une discussion approfondie de ces cas.
(6) Il faut rattacher à cette liste différents contextes physiques, dans lesquels la caractérisation d'un objet ou d'un phénomène comme un relatif vise à diminuer ou à rejeter entièrement sa réalité et sa valeur explicative. Un passage typique est celui de *Physique*, V, 2, cité plus loin (cf. infra, p. 13).

24. Delamarre, Alexandre J.L. 1980. "La notion de πτῶσις chez Aristote et les Stoïciens." In *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 321-346. Paris: Vrin
"Lorsque Denys le Thrace, disciple d'Aristarque, définit la grammaire comme « l'étude empirique de l'usage le plus courant de la langue chez les poètes et les prosateurs », il apparaît encore comme un philologue attaché à l'examen des textes. Mais son ouvrage lui-même, un petit opuscule qui porte précisément le titre de *Grammaire*, est en fait la première grammaire de l'histoire, et l'origine de toutes les grammaires postérieures(1). Traduite, transposée, adaptée, elle domine la théorie occidentale de la langue, et nous la

retrouvons dans les manuels des écoliers. Que contient cet opuscule? Une division et une définition systématiques des principales catégories grammaticales. Les éléments : voyelles, semi-voyelles, consonnes ; les diphtongues, les muettes, les aspirées, les liquides, l'accent; les parties du discours, au nombre de huit (§ 13) : le nom, le verbe, le participe, l'article, le pronom, la préposition, l'adverbe, et enfin la conjonction. On remarque que, presque à chaque fois, le terme français semble être, plus encore que la traduction, la transcription exacte, par l'intermédiaire du latin, du terme grec original. Ainsi, par exemple, le participe, μετοχή, qui participe de la propriété des noms comme de celle des verbes. Cependant, nous ne nous interrogerons pas sur ce passage du grec au latin, et sur les effets qui en sont résultés. Nous voudrions au contraire remonter au-delà de la grammaire elle-même, pour déterminer l'origine prégrammaticale d'une de ses catégories." (p. 321)
(1) Sur ces problèmes, voir Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, II. [1863].

25. Denooz, Joseph. 1996. "L'étendue du lexique chez Aristote." In *Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts a Christian Rutten*, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 81-90. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres
"Pour ce volume d'hommage, nous avons choisi un sujet qui s'inscrit dans la ligne des études stylométriques que le Professeur Christian Rutten a consacrées au Stagirite: il s'agit d'une enquête comparative sur la diversité du vocabulaire chezquelques auteurs grecs." (p. 81)
(...)
"Dans les tableaux que nous présentons ci-dessous, nous ne prendrons en compte que trois données, à savoir la longueur du texte exprimée en nombre de mots-formes, le nombre de vocables et la moyenne d'emploi de chaque vocable. Cette dernière se calcule, pour un texte donné, en divisant le nombre de mots-formes par le nombre total de vocables.
À partir du nombre de mots-formes que nous désignerons par *n*, du nombre de vocables symbolisé par *v* et de la moyenne d'emploi représentée par *m*, on peut considérer

comme l'a proposé Ch. Muller(2) que le vocabulaire de l'oeuvre *x* est plus riche que le vocabulaire de l' oeuvre *y* si *vx* > *vy* et *nx* < *ny*." (p. 82)
(...)
"Les valeurs observées pour le Stagirite montrent que, dans la *Métaphysique* et la *Physique*, le vocabulaire est plus pauvre que dans le *De partibus animalium*.
De même, le lexique des *Catégories* est moins étendu que celui de la *Poétique* : la différence entre ces deux oeuvres est nettement marquée puisque la *Poétique*, avec 154 mots-formes de moins que les *Catégories*, contient à peu près exactement le double de vocables (640-1241).
La moyenne d'emploi du *De anima* (15,82) comparée à celle des *Catégories* (16,37) montre que le vocabulaire du premier est plus riche, étant donné les valeurs de n et de v pour ces deux oeuvres. De même, le lexique est plus étendu dans le *De partibus animalium* que dans les *Catégories*." (pp. 84-85)

26. Derrida, Jacques. 1972. "Le supplément de copule. La philosophie devant la linguistique." In *Marges de la philosophie*, 211-246. Paris: Éditions de Minuit
Première version publiée dans *Langages*, 24 décembre 1971.
"Si, à partir de l'opposition, naïvement reçue, entre langue et parole, langue et discours, on tentait d'élaborer une théorie du discours philosophique, il serait difficile de contourner la question classique: le discours philosophique est-il réglé — jusqu'à quel point et selon quelles modalités — par les contraintes de la langue ? En d'autres termes, si nous considérons l'histoire de la philosophie comme un grand discours, une puissante chaîne discursive, ne plonge-t-elle pas dans une réserve de langue, réserve systématique d'une lexicologie, d'une grammaire, d'un ensemble de signes et de valeurs ? Dès lors n'est-elle pas limitée par les ressources et l'organisation de cette réserve ?
Comment déterminer cette langue de la philosophie ? Est-ce une « langue naturelle » ou une famille de langues naturelles (grec, latin, germain, indo-européen, etc.) ? Est-ce plutôt un code formel élaboré à partir de ces langues naturelles ? Ces questions ont une vieille histoire, elles

remontent sans doute à l'origine de la philosophie elle-même. Mais on ne pourrait les ré-élaborer sans transformer ou déplacer les couples de concepts qui la constituent." (p. 211)
(...)
"Au lieu de suivre cette immense problématique en pleine mer, si l'on peut dire, peut-être vaut-il mieux, étant donné les exigences et les limites de cet essai, partir ici des propositions d'un linguiste moderne. On sait que Benveniste a analysé dans « Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue » (6) les contraintes par lesquelles la langue grecque limiterait le système des catégories aristotéliciennes.
Ses propositions font partie d'un ensemble stratifié; il ne selimite pas au texte qui en énonce directement la thèse. Nous devrons en tenir compte le moment venu. Cette thèse, d'autre part, a déjà rencontré des objections de type philosophique(7) qui forment donc avec elle un débat dont l'élaboration nous sera précieuse.
Voici d'abord la thèse: « Or, il nous semble — et nous essaierons de montrer — que ces distinctions sont d'abord des catégories de langue, et qu'en fait Aristote, raisonnant d'une manière absolue, retrouve simplement certaines des catégories fondamentales de la langue dans laquelle il pense » (p. 66).
(...)
(6) 1958, repris in *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, éd. Gallimard, 1966, p. 63.
(7) Cf. P. Aubenque, « Aristote et le langage, note annexe sur les catégories d'Aristote. A propos d'un article de M. Benveniste », in *Annales de la faculté des lettres d'Aix*, t. XLIII, 1965, et J. Vuillemin, *De la logique à la théologie, Cinq études sur Aristote*, Flammarion, 1967, p. 75 sq.

27. Duhot, Jean-Joël. 1994. "L'authenticité des *Catégories*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 12:109-124
"L'authenticité des *Catégories* d'Aristote, qui n'avait fait l'objet d'aucune suspicion pour les Grecs(1), a commencé à être mise en cause au début de ce siècle. Jaeger, A. et S. Mansion, arguant de la singularité de la doctrine de la substance que présente l'opuscule, inclinaient à ne pas y

voir la main du Stagirite(2). Reprenant les deux séries d'arguments, B. Dumoulin reconnaît ne pas pouvoir trancher la question(3). En revanche, d'un tout autre point de vue, la stylométrie, C. Rutten se montre favorable à l'authenticité(4). Nous nous proposons d'aborder ce problème à travers un autre critère, qui nous semble permettre l'authentification de l'opuscule : l'origine même du terme de catégorie. Le concept titre de l'opuscule a suscité bien des interrogations. On a dépensé beaucoup d'habileté à essayer d'établir des relations entre les sens philosophique et judiciaire (accusation) du terme. Plutôt que de rapprocher catégorie et accusation, ce qui peut donner lieu à des subtilités gratuites, il semble opportun d'examiner le texte d'Aristote." (p. 100)

(1) Nous ne tenons pas compte ici des cinq derniers chapitres, ou *Postprédicaments*, déjà mis en doute par les Anciens.

(2) S. Mansion, "La première doctrine de la substance: la substance selon Aristote", et "La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le traité des catégories", recueillis dans *Études aristotéliciennes*, Louvain, 1984, pp. 282 - 303, et 305 - 308; *Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote*, Louvain, 1976, n. 94.

(3) "Sur l'authenticité des Catégories d'Aristote", *Concepts et catégories*, Paris, 1980, pp. 22 - 32.

(4) "Stylométrie des Catégories", in *Aristotelica*, Bruxelles-Liège, 1985, pp. 315 - 329."

28. Dumoulin, Bertrand. 1980. "Sur l'authenticité des *Catégories* d'Aristote." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 23-32. Paris: Vrin

"L'ouvrage intitulé *Catégories*, généralement attribué à Aristote, témoignerait, selon Werner Jaeger, d'une «inversion nominaliste»(1) de la doctrine propre au Stagirite. Il caractériserait, selon le même historien, « la période de naturalisme et d'empirisme qui a marqué le Lycée après la mort d'Aristote »(2). Si on prend à la lettre l'expression de Jaeger, dans la proposition « Socrate est un homme », les *Catégories* voient en Socrate la substance

première et dans homme la substance seconde, alors que dans la perspective d'Aristote, homme serait au contraire la substance première, et Socrate la substance seconde !"
(...)
"S. Mansion défendait une position presque aussi radicale : «le traité des *Catégories* doit-il être tenu pour un ouvrage de jeunesse d'Aristote? a-t-il été écrit par un de ses disciples? ou par un Académicien de cette époque? Il paraît sûr en tout cas que l'opuscule ne reflète pas la pensée du Stagirite arrivée à sa maturité et cela nous justifie d'avoir négligé le contenu du traité pour notre exposé sur la substance aristotélicienne.»(3)
Disons tout de suite que nous n'allons pas chercher à résoudre en lui-même et dans son ampleur le problème de l'authenticité des *Catégories*. Occupé présentement à l'analyse génétique de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote, nous voudrions seulement montrer le caractère inacceptable du jugement cité de W. Jaeger, et le caractère excessif de certaines formules de A. Mansion (selon qui le traité des *Catégories* « couvre des conceptions qui ne sont guère conciliables avec celles de la *Métaphysique* »(4). Nous aboutirons cependant à des conclusions de fond et de méthode voisines de celles que nous venons de citer sous la plume de S. Mansion...
W. Jaeger et A. Mansion semblent considérer que, mises à part les *Catégories*, il existe chez Aristote une doctrine uniforme de la substance, et que les *Catégories* sont aberrantes par rapport à cette doctrine. Il importe donc de montrer l'évolution de la doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance." (pp. 23-24)
(1) « Die nominalistische Umkehrung der aristotelischen Lehre von der ersten und zweiten οὐσία in der *Kategorienschrift* lässt sich nicht wegraümen oder -denken », W. Jaeger, Aristoteles, *Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, Berlin, 1923, p. 45, n. 1 ; nous citerons sous le titre *Aristotle* la trad. angl., 1934, ici p. 46, n. 3.
(2) Jaeger, *Aristotle*, même page.
(3) S. Mansion, *Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote*, Louvain, 1946, p. 233, n. 61.

« Les suspicions que nous avons élevées contre l'authenticité des *Catégories* n'ont pas réussi à ébranler l'opinion traditionnelle à leur sujet », reconnaît l'auteur dans une longue note, assortie d'une bibliographie, ajoutée à la réédition de son livre, mais elle réaffirme et précise sa position de 1946 (voir *Le jug. d'exist. chez Ar.*, Louvain, 1976, note 94, p. 351-354).

29. ———. 1983. "L'*ousia* dans les *Catégories* et dans la *Métaphysique*." In *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981*, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 57-72. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
"Je tiens d'abord à dire que je ne suis pas un spécialiste du traite des *Catégories*, ni de la logique d'Aristote en général. Mon travail a jusqu'ici porté sur les *Ethiques*, sur le premier Aristote, et sur la *Métaphysique*; je cherche à reprendre à nouveaux frais l'entreprise illustrée par l'Aristoteles de Werner Jaeger, car cet historien me paraît avoir mêlé des confusions dommageables à des intuitions profondes. C'est mon essai d'une analyse génétique de la *Métaphysique* [*] qui m'a donné la conviction que le traité des *Catégories* n'était pas l'oeuvre d'Aristote, mais celle d'un disciple plus ou moins éloigné. L'aimable insistance de P. Moraux m'amène aujourd'hui à tenter de vous faire partager cette conviction." (p. 57)
(...)
"L'originalité de mon propos consistera donc à tenter de résoudre le problème de l'authenticité des *Catégories* en situant ce traité dans la courbe évolutive de l'ousiologie d'Aristote. Pour ce faire, je vais surtout m'attacher à des textes dont l'authenticité n'est pas contestée (par exemple, je ne ferai guère usage du livre K de la *Métaphysique*) (3). Pour retracer les grandes lignes de la doctrine aristotélicienne de l'ousia, je commencerai par quelques remarques sur les *Topiques* (I). Je considérerai ensuite les chapitres 9 et 10 du livre M de la *Métaphysique* (II), puis je résumerai la doctrine du livre Z de la *Métaphysique* (III). J'en viendrai alors au point névralgique de mon exposé, qui

consistera dans une comparaison entre l'ousiologie des *Catégories* et celle de *Métaphysique* M 9 - 10 (IV). Une remarque de méthode pour terminer cette introduction: l'analyse génétique n'a des chances d'être concluante que si elle s'appuie sur l'examen du vocabulaire avant de rechercher l'enchaînement chronologique des idées." (p. 58) [* *Recherches sur le premier Aristote*, Paris: Vrin 1981.]

30. Dupréel, Eugène. 1909. "Aristote et le traité des *Catégories*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 22:230-251
"La question de savoir si l'écrit intitulé Κατηγορίαι est ou n'est pas l'oeuvre d'Aristote, après avoir été débattue déjà dans l'Antiquite, s'est posée de nouveau des que l'etude critique de laristotelisme a été remise en honneur. Spengel, Valentin Rose et Prantl(1) furent les premiers adversaires modernes de l'authenticité du traité des *Categories*.
Je dirai tout de suite que ces auteurs me paraissent avoir justifié leur thèse, bien qu'un certain nombre de leurs arguments se trouvent être sans valeur : mais la majorité des savants n'en a pas jugé ainsi, et la thèse classique de l'authenticité du Traité, profitant d'une reaction qui dure encore contre le radicalisme critique, a trouve plus de defenseurs que d' adversaires. Zeller(2) a rallié a l'opinion traditionnelle la plupart des savants qui ont formulé leur avis sur la question, et recemment Gomperz(3), traitant de l'activité scientifique d'Aristote, a pris le traité des *Categories* comme point de départ et comme base de son exposé." (p. 230)

31. Gambra, José Miguel. 2013. "La définition des relatifs dans les *Catégories* et son emploi dans les *Topiques*." *Philosophie antique* no. 13:225-242
Résumé : "Le premier livre des *Topiques* constitue une sorte d'introduction théorique à la compilation de stratégies dialectiques présentée dans les livres centraux de cette oeuvre. Nombre des notions principales employées dans les règles d'inférence
contenues dans les τόποι sont systématiquement exposées et ordonnées dans ce premier livre. Parmi elles, l'exemple le plus clair est celui des «prédicables». Il y a, néanmoins, d'autres notions, dont l'exposition doctrinale doit être

recherchée dans les *Catégories*. Par exemple, les diverses sortes d'opposition entre termes, qui sont abondamment utilisées dans les *Topiques*, mais ne s'y trouvent pas définies. Dans cet article, je présente une analyse formelle des deux définitions des relatifs que l'on trouve dans *Cat*. 7, pour montrer ensuite comment elles sont employées dans les τόποι qui impliquent la prédication essentielle des relatifs,démontrant ainsi la cohérence de cette théorie et la dépendance étroite entre les deux oeuvres."

32. Goldschmidt, Victor. 1956. "La théorie aristotélicienne du lieu." In *Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à Mgr. Diès par ses élèves, ses collègues, ses amis*, 79-119. Paris: Vrin
Repris dans V. Goldschmidt, *Écrits, Tome I. Études de philosophie ancienne*, Paris: Vrin, 1984, pp. 21-62.
33. Jaulin, Annick. 1996. "Form, individu et universel." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 14:57-73
"L'intitulé de ma communication : "Forme, individu et universel" tend à établir une partition entre la forme d'une part, l'individu et l'universel d'autre part. Cette partition reflète la distinction, proposée au livre Z, entre ce qui est nommé *ousia prôtè* - la forme -, et les deux sortes d'*ousiai synoloi* que sont l'universel et l'individu. Le développement de cette distinction, bien établie par le livre Z, me paraît de nature à éclairer les débats récurrents sur le fait de savoir si l'*ousia* est un universel ou un individu : l'*ousia* n'est ni l'un ni l'autre. La récurrence des débats (qui s'illustre par les conclusions opposées de deux livres parus la même année : 1988, M. Frede, G. Patzig, *Metaphysik Z* (München, Beck) pour qui l'*ousia* est un individu, tandis qu'elle est un universel pour M. Furth, *Substance, Form and Psyche : An aristotelian Metaphysics* (Cambridge University Press) me paraît être le signe de la non-pertinence de la question plus que celui de son aspect bien-fondé. Si, en outre, le fait de distinguer l'*ousia*, comme *ousia prôtè*, des deux formes de *synoloi* que sont l'universel et l'individu, permet d'établir la cohérence de la théorie de l'*ousia* proposée dans le traité des *Catégories* et dans les traités métaphysiques, il semble

valoir la peine d'essayer de convaincre que cette distinction est nécessaire." (p. 57)

34. ———. 2011. "Les Catégories d'Aristote : instrument ou doctrine ?" *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 201:3-16
"Il est sans doute important de rétablir le statut dialectique du traité des *Catégories*, car « les dialecticiens argumentent sur tout ; or l'être est commun à tout et, à l'évidence, ils argumentent sur ces questions parce qu'elles sont propres à la philosophie »(2). Ainsi les questions dialectiques sont également philosophiques. Sans ouvrir le dossier complexe du rapport entre dialectique et philosophie première chez Aristote, il suffit ici de rappeler qu'elles sont le fait de la même « puissance (*dunamis*) »(3). La question ne sera plus alors de savoir si la logique est un instrument ou une partie de la philosophie, mais si une philosophie peut aller plus loin que les instruments qu'elle se donne.
La *Métaphysique* ne semble pas utiliser dans la recherche des causes, lors de la critique des thèses platoniciennes, des instruments autres que les catégories. Quelles que soient les subtilités herméneutiques déployées par Porphyre et ses successeurs pour contourner, à partir de la primauté de la forme dans les traités métaphysiques, le statut premier des substances sensibles dans les C*atégories*(4), il semble difficile de nier que l'ordre instauré entre les substances par ce traité ait quelque conséquence doctrinale. La question principale sur les objets présentés par le traité se trouverait ainsi déplacée : elle ne concernerait plus tant la nature des objets que l'ordre de leur présentation." (p. 16)
(2) *Métaphysique,* Γ, 2, 1004b 19-22.
(3) *Métaphysique,* Γ, 2, 1004b 24.
(4) Voir sur ce débat, Lloyd P. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists* (2005, Cornell University Press), notamment ch. 3, « The Categories of Reality », p. 76-100.

35. Majolino, Claudio. 2004. "De la grammaire à l'ontologie et retour. Le rapport entre catégories de l'être et grammaire philosophique selon Trendelenburg et Marty." In *Aristote au XIX siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion

"S'il est bien vrai que le propre de la logique c'est le jugement - dit Trendelenburg -, le lieu du vrai et du faux, et que dans le jugement il faut bien reconnaître une forme de synthèse (la συμπλοκή), tout le problème est dans la façon dont il faut comprendre la nature d'une telle synthèse. Or, la première *Critique* kantienne nous avait appris que les catégories sont déduites à partir des formes du jugement, et c'est en ce sens précis que Kant peut reprocher à Aristote de ne pas avoir suivi un critère systématique dans la compilation de sa table des catégories (*KdrV*, A 81/B 107). La critique kantienne à l'égard d'Aristote est double : n'ayant pas reconnu que la *Verbindung* [connexion] propre au jugement est à l'œuvre dans l'activité synthétique de I'entendement et, en dernière instance, de la connexion entre sujet et prédicat opérée par le Je pense - qui *lie* aussi bien le multiple dans l'intuition que le sujet et le prédicat dans le jugement -, Aristote n'a pas pu reconnaître non plus le seul critère qui préside à la déduction des catégories : le critère transcendantal. Deux objections donc, dont l'une est la prémisse de l'autre : 1) Aristote s'est trompé au sujet de la véritable nature de la synthèse et *donc* 2) il n'a pas suivi un critère cohérent pour la déduction des catégories.
Or, dans le texte de 1833, Trendelenburg répond aux deux objections en retournant contre Kant ses propres arguments. La thèse, d'ores et déjà exposée de façon claire et nette, est la suivante : chez Aristote les catégories sont tirées non pas des formes du jugement, mais plutôt de ses parties, et parce que Kant, lui, s'est trompé quant à la nature du caractère synthétique du jugement qu'il a pu accuser Aristote de ne pas avoir suivi un critère systématique pour la déduction des catégories." (pp. 85-86)

36. Mansion, Suzanne. 1946. "La première doctrine de la substance : la substance selon Aristote." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 44:349-369
Repris dans S. Mansion, *Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles,* Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp. 282-303.
37. ———. 1949. "La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le traité des *Catégories*." In *Proceedings of the Tenth*

International Congress of Philosophy. Amsterdam (11-18th August, 1949), edited by Beth, Evert Willem, Pos, H.J. and Kollah, J.H.A., 1097-1100. Amsterdam: North-Holland
Vol. I, fasc. 2.
Repris dans S. Mansion, *Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles,* Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp. 305-308.

38. ———. 1968. "Notes sur la doctrine des Catégories dans les *Topiques*." In *Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics. Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 1963)*, edited by Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane, 189-201. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Repris dans S. Mansion, *Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles,* Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp. 169-182.

39. Mariani, Emanuele. 2018. "Le fils des catégories, Trendelenburg, Kant et la réception de l'*Aristoteles Kategorienlehre* (1846)." *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 183:447-462
"C'est à Trendelenburg que revient le mérite d'avoir relevé la critique adressée à Aristote par Kant puis réitérée, dans une tout autre perspective, par Hegel à l'égard de l'absence d'un critère directif de la table des catégories, dont l'énumération n'aurait été que le résultat fortuit d'une rapsodie." (p. 448)
(...)
À défaut d'une solution en principe définitive, nous estimons que ces apories peuvent du moins indiquer la « question » avec laquelle l'analyse est appelée à se confronter. C'est là notre hypothèse de recherche qui nous amène à réévaluer la réception que l'*Aristoteles Kategorienlehre* a généralement rencontrée : dans les hésitations du texte aristotélicien, Trendelenburg entrevoit les lignes directrices d'un plus vaste projet en vue d'une nouvelle philosophia fundamentalis, à même de combiner logique et métaphysique(13)." (p. 451)
(13) 12. F. A. Trendelenburg, *Aristoteles Kategorienlehre*, p. 189 : « La doctrine des catégories » – nous lisons en 1846 – « ne trouvera son accomplissement que lorsque l'origine des

concepts et la génération des choses procéderont ensemble. »

40. Morrison, Donald. 1993. "Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l' *Organon*." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* no. 183:147-178
"Il n'est pas facile d'arriver à comprendre clairement la conception aristotélicienne de la différence. Les théories d'Aristote sur la division, sur la définition, sur l'essence et la substance, sur l'explication scientifique et la démonstration, exercent toutes un effet sur la notion de différence ; et inversement, elles sont toutes affectées par cette notion. De plus, la conception qu'Aristote s'est faite de la différence a évolué de façon significative dans le cours de sa carrière. Beaucoup des questions qui entourent la théorie aristotélicienne de la différence ont fait l'objet de discussions étendues. Mais il est un problème majeur qui n'a reçu que peu d'attention soutenue de la part des interprètes modernes : celui du statut catégoriel de la différence." (p. 147)
41. Narcy, Michel. 1980. "Qu'est-ce qu' un figure ? Une difficulté de la doctrine aristotélicienne de la qualité." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 197-216. Paris: Vrin
"Au chapitre 8 des *Catégories*, consacré à la qualité (ποώτης), Aristote, comme il l'a fait à propos des catégories précédentes (substance, quantité, relation), fait suivre son exposé de l'examen de deux questions : savoir, si dans l'ordre de la qualité (κατά το ποών 10 b 12) se trouvent contrariété (έναντώτης) et accroissement ou diminution (το μάλλον και τό ήττον). On peut noter d'ailleurs qu'à la réponse à ces deux questions se limiteront, au chapitre 9, les indications fournies au sujet des catégories de l'action et de la passion. Questions dont on a pu reconnaître qu'elles constituent comme l'application aux catégories aristotéliciennes d'un système catégorial plus ancien, provenant de l'Académie et dérivé, à travers le platonisme, du pythagorisme(1). Il peut paraître étrange de délimiter ici, en vue d'une étude de la catégorie de qualité, un passage d'allure adventice, où vient pour ainsi dire s'entrecroiser

avec le fil de l'exposé d'Aristote, et contredire l'assurance de sa classification(2), une problématique qui semble d'autant moins lui appartenir en propre qu'elle contribue surtout à jeter le doute sur la cohérence de l'exposé qui précède." (p. 197)
1)Cf. Ph. Merlan, Beitrâge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus I. *Philologus* 89 (1934), pp. 44-46.
(2) Aristote distingue, rappelons-le, quatre sortes de qualités : état et disposition (ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις 8 b 26-9 a 13), aptitude et inaptitude (δύναμις-ἀδυναμία 9 a 14-27), qualités affectives et affections (παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη 9 a 28-10 a 10), enfin figure et forme (σχήμα καὶ μορφή 10 a 11-26).

42. O'Brien, Denis. 1978. "Aristote et la catégorie de quantité : divisions de la quantité." *Les Études Philosophiques*:25-40
"L'analyse de la quantité, au chapitre 6 des *Catégories*, se fonde principalement sur la distinction entre ce qui est discret et ce qui est continu (4 b 20 sqq.). La quantité discrète est représentée par le nombre et par le *logos*; la quantité continue, quant à elle, est représentée principalement par la ligne, la surface et le corps, et d'une façon complémentaire (cf. παρὰ ταὐτα) par le temps et le lieu (4 b 20-25)." (p. 25)
43. ———. 1980. "Aristote: quantité et contrariété. Une critique de l'école d' Oxford." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 89-165. Paris: Vrin
"L'école d'Oxford et le commentaire du Professeur J. L. Ackrill sur les ' Catégories ' d'Aristote.
L'influence de la philosophie dite « linguistique » ou « analytique » de l'école d'Oxford se fait ressentir dans plus d'une faculté de philosophie en Angleterre. Qui plus est, l'intérêt des philosophes de cette école ne s'est pas borné aux problèmes de la pensée contemporaine ; en effet, malgré l'esprit délibérément novateur — pour ne pas dire iconoclaste — d'un Ayer ou d'un Ryle, un intérêt porté à certains aspects de la philosophie de l'antiquité fait bien partie de la tradition qui s'inspire des ouvrages, *Language, truth and logic* (1936) et *The concept of mind* (1949) ; en

témoignent, entre autres choses, les deux séries de la Clarendon Press dédiées, la première à Aristote (à partir de 1962), la seconde à Platon (à partir de 1973).
Les contributions à ces deux séries se caractérisent par des traits communs ; on y voit notamment une tendance à privilégier la portée proprement philosophique d'un ouvrage de l'antiquité, par rapport aux problèmes de philologie et d'histoire. Évidemment, cette manière d'aborder le sujet soulève des questions de méthode fondamentales pour la recherche sur la pensée de l'antiquité ; et je ne cache pas, pour ma part, les réserves que m'inspirent les réponses contenues implicitement dans les ouvrages parus jusqu'ici dans les deux collections citées.
Il ne s'agit pourtant pas d'approfondir ce problème en une soixantaine de pages ; ce n'est donc que pour signaler l'existence du problème, et pour poser un tout premier jalon, que l'exposé actuel s'est présenté sous la forme qu'il a. Je m'y suis borné, en effet, à l'étude d'un seul texte, et à l'examen du commentaire qu'en a fait l'un des adhérents les plus distingués de l'école d'Oxford. Le texte, celui des Catégories où Aristote cherche à montrer que les quantités ne peuvent pas avoir un rapport de contrariété (chap. 6, 5b11 sqq.) ; le commentaire, celui du Professeur J. L. Ackrill, qui occupe en ce moment une chaire de philosophie à l'Université d'Oxford, et qui s'intéresse notamment aux philosophes de l'antiquité.
Je ne m'en tiendrai pas cependant à une œuvre purement critique — à fabriquer le commentaire d'un commentaire ; en passant par la critique, j'espère pouvoir apporter des éléments positifs pour éclairer les problèmes, à la fois linguistiques et conceptuels, qui ont fait de ce texte l'un des plus difficiles dans le traité des *Catégories*." (pp. 89-90, notes omises)

44. ———. 1980. "Bibliographie annotée des études principales sur le 'Catégories' d'Aristote 1794-1975." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 1-22. Paris: Vrin.
45. Pelletier, Yvan. 1987. "Le propos et le proème des *Attributions* (*Catégories*) d'Aristote." *Laval Théologique et*

Philosophique no. 43:31-47
Résumé : "Le but de cet article est de manifester qu'Aristote, dans ses *Attributions* (Catégories), a pour propos de fournir le prémier principe systématique de toute recherche de definition. Ce but est atteint en deux temps: 1) par l'exposé direct de la conception que s'en fait l'auteur de l'article; 2) par la verification de cette conception à travers une lecture rigoureuse des quatre premiers chapitres formant le proème aux *Attributions*."

46. Philippe, Marie-Dominique. 1958. "Le relatif dans la philosophie d'Aristote." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* no. 42:689-710
"Sans prétendre à une étude exhaustive, essayons ici de dégager la pensée d 'Aristote sur le relatif, selon les étapes suivantes : 1° partir des critiques qu'Aristote fait aux platoniciens sur ce point, puisque c'est à partir du platonisme et face à lui qu'il élabore sa propre philosophie ; 2° analyser *Catégories*. Il conviendra alors d'approfondir déterminer du point de vue métaphysique du relatif ; 4° ses modalités spécifiques dont Aristote le met en oeuvre dans ses divers traités." (pp. 689-690)
(,,,)
"Voilà bien les deux catégories extrêmes [substance et relatif] qui s'éclairent mutuellement : l'une exprime ce qui est entièrement soi-même, ce qui ne dit référence à rien d'autre, ce qui constitue un «premier» tant dans l'ordre de la détermination que du point de vue de l'existence; l'autre exprime ce qui est pure référence à un autre, ce qui est entièrement dit en dépendance d'un autre ou orienté vers un autre, et qui par le fait même n'est en rien pour soi.
Ces deux catégories ne font d'ailleurs que traduire les deux manières extrêmes dont notre intelligence exprime le réel : ou bien comme un absolu ayant sa propre détermination et sa manière propre d'exister; ou bien comme un relatif totalement orienté vers un autre, incapable de posséder sa propre forme par lui-même." (p. 692)

47. Purnelle, Gérald. 1996. "La proportion des conjonctions de subordination dans six oeuvres d'Aristotle." In *Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts a Christian Rutten*, edited by

Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 91-102. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres

"Mon propos sera ici d'utiliser les méthodes habituelles de la stylométrie dans une perspective différente de celle des études de chronologie et d'authenticité, afin d'appréhender, indépendamment de ces implications, certains traits stylistiques des textes étudiés. Je m'intéresserai aux matériaux étudiés (les mots, les catégories, leur fréquence) pour eux-mêmes, en cherchant à déterminer la manière dont les emploie Aristote dans six de ses textes.

Les mots outils, même s'ils sont moins porteurs de sens que les mots pleins, n'en sont évidemment pas totalement exempts. Prépositions, conjonctions de subordination et même particules participent à la construction du sens de la phrase et du texte. S'il n'y a aucun inconvénient à regrouper toujours dans une même catégorie des mots tels que και. (conjonction) et τε, on conviendra que les conjonctions de subordination, par exemple, sont sémantiquement très différentes les unes des autres, et qu'une proposition causale n'est pas une consécutive. Il m'a dès lors paru intéressant d'aller plus loin que le simple dénombrement indifférencié des représentants d'une partie du discours, en éclatant l'une de ces catégories afin d'examiner la fréquence, dans quelques textes, de chacun des vocables qui lui appartiennent.

Dans cette perspective, les conjonctions de subordination constituent un premier cas intéressant à étudier. Les différents vocables qui entrent dans cette classe sont peu nombreux (bien moins que les substantifs, les verbes ou les adverbes), et ce sont typiquement des mots outils. En outre, en tant que telles, les conjonctions participent à la construction du sens du texte d'une manière différente, par exemple, de celle des prépositions : le niveau de syntaxe auquel elles participent (les propositions) est supérieur à celui des prépositions.

(...)

Les textes examinés sont au nombre de six ; ce sont ceux qui ont été lemmatisés et analysés au LASLA et ont été constitués en fichiers informatisés contenant, pour chaque

mot, une code de catégorie grammaticale. Il s'agit des *Catégories*, du *Traité de l'âme* (*De Anima*), de la *Métaphysique*, des *Parties des animaux*, de la *Physique* et de la *Poétique*. Cet ensemble paraît relativement varié, où se mêlent traités de philosophie, de logique et de biologie." (p. 92, note omise)

48. Rutten, Christian. 1985. "Stylométrie des *Catégories*." In *Aristotelica: mélanges offerts à Marcel de Corte*, edited by Motte, André, 315-336. Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia.
49. Stevens, Annick. 2000. *L'ontologie d'Aristote. Au carrefour du logique et du réel*. Paris: Vrin
"Les définitions de l'homonymie, de la synonymie et de la paronymie constituent la première partie du traité des *Catégories*, tandis que dans sa dernière partie figurent de nombreux exemples de termes plurivoques à propos desquels il n'est jamais précisé si cette plurivocité correspond à l'une des trois formes définies. Cette constatation, et aussi le fait qu'après les trois définitions le texte passe abruptement à une autre problématique, a pu faire douter de l'homogénéité du traité et, partant, de l'authenticité des chapitres 1 et 10-14. Cependant, dans toute son œuvre, Aristote utilise toujours ces termes en accord avec les définitions données ici et en reproduit quelquefois des parties (cf. *Topiques*, VI 10, 148 a 23 sq.) En outre, la disposition des problématiques ne doit pas nous étonner, car le traité des *Catégories* se veut un inventaire, successivement, des différentes portées sémantiques d'un mot (champ sémantique unique ou multiple), des différents types d'expressions (combinées ou non combinées), des différents statuts ontologiques auxquels renvoient les mots (sujet, attribut, inhérent), des principaux genres des étants (les dix catégories), et enfin de quelques déterminants qui peuvent s'appliquer à des étants de chaque genre (comme « opposé », « antérieur », « ensemble »...). On peut donc considérer les définitions fournies comme une base fiable pour aborder les termes plurivoques dans le corpus." (p. 62)
50. Surdu, Alexandru. 1971. "Interprétation symbolique des premiers chapitres des *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique* no. 15:235-248.

51. Thillet, Pierre. 1960. "Remarques sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Mélanges de la Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne* no. 8:28-36.
52. Thivel, Antoine. 1992. "Comment se forme un vocabulaire philosophique ? Essai de comparaison entre le grec, l'indien et le chinois." *Lalies.Actes des Sessions de Linguistique et de Littérature* no. 10:377-387
Résumé : "La célèbre théorie de Benveniste sur les catégories de pensée et les catégories de langue, par laquelle il essayait de prouver que la pensée n'est qu'un reflet de la langue, en analysant les catégories selon Aristote, ne résiste pas à l'examen quand on essaie de l'illustrer par des comparaisons entre la philosophie et la grammaire en sanskrit et en chinois.
Les notions grammaticales sonî inconscientes et élaborées par le sens commun, tandis que les concepts fondamenraux mis au point par les philosophes sont une formalisation consciente des idées cosmologiques de chaque peuple."
53. Thouard, Denis. 2004. "Une métacritique des catégories : l'usage critique d'Aristote chez Trendelenburg." In *Aristote au XIX siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 37-62. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion
"Aristote est un partenaire essentiel pour la discussion de la question des catégories qui fut vive au cours du siècle. Remise par Kant à l'ordre du jour, cette question fut l'un des enjeux de l'idéalisme, en tant que celui-ci s'est donné pour tâche de ramener la pensée à ses conditions subjectives : non seulement ce qui apparaît, le phénomène, n'est qu'à la condition d'être présenté en tant que tel dans les formes générales de la subctivité, mais les grandes fonctions de la pensée, qui lui donnent un contenu déterminé et se répartissent en catégories, sont intégralement réductibles à l'auto-position de la subjectivité. Le primat du jugement établi par Kant doit être fondé par la réconduction des catégories à l'acte de la pensée. Autrement dit, la déductibilité des catégories est une pièce décisive du projet idéaliste en tant qu'il a partie liée avec l'élaboration du «synthétique a priori». Mais cette recherche d'un unique fondement des catégories a suscité des réserves sceptiques.

Ces réticences se sont volontiers exprimées à travers un retour à Aristote, retour qui signifiait dans le même temps une interrogation sur la formation de la langue de la philosophie, sur le vocabulaire grec des catégories, sur le latin scolaire et sur la philosophie en langue nationale. L'attention aux catégories s'inscrit, comme on peut le montrer, dans la problématique générale de la métacritique, autrement dit d'une remise en question de la critique kantienne à partir du langage, soit pour l'invalider, soit pour la compléter. Cette orientation, quasiment contemporaine de la critique kantienne, a nourri l'opposition à l'idéalisme philosophique avant d'être reprise dans l'orientation anti-spéculative de la «critique du langage» ou *Sprachkritik*, puis dans la réduction de la philosophie à l'analyse du langage." (p. 37, une note omise)

54. Touratier, Christian. 1992. "Catégories de langue et catégories de pensée : (Benveniste lecteur d'Aristote)." *Lalies.Actes des Sessions de Linguistique et de Littérature* no. 10:367-376
Résumé : "Alors que Benveniste pense que les catégories de la logique d'Aristote ne sont que la transposition des catégories de la langue grecque, on essaie de montrer que, même chez Aristote, les catégories linguistiques ne sont pas parallèles aux catégories logiques, et que s'il y a parallélisme c'est entre les catégories aristotéliciennes et les définitions logicisantes des catégories linguistiques, que la tradition grammaticale a du reste abusivement empruntées à la logique d'Aristote elle-même."

55. Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf. 2018. "Les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Les Études Philosophiques* no. 183:345-362
"Ainsi, toutes les parties du discours, peut-on penser, ont donné lieu à leur catégorie. Il reste certes les conjonctions ; mais, puisque les catégories sont issues de la dissolution de l'énoncé*, les conjonctions sont par elles mêmes exclues des catégories. Quant aux pronoms qui, une fois mise à part la matière propre des notions si l'on peut dire, ne conservent que la nature du genre, tant s'en faut qu'on puisse leur assigner des catégories propres, qu'ils ont imposé leur nom, à une grande partie de ces catégories. *Ousia* en effet est

qualifié habituellement de *tode ti***, par quoi on signifie ce qui est défini à tous égards de telle sorte qu'on puisse le montrer dans son lieu. La seconde et la troisième catégorie sont intitulées *poson* et *poion*, qui sont des pronoms adjectifs ; *pou* et *pote*, qui sont des expressions du lieu et du temps, pourraient être appelés des pronoms adverbiaux. Voilà à peu près ce qui dans les catégories se ressent de son origine grammaticale.
Tel ne fut pas, pourtant, le tour d'esprit d'Aristote de ne s'attacher qu'aux simples formes de langues ; toutes les traces qu'il paraît en avoir décelées, il les a perfectionnées de façon à faire porter son investigation sur les contenus des notions, après avoir mis à l'écart ces formes." (p. 358)
(...)
"Donc, une fois abandonnée l'idée d'une origine pythagoricienne des catégories, il fallait rechercher leurs causes dans le système même de la philosophie aristotélicienne. Si nous avons réussi, sinon à mettre en évidence l'ensemble des causes, du moins à en élucider une espèce, qui ait conduit le philosophe à établir précisément ces genres de notions, il nous semble avoir en tout cas fait avancer la question." (p. 362)
* « Κατα` μηδεμίαν συμπλοκη`ν λεγόμεναι », *Catégories,* chap. 4 [1b25 ; « Ce qui se dit sans combinaison », p. 61]
** Cf. Aristote, *De l'âme*, I, 1, § 3 [412a], p. 206 de notre commentaire [Iéna, Walz, 1833].

56. van Aubel, Madeleine. 1963. "Accident, catégories et prédicables dans l'oeuvre d'Aristote." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 61:361-401
"La philosophie scolastique, lorsqu · elle définit la notion d'*accident*, accorde à ce terme, c'est bien connu, une double signification.
Elle parle d'accident logique (ou prédicable) et d'accident *métaphysique* (ou prédicamental).
Cette présentation, qui se réfère à deux théories bien distinctes - la théorie métaphysique des *Catégories* ou genres suprêmes de l'être, et celle des prédicables ou modes de la prédication -, se réclame d'ordinaire directement de la

philosophie de saint Thomas, et indirectement de celle d'Aristote.
Or, lorsqu'on entreprend l'étude du sens qu'avait pour Aristote le terme το συμβεβηκός - traduit *accidens* par les scolastiques -, on est amené bien vite à se demander s'il est permis d'attribuer à Aristote la distinction précise et explicite établie depuis des siècles entre l'accident logique et l'accident ontologique.
Car, s'il est indiscutable que l'on trouve chez Aristote tous les éléments qui ont permis la distinction aujourd'hui nettement définie entre les deux théories dont nous parlons, il n'apparaît cependant pas de façon aussi claire qu'elle soit déjà Jormellement perçue par Aristote, que celui-ci ait déjà présenté comme tels un accident logique et un accident métaphysique bien distincts l'un de l'autre.
Face à cette constatation, nous nous sommes posé la question qui constituera l'objet de cette étude : comment Aristote comprenait-il l'accident ?
Cela nous force d'ailleurs à nous demander préalablement ce que représentaient pour le Stagirite la théorie des prédicables et celle des catégories, et à tenter ensuite de déterminer la place qu'occupait la notion d'accident dans la pensée du philosophe." (p. 361)

57. Van Schilfgaarde, Paul. 1963. "Les catégories d'Aristote." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 68:257-267
"Par catégories aristotéliciennes, on entend le plus souvent des énonciations, déclarations, expressions, prédicats; mais le verbe grec signifie " s'adresser à " avec le sens accessoire d'accuser, obliger. Je ne discute pas ce qu'ont entendu les autres, dans une autre façon de penser, cette notion : dans l'esprit d'Aristote la vérité du monde ou de l'univers est adressée par les catégories et en même temps cette vérité est jugée responsable de cette dénomination ou qualification, de telle façon ce n'est pas l'homme qui en raisonnant attribuerait quelque chose monde ou qui ferait des observations plus ou moins véridiques sur monde (thèse jusqu'à présent maintenue par un nominalisme soit ouvert, soit déguisé) ; mais bien que le monde est appelé par la raison l'homme par son vrai nom - un appel qui à la fois

contient un défi une accusation. Si l'on s'adresse, par exemple, à la nature animale par désignation " cruelle ", sous condition que ce nom soit accepté par nature animale (c'est-à-dire qu'il soit " vrai "), alors cette nature male est responsable (dans le sens scientifique, non pas dans le moral) de sa crudélité et en porte la " culpabilité ". "(p. 257, notes omises)

58. Vuillemin, Jules. 1967. "Le sistème des *Catégories* d'Aristote et sa signification logique et métaphysique." In *De la logique à la théologie. Cinq études sur Aristote*, 44-125. Paris: Flammarion
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59. Zaslawski, D. 1969. "Termes, propositions, contrariété et contradiction." *L'Âge de la Science* no. 2:21-54.

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   A cura e con un saggio di Venanzio Raspa.
   Traduzione di Italo Cubeddu e Venanzio Raspa.
   "Il saggio di Otto Apelt (1845-1932) *Die Kategorieenlehre des Aristoteles* [La dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele] fu pubblicato nel 1891 all'interno di una raccolta di testi dell'autore intitolata *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* [Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca]. Con esso Apelt prendeva posizione all'interno di un dibattito sulla dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele che aveva attraversato la filosofia di lingua tedesca per gran parte del xix secolo.
   Il saggio rappresenta il punto più maturo di tale dibattito e si pone quasi a suo suggello. Alla rigorosa analisi testuale e alla profonda conoscenza degli scritti aristotelici, Apelt unisce una tesi interpretativa forte, per mezzo della quale ci introduce con sapienza filologica e acume filosofico nella teoria delle categorie di Aristotele." (Venanzio Raspa, p. 11)
2. Belardi, Walter. 1976. "Le *Categorie* aristoteliche e la cultura linguistica dell'epoca." *De Homine* no. 57:3-24
   Ripreso ed ampliato in W. Belardi, *Filosofia, grammatica e retorica nel pensiero antico*, Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1985.

3. ———. 1985. "Le *Categorie* aristoteliche tra grammatica e linguaggio." In *Filosofia grammatica e retorica nel pensiero antico*, 147-165. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo Versione riveduta di: *Le categorie aristoteliche e la cultura linguistica dell'epoca*, De Homine, 57, 1976 pp. 3-24.
4. Bernardini, Marina. 2009. "Modulazioni della sostanza aristotelica nelle *Categorie*." In *La filosofia come servizio. Studi in onore di Giovanni Ferretti*, edited by Mancini, R and Migliori, Maurizio, 144-164. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
5. Bonelli, Maddalena, and Guadalupe Masi, Francesca, eds. 2011. *Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele*. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert
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"Il volume si articola in tre parti. La prima parte contiene un saggio introduttivo curato da Carlo Natali sul tema e la struttura delle *Categorie*.
La seconda parte riporta i saggi di analisi e commento ai diversi capitoli dell'opera, curati da Maddalena Bonelli, Barbara Botter, Lisa Bressan, Elisabetta Cattanei, Paolo Fait, Francesca Masi, Stefano Maso, Carlo Natali, Cristina Rossitto, Rita Salis, Cristina Viano, Diego Zucca. La divisione dei saggi, da un lato, riflette la divisione degli argomenti adottata durante il seminario, dall'altro, rispecchia l'esigenza di suddividere la tematica in unità più brevi e più adatte alla segmentazione e ai tempi delle lezioni o delle sessioni dei seminari universitari. In molti casi, perciò, uno stesso capitolo è stato suddiviso in due parti e affidato all'analisi di più studiosi. Ogni contributo, inoltre, è pensato per introdurre il lettore alle principali problematiche affrontate da Aristotele in ciascun capitolo dell'opera e per orientarlo nelle diverse posizioni e soluzioni critiche che si sono presentate sia nella tradizione esegetica antica che in quella moderna e contemporanea. Abbiamo lasciato che ogni autore interpretasse liberamente questa indicazione. Ne è risultata, tuttavia, con nostra soddisfazione, un'impostazione tutto sommato omogenea. I saggi dedicati ai primi nove capitoli dell'opera riportano una traduzione, per quanto possibile originale, del passo esaminato, un'analisi e una divisione degli argomenti trattati nella porzione di testo considerata, un esame puntuale del testo in forma, per lo più, di commento

continuo. I saggi dedicati ai *Postpraedicamenta*, data la loro tematica e la loro articolazione interna del tutto peculiari, sono stati pensati diversamente dagli altri, vale a dire non come un commento continuo, bensì come un'esposizione complessiva del tema affrontato e della sua funzione nel contesto complessivo dell'opera.
La terza parte è occupata da due articoli di approfondimento rispettivamente scritti da Jonathan Barnes e Walter Cavini e dedicati l'uno ad una riflessione teorica più generale sulla categoria della quantità e l'altro sulle nozioni di vero e falso nelle *Categorie*.
Seguono ai contributi critici gli indici. Per quanto riguarda quest'ultimi, abbiamo optato per una soluzione il più possibile agile e minimale. L'indice analitico, in particolare, riporta solo le nozioni intorno a cui ruotano i saggi. L'indice delle fonti registra i passi tratti da opere diverse dalle Categorie effettivamente commentati e/o citati, nonché i passi delle *Categorie* discussi e citati nei saggi di Natali, Cavini e Barnes." (p. 13)

6. Bonitz, Hermann. 1995. *Sulle categorie di Aristotele*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero
   Traduzione italiana di *Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles* (1853).
   Prefazione (7-9), introduzione (13-31), Nota bio-bibliografica (33-43), di Giovanni Reale; traduzione e indici di Vincenzo Cicero.
   "Bonitz ha scritto questo saggio che presento nel 1853, come ho già detto, proprio in polemica con Trendelenburg, rilanciando in modo massiccio la prima delle tesi sopra elencate (le categorie come figure dell'essere), cercando di darle una ben precisa coerenza e consistenza.
   (...)
   In questo saggio sulle categorie, Bonitz, seguendo un criterio metodologicamente assai corretto, non parte dalla discussione della tesi di Trendelenburg, che intende confutare, ma fa questo nella seconda parte, dopo aver stabilito, mediante una accurata analisi dei testi, quale sia il vero e proprio significato delle categorie e quale sia stata la via percorsa da Aristotele per stabilire la tavola di esse.

In particolare, Bonitz vorrebbe, nella misura del possibile, rileggere e interpretare la problematica delle categorie aristoteliche senza lasciarsi condizionare dagli influssi dei vari ripensamenti teoretici delle medesime (errori in cui non pochi studiosi sono caduti), e quindi accertare in modo preciso quanto segue: la questione più importante è la seguente: quale significato aveva la dottrina in questione per lo stesso Aristotele, e in quale rapporto sta con l'impalcatura globale del suo pensiero? Solo a partire da questa domanda, infatti, sarà possibile misurare interamente l'ampiezza delle trasformazioni e delle evoluzioni che le singole dottrine hanno subito nelle fasi successive»(7).
Ecco, allora, le due domande di fondo che Bonitz si pone: in primo luogo, bisogna stabilire quale sia oggettivamente il significato che le categorie di Aristotele assumono nei suoi testi; in secondo luogo, bisogna cercare di stabilire quale sia stata la via percorsa da Aristotele per giungere alla scoperta delle categorie.
Per rispondere in maniera metodologicamente corretta a tali domande, dal momento che Aristotele non presenta nei suoi scritti una precisa definizione del concetto di «categoria», Bonitz nella prima parte del suo saggio(8) inizia con l'esame dettagliato di alcuni passi-chiave nei quali Aristotele nel discutere problemi di vario genere fa uso del concetto di «categoria», per giungere a una serie di chiarificazioni intorno a tutti i termini usati dallo Stagirita in connessione con tale concetto.
Nella seconda parte del saggio(9), Bonitz cerca di ripercorrere, come ho già detto, quella via seguendo la quale Aristotele è pervenuto alla dottrina delle categorie, ed è proprio nel corso di questa parte che egli ingaggia una serrata polemica con la tesi di Trendelenburg." (Giovanni Reale, p. 15)
(7) *Infra*, pp. 49-50.
(8) Dal titolo *II significato che le categorie assumono per Aristotele*, cfr. *infra*, pp. 9-93.
(9) Dal titolo *La via percorsa da Aristotele per stabilire le categorie*, cfr. *infra*, pp. 95-127.

7. Botter, Barbara. 2010. "La predicazione delle differenze nelle Categorie di Aristotele." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:1-18
Abstract: "In chapter 3 of the Categories Aristotle introduces a principle that is widely taken to assert the transitivity of the *said-of* relation. In this paper we shall show than something different may be going on in the transitivity principle that straightforward invocation of the transitivity of the *said-of* relation."
8. Brentano, Franz. 1995. *Sui molteplici significati dell'essere secondo Aristotele*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero
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9. Cavini, Walter. 1979. "Categorie e predicazione in Aristotele." *Annali dell'Istituto di Filosofia - Università di Firenze* no. 1:1-16
"Le Categorie aristoteliche contengono sia una teoria della predicazione (e dei tipi di enti possibili) o *Antepraedicamenta* (capp. 1-3), sia una teoria dei *Praedicamenta* o categorie dell'essere (capp. 4-9), che insieme formano il nodo essenziale di logica e metafisica, teoria del discorso apofantico e filosofia prima, caratteristico di tutto il pensiero aristotelico; nodo che nei *Postpraedicamenta* (capp. 10-15) viene
a includere, in particolare con la nozione di' mutamento' (κίνησις), anche i principi della :fisica o filosofia seconda.
(...)
Si tratta dunque di delineare tali rapporti fra predicazione, categorie e copula in Aristotele." (pp. 1-3, note omesse)
10. ———. 2011. "Un nuovo papiro delle «Categorie». *PHarris I 2* e *Arist. Cat. 10*." In *Papiri filosofici. Miscellanea di studi VI*, 241-251. Firenze: Olschki.
11. ———. 2011. "Vero e falso nelle *Categorie* di Aristotele." In *Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele*, edited by Bonelli, Maddalena and Guadalupe Masi, Francesca, 371-406. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert

"Nelle *Categorie* aristoteliche non compaiono mai i sostantivi 'verità' (ἀλήθεια) e 'falsità' (ψεῦδος), ma sempre gli aggettivi corrispondenti 'vero' (ἀληθής) e 'falso' (ψευδής o ψεῦδος usato come aggettivo) applicati agli enunciati dichiarativi (λόγοι) e alle credenze (δόξαι) che essi esprimono. Questo lavoro vuole essere una lettura mirata del testo aristotelico alla luce dei predicati semantici 'vero' e 'falso' allo scopo di delineare la teoria della verità e falsità soggiacente all'uso di tali aggettivi. La coppia di antonimi 'vero'/'falso' ricorre nel testo aristotelico sia come coppia disgiuntiva 'vero o falso' sia come coppia congiuntiva 'vero e falso'. Nel § 1 esamino il significato della coppia disgiuntiva 'vero o falso' sia applicata al singolo enunciato sia applicata alla coppia di enunciati contraddittori. Nel primo caso la coppia disgiuntiva ha valore disgiuntivo: ogni enunciato dichiarativo è vero o falso (Principio di Bivalenza); nel secondo caso invece ha valore distributivo: ogni affermazione e negazione opposte sono l'una vera l'altra falsa (Regola delle Coppie Contraddittorie). Nel § 2 esamino il significato che la coppia congiuntiva 'vero e falso' assume alla fine di *Categorie* 5, cioè quello di ora vero ora falso, in relazione al problema della variazione diacronica dei valori di verità degli enunciati e delle credenze, e del mero cambiamento *à la* Cambridge cui sono soggetti rispetto al cambiamento reale cui è soggetta la sostanza. Nel § 3, infine, esamino un passo di *Categorie* 12 in cui Aristotele enuncia sia i principi di discesa e ascesa semantiche (da essere vero a essere e da essere a essere vero), sia il principio di priorità causale di essere o non essere rispetto a essere vero o falso. La tesi che intendo sostenere è che vero e falso nelle *Categorie*, e in generale nel pensiero aristotelico, sono da considerarsi non proprietà ontiche o reali, ma proprietà logiche genuine degli enunciati e delle credenze che essi esprimono." (pp. 371-372, note omesse)

12. Cicero, Vincenzo. 1994. "L'interpretazione linguistica delle categorie aristoteliche in E. Benveniste." In *Adolf Trendelenburg. La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele*, 285-353. Milano: Vita e Pensiero

Il problema moderno del filo conduttore grammaticale nell'interpretazione delle categorie di Aristotele.
Friedrich Adolf Tredelenburg è stato il primo studioso a tematizzare in modo esplicito la possibilità che lo schema categoriale di Aristotele fosse il risultato di una deduzione sistematica condotta a partire da un principio ben definito. In particolare, la sua tesi per cui a far da guida nella costruzione di questo schema sarebbe stato, almeno in un primo momento, un filo conduttore grammaticale, ha costituito nel corso della seconda metà del XIX secolo un punto di riferimento imprescindibile, sebbene quasi sempre polemico, per tutti coloro che hanno rivendicato la presenza di un'impalcatura quanto meno organica nella dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele.(1)" (p. 287)
(...)
"È un fatto, però, che l'esito delle ricerche di Trendelenburg sia stato inequivocamente aporetico. Esso potrebbe riassumersi nel modo seguente: Aristotele sembra aver scoperto le categorie, in quanto predicati supremi, seguendo un filo conduttore grammaticale (un *proteron pros hemas*), cioè la scomposizione della proposizione, e precisamente l'analisi dell'espressione e della forma del giudizio; le categorie, però, hanno anche un significato «reale», ontologico, e perciò in diversi luoghi delle opere aristoteliche il fondamento generativo, ciò che è anteriore per natura (*il proteron tei physei*), è apparso come il vero punto di vista della classificazione; in conclusione, «alla questione, posta in termini aristotelici: in che misura questo "primo per noi" (*proteron pros hemas*) coincide con il "primo per natura" (*proteron tei physei*), ovvero in che senso se ne distingue?, non riceviamo alcuna risposta».(10)" (pp. 289-290)
(...)
"La nostra trattazione si propone piuttosto di collocare una volta per tutte il problema del filo conduttore grammaticale nella sua giusta dimensione speculativa, e in questo senso sarà dedicata prevalentemente ad un confronto diretto con le critiche «radicali» che Benveniste, prendendo lo spunto

dalle categorie aristoteliche, ha mosso al pensiero filosofico in generale." (p. 292)
(1) Cfr. l'elenco bibliografico riportato nel *Saggio introduttivo* di G. Reale, *supra*, p. 19, n. 7.
(10) Trendelenburg, *La dottrina...*, *supra*, p. 270.

13. Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2005. "Dialettica e grammatica nella dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 26:33-64.
14. Fait, Paolo. 2004. "La predicazione linguistica nelle *Categorie* di Aristotele." *Rivista di Estetica* no. 44:23-36
"The paper deals with the relations of *being said of* and *being in* which are indirectly introduced in Aristotle's' Categories. Is Aristotle distinguishing two kinds of ontological predication, corresponding respectively to essential predication and accidental predication, or not? Unlike many interpreters who answer this question in the affirmative, I deny *being in* to be a kind of predication at all. My aim is to show that in the few passages of the *Categories* in which Aristotle has recourse to a generic concept of predication, covering both essential and accidental predication, what he has in mind is just *linguistic predication*. The problem with linguistic predications, however, is that sometimes they do not mirror their ontological underpinnings, thereby misleading people into such absurd positions as that held by the "late-learners" depicted in Plato's *Sophist*."
15. Lugarini, Leo. 1955. "Il problema delle categorie in Aristotele." *Acme.Annali della Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere dell'Universita di Milano* no. 8:3-107
Ristampato in volume, Milano: Nuvoletti, 1955.
16. Maso, Stefano. 2008. "Come determinare la sostanza? Aristotele, 'Categorie' 5." *Lexis* no. 26:185-200
"È noto a tutti gli studiosi di Aristotele che, intorno all'individuazione e alla definizione della sostanza, si gioca gran parte dell'ontologia aristotelica. Lo Stagirita affronta il problema a più riprese, in particolare nel capitolo V delle *Categorie* e nel libro VII della Metafisica. Si tratta di due opere molto diverse quanto a concezione, storia e tradizione. La prima, insieme ai *Topici*, è oggi pressoché

concordemente riconosciuta autentica e ritenuta uno tra i primi lavori del filosofo (almeno tra quelli pervenutici), destinata a essere messa a disposizione dei discepoli per le indagini di fisica e metafisica.
Appartenenti all'*Organon*, le *Categorie* infatti esibiscono immediatamente il loro carattere logico-linguistico, strumentale alla determinazione di ciò di cui ci si occupa allorché si fa filosofia e, insieme, all'analisi del linguaggio che tale ricerca e tale determinazione consente." (p. 185, note omesse)

17. Negro, Camillo. 1960. "Note per una definizione del concetto di categoria in Aristotele, *Cat* . 1-5." In *Miscellanea Adriano Gazzana. Vol. II*, 5-22. Milano: Marzorati.
18. Palù, Chiara. 2000. "Le definizioni dei relativi nelle *Categorie* di Aristotele: una risposta a David Sedley." *Diánoia* no. 5:39-55
"This paper analyzes the two definitions of relatives in chapter 7 of Aristotle's *Categories* starting from David Sedley's recent article on this topic. In particular, using Simplicius's *Commentary*, I suggest some new arguments for Sedley's emendation at 8b18, which make it possible to read the expression '*aute e kephale*' in the sense of the head in itself (a substance) in opposition to the head as a part of the body ('per accidens'). The consequence of this interpretation is that it changes the meaning of the second definition of relatives, making it able to distinguish between what is a relative as such and what is a relative accidentally."
19. Ragnisco, Pietro. 1871. *Storia critica delle categorie, dai primordi della filosofia greca sino ad Hegel*. Firenze: Cellini
Due volumi.
20. Raspa, Vincenzo. 2020. "Categorie e linguaggio. Trendelenburg interprete di Aristotele." *Paradigmi*:294-297.
21. ———. 2020. *Origine e significato delle categorie di Aristotele. Il dibattito nell'Ottocento*. Macerata: Quodlibet
"Il presente volume verte su un singolo capitolo, breve ma significativo, della storia delle interpretazioni dei testi di Aristotele. Esso non vuole però essere solo un lavoro

storiografico e, quindi, offrire uno sguardo complessivo sulla produzione filosofica e filologica che in un determinato periodo storico, precisamente nel xix secolo nei paesi di lingua tedesca, ha interessato la teoria delle categorie di Aristotele.
Intende, invece, offrire uno strumento interpretativo utile per la comprensione di tale teoria e, allo stesso tempo, dare uno specifico contributo a una storia dei concetti filosofici. Il xix secolo non ha senz'altro esaurito il discorso sulla dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele, un discorso che è proseguito, proprio perché le interpretazioni date allora non sono apparse decisive, anche se non pochi risultati sono stati acquisiti; ma ha offerto al secolo successivo una scelta accurata del materiale su cui lavorare, nuove piste da esplorare, intuizioni da approfondire. Intraprendendo il tentativo di dipanare il groviglio di fili che, intrecciati, costituiscono il dibattito ottocentesco sulle categorie di Aristotele, questo piccolo volume intende, a sua volta, offrire un commento." (pp. 18-19)

22. Reale, Giovanni. 1957. "Filo conduttore grammaticale e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 49:423-458
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23. Rini, Enrico. 2010. "L'analisi aristotelica dei relativi." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* no. 65:623-656
"Nel settimo capitolo delle *Categorie* Aristotele tratta della categoria dei relativi (τα πρός τι), fornendo degli enti che si dicono in relazione ą qualcos'altro una prima definizione, più grezza e approssimata, e poi una seconda definizione, finalizzata a risolvere i problemi derivanti dall'applicazione della prima: la prima definizione, secondo Aristotele, lascia infatti aperta la possibilità che le parti delle sostanze seconde possano rientrare nella categoria dei relativi.

Cercherò qui di dare una ricostruzione plausibile dell'argomentazione aristotelica, provando a mostrare: (§1) quale sia la prima definizione dei τα πρός τι data da Aristotele, (§ 2) perché essa implichi l'ammissione di relativi nella categoria di sostanza (relativi sostanziali), (§ 3) perché i relativi sostanziali debbano essere esclusi e dunque perché la prima definizione debba essere rimpiazzata da una seconda. A questa ricostruzione teorica sarà affiancata una valutazione critica, mirata a sottolineare (§ 4) la connessione dei relativi con il problema dell'unità della definizione e(§ 5) l'insufficienza della seconda definizione in rapporto al problema che essa intende risolvere." (pp. 623-624)

24. Sainati, Vittorio. 1968. *Storia dell'Organon aristotelico*. Firenze: Le Monnier
Vol.1: Dai *Topici* al *De interpretatione* (1968); vol. 2: *L'analitica - Parte I - La crisi epistemologica della Topica* (1973).
Nuova edizione del I volume a cura di Mauro Mariani, Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2011.
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Sulle *Categorie*: Vol. I, Cap. III, *Le "Categorie" e la teoria della predicazione*, pp. 146-198.
25. Segalerba, Gianluigi. 2001. *Note su Ousia*. Pisa: Edizioni ETS
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26. Seminara, Lauretta. 2002. "Aristotele: omonimia e sinonimia." *Castelli di Yale* no. 5:25-36
"Vista l'importanza dell' omonimia nella filosofia aristotelica, è curioso costatare che solo nelle *Categorie* troviamo una definizione esplicita di enti omonimi e di enti sinonimi; secondo alcuni studiosi, peraltro, la definizione concernente gli enti omonimi non sarebbe per nulla chiara, e si riuscirebbe a capirne il senso solo con l'aiuto di scritti successivi alle *Categorie*. Oltretutto, tale definizione si trova proprio all'inizio del trattato e Aristotele non ci spiega se e come essa servirà nel seguito di questo. Del resto, vi sono state numerose discussioni, sia tra i commentatori antichi

sia tra gli studiosi moderni, di quale sia l'oggetto dell'intero trattato *Categorie* - parole o enti e di che cosa siano le categorie stesse.
Fatta questa premessa, vorrei ora esaminare la definizione di enti omonimi e di enti sinonimi data in *Categorie* 1 con lo scopo di mostrare che, al contrario di quanto molti ritengono, Aristotele, già nelle prime opere - le *Categorie* sono un'opera concordemente ritenuta dell' Aristotele giovane -, aveva una nozione di omonimia e di sinonimia ben definita." (p. 25)

27. ———. 2004. "Omonimia e sinonimia in Platone e Speusippo." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 24:289-320.
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Capitolo quarto: *La coordinazione delle categorie,* pp. 109-153.
30. Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf. 1994. *La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero
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Saggio introduttivo di Giovanni Reale: *Filo conduttore grammaticale, filo conduttore logico e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche e significati prevalenti di esse us fondamenti ontologici* (pp. 17-70).
In appendice: A. Trendeleburg, *De Aristotelis categoriis* (1833), pp. 375-399.
"Già nel 1833 [Trendelenburg] pubblicava la sua prolusione accademica dal titolo *De Aristotelis categoriis*, in cui anticipava la sua tesi, divenuta subito assai celebre, sul «filo conduttore grammaticale» nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche.
Nel 1846 pubblicava la sua *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, contenente due saggi: un primo dal titolo *Aristoteles*

Kategorienlehre e un secondo dal titolo *Die Kategorienlehre in der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Il primo è senza paragone più denso e originale del secondo. Infatti, il primo è di quasi duecento pagine, mentre il secondo, che va dai Presocratici a Hegel e alle *Logische Untersuchungen* dell'autore stesso, è di poco più di centosessanta pagine. L'originalità del Trendelenburg si manifesta, comunque, a tutti gli effetti, soprattutto nel primo." (Giovanni Reale, p. 32)

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Riassunto: "La nozione di «non-omonimia» surruga nel *Perì ideon* quella di sinonimia, istituita nelle *Categorie* sulla base della già effettuata critica delle Idee platoniche, in un momento, quale quello della composizione del *Perì ideon*, in cui Aristotele si accinge a operare detta critica. L'uso, qui, della nozione di sinonimia avrebbe infatti comportato l'introduzione di una nozione non ancora fondata."

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The Stoic Doctrine of *Supreme Genera* (Categories)

INTRODUCTION

"In addition to developing the hypothetical syllogism, Stoic logic also elaborated categories, which likewise stand in contrast to Aristotelian thought. The Stoics teach that there are four categories: substance, quality, disposition, and relative disposition.(140) Rather than being horizontal, signifying aspects of an enduring substance which are accidental and which can be shorn from it without destroying its essence, the Stoic categories are vertical. They move from lesser to greater levels of concreteness. None is accidental; all must be present in a given reality if that reality is to be grasped in all its individuality. Substance denotes the materiality of a thing and is possessed by everything except the incorporeals. Quality denotes the way in which matter is organized to form an individual being. Disposition includes times, places, actions, size, and color. It describes the particular situation and attributes of the individual. All the features covered by the category of disposition, including color,(141) are regarded by the Stoics as inherent in the individual. This view harmonizes with the doctrine in Stoic physics that bodies create their own extension and their own time and space, so to speak, through their *tonos* and activity. Relative disposition denotes the way that an individual thing is related to other phenomena. None of the four Stoic categories can be removed from an individual being without that being ceasing to be itself. At each level of specificity the categories refer to something integral to the individual being's reality. The

categories mirror the physics of concrete individual events taught by the Stoa. Although officially classified under logic, the Stoic categories are really pertinent to physics since they are modes of expressing reality.(142)"

> (142) Bochenski, *Ancient Formal Logic*, p. 87; Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, pp. 132-33; Phillip De-Lacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles,"*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 76 (1945), 246-63; Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien*, p. 23; Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, p. 18; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 93-94. On the other hand, A. C. Lloyd, "Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa," in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. Long, p. 65 and Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 15260 argue that the categories should be regarded entirely as *lekta*. (pp. 55-56)

From: Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. I. Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature,* Leiden: Brill 1985.

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4. de Lacy, Phillip. 1945. "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 76:246-263 "The Stoics used the four categories, *substance, quality, disposition, and relative disposition*, as methodological principles in all three branches of their philosophy. Moreover, in each case the third and fourth categories, disposition and relative disposition, embraced the most important questions. To the extent that the categories supply a methodological framework common to all three departments of philosophy, they constitute a unifying

element. Perhaps they cannot provide an instrument for resolving all the contradictions attributed to the Stoics, but at least they give a clue to that inner unity of which the Stoics themselves boasted."

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    "Das Wort exsistentia erscheint erstmalig im Lateinischen- in den theologischen Werken des Marius Victorinus, in

denen es fast immer zur Übersetzung von hyparxis; dient, im Gegensatz zu dem Wort substantia das ousia übersetzt, und zu subsistentia, das hypostasis wiedergibt. (1) Exsistentia ist abgeleitet von exsistere, das in der philosophischen Sprache oft für esse eintrat, zumal in der Form des Partizips.(2) Exsistere seinerseits wurde auch zur Übersetzung von hyparkein verwendet, wie aus der Timaios-Übersetzung des Calcidius ersichtlich.(3)
Für das Verständnis der Vorgeschichte des Begriffes Existenz ist es daher unerläßlich, sorgfältig die Bedeutung zu präzisieren, die das Wort hyparkein innerhalb des technischen Wortschatzes der griechischen Philosophie aufweist, und die vorliegende Studie möchte einen Beitrag zu einer derartigen Untersuchung liefern. Zunächst soll zu zeigen versucht werden, daß das Wort hyparkein innerhalb der Stoa eine Seinsweise bezeichnet, die dem Geschehen, dem Akzidenz, dem Prädikat zukommt und der Seinsweise des Subjektes gegenübergestellt wird. Danach soll diese Bedeutung des hyparkein einerseits mit dem aristotelischen, andererseits mit dem neuplatonischen, Gebrauch dieses Wortes verglichen werden." p. 115
(1) Marius Victorinus Adversus Arium, III, 7, 9, Henry-Hadot (Sources Chrétiennes, Paris, 1960); deutsche Übersetzung, Bibliothek der alten Welt, Artemis Verlag, S. 244-245, Hadot-Brenke); Adversus Arium, II, 4, 48-57 (S. 221, Hadot-Brenke); Candidi Arriani (= Marii Victorini) ad Marium Victorinum rhetorem, I, 2, 18 (S. 74, Hadot-Brenke).
(2) CICERO, De officiis, I, 30, 107: "Ut in corporibus magnae diaim;litudines suns, sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam uarietates " Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium, I, 33, 7: "In potentia exsistens ad id quod est esse."
(3) Calcidius, Timaeus, 50, 23, Wasznik: "In reputatione quidem et consideratlone, uere existentis uereque peruigilis naturae." Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 B.

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"Les articles consacrés au mot *pragma* dans les dictionnaires de la langue grecque sont en général assez longs et ils énumèrent d'habitude les sens suivants : au singulier, le résultat de l'action, l'action elle-même, l'affaire, notamment au sens juridique, le sujet en question, la chose comme réalité concrète ; au pluriel, les circonstances, les affaires de l'état, les ennuis et désagréments. Mais il se trouve assez souvent que le mot *pragma* prend, dans les textes philosophiques, des sens techniques très précis, pour lesquels les dictionnaires apportent peu de secours. Il est vrai que, dans ces cas difficiles, les traducteurs en difficulté recourent la plupart du temps au mot « chose » ou au mot « fait » qui permettent, par leur généralité et leur imprécision, de dissimuler le problème. La présente étude voudrait recenser quelques-uns de ces sens techniques du mot *pragma* et en laisser entrevoir l'arrière-plan rhétorique et philosophique." (p. 309)
(...)
"Nous avons donc étudié six types d'emplois différents du mot *pragma* dans la langue philosophique grecque. Ces emplois sont, en général, étroitement liés. De la notion de « ce dont on parle », on passe naturellement à celle de « sens », de « contenu conceptuel », d'« unité de sens » et d'« incorporel ». Dans tous ces sens, pragma est étroitement lié au discours et à la pensée. Il est dangereux de traduire, dans ces cas, pragma par le mot « chose », si l'on entend par « chose » une réalité extralinguistique, indépendante, extérieure à la pensée et au discours, alors que, précisément, pragma connote très souvent un rapport au discours et à la pensée. Ou bien alors, il faudrait réviser complètement la notion traditionnelle de « chose ». La présente étude pourrait ainsi apporter une modeste contribution à la réflexion sur des notions les plus confuses et pourtant les plus centrales de la tradition philosophique." (p. 319)

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Stoic Ontology:

The Stoic Doctrine of *Supreme Genera* (Categories)

The Stoic Doctrine of "Something" as Supreme Genus (under construction)

Stoic Ontology

Theory and History of Ontology

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Plotinus' Criticism of Aristotle's and Stoics Categories (*Enneads* VI, 1-3) [42-44]

INTRODUCTION

"In VI, 1-3 [42-44] Plotinus severely criticizes the Aristotelian (VI, 1 [42], 1-24) and the Stoic (VI, 1 [42], 25-30) doctrines of categories. Following in the footsteps of Plato for the Intelligible world (VI, 2 [43]), he proposes five categories, being, identity, otherness, movement and repose, the "greatest kinds" of the 'Sophist'. For the sensible world he presents us with an emended and simplified system of five Aristotelian categories, substance, quantity, quality, relation and movement (but he certainly seems to derive these latter from the Intelligible in VI, 2 [43], 21,24-59).

1) What are the categories of the sensible world and what is their status? Are they classifications of words, concepts or things? Does Plotinus subordinate the Aristotelian categories to the Platonic genera or does he accept Aristotle's categories as proposed but limit their usefulness exclusively to the domain of the sensible? Evangeliou argues that Plotinus accepted only the ontological interpretation of the Aristotelian categorical theory and, therefore, rejected them. Anton tends more to the view that while Plotinus rejects Aristotelian doctrine, he also subordinates it to the Platonic genera of VI, 2 [43]. Wurm also holds the view (at the beginning of his book) that Plotinus uses Aristotle's categories to express the divisions of the sensible world and presents them as a sort of intermediate help to the knowledge of the intelligibles, but he also contradicts this at

the end of his book, which perhaps accurately reflects Plotinus' altogether negative attitude in VI, 3 [44]. (25)

2) How is sensible substance, then, to be related to intelligible substance? C. Rutten had argued that Plotinus' treatment of the categories was nominalistic, that it made of his system an absolute idealism re Intelligibles, but a nominalism re sensibles. Against this mistaken, but widely accepted thesis, Wurm has shown convincingly that Plotinus' philosophy is objective, not merely psychological, and that the objective knowledge of Intelligible entities is the ground for the perception of sensible substances, which are a collection of qualities in matter manifesting intelligible *logoi* and not merely a projection of thought upon appearances. Therefore, the charge of nominalism re sensibles is not well founded.

3) But how is homonymous sensible substance grounded in Intelligible substance? Plotinus refuses to grant that the term "substance" can be attributed synonymously to all the substances admitted by Aristotle. But at VI, 1 [42] 3,1-5 he does suggest that we might take Intelligible substance, matter, form and compound together as an individual category in the same way as we might say the clan of the Heracleidae constitutes one genus, in the sense that they are all derived from one source. This would make of Intelligible substance the focal unity of the otherwise purely homonymous principles, form and matter, in sensible things and would perhaps permit of interpretation along the lines of an Aristotelian *pros hen* equivocal.

Hadot, in a fascinating and extremely careful piece of detective work, (26) has uncovered, from the commentary of Dexippus on the 'Categories', a residue of a lost commentary by Porphyry on the 'Categories' and addressed to Gedalius (and transformed by lamblichus in Simplicius according to Iamblichus' own metaphysical assumptions), in which Porphyry tried to show that the systematisation of substances in Bk. XII of the 'Metaphysics' was not incompatible with the Plotinian doctrine of substance (Dexippus, In Categ., 40, 13 --42, 3 Busse). Aristotle speaks of

three kinds of substance (two sensible and one an immobile, Intelligible substance), Porphyry of a) sensible, composite substance, b) physical substance i.e. incorruptible substance in the light of the incorruptible principles of the physical world, matter and form, and c) Intelligible substance (Dexippus, p. 41); and they are related in such a way that although there is homonymy between sensible and Intelligible substance, there is also a relation of analogy based upon developments in that notion in Metaph. XII (1070 B 30-1071 B 3) which require that all substances ultimately have reference to Intelligible substance from which they come forth (Hadot, p. 44).
Aubenque, by contrast, has stressed (1) that it is from Plato (Rep. 508 BC), and not from Aristotle, that the idea could be developed that analogical unity is founded on the unity of convergence *pros hen*) or dependence *(aphi enós)* (27) and (2) that there is a genuinely Aristotelian refusal (implicit in Plotinus, explicit in Proclus) to confuse focal unity and analogy and to play simultaneously on the two tableaux, the vertical and the horizontal. Such a confusion, according to Aubenque, would be to suppress the liberty of the One in favour of "*une sorte d'administration de la procession*", (73-74). This makes us see quite clearly how important is the radical gulf between Intelligible reality and its images. This concern has also been urged by Hadot.

4) Wurm (*Substanz and Qualitat*, Berlin, 1973) has maintained, in a similar vein, that Plotinus only employs the Aristotelian immanent, substantial form in such cases where there is no nearer concept. Hence, the disappearance of the substantial form in sensible substances in VI, 3 [44] is Plotinus' true position, perhaps a correction of his earlier avowed position in II, 6 [17], according to which quality may be viewed in either of two ways: as inhering in substance it is an act, as coming after substance it is pure quality (for the 'correction' VI, 2 [43], 14). Strange (Diss. U. of Texas, Austin, 1981) sees this as clear evidence for a development in Plotinus' thought. This new position where the sensible species of the object is nothing more than the conjunction of the sensible *differentiae* leads to the position of the 'Isagoge'

(18, 23-19, 3), that the form-species is constituted by the sum of the *differentiae*. Szlezák (GGA 227, 216-225) criticizes Wurm's position; the productive *logos* of VI, 3 [44], 15, 27ff. is the Aristotelian form, which Plotinus does not reject. One may say in review of Szlezák's view that, on the one hand, it does not square with the sharp dichotomy of the logical treatises between Intelligible and sensible; on the other hand, however, the foundation of discourse is what is important to Plotinus here. In VI, 1 [42] and 3 [44] the ultimate ground is matter and, therefore, no principle of inner organic unity can reveal itself. Perhaps then one should not reject too strictly a place for the "psychological" in Plotinus' thinking. But there is no need because of the Platonic form of argument in VI, 103 [42-44] to disregard genuine dialogue with Aristotle in a context elsewhere. Plotinus' thought is full of apparent inconsistencies, but the difference between II, 6 [17] and the logical treatises may still only be one of standpoint. Where the inquiry is founded upon Being, then quality, quantity, movement, even matter and bodies (as Porphyry's argument in Dexippus might well be understood to claim) will be discovered "there" (VI, 2 [43], 21, 24-59) to be reflected later in an *ad hoc* "material" classification which has already lost the focus of any objective foundation for thought.

In the views of this "new wave" of scholars, then (Wurm, Szlezák, Evangeliou, Anton, Strange, Hadot, Henry), Plotinus' treatment of the genera of being is given a more sympathetic treatment. Anton emphasizes the importance of Plotinus' reconstruction of categorical theory for the history of the criticism of classical Aristotelianism.

Hadot, Henry and Wurm have done most to bring about this change of attitude by locating Plotinus' written philosophy within the larger context of Plato and Aristotle or of a Plotinian oral teaching on substance, quantity etc. in Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius. Thus, it has become legitimate to ask not only (1) what does Aristotle mean, (2) how does Plotinus understand and refute him and (3) how is this viewed by later commentators, but also (4) who is right, to what degree and in what sense. (28)" (pp. 579-581)

Notes

(25) C. Evangeliou, "The Ontological Basis of Plotinus' Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Categories", in: *The Structure of Being*, ed. R. B. Harris, Albany, N. Y. 1982, 73-82; J. Anton, "Plotinus' Approach to Categorical Theory", in: *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. B. Harris, Albany, N. Y. 1976, 83-100; K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität*, Berlin 1973.
(26) "L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre", in: *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo*, Rome 1974, 31-47.
(27) "Néoplatonisme et analogie de l'être", in: *Néoplatonisme*, Cahiers de Fontenay, 1981, 63-67.
(28) P. Henry, "The Oral Teaching of Plotinus", *Dionysus*, 6, 1982, 4-12, cf. also Id., "Trois apories Orales de Plotin sur les Catégories d'Aristote", in: *Zetesis*, 1973, 234-267.

From: Kevin Corrigan, Padraig O'Clereigh, "The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971-1986". In Wolfgang Haase (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (ANRW). Teil II: Principat. Band 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. I. Teilband: Philosophie (Historische Einleitung; Platonismus)*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1987, pp. 571-623.

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"The text of this article was completed in January 1973. - Though some important work appeared thereafter, the general picture remained substantially the same four years later, when the bibliography was added. This, combined with supervening pressures, dissuaded me from attempting to rewrite the whole *Forschungsbericht* at that time (April 1977). Details of work known to me up to the beginning of 1977 which had not been taken into account in the article itself will be found in the bibliography, which was compiled then, at the editors' request. It also includes some works that were not thought worth mentioning in the original article. In view of the constantly impending but repeatedly delayed imminent publication of the volume in which it appears, I have made no further changes since 1977." p. 528 "The year 1951 easily chose itself for the start of a survey of recent work on Plotinus. It saw two events of outstanding importance. First the appearance of the first volume of HENRY and SCHWYZER'S edition, undoubtedly the most important contribution to Plotinian scholarship since Porphyry published the 'Enneads'. In the same year was published SCHWYZER'S article 'Plotinos' in PAULY-WISSOWA, the first comprehensive and scholarly survey of Plotinus. It remains the best and most reliable introduction to the study of Plotinus even after the considerable progress that has been made over the last twenty years. This article will not attempt to emulate SCHWYZER'S work, or to produce what could be little more than a condensed version of it, but will refer the reader to it for an introduction, and much more, to the subject: he will find that all work of any importance up to that time has there been taken into account. Instead it will try to show what has been done since, against a background of the hitherto accepted position, and to indicate some of the more important tasks for the immediate future." p. 529.

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   Compiled by Richard Dufour with help in translation from Hanneke Teunissen.
   Contents: Acknowledgments 235; Introduction; 237-239; Reference Works 241; Abbreviations 243; List of collected volumes, miscellanea and Conference proceedings 253; Greek text and translations 257; Studies 271 [1542 entries] 271; Index of themes 395; Index of Authors and Themes 401; Index of Treatises 409; Index of Greek Words 411.
   Reprinted as separate volume: Leiden, Brill, 2002.
   From the Introduction: "This bibliography covers the fruits of Plotinian scholarship over the last fifty years (1950-2000). Completed with four different indexes, it will provide students and scholars with easy access to modern Plotinian studies.
   My work derives much inspiration from Luc Brisson's bibliography of Plato, which served as an exemplary model and the principles of which have guided me throughout the compilation of this bibliography. With the exception of the indexes, the presentation of my bibliography follows the general principle of Luc Brisson's work in *Lustrum* (now published by Vrin).
   This bibliography aims to be exhaustive. References were systematically taken from indexes, bibliographies, journals, conference proceedings, annuals and collections of articles. A full list of these is given later.
   Fewer references are listed for 1995 and the following years due to the fact that most Bibliographical reference works have not yet reached the Year 2000. *L'Année Philologique,* for example, has just published the volume covering the

year 1997. For this reason we not only miss three full years of indexing up to 2000, but also supplements to the preceding years. It is possible, in fact, that the volume covering the year 2000 will provide bibliographic references from 1995 to 2000. In order to close the gap, I studied library catalogues, frequented bookshops and consulted most recent issues of the major journals. These efforts, however, can never contend the incredible amount of work by institutions like *L'Année Philologique*. As a result, the exhaustiveness of this bibliography is slowly reduced as we near the new millennium.
(...)
Four different indexes may be consulted referring to all information in the respective entries. In order, these indexes are arranged by:
1) Theme. Key-words are arranged in alphabetical order.
2) Author-theme. All entries which include an author other than Plotinus are listed in this index. Sub-categories have been added in order to facilitate specific searches. It is thus possible to search for all articles pertaining to, for example, Plotinus and Aristotle.
3) Treatise. Adhering to the Porphyrian system of classification of the *Enneads,* a list of studies concerning a specific treatise has been assembled. Only references which explicitly refer to one treatise are listed. For example, not every article concerning the Gnostics is automatically included in Column II, 9. All references to Gnostics may be found in the index "Author-theme" under the heading "Gnostics".
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Plotin, comme la "partie précieuse de la philosophie" dont le lieu propre est le Noûs. Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, l'auteur explique comment, dans le traité VI.2 (43) intitulé *Des genres premiers de l'Être*, Plotin se sert de la méthode dialectique pour révéler les cinq genres premiers que sont l'être, le mouvement, le repos, le même et l'autre. Par là, il nous donne l'occasion de rentrer dans l'un des plus difficiles traités plotiniens et aussi l'un des moins commentés, où le monde intelligible se dévoile comme une suntaxis, un système d'ordonnancement, à travers les deux structures héno-logiques que sont le genre-espèces et le tout-parties."

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"In *Ennead* VI. 1, Plotinus criticized not only Aristotle's set of categories, but also what he considered as the Stoic set of categories. He found both sets of categories unacceptable for many reasons, but especially for their inapplicability to the intelligible realm of being which, for him, is more important than the realm of sensible becoming. The study examines critically the reasons for Plotinus's criticism of the Stoic doctrine of categories, to the logic of which he objected primarily because of its presupposed ontological materialism."
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"In *Ennead* VI. 1, Plotinus criticized Aristotle's categories one by one. He found the Aristotelian doctrine of categories as a whole unacceptable for many reasons, but especially for its inapplicability to the intelligible realm of being and its superficiality regarding the sensible realm of becoming, for which it was intended. In *Ennead* VI.3, he proposed a new set of categories for the *kosmos aisthetos*, which is characterized by a reduction of Aristotle's set by fifty per cent and by the introduction of motion as one of the five categories. The study examines critically Plotinus's reasons for such a radical reduction and such a Platonic innovation."
25. Gerson, Lloyd P. 1994. *Plotinus*. New York: Routledge
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criticism of Aristotle's categories 84; 3. Aristotelian essentialism 93, 4. The Plotinian categories 96-103 (Notes to Chapter Five: 256-261).

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"Plotinus' apparent incapability of accomplishing his general purpose in VI, 1-3 [42-44] and his specific task in VI, 2[43] 20 of relating Neoplatonic ontology and Aristotelian logic is due to a mistranslation and misinterpretation of two sections, vi, 2, 20, 4-6 and vi, 2, 20, 20-32."
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"In this paper I propose a reading of Plotinus Enneads VI.1-3 [41-43] On the genera of being which regards this treatise as a coherent whole in which Aristotle's Categories is explored in a way that turns it into a decisive contribution to Plotinus' Platonic ontology. In addition, I claim that Porphyry's Isagoge and commentaries on the Categories start by adopting Plotinus' point of view, including his notion of genus, and proceed by explaining its consequences for a more detailed reading of the Categories. After Plotinus' integration of the Categories into the Platonic frame of thought Porphyry saw the possibilities of exploiting the Peripatetic tradition both as a means to support the Platonic interpretation of the Categories and as a source for solutions to traditional questions. His allegiance to a division of being into ten, and his emphasis on semantics rather than ontology can be explained from this orientation. In the light of our investigation the alleged disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories changes its appearance completely. There are differences, but these can be best explained as confirmation and extension of Plotinus'

perspective on the Categories and its role in Platonism." (p. 492)
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Plotins Verhältnis zu den Vorgängern 106; a) Die Kategorien der Sinnenwelt 108; Die relativistischen Kategorien und die Usia 108; Der Stoff 111; Quantität 113; Qualität 115; Kraft 117; Bewegung und Ruhe 118; Zeit 120; Raum 122; Relation 123; Kausalität 125; Universelle Sympathie 127; Teleologischer Panlogismus 128; Notwendigkeit 129; Aktive und passive Möglichkeit 131; Die Lehre vom intelligiblen Stoff 133; b) Die Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt 135; Das Problem 135; Quantität, Qualität und Relation vom Intelligiblen ausgeschlossen 137; Das intelligible Ineinandersein der Ideen 139; Ständigkeit und intelligible Bewegung 141; Die intellektuelle Anschauung und ihr Geschautes 144; Energie und Hypostase 145; Nus, Logos und Sophia 147; Aufstieg vom Nus zum Einen 149; c) Das Eine im Verhältnis zu den Kategorien 153; Das Ringen nach dem Substanzbegriff 153; Das Eine als überseiender Grund des Seins 155; Die positiven Bestimmungen des Einen 157; Die "analogen" Bestimmungen des Einen 159; d) Das Verhältnis der drei Kategoriensphären 160; Unterschied und Verwandtschaft der Kategorien der drei

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lettre à Heinrich Rickert du 27 novembre 1910) 268; Glossaire 281; Index nominum 287-288.
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"Plotinus' treatise on the kinds of being (VI, 1[42]) criticizes the category of the relative (*pros ti*) found in Aristotle and in Stoic writers. Starting from a different foundation, Plotinus postulates certain Platonic principles which control his own theory of the relative -- a theory he does not explain, but which he uses in part in order to support his criticism. Examination of the premises of Plotinus' criticism, its logic, and its limitations allows us to evaluate its pertinence compared with the two other theories of the relative against which it argues. Plotinus effects a separation between two different kinds of relative. From this premise come certain consequences : 1) Plotinus does not succeed in giving sense and unity to the relative except by way of detour into the Forms. 2) Thus Plotinus does not respond directly to the problem posed by the relative. 3) The unity of the relative in Aristotle implicates a necessary variability which Plotinus has not taken into account, because it conflicts with the idea of a homogenous ordered sequence. 4) The question of what relation the Forms have to each other remains open."
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The first part is on the theory of forms; the second on the theory of categories.
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Summary: "Aristotle regards the informed particular as primary substance and real.

Plotinus as a Platonist sees intelligible substance as real and the particulars that belong to a genus as secondary substance and ontically deficient. To avoid the infinite regress involved in predicating the Form both of the particular and the Form Aristotle locates the Form in the particular. Plotinus preserves the transcendence of Form by replacing the Aristotelian predication by synonymy with a system of predication built on pros hen equivocity. The Form then becomes eidos aneideon, “formless form.” This formless form is, not a restricted entity, but rather as an ocean of possibity. As such it dismisses the world of Aristotelian science and opens up new possibilities for understanding art. The Form is regarded as an individual aspect of the intelligible world which is expressed in a P-series which extends from the intelligible world to sensible reality."

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Kapitel IV. Die Trennung von Seinsaussage und Seinsbegründung als Voraussetzung für die Anerkernnung der aristotelischen Kategorien durch die Platoniker 167; Kapitel VC. Plotinus Frage nach der Leistung des diskursiven Denkens bei der Seinserkenntnis als Grundlage seiner Aussagen zum Kategorienproblem 221-262.

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the light of the well known Fr. 3 DK, on the identity of being and thought. It needs to point out that Plotinus, with Clement of Alexandria, is our source of this fragment. The plotinian interpretation is essential to understand the nature and the ontological-metaphysical function of Plotinus' hypostasis Nous. The Parmenidean conception of the identity of eînai and noeîn is profoundly reshaped by Plotinus and integrated into a perspective compatible with the Platonic and Neoplatonic ontology. According to the plotinian theory, in the hypostasis of Noûs, i.e. in the intelligible reality as a whole, being and thought are connected to each other in a dynamic and not motionless identity, which characterizes the nature of Noûs as uni-multiplicity (hen pollá). In accordance with what Plato states in Sophist, Plotinus conceives the intelligible reality as something intrinsically living and alive. Plotinus' conception of Noûs and his interpretation of Parmenidean noeîn in Fr. 3 DK appear to be central in the whole Neoplatonic tradition and in particular in Proclus' reflection on the nature of intelligible world."

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Rèsumé: "Le concept d'éternité tel qu'on le rencontre chez Plotin ne se truve chez aucun de ses prédécesseurs. Or, c'est Plotin lui-même qui a occulté ce fait d'histoire, en se donnant pour le disciple fidèle de Parménide et de Platon, qu'il s'évertue à défendre contre le matérialisme d'Aristote.

En vérité, Platon et Aristote ont ceci de commun qu'ils pensent l'éternitè comme absence de temps et de changement, et non comme absence de durée. Plotin, au contraire, oppose le temps à l'éternité comme la durée à son absence, introduisant ainsi le concept d'éternité qui sera celui de Boèce et de tout le Moyen Age."

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"This paper is a study of Plotinus's analysis of the idea behind Parmenides' famous claim that "it is the same thing

for thinking and for being". Plotinus's analysis depends on his reading of Plato as well as his co-option of Aristotle in the service of Platonism. It also depends on his original insights into self -consciousness as a property of cognition and on his non-representationalist theory of knowledge."

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"This passage provides a statement of the distinction between dialectic and logic which aids the understanding of the subsequent development of the latter as a separate discipline. Plotinus also sets up a contrast between the philosophy of the Stoics and the Peripatetics."

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"All mentions of the notion of participation ('*methexis*') prior to Plotinus have influenced his considerations on it, primarily, but not exclusively ontologically, the architectonic of the Plotinian system being directly inspired from Plato's *Sophist*. The eclosion of the notion of '*methexis*' seems to have followed a long itinerary before its flourishing within the framework of Neoplatonism."

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Related pages

Plotinus' Criticism of Aristotle's and Stoics Categories (Enneads VI, 1-3) [42-44]

Theory and History of Ontology

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Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*

INTRODUCTION

"The five introductions to the study of Aristotle by Ammonius, Olympiodorus, Elias, Philoponus and Simplicius give us a very good idea of the organization of the neoplatonic exegesis. The elaborated plan, and the long list of predecessors which Simplicius gives, make it certain that the five extant prolegomena are the result of a long development. Part of the material used in the prolegomena is old, especially the facts presented in the chapter on the names of the different philosophic schools (see Diels, *Doxographi* p. 246). But the scholastic approach and outlook is so apparent even in the earliest of these prolegomena, that of Ammonius, that we cannot go too far back. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrian and Proclus were great individualists, compared to Ammonius and his disciples, and their prolegomena have a different character. Simplicius says, CIAG [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*] VIII, p. 3.3, that he has freely used and transcribed Iamblichus' commentary, and it is possible that Iamblichus added prolegomena of the later type, but on the whole I am more inclined to regard Ammonius as the real originator of this scholastic type of introduction. Littig and, more recently, Moraux are certainly wrong in assuming that the elaborate neoplatonic classification of Aristotle's writings goes back to Andronicus. Firstly, there is no ancient evidence at all for this hypothesis, and that in itself ought to be enough; secondly, the prolegomena are throughout coloured by neoplatonic conceptions and doctrines; thirdly, they are intimately connected with a type

of scholastic and professional study of Aristotle which cannot have existed earlier than in the fourth or fifth century; they are also so closely connected with Porphyry's famous *Isagoge* that, as Praechter says, the whole course could be entitled "Erklarung von Porphyrius' Eisagoge mit Einleitung in die Philosophie".
Generally speaking, the highly speculative character of this classification is incompatible with what we know of Andronicus and his period. We may compare the Alexandrian and Hellenistic approach in the extracts preserved by Diogenes III 65.
The edition of Aristotle's works used in the neoplatonic school in Athens about 500 A. D. was the same as that we possess, i.e., in principle, Andronicus' edition. It was introduced by the *Categories*, preceded by a short biography of Aristotle, late copies of which we possess in the *Vitae* Marciana and Vulgata. This biography, which included a list of Aristotle's writings, was an epitome of Ptolemy's *Vita*." (pp. 444-445)

From: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1957.

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Selected bibliography on the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*

Editions of the Ancient Commentaries to Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry's Isagoge

Eight Neoplatonic commentaries are extant: seven in Greek by Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, Pseudo-Elias (David), published in the series of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* by the Berlin Academy (1882-1909, 23 volumes; this edition is reprinted by Walter de Gruyter) and one in Latin by Boethius.

1. Porphyry. 1887. *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: IV/1, edidit Adolf Busse.
2. Dexippus. 1887. *Dexippi In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: IV/2, edidit Adolf Busse.
3. Boethius. 1860. "In Categorias Aristotelis." In *Manlii Severini Boethii opera omnia* , edited by Migne, Jacques Paul. Paris: Garnier
   Patrologia Latina, v ol. 64, colL 159A - 294C.
   A critical edition and an English translation are in preparation by Monika Asztalos: "At present I am editing the text and at the same time preparing an English

translation of it to appear in *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle." ("* Boethius on the *Categories* ", in Alain Galonnier (éd.), *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs* , Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters, 2003, p. 195.)

4. ———. 1906. *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta* . Vienna: Tempsky
   Copiis a Georgio Schepss comparatis suisque usus, recensuit Samuel Brandt.
   Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum vol. 38.
   Anastatic reprint: New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966.
   First Commentary on *Isagoge* pp. 3-132; Second Commentary on the *Isagoge* pp. 135-348.
5. Ammonius. 1895. *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: IV/4, ediddit Adolf Busse.
6. Philoponus. 1898. *Philoponi (olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: XIII/1, ediddit Adolf Busse.
7. Olympiodorus. 1902. *Olympiodori Prolegomena et In Categorias commentarium* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: XII/1, edidit Adolf Busse.
8. Simplicius. 1907. *Simplicii In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: VIII, edidit Karl Kalbfleisch.
9. Pseudo-Elias, (David). 1900. *Eliae In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria* . Berlin: Reimer
   Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: XVIII.1, edidit Adolf Busse.
10. Porphyre. 2008. *Commentaire aux Catégories d'Aristote* . Paris: Vrin
    Édition critique, traduction française, introduction et notes par Richard Bodéüs.
11. Szlezák, Thomas A., ed. 1972. *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien* . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

Vorbermerkung VII-VIII; Inhalt IX-X; Einleitung 1; Texte pp. 27-68; Übersetzung pp. 69-86; Kommentar 87; Index Verborum 189; Stellenregister 211; Literaturverzeichnis 22-226.

Modern translations of the Ancient Commentaries to Aristotle's Categories

English translations

1. Ammonius. 19911. *On Aristotle Categories*, *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews.
2. Dexippus. 1990. *On Aristotle Categories*, *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by John Dillon.
3. Porphyry. 1992. *On Aristotle Categories*, *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by Steven K. Strange.
4. Simplicius. 2003. *On Aristotle Categories 1-4*, *Ancient Commentators of Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by Michael Chase.
5. ———. 2001. *On Aristotle Categories 5-6*, *Ancient Commentators of Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by Frans A. J. de Haas and Barrie Fleet.
6. ———. 2002. *On Aristotle Categories 7-8*, *Ancient Commentators of Aristotle*. Londo: Duckworth
   Translated by Barrie Fleet.
7. ———. 2000. *On Aristotle Categories 9-15*, *Ancient Commentators of Aristotle*. London: Duckworth
   Translated by Richard Gaskin.
8. Philoponus. 2014. *On Aristotle Categories 1–5 with Philoponus: A Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts*. New York: Bloomsbury
   Translated by Riin Sirkel, Martin Tweedale and John Harris ; with "A Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts", by Philoponus translated by Daniel King.
9. ———. 2019. *On Aristotle Categories 6–15*. New York: Bloomsbury
   Translated by MIchael Share.
10. Ammonius. 2019. *Interpretation of Porphyry's Introduction to Aristotle's Five Terms*. New York: Bloomsbury
    Translated by Michael Chase.

Traduction françaises

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   Traduction commentée sous la direction de Ilsetraut Hadot.
   Traduction de Philippe Hoffmann (avec la collaboration de Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot).
   Commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec des appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé.
2. ———. 2001. *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. [Fascicule II.] Chapitre 2-4*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres
   Traduction par Philippe Hoffmann avec la collaboration de Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot.
   Commentaire par Concetta Luna.
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For a general bibliography on the Greek Commentators on Aristotle see: The Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

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   Edited by Joseph Almeida and Sarah Klitenic Wear.
   Contents:
   Introduction: Joseph Almeida, Sarah Klitenic Wear: Ancient and Medieval Interpretations of Aristotle's Categories 4;
   Prolegomena to the study of Aristotle's *Categories*:

Lloyd P. Gerson: The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism 7;
Ancient Commentary
Michael Griffin: What is an aisthêton? “Ordinary things” among the Neoplatonist commentators on the *Categories* 24; Charlene Elsby: Plotinus on the Reality of the Category of Relation 42; Sarah Klitenic Wear: Syrianus the Platonist on Aristotle’s Categories 8a13–b24: The Ontological Place of *Skhesis* in Later Platonic Metaphysics 58; Joseph Almeida: Simplicius on *Categories* 1a16–17 and 1b25–27: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the *Categories* 73; Gary Gabor: The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle’s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius 100-113.

2. Anton, John Peter. 1969. "Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of *Homonyma*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:1-18.
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   "The main purpose of this paper is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of *homonyma*.(1) A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by *homonyma* things is given in *Categories*, ch. 1. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the *Categories* than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c. 233-303), Dexippus (fl. c. 350), Ammonius (fl. c. 485), Philoponus (c. 490-530), Olympiodorus (fl. c. 535), Simplicius (fl. c. 533), Elias (ft. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675-749), Photius (820-91), and Michael Psellus (1018-79), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason, the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper. The main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and

to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here in anticipation of what follows that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of *homonyma* aspects that were quite foreign to his views and that by doing so these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the *Categories* issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of *homonyma*, as given in the opening chapter of the *Categories*. Suffice it to add at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of *homonyma* with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work." (pp. 115-116)

(1) This essay, the second of a two-part article, was originally published in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, VII/1 (1969), 36-57, and is printed with minor changes. It was based on an invited paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in New York City, Dec. 27, 1965. For a full discussion of the doctrine of *homonyma* and the background against which it can be understood, see my “The Aristotelian Doctrine of *homonyma* in the *Categories* and its Platonic Antecedents,” also in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy* VI, 4 (Oct., 1968), 315-326). I tried to show in that paper how Aristotle's formulation is indebted linguistically to Plato but was worked out not in response to Plato's usage but to his own philosophical position and as part of his logical apparatus to attack the Speusippean wing of the Academy. On the whole, the textual evidence from the Platonic writings indicates clearly that Plato had not proposed a technical use of *homonyma*. Speusippus and Aristotle, however, offered two different and opposing technical formulations intended to fit their respective ontologies.

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"Bien que maintes préfaces affirment le contraire, les actes d'un colloque ne constituent jamais un livre. Les Actes du Colloque de Genève ne font pas exception: même si un thème commun les unifie, ils ne racontent pas une histoire linéaire. C'est pourquoi nous avons ajouté aux Actes une longue introduction. Ce chapitre, Les Catégories et les *Catégories*, de la plume de Jonathan Bames, vise à esquisser, dans ses grandes lignes, l'histoire des *Catégories* d'Aristote et de la théorie aristotélicienne des Catégories, et d'y encadrer les différents épisodes décrits par chacun des chapitres suivants. Un lecteur qui voudrait lire ce volume comme on parcourerait un livre pourrait donc suivre le texte

de l'introduction, tout en y intercalant les chapitres là où une note en bas de page les mentionne. L'index nominum et rerum, l'index locorum et la bibliographie, qui se trouvent à la fin de ce volume et qui s'appliquent à tous les chapitres, lui permettront d'établir d'autres liens entre eux." (Préface, 7)

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In the *Categories* Aristotle provides us with the first "model" of a conceptual classification. These classes are designated by specific linguistic utterances, the possible categorization of which has been puzzling thinkers and scholars ever since antiquity: why did the philosopher choose these specific terms for his categories? Neoplatonic philosophers who comment on the first logical treatise believe that only certain linguistic utterances can render Aristotle's ten classes and their approach emerges from: i) the treatment of the *Categories*' purpose, as related to the subject matter of *On Interpretation*; ii) their discussion of the 'parts of expression' (*lexis*) in connection with the grammatical 'parts of speech' (*logos*)."
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"Porphyry has recently been criticized for "muddling" Aristotle's doctrine of predicables by adding species to the list. I argue that a careful comparison of the two lists shows that they differ more profoundly than Porphyry's critics suspect, and that these modern critics, unlike the ancient

commentators, have been mislead by the title of *Isagoge* which they interpret as "Introduction" to *Topics* or *Categories* exclusively. it is shown that this is not the case."

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Abstract: "Boethius identifies beings that are in a subject with what the Scholastics called predicamental accident, and predication by accident with the predication of what is in a subject. The first of these questionable assimilations went on to become terminology commonly accepted by Scholastics of all eras. On the other hand, the second, whichseems quite consistent with the thinking of Aristotle, was only admitted with many reservations, probably because of the bewildering claims of Aristotle in *Cat*. 5, 2a27-34 about the predication of what *is in* the subject. In what follows I will try to show how these phrases, properly understood, are consistent with the idea that what is in the subject is said by accident of the substance, although they implicate a difficulty poorly resolved by Boethius himself and those who followed him on this point, of whom I will only mention by way of example some Scholastics from the 16th century."
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Abstract: "At *Categories* 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as 'Socrates is sitting,' as what later writers were to call '*complexe significabilia*', i.e., items such as 'that Socrates is sitting'. Simplicius's discussion of this passage in his commentary on the *Categories* clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius's commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a '*complexe significabile*' in the second

instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the *Categories* text with the first chapter of *De Interpretatione*."
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As Aristotle explains in *Rh*. III 2, poets take advantage of ὀνοματοποιεῖν to catch the undefined and give it a recognisable image, by means of a metaphorical name. In science, this practice, codified by Aristotle, is twofold: ὀνοματοποιεῖν meant both to re-semanticize words well known and to create names ex novo for things not discovered or studied yet. After analysing ὀνοματοποιεῖν's recurrence in Aristotle, I illustrate that, according to Neoplatonic Commentators, impositio can be, both natural and technical, only of things in actuality, having a solid consistency.
Intermediates between contraries, presumed relatives and powers as qualities are nameless – as Philoponus notices in his *In Categorias* – since they haven't an independent status and aren't definable. This bond between the original rhetorical practice and the ontological perspective, sketched in *Int*. 1, was strengthened by Alexander, who filled

Aristotle's gaps, stating that names signify things' being, i.e. the form acquired in actuality."

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52. Griffin, Michael J. 2012. "What has Aristotelian dialectic to offer a Neoplatonist? A possible sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the *Categories* 12,10-13,12." *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* no. 6:173-185.
53. ———. 2012. "What does Aristotle Categorize? Semantics and the Early Peripatetic Reading of the « Categories »." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London* no. 55:69-108.
"One of the more provocative mysteries of later ancient philosophy is how Porphyry came to situate the *Categories* of Aristotle at the outset of the nascent Neoplatonic curriculum." (p. 69)
(...)
"In this essay, I would like to offer a possible explanation for the tension that I have attributed to Porphyry above, which I think also sheds light on the early surge of interest in the *Categories*. Specifically, I will argue that the protreptic to the study of the *Categories* contained mainly in Porphyry's shorter surviving commentary *By question and answer* – that is, the 'semantic' treatment of the *Categories* as a map of the genera of being, only insofar as it is a map of the genera of simple, significant terms – is derived more or less unaltered from a Peripatetic tradition dating to Andronicus

of Rhodes, while Porphyry's own critical response to this tradition was developed primarily in his longer, now lost commentary addressed To Gedalius. The former semantic theory, I argue, has been somewhat blurred by our effort to filter it through the lens of the rather different theory from which Porphyry, in his longer commentary, developed his own considered view." (p. 72)
(...)
"Through this sketch of the evidence, I hope to have suggested that there is, in any case, more to the 'bipartite' theory than a compendious treatment or compression of the 'tripartite' material by Porphyry, and that attention should be drawn to it as a separate and distinct layer of the tradition. I have also explored some of the ways in which both 'layers' may be seen as predating Porphyry, while Porphyry's approach to the Categories in the shorter commentary could be seen as building on an earlier source." (p. 90)
In Appendix: I. Selected texts on the Semantical Reading of *Categories* 93-96; II. Analysis & context of the 'bipartite' theory 96-101; III. Early Sources for T9 and the bipartite reading 101.

54. ———. 2013. "Which 'Athenodorus' Commented on Aristotle's *Categories*?" *The Classical Quarterly* no. 63:199-208.
55. ———. 2015. *Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press.
56. ———. 2020. "Articulating Preconceptions: A Reconsideration of Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 31:1-38.
Abstract: "In this contribution, I respond to several points raised by Andrea Falcon, Stephen Menn, and Riccardo Chiaradonna in the course of their engagements with my monograph Aristotle's *Categories* in the Early Roman Empire. In particular, I reply to concerns raised by Falcon about my reliance on evidence from Ptolemy for Andronicus' catalogue, and try to situate more clearly my focus on Andronicus'

pedagogical treatment of the *Categories* within the wider context of evolving scholarship on its early reception. In response to challenges raised by Menn, I also argue in favour of Andronicus' interest in a
principled distinction between essential and accidental predication, and defend the value of Boethius' *De Divisione* as a witness to Andronicus, while highlighting Menn's ingenious reconstruction of Andronicus' interpretation of the 'said of' and 'in' relations in *Categories, 2*. Finally, in response to concerns raised by Chiaradonna in the opening chapter of Rashed and Chiaradonna's new and standard setting edition and discussion of Boethus of Sidon, I offer a provisional justification for my attribution to Andronicus and Boethus of a pedagogical view about the elementary articulation of kinds of
predication, motivating the introductory role of the *Categories* in logic and philosophy."

57. Haas, Frans A.J.de. 1997. *John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter. Aspects of His Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition*. Leiden: Brill.
Chapter four: *Second Objection: A Category Mistake,* pp. 165-250.
58. Hadot, Ilsetraut. 1987. "Les introductions aux Commentaires exégetiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens." In *Les règles de l'interprétation*, edited by Tardieu, Michel, 99-122. Cerf.
"Le present article décrit les différents types de schémas introductifs contenus dans les commentaires des néoplatoniciens tardifs sur les oeuvres d'Aristote et de Platon, en essayant de determiner leur signification exégétique ainsi que l'origine de plusieurs d'entre eux. Il apparait que les deux schémas en dix points qui introduisent respectivement à la philosophie d'Aristote et à celle de Platon ont de toute vraisemblance eté codifiés par Proclus au V siècle de notre ère, tandis que certains points des schémas en six points introduisant aux différents traités d'Aristote ou aux divers dialogues de Platon apparaissent

déjà au III siècle chez Origène qui a dû s'inspirer des commentaires platoniciens de son temps."

59. ———. 1991. "The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy According to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the *Categories*." In *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, edited by Blumenthal, Henry and Robinson, Howard, 175-189. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

60. ———. 1992. "Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique neo-Platonicien: les Préfaces des Commentaires sur les *Catégories*." *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 124:407-426.
Résumé: "Cet article répresente une contribution de plus à ma critique générale des thèses de Praechter selon lesquelles l'école neo-Platonicienne dite "d'Alexandrie" se distinguerait, non seulement par le lieu de son enseignement, de celle dite "d'Athènes", mais encore et surtout par ses doctrines philosophiques et par son attitude envers l'oeuvre d'Aristote. La comparison entre elles des Prefaces des cinq commentaires neo-Platoniciens des *Catégories* d'Aristote, dont l'un, celui de Simplicius, appartiendrait, selon Praechter, a l'école d'Alexandrie, fait apparaître la concordance fondamentale de la philosophie neo-Platonicienne qui était enseignée à Athènes avec celle qui était enseignée à Alexandrie: toutes deux interprètent la philosophie d'Aristote dans la même perspective neo-Platonicienne et la même volonté d'harmoniser Platon et Aristote."

61. Hadot, Pierre. 1959. "Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote dans le *codex Bernensis* 363." *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* no. 26:11-27.
Repris dans P. Hadot, *Plotin, Porphyre. Études néoplatoniciennes,* Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999, pp. 383-410.

62. ———. 1974. "The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle According to Porphyry." In *Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 125-140. London: Duckworth.

English translation of: "L'armonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories", in: *Plotino ed il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1974, pp. 31-47.

63. ———. 1974. "L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les *Catégories*." In *Atti del Convegno internazionale sul tema: Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente : (Roma, 5-9 ottobre 1970)*, 31-47. Roma: Accademia nazionale de Lincei.
Repris dans P. Hadot, *Porphyre: Études néoplatoniciennes*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1999, pp. 355-382.

64. ———. 1980. "Sur divers sens du mot pragma dans la tradition philosophique grecque." In *Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 309-319. Paris: Vrin.
Repris dans P. Hadot, *Études de philosophie ancienne*, Paris: Les Belles Lettes 2010, pp. 61-76.
"Les articles consacrés au mot *pragma* dans les dictionnaires de la langue grecque sont en général assez longs et ils énumèrent d'habitude les sens suivants : au singulier, le résultat de l'action, l'action elle-même, l'affaire, notamment au sens juridique, le sujet en question, la chose comme réalité concrète ; au pluriel, les circonstances, les affaires de l'état, les ennuis et désagréments. Mais il se trouve assez souvent que le mot *pragma* prend, dans les textes philosophiques, des sens techniques très précis, pour lesquels les dictionnaires apportent peu de secours. Il est vrai que, dans ces cas difficiles, les traducteurs en difficulté recourent la plupart du temps au mot « chose » ou au mot « fait » qui permettent, par leur généralité et leur imprécision, de dissimuler le problème. La présente étude voudrait recenser quelques-uns de ces sens techniques du mot *pragma* et en laisser entrevoir l'arrière-plan rhétorique et philosophique." (p. 309)
(...)
"Nous avons donc étudié six types d'emplois différents du mot *pragma* dans la langue philosophique grecque. Ces

emplois sont, en général, étroitement liés. De la notion de « ce dont on parle », on passe naturellement à celle de « sens », de « contenu conceptuel », d'« unité de sens » et d'« incorporel ». Dans tous ces sens, pragma est étroitement lié au discours et à la pensée. Il est dangereux de traduire, dans ces cas, pragma par le mot « chose », si l'on entend par « chose » une réalité extralinguistique, indépendante, extérieure à la pensée et au discours, alors que, précisément, pragma connote très souvent un rapport au discours et à la pensée. Ou bien alors, il faudrait réviser complètement la notion traditionnelle de « chose ». La présente étude pourrait ainsi apporter une modeste contribution à la réflexion sur des notions les plus confuses et pourtant les plus centrales de la tradition philosophique." (p. 319)

65. ———. 1985. "Les commentaires de Boèce et de Porphyre sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. V Section, Sciences Religieuses* no. 93:335-337.
66. Henry, Paul. 1973. "Trois apories orales de Plotin sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." In *Zetesis : Album amicorum door vrienden en collega's aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. E. de Strycker ter gelegenheid van zijn 65e verjaardag*, 234-265. Antwerpen: De Nederlandsche boekhandel.
67. Hijsmans, B. L. 1975. "Athenodorus on the *Categories* and a Pun on Athenodorus." In *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel*, edited by Mansfeld, Jaap and de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, 105-114. Assen: Van Gorcum.
68. Hoffmann, Philippe. 1980. "Les catégories ποῦ et ποτέ chez Aristote et Simplicius." In *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique*, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 217-245. Paris: Vrin.
"L'exposé que l'on va lire ne se propose pas d'étudier les concepts de lieu (τόπος) et de temps chez Aristote et son commentateur Simplicius (1), mais de scruter les quelques indications qu'Aristote, dans son Traité des *Catégories*, nous donne sur les prédicats ποῦ et ποτέ, ou que l'on peut trouver dans certains passages de *Physique* IV. La matière fournie par les textes aristotéliciens étant peu abondante,

notre attention se portera principalement sur le Commentaire de Simplicius.
Si les catégories ποῦ et ποτέ ne se confondent pas avec les concepts de lieu et de temps, c'est pourtant par rapport à eux, c'est-à-dire par différence avec eux, qu'elles prennent sens et consistance. C'est pourquoi, et bien que ce ne soit qu'à titre secondaire, la méditation sur le temps et le lieu nourrit le commentaire de Simplicius, chez qui elle fonde (ainsi d'ailleurs que chez nombre de commentateurs antérieurs) l'ordre relatif des deux catégories : selon que le temps, ou le lieu, est considéré comme plus « proche » de l'essence, plus « apparenté » à elle, la catégorie ποτέ (ou la catégorie ποῦ) se situera plus près de Ουσία dans la liste des catégories. Tel étant le critère du classement, l'analyse catégoriale court toujours le risque d'être remplacée par une étude « physique » du temps ou du lieu. Mais Simplicius situe la doctrine des catégories au niveau d'une étude des signifiés et des significations. Un second danger se présente alors, qui est de confondre l'analyse catégoriale et l'analyse grammaticale des « parties du discours ». En effet, les catégoriesποῦ et ποτέ correspondent presque exclusivement à deux classes d'adverbes, qui sont, respectivement, les adverbes de lieu et les adverbes de temps(2).
Nous verrons que Simplicius, analysant et classant les significations des adverbes (et compléments) de lieu, ne fait que reprendre, sur ce point, la doctrine grammaticale classique, telle qu'on la voit exposée dans la Grammaire de Denys le Thrace, dans les Scholies relatives à cette Grammaire, ou chez un auteur comme Apollonius Dyscole. Guidé par l'idée d'une étroite parenté entre les catégories kou et ttots, Simplicius étudie les adverbes de temps en suivant comme modèle la doctrine grammaticale des adverbes de lieu.
A la suite de Jamblique, il défend contre les attaques de Plotin la thèse soutenue par Aristote dans son Traité des Catégories : twk et koü sont des catégories distinctes et propres, tandis que temps et lieu relèvent de la quantité. Pour fonder cette distinction, Jamblique et Simplicius établissent que koü signifie « la relation au lieu de ce qui est

dans le lieu », et 7cot£ « la relation au temps de ce qui est dans le temps ». D'autre part, koü et 7cot£ se différencient des relatifs, en ce que la relation constitutive de ces derniers est convertible, ce qui n'est pas le cas de la relation constitutive de ces deux catégories : il s'agit, par exemple, de la relation au lieu de ce qui est dans le lieu, et non de la relation du lieu à ce qui est en lui." (pp. 217-218)
(1) Aristote, *Traité des Catégories*, ch. IV, 1 b 25 - 2 a 10 ; 11 b 10-15. Simplicius, *Commentaria in Aristolelem Graeca* VIII, pp. 340-364.
(2) Cette affirmation peut sembler contestable, du fait que les exemples donnés par Aristote et repris par les commentateurs sont « ἐν Λυκειώ », « ἐν αγορά », et ne sont pas à proprement parler des adverbes. On peut répondre à cela que le « titre » de la catégorie est un adverbe, et que Simplicius, à la suite, semble-t-il, des grammairiens, établit une équivalence sémantique entre de telles expressions et les adverbes de lieu : c'est cette équivalence qui nous importe, puisque la table des catégories est issue, aux yeux de Simplicius, d'une analyse des significations.

69. ———. 1985. "Sens et dénomination: Homonymie, analogie, métaphore selon le Commentaire de Simplicius sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études.Section des Sciences Religieuses* no. 93:343-356.
70. ———. 1987. "Catégories et langage selon Simplicius. La question du *skopos* du traité Aristotelicien des *Catégories*." In *Simplicius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie. Actes du Colloque international de Paris (28 septembre -1 octobre 1985)*, edited by Hadot, Ilsetraut, 61-90. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
71. ———. 1987. "Le *Prologue* du Commentaire de Porphyre par questions et réponses sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études.Section des Sciences Religieuses* no. 95:295-305.
72. ———. 1988. "Recherches sur les Introductions néoplatoniciennes aux *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études.Section des Sciences Religieuses* no. 96:272-281.

73. ———. 1992. "Le Commentaire de Dexippe sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote." *Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études.Section des Sciences Religieuses* no. 100:299-305.
74. ———. 1997. "La problématique du titre des traités d'Aristote selon les commentateurs grecs: quelques exemples." In *Titres et articulations du texte dans les œuvres antiques. Actes du colloque international de Chantilly, 13-15 décembre 1994*, edited by Fredouille, Jean-Claude, Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, Hoffmann, Philippe and Petitmengin, Pierre, 75-103. Turnhout: Brepols.
75. ———. 1999. "Les analyses de l'énoncé: catégories et parties du discours selon les commentateurs néoplatoniciens." In *Théories de la phrase et de la proposition: de Platon à Averroès*, edited by Büttgen, Philippe, Diebler, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 209-248. paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.
76. ———. 2000. "Les catégories aristotéliciennes *pote* et *pou* d'après le Commentaire de Simplicius. Méthode d'exégèse et aspects doctrinaux." In *Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation*, edited by Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile, 355-376. Paris: Vrin.
Actes du Colloque International de l'Institut des Traditions Textuelles (Paris et Villejuif, 22-25 septembre 1999).
77. Huby, Pamela. 1981. "An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the *Categories*?" *Classical Quarterly* no. 31.
78. Isnardi Parente, Margherita. 1986. "Simplicio, gli stoici e le categorie." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* no. 41:3-18.
79. ———. 1990. "Ancora su Simplicio e le categorie." *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* no. 45:723-732.
80. Karamanolis, George. 2004. "Porphyry: the first Platonist commentator on Aristotle." In *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries (Vol. One)*, edited by Peter, Adamson, Baltussen, Han and Stone, M.W.F., 97-120. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
81. ———. 2006. *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*. New York: Oxford University Press.

See in particular Chapters 6. *Plotinus* pp. 216-242 and 7. *Porphyry* pp. 243-330.
82. Kenny, Anthony. 2005. "Les *Catégories* chez les Pères de l'Église latins." In *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, edited by Bruun, Otto and Corti, Lorenzo, 135-173. Paris: Vrin.
83. Kustas, George L. 1973. "The Commentators on Aristotle's *Categories* and on Porphyry's *Isagoge*." In *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, edited by Kustas, George L., 101-126. Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies.
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85. Libera, Alain de. 1995. "Boèce et l'interprétation médiévale des *Catégories*. De la paronymie à la *denominatio*." In *Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts a Christian Rutten*, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 255-264. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres.
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89. ———. 2013. "Boéthos de Sidon sur les relatifs." *Studia Graeco-Arabica* no. 3:1-35.
90. Marenbon, John. 1993. "Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, before c. 1150 A.D." In *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, edited by Burnett, Charles, 77-127. London: The Warburg Institute, University of London.
Reprinted as Chapter II in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval*

Philosophy in the West, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
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92. Matthews, Gareth B. 1992. "Container Metaphysics According to Aristotle's Greek Commentators." In *Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters*, edited by Bosley, Richard and Tweedale, Martin, 7-23. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
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Abstract: "Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius' *Categories* commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry's greater *Categories* commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the *Categories*. In some cases building on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander's and Porphyry's responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus' interpretation of 'in' and 'said of', which is based on Aristotle's distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of 'said of'; (ii) Boethus' use of *De Interpretatione 1* to explain how a universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic λεκτά, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the *Categories* and *De*

Interpretatione; and (iii) Boethus' solution to the tension between Aristotle's hylomorphism and the *Categories*' account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the form is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it is nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus' reading, connect it with Boethus' accounts of *differentiae* and of the soul, and show how Boethus' views help motivate Porphyry's responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander."

94. Merlan, Philip. 1934. "Beitrage zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus: I. Zur Erklarung der dem Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Kategorienschrift." *Philologus.Zeitschrift für das klassische Altertum* no. 89:35-53.
95. Militello, Chiara. 2014. " Aristotle's *Topics* in the Greek Neoplatonic Commentaries on the *Categories*." *Peitho. Examina Antiqua* no. 5:91-117.
96. Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo. 1942. "The Genuine Text of Boethius' Translation of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* no. 1:151-177.
Reprinted in: L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscola: the Latin Aristotle,* Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972, pp. 1-27.
97. ———. 1945. "The Text of the *Categories*: the Latin Tradition." *Classical Quarterly* no. 39:63-74.
Reprinted in: L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscola: the Latin Aristotle,* Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972, pp. 28-39.
98. Moraux, Paul. 1984. *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. Zweiter Band: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II.]h.n.Chr*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
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Traduzione di Stefano Tognoli. Revisione e indici di Vincenzo Cicero.
Prefazione di Giovanni Reale. Introduzione di Thomas A. Szlezak.

100. Morison, Benjamin. 2005. "Les *Catégories* d'Aristote comme introduction à la logique." In *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, edited by Bruun, Otto and Corti, Lorenzo, 103-120. Paris: Vrin.
"Pourquoi les commentateurs antiques, tel Simplicius, estimaient-ils que les *Catégories* devaient être lues préalablement aux œuvres de logique ? Dans quel sens pensaient-ils que l'étude de la logique présupposecelle de) la doctrine des catégories ?
Les commentateurs affirment que les *Catégories* constituent l'introduction naturelle à l'*Organon*, lequel sert à son tour d'ouverture au reste du corpus aristotélicien. Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de traiter brièvement des raisons sur lesquelles ils se fondent pour considérer l'*Organon* comme I'introduction appropriée à l'ensemble du corpus. Cela exerce en effet une certaine influence sur les motifs avancés par les commentateurs qui regardent les *Catégories* comme l'ouverture de l'Organon.
Ammonius, Simplicius, Élias et Philopon débutent tous leurs commentaires sur les *Catégories* par dix questions relatives à l'étude du corpus aristotélicien(2). Cela est dû au fait que les *Catégories* constituent l'ouverture traditionnelle du corpus aristotélicien. Il ne semble pas qu'il existe une unité particulière entre les questions et on pourrait en soulever davantage ; il est difficile de résister à la pensée peu charitable que le nombre de dix ait pris une certaine signification en raison des dix catégories." (p. 103)
(...)
"Parmi ces questions, celles qui nous intéressent dans la liste principale concernent la nature du corpus aristotélicien, la subdivision des écrits, et l'endroit où nous devons débuter la lecture ; dans la sous-liste générée par la dixième question, [Pour chaque traité d'Aristote, quels sont les principaux points à examiner, combien sont-ils et quelle est leur justification?] notre intérêt porte sur le problème de l'utilité des *Catégories* et de leur place dans l'ordre de lecture des œuvres d'Aristote."
Texte traduit de l'anglais par Annick Weizmann.

(2) Proclus semble être l'auteur de ces questions (Élias, *In Cat*. 107.24-6). Quelques commentaires consacrés à d'autres œuvres possèdent également les mêmes questions. Voir K. Praechter, compte rendu des *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, dans Byzantinische Zeitschrift, XVIII, 1909, p. 516-538. [Traduction anglaise: Karl Praechter: *Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*, London: Duckworth 1990, pp. 31-54]
(3) Simplicius, *In Cat*. 3.18-29; dans les notes, j'indique où la version de Simplicius diffère de celle d'Ammonius (*In Cat*. 1.3-13).

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Résumé : "Simplicius utilise (et transforme) le concept d'υπογραφή (d'origine stoïcienne) pour décrire les genres premiers et les êtres sensibles qui, chez Aristote, ne sont pas susceptibles de définition. Or un examen attentif du statut de la science chez Aristote (en référence à la doctrine de l'incommunicabilité des genres et au problème de lo'individuation) montre que la tentative de Simplicius est inconciliable, ou difficile à concilier, avec l'aristotélisme (d'Aristote)."
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"Boethus is surely one of the most important thinkers of the first century bc.
Though only few testimonies, and no clear fragment, remain, their number and content are sufficient to show how insightful he was in commenting upon Aristotle.(1) It is not just that he was typical of this first generation of commentators who have struck modern historians by the free spirit with which they approached Aristotle's text.(2) Boethus' fragments on substance testify to more than a free attitude towards the Philosopher: it is also possible to recognise, through the many layers of the tradition – Alexander,
Porphyry, Iamblichus and Simplicius – a coherent and unitary doctrine.
His doctrine, of course, is not un-Aristotelian; it does not even stand somewhere halfway between Aristotle and other thinkers of antiquity, the Stoics in particular (even if it is obviously inspired by a general Stoic atmosphere). Boethus has consciously built, out of a few indications in the text of Aristotle, a certain kind of Aristotelianism among other possible ones.(3) This doctrinal approach is probably both

the cause and the effect of a cultural fact: the Peripatos' nearly exclusive focus, in the first century bc, on the Categories.(4) For sure, the treatise of the Categories, by itself, does not necessarily produce a definite account of the world. But by contrast with what is the case with other parts of the Aristotelian corpus, its basic ontological features seem naturally at home in the framework of a doctrine upholding the primacy of the individual material substance." (p. 53)

(1) Curiously enough, there has been until now no collection of Boethus' fragments. I am currently working, together with Riccardo Chiaradonna and Philippe Hoffmann, on just such a project. Our book, to be published with de Gruyter, will include all the fragments (Greek and Arabic), a French translation, and a commentary. [R. Chiaradonna, M. Rashed (eds.), *Boéthos de Sidon – Exégète d'Aristote et philosophe*, Berlin: de Gruyter 2020]

(2) See Moraux 1973: 98–9 and 105–13.

(3) See Rashed 2007a: 22–6.

(4) See R. Chiaradonna's chapter in the present volume.

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"A re-examination of the question why, in the revival of interest, in the first century B.C. in Aristotle's esoteric works, as opposed to his doctrines, the work *Categories* played so large a part. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest just because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle's other works with the possible exception of the *Metaphysics*, it revealed aspects of Aristotle's thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period."
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"The hermeneutic tradition concerning Aristotle's *Categories* goes back to Eudorus and his contemporaries in the 1st cent. B.C. Initially a perplexing text, it forces the Platonist to consider a variety of new dialectical questions. The criticisms of Eudorus demonstrate the desire for orderly arrangements and pose questions that the hermeneutic tradition, culminating in the commentary of Simplicius, would try to answer. His pursuit of a critical agenda does not warrant the labels "anti-Aristotelian" or "polemical", but it does show why he preferred to be known as an Academic rather than a Peripatetic."

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Contents: Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Epistemology; 3. Science and logic; 4. Physics; 5. Psychology: perception and intellect; 6. Metaphysics; 7. Ethics; Chronology; Glossary of names; Guide to further reading; Bibliography; Index.
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The Neoplatonic Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

Latin Medieval Commentators on Aristotle's Categories

Theory and History of Ontology

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Eriugena, *Periphyseon* Book I: Aristotelian Logic and Categories

LOGIC AND CATEGORIES IN THE PERIPHYSEON

Categories are discussed in the Book I (462D 8 - 524B 12); numbers are that of columns in Heinrich Joseph Floss (ed.), *Joannis Scoti opera quae supersunt omnia* in: Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia Latina,* vol. 122, Paris 1853, coll. 439-1022 and are reproduced in modern editions and translations.

"[John the Scot] unique qualities appear first in the treatise that Archbishop Hincmar commissioned in 850 as a reply to Gottschalk's thesis of double predestination.(26) To Gottschalk's argument that God has without qualification predestined the just to salvation and the unjust to perdition John the Scot replied by asserting the fundamental unity of God. We cannot know this unity. We can know, if only by analogy, the manifestations of this unity: God's will, his life, his power. We can recognize also that created nature is itself a manifestation of God: another form in which he is partly accessible. However trivial, and however misguided, individuals may be, as part of that creation they are all inescapably manifestations of the one ultimate unity. Gottschalk's thesis, whereby part of creation is absolutely opposed to another part (the just to the unjust), has always been so opposed and cannot conceivably resolve this opposition, introduces into creation a division that goes right back to God himself, dividing his will, and beyond that his unity; which is unthinkable. Now John is arguing here along familiar Neoplatonist lines. Where he is exceptional (for the ninth century at least) is in seeing the relationship of God to the creation in terms of contemporary logic. In the treatise against Gottschalk this is not spelled out. John makes it clear in his major independent work, the *De divisione naturae*. For the ultimate genus, which covers

everything, including God. John proposes the name *natura*.(27) The *genus natura* sums up four *species*: the first creates and is not created, the second is created and creates, the third is created and does not itself create, the fourth neither creates nor is created. Now this raises a host of questions, which cannot be discussed here. But the essential is that within the all-embracing genus nature John has included both God and the created world. The further analysis of the first species, the uncreated creator, God, takes up the rest of Book I of the *De divisione naturae*. In what sense can the ten logical categories of substance, quantity, quality, and the rest be applied to God? How are these categories related one to another? In this rather violent change of direction we can see what is almost certainly the major logical text underlying Book 1. A discussion of *genera* and *species* that points in the direction of John's comprehensive *natur*a can be found in the *Isagoge*,(28) Aristotle's fundamental account of the categories alone was known, though not widely available.(29) Where the two are combined, and a much closer precedent offered for John's *natura*, is in the *De decem categoriis*, the late fourth-century text that I have mentioned already as a source for Sedulius Scotus. The author of the *De decem categoriis* begins with the idea of *species* building up into ever more comprehensive *genera*. Finally, he says, the vast name of infinite capacity which comprehends everything else is substance, beyond which nothing can be found or thought to exist. This is one of the ten categories.(30)

He goes on to expound each of the categories in turn. Though John the Scot has not followed the *De decem categoriis* slavishly, he could find in it a model for the general structure of Book I of the *De divisione naturae*, as well as the source for specific passages. Hugh of Saint Victor saw the parallel when he called John's treatise the *De decem categoriis in Deum*.(31) Both in the first book of the *De divisione naturae* and in the argument already cited from his treatise on predestination, John the Scot is thinking within the framework of the *De decem categoriis*.

The first book of the *De divisione naturae* is John's most explicit statement of the logical basis of his theology. The rest of the treatise, however, depends principally on texts that he himself had translated from the Greek: the writings of the Pseudo-Denis,

Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor.(31) Here John the Scot had gone so far beyond his contemporaries that this part of his work had very little immediate effect. He had opened up a vein that no one else at that time could develop. We may remember the reception that the writings of Pseudo-Denis had met with in France earlier in the century. The Greek emperor had sent a copy to Louis the Pious, who gave it to Abbot Hilduin of Saint Denis. Within twenty four hours of its arrival at Saint Denis, nineteen miracles had been recorded from the mere presence of the wonderful volume within the walls of the abbey.(32) To do Hilduin justice, he then sat down and translated it; but the first reaction is the more typical, even for the later ninth century. The Greek philosophers were totally removed from the main currents of contemporary learning; and here John by his fluency in Greek was to some extent isolated from the ordinary masters of his day.
I have spoken so far of individual scholars and their work: Gottschalk, Sedulius, John the Scot. With John the Scot we are brought up against the question of what impression, if any, was made by these great men on the ordinary school curriculum. Though the study of any one institution here is bound to be inadequate, we can see the beginnings of an answer in the group of masters who taught at the monastery of Saint Gerrnanus in Auxerre. Their founder seems to have been the monk Haimo, who was active as a teacher circa 840 to 860.(34) Younger than Haimo and roughly contemporary with each other were Heiric, also a monk of Saint Germanus, and Hucbald his pupil, who was a monk of Saint Amand, near Tournai, Finally the youngest and most prolific of the group was Remigius, who taught in Auxerre circa 876 to 893 and then moved on to Rheims and possibly Paris.(35) The school of Auxerre had a continuous existence for over fifty years: during that whole period the library was being built up; and successive masters could establish a routine of accepted texts. We do not know how far their currency elsewhere was due to the school of Auxerre; we can see only that they are in practice the texts that are generally available in France and Germany over the next hundred years.
In the first place the school of Auxerre confirms the growing interest in logic. The first (and perhaps the only) commentary on the *De decem categoriis* is attributed to Heiric of Auxerre, who

had himself been taught by a pupil of John the Scot. There is a trace of John's influence at the very beginning, where a phrase from Alcuin's preface is explained by a quotation from the *De divisione naturae*, but substantially it is a sober and meticulous exposition of the text. It seems to have been exactly what was needed; for it was copied again and again throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries, until the *De decem categoriis* itself went out of use.(36) The other major texts of the *logica vetus* were already furnished with the commentaries of Boethius. So on the face of it there was less need to produce new ones. What we do find, however, are adaptations of the Boethian commentaries to meet current needs. A series of glosses on the *Isagoge*for example, which should perhaps be ascribed to Heiric's pupil Hucbald of Saint Amand, is essentially based on Boethius's commentaries on the same text.(37) The author has drawn attention to the passages that are specially important, and quoted the parts of the Boethian exposition that he thinks will he helpful. This might he dismissed as a mere abridgment, were it not so typical of the way in which the *Isagoge* and similar texts were to be treated in the future. Like Heiric's commentary on the *De decem categoriis*, these notes are an attempt to drill the ordinary student in logic: to pitch the Boethian commentary at classroom level. Here they exemplify the principal concern and achievement of scholarship over the next 150 years. Both in France and Germany *marginalia* of this type can be found throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries.(38) Notker's German paraphrases of the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* have the same purpose.(39) Though material of this kind is not philosophically original, it is of the greatest interest as an index of where and how the *logica vetus* was being mastered. Heiric's commentary on the *De decem categoriis* and the glosses on the *Isagoge* that may be the work of his pupil Hucbald are representative of a great deal of later work in the same field. On the linguistic side of the curriculum the school of Auxerre made a contribution that was clearly useful, and may prove to have been fundamental.

The other aspect of Carolingian learning may broadly be called "scientific": the enthusiasm for speculating on how the universe is put together - what keeps the stars on their courses and the

material of this world in a coherent order. Most students would encounter such questions first in their study of Vergil." (pp. 6-9)

Notes

(26) *De divina praedestinatione* sap. 2. PL 122.360B-4C; cf. K. Vielhaber, *Gottschalk der Sachse* (Bonn 1956) 68-74.
(27) *De divisione naturae* 1, ed. Sheldon-Williams, *Scriptores l.atini Hibernici* 7 (Dublin 1968) 36.
(28) *Isagoge Porphirii*, ed. Minio-Paluello (Bruges 1966) 6-14: *Aristoteles latinus* 1.6.
(29) Minio-Paluello "Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale XV,"*Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam 1972) 448-458.
(30) "Postremo, licet abunde prospexerat dispersa passim genera speciali nota concilians, tamen ingenii quodam et capaci ad infinitum nomine omne quicquid est comprehendens dixit οὐσία extra quam nex inueniri aliquid nec cogitari potest. Haec est una de categoriis decem": *De decem categoriis* 5, ed. Minio-Paluello, (Bruges 1961) 134: *Aristoteles latinus* 1.5.
(31) Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon* 3.2, ed. Buttimer (Washington 1939) 49.
(32) I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "Johannes Scottus Eringena,"*The Cambridge History of later Greek and early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge 1967) 518-533.
(33) PL 106.16BC, cf. H. F. Dondaine, *Le corpus dionysien de l'université de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Rome 1953) 25.
(34) R. Quadri, "Aimone di Auxerre alla luce dei *Collectanea* di Heiric di Auxerre,"*Italia medioevale e umanistica* 6 (1963) 7-18.
(35) R. Quadri, *I "Collectanea" di Eirico, di Auxerre* (Freiburg 1966: *Spicilegium Friburgensis* 2 3-28. For Hucbald see A. van de Vyver, "Hucbald de Saint Amand, écolâtre et l'invention du Nombre d'or," in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, (Louvain 1947) 61-79. For Remigius see C. E. Lutz, *Remigii Autissiodorensis Commentum in Martianum Capellam* (Leiden 1962) 1-2, 5-16. The school of Auxerre as a whole is discussed by Quadri (1966) and E. Jeaneau, "Les écoles de Laon et d'Auxerre au IXe siècle,"*Settimane di studio Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo* 19 (Spoleto 1972) 495-522.

(36) It is likely that several scholars contributed to this gloss: see L. Minio-Paluello (n. 29 above) 451 and again in the discussion of Jeauneau's paper (n. 35 above) 558-560.
(37) C. Baeumker and B. S. von Waltershausen, "Frühmittelalterliche Glossen des angeblichen Jepa zur Isagoge des Porphyrius,"*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Münster 1924) 24.1; cf. Cappuyns, *(Jean Scot Érigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée,* Louvain 1933) 72-73; 73 app.
(38) See for example Munich Clm. 14372, 14516 (S. Emmeram, Regensburg); Paris Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 11127 (Echternach): Orléans, Bibl. mun. 277 (Fleury: cf. A. van de Vyver, *Abbonis Floriacensis Opera inedita* (Bruges 1966) 25).
(39) ed. Piper, *Schriften Notkers und seiner Schule* (Freiburg 1882) 1, 2-3.

From: Margaret Gibson, "The Continuity of Learning *circa* 850-*circa* 1050", *Viator*, 6, 1975, pp. 1-14 (reprinted as Essay X in: M. Gibson, *'Artes' and Bible in the Medieval West,* Aldershot, Variorum, 1993.

"The first book of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* can and should be read as a text within the tradition of commentary on the *Categories*. Although the object of Eriugena's remarks is the pseudo-Augustinian *Categoriae decem*, the paraphrase of the *Categories* that, in the era of Constantius and Theodosius, originated in the school of Themistius, his treatment of predication is altogether systematic and is at least as conformable to Aristotle's text as is the commentary of Ammonius. (1) That the *Categoriae decem* is a text derivative from that of Aristotle, Eriugena well understands. (2)
Since there is no evidence than, apart from the *Categoriae decem*, Eriugena enjoyed access to the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, it seems that he could not have brought, as did Ammonius, the interpretative weight of such works as the Metaphysics to bear on his understanding of the *Categories*. Thus, for Eriugena, but unlike Ammonius, matter has no place in the category of substance.

Since Eriugena, is treating the categories, upholds it as a cardinal principle that all the categories, considered in themselves, are incorporeal, (3) he already has grounds for thinking that corporeal beings, with their matter, are at least as marginal as Ammonius had understood them. Believing, as he does, that substance -- in itself -- is incorporeal, Eriugena maintains that whatever inhere in substance is likewise incorporeal. (4) So the investigation of substance, for Eriugena, requires no investigation of matter.
As Eriugena would have it, the category of substance does include genera, species, and individuals but, because no substance is extended, no substance may be corporeal. The contents of the category of substance are, therefore, purely formal. As being purely formal, they are completely immaterial." (p. 19)

Notes

(1) The text of *Categoriae decem* is in: *Aristoteles latinus I, Categoriae vel praedicamenta*, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, Bruges/Paris 1961.
(2) *Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae periphyseon. De divuisione naturae (Liber primus)*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Dublin 1968, 493A
(3) ibid., 478D-479A.
(4) ibid., 478D-479A.

From: Jack C. Marler, "Ammonius and Eriugena: On Matter and Predication", in: Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora, Pia Antolic (eds.), *Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft. Knowledge and Science / Probleme der Epistemologie in der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Problems of Epistemology in Medieval Philosophy*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004.

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[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*

INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF LOGIC IN LATE ANTIQUITY

"The centuries between Aristotle and Porphyry bequeathed few logical works to the early Middle Ages. Cicero wrote a *Topics*, professedly based on Aristotle's work on the subject, but probably derived from a later source. The book was quite widely read in the Middle Ages, at the time when Aristotle's Topics was unknown. A work attributed to Apuleius, and bearing the same Greek title (transliterated) as the *De Interpretatione* – *Peri hermeneias* – enjoyed a certain vogue among the earliest medieval logicians. For modern scholars, it is a useful source of Stoic logical theories; but its philosophical content is slight.
By the time of Porphyry, however, a development had taken place in the status, rather than the doctrine, of Aristotelian logic, which would be of great importance for medieval philosophy. Aristotelian logic had been adopted by the Neoplatonists and given a definite place in their programme of teaching. Whereas their use of Aristotle's philosophical works was piecemeal and distorting, his logic was studied faithfully as a whole. Aristotle had rejected the notion of Platonic Ideas; and he had consequently treated genera and species in his logic purely as class-designations for individual things. The Neoplatonists assimilated this approach, which contradicted the very basis of their metaphysics, by limiting the application of Aristotelian logic to the world of concrete things. Stripped of its metaphysical relevance, the tendency was for logic to become more purely

formal than it had been for Aristotle. However, the extra-logical aspects of the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* were too intrinsic to these works to be ignored; and the result was the growth of a body of philosophical discussion and commentary within the Neoplatonic logical tradition, only vaguely related to Neoplatonic metaphysics, and sometimes seemingly antithetical to its principles.

Porphyry himself did more than anyone to establish Aristotelian logic within the Platonic schools. He commented the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* and wrote a short *Isagoge* (Introduction') to logic, which quickly became established as a prologue to the Aristotelian corpus. The *Isagoge* is devoted to explaining five concepts which play an important part in the Categories: genus, species, difference, property and accident. It illustrates well Porphyry's formal approach to logic; and he avoids a philosophical discussion of the nature of genera and species, listing various opinions, but refusing to discuss them further in a work which is designed as an introduction.

The language of philosophy in the Roman Empire was Greek. The few philosophers who wrote in Latin were of vital importance in transmitting the logical tradition to the Middle Ages, even - perhaps especially - where their activity was limited to translation and paraphrasing. From the circle of Themistius (c. 317-88) derives a Latin epitome of the *Categories*, known as the *Categoriae Decem*, much read in the ninth and tenth centuries. This work adds some further remarks, on quantity, space and the relationship between ousia and the other categories, to a summary of Aristotle's text. The author begins by treating Aristotle's text as a discussion of speech (133:1-8) -- a term he believes should principally apply to nouns and verbs which, unlike other words, designate things (133:11-15). He searches for a word which will include (that is, presumably, designate) all things, and arrives (134:16-20) at the conclusion that this word is ousia 'one of the ten categories'. This seems a fair enough conclusion from Aristotle's theory, since every thing is an ousia and can therefore be signified by the word ousia. But, a little later (145:25-146:2), the author produces a similar definition, but one which this time applies not to the word 'ousia', but the concept designated by it: 'ousia has no genus because it sustains

everything'. The suggestion here is that ousia refers, not to the individual thing as in the Categories (although this definition is also given by the paraphraser), but to that which every individual has in common by virtue of being something at all. The implication may well not have been intended by the epitomist who, in general, tries to give a faithful impression of Aristotle's text; oversight or not, it proved influential.

Marius Victorinus seems to have been a prolific translator of philosophical and logical works into Latin. Augustine used his versions of the Platonists' books' (probably parts of Plotinus and Porphyry); Boethius - whose opinion of him was low - used his adaptation of Porphyry's Isagoge in his first commentary on it (see below, pp. 30-1); and there is evidence that he wrote a commentary on Cicero's Topics. But the only part of his logical work which reached the Middle Ages intact was a brief treatise *De diffinitione*, an aid to studying the *Topics*.

In the Middle Ages, the *Categoriae Decem* was attributed, wrongly, to Augustine. But Augustine's authentic comments about the Categories, as well as the misattributed work, made him an authority for the earliest medieval logicians. In the Confessions (iv.xvi.28), Augustine describes his first contact with Aristotle's treatise, which he found himself capable of understanding without the aid of his teacher. When he came to write his *De trinitate*, he included a discussion (v. ii. 3) of a type frequent among the Neoplatonists, about the Categories and their inapplicability to God. But he stated that ousia could be applied to God: indeed, that it was God to whom it most properly applied. This idea, fully consistent with Augustine's ontology (see above, pp. 15-16), was to influence ninth-century interpretations of the Categories. A short treatise, *De dialectica*, was also attributed to Augustine in the Middle Ages; and most scholars now accept its authenticity. The work is remarkable for its linguistic approach to dialectic. Having separated words into single and combined (I) - as Aristotle distinguishes at the beginning of the Categories between things said with and without combination - Augustine devotes most of his energies to discussing single words, how they gain their meaning and how 26 The antique heritage ambiguity is possible. Dialectic includes, says Augustine (iv), the discussion of

the truth or falsity of sentences and conjunctions of sentences; but the treatise does not go on to consider this topic." (pp. 23-26)

From: John Marenbon, *Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150). An Introduction*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983.

NOTE ABOUT THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE COMMENTARY GENRE

"It is generally assumed that Homer was the first author to be subjected to commenting, and I see no reason to dispute this most reasonable assumption. It is scarcely imaginable that anything meriting the name of commentary was composed before 400 BC, but by 300 BC the literary commentary must have been around for some time, and the philosophical commentary appears. The first one evidenced was by Crantor and dealt with Plato's *Timaeus* (2).
We have to wait almost half a millennium to find a fully preserved philosophical commentary. Indeed, the second- to third-century Aristotelian commentaries of Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias are among the oldest commentaries on any text that we have got and among all preserved commentaries from Antiquity those on Aristotle or Plato are massively represented -- the two philosophers are in the heavyweight league together with the Bible and Hippocrates. The bulk of the preserved commentaries are from the fifth or the sixth century, with a special concentration of Aristotle commentaries in the sixth century. Most of them are in Greek, the most notable exception being Boethius' works, which belong in the sixth-century group. The sixth century, then, was to have a very strong influence on the medieval approach to philosophical texts, whether in the East, where people read Aristotle with Ammonius, Simplicius and Philoponus at their elbow; or in the West, where Boethius alone made an impact as strong as that made by his three Greek colleagues together in the East. In the formative period of Western scholasticism in the twelfth century, commentators

imitated the format and the formulae of Boethius' Aristotle commentaries, and even commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus* use a Boethian format rather than that used by Calcidius in his exposition of Plato's work. (3)

Teachers, whether ancient or medieval, Greek or Latin, would give their pupils a few hints about the general contents of the relevant text in their introductory lectures, which appear as proems in the written versions of commentaries. But much more important than those lectures were the compendia, the sort of books that since Antiquity have often carried the title of Introduction to... whatever the subject (*Eisagogé, Introductiones*...). Most of the extant ancient specimens, insofar as they are philosophical, are about logic. In principle, and sometimes in practice, such works can be independent of any particular authoritative text. Thus there is no reason to see Galen's Introduction to Logic as a sort of summary of one or two of the classics of logic. On the other hand, Boethius' Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms4 makes no secret of the fact that it tries to summarize the syllogistics presented in Aristotle's Prior Analytics, and for good measure, it starts with a summary of the doctrine of terms and propositions from the *Perihermeneias*. Basically the same matter is covered in Apuleius' *Perihermeneias*. Boethius used a work by Porphyry for his models. We cannot tell for certain how closely he followed his model, but at least the general structure is likely to have been the same in Porphyry. If so, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories (the *Isagoge*) and his Introduction to categorical syllogisms together offered a compendium of a very large part of the Organon.

A brief compendium of logic may also be found in Martianus Capella and an ultra-brief one in Cassiodorus. Together with Boethius they gave inspiration to the revitalizing of the compendium genre in medieval Latin scholasticism, with Peter of Spain's *Summulae* as the most famous specimen. The genre also survived in Byzantium, but only barely so -- only three reasonably complete ones are extant, dating from 1007, ca. 1260, and ca. 1325, respectively ; there is convincing evidence that not a lot more ever existed'. The typical Latin compendium or *summulae* is characterized by combining sections that summarize certain

parts of the *Organon* with sections that deal with more recent parts of logic. This is not the case with the Byzantine compendia. Most often people would read a compendium before they read the original texts. In that way the compendia could be very influential by preconditioning students for a certain way of reading the authoritative texts." (pp. 1-3)

Notes

(2) Referred to by Plutarch in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*, and by Proclus in his *In Timaeum*. The sources do not allow us to decide whether his work was some sort of essay on the *Timaeus* or more like a series of explanatory notes on the text.
(3) Thus in the anonymous scholia on *Timaeus* published as Bernhard of Chartres, *Glosae super Platonem*. Edited by P.E. Dutton, Studies and Texts 107, PIMS, 1991.
(4) I use this title for the work of which the first version appears as *De syllogismo categorico* in Migne's *Patrologia Latin*a 64, whereas the incomplete revised version appears as *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos*. Christina Thomsen Thornqvist of the university of Gothenburg will discuss the title question in her forthcoming critical edition of the first version. [Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De syllogismo categorico. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg 2008.]
(5) See *Patrologia Latina* 64 : 813C " ipse Porphyrius ", and cf. 814C " Hos ergo quatuor in prima figura modos in Analytics suis Aristoteles posuit. Caeteros vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, virus est consensisse ".
(6) See S. Ebbesen, “Western and Byzantine Approaches to Logic”, in *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin*, 62 (1992), pp. 167-178, at p. 172.
(7) Already in ancient times hypothetical syllogisms had been added to the *Organon* material, but then hypothetical syllogisms had also found their way into the commentaries on *Prior Analytics*.

From: Sten Ebbesen, "Late-Ancient Ancestors of Medieval Philosophical Commentaries", in *Il Commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino (secoli XIII/XV) / The Philosophical*

Commentary in the Latin West (13 - 15th Centuries). Edited by Fioravanti Gianfranco, Leonardi Claudio, and Perfetti Stefano. Turnhout: Brepols 2002, pp. 1-15. Reprinted as Chapter 7 in: S. Ebbesen, *Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction*. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen. Volume 1, Aldershot: Ashgate 2008, pp. 97-106.

PROBLEMS IN ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

"Among the main problems of Aristotle's theory of the categories are the nature of their members, their number and how this number is arrived at. We find these problems discussed in modern research (1), but they are also dealt with in medieval philosophy.

To have a better understanding of the theories of the categories, we would like to point out that, in our view, ancient and medieval authors took for granted a parallelism between thought and reality. By 'parallelism' we mean that they accepted that there are things that exist in reality, and that there can be, and is knowledge of those things. These things as conceived by human understanding are designated by a term. So human understanding involves a subjective element when the thing is conceived or named, but thanks to the parallelism, the thing conceived by man is also the thing in nature. Now different authors put emphasis on different things, i.e. either on the things conceived (the objective (point of view) or on the conception of things (the subjective point of view). The question need not be asked whether a kind of gap had to be overcome: there is no gap. (2)

In a number of studies, L.M. de Rijk has made a fruitful distinction between a name in its *descriptive* function and in its *deictic* function. The use of e.g. the term 'man' implies a descriptive function, by which we can describe the class of men, and a deictic function, by which we can refer to the members of the class. Within the latter he distinguishes between 'actuality' and 'factuality'. A term in its deictic function refers to things, though they need not factually exist, i.e. they are contingent.

Signification of factual existence is a complementary function of the name.(3)
In the categories of being items are collected and ordered by which man can name reality, or by means of which he can form complex wholes (for instance 'white man'), and even propositions (for instance 'men are white'), by which he can speak about reality and refer to it in the way he wants. So the theory of the categories is fundamental for philosophy. One could even say that the choice of a particular theory of categories depends on what kind of a philosopher one is.
What is the nature of the members of the categories? Are these members primarily terms which refer to something in reality? Or are they things so far as, and only so far as, these are captured in a linguistic expression or thought? When the nature of the members of the categories has been determined, the question arises for medieval philosophers how they are divided, i.e. how many categories there are, and which. Is their number ten, which is usually supposed to be held by Aristotle. Can this number be established by proof (or deduction)? Especially from John Duns Scotus onwards, not only positive terms, which are a privileged group, are studied, but also non-positive terms, such as 'blindness', fictional terms (for instance 'chimera'), terms of second intention, negative terms etc., which complicates the interpretation of the categories." (pp. 183-184)

Notes

(1) See for a general survey of the problems, H. Baumgartner, 'Kategorie, Kategorienlehre', in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* IV, Darmstadt 1976, cols. 714-725.
(2) See esp. L.M. de Rijk, 'Categorization as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics', *Vivarium* XXVI, 1 (1988), 1-19.
(3) L. M. de Rijk, 'Ist Logos Satz?', in M.F. Fresco a.o., (eds.), *Heideggers These vom Ende der Philosophie. Verhandlungen des Leidener Heidegger-Symposiums*, April 1984, Bonn 1989, 21-32.
(4) E. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre,* 1923 (1911) (*Gesammelte Schriften* 2, 4): Was für eine

Kategorienlehre man wählt, hangt davon ab, was für ein Philosoph man ist.

From: Egbert Peter Bos and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus". In E. P. Bos (ed.), *John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308): Renewal of Philosophy*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1998, pp. 183-196.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORIES COMMENTARIES

"Aristotle's *Categories* is the subject of an extensive number of commentaries and of an unusual amount of debate, and for good reasons.(1) To begin with, in spite of its relatively short length, it can be a rather difficult text to understand, even for the trained philosopher, to say nothing of those who are just beginning their study of philosophy. Yet, because it laid the foundation for many subsequent philosophical discussions in general, and for logic in particular, it was, during much of the Middle Ages, often the very first philosophical text students encountered. Even contemporary philosophers who are steeped in philosophy and who have studied the *Categories* in depth often find it difficult, albeit for different reasons. One difficulty, as the ancient commentators on the *Categories* recognized, is that Aristotle himself is ambiguous about the subject of the work. What exactly is he categorizing? Is it 'things that are' or 'things that are said' or something in between, such as a concept? Furthermore, depending on how one understands its purpose, the *Categories* can be seen in harmony with, in contrast to, or even in contradiction to, Plato's own theory of the five highest genera. For all of these reasons the *Categories* has historically acted like a magnet, attracting commentaries from Aristotelians, Platonists, and Stoics alike. Quite naturally, some of these commentaries defend Aristotelianism, whereas others defend either Platonism or Stoicism by attacking Aristotle's *Categories*. Finally, still others,

especially during the Late Middle Ages, use the *Categories* as a means to expound their own philosophical systems in the process of interpreting Aristotle.
Though many of the ancient and medieval commentators, such as Porphyry, Boethius and Albert the Great, did write original treatises on philosophical issues, their commentaries are in themselves valuable contributions to philosophy, particularly those from the later Middle Ages.(2) Consequently, studies of the various commentaries, and especially those dealing with the *Categories*, are valuable projects, as the following essays amply demonstrate. As Robert Andrews points out, medieval "Categories commentaries are the repository of centuries of analyses of the basic concepts of Western thought, all carefully organized and awaiting modern rediscovery." (3) And while most of those commentaries are still awaiting rediscovery, the following essays, I hope, will convince everyone that the effort is worthwhile." (pp. 1-2)

Notes

(1) According to my count of the texts listed by Charles Lohr, roughly two hundred extant Latin commentaries on the *Categories* were written during the Middle Ages. Of course, this number does not take into account the commentaries that are not extant, nor the ones written in Greek, Arabic, or Hebrew. Cf. the lists of extant commentaries cited by Charles Lohr in *Traditio*, vols. 23-29.
(2) Compare Fr. Wippel's description of St. Thomas' commentaries: of his theological commentaries, "two are commentaries in the strict sense, i.e., on the *De Hebdomadibus* of Boethius and on the *De divinis nominibus*; the other two offer brief expositions of the texts of Boethius and of Peter and use them as occasions for much fuller and highly personal disquisitions by Thomas himself." John E Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000), p. XVIII.
(3) Robert Andrews, "Question Commentaries on the Categories in the Thirteenth Century,"*Medioevo* 26 (2001), 265-326, p. 266.

From: Lloyd A. Newton, "The Importance of Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*", in: Lloyd A. Newton (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 1-8.

"The interest of *Categories* commentaries for the contemporary philosopher is worth reviewing. Categorization of items constituting the world is today called ontology; the medievals attempted to classify the world according to the ten categories of Aristotle. The modern accusation, that medieval philosophers were actually dealing with linguistic classification, was in fact acknowledged by many medievals. While the medieval treatment of some categories (and here I am thinking especially of relation) was arcane, resulting from a particular interaction of theology and philosophy, other discussions, such as on the nature of number, involved speculative thought comparable to modern reflections on the subject. Medieval discussions have contributed directly to the development of contemporary philosophical concepts, such as intentionality, "haecceity", and the distinction de ditto / de re. Medieval Categories commentaries are the repository of centuries of analyses of the basic concepts of Western thought, all carefully organized and awaiting modern rediscovery.

The study of the Categories is uniquely able to take advantage of the continuity and traditionalism of the Middle Ages. Not only was the Categories the first Aristotelian work introduced to the Latin Middle Ages, but it was the only work of dialectic available for several centuries, in one form or another. During the beginnings of Latin scholasticism, when the study of philosophy faced a struggle for acceptance, Church Fathers such as Tertullian and Peter Damian denounced all pagan learning, including Aristotle. Against them it was argued that the study of dialectic (and grammar) is useful for the correct interpretation of Sacred Writings. The utilization of the Categories during the period of the seventh through tenth centuries escaped censure in special measure because it was available in two vehicles associated with St. Augustine. Augustine' s *De trinitate* systematically analyzes whether each category can be applied to God. Boethius' s *De*

trinitate – a model and paradigm of the application of dialectic to theology – follows the relevant sections of Augustine. Furthermore, to Augustine was mistakenly attributed the Themistian paraphrase *De decem praedicamentis*, (2) placating those who feared the pagan Aristotle. This work was utilized by commentators during the time when no complete work of Aristotle was accessible, as informatively recounted by Marenbon in *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre*.(3)
When the *logica vetus* began circulating with the commentaries of Boethius in the 11th century, (4) the *Categories* was packaged with Porphyry's *Isagoge*, a work purporting to be an introduction to and an explication of key concepts in the Categories. When the *logica nova* was introduced, the *Categories* was recognized as first in a ranked order of logical works; its subject matter, individual words, is requisite for the understanding of sentences (in *De interpretatione*), syllogisms (Prior analytic) and science (Posterior analytic). This order was later overturned by the terminist logicians, who proposed an analysis of language which treated sentences, rather than words, as fundamental." (266-267)

Notes

(2) Pseudo-Augustini, *Paraphrasis Themistiana*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Brill, Leiden 1961 (A.L. 1, 5).
(3) Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981.
(4) Marenbon, *From The Circle of Alcuin*, 16.

From: Robert Andrews, "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century", *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della filosofia Medievale* 26, 2001, pp. 265-326.

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6. ———. 2001. "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century." *Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della filosofia Medievale* no. 26:265-326.
   "A philosophical genre new to the thirteenth century was the question commentary. Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* (a book "read by children"), extending in an unbroken tradition back to antiquity, by 1300 had developed into sophisticated analyses of the fundamental concepts underlying the rest of logic and philosophy. In this article I present, from both published and manuscript sources, texts selected with two purposes in mind: to examine the development of the question commentary out of the inserted *dubia* of the literal commentary, and to point out a particular shift in the concept of quantity, which may serve as a criterion for relative dating of *Categories* commentaries."
7. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1991. "A Thirteenth-century interpretation of Aristotle on equivocation and analogy." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. Supplementary volume 17:85-101.
   "This paper is a case study of how Aristotle's remarks about equivocation were read in the thirteenth century. I analyze the divisions of equivocation and analogy found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sophistici Elenchi* written in Paris between 1270 and 1280; and I show the part played by four sources: 1) the Greek commentators of late antiquity; 2) the new translations of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*; 3) Arabic works, particularly those of Averroes; 4) new grammatical doctrines, notably *modi significandi*."

8. ———. 1997. "L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes. *Categories*, 1 dans la "*Guide de l'étudiant*"." In *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109. Actes du Colloque International*, edited by Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, 281-295. Turnhout: Brepols.
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"...my purpose in this paper is to bring out what these commentaries, and especially the ones on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, reveal about Boethius' working methods in his earliest works on Greek logic. I intend to deal less with the end product than with the road to it, and to point to the stages of development and improvement exhibited within these early works." (p. 367)
(...)
"Boethius devoted his first effort in Greek philosophy to Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and later, in the year of his consulate (510), when he was in all likelihood in his late twenties, he spent all his spare time commenting for the first time on a work by Aristotle, the *Categories*. Ever since Samuel Brandt attempted a chronology of Boethius' works on the basis of their internal references, it has been commonly held that when Boethius began commenting on the *Categories*, he had already written both his expositions of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (hereafter *Isag. 1* and *Isag. 2*), the first one a dialogue in two books based on Marius Victorinus' apparently incomplete Latin version, the second a five book commentary on his own, complete translation. (2) This is certainly not the place for a full discussion of the chronology of Boethius' works, but for the arguments of this paper it is necessary to establish the order between *Isag. 2* and the commentary on the Categories (CC)." (p. 368)
(..)
"... I am not in a position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real originality in his later, more mature works. But I think that it would be unfair to expect novel interpretations in commentaries like the *Isag. 1* and CC,

which, if my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the context in which he first encountered Aristotle. He seems to have come quite unprepared to both the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the work he was commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expression *docendo discimus*." (p. 407)

(2) 2 S. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius," *Philologus* 62 (1903), 141-154 and 234-275. See also pp. XXVI-XXIX of the Prolegomena to *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta*, rec. S. Brandt, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 48, Wien/Leipzig, 1906. In his " Stylistic Tests and the Chronology of the Works of Boethius," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 18 (1907), 123-156, A. P. McKinley's conclusions concerning the chronology of *Isag. 7*, *Isag. 2,* and the commentary on the *Categories* (hereafter CC) are the same as Brandt's.

McKinley studied the frequency of certain particles in these commentaries as well as in Boethius' translations of the *Isagoge* and *Categories*, assuming that Boethius' language was influenced by his translations of Porphyry and Aristotle. Now, some of McKinley's data corroborate Brandt's chronology whereas others support the one I will suggest below. Furthermore, McKinley's tests were made before the appearance of L. MinioPaluello's critical editions of Boethius' translations in the *Aristoteles Latinus* and would therefore have to be remade. I also believe that a necessary preliminary stage in examining whether Boethius' translating activities influenced his choice of particles is to compare his Latin commentaries with the extant Greek sources. Since there is no adequate source apparatus in any of the editions of Boethius' commentaries, this would mean a great deal of work. Concerning the question whether Boethius wrote *Isag. 2* before or after CC, L. M. De Rijk follows Brandt's view on pp. 125-127 of "On the chronology of Boethius' works on logic," *Vivarium* 2 (1964), 1-9 and

125-162, on exactly the same grounds as the ones on which Brandt based his conclusions and without corroborating them further.

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Acts of the Third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996).
"In this contribution we shall investigate the views held by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus concerning the nature and number of the categories. As is traditional in medieval logic, one first has to determine the nature of something, and then its division (in this case their number). Each in their own way, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas intended to safeguard the number of ten by way of a proof, i.e. a deduction. Duns Scotus, however,

believes that such a proposition is impossible. He also investigates the opinions of those who try to infer the nature of the categories from the various modi predicandi, thus possibly criticizing Albert and Thomas -- be it justly or unjustly. In his opinion, the members of the categories refer to distinct 'realities' ('realities' in a Scotistic sense). None of them can be reduced, neither to each other, nor to something else. All members possess a certain formal reality, although this is not merely identical with the being of an actual thing. (5) Scotus accepts the number of ten categories with reference to tradition, (6) but he gives some negative arguments. He demonstrates that there are neither more categories (for instance motus as an eleventh category), (7) nor less than ten (for instance *ens per se* and *ens in alio* alone). So he concludes to the number of ten in a negative way: there are no more, and no less." pp. 183-185
(5) Th. Kobusch, 'Substanz und Qualität. Die Reduzierung der Kategorien nach Wilhelm von Ockham' in D. Koch and Kl. Bort (eds.), *Kategorie und Kategorialität. Historisch-systematische Untersuchungen zum Begriff der Kategorie im Philosophischen Denken. Festschrift für Klaus Hartmann zum 65. Geburtstag*, Würzburg 1990, 79.
(6) Just as his (supposed) disciple Francis of Mayronnes would. E. P. Bos, 'The Theory of Ideas According to Francis of Meyronnes (*Commentary on the Sentences (Conflatus)* I, dist. 47), in L. Benakis (ed.), *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Acts du colloque international de Corfu*, 6-8 octobre 1995, Bruges 1997, 211-227.
(7) Which is also suggested by Aristotle in one place of his work, where it said that for each category there is a substrate, for instance for the *quale*, for the *quantum*, for the when, for the where, and for the motion. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 4 1029b 25.
"Conclusions.
1. The number of categories turns out to be a problem for medieval philosophers. It is pointed out that the Philosopher himself was not too consistent in his listings of the categories. Avicenna, for instance, does not accept the number of ten just like that.

2. Some Medievals try to deduce the ten categories. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas do so each in their own (although quite similar) ways, starting from their own respective ontology.
3. Scotus does not undertake any kind of deduction. He stresses the *realiter* difference between the diverse categories. He only accepts the number of ten categories on the basis of tradition. He differentiates between the way the metaphysician and the logician views the list of ten categories.
4. Scotus does reduce *non-entia, figmenta*, and so on to *entia*, as members of the categories. To Scotus this seems to be a matter of far greater concern than it was to his predecessors. After Scotus philosophers are very much interested in the problem whether those non-positive terms can be regarded as members of the ten traditional categories." (p. 196)

15. Bos, Egbert P. 1999. "John Buridan on Substance in his Commentary (*Summulae*) on Aristotle's *Categories*." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. I*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 85-99. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
"As a master of arts John Buridan commented on Aristotle's logic. The *quaestiones,* in which specific problems are discussed in the traditional medieval form, are more elaborate and detailed commentaries.
One of Aristotle's text to *be* commented are the *Categories (Praedicamenta)*. The *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta* have been edited recently by J. Schneider (München, 1983); I have prepared a critical edition of Buridan's commentary *(summulae)* on the same work, which is due to appear soon. This edition is part of an intemational project, of which it is the intention to issue the first complete edition of Buridan's *Summulae,* which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new edition of his *Sophismata*.
In the present contribution I shall give an analysis of Buridan's commentary on the category of substance. Before entering this subject, I shall make some remarks on the general nature of the work. This contribution is practically

the same as a part of the introduction to my forthcoming edition." p. 85

"4. A summary of the Contents

Buridan starts with a discussion on *aequivocatio, univocatio* and *denominatio*. Sometimes, he says, *aequivocatio* is attributed to a *word* having signification, sometimes to *things* signified. Here (3.1.1.) Buridan attributes *aequivocatio* to things as far as they are signified equivocally by one and the same word. This signification is not matched by one concept *(ratio,* 3.1.2), but by two, or more, one for each thing. E.g. a dog, a star and a fish are signified by the word *canis* ('dog') that may have supposition for them under different concepts.

There is univocation when the several things signified are united, not only by a common designation, but also by a common definition. Buridan emphasizes (3.1.2) that both *equivocatio* and *univocatio* are on the level of conventional terms and propositions, and are *not* properties of *mental* terms and propositions.

Equivocation and univocation are mutually opposed in an exhaustive division. The third item of the *Antepraedicamenta,* denomination *(denominatio),* is different. For a term to be denominative it must satisfy both a morphological-cum-semantical criterion and a purely semantical one. First, (1.a) it must be a concrete term (a term signifying concrete entities), and (1.b) it must be morphologically related to the corresponding abstract term; *album* ('white [thing]') satisfies (1.a-b), having *albedo* ('whiteness') as its abstract counterpart. Second, (2) the term must have appellation. This, Buridan explains, means that it must 'evoke' or 'connote' some disposition which is extrinsic to the nature of that for which the term supposits. *Album* (`white [thing]') satisfies this condition; it may supposit, say, for a man, but it also connotes something which is extrinsic (nonessential) to man, namely whiteness. By contrast, *homo* ('man') only satisfies criteria (1.a-b); it is a concrete noun with a morphologically related abstract counterpart, viz. *humanitas*. Criterion (2) remains unsatisfied because humanity is essential to all supposits of

homo and thus cannot fulfil the role of an extrinsic disposition connoted by the term." p. 91 (notes omitted).

16. Bos, Egbert Peter. 2000. "Some Notes on the Meaning of the Term 'Substantia' in the Tradition of Aristotle's 'Categories'." In *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Steel, Carlos, 511-537. Turnhout: Brepols. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven, 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie Médiévale
17. ———. 2002. "John Versor's Albertism in his Commentaries to Porphyry and the *Categories*." In *Chemins de la pensée Médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, edited by Bakker, Paul J.J.M., Faye, Emmanuel and Grellard, Christophe, 47-78. Turnhout: Brepols.
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"...la question des catégories constitue une aporie que toute métaphysique doit traverser, et que Duns Scot lui-même a parcouru minutieusement. Son traitement des catégories est-il déjà un fondement de l'univocité? Ou, *a contrario*, une doctrine qu'il lui a fallu abandonner?
L'élucidation du statut des catégories va évidemment de pair avec une interprétation de l'ouvrage éponyme (attribué à Aristote, mais peut-être d"origine scolaire): les *Catégories*. Lïndécision portant sur le *skopos* du traité donne aux interprètes du grain à moudre. En tous cas, si nous pouvons maintenant s"efforcer de renouer avec une compréhension de l'aristotélisme authentique, nous le pouvons qu'en tenant compte de la tradition de lïnterprétation. et notamment de l'interprétation médiévale. Celle-ci, tantôt a fait surgir des questions essentielles, tantôt a recouven le texte de questions étrangères. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre. il nous faut les reprendre, soit pour les faire nôtres, soit pour les détruire.

Dans ce cadre historique et herméneulique plus vaste, je me limiterai ici à une de ces interprétations, celle de Duns Scot. Nous bénéficions depuis peu d'une nouvelle édition critique de son *Commentaire par questions sur les Catégories*. Pour l'architecture d'ensemble de l'ouvrage, il est frappant que Scot ajoute une réflexion préliminaire sur le concept de catégorie en général, alors qu'une telle réflexion est absente chez Aristote. JI consacre en effet 4 questions à des considérations générales sur les catégories, - avant d'examiner en 7 questions l'objet des chapitres 1 à 3 des *Catégories* (Univoques, équivoques et paronymes; genres et espèces). et de consacrer 33 questions aux diverses catégories en particulier, ainsi qu'aux postprédicaments. Ces quatre questions sont les suivantes:
1. Le livre des *Catégories* pone-t-il sur dix sons vocaux signifiants? (Problème du rapport entre la grammaire et la logique).
2. Ce livre a-t-il pour sujet les dix catégories? (Problème du rapport entre le nominalisme et le réalisme).
3. Y a-t-il un prédicat intentionnel commun à ces termes les plus généraux?
4. L'être est-il univoque aux dix catégories?
Je suivrai le fil conducteur de ces 4 questions." (pp. 357-358, note omise)

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Pères de l'Église Grecs 135; Alain de Libera: L'onto-théo-logique de Boèce: doctrine des catégories et théorie de la prédication dans le *De Trinitate* 175; John Marenbon: Les *Catégories* au début du Moyen Âge 223; Sten Ebbesen: Les *Catégories* au Moyen Âge et au début de la modernité 245; Stéphane Dieble: *Catégories*, conversation et philosophie chez al-Fàràbi 275; Katerina Ierodiakonou: La réception byzantine des *Catégories* d'Aristote 307; Otto Bruun et Lorenzo Corti: Bibliographie 341; Index locorum 363; Index nominum et rerum 369-396.

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"Il nous est parvenu d ’Aristote un petit traité de logique dont l’unique but, semble-t-il, est de vouloir ramener toutes choses à l’une ou l’autre de dix catégories. L’usage constant que fait l’auteur des
noms de ces catégories dans tous ses autres traités n’est pas sans suggérer qu’il serait tout à fait impossible de faire oeuvre de science telle que l’entend Aristote sans l’aide de ces catégories. Or, l’on est forcé de noter que l’énumération qu’il en fait lui-même en plusieurs traités différents n’est pas toujours la même : en fait, et le nombre et l’ordre des choses énumérées varient.

La chose n'a pas été sans attirer l'attention de nombreux successeurs d 'Aristote, et, disciples comme critiques lui ont le plus souvent accordé un intérêt qui dépassait la simple curiosité. Mais les explications proposées par les uns ou les autres n'ont pas toujours touché, à notre avis, le fond du problème qui nous apparaît comme étant strictement d 'ordre logique. Il semble donc que toute solution éventuelle du problème tel que posé devrait s'appuyer sur les réponses aux deux questions préliminaires suivantes, à savoir : quel est le rôle précis que jouent les *Catégories* dans l'ensemble de la logique aristotélicienne ; et, est-il possible de démontrer, d 'une preuve proprement logique, le nombre de ces catégories ?
Nous nous limiterons ici à suggérer une réponse à ces deux questions, réponse que nous croyons se rattacher à une certaine tradition logique à laquelle nous aimerions associer les noms de Porphyre,
Boèce et Albert le Grand en particulier." (p. 165, notes omises)

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"Many people throughout the centuries have been fascinated by Aristotle's theory of the categories. Here I would like to put forth the view that in terms of contemporary linguistic theory it may be regarded as a theory of componential semantics. This discussion will be primarily historical, tracing the development of the theory up to what may be considered its high point in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. The history of the theory will also

stand as the main argument for the interpretation herein, in lieu of a detailed treatment of specific points in terms of current semantical theory.

Following Lyons (1977:317-335), we can define a theory of componential semantics as a view that the meanings of words (lexemes) in languages exhibit structural relations within conceptual fields. Within these fields there are atomic sense components (SC's) into which meanings can be factorized.

The 'basic', literal, semantical meanings within language are thus regarded as molecular structures built up from atomic SC's. Elsewhere (McMahon 1980b:147-148) I have taken the fairly standard position that Aristotle's categories are semantical. Here I want to add the contention that the ten Aristotelian categories are a suggested list of atomic SC's. and hence the theory of the categories would actually be the original theory of componential semantics within Western thought." (p. 53)

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Contents: Preface VII-VIII; Lloyd A. Newton: The Importance of Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* 1; Michael Chase: The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius ' Commentary on the Categories: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī 9; Allan Bäck: Avicenna The Commentator 31; Bruno Tremblay: Albertus Magnus On the

Subject of Aristotle's *Categories* 73; Robert Andrews: Interconnected Literal Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Middle Ages 99; Paul Symington: Thomas Aquinas on Establishing the Identity of Aristotle's Categories 119; Giorgio Pini: Reading Aristotle's Categories as an Introduction to Logic: Later Medieval Discussions about Its Place in the Aristotelian *Corpus* 145; Martin Pickavé: Simon of Faversham on Aristotle's *Categories* and The *Scientia Praedicamentorum* 183; Lloyd A. Newton: Duns Scotus's Account of a *Propter Quid* Science of the Categories 221; Todd Bates: Fine-tuning Pini 's Reading of Scotus 's *Categories* Commentary 259; Giorgio Pini: How Is Scotus's Logic Related to His Metaphysics? A Reply to Todd Bates 277; Alexander W. Hall: John Buridan: on Aristotle's *Categories* 295; Alessandro D. Conti: A Realist Interpretation of the *Categories* in the Fourteenth Century: The *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* of Robert Alyngton 317; Robert Andrews: Thomas Maulevelt's Denial of Substance 347; Appendix: Thomas Maulevelt: *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta: Quaestio 16* 358; Alessandro D. Conti: Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages 369; Bibliography 411; List of Contributors 429; Index 433-439.

"Originally, I planned to include essays on all three main philosophical traditions alive throughout the Middle Ages, namely, those written by Jewish, Christian and Islamic philosophers. Essays pertaining to the Jewish tradition, however, are noticeably absent due to the lack of contemporary scholarship in this area. Consequently, the preponderance of the remaining articles focuses mainly on Christian philosophers. The scope of the project has, however, stayed away from theological issues, even though discussions of the categories often have tremendous theological implications, especially concerning the doctrines of Transubstantiation and the Trinity. Consequently, the issues raised in the following essays are properly philosophical issues, not theological.

What follows is a collection of fourteen original essays, all devoted to one or more medieval commentaries on

Aristotle's *Categories*, written by a wide variety of philosophers from Europe, Canada, and the United States." (p. 2)

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"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb '*katêgorein*' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known `S is P' type, and (b) 'non-statemental predication' or `categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.
1. *Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle*
Aristotle was the first to use the word `category' *(katêgoria)* as a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean `highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the logical point of view categories are thus considered `potential predicates'.(*)
(...)
1.3 *Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true substance'*
What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the central books of his *Metaphysics* (Z-Th) is to discover the proper candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of 'being' or 'being as such' *(to on hêi on)* can only be found in 'being-ness' *(ousia;* see esp. *Metaph*. 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to grasp the things' proper nature *qua* beings. In the search for an answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its 'beingness' is focussed upon.
(...)
2. *The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius*
The Greek phrase *katêgorein ti kata tinos is* usually rendered in Latin as *praedicare aliquid de aliquo*. The Latin formula primarily means `to say something of something

else' (more precisely `of somebody'). Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is `to *predicate* something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'. However, the verb *praedicare,* just as its Greek counterpart *katêgorein,* is used more than once merely in the sense of `naming' or `designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name performs in a statement. In such cases *praedicare* stands for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure that we have labelled `categorization'. (...) Boethius' use of *praedicare* is quite in line with what is found in other authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental predication, Boethius also frequently uses *praedicare* in the sense of `naming' or `designating something under a certain name' whereby the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly, ruled out." pp. 1, 4, 9-10.
(*) See L. M. de Rijk, *The Categories as Classes of Names (= On Ancient and Medieval Semantics 3), in: Vivarium, 18 (1980), 1-62,* esp. 4-7

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A SELECTION OF LATIN COMMENTATORS ON ARISTOTLE'S Categories

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To facilitate research, for every author I give the name in English, Latin, French and Italian.

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(Pseudo) Augustine 4th century [(Pseudo) Augustinus - (Pseudo) Augustine - (Pseudo) Agostino]

Boethius ca. 480 - 524/5 [Boethius Anicius Manlius Severinus - Boèce - Boezio]

John Scottus Eriugena ca. 800 - ca. 877 [Johannes Scotus (Eriugena) - Jean Scot Érigène - Giovanni Scoto Eriugena]

William of Champeaux ca.1070 - 1122 [Guillelmus de Campellis - Guillaume de Champeaux - Guglielmo di Champeaux]

Gerlandus of Besanon 11th century [Garlandus - Gerlando]

Peter Abelard 1079 - 1142 [Petrus Abaelardus - Pierre Abélard - Pietro Abelardo]

Gilbert of Poitiers 1085/90 - 1154 [Gilbertus Porretanus - Gilbert de la Porrée - Gilberto Porretano]

William of Sherwood 1200/5 - 1266/71 [Guillelmus de Shirwode - Guillaume de Shyreswood - Guglielmo di Shyreswood]

Albert the Great 1193/1206 - 1280 [Albertus Magnus - Albert le Grand - Alberto Magno]

Thomas Aquinas 1225/6 - 1274 [Thomas de Aquino - Thomas d'Aquin - Tommaso d'Aquino]

Lambert of Auxerre 13th century [Lambertus Autissiodorensis - Lambert d'Auxerre - Lamberto di Auxerre]

Boethius of Dacia 13th century [Boethius Dacus - Boèce de Dace - Boezio di Dacia]

Peter of Spain13th century [Petrus Hispanus - Pierre d'Éspagne - Petro Ispano]

John Pagus 13th century [Johannes Pagus - Jean Pagus - Giovanni Pago]

Robert Kilwardby ca. 1215 - 1279 Robertus de Kilwardby - Robert Kilwardby - Roberto Kilwardby]

Roger Bacon 1214 - 1294 [Rogerius Bacon - Roger Bacon - Ruggero Bacone]

Martin of Dacia d. 1304 [Martinus de Dacia - Martin de Dacie - Martino di Dacia]

Peter of Auvergne - d. 1304 [Petrus de Alvernia - Perre d'Auvergne - Pietro d'Alvernia]

Simon of Faversham ca. 1260 - 1306 [Simonis de Faversham - Simon de Faversham - Simone di Faversham]

Thomas of Sutton ca. 1250 - ca. 1315 [Thomam de Sutona - Thomas of Sutton - Thomas of Sutton]

Giles of Rome ca. 1243 - 1316 [Aegidius Romanus - Gilles de Rome - Egidio Romano]

John Duns Scotus c. 1265/6 - 1308 [Johannes Duns Scotus - Jean Duns Scot - Giovanni Duns Scoto]

Radulphus Brito ? - d. 1320 [Radulphus Reginaldi Britonis - Raoul le Breton - Rodolfo il Bretone]

(Pseudo) Richard of Campsall ca. 1324-34 [(Pseudo) Richard de Campsall - (Pseudo) Richard de Campsall - (Pseudo) Riccardo di Campsall]

Walter Burley (or Burleigh) 1274/5 - 1344 [Gualterius de Burley (Burleaus) - Walter Burley - Walter Burley]

William Ockham ca. 1285 - 1347 [Guillelmus de Ockham - Guillaume Ockham (Occam) - Gugliemo di Ockham (Occam)]

Gerardus Odonis ? - 1348 [Gerardus (Giraldus) Odonis - Geraldus Odonis - Geraldus Odonis]

John Buridan ca. 1300 - after 1358 [Johannes Buridanus - Jean Buridan - Giovanni Buridano]

William of Heytesbury before 1313 - 1372/3 [Guillelmus de Heytesbury (Heitesbeurus) - Guillaume Heytesbury - Guglielmo Heytesbury]

Marsilius of Inghen ca. 1340 - 1396 [Marsilius de Inghen - Marsil d'Inghen - Marsilio di Inghen]

Robert Alyngton ? - 1398

Blasius of Parma ? - 1416 [Blasius Pelacanius de Parma - Blaise de Parme - Biagio Pelacani da Parma]

Paul of Venice 1369 - 1429 [Paulus Nicolettus Venetus - Paul de Venise - Paolo Veneto]

Marius Victorinus

Author of the first Latin translation of the *Categories* (now lost).

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(Pseudo) Augustine

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Boethius

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   "This volume contains five Latin versions of Aristotle's Categories. Numbers 1 and 2 both stem from Boethius, who is responsible for the Latin translations that were most widespread. One of them is more literal, the other more elegant. William of Moerbeke, on the other hand, was the author of a Latin version not only of Aristotle's work, but also of Simplicius' commentary, which contains the abbreviated lemmas of the Aristotelian text. Moreover, Aristotle's work was known by means of a Roman paraphrase attributed to Augustine and influenced by Themistius."

2. *Categoriarum Supplementa. Porphyrii Isagoge, Translatio Boethii, Et Anonymi Fragmentum Vulgo Vocatum "Liber Sex Principiorum"*. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer, 1966.

   "This volume constitutes a supplement to the Latin versions of the Categories. It contains Porphyry's famous Introduction to Aristotle's Categories in Boethius' translation and an extract of an anonymous 12th century Latin writing, which was widespread under the title Liber sex principiorum: it deals mainly with the last six categories, treated more briefly in Aristotle's work. The volume also contains the fragments quoted by Boethius from an older Latin version of Porphyry's Introduction, done by Marius Victorinus."

Studies

William of Champeaux

Texts

Available only in manuscript (C8 in Marenbon's list: *Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, before c. 1150 A.D.* - see bibliography)

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The Problem of Universals in Antiquity and Middle Ages

INTRODUCTION

"One of the most debated problems during the Middle Ages was the problem of the nature of general concepts. Greek logic, after long discussions, established the theory of the concept, which became classic, and was transmitted by commentators in their manuals and compendia. In the Middle Ages, the problem of the nature of general concepts, called by the logicians of the time *universalia*, was placed in the centre of logical and philosophical concerns, and gave rise to the famous "dispute of the universals". (...)
This dispute lasted throughout the Middle Ages, though in certain periods a particular conception might prevail. This problem originates from a famous passage in Porphyry's Introduction to Aristotle's *Categories* -- *Isagogé* -- translated by Boethius, a treatise which represented the corner-stone of all dialectical studies. This passage appears at the beginning of the above mentioned work and it raised the following problem: are genera and species real, or are they empty inventions of the intellect? Here is that famous passage, opening the Prooemium in Porphyry's *Isagogé*: *De generibus speciebus illud quidem sive subsistent, sine in nudis intellectibus posita sunt, sive subsistentia corporalia sent an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo; altissimum mysterium est hujus modi et majoris indigens inquisitionis* ("I shall avoid investigating whether genera and species do exist in themselves, or as mere

notions of the intellect, or whether they have a corporeal, or incorporeal existence, or whether they have an existence separated from sensible things, or only in sensible things; it is quite a mystery which requires a more thorough investigation than the present one"). This problem, raised by Boethius, had been left aside for a while in the Middle Ages, but it arose again as soon as Aristotle's texts became better known.
(...)
Let us now see how this extraordinary problem of the universals arose. Aristotle said, (...) that there was no other science but of the universal. This thesis was adopted by the Scholastic logicians, who kept repeating: *Scientia est de universalibus, existentia est singularium* -- "Science concerns the universals, existence refers to singular (objects)" or, with another formula: *Nulla est fluxorum scientia* -- "There is no science of transient (ephemeral) things". It is therefore clear that the universal will be the central problem of any science, its whole foundation, its starting point. They granted such a great importance to this problem because they wanted first and foremost to lay the basis of science, without which science itself could not exist. Also, at the beginning of this dispute, a nominalist thinker, Roscelin, appeared, who denied the universal; this shocked the Aristotelian and Latin minded Middle Ages and gave rise to the discussion.
The treatises on the history of philosophy simplify, generally, the solutions the Scholastic proposed to the problem of the universals, and deal with only three or four main solutions. This simplification is made in order to detect the general directions of the Scholastics' thinking. As we shall see, the problem was far more complicated and subtle. Of course, it appeared simple to the first Scholastics. F. J. Thonnard remarks (*Précis d'histoire de la philosophie*, Paris, Tournai, Rome, 1963 p. 285) : "In the Middle Ages, the first philosophers did not realise initially all the nuances, and they answer by yes, or by no". According to Thonnard, only two groups of philosophers should be considered: (1) the realists, embracing a metaphysical point of view, and who assert that the universals are definitely objects; (2) the antirealists, adopting a psychological standpoint, and raising objections which force the realists to be more precise in their solutions.

The problem of the universals, as defined by Porphyry, and taken over by Boethius, was called *prima quaestio* -- "the first problem". Great importance was attached to this problem because of the numerous trends and nuances implied by the solutions. We possess a complete classification of these solutions, made by a mediaeval logician, John of Salisbury (twelfth century), in his. work *Metalogicus* (Metalogicon). In this work, the author enumerates 13 directions in the problem of the universals.

Metalogicus was a treatise on logic which the author himself confessed to have written (1159) from memory, after a rather long interruption of his studies of logic. His intention was to prove the usefulness of logic, opposing the attacks against this discipline by certain philosophers. The value of the work is that it is a vast source of information about the conceptions of the time.

Here are the 13 conceptions in the problem of the universals, such as given by John of Salisbury.

1) Roscelin's conception, in keeping with which the universals are mere words -- votes (nominalism).

2) Abelard's, and his disciples' conception, with whom the general concepts are reduced to sermons, predication being possible only in *sermo* (judgement), as the predicate of an object cannot be an object.

3) Another position upheld that the universal is *intellectus* (idea), or *notio*, such as Cicero (that is the Stoics) had seen it. Thinking cannot discriminate the particular and corporeal concrete from the sensation, but only the abstract, namely the general abstract, which is devoid of reality.

4) Walter of Mortaigne's position, who maintained the universals to be closely united with the individuals (*res sensibiles*), but to have a mode of existence -- status -- according to which way they are considered. It is the so-called theory of the status.

Walter of Mortaigne was a professor in Paris, and died as a bishop of Laon in 1174. His position is interesting because he

professed, basically, a multiplicity of ontological status. The *species* and *genera*, up to the supreme *genus*, have different existential states. So, the status of the general, united to the individual, depends on the consideration of the individual as belonging to one or to another species. (This idea, of "the multiple states of the Being" originated with Aristotle. See the relevant chapter). The idea of multiple ontological states has appeared in contemporary logic since the establishment of the many-valued logics where the proposition can have more than two values, truth and falsehood. A close examination of Walter of Mortaigne's theories in this respect would certainly prove very interesting.

5) The platonic realism of Bernard of Chartres.

6) Gilbert of Poitiers' conception concerning the native forms - *forma nativae*.

Gilbert de la Porrée, bishop of Poitiers (1076-1154), is known also as Gilbertus Porretanus, or Pictaviensis (of Poitiers). His most important work on logic is *De sex principiis*, which played an important part later on. He started from the Platonic conception of ideas -- principles; these have copies -- the native forms -- which become multiple ant distinct in the individuals. Comparing these forms, the intellect shapes by abstraction a unique form, the genus, or the species, which conforms with the divine idea. Therefore in Plato's existence he saw a special "subsistence"*subsistentia* -- the essence of the individual Plato, this "Platonicity" -- *Platonitas* --, his distinct form, a copy of the idea of man.

7) Gauslenus of Soissons' opinion, according to which the universal exist only in collections.

Gauslenus of Soissons (1125-1151), bishop of Soissons, held that the universal concept exists only in the collection of individuals belonging to the same class, and not in the individual. The author of the treatise *Metalogicus* wrote that "Gauslenus Suessonensis episcopus situated the universal in

objects gathered in a collection" (*rebus in unum collectis*) and denied it with isolated individuals.

8) The so-called theory of "manners" -- *maneries*.

This conception, just like that of Gauslenus of Soissons, of the collections or of native forms, is to be found in a work, written in the Middle Ages, *De generibus et speciebus*. This conception is a nominalist variant, in keeping with which the thing -- *res* -- is mere word -- *vox*.

The term *maneries* means "way of treating" or "way of handling", and is the origin of the French "manière". The canonist Huguccio (d. 1212), author of *Summa Decretorum* defined, in this sense, the species (*species*) as being *rerum maneries* (the "manner" of things). In short, a thing is a word -- *vox* --, and genus is its manner -- *maneries*.

9) The opinion according to which the universals are abstract form similar to the mathematical forms.

10) The so-called *ratio indifferentiae* doctrine, in keeping with which one thing can be at the same time individual and universal, although there is nothing universal in things, but the universal is what is similar between them.

Charles de Rémusat in *Abélard* (2nd ed., Paris, 1855) supplied a few excerpts from Abelard *Glossulae super Porphyrium* which explain this *ratio indifferentiae* conception. What in Plato, or in Socrates, is non-differentiated, or similar, *indifferens vel consimile*. Certain things are mutually convening, or agreeing, that is similar in nature, such as animals, bodies, so they are both universal and particular -- universal in that they are several in a community of essential attribution, and particular in that each of them is different from the other.

11) William of Champeaux's (1070-1120) opinion, who held a rather strange realism, finally coming to a *theoria indifferentiae*.

12) The conception according to which the distinction between *genus* and individual lies merely in a particularity of existence, as the universal exists at the same time in several and in the particular object.

13) The conception of the unknown author of the above mentioned -- *De generibus et speciebus*, a sort of Platonism, the "theory of identity". According to it, the genus, mankind for instance, is unique and identical with all the individuals, which are only accidentally distinct." (pp. 62-66)

From: Anton Dumitriu, *History of Logic*, Vol. II, Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press 1977.

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The Nominalist Ontology of William of Ockham

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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Selected Bibliography on the Problem of Universals in Antiquity and Middle Ages

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   "When Ockham's logic arrives in Italy, some Dominican philosophers bring into question Ockham's ontological reductionist program. Among them, Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate pay a great attention to refute Ockham's claim that no universal exists in the extra-mental world. In order to reject Ockham's program, they start by reconsidering the notion of "real", then the range of application of the rational and the real distinction. Generally, their strategy consists in re-addressing against Ockham some arguments extracted from Hervaeus Natalis's works. Franciscus's and Stephanus's basic idea is that some universals are not acts of cognition, but extra-mental, predicable things. Such things are not separable from singulars, nonetheless they are not the same as those singulars. Consequently, it is not necessary to allow, as Ockham does, that if two things are not really identical, they

are really different and hence really separable. According to them, it is possible to hold that two things are not really identical without holding that they are also really non-identical and hence really different. Basically, their reply relies on a different notion of the relation of identity. Identity is regarded as an intersection of classes of things, so that it is possible to say that two things are really identical without saying that they also are the same thing. Franciscus and Stephanus, however, do not seem to achieve completely their aim."

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   "In this essay I argue that Aristotle is committed to a sortal analysis of the universal. According to this analysis something is a universal ("to katholou") just in case it is predicated "essentially" of a plurality of entities. I find evidence for such an analysis in the *Categories*, *Posterior analytics*, and *Metaphysics Gamma*. Finally, I suggest that an appeal to this analysis may help resolve a longstanding difficulty in *Metaphysics Zeta*, viz., Aristotle's commitment to (a) substances are not universals; (b) forms ("eide") are substances; and (c) forms ("eide") are predicated of a plurality of entities."

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12. Caruso, Ester. 1979. *Pedro Hurtado De Mendoza E La Rinascita Del Nominalismo Nella Scolastica Del Seicento*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

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    "The Stoics did not have a single, unified account of concepts and universals, but with respect to Platonic Forms they were eliminativist rather than reductionist. According to virtually all Stoic accounts, Platonic Forms are literally nothing."

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22. Cresswell, Max J. 1975. "What Is Aristotle's Theory of Universals?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 53:238-247.

"Aristotle's theory of universals is expounded by contrast with Plato's. Where Plato had said that X is F iff X participates in the form of F, Aristotle has two analyses. If F is a substance predicate then X is F iff X is specifically identical with an F. If F is an accidental predicate then X is F iff there is a Y in X which is specifically identical with an individual in the appropriate category for F."

23. Cross, Richard. 2007. "Aristotelian Substance and Supposits: Relations, Universals, and the Abuse of Tropes." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.Supplementary Volume* no. 79:53-72.

" Scotus's belief that any created substance can depend on the divine essence and/or divine persons as a subject requires him to abandon the plausible Aristotelian principle that there is no merely relational change. I argue that Scotus's various counterexamples to the principle can be rebutted. For reasons related to those that arise in Scotus's ailed attempt to refute the principle, the principle also entails that properties cannot be universals."

24. Da Gama Cerqueira, Hugo. 2003. "Ockham E O Problema Dos Universais: Um Comentário Ao Argumento Da *Summa Logicae*." *Veritas.Revista de Filosofia* no. 48:441-454.

"In this article, the author tries to explain the central aspects of Ockham's arguments on the nature of universals, giving attention to the analysis of the semantic properties of signification and supposition as they were exposed by Ockham in the first part of his *Summa logicae*. After presenting the doctrine of intuitive and abstractive knowledge, the author discusses Ockham's critics to realism and his specific way of conceiving universals."

25. Dafonte, César Raña. 2007. "El Tema De Los Universales En Juan De Salisbury." *Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval* no. 6:233-239.

"This work presents the information that John of Salisbury provides us in his *Metalogicon* about the problem of the universals in the 12th century. He is especially careful when he treats Aristotle's solution, philosopher for whom he shows great admiration."

26. Dahlstrom, Daniel. 1980. "Signification and Logic: Scotus on Universals from a Logical Point of View." *Vivarium* no. 18:81-111.

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    "Le présent livre propose l'étude de la constitution, durant le haut Moyen Âge latin, d'une position philosophique: le réalisme de l'immanence à propos des universaux. Cette position est fondée sur la conviction qu'il existe, dans le monde qui nous entoure, certes des individus particuliers -- ce tilleul, cette tortue --, mais aussi des entités universelles. Ces entités n'existent pas séparées des individus, mais intégralement réalisées en eux, sans variation ni degré. Cet engagement philosophique résulte d'une exégèse des *Catégories* d'Aristote, réinterprétées selon des philosophèmes issus de la pensée de Porphyre. La généalogie de cette position est ici retracée en abordant successivement ses sources tant grecques que latines et ses ancêtres patristiques (avant tout Grégoire de Nysse), puis son élaboration conceptuelle durant les premiers siècles du Moyen Âge latin jusqu'à la critique qu'en donnera Pierre Abélard, et ce, par l'analyse de l'ontologie des quatre philosophes qui l'ont soutenue: Jean Scot Érigène, Anselme de Canterbury, Odon de Cambrai et Guillaume de Champeaux. Ce parcours permet de dessiner les contours d'un projet philosophique: comprendre, analyser et décrire le monde sensible au moyen des concepts issus de la logique aristotélicienne."

31. Gentile, Luigi. 1975. *Roscellino Di Compiègne Ed Il Problema Degli Universali*. Lanciano: Editrice Itinerari.

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    "In this paper, I explore the origins of the 'problem of universals'. I argue that the problem has come to be badly formulated and that consideration of it has been impeded by falsely supposing that Platonic Forms were ever intended as an alternative to Aristotelian universals. In fact, the role that Forms are supposed by Plato to fulfill is independent of the function of a universal. I briefly consider the gradual mutation of the problem in the Academy, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and among some of the major Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, including Porphyry and Boethius."

33. Gill, Mary Louise. 2001. "Aristotle's Attack on Universals." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:235-260.

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    "The medieval version of the Problem of Universals centers around propositions such as '"man" is a species' and '"animals" is a genus'. One of C. Lejewski's analyses of such propositions shows that semantic status of their terms by means of Ajdukiewicz-style categorical indices having participial or infinitive forms as their natural-language counterparts. Some medievals certainly used such forms in their corresponding analyses, thus avoiding the alleged referential demands generated by nominally-termed propositions. Boethius exemplifies the confusion which may still arise from the traditional definition of "universal" in terms of predication "of many". Unnecessary adherence to nominally-termed analyses not only grounded a tendency towards Nominalism and Platonism, but also towards the moderns' 'way of ideas'."

35. Hönigswald, Richard. 1961. *Abstraktion Und Analysis. Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte Des Universalienstreites in Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

    Edited by Karl Barthlein

36. Hull, Gordon. 2006. "Hobbes's Radical Nominalism." *Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 11:201-223.

    "This paper analyzes Hobbes's understanding of signification, the process whereby words come to have meaning. Most generally, Hobbes develops and extends the nominalist critique of universals as it is found in Ockham and subsequently carried forward by early moderns such as Descartes. Hobbes's radicality emerges in comparison with Ockham and Descartes, as, unlike them, Hobbes also reduces the intellectual faculty entirely to imagination. According to Hobbes, we have nothing in which a stabilizing, prediscursive mental language could inhere. Hobbes thus concludes that all thinking is affective and semiotic, and depends on the regulation of conventionally established regimes of signs. Establishing this regulation is one of the central functions of the Hobbesian commonwealth."

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    "Aristotelian science seeks to define the essential nature of a thing and then to demonstrate the features the thing must have because of that nature. A philosophically inevitable question thus arises for Aristotelians: what *is* a nature? Is it a reality over and above (or perhaps "in" the things whose nature it is? Is it a mental construction, existing only in our understanding of things, if so, on what basis is it constructed? This is the medieval problem of universals, or at least one way of thinking about the problem. In a classic formulation, Boethius states the problem in terms of the reality of *genera* and *species*, two main types of universals involved in an Aristotelian definition of essential nature (as in "a human being is a reasoning / speaking animal," which places us in the genus of animals and marks off our species by reference to our "difference" from other animals in reasoning or using language): "Plato thinks that genera and species and the rest are not only understood as universals, but also exist and subsist apart from bodies. Aristotle, however, thinks that they are understood as incorporeal and universal, but subsist in sensibles."' A rigorous tradition of, mainly Aristotelian, discussion originates from Boethius's tentative exploration of the problem thus stated. But a more

Platonic solution had been put into play about a century before Boethius by Augustine, and this, too, would have a rich development."

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    "This article offers the first edition of the beginning of the *Communia logice* (*et grammatice*), a substantial didascalical compilation emanating from the Arts faculty of the University of Paris during the first half of the thirteenth century and preserved in a manuscript bequeathed by master Peter of Limoges (d. 1306) to the old library of the Sorbonne. After a general presentation (section I) and before some clarifications on the *Ratio edendi* (section III), the doctrinal study (section II) which precedes this edition (section IV) shows how the author-compiler of the *Communia logice* answers - while reformulating it - to the well known porphyrian set of questions about the universals."

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    "William Ockham's ontology as outlined in *Summa Logicae* and elsewhere is sufficiently like the *trope nominalism* described in D.M. Armstrong's *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* to warrant the attention of contemporary metaphysicians, so long as one bears in mind (a) Ockham's fundamentally theological presuppositions, and (b) his Aristotelian logic and philosophy of language."

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    "In the *Fifth Meditation*, Descartes makes a remarkable claim about the ontological status of geometrical figures. He asserts that an object such as a triangle has a 'true and immutable nature' that does not depend on the mind, yet has being even if there are no triangles existing in the world. This statement has led many commentators to assume that Descartes is a Platonist regarding essences and in the philosophy of mathematics. One problem with this seemingly natural reading is that it contradicts the conceptualist account of universals that one finds in the *Principles of Philosophy* and elsewhere. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the notion of a true and

immutable nature which reconciles the Fifth Meditation with the conceptualism of Descartes's other work. Specifically, I argue that Descartes takes natures to be innate ideas considered in terms of their so-called 'objective being'."

64. ———. 1998. "Descartes' Theory of Universals." *Philosophical Studies.An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* no. 89:161-180.

    "I argue that Descartes holds a conceptualist account of both the ontology and the origin of universals. Universal mathematical objects, such as the number two, are merely innate ideas that are made occurrent by a process of abstraction. Although Descartes's conceptualism is fairly explicit textually, the details of his theory are not. I recover this theory by linking it to his account of attributes--an attribute being something which we distinguish from a substance within our thought where there is no distinction in real.
    This approach uncovers Descartes's diagnosis of how the realist goes wrong in positing universals outside thought."

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75. Rubenstein, Eric M. 2002. "Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 5:193-204.

    "While the medievals spilled much ink over the 'problem of individuation', the moderns scarcely mention it. My aim here is to explore what *philosophical* reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, might lie behind the disappearance of a philosophical problem that vexed minds for centuries. I argue that Ockham clearly saw that a commitment to nominalism removes the need to take seriously the problem of individuation. Suarez, who did take seriously the problem, but who also advocated nominalism, will be shown to be subject to important Ockham-inspired

arguments. To the extent, then, that Ockham's nominalism carried the day into the moderns, it is understandable, philosophically, that the moderns should turn a deaf ear to the problem of individuation."

76. Sacksteder, William. 1986. "Some Words Aristotle Never Uses: Attributes, Essences, and Universals." *New Scholasticism* no. 60:427-453.

77. Scaltsas, Theodore. 1994. *Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

78. Schoedinger, Andrew B., ed. 1992. *The Problem of Universals*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

79. Sedley, David. 1985. "The Stoic Theory of Universals." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 23:87-92.

    Supplementary volume.

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    "Daniel Devereux has argued that "Categories" 3b10-18 provides evidence for the view that Aristotle's first-order accidents are tropes. However, the passage should be interpreted differently than as Devereux proposes and the proper interpretation is neutral as between a tropes-view and a universals-view."

81. Sharples, Robert. 2005. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Universals: Two Problematic Texts." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 50:43-55.

    "Two texts that raise problems for Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of universals are examined. *De anima* 90.2-8 appears to suggest that universals are dependent on thought for their existence; this raises questions about the status both of universals and of forms. It is suggested that the passage is best interpreted as indicating that universals are dependent on thought only for their being recognised as

universals. The last sentence of *Quaestio* 1.11 seems to assert that if the universal did not exist no individual would exist, thereby contradicting Alexander's position elsewhere. This seems to be a slip resulting from the fact that species with only one member are the exception rather than the rule."

82. Sorabji, Richard. 2006. "Universals Transformed: The First Thousand Years after Plato." In *Universals, Concepts and Qualities. New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates*, edited by Strawson, Peter Frederick and Chakrabarti, Arindam, 105-126. Aldershot: Ashgate.

83. South, James B. 2002. "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 55:785-823.

    "In this essay, I argue that the typical way of thinking about the problem of universals and the cognition of them (realism vs. nominalism, abstraction) is inapplicable to the account Suárez gives in his *Commentary on the De anima*. I show how he justifies objective universal concepts while rejecting the notion of a common nature, as well as the typical nominalist appeal to intuitive cognition. His proposal, I conclude, provides an interesting contrast to the traditional nominalist account of cognition, while retaining the emphasis on the primacy of the singular in intellectual cognition."

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    Contents: Introduction VII; Note on the text XVI; Porphyry the Phoenician: *Isagoge* 1; Boethius: From his *Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge* 20; Peter Abelard: From the " *Glosses on Porphyry*" in His *Logica 'ingredientibus*' 26; John Duns Scotus: Six questions on individuation from his *Ordinatio* II. d. 3, part 1, qq. 1-6 57; William of Ockham: Five questions on universals from his

Ordinatio d. 2, qq. 4-8 114; Glossary 232; Bibliography 235-238.
"It is well known that the problem of universals was widely discussed in mediaeval philosophy --indeed, some would say it was discussed then with a level of insight and rigor it has never enjoyed since. The five texts translated in this volume include the most influential and some of the most sophisticated treatments of the problem in the whole Middle Ages.
The first text is Porphyry's *Isagoge*, translated here in its entirety. Porphyry was a third-century Greek neo-Platonist, a pupil and the biographer of Plotinus, and the one who arranged Plotinus's writings into six groups of nine essays (the " *Enneads*").
(...)
Despite its importance in this respect, perhaps the main influence of the *Isagoge* lies not in what it says, about the predicables or anything else, but in what it does not say. For in his introductory remarks, Porphyry raises but then modestly refuses to answer three questions about the metaphysical status of universals, saying only that they belong to "another, greater investigation". [*Isagoge*, 2] It is this brief passage that raised the problem of universals in the form in which it was first discussed in the Middle Ages. It contains some of the most consequential lines in the entire history of philosophy.
Porphyry's silence means that there really is no detailed theory of universals in the *Isagoge* -- or for that matter in his other writings. Taken by himself, therefore, Porphyry would not have been a very important figure in the history of our problem. But he cannot be taken by himself. His importance lies in the fact that his Isagoge was translated into Latin in the early Middle Ages and used as the occasion for discussing the problem of universals directly and in detail. It was as though commentators found his silence intolerable and were irresistibly drawn into the very questions Porphyry himself had declined to discuss.
The most important of these early mediaeval discussions is undoubtedly Boethius's.

(...)
In addition to works of Aristotle, Boethius also translated Porphyry's *Isagoge* and wrote two commentaries on it. (His first commentary was based on an earlier translation by Marius Victorinus, who is known to readers of Augustine's *Confessions* VIII. 2 & 4.) Although Boethius addressed the problem of universals in several places, the discussion in his *Second Commentary on Porphyry* was the longest and probably the most inIluential. The relevant portion of that commentary is translated below.
(...).
Abelard wrote on the problem of universals in several places. The most well known of them is in the " *Glosses on Porphyry*" in his *Logica 'ingredientibus'*. Once again the relevant passage is a discussion of Porphyry's three unanswered questions.
(...)
By the time of the last two authors represented below, John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) and William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347), philosophy had become a specialized and highly technical academic discipline, carried on almost exclusively in a university context. These last two texts are here translated into English for the first time, and are by far the longest and most intricate in this volume. " pp. VII-XI.

85. ———. 2005. "The Problem of Universals and Wyclif's Alleged "Ultrarealism"." *Vivarium* no. 43:111-123.

"John Wyclif has been described as "ultrarealist" in his theory of universals. This paper attempts a preliminary assessment of that judgment and argues that, pending further study, we have no reason to accept it. It is certainly true that Wyclif is extremely vocal and insistent about his realism, but it is not obvious that the actual content of his view is especially extreme. The paper distinguishes two common medieval notions of a universal, the Aristotelian/Porphyrian one in terms of predication and the Boethian one in terms of being metaphysically common to many. On neither approach does Wyclif 's theory of

universals postulate new and non-standard entities besides those recognized by more usual versions of realism. Again pending further study, neither do Wyclif 's views appear to assign philosophically extreme or novel roles to the entities he does recognize as universal. On the contrary, by at least one measure, his theory of universals is less extreme than Walter Burley's, as Wyclif himself observes. For Wyclif, the universal is numerically identical with its singulars, but numerical identity is governed by something weaker than the Indiscernibility of identicals."

86. Spruyt, Joke. 1996. "Gerardus Odonis on the Universal." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* no. 63:171-208.

87. Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "The Debate on Universals before Peter Abelard." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 33:409-429.

88. Trentman, John. 1968. "Predication and Universals in Vincent Ferrer's Logic." *Franciscan Studies* no. 28:47-62.

89. Tweedale, Martin. 1976. *Abailard on Universals*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    "This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication."

90. ———. 1984. "Alexander of Aphrodisias Views on Universals." *Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 29:279-303.

91. ———. 1987. "Aristotle's Universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 65 (4):412-426.

"This paper is devoted in the main to arguing for certain negative theses of the general form: Aristotle did not himself hold such and such a view of universals; but in the course of the discussion some points about Aristotle's own positive conception of universals, to the limited extent that he had one, will emerge. In fact, Aristotle's negative remarks about universals, e.g. that they are not substances, not separate, not in addition to the particulars, etc., are much clearer and less tentative than any of his positive ones, and it is little wonder that interpreters through the ages have attributed to him radically different and opposed positive theories. The words they found in their authority could not easily be used to decide the issue between their competing interpretations. In order to clarify the aim of this essay I want first of all to distinguish with regard to any topic Aristotle treats the question of what view he himself held, if any, from the question of what view he *should* have held given the basic tenets and thrust of his whole philosophy. The views which are definitely not, as I shall claim, ones Aristotle himself held, i.e. not defensible answers to the first question, may well be tenable answers to the second. Indeed, I am rather inclined to think there are several mutually incompatible theories that will answer as well as any the question of what view Aristotle *should* have taken of universals. On that whole matter I shall have nothing more to say in this place. The two interpretations I shall discuss see Aristotle as a nominalist and a conceptualist respectively. By `nominalism' I mean any theory which says that what is universal is universal only in so far as it is a certain sort of sign. In other words, being a sign is necessary to being a universal, although the converse is not true. Just what the things are which serve as universal signs is left entirely open on this definition of nominalism. Signs may be spoken sounds, written marks, mental images, mental states or any thing you please. Also the definition is non-committal on just what sort of a sign it is that is universal; theories about

this will vary with the semantic theory the nominalist adopts. There is perhaps a place for a narrower sense of `nominalism' in which the nominalist must maintain that universals are all certain expressions of a written or spoken language. In this narrower sense Ockham, for example was not a nominalist since the signs he thought of as universal were primarily those of a mental language, although he was certainly a nominalist in the broader sense I first proposed. By `conceptualism' I mean the view that nothing could be a universal unless there were in existence thought and cognition of an intellectual sort. In this broad sense all nominalists are conceptualists, since presumably there could not be signs unless there were thought. But there is a narrower sense of `conceptualism' too, in which the conceptualist must maintain that universality applies only to mind-dependent entities, e.g. concepts, mental images, etc. (Even words when they are conceived as not identifiable with their physical manifestations are things that cannot exist unless there are minds and so are mind-dependent in my sense.)

The difference between the broad and narrow senses has this noteworthy consequence: someone can be a conceptualist in the broad sense and believe that what is universal is some entity independently existing outside the mind as long as they also accept that it is a universal only when it is thought of or conceived in some way. But such a person is not a conceptualist in the narrow sense. Also nominalists need not be conceptualists in the narrow sense since they can hold that the things which are signs are mind-independent objects with a wholly physical existence, for example sounds or marks.

My task will be to convince the reader that Aristotle was neither a nominalist nor a conceptualist in any of these senses. I shall begin with the nominalist proposal, but to some extent my refutation of it will be incomplete until I have finished with conceptualism. From the fact that Aristotle was not a conceptualist in the broad sense it will follow that he was not a nominalist, so the evidence against

broad conceptualism argues against nominalism as well." pp. 412-413.

92. ———. 1993. "Duns Scotus' Doctrine on Universals and the Aphrodisian Tradition." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 67:77-93.

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Universals in Antiquity and Middle Ages

The Problem of Universals: the Contemporary Debate

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The Realist Ontology of John Duns Scotus

THE FIRST OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO DUNS SCOTUS

"The problem from which a systematic reconstruction of Scotistic thought must take its start is the problem of the proper object of the human intellect. It is only thus that the natural logical order of the Scotistic system is properly emphasized.
The Subtle Doctor was confronted with two conflicting solutions. Henry of Ghent, who was at the time the most influential representative of the Augustinian school, taught that the first and proper object of the human intellect is God, or the supreme being. This thesis is implicitly contained in every theory of intellectual illumination, such as that prevalent, with very few exceptions, among the Augustinians of the thirteenth century. Henry of Ghent is to be credited with having stated explicitly what had been previously said in a confused manner. The advantages of this doctrine are evident. If God is the proper object of the human intellect, one can readily understand why man should not concentrate upon any created thing, for man is led by an interior logic to fix his attention upon what is eternal, infinite, absolute. This deep interior "drive" might well be called man's divine vocation.
In contrast with the Augustinian solution, stands the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine, according to which the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. This is tantamount to saying that the natural object of our knowledge is the essence abstracted from matter. This opinion seems to be

confirmed by our daily experience, which shows that all human knowledge has sensation as its necessary starting point.
Duns Scotus is not satisfied with either of the two solutions, and he makes this clear by pointing out their grave disadvantages.
When the first object of the intellect is discussed, it is immediately necessary to define the meaning of the term "first." The question, "What is the first object of the human intellect ?" can be understood in different ways. One way of stating it is, "What is the first thing that man knows in the order of time ?" Another way is, "What is the most perfect thing (first in the order of perfection) that can be known by the human mind?" Still another way of stating it is, "What is the object to which the human intellect is directed by its very nature ?" It is in this third sense that the question is taken here. To ask, therefore, what the first object of the human intellect is, is equivalent to asking, "What is the adequate object, that is, the object that fully corresponds to the natural power of the human intellect?"
Man is not born perfect. This means that man is not in possession from the first moment of his existence of all the acts of which he is capable. Like all other creatures, man is a complex of potentialities, to be developed gradually as he comes in contact with reality. To the law of this gradual development and becoming, not only his body is subject but also his soul. Thus man's intelligence and will have a natural tendency toward the possession of their objects. When this possession is completed, the perfection of these two faculties is attained, i.e., fully actuated.
The object specifies the faculty, i.e., the object is the measure of the perfection of the faculty. Moreover, any development of the faculty is only possible in virtue of its object, in the sense that it is necessarily a pursuit of its object, since it is only in view of its object that the faculty is determined to act.
By applying these general considerations to the particular case of human knowledge, it becomes evident: (1) that the human intellect can know nothing that does not somehow enter the sphere of the natural object for which it was made; (2) that the human intellect knows things in the light of its object, which thus becomes the necessary point of view from which it sees everything. This can be realized in a perfect way, as in the case of

God, who knows all possible things in the unique object of His divine mind, or imperfectly, as in the case of man, who does not know all things in the idea of being, yet cannot know anything apart from the idea of being. In fact, "the adequacy of the object," writes Scotus, "can be considered from the point of view of its power (*secundum virtutem*) and from the point of view of its predication (*secundum praedicationem*). From the point of view of its power, that object is adequate to its faculty which, once it is known, makes all other possible objects knowable to the intellect. In this sense the divine essence is the adequate object of God's intellect. From the point of view of its predication, that object is adequate to its faculty which is per se and essentially the predicate of all things that can be known by the intellect.(1)" (pp. 27-29)

Notes

(1) *De anima*, q. 21 n. 2.

From: Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus. The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*, Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1961.

THE UNIVOCITY OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING

"The obvious consequences that follow from such a standpoint did not escape Duns Scotus. The first of such consequences is the univocity of the concept of being. The proper object of a faculty, in the sense that has just been explained, must be only one, just as the faculty is only one. Therefore, in order that being be the proper object of our intellect, and consequently the point of view from which and the reason why we know God and creatures, immaterial and material beings, it must be predicated univocally, i.e., in the same sense, of all things. It cannot be otherwise, for the

simple fact that being is the means by which, and the light through which, all things are known.
In the Augustinian philosophy there remained the difficulty of explaining how, from the concept of God, man could descend to the concept of creatures without passing through the intuition of the divine essence. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy the difficulty was reversed: a way had to be shown how one could ascend from the concept of creatures to the concept of God. Both Augustinians and Thomists solved the difficulty with the doctrine of analogy: an analogy that goes from God to creatures for the Augustinians, an analogy that goes from creatures to God for the Thomists. With his doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being, and consequently of the other transcendental concepts, Duns Scotus opens a new way to the solution of the problem. He does so very modestly, as the following passage indicates:
"In the second place, it can be said, although not definitely because it is not in accordance with the common opinion, that of God we possess not only concepts which are analogous to those of creatures, that is, entirely different from those had of created things, but also concepts which are univocal to God and creatures.(2)" (pp. 33-34)

Notes

(2) Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 5. [Obviously, in this passage Duns Scotus does not use the term "analogous" in the sense it is used by modern Thomists. When he states that the concepts we possess of God are "entirely different" from the concepts we have of creatures, he simply means that the reality expressed by these concepts is in itself essentially different. God is an infinite, self-subsistent being; creatures are limited, participated beings. (*Translator: B. Bonansea*)]

From: Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus. The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*, Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1961.

DUNS SCOTUS ON THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

"In *Quaestiones in librum Metaphysicorum* VII, *quaestio* 18 Scotus recognizes three meanings for the term 'universal'. In one sense it refers to universality, i.e. the property of being suitable to be predicated of many; in another sense it means what has that property. But, he says, something can be either the near (proximate) subject of that property or the remote subject;but it is not easy to see what this latter distinction amounts to. Scotus says that the near subject is of itself a numerically single entity with an indeterminateness which rejects its being identified with any particular case of the universal in question. If we are talking about the universal human in this sense, then it is numerically one, but it cannot be any one individual human; likewise, the universal animal is numerically one, but it cannot be any particular species of animal. The remote subject, on the other hand, is not of itself numerically one and though it is not of itself determined to any one particular of the universal-in question, it does not reject such determination either.
It is clear that the remote subjects of universality are the natures that we have discussed earlier. Scotus takes over from Avicenna the doctrine that there are three ways of talking about natures: (1) where there is no assumption of either the existence or non-existence of the nature and all that is true of the nature concerns what that nature is and is not of itself; (2) where we say what is true of the nature on account of its actual existence in real things; (3) where we say what is true of the nature on account of its existence in the mind. When we say that a nature is universal we are talking about what holds of it in the third sort of discourse. Universality is a "thing of second intention" and hence can only belong to first intentions, which are natures existing as objects of thought. Things existing as objects of thought are said to have *esse objectivum* and to be *entia objectiva*. An *ens objectivum* is another one of Scotus's accidental beings; it comes into existence as soon as something becomes an object of thought. Since *esse objectivum* does not belong to a nature taken absolutely and in

itself; it is accidental to that nature, just as is individuation, as we saw above. We may think of the *ens objectivum* as the nature-as-conceived-by-a-mind; it is a single, mind-dependent entity whose own numerical oneness derives ultimately from the numerical oneness of the mind doing the conceiving.

As Scotus and other scholastics view the matter, the ens objectivism is the immediate object of thought and represents the nature, which then becomes the remote object of thought. This theory is saved from the idealism that afflicts representational theories of thought in modern times only by this doctrine that the *ens objectivum* just is the nature-as-thought. It is not some real entity distinct from the nature itself, and from whose character we are somehow to infer the character of the nature; rather in apprehending it we are apprehending the nature directly but in a certain way.

The near subject of universality, according to Scotus, is this ens objectivum through which we apprehend the nature. The nature itself is only a universal because this *ens objectivum* is the nature-as-thought. To be a universal something must be suitable to be predicated of many, and, on the sort of view Scotus and many other scholastics subscribed to, only something that is a single object of thought, yet intrinsically indeterminate in respect of its particular instances could have this suitability. The item which is predicated has to be some single thing which many can be said to be; otherwise, the singleness of meaning of the predicate over its many applications to different particulars would evaporate." (pp. 409-410)

From: Martin Tweedale, *Scotus vs. Ockham - A Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. II: Commentary*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.

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"En 1928, étudiant en philosophie, je me voyais assigner comme dissertation une synthèse de la métaphysique scotiste. Je remis un essai sur l'être, la distinction formelle, les universaux et la nature commune. Je ne sais ce qu'il me faut admirer le plus des deux: ma présomption juvénile ou le charisme prophétique de mon professeur. C'est ce noviciat scotiste qui me vaut de vous parler, un demi-siècle plus tard, de la première école scotiste, dans cette université où l'esprit subtil d'un frère mineur d'Écosse lui a donné naissance.

Je me suis initié au scotisme dans la *Philosophie du Bx Jean Duns Scot* d'Ephrem Longpré, et dans *l'Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot* d'E. Gilson, deux médiévistes qui faisaient alors une tournée de conférences à Montréal. Quelques années plus tard, je voulus déposer un sujet de thèse sur l'être, objet de l'intelligence et de la métaphysique selon Duns Scot. Quand le professeur eut compris que je me proposais de critiquer mes deux guides, il m'avisa de changer le sujet, parce qu'aucun jury ne me donnerait raison contre ces deux médiévistes chevronnés, même s'ils n'étaient pas d'accord entre eux. Autant valait changer tout de suite. Je me rabattis sur la théorie de la connaissance chez Duns Scot pour finir par *La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen âge* La publication de l'ouvrage aux Presses universitaires de France et la préface magistrale de Paul Vignaux me valurent de passer pour son élève. Je me sens donc à l'aise parmi vous que l'amitié réunit autour d'un vénérable maître, avec qui j'ai partagé pendant vingt ans l'enseignement de la pensée franciscaine à l'Institut d'études médiévales de l'université de Montréal.

I. La naissance du scotisme.

Je me suis intéressé de bonne heure à l'école scotiste, en raison de l'imbroglio que j'y découvris au sujet de la connaissance du singulier et dont je trouvai la clef en dépistant parmi les incunables de la bibliothèque un livre, fait de textes de Scot, dont l'auteur était Antoine André. Je compris que, pour remonter jusqu'à Scot à partir des scotistes, il me fallait passer par sa médiation. Il y a quelques années, en faisant la recension du volume VII de

l'Ordinatio de Scot, je manifestai quelque réticence sur l'efficacité du recours au commentaire littéral d'Antoine André sur la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote, publié sous son nom en 1482, mais édité de nouveau sous le titre *d'Expositio,* en 1501, par Maurice du Port l'attribuant cette fois à Scot, parce que, selon les éditeurs de *l'Ordinatio,* le disciple n'aurait, en somme, que repris à son compte un commentaire du Docteur Subtil. J'avais consigné le résultat de ma première étude dans mon livre sur la connaissance du singulier, mais puisque cela était passé inaperu, il fallait reprendre le problème du crédit à accorder à Antoine André comme témoin et interprète de Scot, là où Aristote entre en jeu. J'y reviendrai dans la dernière partie de cette communication. En parlant de l'école primitive, je veux me limiter à un point de vue. J'ai essayé de comprendre dans quel esprit et selon quelles méthodes les disciples de Scot ont transmis ce trésor de doctrines émanées des lèvres de leur Maître autant que de ses écrits. Cela me paraît une condition préalable pour rejoindre à travers eux le message original de Scot dans sa verdeur primitive, et comprendre ce qui fait du Docteur Subtil un des grands penseurs de l'histoire." pp. 9-10

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    "The thesis of this article is that Scotus makes a special contribution with his theory of intuition, not for giving new answers to the questions asked, for example, by Aquinas, but for asking different questions; and that the significance of this contribution cannot be appreciated until one sees

why, with respect to the questions asked by Aquinas, Scotus is in (substantial) agreement with the Aristotelian analysis. The author tries, in an informal way, (1) to point out some confusions that have led to a misunderstanding of Scotus's (or anyone else's) defense of an Aristotelian account of abstraction, and (2) to isolate the phenomena that makes Scotus's theory of intuition suggestive."

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    "Of singular importance to the medieval theory of transcendentals was the position of John Duns Scotus that there could be a concept of being univocally common, not only to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. Scotus"s doctrine of univocal transcendental concepts violated the accepted view that, owing to its generality, no transcendental notion could be univocal. The major difficulty facing Scotus"s doctrine of univocity was to explain how a real, as opposed to a purely logical, concept could be abstracted from what agreed in nothing real, in this case, God and creatures. The present article examines Scotus"s solution to this difficulty and its interpretation in four of his noted fourteenth-century followers. It is shown that the balance Scotus"s solution achieved between the competing demands of the real diversity between God and creatures, on the one side, and the conceptual unity of transcendental being, on the other, is taken in opposed directions by his interpreters. Either the real diversity of God and creatures is given priority, so that the concept of being becomes a purely logical notion, or the real unity of the concept of being is stressed, so that some sort of real community is posited between God and creatures."

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"It has been widely accepted in the literature that Scotus was the first to advance the so-called synchronic' view of contingency, where something is contingent if, at the very moment when it occurs, there is a real possibility for its opposite. This is usually contrasted with a statistical' construction of contingency, found in Aristotle and scholastics before Scotus, according to which something is contingent if its opposite can be actually realized at some other time. The present article examines the background to Scotus's treatment of this theory of synchronic contingency and traces its proximate origin to Peter Olivi."

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"The degree of realism that Duns Scotus understood his formal distinction to have implied is a matter of dispute going back to the fourteenth century. Both modern and medieval commentators alike have seen Scotusrsquos later, Parisian treament of the formal distinction as less realist in the sense that it would deny any extra-mentally separate formalities or realities. This less realist reading depends in large part on a question known to scholars only in the highly corrupt edition of Luke Wadding, where it is printed as the first of the otherwise spurious Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus. The present study examines this question in detail. Cited by Scotusrsquos contemporaries as the Quaestio logica Scoti, we establish that it was a special disputation held by Scotus at Paris in response to criticisms of his use of the formal distinction in God, identify its

known manuscripts, and provide an analysis based upon a corrected text, showing in particular the total unreliability of the Wadding edition. Our analysis shows that the Logica Scoti does not absolutely prohibit an assertion of formalities as correlates of the formal distinction, even in the divine Person, so long as their non-identity is properly qualified. That is, the positing of formalities does not of itself entail an unqualified or absolute distinction."

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    "In the development of logical theory from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth century, the "new logic" was distinguished from the "old logic" when the last four books of Aristotle's "Organon" were translated, and the "modern logic" was distinguished from the "ancient logic" when the principles of demonstration were found in rhetorical or dialectical topics or sophistical paradoxes rather than in analytical causes. The "old logic" and the "new logic" continued to be used to designate two sets of problems, and William of Ockham wrote treatises on both. "Moderns" was not a synonym for "nominalists" in the Fourteenth century, and the innovations in logic of that century were made by both "ancients" and "moderns." According to Duns Scotus the problems of the old logic are problems of the interpretation of sentences and the definition of simple terms from that interpretation; the problems of the new logic are problems of the analysis of inference and the interpretation of sentences from that analysis."

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    "In both versions of his *Commentary on the Sentences,* Scotus alludes to a great controversy among his contemporaries over the question of whether a spoken word signifies a thing or a concept.
    He does not give a detailed account of this controversy, but confines himself to saying, "in short, I grant that what is properly signified by a spoken word is a thing." This brief statement may seem trivial at first sight, but it turns out to be innovative when it is assessed against the background of medieval Aristotelian semantic theory. From Boethius onwards, the overwhelming majority of the commentators on *De interpretatione* held that it is a concept and not a thing that is primarily and directly signified by a spoken word.

In this paper, I intend to examine the reasons that led Scotus to criticize and revise the dominant theory. Such an examination can scarcely be restricted to a logico-semantical analysis. An adequate understanding of the relationship between a sign and its significate not only necessitates an examination of the question of *how* this relationship is established, but also a discussion of the question of *what* exactly the sign and the significate are-what kind of entities they are. Therefore, the following analysis aims at investigating not only the semantic aspects of Scotus's theory of signification, but also its ontological commitments." (notes omitted).

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"This study compares the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on the issue of being and individuality. Its primary aim is to contrast Scotus's individuating principle, *haecceitas*, with Aquinas's actualizing principle, *esse*, attending both to their rather striking similarities as well as to their significant differences. The article's conclusion is that, while Scotus's crowning principle, haecceitas, is the unique entity internal to each thing, rendering the nature complete and singular as nature, Aquinas's crowning principle, esse, actualizes the nature without individualizing it. This is not to imply that Scotus overlooked the importance of a thing's being, any more than Aquinas overlooked the importance of a being's singularity. It does mean, however, that the primal integrating focus and the resulting philosophical synthesis of these two seminal thinkers of the Middle Ages did significantly differ. The conclusion of the paper might be stated thus: what most distinguishes their respective philosophies is that, while Scotus's primary concern was with the existing individual, Aquinas's was with the existing individual."

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of the complete works of John Duns Scotus 368; Notes on Contributors 380; Index 382-384.

"The names of certain of the great scholastic thinkers of the middle ages-St. Anse1m, Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent, and the rest-are familiar not only to students of philosophy and theology but also in varying degrees to the educated public. Abelard is known for his *Historia calamitatum* and as a figure in romantic literature, if not for his work in ethics and the theory of knowledge. Like Zeno's paradoxes and the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum," a passage in St. Anselm has become the subject of unending discussion. Certain of St. Bonaventure's books have been translated and find readers. But with the exception of St. Thomas Aquinas first-hand knowledge of the writings of the medieval masters is not a common thing.

For reasons that have varied throughout the modern era John Duns Scotus has not always received the general recognition that what he was and what he did should have brought to him. However, inadequate understanding and even hostility are being displaced by something better. Appropriately, this change is due in large measure to the research and writings of his fellow Franciscans, but the books and articles of many other scholars have aided them in their labors. As a result, the record of Scotus' life has been made fuller and clearer, what he actually taught on various subjects has been brought to light, and translations of his writings begin to appear. But the most important thing of all is the essential work of the Commissio Scotistica on the canon and the critical edition of his writings, which proceeds year by year in spite of the inherent difficulties of the task and those caused by the turmoil of our era. To all such labors the present volume, a cooperative effort of European, American, and Canadian scholars, is added as a further monument raised in honor of John Duns Scotus on the seventh centennial of his birth." (from the Foreword).

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Texts translated into English with commentary by Martin M. Tweedale.
"This work is meant to make accessible to students of philosophy and later medieval thought the key texts in one of the most crucial philosophical debates of that period. The concentration is on Scotus's positive doctrine since it is difficult and has not received the detailed attention it deserves. Ockham's polemic against Scotus raises a host of objections to the internal coherence of Scotus's reworking of the traditional line. Some of these are ones it seems to me Scotus could have countered quite easily; others would have required some revisions, but ones that are basically within the spirit of the doctrine. Some, however, are very difficult indeed, and I shall leave to the commentary and its introductory essay the exposition of my own view on whether Scotus's position can survive intact. There is also a positive side to Ockham's views about universals, and that is only partially covered in what follows. The texts that show how Ockham envisioned preserving all the essentials of Aristotelian science even after real universals have been excised, are presented and discussed, and the very real issue of whether Ockham's effort here could possibly succeed is broached but not definitely resolved one way or the other."

110. ———. 1999. *Scotus Vs. Ockham - a Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. Ii: Commentary*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.

"The commentary which composes the greater part of this volume attempts not only to explain the texts translated in the Iirst volume and to understand the positions adopted by the protagonists in this debate, but also to assess the cogency of the various arguments put forward. After all that work is done, however, there remains the task of drawing attention to the crucial issues that have emerged and arriving at some understanding of the debate as a whole and the relative merits of the positions put forward. It is this task that this introductory essay undertakes. Perhaps it would be better read after a thorough study of the commentary, but I am inclined to think that some awareness of the general issues and positions taken by Scotus and Ockham helps in making one's way through the individual texts and their often elaborate argumentation. In explaining these issues and positions I have made free use of philosophical ideas of our own day, at least to the extent that this is not grossly anachronistic."

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"This article is a discussion of the vocabulary and arguments in Scotus' "Prima Lectura" which seeks to show the close relationship between the doctrine of "formal distinction"

and the notion of "ultimate abstraction". The paper also suggests that in the "Prima lectura" One is in at the birth of the fully developed notion of "formal distinction" in Scotus' own thought."

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"The realist-nominalist controversy in the fourteenth century owes its origin to Duns Scotus and William Ockham, the two men whom C. S. Peirce in his Harvard lectures on British logicians praised as "decidedly the greatest speculative minds of the middle ages, as well as two of the profoundest metaphysicians that ever lived." Scotus's reputation as a realist, even if his realism be what neo-

scholastics call "moderate" and Peirce "halting," rests on his conception of how the specific nature of anything exists in individuals of any given kind."

117. ———. 1990. *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Contents: Foreword by Marilyn McCord Adams VII-IX; Introduction 1;
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1. The Formal Distinction 27; 2. The Realism of Scotus 42; 3. A "Reportatio" of Duns Scotus' Merton College. Dialogue on language and metaphysics 54; 4. Scotus' Individuation theory 68; 5.
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A Bibliography of Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. 335; Index of Names 345; Index of Subjects; 347-356.
"Over the last four decades, Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., has done more than anyone else to make the philosophical theology of John Duns Scotus accessible to the English-speaking world, by preparing English translations of primary sources as well as interpretative essays introducing readers to Scotus' central ideas.
These tasks have been both hindered and made more urgent by the painfully slow progress of the new Vatican edition of Scotus' writings (volume I containing the Prologue of Scotus' Oxford commentary on the Sentences appeared in 1950; as of 1988, only nine volumes have been published,

and the critical edition of the Oxford commentary is not yet complete). Although useful, the seventeenth-century Wadding edition is unreliable both in its attributions and readings. Difficult issues of authenticity, dating, and the interrelation of Scotus' works remain. Thus, beginning with his dissertation, Wolter formed the habit of reverting to the manuscripts to produce his own provisional editions, consulting with Vatican editors on the Scotus Commission where possible.

Wolter's career as a Scotus translator began in 1947, when Paul Weiss requested some material for the first volume of his new journal Review of Metaphysics. Remarking on Scotus' notoriously tangled Latin, Wolter described the work of translating it as "a special vocation" and vowed never to do it again. Necessity is a sign of calling, however, and Wolter began translating topical selections for summer-school students at the Franciscan Institute in the early fifties. Many of these were published, with Wolter's Latin editions on the facing pages, in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings: A Selection (first published by Thomas Nelson, 1962, and English only in Bobbs-Merrill's Library of Liberal Arts series, 1962; reprinted by Hackett, 1987). Over the years, Wolter has made many more of Scotus' works available, always preferring the format of publishing the English and Latin together: principally, John Duns Scotus: God and Creatures, the Quodlibetal Questions (with Felix Alluntis); John Duns Scotus. A Treatise on God as First Principle. A Latin Text with English Translation of the De Primo Principio; and Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. By now, Wolter has given us enough for a reasonably comprehensive and balanced course on Scotus.

Duns Scotus is not called "the Subtle Doctor" for nothing, however. Diving into his highly technical philosophical corpus without benefit of an interpretive guide is heroic at best. Yet, when Wolter began, reliable guides were unavailable. While not without value, the secondary literature was on the whole confused and confusing, and/or marred by polemical distortion. Together with Wolter's pioneering first book on Scotus, his published dissertation

The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (finished in one semester of intensive interaction with Philotheus Boehner), Wolter's interpretive essays over the last forty years supply us with our needed map. Collected here from many (often inaccessible) journals and books, they are a paradigm of method and a treasure of illuminating insights. Wolter's consistent response to interpretive puzzlement has been to return to the primary sources and to offer readings as detailed and philosophically subtle as the texts themselves. Thus, in the early days, when Scotus' ideas were "known" and criticized mostly from hearsay, Wolter refuted misguided attacks with careful analyses of the texts (see chapters 10 and 11 below). Throughout, Wolter's own philosophical penetration of the material has enabled him to make clear what seems in Scotus complex and confusing (e.g., regarding the formal distinction, chapter 1, and Scotus' theory of universals, chapter 2). Again, Wolter's identification of Scotus' doctrine of the will as the key to his ethics resolves old and false puzzles (see chapters 7-9). At the same time, Wolter's sensitivity to philological issues and to the historical development of Scotus' thought has enabled him to illuminate Scotus' notion of intuitive cognition (see chapter 5) as well as his account of Divine foreknowledge (see chapter 13). All of the essays reflect Wolter's philosophical and historical curiosity and a reasoned and reasonable open-mindedness. Paying Scotus the respect due a great philosopher, Wolter was glad to return to old topics because he always learned something new (e.g., his treatment of formal distinction in chapter 1 makes new points not found in his dissertation). Wolter's interests in analytic philosophy surface as he relates Scotus' semantics and metaphysics to twentieth-century analytic thought (see chapters 3 and 12)." (from the Forewored)

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The Realist Ontology of Duns Scotus

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The Nominalist Ontology of William of Ockham

INTRODUCTION

"Like most philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition, Ockham distinguishes between propositions and the terms out of which they are composed. Central to Ockham's analysis of the concept of a term is his distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms. We can get at this dichotomy if we distinguish between expressions that do and expressions that do not yield a meaningful proposition when substituted for *x* in 'This *x* -es' or 'This is (a/an) *x*'. The former (including predicate-expressions, proper names, demonstratives, and pronouns) Ockham calls categorematic terms; the latter (including articles, particles, interjections, quantifiers, and truth-functional connectives) he calls syncategorematic terms.
It is among categorematic terms that Ockham locates the distinction between singular and general, or employing Ockham's own terminology, the distinction between discrete and common terms. Very roughly, this is the distinction between categorematic terms that can and categorematic terms that cannot function as predicate in subject-predicate propositions, or that at least is the way a contemporary Ockhamist would express the dichotomy. Ockham himself construes the subject-predicate nexus more broadly to include identity-statements, existential propositions, and propositions incorporating either the universal or particular quantifier. Against this broad interpretation of subject-predicate discourse, Ockham tells us that while the discrete term is

predicable of just one thing, the common term is predicable of many.
I have indicated that this distinction has traditionally been associated with the distinction between universals and particulars. For the medieval, the view that these two distinctions are related was legitimized by Aristotle's claim that the universal is that which is predicable of many. In a number of medieval philosophers this relation was explicated in terms of the notion of signification. The claim was that while discrete or singular terms signify particulars, common or general terms signify universals. In medieval semantics, 'signify' was used as a transitive verb linking categorematic terms with their non-linguistic counterparts. Underlying this usage was the notion that categorematic terms are signs of objects, and the concept of a sign at work here was interpreted in psychological terms. A categorematic term is the sign of an object in the sense that the utterance of the expression has the effect of "bringing that object before the mind" of anyone familiar with the conventions governing the language in which the expression is embedded. The fact that signification involves a word-thing relationship suggests that the medieval notion of signification corresponds to the contemporary notion of reference; but in fact, the two concepts are quite different. The contemporary view tends to be that terms refer (or are used to refer) to objects only within the context of a proposition. The medievals, however, held that the signification of a term is a property which it exhibits quite independently of its role in any particular proposition; and they claimed that, at least in the case of univocal terms, the significatum of a categorematic expression is invariant over the various referential uses to which the term is put. Although it is explicitly relational, the medieval notion of signification is probably closer to the contemporary notion of meaning. In contemporary terms, the medievals were claiming that to know the meaning of a categorematic term is to know which object is its significatum." (pp. 1-2)

From: Michael J. Loux, "The Ontology of William of Ockham", in: *William of Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa logicae*. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press 1974. (Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press 1998).

[Theory and History of Ontology](#)

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   Ockham's account of the truth conditions for categorical propositions of the forms ' *N* is *B*' and ' *A* is *B*' is dictated by his two-fold ontological program: to eliminate universals other than names or concepts and to restrict particular things (*res*) to the categories of substance and quality.(1) For endorsing
   (T1) ' *N* is *B*' is true if and only if *B*-ness inheres in *N*
   and
   (T2) ' *A* is *B*' is true if and only if something that is *A* has *B*-ness, or *B*-ness inheres in something that is *A*
   for all substitutions of proper names for ' *N*', concrete general terms for ' *B*', and abstract general terms for ' *B*-ness' would be tantamount to adopting the ontology of the moderns with a distinct kind of thing for each of the ten Aristotelian categories. According to Ockham's description in the *Summa Logicae*, the moderns saw substances such as Socrates as having a certain layer-like structure: at the core is a particular substance composed of prime matter with several substantial forms; it is made one by the inherence of discrete quantity and extended by the inherence of

dimensive quantity; other absolute quality-accidents such as color, flavor, odor, shape, etc. inhere in dimensive quantity immediately and substance mediately. Accidents in the remaining seven categories are relative things (*respectus*) that have their foundations either in the substance, quantity, or qualities and their term in something else. For example, when Socrates and Plato are similar, a relative similarity thing inheres in Socrates' whiteness and is Socrates' similarity to Plato, while another relative similarity-thing inheres in Plato's whiteness and is Plato's similarity to Socrates. For reasons that lie beyond the scope of this paper,(2) Ockham thought this ontology was as prolific of contradiction and absurdity as it was of entities. His own contention is that the truth of a proposition depends not merely on which things exist, but on how they exist.

In what follows, I shall explain how Ockham sacrifices the simplicity of across-the-board adherence to (T1) and (T2), applying them only to a certain range of case in the category of quality. Then I shall examine a series of objections that his own ontology offers no advantage commensurate with this loss. (p. 175).

(...)

"SUMMARY. Ockham's theory of truth-conditions is calculated to accomodate his ontology. He adopts a two-name theory of predication for categories involving absolute terms only, and admits the inherence-analysis for only a restricted range of concrete quality terms. Although he argues extensively that its wider application to the last eight Aristotelian categories of accident leads to contradiction and absurdity, his own positive proposal -- to treat all terms in those categories as connotatives that signify particular substances and/or particular qualities existing one way or another -- remains essentially programmatic. A full development of it would involve supplementing (T3)-(T7) by stating truth-conditions for statements about how things are related, quantified, active, etc., using absolute terms that name only substances and qualities. Ockham never delivers on the promissory notes he issues. Nevertheless, we must

ask how many nominalists have gone further, and by how much, and how recently? In Ockham's view, the realists' program is demonstrably impossible; how much less an evil, if his own is merely incomplete." (p. 188.).
(1) Although Ockham thinks that unaided natural reason will restrict its ontology to substances and qualities, he himself feels forced by the doctrines of revealed Christian theology -- viz., the Trinity, the Incarnation, and transubstantiation -- to admit really distinct relations of Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration in the Godhead, a relation of assumption in the human nature of Christ, real relations of inherence between matter and form, substance and accident, and relation of union between parts of the continuum (*Ordinatio* I, d. 30, q. 4; OT IV, 360-374).
(2) See my forthcoming book, *Ockham*, Part One, Chapters 5-9. [Adams 1987].

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    "When the treatises on knowing and doubting first appeared as separate specialized pieces of logical literature in the first half of the 14th century, (1) Ockham was already deeply involved in political controversies.(2) His work on logic and theoretical philosophy was certainly behind him by 1330 and his personal Odyssey began, ending in Munich in 1347. Although he left us with many detailed discussions of the most important logical theories of the day, his treatment of epistemic-logical materials indicate that he was himself

struggling to understand what little he found on the subject in his predecessors, to fit it properly into his own *Summa logicae* and to show its use in the formulation of the theory of scientific demonstration.(3) The main aim of this paper is to identify the epistemic principles involved in a demonstrative syllogism and to recognize the pragmatic dimension of language in which such a syllogism is expressed. To achieve our goal, we must begin with observations about the state of epistemic logic in Ockham's time and about some of the problems which comprised such logic." p. 241

"Summary and Conclusion.

Ockham's contributions to epistemic logic are diversified, ranging from his recognition of several special modes *(scire, credere, opinari, dubitare,* etc.), through his extensive concern with epistemic syllogistic moods in all three figures, and through his perceptive judgment regarding composite and divided sense of epistemic proposition, and culminating perhaps in his epistemization of the theory of demonstration. Although there is a sparsity of the most general rules of consequence (i.e. the propositional rules) in Ockham, there are at least some. Moreover, Ockham says enough in various places on the basis of which we can reconstruct his most important presuppositions and his implied awareness of general principles of epistemic logic, especially those which are relevant for the theory of demonstration. One such principle is that if the antecedent is known by *a,* the consequent is known by *a,* but only on the condition that *a knows* that the consequence is sound. Whereas other writers on *Post. Anal.* and on scientific demonstration concentrated on the objective side of the matter, treating demonstration as if it were a matter of logical and extra-logical connections independently of the investigator, questioner, or doubter, Ockham showed a great deal of attention to the role of the knower and he recognized most vividly that the reference to the epistemic subject in the statement of epistemic/doxastic principles is essential and not accidental or superfluous." p. 255

(1) One of the earliest special treatises on the subject of knowing and doubting was written by Ockham's younger contemporary William Heytesbury whose *De scire et dubitare* appeared as one of the chapters of *Regulae solvendi sophismata* (ca. 1335). In this chapter Heytesbury refers back to the famous Grosseteste's characterization of the various senses of 'to know' *(scire),* but, unlike Ockham, he concerns himself with explicating primarily the nature of knowing in the sense of knowing "necessary" propositions of the sort which can become objects of scientific demonstration.
(2) The most comprehensive presentation of Ockham's ideas is undoubtedly that of Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham (2* vols.), Notre Dame University Press (Publications in Medieval Studies, 26), 1987, xvii + 1402 pp. The unique contribution to Ockham studies, however, goes to the editors of Collected Works of William of Ockham at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University who finally made possible studies grounded in definitive, critically-edited texts. One should also keep in mind the studies of two other scholars, Philoteus Boehner and Ernst A. Moody, who made the thought of the great medieval thinker palatable to modern tastes. Cf. P. Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*. Ed. Eligius M. Buytaert. Franciscan Institute. St. Bona-venture, N.Y. 1958; and E. A. Moody, *The Logic of William Ockham*. Russell & Russell, New York 1965.
(3) For an attempt to identify the most general aspects of Ockham's epistemic logic and to relate them to similar concerns in the works of Burley see I. Boh, "Propositional Attitudes in the Logic of Walter Burley and William Ockham", *Franciscan Studies* 44 (1984), 31-59

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    "Connotation plays a central role in Ockham's analysis of the language of natural philosophy and mathematics. Some simple connotative terms belong to the deep structure of mental language. Ockham's program cannot guarantee the objectivity of things being quantified or located in space and time without his connotation-theory. Ockham's theory provides a partial explanation of why fourteenth- century philosophers shifted attention from discussion about the objects of mathematics to discussion of mathematics as a language. The shift explains in part the adoption of mathematical and metalinguistic approaches to philosophical and theological problems."

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"Many medieval grammar and logic texts contain treatments of relativa grammaticalia, expressions some of which we now call anaphoric pronouns. The first philosopher who paid attention to these treatments seems to have been Peter Geach. Apparently, Geach found their treatments both stimulating and frustrating.' In his main work on semantics, *Reference and Generality* (1), he presents some theses of Walter Burleigh's on this topic, a fourteenth century logician and opponent of William Ockham, at considerable length. Elsewhere, however, he remarks that while 'the logic of pronouns with antecedents was extensively studied by medieval logicians in their chapters de suppositione relativorum; [...t]his medieval treatment of pronouns was inconclusive" (2) and that '[...] the medievals who discussed *relativa* - pronouns with antecedents - were groping in the dark despite all their ingenuity'. (3) What Geach deplored was the apparent tendency of 'the medievals' to treat anaphoric pronouns, *relativa grammaticalia substantiae identitatis* in terms of

co-reference, of ' *supponere pro eodem*'. As is well known, Geach himself favors a rather different approach, according to which it is nonsense to talk about the reference of such pronouns at all, for they act like bound variables. His view on pronouns has now a considerable number of adherents and a few critics - most notably Gareth Evans. (4)
I am not concerned here with the question whether Geach's own theory of pronouns is correct, but whether his verdict about *medieval* theories of *relativa* is justified. His verdict is of unrestricted generality: it is not *some* medieval treatment of pronouns that is inconclusive, but "the" medieval treatment. This makes his claims an easy target for counterattack: Just find some medieval logician, whose theory does not fit Geach's claims. I have done this elsewhere. (4) Here I want to consider two logicians Geach has actually dealt with himself: Burleigh and Ockham.
(1) Geach (1962), *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories,* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press (3rd edition) 1980.
(2) Geach (1960-61), "Ryle on Namely-Riders"; *Analysis* 21/3, repr. in Geach, *Logic Matters,* Oxford 1972, pp. 88-92, p. 92. All page-references will be to this edition.
(3) Geach (1968-69), "Quine's Syntactical Insights", *Synthese* 19, repr. in Geach, *Logic Matters,* pp. 115-127, p. 118. All page-references will be to this edition.
(4) Evans (1977), "Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 7, pp. 467-536.
(5) On a few such logicians see my *Die Semantik anaphorischer Pronomina,* Leiden 1994.

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Part one contains a presentation of the basic concepts of Ockham's semantics. It is followed by an investigation of his ontology, including a comparison with modern ontology. Part three deals with the common and different elements in the conceptions of supposition and of quantification. Part four shows some similarities of Ockham's views on the truth of sentences with those of Davidson. The final part presents Ockham's epistemology within the discussion of his contemporaries and confronts it with actual issues raised by Quine and Putnam."

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Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
"This paper is going to outline the innovative semantic theories of the two great 14th-century nominalist thinkers whose work eventually gave rise to the quasi institutional separation of the nominalist *via moderna*, the "modern way", from the realist *via antiqua*, the "old way" of doing logic, science, philosophy, and theology in the late Middle Ages. The person who initiated these changes was the English Franciscan theologian, William Ockham. However, the person who was primarily responsible for establishing Ockham's nominalism as a genuinely viable theoretical alternative was the French secular Master of Arts, John Buridan." p. 389 (note omitted)
"Buridan's semantics starts out in the same way as Ockham's. Acknowledging the subordination of written to spoken, and spoken to mental terms (i.e., concepts), establishes for him a "semantic triangle", in which concepts are natural signs of whatever we conceive by means of them, whereas the utterances and inscriptions subordinated to them are the conventional signs of the same, in virtue of their conventional subordination to concepts. Not all concepts have, however, the function of conceiving something; some concepts merely serve to determine *how* we
conceive of things conceived by other concepts. This is the basis of Buridan's primary distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic concepts, and the corresponding spoken and written terms." p. 414

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Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
"The distinctions between singular and general terms, on the one hand, and abstract and concrete terms, on the other, play crucial roles in discussions of ontological issues. Although these dichotomies can be expressed in purely grammatical terms, they have traditionally been thought to point to two over-arching distinctions among things. Philosophers have frequently claimed that the singular-general term distinction is rooted in a distinction between objects that are particulars and objects that are universals; whereas, the distinction between concrete and abstract terms forces us to confront the distinction between substances (minimally interpreted to include material bodies and persons) and the various characteristics they possess or exhibit.
But because they appear to carry these far-reaching metaphysical implications, these grammatical dichotomies receive detailed treatment at the hands of the nominalist. If his theory is to be at all plausible, the nominalist must have the resources for providing a metaphysically neutral account of the singular-general and concrete-abstract dichotomies. In this essay I want to examine William of Ockham's

ontology by focusing on his treatment of these distinctions. My aim here is twofold. By examining Ockham's analysis I hope to provide an introduction to the central themes of Part I of the *Summa Logicae* and to clarify the concept of a nominalistic ontology in general." p. 1

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"The author analyses philologically and philosophically the two different expressions 'nomen' and 'terminus' used by Ockham in the chapters given up to the supposition theory in his "Summa logicae". By that we can say that Ockham's logic of terms is interested primarily in the words, and in the concepts just with reference with these last ones, without qualifying Ockham's logic as 'nominalist': in fact 'nomen' receives his own capacity of meaning by the concept as natural linguistic sign."

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131. ———. 2005. "Le Nominalisme D'ockham Et La Représentation Mentale. Précis De *Ockham on Concepts*." *Philosophiques* no. 35:423-426.

132. ———. 2005. "Réponses À Mes Critiques." *Philosophiques* no. 35:449-457.

Replies to the essay by E. J. Ashworth and P. King in the same journal.

133. ———. 2008. "L'ontologie D'ockham Et La Théorie Des Tropes." In *Compléments De Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De Libera*, edited

by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine, 167-181. Paris: Vrin.

134. Panaccio, Claude, and Piché, David. 2010. "Ockham's Reliabilism and the Intuition of Non-Existents." In *Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background*, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 97-118. Leiden: Brill.

135. Pelletier, Jenny E. 2012. *William Ockham on Metaphysics. The Science of Being and God*. Leiden: Brill.

136. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2002. "L'extension De La Liste Des Modalités Dans Les Commentaires Du *Perihermeneias* Et Des *Sophistici Elenchi* De Guillaume D'ockham." *Vivarium* no. 40:174-188.

137. ———. 2003. "A Explicaão Ockhamiana De Proposiões Passadas, Ou Instruões Ára Um Aprendiz." *Analytica.Revista de Filosofia* no. 7:49-64.

"Within the Ockhamist semantics, the predicate 'true' is explained by another more basic semantical relation, the relation of supposition.
The author shows how this relationship between two semantical predicates figures in the analysis of the truth-conditions of propositions about the past, and demonstrates that it is a model that can be extended to propositions about both the future and the possible. The author indicates how the semantics of alethic modalities is in continuity with the semantics of propositions about the past and about the future. If we consider another aspect of Ockham's modal theory, viz., the fact that modalities are defined as any term that can be predicated of a whole proposition, the importance of this point becomes clear. In conclusion, the author points out the different levels of analysis of alethic modalities within an Ockhamist framework."

138. ———. 2006. *La Théorie Ockhamienne De La Connaissance Évidente*. Paris: Vrin.

139. Perler, Dominik. 1991. "Kopulatheorie Und Seinsbegriff. Zum Verhältnis Von Logik Und Metaphysik Bei Wilhelm Von Ockham." In *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters*, edited by Burkhard, Mojsisch and Pluta, Olaf, 805-829. Amsterdam: R. Grüner.

140. Putallaz, Franois-Xavier. 1983. "Autour De La Connaissance Intuitive Des Non-Existants Chez Ockham." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* no. 30:447-467.

141. Rabade, Romeo Sergio. 1966. *Guillermo De Ockham Y La Filosofía Del Siglo Xiv*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Luis Vives" de Filosofía.

142. Read, Stephen. 1977. "The Objective Being of Ockham's *Ficta*." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 27:14-31.

143. ———. 2007. "William of Ockham's *the Sum of Logic*." *Topoi* no. 26:271-277.

"William of Ockham's Summa Logicae is a classic of analytical metaphysics, using a typical fourteenth century logic treatise to defend a reductionist ontology. For Ockham, everything is an individual, and this is to be shown by the correct logical analysis of language, reinterpreting Aristotle's *Categories* as a taxonomy of the many ways in which terms can be predicated. The ultimate basis is the attribution of an individual quality to an individual substance. This theory of the signification of terms is then extended to an account of the truth-conditions of propositions and the truth-preservation of arguments, but always with the reduction to individuals as the key. This classic work in the logical analysis of language still contains lively insights for contemporary scholars."

144. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1987. "War Ockham Ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine Semantische Betrachtung." In *Philosophie Im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien Und*

Paradigmen. Wolfgang Kluxen Zum 65. Geburstag, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder, Ludger and Wieland, Georg, 313-328. Hamburg: F. Meiner.

Reprinted as chapter XIV in: *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics*.
"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den transzendenten Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber verwirft er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für Ockham, die individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffallend bescheidene Stelle zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelbarer Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlieben erklären?
Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fort während eingedenk sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:
a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus essendi in der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), ondern der Ab sicht des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend deuten." pp. 326-327 (Notes omitted).

145. ———. 1987. "Logic and Ontology in Ockham. Some Notes on His View of the Categories of Being and the Nature of Its Basic Principles." In *Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 10th*

Anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986), edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 25-40. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Reprinted as chapter XIII in: L. M. De Rijk, *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics*, (edited by E. P. Bos), London, Variorum Reprintsa, 1989.
" *Conclusion*. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creatural being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the *onta* 'beings') are as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (*ontôs einai* Plato would say). Well, in order to let them *be,* human thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus." pp. 38-39

146. ———. 1990. "Ockham's Theory of Demonstration: His Use of Aristotle' S *Kath' Holou* and *Kath' Hauto* Requirements." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenkühl, Wilhelm

and Schönberger, Rolf, 232-240. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.

"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate the basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth century philosophical and theological development lies in systematically rethinking scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his own favourite leading principles: the strictly individual nature of all that really is and the radical contingency of all creatural being.
These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the so-called ' *demonstratio potissima*'). Our main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar ' *kath holou*' requirement and Ockham's appliance of the ' *kath hauto*' (Latin: `per se') notion which is also involved in framing correct premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." p. 232
(...)
"Conclusions.
To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle, always starting from his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his introducing the ` *per se strictissimo modo*' rather seems to be a matter of technicality. Whereas in *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of

apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an *apodeixis,* the Medievals, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the ' *demonstratio potissima*' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's theory of demonstration." p. 239

147. ———. 1995. "Ockham as the Commentator of *His* Aristotle. His Treatment of *Posterior Analytics*." In *Aristotelica Et Lulliana: Magistro Doctissimo Charles H. Lohr Septuagesimum Annum Feliciter Agenti Dedicata*, edited by Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando, Imbach, Ruedi, Pindl, Theodor and Walter, Peter, 77-127. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or epistemonic proof; 2.1 On the three requrements *'kata pantos', kath' 'hauto', 'kath' holou'*, 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four types of questions. On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and attribute. The Middle; 2.3.2. On definition and the four question-types; 2.3.3 The role of definitions in epistemonic proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the discovery of definitions; 2.4 The ' *kath' holou*' requirement revisited; 2.5 Particulars and the proper objects of Aristotle's epistemonic proof; 3. Ockham as a Commentator of *Posterior Analytics*; 3.1 Ockham's treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2 Ockham's view of the ' *kath' holou'* requirement; 3.3 The impact of Ockham's ontology upon his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem concerning the First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First Subject'; 3.3.3 ' *Demonstratio particularis'* in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's view of necessity; 3.5 ' *Dici per se'* and ' *propositio per se vera*' in Ockham; 3.5.1 Two kinds of *'per se'* assignment; 3.5.2 The ' *propositio per se (vera)'* in Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest senses of ' *per se'*; 4. Comclusion.
"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle adopted by one of the leading lights of fourteenth

century philosophical and theological thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how in some of the vital subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable Inceptor understood and interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on specific occasions, he deliberately took the liberty to stray from Aristotle's teachings. It goes without saying that in such an undertaking, one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal themes the choice of which might seem quite arbitrary. The present author has picked out the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by Ockham." p. 78

148. ———. 1995. "Ockham's Horror of the Universal. An Assessment of His View of Individuality." *Mediaevalia.Textos e Estudos* no. 7-8:473-497.

Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV

149. Salamucha, Jan. 2003. "The Propositional Logic in William Ockham." In *Knowledge and Faith*, edited by Swietorzecka, Kordula and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 139-167. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Originally published in Polish in *Przeglad Filozoficzny* 38, 1935, pp. 208-239.

150. Schulthess, Peter. 1992. *Sein, Signifikation Und Erkenntnis Bei Wilhelm Von Ockham*. Berlin: Akademia Verlag.

151. Scott, Theodore Kermit. 1969. "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 7:27-50.

152. Shapiro, Herman. 1957. *Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham*. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.

153. Shimizu, Tetsuro. 1990. "Time and Eternity: Ockham's Logical Point of View." *Franciscan Studies* no. 50:283-307.

154. Spade, Paul Vincent. 1981. "Ockham on Terms of First and Second Imposition and Intention, with Remarks on the Liar Paradox." *Vivarium* no. 19:47-55.

155. ———. 1990. "Ockham, Adams and Connotation. A Critical Notice of Marilyn Adams, *William Ockham*." *Philosophical Review* no. 99:593-612.

156. ———. 1997. "The Logic of ' *Sit Verum*' in Richard Brinkley and William of Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:227-250.

157. ———. 1998. "Three Versions of Ockham's Reductionist Program." *Franciscan Studies* no. 56:347-358.

158. ———. 1999. "Ockham's Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main Themes." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 100-117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

159. ———, ed. 1999. *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

160. Stump, Eleonore. 1987. "Consequences in Ockham's Summa Logicae and Their Relation to Syllogism, Topics and Insolubles." In *Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans*, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 141-159. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

161. ———. 1999. "The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 168-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

162. Tabarroni, Andrea. 1984. "A Note on a Short Treatise Attributed to Ockham: The *Super Terminos Naturales*." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:329-349.

163. ———. 1989. "Mentl Signs and the Theory of Representation in Ockham." In *On the Medieval Theory of Signs*, edited by Eco, Umberto and Marmo, Costantino, 195-224. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

164. Tachau, Katherine. 1988. *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345*. Leiden: Brill.

165. Turnbull, Robert G. 1962. "Ockham's Nominalist Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections." *New Scholasticism* no. 36:313-329.

Reprinted in: Edwin B. Allaire [and others], *Essays in Ontology*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 79-91. "The logic of William of Ockham is commonly -- and, I believe, rightly - thought to be nominalistic. It is also commonly -- and, I believe, wrongly -- thought to be helpful in the solution of those philosophical problems which cluster about the issue of the "one and the many." The allegedly helpful features of his logic are the theories of signification and supposition. I intend to show that these theories, far from being helpful, lead to certain intolerable results, in particular, (1) construing singular propositions, like "Socrates is a man," either as analytic or as no propositions at all (i.e., neither true nor false) and (2) construing all general propositions as either analytic or contradictory. These results follow from taking Ockham as offering object language analyses of object language propositions. Taking him as offering metalanguage analyses of object language propositions is to start off with attributing an intolerable "result" to his logic. It will be helpful, at the end, briefly to compare his logic with that of a contemporary nominalist, Nelson Goodman, for neither of the intolerable results follows from Goodman's logic. Whether the latter is, therefore, acceptable is another issue. My strategy is as follows. In Part I, I wish to show that a rather straightforward interpretation of Ockham does have him offering metalinguistic analyses of object language

propositions and also to show how certain contemporary interpreters and Ockham himself have managed to blind themselves to this fact. In Part II, I wish to show that the so-called "descent to singulars" affords a possibility of construing Ockham as offering object language analyses of object language propositions and to show how, given the doctrines discussed in Part I, he is led to adopt the 'is' of identity, the latter in such a way as to lead into the "intolerable results" mentioned above. In Part III, I wish to make the brief comparison with Goodman's logic.
No detailed descriptions of the Ockhamite theories of signification and supposition will be attempted. Ockham states them quite clearly, and there exist excellent contemporary accounts of both, especially those of Fr. Boehner and Prof. Moody.(*) I shall discuss just what is necessary to make good the several claims listed above. The discussion will, furthermore, be limited to Ockham's doctrine of categorical propositions of present time. This is quite enough, for his doctrines of past, future, and modal propositions are directly dependent upon his doctrine of present-time categoricals." (pp. 79-80 of the reprint).
(*) Cf. P. Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 5958); E. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York, 5935); E. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953).

166. Tweedale, Martin. 1963. "Scotus and Ockham on the Infinity of the Most Eminent Being." *Franciscan Studies* no. 23:257-267.

167. ———. 1992. "Ockham's Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony." *Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 31:38-54.

168. ———, ed. 1999. *Scotus Vs. Ockham - a Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. I: Texts*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Texts translated into English with commentary by Martin M. Tweedale.
"This work is meant to make accessible to students of philosophy and later medieval thought the key texts in one of the most crucial philosophical debates of that period. The concentration is on Scotus's positive doctrine since it is difficult and has not received the detailed attention it deserves. Ockham's polemic against Scotus raises a host of objections to the internal coherence of Scotus's reworking of the traditional line. Some of these are ones it seems to me Scotus could have countered quite easily; others would have required some revisions, but ones that are basically within the spirit of the doctrine. Some, however, are very difficult indeed, and I shall leave to the commentary and its introductory essay the exposition of my own view on whether Scotus's position can survive intact. There is also a positive side to Ockham's views about universals, and that is only partially covered in what follows. The texts that show how Ockham envisioned preserving all the essentials of Aristotelian science even after real universals have been excised, are presented and discussed, and the very real issue of whether Ockham's effort here could possibly succeed is broached but not definitely resolved one way or the other."

169. ———, ed. 1999. *Scotus Vs. Ockham - a Medieval Dispute over Universals. Vol. Ii: Commentary*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

"The commentary which composes the greater part of this volume attempts not only to explain the texts translated in the Iirst volume and to understand the positions adopted by the protagonists in this debate, but also to assess the cogency of the various arguments put forward. After all that work is done, however, there remains the task of drawing attention to the crucial issues that have emerged and arriving at some understanding of the debate as a whole and the relative merits of the positions put forward. It is this task that this introductory essay undertakes. Perhaps it would be better read after a thorough study of the

commentary, but I am inclined to think that some awareness of the general issues and positions taken by Scotus and Ockham helps in making one's way through the individual texts and their often elaborate argumentation. In explaining these issues and positions I have made free use of philosophical ideas of our own day, at least to the extent that this is not grossly anachronistic."

170. Vossenkühl, Wilhelm. 1985. "Ockham and the Cognition of Non-Existants." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:33-46.

171. Vossenkühl, Wilhelm, and Schönberger, Rolf, eds. 1990. *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*. Veinheim: VCH Acta humaniora.

172. Webering, Damascene. 1953. *Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham*. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts.

173. Weidemann, Hermann. 1979. "William of Ockham on Particular Negative Propositions." *Mind* no. 88:270-275.

174. White, Graham. 1984. "Ockham's Real Distinction Betweeen Form and Matter." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:211-226.

175. Willing, Anthony. 1985. "Buridan and Ockham: The Logic of Knowing." *Franciscan Studies* no. 45:47-56.

176. Wood, Rega. 1990. "Ockham on Essentially-Ordered Causes, Logic Misapplied." In *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, edited by Vossenkühl, Wilhelm and Schönberger, Rolf, 25-50. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.

177. Zheng, Yiwei. 1998. "Metaphysical Simplicity and Semantical Complexity of Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental Language." *Modern Schoolman* no. 75:253-264.

178. ———. 1998. "Ockham on Connotative Terms." In.: The Paideia Project On-Line. Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Boston, Massachusets U.S.A. 10-15 August 1998.

179. ———. 2001. "Ockham's Connotation Theory and Ontological Elimination." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 26:623-634.

"The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham's semantics and metaphysics can hardly be overstated--it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham's famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: (1) there is no synonym in mental language; (2) a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal definition; and (3) there are simple connotative terms in Ockham's mental language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate all."

Related pages

The Nominalist Ontology of William of Ockham

Theory and History of Ontology

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Study Guides to Comparative Philosophy

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Ancient Chinese Logic (a survey of contemporary studies)

Selected Bibliography on Chinese Logic

Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology (with particular reference the Nyaya-Vaisesika School)

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[Theory and History of Ontology]

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Comparative Philosophy: Non-Western Logic and Ontology

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The purpose of these pages is to give both the beginner and the more experienced reader a brief guide to the literature on ontology and logic available in non-Western traditions.
This is an important and original, but often neglected, subject and I will made an attempt to list the more important studies of African, Buddhist, Chinese, Indian and Arabic traditions that are available in English.
In its initial form the page will contain a selection of readings, with brief annotations on the content (for the most important books, also the index will be included); subsequently these will be expanded to include more specific essays on selected problems and the most relevant studies in French, Italian and German.
This is a very hard job and will require a long amount of time to be completed; suggestions and criticisms will be particularly welcome.
In the sections for beginners, preference will be given to those books more readily available. In other sections some books could be out of print; if your Library does not possess the volume, it may be possible to obtain it via interlibrary loan.
Every effort will be made to provide details that facilitate bibliographical research.

INTRODUCTION: THE TASK OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

"Comparative philosophy is a field of inquiry that has been little explored. It could not have come into existence before intellectually significant contacts among the philosophical traditions. China had such a contact with India during the early centuries of the Christian era, mainly through Buddhism; but India remained unaffected. Between Greece and India the encounter was sporadic and short-lived; neither made a deliberate attempt to study the other. But the world situation has now changed. The East and the West have come once for all into intimate contact on a vast scale. Each feels the necessity for mutual understanding and even for assimilating whatever in the other is true and useful. This need to understand is no longer a matter of mere intellectual curiosity but of survival. The eastern and western minds need to be integrated. It has been asserted and is still being maintained today that each has a different kind of soul. But if the two are to be integrated, we have to assume a deeper soul comprehending the manifest souls of both. This common soul must always have been, without either component being conscious of its presence. The encompassing soul has to be discovered and understood; and in its terms the separate souls have to be reappraised.

There have been works useful for the study of comparative philosophy, such as source books, treatises on philosophical beginnings, separate histories, evaluations of cultures, and some syntheses. However, they have not presented the philosophical traditions with a unified perspective from which they can be studied comparatively. Comparative philosophy must have a philosophical aim. Only when the aim is clarified can the work be given a definite shape. The aim has to illuminate the perspective; then the traditions thrown into perspective take on a definite meaning and significance. The aim of comparative philosophy is the elucidation of the nature of man and his environment in order that a comprehensive philosophy of life and a plan for thought and action may be obtained. It is with this end in view that the present the Indians who are acquainted with both western and Indian philosophies have little knowledge of the Chinese. Similarly, many Chinese know very little of the western and the Indian except Buddhism. Moreover, each has many wrong

notions about the other philosophies and cannot get the feel of them. There is therefore a need for a book in which all three traditions are given in outline. From this book the reader can learn the general trends and central ideas of each.

In comparing and evaluating, the reader should be allowed to draw his own conclusions. He need not accept those given by authors, not even by the present writer. But he can draw his own conclusions only if the traditions are presented according to a single plan, and if he is given some insight into them. He should know fairly well what he is to compare before he does compare. There are many standard works on the separate histories of the philosophical traditions. But often they are so detailed that it is difficult to understand the main trends and interests. One cannot easily rise above the minutiae in order to view all the traditions together. There are also briefer histories of philosophy. But they have not been written from any single point of view, not even according to any single plan, with the result that one becomes confused when attempting to get a comparative view. The reader belonging to any one tradition should get an understandable impression of the others. This purpose can be achieved only if all the traditions can be presented according to a generally common plan and common concepts. This volume undertakes to do this in a modest fashion by introducing the western, Indian, and Chinese readers to each others' philosophies.

A few books have been written about the world's philosophies, but often without an adequate grasp or exposition of their natures. The result is that the reader finds the unfamiliar traditions strange and outlandish, and is unable to form an opinion about them. Some of the authors treat several different philosophies sympathetically. Yet sympathy, though essential, is not enough, unless it leads to deeper understanding. That is why their interpretations are often curious, and not very helpful. If reason is the same everywhere and many of life's problems are shared, this strangeness ought to be minimized. Any presentation of all philosophies together should lessen this strangeness and increase understandability.

One great hurdle in preparing a work on comparative philosophy is the difficulty of learning all the languages involved. The project

could have taken the form of a symposium by a number of specialists.
Nevertheless, even when a uniform plan is outlined, it is hard to obtain uniformity of treatment, since the minds of individual investigators operate along different lines.
How long, then, are we to wait till a master of all languages and philosophies offers the world a work on comparative philosophy? Some one has to start the task, and the author, along with a few others before him, has ventured to begin, even though aware of the perils.
He accepts dependence on translations as inevitable for any treatment of comparative philosophy. One who attempts to master several languages as well as the philosophies written in them risks shallowness.
The language barrier is likely to confront every writer on comparative philosophy who wishes to base his work entirely on original sources, but any defect that may result from the difficulty will rectify itself in course of time, as thinkers of different traditions, interested in comparative philosophy, cooperate with one another through mutual criticism." (Preface, pp. V-VII)

From: P. T. Raju, *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1962.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Selected Bibliography on Comparative Philosophy

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"The purpose of this work is to provide a sophisticated, one-volume companion to the study of select non-Western philosophical traditions. It has become increasingly evident to many teachers and students of philosophy as well as to general readers that philosophy is not the exclusive province of the West: that indeed other traditions have a depth and range comparable to Western thought and exhibit distinctive features, the knowledge of which can enrich philosophical understanding and creativity wherever it occurs. This volume wit strive at once to introduce some of the finest thinking within and about non-Western traditions to teachers, students and general readers, and to offer interpretations and insights relevant to the work of other scholars in the field." (from the Introduction, p. XII)
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"The analysis of methods of comparative philosophy, originally intended to serve as a base for the design of a new program of applied philosophical studies in Indonesia, is presented here as a general survey of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy as such, without references to Indonesian thought. As a survey it strives after comprehensiveness rather than completeness. No such survey has been attempted yet. Those who are engaged in the study of comparative philosophy may have some knowledge of some of the other projects with analogous purposes, but a comprehensive and systematic treatment of comparative philosophy, covering the whole field of studies, is still lacking. The present study by no means pretends to fill up this gap completely. It does not attempt to give a detailed and accurate picture of the scene, but rather to indicate the main horizons. As in a usual triangulation some points of reference are marked off with some emphasis while inter mediate areas are left out of consideration. The only possible merit of such an undertaking lies in what has-not-yet-been-said rather than in what is actually propounded, It serves to stimulate to further, more systematic and more integral researches rather than to

registrate objectively what has been achieved at the moment. It serves to link apparently disconnected projects and themes, and so to open unexpected vistas and to readjust and enlarge existent perspectives, When it succeeds to evoke some fertile criticism, to bring about more-effective co-ordination in the many contemporary projects of comparative philosophy, and to contribute to the growth of practical transcultural understanding, the author's main intentions have been amply rewarded.
Because this work is itself a survey it is impracticable to add a summary to it. The three parts of which it is composed, respectively dealing with a systematic analysis of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy, asystematic analysis of the phenomenon of philosophy itself, and the current methods of comparative philosophy, constitute a systematic whole." (pp. VI-VIII)
"This study is composed of three parts.
The first part will be an analysis of *the meaning of* comparative *philosophy*. A first mapping of the phenomenon is carried out in three sections. Some of the most significant recent studies are mentioned in this chapter. A second chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the main problems. Then, the phenomenon is viewed in a historical perspective.
The second part will contain an analysis of *the meaning* of *philosophy* itself. The phenomenon of philosophy being the formal object of study in comparative philosophy, a mapping of this phenomenon itself is indispensable for an adequate integration of the various fragmentary endeavours in comparative philosophy. On the base of a comprehensive phenomenology of philosophy the systematic study of comparative philosophy will be facilitated. The third and last part is a comprehensive survey of current *methods of comparative philosophy*. A triangulation of methods is an efficient means to reveal the actual character of comparative philosophy as a consistent discipline." (pp. 4-5)

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Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. Being: perspective versus substance 11; Chapter 2. Truth: Confucius and Heidegger 35; Chapter 3. Pragmatic versus semantic 63; Chapter 4. Ethics: Confucian *Jen* and Feminist Care 89; Chapter 5. Family: duty versus rights 115; Chapter 6. Religion: multiple participation versus exclusionism 139; Chapter 7. Justice: Confucian values and democratic values 163; Concluding remarks 191; Notes 193; Bibliography 217; Index 229.

From the Introduction: "The book may be seen as a study of Chinese and Western versions Tao. "Tao", as the word is used in Chinese, is not limited to Taoism; in all major Chinese systems it refers to the right way (the Ways or cosmic order even though different schools have different interpretations.' Chinese philosophy, therefore, may be seen as studies of various aspects of the Tao. Neither Chinese nor Western philosophy is homogeneous. There are, however, certain philosophies and philosophers who have had a defining influence within their own cultures and traditions, and I believe that a comparative study of these philosophies and philosophers can be used to demonstrate different thought patterns of the two cultures. Such a study illuminates the Chinese harmony model of life, which serves as a cornerstone of my argument for the coexistence of Confucianism and democracy.
This book serves a dual purpose. While each chapter contributes directly or indirectly to the main thesis, each also stands on its own as a comparative study *of* a specific

dimension of Western and Chinese philosophical and ethico-religious traditions.

Chapter 1, "Being: Perspective versus Substance," investigates the differences between Chinese ontology and Aristotelian ontology, which is the most influential in the West. Aristotle's view of being is a substance ontology, according to which the world is composed *of* various individual substances. The Chinese philosopher Zhuang Zi's ' ontology, which reflects on the background *of* Chinese thinking in general, is a perspective ontology. According to this ontology, the being or identity of an entity is always contextually situated and perspective-dependent. These ontological differences occur at a fundamental level and thus underlie many other philosophical positions that distinguish Chinese from Western views. Communication and mutual understanding can be enhanced with a clear understanding of these differences. For example, the Chinese "contextual perspective" ontology has profound implications for people's attitudes toward many other significant aspects of life, including truth, morality, and religious practice. Because of the significance of Chinese ontology for Chinese philosophy in general, this first chapter not only provides the basis for chapter 2, on truth, it also has direct relevance to chapters 4 and 5 as the foundation of the Confucian understanding of `personhood."

Chapter 2, "Truth: Confucius and Heidegger," investigates various concepts of truth, which is a central value in the West and in China. In the West, truth is usually understood semantically; it is a relation between language and reality. The Chinese understand it primarily as a matter of being a good person, as a way of life; being true is the way to realize one's potential for becoming fully human. Different understandings of truth in Western and Chinese philosophies affect value judgments in significant ways. Heidegger is chosen here not because he represents a typical Western understanding of truth (he does not), but because he presents a root metaphor of truth that is shared by both the Chinese and the Westerner. Through exploring

Heidegger's view on truth, this chapter demonstrates how the Chinese and Western notions of truth, although sharing the same common metaphor of "unveiling *(aletheia),"* lead in different directions. This understanding of Chinese truth as a way of life and self-realization provides further ground for discussion in chapters 4, 5. 6, and 7." (pp. 2-3)

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Abstract: "As a genus of philosophy, comparative philosophy serves various important purposes. It helps people understand various philosophies and it helps philosophers develop new ideas and solve problems. In this essay, I first clarify the meaning of "comparative philosophy" and its main purposes, arguing that an important purpose of comparative philosophy is to help us understand cultural patterns. This function makes

comparative philosophy even more significant in today's globalized world."

58. ———. 2016. "A Theory of Interpretation for Comparative and Chinese Philosophy." *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 15:575-589.
Abstract: "Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices (forms of life) across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that "the other" is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted by the "danger" of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy."

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"This article offers a brief summary of the main points raised in the four papers read in the Symposium on "East-West perspectives on truth" which was organized by the society for Asian and comparative philosophy from December 27-28, 1978 in Washington, d c. The papers covered the Chinese, Japanese, Indian and comparative perspectives on truth. The Symposium revealed that the time had come when a dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophers was not only important but necessary. the Symposium achieved its aim of broadcasting this essential message."

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East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective. Proceedings of the conference, held at the University of Hawaii under its sponsorship during the summer of 1959.
"The general theme of the conference was East-West philosophy in practical perspective, and the goal primarily was to achieve mutual understanding between the great cultures of East-and-West, and not to engage in critical analysis. Most of the emphasis was on the classical tradition rather than contemporary movements--especially Buddhism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism and Confucianism. Among the topics discussed were the relation of philosophical theories to practical affairs; natural science and technology in relation to cultural institutions and social practice; religion and spiritual values; ethics and social practice; legal, political and economic philosophy; conspectus of practical implications for world understanding and cooperation."

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86. Raju, Poolla Tirupati. 1947. "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions." *Philosophical Review* no. 56:127-155.
"This was the first important paper published by me on comparative philosophy in USA. in a way, it was the forerunner of my book, *Introduction to comparative philosophy* (University of Nebraska Press, 1962). for a quick bird's eye view of the two traditions, it will be very useful. it will be useful particularly for those who cannot find time enough to read my thicker books on comparative philosophy."

87. ———. 1955. "Idealisms: Eastern and Western." *Philosophy East and West* no. 5:211-234.
"This is a comparison of Western and Eastern (including the Chinese) idealistic thought in its growth. It gives in a short space a summary of the similarities and differences."

88. ———. 1957. "Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:291-315.
"This paper which attempted to clarify the meanings of the four words which are still being used confusingly in both the same and different senses. Their meanings coincide, but also differ; that is, there is overlapping both in meaning and usage. Incidentally, the paper brings in also the Indian meanings and usages, which also have similar difficulties. In their usage the ontological, the cosmological, the epistemological and logical, and even the artistic (imitative art) meanings are mixed up. The intent is to raise the question: to what or to which are all these meanings moored or to be moored?".

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Chapter 4. Early logical relativism, skepticism, and absolutism Mahavira, Chuang-tzu, Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato 113; Chapter 5. Early rational Synthesis Hsün-tzu, Aristotle 145; Chapter 6. Early varieties of atomism Democritus/Epicurus/Lucretius, "Gautama"' and Nameless Buddhists 171; Chapter 7. Hierarchical idealism Plotinus/Proclus, Bhartrhari 205; Chapter 8. Developed skepticism Sextus Empiricus, Nagarjuna, Jayarashi, Shriharsha 233; Chapter 9. Religio-philosophical synthesis U]dayana, C.hu Hsi, Avicenna, Mairnonides, Aquinas 275; Chapter 10. Logic-sensitized, methodological metaphysics Gangesha, Descartes, Leibniz 329; Chapter 11. Immanent-transcendent holism Shankara, Spinoza 367, Chapter 12. Perceptual analysis, realistic and idealistic Asanga/Vasuhandu, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 407; Chapter 13. Fideistic neo-skepticism Dignaga/Dhamakirti, Kant 467; Afterword 517; Notes 531; Bibliography 655; Note on the Author 659; Index 661.
From the Preface: "Because I hope that newcomers to the history of philosophy will be among the readers of this hook, I have taken care to explain whatever I think they need to

know. The book begins with the reasons for studying philosophy comparatively and with the difficulties raised by such study, and it ends with a view of philosophy that is personal but that rests on all of the preceding discussion The philosophers dealt with represent certain attitudes. schools. and traditions, but they are remembered most interestingly and accurately as individuals. So even though I have had to omit a great deal and make schematic summaries, I have in each instance tried to suggest the philosopher's style, density, and order of thought. In its later chapters the book tends to grow more difficult and elaborate, like the philosophies it deals with; but the early chapters prepare for the later ones. and, whatever the difficulty, I have always wittiest as simply and clearly as I can.
To avoid making a long book forbiddingly longer, I have limited not only the number of philosophers dealt with but also the range of thought by which each of them is represented Plato. for example, is limited to his theory of Ideas and Kant (except in the later discussion) to his Critique of Pure Reason. In keeping with the needs of a particular comparison. I have sometimes drawn a broad sketch and sometimes entered into details. When it has seemed natural. I have shared my own views with the reader-there is no good reason to pretend that I am a neutral, disembodied voice. But however I judge each philosopher's thought, I have committed myself to expound it with a minimum of bias." (p. XI)

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African Philosophy: A Survey of Contemporary Studies

INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

"In the past three decades, philosophers -- especially African-born who are trained in Western philosophy -- have engaged in a metaphilosophical debate over whether there exists an African philosophy and, if so, what its nature is. This debate regarding the nature and existence of African philosophy has culminated in two camps, which I shall call the universalists and the particularists. Wiredu characterizes the latter as the anti-universalists or the nationalists.(1) The former camp, represented by the works of Bodunrin, Wiredu, Appiah, and Hountondji, among others, argues that the concept of 'philosophy', in terms of the methodology and subject matter of the discipline, should be the same in both the Western and African senses.(2) The latter camp, as seen in the works of Ayoade, Gyekye, Sodipo, and Onwuanibe, among others, argues that different cultures have different ways of explaining reality; hence Africans must have a philosophy that is essentially different from other philosophies. Perhaps it is along this line of trying to articulate the essential nature of 'African philosophy', Safro Kwame argues, that the metaphilosophical approach of the Western analytic tradition is not African, and as such, it is not and should not be a legitimate approach in African philosophy.(3) Some of the people in this camp have thus questioned the use of the been characterized by African philosophers as African philosophy, and three of these

have been criticized by the universalists as unphilosophical. The universalists argue that, compared to their paradigm view of the nature of philosophy -- that is, the contemporary analytic tradition of Western philosophy -- African philosophy does not have the requisite features of a tradition of writing and a rigorous and critical analytical approach to debates over universal conceptual and abstract issues that are engaged in by individuals. However, it is my view that there are both universalist and particularist elements in African philosophy. In other words, although there are culturally determined philosophical ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not incommensurable. As such, we can use the 'known' universal (?) philosophical concepts and methods of one 'culture' to analyze and make understandable the philosophical beliefs and worldviews of another culture that may 'appear' arcane -and this, in my view, is what many of the particularists have tried to do with African worldviews. This does not imply, as the universalists have claimed, that the beliefs and worldviews of one culture (Western) are comparatively superior to another philosophically, to the extent of denigrating one (African) as unphilosophical or denying its existence as a philosophical system."

(1) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 27.
(2) This stance can be found in the following works: P. O. Bodunrin, "The Question of African Philosophy", Philosophy 56 (1981), reprinted in Richard A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction (New York: University Press of America, 1984); Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture; Paulin Hountondji, African Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983); and Anthony Appiah, Necessary Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989). (3) Safro Kwame, "How Not to Teach African Philosophy", APA Newsletter 91 (1) (Spring 1992): p. 29.

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Philosophy 41; Lacinay Keita: The African Philosophical Tradition 57; Henry Olela: The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy 77; John A. A. Ayoade: Time in Yoruba Thought 93; Helaine K. Minkus: Causal Theory in Akwapim Akan Philosophy 113; J . E. [Kwame] Wiredu: How Not to Compare African Thought with Western Thought 149; Thomas J. Blakeley: The Categories of Mtu and The Categories of Aristotle 163; Richard C. Onwuanibe: The Human Person and Immortality in IBO Metaphysics 183; Kwame Gyekye: Akan Concept of a Person 199; Benjamin Eruku Oguah: African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study 213; Diana E. Axelsen: Philosophical Justifications for Contemporary African Social and Political Values and Strategies 227; Benyamin Neuberger: A Comparative Analysis of Pan-Africanism 245; Bibliography 265; Bibliography Index 307.

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Index of the Section "Bibliographical Study Guides"

Theory and History of Ontology

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Ancient Chinese Logic. A Survey of Contemporary Studies

INTRODUCTION: THEORIES ABOUT LANGUAGE IN CLASSICAL CHINA

"Technically, classical China had semantic theory but no logic. Western historians, confusing logic and theory of language, used the term 'logicians' to describe those philosophers whom the Chinese called the 'name school'. The best known of these were Hui Shi (380-305 b. C.) and Gongsun Lung (b. 380 b. C.?). This group now also includes the Later Mohists and the term 'distinction school' (translated as 'dialecticians') has become common.

The importance of the more detailed Mohist work came to light in modern times. The Confucian tradition had lost access to it. Rescuing that text rekindled a long-lost interest in Chinese theories of language. The restored Mohist texts give us a general theory of how words work. A term picks out part of reality. Some terms are more general than others; terms like 'dobbin' or 'horse' or 'object' might pick out the same thing. When we use a term to pick something out, we commit ourselves to using the name to pick out similar things and 'stopping' with the dissimilar. Thus, for each term we learn an 'is this' and an 'is not'. 'Is not' generates an opposite for each name and marks the point of distinction or discrimination.

Chinese doctrine portrays disagreements as arising from different ways of making the distinctions that give rise to opposites. The word *bian* (distinction/dispute) thus came to stand for a philosophical dispute. The Mohists argued that, in a

'distinction/dispute', one party will always be right. For any descriptive term, the thing in question will either be an 'is this' or an 'is not'. Mohists were realistic about descriptions and the world. Real similarities and differences underlie our language. They rejected the claim that words distort reality; to regard all language as 'perverse', they noted, was 'perverse'. The Mohists failed, however, to give a good account of what similarities and differences should count in making a distinction. Mohists also found that combining terms was semantically fickle. In the simplest case, the compound picked out the sum of what the individual terms did. Classical Chinese lacked pluralization so 'cat-dog' works like 'cats and dogs'. Other compound terms (such as 'white horse') worked as they do in English. The confusion led Gongsun Long to argue, on Confucian grounds, that we could say 'white horse is not horse'." (pp. 694-695)

From: Chad Hansen, "Logic in China", in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London/New York: Routledge 1998, Vol. 5, pp. 693-706.

"Systematic argument in Chinese philosophy began with the Moist school, founded in the fifth century b. C. by the first anti-Confucian thinker Mo Tzu (c. 468 - c. 376 b. C.). He laid down three tests for the validity of a doctrine: ancient authority, common observation, and practical effect. At first the controversies of the various schools over moral and political principles led to increasing rigor in argument; then to an interest in dialectic for its own sake, as evidenced in Hui Shih's paradoxes of infinity and in Kung-sun Lung's sophism "A (white) horse is not a horse"; and still later to the antirationalism of the Taoist Chuang Tzu (born c. 369 B.C.), who rejected all dialectic on the grounds that names have only an arbitrary connection with objects and that any point of view is right for those who accept the choice of names it assumes.
Logic of Mohism. In the third century b.C. the Mohists responded to Chuang Tzu's skepticism by systematizing dialectic in the "Moist Canons" and the slightly later Ta-ch'ü and Hsiao-ch'ü.
Moist Canons. The "Canons" confined dialectic to questions of the form "Is it this or is it not?" or, since they assumed that the

proposition is merely a complex name for a complex object, "Is it or is it not the case that . . . ?" (The form is distinguished in Chinese by a verbless sentence with a final particle, not by a verb "to be.") In true dialectic the alternatives are paired ("Is it an ox or not?") so that one and only one fits the object. Dialectic excludes such questions as "Is it an ox or a horse?" (it may be neither) and "Is it a puppy or a dog?" (it may be both). Its solutions are absolutely right or wrong; being or not being "this," unlike being long or short, is not a matter of degree, since nothing is more "this" than this is. The Mohists further argued that it is self-contradictory to deny or to affirm all propositions: the statement "All statements are mistaken" implies that it is itself mistaken, and one cannot "reject rejection" without refusing to reject one's own rejection.

Names are of, three types, distinguished by their relations to "objects," which are assumed to be particular. "Unrestricted" names (such as "thing") apply to every object. Names "of kinds" (such as "horse") apply to every object resembling the one in question. "Private" names (for example, the proper name "Tsang") apply to one object. Whether a name fits an object is decided by appeal to a "standard." There may be more than one standard for an object; for "circle" the standard may be a circle, one's mental picture of a circle, or a compass. Some standards fit without qualification: a circle has no straight lines. Some fit only partially: in deciding whether someone is a "black man" it is not enough to point out his black eyes and hair. The "Canons" began with 75 definitions, evidently offered as "standards," of moral, psychological, geometrical, and occasionally logical terms. An example of a definition of a logical term is "'All' is 'none not so' " (supplemented in the Hsiao-ch'ü by " 'Some' is 'not all' "). The first of the series is "The 'cause' is what is required for something to happen." ("Minor cause: with this it will not necessarily be so; without this it necessarily will not be so. Major cause: with this it will necessarily be so.") The "Canons" also distinguish the senses of 12 ambiguous terms. Thus, "same" is (1) identical ("two names for one object"), (2) belonging to one body, (3) together, and (4) of a kind ("the same in some respects").

"Ta-ch'ü" and "Hsiao-ch'ü." The Moist Ta-ch'ü further refined the classification of names. Names indicating "number and measure"

cease to apply when their objects are reduced in size; when a white stone is broken up it ceases to be "big," although it is still "white." Names indicating "residence and migration" do not apply when the population moves, as in the case of names of particular states ("Ch'i") or of kinds of administrative divisions ("country"). The claim that one knows X only if one knows that an object is X applies only to names indicating "shape and appearance" ("mountain," but not "Ch'i" or "county").

The Ta-ch'ü, and still more the Hsiao-ch'ü, also showed a shift of interest from the name to the sentence and to the deduction of one sentence from another. The Chinese never analyzed deductive forms, but the Mohists noticed that the formal parallelism of sentences does not necessarily entitle us to infer from one in the same way as from another, and they developed a procedure for testing parallelism by the addition or substitution of words. For example, "Asking about a man's illness is asking about the man," but "Disliking the man's illness is not disliking the man"; "The ghost of a man is not a man," but "The ghost of my brother is my brother." In order to reconcile the execution of robbers with love for all men some Mohists maintained that although a robber is a man, "killing robbers is not killing men." Enemies of Mohism rejected this as sophistry, on the assumption that one can argue from "A robber is a man" to "Killing robbers is killing men," just as one can argue from "A white horse is a horse" to "Riding white horses is riding horses." The Hsiao-ch'ü replied that there are second and third sentence types of the same form, which do not allow such an inference-for example, "Her brother is a handsome man," but "Loving her brother is not loving a handsome man"; "Cockfights are not cocks," but "Having a taste for cockfights is having a taste for cocks." A four-stage procedure was used to establish that "A robber is a man" belongs to the second type:(1) Illustrating the topic ("robber") with things ("brother," "boat") of which formally similar statements may be made.

(2) Matching parallel sentences about the illustrations and the topic-for instance, "Her brother is a handsome man, but loving her brother is not loving a handsome man"; "A boat is wood, but entering a boat is not entering [piercing?] wood"; "A robber is a man, but abounding in robbers is not abounding in men, nor is

being without robbers being without men."(3) Adducing supporting arguments for the last and most relevant parallels by expanding them and showing that the parallelism still holds: "Disliking the abundance of robbers is not disliking the abundance of men; wishing to be without robbers is not wishing to be without men."(4) Inferring, defined as "using its [the topic's] similarity to what he [the person being argued with] accepts in order to propose what he does not accept": "Although a robber is a man, loving robbers is not loving men, not loving robbers is not loving men, and killing robbers is not killing men." (pp. 415-416)

From: Angus C. Graham, "Chinese Logic", Third section of "Logic, History of" in: Paul Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan 1967, Vol. IV pp. 523-524; Second edition: Donald M. Borchert (ed.), New York: Thomson Gale 2006, vol. 5, pp. 415-417.

Related pages

Selected Bibliography on Ancient Chinese Logic

Index of the Section "Bibliographical Study Guides"

Theory and History of Ontology

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78. Lucas, Thierry. 1993. "Hui Shih and Kung Sun Lung: An Approach from Contemporary Logic." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 20:211-255.

    "Semantical instruments of contemporary logic are applied to the analysis of Hui Shih's "Ten propositions" and Kung Sun Lung's discourses "On the white horse", "On hard and white", "On indices and things". The notion of logical interpretation is used to clarify the structure of Hui Shih's argument; coupled with the notion of sorted language, it also allows us to show the logical coherence and common structure of Kung Sun Lung's three discourses."

79. ———. 2005. "Later Mohist Logic, *Lei,* Classes and Sorts." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 32:349-366.

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81. Makeham, John. 1991. "Names, Actualities, and the Emergence of Essentialist Theories of Naming in Classical Chinese Thought." *Philosophy East and West* no. 41 (3):341-363.

    "In this paper the author advances the thesis that by the late Third century b.C., discussions of the name and actuality/object, *iming-shid*, relationship by classical Chinese thinkers evidence a shift from nominalist theories of naming to essentialist theories of naming. According to the former, it is man who arbitrarily or conventionally determines which *imingd* should be applied to which *ishid*. According to the latter, there is a proper or correct correspondence between a given *imingd* and a given *ishid*, determined, variously, by what is ordained by 'heaven' or by what is 'naturally so'/'so of itself' (*izirand*)."

82. ———. 1994. *Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

83. Meu, Tsu-Lin. 1961. "Chinese Grammar and the Linguistic Movement in Philosophy." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 14:135-175.

84. Moller, Hans-Georg. 1997. "The Chinese Theory of Forms and Names (" *Xingming Zhi Xue*") and Its Relation to "Philosophy of Signs"." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 24:179-190.

85. Mou, Bo. 1998. "An Analysis of the Ideographic Nature and Structure of the Hexagram in "Yijing": From the Perspective of Philosophy of Language." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 25:305-320.

"I present an analysis of the ideographic nature and semantic structure of the hexagrams of the "Yijing" ("the book of changes") from the perspective of the philosophy of language. My purpose is twofold: first, i take this as a good case for analysis leading to an understanding of the ideographic semantic structure of an ideographic language like Chinese; second, I take this understanding as a significant aspect in comprehending the "Yijing" philosophy. In the paper, I first examine the ideographic construction of the hexagrams, then suggest an interpretation of the triple ideographic semantic structure, and finally discuss the denotational meaning of the hexagrams in terms of a collective-noun hypothesis."

86. ———. 1999. "The Structure of the Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis." *Philosophy East and West* no. 49 (1):45-62.

    "Through a comparative case analysis regarding the Chinese language, it is discussed how the structure and functions of a natural language would bear upon the ways in which some philosophical problems are posed and some ontological insights shaped. Disagreeing with Chad Hansen's mass-noun hypothesis, a collective-noun hypothesis is argued for: (1) the denotational semantics and relevant grammatical features of Chinese nouns are like those of collective nouns; (2) their implicit ontology is a mereological ontology of collection-of-individuals with both part-whole and member-class structure; and (3) encouraged and shaped by the folk semantics of Chinese nouns, classical Chinese theorists of language take this kind of mereological nominalism for granted."

87. ———, ed. 2001. *Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions*. Chicago: Open Court.

    Foreword by Donald Davidson.

88. ———, ed. 2003. *Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

89. ———, ed. 2008. *Routledge History of Chinese Philosophy*. New York: Routledge.

90. Pogonowski, Jerzy. 2010. *Remarks on Ancient Chinese Logic*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

91. Reding, Jean-Paul. 1986. "Greek and Chinese Categories: A Reexamination of the Problem of Linguistic Relativism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 36:349-374.

    Reprinted in: J. P. Reding - *Comparative essays in early Greek and Chinese rational thinking*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 65-92.

92. ———. 2004. *Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

93. Reding, Jean-Paul, and Reding, Jean-Paul. 2002. "Gongsun Long on What Is Not: Steps Towards the Deciphering of the *Zhiwulun*." *Philosophy East and West* no. 52 (2):190-206.

    "The *Zhiwulun,* chapter 3 of the *Gongsunlongzi,* attributed to the Sophist Gongsun Long (third century B.C.), is generally interpreted as a theoretical treatise on the relations between words and things. A new reading proceeds from the hypothesis that the *Zhiwulun,* like the *White Horse Treatise, is* another logical puzzle. Its theme is the problem of pointing out things that do not exist in the world or, put in modern terms, the problem of negative existentials. The *Zhiwulun* is a dilemma whose purpose is to show that the pointing that points at things that do not exist points without pointing."

94. Rieman, Fred. 1980. "Kung-Sun Lung, Designated Things and Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:305-319.

95. ———. 1981. "Kung-Sun, White Horses and Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 31 (4):415-447.

96. Rosemont, Henry. 1974. "On Representing Abstractions in Archaic Chinese." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24 (1):71-88.

"Some evidence and arguments are offered to show that the archaic (classical) Chinese language served as a linguistic vehicle largely because of the pictographic qualities of the characters rather than its being basically a transcription of speech. If natural languages are equated with spoken languages, it follows that classical Chinese is not a natural language. Some implications of this conclusion are then considered: 1) classical Chinese cannot be used as a counterexample to any transformationalist claims about the existence of significant linguistic universals. 2) Chinese philosophers were not hindered in their thought by their language; on the contrary, they were probably twice blessed in having two distinct media by which to convey their views (spoken and written). 3) the structure of classical Chinese suggests the importance of entailment logic for the Chinese, rather than propositional or predicate logic. 4) Wittgenstein's view that we must remain silent in the face of what cannot be said requires a Confucian footnote: perhaps the unsayable can be written in classical Chinese."

97. ———. 1992. "Remarks on the Quasi-Syllogism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 42 (1):31-35.

98. Schwartz, Benjamin I. 1985. *The World of Thought in Ancient China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

99. Shien, Gi-Ming. 1951. "Nothingness in the Philosophy of Lao-Tzu." *Philosophy East and West* no. 1 (3):58-63.

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101. Steinkraus, Warren E. 1980. "Socrates, Confucius, and the Rectification of Names." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30 (2):261-264.

102. Sun, Siao-Fang. 1963. "Chuang-Tzu's Theory of Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 3 (2):137-146.

103. Thompson, Kirill Ole. 1995. "When a "White Horse" Is Not a "Horse*." *Philosophy East and West* no. 45 (4):481-499.

"Is the White Horse Paradox just a sleight of hand, or is it indicative of some truths about words, language, and logic? The paradox underscores some differences in the significance and implications of terms when considered in the context of mention rather than use. Moreover, the paradox shows that insights into how words and phrases operate in language can be gained by considering them in the context of mention. The paradox also causes us to think of the instrumental value of words, as opposed to thinking of their roles just in referring and in judgments and inferences."

104. Trauzettel, Rolf. 1999. "A Sophism by the Ancient Philosopher Gongsun Long: Jest, Satire, Irony--or Is There a Deeper Significance?" *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 26:21-35.

105. Tu, Wei-ming. 1973. "Subjectivity and Ontological Reality. An Interpretation of Wang Yang-Ming's Mode of Thinking." *Philosophy East and West* no. 23 (1-2):187-205.

106. Vierheller, Ernst Joachim. 1993. "Object Language and Meta-Language in the Gongsun Long Zi." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 20:181-209.

"The Gongsun Long Zi is a text of the ancient Chinese School of Logicians. An attempt is made to provide a coherent interpretation of the logical content of the chapter "bBi ma lun". The analysis based on a new look on the logical function of the negated copula "Fei" yields a reading of the text as being directed toward elucidating the distinction of meta-/object-language and of extension/intension of a concept. This fact could enhance

the appreciation of the level of language analysis reached at an early premodern state of Chinese philosophy. "

107. Wardy, Robert. 2000. *Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

108. Wei-Ming, Tu. 1980. "Neo-Confucian Ontology: A Preliminary Questioning." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 7:93-114.

109. Wenzel, Christian Helmut. 2007. "Chinese Language, Chinese Mind?" In *Cultures. Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue*, edited by Kanzian, Christian and Runggaldier, Edmund, 295-314. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Proceedings of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2006, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria.
    "This article focuses on two questions. One is about the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which says that language plays a role in how we perceive and understand the world. To put it strongly: Language determines thought. The other question is more specific. It is about the Chinese language. Is Chinese, with its grammar and its writing system, fundamentally different from Western languages such as Greek, Latin, German, Spanish or English? And does this difference account for cultural differences in perception and understanding? We all live in one world. But individually and culturally, we also live in different worlds. One easily notices this when one lives abroad. What is the role of language in this? What is its influence on perception, thought and culture? I am interested in influences that are due not just to vocabulary (which should be obvious), but, more fundamentally and systematically, to grammar and writing system. Words can easily be added to a language, one by one and step by step, and they do indeed reflect thought and culture. But grammar goes deeper. In what ways it reflects thought and culture is a more difficult but more interesting question, so it seems to me."

110. ———. 2010. "Isolation and Involvement: Wilhelm Von Humboldt, Franois Jullien, and More." *Philosophy East and West* no. 50:458-475.

"This is an essay about language, thought, and culture in general, and about Ancient Greek and Classical Chinese in particular. It is about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and about comparative philosophy, as well as a contribution to the history of ideas. From the language side, it relies on the nineteenth-century German linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt, and from the culture side on the contemporary French sinologist Franois Jullien. Combining their ideas, substance is given to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and some of Jullien's claims about the historical and political development of Chinese culture are explained. The central claim here is that a certain lack of morphology (a lack of what may be called an abstract and universal "systematic scheme of variation") in the Chinese language invites the user to pay more attention to contexts and be more perceptive of, and open to, change and transformation. A further claim made here is that this leads to more involvement in the world but at the same time demands distance and detour. Toward the end there is a reflection on problems of autonomy and personal identity, self-understanding, politics, and our relation to the world around us."

111. Wu, Joseph S. 1969. "Chinese Language and Chinese Thought." *Philosophy East and West* no. 19 (4):423-434.

"The main task of this paper is an exposition of some subtle common traits of Chinese thought through an examination of some major characteristics of the Chinese language. First, the author presents the main structures of the Chinese written characters and some notable syntactical features of the classical Chinese. Second, he exposes some essential characteristics of Chinese thinking as revealed by the nature of the language. In the conclusion, he justifies the thesis that the Chinese language is a language for poetry."

112. Wu, Kuang-Ming. 1987. "Counterfactuals, Universals and Chinese Thinking." *Philosophy East and West* no. 37:84-94.

113. Yasuo, Yausa. 2005. "Image-Thinking and the Understanding of "Being": The Psychological Basis of Linguistic Expression." *Philosophy East and West* no. 55 (2):179-208.

Translated by Shigenori Nagatomo and Jacques Fasan. "This essay investigates why and how East Asian thought, particularly Chinese thought, has traditionally developed differently from that of Western philosophy by examining the linguistic differences discerned in the Chinese language and Western languages. To accomplish the task, it focuses on the understanding of "being" that relates to the theoretical thinking of the West and the image-thinking of East-Asia, while providing a psychological basis for the latter."

114. Yuan, Jinmei. 2005. ""Kinds, *Lei"* in Ancient Chinese Logic: A Comparison to "Categories" in Aristotelian Logic." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 22:181-199.

115. ———. 2006. "The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:136-152.

116. Zhenbin, Sun. 1997. "Yan: A Dimension of Praxis and Its Philosophical Implications (a Chinese Perspective on Language)." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 24:191-208.

117. Zong, Desheng. 2000. "Studies of Intensional Contexts in Mohist Writings." *Philosophy East and West* no. 50 (2):208-228.

"The Mohist School's logical study focuses mainly on the following inference rule: suppose that N and M are coextensive terms, or N a subset of M; it follows that if a verb can appear in front of N, it can also appear in front of M. That is, if 'VM' then 'VN', where V is some extensional verb. Such an approach to logical inference necessitates the

study of logical relations among nouns, verbs, and the relations between these two types of words. Evidence is offered here that the Mohists clearly distinguished extensional verbs from intensional verbs, and that this insight enabled them to say, among other things, that VN does not follow from VM, even in cases where N is M or contained in M, as long as the V in question is an intensional verb."

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Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology. A Survey of Contemporary Studies

INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

"Indian philosophy denotes the philosophical speculations of all Indian thinkers, ancient or modern, Hindus or non-Hindus, theists or atheists. 'Indian philosophy' is supposed by some to be synonymous with 'Hindu philosophy.' This would be true only if the word 'Hindu' were taken in the geographical sense of 'Indian.' But if 'Hindu' means the followers of a particular religious faith known as Hinduism, the supposition would be wrong and misleading. Even in the ancient writings of the orthodox Hindu philosophers, like the Sarva-darsana-sangraha of Mädhâvacârya which tries to present in one place the views of all (sarva) schools of philosophy, we find in the list of philosophies (darsanas) the views of atheists and materialists like the Cärväkas, and unorthodox thinkers like the Bauddhas and the Jainas, along with those of the orthodox Hindu thinkers.
Indian philosophy is marked, in this respect, by a striking breadth of outlook which only testifies of its unflinching devotion to the search for truth. Though there were many different schools and their views differed sometimes very widely, yet each school took care to learn the views of all the others and did not come to any conclusion before considering thoroughly what others had to say and how their points could be met. This spirit led to the formation of a method of philosophical discussion. A philosopher had first to state the views of his opponents before he formulated his own theory. This statement of the opponent's case came to be known as the prior view (purvapaksa). Then followed the refutation

(khandana) of this view. Last of all came the statement and proof of the philosopher's own position, which, therefore, was known as the subsequent view (uttarapaksa) or the conclusion (siddhänta).
This catholic spirit of treating rival positions with consideration was more than rewarded by the thoroughness and perfection that each philosophical school attained. If we open a comprehensive work on the Vedanta, we will find in it the statement of the views of all other schools, Cärväka, Bauddha, Jaina, Sänkhya, Yoga, Mimämsa, Nyäya and Vaisesika, discussed and weighed with all care; similarly any good work on the Bauddha or Jaina philosophy discusses the other views. Each system thus became, encyclopaedic in its grasp of ideas. Naturally we find that many of the problems of contemporary Western philosophy are discussed in Indian systems of philosophy. Besides, we find that indigenous scholars with a thorough training, exclusively in Indian philosophy, are able to deal even with abstruse problems of Western philosophy with surprising skill.
If the openness of mind - the willingness to listen to what others have to say has been one of the chief causes of the wealth and greatness of Indian philosophy in the past, it has a definite moral for the future. If Indian philosophy is once more to revive and continue its great career, it can do so only by taking into consideration the new ideas of life and reality which have been flowing into India from the West and the East, from the Aryan, the Semitic and the Mongolian sources." (pp. 4-6)

From: Satischandra Chetterjee and Dhirendaramohan Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1954 (Fifth edition).

THE SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

According to a traditional principle of classification, most likely adopted by orthodox Hindu thinkers, the schools or systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad,classes, namely, orthodox (ästika) and heterodox (nästika). To the first group belong the six chief philosophical systems (popularly known as sad-darsana), namely, Mimämsä, Vedanta, Sänkhya, Yoga, Nyäya and

Vaisesika. These are regarded as orthodox (ästika), not because they believe in God, but because they accept the authority of the Vedas. (1) The Mimämsä and the Sänkhya do not believe in God as the creator of the world, yet they are called orthodox (ästika) because they believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas.
The six systems mentioned here are not the only orthodox systems; they are the chief ones, and there are some other less important orthodox schools, such as the Grammarian school, the medical school, etc., also noticed by Mädhaväcärya. Under the other class of heterodox systems, the chief three are the schools of the Materialists like the Cärväkas, the Bauddhas and the Jainas. They are called heterodox (nästika) because they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas."

Notes

(1) In modern Indian languages. 'astika' and 'nâstika' generally mean 'theist' and 'atheist', respectively. But in Sanskrit philosophical literature, 'àstika' means 'one who believes in the authority of the Vedas' or 'one who believes in life after death. ('Nâstika' means the opposite of these.) The word is used here in the first sense. In the second sense, even the Jaina and Bauddha schools are 'âstika', as they believe in life after death. The six orthodox schools are 'âstika', and the Carvâka is 'nâstika' in both the senses." (pp. 6-7)"

From: Satischandra Chetterjee and Dhirendaramohan Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1954 (Fifth edition).

THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA SCHOOL

"Historically the Nyâya and Vaisesika schools are different. They had separate origins and developed differently in the early phases of their existence and also had different spheres of interest and expertise. However, on account of their common philosophical standpoints and methodology a link seems to have existed between the two quite early in their history which during the course of their

development brought them closer, resulting in their subsequent amalgamation into a single syncretic system.
Roughly speaking the history of the Nyâya-Vaisesika system extends over a period of twenty-four centuries, i.e. from about the fourth century BC, till modern times. Like Vedânta, it has been one of the living systems of philosophy. Redaction of the Nyâya doctrines in the form of sutras was done by Gautama around the fourth century BC. He was succeeded by an array of illustrious commentators and exponents like Vatsyayana (about AD 400), Uddyotakara (about AD 650), Väcaspati (about AD 840), Bhâsarvajna (about AD 860), Udayana (about AD 984), Jayanta (about the tenth century AD) and many others. The sutras of the Vaisesika school were formulated by Kanâda, about one century prior to Gautama, and he was followed by thinkers like Prasastapada (about the sixth century AD), Sridhaka (about AD 990 and Sarirkara Misra (about the fifteenth century AD).
As stated above, the Nyâya and Vaisesika schools had more or less the same sort of philosophical orientation and presuppositions; however, their interests were most pronounced in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics respectively. They borrowed from and leaned upon each other so heavily that they could not afford to remain separate for long. Though the synthesis of the two schools began appearing in Udayana, it was Gangesa (about the twelfth century AD) who is to be given the credit of forging the unity of the two schools. He is regarded as the founder of the syncretic school known as the Navya-Nyâya (Neo-Nyâya) school." (p. 132)

From: Brian Carr and Indira Mahalingam (eds.), *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, London: Routledge 1997, Chapter 7: "Nyaya-Vaisesika" by S. R. Bhatt pp. 119-138.

INDIAN LOGIC

"The term "Indian logic" may be used to refer to the system of logic (Nyaya) that forms one of the six principal schools of Hindu philosophy. In a wider sense it denotes Buddhist and Jaina logic as well. In a still wider sense it refers to any logical doctrine

propounded by Indian scholars. In this article the term is used in the last sense, although Jaina logic is omitted and only some representative doctrines and techniques from other sources are discussed.

The history of Indian logic covers at least 23 centuries, and the number of works by Indian logicians, published and unpublished, is vast. Those available in Western languages or accessible in good editions constitute only a fraction of this material. Attention here is confined to material from some of the published Sanskrit texts. For the study of Buddhist logic translations into Tibetan or Chinese from Sanskrit originals, many of which are lost, must also be utilized.

This survey falls into five parts: (1) Grammar, which was well developed by the time of the Sanskrit grammar of Panini. Its sophisticated logical rules and techniques influenced almost all later scholarly developments in India. (2) Mimamsa, the most orthodox of the six philosophical schools of Hinduism. It dealt largely with problems of textual interpretation and faced a variety of logical problems in the course of its history. (3) Vaisesika and Old Nyaya. Vaisesika, which also embodied a system of natural philosophy, provided a list of categories that set the framework within which logicians of the Old Nyaya school developed their systematic analyses of perception and inference. (4) Buddhist logic, partly a reaction against the old Nyaya. Some branches of Buddhist logic laid a foundation for formal logic and began to exclude extraneous considerations of ontology, epistemology, and psychology. (5) New Nyaya, the final phase of Hindu logic, both challenged by Buddhist logic and substantially enriched by it. The New Nyaya began with the work of Gangesopadhyàya (thirteenth century A.D.) and continues to the present day.

Lack of space prevents discussion of the role of logic in the sciences and of the philosophical schools of the Vedanta, which dealt with logical topics, especially in the later developments within Advaita and Dvaita.

Since more attention will be paid to doctrines than to individual logicians and their works and dates, a chronological table may be helpful in providing a rough outline of their historical context. (In the table, names of writings are in italic.) The table makes it clear that some of the schools which developed simultaneously were in a position to influence each other." (pp. 529-521)

INDIAN LOGICIANS AND LOGICAL WORKS

CENTURY	GRAMMAR	MĪMĀṂSĀ	VAIŚEṢIKA AND OLD NYĀYA	BUDDHIST LOGIC	NEW NYĀYA
	(*Vedas*)				
	(*prātiśākhya*)	(*ritual sūtras*)			
Fourth B.C.	Pāṇini				
Second B.C.	Patañjali				
First A.D.			Kaṇāda		
Second				Nāgārjuna (?)	
Third		Jaimini (?)	Gautama		
Fourth			Vātsyāyana		
Fifth		Śabara	Praśastapāda		
Sixth				Dignāga	
Seventh	*Kāśikā*	Prabhākara	Uddyotakara	Dharmakīrti	
	Bhartṛhari				
Eighth		Kumārila		Dharmottara	
Ninth			Vācaspatimiśra		
Tenth			Udayana		
Eleventh	Kaiyaṭa				
Thirteenth					Gaṅgeśopādhyāya
Sixteenth		Nārāyana			Raghunātha
Seventeenth	Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita	Āpadeva			Mathurānātha
					Jagadīśa
					Cadādhara
					Annambhaṭṭa
					Pañcānana
					Maṇikaṇa
Eighteenth	Nāgojībhaṭṭa				

From: Frits J. Staal, *Indian Logic* (Second section of: *Logic, History of*) in: Paul Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: Macmillan 1967, Vol. IV pp. 520-521.

INDIAN ONTOLOGY

"All Indian philosophical traditions are deeply engaged with ontology, the study of being, since clarity about the nature of reality is at the heart of three intimately connected goals: knowledge, proper conduct and liberation from the continued suffering that is part of all human existence. The formulation of a list of ontological categories, a classification of reality by division into several fundamental objective kinds, however, is less widespread. There is little room for a doctrine of distinct, if related, ontological categories in a philosophical school that takes reality as one, even less if that one lies beyond description. If the phenomenal world is but illusory appearance, as, for example, in the Vedanta of Sankara, then a determination of kinds of entities does not recommend itself as a means to adequate analysis of the world. Even the Sankhya tradition's realism reduces the world to an evolution from two fundamental entities, spirit and matter. Categories make sense

within the context of a pluralistic realism, an analysis of the world that finds it to be composed of a multiplicity of real entities. Such a view is found to some extent in Jaina philosophy, but is primarily defended and developed in the Nyaya-Vaisesika school.
The Nyaya- Vaisesika categories are seven: substance, quality, motion, universal, particular, inherence and not-being. While all are understood as real entities and objects of knowledge, substance is most fundamental as each of the others in some way depends on substance. Substances are nine: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind. The first four are atomic: they may combine to form macroscopic substance, such as a clay pot, but in incomposite form they are indestructible atoms, as are the last two. Ether, time and space, likewise indestructible, are unitary and pervade all. In its irreducible parts, all substance is eternal; every composite whole is a destructible substance.
A relation of containment, called inherence, structures the categories. The qualities, actions and universals by which we might characterize a pot inhere in it. They are distinct entities from the pot, yet cannot exist apart from their underlying substrate. Composite substances like a pot are also contained in their parts by inherence, but the smallest parts, eternal substances, exist independently as receptacles that contain nothing A whole, greater than the sum of its parts, is said to inhere in the parts while the parts are the inherence cause of the whole.
Eternal substance, the ultimate substrate of all, is a bare particular. An entity that is nothing but a receptacle for other entities, it furnishes criteria for separability and individuality, but cannot be defined in itself apart from others. This aspect of the concept of substance leads later Nyaya-Vaisesika into extensive analysis of relations and negation." (pp. 118-119)

"From: David Ambuel, *Ontology in Indian Philosophy*, in: Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London, New York: Routledge 1998.

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   "The article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and contrariety fall under the common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means "pervasibility of two predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests that contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on contradiction of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction (including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction of facts is impossible."

6. Banerjee, Hiranmoy. 1972. "On a Mistranslation of the Terms ' *Visesya*' and ' *Prakara*'." *Philosophy East and West* no. 22 (1):93-96.

   "The translation of the Nyaya terms, ' *Visesya*' and ' *Prakara*' as 'subject' and 'predicate' is mistaken. This mistake is the progenitor of the philosophical mistake that a particular can possibly be a predicate. In 'ram is possessed of a stick', the stick is the ' *Prakara*', but being possessed of a stick is the predicate. This inclusion of relation in the predicate is alleged to lead to an infinite regress, for the predicate's relation to the subject should be included in it ad infinitum. There is, however, a tie and not a relation

between the subject and the predicate. A relation, being a universal, is a prediate of particulars whereas a tie binds together entities of heterogeneous types."

7. Barlingay, Surendra Sheodas. 1965. *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*. Delhi: National Publishing House.

8. Barua, Beninadhab. 1921. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.

   Reprinted: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.

9. Berriedale, Keith Arthur. 1921. *Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyaya and Vaicesika Systems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

   Reprinted: New York, Greenwood Press, 1968 and New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1977.

10. Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1987. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyaya Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:149-154.

    "It is argued against the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two notions of implication and entailment in the Navya-Nyaya logic. Also, it is suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the deductive model of inference."

11. ———. 1990. *Form and Validity in Indian Logic*. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

12. Bhattacharya, Chandidas. 1987. "Can There Be Empirical Evidence for General Truth?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:333-347.

13. Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 2001. "A Note on Formalism in Indian Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 29:17-23.

14. Bhattacharyya, Hari Mohan. 1994. *Jaina Logic and Epistemology*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co.

15. Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra. 1956. *Studies in Philosophy*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

    Two volumes edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya

16. Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 1955. "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 5 (2):155-162.

17. ———. 1961. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Doctrine of Qualities." *Philosophy East and West* no. 11 (3):143-151.

18. ———. 1974. "Some Features of Navya-Nyaya Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24 (3):329-342.

    "Navya-Nyaya developed a technical (non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the language of all serious discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law, medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer suggested is that Navya-Nyaya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of the object'. This necessitated the development of special concepts like the concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyaya made extensive use of Occam's razor to decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as concrete objects."

19. ———. 1990. "Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyaya." *Philosophy East and West* no. 40 (2):129-149.

    "The technical language of Navya-Nyaya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc., to deal with sentences expressing cognition like perception, inference, memory, belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyaya distinguishes between what is cognised and the mode

under which what is cognised is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of cognition and is also used to express quantity of cognition, universality, particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is asserted of what subject in the same cognition."

20. Biardeau, Madeleine. 1964. *Thèorie De La Connaissance Et Philosophie De La Parole Dans Le Brahmanisme Classique*. Paris: Mouton & Co.

21. Bilimoria, Purusottama. 1985. ""Jnana" and "Prama": The Logic of Knowing. A Critical Appraisal." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:73-102.

    "The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology, since more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework developed by Nyaya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a wide range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering', 'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in respect of its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and the set of criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of the objective correlate."

22. Bossche, Frank van den. 1995. "Existence and Non-Existence in Haribhadra Suri's Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 23:429-468.

    "In part I of the article the author explains how the problem of negation has led the Jains to accept non-existence as well as existence as constituents or 'Dharmas' of every real object in the world and to formulate the first dialectical principle of

the "Anekanta-vada" doctrine: 'Sad-asad-rupam vastu' or 'every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a nonexistent'. In part II of the article the author explains, using mereology as a logical tool, how Haribhadra Suri defends the Jain viewpoint in his 'Anekanta-jaya-pataka'."

23. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51 (4):474-491.

    "Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."

24. Butzenberger, Klaus. 1996. "On Doubting What There Is Not: The Doctrine of Doubt and the Reference of Terms in Indian Grammar, Logic and Philosophy of Language." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 24:363-406.

25. Cardona, George. 1975. "Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:259-281.

26. Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1992. "On Knowing by Being Told." *Philosophy East and West* no. 42 (3):421-439.

27. ———. 1997. *Denying Existence. The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of Negative Existentials and Fictional Discourse*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

See the Appendix: "The problem of the nonexistent in Indian philosophy of logic and language" pp. 211-245.

28. ———. 2000. "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating *Nirvilkalpaka* Perception from Nyaya." *Philosophy East and West* no. 50 (1):1-8.

    "Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" *(nirvikalpaka pratyaksa)* in Nyaya. Standard Nyaya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyaya theory of perception is better off without it."

29. ———. 2001. "Reply to Stephen Phillips." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51 (1):114-115.

30. Chakrabarti, Chandana, and Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1981. "Toward Dualism: The Nyaya-Vaisesika Way." *Philosophy East and West* no. 41 (4):477-492.

31. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1975. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Universals." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:363-382.

    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part gives an exposition of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory that universals are real entities distinct from and independent of the particulars to which they may be related. Various arguments for the theory are stated. The distinctive features of the theory are brought out by way of comparison and contrast with the views of Aristotle and Plato in particular. The second part discusses some objections to the theory. The

third part explains the so called 'preventive conditions for universals' together with their bearings on recent philosophical developments."

32. ———. 1976. "Some Comparisons between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 36:554-563.

"This paper consists of three parts. The first part deals with Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names and a similar distinction in Navya-Nyaya logic. In the second part we have compared Frege's definition of number to the Navya-Nyaya definition of number. In the third part we have shown how the study of the so-called 'restrictive conditions for universals' in Navya-Nyaya logic anticipated some of the developments of modern set theory."

33. ———. 1978. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 6:129-144.

"The paper consists in three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and Western philosophers like Plato, Cook Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras, etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The second part is devoted to their classification and contains additional arguments in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses some problems of a specialized nature such as the criteria for distinguishing one negative entity from another."

34. ———. 1985. "Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12:339-356.

"Some of the points sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy should be avoided; (2) notions similar to that of knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths are found in Indian philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an infinite

regress and that (4) in some cases truth is known immediately."

35. ———. 1995. *Definition and Induction. A Historical and Comparative Study*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

36. ———. 1999. *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. The Nyaya Dualist Tradiiton*. Albany: Sate University of New York Press.

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38. Chapple, Christopher Key. 2000. "Sources for the Study of Jaina Philosophy: A Bibliographic Essay." *Philosophy East and West* no. 50 (3):408-411.

    "Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified, focusing on English-language materials published in the Twentieth century. Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five years: Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umasvati's "Tattvarthasutra" (that which is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyayavijayaju's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina philosophy and religion)."

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    Reprinted 1950, 1965 and 1978.

40. Chatterjee, Satischandra, and Datta, Dhirendramohan. 1939. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.

    Seventh edition 1968

41. Coward, Harold G., and Kunjunni, Raja K., eds. 1990. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5. The Philosophy of the Grammarians*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

42. Cox, Collett. 2004. "From Category to Ontology: The Changing Role of *Dharma* in Sarvastivada Abhidharma." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 32:543-597.

43. Dasgupta, Probal. 1981. "Modern Indian Work at the Logic-Linguistics Boundary." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:217-225.

    "The mainstream Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier reflects features of Western languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions systematically by adding an existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a variable and not a quantifier. Further probing indicates that existential and universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables. Independent linguistic arguments show that these proposals work better than the quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen have, on logical grounds, already argued for a variable theory."

44. Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1922. *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Five volumes.
    Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.

45. ———. 1982. *Philosophical Essays*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

46. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1979. "Circularity in the Inductive Justification of Formal Arguments (*Tarka*) in the Twelfth-Century Indian Jaina Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 29 (2):177-188.

47. Dixit, Krishna Kumar. 1971. *Jaina Ontology*. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology.

48. ———. 1975. "Indian Logic. Its Problems as Treated by Its Schools." In. Vaishali (Muzaffarpur): Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology, and Ahimsa.

49. Dravid, Raja Ram. 1972. *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

    Second revised edition 2001.

50. Faddegon, Barend. 1918. *The Vaiesika-System, Described with the Help of the Oldest Texts*. Amsterdam: J. Muller.

    Rreprinted Wiesbaden, M. Sändig, 1969.

51. Franco, Eli, and Preisendanz, Karin, eds. 1997. *Beyond Orientalism. The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

52. Frauwallner, Erich. 1961. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie für das indologische Institut der Universität Wien* no. 5:125-148.

53. ———. 1973. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

    Introduction by Leo Gabriel. Translated from the original German (1953) by V. M. Bedekar.
    Two volumes: 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the Epic. The Buddha and the Jina. The Samkhya and the classical Yoga-system.. 2. The nature-philosophical Schools and the Vaisesika system. The system of the Jaina. The Materialism.

54. Ganeri, Jonardon. 1986. "The Hindu Syllogism: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Indian Logical Thought." *Philosophy East and West* no. 46 (1):1-16.

"Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyaya-Sutra, European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later historians of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist traditions in favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian thought is spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and then their criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."

55. ———. 1995. "Vyadi and the Realist Theory of Meaning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 23:403-428.

"Vyadi, a celebrated Indian linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. As applied to generic nominals like "(the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each token utterance, a separate meaning rule must be given, then the number of such rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only some finite set is given, use of the word to refer outside this set will be "aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian constraints on a theory of meaning. The application of Vyadi's theory to proper names is also examined."

56. ———. 1996. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 24:1-19.

"In another paper, I discussed the grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to distinguish between the concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced to seek new, more

sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of meaning. I would like in this paper to discuss the contributions of these authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of a term and its reference, and to the semantics of context-sensitive expressions."

57. ———. 1999. *Semantic Powers. Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

58. ———. 2001. *Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason*. New York: Routledge.

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60. ———. 2003. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 31:33-45.

61. Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti. 1971. "The Concept of Upadhi in Nyaya Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:146-166.

62. ———. 1984. *Indian Logic in Its Sources. On Validity of Inference*. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal.

63. Gerow, Edwin. 1984. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." *Philosophy East and West* no. 34 (3):245-260.

64. Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

"Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and

America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed. I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."

65. Glashoff, Klaus. 2004. "On Stanislaw Schayer's Research on Nyaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 32:295-319.

66. Gokhale, Pradeep P. 1982. "The Terms *Padartha* and *Prameya* in the Context of *Nyayasutra*." *Philosophy East and West* no. 32 (2):207-211.

    "In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyaya-Sutra III. Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with "padartha" of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha" with Vaisesika "padartha" is

misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyaya are also not 'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has linguistic import rather than ontological."

67. ———. 1992. *Inference and Fallacies in Ancient Indian Logic: With Special Reference to Nyaya Buddhism*. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

68. Gopalan, Subramania. 1973. *Outlines of Jainism*. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Private.

69. Gradinarov, Plamen. 1990. *Phenomenology and Indian Epistemology: Studies in Naya-Vaisesika Transcendental Logic and Atomism*. New Delhi: Ajanta Books International.

70. Grimes, John. 1989. *A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Sanskrit Terms Defined in English*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    New and revised edition 1996.

71. Guha, Dinesh Chandra. 1968. *Navya Nyaya System of Logic. (Some Basic Theories and Techniques)*. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan.

    Second revised edition with the title: *Navya Nyaya System of logic: theories and techniques*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.

72. Gupta, Bina. 1980. "Are "Hetvabhasas" Formal Fallacies?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:135-147.

    "The first part of the paper examines the "Hetvabhasas" of the Nyaya school. The second part analyzes the differences between Indian and Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion of formal fallacy as it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though the "completed" Nyaya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the notion of "Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily

completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyaya inference adequately accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the Nyaya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound product of inference."

73. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1988. *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Translation of: *Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung* - Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1981.

74. ———. 1992. *On Being and What There Is. Classical Vaisesika and the History of Indian Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

75. Hamilton, Sue. 2001. *Indian Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

76. Ho, Chien Hsing. 1996. "How Not to Avoid Speaking -- "a Free Exposition of Dignaga's Apoha Doctrine"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 24:541-562.

77. Houben, Jan E.M. 2000. "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition." In *History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present*, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees, 146-156. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

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81. Jha, Ujjwala. 2002. *Mimamsa Philosophy of Language*. Delhi: SRI Satguru Publications.

82. Jha, Vashishtha Narayan. 1992. *Relations in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

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   "This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very

different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."

4. ———. 1971. *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*. The Hague: Mouton.

   Second revised edition with a new preface by Jonardon Ganeri and the additions and changes made by Matilal in his personal copy: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

5. ———. 1974. "A Note on the Nyaya Fallacy Sadhyasama and Petitio Principii." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:211-224.

   "When H. N. Randle (in 1930) interpreted 'sadhyasama' as petitio principii, he made a mistake. Unfortunately, many scholars accepted randle's interpretation. It has been shown that Randle was wrong about this interpretation. 'Sadhyasama' can be correctly translated as a fallacy of being in the same predicament with yet-to-be-proven proposition. Petitio is a different fallacy, as it has been described by Aristotle. Some general comments have been made on the notion of fallacy, and on the distinction between 'formal' and 'non-formal' fallacies."

6. ———. 1975. "Causality in the Nyaya-Vaisesika School." *Philosophy East and West* no. 25 (1):41-48.

   "The meaning of "cause" is much wider in some Indian philosophical schools than in the West. the Buddhist terms, "hetu" and "pratyaya", cover an unusual variety of causal notions. The Vaisesika notion of cause is said to be closer to commonsense. A causal substrate in this system approximates the notion of "material" cause in Aristotle, but the "non-substantial" cause is a unique notion in this system. The Nyaya critique of causation (in Udayana) can be

profitably compared and contrasted with that of David Hume. It has been further argued in the paper that Mill was a poor defender of Hume against Reid, and that the Navya-Nyaya analysis of the 'unconditionality' criterion was slightly better than that of Mill."

7. ———. 1977. *Nyaya-Vaisesika*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz.

   A history of Indian literature: vol. 6, II.

8. ———. 1977. "Ontological Problems in Nyaya, Buddhism and Jainism: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 5:91-105.

   "The Nyaya-Vaisesika believed that we can achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is' if we can analyse and classify the concrete objects of our experience into 'substance', 'quality' and 'action'. The Buddhist thought reality to be in perpetual flux and thus the objects of experience are synthetic and analysable into what they called "dharmas". The Jainas compromised by saying that reality is 'many-sided', both substantial (when we take the Nyaya point of view) and ever fluctuating (when we take the Buddhist position). In Whiteheadean terms, it is a combination of 'process' and 'reality'. A comparison, in some details, of these three Schools is attempted in the paper."

9. ———. 1981. "Error and Truth. Classical Indian Theories." *Philosophy East and West* no. 31 (2):215-224.

   "Classical Indian theories of error are discussed to show their relevance to the philosophical problems of the Cartesian epistemologists in general and the British empiricists in particular. The concept of "alambana" and "pratibhasa" as discussed by the Ssautrantika-Yogacara School is explained and the views of the "sense-data" philosophers are discussed in this connection."

10. ———. 1985. *Logic, Language and Reality. An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

11. ———. 1986. *Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

12. ———. 1990. *The Word and the World. India's Contribution to the Study of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

13. ———. 1998. *The Character of Logic in India*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari

14. ———. 2002. *Mind, Language, and World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Edited by Jonardon Ganeri

15. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Chakrabarti, Arindam, eds. 1994. *Knowing from Words. Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

16. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Shaw, Jaysankar Lal, eds. 1985. *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective. Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

17. McCrea, Lawrence. 2000. "The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mimansa Interpretive Theory." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 28:429-459.

18. Mehta, Mohan Lal. 1954. *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy. The Essential of Jaina Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics*. Bangalore: Jain Mission Society.

19. Mejor, Marek. 2003. "Contribution of Polish Scholars to the Study of Indian Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 31:9-20.

20. Misra, Ganewar. 1990. *Language, Reality, and Analysis. Essays on Indian Philosophy*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

21. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1961. "Reflections on the Nyaya Theory of Aavayavipratyaksa." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:30-41.

22. ———. 1980. "Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30 (4):439-451.

    "The peculiar features of Indian theories of truth, according to this paper, are: (I) a theory of cognitive occurrent; (II) absence of a theory of meaning as distinct from reference; (III) a consequent position that avoids the extremes of logicism and psychologism; (IV) a restricted theory of necessary truths, a fallibilism with regard to empirical truths and infallibilism with regard to moral truths; (V) a close connection between cognitive enterprise and practice; and (VI) reliance on reflective analysis of the cognitive situation."

23. ———. 1980. "Understanding Some Ontological Differences in Indian Philosophy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:205-218.

    "Taking up the pluralistic realism of Nyaya Vaisesika and monistic idealism of Advaita Vedanta, the paper enquires into the origins of this ontological difference. While the theory of "Pramanas" (or theory of knowledge) was used to certify the ontology, the epistemology itself was incorporated into the ontology. No absolute point of beginning is available for a system, both the systems claim to give accounts of ordinary language and ordinary experience. The search for an extra-systemic evidence is frustrating."

24. ———. 1984. "Pramanya and Workability -- Response to Potter." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12:329-338.

25. ———. 1992. "On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 42 (3):397-406.

26. ———. 1992. *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*. New York: Oxford University Press.

27. ———. 2000. *Classical Indian Philosophy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

From the Preface: "This is a book that I always wanted to write, but the project had to be postponed up until this stage in my life. Having learned Indian philosophy under two great Sanskrit Pandits -- the late Mm. Yogendranâth Tarkavedântatirtha and the late Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatirtha -- I wanted to convey to Western scholars something of the education I had received. Hopefully, I have succeeded in doing so in some measure. There are gaps that I would like to fill, and there are topics on which I would like to elaborate, should there be an opportunity to do so in the future. For the present, I am glad to be able to send this manuscript to the press."
Contents: Preface IX; 1. Indian philosophy: a historical overview 1; Part 1: Theory of knowledge (*Pramana Sastra*) 2. Theory of knowledge (*Pramana*-Theory) 11; Part 2: Metaphysics (*Prameya Sastra*) 3. The Categories (*Padharta-s*) 41; 4. the Self (*Atman*) 59; 5. Central metaphysical issues 73; Part 3: Philosophy of politics, law and morals (*Dharma Sastras*) 6. State, society, and law 95; 7. Moral philosophy 105; Part 4: Religion and art: 8. Philosophy of religion 125; 9. Aesthetics of *Rasasasta* 133; Part 5: Beyond the *Pramana-Prameya* distinction 10. Beyond the *Pramana-Prameya* distinction 141; Appendix 1: A note on Navya-Nyaya analysis of cognition 147; Appendix 2: Some general features of the Indian theories of knowledge 149; Appendix 3: The classical *Darsanas* (Systems) 153; Appendix 4: Glossary of important Sanskrit terms 159; Bibliography 167; Index 175; About the Author 181.

28. ———. 2001. *Explorations in Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Two volumes: 1. Indian philosophy; 2. Western philosophy

29. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, Saha, S.R., Chatterjee, Amita, Sarkar, Tushar Kanti, and Sibajiban, Bhattacharyya. 2009. "Indian Logic." In *The Development of Modern Logic*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 903-961. New York: Oxford University Press.

30. Mukherjea, A.K. 1976. "The Definition of Pervasion ("Vyapti") in Navya-Nyaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 4:1-50.

31. Mullick, Mohini. 1976. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyaya Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 4:127-134.

    "My attempt is to produce some evidence to show that the notions of implication and entailment are clearly distinguished in Navya-Nyaya logic. This is done by examining the nature of the Navya-Nyaya syllogism and showing that the Naiyayikas were aware of various definitions of material implication but rejected them as definitions of vyapti (implication), not because they led to inferential paradoxes but to semantic ones; they in fact never confused implication with entailment. The entailment relation is contained in their notion of "paramarsa" and appears as the last premise in the argument which immediately precedes and thus 'causes' the conclusion."

32. Nicholson, Hugh R. 2004. "Specifying the Nature of Substance in Aristotle and Indian Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 54 (4):533-554.

    "Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical speculation. The first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying substrate (*to hupokeimenon*)and as the individual "this" *(tode ti),* finds a parallel in the concept of *dravya* in Patanjali's *Mahâbhasya*. The second tension, between the

understanding of reality as the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this (*to ti en einai*) , corresponds to an ambiguity in the concept of *vastu* in Kumarila's *Slokavarttika*."

33. Nieuwendijk, Arthur. 1992. "Semantics and Comparative Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 20:377-418.

    "The paper takes up the question as to which logical framework is most suitable for a formal interpretation of Navya-Nyaya logic. It is claimed that, for this purpose, the framework offered by extensional first-order predicate logic is inadequate. This claim is established by discussing three well-known difficulties: the interpretation of the notion of Jnana, the question whether contraposition is a law of NavyaNyaya logic, and the interpretation of the Navya-Nyaya scheme of inference. Next, the interrelatedness of these difficulties is pointed out, and, carrying through the analysis, it is examined whether situation semantics offers a suitable alternative framework."

34. Oetke, Claus. 1996. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 24:447-539.

    "The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the most ancient varieties of "Indian logic" are significantly related to theories associated with the term "non-monotonc logic" in so far as they try to account for reasoning relying on the ability to use general rules subject to exceptions and indicate a conception of context-dependent validity implying that valid inferences or arguments can lose this status in the context of additional information. On that background it is possible to give a theoretical justification for a number of features of Indian theories of inference which previously appeared theoretically ill motivated and which were often explained by historical coincidences."

35. ———. 2003. "Indian Logic and Indian Syllogism." *Indo-Iranian Journal* no. 46 (1):53-69.

36. Padmarajiah, Y.J. 1963. *A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal.

37. Pandey, Sangam Lal. 1974. *Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy*. Allahabad: Darshan Peeth.

    Second edition 1983

38. Pandeya, Ram Chandra. 1963. *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

39. Perrett, Roy W. 1984. "Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12 (3):237-264.

40. ———. 1985. "A Note on the Navya-Nyaya Account of Number." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:227-234.

    "I maintain (contra Ingalls) that the Navya-Nyaya account of number as a property of classes should be understood intensionally, not extensionally. Such a theory is closer to Frege's earlier views than to Russell's and also has certain advantages over Russell's theory. However it seems that Navya-Nyaya cannot provide a criterion of identity for such intrinsically intensional properties; and this difficulty is particularly important for Navya-Nyaya, given its epistemological and metaphysical realism."

41. ———. 1999. "Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 49 (4):401-414.

    "Naiyayikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable". What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyaya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false."

42. ———, ed. 2001. *Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. I. Epistemology*. New York: Garland.

Vol. 1: Epistemology; Vol.2: Logic and philosophy of language; Vol. 3: Metaphysics; Vol. 4: Philosophy of religion; 5. Theory of value.
"Volume 1: *Epistemology* isconcerned with the nature and scope of Indian *pramâna* theory, i.e. that part of Indian philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge. Indian philosophers developed a causal theory of knowledge and acknowledged the existence of a number of valid ways of knowing, including perception, inference and testimony. The Indian *Pramâna* theorists thus discussed many issues that have also occupied Western epistemologists, often offering importantly different perspectives on these matters. They also sometimes addressed various interesting questions about knowledge that are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists.
The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of epistemological topics like the means of knowledge, realism and anti-realism, truth, knowledge of knowledge, illusion and perceptual error, knowability, testimony, scepticism and doubt."

43. ———, ed. 2001. *Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Ii. Philosophy of Language*. New York: Garland.

"Volume 2: *Logic and Philosophy of Language* isconcerned with those parts of Indian *pramana* theory that Western philosophers would count as logic and philosophy of language. Indian philosophers and linguists were much concerned with philosophical issues to do with language, especially with theories of meaning, while the Indian logicians developed both a formalised canonical inference schema and a theory of fallacies. The logic of the standard Indian inferential model is deductive, but the premises are arrived at inductively. The later Navya-Nyaya logicians went on to develop too a powerful technical language, an intentional logic of cognitions, which became the language of all serious discourse in India.

The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in logic and the philosophy of language like the nature of inference, negation, necessity, counterfactual reasoning, many-valued logics, theory of meaning, reference and existence, compositionality and contextualism, the sense-reference distinction, and the nature of the signification relation."

44. ———, ed. 2001. *Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Iii. Metaphysics*. New York: Garland.

    "Volume 3: *Metaphysics* is concerned with the complement to *pramana* theory, i.e. *prameya* theory. Whereas the *pramanas* are the means of knowledge, the *prameyas* are the knowables, cognisable entities that constitute the world. With respect to the number and kinds of such entities, there was a very wide variety of opinion among classical Indian philosophers - including variants of monism, dualism and pluralism about both entities and kinds. Many metaphysical topics were debated, but two of the most important were causation and the nature of the self. The competing theories offered about these two issues also raised other questions about the metaphysics of wholes and parts, substances and properties, and universals and particulars.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in metaphysics like ontology, constructionalism, universals, negative facts, mereology, causation, relations, freedom and determinism, and theories of the self."

45. Perszyk, Kenneth J. 1983. "'Virtue Is Not Blue': Navya-Nyaya and Some Western Views." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 11:325-338.

    "The primary aim is to construct, within the Navya-Nyaya system, an analysis of sentences such as 'virtue is not blue', which they would claim are meaningful. There is a discussion of their important distinction between meaningful sentences and sentences which generate or have the ability to generate a cognition, and their concept of negation. The secondary aim is to compare their analysis

with certain Western philosophers, especially those who follow the theory of types."

46. ———. 1984. "The Nyaya and Russell on Empty Terms." *Philosophy East and West* no. 34 (2):131-146.

    "The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the Navya-Nyaya school of Indian philosophy determines the truth or falsity of a sentence which contains an empty term, and to point out some similarities and differences between its method of analysis and truth-value determinations of such sentences and that of Bertrand Russell."

47. ———. 1984. "Negative Entities and Negative Facts in Navya-Nyaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12:265-276.

    "The purpose of this article is to discuss the Navya-Nyaya's thesis that absence is an ontological category, which is to say that there are negative entities, and its corollary that there are negative facts. The Nyaya resists all attempts to eliminate negative facts in favour of positive facts. In addition, we see that no atomic sentence can have a negative subject-term."

48. Phillips, Stephen H. 1995. *Classical Indian Metaphysics. Refutation of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic"*. Chicago: Open Court.

49. ———. 2001. "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyaya's *Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa*." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51 (1):104-113.

    "As part of its direct realism in the epistemology of perception, classical Indian Nyaya posits indeterminate perception where a qualifier is grasped immediately without being grasped as qualifying its qualificandum, the thing whose property it is. Contemporary philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, argued in Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1 (January 2000) that Nyaya would best eschew such

"indeterminate perception." This paper offers a defense drawing on the classical texts. It is explained in particular that while there is no claim of direct, apperceptive evidence for raw perception, there is an argument that ties up all verbalizable cognition, including verbalizable perception, as having the qualifier it presents as available through previous experience. But with a first-time perception of something as, say, a cow, the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood, and the best candidate seems its perception in the raw."

50. Phillips, Stephen H., and Chakrabarti, Arindam. 2004. *Epistemology of Perception: Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, Jewel of Reflection on the Truth /About Epistemology). The Perception Chapter (Prataksa-Khanda)*. New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies.

    Transliterated text, translation, and philosophical commentary.

51. Potter, Karl H. 1954. "Are the Vaisesika "Gunas" Qualities?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 4 (3):259-264.

52. ———. 1963. *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

53. ———, ed. 1970. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 1. Bibliography*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

    Second revised edition 1983; Third revised edition 1995.

54. ———. 1974. "On the Realistic Proclivities of Navya-Nyaya as Explicated by Bhattacharyya." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24 (3):343-347.

55. ———. 1975. "Some Thoughts on the Nyaya Conception of Meaning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:209-216.

56. ———, ed. 1977. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 2. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Gangesa*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Second edition 1995.

57. ———, ed. 1981. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 3. Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

58. ———. 1984. "Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12:307-328.

"I endeavor to show that J. N. Mohanty's claim of incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is based on a justified true belief account of knowledge; that "Pramanya" doesn't mean truth but rather workability; that Indian theories of knowledge are not predicated on noncognitivism in values as Western ones are; that the claim incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is a result of imposing on them shortcomings in contemporary Western ways of thinking."

59. ———, ed. 1999. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

60. ———, ed. 2003. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 9. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

61. Potter, Karl H., Buswell, Robert Jr., Jaini, Padmanabh S., and Ross, Reat Noble, eds. 1996. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

62. Potter, Karl H., and Sibajiban, Bhattacharyya, eds. 1993. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 6. Indian*

Philosophical Analysis. Nyaya-Vaisesika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

63. Pradyot, Kumar Mukhopadhyay. 1984. *Indian Realism. A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.

64. Prasad, Jwala. 1958. *History of Indian Epistemology*. Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal.

65. Prasad, K.S., ed. 2002. *The Philosophy of Language in Classical Indian Tradition*. New Delhi: Decent Books.

66. Prets, Ernst. 2001. "Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 29:545-558.

67. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, and Moore, Charles A., eds. 1957. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

68. Raja, Kunhan C. 1960. *Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

69. Ranade, Ramachandra Dattatraya. 1926. *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy Being a Systematic Introduction to Indian Metaphysics*. Oriental Book Agency: Oriental Book Agency.

70. Randle, Herbert Niel. 1930. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools. A Study of the Nyayadarsana in Its Relation to the Early Logic of Other Schools*. London: Oxford University Press.

    Reprinted New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1976.

71. Rao, K.L.Seshagiri. 1970. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." *Philosophy East and West* no. 20 (4):377-382.

    "The article shows how the Hindu tradition and specially Vedanta has come to express its own experience of truth. It views the problem of truth ontologically: ultimate truth

cannot be 'known' like a finite object; it is in fact the 'knower' himself, Atman, the unconditioned being. Both absolutistic and theistic interpretations of Atman/Brahman are considered. It concludes: truth is spiritual reality, being of our being and the meaning of all finite existence."

72. Rastogi, Maharaj Narain. 1983. *The Theories of Implication in Indian and Western Philosophy. A Critical Study*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

    Foreword by Irving M. Copi

73. Ratnakirti, Dhirendra Sharma. 1969. *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*. The Hague: Mouton.

74. Reyna, Ruth. 1984. *Dictionary of Oriental Philosophy*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.

75. Riga, Peter J. 1970. "On Truth: A Catholic Perspective." *Philosophy East and West* no. 20:369-376.

76. Sastri, Kuppuswami. 1932. *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha*. Mylapore: The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute.

    Second edition 1951; Third edition 1961; Fourth edition 1998

77. Sastri, Pothukuchi Subrahmanya. 1975. *Indian Idealism. Epistemology and Ontology*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

78. Scharf, Peter M. 1996. *The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy. Grammar, Nyaya and Mimamsa*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

79. Schuster, Nancy. 1972. "Inference in the Vaisesikasutras." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:341-386.

    "Conflicting statements appear in the Vaisesikasutras about how knowledge of imperceptible entities is attained.

Passages from the Sutras are compared with the Samkhya Sastitantra, the Nyayasutras, Nyayabhasya, and other early texts. Impact of the Sastitantra on Vaisesikasutras and Nyayabhasya was strong. Contradictions within Vaisesikasutras reveal the compilers' grappling with the Samkhya theory over a period of time. Bias in favor of direct perception dominates the Vaisesika text."

80. Seshagiri, Rao K.L. 1970. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." *Philosophy East and West* no. 20:377-382.

81. Sharma, Chandradhar. 1960. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*. London: Rider & Company.

82. Shastri, Dharmendra Nath. 1964. *Critique of Indian Realism. A Study of the Conflict between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga School*. Agra: Agra University.

83. ———. 1976. *The Philosophy of Nyaya Vaisesika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (a Critique of Indian Realism)*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidy Prakashan.

    Third edition 1997.

84. Shastri, Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. 1959. *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartrhari*. Calcutta: Sanskrit College.

85. Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1978. "The Nyaya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 5:255-266.

    "One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the Nyaya philosophers. This discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. A discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. According to the Nyaya, existence, knowability and

nameability are considered as universal properties. The distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. I have also discussed the question whether the Nyaya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different terms. A distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context."

86. ———. 1980. "The Nyaya on Cognition and Negation." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:279-302.

"The aim of this paper is to discuss the Nyaya concept of negation and the different types of negation. This discussion involves a discussion of the Nyaya concept of cognition, relation and meaning. The Nyaya has drawn a distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be represented by the form "arb". The Nyaya concept of negation cannot be said to be a term-negation, or a sentence-negation, or a propositional function negation. The conclusion is that the Nyaya concept of negation does not correspond to any Western concept of negation."

87. ———. 1991. "Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 19:103-119.

"The aim of this paper is to discuss I) whether the following sentences have the same meaning, II) whether they have the same truth-value, III) whether there is some assertion common to all of them, and IV) if there is some such assertion, whether it can be defined. 1) all men are mortal, 2) whoever is a man is mortal, 3) wherever there is humanity, then there is mortality, 4) if anyone is a man, then he is mortal, 5) if humanity is present somewhere, then mortality is also present there."

88. ———. 2000. "Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: The Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 28:273-293.

89. ———. 2003. *Some Logical Problems Concerning Existence*. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.

90. ———. 2003. *The Nyaya on Meaning: A Commentary on Pandit Visvabandhu*. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak.

91. Siderits, Mark. 1987. "The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 14:331-355.

92. ———. 1991. *Indian Philosophy of Language. Studies in Selected Issues*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

93. Sinha, Jadunath. 1938. *Indian Realism*. London: Kegan Paul.

    Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.

94. ———. 1952. *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House.

    Two volumes: 1952-1956.

95. Smart, Ninian. 1964. *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

    Reprinted: Atlantic Highland, Humanities Press, 1976; Second revised edition: Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992.

96. Staal, Frits. 1973. "The Concept of 'Paksa' in Indian Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:156-165.

    "The customary assumption that the Indian concepts of hetu, sadhya and paksa correspond to the Aristotelian middle, major and minor terms, respectively, is incorrect. The concept of paksa is used ambiguously in Indian logic, where it denotes either the term whose property is the sadhya, or the relation between that term and the sadhya. Another ambiguity of the Sanskrit originals, between paksa as used and paksa as mentioned, is resolved in a Chinese translation."

97. ———. 1975. "The Concept of Metalanguage and Its Indian Background." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:315-354.

"In Indian culture the concept of metalanguage originated early in the context of linguistics and speculations on language; in the West, late in the context of logic. This is related to the grammatical character of Indian culture and the mathematical character of Western culture. Connections are made between metalinguistic notions and technical, in particular poetic and ritual languages; Mantras; the origin of phonetic writing; communication and metacommunication among animals and men; and the origin of language."

98. ———. 1988. *Universals. Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

99. Taber, John A. 1989. "The Theory of the Sentence in Purva Mimansa and Western Philosophy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 17:407-430.

"The Mimansa school of Indian philosophy developed two distinct theories of the relation of the meaning of a sentence to the meanings of the words that comprise it, the Anvitabhidhana or "qualified designation" theory and the Abhihitanvaya or "designated relation" theory. Both of these theories, I attempt to show, turn on the observation that the meanings of individual words change in different sentences. I go on to suggest that an appreciation of this fact can lead to a solution of the problem, first raised by Frege, of the change of meaning of terms in intensional contexts."

100. ———. 2004. "Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 54 (2):143-170.

"Claus Oetke, in his "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning," presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that have been explored in the field of Artificial

Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property
identified as the "reason" (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya) -- a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened"

101. Tachikawa, Musashi. 1971. "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:111-145.

"This article consists of four parts: explanations of basic technical terms as an introduction, a translation of the Nyayapravesa, notes to the translation, and a romanized text based upon Dhruva's edition. This work is Samkarasvamin's introduction to Dignaga's logic, and deals with means of proof, fallacious means of proof, means of refutation, perception, inference, fallacious perception and fallacious inference."

102. Tarkatirtha, Visvabandhu. 1991. "The Nyaya on the Meaning of Some Words." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 20:41-88.

Translated by Jaysankar Las Shaw.
"The aim of this paper is to discuss the views of Nyaya philosophers on meaning. This paper deals with the meaning and reference of proper names, and general terms. It also deals with the meanings of homonymous expressions, and discusses the question whether demonstrative pronouns are homonymous terms. Different uses of personal pronouns have been mentioned. The section on the quantifier 'all' deals with different uses of it. Similarly, the section on interrogative pronoun deals with as

many as seven uses of an interrogative pronoun. This paper ends with the discussion of the meaning of a sentence."

103. Tiwari, Heeraman. 1994. "One and Many: The Early Naiyayikas and the Problem of Universals." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 22:137-170.

"The problem of universals in Indian philosophy is as old as c. 400 b. C. In his great work, Astadhyayi, the grammarian Panini introduced the problem of universals while discussing the meaning of a noun. Later, the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy discussed the universals in great detail. The present article deals with the early Nyaya view of universals. The article is divided in two parts: one gives a brief general introduction to the problem; the other contains a fresh translation of the Nyaya-Sutras 2.2.58-70 and Vatsyayana's commentary on them. The translation is also supplied with discussions and analysis. The article tries to demonstrate that the Nyaya system extends the debate about word and meaning which was inaugurated by early Sanskrit grammarian (viz., Panini, Patanjali etc.)."

104. Tripathi, R.K. 1969. "The Central Problem of Indian Metaphysics." *Philosophy East and West* no. 19 (1):39-43.

"The main argument of my article is to show that the question regarding the metaphysical status of relation is the central problem of Indian metaphysics as it is this that determines the nature of the major systems. four possible alternatives have been discussed: a) relation is as real as the terms (pluralistic realism like the Nyaya etc.), b) the terms are real but the relation (between Prakrti and Purusa) is false (Samkhya dualism), c) the falsity of relation means the falsity of one of the terms also (Advaita Vedanta and Vijnanavada), d) the falsity of relation entails the falsity not only of one term but of both the terms (Madhyamika). I have treated the relation between identity and difference as most basic."

105. Umesha, Mishra. 1957. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications.

106. Vattanky, John. 1993. "The Referent of Words: Universal or Individual, the Controversies between Mimansakas and Naiyayikas." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*:51-78.

"One of the most important problems discussed in Nyaya philosophy of language is whether words denote an individual or a universal. On this point there are basically two schools of thought which oppose one another, i.e., the Mimansakas and the Naiyayikas. The texts of Muktavali, Dinakari and Ramarudri dealing with this topic give a brilliant summary of the long drawn out conflict between the two Schools. The authors of these texts established the Nyaya position that the denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified by the universal and the present essay examines these arguments and counterarguments."

107. ———. 1995. *Nyaya Philosophy of Language. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Upamana and Sabda Sections of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

108. ———. 2003. *A System of Indian Logic: The Nyaya Theory of Inference. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of the Anumana Section of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

"Nyaya is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyaya philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit contained

especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains a commentary on all the texts included."

109. Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra. 1909. *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic*. Calcutta.

    Reprint: New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Coropration, 1977.

110. ———. 1921. *A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools)*. Calcutta: Calcutta University.

    Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2002.

111. Wada, Toshihiro. 2001. "The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 29:519-530.

112. Wayman, Alex. 1974. "Two Traditions of India -- Truth and Silence." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24:389-403.

113. Williams, Paul. 1999. "Indian Philosophy." In *Philosophy 2. Further through the Subject*, edited by Grayling, Anthony C., 793-847. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

114. Zilberman, David B. 1988. *The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Edited by Robert S. Cohen.

115. ———. 2006. "Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought." In, edited by Gourko, Helena and Cohen, Robert S. Dordrecht: Springer.

116. Zimmermann, Francis. 1998. "Le Sens Des Mots Selon Les Logiciens (L'analyse Du *Padartha*)." *Histoire Épistemologie Langage* no. 20:53-62.

"A comparison between the analysis of padârtha (the object of the word) by the Nyâya tradition and the Theory of Incorporais by Stoicism leads us to significantly modify the metaterminology in use among the sanskritists who specialize in the interpretation of Ancient Logic texts. Specifically, if we make use of the philosophical and grammatical terminology that we have inherited from the Stoicians in order to translate and comment Nyâyasûtra II. 2.58-69, which deal with *padârtha*, we not only recognize the hierarchy «letter-syllable-word-utterance» that pervaded the whole structure of ancient grammar, but at the same time we bring to light the realistic and vitalistic ontology (we might call it a physiology of notions) which was the framework within which the grammatical theory was evolved."

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   Contents: Foreword. General introduction. Philosophical background of Bhartrhari and Heidegger: Bhartrhari: the grammarian philosopher. Heidegger: the philosopher of being and language. 1. Sabdatattva: the ultimate reality; 2. Sabdatattva: the Sphota of language; 3. Heidegger's concept of reality; 4. Language: the saying of being; General conclusion; Being and language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger: a synthesis; Glossary; Appendix; Bibliography. Index.
   "Being and Meaning is a comparative study of the concepts of being and language in Bhartrhari and Martin Heidegger, emphasising the universality of their thinking. Language in Bhartrhari's vision is the medium of the self-expression for the ultimate reality (Sabdatattva). In Heidegger's thinking language is the original utterance (sage) which being speaks to man. Being expresses itself in language, and phenomena in the world occur simultaneously with the occurrence of language. Bhartrhari and Heidegger lead one to the belonging togetherness of being and being beyond all conceptualizing, transcending the bounds of orient and occident."

2. Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1989. *Definition of Valid Knowledge. Pramalaksana in Gangesa's Tattvacintamani*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.

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3. Bapat, Lata S. 1989. *Buddhist Logic. A Fresh Study of Dharmakirti's Philosophy*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

4. Bharadwaj, Krishna Datta. 1958. *The Philosophy of Ramanuja*. New Delhi: Sir Shankar Lall Charitable Trust Society.

5. Bhartrhari. 1964. *Vakyapadiya Brahmakanda Avec La Vrtti De Harivrsabha*. Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard.

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6. Bhattacharya, Bhaswati. 1979. "The Concept of Existence and Nagarjuna's Doctrine of Sunyata." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 7:337-344.

7. Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 1993. *Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception. Nirvikalpakavada, Part 1*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

8. ———. 1996. *Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception. Nirvikalpakavada, Part 2*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

9. ———. 1997. "Gadadhara's Theory of Meaning of Pronouns." In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 16-31. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

   "In order to explain Gadadhara's theory of meaning of pronouns, it is necessary first to briefly state his theory of word meaning. In Indian philosophy in general and in Navya-nyaya in particular, theories of meaning of sentences

are regarded as a part of theories of origin of true cognition. Hence in discussing theories of meaning, Indian philosophical systems almost exclusively consider how a hearer acquires information second-hand from what a speaker tells him. Indian theories of meaning refer to the speaker's intention only in so far as it is necessary for the hearer to cognize truly what the speaker says.
According to Navya-nyaya, a word means an object only under a mode of presentation. Anyone who knows the meaning of the word knows the object under this mode on hearing, remembering, or otherwise cognizing, the word. The problem of meaning of words is the problem of explaining how the hearer knows the object under the particular mode.
The mode of presentation of an object, according to Navya-nyaya, must be a property of the object. A property is anything which may be said to be *in* the object. According to Navya-nyaya, this is the case if and only if what is to be regarded as a property of an object is related to the object *by an occurrence-exacting relation*. Anything related to an object by such a relation will be its property."

10. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1983. "On the History of Paninian Grammar in the Early Centuries Following Patanjali." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 11:357-412.

    "Virtually no literature of the Paninian School of grammar has survived belonging to the period after Patanjali (2nd century b.C.?) and before Bhartrhari (5th century a. D). Some verses in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya deal with this time, but they allow of different interpretations. A close study of certain indications pertaining to this period reveals that Panini's grammar and its appendixes were modified to an unknown extent and that Patanjali's Mahabhasya was studied but not taken as the final authority, as it was later."

11. Cardona, George. 1970. "Some Principles of Panini's Grammar." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:40-74.

12. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1977. *The Logic of Gotama*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

13. Chakrabarty, Debasish. 2000. "Kanada's *Vaisesika Sutra*: A Translation." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 311-336. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

14. Coward, Harold. 1982. "Time (Kala) in Bhartrhari's "Vakyapadiya"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 10:277-287.

    "Behind the discussion of the levels of language in the Vakyapadiya is Bhartrhari's notion of the dynamic limiting function of time (Kalasakti). After setting forth the absolute nature of Brahman as the one eternal essence of word and consciousness Bhartrhari then introduces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one unchanging Absolute (Sabdatattva--Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic diversity mankind experiences as creation. Time is the creative power of Brahman."

15. ———. 1990. "Derrida and Bhartrhari' *Vakyapadiya* on the Origin of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 40:3-16.

16. ———. 1991. ""Speech Versus Writing" in Derrida and Bhartrhari." *Philosophy East and West* no. 41 (2):141-162.

    "This study identifies points of formal and substantive contact between Derrida and traditional Indian thought. Reading Bhartrhari with Derrida highlights the error of previous interpretations that have read the Vakyapadiya through Advaitic eyes. it also highlights Bhartrhari's accommodation of Buddhist stress on individual experience while retaining an orthodox grounding in Vedic dharma, now reinterpreted as sabdatattva. Derrida, however, challenges Bhartrhari's notion of pratibha or "pure" mystical perception. The study calls into question current suggestions that Derrida can be understood as a Madhyamikan Buddhist -- for this analysis shows him to

agree with Bhartrhari on exactly those points which separate Bhartrhari and Nagarjuna."

17. Dreyfus, Georges B.J. 1997. *Recognizing Reality. Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

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19. Gangopadhyay, Mrinalkanti. 1975. "Gangesa on the Means for the Ascertainment of Invariable Concomitance." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:167-208.

    "The article is an exposition of the Vyaptigrahopaya (means for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance) section of the Tattvacintamani, the famous NavyaNyaya work of Gangesa. The Sanskrit original, given in transliteration, is divided into nineteen short texts. Texts 1-15 give the Prabhakara position: invariable concomitance is not ascertained through 'repeated observation', but through 'single observation'. texts 16-18 give Gangesa's refutation of the Prabhakara. Text 19 gives Gangesa's own position: the cause for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance is the perception of the coexistence of the probans with the probandum along with the absence of cognition concerning the irregularity of the probans."

20. Goekoop, Cornelis. 1967. *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintamani*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Gangesa's *Anumitinirupana* and *Vyaptivada*, with Introduction, translation, and commentary.

21. Hayes, Richard Philip. 1980. "Dignaga's Views on Reasoning (Svarthanumana)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:219-277.

    "This paper presents the views of the Sixth century Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignaga on the reliability of reasoning in the acquisition of knowledge. In stating the

necessary conditions for reliability in inference, Dignaga outlined an elementary logic of classes that served as the foundation for all later extensional logics in India. The first part of the paper presents an overview of Dignaga's epistemology, followed by a more detailed discussion of his presentation of the test of validity in reasoning. The second part comprises an annotated translation of a previously untranslated passage from Dignaga's principal work."

22. ———. 1988. *Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

23. Herzberger, Hans Georg. 1981. "Bhartrhari's Paradox." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:1-17.

    "The thesis that some things cannot be named was characteristic of certain Schools of traditional Indian philosophy. The problem we call 'Bhartrhari's paradox' arises from efforts to verify this thesis by positive instances. We examine Bhartrhari's position on the unnameability thesis in general and on the more particular thesis that the naming relation itself is unnameable. We then show how this more particular thesis is entailed by the set-theoretical proposition that no relation can be one of its own relata. Finally we generalize the set-theoretical argument and embed it within the paradox with which we began."

24. Houben, Jan E.M. 1995. "Bhartrhari's Solution to the Liar and Some Other Paradoxes." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 23:381-401.

    "In a passage in the Vakyapadiya which should be of special interest to logicians and semanticists, the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (India, 5th century c.e.) deals with paradoxes of negation, self-reference and truth (including the so-called 'Liar paradox'). The strategy of Russell and others attempting to establish a perfect formal language was to try to preclude their occurrence. The more recent trend to accept them as paradoxes has stimulated interesting developments in semantics, formal logic and related areas.

Bhartrhari, however, presents the key to a solution based on the way intention, reference, and negation work in everyday language and communication."

25. Iwata, Takashi. 2003. "An Interpretation of Dharmakrti's *Svabhava-Hetu*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 31:61-87.

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29. Kiparsky, Paul. 1991. "On Paninian Studies: A Reply to Cardona." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 19:331-367.

30. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1968. "Gangesa on the Concept of Universal Property (*Kevalanvoyin*)." *Philosophy East and West* no. 18 (3):151-161.

31. McDermott, Charlene Senape A. 1972. "Mr. Ruegg on Ratnakirti." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:16-19.

    "This point-for-point response to Mr. D. S. Ruegg's criticisms of my "An Eleventh century Buddhist logic of 'exists'" is at the same time an argument for a true interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophers and indologists."

32. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1966. *Gangesa's Theory of Truth. Containing the Text of Gangesa's Pramanya Jnapti Vada with an English Translation, Explanatory Notes, and an Introductory Essay*. Santiniketan.

Second revised edition: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989

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Contents: Date and Works of Bhartrhari; Language, Grammar and Culture; Scope and Scheme of the Vakyapadiya; Communicative and Analytic Language; Sentence; Indivisibility of Sentence; Theory of Sphota; Sentence Sense Pratibha Word; Intention of the Speaker; Referent of the Word; Substance and Universal; The Qualifier and the Qualificant; Basal and Contextual Referents; Negative Particle; Yugapadadhikaranavacana; Abhedaikatvasamkhya; Time Sabdadvaita Philosophy; Epilogue; Bibliography.
"Bhartrhari, the celebrated grammarian philosopher, is believed to have lived in the 5th century. This monograph presents the linguistic and philosophical theories connecting the analysis of the sentence with the ultimate reality-Sabdabrahman. The linguistic principles dealt with here are applicable not only to Sanskrit but to any language. His magnum opus the Vakyapadiya, even though partly incomplete, is the only extant work comprehensively dealing with the linguistic features of the Sanskrit language and the philosophy of grammar. It contains three kandas-Brahma-kanda or Agama-kanda, Vakya-Kanda and Prakirna-Kanda. The first two kandas together consist of 635 slokas, and deal with the Sabdabrahman, the creation of the world, jiva, world and language. The Prakirna-kanda running into 1300 slokas, divided into 14 sections called samuddesas, deals with the linguistic categories and semantic speculations prevalent in the Indian grammatical tradition. The other extant works of Bhartrhari are his fragmentary commentary

of the Mahabhasya of Patanjali and auto-commentary on the kandas I and II of the Vakyapadiya."

34. Ogawa, Hideyo. 2001. "Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 29:531-543.

35. Paksilasvamin, Aksapada, and Aksapada, Gautama. 2009. *L'art De Conduire La Pensée En Inde Ancienne. Nyaya-Sutra De Gautama Aksapada Et Nyaya-Bhasya D'aksapada Paksilasvamin*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

    Édition, traduction et présentation de Michel Angot.

36. Parsons, Terence. 2001. "Bhartrhari on What Cannot Be Said." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51 (4):525-534.

    " Bhartrhari claims that certain things cannot be signified - - for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartrhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the thatness of the signification relation can be signified. Bhartrhari also claims that the relation of inherence cannot be signified -- a quite different view that is not borne out by twentieth-century results. Finally, further research is needed to investigate what Bhartrhari's own reasons might have been for these views."

37. Patnaik, Tandra. 1994. *Sabda. A Study of Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language*. New delhi: D. K. Prrintworld.

38. Phillips, Stephen H. 1993. "Gangesa on Characterizing Veridical Awareness." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 21:107-168.

    "Within the context of a causal theory of knowledge, Gangesa, the revolutionary 14th-century Indian logician and epistemologists, considers and reflects about twenty-five

definitions of knowledge (in his view, "veridical awareness," "Prama"), and accepts about eight, with one in particular acquiring the status of Plato's "justified true belief" for all later epistemologists (writing in Sanskrit) to the present. This article is an annotated translation, introducing technical notions of Gangesa's system (in particular for an audience of non-Sanskritist philosophers). The notes provide some historical context but are devoted chiefly to the question of the success of the project."

39. ———. 2000. "From Gangesa's Tattvacintamani: Discourse on Perceptual Presentation of Something as Other Than What It Is." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 28:567-650.

    "Classical Indian theory of perceptual illusion is refined by Gangesa (c. 1325) in this translation (with explanation) of an important section of his masterwork, "Jewel of reflection on the truth (about epistemology)". Illusion is a single cognition of an entity as qualified by a qualifier that is fused by memory into current perception. This view is challenged by various adversaries (mainly Mimansaka but also Buddhist and Vedantic). Examples agreed to are of people making false statements on the basis of perceptual evidence, e.g., "this is silver," when an object in front is really mother-of-pearl. One rival camp sees the unsuccessful effort to pick up silver as flowing from a failure to cognize of a certain sort, not from a perceptual misrepresentation. Gangesa devotes (successful) effort to refuting this and other views, his overall strategy being that though his view faces difficulties they are much less severe than those faced by the alternatives."

40. Prasad, Rajendra. 2002. *Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference. Revaluation and Reconstruction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

41. Ruegg, Seyfort. 1971. "On Ratnakirti." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:300-309.

42. Subramania, Iyer K.A. 2007. *Bhartrhari. A Study of the Vakyapadiya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries*. Poona: Deccan College.

43. Sudhakar, Jatavallabhula. 1999. *Bhartrhari's Ontology*.

44. Tillemans, Tom J.F. 1999. *Scripture, Logic, Language. Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

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Buddhist Logic and Ontology. A Survey of Contemporary Studies

INTRODUCTION

"In the non-Buddhist traditions of Indian philosophical thought, and perhaps also in early Buddhist thought, there appears to be a tacit acceptance of the possibility of acquiring knowledge of reality. However, Nâgârjuna (about AD 250), a later Buddhist dialectical thinker, raised serious doubts about the possibility of acquiring knowledge by pointing out the self-contradictory character of all means of acquiring knowledge, Nâgârjuna's objections stimulated and compelled all subsequent philosophers provide a solid foundation to epistemology and logic before proceeding with the formulations of their philosophical positions. In Buddhist circles Asanga (about AD 405) and Vasubandhu (about AD 410) made pioneering attempts to construct epistemology and logic on the Buddhist pattern. However it was Dignâga (about AD 450) who put Buddhist epistemology and logic on a solid footing and gave them a distinctive character. He is, therefore, rightly regarded as the father of Buddhist epistemology and logic, and also of medieval Indian epistemology and logic in general, for he not only gave a precise formulation to Buddhist epistemology and logic but also imparted a new direction to Indian epistemology and logic by way of composing independent treatises on epistemology and logic and interspersing the treatment of metaphysical problems within them, a style which was later on followed by Gangesa (about the twelfth century AD), the founder of the school of Navya-Nyaya. Buddhist literature prior to Dignaga deals with the problem of

knowledge and the means of knowing either very casually or not at all. There seems to be no work devoted to the problem. But Dignaga felt the necessity for a distinct treatise on epistemology and logic to establish the Buddhist doctrines in a logical manner. He explicitly mentions in the Pramâna-samuccaya that its composition was led by the need to establish the means of valid cognition.
The task initiated by Dignaga was brilliantly continued by Dharmakirti (about 635), a doyen of Buddhist epistemology and logic. His Pramâna-vârtika, Pramânaviniscaya and Nyaya-bindu are masterpieces of Buddhist epistemology and logic. When Dignaga undertook an examination of the logical tenets of other philosophical schools in his treatise there were reactions from the latter. For instance, Uddyotakara and Kumarila (about AD 500) tried to controvert the views of Dignaga. Dharmakirti therefore defended and modified the views of Dignaga, thereby strengthening the foundations of Buddhist epistemology and logic. However, his exposition, which was ended to explain and defend the views of Dignaga, superseded and eclipsed the original by its superior merit. This tradition of Dharmakirti was carried forward by Darmottara (about AD 847) and subsequently by, amongst others, Jnanasrimitra about AD 1040)." (pp. 414-415)

From: S. R. Bhatt, "Logic and Language in Buddhism" in: Brian Carr, Indira Mahalingam (eds.), *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian philosophy*, London-New York: Routledge 1997.

"(...) from the origin of Buddhism in the 6th century b.C. to its expansion into four philosophical schools in the 4th century A.D., there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to that science in the works on philosophy and religion. Nagàrjuna, about 300 A.D., wrote a tract on Logic which was a mere review of the common topics of the Ancient School of Brahmanic Logic. During 400-500 A.D., Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu handled Logic, but their treatment of it was merely incidental, being mixed up with the problems of the Yogacara and Vaibhasika schools of philosophy. Vasubandhu's three

works on Pure Logic mentioned by Hwen-thsang are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged. With 450 A.D. began a period when Logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to that branch of learning. The works brought out by these. writers, along with those brought out by the Jainas, constitute the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Dignaga is the earliest known writer of this school." (p. 270)

From: Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic. Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools*, [1920]. Reprinted Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass 2002.

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STUDIES ON BUDDHIST LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY

1. Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1979. "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 7:43-78.

   "The article seeks to introduce Dharmakirti's theory of identity between Prama and Pramana, i.e., valid knowledge and its means. Knowing is nothing but feeling an object-shape stamped upon knowledge. This cognitive object-stamp is the immediate means to knowledge, being the direct measure of its object and as such is not really different from the structure of knowledge itself. The difference is thus only an analytical abstraction having no causal import. Many other systems, even Kumarila Mimansa, on close examination, are reduced to the same position, barring the Nyaya which firmly holds the difference."

2. Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1984. "Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives (*Catuskoti*) in Buddhist Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 34 (3):303-319.

3. Bugault, Guy. 1983. "Logic and Dialectics in the "Madhyamakakarikas"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 11:7-76.

4. Cheng, Hsueh-li. 1984. *Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources*. New York: Philosophical Library.

   Reprinted: New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.

5. Chi, Richard S.Y. 1969. *Buddhist Formal Logic*. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

   Part I. A study of Dignaga's *Hetucakra* and K'uei-chi's *Great commentary* on the *Nyayapraveda*.
   Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984; contains "A Bibliography of Indian and Buddhist Logic" pp. 181-222.

6. ———. 1974. "Topics on Being and Logical Reasoning." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24 (3):293-300.

7. ———. 1976. "A Semantic Study of Propositions, East and West." *Philosophy East and West* no. 26 (2):211-223.

8. ———. 1984. "Buddhist Logic and Western Thought." In *Buddhism and American Thinkers*, edited by Inada, Kennet K. and Jacobson, Nolan P., 111-119. Albany: State University of New York Press.

9. Chinchore, Mangala. 1987. "Some Thoughts on Significant Contributions to Buddhist Logicians." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:155-171.

   "The paper attempts to show that the difference between "Nyaya" and Buddhism is not merely verbal, but has varied philosophical implications, due to which Nyaya-Buddhist controversy occupies a very important position in the history of indian philosophical thought. This is vindicated with reference to some of the important and significant issues, viz. "sahtana" (the doctrine of universal flux), "anityata/ksanikata" (the doctrine of impermanence), and

"vyapti (avinabhava-niyama)", which indicate marked differences between them in the field of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic."

10. Conze, Edward. 1953. "The Ontology of the Prajnaparamita." *Philosophy East and West* no. 3 (2):117-129.

11. ———. 1963. "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels." *Philosophy East and West* no. 13 (1):9-23.

12. ———. 1963. "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 13 (2):105-115.

13. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1975. "On Logic and Algebraic and Geometric Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 25 (3):357-364.

14. ———. 1975. "Remarks on Early Buddhist Protoformalism (Logic) and Mr. Tachikawa's Translation of the "Nyayapravesa"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:383-398.

    "I discuss some important logical points of translation concerning seven Sanskrit metalogical terms (*paksa, hetu, drstanta, rupya, viruddha, viruddhavyabhicari and ubhayatravyabhicara*), and some proto-formal theories in light of the probable theoretical formalistic expectations of non-specialists in Buddhist logic, e.g., non-formal criteria in the evaluation rules for determining the legitimacy (not validity) of inference schemas. Additional comments are made on the developmental stages and proto-formalized virtues and limitations of this early Pramana Yada text."

15. ———. 1977. "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Inscription of Buddhist Logic (*Nyaya*)." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 28 (2):221-231.

16. ———. 1979. "Empirical Falsifiability and the Frequence of *Dar'sana* Relevance in the Sixth Century Buddhist Logic of

Sankaravamin." *Logique et Analyse* no. 86.

17. ———. 1979. "Metalogical Clichés (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 20:549-558.

    "This paper answers the question: are there variables in early Buddhist logic (Nyaya)? Thus the article describes 1) the implicit rules and sources for the correct substitution of 6th century Buddhist metalogical clichés (proto-variables), 2) some differences between such clichés and modern variables, 3) various metalogical theories and the crucial function of metaphysical presuppositions, and 4) offers a translation into the first order predicate calculus."

18. ———. 1981. "Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons." In *Buddhist and Western Philosophy*, edited by Katz, Nathan, 54-79. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

19. ———. 1988. "On Translating the Term *"Drstanta"* in Early Buddhist Formal Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 38 (2):147-156.

    "The discussion of problems in the translation of "Nyaya/Pramana Vada" terms into their possible English target expressions remains relevant for philosophers because to translate such terms is to presuppose some implicit interpretations of formalistic logic. This takes us beyond the confines of traditional Indology to philosophical questions about comparative formal logics."

20. Eckel, Malcolm D. 1978. "Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 28 (3):323-337.

    "Evidence from Bhavaviveka's Orajnapradipa and Tarkajvala is used to show that Bhavaviveka makes an important contribution to the understanding of Nagarjuna's arguments about the foundations of language.

Bhavaviveka's arguments are then compared and contrasted with those of Candrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa."

21. Ellingson-Waugh, Ter. 1974. "Algebraic and Geometric Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24 (1):23-40.

22. Fujinaga, Sin. 1990. "Determining Which Jaina Philosopher Was the Object of Dharmakirti's Criticisms." *Philosophy East and West* no. 50 (3):378-384.

23. Galloway, Brian. 1989. "Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka Thought." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 17:1-35.

    "In this paper we should like to argue that the "Prasajya" negation of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy is not the same as that of the non-Madhyamaka schools (that is, that the distinction between "Prasajya" and "Paryudasa" negation is not drawn in the same way). We should also like to argue that the terms and concepts of elementary set theory, employed in conjunction with the elementary predicate calculus, are useful in the explication of the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction and also in the clarification of the "Catuskoti". Finally we shall defend the Madhyamika Nagarjuna against two charges that have been laid against him to the effect that he has been guilty of certain errors of reasoning."

24. Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    "Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers,

transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed. I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."

25. Gupta, Rita. 1980. "The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and Its Presuppositions." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:47-68.

    "The article first examines the arguments with the help of which philosophers like Dharmakirti established the doctrine of momentariness. The article later proceeds to examine some of the basic presuppositions of the doctrine which are: (I) causal efficacy must be the intrinsic property of a cause, (II) there is no such thing as an unrealized capacity, (III) causal efficacy is the hall mark of the real as opposed to the unreal, and (IV) the identity of a thing is destroyed not only if it happens to be concurrently invested with two contradictory properties, it is destroyed even if the contradictories characterize the thing (at different times)."

26. ———. 1985. "Apoha and the Nominalist/Conceptualist Controversy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:383-398.

27. Herzberger, Hans G. 1975. "Double Negation in Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:3-16.

    "The Apoha doctrine of Dignaga and his followers, presents a fascinating logical puzzle. While rejecting the classical law of double negation, it nevertheless requires a partial semantic equivalence between expression and their double negations. None of the principal nonstandard concepts of negation (classical, intuitionistic, three-valued) can do justice to this complex position. this paper undertakes a semantic reconstruction of the Apoha doctrine, using methods derived from Emil Post's work on the foundations of many-valued logic, especially the notion of a "two-fold" proposition."

28. Herzberger, Radikha, and Herzberger, Hans G. 1997. "Two Truths, or One?" In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 278-300. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    "Thomas Mann begins his essay on Schopenhauer by telling us that the pleasures of metaphysics are mainly aesthetic. Without sharing that high degree of philosophical detachment, we acknowledge that the present essay was motivated by aesthetic as well as historical concerns. Because it is part of an effort to understand Indian philosophers as particular individuals with distinctive problem situations and doctrines it is properly classified as historical. Because it aims to locate particular doctrines within larger philosophical, visions, it might also be classified as aesthetic. Our essay develop's a long perspective going back to the early origins *of pramâna* theory. Drawing the reader back in time puts us in a better position to trace historical sources for certain important ideas of Dharmakirti and Dinnaga, and to contrast the

treatment of those ideas in their respective philosophical systems."

29. Huntington, C.W.Jr. 1983. "A "Nonreferential" View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work of Tson-Kha-Pa." *Philosophy East and West* no. 33 (4):325-339.

    "Part one of the work briefly describes Wittgenstein's theory of nonreferential meaning, as presented in Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and Buddhism". This theory is then applied to the interpretation of an essay by Tson-kha-pa dealing with the "two truths." Part two is an annotated translation of the Tson-kha-pa piece."

30. Inada, Kennet K. 1988. "The Range of Buddhist Ontology." *Philosophy East and West* no. 38 (3):261-280.

    "The essay aims at the achievement of a proper understanding of Buddhist reality based on the Buddha's original enlightenment. It expands on the three aspects: the locus of reality, its nature and function, and its implication. This reality is a dynamic and open ontology, one that focuses on the momentary nature of ordinary experience. It is a unique ontology which finally affirms the universal nature of the doctrine of emptiness which, in turn, opens up new directions in both ideological and cultural pursuits."

31. Lance, Factor R. 1983. "What Is the "Logic" in Buddhist Logic?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 33 (2):183-188.

    "In opposition to a contemporary interpretation of the influential Buddhist logic text, "Nyayapravesa" (Introduction to logical methods, circa 600 a. D.) which holds that its argument forms are not deductive and hence not comparable to Western notions of logic, I argue that its basic syllogisms are retroductive-deductive pairs. A Nyaya syllogism is virtually identical with the retroductive form expounded by C.S. Peirce and N. Hanson."

32. Lindtner, Christian. 1981. "Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no.

9:161-214.

"This paper presents a survey and an annotated translation (from Tibetan and Sanskrit) of the main Buddhist documents from II-X century a. D. dealing with the 'two truths', or two degrees of reality: a relative and an absolute. The former is the empirical world known to us through the senses and the usage of language. Submitted to sustained critical analysis it proves to be devoid of logical and ontological foundation. Enlightened individuals realizing that there is thus in fact only one truth -- the absolute -- nevertheless avail themselves of the convention of language in order to indicate what cannot be communicated but only 'personally intuited.' Thus the relative truth is pedagogically indispensable."

33. Liu, Ming-wood. 1993. "A Chinese Madhyamaka Theory of Truth: The Case of Chi-Tsang." *Philosophy East and West* no. 43 (4):649-673.

    "Chi-tsang (549-623) was the key figure in the revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth century, and his teaching is commonly acknowledged to be the apex of the development of Madhyamaka thought in China. This essay attempts to examine the conception of truth underlying a number of ideas generally considered as central to Chi-tsang's thought, including "refutation of falsehood", "revelation of truth" and "two truths"."

34. Loy, David. 1984. "How Not to Criticize Nagarjuna: A Response to L. Stafford Betty." *Philosophy East and West* no. 34 (4):437-445.

35. Manchester, Rogers Katherine. 2009. *Tibetan Logic*. Ithaca: Snow Lions Publications.

36. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1970. "Reference and Existence in Nyaya and Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:83-108.

"This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."

37. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Evans, Robert D., eds. 1986. *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

38. McDermott, Charlene Senape A. 1969. *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of Exists*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

39. ———. 1970. "Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:22-29.

"One defense of the central tenets of Buddhist metaphysics by the Eleventh century logician, Ratnakirti, culminates in his development of a system broad enough to accommodate null subject terms -- an achievement proleptic of contemporary free logics. The article is intended as an implicit argument in favor of the utilization of formal logical structures as tools for explication in comparative philosophy."

40. Mortensen, Chris. 2004. "Dharmakirti and Priest on Change." *Philosophy East and West* no. 54 (1):20-28.

Competing accounts of change and motion are given by the seventh-century Buddhist logician Dharmakirti and the contemporary analytical philosopher Graham Priest. They agree on much, but disagree on the issue of the Law of Non-Contradiction. Priest takes Dharmakirti's side, appealing to current space-time theory, while making some qualifications."

41. Nakamura, Hajime. 1958. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 7:375-395.

42. ———. 1987. *Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

First edition: Japan 1980.
Chapter V. *Logicians* pp. 294-311.

43. Ng Yu, Kwan. 1987. "The Arguments of Nagarjuna in the Light of Modern Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:363-384.

44. Payne, Richard K. 1987. "The Theory of Meaning in Buddhist Logicians: The Historical and Intellectual Context of Apoha." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:261-284.

45. Perdue, Daniel E. 1992. *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

46. Potter, Karl H., ed. 1999. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

47. Potter, Karl H., Buswell, Robert Jr., Jaini, Padmanabh S., and Ross, Reat Noble, eds. 1996. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

48. Rajnish, Mishra. 2000. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 337-358. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

49. Robinson, Richard H. 1967. "The Classical Indian Axiomatic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17 (1-4):139-154.

50. Santina, Peter Della. 1987. "The Madhyamaka Philosophy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:173-185.

    "The paper attempts to provide a brief but complete history of the conceptual development of the Madhyamaka system in India from Nagarjuna to Shantarakshita and Kamalashila, including the controversy between the Prasangika and the Svatantrika Schools and the emergence of the synthetic Yogacara-Madhyamaka school. The Madhyamaka system represents the quintessence of the critical attitude in Buddhist philosophy. Nonetheless, in the course of its development, it exhibited logical and idealistic tendencies as well as analytical ones."

51. Sharma, Dhirendra. 1968. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning (*Apoha*) and Negative Statements." *Philosophy East and West* no. 18 (1-2):3-10.

52. Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1974. "Empty Terms: The Nyaya and the Buddhists." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:332-343.

    "The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists' conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of Sunyata, and to answer some of the questions raised by certain contemporary writers on Nyaya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. A comparison between Russell and the Nyaya has been drawn, and some of the questions raised by Quine have been discussed in this context."

53. ———. 1978. "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 6:59-77.

"The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. The Buddhist theory of meaning requires two types of negation for expressing the meaning of an expression. This discussion leads us to an investigation of the different senses of negation used in Indian logic. The first section deals with the different classifications of negation. The second section deals with professor Herzberger's explication of the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to our positive thesis the theory of meaning can be reconstructed in terms of two senses of negation."

54. Siderits, Mark. 1979. "A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 29 (4):491-499.

55. ———. 1980. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (First Part)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:307-336.

"A stock objection to the Madhyamaka project of establishing a null ontology is that any knowledge claim requires the existence of objects of knowledge. Here I describe the Nyaya formulation of this objection. Nagarjuna's response, that the theory of knowledge cannot supply us with metaphysical truths, is examined in detail. Finally, I consider the Nyaya defense of epistemology, concluding that it misses the point of Nagarjuna's objection."

56. ———. 1981. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (Second Part)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:121-160.

57. ———. 1985. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Apoha." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:133-152.

"I show that the Buddhist philosophers Santaraksita and Kamalasila subscribed to the Indian equivalent of the context principle, according to which a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. I then discuss the manner

in which they used the Buddhist exclusion (Apoha) theory of meaning to answer two major objections to that account of word meaning: the "hermeneutic circle" objection, and the objection that this account cannot explain our ability to understand novel sentences."

58. Stcherbatsky, Fedor Ippolitovich. 1930. *Buddhist Logic*. Leningrad: Academy of sciences of the U.S.S.R.

    Two volumes (1930-1932).
    Vol.2 includes "A short treatise of logic (Nyaya-bindu) by Dharmakirti with its commentary (Nyaya-bindu-tika) by Dharmottara translated from the Sanscrit text edited in the Biblioteca Buddhica."
    Reprinted: New York, Dover Publications, 1962; Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1992.

59. Steinkellner, Ernst, ed. 1991. *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakirti Conference, Vienna, June 11-16, 1989*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

60. Tillemans, Tom J.F. 1984. "Two Tibetan Texts on the "Neither One nor Many" Argument for "Sunyata"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 12:357-388.

    "This is my third article in a series on a Buddhist Madhyamaka argument for "voidness", that is the impossibility of entities existing themselves. For the previous two articles, see E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.) "Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy", Vienna 1983, and "Etudes de lettres", 3, University of Lausanne 1982. The present article consists of an annotated translation and a critical edition of sections from two Tibetan texts."

61. ———. 1989. "Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Debate Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 17:265-297.

62. ———. 1999. *Scripture, Logic, Language. Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Contents: Series Editor's Preface: E. Gene Smith; Acknowledgments and notes on the bibliographic sources; Abbreviations; Introduction; Scripturally based argumentation. 1. Dharmakirti, Aryadeva and Dharmapala on scriptural suthority 27; 2. How much of a proof is scripturally based inference? 37; 3. Pre-Dharmakirti Commentators on the definition of a thesis 53; Logic; 4. On Pararthanumana, Theses and syllogisms 69; 5. On Sapaksa 89; 6. Formal and semantic aspects of Tibetan Buddhist debate logic 117; 7. Dharmakirti and Tibetans on Adrsyanupalabdhihetu 151; 8. What is the Svadharmin in Buddhist logic? 171; 9. Is Buddhist logic non-classical or deviant? 187; Philosophy of language; 10. On the so-called difficult point of the Apoha theory 209; 11. What can one reasonably say about nonexistence? (with Donald S. Lopez, Jr.) 247; Bibliography 285; Index 301.

63. Tillemans, Tom J.F., and Lopez, Donald S.Jr. 1998. "What Can One Reasonably Say About Nonexistence? A Tibetan Work on the Problem of Asrayasiddha." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 26:99-129.

64. Tucci, Giuseppe. 1929. "Buddhist Logic before Dinnaga (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-Sastras)." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*:451-488.

65. Waldo, Ives. 1975. "Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 25 (3):281-290.

66. Walser, Joseph. 1998. "On the Formal Arguments of the Akutobhaya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 26:189-232.

"Though the Madhyamika school of Buddhism begins with Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamakakarika, modern scholar's interpretations of this work rely heavily on the commentaries of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and

Candrakirti. These commentaries each reflect the so-called "Svatantrika-vs-Prasangika" debate, which became a Madhyamika preoccupation in later times. There are, however, two earlier commentaries which have been largely ignored. This article will demonstrate that one of these commentaries, theAkutobhaya, gives us a rendering of Nagarjuna's logic that is perhaps closer to Nagarjuna's own milieu than post-Dignaga commentaries, such as those of Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka. In this article, I show the ways that the formal argumentation of the Akutobhaya differs from the post-Dignaga logic and seems to conform more closely to an earlier standard set by the early Nyaya and Samkhya schools of logic. The result of this difference in logical methodology is subtle, but nevertheless has ramifications for Madhyamika doctrine."

67. Watanabe, Fumimaro. 1983. *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikayas and Abhidhamma*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

68. Wayman, Alex. 1999. *A Millennium of Buddhist Logic*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

    "This is volume one of texts (from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources) of the two planned volumes on Buddhist Ligic (the second volume to be on topics and opponents). This first volume is in two parts: Part I (Introductory) has Asanga's rules of debate, Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu with Kamalasila's commentary, and Santi-pa's treatise on 'inner pervasion. Part II, devoted to the Dignaga-Dharmakirti system, has five sets of eleven verses, then a study of Bu-Ston's commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya, and finally Tsong-kha-pa's Mum sel on the seven books of Dharmakirti. The 'Millennium' goes from Asanga to Tsongkha-pa. The texts here included began to be translated in the 1970s, were all in draft renditions in the 1980s, and were brought to their present condition in the 1990s. Doubtless the present volume took longer than originally

anticipated, and hopefully this published result will compensate for the many years of delay."

69. Williams, Paul M. 1980. "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 8:1-45.

    "The word 'Prajnapti' in the Madhyamaka designates the status of an entity which has no existence apart from that postulated to fulfill the requirements of linguistic reference. the 'prajnapti' is the referent of a term with no ultimate referent, and is created by language due to the requirement that all terms have referents in order to be meaningful. 'Samjna' involves the classification of a perceptual given in terms of a verbalized subject-predicate formula. The requirement for a referent of the terms involved is fulfilled through the operation of 'Kalpana', and this constructive operation seen as the creation of a semi-permanent entity is referred to under the aspect of 'Parikalpa'. The paper also treats 'Prapanca' and, briefly, 'Drsti'."

70. ———. 1981. "On the Abhidharma Ontology." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:227-257.

    "The Sarvastivada ontology maintained that all of which could be an intentional object of consciousness and verbally characterized must exist. Existing solely with self-essence was necessary in order to allow for imagination, memory and the atemporal referring of uniquely individuating descriptions. These entities are primary existents and are constructed into the spatio-temporal everyday world. For a primary existent to be spatio-temporally instantiated is the same thing as for it to be effective, and this sort of existence was radically distinguished from existing simply possessed of self-essence. Secondary existence is constructed out of these as the sort of existence required by non-uniquely individuating intentional acts."

STUDIES ON BUDDHIST LOGICIANS

1. Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 1971. "The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:217-261.

2. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1985. "Nagarjuna and the Naiyayikas." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:107-132.

3. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1987. "The *Svabhavahetu* in Dharmakirti's Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 37 (4):392-401.

   "In the case of a "Svabhavahetu" the generalisation is based on identity. Such general statements are true by virtue of meaning, but they are not contentless. This is in disagreement with a currently popular view that statements true by virtue of meaning must be contentless. The threefold classification of such general statements proposed by Dharmakirti has been explained."

4. Dreyfus, George B.J. 1997. *Recognizing Reality. Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

5. Dunne, John D. 2004. *Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

6. Fenner, Peter G. 1983. "Candrakirti's Refutation of Buddhist Idealism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 33 (3):251-261.

   "A philosophical reconstruction of Candrakirti's critique of the Buddhist Vijnanavada as found in the "Madhyamakavatara". The basis of the refutation of idealism is (1) refuting the nonexternality of sense objects, (2) the failure of mental potentials to account for sensory experience and (3) the refutaton of apperception. the relevant verses of the "Madhyamakavatara" are translated in an appendix."

7. Franco, Eli. 1993. "Did Dignaga Accept Four Types of Perception?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 21:295-299.

8. Ganeri, Jonardon. 1990. "Dharmakirti on Inference and Properties." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 18:237-247.

9. Ghose, Ramendra Nath. 1987. "The Modality of Nagarjuna's Dialectics." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:285-309.

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introduction describing the development of the idealistic school of Buddhism, the teachings of Dinnaga are compared with those of Vasubandhu and the points of difference noted. The arguments adduced by Dinnaga in refutation of the realist theory of perception are then compared with those of the Western philosopher, Berkeley. This has lead to the conclusion that Dinnaga presented a theory of immaterialism comparable to that propounded by Berkeley.

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    "Paramartha's philosophical views on language focus on the communicative function of language, particularly the arbitrary nature of word-formation, the intentional nature of reference of language, and the influences of language on our attitudes and behavior. All of these features are discussed. A comparison is made between Paramartha's

skepticism of the purported truth-expressing dimension of language and Frege's position on the truth-expressing dimension of language. while Frege has skillfully distinguished between sense and reference, Paramartha's main concern is with an issue not addressed by Frege, namely the communication process of language. Paramartha also is shown to have made a logical distinction between sense and reference. The important differences and similarities between these two theories of language are illustrated by the author."

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    "The Buddhist Dharmakirti (c. 650) is one of the great minds of classical Indian thought, but his main works, apparently lost, were rediscovered only in the Nineteen-Thirties. Much scholarship has been devoted since the rediscovery to the interpretation of his complex positions and subtle arguments. The principal merit of this paper is that it shows how various dimensions of his philosophy -- the logical, epistemological, ontological, and soteriological, fit together as one comprehensive world view. The precise senses in which Dharmakirti's views may be said to be both "pragmatist" and "idealist" are specified, and his arguments for such main tenets as "momentariness" and the "Apoha" logic of concepts are scrutinized, along with his views on sensation and "causal efficiency" as the criterion of the real."

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"I dispute B. J. Matilal's representation of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a skeptic concerning the possibility of giving an adequate account of the valid means of knowledge. I argue that Nagarjuna is best seen instead as an antirealist who is concerned to undermine the assumptions common to both the realist and the skeptic about knowledge. I reconstruct two arguments of Nagarjuna's, both of which are meant to show that while it is possible to construct a theory of the valid means of knowledge, no such theory can legitimately be used to defend metaphysical realism."

26. Stafford, Betty L. 1983. "Nagarjuna's Masterpiece -- Logical, Mystical, Both, or Neither?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 33:123-138.

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Ancient Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

INTRODUCTION: LOGIC IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM

"It has long been recognized by historians of logic that the medieval Muslim philosophers and philosophical theologians (*Mutakallimún*: rendered variously as rationalist theologians, dialectical theologians, the "scholastics" of Islam) made some interesting contributions to the history of logic. When the Greek logical works were handed to the Muslim scholars in translation in and after the 9th century A.D., they studied them thoroughly and critically and wrote commentaries upon them. Prantl, (1) the 19th-century writer on the history of logic in the West, noted that Arabic literature on logic was one of the main sources for the terminist logic (i.e., the logic of terms) of the medieval Western logicians - a view upheld by 20th century scholars on medieval philosophy. (2) William and Martha Kneale (3) and David Knowles (4) have also noted the origin in Avicenna (Ibn Sina, d. A.D. 1037) of the doctrine of intentio, a doctrine which was of great importance in both Arabic and medieval Western philosophical logic. The *secundae intentiones* constituted the subject matter of logic. (I have shown elsewhere, however, that in Arabic logic itself the doctrine of the "intentions" is traceable to al-Farabi, d. A.D. 950). (5)Bochenski (6) was also aware that "Arabian logicians certainly exercised some influence" on medieval scholastic logic.
However, for a complete knowledge of the contributions to logic made by the Muslim philosophers we have to wait until a great

number of the logical works in Arabic have been edited and studied. But we know so far that modal logic, the branch of logic which deals with the concepts of possibility and necessity, because of its relevance to the problem of determinism and divine foreknowledge, was of great concern to them; that the relationship between logic and grammar interested them; that conditional syllogisms, the problem of universals, the analysis of the concept of existence and predication, the theory of categorical propositions were some of the logical or logico-philosophical questions which the Muslims philosophers treated in interesting ways." (pp. 1-2)

Notes

(1) C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik in Abendlande (Leipzig, 1855), 2: 263 f.
(2) See, e.g., L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum (Assen, 1962), 1: 18-19.
(3) William Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), p. 229.
(4) David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962), p. 197.
(5) Kwame Gyekye, "The Terms 'prima intentio' and 'secunda intentio' in Arabic Logic," Speculum 46 (January 1971).
(6) I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame, 1961), p. 150.

From: Kwame Gyekye, *Arabic Logic. Ibn al-Tayyb's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1979.

Whereas the study of medieval Western logic is now an established field of research, contributing both to modern philosophy of logic and to the intellectual history of the Middle Ages, the study of logic in the precolonial Islamic world is still barely in its infancy. That fact alone makes it difficult to write an introductory chapter on the field:we are as yet unclear what contributions of the logicians writing in Arabic are particularly noteworthy or novel. It is also a dangerous temptation in this

state of relative underdevelopment to cast an eye too readily on the work of the Latin medievalist, and to import the methods, assumptions, and even the historical template that have worked so well in the cognate Western field.

This temptation must be resisted at all costs. There are many important differences between the scholarly ideals and options of the Latin West and the Muslim East; there are, also, many differences between the various fortunes encountered by rigorous logical activity in the two realms over the centuries. A glance at the historiographical preliminaries of Bochenski's *History of Formal Logic* prompts the following observations.(1) First and foremost, Aristotle ceases by the end of the twelfth century to be a significant coordinate for logicians writing in Arabic - that place is filled by Avicenna. The centrality of Avicenna's idiosyncratic system in post-Avicennian logical writings and the absence of Aristotelian logic in a narrowly textual sense meant that Arabic texts dealing with Avicenna's system were left to one side by the medieval Latin translators. Instead, other, less influential texts by Averroes and al-Fârâbi were translated because they did concentrate on Aristotle and spoke to thirteenth-century Western logical concerns. Even at the outset, then, the insignificance of Aristotle's logical system in the Avicennian tradition worked to distort Western appreciation of the relative importance of particular logicians writing in Arabic.

A second difference is that the whole range of Aristotelian logical texts were available in Arabic by about 900, and so the broad periodization of medieval Latin logic into *logica vetus* and *logica nova* is inappropriate as a way of periodizing logic written in Arabic; by the time serious logical work began, the complete Organon was available. Avicenna's work marks the watershed for any helpful periodization. Thirdly, Bochenski's analysis of what preconceptions and historical meanderings clutter the way to the proper study of medieval Western logic (the collapse of acute logical study with the demise of scholasticism, the ahistorical reductivism of post-Kantian logic, the institutionalization of a psychologistic logic in neoscholasticism) do not apply to the study of the logic of medieval Muslim scholars - even in the early twentieth century, it is clear that at least some scholars were still in contact with the acute work of the thirteenth century. There

had been far less of a rupture in logical activity over the intervening centuries. On the other hand, there have been postcolonial efforts to find later Western logical achievements foreshadowed in early Arabic logic, and this has damaged the prospects for appraisal of the work by leading to a disproportionate focus on minor traditions.
Finally, only some of the characteristics Bochenski finds which distinguish medieval Western logic from the logic of late antiquity apply to the logic being written in Arabic at roughly the same time It too is highly formal and metalogical in its treatment, and pedagogically central; but no doctrine like supposition was developed, and there seems to have been far less concern with antinomies. One may say - nervously, given the current state of research - that Arabic logic is somewhat closer to the logic of late antiquity in its concerns and methods than medieval Latin logic. That said, one must guard against an obvious alternative assumption, which is that Arabic logic is by and large just one or other of the systems of late antiquity.9 We already have enough control over Avicenna's logic to know that is false." (pp. 248-249)

Notes

(1) I. M.Bochenski, *A History of Formal Logic*, translated by I. Thomas, Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1961; see esp. "On the History of the History of Logic", pp. 4-10.

From: Tony Street, "Logic", in Peter Adamson, Richard C. Taylor, *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 247-265.

ONTOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM

"The problem of expressing the Greek concept of being in Arabic did not escape classical Islamic writers. But the discussion of this problem as an instance of the general question of the influence of grammar on the formation of philosophical concepts is to be found among some recent writers on Islam, although

unfortunately there is hardly anything approaching a sustained treatment from this perspective.
A few quotations from two recent writers will bring into focus those distinctive features of the Arabic language which are said to be problem-causing, and at the same time they will provide our analysis with a point of departure.
In his useful book Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Soheil Afnan identifies the problem for the Arabic translator of Greek metaphysics in these words: "the translator can easily find himself helpless." (1) This is generalized to all semitic languages, which are said to be "still unable to express the thought adequately." (2) Afnan attributes this to what he calls "the complete absence of the copula." (3) Another writer, the linguist Angus Graham, in a stimulating article, (4) singles out another, but related, feature of Arabic, the sharp separation of the existential and predicative functions, a feature notably lacking in classical Greek. (5) These two features, the absence of the copula and the existential-predicative separation, are supposed to have stood in the way of expressing the Greek concept of being adequately or accurately. And what is meant by this, in the words of Afnan, is the failure to express "the precise concept of being as distinct from existence." (6) Graham puts it this way: "Because of the structure of the language, they [the Arabic translations of Aristotle] transform him at one stroke into a philosopher who talks sometimes about existence, sometimes about quiddity, never about being.(7)" (pp. 29-30)

Notes

(1) *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian*, p. 29.
(2) Ibid., p. 30. It is not clear what the relevance of time is ("still").
(3) Ibid., p. 29.
(4) Angus Graham, " 'Being' in Linguistics and Philosophy," *Foundations of Language* 1 (1965): 223-31.
(5) Ibid., p. 223. (6) Afnan, op. cit., p. 29.
(7) Graham, op. cit., p. 226; italics in the original.

From: Fadlou Shehadi, *Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy*, New York: Caravan Books 1982.

ISLAMIC LOGICIANS

Al Kindi (c. 801 - 873)

Al-Farabi (c. 872 - 950/951)

Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c. 980 - 1037)

Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126 - 1198)

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    "The more passages one examines in the translations from Arabic to Latin and from Arabic to English and other modern languages, the more mistakes one comes across in the translation of the Arabic expression *ala al-qasd al awwal* (or, *'ala al-qasd al thani)*. The mistakes stem from the failure to distinguish between two senses of the

expression, one an adverb, and the other a famous philosophic concept. Failing to distinguish between the two senses, the translators translated the phrase literally, often with unsatisfactory results. In this paper, I shall indicate a Greek word which was rendered by the Arabic ' *la al-qasd al-awwal*. Ishall refer to some English translations from the Arabic and show how wrong they are. I shall suggest that in Arabic philosophy itself al-Farabi, rather than Avicenna, may have been the origin of the philosophic concepts of "first and second intentions." I shall point out that although these concepts may have been introduced into Latin scholasticism by Raymond Lull, he could not have derived theni from the Logic of al-Ghazali, as has been alleged."

40. ———. 1972. "The Term *Istithna* in Arabic Logic." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 27:88-92.

41. ———. 1979. *Arabic Logic. Ibn Al-Tayyb's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

42. Hallaq, Wael B. 1993. *Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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46. ———. 1997. "La Traduction Arabe Des *Premiers Analytiques* D'Aristote." In *Perspectives Arabes Et Médiévales Sur La Tradition Scientifique Et Philosophique Grecque*, edited by Hasnawi, Ahmad, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Aouad, Maroun, 395-407. Leuven: Peeters.

    Actes du colloque de la SIHSPAI (Société internationale d'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie arabes et islamiques) Paris, 31 mars - 3 avril 1993.

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49. Jadaane, Fehmi. 1968. *L'influence Du Stoïcisme Sue La Pensée Musulmane*. Beyrouth: Librairie Orientale.

    Chapitre III. *La logique* pp. 99-135

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    Actes du Colloque International de l'Institut des Traditions Textuelles (Paris et Villejuif, 22-25 septembre 1999)

51. Kennedy-Day, Kiki. 2003. *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy. The Limits of Words*. New York: Routledge Curzon.

52. Leaman, Oliver. 1999. *A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy*. Malden: Blackwell.

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Preface by Simon van den Bergh.
Second edition 1969.

55. ———. 1963. "La Métaphysique En Terre D'islam." *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales (MIDEO)* no. 7:21-34.

56. Margoliouth, David Samuel. 1905. "The Discussion between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa'id Al-Sirafi on the Merits of Logic and Grammar." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*:79-129.

57. Marmura, Michael E., ed. 1984. *Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

58. ———. 1990. "The Fortuna of the "Posterior Analytics" in the Arabic Middle Ages." *Acta Philosophica Fennica* no. 48:85-103.

"The entry of the "Posterior Analytics" (translated to Arabic early in the 10th century) into medieval Islam marked a turning point in the development of Arabic philosophy. Its precepts became part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse as the world came to be perceived through the medium of logical connections, expressed in the language of middle terms. Al-Farabi (d. 950), developed his essentially Platonic political philosophy within the framework of Aristotle's demonstrative ideal. It had immense influence on Avicenna (d. 1037), who expanded on its precepts.
But it was also influenced by its new Islamic cultural environment. Avicenna included among the premises of demonstration, statements of individual historical events known through innumerable corroborative reports, deemed certain by the Islamic theologians; and the theologian

Ghazali (d. 1111), sought to render its canons operative within his non-Aristotelian (occasionalist) world view."

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    "This article is a critical study of a widespread tendency in contemporary scholarship on Near Eastern philosophy to assume tacitly (1) that Near Eastern philosophy is basically Greek philosophy as modified by the Muslim religious tradition, and (2) that philosophizing terminated altogether in
    the Near East after Ibn Rushd (Averroes). salient features of the philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) point on the one hand to the presence of many significant themes in Near Eastern philosophy which stand in direct conflict with the commonly held dogmata of the Islamic religion and on the other
    hand to a departure in Ibn Sina's views from those of representative Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plotinus."

61. ———. 1982. "Greek Sources of Some Islamic Philosophies of Being and Existence." In *Philosophies of Existence*, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 285-336. New York: Fordham University Press.

    Reprinted in: Parviz Morewedge - *Essays in Islamic philosophy, theology, and mysticism* - Oneonta, : Oneonta Philosophy Studies, 1995, pp. 57.138

62. ———, ed. 1992. *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*. New York: State University of New York Press.

63. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1989. "Existence ('Wujud') and Quiddity ('Mahiyyah') in Islamic Philosophy." *International*

Philosophical Quarterly no. 29:409-428.

"This paper deals with the meaning of "wujud" and "mahiyyah" in various schools of Islamic thought. It begins by turning attention to the significance of this subject for Islamic philosophy as well as theology and even certain schools of sufism. It traces the history of the subject from Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina to Suhrawardi, Fakhr al-din Al-Razi and later Islamic philosophers such as Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra. The essay then deals with the basic distinctions made by Ibn Sina between necessity, contingency and impossibility which forms the basis of the ontology of Islamic philosophers."

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65. ———. 2006. *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

66. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, and Aminrazavi, Mehdi, eds. 1999. *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia*. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Volume I.

67. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, and Leaman, Oliver, eds. 1996. *History of Islamic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

68. Perler, Dominik, and Rudolph, Ulrich, eds. 2005. *Logik Und Theologie. Das Organon Im Arabischen Und Im Lateinischen Mittelalter*. Leiden: Brill.

    Proceedings of a Conference held October 3-5, 2002 in the Kartause Ittingen

69. Peters, Francis E. 1968. *Aristotle and the Arabs. The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam*. New York: State of New York University Press.

"The purpose of this book is to provide a reliable introduction to the history of the influence of Aristotelianism on Islamic intellectual life. After the ancient stage of Aristotelianism, the medieval transmission stage exhibits two separate movements: the passage of Aristotle into Western
christianity and the absorption of Aristotelianism by the Oriental world of Islam."

70. ———. 1968. *Aristoteles Arabus. The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*. New York: State of New York University Press.

    "This monograph is an attempt to say all that can be presently said about the fortunes of the individual Aristotelian texts and their exegetical outriders from circa a. D. 1250 when the last of Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle arrived at the university of Paris and this particular chapter in the Aristotelian tradition came to an end."

71. ———. 1979. "The Origins of Islamic Platonism: The School Tradition." In *Islmic Philosophical Theology*, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 14-45. Albany: State University of New York Press.

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73. Rámon Guerrero, Rafael. 2001. "El Lenguaje Del Ser: De Ibn Sina a Mulla Sadra." *Convivium* no. 14:113-127.

74. Raybaud, Natahlie. 2003. "La Philosophie Arabe: Une Philosophie Du Commentaire?" *Philosophie* no. 77:85-110.

75. Rescher, Nicholas. 1962. "Some Arabic Technical Terms of Syllogistic Logic and Their Greek Originals." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 82:202-204.

76. ———. 1963. "Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon." *New Scholasticism* no. 37:44-58.

77. ———. 1964. *The Development of Arabic Logic*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

"The book begins with a chapter on the "first century" of Arabic logic which is understood to be a period of transmission, translation and assimilation of mainly Alexandrian Aristotelianism. The author relates how toward the end of the development of Arabic logic the initial relationship which logic bore to medicine, mathematics and astronomy was replaced by a new kinship with the Islamic "sciences" of theology, law, philology and rhetoric."

78. ———. 1964. *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

"In the ten essays brought together in this volume, the author discusses different aspects and problems related to the intellectual history of Islam and centered around logical and philosophical issues. The guiding line is that Arabic logic is entirely Western and has nothing to do with "oriental philosophy." Six of the essays have appeared in different journals. The first essay, written especially for this volume, gives a brief account of the history of Arabic logic. The other essays deal with particular texts and problems related to the writings of such thinkers as al-Farabi, al-Kindi, Avicenna, Abu 'l-Salt of Denia, Averroes. The book contains extensive bibliographical references, documentary and critical notes."

79. ———. 1967. *Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

80. ———. 1968. *Studies in Arabic Philosophy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

81. ———. 2006. *Studies in the History of Logic*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Table of Contents: Preface; 1. On Aristotle's Apodeictic Syllogisms 1; 2. Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's *Organon* 15; 3. A Ninth-Century Arabic Logician on: Is Existence A Predicate? 29; 4. Avicenna on the Logic of "Conditional" Propositions 33; 5. Avicenna on the Logic of Questions 47; 6. The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic 55; 7. Choice Without Preference: The Problem of "Buridan's Ass" 91; 8. Leibniz's Interpretation of his Logical Calculi 141; 9. Russell and Modal Logic 159; 10. Default Reasoning 173; Index of Names 185-190.

82. Roccaro, Giuseppe. 2008. "Ontologia, Metafisica E Pensiero Islamico. Note Introduttive." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 30:57-74.

    "Although the noun "ontology" did not appear in the Islamic tradition, the problem of the relationship between metaphysics and being qua being as subject-matter is discussed according to the epistemological canons given by Avicenna and in the Islamic philosophy.
    This paper offers an introductory examination of the relationship between ontology and metaphysics in the Islamic thought and takes into account exemplarily the Avicennian and Averroistic interpretations, according to the classical outline of opposition drawn by Duns Scotus.
    The terms of the problem are not fixed by the position of Duns Scotus, rather by the Islamic horizon, and not according to the various many perspectives of the Islamic metaphysics, but according to the rational radicalism of the *falsafa* (philosophy) based on the authority of the Greek *ilahiyyun* (wise men), as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus."

83. Rosenthal, Franz. 1994. *The Classical Heritage in Islam*. New York: Routledge.

    Translated from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein.
    Original edition: *Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam* - Zürich, Artemis, 1965.

84. Sabra, Abdelhamid I. 2006. " *Kalam* Atomism as an Alternative Philosophy to Hellenizing *Falsafa*." In *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebraion of Richard M. Frank*, edited by Montgomery, James E., 199-272. Leuven: Peeters.

85. Shehadi, Fadlou. 1975. "Arabic and the Concept of Being." In *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, edited by Hourani, George Fadlo, 147-157. New York: State of New York University Press.

86. ———. 1982. *Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy*. New York: Caravan Books.

87. Stern, S.M., Hourani, George Fadlo, and Brown, V., eds. 1972. *Isamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer.

    Essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday.

88. Street, Tony. 2000. "Towards a History of Syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher's Studies on Arabic Modal Logic." *Journal of Islamic Studies* no. 11:209-228.

    "This article examines the works of Rescher on Arabic syllogistic, particularly his 1974 paper, 'The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy'. The article focuses in particular on the technical terms used by the logicians Rescher studies, and suggests some alternative translations. It also argues that the historical conclusions Rescher reaches need to be significantly qualified."

89. ———. 2005. "Logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, edited by Peter, Adamson and Taylor, Richard C., 247-265. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

90. ———. 2008. "Rescher on Arabic Logic." In *Rescher Studies: A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of*

Nicholas Rescher, edited by Almeder, Robert, 309-324. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

91. Taha, Abderrahmane. 1979. *Langage Et Philosophie. Essai Sur Le Structure Linguistiques De L'ontologie*. Rabat: Imprimerie de Fédala.

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92. Thillet, Pierre. 1994. "La Formation Du Vocabulaire Philosophique Arabe." In *La Formation Du Vocabulaire Scientifique Et Intellectuel Dans Le Monde Arabe*, edited by Jacquart, Danielle, 39-54. Turnhout: Brepols.

93. Troupeau, Gérard. 1994. "La Terminologie Grammaticale." In *La Formation Du Vocabulaire Scientifique Et Intellectuel Dans Le Monde Arabe*, edited by Jacquart, Danielle, 11-21. Turnhout: Brepols.

94. Versteegh, Cornelis H.M. 1977. *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking*. Leiden: Brill.

95. Versteegh, Kees. 2000. "Grammar and Logic in the Arabic Grammatical Tradition." In *History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present*, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees, 300-306. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

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96. Walbridge, John. 2000. "Logic in the Islamic Intellectual Tradition: The Recent Centuries." *Islamic Studies* no. 39:55-75.

97. ———. 2011. *God and Logic in Islam. The Caliphate of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

98. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1973. "The Terms *Tasawwur* and *Tasdiq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents." In *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion. (Vol. I)*, edited by Twersky, Isadore and Williams, George H., 478-492. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Related pages

Ancient Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

Index of the Section "Bibliographical Study Guides"

Theory and History of Ontology

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L'Ontologia in Italia. Una Guida per gli Studenti di Filosofia

(Pagina in costruzione - sarà aggiornata nei prossimi mesi)

INTRODUZIONE

Negli ultimi anni anche in Italia si è manifestato un interesse crescente per l'ontologia, ma non esiste una pagina web che presenti agli studenti italiani le pubblicazioni disponibili nella nostra lingua ed i Centri di studio dedicati all'argomento; il mio obiettivo è di contribuire a colmare, almeno in parte, questa lacuna; chi desidera approfondire l'argomento con riferimenti agli studi in altre lingue troverà nelle altre pagine del sito informazioni sufficienti, che non saranno ripetute qui.
Negli ultimi anni in Italia sono stati organizzati alcuni importanti convegni sulla storia dell'ontologia:

- a Bolzano la Mitteleuropa Foundation diretta da Liliana Albertazzi e Roberto Poli ha organizzato diversi convegni dal 2002 ad oggi.

- a Torino a cura del Laboratorio di Ontologia diretto da Maurizio Ferraris nel dicembre 2002 (atti pubblicati nella *Rivista di Estetica* n. 1 del 2003).

- a Milano nel maggio 2003 dall'Astufilo - Associazione Studenti di Filosofia dell'Università Statale (atti pubblicati nel volume *La Storia dell'ontologia*, edito da E. Storace, 2005)

- all'Università di Bari nel maggio 2008 si è tenuto l'importante convegno internazionale *Nascita e trasformazioni dell'ontologia: secoli XVI e XX* i cui atti sono stati pubblicati sulla rivista *Quaestio. Annuario di Storia della Metafisica* nel numero 9 del 2010.

Questi ed altri avvenimenti e la pubblicazione di lavori sia di carattere introduttivo che di livello più avanzato, mi sembrano una ragione sufficiente per tentare un panorama delle pubblicazioni disponibili in lingua italiana; considerato il carattere informativo di questa pagina, come del resto di tutto il sito, saranno prese in considerazione opere di diverse tendenze (filosofia analitica, fenomenologia, ecc.): il criterio prevalente per l'inserimento nella pagina sarà la qualità dei lavori e per i testi più importanti saranno riportati gli indici e dei brevi estratti.
Particolare attenzione sarà riservata ai lavori disponibili in italiano sui maggiori ontologi dell'Ottocento e del Novecento, a cui sono dedicate alcune pagine monografiche.
Critiche, suggerimenti e segnalazioni di eventuali errori sono particolarmente gradite; il sito è aperto alla collaborazione di tutte le persone interessate all'argomento che abbiano un contributo originale da dare.

LIBRI RECENTI SULL'ONTOLOGIA: TESTI INTRODUTTIVI

1. Bonino, Guido. 2008. *Universali / Particolari*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

2. Bottani, Andrea, and Davies, Richard, eds. 2006. *L' Ontologia Della Proprietà Intellettuale. Aspetti E Problemi*. Milano: Franco Angeli.

3. AA. VV. (a cura di). 2007. *Ontologie Regionali*. Milano: Mimesis.

4. Caputo, Stefano. 2006. *Fattori Di Verità* . Milano: AlboVersorio.

5. Carrara, Massimiliano, and Giaretta, Pierdaniele, eds. 2004. *Filosofia E Logica*. Cosenza: Rubbettino.

6. De Luca, Paolo, ed. 2008. *Ontologia Sociale. Potere Deontico E Regole Costitutive*. Macerata: Quodlibet.

7. De Monticelli, Roberta, and Conni, Paolo. 2008. *Ontologia Del Nuovo. La Rivoluzione Fenomenologica E La Ricerca Oggi*. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.

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   Indice: Introduzione 3; 1. Dalla metafisica alla ontologia 9; 2. Dalla ontologia all'epistemologia 21; 3. Apriori concettuale 31; 4. Apriori materiale 41; 5. Prescrivere e descrivere; 6. Il ritorno della ontologia 55; Riferimenti bibliografici 61; ANTOLOGIA. 67-159; Glossario 161-166. "È nel 1613 (*) che si trovano le prime attestazioni del termine 'ontologia', nelle opere di due autori di enciclopedie filosofiche che operano indipendentemente l'uno dall'altro: Rudolph Göckel (o Rodolphus Goclenius, nella latinizzazione da lui stesso proposta; Corbach 1547-Marburgo 1628, Antologia, 5), che ne tratta di sfuggita nel *Lessico filosofico* e Jacob Lorhard - su cui non ho trovato ragguagli -, nel *Teatro filosofico,* e che credo codifichino - in qualità di lessicografi - un uso ormai invalso. Non è secondario che questo battesimo abbia luogo nell'epoca in cui si scatena la rivoluzione scientifica: i metafisici si concepivano come dei commentatori di Aristotele, gli ontologi ritengono - a torto o a ragione - di rompere con la tradizione aristotelica e scolastica, alla luce dello sforzo di risistemazione metodica delle conoscenze che caratterizza un periodo in cui assistiamo o alla radicale riforma di saperi tradizionali, come la logica, la fisica e la matematica, o

all'invenzione di saperi nuovi, come la semiotica, l'estetica e, per l'appunto, l'ontologia." p. 14-15
"Le possibilità applicative che si aprono per l'ontologia riflettono le due anime, descrittiva e prescrittiva, che hanno attraversato la nostra storia, specie nel suo tratto terminale. Nell'approccio prescrittivo, l'opzione di fondo è quella per cui l'ontologia costituisce un elemento di un processo unificato sotto il profilo epistemologico. L'ontologia, qui, sarebbe una scienza assimilabile alla chimica o alla fisica, sottoposta a revisioni e a progressi determinati da scoperte empiriche. Se questo è il suo assetto metodologico, quanto alle finalità l'obiettivo è la costituzione di un linguaggio ontologico universale, che valga per ogni livello di realtà, dal fisico al sociale. Nell'approccio descrittivo, invece, l'ontologia applicata si configura come una riattivazione delle problematiche delle scienze dello spirito ma con un più marcato impianto oggettivistico.
La prima opzione è prevalente nei problemi su cui portano l'attenzione, nei brani antologizzati, Nicola Guarino (Messina 1954, Antologia, 27) e Barry Smith (Antologia, 28). Qui il problema è *classificare,* e l'idea di fondo è dimostrare l'applicabilità dei metodi e delle teorie ontologiche all'informatica, movendo dall'ipotesi di lavoro che l'ontologia tradizionale abbia tutti gli strumenti per risolvere una della difficoltà principali con cui l'informatica ha dovuto confrontarsi in questi anni, cioè la ricerca di una lingua franca che semplifichi la condivisione delle conoscenze e la loro comunicabilità, ossia che permetta l'integrazione sistematica dei database. Tuttavia, anche una buona classificazione e chiarificazione di oggetti ed eventi sociali costituisce un indispensabile campo di indagine, più vicino agli interessi di una metafisica descrittiva e di una fisica ingenua. Qui il problema *è esplicitare* l'ontologia soggiacente a entità e relazioni invisibili e immateriali (diritti, pretese, obblighi, *status)* che risultano tuttavia, come scriveva un allievo di Husserl, Adolf Reinach (Mainz 1883-Dixmuiden, Belgio 1917), solide 'come alberi e case', tali dunque da limitare e indirizzare il nostro rapporto con il mondo, che non apparirà più - come volevano i teorici delle

scienze dello spirito - una pura creazione storica, pur rivelando una complessità bene attestata nel brano di John Searle (Denver 1932, Antologia, 29) con cui si chiude il nostro compendio." pp. 58-59.
Nota di Raul Corazzon: in realtà il termine "ontologia" compare per la prima volta nel 1606, nel sottotitolo di un libro di Jacob Lorhard (fl. 1597) Rettore dell'Università di S. Gallo in Svizzera, "Ogdoas Scholastica", ignorato finora dagli studiosi e da me scoperto il 16 maggio 2003.

10. Gnoli, Claudio, and Scognamiglio, Carlo. 2008. *Ontologie E Organizzazione Della Conoscenza*. Lecce: Pensa MultiMedia.

    "Questo libro si propone come introduzione critica all'ontologia per la *knowledge organization,* in primo luogo per rispondere a un'esigenza editoriale, non essendo attualmente presenti nel panorama librario strumenti analoghi in lingua italiana. Secondariamente, per lo stile prospettico che lo caratterizza, il testo vuole accompagnare il proprio profilo introduttivo con una proposta di lavoro interdisciplinare e metterne in evidenza le potenzialità .
    A partire da un'indagine sopra il rapporto tra la nozione filosofica di ontologia e le sue varianti "applicative" in ambito informatico e di organizzazione delle conoscenze, il volume presenta sistematicamente i modelli teorici e applicativi dell'indicizzazione semantica, illustrandone i limiti e le parzialità . Quale prospettiva di cambiamento e di riorganizzazione del paradigma scientifico, i due autori insistono sull'importanza dell'approccio ontologico nella risoluzione dei problemi di interoperabilità tra basi di dati e sistemi informativi. Il meta- modello dei livelli di realtà, rielaborato a partire dall'ontologia di Nicolai Hartmann e mediato da teorie più recenti, può costituire l'architettura di un sistema di organizzazione della conoscenza capace di presentare I'interconnessione di tutti gli aspetti della realtà e al contempo la loro irriducibile diversità ."

11. Marsonet, Michele. 1990. *La Metafisica Negata. Logica, Ontologia, Filosofia Analitica*. Milano: Franco Angeli.

12. Runggaldier, Edmund, and Kanzian, CHristian. 2002. *Problemi Fondamentali Dell'ontologia Analitica*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

    A cura di Sergio Galvan

13. Spolaore, Giuseppe, and Giaretta, Pierdaniele. 2008. *Esistenza E Identità . Temi Di Logica Filosofica*. Milano: Mimesis.

14. Toccafondi, Fiorenza. 2000. *L'essere E I Suoi Significati*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

15. Valore, Paolo. 2008. *L' Inventario Del Mondo. Guida Allo Studio Dell'ontologia*. Torino: UTET.

16. Varzi, Achille. 2001. *Parole, Oggetti, Eventi E Altri Argomenti Di Metafisica*. Roma: Carocci Editore.

17. AA. VV. (a cura di). 2005. *Ontologia*. Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza.

    Indice: Ringraziamenti V; Introduzione 3; 1. Che cos'è l'ontologia 7; 2. Come si fa ontologia 32; 3. Temi dir ricerca 51; Cos'altro leggere 139; Riferimenti bibliografici 145; L'autore 175.
    "In quanto segue cercheremo di illustrare un po' meglio le ramificazioni di questo genere di considerazioni, intorno alle quali verte gran parte della discussione filosofica attualmente dedicata all'ontologia. In particolare, nella prima parte (capitoli 1 e 2) ci concentreremo su due ordini di questioni, e cioè (a) se l'ontologia si riduca davvero alla domanda «Che cosa esiste?», e (b) quali siano gli strumenti di cui ci si può servire per affrontare questa domanda (ed eventualmente altre che rientrano nel campo d'indagine dell'ontologia). Tanto (a) quanto (b) sono principalmente questioni di carattere metafilosofico, e fanno tutt'uno con il

problema di demarcare il campo d'interesse dell'ontologia rispetto a quello della metafisica in senso lato. Nella seconda parte del testo (capitolo 3) cercheremo invece di fornire un quadro dei quesiti concreti di cui si occupano gli ontologi nel momento in cui procedono con l'esercizio effettivo della loro professione, quali che siano la visione di fondo e le metodologie a cui fanno riferimento. Sarà un quadro molto approssimativo, ma consentirà di identificare almeno alcune delle linee di ricerca attualmente più seguite. Del resto questo sarà anche il nostro limite: tanto nell'ultima parte quanto nei capitoli che la precedono ci limiteremo appunto al panorama attuale. La storia dell'ontologia meriterebbe un trattamento a parte e qui non verrà considerata se non in maniera tangenziale." pp. 4-5.

18. AA. VV. (a cura di). 2007. *Metafisica. Classici Contemporanei*. Bari: Laterza.

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   Indice: Presentazione 7; Franca D'Agostini: Autoriferimento e paradossi: una introduzione 9; Alberto cevolini: Analogia fisica, logica delle operazioni noetiche e autoreferenzialità: contributo al realismo riflessivo 75; Joseph M. Bochenski: Sulla analogia 131; Gianfranco Basti: Analogia, ontologia formale e problema dei fondamenti 159; Alberto Strumia: L'analogia e le scienze 237; Claudio A. Testi: Analogia, logica formale e paradossi 267; Sergio Parenti: L'analogia dei nomi: dai paradossi al linguaggio teologico 333; Bibliografia generale 365; Notizia sugli autori 389-392. Dalla Presentazione: "Che l'autoreferenzialità sia una caratteristica discriminante della modernità, è oggi una affermazione quasi scontata. Ma chi la sostiene dovrebbe essere in grado di rispondere ad almeno due questioni preliminari: a che cosa si sostituisce, da che cosa è preceduta l'autoreferenzialità? E in secondo luogo: è davvero certo che l'autoreferenzialità sia una "scoperta" della modernità? Alla prima questione si può rispondere in modo inequivocabile: il mutamento di paradigma che sancisce l'inizio dell'epoca moderna concerne il passaggio dal primato della analogia al primato della autoreferenza.

L'analogia rappresenta l'orizzonte speculativo all'interno del quale si muove per lo più la filosofia classica e medievale. In essa trova posto una concezione stratificata del reale il cui fondamento metafisico risiede nella dottrina della partecipazione. Solo quando questa concezione stratificata (dal particolare all'universale, dalla specie al genere e così via) viene messa in discussione, si può cominciare a parlare di modernità. D'altra parte è altrettanto legittimo dubitare della ricostruzione storica che attribuisce alla modernità il primato dell'autoreferenzialità. Nelle argomentazioni logiche e gnoseologiche sia classiche che medievali l'operazione autoreferenziale è già conosciuta e affrontata in modo rigoroso, sia nei suoi risvolti positivi (l'autocoscienza ad esempio), sia nei suoi risvolti negativi (i paradossi). Resta allora da capire in che cosa consista davvero la cesura che separa le strutture teoriche ed epistemologiche moderne da quelle premoderne e in quale misura la modernità sia del tutto scevra da problematiche di tipo analogico.
Colmando una lacuna notevole della cultura filosofica e scientifica contemporanea, questo libro si propone come primo passo verso una comprensione dei complessi e articolati rapporti che sussistono fra analogia e autoreferenza. Gli studi qui raccolti prediligono un livello di argomentazione teoretico piuttosto che storico-ricostruttivo, come mostrano del resto le nuove formalizzazioni della analogia presentate nei
saggi di Basti, Testi e Strumia, le quali si affiancano alla "classica" formalizzazione di Bochenski, qui per la prima volta tradotta in italiano. I contributi di Cevolini, Parenti e D'Agostini mirano d'altra parte a chiarire il nesso che lega fra loro autoreferenzialità, analogia e paradossalità, discutendo di volta in volta sia la possibilità di paradossi non autoreferenziali (D'Agostini), sia la possibilità di concepire l'analogia fisica come presupposto dell'autoreferenzialità moderna (Cevolini), sia infine la possibilità di usare l'analogia come strumento di soluzione dei paradossi linguistici (Parenti)."

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15. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1972. *Introduzione All'ontologia Critica*. Napoli: Guida.

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    Indice: Prefazione di Toni Negri 5; Introduzione. Gilles Deleuze. L'anomalia materialista. 7; I. *Dýnamis tôn pánton* 13; II. Ontologia positiva: *Sein ist Zeit* 33; III. Materia-tempo 63; IV. Della potenza d'essere. "Gioia eterna del divenire" 87; Conclusioni. Del pensare e del creare. In nome di un "popolo a venire" 123-127.
    "Un'«ontologia materialista» è il titolo di questo lavoro su Deleuze di Francesco Lesce. Un discorso singolarmente maturo che riesce infatti a percorrere, ad un tempo, l'itinerario filosofico di Gilles Deleuze e a costituirlo in una articolata ontologia materialista per il presente. Il confronto che Gilles Deleuze sviluppa con le filosofie del `900 è qui

ricostruito in maniera piena. Con qualche passaggio che senz'altro arricchisce le letture che di Deleuze si sono fatte. C'è in Deleuze una capacità di definizione e scavo dell'immanenza assoluta che strappa la fenomenologia del moderno alla caratterizzazione che ne avevano dato Heidegger e la fenomenologia. Successivamente, l'analisi della temporalità si confronta qui con lo «slancio vitale» di Bergson, anche in questo caso strappando il contesto ontologico ad ogni precostituzione ed ad ogni teleologia dell'essere. Il bergsonismo costituisce uno degli strati dell'indagine deleuziana, in nessun caso la soluzione del problema ontologico. In positivo: prima Hume, poi Spinoza, permettono a Deleuze la definizione della potenza d'essere; quanto la demistificazione empirista degli universali e dei processi di causazione sia importante e come questa si impianti sui presupposti dell'immanentismo moderno, Lesce comincia a mostrarlo con estrema chiarezza. Del legame Spinoza-Deleuze sappiamo ormai tutto, ma del processo costitutivo humiano, da Deleuze così profondamente letto, in realtà nella letteratura deleuziana si dice poco. Si preferiscono riferimenti generici a qualche corrente pragmatista o letteraria americana piuttosto che l'insistenza sulla critica humiana (Hume come alternativa di Kant). E a partire da questo inquadramento generale che - secondo Lesce - la dimensione della *praxis* diventa fondamentale in Deleuze e rappresenta la soluzione del suo pensiero. Una soluzione positiva, una politica che si fa immediatamente ontologia, che assume la critica e la dissoluzione del positivo come apertura all'avvenire, come avventura etica." p. 5.

17. Orilia, Francesco. 2002. *Ulisse, Il Quadrato Rotondo E L'attuale Re Di Francia*. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.

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"L'autore che con più attenzione ha cercato di delimitare il concetto di ontologia formale è stato Husserl. Dalla prima formulazione delle Ricerche logiche, alle analisi presenti nella successiva e variamente stratificata produzione teoretica husserliana, il concetto di ontologia formale, pur presentando raffinamenti e articolazioni, rimane sostanzialmente immutato nei suoi tratti fondamentali. Il fatto è degno di nota perché indica che la retrocessione genetica al fondamento costitutivo dell'esperienza esula dall'ambito pertinente alle questioni di ontologia formale. Le motivazioni che supportano questa osservazione rinviano al fatto che l'ontologia formale tratta l'oggetto come qualcosa che è già stato costituito e che in un qualche modo è dato, mentre non si cura del processo di costituzione dell'oggetto né dei suoi modi di datità soggettiva. Questo solo fatto è sufficiente a spiegare la ragione per cui si è finiti con il parlare di ontologia formale in due distinti sensi. Una accezione perfettamente congruente al main stream della filosofia contemporanea è quella che possiamo definire analitica: l'ontologia formale è quella sezione dell'ontologia che si ricomprende dal punto di vista della logica formale. Il principale esponente di tale posizione è certamente Nino Cocchiarella. A partire dal riconoscimento che ogni particolare scienza riguarda il suo specifico «modo di essere», egli afferma che «la metafisica..., o ciò che possiamo chiamare ontologia formale, riguarda lo studio e lo sviluppo di differenti formalizzazioni che concernono il sistematico coordinamento di tutti i 'modi' o categorie dell'essere sotto le più generali leggi. Usualmente... ogni 'modo di essere' all'interno di una particolare ontologia formale è rappresentato da un tipo di variabile vincolabile, il cui ruolo sintattico dovrebbe riflettere... il ruolo ontologico di tale "modo di essere"». In tale accezione l'ontologia formale studia in particolare le caratteristiche logiche della predicazione e delle varie teorie degli universali. L'altra accezione, che chiameremo fenomenologica, trova come detto i propri riferimenti primari nei lavori di Husserl, in particolare nelle Ricerche logiche, nelle Idee, in Logica formale e trascendentale e in Esperienza e giudizio. In

prima istanza, di essa possiamo dire che è interessata in particolare ai problemi delle parti e dell'intero e della dipendenza. Nonostante le loro differenze, le due forme di ontologia formale presentano, per molti aspetti, rilevanti sovrapposizioni. In ogni caso a tutt'oggi manca sia uno studio sistematico delle categorie e degli strati che compongono la ontologia formale sia una analisi sistematica dei temi affrontabili da una ontologia formale. Una delle ragioni che può contribuire a spiegare tale mancanza risiede nel fatto che la distinzione fra le due accezioni di ontologia formale, per quanto apparentemente semplice e non problematica, nasconde in effetti sia le ragioni della loro sostanziale unità sia i reali motivi della loro effettiva differenza teoretica." pp. 51-52 (note omesse).

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Users have the right, at any time, to know whether their Personal Data has been stored and can consult the Data Controller to learn about their contents and origin, to verify their accuracy or to ask for them to be supplemented, cancelled, updated or corrected, or for their transformation into anonymous format or to block any data held in violation of the law, as well as to oppose their treatment for any and all legitimate reasons. Requests should be sent to the Data Controller at the contact information set out above.

Changes to this privacy policy

The Data Controller reserves the right to make changes to this privacy policy at any time by giving notice to its Users on this page. It is strongly recommended to check this page often, referring to the date of the last modification listed at the bottom. If a User objects to any of the changes to the Policy, the User must cease using this Application and can request that the Data Controller removes the Personal Data. Unless stated otherwise, the then-current privacy policy applies to all Personal Data the Data Controller has about Users.

Information about this privacy policy

The Data Controller is responsible for this privacy policy.

Definitions and legal references

Personal Data (or Data)

Any information regarding a natural person, a legal person, an institution or an association, which is, or can be, identified, even indirectly, by reference to any other information, including a personal identification number.

Usage Data

Information collected automatically from this Application (or third party services employed in this Application), which can include: the IP addresses or domain names of the computers utilized by the Users who use this Application, the URI addresses (Uniform Resource Identifier), the time of the request, the method utilized to submit the request to the server, the size of the file received in response, the numerical code indicating the status of the server's answer (successful outcome, error, etc.), the country of origin, the features of the browser and the operating system utilized by the User, the various time details per visit (e.g., the time spent on each page within the Application) and the details about the path followed within the Application with special reference to the sequence of pages visited, and other parameters about the device operating system and/or the User's IT environment.

User

The individual using this Application, which must coincide with or be authorized by the Data Subject, to whom the Personal Data refer.

Data Subject

The legal or natural person to whom the Personal Data refers.

Data Processor (or Data Supervisor)

The natural person, legal person, public administration or any other body, association or organization authorized by the Data Controller to process the Personal Data in compliance with this

privacy policy. Data Controller (or Owner) the natural person, legal person, public administration or any other body, association or organization with the right, also jointly with another Data Controller, to make decisions regarding the purposes, and the methods of processing of Personal Data and the means used, including the security measures concerning the operation and use of this Application. The Data Controller, unless otherwise specified, is the Owner of this Application.

This Application

The hardware or software tool by which the Personal Data of the User is collected.

Cookie

Small piece of data stored in the User's device.

SUMMARY

These are the three cookies used by this website June 7, 2015 (date in brackets to expire):

_ga Google Analytics tracking cookie (6/6/2017)
_gat Google Analytics tracking cookie (7/6/2015)
_cfduid CloudFlare cookie (6/6/2016)

For more information about Google Analytics see:

Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites.

About Cloudflare:

“The __cfduid cookie is used to override any security restrictions based on the IP address the visitor is coming from. For example, if the visitor is in a coffee shop where there are a bunch of infected machines, but the visitor's machine is known trusted, then the cookie can override the security setting. It does not correspond to any userid in the web application, nor does the cookie store any personally identifiable information.” Note: This cookie is strictly necessary for site security operations and can't be turned off.“ From Cloudflare Support.

Third-party domains:

None.

Data Controller and Owner

Raul Corazzon
Via Panfilo Castaldi, 18
20124 Milano

e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Legal information

Notice to European Users: this privacy statement has been prepared in fulfillment of the obligations under Art. 10 of EC Directive n. 95/46/EC, and under the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/136/EC, on the subject of Cookies. This privacy policy relates solely to this Application.

Last update: May 24th, 2018.

Theory and History of Ontology

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Informativa sulla Privacy

Norme sulla Privacy e Siti Web

Nel maggio 2011 il Parlamento Europeo ha emanato una nuova legge sulla privacy, la EU Cookie Law (legge europea sui cookies - testo in formato PDF) che obbliga i siti internet a richiedere il permesso degli utenti ad utilizzare i cookie relativi ai servizi offerti. La parte più rilevante per l'utilizzzo dei cookie si trova nell' art. 5, p. 20 di 26:

«3. Gli Stati membri assicurano che l'archiviazione di informazioni oppure l'accesso a informazioni già archiviate nell'apparecchiatura terminale di un abbonato o di un utente sia consentito unicamente a condizione che l'abbonato o l'utente in questione abbia espresso preliminarmente il proprio consenso, dopo essere stato informato in modo chiaro e completo, a norma della direttiva 95/46/CE, tra l'altro sugli scopi del trattamento. Ciò non vieta l'eventuale archiviazione tecnica o l'accesso al solo fine di effettuare la trasmissione di una comunicazione su una rete di comunicazione elettronica, o nella misura strettamente necessaria al fornitore di un servizio della società dell'informazione esplicitamente richiesto dall'abbonato o dall'utente a erogare tale servizio.»

Questa normativa è entrata in vigore in Italia il 3 giugno 2015.

Informativa sui Cookie

Che cos'è un cookie e a cosa serve? Un cookie è un file di dimensioni ridotte che un sito invia al browser e salva sul

computer dell’utente che visita un sito Internet. I cookie vengono utilizzati per far funzionare il sito o per migliorarne le prestazioni, ma anche per fornire informazioni ai proprietari del sito.
Con la nota "Individuazione delle modalità semplificate per l'informativa e l'acquisizione del consenso per l'uso dei cookie" dell'8 maggio 2014 [doc web n. 3118884] il Garante della Privacy ha stabilito quanto segue:

(Le parti più rilevanti per l'uso di questo sito sono evidenziate in grassetto).

"Al riguardo, e ai fini del presente provvedimento, si individuano pertanto due macro-categorie: cookie "tecnici" e cookie "di profilazione".

a. Cookie tecnici.

I cookie tecnici sono quelli utilizzati al solo fine di "effettuare la trasmissione di una comunicazione su una rete di comunicazione elettronica, o nella misura strettamente necessaria al fornitore di un servizio della società dell'informazione esplicitamente richiesto dall'abbonato o dall'utente a erogare tale servizio" (cfr. art. 122, comma 1, del Codice).
Essi non vengono utilizzati per scopi ulteriori e sono normalmente installati direttamente dal titolare o gestore del sito web. Possono essere suddivisi in cookie di navigazione o di sessione, che garantiscono la normale navigazione e fruizione del sito web (permettendo, ad esempio, di realizzare un acquisto o autenticarsi per accedere ad aree riservate); cookie analytics, assimilati ai cookie tecnici laddove utilizzati direttamente dal gestore del sito per raccogliere informazioni, in forma aggregata, sul numero degli utenti e su come questi visitano il sito stesso; cookie di funzionalità, che permettono all'utente la navigazione in funzione di una serie di criteri selezionati (ad esempio, la lingua, i prodotti selezionati per l'acquisto) al fine di migliorare il servizio reso allo stesso.

Per l'installazione di tali cookie non è richiesto il preventivo consenso degli utenti, mentre resta fermo l'obbligo di dare l'informativa ai sensi dell'art. 13 del Codice, che il gestore del sito,

qualora utilizzi soltanto tali dispositivi, potrà fornire con le modalità che ritiene più idonee.

b. Cookie di profilazione.

I cookie di profilazione sono volti a creare profili relativi all'utente e vengono utilizzati al fine di inviare messaggi pubblicitari in linea con le preferenze manifestate dallo stesso nell'ambito della navigazione in rete. In ragione della particolare invasività che tali dispositivi possono avere nell'ambito della sfera privata degli utenti, la normativa europea e italiana prevede che l'utente debba essere adeguatamente informato sull'uso degli stessi ed esprimere così il proprio valido consenso.
Ad essi si riferisce l'art. 122 del Codice laddove prevede che "l'archiviazione delle informazioni nell'apparecchio terminale di un contraente o di un utente o l'accesso a informazioni già archiviate sono consentiti unicamente a condizione che il contraente o l'utente abbia espresso il proprio consenso dopo essere stato informato con le modalità semplificate di cui all'articolo 13, comma 3" (art. 122, comma 1, del Codice)."

Con la nota del 5 giugno 2015 Chiarimenti in merito all'attuazione della normativa in materia di cookie Il Garante della Privacy ha precisato quanto segue:

• I siti che non utilizzano cookie non sono soggetti ad alcun obbligo.
• Per l'utilizzo di cookie tecnici è richiesta la sola informativa (ad esempio nella privacy policy del sito). Non è necessario realizzare specifici banner.
• I cookie analitici sono assimilati a quelli tecnici solo quando realizzati e utilizzati direttamente dal sito prima parte per migliorarne la fruibilità.

• Se i cookie analitici sono messi a disposizione da terze parti i titolari non sono soggetti ad obblighi (notificazione al Garante in primis) qualora:

A) siano adottati strumenti che riducono il potere identificativo dei cookie (ad esempio tramite il mascheramento di porzioni

significative dell'IP);

B) la terza parte si impegna a non incrociare le informazioni contenute nei cookie con altre di cui già dispone.
• Se sul sito ci sono link a siti terze parti (es. banner pubblicitari; collegamenti a social network) che non richiedono l'installazione di cookie di profilazione non c'è bisogno di informativa e consenso.
• Nell'informativa estesa il consenso all'uso di cookie di profilazione potrà essere richiesto per categorie (es. viaggi, sport).
• È possibile effettuare una sola notificazione per tutti i diversi siti web che vengono gestiti nell'ambito dello stesso dominio.
• Gli obblighi si applicano a tutti i siti che installano cookie sui terminali degli utenti, a prescindere dalla presenza di una sede in Italia."

Che tipo di cookie utilizza questo sito e a quale scopo?

Cookie Tecnici.

Si tratta di cookie utilizzati da Cloudflare per migliorare la velocità di caricamento delle pagine. I Cookie Tecnici non necessitano di consenso.

Cookie Analitici.

Questi cookie sono utilizzati da Google Analytics per elaborare analisi statistiche sulle modalità di navigazione degli utenti sul sito, sul numero di pagine visitate o il numero di click effettuati su una pagina durante la navigazione.

Su questo sito l'indirizzo IP del visitatore è anonimizzato:

"Quando un cliente di Google Analytics richiede l'anonimizzazione dell'indirizzo IP, Google Analytics anonimizza l'indirizzo non appena ciò è tecnicamente possibile nel passaggio più a monte della rete in cui avviene la raccolta dei dati. La funzione di anonimizzazione IP in Google Analytics imposta l'ultimo ottetto di indirizzi IP dell'utente IPv4 e gli ultimi 80 bit degli indirizzi IPv6 su zero in memoria subito dopo l'invio alla

rete di raccolta di Google Analytics. In questo caso l'indirizzo IP completo non è mai scritto su disco."
Per maggiori dettagli consultare: Anonimizzazione IP in Google Analytics
Per disabilitare i cookie analitici e per impedire a Google Analytics di raccogliere dati sulla navigazione, è possibile installare il Componente aggiuntivo del browser per la Disattivazione di Google Analytics.

Che tipo di cookie NON utilizza il sito?

Cookie di profilazione.

Sono i cookie utilizzati per tracciare la navigazione dell'utente in rete e creare profili sui suoi gusti, abitudini, scelte, ecc. Con questi cookie possono essere trasmessi al terminale dell'utente messaggi pubblicitari in linea con le preferenze già manifestate dallo stesso utente nella navigazione online. Se si utilizzano cookie di profilazione è obbligatorio richiedere preventivamente il consenso dell'utente.

Come è possibile disabilitare i cookie?

La maggior parte dei browser (Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox, Safari etc.) sono configurati per accettare i cookie, che possono essere disabilitati utilizzando le impostazioni del browser; per le istruzioni consultare, ad esempio, Cinque principali accorgimenti.

SOMMARIO

Su questo sito non è richiesto l'utilizzo del banner con la richiesta del consenso da parte dell'utente perchè i cookie utilizzati sono solo quelli tecnici (nel caso di Cloudflare) e quelli analitici in forma anonimizzata (nel caso di Google Analytics), da considerare quindi equiparati a quelli tecnici.
A titolo di esempio: questi sono i tre cookie utilizzati il 7 giugno 2015 (la data tra parentesi è quella di scadenza):

_ga Google Analytics tracking cookie (6 giugno 2017)
_gat Google Analytics tracking cookie (7 giugno 2015)
_cfduid CloudFlare cookie (6 giugno 2016)

Per maggiori informazioni su Google Analytics consultare:

Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites

Riguardo al cookie di Cloudflare:

“The __cfduid cookie is used to override any security restrictions based on the IP address the visitor is coming from. For example, if the visitor is in a coffee shop where there are a bunch of infected machines, but the visitor's machine is known trusted, then the cookie can override the security setting. It does not correspond to any userid in the web application, nor does the cookie store any personally identifiable information.” Note: This cookie is strictly necessary for site security operations and can't be turned off.“

Traduzione: “Il cookie __cfduid consente di ignorare eventuali restrizioni di sicurezza in base all'indirizzo IP da cui proviene il visitatore. Ad esempio, se il visitatore si trova in un Internet Point in cui ci sono molti PC infetti, ma quello usato dal visitatore è attendibile, allora il cookie può ignorare l'impostazione di protezione. Non corrisponde a qualsiasi userid nell'applicazione web, né il cookie memorizza alcuna informazione personale. Nota: Questo cookie è strettamente necessario per le operazioni di sicurezza del sito e non può essere disattivato". Informazioni tratte da Cloudflare Support

Richieste di terze parti:

Due da Google Analytics.

Cookie installati da terze parti:

Nessuno.

Log di sistema e manutenzione

Per necessità legate al funzionamento ed alla manutenzione, questa Applicazione e gli eventuali servizi terzi da essa utilizzati potrebbero raccogliere Log di sistema, ossia file che registrano le interazioni e che possono contenere anche Dati Personali, quali l'indirizzo IP Utente.

Proprietario del sito web e titolare del trattamento dei dati:

Raul Corazzon
Via Panfilo Castaldi, 18
20124 Milano

e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Nota legale

Questa informativa è stata predisposta in conformità agli obblighi dell'Art. 10 della Direttiva n. 95/46/EC della Comunità Europea, ed in base alle disposizioni della Direttiva 2002/58/EC, aggiornata dalla Direttiva 2009/136/EC, riguardo all'uso del Cookies.

Ultimo aggiornamento: 24 maggio 2018.

Theory and History of Ontology

Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

How to read or download the e-book and PDF version

The website **"Theory and History of Ontology"** can be read as an e-book or a searchable PDF file:

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Theory and History of Ontology

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Main Site and Mirror Sites

About This Site

Theory and History of Ontology, created April 13, 2000 at the address *www.formalontology.it*, moved August 13th 2010 to a new address: *www.ontology.co*; a mobile version is available when the screen resolution is less than 480 x 500 pixels.
The site is best viewed with a recent version of one of the following browsers: Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Maxthon, Opera, Safari, UC Browser.
Please note that only Internet Explorer version 11 is supported by Microsoft after January 12, 2016).
There are two sections, currently under development, for Italian and French readers Pages in Language other than English, that will contain bibliographical information and references to works published in these languages.

Note on the Fonts

These fonts are used:

For the text: *Georgia* (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux);

For the terms in Ancient Greek: *Georgia* (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux).
For the transliteration of Arabic terms: *Arial MS Unicode* (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux).
For the logical symbols: *Lucida Sans Unicode* (Windows); Lucida Grande (Apple Mac); Lucida Sans or DejaVu Sans Condensed (Linux);

How to Cite This Website

If you want to cite or link a page of my site please use the main address www.ontology.co because the mirror site will not be indexed by the Search Engines to avoid duplicated content.

Theory and History of Ontology

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